The semi-weekly miner. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1882-1886, 1885-05-13
A MIST OF UNCERTAINTY.
Russia Believed to Be Simply Bridg.
ing Over the Afghan Trouble
With Great Britain,
And Preparing Herself for the Great
Struggle Which Must Inevitably
Take Place Soon.

conciled to the idea of the submission
of the difficulty to arbitration than
reports began to prevail questioning
the probability of there being any
arbitration after all the talk as to the
great things it was about to accom-
plish. Tonight no one professes to
understand what the precise condi-
tion of the negotiations with Russia
may be. The average Englishman
finds it difficult, if not absolutely i'm
possible, to disabuse himself Of the
feeling that, whatever Gladstone and
Granville may say to the contrary,
the Russian diplomatists are getting
the better Of the British. Every de-
lay in the negotiations has re-
douneded to Russia's adv antage.
While the Ministers have been talk
ing, the Russian railway has been
actively pushed towards the Afghan
frontier, and the Russian troops have
seized the debatsble territory. These
are facts, and the average BritOn
grows impatient when the attempt is
made to belittle their importance or
obscure them with cloud of words.
The position of affairs tonight Is so
INVOLVED IN UNCERTAINTY AND
| DOUBT
as to create the general feeling of
insecurity. A feeling that the pro-
posed arbitration is likely to fall
| through gains weight from the au-
nouncement made to day that there
Is likely to be considerable delay in
preparing the preliminary details.
There is no denying that the an
| n0uncement is received by many
people with q smile. The delay, it
is said, will be necessary in order to
allow the Cabinets of the two ma
tions to come to decision upon the
precise points to be submitted to ar
bitration.- Some people profess to
think that this process of arriving at
preliminary understanding will be
so fruitful source Of delay that the
chance of the arbitation taking place
at all are decided slight. rhe Cab
met, it is thought, may find them
selves as much at sea in deciding
what shall be submitted to the arbi-
traitors as they were in trying to
come to an understanding in regard
to the original difficulty. 1t is hu-
morously suggested that they may be
obliged to resort to preliminary
arbitration ia order to determine
what shall be submitted to the ar
arbitrators. The possibilities OF this
sort of diplomacy opens up a rich
field to the imaginative statesman.
This view of the situation gains ad-
dition likelihood when one considers
THE LATEST EXCHANGE OF VIEWS
that has taken place between Gran
Vile, Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, and De Staal, Russian Min
lister. Between these diplomats the
difference of opinion about such pri-
mary questions as the scope of the
proposed arbitration and the zone of
delimitation still remains unsettled.
Whether those divergent views can
be recOnciled and a common stand
point reached from which to consider
the main question, is by no means
certain. De Staal has proposed that
the whole scheme of arbitration shall
be abandoned in case a comparison
of the evidence regarding the PeDjdeh
incident shall be found to sustain
Russia's Interpretation of the agree
ment of March 18th. Granville is
inclined to accede to this proposition,
but only on condition that Russia
will grant definite treaty, in which
she shall pledge herself not to make
any
ADVANCE INTO AFGHANIsTAN.
There is little likelihood chat Rus
sia will make any such treaty as
Granville suggests. There is neces-
sary reason to believe that the pos
session of Penjdeh has whetted the
appetite of the voracious Russian
Bear. and that nothing but Herat
will long appease its cravings. Rus
slams here in London who are on
terms of intimacy with the Russian
ambassador, do not hesitate to de-
clare openly that Russia intends to
take Herat. They assert that it will
be an easy matter to obtain the as
sent Of the Ameer to Russian occu-
patton, and they declare that no
treaty which should propose to for
bid such an action on the part OF
Russia would have any binding
effect when the opportunity comes
or the effort is made to seize Herat.
HERAT WILL BE SEIZED,
no matter what the treaty stlpula-
tions may be. This opportunity is
not likely to come Immediately, they
think. and Russia will for the pres
ent make no advance beyond the line
of the frontier which shall be agreed
upon in the coming negotiations at
London. They say further that Rus
ala does not contemplate intervening
in the affairs of Herat, the proprio
o,,0tu of her own accord, but when the
local tribes, together with the
Heratees, shall ask for the protection
of the Gar, Russia is bound to incOr-
norate them in her dOmlnlons.
Englishmen familiar with the story
of the annexation Of Merv, think
they understand what the Russians
mean when they speak Of the local
tribes
ASKING THE PROTECTION OF THE
CAR.
There is a shrewd suspicion at1oat
that the impOrtunate asking for pro-
lection by the Mervii which the Gar
has no heart to withstand, was not
quite proprio naotu. These express
slons of opinion and belief on the
mart of the Russians, who have ac-
cess to the Russiaa Embassy are
fair reflex of the tone of De Staal's
recent communications to Granville.
The practical upshot of the whole
matter is that Russia refuses to enter
into a treaty fixing definite limit
to t her territory and binding her to a
maintenance Of the frontier SO hXed,
unless the rule of the Amer shah be
a. f;rmIv kept within the line of the
feontier that all tribal disturbances
viii be promptly repressed and col
,isaions between the Saraks and the
Afehans prevented and order at
Herat preserved.
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