Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1886-03-02

preserved in the public offices, Their nature
sns fsp. s she tss
or deposited in the Departments There
Is ,,a no m, my power OF trans.
there magic in the underlined and SACRED soiem.
nifty Of Department hles. II the presence Of
bling-block in the way Of the Performance
proved move. The papers and documents which
cial character from any constitutional, statu-
tory, or other requirement making them neces-
the E1ecatye W not 'p be dsnied oq' su Oh
pose that the President may suspend public
ofhcer In the entire absence of any papers or
documents to aid his official Judgment and dis
erection. And 1 am quite prepared to avow
that the cases are not few in which suspensions
from office have depended more upon oral rep
resentations made to me by citizens of known
| good repute and by members OF the House of
Representatives and Senators of the United
presented for my examination. have not felt
Justined In suspecting the veracity, tnteg-
rity and patriotism Of Senators, or ignoring
their representations, because they were not in
party afhliation with the majority Of their as
sociates; and recall a few suspensions which
tilted politically with the majority in the Sen
While, therefore, am constrained to deny
ments described, so Ear the right TO the same
is based upon the claim that they are In any
view OF the subject official, am also led uneQuiv-
ocally to dispute the right of the Senate by the
aid of any documents whatever, or in any way
save through the judicial process OF trial on inn
Executive, in the suspension during the recess
of the Senate, of Federal officials.
believe the power to remove or suspend
such officials Is vested in the President alone
by the Constitution, which in express terms
provides that 1.-The executive power shall be
IN tSa oe shs %
the laws be faithfully executed"
The Senate belongs TO the legislative branch
of the government. When the Constitution by
express provision superadded to its legislative
duties the right to advise and consent to APP
pointments to office and to sit as a court of inn
parchment, 1t conferred upon that body all
the control and regulation of Exec
utlve action supposed to be necessary
for the safety of the people; and this express
and special grant of such extraordinary pow
ers, not in any way related to or growing out of
general senatorial duty, and in itself a depart
ure from the general plan of our Government,
should be held, under a familiar maxim of con-
struction to exclude every other right Of inter-
ference with Executive functions.
In the first Congress which assembled after
The adoption OF the Constitution, comprising
many who aided in its preparation, legisla-
i've construction was given to that instrument
the matter OF removals from Office was fully
sustained.
think it will be found that in the subsequent
discussions of this question there was gener-
ally, If not at all times, a proposition pending
to IN some way curtaii this power of the Presi-
that to limit such power it was supposed TO be
necessary TO supplement- the Constitution by
such legislation. The first enactment of this
description was passed under a stress OF parti-
sanship and political bitterness which culmi-
mated in the President impeachment.
This law provided that the Federal officers
to which it applied could only be suspended
during the recess of the Senate when shown by
i evidence =, satisfactory to the President TO
or crime, or when incapable or dis
qualified TO perform their duties. and
ing of the Senate it should be the duty of the
President "to report to the Senate such suspen-
sion, with the evidence and reasons Tor his
This statute, passed in 1867, when Congress
was overwhelmingly and bitterly opposed
politically to the President, may be regarded as
an indication that even then it was thought
necessary by a Congress determined upon the
subjugation of the Executive to legislative will
to furnish itself a law for that purpose, instead
of attempting to reach the object intended by
right.
The law which thus found its way to our
statute book was plain in its terms, and its
intent needed no avowal. If valid and now
in operation it would Justify the present
demands. It may however be remarked
in passing, that under this law. the President
had the privilege OF presenting to the body
which assumed to review his executive acts his
reasons therefor. instead OF being excluded from
explanation or judged by papers found In the
departments.
Two years after the law of 1867 was passed,
and within less than five weeks after the inau-
guratlon Oh IL PRESIDENT i'll political accord with
both branches OF Congress, the sections of the
act regulating suspensions from office during
the recess OF the Senate were entirely repealed
and in their place were substituted provisions
which, instead of limiting the causes of suspen-
sion to misconduct, crime, disability, or dis
sion by the President sin his discretion" and
completely abandoned the requirement oblig-
ing him to repor. to the Senate ''the evidence
ana reasons Tor his action.
With these notifications and with al,
branches of the Government in political har-
mony, and in the absence of partisan incentive
to captious obstruction, the law as
1t was left by the amendment of 1869
was much less destructive OF Executive
discretion And yet the great Cen
March, 1869. assumed the duties of Chief Ex-
ecutive, and for whose freer administration of
law OF 367 were, on the 9th day of April, 1869,
removed, mindful of his obligation to defend
and protect every prerogative of his great trust,
and apprehensive of the injury threatened the
public service in the continued operation of
these statutes even in their modified form, in
his first message to Congress advised their re-
peal and set forth their uncOnsti. utional char
acter and hurtful tendency in the following
language: ut may be well TO men
ton her here the the, possible
statute-boOks the so-calIed tenure of
Office acts and to earnestly recommend their
total repeal. 1t could not have been the inten-
ton OF the trainers of the Constitution, when
providing that appointments made by the
President should receive the consent Of the
Senate, that the latter should have
the power to retain in office persons
placed there by Federal APP
The law is inconsistent with a faith ful and
efficient administration of the Government
What faith can an Executive put in officials
forced upon him, and those, too, whom he has
suspended for reason? How will such officials
be likely to serve an administration which
they know does not trust them?
I n U mot DC
recommendation for q repeal of these laws has
been since repeated. II It has not, the reason
can probably be found In the experience
which demonstrated the fact that the necessi-
ties of the political situation but rarely devel-
Oped their vicious character.
And SO it happens that after an existence Of
nearly twenty years Of almost innocuous desue-
tude these laws are brought forth, apparently
the repealed as well as the unrepealed, and put
in the way of an Executive who is willing, il
permitted, to attempt an improvement in the
methods of administration.
The cOnstitutiOnality OF these laws Is by no
means admitted. But why should the provis-
ions of the repealed law, which required spe-
cific cause for suspension and q report to the
Senate of evidence and reasons" be now, in ef-
the law, afterwards passed and unrepealed,
which distinctly permits suspensions by the
President Gin his discretion" and carefully
omits the requirement that ''evidence and rea-
for his action in the case" shall be reported
to the Senator
The requests and demands which by the score
have for nearly three months been presented
to the different Departments of the Govern.
ment, whatever may by their form, have but
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