New-York tribune., 1885-07-24
THE BLOODY MAROA TO RICHMOND


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THE BLOODY MAROH TO RICHMOND
The advance against Richmond began at midnight
of May 3. 1864, and the surrender of Lee at Apo
mattoS Court House took place on April 9, 1868
The fierce death grapple of the Confederacy lasted,
therefore, nearly an entire year. The relative
situations OF the hostile sections were widely
different at the opening of the final struggle. The
North, with It's inexhaustiblc resources its vast
armies. its moral strength. and its growing conf.
dence In victory born of repeated successes was
lust beginning to feel its power. The South was
slowly yielding to exhaustion. 1t had few
resources its armies had been reduced and weak
eucd by captures and slaughter and its lines were
being steadily driven backward. = Grant, who cared
as little for the formulas of the pedagogue soldiers
rs Napoleon. and made without regard to pre-
cedents, saw that the great thing now was to beat
the Confederate armies to pieces rather thanAto
take strongholds Territory was hardly al object
and brute force was to be more effective thar
strategy. To use his own words: 81 therefor
determined frat, to use the greatest number
troops possible against tho enemy; second u
hammer continuously against the armed force o.
the enemy and his resources until by mere attritior
if in no other way there should be nothing left t.
him" He had big hammer to use on Lee-l3O,Ooo
men against 10000. Besides these Grant had "a
column of 10000 the y ines to threaten TIE
flank of Richmond, and 10000 more for move
ents in the Kanawha and Shenandoah Valleys.
General Grants own reflections on the Wilderness
campaign are found in his autobiography:
Operating were in an enemys country. and sup
piled always from distant base. large detacments had
at all times to he sent from the 'front.' not only 10 guard
the base OF supplies and leading It, but all
The roads leading to our 1anks and We were also
operating in q country unknown to us, and without
competent guides maps showing the roads accurately
Estimating Lees strength in the same manner as ours
the enemy had not less than 10000 men at the start
His renforcements during the campaign were about
equal TO o. deducting our discharged men and those
sent oacK Lee Was on the defensive. and In country
IN which every stream every road every obstacle to the
familiar TO him and his army. The citizens were a
him with sccnpats sd reports o r % 1%I ar R
guards were not necessary for him. and having always
nd ~ ,s naeE large wagon trains % %efe MOI re-
any advantage OF numbers.
When Grants army crossed the Rapidan, Lee wa
Just below it. and Gr.s,s plan TO turn the robe
right beyond the Wilderness, and then throw his
army between Lee aud Richmond. But 10 had now
to deal with of the best stratcgists if not the
very hest. the South had produced. While Grant
moving through the Wilderness trusting to the
difficulties of the region for tho protection of hi
flank, and planning only what lie should do wheu
he had passed through it, he was suddenly attacked
by Lee. The bloody battles Of the Wilderness,
AoAoWcu-d WraDgIc ID jungle where ucitnei
cannon nor cavalry could be used-costing Grant
10000 and Lee 10000. Tie Army of tn
Potomac. accustomed to fall back when failure t.
accomplish its intent was palpsbe. awaited the
order to return across the Rapdan. But 1T was now
commanded by tho man who amid the disasters
Pttsburg Landing calmly reasoned out the certaIn
success of the morrow. AS he found that Lees Z
attack upon his faux had ended through eS-
haustion, he silently drew out his troops and (
renewed his march toward Richmondp I" Ohio IN I
the War; During the fighting Grant had uttered Z
another of those sayings that give the secret of his
obstinacy aud success. alt has been my expert
ence," said he, that though the southerners fight
desperately at first yet when hang for a day |,
or two,we whip them awfully." (Swinton's }
Decisive Battles of the War; The first advance {
on Richmond having been foiled, the second wns E
made toward Spottsylvania Court House But when L
Grant reached IL MAY 81 he was received with
fierce musketry fire from Lees advance That able (;
strategist had checked him again. The first day
was, ON the whole, favorable TO the Union forces
ana Grant teiisgtapnes 1 70 Mashlngto9 that the
the enenys loss gre than hie 0wn aud that
be proposed to fight 1t out thls line If it takes
oil summer"-which words became famous But y
the next day there bloody rspulse. with loss
of 5000 or 6,0oe men; two days later another. q
With loss of 5000 more Seven days more o! 3
blind attacks or attempts IL attack followed. Al 81
last on the 20th of May. Grant, finding himse ?,
fairly checkinatod silently withdrew. and started H
again toward Richmond. Meantime ne had put in q
of the cavalry little man whose fiery x
courage lie had noticed at Missionary Ridgo-Phihp q
n. Sheridan-and sent him on a tying expedition a
around Lees rear to Rchmsnd, which brought back IA
much information. Butler at the same lime E
against Richmond. On the 23d o. "a
May Grant reached the North Anna River, only h. q
zee Lees army in strong position on the other "
hide. Grant checked again. This was E
evidently All antagonist TO be feared and respected
There was some fighting, but Grant finally turned "
away, crossing the Pamnnkey River, aud going n
toward tho Chckahominy. Lee having the Shorter e
route 10 travel kept we'll In front OF him. and at last
ytood in the absolutely impregnable rihe-pts o. 81
Cold Harbor. only fifteen miles from Richmend. q
Ind covering the approaches to the Chckah0miny n
River preliminary contest for position June II
asting hardly more than quarter of hour, cost q
him III 900 men; and when orders weut cut to IA
'cDew it, the whole line, without any previou. n
.oucert, absolutely refused to meve They were 81
!ishcartened by such butcbery. a
The official figures show that Grants losses from d
he Rapdan 30 the James, May 3 to June Is, bad H
'cen 55,55k killed, wounded and missn gan b
yeraye of over 1,300 mon u day since the start
lees loss varI0uslv stated from 20 600 to 81 900
;rant only gathered resolution from his reversos d
10 determined TO abandon the overland route a
gaIn,t Richmond, to let Washington take care Of 4
amos River. making RIchBond his objective point n
nste2d OF Lees Amy. By fsgnod noyeinsnts he n
cpt Lee IN doubt as TO his pGns intending hy q
1dden stroke to capture Pccrsburg TO the south OF
Richmond when Hiehmond Itself would have H.
AL. But unfortunate delays aud mishsps gave 3
,ees advance time T. rcack Petersburg aud again p
Dnfront Grant. mahing barrier whtch he was moi n
pass Tor nine months to come.
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n r ~ ~ n III