The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1885-1921, 1885-02-26
THE WAGES OF SIN.
Sarah AIthea Granted AIimOny and
Counsel Fees.


On the 10th of February, Judge Sullivan
decided the application for alimony and
counsel's fees in the celebrated Sharon
divorce case. The decision in full is as
follows;-
Sarah A. Sharon, plaintiff, VS.. William
Sharon, defendant:
This is an action for divorce. The
present application is for alimony pen
dente lite, and for counsePs fees. The
fact of marriage is denied. Notwithstand-
ing defendants denial, find, as Z fact,
that valid marriage is shown to exist
between plaintiff and defendant. The
plaintiff is without means to properly
maintain herself, or to properly compen-
safe her counsel for the. conduct of her
cause. The law which governs in q case
of this kind is plainly written in section
1877 of the Civil Code of this State:
" While an action for divorce is pending,
the court may, in its discretion, require
the husband to pay, as alimony, any
money necessary to enable the wife to
support herself, or TO prosecute or defend
the action" The object of the law is to
place the wife on an equality with the
husband during the litigation in which
she is seeking redress for her grievances.
The husbands denial of the relationship
does not, where the court finds it to be
established, release defendant of his obi
CATION, or the court of its duty to comply
with the law. Under the law as laid
down in the Code. and the facts as I find
them, deem it an imperative duty to
make an allowance for plaintiff for her
support and the compensation of her
counsel. Defendant and his counsel rec
ognize the rule and its application to the
facts, as found by the court, but they
seek to escape from the immediate en-
forcement or the rule, which the statute
contemplates. Defendant asks the court
to deny plaintiff her statutory right to
alimony, because he intends to appeal
from any judgment of this court, declar-
ing him to be the husband of plaintiff. 1
am asked to step aside from the procedure
invariably followed in such cases, and to
delay the enforcement of plaintiff s right
to immediate relief until place defend
ant in position in which he can deny
the order OF this court requiring him to
support his wife pending the action. The
request has at least the merit of novelty.
I have heard no argument advanced which
would warrant the court in departing from
IL 49,
kind. Defendant seeks further to delay
the granting of plaintiffs prayer for
proper relief until this court shall have
successfully assisted him in the recovery
of bride, which he directed his leading
counsel to place in the hands of the con-
fdential clerk of plaintiffs attorney of
record. Plaintiff was not in any way
connected with that transaction, and I
see no reason why the penalty should fall
upon her.
Nor is it, under well established prin-
ciples of publicly, the duty of this court,
in this proceeding, to concern itself with
the recovery of this money by defendant.
purposely avoid saying anything further
on this suject, because the conduct of the
parties participating in the transaction
has been made the subject of investiga-
ton by other tribunals, in so far as it may
have involved a breach of the criminal
code. While SO pending, shall not I'M
necessarily say anything to influence the
determination of the matter by such tri-
bunals. On the hearing of this motion,
mass of testimony, oral and written, was
submitted as to the credibility of certain
testimony given at the trial. I shall not
discuss these matters at this time. For
present purposes it is sufficient to say
that as to the fact of marriage, my con-
clusion is above indicated. Some of these
matters afford subject for serious con-
sideration. Many of these matters will
properly come up for consideration on the
hearing of the motion for a new trial,
and they can then be better considered in
connection with such other matters as
may be presented at the time.
The amount proper to be allowed at