Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1884-03-17

SOutH NdIOllnd was urged forward in
TINS course by leading disunionists in
other States, who needed the force of one
bold example of secession to furnish the
requisite Stimulus to their own commune
tes. The members of the South Carolina
convention, recognizing the embarrass-
ment and incongruity of basing their ac-
ton simply upon the constitutional cleo
ton of President, declared that the
public opinion of their State chad for
long period been strengthening and ripen-
ing for disuniOn." Mr.. Rhett, eminent in
the public service of his State, asserted
that the secession of South Carolina was
not produced by Mr.. Lincoln's election.
or by the nOn-eXecutiOn of the fugitive
slave law; that it was a matter which
had been gathering head for thirty years."
and that they were now determined on
their course at whatever risk"
=
1t must always be remembered that the
disbelief IN ultimate secession was nearly
universal throughout the free States. The
people OF the North could not persuade
themselves that the proceedings in the
southern states would lead to ANYTHING
more serious than hostile demonstrations.
when would end, after cOaXing and COM
promise, IN return to the Union. But
with this hope Of final security there was.
on the part OF the great mass of people in
t~NtNtNof t1C AldNGSl SOlltlIuuE
throughout the winter of 1S60-61. and a
restless waiting and watching for solu-
ton OF the troubles. Partisan leaders
were busy on both sides seeking
for an advantage that might survive
the pending trials. Northern Democrats.
In many instances, sought to turn the Oc-
caslon to one Of political advantage by
pointing out the lamentable condition to
Which anti-slavery agitation had brought
fpNr -
ed by republicans with defiance, and with
an affected contempt and carelessness of
what the South might do. Much that was
written and much that was spoken
throughout the North that winter. both
by Democrats and Republicans, would
nave remained unwritten and unspOken
If they had realized the seriousness and
magnitude OF the impending calamity.
In a hnal analysis and true estimate of
Mr.. Buchanan's conduct in the first
stages OF the revolt, the condition of the
popular mind as just described must be
taken into account. The same influences
and expectations that wrought upon the
people were working also upOn him.
There were, indeed, two Mr. Buchanans
IN the closing months of the admInistra-
tlOn. The first was Mr.. Buchanan of
November ana December, angered by the
decision OF the Presidential election and
more than willing that the North, includ-
ing his own State, should be disciplined
by fright to more conservative views and
to a stricter observance of what
he considered solemn obligations imposed
by the constitution. Ii the Southern
threat of resistance to the authority of
the Union had gone no further than this.
Mr.. Buchanan would have been READILY
reconciled to its temporary Violence. and
would probably have considered it a ma
uonal blessing i'll disguise. The second
was MI. Buchanan Of January and Feb
ruary, appalled, by surrounding and in
creaSIng perIls, grieved by the con-
duct of Southern men whom he
had implicitly trusted, overwhelmed
by the realization of the evils
which had obviously followed his Off
clal declarations, hoping earnestly for the
safety of the Union, and vet mere disturb
ed and narrowed in his mind than the
mass OF loyal people who did not stand so
near the danger as he, or so accurately
measure It's alarming growth. The Presi-
dent of December, with Cobb and FLOYD
and thompson in his Cabinet, and the
President Of January, with Dix and
Sta#ton and HOLT for hisIcouncillors, were
radically different men. No true estimate
OF Mr.. Buchanan in the crisis of his public
career can ever be reached if this vital
distinction be overlooked.
1t was Mr.. Buchanan's misfortune to he
called to act in an emergency which de-
manded VIII, fOrtltude and moral courage.
In these qualities he was deficient. He
did not possess the executive faculty. His
lie had been principally devoted to the
practice of law in the most peaceful of
communities, and to service in legislative
bodies where he was borne along bv the
force of association. He had not been
trained to prompt decision, had not been
accustomed to exercise command. He
was cautious and conservative to the
point OF timldlty. He possessed ability of
high order, and, though he thought
slowly, he could master the most difficult
subject with comprehensive power. His
sSYice of ten years in the House and an
equal period in the Senate was marked by
conscientious devotion to duty. He did
not rank with the ablest member Of either
body, but always bore a prominent part
in important discussions and maintained
himself with credit.
The difference between the President
and the secessiOnists of the South was a
difference of opinion as to the time for ac-
ton, and as to the name by which that
action should be called. In principle
there was concurrence. The President
insisted that the injured party should APP
peal to the aggressOr and then to the
~
ton always in view, and to be exercised
If neither the aggressOr nor the courts fur
nlShed satisfactory redress. The PreSi-
dent recognized the reserved right of
revolution in the States, and it was
necessary incident of that right that each
State might decide when the right should
be exercised. He suggested that, as
justification of revolution, the Federal
Government is guilty of "a deliberate
Ina HE and On pnrOTIC nNarpiGas' nf NO
ers not granted by the constitution, quo
ting from the text of the State rights dec
laratlOn by Virginia in 1898. But in all
his arguments he left the State to be the
ultimate judge Of the cOnstitutiOnality of
the acts OF the Federal Government. I'm
der these doctrines the Government of the
United States was shOrn of all power to
preserve it's own existence, and the union
might crumble and fall, while it's cOnsti-
tuted authorities stood paralyzed and i'm
potent.
This construction was all that the ex-
tremists of the South desired. With so
much conceded, they had everything in
their own hands. They could march out
of the Union at their own will and caprice,
without resistance from the National Gov
eminent, and they could come back upon
such conditions as, with the Presidents
aid, they might eXtOrt from an alarmed
and weakening North. Assured by the
language Of the President that they could
with impunity defy the constitutional au-
thOrity of the government. the secession
lists were UNNECESSARILY encouraged. The
Southern men had for three generations
been cherishing the belief that they wero
as a class superior to Northern men, and
they were more than ever confirmed in
this pleasing illusion when they saw Il
Northern President, with the power of the
nation in his hands. deliberately affirming
that he could exercise no authority over
or against them.
Men who, under the wholesome restraint
of executive power, would have refrained
from taking aggressive steps against the
National Government were by Mr.. Buc-
hanan'S action forced into a position of
hostility. Men in the South who were dis
posed to avoid extreme measures were by
taunt and reprOach driven into the ranks
of secession. They were made to believe,
after the Presidents message, that the
South would be ruined If she did not as
sert position which the national author
ity confessed it had no right and no means
to contest. The Republicans had been
haunting Southern men with the
intention of using only buster and
bravadO, and if they should now fail
to take a decisive step in the direction of
disuniOn they felt that it would be a hui
initiating retractiOn of all they had said
in the long struggle over slavery. 1t
would be an invitation to the abolition
lists and fanatics of the North to deal
hereafter with the South and with the
question of slavery in whatever manner
might seem good in their sight. No
weapon of logic could have been more
forcible; and, welded as it was by the
Southern leaders with skill and courage,