St. Landry democrat. (Opelousas, La.) 1878-1894, 1883-10-27
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

The United States Supreme Court Declares
the Civil Rights Bill UNCONSTITUTIONAL,
Justice Harlan Alone Dissenting-Tha
Law Reviewed.
WASHINGTON, D. c., Oct Is.
The most important decision rendered by
the Supreme Court of the United States to-
day was that in five cases commonly known
as Civil Rights cases, which were submit
ted to the Court on printed arguments
about year ago. The titles of these cases
and the States from which they came are
as follows: No. /, United States against
Murray Stanley, from the United States
Circuit Court of the District of Kansas;
No. 2, United States against Michael Ryan,
from the United States Circuit Court of the
District of California; No. 3, United States
against Samuel Nichols, from the United
States Circuit Court Of the Western Dis
trict of Missouri; No. 26, United States
against Samuel d. Singleton, from the
United States Circuit Court of the South
ern District of New York, and No. 90, Rich
ard A. Robinson and wife against the Mem
phis & Charleston Railroad Company, from
the United States Circuit Court for the Dis
trict of Tennessee. These cases were all
based on the first and second sections OF
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and were re-
spectively prosecutions under that act for
not admitting certain colored persons to
equal accommodations and privileges in
inns or hotels, in railroad cars and in thea
tiers. The defense set up in every case was
the alleged unconstitutionality of the law.
The first and second sections of the act,
which were the parts directly in contro-
versy, are as follows:
SECTION /. That all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment OF
the accommodations, advantages, facilities
and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land and water, theaters and other
places of public amusement, subject only
to the conditions and limitations estab-
lished by law and applicable alike to citi-
gems of every race and color, regardless OF
any previous condition of servitude.
The second section provides that any per-
son who violates the first section shall be
liable to forfeit $500 for each offense, to be
recovered in civil action, and also to PEN
atty of from $500 to 81 900 fine, or imprison-
ment for from thirty days to year, to be
enforced in criminal prosecution.
Exclusive jurisdiction is given to District
and Circuit Courts of the United States in
cases arising under the law.
The rights and privileges claimed by and
denied to colored persons in these cases
were full and equal accommodations In
hotels, in ladies' cars on railway trains.
and in the dress-circle in theaters.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The Court, in a long and carefully prs-
pared opinion d, livered by Justice Bradley,
holds:
/. That Congress had no constitutions
authority to pass the sections in question
under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
2. That the Fourteenth Amendment is
prohibitory upon States only, and that the
legislation authorized to be adopted by
Congress for enforcing that amendment is
not direct legislation as to matters respect
ing which States are prohibited from making
or enforcing certain laws ordalnlng certain
acts, but is corrective legislation, necessary
or proper for counteracting and redressing
the effect of such law or acts. That III for
bidding States, for example, to deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without
due process of law, and giving Congress
the power to enforce the prohibition, twas
vide due process of law for the protection
of life, liberty and property (which would
embrace almost all subjects of 1egisiation),
but to provide modes of redress for coun-
teracting the operation and effect of State
laws.
8. That the Thirteenth Amendment gives
no power to Congress to pass the sections
referred to, because that amendment re-
lates only to slavery and involuntary serv-
itude, which it abolishes, and gives Con-
gress power to pass laws for its enforce
! :ment; that this power only extends to the
subject matter of the amendment itself,
namely, slavery and involuntary servitude,
and the necessary incidents and conse-
quences of these conditions; that it has
nothing to do with different races or colors,
| but only refers to slavery, the legal equali-
| ty of different races and classes of citizens
being provided for in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits States from
| doing anything to interfere with such
| equality; that it is not infringement of the
Thirteenth Amendment to refuse to any
person equal accommodations and priv
ileges at an inn or public place of entertain
ment, however it may be violation Of his
| legal rights; that it imposes upon him no
badge Of slavery or Involuntary servitude
which imply some sort of subsection of one
person to another, and incapacity incident
thereto. such as inability to hold property,
| to make contracts, to be parties in court,
ETC., and that if the original Civil Rights
| Act which abolished these incapacities
| might be supported by the Thirteenth
! Amendment it does not therefore follow
that the act of 1877 can be supported by it.
4. That the decision affects only the
validity of the law in States, and not in the
Territories or the District of Columbia,
where the legislative power of Congress is
unlimited, and it does not undertake to de-
| eide what Congress might or might not dc
foreign nations and amongst the several
States, the law not being drawn with any
| such view.
5. That, therefore, it is the opinion of the
/ Court that the first and second sections Of
the act of Congress, March l, 1877, entitled
1 IS tnll -niti heir, nj