Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1886-03-27

which the issue Is confined. jacobs Vs.
Hawkins, 90 Tex. j.
The Intention TO appropriate lot II to
homestead purposes Is not contradicteo
by any fact unless the moving OF the cot
taqc QUITO the front part OF that lot u SUCH
TACT. This cottage seems 20 be nm
usually large and costly Tor an
clubhouse. II has the appear.
ance OF very respectable ana
comfortable dwelling. The erection 81
such an Improvement on what was part
OF the homestead would be proof OF an
intention to permanently appropriate the
ground covered by IL 20 independent pur-
poses aud uses But this would only be
evidence, itself open TO explanation.
This case Is different---Ruhl made no such
erection. The cottage was on lot IL
when he purchased, and he was not re-
aured to accomplish his design, to make
all four lots his honest ad, to destroy
the cottage or sell " at a sacrifice.
During the life OF Ruhl this cottage
was occupied by Mrs. Ruhl's parents, by
her brothers in part by family servants
and in part by renters Of particular
rooms. This Is clearly insufficient against
the intent OF Ruhl, otherwise abundantlY
manifested, to make all of these lots one,
aud that one his homestead.
The court below erred In refusing 70
set aside lot IL as part OF the home
stead
One Kaufman claimed lien on lot ~,
alleging that he loaned lRuhl the money
with which to purchase the lot with
view to It's being 30 used. The title was
taken in kuhl's name aud the property
Intended for his benefit. There was no
agreement for lien, and kaufman and
Ruhl did not sustain TO each other the re-
lation OF vendor and vendee, hence there
was no lien. Judgment here rendered.
Opinion by Robertson, j.
Walker ct al. VS.. Read ct al, appeal
from Houston. A certificate of a county
clerk made In 1855 that there was on rec
ord In his office deed from the original
grantee to one through whom a party to
the suit claimed the record having been
destroyed, was admissible In evidence to
prove the existence of such deed; the
court, however, correctly told the jury
that they should not consider the recitals
In that certificate for the purpose of
establishing the execution, delivery or
contents of the deed. When the husband
Is in possession of land claimed by his
wife as her separate estate and an action
is brought against him, although the
wife's title cannot be affected by
such action, yet the possession
which her husband held for her ceases to
be within the meaning Of the law Of lin.
itatlons peaceable possession. just as
would an action against her tenants in
possession stop the running OF the stat
ute in her favor, ii Is stopped by the ac
ton against her husband. Reversed and
remanded. Opinion by StaytOn, j
Jackson ct al w. Hardy ct al. Where
an instrument on its face vests the title
to the property assigned in the preferred
creditors and not in the trustee,
the conveyance ia held to be a
mortgage and not an assignment
The makers of the instrument
continue to be the owners OF the proper
ty subject TO the trust, and their interest
Is subject TO legal process at the suit of
other creditors, to be executed in the
manner pointed out In the statute. II. S.
2292 and 229G. Reversed and remanded
Opinion by Robertson, j.
Kaufman & Runge VS.. Thos f. Hud-
son & Son, appeal from Galveston. IIud-
son & Son made an assignment under
the statute for the benefit of accepting
creditors At the time Kaufman &
| Runge had claim against them for some
$1,000 unsecured, and note for $25,0OO
secured by mortgage on real estate.
| They accepted under the assign
mcnt in general terms, and filed
with the assignee their unsecured
claim. They received reduction on
this unsecured claim only but executed
a release In the form proposed by the as
signee, acknowledging "full payment and
| discharge OF all our claims and demands
against Hudson & Son. This suit is by
| X. & II to recover balance due on the
note, after sale of land mortgaged and
application of the money as a credit.
Held, the effect at this acceptance and
release Is to be determined by the statute,
and creditor having an unsecured claim
and one secured, may accept the
benflt of the assignment so far as
unsecured claim Is concerned and
rely upon his security for the
secured one; and in the event he does not
IL the security does not fully discharge
the debt, Ne may recover tue balance due
from the assgnor, Just as though ah as
Segment had not been made, The accept
ance aud release as above did not bar
recovery in this suit. Reversed and re
handed. Opinion by Robertson, j.
COURT OF APPEALS
George Wltte vs. the State, appeal from
heNnr. WllIe was convicted under art
III p. c, for theft of Tile paper deed
from the Office of the county clerk. BY
the provisions of this article the taking
and carrying away OF the paper, to con
stitute the offense, must be double in
tent--first, to destroy, suppress, alter
conceal or dispose of 1t; second, an ulti
mate intent 90 prevent the lawful use o.
such paper" The ordinary lawful use o.
such paper as the deed in this case Is tc
prove title TO the land described in 1t
From the evidence In this case 1t Is clear
that this was not the intent
OF defendant In this case, fol
the reason that the deed de
stroyed constituted link In his title tC
land claimed by him, and II established
as genuine deed, It Injured to his own
benefit alone But while this is the ordi.
nary lawful use OF a deed, the statute i,
very comprehensive, aud includes an,
other lawful use to which it may be put
The evidence tends to show that the de
PENDANT had forged the deed, and that hi,
intention was TO prevent its use agains
him In prosecution for forgery. Held
/. That this WAS lawful use within
the meaning OF the statute, but II wal
necessary for the Indictment to allege The