The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1884-04-24
GEE. 0. 0. HlEkRl'S "REMINISCENCES.


Of work which can easily be accomplished in
three days, il hardly can be imputed TO mere
baagling.
Had those able engineer officers been prop
efly instructed, those bridges, complete, would
have becn il sight on cur arrival the morning
OF tlle 18th. and spauldiag would have reported
to Sumner Tor orders, and in less than an hour
wosld have been pushing out his boats from
the Falmouth bank oftao Rappahanuock- Few
we're the instances in cur march 70 the sea, or
frosn the sea through 10 the Carolinss, where
VIC were obliged TO wait for bridge trains.
We symiathize with Burnside's feeling of
disappointment when he says: BY this time
(the 2Jth9 tho enemy had concentrated large
force on the opposite side Of the river. so that
1t became necessary TO make arrangements to
cross IN the face .of a vigilant and formidable
foe"
or coarse It was plain to the general that
his original plan had been completely defeated
Goadod by disappointment. pressed by the adj
rniais.iai ion at Washington, and more by an
impatient people behind il, Burnside at once
decided to move down the river fourteen miles
and effect crossing at that point; but the
cuSiif h.sS LOO lsil4t 40 IL AANlIDAt 1di
resistance, his attempt TO cross the river at any
point. Too many eyes beheld the Accommodating
parties from the opposite shore ANA soon as
the preparations for bridging had begun a
formidable force WAS sent by Lee to dispute
tic passage; aBd in consequence the second
project Of General Burnside was abandoned
CHANGE OF PLANS.
Then suddenly our general took a new
thought. 1t WIS as soon rs he coaid get
his supplies in sufficient quantity. 10 do as
Sherman subsequently did at kenesaw Noun
tain-n0ve straight forward upon the enemys
works. The chances IN these hardy enter
prises were somewhat more in Sherman's favor,
fox he had comp lisI.igely larger force, and no
Intervening river TO cross
Burnside expected 20 effect an easier cross
ing here, where Lee could hardly dream OF his
making the attempt, but certainly he had no
settled plan for his army beyond the crossing.
He selected three points: one near as, at the
Lacy House: another further down, opposite
tao loger part Of the city, and third more
THAI a ms" below. At last the time drew near
when We were TO attempt crossing OF the fatal
river.
Standing on orr side Of the RaHpahannock, on
what the historians call the Stafford Hills,
fwhere General Hunt arranged Burnside's nn-
nercus pieces of artillery siege guns and
more common batteries-irom above Falmouth
10 inclaoe the covering of the lower bildge,l
the Confederate lines, of which we had but
glimpses here and there, appeared to US to be
drawn up in vast seini-circle behind the city
OF Fredericksburg. and mainly along the Fred
eTickshurg Heights. These heights touched
the R5ppahannOck a mile above Us, and ex-
tesded With their knobs ravines and woods
Elong our front, leaving between them and the
rivera broadening lower plateau ofopen ground.
The MaTye dill was about the center OF the APP
h &g.fafh ..ffl a III
the ridge ended; then there stretched further
southwark wooded space Of lower ground. 1t
was broad break IN the ridge; for suddenly
there prose another fragment of ridge, the
highest part OF which was called Prospect Hill.
This fragment gradually sleped of TO that river
hard TO rcsnenIber-MassaPonax a tributary of
the ppahanaogk-whieh, running e2Sterlv,
helped 10 bound Lees right and cover bis flank.
and was beyond Bamside's left. After taking
a-g0od look at this suspicious and suggestive
landscape, j wrote a friend from Stafford
Hills: am writing Wednesday morning,
December 10th. Before you get this letter you
will get the news of battle. Try TO rely on
my Saviour ia these trying hours. >
have DO forebodings Of disaster, but I know
the desperate nature of our undertaking. /
felt sad in view of the hardships of that battle
sad for the men, and especially so for my staff,
for each member Of which / had a personal at
taellpcnt.
MORE BIcKERISG.
About this time there was mech nnuEmuring
szaung tho officers They were not over care
fnl in wlat they said TO one another. They
lsorne ~ thsgn spoke against the administra-
tign 81 Washington. and sharply condemned
the change OF commanders and openly ex-
FnesSd want Of ontideHce Ia anything Burn
aide might DO. Some of this adverse talk came
70 the ears Of Burnside On thar Wednesday
i
number OF generals and Others. field and staff
Officers. and 10 room lui of them addressed
sozne very pointed remarks He had beard Of
their criticisms and complaints. They knew
how reluctantly he had assumed the RESPONSE
bllity Of his command. He was conscious OF what
he lacked. bat still he had been placed where
nc WIS and be should Low do his best he
relied OF God Tor wisdom aud strength. Their
dRty was rot to throw ccld water. but 10 aid
ham loyalty with their advice and with their
hearty service. Ia noting at the time this con-
ference and BurEssae's sl,scch. wrote concern
ing him: Solemn, noble, maniy and Christian
were his rcIn2rizsD
il is easy 10 see new that General Burnside
III Lire when be most needed warm sym-
p.It5y and kindly advice, not only did not have
10, bui, being forced To meet the reverse, and
being pierced with the shafts of bitterness,
suddenly passed fr0ra his usual confiding WAYS
ard seli-deprcciatioB into an assumed self
confidence and manifest dist-ust of those in
WHOM he had hitherto coHfded. So he pre-
pared At once 70 lay his bridges, effect cross
ing into Fredericksburg within Lees prepared
se1ni-ciTcio, AID storm Lees strongest and
best defended forts squarely in 'front.', in the
very teeth Of his foes. as IT, like Joshua of old.
he rciied or miracle 70 give him great vic
tory. But Ike Joshua at al. he was doomed
10 birter disappointment, and the land was
filed with deeper sorrow and humiliation than
ever before
TO be Continued