The Milan exchange. (Milan, Gibson County, Tenn.) 1874-1978, 1883-10-20

WASHINGTON, u. c.. oct. H.
b. The most important decision rendered by
the Supreme Court of the United States to-
day was that in live cases commonly known
as Civil Rights cases, which were submit
ted to the Court on printed arguments
about a year ago. The titles of these cases
and the States from which they came are
as follows: No. I, United States against
Murray Stanley, from the United States
Circuit Court of the District of Kansas;
No. ., United States against Michael Ryan,
from the United States Circuit Court of the
District Of California; No. 3, United States
against Samuel Nichols, from the United
States Circuit. Court of the Western Dis
trict of Missouri: No. 26, United States
against Samuel D. Singleton, from the
United States Circuit Court of the South
ern District of New York, and No %, Rich
ard A. Robinson and wife against the Mem.
phis, IS Charleston Railroad Company, from
the United States Circuit Court Tor the Dis
trict of Tennessee These cases were all
based on the first and second sections of
tile Civil Rights Act OF 1875, and were re-
spectively prosecutions under that acs for
not admitting certain ,coloredf persons to.
equal accommodations and privileges in
inns or hotels, in railroad cars and in thea
ters. The defense set up in every case was
the alleged unconstitutionality of the law.
The first and second sections Of the act,
which were the parts directly in contro-
versy, are as follows:
s SECTION /. That all persons within the
\ jurisdiction Of the United States shall be
entitled to the full and equal enjoyment of
the accommodations, advantages, facilities.
and privileges of inns, public conveyances
on land and water, theaters and other
places of public amusement, subject only
to the conditions and limitations estab
lished by law and applicable alike to citi-
zens of every race and color, regardless of
any previous condition of servitude.
The second section provides that any per-
son who violates the first section shall be
liable to forfeit 500 for each offense, to be
recovered in civil action, and also to a pen
atty of from 500 to 1000 fine, OF imprison-
ment for from thirty days to year, to be
enforced in criminal prosecution.
| Exclusive jurisdiction is given to District
and Circuit Courts of the United States in
cases arising under the law.
| The rights and privileges claimed by and
denied to colored persons in these cases
were full and equal accommodations in
hotels, in ladies' cars on railway trains,
and in the dress-circle in theaters.
| OPINION OF THE COURT.
| The Court, in a long and carefully pre-
pared opinion d, livered by Justice Bradley,
holds
| /. That Congress had no constitutional
authority to pass the sections in question
under either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution.
=. That the Fourteenth Amendment is
prohibitory upon States only, and that the
legislation authorized to be adopted by
! Congress for enforcing that amendment is
not direct legislation as to matters respect
| ing which States are prohibited from making
or enforcing certain laws ordaining certain
acts, but is corrective legislation, necessary
| or proper for counteracting and redressipg
the effect of such law or acts. That in for
| bidding States, for example, to deprive any
person of life, liberty or property without
| due process of law, and giving Congress
the power to enforce the prohibition, it was
not intended to give Congress power to pro-
vide due process of law for the protection
of life, liberty and property (Which would
embrace almost all subjects OF legislation),
but to provide modes of redress for coun-
teracting the operation and effect of State
| laws. r.f'rF 81
3. That the Thirteenth Amendment gives
no power to Congress to pass the sections
referred to, because that amendment re-
| lates only to slavery and involuntary serv-
itude, which it abolishes, and gives Con-
gress power TO pass laws for its enforce
ment; that this power only extends to the
subject matter of the amendment itself,
namely, slavery and involuntary servitude,
| and the necessary incidents and conse-
! quences of these conditions; that it has
nothing to do with different races or colors,
but only refers TO slavery, the legal equali-
| ty of different races and classes of citizens
being provided for in the Fourteenth
Amendment, which prohibits States from
doing anything to interfere with such
| equality; that il is not infringement of the
| Thirteenth Amendment to- refuse TO any
/ person equal accommodations and priv
| ileges at an inn or public place of entertain
ment, however it may be a violation of his
legal rights, that it imposes upon him no
badge of slavery or involuntary servitude
| which imply some sort of subsection of one
person to another, and incapacity incident
| thereto, such as inability to hold property,
to make contracts, TO be parties in court,
etc, and that if the original Civil Rights
Act which abolished these ncapaci les
might be supported by the Thirteenth
Amendment it does not therefore follow
that the act OF 1877 can be supported by it.,
4. That the decision affects only the
validity of the law in States, and not in the
Territories or the District of Columbia,
where the legislative power of Congress is
unlimited, and it does not undertake to de-.
eide what Congress might or might not do
under power TO regulate commerce with
foreign nations and amongst the several
States, the law not being drawn with any
4 such view. ..n-. ,.
! >. That, therefore, it is the opinion of the
Court that the first and second sections of
the act of Congress, March /, 1917. en- Tiled
IAN act TO protect all citizens in their civil
and legal rights" are unconstitutional and
void, and Judgment should Toe rendered up
ON the indictments accordingly.
At the conclusion of the reading of Jus.
tice Bradley's" opinion, which occupied