The Sedalia weekly bazoo. [volume] (Sedalia, Mo.) 187?-1904, 1885-04-14
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH,

An Apparently Impartial aad Uapre5u
diced View of the Much Mooted Quss
oons Connected with this Impostan
Adair-The Discrepancies OF History III
iustrated-The IssHes Of the Battle Pros,
ably Determined by an Accident.
The difficulty which the consideration.
historian has to overcome in getting a.
the truth is curiously illustrated by ,
careful reading of the two articles or
the Battle of Shiloh" in the February
Century, the one by General Grant, the
other by Colonel William Preston John
ston, son of General Johnston. and on
the staff of jefferson Davis. One gives,
of course, the Federal, the other
che Confederate, side. Not only
is their Interpretation of the aims and
purposes of the combatants, and in their
estimate of the significance and result
OF the fIrst days battle, do they differ,
but In their accounts of events. even in
minor details. Thus Colonel Johnston
credits Grant with an armv of $4,000,
nearly $1,000 of whom were electives,
while he allows the Confederate COM
mander $4,000, of whom but 10000
were available for combat General
Grant, on the contrary, gives the entire
strength OF the Federal army at 80, 900,
of whom not more than %, 900 were in
line on the first day. OF course Gen
eral Grants statement of his own forces
is official and conclusive; but the fact
illustrates the discrepancies of history.
The battle of Shiloh was one of the
nnf Hnf las h. IA
whether estimated by the number of
men engaged in it, by the character of
the Generals commanding, by the des-
perate nature of the conflict, by the I'M
certainty of the result during the whole
OF the first day, or by the consequences
which ensued from the Confederate de-
feat and which might have cnsued from
a Federal defeat. The Confederate au-
thorities have always insisted that Gen
eral Grant was virtually beaten at the
end of the first days fight, and that
nothing saved his army but the death
of General Johnston, and the conse-
quent change of commanders. Gener-
al Grant was freely charged at the time
with being intoxicated, and severely
criticised for putting undisciplined men
at the front without earthworkS. The
newspaper correspondents had General
Prentiss' division surprised and capt
ured at the very beginning of the fight.
Some of these then current errors are
corrected, so far as we know for the first
time officially, by General Grants pa
per. General Grant horse fell on him,
and nearly disabled him, two DAYS be-
fore the battle. The raw levies were
put at the front purposely, General
Grant trusting to their commander,
General Sherman. to compensate for
their ineXperience-a trust repoSed not
in vain. And General Prentiss' divis-
ion fought bravely and effectively
throughout the day, and were not capt
ured till after four o'clock in the after
noon.
: The man OF Northern prejudiceS will
read General Grants paper, and will
but glance at Colonel Johnston's. The
man of Southern prejudi res will console
himself with Colonel Johnston convic-
ton that the battle of Shiloh was won
on the first day, and was lost on the
second only because the Confederate
was killed. The impartial
historian, accepting the yeracity, but
not necessarily the judgments, of both
authors will compare the two papers TO
reach true understanding of this mo-
mentous battle, and will find in General |
Grants frank confession of his miSap- |
prehension OF the strength of the Con- !
federacy, and in Colonel Johnston's
of the divided counsels in the /
Confederate army the two clues TO the |
true interpretations of the events of the !
day.
s'Up to the battle of Shiloh" SAYS |
General Grant, Il. as well as thousands |
of other citizens, believed that the re- !
bellion against the Government would !
collapse suddenly and soon If a decisive |
victory could be gained over any Of is
armies. This was substantially the |
universal opinion in the North. 1t was
even shared by many in the South. /
The fall of Forts Donelson and Henry |
opened the whole Southwest /
10 the Federal army. The North be- |
iieved that further resistance would be |
in vain. Thousands in the South !
shared that belief General Grant, a. |
soon as the dilatory Halleck gave him !
opportunity to move, acted in accord !
snce with his subsequent Instructions to /
General Sheridan before Richmond and |
pushed things. He hurried his army |
forward after the retreating Confederate I
forces, meaning to give lem no time to .
recover from their decentralization. He !
expected no other than Fabian policy I
IF slow retreat and sullen, but not
aggressive. resistance. Assuming that !
Inc Confederates would retreat, if /
pushed, he threw up no carthworks.
lie put raw levies al the front. He tele-
graphed to Halleck on Saturday night,
= / have scarcely the faintest idea of an
attack general oneJ being made upon
Us" The army, catching tire con!agion
Of his confidence, perhaps neglected to
keep out scouts in the front. This was /
charged at the time by newspaper cor
and is not specifically de
MED by General Grant. who does Speci-
Ill IL ~ alg,.r