The clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1883-1888, 1884-05-14
Judge HIS Opinion.


Court in this District, in the case Of the
Illinois Central Railroad Company
against the the Railroad Commission
This opinion, or rather a synopsis or
abstract Of it, has been published in
many newspapers at home and abroad,
and it has been accepted by many per
sons as being conclusive against the con-
stitutionality of the law establishing the
Commission.
Knowing the reputation which the
author of the opinion has earned by
years of faithful service on the bench,
for ability and honesty, we desire to say
at the outset that we eOneede to him all
Inequalities which his admirers, and they
are hosts, claim for him; and we ask
that not one word Of what we may utter
snail be taken in any sense as refec-
ton upon his ability or his integrity.
As we understand it Judge Hill was
under no legal obligation to state the
reasons nor the authority on which he
based his decision, but having stated
both with some elaboration, We pro-
pose to examine both with view to
determine to what extent his conclu-
sions are justified.
1t will be seen from the opinion that
the act of the Legislature is declared to
be unconstitutional, because (D it vio-
lates the charter contract between the
State and the Chicago, St. Louis and
New Orleans Railroad Company; and
~ because it is regulation of COM
merce.
/. For the purpose of the argument
we propose to cOncede that the Legisla-
ture has by contract with the railroad
company granted it the right ''to make
contracts and to adopt and establish
such tariff of charges for the transpor-
tation of persons and property as said
corporation might think proper, and the
same to alter and change at pleasure
and that this contract is protected by
the Constitution of the United States
to the extent that the State may not now
establish tariffo of charges for said com
pany, that will be obligatory upon it
Does it follow from this admission tina
the act of the Legislature is uneonstitu
tional? Not by any means; because t.
render the act unconstitutional on thu
ground that it is violative of the alleged
contract, it must not only be shown tina
the privilege granted is a contract, bu
it must be also shown that in disregard
of such contract the Legislature ha
undertaken TO establish a tariff tina
will be binding and obligatory upon tn
company. We assert that the Legisla
ture in contemplation of law has dom
no such thing. Judge Hill quotes tn,
sixth section of the get in his opinion
and we omit it here for convenience
Having quoted said section he says;
sit is very clear that this act, referring
to the section We supposed il enforced b,
the commission will deprive complainant
of the right TO adopt its duly appointe'
officers, and establish such o tariff o
charges for the transportation of person
and property as it may think proper, ant
the same to alter and change at pleasure.
But how is this section to be enforced
by the commission? That's the question
1t must be admitted that the section
so far as it requires a revision of tariffs
standing by itself, violates no contrac
because it contains no remedy for tn
enforcement of its provisions. 1t is mer
brutem ,tllmen. So that the manner il
which compliance with the terms of th
section is to be enforced becomes o
vital importance, But we have looked
in vain from one end of the opinion t.
the other to find sentence which show
that the Legislature ever intended tt
force the complainsnt..to govern itsel
in it's charges by any other tariff thar
one of its own choice. For aught tina
we find in the opinion the tariff which
the commission is required to revise anC
establish is an advisory tariff which thu
complainant may adopt or not at it
pleasure.
The opinion proceeds upon the theor.
that the act of the Legislature makes tn,
tariff, when revised, obligatory on the
complainant so that it may not disre
gard the conclusions of the commission
without mourning penalty of som'
kind. That Judge Hill intended to sa!
that that portion of the sixth section
requiring the commission to revis,
tariffs, is, when taken by itself uncon
stitutional is hardly to be believed anC
we do not believe it.
Does it make the sixth section uneon
stitutional to declare that the tariff whel
revised and established by the commits
sion shall be priima .faeie evidence tina
the charges therein are just and reason
able, and to afix a penalty for their VIC
lation?
In the opinion it is said as matter o
law that:
1.-THE complainant being common car
/ rier is liable to be amerced in damages
not only compensatory, but punitive, fol
refusing to transport persons or property
suitable for transportation upon the pay
ment or tender of such reasonable com,
pensation."
We agree to this. So it is not tbs
penalty for the enforcement of the
sixth section that makes it uneonstitu
donal What is it then? Says the opin
ion in answer" i.
'The question of what is reasonable
compensation in such cases is one alone
for judicial ascertainment when not fixed
by the charter, and no power is reserved
therein to fix it.n
If we admit this in what better posi-
ton does it leave complainant We say,
for the argument, that what is reasona-
BILE compensation is a judicial question,
and We say also that there is no provi-
sion from one end of the supervision
law to the other which authorizes the
ascertainment Of what is reasonable
compensation, so as to bind the COM
plainant, outside Of Judicial tribunal.
IF there be sueh 4 provision We have
not seen it. We deny that it can be
found. Does the learned Judge desire
to he understood AZ saving that fha