Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1885-05-01
M'CLELLAN'S INDICATION.
A1 ~ THE REsPOxsTBILrrY or THE
= IlENTwsULAR FAILURE ON STANTON.
How His Confidence Was Betrayed-secretsry
stanton the Marpiot Of Lincoln's Admins
trstion-An Interesting Contribution 20
the History of the Rebellion.

General McClellan's paper on "The Penin-
sular Campaign" in which he places the re- :
sponsibility for tho failure of that campaign
very distinctly upon Secretary Stanton.
From this we make these extracts
So long as Mr.. Cameron was secretary of
war received the cordial support Of that de-
partment but when no resigned, the whole
state of affairs changed. / had never met
Mr. Stanton before reaching Washington, in
1861. He at once sought mo and professed
the utmost personal affection, the expression
OF which was exceeded only by the bitterness
OF his denunciation of the government and its
policy. was unaware of his appointments as
secretary OF war until after il had been made, |
whereupon he called to ascertain whether j
desired him to accept saying that TO do so
would involve a total sacrifice of his personal
interests, and that the only iDducement
would be the desire to assist me in my work.
Having no reason to doubt his sincerity, /
desired him TO accept whereupon he con-
sented, and with great effusion exclaimed
Now we two will save the country"
On the next day the president came to my |
house to explain why he had appointed Mr.. |
Stanton without consulting me his reason |
being that he supposed Stanton to be great |
friend Of mine, and that the appointment
would naturally be satisfactory, and that he
feared that If I had known II beforehand il
would be said that had dragooned him into
it
The more serious difficulties of my posi-
tion began with Mr.. Stantons accession 10 the
war Office. IL at once became very difficult
to approach him, even for the transaction of
ordinary current business and our personal
relations at once ceased. The impatence of
| the executive Immediately became extreme,
and can attribute it only to the influence of
the new secretary, who did many things to
break up the free and confidential intercourse
| that had bprptDfDrp pyistad hQtyyaan the
| president and myself The government so0n
| manifested great impatience in regard to the
| opening OF the Baltimore & Ohio railroad
| and the destruction of the Confederate bat
| be permanently attained only by occupying
| the Shenandoah Valley with force strong
enough TO resist any attack by the Confeder-
| ate army then at Manassas; the second only
| by general advance of the Army of the
Potomac, driving the enemy back Of the
| Rapidan. My own view was that the move
ment of the Army of the Potomac from Ur-
banna would accomplish both of these
objects, by forcing tho enemy To aban-
don all his positions and fall back
ON Richmond. l was therefore unwilling
to Interfere with this plan by a prema-
ture advance, the effect of which must be
either 10 commit us to the overland route or
| to minimize the advantages of the Urbanna
movement. | wished to hold the enemy at
Manassas to the last moment-f possible un-
I'll the advancement from Urbanna had actu-
i
| OF the railroad nor the destruction of the bat
teres was worth the danger involved.
sTANToN's UNAUTHORIZED ACTION.
The positive order of the president, proba-
| bly, issued under the pressure of the secre-
tary of war, forced me to undertake the open
: | to iarper's Ferry I'm February, intending to
throw over force sufficient To occupy Win
chester. To do this it was necessary to have
| | reliable bridge across tho Potomac--to en-.
/ Sunnips mr. II nj IL
The pontoon bridge, thrown as preliminary
could not be absolutely trusted oL
n river so liable to heavy freshets
| therefore 1t was determined to con
! struct canal boat bridge 1t wa'
, discovered, however, when the attemp
| was made, that the liftlOck from the canal I,
, the river was too narrow for tho boats by
| some four or five inches and / therefore do
cded to rebuild the railroad bridge, and con
tent myself with occupying Charleston unit
r | its completion, postpOning to the same tim,
= the advance to Winchester. I had fully ex
| planned my intentions to the president ant
) viding for precisely such contingency
i While at Harper's Ferry j learned that th
h | president was dissatisfied with my action
J. and on reaching Washington laid a full OK
a | PLANTATION before the secretary, with whcl
r. he expressed himself entirely satisfied, an,
told me that the president was already So
and that it was unnecessary for me to com
;, muncaie with him on the subject the'
L
y | force the evacuation of the Potomac batteries
5. On the very day appointed for the divisio.
commanders to come to headquarters to re
O. ceive their final orders, the presiden
"a sent for me. l then learned that he ha'
"a received no explanation of the Han
- | per's Ferry affair, and that the sec
J. retary was not authorized to make the state
ment already referred to; but after my re
y petition of it, the president became fully sal
v isfied with my course. He then, however
! | said that there was another "very ugly mat
n ter" which he desired to talk about, and ths
was the movement by the lower Chesapeake
% He said that it had been suggested that
p proposed this movement with the traitorous
n | purpose of leaving Washington uncoyere
a. and exposed TO attack. I very promptl
20 | objected to the coupling of any such adjet
T. claimed any intention of conveying the ide
70 that he expressed his own opinion, as h
s. merely repeated the suggestions of Others
then explained the purpose and effect c
iortifying Washington, and, as l thought
is removed his apprehensions, but informe'
"a him that the division commanders were TO b
~ ~ at the headquarters that morning, and sug
~ gested that my plans should be laid befor
lc them, but they might give their opinion q
! also said that in order to leave them per
fectly untrammelled would not attend tn
meeting. Accordingly they met on the ST.
OF March and approved my plans
!, DEMoRALIzING THE ARMY.
/ oh viz Shhio udJ Was isouCo, Whhoue al.
:, knowledge, tho order forming army corp
= and assigning the senior general officers +
- their command. My own views were that
r. as the command of army corps involve,
great responsibility and demanded ability O
10 | high order, it was safer to postpone thei
y formation until trial in the field had showl
!. which general officers could best perform
a these vital function. An incompetent divi
= | sion commander could not often jeopardiz
a a the safety of an army; while an unfit corp
commander could easily lose battle an,
:, frustrate the best-conceived plan Of campaign
& | OF the four corps commanders, only one haG
y y commanded so much as a regiment in tn
y | field prior to the Bull Run campaign. Or
q q the next day intelligence arrived that tn
. enemy was abandoning his positions
? l crossed to the Virginia side to re
!, | ceive information more promptly ant
. = decide upon what should be done
% During the night l determined to adyanc'
the whole army, to take advantage of any
opportunity to strike the enemy, to break uI
the permanent camps, give the troops LITTLE
experience on the march and in bivouac, ge
Q rid of extra baggage, and test the working o
a the staff departments. If this were done a
!. | all, 1t must be done promptly and by moving
Y the troops by divisions, without waiting u
i form the army corps. Accordingly, tele-
4 graphed TO the secretary, explaining the state
I | OF the case and asking authority to postpone
5 | the army corps formation until the compile
. | tion OF the movement The reply was an