The Democratic advocate. [volume] (Westminster, Md.) 1865-1972, 1886-10-09
The Tariff and Wages.
written for the democratic Advocate.

Written Tor the DenOcrauc AuNOcAle-J
We have in former articles touched several
times upon the subject of toages as affected
by the tariff. We propose now to return 10
this subject, and to considerit somewhat more
closely.
1t is standing argument on the part of
certain politicians that protection enhances
the price of labor, and that therefore it is a
benefit to the working classes. And appeals
are periodically addressed to these classes,
which rest solely upon this assumption. On
the eve of every important election the labor
ers in mines and workshops are told that
their subsistence depends upon the continu-
ance of the tariff, which somehow is supposed
to be threatened by the Democratic party.
And the appeal, it must be admitted, has thus
far generally not been made in vain. The
promise of high wages to workiEgmen has
generally secured their votes.
And yet this promise is always delusion
and a mockery. The argument is that the
system of protection enables the manufacturer
to pay higher wages to his employees than he
would otherwise be able to pay. Butthe fact
is that he does not do it. He hires his en-
ployes at the price of labor ruling in the COM
munty in which his enterprise is located, and
the profits which protection secures he pockets.
Who has ever heard of higher wages being
paid to the laborers engaged in protected in
dustries than are paid to those engaged in
unprotected industries in the same locality :?
Indeed, it would be q wrong if such were the
case. What right has the government to
prefer one class oflaborers to another? Differ
emit occupations will command different wages,
according to the degree of difficulty or danger
connootea- with Jnem, ana accOrdiug W tho
degree of skill required. This is right, but it
would be immoral for the government, by
mere legislative enactment, to secure higher
wages to one class of laborers than to another.
But this is not the effect of protective
tariff. The manufacturer of cloth does not
pay higher wages to his operatives, because
the tariff enables him to charge two dollars
more for a yard of his cloth than the same
goods could be bought on condition of free
trade. 1t is not the operative, but the capt.
talist, that gets the benefit of protection. Let
us recur again to the illustration afforded by
the artificial culture of coffee, referred to in
our last paper. Suppose Congress were to
impose duty of seventy-fve cents a pound
on imported coffee, and thus to enable some
company of Southern capitalists to engage in
the coffee culture. What this would mean to
the people of the United States we have al
ready seen. But what would it mean 10 the
laborers on these artificial coffee plantations
Would these get higher wages than the laborers
on The cotton and rice plantations By no
means. They would just get about the same
amount, and no more. The fact is that the
amount would be regulated by the competition
of laborers. If only cent or two more were
offered than is paid for other labor of the
same quality, all hands would want to forsake
the cotton and rice fields and seek employ
ment on the coffee plantation. This compe-
tition of labor would enable the capitalists to
reap all the benefits of protection, and to grow
rich at the expense of the wealth and comfort
of the whole people.
1t is just so with the iron industry. This
industry has been protected and fostered by
government influence beyond many others.
What, then, are the wages of the men en-
ployed in the mine, the furnace and the roll
ing mill? Just about what men get in other
occupations of equal severity and rigor, and
no more. In the district of this county in
which the writer lives a Pennsylvania com
pany is working an iron ore mine. What
wages are the laborers getting in this mine?
About seventy or eighty cents day, Just what
farm laborers get in the same community
And then the miner has to find his own board,
while the farm laborer gets his with his EN-.
ployer. The Pennsylvania iron masters are
immensely rich. They live in palatial resi-
dences, and ride about the country in palace
cars built expressly for their own use and
convenience, while the miner is simply getting
enough to enable him to live in the plainest
way. That is the way protection works.
1t may be admitted, however. that pro-
tective tariff does in some circumstances
slightly enhance the price of labor. 1t does
so, at least temporarily, by increasing the
demand for labor. The commencement of
the coffee culture would increase the demand
for labor in the localities where the planta-
tons might be situated and would thus tend
to put up wages. But the effect would, in
part, at least, be only temporary, for laborers
would soon arrive from other sections, and
the competition would presently be as great
as ever, and so the price would go down again
almost or quite to its old level
But there is one thing that would not go
down, and that is the price of coffee. And
this would affect all laboring men in the coun-
try. The effect Of a prOtectire tariff is iaeui-
tally to raise the price of living. There are
some thousands of different kinds of goo DIS
liable to protective duties in this country.
Among these are all cotton and wooden fab
RIGS, all raw and manufactured iron, refined
sugars, &c. The effect of this is considerably
to increase the price of living, and this in
crease in the price of living more than bal.
ances any increase in the price of labor pro-
dueed by a protective tariff. Laboring
men, wage-ea then, derive no benefit
from protection, but only injury and damage,
and they are the last men that ought to allow
themselves to be fooled into voting for high
tariff Lux.
Business Locals.