Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1884-02-14

BOTH CENSURED BY THE PRO
TEUS COURT OF INQUIRY.

" Il CUs lOs--l nG IEDOIb "
the court of inquiry into the loss of tn
Arctic relief steamer Proteus was trans
mitted to the Senate to-day by the Presi
dent. 1t finds Lieut.. Darlington guilt
Of an error of judgment in not waiting
longer at Pandora harbor after the sink
ing of the Proteus, in order to connec
with the consOrt steamer Yantic ant
make depot ofsupplies, but it commend
his general conduct of the expedition be
fore and after this event, and says tha
the error described occurred in the exer
else of difficult and unusual discretion
for which he should not be held to furthe
accountability to Gen. Hazen. The re
port gives credit for zeal and good inten
tions, but finds grave errors and omissions
in his actions, which are described a
length and numbered from 1 to 8, forming
a severe arraignment of that officer.
While awarding credit to Gen. Hazen
Chief Signal Officer of the Army, for the
best intentions in deyising measures fol
the rescue of the command of Lieut.
Greedy, and for an earnest desire, which
it was impossible that he should not have
entertained, to restore those adventurous
men TO their country and homes after two
years. exile from the world of humanity
and While further commenting the study
and care of Gen. HaZen and of his assist
ants in the Signal Office in 1883 in the
preparation of the outfit and material of
the expedition of that year and the selec-
ton OF its personnel, the court is Of the
opinion that in many particulars, and in
some OF the graVest moment, he failed in
an adequate comprehension of the neces-
stiles of the case and of the measures and
means essential TO meet them.
ERRORS OF JUDGMENT.
The following grave errors and Omis-
sions are noted In his action:
First. In not submitting IN the fall of
1882 to the Secretary of War, for the ac-
tion of Congress, sufficient plan, with
corresponding estimates, for the Organi-
cation and equipment of a complete and
efficient relief expedition, to be conveyed
in two vessels fitted for ice navigation,
whereby the chances of failure would
have been greatly diminished.
Second. In Objecting strongly in the
fall Of 1852 to the proposed endeavor by
the War Department to obtain from the
navy men for the relief party of 1888.
Third. In sending an independent
command upon the most perilous and
responsible, as well as distant expedition,
with only one commissioned officer.
Fourth. In informing Lieut.. CARING
ton in his instructions that Lieut.. Greely's
supplies would be exhausted in the fall Of
1883, whereas means of correct knowledge
were within ready reach i'll the Signal
Office to show that Lieut.. Greely's COM
mand was fully prOyisjOned for more
than three years from the summer f1SS1,
the natural effect of this beng to urge
Lieut.. darlington to undue impatience
ana naso2 to reach Lady Franklin BAv
with all the stores entrusted to his
charge, and to obscure from his
mental vision, after the ship and
cargo had gone down, the de-
of advancing as far as
possible nOrthward to give notice of the
in order that Lieut.. Greely, be-
fore coming down too far to 90 back,
might, being so warned, retire again to
his well provided station at Lady Frank
lin Bay.
Fifth. His persistent rejection of the
wisest measures that it remained possible
for him to adopt in the spring of 1888,
and which was repeatedly urged upon his
consideration, to wit: The making on the
northward voyage of the relief ship of
large depot for the winter at or
near Littleton Island, the objec-
tive point of the projected retreat of
Lieutenant Greedy, whereby the ship
would have been lightened of the stores
which it was in no wise necessary to car
ry to Lady Franklin Bay, or to expose to
the dangers of Smith Sound, and whereby
the subsequent loss of the vessel would
have been of comparatively trivial cOnse-
quence.
The explanations offered by the Chief
Signal Officer of his desire not so to make
depot that it would be a deviation
from Lieutenant Greely's own plan of re-
lief, is, as has already been shown, utter
ly untenable and illogical. Concert of
action between the retreating and
relieving parties was undoubtedly
important, but this being secured by COM
pliance with all Lieut.. Greely's requests
as to the location of depots or otherwise,
how could any intelligent Difference to
those requests, either in their spirit or
letter, forbid that further precautions and
measures should be devised and taken
with a view to his rescue? This was
plainly the case in the proposed unload
ing at or near LittletOn Island on the way
Eorthward. Lieut.. Greedy asked to have
winter station made tor him near that
place. If One-half or twO-thirds
of the stores of expedition had
been unloaded at the entrance
of Smith sound there would have been Sc
cured a vastly greater approach to a GER
tainty of the full attainment of Lieut..
Greely's wishes and urgent needs than
when the whole cargo was subjected to
the hazards of heavy ice pack habitual-
ly present in that water, and while a de-
lay of a few days would have involved
no appreciable disadvantage from retard-
ing voyage to Lady Franklin Bay which
was not essential. The omission to make
thlssdepOt, which was essential, threatens
G0rIOlIC dQnnnp tho liUOG of
Lieutenant Greedy and his command.
The further reason that Gen. Hazen
assigns tor his action that a naval tender
would be itself depot was, as has already
been shown, wholly fallaciOus and un-
founded.
SiGth. In falling to perceive the neces-
sity for second vessel until nearly the
middle of May, 1888, or to advise the Navy
Department of what such tender was
wanted to do, or how far was wanted to
go, until a fortnight later, whereas a def
mite and explicit request ought to have
been made Immediately after the enact
ment of the appropriation which author
lied the expedition two months sooner,
and that much longer notice was given to
enable more complete fitting of the ship
for the purpose.
SeUeRth. The omission of proper direc-
tiOns and measures for slowing the cargo
vi tu6 L IOiGuS III OIuGI Ludb IuS IuOSI I'M
p0rtant material for the purposes of the
expedition should be readily accessible in
an emergency, owing to which omission
it was unknown to either Lieut. CARING
ton or the master of the ship where the
arms and ammunition provided for the
party were slowed, and upon the loss of
the ship the command was left with only
a few arms and comparatively small
amount of powder and shot, that had been
kept in their personal possession. 1t was
of vital Importance that the cargo should
be so slowed that its most essential con-
tents would be easily accessible and re-
movable in an eXigency. The instruc-
tions to Lieut.. Darlington were insult
ficient, while he was denied permission
to proceed in advance to St. John to at
tend to the matter, which was committed
to the sole care of a nOn-cOmmIssioned
officer, who wholly failed to attend to it,
not even going to st. Johns for that pur-
pose. If sufficient quantity of arms and
ammunition had been saved, a cache OF
them might have been made for
use of Lieut. Greedy, the amount of whose
supply of this Indispensable material has
not been made known to the court, and
however ample it may have been origi-
nally, by this time may be entirely eX-
hausted.
Eighth. The lax, negligent and defec-
tive method Of keeping the record of pub
lie business and conducting correspond
ence in the Signal Office as illustrated by
the action of the Chief Signal Officer in
regard to the so-called supplementary
instruction or order to Lieut.. Darlington,
ns,nk tn f,aA NO. Il.