The Indianapolis journal., 1885-05-23

III. O'Clock at night on sundays, holl-
days and election days, but al
lows it to be sold at all other
hours from A. n. until III p. NJ Of those days.
That the statute was never meant to produce
such result is clear, and it requires no more
than reasonable construction of the language
employed to avoid that result It is not doing
violence to the language of the statute to hold
that the clause quoted is an interdiction of all
sales between the hours designated, and, cer-
tainly, 1t is but carrying into effect the intention
of the Legislature to thus hold We are bound
to look to the purpose of the statute, to the ne
cessity of its enactment, and the effect it was
intended to accomplish. Looking to these con-
siderations we cannot be in doubt as to the
Legislatures intention, and, giving to language
its usual effect and meaning, cannot doubt that
this intention is we'll and fully expressed.
The statute must have reasonable construction,
and a reasonable construction will make the
clause between the hours OF IL P. NJ. and 5 A.
NJ. mean the period intervening between IL,
night, and 5, morning of the succeeding day.
Courts judicially know the meaning of the
authorizations employed, and know, also. the
usual method of reckoning time. Judicial
knowledge is by no means so limited as counsels
theory assumes. Courts do take notice of mat
ters of general knowledge, and it certainly is a
matter of general knowledge that the usual
method of reckoning time is to follow the hours
as they move forward, and to so complete the
one Time is not reckoned backward,
nor is it divided into separate and
fragmentary parts, unless there is something
indicating that the ordinary method is not to be
pursued The consecutive hours, reckoning
forward in the usual and natural way are from
IL o'clock post meridian until o'clock ante
meridian, and this period necessarily begins in
the night and terminates in the morning. We
can not do otherwise than hold that the Leg
islature employed the language found in the
statute in its ordinary signifcation, and when
this Specification is given it, there is no uncer-
tainty nor indeed obscurity.
What the statue prohibits under the penalty
of fine and Imprisonment, is unlawful.
should, in express words declare an act to be
unlawful; it is enough if it prohibits it under
penalty Scarcely one among all the statutes
defining felonies expressly declares the act for
hidden to be unlawful, and one has ever
thought of questioning the validity of con-
victions under them, nor; for that matter, has
any one until now ever questioned the validity
of the section Of the statute under immediate
discussion, so far as it defines the offense of
selling on Sundays, election days and holidays
It's validity has, in scores of cases. passed un-
challenged by court and counsel.
1t has been said many times by all the courts
of the land that statutes shall not he Overthrown
upon the ground that they are unconstitutional
or uncertain unless there is no doubt of their
infirmity. Legislative enactments are not to be
lightly dsregarded; it is only in clear cases that
courts will declare them invalid 1t is always with
reluctance that courts strike down an enactment
VI ehO la -iudhiHS pOWoI, lOT any CduSo. no
reasons for this rule are so obvious and have
been so often stated that it is unnecessary to
peat them. 1t is not at all difficult to sustain
the present statute. No can be at loss to
ascertain its meaning, nor can any
one be misled by it's provisions.
1t regulates the retail liquor traffic,
and one of the regulations is that there shall
be no sale of intoxicating liquors between the
hours of IL P. NJ and A. NJ. The violation of
this provision is an offense, and no one who can
understand the force of language can be put to
doubt. nor can anyone be misled or entrapped.
1t is sufficient if an offense is so defined as to
convey to person of ordinary intelligence an
adequate description of the evil intended to be
prohibited, and it is sufficient if this intention is
expressed in ordinary language without technical
accuracy. MIR. Bishop says: 1.-THE language of
statutes is, in the greater part, not
technical. in either sense above ex-
planned but popular; to be understood
therefore in its common, popular meaning" The
language used in the statute before us. taken in
its popular meaning, describes an offense, and
so describes it that there can be neither obscur-
ity nor confusion. The principle which here ap-
plies has been repeatedly declared and enforced
by this court. In several of the cases the
phraseology of the statute was substantially the
same as that in the one now before US, and it
was held that the offensa was we'll defined. The
resemblance between the statutes acted upon in
the State VS.. Craig and Evans VS.. State is very
Close and the principle which those cases estab-
lish rules the present
The trial court did not err in overruling the
motion to Quash, and the judgment is therefore
affirmed.