Little Falls transcript. [volume] (Little Falls, Morrison County, Minn.) 1876-1894, 1886-07-23

MINNESOTA ST ATE NEWS,
Another Important Tax Title Decision
May 28 the supreme court handed down
! decision Of great interest to those inter-
| ssted in tax titles, either as purchasers or
| victims. It declared unconstitutional
| section %. chapter 10 OF the General Laws
Of 1881. This was an amendment repeal
! ing the provision Of the previous law which
| notice to the owner of the fee
ninety days before the time Of re-
demption expired. This left, however.
| q very important question unsettled. The
{ law left standing by the decision is that
| Fall persons having tax certificates shall
give this notice. Now, many OF these tax
| certificates were held by the state, and the
question was whether the certificates held
| by ''all PERSONS included those held by the
| state. The matter has been argued before
the supreme court, and lawyers and others
| interested in the question have eagerly
waited the decision which was given, in the
, case OF Nelson, appellant, VS.. the Central
Land company, respondent, which ia
to the effect that the titles
bid in by the state come under the same cat
egory in this respect as those bought by
private persons. the court taking the broad
ground that the statute is to be construct.
ed literally and benefcially. it's object be-
| ing to give the landowner time to redeem
after the service of the required notice.
The full text OF the opinion will be found
| in the court record. The syllabus is asi fol.
| lows:
| Andrew Nelson, appellant. VS.. The Cen
trail Land Company, respondent. Judg
ment Douglass county. Syllabus:
! In order to make sheriffs certificate OF
| sale upon a mortgage foreclosure evidence
OF the regularity OF the proceedings under
chapter liz, General Laws 1888 such GER.
tificate must in matters OF substance con-
form to the requirements of the statute.
| Upon the facts disclosed by the record,
| held, that no proper foundation was
laid for the introduction Of parol evil
dence Of the contents Of written in
strument. The term tax certificate as
used in chapter 81, section E, Laws. 1877,
which requires notice OF the expiration OF
the time of redemption to be served ETC.,
is equally applicable to the certificate OF
sale prescribed by section s4 and the Ger
| tihcate OF assignment provided for in Sec
ton 80, chapter IL, General Statutes,
| 1878. The object OF this provision in
the act OF 1877 was to make the
lapse OF the right OF redemption de-.
| pend upon the service of the notice, and
| to extend the time for the exercise OF euch
| rights until the service of notice thereof
| and q specified time thereafter. Following
Merrill & bearing, 80 Mimi. The burden
| rests upon Il party asserting title in fee by
virtue OF such tax certificate to prove that
| such notice has been duly served. The
point that the decision of the trial court
is not supported by it's findings may be
raised for the first time in this court.
Judgment reversed and new trial ordered.
VANDERBURGH, Judge.
ANOTHER DECISION.
! The supreme, court filed another opinion
! having % bearing on the general subject OF
! tax titles, in the case OF Easton vs. The
County Auditor OF Douglas county. The
| opinion is as follows:
! The complaint shows that at the tax
sales in Fillmore county in the several
years, 1864, 1865 and 1866, certain lands
were sold for delinquent taxes, one John
son purchasing at the sale OF 1864 and the
plaintiff purchasing at the other two sales
that no redemption was made, and that
| the proper tax deeds were executed to said
| purchasers: that johnson conveyed bv
! luitclaim deed to the plaintiff; thatin 1S95
n an action in the district court against
/ This plaintiff Judgment was duly rendered
| setting aside and declaring void all such
| tax sales and deeds on the ground that
| the lands at the time of the assessment
to taxation. The object of the acti on is to
! recover from the county the amounts paid
! at the tax sales, with interest. BY de-
murrer to the complaint the right to recov.
| er is contested. Sec. 8, OF Oh. !, of the
| laws OF 1878 [Sec. 81, Oh. II, Gen. Stat.
1879, as amended by Oh. 10. OF the laws
Of 1881, unquestionably entities the plain
tiff to the reimbursement here sought il
that statute as applied to such cases is
valid. The power OF the legisla ture to
make provision for reimbursementsi in such
cases as was done by the statutes cited
vas recently determined in Coils vs..
Commissioners OF Washington County,
in which is applicable to and
controls this case The opinion in that
case indicates the distinction between that
case and state vs. Foley, 80 MINI. $50, re.
lied upon by the respondent. The point is
made that the conveyance by quitclaim
deed fl ON johnson to this plaintiff did not
paid by Johnson as the purchaser at tho
| tax sale OF 1864. As we continue the allie
cations at the complaint, the question is
| whether by a mere deed of quitclaim from
johnson to the plaintiff in 1875, the latter
| became entitled to reimbursement OF
the price paid by Johnson upon the
tax sale in 1854. The statute
above cited confers the right OF reimburse
ment upon the purchaser at the tax sale,
'or the party holding his right" The legal
right to repayment exists only by force OF
the statute, and we seek only to determine
| what was intended by it. We think that
it was the purpose OF this law that when
tax sale should be adjudged void, and
thereby the supposed title or interest OF
the purchaser or his assigns in respect to
the law should De defeated, the price paid
to the state, with subsequent taxes paid,
should be repaid to the purchaser or to the
person to whom his interest in the land
should have been transferred. Ii this is the
proper construction OF the sta tute, this
plaintiff and not his grantor johnson, is
entitled to repayment. We embrace this
opportunity OF correcting a miss tatement
in the case OF state vs.. Foley, supra. 1t is
there said that sec. "a OF CHI. -, Revised
Statutes 1851, remained unaffected by
subsequent legislat ton until 1866, when it
VAS repealed. Our attention has since
oeen called to the fact that that chapter
was also repealed by sec. 10, CHI. 1, General
Laws OF 1860. Our conclusion being that
The second, third and fourth causes OF &C.
ton stated in the complaint show a right
OF recovery the order sustaining the de-
murer thereto is reversed.
DICKINSON, J.
A Railroad Conference Called.
The following has been issued from the