The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1884-04-11
SPRING HILL AND FRANKLIN.
The Story of SchOfield's PerilOus Situa-
ton RetOld by an Eyewitness.
Services of General D. S. Stanley and the
Army of the Tennessee-HOw a Con-
federate Opportunity Was Lost.
osbinrton Letter in Cleveland Herald.

the brgadier generalship made vacant by the
retirement of General Mckenzie recalls his dis
tinguished services during the war in the Army
of the Cumberland. During the first few
months he rode at the head of a cavalry regi-
xnent and won his first laurels in that branch
of the service. His personal gallantry, as well
as his marked ability to command, soon
attracted the attention of his superiors, and
more important trusts were confded to
him So faithfully and well did he
discharge them that the opening of the Atlanta
campaign, early in 1864 found him in command
of the First division of the Fourth corps. The
division contained about twenty-five regiments
of thoroughly seasoned veteran troops. The
corps was commanded by General Howard
McPerson, the gallant and beloved commander
of the army of the Tennessee, fell on the
23d of July, while Sherman was drawing his
lines around the fated city of Atlanta. Howard
was then placed at the head of the army of the
Tennessee, and Stanley in command of the
Fourth corps. He led this superb corps in all
its subsequent engagements, except at Nash
ville where it was under the command of
General Tom" Wood, General Stanley having
been disabled by wound received two weeks
before at Franklin Although he discharged all
his trusts with signal fidelity and efficiency, it
was at Spring Hill and Franklin that he earned
his greatest fame, and it is of those two days
Nov. 80 and 80, 1864-that 1 propose to speak,
from personal observation.
Atlanta had fallen; Hood had "got away" with
his army and was marching rapidly northward,
intent upon the reoccupation of Tennessee and
Kentucky; Sherman was off with four corps on
kIo To tba viii no md
Twenty third corps under General Thomas,
were kicking up the dust at a lively rate in their
efforts to reach Nashville before Hood The
two corps had not exceeding $4,000 men. Gen
eral Schofeld was in immediate command,
Thomas having fastened by rail to Nashville to
direct the organization of the various bodies of
troops ordered thither from every point in the
department from which man could be spared.
A. ]. Smiths division of the Sixteenth corps was
on the way up from Memphis, and from Chatta-
nooga, Murfreesboro, Bowling Green, Louisville
and other places brigades and regiments were
being hurried to the point of rendezvous. Hood,
with AZ, 900 men, had crossed the Tennessee
river at Florence, and was headed for Nashville,
the only force to- oppose him before reaching
that point being the two corps
under Schofeld, less than half his
strength 1t was all important that few
days be gained for collecting and organizing the
scattered troops, and Schofelds orders were,
while studiously avoiding general engagement,
for which his force was wholly inadequate, to
delay the enemy's advance as much as possible.
With all the available troops concentrated into
compact body, and odd Pap" Thomas as their
head, it was believed that Hoods advance would
be checked.
But the situation was the most critical one in
the history OF the army of the Cumberland.
The rebel commander comprehended it thor
OuphlV and hurried his fOpyVa I'd To the
utmost limit of human endurance His troops
were flushed with the hope held out to them of
atoning by bold stroke for the long, unbroken
series of defeats, as they had been driven one
hundred and fifty miles southwark from Chatta-
nooga by Shermans conquering legions. A
large number of Hoods regiments were from
Tennessee and Kentucky and it is not strange
that, as every step of their weary march
brought them nearer to their homes, which they
were to rescue from the hands of the spoiler,
their hearts beat high with enthusiasm, Just
such as the Northern soldiers would have felt
under similar circumstances. General Hood,
in his Advance and Retreat" speaks in the
highest terms of the morale of the army during
the entire march from Atlanta to Nashville.
Hood was extremely anxiousto overwhelm Soho
field before he could reach Thomas This done,
it would be comparatively easy for him to brush
away the heterogeneous mass of troops at Nash
vile, or to pass around that place and continue
his march unopposed to the Ohio river. Had he
succeeded in his plans the glory of the march to
the sea-of which the Tennessee campaign was
really part and a most vital one-would have
faded like plucked flower in the MONDAY sun.
THE MARCH TO SPRING HILL.
General Schofeld, with admirable strategic
skill had succeeded in impeding the advance of
the enemy by taking advantage of every oppor-
tunity that was presented, particularly at the
crossing of Duck river, near Columbia, where
he held Hood at bay for three days. There was
much hot diminishing, and general engage
ment seemed imminent at every moment.
During the night of Nov. g. the
Union army quietly left it's intrenchments,
under cover of the darkness, and when the
morning broke it was well on its way northward
Stanley, with the Second (Wagner's) division of
the Fourth corps, was well in advance followed
by the immense train of baggage, ammunition
commissary and hospital wagons, and in the rear
of this the main army. But meanwhile the
rebels had not been idle. Anticipating such
movement, Hood had ordered Cheatham, with
strong corps, to push rapidly forward on par
allel road to Spring Hill, and there plant his
troops across the pike on which Schofed was
moving, and which led directly to Franklin and
Nashville.
Stanley, at the head of his column, reached
Spring Hill about the middle of the afternoon
The troops were much iaded, having marched
without moments sleep nearly all the previous
night, Cheathams arrival was nearly simultane
GUS. Stanley's hankers ran into his skirInishers
and a spirited fire ensued The rattle of musket-
ry and the whistle of bullets over the pike gave
notice that an emergency was at hand
and not moment must be lost. The
force of the enemy was unknown, but the
established fact is that Cheatham's entire
corps was there, outnumbering Stanley's single
division three or four to one. There was no
hope of immediate reinforcement. The wagon
train stretched away back along the pike for
distance of five or six miles, and then the troops
under Schofeld, with all they could attend to-
for Hoods army was lowering on their TANKS
eagerly watching for an opportunity to strike a
decisive blow. The rebel cavalry were active all
along the line, and at two OF three points
swooped down upon the train, and captured and
destroyed a number of wagons. The vehicles
were hurried on with all possible dispatch. 1t