The Cecil Whig. [volume] (Elkton, Md.) 1841-current, 1886-02-27

removed into the Circuit Court of the
United States for the District of Kansas.
The suit was that of an injunction issued
by the State Court, and restraining the
defendants from the manufacture Of
beer. These defendants were the OWE.
ers of a brewery, worth some fifty thou
sand dollars, which, when the manufac-
ture of beer was lawful in Kansas, they
had erected at this cost, but which would
not be worth more than five thousand
dollars if they were denied the right of
using it for such manufacture. Such
denial would hence impose upon them
the loss of forty five thousand dollars in
the value of their property. They
claimed that the Constitution and laws
of Kansas and the injunction issued in
pursuance thereof directly entailing
upon them this loss were in conflict with
the Fourteenth amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United states, which dc.
cares that no State shall deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, with
out due process of law" Judge Brewer
held that the defendants were entitled to
| a removal of the suit; and this is tie
only point that was actually decided.
The opinion delivered in assigning rea-
| soEs for this decision, rather than the
point decided, has specially attracted the
| attention of the general public. The
conclusion reached by the Judge is that
the defendants having lawfully aquired
a rc&tcd right in the brewery owned by
them when the manufacture of beer was
lawful, cannot, by the Constitution and
laws of Kansas, be deprived of the right
of such manufacture by such brewery
without just compensation by the State
for the damages in the value of the
property thereby inflicted on them. This
| question, while having nothing to do
with the wisdom or unwisdom of prohib-
tory laws, is simply one Of law, to be
decided by the courts.
Judge Brewer rests his opinion iii pant
upon certain suggestions made in the
Supreme Court of the United States in
the cases of BIrtemeyer VS.. Iowa; IS
Wall, 129, and the Beer Company VS..
! Massachusetts: 81 [. S, %. In the first
of these eases it was suggested that, ''if
a case were presented in which person
owning liquor or other property at the
time law was passed by the State alb
solutely prohibiting any sale of it, it
would be very grave question whether
such a law would not be inconsistent
with the provision of the amendment
which forbids the State to deprive any
person of life, liberty or property with
out due process of law This sugges-
ton was made by Mr.. Justice Miller III
stating the .opinion of the Court; and a
similar suggestion was made by Mr.. JUS
tice Bradley, and also by Mr. Justice
Field. In the second case. the Court
said: eve do not mean to say that
property actually in existence, and in
which the right of the owner has become
vested, may be taken for the public good
without compensation; but we infer that
the liquor i'll this case, as in the case of
Bartemeyer VS. Iowa, was not in exist
ence when the liquor law of Massachu-
sets was passed" The language used
in both these cases furnishes one of the
reasons for Judge Brewers refusal to re-
mand the suit to the State Court in
which it was originally brought, and also
for the opinion which he gave. He
speaks of the language as containing
Authoritative suggestions.
The Judge, however, does not leave
the case to rest merely upon these ''sug-
gestions,' but proceeds to lay down, and
support, by judicial authorities, the fol-
lowing legal proposition: /. That ode
barring man by express prohibition
from the use of his property for the sake
of the public is taking of private prop
erty for public uses" .. That natural
equity, as we'll as constitutional guar
anty, forbids such a taking of private
property for the public good without
compensation. 3. That mo matter
what Legislative enactments may be had,
what forms of procedure, judicial or
otherwise, may be prescribed, there is
not due process of law, if the plain and
inevitable result is the spoilation of pri-
vate property for the benefit of the pub
lie without compensation. t. That /" 'as
a necessary consequence of these propo-
sitions, legislation which operates upon
the defendants as does this is in conflict
with the Fourteenth amendment. and as
to them void
We have thus given a summary OF
Judge Brewers argument in relation to
the point he considers. Whether he is
right or wrong in his conclusion, Prohi-
btionists ought not to regret that the
question hes been raised. 1t was bound
to come, sooner or later; and the sooner
it comes and is finally settled, the better
for the public interest. If Judge Brew
er's view is correct, then let US know it,
an act accordingly. If it is not correct,
then let us know that.
Civil society may, undoubtedly, in the
exercise of what is called its police
power, pass great variety of laws for
the public good, even though such laws
operate injuriously upon individual ill.,
terests. ThIs is well-settled principle
1t is equally well-settled that individuals
have rights which society has no right
to violate. Justice aud commou-sensc
require that neither of these principles
should be SO extended as, in the practi-
cal effect, to destroy the other. Each
limits the other; and that, too, with
equal authority. 1t is for the Courts, in
the light of the general principles of Ia s.
and constitutional limitations and qua:
antics, to fix the precise line along which
each class of rights may move without
interfering with those of the other class
And, in respect to the question of Pro
hibitiou, it is of the first Importance tc
) the whole country that the Supreme
, Court of the United States should d,
this at as early 4 date as possible anC
thus let the people know whether tho
Federal Constitution does or does not
| impose any limitation or qualification