New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1885-11-24
THE CAPE SABINE DISASTER
WHO WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR IT.

proceedings of the court-martal convened LOT the
trial of General Hazcn charges preferred oy
Secretary Lincoln. The appendix includes al 'no
important letters, statistics and documentary evil
dence mon which General Hazen and his couhsel
have grounded their charge that the Secretary
was personally res ponslble for tho disas-
fer to the Lady Franklin Bay Expo
dition. The introduction to tho volume, when Is
furnished by Judge Mackey, is the only portion
that requires critical attention, since clearly ana
succinctly presents the argument for the defence
before the court-martia and makes full use of the
evidence upon which this serious charge against
Secretary Lincoln was based. We have read TINS
chapter with pdnstaking care and while we are
not convinced that the Secretary is justly 10 De
held responsible for that disaster, must admit that
Judge Mackey has made an adroit use of the tech
meal facts at his disposal and established pflun"
facie case that deserves critical consideration.
Judce Mackey's proposition Is that tho fate of the
expedition was due IN the first instance 10 ylo-
lation of orders on the part of one officer ana IN
the last to the untilnely action of another whose
personal auimosity to the Chief Signal O1hcer
blinded HIM TO the requirements of great public
trust and led HIM to disregard the supreme
exigency, the one critical moment. upon winch
hung the fate of brave men who were acting
in the line of their duty" He con-
tends that while derelIctions of duty on
the part of Lieutenant Darlington and Commander
Wildes made the disaster probable secretary
Lincoln on September 10, 1888 held in his hands
the balance of life and death for Greedy and MS
men, and decided every chance against them' Inns
he considers q proposition that is morally certain
and as convincingly demonstrate as any fact
which depends for proof on an unbToken chaln Oh
eircumstantial evidence"
The chief link in this chain is the fact that Sec
rotary Lincoln decided against attempting to res
cue the expedition in the autumn Of 1883
General Hazen strongly and persistentIy recon-
mended the immediate organization OF new reAeI
expedition. Engineer Melville had also urged that
q vessel should be sent at once from ST. johns 10
Cape Athol or Cape York, whence a rescue party
could return to LittletOn Island with boats tents
and supplies. These proposals Secretary Lincoln
rejected, and recalling Garlingtons party from st.
Johns decided that 1t was too late in the season to
effect a rescue. Judge Mackey proves that as
mattr of fact it was not too late, that the
ice-navigators of Newfoundland supported
the views of Chief Engineer Melville and General
Uazen, and that Melville Bay was naglgable
throughout October 1888. or for period Of forty
five DAYS after the date Of Secretary Lncolns de-
cision that 1t impracticable TO dispatch
steam sealer to Cape Sabine. The evidence On this
point is conclusive The official tables OF tempera-
lures for October 1883, complied by observers IN
Greenland for tho DANISH Government together
with the records kept at Cape Sabine during the
same period, establish the fact that Mel
Vile Bay was opou even on It's
northern line as late as November T.
The rescue coud undoubtedly have been effected
if in response to Chief Engineer Melyile's urgent
advice a vessel had been chartered and sent
north after September 10. This prima facie case
against the secretary in our judgment cannot be
contraverted.
But while General Hazen is to be credited with
sound judgment in proposing what would have
proved successful method of rescue, II does not
follow that the Secretary is 10 be held accountable
for anything moro than an error Of judgment, or
still less that he rejected that proposition
in consequence of a feeling Of antagon-
ism TO the Chief Signal officer. General
Hazen was absent on the Pacific coast at the time
of Garlington's return and could only send brief
dispatches in support Of his recommendations.
There is, so far as we can perceive, no evidence
that Secretary Lincoln disregarded that advice
from any feeling of personal hostility TO General
Hazen. 1t was his official duty to decide whether
an autumn expedition practicable or not. He
telegTaphed to Darlington for an opinion, and re-
ceivel reply that distinctly discouraged the at
tempt "The ultimate result" Darlington stated,
"Of any undertaking to so north at this time ex-
tremey problenatical; chances against its success
owing to dark nights now begun in
those regions. making ice navigation extremely
critical work. The ship must be under Uhited
States laws and subject to military discipline. |
believe nothing can be done with foreign civilian
officers and crew." This advice from the officer
who had been selected to head the rescue party
and who had Just returned from Melville Bay
seemed decisive If Darlington was not competent
10 give advice on this subject, he certainly Ought
never TO have been sent to LittletOn Island on the
Proteus. II Secretary Lincoln acted upon his
advice he certainly did not evince hostility
TO General Hazen. since Darlington
was the agent, deliberately chosen
of the Chief Signal Office. Darlington was the Of
fcer whose recommendation under the circum-
stances entitled to the first consideration, and
while he declared that there was a bare chance of
success if United States naval officers and soamen
were placed in chlrgo of the relief ship, he evil
IDENTIFY condemned the undertaking. Secretary
Lincoln having obtained this hostile opinion, con-
suited Captain Greer, Captain Tyson and DR..
Emile Bessels, and finally decided not to under
take the expedition This proved in the end to be
an error of judgment, which took away the last
chance of avertlng the calamity at Cape Sabine.
But this re suit is not to be imputed TO criminal
gect his part and still less to a violent personal
dislike Of General Hazen and a desire to override
suggestions plans eTnanating from the Chief
Signal Office. Ii the Secretary had acted upon
General Hazcns advice and Chief Engineer Mel
ylle's scheme, the rescue might have been accom-
plshed. But we do not believe that Judge Mackey
under the same circumstances would have assumed
the responsibility for autumn expedition. 1t
is manifestIy unfair to lay undue stress upon the
falibIlity of human Judgment and to attribute
tho disaster mainly to an official decision that
under the circumstances was apparently we'll
grounded and entirely uninhuenced by unworthy
personal considerations.
Judge Mackey clearly demonstrates IN this same
chapter Garlington's direct responsibility for the
failure of the Proteus expedition. He shows that