The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1886-07-22

before the battle as TO the dispositions Of my
troops to meet Longstreets assault, nor did
receive an order Of any kind during the battle.
] am, therefore, alone responsible for the dispo-
sitions made.
20. That / moved out from a very weak
position TO occupy one naturally stronger,
which could have been held with perfect sue
cess If had been supported; that is 10 say, il
half the troops afterward brought up to meet
the assault had reinforced me early in the
action, my lines would have been held intact
TO the end of the battle; in other words, that a
line held by 10000 men is not proof that
more advanced line held by 10000 was not good
line. Our good and constant friend. Gen. de
Peyster, has shown by ample citations from
military history that salient strongly held
has been the salvation of great battles as it was
our salvation at Gettysburg.
MY SALIENT.
81. The best thing in my line was the salient
position, except the men who held it!
Whyl
Because it meant fght-fght right there and
then. 1t meant an attack on the enemy's flank
| If they pushed further on our flank, an attack
| in front If the enemy preferred; but il meant
fight right there and then, anyhow; and i had
ample reason for believing that if the battle
OF Gettysburg did not begin there and then
the battle would not be fought at all.
! So much learned criticism on "salients
makes me tired. Where is the authority for
| the maxim, There shall be no salient in
a line of battle!" Where is il written by
the military law giver that lines of battle
must be straight lines, or curved lines, or
elllptical lines, or convex, or concave lines
Lines of battle are controlled by the contour
Of the ground where you must fight unless
| you can force your enemy TO come and fight on
/ ground you choose. My position was here on
the left flank. The enemy chose our left flank
. slnfu r,Ia e. Il.
attack. Ny duty was to decide whether would
wait and let the enemy choose their field of
4 battle or choose IL myself II i had waited
\ on the line extending through low. marshy
swale from the left of the Second Corps di-
roctly toward Round Top, line affording no
advantages for defense and none for attack, the
enemy would have seized the Round Tops
without a blow, and the Round Tops were
! the keys Of our position; the enemy would have
gained all the commanding ridge in my front
10 the Emmittsburg road for their artillery
the ground Gen. Lee says he wanted 10 occupy
| TO enable him TO assail our left. Now, il is a
cardinal maxim in war TO
SEIZE THE ENEMY's VANTAGE GROUND
when you know he means to attack. j seized
the ground Gen. Lee says he wanted. If / had
let Gen. Lee take the Round Tops and the ridge
TO the Emmittsburg road, would have kept my
straight line and lost the battle BY helping my
self TO the ground Gen. Lee wanted, and cover
! ing the Round Tops held the enemy until the
Round Tops were occupied by the Fifth Corps,
and until CaldwelPs Division of the Second Corps
could come into position on our left-I held the
enemy until 10000 men were marshaled on
our left flank, enough TO hold il and repulse the
enemy, assault, and win the battle. But my
4 line was salient" say the criticsl So be it,
| The enemy found it TO be a wedge bolt, a
bastion, spear, and thrust. ! say my line
was an arch, and that arch of Diamonds resisted
1 all the pressure and all the weight of the ene-
my's assaults until the keystone of our position
was safe and the battle won. i confess that
! prudence might have found safer positions for
! troops more 10 the rear; but as il was, Graham
and the heroes Of my salient fell nearest to the
enemy.
y. That Gen. Meade had told me in the after
noon Of July 2 that on the arrival of the Sixth
Corps he would move the Fifth Corps TO the
left and make an attack himself from the left
My advanced position had the double purpose
and the double merit of holding the enemy in
/ check until Round Top could be occupied and
/ the left reinforced, and was also the best posi-
tion for attack, assuming that Gen. Meade's
decision TO attack was 10 be executed. lMeade's
testimony, c. W., pp. 349, 43s.l
%. That Gen. Meade himself declared II
was his intention on July 2 TO attack from his
left lie says:
went 10 the ieft with the view Of ascertaning AZ
/ far as j could the position of my own troops and
the troops OF the enemy, and with the intention o
ordering an attack from there, IL the enemy did not
themselves attack. The enemy, however, attacked
4 aud were repulsed.
The same declaration is repeated at page 437
Of Gen. Meades testimony.
"a That the losses in killed and wounded
on both sides on the I'd Of July were greater
than on both the first and third combined
Gen. Meade states that, "in fact as subse
1 quently aScertained out Of the
2i,OOO MEN
killed, wounded and missing. which was the
amount Of my losses at Gettysburg, over 20OOC
OF them had been put hors dH combat before the
night Of the 2d Of July" Nearly 1000 of ouI
loss on the lst in the First and Eleventh
Corps are reported as captured or missing,
out Of an aggregate loss Of 10000, which leave.
our loss in killed and wounded on the I'd
at 10000 men, against 1000 on the 81 aud
6,OOO on the lst. Here on the left we held
diamonds; diamonds were trumps-and we
played trumps and won the game"
THE THIRD CORPS CONSOLIDATED.
% This corps, with its noble record from vii
liamsburg TO Gettysburg, corps that lost 90
OOJ men in battle-the corps of Hcintzelman
kearny aud Hooker. aud Humphreys. and
Birney, and Berry, and Mott, aud Carr, and
Graham, aud Ward, and De Trobriand, and
Berdan, and Buriing and Randolph; Of Ellis
and Burns and Stevens, and Taylor, and
Eagan; Of Winston, Clark, Seely, Smith-thi.
corps which had given luster to our arms on
so many battleGelds; that never faltered il
battle; that never deserved reproach, unles
repr0ach Is deserved for forcing conflicts lik,
Williamsburg and Gettysburg; that alwayl
loyalty supported all Of the commanders OF tn,
Army Of the Potomac-McClellan, Burnside
Pope, Hooker and Meade-this heroic corps
that began the history Of the Army Of th,
Potomac at Williamsburg, aud filled its b.o9di
est pages 10 the end with the splendor Of an uu
clouded renown this corps, after it had fllet
the measure Of its glory at Gettysburg. wa
consolidated But il was not extinguished
Although destroyed, it was immortal YoI
were hidden TO put away your badge-the frs
worn in the army,-the badge OF Kearny, con
secrated in battle,-and, ever obedient 10 com
mand, no matter how cruel in dishonor o
costly in blood, you did put away your badge
Yes, you put il away close 10 Your hearts
where il lies in unmarked graves from the Pen
insula 10 AppomattOx, and today is proud,
. worn by every survivor Of the Third Corps.
And you were told 10 put on another badge
and you obeyed. But you put il where il wa
seldom seen, unless the wind blew very hard
until the generous Hancock restored TO yol
your Diamond, undimmed in luster, the gem o
the army.
26. And last and least / must notice tn
statement made in the official report Of Mai.
Gen. Halleck. His report Of the battle Of TIA
"a Of July shows how much more a spectatO
looking at the conflict from Washington coul,
see of the positions and movements Of on
troops than any Of us who took part in the en-
gagement were able 10 discover. Gen. Hallecl
informs US that the advance of the Third Corn
left gap" in the line of battle which WA