Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1886-05-16

what Mntsary Critics nag Aboas ths
Two Mon.


clearly set forth. In the light OF calm,
historical investigation the deeds OF the
Confederate army are taking their
proper place, not merely in our own
chronicles, but in the history OF the
whole country. Old Confederates re-
ioice in this, ell the more perhaps be-
cause there is nothing left to them OF
the terrible struggle Of twenty years
ago but glorious memories.
Among the lectures delivered at the
Lowell Institute in Boston, last winter
one of the ablest and most interesting
was that of Mr.. John G. Ropes, of Bos-
ton. on Grants campaign in 1864 from
the Rapidan to Petersburg. MIR. Ropes
as is wei known, is one Of the most &C
complished military critics and writer's
of the country. lie is no less remarka-
BILE for fairness of judgment and free
dom from prejudice than for the learn
ing. ability, and vigor with which he
treats of campaigns and battles. The
following extracts from the close OF bis
address will show his Judgment in re-
gard to the core uct and results OF the
Federal operations in Virginia from the
lst of May to the middle of June,
1861:
"Our army sat down before the
works of Petersburg, which were to
detain US nearly ten months. Neither
Of the great objects of the campaign
had been obtained. Lees army had
not been shattered, nor had Richmond
been taken. Our cavalry raids had not
DESTROYED the Confederate lines Of sup
ply. The Virginia Central railroad
still ran undisturbed by the North
Anna through Hanover Junction to
Richmond. The Weldon, Dauville, and
Southside roads were as yet not even
menaced. The army was terribly shat
tered. 1t had lost considerably more
than half of the troops that had crossed
the Rapidan on the Sd of May. I'M
doubtedly it had killed, wounded, and
captured some 10000 of Lees army. 1t
had carried out Grants policy Of attri-
tiop, but that was all. 1t had simply
depleted Lees army. 1t had neither
dsir ttgrated nor demoralized it.
"In fact, after the battle of Cold
Harbor, Lee felt himself able to spare
the Second corps, under Early, to OPP
pose Hunter, and afterwards to make q
demonstration on Washington Of so
serious character that Grant had to
dispatch the Sixth md Nineteenth
corps to defend the capital. This was
the result and consequence Of the cam
paign of 1864 in Virginia.
1.-THE campaign of 1864 must be pro-
nounced a failure. Of this there can
be no real question. The capture OF
Richmond and the surrender Of Lee,
which took place ten months after
wards, were the result of quite diff
ferent causes. The result of this cam
paign was to reduce our army in mum.
bers and morale out of all proportion
with its adversary. | need only to
sllude to the affair of the Jerusalem
plank road, to the assault at the Pc
tersburg mine, and to the action at
Reams's station, which occurred in
June, July, and August.
lone thing is certain: With any
resources less than those Of the United
States the campaign, as Grant conducted
it, must have come to dead halt. 1t
was so wasteful, SO thoughtless OF
mems lives, that it required large re-
Inducements, an adversary numerical
" much weaker, and very patient and
much-enduring soldiers"
This and other statements Of Mr..
Ropes brought down on him the severe
criticism Of some provincial journals as
we'll as Of some correspondents of the
Boston papers. In a defence of Mr..
Ropes from these criticisms, published
in the Boston Herald, C. A. P. "a
writer unknown to me- thus states the
matter
lone man for four years planned and
managed every large battle fought by
the army Of Virginia, and can it be un-
fair or BIASED if in the light of his
numerous victories he is mentioned by
brave opponents as deserving OF glory
from a military point of view. What
is the story from our side? Mcclellan
shelyed after losing 10000 men and
nothing gained; Pope banished after
$4,000 more sacrificed; Burnside re-
moved after an uncalled for slaughter
of Is. 900. and Hooker ignobly beaten
with Il 900 men killed and wounded
to add to the list. Meade-and why
shouldn't Meade have been obliged to
defend his action in allowing defeated
army to leave his front at leisure and
cross the Potomac without ending the
rebellion then and there?
"Such is the story to Grants time.
Can military men be accused Of class
prejudice that they tell the truth
instead Of pandering to partisanship
by twisting the facts? General Grant
took command, according to Hum
pbreys's figures, Of l2l, 900 men and
354 guns in opposition to his opponent.
60, 900 men and 224 guns. lie started
on his campaign with no plan except to
get to Richmond by the road tn t
would give him easiest access to his
supplies without regard to country or
obstacles. But Grant had
not gagged, as no western officer could,
the wonderful skill Of his opponent, aud
feeling assured of his superiority, he
grappled his enemy at the first OPP
portunity in dense, unknown woods,
and should have come out q wiser
man."
Then follows rapid review of the
campaign. The article closes as fol-
lows:
Finally, worn out by this general
ship, depleted to almost nothing, half
starved, and less than half equipped,
Lee left his entertainments with the fat
and hearty army Of the Potomac after
him ; but although then literally the
worst-equipped, worst-clothed, and
worst-organized army in the world,
they increased the roll Of the Potomac
lost ten thousand in the five days end
ing with Appomattox. Here, then, we
summarize Was Grants campaign. in