The National tribune., 1884-10-09
ChanceIlorssiile.


To THE EDITOR: In your issue Of Sept II
appears an interesting article from Mr.. Conner,
who acted as courier TO Gen. Howard during
the Charlottesville campaign. He gives his
letter as statement of facts which came under
his own observation during the battle, and
states that he was with Gen. Howard May 2,
1863, when Gen. Hooker rode along the entire
front of the Eleventh Corps, and knows that
Gen. Hooker's expression of satisfaction with
Gen. Howard's position were unqualified. In
view of the following order, issued by Gen.
Hooker on that memorable May 2, in the morn
ing, the friends of Gen. Hooker will be reluc-
tant to permit this implied responsibility for the
surprise to Howard to be laid upon the Gen.
eral-in Chief Here is copy of the order, and
is in itselfa complete refutation of the charge
that Hooker was satisfied with Howard's posi-
tion, etc.:
HEADQUARTERS. ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
CHANcELLoRsvuLE, VA, May 2, 1868, $50 a. m.
Maj.Gen. SLocuM AND Maj.-Gen HOWARD:
am directed by the Major General commanding
to say that the disposition you have made of your
corps has been with view to front attack by the
enemy. If he should throw himself upon your
hanks ne wishes you to examine the ground and
determine the positions you will take in that event.
in order that you may be prepared for him in what
ever, direction he advances He suggests that
contingency. The right of your line does not ap-
pear to be strong enough. No artificial defenscs
worth naming have been thrown up and there APP
pears to be scarcity of troops at that point and
not iii the Generals opinion as favorably posted as
might be. We have good reason to suppose that
the enemy Is moving to our right. Please advance
your pickets for purposes of observation as far as
may be SAFE In order to obtain timely information
of their approach.
tSigned.) JAMES II. VAN ALLEN,
Brigadier-General and Aid-de-Camp
After sending his corps commander such an
order at 10 in the forenoon can Gen. Hooker,
with any show Of justice, be held responsible
for the surprise and rout which befell that
corps at o'clock in the evening, even if no
other warning of the impending attack of
Jackson's $4,000 men had been given? But
such was not the case. Gen. Howard in his re-
port says that though constantly threatened
and apprised of the moving of the enemy, yet
the woods were so dense that he was able TO
mass large force whose whereabouts was not
ascertained."
But the suggestions contained in Hooker's
order were especially adapted to prevent such
an undiscovered massing of the enemy in the
immediate front, and had they been even par
TALLY obeyed would have prevented the hor-
rible disaster which followed.
Immediately after the battle, soldiers Of the
Army of the Potomac will remember that the
Germans were made the scape goats upon whom
to rest the blame, on account of their breaking
at the first onset; but what troops could have
maintained the least show or retained their or
ganization, surprised as they were by the masses
Ol JdckSOuS VettEdUS anu Ln6lE own plckeE3
together rushing among them, as they, with
arms stacked, were lounging around, playing
cards, cooking coffee, etc.
Serg't Conner, the writer of the article also
states " that large number of both officers and
priVates hold Gen. Devens responsible for the
defeat of the Eleventh Corps at Chancellors-
vile May 2, and the ultimate defeat Of the
entire army under Hooker Be that as it
may, venture to state that there is an i'm
mensely larger number who elieve that if the
Congressional investigation " the Committee
on the Conduct of the War had not been the
veriest farce and sham, the responsibility
for the disaster would have been incontrover-
tibly fixed at the time, and it would not have
been saddied upon Gen. Devens, nor the Ger
mans, nor yet Gen. Hooker.
Had the $50 order of the morning been acted
upon it would have given the exposed part OF
the line more than half day in which to
prepare their front Had q few men of the
Eleventh Corps been supplied with axes and
been turned loose in the dense woods in his
'front.' referred to by Gen. Howard, for half an
hour, let alone half day, how many old soldiers
among your readers are there that don't believe
that the disaster of the attack would have been
az fatal to the rebel army as it was to the Union
army eventually. Speak up, Eleventh Corps
officers and men, By permission of THE TRIB-
UNE, and give its half million readers the "un-
written history" of that bitter defeat before
you are all dead and it is too late to rectify the
many wrong views and beliefs that prevail on
the sulject-PRIvATE, Oil City, Pa.