The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1885-03-22
THE CONFLICpIN ASIA.

There is still much talk about war be-
tween England and Russia, and the relations
of the two great Asiatic. powers are danger
ously strained. But England does not want
war and Russia is not ready for it. The
Cars treasury is virtually bankrupt. The
budget shows yearly deficit, and steady
borrowing and an increasing debt have been
the rule during all the years since the war
with Turkey. 1t becomes harder and harder
to place Russian loans, and the prospect OF
war would certainly not make borrowing
money an easier task.
But though Russia, bankrupt as she is,
could carry on war on formidable scale
wherever she could put forth her real
strength, as in Turkey, the conditions are
not yet favorable for her to attempt the long
arof has, it is true, pushed small advanced
force to within perhaps one hundred miles
of Herat. But this weak expedition could
neither be reinforced nor munitioned in case
of war. The Trans-Caspian Railway termi-
mates at Kizil Arvat, which is five hundred
miles from Herat. Now small expeditions
that can draw their supplies from the scanty
stores of their Turcoman subjects may create
vast amount of disquiet on the Afghan
frontier, and profound uneasiness in Calcutta
on large scale could not be carried on with
the railway base beyond five hundred miles
of desert is evident to every soldier.
We may therefore assume that II is not
vet the intention of the Russian government
to bring on the long-prepared-for conflict
for the empire of the East. The result of a
duel with England at the present time would
be disastrous to Russia. The supremacy on
the seas permits the power possessing 1t to
select the theatre of operations, and Russia
has several vulnerable points, especially on
the Pacific, where the great arsenal and sea-
port, Vladivostock, might fall to British
fleet.
As for the invasion of India that must be
reserved by the czars for far-distant day.
At present England would have greatly the
advantage in war with Russia carried on
in Afghanistan. The Aighans, II we'll paid
would no doubt prove trustworthy allies,
while the Indian regiments would all be
available and could be indefinitely recruited.
The conditions which would make a Rus
sian advance upon India promising enter
prise are as yet all wanting. They are,
first. the extension of the railway to Sarakhs
or beyond second, the organization and dis
e. Al, trfh 4 hate tha,
could supply a part Of the invading army,
and .hird, a substantial revolt against Brit
Ssh influence among the Afghans or Hindoos
or both.
But in considering this question II should
be remembered that Russia needs many
pieces of territory nearer home more than
she does India. Indeed, Hindostan must for
many decades to come lie far out OF the
natural lines of expansion OF the great
Northern empire. Ethnologically as well al
territorially Russia's first desire is to Absorb
her kinsInen, the Southern Slavs, and to be
come Mediterranean power by taking
Constantinople. The Central Asian pawni
are moved simply TO check England's in
fiuence IN Europe and her power TO interfere
with Russian designs on the Bosphorus
For Turkey is always the great stake IL
the Russian game. Besides this, Persia anC
Armsnia are reyenue-producing provinces
and, next TO European Turkey, the first ao
auisitions Russia would naturally maxi
southward. Indeed, she cannot safely ad
vance toward India without reducing to vas
salage or absorbing Persia, for her elongated
route lies for over 1000 miles close aloni
the shah's frontier. II may therefore fairl,
be suIlnised that the Russian advance TO
ward Herat has no more serious object thar
20 keep the British occupied in that quartz
and have the means for diversion read,
whenever the time IL ripe for reopening o
the Eastern question.