Cheyenne transporter. [volume] (Darlington, Indian Terr.) 1879-1886, 1884-06-13

neaVy lOSScS, to be sure, and several
days OF stagnation and embarrassment:
but the result proves that the condi-
tions were lacking for one of those cur
ious convulsions to which trade is peri
odically subject, and which are fre-
quently precipitated by the failure of a
single bank or business firm of prom
inent character. The panic of 1857 fol-
lowed closely upon the failure of the
ONO Life and Trust Company; and it
was the failure of Jay Cooke q Co.
which brought on the panic of 1873.
If the situation had been the same this
year, the New York failures of last
week would inevitably have produced
like result, for they were quite rs inn
portant in their way as the two which
lnaugurated the panics of 1873 and
1891 But the situation was not the
same, and so the storm was confined
to local area, and the losses fell upon
n particular class, and the general
course of business has escaped with a
mere temporary tremor and apprehen-
sion of disaster.
There is logical ground for saying
that this experience demonstrates that
the financial condition of the country,
including New York, is exceptionally
sound and free from elements of weak
ness and danger The simple fact
that the closing of several such influ-
entail concerns as those which went
under last week did not cause Il panic
Is in itself sufficient to show that things
are upon Il stable basis, and that busi
ness is being transacted according tC
methods that do not partake of the
kite-nying philosophy. Had it beer
otherwise nothing could have pre-.
vented general smash when banks
like the Marine and Metropolitan and
and firms like Fisk d Hatch and Don.
nell, Lawson & Simpson found it nee.
essary to suspend. The truth is the
banks doing a Legitimate business, and
the traders of large capital and exten
sive connections, have been preparing
to meet just such a turn of affairs fol
the last two or three years; and wher
1t came it found them ready to protect
themselves and to stand firm while tn,
few suffered who had only thcmselves
to blame for their misfortune. Tha
is the real explanation of the matter
and 1t conveys an assurance tina
should inspire confidence instead o
creating fear or diStrust.
These New York failures and sus
pensions are easily traceablc to cause
entirely out of connection with tina
theory of interdependenCe and mutua
interest which is the foundation anC
security of general, legitimate com
merce. The sort of business they wer
doing set them apart and eXpose'
them to perils all their own. The,
had not overstrained themselves in cf
forts to reach proper results by prope
means; they had attempted to compass
a given end ard one not strictly cor
rect by rcSOrting TO unSOund and SIMS
ter cNpedieEtS. In other words, the
neither did healthy business nor sus
tanned a definite relation to the inter
ests of the community, and hence whel
they collapsed the effect was limitet
and ShOrt-liVed. The worst comes firs
in such miSfOl tunes, whereas in cas-
of the failures that compel panics tn
damage is cumulative, and every AZ
terry in the whole commercial system
is more or less affected before the tul
extent of the calamity can be appro
ciated. This instance was clearly on
in which speculation alone was tn
> prediSposing feature, and speculator
alone were required to shoulder tn
consequences. 1t speaks well for Tia
fifty or sixty other banks in New Yor
that they were not materially y afl'ecte
by the downfall Of the houses in ques
tion, but kept on the even tenor {
their way without recourse to any eN
ira measures of self-defenSe; and cen
tainly the banks in other parts of tn
country, all of which are in som
measure dependent upon New Yorh