St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1886-03-10
McCLELLAN'S MISTAKE
Little Macs Critics Efectually Routed by
Veteran Of the Late Un-
pleasantneSs.
The Reason Why Mcclellan Did Not
Pursue Lee at Antietam--Lin-
coins Instructions.
How tho Nation Was Saved From u
Most Terrible and Humiliat-
ing Fate.
To the Editor of the Globe:

To the Editor OF the Globe:
In your paper of the 5th inst. you gave
synopsis of Capt. Edward Simonton's
lecture at the hall of the Y. NJ. G. a.
headed, "Reminiscences Of Soldier" i'll
which the lecturer repeats the old charge
that Mcclellan missed the greatest Oppor-
tunity of his life when he failed TO follow
up Lee at Antietam." This same charge
was made against Mcclellan when he re-
pulsed the Rebels at Malvern Hill; so Gen.
Mcclellan lost another grand opportunity
there by not pursuing the Rebels into Rich
mOnd. Had Mcclellan crowded Lees
army at Malvern Hill, and instead of hav-
ing the easy walk-Over" these critics
claim. he should have been checked, and
had Lee taken advantage of the fact and
begun to press him in return and finally TO
route him with every prospect
or capturing his artillery and
wagon trains. how quickly these critics
would have taken the other tack, and cen
sured him for his lack of judgment in not
being satisfied with the splendid achieve
mentS he had already accomplished in re-
pulsing all the fierce assaults or the COM
blned forces of the rebel army under Lee
and his ablest generals during the previous
six days, and safely bringing away all his
immense trains and artillery. How his
military skill and generalship would have
been criticised and ridiculed for attempting
TO capture Richmond with an army already
overstrained and fatigued from the severe
lighting they had had; their constant
marches without rest, sleep or food and
fighting one and two battles each day the
previous six days. To attempt TO intelli-
gently criticiSe the actions of the general Of
ficer when his army Is in
LINE OF BATTLE
covering an extent OF ground over mile in
length, simply upon the meager informa-
ton one might obtain from the observations
of the enemy Immediately in his front, with
out the slightest knowledge of the various
complications and obstacles that necessarily
arise under the circumstance, aud that have
10 be met and overcome at other and distant
points along the line, is simply ridiculous;
vet it Is from just such sources that nine
tenths of our military critics derive their in
formation and proceed forthwith 70 eriticise
the actions OF their superiors. and announce
TO the world what they would have done
had they been the commanding general.
Having been participant in all the bat
ties in the army of the Potomac, and under
Mcclellan in all of his campaigns, / think
can offer plausible reason why Mcclellan
did not pursue Lee at Antietam.
Let it be remembered that Mcclellan as
sumed command of the Army of the
Potomac about the Sd of September, 1852,
he having been relieved from its command
before the5army left the Peninsula. Be-
fore the Army OF the Potomac joined POpe's
army ont at Fairfax court house, il was
terribly demoraliZed and mutinous; they
had terrible time OH the Peninsula. vir-
tually driven from that place; defeated, de-
jseted. clothing gone, ragged and only half
shOd. They well knew it was the politicians
and wire-workers and not military men
who alone were responsible for all their
hardships, reverses and disasters, conse-
| quently they were not in a very pleasant
mood. On the march from
ALEXANDRIA TO FAIRFAX
the woods the entire distance was filled
with stragglerS, old veterans who had be-
come mutinOus and disguised with the man
ner in which the army of the Potomac had
been continually treated, and who became
| tired of being ordered about by the political
Shysters vino apparently controlled affairs
at the national capital. After Pope had
been defeated and his army driven back,
Lee. who had always been kept posted re-
/ garding Affairs in the Union lines by the
horde of rebel spies and sympathizers who
infested Washington city at the time, knew
exactly the condition of the army of the Po-
tomac and its decentralization and want of a
leader and labOring under the delusOn that
no inducement would cause Mcclellan to
| ever take command again. Lee concluded
that now was his opportunity to strike a
blow that would create panic and diSmay at
the North and at the same time give
the COnfederacy a boost in the eyes of
Europe, so he cut leose from his base, not
caring for Pope and his army. and made a
dash for the capture of Philadelphia.
| When Lees movements became known at
the national capital the greatest cOnSterna-
ton prevailed, for il was well known that
there was no life in the Army of the PotO-
mac and no dependence TO be placed in it.
What was to be done? Who could be Sc
lected TO lead the army and resist Lees ad-
vance? 1 only know this much of the re-
suit of their deliberations at this terrible
crisis. President Lincoln and Secretary of
War Stanton went in all haste to McClel-
lan's headquarters at Alexandria, and Pres
ident Lincoln implored him for Gods sake,
TO take command of the Army Of the Poto-
mac, again, and
SAVE THE NATIONAL CAPITOL.
In less than half ali hour after this inter-
view Mcclellan and his staff were gallop-
ing TO the front. and all along the road he
was met by st:agglers from every regiment
in the army working their way back to
Alexandria, but who on learning that Lit
tie Mac" was again in command made the
woods ring with their huzzas and, as if by
magic, these same demOraliZed. mutinous
men became enthused with new life, and
instead of skulking to the rear they at once
turned back and before taps sounded that
same night every man had rejoined his regi-
ment. The next morning. the Sd or Attn of
September, we were on the jump in pursuit
of Lee. This demoralized army, which had
been chased off the peninsula, whipped at
second Bull Run, fOOt-sore and weary, was
thoroughly recognized aud brought under
its former discipline on the march, and its
members. forgetting all their past trials
and troubles. calamity went with all
haste to the point of danger, and succeeded
in bringing their old foe to halt, and gave
Lee and his victorious legions the worst
thrashing they had ever received. Only
those who were present and participated in
this fight can know or realize its desperate
and stubborn character. Lee well knew
that If he failed his chances for ever again
putting foot on Union soil was lost and that
the Confectionery would receive a most
crushing blow, and his best energies and
military skill were all brought Into play;
but the old veterans of the Army of the
| DotOmoc hat itfia Moa uac