The Vermont watchman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1883-1911, 1885-09-02
General Grant as a Commander.

colonel Albert Clarke, formerly OF
the st. Adams Messenger, delivered an
able address at the Grant memorial ex-
ercises in Natick, Mass, August Sth.
Of General Grants career in the war
of the rebellion, Colonel Clarke spoke
as follows:
Up to the time of the capture of
Fort Donelson he had done nothing
in life but that thousands of others had
done as well, and even that event he
afterwards said he would have con-
Quoted differently if he had it to do
over. He was not believer in chance,
but in method. In his philosophy sue
cess was not gamble; it was a result.
Opportunity with him meant duty.
Events might come, but they would
come mostly as they were shaped.
Somebody must decide, and he was
willing to take the responsibility. All
obtainable knowledge was the fOunda-
ton of all his plans, and though tenac-
ity was the most marked trait of his
charactar, no fond theory ever stood
with him a moment against undoubted
facts. He regarded truth as so all
important that he welcomed it from
every source. His dignity was not Of
iShuNu IL a. newspaper
told him of an endangered position and
suggested the means of relief; on the
contrary, he was glad to know the fact
and happy to intrust his informer with
message ordering up support. He
never called formal council of war:
but this was because he took his army
into his confidence and gathered knowl-
edge from every source. He did not
dazzle by brilliant qualities, but shone
by the common virtues not observable
in ordinary men, but greatest in the
greatest For instance, his consider
alton for others-a quality that any of
us can imitate-drew men to him and
fastened them with hooks of steel. If
he had occasion to rebuke an officer, it
was done delicately and in private.
Annoyed as few men ever were, he
never betrayed weakness by passion.
Unselfish, he disarmed all mean per-
sonal opposition. Thoughtful, careful
self-possessed, he inspired confidence.
Earnest, persistent and brave, he held
men to the death hug because they
knew that he was right. The valuable
thought occurred to him early in the
war that whatever trepidation he might
feel, his antagonist was equally dis
turbed. When he was almost defeated
he felt that the enemy was almost de-
feated also. He knew that war was
not all strategy nor all bayonet charges,
but largely a question of endurance.
He believed in the logic of blow after
blow. In that fearful thirty five days
campaign from the Wilderness to Cold
Harbor, when he lost more than fifty
thousand men, it would have been re-
freshing to his army to turn back and
try some other field. They were used
to that. 1t would have been refreshing,
but it would also have been discourag.
ing. He knew and they knew that
economy of life would be found in
economy of time, in unrelenting press
ure, in the determined tug of war:
and the country, although filled with
mourners, had sense of relief when
he sent to the President that grim as.
surance, propose to fight it out on
this line if it takes all summer Let
us not, however, fall into the common
error of supposing that what is called
his bulldog grip was the CHIEF
cause OF his success. A less ag9ree,
able commander could not have main
tanned that grip. He and his army
were one. His purpose filled them in
stead of pushing them. With the ut
most power to command, he usually
suggested. 1t was they who were per
forming the great feats, not he. Taci
turn, his words had weight. Consid
crate, he could expect prodigies o.
valor. So IL was his plain good quail