The Republican journal., 1885-05-21
Grant as q Soldier.

From an anecdotal and reminiscent article by
General Adam Badeau. on the characteristics
of Grant as a soldier, in the May Century
Magazine we quote the following: ''At the
close of the war, the man who had led the
victorious armies was not forty-three wears of
age. He had not changed in any essential
qualities from the captain in Mexico or the
merchant in Gaena. The daring ana resource
that he showed at Donelson and Nicksburg had
been foreshadowed at Panama and Garta San
Cosme; the persistency before Richmond was
the development of the same trait which led
HIM to seek subsistence in various occupations,
and follow fortune long deferred through many
| unsuccessful years. Developed by experience,
taught by circumstance, learning from all he
saw and even more from what he did, as few
have ever been developed or taught, or have
learned, he, nevertheless, maintained the self
same personality through it all. The character
istlcs of the man We're exactly those he mani
tested as a soldier-drectness and steadiness
of purpose, clearness and certainty of judg-
ment, sef-reance and immutabe determine
ton.
Grants genius, too was always ready; it
was always brightest in an emergency. All
his faculties were sharpened in battle; the man
who to some seemed duh, or even slow, was
then prompt and decided. When the circum-
stances were once presented to him, he was
never long i'll determining. He seemed to
have faculty of penetrating at once to the
heart of things. He saw what was the point
to strike, or The thing to do, and he never
wavered in his Judgment afterward. unless, of
course, under new contingencies. Then he
had no false pride of opinion, no hesitation in
undoing what he had ordered; but if the cir
cumslances remained the same, he never doubt
ed his own Judgment | asked him once how
he could be so calm in terrible emergeni les,
after giving AN order for corps to 90 into
battle. or directing some intricate manuuvre
IN led hat he had bnSt Nd mi
do no better; others mi ght have ordered more
wisely or decided more fortunately, but he was
conscious that be had done what he could, and
he gave himself no anxiety about the judy
ment of the decision. OF course he
anxious about the accomplishment of his plans.
but never as to whether he ought to have
attempted them. SO, on the night of the battle
of the Wilderness, When the right of his army
had been broken and turned. after he had
given his orders for new dispositions, he went
to hi tent and slept calmly till morning.
Not that he was Indifferent to human life or
human suffering. | have been with him when
he left IA hurdle race, unwilling TO men
risk their necks needlessy; and he came away
from one of Blondin's exhibitions at Niagara,
angry and nervous at the sight of one poor
wretch in gaudy clothes crossing the whirlpool
on wire. But he could subordinate such
sensations when necessity required it, He
risked his life, and was ready to sacrifice it
for his country; and he was ready, if need
cdllt, W sdcIluct his country -lnen lOf lie knew
that they had to make the offering.
sit was undoubtedly as fighter alher thar
a manGuvrer That Grant distinguished himself
He was ready with resource and prompt in
decision at Belmont and Donelson, but it was
the invincible determination at both these places
as well as at Shiloh that won. As with men,
so with armies and generals skill and strength
are tremendous advantages, but courage out
weighs them ALL In battle, in
strategcal movements, Grant always meant to
take the initiative; he always advanced, was
always the aggressor. always sought to force
his plans upon the enemy; and if by any chance
or circumstance the enemy attacked, his method
of defense was an attack elsewhere. At Dom
elsOn, as we have seen, when his troops We're
pushed back on the right he assaulted on the
left; and this was only one instance out of Il
hundred. This, too, not only because he was
| the invader, or because his forces We're hume r.
ically stronger but because it was his nature in
war to asssl. In the Vicksburg campaign his
army was mailer than Pemberton's; yet he
was The aggressor. In the operations about
Iuka bis position was defensive one, but he
attacked the enemy all the same. 1t was his
idea of war to attack necessarily and advance
invariably, and thus to make the operations of
the enemy part and parcel of his own