Southern standard. (McMinnville, Tenn.) 1879-current, 1884-07-12
batteries planted and their lines forti.

pdrallel lnJrencnmentS.
The enemy had gathered princi-
pally on the east Of the railroad, and
everything gave evidence that he did
not mediate an attack upon Corinth,
but regular bombardment and seige.
Beauregard's communications were
severely threatened on the right,
where the enemy seemed determined
to extend his fortified lines to Che
walla and cut off Beauregard's sup
plies by railroad. To counteract these
demonstrations, Gen. Price, of Van
Dorn's army, kept Halleck's left wing
busy. There was no difficulty in get
ting up fight in front Of Prices di-
vision. If the enemy came around
too presumptuously he was sure of
warm reception, for Price always ac-
cepted anything in the way ola chal-
lenge. In the different sorties on the
right the enemy was driven back in
the first stages of the seige, and on
one occasion Price took possession
of the enemy's telegraph Office and
telegraphed his compliments to the
President of the United States.
BY the 25th of May the forces ofthe
enemy had thickened on the right
and had gained so strong q fOothold
that Van Dorm was unable to dislOdge
him, and his lines of intrenchments
drew nearer and nearer. The Con-
federates were row completely on the
defensive, with every resource taxed
to the utmost. The lines of the enc
my had been reinforced, and the fall
of Corinth seemed only question of
time. The commander-in-chief took
in the situation at a glance. One of
three things must be promptly done.
The Confederates must attack the en-
envy or be attacked by him, or evacu-
ate the place. This was the nature Of
the situation as viewed by the corps
commanders of the army, and as the
first two propositions involved seri-
GUS difficulties, the latter expedient
was suggested by Gen. Hardee, and
the various reasons explained in the
following communication to Gen.
Beauregard:
CoRINTH, MISS, May 25th, 1862.
General G. T. Beauregard, Com
handing, etc. THE situation at Cor
NTH requires that we should attack
the enemy at once, await his attack
or evacuate the place.
J Assuming that we have $4,000 men
and the enemy nearly twice that
!, number, protected by entertainments,
, l am clearly of opinion that no attack
should be made. Our forces are in
= ferior, and the battle of Shiloh proves
with only the advantage of position
: it was hazardous to contend against
| his superior strength and to attack
: him in his intrenchments now would
< probably inflict on us, and the Con.
t federacy, fatal blow. Neither the
: numbers nor the instruction of oul
/ troops renders them equal to the task
v / think we can successfully repe
}, any attack on our camp by the enc
a my, but it is manifest no attack il
meditated. 1t will be approached
Y gradually, and will be shelled ant
= bombarded without equal means t
e respond. This will compel us to make
h sorties against his intrenched posi-
k tons under most adverse circum
l. stances or to evacuate the place. TIL,
g latter seems to me inevitable. If so
|, the only remaining question is
l. whether the place should be evacua
d ted after or during the defense. Al
y ter fire is opened, or the place is &C
d lively shelled or bombarded, or dur
ing such an attack, it will be Difficult
E to evacuate the place in good order
It With large body of men imperfect,
4 disciplined, any idle rumor ma,
d spread a panic, and inextricable con
l. fusion may follow, so that the retrea
< may become a rout. The same OF
d jections would apply to any parts
ID or feeble defense of the place, and a.
in attempt to evacuate it in the mean
n time. If the defense be not deter
If mined or the battle decisive, no use
7 full result would follow, but it woul
ct afford an opportunity to our enemie
in to magnify the facts, give them pre-
text to claim victory, and to discoul
age our friends at home and abroad
ID and diminish, if not destroy, a
,is claims of foreign Intervention.
IN Under these circumstances l thin
no the evacuation, if it be determine
| L l. 1. L