The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1886-11-03
Interstate Commerce. Decision on
the Subject by the Supreme Court
Of the United States.

A Washington special to the St.
louis Globe Democrat gives the fullest
distract we have seen of the recent :
lecision Of the Supreme Court Of
he United States on the subject Of
interstate commerce. The opinion was
oy a divided court, the majority
It would seem having oYerruled the
decision in PEEK q. Rai5,oay Company,
while the minority, including the Chief
Justice, adhered to it. We await with
some interest the full text Of the oPin-
ion. The following Is the abstract re-
ferred to:
The United States Supreme Court has
Just rendered another decision of great
on the subject Of interstate
commerce. 1t is a decision which viii /
attract more attention even than the /
former decision on the same subject. Il |
probably goes quite as far IN the asser- /
ton of the power Of the General Gov
eminent over the commerce Of the |
States as is desired by the most extreme |
centralist, and it viii for the same rea- /
son excite the most determined oppesi |
ton of the States rights school. The !
commercial consequences of a logical
enforcement of this decision viii be
very great. Briefly stated, the majority
of the Court say; Eve must, therefore,
hold that it is not, and never has been,
the deliberate opinion of a majority Of
this Court that a statute of State
which attempts to regulate the fares
and charges by railroad companies with
in its limits, for a transportation which
constitutes a part of commerce among
the states, is a valid law"
The case comes up from Illinois, and
is known "a the case Of the Wabash
Railroad. The basis of the suit -asl
the charge that the Wabash, st. Louis
and Pacific Railroad Company had,
in violation of a statute Of the
State of Illinois, been guilty of an
H. 4.--Ases~z is-- 49,
charges of toll and compensation for
the transportation of freight. The
specific charge is that the railroad
on the same day charged Elder q Nc
Kinney for transporting 10000 pounds
Of goods aud chattels from Peoria, in
the State Of Illinois, to New York City,
the sum Of $50, being at the rate Of tif-
teen cents per 100 pounds for said car.
load and that, on the same day, they
agreed to carry and transport for Isaac
Bailey and F. 0. Swanell another car
load of goods and chattels from Gilman,
in the State Of Illinois, to said City of
New York, for which they charged the
sum of $65, being at the rate of twenty
five cents per 100 pounds And it is
alleged that the carload carried for
Elder & Mckinney was carried eighty
six miles farther in the State Of Illinois
than the other carload Of the same
weight. The opinion of the Court is
quite long, exceeding 1000 words. The
following are some OF its more important
points:
The charge exacted from the ship
pers was a charge for interstate trans
portation, and was not susceptible of
| division which would allow of so much
of it to be charged to commerce strictly
within The State, and so much more to
commerce in other States. The Supreme
| Court of Illinois does not place its judg
ment in the present case on the ground
| that the transportation and the charges
| in this case are exclusively State com
merce, but conceding that it may case
of commerce among the States, or inter
state commerce, which Congress would
have the right to regulate if it had
attempted to do so, argues that this
statute of Illinois belongs to that class
of commercial regulations which may be
subject to the laws of State until
Congress shall have exercised its power
on that subject. As to the former de-
cision of the Supreme Court in the case
of Mum v Illinois, the Court in its
present decision says: The question of
how far charge made for a continuous
transportation over several States, which
included a State whose laws were in
question, may be divided into separate
charges for each State, in enforcing the
power of the State to regulate the
charges of its railroads, was evidently
not well considered. The Court says:
It cannot be too strongly insisted upon
that the right Of continuous transportation
from one end of the country to the other is
essential in modern times to that freedom
of commerce from the restraints which the
State might choose to impose upon it,
which the commerce clause IN the Consti-
tuition was intended to secure. The clause
of the Constitution giving Congress the
power to regulate commerce among the
States and with foreign nations, rs this
conrt has said before, was among the most
important of the subjects which prompted
the formation of the Constitution, and it
would be a very feeble and almost useless
provision, but poorly adapted to secure the
entire freedom OF commerce among the
States which was deemed essential to Q
more perfect union by the trainers OF the
Constitution, if at every stage OF the trans
portation of goods and ehattels throughout
the country, the State within whose limits
part of the transportation business must
be done could impose regulations concern
ing the price, compensation, or taxation,
or any other restrictive regulation interior
ing with and seriously embarrassing this
commerce
When it is attempted 10 apply to trans
portation through an entire series OF States
principle of this kind, and each one OF
these States, or of half dozen States, shall
attempt TO establish its own rates OF trans
portation, its own methods to prevent dis
elimination in rates, or to permit it, the
deleterious influence upon the freedom Of
commerce among the States and upon the
transportation OF goods through these
States cannot be overestimated. That this
species of regulation Is one which must be,
If established at all, of general aud ma
tional character, and cannot be safely and
wisely RENTED to local rules aud local
regulations, we think Is clear from what
has already been said. And ii it be a reg
ulation Of commerce, as We think we have
demonstrated it is, and "a the Illinois
Court comedies it to be, it must be OF that
national cha acter, and the regulation eau
only appropriately be by general rules and
principles, which demand that il should be
done by the Congress of the United States
under the commerce clause of the Consti-
tuition. The Judgment of the Supreme
Court Of Illinois, which was adverse TO the
railroad. is reversed, aud the case is re-
handed to that court for further pro-
ceedings in conformity with the above
opinion.
Opinion by Justice Miller:
Justice Bradley delivered dissenting
opinion, in which the Chief Justice and
Justice Gray concurred. In this opin-
ion, it is conceded that Congress might,
if it saw fit, regulate the matter under
consideration, but not having done SO,
it Is held that the State does not lose its
power to regulate the charges of its own
railroads in its own territory simply be-
cause the goods or persons transported
have been brought from or are destined
to a point beyond the State borders.
Good.