The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1886-04-22
A HERO AMONG HEROES.

A HERO AMONG HEROES.
The Tribute Of Federal Soldier to the
Military Genius of "the Most Able Lieu
tenant of our Civil War"
The fourth lecture of series on the
Civil war at the Lowell Institute, Boston,
was delivered some time ago BY Col.
Theodore A. Dodge, one of the best
known men in Boston military circles.
He served constantly in the Army o. the
Potomac, lin every volunteer regimental
rank up to that of colonel,) from the
Peninsula, where he was with Kearney,
through Pope's and Burnside's campaigns,
and at Charlottesville and Gettysburg.
The subject of Col. Dodge's lecture
was "Chancellorsville," and particularly
the great flank movement of stonewall
Jackson which turned the tide of war on
the memorable second day Of May, 1862.
Col. Dodge related in detail the move,
ments of the Army of the Potomac
which led to their assuming position at
Charlottesville and gives the position
of the two armies when they confronted
each other on the day of the great battle
between Lee and Hooker. Col. Dodge
says:
The Army of the Potomac on Friday
night lay huddled in the chapparal
around Charlottesville, instead of oc.
cupying, as they might, well-defned
position on the open ground in front of
Banks's ford. Gradually during the
night the several corps drifted, weary
and disheartened at this unexplained
check in the midst of success, into the
position which they had taken up after
crossing the river, without any idea of
fighting there. The line was thus hap
hazard one, on the worst conceivable
ground, where cavalry was useless, artil-
lery confined to the roads or to few
open spaces, and infantry hidden or par
alyzed.
During this night, while the Army of
Northern Virginia was moving into po-
sition in front of its gigantic, but ap-
parently unnerved enemy, Lee and jack
son developed plan for an attack upon
our right; which, though posted on high
ground, was really in the air. Lee may
have originated the plan, but it bears a
distinctly Jacksonian flavor; and, sure
ly, without such lieutenant to execute
it Lee would never have dreamed of
making such risky move. The plan
gave Jackson about $4,000 men with
which to undertake march around our
right flank to a position where he might
cut us off from United States Ford. 1t
was ultra. a.hazardous, for it separated q
small army in the presence of a large
one. 1t was justiiable only on the
ground that Hooker evidently meant to
retain the defensive; that the movement
would be screened from his eye by the
woods; that there seemed no more avail
able plan; that some immediate action
was demanded. Had it failed, it would
have met the censure of every soldier.
No maxim of tactics applies to it so well
as the proverb, Nothing venture, moth.
ing have"
Although Jackson's corps had been on
foot and partially engaged for some
thirty hours, the men set out on this new
march with cheerful alacrity. They
could always follow "Old Jack" with
their eyes shut. Stuart's cavalry masked
the advance. Jackson did not know
that his column would have to pass some
open ground in full view of our line at
Dowdall's until too late to have it follow
better concealed route. Early Saturday
morning the movement was discovered
by the Sd corps, and a reconnaissance
was pushed out to embarrass its advance.
After some trouble and slight and sue.
cessful attack, Birney ascertained and
reported that Jackson was moving over
to our right. The conclusion which
Hooker drew from this fact was appar.
emily that Lee was retreating. Jackson,
meanwhile keeping Sickles busy with a
small rear guard, advanced along the
Brock road until, toward afternoon, he
was abreast and in the rear of our right
flank. While he WAS thus massiDg his
men to take the Army of the Potomac in
reverse, Hooker continued to authorize
sickles to deplete the threatened wing
by sending large part of its available
strength Barlow, Birney, Whipple and
Geary in part-some $4,000 men) out
into the woods in the hope of capturing
the force which had long ago eluded his
grasp aud was ready to fall upon our
rear. Hooker's right flank of barely
10000 men was completely isolated.
And yet, though scouts, pickets and an
actual attack at $3.50 p. m. proved beyond
peradventure Jackson's presence at this
point, Hooker allowed this flank to be
held by an untried corps composed of
the most heterogeneous and untrust-
worthy elements in the Army of the
Potomac.
This march of Jackson's might at
first blush have been construed by Hook
er to be either a retreat or strategic
march by Lee to new ground, or to be q
threatened flank attack. Either would
have been accompanied by the same
tactical symptoms which now appeared.
If the former, Hooker had his option to
attack at an early or late period, more or
less vigorously, as might appear best to
him. Hooker afterward claimed that be
believed in the flank attack. But the
testimony of his dispatches at the time
finds him riding both horses, and he
acted on the retreat theory. At $50 a.
m. he had notified Slocum and Howard