The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1885-01-21

/ which WallaceS command had assisted, eX
pressly to enable the troops at the two places TO
| support each other in case of need Wallace did
not arrive in time to take part in the first days
| fight. General Wallace has since claimed that
the order delivered to him by General Baxter
was simply to join the right of the army, and
that the road over which he marched would have
| taken him to the road from Pittsburg to Purdy
/ where it crosses Owl Creek, on the right of
| Sherman; but this is not where / ordered him
nor where wanted him to 90. Even if he were
correct as to the wording of the order, it was
| still very unmilitary proceeding to join the
| right of the army from the flank instead OF from
| the base His was one of the three veteran di-
visions that had been in battle and its absence
was severely felt. Later in the war General
| Wallace would never have made the mistake that
| he committed on the 9th of April, 1862. pre-
| sumo his idea that by taking the route he
| did he would be able to come around on the flank
| or rear of the enemy, and thus perform an act of
heroism that would rebound to the credit Of his
| command, as we'll as to the benefit Of the coun
| try.
SHILOH MEETING-HoUsE
Shiloh log meeting house, some two or
three miles from Pittsburg Landing and on the
| ridge which divides the waters of Snake and
Lick creeks, the former emptying into the Ten
nessee just north of Pittsburg Landing, and the
latter south. Shiloh was the key to our position,
and was held by Sherman. His division at that
time was wholly raw, no part of it ever having
been in an engagement; but thought this de-
fciency was more thar made up by the seniority
of the commander. McClernand was on Sher-
! mans left, with troops that had been engaged at
/ Forts Henry and Donelson, and were therefore
| veterans so far as Western troops had become
such at that stage of the war. Next to McClern-
and came Prentiss, with raw division, and
the extreme left, Stuart with one brigade of
Shermans division. Hurlbut was in of
| Prentiss, massed. and in reserve at the time of
the onset. The division of General G. f. Smith
was on the right and in reserve. General Smith
was sick in bed at Savanna, some nine miles
below, but in hearing of our guns. His
| services on those two eventful days would
no dc ut have been of inestimable value had his
health permitted his presence The command Of
| his division devolved upon Brigadier general W.
| ID. l.. Wallace, most estimable and able officer
/ "a veteran, too, for he had served year in the
Mexican war, and had been with his command at
Henry and Donelson. Wallace mortally
wounded in the first days engagement and
with the change of commanders thus necessarily
effected in the heat of battle, the efficiency of his
/ division was much weakened.
The position of our troops, as here described
made continuous line from Lick creek, on the
left to Owl creek, branch of Snake creek, ON
the right, facing nearly south, and possibly a
| little west The water in all these streams was
very high at the time, and contributed to protect
| our TANKS The enemy was compelled, there
| FORE to attack directly in front This he did
| with great vigor inflicting heavy losses on the
| federal side, but suffering much heavier on his
| own.
The confederate assaults were made with such
disregard of losses on their own side that our
| line of tents soon fell into their hands The
ground which the battle was fought was
| undulating, heavily timbered, with scat
tered clearings, the woods giving some
protection to the troops on both sides.
| There was also considerable underbrush. A
| number of attempts made by the enemy
/ to turn right flank, where Sherman was
| posted, but every effort was repulsed with heavy
| loss But the front attack kept up so Wig
/ orousy that, to prevent the success of these
attempts to get on our tanks, the Federal
| troops were compelled several times to take po-
| sitions to the rear nearer Pittsburg Landing
When the firing ceased at night the Federal line
/ was more than mile in rear of the position it
had occupied in the morning.
/ In one of the backward moves on the 9th the
i division commanded by Gen. Prentiss did not
! fall back with the others. This left his TANKS
! exposed. which enabled the enemy to capture
/ him, with about 2, 200 of his officers and men.
| Gen. Badeau gives o'clock of the 9th as about
the time this capture took place. He may be
right as to the time, but my recollection is that
i the hour was later Gen. Prentiss himself gave
/ the hour as $50. / was with him. as
i I was with each of the division com
| manders that day, several times. and my
recollection is that the last time l was with
| him was about 43O when his division was stand
! ing up firmly, and the General was as cool as if
/ he had been expecting victory. But no matter
| whether it was or later, the story that he and
his command were surprised and captured in
| their camps is without any foundation whatever.
| IL it had been true, currently reported at the
| time, and yet believed by thousands of people,
that Prentiss and his division had been captured
in their beds, there would not have been all day
| struggle with the loss of thousands killed and
/ wounded on the confederate side
With this single exception, for few minutes
/ after the capture of Prentiss, a continuous ana
j unbrokSn line was maintained all day from
| Snake Creek or its tributaries on the right to
| Lick Creek or the Tennessee on the left above
| Pittsburg There was no hour during the day
| when there was not heavy firing and generally
hard fighting at some point on the line, but sell
| dom at all points at the same time. 1t was a
case of Southern dash against Northern pluck
| and endurance.
/ THE FIRST DAY.
During the whole of the first day was con-
tinuousy engaged in passing from one part of
the field to another. giving directions to division
commanders. In thus moving along the line,
however, never deemed it important to stay
i long with Sherman Although his troops were
then under fire for the first time, their COM
mander by his constant presence with them in
spired confidence in officers and men that en-
/ abled them to render services on that bloody
battlefield worthy of the best of veterans Nc
/ Clernand was next to Sherman, and the hardest
! fighting was in front Of these two divisions
| McClernand told me himself on that day. the
9Th that he profited much by having so able a
commander supporting him. A casualty to
| Sherman that would have taken him from the
| field that day would have been a sad one for the
| troops engaged at Shiloh And how near we
| came to this On the 9th Sherman was shot
! twice, once in the hand once in the shoulder
/ the ball cutting his coat and making slight
| wound, and a third ball passed through his hat
/ In addition to this he had several horses shot
! during tho day
The nature of this battle was such that cavalry
could not DO used in front; l therefore formed
| ours into line in rear, to stop stragglers, of
| whom there were many. When there would be
! enough of them to make show, and after they
had recovered from their fright they would be
! sent TO reinforce some part of the line which
needed support without regard to their com