New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1885-12-02

General Haleck remained until the 17th Oh July
but he very uncommunlcauNe anu gas1 ari,tb
information as TO what nau Deen Oaliou "
When General Halleck left to assume the duties .ss
of general -in-chief / remained IN command OF Ine
district of West Tennessee. Practically Decame
n department commander because no one was 90
signed to that position over me ana haqo NY ot
ports direct to the genera-in-chet; Dut was Iou
ass1oned 70 the postion of department commander
until the 25th of October.
When Corinth was occupied, Halleck had mag
nifcent army of 10000 men. Besides hoidihg al
the territory which had been acquired, he might
have made u great campaign, in any direceion
required. with movable force of not less tnan
$4,000. He might have reached either VicHSours
or Atlanta without bloOdshed, and avoided some
Of the most costly battles of the war. But he
proceeded to break up his army and scatter IL where
it could do least good. When Grant took command
at Corinth he found himself in an anxious and
calling position, thrown upon the defensive IN the
midst of hostile population, harassed by the rebel
cavalry which he was too weak to dlsperse, ana
practically isolated from Memphis, point in his
command not less important than COrinth itself.
But at Memphis he adds significantly, he had
Sherman, Halleck had constructed an enormous
system of Notifications at COrnth which reflected
great credit upon the skill of his engineers; only
they were of no because they were Tar TOO
extensive for the depleted army which had TO man
them Grant was obliged TO construct other
defences suitable to the strength of his garrison
The most anxious period of the war to me-" no
saws. was during the time the Army of the Ten
nessee was guarding the territory acquired by the
fall of Corinth and Memphis. and before l was
sufficiently reinforced to take the offensive" The
new defences at COrinth proved of high value
when that position was attacked soon afterWard by
Van Dorm. Rosecrans was in immediate command
of the Union troops in this engagement and
succeeded in rcpelling the attack, but Grant COM
plains that he did not follow up the victory nor
obey his specific orders for pursuit. lie was dis
satisfied also with the conduct of Rosecrans at
Iuka, and when that gallant but not always
fortunate commander was appointed to succeed
Buell. IN Middle Tennessee Grant was unfeignedly
thankful
was delighted at the promotion OF Genera
Rosccrans to a separate command, because l stlll
believed that hen Independent of an immediate
superior the qualities which at tat time, credlteu
hlia with possessing, would show themselves. AS
subordinate found that could not make MN 40
as / wished and had determined to relieve MN from
duty thar very day.
The repulse of Van Dorm at COrnth had not the
full consequences which might have been secured
from IT.. but Grant recognized the Importance Of the
victory; and very soon afterward, having obtained
some reinforcements he suggested to HaUeck a
plan fer campaign against Nicksburg. The
Geueral-in- Chief appears to have kindly left'him
without orders in this great movement, the whole
scheme of which, from beginning to end was
Grants own. The " Memoirs" cordially recognize
tie support which Mr.. Lincoln and General llalleck
steadily gave to the undertaking after it had been
begun, and Haeck is particularly praised Tor his
foresight in dispatchiDg renforcements before they
were actually called for Grant had hardly taken
the field however, before his plans were consider
ably disturbed by an order from Washington
dividing his command into four corps and placing
one Of them under McClernand, who was specli-
c,llv assiglel to that part OF the army operating
down the Mississippi Grant well aware that
N.Clernand was appointed for political reasons, and
for the particular duty allotted to him he had
already designated Sherman. His conviction OF
NcClernand's unftncss amply sustained by
tbo event. but perhaps no great evil resulted from
n. the lncapacity OF the new leader was so
,rorUtly made apparent that Sherman and
Admiral Porter united in a request to Grant to
,,,,o and take the command in person; which he
did.
On the ooh of January | arrived at Youngs
p1lnt and assumed COuWdDd Jne IOiOWlAg
5"y. General McClernand took exception IN q most
clHracters tic way-for hun. HIS correspondence
with me On the subject was more III the nature OF a
rcprmand than protest. IL was highly msuDor-
dina C. bur | overlooked n, as ] believed for the
good of the service. General McClernand was a
politician of very considerable prominence IN hls
state; he WIS member OF Congress when the
Secession war broke out; be be.Onged TO that
DO itlcal party which furnished All the opposition
there was 10 vigorous Iosccutiou Of tile wal Tor
saving the Union; there WAS no delay in his de-
clariug himself for the Union az all hazards, aud
there was no uncertain sound IN his declaration OF
where he stood IN the contest before the country
He also gave up his seat an congress 10 take the
field u dCicuCc of the principles he mad proclaimed
When the advance toward Nicksburg began
Grant had about 10000 men. These not
more than enough to hold the railroad commurlca-
tous he was already defending, but as he meant to
drive the enemy before HIM he perceived that the
lines would almost hold themselves. Up TO this
fine il had been universally regarded as an axiom
in war that an invading force must maintain a safe
limo of communication with a base of supplies.
ALWAYS moving 50 rs to keep it covered. This would
involve Grant in peculiar difficulties. Nicksburg
WAS impregnablo the river side. Sherman's
attempt to carry il by coup de main from the north
had rled through nj fault of MIS- but owing to the
formation of the ground. The problem was to
scrnre a foothod on the east, or land side of the
town from which the troops could or crate by siege
Tho nature of the country cut up by ravines and
pavigable bavous. and flooded at this time by
unprecedented rains, made II impossible to march
overland in the face of the enemy. The strategica
w.v therefore. would have been to fall back to
Memphis fortify il rs base of supplies, and then
move forward along the line of the railroad repair
ip., rs the advance pushed on But the North had
become very much discouraged. The elections Iof
1862 had gone against the war party Voluntary
enlistments had ceased. Tho draft had been
resisted Grant believed that a retreat away back
to Memphis would be interpreted as defeat. and
would have the most pernicOus effect. There
WAS nothing left TO be done but to 30 forward to u
dec'sire rictorI This was in my mind from the
moment / took command in person at Young's
Pomt.p This was what he told sherman when that
officer demonstrated against his plan. and urged the
paramount Importance of securing IA base. Grant
had taken the daring resolve OF cutting loose from
his base altogether. and foraging upon the hostile
country. sherman afterward accomplished his
most famous exploit by the same eXpedlent; but
Il Mr.. haL,