Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-03-02

! am Qulte prepared 10 hNoW UNI AVE- NJ
| not few in which suspensions from
| Office have depended more upon ora
representations made 10 me by cltlzens or
! known good repute and by members OF the
| House OF Representatives ana Senators oi
| the United States than upon any letters
and documents presented for my examina
| lion. have not felt Justified In suspecting
| the veTaciiy, integrity, and PATRIOTISM oi
| senators. or ignoring their representations
because they were not in party animation
with the majority Of their associates: and l
recall n few suspensions which besr the
approval OF individual members Identified
politically with the majority OF the senate.
While, therefore, am constrained To
deny the right Of the senate TO the papers
and documents described, so far as the
right TO the same 10 based upon the claim
that they are I'm any view OF the subject
official. | am also led uuequivOcally To dis
pute the right of the Senate, by the aid o (
any documents whatever. or IN any way.
save through the judicial process OF trial on
Impeachment, TO review or reverse the act
of the Executive in the suspension, during
the recess of the senate. of federal officials.
| believe the power to remove or suspend
such officials is vested in the President
alone by the Constitution. which In express
terms provides that 1.-THE executive power
shall be vested In President OF the United
states OF America" and that " he shall
take care that the laws be faithfully exc
cuted.'
The Senate belongs to the legislative
branch of Government. when the Consti-
tuition by express provisions superadded to
its legislative duties the right TO advise and
consent 10 the appointments TO Office, and
to sit as O court of Impeachment. 10 con-
conferred upon that body all the
control and regulation ot the Execu-
tive action supposed to be necessary for the
safety OF people; and this express and
special grant OF such extraord mary pJNeIs
not In any way related TO or growing out OF
The general senatorial duty, aud In Itself a
saE
crime nt should be held under the familiar
maxim OF construction TO exclude every
other right OF Interference with the ENecu-
tive functions. In the first Congress which
assembled after the adoption OF the Consti-
tuition. comprising many who aided Its
preparatioD legislative construction was
given 10 that instrument In which the in
dependence OF the Executive ia the matter
of removals from Office was fully suSt aned.
/ think II will be found that in subsequent
discussloLs OF this question there was gen
efally. II not at ell times, proposition
pending 10 In some way curtail this power
OF the President by legislation, when fur
nishee evidence that 10 limit such power
10 was suppose q TO be necessary TO supple
II ent the Constitution by such legislation.
The flint enactment OF this description
was passed under "A stress OF partsanship
and political bitterness which eliminated
IN the Presidents impeachment. This law
prov ided that the Federal officers to which
II applied could only be suspended during
the recess OF the Senate when shown by
evidence satisfactory 10 the President To be
guilty OF misconduct In Office or crime or
when incapable or disqualified TO perform
their duties. and that within twenty days
alter the next meeting OF the Senate IL
should he the duty OF the President 10 re e.
Ioft To the Senate such suspension. with
the evidence and reasons for his action In
the case The statute. passed In 1857,
when Congress was overwhelmingly aud
bitterly opposed politically to the Prest-
dent, Nay be regarded a. an indication
that even then IL was thought necessary
by Congress determined upon the subJu-
cation OF the Executive to the legislative
viii 10 furnish Itself "a law for that purpose
instead OF attempting to reach the -oOlect
intended by an invocation or any pretend
ed constitutional right. The law which
thus found It's way TO our statue book was
plain in It's terms and It's Intent needed no
aNowal. II valid and now In operation, IL
would Justify the present course OF the
Senate and command the obedience OF the
Executive to It's demands. II may. how
ever, be remarked IN passing that under
this law the President had the privilege OF
presenting TO the body which assumed TO
review his EAecutiN a acts his reasons there
for instead Of being excluded from eXplaua-
tiOn or Judged 10y the papers found in the
delartlne TWO years after the law Of
sol WAS passed. and within less than live
weeks after the Inauguration Of a Presi.
dent IN political accord with both branches
Of congress the sections Of the act regu-
iatiug suspensions nom Office during tue
recess II the senate were entirely repealed.
and in their pace were substituted prOvI-
sioLs " hich. Instead OF limiting the causes
OF suspension To misconduct, crime. dis
ability, or disqualification, expressly per-
mitted such suspension by the President
in his discretion and completely aban
dOned the requirement Obll2tug htm 10
report TO the senate "evid ance and
reasons TOR his action. with these
notifications and with all the branches
of the Government in political harmony,
and IN the absence OF partisan incentive TO
captlOus obstruction, the law, H. IT was lett
by the amendment OF 1869, was much less
destructive OF the Executive discretion.
Yet great general and patriotic citizen.
who, on the Ith day Of March, 1869, as
sumed the duties OF Chief Executive. and
for whose fIeer administration of his high
Office the most hateful restraints OF the law
OF 1867 were on the 9TH day Of april 1869.
removed, mindful of his obligation to de-
lend and protect every prerOgauve Of his
great trust, and appTeh ensiYe OF the Injury
threatened the pablo service In the
continued operation OF these statutes.
even in their modified form, their
unconstitutional character. and hurt
ful tendency said: 1T may be well to
mention here the embarrassment possible
10 arise from leaving on the statute books
the so called tenure Ot-Ofiice acts and TO
earnestly recommend their total repeal.
II could not have been the intention OF the
trainers Of the Constitution when pro.
Vidirg that the appointments made by the
President should receive the consent OF tue
senate that the latter should have power
10 retain IN Oillce persons placed there by
Federal appointment against the VIII Of
the President. The law Is Inconsistent
with the faithful and efficient administTa.
ton OF The Government. What faith can
an Executive put in officials forced upon
him, and those too whom he has suspended
for reason How Will such officials he
nkely TO serve an Administration which
they know does not trust them
am unable 10 state whether or not this
recommendation for the repeal of these laws
nas since been repeated, If 10 mas not the
reason can probably be found I'm the eXpe
rleuce which demonstrated the fact that
the Lecessiurs ot the political situation but
rarely developed their vicious character:
and 80 10 happens that after an existence OF
nearly twenty years OF almost inocuOus
deSuctude those laws are brought forth ap-
Iarenuy repealed as well as unrepealed. 10
attempt an Improvement In the methods OF
administration. The constitutiOnalty OF
these laws IS by 10 means admitted: but
why should the provisions Ofa repealed law
WhlCh required specific cause for sus-
pension and repirt 10 the Senate OF
evidence and reasons % be now in
effect applied to the present Executive. in.
stead OF law afterwards passed and uure-
pealed. which distinctly permits suspen-
siOns by the President ia his discretion.
and carefully Omits the requirement thar
evidence ana reasons Tor MS action IN the
case shall be reported 10 the Senate"
The requests and demands which by the
score have for nearly three months been
presented 10 the different departments OF
the Government, whatever may be their
form, have but one complexion. They
assume the right OF tho senate 10 SIT In
Judgment upon the exercise Of my
exclusive discretion ana executive func-
ten. for which am solely re-
spUusible 10 the people. from whom
: lave 50 lately received the sacred
uust OF Office. My oath TO support aud de-
tcLd the Constitution; my duty 10 the PEG.
pie who have chosen me To execute the
powers OF their great Office. and not TO re.
linquish them and my duty TO the en- ief
msgistracy. which ! must preserve uuim-
paired In all It's dignity and YlgOr, compel
me to refuse 10 comply with these demands.
To the end that the service may be- i'm.
proved, the senate is invited 10 the fullest
SCRUTINY OF persons submitted 10 them for
public Office. In recognition Of the consti-
tu,ional power of that body TO advise and
consent to their appO lntmeDt. / shall
continue, as ! have thus far done,
10 furnish, at the request Of the
confirming body. all Information I pos
placed before them for their action, b)tn
when they are proposed to MI vacancies
and 10 take the place OF suspended officials.
Upon the refusal to confirm / shall not as
sumo tie right 10 ask the reason for the
action OF the senate, nor question its de-
termination. ] cannot think that anything
inOle is required to secure worthy incum-
bents in public Office than careful and in
dependent discharge OF our respective
duties within their well'dedned limits.
though the propriety OF suspensions might
he 10 r.I the action m tho Hrasl.