The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1884-04-17
SIMON coRREspoNnENcE.

captain W. Mch. Heath, 0tn Ohl0 cavalry,
editor of Field and Stream, Philadelphia, thinks
there was considerable surprise on the morning
of the attack. He says:
1t is enough to make a sensible mans blood
boil to hear some good men deny that Shiloh
was surprise. In every usual, just sense it
was surprise, needless, bloody, shameful.
OF course, many regiments and brigadeS had
ample time to form, and all that but our army,
as an army, went to sleep on Saturday night
and woke on Sunday morning, having made no
preparations whatever for battle, because it
didn't know it was coming. How differently
would we have spent most of that Saturday
night had we known that a rebel army was even
then camped right under our noses, ready TO
spring upon us
NJ HI. Yard, 18th Iowa, of Norborne, Carroll
county. Mo-, gives the following account of
what was said in the 18th Missouri after the
fight:
Our regiment fthe 18th Iowa. did not reach
the front until some time sS1er the battle yet
TO me it had peculiar interest as had several
friends and acquaintance in regiments that
were engaged, and my first step, on arriving,
was to learn their fate. Some of them / found
among the slain. / made a careful study of
the battlefield, aided by information cleaned
from those who had participated in the fight
gineer Regiment of the West, with which the
25th Missouri was consolidated. This regi-
ment it will be remembered, was the one
which opened the fight. For eighteen months
] messed with former members of that regi-
ment and had good opportunity to learn the
part they took in the fight.
Colonel Peabody, of the 18th Missouri, was
i'll command of the three companies of the 25th
that brought ON the action. They started out
about $50 a. M, and came upon the rebel
picketS about three miles in advance of the
Union camp They skirmished about half
hour with the Confederate pieizets before they
were driven back by the advance Of the main
| force of the enemy The morning appears to
have been damp muggy one, and the country
was likewise heavily timbered. These eondi-
lions seemed to have so deadened the sound ofthe
firing that it was not heard in camp As will be
readily surmised, the Confederate forces did
not long delay their advance after this unex-
pected surprise. They had lain on their arms
in battle-line during the cold night anxiously
waiting for the dawn to begin their advance :
hence it was but the work of a moment to pre-
pare for action. So rapid was their advance
that when the 18th reached their camp the
bullets of the rebels were cutting through their
tents Was the Union army surprised? The
testimony of the 25th was unanimous that a
part at least of Prentiss' division was surprised
and thrown into confusion. They all repre-
sented that when they were driven into camp
no battle-line had yet been formed, and that
the men were called up to fall-in under fire.
Generel Prentiss was just mounting his horse
as Colonel Peabody, with the remnant of the
18th, retreated on the camp, the whole rebel
| army at their heels Eyewitness told me
that this remarkable coloquy then occurred:
General Prentiss: What did you mean by
bringing on an engagement when you knew
we were not ready 2"
(01nnpl ahadxy 20 did ~ hi, =
is coming without my assistance
General Prentiss: Get your men out and
stop the rebel advance till we have time to form
line"
Colonel Peabody, smarting under this rebuke,
ordered his men to charge, and, without turn
ing his head, rode forward until shot dead
The 25th always spoke of thelo of their colo
mel with feelings akin to indignation.
Much allowance, however, ought to be made
for General Prentiss. He was undoubtedly
| laboring under great excitement at the mo-
ment. His heroic efforts to rally his men and
stay the rebel advance, which was of the most
! desperate and determined character. deserves
| great praise. That his men withstood the re-
peated assaults of the foe until late in the after
noon in struggle begun under such adverse
circumstances, shows good staying qualities, to
| say the least. There were many however.
| who seized with terror by the suddenness of
| the rebel onslaught and the confusion incident
| to surprise, fed panic-strcken to the river.
/ and the 25th had one man who accomplished
| the remarkable feat of swimming the cold and
! swollen Tennessee Had the proper vigilance
been exercised by those high in authority, / am
satisfied that the disaster OF the first day would
have been avoided and there would have been
no stampede. That the whole army was sur
i prsed is gross exaggeration but it is true that
a considerable portion of one division was sur
prised and hurried into action amid so much ex-
| element and confusion as to demoralize MANY
| who, under favorable conditions, would have
/ given a good account of themselves
Had the spade been employed in the two
weeks preceding the attack, no such disaster
would have threatened the army as at one time
seemed imminent As Carleton remarks.
the army had to learn a lesson-the lesson of
the.spade." But here we have the verifcation of
/ the old adage, extremes meet" for in the en-
/ suing Corinth campaign the spade was used to
degree bordering on the absurd.
Grants failure to use the spade is not enough
to condemn him, for as high military au-
thority as Gen. Won Moltlze rejects the spade
as tending to render an army timid and re-
luctant to act on the aggressive without cover.
My object in writing this is to call out some
| of the old 2oth to eorroborate testimony that [
have heard them give orally around the camp
fire, and settle the long dispute that has RACED
about this battle and get at the truth.
/ My account is a private soldiers view of a
great struggle, and no official report was ever
made by the commander, trust mine will re-
ceive a respectful hearing.
| The Rundown Condition of the System.
in which weakness, nervous worry and low
~. I, -