Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-07-25

day on which Mcclellan found the lost
dispatch. On the 18th Halleck says:
81 fear you are exposing your left and
rear" And even "a late as the 10th no
urges the same idea upon Mcclellan.
Now, IL we put together tho condition
Of McClellan's army, his slowness and
caution as commander, which was 80
fully evidenced in the Peninsula cam
paign, and the apprehension with
which the Federal Administration
viewed his increasing distance from
Washington, is II not evident
that McClellan's progress must have
been slow, and as he approach
ed the mountains slower still?
In estimating McClellan's progress
General Lee could not have known OF
Halleck's fears, and Of the constant
pulling back exercised upon Mcclellan
from Washington, but he knew Nc
Clellan's cautious character as COM
mander thoroughly, he knew the dis
ordered condition Of bis army, indeed,
probably moderated the rapidity with
which il was recuperating, and from
this data he estimated fairly and justly,
we believe, tho length Of time it would
| take Mcclellan to reach the South
! Mountain.
General Lee expected, OF course,
when he entered Maryland that the
garrison at Harper's Ferry would leave
the place and escape to the North.
Finding that it continued there, he de-
termined, while watching and waiting
for Mcclellan, to capture this garrison
and the large material Of war which
had been collected at Harper's Ferry.
lie proposed TO General Longstreet, it
seems, to carry out this plan, but find
ing his senior lieutenant unable to ap-
preciate the opportunity, he turned to
Jackson, whose vigor and boldness bet
ter suited the enterprise. On the 10th
September the army left Frederick.
jackson, as General Longstreet states,
was to make sweeping march
by way Of Williamsport and Martins
burg. and, driving the Federal troops
at the latter place towards Harper's
Ferry, close all the avenues Of escape
in the hngle between the Shenandoah
and the Potomac. At the same time
McIaws. with his own and Ander-
sons divisions, was sent into Plea
SAINT Valley, with instructions to
take Maryland Heights, and hedge
in the garrison on the north
side of the Potomac. j. G. Walk
err, with two brigades, was or
dered from the mouth Of the Monocscy
to cross the Potomac, move towards
Harper's Ferry, and, seiziDg the Lou
doun Heights, to shut up the eastern
angle formed by the Shenandoah and
the Potomac. Longstreet was sent to
Hagerstown to look after some supplies
and reported movements of troops from
Pennsylvania, while d. II. Hill was
left at Boonesboro' to be ready to sup.
port Stuart's cavalry and to guard the
mountain. pass which led to McLaws's
rear until Isrper's Ferry should fall.
Ii was not General Lees original inten-
ton to dispute the passage Of South
Mountain with Mcclellan. His design, on
the other hand, was to induce the Fed
eral army, if possible, to cross into the
Hagcrstown Valley, and when this army
had thus gotten fairly out of the reach
of Washington the Confederate com
mander expected to give it battle upon
his own terms. And, judging from Nc
Clellan's character and movements, he
believed he would have ample time for
the reduction Of Uarper's Ferry and the
reunion of his divided army in the
neighborhood Of Hagerstown before Nc
Clellan would be ready to cross the
mountain. Consequently d. II. Hill
and Stuart were expected to delay Nc
Clellan's march until the operations at
Harper's Ferry should be completed.
On the 18th Of September copy OF
General Lees order giving the proposed
movements Of every division in his
army until it should be reunited after
the capture of Hsrper's Ferry fell into
the hands of General Mcclellan at
Frederick. The copy so captured was
the one sent from General Lees head
quarters addressed to General ID. ii.
Hill. How il was lost, and where, are
not definitely known. General Hill
states that he never received this copy
of the order, and consequently it must
have been lost through the carelessness
Of some one else, but we believe no
means exist Of tracing the history OF
this accident further. General Long
street thinks that Mcclellan might have
gotten through his own agencies
all the information the order gave
him but such q supposition is
at variance with all the facts Of
The case. AS Halleck's dispatches
show, the movement Of Confederate
troops on the south side Of the Poto-
mac was interpreted as a menace to
Washington, and served simply to
hamper Mcclellan. Nor could any
agencies, even had they been vastly
more efficient than usual, have revealed
20 Mcclellan the position of every part
Of Lees army for days to come as well
As the designs Of its commander. Nc
Clellan, it is certain, valued the import
ance Of the order infinitely higher than
General Longstreet does. lie gave
vent TO demonstrations of JOY when he
read it, and at once comprehended the
opportunity presented for striking q
tremendous blow at his adversary. by
A prompt movement forward he might
expect to overwhelm the small part OF
Lees army in his front, and, turning
down upon the rear Of McLaws, might
raise the siege of Harper's Ferry, and
perhaps destroy portion Of the
troops engaged in conducting 1t. AT
once orders were issued to every part
of the Federal army for vigorous for
ward movement. Stuart found his
cavalry pickets attacked and pressed
back with unusual vigor. Everything
on the evening Of September 18th gave
indications of a change in the mode OF
movement Of the Federal army. Some
one who had been o witness OF the
scene at McClellan's headquarters
when the lost dispatch was brough: to
him came through the lines and in
formed Stuart, who then understood