The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-12-12
THE RECORD OF TIE COURTS
United States District Court.
Hon. w. A. Woods. Judge.
To-day-No calls.
Supreme Court.

Supreme Court.
Hon. W. Z. Niblack, Chefjustce
The following decisions were rendered Dec. IL
1926. Henry G. Hedges ct al VS.. Cecilia Kel-
Ter ct al. Huntington c. c. Affirmed. Howk,
J.-Ip 1855 the Huntington County Bank, organ
lied under the general law of the State for the
purpose of doing an exchange and banking bust
ness, held u note on which one Brown was prin
cipal and one Bratton was surety. Neither par
ty had cash to meet its payment. Brown owned
the land now in controversy, and to indemnity
Bratton as surety conveyed it to
him. James R. Weldon, cashier of
the bank, took such land, and turned
the note over to Bratton and paid him in addi
ton $3.50 or $500, which money Bratton paid to
Brown. Bratton conveyed the land to Weldon
by deed, and Weldon took the land and the deed
therefor by the direction of the president of this
bank The transaction between Weldon and
Bratton was in the bank. Weldon shortly after
ward resigned as cashier and little later died.
leaving appellees as heirs. The president took
possession of the land receiving rents. paying
taxes. except in 1867. when the taxes were not
paid The. land was sold for taxes and he bought
1T, receiving deed, and thereafter quitclaimed
to appellees Held: That the facts failed to show
that Weldon took or held the land as trustee for
the bank, or any one else and as the land was
conveyed to him personally, by absolute deed of
warranty, in the absence Of any fact to the con-
trary, the fair presumption is that he paid for
the land with his own means.
1920 Clara A. Kelsoe VS.. Allen T. Fleming.
Dubois c. G. Reversed Mitchell, J.-Appellee,
on the day after executing a note executed a
mortgage, conveying to the payee certain real
estate as security for the debt. Subsequently
appellee sold and conveyed the land mortgaged
to one Stien. who assumed the payment of the
mortgage debt as part of the purchase price.
Appellee averred in his answer to a suit on the
note that the payee agreed to accept Stien as
the payor of the debt and release the appellee,
and that in pursuance of the agreement he did
release the appellee. There was no agreement
mutually entered into between all the parties that
Stien should become the debtor of the payee
of the note, and that in consideration of his so
agreeing, appeee's debt should be released. AS
between the payee and appellee, the debt re-
NAMED that of the latter That Stien had
assumed its payment by contract, no considera-
ton to the payee appearing, did not extinguish
the debt. The arrangement completed in the
absence Of the payee, and substantially assented
to by him, did not constitute consideration for
a release. Two essential elements Of novation
are absent: H. } mutual agreement between
all the parties to substitute a new debt for
the old debt. e. The extinguishment of the
old debt. There was no consideration for a
release upon the facts: the averments of the
answer that there was are mere conclusions.
1924 Charlotte Wright VS.. Peter NJ Keyla.
Upton G. G. Affirmed. Elliott, Under our
statute of limitations person under legal dis
ability has two years after the removal of the
disability within which to bring an action. The
provision proceeds upon the theory that the
ton accrues. and so grants two years after re-
moval of legal disability, although the full time
may have expired 1t does not cut down the
period of limitation, for if twenty years from the
time cause of action has accrued have not ex-
pired the party is entitled to the whole of the
unexpired time. A legal disability does not
postpone the time when the statute begins to