Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1886-03-02

uciit may suspeuu PUBIC OIflcer IN the entire
absence OF any papers or documents to aid his
official Judgment and discretion, and I am
quite prepared to ayow that cases are not few
III wnlch suspension from office have depended
more upon oral representations made to me by
citizens OF known good repute, and by members
of the House of Representatives and Senators OF
the United States than upon any letters and
documents presented for my examination.
have not felt justified in suspecting the veracity
integrity ana patriotism of the Senators, ignor-
ing their representations because they were not
IN party animation with majority of their as
sociates; and recall few suspensions which
bear the approval OF individual members iden-
titled politically with the majority in the SEN
ate While therefore, am constrained to deny
the rignt OF the Senate to the papers and dOcu-
ments descl ibed, so lar as the right to the same
is based upon claims that they are, in
any view, of the subject, Official /
am am r,bt aso f th leo soq uneqpvoealy to dispute
whatever, or in any way save through the ju
dicial process of trial on Impeachment, to re-
view or revise the act of the Executive in the
suspension, during a recess of the Senate, of
Federal officials. | believethe power to remove
or suspend such officials is vested in the Presi-
dent alone by the Constitution, which in ex-
press terms provides that 1.-The executive power
shall be vested in the President of the Unified
States of America" and that .. he shall take
care that the laws be faithfully executed" The
Senate belongs to the legislative branch of the
Government. When the Constitution by
express provision, superadded to its legisla-
tive duties the right to advise and consent to
appointment to office, and to sit as Il Court of
impeachment, II conferred upon that body all
the control and regulation of executive action
supposed to be Necessary for the safety of the
people, and this express and specific grant of
related to or growing out of the general sena-
torial duty, and in itself departure from the
general plan ofour Government, should be held
under the familiar maxim of construction to
exclude every other right of Interference with
executive functions. In the first Congress
which assembled after the adoption of the Con
sstltution, comprising many who aided in
was given to that instrument, in
which the independence of the Executive,
in the matter of removal from Office. was fully
sustained. think it will be found that in sub
sequent discussions of this question there was
generally, if not at all times proposition pend
ing TO in some way curtail this power Of the
President by legislation. which furnishes evil
dence that to limit such power it was supposed
to be necessary to supplement- the Constitution
by such legislation. The first enactment of this
description was passed under stress of partisan
ship and political bitterness which culmi-
mated in the Presidents impeachment. This
law provided that the Federal officer to which
it applied could only be suspended during a re-
cess of the Senate. when shown, by evidence
satisfactory to the President. to be guilty of
misconduct in Office, or crime, or when incapa-
Bile or disqualified to perform their duties and
that within twenty days after the next meeting
of the Senate it should be the duty of the Presi-
dent to report to the Senate such suspension,
with the evidence and reasons for his action in
the case. This statute, passed in 1867, when
Congress was overwhelmingly and bit
terry opposed politically to the President,
may be regarded as an indication that
even then it was thought necessary by
a Congress determined upon the subjugation OF
the Executive TO legislate and furnish itself a
law for that purpose, instead OF attempting to
reach the object intended by an invocation of
any pretended constitutional rights. The law
which thus found its way to our statute book
was plain in its terms, and its intent needed no
avowal. If valid, and now in operation, 1t
would Justify the present course of the Senate,
and command the obedience of the Executive
to its demands. 1t may, however, be remarked
in passing. that under this law the President
had the privilege of presenting to the body
which assumed to review his executive acts, his
reasons therefor, instead of being ex-
by papers found in the departments Two
years after the law of 1867 was passed,
and within less than Ave weeks after the inaug-
uration of President in political accord with
both branches of Congress, the sections of the
Act regulating suspensions from Office during q
recess of the Senate were entirely repealed. In
their place were substituted provisions which.
instead of limiting the causes of suspension to
misconduct, crime, disability or disqualified
ton. expressly permitted such suspension by
the President in his discretion, and completely
abandoned the requirement obliging him 20 re-
port to the Senate the evidence and reasons for
his action. With these notifications, and with
all branches of the Government in political
harmony, and in the absence of partisan
incentive to captious discussion, the law,
as it was left by the amendu ent of
1869, was much less destructive of the Execu-
patriotic citizen who on the 4th day of March,
1869, assumed the duties of Chief Executive,
and for whose freer administration OF his high
o ice the most hurtful restraints of the law of
1867 were, on the 9Th day of April, 1862 re-
moved, mindful of his obligation TO protect
every prerogative of his great trust. and appre-
hensiye OF injury threatened the public service
in the continued operation of the stat
uteS their modification in
his first message to Congress ad-
vised their repeal, and set forth their uncon-
stitu;ional character and hurtful tendency
am unable to state whether not this recon-
mendation for the repeal OF these laws has been
since repealed. If it has not, the reason can
probably be found in the experience which
the political situation but rarely developed
their vicious character, and so it hap
pens that after an extension of nearly
twenty years of almost inEocuous desue-
tude, these laws are brought forth apparently.
repealed as well as unrepealed, and put in the
way of an Executive who is willing, if permit
of administration. The constitutionality of
these laws is by no means admitted, but why
should the provisions of those repealed, which
required q specific cause for suspension and a
report to the Senate OF the evidence and rea-
sons be now in effect applied to the present Ex-
ecutive. instead of the law afterwards passed
and unrepealed, which distinctly permits sus-
pensions by the President in his discretion and
carefully omits the requirement that the evil
dence and reasons for his actions in the
case shall be reported to the Senate? The
requests and demands, which by the score have
for nearly three months been presented to the
different departments of the Government. what
ever may be their form, have but one c7nstruc-
ton. They assume the right of the Senate 10 sit
IN Judgment upon the exercise of my executive
functions, for which am solely responsible to
the people, from whom have so lately received
the sacred trust of office. My oath 10 support
and defend the Constitution, my duty to the
DeODle WlO have chosen the 20
powers of their great Office, and not to relin-
quish them. and my duty to the chief magis-
its dignity and vigor, compel me to refuse to
comply with these demands, to the end
that the service may be improved. The SEN
ate is invited to the fullest scrutiny
of the persons submitted to them for
public Office. In recognition of the
constitutional power of that body to advise and
consent to their appointment. shall continue
quest of the confirming body, all the nforma-
ton possess touching the fitness of the nomi-
nees placed before them for their action, both
when they are proposed to fill vacancies and to
take the places of suspended officials. Upon a
refusal to confirm, / shall no. assume the right
TO ask the reasons for the action of the Senate
nor question its determination. cannot think
incumbents in public offices than care
ful and Independent discharge of our re-
spective duties within their well-defined
limits. Though the propriety of suspensions
President was subject to review by the Senate
yet if the Constitution and laws have placed
this responsibility upon the executive branch of
the Government. it should not be divided, nor
the discretion which it involves be relinquished
1t has been claimed that the present Executive,
having pledged himself not TO remove officials
except for cause. the fact of their suspension
implies such misconduct on the part of a slis-
pended official as Injuries his character and
reputation, and therefore the Senate should re-
view the case for his vindication. / have said
that certain officials should not, in my opinion
be removed during the continuance of
the term for which they were appointed,
solely for the purpose of putting in their places
those III political atfiliation with the appointing
power and this declaration was immediately
followed by description of the official partisan
ship which does not entitle those in whom it
was exhibited TO consideration. IT is not apns.
rent how an adherence TO the course thus an
nounced carries with it the consequences de-
scribed. If in any degree the suggestion is wor-
thy of consideration, it is to be hoped that there
may be defense against an unjust suspicion
In justice to the Executive, every pledge which
have made, by which l have placed
a limitation upon my exercise of
executive power, has been faithfully
redeemed OF course the pretense is not put
forth that no mistake has been committed but
not suspension has been made except it ap-
peared to my satisfaction that the public well
fare should be improved thereby Many ap-
plications for suspension have been denied and
an adherence to the rule laid down to govern
my action as to such suspension has caused