Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-07-25
THE LOST DISPATCH.
co1onrL WILLIAM ALLEN REPLIES TO
GENERAL LoNGsrREEr.
The firs, Maryland Campaign uSS2'-
stonewali Jackson and the Capture
of Harpers Ferry.
To he Editor of the Dispatch :

In the June Century General Long
street has an article on the Maryland
Campaign Of 1862, which is remarkable
for lis ill.natured illusions to General
Jackson, as well as for It's partial view
of the campaign and its severe and I'M
fair criticism Of General Lees strategy.
General Longstreet leads US to infer
that no prevailed over Lees hesitaucy
to 20 into Maryland at all by reminding
him Of his Qsopgstreet's) experiences
in Mexico, where, on several occasions,
We had TO live two or three days on
green corn" AS Jackson's corps GER
tsinly, and Longstreets probably,
had to live on green corn for
some days before the second bat
tie Of Manassas, it was hardly
necessary in General Longstreet to re-
cur to Mexican experiences in order to
overcome the hesitancy Of Lee. But,
however much Lee yielded to the intiu-
ence Of Longstreet in crossing the Po-
tomac. 1t is evident from General Long
streets article that Lee unfortunately
refused to be guided by the wisdom Of
his lieutenant vixen he had once en-
tered upon the campaign. General
Longstreet thinks that Lee ought not
to have attempted the reduction OF Har-
per's Ferry. Longstreet is careful TO
throw the blame for this movement of
his own shoulders, for he tells US that
when Lee proposed to him TO under
take it be objected, and urged that
.'our troops were worn with march
ing," DC. lie thinks, too, that the
fight at South Mountain was a
mistake, and that the stand ought
to have been made at Sharps-
burg, and not at the Mountain, though
he does not elesAl y admit that this
would have involved the failure of Lees
plans for the reduction Of lIarper's
Ferry. After South Mountain he oriti-
cises the battle Of Sbarpsburg-thinks
j, should not have been fought--but
that the Confederate army ought to
have WELDED the moral effects Of vic
tory without further struggle by re-
turing at once to the south side Of the
Potomac. After defending General
p. IL. Hill from some imaginary assail-
art for tie loss of the captured dis
patch ne ADOPTS, more or less, General
Hills idiOsyncrasy a regard to the
value Of that dispatch to Mcclellan
and its effect upon the fortunes Of the
campaign. lie thinks it did Mcclellan
little good. and that it contributed in
no considerable degree TO General Lees
failure. The animus Of the article is
unfair to the Confederate leader, but
makes up for this by being very COM
Elementary to General Longstreet him
self.
If The author looks back with dis
torted vision upon Lee aud his deeds in
this campaign, lis bile is evidently
deeply stirred len the vision of jack
son passes before his mind. Speaking
Of the results Ct the campaign, he says
jackson was quite satisfied with the
campaign, as the Virginia papers made
him the hero of IIarper's Ferry, although
the greater danger was with McLaws,
and his was the seyerer and more im-
portant service" Again: jackson
made a wide. sweeping march around
the Ferry, passing the Potomac at Will
Transport, and moving from there on
towards MartinsbuIg, and turning
thence upon EIarper's Ferry to make
his attack by Bolivar Heights. McLaws
made q hurried march to reach Mary
land Heights before Jackson could get
in position, and succeeded in doing
so. With Mary land Heights in
our possession the Federals could
4 not hold their position there. Nc
Laws put two OF three hundred men
3 TO each piece Of his artillery, and car
ried ii up the Heights, and was in posi-
ton before jackson came on the Heights
opposite. simultaneously Walker ap-
i peared upon LOudoun Heights, south Of
the Potomac and east Of the Shenan-
doah, thus completing the combination
z against the Federal garrison In the
description Of the battle of Sharpsburg
but a very meagre allusion is made to
the tremendous struggle which took
place on Jackson's line, and which was
the heaviest attack made by Mcclellan
during ne day; and only the obscurest
mention is made Of the tremendous blow
struck by A. p. Hill in the afternoon,
which relieved Longstrcets own line
from erwhelming pressure and sent
Burnside's corps broken and bleeding
back to the Antietsn.
The purpose and plans OF this Mary
land campaign are not hard to under
stand. Lee had defeated one half OF
the Federal troops and driven them to
TIE Notifications Of Washington. lie
could not get at his foe in that position,
and TO remain idle at Manassas was to
give The enemy an opportunity to re-
cover from the blow he had struck.
BE. therefore, after, it would seem,
being satisfied by General Longstreet
that his army might live on green corn,)
crossed into Maryland for the purpose
3, Of drawing the Federal army away from
s. Washington in order to defend the North
& from invasion. His movement was i'm
b DE diately successful. Mcclellan, with
out waiting to reorganize his disjointed
= forces set forth from Washington to-
& wards Frederick City that be might
q cover Baltimore as well as the Federal
q capital. His movements were neces-
Z sarily slow, and this slowness was In
: creased by his cautious temperament
and the panic fears Of the national Ad-
minis,ration, which but few days be-
fore bad looked upon the fall of the capt.
tai as certain. Mcclellan crept slowly up
the Potomac, carrying on his work OF
Z Reorganization as he went, stretching
q his army from the Potomac TO the
s. patapsco so as to cover the cities. His
4. force was large, from $4,000 to 10000
effective men, but mis- army was not in
rood condition. One part OF 1t had
but recently returned from the unsuc-
i.seesslul Peninsula campaign, another
part, under Pope, had been dreadfully
beaten at Manassas. Gaps had been
5 6lled by new troops not yet Injured to
Service. With his usual tendency to
exse gerate the strength Of his foes, Nc
s Clellsn believed that the veteran and