St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1884-10-30
The Battle of Bull Run.

General Beauregard's paper in the
current number of the Century, on the
battle of Bull Run, will attract wide
attention. 1t is the authoritative con
federate account of the first great bat
tie of the civil war. Written after i
lapse of twenty years, it is a calm, dis
passionate report, clear and dignitied
in style, n valuable piece of military
history.
The memory of Bull Run still rankles
in the northern breast, but it is posi-
BILE ut this distance of years to forget
the humiliation far enough to form an
impartial judgment. Fort Sumter had
been bombarded fifty days before
President Lincoln had called for 75,
600 volunteers to serve three months
the raw recruits had mustered at
Washington it was resolved to strike
at Richmond the confederate army
had concentrated at Manassas June
ton, a strong position which controlled
the railroad routes to Richmond and
the Shenandoah valley; it must be
dislodged !; and so, on July 10, 1861
McDOwell's army of 81 900 was set in
motion from the banks of the Potomac.
Battle was joined on July 81, and after
hard fighting with varying fortunes for
five hours and when the day seemed
to belong to the Federal forces, theil
flank was turned, and then began a
rout the like of which was not seen
again during the war.
Mcdowell ascribes the defeat prima
rily to loss of time i'll an important
movement made early in the morning,
and secOndarily to the arrival of strong
confederate reinforcements just ut the
critical iuncture. Beauregard scouts
this explanation, and attributes the
result chiefly to his opponents faulty
plan of battle which dislocated the
turning column from the main body,
and also to lack of dash in the Federal
attack. The plan in fact, Beauregard
says, aided his own offensive opera
tions. And when, strengthened by
reinforcements he ordered II charge,
he turned the flank of the Federal
troops, swept them from their posi-
tion and drove the panic stricken mob
from the field. Furthermore he main
tains thatI though his forces were ma
mericaily much the weaker they were
strong in the fact that they were de-
Tending their homes, while the OppOs-
ing forces were invaders.
The result is not greatly to he won
dered at. Here were two great bodies
of raw, undisciplined recruits hurled
at each other. They were otiicered on
both sides by trained and able gener-
ais, it is true, but generalslip avails
little without discipline. The south
ern commander indeed had the advan-
tage of being on his own ground, but
iOrtuitous circumstances mainly de-
cided the day. A slight chance might
have turned the tide the other way,
and then what different story would
have been written. Beaten in the first
pitched battle, the south must have
lost heart. The road to the cOnfeder-
ate capital would have been open, and
the war would have been matter of
months instead of years. Tremendous
results hung upon the issue at Manas-
sas.
After having routed the northern
army SO etfectually, Beauregard might
have pushed the pursuit and taken
Washington. He explains that he was
prevented by the nntimely caution of
Jefferson Davis. His plan was to dis
perse all the Federal forces south of
Baltimore and east of the Alleghanies,
liberate Maryland and capture Wash
ington, thereby gaining an early peace
and establishing the right of secession.
But Davis rejected the plan as imprac-
ticable, and the north was allowed to
recover and to organize the army
which at last wore ont the confederacy.
The confederate presidents timidity
chafed his general, and BeauregaTd's
removal from command at IL later peri
cd thoroughly soured his temper. In
his contribution to the Century he lays
the whole blame of failure upon Davis,
and thinks that with Il commanderin-
chief of higher military and political
ability the south might have carried
its nnint