The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1885-03-01

BRAVERY. az ana iii SaeE only Whsn ovsrpowsrcd
y m; q. e and Ss :
not captured iii about 5H in the sitsrnoon. 10.
stoad OF early IN tue il2rninY, a. WAS ior time
the. case. Tho. courage and stcndiness OF
both mon and officers. especially those OF the
but We cannot sur press shs al the
Owl creek. and had oeen occupied by the older
divisions oven without rifle plts. the chances
would never have brokenit Az was. after
driven back repsatsiiy. oas NY QUO. or together.
till their ranks. drcimated ty casualties. cap:
iSs . Ss y tho 4 LIS. "a. &
rested on the river at .th8 landing and was
covered By artillery anil gunboa!s. while their
o. Tie H s%smpy land oi Owl Geek sna for he
psists strait he had not We. isapaiFod q whip.
ping the enemy the next day. Ia thus MS
aPS he so SS En no,
ii, il is now certain that Gen. Johnston. the
rebel Qopmandsr; in-chist had been Killed
rebel advance hnd not b.sn stayed TN bstwesn
5ani O oolock. It had spent i,s force. and orders
h.a 9sS" s'G s w " s To TIC
captured camps. These orders were doubt
!s:. aa. 20 the, are OF the "a, ar'iasry
maid OF Col. Webster. Gen. Grants Cnioi
pi S,,,ft. and that oi the sunbonts Tyler and
and sSovs the Cnion lett. The plateau forming
ths battle Held wa, son ns 80 or log iess ae2we
t nossSs for the xanSsas to swsss the
Cuon front effectively. hut their shot and shell
fell about Shiloh Onurrii. where the Cohied;;
around which their strasK.erS IN large mum
beers had gathored during tho day; Roman
There Was a scene OF strn.xi,ns and uillnce
which for u tim" drhed all rsmonsttnhcc ami
efforts at coercion" In add..i9n. mo Con;
their now commander rightly Judged that
u hs held on to his advanced position he would
Buell. the next day In view OF ali this, ind
tho arrival OF Lew Whiiace's fresh division.
which cant upon hs nei ~ auI ny aha T TI
the prSSSbiiisis. nre that Gran. would have
without tho help OF Bleil. though This. OF
course. has been hotly denied by com potent
In Ducn's army. The Arrival Of that army.
however. on the Held Of bntti. during the even.
to the future. md Wis In hccordhnee with the
rules OF the art oi war.
Don. penuraEnid holds. and his opinion Il.
METEOROLOGICAL attack Ia heavy mass could that
evening strike the ftnIshin9 bow" He AGO
nynss that l." d,d a, tnrt could oe done to
mandsrs excrtei theni,elyes 10 their utmost.
but. withal. tie troops wern not nressed to the
u
made u serl,s uf disjointei attacks instead =:
tnat the artillery. gunbon,s. and the raied
unlon soldiers: snp?3rlsa ~ tns nIvanee Of
practically impre.ntoie. and that exhaustion
and hunger .liilod all ATTEMPTS. on the part
siaIn on tho part of their men,, For these
and similar REASONS Braurc"ard. meanwhii-
weighing nttentivey and anxiously al these
Things yl-ips in the later hours Of the bat
to-" resolved TO withdraw the troops gradually
from the front. and rsorganize them rs Well as
" al
complete his victory OYER Grant. He aud MS
critics are substantially IN accord as To the
facts. but the latter contend that notwithstani.
ing oil this ms oniy GahLce TO wan WAS ny con-
tInuing the fight the ilrst evening with ali pos
supsrhuman effort. ant won or lost all. In this
conclusion military critics viii III the end con.
our: for white no might have won. and could
not possib! hope 10 win the next day, In case OF
failure no would probably nave lost nothing
more than the men killed. in the final assault.
Johnston's p an. as abundunt,y shown by the
records. Was sound in every uarticu ar, aud was
vigorously carried out from the itrs;. It ill.,
vowed the concentration OF ali the rebel troops
VIGOROUS attack OF Grants forces before Buell.
could form junction with him. The 'nesn-
ration %as mad" BY hrr ana she , ;;vanSs
| position undiscovered. by tho night Of April 4.
| Tne rawness OF the Confederate troops. the In
experience OF som. OF their Generals. Inc mud
dinesS OF the roads. and tho heavy rains OF the
Attn and 9Th prevented Johnston from making
intention. Had he sacc..d.I IN doing this. he
woulh have mud one more DAY In wh'ch TO- con 81.
reault would have been must remain "A mere
| matter OF conjecture. but it is not likely that
| 1t would have been less favorable thau the re-
been moro so. a. the Union soldiers could not
have felt 80 confident Of help from Buell..
The organization Of the Confederate army
| into corps under such able and experienced
| professional soldiers IA Hardee. Bragg. and
| Polk. was better for purposes Of administra.
| ton and mnnnuvro than that OF III. Union
| army into divisions unler commanders all OF
| whom were volunteers excep: Sherman. The
| we'll shown by the coherenos and persistsncy of
the esrliernttack and the isolated and irrs2 lar
| defence. The Union army was better fed sup
piled. and armed than was !ts opponent. and
| II should have been ready to pursue BeuurpRard
vigorously on u. evening OF the 7th and the
little room Tor doubt that il would have cap
tur-d or dispersed the reosl forces.
Neither the official, Records nor subseQuen.
Law wailaces delay in marching from Cramps
Landing. five or six mites away. TO the Shiloh
Satis.d II IS NV N.Y. cen" ", that at order ate,
him. but al. failed to get him to. the nsld iii
after the nEhtinx OF thu On had eloa'd. In view
the enemy. guns, aud with two good roRls
leading 10 the Held. both open and unobstruct.
'h for k. 10 f o on Tn'p w 'uY
agree with Gen. hrnat that it was stil H very
| unnilitary procerding n join the right Of tbs
army from tn. Gnnk Instead ot from the base.
| as Gsn, Wallace hal il in mind to do. Had he
| carried out evan tnls prujrc. and crossed Ow
Creek west Of shi ON Church, on tho P!ttsbnr.
and Purify road. he won q have come in upon
| the left flank and rear Of the Conf"'!-ratr army
where, A. above stated. he WAS exp"rtet. nnt
whore he might have ind c!ad irrepara he in,uri
upon II. i nrh"r coined wellington ut WaterIo!
from tho flank" and not from the base.
and thereby changed the history ~ Europe.
Gen. Grant having used and repro iUr.i the
map OF the bait Ell 40 pr.Dared b, Gen. Thorn
showing the position 81 the troops on IN,
morning and evening OF the 9Th anl It'll .
| April respectively. a. laid down shortly afte
the battle. from information furnished b,
Grant, Sherman. and Bu"li. 1t must bs pre-
| sum"i that this II the ony authentic ma.
III existence. and that ovcry other wheths
! made by Sherman or any one else subsequent
H. must. In the absence OF the proof Of error II
the offiriai man. bn aiscredi;ei and thrown on
and this IL us 1t should be. since tho ofiicla
map was made rs skiitul unl eyrArie nee,
surveyors immediately after the battle. an,
seems 20 ~. compete Ia NJ ;,Ir-'cuars Tn.
positions of the troops having bean laid dow.
! while they were still on and near the battla
field are much more Likely TO have boon cor
! rectly placed than they could be after any sub
seuusnt investigation.
Finally. VIZ note with surprise the ahaenc,