The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1885-01-29
CHARLOTTESVILLE.
The Defeat Of the Eleventh Corps.

To THE EDITOR: had intended that my
note of Nov. q should close my side of the
Charlottesville case; but as Mr.. Beale has
"rebutted more in the spirit of Boston
than that of the City OF Brotherly Love-,
using Col Culps paper as cudgel to enforce
hearing for his somewhat ill-natured and alto
gether superclious criticisms, beg space for
a sur rebutter" / have no AK TO grind, nor
fence Tor Generals reputation to whltcwash
] write with the sole motive of adding my mite
to the treasury of information going to place
responsibility where it belongs. / do not con-
slider Gen. Devens a "scapegoat," and | doubt
if any reader of THE TRIBUNE other than Mr..
Beale read any such spirit motive between
the lines of my letter of Sept IL. Certainly
the lines themselves would bear no such con-
struction. l refer Mr.. Beale to that letter and
to the meaning of the term "scapegoat."
1t may be news TO Mr.. Beale, but is matter
of common knowledge and experience, that
the recolections" or remembrance of certain
events are not dimmed by time, but only fade
with the failing of the mind. 1t is also well
understood that with most people the incident
of time, as connected with events is the most
difficult to fix unless it is specially noted, or
impressed upon the mind by some other Incl
dent.
Now as TO the hour at which Gen. Hooker
rode along the line held by the Eleventh Corps,
my impression has been and is that 1t was
about 10 a. IN. l have not insisted upon that,
as there was nothing to call my attention to
the hour or cause me to note 1T particularly.
That he did inspect that position on that
morning no one, believe, has had the hardI-
hood to deny; and that he did, then and there,
express satisfaction with the situation / am as
clear as that ] saw him that day l am not
mistaken in that. Whatever the hour of that
visit, the $50 dispatch was sent Of at ALI after
wards; and if information received by Hooker
after that inspection gave him " reason to sup
pose that the enemy was moving around his
right" and he considered Howard i'll prepared
for an attack on his right flank and rear, that
does not disprove and is not inconsistent with
the fact of his satisfaction with the situation
while he was expecting the attack Of any
would be upon the left front of the Eleventh
Corps, or still farther to the left, on the front
of the Third Corps.
That such a dispatch was sent, and received
by Howard, l have neither admitted nor de-
MED. l have no information on that point
that would justify me in discussing it. l did
not blame" Col. Meysenburg. l said, " If
Comrade Rumple's II should have said Powder
Monkeys understanding of the matter is
correct, Meysenburg was largely to blame"
That understanding was that Meyscnburg re-
ceived the dispatch, put it in his pocket, and
thought no more about it until after the battle
of Gettysburg, when it was discovered and
quietly filed as of May 2. i neither admit nor
effect current in the corps and was first heard
after the army had recrOssed into Virginia.
While such a thing was not likely to have &C.
Cured, it is not very improbable. This
point can only be settled by Howard and Mey
senburg, though one of two considerations may
prevent either of them speaking. e., if in
fault, their own reputation; if not in fault,
the reputation of another. l prefer to believe
that the latter motive has prevailed. Col.
Culp does not show how or by whom Howard
received the information which Devens had.
He presumes the dispatch was received. He
knows that Devens had timely information of
the enemys movements; that he gave no heed
TO it, and that he insulted his informants-his
own reglmental commanders-by reflection on
their courage and sneering AT their statements
If presumption is to be INDUCED, by we'll
known rule it would be that Howard did not
receive that information. 1t is not TO be sup
posed that Devens, after treating this Informal
tion as he did, would carry it to his chief. 1t
is not TO be supposed that Howard would have
utterly disregarded such information, coming
from division commander. / confidently re-
peat, Howard was mistaken in the time when
he saw Deyens rallying his men. The time
when that officer passed me going TO the rear
on foot was fixed in my mind by number of
events that almost Immediately succeeded each
other: the attack (6 p. m.) {; Howards arrival
al the front; his dismount; his sending me with
ilS piuSIltce 10 IDSu dS poiHl tsssb VI
Dowdall's, aud Devens passing me almost as
soon as had reached that point. ! am clear
that it was not more than half an hour after
the attack. Again, the fragments of those two
divisions were gathered up behind the Twelfth
Corps before dark-a large portion Of them.
Mr.. Beale ignores cardinal rule of argument
by assuming the entire correctness of official
statements" as against unofficial statements
when that is one of the very points at issue-a
point which with him. it is utterly useless
to argue" And yet he weakens the authority
of such statements by citing the history of
the battle to show that Howard went on a
reconnaissance with Barlow's Brigade Sin a
wrong direction" after citing Gen. Schimmel-
pfennigs report (see his letter of Oct q to show
that but one reconnaissance was made. and that
by Schimmelpfennig In conclusion, / again
submit that the evidence. impartially consid-
cred, is sufficient to show to any reasonable
mind: /. That Devens was guilty of gross mis-
conduct and criminal negligence. 2. That
while there is some evidence tending to show
that Howard had information which would
have insured an ordinarily wary commander
against surprise. the weight of evidence thus
far adduced is the other way, and the charge
against him not enthusiastically NJ. CONNER
Livermore Cal.