The Sunday herald., 1886-12-05
MORE ABOUT GETTYSBURG.


must seem pretty well worn. But II Waterloo |
can still after the lapse OF seventy years be fruit
ful subject OF criticism there must yet be plenty OF
matter for discussion In the most momentous con- |
lcts OF Civil War; And that the last word has not
been said about Gettysburg is most conclusvely |
shown by Gen. Henry j. Hunt In his second article |
which appears in the December Century. Gen. |
Hunt treats Of the events of the second day, having
written OF the first day In the November number, |
and what he says Will be apt to cause revisal Of |
hastily formed opinions several points. one OF
these is the pan of lighting Pipe Creek, the rea
sons for which Gen. Hunt gives as follows:
Examination Of the map will show thar such line /
would cover Baltimore AMI Washington IN all direc
tons from which Lee could advance, and that West
munster. his depot, would be Immediately behind |
him, with short railroad communication to liaii- |
more. 1t would, moreover, save much hard dmaTcl- |
ing, and restore to the ranks the thousands OF srag
Ininstcr-which is In PARIS Ridge. the eastern bonn
Diary of the Valley OF the Monocacy-Good roads led
in all directions and gave the place the same stra-
tegic value for Meade that Gettysburg had for Lee.
The new line could not he turnedby Lee withoutim-
mnent danger to HIS own army nor could he afford
TO advance upon Baltimore Washington, leaving
the Army OF the Potomac intact behind and near
hm--that would he to invite the fate of Burgoyne.
Meade then could safely select good "olensve-de-
! fensive line" behind Pipe Greek and establish him
self there, with perfect liberty of action in all direc
lions. Without magazines or assured communica-
tions, Lee would have to scatter his army, more or
less in order To subsis II, anu 30 expose 1t to Meade
or else keep 1t united, and so sarve 1t, and Meade
coIid compel me latter alternative by simple dem-
for Lee-eilhcr to attack Meade in his chosen posi-
tion or to retreat without battle. The latter,
neither the temper OF his army nor that of his gov
ernment would probably permit. In of a de-
feat Meades line of retreat would be comparatively
short, and easily covered, while Lees would be for
| two marches through open country before he
| could gain the mountain passes. As Meade be-
cved Lees army TO he at least equal to his own, all
the elements OF the problem were in favor of The
| Pipe Creek line. But Meades orders for July l,
drawing his corps toward the threatened fiank car
hastened this movement. Reynolds, who probably
never received the Pipe Creek circular. was eager
ing the dimension OF battle, caused an immediate
concentration of both armies at Gettysburg. Prior
to this, the assembling OF Meade's army behind Pipe
Greek would have been easy, and Oil fears OF D1ur
Ing thereay the morale of his troops were ide the
Army of the Potomac was OF "sterner stun ~ than
| that Implies The battle of July II changed the sit
| nation. Overpowered by numbers, the First and
Eleventh corps had, after hard lighting and infctlng
AZ well as ncurring heavy losses been forced back
to Cemetery Hill, which they still held. TOhave with
| drawn them now would have been a retreat, and
might have discouraged the Federal, as II certainly
would have eated the Confederate troops; especi-
ally as injurious reports unjust to both the corps
| named had been circulated. 1t would have been TO
| acknowledge defeat when there defeat.
Meade therefore resolved 20 fight vt Getiy ysb,rg An
ominons despatch from Gen. ilalleck to Meade, that
afternoon suggesting that while his acticalarrange
men's were good. his strategy was nj fault, that he
was too TAR east, that Lee might attempt TO turn his
left, and that Frederick was preferable as base TO
Westminster, probably confirmed Meade In this de-
| cisOn.
In pursuance of his Instructions, I had that morn
ing Cjuly ~ reconnoitered the country behind Pipe
| Creek for battle ground. on my return found
Gen. Hancock at Gen. Meade's tent. lie informed
Reynolds was killed, that battle was going on at
Gettysburg, and that he was under orders TO pro-
coed TO that place. His Instructions were to exam
Inc II and the immediate country fora suitable field,
and II his report was favorable the troops would he
ordered forward Before the receipt of HancOck's
written report from Cemetery Hill, which was not
very encouraging, Gen. Meade had received from
others Information AZ TO the state OF affairs at the
front, set his troops In motion toward Gettysburg,
afterwards urged them to forced marches, and
under his orders gave the necessary Instructions
to the Artillery Reserve and Park for battle there
The move was, under the circumstances. bold one,
ana Meade, as we will see, took great risks.
| Equally clear is Gen. Hunts summary OF the rca-
sons for lighting at Gettysburg, they probably ap
pcared to Lee after the conflict OF tho first day:
| 1t had not been Gen. Lees intention to deliver n
general battle while 80 far from his base un
less attacked, but he now found himself by the mere
force OF circumstances committed to one. ltii must
take place, the sooner the better. His army was
now nearly all on the ground, and delay, while u
better that OF Ills antagonist. LOngstreet indeed,
urged Gen. Lee Instead OF attacking 10 turn MeadeS
left, and by nerposing between him and Washing
ton, and threatening his communications, 10 force
him to attack the Confederate army IN position; bur
he under no such necessity; would have no great
difficulty in obtaining supplies, and-disregarding
the clamor from Washington-conld play waiting
game which II would be impossible for Lee TO main
lain in the open country lie could not advance on
BALTIMORE or Washington with Meade IN his rear,
"
which would soon swarm with additional enemies.
His communications could he OH for his rec0m-
mendaiion to assemble even small army At Gull
peper to cover them and AID MIN had not been COM
piled with.
A battle wasa necessity to Lee, and defeat would
he more disastrous to Meade AMI less so 10 himself al
Gettysburg than any point east OF II. with the denies
OF the south Mountain range close In his rear, which
could he easily held by small force, safe retreat
through the Cumberland Valley was assured 80 that
his army, once through these passes, would he prac-
iically on the banks OF the Potomac, alta poi6t al
| auGln nf
| Gettysburg would deprive him OF these advantages.
1t more probable that Gen. Lee WAS Influenced by
cool calculation OF THIS nature than by hot blood,
| that the opening success Of chance battle mad
thrown him on his balance. Whatever his reasons,
he decided 10 accept the gage Of battle offered by
| Meade, nnd To attack as soon AZ practicable.
The story that Meade contemplated retreat from
Gettysburg without general battle Is also con-
cerning which Gen. Hunt brings forward fresh aud
apparently conclusive evidence. After narratiDg
The arrival aud positions of the troops on The morn
Ing of the I'd, Gen. Hunt says:
Meade posi- pOned all offensive operations until the
eneny's Intentions should he more clearly devel-
Opcd. In the mean time he took precautionary
measures, II was clearly now to hls advantage TO
fight the battle where he was, aud he had some ap-
prehension that Lee would attempt To turn his nank,
aud threaten his communications, Just what Long
street had been advising. In this II might he
necessary to fall hack 10 the Pipe Greek line II pos
sible or else to follow Lees movement into the open
country. In either case, or IN that OF forced With
drawal, prudence dictated that arrangements should
he made in ADVANCE and Gen. Meade gave instruc-
IOr Tue fohus anu
and to draw up an order OF movement which Gen.
Butierned the chief OF stan, seems to have con
sidered an order-absoue for the withdrawal OF the
army without q battle
These instructions must have been given early In
the morning, for Gen. Bnteriled states thai II was
on his arrival from Taneytown, which place he left
AT daylight An order was drawn up accordingly,
given 10 the adjutani general aud perhaps prepared
for issue Ia case OF necessity TO corps commanders
but 1t was not recorded. Issued, nor even copy
of II preserved. Cen Meade declared that never
contemplated the issue Of such an order unless con-
tingenclcs made II necessary; ana his acts aud de-
spaiches during the day were IN accordance with his
statement. There is one circumstance pertaining u
my own duties which TO my mind Is conclusive, and
relate II because " may have contributed TO tho
llea that Gen. Meade Intended to withdraw froIu
Gettysburg. lie same TO me that morning before
the Artillery Reserve had arrived, and, therefore
about ihe time that The order IN OF prep
aratlon and Informed ue that one OF the army corps
had left It's whole artillery ammunition train hehlnd
II aud that others We're also dehcieut notwtlsiand
lug his orders on that subject. lie was very muol
disturbed, and feared that taking into account the
large expenditure OF tue preceding day by tho Era
and Eleventh Corps there would not he sunicent 4
carry us through the battle. This was not the ma
nor the last time lhat WAS called upon TO meet de
uclencles under SUCH circumstances, and | WAS
therefore, prepared for this, having directed Gen.
Tyer commanding tho reserve artillery whateye
else he might leave behind bring up every rounl
lN.. tNl. Ia Mo Nn..