Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1885-02-19
The Lion i'm the Tolls.

| There is tragic pathos in the spec
tacle presented by the British nation
wrung by unavailing sorrow and afiam
with passionate desire to rescue its en-
dangered sons, yet writhing helpless
in the tolls of paralyzing Ministry
With the lapse of every wasted hou
the conviction grows more poignan
that England must be wrenched fire,
from the Gladstone incubus to save be-
from crushing visitation and IRE
trievable disgrace.
The fall of Khartoum has indisputa
bly, been known to the Gladstone Cab
met since an early hour on Thursday
anu there is grave suspicion that ths
news reached the War Office two. day.
before. How have Ministers used th.
precious interval, duriug which Cor
don, if alive, has borne narrowing sus
pense. or, perhaps, APPALLING tortures
and during which the weak and decima
ted band under Stewart has been lef
in deadly peril, exposed to attack from
the main body of the triumphant
rebels. now pressing northward from
Khartoum TO wash their spears at Gu.
bat? Not sinlge English troop ship
is as yet on its way to re-entorce the
| Soudan army; not soldier of Wolse-
ley's reserve has rs yet arrived from
Korti to inspirit Stewards forlorn hope.
| The first two days were spent by Glad
stone and his military favorite in a
| feverish exchange of futile kilograms
whereby each strove to shift RESPONSE
biiity upon the other. Saturday was
wasted in desperate attempt to find
a pretext for delay by the imbecile re-
quest that Wolseley, from his post far
in the rear, would ascertain more par
ticulars of Gordon's fate than Wilson
| was able to elicit within gunshot of
Khartoum. Sunday, the fourth, if not
the sixth, day after the Ministry was
summoned by a grave disaster to act
instead of talking, was devoted, it
seems, to discussion of the course to
be pursued. provided proof should be
forthcoming of Gordon's death, an
event of which from the outset there
was an overwhelming probability. We
are told that the debate was "ani-
mated" which means that counsels
were divided, and that not even the
stress Of the existing crisis could ex-
tort unanimous approval of energetic
action.
While in London the Cabinet was
starving hope by wrangling over the
policy of fighting at all:for England's
honor, the military incapacities at
Cairo were transacting the stage busi-
ness of a council of war and concocting
a programme which should have the
merit of exposing Gen. Wolseley to the
least risk possible. Of course, they see
that Berber must he the ultimate base
of operations for the small and scatter
ed forces that now confront the Mahdi,
but how is the imperative preliminary
concentration to be effected? These
sapient authorities advise that Gen.
Wolseley with his 5000, or probably
by this time 1000, men shall remain
idle and safe at Korti, and that the
small detachments under Stewart at
Gubat and Earle at Abou Hamet shall
get back to him, if they can. Butwhy
should these weak columns, already
far on the way to Berber, be ordered
to fall back-a movement of the utmost
danger in view of the changed tenn
per of the Arabs since the fall of Khar-
toum-when, if they managed to reach
Wolseiey, they would straightway be
called upon to retrace their steps over
onesof the same routes? Why should not
Wolseley go to them, instead of re-
calling them to him, if the common
aim is Berber? Were Stewards men
promptly strengthened with part of
the reserve from Korti, including, of
course, the garrison at Gakdul. they
might be able to retire up the Nile to
Berber, before the main force of the
Mahdi could arrive from Khartoum.
Meanwhile, Wolseley himself, with
the rest of the reserve, could push on
in Earle's track and reach Berber from
the northwest, leaving post at Abou
Hamet. to keep open communication
with Korosko. The time available is
short, ard the indispensable concen-
tration can be more swiftly brought
about by converging movements aimed
directly at the objective point itself
than by antecedent retreat on Korti.
But fresh blunder in strategy was
not the only sinister suggestion of the
Cairene council of war. An ominous
hint was dropped that the adoption OF
Berber as base would involve post
ponement of aggressive operations un-
til next autumn. But why should this
follow? If Wolseley will but start for
Berber, and move as if he meant to get
there, there is no reason why his whole
force should not be massed at that
coign of vantage before the end Of Feb
ruary. Meanwhile, if England could
but shake off her old man of the sea,
or if, in spite of him, some vigor could
1 be infused into the Ministry an Anglo
/ Indian army of $1,000 men could GER
tainly be placed at saukim as early as
the first of March. Then, remember
! ing what was accomplished at precise
Ily the same season of last year by Gen.
Graham with Only a third as many
i uho doubts that the fOrcesmen-