Iron County register. [volume] (Ironton, Iron County, Mo.) 1867-1965, 1885-05-14

| ceedlng one dollar and fifty cents for
the fraction of twenty-five miles less
than thirteen miles. This provision of
| carried forward i'm tile revision of 1879,
| and is the law to-day. By this statute
| defendant was not authorized to charge
more than SIS 30 for lear load" of
| lumber carried from Vulcan Switch to
| to st. Louis. The receipts for freight
paid by Mr.. Morris on the cars shipped
for him show that the Company had
| charged him from $40 to $50 or S333 for
| the lumber carried on each car. The
Company had charged and claimed the
right to charge tile statutory rate for
| the first 10000 pounds, and extra
| freight on the weight over 10000
hounds on one car. Mr.. Morris diSput-
ed this proposition, and contended that
the Company was bound to carry all
| that was put on each car for $3.50, he
| having proved that the cars sent him
| were stencied on the sides to be from
5000 to 10000 pounds capacity, and
that he had never loaded more on car
than its stenciled capacity. In fact it
was conceded that the capacity of cars
varied from 20, 900 pounds to 10000
pounds, and that shippers had the
right TO load the cars to their capaci-
ties as thus marked.
The jury took tie view that "car
load" was what the car carried, and
allowed plaintiff all he claimed. The
amount OF over-charges allowed by the
jury was about 81 200, which the stat
ute required to be trebled, making
$4,000. Defendant filed its motion for
| new trial, and for grounds thereof al
legged that the verdict of the jury was
against the weight of the evidence and
that the court had erred in not instruct
| ing the jury as matter of law, that a
''car load" under the evidence was 90
900 pounds. In passing upon this mo-
ton, Judge Thomas said:
"The main question for the court to
| determine is whether it erred in it's
instructions to the jury, for if the in
| structions were right the verdict was
wrong. The court instructed the jury
that if they believed from the evidence
| that by the regulations of the Company
and by custom universally prevailing
| with defendant and the business public
In 1879. and ever since, a car Load was
| fixed and understood to be O,OOO
pounds for the purpose of fixing the
| freight, then the defendant had right
to charge $3.50 for distance of 112
miles for each scar load of 20, 900 pounds
and in addition thereto extra freight
for the weight put on each car in ex-
cess of 90, 900 pounds and i'm this form
of action where the plaintiff was seek
ing to recover a penalty, the rates of
charges for such extra weight were not
| limited, except that they must not ex-
| coed $3.50. If this be the law, then
there is no question in my mind that
the verdict is against this instruction
under the evidence. The regulations
of the Company dated Jan. LIST, 1885,
and others dated subsequently, pre-
scribed that ten tons should constitute
Il 'car load and that a ton was 10000
| pounds. All of the witnesses, both for
the plaintiff aud defendant testified,
without a single exception, that for the
purpose of fixing the freight scar load
| was understood by the usage of the
| Company and those doing business
with it to be 10000 pounds, and that if
| shippers put more than that on car
| it was well understood that they would
| have to pay extra for the weight in
excess of 20, 900 pounds. The plaintiff
| himself testified to this and that he
knew this was the custom though lie
| did not think it was right. The jury,
| in order to return the verdict that they
| did, must have misconstrueI the in
| structinn, for there was no evidence
| that a car load, for the purpose of fix
| ing the freight, was anything but 20
900 pounds. 1t was all one way. i
| have no doubt the jury acted and dis
charged their duty conscientisusly I'M
| der their oath, but it is manifest to my
| mind they misconstrued the law as laid
| down by the court. They evidently
deemed car load whatever the car
carried, regardless of it's weight. They
have allowed defendant SIS 30 per car
Load for car carrying twenty thous-
and pounds, and only $3.50 for another
carrying $4,000 pounds. Now, as /
said, if the court was right in defining
| a ear load to be 10000 pounds, then
| the jury was wrong in finding, from
the evidence in the case. that a 'car
load was anything from 10000 to co.
900 pounds. And, while l doubt not
the jury acted conscientiously and hon
eSIly, YET the court mas a uuCV TO per-
form, also, under oath, and if it is sat
isfieG that the verdict is not supported
by the law and evidence, it is its plain
duty to set it aside. Did I, therefore,
declare the law to the jury correctly? is
the sole question for me to dispose of
on this motion. I find that in 1875 the
General Assembly of Missouri enacted
the law under which this suit was
brought. BY that law, railroad COM
panies are prohibited from charging
more than certain rates per car load.'
The words car load are not defined in
the act, and in constituting it we must
look to other sources for the meaning
of these words. In doing this, We must
consider the evils intended to beavoid-
ed, and the benefits to be conferred. 1t
was clearly intended to fix a uniform
rate of freight tariffs for all shippers,
and to prevent unjust Discrimination
by railroad companies. If the law
making power had no definite idea of
the words car load,' but intended to
leave it optional with the companies to
call car load anything from 10000
to go, 900 pounds, then the door was left
wide open for them to discriminate be-
tween shippers. They could send a
e, 900 pound car to an enemy or to
station that was not popular with their
employees. and 10000 pound car to
their friendly shippers or favorite
points. The Legislature could not
have meant to clothe railroad compan-
les into unjust power. To charge an
enemy or any ono GlS IN for 40 rr.-;,o