The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-03-24
POLYGAMi AND THE BALLOT.
Decision Of the United States Supreme
Court in the ClaWsOn Case.
Constitutionality Of the Edmunds Act At
firmed, ard Congressional Control in the
Territories Held To Be Supreme.

IerfltOrleS ueiu 10 be supreme.
WASHINGTON, March PA decision was rem
States, to-day in the series of five cases known
as the polygamy cases, brought by certain Nor
mon citizens of Utah for the purpose of getting
judicial decision as to the powor of the Board of
Commissioners, or canvassers, appointed under
the socalled Edmunds act, of March %, 1882, to
supervise elections in that Territory. The COM
plainants and appellants in these cases are Jesse
G. Murphy, Mary Ann M. Pratt, Mildred e. and
Alfred Randall Ellen G. and Hiram B. Claw
son. and James M. Barlow; the defendants
and appelees are Alex. Ramsey and others, con-
stituting the federal board, the commissioners,
and certain registration officers appointed by
them. The principal question raised by the suits
is whether the Board of Commissioners appointed
under the Edmund's act had power to prescribe,
as a condition of registration of voters, dis
eliminating test oath requiring an applicant for
registration to swear, eff man, that he is not
a bigamist or polygamist, and does not live or
cohabit with more than one woman in the mar
riage relation; or, ''if woman" that she is not
the wife of polygamist, and has not entered
into any relation with any man in violation of
the laws Of the United States concerning polyg-
amy or bigamy. This court holds
that the rules promulgated by the
board prescribing the form of oath
to be exacted of persons offering to register as
voters, and which constitute the directions under
which, it is alleged, the registration officers
acted in the cases here complained of, were
without force, and that no effect can be given
them. "It cannot be alleged" the court holds,
that they had the effect, in law, of preventing
the registration of the plaintiffs for the regis
tration officers were not bound or authorized to
obey them. and if they did 80, they did 1t in their
own wrong. There was no relation between the
board and the officers appointed by them of prin-
cipal and agent, so as to make the members Of
the former liable for what the latter may have
illegally done under their instructions, and
therefore, no connection in law between the acts
of the board. as charged, and the wrongs com
planned Of If it be supposed the board had the
power which it seems they claimed and exer
csed, of putting into form rules for the govern
ment of registration officers, and their inter
probation Of the law, and in that way published
erroneous and illegal restrictions upon the right
of suffrage in the Territory, such acts of admins
tration were not ministerial, and cannot be made
ground of action. They would be of that class
which involve the exercise of judgment and dis
erection in public officers, and which, even when
erroneous, cannot furnish cause Of action for
damages In either view therefore, the judg-
ment in favor of the Board of Commissioners in
the court below was rightly rendered"
AS regards the power and responsibility OF
registration officers, tho court holds that they
were merely ministerial officers, and if they de-
onff iObf fn ha
tered as voters in violation of law, they
sponsible in action for damages.
The court then takes up and examines the
cases separately, and holds that con.plainants
clearly deprived Of their right to registration
without authority of law since. by their alega-
lions. they exclude themselves from the dis
qualifications of the act OF 1882 Ellen
Joseph M. Barlow, on the other
hand, were, the court holds, included
in the disqualifcations Of the act, and had
right to registration In reaching these conclu-
ate review of the act of 1882, for the purpose of
giving construction Of some of its provisions,
and showing how they apply to the present cases.
BY that act the court holds that it is made the
duty of registration officers to see that persons
Offering to register are free from the Disqualified
tons defined therein, and, in doing so, they
required to exercise diligence and care in their
inquiries, and are responsible in damages for re-
jections made without reasonable cause, or ma
liciousy In the cases of Mary Ann Pratt and
Mildred E. Randall, above refer
rod to. the allegations of the complaint
not only show that the compainants
were legally entitled to be registered voters,
but declare that the refusal of the registration
officers to admit them to the list was wrOng ful
and malicious. The demurrers should therefore
have been overruled.
In conclusion, Justice Matthews, who delivers
the opinion of the court. says: with reference
to the constitutionality of the above mentioned
act, counsel for appellants argument seemed to
question the constitutional power of Congress to
pass the act of March %, 1882 so far as it
abridges the rights of electors in the Territory
under previous laws, but that question is, we
think, no longer open to discussion 1t has passed
beyond the stage of controversy into final
judgment. The people of the United States,
as the sovereign owners Of the national Terri
tories, have supreme power over them and their
inhabitants In the exercise of this sovereign
dominion they are represented by the govern
ment of the United States, to whom all powers
of government over that subject have been dele
gated, subject only to such restrictions as are
expressed in the Constitution or necessarily i'm
piled i'll its terms or purposes and objects. The
power itself of ordainlng government for the
Territories and the people who inhabit them,
with all discretion which belongs to legislative
power, is invested in Congress- and extends,
beyond any controversy, to determining oy law,
from time to time, the form of local
government in particular Territory, and
the qualifications of those who shall
administer it. 1t rests with Congress to say
whether, in given case, any people resident in
tie Territory shall participate in election of its
officers or the making Of its laws. and it may,
therefore, take from them any right of suffrage
it may previously have conferred, or at any
time modify or abridge it as it may deem expe-
dent The personal and civil rights Of inhabi-
tants of the Territory are secured to them as to
all other citizens by the principles of constitu-
tional liberty, which restrain all agencies Of
government State and national. Their political
rights are franchises, which thew hold
as privileges in the legislative discretion
of the Congress of the United States.
If we concede that this discretion in Congress is
limited by the obvious purposes for which it was
conferred, and that those purposes ara satisfied
by measures which prepare the people Of the
Territories to become citizens of States in the
Lie nt;N H. H. LII