Morning journal and courier., 1886-07-28

charge in substance was that the right of the COURIER to employ what workmen it chose was natural right with which not even the State could interfere. Yet the 'scharge'' went on to say that though this was so, the right ot the accused was perfect to combine and say to the COURIER, We demand" that you employ us, and if you do not employ us we will injure you by the concerted withdrawal of our patronage, and we will injure your patrons by the concerted withdrawal of our patronage from them, and we will inj jure the patrons Of your patrons by the concerted withdrawal of our patronage from them, un- less one and all of you submit to our request and comply with our wishes; provided, how ever, that the ultimate object of the combina- tion was to get work for themselves and did not contemplate the collection from the COURIER of the boycott expenses. But the court said that such combination would be and was criminal conspiracy If it's ultimate object was not to get work for the combina- tion.
 The court probably recognized that the "good wilP' of newspaper, like that of any other business. was valuable asset; that 1t is protected by the courts from unjustifable attacks, but the court seemed to be of the opinion that boycotting attack on such good will was not criminal if the object was to improve the condition of the boycotters. It was concealed, and it is the boast of the boycotters, that the boycott was and is 8 weapon exactly calculated and adapted for immediate and direct injury to private busi- ness, even to the point of running it, unless suppressed by public opinion or the courts, and it was clear that the Morning News had been forced, by boycott, to submit to ar bitration the Wa1estion whether they should employ such persons as they chose, and whether they should pay the expenses of the boycott on them.
 We have then the position of the "charge." This boycott is an illegal and criminal con- spiracy, unless it's object was to get work for the conspirators.
 But on what grounds would it be crimi- nal conspiracy if it's object was not to get work? Plainly on the common law doctrine of being conspiracy exactly adapted to in-
 jure man in his business, prevent him from
 carrying on his trade and to disturb the good order of society, and this has been the com
 mon law for hundreds of years.
 How then does the fact that the conspira-
 tors hope ultimately to get work for them
 selves relieve the conspiracy from it's criminal character! Evidently the ''charge'' must
 proceed on the idea that the expectation of personal benefit either prevented the exis- tence of a bad intent or neutralized it's eff feet.
 If the combination had no other object in
 view, directly or remotely, in injuring the
 business of the COURIER or in driving its
 workmen out of employment than to inj jure
 the business and drive the workmen from
 their work, then the members of the combi
 nation had criminal intent in view accord
 ing to the 'Fcharge." But if their ulterior
 object in injuring the business and in driv
 ing the men from work was to get the work
 for themselves, the ulterior intent prevented the immediate intent from becoming crimi
 nal, as we understand the "charge." In other words, if the combination directly and Intentionally injured the business of others without motive the conspirators would be guilty, but if they had selfish motive in do ing the very same acts of injury to others they would be innocent, though deliberately engaged in acts of immediate wrong. For there can be no question but that the imme diate intention of boycotters is to hurt their victim. Have they right to hurt their vic tim ?
 Evidently the "chaRge' was erroneous in it's use of language when 1t said that the boycott ters had right to ''demand" employment. For if it was intended to use the words right" and demand" in their strict mean ing, it is manifest at once that no man has hands of another. Any doctrine based upon such claim of fright" to "demand" en- ployment must obviously be unsound. A ''right' to demand" implies some owner ship in the right to bestow employment and some duty or obligation to bestow employ ment to the demandants, and clearly there is no foundation or warrant for such posi- ton.
 When the seeker for employment has been refused there exists no possible relation or connection between the man that employs labor and the refused seeker for employment. Those two men are then perfect strangers to each other. There is no point in which they meet, and neither has any connection with the other.
 You might just as we'll say that certain employers of labor have perfect right to demand that particular 1aborers must work for them, with the right to blacklist them to compel them to do so, to hold the con- verse of the doctrine.
 When, therefore, the seeker for labor has been declined or refused, he and the refus-
 ing employer are strangers.
 Now will anybody explain on what theory the seeker for labor can combine with others -''organized labor"-boycotting labor or ganizations, to destroy the good will of the business of the employer? Certainly strang- CTS could not boycott and inj jure the business of the employer, even according to the E'charge," for there would be no sense in such conduct. How have the refused seekers of labor become other than strangers to tho re- fusing employer2
 Again if the seekers for labor should com bine to boycott and injure the business of the refusing employer simply and only be- cause of the refusal, and as 8 punishment for such refusal, the intent would be bad and criminal, even according to the ''charge."
 So we get the F'charge" down to this close point: A body of strangers to an employer of labor may legally combine to adopt meth ods, calculated and adapted by reason of the concerted action of the combined persons, directly to injure and destroy the good will and business of the employer, if their object be, by such means, to compel the em- ployer to enter into contract relations with them They may legally combine to do di- rect evil to others that good may como to h11fo m ofb
 We do not think the doctrine of the charge is supported in reason or authority. It is the reasonable view of human society to say that the duties and obligations of men grow out of proper regard for the just rights of others The natural liberty of each individ- ual is checked at the point where it interferes with the natural liberty of others.
 We all agree that it is not in the very na- ture of things right or just that an employer of labor should be interfered with as to whom he shall employ. The charge says that such is his natural right, and that the State itself could not interfere with it. But it ysh%S' whas the dSe0fGs State " itself could could mot not rightfully do, boycotters may lawfully at tempt to do, and adopt measures calculated ts accomplish their wishes, and it is notori- ous that they have succeeded in many in- stances in accomplishing that, which, ac- cording to the charge, the State itself could
  delegate" is not the t'uncrowned Caesar" we should like to know what he is.
 Again, the boycotters say they will win in this fight. They define the fight to be to compel the COURIER to employ them and send it's present workmen Elsewhere" In other words the combination, according to their own statement, is to compel the CoUR- FER, through the weapon of direct injury to it's business, to employ them.
 Everyone the judge himself, would say, that this intent is bad and immoral and dangerous to society. Is it criminal? Suppose a case of combination to get another mans property by theft, robbery or false pretences. Clearly the ulterior object ot getting proper ty is not illegal. Property will benefit thieves and rascals as well as honest men. But in this case nobody for moment sup poses that the ulterior object of getting property is legal justification for the com bined intent to get that property without | the fair consent of the owner. Everybody l that though in case of a combina- | tion to obtain goods by false pretences it is l supposed the owner knowingly and freely will consent at the time to part with his | goods that if such consent is obtained by false pretences it is in law no consent.
 The criminal law punishes the forming of ! 8 combined intent among several people ! to get the property of another against his l
 E.