Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1886-02-19
Hancock and Meade.

Hancock arrived on the battlefield of
Gettysburg at 40 O'Clock p. m. the first
day, with authority from Meade to decide
whether to fight on that ground or not.
He was from this hour the hero and genius
of Gettysburg he at once ordered the
Meade that 1t was good ground from
which to deliver battle. To Hancock, who
persuaded Meade against his will and
judgment to hold the position, did we owe
this advantage of defensive battle
ground Meade disapproved of the battle
too late to do anything but fight. Han
cock saved the second day at Gettyburg.
Meade that night was so discouraged by
our awful losses that he wanted to retreat,
but Hancock said the Army of the Poto-
mac had retreated too often, and Meade
finally acquiesced, saying angrily Have
1t your own way, gentlemen, but Gettys-
burg is no place to fight a battle. "-Rut-
land Herald.
Gen. Hancock was a noble soldier and,
square and manly man, and if he could
speak he would be the first man to rebuke
any exaltation of himself at the expense
OF the fame of a brave and worthy brother
soldier. With regard to the selection of
the field of Gettysburg, the facts are that
Gen. Meade sent Hancock thither with a
view to fighting there, if the ground was
found to be favorable ; and that as
soon us he obtained Hancock's report de
scribng the features of the ground, he ap
proved of it as the battlefield and issued
the necessary order to fight there Gen
Meade's own testimony on this point is
distinct He says 81 directed him Han
cock to proceed without delay to Gettys-
burg, to make an examination of the
ground and to report to me the facilities
and advantages and disadvantages of that
ground for receiving battle. / further in
structed him that i'll case upon his arrival
at Gettysburg-a place | had never seen
in my life and had no knowledge ot-ht
should find the position unsuitable and
the advantages on the side of the enemy
he should examine the ground critically
and report to me the nearest position in the
immediate neighborhood of Gettysburg
where a concentration of the army would
be more advantageous then at Gettys-
burg" He adds that when he received
HancOck's report he determined to fight 1
battle at that point. In other words when
Meade found that his advanced corps haG
met the enemy at Gettysburg, he abandon
ed his previous idea of fighting on the gen
to fight at Gettysburg provided ther
was suitable ground there and if not
TO fight as near there as suitable grount
could be found. Now what does Gen
Hancock say at this point? He says tina
he was directed by Gen. Meade to repor
to him, after looking the ground over
whether or not it would be wise to cont
nue. to fight at Gettysburg that afte
he had been on the ground abou
half an hour he sent back wore
to Meade by Colonel Mitchell that
he (Hancock) would hold the ground til
dark-'meaning" he says, "to allow hin
(Meade) time to decide the mat
ter for himself ;" that he the
sent back a note giving Meade hi
views of the ground, and saying that it
only disadvantage was that it might b
turned by way of Emettsburg; and tina
finally after completing the disposition
of the troops he rode back to Meade to re
port more in detail and see wha
he was disposed to do. He told me-
says Hancock, "that he had received m
message and note and hdd dccided upo
the representations | had made and tn
known facts of the case, to Gght at Getty'
burg and had ordered all the corps to tn
'front.'
Here is no story of a reluctant con
mander-in-chief forced against his will t
hold position which proved to be goo
one. This testimony is supported b
quantities of other evidence and by al
the facts and is perfectly conclusive t
any fair mind, to the effect that Mead
was ready and willing to fight at Getty.
burg if there was good ground there t.
fight on, and if not as near there as h
could get good ground that IIancoc
gave him the facts and let him decide 10