The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1886-03-03

construction to exclude every other right OF
interference with executive functions.
In the hrst Congress which assembled af-
ter the adoption of the Constitution COM
prising many who aided in its preparation, a
legislative construction was given to that in
strument in which the independence of the
executive in the matter of removals from
office was fully sustained. | think IL will be
found that in the subsequent discussions of
this question there was generally, if not at
all times, proposition pending to in some
way curtail this power OF the President by
legislation, which furnishes evidence that to
limit such power it was supposed to be nee
essary to supplement the constitution by
such legislation. The first enactment OF this
description was passed under stress OF par
tisanship and political bitterness, which
ment. This law provided that the federal
offices to which itapplied could only be sus-
pended during the recess of the senate When
shown by evidence satisfactory to the Presl-
dent to be guilty OF misconduct IN once OF
crime, or when incapable or disqualified TO
perform their duties, and that within ~ Gays
after the next meeting of the Senate 1t should
be the duty of the President ITO report TO
the Senate such suspension, with the eVi,
denee and reasons for his action IN tne case.
This statute, passed in 1867, when Congress
was overwhelmingly and bitterly opposed,
politically to the President may be regard
ed as an indication that even then 1t was
thought necessary by Congress determined
upon the Subjugation of the Executive to
legisate we'll to furnish itself law for that
purpose, instead of attempting to reach the
object intended by an invocation of any pre-
tended constitutional right. The law which
thus found its way to our statute book was
plain in its terms, and the intent needed no
avowal. If valid, and now in operation, It
would justify the present course OF the Sen
ate and command the obedience of the Exec
utlve to its demands 1t may, however, be re-
marked in passing, that under this law the
President had the privilege of presenting to
the body which assumed to review his exec
utive acts, his reasons therefor, instead of
being excluded from explanation or judged
by papers found in the departments. Two
years after the law of 1867 was passed, and
within less than five weeks after the inaugu-
ration of a President, in accord with both
branches of Congress, the sections of the act
regulating suspensions from Office during the
recess of the Senate, were entirely repealed,
and i'll their place were substituted proVlS-
ions, which, instead of limiting the causes of
suspension to misconduct, crime, disability,
or disqualification, expressly permitted such
suspension by the President in his dlScre-
tion," and completely abandoned the re-
quirement obliging him to report to the
Senate the evidence and reason for his ac-
ton. With these notifications, and with all
branches of the government in political
harmony, and in the absence OF partisan IN
centive to captious obstruction, the law as
it was left by the amendment OF 1863 was
much less destructive of executive discre-
ton, and yet the great general and patrlotlc
citizen who, on the 4th day of March, 1869,
assumed the duties of chief executive ana
for whose administration of his high 0thee
the most hateful restraints of the law OF
1867 were, on the 9TH day of April, 1869, re-
moved, mindful of his obligation to defend
and protect every prerogative of his great
trust and apprehensive of the injury threat
ened the public service in the continued
operation of these statutes, even in their
modified form, in his first message to Con-
gress advised their repeal and set forth
their unconstitutional character and hurtful
tendency in the following language:
1t may be well to mention here the embarrass-
ment possible to arise from leaving ON the statute
books the so-called "tenure of office acts, and TO
earnestly recommend their total repeal II could
not have been the intention OF the trainers OF the
Constitution when providing that appointments
made by the President should receive the con
sent of the Senate, that the latter should nave
power to retain in Office persons placed there by
federal appointment against the VIII OF the fres,
ident. The law is inconsistent with faithful
and efficient administration of the government
What faith can an executive put in officials
forced upon him, and those too whom ne mas
be likely to serve an administration which they
know does not trust them?
| am unable to state whether or not this
recommendation for repeal of these laws
has been since repeated. IL 1t has not, the
IeaSOn can probably be found IN the expert
ence which demonstrated the fact that the
necessities of the political situation but rare
ly developed their vicious character; and so
it happens that, after an existence of nearly
twenty years of almost innocuous desuetude,
these laws are brought forth, apparently the
repealed as well as the unrepealed, and put
in the way of an executive who is willing, II
permitted, to attempt an improvement In the
methods of administration.
The constitutionality of these laws is by no
means admitted. But why should the pro-
visions of the repealed law, requiring specific
cause for suspension and report to the Sen
ate of evidence and reasons" be now, In Ell
feet applied to the present executive instead
of the law afterwards passed and unrepealed
which distinctly permits suspensions by the
President sin his discretion" and carefully
OmitS the requirement that evidence ana
reasons for his action in the case" shall be
reported to the Senate?
The requests and demands which by the
score have for nearly three months been pre-
sented to the different departments OF the
government, whatever may be their form,
have but one complexion. They assume the
right of the Senate to sit in Judgment on the
exercise of my exclusive discretion and ex-
ecutive function, for which l am solely re-
sponsible to the people from whom L nave
lately received the sacred trust OF ONCE. My
oath to support and defend the Constitution,
my duty to the people who have chosen me
to execute the powers OF their great once,
and not to relinquish them, ana my duty 10
the chief magistracy, which must preserve
unimpaired in all its dignity and Vlgor, COM
pei me to refuse to comply with these de-
mands To the end that the service may be
improved, the Senate is invited to the fullest
scrutiny of the persons submitted to them
stitutional power of that body to
advise and consent to their appoint
ment. l shall continue, as | have thus
far done, to furnish, at the request
of the confirming body, all the information
possess touching the fitness of the nominees
placed before them for their action; but
when they are proposed to ill vacancies and
to take the place OF SUSPENDED oinclals, upon tI
right to ask the reasons for the action OF the
Senate, nor question its determination. 1
cannot think that anything more is required
to secure worthy incumbents in public office
than a careful and independent discharge OF
our respective duties within their well detin-
ed limits. Though the proprlety OF Suspen-
siOnS might be better assured II the action OF
the President was subject to review by the
Senate; yet, II the Constltutl!o,ni /. . ana tne
the executive branch Of the government, 1t
should not be divided, nor the discretion
which it involves Telinquished.
1t has been claimed that the present execu-
tive having pledged himself not to remove
officials except for cause, the fact of their
suspension implies such misconduct on the
part of suspended official as injuries his
character and reputation, and, therefore, the
Senate should review the case for his vindi-
cation. | have said that certain officials
should not, in my opinion, be removed dur
ing the continuance of the term for which
they were appointed, solely for the purpose
of putting in their place those in political af-
fliation with the appointing power, and this
declaration was Immediately followed by
description of official partisanship which
ought not to entitle those in whom it was ex-
hibited, to consideration. 1t is not apparent
how an adherence to the course thus an
| nounced carries with it the consequences de-
scribed. If, in any degree, the suggestion Is
worthy of consideration, it is to be hoped tnat
| there may be a defence against unjust suS-
| pension in the justice of the executive.
| Every pledge which have made, Dy whlcn
| / have placed limitation on my exercise OF
| executive power, has been faithfully redeem
| ed. OF course, the pretence is not put 1ortn
| that no mistakes have been eommitted, nut
| NOT n suspension has been made unless II ap-
| peared to nv satisfaction that the public
| welfare would be improved thereby. Many
| apnlicatiops for suspension have been denied
| and the adherence to the rule laid down to
| Govern nv action as to such suspensions has
essnsed much irritation and impatience on
| the mart of those who have insisted upon
| more changes in the offices. The pledges
| have made were made to the people, and to
| them am responsible for the manner in
| which they have been redeemed. am not
| responsible to the Senate, and l am unwil-
| it, - eubnoit NV actions and official cOn-