The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-01-17

paner But after the events, person of ordinary
perception needs only map and truthful
story To sec that Grant had that quality which,
by whatever name ii be called. served 70 accom-
plish as good results as ever were attained by
the historic masters of grand strategy
His imperturbability was not indicative of in
difference. He was a keen observer, and he
turned all his experiences to good ac-
count He appreciated imminent dan
gers, perceived instantly what was needed
for the exigency, and never delayed action till
it was too late to avail General Lew Wallace,
IN the December Century, relates how, at Fort
Doneson, when Grant approaching group of
officers on the field, was informed that his right
wing had been driven from tue road leading
southwark, he told them at once that their po-
sltlons on the right must be retaken. and imme-
diately turned and rode away to give the order
to General Smith for the charge against the
rebel right, which discounted Buckner. and.
with the movement ordered on our right, result
ed speedily in the proposal to capitulate.
have 1T from friend of his, that the first
duty to which he was assigned in Missouri was
to move against force which he learned, as he
advanced was Of double his strength in num-
bers. When, with some misgivings because of
his inferior force, he reached the place
at which his attack was to be made, and looked
for signs OF the enemy. he was informed that
they had heard of his approach and were then
thirty-five miles away and still going. This, he
said, was the only time his heart ever pounded
its way up into his mouth. This, his first expe-
rience, stongly impressed upon his mind the i'm
portance of advancing.
Whoever first suggested the line of opera
tons by way of the Tennessee and the
Cumberland, Grant was eager to pursue
1t. And SO far as the movement against
Fort Donelson was concerned he undertook it
upon his own motion, simply writing to General
HalecK, after the fall Of Fort Henry, that be
would proceed to capture Fort Donelson. He
always undertook the thing next at hand, and
when it was accomplished adapted his opera
tons to the situation AS thus changed. He never
enslaved himself to pet scheme, or became en-
tangled in broken plan
When he crossed the river below Vicksburo it
was the purpose of the authorities at Washing
ton and in his own mind. that portion of his
forces should be joined with those of Banks and
that Grant should await the reduction of Port
Hudson before attempting that Of Vicksburg
But after the defeat of Bowen at Port Gibson
and the consequent capture of Grand Gulf he
without hesitation abandoned that purpose
With borrowed clean shirt and borrowed
horse, and with no personal baggage but tooth
brush, he swung clear of a base and drove into
an interior when two confederate armies were
approaching each other, which must not be per-
mitted to unite; one of them in the immediate
command of an officer for whom some of the best
Union generals seem to have entertained much
Of that respect which inspires caution Proceed
ing as if to attack yPemberton who had
come out from Vicksburg across Big Black
river, along the Jackson railroad, and men
acing him, and keeping him in line of battle,
Grant moved quickly with portion Of his army
upon General Johnston, at jackson, and, draw
ing off, by the right flank, the menacing force
from Pemberton's front marched it rapidly to
supporting distance from Jackson Having
taken this city, and having routed Johnston and
made him useless factor for the time, the
Union commander returned at once with his
entire force upon Pemberton and at Champions
Hill, administered to the Vicksburg army such
severe chastisement as sent it back to that
stronghold and made the capture of the city and
its army mere question of time
This appears after its accomplishment to
have been done in the most natural way 1t
was not thought by General Halleck to be feast
BILE, and he sent an order which, if it had been
received in time, would have prevented what
was done, and Grant would have taken Vicks-
burg i'll some other manner. But with becoming
generosity he wrote to Grant: Your narrative
of the campaign, like the operations themselves,
is brief, soldierly and in every respect credta-
bic and satisfactory In boldnesS of plan
rapidity Of execution and brilliancy of routes,
these operations will compare most favorably
with those of Napoleon about Ulm."
President Lincoln, with characteristic frank
ness. wrote: when you got below and took Port
Gibson, Grand Gulf and vicinity l thought
you should go down the river and
Join General Banks; and when YOU
turned northward, feared it was mistake. L
wish to make a personal acknowledge
ment that you were right and j was wrong. "
And when Grant and Sherman, riding to-
gether, reached and stood upon the bluff Of the
Yazoo the latter, turning to the former, said:
Until this moment never thought your expedi-
ton success. | never could see IL e end clearly
until now. But this is a campaign; this is sue
cess, if we never take the town."
When Grant arrived at Chattanooga, he found
an army cut off from communication, by river or
by rail, its scant supplies being brought in wag-
ons by a long detour over muddy and mountain
Gus roads; an army without horses for its artil-
lery, its men hungry, sick and demoralized; an
army held in the grasp of confident enemy.
What q contrast between the rainy night of his
arrival and that day which he soon brought on,
when he stood upon Orchard Knoll, in the midst
of grand panorama of war, thirteen miles in
length, and waited with his own sublime patience
for the moment at which to hurl the Army of
the Cumberland against Missionary Ridge Well
might General Sherman say: ut was magnif-
cent battle in its conception, in its execution
and in its glorious results"
When reflect that ''no movement of a di-
vision was made during the campaign which
was not expressly directed by the commander of
the triple army. we realize that the master
spirit of this brilliant spectacle was not depend
ent upon good fortune but achieved his destiny
by the powers of mind able to bear up a
mountain of cares,
1t was in the natural order of things that he
should now be called, with commensurate rank,
to the supreme command of all the armies; and
being so called, 1T was like him that he should
keep himself away from Washington, and that
he should take his place in the field with that
magnificent army of the East, whose only i'm
portant successes against the opposing army of
wellled veterans had been In repelling invasions
of the North With the task before him, his
simple, earnest nature could not have endured
immediate contact with the intrigues and
fornalties of the capital, and the heart Of the
great soldier could only find contentment amidst
the heroic scenes he was about to naugurate,
and in association with the loyalhearted men
who were to be his faithful Instruments
A true solder, he liked the society of soldiers,
and was fond of the camp and field. He once wrote
to Sherman Il have just arrived and although
sick for the last two weeks, begin to feel better
at the thought of being again with the troops y
From the moment he attached himself to the
army on the Rapidan the hopes of all who loved
the Union revived and remained steadfast The
country and its great President had come to
lean upon Grant. He made the army of Lee his
objective points destruction or capture his
grand purpose. Being temporarily thwarted,
not by the superior generalship of his adver-