The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-08-02
THE VALUE OF LEGS INWAR.
The Brilliant Campaign of Gen. Mitchell
in the RebelliOn's Early Days.
Of Good Result Because of the Timidity
of Superior officers.

- ~ SRSNA~s AS WAY S"@
his troops should be subsisted off the country
occupied by them. He thus got rid of bases of
supplies and long lines of communication that
had to be kept open. Another of his maxims
was that when his army moved, it should march
as if it had wings, thus giving the enemy no
time to prepare for his coming. 1t was this
wonderful rapidity of movement that so aston
ished and COMPOUNDED the Austrians during his
first Italian campaign. When war came to us a
few years ago, these plain maxims of successful
warfare were ignored by our generals. All
movements were slow and methodical, taking
days aud weeks for their preparation. and other
days and weeks for their execution. The troops
were scattered, but not for subsistence. We
were fighting in a country in open rebellion
against the government, but the loyal North was
not only taxed to furnish men for the army, but
to furnish food and raiment for the men. The
South was abundantly supplied with all the
army needed except ammunition. Yet it was
held sacred to be used by the enemy, While our
forces had to be subsisted from the North, ne
eessitating the establishment of bases of supplies
at various points, and the keeping open of long
lines Of communication Without such a base
Of supplies it was held to be impossible to main
tain an army or carry on the war.
In the West, however, there were two gen
erals who believed that success was to be won
the most easily by moving the army rapidly, and
one of them, at least. believed that it WAS not
only possible to subsist his forces off the country
through which they moved, but that it was right
to do so. These two generals were only com
maOdarC IF IiuiSinpc h-t fhau aach damon.
strated the truth of their theories. One was
Gen. William Nelson, the other Gen.
0. NJ. Mitchell Nelson, when he got
the advance of Buell's army on the way to
Pittsburg Landing, moved forward with a
rapidity and earnestness that impaired itself to
the whole army, and it was thus enabled to
reach Shiloh in time. Mitcholls movements
from the camp at Bacon Creek, in Kentucky,
until his guns were laundering at the gates of
Chattanooga. spread terror and dismay through
out the entire South, and demonstrated that the
confederacy was but a shell, and that an army
could be subsisted without q base of supplies.
We were slow to utilize the lessons thus learned.
and wasted thousands Of lives and millions of
money.
Other movements of larger armies, accom-
panied by bloody battles. later in the war, have
served to drive out of mind some of these earlier
operations, but to the candid and impartial
student of history the campaign of General
Mitchell will stand as one of the most
brilliant episodes of the war, and as we get
further away from the glamour Of grander sue
cesses, won at the lannon's mouth, the greater
will be our establishment that the commanding
generals and the authorities at Washington did
not sooner profit by the experience gained by it.
We ali remember that during the first year and a
half of the war a great deal was said about
grand strategy" 1t is told that just after some
success achieved by General Blunt in southwest
ern Missouri a number of army officers we're at
the White House, and, as usual, they were
eloquently descanting on the favorite topic OF
strategy" when Mr.. Lincoln. with that peculiar
twinkle of the eye, remarked that he liked the
strategy of General Blunt best. This surprised
the military magnates, who declared they never
knew he had any, and asked the President in
what this strategy lie so much admired consisted
He explained something after the following fash
ion: Blunt first finds out where the enemy is
posted. He then fires a she'll over into their
iAO ohu az oHCc SOco 10 Bee WleTe II MT ana
what execution it did," The officers present were
not slow to see the sarcasm of the President,
aimed at the do-nothing policy of the Eastern
armies. The strategy of General Mitchell was
modelled after that SO tersely commended by the
great President.
In the beginning of 1862 the rebels occupied a
line extending from Columbus, on the Mississippi
river, to Cumberland Gap. The fortified points
were Columbus, Fort Henry, on the Tennessee;
Fort Donelson, on the Cumberland: Bowling
Green, and Cumberland Gap. These places were
all naturally strong and easily defended, and the
line was supposed by the rebels to be impreg-
nable. The great body of the confederate
troops were between Nashville and Bowling
Green, ana the Mississippi river. The federal
authorities determined to pierce this line, and
the points selected for the attack were the TWO
forts, Henry and Donelson, and the duty
was assigned to Halleck's forces, under General
Grant, Fort Henry soon fell, but Donelson was
destined to be a harder nut tc crack, and it was
necessary to make a diversion on another part
of the line to prevent the rebels from
reinforcing the fort. General Buelrs forces
were selected to make this demonstrations on
the east, and the remainder of Halleck's troops
on the West. Buells forces were stretched out
from Louisville to Green river. In December,
1861. Gen. O. NJ. Mitchell had been assigned to
the command of the Third division of Buells
army. The division was composed of three
brigades, commanded by Colonel Turchin, Gen
eral Dumont, and Colonel Sill. The men had all
seen service either in western Virginia or east
ern Kentucky. To this division was assigned
the advance of the movement to be made by
B"ell. The first objective point was Bowling
Green. This village of :, 900 inhabitants is stu
ated on the western bank of the Barren river,
and is surrounded by numerous hills. Upon
these hills the rebels had planted strong batter
les. In and around it were gathered about
5000 confederate troops, and it was counted one
of the strongest points in the confederate line.
The fall of Fort Henry. thus enabling the fed
erals to turn his left flank, satisfied Johnston
that neither Columbus nor Bowling
Green were longer tenable, SO he
hastily prepared to withdraw his
forces to a new line far to the southwark. The
fall of Fort Henry and the rapid investment of
Fort Donelsou, combined with the movement of
Bueiis forces, spread terror and dismay through
out the entire South. The war they fondly
hoped would be confined to the border States
was to be brought to their own doors.
Mitchell had command of the advance on
Bowling Green. and he moved with the utmost