Middlebury register. (Middlebury, Vt.) 1886-1937, 1886-01-01


AL. Yes.
Soc. And can they teach the better
who are unable to teach the worse?
AL. think that they can; at any rate,
they can teach many far better things
than to play at draughts.
Soc. What things?
AL. why, for example, l learned to
sneak Greek of them, and | cannot say
who was my teacher, or to whom am to
attribute my knowledge of Greek, if not to
those good-for-nothing teachers, as you
call them.
Soc. Why, YES, my friend; and the
many are good enough teachers of Greek
and their instructions in that line may be
justly praised.
AL. Why is that?
Soc. Why, because they have the
qualities of good teachers.
AL. What qualities?
Soc. Why, you know that knowledge
is the first qualification of any teacher?
AL. Certainly.
Soc. And if they know, they must a
gree together and not differ?
AL. Yes.
soc. And would you say that they
knew the things about which they dl1lerE
AL. No.
SOC. Then how can they teach them:
AL. They cannot.
Soc. We'll, but do you imagine that
the many would differ about the nature
of wood and stonc-if you ask any one a.
bout them are they not agreed, and go to
fetch the same thing, when they want Il
piece of wood or a stone, or anything else
of the sort for that, if am not mistaken,
is pretty nearly all that you mean by
speaking Greek.
AL. True.
SOC. But then, as we were saying,
these are matters about which they are
agreed with one another and with them
selves: both individuals and states use
the same words about them: they do not
use some one word and some another.
AL. They do not
SOC. Then they may be expected to be
good teachers of these things:
AL. Yes.
SOC, And if we want to instruct any
one in them, we shall be right in sending
him to he taught by our friends the many:
AL. Very true.
Soc. But if we wanted further to know
not only which are men and which are
horses. but which men or horses have
powers of running, will the many be able
to inform us of this!
AL. Certainly not.
Soc. And a sufficient proof that they
do not know these things and are not
true teachers of them is, that they are
never agreed about them?
AL. Yes.
Soc. And suppose that we wanted to
know not only what men are like. but
what healthy or diseased men are like
would the many be able to teach Us this
AL. They would not.
Soc. And YOU would have Il proof that
they were bad teachers of these matters.
if you saw them at variance:
AL. | should.
Soc. Well. but are the many agreed
with themselves. or with one another
about the justice or injustice of men and
things:
AL. Assurcdly not. Socrates.
Soc. There is no subject about which
they are more at variance?
AL. None.
Soc. | do not suppose that you ever
saw or heard of men quarreling over the
Il
an extent as to 90 to war and kill ont
another for the sake of them.
AL. No. indeed.
Soc. But of the quarrel about justice
and injustice, you have certainly heard
even if you have never seen them: TO
you have heard rectations of the lilac
and Odyssey.
AL. TO be sure, Socrates.
Soc. A difference of just and unjust i
the argument of the poems?
AL. True.
Soc. And this difference caused al
the wars and deaths of Trojans and Acha
ans, and the deaths of all the sutOrs o
Penelope in their quarrel with Odysseus
AL. Very true.
Soc. And when the Athenians an
Lacedamonians and Beotians fell a
Tanagra, and afterwards in the battle O
Coronea, at which your father, Cleinias
met his end, the question was one of just
ice-this was the sole cause of the battles
and of their deaths?
AL. Very true.
Soc. But can we suppose that the
understand that about which they al
quarreling to the death?
AL. Clearly not.
Soc. And yet those whom you thu
allow to be ignorant are the teachers I
whom you are appealing.