The Washington critic., 1886-07-27
THE VETO POWER.

The President finds the veto power
in the Constitution in mandatory
form. every bill" says the Consti
tuition, "shall be presented to him; If
he approve he "shall sign" 1t; If
not, he "shall return it, with his OBJ
jections. Under this section of the
Constitution Mr.. Cleveland evidently
conceives ii to be his duty to examine
all the bills that are transmitted to the
Executive by Congress. How will he
be able to signify his approval or dis.
approval of measure, unless he knows
what 1t is? The very first question
that naturally suggests itself to the
mind of the Chief Magistrate Is: What
is this power imposed upon me for, If |
am not to use II on my own judgment,
and in what way can use 1t intelli.
gently, without personal scrutiny Of
the legislation that is left with me to
be finally perfected
The fault which TIE CRITIc has to
find with the President, or rather the
criticism which it feels constrained to
make on his policy in regard to the
veto, is that he puts an unnecessarily
literal construction upon the clause of
the Constitution referred to.
1t is certainly a sufficient compliance
with the requirements of that clause,
and has always been so regarded, II he
shall be satisfied from general knowl-
edge of the subject.matter legislated
upon, that the bill before him is meri-
torious The obligation to approve or
disapprove does not imply that he is to
have no confidence In the honesty and
sagacity of Congress except as he veri-
fes it by inquisition, and 1t is absurd to
suppose that the trainers of the Con.
stitution ever contemplated the estab.
llshment Of such antagonistic and un.
worthy relations between the Execu
tive and Legislative departments. The
President is bound, in the natural order
of things, to accept much of the legis-
lation that Is presented for his sigma
ture, on the recommendation of the
Legislators who enacted it.
To assume that every bill Is guilty
until 1t Is proved to be innocent is a
position that no President can afford
to take with due respect to Congress
or his own Office.
There are some measures involving
great questions of public policy in
which Congress might attempt to
thwart the success or defeat the aims
&c l., t,,ts IA 10
would be plain and the exercise Of the
veto power warrantOble. So with meas.
ures of party policy he would be justi-
fed in disappearing purely partisan
legislation intended to bring him into
political disrepute and impair his power
to carry out the principles on which he
was elected or to which he is pledged.
Should he veto the Morrison Surplus
resolution on the ground that it is a
measure which he believes to be ad-
verse TO the financial interests of the
country, 1t would not be considered an
arrogant exercise Of executive privl-
lege, though 1t might be unwise. If
Congress should pass a bill repeating
NiIS lbNb hS NOuiu, nv
doubt, feel like interposing veto for
the reason that such legislation would
be in direct contradiction to his own
views repeatedly declared and the re
peatedly declared views of his party
and of the people His veto would be
in the line Of consistency, and there
fore not to be condemned as an execu-
tive act.
But there are many matters Of com.
paratively minor importance that he
safely may and properly should leave
entirely to the discretion OF Congress,
which is held primarily responsible
for all legislation; and especially such
bills as those for pensions or other pn-
vate relief, where it is impossible that
he should have the same intimate
knowledge Of the various technical
and complicated points involved, as is
possessed by the committees having
them in charge ana under laborious
investigation. We have already seen
that the Presidents judgment is no,
infalllle; therefore 1t should be held
cautiously iu reserve for great occa
eiOuE