The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1886-05-12
UNION AND REBEL GENERALS
Estimates of the Qualities of Sherman,
Sheridan, Thomas, Meade, Hancock,
Sedgwick, W. F. Smith and Others of the
Northern Army, with Mention of Lee, For
rest, Bragg. and Other Southern Generals.

Inc second volume or General Grants Me-
moirs has just been issued. In this volume
General Shermans campaign to Atlanta, man
aged with the most consummate skill,n is spoken
of as zone of the most memorable in history.
There was but little if anything in the whole
campaign, now that it is over to crticise at all,
and nothing to criticise very severely. 1t was
creditable alike to the General who commanded.
and the army which had executed it," General
Grant finds fault with Shermans operations
at Dalton and Snake Creek Gap He says that
Johnston hoped to hold Sherman permanently
at Dalton, and with less skillful general, and
one disposed to take no risks. have no doubt
that he would have succeeded. For my own
part. I think that Johnston's tactics
were right Anything that could have
prolonged the war year beyond
the time that it did finally close would probably
have exhausted the North to such an extent that
they might then have abandoned the contest and
agreed to separation" He also has no criticism
upon the order by which the citizens of At
lanta were all compelled to leave" Finally he
notes that Sherman's campaign twas the first
great political campaign for the Republicans in
their canvass of 1864" Reverting to the substi-
tuition of Hood for Johnston he again says: my
own judgment is chat Johnston acted very wise
ly. He husbanded his men and saved as much
Of his territory as he could without fighting de-
cisive battles, in which all might be lost AS
Sherman advanced, as l have shown. his army
became spread out, until, if this had been con-
tnued, it would have been easy to destroy it in
detail. Hood was unquestionably a brave, gal
liant soldier, and not destitute of ability, but, IN
wherever he saw him, without thinking much
of the consequences of defeat" Mr.
Lincoln was afraid that Sherman might
be captured in his march on Savannah, but
Grant removed his fears by explanations which
afterwards took this form in Lincolns peculiar
phraseology when inquiries were made of him:
Grant says they are safe with such general,
and that if they cannot get out when they want
to they can crawl back by the hole they went in
at" In closing this part of his work Grant says
with customary magnanimity: 1.-THE question of
who devised the plan Of march from Atlanta to
Savannah is easily answered. 1t was clearly
Sherman; and to him also belongs the credit Of
its brilliant execution It was hardly possible
that any one else than those the spot could
have devised new plan Of campaign to super
cede one that did not promise SUCCESS" Grant
favored it from the start, but his chief of staff
bitterly opposed it. Grant speaks of the ''cruel
and harsh" treatment of Sherman by Stanton
and Halleck after the peace terms with John
ston.
To Sheridan, as was of course expected, the
warmest praise is given His first raid upon
Lees communications in May, as far as the outer
defenses of Richmond. is spoken of as the most
brilliant in execution and results, although it
had left him at one time Sin a perl0us position,
from which but few generals could have extricated
themselves" To Sheridan's Shenandoah cam
paign throughout the highest appreciation is also
given, though with few unintentional errors
in the statement of facts. Sheridan's decisive
victories were ''the most effective campaign ar
guments made in the canvass of 1864 after the
Democratic convention at Chicago "had declared
the war failure" President Lincoln was afraid
that Sheridan was even driving Early too far, as
General Cass is once said to have driven the In
dams "Cass was pursuing the Indians so close
iy that the first thing he knew he found himself
in their front and the Indians pursuing him.
The President was afraid that Sheridan had
got on the other side of Early and that
Early was in behind him." meaning
that Lee would send reinforcements to threaten
his rear AS one reads the accounts of Sheri-
dams campaigns, and also the many pages givan
to Sherman'S, he cannot but be struck with the
generous zest of Grant in describing them, and
with the comparatively slight attention given TO
his own great cooperative operations around
Petersburg, the detailed daily account of which,
he says. would prolong this work" while ''it
would not interest the general reader if given.
All these details can be found by the military
student in a series of books published by the
Scribners Badeau's history of my campaigns,
and also in the publications of the War Depart
ment"
Earlys generalship in the Shenandoah Valley
is criticised especially his division of his forces
just before the battle at Winchester; and censure
is passed on the burning of Chambcrsburg "a
purely defenseless town. with no garrison what
ever and no Notifications" Hunter is praised
for his patriotism in expressing perfect willing
mess to give up the command of his department
to Sheridan to avoid embarrassment
In speaking of Thomas General Grant says
(page lI3) that on the 18th of February, 1864,
he ordered him to move on Dalton without
delay, urged him again on the 18th, yet again on
the 2lst, and ''he finally got off the 22d or
23d" After he had gone on and the enemy had
retreated he could not keep up supplies with his
half-starved teams and ''soon fell back" 1t
subsequently appears that 'Schofeld also had
to return for the same reason" In speaking of
the battle of Nashville, hardness is again
ascribed to Thomas. Here is more formal
summary Of his qualities:
"He was man of commanding appearance,
slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensi-
BILE, honest and brave. He possessed valuable
soderly qualities in an eminent degree He
gained the confidence of all who served under
him, and almost their love- Thomas's DISPOSE.
tions were deliberately made, and always good.
He could not be driven from a point he was
given to hold. He was not good, however in
pursuit as he was in action. do not believe
that he could ever have conducted Sherman's
army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the
defenses and the commander guarding that line
in 1864 On the other hand. if it had been given
HIM to hold the line which Johnston tried to
hold, neither that General, nor Sherman nor any
other officer could have done it better
GenerakilMeade is described as an officer of
great merit with drawbacks to his usefulness
hatwere beyond his control:
He had been officer of the Engineer corps
before the war, and consequently had never
served with troops until he was over forty-six
years of age. He never had believe, a COM
mand of less than brigade. he saw clearly
and distinctly the position of the enemy and the
topography of the country in front of his own
position. His first idea was to take advantage
of the lay of the ground, sometimes without ref
erence to the direction we wanted to move after
ward. He was subordinate to his superiors in
ranksto the extent that he could execute an order
which changed his own plans with the same zeal
he would have displayed if the plan had been his
own. He was brave and conscientious. and COM
manded the respect of all who knew him. He
was unfortunately of temper that would get
beyond his control at times. and made him speak
to officers of high rank in the most offensive