The Warner weekly sun. (Warner, Brown Co., Dakota [S.D.]) 1883-1885, 1885-01-09
THE BATTLE OF THE NATIONS.
Napoleon's Military Movements and his
Blunders.

n~aleou's p~recocity astonished the world,
but his early failure of faculties is
Nauallv wonderful. After the battles of
Nckmuhl he was barely n second rate
general. Aspern was q failure. Wa
yram was a failure. The entire Russian
campaign was a failure. At Lutzen he
nas barely not defeated. At Bautzen,
with overwhelming forces, he con-
luored, but made no prisoners. His
victory at Dresden was due chiefly to a
lucky topography. By pushing Van
lamme into peril and utterly failing to
support him, that Generals army was
annihilated. By pushing Oudinot, and
afterward Ney, too far north at Gross
Beeren and Dewnewitz, and MacDon-
. aid too far south at Katzbach, their ar
mics were defeated and almost ruined.
In short, the campaign of the Elbe was
A failure. Napoleon's management was
g bad. Even the illiterate and stupid
Butcher outwitted him.
The nations were combined against
Napoleon. Spain, England, substan-
tally all the Germanic sovereignties,
Sweden and Norway and Russia and
/ Austria, through his vicious statesman
ship, we're in alliance and were resolved
to conquer or die. In October, 1913,
he had become much weakened by sue
9essiye disasters. The allies determ-
med on a bold movement. Schwartzen-
berg. in command of the Austrian AID
Russian forces, marched to his rear
from the south, and Butcher with Prus-
! slams and Bernadotte with Swedes from
the North, made a like movement.
Their purpose was to unite at Leipzig.
Napoleon was then at Dresden. The
allies were immensely superior to him
in numbers. A military tyro ought to
have known that a concentration of his
forces was necessary. Especially was a
concentration necessary when his com
nunication with Franco Was threatened.
Napoleon saw clearly his peril. Weeks
before he forwarded to his War Minis
ter in Paris an order to man and pro-
vision fortresses along the Rhine with a
view to defensive warfare on that from
tier. Yet when he saw his communica-
tons threatened from both north and
south and the destruction of his army
imminent, he delayed. His mind seemed
paralyzed.
In addition to the army which he ac-
tuaIly led into battle at Leipzig, he had
mjre thaa 200, 900 excellent troops scat
tered in different garrisons on and near
the Baltic and on the Elbe. Though
treatened With destruction, he allowed
them to remain, and all were finally
taken prisoners. Even when he did
quit Dresden to march to Leipzig, he had
time to collect the garrisons of Dresden,
Meissen, Torgau, Wittenburg and Mag
deburg, making a total of 80, 900. 1t is
inexplicable that Napoleon allowed
these to remain idle. Though time
was terribly precious, and though the
weather was cold and rainy, he made a
ciruitous route, by which he wasted 150
miles of march, lost 1000 men for SER
vice through exposure and consequent
sickness, loitered four days at Duben
and brought his army into Leipzig ex-
hausted. He reached Leipzig October
Is. His main army was posted about
FIVE miles south of Leipzig and on q
slight ridge, which gave him an advan-
tage of position. Though his line OF
battle was about four miss long, yet
the country was so level and so free
from forests that he was able from an
elevated point to survey the field. To
his 115, 900 men Schwartzenb9rg OPP
posed $50, 900.
To oppose Blucher's approach from
the North with co. 900 xBernadotte was
tardy) he stationed Marmont with TO-
600 at the village of Mockern, five miles
north of Leipzig. But it was essential
that his line of retreat must be guarded
and hence he placed Margaron with
10000 at Lindenau, about two miles
west of Leipzig, to guard the road and
bridges. Bertrand with 10000 was
stationed in the city TO aid Marggarea or
Marmont, as occasion might require.
This was q mistake. Bertrand did
nothing, although Margaron was over
powered and driven back. Thus, on
the night Of the 18th there were three
battlefelds prepared. The troops of
the allies we're burning with patriotic
hate.
October Is, 1913. At 8 o'clock in the
morning seventy-one years ago
Schwartzenberg opened fire. Soon the
battle ragged all along the line. For
three hours Schwartzenberg gained
} ground slowly but steadily. Napoleon's
/ right, where the battle ragged ~furiously
was driven back. But at IL the tide
turned. Napoleon massed on the
J enemy's center, determined to pierce it.
Within three hours he had gained ar
, important advantage. He even con.
i cIuded that he had gained a victory,
and sent to Leipzig an order to ring al
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