Alpena weekly argus. [volume] (Alpena, Mich.) 1871-1893, 1885-07-29
GRANT ON THE POTOMAC.
His 1rrivat in WashinD -GrdUe COntin-
Oencies and AnTieties.


Tho following recollections of Grant with
the Army Of the Potomac are narrated
by gentleman formerly attached TO the
headquarters of that army:
When Gen. Grant was raised TO the grade
of Lieutenant General, and appointed to
the command of all the armies of the United
States, he was called to Washington 10 confer
with the Government as TO the mode in
which the war should be further conducted.
Despite general confidence in the final sue
cess OF the national cause, there were con-
tngencies and nnXicties that President Lin
coin felt should be known to and shared by
the military leader in whom the hopes of the
country were now placed. Secretary Seward
had convincing reasons for knowing that the
danger of foreign Intervention had not passed
away, and that any serious check TO the Federal
arms might bring IL upon us so suddenly and
effectively as to completely turn the tide of
events. Secretary Chase was holding gloomy
views concerning the financial future, owing
TO the enormous and steadily growing cost of
the Federal ornaments. Secretary Stanton,
who never permitted himself to think of but
one end, had begun to doubt whether the
means TO that end would hold out in sufficient
measure and duration. President Lincoln
embodied in his own person the disquieting
knowledge and the fears of all his heads of
departments. Gen. Grant, away of in the
with Washington, and personally a stranger
to the members of the administration, had
| comparatively little knowledge of the gener-
| al situation, and was of that mental habit
that concentrates u mans thoughts upOn the
thing OF the moment.
IL needed the visit to Washington and con-
tact with the President and Cabinet to bear
| in upon him the supreme Importance, from
the standpoint of both domestic and foreign
politics, OF successfully assailing the army
of Lee aud the capital of the Confederacy.
| So long as both remained detanty almost
within the shadow of tho national capital
| victories in the West in large part failed of
! their proper immediate effect, and in truth
| served to quicken tho desperate efforts which
| Secretary Seward knew Emperor Napoleon
! to BE- making to gain material or at least
| moral support in Europe for an interven-
| ton. In the eyes of the administration Gen.
| Lees army was the Indispensable objective
point of any operation designed to affect
public opinion at home or abroad and hence
| the con .lusion that Gen. Grant should take
charge of the Army OF the Potomac, and
| conduct n movement against Richmond and
| the army under Lee.
| He went out to Gen. Meade s headquarters,
| and, as the result of Il prolonged conference
| with that commander, in which he gained
| some new views of u new situation, he 70
solved not to displace Meade, either by as
| Stunning the immediate command himself OF
by procuring the assignment of another 10
| the command. IL was characteristic of Grant
| that, having made up his mind on this i'm.
| portant matter, his decision was full and
| final. In spite OF assurances from friends al
| Washington, in the West, and in Meade's
| own army, that the removal of that officer
was little short of "a nccoss ty, he never en-
| tertancd the thought OF displacing him from
| first TO last; and so little did he interfere
| with the internal administration of the Army
| of the Potomac that he did not propose
| Sheridan for the command of the cavalry
| until he learned that Meade wished change,
| and although he repeatedly made known to
Meade his wish TO dispace Warren from the
command OF the Fifth Corps, he yielded 70
| the tenacity with which Meade chung to that
officer until sheridan took the matter into
his own hands in an emergency.
| Upon joining the Army of the Potomac,
| Gen. Grant established for himself u little
| camp four miles distant from the general
| headquarters, and here he received and list
enod TO such officers OF that army as chose to
| call upon him, but quietly kept of intrigue
| and INSTRUMENTATION, and this course he
| steadily pursued to tho close.
Before opening the campaign, he startled
the authorities at Washington by asking that
| Gen. Mcclellan might he restored to active
| duty, and became so urgent about it, taking
| such n high view of McClellan's military
abilities, that the President and Mr.. seward
| supported him, and even secretary Chase
| stood neutral. But the passionate and fiery
ALL and the Lieutenant General was firmly in
| formed that Gen. McClellen was an impossi
! biiity in any military situation. The Score
| tary of War was not so unytcding as to Gen
| Buell. but that stubborn soldier refused al
overturcs unless the injustice done him by
the War Department should be formally a
| well rs substantially expiatcd, and in thi
| pursuit of Il shadow lost his last chance Of
browning military career full of merit bu
also full of misfortune.
The earlier results of Gen. Grants Eastern
| campail N were we'll calculated TO cause hin
| to share the anxieties of those in power a
Washington, but when, on the very first day
| Lee doubled up the division of Ricketts, ant
threatened, for tho time being, to lead
| considerable part of the Army of tho Poto
mac to Ricomond In n manner unexpected
he was the one calm man of thousands-s'
stolidly calm as to mingle touch OF exae
peration with surprise In the minds OF by
ISLANDERS. And yet his calmncss was not o
the unreasoning kind, for he believed in tn
leadership and discipline of the troops IL
rear OF which he sat whiting the bark of
tree, and deemed shem equal to the repellinl
of the fierce assault and the reformation o
the broken line of battle, and his cool calcu
lation was I'm due course exemp'itlod. Evel
on that memorable June day when, for th
first time, the spirit seemed beaten out OF tn
Army of the Potomac by repeated and muir
derous assaults upon Petersburg, he calml
remarked to tho agonized Meade that havin
| uON pTONed lHlIObslDlilly VI Ndfiy Jug III
works 1t was useless to make further al
tcmpts.
Three things are essential to the prope
understanding of this remark: First, tina
the day be ore the arrival and assault tn
Federal scouts had reported that Lees arm
had not como up, and that there was les
than IL, 900 men In tho works; second, tina
the first assault had satisfied Meade that lie
was there i'm force, and that further attemp
TO storm the works was useless; third, tina
I'm consequence OF the failure of the assault
IL took ten months longer to effect the II
tended result mt time when Gen. Grant wa
being almost daily reminded from Washing
, ton that nothing was so important as TO br n
the war to n close at once. In fact, so urRen
was the necessity for discounting time tha
the exchange of prisoners was stopped, 1
hopes to bring the Confederacy to an end b
dearth of men to I'LL the Insurgent ranks.
, And now for the last "reminiscences fini
illustration of his straightforward character
. He did not like, either personally or pre-
fossionally, Gen. Butler, who was In con
mand of the Army of the James, and he ha
personal and professional liking for Ger
, Badly" Smith, who he'd n subordinat
command in that army; but when he hear
: that n scheme was Matching by which, will
out directly involving him, Gen. Butler wa
10 be relieved from service In the field an
ordered back to his headquarters at Fol
Monroe for routine duty, leaving Gen. Smit
: | In command OF the active troops. he s,
8 aside his personal and military prediction
2 and promptly sent Gen. Smith clear avs
0 from the army and never restored him
|. | favor