The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-04-29
The Generals Characteristics.

At the close Of the war, the man who had led
the victorious armies was not forty three years
of age. He had not changed in any essential
qualities from the captain in Mexico or the
merchant in Galena. The daring and resource
that he showed at Donelson and Vicksburg had
had been foreshadowed at Panama and Garita
San Cosme. The persistency before Richmond
was the development of the same trait which led
him to seek subsistence in various occupations,
and follow fortune, long deferred, through
many unsuccessful years. Developed by expert
ence, taught by circumstance, learning from all
he saw, and even more from what he did, as few
have ever been developed or taught, or have
learned, he, nevertheless, maintained the self
same personality through it all. The character
istics OF the man were exactly those he mani
tested as sodier-directness and steadiness of
purpose, clearness and certainty of Judgment,
self-reliance and mmutable determination.
Grants genius, too, was always ready; it was
always brightest in an emergency. All his fac
ulties were sharpened in battle; the man who
to some seemed dull, or even slow, was then
prompt and decided When the circumstances
were once presented to him he was never long in
determining. He seemed to have faculty Of
dL once TO the nearC or things. lie
what was the point to strike, or the thing to
do, but he never wavered in his Judgment after
ward unless. OF course, under new contin-
gencies. Then he had no false pride of opinion,
no hesitation in undoing what he had ordered;
but II the circumstances remained the same he
never noubted his own Judgment
L asked him once how he could be so calm in
terrible emergencles-afterg giving an order for
corps to 60 into battle directing some intricate
maneuver. He replied that he had done his best
POnld In M oth iont how ordar rod
more wisely or decided more fortunately but
he was conscious that he had done what he
could, and he gave himself no anxiety about the
Judgment or decision. Of course he was anxious
about the accomplishment of his plans, but
never as to whether he ought to have attempted
them. So, on the night of the battle of The
Wilderness, when the right of his army had
been broken and turned, after he had given his
orders Cor issw dispositions, he went to his tent
and slept calmly till morning. Not that he was
indifferent to human life or human suffering.
have been with him when he left hurdle race
unwilling to see men risk their necks needlessly;
and he came away from one of Blondin's exhi-
billions at Niagara angry and nervous at the
sight of one poor wretch in gaudy clothes cross
ing the whirlpool on wire. But he could sub
ordinate such sensations when necessity required
it, He risked his life, and was ready to sac
rifce it for his country; and he was ready if
need came to sacrifice his countrymen for he
knew that they too maze the offering.
1t was undoubtedly as fighter, rather than as a
maneuverer, that Grant distinguished himself.
He was ready with resource and prompt in de-
cision at Belmont and Donelson, but it was
the invincible determination at both these
places, as we'll as at Shiloh, that won. As with
men, so with armies and generals-skili and
strength are tremendous advantages but cour-
age outweighs them all. In battle, as in strate-
glcal movements, Grant always meant to take
the initiative; he always advanced, was always
the aggressor, always sought to force his plans
upon the enemy and if by anychance or circum-
stance the enemy attacked his defense was an
attack elsewhere. At Donelson as we have
seen, when his troops were pushed back on the
right, he assaulted on the left, and this only
one instance out of a hundred. This, too, not
only because he was the invader or
because his forces were numerically
stronger, but because it was his nature
| in war to assault. In the Vicksburg campaign
his army was smaller than Pemberton's, yet he
was the aegressor. In the operations about
| luka his position was defensive one but he at
| of war to attack necessarily and advance inva
| riably, and thus 20 make the operations of the
! enemy part and parcel of his own
In another place Badeau writes of General
| Grant: Ills relation with the troops were pc
culIar lie never made speeches to the soldiers,
| and, OF course, never led them himself into hat
| tie after he assumed his high commands But
| in every battle they saw him certainly once or
| twice far to the front, as exposed as they. for
| there always seemed to come q time in each en-
| or ears of another, but must observe for him
| self in order to determine After the battle of
| the Wilderness he rode along the road where
| Hancockss veterans lay, and, when the men
discovered it Grant and that his face
was turned toward Richmond, they knew in
| moment they were not to retire across the Rap
idan- as so often before, and they rose IN the
darkness and cheered until the enemy thought
| it was night attack, and came out and opened
| fire. When the works were carried at Peters
burg their enthusiasm was OF course, I'M
bounded and whenever they caught glimpse
of him in the Appomattox campaign, the cheers
were vociferous. After the surrender of Lee
they began, without ORDERS to salute him with
cannon, but he directed the firing to cease lest
it should wound the feelings Of the prisoners,
who, he said, were once again our country men.
This sentiment he retained. Soon after the
close of the war / was present when commit
tee of Congress, headed by Charles Sumner,
waited on him to propose that a picture should
be painted of the surrender of Lee, to be placed
in the rotunda of the Capitol: but he told them
he should never consent, so far as he was con-
cerned to any picture being placed in the Cap
ito] to commemorate a victory in which our own
countrymen were the losers"
The Charter of the Chicago Board of Trade.