Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1883-01-10
.LONGSTREET ON PORTER.

'IUNGSTREET Uh PURTER.
The Ex-Confederate Chieftain, on the
Manassas Gap Fight-His Opinion OF the
Result of Fitz John Porter's Refusal to.
Obey the Order Of His Cemnandsr. =
: WASHINGTON, Jan. General Long,
street, by request of the National Republi-
can, sends that paper the following letters:
ATLANTA, Ca, Dec. 80, 1882-General U.
S. Grant, New York-MY DEAR SIR: It
occurs to me that commanders are not un-;
der obligations to obey the letter of the
orders of their chief, but are expected and
required to exercise due discretion when
not in his immediate presence. No doubt
cases have occurred in your experience
where officers were as deserving of reproof
for failing to exercise such disere-
ton as for failing to obey orders.
Early on the 18th of August, 1862,
at the head of my column, arrived with
in striking distance of the battle then in
progress between the army of the Poto-
mac and Gen. Jackson's wing of the army
of northern Virginia. Upon seeing the
approach Of our column the federal troops
were Withdrawn to adefensive position, a
little retired before noon, as testified by
myself and others before the Schofeld
board. Ny command was employed and
formed on Jackson's right, at right angles
to Warrenton Pike and extending to and
beyond the Manassas Gap rail-
road. AS soon as deployed, General
Lee indicated his purpose to have me at
tack. Intending to execute his plan I
asked time to reconnoiter my position and
the ground intervening. After recon
noisancs reported the federal position
strong and that the sacrifice was likely to
be such as to cause apprehension of fail
ure. He did not seem satisfied and was
considering the propriety of making hi
orders more definite when information was
received from Gen. Stuart of the ap-
proach of federal troops upon my
right. This drew attention to
that part of the field for the time, but
when it appeared that this force was hard
~ strong enough for the attack the ques-
ton of attack by the first corps was re-
sumed. AS the day was far spent I sug
gested force reconnaissance at nightfall,
and preparations for the action of the day
following. This was accepted. A recon
noisance, however, satisfied General Lee
that the battle should not be made at this
point So withdrew about midnight to
the ground we had occupied before our
advance. Next day the federalG
renewed the battle against
Jackson. AS we were not engaged nor Sc
riously threatened rode out in advance
of my line in search of an opportunity to
take my share of the battle, and found
number of my officers collected at point
from which they had fair view of the
masses swelling up against jackson.
From this point it was evident that few
batteries having an enfilade fire could dis
perse the attack, and some of our batteries
were ordered forward for position
and preparation. Meanwhile mes
sage came from Gen. Jackson
asking for reinforcements and almost i'm
mediately after came an order from Gen
eral Lee to send some of my brigade to
Jackson. 1t did not seem probable that
the troops could reach Jackson in time if
sent at the same time. There was no
doubt of our dispensing the attack by the
fire of our artillery. Under the circum-
stances l felt impelled to disregard orders
and operate on my own judgment The
fire of our batteries produced the result
anticipated. When the attacking forces
were dispersed my command was sprung
to charge and swept the field. Had thus
engaged the day before, it is more than
probable that Porter would have been in
good season to take me on the wing and
would in all probability have crushed me.
Had stopped to reinforce on the second
day, it is hardly probable Jackson could
him. AS you state, it was not possible for |
Porter to attack under the 4:30 order, the |
failure to do which was alleged TO be his
high crime. If we may suppose
he received the order at 4:5O, and had |
attacked, he would have given US the op |
portunity that We were SO earnestly seeking |
all that day, and in the disjointed condi-
ton of their army on that day, the result !
might have been more serious than that of |
next day, the i30sh. Now, if we suppose
my attack on the afternoon of the Both |
failed, we shall see that the evidence
against me would have been stronger
than that against Porter. Yet with
an earnest desire TO meet the orders of my
chief felt it would be more culpable to
execute than disobey them. AS we were
successful, there was no room for question
as to the only safe raie to guide Judgment
in such case. ii IN the exercise of discre-
ton one becomes the direct cause of fail
ure, he should only be adjudged as failing
in generalship. Il the intention is to
bring discontinue upon arms,it is criminal
Soon after TINS cam paign was promoted
md assigned as senior lieutenant general
Of the confederate army. With highest
respect, your most obedient servant,
JAMES LOsGsTREET.
The miners about Tilkesbarre are about