The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1886-07-15

nfffcItIA hfiNNi NDll-ttttittitit
by hi,u, ui.e : Was niaking ny report from yoa
Aaer your aeacllnieris ,verc ,rcl MP and after
thc tFaln- h ,d haen ordered of iie imuiitisbufS
road tlilfl4al n WAS evident tinl llr enemy were
rnul.iua y formidable demonstration towards the
lcil w thr Hnis bui before amy firing. other Than
lralNcci4 rtll4ii7hcFs, bad commenced recoiect
nn Interview Asiill Gen. Meade, when ic was asked
topiacc artillery ulron Little Round Top, that being
conena'.ig position, te ii"s 's-''h oi Vic. ~
Wntis oill.rp tho=i-llllii -iHtI to io tH h"t't
tha lcfi of iic army Little Round Top was 10 the
rear of rbc grnuud that had hecn occupied 10y your
fr0oIs az iac morning and o thor Hne oi march:
lf tatrg iud been ANY idea thai that ground ana
that line af mlrVli should hc abandoned tor some
other nc FATHER 90 the rear. with the lcfl resting
upau Round Top IL would certainly at that time
have been communicated 10 me or tp yourself u
was MOI communicated. aud h WIS with great difi-
Guilty ar won will remember, that an order was
hnaily obtained 10 send Troops ana artillery ur9m
tiC Finh Corps 10 Little Round Top, an order
which. 90 nay personal knowledge, was not exc
cuted even ~ late after your own corps hccane
fully engaged. II you. at amy time, received AN
order % ncc your troops in the position thai Gen
Genry occupied, or indeed upon AMY aseertained
lime of biitr such order was referred 10 by Gen.
Meade in nay presence.
POSITION OF THE THIRD CORPS.
When your troops arrived they occupied ground
on thc la at the army, where there were no other
troops and where there was nothing TO indicate
thc presence of tieh. Gcnry Your hiNouae Wa- uh
the sli 0fttc line OF the Second Corps. recOiieci
distinctly spcaising with you on the morning 81
the 81 of lua 20 how your troops should be dis
posed aud assisting in their disposition. For in-
etnnbc. among other things. anticipating attack ln
fbe dino .fio. from which d finally came. prcpaia-
tions vcIc mace TO tie attack before II could
be delivered joe iis fuil volume. Aou may recall
that we had a.l the fences taken down, wherever
there WAS an open field 10 aid in the manuHcIs.
All Of tins time Gen. Meade was more than once
informed that the enemy was moving in large
numbers toward our Jeff, aud finally thai they
were crossing he Bmmittaburg road
NJ haa had only one or two interviews with
Gen. Mcaat upon that erentiul day, should not
venture u sprGiS with tie certainty oi my present
f. naHsftn9 N.H. sasa ~ 70
since ini day but firmly believe that whatever
Gen. NeaGC may have had in hs mind as having
ordered you to do on the night before You were
wounded he certainly had not on the morning ol
the second day 81 the battle anyinng more definite
for YOU a. accomplish than 90 look out Tor your
front nna a., lcfi flank Of his army aud a. a pru-
dent aun HagHcioas officer 40 keep INN iully ad-
Nised.
The acluai situation never seemed TO have been
fully appreciated 10y Gen. Meade UNTIL without
definite Instructions from him, az least 50 far us /
made nliy communication 60 you. YOU had almost
completed ioui disposition and forced the enemy
90 stop i- march 10 your len nud 10 attack you. ~
was iusi about that ime, and ID must have been IA
res1ousC to ihe repeated messages from you, that
Gen. Meade himself, with lalpe staff, rode upon
the ground Boz your immediate front aud near the
angle Whert your line refused 90 tine left bat
before ho finished speaking his brief interview
with you was broken up lly ihe enemy lire, nnu
the battle had fairly commenced.
IrpmttIber GCn Meade femarlsing that be was
afraid you Wf loo lar ont, bat that u was too late
20 change
III in iac, your troops had not been moved for
ward, tilrg were moved the enemy would have
hanzed Gcn. Meade without the battle that was
fought in your front that afternoon; since, when
thai battle began and Tor some lime ater "a had
been raging tile cii OF your lime was without ANY
III there lad been any definite orders in respect
20 where iie right and leit OF your sac of battle
should haFl rested, in expectation 0i pS's~lbt hi-
tack, those orders were moi referred 10 Ny Gen.
Meade ii au, 0f his interviews with me. nor were
my reports ui ime situation OF your troops aud 81
thesurfoundHg topography and oi The moveH ents
a et "a. l. a.
amy definite line; but on the contrary, with view
20 ascertain what were tle views uf the commander
OF the army 'n respect 10 Ian leii flank, with ihe
command 81 which you were then charged
THEEE WAS 80 DEFINITE PLAN
submit ior your consideration that there are
ciruCmstauoc- tending TO show that there hot,
in the mind of the commander OF the army him-
self ans definite line mapped out that YOU should
OCCUPY 4 do distinctly recollect thai every inter-
view " ihRt morning with Gen Meade WAS an in
terNiew oi disappointment la tlis respect and
when troops were finally sent 10 your leil BY Gen.
Meade order hiter the action ai ts fury, they
lnd 40 be arrested from their line oi march and
placed IN action BY your officers al great risk of
cOuTi-nlaFtiM and without orders lest the arrival
Of Eucl troops az the points where they were need
ed-sorely tlceded-should be too iardy4o be OF
any avail.
II Gen Meade had given any orders 10 your
corps on that morning respecting its general align
meni. b would have been complete answer 10
many ~ my inquiries Of him, hen sent 10 him by
you with reIoris for him simply 10 have stated. or
to have Teitfled 10 those orders never heard it
claimed That tere ever were such definite orders.
If bad, should have been glad 10 have made his
statement during Gen. MeHde's lifetime tor hs
criticism looked upon the statement in lils re-
p0ri as the statement 81 impression d. his own
minu a. io what be, after the battle thought you
should have done, rather than ar direct cnr that
be had ordered you 10 do something different from
tfnt which you had already done ~ there were
orsiore nnc they were uintcllglble to you d seems
90 iue my reports to Gen. Meade must have made
tiM clear a. hiini and u bis own mind had been
clear npun lllat subject be would not have omitted
the opportunity 70 have impressed his wishes upon
you, either directly through me or through some
81 Lis own staff officers
up othe time the battle of the second day open
ed Gen Meade did not appear 10 regard nIntterr in
your iront AZ 81 very grave importance. Be was
expecting go attack 90 his right, and discouraged
your nDticipaiions of stack on his lefi.
Al you ask ine how many interviews j had with
Gen. Meade Curing the day cannot answer you
iurilfer isau 20 say that was in the saddle con-
sianty from shortly after daylight aud that large
IlaH q my inie was occupied in successive Jour
neys between Gen. sieade aud yourself IRE
flaine, Jane - -. Letiersl
The testimony Of Mai -Gen Alfred Pleason.
ton, commander Of the Cavalry Corps OF the
Army o. the Potomac is Of the
SAME TENOR AND C0RROBORATEs
tic ample, clear aud distinct statements Of Gen
i'remaine and MAJ. Moore Gen Pleasonton
says 20 me under date Of Washington, june IL
fss6:
was greatly surprised about O'Clock in the day
t5niy = "h.ie standing talking with Gen. Meade n
N.
saluiing doc GcnerAl you said
tlffi- Meade ] have received no orders assigning
Aiit Alifo iurpa ID d position thc enemy are pre.
pairing "a narc isn niiack and any corps s not II
proper position - receive a." .lcasOniOn. unt
Il ltsl letter
Gen Mcaaa replied General j viii 20 with you
nasciihiln lnsi guur corps, and immediately eallet
Tor Doe lnfac lt could mot have been
more than ~ minutes after Meade lefl when Gen
Aee of'euel ihe battle with cannoHadiug from !
hundred pieens of artillery aad ai ts tirpe Gen
Meade "a with the Third Corps
Nen. Meade bad not given any orders ~ IA,
ltiln Corp up 10 the time hc mounted aid nfis-
ihai ulc itulc too sh0r before ie battle beani
eten4 he han been prepared % do 90.
fim IhEu turpa repuAed the eucfnVis e-iinrer
nmrlna tif battle lE a brilliant manner. and sgn
niitiAtN bE 81 iilal as just and honorable io hag
ln'an lEtnrt iitHAlg mentioned and commended \
tlAc official report of Gen. Meade
Why waa ID that all day long had not bee
able ~ gei auy definite orders as 10 the disposi
tont % ne mado Oh the left Sank 2 Why wa
u THAI my rcn0nstTance against the removal .
l5uioFe Division of Cavalry away from tia
lsnk
Rad UEEN DIzELGAHDEDf
Wig w@ it taat my urgent requests fc
ifppfF and artillery to lccupg Littlc Round TO
received n attentions
Gen. IrrnaluG bias perhaps, given a snf
eicut answer when be- states that up 20 III
tiHt the haitle opened Gen Meade did not Al
Iifai o. regard matters in yOur front as OF yer
great importance. Be was expecting an atlao
on hls right and discouraged your anticipation
ol an attack on biz Jeff"
There b. get another reason.
10 BE- ooHfinHcll
a..