The Jackson standard. [volume] (Jackson C.H., Ohio) 1847-1888, 1884-11-27


erroneous, is valid and binding until
reversed or over-ruled. IL o. 435, Is
O. 1923, 20 o. S. $50, and many other
cases.
When a legislature has enacted a
statute and the Supreme Court Of the
State has declared the meaning and
force of the enactment, the two, to-
gether, make up to the full, the linn
tied sovereignty delegated to these
two branches. It is the voice of the
State, authoritatively announcing to
the citizens the law of the land. The
law so announced is supreme and bind
ing upon all the inferior courts. When
the court of last resort thus declares a
statute constitutional, it cannot be
other than binding.
After the money in controversy was
paid, the Scott Law, in State V. Frame,
80 O. S. 800, was declared to be val
id, constitutional enactment, and ii
follows, unless decision Of the Su-
preme Court is utterly void, that the
collection of the tax in this case was
legal.
The highest authority in the State
has so said to all the county treasur-
ers.
But it is claimed that recent case
State v. Sinks, O. L. J. 6 VOL, No. -
p. So, annuls the Scott Law, the
Frame case, and makes the entire pol
ICY Of the State touching this tax, as
previously established by both legisla-
tive enactment and judicial decision,
illegal and void. The defect Of this
reasoning consists in giving an effect
to the decision in the Sinks case to
which it is not entitled; that decision
only declares thing to be null which
before was valid. 1t does not make a
payment legal when made, illegal now.
As to the effect of an over-ruling
decision upon former rights we have
no precedent in Ohio exactly in point.
We are, however, aided by very strong
analogies. A decision of the Supreme
Court must be regarded somewhat as
the English courts regard an act Of
Parliament, absolutely supreme and
conclusive, so long as it exists. Moth
ing Of higher municipal authority can
be imagined. Touching an act of
Parliament the English Courts say
1T has long been established, that
when an act of Parliament is repealed
it must be eonsid, red Except as to
transactions passed and closed) as ifjt
had never existed. And so we say
that when decision Of the Supreme
Court touching public law is over
ruled, such decision simply ceases to
be authoritative, and is to be consid-
cred as if it never existed, except as tt
transactions past and closed. IA O.
S. 230, 231. 3 O. S. 494. No Other
doctrine is conceivable, save upon the
hypothesis that the judgments Of the
Supreme Court are not binding. This
we cannot concede. The collection by
the Treasurer was legal collection, 6
transaction past and closed, and judg.
ment must be entered for the defend
ant.
This disposes Of the case, but as
counsel for plaintiff has earnestly anc
ably urged that this payment was in
voluntary, ! do not hesitate to consid
er that ground. 1t must be borne il
mind that the assessment made under
the Scott Law is not levy made by {
public officer, like county levies, ,'bridgt
levies, &c., in which the citizen has M
direct voice, but is levy called into
being by the voluntary act Of the citi
zen himself; it is his choice; he calls
into operation the machinery Of the
law. and procures the assessment tt
be made upon him. And in this CASE
the assessment was made with the
plaintiffs s knowledge and consent; hs
engaged in the business of selling. in
toxicating liquors, freed from some Of
the prohibitions which formerly sur
rounded that traffic; he enjoyed thu
protection Of the statute which wa'
thrown as shield over his business
and finally, Of his own will went tt
the Treasurer's office and paid his as
sessment, under protest as he now al
leges, yet he voluntarily did it. 1t i
immaterial, under the circumstances
disclosed in this case. He waived hi,
right to insist upon the illegality ot
the tax. He cannot recover the mon.
ey so paid. Kellogg V. Ely, Is o. S
"a.
When the plaintiff went, of his
own will, to the Treasurer's office anc
made this payment, his mere statement
to the officer that he paid under pro.
test, although that statement was in.
dorsed upon his receipt, did not divesi
the payment Of its voluntary charac-
ter. In Wilson v. Pelton, 40 Ohio
State, 3O6, we find the following
"Where such taxes (llegaD were paid
after the Goth of December. and the
Treasurer, prior to the payment, had
made no effort to collect them, or to
enforce payment by any process au-
thorized for that purpose, but received
the taxes when payment was offered
in the usual course of his official bust
ness; Held, "That payment thus
made was voluntary" And at page