National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1885-06-25
ANTE-nrLIuM rREAsoN.
Tho Manner in which tho souther

Tho Manner In Which tho southern
Leaders Crippled the Nations Navy.
When Mr.. Tousey handed over the Navy |
Department TO Mr.. Wellest was in a rather
demorallzed condition. Southern officers |
were rcsigning right and left. Officers OF |
the bureau even were talking Of going with
their states, and there was a want of conn-
dence in all quarters. When men who had
held the highest aud most influential posi-
tions In the navy came forward and offered
their designations there was apparently no
one upon whom the Secretary could rely
distrust seemed TO pervade every branch Of
the naval service. No cOmmandercOuld.b he
sure who would be faithful TO the flag, and
the Secretary Of the Navy could not be GER
tain Of southern men being true TO the
government. II was bad state OF affairs
for the Secretary to begin his administra-
tion with, but the eventful year of lS6l-'63
will show that the operations and achieve
ments Of the navy were such that great
credit was reflected not only upon the de
pnrtment, but upon the personnel OF the
service, which so eignally aided the depart
mcut in carrying out the measures tend
ing so greatly to cripple the confederate
cause.
Some there were, who, rebels at heart aud
purpose, held for several years previous TO
The war high positions In the administration
preceding that OF Mr.. Lincoln, and had
done all they could to dispose of the navy
so that II could not be used in event Of
trouble between the north and the south.
The object was TO destroy all its resources,
TO cripple the navy yards, dismantle the
ships, or have them on distant stations, SO
as TO render II impossible for the navy TO
| strike an offensive blow, or, II possible, to
throw the ships and yards into the hands OF
| the secessionists.
II may be supposed by those unfamiliar
| with the events OF the times that the rebel
| lion was the result of measures forced upon
the south Just previous to the election Of
| Abraham Lincoln, and that In his election
| they saw the death blow TO the hopes they
| had cherished OF extending slavery into new
states and territories. If any one supposes
| that the rebellion was an impulsive measure
| let him dismiss such an idea, for l was told
| by southern senator in 1860 that as lar
| back as 1865, when the Colorado class OF
ships were built, he and others had voted to
| have them and all other vessels built of
such size and such draft OF water that
they could not enter any southern ports;
so IL seems that the thought OF secession
had been maturing for years, and while
southern statesmen were apparently urging
the building of large vessels instead OF
small ones on the grounds that the dignity
OF the nation called for these cumbersome
structures, II was really for the purpose of
crippling the government In case the south
EN- states should secede. Had our navy
ut that time consisted or some thirty small
| gunboats or q dozen monitors, the rebellion
would have been unable to raise its head.
Yet with all the experience we have had
before us we are at the present time in a
worse condition than we were on the break
| ing out Of the rebellion.
When President Lincoln entered upon
the duties Of his Office his position toward
Virginia differed somewhat from that which
lie assumed toward the states further south
twas deemed desirable that the government
should do nothing to wound the sensitive
feelings Of the Nirginiaus, and Gen. Scott,
the gCucTal-in-Chicf Of the army, was par
ticularly solicitous that the government
should give the state of Virginia no excuse
to seccde, There were several reasons for
this extra tenderness toward Virginia; one
OF the principle navy yards, filed with
southern officers, was within the limits OF
the state. The commanding officer, Com
mudOrc McCauley, was considered loyal,
and lad In his day stood high In the service,
but he was now old, and at a time when he
should have maintained his seli-possession
he appeared to have completely lost his
head.
Tho Secretary Of the Navy, Mr. Welles,
knew very little Of the condition of affairs
In his department. His position was a diff
cult one for man advanced In years, for
the duties were complicated, and such as
only an expert could be expected to
fathom. Mr.. Welles was surrounded with
officers and clerks whose loyalty was
doubted, and one bureau of the department
In particular, presided over by an officer OF
southern birth and OF national reputation,
was the headquarters Of naval officers who
were plotting the downfall OF the country
TO which they owed their position aud what
ever Importance they possessed
A short time before Fort Sumter was
fired upon the commandant of the Wash
ington navy yard gave large party at his
quarters on the occasion Of the marriage OF
his daughter, to which the President and
his Cabinet were invited. A number of
dislOyal naval officers were present, and the
house was everywhere festooned with the
American flag, even to the bridal bed. Yet,
just after Sumter was fired on, this com.
mandant, with most Of those under his
command Qncluding his new son-in-law),
resigned their commissions and left the
Washington navy yard to take care of itself
AT that very time the secession OF Virginia
had been resolved upon, which was known
to these disloyal officers, although not to
the government, for the action OF the seces-
sionists had been delayed and kept secret
so that the blow would be more decisive
and enable the conspiritors to seize the
| ,.,,II 40,