New-York tribune., 1885-02-06
THE FALL OF KHARTOUM

In the cnange1ul EaSt III Is lne u1leApec'cu 'hat
happens. Khartoum has fallen at moment
| when apparently it had ceased to be in danger.
| British army was intrenched on the river
hardly more than hundred miles away; the
fotilla of which General Gordon had made such
| effective use had opened communications with
| the rescuers; the fanatical horde which had
been besieging the city for the greater part OF
a wear had been disastrously defeated in battle
| and the heroic defender of the garrison had
sent word that he could hold out for
two wears if necessary All apprehensons
respecting the fate of General Gordon
| and the security of the city seemed week ago
to have been dispelled The success OF General
| Wolseley's expedition was predicted with abb
| soute confidence. His work was virtually
| finished, as every one thought; the advance
| column would be reinforced and in few weeks
| General Gordon would have an English army
behind him, and the Mahdi's followers would
| be scuttling home across the deserts. How
| sudden is the transition, how unexpected the
| denouement Treachery has opened way for
| the Mahdi's triumphal entry into khartoum.
| The defence has failed at the last moment,
| when deiverance was close at hand. General
| Gordon is either slain or prisoner.
| The cable dispatches do not offer an adequate
explanation of this catastrophe. Khartoum is
| reported to have fallen on January 20. four
| DAYS after the arrival of the British advance
| guard at Gubat on the Nile. General Gordon
bad sent five of his six steamers, with five hum
| dred negro troops, down the river to await the
| coming Of the rescuers 1t Is possible that this
proved to be q fatal mistake. The garrison
NAV not have been strong enough to dispense
| with so large detachment; and certainly the
! fotilla, armed with guns and protected with
| iron, must have been Indispensable for the
| protection of the town. The absence of the
steamers may have enabled the Mahdis fol-
lowers to approach Khartoum and trcachery
within the walls may have divided the garrison
and given an entrance to the enemy. False re-
ports of the massacre Of General Stewards
force may have been circulated by Arab spies,
and the population may have deserted General
Gordon in sheer desperation. Or it is possible
that the British commander at Gubat was lured
by false Intelligence into sending a weak force
I'D tho river to Khartoum and that the fate OF
the town had been decided before the rescuers
| reached their present intrenched position.
The tidngs Of the disaster are so unintelligible
| that all these cOnjectures may be entertained
| But unfortunately there can be no doubt as to
| the magnitude of the disaster which has be
fallen the British arms. Not only has General
| Wolseley's expedition arrived on the upper
| Nile too late to effect the deliverance of Gen
eral Gordon. but the dangers to which 1t Is ex-
posed have been multiplied.
| The capture of the capital OF the SOudan will
reinvigorate the Mahdis prestige and kndle
| the fires Of fanaticism anew throughout the
Nile Valley. On the seaboard and in the deserts
| alike II will be recognized as sign OF the val
| idity of his divine pretcnsions. 1t will revive
the dropping spirits Of his warriors who have
been defeated by the English invaders, 1t will
widen the area Of disaffectiOn In the Nile Val
| lev; and 1t will rally 10 his support the treach
| erous tribes with which the divided columns OF
| General WOlseieys forces are surrounded.
| The fame of General Gordon has become one
| Of the traditions of the desert. To have over
powered his garrison and to have taken him
captive will be overwhelming evidence in the
eyes of his followers Of the Mahdis divine
mission to restore the glory of Islam.
Fanaticism with a great victory behind 1t
will spread like wildHre in the desert
wastes. General Wolseley's scattered columns
! with their long lines of communication may
speedily find themselves in critical position.
The danger has increased tenfOld.
The fall of KhartOum Is the crowning disas-
ter for which long series OF blunders and
fatal delays have prepared the way. The Eng
lish, after Tel-el Kebir. were responsible for
whatever happened In the Nile Valley. They
had invaded Egypt and assumed control
over the Khedive's Administration; and
the Soudan was his Empire. If they were
not prepared to accept the responsibility
of governing that Empire. they ought not to
have bombarded Alexandria nor fought at Tel
e-Kebir. Responsibility was systematically
shirked Hickss army wasallowed to be massa-
cred on the White Nile and Bakers on the sea-
board the evacuation of the SOudan was per-
emptorily ordered when 1t WAS impracticable
for the garrisons to withdraw and every at
tempt to rescue the imperillcd forces has been
made too late to be of any avail. There has
been as much bloOdshed as vaclllation and In
decision, and the slaughter of the natives has
never accomplished any useful purpose
General Gordon was sent to Khar-
toum to work miracle and he sue
ceeded for year in making negroes fight
for him and In governing the city without
dollar in the treasury and without European
to help him. But In the end tho miracle worker
failed There will be more bloOdshed now
Khartoum must be recaptured for the sake OF
British prestige no matter what may be the
cost Of life or treasure and when It is recapt-
ured, it will be abandoned. This Is the Eng
lish Nile policy, barren as the desert sands,
and reektng with blood.