The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-03-30

regimental and brigade commanders were in a
state OF great anxiety. 1t has not appeared that
the division commanders were disturbed or even
apprehensve.
Saturday passed and night settled over the
army, on the brink of catastrophe, like sheep
without shepherd. Was it not known that
there was an army at Corinth or still nearerl If
there was. were its objects not wariikel Or was
it expecting that Sidney Johnston would wait on
Buell.! 1t is not my present intention to go over
the battle of Shiloh Church paper.
These criticisms involve high officials,
but would not have been used except in self
defense of the Third Division, which those
ofhclals have pursued with relentless pertlnac-
~ more than twenty years. 1t can be and has
been shown that their charges not tenable
Themselves and their friends have, during that
period. endeavored to throw the blame of the
defeat of Sunday upon General Lew Wallace
General Grant has officially stated that the pro
prlety of removing him was under consideration
before the battle. He was evidently not
favorite. But fair and candid investigation,
such as General Grant is generally inclined to
make would have shown that Wallace was not
lacking in any respect on that day:
Here are specimens of the charges:
Lew Wallace equally amiss. He, who had been
upon the ground month, excused himself that ne
onel Mcpherson put him right at / o'clock and it took
him till z that night to march five miles. (Badeau,
vol l, p. S0)
Lew Wallace was put in position on the extreme
fore. Up. 80
Lew Wallace to whose shameful tardiness-to call
it by no harsher neme-was mainly due the cause or
the repulse of the first day.Nationa Tribune March
z, 1868.
In the United Service Magazine, January,
1863, is a letter from General Sherman Of the
same tenor:
selected that line (about p NJ in advance of the
bridge across Snake creek, by which we had all day
been expecting Lew Wallaces division from Crump's
Landing.
- Lew Wallaces fresh division, only four
miles away, was expected each minute.
General Sherman, in his recent memoirs, re-
wives the subject lpage 1850 with particulars:
General Grant visited me about 10 A. NJ, where
Were holding ground and said that on his way up
ne ne stopped at Crump's Landing, and ordered Lew
Walaces division to Lick (Snake9 creek to
come up my right, telling me to look out for him.
We had waited all day for him.
In the Century Gen. Grant says:
On my way UP, after an early breakfast, directed
e ma dr to get his troops IN line ready to nds
arms, prepared to move.
reached the front about A. NJ. directed
Captain Baxter to order General Wallace to march i'm
medatey by the road nearest the river to Pittsburg
Landing He made memorandum of the order.
sent Colonel Mcpherson and Captain Rowley to bring
him up with his division They found him marching
toward Purdy, Bethel, some point west from the
river, further by sevea miles from Pittsburg Land
ing than when he started never could see
and do not now see why order necessary
further than to direct to Pttsburg Landing with
out specifying the route. 1t was direct and near the
river.
He has since claimed that Baxter directed him TO
sherman right which is not where wanted him to
go. - 1t he was correct it was very unmilitary
proceeding to join the right of army from the flank
instead of from the base. i presume he
thought it would be act of herosm redoundng to
the credit of his command. and the benefit OF his
country.
The order was given to Captain Baxter, on
Sherman's line, about 10 o'clock A. M, and de-
n Ganaral Val ar
two miles west of Crumps Landing, at 20
minutes past IL A. NJ
What General Grant directed Captain Baxter
to say or to write. or what he said to General
Sherman are matters to be settled not by Gen
eral Wallace. Neither is he response BILE for the
condition of the battle at half-past IL clock.
When Captain Baxter left, Shermans line had
not been crowded back. Baxter knew no more
about its being driven than We did; and, there
fore, said nothing on that subject Neither him
self nor his order referred to Pittsburg Landing
or the river road.
Col Ross says: "About Ii o'clock A. NJ.
Captain Baxter handed me paper which read
''You (Wallaee) will move on the Purdy
road sSrm at light angles To the river, and act
according to circumstances ,"
Gen. j. A. Strickland says SAT half past IL
or fifteen minutes to II, person rode up to
General Wallace with orders to move. The
movement began in ten minutes"
Gen. Fred Knefer says: 1T must have been
IL NJ. when Captain Baxter arrived with orders,
bringing the cheering intelligence that our army
was successful. 1t was written or
der to move and form junction with the right
of the army. which we understood to be the
right as it rested in the morning"
Captain A ID. Ware says Eat twenty min
utes to II an order was delivered by Captain
Baxter to move to Sherman's right on the Purdy
road" The head of Wallace's column was in
sight of the field, when Captain Rowly and Colo
mel Mcpherson overlook it. telling qnite a diff
ferent story from Captain Baxter
On the way up, in the morning, General Grant
| and General Wallace agreed that the probabli-
| ties of an attack were upon Adamsville, where
my brigade lay, five miles from Crump's, near
| ly west on the road to Purdy. We were, on this
| theory, not ordered to move until P. NJ. and
after the distressing Of the last set of mes
| sageS. At that hour both the camps of Sher-
| man and Prentss were in the possession of the
| enemy. After most heroic combat they were
| compelled to yield. W. III. L. Wallace Nc
| Clernand, Hurlbut, Sherman and Prentiss were
| all then in the new line, which was shorter and
more compact, but from three-fourths of mile to
| mile nearer the river. At about p NJ. this line
| gave way, after resistance worthy of veterans,
| and the day was lost To make the Third Dvs-
ion responsible for this disaster is certainly not
| generous, nor is it correct history. Wallace is
| blamed for not facing about and marching left
in front to the river road. In those thckets,
| swamps and ravines, if the reversed
| column had been attacked, confu-
! sion would have been inevitable. If it
| had reached the held unfnoleSted, there
| must have been halt to get the division right
| in front and as much time lost there there
| was on Snake creek. A party which sent out
soon after the battle to examine the cross routes
toward Purdy reported the distance from Stony
| Lonesome to the upper Snake creek bridge. half
| a mile below the mill, to be about five miles.
How far it is back to the route leading across to
the river road and the lower crossing was not re-
ported nor the distance. Each of these dis
| tances may be one and ene-haf or two miles,
%lov fha1
| be eight to nine miles, besides the distance
across Snake creek bottom. Notwithstanding
the unheard-of slowness of the prelude, when
| the storm burst upon our astonished generals
they breasted it with skill and valor AS the
engagement engage IS more clearly ilumih ha oy
the list of important battles The bold plan oil
| attack by continuous assaults. characterized by