The sun., 1884-02-10


commander thought OF the countless sins OF
omission committed on the part OF the confed-
crates during Shermnn's fatal march 10 thus
summed UP In n chapter OF this narrative:
Gen. Beaurcgard bitterly reflected upon Gen.
Sherman's long and slow advance from Atlanta
to Savannah from Savannah to Goldsboro. aud
from Goldsboro to Raleigh. a distance OF $50
miles. which It Ind taken him LOB days ian
average OF six miles day, 10 accomplish. He
know that this had been effected without
material opposition. because Of want Of foro-
thought on the part Of tho offlcers OF the War
Department, from whom no rsanforcements
could 10 obtained. and by reason Of whose
apathy no concentration could be made at any
point. hotwlthstan ng his repeated and urgent
appeals. What nddod keennoss TO his regret
WAS the recollection that had Gen. Hood crossed
the Tennessee River At 0untsrsville when no
should have done so. no would have had ample
time to destroy tho scattered Federal forces In
TINT part Of tho State. .'tako Nashville with all
the supplies there collected. and move on the
Ohio without encountering serious obstacles.
Or possibly no might. after taking Nashville.
have crossed the Cumberland Mountains and
gone to form junction with Gen. Lee. 30 us to
strike Gen. Grant before Gen. Sherman could
come to his assistance. The success OF either
movement might have compelled Gen. Sher-
man tn follow the Confederate forces into mid
die Tennessee. thus showing the correctness OF
Gen. Hoods original plan. which, though badly
executed. WAS nevertheless vol conceived"
pnrt Of Col. Romans narrative which will
DO read with special interest Ia the concluding
chapter. In which are summed up what are
understood TO be Con. Beaurogards opinions
of the course pursued BY the Confederate Gov
ernment In regard to several matters which
had a decisive bearing on tho ISSUE Of tho war
t,ntx fhaS Stnsn nl,,,ir In Of
the secession movement depended on the
promptness and efficiency II tho steps taken
to provide the means of defence. Gen. Beau
regard accordingly examines what was actu-
ally done by the Confederate Government
with regard to tho importation OF arms and
munitions Of war from Europe. and tho pur-
chase OF navy. and. in connection with these
topics he reviews the financial operations and
the attempts to establish diplomatic relations
with foreign powers and especially England
and France.
1t was patent" We are told. to every man
OF Intelligence in the Southern States that
arms ammunition. accoutrements. soldiers
clothing Shoes an ii blankets must be inn ported
from Europe" During the threc months be-
tween February and May. 1861. there was not
the slightest obstacle to the procurement Of
arms and munitions" Moreover. after war
had been declared the blockade OF the Southern
seaports was for six months only nominal. and
continued to be very imperfect uD to very near
the close OF the contest. To what extent were
these precious opportunities turned to account
by the Confederate authorities? On Dec. 80.
1861 Major Huse. the only agent for the pur-
chase of army supplies that the Richmond Gov
ernment is known to have had in Europe. telo-
graphed. Not able to send anything" In
view OF such performance. 1t is not surprising
that in 1862 accepted regiments should for
months have vainiy waited for arms nt Rich-'
mond. and that the chief anxiety OF Gen. A. s
Johnston was to find arms for his enlisted
men. 1t appears that tho first Confederate
| Secretary OF War Gen. l.. P. Walker. resigned
| after long and fruitessly urging the importa-
| tion of arms by the hundred thousand Almost
| the whole OF the utterly INADEQUATE supply oil
| arms acquired by the Confsdcrates came
| through the private enterprise of merchants
| shipping Mt their own risk. or from capture on
| the fields OF battle With this astonishing re-
| missness on the part Of the Richmond Execu-
tive is contrasted the energetic action OF the
| Northern States. "A reference to the bills OF
entry in the Custom Houses OF London and
Liverpool shows that from May l. 1861 to Dec
| 81 1861 no less than S41 900 rifles. Al 500 mus
kets. &c 500 flint guns. about 81. 900 900 percus-
sion caps. and 2.25O swords we're exported to
the North And from ons-t third to one-hnf rs
much more was shipped as hardware" This
| too. although the facilities for the home manu-
| facture Of arms and ammunition were incalou-
| lobly greater in the Northern than in the South
| ern States.
The Confederate Government displayed sim.
liar incompetence in the matter OF obtaining
and organizing a navy At the worry outset 81
the war an appropriation Of ten million dollars
| in bonds invested in cotton. would have given
| it sufficient number OF 1lrst-class seasoinC
steamers to prevent. or long postpone. block.
ade. Such proposition. We learn was actually
made to it By tho British East India Company
| 1t was indeed. very early proposed and urged
by men of prominence Including Yce-Presi-
dent Stephensl that cotton should be purchased
with bonds OF the Confederate States" and 1,
is here affirmed that il 100000 bales OF the
crop OF 1860. or any considerable fraction Of
| that quantity. had been got out before the
| Southern ports were closed. enough vessels
| could have been bought in Europe to form a
navy little. il at all. inferior to that Of the
United States. From tho damage inflicted on
Federal commerce by the few ships which were
tardily commissioned may DO measured the
work that might have been accomplished had
the Richmond authorities betimes availed
themselves OF their resources and transformed
u reasonable proportion OF their surplus cotton
into n strong naval force.
As regards its fiscal policy the Confederats
| Administration rolled mainly on the issue o.
Treasury notes and call certificates. Even b,
December. 1868. the carrency put forth q mount
cd to over 5000. 900. 900. or certainly moro thar
three times and probably moro than fonr dmet
the sum required by tho business OF tho ooun
try. We imagine that fGw competent hnanciers
looking back on the situation. will fall to con
cur in Gen. Beauregards 3 aver,nsDt that tho trul
fiscal resource OF tho Coniederacy lay from tn,
beginning in tho sale Tor cotton OF per ceht
bonds. payable In ten. twenty. and forty years
There is no .douM that during the first two o
three years OF tho war. at all epohts. tn
people OF tho South would have exchange,
their cotton and all their available mean
for such bonds. and It Is equally indispu
table that a market could have been found Il
Europe for tho cotton thus purchased. deliver
abe at the buyers risk. In proof 0f this as
sortiom IL will be sufficient tn Uife tWD faptE