Middlebury register. (Middlebury, Vt.) 1886-1937, 1886-01-08


Soc. Nothing honorable regarded as
honorable is evil; nor anything base, re-
garded as base, good.
AL. Clearly not.
Soc. Look at the matter yet once
more in a further light he who acts hon
orably acts well?
AL. Yes.
Soc. And he who acts well is happy? |
AL. OF course.
Soc. And The happy are those who
obtain good?
AL. True.
Soc. And they obtain good by acting
well and honorably?
AL. Yes.
Soc. Then acting well is a good?
AL. Certainly.
Soc. And the happiness is a good?
AL. Yes.
Soc. Then the good and the honor
able are again identified?
AL. That is evident.
Soc. Then, according to the argument,
shall also find to be good?
AL. Certainly.
Soc. And is the expedient or not?
AL. EXpedient.
Soc. Do you remember our admis-
sions about the just.
AL. Yes; if | am not mistaken we
said that those who acted justly must al
so act honorably.
Soc. And the honorable is the good?
AL. Yes.
soc. And the good is expedent?
AL. Yes.
Soc. Then, Alcibiades, the just is ex-
pedient.
AL. | should infer that.
Soc. And all this prove out of your
own mouth, for | ask and you answer?
AL. | must acknowledge that you
do.
soc. And having acknowledged that
the just is the same as the eXpedient, are
you not (et me ask prepared to ridicule
any one who pretending to understand
the principles of justice and injustice,
gets up to advise the noble Athenians or
the ignoble Peparethians, that the just
may be the evil?
AL. Indeed, Socrates, 1 know not
what am saying. Verify, l am in a
strange state, for when you put questions
to me am of different minds in success
sive instants.
Soc. And are you not aware of the
nature of this perplexity. my friend?
AL. Indeed | am not.
soc. Do you suppose that if some one
were to ask you whether you have two
eyes or three, or two hands or four. or
anything of that sort, you would then
be of different minds in successive in
stants.
AL. l begin to distrust myself, but
do not suppose that should be of differ
ent minds about that.
Soc. You would feel no doubt be-
cause you know?-that would be the
case.
AL. | suppose so.
Soc. And the reason why you invol'
unfairly contradict yourself is clearly
that you are ignorant?
AL. Verify likely
Soc. And if you feel this perplexity
in answering about just and unjust, hon
orable and dishonorable, good and evil
eXpedent, the reason is that you are ig-
norant of them and therefore in perpeXi-
ty. Is not that clear?
AT. agree.
Soc. But is this always the case, and
is a man necessarily perpleXed about that
of which he has no knowledge?
AL. Certainly he is.
Soc. And do you know how to ascend
into heaven?
AL. Certainly not.
Soc. And in this case, too, is your
Judgment perpleXed?
AL. No.
soc. Do you see the reason of this
or shall | tell you?
AL. Tell me.
Soc. The reason is, that you not only
do not know, my friend, but you do moi
think that you know.
AL. What do you mean by that?
Soc. Think for yourself; are you il
any perpleXity about things of which you
are ignorant? You know, for example
that you know nothing about the prepar
alton of food.
AL. Very true.
Soc. And do you think and perple,
yourself about the preparation of food
or do you leave that to some one who un
derstands the art?
AL. The latter.
Soc. Or, if you are on voyage, dc
you bewilder yourself by considering
whether the rudder is to be drawn in
wards or outwards, or do you leave tina
to the pilot, and do nothing?
AL. That would be the concern of tn