The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1885-05-14

day Intelligence arrived that the enemy
was abandoning his positions / crossed
10 the Virginia aide TO receive inf0rma'
tion more promptly and decide npon what
should be done, During the night | do.
terminsd 10 advance the whole army, to
take the advantage OF any opportunity
to trlke the enemy, 10 break up the per-
manent camps, give the troops q little
experience on tho march aid In biv0uac,
get rid OF extra baggage, and test work.
Ing Of the staff departments II this
we're done at all, II must be done prompt.
ly and by moving the troops by divisions,
without waiting TO form the army corps.
Accordingly, l telegraphed 10 the Secre-
tary, explaining tho state OF the case
and a'king authority TO postpone the
army cOrpa formation until the comple'
ton OF the movement. The reply was an
abrupt aud unreasonable refusal.
again tel graphad, explaining the stu
alton and throwing the responsibility
upon the Secretary, whereupon he gave
way. nt.U. ... ln..LI !.
Meanwhile, as far back 40 the 27 h OF
February, orders had been given for col
Letting the transportation necessary 70
carry out the Urbanna movement This
conclusion had been reached after tnll
discussion, On the 27th OF January had
been Issued the Presidents general war
order No, 1, directing a general move
meDt on the land and naval forcea
against the enemy on the % Of Febru.
dry. On the 3lst Of January was Issued
the Presidents special war order No, l,
directing the army OF the Potomac 10
advance !" the attack OF Manassas on
the 22l OF February. The Pre- iden',
however, permitted me to state my oh
jeGtlOna TO this or ler, which did, NJ
length, In n letter OF February 3, 70 the
Secretary OF War. Az the Presidents
order was not insisted upon, although
n6var formally revoked, II Ia 10 he as-
sumei that my letter produced, for q
time nj least, the desired effect. When
Manassas was ab ndoned and the lntmy
was behind the Rapldan, the Ufbanna
movement lost much OF ita promise, an
the enemy were now In position TO reach
Richmond before we could do 10. The
alternative remained OF making Fort.
ress Monroe and lts vicinity the base Of
operations.
The question now arose az 10 thelllne
| Of operations 10 be allowed; that OF the
James on the one hand, and, on the
other, the line from White House as q
base OF crossing the Upper Chickahominy
REINFoRcEMENTs WITHHELD.
The army was admirably placed for
adopting either, and my declslon was TO
take that OF the James, operating on
either bank as might prove advisable
but always preferring the southern l
had urgently asked for Ielnforcemenla
to 9 me by water, 40 lthey would thus
bs equally available for either line OF
operations. The destruction OF the
MerTImac on the llth OF May had opened
the James river 10 M, and II was only
after that date that II became available
My plan, however, was changed by or:
ders from Washington. A telegrem OF
the 18th from the Secretary OF War In
formed me that Mcdowell would ad,
vance from Fredericksburg, and directed
me TO extend the right Of the Army OF
the Potomac 10 the north OF Richmond,
In order TO establish communication
with him, The came order required me
to supply his troops from depOts at tho
White House. Herein lay the failure OF
the campal IN, as II necessltated the d.
vision OF tho army by the Chickah0mlny,
and caused great delay In constructing
practicable bridges across that stream;
while " | had been able TO cross TO the
James, reinforcemonts would have
reach me by water rapidly and safely,
the army would have been united ana In
DO danger OF having its flank turned, or
its line OF supply interrupted, and the At
tack could have been much more rapid
ly pushed.
No praise can be too great for the off,
GERS and men who passed through these
seven days OF battle. enduring fatigue
without q muTmur, successfully meet
ing and repelling every attack made
upon them, always In the right place al
the right time, and emerging from the
fiery ordeal a compact army OF veterans
equal TO any task that brave and discl'
pllned men can be called upon to under
take. They needed now only q few days
OF well.earned repo9p, a renewal OF am
munltion and supplies, and reinforce
ments TO Oil the gaps made In their
ranks by 30 many desperate encounters,
to be prepared to advance again, with
entire confidence, to meet their worthy
antagonists In other battles. IL was,
however, decided by the authorities AT
Washington, agalns! my earnest remon'
atrances, to abandon the position on the
James. and the campaign The army OF
the Potomac was accordingly with
drawn, and II was not until two years
later that II again found Itself under
lts last commander at substantially The
same point on the banks Of the Jamea
|. IL was 40 evident IN 1862 ny In 1850 thai
was the true defense OF Washington
and that II was on the hanks OF th'
James that the fate OF tho Union was Il
be decided.