The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1886-01-20

A.. u tteASl~Nt
10 another town The citizens of CanfeJJ
then ed bill o be filed for an iniupo.
ton restraining the county commissioners
from etfecfing the removal on the ground
that the ofia inal act, and wnat was done
under it, constituted an exet uted contract
on the part of The Stale thar the seat OF
justice should remain forever AZ Candeld
and the latter act impaI red the oblirsiiob
of that contract; but this court held other
wise. saying, among other things, II the
legislature had intended 10 assume au obi
gait thatit should be Kept there in per
petUity, il Is 10 be presumed II would have
said so. We cannof-certainly not in Ibis
case-interpolafe into he statute a thing sa
important which il does not lain"
The cases IN which IL has been held thar
a contract was entered into are equally
instructive. Thus in Gordon q. The TGr
Appeal Csurt, How. lSS, the statute was.
THAT upon any of the banks la this Stats
complying with the conditions of this ACT
the filth of the State is hereby pledged NOT
to impose any future tax or bonus on The
said bans during the continuance OF their
charters under this act. In Ndfe Band Of
Ohio o. Knoop. l6 How. 500, the provision
was that each bank organized under the act
should semi-annually, on the days desig-
mated for declaring dividends, set of to he
State six per cent on the profits deductinc
there rom the expenses and ascertain losses
for the six months next preceding which sum
or amount 50 set oil snail be In lieu of ali
taxes to which the company. OF the Stock
holders therein, would otheI wise be subject
and from the Judgment that this was CON
tract of exemption from any further exer-
else of the power of taxation three justices
dissented n BRIDGE PrOpT5et0yS v N0b0tsp
IN | Wall 116 the words of exclusion
| were. that it should not be lawful tor any
| person or persons whatsoever to erect OF
| canse t. be ereci ed within certain specified
/ Il. l. n Fg-1.
across the said river" In hoNE FOR tbs
| FRIENDLEss v. ROUSE, Wall. 40. the pro.
vision was that all property of "a corpor-
| alton shall be exempt from taxation and
| that a certain existing statute 70 the effect
that every act of incorporation should be
subject TO alteration and repeal shall not
apply to this corporation
| Such being the rule, and such its praeti-
cal operation, we return 20 the special pro-
| visions of The charter on which this case
depends, and ind, first, the authority given
the corporation TO carry persons and prop
erty This of itself implies authority 10
charge a reasonable sum for the carriage
In thi. way the corporation was pm; in The
same position natural person would oceu.
nv if engaged in the same or like business
| Its rights and its privileges in is business
of tran spor;alion are JUS what those Of
natural person would be under / he cIrcum.
stances no more, no less. The natural
d rsen would be subj G. to Legislative con-
troll as TO the amount of his charges So
must the corporation be. That was decided
/ in Baltimore e Ohio Il. *, Co. e Hdrglqad 4.
CHICAGO, Burlington e Quincy II. Il. Co. C.
{ To7rq Peik a. Chicago 6 Northeastern Rail
: 1ras Co Wj11ona d St Peter T. e. Go.
Blake and RUggtes a. Illinois
I Next follows the power of the director.
! to make bylaws, rules, and regulations for
: the management of the affairs of the com
pany. but il is expressly provided tina, such
: bylaws, rules, and regulations shall not be
n contrary TO The laws OF the State. This we
! held in Ruggtes V. Illinois included laws in
, force when the charter was granted and
q those which came into operation Afterwards
as we'll II is true that the clause which
q thus limits the power of the directors is
: found N the middle of the sentence which
: eonfers the power, but il clearly was in.
tended 20 refer 10 everything that might Be
% done IN this way touching all
matt RS whatsoever that may appertaiu to
! the concerns Of said COM auy There is
n nothing here, therefore, which IN any msn.
4 ner Implies contract on the part Of the
State to exempt the company IRON The
!. operation of laws enacted within the scope
o of legislative power for the regulation Of
the business in which IL Is authorized to
Al engage.
# The case turns consequently on section
II. which is, that it shall be lawful Tor the
u company from uilt 10 time 10
Is fix, regulate. and receive the toll and char
: ges by them to be received for trausporta-
ton dc. This would have been implied
If from the rest of the charter If there had
been no such provision and il is argued
= that unless it had been intended to surren
der the power OF control over fares anC
h freights this section would not have been
= inserted. The argument comedies that The
power OF the company under this secliOT
il is limited by the rule of the common Law
which requires ali charges TO be reasonable
A In N,tnn v Illinois, and Chicago, Burling
- ton Dc Quincy r. K. Co. V. Iolca. this cour
of decided that as TO natural persons and cor
ar porations subject to legislative control, tht
!, State could ia cases like this fix a maxi
mum beyond which any charge would b
II unreasonable and that such maximum
: when fixed would be binding n the court
~ in their adiudieations, as well rs on The
4 parfies in theira dealing nov
is that by section II the state has surren-
dered tie power to fix maximum for this
! company, and has declared that the courts
{ shall be left to determine what rs reas0na-
Bile, free of all legislative control We
see no evidence of any such intention
; Power is granted to fix reasonat L. charges
, but what shall ue deemed reasonable in law
is nowhere indicated. There Is no rate
: specified, nor aiy limit set. Nothing what
, ever is sad of the way in which the ques-
thar is left as it was. Consequently, all he
power which the State had IN the matter
before the charter il retained afterwards
The power to charge being coupled with tie
condition that the charge shall be reasoua-
? BILE, the State Is left tree to act on the sub
, ject of reas1nableness within the limits Of
its general authority as circumstances may
: r quire. The right to fix reasonable char
ges has been granted, but the power OF de-
claring what hall be deemed reasonable has
not been surrendered Ii there had been
an intention of surrenderiug this power 1t
would have been easy to say So Not hay-
ing sa d so, the conclusive presumption Is
D there was no such int niion.
e This is not in conflict with the judgment
: of the Supreme Court OF Miss sSlppl IN
r RAILROAD COMMISSION V 9AZO MIssIs-
, sIPPI RAILROAD Co, in which II was de-
I. cided tina; the power had been SURRENDERED
: in favor of that company because in that
. chartar ma ximum OF rates was filed. In
. | the opinion, copy of which has been
d furnished us in advance OF its pubhea-
: ton in the regular series of reports
the court says distinctly that = gram
e in general terms of authority TO fix rates IS
d rot a remuneration of the right OF ltgl-is-
= tive control so as to secure reasonable
y rates. Such a grant evinces merely pur-
q pose to confer power o exact compensatlon
e which shall be just aud reasonable. 1t Is
OutN NHtI6 tHtTS Is an uDI1lsla hdblt mann
K fcsiatlon OF a purpose 10 place the IN
1 restricted right in the corporation t, deter
t mine rates Of compensation that the power
u of the legislature afterwards 10 interfere
e can be denied" In Railroad Commission 9
q NGtchez, Jackson and Columbus Il. Il. 90. II
\ WAS held by the same court hat the charter
e authority for the company from time to
: time to nix, regulate, aud receive tolls ana
e charges by them to be received for trans,
It portation of persons and property, ala
g not amount 10 a contract OF exemption,
y and the commission was allowed TO proceed
5 under the law.
{ From what has thus been said, It Is mol
: to be inferred that this power of limltalon
i | or regulation is itself with mt limit IBIS
n power 10 regulate is not power 10 destroy
= aud limitation is not the equivalent OF con
tIscation. Under pretence of regulating
: tares and freights, the State caunOt require
5 railroad corporation to carry persons OF
e property without reward neither can Il "
/. that hlch in law amounts to taking o.
o private property fer public use wlthou
r just compensation, or without due proves
t OF law. What would have this effect We
I need not bow say, because no tariff has yes
been liked by The commission, ana ths
j statute of Mississippi expressly PROVIDES
0 that IN all trials of cases brought LOT
: violation OF any tariff of charges, as hAsD
n by the eomm sson. it may be shown ID
defence that such tariff so fixed Is UNJUST
8 1t is also claimed that the charter eoa-
n tains contract binding the Stale 70 aIo"
/ the company, at all times and in all way
e to manage ITS own affairs through It's oTA
t board OF directors, and that the 0blIga' %
r of this eontl act will be impaired II tie pr
Y visions OF the statute are enforced ~ ias
commissioners As has already been seeI
/ the power of the directors is coupled WIZ WI
[ condition that their management sAan
0 be In accordance with the laws OF ~
/ State. This undoubtedly means with sae9
a laws as may be constitutionaily enaeseo
/ touching the administration Of the aflalls
of the company. The present statute q