New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1885-12-27
BRAINS BEHIND BAYONETS.
sELr-RELIANCE or AMERICAN SOLDIERS.

soldiers The Union army was cIea' 10 y w
citizens a moving array OF thinking haI"he's'
10 use Winthrops apt expression. The same was
nrobablv true of the Confederate army. 1t 70 gen
orally conceded that tao conventional military dis
cipine was better enforced aud mare hshy
deyelOpel ia the Army OF the Potomac than IN any
of the other armies of tile Union. Yet there was
no. "a battle in which that army WIS engaged that
its line that TO say all from prlvateS TO captains
inclusive did not show its understanding oi every
movement and behave. not as If 1t were mercy
parts OF machine, but as a leading actor directly
responsible 10 tue country for tie good or Ill results
of its performances. The linc not only a'ic 10
take care of itself and the cause, but cOnst utrd
itself au efficient assistant TO commanders III carry
ing out their plans; modifying those plans or
setting them entirely aside, according as circdm
stances seemed to it TO dictate. To illustrate thls
few instances are given to which every iue-oiiicer
ortsoIdier who saw much real field service during
the Civil War could add Others.
Tie most sayagely contested part of the struggle
Mt Autietam was in and around the sunken lane OF
Roule;'s farm whore JacksOn's corps Tor hours
held the ground. from which Hoo er and Mansfield
had been excessively repulsed early IN the morn
ing In their yellowish, butternut suits, the Con
feJerates were scarcely dstinguishable from the
roadb, Il on the ditch where they lay or from the
ripe stalks OF the cOrnheld behind. through which
their reinforcing brgades were constantly descend
ing. Not more tnan fifty yards OF, lying or kneei-
ing in the green pasture field without any shelter
the Union men -Kip.balrs. Caldwelrs and the Irish
brigades-poured so deadly a fire into that lane
that after the battle six hundred Confederate dead
were found there Repeated efforts made by
the Union troops to charge. Perhaps the first
was'n conformity to q generals orders; the others
certainly were not. The Confederate fire was so
terrible that every One however realized the need
either of driving the Confederates from the lane
and the rising ground behind, or else OF retiring TO
avoid humiliation. Such expressions az. o
must charge" Lets try the bayonet, boys" were
constantly repeated along the line, aud bayonets
would be fxed without any order whatever. so far
as known, from general or field officers. But, on
making the effort to charge and finding the eneinys
fire irresistible, the Union line. with heads bent.
asif against a rainstorIa would back up" to its
former position and kneeling or lying down again,
resume its fire. Finally Il clamOr of desperation
broke out. There no troops in sight behni,
no promise of reserve support, ana the situation
was CALLING The whole heavens were splitting
with the aetOnatons of battle and the rest OF the
army was probably fighting for its own Lille. The
men on their knees fixed bayonets again, for the
tenth time Ierhaps, and with n murdeIous howl OF
rage the three brlgades rushed for ward aud III a
minute were in the lane and their banners were
ascending through the cornfeld toward the peach
orchard where Jackson himself is SAID 10 have
been during all thoss hours. This charge. which
broke Jackson's right for time, and required all
his genius to proving supreme disaster to
his army, would not have been made. when it was
made, if the initiative had depended on "a com
mander's orders.
Military writers, from Jomini down to the latest
of his copyists studied at West Point, have pro
nonnced "A change of front under fire to be so
hazardous as never to be advised. But let any
look at Bachelders brdseye map of the battle OF
Gettysburg on the final day. On HancOcks
extreme right. though far out beyond the general
alignment of the corps, out, in fact. hey ond the
Enmittsburg Turnpike he will see a Unionregllnent
of Infantry, all alone and in a position perpen-
dicular TO tue direction of the Union lines. That
regiment is squarey the flank of Pickett's Con-
federates That regiment, which. as a mere
diminishing support. had been living ia the ditch
OF the Emmittsburg Turnpike, rose to ITS feet when
the yells OF he coming COntederates were hea a.
and moved forward. 1t came face to face with
Pettigrew's lines and Pettigrew almost immed latoy
halted This isolated regiment then. pay ny 10
further attention to Pe5iigrew. and without any
order of general commanding other Whatever
and simOly because of the appreciation which ITS
men, officers and privates. individually had o the
crisis wheeled To the left and opened dcStru tive
fire Oh the left flank of Pcketts column which III
grand style was advancing at the charge within
stones throw. The regiment dld not Wbecl " as
TO the lett. Indy dualy and by gronns IN fractions
uutil il all formed at right angles 10 It's
position of few moments before. How much That
regiments presence where & was-a fnrg 'ttcn
handful comparatively its unordered chan e
OF front un Ter a terrific ire, had 10 do with the
check TO Pettigrew's heavy lines and the breaking
and then the rOut of Pcketts almost successful
cOlnm", is something well worth study IN con
nectiou with The history Of the glUrous battle
Certain il that the position OF that regime Il was
purely accidental so far as any generals foresight
went.
O veteran Union brigade was engaged in an open
wood 10 its right WIS a re9 ent that seemed
inclined to give way on slight pressure. There was
q succession of ineffective charges by federalS and
COnfederates. but invariably when the Con4cder-
ates charged, our Union brigadc's right fell back
and its left stood fast, like a gate swinging back
it, huge. 1t left the ConfederaIes free To press
that shaky regiment If they liked but at the fisk
of beng taken IN flank If they tried 1t. 1t was
brilliant aud successful If simple. counter move
ment. At first as the enemy came cnarg ~ on Win
loud yolls the all along the bng,dc. having
been keeping suspicious aId anxious eyes to tho
right flank. began TO murnur why don't we
refuse II. g., retire the right p and 10y general
impulse. without any order whatever from the
commanding officer. the whole line awkwardlv
and a little brOkely the irst tune, made Il back
ward right wheel and checked the enemy. Nh"n-
ever the enemy APPROACHED again The word would
fy along the ranks, Refuse the Right - and the
maneuvre would be- repeated with neatness and
dsnatch; the sole responsibility of the officers
consisting in giving harmony to the movements by
snch cautions Steady :" if any Of the men.
ebgrossed With leading and firing as they fell back.
would appear to be stepping too rapidly for the rest
Of the lire.
IL the lines at TolOpOtomy. in June. 1864, three
regiments of the Second Corps OrdeTel 10
assault the Confederate position in their front,
low ridge with line Of breastwOrKs at the foot
and one at the crest. They Obeyed the order, of
course. far moving out. aud they sent up a
formidable cheer. especially the two famous resi-
meuts of veterans the third regiment, which had
never before been under fire, not showing so
boisterous a reaa ness. But when half wav on tie
veteran regiments lay down and the green regiment
pressed for ward aud all by itself carried the FIRST
breastwOrk. overp0wer.ng numbers of the Con-
fsderates however. poured down them IN
st4ntly from above and few OF the gTeenhorns
escaped. he veterans had rightly estimated at
one glance the strength OF the enemy rs 10 position
tran. That was all They came back alive, to
fight another day."