Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1883-06-21

HNOIO SCS. = CAIilC-
claws shall be passed, taxing by uniform
rule, all moneys, credits, investments in bonds,
stocks, joint stock companies, or otherwise;
and also real and personal property, accord
: ing to It's true value in money: but burying
grounds, public school houses, houses used
exclusively for public worship, institutions
OF purely public charity, public property used
exclusively for any public purpose, and per-
sonal property, TO an amoIn not exceeding
in value two hundred dollars, for each indi>
vidual, may, by general laws, be exempted
from taxation; but, all such laws snall be sub
Ject to alteration or repeal: and The value of
all property, so exempted. shall, from time to
time, be ascertained and published, as may be
directed by law"
1t may be conceded, that the constitu-
ttiOnal convention intended by this sec
tiOn to provide, that the public burdens
should rest primarily upon the burdens
of the State, and be provided for by tax
eS levied thereon by uniform rule, in
accordance with the real value of such
property in money. But the question
arises: Is this necessarily exclusive of
other forms of taxation? Does 1t forbid
assessments upon the business avoca-
tions of the people, and the other multi
form methods by which governments
are accustomed to raise revenue? If so,
why the necessity of section l, to which
reference has been made? Its only pur-,
pose is to forbid the levying of capita
ton or poll-tax upon the people. If
Section he exclusive, then Section l is
wholly unnecessary, and is in fact a
work of Supererogation; to admit the
latter, is to suppose the trainers of the
constitution guilty of meaningless taut-
Ology. The conclusion is irresistible; if
it was necessary, by a separate section,
to forbid the levying of tax upon the
heads of the people, then it was equally
necessary to provide in as positive terms
against the levying of an assessment or
tax upon the business in which they
severally engage. This has not been
done, and | submit, therefore, that the
levying of an assessment or tax upon
the business of trafficing in Intoxicating
liquors is not in conflict with any pro-
vision of Art. u.
! Perhaps the most analogous case to the
one at bar, is the case of Western Union
Telegraph V. Mayer % Ohio St., 521.
There it was urged by counsel with
great force, that ''the Legislature of Ohie
has no power, in raising revenue for
general purposes, to levy tax upcn any
business, pursuit, or avocation, or upon
the receipts of a business. Its power is
limited. The only basis of taxation in
Ohio is property" Yet the court, in de-
Gliding the case, distinctly recognized
the principle that such power ex-
lists, and accordingly held that tax
upon the gross receipts of telegraph
company was properly laid. In other
words, instead of being confined to the
power of taxing the property of the
| company at its true value in money, the
right of the General Assembly to 60
further, and levy an assessment or tax
upon its business, was expressly upheld
and declared to be unaffected by any
limitation in Section 2, of Article u, of
| the constitution. regard the decision
in this case, taken together with the areas
soning of the learned judge, as absolute
ly conclusive of the principle of taxa
tion asserted by the General Assembly
in the act now in controversy, and that
unless overruled, it must be held to be
decisive of the issues involved in the
case at bar. l know it is urged that this
power to levy taxes other than ad
valorem taxes upon property, is confined
to assessments upon business. or en-
ploymentS of a quasi public character,
or which in one form or another impose
burdens upon the public, but am una
BILE to find such distinction established
by any abjudicated case where the point
was in issue, and it certainly is not re
cognized in the constitution itself. The
business of trafficing in intoxicating
liquors, for example. is surely of no more
sacred character, so far as the right of
taxation is concerned, than the business
of the Western Union Telegraph Com
pany in the above case, which consisted
in the speedy dissemination of news
among the people.
This case also settles the constitution
ality of the law, in so far as it is claim
ed to be in conflict with Sec. 10, Art l
of the Constitution of the United States,
which prohibits State from laying any
imposts or duties on impOsts. An in
spectiOn of the provisions of the act in
question shows conclusively that its OBJ
| ject and effect consist in regulating and
taxing the retail traffic in Intoxicating
| liquors, which the State in the exercise
of its legislative power may actually
prohibit, Notwithstanding this provis-
ion of the United States Constitution.
License cases, Howard, 5O4 In Tele-
graph Company v. Mayer, Judge John
son cited these authorities approvingly,
and added: "a State may, in the exer-
else of its police powers, forbid the sale
by retail of spiritueus liquors imported
from abroad, or from another State"
The maxim majori cOntiDet in Sc minus
is applicable here. The power to pro-
hibit includes the right to regulate.
See also Ragnet V. Wade, A Ohio 1O7.
l ask the court to give these questions
a careful review in the light of recent
Ohio authorities, in which the decisions
of other State courts, and the opinions
of learned commentators have been fully
collated, believing that in the adjudica-
tions of our own Supreme Court will be
found ample authority lor the acticn of
the General Assembly.
III. LICENSE.
Nor is the grant of legislative power
conferred by Sec / Art. 2. of The consti-
tuition, limited by the first clause of Sec
tion IS of the Schedule, so as to render
the statute of April II unconstitutional.
! The words of this clause are:
"No liceuse to traffic in intoxicating
| liquors shall hereafter be granted in this
state" The subject of license as con-
templated in the above clause of the con-
stitution, has been so recently discussed
and considered by the court, in State v.
Hipp, So Ohio St., 1919, that it would be
somewhat presumptuous to expect a re
consideration of the question in this
case. l accept, therefore, as conclusive.
the definition of license there given bv
the court, in the second clause of the
syllabus, tO-wit:
"a license is permission granted by
some competent authority to do an act
which, without such permission. vould
be illegal" In delivering his opinion.
Okey, c. j., cited approvingly a number
of authorities which mdke clear the dis
tinction between Incense to carry ON
/ IT ienlnr hn ci,nncs L