The Worthington advance. [volume] (Worthington, Minn.) 1874-1908, 1885-05-07

0s41sa1 DsauRs0s1A - Je2sxooa DGvas,
1nlltasy Policy.

G.ll-- f.
0salsal 0ss1xsgazA = jsasreoa Davas-
3, ., Military 1eaiey.
The following extracts are taken from
Gsa. Besuregards story of the Battle
Of Bull Run" in the November Century:
mo people ever warred for independ-
once with more relative advantage than
the Confederates; and il, as military
question, they must have failed, then no
country must aim at freedom by means
q war. We were one in sentiment as in
territory starting out, not with strug-
Cling administration ofdoubtful author
lty, but with our ancient State Govern.
ments and . fully organized central Gov
srnment. As . military question, it was
IN no sense civil war, but q war be.
tween two countrics-for conquest on
neside, for self representation on the
other. The South, with its great ma.
terial resources, its defensive means of
mountains; waterways, railroads and
telegraph, with the immense advant-
ago Of tho interior lines of war.
would be open to discredit a. a people
II tho failure could not be explained
otherwise than by mere material. The
great Frederick, at the head of q little
people, not only beat back o combina.
ton of several great military powers,
but conquered and kept tbs territory,
and Napoleon held combined Europe at
the feet of France till his blind ambi-
ton overleaped itself. It may be said
that tho South had no Fredericks. OF
Napoleons, but it had ct least as good
commanders as its adversary Nor was
It the fault Of our soldiers or people.
Our soldiers were as brave and intelli.
gent as ever bore arms; and, If only
for reasons already mentioned, they had
q determination superior to the enemy's:
Our people bore q devotion to the cause
never surpassed, and which no war:
making monarch ever had for his sup:
port; they gave their all-even the last
striplings under the family roofs filling
the ranks voided by the fall of their
fathers and brothers. But the narrow
mill airy view of the head of the Gov
eminent, which illustrated itself ir the
outset by ordering from Europe, not
1000 or 100000, but 10000
stands OF arms, as an increase
upon 5000, its first estimate,
was equally narrow and conse-
quently timid in its employment O,
our armies. The moral and material
forces actually engaged in war made
our success mortal certainty, but for
tho timid policy which ignoring strategy
as science and boldness of enterprise
as it's ally-could never be brought to
view the whole theatre of war as one
subject, of which all points were. but
integral parts or to hazard for the time
points relatively unimportant for the
purpose of gathering for IN overwhelm-
ing and rapid stroke ut some decisive
point; and which, again, with character
istic mis- citation, would push q victori-
GUS force directly forward into unsup-
ported and disastrous operations in
stead of using its victory to spare from
its strength sufficient to secure an
equally important success in another
quarter.
"Wo needed for president either q
military man of high order ora politi:
can of the first class (such as Howell
Cobb without military pretensions:
The south did not fall crushed by the
mere weight of the North, but it was
nibbled away on all sides and ends be-
cause it's exclusive head never gathered
and welded its great strength under the
ready advantages that greatly reduced
or neutralized it's adversary's naked
physical superiority. It is but another
of the many proofs that timid direction
may readily go with physical courage,
and that the passive defensive policy
may make long agony, but can never
win war;"