Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1886-05-15
IHk LIukNNE OIkNrInN.


courts in respect To- the granting of licenses
We need hardly say that we cannot take
notice OF objections contained In anonymouS
commun icsiions which have in some cases |
been mailed To US. In this connection We |
take occasion To say that we know of no |
method adopted to influence judicial action |
which is so despieible, aud ut the same time |
SO futile ss this.
These same persons would never hint at |
attempting to influence judicial action i'll
any other matters in this way. We believe
they err in the matter through thOughtloss-
ness and not Intentionally. They forget
that, under the law, tho discretion which il
vested in the judges is to be exercised judi
cially and not according 10 Our private
opinions, whms, prejudices, or pirtialities.
We msy enter on erroneous Judgment ana
not forfeit the respect OF honest men, but
Judgment based on private aud e. gurfr /
representations is deserving OF contempt 1t
would be as much 81 in the IadiudiCation Ot
liquor license application as tu the adludl-
cation OF any other question submitted Tor
judicial determination.
wHAr JUDGE AGNEw SAYS.
The general remonstrances presented on
the day appointed for granting licenses de-
serve respectful consideration because they
come from associations of Christian women
who have no selfish interests to serve. and
who undoubtedly have the moral welfare OF
the community at heart At tho same time
we believe that these appeals are tasea on
an erroneous notion OF the law, and Oi the
discretionary power which the people, acting
through their representatives, have seen tit
to vest in the court Amid the conflicting
opinions "a to the lawful authority and duty
of the court it is refreshing to he able 10 re-
fer to an exposition of the subject which Is
at the same time clear and authoritative. In
| the case OF SchlandeCker vs.. Marshall, - Sm.
206, the supreme court say, Agnew, J.. dc.
| hveriug the opinion
| "No object has been productive OF more
| differences OF opinion and practice than this
in the different Judicial districts OF the state,
| some judges holding It to be obligatory OF
| the court to grant every license where the
| applicant has brought himself within
| the provisions of the law As 10 the terms oil
his application. and others holding that they
| are not bound 10 grant any license whatever.
Clearly neither opinion - right the dISCre-
ton which the court exercises being sound
| discretion upon the Circumstan 'es OF each
case As ii - presented To the court and not a
| general opinion upon the proprietv, or i'm
propriety of granting licenses. Whether
| any or all licenses should be granted is a
| legislative not a Judicial question. Courts
| sit to administer the law fairly Rs it is given
| to them, aud not to make or repeat II. The
| law of the land has determined that license
| shall exist, and has imp posed upon the court
| the duty of ascertaining the proper instances
| in which the licenses shall be granted, and,
| therefore, has given to the court to decide
| upon each case as it rises in due course Oi
| law. The act OF deciding is Judicial, aud not
| arbitrary or wilful. The discretion vested in
| the court is, therefore, a sound judicial dis
| cretion and to be rishtfnl Judgment i
| must be exercised in the particular case and
| upon the facts and circumstances before tht
| court after they have been heard and duly
| considered in other words, to be exercise
| upon the merits OF each case, according &
| the rule given by the act of assembly II
Il hat NJ L.A a N
| or that ! will grant 1t tn every one, il not L
| decide iudicially on the merits Ot tho cas-"
| but to determine before hand without hear
! | ing, or else to disregard what has been heard
| 1t is to be determined not according to law
, | but outside of law, and it j. not q lega
| Judgment, but the exercise Of an arbitrary
| will. Discretion Is thus described "WheTt
: l anything is left to any person to he done
: | according tn his discretion, the law intends
| it must be done with sound discretion and
| according 10 idip, and the courts OF King
{ | Bench hath power to redress things that
| are otherwise done, notwithstanding they
: l are LETT to the discretion Of those that dC
| them" Tomlin's Law Dict, vol I, tit
| " Discretion" "And though there be
latitude of discretion given to one, yet he Is
: ! circumscribed that what he does be necessary
l and convenient, without which no liberty
| can defend it"
"It il the duty ot the court, therefore, II
| hear and determine each case on its evidence
and facts TO ascertain the fitness OF tho ap
| plicant, the necessity Of his honSe for tht
| public accommodation az a hotel or A. al
| eating house, (and this involves the numbpl
| of each in the particular locality and Ia 81,
that the applicant has fully complied viii
the law, before his license can he granted
| This is a large discretion and j. To- bo eNCr
| | cised primarily for the public good, an'
| secOndariy for the private interest,"
, MUST DE REASON FOR DIsCHIMINArlpS.
Accepting the foregoing as the measure o
| the power vested i'll the court, how IL th
r | duty to bs performed Manifestly the re
| fusal of all applications, or all applications q
| particular kind, without evidence on behal
| OF the general remonstrances and against tn
} | evidence adduced on behalf oi the petitioner
9 l would be an arbitrary act, and not the eXer
I | else OF sound discretion. The discretion
l | which the court is to exercise Is - soun,
8 | discretion upon the circumstances Of oacI
case a. it Is presented to the court and not
| general opinion upon the proprlety or in
, | propriety ot granting licenses Maniicstly
D | also, unless tue judges of this court put ssiG
all other duties, aDd undertake TO decd
: | from personal examination ana inspection q
3 | the numerous places which We arc asked I
s | license some general system must bc adOptet
7 | for the hearing of the applications, and "
! | must depend very largely upon the test
l | mony which il submitted u US. ENpeTienC
has convinced US that under the most care
/ fully devised sy stem mistakes in lndlVIdua
q | instances will be made, owing to our lack {
| information as to the surrounding CirCum
| stances. This must necessarily he so in til
: | practical execution OF any law 10y an
@ | humane tribunal. The court has no dispns
, | ton to shirk any duty which the Law Ia
5 imposed upon It, nor To shtt upon othe
r shoulders the responsibility for its actor
0 | At the same time, when the law makes it
: | our duty "to decide upon each case IA
D | arises in due course OF law II is fair tha
those who have filed these general ramOn
| strances should know that We must pay som
2 | attention to the evidence submitted to u,
r | that we sit here to administer the law fairl
as it is given To us, and not 10 make q
: | repeal it, General remonstrances against th
/ granting of all licenses, or protesting again'
the granting more than certain number d
not assist the court in deciding which app
- | cation to grant and which to refuse.
discrimination between application
j | must be based on some reason, aud so ION
a | as the courts continue TO be the tribunals 10
I | deciding upon license applications they mus
i denend largely upon tho testimony OF thns
: | who live in the vicinity and who are in
position to form an intelligent opinion a. I
the character OF the applicant aud as to th
? necessity for his place. p
Let Him Have 'Em.
"Mra DOwden, see that you have neN
1