New-York tribune., 1886-07-11
GRANT IN PEACE.
BY GENERAL ADAM BADEAU.
NO. vi.
BATTLING JOHNSON'S MANEUvRES.


Immediately before the elections which were To
give tue verdict of the country upon Mr.. Johnsons
policy violent political discussion arose in Mary
land where 1t was well known a spirit had existed
as hostile to the Union as in New Orleans There
seemed dinger of a collision between the State
authorities who were friendly to johnson. aud
those of the City of Baltimore. The Governor ap-
pealed to the President for armed assistance. and
johnson made several attempts to induce Grant to
order United States troops into Maryland. Grants
anxiety at this suggestion was acute. He held
numerous conversations with the President. aad
though no disoyal proposition was made to him Ill
words he conceived profound distrust OF Johnsons
designs This feeling was shared by Stanton, then
Secretary of War In the excited state OF feeling
aroused by Johnson's course the of troops was
certain to prove exasperating. and seemed to be
the Presidents purpose to te'uDt or provoke his
opponents to some Illegal act which would warrant
a resort to arms. II was too soon after civil war
TO incur such risks without alarm.
Grant az once protested verbally Init earnestly
against seuding troops to Baltimore But the Pres
dent persisted in his suggestion. He did not give
the order for he frequently used all the weight or
his position to in luce Grant to act as he desired
yet failed to assume the responsibility OF issuing
positive command. Grant therefore wrote al
official letter to the Secretary of War, declaring
that anO reason e1sted for giving or promising
military aid to support the laws of Mirylan l."
The tendency" he said, -"of giving such aid
would be to produce the very result that was in
te l,led to bs averted' Tue President referre this
letter to his Attorney General who WAS compelled
10 concur with Grant; and Johnson. unable to in
,luce Grant to -enl the troops without q posIt We
order took very good care not to give one Grant
sent both staff and general officers 20 Baltimore. ana
went there twice in person during the emergency
He saw both parties the dispute, psrsu lded them
to leave the decision to the courts and aVerted tue
,langer-ls signal a service he hId often rem
dered the country in the field.
This entire proceeding cansed him az much
soicitule as any Presidential action oil the period'
Occurring Immediately before the elections which
were 10 pronounce upon Johnson's policy it hal
peculiar significance The President almost in
sisted for while sending troops into region
that had been dsafscteI. aud where the very au-
thoritles whom hs wished to support by arms hs
been of doubtful loyalty during the war. He srg-
sestel to Grlnt in writing that there WIS tar
0ulent disposition which might asSum insurrection-
lry proporton." andithlt 1t was the dnty OF
the Government to bs prepared To act with iorce
and decision" Bat h meant to act - with force
against men who had fought for the Union anr in
support Of those who hat Iou Iht against it. Grant
believed that johnson wonil be glad to pnt those
wao oDpo ,ed his policy into the posltloh OF rebels
while the Soltherners who supported it. wOu
seem to bs loyal to the Government. The crafty
scheme was never developed. bat the wltchfnl.
,kilful. anxious care of Grant may have had more
to do with lts prevention than any lack OF will 'n
the part OF the Prcsidelt.
General Grant never sad in nv hearing that he
knew the intentions OF Johnson to be seiitlous at
this time but much Of his cour'c throughout the
entire .crisis was tlken because he feared they
were. He was anxious to frn5tratc Johnsons =
maneuyres rs h. lad ever been to thwart those OF
Lee In each instance he was uncertain OF the
strategy OF the enemy bat he fought what he be-
lleved TO ba tho plan. He never changed his opin-
ion afterwarl bnt remained convinced thlt hat
opportunity offered johnson would have attempted
some disloyll artiice OF this he repeatedly as
sured rie
The following letter to General Sheridan shows
Grants appgehensons at this time. IL was
written while Sheridan was in command at New
Orleans:
Conilentlal.
HrADorARrrRs ARMIES or THE UNITED STATES.
WAsuINGrON. d. C.. Oct II. 1866
DEAR GENERAL: | regret TO say that ~ nee the
nnfort innate differences between the President and
Congress the former becomes more violent with the
oppos ton Il meets WITH until now but few people
who were loyal 10 the Government during the
| Rebellion seem to have any influence with him.
| None have unless they join IN Crusade against
Congress and declare their acts, the principal ones
| illegal. and indeed | much fear that We are fast
approaching the time when he VIII want 70 declare
the body itself Illegal unconst tutlonal AMI reyolG-
ti0nary. Commanders in Southern states Will have
to take great to SEE, If crisis does come that
/ no armed headwav can be made against TIE | MON.
For th.s reason it will be desirable that Texas
| should have no reasonable excuse for calling out
the militia authorized by their Legislature. Indeed
10 shOuld be prevented. write TINS IN STRICT conn
dence hut to let you know how matters stand in
acton act accordusy Very respectfully your obedi-
ent servant, U. ;. CRANE
o Najor General p II. SHERIDAN.
T. S-T gave orders quietly two or three weeks
since for the removal of all arms in store in the
Southern STATES 10 Northern arsenals. wish You
would see that those from Baton Ronge and other
places within your comnant are beng movet
RAPIDLY by the ordnance officers having the matter
in charge. L. >. u.
EGrsnts course in the Maryland matter and his
outspoken advice to the Arkansas delegation had
convinced the Administration that he could be i'll
duced to take no step ut all beyond the strlctest
line of the law and when it was seen TO be i'm
possible TO nse him. scheme was concocted to send
hun out of the country The Government did not
indeed dare remove the victorious head Of the
army but they determined to suspend him from his
functions for a while, and to put Sherman. who 1t
was hoped would prove more supple, in his place.
sherman had said and written things which the
President construed into approval OF his policy.
So Grant was directed To order Sherman 10 W ash
ington but was not informed of the reason for the
order.
Grant had long manifested an extraordinary in
terest in the expulsion of the French from Mexico,
an interest well known 10 the country and the
plan now was TO send him to the neighboring
republic The French Emperor was indeed tardily
preparing to remove his army and there neither
object nor necessity for Grants presence there.
Nevertheless, in November 1866, Immediately
after the failure OF the Baltimore scheme the Pros
ident informed Grant that he meant to send him to
Mexico A Minister had already been appointed to
that republic and Grant was to be given neither
apowersr nor authority No special purpose for
annnnnced ha mnu a To