The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1885-11-05
FIGHTING THEM OVER
What Our Veterans Have TO Say About
Their Old Campaigns.
THE ARMY OFTHE POTOMAC
It's Services Compared With These Of The Army of
tie Cumberland.

THE ARMY OFTHEP POTOMAC
It's Services Compared With Those Of The Army of
the Cumberland.
To THE EDITOR: There seems to be some
thing of sarcasm in the reported statement
OF Gen. Rosccraus in THE NATIONAL TRIB-
UNE OF Sept. ~, in relation to the relative
greatness of the undertaking of the Army
of the Cumberland, in the campaign that
eliminated in the battle of Chickamauga,
aud that of the Army of the Potomac, that
ended in the fall OF Richmond. The statement
referred TO is as follows: He ltarleton
might have given some idea of the greatness
OF the undertaking, by telling them that the
Army OF the Cumberland had more miles TO
march and more natural obstacles in the way
than had the Army CT the Potomac in its adj
vance from the Wilderness to Richmond. and
that the Army OF the Cumberland finished It's
campaign and took IFS point in IS days, while
the Army of the Potomac was over ii months
iron the Rapaahannock to the occupation of
Richmond"
The object of this communication is to give
brief outline of the obstacles in the way of
the Army of the Potomac II from the Kappa
hammock 10 the occupation OF Richmond, nat
ural and artificial; the distance marched, and
tine time occupied in the series of battles and
campaigns referred TO, so that the veterans who
served in the Western armies may the better
Judge of their greatness; but not to attack
Gen. Rosecrans, nor to dispute the laurels
which the Army of the Cumberland earned IN
its IIany brilliant movements.
First. Natural Obstacles.-The Wilderness
was natural obstacle to the movements of an
army OF 10000 men, with its enormous array
OF artillery and its 1000 wagons, especially
with a yigiiant and intrepid foe in the vicinity
ready TO pounce upon its flank. This the Army
OF Northern Virginia actually did, compelling
battle in that uupropitious place. For the
-in Of
quote from Swinton's Campaigns of the Army
OF the Potomac" the most accurate history of
the operations of that army published:
Ii is impossible 10 conceive field worse adapted
TO the movements of a grand army. The whole
face of the country Is thickly wooded, with only
an occasional opening. and intersected by few
narrow wood roads. But the woods q: the Wilder
ness have not the ordinary features of a forest.
The region rests belt OF mineral rocks and for
above "a hundred years extensive mining las here
been carried on. To feed the mines the timber of
tbs country for many miles around had been cut
down, and in its place had arisen dense uder
growth of low limbed and scraggy pines stiff and
brisling chinckapins scrub-oaks, and hazel. 1t is
a region of gloom and the shadow of DEATH Ma
nuyering here was necessarily out of the question.
and only Indian tactics told. The troops could
only receive direction by point of the compass;
for only the lines of battle entirely hidden
from the sight of the commander, but no officer
could see 10 files on each side OF him. Artillery was
wholly ruled out of use the massive concentration
OF $40 guns stood silent, and only an occasional
piece section could be brought into play in the
that horrid thIcket there lurked 200, 900 men, and
through Il lurid fires played and. though array
of battle could be seem there came out of lis depths
the cr;.ckie and roll of musketry, like the noisy
boiling of some hell -caldron that told the dread
story oI death. Such was the field of the battle of
the Wilderness.
Strong language is this; but whoever was
there. in it, and through it, will say that the
half is not told. Its truthfulness may be judged
by consulting the official report OF the losses of
the Union army at that battle, which gives the
number killed 3,2SS; wounded, 1925; miss
ing-many of whom were killed or severely
wounded and persisted in the fire that swept
over a portion of the battlefield just as the bat
tie ended, 6,S34; making a total of 29,4i0.
This does not include the loss to the Ninth
Corps. under Gen. Burnside. that was en-
gagged in that battle, but was independent
OF the Army of the Potomac Seven rivers
were crossed, from the Rappahannock to Pc
terSbuTg. in the very face OF the enemy, one
of which was more than 1000 feet wide. Each
river was an immense :" wet ditch in front of
redoubts and rifie-pits. These were formidable
obstacles III the way of the advance of that
army. In fact, the whole country from the
Rapidan to the James is rarely surpassed as de-
fepslre ground.
Second. Distance Marched-From Winter
quarters on the Rippah&anock to the occupa-
ton of Petersburg and Richmond, the Army of
the Potomac in all its marches and counter
marches covered more than 200 miles, and in
the IL months and five days it marched more
than 300 miles.
Third. Time Occupied.-The active cam
paign work in the IL months mentioned by
Gen. Rosecrans was done i'll just 80 days. Gen.
Il. neglects TO add that in ii months and five
days Lees army was destroyed and captured,
which resulted in the downfall of the rebel
lion. The time from the crossing of the Rapi-
dan to the investment of Petersburg was Just
AZ days. The active campaign work from the
Rapidan TO Appomattox was done in 30 days;
the balance of the Ii months and five days was
consumed in the siege of Petersburg. But more
than all this, from the Rapidan to the Chieka-
hominy four desperate pitched battles were
fought, with loss to the Army of the Poto-
mac Including Burnsidc's Ninth Corps of
above 10000 men. All this within so days.
There was another obstacle in the way, not
natural one. 1t was the rebel Army of North
ern Virginia, the flower of the rebel armies
defending the approaches to the citadel of the
rebellion.
Let us sec what the Army of the Cumber-
land did in the campaign referred to by Gen.
Rosecrans. The writer can only state this as
he finds it in John S. c. Abbott's history We
quote:
In % days the Army of the Cumberland (up to
the occupation OF Chattanooga, marching 800 miles
from Its base OF supplies carrying ID days rtions,
had crossed three ranges of mountains varying
from 500 TO 400 feet In hight; had crossed river
q quarter OF a mile wide, and captured one of the
most powerful strongholds in the United States All
this they had accomplished with the loss of six men.
We must infer from this that it was not op-
posed by enemy, but was following a re-
treating army. He might have added, in this
connection aud which he afterwards goes on to
describe that in order TO retain this stronghold
he had 10 sacrifice a third of his army, and
came near losing the whole Of it. We all re-
member the critical state that army was in for
several weeks after the battle of Chickamauga
while cooped up in Chattanooga
Before closing the writer will refer briefly
to that piece of bonbast and concentrated ig-
norance of Comrade (?) T. Ii. Martin in his
communication Oh the use of dictionary words
by correspondents in The NATIONAL tribune
OF Oct. /. We quote the passage referred to- and
to which the writer takes exceptions: Next
in line we find that conglomeration of old
cheese, navy tobacco, suffer tents and concen-
tratcd lie from the Army of the Potomac.
] think one of these mule teams he speaks of
could have hauled all their trophies including
cannons, and rebel Notifications, up to the
time we sent our Grant TO show them how the
thing was done" d.
Docs this gassy writer know what he is writ
ing about? Does he not know that the So
called Confederate Government had concen-
trated their most powerful armies under their
abicst Generals in Virginia, and consequently
all other points were Of secondary Importance
to this? Does he not know that Longstreet's
did hay IN hp Ar.uv IF tho (tt,rn