The National tribune., 1885-09-24
that they were in advance of the movement

that they were IN advance OF the movement
of the whole army.
To prevent the suspicion that it was feint
McCook was to send brigade and battery
down the eastern slope as far as Alpine, aad
was in his discretion, authorized TO make the
advance with a whole division if necessary,
but no more.
He made the mistake of moving MS whole
corps down 90 Alpine before orders reached
him to join Thomas with all possible dispatch.
These we're expected TO find him ut the top OF
the mountain instead of 13 miles below it, and
falling to do so was the cause Of an almost fatal
delay of two days. Gen. Bragg Is mistaken
when lac SAYS Gen. RoSecranS was thrown OH
his guard by our rapid movement Gen. hose
Grams was not thrown off his guard. His object
was to compel Gen. Bragg to retreat far enough
south to enable him to concentrate his army be-
tween Rraggs forces and Chattanooga to which
end Rosecrsns had ordered Thomas with the
Fourteenth Corps to cross Lockout Mountain
through Coopcr's Gap, and leaving his train
and everything that could possibly impede his
backward movement up the mountain in case
of danger put his corps in position at the foot
of the gap so as TO be free to move back should
the enemy attempt to fall upon him. While
this was being done Crittenden used the only
other pass-that at Chattanooga-toc cross Look
out and fellow the epemy's retreating forces
and ascertain the whereabouts OF their main
army.
ders as the tccgraphc correspondence VIII
show, as early as the 9Th, to go down and join
Gen Rosccrans which Gen. Burnside failed TO
obey The crossing OF the Tennessee River by
the Army of the Cumberland made 1t an I'M
perative military necessity fer Gen. Buckner to
evacuate East Tennessee and join Bragg, which
he did.
"Carleton continues: "Ab he did not know
that almost at that moment Bragg was issuing
orders to two of his division commanders to
move on Negley's Division of Thomas's Corps,
which was descending the east side OF Lookout
Ridge from Stevens's Gap; that Cieburne and
Hindmau together outnumbered Negley Two
to one"
No mortal man knows better than Gen. Rose
Grams that this is mistake. He well knew on
the 9th what the peril was, and on the 10th the
approximate position OF the enemy, and dis
patched CrittenIen to keep a hold 'front.' while
behind it he moved with secrecy and ceierlty
on the north side Of tue Chickamauga until
within supporting distance of Thomas. 1t was
the movement of Crttenden's troops and of
Wilders Brigade which advised him that Gen.
Bragg's quarters were in Lafayette, and that
it was his supreme necessity TO concentrate our
army without moments delay.
Referring 90 'Carleton's" assertion that
Negley is Oh the east side of the ridge with
5,G00mcn,- his estsuppOrt, Baird's Division
of 5000, four miles distant; while the other two
divisions of Thomas's Corps are on the west
side of Lookout, at Trenton" Gen. Rosecrans
has always been advised that Thomas's Corps
moved as a unit. with Negley in advance, and
never before heard that Thomas had allowed
two of his divisions to descend the mountain
while the other two were On its opposite side.
'Rosecrans was in utter ignorance of the
state of affairs" asserts Carleton and the
assertion is subheaded Ro5ecrans's Mistake"
RosecrauS made no mistake. The dispatch
to Thomas of the 9th was before Crittenden's
Corps had gotten fairly out on the road and
developed the truths before alluded to; but the
information came as fast as it could be obtained,
and on its receipt orders were dispatched to
McCook, Crittenden, and Thomas for the con-
centration, and Gen. Rosecrans Joined Gen.
Thomas the same night at the foot of Cooper's
Gap.
Gen. Bragg's idea of crushing Crittenden and
attacking Thomas was evidently the best I'M
der the circumstances; but its execution was
not of easy accomplishment, because Crtten-
den had at once moved with all secrecy and
dispatch, as already stated, to within support
ing distance of Thomas.
"CarlctCn' is grievously in error when he
attempts TO attribute the salvation of the army
to Gen. Garfeld's comprehension of the neces
sity for concentration and, to effect it, OF quick
marching. This is q revelation. Rose crans
never heard Of it, and is quite sure nothing
from his Chief of Staff Gen. Garfield, added
light on the necessities of the situation. The
General IN command from the beginning com
pretended what those necessities were, and was
more keeuly alive, probably. than any man in
the army 10 them. The implication that Gen.
Garfield was in any manner moving spirit in
this plan is an entire mistake.
: IL IVES on the 18th that the army had abso-
Lutte assurance from captured Confederate oth-
Ger that Longstreet was at Atlanta coming up.
AS Carleton puts it, " For four days be
Bragg remained inactive. Why? Possibly
e.
he would wait. The golden thread dropped
from his grasp once more. Well for our coun-
try that it was so for bad he moved on the
18th there can be little doubt that ROsecranss
army would have been swept from the face of
the earth-cut up, division at time. He did
not move fill the night of the 18th. and all
through these hours Thomas and McCook were
marching"
There is inaccuracy in this. Bragg's chances
wore better on the 18th, but it is extremity
doubtful whether he had forces enough TO have
"swcpt Rosecrans's army from the face of the
earth" Two corps were already within sup
porting distance of each other and there was
no chance of cutting them up division at
time" Bragg probably knew that better
than " Carleton" All that was wanted was the
Twentieth Corps which did not reach the top
of the mountain at CO0per's Gap until tho 18th.
Thomas was still concentrated at the foot of
Coopers Gap communicating with Crittendcn,
VINO fiCkcIeu Ine ilnc Oi the Inlckamdng3.
As soon as the advance of the Twentieth Corps
was signalled from the top of the mountain on
the 18th, the movement began to place the
Union forces across the line of the read from
RossyilIe to Lee & Gordon's Mills and the
Twentieth Corps was ordered TO descend the
mountain and join in the movement with ali
possible dispatch.
Finally Carleton F" allows himself TO say:
"The day was one of great anxiety to Rose
Grams and Garfield. They could see clouds
Of dust cast Of the creek. extending far to the
north: but not till the head Of McCooks
column reached CraYiish Spring mile and a
half south of Lee q Gordons MIL did Rose
Grams dare 10 put Thomas in motion toward
Rossvillc along the Lafayette road
The truth is, the movement of Thomas began
as soon as McCook's column was signalled from
the nlouutain-top. as heretofore stated. and
continued all night by the light of fires built
through the woods.
Southern ConiGrers and Northern Quaeks.