Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1885-08-28
laws Of free country lie open even to
vulgar inspection.


EARLY LAW.
Dur;nr the whole Saxon era, and
even long after the establishment OF
the Norman Government, the whole
administration of justice, criminal aud
civil was in the hands Of the people.
without the control or Intervention OF
any judicial authority, delegated 10
flxed magistrates by the Crown. The
tenants of every manor administered
civil Justice TO one another in the
court-baron OF their lord; and their
crimes were judged Of in the leet'
every sutton OF the manor giving his
voice as a Juror, and the steward being
only the registrar, and not the judge.
" When the courts at Westminster
were established in their present forms,
and when the civilization and commerce
of the nation had introduced more III
tricate questions of justice, the judicial
authority in civil cases could not but
enlarge its bounds the rules OF pro-
perty became by degrees beyond the
compass of the unlettered multitude
and. with certain wcll-known restrlc-
tons, undeniably fell to the judges;
yet more perhaps from necessity than
by consent. as all judicial proceedings
were artfully held in the Norman Ian
guage, to which the people were
strangers.
JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS.
"Of these changes in judicature, i'm
memorial custom and the acquiescence OF
the Legislature are the evidence, which
establish the jurisdiction Of the courts
on the true principle Of Englishlaw, and
measure the extent Of it by their ancient
practice"
And in the same case, Lord Chief
Justice Mansfield said, ibid. PIP. 31o.,
$40:
"If the law was in every case to be
determined by juries we should be in
miserable condition, as nothing could
be more uncertain from the different
opinions of mankind" Again, he says:
1.-THE Constitution trusts that under the
direction of a Judge the jury will not
usurp a jurisdiction which is not in
their power" But he adds: " 1t is
the duty Of the Judge in all cases of
counsel justice to tell the jury how to
do right. though they have it an their
power to do wrong; which is a matter
entirely between God and their con-
science" Thus this great judge,
with all his learning, all his ingenuity,
and all his high tory desire to muzzle
Jurors and curb liberty, was compelled
to admit that "juries have it in their
power to do wrong which really
meant this: that they have it in their
power to differ from the judges view
Of the law and to act upon their own
view. if in their conScienceS they can
not agree with him.
TIE JURORS RIGHT.
1t appears, then, that public policy
having, as a matter of convenience for
expedi,ing litigation, ordained a class
Of men charged with the duty Of ex-
pounding the law to juries. and these
men having been generally found equal
TO the duty. it has come to be regarded
as their right to give such guidance,
and the duty Of iuries to follow it.
But this is the general rule only; and
tho above quoted law Of Virginia for
new trials shows that there are recOg-
nized exceptions to it; and that the
right If a .jadge 10 enforce his inStruc-
tons on .juries is limited and that after
twO trials iuries have greaterpOwer than
Judges. This comedies the right of a
jury to do wrong" as Lord Mansfield
petulantly phrased it; or, as they
would say, 10 exercise their own judy
ments in spite Of instructions from the
bench.
AS TO EXERCISING THAT RIGHT.
Under what conditions should not a
right be exercised? The object of the
system being justice, the inquiry is,
Can that object be obtained by giving
one man the right to dictate their YER
diets to twelve other men under all cir
cumstances: May it not sometimes be
better to aim at that end in another
way? May not absolute adherence to
a rule sometimes defeat the purpose of
the rule-in fact, sacrifice the principle
TO the rule? May we not sometimes
perpetrate injustice by giving Judge
the despotic right to instruct a
jury what Justice is? 1t seems to
me we may, and that where it is
necessary to justice to disobey the
Judge there is no inconsistency in the
act for "a difference in conduct" ~
Mr.. Burke says. "under variation OF
circumstances, is not an inconsistency
in principle
JUDGES NOT LEARNED IN THE
LAW"
Apply this reasoning to the case be-
fore us. Here we have two Judges
grossly ignorant Of law, and therefore
unable to command the respect Of a
jury; neither Of them ever having prac-
tced a day in his life (; one a commits
sioner i'll bankruptcy, the other a clerk
in q court neither of whom would
ever have been thought of for a judge
ship--a place reserved by the Con-
stitution for men a." learned in the
law but for his being a Malone
man. and neither of whom knows much.
If any. more law than many of the
jurors whom he assumes to instruct.
THEIR DANGEROUS ACTS.
If my account Ct their conduct on the
bench be correct, then the ignorance or
partiality which has led these two
Judges to decide the coupon cases in
favor Of the plaintiffs has wrought in
justice, has deGed the State. and has
promoted the fraud upon the Common
wealth which every one Of these cou-
pons represents. Worse still, it has
established a precedent by which the
State may be plundered to the extent
Of millions. For these judgments are
but the beginning Of what will be thus
obtained unless the persevering patriot
ism and good sense of the people shall
prevent. Already there are some sixty
cases to come in under the rules at the
September term, cases which will aim to
be decided, before the Legislature can re-
move these judges and amend the law
hey ond misinstruotions. And even
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