Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-10-17
RUSSIA'S STRENGTH.
prsxAacKy ATTITUDE NOT ONE OF
MERE SENTIMENT.
The Northern Powers Military supori-
ority-AConfict in Asia Probable
highlands Weakness.

saws: II Is generally conceded that u
Prince Alexander, OF Battenberg, was
abandoned by those Of whose support ne
had received an assurance, this desertion
was due TO the positive refusal Of the Ger
man Emperor 10 engage IN another war.
II f. also generally conceded that this re-
fusa on the part OF the aged sovereign was
from affection for his nephew, The Czr,
&c. But sentiment really has very little
weight in politics; az least II has had very
little during the last hundred years. Aus
tfia did not come 10 the aid OF Napoleon L.,
though daughter OF her Emperor sat upon
The throne OF France. The relationship
N Victor Emmanuel to the Grand Duke OF
Tuscany and the King of Naples did not
prevent The annexation Of their States, nor
even the confjscation OF the per sonal effects
Of IeopoId and Francis by the Re Gdtdnfu-
o7oo. Who later manifested no gratitude To
the man who had made him present of all
ltsIy. There was something more than
sentimental consideration which induced
Prince Bismarck TO draw in his horns and
Weld N the request OF his old master,
whose hand he could and would have
forced In some way II he had not
thought IL more prudent TO avoid hos.
Utilities. For twenty years past the hand OF
Bismarck has pulled the wires Tor all
Europe's puppets, but there Is reason 10
suppose that he feels less sure OF his ability
TO control events than heretofore. A Few
articles in the Russian press threatening
Franco-Russian alliance sutilced TO produce
an entire change In German policy. Ger
many and Russia are now rather allies than
enemies: neither will help the other,
and siavlsm remains as antagonstic to
Germanism as IL has always been. But
the issue OF war is generally doubt
full, and though the French continue
TO remain unready. Germanophobla Is on
the increase among them, and, in the event
OF collision with Russia. the French army
on the German rear would not be negligi.
BILE factor. II might, and probably would
be, again defeated; but to NEE: II would
necessitate the deplOyment OF a large frac-
ton Of the German army, and Prince Bis
marck knows full well that every man 10
Fatberlard, and more, too, will be neces-
sary for even the genius OF Won Moltke 10
cone successfully with the Bear.
AsI wrote last month, just previous 10
the Bulgarian coup P<tdf, commenting
upon the absence OF any representative OF
one OF TIE Triumvirs at the Gastein Con-
ference, Russia proposed to show 10 her
former colleagues that she could exist with
out the triple alliance, and, rejecting upon
the probability that she could so exist, the
Chancellor Of Iron preferred TO bow before
the Gar rather than break up the triumvi-
rate, neither England nor Italy being con-
sidered as an equivalent for the loss OF the
great northern power. Prince Won Bis
marck hates Russia, but Berlin's new Gov
ernor. General, Won Werder, was for many
,,,,litaru nffHeHL of ~
Petersburg, and from him he has learned
that the Cars pretensions TO act inde'
pendent of all foreign control are rot ex-
aggerated. General Won Werder has fol-
lowed carefully the wonderful develop
ment OF Russia's military forces since 1870,
and his advice has doubtless been: Don't !!
In the course OF the last sixteen years
the Russian infantry mas been nearly dou-
bled. and the regular cavalry has been re-
inforced hy 104 -quadronS. The army
Of the first line, inclusive OF its Cos
sack contingent, is composed oil $50 Dattal-
ions, COS squadrons, and 3j2 batteries, FORM
ing total OF ,29l 900 troops OF all arms
The reserve, with the first and second ban
of COssacks, can put into The field o29 Dat
laions, so squadrons, and ZIG batteries
total, G64.000 men; and 1t must be noted
that this reserve consists OF well-drllledand
well. ofiicered veterans, perfectly capable
OF fighting IN the first line and not to be
COMPOUNDED with the 6SS battaions and y
sauadrons OF the territorial militia, which
can only be called out by special imperial
ukdSe. Exclusive OF the territorial militia
and inclusive OF the naval forces, the mo-
bilizabe masses OF which Russia can dis
pose equal PASS, 900 combatants. A detail
OF importance TO be remarked In connec-
ton with the Russian military organization
is the immense proportion OF its cavalry
element, which represents 1,l3O squad
rons-60S in the first and 522 in the second
line. II must be remarked also that the
cavalry in Russia is genuine institu-
tjop. and not ut all an institution on
paper, as many are inclined to repre-
sent. The Russian cavalry soldier is
not a recruit stuck on the outside OF
q horse, possibly never having bestridjen
q horse before he was conscripted. lie
has ridden horse from his earliest child
hood, and when he leaves the colors, after
the expiration OF his term OF service, he
mounts at home, and, until too old to
leave his fireside, passes fully half his time
in the saddle. According to the plan
presented and executed by the Russian
Minister OF War-Count Miliontine-
the entire cavalry is being transformed
into mounted infantry-an idea bor'
rowed from the Circassians. say those
who forget, If they ever knew, that
this institution was first practiced
In America during our civil war, and was
much Knocked at then by certain brilliant
British military critics, who suggested also
the introduction OF mounted troops into our
navy. 1t Is possible, however, that In TINS
case the men Of Daghestan were, for Russia
the inspirers OF the innovation which, In
| the first instance, was adopted by the Cos
sacks, and gradually has been imposed or
| the tactics of the whole Russian army
II is not likely TO be applicable II
| countries where, a. France and Italy, thu
| ground Is cut up with hedges, fences, anc
| bitches, but IL secures wonderful superb
| ority to the Power able to use 1t on th'
vast plains OF Prussia, Poland, and Russia
| 1t requires a great number OF horses and
| great number OF mea who can ride, and
Russia can dispose OF both. In France 'h'
sadde.horse has amost-comparatlyely
speaking, Of course-disappeared to make
| way for the draught horse, and the French
| man. as arule. cannotride, so no such organ
ization here Is possible, and, although Ger
| many in both respects Is superior % hei
| old enemy, she is inferior in both to
her northern rival. The disproportion
| is indeed colossal; 1,130 squadron'
| OF regular cavalry on the one side
against the $40 that Germany can
muster. and this difference Is quite enough
| in itself TO explain why the latter Power
would not venture upon war OF plains
| where she must be exposed TO the SAME
1 ..t, laa tha of Fred
erick the Great after his triumph at Ros
bach. And. IN addition, Russia has ut heT
| dismissal all the cavalry OF her Asian hordes
which would swarm upon her enemy =
TANKS, irregularly IL you will, always Ger
tain OF defeat when met by regulars, Du
for all that dangerous and annoying, no
unlike in their tactics the Indians OF ouI
| western possessions.
Even surprising an effective alliance o
Germany with Austria, the combined
armies OF those two empires scarcely eqna
the number OF Russian infantry, and are no
equal to one half OF the number Of Russian
cavalry, which would crush their cavalr,
by superiority OF numbers, and, then bein;
drilled as infantry, could always fight oil
ground of its own choosing. IL is urge,
that money, the sinews OF war, being lack
ing 10 Russia, she could not 90 10 war. Thi
Is mistake; Russia has quite enough col
where coin is necessary, and we have la
frequent examples where paper currenc
supplied the deficiency Of gold. There wa
not a great deal of metal at the service q
either North or South at the time OF our N
ternecine difficulties, and Germany wa
very impecunious in 1870. But Franc
then paid the wars expenses, aud Russi
hopes TO ind in Germany not only tn
French miliards. but more still, and |