The Sedalia weekly bazoo. [volume] (Sedalia, Mo.) 187?-1904, 1885-04-14

The Federal forces were not expecting
an attack. and were not prepared for
It. Even when it came. they regarded
il at first as only a reconnaissance in
force. General Sherman, who was at
the front. so interpreted it. ''Beaure-
gard. he said. lis not such fool As 10
leave his base Of operations and attack
us i'm ours" On the other hand, the
Confederates entered on an aggressive
campaign with divided counsels- The
second in command was halt sick, had
no faith in an assault, and no expecta-
ton of success.
General Grant apparently insists that
the Federal forces were not defeated on
the first day. But we think the facts
do not bear out this claim. His front
had been forced back nearly or quite
two miles. General Prentiss' division
had been captured en- nadSse-2, 200 Off
GERS and men. The Federal camps were
in the possession of the enemy. What
the Confederates could or would have
done on the morrow II Ineu
leadership had remained I'm.
changed must ALWAYS remain mat
ter of opinion. That the wearied
sssailants could have driven the Federal
forces into the river, or cut of their re-
treat, and enforced their surrender. is
TO us Incredible, even if the Federal
army had not been reinforced on the
morrow by part of General BuelT's
forces, and by the gunboats. But the
attempt was not even made. The death
OF General johnson devolved the COM
mand on General Beauregard; and the
change of commanders brought
change of policy. At the council of
war on Saturday afternoon General
Beauregsrd had urged that the army
withdraw TO COrinth. On Monday
morning he ordered that withdrawal to
take place. The first DAYS battle of
Shiloh was Confederate attack under
one commander. The second DAVIS
battle was Confederate retreat under
another commander Both were meas
urably successful. IL is. indeed, rarely
the case that change of command and
a change of policy takes place on the
field of battle with so little resultant
disaster 10 the arms as resulted to the
Confederates from their change of COM
manders and policy at the battle of
Shiloh.
This battle singularlv illustrates how
far the fortunes of war depend upon
what we call accident If General
Johnston had lived he would have pur- |
sued on Monday the aggressive policy |
of SUNDAY. and his army would have |
either won a.Yictory or suffered rout |
And thas he did not live was due to &C
cident. A stray shot cut an artery in |
his leg. An extemporized tourniquet |
would have stopped the bleeding. But
half an hour earlier he had dismissed the |
who up to that time had ac- !
him, TO attend wounded
Federal prisoners. There was no one
present at the moment who knew
enough to tie up the artery, and General
Johnston bled 10 death. His humanity /
o Federal prisoners cost him his life.
On the other hand, General Grant, Col
,nel Mcpherson and Major Hawkins,
'ecOnnoitering the field together, sud-
ienly found themselves subjected to a
harp muSket fire from a concealed bat
cry. Major Hawkins lost his hat; Col
mel McPherson'S horse was shot
through the body and lived just long
enough to take him out of danger; and
he scabbard of General Grants sword
vas taken off by a ball. If the one ball
lad missed General Johnston, and the
,ther ball had struck General Grant,
he commander of the Federal forces.
lot of the Confederate forces, would
rave been changed. and the issue of the
'attle of Shiloh might have been differ
nj. Christian Union.