The Democratic press. [volume] (Ravenna, O. [Ohio]) 1868-1901, 1884-05-01
How to Suppress Riots.

The December number OF the journal
of the Military Service Institution con-
tanned remarkable article on the sup
preston of riots in cities. We directed
attention to it at the time rs curious
professional study, which fortunately
did not possess any urgent interest in
the sense that there was either cause or
reason to expect riots in American
tiles. The catastrophe in Cincinnati
proves how necessary it is to be pre-
pared for sudden revolts in the streets,
and for destructive campaigns against
public buildings. We offer no excuse,
therefore, for recurring to General
Molineux's instructive paper and to
the discussion to which it gave rise in
the Military Service Institution.
One of General Molineux's premises
was the necessity of abandoning old
time measures of dealing with rioters.
The mob of the future, he contended,
would have greater power for either
offensive or defensive operations than
the mob of the past. 1t would be armed
with dynamite and rendered formida-
BILE for evil by the consciousness of the
destructive nature of the agencies it
was employing. He considered it only
a matter of time when troops operat-
ing against rioters would be forced to
fight dynamite with dynamite. Not
only would public buildings have to be
zealously guarded against these new
and dangerous weapons, but discre-
tionary power would have to be given
to the commanding officers to employ
the same means in turn against the
mob, and not to depend exclusively up
on the rifle and bayOnet.
Happily the Cincinnati outbreak did
not reach the dynamite stage. 1t was
a spontaneous uprising, without lead
ers, and without weapons until the
gunsmiths' stores were broken open.
If there had been any chance of pre-
liminary organization, dynamite car
tridges could have been readily obtain
ed and used as destructive hand-gren-
ades by the rioters. If q few of the
leaders had been armed with such
weapons as these, the police and the
militia would have been pOwerless to
contest the ground with them. 1t can
not be doubted that it would be a wise
precaution for the officers of the nation
al guard to acquire practical knowl-
edge respecting dangerous explosives.
Dynamite is one of the enemies which
they may be required to fight, and they
ought to be Systematically instructed
in its use. The criminal classes in
New York and Brooklyn have to-day
wholesome fear of the small army of
six thousand militia which can be
massed against them in an emergency.
That fear would be intensified if they
also knew that those citizen-soldiers
were familiar with the modern science
of destruction, and could arm them
selves with explosives if they were at
tackled with dynamite bombs by des-
perate communists.
General Molineux's suggestion re-
spectng the use of barricades as a
means of defense was practically car
ricd out by the militia in Cincinnati.
Pork barrels, store counters and such
material rs was at hand were effective
ly utilized by the officers in command,
and the position of the troops was
speedily rendered impregnable. The
| barricade has been considered the
rioters exclusive weapon. but it con-
stitutes most important adjunct of
military defense. General Molineux's
remaining suggestions, however, were
not practically tested at Cincinnati.
He makes strong point of quelling
riot in its inclpient stages. He speaks
of the necessity of having general
alarm signals which are definite and
distinctly understood. The militia re-
sponded quickly at Cincinnati, but in the
first instance in inferior force, barely
thirty men marching to the relief of
the sheritf's little garrison in the jail.
General Molineuxs plan of campaign
is defensive at the outset. He consid-
ers it more important to protect all
points liable to attack than to disperse
the rioters. He would post strong
guards in front of gun stores, which
are naturally the first arsenals exposed
to attack, and in like manner would
protect armories, the gas and water
works and prominent public buildings.
These precautionary steps being rap
idly taken, an advance of troops head
ed by body of police may be ordered.
The line of march should be through
the broadest streets, the advance guard
when hard pressed, taking advantage
of the shelter afforded by side streets,
and the flanks and rear being protected
by the most expert marksmen. Many
practical suggestions in relation to the
formation of columns for clearing
streets and for attacking rioters in po-
sition are also given in this valuable
article. Power should be used with
promptness and decision, with iron de-
Termination, and without hesitation.
A steam fire engine throwing water on
crowd is not without is use, but
breech-loaders are to be relentlessly
employed when required.
General MolineuX speaks of nervous
ness as being a quality which the Off
Ger must control in himself or else run
n great risk of imparting it to his men.
This nervousness, which is so fatal in
such emergencies, can be best over
come by preliminary study of all the
conditions of the problem of quelling
riots. The officers of the national
guard ought to have an accurate per-
sonal knowledge of the cities where
they live-the probable scenes of dis
order and the most desirable points at
which to make stand. They should
also be familiar with the maneuvres,
tactics and expedients which are the
most useful in such emergencies. The
question is one that should be carefully
analyzed and deliberately discussed in
armories, so that when the crisis comes
with startling suddenness. the officers
may be prepared to act with GOODNESS,
intelligence, resolution and success
NJ Y Tribune.