The weekly Union times. [volume] (Union C.H., South Carolina) 1871-1894, 1886-04-16

florence is that it was this the Legislature
intended to alter, SO as to con6ne the con-
tracing power of married woman to a
certain class Of contracts, to wit, those
which were made rs to her separate estate.
We are not aware that any controversy
had arisen or any adjudication had been
made as to the kind of property which
could be made liable for the breach of
married woman's contract, and therefore no
occasion had arisen for an alteration of the
law in that respect. Indeed, we do not sec
how such a controversy could have arisen,
for the old Code as we'll as the Code of 1882
expressly provided that damages recovered
against married womaa could only be coll
lected out of her separate estate. Section
29S of the old Code, which is in this respect
the same as Section 296 of the amended
Code, provides that lin an action brought
by or against married woman, judgment
may be given against her as we'll for costs
as for damages, or both for such costs and
for such damages, in the same manner as
against other persons, to be levied and col-
lectcd Of her separate estate, and not other
! mise And in section 80 of the old code,
tho provision was that 'an execution may
issue against married woman, and it shall
direct the levy and collection of the amount
of the judgment against her from, her sep
arate estate, and not otherwise' and the
same provision is found in Section 307 Of
the present Code. So that it is very clear
that the construction contended for by the
| appellant, to wit, that the amendment now
under consideration was simply designed
to limit the liability Of married woman
on her contracts to her separate estate can
not be the correct one, for such a con-
struction would make the amendment in
question wholly unnecessary, as that was
the law before. We are therefore of opin-
ion that the object Of the amendment was
not to indicate the kind of property which
could be made liable for the breach of
married woman's contract, but to limit her
right to contract, so that she could only
make such contracts as, at the time they
were made, related to or concerned her sep
arate property. Hence, before a married
woman can be made liable for the breach of
a contract alleged to have been made by
her, it must be made to appear, either from
the inherent nature of the contract, or other
wise, that the contract was made in relation
to or concerned her separate property.
Even if she declares in express terms her
intention to bind her separate estate, that
alone will not be sufficient to render the
contract valid, for the question is as to her
po,oer, which is to be determined by the
nature of the contract itself, and not as tc
her intention to bind her separate property
If, therefore, wife should sign note as
security for her husband, or, indeed, fol
any Cher person, aud should declare in the
note, IN express terms, her intention'to bind
her separate estate, that would not make the
contract valid as to her, unless it was made
to appear that the contract, though ex'
ecuted by her as surety, was designed tc
benefit her separate property, or in som q
other way related to or concerned such
property:
We have not deemed it necessary to 60
into consideration of the very numerous
cases elsewhere upon questions similar to
the one now before US for while the stat
utes of the various States are somewhat
like our own, yet they differ, sometimes
very materially, in their phraseology, and
in the very great conflict of authority abroad
we have thought it more likely that we
would reach correct solutoin Of the ques-
ton by conining our attention to the terms
Of our own statutes, viewed in the light of
our own past legislation and adjudica--
tions.
The judgment of the Circuit Court i.
affirmed:
I concur. w. d. SIMps ON, C.J.
MCGOWAN, A. j.: concur in the result
AS the purpose Of the Act manifestly was
to confer upon a married woman power.
beyond what she possessed before, sanno
suppose that by the insertion of the word
'as to her separate estate, it was intended t.
defeat that object entirely as to contracts
The same Act, in conformity to the Con.
stitution, confers the powers to bequeath
devise aud convey her separate estate
in the same manner and to the same ex
tent as if she were unmarried, and 10 ordert
to harmonize the different provisions, l in
cline to think that the intention of th,