Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1883-04-13
MEADE AT GETTYSBURG.

iSsertlOn That on inc nlgnl Vi July - AS'';
Gen. Meade intended to retreat from Gettys-
burg. Gen. Doubleday backs up his state
ment with letter from Gen Pleasanton,
stating that about 3 o'clock in afternoon OF
July ., Gen. Meade directed him to get
what cavalry and artillery he could as soon
as possible, and take up position in rear TO
cover the retreat Of the army, and with
note from Gen. II. W. Slocum who com
mande1 the 10th corps at Gettysburg, stating
that at a council of corps commanders on the
evening of July ., 1868, Gen. Meade remark
ed "Well, gentlemen, the question is settled
We will remain here, but wish to say that
l consider this no place TO fight batlc.'
The trouble with this theory, which has
been so Professionally advanced by little
knot of generals WHO dislikod Gen. Meade
ard have lccn willing to lend themselves TO
an attempt to lessen his military reputation,
is that il is proved false by very strong
countervaiing testimony, and especially by
the conclusive evidence of events II Gen
Meade wanted to retreat, why did he not re-
irca There was nothing to hinder him.
Ii be thought Gettysburg no place to fight a
battle, aud preferred Pipe Clay Creek, why
did lie not fall back to Pipe Creek, when he
could lie did nothing of the sort but sial.i
and fought the battle on, at Gettysburg
up to the hour when General Buttcrilpli
would have us believe that he called u
council of war with view to retreat,
| Gen. Meade had been hurrying every man
and Gun that had not already reached Gcttys-
burg, to GdtysJurg aud net to any other
| point and there they went and slaid and
fought under his orders. Gen. S!ocum's noto
| is the strongest evidence that has as yet teen
adduccd in support of But,crlicld's assertion
| about Gen Nleadc's remark at the conference
of Thursday evening July I'd. But it was
single brief sentence, uttered as the council
was breaking up. and may have been misun-
derstood by Gen. Slocum. That there was
some mistake about ii is plain from other cir
cums,ances. Gen. Williams, adiutant gener-
al of the Army of the Potomac, who was
certainly in as good position as Gen Butter
field to know the intentions of his chief, is
on record to the effect that 'as soon rs Gen.
Mead. learned the result of the engagement
on the LIST of July and the character OF the
= oanl at Gettysburg, he made up his mind
fght the battle at that place, aud he con-
ocn rated the army there with all possible
rapdity." ~ have no idea" added Gen.
Williams "that he could for moment have
entertained the idea of withdrawing, except
as last extremity" This is confirmed by
the evidence of Gen Hunt, Gen. Hancock,
Gen. Gibbon and other equally careful and
responsible officers.
Again at O'Clock p. m. Of july . |, Gen.
Meade tclcgraphcd to Gen. llnllcck, al
Washington a have a strong position for
defence, have delayed attacking, tc
allow the 9th corps and parts of ether corps
to reach this place, and to rest the men. II
not attacked, ard can get any positive in
formation Of the position of the enemy
which will justify me in so doing, shat
ottacf. If | find it hazardous TO do so, oil
am satisfied that the enemy is endra8oriug
to move to my rear, and interpose between
line aud Washington, | shall fall back.
Here is something better than the hearsay
testimony Of two generals, one Of whom al
least, had srudge against Meade. Il show:
not that Gen. Meade thought Gettysburg no
place to fight battle; bat That he thought
it g9od place, At least to fight defensive
battle. Il shows that short time before
the council of war, Gen Meade was intend
ing to force the fighting at GotySjU9, if he
got chance. The terrible loss sustained
Sickles's disastrous movement (amounting.tc
CO per cent of the total Union loss in the
battlc) decided him to remain on the dcfen
sivc and in view of that ard to learn tn,
temper and obtain the views Of lis corp!
commanders, he called them together in al
informal conference.
General Meade, like prudent commander
looked out for bis rear. and for possible con
tiugcncics; but he declared before the com
mittcc on the conduct of the war, "undor thu
full solcmnity and sanctty Of an oath ant
+ in the conviction that the day will CONT
when the secrets of all men will be known,
that he never intended or thought for an in
slant OF Withdrawing his army, except as o
matter of military necessity. We believed
, him then and believe him still but if he ha,
| made no such solemn declaration, we SHOULD
think the same, for, for. every statement an,
2 fact which taken by itself, might seem to in
dictate that he contemplated retreat, there ar
D two stronger statements and facts showing
in the words of General Williams, that h
"could not have entertained for moment tn
idea of Withdrawing, except as last ex
tremity."
1t is almost humiliating 10 have to refe
p 10 these matters over and over again but "A
, long as General Mcade's opponents in his lif
follow him beyond the grave with unjust as
pensions, it seems to be necessary for Iii
friends to vindicate the truth of history au
, his character as a brave and resolute com
mander.
LICENSE vs.. PROHIBITION.
a In answer to the oft-rcpcated assertio
thu, n,olihition nc a rnn,nIv for tho pvil. n