The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1886-03-11

ocsily to dispute the right OF the Senate. by the
aid of any documents whatever. or I'm any way
save through the judicial process Of trial ON
I'M 70 review or ssvel S,, me the re-
cess OF thersenate OF Federal officials
believe the power TO remove or suspend such
ohcials 10 vested in the President alone by the
Constitution, which in express terms provides
that -the executive power shall be vested in
President OF the United States OF America and
that "he shall take care that the laws be faith
1 fully executed The Senate belongs 70 the leg
islative branch Of the Government When the
Constitution by express provision superadded TO
It's Legislative duties the right TO advise and con-
sent TO appointments 20 ONCE, and To sit as a
court OF impeachment IL conferred upon that
body all the control and regulation OF executive
action supposed to be necessary for the SAFETY
| OF the people; and this express and special
grant of such extraordinary powers. not in any
way related to or growing out OF general sena-
torial duty, and in itself a departure from the
! general plan of our Government, should be held,
under a familiar MAXIM OF construction. to ex-
clude every other right Of interference with ex-
ecutive functions.
In tho first Congress which assembled after
the adoption of the Constitution, comprising
many who aided in it's preparation, n Legislative
construction given t0 that instrument. in
which the indep sndence of the Executive in the
matter OF removals from Office was fully sus-
stained. i think IL will be found that, in the
subsequent discussions OF this question, there
was generally, IL not at all times. proposition
pending TO in some way cuftail this power OF the
President by Legislation. which furnishes evil
dence that TO limit such power it was supposed
| 10 be necessary 10 supplements the Constitution
by such legislation.
The first enactment of this description was
passed under stress of craftsmanship and
| political bitterness, which eliminated in the
Presidents impeachment. The law provided
| that the Federal officers to whom it applied
could only be suspended during the recess of the
Senate when shown by evidence satisfactory to
the President 20 be guilty OF misconduct in
SSiaee. .,, or crime, or when incapable o;
that, within twenty days after the next
meeting Of the Senate. it should be
the duty of the President ito report
TO the senate such suspension, with the evil
dence and reasons for his action in the case.
This statute passed in 1867, when Congress
wac overwhelmingly and bitterly opposed, POI
litically, 70 the President, may be regarded as.
an indication that even then il was thought nee
essary by Congress determined upon the subju-
cation of the executive TO the legislative will to
furnish a law for that purpose. instead Of at
tempting to reach the object intended by an i'm
vocation OF any pretended constitutional right.
The law which thus found its why tOour sta
tute-book was plain in its terms, and its intent
needed no avowal. IL valid aud now in opera
ton it would justify the present course OF the
Senate and command the obedience of the Exc
cutive TO its demands. 1t may however, be
marked in passing that under this law the Pres-
dent had the privilege OF presenting to the body
whiah assumed to review his executive acts his
reasons therefor, instead Of being excluded from
explanation or judged by papers found in the
department.
Two years after the law Of 1867 was passed,
auguration of the President I'm political accord
with both branches Of Congress-, the sections of
the act regulating suspensions from office dur
ing the recess of tho Senate were entirely re-
pealed, and In their place substi-
tuted provisions which, instead OF limiting
the causes OF suspension TO misconduct,
pressiy permitted such suspension by the
President lin his discretion" and completely
abandoned the requirement obliging him TO re-
port TO the Senate -the evidence and reasons"
for his action. With these notifications, and
with all branches Of the Government in political
harmony, and in the absence Of partisan in
centive TO captious discussion, the law, il was
left by the amendment of 1869, was much less
destructive of executive discretion and yet the
great General and patriotic citizen who ON the
4th day OF March, 1869. assumed the duties of
chief executive, and for whose freer administra-
ton of his high Office the most hateful restraints
OF the law of 1861 were ON the 5th day Of April,
fend and protect every prerogative OF his
great trust and apprehensive Of the injury
threatened the public service in the continued
operation of these statutes, even in their modi-
fcation, in his first message to Congress advised
their repeal and set forth their unconstitutional
character and hurtful tendency. am unable
to state whether or not this Recommendation for
n repeal of these laws has been since repeated
II it has not. the reason can probably be found
in the experience which demonstrated the fact
that the necessities Of the political situation
but rarely developed their vicious character
And so IL happens that after an extension OF
nearly twenty years of almost innocuous desue-
tude, these laws are brought forth, apparently
therepealed as well as the unrepealed, and put
in the way OF an executive who is willing, If per-
mitted, 20 attempt an improvement in the
methods OF administration. The constitution
atty Of these laws is by means admitted
But why should the provisions of the repealed
law, which required specific cause for slispen-
sion and a report to the Senate OF "evidence and
reasons, be now, in effect applied TO the pres
ent executive instead Of the law, afterward
passed and unrepealed, which distinctly per-
mits suspensions by the Pr esident" in his dis
erection, and carefully omits the requirement
that evidence and reasons for his action in the
case" shall be reported TO the Senate?
The requests and demands which by the score
have for nearly three months been presented to
the different departments Of the Government,
whatever may be their form. have but one COM
plexion. They assume the right OF the Senate
to sit in Judgment upon the exercise Of my
ecutive function, for Va ich am solely respon-
sible to the people fronclwhom have so lately
received the sacred trust of Office. My oath TO
support and defend the Constitution my duty
to the people who have chosen me TO exc
cute the powers OF their great office, and not to
relinquish them, and my duty to the Chief Mag
istracy, which must preserve unilnpaired in oil
its dignity and vigor, compel me 70 refuse To
comply with these demands; To the end that
the service may be improved, the Senate is in
vited to the fullest scrutiny of the persons sub
United TO them for public office, in recogni-
ton of the constitutional power OF that body
to advise and consent to their appointments.
shall continue, as have thus far done, TO
furnish, ut the request OF the confirming body,
all the information possess touching the fitness
ton, both when they are proposed 70 NIL yacan-
ces and to take the places of suspended officials
Upon a refusal to confirm shall not assume the
right TO ask the reasons for the action OF the
Senate nor question its determination. / can
not think that anything more is required TO
secure worthy incumbents i'm public office than
a careful and independent discharge of
respective duties within their wel-dehned
limits. Though the propriety of suspensions
might be better assured II the action of the
President was subject to review by the Senate,
yet il the Constitution and the laws have placed
this responsibility upon the executive branch OF
the Government il should not be divided nor
the discretion which IL involved relirquishcd.
1t has been claimed that, the present Execu-
tive having pledged himself not to remove Of
ficials except for cause, the fact OF their suspen
sion implies such misconduct on the rert of n
suspended official as Injuries his character and
reputation, and therefore the Senate should re-
view the case for his vindication / have said
that certain officials should not in my opinion,
be removed during the continuance of the term
for which they were appointed solely for the
perpose Of putting in their place those
in political utilization with the appointing
power; ana this declaration was Immediately
follow ed by n description of official partisan
ship which ought not 10 entitle those in whom IL
was exhibited TO consideration. It is not APP
parent how an adherence 20 the course thus an
nounced carries with IL the consequences de-
scribed. II in any degree the suggestion is
worthy OF consideration il il TO be hoped that
there may be defense against unjust suspen-
sion in the justice of the Executive.
Every pledpe which have made by which