St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1885-01-08

ton of any of the provisions of the ordi-
nance.
II is apparent from the terms of the enact
ment that the city council Intended II to be
etfectual to contine the traffic in spirituous
liquors within the limits of the city to those
who should be specially authorized bv license
to engage in it and to ordain certain con iitious
with respect to the granting of licenses, and
certain regulations and restrictions pertain
ing to the business.
II was contemplated as one means of regu-
lating the traffic, even in the hands of
licensees, that it should be confined to de-
fined districts of the city, to be specially des-
ignated, and it was with a view to the ac-
complishment OF this purpose that section
was enacted, providing for the appointment
OF those districts by the mayor The enact
ment of subdivision of section 2, and sub
division 10 of section 8, was directed to the
same end. These subdivisions were so in
timately related to the provisions of section
y, that in the absence of any other ordinance
defining the patrol districts, they could be
operative only in con uection with that Sec
ton. The provision made by sec. 9 for deter
mining the districts, within which 1t was In
tended to confine the traffic, being void, the
subdivisions just referred 10 were necessarily
imperative and incapable of enforcement.
Thus the purpose of the council, of local re-
striction, which was sought to be carried into
effect by these divisions of the ordinance,
failed of plishment. But this fact af-
fords 10 sufficient reason for a judicial dec
laration that the remaining portion of the
enactment should not be enforced. The
prohibition against selling liquors within the
city limits, without a license, is distinct, alb
solute, unqualified, and apparently In no
manner dependent upon the provisions with
respect to local restriction. The same may
be said of the other portions of
the ordinance which prescribe conditions
with respect to the granting of
licenses, and impose numerous regulations
and restrictions concerning licenses and
their business. DIsregarding as invalid and
imperative those provisions of the ordinance
above referred to, which are directed to the
end Of local restriction, the remainder may
stand as complete ordinance, clearly ex-
pressing the intention of the legislative body
enacting it, and capable of being carried into
full effect. 1t is not either in the nature of
its provisions, or in its structure, made de-
pendent upon section 9. The provisions
and the purposes of the main body of the
ordinance, and of that portion which is in
valid and not enforceable, are distinct and
separate; the failure of the latter does not
modify the operation or affect the construc-
ton of that which remains. There is no
reason apparent to justify q court, in the
exercise of its duty of constituting or enforc-
ing the law, in the conclusion that the city
council would not have enacted the ordi-
nance prohibiting the sale of intoxicating
liquors without license, and imposing the
regulations and restrictions there declared,
except in connection with the provisions of
legal restriction.
That the city council did enact such an Or
dinance, and that the provisions were not
apparently in any way dependent upon the
accomplishment of the purpose Of legal re-
striction, is sufficient to indicate our duty to
give effect TO the law.
AS We construe the ordinance the case is
quite within the principles which accord
ing TO the authorities, sustain
the enactment, except only as those
provisions which were in themselves void,
Corn vs.. Hutchius, 5, Gray 1872; State VS..
Wheeler, %, Conn 290; Gordon vs.. COrms
AZ, N. T., sos, 6l5, 6l7; People ex rel, City
of Rochester VS.. Briggs 80 n. Y, $50, $685..
Morgan 81 Co., VS.. Diekart, 32 Md, 369;
Lynch VS. Steamer Economy, % Wis,
SO; Herman VS.. Riuker, 102 Q. s., 1873;
Cooley's Const. Lin. 212.
There is another reason contributing to the
conclusion that the city council are TO be re-
garded as having intended that the ordin-
ance should go into effect independently Of
those provisions becoming operative, which
were designed to restrict the business to de-
fued limits within the city. BY its terms the
ordinance was TO stake effect and be in force
from and after its publication" While the
time when the restriction OF the traffic to de-
fined districts should become effective was
| S.. l..lNN
future action Of the mayor and the approval
Of that action by the city council
Our conclusion Is that the unconstitution-
ality of section resulted only in rendering
the ordinance Intellectual as 10 the appoint
ment Of patrol districts aud the restricting Of
the business, by licenses, 10 such districts
and that, as to the rest, the ordinance was
valid. This being so, the amendment in
question was effectual, which enacted that
section should stricken out and properly
designated certain portions Of the city as
tive patrol districts, and so amended subdi-
vision 9 OF section as 10 make IL conform
able TO the change thus effected.
The ordinance was ntly entitled "An
Ordinance TO License and Regulate all Per-
sons Vending, etc"
IIf.-Under the ordinance as amended,
the defendant was properly charged aud
con yicted OF the oflense Of selling without q
license.
The restriction OF the business to defined
districts within the city is a proper regulation
OF the traffic. I'm re Wilson n. w. X. 723,
724) which all licensees may be required TO
observe.
As means OF securing conformity with
this regulation applicants for license are re-
quired, among other things, to state whether
or not the place where they intend 10 carry
on the business is within the now properly
designated districts, and II It thus appears
that the applicant intends TO disregard the re-
strictiun. and 10 sell outside OF these limits,
1t is declared In effect that no license In such
case be granted The effect Of this Is not to
render imperative, or impossible to
be complied with, the requirement
that all persons who would engage
in the business within the city, shall procure
a license therefor. This part of the ordi-
nance prevents from obtaining license only
such persons as refuse to comply with the
regulation ordained with reference to the
pisces where the business may be carried on.
Selling without n license is within the dis
tiuct prohibition Of the enactment, aud II is
not material that no license could have been
procured, authorizing the business To be car
ried on at that place within the city where the
sale charged was made. State vs. Laug,lon,
81 Mimi. $40. This decision IS not opposed
to that in State vs.. Hanley, 25 Mimi, 400,
relied upon by the appellant. That case is
not applicable rs authority here. See com
mept upon that case in State VS.. Langdon
report
The order refusing Il new trial and the
judgment appealed iron are affirmed
DICKINSON, J.
YESTERDAYS SESSION.