Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1884-08-15


their orders TO retreat by boat ard slcdge
from the station southwark. 245 miles,
along the west side OF the channel, To Cape
Sabine, near the head OF Batfin's bay.
Greely believed that he could make tha.
trip. Once at Cape Sabine he would be at
the southern end OF the lec-locked channel
and within reach Of rescuing party.
From the cape he could look across the
strait (Smith sound) and see Littleton
Island and Lifeboat Cove, where other ex-
ploriDg parties had wintered.
But he could not make tnat hazardous
journey without the assistance Of numerous
defots Of provisions along the line. nor
was he willing to make II unless he should
he assured that rescuiug party would be
waiting for him at Lifeboat Cove, on he
east side of the strait. With remarkable
foresight, he laid the plans for his own
rescue and sent them TO General llaZen.
Regarding the establishment Of the pro-
vision derots as OF the greatest impOr-
'ance, he gave careful directions concern
ing them in his letter OF August L.. 1881.
The relief party Of 1882 was to make,
II II should not get through the ice, a depot
cat permanent point on the east coast
OF GrinBell Land (west siie OF smith
sound, or Kennedy channeD": afterwards
another was to be made at Littleton Island.
IL the relief party cf 1888 should also be
unable to come northward through the ice,
the derOts OF 1882 were to be duplicated,
one of them 10 be "between Cape Sabine
and Bache Islaud.r He added that in this
way there would be placed on the
coast line OF 2i5 miles which he
must traverse seven dep0ts OF pro-
visions. not including two months sup
plies already deposited at a prominent
point on the line. "The party should
then proceed to establish a winter station
at LfeDoat Cove" Those dep0ts must be
made fiI ST, and then the rescuers should 20
into winter quarters, looking for him
through telescopes and sending scdgc par
ties across the strait and up the coast line
In search oi him. After bis arrival at the
station Greely himself established two or
three depois OF provisions on the northern
part Of the line OF retreat. and when he be-
gan his retreat. one year ago. he supposed
that the other depOts below had been made
10y the relief parties.
Now let lis see what IIazcn did. Beebe
carried up great load Of provisions in the
Neptune. He could not get through the
ice. Following lIazens instructions. he
left little bundle Of 80 ratiOns at Cape
sabine and another similar bundle at LIT.
Teton Island. and returned "with the
vessel and the remainder OF her stores
to It. Johns IIazcn has testified that
he afterwards regretted that Beebe
had not been instructed to deposit the
bulk Of his stores at Cape sabine. one year
later Darlington went uD with the Protcu,
and the YantIc. He was directed to spare no
effort 10 "pIISh the vessel through" to the
Altl,An.,l pft l,,t finn. 4 L., "A
years supply OF good food, llazen led
Darlington to believe that the colOny'S sup
plies would be exhausted in two or three
months. He must push northward through
The ice at ANY cost to save them from I'M
Tondng starvation. The instructions in this
particular were imperative. Notwithstiud-
ing the urgent need of provision dcDOtS On
GIcely's line Of retreat, concerning the 10.
cation Of which Grcely had written. Gar
liugton was not Instructed 10 make any
additional deposits. He must push through.
Ii hc couldn't get. hrough he was to land
his provisions, not on the west side OF
smith sound, hut on The east side. at Life
lOat Cove. and 20 into winter quarters.
He Oheyed bis Instructions and lost his yes
sci. Cast ashore, he lclt all OF his supplies
that he could spare and S.arted southwark
Cape SGbIne. found scarcely any food, and
learned that he had been forsakcn.
lIazen ordered that great load OF food
should he taken, at all hazards. to the sta
tion where it was not needed. and that
none Of 1t should be deposited on the way
at the points selected by Grcely, where it
was sorely needed. His ignorance. >II-
pidity, and blindness To the most urgent
necessities Of the ease were almost iucom-
prehensible. II half OF the Neptune's load
had been LETT at Cape Sabine. or il CARING
ton had been directed to make deposits 1t
the points mentioned y Greely before
striving 70 90 through the ice. Gresly's
companions woIld not have starved. In
pursuing the course 10 which we have rr.
ferred. Hazen per>i,tently rejected the adj
vice of others who haG accurately mea-
sured his mental capacity.
We have undertaken to point ont those
miserable blunders Of IIazcn which directly
affected the rctreating colony, food sup
plies There were other blunders, which
the Proteus court enumerated among the
"uinc grave errors and omissions noted in
his action. which either directly led or
largely contributed to the abortyc issue oi
the Darlington expedition" Wnen the
court made that declaration it did not
know that these hlunder- had caused the
deaths Of nineteen men and forced the sur
VivOr, 10 become cannihas. But without
taking into consideration these other blum
ders. the one We have described j. sufficient
to prove that lIazen should no longer be
allowed to hold the Office in which hi'
stupidity and incompetence have become
notorious.