The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1885-03-01

and abattis or sashings at least. and that the
troops assembling there should be placed In
camp 80 as to cover the field and support each
other. All the necessary defensive works could
have been laid out and constructed In two days.
so that tho rawest troops could have defled In
definitely the assaults OF season ed v"terans. Gen.
Sherman says this was not done because II was
not ordered. and besides It would havo made the
men timid. and because the time required was
more properly devoted to organizing and drill
Ing. This OF course. begs the whole question.
and 10 At variance with the weil.established
rules OF war. which require that the raw and
undisciplined troops should be protected and
inspired with confidence by breastworks.
though Veterans do not necessarily require
such protection.
1t IL doubtless true that no specific orders
were issued by Halleck to Grant or by Grant to
Sherman to forti'y tho position. but on tho Sth
OF March Hallock notified Grant that he had
sent forward intrenthing tools; on the 9th he
directed Grant, then at Fort Henry. to forward
intrenching tools TO tho army: on the 18th no
notified him that he must regulate all details.
and on the Goth he telegraphod Grant: by all
means keep your forces together until you con-
meet with Con. Buell.. Don't lot the enc
my draw you into an engagement now. Wait
III vou are property fortified aud receire or
da's." These dispatches clearly implied that
Grant should fortfy. but common prudence
should have caused him to do this without or
ders. But. in face OF this twenty-five years
afterward. Grant says In his Century article:
But up to that time the pick and spade had
been but little resorted to Mt the Wost.
The troops with mo- officers and mon. noedcd
discipline and drill more than they did exps-
rience with the pick. shovel. and axe" and
finally that under all these circum-
CNuCludaA lint drill anil
discipline were worth more to our men than
fortincations." II will not escape notice that
this conclusion was bnsed upon an error OF
fact. and was at variance with tho prccepts OF
military writOrs. At that time there was
| scarcely n young graduate OF tho Military
| Academy who could not have applied 20 tho
| Shiloh field the principles OF Ro1nat's limo
| specially designed for Just such cases as that
under consideration. Tho Confederates had
already fortified Donelson. Henry. Bowling
Green. Columbus. Island No. 10. and perhaps
| other points-nnd even at this day it must bc
| admitted that 1t would have been visor IL
| Grant and his subordinates hnd followed ther
examples at Shiloh. 1t would have been moro
credi,able to all concerned II they had acted in
accordance with the suggestion OF Gen. Halleck
| or had frankly confessed that they differed from
| him in judgment. or that they had overlooked
| his wishes. as was probably the fact Had the
| simplest line OF defence boon laid out and con-
| structed, 1t would certainly havo saved hun
dreds OF lives. IL 1t had not entirely nver:ed
disaster which followed the Confederate attack.
As he says OF VILLAGES mistake in not get
ting into the battle on the first day 1t Ia snie to
assert that Gen. Grant would not have made
the mistake later in the war of failing to fortiiy
his position under sucr circumstances
Was Grants army surprised? Grant. Sher.
| man and Kadanu donv II hut the rpcorl cha n
read as 1t should be. proves beyond question
that 1t was.
| Webster says that to surprise Is to como or
fall upon suddenly and unexpectedly. to take
unawares." and surprise is tho act OF COM
ing upon unawares or Of taking suddenly and
| without preparation. "a the fort was taken by
surprise" There can be but ono meaning t.
the word and there is no denying that Mt Shl-
| lob Grants army was come upon by tho rsbe
army unawares. taken suddenly and without
preparation. This is shown by the following
Official dispatches:
| PIrIssuRo LANDING. April 5. 1862.
| SIN: Your note received. I have doubt that moth
ing will to-day than picket firing tn,
enemy 10 saucy but got the worst OF It yesterday,
will not press our pckets far. will not bs drawn ou
far unless with certainty of advantage ant do dp
prcheId anything IKE attack posItion You're
| W. T. sHrExAS. Brigadier.tienerai COMMANDING
sAvAyS,H April 5, 1852
XdJor. Gen. H. " Hiliect, ST. Louis No.:
The main force Of the -,emy is at Corinth ,ch troops
at dirtrent points east also at Bethel Jaokso AM
HUMBOLDT are small gsrrisons. Tho number vt thes
plsces seem to constantly change.
The number OF the enemy at COrnth and within sup
porting distance of it cannot be far from 5000
U. S. GRANT, Major. General
The same day no wrote to Gen. Haleck: 81
hare scarcely the Jain'es. idea Of attach
general onej being 1aate upon u.s." When i
Is remembered that the advanced corps OF tn,
rebel army was. during tho entire day Of the
9Th OF April. within q mile and n half o
Shiloh Church and prevented from faIins
upon the Union army at daylight OF tn,
same day by the ruin only. it is simply
impossible. in face OF tho foregoing de
spntchss. that either Sherman or Grant coult
have been aware OF tho Confederate advance
Indeed. no fact In history is better established
than that neithor OF them had the faintes
idea" OF it. Nothing Is moro certain than tina
the rebel army had como thus far "unawares.
Unexpectedly" and without preparation
on the part OF the Union forces to receive it.
There is not the slightest evidence in exist
ence TO show that the Union commander
thought the hostile force in their front WA
anything moro than scouting parties or pick
cts. saucy and active. to bs sure. bat no
strOn2 enough oven TO press our plckotS far.
Neither Grant. Sherman nor. so far rs we cal
discover. any other Federal General had tn
slightest suspicion OF the enemy's proxmit
or expected an attack in iorcs on tn, 9Th. o
any other day subsequent thereto. He seem
to have had no scouts out no cavalry putrollini
the country. and no spies gathering informn
ton OF the enemys movement Aud yot thu
whole rebel army Law within three miles 0
Thorn on the night OF tho 9Th.
Now let NJ SEQ II it did not actually :" come o
fall suddenly ana unexpectedly" upon tn,
Union forces. and take them unawares."
Grant Sherman. and Badeau all deny tn
surprise. But Notwithstanding tho bold move
ment OF tho Confederate cavalry on the even
ing OF the 9Th. Sherman admits that on seein,
the rebel line OF battle extending ns far rs tn
eye could reach on the 9th. no became satisfied
for the first time that the enemy designed t.
make a determined attack. PrentIss VIII
made and received the first attack. an,
tho truth OF whose sta,eman.s ia en-