The weekly Union times. [volume] (Union C.H., South Carolina) 1871-1894, 1886-08-20

VI INC country. The spring, however was moi
| rs bold, rs some soldiers placed around IL. A ,
guard, were partial. Our camp at that plao,
viii DC remembered MS abounding in rocks
| under which were the dens of rattlesnskes On In a,
INFESTED that country. We were now gsttin Q
near Vicksburg and the enemy's guns sounded
much louder than they did when We wers A,
jackson and made us more nervous. Afte,
remaining in that camp FIVE days the troop,
were ordered to cook three days rations. We
all knew the Interpretation Of that order, and
oegan to Imagine . fight was at hand. just
after the turn Of midnight on the 9th July, the
army marched out Of camp, and on rsachins
the road filed to the right aud moved towards
Big Black and Vioksburg. The army had
scarcely Strengthened out in the. road before il
was halted. Every one knew that Big Black
was not far of, and just beyond Was the Fsds-
raj army II was believed that IN attempt
would be made TO cross the river before day.
and with the sun would come bloody work. A
dcathlike stiffness pervaded tho army, There
was no whispering. Perhaps each man was
busy with thoughts Of what the mornings light
would bring. Tho night wore on and still tho
ominous silence hung with mysterious forebod .
ings about the army. The soldiers not being
able to divine its meaning, began to imsgin o
some evil forebodings. Perhaps the time was
being consumed in laying pontoons for the sue.
cessful crossing of the river. Or II NAV be
that the enemy had gotten wind of our approach
and were already at the river to dispute our
passage. Thoughts like these doubtless f,,ed
the minds with conflicting emotions and tho
soldiers with kind Of dread of the revelation.
that day would bring. Just before day the
mysterious silence was broken. The news ran
down the limo that vioksburg had fallen and
that we were already confronted at the river
by tho Federal army. No one can form INV
conception of the emotions that ran wild
through the soldiers brains at that hour. tn.
Importance Of Vicksburg had been greatly mar
nifisd Ourtroops had been led to believe that
our national existence depended upon our ability
10 hold IT. but 1t was now in the possession Of
the enemy. We knew that the eyes Of the Con.
federacy were watching Johnson's army and
that much was expected Of it. None, therefore.
who were not on the Big Black that morning
can ever realize how Johnson's men staggered
under the blow. Had the garrison held out two
days longer, the experiment of relieving Vicks-
burg would have been made F; and, in all prob
ability, Johuson's army would have been cut 10
pieces. Yet we cannot but wish the experiment
could have been made.
johnson has been severely criticised for not
s-raliaf .anncr n ,,,..
be remembered that an army cannot be ghIhrf1eSai h1Si
up from the four points Of the compass and
made available in few days time.
On the 23d of May, 1868, when Evans brig.
adc arrived at Jackson, Pemberton was already
hermetically sealed in vicksburg. and johnson
on the outside with q command Of six thousand
troops, as y neuclus for tn, formation of an
army for the purpose Of saving Vicksburg.
Johnson's army grew in number daily and soon
swclled to thirty thousand men. The troops
that composed this army came from Charleston,
Deauregard, Bragg, and part of Pemberton's
defeated army at Edwards Depot, bu. being cut
off was not shut up in Vicksburg. The medley
of troops suddenly brought together had to be
organized into divisions and corp, and then
drilled together before they could have that
mutual confidence in each other so essen
tial to success on the battlefield. II is only
when officers and men have mutual confidence
in each other-a confidence that is born Of asso-
citation and courage exhibited in the trying hour
of danger-tbat the best results can be safely
counted on. Johnson's army composed of officers
and men hastily thrown together, and without
any practical knowledge Of each others cour.
age, could not hope to meet successfully nm
enemy superior in number and training, and, at
tho sane time. flushed with victory.
It is true that johnson made no record as q
fighter. He thought the preservation of his
army was worth more to tho Confederacy than
towns and cities; that troops should not be
sacrificed and exposed whore there is no ad.
vantage to be gained. The wisdom of his pol
icy verified in two notable instances. Hi.
first order to Pemberton, after taking command
in Mississippi, was not t, shut himself up in
vicksburg, and lose both men and place. Th,
order was set aside, and both place and army
were lost to the Confederacy. Johnson did no
believe that the sacrifice Of his army in m un
equal contract on the battlefield would save
Atlantis, and if it did, the place was not worth
the price paid for It. He was removed and tn,
gallant Hood was put in command Of our west
ern army. No troops fought better. Atlaut,
was lost, aud in three fights Johnson's ole
army, under Hood, had an existence only il
history. Had Johnson remained in command
Of our western army, Sherman would never
have reached the sea in command Of conquer
ing army, or had the pleasure of sticking hi.
feudish torch to tn G city Of Columbia.
The noble Lee, under the pressure of publi
sentiment, proved the impracticabiity Of inva
sion. Twice he made the experiment ant
twice he returned to Virginia with shattered
army. Johnson's plan was the only one tha
had in it the element Of success. Put the en-
cmy to the necessity Of hauling supplies over
| long line, forcing him to garrison every tow