New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1886-12-05

W hich he STYLES rrivate treason #" to the General
He might have made the list much longer, and
shown that at the time in question (lS6zl there
was an extensive feeling OF hostility toward Nc
Cellan all over the country. We are at loss 10
know why this feeling should be thought treason
able Neither members OF the Cabinet. nor private
citizens nor even soldiers in the field, were nnder
an obligation to approve the course OF the CON-
mander of tho Army OF the Potomac; and II tho
Secretary of War believed that Mcclellan was
unfit for his place las he certainly did his hostility
was commendabIe Mcclellan was hostile to Stan
ton his official superior ana hostile to the Presi-
dent. his Commander-in- Chief Was that treason
sblei But Mr. Prime goes further and fares worse.
- Mr. Chase. with startling innocence OF MIND,
avows warden p. 44Ol that on July % he urged
Mr. Lincoln to remove Mcclellan, on the ground
that did not regatd General Mcclellan as loyal 10
the Administrations although l did not question
his general loyalty to the country. This Is inc
confession Of motive In the conduct OF % great
war which Is universally regarded as Infamous. L.
is an avowal that the controlling consideration Oh
such leaders as Mr.. Chase in tho use OF tine oioou
and treasure of the people, wa, tho supremacy OF
party and not the success OF country IL Is noth-
ing of the kind. Mr.. Prime. by substituting She
word @party" for Administration has grossly
deformed Mr. Chase's meaning TIE Admnistra-
was made the guardian of the national interests; it
was responsible for all its generals. Tbs conf
mauder who was not loyal to the Administration,
however patriotic his intentions, was not loyal to
hi, duty This is what Mr.. Chase declared, and his
remark has no reference whatever to the suprem-
acy of any party. There were many Generals In
the field tho disliked the principles OF the Admin
istration but were thoroughly loyal in their ODE
dleuce all tue same.
IL was one of General McClellan's greatest
troubles that ne couli not understand the limits OF
his own respons bity. A ruder way OF stat'ne
the case would be to say that he did not know how
TO mind his own business He charged himself
with too many of the Presidents cares In one
sense he was not politician for he ha little init
mate association with party managers, and no
knowledge of political arts. But ike many othor
men who do not understand the business. he had
an exaggerated estimate of his own capacity and
importance in affairs of state. and a persuasion
that his views ought to be impressed upon tho Gov
eminent 1t is not to he doubted that under his
influence a spirit of what Mr.. Chase well called
dsloyalty to the Administration was growing
strong and dangerous among the higher officers OF
the Army of the Potomac, and the Government was
seriously troubled by 1t not orly in Its civil policy
toward the rehelhous States but in its military
plans also McClellans famous Harrison's Bar let
ter TO the President written after the retreat to
James River. was manifestation of this spirit 1t
is not unlikely that Mcclellan himself was not
fully conscious of its character. Never did de-
feated General address snch an astounding epistle
10 the bead of the State With all the assurance
of a conqueror. he procee led to tctAte both the
political and military course which his judg
neut it was necessary for the President to adopt
aud to warn him that a declaration of radical
o;aur ela
dsinteyrate our present armies" and defeat all
attempts to obtain the forces requisite for the pros
ecution of the war Mr.. Prime takes pains to i'm
press upon us that his friend wrote thus from the
purest and most patriotic motives We have no
desire to question that Int the fact remains that
the letter was virtually threat that the Army OF
the Potomac woul not light if slavery was to he
abolished and demand that the President should
bring on a fatal political crisis by Diminishing the
most important members Of his Cabinet. tho Secre-
tary of the Treasury aud tho Secretary of War
McClellaus removal after this became military
necessity. lie says ittle about 1t in the Memoir ;
oulv prints it with short account Of the circnm-
stan COS uuder which it was written and del vereh ;
but there are several references to it in the accom-
panying private letters Here is an extract from
letter TO his wife:
60 von like nv letter to the PRESIDENT l feel
that did nv duty in writing 10, though appre-
mend it will do no good whatever: but it CLEARS
my conscience to hav. spoken panty at such a
toward those people than do. do not say much
ab,ut it, but fear they have done all that cowar,
dice and folly can do to ruiz our poor country ano
the blind prope seem not to ses IL. Ii makes my
blood boil when think OF IT, cannot resign &c
long as the fate Of the Armv OF the Potomac Is en-
trusted t. nv care. owe great duty 10 this
noble set of men, AMI that is the only feeling that
retains me. fear that my day OF usefulness 10
the country is pastat least under this Adm nlstra-
ton [ hope aiil trust that God will watch over.
guide and protect me. | accept most resgneily
all He has brought upon ne Perisps nave re-
ally brought it myself; for while stiiving con,
scientionsy to do my hest, It NAV well os that
have made great mistakes that my vanity does
not permit me to perceive When see 30 mnch
self-blindnrss around me cannot arrogate to my
self greater clearness of vision and self-e1amn ma
ton I did have "a terrible time during that week;
for sto,d alone without any one t. help me.
fe that on me rested everything and i1is no"
weak a thing Door. morta'. errin9 man Is! elt II
sincerely. and shat never, | trnst, forget the
lesson: it will last me to my dying day am
very well now. perfectly well. aud ready Tor any
amount Of fatigue that can he Imagined
rbe story of the Peninsllar campaign and its
falnre has been fully and holly discussed. There
il no reason to oppose that General McClellan's
final abatement will close the controversy. His
defence has been ably presented great manv times
within the past twenty years. and no important
additions are now ma le to it. He maintains, with
a show of strong feeling that his plan OF opera
tions against Richmond was the right one and
that il was sienalIv vindcateh by the campaign of
General Grant; and he is snre that he wonld have
closed the rebellion in 1852 II the President aud
the Secretary Of War had not UNANIMOUSLY conspired
to help Lee. He justiies the siege operations at
Yorktown devo.ing to that subject several elabo-
rate pages in the course Of which he throws blame
upon the navy. and makes thrust or 30 at General
Barnard, his chief engineer:
The unanimous opinion of all was that certain
preliminary siege operations were necessary.
assert W hout fear Of iction that at
that time thought an assault possible: moreover
that W hen saw the works abandoned by the
enemy IL remained the conviction Of all that. with
the raw troops had, an assault would have re-
suited in simply AZ nseess hutchery ~ tn no hope
Of Success The statements made long afterward
by such meb rs ksmard were simply ex-?ost facto
o1iIiors gotten up for political purposes, ana
never could have hern really entertained 10y them.
The only fault to found with to ore.A ons at
Z.