The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-08-11
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
A Hitherto Unpublished Letter from General
Meade Regarding Points in Dispute.

u Meade, commander Of Army of the Potomac.
In relation to his victory at Gettysburg. and
which, with comments by Colonel Benedict of
burlington, Vt, will be published in the Weekly
Press series of war articles, tomorrow, is
most important chapter to the controversy con-
corning General Sickles's conduct in the battle.
carried on in that journal by Gen. Lafayett
McLaws. General Sickles and Colonel Biddle. of
Meades staff General Meade's letter holds
General Sickles responsible for crippling the
Army OF the Potomac, gives the entirely new
evidences of General Ewell tconfederate) in sup
port Of the wisdom of the sometimes miseon-
strued Pipe-creek order, and explains why Gen.
Butterheld, General Hookers chief -of-staf, hap
pened to be retained temporarily by General
Meade:
HEADQUARTERS
MILITARY DIVISION OF THE ATLANTIC.
PHILADELPHIA, March 10, 1870.
[Private1
IT, IT, Benedict Burlington, Vt:
Dear Sir-I am in receipt of your letter of
the I3thinstant, as also the copies of the Free
Press, with editorials and comments on the adj
dress OF Colonel Groul, before the officers So
clety and Legislature of the State. have care
fully read your articles and feel personally
der great obligations to you for the clear and
conclusive manner in which you have vindicated
the truth of history. l find nothing to correct
in your statement, except a fact you mention,
winch is Misrepresentation. / did not invite
General humphreys to be my chief-of-staff until
after the battle, because did not see him after
assuming control until / met him on the field,
and besides, relied him mainstay in
handling the Third corps and did not wish TO
withdraw him from that position. / did ask
General Williams to assume the duties in addition
to those of Adjutant- general, but he declined
also asked General Warren, then my chief of
| engineers, to act temporarily as chief of staff,
but he also declined taking on himself additional
duties. Under these circumstances asked Gen
eral Butterfeld to remain till had time to make
permanent arrangements. On the third day,
General Butter6eld having been disabled by
being struck with a fragment of spent she'll,
| left the army, and few days afterwards Gen
| eral Humphreys accepted my invitation.
My defense against the charges and insnuations
of Generals Sickles and Butterfeld is to be found
| IN my testimony before the committee on the
| conduct of the war. / have avoided any contro-
| versy with either of these officers, though both
| have allowed no opportunity to pass unimproved
which permitted them to circulate their exparte
statements and as you justly say, to distort his
| tory for their purposes Both perfectly under
stand what meant by my ante battle order,
| referring to Pipe Clay creek; also
my instructions to Butterfeld on
| the morning of the 2nd which he persists in
calling an order for retreat-in the face Of all
my other acts. and of the fact that did not re-
treat when could have done so with perfect
ease at any moment Longstreet's advice to Lee
was sound military sense; it was the step feared
Lee would take, and 70 meet which, and be pre-
pared for which, was the object of nv instruc-
tons to Butter6eld. which he has so misrepre-
sented. Now, let me tell you another historical
fact. acknowledgement Ewell, in converse
ton had with me shortly after the war, asked
what would have been the effect if, at P. NJ on
the 1st he had occupied Culp's Hill and estab-
lished batteries on it. I told him that in my
judgment, in the then condition OF the Eleventh
and First corps, with their morale affected by
their withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge, with the
loss Of over half their numbers in killed,
wounded and missing, (of the 5000 prisoners we
lost on the field, nearly all came from these corps
on the first day. his occupation of Culp's Hill,
with batteries commanding the whole of Cemetery
Ridge, would have produced the evacuation of
that ridge, and the withdrawal of the troops
there, by the Baltimore,pike and Taney town and
EmTrettsburgh roads He then informed me
that - p. NJ. on the Est he had his corps 90 900
strong. in column of attack and on the point of
moving on Culps hill, which he saw was unoccu-
pied and commanded Cemetery ridge, when he
received an order from General Lee directing
him TO assume the defensive and not to advance;
that he sent to General Lee urging to be permit
ted to advance with his reserves, but the reply
was reiteration of the previous order To my
inquiry, why Lee had restrained him, he said
our troops coming up (Slocum's were visible
and Lee was under the impression the greater
part of my army was on the ground and deemed
quote from his report
But suppose Ewell with 20, 900 men had occu-
pied Culps hill, and our brave soldiers had been
compelled to evacuate Cemetery ridge and with
draw on the roads above referred to, would the
Pipe-clay creek order have been so very much
out OF place! That order was to meet the very
contingency here in question, to wit A part of
my army. overwhelmed by superior numbers,
compelled to fall back, and line of battle
formed to the rear of my most advanced posi-
ton thus necessitated.
AS to General Sickles having, by his advance,
brought on an attack, and thus compelled the
battle which decided the war, you have COM
pletely answered it-and it is very favorable
theory with the partisans of this officer. But
these gentlemen ignore the fact that of the 49,
600 men killed and wounded on the field during
the whole battle. more than two-thirds were lost
on the second day. and but for the timely ad
vance OF the Fifth corps and of the prompt send
ing of q portion to Round Top where they met
the enemy almost on the crest and had des
perate fight to secure the position say but
for these circumstances, over which Sickles had
neither knowledge nor control, the enemy would
have secured Round Top, planted his artillery
there. commanding the whole battlefield, and
what the result would have been leave you to
judge. Now, when I wrote my report of the
battle, l honestly believed General Sickles did
not know where wished him to go. and that
orders, bat I have recently learned from
General Geary, who had, the day
before, been sent by Hancock to hold the
left, and who in doing so. had seen the great
Importance of Round Top and posted brigade
on it, that on the morning of the I'd when he re-
ceiyed my order that he would be relieved by the
Third corps, and on being relieved would reioin
his own corps 1.-THE Twelfth) on the right. After
waiting for some time to be relieved he sent to
General Sickles staff officer with Instructions
to explain the position and its Importance, and to
ask if troops could not be sent to relieve him;
that General Sickles would send one of his staff
to see the ground and to place troops there on
their arrival. He received for reply that General
Sickles would attend to it in due time 10 Of
6cer or troops came, and, after waiting until his
patience was exhausted, General Geary with
ders to General Sickles were to relieve the
Twelfth corps division (Gearys) and occupy
their position. Here is evidence that he knew
the position occupied by Geary's division or
could have known, and yet failed to occupy it.