New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1886-12-05
MoCLELLAN'S BOOK.
. DEFENCE AND REORGANIZATION

srccLELLAN's OWN W. poueh, IT, the Civilians who
Directed IT, ant hi. Relations 20 M.or Com
S.na.s the Armies svo. PIP. Kill, 67s' cnAfis'
webster h Co. Az.
Never probably las 1t happened that TWO oi',
s,rsu;sbed leaders, serving the same Gauss a"'
,,vals IL not in purpose at least IN popular '""
40 nre.euted such close and clear contrasts OF
-h.r.o,sr a. Grant and Mcclellan exhibit IN the
,,uh,,.at,on Of their memoirs General Urante
.-ra,;vs Was distinguished for simplicity. direct
80. md omposure of manner; his personal CRU
.,sm. were sparing and moderate; although no
xxas n man of strong feelings which had often oeen
..vereav tried. he made little show OF them I'D
print: ana finally in describing military a"a.r' oe
iurr,ed o7er details and gave the outlines OF so"
eral plans and campaigns. There ~ero ro":o"''
outside of his nature. why he might naNe ooe',
expected to speak in large. majestic tone no uA'
closed the great war in triumph anu ho n"'
been rewarded for one of the most signal OF moue'n
military successes by the highest honors Ms
country could bestow and by extraordinary oeu''
onstrations of respect both at home and IN foreign
lands Bnt back of all sxtraneous influences We
nan easily Discern in his Memoirs a calm tempers-
,rcnt and broad mind. McClellans naturs was
in many respects finer than Grants. out 7" ""'
also smaller. Disappon iment and injustice rs"Ai0u
in his sensitive mind. He was emotionai s'o ey"'-
ratbet;c: and while this quality endeared him TO
his friends and, in combination with some NOUS
sodierly virtues, gave him remarkable ho'o upo"
his troops, it interfercd with his Judgment upon
MANY important matters, and was the source OF
animosities of which this posthnmous pnplca'ion
makes a singular display. In the story OF his cam
naions he shows nearly all his principal traits as
genersI He delights In describing the or0an'za-
finn of armies. the pnuti@ of administration
the details of movements and man9uvres, the
orders of battle, the plans that he wouln nave
executed if he had had the means. the results 'n"'
might have followed if this OF that had been zone
He ia precise rather than graphic; aud even III
falling of the Seven Days on the Chlckahomny
he 10 useful to the historian and the professional,
etui.nt rather than interesting to the general
reader The part of the work in which he appears
to have taken the most pleasure is the long ana
.rof,, account of the organization of the Army OF
the yotomuc after the first battle of Bull Kun. lie
may he hardened the frank statement that ne
knows OF no case in history where so great u
task was 30 thoroughly performed In so oriel d
rer;odn Abont the value of his services in that
uatter there never can be any dispute. but wa
douht whether a General of the first order woui"
hav, laid quite much stress upon an achleNe-
nent which does not require an intellect ABOVE 'ne
third order
was to be supposed that General Mcclellan
would have great deal to say abont bis treatment
pa,ed for the yeuomous character OF his assaults
mot npop the Judgment but upon the integrity OF
tbos. VINO doubted his capacity as commander'
Tn these attacks he is holly seconded by MS lite
rary exc ,utor Mr. William Z. Prime. who. ooth ID
the notes and in Introductory hio9rapnic'i
sketch repeats the most Infamous charges against
what he calls the Radical faction at washington
accusing especially Mr.. Chase and Mr. stanton oil
crimes for which the halter would have been an
inadequate pun sh ,nent. The book is not what the
titlspape calls it. "a history of The War for the
Union" OF of The Soldiers Who Fought 1t "; but a
history of General McClellans share in il, includ
ing his differences with the President aud the
Cabinet: and the keynote appears to be that from
the very start Mcclellan was made tho victim OF
reasonable intrigue to prevent the capture OF
Richmond and the conclusion of the war. This is
not piece of political rhetoric. such as we used TO
hear in the excitement of rebellion times out oe
1,b,rate indictment made with tull sense OF its
gravity and olteo repeated Mcclellan writes
that sooL after his arrival in Washington y Tue
radical Leaders" seeing that they could not make
tool of him and that would givo MIN great
inAnencs throughout tho country. deliberately
plotted first to force him into premature advance
which they knew must fail. and affer"ard TO WIN
bold the means necessary to victory when he was
in contact with the enemy. This they dld because
their real object was not the restoration OF the
Union bot the permanent ascendency oi 'ne''
party for which they were quite willing thst inc
Union sbonld be sacrificed The prime movers III
this dsbolical conspiracy. he asserts, were chase
and Stanton but Mr.. Lincoln was drawn into ~ :
and the Presidents order recognizing the military
commands " hen Mcclellan moved his army 10 the
Peninsula was made in order to secure the failure
of the approaching campaigu.' lie regards 'ne
detachment of McDoweiPs corps for the defence OF
They determined that should not succeed, and
oarried out tueir determ ion only too well. and
Mt a fearful sacrifice of bloc l. time, aud treasure
do not doubt that more than half million
of men were SACRIFICED unnecessarily Tor the sake
of insuring toe success of a political party.
When Mcclellan wrote to Secretary stanton
from the Chckahominy swa1ips: III save THIS
army now tell you plainly that owe no THANKS
to you OF to any other persons in Washington; you
have done your best TO sacrifice this army lie was
making charge against The Administration 10
which ne adhered all Trough his life. tic believed
that the President and his advisers were ready to
tens of thousands Of soldiers to ruin tue
pnpuIarity of one general. There appears to be
something monstrous in the conceit which must
underre such au awful belief; but 1t was Nc
Clellao's profound convection. That anybody
c1uia ,listrust him except from corrupt and in
famous motives-that there might he some simpler
reason for rejecting his plaos than desire OF the
President for tho defeat of his own arnies-Dever
entered his head And II probably never occurred
to biin to ask why the radicals did not also seek
the destruction of Grant Did anybody expect to
use himf
Mr.. Prime puts the charge Of treaon in the
strongest and baldest terms when he declares that
Secretary stanton deliberately planned and ex-
ecuted the defeat of the Peninsuiar campaign"
Blu, reither he nor Mcclellan oilers any evidence.
Tho General does Indeed bring forward certain
facts which in bis opinion point to snch p"r-
pose. but u moments consideration will show that
the Conduct Of the Administration in these cases.
while il may have affected the result OF the cam
paieu il not evidence OF motive lie declares that