The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1885-10-29
~ her money an she marries me TO my
blood. --Neto York Times.
Grants Military Ability.

Grants Military Ability.
Gen. Grant was created for great
emergencies. 1t was the magnitude of
the task that called forth the powers
by which he mastered it. In ordinary
matters he was an ordinary man; in
momentous affairs he became a giant.
When performing the routine duties
Of frontier camp there was no act to
make him conspicuous above his fellow
officers, but when he welded corps and
armies the great qualities of the COM
mander flashed forth, and his master
strokes of genius placed him at once in
the front rank of the worlds great cap
tains.
When he hauled wood from his little
farm and sold it in st. Louis, with all
his industry he did not drive as advan-
tageous bargains or make as good O
living as most of the farmers about him;
but when he came to cope with the
trained diplomatists of Europe in con-
Quoting the intricate negotiations which
resulted in forcing satisfactory settle
ment of the Alabama claims, he put
forth abilities which showed from the
start that the matter was in the hands
of master. When conducting the
business of his store in Galena his finan-
ciering was hardly equal to that of the
average country merchant, but when a
message was to be sent to Congress that
would puncture the fallacies of the in
fationists and throttle by q veto the at
tempts of unwise men to cripple the
finances of the nation, state paper
was produced which commanded the
admiration of every believer in sound
currency. He could collect for the ma
ton fifteen millions from Great Britain; ;
he could not protect his own personal
savings from the miscreants who lately
robbed him in New York.
| His methods in warfare all bore the
stamp of originality and ingenuity. His
success depended upon his powers of
fact that he has been compared at times
to nearly all the great commanders Of
history is the best proof that he was like
none of them. He saw that the art OF
war as practiced in Europe, with its
open country, macadamized highways,
and densely populated States would not
answer for America, with its dense for
ests, impenetrable swamps, difficult riv-
ers, mud roads, and sparse population.
He found the necessity of devising an
American system of warfare applicable
to the conditions surrounding him, and,
while it had been part of his education
! to study the instructive lessons derived
| from the great European campaigns,
yet he never wasted time in trying to fit
a European square peg into an American
round hole.
The Importance of celebrity in action
was always uppermost In his mind.
There was a spur in the heel of every
order sent. No one could feed fight"
more rapidly-that is, rush fresh troops
promptly to the spot where they were
needed. Every point gained was tena-
ciously held, and the enemy never re-
captured an important position which
had once been wrested from him.
The combinations and movements of
the several great armies of the Union
during the last year of the war were on
a scale never before or since at
tempted. Over half million of men
were in the field in commands sep
arated by more than thousand miles,
and all moving under the guiding
hand of their chief: Meade maneuvering
around Petersburg, Ord hanging onto
Richmond, Sheridan galloping through
the Valley of Virginia, Sherman cut
ting the Confederacy in two, Candy
Selling the strongholds on the Gulf,
Thomas crushing Hood in Tennessee,
armies defending the Mississippi and
resisting raids in Missouri. When
communication was open, daily reports
came into the chief, who sat in his little
hut quietly smoking his cigar, study
ing the maps, and sending out instruc-
tions to all points Of the compass. His
self-reliance in the field was perhaps
his most characteristic trait. He never
convened formal councils of war, though
he always consulted and advised with
his officers, whose opinions never failed
TO have with him the weight to which
they were entitled. He manifested no
pride of opinion, but in q campaign he
felt that the person who had to shout
der the responsibility ought to decide
the movement. One of his objections
to council of war was that there would
naturally be some officers who would
oppose his plans, and in urging their
objections and finding arguments with
which to fortify the position they had
taken, they would reach q frame of
mind which, in case they were over
ruled, might make them lukewarm in
executing the movement.
General Sherman once made q very
fair criticism when he said, in his
graphic way, and with his crisp style
of expression: Grant always seemed
pretty certain to win when he went into
a fight with anything like equal num-
bers. believe one great reason why
he was so much more successful than
others was that while they were think
ing so much about what the enemy was
going to do, Grant was thinking all
the time what he was going to do him
self. Gen. Horace Porter, an Har-
per's Magazine.