The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-04-20
RUSSIA AND ENGLAND.


corps is all that could be desired by the COM
manders. the history of crack regiments ex-
tending; in many instances, over a century,
and including campaigns and hard fought
battles by the score. Until quite recently it
has been supposed that they were equipped
with the best arms procurable, so that Eng
lands fine soldiery, backed by what was
| claimed to be an invincible navy, has long
been regarded as among the most formid-
able in the world. Within the past
| few weeks, however, certain of the British
press have cast doubts upon points hitherto
generally conceded. The London Times has
found fault with the Martini-H Henry rifles
long stored in the Tower of London, CRITICS
ing them as antiquated in some respects, and
by no means equal in effectiveness to the arms
semi official sources, in the shape of fault
| finding with the government, that Englands
men-of-war are not seaworthy, in that
they have not sufficient coal capac-
| ity for an extended sea voyage,
nor can they weather rough seas. Such crit
cisms are natural enough and common enough
on the eve of possible conflict with another
great power, but it is probably true that Eng
lands army and navy are about all that could
be desired. 1t is undeniably true that in
case of collision with Russia England would
meet with an enemy more formidable than
any she has encountered since last Slav and
Saxon met in battle on the peninsula Since
then Russia has not been idle, but has made
great progress in the science of modern war
fare, and is now in better fighting condition
| than ever before.
To drive Russia away from Afghanistan
will be no easy thing for England to do. The
| fight at Penjdeh was evidently feeler, dare
to England, to test the mettle of British valor.
Of truth, neither Russia nor England is
quite ready for the death grapple of war.
Hence, the former temporizes, though in no
| degree relaxing her grip on the narrow wedge
of Afghan territory now held. 1t will require
yet some weeks, perhaps, for the
Cars commanders to concentrate for
midabe force on the boundary between Tur-
kstan and Afghanistan. Nor can England
push force from India across the lofty
mountains between Quetta and Herat with
out great trouble and unavoidable delay. A
slight advantage lies on the side Of the Car,
in that his broad possessions are well in hand,
and there is no visible danger of internal
troubles at any point within his dominions.
Even the Nihilists are silenced and it is NOR
ally certain that in contest between
Russia and any foreign foe they would be
thoroughly loyal The same may be said in
behalf of Ireland in event of hostilities. The
Irish are very much dissatisfied with the En-
| glish government, and feel that they have
been wronged, but if war be declared between
1 Briton and Russian, they will unhesitatingly
give hearty support to the former, with per-
haps a few unimportant exceptions.
The Russians would have the added add
vantage Of land communication with the scene
of greatest activity and the point
in dispute, WHILE except the con-
tingent which could be drawn from
Understandable though it may be-all of
England's forces must traverse thousands Of
miles of sea, to afterward make perilous
march over some of the most formidable
mountains in the world. On the side of
England would be the advantage Of the better
war fleet, which, in an open fight, would be
able to overcome that of Russia. But at the
same time England's vast shipping interests,
represented in every port in the world, would
offer fine game for Russian privateers,
which would doubtless infest the seas.
But while England and Russia
are reasonably safe at home, the former is by
no means secure in foreign possessions. At
this very time retreating from the Soudan,
the whole of Egypt would be almost sure to
slip from her uncertain grasp the day troops
began to move toward the scene of operations
in Afghanistan. The rebellion in upper Egypt
has assumed the proportions of a revolution.
How soon the infection might spread to Cairo
and Alexandria is apparent enough to cause
the gravest apprehension. To fight Russia is
to surrender Egypt, at least FOR the
present, to recover which, against the
prestige of defeat sustained in the Soudan,
would be very uncertain and very expensive
undertaking. 1t would seem, them that of
the two Russia is better prepared for the issue
of fight over Herat, the object of Russian
invasion. That blow has already been
struck by Russia and not promptly resented