The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1884-10-30

lpon 5000, its first estimate, was
equally narrow and consequently
.imid in its employment of armies
Again he Says, $3.50
The moral and material forces actu-
ally engaged in the war m3de our sue
cess a moral certainty, but for the
tlmid policy which-ignorlng strategy
as science and boidness of enterprise
as its ally-could never be brought to
view the whole theater of war as one
subject, of which all points were but
integral parts, or to hazard for the
time points relatively unimportant
for the purpose of gathering for an
overwhelming and rapid stroke at
some decisive point, and which, again,
with characteristic mis- citation, would
push victorious force directly for
ward into unsupported and disastrous
operations, instead of using its vic
tory to spare from it strength suffi-
Gent to secure an equally important
success IN another4uarter.
The principles of war never change,
and these principles dictated the
course urged by Gen. Beauregard.
After defeat at Vicksburg he urged
vigorous action - advance which
would either have caused peace or
ended q cruelty protracted war; but
the same jealousy and timidity still
prevailed. Albert Sydney johnson
went down before it; Joseph E. John
ston was robbed of command in conse-
quence of it; and had it not been that
r. E. Lee was looked to with adora-
ton by every man, woman and child
in the south, he would have been de-
graded because of his greatness. The
removal of Lee from command would
have led to armies laying down their
arms and going to their homes, where
beggared families waited for the re-
turn of the brave men who had gone
to the field. Again Gen. Beauregard
says:
In addition to the radical diverg-
ence of military ideas-the passive de-
fensiye of an intellect timid of risk
and not at home in war, and the &C
tive defensive, reaching for success
through enterprise and boldness, ac-
cordIng to the lessons taught US in
the campaigns of the great masters
there was a personal feeling that now
gave cold hearing or none to any re-
Communications of mine. Mr.. Davis
friendship, warm at tie early period
of the war, was changed, some time
after the battle of Manassas
to a corresponding hostility from
several personal causes, direct and in.
direct, of which need only mention
that my report of the campaign and
battle of Manassas having contained
as part of its history, a statement Of
the submission of my plan of cam
paign already described for concen
| trating our forces, crushing both Nc
Washington. Mr., Davis strangely
cused responsibility for rejecting th'
plan he sought. after the demonstra-
ton of events, to get rid of by deny
ing that such a plan had ever beer
submitted-an issue, for that matter
easily settled by my production OF tn
cotemporaneonS report OF Col. Jane
Chestnut, the bearer or the mission
who, moreover, at the time of the con
troversy, was on Mr.. Davis OWL
staff, where he remained. Mr.. Davi
made an endeavor to suppress tn
publication of my report @
the battle Of Manassas. The matte
came up in a secret debate in the con
federate congress, where a host o
friends were ready to sustain me; bH
1 sent telegram disclaiming any de
sire for its publication, and advising
that the safety of the country shout
be our solicitude, and not persona
ends.
Gen.Beauregard says she dreaded fail
ure more from his own government be
hindhfm than from the enemy betor
him." This fear was iudulged il
! certainly, by all the Confederate com
manders. The general reiterates tn
terrible fact, that during the fou
years Of war Mr. Davis did not ca
the five generals together into col
ference with view to determine tn
best military policy or for:settling mp
decisive plan of operations involvin
the whole theater of war, thong
there was often ample opportunit
for it. He says: 1--WE needed fo
president either military man of
high order or a politician OF the frs
class (such as Howell Cobh) withoU
military pretensions." The south di
not fall crushed by the mere weigh
of the north; but it was Dibbled ava
at all sides and ends, because its eN
ecutive head never gathered an
welded its reat siren tn under th
) ready advantages that greatly IT
, duced or neutralized its adversary
naked physical superiority. 1t is bu
, another of the many proofs that timi
direction may readily go with ply
steal courage, and that the passiv
defensive policy may make Ion
agony. but can never win a war,