Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-08-01
WAR PAPERS.
MON. IN REGARD 10 THE fiAsT
MARYLAND CAMPAIGN
cn,nr., Adams second Paper-The Lost
Dispatch. Agsin-rhs Bat
tie OF Ansietafn.
fro, the p,sasch.,

IN, wss free TO devote all his energies
"a the relief OF Harper's Ferry and the
crushing Of that part Of the Confed-
e,ate army which was nearest TO him
before the other portion could rejoin 1t,
the babitual caution and slowness OF
the Federal commander prevented him
from reapipg the full advantage Of his
good fortune. As We have seen, Lee
was able to hold him back at the South
Mountain passes until nightfall on the
l4,h Of September, and the time thus
gained was sufficient TO insure the fall
Of Harper's Ferry early next morning.
This disaster TO the Federal army
was known to Mcclellan as soon
Is it was to Lee, and thencefor-
ward the formers only object must
have been to exact as severe q penalty
rs possible from his adversary for this
success. When Lee took position be-
hind the Antietam, on September 18th,
he had but Longstreet and ID. III. Hill
with him, and as this fact was known
to Mcclellan, it is difficult to account
for the deliberation OF his movements.
Lee, it is true, disposed of his troops
and batteries so as TO show as iormi-
dable q front as possible. Imposed
upon to some extent by this, Mcclellan
not only did not attack on the after
noon of the 18th, but was not ready TO
do so until nightfall Of the 10th. 1t
was Wednesday morning the 18th Of
September before the Federal command
er was ready to deliver battle. Lee used
every hour Of his time in energetic efforts
to reanite his army. The troops about
IIarper's Ferry were recalled TO Sharps-
burg by orders suitable to the urgency
of the occasion. Jackson, leaving A.
p. Hills division, marched back on the
evening and night Of the 18th. j. q.
Walker WAS close behind him. These
two reached Sharpsburg during the FORE
neon of the 10th. McLaws and Ander-
son were q day later, and arrived on
the morning of the 18th after the battle
had been some hours in progress. A.
p. Hill was sent for on the night Of the
10th, and, leaving early on the 18th,
reached the field, Us we shall see, in
time TO snatch victory from Burnside's
corps. Thus Lee, by tremendous ef-
forts, concentrated all his army in time
for participation in the battle. This
concentration was, however, effected by
exhausting marches and at the price Of
greet struggling. :.
On the 10th the two armies were d.
yided by Antietam creek, Lee occu-
pyipc the hills west Of the stream,
which offered a fine commanding posi-
ton. His right rested at the Burnside
bridge-the lower one OF the three
which were used in the battle. His
right centre faced towards the bridge on
the turnpike leading from Sharpsburg
TO Boonesboro'. His left centre and
left extended northwaId, gradually re-
ceding from the creek and finally rest
ing upon the Hagerstown turnpike
some two miles or so from Sharpsburg.
Cavalry continued the line thence to
the Potomac. Jackson's two divisions
held the left, supported by Hood. In
he centre was ID. II. Hill. Beyond
him, towards the right, was Evans
aud u. r. Jones's division of Long
streets command. A part Of Toombs'S
brigade held the bridge on the right.
j. G. Walkers brigade had been sent
to this flank on the 10Th. but early on
the 18th were ordered to the other
wing to help Jackson. Stuart's cavalry
was mainly on Jackson's left, guarding
that flank. a number of batteries had
been sent to assist him.
McClellan's plan was to throw the
corps of Hooker, Mansfield, and Sum-
ner, supported by Franklin if nece'-
sary, against the Confederate LETT wing,
and. as soon as matters looked favora-
Bile there, TO move Burnside's corps
against the Confederate right wing.
Whenever either of these attacks we're
successful he intended TO advance his
centre with all the forces then disposal
BILE. 1t thus appears that Mcclellan
intended TO throw the half Of his army
upon Lees left ard support it if neces-
sary by Franklin in addition. His other
operations were to be in concert with
this, but subsidiary. At daylight on
the 18th Hooker opened the battle by
ferccly attacking Jackson. After a
terrible struggle, Jackson's two weak
divisions were forced back, wher
Hoods veteran bIigades and part of D.
Ii. Hills brave men came to the rescue
and uooker's corps was broken IL
pieces. Mansfield, who was close be-
hind Hooker, came to his assistance, anC
once more ensued a struggle OF TIT
tiercest and bloodiest character. Gradu
ally jackson and Hood yielded to th'
pressure and were forced to the west
side of the Hagerstown turnpike, while
Hills men we're driven back upon the
remainder of bis division along the
Bloody Lane" The Federals got fol
a time a foothold near the Dunkel
church but if the Confederates OF
Jsckson's wing had been forced to yiel(
ground, they had exacted fearful pric'
for il. and at 9. o'clock in the morning
Mansfeld's corps was fought out
There was nothing left Of it but feS
fragments. in no condition Of themselve
10 renew the attack. Now it was tha
Mcclellan threw in Sumner, whos'
corps made the Federal force that ha(
been launched against the left OF to-
Confederate army in all 10000 men
Summers corps became divided IN NOV
irgto The attack. Sumner himself, lead
ing Sedwick's division, followed the tract
Of Hooker and Mansfield and move'
against Jackson's weak lines in IN
woods north Of the Bunker church
Sumner found that at this time H0os
er's corps was not only repulSed ou
dispersed. lie says: :" saw nototn
Of his corps at all as ! was advancin,
with my command on the field. Their
were some troops lying down on tn
left which took 10 belong to Mans
fields command. General Hooker
corps was dispersed. There is no qnes
tion about that" Though it is piAi
from this that Jackson bad nothing I
fear from Hooker and Mansfield, th
advance Of Sedgwick's fye or six thou
sand fresh men threatened to over
whelm the weak Confederate line
Rnt one brigade (Eariy'sl OF ia tx