Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1885-05-07
-(Iraut az a Soldier.

From an anecdotal and reminiscent
article by General Adam Badeau, on the
characteristics of Grant as a soldier, in
the May Century Magazine we quote the
following: AT the close of the war. the
man who had led the victorious armies
was not forty-three years of age. He
had not changed in any essential quail
ties from the captain in Mexico or the
merchant in Galena. The daring and
resource that he showed at Donelson and
Vicksburg had been foreshadowed at
Panama and Garita San Cosme; the
persisLency before Richmond was the
development Of the same trait which
led him to seek subsistence in various
occupations, and follow fortune long de-
ferred through many unsuccessful years.
Developed by experience. taught BY cir
cumstance, learning from all he saw and
even more from what he did, as few
have ever been developed or taught, or
have learned, he nevertheless, maintain
ed. the self same personality through it
all. The characteristics of the man were
exactly those he manifested as soldier
l-directness and steadiness of purpose
clearness and certainty of judgment,
self reliance and immutable determine
tion.
Grants genius, too, was always ready;
it was always brightest in an emergen-
cy. All his faculties we're sharpened in
battle; the man who to some seemed
dull. or even slow. was then prompt and
decided. When the circumstances were
once presented to him, he was never long
in determining. He seemed to have a
faculty Of penetrating at once to the
heart of things. lie saw what was the
point to strike, or the thing to do, and
he never wavered in bis judgment after
wards, unless, of course, under new con-
|tingencies. Then he had no false pride
of opinion, no hesitation IN undoing
what he had ordered; but if the circum-
stances remained the same, he never
doubted his own judgment. l asked him
once how he cUdld be so calm in terrible
emergencies, after giving an order for a
corps to go into battle. or directing some
intricate maneuvre. He replied that he
had done his best and could do no better
others might have ordered more wisely
or decided more fortunately, but be was
conscious that he had done what he
could, and he gave himself no anxiety
about the judgment or the decision. Of
course be was anxious about the accom-
p.ishment of his plans, but never as to
whether he ought to have attempted
them. So, on the night of the battle of
the Wilderness, when the right of his
army had been broken and turned, after
he had given his orders for new disposi>
tions, he went to his tent and slept
calmly till morning. Not
that he was Indifferent to human life or
human suffering. have been with him
when he left a hurdle race, unwilling to
see men risk their necks needlessly and
he came away from one of BloDdin's ex>
hibitions at Niagara. angry and nervous
at the sight of one poor wretch in gaudy
clothes crossing the whirlpool on wire.
But he could subordinate such sensa-
tions when necessity required it. He
risked his life, and was ready to sacrifice
it, for his country; and he was ready, if
need came, to sacrifice his countrymen,
for he knew that they too made the Of
fering.
1T was undoubtedly as fighter rather
than maneuvrer that Grant distin>
guished himself. He was ready with
resource and prompt in decision at Bel
mont and Donelsen, but it was the in>
vincible determination at both these
places as well as at Shiloh that won. AS
with men, so with armies and generals:
skill and strength are tremendous ad-
vantages, but courage outweighs them
all. In battle, as in STRAIT
egieal movements, Grant always meant
to take the initiative; be always ad-
vanced, was always the aggressor, al
ways sought to force his plans upon the
enemy; and if by any chance or circum-
stance the enemy attacked, his method |
of defense was an attack elsewhere. At |
Donelson, as we have seen, when his |
troops were pushed back on the right he |
on the left; and this was only |
one instance out of hundred. This, |
too, not only because he was the invader, |
or because his forces were numerically |
stronger, but because it was his nature |
in war to assail. In his Vicksburg cam
paign his army was smaller than Penn.
berSon's; yet he was the aggressor. In
the operations about Iuka his position |
was u defensive one, but he attacked the
enemy all the same. 1t was his idea of |
war to attack necessarily and advance
invariably, and thus to make the opera
tions of the enemy part and parcel of |
his own"
Cleveland, Lorain and Wheeling