New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1884-02-01


in subordinate positions and was destitute OF means
which should have been at his command 30 lar Us
the ifs and might have-beens of the book are IN
tended to explain these matters and to excuse beau
regards failure to accomplish the results for winch
he planned and hoped by showing that the 1ault
was not his but that of the Richmond OoVerhineh'
which neglected his needs and refused nm proper
assistance their presentation is entirely legitimate
and the documents furnished in SUPPORT OF inc
argument throw not little light upon matters Vi
great historical interest.
This indeed is the aspect in which 1T is proper W
consider the whole work. As q contribution 10 ,no
b;tor nc the war the hook is really invaluable De-
cause of the assistance it gives the student no, onS
in arriving ut certain aud definite knowledge IT,
snecting many facts hitherto misunderstood OF HIS
onnrehended-such for example. as inc 'ii'io VI
Lees arrival at Petersburg IN 1861, anu lis pio'f
ous bewiderment respecting GRANTS mo'eii'"'
Int st,l more in understanding the character ana
sn;r;t of the Richmond Government. and IN inter
pretinr its rapid dcgeneracy into feeble put sieu
iarly sensitive and exigent personal despotism'
General Beauregard had the ill-luck TO incur inc
cnmitv of Mr. Davis very early in the history OF the
war whether Justly unastly it IS not our purpose
now TO inquire The fact concerns us only because
# gave him a special incentive to preserve doeu-
uentary records which, now that they are spread
before the public are of no little vaiue 10 the
student of history. We may say, indeed thaI W
this cause chiefly owe the existence OF q WORK
which is really indispensable to full ana just
understanding of the important matters of war his
tory with which it deals. go
In spite of its personal purpose-which Is legI'i-
mate enough in an autobiography or an inspired
bogranbv-the work is written in spirit of fair
ness strongly in contrast with the temper of most
other works of like origin. There is in it none OF
in
ard Taylor's Destruction and Reconstruction" y;
and IT is far less partisan and infinitely less unfair
than Mr. Davis's Rise and Fall of the Confederate
Government was, both in the statement and Ill the
snpnresson of facts; it is broader and more COM
prehensiye than General Johnston's Narrative Oh
Military Operations" or Hoods" Advance ana he-
treat" Frankly Southern in its point OF Vlew' IL
nowhere Oifends by the employment Oh harsh epI-
thets or by forgctfuness of the courtesy duc 10 u
versarics. Even in the chapter devoted 10 inc
maintenance of the position that General sherman
is morally responsible for the burning OF Columbia
s c. there is marked and praiseworthy abstinence
from all angry utterances.
We have sufficiently indicated our estimate OF
Beaurerard as a strategist. Avoiding all compare
sons with generals opposed to him III the war-whose
problems and situations different as to make
lust comparison dificult-we find nothing even III
the most favorable analysis of his achievements, as
given in the present work. to support the theory OF
his superiority to the abest Of the active Southern
| leaders, except in his speciality of defensive en-
| cheering. In that department his dciehce vi
Charleston fairly entities him to take hrSt place.
| BAT if we cannot accept the authors theory of
Beauregards supremacy in strategic genius, we are
| certain nevertheless that his experiences in the
| war peculiarly fitted him to understand and IN
terpret the spirit and the methods OF the ldcmnond
Government And as that Government happened TO
represent not only its personnel but also III us
| ideas and practices, the group OF politicians VINO
invented secession and persuaded the South to act
| upon il, we have occasion to be thankful Tor the
| light which General Beauregard's military BIZ
| ographer is able to throw upon the subject. we
cannot forget that who ruled at Richmond once
aspired to rule the whole country. Their doctrines
we're set up as sound Interpretation of the Consti-
| tuition and their methods were sought to be I'M
| posed upon the Nation. 1t Is worth our while,
therefore. to study the results Of those doctrines
and methods as they appeared in practice, when
| permitted to have full sway at Richmond
For this purpose the whole work is a valuable
text book but il is in the final chapter that have
the summing up of the matter, in a caustc review
of the work of the Davis Administration The
chapter is slnguarly clever and clear III analysis,
and it does not matter that its point of view is that
of the Lost Causeits complaint that OF an earnest
SOutncrncr VINO DlamcS DdNlS AOI thO oOu'H
failure to achieve the purpose of secession. With
the regrets that inspire the complaint, Northern
| readers of course, have sympathy; and even IN
the South no judciOus person should now think 1t
unfortunate that the attemptt TO divide the Union
came TO naught. But we do not need TO adopt
Judge Romans point of view or to share his regrets
for the Lost Cause in order to find both interest and
profit in reading his analysis of the methods adopted
bv the secessionst school of politicians, when they
had control Of affairs.
1t is beyond our plan to enter at all fully into
this subject Space is insufficient for the presenta-
tion of even synopsis of the chapter to which we
| direct attention; but may say briefly that no.
where else has criticism Of the Confederate policy
taken more distinctive form. The author shows
how utterly incapable the Richmond politicians
were of managing the practical affairs of govern
| ment; how completely their craftsmanship was a
thing of forms and distractions; how ostrleh-llke
they were in presence Of danger or difficulty; how
| utterly they were dominated by doctrines and
| hound by preconceived convictions They sent
ambassadors to Europe, he says, charged with the
| duty Of expounding the Declaration OF lndepend-
| ence and proving that secession was logical de-
ducton from the premises laid down IN that lnstru-
| mept. They expected monarchical governments not
only to accept the Declaration itself as infalhble
| and automatic but also to enforce the logical ap-
plication of its principles upon the Government of
| the United States. They expected to secure help
from the enemies of republican institutions by
proving to them that secession prominently
republican.
A like Obtuseness prevailed in all departments of
| business. The finances were managed upon tie
principle of blind faith in impossible luck. Military
affairs were embarrassed at every step by the diff
Guilty of reconciling necessary action with doc
| trnaire dogmas. The syllogism was supreme, and
its premises being absurd it involved disastrous alb
! surdity in all its conclusions.
| This final chapter is, in brief notable mono
| graph upon Southern diplomatic and administrative
methods; it is worthy Of separate publication and
of attentive study because of the flood Of light it
Il Z. LII La