Democratic Northwest. [volume] (Napoleon, Ohio) 1869-1894, 1883-08-09

I had relation 10 particular times, places
I and persons, a. sales on Sundays anC
days Of election, or in the vicinity o
certain religious meetings or the like, o.
To minors except on permission, or Il
dissipated persons. Municipal corpora
tions then had power to regulate, bu
: none to prohibit, beer, ale, potter, and
: tippling houses, and dealer id liquor,
was taxed, in addition to the license fet
eXacted by the general government In
the same way as grocer or like dealer
: and not otherwise. The leading and
. far most important statutory inhibition
then i'm force was the provision which
was directed against the sale of spirit
uOus liquors by the drink. BY force OF
that provision, which had retained sub
stantially the same form during our en-
tire existence as state and portion OF
our existence as a territory period,
indeed, of more than ninety years-it
was crime, and punishable as such,
for any one not licensed to sell spurious
liquors by the drink; and, of course,
since 1851, the inhibition has been gen.
eral, for no license could constitutiOnally
exist. True, i'm portions of the state the
provision against such sales, like that
| anu oOiilS
Others, was not seriously enforced, but
i'll other parts of the state it was en-
forced, and official reports will show
that the convictions in the state, out
side of the large cities, for such illegal
i. sales have, for several years, greatly out
numbered the convictions for any other
otfense.
And this historical review brings me
to the consideration of the act of 1888
$50 Ohio l.. l64). and to the determina-
ton of the question as to its constitu-
tionality. The act provides for an as
sessment upon the business of tratfiick-
ing in intoxicating liquors.
The amount of this assessment is 5000
a year where the person is engaged in
the general traffic in liquors, and 500 a
year where the traffic is confined to
malt and vinous liquors. The persons
so assessed are those who cary on such
traffic in premiser of which they are
owners, and those who, not being own
ers, carry on such traffic on the premi-
ses of Others with their consent in writ
ing. All Others carrying on such traf-
fic are engaged i'll an unlawful business,
and punishable criminally therefor.
The statutes imposing restrictions upon
the traffic remain, in their general feat
ures, the same as before the passage of
the act of 1888, except in certain partic-
ulars. Municipal corporations have,
under this act, power to prohibit, where
as before they only had power to regu-
late, beer, ale, porter, and tippling
houses, but it is provided that "if any
municipal corporation shall prohibit,
ale, beer, and porter houses within the
limits of such corporation, a ratable
proportion of the tax paid by the pro-
prietors thereof for the uneXpired por-
tion of the year, shall be returned to
such proprietors." Section 8. This
provision was doubtless suggested by
che remarks of BARLEY, j. in High VS..
The State, supra, in which he speaks Of
refunding in case of the revocation of a
liquor license. Power seems also to be
granted to municipal corporations to
suspend the operation of the statute
prohibiting the sales of liquors on Sun
day. But the great and important
change made in the legislation on the
subject, is thatthe provision against the
sale of spirituous liquors by the drink,
which had remained in force so long
that no man now living can remember
when it was enacted, is in terms repeat
ed by the act of 1888. i If that act is
valid, it will hereafter be as lawful for
one taxed as dealer in liquors to sell
brandy to be drunk as beverage at the
place where it is sold, as to sell wine
for medicinal or even sacramental pur-
poses; and if it is true that there are
5000 such taxed persons. 1t follows
that there are to-day 5000 places in Ohio |
where spirituOus liquors are lawfully
sold by the drink whereas for more
than thirty years before the passage of
this act, there had not been one such
place in all the state. These remarks
are made in no censorious spirit, but
solely for the purpose of showing, that
the act under consideration is, in its OPP
Grafton and effect, a license law, fOrI
agree that the legislature is ihe sole |
judge as to the form and even justice of
its legislation, ifno provision OF the con-
stitution is infringed.
In the discussion of The State VS..
Hipp, and also in the consideration of |
these cases. it was ably and zealously |
argued that the farmers of the constitu- |
ton, who prepared the provision here
under consideration, and the people |
who ratified it, must have had in their
minds the licenses granted and issued |
under the act of 1881, and none other,
and hence that statute upon the, SUBJ
ject which did not in terms provide for
and issuing such license, in
thesame way as under the
act Of 1881, can not be in conflict with
the constitutional provision against |
licenses. This view was evidently
adopted by the general assembly as a
fair Interpretation of the constitution,
in the passage of the act of 1883. But
that this construction of the constitu-
ton would render the inhibition prac-
tically nugatory, and, therefore, is erron-
eous, was, distinctly decided in The
State VS.. Hipp, and l understand the
majority opinion to approve that decis-
ION, and to reject the view of the con-
,titutional provision which seems to
have met the approval of the legislature.
True, the judge delivering the opinion
,efers to passages in The State VS.. (
Hipp, in which the act of 1882 is saidt
De with certain exceptions)a a pfollibito-
" liquor lawas to all dealers falling to
comply with its terms, it is claimed that
his was the groundaupon which the act
If 1882 was held to be invalid. Butwit
great respect for the opinion of the ma
ority, must be permitted to say that
his is very misleading. We never had
n this state prohibitory liquor law.
The act of 1882 permitted the sale of liq-
lors of medicinal and mechanical pur-
,oses, and that act was prohibitory, with (
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