New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1886-12-12
MCCLELLAN'S BOOK.
>ur DEFENCE OF WASHINGTON AND CAM
PAIGN OF ANTIETAM.
(Second Nofice)

srccr.EIIAN-s OWN STORY. BY GEORGE B. MoCIEI-
Ian Ina late Elm S9s Charles WeSsser Co.,
N mem Mcclellan reached Acquia Creek on the
esth of August, 1862. after the evacuation Of the
peninsula. he had no orders for his further move
ments no troops, no knowledge what his CON-
,nand was to be, and no information as to the
position and strength Of the enemy. Telcgraphic
inouiries of Halleck did not enlighten him. u
do not know replied that officer to one OF the
questions, "either where General Pope is or
where the enemy In force is. These are matters
which have been all day most anxious to ascer-
Iains The lack Of information in the Office OF
the General In Chief was ono Of the most re
marlxable phenomena not only Of this exciting
crisis but of the entire Halleck period. On the
p7th General Hallec< telegraphed again. Il
can get no satisfactory information from the 'front.'
either Of the enemy or Of our troops He con-
tinued ignorant up to the very last, and IT Is
possible that his persistent failure to acknowledge
McClclland's demand for definite orders was more
the result Of bewilderment than of Ill will He
presently transferred Mcclellan to Alexandria.
and dcpended upon him there to expedite the dis
posal of troops as fast they arrived. But there
continued to be a serious MISUNDERSTANDING
am not responsible for the past wrote McClebah'
i"and cannot be for the future unless receive
authority to dispose of tho available troops &C
cording to my Judgment. Please inform me at
once what my position is do not wish to act
In the dark At last on the Both of August an
order was issued from tho War Department dc
fniny McClellan's command to be that portion
bf the Army of the Potomac that has not been
scnt forward to General Popcs command As the
whole army had been sent forward, McClenan's
command for the time was therefore nothing and
his services became practically those OF O voun-
teer adviser whose advice was heard with scant
ciyility. He was in favor Of retaining consid-
crable force in or near the defences OF Washington
rather than sending everything to the general
whom he used to speak of as "Mr. Pope and in
Safeguarding to the President: IL am clear that
one Of two courses should be adopted; ISL 10
concentrate all our available forces to open CON-
munication with Pope ed, to leave Pope TO get
out OF his scrape. and at once use all our means
10 make the capital perfectly safe,"-it IS probable
that he preferred the second course, although he
did not say so.
Whether he pushed the troops forward as fast
ms he could is question which the memoir can
not solve lie prints a number OF his dispatches
to explain the delays which caused so much irr1ta-
ton at Washington, but most Of them the pubic
are already familiar with, while some Of the dis
matches of IIalleck necessary to their fun appre-
ciation are omitted 1t should be said that all
Through the work the selection Of official letters
and kilograms is made with an affectlonate regard
for General McClell9n's fame. Nobody VIII re-
proach either the General or Mr. Prime for thls
discrimination; and the historian who wishes Tor
The full correspondence may find 1t in other pub
ications On the 3Oth of August. after the publca-
ton of the order defining the commands, General
Mcclellan wrote thus TO Halleck:
/ cannot express to you the pain and mortlhca-
tion have experienced to-day In listening 10 the
distant sound of the firing Of my men. AS can
be of no further here, / respectfully ask that'
II there is q probability of the conflict being re-
newed tomorrow, may be permitted TO 60 to The
scene of the battle with my stall. merely 10 be
with nv own men, if nothing more: they VIII
fight none the worse for my being with them
If it is not deemed best to entrust me WIN The
command even of my own army L simply ask 10
no nermittcd to share their fate on the Held or
battle
Ualleclx replied-but not until the next day
that he "could not answer without seeing the
President" IL is not likely that any further al
fcntion was paid to the request, for the develop
ments of that day put new face upon the situa-
lion. Mcclellan wrote to llaleck on the night
nj August 81 that he had information that Pope
WAS beaten, and he urged the calling IN OF the
troops available for the defence Of Washington.
lie continued follows:
think these orders should be sent at once l
have no confidence in the dispositions MADE as
Father them. To speak franlIly-and the occasion
requires it-there appears TO be total absence
Of brains. and | fear the total destruction OF thc
army. | have some cavalry here uat can
carry out any orders you may have to send Inc
occasion is grave, and demands grave measures
The question is the salvation OF the country
learn that our loss yesterday amounted to 3D.
000 We cannot afford such losses without an
object.
II ;s INV deIherate oninon that the interests of
the nation demand that Pope should fall back to-
night, If possible, and not one moment Is TO be
lost.
Haneck however was incredulous and would
not order the retreat. He had received. or re
ceived soon after dispatch from Pope which Nc
Clellan pronounces false throughout" Nc
Clellan had sent one of his aides, Major Hammer
stein to investigate the state OF affairs at the
front, and this officer brought back POpes dis
patch to be telegraphed to Halleck, and with 1t a
personal report Of a very different character.
Mcclellan gave the substance Of it to Halleck In
an interview at Washington:
lie doubted the accuracy of my information and
believed the statements Of Pope. / then told him
That he ought TO 60 to the front in person and see
what the true condition OF affairs was lie SAID
that he was much occupied with office duty
that it was impossible for him TO leave. / told
him that there could be no duty so important for
the general inchief Of the armies as to know
the condition Of the chief army Of the country.
then actually fighting for the defence Of the CAPT
tai and that his first duty was to 60 out and see
how matters stood, and if need be- assume com
mand in person lie merely repeated his reply,
and urged him as strongly as possible to follow
my advice. He still refused. and then urged
him to send out his chief Of staff. General Cullum
who lust then entered the room but Cullum said
that he could not go. Then l asked that Keton
his adjutant general might be sent. Kelon cheer
fully offered to 60 and it determined that he
should start Immediately / took Kelton TO one
side and advised him not TO content himself with
merely seeing Pope. but also to make it a point
10 converse freely with the general officers and
learn their individual opinions