Richmond dispatch. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1884-1903, 1884-11-25

Nyp,V demonstrated. fOr example. lininr-
digiciY aiirr tie wax al iST0-'Tl a cost
plsfe revolution ia the tactics II the in
isntiy MAJ imposed by the Introduction
OF hrrccbinRdcrs. THIS revolution appeared
60 leo al irreyOcahiy accomplished iact.
A. fire had played The leading part
throughout tse war. Il was put down
- su axiom which admitted Of no
discussion that no troops could either
move or tight within tAc effective
gcnr of he cDcuy'> tire. either il col
unn ~ ~ inc, and tia, consequent
IS, clO,o order must be replaced 10y di,-
Icf,ci of(CT, Whaicyes might bc the time,
place, % CIRCUMSTANCES 0i :.n engagement.
iirucg. in Lic inanWnyfc, Immediately iJi-
loSing The peace in Germany -3ud indeed
eypfywhcsr., hos especially in Gcrminy-
nothing wa; SO De- seen save long line, OF
skismi>bci,; at wide intervals. witt
.'groups Cf supports " in rear, numerous,
bui Cach having feeble elective,
which groups preceded ~ long distances
two. three, and sometimes four lines, ~
tin - pO,,ihlc-kl,irmislcrs. supports. and
inc. moving with pTecantIOn. using every
cnytr 0dcirdby thr ground, passing oyer a;
: run The spaces swept 10y the chriny's
fire, ard lying down as soon A. the " Ullt -
WAS sounded. II was net even DIS
pcisCd order Of battle; it va, a scattered
order. and ihc great soldier who preside.
Over GSImany's military organization soon
.aw thai il must be modified. Open order
certainty bad rs advantages; but By II tlc.i-
clans hoped 10 escape, patty 81 least. from
the destructive effect Of improved weapons.
and Tie French elaborated very re-
uiarkalie system, as near perfection Oh
paper - possible. which had scarcely been
adopted (I2ih oI June. 1871 when tdcv
lc3rned tillt Tic Germans md recognized
the necessity oi rejecting against the cXcc>.
-iyc tendency 10 di-lrcatG aud scatter
THINKS TO their practical common sense,
tEcy perceived that, although The number
81 casualties might be reduced. - The
Mcih0Gs ia favor pagaiyIed. II they did
not deStrog altogether. the offensive spirit,
tho lighting sririt; thal their application
on The ie,G oi battle produced disorder
and confusion withdrew The men from The
control Of their officers, and by the too
great ips,,,ancc on using tho ground ~
cover tended TO inspire puerile timiiitv
incompatible with that 0r'odrt> : which
IL the motto of the German army.
Coun, Won Moltkc aud his colleagues dc.
icimiDrd to remedy thS. and they did
fe,1cdy Il, and wncn. IN 1876. foreign mill
TRY delegations Witnessed the grand M
u0pNfcS OF the German army they were
a>tOnishch. :" Bit i1is j. mol The physi,.-
nomy os cOmbat tausht 10y the lessons OF
iSGG and Of 1901 :" exclaimed one liccr.
lone would thinl, tia; we are back
10 the times Of the great Frederick aud The
seveu-Ycars' War" chimed In smother.
Certainty those naaTuYre, little rcSeai.
Il ltgf
the nau who compared Tie movements IN
1876 20 the movements invented by Fred.
cfick The Grca; exaggerated. Whit he
saw VII, not resurrection OF The " COM
pact" order: It was the transformation ni
The scattered" order into IN open iofIn1-
ton, where everything VS. handled aud
directed IL the same way, and with ne
same regularity and discipline u in The old
formation, with closed ranks The i'd
vance anq Dtogres,iOn Of "a attack is inll-
liahl ~ follow After preparation
with artillery. the " chain " Oi -kirmi~h-
cr.. continuous and rs Tar q. possible
kfcuug an alignment, move, forward
RAPIDLY, bu! nui q; run, and without
rfasin.. 10 ire. without attempting 10 itkc
advantage 0i any cover which miglt hc
.yailablc on ether side al the shortest lin"
~ tlii' tEAif. w Nhfll VII W. Atf"N w
with the ciigin from the very begin
nine 81 The action. shorten their distance
from The sAirmshcrs either = strengthen
il OF 10 prolong il 10 the right Of iei'.
In rear. also short distance come
the reserves dcployed in line. and.
ia rear Of these. the maia body formed
m company columns. ready either 10
support IN their turn the aliaci, 81 q,
rally the iiT,t line IL II ha- been repni-cd.
Az TIN, ensemble moves forward directly
obllquclr. Nv the Hank, without effort, a.
most without orders. always Keeping up a
steady IRE, until the moment wnrn. tie
enemy appearing 10 wayer. the whole bri-
eadc. without distinction OF Sc chain.' sup.
ports. reserves. DIST line OF serond linz.
dasbes forward with the bayonrl and viii
| those formidable ii0mrah. winch are ~
wcll calculated TO demoISlize and terriiy
coWard.y or il.di,clplined >oldicr>.
In no c.se i decisive ATTACK made
without AN obligatory turning movement
By this mean systematic outt1neing OF
| the eLcmyS line. not That turning NOV -
meni o. an army which i Of The donnin
/ OF strategy, no. tactics. The dominant
| principle i 10 keep the enemy 30 bh.,
/ along bis lIopt thlt hs cannot reinforce
| his wings. aud direct sgsiDS; these al The
/ troops dispoSabic OF the second and thiro
! lines in other words, 10 continue hans
I attack with IN attack upon tue front. Thi'
/ same principle, or AZ least rs counter
part. is equally applied Il the defence
/ Nhic6. thanks 10 The depth Of formation
/ OF H. order Of battle. caO instantly parry
any atiack upon IL. flank. should add
that both taciicaliy aud sirategicaliy, to-
! Gcfinaus only admit Tie otensiV"-teien
/ siye. which attack, III turn on the iir,
favorable opportunity, and Tor Thar reason
rroscrlbe ALI lnnnlobllizsiion behind Ell
ttenehmcHiS; they never ne2lerl 10 cover
their front With ride-pits, but they Do i
merely - = precau;ion IVA the event OF
reverse. ~ a supreme resource 10 eng U
( their position 10 the lasi moment.
The Iapidity Of execution oi alt the Go r
tnan movement. il marvellous, both in th'
attach aud IN The defence and so l. thri
precision even when seemingly mos. us
ordered, thanks 10 The admirable eihclene,
OF their commissioned AMI non-comhli :
stoned o.liCers, without which 81 IN = dl~
cipiiue vi comba. = would be- Impossible
NtIJ rarely dos-s the coupany commando
abandon the direction OF the firing, eve
when bis men are within tbc zone 81 sloil
3 tl~ltLff>s anu hiitN isfN Minus
rap,a, ALWAYS fixing the exact number
cartridges 10 be used by each man. An'
here let me resaik thai file firing. II"
rol0rie. or. a. the Germans call Il. Sch"fi'
feuer. : with them only employed eNecl
tiops,lly. in extreme cases ana Tor pfie
period OF time; ihev prefer sol'ey hrin-
Li,i.asotre. by the entIre line. or hrins .
sections or bv piasooHs. ibfheiiaHgSfe'ie'
and consequently never waste theis poNne
oil IN en,niy whom They can scarcely So
l.lke the Austrians and IuSsiau., they baV
little ccnhdencc IN tbe efficacy OF ylu,ke'r
lrr al distances greater than Lao yard'
and nainfaiB tia, II really becomes dead
within The distance OF lc6 wards &c
crater distances they rel, entirely upo
ili,ir artillery.
Now, IL has brcn objected that IN pra'
,iee n viii be difficult II coneiliate The
Tomatoes Of battle with those de''ruc,iy
effects OF m,tsketry after whica they sol
hut OF which they csnnot expect 70 pc
serve the monopoly. when II IS que
,Iec not Of nero nlsnwuvrcs, but Of ~
n-stin.. To tiis ne orrmsns rtpN Tn