New-York tribune., 1886-01-10

not he obtained until Austria had been doelsiNoy
whipped To strengthen the rrussan Crown there
fore in every possible way, to snbJugato Inril"-
ment TO deprive popular representatives, whom no
detested aud despsod, of thopower to interfere win
the budget TO get the army we'll III hand, To lsoato
Austria by bargaining for the friendship Or neutral
ity of the other great Powers, were the principal
points of his extraordinarily astute and resolnte
course in parliamentary aud diplomatic lie. III was
life of almost incessant conflict. His schemes were
so completely successful the results correspondou
so closely to his calculations. that one is tempted
to think of him ruling Europe alone. lie was
freouently in opposition during his younger and
less honored wears not only to the most powerful
statesmen of Prussia but to the King himself; and
1t happened more than that In the trlal oil con-
cusions with Austrian diplomacy the most formid-
able antagonist he had TO overthrow was his royal
master. There is no chapter in the history OF mod-
ern Europe which compares for thrilling interest,"
with the narrative of what this hardliving ana
hard hitting JUnkT accompl shed between the con
versation with Frederick William w., which We
cited just now. and the dramatic climax which was
reached before the walls of Paris.
The adroitncss of BismaIcks foreign policy Will
long remain n subject of admirng study for states
men; but the appearance OF TINS booted nllI'aiy
giant among the silk stocking diplomats OF the old
could he charming companion, and often made
hlu self general favorte at the courts to which he
was accredited, his temper was not to be tflned
with; he drove through formalities and ohstrnc-
tons like incarnate Force; he penetrated all the
disguises in which kings, ministers, ana amDassa'
dors wrapped up their characters; he generally
ended by despising them; often he threw them INTO
hopeless perplexityby telling them TIE truth. Some
of his very free comments upon the pablic men OF
his day have been published with his DISPATCHES
and letters. OF the Austrian representatives at the
Diet of Frankfort he wrote:
"COnnt Thun has somewhat of a bumptious ap-
pearance with tOuch of the Vienna rOue about
him. Butthe sins which he commits III the latter ca
pacty he tries 10 make up for in his own eyes ana
in those OF his Countess, by strictly obseIvihg dnG
macao) at the club till j IN the morning. or dances
from ten to five without ceaslng and with evident
passion drinking plenty OF iced champagne All the
while, and pays court to the pretty wives ol the
merchants with an ostentation that makes one be-
leve he does so as much 10 make an IMPRESSION on
the SPECTATORS as to give himself pleasure. Chder
this exterior Count rhun cOnceals. VIII not say
high political energy and mental Ntts, but an
unsua degree of ceverness ana cacuiallon' tnat
issue with great presence of mind IRON Il der thc
mask of harmless bOnhOme as soon as pOlltlcs come
into question | consider him an opponent that
might be dangerous to everybody who honestly
trusts him, instead of paying HIM back Ill MS own
coin. , .
1iciSt as the saving is; he is nearly NIFTY, writes
poetry occasionally Is sentimental falls TO weeping
readily at the theatre, has an appearance OF good
nature and agreeablcness drinks more than he can
stand, and is said to have had family misfortune.
Herr Won Prokesch, who succeeded Count Ihun
1s53) is denounced for " the easy calmness with
which he advances falsehoOds contests the
truth" Later Bismarck said in conversation:
"No Austrian diplOmatist of the school of that
day troubled himself very much about the exact
fruth PrOkeSCH not at all the man lot me-
He had brought with HIN from the last the trek "l
the most miserable lntrlgues. ruin was matter
of absolute Indifference to him. | rencmber once.
in a large company, there was some tdlk oi an
Austrian assertion which did not square with the
truth Prokesch raised hls voice ana sald. so tilat
should hear HIM distinctly, II that were not true
should have been ipng land he emnhazied the
wor,U IN the nan.e of the lmperlal-Royal Govern
ment.' He looked me straight III the lace. re-
tanned the LOOK and sa d. quietly. Quite 50, your
Excellency.' He was obviously shocked: : but when
OH looking ronnd he perceived nothnI but down
dropped eyes and solemn silence, which meant 80
say that | was in the right he turned on MS hrel
and went into the dining-roOm where covers wer"
laid. After dinner he had recovered himself. ana
came across to me with fall glass, for Otherwise
| should have supposed that he was gong 10 call
me out He said. Come, now; let us make friends
Why not 2 sad |; but the protocol must Of
piled smiling. IL all right The protocol Uds
altered that they recognized that 1t mad contained
an untruth.
In 1857 Bismarck wrote of the French Emperor :;
In Napoleon III. the conquering impulse does not
seem TO predOmnate Jas it did with his unclc He
is no soldier aud in big war coupled with great
success or dangers the eyes of the army-hc support
of his supremacy he assuredly directed more
toward Il successful general than TO the Emperor
himself: so he will only have recourse TO war when
he thinks he is forced to do owing to domestic
dangers" Napoleon was far less happy in his judg
ment Of Bismarck. After some significant con
versatlons with the PIussian Minister the Emperor
- Il.
ion which he doubtless modified few years later.
Bismarck seems to have had no very high respect
for Jules Fayre with whom 1t was his fortune to
treat for the surrender:
Speaking afterward Of the passag &c in Favro's ac-
count of the otiatOns where he saysbc wept with
anguish bismarck remarked " Ii Is true he seemed
to be crying and ] tndeavored in fashion 10 con
sole him; hut when / looked "a little closer.
positively believe that lie had not she a tear lie
intended, probably, to work upon my feelings with
a little theatrical performance. ~ the Parsiln adj
vOcates work upon their public. 1 am almost
convinced that at Ferrcres. too, he was painted
wbte, especially the second time That morning
in mis- part of the injured and much-snlirrlng man,
he looked much graycr than he did before Ii -
possible Of course, that he feels all this' but hc IS
no politician. He ought to know that bursts Of
feeling are out OF place in politics.
OF Theirs he thought much more highly: lie
peascs very much for he has fine intellect
good manners, and can tell his story very well.
often feel for him, for he is in a bad position
but all that cannot help HIM" His estimate Of
Gortschakoif far from hatteFing; the Russian
statesman seemed to him vain, untruthlul, and
greatly Overrated:
Without the least reason, many people take him
fol a particularly clever and skiliul diplOmatist
lie never has any really great object IN view and
therefore cannot point TO any remarkable success
His policy Is not that OF tue Car Alexander. nor is
il Russian policy, but one dictated and guided IN
the first place by considerations personal 20 him
self. and the second his prediction Tor
France, which his master does not share. His
Chief characteristic is highly developed egotsim ;
hls chief aim the qualification OF his yearning to
esteemed politician OF the first class. which is inst
what he is not Hence his chronic disDOsti)n to
invent scenes in which he can play part likely to
elicit applause from public opinion. The Russian
during the past four years; and no expert will
venture to say that his operations have revealed