St. Landry democrat., 1885-02-28
m1sinformation About Egypt.
N. O. Pieayune.


The general excitement over the fall
of the gallant Gen. Gordon and the
British movements in Egypt has drawn
from the press of the United States, IN
connection with deserved praise OF the
English, q vast amount OF mlslntGrma-
| ton. It is not surprising that villages,
armies and even battles should be
wrongly located, but there is less ex-
cuse for Misrepresentation OF events
which have been chronicled IN the
press as they occurred during the prog
ress of the troubles.
We cannot undertake to correct a
| tithe of the errors, but few which re-
| feet injustice should be noted.
1t is not true that the Soudan troub-
les succeeded the overthrow and cap
ture of Arab. The mission of ElMahdi
began eighteen months before Iel-el-
Kebir. It is not impossible that Arab
had some idea of what was going on
but even that connection Is surmlse.
The troubles really followed the retire.
ment OF Gen. Gordon from the post OF
Governor General. His just and Glenn
ent rule was not maintained by the sue
ceeding administration as we'll as 1t
should have been, while his vigorous
hand was no longer on the sword which
kept down the slave-traders.
1t is not true that England occupied
military posts in the Sondan for the
protection of commerce. 1t was Egypt
The Egyptian garrisons in the SOndan
numbered more than 44,000 men. They
have nearly all been massacred.
1t is true that when Gladstone deter
mined to withdraw, Gordon denounced
that policy SO did Baker, and every
other competant military critic who
personally knew what he was talking
about. 1t is true that Gordon hoped to
pacify the country, but there is no war
rant for the assertion that he was a
volunteer. He was Major General
in the British service, bound to go
wherever required. He was about to
start for the Congo, as cOmmander-1n-
chief of the military forces OF the
African international Association, when
suddenly summoned to go to Egypt.
He was dispatched from England Jan.
IS, 1884, accompanied by Col. Stewart.
His instructions were to report to the
British Government on the military 81
tuation in the Soudan, and on the meas
ures which it might be advisable to
take for the security of the Egyptian
garrisons still holding positions in that
country (the reader should remember
butchering nearly three years already,
and for the safety of the European
population in KhartOum and, further,
upon the best mode of efecting the
evacuation of the interior of the Sou
dan, and upon the manner in which the
safety and good administration by the
Egyptian Government of the ports on
the sea- coast could best be secured.
He was in addition, authorized and in
structed to perform such other duties
as the Egyptian Government might de-
sire to intrust to him, and as might be
communicated to him by Sir E. Barring.
We have been at pains to state these
particulars clearly, both that it may be
seen how the British Government left
entire responsibility for everything to
the khedival administration, and also
that it may be seen that Gordon has
fulfilled his orders to the very letter
neither more nor less.
1t was in accordance with the discre-
ton committed to the Egyptian Gov
ernment, and more especially to Barring
himself, that Gordon and Stewart were
sent to Khartoum. We ought to add
that Gordon was originally selected in
respOnse to request from the 'Egyp-
tian Government that a British officer
StlOuIu UG SOISCGtu W ~ IU hudEbOuuIt
instead of the Egyptian Minister of
War, for the purpose of arranging the
withdrawal of the garrison of that
place it was stated that such officer
would be given full powers, both civil
and military, to conduct the retreat,
and Barring expressed to Granville the
opinion that Gordon would be the best
man for the purpose.
The Egyptian Government gave Cor
don full discretionary power to retain
the troops for such reasonable period
as he might think necessary, in order
that the abandonment of the country
might be accomplished with the least
possible risk to life and property.
Gordon began the evacuation vigor-
ously; but his communications were
soon cut by the insurgents. This eva
cuation was not a mere retreat of sol
diers; it involved getting out of the
vast region the civilian officials and
employees, and their families, and those
OF military officers and soldiers, and
was an affair of time.
Many minor ISLANDERS are afoat, such
as the sneering way of referring to
Gordon's dispatch stating that he could
hold out for years. That dispatch was
undoubtedly written for the special
benefit of the insurgents. Nor is it
even now certain that Gordon could
not have held out, if there had been no
treachery.
The financial distress in this section