New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1885-12-27
POLICY OFTHE CONFEDERATES
WHAT THE ADMINISTRATION DID IN THE
AUTUMN OF 1861.
C0Dl1-ight 1885.


Constrained to leave Kentucky, for causes
foreign 70 the subject OF this article will merely STATE
that before my arrival In Nashville, Tenn cary L" coy
TENDER, 1861, had been advised by my physician" '''
the waters OF tho Hot SPRING OF ARKANSAS ""o''' ~
hest chances for my recovery from stroke or paralysis
which had disabled ms in the preceding ho"'u "
March But nv medical advisers did not consluer ~
prudent for me- In my then condition. to at'emp '"c
Journey TO the Hot Sprin,s until November. ""h
reached Nashville I 80 Thoroughly o"nV'ncou '"''
tho est policy for the Confederate STATES was W '0
an active and determined campaign OF invasion net"re
winter set In, determined to proceed at o"co |"
Richmond and join the army without waiting lo'
the fail restoration Of my health. ON the l'tn
OF September I was appointed Malor-"'"o'"
In the Confederate Army, and ordered 10 report ior S
to General j. T.. Johnston. who tnen comhahuo" '"'
Confederate forces in Northern Virginia win he"iqar
ters AZ Fairfax Court House was ut once ass'she1 "
command tho Second Corps o! JOhnstons arny-Iho
First Corus being commanded by BeauregrL ihmcui
atey after my arrival ut Fairfax Coart House Ie"'"on
that Generals Johnston and Betireslri were IN '"o VI
an active campaign OF INVASION before "'''o' ''' "
provided the army Northern Virginia conid DC rem
forced 10 an extent sufficient to justify such ah opera
t,on General Bealregarl was more prononnceI thah
General Johnston In advocacy OF Immediate mNa'on'
But the latter favored the plan. The ihnc"'"'e u
ton then was what should be done III order 10 o"u''
the requisite rcntJrcements, aud tue authority W Nan"
tie conicmp ateI cImpaign All three OF "a DfhoVo"
that IL President Davis would visit Tie army Iui con
ference With him might result in s sending tue rem
orcements needed AMI that he would apIroFe the con-
templai ed movement.
or eour,e no ore but General Johnston tho Com
mander OF the Army could request the PRESIDENT 10 s
the neaouarors serious difficulty arose here from the
fact that P,eNdcut Davis had only short time pte'-
ouslv written curt ami Insulting letter 10 1eh'rh
Johnston regard 20 the rank OF the latter however
the request fov President DAVIS to visit the army WAS
made by General but, 1t was aldrcSseu u INC
Secretary OF War In letter 20 the secretary datcd
September 26 1861. General Johnston sail; fhnS Tar
the enbers ana condition OF this army have at no uhe
,nstiael our assuming the offensive Tue dlnou'y VI
obtaining the means OF establishing p'''o'' "o"
Ey,rsport has given me the impression that
Won cannot nj present put this army IN condition 10 "
s,rne the of, nsve II ain mistaken IN ths' an" you
can furnish those means think 1t in orthJ tt' ct"'
hi xrelleucy the President yOurseIOr some one repre-
seutng you should here.upon the groindcJnef "'h INC
on this all important question"
The reasons why the Generals favored an active cam
paOn Of invasion before winter n were that the Con
federaes we're then we'll prepared rs they cOui ever
ma without arms from abroad; whilst the Federas were
nat vet ready to resist slch army the Confedoraes
cold sond into their country Bat II the dow was not
struck ia the OF 1851 before hard winter toV H.
tie spring campaign would open with large anu WI"
organized Federal army; while the Confederate army
wonld be weakened by tae expiration o. me term Oh Gu
lstmen OF about onehalf OF their men, Already trned
TO field service and elaed by victory In july precedile
at Manassas Crst Bull Rum, the Confederate army III
the early autumn OF 1851, was hopeful, DuOyahr anu
anxious to no led on 10 decisive contests
On tho Federal side the term OF enlistment OF the!r
three mouths volunteers had expired; and the enormous
new leyies assembled and assembling were for active
camumru operations little better than an armed moo
Bnt we all knew that IN six months II we allowed tneh
that length OF tmo FOR prepar'ti1n the now he"y 'S
sem led Federal forces would have bccon well organ
lied and disciplined army and we were sa'shcd U'"'
rercuen efforts would be made by tine Federal Govern
ment aud Northern people duIug the winter To rc"aro
for war on great scale They mad bouuiess resources
we had little or none beyond wnat had already been
made available In short the Conieicraes were re'uy
TO make campaign Of Invasion aud the Federa7 were
not rea iy to successfully ross it, If made with the thea
fu Confederate strength Besides, we were anxious 10
avoid the Of war In our own country and mucn
preferred that it s0ud take place on northern soil Inc
"Ieouliar institution" in our midst. which had such
marked influence In bringing on tho war, was an al
donai reason desiring that the struggle Should
be made in the enemy's country" But the strongest
rcason for taking the active offensive that the Con
federatc States In numbers and resources tue
weah err party, and their best not only chance TOT sue
cess was to combine their power and attack ln7'u o'
dividing their forces ul attempting Ia mat way 10 ne
fend all parts OF their country
In answer to General Jolns,ons letter OF September
26 the Secretary War wrote the 18TH saying tdt
the President would visit wtnin few days Tor
conference rs suggested by General johnston lie came
on the 30th OF September and was the guest OF "eher4
Beauregard General Johnston and called on MIN that
evening ct Beaure Iarrs, enl by appointment OF the
President we all met tho next evening for conference
Various matters OF detail introduced by the PfeSi-
dent and talked OYER himself and the Two senior
Generals This impressed with the belief that he was
more interested small detail, OF army organization
than he the great question lie WAS Invited thero
! to discuss and 10 decide.
Finally, with perhaps, some abruptness, SAID: MI
| .ih In Tn
dton TO assume the active Ofensvcl Aiding that this
was question OF vital Importance upon winch inc sue
cess failure OF cause might depend Ihls qneh
ton brought discussion IL Is well for me To state
here that the quotations just used are from paper the
rough draft OF which drawn up by me, about four
mcnt after the conference the request OF Generals
Beauregard and Johnston. That rough draft was care
fully considered ~ all three OF us in each others pres
cncc II amended until we were satisfied that u
was correct that gave fair idea OF all that oc
Cured ut that time In regard to the question OF our
crossing the Potomac" Three copies were made OF that
amended draft aud these were signed In trplicatc by
the three generals In Of each other January
Al lSG2 and each Of US retained OF the trpicate
papers.
| In that document thus signed it is stated that The
President asked what number OF men was necessary
IN my opinion TO warrant an offensive oanpagn 10 cross
the Potomac cut Oh the CONT luncat0n9 OF Inc enemy
with their fortified capital and carry the war into their
country answered Fiftg thousand elective, seasoned
soldiers explaining that, by seasoned soldiers, meant
such men as we had here present for duty" AT that
| time there were something over 10000 such men In
General Jobnston's army General Johnston and Cen
eral Beauregard both said that force OF 10000 such
men would be necessary" 1t Is thus that the num-
her OF relnforcemcnts asked for BY me was 10000
while Generals Beauregard and Johnston said 10000
| would te required.
Some time later the conference the President asked
me from what place places would suggest that such
ha 1ro,x Irc IVA
a nuestion COR him to decide. lie insisted that should
name the place places called his attention to the
fact that very recently arrived In the Confederate
States and knew too little Of the condition OF affairs at