The Austin weekly statesman. (Austin, Tex.) 1883-1898, 1884-06-05
THE COURTS.
SUPREME COURT.

opinion Dy ASSOClaL6 y uSJlCo w co'
the court holds that in suit to re
cover damages for personal inJur.
done to the wife during marriage, th'
husband is the proper person to main
tain the action The wife is ordinari
party to such suit. Judgment Is re
versed and cause remanded.
In the case of w. w. Styron, as next
friend of Mittie IStyron, a minor, the
Gulf, Colorado s. Santa Fe railway
company was sued for her use for $780,
O0Odamages forinjuries received by her
while playing on turn-table belong
ing to the company, and caused, it is
ged, by the neglect of the company
&c ave 1t enclosed, or SO fastened as
to render it safe.
"A special exception raised that
Millie Styron, the party alleged to
have been injured, was not party to
the suit was overruled, and there Was
verdict and Judgment against the
company for 5000. OF the several
errors assigned, the only one deemed
material by the supreme court Is that
with reference to the ruling Of the
lower court, on the special exception
referred to. The effect of the decision
as derived from the opinion of the
court by Judge Watts, Is that the
suit being brought by Stynor as next
friend to Mile instead Of In
her name and for her use through
Stynor, there was misjoinder of par
ties, and the case was not conclusive.
The case came, by appeal, from john
son county.
In the case of Adams & W1ckS VS..
7. w. House and others, from San
Saba county controversy about title
to land the decree of the court is
that apelleeS, House and others, take
nothing by the suit, and that the case
be dismissed.
In the cas- of Porterfield and others
VS.. G. M. Harper, appealed from Ellis
county the suit was instituted against
Harper and Tarply in trespass to try
title to recover 140 acres of land,
claiming that Mary J. Harper, the
deceased wife of appellee, died |
without children or their defendants, |
and that appellants, being her brother |
and sister, were heirs at law; that |
the land in controversy was the sepa-
rate property Of Mrs. Harper at her
death, etc. Tarply disclaimed. Ap-
peliee, Harper, answered by general |
demurrer, general denial, plea of not |
guilty, that the land was his home |
oOStiuy anu Ulldb IL was 1lo 5cP-
arate property as gift from his de-
ceased wife; also suggested improve
ments, etc. Appellants, by supple
mental petition, claimed that appellee
had abandoned the land as his home
stead. There was judgment for ap-
pellee.
The opinion of the court, as written
by Judge Watts, holds that the evil
dence of the husband as as to the
statements made by his deceased wife
should have been excluded, having ref
erence to a transaction coming within
the spirit of article 2,248, r. s.; that,
that there is but one mode prescribed
by law by which married women can
convey their lands, and that Is by
deed privily acknowledged and in the
execution of which they are joined by
their husbands; and that where
wife cannot convey the land directly,
her acqujescence in deed being made
by another person to the husband for
land purchased and paid for with her
means would be equally Intellectual to
vest title. The real purpose of the
law in prescribing the manner, and
limiting the power of married women
in the disposition of their separate
property is to protect them against
Sho uhuuO AAnuOA0o VI oilOAl Auo-
bands.
The case of Cannon VS.. Boutwell, (53rd
Tex. CPD is cited by Judge Watts,who
says: In citing the case an authority
for the proposition that the wife can
not convey her real estate to her
husband by deed, we are
not to be understood as
intimating that under no conditions
or circumstances whatever, the wife
could not, by power of attorney, au-
thoriZe the husband to convey her
real property. The question as to
whether appellee had or not abandon
ed the property as his homestead is to
be determined by evidence, and if it
should appear, on another trial, that
he had so abandoned it, then his right
to recover for improvements in the
event the property cannot be parti-
toned, would be dependent upon
whether the same were made in whole
or part with his separate means.
A Mrs. Harper left neither children
nor their descendants, the appellee
would inherit all the personal proper
ty, and one-half of the lands in fee
simple of which she died seized and
possessed, SC. The other half of the
lands would pass, one-half to her
mother, and the other half in equal
notifies to her brother and sister, or
their descendants.
If partition Is decreed, and 1t
should be determined that the land Is
not such as can be partitioned, appel
lee would then be entitled to re-em-
bursement for the amount Of his sep
arate property used by him In making |
permanent improvement on the land,
ho1f 81 ho NV
him after the abandonment of the
property as his homestead. Judgment
reversed and case remanded.
Joseph Tyler vs.. J. w. Davis ct al.
from Llano county. Affirmed. Op1n-
ion by Chief Justice Willie.
Elizabeth Starm vs.. Jube Wheeler |
ct al. from Grayson county. Affirmed.
Opinion by Associate Justice Stayton. |
A. Lott II VS.. Francis @. Kaiser |
ct al. from Bosque county. Affirmed. |
Opinion by Justice Stayton.
International & Great Northern |
railway company VS.. Wilhelmine Zim- |
hermann, from Comal county. AT |
firmed. Opinion by Associate Justice |
West. This waS'a suit for damages |
caused by fire from the sparks of a To- |
connective engine.
Nicholas Hanrick ct al. VS.. G. G. |
Hanrick ct al, from Falls county. |
Reversed and remanded. Opinion by |
Judge Watts adopted. This was suit |
for partition Of property.
James E. Barkley ct al. VS.. A. M. |
Friend ct al, from Dallas county. AT
firmed. Opinion by Judge Watts adj
opted.
Thirty-seven cases were referred to
the commissioners of appeals.
In the Barley case, Barley &
Brothers were sued by A. M. Friend
s. Co. on Barkley's official bond as
she of Dallas county, for $1,000
* ages, for alleged unlawful enter
me place of business of Friend &
d, and levying an attachment In
favor of the Miami Valley Manufac
turing company against Suter, Ever
hart & Co., on lot of furniture
claimed by Friend s. Co. to belong to
them, and in selling and converting
said property.
Appellants, the sheriff and surities,
plead that the property seized was in
fact the property of s. E. & Co.; and
that the transfer Of the property
from S. E. & Co., set up by s. E. & Co.,
was fraudulent. Friend & Co. claimed
that Suter had withdrawn from the