Middlebury register. (Middlebury, Vt.) 1886-1937, 1886-03-12

of our government, should be held under
a familiar maxim of construction to ex-
clude every other right of interference
with executive functions.
In the first Congress which assembled |
after the adoption of the constitution.
compromising many who aided in its .
preparation, IA legislative construction /
was given to that instrument, in which .
the independence of the executive i'm the /
matter of removals from Office was fully
sustained. think it will be found that |
in the subsequent discussions of this |
question there was generally, if not at all
| times, a proposition pending to in some
way Curail this power of the President |
| by legislation, which furnishes evidence
that. to limit such power, it was sup
posed to be necessary to supplement the
constitution by such legislation. The
first enactment of this description was
! passed under a stress of partiSanship and
political bitterness which eliminated in
the Presidents impeachment This law
provided that the federal officers to which
it applied could only be suspended dur
ing the recess of the Senate, when shown
by evidence satisfactory to the President
to be guilty of misconduct in office. or
crime. or when incapable or disqualified
/ to perform their duties, and that within
20 days after the next meeting of the Sen-
ate it should be the duty of the Presi dent
''to report to the Senate such suspensions
with the evidence and reasons for his ac-
ton in the case" This statute. passed
in 1867, when Congress was overwhelm-
ingly and bitterly opposed politically to
the President, may be regarded as an in
dcation that even then it was thought
necessary by Congress determined upon
the subjugatiOn of the executive to legis-
l.t. 70 IL.
purpose instead of attempting to reach
the object intended by an Invocation of
any pretended constitutional right. The
law which thus found its way to our
statute book was plain in its terms, and
: the intent needed no avOwal. If valid
: and now in operation, it would Justify
: the present course of the Senate. and
command the obedience of the executive
to its demands. 1t may, however, be re-
marked in passing, that under this law
the President had the privilege of pre-
: senting to the body which assumed to re-
view his executive acts his reasons there
= for, instead of being excluded from eX-
l PLANTATION or judged by papers found in
2 the departments.
. Two years after the law of 1861 was
: passed. and within less than five weeks
: after the Inauguration of President in
= political accord with both branches of
= Congress, the sections of the act regulat-
ing suspensions from office during the
recess of the Senate were entirely repeal
l. ed, and in their place were substituted
e provisions which. instead of limiting the
: causes of suspension to misconduct
o crime. disability or disqualification. eX-
/, pressly permitted such suspension by the
u President Tin his discretion and com.
;. pletely abandoned the requirement oblig
ing him to report to the Senate the evil
,, dence and reasons for his action. Will
~ these notifications, and with all branch
: es of the government in political har
mony, and in the absence of partisan in
! centive to captious obstruction. the law
/ "a it was left by the amendment of 1869
: was much less destructive of eXecutiv,
- discretion. and yet the great general anC
+ patriotic citizen who on the 18th day o
- March. 1863. assumed the duties of chic
~ executive. and for whose administration
/ of his high office the most hateful re
+ straints of the law of 1867 were. on tn
=, 9TH day of April, 1863, removed, mindful
~ of his obligation to defend and protec
~ every prerogative of his great trust. an,
a apprehenSive of the injury that threaten
re ed the public service in the continue,
:, operation of these statutes. even in thei
M modified form. in his first message t
10 Congress advised their repeal. and Sc
,e forth their unconstitutional character an
~ hurtful tendency in the following Ian
~ guage:
- 1t may be well to mention here the cmba
a. rassmcnt possible to arise from leaving o
e. the statute books the so-called tenure OF ofc
III acts, ana to earnestly recommend their toti
of repeal. II could not have been the mtcntio
Ina tthc trainers OF the constitution, when pre-
y. viding that appointments made by the Pres
OF dent should receive the consent of the Ncnat,
ha that the latter SlOulU have the I q a.
a. in office persons placed there by federal ~
pointment against the will of the Presiden
re The law is inconsistent with faithful an
it. efficient administration of the government
- What faith can an executive put in offca
Ia forced upon him. and those, too, whom he hi
IT, suspended for reason How will such of
in cials be likely to serve an administrator
of which they know does not trust them;
of | am unable TO state whether or NJ
IA this recommendation for Il repeal of thes
A. laws has since been repealed. If it III
be not. the reason can probably be foun
u in the experience which demonstrated Il
We fact that the necessities of the polite;
IL situation but rarely developed their V
mt cious character, and so it happens tina
Dr- after an existence of nearly % years
u almost innocuOus desuetude, these law
So. are brought forth, apparently the r
lie pealed rs well rs the unrepealed, and put
,rS the way of an executive who is Willing
mt if permitted. to attempt an improvement
to in the methods of administration. III
in constitutionality of these laws is by l
le- means admitted. But why should Il
on provisions of the repealed law. which I
re- quires specific cause for suspension IN
of Il report to the Senate of ''evidence IA
he reasons" be now in effect applied To Il
nd present executive instead of the law afte
ma wards passed and unrepealed, which I'll
ct tinctly permits suspensions by the Pres
Sm dent sin his discretion," and careful
tai OmitS the measurement that "eridcn
rtv and reasons for his action in the cas-
cir shall be reported to the Senate:
ms The requests and demands which,
ual the score, have for nearly three mont
the been presented To the different depa
mcnts of the government, whatever mi
to be their form, have but one complectio
ers They assume the right of the Senate
ght sit in Judgement on the exercise of Il
hat exclusive discretion and executive fun
iii ton, for which am solely reSponsll
to to the people, from whom have late