The weekly Union times. [volume] (Union C.H., South Carolina) 1871-1894, 1886-04-16
AN IMPORTANT DECISION BY THE SUPREME
COURT.
The Rights Of Married Women as to Their Sepa
rate Estates Defined and Settled.

Married Woman ThAir a
rate Estates Defined and Settled.
The STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, In THE
SUPREME COURT NOVEMBER TERM,
1885.
G. G. Habcuicht, plaintiff, appellant, VS..
Rawls & Wilhalf, John Agnew, jr., and
jennie Agnew, defendants, and Jennie
Agnew, appellant. OPINION.
Mc1yER, A. j.:
On the 18th day of January, 1883, the
defsSdants, Rawls & Wilbalf, made the
notes sued on payable to the plaintiff, and
before they were delivered to him they were
endorsed by the other Two defendant, Jen-
ME Agnew then and now being a married
woman. The notes were given in discharge
of lien held by the plaintiff on the stock
of goods belonging to Rawls Il Wilhalf
Mrs. Agpew had no interest in the stock of
goods and received no consideration for her
endorsement. She was, therefore, practi-
cally, nero surety for the debt of an other :.
and the sole question raised by the appeal
is, whether she, being a married woman, was
capable of making such contract. At
common law there is no. doubt that she had
no such capacity, and therefore the inquiry
is whether she has by statute been endowed
with the power to make such contract.
That The Act Of 1870, incorporated in Chap
ter G of the General Statutes of 1872, Page
4S2, Section 3, did confer upon married
woman the power to make any contract
which feme sole conld make, even to the
extent of becoming surety for her husband
was settled by the case, Of Pelzer, Rodgers
& Co. vs.. Campbell, Is S. c. Rep, 5s1,
and Clinkscales VS.. Hall, Is S. G. Rep,
COZ. But at the very next session of the
General Assembly, which convened only a
few days after the decisions in the cases
just recited were rendered, the law which
had been thus construed in those cases was
altered so as to limit the power of married
woman to contract, and the question is as
to tho extent and effect of that limitation
BY the law as it formerly stood it was
dsolesed that "a married woman shall have
the right " 4 X to contract and be contlac.
ted with in the same manner as if she were
unmarried but by the law as it stood Al
tho date of the alleged contract here il
question, and still stands, it is declared q
married woman shall have the right 4
to contract and be contracted with, as Il
her separate property, in the same manner
as if she were unmarried; the five words
italicised have been inserted as an amond
ment to the law as it formerly stood; so
that the question raised by this APPEAL is
narrowed down to the inquiry as to the effec
of these FIVE words. 1t seems to us tha
the mcst natural aud the proper construo
ton of the Act. as amended, is that adopted
by the Circuit Judge: that the contrac
which married woman is there authorized
to make is 'as to the separate property
must have reference to her separate prop
erty, must concern her separate property
1t will bo observed that the question is a.
to what contracts . married woman ma,
make, and not as to their effect after they
have been made. If a given contract is one
that the law authorizes married woman tc
make, then its effect is, and must necessa-
rily be, the same as that Of contract of q
person not laboring under any disability
1t is very clear that the Legislature inten-
ded to make some alteration in the law as
it formerly stood, and we think it equally
clear that the intention was to limit the
power Of q married woman as to the K ind
Of contracts which she was permitted to
make, viz.: to those in relation to her sep.
arate property: AS we have seen, prior to
the amendment, o married woman could
make any kind Of a contract which person
sui juris could make, and the intention un.
doubtedly was to alter this, and hence her
general power to contract was qualified by
the words constituting the amendment, SO
that while formerly she had the unlimited
power to contract. now she can only make
contracts las to her separate property
We are unable to discover anything in the
Act which indicates that the intention OF
the Legislature was simply to confine her
liability on any contract, which she Nigh,
choose to make, to her separate estate, as
is contended for by appellant. There il
nothing in the Act which shows that the
attention of the Legislature was directed tc
the kind Of property which could be held
liable for the performance of married
woman's contract and, on the contrary
the language used shows that the Legislative