Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1885-02-13
THE STAFFORD BRIDGE.
supRExE- couRT DECISION.

ECPREAE-COChI OEtfoiON.
Ovsssss yssss-sss N !. Case thss Mas Bsc~
mseh Discussed n the General Asssnsis
ara Ei~whsrs.
In the Supreme Court yesterday
Judge Lewis delivered shc opinion in
the case Of The Supervisors Of Stafford
against Luck ct eis., a. follows
This Is an appeal from . decree Of the
Circuit Court Of Fredericksburg. In the
argument Of the case number OF cues
tons we're discussed by counsel which
need not be considered by the Court.
The case lies within narrow compass,
and may be briefly disposed Of
II is very clear that the bridge COM
missioners. whose appointment is pro-
vided for by the act Of February 0, 1882
(Acts lSSl-'S2, page 66), are To be re-
garded as agents or instruments Of the
State. The act does not invest the cons
m:ssioncrs with any rights Of property
in their indiyidual or private capacities.
The object OF their appointment was for
purposes essentially and exclusively
public--nsmely the erection and man
agement Of bridge over the Rappaban-
mock river TO connect two of the coun-
ties Of the State for the public conve-
nience. They therefore stand towards
the State in the same attitude as the SUI
peryisors Of Stafford county, public
quasi corporation, who are charged by
the act with the duty Of building the
proposed bridge when petitioned so to
do by fifty voters Of the said county,
and who are empowered by the act to
borrow money to defray the necessary
expenses attending its construction. In
other words, the supervisors are charged
with the duty of building the bridge and
Of levying taxes to defray the expenses
thereof. and the commissioners are
charged with the duty, under the direc-
ton of the county judge, of control
ling and managing it after its erec-
tion. in the interests OF the said
county and such other county and
districts or corporations as may sub
SCRIBE" &c. In no just sense. then,
can il be said that contract was en-
tered into by the State, on the one hand,
and the supervisors and commissioners
on the other, by the passage Of the act
under which the latter were appointed,
or by anything that has since occurred.
The act is simply grant by the State
of certain privileges for public purposes,
containing none Of the elements Of
contract, and therefore subject to be
changed or repealed altogether, as the
Legislature may see fit. These PROPOSE
tons are not only well established, but
are incontroyertible. The authorities
upon the subject are numerous and
unanimous. The question was elabo-
rately considered by the Supreme Court
of the United States in the case Of East
Hartford rs. The Hartford Bridge Com
pany 90 How, Sill, in which it was
held that law granting to the town of
East Hartford the right to keep ferry
across public river did not constitute
a contract between the State and the
town so as to preclude the Legislature
from reyoking the grant. in delivering
the unanimous opinion Of the Court
affirming the judgment Of the Supreme
Court Of Connecticut, Mr.. Justice
Woodbury. said: 1.-The parties to this
grant did not by their charter stand in
the attitude towards each other
of making a contract by it such
as is contemplated in the Con-
stitution, and as could not be modified
by subsequent legislation. The Legis-
lature was acting here on the one part,
and public municipal and political cor
porations on the other. They were act
ing, too, in relation TO a public object,
being virtually highway across the
river, over another highway up and
down the river. From this standing
and relation Of these parties, and from
the subject-matter of their action. we
think that the doings of the Legislature
as to this ferry must be considered
rather as public laws than as contracts.
They related TO public interests. They
changed as those interests demanded.
The grantees likewise, the towns being
mere organizations for public purposes,
were liable to have their public powers,
rights, and duties modified or abolished
at any moment by the Legislature.
They are incorporated for public and
not for private objects. They are al
lowed to hold privileges or property
only for public purposes. The men,
bers are not shareholders nor joint
partners in any corporate estate which
they can sell or devise TO others, or
which can be attached and levied on for
their debts. Hence, generally, the
doings between them and the Lcgis-
lature are in the nature Of legislation
rather than compact, and subject
to oil the legislative conditions
Just named, and therefore to be con-
sidered as not violated by subsequent
legislative changes. II is hardly possi-
BILE to conceive the grounds on which a
different result could be vindicated
without destroying all legislative sove-
rcicnty and checking most Legislative
improvements and amendments, as well
as supervision over its subordinate pub
lie bodies. II is as much the
duty Of the Legislature to continue to
regulate such public matters and bodies
as TO organize them at first. Where
rot restrained by some constitutional
provision this power is inherent in its
nature, design, and attitude; and the
community possess as deep and perma-
nent an interest in such power remain
ing in and being exercised by the Lcgis-
lature, when the public progress and
welfare demand it, as individuals or
corporations can in any instance pos
sess in restraining it,
In the case Of Laramie county rs.
Albany county ct ais, t92 U. s., 307,l
il is said that, except where the Consti-
tuition Of the State otherwise provides,
municipal corporations. such as conn-
ties, cities, and towns, are the mere
creations Of the legislative will and
inasmuch as ali their powers are de-
rived from that source, 1t follows
that those powers may be enlarged,
modified, or diminished at any time
without their consent or even without
notice. Their officers are nothing
more than local agents Of the State, aud