The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1886-01-15
LABOR CLAIMS,
Il. KELLER & co. vs, i. b. BEISH-
LINE EFT AL.

ext cution creditor and within six months
Immediately preceding the sale.
The opinion after discussing other mat
ters connected with the exceptions to the
auditors report, says;
Concedlng that legal levy was made on
the Gath day of May, 1884, that the purpose
Of the execution was not merely for the
security of the debt, but for the bonafide
purpose of collection, and that the delay
of the Sheriff in making sale, was aga inst
positive instructions of the plaintiff, and
that the stay ordered by the court, from
the 18th day of October, 1884, to the 7th
dayIof January, 1885, was legal suspen-
sion of the remedy of the plaintiff, aud not
chargeahle as any fault, or laches on his
part, the question still remains, whether
the labor claims for work sfter the levy,
and within six months Immediately pre-
ceding the sale, are entitled to priority in
the distribution.
The solution of this question is to be
found in the proper construction of the
Wages Act of 9th of April, 1872. BY the
first section It is enacted, that all moneys
due for labor, by the class of persons and
in the kinds of business therein specified
for any period of time not exceeding six
months, Immediately preceding the sale
and transfer of the property connected
with such business, whether such sale be
by execution or otherwise, shall be pre-
ferred and first paid out of the proceeds of
the sale of such property.
1t is cortended by counsel for the exc.
| cution-cre'iIor that the statute gives no
lien or preference after levy, for the rea-
son that 1t would impair vested rights ac-
| quired by virtue of the levy.
This view of the law finds support in
several opinions of the Court of Common
Pleas of Schuylkill county, to be found in
Schrader VS. Burr 10 Phil Rep. 620, Kindig
VS. Atkinson "a Leg. Int. 1876, in Graham
VS.. Machine Co. 35 Leg Int. 20. Judge
| Butler, in the Common Pleas of Chester
county, confirmed an auditors report
which followed the decision in Atkinson
VS.. Kindig supra.
The opposite of these opinions is held by
the Judges of the Common Pleas OF Phia
delphhia a. will be seen by reference tu
the cases of Askam vs. Wright 1 w. n. C.
1856, McCut,e vs.. Fitzgerald w. N. c.
39G, Matznger ct al. vs.. Publishing Co. Il
w. n. G. 80, and by the Common Plea,
court of Cumberland county, in Nagle vs.
Cumberland Ore Bank Co. ! Chester Co
Rep. 49l On some two or three occasion.
these conflicting authorities have beer
cited in argument before the Supreme
Court, but no decision has been rendered
upon the question by that tribunal, for the
reason that the cases argued did not In
volve q construction of the act Being
stil an open question it must be decided il
accordance with the intention of the Leg
islature, ascertained according to establish
| ed rules of construction.
1t is a cardinal rule that the intention OF
the Legislature must govern in the con.
struction of statutes When the words
used are not ambiguous or obscure, the in.
tentinn must be collected from them. Tht
words used are TO be taken in their ordi.
note 2O4, and are not to be extended be.
yond that meaning to comprehend cases
within the supposed intention of the max.
ers. Dwarris on Statutes ZIG.
The best rule to arrive at the meaning OF
the Legislature is to abide by the words
used, according to their ordinary meaning
and import, per Thompson j. in Ihmseu
VS.. Navigation Co. 80 Pa. State Rep. 157
1t would be dangerous to put upon the
language used construction, which
would amonnt to holding that the Legislat
ure did not mean what it has expressed.
Dwarris on S atutes 215, 90 Wendell 555
In State VS.. Brewster AZ n. j. L. 1876, th,
rule of construction is thus stated
"Where the language of statute is cleal
and unambiguous, and its literal meaning
leads to no absurd results, and is not re-
pugnant to other parts of the statute, such
literal meaning, should be accredited to it,
in its exposition" Courts cannot correct
what they may deem either excesses OF
omissions in legislation, nor relieve against
the occasional harsh operation of statutory
provisions without the danger of doing
more injury than good Auth ority in note
32 Am Dec 597.
1t is very clear that when the Legislature
in the Act of 1872 used the words, "Salt
or transfer by execution or otherwise" il
Intended to give to the word sale its mean
ing Ms universally understood. The words
themselves are not ambiguous, nor are
they made so by connection with othel
words in the statute. On the contrary, tn,
question of liens prior to the performance
Of labor, was in the mind of the Legislature
as shown by the proviso to the 4th section
which declares. THAT no lien of mortgag,
or judgment entered before such labor i,
performed, shall be affected or impaired
thereby" The protection thus given tC
mortgages and judgments against labOl
claims accruing after their entry of record
clearly implies that other liens are not SC
| protected. The naming of mortgage anC
| Judgment liens, according to well estab
lished rules of reasoning, precludes the ide,
that any others were intended II the in
,enion mad been to limit the time to 81,
months before q levy on personal property
it is a fair presumption that proper word
to express that intention would Lave beer
introduced into this proviso. The court
have no right to nterpoate the words, "or
of execution issued" following the wor,
'entered," in this proviso; to do so woul
be to legislate and not to construe.
The case of Schnapp's appeal, . W. n
G, l40, cited by the court in delivering tn
opinion in Kindig VS., Atkinson, "a Leg
Int. 1896, affords no aid in deciding tn
question in hand. The wages claim i
that case was made upon the proceeds @
real estate for work done after entry O
judgment BY the express terms of tin
proviso above quoted the lien of the judg
ment was protected from the wages claim
The Supreme Court decline to pass upo
the question, whether the six months lin
taton precedes the sale.
There appears to be good reason why
labor claim should not have preference
over the lien of a iu lpment or mOrtuag,