The Portland daily press., 1885-04-04
Removal for Cause.


The Supreme Judicial Court Of Maine has
just rendered decision declaring illegal the
attempted removal last year of City Marshal
Andrews Of Portland, and its opinion dis
cu5ses an Important aspect Of law relating to
removal Of public officials "for cause" which
should receive the serious attention Of all per-
sons interested 10 the improvement Of the civil
service
The Maine statute provided that the mar
shsl should "hold Office during good behavior,
subject, however, after hearing, to removal at
any time by the mayor, by and with the ad-
vics and consent OF the aldermen, for ineffi-
cheney or other cause" Acting, as was sup
posed, in conformity with the law, Mayor
King submitted to the aldermen charges
against Marshal Andrews, and Il hearing was
given by the aldermen, the mayor being pres
ent as listener, but not as a member of the
body, at which hearing Andrews was repre-
sentsd by counsel. At the end OF the hearing
the mayor took his seatsnd passed sentence OF
removal. A suggestion, made bysons of the
board, that verdict upon each OF the charges
saoold be given, was rejected and the board,
without expressing judgment upon the truth
or falsity OF the charges, by vote Consented to
the removal.
These proceedings have been considered bv
the court uDon petition of the marshal, and
the decision just given holds that the removal
vas illegal aud without effect. The grounds
of this decision and the arguments used by the
court are OF much importance at this time in
asmueh as the statute language construed is
in substance, if not in exact form, that used in
many civil servics laws aad rules, and the de-
cision, although not a controlling authority in
other States will be often cited and consider
ed with Difference.
The court holds that ''ineficiency or other
cause" must, in the light OF the earlier refer
ence to ''good behavior" be held 20 mean sub
stantisl cause 1t thus limits the discretion of
the mayor and aldermen, clearly intimating
that cause sufficient in their discretion might
not be held by the court to be cause" in the
meaning of the statute. 1t holds, also, that
hearing must be before the mayor and alder
men, both parties being essential factors Of
the tribunal; that the hearing must be con-
Quoted in conformity to the Law Of the land;
that the tribunal must proceed to pass iudg-
mont upon the truth or falsity Of the charges
made, and that only upon such finding or
Judgment, can removal be ordered. The
hearing is looked upon in the light Of judi-
cial inquiry, and the right OF the court to te-
view II upon certi0rGri is found il the statute
giving to the Supreme Court general superin-
teEdeDce OF all inferior courts." In the light Of
these principles the removal is declared illegal,
because the mayor did not sit with the alder
men as part OF the tribunal, and because the
tribunal did not formally fnd as a matter Of
fact that the charges were proved.
1t is the latter of these grounds that deserves
notice, not only because it is feature OF the
system that is unfortunate, but because it in
vades, as we think, one of the most sacred Sc
curities with which the Law should protect the
citizen. 1t is fraudulent principle OF the
common law, declared in bills of rights and Sc
cured by constitutions, that citizens shall not
be adiudicated as guilty of heinous offences
except upon presentment of a grand jury, and
after trial by an impartial jury of their peers.
This, in spirit at least, is not limited to crimi-
nal procedure, where the Judgment is followed
by imprisonment or other ignominious punish-
meut, bat should protect citizen from any
adjudication OF guilt, except under the sane
tions and safeguards Of an impartial trial II
the language of this statute subjects the officer
whose removal is sought to the alternative Of
surrendering his Office or of going to trial upon
criminal charge, before municipal tribunal
political and partisan in character, majority
of the members of which may be inclined by
prejudices or by interest to wish him removed
then this statute, instead Of being protection
TO faithful official, Is not unlikely to work
his distraction, stripping him alike of office
and reputation. Such tribunal is not an i'm
partial tribunal, and while it may be necessary
TO intrust it with the appointment or removal
OF officials, yet it should not be required or
permitted to hear and decide upon questions Of
guilt or innoeonce, except so far as is necessa-
~ to guide its own action with regard to pub
lie duties.
We have no disposition to question the accu-
racy OF this decision of the Maine court which
adopts, upon almost every point, the principles
laid down 10 the once famous case Of MurdOck
VS. Philips Academy, decided in our own su-
preme judicial court in 1881, the opinion being
given by Chief Justice Shaw soon after his ac-
cession to the bench.
It is probable that the fault lies in the choice
OF language by the legislature, rather than in
the Interpretation OF that language by the
coart But the statute, as construed, erects
political board into criminal court without
the essential elements OF court, such as i'm.
partiality and the right of challenge. Before
this tribunal it sends man charged, perhaps,
with bribery or some ether offence which i5
both an official fault and an infamous crime,
cence or gnilti while, as premium upon its
verdict, the court may gain or lose official pat
ronsge or partisan advantage.
There is, however, legitimate and benef-
cent purpose in the requirement that there
shall be hearing before removal. But the
purpose OF this hearing is that the minds of
the removing board should be informed and
enlightened By all facts and arguments, ss
well those in favor OF as those against the in
cumbent Of the office. Beyond this function,
however, the hearing has no relevancy, and
should have no effect. 1t should be
purely and simply hearing for information,
ana not hearing for adjudication. This Is
necessary alike for the protection of the public
al Gases are frequent where Q conscientious
person would be reluctant to decide, upon the
evidence before him, that an official was guilty
OF a crime where he might be thoroughly con-
vinced that he bad 90 acted, or so incurred
suspicion, as to render him unfit for office.
The rule in criminal trial is that guilt must
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt; bat a
much weaker probability OF guilt should dis
qualify a man for retention in position OF
public trust.
Ii the decision of the Maine court is to be
accepted, it behooves those States in the laws
OF which there are similar provisions to enact
that advisory boards, after their Judgments
have been informed BY an impartial hearing,
may proceed in their discretion to consent 10
removals without being obliged to brand the
official removed with verdict of guilty. Let
it be reserved to the regular courts, s,-presided
over By learned judges, where the rights of the
accused are protected by ample safeguards,
and where he may challenge any Juror sus-
pected OF undue prejudice,-to pronounce YER
victs that blast character and brand the cul-
prits with infamy.