The National tribune., 1884-10-23

an accident. Two unorganized bodies Of men
grappled each other, and it was inevitable that
one of them should break and retire in panic
! The chances from the first were that this would
be the Union army, because it was attacking
over an unknown ground an army greater in
strength aud standing in good defensive posi-
tion--a thing Of the utmost Importance with
new troops. There was not much generalship
on either side-not much was possible with
such swarms of men. About all that could be
done was for brave Colonels and Brigadier- Gen
erals to lead small bodies forward, or encourage
| them to stand fast. They could not be mored
In the military way, and made to carry out the
tactical arrangements of plan of battle.
| Beauregards generaship was about equal to
McDowelFs-it certainly was no better-and
the issue, as we have said before, was deter
mined by things wholly beyond the control of
either commander
In spite Of the great prestige given him by
Bull Run, Beauregard accomplished nothing
afterward, though he was in the service of the
Confederacy until its downfall. Hetakes upsev-
eral pages of the present article to demonstrate
that the ill-success which attended his subse-
quent military career was due wholly to JEFF
Davis's hostility, pretense quite as absurd as
the rest.
When it comes to comparison of the forces
engaged in the battle Beauregard shows himself
true Southerner. Everything hesays, favored
the Union commander, while the rebels had to
rely upon their superior courage, patriotism,
and justice of the cause. He says:
On the Federal hostile side were all the ma
terial advantages including superior numbers,
largely drawn from the old militia organizations
of the great cities of the North, decidedly better
armed and equipt than the troops under me, and
strengthened by small but incompatible body
OF Regular infantry, well q number of batter
les of Regular field artillery of the highest class
and n very large and thoroughly organized staff
corps, besides numerous body of professionally
educated officers in command of volunteer regi-
ments.
Now, except the statement in regard to the
Regular infantry and the batteries of field ar
tillery, not one of the statements is true. The
but the reverse, as the returns show. Mellow
ell took on to the field less than $4,000 men,
with 40 guns, and confronted there 32 1000 men,
with 81 guns. There was nothing like the
proportion of organized miitiamen among the
Union men that there was among the rebels,
for the reason that militia organizations were
nf in fhp ir,f fha
ing the war. while in the South they had been
kept up with the greatest zeal. Nor were they
better armed because by the Vaccinations of
Secretary of War Floyd and his fellow-con-
spirators the greater part Of the best arms in
the National arsenals had been transferred TO
the South before the outbreak of hostlites.
The staff corps" is absurd. We have the tes-
timony of "Bull Run" Russell that an entire
absence of an efficient staff was one of the hard
est things that Mcdowell had to contend with
Russell gives quite picture of the Union COM
mander riding around to attend to minor de-
tails, which should have been taken care of by
Lieutenants and Captains, instead of the Com
manding General of the army.
The claim about the numerous body of pro-
fessionally educated officers" in the Union
army is absurd when it is remembered how
many Regular Army officers went over to the
Bull Run the Regular Army officers on the
rebel side quite overtopped those on the Union
ide, both in numbers and prominence The
list starts off with Beauregard himself, Joe
Johnston, Stonewall Jackson, Longstreet, Kirby
Smith, Ewell, Early, Bee d. f. Jones, Holmes
Evans. Elzey, and Jordan, beside host less
prominent
1t were very tiresome to go through the
whole article and point out its absurdities and
absolute falsehoods Beauregard cannot resist
the common Southern propensity to make rebel
regiments successfully encounter Union bri-
gades, and in one place he gives spirited ac-
count of a couple of his howitzers VIGOROUSLY
fighting an indefinite number of the "inely
equipt batteries of field artillery"
When 1t comes to talking of what he would
have done had it not been for the malign in
reference of jeff Davis, Robert i. Lee, and
others, he gives as free rein to his Imagination
as when comparing the Union and rebel armies
Take this modest sentence, as to what he in
tended doing:
The true immediate fruits of victory should have
been the dispersion of all the Federal forces south
Of Baltimore and east of the Alleghanies the lib
Grafton of the State of Maryland, and the capture
of Washington.
AS good a commentary as can be made on
this is a note that JEFF Davis made on one of
Beauregard'S so-called brilliant plans"
This plan is based on the improbable and mad
missible supposition that the enemy TO await ev