The Daily clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1866-1888, 1886-01-20


ments Of the law, and the seat OF justice
remained undistnrbed az the place where il
had been permanently established until
1874 when law Was passed for lis re moVal
to another town. The citizens OF Garfield
then caused bill % be filed for an injunc-
ton restraining the county commissioners
from effecting the removal on the ground
that the original act, aud what was done
underit, constituted an executed contract
on the part of the Stale that the seat Of
Justice should remain forever at Canfeld,
and the latter act impaired the obligation
Of that contract; but this court held other
WISE saying, among other things, II the
legislature had intended 10 assume an obi.
gait that it should be kept there in per-
petuity, il is 10 be presumed it would have
said so. We cannot-certainly not in this
case-interpOlaIe into he statute a things so
important which it does not conlsin."
The eases in which it has been held that
a contract was entered into are equally
instructive. Thus in Gordon y. The TAI
Appeal Csluf, How. 1888, the statute was:
That upon any Of The banks ia this State
complying with the conditions of this act,
the { it'll Of the State is hereby pledged not
to impose any future tax or bonus on the
said banl during the continuance of their
charters under this act" In State Bank Of
Z
was that each bank organized under the act
should seIai-annually, on the days desig-
mated for decl ng dividends, set of to the
State six per cent on the profits deducting
thereirom the expenses and ascertain losses
for the six mon his next preceding which sum
or amount 50 set off shall be in lieu of all
taxes to which the company, or the stock
holders therein, would othe wise be subject
and from the judgment that this was a con-
tract of exemption from any further exer-
else of the power Of taxation three justices
disseuted Ia Bridge Proprietors " HoJoken
Co., | Wall. ll6, the words of exclusion
were, that il should not be lawful for any
person or persons whatsoever to erect, or
cause 70 be erected within certain specified
limits, any other bridge or bridges over or
across the said river" In HoAB TOR THE
FRIESDLEss " ROUSE, Wall. 400 the pro-
vision was that all property of said corpOr-
alton shall be exempt from taxation, and
that a certain existing statute to the effect
that every act of incorporation should be
subject to alteration and repeal shall not
apply to this corporation.
Such being the rule and such its practi
cal operation. we return to the special pro-
visions of The charter on which this case
depends, and find, first, the authority given
the corporation 10 carry persons and prop
erty. This of itself implies authority 10
charge a reasonable sum for the carriage.
In this way the corporation was put in the
same position natural person would occu-
by If engaged in the same or like business.
Its rights and its privileges in It's business
of transportation are just what those or
natural person would be under like circum-
stances no more, no less. The natural
person would be subj CT to legislative con-
troll as TO the amount of his charges. So
must the corporation be. That was decided
in Baltimore & Ohio r. r. Co. o. Maryland
Chicago Burlington d Quincy X. r. Co. o.
Iotpd Peik .. Chicaqo DC Northwestern RdiL-
trdv Co. Wiaona Ce 81. Peter r. r. Co. Y.
Blake and Ruggles q. Illinois.
Next follows the power of the directors
to make bylaws, rules, and regulations for
the management of the affairs of the COM
pany, but it is ex pressly provided that such
bylaws, rules, and regulations shall not be
contrary to the laws of the State. This we
held in Ruggies V. Illinois included laws in
force when the charter was granted and
those which came incorporation afterwards
as well 1t is true that the clause which
thus limits the power of the directors is
found n the middle of the sentence which
confers the power, but it clearly was in
tended 20 refer to every thing that might be
done in this way touching ell
mat RS whatsoever that may appertain to
the concerns of said company" There is
nothing here, therefore, which in any man
ner implies a contract on the part of the
State to exempt the company from the
operation oil laws enacted within the scope
of legislative power for the regulation Of
| the business in which it is authorized to
engage.
| The case turns consequently on section
| II, which is, that il shall be lawful for the
company from time to time to
| FIX, regulate. and receive the toll and char
| ges by them to be received for transpo ia
ton &c. This would have been implied
| from the rest of the charter if there had
been no such provision, and it is argued
that, unless il had been intended to surren-
der the power of control over fares and
| freights this section would not have been
inserted. The argument c0nceaes that the
power of the company under this sec ion
| is limited by the rule of the common Law
which requires all charges to be reasonable.
In Munn V. Illinois, and Chicago, Btrling-
ton G. Quincy Il. k. Co. v. IOicd. this court
decided that, as to natural persons and cor
porations subject to legislative control, the
State could, in cases like this, fl a maxi
mum beyond which any charge would be
unreasonable, and that such maximum
when fixed w,uld be binding the courts
in their adjudicatiOns, as well as on the
parties in their dealings. The claim new
is that by section II the State has surren-
dered the power to fix q maximum for this
company, and has declared that the courts
shall be left to determine what is reasona-
Bile, free of all legislative control. We
see no evidence of any such intention.
Power is granted to fix reasOnat lie charges,
but what shall be deemed reasonable in law
is nowhere indicated there is no rate
specified. nor Al limit set. Nothing what
ever is sac of the way in which the ques-
tion of reasonableness is to be settled. All
tina is left as it was. Consequently, all the
power which the State hid IN the matter
before the charter it retained afterwards
The power to charge heing coupled with the
condition that The charge shall be reasona-
BILE, the State is left free to act on the sub
iect of reas1nabeness within the limits of
its general authority as circumstances may
require The right to fix reasonable char
ges has been granted, but the power OF de-
claring what hall be deemed reasonabl e has
not been surrendered. If there had been
an intention of surrendering this power it
would have been easy to say so. Not hay-
ing sa d so, the conclusive presumption is
there was no such int ntion.
This is not in conflict with the judgment
of the Supreme Court of Miss ssippi III
RAILROAD COMMISSION V. YAzO & MIssIs-
slPPt RAILROAD Co, in which il was de-
cided tina; the power had been surrendered
in favor of that company becaus in that
chartar maximum of rates was filed. In
the opinion, a copy of which has been
furnished us in advance OF it's publica-