Alexandria gazette. [volume] (Alexandria, D.C.) 1834-1974, 1886-11-10
The Ownership OF the Coupons.

ceipts the tax bill.
Whose is the money and whose are the
coupons?
In the attempt to arrange this subject in
some sort of logical order, I will consider H.
l. AS between the officer and the State.
To simplify matters under this head, I
will assume that The taxpayer never intends
to bring suit for damages.
AS between the officer and the State. the
money collected from the taxpayer uuoues.
tionably belongs to the State. The officer,
acting colore otcii and at her instance, is
estopped TO deny her right for in relation TO
the State he has never ceased to DO an oil
Ger, though obeying al unconstitutional
law. BY giving an official receipt he admit 3
that the money was received not as his own,
but on behalf Of the Common wealth, and il
is his duty, and he can be compelled to pay
it into the treasury. Quoad that particular
tax claim, the privity between the State
and the taxpayer is absolutely determined
and no subsequent event can revive it. The
liability is thus transferred from the tax.
payer to the officer, and the State must look
to him alone for the tax.
At this stage CT the case can it be pre-.
tended with any show of reason that the
| coupons belong to the State2
| 2. AS between The officer and the tarpauer
But suppose the taxpayer does bring q
suit for damages against the officer in The
proper federal court. Here the theory is
that the State is not purity to the proceed
ing and that the officer is liable personally
as trespasser, because the State law under
which he acted was no authority for the
seizure and sale of the property after ten.
der OF coupons. There is consequently 9
personal judgment against him for damages
and with this, the State is in no wise legal
| ~ concerned.
| :. AS between the Taxpayer and the State
Now conceive, just at this point, tina,
there was no indemnity board to reimb urse
the trespassing officer, and he was COMPEL
ed to satisfy the Judgment out of his own eg
tate. Could this, in any way or to any ex.
tent, alter the pre.existing relations between
| the taxpayer and the State? Does he moi
| still stand to her in the attitude of dis.
charged debtor? Has he not paid bis tax
and has not the State received her money L:
If she has not, it is the fault of her own Of
fetal agent, aud she has plain and perfect
right to proceed against him and his sure
ties for the money collected. No civilized
court On earth, upon any principle of law
applicable to the case, would permit him OF
them, in such proceeding, to plead thai
the money belonged to the officer and moi
to the State.
But suppose that when the State demands
the tax from the officer, he can successfully
reply: "You required me to levy and make
the tax under q promise of indemnity.
have done so, but since then, damages have
been recovered against me and | now pro
pose to keep the money" Even on thi;
eXtrem hypothesis, by what course of rea
soning can the State make good her claim
to have the coupons? Unquestionably the
tax has been paid, for this was condition
precedent to the right of indemnity. Then
if the tax is paid, under what pretext ear
the taxpayer be again dragged into the
transaction simply because a question has
arisen between the State and her officer a:
to the mode of settling his account?
The confusion OF ideas on this subject re-
suits from the abnormal existence and func,
ton Of the Indemnity Board. The State
chooses to Indemnify her officer and thereby
seeks to throw back upon the taxpayer
new obligation to surrender his coupons mot
in payment of his taxes, for they have al
ready been paid in money derived from the
sale of bis property, but for the purpose Of
relmburslng the State. This, submit, is
not only unreasonable, but unjust and op
presslve. 1t is mere shift to evade the full
force of the federal decisions by improvieinp
a sort OF re.inoemnity for the State herself
when the sale is made, the money received
and the tax bill receipted, then the tax is
paid, the State satisfied and the debtor dis
charged. BY what means, then, aud upon
what principle Of law CIR morality, can the
State afterwards acquire right 10 have the
coupons from the taxpayer? When and
how do they cease to be his d? She acquires
the right, because, forsooth, the TAXPAYER
sues the officer and obtains personal iudg
ment against him which The State roLunteers
to pay.
1t is wholly fallacious, and the Indemnity
Board have no right to say that the same
money which the State received FROM the
citizen as tdreS is returned 10 him ia the
form OF damages on his personal judgment
against the officer, and that therefore the
State has gained nothing and must have the
coupons. which she once refused Who
| compelled her to pay the damages incurred
by her officer? Did she not get rid of her
gain by voluntarily assuming this obl;na.
ton and what right has she thus to burden
the discharged taxpayer with new liabili-
ty, for which she has granted no new con.
slderation whatever? On demand of this
kind she has no more right to claim his cou-
pons than any other portion of his estate.
Furthermore, by what process is the State
going to get possession Of the coupons? In
this article l have relied upon what I con-
ceive to be general and familiar principles
of law, for which abundance of authority
can be cited. Now, If I have overlooked
any. statute or special rule of practice, which
authorizes tax collector as such to distrain
or levy upon citizens property for the
purpose OF enforcing the delivery of spe-
cliic chattel; viz, coupon under claim of
title by the Commonwealth or if a writ of
possession can issue without previous
Judgment in an action of detinue for the
coupon itself shall be obliged to any one
who will bring the law to light
This is, of course, very imperfect pre-
sentatlon OF the subject and barely outlines
some of its more prominent features.
SAMUEL D. DAVIES.
Richmond, Va, Nov. 9. 1856.
The Situation III Chicago.
CHICAGO Ncv IN I,roo ,,,.t r.