Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-01-03
Organization OF the National Gunrd.

1t is perfectly practicable, under a
proper system, to form in time Of
peace National-Guard regiments of in
fantry capable Of becoming thoroughly
efficient after short term Of field ser
vice, and competent to render efIectual
cooperation with the regulars in war.
There is no reason why the organ
lied militia should not readily be
placed in condition to quell all riots and
local disturbances, even where they
have reached the stage Of incipient or
ganized rebellion, and they should be
fully able to DO this work without any
aid whatever from the regular army,
which need then be called upon only to
protect the property Of the General
Government.
1t is a fact that in this country the
mere presence Of a handful Of regulars
has always sufiiced to prevent or quell
riots without the necessity Of firing
upon the mob. This has arisen from
the fact that it is well known that the
regulars are under thorough discipline.
and will unhesitatingly obey any order
to fire, and that when they fire it will
be upon the mob, and not over their
heads.
The National Guards will accomplish
precisely the same results wherever it
Is known that their discipline and
esprit de corps are such as to insure
their prompt and effective obedience Of
any orders received, and TO outweigh
any personal sympathy Of any of their
members with individuals in the mob.
This is doubtless the case now with
many Of the regiments throughout the
country, and there is no reason why
it should not be the case with all,
ard that all should preserve at the
moment Of action that steady bearing,
profound silence, and complete inditier-
ence to danger which are so impressive
and conclusive when dealing with an
angry and excited mob. In brief, |
would propose that the mass Of the
active militia, or National Guard, should
be organized and instructed as infantry
that they should be furnished with an
adequate supply Of machine and field
guns. drawn by hand, for use in cities,
10 be manned by detachments specially
detailed that in the districts near sea-
coast defences q sufficient number OF
regiments should be designated and in
structed as heavy artillerists and that
at suitable points in the remote interior
a moderate number of companies of
mounted men should be organized to
cooperate with the regulars against the
lroIans in the event Of a sudden emer-
gercy.
A. the existence OF a trustworthy
force Of the National Guard is i'm
pOilaht 70 the country at large, as well
a. TO The individual States, it Is only
Just that the General Government should
assume its fair share of the expense.
THIS can best be done in the form OF
arms, ammunition, clothing, camp aud
garrison equipage, etc., in order 70 in
sure uniformity of equipment and arma-
ment, and also probably in the issue Of
rations, and even Of pay under certain
circumstances. And this assistance
should besppOrtiOned among the States,
not in the ratio Of population, but ac-
coIding to the numbers of effective
militia actually on foot in each State ;
moreover, the actual number thus TO be
aided should be apportiOned according
to the necessities Of the case.
For example, the organization OF
heavy artillery should be confined to
the States on and adjacent to the sea-
board and lake frontier, within whose
limits permanent Notifications exist, or
where temporary batteries armed with
heavy guns must certainly be erected
in the event Of foreign war; moreover,
the strength Of these organizations
should be greatest in the States nearest
our most extensive and important sea-
coast defences-for instance, the harbor
Of New York.
On the same principle, the infantry
organizations should be relatively th3
strongest in the States most liable TO
foreign attack, or where large manu-
featuring and mining establishments
most abound, as these, and not the
agricultural regions. are the probable
centres Of domestic attack.
While it is very desirable to organize
a certain portion Of the National Guard
in the agricultural districts, it has never
been found easy to do so on account
Of the difficulty Of bringing the men
together and the lack Of proper facili-
ties, but it is probably practicable to
lessen these difficulties by granting
additional pecunisTy aid at least in the
smaller towns where the Troublesome
elements are not present, or at least
in very small proportion.
But the essential condition at The
foundation of the whole matter is the
establishment Of good discipline and
sspS1i de corps; for with the existence
u these elemests the National GasrJ
can be relied up,n To do tie dutv In IN