The National tribune., 1885-07-30
FIGHTING THEM OVER
What Our Veterans Have to Say About
Their Old Campaigns
THE ELEVENTH CORPS.
Who Was Responsible for Its Disaster at Chan.
cellcrssille.

ceslcfhStlle.
To THE EDITOR: have read with the great
est interest the communication of Comrade ID.
NJ. kellogg regarding the Eleventh Corps at
Charlottesville. For % years have i, with
Others been waiting to see justice done to
body of men as brave as any that composed the
Army Of the Potomac; have perused with
great care such accounts as were published
about that battle-ofiicial and historical, but
MP to the present time have found that not one
of those who, being at the time in authority.
were best able to give the true and correct
account of that first days battle, found it worth
while to come out boldly to give credit where
credit belonged or lay the blame where SO
much blame was deserved. For over 20 years
the first hasty account given by the war cor
respondent of the New York Times of the battle
of Charlottesville has been accepted as cor
rect, the loss Of that battle blamed on the
cowarlice of the Eleventh Corps, or by some
ascribed to the mental incapacity of Gen.
Hooker on that day.
Gen. Howard, the commander of that corps.
has, by silence, permitted the imputation of
cowardice to rest on those troops. Not one
word in defense of the reputation of his corps
from him. He was willing to let that verdict
stand. Did he really believe that the troops
and their officers were to blame for the loss of
that battle or did he keep silent to shield his
own faults, his objectionable want of care and
still more apparent by the light of this long
concealed order of Gen. Hooker, which seems
to have come to light for the first time at SO
late day in your issue of June II? 1t seems
almost incredible that Gen. Howard having
received such an important order from Gen.
Hooker as stated by Comrade Kellogg, should
have ignored it entirely. But how little atten-
ton he paid to the advice contained in it, the
following will make clear.
The order reads:
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac
SATURDAY. May 2, $50 a. ~, 1863.
To GEN. HOWARD.
GENERAL: / am directed by the Major General
commanding to say the disposition you have made
Of your Corps has been with a view of a front at
tack by the enemy. If he should throw himself
upon your flank he wishes you TO examine the
ground and determine upon the position you will
take in that event, in order that you may be pre-
pared for him in whatever direction he advances.
He suggests that you have heavy reserves well in
hand TO meet this contingency.
Your ob'd't servant, tSig:) j H. VAN ALLEN,
Brighten. and A. d. &.
We have good reason 10 suppose that the enemy
is moving to our right. Please advance your pick
cts for purposes of observation as far as may be
SAFE in order to obtain timely information of their
approach.
1t seems necessary to explain what DISPOSE
ton Gen. Howard had made Of his command
The entire corps, composed of three divisions,
was stretched in single line of battle facing
south, on the road leading from ChaucellOrs-
manded by Gen. Barlow, formed the right
wing, his extreme right resting about three
miles from Charlottesville House; the Third
Division, under Gen. c. Schurz, in the center,
with the Second Division, under Gen. Won
Steinwehr, on the left. The whole line thus
formed was probably one and half miles long.
There were no reserves. One of our batteries
occupied a position on an elevation near our
extreme right flank, and played an important
mart in the final result
Late in the evening of the LIST of May the
pickets in front of our center were driven in,
and the report was sent to Gen. Howard that
the enemy was
TRYING TO REACH OUR FLANK.
Gen. Schurz, anticipating then an attack from
the west instead of the south, ordered two regi-
ments of the First Brigade. Third DIVISION
the 18TH N. Y, under Col. Brown, and the
62d ILL.,, under Col. F. Hecker,-t0 take posi-
ton facing west, and both regiments at once
threw up breastworks in their new position.
The morning of the ID of May opened bright
and warm, and during the entire forenoon the
enemy could be plainly seen from our line
in heavy and steady columns past
our front TO the west at a distance of not more
than one and half miles. 1t was plain to
every man and officer that the rebels would
attempt one of their flank movements, and
what preparation did Gen. Howard make to
meet this attack? None at all On the con-
trary, the aforementioned two regiments,
an intrenched position facing west,
were ordered back to the original line with
severe reprimand to Gen. Schimmelpfennig, to
whose brigade they belonged. Fortunately
this trained and experienced officer recogniz-
ing the utter folly of the order received, placed
these two regiments again in position to face
the coming attack from the west, and there
they remained unseen and undisturbed by Gen.
Howard or mis- staff
At noon our scouts reported the enemy close
to our flank and spreading to the north. Gen.
Howard made no change in the disposition of
his troops; they were still facing SOUTH At
8 p. m. Gen. Schimmelpfennig ordered two of
his officers with small detachment of men to
reconnoiter. This detachment, going only one
quarter of a mile south and about one-auarter
of mile beyond our extreme right flank, ap-
preached near enough to the enemy in the
thick forest surrounding our right flank and
rear to
HEAR THE WORDS OF COMMAND
given by the rebel officers as one regiment |
after another was massed in lines of attack
These officers fastened back to our lines as fast
as horses could carry them and reported. was
one of these two. and gave the information
ut once to Gen. Schurz. From the way was
received by that General, i carried away the
impression that he deemed further efforts to
warn Gen. Howard useless; but he was kind
enough to suggest, and after a moments re-
Election to order me to report at once to Gen.
Howard. / reached the corps headquarters
about half mile east, in a very short time.
did not see Gen. Howard, but in making nv
report to several of his staff officers was told
that we need not be unnecessarily alarmed
When leaving Gen. Towards headquarters /
observed that the Second Division of the Elev-
enth Corps had left its position was informed
that it. with the Fifth Corps, had started in |
pursuit of the enemy in a southeasterly direc- |
tion. 1t must be borne in mind that this dis |
position of Gen. Towards troops left vacant |
space of two miles between Charlottesville |
and the left wing of Gen. Schurz's Division, |
without so much as a single regiment in re-
serve, or any support nearer than Chancellors- |
Vile.
While returning to my command met How |
Rrd's headQuarter guard-composed of small |
company of cavalry-returning at full gallon. |
on road nearly parallel to our position Com |
ing from the west beyond our right flank, they |
had been driven in by the enemy and SO re- |
ported at headquarters. And, now, with Gen. |
lockers note Of warning in his possession since |
morning, the repeated information and warning |
given by Gems Schurz and Schimmelpfennig. /
md with my report, confirmed by the COM |
mander of his headquartcr guard, what measure |
Of defense did Gen. Howard take? Not a mans |
position was changed, and, to crown all, the |
men in line were ordered to
UEsLING KNAPsACKs AND STACK ARMS.
Shortly before 6 o'clock the storm burst
the attack was made. The first shot from a |
small rebel fieldpiece, coming from the north. |
west, killed mounted officer in the center of |
our line. simultaneously with the rebel |
line of battle in front. rear and flank came