The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1883-06-10
The Naval and Military Power Of China,

In estimating the capacity OF the Chinese
empire to cope with France In eastern Asia
We should carefully distinguish between Its
military and Its naval resources. Paradox
cal as 1t may seem, the Middle Kingdom,
with its three or four hundred million people,
Is just now better prepared for sea than for
land fighting with European power.
The superior efficiency Of tho Chinese navy
Is Of course due to the fact that the assimila-
ton of European ideas and usages has been
carried much further in this branch Of the
service. Not only have the Pekin author-
ties, largely influenced by the progressive
statesman. Ii HUNG CHANG, provided them
selves with the armored vessels Of improved
type and armament to which we shall pres
emily refer, but they have created nursery
OF engineers and seamen by absorbing al
most the whole steam coastlng trade Of
eastern Asia from the ports Of Burmah to
those Of Japan. Moreover, 1t Is far easier to
obtain competent volunteer officers for the
navy than for tho army the Chinese treaty
ports being thronged with vessels belonging
to the Government or mercantile marine OF
European countries and the United States.
Bearing In mind the relative facilities for
procuring efficient officers and thoroughly
trained men In the naval service, let US look
at the war vessels which are now or may
speedily be placed in readiness for action in
Chinese waters. To say nothing Of ten I'M
armored corvcttes and thirty wooden gun
boats, the Chinese navy comprehends two
heavy ironclads. two steel plated corvettes
built at Stettin and armed with twelve-inch
Krupp guns, ono monitor and two
steel cruisers built In England and furnished
with Armstrong and Calling guns, six steel
and six iron gunboats Of English construc-
ton, and four steel torpedo boats purchased
in Germany. To these vessels will soon be
added the Ting-Yuen. an ironclad which Is
admitted by French experts to be one Of the
most perfect embodiments OF naval science
and which is on the point Of leaving the
Stettin navy yard for China, II, indeed,
1t has not already started. We have
here plainly an armored feet which,
as regards both the number OF ships and the
weight Of armament, is superior to any naval
force which France Is likely to collect in
Chinese waters. But the preponderance Is
not greater than that Of tho Peruvian over
the CHILEAN feet when the recent war In
South America began. 1t remains to be seen
| whether the Chinese will be able to turn
| their armored vessels and improved ord
nance to account; but we repeat that
the msnnlng of the feet with sailors
thoroughly conversant with steam nav-
CATION can be accomplished without difficulty,
and that the commanders, chief engineers,
and artillerymen will probably be drawn
from the Europeans employed In the Chinese
service. That, In other words tho navy Of
NzlA kt-l
footing. will be substantially European
force, may perhaps be taken for granted, In
view Of the absolute powers conferred upon
the comparatively unprecedented and enlight-
ened viceroy LII In this emergency.
| Regarding the actual condition OF the
Chinese army We have very little trust
worthy information. The Pekin authorities
| themselves have to depend mainly on the