The National tribune., 1884-09-11
FIGHTING THEM OVER.
What Our Veterans Have TO Say About
Their Old Campaigns.
cHANCELLoRsvILLE.
Gen. Devcns's Responsibility for the Humiliatine
Befeat.

vile, partly IN cofroooratl0n ana parity sup
elemental of the Generals account of that
affair
] belonged to the on-commissioned staff of
the Eleventh Corps, as courier 10 Gen. Howard
and Col Meysenburg, his Assistant Adjutant-
General / was with the General on Saturday
morning, May ?, when Gen. Hooker rode along
the entire front of the Eleventh Corps, and
know that
HIS EXPRESSIONS OF SATISFACTION
with Gen Howard's position were unqualified.
] was with Gen. Howard when, later in the
day, he rode over to the lett, along Gen.
Sickless position. and spcut some time on Gen.
Birney's line, against which it was thought
the attack, If any, would be made. The party
returned to headquarters, the Dowdall House,
and all began 10 nnsaddle and feed. j made ii
a rule not 10 unsaddle in any stirring time, un-
less there were other couriers orderlies
ready 20 mount; and on this occasion, seeing
all the boys unsaddling, spoke to couple of
them Horne aud Henderson,, saying, We
had better not unsaddie for awhile"
When the attack came was In the saddle at
the first golley and Gen. Howard rushing to
the door directed me TO ride in haste and re-
port the meaning of the firing and called for
his horse. i rode at full speed TO where the
firing seemed heaviest. in front OF Won Gllsas
brigade, Just north of the plank road, and was
clesely followed by the chief of staff, COL As
musseu, and Henderson. i reported TO Col.
Won Gi lsa and was ordered 10 report to Gen.
Howard a general attack, which seemed en-
tirely needless, as the roar Of battle was then
terrific j started TO return with my report
and met the General riding at slashing gait,
which be never slackened until he reached the
very front, where
THE PANIC HAD ALREADY SET IN.
The mishap 10 himself happened in this way:
he usually rode a tough, active, and rather
small cheStaut-sorrel horse called Charley"
the same he rode when he lost his arm, and
which received two wounds at the same time
The General had ridden Charley" almost all
day, and when the firing commenced the or
derly saddled a powerful and restive black
horse which seemed, as the General says, per-
fectly crazed when the melee surged around us.
He reared and plunged wildly, aud the General,
with his one hand, lost control Of him, and
slipped to the ground when the horse seemed
about to fail backwards. The horse was soon
caught and the General remOunted, and he and
the entire staff made every effort to check the
tide of panic-stricken men that were rolling
TO the rear. but in vain. 1t was panic result
ing from surprise, and a surprise for which,
as i believe,
GEN. DEyENs,
commanding the First Division, Eleventh
Corps, was and is wholly responsible. II viii
say by way Of explanation, that Gen. Mclean
had long commanded the First Division, and Col
Lee, 55th Ohio, q brigade in the same. Soon after
Gen. Howard assumed command of the Eleventh
Corps, Gen. Devens was given command oi
the First Division ut Gen. Howard's special
request / believe. The bringing of Deyens
into the Corps sent Mclean back to his old
brigade and Lee TO his regiment, and caused q
good deal Of dissatisfaction in the division
amongst both men and officers, vino never had
much confidence in, or eordiality Of feeling for
Gen. DeFens.1 Col. Lee held an advanced po-
sition on the right, and became satisfied that
the enemy was working around our extreme
right. and SO reported twice that day i dc
not know what time the first report was made
but was present when the second report was
made, which was just before Gen. Howard
started or his visit TO Sickles's line. Gems
Deyens and Mclean and several other officers
were standing in a group some distance north
OF the plank road, opposite the Dowcal House
when Col Lee rode up and reported his belief
that large force was working around ouI
right flank. Gen. Deyens
TREATED THE MATTER LIGHTLY,
and said it was simply impossible, as the enemy
would have to cut roads through the dens'
underground and timber as they moved. Wher
Ice repeated his belief Gen. Devens replied
"Eou are over-anxions. Col. Lee; don't b
scared before you're hurt" Col. Lee retorteC
somewhat sharply, TO the effect that he wa
not easily frightened, and If an attack came h
would be likely 10 remain as long Gen
Dcyens dic," i" and rode of towards his regiment
As be rode away Gen. Devens remarked that b.
was testy" F" fellow, and Gen. Mclean replies
that he would always find Col. Lee brave ant
vigilant officer" did not bear Col Lees irs
report, but il was frequently mentioned as
fact, after the battle, that he reported his be
lief TO Gen. Mclean, who promptly reported Z
Gen. Deyens early that morning. If this b
true, and from all the circumstances j am sal
listed that it is. il may account for Deyens'
n \. 4
Ned, and j think no one viii contend tha
Gen. Devens ever reported TO Gen. Howard til
statements Of Col. Lee and Gen. Mclean, an,
that Gen. Howard had no intimation Of
THE WELL FOUNDED FEARS
Of Lee and Mclean.
Col. Lee was not surprised In the sense
being Unexpectedly attacked. but was literar
swept away by the suddenncss and force of th
eyclone-like rush OF the enemy. Mclean, Yo
elisa ard Lee were conspicuous for the
bravery and their efforts 70 hold their con
n2nds and present an organized front to th
foe. Both the former were wounded, and WEI
amongst the last 20 leave the field. Ger
Devens was wounded in the foot and imm,
diately left the field, and Gen. Mclean tool
command OF the division. AS soon as Gel
Howard was remounted, after being unhorse,
he ordered me 70 take the staff ordcrlics an
endcavor 70 halt the retreating men az a rifit
pit running across the field east Of the Dowda
House; aud we were thus engaged when Gel
Devens came hurrying along on foot, and calle
20 me for my horse, saying he was Gel
Devcns, and was wounded"
de was alone, and seemed TO have completed
lost his head. ] answered that was on dut
with Gen. Howard, and could not give up n
horse without his orders. The General weI
OF towards the rear. and never returned TO Il
corps. i would not knowingly do Gen. Devei
nor any other soldier En injustice but ha,
no hesitation in saying that had be given
Col. Lees reports the consideration they sbou
hsve received from an ordinarily cautious sr
alert commander,
TIE SHAMEFUL DEFEAT
might have been averted. am equally sati
Ned, from my long service and personal a
quaintance with Gen. Howard, that had CS
Lee, Gen. Mclean, or any other officer take
the responsibility 10 report 10 him Col. Lee
belief in the premises, he would have listen,
20 him, and taken such steps as would ha'
pDmaskec Jackson's movements Whether Il
fsct viii ever be established or not, lar
number Of both officers and privatcs hold &c
DeveDs responsible for the disastrous defeat
the Eleventh Corps AZ Charlottesville on Nj
6, 1863, and the ultimate defest Of the enti
army under Hooker.-D. M. CONNER, Order
Sergeant, Co. L, sst Ind. Cav, Lyermore, Al
neda Co., Gal.
I'm BE E0scor.
To THE EDITOR: Please let me give 1T
testimony in the matter Of the Battle of NJ,
COW, Tenn, and the conduct of Gen. Hat
during tie battle