The National tribune., 1885-04-16

dered il almost necessity to break up
Crittendens Corps, and place its separate di-
visions ut whatever points the fuctuating stages
of the battle seemed 10 require. When the dis
order 60 the right occurred on the 10th. l be-
lieve there was not q division o, Crittenden's
Corps that was subject TO his orders. This is
another misfortune in any battIe-to be COM
PEELED to break up corps or divisions in order
to Gil UP gaps wherever one may have been
opened by the enemy, or to extend n line on
either flank. If McCook's Corps had arrived q
day sooner there would have been 40 necessity
of disintegratng Crittendens Corps in order to
meet the various emergencies that arose before
his arrival. The immediate but secondary
cause of our defeat was the unfortunate con-
structon by Gen. 4. J. Wood OF Rosrcrans's
order to "close up on Reynolds" which caused
Wood TO take his division out of line and pass
around Brannau's Division. Mai.-Gen. George
III. Thomas achieved lasting renowR by his sue
ccSsfui repuise Of the many assaults OF all over
whe!miDg force on the Goth Of September. Tho
honor awarded him by the Government aud
people was well deserved. History has done
him justice. He was worthy of all the honor
and ali the praise that have been awarded him.
No officer ever moro entirely devoted himself
to duty than Gen. Thomas: none ever under
stood moro thoroughly what was necessary TO
success in any given problem that foil 10 him
for solution. But, If the three Corps of the
ready for battle day or two before it was
forced upon them. there is no reason TO doubt
that the glory won by Thomas would have been
the common property of the entire Army OF
the Cumberland. Gen. Thomas had occupied
the ground on which he fought that day, or the
ground in its immediate vicinity, for about a
week before the final struggle. He had selected
the best position the theater of operations af-
forded. and had strengthened it. McCOok' S
Corps had had none Of these advantages. and
Crttenden's had not been able to profit hy any
Of them. in consequence of being divided into
fragments for reasons already stated.
| do not wish TO be understood az writing
the history of the battle of Chickamauga. but
only of the part taken by my brigade. and my
recollection Of what came under nay personal
observation. | would be glad if | could men
tion individual instances of galiantry and for
titude but | Will not attempt il, as such course
would lead me too far away from the straight
line Of narrative which have adopted for these
"reminiscences. But cannot refrain mention
ing an instance that came under my ohserva.
tion at the close Of the disaster on the GOTH
About the last man who | remember speaking
to or noticing particularly on the immediate
ground where our last contest occurred was the
color bearer Of the 36th Ill. He saw mo alone
He came up TO me without a hat or cap. with
his head bandaged with white handkerchief
or white cotton cloth. His face was bloody. He
had been wounded, but was not in the least dis
heartesed. He was. believe, the last man of
the 3Sth Ill. who left the ground. | cannot
recall his naGie, but remember that he was
from Atlanta. III. and a member of Go. Z. 3Sth
III. I told him the direction in which his regi
ment had gone. aud he followed it and found il,
and resumed his post Of o0lor-hearer.
| believe our retreat TO Chattanooga had far
mere depressing effect on the spirit of our army
than the resRlt Of The battle. 1t became evi-
dent next day that Bragg was not aware that
he had gained any great success over the Union
army. His dispatch that night to the PreSi-
dent of the Coniederacy claimed only TO have
driven US from several important positions. He
did not seem disposed 10 risk another contest
at RoSsyille.
TTa he ro;I;,fvledl