The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1883-03-01
, ANDEtsON, s. c., THURSDAY MORNING., MARCH i 1858
nor could ! distinguish ono brigade from
aholher, but no line STAYED LONG IN faca

ano'her' out no line stayed long to face
NO" ne had the advantage of over.
iapPing them somewhat on our right and
,heir ielt, so that when n line stood IN
Mle upon us about the whole length of
.ne FIRST South Carolina could move for.
%atd unimpeded to any extent. and nv a
halfwheel get '' y +"
A SWEEPING ENDFIEIp FIRE
a:long them. The enemy were not quite
IN panic, for sometimes BODY of ,han
"ould stand until fearmlly handled. I
remember that, following up the line
through scattered growth of small
pines: found the dead and wounded of
lhe seventh Maryland Regiment living
30 thick upon the ground t!.a: had io
lake e good deal Of care to prevent nv
hoTse from trampling some Of them.
Judge Advocate Sanders, of the
united States army, in his argument be.
lore the court of inquiry on Gen. war.
req Case, in July, 1881, speaks of this
ilghting as resulting in the
UTTER AND COMPLETE Drpr,sr
and rout of Ayres's and Crawfords Di.
yisons'' -
1t is not to be inferred that all this
was elected by the two brigades above
mentioned of our army. Gen. Eppa
nunton.s i Brigade was also engaged. and
Mlses brigade was brought out of this
works. Wise's Brigade was little if at
all actually engaged. believe, !or il
was brought out of the works some little
time after the battle veg Joined, and .as
theh held 10 meet possible attempt on
the part of the enemy to cut us off from
The works. Hunton's Brigade, however,
was IN at or about the beginning, it then
occupying, according to my recollection.
the left of Gracie's Brigade.
ferhaps l should be more accurate
about this than am. But as Gen.
hcGowan had to leave his assistant ad.
Jutant- general, Capt. Riddick, with his
own brigade, he had Inc as his only staff
olhcer. By tacit understanding the
General remained mostly in rear Of the
brigade on our left, while followed up
our old brigade. This was my choice,
partly because ] preferred to look after
my oid comrades, and partly because its
!ignt' reaching out into the air, we were
ih aanger or being turned OH that flank.
1, therefore, kept near the extreme right
VI our brigade. except when occasionally
riding to Gen. McGowan to inquire for
orders or to report, and sometimes rode
clear to the right Of the line to observe
what efforts might be made to turn us
or cut us off This was our danger. for
advancing down line almost parallel
with our breastworks, there was great
likelihood that some of the enemy's re.
serves would be thrown upon this flank.
And we had no cavalry that l thought
we could entirely rely upon. There was
about company of them out there, but
they were some distance off, and I
! thought they did not keep sufficiently
advanced to be of much service to us.
And SC we moved on,
DRIVING THE TWO FEDERAL DIVISIONS
before us for about a mile, when We
reached the banks of Gravelly Run, or,
| suppose, its main tributary, for the
maps have seen Of this locality place
the main branch of that stream farther
south and about parallel with our line of
advance. The main stream does take
northward bend just before the tributa-
ry enters it, but that would not put be-
fore our whole line the watcrcourse
which stopped it. But whether our OBJ
stacle was the principal creek or not, we
found ourselves at the end Of All hour
opposed by the swift, turbid current of
water, much swollen by the rains, just
beyond which was rough, steep ground,
rendered particularly formidable by
felled trees, all of whose branches seemed
to point towards us. Besides, our con.
slant firing had pretty we'll exhausted
our ammunition.
a furious fire was opened upon us
from the opposite bank, but that was not
regarded as sufficient 10 stop us. We
were considerably fatigued, for our pro-
gress had been rapid, aud the sun, which
had burst forth just after we began the
attack, was exceedingly warm, and the
ground We had passed over was very
heavy and difficult Moreover il was
necessary to procure a fresh supply of
cartridges. So common sense required
halt. When
THE SCARCITY OF AMMUNITION
was made known, Gen. MCGOWAN or
dered details to the rear to meet the
ordnance wagons that had already been
sent towards US, and he and used every
effort to direct these details by the near
est way, and to move them with the ut
most dispatch. But no small delay rs.
suited, and the third division of War.
ren's Corps had time to Establish them
selves and take in the whole situation.
Inc tulIly'uSt uuuuTeu SOnieucIdteS
had routed eight thousand of the enemy
by their unequalled dash and daring;
but the sequel may be imagined when
six thousand fresh troops were thrown
against these thifty.five hundred. And
these are the figures conceded by our
enemy. Their own officers put Ayre's
division at 3,30S men for duty, Crawford's
division at 4,69S apd Grifin's division at
$685.. The irs. tao were the troops we
had driven before US, the last named was
the command that stayed US Mt Gravelly
Run.
We fought all these men with the
following numbers: McGowan's Brigade,
certainly not more than thousand meu
for duty; Gracie's Brigade, scarcely so
large, certainly not larger, and Hunton's
Brigade, which is estimated at from fif.
teen hundred to seventeen hundred and
fifty. Judging by the eye, should not
think there were as many as fifteen hun
dred Of the last mentioned brigade en-
gagged; there certainly was not that num-
Ser on the field when my attention was
called to them. Wise's Brigade was not
: engaged, as have said, except, perhaps,
at long range and even it was opposed
by Miles Division of the Federal army,
which must have numbered more than
10000, probably $4,000 men.
We could not pass Gravelly Run. The
fresh division Of Griffin poured its six
thousand veteran soldiers against our
front and right flank Miles advanced
his large division against our left. We
received no reinforcements; we were