The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-02-08
A PERILoUs SITUATION.
Dangers to Which Wolseley and Stewart Are
Now Exposed.

Dangers to Which Wolseley and Stewart Are
Now Exposed.
Washington Special.
General Colston, late an officer in the army of
the Khedive, says:
Il think the British army is in terrible and
disastrous condition, and should not be sur
prised if it was totally destroyed. The main
blunder in the campaign, the one which has lost
khartoum and possibly the lives of all those
brave soldiers was the loss of nearly three
months in dilly-dallying about which route was
to be taken to reach Khartoum. This was due
to the utter incompetency of the present British
authorities. England has occupied Egypt now
for the last eight years, and it has been surveyed
and mapped out so that it has become to be al
most as well known as European countries
Now, why could not the British gov
ernment have sent a competent officer
to examine the various routes to
Khartoum, which are as well known
as the road from Washington to New York and
the maps of which are all in the city Of Cairoi
But instead of this, one route and another was
proposed, three months were lost in planning
railroad to Khartoum and when finally the river
route was decided upon, and the order given in
September to build the boats the expedition
might have been half way up the Nile"
WAS this the only blunder2"
mo. Another blunder was the sending away
by Woseley, when he reached the most danger
Gus portion of his march, of Stewart to Abu-
klea wells, one hundred and fifty miles south
east, and Earle nearly one hundred and fifty
miles in Numerically opposite direction, to
Abu- -Hammed, thus scattering his forces to the
four winds. The conditions of warfare in the
Soudan are very different from those of any
other country. Generally an army can depend
upon the country through which it is passing fof
subsistence but in the Soudan it is different
Only along the banks of the Nile can water and
supplies be obtained. Wolseleys army has no
supplies but what it carries. unless, which is
scarcely likely, the Bedouins bring theirherds to
them for sale. His only base of supplies is Cairo,
between which place and him stretches 12O0
miles of desert. True the Nile is there. but il
is gradually sinking lower and lower and is al
ready almost impossible for steamers. Even il
1t was passable, it would take at least two
months for supplies to reach him. Then again,
the heat at the beginning of March becomes
intense, and no European army can withstand
it."
'What will the Mahdi do now9n
HE must have had very large force concen-
trated near Khartoum in order to have been able
to capture 1t; and now that his forces are loosed
from there. they will descend upon Stewards
little band, which must now be reduced to about
1900, and will wipe them out. / should not be
surprised If mere corporals guard were to es-
cape slaughter. All the Bedouins, with whom
the deserts are swarming, and who have been
hitherto neutral, waiting to see who came out
best, will now turn against the British. There
will be a general rising of tribes everywhere"
What about Wolseleyl"
Although Stewards position is most critical,
that of General Woseley is little better. He had
taken Khartoum as new base in strong posi-
ton, having made juncture with Gordon, and
having his steamers at his command. Now he
has lost that base, and he is in much worse
position than if General Stewart had failed to
reach the seaboard. At the first show of retreat
all the Bedouins would rise upon him. He would
have to fall back 1000 miles to Cairo, his base of
supplies, over rocky and sandy deserts, without
water and with such supplies as they carried
with them. British gold and British pluck,
which are something wonderful can do many
things but there is limit to human possibili-
ties. The Mahdi would simply cut off their
water and food supplies, and starve them to
death, and few would live to tell the tale