St. Paul daily globe. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn.) 1884-1896, 1884-10-18
France and China.

France aud China.
A Paris telegram to The London Standard
says: 1t is interesting to refer to the report
drawn up at the time of the Bourree treaty,
perhaps the most competent authority on
Indo- Chinese affairs, as it shows that French
statesmen were forewarned of all the COM
plications that have arisen. After urging
the French govern ment not to undertake
the conquest of Tonquin, but to only to
seek CITIZEN the French protectorate over
that country, the author of this report inquiries
what advantages France would derive from
taking it, He says:
''Would We derive any great advantages
from the annexation Of Tonquina Our at
tempts at colonization in lower Cochin
China, do not seem to show that we should.
for whereas under our rule Anamites, the
Chinese, and small number of
Europeans, but not Frenchmen, pros
per, French commerce has not sue
ceeded in gaining anything, either from
local enterprise or from exchanges between
the home country and our colony The
French trading houses establish ed there
have been ruined by the competition of the
| Germans, the English, and especially of the
Chinese, who, through their intimate rela-
tons with the Anamites and their agents
at Singapore, Hong Kong, Japan, etc., have
absorbed all the trade in rice, which con-
| stitutes the only important export of the
country. The imports are composed of
Chinese products, English cotton goods and
opium. Our traders take no part in the i'm
portation of those articles, and the Paris
fancy goods and the spirituous liquors which
reach Saigon scarcely suffice to insure the
existence of few retail houses. Neither
have the attempts at cultivation succeeded
AS for attempting to compete with cheap
Auamite labor in the cultivation of native
products it is useless, and with regard TO the
possibility of introducing new agricultural
! products the soil has proved unfavorable
and the requisite capital wanting.
an enumeration of the French establish
ments at Saigon will suffice to prove the
truth of our statements. The following in
formation may be regarded as authentic
There are in Cochin China two maritime
companies, both of which receive subven-
tons, two rice-husking establishments, one
bank, and one single export and import
| firm that is to say, there are six establish
ments of our countrymen, against one bank
and four foreign houses, three of which are
German. Add to preceding a few retail
! houses, and you will have the total of our
commercial and industrial establishments in
the colony. 1t is permissible to doubt
whether we should succeed better in Tom
| quin. The competition of the Chinese
would be much more overwhelming than at
Saigon, for they would not even have to
cross the sea to get there, moreover, thew
are already there in large numbers. The ac-
! tual products Of that country do not differ
| from those of lower Cochin China 1t is
said that the climate is better, but that is
not the case, at least not in the delta of the
Red river. To introduce new products to
work the supposed rich mines that are said
| to exist in the noun taiDs along the upper
course of the river we should want the cheap
| labor which our traders have not been able
| to find for lower Cochin China, and which
they would not find with greater facility for
| Tonqun. 1t has, however, been alleged
! that the southwestern provinces of China
| might give room for a considerable future
| commerce. Future is the word, for the
province of Yunnan has not yet recovered
from the ravages caused by the Mussulman
instruction, which lasted sixteen years
The products of that country, as well as those
of its mines, have fallen to very insignif-
cant proportions. Blu. our protectorate
would give US the same facilities for COM
merce with Yunnan as would
annexation, and in neither case should
we be able TO close the access to this
Chinese province to foreign commerce,
which would beat US here as it beats us in
| parts OF the Chinese coast. Thus there are
no advantages TO be gained by conquest of
Tonquin, but, on the other hand, very real
| danger, which those who urge US to that
measure do not seem to suspect. That dan
| cfc in, har
date neighbor. In Tonquin we should not
! find ourselves surrounded by enfeebled or
exhausted countries, as was the case in lower
Cochin China, but side by side with a com
| pact empire, the population of which is esti-
mated at several hundred million souls"
After pointing out that in case of annexa-
| ton one Of the first difficulties that would
arise would be concerning the delimitation
Of the frontier, the report proceeds TO show
| that it would be mistake to reckon on the
apparent inertness of China, who would pa
tiently wait till she thought a favorable mo-
ment for hostIlities had come. Then, de-
scribing the progress made by China in the
art Of war, 1t says:
'The army and navy Of China are far from
! having reached the height of perfection of
the armies at the disposal of the European
powers, but neither are her forces any longer
the war junks propelled by oars and the SOL
diers armed with bows and arrows, that our
expeditions Of 1858 and 1850 encountered
Progress has been and continues TO be made
slowly, ii is true, but surely. Even with
out any ally China could force a foreign
power wishing to attack her to employ con-
siderable force against her. Should a Euro
pean nation with whom France might be at
war give China the moral and effective sup
4..ff II I
material we should be forced in the defense
of Tonquin to employ such forces as would
| cause highly dangerous diversion for our
arms. These are, perhaps, rather remote
contingencies, but they must be considered
when one is engaged in such a defnitive
operation as the conquest of country
China has always shown herself to be
extremely jealous in keeping hes
SOIL and her apparent inertnesr
gives way to the most tenacious perseverance
when it is a question of maintaining her
rights. If proof of this, were it necessary,
the effort she made to retake Turkistan, and
the diplomatic pressure she brought to bear
on Russia to make her give back the territory
of Kouldja would suffice. We must not then
imagine that we shall frd her disposed to
yield the moment difficulties arise on her
frontier, for we shall meet with such tenac-
ity on her side that even time and repeated
sacrifices win fail TO weaken"
In a letter which have to-day received
from the author OF the above document, he
says:
You ask me ny opinion with regard TO
the issue of the present struggle. I give it
you frankly. If hostilities are not almost
Immediately stopped by means Of mediation
It will be too late, and France will be def
nitively engaged in long and difficult war.
It is all very well to say that we must capture
pledges, and that we shall then wait till it
"a E