Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1885-08-28

successfully when detached. IL was 10
guard against this that the gcnulnencss
OF each set Of coupons, offered for taxes
| BY each taxpayer, was to DO subject to
this separate scrutiny. And that scru-
tiny having been declared lawful by the
Supreme Court Of the United States, 1t
followed logically, and by proposition
universally admittedA--to wit, that tie
rules Of evidence require the produce
ton Of the best evidence that the case
admits oi--that the Commonwealth had
the right to demand Of the plaintiff to
produce the bond to which the coupon
belonged, and to exhibit the coupon at
tached to that bond. or to prove that 1t
had been so attached; and it was the
duty of the court to inform the jury
that such was the law. If this rule
had. at any time, wrought hardship
10 an innocent holder, that would have
been what the law calls damnam
absque iejuria, growing out OF an act
demanded to be passed to pro-
tect the State and her bondholders.
COUPONS ATTACHED TO THE BOND.
But that damage could only have af-
fected those coupons which had been
detached at the time Of the passage OF
the law---to wit, January IA, 1882. As
to all subsequent coupons, and which
were then attached to the bonds, they
could have remained in that condition,
and so could have been proved to be
genuine at the time Of tender. IL it be
argued that that would have been IN
convenient, or attended with loss to the
bondholders, reply that the settle
ment under which these coupons
claim was well known to have been pro-
cured by bribery, and that large par
ty, since become all parties, in Virginia
had given notice that they meant to de-
feat that fraudulent settlement by all
lawful means--such as this act has
been declared to be }; that this risk Of
loss was one the bondholders took
when they received the bonds thus
fraudulently imposed on the people of
Virginia. with notice by the people that
payment would be resisted, and that no
debt would be admitted but such as
was fairly ascertained to be due by I'M
bought legislation.
JUDICIAL INSTRUCTIONS.
have reason to think that this view
Of the law and the facts, or something
tending to the same conclusion, would
have been acted upon by at least a part
Of the jury, in all these late cases, if
they hsd not received instructions
which cut of the evidence, and which
the jury should have disregarded, de-
Ginning to find verdict for want Of evil
dence, as they had a perfect right to
do. But one Of the cOmmonest mis-
takes, and among very intelligent men
too, is the belief that Judge has such
a right to instruct jury as carries
with it tie correlatiye obligation of the
jury to obey the instructions. Since |
have commenced the preparation of this
paper, one ofthe bcst-informed gentlemen
Of Richmond has told me that it was his,
and the common, opinion that jury
was bound to obey the instruc-
tons of a judge, under the pen
atty Of contempt and imprisonment
and know of one, and have heard Of
three others, Of the late jury, who say
thew thought themselves bound to obey
the instructions of the judge-an opin-
ion which may have been confirmed in
these particular cases by the confident
manner in which, refusing the cOun-
sells request that the jury might be
allowed to take the statute into their
room and read it. the Judge asked
"Does the counsel mean to say that
this jury of twelve men is the Judge Of
the law and the consiitutiOnaity of the
statute?" But no matter whence the
opinion is derived, nor how strong it
may have become, venture to say that
to the extent to which it is carried it is
a mistake. A school-master has the
power to enforce his instructions upon
his pupils by the rod and in various
other ways. But a judge has not
shadow of such power. All he can do
if his instructions are disregarded is to
set aside the verdict and order a new
trial: and this he can do only trice +;
the third verdict must stand. The law
so provides Code of Virginia, P. ll20.
Beyond that ne cannot go. Many a
Judge has knit his brow with impotent
anger when jury finds its verdict
against his instructions. AS this an
nOuncement may startle some, and by
others be considered as the dietum Of a
mere layman, beg leave to submit
some authority on this point.
MUST THE JURY FOLLOW THEN?
If, in arguing from it that juries can
disregard the instructions Of a judge
whenever they choose-snd under some
circumstances ought to do SOL shall
be found to diGer with my friends, the
gentlemen Of the bar, hope they will
not consider me as meaning to depre-
cia,e them or their profession if sug-
gest a doubt Of their being the best
Judges of question involving the privi-
leees Of their class. Rather | am APP
plying that maxim Of Burke, which
says: at cannot escape observation
| that when men are too much confined
to professional and faculty habits, and.
as it were. inveterAte in the recurrent
employments Of that narrow circle.
they are rather disabled than qualified
for whatever depends on the knowledge
Of mankind or experience in mixed
affairs, or comprehensive, connected
view of the various complicated external
and internal interests which 20 to the
formation of that thing called State. -
LORD ERsRINE ON THE SUBJECT.
In Lord Erskine's speech on the
Kings Bench in support Of the rights
Of juries, said TO be the finest argument
ever made in Westminster Hail, in the
case of the Dean Of Azaph, Erskine's
Speeches, English edition Of 1913.
Volume J., PIP. 2G7, 80, 30, will be
found the following bit of law and
history:
alt is not very usual in an English
court of justice to be driven back to
the earliest history and original ele-
ments Of the Constitution in order to
establish the first principles which
mark and distinguish ERglish law.
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