The Arkansaw traveler., 1883-07-21

great show of troops. Great secrecy could alone protect his own army during is dangerous flank march. Hill was left behind, and concealed the deparature of ,wn-thirds of the army
 Hooker had only So,ooo infantry: his artillery was very numerous, and out of proportion to the reduced number of the infantry. His cavalry was tired, after the raid of Stoneman, and needed repose. termine the authorities of Washington to reduce the garrisons of useless posts. Hooker had orders which forced him to cover Washington and Harper's Ferry, though Washington was well gauisoned and Harper's Ferry had no stra,egical importance "General Hooker had asked that all the forces which could cooperate against Lee should be under one direc- ton, so as to combine their efforts. Gen. eral Halleck judged that the superior direction which was exercised by himself in his cabinet a, Washington was suffi- cent.' The army of the Potomac was thus reduced to the defensive. The Com:c de Paris praises the efforts made
 
 plans of Lee. In reality, Lee was leav- ing the road to Richmond open, while he himself tried to march on Washington he was playing, as he said, Queen for Queen and Hooker soon perceived the advantages which could be drawn from the movements of his adversary. Wash ington, with its powerful Notifications, its formidable artillery, its garrison of 5o,ooo men, which Schenck could have rapidly swollen to 5000 men, was more than a match for Lee, while, without a second army, Davis could not have been able to protect Richmond. The resources Of the confederates were limited in men, in ma terial of war, in means of transport they had not the command of the sea. Hooker could not, however, persuade the govern ment i; he was told that his mission was not 10 go 10 Richmond. but to fight Lees army. Abandoning 10 the enemy the offensive, there was nothing left for him but to try 10 understand its movements
 Meanwhile, Lee marched his army be- tween the two parallel ridges, the Blue ridge and the Bull Run mountains. His movements were mask ked. The campaign was opened by the battle ot Winchester, which told the north tha, the army of in- vasion was in the valley of Virginia. Hooker pu, his whole army in motion. turned northward, and concentrated his troops so IS to cover Washington. The disasrous retreat of Miiroy produced q profound sensation the invasion Of pennsylvania was near: Harrisburg was in danger the valley of the Cumberland was in alarm. The audacious. though extremely injudicious, raid of Stuart had very singular results. At one moment. says the Comte de far,s, Lee. Hooker. and Stuart were marching all three on parallel lines, the second being between his two enemies. and separated from them by chain of hills The diversion of Lees cavalry was very useless. and brought in reality no good result 10 the confederate cause.
 l. is well known that the command oi the army of the Potomac was transferred from Hooker to Meade. " This change would have been iogioal the day after Charlottesville il was slngularlv inop- portune at the moment when the two armies were on the eve ot a decisive struggle" General Meade is thus de- seribed
 Qaici. =lotr>l, ,'icnt bat 9ia l ias, ledcrfrnt. c'etr .tnd precise mud. .,.'l ., cpolncSs Whieh 44neef eaald not .titer. br N,.ss ouls kno"n bN hls sHtordta,tys yni hN ihe other generals. for nrltcr hf, s3oN an! iutthodlltl msa1 nor his ione ihln ace N ,h eyes the sad expression al which N as hardly Neileti hy >re eNiaclcs, was made to strike the muliitHdc or 10 lnspirc enthusiasm. But he was esteemed D his companions n iruis and respected hy hi> adycrsanes.
 Meade received large powers from Washington. but he had the good sense to make as few ehanges as possible in the organization of the army. This army. when he received the command, was d i liltle short af 5000 men. The two armies, Tn ignorance of each other $ 1 movements, changed their direction while ,heir cavalry crossed each other, a a,d sometimes met ln sharp encounters, and finally, on the ist of July, took a direction which placed them in presence of each other in the neghborhood oi l.tiettysburg.
 The Com,e de Paris has two long chapters on the momen,ous battle of Gettysburg. which was in reality the turn- ing poin; of ,l.e war. will only give a resume of his account. The first cause of the defeat of the confederate army was the absence of Stuart, which brough, the ior,uitous encounter al Gettysburg, and retarded the concentration of this army. Lee had four brigades of cavalry with hlm, but did no, know how 10 use them. He did no, understand ,ha, q new ground, open, with commanding posi- tionS rendered all concealed marches all sudden attacks impossible. He gave 100 much development to his line. and made his principal attacks at the two ex,re- mites. Having failed Tn them. he did not throw troops enough against Meade's centre. The army of the Potomac had the advantage of good positions. of which Meade made excellen, use. His victory was decisive, for the losses were enor- nous on both sides, amounting to 7 per cent. on the side of the tederals, and ,o soI ger cent. on the side of the confeder- ates. The numbers show how desperate