New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1886-05-10
of the Atlanta campaign on Shcrman's part is thus

The campaign had lasted about four me nths, and
was one of the most memorable in history. Ihert
was but little if anything in the whole campaign
| now that it is over to criticise ut ALL and nothing
to criticise severely IL was creditable alike to tn.
executed il. Sherman had on this campaign some
bright. wide-awake division and brigade command
ers whose aertness added host to the efficiency
of his command.
General Grants narrative of the whole com
plicated and arduous movement from the Rapldan
to Petersburg. the last and the triumphant march
of the Army of the Potomac against the stronghold
of the rebellion is of the most remarkable
pieces of military autobiography ever put upon
| paper. It's distinguishing notes are simplicity and
moderation. So plain and even homelv is the
language, so quiet is the tone so measured are the
statements of fact. that a reader not already ac-
quaintcd with the story might run through chapter
after chapter without realizing that the hero OF a
mighty war was recounting one of his most cele-
brated exploits 1t is only on reaching the end and
surveying the result that one fully comprehends
what q stupendous affair this forty days battle has
been what deeds of Homeric valor have consecratcd
these Virginia woods and swamps. Of the engage
ment Of the 9Th and 9th of May. known as the
Battle of the Wilderness General Grant says: More
desperate fighting has not been witnessed on this
continent. . Our victory consisted in having
successfully crossed a formidable stream, almost in
the face of an enemy, and in getting the army to-
gether again as a unit. We gained an advantage
Oh tho morning Of the 9Th which, if it had been
! followed up. must have proven very decisive. In
the evening the enemy gained an advantage; but
was speedily repused. AS stood at the close,
the two armies ere relatively in ab0nt the same
condition to meet each other as when the river
divided them. But the fact of having safely
crossed was a victory" The neglected advantage
on the 9th to which Grant refers was the success
II IL IL A Hill fao
we'll arranged and CALAMITY carried out that the
Confederates were thrown into complete confusion.
The nature of the country, however, was such that
the panic was not discovered. If Hancock could
have seen the condition of the enemy Grant does
not believe that Lee would have made another
stand outside of the defences of Richmond. Once
more, two days later, an accident prevented the
sudden close Of the fighting. Moving as usual by
the flank, Grant directed his army upon Spottsyl-
vania, hoping either to draw Lee into the open
possibly to get between him and Richmond. Lee
did not suspect this design, but supposed that the
Army of the Potomac falling back upon
Fredericksburg He accordingly ordered Ander
sons corps to march to Spottsylvania the next
day. If this order had been obeyed, Anderson
would have found Spottsylvania already in our
hands, and there wOnld have been a race for Rich
mond, with the Army of the Potomac on the shorter
line. But the woods being on fire Anderson could
not bivOuac, and consequently he marched to
Spottsylvania at once the day before his orders
specified. Through this accident the Confederates
reached the place first, and there. the 10th and
11th was fought of tue blOodest battles of the
campaign.
We shall not attempt to follow General Grant
step by step on this momentous advance. At most
quote only few of his comments upon the
principal incidents, or the men concerned i'll them.
So.~ he crit Wi
fran ness
have always regretted that the last assault at
Cold Iarbor was ever made. might say the same
thing of the assault of the 22d of May, 1868. at
Nicksburg. AT Cold HarbOr 10 advantage whatever
gained to compensate for the heavy loss we
sustained Indeed the advantages other than those
Of peae los were On tine CSnde sde
to have acquired a wholesome regard tor the cour-
age endurance, and soldier ~ qualities generally of
the Army of the Potomac. They no longer wanted
to fight them " one Confederate to five lanks" In
deed, they seemed to have given M any idea of
gaining any advantage of their antagonist IN the
open field. They had come TO much prefer breast
works in their front to the Army of the Potomac.
This charge seemed to revive their hopes tempo
rarily but il was of short DURATION The effect
upon the Army of the Potomac was the reverse
When we reached the James River, however all
effects of the battle Of Cold Harbor seemed to have
disappeared.
He does not enter into analysis of General |
Lees character but he says this of the Confederate
leader anC his army:
General Lee who had led the Army of Northern |
Virginia in all these contests. was a very highly es
timated man in the Confederate Army and states, |
and lied also very high place in the estimation |
of the people and press OF the Northern States. His
praise was sounded throughout the entire North
after every action he engaged in the number |
of his forces was always lowered and that of the |
National forces exaggerated. He was large. |
austere man. and Judge dlfficnt of approach to his
subordnates TO be toed by the entire press OF the
South after every engagement and by portion of the
press North with equal vehsmence, was calculated
n uIN / m he aUf1 nf ne md
to make him feared by his antagonists. 1t was not
an uncommon thing for my staii-onicers to hear
from Eastern officers "Well, Grant has never met |
Bobby Lee yet" There were good and true officers |
who believe now that the Army of Northern VIZ
gina was suIeror to the Army of the Potomac |
man to man. | do not believe 50. except the adj
vantages spoken of above made them so. Before |
the end believe the difference was the other way.
The army of Northern Virginia became despondent
and saw the end 1t did not please them. The |
National army saw the same thing and were en- |
couraged by it.
Grants dissatisfaction with Warren is an old |
story. For some of the fine qualities of that accom-
pshed and patriotic officer lie had a high appreca-
tlon but it was Warrcn's misfortune that circum-
stances placed him in position where gifts other
than his were especially demanded. Some time be-
fore Sheridan relieved him of his command, by |
Grants authority, General Meade had received
written orders to take the e1 trcmc in
case Warren failed to move promptly, on certain
occasion, as it was feared that he would.
Warrens difficulty was twofold: when he re-
ceivcd an order to do anything, it would at once
occur to his mind how all the balance of the army
should be engaged so as properly to cooperate with
him. His ideas were generally good, but be would
forget that the person giving him orders had
thought of others at the time he had of him. In
like manner, when he did get ready to execute an
order, after giving most .nellgen instructions to
division commanders, he would 90 in with~One di-
vision, holding the others in reserve until he could
superlntend their movements in person also forget
ting that division commanders could execute an
order without his presence. His difficulty
sttutlona and beyond his control He was an
officer OF superior ability, quick perceptions and
personal courage to accomplish anything that
could be done " It'll a small command.
Sedgwick was killed early in the campaign and
Grant never had much personal intercourse with
him; but he seems to have formed very high
opinion Of the mobile commander of tho 9Th Corns