The Manning times. [volume] (Manning, Clarendon County, S.C.) 1884-current, 1886-04-14
MR.. TILLMAN AND
FARMERS CONVyesies on the

SSt4tS S.A-!~
pm el1se ,;a IN the Ns'A Doige, one OF the best
sTo. Ta otS.' vi, IN Boston military circles.
,,,.one .Tyed col.S;,.nttr IN the Army OF
-oNe Potomac On every volunteer reg:
imen,ai rshk up to thai OF coto;:cil,
from the Peninsula, where he was
with Kearaey, through Pope's aud
Buraside's campaigns, and at Chan
ceHorsville ana Get1ysbarg.
The sutjecro Col. Dodge's lectus2
was "Chanceliorsyilie, and particu-
larry the great faux movement Of
S,onewall> Jackson :ghich turned the
tide Of war on the memorable second
of May, 1862.
Col. Dodge related in detail the
movements of the Army OF the Poio-
mac which led TO their assuming posi-
ton at Charlottesville, and gives the
position OF the two armies when they
confronted each other on the day OF
the great battle between Lee and
Hooker. Col. Dodge says:
The ARM OF the Potomac on Fri
tlayalight l.y huddlea III the chappa-
raj around Charlottesville, instead OF
occupy, as they might, a well defined
position on the open GROUND in front
Banks Ford Gradually during the
night the several corps Gritted, weary
and disheartened at this unexplained
check IL the midst of success, into the
position which they had taken up after
crossing The river, without any idea OF
fighting thece. The line WAS thus 4
haphazard one, on the worst conceiva-
BILE ground, where cavalry was useless,
artillery confined to the roads or 10 q
few open spaces, and infantry hidden
or paraiyzed.
Daring this night, while the Army
of Northern Virginia was moving into
position in front of its gigantic, bat
apparently unnerved enemy, Lee
and jackson developed g plan for al
attack upon our right, which, though
pustsdson high ground, was really in
the airsS Lee may have originated the
plan, but it bears = distinctly Jack
niamzfavor; aud, surely, without
such q lieutenant 20 execute ii, Lee
would never have dreamed of making
such a,sriskysmoYe. The plan gave
jackson about $4,000 men with which
to undertake, q march around our
right flank to q position where ne
might cut US off from United States
Ford. 1t was ultrahazaraou>, for 1t
separated small army in the presence
of a large one. l, Was iustihsbie only
on the ground that Hoo, er evidently
meant to retain the defensive; that the
movement would b. screened from his
eve by the woods; that there seemed
no more available plan, that some inn
mediate action was demanded, had
it f.iled, it would have met the cca-
sure of every soldier. No maxim OF
tactics apples to lit SO well as the
proverb, 'Nothing venture, nothing
GAIN" -
Although Jackson's corps had been
on.toot aud. partially engaged for some
thirty hours the men set out OH this
new iNarch with cheerful a!aerlty.
They could always follow ''Old jack
with then: eyes shut. Stuarts cavalry
maskedsthe advance. Jackson lid not
know tat his column Woulu have to
pass some open ground in full view OF
our liae at Dowda!lss until too lane to
baye it foilowa better concealed route
Early Saturday morning the move
ment was discovered by the Sd corps,
and reconnaissance was pushed out
TO embarrass its advance. Alter somc
trouble, and a Slight and sue
cessful attack, Blrney aScertalned
and reported that Jackson was
moving over to our right. The con-
clusiom which Hooker drew from this
fsef was apparently that Lee was re-
treating. Jackson meanwhile keeping
Sickles busy with small rear guard,
advanced slong the Brock road until,
toward afternoon, he was abreast and
in the rear OF our right flank. While
hewas thus amasSing his men to take
the Army Of the Potomac in reverse,
Hooker continued TO authorize Sickles
tosdeplete The threatened wing by
sending q large part of IT'S available
strength lBarlow, Birney, Whipple
and Geary in part-some 5000 men)
out in the woods IN the hope of cap
turing the force which had long ago
eluded his grasp aud was ready 10 fall
uponJou rear. Rookers's right flank
ofbarely 10000 men was completely
isolated. And yet, though scouts,
pickets and al actual attack at
$50 D. approved beyond peradven-
ture, Jackson's presence at this point,
Hooker allowed this flank to be held
by an untEed corps composed of the
most heterogeneous and untrustwor-
thy elements in the Army OF the Poto-
mac.
This march Of JacAson's might al
first blush have been construed by
Hooker 10 be either q retreat or
strategic march by Lee to new ground
or to be q threatened flank attack.
Either would have been accompanied
by the same raclicai SYMPTOMS which
nowa9peared. Ifthe former, Hooker
had his option to attack at an early
or late period, more or less vigorously,
astMgnt appear best to him. Hooker
afterward claimed that he believed IN
the flank attack. But the testimony OF
his dispatches at the lime finds him
riding both horses, and he acted on
the retreat Theory. AT $3.50 a. III. he
had notified Slocum ana Howard Ia
look out aud prepare for i flank attack
and 10 post heavy reserves to meet
one. He ieiegrapasd Sec!gwicN ut 4:i0
.. H., we Know that i:le enenrS IS
flying, irving t" save the trai Is. III
the meantime he had removed the
hetvv reserves IL question! &:d sc:;t