Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1884-07-19
JUDGE sNYoER's OPINION

Tn the Now Celebrated Intelligencer Con-
tempt Case---His Views on the Matter.
The following is the concluding portion
of Judge Snyder's opinion in the lnteligen-
Ger contempt case. After arguing as to
the Courts power, Judge Snyder proceeds
to say:
Having thus shown that this Court has
the power to punish for contempt, it must
not be overlooked that this power can be
justified by necessity alone and should
rarely be exercised and never except where
the necessity is plain and unmistakable 1t
is not given for the private advantage OF
the Judges who sit in the Court, but to pre-
serve to them that respect and regard OF
which Courts cannot be deprived and main
tain their usefulness. 1t is given that the
law NAV be administered fairly and impair
tally, uninterrupted BY any influence which
nigh affect the rights of the par
ties or bias the minds Of the Judges-that
the Court may command that respect and
sanctity so essential to make the law itself
respected, and that the streams Of justice
may be kept pure and incorrupted. If the
Court is scandalized and is motives or in
tegrity impeached in regard to official acts
or conduct, the consequences cannot be
otherwise than baneful. The adminiStra
ton of the law is embarrassed and impeded,
the passions often unconsciously aroused,
the rights of the parties endangered, and a
calm and dispassionate discussion and in
vestigation of causes prevented. The public
have q profound interest in the good name
and fame of their courts Of justice, and es-
pecialy ofthe courts of last resort. Every
thing that affects the well being of organ
lied society, the rights of the property and
the life and liberty OF the citizen is submit
ted to their final decision The confidence OF
the public in the Judiciary should not be
wantonly impaired 1t is all important to
the due and efficient administration of JUS
tice, that the courts of last resort should
possess in a full measure the entire conf
ience of the people whose laws they admin
lister. All good citizens will admin, that ne
who Wilfully and wantonly assails the courts
bv grOundless accusations and thereby
weakens the public confidence in them,
commits great wrong not alone against
The courts, but against the people of the
State. 1t must be and is cheerfully con-
ceded, that public journals have the right
to criticise freely the acts of all public otti-
GERS, executive legislative and judicial. 1t
is constitutional privilege that even the
Legislature cannot abridge. But such criti-
cism should always be just, and with
view to promote the public good.
When the conduct of public officer is
wiliulIv corrupt, no measure of condemna-
ton can be too severe; but when the mis-
conduct apparent or real may be simply an
honest error Of judgement, the condemna-
ton aught to be withheld or mingled with
charity, As said, by Holt IN his work on
libel, chapter 9: 1T is undoubtedly within
the natural compass of the liberty of the
press to discuss in decent and temperate
manner the decisions and judgements of
court of Justice; to suggest even error, and
provide of it be done in the language and
with the view of fair criticism, to censure
what is apparently wrong; but with this
limitation, that no false or dishonest motives
be assigned to any party" These views
are in my judgement sound, and. these
rights should be cheeriully accorded to the
press in this free and enlightened
country knew full well that
respect to Courts or Judges cannot be COM
PEELED; respect is the voluntary tribute Of
the public to worth virtue and intelligence,
and while these are found on the judgment
seat, so long and no longer will courts re-
tain the public confidence" But the peO-
pie have placed the Judge in a position,
in which he unavoidablv comes in conflict
with the jcalousies and resentments Of
those upon whose interests he has to act;
H. al, and intallfpapra hpNp
ever pure and unselfsh are not always a
protection against the prejudices and pas
sionS of such as conceive themselves injured
BY his Legitimate aud proper official acts;
and when assailed by such, if he may not
punish them as a court "he will he reduced
to the alternative Of either submitting tame
" to cOntumely and insult, or to reSenting
it BY force, or resorting to the doubtful
remedy of an action at Law.
In snch a state of things, as said By
Judge Dade, in Daudridge's case. it would
Court to force the judge either to shrink
from his duty, or to incur the degradation
Of his authority, which must unavoidably
result from the adoption Of either of the
above alternatives. To suppose that the
personal character Of the Judge would be
sufficient guarantee against this is to i'm
agine state of society, which would render
the Office of the Judge wholly unnecessary.
The people for the benefit of society and
the promotion of law, order and Justice
have placed the judge in a situation in
which by reason Of his office and duties as
such he is exposed to assaults and unjust
suspicious, which he would not have to
occur as a private citizen. These assaults
and suspicious do not attach to him as a
citizen 1t is against these that the
power of the Court should de-
feui him, and not from
those which attach to him as a private per-
son merely. In this country there are and
ought to be no privileges but such as exist
for the public good. No privileges can be
claimed or admitted for Judge except such
as pertain to his official acts. Attacks
upon these it is neither his duty nor his
right as a private citizen to defend himself
against. These are the acts Of the people,
which they have imposed upon him, and il
is their duty alone to defend or TO give the
Judge the power as an officer to do so for
them. Experience has shown that this is
absolutely necessary, and that its exercise
cannot be withheld without destroying the
efficiency and usefulness Of courts. The
Judge as private citizen is not entitled to
grievances, except as other citizens, but his
public acts are not of that character and
cannot and ought not to be so defended.
While it cannot be successfully as | think,
denied that this protective power, this
right of self defense exists as necessity
and must be exercised by some officer, 1t
must be conceded, that it is underlined, and
to large extent arbitrary, and would there
fore seem to be, abstrac,ly considered, liable
to abuse if not dangerous in the hands OF
tn, court, which is itself the subject OF Of
fense. But in reply, we may with just
pride refer to the history Of the iurspru-
dence of Virginia and of this State to prove
that this power is not likely to be abused,
and that it could not to be entrusted into
safer hands than the Supreme Courts of
these States. The reports Of Virginia Gov
ering more than century show but one
II thfs fhA frSt