Jamestown weekly alert. [volume] (Jamestown, Stutsman County, D.T. [N.D.]) 1882-1925, 1886-05-06
THE NATIONAL GUARD.
rhe Late General McClellan's ldea Cen.
corning the Organization and Maintes-
ance Of Militia Companies.

The Late General MCCleloD'D 1O08 CO0s
corning the Organization and Maintes-
ance of Militia Companies.
1t is perfectly practicable, under
proper system, to form in time Of peace
National Guard regiments of infantry
capable Of becoming thoroughly efficient
after a short term Of field service, and
comp 3tont to render cffectual co-opera-
tio,, r:ill the regulars in war.
Iiere is no reason why the organized
militia should not readily be placed in
condition to quell all riots and local dis
turbances, even where they have reached
the stage OF incip;ent organized re-
bcllion, and they should be fully able to
do this work without any aid whatever
from the regular army, which need
tLcn be called upon only to protect the
property of the general Government.
1t is Il fact that in this country the mere
presence of a handfal. Of regulars has
always suiliccd to prevent or quell riots
without the necessity of firing upon the
mob. This has arisen from the fact that
it is well known that the regulars are
unAc,. thorough discipline, and will un-
hcs;ta:in1ly obey any order to fire, and
that when they tire ii will be upon the
mob, and not over their heads.
The National Guards will accomplish
precisely the same results wherever it is
kaown that their discipline and esprit
de corps arc such us to insure their
promp! and effective obedience of any
orders received, and to outweigh any
personal sympathy Of any of their MEM
bcrs with individuals in the mob. This
is doubtless the case now with many of
the regiments throughout the country,
and there is no reason why it should not
be the case with al, and that all should
preserve, at the moment of action. that
steady bearing, profound silence, and
complete indifference to danger which
are SO impressive and conclusive when
dealing with an angry and excited mob.
ln brief, l would propose that the mass
of the active militia, or National Guard,
should be organized and instructed as in
fantry; that they should be furnished
with an adequate supply Of machine and
cities, to be manned by detachments
specially detailed; that in the districts
near sca-coast defenses sufficient num-
bcr Of regiments should be designated
and instructed as heavy artillerists; and
that at suitable points in the remote in
terror moderate number of companies
of mounted men should be organized to
cooperate with the regulars against the
Indians in the event of sudden emer-
gency.
AS the existence of trustworthy
force of the National Guard is impor-
tant to the country at large, as well rs
to the individual States, it is only just
that the general Government should as
sumo its fair share Of the expense.
This can best be done in the form Of
arms, ammunition, clothing, camp and
garrison equipage, etc.--in order to in
sure uniformity of equipment and arma-
ment-and also probably in the issue Of
rations, and even of pay under certain
circumstances. And this assistance
should be apportioned among the States,
not in the ratio Of population, but ac-
cording to the numbers of effective mill
itia actually on foot in each State; more
over. the actual number thus to be aided
should be apportioned according to the
necessities of the case.
For example, the organization of
heavy artillery should be confined to
the States on and adjacent to the sea-
board and lake frontier, within whose
limits permanent Notifications exist, or
where temporary batteries armed with
haavy guns must certainly be erected in
the event of foreign war; moreover, the
strength OF these organizations should
be greatest in the States nearest our
most extensive and important sea-coast
dcfenses. for instance, the harbor of New
York.
On the same principle, the infantry
organizations should be relatively the
strongest in the States most liable to
foreign attack, or where large manufac-
turing and mining establishments most
abound, as these, and not the agricul-
tural regions, are probable centers of
domestic disturbance.
While it is very desirable to organize
certain portion of the National Guard
in the agricultural districts, it has never
been found easy to do so, on account Of
the difficulty of bringing the men to-
gether, and the lack Of proper facilities,
but it is probably practicable to lessen
these difficulties by granting additional
pecuniary aid, at least in the smaller
towns where the troublesome elements
are not present, or at least in very
small proportion.
But the essential condition at the
foundation of the whole matter is the
establishment of good discipline and
asp,,t de corps; for with the existence of
these elements the National Guard can
be relied upon to do its duty in the
maintenance OF law and order, without
regard to personal sympathies. and that
this can be brought about I do not
doubt.
In preparing legislation, whether by
the general Government or States, to
carry out these purposes, it should
never be forgotten that those who
enter the National Guard necessari-
ly give to the public great deal of
their time, and that with those who
form the vast majority of the National
Guard time is matter of the greatest
| value. and that, having made this most
| important contribution to the public
service, they should be relieved from
any direct pecuniary demands. Their
arms, equipments uniforms, armories,
etc., should be furnished free of cost,
and when they are called out during
working-hours, whether for duty or
| instruction, other than mere parades
for their own qualification, they should
receive fair compensation, and all nec-
essary expenses for their subsistence
and transportation should be paid. An
efficient National Guard is not luxury,
but necessity, and the public can well
afford to meet the cost, provided il il
kept within just limits, and expended
wisely and honestly. George b. Nc
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