The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1885-11-08
GEN. GEORGE d. MecLpII.AN,


IN tue death OF Gen. Mcclellan many memories OF
."epast are orougntto 10 ,he minds of middlc-ngcd
men VINO were prouu 10 draw sabre or pull trigger
under MIN thrco-and-twenty years ago. The skill
ne exnoiteu In organizing an army ont OF raw ma
,cras all admitted; the industry, the perseverance,
.ne 'ac 'nc talent ne showed 'ncren spoke well for
'ne ru'ure. lie was an honest, courteous, a
christian gentlcman he possessed TO remarkable
ueet'e thc gut OF winning the goodwill OF the
co'nuhssloncu ahu tnc rank ana ne, and the re-
serve without haughtiness, which was one
oI MS cnaracteristcs, nlicnsted few, II any,
OF MS stan' In those carly days II was noted
more tnan one educated on'cer that he lacked the
so'i,y tosay NO; or rather that his natural good
ncar'euncss OF MS lucas OF policy prompted him TO
instead oiempha'ically ending question
WIN ueclueu out courteous Yes or No. All who
naNce'et helu large commanu can bear the writer
witness 'ha' 'hs want ot prompt decision is great
iaui' IN commander
Yen. mcVieian was good student, was pro-
tounuy verscd IN the booSish theoric OF his profcs
s'oh' onu MS memory Tor details was remarkable.
In any discussion or iuesschM nt headquarters he
coulu instantly give the date of any OF the great
oattles OF history or the day that any Of the celc
ora'eu commanders was born or died. lie was
iamiar win the works OF Jomini, 1crnay, frcder
lex, Charles Lloyd, Clatiscwlts, Napoleon, Marmont,
Duiour ccnaik, ETC., anu nc was great admirer OF
oom'ni wnom ne had visited across the water. lie
literature OF war;" anu any close student OF his
campaigns, " that student is familiar with Jomini,
can see what an influence his works had upon
Mcclellan
In 1865 Gen Lee visited Washington. A then
MAYOR General IN thc United states Army spent an
evening with MIN at the Metropolitan Hotel In the
course OF conversation Gen. Lee remarked that he
hau never Iought Cen Mcclellan.
.Never fought Gen. Mcclellan, Gcneral7n
NeVcr'' SAID Gen. Lee, VI was lighting Jomini."
Ihere was sermon IN these lew words, and
whoic history wlthal. Gen. Lee was as familiar with
Jom,ni as Gen. Mcclellan could be, and his wonder
'ui insight INTO mis- opponents character, which
was one OF nus happest characteristics, informed
MN as 70 McClellan's plans as surely as captured
uespa.cnes couiu, ana nc always checkmated him.
zen. Mcoielian was familiar with war In Europe as
a stuuen. ana oy contact, but he did not seem to
Possess tnc power ot eliminating European tactics
ana strategy from an American field. There the
continent was and is superbly mapped, roaded, AMI
Driugeu; mere the maps had to be drawn under IRE,
roaus hau 10 he male, and bridges must need he
dragged along with other mpedimenta and built.
Inere 'ne sworn Is sheathcd only; here the sword
was crude ore, but he fashioned 1t into trusty
biaue. would that he had welded 1t with more
cohu"ehce Wheh ne urew u ringing from Its scab-
oaru.
Ihere were more than one who aftcrward held
n'gh commando VINO rode with him In his sian when
tne advance was made upon Ccntrevile, who noted
nus nervousness AMI there was more than one,
right then anu there who felt and knew that he had
the bravery OF soldier. but he lacked the courage
Oh tne General.
III position can be gained or battle won by
the loss OF hve hundred lives, and i've hundred and
one are iost, tnere Is one ffurter," said General
put p" you cannot make oi1elcttes without breaking
eggs" said great Captain. We grant that he was
prompted Dy q mercilul desire to save life when he
Afterwards
vance up the Peninsula, but he discussed them SO
iong that tuey were known In iiichnofd ere the
transports steamed away from Alexandria.
Ihe delays on the Peninsula 1t were Idle TO re-
count tnat nc only was responsible therefor 1t were
cruel TO assert; but we must perforce say he had
witnin something which prompted him to look
eioomliy upon MS own cndeavors and hopefully
upon those OF his opponent In opposition to the
views OF several OF his stan, whose opinions should
nave Dorue great weight with hlm, he chung to the
luea tnat the Confederates had 10000 men at Cen
tervllle when the advance was made there, and
100000 at Richmond when the advance was made up
the Peniusula. In forming this view he listened to
the ADVICE OF detective at headquarters instead of
10 the wholesome facts which were presented by the
educated gentlemen OF his saG.
III mattered not whether the Peninsula failure was
chargeaoie 10 MN or 10 fhe Administration. The
People knew II was failure In every sense of the
word, and the busy world would not stop to weigh
Tue Pros anu cons' IL looked at the big fact only.
1t were nonsense to hope that the minuin Of the
campaign Will be Inquired into by the unprofes-
sional.
coming from the Peninsula under cloud. on bad
terms with the Secretary the Committee on the Con-
duct OF the War; and the General Of the Army, Pope
beaten, and the dlsorganzed Army streaming
toward washington, he was placed over 1t, and he
reorganzed IL magnifcently on the march TO Fred
erick. For this he deserved AMI received high
fntanl
placed In his hands-altlough It's possession gave
him an astounding advantagc-his ovcr.cau,ion in
tervened TO snch an extent that he threw that advan
tage to the wlnds. The mistakes and delays OF the
Peninsula were as nothing to this. Had he fought
and marched through Turner's and Champions Gap
with any OF the vim, the drive. the pdsh the dare
that jackson and Lee exercised in concentrating on
the west bank OF the Antietam, 1t makes one dizzy
to think what cOuld have been done. But prompt
iearless decided action was not In the man. That
fatal halting between two opinions prevented his
great success, and no one knew better than he his
weakness In this regard. Gen. Lee, with his calm
equlpose, knew his opponent: knew him to be an
accomplished officer, but too cautious to conceive
quickly and strike effectively, and with but hand
ful OF troops comparatively he awaited tile issue,
FEELING confident that he would have ample time TO
call In his scattered command ere n plan OF attack
would bc discussed, formulated, and delivered by
the Union commander.
Books and books have been written upon The
Antictam. The bald facts are simply these: The
Confederates had less than 10000 troops at hand;
we had between 10000 and 10000, and the battle was
drawn one. Excepting q slight gain Of ground
about the bunker Church on our right and the TAX
ing OF the bridge our left, we obtained no adyan-
tage aftera bloody struggle OF thirteen hours In
the Confederate army there was not man in re-
serve when the sun went down. In the Union Army
there were $1,000 men who had not pulled trigger.
Then was the time that prompt action would have
worked big results, and there scarcely soldier
In the Union Army who did not know that tho Con-
federates were hemmed In In that triangle formed
by the Potomac and the Antietam, and that they
were frghtful!y of for supplies and ammunition
An early vigorous attack the next morning was
hoped for by all, but again delay took the place of
action, and Gen. Lee, with great skill and complete
success, retreated the next night.
.' 'N. ,'" "SeN"" "''ei n"ic"hi WaS