Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-06-29
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
rhs Case Of the Norfolk and Western 1aii'
road Against Prindls and Wife
Wifs % witness.


Wife % witness.
The following is an abstract Of the de-
c;.;on Of the Supreme Court Of Appeals
IN the case of the Norfolk and Western
Railroad against Prindle and wife
The question arising and decided in
the above case was Is to the compe-
tency Of married woman to testify In
! suit for damages for tort committed
against her, or in other words, whether
The rule of the common law on TINS
point had been changed by what is
commonly known as the married wo-
mans law. The following is On so-
stract Of the opinion as read BY Judge
Lacy:
In February, 1885, the defendants IN
error brought their action Of trespass on
the case against the plaintiff in error
for injuries received by the defendant
in error, Judy Prindle, while travelling
on the road of the plaintiff in error.
The action is by husband and wife
against . common carrier for injuries
inflicted on the wife by the negligence
Of the company. Upon the trial there
was . verdict for the plaintiff for 81, 900,
and judgment accordingly.
The error assigned is that the action
being rs stated above and the recovery
belonging to the husband, the wife was
admitted as witness in the case not
withstanding the interest of her hus-
band.
On the other hand it is insisted that
the husband has no interest in the suit,
but is joined for conformity only; that
the interest OF tho wife does not dis
qualify her under our act notwitbstand-
ing such interest TO-, chapter liz, Sec
tons BLAND 90; that while under that
statute the common-law rue is ex-
pressly preserved, the husband having
no interest, she is not excluded asa wit
ness.
In 76 Virginia Reports, page 22o,
this question was discussed in case
arising at the suit Of the wife under the
act known Is the "msrried.woman's
act" approved April 4, 1877, in which
this court held tho wife competent to
testify because it was her suit to re-
cover her separate property, and her
husband was q nominal party in the
suit only.
In q late case of Farley rS. Tillar,
not yet reported, this court held that
in suit against q wife who was en-
gagged in keeping hotel her husband
was a nominal party only, and had no
interest in the subject-mattsr Of the
suit, and that while he could not testify
because Of the legal interest Of tho wife
she was not disqualified, because under
the statute it was her separate estate.
See also Frank d Adler rs. Lilienfeld,
80 Graft, 377.
These cases seem to have been co.
vered by the terms Of our statute. We
must now consider whether under the
said married-woman's act" the re-
covery in this case is the sole and sepa-
rate property Of the wife. The pro.
perty right involved is the chose in
action of the wife. II is her suit; but
if it is brought during the lifetime of
the husband he must be made plaintiff
with her-it is suit for the recovery of
her damages. When the judgment is
recovered it becomes her chose in
action; when the money is paid it is his,
unless by the statute above referred to
it is made her separate estate. If so,
she is not debarred from testifying
if not, the common law applies, and
she is debxrred.
The second section Of the act Of
April 4, 1877, is as follows:
"AH real and personal estate here
after acquired by any married woman,
whether by gift, grant, purchase, in
heritance, deuise, or 6equest, shall be
and continue her sole and separate
estate" &c.
Now, do the words in our statute
cited above cover such property or
point to such damages as may be &C.
quired by married woman in an &C
ton for tort or any wrong done to
her?
This second section came unc ,r Judi
cial consideration in IS Virginia Re-
ports, page 393, when Judge Burks
said: " While the second section Sc
cures to her such separate estate in all
property acquired by her after and d.
ring marriage in either Of the modes
designated in that section" &c.
: Estate" and purchase ARE among
the most comprehensive words in legal
TECHNOLOGY. Property in chooses in
action is certainly personal estate"
and't acquisition Of such chooses for
valuable consideration is q purchase
even under the most restricted legal
sense.
Let us see if there is any mode pre-
scribed by our statute for the acquisi-
tjpn of property by the married woman
which will include or point to this
chose in action. The terms are gift,
grant, purchase, inheritance, devise, or
bequest. According to Mr.. Bowler,
purchase is a term including every mode
Of acquisition of estate known to the
law except that by which an heir on
the death Of his ancestor becomes sub.
stituted in his place IS owner by opera
ton of law. In its more limited sense
purchase is applied only to such acqui-
sitions of lands as are obtained by
bargain or sale for money or some other
valuable consideration. Webster de-
fines it To acquire by seeking; to
gain, obtain, or acquire to acquire by
any means except descent or inheritance.
But in what sense was it used by the
lawmakers in framing the statute?
He here quotes number Of authorities
as to the method to be followed in the
Interpretation Of statutes.l
The foregoing are substantially the
rules upon which we must proceed in
constituting the statute in question. Be-
yond the force Of the cited cases We
have seen no decision of binding au-
thority upon us in our own court, and
We have found none precisely in point
from other States.
But, as there are statutes in other
States similar to our own, the decisions