New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1886-12-12

entire command Of the city and of tho troops
falling back upon it from the front.
He instructed me to take steps at once to stop
and collect the straggles, to place the works In
proper state of defence and to go out to and
take command of the army when 1t approached
the vicinity of the works then to put the troops
in the best position for defence-committing every
thing to my hands The President left me with
many thanks and showing much feeling
On the same day o formal order was issued CIV
ing Mcclellan command Of all the fortihcatlon
of Washington and Of all the troops for the defence
of the capital" This the only order ever pub
lished extending his command. Mr.. Prime doubts
whether Mr. Lincolns attention was called to the
existence of this order. "for it is remarkable
fact that. when he finally consented to dispace
Mcclellan he gave the order that he be relieved
from the command of the Army of the Potomac
q command which Gen. Mcclellan had not held
by any authority since August 30" MIR. Prime Is
mistaken Mcclellan was not relieved nom inc
command of the Army Of the Potomac by the order
of August 30 His troops were temporarily de-
tached and sent to Pope, but he was never relieved
from the command until his final retirement alter
the Antietam campaign. Neither was Pope lot
maly relieved after his defeat. When ne In
ouired of Hallecl. on the 9Th of September, "What
is my command, and where Is IL ne was an
swercd, "Ihe armies of the Potomac and Virginia
the Secretary Of War
Mr.. Stanton was violently opposed to McCleE
lans rsuming control. and the order OF septem-
Der was the subject Of an exciting discussion In
the Cabinet, when the President declared that the
order was his and that he would be responsible Tor
it to the country. The truth is that what forced
Nc Clellan back into the actual command was the
hopeless ineficiency of Halleck. The manage
ment of the Gener.aland- Chief had been miserable
from the outset and in the hour OF emergency he
developed an ignorance Of the situation which for
extent and variety has rarely been equalled by the
incumbent OF such a position. Under all the cir
cumstances Mcclellan was the only resource OF
the Government. His ability, within certain linn
it's was beyond question: his personal popularity
in the army was as valuable in that time OF panic
as a reinforcement Of several good divisions and
although Mr.. Stanton regarded his RESTORATION
as great public misfortune-woIse, he is reported
TO have said than the fall of the capitalthe Pres
ident in this instance judged more wisely than his
patriotic but often violent and prejudced minister
Mr. Prime of course implies that Stanton's oppo-
sition was only another development of his porten
tous radical plot to sacrifice the capital and de-
stroy an army Of one hundred thousand men In
order to kill McClenan's influence. But it is be-
yond question that Stanton had always regarded
McClellans plan Of campaign against Richmond
with downright dread. Very few imagined that
lie was timid man but Grant understood that
trait in his character and described it admirably
in his Memoirs "1he Secretary" he says. "was
very timid and it was impossible for him to avoid
interfering with the armies covering the capital
when it was sought to defend it by an offensive
movement against the army guarding the Coined
crate capital He could see weakness, but he
could not that the enemy was in danger. The
enemy would not have been in danger if Mr.. Stan
ton had been in the field"
So Mcclellan went earnestly TO work to gather
up Popes fragments and make the capital safe.
Mr. Prime says that HalleclS still forbade him to
go beyond the Notifications, but that when Pope
and Mcdowell abandoned the defeated army, "he
left the Notifications and the orders of Gen. Hal
ecll behind him, and crossed country TO the sound
of the enemy's cannon" This is an exaggeration
of McClellans own story, and is rreconcable
with the tone Of his private letters but it is inter
est nc Illustration of the danger Of trusting
MIR, Prime IIalleck gave no such order and Nc
Clellan left orders behind him. What did oc-
cur is told in the following extract from the Nc
moirs:
In a very short time 1 had made all the requi-
site preparations and was about to start to the
front in person TO assume command as far as pos
sible when message came to me from Gen. Hal
lecll informing me that it was the Presidents or
der that should not assume command until the
troops had reached the immediate vicinity Of the
Notifications
therefore waited until the afternoon. when
rode out to the most advanced of the detached
works covering the capital.
/ had with me Colburn, Key, and some other
aides with small cavalry escort. and rode at
once to MunsOn's Hill. About the time l reached
there the infantry OF Kinys division of Mellow
ellis corps commenced arriving, and halted them
and ordered them into position Very soon
W
peared marching by twos and sandwiched in the
midst were Pope and Mcdowell with their staff
officers. / never saw more helpless looking head
quarters. About this time rather heavy artillery
firing heard in the distance, When these
generals rode up to and the ordinary saluta-
| tons had passed. | inquired what that artillery
| firing WAS, Pope replied that it was no doubt
| that of the enemy against Sumner who formed the
| rear guard and was to march by the Vienna and
| langley road. He also intimated that Sumne
| Sas probably in a dilemma He could give ne
information Of any importance in relation to
Vno whereabouts OF Different corps, except in
a most indefinite way ; had evidently not troubled
| his head in the slightest about the movements of
| his army in retreat, AMI had coolly preceded the
troops, leaving them 10 get out of the scrape as
best they could. He and Mcdowell both asked
my permission to go on to Washington to which
| assented, remarking at the same time that l was
going to that artillery firing. They then took
leave and started for Washington. / have never
since seen Pope.
Immediately l dispatched all my aids and or
dcrlies with instructions to the troops coming
in by the Alexandria and Central roads. retaining
only Colbuln with me. borrowed three orderlies
| from some cavalry at hand, and, accompanied by
| them and ColbuIn, started across country rap
| idly as possible to reach the Langley road. By
the time reached that road the firing had ceased,
with the exception of perhaps a dropping shot
| occasionally 1t after dark-I think there
was moonlight-by the time met the first troops,
which were. l think. of Morrell's division 9Th
! Corps; Porter had gone little while before
to make arrangements for the bivouac Of his
troops. l was at once recognized by the men,
upon which there great cheering and ex-
citement but when l came to the regular divis-