New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1884-02-01
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
THE BEAUREGARD BOOK.

This is inspired biography; in saying which we 10
not mean to call it Holy Writ or to ascroe 10 ~ any
kind of infallibility. We mean merely 10 poh' ou'
the fact that the book is in essence ana erect an
autobiography, and has that special value 10 the
student which always attaches to the auto
biographies of men of action who nave had 10 10
with important historical events.
The work bears the name of a former member Oh
General Beauregard's staff upon its title page, as
author. But General Beauregard has himself
furnished the documents and materials used in its
construction and, in q predatory letter, he makes
himself responsible for all its statements of fact.
Jndirectly he has probably done more than this.
The work speaks throughout in his behalf and from
his point of yiew II is in effect his own account OF
his military operations, his own exposition OF his
purposes and performances in the war; 1t may be
said to be- in brief General Bcauregars plea to the
tribunal of history intended TO set up and justify
his claim to what he regards as his proper share OF
the fame to be awarded to the several southern
leaders for military genius and military achio'o-
ments.
That claim is q large one. Perhaps it is somewhat
larger than history is likely to allow when 'he
,eoord shall he fnllv made up and final judgment
pronounced. -,
The author of the book maintains the theSls-whlch'
however he has nowhere distinctly formulated
that Beauregard was the foremost OF inc oo"tncih
generals in capacity, and that II larger cohtroi VI
affairs had been given to him, the military results
of the war would have been much more iavoraoio 10
the Southern arms than they WERE
Perhaps the best proof we could have that inns
thesis is unsound be found in the fact that tie
matters urged in its support. even II accepted WIN
ont criticism do not carry conviction of that kind
TO the mind of the reader Indeed, we think IL sale
TO saw that person of intelligence wholly destitute
of preyious knowledge of the subject-if we may
suppose such-wOuld not finish his reading OF the
work with the conviction that its subject was man
of supreme capacty. He would sec in General Beau
regard an educated and capable soldier, highly ac-
complished In engineering earnest III hlS WORK. III
defatigable in his attention to details enthusiastic
bevond the common and somewhat given to over
confidence in his In strategy upon large
scale he appears to have been more brilliant IMAM
sound. He was somewhat visionary in his hopeful
ness and was apt to found his calculations upon
anticipations of the maximum of good luck. The
luck failing at any pont,-a delay occurring which
ought not to have occurred, reinforcement ar
irving too late any unforeseen mishap Detailing
bim-he was pretty sure to come short OF the IN
tended achievement. In such cases he was consum-
mately skilfu in avoiding disaster, and as the wcTk
before us abundanty shows, he was and is exceed
inply ant in the art of demonstrating the soundness
of his plans and showing the certainty OF their sue
cess-if everything had gone smoothly as he hoped.
At Pittsburg Landing, for example. Beauregards
plan was in every way excellent, except that It's
success depended upon good luck in too many con-
tingencies. He proposed to concentrate ms own
Johnston's and Van Dorns armies at Cornth; to
march quickly forwards to fall upon Grant and
crush him before Buell. could effect junction with
him. and then to turn upon Buell. and overwhem
him, thus regaining control of the Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers and opening the way Tor an ag-
rressiye campaign into Kentucky. This was good
strategy in intent The thing sought was, in mill
tary sense emnently the proper object to be pur-
sued But the whole scheme required Tor Its success
the maximum of good luck at every step, ana III
that it was faulty and impracticable. 1t is safe
generalization that only those strategic plans are
sound which are capable of successful execution
with the means at commandments being under
stood rs including not only and materials, but
efflc ency discipline, organization and everything
else that affects the problem That this plan was
founded upon mistaken and visionary estimate OF
the means at command, is evident enough even II
we base our criticism solely upon the showing made
;n the book under review. The plan required in the
first place. that the proposed concentration should
be effected and the blow delivered before Buell
could arrive and at this point 1t failed IN an import
mt particular; Van Dorm, with his 2O,OOo men, OF
onethird of the whole force expected, failed to ar
Beauregard was several days ont in his calculation
of the time necessary to effect the concentration;
his plan was founded upon radical error in est-
mating the means at his disposal. OF the 10000 men
upon whose presence he counted, 10000 utterly
failed him because they could not accomplish the
march set them within the time allowed Beaure
card had therefore over-estmated the force at his
disposal by so per cent and that, certainly was an
error of sufficient magnitude TO rank almost as
blunder. But that was not all. The bographer is
at pains to show that there were other unforeseen
mishaps which prevented success; and saying that
as we understand the matter is equivalent to say
ing that the plan was unsound in other ways, was
founded upon other miscalculations of means. Polk
DELAYED his movement from COrinth, we are told,
far beyond the prescribed time; the troops marched
much less rapidly than they should; the organiza-
tion was imperfect for want of general omcerS OF
experience in subordinate commands; the battle
which should have occurred on the 9th of April, at
latest did not begin until the 6th and hence the
success of the first day was neutralzed by the ar
rival of Buels army before tho work OF crushing
Grant could be completed Such. In substance Is
the authors exposition of that affair." and his argu
ment seems to be that as Beauregard was not
directly responsible for any of these mishaps, he
should have all the credit which would have been
given him if he had accomplished the contemplated
destruction of Grant and overthrow of Buell..
Such is not our understanding of the principles of
military criticism. We count Pchegrus campaign
I'm the Netherlands a brilliant affair because it
ended in the utter discontinue of his enemies and
the complete conquest of the country-facts which
showed that he had rightly estimated IFS means.
If his barefoote1, half naked troops had found it
impossible to endure the seventies of that terrible
winter campaign. or if the ice-brdges over the
Mouse and the VAIL had failed him by reason of a
thaw, the French commander would have stood ex-
cused for his failure TO accomplish his grand pur-
pose but his campaign would have been abortive,
his scheme would have been numbered among the
many that have proved to be impractlcable IN exc
cntion. He could never have claimed credit as a
far ho,. ken q camnann