The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1885-05-14
The Responsibility OF the Pennsylvania
Failure.
How His Confidence Was betrayed. STAN
ton tho Marpiot OF Lineoln's Admin
istration---An Interesting Com
tribution TO iho.Iiistory of
The Rebellion.

OH lUHR nb mIs NNlutIUH WhN DbCIblhIy
VI War received the cordial support OF
that dep .rlment; but when no resigned
III whole state of affaira changed. /
had ney 7 met Stanton before reaching
In 1861. Hs at once sought
me aud pr0'eSsed the utmost personal
Affections, Ia expression OF which was
exceeded only by the bitterness OF his
ienun 'lati0n Of the Government and ite
pOlcy, was unaware OF hia appoint.
ment ~ 8 'cretary of War until after II
had been made, wherenpOn he called to
ascertain whether | desired him TO ac.
cept, saying TO do 30 would involve "A
total sacrifice OF hla personal interests.
and that tia only indacement
wonld no the desire 10 assist me In my
work, Having no rea9 II TO doubt his
sincerity, desired him to accept, where
npOn he consented, and with great eifu
sion exclaimed: Nov we two will save
the country"
On lhs next day the President came TO
my house 10 explain why he had ap
pointed Mr.. Stanton without consulting
me; his reason being that he supposed
stanton TO be great friend OF niue,
aud that the appointment would natnr.
ally be satisfactory, aud that he feared
that n had known beforehand II would
% said that had drag0Oned him Into IT,
The more serious dfllcu ties OF my p0'
siti0n hogan with Mr.. StanIon's acces-
sion 10 the war Office. II at once became
very difficult to approach him, even for
the transaction Of ordinary current buei'
mesa, aud our personal relations at once
ceased. The impatience OF the Execu-
tive immediately became extreme, aud !
can attribute u only TO the Influence OF
the new Secretary, who did many things
10 break up the free and confidential In.
terc0urse that had heretofore existed
between the President and myself, The
Cover ment soon manif, sted great i'm.
patience In regard to the opening OF the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the de-
struct,on Of the Confederate batteries
on the Potomac. The 1rst object could
be D, rmanently attained only by occn'
pying the Shenandoah valley with q
force alr0Dg enough TO resist any attack
by the confederate army then at Man
asaas; the second only by general ad-
vance of the Army OF the Potomac, driy-
Ing the enemy back TO the Rapidan. My
own view was that tho movement OF the
Army OF the Potomac from Urbanna
would accomplish both OF these objects,
by forcing the enemy 10 abandon oil hie
positions and fall back OH Richmond, ]
was therefore, unwilling 10 interfere
with this plan by q premature advance,
the effect OF which must DO either 10
commit us TO the overland route or Ia
minim 20 the advantages OF the Urbanna
movement. wished TO hold the enemy
at Manassas TO tho last moment-if pos
sible until the advanc sment from Urban
ma had actually commenced, for neither
the re0pening OF the railroad nor the de-
atructiOn VI The batteries was worth the
danger involved. .....
STATIONS UNAUTHoRIzgD ACTION.
TIE positive order OF the President
probably Issued under the pressure o.
the Secretary Of War, forced me TO un
dertake the opening Of the railway. Fol
this purpose | went 10 Harper's Ferry ID
February, intending 10 throw over force
sufficient TO occupy Winchester. To dc
thia II was necessary TO have q reliable
bridge across the Potomac-to insure
supplies and prompt reinfOrcements
The pontoon bridge, thrown as o pre-
llminary could not be absolutely trust
cd on river so liable to heavy freohets
therefore, II was determined TO con
strnct a canal boat bridge. II was dis
covered, however, when the attempt wal
mad, that the liit'lock from the cana
10 tho river was too narrow for thu
boats by some four or Ave Inches, and
therefore decided to rebuild the railroad
bridge, and content myeelf with occupy
Ing Charleston until its completion
pOStponifg z TO the same time the adyanc)
to Winchester. | had fully explained
my Intentions TO the President and Soc
rotary before leaving Washington, pro
vlding for precisely such q contingency
While at Harper's Ferry learned tha
the President was dissatisfied with m!
action, and on reaching Washington
laid n full explanation before the Sec
rotary, with which no expressed him
self entirely satisfied, and told me tina
the President was already 30, and that |
was unnecessary for me 10 c0mmunlcat
with him on the subject. | then pro
ceeded with the preparations necessar
| TO force tho evacuation OF the P0t0ma
batteries. On tho very day appOinte
for tho division commanders TO come !
headquarters TO receive their anal order
| the President sent for mo. | then learn
cd that he had received no explanation
OF The Harper's Ferry affair and tina
the Secretary was not authorized I
make the statement already referred tC
hut after my repetition OF II, the Pres
dent became fully satisfied with m
course. He then, however, said tha
there was another "yory ugly matter
which he desired TO talk about, and thu
was the movement by the lower Chest
peak. He said that II had been suggest
ed that proposed this movement wit
the "trait0rous" purpose OF leayin
Washington uncovered and exposed |
attack. very promptly objected TO Nh
coupling OF any such adjective with m
purposes, where0n ho disclalmed any II
tention Of conveying the Idea that h
expressed his own opinion, as he merel
repeated tho suggestions Of others.
then explained the purpose and effect {
fortifying Washingtonsand, as Though
removed his apprehepslCne, but inform
cd him that the division commander
were 10 be at the headquarters thl
morning, and suggeeted that my plar
should be laid before them, that che
| might give their opinion as TO wheth,
| tho capital would be endangered; | alt
said that In order to leave them porfec
| ly untrammeled | would not attend n
meeting. Accordingly they met on n
9Th of March and approved my plans.
1 DEMonAIIzING THE ARMY.
| On tho same day was issued, wlthoU
my knowledge, tho order forming arm
corps and assigning the senior generl
| officers to their commands. My own view
were that, as the command OF arm
corps involved great responsibility an
| d manded ability of o high ordor, II wa
safer to postpone their formation unt
trial In The 0eld he'd shown which goi
eral oflleArs could best poifOrm the.