Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1885-08-05
GRANT ANECDOTES.
Interesting Stories about the
Hero of 4ppomattoc.
GRANTS GREATNESS.

Cen. 4ddsls Badea,s's Interesting analysis.
Gen. Badeau, in his military history OF
Grant, gives the following interesting analy
sis OF Grants military genius; 'When the
war was over, Grant had fought and beaten
every important rebel in turn-Buckner at
Doneison, Beaureaa ard at Shiloh, Pemberton
and Johnston at Vicksburg, Bragg at Chatta-
nooga, Lee in Virginia, and ali of them
altogether in the last year of the rebellion.
From Belmont, the initial battle of his career,
ne had never been driven from the field, and
had never receded step in any of his CAM
palgnS, except at Holly Springs, and then the
rebels were in retreat before him, and Grant,
unable to follow fast enough to overtake
them, withdrew, only to advance on another
line.
HE went on steadily from the start, gain
ing in reputation and skill, acquiring expert
ence, developing his powers, but manifesting
at the beginning many of the traits which
were always conspicuous in his generalship.
At Belmont there was the same steadtaStness
under difficulties, the same sufhciency or re-
source, the same invention in unexpected
emergencies, which were afterward so
often displayed; at Donelson, the same
daring which attacked superior num-
bers, and the fortitude undismayed at
temporary reverse, as well as the quick
intuition which detected the intention
OF the enemy from apparently insignificant
circumstances; and, above all, the percep-
ton that the crisis had come when both ar
mics were nearly exhausted, and whichever
urSL attacked would WIN; ana Cnon ne Q6-
clared: The rebels will have to be very
quick to beat me- At Shiloh there was the
same Indomitable perseverance and conf
dence which made him say to Buell. at the
darkest moment of the fight, when that COM
mander inquired, What preparations have
you made for retreatingy' I haven't de-
SPARED of whipping them yet and inspired
the orders to Sherman TO advance on the
morrow before Buell. had arrived. AT VickS-
burg he displayed again the untiring persist
the WILLINGNESS try al schemes until
the right one was found; then the bold con-
ceptiOn Of running the batteries and separat-
ing his army from its base, plunging into
the interior between tie hostile forces, Con-
trary to all the rules of schools and the urg-
ent counsel of his ablest Subordinates; and
finally the celebrity, the audacity, the STRAIT
egical maneuvers, the marches, the counter
marches, the five successful battles of
the great campaign - except AppomattoX
week, the most brilliant episodes of the war.
At Chattanooga there came the large respon-
sibiit1es, the wider sphere, the varied CON-
binatiOns of the three armies, eliminating in
the elaborate tactical plans and eyolutions of
Lookout Mountain and Mission Ridge--a
meet preparation for the still grander duties
ae was to assume and the more comprehen-
sive strategy he was to unfold as General lin
Chief of the whole.
His entire career was indeed up to this
point q prelude and preface for what was to
follow. Events were educating him for the
position he was to occupy. He learned the
He found out that many of the rules appi-
cable in European contests would tail him
here. He discovered, years be ore the Ger
mans, the necessity of open-order lighting;
his troops became proficient in field 1ortih-
cations; his cavalry was used to the system,
afterward so successfully employed by the
uhlans, of mounted infantry; he limited the
use OF artillery; be perceived that the day
for cavalry charges was nearly past. He
also invented the long campaigns without
base which astonished the enemy and the
world. But above all, be understood that he
was engaged in a peoples war, and that the
people as well as the armies of the South
must be conquered before the war could end
Slaves, supplies, crops, stock, as well as
arms and ammunition-everythin that was
necessary in order to carry on the war was a
weapon in the hands of the enemy; and of
every weapon the enemy must be deprived.
''This was view of the situation which
Grants predecessors in chief command had
failed to grasp. Most of the national Gener-
ais in every theater prior to him had at
tempted to carry their operations as if
they were fighting on foreign fields. They
sought to Outmaneuver armies, to capture
posts. TO win by strategy pure and simp e..
But this method was not sufficient in a civil
war. Their passions were too intense, the
stake was too great, the alternatives were
too tremendous 1t was not victory that
either side was playing for, but existence.
If the rebels wen, they destroyed nation;
if the Government succeeded. i annihilated
a rebellion. 1t was not enough at this emer-
gency to fight as men fight when tbeil object
is merely to outwit or even outnumber the
enemy. This enemy did not yield because be
was outwitted or outnumbered. It was indis-
pensable to annihilate armies and resources,
to place every rebel force where it had no
alternative but destruction or submission
and every store or supply of arms or NUM-
lions or food or clothes where it could be
reached by no rebel army.
''Grants greatness consisted in his percep-
ton OF this condition of things and his adap-
tatiOn Of all his means to meeting it. When
he became Generalin-Chief he at once con-
ceiy co this idea, and understood the terrible
nature of the task he must assume. He made
all his plans and combinations with this end
in view. The scope of these plans included
the entire Republic. The Army of the Poto-
mac at the east and Sherman's forces at the
west constituted the two great motive DOW
ers; but in Virginia Butler on the James and
Sigel in the valley were to assist Meade On
the Rapidan, while at the west Banks was to
meet Sherman, both marching toward Mo-
bile. all were combined and directed with
common purpose and a central aim.
These combinations were sometimes in
terrupted or thwarted in their DEVELOPMENT
Grant and Sherman each met many obstacles
before either sat down in front of the
strategical objective point of his army.
Butler and Sigel both failed in their
cooperation in Virginia, while Banks failed
TO cooperate at all at Mobile. Grant him
self entered upon an encounter as terrible
as that of Christian with Apollyon in the
valley of the shadow of death. The struggle
was prolonged and bitter and the national
commander received as we'll as inflicted ap-
palling loss; but he persisted in his advance
aruid carnage and assaults with that awful
composure ard confidence which to many
natures is not only inscrutable but absolutely
repelling, but which, nevertheless, was the
especial quality which enabled him to sue
coed. He pushed his army through such a
month of ceaseless and seemingly resultless
battle as the world has hardly ever seen;
dealing, however, as he knew, the blows from
which his antagonist could never recover. In
the Wilderness the rebellion received its
death stroke. Tt fingered months afterward
and all the skill and strength of the nation
and it's soldiers were required to push the
blade to the heart, but the iron entered in
May. 1854. But for just this terrific strife,
just this persistent attack. just this bloody
wage, the result would have been deferred
or different. When, finally all
things were ready, and the great blow was
struck, it was seen how complete had been
the preparations and combinations which
had preceded TIE end, how absolute the exc
cution of the scheme devised year before
GRANTS LICK