National Republican., 1883-01-26

between and 10 q. m. Sherman says he mot
him about 10 q. M As % matter Of course
Grant had to inform himself of the position
of the respective armies before he could send
orders for Wallace to advance. Those orders
came by an aide about II q. m. Wallace had
concentrated his division, and tho march
commenced on the road TO Pittsburg land
ing, with the first brigade, commanded by
Col. Morgan l.. Smith, in front. In that bri-
gade were the eleventh Indiana, eighth Mis-
sOuri, and twenty-fourth Indiana, and it is
no reflection on or disparagement of other
commands to say that they were the best in
battalion drill of all the regiments of the
army of the Tennessee, and Col Morgan l..
Smith was probably the best drilled officer
in that army, from commander to the lowest
subaltern. lie was not only the best drilled,
but he know no fear. For these reasons,
have no doubt Wallace placed this brigade in
front on tho march to the battle field, To say
that the whole division was surpassed by none
on the second day in battle and its subsequent
service, Is but to repeat the Judgment OF all
who knew IL and the truth of undeniable his
tory; but rs IL was impossible to know where,
through tho dense woods, we might como in
contact with the enemy, it was certainly pru-
dent on the part of Wallace to place and keep
the brigade in front which could be the most
easily and readily handled. Advance and side
guards were thrown out in the woods, at least
One-half mile on either side to prevent sur
prise and, as we had no cavalry, our move
ments were necessarily slow. We had to halt
several times and send out mounted orderlics
to ascertain in the dense woods the position
of our guards.
We had been marching toward the roar o
cannon from IL or 11:30 a. M, holding the
| division in close order and well in hand, until
about y. M, when we were Overtakcn by
Capt. Rawlins, afterward Maj. Gen. Rawlins ;
| Lieut.. Col Mcpherson, aiterward Maj. Gen.
McPherson, and Capt. Rowlcy, aids on the
staff of Gen. Grant. Wallace and staff were
riding little to the rear of the head of our
| column. 1t wns my good fortune ON that day
| to command the twenty-iourth Indiana vol
untcerJ, then leading the division, and my
memory of that eventful occurrence is very
distinct. halted the column as directed, and
| Wallace and Grants aids came to the front.
| saw by n glance at their troubled faces and
soicd uniforms that some disaster had be-
| fallen our army.
We were then informed by the aids that
the morning had gone badly with our forces
that the divisions had been driven back from
their tents and encampments, and that IL
would be impossible to take the position
assigned to Wallace, as the enemy were at
that time in possession of that part of the
field. Not word did l hear that our division
had taken the wrong road, nor did hear
such a charge until months aftcrward. The
counter marches, as l understood IL, was
made under the orders of the aids and we
were directed to take our position still nearer
the river about one and a half miles cast OF
the position for which we started. The
counter march was slow, cirCuitous and cau-
tious to avoid being taken by surprise by the
then victorious rebels and the thick, murky
clouds of the smoke of battle fell like pail
of darkness around us.
Tho column was halted, and / was ordered
to form the twenty-fourth Indiana in line OF
battle and carefully feel forward and ascer
tain what forces were in our front 1t was
about 5 p. m. A line OF men were visible al
or near one hundred yards distance My
regiment gallantly advanced with fixed bay
onets, when we were halted by the shout O
"Who comes thcre?"
To this challenge, not knowing whether it'
answer would be greeted by volley from the
enemy's rifles or welcome from friends, l an
swered, "Hoosiers! !" The blessed Response
that came was, "Wclcomc, Hoosicrs!" Berge'
sharpshooters occupied that part of the field
and our division was placed in line for thu
E night. Darkness soon closed around, and tn,
groans ofthc wounded and dying fell piteousl,
, on the stiffness of the gloomy night. Friend
and foe seemed to be intermingled on on
= broad field of carnage, and rs SOM
comrade would light in hand, attempt through
the darkness to answer the call of SOM
wounded or dying friend, he was met by tn
0 sharp ring of the enemy's rifle, and often fel
victim to his brave and tender human dcvo
ton slept not that night. The rain poured
, down through the blackness of darkness, AM
| when the long-lookcd-for dawn of the secon'
D day appeared ii was hailed with the rattlinl
{ of musketry and the roar of cannon
, 1t is not my purpose to attempt descrip
5 tion of the conflict of that second day which
:, when the lurid sun went down in clouds AM
: smoke found our enemy broken, in full re
f treat, and grand victory had bcon won.
, Gen Wallace and myself have never beel
4 what. the world would call close or bosom
; friends. Our natures, rs the Spanish woul
l saw, are not simpdtce; but known and rC
o spect him NJ true, brave soldier and pa
4 triot and can only feel indignation at the at
@ tempt to make him the sCapegOat for othe
f mems mistakes and blunders, and deem
/ but Justice to tell the truth in vindiCation Q
t history and the right.
: Badeau, Grants historian, errs when
y. says, "Night closed in, and it was still hope
= Lew Wallace might arrive" He errs whe
n he speaks of tho laggard movements of tn
V preceding day" of that division. He err
Y when he says, "Lew Wallace, too, was pu
i in line on the second day on the Gxtrem
@ right where he should have been eightee
@ hours before" The authors of " Sherman an
n His Campaigns" err when they say, "The
i tour troops) knew that the enemy had failed
i that Lew Wslace would be up during tn
/ night" They err when they say, LIE
G Wallace arrived about l q. m. Monday an
II came into line on Sherman's right" Thin
It of q division marching through woods nel
Is Shiloh at midnight on Sunday There WI
e not a man of all the vast hosts there assen
IS bled who will not laugh at such a ridiculor
J. assertion! The hand could not be seen befoi
If the eyes. 1t was darker, stillor nigl
II than Tam O'Shanters:
II When sic Il night he took the road In
r As ne'er poor sinner was abroad in.
?. Buells army, out Of danger and shot, benin
o the banks, with great blazing bonllres to ligl
A. them, were crossing the river
IS Gen. Sherman is unjust to Wallace when |
10 saws in his report 81 told Buell. l had bee
st expecting Wallace all day" lie had Meth,
t. right nor reason for such an expectation
II Wnllace's division had been in great dang
II from u large force at Purdy, Of which &c
rs Sherman was informed, and ON the night
l. Friday, April 4, in utter darkness and mi
1t far down the road, my regiment with other
stood for hours expecting an attack from tn
l. quarter.
Now, Notwithstanding all these false stat
N ments about Lew Wallace, Sherman in h
rs "Nomoirs" (vol. /, p. 23s) says " Gen. lie
l. Wallace arrived from Crump's landing aft
T. dark Sunday and formed his line to N
r right rear" Coppie, in his "Grant and II
y Campaigns" Up. 0l) says: "Grant had bee
d all day ON the field, visited sherman about
II p. m, and, yet ignorant of Buelrs arrive
d had ordered him, with the assistance of lie
2. Wallace, who was now crossing Snake cree
d bridge, to assume the offensive in the NOR
II ing"
To say that Wallace missed his road to Sl
% loh, or Pittsburg Landing, is more than a
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