National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1886-01-07
As to an Exccntire rolicy.

As to an Executive Policy.
1t was not the intention Of the fathers Of
our republic that the Executive should have
any policy or use any influence inconsistent
with the theory of the absolute independ-
ence of the legislative department. The au-
thors Of the fundamental law intended that
the legislative and the judicial departments
should be alike free, in the discharge Of their
respective duties, from any sense of obliga-
tlon to crafty the wishes or advance the
purposes of the Executive. II would be
little, II any, less dangerous or less viola
tive Of the principles Of the constitution II
the Executive were to attempt coercion Of
the legislative department than IL such an
attempt were made against the freedom OF
the judiciary No man can have studied the
constitution intclligently who has not
learned that its intent is TO leave each Of the
three great branches Of our trlune system
Independent Of the others, so that the max
ing, the interpreting, and the execution of
the laws shall each be attended to without
fear or favor and in accordance with the
honest Judgment Of the public servants in
trusted with these distinct and separate du-
tics.
IL Is true that the veto power is lodged
in the hands Of the Executive, making him,
in some sense, part of the legislative
mechanism. But his legislative connec-
tion with bill begins after II has passed
both hoLses of Congress. To assume that
he might properly use the influence, the
power, and patronage of the executive
Office to control the initial and successive
steps of legislation, would be to reverse
the theory OF our government. IL the
fathers had desired the establishment OF the
one-man power they would have put it in
simpler and more sensible shape, and would
have called 1t by some such name as Dicta.
tor.
The people and the states elect represent
atives and senators. These legislators get
their authority from their constituencies,
and are directly responsible TO them and
them alone. But the Executive is held re-
sponsible to the people through the peoples
servants. lie may beindicted by the peo-
ple's immediate representatives and tried
by the representatives Of the states. Under
the constitution all power comes from the
people. The individual voter is the unit Of
use his office to shape the laws, what would
he the use ofthcsc units And II he might
thus legislate, why clog hiswo with so
costly and cumbrous an arrangement as the
Congress Why not let him make the
laws directly instead Of indlrectly9
But" 1t may he suggested, "why did
the fathers put into the constitution a pro-
| vision requiring the President to recon-
mend to Congress such measures as he
shall judge necessary and eXpedient,' II his
office Is not to be used In shaping legisla-
tionfn The answer is almost obvious. The
official charged with the execution Of the
laws is the person most likely TO see what
changes may be advantageously made.
Varying conditions, resulting from the prog
ress Of civilization and the introduction Of
new inventions, necessitate statutory
| changes. The head Of the executive de-
partment is the official who should be best
qualified to state to the lawmakers what
new statutes or amendments of existing
laws are needed. 1t Is rs an expert that he
speaks ON such occasions. His opinion is
entitled to most respectful consideration.
But no individual legislator is bound TO ac.
cept that opinion as conclusive, nor can any
legislator free himself from the duty of in.
vcstigating for himself, so that his vote
shall rest on his own judgment based on his
own knowledge.
1t is not possible to conceive of greater
dclusion than the theory that President
should have policy us to measures to be
enacted during his term of office, and
should undertake the bestowal of rewards
and punishments on Legislators with a view
to carrying out such policy. Such theory
degrades the executive and legislative de
partments alike, and would inevitably de
stroy the government.
As the number Of federal offices increases
from year to year, to meet the increasing
wants Of our wonderful growth, the neces
sity becomes more and more urgent for
careful observance of the lines of demaria
tion between the three departments of gov
emment. A failure of these department,
to conflne themselves each to its own sphere
/. in other words TO mind their own business
would tend rapidly toward a chaotic con
dition. A President who would use thu
patronage of the executive department tc
make friends of or concllate enemies of any
measure, or any line Of policy, would be {
dangerous enemy TO the republic.
What we have stated above is, like thu
constitution, adapted to any and all time
and to all parties. 1t has no more peril
nency of application to existing conditions
than 1t had to the conditions of year or
decade ago, or than 1t will have to the con
ditions of future years. 1t is plain trutl
plainly stated, but it is directly at varlanc,
with much of the speculations of numerous
esteemed contemporaries.