Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1885-08-15

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slaves what would be required to con-
tinue the war.
What more could Mr.. Seward say or
dor When Mr.. Hunter, after reca-
pitalasion Of tho subjects talked over in
The interview, said with feeling that il
seemed that " there could be no agree
mcnt. no treaty, no stipulation as to
terms, nothing but unconditional sub
mission, Mr.. Seward promptly replied
by Insisting that no such words as an
conditional submission had been used,
or any importing or justly implying
degradation, or humiliation even, to the
people Of the Confederate States. He
wisked 6is to be borne in mind"
MIR. Hunter again stated his view OF
the subject, end asked, ''What was this
but unconditional submission to the
mercy OF the conquerors ?" When,
"Mr. Seward replying, said They (the
Federals) we're not conquerors further
than they required obedience to the
laws, nor did he think that yielding to
the execution of'the laws under the
| Constitution of the United States could
be properly considered as unconditional
submission to conquerors, or as having
anything humiliating in it. The south
ern people and the southern States
would be under the Constitution of the
United States, with all their rights Sc
cured thereby, in the same way and
through the same instrumentalities as
the similar rights of the people Of the
other States WERE"
Thus completely foiling Mr. Hunter,
who in an informal conference seems
to have expected formal oyertures from
the opposite party, while he on his part
offered nothing even informally that
was tangible, Mr.. Seward, in his ac-
count Of the interview, says: "The
Richmond party approached the discus
sion rather indirectly, and at no time
did they either make categorical de-
mands or tender formal stipulations or
absolute reprisals."
Mr. Lincoln says: "By the other
party it was not said that in any ecsnt
or on any conditions they erer would
consent to reunion, and yet they equal
ly omitted TO declare that they never
would so consent"
Their positive instructions received
from President Davis called for Gtco
countries, and, as a matter of course,
they we're estopped from agreeing to
union on any terms.
The southern commissioners return
ed to Richmond and made their report,
and no one will doubt that Mr.. Ste
phens informed President Davis Of all
that t1ospired. lie says that he did.
If you read his account of it you can
not think that he was derelict in his
duty Isee Stephens's History United
States, page l0l0l, for he says that in
his interview with the President he
gave the details Of the conference much
more in detail than he gives it in his
history.
With all OF the facts thus placed be-
fore him, if he was afraid to trust to
Mr.. Lncoln's word or to his ability to
perform his promise, why did he (Mr.
Davis not advise his Cabinet and Con-
gress to ask for formal conference, in
which both sides could appear with
their clerks, witnesses, &C., and forBtu-
late such terms as might be agreed
upon! But il is not to be supposed
that Mr.. Davis would send such dis
tiuguished commissioners into the enc
my's lines to confer with men that he
well knew if he supposed for moment
that the Federal commissioners were
unreliable or without great influence.
To suppose such thing is to suppose
that he was incapable Of governing a
great country. The fact is he knew the
Federal commissioners were every way
reliable and trustworthy; that they
had great influence, and voiced the SEN
timents and views of their section.
The profIer Of conference came first
from the North. If Mr.. Davis wished
for peace without division Of the Union,
all he had to do was to follow up this
lead of negotiation, and he could have
had it without further loss of property
or life. 1t is plain that be could. But
the fact seems TO be patent from the
narrative that he gave way to his cha
grin and determined to win the horse
or lose the saddle"
Mr.. Stephens was we'll informed.
He had been through the enemy's
lines. He had no doubt both seen and
heard. He had seen the enemy's ar
rangements, and he tells you "that
he then considered the cause as ut
terly hopeless, and that he re-
fused to speak at either Of the meet
ings AFRICAN church or Capitol Square),
because he could not consent to i'm
press upon the minds Of the people the
idea that they could do what he be-
lieved to be impossible, or to inspire in
them hopes which he did not believe
could ever be realized"
lie Withdrew from Richmond and
went to his home in Georgia to await
the end he knew so well was coming.
lie left because he could not sanction
a policy (the continuance Of the war
which he thought would certainly end
in disaster. Was he unfortunate in his
associations?
MIR. Stephens tells us that he (Ste-
phens) opposed any written report
being made, and he has in so doing left
the strong inference that he signed the
one that was made pro lorna for
neither the report or the message to
Congress reflect the spirit of the inter-
view. think have shown that Mr..
Davis could have made peace, stopped
the effusion of blood, aud saved the SUBJ
sequent loss Of property if he had been
so minded, and as DR.. Jones has
said that he could not have done
so il he wished because Of the
temper Of the people," pass on to
review Of that question, and in
doing SO ] will rely almost wholly on
documentary evidence, as that will
doubtless DC most satisfactory to him
and to others, Let's see what the
documents say:
sin view Of all this, 1.-THE failure Of
pay, rations, Gel it was not strange
that the troops deserted at frightful
rate. ''-AcCabs's Life Of Lee, SO.