The Cambria freeman. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1867-1938, 1885-05-15
McCLELLAN,S yINDICATION.
HE PUTS THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
PENINsULAR FAILURE ON STANTON.


PENINsULAR FAILURE ON STANTON.
The May number of The Centary con-
tains several war papers, in addition to
other interesting matter. but nothing so
important as General McClelian's paper
on The Peninsular Campaign" in
which he places the responsibility for
the FAILURE OF that campaign very dis
tlnctly upon Secretary Stanton. From
| this we make these extracts
so long as Mr.. Cameron was Secreta-
| ry OF War | received the cordial support
or that department; but wten he re-
signed, the whole state of affairs chang
! ed. l had never met Mr.. Stanton be
fore reaching Washington, in 1861. He
/ at once sought me ard prOfessed the ut
most personal affection, the expression
| or which was exceeded only by the bit
terness of his denunciatiou of the gov
/ eminent and its policy. was una ware
o: ms appointment as Secretary of War
! until after it had been made, whereup-
| on he called to ascertain whether | de-
! sired him to accept, saying that do SO
| would involve a total sacrifice of his
| personal interests, and that the only in
/ ducement would be the desire to assist
me in my work. Having no reason to
doubt his sincerity, I desired him to ac-
cept, whereupon be consented, and with
great efusion exclaimed "NoW we
two will save the country"
On The next day the President came
to my house TO explain whv he had ap-
pointed Mr.. Stanton without consulting
me his reason being that he supposed
Stanton to he a great friend Of mine.
| and that tbs appointment would natur-
ally be satisfactory. and that he feared
that if I had known it beforehand j:
would be said that I had dragoOned
him into il.
The more serious difficulties of nv po-
sitiOn began with Mr.. StantOn's accPs-
sion to the war office. It at once be-
| came very difficult to approach him,
even for the transaction of ordinary cur
rent business. and orr personal relations
at once ceased. The impatience of the
| Executive Immediately became extreme,
! and L CAP attribute it OIlv to the infiu-
ence of She lew secretary. who did manv
things to break up the free and conf
Dental intercourse that had heretofore
existed between the President and N.Y.
self. The government soon manifested
great impatience in regard to the open
! ing of the Baltimore 4 Ohio railroad
and the destruction of the Confederate
batteries on the Potomac. The first Oh
ject could be permanently attained only
by occupying the Shenandoah Valley
with force strong enough to resist any
| attack by the Confederate army then at
Manassas; the second only by a general
/ advance of the Army of the Potomac,
! driving the enemy back of the Rapidan.
/ NV own view was that The movement of
| the Army Of the Potomac from Urbanna
1 would accomplish both of these objects
( by forcing the enemy to abandon all his
| positions and fall back on Richmond. |
/ was therefore unwilling to interfere
| with this plan by premature advance,
! the effect of which must be either to
| commit us to the overland route or to
minimize the advantages of the Urban
ma movement l wished to hold the en-
| emY at Manassas to the last moment
! II possible until the advancement from
! UThanna had actually commenced. for
neither the reopening of the railroad
nor the destruction OF the batteries was
worth the danger involved.
sTANToN's UNAUTHORIZED ACTION.
The positive order of the President.
probably issued under the pressure the
Secretary of War, forced me to under
take the opening of the railway. For
this purpose went to Harper's Ferry.
| in February. intending to throw over a
I -
| To do this was necessary to have a reli-
able bridge across the Potomac-to en-
sure supplies and prompt reinforce
ments. The pOntoOn bridge, thrown as
a preliminary could not be absolutely
| trusted on river so liable TO heavy
treShetS therefore it was determined
to construct a canal boat bridge IL
was discovered. however, when the at
tempt was made, that the lift lock from
the canal to the river was too narrow
Cor the boats by some four or five inch
es, and | therefore decided To rebuild
the railroad bridge, and content myself
with occupying Charleston until its
completion, pOstpOning to the same time
the advance to Winchester. l had full
ly explained my intentions to the Pres
ideut and Secretary before leaving
Washington, providing for precise,y v
such contingency. While at Harper s
Ferry | learned that the President was
dissatisfied with my action, and on
reaching Washington | laid a full ex-
plauatiOn before the Secretary with
which he expressed himself entirely sat
isfisd, and told me that the President
was already so. and that it was uuueces.
sary for me to communicate with him
on the subject. 1 then proceeded with
the preparations necessary to force the
evacuation of the Potomac batteries. -
On the verv day appointed for the divis-
ion commanders 10 come to headquar-
ters to receive their final orders. the
President sent for me- | then learned
that he had received no explanation OF
the Harper'S Ferry affair, aud that the
Secretary was not author iZeu to make
thu statement already referred to; but
after my reprtItiOn of 1T, the President
hecAmr fully sat isfird with my course.
He then, however. said that there was
another. very ugly natter which he
| desired To talk ABOUT, and that WAS the
mo yement 10y the lower Chesapeake
H SAID that it had been suggested that
| | proposed this movement with the
"traitOTOus" purpose of leaving Wash
ingtOn uncovered and exposed to attack
] very promptly objected to the coupling
of any such adjectives with my pur
poses when he disclaimed any intention
of conveying the i0ea that he expressed
his own opinion, as be merely repeated
the suggestions of others. then ex.
planned the purpose and effect of forti-
flying Washing on. and, as l thought
removed his dpprehensions, but in formed
him that the division commanders were
to be at the headquarters that moI ming
and suggested that my plans should bt
laid before.them, that they might give
their opinion AS to whether the capita
would be endangered l also said tha,
in order to leave them perfectly untram
melled would not attend the meeting
Accordingly they met on the Stb o.
March and approved my plans
DEMORALIzING THE ARMY.