The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-09-20

route wallace had informed Grant in the morn
ing that he had issued orders for concentrating
his division at Stony Lonesome where he would
await orders, and Grant knew just where his
order would he delivered
| wrote. soon after the close of the war, when
the matter fresh in my memory: "Tne
route from StOny-LonesOme was, in my opinion,
the shortest and most direct to the point at
which the right OF the army was resting when
the battle began. Orders were not received for
the division to march until about ~ o'clock, and
no time was lost during the march, as we moved
with the utmost rapidtty." General kneher
also wrote about the same time as follows:
Grant passed Crump's Landing about O'Clock.
II must have been IL O'Clock, noon, when Capt.
Baxter, a quartermaster, arrived with orders
and brought the very cheering intelligence that
our army successful l cannot tell at this
time what the particular language was. The order
was placed in my hands, as acting Adjudant-
general, but where 1t is now or what b5came of
II am unable to say. Very likely
having been written a scrap of paper
it was lost after coming into my hands, matter
much regret, as feel confident that IT'S pro-
duction now would conclusively demonstrate
that you (Walace) Obeyed the command con
tanned III 1t. | remember, however distinctly
that it was written order to march and form
junction with the right of the army, which was
understoor to be the right of the army as 1T rest
ed on the morning when the battle began. SUI
flee IL to say that the division marched at once
and took the road which had previously been as
certained as leadin e to the right of the army in
the position 1t occupied on the morning of the
9th, and previous to that time. The road was
then patrolled and picketed by cavalry detach-
ments of your command" Captain Ware, OF the
Eighth Missouri, says: cat twenty minutes OF
~ an order was delivered to you (Wallace)
by Captain Baxter, A. Q. M, directing
Sherman's right, on the road leading from Plus
burg Landing TO Purdy, that being the extreme
writing Waliat e. uses the following language:
81 can only state that my orders TO you were
given verbally to staff officer TO communicate,
Badeau in his book. I always understood that
the staff officer referred to, Captain Baxter, made
memorandum of the orders he received, and
memorandum L
saw"
WAS IT BAxTER's MISTAKE?
1t unfortunate that the written order de-
livered TO Wallace was not preserved, as it
would settle the question in controversy beyond
doubt. 1t is no matter what Grants verbal
order to Captain Baxter for Wallace may have
heen. Wallace bound by the order deliv-
cred to him by Grants aide, whether verbal or
written. If Baxter, In reducing the order to
writing left out the four important words, "by
the river road" Wallace is not and should not
be held responsible for it. Bakers lips appear
to be sealed. AT least he will not talk about the
matter. Grant is positive as TO the language or
his verbal order. and the members OF his stan
generally sustain him, whether they heard 1t
or not. The written order read by at least
four persons, and they very nearly agree to
the exact wording of it, The preponderance OF
evidence is, therefore, largely In favor OF wal
lace and the route he took.
General NJ L. Force, in his interesting work,
"From Fort Henry to Corinth," says: Captain
Baxter, of Grants stan, brought to Lewis Wal
| lace, at L or 1880, verbal order to move his
division. The First brigade had already
moved out to stony,Lonesome, and
| General Wallace believed the attack at
Pttsburg was a feint, and that the real attack
was to be made at Crunp's Landing, on account
of the great accumulation of stores at tnat point
| and desired the order requiring hun to move
! away from Crump's Landing should be in writ
| ing. Captain Baxter wrote and gave him an
order to march to the Purdy road, form there
on Shernan's right, ana then act as cireun-
stances should require" In this extract there
are two amusing errors, and one great mistake.
The idea that Wallace believed for a moment,
that the attack at Pittsburg was feint is some
| thing unheard of by any person in his division
until published as history, and If he had had any
such thought in the morning the idea that he
should have held to the same opinion when the
battle had been raging for more than hve hours
is simply ridiculous FeinJs Go not continue
half day before the real attack is made. As to
was only one weeks supply of commissary
and Quartermaster's stores Tor one
division. The great accumulation was at fltts-
burg Landing, where the main army lay, wnere
| it ought to have BEEN aud where it Is reasona
ble to suppose it would be. That Captain Bax-
ter on Walaee's demand, did then and there
write the order about which there is so much
controversy, is simply preposterous, as IL is
well known TO many Of the officers OF the owl
sion that he handed the written order TO wallace
| immediately on his arrival. Major Ross met
| Baxter about midway between Crump's Landing
and StOny-Lonesome, asked him for news, and II
| he had any orders. Baxter showed MN the
written order, and Ross read 1t some minutes
before it was delivered TO Wallace 1t
stance of the order, as given by
Force, agrees almost word for word with
| the statements of members OF Wallaces stan
and others who read it, Force also says that
| Whittlesey's brigade, at Adamsvile "received
at p. NJ. the order to march," when the fact is
that the order was delivered not later than z A.
NJ by Major James r. Ross, showing differ
ence of seven honrs in favor Of truth versus MIS-
tory. There is the further fact that Whttlesey' s
brigade had Joined the other two long before =
o'clock.
CORRECTING BADEAU's BLUNDERs
| Boswell Badeau, in his life of Grant, shows
how utterly venomOus, INSCRIPTIONS and IN
! truthful man can become in his efforts to APP
plaud, defend and relieve from responsibility
his friends, and to attack and defame others
whom he desires to hold responsible for the
shortcomings and mistakes Of others. Propose
to quote, and correct as L go along, some
of his miss atements On page "a he
| says: ITO the right and rear of Sherman
the Crumps Landing road crosses Snake creek,
| and here a military bridge had been built, prin-
cipally by Lewis Wallaces troops by which
| Communication with Walace's command was
had five miles off" Neither Wallace nor his
troops had anything to do with the bridge across
| Snake creek but did build bridge across Owl
creek, about half mile from Sherman's right,
| which was the extreme right OF the Union
army Badeau says ON page 70 that "Grant
stopped at Crump's Landing to see Lewis Wal.
lace, and notified him in person OF the undoubted
fact, which had not yet been officially reported,
| that general engagement had begun, and that
/ Wallace must hold himself in readiness to march
| to the support of the main army at Pittsburg,
| or if the attack there should be felnt. to de-
| fend himself against probable movement
| upon him from the direction of
| Purdy, his situation being isolated and some
| what exposed" Now, who is responsible for
| the suggestion of the attack at Shiloh being Il
feinta According to Badeau no person bat
| Grant, and at the time the suggestion OF a feint
| was made the battle had been raging for more
than two hours. The two propositions do not con-
sist. If Grant believed, as Badeau says that a
| general engagement had begun why did he not or
der Wallace TO ''march TO the support of the main
army at Pittsburg" immediately, as there was
no good reason why his command should remain
| at Crump's Landing or vicinityf Again, SAYS
Badeau "Word was instantly sent to Nelson
| and Lewis Wallace of the state of affairs"
The order to Nelson was in writing. You will
hurry up your command fast as possible.
| Tha hnats VIII ha in readiness transfer all