The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-04-22

Kushk river To this reply: Tash Kepri is
Kurti for PuliKhisti. General Komarofs
able The left bank has always been
held by the Afghans, and was never subject
to Russian occupation On the 10th OF Februa-
ry the Russians located an outpost OF twenty
FIVE Turkomans at KiziI-Tepe, mound one
mile north of Pul-i-Khisti, and about one mile
from the nearest point on the kushk river and
the Kushks junction with the Murghab river.
This had always remained the extreme limit OF
the Russian advance within their line OF vi
dettes. The Russian cavalry detachment al
luded to did advance almost to Pull Khisti on
March 20, but they retired before reaching there,
when warned by the Afghan commander, as
they had been on Feb. 90.
'Secondly-General Komaroff states that near
the bridge he found ntrenchmentS occupied by
Afghans. reply that this position was occupied
by the Afghans previous to General Komaroifs
advance and previous to the agreement OF
March IL.
"Thirdly-General Komaroff says: Tn order
to avoid a conflict l placed my troops five yersts
from the Afghan position In reply to this,
! can only refer to the main BODY, as Russian
troops were in Kzel-Tepe, one mile from the
Afghan position, and the Russian videttes were
considerably in advance of that point
"Fourthly-General Komaroff says: When
the Afghans were convinced that we had no
intention of attacking them they began to come
nearer to our camp / reply that, so far from
the Afghans being convinced of General
Komaroff's innocent intentions, they continued
irritating daily attempts to provoke hostilities,
which convinced the Afghans that the Russians
determined to provoke conflict. This induced
the Afghans to what appeared military neces-
sity in extending their defensive operations.
"tlfthv-General Komaroff states that on the
9th of March the Afghans sent a company,
which was charged with covering a reconnois-
sance, three companies with cannons, and some
cavalry. In reply to this | say that reconnois-
sance in force itself meant hostilites Rus
sian company means 250 men--more than an
equivalent to three Afghan companies, which
aggregated 225 men. On the 9th two bodies of
Russians simultaneously advanced. Colonel
Alikhanof, with cavalry, pushed past Pull
khisti, and the Russian infantry penetrated to
the right flank of the Afghan position, on the
right bank of the Murghab. Colonel Alikhanoff
only retired when intercepted by the Afghans.
The cavalry was four miles in the rear of the
Afghans. The Russian infantry only retired
when the Afghan commander drew up his COM
panies, warning the Russian officer if he ad-
vanced further he would be fired upon. General
Komaroff's chief of staff, at an interview had on
the Goth, called Colonel Alkhanoffs advance
merely pleasure trip, but he was informed that
the Afghan commander viewed it in most seri-
Gus light
'Sxthly-General Komaror states that the
arrogance and audacity of the Afghans increased
by degrees. / reply that it may have been 80;
but, if so, it was entirely caused by Russian
ton. 1t was solely owing to their patience and
forbearance during two months of incessant irri-
commanders courteous reply of March %, to
General Komaroffs ultimatum proves his wish
to the last to avoid conflict. General KomaroH
says that, on the 2Sth, the Afghans occupied
point commanding the left flank of the Russian
camp, and began to throw up intrenchments
there, to establish post of cavalry behind the
Russian line, and placed picket within gunshot
distance. l reply that the Afghan commander
did, on the 18th, after the hostile reconnaissance
of the 9th, place post of observation on the
right of MurChah for "a aDI1rnO
of giving notice of any fresh Russian advance,
but the post was withdrawn the next day.
"Eighthly-General Komaroff says that
the 29th lie sent to the Afghan commander an
energetic summons, ETC., and received an an
swer that by advice of the English, he, the
Afghan commander, refused to retire across the
kushk river. II reply to this, l may say that
the statement Itself, AS reported to me- is totally
incorrect. Nowhere in the Afghan commanders
reply is there any such statement; on the con-
trary, its wording is distinctly thus: L have duly
received your letter regarding the withdrawal of
certain pickets. AS had received orders from
the government at Herat to consult Captain
Yate, who was deputed to 60 to Penideh by Sir
Peter Lumsden, in such matters, / showed him
your letter. Captain Yate afterwards had an
interview with Colonel Zakrichewski, and in
formed me of the conversation which ensued.
Be it known to you that must Loyalty obey the
orders have received from his Highness, the
Amcer can no wise act contrary to the orders
of my sovereign. Of course, in matters of de-
Tall, Eucn as alterations IN the position or the
advanced pickets and videttes, l am prepared
to arrange with you with view to the avoid
ance of a conflict
"Ninthly-Genera Komaroff says he again
addressed a private letter. couched in friendly
terms. In reply, 1 say the letter in question
was never seen by any officer of the commission,
but Captain Delashal was told letter had been
received a few hours before the Russian attack
on the 30th. have now called for COPY of the
second letter.
Tan n "
the 3oth, to support my demands, marched
with my detachment against the Afghan posi-
ton, counting still a pacific result, but ar
tilery fire and cavalry attack compelled me
advanced to attack the Afghan position Of
course, the Afghans were obliged to defend
themselves. Certainly the engagement was not
commenced by artillery fire, as General Kom-
aroff states, as infantry firing heard, contin-
uing several minutes before the first guns"