Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1884-06-24
Decided Arain,. the County.

| LII The superior OOuIl VI lue county Oh SdCTd-
mento State of California Carlton Richards,
| plaintiff VS.. The County of Sacramento defend
ant. This action was commenced in the JUS
| tees Court of the City of Sacramento held by
| j. c. Tubbs, Esq, Justice Of the Peace. The
| complaint contains two causes of action. The
| first cause stated in the complaint is for bal
ance of $50 claimed to be due for interpreting
| before the Grand Jury. The bill as originally
presented to the Board of Supervisors was for
| 800, and the Board allowed the claim for 500 and
| rejected it as to the balance. The county paid
| to the assignee of the plaintiff the amount
allowed, which was accepted by him.
| The payment and acceptance of the
amount allowed must, upon fair.
| and reasonable construction of Sections 43 and
| A of the County Government Act, be deemed a
| waiver of the claim for the balance, and the de-
cision of the Justices Court, that the plaintiff
could not recover the balance, must be affirmed.
The second cause of action stated in the COM
plant is for eighteen days services of the
plaintiff, in interpreting, in this Court, from the
| English into Chinese, and from Chinese into
| English in the of the People of the State
| of California against Mock Soon for murder.
| The plaintiff attended in obedience to the pro-
cess of the Court, and was appointed and sworn
| as an interpreter in the case. The proof shows
| that his services were reasonably worth SO per
day. The evidence shows that there are only
two white or American interpreters IN the
| State who are competent to interpret IN
| Court, Mr.. Locke being absent. Those two are
| Carlton Richard, the plaintiff and jerome Mil
| lard. These gentlemen are the Court interpret
| ers in San Francisco, and are men OF integrity,
| which is a material element in the qualification
of an interpreter. The plaintiff claims $50 for
his services, but the Board of Supervisors
| allowed him only sd, which he refused to ac-
cept. The learned Justice before whom the case
was tried decided that the plaintiff was entitled
| to recover the full amount claimed and rendered
| judgment for it. Did he err in so deciding? we
| think not. The special counsel for the county,
S. S. Holl, Esq, contends: First, that the coun-
ty is not liable for the services of Interpreter
in criminal actions; second, that If the county
| is liable, the compensation cannot exceed three
| dollars per day. In support OF the second pro
| position, he cites and relies upon Section IS OF
the Act entitled D." An Act to regulate, fees
| of office and salaries of certain officers,
| and to repeal certain other Acts,
approved March s. 1870. That section
reads . Interpreters and transators shall be al
| lowed such compensation for their services az
| the Court shall allow to be taxed and collected
| as other costs; but the same shall not exceed
three dollars per day" Statutes 1870, p. 49,
This section only applies to civil, and not to
criminal actions. In all civil actions the Court
| can tax the costs against the losing party, and
| in equity suits in its discretion may tax costs
| against the successful party and render a Judg-
| ment therefor but in a criminal action, wherein
| a person is convicted of murder in the hTst de-
| gree, where there is no recommendation by the
jury for imprisonment for life, the whole luIls-
| diction of the Court is exhausted. When Judg-
| ment is entered that the defendant be hanged
| until dead, there Is no provision IN the renal
| Code that the Court shall adjudge that the OF,
| fender be hanged until dead and pay the cost OF
the prosecution, too Nor was it ever intended
by the Legislature that an interpreter whose
| services were necessary to the prosecution,
| should take out execution against the property
of such offender or, after he was hanged.
should take letters of administration upon his
| estate to collect the compensation for his ser
| vices As counsel fees for services in procuring
| letters of administration cannot be charged
against the estate of deceased, the fees of coun-
sci necessary to obtain letters OF administration
| would frequently exceed the amount due Tor IN
| terpreting and leave the interpreter without
| anything for his services and i'll debt to his
| counsel. The injustice of such construction OF
the law is too apparent to. require further
notice. The principle is the same in all
| criminal actions, and the argument that the
interpreter must first exhaust his remedy against
the property of the defendant convicted IN a
criminal action or show that such defendant
had no property, before he could assert claim
against the county, is equally untenable No
other provision OF the statutes or codes, hXlng
the amount of compensation OF interpreters, has
been cited, and We know of none. The amount
OF compensation, then, is not fixed by statute.
This, then, presents the question as TO The la
bility of the county for services rendered to the
use of the county where the compensation is not
fixed by statute. There is no doubt that the
county where an Indictment or information is
found, is liable for all proper and legitimate
costs incurred in a criminal action. County
Government Act Sections lie, ll9, lSO, Isl,
Statutes 1888 p. 36i) But Section "a
of that Act provides that accounts for
county charges of euery description must be pre-
scented to the Board of Supervisors, to be audited
| as prescribed in this Act;" and III obedience to
| this provision of law the plaintlf presented MS
claims to the Board Section Us declares GER
| tain claims to be county charges, among them
are 1.-THE contingent expenses necessarily IN
ourrcd for the use and benefit of the county"
| As to whether the county is liable for the ser
| vices of an interpreter in a murder case depends
| upon the construction to be given to this clause
in the statute. Experience in the administra-
| ton of the law shows that in this State, where
people of all races and tongues have congregG-
ted it is necessary to press into the service ofthe
| Courts Interpreters to interpret from one Ian
guage into another and vice versa. And the Legis-
| lature recognizing the necessity, provided that
| "when witness does not understand and
speak the English language, an interpreter must
| be sworn to interpret for him." &C.. c. p, Sec.
| 1SS4) And the same section of the Code of Civil
| Procedure, which is also applicable to criminal
actions provides that the Court may summons
| any person to act as Interpreter and II he fails
| to attend at the time and place named in the
summons, he shall be guilty of a contempt. The
| Court has the power not only to compel the
! attendance of an interpreter, bnt to detain him
| and require him to act so long as the necessity
| for his services continues. He may be detained
| one day or one week, or one month or longer
| But it is claimed that the Interpreter must per
| form such services without any com
interest of the public; but why should the public
| appropriate the fruits of the labor of the profes
sional Interpreter or linguiSt any more than the
earnings of the blacksmith without compensa-
| ton ? The wages of an Interpreter is as much
| his property as is the wages of the mechanic
| who tolls daily for his bread, and the wages of
| such a mechanic is as much his property as the
clothes he wears and is entitled to the same
|
| public The constitutional principle That pri-
vate property shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation is as old as civil
lied jurisprudence itself, and where either the
public or an individual appropriates the prop
erty of another to their or his use, the law i'm
plies that the appropriation agrees to pay for such
property what the same is reasonably worth. In
the of Brady VS.. the Supervisors Of New
York, > Sandf.. 473, the plaintiff sought to re-
cover the value OF professional services.
There was no express contract that
the services should be paid for
by the county. The Court said, in rendering its
decision: 1T is not to be doubted that the
plaintiffs claims are county charges, and might
have been submitted to the Board of Super
visors for allowance. He claims by force of an
implied contract of the Board, for services
which were beneficial to the Board and thus to
the county The Supreme Court had the stat
utes on this subject under consideration in
Bright VS.. Supervisors OF Chtnango, Is John 2i2;
Mallory vs.. Supervisors of COstland, and Double
day ". Supervisors of Broome, , Cow, 5S3: and
the People vs.. Supervisors of Albany, II Nend.,
257. Those cases establish this general princi-
pie that whenever services have been rendered
which are beneficial to county and no com
pcnSatiOn is provided for the same by law.
| they viii be deemed contingent charges against
| the county. The services of the plaintiff are
precisely of that character 1t will be
seen by reference to the statute regulating the
powers of county officers Il r. s, 3S5 Sec y, that
| after specifying various liabilities and demands,
| the fifteenth subdivision includes, The contn-
| gent expenses necessarily incurred for the use
| and benefit of the county These are to be
examined, settled ana allowed DN the fOdfu oil
| Supervisors; and the fourth section of the same
title contains the general directions before men
| TONED, that accounts for county charges of
| every description shall be presented to the
| Board to be audited by them
| And in tho People vs.. Supervisors, 10 New
| York, 100 it is decided that where services were
| rendered for the benefit of the county and no
| specific amount was fixed by law as a compcnsa-
| ton, such services must be deemed contingent
| charges against thScOunty.' To the same effect
is the case of the People VS.. Supervisors 50 New
| York, 4H.
The provisions of our statute as to the liability
| of the county for contingent expenses, is in
| the exact language of the New York statute
| upon the subject under consideration, and the
decisions cited from that State authority for
the conclusion that n reasonable compensation
| for the services of an interpreter in criminal
actions is to be considered contingent eX-
| penses necessarily incurred for the and
| benefit of the county, within the meaning of
| the statute, for which tile county is liable. The
| only difference between the New York statute
| and our statute. is this Under the New York
| statute the determination of the Board ms to the
| amount due from the county was conclusive, but
| not so under our statute. If the claim is re-
jected after being duly presented. as in this case
| the claimant may bring his action against the
county. County Government Act Sec Al 1t
follows that the judgment of the Justices Court
must be affirmed with costs, and it is so ordered
| JoHN W. ARMSTRONG, Superior Judge
SAN FRANCISCO STOCK SALES