The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1884-06-25
AN IMPORTANT LETTER.
MIR. ,BLAKNE's EXPLANATION OF
GARFIELD's FOREIGN POLICY.
Not War, but Closer Relations with Cur
Continental NeighbOrs.

periodical Mr. Blaine prepared a letter for
publication with a view to defining the pur-
pose and aim of the foreign policy which the
Garfield Administration intended to carry ont
had the President lived. So much has been
said in regard to that policy, and falsely said,
that the publication of the letter is a matter
Of interest at the present time. 1t is, there
fore, given in full:
AUGUSTA, Me-, September 1, 1882.
The foreign policy of President Garfeld's
Administration had two principal objects in
view: First, to bring about peace, and pre-
vent future wars in North and South America;
second, to cultivate such friendly commercial
relations with all American countries as would
lead to large increase in the export trade of
the United States by supplying those fabrics in
which we are abundantly able to compete with
the manufacturing nations OF Europe.
To attain he second object the first must be
accomplished. 1t would be idle to attempt the
development and enlargement of our trade
with the countries of North and South Ameri-
ca il that trade were liable at any unforeseen
moment to be violently interrupted by such
wars as that which for three years has en-
crossed and almost engulfed Chill, Peru and
Bolivia; as that which was barely avertsd by
the friendly offices of the United States be-
tween Chilli and the Argentine Republic; as
that which has been postponed by the same
good offices, but not decisively abandoned, be-
is threatened between Brazil and Uruguay as
that which is now foreshadowed between
Brazil and the Argentine States Peace is
essential to commerce, is the very life Of hon.
est trade is the solid basis of international
prosperity: and yet there is no part of the
world where resort to arms is so prompt as in
the Spanish American republics. Those re-
publics have grown out of the old colonial
divisions, formed from capricious grants to
favorites by royal charter, and their boun-
80 - al L.. La.
and consequently afford the basis of continual
disputes, breaking forth too often in open
war. To induce the Spanish American States
to adopt some peaceful mode OF adjusting
their frequently recurring contentious was re-
garded by the late President as one OF the
most honorable and useful ends to which the
diplomacy of the United States could con-
tribute-useful especially to those States by
securing permanent peace within all their
borders, and useful to our own country by
affording coveted opportunity for extending
its commerce and securing enlarged fields for
our products and manufactures.
THE MOTIVE FOR CALLING A PEACE CONGRESS.
Instead Of friendly Intervention here and
there, patching up treaty between two coun-
tries today, securing q truce between two 9TH
ers tomorrow, it was apparent to the President
that more comprehensive plan should be
adopted if war was to cease in the Western
Hemisphere. 1t was evident that certain Eu.
ropean powers had in the past been interested
in promoting strife between the Spanish-Amer-
lean countries, and might be so interested in
the future, while the interest of the United
States was wholly and always on the side of
peace with all our American neighbors and
peace between them all.
Ii was therefore the Presidents belief that
| mere incidental and partial adjustments failed
| to attain the desired end, and that common
| agreement of peace, permanent in its charac-
| ter and continental In its extent, should, if
| possible, be secured. To effect this end it had
| been resolved, before the fatal shot of July 2,
| to invite all the Independent governments of
| North and South America to meet in peace
| congress at Washington. The date to be as
| signed was the 18th OF March, 1882. and the
| invitations would have been issued directly af-
| ter the New England tour, which the Preei-
dent was not permitted to make. Nearly six
/ months later, on Nov. %, President Garfield 3
| successor issued the invitations for the peace
| congress in the same spirit and scope, and with
| the same limitations and restrictions that had
been originally designed.
AS soon as the project was understood in
| South America it received a most cordial ap.
| proval, and some of the countries not follow
| ing the leisurely routine of diplomatic cores
pondence, made haste to accept the invitation.
| There can be no doubt that within a brief Pc
Rod all the nations invited would have for
/ mally signifed their readiness to attend the
congress; but in six weeks after the Invita-
/ tions had sg0ne to the several countries,
President Arthur caused them to be recalled or
| at least suspended. The subject was afterward
referred to Congress in a special message, in
which the President ably indicated his con-
| stitutional right to assemble the Peace Con-
gress, but expressed a desire that the legisla-
| tive department of the Government e3puld
| give an opinion upon the expediency OF the
| step before the congress should be allowed to
| convene. Meanwhile the nations that receiv-
| ed the invitations were in an embarrassing stua-
| ton; for after they were asked by the Presi-
dent to come, they found that the matter had
been reconsidered and referred to another de-
| partment OF the Government. The change
| was universally accepted as practical though
| indirect abandonment of the project, for it was
not from the first probable that Congress
| would take any action whatever upon the sub
| jecr. The good will and welcome of the invi-
tation would be destroyed by a long debate in
| the Senate and House, in which the question
| would necessarily become intermixed with per-
sonal and party politics, and the project would
| be ultimately wrecked from the same cause
| and by the same process that destroyed the
| usefulness of the Panama Congress- more than
fifty years ago. when Mr.. Clay was Secretary
Of State. The time for Congressional action
| would have been after the Peace Conference
had closed its labors. The conference could
| not agree upon anything that would be bind
ing upon the United States, unless assented to
as treaty by the Senate, or enacted into a law
by both branches. The assembling of the
Peace Conference, as President Arthur so we'll
demonstrated, was not in derogation of any
] AiSAb VI pIoAOSdblEo VI tu6 OouAJ6 OE HOUSE.
The money necessary for the expenses of the
| conference-which would not have exceeded
| $10,OO0-could not with reason or propriety
have been refused by Congress. If it had
been refused, patriotism and philanthropy
would have promptly supplied it.
THE NECESSITY OF FRIENDLY INTERVENTION.
The Spanish American States are in special
need of the help which the Peace Congress
would afford them. They require external
| pressure to bring them peace. Their outbreaks
| are not only frequent, but are sanguinary and
sometimes cruel. The inhabitants of those
countries are brave people, belonging to a
| race that has always been brave, descended of
| men that have always been proud. They are
| of hot temper, quick to take affront, ready to
| avenge wrong, whether real or fancied. They
| are at the same time generous and chivalrous,
and though tending for years past to estrange-
| ment and alienation from us, they would
| promptly respond to any advance made by the
| Great Republic Of the North, as they have for
| two generations termed our Government. The
| moral influence upon the Spanish American
| people OF such an International assembly as the
| Peace Congress, called by the invitation and
| meeting under the auspices of the United
| States, would have proved benefcent and far
reaching. 1t would have raised the standard
| OF their civilization. 1t would have turned
| their attention to the things of peace; and the
| continent, whose undeveloped wealth amazed
| Humboldt, might have had a new life given to
| it, a new and splendid career opened to its in
| habitants.
| Such friendly interventions as the proposed
| Peace Congress, and as the attempt to restore
| peace between Chill and Peru, fall within the
| line of both duty and interest on the part of
| the United States. Nations like individuals
| often require the aid of common friend to re-
| store relations of amity. Peru and Chilli are
| in deplorable need of wise and powerful
mediator. Though exhausted by war, they are
unable to make peace, and, unless they shall
| be aided by the intervention of friend, poll
tical anarchy and social disorder will come to
the conquered, and evils scarcely less serious
to the conqueror. Our own government cannot
take the ground that it will not offer friendly
Intervention to SETTLE troubles between Ameri-
can countries, unless at the same time it freely
comedies to European governments the right
| of such Intervention, and thus consents to a
| practical destruction of the Monroe doctrine
| and an unlimited increase of European and
monarchical influence on this continent The
| late special envoy to Peru and Chilli, Mr. Tres
| cot, gives it as his deliberate and published
| conclusion that If the instructions under which
he set out upon his mission had not been re-
| voked, peace between those angry belligerents
| wouldhav been established as the result of his
| labors-necessarily to the great benefit of the
| United States. Ii our government does not
| resume its efforts to secure peace in Sontb
America, some European government will he
| forced to perform that friendly office, The
| United States cannot play between nations the
| part OF the dog in the manger. We must per-
| form the duty of humane Intervention onr-
selves or give way to foreign governments that
| willing n he