The Dallas daily herald. [volume] (Dallas, Tex.) 1873-1887, 1885-03-14
THE HIGHER COURTS.
COURT OF APPEALS.

cali [
many VS.. Super, from Harris coun-
e " onipion by White, p. j. In this suit
Hs.rent was recovered for $3.50, the
l I value of cow claimed to have
s s.se killed by the appellants cars. The
g gsa evidence sddueed upon the trial,
~ In which Judgment was rendered, is
up,yirely insufficient to support the iudg-
emu ~ that there is no proof thai the
men ,ras killed, or that if killed, the in
CIV. CIV causing her death were caused by
ihs appellanVs c1fs' ReVerseu ana re-
n S,so Draub VS.. the State, from Con
Ias connty. Although appellant had
ttss,sined and paid for license to keep
ouSS'alybibit table commonly called
snu horse pool" yet his license will
"L ia 'vrotect him from prosecution for
a Emitting money to be bet upon such
fisnle, Affirmed.
~ Iones VS. the State, sfr0m Navarro
.o Sv Opinion by Wilson j. Where
e .go oayidence shows that the deceased
.snncv,menced the quarrel which terni-
S S,ted in the defendant killing HIM, it is
n arrcr for the court to charge the Jury on
, sh law of manslaughter, "that if the de-
,nvdant provoked the conflict with tho
0vnparent intention Of killing the de-
S Sseapsed, or doing him some serious
Sodily injury, the homicide would be
murder and not manslaughter, and the
srror is such as will cause a reversal Of
he case when excepted to. IN
addition to the charge that
II the defendant provoked the
aonaict with the apparent intension of
sillpg the deceased or intlicting upon
him some serious bodily injury, he
would not be justified under the defence
nj self defence, the court should have
further charged the jury that ii defen-
dant provoked the difficulty without
sny ielonious intent, such provocation
would not entirely deprive him of the
iustjfcation Of mitigation under his
Hes of self defence. (See Cartwright VS..
Nash, "A CT. App, 1856 and authorities
tbeyecited.) Reversed and remanded.
Galveston, Harrisburg IL San Antonio
Railroad company VS.. Hodg7; from
Gonzales county. Opinion by White, D.
/ Where the Justices transcript to the
county court shows that the Judgment
in the lower court was rendered April
A. and the appeal bond appears to have
been filed and approved on the day be-
fore, to-wit, the 13 b, the bud Itself
shows that the dating of the appeal
bond was evidently a clerical error,
in that it recites, "Whereas,
A. Hodge recovered Judgment against
the Galveston, Harrisburg 81 San An
tonic Railway company on the l4th day
Of April, A. ID. 1884," ETC., which latter
dale corresponds with the date of the
rendition of the Judgment, the error of
dating will be held 10 have been cler-
ical error, and on motion to that effect
the Justice should be- allowed TO correct
| the error. The county court, therefore,
erred in overruling the motion to cor
Irct the erroneous date and in dismiss
Ing the appeal. Reversed and re-
SUPREME COURT.
Clara d. Stringer ct al. VS.. S. NJ.
Swenson, from Travis county; on re-
bearing. In suit against the husband
Oaa note and against him and tho wife
OiOIeclose deed Of trust executed by
item to secure such note, where no per-
Dnal judgment Is asked against her, the
feet that the wife did not execute the
note, or that she was not personally
bound for the debt, is of no con-
Equence. Even if there was
fraud or undue influence prac-
ced upon the wife in procuring the ac-
k1oSledgment, there being no evidence
lst either plaintiff or his agent knew
dthe fact, the point is unavailable. If
property be homestead, Il declaration in
edeed that 1t was not a part of their
homestead, is not binding on the
Unikers.;
The certificate of acknowledgment is
led sufficient. II is as follows:
le state OF Texas, County of Travis:
Before me, b. DeCordova, a notary
lOIc OF Travis county, personally APP
cared John Stringer and Clara d.
llnger, who reside ut Austin, in Ira
Is county, and who are TO me well
Known, and acknowledged that they
psd, executed and delivered the
Snsoing instrument in writing,
~ the purpose and consid-
ration therein specified. And the
aid Clara D., wife at John Stringer, be-
Ig by me examined separately and
part from her said husband, and this
Nrument of writing being fully ex
aned to her, declared she signed and
xruted same OF her own free will and
cccrt for all its uses and purposes, and
vlat sue did not wish to retract it. TO
tTliy which | hereunto sign my name
pnd ailiX my seal of Office this 9TH day
March, A. d. 1877,
EALl p. De CoRDovA.
rotary Public, Travis County, Texas.
Affirmed.
Rull vs., Kaufman d Runge, from Gal
Ieslon county. On rehearing. In
lll by application in the county court
urviviug wife TO have certain pro-
uriy set aside as her homestead,
hertin the administrator of her hus.
amos estate filled opposition 20 her
pilcaliOn, and her creditors interven.
amt Joined the administrator in
Exposition to the application, the Act
N tue administrator does not perfer
sppeal to the district court does not
ltst the right of the creditors TO
stng IN that court. Oral evidence
ueelarations of husband rs to his
ehuOns In making purchase of
E9perty claimed rs homestead, Is adj
SlDle upon an issue as to whether
II particular parcel of land constitu-
part of the homestead or not.
hen the husband and wife had both
sue trust deed to piece OF land on
same block as that in
aNoyefsy, in which deed
Rey had expressly disclaimed all
9estead interest In other property
~ designated their homestead, such
NV is admissible as evidence of an ex-
NV declaration OF the parties as to
Nv intention respecting the limits of
Eer homestead AT that time. Where
Euperty in fact constitutes part Of
homestead, the husband and wife
nnoIl AZ the same time, waive the home
m rlght and create lien upon the
oPeity, such lien is inhibited by
constitution. Intention OF the
aer respecting the property and the
70 which It is subjected are con-
mng facts in determining what lot
ws constitute the homestead. Such
sration, however, is not an ostoppel
en no one at interest Ia shown to
W. acted upon the faith of II. Az