The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1884-05-28

If in England the sovereign could
take from the courts the right to deter
mine a particular question, it is clear
that the States Of the Union may do
likewise, unless prevented by Constitu-
tional restraint; and, as there is nothing
in the Constitution, State or Federal,
denying the right of the States to regu-
late tariffs Of common carriers by legisla-
ton, we may safely assume that the
Legislature of Mississippi may now
assume jurisdiction of the subject. This
seems to US to flow from the admission
that the courts have jurisdiction.
But whether we be right or wrong in
this, the Supreme Court of the United |
States has held that the question of rea-
sonableness was legislative question in
England and is legislative question in
this country.
The only parts of the act noticed by
the chancellor, as will be seen, are sec
tons /, 2, 8, 6, and 9. The first three
of these define extortion and provide
penalties. They have no SORT of connec-
ton with the Commission, and, as we
have once before stated, should be
treated as if they were in separate and
distinct act. We doubt seriously, the
jurisdiction of the chancery court to de-
eide upon the validity of these sections.
Section I provides a penalty for those
who shall make any reduction or rebate
prohibited by the act. To save time, we
will admit that this section cannot be
enforced. The Proviso to section 9 is
plainly unobjectionable. This brings
US to the only remaining section cited
by the Chancellor, which We will dispose
of hurriedly.
If the complainant has contract with
the State protected by the State and
Federal Constitution, which authorizes
it to regulate its tolls and charges, it
must be shown that the act of the Leg
islature which the Chancellor condemns
authorizes the commission to fix rates
and deprives the complainant of the
right to do so. To say that the commits
sion shall fix rates and that the COM
plainant may also fix rates would GER
taiDly be nnobjectionable, unless tie
rates to be fixed by the commission
should be made obligatory on the COM
plainant Now, while the sixth section
of the act authorizes the commission to
revise and fix tariffs of charges it does
not deny the complainant the right to
do the same thing. The only distinc-
ton which the supervision law makes
between the rates established by the
commission and those established by the
complainant, is that in a proceeding
against complainant for charging more
than reasonable rates the tariff of the
commission must be treated, prinad .facie,
as reasonable. But the complainant
may prove that its tariff is reasonable
and that the tariff of the commission is
unreasonable, and this, too, IL judicial
proceeding! So that at last nothing can
be determined under the sixth section
so as to bind the complainant except in
q court. The supervision statute gives
the complainant its ebay in court"
which the chancellor claims for it. 1t
is true that the complainant is COM
PEELED to prove the reasonableness of its
charges as against the prinla facie evil
dence furnished by the commission, but
this is a mere rule of evidence over
which the Legislature has absolute con-
troll. The complainant has no more
charter right to rule of evidence than
it has to an existing remedy and the
Chancellor comedies the power of the
Legislature to prescribe new remedies.
1t was formerly thought that the OBJ
ject of granting charters was 20 create
artificial persons, who could exercise,
to the extent mentioned in the charter,
the powers and privileges of a natural
person, and it was then conceded that it
was in the power of the Legislature to
take away from corporation any right
or privilege that might be taken away
from natural person. In other words,
rights which natural persons have by
the claw of the land" may be conferred
on artificial persons by legislation; and
rights which may be taken away from
private or natural person by legislation,
may also be taken away from an artifi-
cial person by legislation though pre-
viously granted by charter.
The struggle for a long time was to
put corporations on an equal footing
with the man "with a soul to save"
Now it is, that while by legislation you
may deprive a man of one of his So
called natural rights, having given the
same right to a corporation it is pro-
tected by the Constitution. To illus.
trate: A hackman in the city of Jack
son has right to charge what he pleases
for hauling passengers to and from the
depot within the limit of reasonableness.
The complainant has the right to haul
passengers to and from Raymond at any
rate with the same limit. The State
may say absolutely, what the hackman
shall charge, and punish him if he de-
mand more. 1t cannot say what is, prima
facie a reasonable charge for complain
ant; because while the Constitution
does not protect the hackman it does
protect soulless corporation.
How can prudent citizen rejoice 20
hear the courts announce such lawl