New-York tribune., 1886-03-04

-. nv w.. noHed Of these parties. He answered
that the pckets must be strehgtnenea an @ he want OF
cavalry: Liz cavalry had beeh orde.cu a""2 W sc'u
cavary lie was To- havo Stenu ha & i,% -, t fynu and
find ont what there. IN one OF hle VI niot ..
regiTcntai commgndors held consultation. at Whcn IL
wSs determined 10 strengthen Tho piekcts ihcbc arc
curious revelations to a soldier ear. .,
General Buell. ascribes to General Prrn; sa's vigilance
the first 1is, ovcry Of the actual danger "HI
what rIeniiss did, continuing:
All ihis occurred in front Of Shermars camr 0t ~
front Oi Premises. isspircd beginning nheAlto',
on hntn sides cavc the FIRST alarm the divisions ci
sherman and Prrnt.Ss The latter promptly formed hs
division at the first from The front, ava Hun'u "
Quarter Of mie ~ ddvaacc OF his camp. where G WIS
attack,d Lcf re slclran under alms lie he'd Ms
POSITION until the enemy Ms rlgh passed nun ~ r. r.
lacking sEcrmam whose left regiment llnrila ,
into rnu He then retired Ia some as jg1'I'
the resistance n hs camp but foFetn nH,T M ~ S %
disorder until at ociack be CAME upon Inc g i
ur;but AMI W. II. l. Wallace were ioihlHs ''' 'N'
in rear. =.
And little later he Gs7oscs OF General shermauS inF
ther contributions to tho first Days lighting Win '"'
quiet remark:
sbcrmans division as an organized body disappeared
from the field from this iinc unli the c'1|r U % M tH,
sncImnn reports that at " a"ut lU1U , d. NJ w. tcr @
enemy lad made furious attack on General Me' iT ,c
nand's n0lr front. Finding nm pressed NOV"
f"pcn n hack some distance and then directed the
men to av: themselves OF every cOvcr-HG'S. C n,,(
iie |he siGnnI 10 di,rer.c and n tleacr o'clock the
brigade and regiments are seen no more.
TIE FIRST DAYS OPERATIONS REVIEW D.
In concluding thc atcOuht vi 'ho Hi9' ""' '0'9'
General Buell. says:
The want OF cohesion and OF tho Union ranks
ia cnnspcuously indicated in the official reports.
regiment is rarely overcome in front but als Ddc% ne
the regiment on right left has done 50, ana
exposed its flank II continues US backward %
~ least nntI n is well under shelter thus exposing me
flank OF neighbOr who then must als1 hceds ial
back Once in operation, the process repeats l'c IN
definitely. In broken and covered country "hch az
oris occasional rallying points ANA ohstrncS the pur
suit ii proceeds step br step On al open ue.u y, @ unp
presence of light artillery aud cavalry IL "ouu run
rapidly into general rOut -, w., u,, .,
This outnank'ns. so common IN tne Innom rGpI' AZ
Shiloh is mere excuse of the inferior conhthuers
II is the practical consequence or inc Ap'ehce
of a common head, ana INC J"@u''omS @ s.r,, u.s. the
reserves 10 cnuntcract partial lrrverscs ava preserve wv,
front OF battle The reports OF all the officers
who took part the action NJ the Landing. Nelson An
men. and The regmcnial commanders. iuy sustain tnS
main point these accounts ana are totalN al variance
with General Grants statement IN his C'ntry article
Had tue attack been made heI1rr Nri>nn co,iu
arrive with the means which the enemy had Auhdhhty
at hand would have succeeded beyond All question:
General sacrmans official map OF the battlefield
in the War Department next referred to- and the Gen
erals own speech presenting 1t 10 the Army oI the
Tennessee is quoted. with the suhj"ncd continent;
And yet twill he that this new line. prepared
with such elaboration of detail and introduced with such
richness of auecdOta embellishments. waSR thoio"gh de
uson; that Blrges sharrshoocrs were not ihcte Auu
that General Sherman was in different place. ttng
aside historical accuracy however, the advantage "f the
revised rrangement is obvious: IL extended General
TO the west, taking in Tman's Hollow, onc-thrd of
McClernands captured camp ana iarS1 ID part r oi
tbe con ederate army, giving battle 'front.' ot TWO mics
and a hall instead OF one milc and requiring no greater
power OF imagination to man 1t t9'' TO GeVisr IT. IN
said The uap as thus moihed te's the story UI the
battle !"
sHFRNAN's SHARE IN THE ENGAGEMENT.
or General Buel's own map which is given in con-
depscdform and of which fs zed copy saso issucdbJ
The CcHfry 1t may lie said that corresponds with ana
makes intcgble the official reports OF the day. and
undoubtedly the farest and most exact report OF the
actual condition OF fed and Of the location of the
troops attainGble.
General Buell. tells how. in walking about the lines
after his troops had arrived the field and the enemy
were held IN check Sunday evening he encountered
sherman.
OF course We talked OF other incidental matters IN
al his career he has venture to say never ap'aied 10
brtter advantage There the frank. bravo soldier
rather subdued realizing the critical situation IN ~hch
causcs OF some SORT perchance ms own Iau,t ehleny,
had placed hin but ready, without ahrctation or
bravado 10 DO anything that duty required Of h!m lie
asked me what the plans were Tor tomorrow,
answered that was gonS TO attack th' enemy AZ dy-
light and he expressed graticton at my reply though
apparently not because OF any nhmlAed 60 l,hcc ~
the result. had had no cohsuitlnnn WIN hcu'I"It
Grant. ana knew nothing or MS purpose" II'-un'u II
that we would he III acc t9td bni n"i & ngI" TS , I
hours within the limits oi us nu'h'rlS anu ~" ~"
upon him as my commander though would |c'lonsH
TO take with The mGp Of wncn lac-s.niie accom-
it would have th9 Interest which now aichr7 To H. ana
after the battle II was laid aside and forgotten
within TWO years after that nrelllg quite c9htr"ry
man aud myself concerning the battle of SHILOH aud his
Memoirs give different account OF the ntgr,r~ vi Nv an"H'
neernIlccr Capran NchIcr who, in fact. pres
emit and complains that it never returned 10 hun
lie saws that grGmbed about tn straselcrs. and that
tie feared would NOT bring my army across thc HVeI
one would suppose that his fears would have been al
layed by the fact that At that very moment ny troop
were arriving and covering MS front AS last a. legs ad
steamboats, could carry them
The condition OF General shermans command at thl7
time II thus described:
II thus appears that from about o'clock until tho
time when General Sherman lonhd Colonel buchiahl
with regiments on the road rom tne bridge to tho
Landing. single regiment Of E' division excepting
Cockeris ana not prominent individual represent
ave of iteIcrptng that officer aud Colonel lihchrand
was present with him The only body oi troops bc-lIes
Cockerls regiment having any recognized ore"lallon
was the 18Th Missouri which hclon-cd 10 anolh-
or division Al the rest were squads or inlitiduu
stragsers In all the Official reports, uot regiment or
part OF regiment Is described a. D'Hs WIN nun ~ th'
unc'ure for several hours b-llr. 81 me hiho ItI'
hs immediate command al the church. only ye Ichderrl
reports, and three Of these were from Bnckmhd'
ripcc The division did exist except IN the person
OF s commander Snch Is th' story OF the omcal re-
ports. The number OF men present could not bayr he
large. Thousand. including Bucklauds
two regiments after they found. would have toi
the number that lay on their arms IN shehahs ranks on
This explains the close relation Of McCcrnand and
SHERMAN turing last hye hours OF sunday and the
identity of their expcricncrs General sherman has
nothing To report Of bis own comm ihd asuhcuF,,y
Everything il conductive and general as between NC
ClcrDand ana himself.
THE VALUE Of REINFORCEMENTs CONsiDEHED.
ofthe general condition Of tire whole army under
Grant at the end OF the first days hghtng this Is what
General Buell. has to say:
The physical condition OF tho army was an exact
TYNE of its moral condition. The ties Of dc plnc,
vet of enough duration Tigdly enough enforced
TO very strong, In much the largest part Of the
army thoroughly severed An nnbroken tide Of disaster
had oDllterated the distance between grades. and
brought all men the standard OF personal qualities
The feeble groups that still cluug together held by
force OF Individual character more than by discipline,
ana a disbelief IN the ability Of the army unaldtd 10
extrcate itself from the peril that envroncd H. was
do not hesitate affirm universal In opinion that
feeling Was shared by the commander himself. week
after the battle the army had not recovered from It's
shattered aud prosraed condition. On me l4th three
days after HallecKs arrival, ho instructed Grant:
Divisions ana brgades should, when necessary be re-
organized and put In position. and all stragglcrs
turned their companies aud regiments Your army Is
not now In condition 10 resist an attack"
And few further touches upon the first days
battle:
From the sef-assurng interview In which. according
TO some OF General Sherman's romnIscenccs 1t was
agreed had pended tho furUr Of his at
~ - t,I