St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1885-03-26

what now repeat, that with all of the disas-
tiers which have befallen US, we are physically
not overcome; but We are morally SO in a
greater degree. The feeling of dependency
which is so prevalent can be lightened by
success; but continuous disaster will en-
velop the whole country in its folds. And
fxedly am Of the opinion that where Gen.
Sherman's army is there now is the place
where the power of the Confederation, as
speedily as possible, should be concentrated
to crush him.
l have said that morally we are more re-
duced than physically. l believe that the
army OF Virginia is, perhaps, the only ex-
ception to this truth; but even there the
same influences will be felt, and perhaps in
the worst form, if it should be that the COM
ponents of that army would know that the
states from which they have come were lost
ana under subsection. When the states
which have given to the Confederation an
army are overrun, the real strength OF that
army has been lost. To it the sources of in
spiration, of courage and devotion, are in
the states from which they have been drawn.
If these states are lost the sources of strength
are lost with them. If the hope of recovery
becomes small,iu that proportion also viii the
strength of the army diminish. If the con-
test is doubtful, and in case that the enemy
shall have that control of it which makes the
effort to maintain the contest desperate, the
components of the army who come from
these states will be naturally and properly
may not add?-attracted to share the pri-
vations of that state from which they came.
You can not have stronger bond of union
in the army than that derived from the
states of which that army is com posed.
And if you go beyond this, the difficulties
increase with each step. Great reduction of
territory, great loss of population, great loss
of revenue, all rise up brfore US. Look at
the condition of public affairs here. Charles
ton lost, there is lost to the state aud to the
Confederation perhaps one-third of the rev.
enue of the state. Shall the expense of
government be reduced, or the taxation of
those who are still under your govern
ment be increased? Reductions be-
yond "a certain point you can not
accom- plish Taxation beyond a certain
amount you can not impose. l need not
trace the proposition to its ultimate conse-
quence. 1t stands, even in the distance, too
prominent to be mistaken.
l know there are some who have vague
idea that the cause is not lost while there is
an army. Such persons, however, argue
from their hopes, not from facts. You can
not have an army if you lose the states which
sent you the men and the means which COM
pose and support the army.
Alike fallacious is the idea Of reconquest
after these states have been lost. With what
are you to recOnquer what you can not de
fend! How recruit or sustain for the shortest
time an army for that or any other purpose?
the experiment of reconquest has failed
everywhere, except in the Trans-Mississippi
district. It's success there was under circum-
stances so wholly different from those which
prevail here that it seems much more to dis
pei than to animate the hope Of success with
US.
Have we not, then, reached that period Of
our struggle where We must gather up our
strength and concentrate all its force in one
blow! Have we not still enough of strength
left to US to make the force Of that blow efec-
tual! Have we not every inducement to
strike that blow, and to do so as quickly as
we can!
II that blow could have been struck in de-
Tense of Savannah, how fortunate it would
have beenl But what ipcalcuable weight is
given now, in the fate of Savannah, to the
proposition which urges upon US TO beware OF
the like fate for any other city.
If to all other considerations it is ADDED
that the entire grain crop Of the state and all
other supplies for the people and the army
are mixed up with the fate OF Charleston, be-
cause depending upon the safety of its com
munications.it seems to me that no language
can too fOrcihly express the magnitude, OF The
stakes for which we are here forced to play.
have considered these matters most care
fully, and all that have said, or now say, is
the result of a clear conviction after the most
impartial survey of our present conditions
feel that we have approached that crisis in
our affairs when the most decisive measures
must be adopted to give US safety. look in
vain for the resources we can hereafter COM
mand, if now the spirit of dependency is to
become increased. Everywhere the people
have passed from an extreme confidence to
an extreme distrust. Can we present the
proof that the emergency 10 felt and will be
met! Assurance can not be given that all
viii be WELL when on no side is there an eX-
hibition of purpose or power that it should be
so. 1t can not be disguised that all eyes are
turned toward US. feel that the course OF
events here is looked to as that which is
surely to fOreshadow the future fortunes Of
the people Of these states. hope, earnestly
hope, that you may agree with me in this,
and that you will enable US to meet the dan
ger which threatens US with a force which, in
the defeat of the foe, will give safety to all.
You viii appreciate the motive which leads
me to write to you with the most perfect
frankness. We must all have a common
fate; we should, therefore, have but com
mon thought. and this should lead US to a
common purpose. With great respect, am,
ETC., your obedient servant,
a. G. MAGRATH, Governor.