Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1884-10-26

| ed sound, and was stronger, with its rea-
/ Oily assimilating new strength, at the end
OF the war than ever before; the pressure
/ would have been lifted from Kentucky
/ and Missouri, and we should have MAIN
| tained what is called an active defensive
/ warfare, that is. taken and kept the often
| sive against the enemy, enforcing peace.
No people ever warred for independence
| with more relative advantages than the
/ COnfedeTates; and if, as a military ques-
| ton, they must have failed, then no cour-
| try must aim at freedom by means of war.
We were one in sentiment as in territory,
/ starting out, not with a struggling ad-
| ministration Of doubtful authority. but
with our ancient State governments aud a
fully organized central government.
| As military question it was in no
sense CIVIL war, but war between two
cOuntries-tor conquest on one side, for
self-preseryation on the other. The South,
with its great material resources, its de-
! fenslve means Of mountains, waterways,
! railroads, and telegraph, with the i'm
mense advantage of tine interior lines of
| war, would be open to discredit as peo-
pie If its failure could not be explained
! otherwise than by mere material con-
| trast. The great Frederick, at tie head
Of little people, not only beat back q
combination Of several great military
! powers, but conquered and kept terri
! tory: and Napoleon held combined
| Europe at the feet Of France till his
| blind ambition Overieaped itself. IL
may be said that the South
had no Fredericks or Nspolpons.
/ but It had at least as good commanders
! as its adversary. Nor was 1t the fault of
! our soldiers or people. Our soldiers were
/ as brave and intelligent as ever bore
/ arms, and, if only for reasons already
| mentioned, they had a determination su.
1 perior to the enemy's. Our people bore
a devotion to the cause never surpassed,
and which no war-making monarch ever
had for support: they gave their all
even the last striplings under the family
roofs filling the ranks vOided by the fall
Of their fathers and brothers. But the
narrow military view of the head of the
government, which illustrated itself in
the outset by ordering from Europe, not
| 100000 or 100000, but 10000 stand of
arms, as an increase upon s, 200, its first
estimate, was equally narrow, and conse-
quently timid in its employment of our
armies.
The moral and material forces actually
engaged in the war made our success a
moral certainty, but tor the tiIaid policy
which-ignOring strategy as a science and
holiness of enterprise as its ally-could
| never be brought to view the whole thea
ire of war as one subject, of which all
points were but integral parts, or to haz-
ard for the time points relatively unim-
pOrtant for the purpose of gathering for
an overwhelming and rapid stroke some
decisive point; and which, again. with
characteristic miselGtiOn, would push a
victorious force directly forward into I'M
supported and disastrous operations. in
stead of using its victory to spare from it
strength sufficient to secure an equally
important success in another quarter.
THE GREAT PRINCIPLES OF WAR
are truths, and the same to-day as in the
time of Cesar or Napoleon, notwithstand-
ing the ideas of some thOughtless persons
their applications being but intensified
by the scientific discoveries affecting
transportation and communication of in |
telligence. These principles are few and |
simple, however various their deductions |
and application. Skill in strategy con- |
sists in seeing through the intricacies of !
the whole situation. and bringing into |
proper combination forces and influences, |
though seemingly unrelated, so as to ap- |
ply these principles, and with bOidness |
Of decision and execution appearing |
with the utmost force, and, If possible, |
superior odds, before the enemy at some |
strategic, that is, decisive point And |
although a sound military plan NAV not /
be always so readily conceived, yet any |
plan that offers decisive results, if il |
agree with the principles of war, is as |
plain and ineligible as these principles |
themselves, and no more to be rejected |
than they. There still remains, of course, |
the hazard of accident in execution and |
the apprehension of the enemy's move |
ments upsetting your own; but hazard may |
also favor as well as disfavOr, and will not /
unbefrIend the enterprising any more |
than the timid. IL was this fear Of pos
sible consequences that kept our forces !
scattered in inferior or relative strength |
at all points of the compass each holding |
its bit of ground till by slow local process |
our territory was taken and our separate |
forces destroyed, or, if captured, retained |
by the enemy without exchange in their |
process o. attrition. To stop the slow |
consumption of this passive mode of war
fare, tried my part, and at certain
critical junctures, proposed to the gov
eminent active plans of operation looking
to such results as have described-sOme- |
times. il is true, in relation to the en- |
plOyment of forces not under my control,
as | was the soldier of a cause and people, |
not of monarchy nor even OF govern !
ment. Two occasions there were when |
certain of the most noted operations, from !
their isolated or OppOrtune character, |
might, with energy and intelligentventure |
on the Confederate side, have been turned |
into fatal disaster; among them Grants |
movement in front of Vicksburg, and his |
change of base from the north to the south
of the James river, where l was in COM
mdHtls Ill lis Adcb IL a. cAb5t 1AtSh~
mOud. l urged particularly that our
warfare was
SURE OF FINAL DEFEAT,
unless we attempted decisive strokes that
might be followed up TO the end, and that
even if earlier defeat might chance from
the risk involved in the execution OF the
necessary combinations, we ought to take |
that risk and thereby either win or end an
otherwise useless struggle. But in addi-
ton to the radical divergence of military
ideas-the passive defensive of an intel |
lect timid of risk and not at home in war,
and the active defensive, reaching for sue |
cess through enterprise and bOldness, ac- |
cording to the lessons taught US in the |
campaigns of the great masters-there |
was a personal feeling that now gave |
cold hearing or none to any recon-
mendatiOns of mine. Mr.. Davis friend |
ship, warm at the early period of the war, |
was changed, some time after the battle |
of Manassas, to corresponding hostility |
from several personal causes, direct and |
indirect, of which L need only mention |
that my report of the campaign and bat |
tie of Manassas having contained as part |
of its history a statement of the submis- |
sion of my plan of campaign already de- |
scribed for concentrating our forces, |
crushing both Mcdowell and Patterson |
and capturing Washington. Mr.. Davis |
strangely took offense thereat, and his |
self-accused responsibility for rejecting |
the plan he sought, after the demOnstra-
tions of events, to get rid OF by deny
ing that such a plan had ever been
submitted-an issue, for that matter,
easily settled by my production of the
cOtempOraneOus report of Col. James
Chestnut, the bearer of the mission, who,
moreover, at the time of the controversy,
was on Mr.. Davis own staff, where he re-
manned. Mr.. Davis made an endeavor to
suppress the publication of my report Of
the battle of Manassas. The matter came
up in a secret debate in the Confederate
Congress, where a host of friends were
ready to sustain me; but l sent tele-
gram disclaiming any desire for its pub
lica ton, and advising that the safety of
the country should be our solicitude, and
not personal ends.
Thenceforth his hostility was watchful
and adroit, neglecting no opportunity,
great or small; and though, from motives
all its opposite, twas not exposed during
the war by
ANY MURMURS OF NINE,
it bruited sometimes in certain circles of
it's own force. Thus, when in January,
1862, the Western representatives eX-
pressed desire that 1 should separate
myself for a time from my Virginia forces
and go to the defense of the Mississippi
valley from the impending offensive of
oil z xrrac 1,xrt