Roseburg review. [volume] (Roseburg, Or.) 1885-1920, 1885-11-27
GEN. MCCLELLAN.

we SAID IN the former paper tnaG IL
the government had supported Nc
Clellan in the peninsular Campaign he
would probably have taken Richmond
III 1862. But this it failed to do.
From the time Stanton became Secre-
tary of War the administration adopt
ed q asingular attitude towards It's com
manding general. It's support Of him
was vaccillating and half hearted in
in matters wholly military of which
the President and Secretary were Who'll
ly ignorant and of which Mcclellan
was acknowledged to be master, his
own opinion was disregarded and their
ideas substituted. AS one reads the
full history of those day S, the recon-
mendation Of Mcclellan to the author
tiles at Washington, his plans, and then
read how those recommendations and
plans were treated-how they were ig-
q nored and disregarded, it is difficult to
como to any other conclusion than that
the administration was reluctant to
have Mcclellan succeed. And this
believe to be the true explanation of
the anomalous course pursued toward
the general of the army, Mcclellan was
too popular. Everybody knows that
his army idolized him. Had he been
allowed to overcome the enemy and
finish the war he would have been the
most popular man in the country; and
rs irresistible at the polls as was Grant
afterwards,
This I believe to he the reason of
the administration failure to support
Mcclellan. We know how unpalata-
bic this view is to ardent admirers of
the Lincoln administration. Lincoln
was a good man but he was human.
He was not insensible to the siren
voice Of fame; and he did not care to
see his sun eclipsed by the young COM
mander. Then [ think he feared that
if Mcclellan should succeed he would
not be able to carry out his plans of
emancipation which were already for
ming. In this however think there
was no cause for fear. But the most
disturbing element, probably was the
Secretary of War-Stanton. There
can be little doubt but that he was fill
ing the mind of the President with
suspicious Of Mcclellan. Some one
was base enough to suggest to Lincoln
that McClellan's plan of a movement
by the lower Chesapeake was with
the traitorous purpose" of leaving
Washington unprotected. (See Nc
Clellan's account of the "Peninsular
Campaign" in the May Century page
l4o.) With what we now know of
Stanton's attitude towards Mcclellan
It is not hard to believe that this came
from him. What any fair mind must
admit is that Mcclellan never had a
chance to carry out his plans. He was
continually hainpered by "orders from
Washington. Whatever may have
been the reason, the President did not
allow him to command the army, but
kept it in his own hands. Hardly had
he started on the Peninsular Campaign
until he was deprived Of the command
Of the western army. Then followed
series Of orders extracting section
after section Of the army of the Poto-
mac until llc had but about half of the
force with which he expected to make
tba campaign. Mcclellan continued
movement and steadily asked for rein
forcements, and these were as steadily
denied. The rest is familiar to every
one. Every one has read Of the
..chanse Of base from the chicka-
hominy to the James. t IS well
known that against his earnest protest
Mcclellan was ordered to evacuate the
peninsula; that Immediately afterward
E command was transferred to Pope,
- aoeoa4 aeter defeat followed the