St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1886-08-11
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
A Hitherto Unpublished Letter From
Gen. Meade on the subject.
He Takes Issue With the Statements
Made by Gen. Sickles.

w OOHiN l lCSS Settles VI WdT dTtlClGS w. iuUI-
row. 1t is most important chapter to the
controversy concerning Gen. Sickles' con-
duet in the battle carried on in that journal
by Gen. Lafayette McLaws, Gen. Sickles
and Col. Biddle Gen. Meade's letter holds
Gen. Sickles responsible for gripping the
Army of the Potomac, gives the
ENTIRELY NEW EVIDENCE
of Gen. Ewell Confederate in support of
the wisdom of the sometimes misconstrued
Pipe Clay creek order, and explains why
Gen. Field, Gen. Hookers chief of staff,
happened to be detained by Gen. Meade.
headquarters Military Division of the At
lantic, Philadelphia March 16, 1S70.-Pri-
vate G.. G. Benedict. Burlington, VT.
Dear Sir: am in receipt of your letter of
the 18th inst, as also the copies of the late
Free Press, with editorials and comments on
the address of Col. Grant before the officers,
society and legislature of the state. have
carefully read your article and feel personally
under great obligations to you for the clear
and conclusive manner in which you have
vindicated the truth of history. I find moth
ing to correct in your statement except a
TACT you mention which is misapprehe nsion.
dld not invite Gen. Humphrey to be my chief
OF staff until after the battle because l did
not see him after assuming command until
met him on the field. and besides I relied on
him as mainstay in handling tie Third corps
and did not wish to withdraw him from that
position. / did ask Gen. Williams to assume
the duties in addition to those Of adjutant-
general, but he declined. also asked Gen.
Warren, then my chief of engineers, to act
temporarily as chief of staff, but he also de-
clined taking on himself additional duties.
Under these circumstances I
ASKED GEN. BUTTEREIELD To REMAIN
till had time to make permanent arrange
ment. On the third day Gen. Butterield,
having been disabled by being struck with
fragment of shell, left the army and few
days afterward Gen. Humphrey accepted my
| invitation. My defense against the ch argos
and insinuation of Gems Sickles and Butter
field is to be found in my testimony before
the committee on the conduct of the war. 1
have avoided any controversy with either of
these officers, though both have allowed no
opportunity to pass unmproved which per-
mitted them to circulate their exparte state
ments, and as you justly say, to distort his
tory for their purposes. Both perfectly
understand what l meant by my ante-battle
order, referring to Pipe Clay creek, also my
instructions to Butter1eld on the morning of
the I'd, which he persists in calling order
for retreat, in the face Of all my other acts
and Of the fact that [ did not retreat when I
could have done SO with perfect ease at aay
moment. Longstreet's advice to Lee was
sound military sense. 1t was the step feared
Lee would take, and to meet with and be pre-
pared for which was the object Of MY in
structious to Butterfed which he has so mis-
historical fact. Lieut-Gen. Ewel in con-
versation held with me shortly after the war,
asked what would have been the effect if at 4
p. w. On the 1St he had
OCCUPIED CULP'S HILL
and established batteries on it. told him
that in my Judgment, in the then condition Of
the Eleventh and First corps, with their morale
affected by their Withdrawal to Cemetery
ridge, with the loss Of over half of their num-
bers in killed, wounded and missing (of the
5000 prisoners we lost on the field nearly all
came from these corps ON the first day.. his
occupation of Culps hill with batteries CON-
handing the whole of Cemetery ridge would
have produced the evacuation Of the ridge
and the withdrawal of the troops there by the
baltimore pike and Taneytown and Emmetts-
burg roads. He then Informed me that at 6 o.
N. on the 1st he had his corps, 10000 strong,
in column of attack and on the point of NOV
ing on Culp'S hill which be saw was unoc-
cupled, and commanded Cemetery ridge, when
he received an order from Gen. Lee directing
him TO assume the defensive and not to ad-
vance; that he sent to Gen. Lee urging to be
permitted to advance with his reserves, but
the reply was reiteration of the previous
order. To my inquiry why Lee had restrained
him he said our troops coming up (Slocums)
were visible and
LEE WAS UNDER THE IMPRESSION
the greater part of my army was on the
ground and deemed it prudential to await the
rest OF his, as you quote from his report.
But suppose Ewell with 600 men had oc-
cupied Culp's hill and our brave SOL
diers had been compelled to evac-
uate Cemetery ridge and Withdraw
on the roads above referred to, would
the Pipe Clay creek have been so very much
out of place? That order was to meet the very
contingency III question. to-wit: A part of
my army. verwhelmed by superior numbers
compelled to fall back and a line of battle
formed to the rear OF my most advanced pe-
sition thus necessitated. AS to Gen. Sickles
having by his advance brought on an attack
and thus compelled the battle which decided
the war, you have completely answered; and
it is very favorite theory with the partisans
of this officer, but these gentlemen ignore
the fact that of the $4,000 killed and wounded
upon the field during the whole battle more
than two-thirds were lost on the second day
and but for the timely advance of the fifth
corps and the prompt sending of a portion on
Round Top, where they met the enemy al
most on the crest and had a desperate fight
to secure the position-I say that but for
these circumstances, over which Sckles had
neither knowledge or control, the enemy
WOULD HAVE SECURED ROUND TOP
planted his artillery there, commanded the
whole battle field and what the result would
have been leave you to judge. Now when
wrote my report of the battle, honestly be-
Heved Gen. Sickles did not know where |
wished him to go, and that his error arose
from misapprehension of my ORDERS but 7
have recently learned from Gen Geary, who
had the day before been sent by Hancock TO
hold the left and who in doing so had seen
the Importance of Round Top and posted
brigade on it, that OH the morning OF the ID
when he received my order that he would be
| relieved by the Third corps, and on being re-
Heved would rejoin his own corps (TweIfth)
on the right. After waiting for some time to
be relieved he sent to Gen. Sickles staff
officer with instructions to explain the posi-
ton and its Importance and to ask If troops
ralin h i'm, hat
Sickles would send one of his staff to see the
ground and to place troops there on their ar-
rival He received for reply that Gen.
Slckles would attend to it id due time No
officer or troops came, and after waiting till
his patience was exhausted, Gen. Geary with
drew and rejoned his corps. Now my
FIRST ORDERS TO GEN. SICKLEs
were to relieve the Twelfth corps division
(Geary and occupy the position Here is
evidence that he knew the position occupied
by Geary division could have known and
yet failed to occupy it. Furthermore, when
he came to my headquarters at about noon
and said he did not know where TO 90
answered, ''Why you were to relieve the
Twelfth corps" He said they had no position,
they were massed awaiting events Then If
was told him his right was to be HsncocI,s
left, his left resting on Round Top, which /
pointed out. Now his right was three-ouar-
tiers of mile in front of Hancock's left and
his left one-quarter of mile in front of the
pnso VI nouhu Iop, ieaVlng the Key pont IN
occupied which ought to have been occupied
by Longstreet before we could get there with
the Fifth corps. Sickles' movement prac
ticaIy destroyed his own corps, the Third.
caused q loss of so per cent in the Fifth corps
and very heavily damaged the Second CORPS
as SAID before, producing So per cent of the
loss of the whole battle. and with what re-
suit? Driving US back to the position he was
ordered to hold originally. These losses of
the First and Second affected greatly the eff
fclency and morale of the army and pre-
vented my having the audacity in the often
sive that might otherwise have had. IF This
is an advantage to be so crippled in battle
without attaining any object, must confess
l cannot see it. Pardon my writing with SO
much prollxity; but your generous defense
and thEn la 1-iaI Lie