The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1885-01-17

for your patience, and leave this case for
serious consideration in your hands.
We publish herewith in full the charge OF
the Chief Justice to the jury in the Bridges
case. as taken in shorthand by Mr. Logan of
the Daily Bulletin:
CHARGE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Chief Justice Judd said: On the 18th of
Nogem Der gentleman named Patten came
10 his deaf III by pistol shot. 1t was near
fiye clock i'll the afternoon, while the sun
still shining, at tho close of ordinary
business hours. 1t has been proved clearly
to you that that would not have occurred,
and Patten not robbed of his iife-sent
without a word of warning to his account
if pistol had not been carried, 1t is not
the custom in this community to carry
deadly weapons. So long have seat
on this bench, both you and will do all We
possibly can to prevent the carrying of fire.
arms. 1t was something to say very favor
able to this little city, which most people
suppose to be community of barbarians,
that during a period of sixty or seventy
years no human life has been taken by vio-
lence. The character of your verdict will
do much to decide whether this state of
things shall continue or not. 1t is admitted
that Bridges fred the pistol that killed
Patten. 1t may be matter of surprise to
you why he was not presented on charge
of murder. (His Honor here read the law,
defining murder to be taking of human life
IL, E, Al,
ty, justification or extenuation of Law, and
manslaughter killing without malice afore-
thought, illegally, the only difference being
in the matter of malice aforethought) The
Government must have shown that Bridges
killed Patten with malice aforetbought be-
fore it could convict him of murder. The
burden of proaf to the contrary does not
rest upon the defendant, but the Govern
ment must prove malice beyond reason
able doubt 30 make out case of murder.
By reasonable doubt is meant for which
reason eau be givcn, and not an imaginary
doubt, or vague conjecture, or mere possi
bic doubt. His Honor then defined the de-
grees Of manslaughter, said it was not for
the jury to weigh consequences or appor-
ton punishment in this case, as that re
spOnsibility rested with the Court. He
cited examples of what' constituted man
slaughter before the law, such as killing by
the careless discharge of firearms, work
man letting stones fall from building, ETC.,
but those were not the ofiense in the high
est degree. 1t was not for the jury to weigh
degrees in their minds, however, only to
agree to the facts in the case, and be guided
by no other rule. The law in reference to
seIf-defense was an old fashioned one, az
administered by judges in this country, and
even in those places where homicides were
frequent he was not aware that the Judges
set up the law of the borders. The law
binding us might not seem chivalrou 8. but
it was the best, the safest.t the most conducive
to morality, safety and protection to human
life. Under the law, to make homicide ex
cusable the provocative injury must be
actual. man had no right to go armed by
fear of imaginary threats. They must not
refuse to convict because they found the
assault upon the defendant was premedi-
tated, as such fact did not prove self de-
Tense. man must retreat as far as he
safely can from party by whom he is as
saulted; must fly as far as he can, and may
only attack his assailant when hemmed in,
as by wall or ditch. His duty was to es-
cape-that was the law of this country-and
a man had no right to use violence if he had
chance to escape. Is was their duty to
consider whether in this case any injury
would have been inflicted upon the defend
ant which could have not been redressed by
his friend, the Police Magistrate. If there
was no extreme danger our laws would have
afforded all necessary protection to defend
snt. What was the duty of Bridges under
these circumstances? man may not say.
81 believe my life is in danger" in excuse
for homicide. If that was an extenuation
there would be no occasion for o Jury.
Would reasonable man believe his life was
in danger, or that he was in danger of
severe bodily injury? His Honor did not
agree with the Attorney-General that de-
PENDANT would have been justified in firing
one shot. The law did not justify him in
| using any more violence than was necessary
| in repelling the assault, Il was not a case
of necessity, A man was not obliged to take
| life until all other means were exhausted. /
! am asked to charge you on behalf of defendant
| that if he had been in bodily fear Of his life
he was justified in firing. I decline to do
| so. They were to decide what effect the
threats against defendant had upon kiIa by
his actions subsequently 10 being threat
| ened. They Raed not trouble themselves
about the unfortunate relations said to ex-
ist between the deceased and Bridges. Nor
| were they to weigh in their minds which az
| the two men was the more valuable to 80
ciety. They might also leave out of the
question whether, in killing the deceased
the defendant was defending the honor Of
his family. They had only TO consider the
| events that occurred at ave minutes after
! five on the fatal evening. How Vas de