The weekly Union times. [volume] (Union C.H., South Carolina) 1871-1894, 1886-04-16

as any other person, and the irresistible ln-
ference is that it was this the Legislature
| intended to alter, so as to confuc the cons
certain class Of contracts, to wit, those
which were made as to her separate estate.
We arc not aware that any controversy
had arisen or any adjudication had been
made as to the kind of property which
could be made liable for the breach of
married woman's contract, and therefore no
occasion had arisen for an alteration of the
law in that respect Indeed, wo do not see
how such controversy could have arisen,
for the old Code as we'll as the Code of 1852
expressly provided that damages recovered
against a married woman could only be COLI
lectod out Of her separate estate. Section
29S of the old Code, which is in this respect
the same as Section 29G Of the amended
Code, provides that 'in an action brought
by or against a married woman, judgment
may be given against her as we'll for costs
rs for damages, OF both for such costs and
for such damages, in the same manner as
against other persons, to he tcricd ant coll
lcctcd Of her separate estate, dnd not Othc,-
the provision was that IAN execution may
issue against married woman, and it shall
direct the levy and collection of the amount
of the Judgment against her from hcr sep
ardtc estate, and not 0UterwiSc' and the
same provision is found in Section 3O7 Of
| the present Code. SO that it is very clear
that the construction contcndcd for by tho
| appellant, to wit, that the amendment now
under consideration was simply designed
| to limit the liability of a married woman
on her contracts to her separate estate can
not be the correct one, for such con-
struction would make the amendment in
question wholly unnecessary, as that was
the law before. We are therefore Of opin-
ion that the object of the amendment was
not to indicate the kind Of property which
could be made Liable for the breach of q
married woman's contract, but to limit her
right to contract, So that she could only
make such contracts as, at the time they
were made, related to or concerned her sep
aratc property. Hence, before a married
woman can be made liable for the breach OF
contract alleged to have been made by
her. it must be made to appear, either from
the inherent nature Of the contract, or other
wise, that the contract was made in relation
to or concerned her separate property.
Even if she declares in express terms her
intention to bind her separate estate, that
alone will not be sufficient to render tho
cont, act valid, for the question is as to her
powc!', which is to be determined by the
nature of the contract itself, and not as to
her intcntion to bind her separate property.
If, therefore, wife should sign a note as
security for her husband, or, indeed, for
any Cher person, aud should declare in the
note, in express terms, her intention to bind
her separate estate, that would not make the
contract valid as to her, unless it was made
to appear that the contract, though cx-
ccutcd by her AS surety, was designed to
benefit her separate property, or in som 9
other way related to or concerned such
property.
We have not deemed it necessary to 90
into consideration Of tho very numerous
cases elsewhere upon questions similar to
| - | A. a. Il,