New-York tribune., 1886-02-21
cPEtLy,S STEIcrlGES


Sabine disaster has been revived by the pubii-
cation of Lieutenant GIerly's book. Barely
three pages of thlt very interesting work are
devoted to this subject, but compressed within
these narrow limits is much destructive criti-
cism. He does not seek to disclaim his own share
of ofrcsponslbiity. He frankly 5 admits that in 1ool
he ought 10 have done more than to arrange
for retreat 10 Cape Sabine and TO have pro-
vidcd against shpwrccN and other mlSchAnccs.
In the same spirit he assumes that GcLerll
Hazcn regret, that the memorandum requiring
stores to be landed on the west coast before
any attempt should be- made to reach Lady
Franklin Sound was not incorporated in Lieu
tenant Garincton's ordcrs. But having con-
crd-l these points, he exposes Lieutenant Car
lington aud Commander Wildcs to scathing
criticism and supports General lialcn's stilct-
urcs upon the conduct of eA-Sccrctary Lincoln
in deciding against an autumn expedition.
The last point, in oar Judgment, is not well
taken. While it is true that the Greely party
might have been rescued if stout Sealer had left
ST. john, ten days aftcr the return of the Yam
tic. the Secretary of War would not have been
justified in taking the risks. Lieutenant Gar
lington himself advised against IL, while
ostcntatiou,ly Offering 10 20 North again and
the most experienced Arcuc experts IN Wash
ington, with the exception of Chief Engineer
Melville, cOunsellcd inactiOn until spring. The
Secretary could not be expected TO give orders
for so hazardous an expedition late in Septem-
Der, when the officers who had just returned
from Smith Sound plainly considered the at
tempt lmpracticabe. Lieutenant darlington
himself telegrapncd that a Il, alcr must be oili-
4 o Ift,sf. Gt.,t. Nl,tFt
in order to be depended upon for this service.
There was too scant an allowance OF time after
the arrival OF the Ydntc, on September -, for
the organization of such an expedition, and Il
military substitute for Lieutenant Garling on,
whose unfiness for command was manifest,
could not be furnished without much delay. II
the Secretary had been endowed with clalrvOy-
ant intutiOns 50 a TO forecast the conditions Of
the ice in Melville Bay and smith Sound for
three months, he would undoubtedly have
chartered a sealcr and asked the Navy Depart
ment To detail Lieutenant C0llwcll to command
her with crew of volunteers from the Yantc.
Not having this supernatural privilege, he
acted UPON the best advice he could obtain and
is not to be held responsible for the cata5-
trophe.
Wides. however are more vulnerable. They
were seut North for the purpose Of carrying
out precOncertcd scheme for the relief of the
Grccly colony, and between them they failed to
do anything but lure the cast ways to their
doom. Lieutenant darlington, by ordering the
Proleus into the ice against the advice Of 80
experienced navigator rs Captain Pike, vas
Directly responsible for the wreck of the relief
vessel. If he had left at Cape Sabine, as Lieu
tenant Greely says, warning that the colOnlsts
must not look for help, he would have done
them a real service. What ho did was to prom
se that everything within the power of
man should be done for those he was sent to
rescue, and then to scuttle southwark in q
senseless panic, loading his boats to the
danger line" with provisions to insure the
safety of his men, when he had every
reason to expect the Yantic at LittletOn
Island within a week. lie did "every
thing within the power of man" to pro-
tect himself and TO avoid wlntering at Littleton
Island. Even when he reached the Greenland
settlements and joined Commander Wildes, he
never suggested a return TO Smith Sound, but
meekly acqulesced in the immediate return of
the Yantic to ST. Johns.
AS for Commander Wdcs, we are not sure
but that he has been too lenently dealt with in
this transaction. To say that his orders did not
provide for the contingency that arose is an in
adequate defence. lie was within tell miles of
the west coast, where Lieutenant Greedy was
expected to emerge. He knew that the prom
sed supplies had not been landed there and that
If any vessel was to leave them there, it must be
the Yantic. He went South without depOsiting
an ounce of food at Cape Sabine. A few hours
delay in beginning the searcn for the CARING
ton party, which was well supplied with food
and could not be considered in immediate
danger, would have sufliced to land fuel for the
winter, lumber for house and full rations for
the Greedy party. Commander Wildes was not
the main culprt, in laundering, cowardice and
pusillanimOus desertion of the post of duty