The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-10-09
GRANT AND THOMAS.
MIR. Headley on the Two Generals and the
Battle of Nashville.

NIX. hcduIcy Ou tAo Two UeneraLS anu the
Battle of Nashville.
To the Editor of the New York Sun:
In the Sun OF Qst. you publish an extract
from the Boston Herald on the despotie
character of generals, in order to show the
errors OF the statements it contained. In that
extract occurs the following assertion respecting
General Grants conduct toward General
Thomas for his unaccountable DELAY in attacking
Hood before Nashville In view of that delay he
lGrant) said: Il could stand it no longer, and
gave the order without reserve. and think the
battle will take place to morrow"
Now, first here is an error of fact. Grant
never gave any such order without any re-
serve" nor did Thomas ever move under any
such supposed order. But this is small matter
compared with the serious charges implied
against both commanders in this statement.
Grant, after having placed Thomas in command
of the Western army, urges him to assault Hood
at once and the latter, delaying to do SO, he,
totally ignorant OF the motive that governs him,
and the circumstances in which he is placed
six or seven hundred miles away
orders him peremptorily to attack,
just as he would colonel of a regiment
to storm a battery in his immediate presence.
This would make him not only destitute of mill
, tary knowledge, but of that strong common
sense which was his Distinguishing characteristic.
On the other hand, it would make Thomas I'M
der whose personal supervision verything had
been done. more ignorant of his duty than Grant
hundreds of miles away, or too timorous to per-
form 1t. Neither Is true. as the following facts
which obtained from General Thomas himself
will show. He said: General Grant telegraphed
me very urgently to attack Hood at once. l tel
egraphed back that was not ready to move.
did not give any reasons for fear they would
leak out on the way The chief one was / had
been unable to collect enough horses to form a
cavalry force to pursue and demolish Hood after
| had defeated him. Simply to drive him from
before Nashville would be a barren victory. /,
however, telegraphed General Grant that if he
dissatifed with my course to appoint an
other one in my place. and would serve under
him as a subordinate
But General Grant had no idea of doing any
such foolish thing, and telegraphed him so, say
ing: II have more confidence in you than any
other man." But. chafing under the prolonged
inaction, instead of ordering him without re-
serve to move, he determined to go on himself
and ascertain what the obstacles were that so
strongly held the crock of Chickamaugua" back:
but when he got as far as Washington he was
met with the news of the total overthrow of
Hoods army, and his report to the government
said Il was delighted all fears were dspelled "
Now, in what different light do these facts
place these two distinguished commanders, and
how perfectly characteristic of both. General
Grant, in reviewing the campaign, said ne
thought it would have been wiser to have at
tackled Hood before he had time to fortify but
adds with frankness, justice and magnanimlty
characteristic of him. but his final defeat of
Hood was so complete that it will be accepted as
vindicatonof that distinguished officers iudg-
ment." How little this sounds ike II could
stand it no longer, and gave orders without re-
serve" Respectfully, j. 7. HEADLEY.