The National tribune., 1886-04-15
FRANKLIN,
Capt. Flnney Criticizes Gen. Cox's Account Of the
Battle Of Franklin.

To THE EDITOR: Believing that the errors of
history of the late war, if there be any. should
be corrected while its actors are still living,
desire, through the medium of THE NATIONAL
TRIBUNE, the soldiers parer of the country,
and in behalf of the living and the memory of
the dead of the 57th Ind, to correct so much of
Gen. ]. ID. Cox's history of the battle of Frank
lin relates to our regiment.
The reader will recognize at once that it
takes about the same courage to attack Gen.
Coxs writing rs it did for the rebels to attack
his divisions; but believing that the General
did not fully understand the situation and
services of Wagner's two brigades in that bat
tie, and, further, that he would not knowingly
do an I'M ustice to any of that grand old army, L
desire to tell the sad story of the unnecessary
sacrifice of more than a thousand as brave men
as ever marched to the tune of wars alarm, and
with it the story of the brave men who helped
to snatch victory from the very jaws of defeat
without organization, orders officers, and this,
too. after victory was nearly given to the enc
my by the almost criminal mistakes of the
commanding officers.
Never was battle fought with such reckless
bravery, such utter disregard of life, such q
tremendous loss of General and field officers,
and amid such a maddening, sickening butch
cry of men as the rebels fought at Franklin ;
and never was battle Tough where men recOg-
nized the great disaster of defeat quicker, or
put forth greater efforts to the field almost
lost by the mistakes of their officers than the
Federals fought at Franklin.
The rebel army after fan1ing Columbia was
held at bay by Wagner's Division (the Second,
Fourth, Corps at Spring Hill until Schofeld,
with all his trains and army, passed in their
march to Franklin, when the Second and Third
Brigades left Hoods front and in three columns
took up the line of march, while the First Bril-
gade brought up the rear and retarded the pro-
10 k,yc hniI
stands across their path. The Second and Third,
arriving on the Franklin side of the line of
hills that crosses the road at right-angles some
one and a half miles south of that town, were
thrown into battle line covering the road upon
which the enemy were advancing, the First
passing on into town, and was massed in rear
of the center of the strong breastworks then in
course of construction by Cox's troops. After
falling back from place to place, the Second and
Third Brigades wese ordered to take position
from quarter to a third of mile in front of
and covering center of our main works.
This last formation took place from 30 to 40
minutes before the final advance of Hood, who
had, within the last two hours preceding this
time, formed his army in battle array in heav-
lily massed columns in CENTER with thinner
lines to right and left, with his TANKS thrown
well forward.
Right here I want to say that one of the
finest military manuvers l ever witnessed
was the formation of Hoods army into battle
line that day. His right marched in column
of tours, right in front; his left the same, with
left in front from his center; halted at the
place assigned them, came to front and was
ready to forward Immediately. No counter
marching, no shifting of pieces, but the fOrma-
ton was made with precision and dispatch
rarely cqualed in a holiday parade.
Napier says: 1.-THE greatest master of the
art may err; he who wars walks in a mist,
L. .
discern the right path Turenne exclaims
Speak to me of General who has made no
mistake in war, and you speak of one who has
seldom made war"
Gen. Schofield's war record is brilliant one,
and yet It's clouded with terrible mistake at
Franklin.
The formation of Hoods army was within
his sight as well that of the whole Federal
army and just at this time-that is at the time
Wagners two brigades took their last position
they should have been sent within our main
lne and thereby left the field clear for COxs
men to have opened a murderous fire on the
enemy when they reached the point that Wag
ners men were swept from; and my word for
it, considering the open field the strong breast
works, and the skill and bravery of Coxs Di-
visions, no Johnny would have reached the
works, let alone ever seeing the inside of them.
|, The first mistake, to call it with no harder
name, was i'll not placing those two brigades
behind the main works If guard post
needed as lookout, with orders to withdraw
as soon as the attack should be made, it was
worse than foo!ishness to man 1t with two I'M
wieldy brigadcs. If it was thought necessary
to have an outpost at all, a thin skrmish-line
of 90 men to cover our whole front would have
been all-sutiicient, and such line could and
would, unhampered with orders to fight, cleared
the front in jifly. That mistake the General
commanding must shoulder
The second mistake, Gen. Stanley, the COM
mander of the Fourth Corps, of which Wagners
Division was a part, is responsible for in not
withdrawing the two brigsdes in time. And
the third mistake must rest with Gen. Wagner.
IN No. 10, Scribner's Campaigns of the Civil
War;" by Cox, the General says that orders
We're given to the two brigade commanders to
withdraw upon tbs advance of the enemy and
that Gen. Wagner WAS notified of such order;
that upon such advance the brigade COM
mandcrs notified Wagner of the same, and re-
minded him of the order to withdraw; that
Wagner was at the Carter House. house Just
within our main works and fronting on the
Spring Hill road, and just where the enemy
broke our main line and in the center OF
the terrible fight that followed, and that Wag-
ner, in a moment of excitement, forgot his or
ders, and sent word back to fight.
Gen. Cox cites as his authority for this state
ment, two officers who claimed TO have been
with Wagner ut the time, and heard him give
such order. The order from Wagner to fight
is so in accord with the character of the man,
that presume we must believe Cox; and yet
Mr. John ii. Terhuuc a prominent and wealthy
manufacturer in the city of Anderson, Ind,
then an Orderly on Gen. Wagners staff tells
me that Wagner did order the withdrawal of
the two brigades. BE that matter as it may
the responsibility of placing them there and
holding them in such unmiitary position up to
the time OF the rebel advance, cannot be shifted
on to Wagner's shoulders alone.
On page - of No 10, "Scribners Campaigns
Of the Civil War" Gen. Cox says, speaking of
Wagner: " lie rallied the disorganizcd brigades
at the river. but they were not again carried
into action"
gadcs, regiments and companies, were broken
III the rout, but it is not true that the rout
carried them to the river or that they were not
again i'll the action. In the immediate front Ofthe
two brigadcs the enemy was brought nearly to
a staudstiit for 4 time by our murdCrOus fire,
while their extended columns oYcriaped our
TANKS and sent us in broken mass on the
duuble-quicll to the rear At the same time the
enemy took up the charge from front and iianks,
and i'll went neck and neck and struck our
main works at the same instant, and then il
was that the blue and gray were mixed in the
most terrible hand hand struggle that was
had iii all that war. The fight was raging with
the most desperate fury when the First Bri-
gade of our division charged in and ended it
by driving the rebels to the shelter of the out
side of our CaTthWOrks.
Now | speak for myself, my company and
regiment and say that in the break at the main