The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1885-03-01

destroyed"
The reports Of Gen. Huribut commanding .
division. and Of every other division. brigade.
regimental. md battery commander. also show
entire Ignorance OF the enemy's approach In
force. and that tho enemy came on theM
unawares. attacking them suddenly and with.
out preparation. Not one OF them says thaA
he was ready for the attack whlch
came knew whom II was coming. or wss
| prepared to reslst II. They oil show that
they worc alarmed by nring at the front;
that they inquired OF one another what u
meant; that there were no proper scouting par.
tics out: that they had no continuous line ~
battle no field hospitals established. no prepare.
tons OF any kind male for tho bloody CONFLICT
which WAS soon upon thNm. II Ia Rbsolussly
certain that many OF tho troops were still IL
camp or at breakfast when tho alarm vac
given" The suffers goods were displayed.
camp cauipage and bedding unpacked tents
standing. trunks open. md horses at the picket
ropes. sherman himself admits that whom he
recnptured his own camp the next day he found
two OF his own horses which had boen killed.
tied to tho picket ropc where they fell In one
camp n baker was found lying iend across his
own bread trough. These facts. and many
others like them. which ara indisputable. are
utterly inconsistent with tho theory that the
Union army was not surprised-that the enemy
did not come or fall upon II suddenly and I'M
expcctedly and take it unawares.
But tho evidence loes not end here. Col J.
II. MclIenry. Jr.. Seventeenth Kentucky. speaks
OF "a sudden aud unexpected dtdck which
had been made upon our front line" Col. J. A.
Mcdowell. sixth Iowa. speaks Of the " first
alarm of the enemy's attack" Lieut.. Col. Job
II. Parker Forty-elghth Ohio says: They
came upon US 40 suddenly that for short time
our mon wavorod.' Col. Joseph II. Cockorill.
Seventeenth Ohio, begins his report: On sun.
day morning Apr! G. an alarm icds made In
front If tus brigade. and cailed my regiment
from BREAKFAST aud formed il on the color line"
In another part OF his report he says: Our
camp WAS pundcred Of nearly everything
officers uniforms. camp equipaee blankets.
knnpsacks. havsrIacss. clothing. nc Our men
,r',pn called ou. Sunday morning supposed
il ,cds o,,'y ~ support NE picke's." This regi.
mont belonged t. Eucslands brigade OF Sher.
mans division Instance aftor instance and
quotation after quotation might bs given from
tho reports OF the artillery as we'll as the
infantry officers all showing that the
sound OF tho enelny's guns. or the rattle
OF his mussotry. or the gisten OF his
bayonets or the color OF his uniform. or the
oncomirg o! hts limos. or tho alarming sound
OF the long roll" was the first intimatIon
they Ind OF n battle. One battery was even out
upon the drill ground for its daily instruction
and was captured without firing gun. Roman
says: Our narrative of the movement from
Corinth has clearly established the surprise OF
the Fodsrals on that occasion. When an
army OF nearly 10000 men advances to
within O mile and q hnlf OF an enemy's
encampmcnt. establishes lines OF battle
in tho woods In his front during a whole
afternoon. bvouacs all night In that posi-
ton without being disturbed. and the next
morning advances at leisure in line Of battle to
within sight OF those oncanpments without
meeting any serious opposition. 1t ia absurd to
, dony that surprise has been Effected" II
this does not constitute surprise. it is din.
cult to imagine circumstances that would.
IT, in addition to the foregoing. any further
evidence is required. il Ia found In the follow
ing extracts from the report OF Col. VIM Pres
ton. Aldo de-camp to Gen. Johnston:
On the morning Of April tn. were excessive
that the movement WAS greatly retarded but the
afternoon OF the day advance within three
miles of the enemy. who evidently did not expect that
In force in the neighborhood. Strong reasons
demanded immediate attack as delay tho
\ danger Of discovery.
Referring to the advance Of Cleburne's divi.
sion against one OF our camps. he also says:
The SURPRISE complete. II WAS carried betw esn
and O'Clock Uhe hour. given by nearly Federal
report for the BEGINNING of the bats) and its coorA
arms. atores and ammunition were abandoned The
breakfasts OF this men were the table the otcsrs
baggage aud apparel left In the tenta aud every
: remained OF unexpected conflict ana sudden rout
The reports OF the rebel commanders OF ad-
vancsd brsades and divisions show that the
Union pickots were driven In without much
resistance. and that the first serious fighting
7 occurred in and beyond the advanced camps OF
; the Union forces Gen. Bragg says. in a sketch
I OF Shiloh made for Col. William Preston John.
, ston's Century article on Albert Sidney Johnston
, and the Shiloh campaign. The enemy was
nnnN N n mira rad maj hal pO r.
prised and captured In their tents. and othors.
, though on the outside. In costumes better fitted
to tho bsdchamber than the battleh.id." Of
course. all this would have been mpOss BILE had
| | tho Union iorceS formed a continuous line from
Lick Greek to Owl Creek. and been properly
l posted for action. No candid student can come
, to any other conclusion than that they were
t surprised. come or fallen upon suddenly and
!, unex pecteily and taken unawares."
!, Con. Grant says that The position OF ouI
troops as hero described made n continuous
line from Lick Creek on the left to Owl Greek
@ branch Of Snake Greek. on ths right" But ID
this statement borue out by the Official recordsi
We think not. The map published with Con
I Grants Century article was prepared under the
y direction Of General tthan MAORI Geo. Thorn
OF tho Engineers. and gives ths positions OF tbs
a troops As tioy vera placed upon the map. b
y Grant, Sherman. and Buell.. Gen. Grant hs,
r | iuIiS hPIi ONcu tuiS may ~ I'D auopllou ouS
publication and IN fully discountonanced al
y others, including the one exh bred by Sher
man to the Society OF tho Army OF tho Ten.
nessse. 1t shows that Sherman's right was
= three quarters OF a mile from Owl Creek: thai
h!s loft YVES seven-eighths Of a mile from Prem
tiss's right: that Prentss's left WAS seven
e:hths OF Il milo from Stuart's Ia detached
brignie of Sherman's dysion) right and tha
a Stunrt's left was three-uuarters OF II mile from
rr,a al In hat II I'M
vision was q mile and an eighth In rear o.
, Prentiss ami mile from Stuart: that Nc
= C!crnand was at the dearest point
-, u half mile in rear OF Sherman,
- limo and that W. II. L. Wallace with c. F
n Smiths veteran divson) was a mile and
4 quarter in rear OF McCiornand. Each Of these
commands had been canped wholly without