The weekly Floridian. [volume] (Tallahassee, Fla.) 1867-19??, 1885-09-24


yaae rern, 4. .. 1855.
John W. Paul. Appellant. Va William L. Frier-
son, ct al, Appellees-Appeal from fernando
county.
McWHoRrER, c. j. {: IRaney. j., disqualified
Il. A vested remainder in land. IL fixed
interest in one person, to take effect in posses
sion, alter preceding estate oil another person
therein is determined.
Q. When the right to the remainder interest
in an estate depends upon some future event,
which may or may not happen it is contin-
gent remainder.
8. A. executed to B. deed of trust for the
following purposes: I" For the sole and separate
use, profit and enjoyment of my said wife, Mar
tina b. FriersOn subject to her entire control and
management for and during her natural life, and
at her death the said property shall be divided
begotlen as abe may kooe suroioing her. the
child or children of q deceased child TO take
that portion TO which its parent would have
been entitled" Held:
(a) That the language created a contingent
remainder, dependent upon survivorship.
(b) That the children of a deceased child,
upon the decease of the parent, who was one OF
the children of the grantor described above, had
the same contingent interest as the deceased
parent.
4. A person, though not party to suit, but
having an interest in the subject matter thereof,
ul6y UTiug u Jill w iCtiCW euC uCCtCC ia ooiu
suit if his interest is affected by said decree.
5. A suit by John w. Paul, next friend Of
Esther j. Paul, a minor, is not a suit in the
name of the minor. 1t should be Esther j. Paul,
by her next friend, John w. Paul.
Decree affirmed.
John A. Henderson and T. l.. Clarke, for
appellant; A. Paterson, for appelees.
County Commissioners of Polk County, Appel
lants vs. Churchill E. johnson & Co, Appel
lees-Appeal from Polk county.
MCWHORTER, G. j..
1. An alteration of petition TO the County
Commissioners for license to sell liquors. wines
and beer under Chapter 3416, Acts of 1888, by
erasing therefrOm the name of the person whom
the registered voters understood at the time of
the signing 10 be the person to whom such IL
cense was to be granted, and the inserting there
in the name OF another person for whom the reg
istered voters had not asked such privilege is
sufficient reason to justify the County Commits
sOners in refusing to grant permit to such other
person to obtain license.
2. The personal fitness of the party seeking a
license for the special privilege of selling liquors.
as well as the sale of liquors in the election dis
trict, is essential consideration in the mind of
the voter at the time of signing said petition.
g. Section of said act does not require the
publication OF the affidavit to the petition men,
toned therein, said act only requires the publ
cation of the petition and the names and marks
thereto attached"
4. "a return 10 an alternate writ of mandamus
should state the facts relied on, with such prccis-
ion and certainty that the court may be fully ad-
vised of all the particulars necessary TO enable
it to pass judgment upon the sufficiency of the
return"
by section 2, Chapter 1909, Act 1859, was abro-
gated by Section s, Article 6. of the Constitution
of 1868
6. The absconding of one of two joint petition
for license to sell liquors. after the issuance of
an alternative writ of mandamus to The Board OF
County Commissioners which had refused to said
petitioners a permit to obtain license, is not a
good reason why the peremptOry writ should not
issue.
Judgment affirmed
g. A. Hanson, for Appellants; J. b. Wall, for
Appellees
Samuel A Donald, Appellant, vs. Caroline E.
Donald, Appellee for Dvorce-Appeal
from VOlusia county
MCWHoRTER, c. j.:
1. The term extreme cruelty" in the statute,
McClellan's Digest, sec. Z, p 473, is to be nIcr-
preted to mean the cruelty which was ground
tor divorce a naensG ct N0r0 in England.
2 In arriving at a conclusion, as to what
cruelty may be properly termed extreme" the
court should consider
(a) The mental and physical condition of the
person upon whom the violence is inflicted.
o. Whether or not the act of violence
single and exceptional act and the prOvOcation
under which it was committed
e) Whether the circumstances under which
it was committed would induce the belief that
its repetition was very improbable.
g. Extreme cruelty" sufficient to authorize
IA court to grant divorce does not necessarily
mean bodily injury alone, but includes such
conduct on the part of the husband as would
cause to the wife continuous and intense mental
suffering and danger to her health.
4. Divorce for cruelty is not granted as pun
ishment for past acts of violence, but on the
ground OF danger to the wife if the cohabtation
continues
D. Facts not amounting TO actual cruelty NAV
be properly stated in bill for divorce as laying
a foundation for subsequent cruelty, and to
show the true relations between the parties and
the likelihood of the repetition of the vio-
lcnce.
6. Placing his hand on his wife's shoulder and
requesting her to leave the room is not an act of
extreme cruelty by the husband
Decree reversed.
Walter r. Yates, for appellant; j. F. Well
born, John A. Henderson, T. L. Clarke, for
appellee.
William w. Wilingham, Plaintiff in Error, vs.
State OF Florida, Defendant in Error.-Pok
county.
RANEY, j.:
1. The duty imposed by statute upon the
Cicrk o TIC CiTCuit COuft 10 draw from the box
the names OF persons TO serve as grand Jurors at
term OF the court may be performed by depu-
ty.
=. When sep irate paragraphs or parts thereof
OF charge 10 II jury are excepted to, the whole
charge should be considered, and if considered
as whole the charge is !ree from the defects
alleged the exception should be overruled.
3. The Judge charged the jury upon the sub.
ject OF intoxicatiOn and insanity. There was no
testimony as TO the prisoner being "a drunkaid,
or that he had been drinking or was at the time
of the killing under the influence of liquor or a.
to any insanity or mental alteration or tlelusion,
and nothing calculated to raise a reasonable
doubt as to his being sober, and free from such
mental afflction; Held that the refusal of a new
trial should not be reversed even II there was
error in the charge. the verdict being clearly
sustained by the evidence and nothing appearing