Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1884-05-18

vrtN' WINS expTeSteu 10 DC 10 eSt4h- |
fish and maintain fair and uniform
rates OF freight, and TO equaliye the |
business OF forwarding on the Elie and
Oswego canals smong themselves, and |
TO avoid all unnecessary expenses In |
doing the same" The argument of
the court Is brief and Is summed up
IN two short sentences: 1.-The object |
OF this combination was obviously to
destroy competition between the
several lines Ia the business engaged
In. 1t was conspiracy, between
the individuals contracting, to
prevent free competition among
themselves, In tho business Of trans
porting merchandise, property and
passengers upon the public canals.n
IT IL "A familiar maxim that COMPETE
ton Is the life of trade. IL follows
that whatever destroys or even relaxes
composition in trade Is injurious IL not
fatal to it (l. Thus ii win be seen
that by giving u bad name to the ar.
ranpement, and quoting the old
maxim, the court WAS suppo Sad t. have
sufficiently reasoned the case out, and
the Judgment followed as Of course. A
similar agreement was shortly after.
ward condemned by the same court, In
the case Of Stanton against Allen, Coy
as being designed to exempt the stand
ard Of freights, etc, From the whole
some influence Of rivalry and COMPETE
ton.
These cas- have not passed entire
ly without criticism Ia this country.
They were cited Ia the supteme court
Of Wisconsin not long after they were
made; AMI were there diss-nt,d from
In very vigorous terms. ts). Refer
ring To the maxim that competition Is
the life of trade, Judge Howe, speak.
ing FIR the court, said that II "is one If
the least reliable OF the host that may
he picked up IN every market place. II
is IN fact the sbibboleth of mere gam
bling speculation and Is hardly Ell
titled 10 take rank ,ts AN axiom In the
Jurisprudence OF this country. l be
lieve univeral observation will at
test that for tue last quarter of n
century competition In trade has
caused more individual distress, II hot
more public injury, than the want Of
competition. Indeed by reducing
prices below or raising them above
values--as the nature Of the trade
prompted -competition. has done more
to monopolize trade, or to secure ex-
elusive advantages In 1t, than has been
done by contract Rivalry In trade
will destroy itself, aud rival trades
men, seeking 10 remove each other,
rarely resort TO contract, unless they
find II the cheapest mode OF putting
an end 10 the strife. And II seems to
me not little remarkable that IN the
case OF Stanton We. Allen IL should
have been urged against the agreement
that its object was TO exempt the
standards ol freight, etc, 'frm the
wholesome influence Of rivalry and
competition For IL IL very certain
that because Of that very purpose
because they did tend to protect the
party against the influence of rivalry
and competition courts of law have
upheld like agreements In partial re-
) straint Of trade, ever since the case OF
Mitchell vs.. Reynolds" a.
But there are several other American
cases which, i'm their general reason
ing, must he conceded to give some
support to the cases decided In New
) York. Among these are the eases in
which combinations between coal com
panies to control the production Of coal
and its price In the market have been
held Illegal. (5) An agreement be-
tween dealers In a certain line oi goods
not TO put any upon The market for
three months has also been held TO he
} illegal. (6) So has combination
which had for Its parpose to effect "A
corner in the wheat market. az So
has combination between parties
furnishing recruits in time OF war,
whereby they agree not to furnish them
for less than fixed price. (S) So have
agreements not to compete in bids fol
public contracts. (9) So have combi
nations to keep up the price OF salt
1O) And combinations TO put up or IL
put down the wages of laborers
whether entered into by laboreis or by
employ ers, must in general depend fol
their observance upon the good faith o
. thos. who make them. (lll II would
, be easy to show that many of these
eases have no important bearing upon
the question OF the legality of railroad
pool-, but they are likely to be brought
under consideration In any legal con
troversy ON that subject, and the pro
priety OF being here ref rred Il
will therefore be apparent:
In the light of the judicial decisions
as they now stand In this country, II
, cannot safely be affirmed that the law
: will lend its aid to enforce the pooling
! contracts between railroads. IL seems
on the other hand more than probable
that the courts will declare that such
contracts are not san ctioned by the law
This is said irrespective of any opinion
upon the question whether, as an orig
inal proposition, such ought to be th,
result. The early decisions In New
York, which have given certain ten
dency to subsequent judicia! thought
: and action. wyre made with little OF
T no Investigation OF the subject involved
! and without any attempt Whatever V
: show that the principle by which TN
: legality of arrangements 10 avoid IN
8 furious competition must be tested had
: been overlooked or disregarded In thu
contracts before the court. But they
8 have stood without much question q
: the present day; In their conclu
7 sions they fall In with prevailing
y notions Of what IL public policy
. ON the subject; there is. a Tri0ri,
strong presumption, legal as well ~
: popular, that they are correct; ant
they are likely for all these reasons
whether sound OF not, to stand as pre-
: cedents which courts will expect To fol
3 low, If that shall he the result of any
: litigation, or II the! companies them
: selves shall look upon such result,
. possible, and therefore decline htigsa
tiop, the companies entering into pool
must rely for the enforcement OF thei
s contracts upon the honor of the corpol
= ate officers and agents. and upon "
methods that may be devised for max
J ing IL TO the interest of the several con
n tractinu parties to observe their agree