St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1884-03-19

Ga, 250; Thornton VS.. Beedsal, 46 Ala, %.
Good faith'' is the opposite of "bad
faith.''
''Bad faith'' implies fraud or wrong mo-
tive.
Under new registration laws, the essence
and sole object Of which is 10 give notice, OF
course, person cannot be a purchaser in
good faith who has actual notice Of prior
conveyance, for he has all that the statute
was designed to give him. This has been
often SO held, even under recording acts,
which do not contain the expression
Sin good faith.' So too in equity a party
will not be deemed purchaser in good faith
who buys without notice of prior equities.
DCases of this kind have little or no applica-
ton to the present case. Notice of prior con-
veyance will not render subsequent pur-
chaser purchaser in bad faith, unless the
act of purchasing with such notice would be
wrong or fraud upon the prior vender.
Our statute on chattel mortgages is not
mere registry laD as seems to be often assum-
ed. 1t is a statute declaring certain
mortgages void as to certain persons unless
certain things exist or are affirmatively made
to appear
Its object is not merely to give notice to
subsequent purchasers or to protect those who
purchase without notice of prior mortgages,
as would be the case if it were mere regis
tration act
How in view of the provisions of this act
can it be said to be a case Of bad faith or
lack OF good faith to prior mortgage to take
conveyance ofproperty found in possession
OF the mortgagor, simply because
the party has notice of an
other mortgage which the law de-
closes presumptively void and conclusively
so unless the holder can make certain things
appear.
1t seems to me that the object of the stat
ute was to authorize all persons who for an
honest and fair purpose have occasion to deal
with the property to do so on the assumption
that any existing mortgage is presumptively
void, and conclusively SO unless the holder
affirmatively proves its bona fides There is
nothing novel in this. In many states such
as Massachusetts, Maine, Illinois, Missouri
and Wisconsin, chattel mortgages are de-
clared void as against subsequent purchaser
with or without notice, unless possession of
the property has been delivered or the mort
gage filed.
1 concede that under common law rules
defendant would not be in any better posi-
ton than his grantor to attack plaintiffs
mortgages. for only he who had a prior right
could have done so. But under this statute
the rule is different, and under it actual no
tice in part of subsequent mortgage of
prior mortgage does not relieve the latter of
the burden of making it to affirmatively ap-
pear that his mortgage was executed in good
faith, whenever he has permitted the posses
sion of the property to remain in the mort
gagor.
In short the term Gin good faith' as here
applied to the subsequent purchaser or mort
gage does not inclnde want of notice of the
prior mortgage, For this reason I am of
opinion that the judgment should be
affirmed. MITCHELL, j.
Adam Fritz, appellant, VS.. A. r. McGill,
administrator of the estate of John B.
Phillips, deceased, respondent:
Syllabus-The complaint in this action
was so framed that it did not disclose whether
it was intended to charge the defendant in
a representative capacity, as administrator
of an estate, or personally.
Before the trial, in deciding motion for
judgment on the pleadings the court con-
strued the action as being against the de-
PENDANT as administrator, and declared this
as its construction.
The plaintiff merely excepting to the de-
cision of the court, proceeded to
trial, without indicating his
election to prosecute the action against the
defendant personally and without offering
any amendment to ease the equivocal charac-
ter of the complaint.
Held, that the plaintiff should not after
wards be heard to say that the action was
against the defendant personally.
The mere delivery of property to one who
is the administrator of an estate, the estate
not being entitled to it, does not make the
estate responsible for such property to the
person entitled to it, it not appearing that
the property was treated or used as assets of
the estate or that the estate received any ben
eft from it.
Representations of freedom from incum-
brance made without fraud, during the ne
gotiations for the sale of real property, are
merged in the deed of conveyance by which
the sale is consnmmated.
For the fraudulent representations of an
administrator the estate is not responsible in
damages.
The order refusing a new trial is affirmed.
DICKINSON, J.
Steven Warner, appellant VS.: M. L. Lackerly,
respondent.
Opinion-We have carefully considered
plaintiffs petition for reargument in
this case, and under the rule laid down in
Derby 81 Day VS.. Gallop, MINI. 119, we
find no ground for granting the motion.
We are of opinion, however, that plaintiff
is correct in saying that the rule ''that a new
trial will not be granted in an action for de-
famation because a verdict for defendant
should have been for plaintiff,
for nominal damages" should
not be extended to cases ''where
some rule of law has been violated in
the admission or rejection of evidence or in
expounding the law to the jury"
1t follows that we probably misapplied the
rule. Built is unnecessary to invoke this
rule in the present case.
We are still of opinion that the trial court
committed no substantial error, although
it must be admitted that some facts of his
charge to the jury are neither very perspiceous
nor particularly expressed.
Motion denied. MITCHELL j.
District Court.