The Indiana State sentinel., 1886-01-06
A PRACTICAL SOLUTION.

the causes and cure of the commercial stag
nation. 1t will bear the most critical
scrutiny. There is an absence of abstraction
on mere questions of theory, and there is no
unpreiudiced reader but who will be struck
with the soundness of his views and the
practical manner with which the difficulties
are disposed.
He resolves the question into two, one of
them depending upon our trade with South
America and its advantage to those States
and the other pertains to the commercial
marine and mail and freight facilities that
must connect us directly with them. OF
the first his suggestion for Congress of the
South American States and this country to
establish the value of silver, and general
standard that would be current in all the
countries who are party to the congress, is
one that can be studied with profit and
applied easily in practice. That
the commercial nations of Europe have
agreed to demonetize a legal tender that is
opposed to the interests of all the younger
and debtor nations is in itself sufficient
reason why those nations should unite in
defense of those interests and the legal ten
der values of the currency they have adopted
and by which those interests are measured.
All questions of currency depend upon
trade. The trade hostility of Europe
toward this country is only profitable when
they can buy elsewhere, without ourselves
being in position to retaliate. England has
opposed India to our wheat while yet we
buy enormous amounts of tropical produc-
tions that we can buy as easily from South
and Central America. 1t should be our
obvious policy to oppose South America to
Indian spices, medicines and dye stulfs. If
we apply precisely the same principle to-
ward silver that Europe has applied toward
gold we should follow the most manifest
dictates OF common sense, and it is in our
way to accomplish this thing easily and
effectually.
1t must not be presumed that we can en-
ter policy that is so opposed to European
interests without struggle. All the arts of
dipl omacy would be exhausted to prevent
American goods from obtaining a foothold,
and, in fact the policy would not succeed
except in concurrence with the second pro-
position of Mr.. Landers, to establish a line
of steamers from our ports direct to South
America. This must be done. 1t should be
done at once. 1t is unwise to await a time
when it will pay private investors to embark
unaided in struggle for an American ma
rine. The time will never come. English,
French and German lines would never
allow it to become possible. The country is
losing every week, from want of these steam
ers, more than it would cost to equip and
maintain half a dozen frst-claSs vessels.
There Is not now the trade that would justify
a purely private investment; there never
will be a trade to justify it so long as we con-
tinue to ship by way of Europe, and con-
tinue 10 maintain, by exhorbitant mail
and freight charges, the very lines that are
doing their utmost to prevent US from get
ting into this trade. We are paying foreign
vessel owners much higher rates of freight
and carriage than they charge the dealer of
Liverpool, Havre or Bremen, besides an
extra mileage equal to twice the distance
across the Atlantic.
We could buy at present with profit from
South America amounting to two hundred
millions annually, and we could probably
sell equivalent to half that amount and
when it is remembered that both sections
are rapidly growing, it may be seen that in
a few years the trade would grow into man.
moth proportions, and it would come about
in a few years that any reasonable number of
vessels would find steady and profitable en-
ployment in the carrying trade without
special assistance or subyenIion
The United States have entered upon a
new period of existence. In its development
it has reached a condition similar to that of
Europe, and it must enter the struggle with
Europe with the same energy and, in some
measure, by similar means When the mere
possession of market is considered ample
grounds for the undertaking of costly wars
by European powers, it may readily be seen
that we must exert means that, if it does
not lead to actual war, will require a strong
diplomacy and a liberal use of money.
We do not go so far as to state that we con-
slider that the policy outlined would open
direct hostilities with one or more European
powers. All the battles are not won with
bayonets. But that a certain adaptation of
means to ends must be used, and those
means entail a navy and national CONNER
cial marine, and require an expenditure of
money.
With a strong foreign policy, an efficient
navy, and strong line OF mail steamers, in
connection with the vast trade interests
which would inevitably attract the interests
of the South American States, nothing
would be easier to bind them TO us with the
strong ties of similar interests and of certain
profits. Although we. buy of South Ameri-
ca a couple of hundred millions annually,
we buy Il through English and French fac
tories, and it is the English and French who
get the credit of trade from the people of
South America instead of us, who pay
double profit on these transactions. 1t is a
humiliating position. 1t is becoming intol-
erable.
This is by far the most powerful Nation in
the world, either in population, wealth, or
natural energy. Our own necessities; the
very stability of our institutions compels us
to keep our great population employed.
There is not tie room nor the means of em-
rlovmant resident in our own borders and