The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1884-09-03
BLAINE FORCING AN ISSUE.
Editor Shoemaker's Demurrer Argued
at Length Before Judge Woods.
The Defense Makes an Elaborate Effort to
Dodge the Question and Resorts
to Subterfuges.

The defendants demurrer to the complaint in
the Blaine Sentinel libel case was argued before
Judge Woods yesterday, in the small room which
he uses when not occupying the bench during
the regular term of the federal court. Besides
the counsel there were not a dozen persons pres
ent and the argument was conducted quietly
The Sentinel was represented by Judge David
Turpie and Aquilla Jones, while w. H. II. Mil
Ter and Judge Claypool spoke as the counsel OF
Mr.. Blaine The argument began at 10 o'clock,
and was opened by Mr. Jones, who read thecom-
plant to which tile defendant demurred, and in
commenting upon it he said that there were
three objections which would be urged IN sup
port of the demurrer. These objections were;
~ That the complaint in no place, by innuendo
or colloquium implied that the person referred
to in the alleged libeous article was the plaintiff
because it did not say that the James
G. Blaine mentioned was James u.
Blaine, of Maine, and it is not, in consequence,
good common law complaint ~ that the publ
cation in itself is not libelous for the reason
that it is simply in the nature of an interroga-
tory; 81 that the language used, if libelous, is
HUI dSblOIdDl0 per al4u uAO PAosAAAUAAA $3.50
given Judgment unless special damages are al
legged. In his argument upon these points MI.
Jones claimed that there was no nnuendo or col
loquium in the alleged hbelous article directly
implying that the plaintiff was the person to
whom it referred 1t might have meant some
other person bearing the name Of james Y.
Blaine. In the language used the person re-
ferred to is not mentioned as james G. Blaine,
of Maine, or the man who is the Republican can
didate for President of the United States, and
the complaint does not allege any such fact
Judge Woods-But does it not state that the
alleged libelous publication is Of and concerning
the plaintifflp
Mr. Jones-Yes; but he is not identified any
where in the article as Blaine, the plaintiff.
Upon the second proposition Mr.. Jones SAID
that he construed the article sued upon as in
the nature of an interrogatory. No direct
charge is made. The law requires that there
must be some act charged before there can be
libel, and the nature of the charge must be such
that it can reasonably be supposed to degrade
him in the estimation Of his acquaintance.
The sentence in the libelous article reading
IF Mr. Blaine was the"-was quoted, and 1t
was claimed that the language was inJerroga-
tory in FORM and no direct charge was made by
it The word 'fn was used in the subjunctive
clause in the sense that 'if" certain allegations
were true, then his conduct was. etc.
In support of the third proposition Of the de-
murrer he said that if the language is hbelous
per Sc it cannot be made an actonable cause if
no special damages are alleged. A charge of Sc
duction or adultery is llbelous and can only be
made actionable by woman; but such accusa-
tions or charges against man are not hbelous
per Sc under the Indiana statutes,
THE PLAINTIFFS ANSWER
The argument of the plaintiffs counsel was
brief and to the point w. II. H. Miller was the
second to address the judge, and he did not talk
longer than twenty minutes. He cited the
statute which says there shall be sufficient cause
for action upon the publication Of libel when
it is shown that it was of and concerning
the plaintiff. The complaint did charge
that the libelous article referred to James G.
Blaine, the plaintiff, and that it was hbelous
per Sc. The person hbeed is specifically men
toned and the libel is not by innuendo or
hypothetical statement but is specific and direct.
If the person referred to in the publication had
been spoken of as the "Plumed knight" or as a
candidate for President it might have been in
terpreted as innuendo. He cited Bigelows Law
of Torts showing that the repetition of libel
does not excuse responsibility. He gave the law
definition of libel as the charge Of any act which
would subject the person accused to hatred,
ridicule or obloquy.
The argument for the plaintiff was continued
by Judge Claypool, who said that he thought the
Sto ~ =, ~
lot - ~, ms baS heo az,
ra,o5 ~, +b innnyv of +ha cort IN asrno If
Az cor,yo;nt d;d not charge that the iha1 Vas
of and concerning the plaintiff. In publica-
~ ailaa a,,u apnacel Jo,,,sas TIC
~. foT th co,,rt to decda ;s
SS+So az ~ &c i;haos saThere;
,,o y VT ISa Clool ss;d ..,vb;ch want
ta or,Tos;no ceonsa1 r. answer viii thew nav
thot II nberce was nnblsbad charging Them
with seduction it would not be libelous2 If it
is possible for the pen Of man to write hoel q
ea 'li,s % 'i, can , he y, eonce;yed y He
| read the libelous article calling at