Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1884-10-27
BEAUREGARD'S BLAST.
Secrets Of the Late War Let Out by
Gen. Beauregard.
Why Washington Was Not Taken After
the Battle of Bull Run.

q long article from the pen of Gen.
Beauregard ON the battle of Bull Run.
1t is highly interesting throughout,
and is illustrated in the highest STYLE
of art. The closing chapter is entitled
Subsequent Relations OF Mr.. Davis
and the Writer,n and Ia as follows:
The military result OF the victory was
far short of what IL should have been.
IL established as an accomplished fact,
ON the indispensable basis of nail
itary success, the government Of
the Confederate States, which
before was but a political assertion;
but II should have reached much fur
Their. The immediate pursuit, but for
the false alarm which checked It,
would have continued as far as the 20.
tomae, but must have stopped there
with no greater result than the cap
ture Of more prisoners ana material.
The true Immediate fruits of the vic.
tory should have been the dispersion
of all of the federal forces south of Bal.
timore and east of the Alleghanies
the liberation of the state of Maryland,
and the capture of Washington, which
could have been made only by
the upper Potomac. And from the
high source Of this achievement
other decisive results would have con-
tinued to flow. From my experience
In the Mexican war / had great conf
dence in intelligent volunteer troops,
If rightly handled; and with such an
active and victorious war-engine as
the Confederate army of the Potomac
could have Immediately been made
REINFORCED, as time went, by numbers
and discipline-the federal military
power in the East could never have
reached the head it took by Mcclellan
being allowed to organize and discip-
line at leisure the powerful army that,
in the end, wore out the South. In
war one success makes another easier,
and its right use is as the step
to another, until final achieve
ment. This was the use
besought by me in the plsn of cam
paign have mentioned as presented
to Mr.. Davis on the 14th of July, few
days before the battle, but rejected by
him as impracticable, and as rather
offering opportunity to the enemy 10
crush u.s. To supply the deficiency of
transportation vehicles few in num-
Der, and many 80 poor as TO break
down in ordinary camp servicel, l my
self had assigned TO special duty Col.
(since Gov. James l.. kemper of Vir-
ginia,) who quickly obtained for me
some 200 good wagons, to which num-
Der / had limited him so as not to
arouse again the
JEALOUSY OF THE PRESIDENT STAFF.
If my plan of operation for the cap
ture of Washington had been adopted,
l should have considered myself there
by authorized and free to obtain, as /
readily could, the transportation nee
essary. AS 1t was-although the really
difficult part of this "impracticablen
plan of operation had been proven
feasible, that is, the concentration of
the Shenandoah forces with mine
(wrung later than the eleventh hour
through the alarm over the march
upon Richmond, and discountenanced
again nervously at the twelfth hour
by another alarm as TO how
'the enemy may vary his plans"
in consequence, followed by the
decisive defeat of the main federal
ces-nevertheless, the army re-
manned rooted in the spot, although
we had more than $1,000 troops who
had been not at all or but little in the
battle, and We're perfectly organized,
while the remaining commands, in the
high spirits of victory could have been
reorganized at the tap Of the drum,
and many with improved captured
arms and equipments. ! had already
urged my views with unusual persist
ency, and acted on them against all
but an express order TO the contrary;
and as they had been deliberately re-
iected in their ultimate scope by
Mr. Davis as the commander-in-chief,
/ did not feel authorized TO
urge them further than their eXecu-
ton had been allowed, unless the sub
ject were preached anew by himself.
But there was no intimation of any
such change of purpose, and the army,
consistently with this inertia, was left
unprovided for maneuYer with trans
portation for Its ammunition; its forth
Jude, moreover, as a new and volunteer
army while spending sometimes
twenty-four hours without food, being
only less wonderful than the commits
sary administration at Richmond,
from which such state Of affairs could
proceed even two weeks after the hat
tie of Manassas. Although certain
political superstitions about not con-
solidating the North may then
have weighed against the action /
proposed, they would have been light
against the true military policy, If
such had existed in the head of the
government. Apart from an active
material ally, such as the colonies had
afield and ON sea in the war of indie
pendence with Great Britain, coun-
try IN fatal war must depend ON the
vlgor of its warfare; the more inferior
the country, the holder and more en-
terprising the use OF its resources,
especially If its frontiers are convenient
TO the enemy. / was convinced that
our success lay in q short, quick war of
decisive blows, before tine federals,
with their vast resources, could build
up great military power; to
which end concerted use Of our
forces, immediate and sustained, was
necessary, 80 that, weaker though we
were at all the separate points, we
might nevertheless strike with supe-
rioT strength at some chosen decisive
point, and after victory there reach for
victory now made easier elsewhere,
and thus sum up success. lns tead OF
this. which In war we call concentra-
tion. our actual policy was diffusion,