The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1884-01-16


neither of the States of Kentucky or Tennessee
had passed ordinances of secession, and efforts
were industriously made, throughout the sum-
mer and fan of 1861, to induce them to unite
with the confederate cause. There was strong
Union sentiment in each of these States which
both needed and demanded encouragement and
protection, and Governor Morton considered it
OF the utmost Importance, both to the national
cause and the security of this State, that the
Vaccinations to destroy the influence of this
sentiment should be understood and resisted.
With this view he selected trusty agents and
sent them to Kentucky and Tennessee, in order
to ascertain the state of public opinion and to
observe the plottings of those who, while they
Protested neutrality made it apparent by their
conduct that they preferred the confederate to
the Union cause, and would, in the end, take
the side of the former. He succeeded in salts
flying himself that a conspiracy had been formed
to precipitate both States into the war by Sc
cession; and of the danger of this being done
at some unexpected moment and some
guarded point He discovered that there were
large bodies of Tennessee troops encamped at
various points upon the southern border of Ken
lucky, and being convinced that this was not
done to repel confederate invasion, suspected
that it was intended to move them into Ken
lucky, in order to overwhelm the Union people
there, whatsoever the secessiOnists should force
that State into the war. This condition of af
fairs gave him great concern not only on ac-
count of increased peril to the national cause,
but because he saw in it grounds for apprehend-
ing that this State might be invaded-for with
Kentucky on the confederate side, there were
nearly four hundred miles of the Indiana border
exposed to invasion at any time when sufficient
confederate force could be concentrated for that
purpose He entertained the impression That
the possible necessity for massing large bodies of
troops upon the Potomac, in order to protect
the national Capital might increase the diff
Guilty of defending Ohio and Indiana against an
attack from Kentucky, in the event that one
should be made This apprehension was en-
tirely natural, inasmuch as revolutionary move
,npr,tc 11oA1,
lucky and Tennessee in order to force those
States to join the confederacy-with the consent
Of the people, if it could be obtained but without
it, If it could not. 1t was evident that those who
were directing these movements would not hest
tate to resort to whatsoever methods they deemed
necessary to their ends-whether by usurpation
or otherwise. In both States they were resolved
to suppress the Union sentiment, which was
strong and decided. Governor Morton consid-
cred it national duty to foster and encourage
this sentiment as he believed it could be made
available to keep both States on the Union side,
and thus, by weakening the confederate cause,
render an invasion of Ohio Indiana improba-
BILE, if not impossible.
pr ANS FnR PREVENTING AN ISvhsvc 2.
, 1He pisdl ny when he proposed to pu
this State in a proper condition of defens
was to SIMPLY the cities lying upon the Ohio riv
err with sufficient heavy ordnance to repel an,
attack from the Kentucky side; to arm the mill
tia in the southern counties, and to station
regular troops at proper points. With referenc
to these suggestions he was especially emphati
AS it was his duty to be-inasmuch as the inter
estS of his State were involved, to say moth
ing of the advancement of the national cause
| In what he SAID and did he was faithful to boil
the State and the nation, insisting, in the inter
est of both, upon immediate and vigorous prep
aration for any emergency that might. by posi-
biity, arise His mind was occupied will
the subject that even at that early period of tn,
war, he informed the President that this Stat,
would furnish 40 Co., and he hoped so, 900 volun
teePs to the union army, so mistaken was hi.
conviction that the union cause right anC
that the people of the State would remain loya
to it,
His approximations with regard to hos
| tile movements in Kentucky and Tennessee
were strengthened by the events then transpir
ing-that is in the fall of 1S6l-especially in the
former State. A conference of secessionsts was
held there, which resolved to raise troops for the
cOnfederacy, and to resist the collection of any
taxes that could be used in aid of the UnioT
cause notwithstanding the State had not Sc
ceded step which did not even have the
merit of adhering to the policy of the State after
secession, but had the positive demerit of &
treacherous conspiracy to drive the State into
secession whether the people favored it or not
These troops forthwith raised and concen-
trated at Bowling Green and other points below
Louisville, under the command of a slillful con
federate general who had resigned Office in the
army of the United States for that purpose.
Governor Morton was informed that they had
been joined by at least two Virginia regiments
of confederates, which indicated to his mind that
was contemplated - more probably the
latter-in order to reach Cincinnati from
the rear lie could readily foresee that if such
an attack were made il would be likely to pro-
coed from Louisville, as the headquarters of the
invading forces that it would, consequently fall
with terrible severity upon this State and prOba-
bly, desolate the southern and eastern portions
| of it. 1t would have been unnatural for him to
| n OF az
these with compOsuPe, and all the latent ener-
| gles of his nature were aroused The occasion
was critical beyond anything he had ever i'm
agined, and would have completely overwhelmed
| weak and irrcsolute man. To him, however
! the line of duty plainly marked out, and he
did not hesitate to make his opinions and desires
known to the proper authorities. He realized
that it was absolutely imperative that these
| confederate forces should be driven back from
Kentucky and that both that State and
| Tennessee should be occupied and held
by Union troops. He accordingly recon-
mended that a powerful force should
be Immediately concentrated for these purposes
and that such IA blow should be struck as would
make the movement a turning point in the war
before the confederacy had acquired full strength.
| His accommodation was to the effect that
| heavy union column should be concentrated at
| Louisville, and moved thence on Nashville, dis
| lodging the confederates at Bowling Green
| where he was satisfied their numbers were exag-
| gerated-passing by and leaving less important
! points to defend themselves, or take the chances
of war. This, he thought, would at all events,
relieve Kentucky, by compelling the confederates
! to unite their forces for the defense of eastern
Tennessee, thus leaving the union people in the
rear of the national troops, while the secession
lists would be driven back behind
the confederate army He reasoned
thus That the possession of Louisville
by the confederates would be an armed CON
version of Kentucky to the disunion cause,
whilst, on the other hand, the occupation of
Nashville by Union troops would secure the 10y
It may be justly insisted that this idea dis
played the clear headed sagacity of statesman,
if it did not also exhibit such qualities as make
successful leaders of armies And when it is
observed that it was maintained by Governor
Morton as early as the fall of 1S61-before the
armies on either side had become thoroughly