The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-04-08
GRANT ON THE POTOMAC.
His Arrival i'm Washington-Grave Contin-
gencies and Anxieties.

GRANT On THE POTOMACs
His Arrival in Washington-Grave Contin-
gencies and Anxieties.
Washington Letter. in New York Herald.
The following recollections of Grant with the
Army Of the Potomac are narrated by a gentle
man formerly attached to the headquarters of
that army:
When General Grant was raised to the grade
of lieutenant general and appointed to the COM
mand ol all of the armies of the United States he
was called to Washington to confer with the
government as to the mode in which the war
should be further conducted. Despite gen.
eral confidence in the final success of the ma
tional cause, there were contingencies and anx-
ieties that President Lincoln felt should be
known to and shared by the military leader in
whom the hopes of the country were now placed
ons for knowing that the danger of
foreign Intervention had not passed
away. and that any serious check to the federal
arms might bring it upon so suddenly and
effectively as to completely turn the tide of
events. Secretary Chase was holding gloomy
views concerning the financial future, owing to
the enormous and steadily growing cost of the
federal ornaments Secretary Stanton, who
never permitted himself to think of but one end,
had begun to doubt whether the means to that
end would hold out in sufficient measure and
duration. President Lincoln embodied in his
own person the disquieting knowledge and the
fears of all his heads OF departments. General
Grant away off in the West holding little
official communication with Washington, and
personally stranger to the members of the
administration, had comparatively little knowl-
edge of the general situation, and was of that
mental habit that concentrates mans thoughts
upon the the thing of the moment.
1t needed the visit to Washington and contact
with the President and Cabinet to bear in upon
him the supreme Importance, from the stand
pointof both domestic and foreign politics, of
successfully assailing the army of Lee and the
capital of the confederacy. So long as both re-
manned defantly almost within the shadow of
the national capital victories in the West in large
part failed of their proper immediate effect, and
in truth served to quicken the desperate efforts
which Secretary Seward knew the Emperor Ma
poleon to be making to gain material or at least
moral support in Europe for an Intervention. In
the eyes of the administration General Lees
army was the indispensable. objective point of
any operation designed to effect public opinion at
home or abroad and hence the conclusion that
Genital Grant should take charge of the Army
Of the Potomac, and conduct movement against
Richmond and the army under Lee.
He went out to General n sades headquarters,
and as the result of prolonged conference with
that commander, in which he gained some new
views of a new situation, he resolved not to dis
place Meade, either by assuming the immediate
command himself or by procuring the assign
ment of another to the command. 1t was char
acteristic of Grant that. having made up his
mind on this important matter, his decision was
full and and final. In spite of assurances from
friends at Washington, in the West and in
Meade's own army, that the. removal of that
officer was little short of a necessity,
he never entertained the thought
of displacing him from first to last;
and so little did he interfere with the internal
administration of the Army of the Potomac that
he did not propose Sheridan for the command of
the 2svalry until he learned that Meade wished
a c.Ange, and although he repeatedly made
known to Meade his wish to displace Warren
from the command of the Fifth corps, he yielded
to the tenacity with which Meade clung to that
officer, until Sheridan took the matter into his
own hands in an emergency.
Upon joining the Army of the Potomac, Gen.
Grant established for himself little camp four
miles distant from the general headquarters, and
that army as chose to call upon him, but quietly
kept off intrigue and insubordination, and this
course he steadily pursued to the close.
Before opening the compaign, he startled the
authorities at Washington by asking that Gen
eral Mcclellan might be restored to active duty,
and became so urgent about it, taking such
high view of McClellan's military abilities, that
.he President and Mr. Seward supported him.
and even Secretary Chase stood neutral. But
the passionate and fiery invective of Secretary
Stanton prevailed over all, and the Lieutenant
general was firmly informedsthat General McClei-
Ian was an.impossibiity in any military situation
The Secretary of War was not so unyieding as
to General Buell., but that stubborn soldier re-
fused all overtures unless the injustice done him
bv the War Department should be formally as
we'll as substantially expiated, and in this pur-
suit of shadow lost his last chance of crown
ing military career full OF merit, but also full
of misfortune.
The earlier results of General Grants eastern
campaign were we'll calculated to cause him to
share the anxieties Of those in power at Wash
ton, but when, on the very first day, Lee doubled
up the division of Ricketts, and threatened, for
the time being, to lead considerable part of the
army of the Potomac to Richmond in manner
unexpected he was the one calm man of thous-
ands-so stolidy calm as to mingle touch of
evaporation with surprise in the minds of by
ISLANDERS. And yet his calmness was not of tho
unreasoning kind, for he believed in the leader
ship and discipline of the troops in rear of which
he sat whiting the bark off tree. and deemed
them equal to the repelling of the fierce
assault and the reformation of the broken line
of battle, and his cool calculation was in due
course exemplifed. Even on that memorable
June day when, for the first time, the spirit
seemed beaten out of the army of the Potomac
by repeated and murderous assaults upon Peters
burg, he calmly remarked to the agonized
Meade that having now proved the impossibi.ity
of carrying the works it was useless to make
further attempts.
Three things are essential to the proper
understanding of this remark: First that the
day before the arrival and assault the federal
scouts had reported that Lees army had not
come up, and that there were less than 10000
men in the works; second, that the first
assault had satisfied Meade that Lee was there in
force, and that further attempt to storm the
works was useless third, that in conse-
quence of the failure of the as
saults it took ten months longer to
effect the intended result at time when Gen.
Grant was being almost daily reminded from
Washington that nothing was so important as to
bring the to close at In fact, SO
urgent was the necessity for discountipg time
that the exchange of prisoners was stopped, in
hopes to bring the Confederacy to an end by
dearth of men to fill the insurgent ranks.
One more instance of Grants quiet courage.
When the powder boat was exploded at City
Point filling tho air above him with smoke
and exploding shells. he rose from his seat,
looked about to see what he could of the cause of
the noise and destruction, and few minutes
afterward, in company with ingalls,, his quarter
master general and bosom friend, he was down