The National tribune., 1886-03-11

well-directed solid shots and percussion
shells for our audacity.
About noon, should Judge, we got the
order to cease firing, and not provoke an
attack. This we disliked very much TO do.
In fact, it was the most unpleasant thing We
ever did. to lie down and allow the enemy
to continue firing and
SHOOT OUR COMRADES AROUND Us.
This was too exasperating, and our Colonel
finally consented that one man from each
company could 60 out as skirmishers and
drive back the troublesome sharpshooters OF
the enemy Skirmishing continued until
about D. M. when we moved farther to the
left, and the 65th n. Y. took our place on
the extreme right.
Now, as 10 who was to blame for the sur
prise at about O'Clock, will say that this
ground on the extreme right flank, originally
almost an impossible thicket, had been
fought over most bitterly for 36 hours, the
enemy all the time being driven back to
their supporting batteries. All this time 1t
was necessary to keep two or three lines of
hattie in position to hold the Confederates in
check At : o'clock, however, there was
only one frail line, and that contracted from
the right sufficiently to allow a column of
the enemy TO pass unObserved to our rear,
ON the very ground we had fought over on
the right at daylight
1t was no secret that the enemy was mass
ing in the afternoon In the open field on our
right. But our officers said it was the or
ders to withdraw our troops from this por-
tion of the line to strengthen our left. We
were not even allowed TO cut stick or sap
ling with an AK in building the frail line Of
works in our rear. for fear the enemy would
hear it. We did this work chiefly with our
iack-knives. We gathered rotten logs to lay
on the brush, behind which we threw up
the dirt with some shovels that had been
brought up by the pioneers. No works,
however, had been constructed to prevent
SURPRISE FROM OUR FLANK.
Ii appeared to me that our officers only al
lowed US to build these works to quiet and
amuse us.
The allusions to this attack by the press
have always been very meager and inaccu-
rate, and | think, too, derogatOTy to Shaler'S
and SeymOurs Brigades. 1t was terrific
struggle. The loss in killed and wounded
in these brigades was very heavy. l had
nv two tent-mates killed in that terrible
hell-hole Of darkness, and was myself
wounded. More than a quarter of the COM
pany was missing and never have been ac-
counted for. l surmise they fell IL the
thicket.
The enemy were especially ugly and bois-
ferrous all day and far into the night on this
part of the line. They seemed to act as
though they had usn sure this time, and if
this attack had been made in the daylight it
would have caused second Charlottesville.
But no such surprise could have taken
place in the daytime, for the fanking col
iy-oI hot I
had passed to our rear. The throwing
forward of our extreme right flank, so that
our line formed crescent, is perhaps the
solution of the problem of who was to blame
for the loss of three or four thousand men
and two Generals, especially as no protecting
breastwoTks were thrown up at right angles
with our main line
| noticed In the February Century very
glaring error in an "Incideat of the Wilder
ness at the close of Gen. Grants article. 1t
is there stated that large portion of Shaler's
Brigade was captured on the evening of the
first days fight, whereas it was the second
days battle. This battle was fought at
TERRIBLE DISADVANTAGE,
and with great slaughter on our side. First,
our ammunition was much inferior to the
enemy's, and made it at once necessary to
charge our muskets with powder in
order 20 reach their works through the thick
brush. The enemy had much better sharp
shooters than we, while all the afternoon
the sun shone in our eyes, so that it was i'm
possible 10 see our antagonists. Lastly, we
had no artillery to support us, while, if we
drove the enemy any distance, we encOun-
tered artillery that compelled us to halt.
Gen. Lee was exceedingly clever to retire
two OF three miles through thick wilder
ness and make stand in the edge of the
woods, with batteries so placed in the open
fields that he could rake our lines if bis
forces gave way, while if his infantry, per-
chance, should yield little, he could scatter
our forces, as be did on the evening of the
9Th of May.