Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1886-12-11
HOW GETTYSBURG WAS LOST.
a Criticism on the Plan of Battle by
Confederate General.

Confederate General.
| General E. NJ. Law of South Carolina,
| writing IN the December Century of his ex-
perlence at Gettysburg, tells OF PROPOSE
| ton which he made to General Hood for
an attack on the Union left, and says.
found General Hood on the ridge
| where his line had been formed, commu-
| nicated TO him the information | bad OBJ
| tanned, and pointed out the use with which
| movement by the right flank might be
made. He conceded fully in my views,
but said that his orders were positive to at
tack in front, as soon as the left of the corps
should get into position. | therefore en-
tered formal protest against direct at
tack, on the grounds First-That the
great natural strength of the enemy's posi-
ton in our front rendered the result of
direct assault extremely uncertain. Sec
ond-Ihat, even successful, the victory
would be purchased at too great sacrifice
OF life, and our troops would be in no con-
dition to improve it. Third-That a front
attack was unnecssary-the occupation of
Round Top during the night by moving
upon it from the south, and the extension
of our right wing from that point across
the enemy's left and rear, being not only
practicable but easy. Fourth-That such
a movement would compel change of front
on the part of the enemy, the abandonment
of his strong position on the nights and
/ force him to attack US in position.
General Hood called up Captain Ham
ilton of his staff and requested me to repeat
the protest to him, and the grounds on
which it was made. He then directed
Captain Hamilton to find General Long
street as quickly as possible and deliver the
protest and to say to him that he Hood
Endorsed it fully. Hamilton rode off at
once, but IN about ten minutes returned,
accompanied by staff-otficer of General
| Longstreet, who said to General Hood, in
my hearing: General Longstreet orders
| that you begin the attack at once Hood
turned to me and merely said, You hear
the order| | at once moved my brigade
to the assault. | do not know whether the
protest ever reached General Lee. From
the brief interval that elapsed between the
| time il was sent to General Longstreet and
! the receipt of the order to begin the attack
/ am inclined to think it did not General
Longstreet has since said that he repeatedly
advised againsta front attack and suggested
a movement by our right flank. He may
have thought, after the rejection of this ad-
| vice by General Lee that it was useless to
press the matter further
Just here the battle of Gettysburg was
lost to the Confederate arms. II is useless
to speculate upon the turn affairs might
have taken if the Confederate cavalry had
been in communication with the rest of the
army, and if General Stuart had kept Gen
eral Lee informed, as he should have done,
of the movements of the Federal army In
considering the causes of the Confederate
failure on that particular field, we must
take the situation just as we find it. And
| the situation was as follows: The advance
of the two armies encountered each other
on the LIST of July. An engagement ensued
in which the Confederates were victorious.
The Federal troops retired through Gettys-
burg and took position along the nights
east of the town-a position which, if prop
erly defended was practically impregnable
to a direct attack.
The whole matter then resolves itself
into this General Lee failed at Gettysburg
on the ID and Sd of July because he made
his attack precisely where his enemy
wanted him to make it and most fully pre-
pared to receive it. Even had he succeeded
in driving the Federal army from its strong
position by general and simultaneous as
sault along the whole front (Which was the
ouly possible chance of success in that di-
rection), he would have found his army in
very much the same condition that Pyrrhus
found his when, after driving the Romans
from the field of Asculum, he exclaimed,
| Another such victory and am undone!' -