The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-12-12
GEN. M'CLELLAN'S MEMOIRS.
A Ouerulous Indictment of Stanton,
HalIeck, and Other Prominent Men.
The General Claims that lie Not Only Had
to Fight Rebellion in Front, but Was Com
PEELED to Watch Treason in the Rear.

CoiOW4uS Inc IutTOQuCtlou anu dle0i pAidSAH~
q eommendstory telegram from General Scott,
in reference to the success achieved in West
Virginia, General Mcclellan says:
"At this period latter assuming command OF
the Army of the Potomac committed one of
nv greatest errors-that was in retaining Gen.
Mcdowell on duty with the troops under my
command / knew that he had been close
student of military affairs and thought that he
possessed sufficient ability to De uselul IN
subordinate capacity. Moreover, pitied him
extremely and thought that circumstances had
as much to do with his failure at Bull Run az
any want of ability and energy on his part. l
knew that il | sent him away he would be
ruined for life, and desired to give him an op-
portunity to retrieve his military reputation.
therefore left him 10 the nominal command
on the Virginia side OF the river until the or
der forming the Army of the, Potomac was is
sued, he doing some little bureau work and
retaining large staff. while performed the
real military labor demanded by the occasion. l
was sadly deceived He never appreciated my
motives, and felt no gratitude for my forbear-
ance and kindness Subsequent events proved
that, although In some respects very good bu-
Rsau officer and fair disciplinarian and drill
officer for school of instruction, he lacked the
qualities necessary for a commander in the field.
After Pope's campaign, it was not safe for Nc
Dowell to visit the camps OF his troops; the men
declared that they would kill him. ] have long
been convinced that he intrigued against me to
the utmost Of his power. His conduct toward
Fitz-John Porter on the second Bull Run cam
pagn, his testimony in the latter's trial and sub
sequent rehearing in 1880. show what manner OF
man he was In all human probability should
have been spared infinite amount OF trouble
had relieved him upon reaching Washington
and allowed him to sink at once into obscurity."
Speaking of Halleck, "a day or two before he
arrived from Washington, Stanton came to eau
ton me against trusting Halleck, who was, he
said, probably the greatest scoundre and most
bare-faced villain in America; he said that he
was totally destitute of principle, and that in
the Aldamar quicksilver case he had convicted
Halleck of perjury in open court When Hal
leck arrived he came to caution me against Stan
ton, repeating almost precisely the same words
that Stanton had employed
II made note of this fact soon after its oc-
eurrence. and lately, Dec. 4, 1883, saw for the
first time page 1893, volume g. series, /. OF
hcal Records of the War of the Rebellion, Gen.
E. A Hitchcock's letter to Halleek in which
the former transmits a message from Stanton
on the very same subject This is eminenty
Characteristic of Stanton, who would say one
timing to mans face and just the reverse behind
his back.
"Of all men whom have encountered in
high positions Halleck WAS the most hopelessly
stupid 1t was more difficult to get an idea
through his head than can be conceived by any
one who never made the attempt. do not
think he ever had a correct military idea from
beginning to end"
party leaders began almost as soon as he took
command of the Army of the Potomac, and he
has good deal to say concerning their inter
ference and conspiracies, and he boldly accuses
some of them of reasonable intent.
II have already stated" General Mcclellan
writes, I'm a general way, what occurred be-
tween myself and some of the radical leaders
shortly after reached Washington. They then
saw clearly that 1t would not be possible to
make party tool of me. and soon concluded
that it was their policy to ruin me il possible.
1.-THE real object of the radical leaders was
not the restoration of the Union, but the per-
manent ascendency Of their party. and to this
they were ready to sacrifice the Union, il neces-
sary.
They committed grave error in supposing
me to be politically ambitious and in thinking
that looked forward to military success as a
means of reaching the presidential chair. At
the same time they knew that if I achieved
marked success, my influence would necessarily
be very great throughout the country, an influ-
ence which | should certainly have used for the
good of the whole country, and not for that Of
any party at the nations expense.
''They therefore determined to ruin me in any
event and by any means; first by endeavoring to
force me into premature movements, knowing
that failure would probably end my military
career; afterward by Withholding the means nee
essary to achieve success.
That they were not honest is proved by the
fact that, having failed to force me to advance at
q time when an advance would have been mad
ness, thew withheld the means Of success when
was in contact with the enemy and finally re-
Neved uqe from command when the game was in
my hands. They determined that should not
succeed, and carried out their determinations
only too we'll and at fearful sacrifice of blood,
time and treasure. In the East alone it is quite
safe to say that we unnecessarily lost more than
quarter of a million in killed, wounded and
prisoners in consequence of my being withdrawn
from the peninsula and not properly supported.
Taking both East and West, and counting the
- - Z J.
than half q million of men were sacrificed I'M
necessarily for the sake of insuring the success
of rclitical party.
II &c not base my assertions as to the motives
of the radical leaders upon more surmises, but
upon facts that have frequently come to nv
knowledge during the war and since For in
stance, Maj Charles Davies, once professor of
mathem MATES at West Point, told me, and at diff
ferent times told Gen. Joseph E. Johnston, the
following story: He said that during the very
early part of the peninsular campaign he was
one of commission sent from New York to
urge more vigorous action in supporting me.
They called upon the President and found Mr..
Stanton with him. In reply to their state
ments of the purpose of their visit, Mr..
Stanton stated that the great end and aim of the
war was to abolish slavery. To end the war be-
fore the Nation was ready for that would be a
failure The war must be prolonged and con-
Quoted SO as to achieve that. That the people of
the North were not yet ready to accept the view,
and that 1t would not answer to permit me to
succeed until the people had been worked up to
the proper pitch on that question. That the
war would not be finished till that result was
reached, and that, therefore, it was not their
policy to strengthen General Mcclellan SO as to
insure his success.
Il have heard, from the best authority, many
instances in which the same views were ex.
pressed by other prominent radical leaders.
Under date of April Z, 1862, General Franklin,
Sn o letter, informing me of the circumstances
attending the withholding of McDowells corps
of which his division formed part writes: Nc
Dowel told me that it was intended as a blow at
sou. That Stanton had said that you intended
20 work by strategy and not by fighting that all
of the opponents of the policy OF the admins
tration conferred around youth other words,
that you had political aspirations. There was
no friend of yours present to contradict these
statements, of course"
About Stanton's course Mcclellan is particu-
larlv outspOken
''From the light which has since been thrown