National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1885-06-27

Admiral Porter, in his forthcoming took,
frankly notes the weak condition Of the
navy at the outbreak of the rebellion, and
in long dissertation as frankly states what
should have been the policy Of the govern
ment. The following extracts are taken
from the sum Of his conclusions
At the outbreak of the great rebellion
our navy was not In condition to render
that assistance which the occasion de-
handed; the larger portion OF II was en-
ployed on foreign stations, and the govern
ment had not at its disposal class of yes
sells that could enter southern ports and act
Extensively
Had proper naval force existed at the
time the southern people fret proposed to
throw off their allegiance to the Union,
there would have been less difficulty In
suppressing the efforts of the secessionists,
for every southern harbor could have been
taken possession Of, our ports would have
remained in charge of the federal officers,
and II the south did obtain supplies from
Europe, they would have been obliged to
land them on the open coast
If two monitors like the Miontonomah
and the Monadnock could have entered
Charleston harbor when Sumter was first
threatened, they would have prevented the
erection of works for the bombardmont of
that fort, and would have held II through
out the war, as would have been the case
with all the ports on the northern coast
The first policy OF our government should
have been TO get possession of all the ports
in the south, and no doubt the admlnstra-
tion would gladly have done so, but for
their inability to carry out such designs II
entertained, owing to the fact that we had
no navy OF any account TO commence with.
Most OF our vessels OF war were at any rate
too large aud drew too much water to enter
the shoal southern harbors, and a majority
of them were sailing frigntes and sloops Of
war not at all suited to the work required
Of them.
Therefore the Navy Department had to
resort TO a system Of blockade which was
called for by all European nations with
which the south had held commercial rela-
lions. The southern people once recog
nized as belligerents, II was necessary to
close their ports, and the system Of blockade
resorted TO is unparalleled in the naval
records OF the world, reaching us IL did
along the entire sweep Of our Atlantic and
gulf coasts, from the Chesapeake to the
mouth of the Rio Grande.
So efficiently was the blockade main
tanned and SO greatly was 1t improved, that
foreign statesmen who at the beginning Of
the war did not hesitate to pronounce the
blockade Of nearly three thousand miles OF
coast o moral imposaibility, twelve months
after its establishment were forced TO admit
that the proofs of the blockade were 30
comprehensive and conclusive that no OBJ
jections to II could be made.
It's true they would point to the number
of blockade runners that eluded the vigil
lance of our vessels, hut they were fairly
startled with the number Of fast steamers
which were constantly falling into our
bands, and which the government often
bought and equipped for employment in
capturing. blockade runners. These latter
were built in large numbers In England
with much profit to the ship yards of that
country, but generally as fast as they were
built they were picked up by the improved
cruisers under the command Of some ener.
getic naval officers, and their loss was so
greatly felt by the southern people that
they were at times very much hampered, If
not crippled, thereby
What the loss to the confederacy was and
how severely injured they were in their re-
sources from abroad by the activity and
energy Of the navy, will appear from the
mention of the fact that during the war
1,119 prizes were brought in, of which num-
Der 2l0 were fast steamers.
There were also 1855 vessels burned, sunk,
driven on shore, or otherwise Destroyed
total of 1,504 The value of these vessels
and their cargoes, according to q low esti-
mate, was equal to $4,000, 900. They were
condemned for amounts equal to SIS, 900 900.
Without the supplies which the confed-
tTuttb bntl CuuiN HUI
have maintained their position for six
months, for they were very destitute, as
compared with the north, Of all the APP
liances for making weapons OF war, or for
furnishing clothing and other material nee
essary to armies. Hence, IL might be well
said that without the close blockade which
was kept up by the navy the war might
have been carried on indefinitely, while the
battles would have been far more bitter and
bloody than they were. The naval battles
that were fought were more exciting to the
public than that close, dreary blockade, but
doubt very much IL they were of any
more value to the Union cause. .
With the capture of the last of the enemy's
seaports from which they had been drawing
all their supplies, the rebellion was vir-
tually ended.
THE MONITOR AND MRRRISAc.
Admiral Porter describes the transforma-
tion OF the hull of the Merrimac, saved
from the general destruction of the Norfoll;
navy yard, to an ironclad which, ''thus
equipped, differed and manned, repres-
ented at the moment the most powerful
fighting ship In the world" adding, "the
federal government might well feel uneasy
at the tidings which threatened to carry
destruction all along the northern coast
OF her commander he says:
She was placed under the command OF
Flag Officer Franklin Buchanan, who re-
he had reaped the highest rewards that
could be bestowed In time of peace. He
was q man of undoubted courage, and hif
professional ability was Of the first order
Buchanan was fortunate In surrounding
himself with excellent officers, men capable
Of performing any naval duty, and 1t may
be remarked that no commander was eve
better seconded by his subordinates. w,
had several large steam frigates Mt thai
time which might have been cut down anC
covered with iron In much better fashion
than was done in the case of the Merrlmac
The department, II is true, contracted
for ironclad vessels, but two of then
were far behind time in building ant
the other was a 'little nondescript" thai
no one in the Navy Department with the ex
ception of Commodore Joseph Smith hat
any confidence in. This vessel, designed b.
John Ericsson, was to be paid for only II
case she proved successful against TIN
enemy's batteries, hut had the steam
frigates been cut down aud plated we neet
have given little anxiety to the appearance
of the Merrimac or any other vessel, ant
would have been the first In the field witt
this new factor in war, which was to reyo
lutionize naval warfare.
But there are many things we cannot &C
count for--we receive humiliation at first h
teach us not to underrate an enemy
Providence came to our assistance In al
emergency with "Ericssons nondeseript'
to show what skill and enterprise could d.
in behalf of the Union.
AS the Monitor Of Ericsson approache
completion the Navy Department hurrie
the work, on learning that the Merrlma
was further advanced than they had SUI
posed.
This was in consequence of the fact tina
Comd'r David ID. Porter had been sent /
New York TO examine the vessel and repoT
IA 40 n n