Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-02-14

cobtCttu rs IeNcnuo anu uot ihtsoiy 10
incident 10 the general police power of
the State, which, under certain circum-
stances and conditions, regulates GER
tain employments with view to the
public health, comfort, and convenience.
In the latter class OF cases the exactions
may be either fees or fines, as they are
to the expense OF regula-
ton, or laid as burden upon and q
to the business, and not
taxes which are levied for the pur-
pose Of raising public revenue by means
of q contribution either from the per-
son or the property or the occupation
of all citizens in like circumstances.
II was, therefore, in the character of
tax that the payments we're required aud
made for licenses issued under the in
terpal. revenue acts Of the United States.
Mcclure Us. The Commonwealth, 3
Wall, 387. Speaking Of them in the
License-Tdr Cases, 5 Wall, 400, All,
Chief j Justice Chase said " The grant,
ing Of license, therefore, must be re-
garded as nothing more than a mere
form Of imposing tax" &C., and that
9. this construction is warranted by the
practice Of The Governifi5a:29ss from rom. IL It's
organization. They:. os
garded merely as convenient mode :.
imposing taxes on several descriptions
of business, and Of ascertaining the
parties from whom such taxes were to
be collected. But, as we
have already said, these licenses give
no authority. They are mere receipts
for taxes" The license under the laws
of Virginia required from the plaintiff
in error cannot be distinguished from
those Of the class just referred to,
issued under the internal-revenue laws
of the United States.
We are referred to the case Of Sights
rs. YarndUs, IL Grattan, 292, as de-
fning a license under the laws Of Vir-
ginia in a dif'erept sense. We think,
on the contrary, that it is not only con-
sistent with the view we have taken,
but strongly in confederation Of it. In
that case the amount assessed as a con-
dition OF the license is expressly desig-
Dated to be a tax. 1t was an exaction
made by the municipal government Of
the city of Wheeling, under a law
which expressly authorized it, in refer
ence to houses of entertainment, to
grant or refuse licenses, and the case
was one of that class. The language
of the city charter was : They shall
further have authority to regulate the
manner in which such houses or places
shall be kept, and to levy and collect
taxes thereon. in addition to any tax
which is or shall be payable on the
same to the State
The law of Virginia, however, on
this point was definitely settled in ac-
coTdance with the view we have here
taken in the case of Ould as. City of
Richmond. 90 Graf, AGA. followed by
Humphreys rs. City Of NOrfoN, %
Graf, %, and The Western Union Tele-
graph Company rs. city Of Richmond,
2G Graf, l..
in the case Of Humphreys rs. Tie
City Of Norfolk, ubi supra, the Supreme
Court of Appeals of Virginia, referring
. the previous case of Ouid rs. CITY
Of Ri4mond, said: 1.-The objection
was made in that case that a power to
license involves in its exercise the
power to prohibit withoG such License
and that such power vested in mllfS'
cipal corporation is incompatible with
the rights Of attorneys conferred by
their general license to practice in any
and every part of the State. This OBJ
lection did not prevail. Judge Ander-
son, upon this point, speaking for the
entire court. conceded that the city
authorities could not prohibit attorneys
at law already licensed from practicing
their profession within the city limits.
The exercise Of the vocation was, how
ever, a civil right and privilege, to
which are attached valuable immuni-
ties and pecuniary advantages, and is
fair subject Of taxation by the State
and by municipal corporations. The
power to impose license.tax upon the
profession is included in the general
power Of taxation given by the Goth
section Of the charter, and is not taken
away by subsequent limitations"
/" The principles settled by that case"
continued the Court, "are decisive Of
this. In neither case is the attempt
made to prohibit the exercise Of the
business or vocation. The license re-
quired by the corporation is merely a
mode Of assessing the tax; if it be
reasonable and just, it matters but lit
lie by what name it is called. The
power to impose fines and penalties
for failure to pay the tax required is
not only an incident to the power Of
taxation, but is expressly conferred by
statute"
That the party complying with the
statutory conditions is entitled as of
right to the license is conclusive that
the payment is a tax laid for revenue
and not an exaction for purposes ofreg-
ulation. Mayor, Sc, rs. Second Are.
II. h. Co., 80 n. Y, 26l; State rs.
Roboken, 80 n. j. Law, $50; . Dilios
Mum. Corporations, 100, CHI. KIN,
s 7GS. The occupation, which is the
subject Of the license, is lawful in itself,
and is only prohibited for the purpose
of the license; that is to say, prohibited
in order to compel the taking out Ii
cense, and the license is required
only as convenient method Of
assessing and collecting the tax.
Cooley on Taration, 401. Such
a license fee was held to be a tax by this
court in the cases Of Broom rs. Nary
land, II Wheat, 4l9; Wari rs. Mary
land, II Wall, 4lS, and Wilton Us. Mis-
souri,, 81 U. S., 295. We think it en-
tirely clear, both from the nature Of
the case and upon authority, that the
payments demandable by the State for
the license applied for by the plaintiff
in error are taxes within the meaning
Of the act of March 30, 1871, in dis
charge of which coupons were receiva-
BILE by its terms, and that the plaintiff
in error must be regarded, alter making
the tender alleged, in the same situation
in law as if he had rendered gold or sill
Yer coin or other lawful money of the