The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1886-01-15

would give priority to claims for wages
earned after levy. But is 1t not at least
equally absurd to hold a mere paper levy
sufficient to defeat labor claims, without
removal of the properly or putting q
person in charge, or doing any other
act by the sheriff, equivalent to notice to me.
canics and laborers, that the property Is le-
gally out of the hands Of their employer
and In the custody of the law The Act
of 1879 was modelled after other local Acts
which show that the distinction between
lien by laborers up to the time of sale, and
lien up to the time Of levy, was fully un-
derstood by the law-making power. The
local Act for Schuylkil and other counties,
passed the Both day of March, 1859. p L.
page 3lS provides for the payment of la
ecution, in language identical with the first
section of the Act of 1872 In
the third section Of the same Act,
the payment of rent to landlord is limited
to time Immediately prior to the taking
of the property in execution or levy. On
the 11th day of April 1862, local act for
| Schuylkill and two other counties was
passed, (P. L. 400 to protect the wages of
| labor, giving preference in cases Of sales by
execution, but limiting the lien for wages
to six months Immediately preceding the
levy. 1t thus appears that the legislature
| by appropriate words, limits the lien for
wages to the time of levy when ii is intend
ed to be so limited, and extends 1t to the
time of sale, when the term sale is employ
ed.
On the 18th DAY of June 1888, an Act
was passed, (P L. 116) amending the Act
of 1872, by extending its provisions to other
classes of laborers &c. 1t may fairly be
presumed that the legislature knew of the
conflicting decisions in regard to the orig
inal Act. If it had been intended to limit
the lien to the time of levy in accordance
| with the decisions first above cited no
doubt apt words would have been employ
ed for that purpose
Instead of that, the same limitations,
and by the same words, is reenacted for
the new class of claimants for wages, as is
contained in the first section of the origin
al Act, thus implicitly approving the con-
structioE put upon the Act by the Courts of
Philadelphia
But however that may be, am constrain-
ed TO hold with the latter courts, that the
| language Of the statute is too strong to be
limited in its operation ny construction, to
the time of levy by execution, against the
plain language, that the period from which
the time of the existence of the preferred
lien shall be computed, shall be the sale
and transfer. So holding, tie first and
second exceptions of the labor claimants
must be sustained.
In view of the conflicting decisions in re.
gard to the meaning and intention of the
statute, and in the hope that these veXed
questions may be put at rest hy an appeal
in this case, have endeavored, in con
nection with the report Of the auditor to
present the case in such a manner as will
necessarily settle the law upon the subject
| | have but word to add. If the legis.
lature did not intend or mean what the
language imports, it mas been during these
fourteen years negligent of duty in moi
amending the Act by the use of language
declaring what meaning they did intend
should be ascrihed to the words used.
The conclusion which / have reached,
requires me to reverse the report of the
auditor awarding the fund to the execution
creditor and to award the fund to the labor
claim ants.