Morning journal and courier., 1886-08-11

| tere8tfng Letter DY GeneFat Meat
Never Before Made Public.
| PHILADELPHIA, Aug. 10.-The following
| letter is made public for the first time, an,
| is interesting as bearing on the Gettysbur,
controversy:
HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF
THE ATLANTIC,
PHILADELPHIA, March Is, 1870.
| PRIVATE G.. G. BENNETT,
Burlington, VT:
| Dear SRI am in receipt of your letter O
| the 18th inst, as also the copies of the Free
Press with editorials and comments on the
address of Colonel Grant before the officers
society and legislature of the State. I hav,
carefully read your articles and feel person
ally under great obligations to you for tn,
clear and conclusive manner in which yor
have vindicated the truth of history
I find nothing to correct in your statement
except fact you mention which is misap
prehension. did not invite General Hum
phreys to be my chief of staff until after the
battle, because did not see him after assum-
ing command until met him on the field
and besides I relied on him as maiastny il
handling the third corps and did not wish to
withdraw him from that position. I did ask
General Williams to assume the duties in ad
dition to those of adjutant general, but he
declined. I also asked General Warren, then
my chief of engineers, to act temporarily as
my chief of staff, but he also declined TAX
ing on himself additional duties. Under
these circumstances l asked Gen. Butter
field to remain till / had time to make per
manent arrangements. On the third day
General Butterfeld having been disabled by
being struck with a fragment of a spent
shell left the army and a few days afterwards
General Humphreys accepted my invitation.
My defense against the charges and insinu-
atoms of Generals Sickles and Butterfeld is
to be found in my testimony before the COM
mittee on the conduct of the war. I have
avoided any controversy with either of these
officers though both have allowed no oppor-
tunity to pass unimproved which permitted
them to circulate their -parte statements
and, as you justly say, to distort history for
their purposes. Both perfectly understand
what 1 meant by my ante battle order refer
ring to Pipe Clay creek; also my instructions
to Butterfield on the morning of the second /,
which he persists in calling an order for re-
treat-in the face of all my other acts and of
the fact that did not retreat when could
have done SO with perfect ease at any mo-
ment. Longstreet's advice to Lee was sound
military sense. It was the step I feared Lee
would take and to meet which and be pre-
pared for which was the object of my in
structions to Butterfeld which he has so mis-
represented.
Now let me tell you another historical
fact Lieutenant General Ewell, in con-
versation held with me shortly after the
war asked what would have been the effect
effect if at 4 p. ~ on the first he had occu-
pied Culps Hill and established batteries on
ita told him that in my judgment in the
then condition or the Eleventh and First
corps with their morals affected by their
withdrawal to Cemetery Ridge with the loss
of over half their number in killed, wound
ed and missing (of the six thousand prison
ers we lost on the field nearly all came from
$bac he frat 6avl his
of Culps Hill with batteries commanding the
whole of Cemetery Ridge would have produc
ed the evacuation of that ridge and the with
draw4l of the troops there by the Baltimore
pike and Tanneytown and Emetsburg roads.
He then informed me that at p. m. on the
first that his corps, twenty thousand strong,
in column of attack, on the point of moving
on Culp's Hill, which he saw was unoccupied
and commanded Cemetery Ridge, when he
received an order from General Lee direct
ing him to assume the defensive and not to
advance; that he sent to General Lee urging
to be permitted to advance with his reserves,
but the reply was reiteration of the previ-
Gus order. To my inquiry why Lee had re-
trained him, he said our troops coming up
(Slocum) were visible and Lee was under the
impression the greater part of my army was
on the ground and deemed it prudential to
await the rest of his, as yon quote from my
report.
suppose ENcll Will twenty buOusauu
men, had occupied Culp's Hill and our brave
soldiers had been compelled to evacuate
Cemetery Ridge and withdraw on the roads
above referred to; would the Pipe Clay Greek
order have been SO very much out of placer
That order was to meet the very contingency
here in question, to vita part of my army,
overwhelmed by superior numbers, compel
led to fall back and line of battle to the
rear of my most advanced position thus ne
cessitated.
AS to General Sickles having by his adj
vance brought an attack and thus COM
PEELED the battle which decided the war,
you have completely answered that, and
it is a very favorite theory with the
partisans of this officer. But these, gentle
men ignore the fact tnat of the 5000 men
killed and wounded on the field during the
whole battle more than two-thirds were lost
on the second day, and but for the timely
advance of the Fifth corps and the prompt
sending of a portion on Round Top, where
they met the army almost on the crest and
had desperate fight to secure the position
I say but for these circumstances, over
which Sickles had neither knowledge nor
control, the enemy would have secured
Round Top, planted his artillery there, COM
manding the whole battle field, and what the
result would have been l leave you to judge.
Now, when / wrote my report of the battle
honestly believed General Sickles did
not KNOW where Wlsneo MIN 10 go
and that his error arose from a
but have recently learned from General
Gerry, who had, the day before, been sent
by Hancock to hold the left, and who, in
doing So had seen the great Importance of
Round Top and posted a brigade on it; that
on the morning of the second when he re-
ceived my order, that he would be returned
by the Third corps, and, on being relieved,
would join his own corps (Twelfth) on the
right. After waiting for some time to be
relieved he sent to General Sickels staff
officer with instructions to explain the posi-
ton and its Importance. and to ask II troops
would not be sent to relieve him, that Cen
eral Sickels would send one of his staff to
see the ground and to place troops there on
their arrival.
He received for reply that General S. would
attend to it in due time. No officer or
troops came and after waiting till his patience
was exhausted General Geary withdrew and
rejoined mis- corps. Now my first orders to
corps division (Geary's) and occupy their po-
sitions. Here is evidence that he
knew the position occupied by
Gearys division OF would have
known and yet failed to occupy it. Fur
thermore when he came to my headquarters
at about noon and said he did not know
where to 90 l answered: "Why, you were to
4CilONO IAo 4Wc1lGA 70.
no position; they were massed awaiting
events Then it was I told him his right
was to be Hanceck's left, his left
on Round Top, which pointed out.
Now his right was three quarters OF mile in
front of Hancock's left and his left one-quar-
ter of mile in front of the base of Round
Top, leaving that key point unoccupied,
which ought to have been occupied by Long
street before we could get there with the
Fifth corps Sickles' movement practically
destroyed his owl, col ps-the Third-caused
loss of fifty per cent. of the Fifth corps and
very heavily damaged the Secoud corps, as
said before, producing sixty-six per cent. of
the loss of the whole battle and
with what resulta Driving us back into the
position he was ordered to hold originally
These losses of the first and second day af-
fected greatly the offering and morale of
the army and prevented my having the au-
dacity in the offense that might otherwise
have had If this is an advantage to be SO
supported in battle without attaining any
Object must confess Icannot see it.
Pardon my writing with SO much proiixi-
ty, but your generous defense and clear view
you have taken of the battle have led me to
wander thus far.
Very truly yours,
GEORGE G, MEADE.