River Falls journal. [volume] (River Falls, Pierce County, Wis.) 1872-2019, 1885-01-29
THE BATTLE OF THE NATIONS.
Eapoleon's Military Movements and his
BIunders.

Hi IA L Hi VI HI NhkAVNEe
Eapoleon's Military Movements and his
B1unders.
Quick growths decay quickly. Ma
poleon's precocity astonished the world,
but his early failure of faculties is
equally wonderful. After the battles of
Eckmuhl he was barely a second rate
general. Aspern was failure. Wa
gram was failure The entire Russian
campaign was failure. At Lutzen he
was barely not defeated. At BaHtzen,
with overwhelming forces, he con-
quered, but made no prisoners. His
victory at Dresden was due chiefly to a
lucky topography. BY pushing Van
damme into peril and utterly failing to
support him, that Generals army was
annihilated. BY pushing Oudinot, and
afterward Ney, too far north at Gross
Beeren and Dewnewitz, and MacDon
aid too far south at Katzbach, their ar
mics were defeated and almost ruined.
In short, the campaign of the Elbe was
a failure Napoleon's management was
bad. Even the illiterate and stupid
Blucher outwitted him.
The nations were combined against
Napoleon. Spain, England, substan-
TALLY all the Germanic sovereignties,
Sweden and Norway and Russia and
Austria, through his vicious statesman
ship, were in alliance and were resolved
to conquer or die. In October, 1913,
he had become much weakened by sue
cessive disasters. The allies determ-
ined on a bold movement. Schwartzen-
berg, in command of the Austrian and
Russian forces, marched to his rear
from the south, and Butcher with Prus-
slams and Bernadotte with Swedes from
the North, made like movement.
Their purpose was to unite at Leipzig.
Napoleon was then at Dresden. The
allies were immensely superior to him
in numbers. A military tyro ought to
have known that concentration of his
forces was necessary. Especially was
concentration necessary when his COM
munication with France was threatened.
Napoleon saw clearly his peril. Weeks
before he forwarded to his War Minis
ter in Paris an order to man and pro-
vision fortresses along the Rhine with a
view to defensive warfare on that from
tier. Yet when he saw his communica-
tons threatened from both north and
south and the destruction of his army
imminent, he delayed. His mind seemed
paralyzed.
In addition to the army which he &C
tually led into battle at Leipzig, he had
more thaa 200, 900 excellent troops scat
tered in different garrisons on and near
the Baltic and on the Elbe. Though
treatened With destruction, he allowed
them to remain, and all were finally
taken prisoners. Even when he did
quit Dresden to march to Leipzig, he had
time to collect the garrisons of Dresden,
Nielsen, Torgau, Wittenburg and Mag
deburg, making total of 10000. 1t is
inexplicable that Napoleon allowed
these to remain idle. Though time
was terribly precious, and though the
weather was cold and rainy, he made
ciruitous route, by which he wasted $50
miles of march, lost II 900 men for SER
vice through exposure and consequent
sickness, loitered four days at Duben
and brought his army into Leipzig ex-
hausted. He reached Leipzig October
Is. His main army was posted about
five miles south of Leipzig and on a
slight ridge, which gave him an advan-
tage of position. Though his llne of
battle was about four miss long, yet
the country was so level and so free
from forests that he was able from an
elevated point to survey the field. To
his 1880 men Schwartzenberg OPP
posed 10000.
To oppose Blucher's approach from
the North with $4,000 (Bernadotte was
tardy) he stationed Marmont with TO-
600 at the village of Mockern, five miles
north of Leipzig. But it was essential
that his line of retreat must be guarded.
and hence he placed Margaron with
10000 at Lindenau, about two miles
west of Leipzig, to guard the road and
bridges. Bertrand with 10000 was
stationed in the city to aid Margarom or
Marmont, as occasion mignt require.
This was a mistake. Bertrand did
nothing, although Margaron was over
powered and driven back. Thus, on
the night of the 18th there were three
battlefelds prepared. The troops of
the allies were burning with patriotic
hate.
October Is, 1913. At 9 o'clock in the
morning seventy-one years ago
Schwartzenberg opened fire. Soon the
battle ragged all along the line. For
three hours Schwartzenberg gained
ground slowly but steadily, Napoleon's
right, where the battle ragged furiously,
was driven back. But at IL the tide
turned. Napoleon msssed on the
enemy's center, determined to pierce it.
Within three hours he had gained an
important advantage. He even con-
cIuded that he had gained victory,
and sent to Leipzig an order to ring all
bells as a demonstration of Joy. The
order was premature. How Napoleon
must then have regretted that the 200,-
900 troops scattered In garrlsons were
not there. Even the 10000 that he
could have ordered to his aid when he left
Dresden, nay, perhaps the 10, 600 whom
Bertrand at that hour held i'll idleness
in Leipzig, might have turned the scale.
The need was terrible. The alternative
of victory was ruin. His crown was
staked on the issue of this hour.
Schwartzenberg recovered. Night
closed on one of the bloodiest battle
field of modern times, and Napoleon's
knell was knolle1. The butchery had
been awful. Maison's division had lost
five out of six. In nine hours $4,000
men had been stretched upon the
ground dead or dying.
BY hard fighting Margaron had
kept the road open Marmont
had been beaten. In one day the
nations had been in death struggle
on three bloody fields. Napoleon was
lost.
Gross as Napoleon's blunder had been
he now makes a blunder still more
gross. Knowing that on the morrow
the allies would be reinforced py Ben
nigsen with 80, 600 and by Benadotte with
60. 900. his manifest duty was to en-
brace the protection of darkness for an
immediate retreat. With paralysis of
mind that puzzles history, he stood
still. Even through the next day, the |
18th he stood still The next night, too,
he stood still. On the 18th the enemy, |
reinforced, renewed the |
struggle. 1t is idle to describe it. I'M
mensely outnumbered, Napoleon drew
his srmy around Leipzig and insanely |
gave battle. This swelled the total |
number of killed and wounded
in all the battles Of the two
DAYS to more than 100, 900. When