Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1886-12-16
How Gettysburg was Lost.

General E. NJ. Law, of South Carolina,
writing in the December Century of his
experiences at Gettysburg, tells of a
proposition which he made to General
Hood for an att ck on the Union left.
and says: IL found General Hood on the
ridge where his line had been formed,
communicated to him the information l
bad obtained, and pointed out the ease
with which movement by the right
flank might be made. He coincided
fnlly in my views, but said that his or
ders were positive to attack in the front,
as aoon as the left of the corps should
get into position. l therefore entered a
formal protest against direct attack,
on the grounds: l. That the great matt
ural strength of the enemy's position in
our front rendered the result of direct
assault extremely uncertain. 2. That,
even if successful, the victory would be
purchased at too great q sacrifice or life,
and our troups would be in no condition
to improve it. 3. That q front attack
was unnecessary,-the occupation Of
Round Top during the night by move
ing upon it from the south, and the ex'
tension of our right wing from that
point across the enemy's left and rear.
being not only practicable. but easy. 4.
That sucn movement would compel a
change of front on the part of the enc
my, the abandonment of his strong POSI-
tion on the heights, and force uim to
attack us in position.
General Hood called up Captain
Hamilton, of his staff, and requested me
to repeat the protest to him, AID the
grounds on which 1t was made. He
Jheu directed Captain Hamilton to iud
General LoDgstreet as quickly as possl>
bic and deliver the protest, and to say to
him that be (Heod) indOrsed it fully.
Hamilton rode off at once. but in about
ten minutes retured, accompanied by
staff-officer of General Longstreet, who
said to General Hood. in my hearing:
General Longstreet orders that you be-
gin the attack at once Hood turned to
me and merely said, You hear the or
der?' l at once moved my brigade to
the assault. l do not know whether the
protest ever reached General Lee.
From the brief interval that elapsed be-
tween the time it was sent to General
LongstIeet and the receipt of the order
to begin the attack, 1 am inclined to
think it did not. General Longstreet
has said that he repetedly advised
against a front attack and suggested a
movement by our right flank. He may
have thought, after the rejection of this
advice by General Lee, that it was use
less 10 press the matter further.
sJIlst here the battle of Gettysburg
was lost to the confederate arms. 1t is
useless to speculate upon the turn affairs
might have taken if the confederate
cavalry had been in communication
with the rest of the army, and if Goner
al Stuart had kept General Lee informed
as he should have done, of the move
ment of the federal army. In consider
ing the causes of the confederate fail
ure on that particular field, we must
take the situation just as we find it.
and the situation was as follows: The
advance of the two armies encOun-
tered each other on the 1st of July. AD
engagement ensued in which the con-
federates were victorious. The federal
troops retired through Gettysburg and
took position along the heights east of
town-a position which, if properly de-
Tended was practically impregnable to a
direct attack.
"The whole matter then resolved itself
into this: General Lee failed at Gettys+
burg on the sd and Sd of July because
be made his attack precisely where his
enemy wanted him to make 1t and was
most fully prepared to receive it. Even
had he succeeded in driving the federal
army from its strong position by gen.
eral and simultaneous assault along the
whole front (Which was the only posi-
Lle chance of success in. that d,rection),
he would have found his army in very
much the same condition that Pyrrhus
found his when, after driving the
Romans from the field of Asculum. he
exclaimed, Another such victory and ]
am donep"