New-York tribune., 1886-03-04

The physical condition OF the army exact
type of Its moral condition. The tics Of discipline, not
vel of long enough Duration Tgdly enforced
TO be strong, were In much the largest part OF the
army thoroughly severed An nnbroken tide OF disaster
had oDliterated the distance between grades. and
brought all the standard OF personal qualities
The feeble groups that still cnng together weir held by
force OF individual character more than by discipline
ana a disbelief In the ability 0f the army uhaldtd To
extrcate itself from the peril that envroncd H. was,
do not to affirm universal In my opinion that
feeling shared by lie commander himself. \ week
after the battle the army recovered from its
shattered prOstated condition. On the l4th three
days after HallecKs arrival. ho instructed Grant;
Divisions ana brgades should, when necessary be
organized and put In position, and all stragglcrs re-
turned to their companies aud regimcnts Your army IS
not In condition 10 resist an attack"
And few further touches upon the first days
battle:
From the self-assurng interview In which, according
OF General sherman's romnl'cences 1t was
agreed that had expended tho furUr OF his at
tack O'clock and General Grant told the "anccdoo
of his DunesOn battle" that officer aroused by the
OF the din OF the strife and made MS way to the
river the disOrVanzed thrOng Of his rcjreatng
army. While those mutual fluctuations were IN pro
gress the enemy, "A mile to the left. dls3ruing and
marching six captured regiments 10 tue rear Ihus ais
last at very Landing. What worse state of affairs
than tins could have existed General
baggage on bank OF the river, II VIII be
to our advantage. and possibly save the day to u.s."
Grant and General sherman have said that reinforce
ments other than Lev Wallaees division were N no
without reference to them, General Grant would have
assumed the offensive and defeated the Confederate
army next morning Those who study the subject At
tenvely viii hnd no ground 70 accept that declaration
as regards either the purpose or the result. The
evidence establishes that General Grant had not de-
upon had not promulgated plan ofacuOn In
the morning Not order given note O pfepara
ton sounded for the struggle which, with without his
assistance, to begin at day break. To my certain
knowledge II words aud actions were not wholly
misleading GeneI al Sherman when saw him IN the
night the 6b did not consider that any instrucons
had been given for battle, and II no had such
Instructions he did not obey them. His re-
port snstains the impression which derived from our
Interview. AT daylight ON Monday hs says. 81 re-
ceved General Grants orders TO advance and recap
turo our original camps" Then only 1t that he dis
patched several members OF his staff TO bring up all the
men they could fnd Is that the way In which General
Sherman would have acquitted himself OF the obligation
OF orders received the day before TO engage IN battle
answer unhesitatnRly no! The reports of the other
division commanders to the same effect General
McClernaDd says; "YOur General Grants) order Of
the morning OF the 7th for forward movement" etc.
The curious story Of the charge" led by General
Grant and closing the fighting the second day which
was sent to the newspapers the army telegraph
line by person attached TO General Grants stan is
dealt with In a tone of stephcsm;
In tho usual newspaper dispatches from
the field battle thore statement OF charges led
by General Grant and his staff which were assumed to
have decided fate OF the Monday at least
20 have given erowning touch TO the victory 1t would
be satire reproduce tnat statement In its original
form this time. Its adoption, however ny various