Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1886-06-11
Edwin M. stanton's Letter
READ BIT Mr.. KELLEY IN THE House IN HIS
REPLY TO THE AsPERsIoss OF CoNFEDER-
ATE WHEELER UPoS THE CHARACTER OF
Mr. STANTON.

The foIlowing letter was written in cond-
dence to Rev. Hammond Dyer, by Mr.. Stan
ton. and was never made public until read by
Judge Kelley.
WAsHIsGros, May Is, 1862.
Ny DEAR FRIEND: Yours of the 10th j:
welcome as an evidence of the continued re
gard Of one whose esteem | have been anx-
ious to possess have been verv well aware
Of the calumnies busiy circulated against NE
in New York and elsewhere-respecting
my Relations to General Mcclellan, but am
compelled from public considerations to with
hold the proofs that would stamp the false
hood of the accusations and the base motives
of the accusers, who belong to two classes:
First Planderers, who have been driven
from the department when they were g '.ging
millions.
Second, Scheming politicians. whose de-
signs are endangered BY an earnest, resolute
and Incorporating prosecution of this war,
as a war against rebels and traitors
A brief statement of facts on official record,
which can make to you conf1entially, will
be sufficient to satisfy yourself that your con-
fidence in me has not been misplaced. First,
When entered the Cabinet was and had
been for months the sincere and devoted
friend Of General Mcclellan, and to support
nIIu hHU 50 lar us ! might huu ossiSl MN
in bringing the war to a close, was chief
Involvement for me to sacrifice my personal
happiness to a sense of public duty. | had
studied him earnestly with anxious desire
to discover the military and patriotic virtue
that might save the country and if in any de-
gree disappointed had hoped on and waited
! tor time to develop. | wnnt into the Cabinet
about the Goth Of January. On the 9th the
President made his Order No l requiring the
Army Of the Potomac to move. 1t is not
necessary, or perhaps proper to state all the
causes which led to that order, but it is
enough to know that the Government was on
the verge OF bankruptcy, and at the rate of ex-
penjiture the armies must move on OF the
| Government perish. The 22d of February
was the day fixed for the movement, and
when it arrived there was no more sign Of
movement on the Potomac than there had
been for three months before. Many. very
many, earnest conversations had held with
General Mcclellan to impress him with the
absolute Necessity of active operations or
that the Government would fall, because of
foreign Intervention and enormous debt. Be
tween the 22d of February and the 8th of
March the President had again interfered and
A movement on Winchester and to clear the
blockade of the Potomac was promised. com
menced and abandoned. The circumstances
cannot yet 0e revealed
On the Sth of March the President again
interfered. ordered the Army of the Potomac
to be organized into Army Corps and that
operations should commence. Two lines of
operations were open-one moving directly
on the enemy at Manassas and forcing him
back on Richmond, beating and destroying
him by superior force, and all the time keep
ing the Capital secure by lying between it and
the enemy This was the plan favored by
| the President The other plan was to trans
fer the troops BY water to some point on the
lower Chesapeake, and thence advance on
Richmond, This was General McClellan's
plan. The President yielded his own views,
although they were supported by some of the
best military men in the country-and con-
scented that the General should pursue his
own plan. But by written order he imp )sed
the special condition that the army should
not be removed without leaving sufficient
! force in aud around Washington to make the
| Capital perfectly secure against all danger
and that the force required should be deter
mined by the Judgment of all the command
ers of the Army Corps.
In order TO enable General Mcclellan to
devote his whole energy to the movement of
his own army, (Which was quite enough to
tax the ability of the ablest commander in
| the world) he was relieved from the charge
of the other military departments, it being
supposed that the respective commanders
were competent to direct the operations in
! their own departments To enable General
Mcclellan to transport his force every means
and power of the government was placed at
his disposal and unsparingly used When a
large part of his force had been transferred
to Fortress Monroe, and the whole of it abou,
to go in a few days, information was given to
me by various persons that there WIS great
reason to fear that no adequate force had been
left to defend the Capital in case of sudden
attack That the enemy might detach d
large force and seize it at the time when il
would be impossible for General Mcclellan
to render any assistance. Serious alarm was
expressed by many persons and many warn.
ings given me which could not neglect
ordered n report of the force left to defend
Washington. 1t was reported by the com
mander to be less than 10000 raw recruit.
with not single organized brigade. dash
like that made short time before at Win.
chester would at any time take the Capital o.
the nation. The report of the force left tC
defend Washington, and the order of the
President, were referred to Major Genera
Hitchcock and Adjutant- General Thomas, Il
report
First-Whether the Presidents orders haC
been complied with
Second-Whether the force left to defent
the city of Washington was sufficient.
They reported in the negative on boil
points. The reports were submitted to tn,
President who also consulted General Tot
ten, General Taylor, General Meigs and Gen
eral Ripley. They agreed in the opinion ths
the Capital was not safe. The President ther
by written order directed me to retain one o
the army corps for the defence of Washing
ton; either Summers or McDowelrs as par
directed Mcdowell to remain with his com
mand. And the reason was approved by tn,
President.
Down to this period there had never beer
shadow of difference between Mcclellan
and myself. 1t is true that thought his plar
of operations Objectionable as the most ex
pensive, the most hazardous, and most pro
tracted that could habe been chosen. but
was not n military man and while he was il
command | would not interfere with his plar
ard gave him every aid TO execute it. Blu
when the case had assumed the form it hat
done by his disregard of the Presidents or
ders, and by leaving the Capital exposed t.
seizure by the enemy, | was bound to &C
even if l had not been repaired bv the spe
ciifc written order of the President vii
any man question that such was my duty
When this order was communicated to Gen
eral Mcclellan it of course provoked BIZ
wrath, and the wrath of his friends was di
rected upon me because | was the agent o
1 ,ss tha4 had So -