Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1886-03-27


that they have been guilty of a capital Of
Tense; and, even when the proof against
them is of this character, they may be adj
mitted to bail within the sound discretion
of the presiding Judge if there be ex-
ceptional circumstances that seem TO de-
mand it
The admission 10 bail. however. where
there is evident proof or great presumption
of guilt of a capital oifense is not q consu-
tutional right, but matter resting in the
sound judicial discretion Of the trial Judge,
who should not grant it. save under extra
ordinary circumstances-such as serious
and probably fatal injury to health, or un-
usual and prOtracted delay upon the part
OF the State in bringing the prisoner to
trial.
What rule should be applied in de-
terminiRg whether the applicant for bail
has negatived the existence of evident
proof or great presumption of the com
mission of capital offense, and has there
by established his constitutional right 10 be
released from imprisonment?
We remark, in the first place, that the
judicial officer who hears the application
conviction that the testimony leaves
upon his own mind He must
give or deny bail according to
his opinion upon the question whether a
case has been made ont which brings the
prisoner within or without the constitu-
tional rule. When We sit in revision of his
judgment, We act upon the conviction made
upon us by a perusal of the testimony con-
tanned in therecord. giving to the judgment
of the inferior officer that primo fdcic pre-
sumption of correctness which attaches to
the judgment of ali Courts of competent
jurisdiction, strengthened in this class of
h. ia, I. Al.
nesses and heard them testify under cir
1 cumstances which made it his duty to at
tend to their bearing and determine their
credibility.
What strength of proof shall be re-
garded as having made guilt evident. or
the presumption of it so great as to bring
the accused within the constitutional eX-
ception, and deprive him of the legal right
to demand enlargement upon bail?
= 1t was sal by the High Court of Errors
and Appeals i'll Moore's case CSC Miss, 1877
142). and again in Beall's case $50 Miss,
7l5), that the Court might admit to bail,
even in cases where the jury might, or
perhaps ought, on the same evidence to
render verdict of guilty for murder Ii
by this it was meant that this Court or the
presiding Judge, on the hearing Of a writ
of habeas corpus. might, IN its discretion
and under the exceptional circumstances
alluded to above, grant bail even though
the relator had not made out a case by
which he was constitutionally entitled to
demand 1t, we approve the remark but if
1t was meant that the applicant, in the alb
sence Of such exceptional circumstances,
can ever be said to have established a legal
right 70 demand enlargement by testimony
which would make it the duty of
jury to convict him OF a cap
ital crime, we dissent from it.
n jury ought not to convict if there is a
reasonable doubt of guilt, and therefore to
say that the accused is constitutionally en-
titled to bail, when there is no reasonable
doubt of his guilt, is manifestly to nullify
the provision of the Bill Of Rights, which
limits the absolute right to cases where the
prove is not evident nor the presumption
great. 1t would be difficult to give mean
ing to these words if they do not embrace
case where guilt has been established
beyond all reasonable doubt"
In Streets case, 43 Miss. 1, %, reference
was made to, and an extract quoted from.
Commonwealth VS.. Keeper of the Prison, ,
Ashmead pa 227, 234 in which the rule
was announced that bail would be denied
in al cases where Court would refuse to
set aside verdict of conviction of capital
crime. This rule, we think, is as plainly
vioative of the organic law, on the other
extreme, as the remark ofthe High Court of
Errors and Appeals in the cases above cited.
VERDICT OF CONVICTION WILL STAND
UNLESS MANIFEsTLY WRONG
A verdict OF conviction where no error
of law has interviewed will never be set
aside unless manifestly wrong or, as is
sometimes said, if there be any evidence
TO support it. TO say that bail will only
be granted where there is no evidence
showing guilt, or where the proof of guilt
IS SO slight upon the whole testimony that
a conviction would be manifestly wrong,
is plainly inconsistent with the constitu-
tional requirement that it shall be granted
in all cases except where the proof is evident
or the presumption great. The error of the
Pennsylvania rule is in failing to give due
effect to verdict of conviction, or in over
looking the vast change it effects in the
attitude of the party. BY it the legal
presumption of innocence is overthrown.
all doubtful questions of fact are
resolved in favor of the State. and the cred
ibility or non-credibility of witnesses is
concluSively established. AS before re-
marked, where no error of law has been
committed to the prejudice Of the accused,
the verdict will not be set aside unless the
Court can say that it is without evidence
to support it, or that upon a review and in
spection of all the evidence the finding is
plainly erroneous. To apply such test to
proceeding for bail, and to declare that it
will be denied unless the relator has
demonstrated that the evidence against
him is of like unsatisfactory character, is
to reverse the constitutional requirement
that itshall be granted unless the proof of
guilt be evident or the presumption great
" We think the true rule is announced in
Wray's case go Miss, 673-6S1), namely,
e , Ill IL. L 10
even be entertained, then the proof cannot
be said to be evident nor the presumption
great and in such case bail must be
granted.
" In announcing our concurrence in the
rule laid down in Wray's case, we are not
to be understood as declaring our approval
of the application of that rule to the facts
of that case, as to which there was a want
of unanimity among the members Of the
Court, but only as adopting the principle
of law which seems 10 have met the undi-
vided assent of that Court, as it does our
own.
Upon an application for bail by writ of
habeas corpus, the burden is upon the re-
lator to show that he is illegally deprived
of his liberty; and the officer hearing the
case should require the production of all
the available testimony for the prosecution.
ana should, IT necessary, postpone the hear
ing until il can be obtained If upon the
whole testimony adduced before him, he
entertains a reasonable doubt whether the
relator committed the act or whether in so
doing he was guilty of capital crime he
should admit him TO bail in such sum and
with such sureties as will, in his opinion,
certainly insure his appearance If bail is
refused, and the matter comes before us for
review, We shall apply the same rule keep
ing in mind the prima facie legal presump-
ton that the action of the Judge below was
correct"
BAIL WILL BE GRANTEp EVEN WHERE A
JURY MAY CONVICT.
The case of Moore vs.. the State, SO Mis-
sissippi, page 1l2, is very short case. and
| will read the whole of it. The Court
said
On examination of the evidence in the
cause, now appearing on the record. we
think 1t perhaps most consistent with the
liberal policy of our Constitution and laws.
to allow this application for bail We re-
frain from any comment on the testimony.
or the expression of any opinion as to the
guilt of the accused, or the degree of his Of
tense. We do not intend to intimate an
opinion that he may not be guilty of muir
der, or that he may not be wholly inno-
cent. This will be the province of the illrv
who shall hear the evidence We wish it
understood that, on application for BAIL we
may grant the application even in cases