National Republican., 1886-09-07
hrTLE OF eErrYsnuRe.
CoybatinR tho Theory That Gen. Sick
u Held the Position Assigned Him.

hispublic utterances since regarding the
graf battle at that place have naturally
evked, or rather provoked, much bitter
controversy. The discussion, however, is
nollikely to determine favorably TO him,
whit he strives so hard to show, namely,
THU the final result was largely due to his
acton on the second day. AS Is not un-
frequently the case In discussions OF this
clhiacter, the main Issue Is almost lost slght
of IA the confusion OF subsidiary questions
intoduced into the controversy. These side
issies need hardly be adverted 10. They
hae but little bearing upon Gen. Sickles's
cl.im to extraordinary credit for the victory.
Tiat he was faithful and gallant soldier,
an5 fought most obstlnately to maintain
his untenable position at the Peach Orchard,
noone OF course disputes, aud that rs far rs
selecting his line was concerned he was
practically left TO shift for himself is sub.
suntially true.
Now he aflirms that his choice OF the line
ofthe Emmettsburg road was, judged by
The ultimate result, aproper one tactically,
aid that the stubborn effort to hold that
line really saved Little Round Top, which
was the key Of the Union position, and
thereby made victory possible. Considered
In the light Of military science and OF the
ffcts this Is strong assumption, and It
cannot stand unchallenged. As is generally
known the center OF Sickles's third corps
With the extreme left flung back to Round
Top. This conformation violated we'll
Known axioms OF the science OF war re-
glrding lines OF defense. IL was at once
condemned both by Meade and Hancock,
hut when the former first saw the peril
which II involved, the enemy were already
attacking.
The natural and proper line OF the
Union army, and the one eventually held,
extended from the Cemetery due south
along the ridge 10 the Round Tops. Now,
Sickles's line ran obliquely to this one in u
fouthwesterly direction to the Peach Or
chard, where, as has been seen, It turned
Iearwards toward Round Top. AS the
Peach Orchard was about q mile to the
front and west OF Little Round Top, the
angle referred to projected far I'm advance
toward the enemy, who quickly enough
discovered the vulnerable point, and made
haste to destroy It,
But, besides the essential weakness Of
the position at the Peach Orchard, the line
n would appear to have been somewhat T.
I\1nuated by prolongatlon to the point Sc
lected for the left faux.
Gen. Lees determination to assall this
anomalous line was a matter Of course.
1T appeared,n he stated, "that II the posi-
tion held by it could be carried, its posses
sion would give facilities for assailing and
carrying the more elevated ground and
crest beyond"
Without going into the details Of the
fierce struggle which followed the attack
on Sickles's left, 1t is sufficient TO say that,
despite It's obstinate fighting, bis line, to-
gether with its re-enforcements. was forced
back TO the natural line OF the Round Tops
Now, let us see how Little Round Top,
which is admitted on all sides to have been
the key OF our position, was saved. And
will remark at this point that II 1t had been
lost to us Meade would have been forced to
abandon his strong position on Cemetery
Ridge to the victorious foe.
At the beginning OF the contest on our
left Little Round Top was unoccupled save
by some signal officers. Hood, who led the
attack, at once saw the Importance OF gain
ing posses sion Of this strong point, and, as
his line overlapped our left flank, he soon
succeeded In getting round between 1t aud
Round Top, and then dashed forward to
seized the heights Of Little Round Top.
AT this critical juncture, when the loss Of
those all-important heights was 30 immi-
nent, Gen. Warren, who was on Meade's
stan, as chief Of engineers, rode to the crest
OF Little Round Top, and, taking In the
situation at glance, quickly set about
10 defend the position. He stopped the
signal officers, who were packing up to
leave at the approach Of the confederates,
and ordered them to wave their signal flags,
so that the enemy might think the place was
really occupied by an armed force. He
then hurried down, and found Bar1,es's
division Of the 9th corps on its tUdy TO sup
port Sickles, 1Uho 1Uds already calling for
help. From Barnes he detached Vincent's
brigade, which was sent up the hill on a
run, and this force had barely reached the
top when Hocd's men came dashing up the
other side. The Union troops had not even
time to load before they were attacked. A
desperate and bloody hand-to-hand conflict
ensued. 1t lasted for thirty minutes, and
Little Round Top was saved Not long
after this Sickles's line was cut In two at
the Peach Orchard and hurled back with
frightful losses, some OF the brlgades losing
one-half their number. The 2d and the 5th
corps, which had helped the Sd, also suf-
fered severely, and the result of the affair
was to drive the Union line back to the po-
sition it should have held at the beginning.
And now 1t may be asked, what was
gained by this bloody sacrifcep Was
Sickles compensated for his heavy losses by
having secured a stronger position which
he could not have held without this bat
tlep Was not Little Round Top saved by
happy chance, rather than by the fight on
Sickles's liner And will any one attempt
to maintain that, but for his advanced po-
sition and the battle there, 1t would in-
evitably have fallen into the enemy's
handsY
1t seems to me that there can be no man.
ner Of doubt about the proper answers to
these questions. Now let us suppose that
NhVh oluSicu W pIOlOuB ulh llHO On Tie
left OF the second corps, Gen. Slckles had
formed on the natural line to Round Top,
with his left flank resting against that in.
pregnable rock. lie would then, Of course,
have seen the Importance Of the position at
Little Round Top, ana have had ample time
to increase its natural strength, so as to
make 1t almost unassailable. His line
would have been more compact and
stronger, and the enemy could not have
turned his flank, and would hardly have
attempted an assault on his front. And
not only would his corps have occupied O
more advantageous position for defensive
battle, but Meade's entire line also would
have been strategically stronger. More.
over, 1t is q question whether there would
have been any serious fighting on the Union
left If sickles had held this line instead Of
that at the Peach Orchard, for 1t has been
asserted that when he had broken up
Sickles at that point, Lee supposed he had
turned the Union left flank. 1t is nc
wonder that as soon as he discovered
Sickles's salient thrust so provokingly into
his very face, he should have put forth his
hand and swept II away.
There Is surely no disposition to detract
from the credit due Gen. Sickles, but q just
regard for the truth OF history requires II Ia
be stated that his line on the Emmittsbure
road, with the break In 1t at the Peach Or.
chard, was grievous mistake, one which
cost us a tremendous sacrifice of brave men
with nothing gained therefor, and at the
same time nearly lost to us position that
in the hands Of the enemy would unques.
tionably driven tho army Of the Potomac
from the field.
DE WITT G. SpRAGUE,
Late OF Hanoocks Second Corps.
M AguINlTnN n ~ hnor lI 1S2R