The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1886-07-14

was not timd, and he was willing to trust
his generals in making and executing their
plans. The secretary was very timid, and
it was impossible for him to avoid interior
ing with the armies covering the capital
when it was sought to defend it by an often
sive movement against the army guarding
the confederate capital.
General Grant leaves it to be inferred
that he did not entertain an exalted
opinion of the military abilities of Gen
eral Lee, and thinks he was over
estimated In another passage he says:
"There were good and true officers
who believe now that the Army of
Northern Virginia was superior to the
Army of the Potomac, man to man. /
do not believe so, except as the adj
vantage spoken of above made them
so. Before the end believe the differ
ence was the other way. The Army of
Northern Virginia became respondent
and saw the end it did not please
them, The national army saw the same
thing, and were encouraged by it,"
Grants opinion of General Joseph f.
Johnston was much higher In speak
ing of the latter's tactics in the cam
paign of 1864, which led to Johnston's
being superseded by Hood, he says
"I think that Johnston S tactics were right
anything that could have prolonged the war
beyond the time that it did finally close
would have exhausted the North to such an
extent that they might then have aban-
doned the contest and agreed to a separa-
ton" And in another passage he says,
even more strongly: "I think that Johns
tons policy was the best one that could
have been pursued by the whole South
protract the war-which was all that was
necessary to enable them to gain recogni-
ton in the end. The North was already
growing weary, as the South evidently was
also, but with this difference: In the North
the people governed, and could stop hostil-
tiles whenever they chose to stop supplies.
The South was military camp, controlled
absolutely by the government, with soldiers
to back it, and the war could have been
protracted, no matter to what extent, up to
! the point of open mutiny of the soldiers
themselves.
We have no space for other extracts
from this interesting volume. The ex-
ultation which he felt at the first
notification of surrender Immediately
changed almost to sadness and de-
preston as he thought of the disap-
pointment of the men who had fought
bravely, though in a mistaken cause.
He went to meet General Lee in rusty
uniform of private, with only the
straps to mark his rank, and reflected
afterwards upon the contrast which he
presented to the handsomely attired
and equipped commander of the oppos-
ing forces. When they began their
talk, they soon drifted away to remin-
iscences of West Point and army life,
and were so absorbed that they almost
forgot the errand which had called
them together. The famous terms of
surrender-them most magnanimous, per-
haps, ever accorded under circumstances
at all parallel-were written outhastily,
without time for deliberation.
1t is interesting to note General
Grants opinion of the generals with
whom he served. OF Hancock he
speaks in high terms. Hooker's
achievement at Chattanooga was, he
considers, brilliant, but he always
looked upon him as dangerous man;
"he was not subordinate to his superb
ors; he was ambitious to the extent of
caring nothing for the rights of others. "
Burnside, he says, was generally liked
and respected, but was not fitted to
command an army. Meade was an Off
Ger of great merit, and was "subor-
dinate to his superiors in rank to the
extent that he could execute an order
which changed his own plans with the
same zeal he would have displayed
if the plan had been his own" OF
Halleck he had poor opinion, but
for that he had abundant reason and
provocation.