The Saline County journal. [volume] (Salina, Kan.) 1871-1893, 1884-02-14
BAKER PAsHA,s pEFEAT

The defeat Of Baker Pasha IN front
Of Toka IL the logical outcome OF
Egyptian laundering. Baker Pasha
went to Suakin soon after the disaster
10 General Hicks 20 make arrange
ments for the withdrawal Of the relief
Of the Egyptian garrisOns at TOka,
sinkan, Kassala and KhaFtoum. Ne
gotiations with the Abyssinian chiefs
kent omen the southern route from
KhaFtOum 10 MassOWah by way OF
Kassala, aud the gaTrisOns at FashOda
and other points on the Nile were
concentrated at KhartOum without
difficulty. But the Egyptian troops ct
Toka, sixty miles south Of Suakim.
and az Sinkat, two days march across
the desert country to the southwest OF
Suakim, were surrounded by the
Arabs and reduced 70 p point Of star
yation. The authorities st cairo In
sisted that an attempt should be made
to relieve the garrisons at these points,
and Baker Pasha, with a hundred and
fifty Turks and q number Of English
officers as 3 nucleus, formed an army
Of about 5000, and, In obedience 70
orders from Cairo, moved on TOka.
His gunbOats made the march to
BUAAAN AAAAAA Wy A~N"N~--
guakim and TOka, an easy one. But
when he left his intrenchments at
Trinkitat the British officers In Lon
don counted almost to the hour the
time Of his defeat. So far as the
Egyptian troops were concerned II
was the old story Of rout and massa-
ere. The fighting was done by the
few British and the Turks.
Tewflk PashR, hemmed In at Slnkatr
Il is reported, took advantage OF the
diversion to cut his way through the
enemy's lines to the coast. But the
road Is q difficult one for military
operations at best, as there Is water at
only one point between Sinkat and
Suakim, and the Arabs would have
every advantage of the Egyptian
troops. The report that Tewfik's
forces were.cut tOl pieces is probably
true.
The defeat Of Baker Pasha was so
much expected that the Torres In
Parliament counted certainly on II as
q point in their argument against the
policy Of the government. But as the
advance was ordered from Cairo, and
was made in the face OF English pro
test. the defeat, as an isolated incident
proves too much for the Tories. In
terpreted In one way the disaster
might be serious enough 20 retire the
Gladstone Ministry from office. In
terureted In another way, 10 may be
used as an incident TO open the way
TO q change OF policy under the pres
sure Of circumstances.
Il is easy for the government to
make political capital out OF a defeat
that demonstrates the incapacity Of the
Egyptian troops as for the opposition.
This is true whether the government
cOntempiates going into the. Soudan
with British troops, or whether Il Ia
vOrs occupation by Turkish troops.
/ Is as reasonable TO suppose that the
reports have. been exaggerated forieffeet
on the public in the interest Of some
scheme TO be sprung on Parliament as
to suppose they have been exaggerated
IN the Interest Of the opposition. IL
the government desires TO keep up the
pFetence OF having a desire tO get out
Of Egypt, and yet yet desires TO oe-
cupy Egypt under the preteDse OF
complying with a persistent public
demand, then Il would be policy 10
make as much of the defeats OF Egyp-
tian troops as possible. The inference
then would be that as Egyptian troops
cannot preserve peace, British or
Turkish armies must occupy the SOU
dan.