St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1886-03-18
To D. @. Cameron, Superintendent of
Schools in Houston County, for
Habitual Intoxication,
q Document in Which the Executive
Maintains the Dignity of the
Public Schools.
What Is Malfeasance or Nonfeasance
in Office ga Knotty Legal
Point.
II There Was No Precedent Gov HuD-
bard Says He VIII Make
One.
nEr. Cameron Removed.

from his official position. Some time ago
charges of malfeaSance and non-feasance IN
the discharge of his official duties because
of habitual drunkenness, were entered
against Mr. Cameron by p. j. Smalley of
the Caledonia Argus. Gov. Hubbard APP
pointed John McNelley, Z. e. Stewart and
). IL. Ripe of Houston county commits
sion 10 investigate. They took a vast
amount of testimony on the case and sub
mitted it to Gov. Hubbard. A hearing on
the testimony was had at the executive
rooms some weeks ago, Hon. c. X. Davis
and Somer & Torrison appearing for Cam
erOn, and Mr.. Smalley for the prosecution.
After consideration of all the points, Gov.
Hubbard settled the case In the following
document:
THE GOVERNORS DECISION.
The charges against Mr. Cameron are for
lalfeasance and nonfeasance in the dis
charge OF his official duties, owing to the i'm
moderate use of intoxicating liquors. and for
haGitual drunkenness. They are brought
under chapter 8, General Statutes of Mime
sofa, 1873, rs amended by chapter 81, Gen
eral Laws of 1881, the charge of habitual
drunkenness being based especially on the
authority of chapter n, General Laws of
1873, which is also printed rs section Is, of
said chapter 8, in the General Statutes of
1873.
It is objected, on the part of the respond
ent, that said chapter is unconstitutional,
ana that. therefore, the governor has no power
OF removal. Also that said chapter "a, is
not an amendment to chapter aforesaid,
and that, therefore, the governor, whose
power OF removal comes only from said chap
ter 8, is not authorized to remove from office
for habituAl drunkenness.
l shall hold chapter to be constitutional,
as il has uniformly been held by my prede-
ccSsors, including those learned lawyers,
Cows. Austin and Davis. j think clearly
that chapter 4 aforesaid is not an amend
meat of chapter 9. 1t thence follows, not
that said chapter a IS not applicable TO re-
mOvals under chapter 8, but tnat it is not eX-
clusiyely applicable thereto. II applies to
every person holding Office under the consti-
tuition or laws OF the state, and to every au-
thority which, by law, may remove any of
them from Office.
But the cOnstitutionality OF chapter "a may
be questioned. 1t says that ''habitual drunk
enness shall be good cause for removal from
ONCE. But the constitution of the state re-
strictS the cause for which inferior officers
may be removed 10 ''malfeasance and nom
feasanCn,' ard the legislature cannot en-
large the list Of causes. Neither, as it APP
pears, can it determine or direct what shall
constitute malfeGsance or nonfeasance. that
being question of a judicial nature, proper
only Tor the authority which has the power Of
removal.
l regard the statute in question as the ex-
preston Of the opinion of the legislature,
presumably that of the people, on the sub
Ject, suitable 10 guide the discretion of the
proper authority, though Invalid to control or
limit it. 1t remains for the governor to de-
cide, under said chapter g. as amended,
whether the degree of addictedness to immod-
crate drinking proved in any given case
amounts to, or has resulted in, malfeasance
OF nonfeasance of official duties.
If, in regard to any officer included in Sec
non OF said chapter 9, as amended. the leg
islature had especially prescribed that the in
cumbent must, during his term, have and
maintain condition of habitual sobriety, l
should certainly think proved or admitted
drunkenness during his term would be nom
feasance in his official duty.
If, from the nature and functions of an
Office and its relations to the public, it could
be inferred with equal certainty that a con-
duct and character of habitual sobriety was a
duty thereon, then lapses from such conduct
would in my opinion, be nonfeasance
II such instances of drunkenness occurred
at such times that the wel-known immediate
or rcactionary effects OF such indulgences
existed upon the officers intellect while he
was in the discharge OF some of the details of
ms proper Official service, L think the case
would be stronger.
II. owing to over-indulgence in LIQUOR, the
officer failed to be present when and where
such details of Official service should be per-
formed, the case Of nonfeasance might per-
maps be clearer, but to my mind. no stronger
/ think no law requiring habits of sobriety
on the part Of a school superintendent could
add. in the Judgment of candid minds to the
obligations Of that officer to keep sober
Argument and reflection will only deepen the
conviction.
IF anything herein is an extension of tho
presidents in the matter of Interpreting non
1easance III the discharge of Official duty I
understand that with changed conditions de-
partures from early precedents have often
become necessary. / interpret chapter "a as
Judgment a "a fbofo
rule hnbituul sObriety is u part of the Official
duty Of all officers in this state | UNDER
stand that il rests with the authority which
can remove an otlicer to enforce that judg-
ment. The sena,e as
COURT OF IdPEA CHMENT
in the case against Judge Cox, was in accord
with that judgment in deciding that, at lie asst
in the case Of q judge of the district court.
not only was habitual drunkenness an i'm
peGchable ofense, but that a Judge was i'm
peachable for being drunk while in the dis
charge or his duty. If a precedent is want
ing to hold county officers to account for
habits Of inebriety during their terms, or for
instances Of drunkenness while on duty. / in
1end. rs to county superintendent of schools
at least, to make one.
Mr.. Cameron has been superintendent of
SCHOOLS IN Houston county for many wears
He is admitted, except for the fault alleged
III the present charges, to be a capable one
lie Is enthusiastic and efficient in educational
matters. He is active in his own town in
favor of public order and temperance, and
OF the absolute exclusion therefrom of the
sale of liquor. He appears TO be fully sensi-
Die that his habit of occasional inebriety is q
fault and disqualification. In 1882. before
his election, he assured friends who were
Glspleased with his habits, that he would re-
form them If reelected. He claims to have
done so to some extent, but admits that he
did not reform them altogether. In 1884 he
gave further proof of his sense of the obli
cation or Sobriety upon a superintendent nv
pledging himself in writing to resign the
Office, if, being reelected, he should again
drink Intoxicating liquors.
The formal charges in the case cover in
stances OF alleged intoxication prior to his
present term of Office. But the considera-
non or these is asked only as showing hab-
itude.
The testimony shows, indeed It is hardly
disputed, that the respondent is and is gener-
ally reputed to be man who drinks intoxicat-
ing liquors and occasionally drinks to excess.
IL is claimed that he is no worse in that re-
spect than he was before his last election,
and that the people of the county have by
that election pronounced his habits no dis
qualitcation. As he himself promised
10 amend them, it is but lust
10 the voters to suppose that
they trusted that he would do so Rut ~ q
re-election condones the offenses of the past
IL is not license for misconduct in the fu-
ture. ~
Inc testimony convinces me that Mr.. Cam
Sron mas not only been pub
Icly intoxicated since the first Mon
day IN jan, 1885, when his present
term began but that he has been present
while under the influence of LIQUOR at an a "
animation OF teachers at Caledonia. in Anril |
isst, ana on some days at teachers Institute |
IN caledonia In October last, and that because |
OF intoxication he has been oLsH,,t |
on some days and parts Of
days at said teachers institute and
at an examination of teachers at Hous+on |
in april, Immediately following that at Gale |