Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1886-06-25

OF that which y was necessary ~
know. os ,yera
permitted 10 state that they Knew eno
reputation OF the two subscribing VIZ
nesses TO the codicil for honesty apu .nas
this reputation was bad. Ihls eFiuS"NN
should have been excluded.
The subscribing witnesses testinea on
the trial. and the court Improperly
charged In effect "that II the Jury De-
lieyed the subscribing witnesses are cred
ible persons" etc Within the meaning
of the statute such Witnesses as are COM
petent 10 testify are deemed credible
WITNESSES. The charge in effect left to
the Jury question which II was the duty
of the court to decide, and did decide
when II allowed them to testify IN tne
case Reversed and remanded. Opinion
by Steyton, j.
l.. w. Goodrich ct al. vs.. State, appeal
from ----. In passing upon the gene
raj demurrer Il was not necessary TO de-
eide whether the suretles of Brown were
liable for sums Of money received by him
from his predecessor In office or not.
For the same sums are entered as
credits that are thus charged to him.
II a transcript from the books of
the comptroller duly certified would be
prima facie evidence, statement proved
bv witness upon the stand TO reflect
truly and precisely the condition of the
books would be equally admissible and
entitled to not less credit.
"The evidence was sufficient TO sustain
the finding that there was a deficiency.
Sueed's exhaustive investigation In the
pecuniary interest of Brown and in vim
dicatlon of his own character, under all
the circumstances surrounding him, leaves
no doubt OF the correctness Of the plain
uff's exhibit. More money was received
than was accounted for-tbe difference
stated Ia the principal OF the Judgment"
Affirmed. Opinion by Robertson, j.
Morgan ct al. VS.. d. G. Giddings ct al,
appeal from Washington. II the
facts showed that the appel
lees as attorneys for the
plaintiffs had full discretion to pursue
such course in collecting claims in their
hands as they thought best, then they
would not be liable for pursuing the
course dictated by their judgment, even
though they were mistaken aud the
claims were thereby lost, unless 1t
should be made TO appear that the mis-
take was occasioned by want of knowl-
edge of the plain and obvious principles
Of law such as every lawyer is presumed
to know and understand.
The general duty of an attorney does
not require him to search for property
fraudulently concealed or disposed OF,
nor TO institute new and collateral pro-
ceedings with reference to such property,
unless he has contracted to do so. At
hrmed. Opinion Of the commission of
appeals adopted.
MOTION.
Statement of Eacts-On the ground
that the statement of facts in the record
did not show that the plaintiff had been
acquitted Of a criminal charge, this suit
being for malicious prosecution, Ger.
horari was granted to bring up the iudg-
ment in the criminal case. Such iudg-
ment is brought up, but there Is no GER
tllcate of the clerk that this Judgment
was part Of the facts in evidence on the
trial. The facts considered here must be
facts considered in the court below, and
in the absence Of such certificate the
judgment cannot be considered Motion
20 strike out sustained.
COURT OF APPEALS.
l.. w. Owens VS.. State, appeal from
Erath. This prosecution involved no
thing more than the trial of the right Of
property to certain colt. The evidence
for the state showed that II was the
property of Basey; the testimony for the
defense just as conclusively proved That
IL was the property OF defendant The
evidence taken together impresses us
with the belief that defendant took the
animal believing 1t was his, and If this be
true the fraudulent intent necessary to
make the taking theft is wanting and the
conviction not warranted. Reversed and
remanded. Opinion by Wilson, j.
j. Benton vs.. State, appeal from Erath
The evidence fails to show that the an
imal alleged to have been stolen was the
property Of some other person than the
defendant, BY direct testimony the de-
PENDANT proved that the animal was the
offspring OF COW which belonged
to his daughter, and that he had traded
with his daughter for said animal before
the same was taken by hin that said ami
NAL was marked in his mark while IL was
a calf and remained on his place until 1t
was a year old, when IL disappeared If
defendant be Ia fact guilty, 1t Is better
that he escape than that he be punished
upon uncertain proof. Reversed and re-
handed, Opinion by Wilson, j.
Q. A.Wells ct al. vs.. Slate, appeal from
johnson. 1t is only where there IL au
airmance on appeal that a defendants
recognizance on appeal can be forfeited.
When the judgment of conviction is re-
versed the recOgnizance has served its
purpose, and Is functus ofllcio. The bail
bond or recognizance of the defendant to
secure his attendance originally, still
has full force and effect. The decisions
In Weaver VS.. State, AZ Tex, $3.50,
and REVERE vs.. State, Ct App, So,
were made prior TO the adoption
of the Revised Statutes when Art. $40
was added. Under that article the recog
nizance OF a defendant on an appeal is no
longer binding after the reversal Of the
| judgment, aud cannot support iudg.
meut Of forfeiture, Another fatal defect
Is that the Indictment ia the case which
the defendant was bound to answer, was
presented by thirteen grand jurors. Such
an indictment is void and all the proceed
lngs are utilities. Reversed and dis
missed. Opinion by Wilson, j.
Armstead Watson VS.. State, appeal
from Houston The evidence shows that
defendant entered into an agreement with
I IlInlarg.ta 10 III