Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1886-11-26

purpose there can be no doubt, hut
this is entirely different from making
the existence or the law itself depend
ent upon the will OF the people. And
why may not the will Of the people OF
the several localities be an instrument
tality upon which Il question Of policy
can be lawfully made to turn? | have
not heard any good reason urged why
this may not bc done, and do not be-
lievc that any exists. Ii the discretion
to determine the sale of intoXicants
can be lawfully vested in the council
of Il city or the trustees of Il town, as
is frequently done without objection,
il may he vested in majority of the
electors of such city or town, or in the
electors of election precincts.
These are my own views on the
force and effects of our law. The
question of the validity of similar laws
has been passed by the courts of last
resort of many of the States and | feel
that the question am called upon to
decide is OF sufficient importance to
justify an extended consideration of
the decisions of the courts of such
States.
The latest case against such laws
and the one most sIuarely in point, is
cX partc. Vale, As Cal, go. The
California law which was held invalid
i'll the case just mentioned was very
similar to ours. While I have great
respect for the decisions of the SUI
prcmc Court of California, think in
this instance it failed to maintain its
usual high standard OF correct. logical
thought. The argument of counsel
that the law did not leave it to the
people to give effect to the law, or to
change the existing law but only to de-
tcrmine whether licenses should be is
sued under existing law, the court
met thus:
"Thc provisions of the license law
remain in full force until the vote in
favor of prohibition is counted and an
nounced; those provisions cease to
have force from the time the vote is
announced, il the majority is against
license. Consequently, the existing
license law, if changed at all, is
changed, not by the Legislature, but
by the vote of the people"
The foregoing is correct statement
of the argument advanced, but not of
the language in which it is clothed.
The argument is fallacious. The cx-
isting license law, under such an act as
that passed in California and this Ter
ritory, does not remain ia full force
until the vote in favor of prohibition is
counted and announced. The license
law was changed in essential particrl-
lars the moment the local option act
became Il law. There were ingrafted
into it the provision that in certain
contingencies the granting of licenses
should not depend on the Board OF
County Commissioners, as under the
old law, but, upon the discretion of Il
majority of the electors of the precincts
affected. This change was effected
at once, and no other or greater
change was effected or could be effect
ed by any election held under this act
The foregoing analysis of the deci.
sion OF the courts of those States
which have passed on the question
shows that four States only, by an adj
herance to former decisions would
hold our local option act unconstitu.
tional, and those States are California
Missouri, Delaware and Texas; while
nineteen States would hold it to be
constitutional, namely, Pennsylvania
Iowa, New Yofk, Michigan Ohio, Indi-
ana, Massachusetts,, New Jersey, Hi.
nois,. New Hampshire, Vermont, Mon
tana, Minnesota, Arkansas, Kentucky
Connecticut, MARYLAND, Virginia and
Wisconsin.
OF the nineteen States just named
the decisions in ten of them were upon
prohibitory liquor laws involving the
scheme of local option. The principle
established in all the cases, however
is identical. 1t is impossible to make
any just distinction between law
leaving it to the people OF Il county to
say whether liquor shall be sold there
in, and law leaving it to the people Of
a county to say where the county seat
shall be located, or whether Il court.
house shall be built in the county, or
whether subscription shall be made
to some public enterprise, and local
questions of like character. Mr.. Cool
ey in his work on constitutional limi-
tatlons says: "The question whether
a county or township shall he divided
and new one formed, or two townships
or school districts formerly one be rcu-
nted, or county seat located at a
particular place, or after its location
removed elsewhere, Or the municipal-
ity contract particular debts, or engage
in works Of local Improvements, is al
ways question which may with pro-
priety be referred to the voter of the
municipality for decision"
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations
p. 119. The author cites, as support
ing the foregoing proposition, fifty-ive