The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-01-21

directed TO lay out line to 1ntrench.
have to be made in rear of the line of
encampment as it then ran. The new
line while it would be nearer the river, was yet
too far away from the Tennessee or even from
the creeks to be easily supplied with water
from them and in case of attack, these creeks
would be IL the hands of the enemy But, be-
sides this, the troops with me, officers and men,
needed discipline and drill more than they did
experience with the pick, shovel and ak. Re
endorsements were arriving almost daily, com
posed of troops that had been hastily thrown
together into companies and regiments-frag-
ments Of incomplete organizations, the men and
officers strangers to each other. Under ali these
circumstances | concluded that drill and disci-
Dline were worth more to our men than fortifca-
tons
Gen Buell. was a brave, intelligent officer.
with as much professional pride and ambition of
q commendable sort as i ever knew. L had
been two years at West Point with him, and had
served with him afterward, in garrison and in
the Mexican war, several years more. He was
not given in early life or in mature years to
forming intimate acquaintance. He was stu
dlous by habit, and commanded the con-
fidence and respect of all who knew him.
He was a strict disciplinarian and per-
haps did not distinguish sufficiently the
difference between the volunteer who enlisted
for the war" and the soldier who serves in time
of peace. One system embraced men who risked
life for principle, and often men of social
standing, competence or wealth, and independ-
ence of character. The other includes, as
rule, only men who could not do as we'll in any
other occupation. Gen. Buell. became object
of harsh criticism later, some going SO far as to
challenge his loyalty. No one who knew him ever
believed him capable of dishonorable act, and
nothing could be more dishonorable than to ac-
cept high rank and command in war and then
betray his trust. When came into command
of the army, in 1864 | requested the Secretary
of War to restore Gen. Buell. to duty.
After the war, during the summer of 1865,
travelled considerably through the North, and
was everywhere met by large numbers OF peo-
ple Every had his opinion about the
manner in which the war had been conducted
who among the Generals had failed, how and
why. Correspondents of the press were ever
on hand to hear every word dropped, and
were not always disposed to report correctly
what did not confirm their preconceived notions,
either about the conduct Of the war or the indi-
viduals concerned in it. The opportunity fire.
quently occurred for me to defend Gen. Buell.
against what I believed to be most unjust
charges. On one occasion correspondent put
in my mouth the very charge had so often re-
futed-of disloyalty. This brought from Gen.
Buell. very severe retort, which saw in the
New York World some time before / received
the letter itself. could very well understand
his grievance at seeing untrue and disgraceful
charges apparently sustained by an officer who,
at the time was at the head Of the army. |
replied to him, but not through the press. l
kept no copy of my letter, nor did ever see it
IN print, neither did receive an answer
ALBERT SIDNEY JOHNSTON.
Gen. Albert Sidney Johnston commanded the
Confederate forces until disabled by wound in
the afternoon of the first day. His wound, as
understood afterward, was not necessarily fatal,
or even dangerous, But he was man who
would not abandon what he deemed an
important trust in the face of danger
and consequently continued in the saddle, com
mandlng, until so exhausted by the
loss of blood that he had to be taken from his
horse, and soon after died. The news was not
long in reaching our side. and, l suppose, was
quite an encouragement to the Federal soldiers
had known Johnston slightly in the Mexican
war, and later as an officer in the regular army
He was man of high character and ability
His contemporaries at West Point, and officers
generally who came to know him personally
later and who remained our side, expected
him to prove the most formidable man to meet,
that the confederacy would produce. Nothing
occurred in his brief command of an army to
prove or disprove the high estimate that had
been placed upon his military ability.
Gen. Beauregard was next in rank to John
ston and succeeded to the command. which he
retained to the close of the battle and during
the subsequent retreat on Corinth as we'll as in
the siege of that place. His tactics have been
severely criticised by confederate writer's but 1
do not believe his fallen chief could have done
any better under the circumstances Some of
these critics claim that Shiloh was won when
Johnston FELL and if he had not fallen the army
under me would have been annihilated
or captured. Ifs defeated the confederates
at Shiloh: There is little doubt that
beaten if all the shells and bullets fred by us
had passed harmlessly over the enemy, and if
allof theirs had taken effect Commanding
generals are liable to be killed during engage
ments; and the fact that when he was shot
Johnston was leading brigade to induce it to
make charge which had been repeatedly or
dered, is evidence that there was neither the I'm
iversal Generalization on our side nor the un-
bounded confidence on theirs which has been
claimed. There was in fact, no hour during the
day when doubted the eventual defeat of the
enemy, although was disappointed that rein
forcements so near at hand did not arrive at an
earlier hour.
The Confederates fought with courage at
Shiloh, but the particular skill claimed I could
not, and still can not, see; though there is moth
ing to criticise except the claims put forward for
it since. But the Confederate claimants for SUI
periority in strategy, superiority In generalship
and superiority in dash and prowess are not so
unjust to the Federal troops engaged at Shiloh
as are many Northern writer's The troops on
both sides were American. and united they need
not fear any foreign foe. It is possible that the
Southern man started in with little more dash
than his Northern brother; but he was cores
pondingly less enduring.
The endeavof of the enemy on the first day
was simply to hurl their men against ours-frst
at one point, then at another, sometimes at sew
eral points at once This they did with daring
and energy, until, at night the rebel troops were
worn out Our effort during the same time was
to be prepared to resist assaults wherever made
The object of the ConfederateS on the second
day was to get away with as much of their army
and material as possible. Ours then was to
drive them from our front, and to capture orde
stroy as great part as possible of their men
and material We were successful in driving
them back, but not so successful in captures as If
further pursuit could have been made. But as it
was,we captured or recaptured on the second day
abont as much artillery we lost on the first,
Prentiss, we took more prisoners on Monday
than the enemy gained from US on Sunday. On
the 9th Sherman lost seven pieces of artillery,
McClernand six Prentiss eight and Hurlbut
seven guns, McClernand three and the Army of
the Ohio twenty. ..s,o I.,s. .... an. s.sr,5.@ !.
The effective strength of the Union force on