The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-05-31
A WAR "REMINISCENCES.
What President Lincoln Thought of General
Mcclellan.

Communication in Philadelphia North American.
| / see General Mcclellan is trying to make peo-
| pie believe he would have been successful in
his campaign had not the administration inter
| Stanton worked against him. also that re influ-
enced President Lincoln to work against him,
! which was the cause of his failure. The truth
| is, Mcclellan was a chronic grumbler and he
annoyed the administration more than all the
| other generals combined. He would have taken
troops from any general in the field to reinforce
| the army of the Potomac, and because the ad-
mnistratiop would not give him the troops of
other generals he charged them with working
against him. He seemed to have the opinion of
| the fellow who said: ''Of all my daddie's chill
dren, love myself the best. IL Uncle Sam
takes care of me, may the devil take the rest.
He seemed to think his head contained all the
brains there was in the army.
We have heard great deal about military
dictators during the last twenty years, but dur
ing the war Mcclellan was the only dictator
heard OF In letter which he wrote to Presi-
dent Lincoln dated Harrison's Landing, July 7,
1867, he told Mr. Lincoln how to manage both
the army and the government liz order TO make
the war successful What Mr. Lincoln thought
of General McCleilans charge that the adminstra-
ton had not properly sustained him will be
found in the following letter;
s'WAsHINGToN, April g. 1862.
my Dear SIR Your dispatches complaining
that you are not properly sustained. while they
'Blenkers division was withdrawn from you
before you left here, and you know the pressure
under which l did it, and so l thought
acquiesced in it-certainly not without reluct-
ance.
"After you left, ascertaincd that less than
20, 600 unorganized men, without single field
battery, were all you desired to be left for the
defense of Washington and Manassas Junction
and part of this even was to go to Genera! Hook
er's old position. General Banks's corps once
designed for Manassas Junction, was diverted
and tied up on the line of Winchester and Stras-
burg, and could not leave it without again
exposing the upper Potomac and the Balti-
more & Ohio railroad. This presented, or
should be gone a great temptation to the enemy
to turn back from the Rappahannock and sack
Washington. My implicit order that Washing
ton should by the Judgment of all the command
ers of army corps. be left entirely secure had
been neglected. 1t was precisely this that drove
me to detain Mcdowell
Il do not forget that was satisfied with your
arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas june
ton; but when that arrangemen was broken up
and nothing was substituted for it, of course
was constrained to substitute something for it
myself And allow me to ask, do you really
think should permit the line from Richmond
via Manassas junction to this city to be entirely
oren, except what resistance could be presented
by less than 20, 600 unorganized troopsl This is
question which the country will not allow me
to evade.
'1here is curious mystery about the mum
Der of troops now with you. When telegraphed
you on the 9th saying you had over hundred
thousand with you, had just obtained from the
Secretary of War statement taken as he said,
from your own returns, making 108 900 then
with you and en- route to YOU You now say
you will have but So, 900 when all en- route to
you shall have reached you. How can the dis
crepancy of $4,000 be accounted FORT
"As to General Wool's command, understand
it is doing for you precisely what like number
of your own would have to do if that command
was away.
II suppose the whole force which has come
forward for you is with you by this time. And
ii so, | think it is the precise time for you to
strike blow. By delay the enemy will rela
lively gain upon you-that is, be will gain faster
by Notifications and renforcements than you
let me tell you it IS indispensable to You that you
strike blow l am poweress to help this
You will do me the justice to remember that
always insisted that going down the bay in
search of field instead of fighting at or near
Manassas was only shifting and not surmount-
ing difficulty that we would find the same en-
envy and the same or equal intrenchments at
either place. The country will not fail to note
is now noting-tbat the present hesitation to
move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story
of Manassas repeated
Il beg to assure you that have never written
you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feel
ing than now, nor with fuller purpose to sus-
tain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment
| consistently can. But you must act Very
respectfully, A. LINCOLN"
1t seems to me that this letter speaks for it.
self.