Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1886-03-11


to give or withhold copies of documents in
his office according to the will of the Exec
utive and not otherwise" but because re.
gard the papers and documents withheld
and addressed to me, or indeed for my use
and action, purely unofficial and private,
not infrequently confidential and having
reference to the performance of duty ex-
clusively mine. l consider them in no
proper sense as upon the files of the depart
ment, but as deposited there for my con-
venience, remaining still completely under
my control. 1 suppose if 1 desired to take
them into my custody might do SO with
entire propriety, and if saw fit to destroy
them no one could complain.
Even the committee in it's report appears
to concede that there may be with the Pres.
ident or in the departments papers and
documents which, on account of their un-
official character, are not subject to the in
spection of Congress. The reference in the
report to instances where the House OF Rep
resentatives ought not to succeed in call
for the production of papers is Immediately
followed by this statement:
/ "The committee feels authorized to state,
after somewhat careful research, that within
the foregoing limits there is scarcely in the
history of this Government until now any
instance of refusal by the head of depart
ment, or even of the President himself, to
communicate official facts and information
as distinguished from private and unofficial
papers, motions, views, reasons and opin-
ions, to either House of Congress when un-
conditionally demanded"
To which of the classes thus recognized do
the papers and documents belong that are
now the objects of the Senate's quest? They
consist toflettersand representations address
ed to the Executive and intended for his in
spection. They are voluntarily written and
presented by private citizens, who are not
in the least instigated thereto by any official
invitation or at all subjected to official con-
troll. While some of them are entitled to
Executive consideration, many of them are
so irrelevant, or in the light of other facts
80 worthless, that they have not been given
the least weight in determining the ques-
ton to which they are supposed to relate.
Are all these, simply because they are pre-
served, to be considered official documents
and subject to the inspection of the Senate? :?
Ifnot, who is to determine which belong to
this class? Are the motives and purposes
of the Senate, as they are day by day devel-
oped, such as would be satisfied at my selec-
ton? Am l to submit to theirs, at the risk
of being charged with making suspensions
from office upon evidence which was not
even considered? Are these papers to be
regarded as official because they have not
only been presented but preserved in public
Offices Their nature and character remain
the same whether they are kept in the Ex-
ecutive mansion or deposited in the depart.
ments. There is no mysterious power OF
transmutation in departmental custody.
Nor is there magic in the underlined and sa-
the presence of these papers in public offices
is stumbling block in the way of the per-
formance of senatorial duty it can be easily
removed.
The papers and documents which have
been described derive no official character
from any constitutional, statutory, or other
requirement, making them necessary to the
performance of the official duty of the ex-
ecutive.
It will not be denied, suppose, that the
President may suspend public officer IN
the entire absence of any papers or docu-
ments to aid his official Judgment and dis
cretion, and l am quite prepared to avoW
that the cases are not few in which suspen-
sions from office have depended more upon
oral representations made to me by citizens
of known good repute, and by members OF
the House of Representatives and Senators
of the United States, than upon any letters
and documents presented for my examlna-
l.
the veracity, integrity and patriotism OF
Senators, or ignoring their representations,
because they were not in party attillatlOn
with the majority of their associates, and l
recall few suspensions which bear the ap-
proval of individual members identified po-
iitically with the majority in the Senate.
While, therefore, lam constrained to deny
the right Of the Senate to the papers and
documents described, so far as the right to
the same is based upon the claim that they
are in any view Of the subject official, l am
also led unequivocally to dispute the right
of the Senate by aid OF any documents what
ever or in anyway, save through the judi
cial process Of trial on impeachment, TO re-
view or reverse the act of the Executive in
suspension during the recess of the Senate
of Federal officials.
believe the power to remove or suspend
such officials is vested in the President alone
by the Constitution, which in express terms
provides that "the executive power shall HI be
vested in a President of the United States
of America" and that she shall take care
that the laws be faithfully executed" The
Senate belongs to the legislative branch of
the Government. When the Constitution
by express provision superadded to it's leg
islative duties the right to advise and con-
sent to appointments to office, and to sit as
Court of Impeachment, it conferred upon
that body all the control and regulation
of executive action supposed to be necessary
for the safety Of the people, and this ex-
press and special grant of such extraordlna-
ry powers, not in any way related 10 or
growing out of general Senatorial duty,
and in itself departure from the general
plan of our Government, should be held,
under a familiar maxim of construction, to
nf crh intprtpranF9
with Executive functions, in the first Con-
gress which assembled after the adoption of
the Constitution, comprising many who aid
ed in its preparation, legislative construc-
ton was given to that instrument in which
the independence of the Executive in the
matter of removals from office was fully
sustained. 1 think it will be found that in
subsequent discussions of this question
there was generally, if not at all times, a
proposition pending to in some way curtall
this power of the President by legislation,
which furnishes evidence that to limit such
power it was supposed to be necessary to
supplement the Constitution by such legls-
lation.
The first enactment of this description
was passed under stress Of partizanship and
political bitterness which eliminated in
the Presidents impeachment. This law
provided that the Federal officers to which
it applied could only be suspended during
the recess of the Senate when shown by
evidence satisfactory to the President to be
guilty of misconduct in Office or crime, or
when incapable or disqualified to perform
their duties, and that within twenty days
after the next meeting of the Senate it
should be the duty Of the President Ito re-
port to the Senate such suspension with ev-
idence and reasons of his action in the case"
This statute, passed in 1867, when Con-