The Hocking sentinel. [volume] (Logan, Ohio) 1871-1906, 1885-07-30

lie naU Dcen ldiiufo up " thC
time he was summoned to Spring
field to act as military adviser of
the Governor of Illinois in fitting
out troops. He graduated low
down in the list at West Point,
and in the old army and in the
Mexican war, though he did his
duty as a subaltern there was
nothing above the commonplace.
On the other hand Lee, with
whom he was to contend and de-
feat in great battles in Virginia.
came out of the Mexican war
with high military reputation
as the inspiring genius of SCOTS
brilliant cf mpaign.
Grant S id of himself in 1860
that he had played the battle of
life and lost, and seemed content
to sink into the most insignificant
emp!oyments. The civil war
bronghtout qualities few dreamed
of, and they were the ones most
needed at the outset of the con-
flict. He was inflexible in pur-
pose and determined in execu-
ton; not easily discouraged.
hardly knowing when he had the
worst of it, and always intent on
hammering away. Hard blows
followed by harder ones were
the beginning and ending of his
strategy. At Shiloh he had a
narrow escape from being re-
manded to the list of failures,and
a great lesson as to his personal
conduct, which he took to heart
and improved on. That Of Vicks-
burg was probably the greatest
campaign of his career; not in
its results, but in the skill and
tenacitS successfully exhibited
against equal or superior num-
sers with the advantage of posi-
ton against him. But it was
when transferred to Virginia we
get tie fruits of Grants ripened
judgment as to the way the war
could be successfully fought out
and the rebellion crushed. That
was by "atirition'-the word is
General Grants. If the enemy
couldn't be beat in battle, wear
them out by continual hammer
ing. The North could lose three
men to their one. and at that
rate must win. That was Grants
strategy. There must be no eX-
change of prisoners to recruit the
rebel army. This was cruel to
our own soldiers, but a necessa-
ry part Of the plan. The resour-
ces of the North in men, money
and war material were unbound
ed. The South had been grow
ing weaker since the defeat at
Gettysburg. The campaign OF
'.attrition' won, witness Lees
broken battalions at Appatomax.
But General Grant had advanta-
ges possessed by no other com
mander in Virginia. He had con-
quered position at the West
that enabled him TO defy the
malign influences and interfer-
| euce of the Washington cabaIs,
! that had wrought misfortune OF
| defeat for Mcdowell, Mcclellan.
Burnsides, Hooker and Meade
And then he commanded the
best disciplined and seasoned
afsay ever gathered in defense
of the Union-one tried in the
! furnace of defeat as well as vic
tory. without McClellan's Or
ganization OF the army of the Po
tomac," said General Meade.
'.Grant's success would not have
been possible"
While it is probable there were
other Northern generals greater
masters OF that military strategy
and power Of combination that
produce great results with the
smallest loss, yet 10 other had
the hold on the people or the
confidence of the Gov rnment
necessary to carrying out this
campaign of s'attrition" that
! Grant had. The people were
back of him in his constant ham
mering, and the bloody fields
from the Rapidan to Richmond
did not weaken their confidence
or relax the mastIve-like hold he
| had on the life Of rebellion. II
went down from sheer exhaustion
before foe better prepared al
The close of the war than at any
ether period to continue the
Struggle.
! The surrender Of Lee, with hi:
chiyalric generosity 10 4 brave
| but PROSTATE foe, was the climax
OF General Grants career. If all
public employment outside Of bis
profession had ended there, il
/ would have been to his adYanta age
| and honor. The unerring judg=
ment OF men hat was a distin-
gushing trait Of his military ca
reer failed him in civil life. It
see.le} reversed, and he had
abou! hila, and in government