Orleans County monitor. [volume] (Barton, Vt.) 1872-1953, 1885-05-04
GRANT AS A SOLDIER.

From an anecdotal and reminiscent
article by General Adam Badeau, on
the characteristics of Grant as a SOL
dier in the May Century Magazine,
we quote the following: "At the
close of the war, the man who had
led the victorious armies was not
forty-three years of age. He had not
changed in any essential qualities
from the captain in Mexico or the
merchant in Galena. The daring and
resource that he showed at Donelson
and Vicksburg had been foreshadow-
ed at Panama and Garita San Cosme
the persistency before Richmond was
the development of the same trait
which led him to seek subsistence in
various occupations, and follow for
tune long deferred through many un-
successful years. Developed by ex-
perienee, taught by circumstance,
learning from all he saw and even
more from what he did, few have
ever been developed or taught, or
have learned, he, nevertheless, main
tanned the self-same personality
through it all. The characteristics
of the man were exactly those he
manifested as a soldier-directness
and steadiness of purpose, clesrness
and certainty of judgment, self-reli-
ance and immutable determination.
Grants genius, too, was always
ready; it was always brightest in an
emergency. All his faculties were
sharpened in battle; the man who to
some seemed dull, OF even slow, was
then prompt and decided. When the
circumstances were once presented to
him. he was never long in determin-
ing. He seemed to have faculty of
penetrating at once to the heart of
things. He saw what was the point
to strike, or the thing to do, and he
never wavered in his judgment after
ward, unless, of course, under new
contingencies. Then he had no false
pride of opinion, no hesitation in un-
doing what he had ordered; but if
| the circumstances remained the same,
he never doubted his own judgment.
| | asked him once how he could be so
calm IN terrible emergencies, after
giving an order for corps to go into
battle, or directing some intricate ma
neuvre. He replied that he had
done his best and could do no better;
others might have ordered more wise
| ly or decided more fortunately, but
he was conscious that he had done
what he could, and he gave himself
no anxiety about the judgment or the
| decision. OF course he was anxious
about the accomplishment of his plans,
but never as to whether he ought to
have attempted them. So, on the
night of the battle of the Wilderness,
when the right of his army had been
broken and turned, after he had Civ
en- his orders for new dispositions,
he went to his tent and slept calmly
till morning. Not that he
was Indifferent to human life or hu-
man suffering. have been with him
when he left a hurdle race, unwilling
to see men risk their necks needless
ly; and he came away from one of
Blondin's exhibitions at Niagara, an
CRY and nervous at the sight of one
poor wretch in gaudy clothes crossing
the whirlpool on wire. But he could
subordinate Such sensations when ne
cessity required it. He risked his
life and was ready to sacrifice it, for
his country; and he was ready, if
need came, 10 sacrifice his country
men, for he knew that they too made
the offering.
1t was undoubtedly as fighter rath-
er than a maneuvrer that Grant dis
tinguished himself. He was ready
with resource and prompt in decision
at Belmont and Donelson, but it was
the invlncible determination at both
these places as we'll as at Shiloh that
won. AS with men, so with armies
and generals; skill and strength are
tremendous advantages, but courage
outweighs them all. In bat
tie, as in strategical movements,
Grant always meant to take the ini-
tiative; he always advanced, was al
ways the aggressor, always sought
to force his plans upon the enemy;
and if by any chance or circumstance
the enemy attacked, his method of !
defense was an attack elsewhere. At |
Donelson, as we have seen, when his |
troops were pushed back on the right |
he assaulted on the left f; and this
was only one instance out of hun
dred. This, too, not only because
he was the invader, or because his |
forces were numerically stronger, but
because it was his nature in war to |
assail. In the Vicksburg campaign
his army was smaller than Pember-
toms; yet he was the aggressor. In
the operations about Iuka mis- posi-
ton was a defensive one, but he at
tackled the enemy all the same. 1t
was his idea of war to attack inces-
sanity and advance invariably, and
thus to make the operations of the
enemy part and parcel of his own
The RUBY AND THE DIAMOND.-ItI |
is perhaps not generally known that
large ruby is of more value than
large diamond. Mr.. Streeter, who
wrote book about jewels, states