Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1886-12-06
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LANCASTER. DECEMBER 6, 1855.
McClellan's Narrative.

McCIelIan's Narrative.
General McClellan's narrative. as edited
By Mr.. Prime, will attract great deal
Of attention and 60 far towards straight
ening out history, which promises to give
70 posterity a more accurate view of the
people and the events of the war of the re-
bellion than was possible to the generation
that participated in them. The narrative
Is written with little reserve; and the
work Of the editor, in publishing cont empo-
rsneous private letters of Gen. Mcclellan
to his wife and other illustrating records,
has added much to the spirit and force a q
tas;tals..' t.ss ale.
Mr.. Stanton appears, of course, in very
bad light, as he must always appear when
truthfully painted by those who knew him
as malicious liar, a coward and bully.
Before he was made secretary he spoke
constantly to Mcclellan in derision
and denunciation of Lincoln whom
he habitually called the original
gorilla" and he "often said that
Mcclellan was a fool to wander all the
way to Africa to search for what he could
have found SO easily at Springfield, illinois,"
Obviously at this time Stanton was busily
ingratating himself with Lincoln and his
successful double-facedness has hardly a
parallel in history. a fierce political oppo-
nent at Lincoln's Inauguration, he con-
tinued to be so in his aspect to the old
circle of his political associates until he
became secretary Of war, when he be-
came their fiercest foe. 4 man who
derided Lincoln as he did, and then
became of his cabinet, should have
b,en exposed in his true character to Nc
Clellan, as one to be watched, and one
whose professions of friendship were totally
worthless. Mcclellan, however. seems to
have been deceived for time by Stanton's
ardent protestations of devotion to him.
and to have regarded his selection as war
minister as a filling of the office with his
particular friend. His wife was shrewder
In her judgment and never trusted him,
because of his physiognomy, which, with
woman's art. she read as that of the base
hound that he is now known to have been.
1t was TO his Vaccinations, as the tool of
the radical ring of politicians who wanted
the war to go on to the abolition of slavery
and for their profit, politically aud pecuni-
arily, that was due the interference with
Mcclellan that he declares was the cause
OF his failure to win decisive battle early
n the war. The facts seem TO show
quite clearly that there was a strong
influence working 10 protract the war.
in ~
support Mcclellan with that abandon
which was afterwards shown to Grant and
without which he could not have succeeded.
1t was shown in the character Of many
worthless major generals, of whom an
intelligent appreciation could not have
failed to show the wOrthlessness. Halleck,
the commander-in-chief through the war,
Mcclellan declares to have been one of the
most stupid men he ever knew and with.
out the ability to comprehend a military
movement. What is more remarkable
than that to such man should have been
con6ded the direction of armies that were
wanted to win
NO one doubts Mr.. Lincoln's earnest
ness and honesty in pressing the war to
successful conclusion; but there is as little
doubt that he had so poor Judgment of
men as to fail signally in the selec-
tion of the agents of his desire. 1t Seems
also to be true that in his intense ig-
norance of military things he be-
came the dupe of the designing
people about him who sorely abused
che confidence he repUsed in him. Lincoln
seems TO wear the repute of a stronger char
seter than was really bis. Where he knew.
ne was strong; but it was often that he
did not know, and often that he was weak.
de confided in Mcclellan at the start {.
tnen lost his confidence. When the generals
that he placed in his stead were forced back
70 Washington, he fell again upon McClel-
ian's neck, as did all the scared radicals
about him. When the enemy WAS
dsfeated and the devil felt well again
Lincoln permitted himself to be persuaded
TO relieve Mcclellan of the command Of
the army and to proceed to finish the wal
With other agencies more agreeable TO the
radical schemers and less obnoxious tc
their plans, with which it did not accord
atall to give Mcclellan that credit of sue.
cess which would have carried him into
the presidential succession, as it carried
Taylor after Mexico. 1t is quite possible
that Lincoln, with natural desire 10
p his own successor, did not care
70 build up Mcclellan to be the stick
that would beat him, and 50 the more read
ny Inclined to the demand of his counsel.
lors that he should do away with him.
Certain it Is that within few weeks after
ne promised Mcclellan at Antietam his
fullest confidence and support he gave his
command to Burnside. That act would
not have reflected necessarily upon his wis.
dom II his new general had been a comm.
tent leader, but to substitute Burnside for
Mcclellan was something that only a child
10 Judgment and knowledge of men would
have been capable of.
Mcclellan had the opportunity 10 he
( come q master when called a second time
- the extremity of the country, by its
frightened politicians, to save it. He
should have secured himself in the rear