The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1884-12-31
RETREAT FROM MOSCOW.
A War Which Was Begun in wantouness
and Ended in Destruction.

Seventy-two years ago Napoleon
mounted his cream-colored horse and
left the kremlin, and the retreat from
Moscow was begun. OF all the blum.
ders in that campaign the great blum
der was the campaign itself. Napoleon
admitted at St. Helena that it was un-
provoked. All the charges that he
made against Alexander were pretexts.
The war was begun in wantonness and
ended in disaster the most stupendouS.
Napoleon was one of those whom
elevation spoils. From the time when
he assumed the crown he had been in
sufferably vain and insufferably over
bearing and insolent. He could not
brook advice. To military objection
offered by one of his marshals his an
swer was storm of curses and obscen-
ity. If it was suggested that it would
be immensely difficult to subsist large
army in a country so sterile and so i'll
supplied with water, he replied only
with oaths and filth. He seemed to
think that a tempest of imperial pro-
family would intimidate the elements.
In June, 1912, Napoleon's armies
comprised more than 1.150,000 men.
He led nearly 500, 900 across the Me
men. How many returned? 1t is con-
ceded by military critics that the cam
paign was feebly managed. Napoleon 5
mind seems to have been constantly
lethargic. Besides he seems to have
been almost incapable of coming to a
decision. But lethargy and indecision
were not vices of Napoleon earlier
career.
The next day after the battle of
Smolensk battle was fought at Valu-
tino, village three miles from Smo-
lensk. 1t was battle of such impor-
tance that it left 10000 French troops
on the field dead and wounded. The
circumstances were such that it was
Napoleon's duty to be on the field.
Yet, though he listened from dawn of
day to the roar of artillery, and though
he could have galloped to the field in
thirty minutes, this greatest of military
leaders staid away. This is surely
queer conduct in the general of an in
vading army.
In the battle of Borodina the Russian
army occupied position within a mile
or so of the unfordable River Moskwas
and nearly parallel with it, its right
resting on a little stream named Kolo-
teha, having high banks and emptying
into the Moskwa at nearly right angles.
kutGsOff, with his back to the Moskwa,
had 12O.GG0 Napoleon in his front,
and of course, further from the river,
had 10000 The battle began at day
break. Napoleon took a position in
the rear of his center, and spent most
of the day walking to and fro with his
hands behind his back About 10
o'clock Murat and Ney, having by ter
rible fighting driven back Kutusoff's
left wing and got it into an awkward
position, joined in a message to Napol-
con saying that if he would send them
re-enforcements they could drive the
enemy back to the angle of the rivers
and capture the entire army. Napoleon
refused, and even failed to 90 himself
and inspect the field. Kutusoff soon
recovered, and the opportunity was
lost Again at 3 p. m. the same mar
shals jointly reported like advantage,
asked immediate re-enforcements, and
promised like result. The emperor
questioned and doubted and dawdled,
and finally consented to send re-en-
forcements, but was so slow, whether
purposely or not, that again the oppor-
tunity was lost What was the conse-
quence? Borodino was a drawn battle.
True, Napoleon gained a technical VIC
tory in the fact that Kutusoff resumed
his march. But a technical victory,
especially to an invading army, is
sorry thing. The carnage on both sides
was awful. At night eighty thousand
men lay upon the field. Napoleon's
admirers apologize for his admitted
feeble management on that day by say
ing that he was sick. He was not sick.
He had bad cold. but no man, mer-
chant, lawyer, farmer or mechanic
stops work or calls himself sick for
bad cold. The emperor was up, and
commanded the army all day. About
p. m. he rode over to his left center,
distance of some three miles to re-
connoiter a position. The statement
that he was sick is an aftorlhought.
After he occupied Mo- ow his be-
havior showed pusillanimity. Naughty,
overbearing, and insolent as he had be-
fore been, he had the meanness to make
advances to Alexander for peace. He
begs. In return he is snubbed. Oct.
13 snow fell. Again he begs, and
again is snubbed. He is irresolute.
The case calls for instant decision. He
does not decide. Every day that passes
is a day full of threats, of unimagin-
able horror to his army. Never before
was there a more pressing duty for
prompt decision and prompt action.
Napoleon sits in the Kremlin moody,
angry, finding fault with everybody,
and overwhelming with curses all who
came near him. The burning of Mos
COW ceased on the 10Th of September.
Napoleon, during the days when the
conflagration was going on. had leisure
to reflect and to advise with his mar
shals. On Sept. 90 he should have de-
cided. In the terrible strait to which
his insane and wicked ambition had
brought him to expect anything from
Alexander was idiotic If he had begun
his retreat on Sept. 20 he would have
saved his army. But, surrounded by
perils more terrible than ever before
menaced a military chief, he spent one
whole month in irresolution and mac
ton. The horrors of the retreat can
not now be recounted. But it is worth
while to add that, though the attacks
of tho enemy were upon the rear guard,
Napoleon, instead of being constantly
there to enforce discipline, encourage
his troops, and direct the battle, was
constantly miles ahead in the center Of
the army, and riding in carriage with
a fat man on each side to lend him
warmth. Louis Globe Democrat.