Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-08-01
THE RICHMOND DISPA TCH--SUNDAY. AUGUST /, 1885,

reach. This opiaion Of oss Of ths
bravsst 81 bic subordinatss, Of the
man who had charge for hours Of that
part Of the battlefield, and who had
been in the midst Of the battle himself,
Was approved by Mcclellan. About
the same time, or somewhat before It,
jackson, under Lees direction. Was
trying to organize force Of 1000 or
5000 men from his mssgre lines with
which to move out and attack the right
flank Of the Federal army. A little
later Lopgstreet himself Was ordering
j. G. Walker, near the bunker church,
to resume the offensive. Stuart went
out in advance Of Jackson to feel the
way for his movements. He found the
enemy commanding. with great mass
Of artillery in good position, the country
extending all the way to the Potomac,
and jackson reluctantly concluded that
the movement was impracticable with
the forces he had at hand. Note an
other fact: General Lee held his posi-.
ton all next day, and no attempt
was made upon 1t by the Federal army.
Mcclellan was unwilling to risk further
battle without reinforcements, and those
were on their way to him. Lee could
expect none, and he, therefore, with
drew his forces across the Potomac on
the night of the 18th. 1t seems to me
very clear that there were no 10000
soldiers in McClellsn's army who could
have overwhelmed Lee. The truth of
the matter was that the Confederate
army was better off at the close OF
Sbarpsburg than the Federal army, and
il is far more likely that jackson with
I" 10. OCO fresh men "would have driven
il into the Antietam than have been
driven from his own position. 1t is
certain at any rate that Lee and Jack
son and Sumner and Mcclellan thought
SO, and their views may be taken IS .
fair offset to General Longstrest's.
When General Lee undertook the re-.
duction of Harper's Ferry he expected
to accomplish it and to reunite his army
in the Hagerstown Valley before having
to deal with Mcclellan. We have seen
that this expectation was justified by
the condition of the Federal army, by
McClellsn's character as commander,
and by the sensitiveness of the Federal
Government in regard to Washington.
This expectation was defeated by the
loss of the dispatch containing General
Lees plans, and, We believe, by this
alone. General Longstreet seems to
think that only Virginian writers con-
slider this dispatch Of great Importance.
We believe that Generals Longstreet
and D. Ii. Hill are the only two people
who refuse to see the decisive Importance
of the lost dispatch upon the campaign.
CSee Swinton, Comte de Paris, Palfrey,
&C., General Lee, We know, thong ht
it the most important factor in the
campaign. 1t changed all his plans
and, as he believed, the result. A
single day of delay on McClellan's part
at South Mountain would probably
have rendered the battle at this barrier
unnecessary. Two days delay would
certainly have relieved Lee from oil ne
cessity of defending the passes, and
would have rendered possible the con-
centrstion Of his army anywhere in the
Hagerstown Valley in time for battle.
! There seems to us no reasonable room
for doubt that the lost dispatch cost
Lee these days and perhaps several
others. The rapid advance Of McClsl-
Ian threw Lee on the defensive, forced
him to fight at South Mountain or per.
NIT Harper's Ferry to be relieved, and
compelled him either to give battle at
Sharpsburg with march-worn and de.
pleted army or to yield the prestige Of
victory without struggle. He
succeeded in capturing Harper's
Ferry and all it contained, but q few
days' delay would have enabled him to
concentrate his army without forced
marches and the struggling produced
by them. and would have placed him
in condition to give Mcclellan battle
instead of receiving it. lie might even
then have failed, for, as General Lso
once said, "no man can predict the re-
suit Of battle But does not the
wonderful skill, ability, and courage
with which the Confederate commander
extricated himself from the dangers that
threatened him after the capture Of the
lost dispatch show what might have
been expected had not an untoward ac-
| cident prevented the execution Of his
original plans? =,
We regret the tone in which General
LongstIeet speaks Of Virginians, of the
great leader under whom he served, OF
the gallant colleagues by whose side he
fought. Virginians can never forget on
how many of their fields General Long
street won imperishable laurels. They
can never forget the true, brave, skill
full soldier who shed his blood upon Viz
einian soil. They will ever gladly turn
away from his carping criticisms to
recall the leader who, in conjunction
with A. P. Hill, struck 80 splendid
" at Frazier's Farm, whose ability
was SO conspicuous IN seconding
jackson at Second Manassas, whose
name is indissolubly associated with
Sharpsburg, Marye's Hill, the Wilder
ness; who WAS ever ready to strike
great blows alongside of his Virginiar
colleagues end under the leadership Of
his great Virginian commander.
w. A.
McDoyocu Mn. Jnlv 26. 1886,