New-York tribune., 1885-02-20
TIE EIGUT IN THE MING PO.

There are so macy unsolycd problems con-
ncctrd with maritime warfare under the
changed conditions of the present day that all
the world watches every naval operation with
close attention and deep interest. For many
years, however, there has occurred no Opp0r-
tunity To test the new weapons and dcfences
conclusivey. No war aflording opening for
a real naval battle has been waged for twenty
years. There was indeed chance, at the battle
of Lissa to test the practical value of irOnclads
as against one another, but unfortunately one
of the parties to that conflict would not fight
During the Russo Turkish war some things
occurred which tended to produce the impress
sion that automatic torpedDes, or torpedo boats,
might play very important, if not n leading
part in future naval warfare. Not much was
to have been expected in the way of emil ghten-
mcnt from the Franco-Chincsc war, though as
the Chinese possessed several powerful iron
cads it was thought possible that by employing
European officers to sht them some serious
combats might occur So far as can now be
ascertained from the dispatches, the recent
engagement seems TO have been almost entirely
an affair Of torpedo boats. 1t is said that three
out OF five Chinese men-ofwar turned tail as
soon as the French ironclads came in sight
The other two appear to have made gallant
and for n time successful fight, but were finally
sunk by torpedo boats.
A dispatch from Admiral Courbet says that
the French fleet was rcpulsed four times. How
this could be if there were only two Chinese
vessels in line it is difficult to understand
Probably the three other Chinese ships did some
fighting before they ran away. But torpedocs
and not artillery, settled the question, and this
is the important point. For it is u fact that no
ironclad aoat possesses any real defence
against these weapons. All of their bottoms are
unarmorcd. nor, even If they were armored,
could they probably resist the explosion of u
heavy charge placed beneath them. And it is
certain that cthis comparatively easy way of
sinking the most Formidable ironcads will be
more and more followed, that hereafter the
safety of these floating fortrcsses will depend
not at all upon the weight of their batteries, but
upon the ability of their commanders to keep
of the torpedo boats which in every engage
mcnt will swarm round them like flies round
sugar barrel.
Since the indefinite multiplication of these
submarine assailants must reduce the detcns-
bility of the great ironclads to n minimum, it is
possible that this new mode of warfare may
compel the general abandonment of sea-going
ironclads, and reversion to small, lightly
armored, heavily armed, nimble vessels. The
fearful loss of life iDseparablc from the sinking
of the great ironclads must cause the naval
forces to be distributed morc and thus it is
possible that pitched naval battles of the old
fashioned kind will be rendered impossible, and
heavy iiOnclads be relegated altogether To the
duty of coast and harbOr defence. This is ccr-
ainly the tendency indicated by all recent
naval fighting, and the engagement in the
Nngpo fully confirms the conclusions which
naval authorities were previously disposed to
form as to the sea-ights of the future.