Mexico weekly ledger. (Mexico, Mo.) 1855-1956, 1886-03-11
The same day Mcclellan received
the following:

"In answer to your question would
say that Grant is somewhere in the
rear of his army drunk.
H. w. HALLEcK, Msjor-Gen."
Again, as evidence that the idoliz.
ed Grant was favored by the Gods of
fortune. as no other man was ever
favored, we cite to w. T. Sherman's'
letter of September 9th, 1885, to Col.
r. N. Scott. in which Gen. Sher-
man places himself on record as say
ing: "Had C. +. Smith lived Grant
would have disappeared to history
after Donelson." Closely following
upon the heels of Donelson came
Haleck's telegram to Grant of March
9Th, 1882, viz: "Your neglect Of re-
peated orders to report the strength
of your command has created
great dissatisfaction, and seriously
interfered with military plans. You
going to Nashville without authority,
and when your presence with your
troops was of the utmost Importance,
was a matter Of serious complaint at
Washington, so much SO that I was
advised to arrest you on your re-
turn Next came Shiloh, where.
hut for the timely arrival of Buel,
Grants army would have been hurled
headlong into the river, and he shelv-
ed in the same niche of historical
relics as Hooker, Pope and Burnside.
1t is not the purpose of the writer to
follow Grant thr ough the various
vicissitudes of the war; suffice is to
say, that. in the two years following
Shiloh, he beat such adversaries as
Bragg and Pemberton, and finally,
when Sherman had gone through the
South like a whirlwind of destruc
ton; when Thomas had annihilated
Hood when fleets of iron clad YES
sells guarded every foot of her sea
hoard; when her resources wer.
totally exhausted, by wading through
rivers of blood and over many thous
and corses. after eleven months, by
mere weight of colossal numbers, he
forced the evacuation of R chmond
and the subsequent surrender of the
remnant of the confederate army ol
North Virginia at Appomattox cour
house. And here let Swinton speal
through his ''Campaigns of the Army
of the Potomac" ''As it was Grant.
happy fortune to reach the high office
of commander-in-chief at time wher
the administrator and the people
instructed somewhat in war and wal
needs, were prepared to give him al
intelligent support, he was at once
able, with all the resources of the
country at his call, with million Of
men in the field, to enter upon {
comprehensive system of combined
Operations. Moreover, the instru
ment given to him to work withal was
one highly tempered, and brought tt
a fine hard edge. The troops had
become, by experience, thoroughly
INJURED TO war. The armies coult
march, maneuver and fight, &c
Thus the fact is patent that to Gran
really belonged little or no credit fo
the manipulation of the final cam
paign. Indeed, careful study o
Grant as General leads US to EN-
phasize the oft repeated fact tina
during the entire war he did no
manifest either the capacity to plal
snundly a campaign or fight battl
in manner to deserve success tina
in no instance did he manifest tn
ability to comprehend, in the open
ing Of the campaign, what was tn
most practicable way to his objective
but was ever found reaching afte
something too high for his grasp
until at last, circumstances that b
did not bring about by his own geniu
: accomplished his ends" Napolean'
advice to his marshal, Ney, was
|, "Maneuver for position if you woul
win the field" Grant in his well
known correspondence with Ger
Meade said: IL never Daneuver, bu
, hammer away until victory is won.
IT'S an old axiom of military usag
that strategy. other things bein
; equal, wins the day.
. Grant expressed his confidence i
numbers and contempt for war pre-
verbs by saying: Strategy t
|. id" The militias Of Epaminonda
, Cromwell and Washington beat th
: professional or regular soldiers OF
: posed ito them. Grant repudiate
the experience of ages and said
r "No militia was ever a match for
D regular or standing army" II
' editor of the Tribune dealt Grant ii
l following blow under the rit
r when opposing Grants nomin'
: ton and urging that of Chase
: More soldiers were uselessly slaugl
tered in the late war through Il
: blunders of drunken officials than t
t the bullets of the foe." If Grant ,
r a general was fidiculously weak, as
e statesman he was huge VACUUM
;. To the committee who informed hi
4 of his nomination for president |
l. said: If elected the viii OF the pc
d pie shall be my supreme law" I
r seemed as obvious as wild Indis
g of the fact that the president mu
@ take an oath to administer, not ''tl
v will of the people, but the cons
.ution and lans nf the land and I'll,