Reporter and farmer. [volume] (Webster, Day County, Dakota [S.D.]) 188?-1946, 1884-12-25

asxsysi 8sauregara on Jefferson Dsvis
military Foley.

4HN GxMI 1t&WKVN1Iu VA
military Foley.
The following extracts are taken from
Gen. Beauregard's story Of the Battle
Bull Run" in the November Century:
"No people ever varied for independ-
spee with more relative advantage than
the Confederates; and if, as a military
question, they mist have failed, then no
country must aim at freedom by means
Of war. We were one in sentiment SIN
territory starting out, not with q strug-
cling administration OF doubtful author
ty, but with u ancient State Govern
ments and q fully organized central 6oV
eminent. Asa military question, 1t was
IN no sense a civil war, but o war be-
sween two countrics-for conquest ON
sne side, for self preservation on the
other. The South, with its great Ma.
terial resources, its defensive means OF
mountains, waterways, railroads aud
telegraph, with the immense adyaut-
age Of the interior lines OF war,
would be open to discredit as a people
il the failure could not be explained
otherwise than by mere material. Ihs
great Frederick, at the head of q little
people. not only beat back o combina'
lion Of sevsral great military powers,
but conquered and kept the territory,
and Napoleon held combined Europe at
The feet OF France till his blind ambl-
ton oyerleaped itself. 1t may be said
that the South had no Fredericks. 81
Napoleons, but it had az least as god
commanders Us It's adversary. Nor was
il the fault Of our soldiers or people.
Oar soldiers were as brave and lntelh'
gent as ever bore arms; and, If only
for reasons already mentioned, they had
a determination superior othe enemys.
Our people bore a devotion to the cause
never surpassed, and which no raj
making monarch eve had for his sup.
port; they gave their all-eyen the last
striplings under the family roofs filling
the ranks voided by the fall OF then
fathers and brothers. But the narrow
mill airy view of the head of the Gov
eminent, which illustrated itself If. the
outset by ordering from Europe, not
100, 900 or 1000, 900, but 10000
stands Of arms, ss an increase
upon 5000, its first estimate,
was equally narrow and conse-
quently timid in its employment OF
our Armies. The moral and material
forces actually engaged in war made
our success q mortal certainty, but for
The timid policy which ignoring strategy
As o science and boidness OF enterprise
as its ally-could never be brought to
view the whole theatre Of var as one
subject, Of which all points were but
integral parts or to hazard for the time
points relatively unimportant for the
purpose of gathering for an overwhelm.
ing and rapid stroke ct some decisive
point; and which, agsin, with character.
istic mis-. elation, would push O yictori'
Gus force directly forward into unsup-
ported and disastrous operations m
stead of using its victory to spare from
its strength sufficient TO secure an
equally important success in another
quarter.
"We needed for president either a
military man of a high order ora poIiti-
clsn of the first class (such as Howell
Cobb without military preteusions.
The south did not fall crushed by the
mere weight of the North, but it was
nibbled away on all sides and ends be-
cause its exclusive head never gathered
and welded its great strength under the
ready advantages that greatly reduced
or neutralized its adversary's naked
physical superiority. 1t is but anoth,I
Of the many proofs that timid direction
may readily go with physical courage,
and that the passive defensive policy
may make a long agony, but al never
win a war"