The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1884-10-30
WHY THE coNFEDERAoY FAILED

The most pointed part of this paper is
that referring to the relations between
President Davis and General Beaure-
gard, after the battle Of Bull Run, in
which the latter very pointedly shows
that the failure of the Confederacy |
dated from the time Mr.. Davis, be-
cause of prejudice and even of incom-
petence, placed himself in the way OF
and prevented decisive action after
the first important and brilliant vic
tory at Manassas. Had Mr.. Davis not
stood in the way of a successful march
upon the Potomac and Washington,
after that great victory and the utter
Generalization of the Federal army,
Gen. Beauregard, as others have con-
tended, asserts that vigorous pursuit
would have followed the Union army
to the Potomac, and that the true, i'm
mediate fruits of the victory would
have been the dispersion of all the
Federal forces south Of Baltimore
and east of the Alleghanies, the lib
Grafton of the state Of Maryland, and
the capture Iof Washington, while
from the high source of such achieve
ment other decisive results wo,1d
have continued to flow. Gen Beaure-
gard says:
From my experience in the MeXi-
can war I had great confidence in in
telligent volunteer troops, if rightly
handled; and with such an active and
victorious war engine as the Confed-
crate Amy of the Potomac could
have been made reinforced as time
went, by numbers and discipline-the
Federal militar y power of the east
could never have reached the head it
took by Mcclellan being allowed to
organize and discipline at leisure the
powerful army that in the end wore
out tbs south. In war one success
makes another one easier, and its right
use is as one step to another, until
final achievement. This was the use
| besought by me in the plan Of cam
paign L have mentioned as presented
| to MIR. Davis on the 18th of July, a
few days before the battle, but reject
ed by him as impractlcable, and as
rather offering opportunity to the en-
envy to crush us"
The besetting sin, as General Beau
regard admits, of Mr.. Davis and those
in whom he put the most confidence
and from whom he organized his
staff, was jealousy. Everything urged
by the general, which could have led
to success was opposed by Mr.. Davis,
probably because it did not originate
with himself. AS Ger. Beauregard says,
success lay in short, quick war Of de-
cisive blows, before the Federals, with
their vast resources, could build I'D a
great military power; to which end a
concerted use of Confederate forces
immediate and sustained, was neces-
sary, so that, weaker though the latter
were at all separate points, they might
nevertheless strike with superior
strength at some chosen decisive point
and after victory there reach for vic.
tory then made easier elsewhere, and
thus sum up success. Instead of this
which in war is called concentration
the actual policy was diffusion, an in.
ferior Confederate force at each sepa-
rate point defensively confronting 6
superior Federal force; Confederate
power daily shrinking, that of the en-
my increasing; and the avowed Fed
eral policy of "attrition" of the bigger
masses left free to grind the smaller
one by one, to naught. Out of thi'
state the Confederacy never emerged
except when Richmond, where thu
head of the government was housed
was Immediately in danger. Gen
Beauregard continued to urge attacl
beyond the Potomac and in the real
of Washington for months after thu
great victory, while the Federals were
again organizing, but his brilliant prop
ositions, which could then have beer
successfully carried out, were opposed
and frowned down. What he urged
after the first battle of Manassas il
1861-the massing of troops to make
the enemy feel the effect of victory
became a necessity in 1862 for the de
tense of Richmond. What was done
then, through necessity to defend tht
Confederate capital, could have beer
done in 1861, with very little expense
of, blood, to reduce the Federal capital
Gen. Beauregard says:
was willing, then, should it have
come to that, to exchange even Rich
mond temporarily for Washington
Yet it was precisely from similar com
binations and elements that the army
was made up, to enable it next spring
under Gen. Lee, to encounter Nc
Clellan's then perfectly organized
army of 10000 men at the very dool
of Richmond. If that which was &C
cepted as a last defensive resort
against an overwhelming aggressive
army had been used in an enterpris
ing offensive against that same army
while yet in the raw, the same ven
ture had been made at less genera
risk, less cost of valuable lives, anc
with UNNECESSARILY greater certain re
suits. The Federal army of the Poto-
mac would have had no chance mean
while to become tempered to that
magnificent military machine which
through all Its defeats and losses, re
manned sound, and was stronger, with
is readily assimilating new strength
al the end of the war, than ever be.
fer, ; the pressure would have been
lifted from Kentucky and Missouri
and we should have maintained what
is called an active defensive warfare
that is, taken and kept the offensive
against the enemy, enforcing peace.
The military power of the Confeder
acy was grand in commanding genius
and in the bravery and devotion OF
its soldiery; the civil power was weak
and vascillating, governed mostly by
prejudice, and opposed to anything
that was the conception of any subor.
dinate of genius. Gen. Beauregard very
properly holds, that as a military
question there was no "civil war, but
war between two countries-for con.
quest on one side, for self-preservation
on the other" The south, with its
great material resources, its defensive
means of mountains, waterways, rail
roads and telegraph, with the i'm
mense advantage of the interior lines
of war, would be open to discredit as a
people if its failure could not be ex-
planned otherwise than by mere mate
rial contrast The great Frederick.
at the head of little people, not
! only beat back a combination of sever