The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1885-04-09

structed TO do all the damage possible to the
triangle of roads between Hicksford, Weldon, and
CASTOR The railroad bridge at Weldon being fit
ted up for the passage of carriages it might be prac-
tcable to destroy any accumulation OF supplies the
enemy may have collected south of the Roanoke.
All the troops will move with four days.ratOns in
haversac<s, and eight days in wagons. To avoid
as much hauling as possible, and to give the Army
of the James the same number of days supply
with the Army of the Potomac Gen Ord will di-
rect his Commissary and Quartcrmaster to have
sufficient supplies delivered at the terminus of the
roads to fill up in passing. Sixty rounds OF amnu-
milton per man will be taken in wagons and as
much grain as the transportation on hand viii
carry, after taking the specified amount OF other
supplies. The densely wooded country in which
the army has to operate making the use of much
artillery impracticable, the amount taken with the
army will be reduced TO six or eight guns to each
division, at the option of the army commanders.
All necessary preparations for carrying these df-
rections INTO operation may be commenced at once;
The reserves of the Ninth Corps should be masSed
as much as possible. Whilst would not now Or
der an unconditional attack on the enemy'S line by
them, they should be ready, and should make the
attack, if the enemy weal,ens his line in their 'front.'
without waiting for orders In case they carry the
line then the whole of the Ninth Corps could fol-
low up, SO to join cooperate with the balance
of the army. To prepare for this, the Ninth Corps
will have rations issued to them, same as the bal
ance of the army Gen. Weitzel will keep yigilant
watch upon his front and if found at all practical
be to break through at any point he will do So
success north of the James should be followed
up with great promptnesS. An attack will not be
feasible unless it is found that the enemy has de-
tached largely. In that case it may be regarded as
evident that the enemy are relying upon their local
reserves principally for the defense of Richmond.
Preparations may be made for abandoning all the
line north of the James. except inclosed works
only to be abandoned, however, after break Is
made in the lines of the enemy.
By these instructions a large part of the armies
operating against Richmond is left behind. The
enemy, knowing this, may, only chance,
strip their lines to the merest skeleton in the hope
of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they
have everything against the moving column, and
return 1t cannot be impressed too strongly upon
commanders of troops left in the trenches not to
allow this to occur without taking advantage of it.
The very fact of the enemy coming out to attack,
If he does SO, might be regarded as almost conclu-
sive evidence Of such a weakening of his lines. /
would have it particularly enjoned upon corps
commanders that, in case of an attack from the
enemy, those not attacked not to wait for or
ders from the commanding officer of the army to
which they belong, but that they will move
promptly, and notify the commander of their