Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1884-04-25
The Scale Law.

Inc scale Law.
IN tue case Of the Territory VS..
Mouloc, several different statements
! having been made ms to what was
aud what was not decided by Judge
Huyt IN tins ease, on the argument
hpril Is. 1854, the following state
mont, prepared by one of the attor-
noys who took part in the discus
fion of the case, is published for the
bcntG, Of the public:
This was an application fer dis
charge by defendant, Capt. Monroe,
Of tho steamer Libby. charged with vi
olaiion Of the provisions of the Scale
Law of 1883, in towing certain boom
OF saw-logs from near Long Bridge,
Olympia, before the same had been
measured and scaled by the Govern
ment Inspector. The defendant,
Monroe, claimed in bis swoln petit
ton that ho was illegally restrained
Of his liberty by the Sheriff of Thurs
ton county, for the reasons, LIST,
That tho complaint made before the
Justice Of the Peace was insufficient
aud the commitment irregular; %,
That tho evidence upon which he
was hold was insufficient and did not
establish probable cause; Sd, The
statute under which the proceedings
were taken, tho Scale Law of 1883,
IL unconstitutional. The Judge, at
tho outset, refused to hear or con-
slider tho second ground for dis
charge, holding against the defend
ants counsel that habeas corpus was
not tho remedy for such a csse.
Argument then proceeded upon the
first and third grounds stated in the
petition. II. G.. Strive, Esq,
argued for the defendant: LIST,
That tho law, IL constitutional, only
required logs TO be scaled or measured
by tho Government Inspector that
a" had been bartered or sold' before
they woro removed from the place
whore the same had been RATED and
doomed and prepared for towing,
and as the complaint against Capt.
Monroe did not charge affirmatively
that the logs claimed to have been
towod by the Captain with the
steamer Libby "had been bartered
and sold" before they were lowed,
the complaint failed to state a crime.
The Judge, in his decision, held this
point we'll taken and discharged the
defendant, solely on that ground.
On the third ground for discharge,
tho counsel for the defendant only
raised ono objection to the constitu-
tonality Of the law (statute) and
that was TO the portion of Section
No. 2.G40 requiring one-half OF
one pcr cent. Of the fee paid to the
Inspector or his deputies to be given
10 tho county in which the logs are
cut for tho benefit of the common
schools" Of tho county in which the
lumber district is situated. The
counsel claimed that this was in the
nature OF direct tax upon the log
ging business not necessary for the
enforcement OF the police regulation
provided for by the statute, ard
hence in violation of the Organic
Act Of the Territory, requiring call
taxes to DO equal and uniform and
that no distinction shall be made in
tho assessments between different
kinds OF property, but the assess
ments shall be according to the
value thereof" The Judge in his
decision refused to decide this ques-
ton, Ms il was not necessary for the
disposition OF that case, and preferred
TO give the question more full con-
sideration; but he intimated that in
bis then opinion even if the one half
OF one per cent. OF the Inspectors
fees were held TO be O direct tax on
the logging business, yet that would
not invalidate the whole statute, but
tho remedy of the injured party
would be 10 tender the Inspector
the amount Of his fees less the one
half OF one per cent. and the In
spoctor might justify, not paying
over TO tho county.
However. he expressly reserved |
that question. In this the Judge !
followed rule that prevails in
al courts: never to pass upon |
The copstikutiopalitv of a sfatuta