The Nevada picayune., 1885-07-02


 10000 men at Fredericksburg. would have swept down on Rich mond, where they would have uni tied with Mcclellan, and would have driven Lee out of Virginia. and secured possession of the con federate capilal.
 McClellan's "subordinates were not equal to the task" With his I3 900 men, Jackson struck the 64, 900 of his opponents in detail and whipped them without unusu, al effort. And then, while Wash. ingtOn was in tremor of appre. hension from fear that Jackson would sweep down on the national capital, that leader moved swiftly through the gaps of the Blue Ridge. and joined Lee in time to save him from annihilatiOn and to preserve the confederate capital from federal possession. Probably this movement by which Jackson extricated himself from a force five times his own fn number. and changed the pending confederate defeat before Richmond into a vic tory, was. in all essential respects, the most brilliant event of the war.
 It is all at this precise point in the operations in Virginia that were most clearly shown the inef- fciency, the poltroony, the mean jealousy of the Washington ad. ministration. When Jackson broke through the federal cordou, the au- thorities should have known the direction of his movements. They should have learned that Rich mond and Mcclellan were his ob- jective points, and they should have ordered McDo well with his 40, 900 men 10 move for Richmond. He was nearer the confederate capital at Fredericksburg than Jackson was when he broke through the fedora gordon. and issued from the Shenandoah through the deiiles of the noun tains, and it would have been very easy for him to have reached the federal position and assisted in the battle of Mechanicsville and Gaines Mills. His assis tanco would have won those battles, and in all probability would have end ed. the war, at least iu Virginia. In place of sending Mcdowell in this direction, the strategists in Wash ington were shaking in their boots over tho belief that Jackson was advancing on the national capital. Hence, they ordered Mcdowell to fall back to cover Washington against an enemy who was just then moving with incredible celeri' ty in a direction directly opposite that leading to Washington. Me Clellan's movements against Rich mond were predicated on the belief that Of ,000 federals could hold in check, and possibly capture Jack son, with his 13,000 men, and on the further belief that, as promis- ed by tue strategists in Washing ton, Mcdowell should advance and support him on his right. The i'm becility and cowardice of the Washington strategsits frustrated all these essential features of his plan, with the result that the war was prolonged several years, and tens of thousands ot additional lives were sacrificed.
 Probably the Washington cote, rie found one profound satisfaction in the result. Richmond was saved the war was extended. indefinite ly and Mcclellan was killed off as presidential candidate,-all of which, there is every reason fol believing, was exactly what was wanted by the pseudo patriots " ht werethen manipulating the conduc of the war. At that particular pc riod, and for some years later, one of the main object of the war wal not so much the subjugation of the southern revolt as the porpetuatiol in power of the republican regime The defeat of Lee and the capture of Richmond 'in June, 1862, would have both ended the war and the party. It was deemed better tt save the party and loose Rich mond; hence Mcclellan was left to his fate.
 Editing newspaper under