New-York tribune., 1886-01-17
NEW PUBLICATIONS
sTUARI'S CAVALRY.

mn xyii 46s. Holehton, Mflin " Co.
,ia;or McClelIan who was Stuart's Chief OF Stat,
srioyed the hest opportunities for studying tue
military career of the famous Confederate caVahy
leader and he shows the candor and respect to"aru
b;s adversaries which ought to distinguish every
military history but in which so many narratives
=, the late war have been deficient He follows tne
movements OF his chief with an almost painA"i
ortnlaritv sparing little time lor personal mus
tro,iors incidents OF campaign life. descriptions Oh
st;rriny events or even studies OF character pu'
nresentinr a mass of details, gatnered from 'ho
official records of both sides. anu IhHN
"reminiscences which ought TO be welcome 10 al
stnaents of Lees long struggle. work written
unon Major McClellan's plan IS necessarily ueiec-
tive as a military narrative and one OF ltS IauItS 10
thot IL can hardly show operations in thor true
nroportions An affair of cavalry o"tpostS occupies
more of its pages than the battle or Gettysourg'
Nevertheless II has its special value to the hstorian
who deals with the larger aspects OF the campaign
stuort WAS q very able and brilliant officer VINO
rendered incalcuable services to General Lees army
and whose name inspired an exaggerated respect "V
the North. But he was not a conspicuous Heuio iA
anv great battle--'f we except ChaucellorsEiiIo'
where he handled Jackson's corps admirably 4or
short time after the fall of that coinhauoeri his
force was never large enough for great OpeIatOu''
and the dashing and adventurous RAIDS oy WHICH ho
4 aclia
the imagination had little other direct consequence
81 +Io y,one and often doubtful result which we
call moral effect Indirectly perhaps they we're
much more important; but here We are lett 10
,ossvvorl, When Stuart rode around McCleilans
army on the Cbickahoniny, he gained Il great ue"l
NJ information for Leo which could prooaniJ Aa'o
been gained at less cost by other means Inc Plln-
cinal effect of the gallant exploit however was "
discredit General Mcclellan at tue Nor'n' anu
whether that was OF benefit to the ConIeucIacy VI
not lust then is problem In the Chamoersours
raid which was much more telling performance
stua-t carried Off nothing of consequence except
i, ooo hor.es and his chief of-staff tells that his
own borses which he used up and left along the
routo we're worth more than those he took IN eX-
change On the other hand, the Federal cavalry was
ertirelv broken down hunting him, and that vas
the reason why Mcclellan delayed Tor nearly
month the pursuit which the Washington authorl-
ties were urging him to push across the fotoihac'
The third and last of Stuar's RAIDS when was
made around the rear of Meade's army IN con-
nection with Lees advance into fehnsyIVahi"' Il
regarded as aymstake by military critics On oo'h
sidos II ended with the battle of Gettysburg.
r. 10 n nifty that Major Mcclellan did not find it
within his province to discuss SJuarts pecuhartes
leader or to explain the causes of his celebrity
THAT he WAS brave accomplished, and lndeldtle-
oble soldier is plain enough from every chapter OF
the hook but we look through it In vain for the
secret Of his greatness. His personal magnetism
vyss an important element IN his success pdJ even
that quality needs to DO accounted for The tralh
ia that in the first campaign OF the war the eue'A
cavalry was not well handled, and most o. Us com
manders gallant aud devoted as they were couid
oot compete with their Confederate antagonist.
Smart had the aggressive impulse tempered by
great deal of calculation; he was bold almost 10
rosbpess in action, but cautious in his plans; he
loved the 6clat aud excitement of a wild adventure,
dasbinp with his streaming beard and plumeo hat
through an enemy's camp and cutting loose rom
his own army for a week OF so Of riot within tle
hostile lines but all these diversions were so wen
arranged that they were less perIous than tAey
seemed Such leader naturally attracted the
daring and restless spirits of whom the South mas
always had enough and to spare; anu inc eu'uuSl-
asn of his men soon ripened iuto devotion when
tbo forpd that no never failed to show himself at
that point where the fighting was hardest ard
meyer led them into a scrape from which he had not
the wit 10 get them out. Major Mcclellan tells a
remarkable story OF the ready ingenuity WIN
which Stuart extricated his command from a tight
,ace some time after the retreat from Gettysburg
He had only two brigades with him when Ae dls-
covered that he was caught between the "a ana 90
Federal army corps, both marching on the same
road which he occupied, and both near that they
alike 1t was impossible to cut through or to reach
anv other road With the greatest rapidity, the
whole command including artillery and wagons
was turned INTO the fields and, aided by daIkheso
fonnd shelter behind a.range.of hills Inc 81 corps
had moved on When the I'd followed, it found the
road clear and there was nothing 10 betray the
presence of an enemy All night stuart watched
the march from the top of the ridge, not over three
hundred wards away, hoping that the troops would
l. 1ot-li li0bf
showed a Federal bvouac on a neighooring HILL
ts soon as it was evident that fight was uu-
avoidable, Stuart began it without the loss OF
minnie The Union troops were taken by surprise,
INIT ouiekly rallied. This, however, only rear
puard. and before assistance could be summoned
from the main body Stuart broke away with all his
train and guns
Major Mcclellan gives a very curious account OF
The system upon which the Confederate cavalry
were mounted:
At the beginpingof the war, tho Confederate Gov
ernment charged as it with the creation OF an
army and of war materials OF all KINDS, ielt ltsell
unable to provide horses for the numerous cavalry
companies which offered their services especially
from the State of Virginia. Many companies,
organized as cavalry, were rejected. Win, tnoSc
that were enrolled the O3yerImght en'oeu tI. t6e
contract. the substance OF WhIch was 'nat t4e
eayalTymen should supply their own horses, when
would be mustered INTO service at lalr Valuation /;
that the Government should provide leed,shOeS anu
a smith 20 do the shOeing, and should pay the men
pT diem of forty cents for the use of their ho SEES
Should a horse be killed IN action the Government
agreed 10 pay to the owner the muster valuation.
Should the horse be captured in battle, worn out,
or disabled by any Of the many other causes whGn M
were incident to the service, the loss tell upon the
owner who was compelled to furnish another horse
under the same conditions, or be transferred 10
some other arm of the service.
alt is not surprising that this plan shouid have
been adopted in the early days Of the war, when
campaigns had not yet been brought down to sohd
fro, he Of
should have been adhered to is unaccountable. 1t
did not improve the dash perhaps the courage of
the dragon in charge to know that II his hoIso
,as ;inrcd he xnuld have TO bear the loss, for the