The National tribune., 1885-12-10

What Our Veterans Have to Say About
Their Old Campaigns.
CHANCELLORSVILLE.
An Able Defense Of the Action Of the Eleventh Corps
on I!Iai iei.


the defeat of the Eleventh Corps, was read at
Campfire of Burnside Post, OF Washington ID.
C., &C. II. Ingram, Commsnder,) last month, by
Counrade Charles I. Lewis.
Iu compliance with the Commanders request
that / relate some incident of the war. tie
happening of which came under my personal
observation. have chosen an affair that has
CAUSED considerable discussion, aud which, at
the ;iiiie of its occurrence and fer a number of
years afterwards was, in my opinion, wholly
misunderstood. Even now the prevailing
impression is one OF error. j refer 10 the
behavior Of the Eleventh Corps at the
battle of Charlottesville. The general
impression was, and still is, that the corps
in that engagement acted In cowardly
and dissraceiul manner, and that the loss of
the battle Itself was due to the conduct OF the
troops composing it, That the defeat of the
Eleventh Corps on the afternoon OF the 2d of
May, Io63, caused the loss OF Charlottesville,
and made what promised TO be a successful ad-
vance Oil Richmond bid defeat of the Union
army, frankly admit, but that the troops Of
the corps were in anywise to blame, or that
they acted III any manner less bravely than
any other troops would have acted under SINH
lar circumstances, deny. Whatever fault there
was rested with certain of the commanders,
and rot with the troops.
Was at the time First Lieutenant Of the
119th y. Y. Vols, q reg Simcnt attached to krys
l will BOW briefly relate some OF the facts that
occurred that unfortunate Cd of May, to
most of which l was personally knowing. The
Eleventh Corps had the exireInc right OF the
line, and had, prior to the battle, ii my men,
DRY serves me right, occupied that position some
30 hours. We were strung along the Chancel-
lorsyille road in single line. Not breast
work was thrown up, nor the slightest prepara
tion made to resist an attack. though ample
time was had. We lay there doing nothing of
more moment than lcating, sleeping card play
ing. aud storytelling. During the early fore
noon of the I'd Gen. Hooker, accompanied by
Gen. Howard and their respective stalls, rode
along the line, and Gen. Hooker in my pres
ence and hearing said to Gen. Howard: Gen
eral your line is, l fear too greatly extended"
On the return of Hooker to his headquarters
he wrote aud dispatched an order to Howard,
and for this have the word of Col. FeSsenden,
personal friend and a member of Hooker's
staff, and who, unless i am mistaken, carried
the order which in substance
DIRECTED HOWARD TO CONTRACT HIS LINE,
and be prepared for an attack from either front
or flank. Not the slightest preparation was
made, nor, SO far as / ever learned, was any
attention paid to this order. Shortly before
noon heavy dust became visible to us in
the direction of fredericksburg, and moving
slowly towards our flank. 1t was remarked by
both officers and men that this cloud of dust
ericksburg or moving for n position on Our
flank. Ii the former view was correct, why
were We not moving to intercept? If The lat
ter, why were not preparations made to receive
q flank attack? Nothing was done, however.
In the afternoon about or 4, Captain OF an
Ohio battery attached TO the corps, with two or
three OrderlieS or men, rode out beyond the
right of the corps for the purpose as / under
stood, of selecting Some good site for his bat
terry, the belief being that On the Sd the Elev-
enth Corps Was to move still farther to the
right, the Second Corps taking our place. The
Captain referred to, and whose name l think
Was Wheeler, rode" beyond the extreme right
but comparatively short distance, when, run
ming Into a skirmish-line he los, one of his
Orderlies wounded, and barely escaped himself
On his return he reported the facts to Howard,
and stated as his belief that large force was
behind the rmsh-line.
HIS STORY WAS POOH -PooHED,
and, under orders from Howard the men were
told TO make themselves as comfortable as pos
sibie for the night All danger of an attack
seemed TO be over; at all events sucli was the
impression created among the troops. Within
an hour or between 3 and 6, l think, and while
the guns were stacked and the men engaged in
cooking and ealing their evening meal, the
attack, sudden aud awful, of Stonewall Jack
sons forces struck US. The guns of the Third
Division, the division having the extreme
cavalry nor infantry picket-nothing more
IN fact than a camp guard-was on the right
flank OF the great Army Of the Potomac on that
bloody afternoon to give warning of the ap-
proach OF the swift-moving and great COM
nlander, Jackson The attack came Just as the
dust-clOud had indicated it would come, on the
Hank and rear; aud the Third Division was
rolled up and rtumbled upon ours (the Second)
IN dire confusion. Our brigade had just time
enough TO get into line, face to the rear, and
make a left half wheel, when Jackson's men
Were upon US; and grand, though terrible
and awe-inspiring sight it was that met our
view. This was my first battle, but in all my
after-experience never did i see more thrill
ing sight than the advance of that line of bat
tie. On they came four deep, as though
marching by the 1ank,-they had fronted
without undoubling fies,-leaving open the
spaces, and pouring the shot into us
by vo'leys. The front rank would fire and
then apparently pass through the spaces, and
thus became the rear rank, while the whole
force slowly but steadily advanced. The line
was long one and Tapped us on both ends, and
why we were not TO a man made prisoners has
been to me always mystery. Had we been
older IN the service, We would have gotten out
Of such death trap rapidly as possible but
all oil Us We're grecn,-that is of this brigade
and we did not realize the hopelessness of our
position Or know enough TO run; and, besides,
the
FRANTIC PERSONAL APPEALS OF GEN. HOWARD
TO hold the enemy in check until he could re-
form the corps, held the men of the brigade up
TO their work until human courage and endur-
snce were exhausted. Finally we fell back, |
leaving line Of dead and wounded heavier
by far than the line that slowly and sullenly |
retreated, and thus ended our part in the battle
of Charlottesville
would not accuse Gen. Howard of wiIlful |
negligence or carelessness; it may all have |
been mistake of judgment; and certainly no |
one could truthfuily accuse him OF either /
cowardice or lack of patriotism but that he |
wofully misjudged, and TO that misiudgment |
and that alone was due the disaster and defeat |
OF Chanceilorsyille, was my opinion then ahd is |
STILL
Hooker's disposition of the troops was ex- |
ceilent; at least, we all thought so, and have |
never seen any successful criticism on the gen. !
eral disposition made by him. am not here
however, TO defend Joe Hooker;
HE NEEDS NO DEFENSE;
every man who ever fought under his command |
knows the true, tried mettle of his makeup |
but have desired and attempted to do what |
little was IN my power towards removing the |
unjust aspersions hitherto cast upon the troops |
OF the Eleventh Corps. Never was word criti- |
clsing those troops heard before that day, al |
though most Of them were veterans in service: |
and certainly the record of the Twentieth |
Corps, half of which was composed of troops
from the Eleventh, is as fair and bright as that
Of any other of the corps composing the army