The weekly Union times. [volume] (Union C.H., South Carolina) 1871-1894, 1886-08-20


under which were the den, of ra,tlesn,ke es tbs
INFESTED that country. We were now gsttin
| near 'icksburg and the enemys guns souude,
| much louder than they did when we were A
| jackson and made us more nervous. Ate
remaining in that camp FIVE days the troop
| were ordered to cook three days rations. w
all knew the Interpretation Of that order, an,
began to imagine fight was at hand. Ju,
after the turn Of midnight on the 9th July, th
army marched out Of camp, nnd on reachin,
| the road filed to the right aud moved towards
Big Black and Vicksburg. The army h.t
scarcely Strengthened out in the road before i
was halted. Every one knew that Big Black
was not far off, and just beyond was the Feds
raj army. II was believed that an attemp
would be made to cross the river before dav
and with the sun would come bloody work. A
dcathlikc stiffness pcrvadcd the army. -Ther,
was no whispering. Perhaps each man was
busy with thoughts, Of what tho morning's liyh,
would bring. The night wore on and still tn,
ominous silence hung with mysterious forebod
ings about the army. The soldiers not being
able to divine its meaning, began to imagin @
being consumed in laying pontoons for the sue.
cessful crossing of the river Or it NAV be
that tho enemy had gotten wind of our approach
and were already at the river to dispute our
passage. Thoughts like these doubtless filled
the minds with conflicting emotions and the
soldiers with kind of drcal Of the revelation
that day would bring. Just before day the
mysterious silence was broken. The news ran
down the line that Vicksburg had fallen and
that we were already confronted at the river
by the Federal army. No one can form INV
conception of the emotions that ran wild
through the soldiers brains at that hour. Tho
Importance of Nick.burg had been greatly mag
hlhed' Our troops had been led to believe that
our national existence depended upon our ability
to hold it but it was now in the possession of
the enemy. We knew that the eyes of the Con-
fcdcracy were watching Johnson's army and
that much was expected Of it. None, therefore
who were not on the Big Black that morning
can ever realize how Johnson's men stocuered
under the blow. Had the garrison held out two
days longer, the experiment Of relieving vicks-
burg would have been made and, in all prob-
ability, Johnsons s army would have been cut to
pieces. Yet we cannot but wish the experiment
could have been made.
Johnson has been severely criticised for NOT
be remembered that an army cnunOt be gathrreu
up from the four points Of the compass and
made available in a few days time.
On the I'D of May, 1863. when Evans brig
adc arrived at Jackson, Pcmbcrton was already
hcrmctcaly sealed in Vicksburg. AMI Johnson
on the outside with n command Of six thousand
troops, rs y ncuclus for the formation of All
army FOR the purpose Of saving Nicksburg
swcllcd to thirty thousand men. The troops
thnt composed this army came from Charleston,
Bcaurcgard, Bragg, and part of rembcrtons
defeated army at Edwards Depot, bu, being cut
off was not shut up in Nicksburg. The medley
of troops suddenly brought together had to lie
organized into divisions and corps and then
drilled together before they could have that
mutual confidence in each other so essen
tial TO success the battlefield. II is only
when officers and men have mutual confde encc
in each othcr-a confidence that is born of asso-
citation and courage exhibited in the trying hour
of dangcr-that the best results can he safely
counted on Johnson's army composed of officers
and men hastily thrown together, and without
any practical knowledge of each others cour-
ago, could not hopo - meet successfully nm
enemy superior in number and training and. at
the same time, flushed with victory
1t is true that johnson made no record as a
fighter. lie thought the preservation of his
army was worth more to tho Confchcracy than
towns and cities; that troops should not be
sacrificed and exposed whore there i, no al.
vantage 10 be gained. The wisdom of his pol
icy was verified in two notable instances. His
first order TO Pcmhcrton. after taking command
in Mississippi, was not - shut himself up in
Wick sburs and lose both men and place. The
order set aside and both place anil army
were lost to the Confedcrncy. Johnson did no
believe that the sacrifice of his army in an I'M
equal contract on the battlefield would save
Atlanta, and if it did, the place was not worth
the price paid for it.. lie was removed and tht
crn army. No troops fought better. Atlant.
was lost, aud in three fights Johnsons ole
army, under Hood had an existence only il
history. Had Johnson remained in command
Of omr western army, Sherman would ncvcl
have reached the sea in command Of n conquer
ing army, or hal the pleasure OF sticking hi
hcndish torch to the city Of Columbia.
The noble Lee, under the pressure Of public
sentiment. proved the impracticability Of inva
sion. Twice he made the experiment an,
twice he returned to Virginia with shattered
army. Johnson i plan wa, the only one tha
had in il the element Of success. Put the en-
cmy 10 the necessity of hauling supplies over