Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1885-03-22

But that consequence is in the help it
gives to sustain cause which, IN the
opinion of the people, can be successfully
maintained.
That opinion will not be entertained If
Charleston and its connections are lost.
TIE loss Of these must be quickly followed
by others. The fall OF Charleston drags
after IL that of Richmond. Augusta will
be added to the list. Macon and Column
bus will succeed. Columbia, ins this
State, will share the same fate. How,
under this torrent of disaster. can conf
dence be retained? How can hope be pre-
served7 In every State the paralysis of de-
spair will be felt; sympathy will extend
TO and be felt in the army. A chill Will
attend every effort with which, in vain,
you will attempt TO remove or dIspel the
gloom.
What prevents this series Of disasters?
What, | may ask, insures safely and sue
cessY The defeat of Gen. Sherman's army
and the Illustration OF his plans OF extend
ed conquest. This is the great end, and
this accomplished, all will be well.
II we had been asked what great good
we most desired, would it not be prompt
ly answered by saying: 1.-The readiest
means TO terminate the war and insure
success?' Can these be furnished more
certainly than by having now the hope
and the strength Of the foe so combined
budls II tue army III W utCn IucSS are repre-
6ented can be beaten, hope is dispelled
and strength dispersal?
II we can, therefore, overcome Sher-
mans army is il not our obvious policy to
do SOP II we cannot, are we not over
come? But can we be overcome while
we still have in the field the men who are
there? / will not ask how many can be
brought there who are in places where
they should rot be.
have said subGfantialIv tn Won hpfOro
what L now repeat. that, with all of the
disasters which have befallen us, we are
physically not overcome, but we are
morally so in a greater degree. The feel
ing OF dependency which is so prevalent
can be lightened by success, but cOntinu-
GUS disaster will envelOp the whole cOun-
try In Its fOlde. And hXedly am of the
opinion that where Gen. Sherman's army
is there now is the place where the power
OF the confederation, as speedily as posi-
bic, should be concentrated to crush him.
| have said that morally We are more
reduced than we are ply sically. l believe
that the Army of Virginia is. perhaps. the
only exception to this truth; but even
there the same influences will be felt,
and perhaps in the worst form, if it should
be that the cOmponents of that army
would know that the States from which
they have come were lost and under sub
lection. When the States which have
given TO the confederation an army are
OveTrun, the real strength of that army has
been lost. To it the sources of Inspira-
ton, of courage aud devotion, are in the
States from which they have been
drawn. If these States are lost. the
sources of strength are lost with them. Ii
the hope of recovery becomes small, in
that proportion also will the strenyth of
the army diminish. Ii the contest is
doubtful, and in case that the enemy
shall have that control OF it which makes
the hOrt TO maintain the contest desDer-
ate, the cOmpOnenIs of the army who
come from these States will be naturally
and properly, may not add, attracted to
share tue pTiyatiOns of that State from
which they came. You cannot have a
stronger bond of union in the army than
that derived from the States of which that
army is composed.
And If you go beyond this, the difficult
ties increase with each step. Great re-
ductiOn of territory, great loss of pOpula-
ton, great loss Of revenue, all rise up be-
fore us. Look at the condition Of public
affairs here. Charleston lost, there is lost
to the State and to the Confederation per-
haps One-third Of The Tebenue of the State.
Shall the expenses of the government be
reduced, or the taxation of those who are
still under your government be increased?
Reductions beyond certain point you
cannot accomplish. Taxation beyond
certain amount you cannot impose. /
need not trace the proposition to it's ulti-
mate consequence. 1t stands, eV, in the
distance, too prominent 10 be mistaken.
L know there are some who have a vague
idea that the cause is not lost while there
is an army. Such persons, however, argue
from their hopes, not from facts. You
cannot have an army if you lose the
States which sent you the men and the
means which compose and support the
army.
Alike fallGcious is the idea of recon-
quest after these States have been lost.
With what are YOU 10 recOnQuer what
you cannot defend? How recruit or sus-
tain for the shortest time an army for that
or any other purpose? The experiment
of reeOnquest has failed everywhere, ex-
cept in the Il ans Mississippi district. It's
success there was under circumstances so
wholly different from those which prevail
here that it seems much more to dispel
than to animate the hope of success
with US.
Have we not, then, reached that period
of our struggle where we must gather up
our strength and concentrate all its force
in one blow? Have we not still enough
OF strength left to US to make the force of
that blow effectual? Have We not every
inducement 10 strike that blow, and to do
so as quickly as we can?
If that blow could have been struck in
defense of Savannah, how fortunate it
would have been. But what incalculable
weight is given now, in the fate of Sa.
vannah, to the proposition which urges
upon us to beware Of the like fate for any
other C.v:
Ito all other considerations il is added
that the entire grain crop of the State anr
all other supplies tor the people and W.
army are mixed up with the ,oto ~
Charleston, because depeD"' ,,, r@.e AZ ~
safety Of its communication i seems Gem TO 10
I .lIs thn ssge can too forcibly ex-
plm LesS VI" magnitude of the stakes for
w .sn we are here forced to play.
/ have considered these matters most
carefully, and all that have said, or now
say, is the result Of clear conviction,
after the most impartial survey Of our
present conditions. l feel that we have
approached that crisis in our affairs when
the most decisive measures must be
adopted to give US safety. / look in vain
for the resources we can hereafter CON-
mand, If now the spirit Of dependency is
to become increased. Everywhere the
people have passed from an extreme
confidence to an extreme distrust.
Can we present the proof that the
emergency is felt and will be
met ? Assurance cannot be given
that all will be well, when on no side is
there an exhibition OF purpose or power
that il should be so. 1t cannot be dis
guised that all eyes are turned toward US.
feel that the course Of events here is
looked to as that which is surely TO fore
shadow the future fol tunes Of the peoples
of these States. l hope, earnestly hope,
that you may agree with me in this, and
that YOU will enable us to meet The dan
ger which threatens US with force which,
in the defeat OF the foe, will give safety to
all.
You will appreciate the motive which
leads me to write to you with the most
perfect frankness. We must all have
common fate; we should, therefore, have
but common thought, and this should
lead US to a common purpose. With
great respect, / am, etc, your obi. svt.,
A. G. MAGRAIH. Governor.
GOV. MagPath Satisfied with the Replies
Of Cows. Brown and Vance.
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.
COLUMBIA, Jan. 26, 1865.
GOVERNOR received, at the hands of
Col. Prescott, your reply TO the cOmmuni-
cation which instructed him to pres Mt
to you. Your concurrence and cO-Opera-
tiOn, so cordially signified, with that also
of Gov. Vance, confirms me in the opinion
a. lse,l,