New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1885-12-02

hattie of Belmont came near proving disaster
after the Rebel camp had been actually won;
At this point they became demoralized IRON
their victory aud failed to reap It's tuli rev W.
The enemy had been followed SO closely that when
he reached the clear ground upon winch nus CAM
had been pitched. he beat nasty retreat INe W.. ODD
river hank which protected HIM from our shots arc
from view Ibis pTecIpitate retreat at the last ho
ment enabled the National forces 10 PICK IheiI way
without hindTance through the aDaIls-lhe OH a. a.
tiicial defence the enemy had. me HCmeuu VI,
camp was reached our men LAID down thelr an.
and commenced rummagIng the tents 10 plCk VI
trophies. Some of the higher OnoeIs MeIo f
one cluster of men to another, and at every uit o
livered short eulogy upon the OnnoIn
cause aud the achievements OF the collii'laiH t ~
All this time the troops we had been engaged WIN
for four hours lay crOuched under cover OF tne
river bank ready to come up ana surrender II sum,
moned to do SO; but finding that tney WeID mo1
nursued they worked their way mp the river anu
came ND on the bank between us ana our Trans
ports / saw at the same time time TWO steamer
coming from the Columbus side toward the Wesl
shore above us, black-or gray with soldiers lioun
hmIer deck 10 roof. Some of my men were en-
Gagged ID firing from captured guns AT empty steam
ers down the river, out of range, cheering at every
shot 7 tried 10 get them TO turn their guns upon
The loaded steamers above and not so lar away.
NV efforts were III vain. Al last directed my
staff officers TO set tire to the camps. inns drew
+he fire of the enenys guns located on the heights
of Columbus. They had abstained from hrng pc
fore, probably because they were AFRAID Oh hiLllni
their own men; or they may have supposed, untl
the camD was on fire, that II was sun In Inc possess
sion of their friends. About this tlme too, the men
we had driven over the ban K were seen III line up
the river between us and our transports. / ne
alarm surrounded was given. The guns OF Inc
enemy and the report of being surrounded, br0ugnt
officers aud men completely under control. AZ
Grst some of the officers seemed to think that 10 De
surrounded meant TO be placed ID hopeless POSI-
ton W here there was nothing TO do but surrender
Bnt when announced that we had cut our way III
and could cut our way out jus az well, It seemed
new revelation to officers and soldiers lhey Ormel
nne rapidly aud we started back to our boats WIN
the men depoyed rs skITmshers as tncy had ppcu
on entering the camp. ne enemy was SOON Ci-
couutered but his resistance this time was lccDe'
Again the CoufedcTates sought shelter undcr tht
river banks We could not stop, however, 10 pick
them M because the troops we had seen crossing
the river had deblrkcd by this time and were
nearer our transports than we were. 1t would he
prudent 10 get them behind US; but we were moi
again mOlc5ted on our way 10 the DOalS'
While at Cairo Grant had many opportunities OF
meeting Confederate officers under flag Of truce
Some of them he had known at West Point or IN
Nexico Seeing them now under such different
conditions led him to reflect upon the great
advantage which the South had over the North at
the beginning of the rebellion. and he makes some
very acute and novel remarks upon army orgahIa-
ton which harmonic perfectly with his strong
recollection for volunteers as fighting material
The south had not a majority OF The educated
officer, of the army at the outbreak of the war; but
they had as many rs thirty or forty per coat and o.
they had no standing troops these trained soldier
had 10 be distributed through the whole body Of
volunteers. IL leayencd the entire mass.
The North had greater number OF cduca'
ted aud trained soldiers bui TIE bnlh 9i
Them were still IN the army ANA WtIc retained,
generally with their old commands and rtuh unill
the war had lasted many month~. In the Amy 3i
the Potomac here wa- what was known as il'
Regular Brigade IN winch, from the command
Ing officer down 10 the Youngest second llcut'n. MT
every was educrtcd 10 his profession 80, too
with many OF tl" bItiou all thc officers. EcncI-
ally four IN number /" cach' were men tbu
Gated for their profession some of thr~.
went into battle az the be inning under
division commanders who were entirely Win
ont military training. This state of affair
pavr me am ldel winch expressed while go Caro-
that tlc Government ought TO dsbaud ihc regular
army. with 'ht exception of toe stan corp, aH0
notify the dI,baudcd officer, That t"c{ would re-
cciVc mo- compensation while the war lasted cAcrP
as Volunteers. Ihe register should nr hrtt uP' hn'
the names Of al officers who were nor ~ thr N'uh
t,cr service m the close should b" stricken from d.
Grant had given proof enough of lis quality bJ
thu, time 90 enable any competent SUPERIOR {.
discern tnat he was not one of the common ruu 0
BrgaIiers bat lilllerk. who assumed command o.
the department just after the battle OF Belmont
was phenomenally obtusc lIe seems % have
conceived toward Grant from the start dis.ru,
and dislike which nothing could ever overcome
Grant had early di-ccrncd the importance OF {"
Tennessee and Cumberland rivers rs the true lnr o
Federal operations; and in the course of % recon
Nuisance which ne Was instructed 10 make as
diversion m favor OF Buelrs campaign agaiuF
Euckncr h. satisfied himself of the feasibility o.
his plan lie asked permission 20 go 70 s. Lour
and lay the scheme before Halclk personally
The leave was granted, but not gracously
had known General iIalleck but very dignity D.
the old army. not having mct him either ut West
Point or during the Mexican war. / WAS received
with 80 little cordially tuat perhaps stated tie
.t..t % l.... t.I. tftlt
/ have, done and had not uttered many sentence.
before / was cut short "a, II my pau wa prcpo,
ferrous, | returned 10 Cairo very much crest
! fallen.
| Flar-OGicer Footc commanded the little fleet al
! guunoats then ia the nclghborhpJd OF Caro- and
/ though M another branch OF the service, was
| subject to the command of General Ndllcch. n,
/ and consulted freely upon military matters and
| he agreed with me perfectly ~ 10 the feasibility
| of the campaign mp the tennessee. Notwthstaud
/ luC the rebui had received from M immediate
chief / therefore on the 2sth of January. renewed
/ the suggestion bv telegraph that " If perm tied
! could take and hold Fort Henry on the tennessee.
| This time / was backed by Flag-Oniccr Fooic. wn'
! sent a similar dispatch. On the 23th Wrut,
! fully in support of the proposition. ON the 1T u
/ Februry received full instructions from Depart
| mcut headquarters 10 move upon Fort Henry. Oh
/ the ID the expedition started.
! Fort Henry fell even more promptly than Gran
! had anticipated and haste was now OF the utmos
consequence in attacking Fort Donclson before TN
| enemy could reinforce it. IIalleck neithc
| approved nor disapproved. Ic loft Grant to him
! self. sending him, however. characteristic ordc
! to fortify Fort Henry strongly. particularly OF
! the land side" and forwarding with the order "a lo
Of intrenching toos Grant was already "a
! DoncsOn
| On the 9TH. the day after the fail Of Fort Henry
took NV staff and the cavalry part Of one rcgi
! ment-apd made . reconnaissance to within about .
mile of the outer INC of works at DOnclSOn. ] ha,
known General Pillow IN Mexico. and Judged thai
with any force, no matter how small, could marci
! M TO within gunshOt OF any mtrenchmcnts he wa,
gwen to hold SAID this 10 the officers of nv staf
! al the time. knew That Floyd was IN command
but he was 10 soldier, and judged that hc would
! weld 10 Pillows prctensons met, as expected
no opposition IN making the reconnaissance
After tho naval attack upon Donelson, in which
the gunboats were disabled and Flag officer Foot,
severely wounded Grant was in conference Will
FDote on board the dag ship when the Confcderate