New-York tribune., 1885-08-16
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
THE GREAT REPUBLICAN.
EX-SENATOR BoUTwELL's "REMINISCENCES
COPYRIGHT 1885.

That was the darkest day of the sad years OF the
ucC,elan had failed upon tho peninsula.
poue,s army. reinforced by the remains OF the Army
80 the Peninsula had been driven within the iof''.
6cation of Washington. Our losses OF men n"u
beeu enormous but most serious OF all was ,no io'
Of confidence in commanders. Inc Army uio nv
coplde in Pope and the authorities ala not cor"u,
IN Mcclellan In that crisis Lincoln su.rcn'oieS
his own Judgment to the opinion OF tho AiN'' "A"
re.esiablished Mcclellan in command
When the business to which had been summoned
A ,,s prss;aent strange business for the time, the
snno,otnant of assessors and collectors of internal
..ssrno was over. he was kind enough to ask my
oo,;o, "a In the command of the Army. Tne way
as thus opeDcd for conversation and for me 10 say
st the end that thought our SUCCESS depchu'u
upon the emancipation of the slaves
ro this ho said. You would not have 1t done ho"'
,vo,ld vouf Must We not wait for something iiHo
victoryp -...,o.;o,
Tb;s ,vas the second and most explicit intima'io"
to mo of his purpose in regard 10 slavery liz '"'
nn,ceding July or early. in August at an
80, business connected with my Official duties. 10
said. sLet me read two letters an" '"~"s
them from pigeon-hole over his table ho procecucu
to do what he had proposed. l have not soeh 'no
letters in print. His correspondent was sou''o
,',ar :, Iopi.iana. who claimed TO be Union man.
fPndnreu
., the reorganization of that State. and he laoorea
.oo,ousIv to impress upon him the dangers and evils
% concentration. The reply Of the President is only
;,rrtant from the fact that when he can4e 10 thae
t of his corrspondent's letter he used this expres
Go, You ,nust not expect me 20 give mp TINS "o'
arumcnt without playing my last card. Ehiah
o;n.tion WAS his last card. lie waited LOT tiihe
when the facts or events should colncide' MI I'm
col, was as devoted to the States as was even MI
Webster in his views of military necessity IL was
,ho only pronnd on which the abolition OF slavery
in the States could be justified. Next tue weight
of pphlic sentiment in the loyal States not only
demanded emancipation but gave full assurance
that the act would be sustained to tue Gnu
As for myself, l cannot doubt that ne hau cO"-
tenplated tho policy of emancipation lot many
months, and anticipated the time when he S.'o"'"
adopt it. At his interview with the chicago o'ersS
bo stated his reasons against emaacipatoh' ".o
s,o,.d them so forcihly that the clergy were not
prepared to answer them; but an accrooi'0u
account of the inter view contains conclusive proof
Il at Mr.. Lincoln then contemplated isSui"s 'n'
ancpation Proclamation
It NAV be remembered by the reader that IN the
noliticaI campaign of 1862. prominent leader oil
the people's party the late Judge Joel Parker. oil
Cambridge, Mass, said in public that Mr. Lincoln
issued the proclamation under the influence OF the
laval Go, errors who met in Altoona IN September
of that year.
AsI was about to leave Washington in the month
of October to take part in the canvass. mentioned
20 the President the fact that such statement had
been made He at once said:
aIneyer thongnt of the meeting of the Governors.
The truth is Just this. Whom Lee came over the
river I made a resolution that If Mcclellan drove
him back would send the proclamation after him.
The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday
and until Saturday / could not find out whether we
had gained victory or lost a battle. IL was thcn
too late 70 issue the proclamation that day. and the
fact is fixed it mp little Sunday, and Monday |
let them have it,"
Men will entertain probably different notions oil
one part of Mr. Lncolns character. lie not only
possessed an apparent innate faculty oil conprc-
hending tendencies, probabilities aad opinions of
masses of men, but no obs rved and measured with
accuracy the peculiarities Of individuals who we're
about him. and malc those Individuals, sometimes
through their pccuarities. and sometimes in spite
of them. tho instruments or agents of his own
VIEWS
OF tho three chief men in his Cabinet. Seward,
Chase and Stanton, Mr.. Stanton was the only one
who never thus yielded to this power OF the Pres
idcnt The reason was creditsble alike to the Pres
idcnt and to Mr. Stanton. Mr.. Lincoln was frank
and fearless in his opnions devoted to duty, desti
tute of ambition, and uncompromising In his
views touching emancipation and the suppression
of the Rebellion. The peculiar sentiment OF tue day
made no impression upon him. lie was always
ready for cvery forward movement and could never
be rccnnciled to "a backward STEP either IN the field
or In the Cabinet. IL is no injustice to Mr Lincoln
or Mr.. Chase to say that they had ambitions which
under some circumstances might disturb the judg'
ment These ambitions and their tendencies did not
escape the notice of the President
Mr. Lincoln was indifferent to those matters oi
government that were relatively unimportant; but
he devoted himself with conscientious diligence to
tho grayer questions and topics of official duty. and
In the first months of his Administration. AT a
moment of supreme peril, by his pre-enInen,
wisdom, of which there remains indubItable proof
he saved the country from foreign | refer tC
the letter Of instructor to Mr.. Adams, written in
May, 1861, and referring to the proclamation o
the Government of Great Britain. recognizing tb'
belligerent character of the Confederate States
In the greatest exigencies his power of judging
Immediately and wisely dd not desert hiri. o.
the eve of the battle of Gettysburg General Hooker
resigned the command of the Army
This act was a painful and terrible surprise Il
Mr.. Stanton and to the President Mr.. Staltoni
account to me was this:
sWhen / received the dispatch my heart sani
within me, and was more depressed than at any
other moment of the War. I could not say that any
other officer knew General HOokers plans. or the
position even, ofthe various divisions OF the Army
/ sent Tor the President TO come to the War Oliic'
at once 1t was III the evening hat the President
soon appeared. I handed him the dispatch. Al
he read it his face became like lead. and said
what shall be dOneT 49,
He replied instantly. Accept his resignation"
In secret aud without consulting any one else. th'
President and Secretary OF War canvassed th'
merits of tho various officers of the Army and de
cided to place General Meade in command. or th
decision General Meade was Informed by dispatch
sent by bis special messenger. VINO reached th'
Quarters before the break of day next morning.
1t may be interesting to know the grounds OF
which the President decided to promote Genera
Meade: first. that he was good soldier. even