The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-11-07

ing tnau nlmseT, out VINO Stili sought tnelr
recognition, and in short time conceived the
idea, and advanced the proposition to become
their Moses, to lead them triumphantly out Of
all their difficulties" I remember once return
ing to him from the White House. whitner he
had sent me with a message to Mr.. Johnson and
describing to him what 1 had seen; the ante
chamber of the tailor President crowded with
magnates of the South Hunter and Richard
Taylor, and others of that sort, waiting for a
chance to ask to be pardoned.
Grant. like every other human being, was
sometimes unjust in his judgments, and did not
always allow the credit of the highest motives to
those who opposed him. He thought Johnson
affected by the influences / have described, and
that Seward, for the sake of place and power,
followed in the political somersault No word
intlmating belief that Seward originated John
sons policy ever escaped him in my hearing,
either IN the excited intercourse of the time or
IN the deliberate discussions of later years.
1t is needless to say that Grant thought Sew
ard intellectual and able; and of course. he
never dreamed of denying his patriotism; bus
the genius of the one was so Numerically
opposed to that of the other that Grant
could not do justice to the considerations.
whether of legitimate ambition or
lofty craftsmanship, that may have actuated
Seward. He was too intensely himself to be
Stewards place. He could not understand how
Seward could reverse the feelings and principles
of a lifetime to remain in Johnson's Cabinet
He could not perceive that Seward, once the bug
bear of the Shareholders. might take an exquis-
tie pleasure in the thought that they owed their
exemption from many misfortunes to the man
they had so long end so bitterly reviled
But although Grant thought Seward only
follower of johnson in the reconstruction policy,
ne certainly believed that many of the devices
Nf .1Nhn dY1a foS dto H.
did not think Johnson clever enough tc initiate
all the craft that gave the country and Congress
so much trouble and alarm. Many of the acutest
arguments in defense of johnson Grant thought
were in reality perversions Of Stewards intellect
IN an unworthy cause; and the effort to send
Grant out OF the country ne always attributed to
Seward. The conception was worthy of the dip
lomatic Secretary, to whom it would fall to carry
out the device, If it succeeded; for If Grant had
accepted the position pressed upon him he must
have received his instructions from Seward who
had opposed and defeated Grants Mexican poll
cy Those instructions, in fact, were written
out, and Seward once began to read them in Cab
met, but Grant refused to hear them. Even
after this they were forwarded to Grant through
the Secretary of War, but were finally turned
over to Sherman. It would indeed have been a
Machiavellan triumph to have got rid of Grant
at that juneture In affairs at home and at the
same time forced him to carry out Stewards poll
cy in Mexico.
But though, as I have said. Grant never got
over his dislike Of Stewards course, either in the
Mexican matter or In the general policy of the
administration, Seward was determined not to
quarrel with Grant He was never personally
conspicuous In the strategems which Grant was
obliged to contest, and even at the crisis of the
relations between Grant and johnson, when
other Cabinet ministers ranged themselves on
the side of the President, Seward contrived to
write letter not entirely unsatisfactory to his
chief while yet he refrained from giving the lie
to Grant. Thus their relations, although after
this perion never intimate, were not absolutely
interrupted. Some of Stewards admirers even
proposed TO Grant to invite Seward to remain in
the State Department but he never entertained
the idea.
| remember dinner at the house of Mr.
Thornton, the British minister given after
Grants election, at which Seward sat on the
right of the host and Grant the left; and
Seward remarked as he took his seat "After the
4th of March, General, you and will be obliged
to change places at table" But there were
many even then who placed General Grant
above the Secretary of State and Grant him
self. In more important matters than rank or
etiquette, was asserting his own consequence
the host who was then entertaining them from
negotiating treaty with Seward and he mad
striven successfully to lessen the influence of
Stewards minister to Mexico.
Still the honorS were divided. Seward had de-
feated Grant in what the soldier had 80 much at
heart-the forcible emulsion of Maximiian ac-
complishing the overthrow of the empire by d.
plomatic means though he risked, as Grant be-
lieved, the existence of the Mexican republic;
but Seward himself was defeated in the great OBJ
ject Of Johnson's admnistration-ther econstruc-
tion policy; and in this defeat Grant was the
principal figure and instrument Grants eiec-
tion indeed, was the seal of Stewards and John.
sons overthrow. Up to the last their differences
continued. In sending Rosecrans to Mexico Sew
ard must have known the affront he offered
Grant, and by the rejection of the Clarendon
johnson treaty which Grant did so much to ac
complish the final effort of Stewards diplomacy
was foiled
But, after all, both were patriots, both were
Indispensable to the salvation of the state
Grants victories would have been useless. if not
impossible, unless Stewards skill had stayed the
hostile and impatient hands of England and
France; and Stewards diplomacy req uired Vicks-
burg and the Wilderness to be of any avail. AS
Lincoln once said TO Sickles, when they were
discussing the battle of Gettysburg: 'There is
glory enough to go all around" Nevertheless, it
is well to tell the whole truth about great men in
great emergencies ADAM BADEAU.