Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1885-05-01
THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

diced View of the Mach Mootsd Cues
tons Connected with this Important
Aaair-The Discrepancies of History ii
Iu-trat-d-The Issue, of the Battle Prob
abb, DETERMINED by an Accident.
The difficulty which the conscientious
historian has 10 overcome in getting al
the truth is curiously Illustrated by
careful reading of the two articles on
the battle OF Shiloh" in the February
C,ntarH, the one by General GRAFT, the
other by Colonel William Preston John
ston. a son Of General Johnston, and on
the staff of Jefferson Davis. One gives
f course. the Federal. the o;he,
the Confederate. side. Not only
is their Interpretation of the aims and
purposes Of the coinbatantS, and III then
estimate of the significance and result
OF the .Irst days battle, do they differ.
but in their accounts of e.cntS. even in
IN nor details. ThI, Colonel Johnston
credit, Grant with an army Of Js.op.
Learly $1,000 Of whom were electives
while he allows the Confederate com
mander J0.OOJ, of whom but 1000
were available for combat General
Grant. on the contrary. gives the entire
strength of the Federal army at $4,000
Of whom not more than 21.0lD were il
line on the first day. OF course Gen
cral Grants statement of his own forces
is Official and conclusive; but the fac
illustrates the discrepancies OF history.
The battle of Shiloh was one Of the
great battles If the war. 1t was grea,
whether estimated by the number of
men engaged in it, by the character O
tie Generals commanding. by the des-
pcrate nature of the conflict, by the I'M
certainty OF the result during the whole
of the first dl,. or by tie consequences
which cnsIrd from the Confederate de-
feat and which might have eGsIicd from
n Federal defeat The Confederate au-
ihoritics have always insisted that Gen
cral Grant was virtually beaten ut the
nothing saved his army but the death
Of Gencr: Johnston. and the cOnsc-
quent change OF commanders. Grner-
al Grant was freely charged nj the time
with being intoxicated. and severed,
criticised for putting undi>c;plincd men
at the front without earthworks. The
newspaper correspondents had General
Prentiss' division surprised and cant
ured at the very beginning of the fight.
Some OF these then current errors are
corrected, SO far rs We know for the frs
tine officially. by General Grant's pa
per. General Grants horse fell on him
and nearly disabled him, two DAYS be-
fore the battle. The raw levics were
put at the front purrosely, Gen raj
Grant trusting to their commander.
General Sherman. TO compensate 70
their inexperience trust repo>ed not
in vain. And General Prcntis>' divis-
ion fought bravely and effectively
throughout the day, and were not capt
ured till after four O'Clock in tie af er
noon.
The man of Northern prejudice, will
reid General Grants paper, and will
but glance at Colonel .IOhnS:on's. The
man of Southern prejudi KS will con>O,.
himself with Colonel j ohnstOn's convic-
ton that the battle of Shiloh was won
on the first day, and was lost on the
second only because the COnfederSe.
mmander was killed. The impartial
historian. accepting the veracity. but
not necessarily the Judgment. Of both
authors will compare the two papers to
reach true understanding of this mo-
mentous battle, and will find in Genera.
Grants frank confession of his misap-
prchension OF the strength of the Con
federacy. and in Colonel Johnston :
disclosure Of the divided counsels In the
Coafe terate army the two clues to the
true interpretations Of the events of tn
day.
up to the battle of Shiloh" say.
General Grant, Il. as well as thousands
Of other citizens. believed that the re.
belliOn against the Government would
collapse suddenly and soon il decisive
victory could lie gained over any Of its
armies" This was substantially the
universal opinion in the North. 1t wa,
even shared by many in the South.
The fall of Forts Donclson and Henry
apparently opened the whole Southwest
to the Federal army. The North be-
lie, ed that further resistance would be
in vain. Thousands in the South
shared that belief. General Grant, a.
soon as the dilatory Halleck gave him
opportunity to move, acted in accord
ancc with his subsequent Instructions To
General Sheridan before Richmond and
pushed things. He hurried his army
forward after the retreating Confederat,
forces. meaning to gve iem no time to
recover from their decentralization. He
expected no other than q Fabian policy
of slow retreat and sullen, but not
| aggressive. resistance. Assuming that
the Confederates would retreat, il
pushed, he threw up no ear.hworks
He put raw levies at the front. He tele
graphed to Halleck on Saturday night,
IL have scarcely the faintest idea of ar
attack general one) being made upon
u.s." The army. catching the cont agior
of his confidence, perhaps negle tied to
keep out scouts in the front. This was
charged at the time by newspaper cor.
respondents. and is not specifically do
MED by General Grant. who does speci.
fically deny some other analogous
charges. While General Grant wa,
thus taking for granted that the Con.
federate forces would not venture on ar
aggressive campaign. the Confederate
Gen rails themselves were in debate
upon that very point General John
ston, trst in command, purposed m
attack. General Beauregard, the popu-
lar Southern hero of Bull Run, was op
posed to it He wished to pursue I'll.
policy in the West which General LIE.
pursued so effectively in the F st It,
prolong the war. weary out the North
and keep his own army intact, by q de
fensive campaign. General Johnston
overruled all opposition. He ended tn.
counc Of war on Saturday afternoo,
with the decisive declaration: Nv.
shall attack at d.. light tom ,rrow.
would fight them II they were o mill
| ion"
Thus both sides entered the frs
day 5 battle under some disadvantage
The Federal forces were not expectin.
an attack, and We're not prepared TO,
It. Even when it came. they REGARDED
it at first as only n reconnaissance il
force. General Sherman. who was a,
the front. SO inter- reted it "Beaure
CARL" he said. IS not such fool as t.
leave his base of operations and attacl
Us in ours Ga the other hand, tn.
Ccnfedcrate' entered on an aggressiv.
campaign with divided counsels. Tn,
second in command was half sick, had