The Baltimore County union. [volume] (Towsontown, Md.) 1865-1909, 1885-02-21
THE WILLIAMS CASE.
The Judges who Dissented-Full Text Of
the Opinion of Justices Miller and Rob-
inson-Reasons Why the Deed
Should Have Been Declared
Good-The Arguments.

SAO OPlulOn Oh JuSClCe6 nnllI0T dAO ISOO-
| inson-Reasons Why the Deed
Should Have Been Declared
Good-The Arguments.
| The following is the full text of the opinion of
Judges Miller and Robinson, who dissent from the
opinion of the majority of the Court of Appeals,
in the of George H. Williams against Ernault
| II. Williams:
| Court of Appeals of Maryland, October Term,
| lS84.-George II. Williams vs. Ernault II. Will
| liams. Dissenting opinion of Miller, j., con-
| Cured in by Robinson, j.
| The object of the bill in this case is to vacate
and annul deed executed by the complainant,
Ernault H. Williams, to his father George Hawk
| ms Williams, the defendant.
This deed, which is dated the 31st of May, 1882,
is very brief and plain. By it the grantor, in con-
sideration of the sum of one dollar, and other
| good causes and considerations him thereunto
| moving, conveys all his estate and property of
every sort and description to the grantee in trust
to receive and collect the rents, issues and profits
thereof and therefrom, to pay over to the grantor
the sum of 81, 900 per annum, and no more, during
his natural life, and to invest and reinvest the
surplus if any, as to the trustee may seem most
advantageous, and them an further trust to convey
the said property and estate, on the death of the
grantor to the right heirs of the grantor living at
the time of his death. 1t also contains irrevo-
cable power of attorney to the trustee to do and
perform all and everything in regard to said prop
erty which the grantor might or could have done
if this deed had not been executed and it further
stipulates that the trustee shall have full power and
authority to increase said annual allowance to the
grantor if it shall seem proper to the trustee at
any time hereafter so to do and that the trustee
shall have power to appoint by any instrument in
the nature of will the person who shall succeed
him in this trust.
At the date of this deed the complainant was
about twenty-five years of age, and unmarried,
though it appears he was engaged, and the mar
riage was to have taken place short time there
| after. The property conveyed, real and personal
| amounted, so far the testimony discloses, to
something $500, 10000, most of which the COM
painant derived under the will of his grandfather,
the late John S. Cuttings, who died in December,
1879, leaving his will, which was executed in Sep
TENDER, 1864. The principal benefciaries under
this will were the testator's nine grandchildren,
seven of whom, including the complainant were
the children of his daughter, Eleanor A. Williams,
and her husband, the defendant, and the othertwo
| the children of deceased son. Mrs. Williams
died in May, 1881, after the death of her father,
and in the year the defendant was, by decree
of court of equity, appointed in her place sole
trustee under the will of Mr.. Cuttings the trust
being to receive and pay over the income of his
estate to the declared by his WILL until his
grandchildren should respectively attain the age
of thirty years. it being his will that none of his
grandchildren should have control of the principal
age 1t thus appears that the grantee in this deed
was only the father of the grantor, but at the
| time of its execution, and for some time before,
the relation of trustee and cestui que trust, in re-
spect to the greater part of the property conveyed
| by it, existed between them. 1t is also insisted
they occupied the relation of attorney and client,
but of this there is no sufficient proof. The rea-
TONS however, of parent and child and trustee and
cestui qe trust did undoubtedly exist, and it has
been earnestly argued that this fact draws the deed
within the familiar principle of equity in refer
ence to transactions between parties standing in
fduciary relations. Lord Penzance has stated this
equitable doctrine thus: SIN equity, persons
standing in certain relations to one another, such
as parent and child, man and wife, doctor and pa
tient attorney and client, confessor and pentent,
guardian and ward, are subject to certain pre-
sumptions when transactions between them are
brought in question and if gift or contract made
in faror of him who holds the position of influence
is impeached by him who is subject to that infu-
ence, the courts of equity cast upon the former
the burthen of proving that the transaction was
fairly conducted as if between strangers that the
weaker was not unduly impressed by the natural
influence of the stronger, or the inexperience
overreached by him of more mature intelligence"
TLow Rep. Prob. Dc DiU 462. Profit Us. LaOless.]
1t has been often said that this is salutary doc
trine and the tendency of the recent decisions,
no doubt, is to extend its application to all the
variety of relations in which dominion may be ex-
ercised by one person over another, and to every
transaction whereby he who possesses heinfuence
receives any pecuniary benefit from him who is
subject to the influence. The cases in this state
are to the effect that gift obtained where a con-
fdential relation exists, is prima facie void, and
the burden is on the donee to establish to the full
satisfaction of the court that it was the Free vol
untary and unbiased act of the donor. Gil, So,
Brooks Us. Berry; 81 Md. 33S, HghJerger Us. Stof-
fer; SO Md. 1SS, Grove u.s. Todd; 81 Md. 467, Paire
&c Et,.yI 1
But it would seem to be clear that there must be
some gift, or conveyance or some bargain, pur-
i~chase or other business transaction, by means OF
which the party holding the position of influence
acquires property or obtains some pecuniary ad-
vantage benefit, in order to bring this equitable
rule into operation. Itcannot in reason be appica
BILE where the deed simply settles the estate and
property of the grantor upon himself for life, and
after his death transmits it to his heirs at aW
If a party capable Of disposing of his property
chooses, for the purpose of protecting it from his
own improvidence or for any other reason, thus to
setleit why should court of equity look with sus-
pciou upon the transaction simply because he has
made his father or his solicitor the trustee in the
deed of settlement? In all the numerous instances
in which the doctrine has been applied no case can
be found where such a conveyance has been held
to be prima facie void The authorities are all re-
viewed in the elaborate notes to the leading case
of Huguenin Us. Baseley, in White d. Tudor's
Lead. Case in Equity l ,l56, and not one OF them
has gone to the extent of determining that such a
deed stands under prima fdcie condemnation. On
the contrary many cases are there cited in which
such settlements are regarded in a very different
light. Many of the English decisions on the sub
iect are reviewed by the Muster Gf the Rolls in
| Hoqhton rs. Hoghton, Is Beau. 27S, and the rule
drawn from them is that if the settlement of the
property be one in which the father acquires no
benefit not already possessed by him, and if it be
| reasonable and proper one, the court will sup
port it, even though it may appear that some IN
fuence was exerted by him to induce the son to
execute it, provided there was no suppression OF
what was true suggestion of what was false;
and among the cases there cited was that OF Ten
drill u.s. Smith, 2 Atk. SO, in which Lord Hardoicke
stated the proposition broadly that "where father
and child of full age come to an agreement to
alter the limitations under settlement, there is
no ground of equity for the child to set aside such
agreement under pretence of being drawn into 1t
| by the power and authority of the father and to
| restore the ancient limitations again" And he
referred to a case in Lord Co,oper's time, where
father prevailed upon son who was tenant in tail
under settlement, to take estate for life only,
| with remainder to his first and every other son,
and his Lordship would not set it aside upon the
suggestion of the fathers having an undue in
fuence over him. In these cases it did not appear
that the father acquired any advantages under
the settlements In Jenner Us. Jenner, 2 lie Geo.
Fisher Dc Jones' $50, where by the settlement the
son became only tenant for life instead OF remain
ing tenant in tail, but where the father derived no
personal advantage from it, the decision was to
the same effect. In Phillips Us. Mullings Lao
| Rep. Oh. appeals 244, young man OF IMPROVE
dent habits being entitled to sum of money, was
induced by the trustee fthe money and by solicit
| tor to execute settlement by which he assigned
part of the money to trustees, in trust, to invest
and pay to him during his life the income or such
part thereof as they should think fit and after his
death in trust to hold the same for his wife and
children, if any, and subject thereto, in trust, for
certain cousins of his. He had no power of ap
pointment in default of issue, and power of rev.
| ocation, and no power to appoint new trustees.
The deed was explained to him, and the particu-
lar clauses were brought to his notice; and it was
held the deed could not be set aside by the settler
Among the cases in this country on the same sub
ect is that of Hildreh Eliot Pick 293, where
o daughter about to be married conveyed real and
personal estate to her father in trust for her sep
arate use, with power of leasing and investing,
and to pay over to her during her life the rents
and income, and also such portion the principal
| as he should judge necessary for her convenience
| and support, or to such person as she should in
writing appoint, and after her death to convey