The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-01-30
NOAGREEMENTYETR
The City's Representatives and Mr.. Pat
tisOn's Bondsmen Still Far Apart.
The Ex-Treasurer's Affairs Still Further
Complicated by the Supreme Court De-
cisiOns on the Tile Works Receivership.
THE HARRISON REcEIyERsHIr.

THE HARRISON RECEIVERSHIP.
The Supreme Court Sustains Judge Walkers
Appointments of Judge II. N. Lamb.
The Supreme Court yesterday rendered de-
cision in the case Of John T. Pressly against
Robert N Lamb, affirming the action of Judge
Walker, of the Marion Superior Court, in APP
pointing q receiver of Harrison's Bank The de-
cision 10 of considerable importance locally as
It not only involves the interests of the
creditors of the defunct bank, but also material
1y affects the affairs Of ex-Treasurer Pattison.
who had some hopes of being able, by more ia
rorable decision. to liquidate the deficiency in
his official accounts. Pressly, who was cred
itor Of Harrison's Bank, recovered judgment in
the Marion Circuit Court on the 18th
day Of August 1884, against the
tHarrisons for SO, 92902, and caused
an execution to be issued on their property. He
subsequently brought suit to have the appoint
ment of receiver for the firm declared void.
On appeal it was held that the demurrer to the
appellants complaint should be overruled, ON
the ground that the fling and delivering to the
sudge by the plaintiff of papers purporting to be
signed by the Acknowledgement constitute an ap-
pearance by the defendant to the action or to the
plaintiffs motion for receiver. Upon reversal
the appellant filed a second paragraph of COM
plant, wherein it was alleged that in the suit of
Alfred Harrison vs. John G. S. Harrison, insti
tuted in the Marion Superior Court, wherein the
plaintiff made application to Judge Lewis c.
Walker in vacation for the appointment of re-
rsiver. the defendant personally employed attor-
neys to commence said suit in the name of
plaintiff, and in the absence Of plaintiff filed the
petition for receiver, and that the defendant
John G. S. Harrison, made appearance in person.
This second paragraph. although founded upon
the same facts as the first. is not the same case
as was presented the former appeal So
wide difference is there between the two para
graphs that if issue were joined on either and
heard by the chancellor upon the facts stated in
the other paragraph as the only evidence in the
case, there could be no decree in the appellants
favor. The case, as now presented on the sec
ond paragraph and appellee's answer, is SUCH,
says the court, that the former ruling cannot
DE regarded as the law of the case. And the
question presented by the fortk6r complaint is
now wholly eliminated and withdrawn from
decision. While !. is alleged that in Alfred Har-
rison vs. j. c. s. Harrison the defendant en-
ployed attorneys for the plaintiff in such suit,
get it is clear that the authority of the attorneys
no matter by whom or how employed, cannot be
questioned in this collateral suit So far as the
naked facts in this case are concerned, there is
of appeilee's answer and the second paragraph
of complaint. so far as the latter goes. There
are some facts stated in the answer and admitted
to be true, which are not in the complaint. They
are that the Harrisons had assets of $l00, 900
in various shapes, and were indebted 5000, 600,
thereby being hopelessly insovent In
order that the means would not be
wasted. aud that only few of their creditors
would receive any Part Of their claims, the assets
should be placed under control of the court. The
answer then recites the application for receiver,
the full appearance of both parties in vacation
Before the Judge, the plaintiff by attorneys and
defendant in person. resulting in the appoint
ment of appellee; thathe accepted the trust and
took possession of the assets; that he had been
sued. had sold property, executed conveyances
that he had acted in good faith, believing his
appointments legal; that there were unsettled
differences between the partners. 'These facts
are nsanifestly pleaded for the purpose of in
forming the mind and enlghtening the con-
science of the chancellor as to
the present status of appellee's receivership
so if there were any irregularities in the applica-
tion for receiver. not fundamental. court of
equity in ignorance of disastrous complications
might not annul the appointment. 1t is mani
fest that the judge in chambers, in vacation, and
the parties to the application acted or intended
to act in good faith and in conformity with the
code. Under the code (Section 1927 judge of
the court in vacation is clothed with exactly the
same power as when in regular and open session
In vacation the judge has power to appoint re-
ceivers in specified cases, or in any other case
when in his discretion it may be necessary to Sc.
cure ample justice to the parties he may order
property which is the. subject of litigation
to to be .. deposited in court or .,;, with
to the party subject to his further order or that
of the court; he may punish disobedience of the
order. Under this control the receiver has
power to bring, defend actions. and do such
acts as the court judge might authorize
When judge is doing these acts and making
these orders he is exercising, quoad hoe, ''the
judicial powers of the State" and such acts and
orders, although had in vacation. are the judicial
proceedings of the court In legal sense the
judge of a court is the court; certainly there
ean be no court, under laws without
5ndge. So nearly akin words court and
Judge as they are used in the CODE that
The words, Judge thereof in vaca-
tfon," often mentioned in the sections
of the code relating to receivers should be taken
to mean court in vacation" as: the court when
in lawful session the court in vacation; or
the judge IN term, regular, adjourned, or special
or the judge in vacation. The court or Judge
IN vacation in this case acquired full Jurisdic-
ton OF the sublectmatter and OF the persons Of
the parties. The proceedings of the court or
judge in vacation, though they might be found
erroneous were certainly not void, and as it had
jurisdiction this collateral attack cannot be
maintained The statute for voluntary assign
ments and the code in relation for receivers are
not in conflict, but stand together as parts of
our law. While it is true that the firm
of A d j. G. S. Harrison might not. under the
letter of the statute, but under its provisions as
construed by the court, have made a voluntary
assignment in trust for the benefit of their cred
itoYs. yet it must be held that this fact would
not preclude either member of the firm from re-
sorting to the court Of equity for the appoint
ment Of a receiver. Under either pro-
eeedure the end to be accomplished
is precisely the same-the equal
distribution of the property and assets of the
firm among its creditors. Judge Mitchell dis
sented from the decision and will file an opinion
today.
In the hope that the appointment of the re.
ceiver would not be sustained, and that he would
thereby be enabled to realize the full value of
his lien en- the Encaustic Tile Works which be-
longed TO the Harrsons, it is understood that
Mr.. Pattison bought up the claims of
d large number of creditors at 25
per cent. of their face value.