The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-07-11
GRANT IN PEACE.
BIZ GENERAL ADAM sADEAU.
No. VI.
Jolinson's Maneuvers.


~ Johnson's Maneuvers.
written for the indianapolis Journal-Copyrighted
Immediately before the elections which were
10 give the verdict of the country upon Mr.
Dohnson's policy, violent discussion arose in
Maryland, where 1t was we'll known spirit had
existed as hostile to the Union as in New Or
Jeans. There seemed danger Of a collision
between the State authorities, who were friendly
TO Johnson, and those of the city of Baltimore
The Governor appealed to the President for
armed assistance, and Johnson made
several attempts to induce Grant to
order United States troops into Maryland.
Grants anxiety at this suggestion was acute.
He held numerous conversations with the Presi-
dent, and though no disloyal proposition was
made to him, in words, he conceived a profound
distrust of Johnson's designs. This feeling was
shared by Stanton. then Secretary of War. In
the excited state of feeling aroused by Johnson's
course the use of troops was certain to prove ex-
Rsperating, and it seemed to be the Presidents
purpose to tempt provoke his opponents to
come illegal act which would warrant resort to
arms. It was too after civil war to incur
such risks without alarm.
Grant at once protested verbally but earnestly
against sending troops to Baltimore But the
President persisted in his suggestion. He did
not give the ORDER for he frequently used all
the weight of his position to induce Grant to act
as he desired, yet failed to assume the response
piiity Of issuing a positive command Grant,
therefore, wrote an official letter TO the Secre
tary War, declaring that mo reason existed
for giving or promising military aid to
EuDD0rE tina lam 0f MARYLAND sHTha
tendency" he said, 'of giving such aid
would be to produce the very result that was in
tended to be averted." The President referred
this letter to his Attorney general, who was com.
PEELED to concur with Grant; and johnson, un-
able to induce Grant to send troops without
positive order, took very good care not to give
pne. Grant sent both staff and general officers to
Baltimore and went there twice in person dur
ing the emergency. He saw both parties to the
dispute, persuaded them to leave the decision to
the courts and averted the danger-as signal a
service as he had often rendered the country in
the field
This entire proceeding caused him as much
sclicitude as any presidential action of the
period Occurring Immediately before the
elections which were to pronounce upon john
President almost insisted for while on sending
troops into region that had been disaffected,
and where the very authorities whom he wish ed
to support by arms had been of doubtful loyalty
during the He suggested to Grant in
writing that there was "a turbulent dis
position which might assume insurrectionary
proportions" and that it was 1.-The duty of
he government to be prepared to act with force
and decision" But he meant to act with force"
against mon who had fought for the Union and in
support of those who had fought against it.
Grant believed that johnson would be glad to
put those who opposed his policy into the position
of rebels. while the Southerners, who supported
1t, would seem to be loyal to the government
The crafty scheme never developed but the
Watchful, skillful, anxious care of Grant may
have had more to do with its prevention than
amy lack of will on the part of the President.
q General Grant never said in my hearing that
HE knew the intentions of johnson to be sedi-
tious at this time, but much of his course
throughout the entire crisis was taken because
he feared they were. He was as anxious to frus
trate Johnsons maneuyers as he had ever been
TO thwart those of Lee. In each instance ne was
uncertain of the strategy of the enemy bu. he
fought what he believed to be the plan. He
never changed his opinion afterward, but re-
inained convinced that, had opportunity offered,
johnson would have attempted some disloyai
article OF this be repeatedly assured me.
The following letter to General Sheridan shows
Grants apprehension at this time 1t was writ
ten while Sheridan was in command at New Or
Jeans
CONFIDENTIAL
ssHEADQUARTERSA ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
'WAsHINGToN, d. c.. Oct. II, 1866.
.'Dear General regret to say that since the
unfortunate differences between the President
and Congress the former becomes more violent
with the opposition he meets with, until now
but few people who were loyal to the govern
ment during the Rebellion seem to have any IN
Auence with him. None have unless
they Join in a crusade against Congress,
aud declare their acts the principal ones,
illegal and indeed much fear that we are fast
approaching the time when he Will want to de-
clare the body itself illegal. unconstitutional and
revolutionary. Commanders in Southern States
will have to take great care to see. if crisis
does come, that no armed Roadway can be made
against the Union. For this reason it will be
very desirable that Texas should have no reason
able excuse for calling out the militia authorized
by their LEGISLATURE Indeed it should be pre-
vented. l write this in strict confidence, but to
let you know how matters stand in my opinion.
so that you may square your official action az
cordingly. Very respectfully, your obdient segv-
ant, y, $. GRANT.
ITO Major general P. II. Sheridan.
''P. 81 gave orders quietly two or three
weeks since for the removal of all arms in store
In the Southern States to Northern arsenals.
wish you would see that those. from Baton
Rouge and other pisces within your command
ara being moved rapidly by the ordnance officers
having no matter in charge. y. s. e."
Grants course in the Maryland matter and his
outspoken advice to the Arkansas delegation had
convinced the administration that he could be in
duced to take no step at all beyond the strictest
line of the law; and when it was seen to be i'm
possible to use him. o scheme was concocted to
send him out of the country The government