Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1886-05-08
POPE,S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.
An OaIeer Of Jack sons Staff Describes
the Movements Before Washington.

POPE'S VIRGINIA CAMPAIGN.
An OMcer OF Jaek.On's STAFF Describes
the Movements Before Washington.
| LEES STRATEGY AND ITS REsULrs-A BOLD
DECISIVE AND SUCCESSFUL sTRoKE-rHE
EVENTS LEADING TO THE SECOND BATTLE
OF BULL RUN.
paper of interest read before the American
Historical association at its recent meeting in
| this city, was one by Col. William Allan, OF
Baltimore county, Maryland, formerly chief OF
ordnance or Gen. T. j. Jackson's corps of the
confederate army upon Confederate and Fede-
raj Strategy in the Pope Campaign before Wash
ington in 1862" In July, 1862, he paper said,
Mcclellan lay at Westover, on the James river,
| a short distance below Richmond. He was
| resting and recuperating after the labors and
defeats Of the seven days struggle and was anx-
ious to renew his campaign against Richmond,
using Inc James river as q base. He had 90. 600
men ana h. was urging the government to rein
which jackson had defeated in the spring were
now combined under the command Of General
John Pope and were concentrating ON the line
of the Rappahannock These troops amounted
to 10000 men. In addition Burnside, from
North Carolina, and Cox, from West Virginia,
the Federal government had before it was to
combine and use these forces. aggregating over
10000 men, for an active campaign against
Richmond. Halleck was brought from the
west and placed in chief command. Instead of
sending POpe's troops to Mcclellan, which was
the easier and better thing to do, Halleck de-
cded to transfer McCleIlan's army TO the Rap
pahannock and unite 1t with Pope. Discour-
agement at McClelan's failure and distrust in
MS ability to do BETTER and a preference tor the
line OF operations by which Washington was to
be securely covered, led to the adoption of this
hammock until the junction OF the two armies
could be effected when vigorous aggression
was to be assumed. The results of the fede-
raj strategy were chiefly that Pope was
FORCED II
before any considerable part of McClellan's
troops Joined him; that but $4,000 of these
troops had united with him when he was
brought to battle at Manassas and that thus
one half of the federal forces were separated
from the remainder and terribly defeated. On
the confederate side. in the early part OF July,
Lees army rested in front OF Richmond, after
Its severe and successful struggle with McCle-
Ian. Lee had about 10000 men. all the troops
the cOnfederateS had available TO oppose to the
two armies OF Mcclellan and Pope, so that there
was In front OF Pope at this time but single
brigade of cavalry. When Pope's movements
on the Rappahannock began TO threaten the
railroads connecting Lee with the valley of Vir-
Slnla he was obliged, about the middle OF July,
10 send jackson with IL 900 men to GordOns-
vile. Ten days later Lee sent $4,000 men,
under "A. Z. Hill, to reinforce Jas kson but still
retained the bulk of his forces, O,OOO men, at
Richmond to watch Mcclellan. who, with
10000 men, lay at Westover Jacksons arrival
Pope's cavalry, and when Hill joined him jack
son undertook TO strike quick blow at one OF
ane most exposed parts OF ropes command.
This led to the
BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN,
which resulted in the thorough defeat of Banks
corps. Pope concentrating his troops rapidly,
jackson now retreated to Gordonsville to await
Lees arrival. Lee remained at Richmond I'M
til convinced that it was the policy of the
federal government to transfer Mcclellan from
the James, when he determined, il possible, to
fight Pope before Mcclellan could join him. For
this purpose, leaving 10000 men to hold the
men on August 18th, to join Jackson on the
Rapidan. Pope had advanced to the Rapidan,
his army and trains lying between that river
and the Rappahannock, and Lee fastened at
once to attack. The forces were about equal,
but it Was evidently the confederate policy to
dispose of Pope before Mcclellan could reach
the line of the Rappahannock Decays OF his
transportation and OF his cavalry prevented
Lee from crossing the Rapidan on the 18TH of
August rs he had intended. He was not able
TO move until two days later. Pope, meantime,
hearing OF his design, foiled it by q prompt re-
treat behind the Kappahannock. The second
attempt of Lee to cross the Rappahannock aud
attack Pope's right wing was defeated by ire
mendous storm of rain on the I'D of August,
which flooded the river and made it impa,ss-
bic. But one chance seemed lett OF lighting
Pope alone. 1t required the utmost CELEBRITY,
boldness and skill, and involved prodigious
risks. Lee adopted IL. He threw one halt OF
his army under jackson, on August the 20 til
and 26th, completely in Pope's rear, siezed his
depot at Man assas, broke up his colnmunica-
tons, anu prevented the approach OF any more
rciniOrcements from
MCCLELLAN AT ALEXANDRIA.
OF McClellan's men %, 900 had already Joined
Pope. Pope was compelled to let go the Kappa
hammock aud fall back to Manassas. AS soon
as Pope moved Lee hurried with Longstreets
corps after jackson. Pope, finding the conied-
crate army divided, made prOdis iOuS efforts to
concentrate his forces upon JACKSON ut Ma
nassas aud Overwnelm him before Lee could
get up. Bat Pope was no match ior his skilled
opponent, wnO with less tnan 25OUO lneu 81,
Guided and deceived him that for two d,ys
Pope was pretty much occupied i'll marching
Ills men (Io,OOO) 10 death III Irultless efforts 70
md Jackson. W hen he did overhaul MIN ON the
20tn ii was to lind hin strongly posted near
GroyetOn, where all attempts W drive hin
from his position were defeated for half a day
when Lee with Longstreets corps arrived and
the confederate army was once more united in
the presence vi its adversary. Mex. day, August
3Oth, Pope. having ordered pursuit OF jackson,
whom he iondly Imagined " be flying, brou2 nt
on great battle with Lees army, in which he
Was completely defeated, losing largely OF pris-
Oners and material % war; Driven across Bull
Run at ngntfall he rested at CentreviiIe
where he was joined by two veteran corps from
Mcclellan army. But even with these rein
1orcelnents he was In no condition to
RISK ANOTHER BATTLE,
and therefore withdrew on the I'd of Septem-
Der to the lines OF Washington. Mcclellan was
again placed in command OF the federal army,
and Was able in a snort time to organize from
the large bodies OF troops around Washington
and Alexandria, which had been unensa.ed in
Ropes operations, as we'll as from the debris of
ropes Command, the great army which he
carried 10 SiarpsDurg Lee strategy in the
campaign OF August, 1862. was in all essential
particulars successful. In failing to fight Pope
when he was south of the Rappahannuck he
lost advantages OF victory which could not be
gathered at Manassas, but his final movement.
ny which Pope was cut Off from NJ cClellau
ana defeated while the latter Was but thirty
miles away, was one OF the boldest operations
III military history, as its skillful execution by
jackson was one OF the greatest achievements
OF that soldier.
---->o<-
The Proposed Change OF INAUGURATION
Day.
THE NEW YORK STATE MILITIA MOVING,
AGAINST THE FOURTH OF MARCH