Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1884-10-27

I've force OF bU,OuU men, hY drawing
10000 for the immediate enterprise
from several points along the seaboard,
not even at that time threatened, and
from our advanced position be swiftly
THROWN ACROSS THE POTOMAC
at point which had carefully sur
veyed for that purpose, and moved
upon the rear of Washington, thus
forcing Mcclellan to a decisive en-
Ragement before his organization (uew
enlistments) was completed, and while
our own army had the advantage of
discipline and prestige-seasoned sol
diers, whose term, however, would ex-
pire in the early part of the coming
summer. This plan, approved by
Gen. Gustavus w. Smith (then imme-
ulately commanding Gen. Johnston's
own torces) as well as by Gen.
Johnston, was submitted to Mr..
Davis in conference at my head
quarters, but rejected because
he would not venture TO strip those
points of the troops we required,
Even II those points had been cap.
tured, though none were then even
threatened, they must have reverted
rs direct consequence to 90 decisive a
success. was willing, then, should
It have come to that, to exchange even
Richmond temporarily for Washing
ton. Yet 1t was precisely from eiml-
lar combinationsand elements that the
army was made up, to enable IL next
spTing, under Gen. Lee, to encounter
McClellAn's then perfectly organized
army OF 1000 men at the very door
of Richmond. If that which was ac-
cepted as last defensive resort against
an overwhelming aggressive army had
been used in an enterprising often
sive against the same army while vet
In the raw, the same venture had been
made at less general risk, less cost of
valuable lives, and with inmeasursbly
greater certain results. The federal
army Of the Potomac would have had
no chance meanwhile TO become tenn
pered to that magnificent military ma
chine which, through all its defeats
and losses, remained sound, and was
stronger, with its readily assimilating
new strength, at the end of the war
than ever before; the pressure would
have been lifted from Kentucky and
Missouri, and we should have MAIN
tanned what is called an active de-
fensive warfare, that. is, taken and
kept the offensive against the enemy,
enforcing peace.
No people ever warred for indie
pendence with more relative advauta-
gees than the Confederates; and If, as
military question, they must have
failed, then no country must aim at
freedom by means OF war, We were
one in sentiment as In territory, start
ing out, not with struggling admin
istration of doubtful authority, but
tttfih ftar N,N
and fully organized central govern
ment.
AS A MILITARY QUESTION
1t was In no sense civil war, but
war between two countries-for con-
quest on one side, for self-preservation
on the other. The South, with its
great material resources, its defensive
means of mountains, waterways,
railroads and telegraph, with the Inn
mense advantage of the interior lines
of war, would be open to discredit as a
people if It's failure could not be eX-
planned otherwise than by mere mate
rial contrast. The great Frederick, at
the head Of little people, not only
beat back a combination of several
great military powers, but conquered
and kept territory; and Napoleon held
AhiAbinth 4Luibte hN lilt lttl IA HIhDtt
till his blind ambition overleaped it.
self IL may be said that the South
had no Fredericks or Napoleons; but IL
had at least as good commanders as its
adversary. Nor was il the fault of our
soldiers or people. Our soldiers we're
AS brave and intelligent as ever bore
arms and, If only for reasons already
mentioned, they had determination
superior to the enemy's. Our people
bore devotion 10 the cause never sur
passed, and which no war-making
monarch ever had for his support;
they gave their all--even the last
striplings under the family roofs fill
ing the ranks voided 10y the fall of
their fathers and brothers. But the
narrow military view of the head of
the government. which illustrated it.
self in the outset by ordering from
Europe, not 100000 or 10000 but
10000 stands of arms, as an increase
upon 5000, its first estimate, was equal
ly narrow, and consequently timid In
It's employment OF our armies.
The moral and material forces act
ually engaged in the war made our
success a moral certainty, but for the
timid policy which--ignoring strategy
as science and boldness of enterprise
as its ally-could never be brought to
view the whole theater Of war as one
subject, of which all points were but
integral parts, or to hazard for the
time points relatively unimportant for
the purpose Of gathering for an over
whelming and rapid stroke atsome de-
cisive point; and which, again, with
characteristic mis-elation, would push
victorious force directly forward into
unsupported and disastrous operations.
instead of using its victory to spare
from it strength sufficient to
secure an equally important success in
another quarter.
THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF WAR
are truths and the same to-day as IN
the time of Caesar or Napoleon, not
withsianding the ideas of some
thoughtless persons-their applications
being but intensified by the scientific
discoveries affecting transportation and
communication of Intelligence. These
principles are few and simple, how
ever various their deduction and APP.
plication. Skill In strategy consists In