Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1883-07-09
A DEFEAT FOR DAUPHIN.
GRESHAM DECIDES THATKEY,S
ORDER is IN FORCE.

The suspension Not an AbrOgation, and
the Original Order Put Upon Its
Feet by the Supreme Courts Decision
Vague Verbal Agreements Have No
Weight.
WASHINGTON, July S.-The following
is the decision of Postmaster General Gres-
ham, in the Louisiana lottery case: Il
have carefully considered Postmaster
General Keys order, bearing date of No
yember 18th 1879, touching money orders
and registered letters of a character which
he specifically described. In view of the
subsequent action of the department.. and
of the conflicting views to which it
has given rise | have deemed it my duty
TO make the following ruling"
After quoting the order to the Post
master at New Orleans, torbidding him to
deliver postal money orders to NJ. A.
Dauphin, or NJ. A. Dauphin, Sec
retary, or NJ. A. DauDhin. post
office box 692, Judge Gresham
says: ''There can be no doubt
that this order was clearly justified bv
the provisions of sections 1929 and 40l1 Of
the Revised Statutes. 1t expressly recites
that the evidence which authorized the
Postmaster General to act in the
premises was satisfactory to him. His
action was therefore conclusive upOn
his subOrdinates, and the other
departments of the government so long as
the statutes remained in force. The only
question in connection with it which
could be judlclally examined relates to
the power of Congress to confer upon him
the authority under which he acted. The
doctrine is now settled that
the courts will not interfere
by mandamus or Injunction with an
Executive Departmentint in the performance
of its duties, unless they are Of a character
purely ministerial and involve no exer-
else OF discretion or judgment. A subse-
quent order Of Postmaster General Key
is in these words:
Posi- OFFICE DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, ID. c., Feb, 27, 1SS0.f
''SIR-On the 18th of November, 1879.
issued an order addressed to you fOrbidding
the payment of any postal money order to
NJ. 4. Dauphin, or NJ. A. Dauphin, Secre-
tary, or NJ. A. Dauphin, post office box
692, and 3l9 Broadway, New York, and
the return of all registered letters ad-
dressed to them to the Postmaster at
whose offices they were mailed. This
party having brought suit against
me to enjOin the performance
of this order, and having appealed the
same to the Supreme Court of the United
States, and having this day presented the
certificate of the government and State
officers of the State of Louisiana, that he
has complied with all the legal require
ments of that State and other evidence.
and not being satisfied from the evidence
submitted to me that the said NJ. A.
Dauphin is engaged in conducting a
scheme or device for obtaining money!
through the mails, by means OF false and
fraudulent pretensions and promises. |
hereby authorize and decide suspension
of said order of November Is, 1879, SO far
as it relates to said Dauphin until his
case shall have been been heard and de.
termined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.
''Signed d. VI. KEY,
POSTMASTER General"
"'IO tie Postmaster, NelC Orleans, Ld.,
and the Postmaster, Netc York, ". l.'v
lit appears by the recitalss that suit
had been brought to enjOin the execution
of the first order, and that the complain
ant had appealed the case to the Supreme
Court of the United States. The decree,
therefore. of the court of original iuris-
diction was adverse to him, and the Post
master General consented to a temporary
suspension of that order until the case
should have been heard and determined
by the tribunal of last resort.
The previous order was not revoked or
cancelled. If such had been the intention
of the Postmaster General it would have
been expressly declared. 1t was simply,
and in effect provided, that during the
pendency of the appeal the execution of
the preceding order should be suspended.
The dismissal Of the appeal, therefore. in
vacation by the appellants counsel, with
the consent Of the Solicitor General, put
an end to the suspension and restored the
binding effect of that order. 1t has been
strenuOusly insisted that the original
order was not to be enforced
until the case to which the second
order refers should have been actually
determined by the Supreme Court. |
cannot acquiesce in this view inasmuch
as the complainant could at any time, by
dismissing his appeal, withdraw the case
from the determination of the court The
second order would thus, at the option of
the complainant, have the effect of an
absolute revocation of the preceding
order, while mere suspension Of it was
obviously intended. There is no diff
ference between a perpetual sus-
pension and revocation of the
tiOn in the case was the constitutional
power of Congress to enact the statute
upon that question. | have no doubt that
the Supreme Court, in eX parte jackson.
So L. ;. 721, has affirmed the cOnstitu-
tionality of section 1894, which, as
amended by the act of July u, 1876, de-
clares that no letter or circular concern
ing lotteries, sO-called gift concerts, or
other similar enterprises Offering prizes
shall be carried in the mail.
In view of this decision the constitution
ality of the sections applicable to this
case cannot be seriously questioned. |
have confined my self to the matters as
they appear from the records of the de-
partment. Something was stated by the
counsel representing the parties inter-
ested as to verbal agreements or under
standings, but | have not felt at liberty
to consider any other facts than such as
the department records establish. The
first order will therefore be executed as
if the second had not been entered"