The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1886-05-20
FIGHTING THEM OVER
What Our Veterans Have TO Say About
Their Old Campaigns


A Seen hg an OflceF OF TIE WIN DtiO.
To THE EDITOR: More than 20 years have
passed since ] stood on Missionary Ridge one
among the thousands who had successfully
stormod that stronghold, but one hour before
supposed inlpregnable 10 direct assault. lew
months ago j again stood there, recalling The
events Of the battle aud the controversy 20 which
they have given rise. Recently read IN the
Ceifu5V Magu=ine Gen. Grants paper on Chat
tnno0ra and more recently still "Carletons"
narrative as published ina TIE TRIBUNE. As
Carleton has followed Badeau ia his account
want TO briefly present to the readers OF The
TRIBUNE the other side OF the case, in cOnnec-
tion with some comments on that part OF Gen.
Grants paper which treats OF the assault. Ba-
deaus theory is, in brief, that Grants plan 10
drive Bragg from Missionary Ridge was TO use
the forces under Sherman aud Hooker merely
for purposes OF demonstration on Bragg's Hanks
20 induce him % detach from his center to
strengthen the TANKS; that having succeeded
In TINS, in elimination of the plan he ordered
the Army Of the Cumberland TO charge and
break BragFs weakened confer, thus making
this charge the dominant feature Of tbs plan.
Our theory II, that Grant mistrusted the Army
OF the Cumberland for offensive operations;
that he proposed 10 crush Bragg's right flank
with the forces under Sherman that when this
was accomplished and Bresgs right was crornb-
hing away in rout, Thomas army, having had
It's courage restored by this inspiring sight, was
keep the rebels going; that when sherman was
brought to q halt by the resistance he met
Grant turned 10 Hooker 30 bring about the
required conditions ior putting in Thomas S
army by relling up Braggs lett flank; that
night approaching, and Hooker not Yet appear
ing on Bragg's left ] hp.nas array was ordered
forward 10 carry the lsue OF WORKS AZ the foot OF
the ridge with no other defined purpose in view
except TO relieve the heayy pressure on SheT-
man; and thai Tire Army o. tie Cumberland,
having been started w0ud not stop ct the first
line, but went onward o. is own accord aud
drove Brarg's army ina reut from the crest OF
the ridge. Lst us see which theory is sustained
by the facts. i quote from Gen. Grants paper:
sherman now threatened both Bragg flank and
bis stores, and made Necessary for him 10 weaken
other points Of his line 90 strengthen his right.
From tme position j occupied could see column
after column OF BTaf,g f5nces moving against
Sherman. Seeing tive advance, rcpuse and second
advance OF y b. smith from lle position occupied,
directed Thomas 20 send a division 10 reinforce
him. One was sent from the right Oi Orchard Knob
tliairds), which had 10 march considerable dis
tuoe directly under the eyes OF the enemy 10 reach
az position. btasg az once commeneel masshg pa
slle same direction. This was what wanted. But
a had now got 10 be lniein line afternoon and had
expected before this 90 see HOOKER crossing the
ridge ia the ncighborhoOi OF tossyille, and COM
polling Bragg ~ mass in that direction also.
From the close relations existing between
Graut and Badeau, it viii not be denied that
the former would have sustained the theory Of
Tie latter. If II were possible, by language as
unmstakable as his own. The careful reader
will observe, then, that Grant docs not
gy IN explicit terms that Bragg weakened his
center o. strengthen his right. He uses the
evasive expression other points of his line"
and the reason is obvious 10 every soldier who
saw what was done. There were about 10000
Of us in the plain below who also from the
positions we occupied could see these columns
moving against sherman. and in the name Of
the entire 10000 ] assert not one Of these
columns had its origin IN our front. They all
came from the direction Of Rossvilie marching
IN plain sight along the top Of the ridge and
scross our front towards their right. During
the afternoon OF Nov. "a, Bragg's line was
stretched out from the tunnel to the top OF
Lookout Mountain. II Grant wanted a weak
line against which TO send Thomass army,
there ii was ready at hand with sherman ad-
vancing against its right flank. aud its left
going 70 pieces under the blows Of Hooker.
During the night Of the Path Bragg with
drew his forces from Lookout Mountain and
across Chattanooga Valley 10 the top Of Mission
AIRY Ridge. The forces so withdrawn, aud none
other. composed the columns moving against
Sherman the 25th. The greater part OF this
movement took place during the forenoon. But
when llairds Division was withdrawn about
noon from Thomas right 70 further reinforce
ShcrmaH, who already bad six divisions under
has orders, Bragg followed the movement with
another column, this TOO coming from the d.
rec,iou Of Rossgile Sherman could not use
Baird. aud he returned and got into position
on Thomass left just in time 10 take part in the
charge
] challenge Badeau, then, OF any other man
who takes bis view 81 this battle, 10 prove by
She reports OF the Confederate Generals engaged,
or BY the testimony Of any living soldiers,
Union or Confederate, who were in position
10 know. that bragg withdrew any troops in
line in front Of Thomas on Nov. 18th 10
strengthen either Of his TANKS Mbes Thomas's
army charged, Braggs line was all concentrated
on Missionary Ridge il had been reduced in
length by the distance from tho top Of the Ridge
20 the tap Of Lookout Mountain. By reason,
then, OF iis strong position and its ercaty-re-
oucod length and consequent facility with
which any point attacked could be reinforced
IL was actually stronger IN al IFS parts than al
any previous tine during the three DAYS
operations Some OF tic forces Inassed against
sherman were put lD motion as quickly rs
possible 10 reinforce the part assailed, bat the
movement 81 Jh0mnss army was too quick
for them. Bara's Division met them coming
A. b reached the crest Of the ridge and beat
them back Had our line halted al the footOf the
ridge w reform and then charge the summit, the
result may easily be guessed. II Thomas was
slow in preparation Il was because he was care
ful Of the lives OF his soldiers, aud would not
waste their blood in costly experiments When
he did strike 10 was
THE BLOW OF a GIANT,
which crushed whatever IL fell upon quote
again from Gon. GraGt's paper:
directed Thomas 10 order the charge MT once
wAiee1 eagerly a. zee the eject, and became .n1-
patient ui EAST il.at there indication Of ANY
charge being made. Turning 10 Thollae
w. inqpiFe what caused the delay. wac surprised
a. zee &cn. Thomas >. Wood. one Of IlIe division
c5iiinHmdeTa a 40 sgas % make tile charge
toie iiin ~ make Tie ciiaree a. once
III Gen. Grant did mot know ID, nevertheless
seilye preparations Tor the charge were going
o. Tao TROOPS were not al In position 10
charge ~ once. ] was Ia HarkerE Brigade OF
bhcudan's Division, One part Of the line was
partially refused ~ 10 Missionary Ridge. To
get into position VIC were swung forward sew
era hundred yards. The movement was exc
cuted ~ the regiments moving up 10 the new
alignment efzoisy fr,ro l,.et a. 80. -..t