Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1886-03-27

SuiilpllDl Vi E,u4it, IL Il odFl'OSS0 VIZ
accused will almost always attempt to
leave, and elude the demands OF justice.
Hence, in all such cases there must be Facts
and circumstances which counteract or
overcome this presumption before bail will
ever be admissible That man has been
indicted for murder in the first degree and
tried twice, and the jury has been unable
to agree, though not conclusive, is a strong
consideration towards removing the pre-
sumption existing against him.
50 In the case of the People vs.. Perry Is
Abb Pr, n S., 27), it was held that where
the prisoner was indicted tor murder III
the first degree, and had been twice trled
and on both occasions the jury were I'M
able TO agree, it was q proper case for
exercising the power to bail.
=" IN the State VS.. Simmons 10 Ohio, 1884,
it was declared, that the Court would not,
as matter of course, admit to bail because
the jury in a trial for murder failed to
agree upon u verdict. 1t was said, the fact
that the testimony given on the trial did
not produce full conviction of guilt in the
minds of the twelve jurors, would be q
/ strong circumstance to urge to the Court,
| when invoked to the exercise of the dis
| creation of admitting 10 bail, and the fact
would come with redoubled force if sec
| ond jury should fail to agree upon YER
/ dict, but still the question after the mis-
| trials was, who was 70 decide whether the
| proof was evident OF the presumption
! great And the conclusion was arrived
/ at, that it must necessarily be the same
authority which prescribes the amount of
/ the bail, and passes upon the sufticiency OF
| the surcties.
We would not be willing to lay down
as an inhexible rule, that where there had
! been two trials for murder. and the jury
| had each time disagreed, that would show
that proof was not evident, or the presump
/ ton great. There may be circumstances
/ connected with trials which would pro-
duce a disagreement, which would entitle
! the prisoner TO no claims whatever The
! failure, however. to agree upon a verdict
/ twice III succession, is a strong cOnsidera-
/ ton, and coupled with other facts, may
| turn the scale and show that the object
| sought may be attained by admitting to
bail. The
IMPRISONMENT OF THE ACCUSED BEFORE TRIAL
FORMS 40 PART OF TIE PUNISHMENT
Affixed to the crime The whole object
and end of imprisonment before trial is to
secure the forthcoming of a person charged
with the commission of a crime. Where a
| jury has disagreed twice upon the question
of guilt doubt may well be raised, and
where it is satisfactorily shown that the
attendance of the accused to stand his trial
will certainly follow, in the exercise of a
sound discretion, the Court may admit to
bail.
"When the prisoner committed the
offense whereof he stands charged, instead
| OF trying 10 make his escape he immediately
surrendered himself to The officers Suisse
quently the Jail wherein he was confined
was broken open and the other prisoners
! escaped, but he refused to go. His whole
! ponlDet hoe ayinpaI a Loft iya 70
| stand his trial and meet the consequences
/ which may finally ensue We have, there
! fore reached the conclusion that under all
! the circumstances, it would be the exercise
of sound discretion to permit bail to be
! given in this case.
g 1t is argued that this Court has no
/ right to admit to bail but we think other
| wise. The Constitution gives the power to
! issue writs of habeas corpus, and hear and
| determine the same. The power to bail is
necessary incident to the right to hear
and determine the cause. The statute reg
ulatins the practice III habeas corpus pro
ceedings provides that where the oflense is
bailabe the accused should be let to bail.
| (Wagn., Stat 800, Sec 81 Il is not perceived
for what purpose the Court would be vested
with authority for issuing the writ and
bringing up the prisoner if the power to
bail or discharge, as the case might be, did
not follow"
l will now read from 8 Barbour, New
York, from the case of the People VS.. Van
Horne, page l65:
The object of an arrest and imprison-
ment before trial and conviction is not the
punishment of the delinquent, But to Sc
cure his forthcoming to abide his trial,
and the probability of flight to evade the
punishment must be taken into considera-
ton on an application 10 admit 10 bail.
People VS.. Goodwin, Wheel. Cr Cas-,
Az. Elk parte Taylor, 5 Cow, 81, ., per
Sutherland, j. In Rex VS.. Baltimore "a
Bur, 2l79) the Court of Kings Bench let
Lord Baltimore to bail on a charge of rape
for the reason. as assigned by Lord Mans
field, that his voluntary surrender was
strong indication that he had no intention
Of Ascending from justice; the probable
ity of which was heightened by his large
property, Of which he would incur a for
fixture if he ran away.
The power to bail in cases of felony.
not capital, has in this State been repeat
eddy exercised, after indictment, by the
| Court OF Oyer and Terminer and General
Sessions, where there was no probability
of flight from justice, without reference to
the probable guilt of the accused. Where
the punishment is death, or degrading
imprisonment, the presumption is strong
that the accused will attempt to elude the
demands of justice and in admitting to
bail, regard should therefore be had, AS well
to the nature of the punishment as to the
probable guilt of the party. And the safest
course where the guilt of the prisoner is
clear, is to deny bail But where there is
so great an approximation to certainty as
to leave no doubt in the minds OF the
Court that the accused will not attempt to
| abscond from Justice, will not say that
tbn-a ms nj ha WHARF I,.,o
proper exercise of judicial discretion to ad-
nit to bail if the party can give it III the
amount and with the sureties required,
even if the question of guilt did not stand
Indifferent on the eX parte evidence pro-
duced on the part of the people. For al
lowing bail under such circumstances
would be in consonance with the principle
that the object of such Imprisonment before
trial is not the punishment of the accused,
but to secure his forthcoming to stand his
trial, and to abide the punishment to be in
tiicted in case he shall be convicted.
But conceding that the general rule in
cases of felony is, that an Indictment is to
be deemed conclusive as to the guilt of the
accused, and that he is not to be admitted
to bail, there will be found on examination
to be several circumstances, although aris-
ing after indictment which confessedly
entitle the party to bail, and which may be
regarded IS exceptions to the general rule.
Most of the exceptions will be found men
toned at page GIL of ) Hills Reports, in an
able and elaborate note of the reporter.
= The counsel for the people
seem 10 entertain no apprehension of any
intention on the part of Van Horne to flee
from justice. He has at no time made any
attempt to elude an arrest.
HE HAS AT ALL TIMES MANIFESTED \ WILL
INGNEss TO ENCOUNTER TIE ORDEAL OF A
PUBLIC TRIAL.
If there Is no ground for apprehending the
| escape OF Van Horne, the case comes
within that of Lord Baltimore, who was LEI
to bail by the Court of Kings Bench on a
charge of rape, then capital crime, on the
sole ground that he had indicated no inten-
ton of absconding from justice. This con-
sideratiOn fortiies the application to admit
Van Horne to bail, and furnishes an addi-
tional reason in justification of the consent
to the application given by the counsel of
the people. If it could be ascertained to
moral certainty that the accused would APP
pear and stand his trial, there would be no
valid objection to admitting him to bail
For as have already stated, the object of
imprisonment before trial is not the pun
ishment of the delinquent, but merely to
secure his appearance in Court when his
trial is to be had. Chief Justice Spencer
L: