The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-08-20


statute"
For the defendants the instructions were that
If the jury understood the law better than the
judge, they should so act Before the jury can
convict the defendants they must find them
guilty beyond ali reasonable doubt. Mere prob
abilities do not constitute guilt. Personal opin-
ions OF facts not proved are incompetent The
jury are sole judges. and can con-
slider the interests of witnesses which
might color their testimony. Waller
and Seliger were accomplices. and their testimo-
ny should be viewed with great care If Waller
and Seliger testified from . promise of reward,
such fact should determine the weight of their
testimony. If any Of the States witnesses testi-
fed from hope of reward the same rule should
apply. The jury should act with great caution
upon the testimony of accomplices, and should
be satisfied of its truth before finding defend
ants guilty. The jury should endeayor to give
full credence TO testimony of Defendants if pos
si6le The jury cannot disregard the testimony
of defendants on the ground alone that they are
defendants. Statements of the States attorneys
net based on evidence should be regarded cir
cumstantial IF the facts should be compatible
with innocence the defendants should be acquit-
ted. If the crime may have been committed by
some outside party, acquittal should follow. Al
lueions and references to supposed dangers OF
anarchy. ETC., should not be REGARDED by the
jury. Individuals and communities have the
right to arm fer protection and an invitation to
arm for such purposes is not guilt
."rhe defendants should be acquitted unless
the jury were constrained to find them guilty
beyond all reasonable doubt. If a reasonable
doubt was raised as to the guilt of any of the
cused, by the evidence, or by the argument of
counsel. or any hypothesis consistent with the
evidence. that doubt was decisive In favor Of the
prisoners acquittal. A verdict or not guilty
meant only that the guilt of the accused had not
been demonstrated in the specific form prescribed
by law; the evidence to convict must be beyond
any reasonable doubt consistent with any n.y.
pothess of innocence No jury should convict
- c4 MI
because of q prepanderance of evidence bat
upon being convinced of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt The law imposed upon the prosecution,
the burden of proving that the defendants were
guilty as charged in the indictment, and unless
that had been done, the jury should find
them not guilty. The Indictment in the
mere accusation, snd was no evidence
Of defendants guilt. and no juror should permit
himself to be at all influenced on account OF the
indictment. The presumption of Innocence with
which the law guards a defendant was not a
mere form, but was essential and substantial
part of the law, binding upon the jury, and it
was the duty OF the jury to give the defendants
the full benefit of the presumption and acquit
them unless the jury felt compelled by the evil
dence to fn6 them guilty. Unless every ma
teYial allegation in the indictment had been
proved beyond reasonable doubt, the defendants
should be acquitted. To find the defendants. or
any of them. guilty of the murder of Officer
Deegan, the burden Of proof was on the prose
cution, and If the evidence failed to satisfy the
jury of the guilt of any of the defendants. 1t Was
the duty Of tho jury to acauit such of the defend
ants as to whom there was such failure OF proof.
The jury should not adopt unreasonable theories
or suppositions. but must take reasonable view
of the evidence, and unless that forced them to
the conclusion Of guilt. the defendants should be
acquitted. A reasonable doubt was sHch doubt
as impelled the jury TO say they did not feel an
abiding faith, amounting to moral certainty,
that the defendants guilty of the charge
laid in the Indictment IL such doubt existed,
an acquittal must follow. Ii the defendants, or
some OF them, agreed that in the event OF work
ingmen or strikers being attacked by the police,
such defendants would assist the strikers to re-
sist such attack, and such an agreement consti-
tuted a conspiracy, the jury must be satisfied
that such contemplated attack was justified.
legally, before they could convict If such attack
by the police was unjustiied and illegal. and
such contemplated resistance was simply oppos-
Tag wronRfully exercised and illegal force to
yspel said attack. then the facts as
tion did not constitute conspiracy.
Unless the evidence showed that the
person who threw the bomb acting under
the advice and procurement of defendants, or
some of them, all the defendants were to be &C.
puitted. Such advice might not be special as to
The time but general. The jury should not
guess that the person who threw the bomb was
bnstigated by the defendants that fact must be
established beyond all reasonable doubt 1t
would not do to say that because the defendants
may have advised it, therefore. when violence
Eame, it the result of such advice. There
must be direct connection shown between the
advice and the contamination of the crime, in
order to convict Although the defendants, or
some of them, may have spoken and published
their views of the fact that social revolution
should be brought about by force, and that the
officers of the law should be resisted to that end.
and dynamite should be used to the extent of
taking human life, and that persons should
arm to resist the law, that the
law should be throttled and killed,
and although such language might desire
persons to carry out the advice given, and do the
act which caused Deegan's death, yet the bomb
might have been thrown and Deegan killed by
some one unfamiliar with and unprompted by
the teachings of the defendants; therefore. the
Jury must be satisfied that the person throwing
the bomb was acting as the result of the teach
ings encouragement of the defendants, or
some of them, before the defendants could be
held liable therefor.
ut was not enough to warrant the conviction
Of Lingg that he might have manufactured the
fatal bomb, but he must have aided, abetted or
advised the exploding of the bomb, or the doing
of some illegal act, or the doing of q lawful act
in an unlawful manner. Before defendant
could be convicted as an accessory, the prosecu-
ton must show beyond all reasonable doubt that
the crime was committed by some person or
persons acting under the advice, etc. OF the de-
fendants although the jury should be-
Meve that the defendants advised
generally the commission, in certain con-
tingencies, of acts amounting to crime,
yet if the act complained of was committed by
some third party of his own volition, hate,
malice or ill-will, and not materially influenced
by the advice of the defendants-or if he was ac-
tnated only by the advice of other parties not
charged with the crime, the defendants were
not responsible. If the jury found that on the
nighto May meeting was held at Griefs
Hall, at which some of the defendants were
present, and it was determined that 10 the event
of collision between the police and the strikers
certain organizations should meet at certain
places. that committees should be appointed to
attend at places where attacks by the police
might be expected and report attacks to the
armed sections, that such attacks might be re-
sisted. ard police stations and other public
works destroyed; and if the jury further found
that on the night of May 4
some unknown person threw the bomb
which killed Deegan, and the jury were
not satisfied that the act causing the death of
Daegan WAS the result of any act in fnrfharanca