The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-01-25
General Stone ON stewards Battle.

New York Mail and Express.
Stone Pacha who was offered the command
of the English forces against Ell Mahdi and re-
fused the same because the war commissioners
would not allow him the $1,000 men he asked
sor and deemed necessary to the undertaking,
vas approached by representative of the Mail
and Express with the question: "Well, General,
what do you think of the battle news from the
Soudan and the meeting of the forces Of the
Mahdil"
at is always difficult" said he in answer. ITO
discuss battle the first report from one side.
For instance, in this case we cannot have the
Arab report of the affair, and must reason only
on the accounts coming from Lord Wol.eley's
headquarters through the wires of the official
telegraph. It is evident to all that the
British officers and soldiers have in this
case fought with their habitual gallantry
and devotion, and the death roll is only another
proof. of which history gives SO many of how
British officers invariably lead their men in
meeting danger. According TO the figures given
in the official report the British forces lost more
than III per cent. of their whole number in
killed and wounded, while the Arabs lost 16 per
cent When we consider the value Of the Off
GERS and men lost on the side of the invaders
-four field officers and five line officers killed),
the future morale of General Stewards command
column is not only diminished in fighting
strength, but the care Of the wounded will yet
further diminish it, while their enemy will
hardly feel the loss in numbers. 1t is easy to
criticise after a battle, however, and criticisms
in this instance WILL no boubt abound. AL
ready there has been much criticism expended on
Lord Wolseley's original choice of route, yet
think that those best informed in the matter will
agree with me that he chose the most advanta
gsous or the least Instantaneous route under
|
think that it was wise to adopt boat transporta-
tion above Wady Halfa. The camel is the natu
raj ship of the desert and had he from the first
used abundance of that transportation he would
Aave concentrated much earlier at Dongola or
Debbeh. | cannot at this distance understand
why he divided his force at Korti, for he thus
exposed the force to the attack in detail which
has occurred The delay caused by the boat
transportation gave his enemy moro time to
concentrate force against him, and the long de-
lays accustomed the Arabs to the presence In the
country of European troops and lost him the
prestige of rapid movement There must exist
much anxiety until news can be received of the
safe arrival of General Stewert at Metemneh,
and afterward until such time as communication
can be established by steamer between Khar-
toum and that point AS the Mahd holds ON
duraman, it may be that he can prevent such
communication"
Referring subsequently to the one-sded re-
ports of battles at distant points. General Stone
said that it was not unlikely that if report of
the battle at Abu-Klea wells could be received
from Ell Mahdi it would read something after
this style:
''The infdels came up 5000 strong sent
about the same number of men to meet them,
but commanded them after firing deadly vol
ley into the ranks of the enemy to retreat ut
once. Owing to the latest improved firearms
with which the infGels were provided, their
charge upon our forces was most disastrous,
killing and wounding nearly thousand Our
attack, however, while it resulted in KILN:
number greatly below that lost by u.s. was sue
cessful in wiping out nearly one half of the
enemy. and it will now be an easy matter to
completely annihilate them"
Wien General Stone refused the command of
the English forces Eel Mahdi had less than 40
600 followers. His army now is estimated to
number 200, 900. and General Stone is of the
opinion that nothing will rout him but an army
of nearly the same size and strength.