The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-01-22
THE PRESIDENT AND THE SENATE.

necessary independence" of the executive de-
partment is to talk nonsense, and pos
sibly dangerous nonsense, for it may beget
an utterly wrong idea in the public mind of
the constitutional and proper relation of the
several departments Of the government.
There seems just now to be little cloud on
| the horizon between the President and the
Senate, and we are treated daily to learned
disquisitions upon the Independence" or the
'fencroachments" of the one OF the other. In
view of possible disagreement it will be well
to understand the limitations Of the executive
branch of the government, and to understand,
it one may, the province Of the legislative de-
partment, aud especially of the Senate branch
of Congress. In the first place, it will readily
recur to any one that there is no absolute
and thorough independence" of either depart
ment of the government Congress cannot
make an effective law without the signature Of
| the President, or, if he does not APP
prove it, without the concurrence of two
thirds of both branches At the very
| outset the 'absolute" power of Congress is
decidedly curtailed, and the President is given
a very decided Legislative function and power.
Here there is interdependence between the two
branches of the most pronounced type. More
than this: the President, by constitutional
provision, is not only empowered but COM
manded to give to Congress, from time to
| time, information and suggestions touching
legislation; so that, as closely as possible, the
President, who is to execute the laws is
broughtinto directan interdependent relation
with the Congress which is to enact the laws.
Very closely are the President and the Senate
brought together. No treaty can be made, no
| foreign minister, and no officer Of any high
grade or authority, can be appointed except
with the advice and consent Of the Senate"
If the President should be guilty of high
crimes and misdemeanors he is subject to inn
parchment by the House of Representatives
and to removal by the Senate, by two-thirds
| vote. These limitations should be borne in
mind when the question is to be debated
whether the one branch or the other is i'm
properly and unconstitutionally interfering
with the legitimate exercise Of the special
functions of each.
| The present trouble is that the Senate,
which is charged with the duty of advising
and consenting to an appointment, may desire
to know the tscauses" wherefore an officer has
been removed, necessitating the advising and
consenting to another appointment. It is at
once asserted, with great vehemence, that the
attempt to discover these causes is an infringe
ment Of the executive prerogative, and the
President is reported to have said to one SEN
ator that he will give any proper information
as to the fitness and capacity of the new ap-
pointee, but not word shall the Senate know
| as to the causes" which have compelled the
removal or suspension Of an officer. The as
sertion is made that the Presidents power of
removal is absolute, and all that the Senate
| can rightfully ask is information necessary to
intelligent advice and consent touching an ap-
pointment. Now this may or may not be
true, in accordance with the scope given
the statement by the one who uses it, 1t is
possibly true that the Senate may have no
just right to know the reasons that have in
fuenced the mind Of the President in making
a removal; and yet when it is considered that
he offso -
tenure-the nomination of the President and
the confirmation of the Senate-we are not so
clear that one party to the appointment may
arbitrarily remove him without consulting
with the coordinate power which placed him
in his Office. We are not 80 clear that the law
which gives the President the power to sus-
pend or remove an officer thus appointed for
"cause,' and compels him to report the cause
to the Senate, is not in close and exact con-
formity with the spirit and purpose of the
Constitution. There are two coordinate
trustees of the civil service and to say that,
| after the two conformity have placed an officer
in charge of a trust, one of them can, at
any time, kick him out without even so much
as communicating to the other the reasons
which impelled him to that act, would seem
to be stretch of autocratic power the justice
| and righteousness of which may not be con-
coded without question.
But in the pending case the question does
not assume this shape necessarily. The Pres
ident sends to the Senate long list of nom
nations of men to succeed officers who are
suspended or removed for 'cause." Without
asking or requiring the President to commune