The Abbeville messenger. (Abbeville, S.C.) 1884-1887, 1885-05-06

State, who. having previously taken an
oath as member Of Congress or as an
officer Of the United States or as men,
Der Of any State Legislature or as an
executive or judicial officer Of any State,
to support the Constitution of the Uni
ted States, shall have engaged in insur-
rectioI or rebellion against the same, OF
given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof, but Congress may, by vote OF
two-thirds Of each house, remove such
disability"
The question presented will be dis
posed Of upon the loyal intent aud mean
ing OF the amendment. Prior to tho
adoption ef this amendment the Exccu-
tive, in the exercise Of unquestionable
power, had granted pardons to the per-
son whose case is now under considcra-
ton and others standing in the sam e
predicsment Of guilt. The power to
pardon vested in the Executive by the
constitution was not given to be exercised
capriciously, but when resorted to in the
present it should be in furthcrance Of
tho peace Of society and in the interests
OF the Government.
| Such being the theory, it must be pre-
sumed TINT every exertion Of that pow
er in such case by the executive depart
| ment of the Government was in rurth-
erancc Of the objects for which the pow
or WAS granted, for nothing is better es-
| tablished than that want Of fidelity to
its constitutional duties is never to be
imputed to any one Of the three great
| CO. ordinate departments Of Government
If it be possible to avoid it. At the time
the Fourteenth amendment went ;.,to
operation Lawton and the other persons
referred to had been restored, by par
lons previously granted, to all their
rights as citizens, and had becom; by
virtue Of those pardons AZ innocent AZ if
| they had never committed the offence
forgiven. FIX partc Garland, 4 Wall, D.
$50: United States VS.. Padelfortl, 8 Wall
531; United States VS.. Klein, l3 Wall,
1913; Armstrong vs.. United States. VS.. B..
l54; Pargond VS.. United States, l56;
Carlisle vs.. United States, 16 Wall, l48.) }
The question, then, for my opinion is
whether it was the intention Of tho 18th
amendment to take away rights which
previous pardonE had restored, or, in
other words, whether it was the purpose
Of that amendment to cast reproach upon
the executive department Of the Gov
ernment by repudiating as unworthy OF
| credit its acts Of unquestionable yalili-
ty by destroying rights which had un-
doubtcdly vested under those Acts and
by violating national faith solcmnly
pledged. 1t cannot be denied that the
amendment is is comprehensive ss Ian.
guage could make it, but Mt the same
time it must be remembered that the
words Of every Inv are to be taken in
o,,t, Ill, - 4 Al
where they are gsneral their sense will
be restricted. if necessary, to prevent an
unjust or absurd Consequence, which It
must be presumed that tho Legislature
could not have contemplated. 1t was
upon this principle that the Supreme
Court Of the United States held that an
individual pardoncd for taking part in
tho rebellion was not dcbarred from su-
ing in the Court Of Claims by law pro-
viding that in order to recover proceeds
Of captured or abandoned property the
claimant must prove that he has never
given any aid or comfort to the present
rebellion. The Court says:
at is not to be supposed that Con-
gress intended by the general language
Of the Act to encroach upon any Of the
prerogntivcs Of the President. and es-
pecially that benign prerogativc Of mer-
cy which lies in tho pardoning power.
1t is more reasonable to conclude that
claimants restored to their risttx of
property by the power Of the President
were not in contemplation Of Congress
in passing the Act and were not intend
ed to be embraced by the requirement
in question. All general terms in stat
utes should be limited in their applica-
ton so as mot to lead to injustice, op-
preston or any unconstitutional opera
ton il that be possible. 1t will be pre-
sumed that exceptions werc intended
which would avoid results Of that ma
ture. Carlisle vs.. tho United States,
16 Wall, p. 1881 In very important
case recently decided the same Court
restricted the general language Of stat
ute in order to avoid giving it sense
that would have involved Congress in
the violation Of q treaty obligation"
(Chew Heong vs. the United States,
ll2; II. S., 555; same doctrine is forci-
bly, presented in United States VIZ. kir-
by. Wall, 483.)
That this principle is as applicable to
interpretations Of the Constitution as the
statutes was conclusively established
by the Supreme Court in the Slaughter
house case, 16 Wall. II. where the Court
refused to accept tho full meaning Of
certain general words in the first sec
ton Of the cath amendment, in order to
avoid an Interpretation that would have
involcd so great departure from the
structure and spirit of our institutions
as in tho absence of explicit language,
could not be presumed to have been in
tended.
Applying then this sound rule of in
terprotation to tho third section Of the
18th amendment / am Of opinion that
the consequences Of allowing its gsner-
al words Of exclusion to operate without
Limitation in favor Of persons in the sit-
uation Of Mr.. Lawton, would be pro-
ductive Of an injustice and disregard Of
public faith which nothing short Of the
most explicit and controlling language
should authorize.
If the conclusion I have reached ia
not we'll founded then it follows that il