Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1884-10-26
SECRETS OF THE WAR.
BEAUREGARD LETS A FEW OUT
IN MAG AZINE ARTICLE.


Jen Davis Criticised.
The Century for November contains a
long article from the pen Of Gen. Beau.
regard on the battle of Bull Run. The
closing chapter is entitled ''Subsequent
Relations of Mr.. Davis and the Writer"
and IS as follows:
The military result Of the victory was
Tar short Of what il should have been. 1t
established as an accomplished fact, on
the indispensable basis Of military sue
cess, the government Of the Confederate
States, which before was but a political
assertion; but it should have reached
much further. The immediate pursuit.
but for the false alarm which checked it,
would have continued as far as the
Potomac, but must have stopped there
with no greater result than the capture of
more prisoners and material. The true
immediate fruits of the victory
should have been the dispersion of
All the Federal forces south of Baltimore
and east Of the Alleghanies. the liberia
ton Of the State of Maryland, and the
capture Of Washington, which could have
been made only by the upper Potomac.
And from the high source of this achieve
ment other decisive results would have
continued to flow. From my experience
in the Mexican war l had great conf
dence in intelligent volunteer troops, if
rightly handled; and with such an active
and victorious war-engine as the Confed-
crate Army of the Potomac could have
Immediately been made-re-enforced, as
time went, by numbers and discipline
the Federal military power in the East
could never have reached the head it took
by Mcclellan being allowed to organize
and discipline at leisure the powerful ar
my that, IN the end, wore out the South.
IN Al
and It's riEht use is as the step to another
until final achievement. This was the
use besought by me in the plan Of cam
palgn l have mentioned as presented to
Mr. Davis on july IA, few DAYS before
the battle, but rejected by him as imprac-
ticable, and as rather Offering Opportu-
nifty to the enemy to crush US. To sup
ply the deficiency in transportation I've
hicles few in number, and many SC poor
as 70 break down in ordinary camp SER
vice J, | myself had assigned to special
duty Col. (since GovernOr) James L.
hemper. of Virginia, who quickly OBJ
tanned for me some 200 good wagons, to
which number had limited him, so as
not TO arouse again the jealousy Of the
Presidents staff.
II my plan of operation for the capture
Of Washington had been adopted, [ should
have considered myself thereby author
led and free to obtain, as readily could,
me transportation necessary, AS it was
although the really difficult part of this
-Impractlcable" plan of operation had
been proven feasible, that is, the cOncen-
tration Of the Shene.n doah forces with
mine Wrupg e.er than the eleventh hour
81 ~ ne alarm over the march ION
- -Jnd, and discOuntenauced again
!. ~ ,0usly at the twelfth hour by another
alarm as to how ''the enemy may vary his
MD in, n0 f01 Inv hn
decisive defeat OF the main Federal forces
nevertheless the army remained rooted
In the spot, although we had more than
5000 troops who had been not at all or
but little in the battle. and we were
perfectly organized, while the remaining
commands, in the high spirit of victory,
could have been reOrganized at the tap of
the drum, and many with improved cap
tured arms and equipments. / had
already urged my views with unusual
persistency, and acted on them against
all but an express order to the contrary;
and as they had been deliberately re-
jected in their ultimate scope by Mr..
Davis as the cOmmander-in-chiet,I did
not feel authorized to urge them further
than their execution had been allowed,
unless the subject were preached anew
by himself But there was no intimatiOn
of any such change of purpose, and the
army, consistently with this inertia, was
left unprOyided for man9uvre with trans
pOrtatiOn for its ammunitions; its forth
tude. moreover, as new and
volunteer army, While spending some
Simes twentY-four hours without
food, being only less wonder
ful than the cOmmlssary administra.
ton at Richmond, from which such state
of affairs could proceed even two weeks
after the battle of Manassas. Although
certain political superstitiOns about not
consolidating the North may then have
weighed against the action l proposed,
they would have been light against true
military policy, if such had existed in the
head of the government. Apart from an
active material ally, such as the colonies
had afield and on sea in the war of indie
pendence with Great Britain, country
in fatal war must depend on the vigOr OF
ats warfare; the more inferior the cOun-
try the holder and more enterprising the
use of its resources, especially if its from
tiers are convenient to the enemy. L was
convinced that our success lay in short,
quick war of decisive blows, before the
Federals, with their vast resources, could
build up great military power, to which
end a concerted use of our forces, imme-
diate and sustained, was necessary, so
that, weaker though we were at all sepa-
rate points, we might nevertheless strike
with superior strength at some chosen de-
cisive point, and after victory there reach
for victory now made easier elsewhere,
and thus sum up success. Instead of this,
which in war we call concentration, our
actual policy was diffusion, an inferior
Confederate force at each separate point
defensively confronting superior Federal
force: our power daily shrinking, that of
the enemy increasing, and the ayOwed
Federal policy of "attritiOn" of the bigger
masses left free to grind the smaller, one
by one, to naught. Out of this state we
never emerged, when the direction Of the
government was, as almost always, nee
essary, excepting when "RichmOnd" was
Immediately in danger.
Thus, in the fall of 1861, about three
months after the battle of Manassas-af-
Ter throwing my whole force forward to
Fairfax court house, with OutpOsts
haunting our flags on the hills in sight Of
shingtOn, in order to chafe the FEEDER
ais to another battle, but without success
y proposed that the army should be
raised to an effective of $4,000 men, by
drawing 10000 for the immediate enter
prise from several points along the sea-
board. not even at that time threatened,
and from our advanced position be swiftly
THROWN ACROSS THE POTOMAC
at a point which l had carefully surveyed
for that purpose, and moved upon the rear
Of Washington, thus forcing Mcclellan to
a decisive engagement before his Organl-
cation (new eulistmsnts) was completed,
aud while our own army had the advan-
tage Of discipline and prestge-seasOned
soldiers. whose term, however, would ex-
pire in the early part Of the coming sum-
mer. This plan. approved by Gen. Gusta-
vus W. Smith (then Immediately CON-
handing Gen. JOhustOn's own forces as
well as by Gen. Johnston, was submitted
TO Sir. Davis in a conference at my head
quarters. but rejected because he would
not venture to strip those points
Of the troops we required. Even
if those points had been cap
tured. Though none were then even
threatened, they must have reverted as a
direct consequence TO so decisive a sue
cess. l was willing, then, should it have
come to that, TO exchange even Richmond
temporarily for Washington. Yet it was
precisely from similar combinations and
elements that the army was made up, to
enable it next spring, under Gen. Lee, to
encounter McClellan's then perfectly or
gained army Of 10000 men at the very
door Of Richmond. Ii that which was ac-
cepted as a last defensive resort against
an overwhelming aggressive army had
been used in an enterprising often
sive against that same army while vet
IN the raw, the same venture had been
made At less general risk, less cost of