The state chronicle. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1883-1893, 1886-08-12
Lexis Reply to &C.,
Especial Cor. STATE CHRONICLE

Special Cor. STATE CHRONICLE.
OF course no one, Lex included, can set
out to run muck with all comers who,
in answer to his reviews Of the Judicial
decisions, choose to defend the court. He
is glad to see such defence when it is fair,
and is himself open to conviction
But he does expect that lawyer, who
claims to be a gentleman, will abstain from
personal reflections, and he is sorry that
this reasonable expectation has been dis
appointed by 90
When &c" wrote this sentence, IF ru-
NOR is correct as to who he is, | would
advise the man whom he is advocating for
the Supreme Court Bench, if there be such
a one, to take warning from recent oc-
currcnce in this State, and get a less frat
tricidal advocate, ''C' will permit Lex
to say that there is more of the sneak
than the Lawyer IN that sentence, and
that there has been nothing in any
thing written by Lex to Justify
it. There are some persons who have ac-
cess to the editorial columns of newspa-
pers who have not the instincts of gentle
men, who assail mems motives, and SLAM
der their actions because they exercise the
right of free thought and speech From
these animals no man can expect to be
safe But &C" should avoid such exam
plies if he has come to the age of discre-
ton
Now as to COS law in defence of Smith
vs.. Brsson He says ''At common law
an estate to \ and his heirs, bat if he die
without heirs then to Is and his heirs, was
construed to mean, that if at any time \ S
heirs became extinct then the estate would
go over to b and his heirs: that is, when
the death of A without heirs generally
was meant; but this limitation was too
remote, and AS estate became absolute :
''C'' is wholly in error. There never
was cat common law any such thing.
AT common law, in the case stated, a
took the absolute estate whether the llInl-
tatiOn over was after a definite or general
failure of heirs; because the limitation was
rcpugnant to the fee simple in the first
taker and because there could be no re
malnder after fee. See all this III Coke,
Blackstone, Nc. 1t was rot until eXecu
tory devlses came to be allowed and, un-
der the statute of USES Springing and shift
ing uses were created, that such eXecutory
interests after a fee became valid. In
these cases to avoid perpetuity the con
tingency must happen within the definite
period of 21 years, &c. SO much for 50
| much
In the second proposition of &C" moth
ing Ineligible can be discovered by Lex
bearing on the case in hand. He is obliged
therefore to pass it over until it is made
more plain.
3. l he cases Of Hilliard vs. kearny and
Davis vs.. Purcer which s'C' says are Eek
actly on all fours with Smith vs.. Brsson, >
are no more so than f and a is exactly on
all fours with rape.
They are both eases of defeasible fees
in which the effect of the act of 1874 abol-
| iShing entail could not arise; Smiths case
was an estate tail and the construction of
the act which converted that into fee
simple with power in the first taker by
conveyance ''etfectually to bar the remain
der over" became absolutely necessary.
In McBee's case, which was also an es-
| tate tail, J. Reade, Pearson and Battle
oonstrued that act so as to give effect to
its language, and declared the remainder
void, Our court on the idea that they
| committed an oversight overruled McBee;
and ''C' thinks they did commit an over
sight and that they were rightly overruled.
This adds strength undoubtedly to the
late opinion. But Lex still agrees with
| the old court. LEN.