New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1884-04-03
NOW TO SUPPRESS RIOTS.

The December number of Ihe Journal Of the
Military Service Institution contained remark
able article on the suppression of riots in cities.
We directed attention to il at the time as curious
professional study, which fortunately did not
possess any urgent INTEREST in tue sense that
there was either cause or reason TO expect riots
in American cities The catastrophe in Cincin
natl proves how necessary it is to be prepared
for sudden rcy0lts in the streets. aud for de
stTuctiyc campaigns against public buildings.
We offer no excuse, therefore, for recurring to
General MolncuXs instructive paper and to
the discussion to which it gave rise in the
Military Service Institution.
One of General MoincuX's premises was tho
necessity Of abandoning 'old-timc measures of
dealing with rioters. The mob of the future
he contended, would have greater power for
either offensive or defensive operations than
the mob OF the past. 1t would be armed with
dynamite and rendered formidable for evil by
the consciousness of the destructive nature Of
the agencies it was employing. He considered
it only matter Of time when troops operating
against rioters would be forced to fight dyna-
mite with dynamite. Not only would public
buildings have to be zcaOusly guarded against
these new and dangerous weapons. but discre-
tionary power would have to be grycn to the
commanding officers to employ the same means
i'm turn against the mob and not to depend cX-
clusiycly upon the rife and the bayonet Hap
pily the Cincinnati outbreak did not reach the
dynamite stage. 1t was a spontaneous upris-
inc. without leaders, and without weapons uDtil
the gunsmths stores were broken open. If
there had been any chance of preliminary or
ganizatiOn, dynamite cartridges could have
been readily obtained and used as destructive
hand grenadcs by the rioters. If few of the
leaders had been armed with such weapons as
these, the police and the militia would have
been pOwercss to contest the ground with
them. IL cannot BIZ doubted chat it would be 4
wise precaution for the officers Of the National
Guard to acquire practical knowledge respect
ing dangerous explosives. Dynamite IS one of
the enemies which they may be required to
fight, and they ought to be Dramatically in
structcd in its use. The criminal classes III
Ncw-York and Brooklyn have to-day a
wholesome fear of the small army of six thou
sand militia which can be massed against them
in an emergency. That fear would be intcn-
sified if they also knew that those citzen-sOldiers
were familiar with the modern science of de-
struction, and could arm themselves with ex-
plosives if they were attacked with dynamite
bombs by desperate Communists.
General MoIincux's suggestion respecting the
use of barbados as means of defence WAS prac-
tically carried out by the militia in Cincinnati
Pork barrels, store counters and such material
as was at hand were effectively utilized by the
ofiicevs in command. and the position of tine
troops was speedily rendered impregnable. The
barricade has been considered the rioters ex-
elusive weapon, but it constitutes most I'M
pOrtant adjunct of military defence. General
Molineux's remaining suggestions, however,
were not practically tested ut Cincinnati. He
makes strong point of queling riot in its
incipient stages. He speaks of the necessity of
having gcneral-alarm signals which are definite
and distinctly understood. The militia re-
.ponded quickly at Cincinnati, but in the first
instance in inferior force, barely thirty men
marching to the relief of the Sherii1s little gar
rson in the jail General Molincux's plan of
campaign is defensive at the outset. He con
sders it more important to protect all points
liable to attack than to dspersc the rioters. He
would post strong guards in front Of gun
stores, which are naturally the first arSenals cx
posed to attack, and in like manner would
protect aTmories, the gas and water works and
prominent public buildings. These precaution-
airy steps being rapidly taken, an advance of
troops headed by body of police may be or
dcred. The line of march should be through
the broadest Streets the advance guard, when
hard pressed, taking advantage Of the shelter
afforded by side streets, and the hanks and
rear being protected by the most expert marks
men, Many practical suggestions in relation to
the formation of columns for clearing streets
and for attacking rioters in position are also
given in this valuable article. Power should
be used with promptness and decision, with
iron determination, and without hesitation. A
steam fire engine throwing water on a crowd is
not without its use, but breech-loaders are to be
relentlessly employed when required.
General MOlineux speaks of nervousness rs
being quality which the officer must control in
himself or else run great risk of imparting 1t
to his men. This nervousness, which is so fatal
in such emergencies, can be best overcome By