The Dallas daily herald. [volume] (Dallas, Tex.) 1873-1887, 1883-06-23

he article, we conclude that the court may
meet aud transact Business in the absence
If the county judge, and in that event,
'ome other member of the court may pre-
tide, (see also r. S, art. 1901 Section IL
provides that the judge, or any three oil the
may call special terms put
there is no intimation in the Jaw, that IN
The absence of the judge, any member OF
the commissioners, less than the whole, shall
constitute a auoram for the transaction OF
business. Therefore, the three members |
who made the order of revocation ON De-
cember |. 1877, were not a court WITHIN the
meaning of the statute and that the order |
was void. Reversed and remanded:
TAYLOR and wife VS.. Bland and wife, from
Mel imam county. Opinion by Watts, J.
adopted. l, Iva contract, when the con-
il expressed in dollars, the
presum, IN /. tina legal tender dollars are
meant b, fucts are admi ssible IA evidence
to show what The curtencT Us Confederate
money! tue parties had in view. 2. When
the Jury, under The facts, find
that the contract Intended Con.
federate money the rule -, that
the parry is entitled to recover the value OF
the Confederate money estimated at the
date OF the contract, with stipulated inter
est. Third, the date of the maturity OF
a note does not necessarily determine the
character of the currency in which the note
is to be paid. Fourth, upon the surviving
wife qualifying as as administrative OF her
husbands estate, Notwithstanding her exist
ing coventure by a second marriage,
the statute OF limitation does not
cease to run Reversed and remanded.
International & Great Northern railway
ys. Anderson county from Anderson coun'
". Original opinion sustained on rehear-
ing. The court below erred in decreeng
that as Anderson county had donated its
lands to aid in the construction OF the
Houston Il Great Northern railway prior to
its consolidation with the International "
Great Northern railway, the lnternati mai
railway should not be exempt in said coun-
ty. The law creating the exemption was
for the relief of the liberation railway,
and both the language and intent OF the
law were to exempt that road from taxes,
except county taxes in such counties as had
donated their lands to aid in its construc-
ton. The case depends upon the cOnstruc-
ton of the act of March 10, 1875. The con-
stitution in force at the time OF the pas.
sage of the acts of August 8, 1870, and
March 10, 1875, gave power to the
legislature to exempt property from
taxation by law receiving the assent OF
two-thirds of the members of the legislature
both houses), and as there is no dispute
but that such was done, these acts must be
held valid.
The act of March TO- 1875, gave valid ex-
emption from the taxation of the property
sought to be taxed herein. The consolida-
tiOn of the two companies Sept. 20, 1875
did net remove the exemption from taxa
ton given by the act Of August 5, 1870. The
sale OF Oct. 10, 1879, did not defeat the ex-
emption from taxation given by the act OF
March 10, 1876. Rehearing refused.
| Parker county VS.. Glaze, from Parker
county. Opinion by Walker, p. ]
adopted. Suit by injunction against the
county commissioners, to restrain them
from dividing the courthouse square into
four separate squares, and dividing three OF
these squares into lots and the selling Of
the lots for the purpose of raising funds to
on oct courthouse on the remaining sub
divided square, to supply che place of a
courthouse previously destroyed by fire
Appellee alleged his ownership of lots ad
joining the square, his consequent
injury by so subdividing said square
etc., the destruction Of the square as Z
courthouse square, etc. Held: The rules
and principles OF law announced in Lanai
County VS.. Clements. (49 Texas, 349), hav,
unqualified application to this case. On
the authority of that case, The judgmen
herein might be affirmed, but the cour
below erred in rendering judgment agains
defendants upon the pleadings of the partie
without allowing defendants hearing
upon the facts. l. When there is al
answer in the cause presenting an issue o
fact to be determined, the defendant is en-
titled to have hearing on 1t, and to hav
it tried through evidence. 2. It Away
devolves upon the plaintiff to maintain hi
IA M hv prONf hafnrA ha 10 iptitlaN IN ,
Judgment. s.. The general denial put
plaintiff TO the proof OF his case, whateve
. else defendant may have pleaded (Fowle
vs.. Davenport, 2l Texas 626). 4. A gen
eral denial is not abandoned, defeated o
. qualified by subsequent pleas of confession
, or avoidance. (nurt vs.. Blackburn, 2
Texas G0l) 8. Exceptions to the Who'll
answer cannot prevail where genera
denial has been filed and not withdrawn
10. II binson W.. Brunson, 70 Texas 1888
, u. For the purpose of q trial on the merit
+ of an injunction suit, defendant is entitle
5 ito plead a. many several matters. whethe
f of jurisdiction in an original proceeding. t
5 amend the action Of a county court, hav
. in the probate Of will and in such pre-
I ceeding TO probate will. Held. 1t has moi
D list. under Art. 4. Sect. s of the constitution
/. OF 1916, and the provisions Of the statut,
1 art. 12261262 p. d. it was held that tn
+ district court had jurisdiction to try suit
instituted to contest the validity of will
4 which had been admitted to probat,
Darker VS.. Parker 10 Tex. sc: Mickey v!
a Hobbs, q Tex 572). The present constitr
!, ton, unlike the former, confer II
i original jurisdiction upon district court
s over the county courts sitting as probat
). courts. (Constit ution art. 8, sec. s Thi
Y section evidences that while original jurl,
| ,,tr md rnt NV g.,
r istrators. guardians and minors is given I
Q the district courts, the sole jurisdcto
+ given to such courts over the county coul
n sitting in probate, is an appellate jurisdi,
I ton. To enable the district courts to exc
Q else the appellate jurisdiction thus COME
n red, over our probate courts, the legisl,
J. ture has provided that the DEGREES OF pr,
r bate courts may be revised upon appea
a or upon certiorari. "a. s arts. 29O-29S, 22O
Q 220S, 1913, 32l4.) The true rule is stated |
n Munson vs.. Chrisman, % Texas, 1l7.) III
:. revised statutes do not provide any mod
n other or different, for contesting the valid
:. ty Of q will which has been admitted
}. probate, there is provided for the revisiC
}. ting in probate. CART. 32l3 Reversed al
n dismissed.
d Wahrmund ct al. vs.. Merrill & Metca
d from Tom Green county. Opinion
+. Willie, c,j. Taylor purchased Go acres
d land from James Adens, of Sawyer,
IS ceased. Contemporaneously with the ma
10 ing Of the deed, Taylor executed to Waf
r mund deed Of trust upon the same G
{ acres to secure the payment of six prom
- sorry notes given by him TO appellant. IT
4. deed shows the purchase Of the land
10 $500 cash, the confirmation of the sale
10 the proper county court, and that this g
re tire purchase money was by order OF 50
d. court to DO used in paying certain pl
N ferred claims held by beneiiciaries Of I
Il, trust deed; that an arrangement was ma
<. amongst all parties, that the beneiiciari,
nj preferred creditors, were to receipt
in James for the amount due on their claim
%; and that he was to receipt TO Taylor for I
SO purchase money of the land, and Tayl
il executed the promisary notes to the
ne creditors, securing them by vendors Ii
r. on the land as purchased. He d II
ne transaction was a subrogation of appellar
ut to the lien held by Sawyer, administrat,
OF to secure the purchase money Of the la
n. sold to Taylor, and neither he, in
II, lifptima Nnr Eaunia MafCult hia iay;o