Grant County herald. [volume] (Lancaster, Wis.) 1850-1968, 1885-04-23

III.
continuous marches and flank move
ments Gen. Grant kept his own and
Lees army on foot or in action for
nearly q month, and during that time,
from May 3 to June 10, 1864, were
fought the battles of the Wilderness,
Spottsylyania, North Anna, and Cold
Harbor. The union losses in these en-
gagements, which have never been
equaled in the worlds history, were,
in the aggregate, as follows:
Wilderness. 29,4lo Cold Harbor 49, 5s
Spottsyivania. ..... lo.3sl
Besides the above the Ninth corps,
which at this time was not attached to
the Army of the Potomac but was pres
ent at those battles, lost about FIVE
thousand men. making the total union
loss nearly sixty thousand men, or
number greater than the entire strength
OF Lees army at the opening of the
campaign. The loss in officers was
particularly severe, reaching in all
three thousand. The casualties of the
confederates during this month were
about twenty thousand men. 1t is not
often in war that belligerent is in
condition to afford a sacrifice thus dis
| proportionate. G N. Grant, however,
summed up his theory of action in a
single phrase-to hammer continuous
ly," and that he was able to do this in the
| face of such awful sacrifices is the best
proof of the temper of the army which
he had the honor to command.
1t was after the battle of Spottsyl-
yania, where the federal losses were so
heavy, that Grant, firm in his purpose,
sent his famous dispateh: 81 propose
to fight it out on this line if it takes all
summer" Grants idea always had
been that the southerners fought des-
perately at the beginning of battle.
and that when the first inspiration was
over they were whipped. In the three
days struggle of the Wilderness Grant
ordered nothing more than ''the fight
along the whole line and the march;
and when three days had passed away,
giving $4,000 federal loss to 10000 con-
federate loss, Grant knew he could
stand it better than Lee could. Grant
indicated his quality in these opera
tons and his style of fighting. Having
the strategical disadvantages of con-
stantly lengthening line of operations,
through an impoverished and topo-
graphically difficult country, with the
flanks of his line of communications
exposed and the tactical one of either
assailing positions selected and care
fully prepared for resistance, or else
exposing himself to the risks of flank
movements within short striking dis
lance of the enemy, the manner in
which he played this game put the seal to
his high capacity as general. Handling
successfully an army of at least $50, 900
men in broken country, and in con-
tact with the enemy, is of itself no
small feat of generalship. Gen. Grant
not only did this, but abandoning one
base and taking up a new one in sue
cession, from the Rapidan to Port
Royal, from this to the White House,
and now from the White House to the
James, he had swung his army around
from the Wilderness to Spottsylvania
Courthouse, from there to North
Anna, from this stream to the Chicka-
hominy to the south side of the James,
with an order and celebrity seldom, if
ever, equaled; forcing his opponent to
rapid retrogade movements from
strong intrenched positions, where in
each he was held so long as was neces-
sary to have everything in readiness
for the next onward step.
THE SIEGE OF PETERSBURG.
After the battle of Cold Harbor, Gen.
Grant decided, in opposition to the
wishes of the administration, to trans
fer his army by flank march to the
south side of the James river. This
was successfully accomplished early in
June, and Lee, divining his purpose,
pushed forward with all speed to Pet
ersburg. When Grants army arrived
before this place he soon discovered
that it could not be taken without a
battle or a siege. As the event proved,
Grant was compelled to sit down be-
fore it in formal beleaguerment, and it
was not until nearly the elapse of a
year that, in the last act of the drama
of the war, Petersburg fell. The entire
strength of the confederacy was mus
tered here, and although numerous
campaigns had been made by the
union armies against Richmond it was
not there, after all, where the final
struggle was to occur. The confeder-
ate leader had chosen Petersburg for
his last stand, and with grim deter
mination was it defended.
During the months when the Army of
the Potomac lay in front of Petersburg
there were many moves of more or less
Importance by detachments of that or
ganization. OF these the most con-
spicuous were the operations against
the Weldon railroad, the movement to
Deep Bottom, the action at Reams' sta
ton, various turning movements, and
the affair at Hatcher's run. The mine
fiasco was one of the most noteworthy
incidents of the siege. A breach in the
enemy's lines had been made by the ex-
plosion of a mine prepared with great
labor under the direction of Gen. Burn
side, but the assault which followed the
explosion was so poorly managed that
very little damage was inflicted on the
enemy, while the union forces suffered
a heavy loss. While these events were
transporting in front of Petersburg Gen.
L. ii. Sheridan, in command of a mag
nificent body of horse and large de-
tachment of infantry, made his memoir
able campaign in the Shenandoah val
ley, defeating the confederates under
Early. and Kidding that fertile country
of the hostile raider forever Having
finished this task he joined Gen. Grant
before Petersburg, and was instrument
tai in bringing the army of Lee to bay
at last. Sherman, fresh from his vic
torious march to the sea, was already
faced northward, and on the 23d of
March, 1865, he reached Goldsborough,
n. c., where he formed junction with
the now rapidly extending federal line.
Fearful that if Sherman moved further
north Lee would abandon Petersburg
and Richmond, Grant ordered Sherman
to remain at Goldsborough, and Sheri-
dan was sent out with his superb col
umn of ten thousand sabers to sever the
few remaining communications of the
confederates. Lee was in wise. 1t
was plainly to be seen that nothing
could save him. The glory of arms at
length ceased to support men against
suflerings, privations, and fatigue. De-
serhons from the confederate army were
so numerous that while Gen. Lee had
On paper 100000 men he had in reality
less than 40, 900 men with which to de-
fend his forty-miles of intrenchments
around Petersburg. On the morning of
the 25th of March Lee made an effort
to throw column through the union
lines, but after temporary success it
was beaten back On the 29th, day
some time before fixed upon by Gen.
Grant for the enterprise, the Army of
the Potomac was in motion. The OBJ
ject was to get in the rear of the con-
federates and capture the entire outfit.
Suddan aS IA al haar, Grants onaratiopS