National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1884-02-06

last man is Standardization style, you
know. Garnett has over thirty miles TO
run from Laurel to reach Rcd House. Hill
has eight miles, with three days start, and
the problem is to see which army will be at Red
House FIRST. So thoy run, and Hill in hot
pursuit. rushe5 his rapid columns TO the june
ton Mt a. IN. on the fourtoenth--oight miles
in five days-the last rebel having passed that
point four hours before. What race II
should be stated that Hill candidly reports
that no brought his forces from Rowlesburg
and Oakland to West Union, and not Il man
started from West Union until word came that
Garnetts troops had all escaped and would be
on the other side of Backbone mountain before
he could reach the junction at Red House.
Mcclellan also says that he ordered two
Pennsylvania regiments from Cumberland to
join Hill at Rowlesburg, and that Hill was to
concentrate there and capture Garnett at
West Union. That was generalship. The
Pennsylvania regiments on reaching Oakland
would bo eight miles from tho Rcd House.
At Rowlesburg they would be twenty.ono
miles from that point; and Hill actually sent
what troops no had thcro by the way of Oak
land; so that the order Of Mac sent the troops
twenty-ono miles beyond whore they were
needed to Il point where they could not posi-
bly, be needed or used.
Now, though it was certain that Garnetts
men must come up the st. George road, and
strike tho pike at the Rcd House, no scouts
WtIO bGuJ uOWl 10 uuu Oub NOW Hldlly WtIc
coming, how fast, or what was their condi-
tion and they went in tho rear Of West
Union, and got away from under the very
nose of Hill, with mis- advance in two miles
of them, and were eight miles out Of reach
before he had the first knowledge Of their
approach, and no in "hot pursuit." under
orders to fight his last man. .
H. A. Myers, second lieutenant Rngold
cavalry, says in his report: 81 had ascertained
from persons living on the st. George road
that the rebels were retroating, and would be
through to Red House Saturday night (the
thirteenth) or Sunday, and reported the
same to Col Irvine ! told him thought it
important that scouts should be sont out in
that direction, and gavo him the information
| had received. He replied that there were
other points of more importance" That is,
IL was less important to send scouts down the
only road the rebels could possibly take than
to send them on roads they could not take,
for Irvine Mt West Union could not be ignorant
of the fact that they must come on tho Rcd
House and st. George road, for he had on the
ninth telegraphed Hill that he was sure of it.
Bear in mind now that on the ninth IT.
vine, Hill, and presumably, Mcclellan,
knew that if Garnett came at all he must
pass the Red House, and that there was the
place to stop the retreat; yet he orders troops
to re-enforce him at Rowlesburg, twenty-one
miles away, and keeps up the delusion that
Garnett will go eight miles out of his way
and climb mountain to get to West Union,
where Irvine was entrenched and i'll easy
supporting distance by Hill. Hill, on his
part, fooled away all the thirteenth in get
ting his troops to Oakland, which place no
reached at IL p. IN. Did he take them to
Red House? Not at all. He marched to
West Union, on mountain road, thirteen
miles, Just the distance he would have made
had he marched from Rowlesburg to West
Union so that an his time and effort of the
thirteenth to get to Oakland were lost-his
troops were out all night, instead of being at
rest, and at . a. M of the fourteenth he was
exactly the same distance from the Red House
that he was when the march began from Oak
land. Hill attempts to excuse this monstrous
blunder by saying that he supposed Irvine
was at Chisholm's, but he actuallylwas at West
Union. This is ridiculous subterluge or
outright lie.
Hill was trying to find the Red House. At
Chisholms he was within two miles of it, and
west of it, as he knew from Irvine telegram,
but still he marched his jaded troops six miles
further west, knowing they must march right
back over the same road before they could
face Garnett, thus making twelve miles of
rugged weary, unnecessary journey when time
was all important. When he arrived at West
Union word came that tho rebs had slipped
by. Hill it appears knew that Irvine ought
to have been east as least as far us Chisholm's,
for that was his excuse for coming via Oak
lana, anu Wnen nc IOunu nlm SIX nllleS from
his true point Hill repeated the blunder and
put himself also six miles from where he
wanted to be-if he wanted TO be where he
could do any good.
BY such management about four thousand
rebels escaped and turned up to help crush
Mcdowell at Bull Run.
1t may be said that Mcclellan Is not re-
sponsiblo for the blunders of Hill. MOI but
no is responsible for ordering concentration
at Rowlesburg, twenty-one miles from tho
point where Garnett must pass. He is re-
sponsible for supposing for II moment that
Garnett would go to West Union, an almost
inaccessible point if half defended, and of no
ca rthly use If taken, and miles out of his
direct course. lie is responsible for not send
ing Hill telegram on tho twelfth that
Garnett was on tho run for East Nir-
gina He Is responsible for not know
ing df he didn't know that the
Red House was the true objective, and for
not giving Hill orders TO concentrate
there. lie is responsible for not knowing
just how fast Hill was progressing and to
what end, and for not giving the proper or
dors to meet the emergency. He is RESPONSE
bio for sitting on his launches ut Beverly
and allowing Garnctt's force to pass Carrick's
ford with so little opposition, and he is re-
spOnsible for not pressing on his rear clear up
to the Winchester pike. He is responsible
for the bombastic lies uttered in an address to
the soldiers seven days after tho shameless
conduct hero narratedYiz:
SOLDIERS OF THE Army OF THE WEST: l am
| more than satisfied with you. You have annihi
lated two armies commanded by educated and
| experienced soldiers, cntrenched in mountain
Businesses and fortified at their leisure. You have
| taken five guns, twelve colors, 1000 stands Of
| arms. and 1000 prisoners one OF tho second com
manders OF the rebels Is prisoner, the other lost
| his life on the field of battle. You have killed
| more than $50 OF the enemy, who has lost all his
| baggage ana camp equipage. All this has been
| accomplished with the loss OF twenty brave men
| killed and sixty wounded on your part.
GEORGE Il. MCCLELLAN, Major General"
Annihilated two armies with only twenty
men killed Caught them in mountain fast
nesses, behind entertainments, and destroyed
| them Caught them, inducd-orly they got
away, with u loss by capture of 600, and n
| few killed and wounded, estimated By Mac
at $50 but not half thar, allowing for his
| tendency to cNaggerate numbers.
! If we take his estimate Oh GArEetts force
at 10000 Us true more than O,OOD escaped.
! Nine thousand surrounded and shut in BY
! the impossible mountains got away from
| 1900 under the young Napoleon
| Thus was tho nation humbugged by ihw
| gorgeous hifautin dispatches full OF mis-
| representation.
| The idea of the movement was correct; is
execution incompetent in every particular
| save the demonstration by AOsGcrans against
| PcgTan and tho brush at Cargict's ford,
| were Bcnham, with two or threc companies,
| only struck the rear of Garnett kIsgcrdu5
did what no was ordered to, hut in u way
not contemplated by Mcclellan and consider
| ably to his AstOnishmeut. In fact tic success