National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1884-09-20

Pines, in which Gen. Joseph Il. Johnston
was severely wounded, and as conse-
quence the command of the confederate
army of Virginia devol9ed upon Gen. r..
T. Lee, there was period of anxious sus-
pense on both sides, the authorities on
either hand being engaged in the final
preparations--the ono for the taking of
Richmond and the other for the defense
thereof Especially in Richmond was the
period one of great anxiety, for it was
known that Gen. Mcdowell was at
Fredericksburg with large force and
almost in communication with McClel-
lan's right wing, and that jackson in the
Shenandoah valley was being hemmed in
by three times his numbers. At that
time, though he fought well at Manassas,
Jackson had displayed none Of that great
strategetic ability for which he was
afterward remarkable. 1t was greatly to
be feared then, considering the great
odds that were against him, that he would
either be gobbled up entirely or driven in
rout and confusion from the valley which
he had dominated so long, aud Gordons-
vile, Charlottesville, Lynchburg and
Staunton would be Mt tho mercy
of Fremonts forces. Such an
event would have been disastrous to the
confederate cause, and certainly to the
safety of Richmond at that time. 1t is
no wonder, then, that there was daily
rush to procure the bulletins Of the latest
news from the army of the valley, and
that little attention was directed to the
operations Of the army of Mcclellan
before the city, for all felt confident of
Gen. Lees ability to take care of him.
The plan of the federal authorities, as
we now know, was revealed to the con-
federates almost as soon as it was formu-
lated and approved. 1t was ably con-
ceived, and If it had been as ably
executed, If tho various commanders to
whom its execution had been entrusted
had acted with promptness aud cohesion
of plan, it is very probable that tho
confederate army before Richmond would
have been beaten and the city evacuated.
The radical defect, the vulnerable point.
of this skillfully conceived plan, however,
was that its execution was confded to too
many commanders at too long distances
apart. 1t need only DC said that the plan
failed. ...,.
In order to give clear idea of the in
cident to be related further on, and which
i believe the histories have not touched
upon, it will be necessary to describe
briefly the situation of affairs in the
Shenandoah valley in May and June,
1862.
After the battle of Kernstown, near
Winchester, jackson fell back up the
valley, and Banks followed him up and
took position at Strasburg. No doubt
the federal authorities supposed that
jackson had been badly crippled, as he
lot for hi M
self with keeping close watch on Gem
Banks; for no sooner had the time Of the
tightening of the anaconda coil come
than Gen. Shields, with some ten or fifteen
thousand men, was detached from Banks's
command and ordered to report to Gen.
Mcdowell. As soon as Shields was we'll
on his way jackson gathered his forces
and bounced on Banks at Strasburg.
Banks fled with his huge train down the
valley. At Winchester the federal gem
eral made stand, but was routed with
the loss of his trains and artillery, and the
remnant of his army fed to Martinsburg
and crossed the Potomac into Maryland.
The first coil of the anaconda had been
loosened. Jackson then fell back with
all his plumber up the valley again.
The authorities at Washington were
dreadfully alarmed for the safety Of the
capital, and at this day the panic would
seem to have been utterly ridiculous. AT
any rate an additional call was made for
troops from the north. Mcdowell was
ordered to remain in statu quo and to
send Shields back again up the Luray
valley to cut jackson oil from the south.
Fremont, who was then at Franklin, Va,
was ordered to cross the mountains and
attack him from the north, while Banks
was directed to again advance up the
valley from Martinsburg.
Jackson did not appear to BIO greatly
concerned at the seemingly tight fix in
which he was placed, but lay near Stras-
burg, Front Royal, and Whereabouts, rest.
ing his troops and awaiting Developments
Fremont having crossed the mountains
on June 1, struck the advance guard oil
Jackson about five miles FROM Strasburg
Although Jackson had notice of Fro.
mont's advance and had collected his
troops well in hand, he declined an en-
gagement and fell back, skirmishing con.
tinually with his rear guard and cavalry
Just before reaching the north branch OF
the Shenandoah a terrific storm arose and
swelled both branches of the river so as
to render all the iords impossible. Jack.
son crossed on the only available bridge
and burnt it behind him. Fremont aitel
some delay brought up his ponton train
laid a bridge, and followed in the wake
of his nimble adversary.
Now for some thirty miles up and
down the south branch, there was neither
bridge nor ford, except the bridge Al
Port Republic The object Of the fedora
generals was for Shields TO seize upon thi
bridge from the south side of the south
branch, and thus to catch Jackson like {
rat in trap between the forks of the
river and pummel him at their leisure
1t was to reach this bridge before Shields
that Jackson had avoided an engagement
with Fremont. The bridge was tho vul'
nerable point of the game of strategy
and which ever side reached it first had
all the advantage. Jackson beat the ad.
vanCed guard of Shields some two OF
three hours, and this brings me to tn,
point of the incident which | started GU
to relate.
On the morning of Sunday, June s
Gen. Jackson, taking with him his staff
u battalion OF cavalry, and Capt. j. Nc
Dowell Carrington's Charlottesville bat.
terry of six guns crossed the bridge a
Port Republic to the south side, and es
tablished his headquarters at or neal
Kemper's house, just outside the tow
and about 500 yards from the bridge
leaving his main army ON tho north banl
in biyOuac. The horses of the genera
and staff were unsaddled and soor
munching their corn, while the weariel
officers sought such rest and relreshmen
as the time and place afforded.
Now it was known to the general thai
the main body Of Gen. Shields's army wa!
fully thirty miles oil, having been de-
layed in the race by rains or for som'
other reason. Consequently although
the battalion of confederate cavalry wa
on picket, no especial watchfulness was
observed, rs the approach of an enemy
from the south was not expected for {
day at least. But an entcrprising fedora
general (Carroll) had formed u swift col
umn the night before of some Thousand
infantry, regiment of cavalry, a scCtOI
of artillery, and had made forced marcl
OF thirty FIVE miles in some twenty hour