The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-06-12

! oughly acquainted with the wishes OF his
chief and preparing for making the attack at
| an early hour, the commander OF the First
corps only thinks of suggesting new plan
of battle. At dawn, with this object in view,
he has hastily repaired to headquarters.
| This time he has received orders, although
| still of very vague character. General Lee
| did not give his instructions the precise and
| peremptory form which should characterize
| all that emanates from a general-in-chief.
! Consequently, Longstreet, not seeing any
advantage in pressing the attack, loses much
| precious time, either through design or men
| tai sluggishness, while his chief, relying en-
tirely upon his promptness, proceeds to ex-
anime in person the Federal right, which
Ewell is still preparing TO attack"
| And the Comte de Paris finds that even
Lees front of battle was not well ordered.
| He says:
THE Confederate Third corps placed in
| the center, will have to support its two
neighbors as soon as the Federal lines shall
appear to be shaken by either attack. So
| that by a train of errors intimately con-
nected with each other, Lee deploys his army
upon a more extended front than that of
| Meade, without concentrating anywhere the
necessary force for breaking up the enemy's
lines. Shall we find in these dis
positions proof of Lees hesitations regard
ing the point where it is expedient for him
to strike his aversary, or should we rather
| think that he does not dare intrust to any
| body mission fully as important as those
| which Jackson had so well performed at
Manassas and charlottesville This last
| supposition is justified by the part which
Lee will take in the direction of the battle,
and which we should be tempted to designate
as Insignificant if we could do so without
intending to cast blame upon him. Once the
game opened, just as if Jackson was still liv
| ing, he continues to leave an extraordinary
| latitude to his lieutenants. The absence of
Il 49, IL 1 r
American armies-made this, perhaps.
matter of necessity on his part. After having
allotted to each man his separate role in the
action which is about to take place, he will
remain, so to say, spectator of the struggle,
receiving hardly any message and scarcely
issuing any order The intricacies of the
machine he has to maneuver make it too diff
fcult for him to guide it properly when it is
on the march. The plan adopted by Lee has
| the inconvenience of increasing this very
defect by making success dependent upon
! the combined action of several corps between
which there is absolutely no connection.
| Thus he commits in his turn the fault he
made Hooker and Sedgwick pay so dearly for
on the banks of the Rappahannock."
THE SECOND DAYS BATTLE.
In the battle of the second day, the Comte
de Paris thinks that General Lee should
have brought into action more than seven
teen brigades out OF the thirty-seven COM
posing his infantry, as in this way the battle
OF that day might have been made decisive
in his favor. And the criticism made on the
battle of the third day is as follows
at appears that General Lee influenced
| Dy the advantages obtained over the Third
Federal corps, decided simply to resume on
the Sd the movement he had performed the
day before. A fatal ard inexplcable resolu-
! 10 cd Il,,,s 10
tactics of double attack by way of the two
wings. without thinking that the more
ground they gained the easier it would be for
Meade to lead his forces from one wing to
the other in order to repulse them success
sively. The instructions he gave to his lieu
he seemed to leave to each com
mander the task of fighting a sepa-
rate battle according to his own fancy.
In fact he apprised Ewell that the battle
| would commence on the right at daybreak,
| directing him to take the offensive at the
| same hour. and vet it was only on the morn
ing of the Sd, long after the hour specified,
that Longstreet received the necessary orders
| to put his troops in motion. 1t is
now the hottest time of the day; a strange
silence reignsz over the battlefield. causing
the Federal soldiers, worn out by fatigue, to
look upon the impending general attack,
which they have anticipated since early
dawn, as extremely long i'll coming. General
Lee says in his report that by harmonizing
the action of his several corps he had reason
to rely upon success; but it is precisely this
concert of action that he was not able to
| establish. In fact, between Z and o'clock
in the morning, when the conflict had been
progressing along the left for at least four
| hours, he is still occupied in assigning places
| to the troops that are to make attack
upon Ziegler's grove Moreover, he does not
| even appear to have come to any positive de-
| Al.
| endeavoring to make him resort to a flank
movement against the extreme left of the
enemy. During the long examination which
| abSorbs the attention of the two generals
Pickett's fresh troops, which have long since
| reached Seminary hill and are destined to
! play the first role in the combat, at which
ever point 1t may be delivered, remain with
their arms at rest. vainly waiting for their
| orders. 1t is only at 10 o'clock that they
! take position. in the vicinity of the orchard
| a little in the rear of the EmmettSburg road. "
And an error was committed in the point
selected for assault. The writer says:
This assault as we have stated, is di-
rected against the salient point occupied by
Hancock. II is against this point therefore,
that the Confederates should concentrate
their fire, but, on the contrary, they scatter
it along the whole extent OF the enemy's
| line. This error was noticed with astonish-
ment by the Union artilerists so that when,
a few years later, peace had brought them
! into close contact with their adversaries
General Hunt met General Long, Lees sec
rotary, who had formerly been his pupil at
West Point, and asked him to explain the
cause of it. 1T was owing to the interior
ence of the generals commanding the army
corps and divisonsl replied Long"
In the resume of this battle, rs summed up
! by the accomplished writer. he holds the
scales evenly between Lee and Meade. He
thinks that each OF them committed serious
mistakes, and that Meade was guilty of vac
| illation and irresolution in not press
| ing his victory to its legiti-
new encounter with his adversary north of
the Potomac" For the mastery manner in
which General Lee effected his retreat from
| Gettysburg the Comte de Paris has nothing