Crawford avalanche. (Grayling, Mich.) 1879-19??, 1886-03-11
caiiy TO dispute The tlaht a The Senate, by the

DolleVo the power 70 remove or suspend Sucn
officials Is vested in the President alone by the
Constitution, which in express terms provides
that the executive power shall be vested IN Q
President of the United States Of America, and
that "he shall take care that the laws be faith
| fully executed" The Senate belongs to the lega
tslative brateh OF the G0yernment. When the
Constitution by express provision superadded 70
its Legislative duties the right to advise and con-
Gent I'd appointments 70 office and to sit as a
| pourt OF impeachment IL conferred upon that
body ell the coptrol and regulation Of axecutiys
action supposed to be necessary for the safety
of the people; and this express and special
| grant OF such extraordinary powers, not in any
| way related to or growing out OF general sena-
| torial duty, and in itself departure from the
| general plan OF our Government, should be held
| under a Afamiliar maxim Of construction, to ex-
elude every other right Of interference with ex-
In tho FIRST Congress which assembled after
| tho adoption of the Constitution, comprising
| many who aided In its preparation, Rlegislatiye
construction was given to that instrument In
which the independence OF the Executive in the
matter Of removals from Office was fully sus-
stained. think it will be found that, in the
subsequent discussions of this question, there
was generally II not at all times, a proposition
pending to in some way curtail this power OF the
President by legislation, which furnishes evi-
dence that to limit such power 1t was supposed
to be necessary to supplement the Constitution
by such legislation.
The first enactment of this description was
passed under a stress Of partisanship and
Presidents impeachmept. The law provided
that the Federal officers to whom II applied
could only be suspended during the recess Of the
Senate when shown by evidence satisfactory TO
the President to be guilty Of misconduct IN
Office, or crime or when incapable or
disqualified to perform their duties, and
that within twenty days after the next
meeting of the Senate, it should be
the duty of the President ito report
to the Senate such suspension, with the evi:
dence and reasons for his action in the case"
This statute passed in 1867, when Congress
was overwhelmingly and bitterly opposed, po-
litically, to the President, may be regarded as
an indication that even then 1t was thought nec-
essary by a Congress determined upon the subju-
CATION Of the executive to the Legislative will to
furnish a law for that purpose, instead OF at
tempting to reach the object intended by an in
vocation OF any pretended constitutional right.
The law which thus found its way TO our sta
tute-book was plain in its terms, and it's intent
needed no avowal. II valid and now In opera
ton it would justify the present course of the
Senate and command the obedience of the Exe-
cutive TO its demands, 1t may, however, be re-
marked in passing that under this law the Presi
dent had the privilege OF presenting to the body
which assumed to review his executive acts his
reasons therefor, instead Of being excluded from
explanation or judged by papers found in the
department.
Two years after the law OF 1867 was passed,
and within less than five weeks after the in
auguration of the President in political accord
with both branches Of Congress- the sections OF
the act regulating suspensions from Office dur
ing the recess of the Senate were entirely re-
pealed, and in their place were substi-
the causes of suspension to misconduct,
crime, disability, or disqualification, ex-
pressly permitted such suspension by the
President "in his discretion" and completely
abandoned the requirement obliging him to re-
port to the Senate "the evidence and reasons
for his action. With these notifications, and
with all branches Of the Government in political
harmony, and in the absence Of partisan in
centive to captious discussion, the law, az twas
left by the amendment of 1869, was much less
destructive of executive discretion; and yet the
great General md natliOtiC citizen who tho
4th day of March, 1869, assumed the duties Of
chief executive, and for whose freer administra-
1850 rsmrssd oSnipSfni q his oblig9tion 70 de:
fend and protect every prerogative OF his
great trust, and apprehensive of the injury
Threatened the public service in the continued
operation of these statutes, even in their modi-
fcaton, in his first message to Congress advised
their repeal and set forth their unconstitutional
character and hurtful tendency. am unable
to state whether not this recommendation for
a repeal OF these laws has been since repeated.
II it has not. the reason can probably be found
in the experience which demonstrated the fact
that the necessities of the political situation
but rarely developed their vicious character.
And 80 it happens that after an extension OF
nearly twenty years Of almost innocuous desue-
tude, these laws are brought forth, apparently
the repealed as well as the unrepealed, and put
In the way Of executive who is willing, II per-
mitted, to attempt an improvement in the
methods Of administration. The constitution
ality Of these laws is by no means admitted;
But why should the provisions OF the repealed
law, which required specific cause for suspen-
sion and report to the Senate of "evidence and
reasons, be now in effect applied to the pres,
ent executive instead of the law, afterward
passed and unrepealed, which distinctly per-
nits suspensions by the President" in his dis
erection, and carefully omits the requirement
that evidence and reasons for his action In the
case" shall be reported to the Senate?
The requests and demands which by the score
have for nearly three months been presented to
the different departments OF the Government,
whatever may be their FORM have but one COM
plexion. They assume the right OF the Senate
to sit in Judgment upon the exercise Of my ex-
ecutve function, for which am solely respon-
sible to the people from whom have so lately
received the sacred trust Of Office My oath to
support and defend the Constitution my duty
to the people who have chosen me to exc
cute the powers Of their great office, and not to
relinquish them, and my duty to the Chief Mag
istracy, which must preserve unimpaired in all
comply with these demands. To the end that
the service may be improved, the Senate is in
vited to the fullest scrutiny of the persons sub
mitted to them for public office. in recogni-
tion Of the constitutional power of that body
to advise and consent to their appointment.
shall continue, as have thus far done, to
furnish, at the request OF the conilrming body,
all the information possess touching the fitness
Of the nominees placed before them for their ac
tion, both when they are proposed to fill vacan-
cies and to take the places of suspended officials.
Upon refusal to confirm shall not assume the
right to ask the reasons for the action of the
Senate, nor question its determination. can
not think that anything more is required to
careful and Independent discharge Of our
respective duties within their well-dehned
limits. Though the propriety OF suspensions
might be better assured IL the action OF the
President was subject to review by the Senate,
yet IL the Constitution and the laws have placed
this responsibility upon the executive branch OF
the Government IL should not be divided nor
the discretion which IL involved relinquished.
1t has been claimed that, the present Execu-
tive having pledged himself not to remove Of
cials except for cause, the fact OF their suspen-
sion implies such misconduct on the part OF
suspended official as Injuries his character and
reputation, and therefore the Senate should re-
view the case for his vindication. L have said
that certain officials should not, in my opinion,
be removed during the continuance Of the term
for which they were appointed solely for the
perpose Of putting in their place those
In political affiliation with the appointing
power; ana this declaration was Immediately
followed by description Of official partisan
ship which ought not TO entitle those in whom it
was exhibited to consideration. IL is not ap-
parent how an adherence to the course thus an
nounced carries with IL the consequences de-
scribed. II in any degree the suggestion is
worthy of consideraton it is to be hoped that
there may be a defense against unjust suspen-
sion in the justice of the Executive.
Every pledge which have made by which
have placed a limitation upon my exercise OF
Executive power has been faithfully redeemed.
OF course the pretense Is not put forth that no
mistakes have been committed but not a sus-
pension has been made exceptit appeared 70 my
satisfaction that the public welfare would be
improved thereby. Many applications for sus-
pension have been denied, and the adherence
TO the rule laid down to govern my action as TO
such suspensions has caused much irritation
and impotence on the part of those who have
insisted upon more changes in the Offices.
The pledges I have made were made TO the
people, and to them am responsible for the
manner In which they have been redeemed. I
am not responsible to the Senate, and / am un-
willing 70 submit my actions and official con-
duct to them for Judgment. There are no
grounds for an allegation that the fear Of being