The Memphis appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1886-1890, 1886-05-27
GEN. LEES
PLANS IN HIS FIRST INVASION
OF MARYLAND.
A Proof of the COnsummate Ability
That Made aim the Greatest
Soldier of Hts Day.

Gan. John G. Walker contributes
an a. ticle on the An:ietam campl'gn,
entitled "Harper's Ferry aud snap
burg" to the June Ctnhry. From II
we quota as follows: The next day
We reached the ueighborhood OF Fred
Crlrk. l went at once to G n. Lee,
who was alone. After listeIing to my
report he said that IS had division
which would often, perhaps, lie or
dered on detached service, an intelli-
gent Performance of my duty nigh.
require knowledge Of the ulterior
purpot ei ald objects OF the camp ign.
Here, said be, ira ing with his finger
on la -ge map, rs the line Of our COM
munications, ON Rapidsn Station to
Mara sa, thence to Fred rick. 1t is
too near tue Potomac, and i5 liable to
bs Gu any day. have therefor given
orders m we tie line back toto the
Valley of Virginia, by way Of Staun'
ton, Ha riscnOurg end Winchester,
entering Maryland at Shepardstown.
81 wish you to return 10th mouth
of tie Monocacy and etfectuslly de-
s,r the squeduct If tne Chessps axe
and Onip nal. By the time that is
accom- p shed you will receive orders
to cooperate in the capture Of Har.
pel's Ferry, and you will not return
here, but, after the csp,ure( OF Bar-
per's Ferry, will rejoin US at SHsgers-
town, where the army will be )conesn-
trated. My information is that there
are between 10000 aud $1,000 men al
Harper's Ferry and 5000 at Martins
bug The after may escape toward
Dumb rland; but l think the chanel
are that they will take refuge at IHar'
par's Ferry and be csptureo.
"tBssides the men and materifl o.
war which we shall cabtyre st VI Al
peI's f ny, the position 10 reCes5ary
10 us, not TO garrison and hold, hut II
The bau Is OF the enemy it would be {
break in cur new line OF communika
tions WI h K edmond.
ga few days rest at HagersioTI
will he OF great service to our men
Hundreds Of them are ba' e-fcoted, aht
nearly all OF them sre ragged. noR'
to get shoes ard clothes for the mos
, needy. But the best of it will be the
the short delay will enable us 10 ge
up our strs gg trs-not saa2glels ion
shlrkiI G disposition, but simply
ON inability u keep up with thei
/ commands Ibelieve there are not les
Than from 5000 to 10000 OF them be
tween here and Raoldan Station. Be
sides these, we shall be able to get
l., rye number of recruits who bay'
t been accumula ing at Richmond 70
3 some Weekp. | have now requested
, that they be sc 1t forward 10 join Us
Z Tn v ought to reach us at Hsgerstown
=: We Ell ali then have We, y good army
;, ar d smi ing added: One that
( think will be able to give very goo
1 account of itself.
"'In ten days from now he con
4 tinued, If the military situation |
then what l confidently expect it I
BIZ after t. 'pture of Hsrper's Eel
", l s all concentrate the army q
u Ha .ersiown, effsctusly destroy tn
. Ba timore ind Oh road, and marc
/ to this point plac ng his finger
D Hal risburg, Pa. That is the objectiN
3 point If the campaign. You rtmsh
y Der, no doubt, the long bridge Gf tr
Pennsylvania rail DAD over the S4i
oushanns, few mi es west of H$,
risburg. Well, l wish effectually [
Q deitfoy that bridge, which will al
q able the Pennsylvania railroad tpr
IS losg time. With the Baltimore ian
J. Ohio in our posst ssiop, an the Penn
syIvania railroad broken up, the
wi remain to ihs enc my but OF
route If communication with Il
Wet, end that very circuitopF,
E. way Of the lakes. After that | ca
turn my attention to Philadelphia
Ba tlmore or Washington, ,as MT
II seem best for our interests
e 81 was very much astonished at tn
II snn luncement, and l suppose he o
r. terved it, for he turned 70 me al
" said:
"a "'You doubtless regard it haz)r
n GUS to ave Mcclellan practically {
70 my line OF communication, ard
r. march into the heart sbf the enemy
a country | admitted thst such
lee thought had occurred % me.
~ "'Are YOU scquair ted with &c
m Mcclellan? hs inqui1ed. / Iepli,
y that we had served together in u
y Mrxjcau war under Gen. Scott, b
ID that had sea but Ii. tie of him sin
~ that time.
30 He is an able general, but a ca
W tious one. His enemies among
" own people think him too much
Ve H S army is in a very demoializ d &
re chaotic condition, and will not
re prepared for Offensive ope ATOMS
IS he will not think it SO for three
Ve four we .ks. Bsfo e that time | he
81 to be on the susquehanna.'