Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974, 1886-05-28
THE FIRST INVASION OF MARYLAND.

THE FIRST INVASION OF MARYLAND.
General John G.. Walker contributes an
article on the Antietam campaign, entitled
"Harper's Ferry and Sharpsburg," to the
June Century; from it we quote as follows:
'The next day we reached the heneighborhood
of Frederick. I went at once to General
Lee, who was alone. After listening to my
report he said that as had division which
would often, perhaps, be ordered on de-
tached service, an intelligent performance
of my duty might require knowledge of
the ulterior purposes and objects of the CAM
paign.
"'Here,' said he, tracing with his finger
OF a large map, lis the liEe Of our communi-
cations, from Rapidan Station to Manassas,
thence to Frederick. 1t is too near the Po-
tomac, and is liable TO be cut any day by
the enemy's cavalry. l have therefore CIV
en- orders to move the line back into the
Valley of Virginia, by way of Staunton,
Harrisonburg, and Winchester, entering
Maryland ut Shepherdstown.
'''I wish you to return TO the mouth OF
the Monocacy and enectualy destroy the
aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio canal.
By the time that is accomplished you will re-
ceive orders to cooperate in the capture of
Harper's Ferry, and you will not return here,
but, after the capture of Harper's Ferry, will
rejoin us at Hagerstown, where the army will
be concentrated. My information is that
there are hstween 10000 and 10000 men at
Harper's Ferry, and 5000 at Martinsburg.
The latter may escape towards Cumberland;
but think the chances are that they will
take refuge at Harper's Ferry and be cap
tured.
"'Besidel the men aud material of war
which we shal. capture at Harper's Ferry,
the position is necessary to us, not to garri
son and hold, but in the hands of the enemy
it would be break in our new line of COM
munication with Richmond.
"'A few days rest at Hagerstown will be
of great service to our men. Hundreds of
them are bare-footed, and nearly all of them
are ragged | hope to get shoes and cloth.
ing for the most needy. But the best of it
will be that the short delay will enable us
to get up our rstragglers-not stragglers from
shirking disposition, but simply from ina
bility to keep up with their commands. l
believe there are not less than from eight to
ten thousand ofthem between here and Rap
idan Station. Besides these, we shall be able
been accumulating at Richmond for some
weeks. have now requested that they be
sent forwart TO join IL. They ought to
reach US st HageTs'own. We shall then
hn9.. ii yer; good army aud he smilingIy
added One that think will be able to
sive good account o; itself
In ten days from now,' he continued,
'if the military situation is then what l con-
fdently expect it to be after the capture of
Harpsr's Ferry, shall concentrate the ar
my at Hagerstown, efectually destroy the
Baltimore and Ohio road, and march to this
point placing his finger ut Harrisburg,
Pennsylvania. That is the objective point
of the campaign. You remember, no doubt,
the long bridge of the Pennsylvania rail-
road, over the Susquehanpa. q few miles
west OF Harrisburg. Well, wish effectu
ally to destroy that bridge, which will disa-
BILE the Pennsylvania railroad for long
time. With the B. & 0. in our possession,
and the Pennsylvania railroad broken up,
there will remain to the enemy but one
route of communication with the West, and
that very circuitous, by way of the Lakes.
After that, can turn my attention to Phil
adelphia, Baltimore or Washington, as may
seem best for our interests
II was very much astonished at this an
nouncement, and [ suppose he observed it,
for he turned to me and said:
"'You doubtless regard it hazardous to
leave Mcclellan practically OF my line Of
communication, and to march into the heart
of the enemy's country? I admitted that
such thought had occurred to- me.
"'Are you acquainted with Gen. McClel-
Ian p he inquired. replied that We had
served together in The Mexican war under
Gen. Scott, but that I had seen but little of
him since that time.
"'He is an able general, bat cautious
one. His enemies among bis own people
think him too much so. His army is 10 a
very demoralzed and chaotic condition,
and will not be prepared for offensive opera
tions-or he will not think it so-for three
or four weeks Before that time I hope to
be on the Susquehanna.'