Little Falls transcript. [volume] (Little Falls, Morrison County, Minn.) 1876-1894, 1884-12-05
SOUTHERN coNFEDEa.sACYi
General Beauregard on Jefferson Davis
Military Policy. @ &


/. The following extracts are taken iron
Gen. Beauregard's story Of the, aBattl,
4 OF Bull Run" in the Noyembe Century
/ NO people ever varied for independ
ence with more relative advantage thar
the Confederates; and if, as military
question, they must have failed, then nc
country must aim at freedom by means
OF war. We were one in sentiment as in
territory starting out, not with strng-
Cling administration Of doubtful author.
lty, but with our ancient State Govern
ments and fully organized central Gov"
eminent. As a military question, it was
in no sense civil war, but a wsr be-
tween two countrics--for conquest on
one side, for self preservation on the
othsr. The South, with it's great ma
terial resources, its defensive means of
mountains, waterways, RAILROADS and
telegraph, with the immense advant-
age of the interior lines Of war.
would be open to discredit as people
ii the failure could not be explained
otherwise than by mere material. The
great Frederick, at the head of little
people, not only beat back a combina-
ton OF several great military powers,
but conquered and kept the territory,
and Napoleon held com bined Europe at
the fest Of France I'LL his blind ambi-
zion overleaped itself, It may be said
that the South had no Fredericks, or
Napoleons, but it had at least as good
commanders as it's adversary. Nor was
it the fanlt Of our soldiers or people.
Our soldiers were as brave and intelli-
gent as ever bore arms; and, if only
for reasons already mentioned, they had
a determination superior TO the ene,ny's.
Our people bore devotion to the cause
never surpassed, and which no war
making monarch ever had for his sup
port; they gave their all-eveu the last
striplings under the family roofs filing
the ranks voided by the fasl OF their
fathers and brothers. But tAse narrow
military view Of Slle head of the Gov
ern,nent, which illustrated itself Ii: the
outset by ordering from Europe not
100000 or 100000, butt 10000
stands Of arms; as an increase
nron 5000, lbs first estimate,
was equally nagTow and conse-
quent1y ti1nid in IFS employment of
our armies. The moral and material
forcss actually engaged in war made
our success mortal certainty, but for
the tinaid policy which ignoring strategy
as stiezce and boldaess of enterprise
as it's 'lly--could nevw be broughts TO-
view j e whole theatre of war as one
subjee~, of which all points were but
integant parts or to hazard for the time
points relatively uninrpertant for che
purpose' Of gathering foFan overwhelm-
ing an:s|rapid stroke ats some decisive
point; and which, again, with character.
istic mis- citation, would push g victoqi+
GUS foree directly forward into unsup~
ported snI disastrous operations 1rs.-
stead OF using its victory TO spare froma
its strength sufficient to secure an
equally Important SUCCESS in another
quarter.
"We needed for president either AL
military man Of high order or politi-
clan of tire firs$ class (such as Howell !
Cobb without military professions.
The south did not fall crushed by the
mere weight of the North, but it was
nlbbled away OF, all sides and ends be-
cause its exclusive head never gathered
and welded. it's great strength under the
ready advantages that greatly reduced
Or neutralized its adversary's naked
physical superiority. It is but another
Of the many proofs that timid direction
may readily 90 with physical courage,
and that thes passive defensive policy
may make as]bng agony, but can never
win war"