The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-01-26

Abstracts of Opinions Rendered by the
Justices Yesterday.

Abstracts of Opinions Rendered by the
justices Yesterday.
WASHINGTON, Jan. 25.-The Supreme Court
of the United States to-day rendered the follow
ing decisions:
No. 985 The United States We. Dewitt c.
Redgrave; appeal from the Court of Claims.
Redgrave. in June, 1881, graduated from
the United States Naval Academy as cadet en-
gineers and was detached from the Academy
and entered into active service. Up to Aug. 5,
1882, he received the pay of q graduate cadet en-
giaeer and from that date I'D to June 80, 1883.
when he was discharged, pursuant to the act of
Aug. 5, 1882, he only received the pay of q
naval cadet He brought suit in the Court Of
Claims to recover the difference between what
ms received and the pay of a cadet engineer. 1t
was contended on the part Of the United States
that, by virtue Of the provisions of the act of
Aug. 5. 1882 Redgrave became a naval cadet,
not having completed his course of study at the
Academy. but being an undergraduate at the
time of the passage Of that act The Court OF
Claims decided in Redgrave's favor and the Su-
preme Court of the United States afirms that
Judgment
Perkins; appeal from the Court of Claims. This
case differs from that Of Redgrave only in that
Perkins claimed pay after his discharge, protest
ing that the order discharging him was Illegal
The question raised that although the DIS
charge may not be justified by the act of Aug
5. 1862. the Secretary of the Navy irrespective
of that act had lawful power to discharge him
from the service at will This authority was
claimed on the ground that he was not an officer
in the naval service. within the meaning OF the
section of the Revised Statutes which provides
that no officer in the military naval service
shall. in time of peace be discharged from serv-
vice except by sentence OF a court-martial. The
Court of Claims held that cadet engineers are
officers and not employees, and rendered judg-
ment in Perkins's favor The Supreme Court
affirnls that judgment
No. AZ f. S. Coe, plaintiff in error, VS.. The
Town Of Enrol; in error to the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire. The plaintiff and Others
residents OF Maine and Massachusetts. owned a
large number of spruce logs that had been
drawn down from Wentworths Location in New
Hampshire, to the town of Enrol, to be thence
,foated down the Androscoggin river to the State
of Maine, to be manufactured and sold While
the logs remained at Enrol, the selectmen of the
town appraised them for taxation and assessed
thereon State, county, town and school taxes.
Another lot Of logs belonging to Coe. which had
been cut in the State Of Maine, and were on
their way TO lewiston Me-, and which were
detained in the town of Enrol by low water, were
also assessed for taxes The plaintiff filed a
petition in the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire for an abatement of taxes. That
court decided that the tax assessed upon the
legs cut in the State of Maine be abated
and that upon the logs cut in New Hampshire be
sustained. The petitioner took bill of excep-
lions, and upon writ of error carried the case
to the Supreme Court OF the United States. The
question in the case is whether the products of a
State are liable to be taxed like other property
within the State though intended for exporta-
ton 70 another State, and partially prepared for
that purpose by being deposited at place of
shipment, such products being owned by persons
residing in another State Justice Bradley de-
livered the opinion of the court. He held that,
until actually launched on its way to another
State. or committed to a common carrier for
transportation to such State, the destination of
the property is not fixed and GER
tain. Carrying it to the depot is
only an interior movement entirely within
the State, and only for the purpose of putting it
into course of expectation and is no part of
she expectation itself Until shipped or started
on its final journey out of the State. Its exporta-
ton is matter altogether ifere, and not at all
fixed and certain thing. Property husstuated,
he held. can be taxed as all other property is
taxed in the place where it is found, if taxed or
assessed for taxation at the usual time and man
ner in which such property is taxed, and not
singled out to be assessed by itself at unusual
and exceptional time because of its destination.
If taxed in the usual manner that all other sim
liar property is taxed, and at the same rate, and
subject to like conditions and regulations, the
tax is valid. These conditions having been COM
piled with in the present case, the judgment of
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire is af-
lfrmed
The Chief-justice announced that the court
would adjourn on Monday next, Feb. l, TO the
first Monday in March next