The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1886-10-28
TO cope successfully with the ablest of the
yITostorr Nonfodorcta ta Ganerals

10 cope successfully with the ablest of the
Western Confederate Generals.
The Vicksburg campaign did more
than this; it changed, as if by magic,
the 0,oral Of the opposing armies, trans
ferring to the Union troops the hitherto
confidence of the Confederate soldier.
In doing this, Grant made certain the
ultimate downfall of the Rebellion.
Missionary Ridge confirmed that conf
dence, Notwithstanding the blunders OF
the enemy as much as the genius oil the
Union General made that victory easier
than he expected. DonelsoD, Vicksburg,
and Missionary Ridge were the chief iau'
rels with which Grant was crowned when
he went to meet Lee.
The war bad been in progress for a
year before Lee had done any thing
worthy of the public expectation of him.
His West Virginia campaign against
Rosecrans had even damaged the reputa'
ton he had gained in Mexico years
before. But the battle of Fair Oaks, in
MAY, 1862, showed the Army of Northern
Virginia that the loss Of Johnstone was
not as they supposed, irreparable. The
seven days of carnage ending at Malvern
Hill-in which terrible battles, almost
unexampled in history, one is at loss
which more 10 admire, the heroism of the
persistent attack or the stubborn mastery
defense and retreat-changed the hope
of the Southern soldiers into enthusiastic
confidence in their new commander. The
second Manassas, in August, qualified
later by Antetam, but followed by Fred
cricksburg in December, closed cam
paign which left no doubt to the extraor,
dinary resources and talents of General
Lee. The victory at Charlottesville
in the succeeding May was not forgotten
even 10 the great disaster that followed
soon at Gettysburg, so that, when the
campaign of 1868 closed, Lee was univer-
sally regarded as the ablest of the Con.
federate commanders. It must, however,
be admitted that the Maryland compaign
which ended in the battle of Antietam,
was both political and military blunder.
The immediate retreat of the Confederate
commander across the Potomac, after
sustaining loss in battle he could not
afford, was the first serious damper upon
the exuberant and well-earned confidence
in its own invincible prowess of the
Army of Northern Virginia. Still more
indefensible, both from political and
military standpoint, and far more disas-
trous to the Southern cause, was the
invasion of Pennsylvania, SO suddenly
and successfully arrested by General
Meade at Gettysburg, which battle was
strategic blunder on the part of General
Lee, and real defeat, however leisurely,
masterly, and successful his retreat.
When be found that the Federa! com.
mander, from whatever cause, by whom
soever's fault, had with a superior force
secured much the advantage in position,
he should have Withdrawn from Gettys-
burg and awaited the attack upon more
equal ground, as counseled to do by his
ablest generals. The third days battle
there, in which he vainly hurled his
heroic columns against Hancock's in,
trepcbments upon Cemetary Hill, and
sacrificed the flowers of his army in a
charge glorious and immortal as any
thing in history, but futile and fatal, will
forever remain cloud on the military
fame of General Lee, and marked the
turning point in the Confederate cause.
Yet his conduct there was but the exag.
geration of the very quality which dis,
tinguished both Lee and Grant, and
made them great: that is, unwagering
confidence, unfaltering resolution, the
one indispensable quality, and always
predominant in all the great captains OF
history. In battle the real conqueror is
without sentiment or pity, and knows
that war is cruelty personited; that
success d suffering are leagued together;
With hin. the moral questions have all
been settled before be puts on bis sword.
Lee saw and confessed the mistake of
Gettysburg, in silent agony of sympathy
with his brave men, took all the blame.
They forgave, trusted, and loved him
still.
It must be admitted that when the two
great captains met face to face upon the
Rapidan, in May, 1864, Lees reputation
rested upon more battles fought, bloody,
terrible battles, and victories won against
greater odds, than could be claimed for
Grant.
For three long years the whole power
of the Federal government, with Its
unlimited resources, had not been able to
reach the capital of the Confederacy, and
when Grant took command of all the
Northern armies, Richmond seemed to
be really less in danger than Washington.
The maxim, "better is the place OF the
defendant" is as true in war as in law,
and is especially applicable in a country
like that between the Rapidan and the
James. Moreover, modern earthworks,
defended by modern artillery and repeat.
ing rifles, are much more dlihcult OF
successful assault than were Rodrigo,
Badaioz, or Albuera, where Wellington
won SO much renown in his Peninsular
campaign.
When Grant crossed the Rapidan he
found he had different army, under
much ADLER leader, to contend with than
any he had met before. In the battle of
the Wilderness, after repeated attacks, in
which the Union troops, led by the ablest
corps and division commanders, displayed
prodigies of heroic, stubborn valor, and
covered the ground for miles with the
dead of both armies, Grant was repulsed,
defeated, and compelled to retreat, and
leave the field in possession of the enemy;
and the killed, wounded, and missing OF
the Union army largely outnumbered the
Confederate loss. But Grant was deter
mined; he was unused to defeat; he
proposed to eight it out on that line, if
ittook all summer" regardless, seemingly,
of the fearful cost. For the first time in
his life, however, he tried to avoid the
enemy, and by flank movement to reach
Spottsylvania Courthouse. But when
he arrived there and was prepared to
assault, Lee was ready, intrenched, and
awaiting the assault, which was as heroic,
as persistent, as deadly ss that in the
Wilderness, and US unsuccessful. At the
expense of over fifty-thousand men Grant
learned that in that kind of warfare Lee
was invincible. The battle at Cold Har-
Dor, fought within month, ended the
bloodiest campaign in history, and the
Federal General, abandoning the attempt
| to take Richmond by assault, withdrew
to the south of the James, and began the
long campaign of siege and starvation.
He could have placed his army south
of the James three months sooner than
be did, and without the loss of the sixty
f.,.Lk t1,asr loo hot