Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1886-04-28
MCLELLAN,S LAST MESSAGE.
PROM the Pittsburg Post.

paper by General Mcclellan on the Autietam
campaign, ("trom the Peninsula To Antie-
tam,") in the preparation of which he was
engaged when stricken by death. MIR. VIM
G. Prime, who is the generals literary eN-
ecutor, in communicating the article To- the
Century, notes the interesting fact that the
annexed tribute of admiration t. ''the army
which loved him as he loved them" was
the last thought his pen committed to paper.
They are Mctlellau's last words To- his COM
rades OF the Army oi the Potomac:
$50 long as life lasts the survivors ui these
glorious days will remembe with Iuickened
pulse the attitude Ot that army when u
reached the goal for Which it had stryen with
such transCendeut herCism. Exhausted, de-
pieted in numbers, bleeding at every PORE
but still proud aud defiant, and strong IN the
consciousness OF a great feat OF arms herol-
cally accomplished, il stood ready tn renew
the struggle with uudimiuished order when
ever its commander should give tho word. Ii
was one OF those magnificent episodes which
dignity a nations history, and are tit subjects
for the graudest efforts of the poet anl
painter"
The matter of great interest set forth by
General Mcclellan in the CcHtHry paper Is
the effort ho made to induce Halleck, the
ceneral-in-Chiei, TO order the withdrawal of
the ll,oU0 men at Harpsr's Ferry, before
Lee crossed into Maryland. in the fall of
l>b2, prior To the battle of Antetam. 4 few
days before he went to the 'front.' Secretary
NtMMu toushitSi WIN ulin ON iNt Supltct,
and Mcclellan gave sound reasons why
Harper's Ferry should be evacuated. After
stating other military considerations, Gen
eral Mcclellan goes on
al added that il 1t were determined to
hold the position the existing arrangements
eneDy To surround and capture the garrison,
and that the garrison ought at least, to be
Withdrawn to the Maryland Heights, where
| they could resist attack until relieved.
IhL
what said, and asked ms to accompany hun
To General Halleck, and repeat my statement
to him. | acquieSced, and we went together
to General Halleck's quarters, where we
found that be had retired for the night. But
he received us in his bedroom, when after
preliminary explanation 10y the secretary as
To- the interview being at his request, | said tC
Halleck precisely what had stated to Mr.
Seward.
"Halleck received my statement with i'll.
| concealed contempt-said that everything
| was all right a. it was that my views wert
| entirely erroneous, etc, and soou bowed Us
out, leaving matters at HaTper's Ferry pre-
| csely As they were.'
| As a result Stuuewan Jackson swept down
on Harpers Ferry, occupied Maryland
| Heights, took | LOCO prisoners, 10 cannon and
| 10, 900 stand Ot small arms-a disaster that Me
Clellan was oVerruled IN his endeavors 10
/ prevent
| General Mcclellan in the Scri5Rcr paper
| also makes mention OF the peculiar CirCum.
stances under which he fought the battles of
South Mountain and Antietam-that is with
| a rope about his neck, So 10 speak. Alter de-
scribiDg the concentration OF the army on
| the Maryland side OF the Potomac early i'll
/ September, he says:
/ " As the time had now arrived for the army
to advance, aud had received no orders to
| take command OF IL, but had been expressly
/ told that the assignment of "A commander had
| not been decided, determined to solve the
| question for myself, and when l moved ont
from Washington with my staff and personal
/ escort, left my card, with =. L. &. written
upon it, at the White House. war office and
Secretary Stewards house, aud went on my
way.
.'I was afterwards accused of assuming
command without authority, for nefariou,
purposes, and in TACT fought, in the battles
of South Mountain and Antietam with
/ halter around my neck, for il the army o
| the Potomac had been defeated, and | had
| survived i would, no doubt, have been
| tried tor assuming authority without orders
! and, III the state of feeling which SO unjustly
| condemned the innocent and most meritori
| Gus Gen. +. J. Porter, would probably hav,
been condemned to death. l was fully awar,
/ OF the risk ran, but the path of duty wa
| clear and tried 10 follow it. 1t was absu
| lutely necessary that Lees army should b
met, and in the state of affairs / have brietlr
| described, there could be no hesitation Oi
my part as TO doing it promptly. Very few
/ in the army OF the Potomac doubted the tsy
! Orabie result of the next collision with tn,
| Confederate army but IN other quarters no
1 little doubt prevailed, and the desire fol
| very rapid movement 50 loudly expressed
1 after the result was gained, did not make
/ itself heard during the movements preceding
tho battles quite the contrary was tho case
l as / was more than once cautioned that | was
/ moving too rashIy and exposing the capital
/ to an attack from the Virginia side"
/ This fits into the story previously narrated
by General Mcclellan in his paper ON the
Peninsuiar campaign, OF the way Stanton,
Halleck and the luuJa OF radicals IN and about
| Congress, thwarted his plans by every
| method within their power. lie had enemies
| in the rear moro effective because more
| treacheTOus than those in his front They
| were responsible for the failure OF the PENN.
sular campaign, and after POpe's humilating
| failure, sent Mcclellan to meet Lee in Mary.
| land so that he would have had to answer
| with his life for defeat at South Mountain or
| Antietam. lie would have been made "A
l scape- goat Just ~ fItZ John Porter has been
made to stand for Pope's blunders and
incapacity, for the last twenty years.
General Mcclellan gives his opinion of
| General Lee in this paper and in these words,
| referring to the tactical movements of the
| Two commanders, between Pope's defeat and
| the battle of Antietam
"General Lee and knew each other well
| before the war We had served together in
| Mexico and commanded against each other in
the peninsula | had the highest respect for
| his ability as a commander, and knew that he
was not general to he ultied with or care
lessly afforded an opportunity of striking a
iatal blow. Each OF us naturally regarded
his own army as the better, but each enter
tanned the highest respect for the endurance
courage and hghtng qualities of the opposing
army and this feeling extended TO the
officers and men. 1t was perfectly natural
under these circumstances that both OF us
should exercise a certain amount of caution :
l, III my endeavors to ascertain Lees strength
position and Intentions before ! struck the
final blow he TO abstain from any extended
movements of invasion, and to hold his army
well IN hand until he could be satisfied as ~
the condition OF the Army OF the Potomac
after its second Bull Run campaign, and as
TO the intentions OF its commander"