The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1886-06-16
SUPREME COURT CASES.
Reported for The Clarion BY w. H Harper
Attoraey-st-Law, Jackson, Miss
April Term-Iss6.
/. C. R. R. Co..

&c. r. r. Co.,
v.
De Writ G. JORDAN.
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Attal-
la county. Hon. c. I'll. Campbell,
Judge.
De Witt G. Jordan, as next friend of
G.. 5. P. Jordan, brought this action for
damages against the Illinois Central
Railroad Company for the killing of
mare belonging to the said G. S. P. Jor-
dan. 1t was shown on the trial that the
mare was killed by the train of the de-
PENDANT within the corporate limits of
the town of Kosciusko, and that the
train was running at greater rate of
speed than six miles per hour just before
the killing, but just at the instant of
killing at perhaps less rate. The defen-
dant offered to show that the place
where the mare was killed was in a thin
ly populated woodland district, but the
court refused TO admit such testimony.
The jury found for the plaintiff, and the
defendant appealed.
ARNOLD, J., delivered the opinion of the
Court.
HeId-That appellant is liable for the
| value of the animal, unless the restric-
ton imposed ty sec. 1047, Code of 1880,
on the speed of locomotives and cars
passing through towns, is limited to the
improved and inhabited portions of such
towns, and does not apply to the entire
passage through their corporate limits.
On the face of the statute no such limi-
tation is suggested. incorporated towns,
cities and villages are not expressly des-
ignated in the statute, but they seem to
be implied from the provision that suit
may be brought in the name of any
town, city or village in which the stat
ute is violated, to recover the penalty
prescribed for such violation. Unless il
be assumed that it was the purpose OF
the lawmakers to confer this right upon
a nonentity in law, incapable of suing OF
being sued, incorporated towns, cities
and villages must be intended.
The statute subordinates the advan
tages of rapid transportation to the pub
lie safety, in communities where prop
erty and population are aggregated. The
true view is, as said in Y. 4 NJ. r. K
Co. V. MCGOWAN, 60 Miss, 682, that the
statute was passed for the protection OF
life and property, with reference to the
known danger to both, in cities, towns
or villages, from the rapid motion of To-
comotives and cars. PROFESSIONALLY
protection from such danger is more re.
liable and etfectual when she speed OF
cars and locomotives is regulated by le-
| gally defined corporate boundaries, than
when left to the Irregular and varying
lines of settlement and improvement.
IF it can be done, the statute must be
construed SO as to accomplish the object
intended by its trainers. 1t is not in
consistent with the terms, and COMFORTS
both with the spirit and object of the
statute to apply its provisions to organ
| lied, incorporated towns, cities and vii
lagos, including the territory embraced
in their limits as fixed by law.
1t does not appear from the record
that the corporate limits of Kosciusko
are so large and disproportionate to its
| population and the wants and necessi-
| ties of its citizens, as to seriously affect
| the interests of commerce passing
through it from delays occasioned by
| observing the requirements of the stat
ute, nor that the running of locomotives
| and cars therein is regulated, as in the
cases cited for appellants, merely by an
unreasonable city ordinance. We are of
opinion that the objection to the testi-
mony offered to show the character OF
that part of the town where the animal
was killed, was properly sustained.
46irmed.
w. P. & ]. B. Harris, for the appel
liant.
Haden & Dodds, for the appellee