Thomas County cat. [volume] (Colby, Kan.) 1885-1891, 1885-03-26
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

diced View of the Much Mooted Oues-
tions Connected with this Important
Anair-The Discrepancies of History H.
lustrated-The Issues of the Battle Prob
ably Determined by an Accident.
The difficulty which the conscientious
historian has to overcome in getting at
the truth is curiously illustrated by a
careful reading of the two articles on
the Battle of Shiloh in the February
Century. the one by General Grant, the
other by Colonel William Preston john
ston, son of General Johnston, and on
the staff of Jefferson Davis. One gives,
of course, the Federal, the other
the Confederate. side Not only
is their Interpretation of the aims and
purposes of the combatants, and in their
estimate of the significance and result
of the first days battle. DO they differ,
but in their accounts of e,ents. even in
minor details. Thus Colonel Johnston
credits Grant with an army of 5000,
nearly $4,000 of whom were electives,
while he allows the Confederate COM
mander $4,000, OF whom but 10000
were available for combat General
Grant, on the contrary, gives the entire
strength of the Federal army at SO, OGO,
of whom not more than $4,000 were in
line on the first day. OF course Gen
eral Grants statement of his own forces
is Ofiic al and conclusive; but the fact
illustrates the discrepancies of history.
The battle of Shiloh was one of the
great battles of the war 1t was great
1t Al, &c
men engaged in it, by the character of
the Generals commanding. by the des-
perate nature of the conflict, by the I'M
certainty of the result during the whole
of the first day. or by the consequences
which ensucd from the Confederate de-
feat and which might have cnsued from
Federal defeat. The Confederate all-
thorities have always insisted that Gen
eral Grant was virtually beaten at the
end of the first days fight, and that
nothing saved his army but the death
of General Johnston, and the cOnse-
quent change of commanders. Gener-
al Grant was freely charged ut the time
with being intoxicated, and severely
criticised for putting undiscipiined men
at the front without earthwOrks. The
newspaper correspondents had General
Prentiss' division surprised and capt
ured at the very beginning of the fight.
Some of these then current errors are
corrected, so far as we know for the first
time officially, by General Grants pa
per. General Grants horse fell on him,
and nearly disabled him, two days be-
fore the battle. The raw levies were
put at the front purposely, Gen' raj
Grant Trusting to their commander,
General Sherman, to compensate TO.
their ineXperience-a trust repoSed not
in vain. And General Praniiss' divis-
ion fought bravely and effectively
throughout the day, and were not capt
ured till after four O'Clock in the after
noon.
The man OF Northern prejudiceS will
read General Grants paper, and Will
but glance ut Colonel JohnstOn's. The
man of Southern prejudi :es will console
himself with Colonel Johnston : convic-
ton that the battle of Shiloh was won
on the first day, and was lost on the
second only because the Confederate
commander was killed. The impartial
historian, accepting the yeracity, but
not necessarily the judgments, of both
authors will compare the two papers to
reach Il true understanding of this mo-
mentous battle, and will find in General
Grants frank confession of his misap-
prehcnSion OF the strength of the Con-
federacy, anI in Colonel JOhnstonS
disclosure of the divided counsels in the
COME icrate army the two clues to the
true interpretations of the events of the
day.
'Up to the battle of SHILOH saws
General Grant, 81. as well as thousands
of other citizens. believed that the re-
bellion against the Government would
collapse suddenly and soon if Il decisive
victory could he gained over any of its
armies. This was substantially the
universal opinion in the North. 1t was
even shared by many in the South.
The fall of Forts DonelSon and Henry
apparently opened the whole Southwest
to the Federal army. The North be-
1ieved that further resistance would be
in vain. Thousands in the South
shared that belief. General Grant. is
soon As the dilatory Halleck gave him
opportunity to move, acted in accord
ance with his subsequent instructions to
General Sheridan before Richmond and
pushed things. He hurried his army
forward after the retreating Confederate
forces, meaning to give t lem no time to
recover from their generalization. He
expected no other than Fabian policy
of slow retreat and sullen. but not
aggressive, resistance. Assuming that
the Confederates would retreat. if
pushed, he threw up no earthworks
He put raw levies at the front. He tele-
graphed to Halleck on Saturday night,
Il have scarcely tho faintest idea of an
attack general oreJ being made upon
us. The army. catching the con:agion
of his confidence. perhaps neglected to
keep out scouts in the front. This was
charged ut the time by newspaper cor
respondents, and is not specifically de-
MED by General Grant. who does speci-
f:cally DENY some other analogous
charges. While General Grant was
thus taking for granted that the Con-
federate forces would not venture on an
aggressive campaign, the Confederate
Generals themselves Were in debate
upon that very point General john
ston. first in command. purpoSed an
attack. General Beauregard, the popu-
lar Southern hero of Bull Run. was OPP