Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1883-03-28

wins the respect and confidence Of the |
reader. He neither treats or speaks Of Them |
with acrimony or bitterness. He gives a
professional view of the condition OF the
navy at the commencement of the war, and
proves its uureadiness for the great contest.
He also rates the officers at their best, gives
credit where it is due on both sides, and
does not hesitate to make adverse criticism
where he believes it is deserved. He
pictures, in a sailor-liks way, the fight
between the Monitor and the Merrimac
at the mouth of the james, the exploits OF
Cushing at Wilmington, and his destruction
OF the Albemsrle, the passage Of the forts
in the Mississippi, the capture of Mobile,
the duel between the Alabama and the Kear-
sarge, and many of the exciting episodes OF
block ade running, making altogether, SO far
as so brief compass will permit, full &C.
count Of the Federal side of the it
was fought upon the sea. The professor. as
was to be expected of him, finds two lessons
in the war, both of them learned from the
Confederate navy, to-wit-the value OF iron
clad vessels and of swift, well-mansged
cruisers against the commerce OF an enemy.
On this latter point be dwells at length, and
so clearly and well that We transfer all that he
has TO say to our columns. He justifes the
Confederate authorities by International law
and usage, and thus refutes great many
libels, the result of prejudice, and he is espe-
cially complimentary of the high intelli-
gence and seamanship of Admiral Semmes,
the hero of the Confederate navy. Prof.
Solely says:
Among all the developments in naval warfare
that were brought about between 1861 and 1865,
the art of commerce-destroying, as systematized
ana applied by Semmes viii not be rsekoned the
stood that reference is made not 70 It's ethical but
TO its military aspect. Asa mode OF carrying on
nor is il that which a naval ofcer of the highest
type would perhaps most desire to engage In; but
it fulls. in extraordinary degree, the main OBJ
ject Of modern war; that OF Chipping an ad-
versary
AS war in our days has lost much of its brutal
| 1t has become scientific. stern, bloody; snd bust
ness-like. The Alabama's mode of warfare, how
ever combined the greatest effect with the least
bloodshed and, 1t NAV be added. with the least
outlay of men and money and It's success has
stimulated efforts in the great naves of the world,
which will doubtless some day result in similar
enterprises. The name of the Alabama, like that
of the Monitor, has BECOME a generic term; and
Semmess vessel as the starting-point In all their
operations.
Commerce-destroying had been practised on
considerable scale in earlier wars; but the intro
duction of fast steamers enabled Semmes to carry
never before been attained. His preliminary
cruise in the Sumter showed him the possibilities
he entered upon the cruise Of the Alabama with
| well-considered plan OF operations: He began
commerce: and these determined the locality of
bis successive cruising grounds 1t Is upon this
discovery OF stratese points tnat MS patent emery
news of bis presence to reach the United States.
and before ship could be sent after him, be had
moved to @ new scene OF operations The period
which he generally allowed himself in any one
quarter was about two months. At the end of this
time he was on his way to another cruising ground:
and unless his movements could be foreseen he was
tolerably safe from pursuit. He passed his f st
/ two months in the North Atlantic. His next field
was the West Indies On each of these stat ons he
found large number OF unprotected merchant
/ himself near the equator, in the track OF South
American commence. The waters over which this
commerce passes lie within belt not more than
one hundred miles wide. Tue Alabama occupied
this belt. Next she passed two months on the
| coast of Brazil. Thence she went to the Cape,
i ocean must pass. At the Cape again she remained
about two m Jnths; but American shipmasters had
i by this time become cautious, and they gave the
African coast a wide berth. From the Cape semmes
went to the Straits of Sunda, the gateway of the
| China sea- Here he remained two months, and
was again successful.
| During all this period the Alabama was kept
constantly moving. The only delays were for re-
pairs and coal. The latter furnished at Fl rst
by coaling-vessels sent to appointed rendezvous
| Later, the ship depended upon prizes, and upon
| supplies in neutral ports, which were never
grudged. When long cruise made repairs or rest
| necessity an anchorage was selected, which from
is remoteness and obscnIity, and from its slight
portunity to reft at leisure and in security. The
Areas, Fernando de Noronha, Angra Pequena, and
| Pulo Condore were successfully utilized In this
| way. When more extensive repairs were required,
semmes put boldly into q neutral port. and his
the points that were needed to justify them in
| tending to him every facility.
| It is common to speak of the Alabama and the
other Confederate cruisers privateeIs It is hard
| to find suitable designation for them, but pri-
| vateers they certainly were not The essence of a
priyateer lies in its private ownership; its officer,
| and persons in private employment and the au-
thority under which it acts is letter-of-marque.
To call The cruisers pirates is merely to make
of invectiye. Most of them answered all the leaa
| requirements of ships-of-war; they were owned by
| the government, and they were commanded by
| naval officers acting under genuine commission.
some of them were put in commission at sea or in
foreign waters, and never saw the country of their
adoption; but their commission could not thereby
| be invalldated. There is no rule of law which
preseribes the place where government shall
commission its ships, or which requires the cere-
mOny to take place, like the sessions of plize-
courts, within the belligerent territory.
Assuming that the commissioned vessels of the
Confederates were primG fdctc shipsofwar, the
question arises whether they were entitled to the
privileges accorded to such vessels by the usage OF
nations. They were acting for q government
whose belligereney had been recognized. thou h
| no recognition had been accorded to the State
which il was seeking to establish This fact might
modify somewhat the view in which the vessels
were regarded by foreign States in that 1.-THE latter
could maintain no official relations with the in
surgent govern ment and were therefore deprived
of the ordinary methods OF redress, if the vessels
should commit offense against their sover-
eighty. But the Il ethod OF obtsining redress by
negotiation is by no means the only way of deal
ing with offending ships-of-war in foreign waters.
They may be summarily ordered to depart; they
may be forbidden TO enter; and, finally, if they
Rssail in any way the local sovereignty or il they
| p
ture or their exclusion, forcs,nay be used against
them. There is, and there can be. no rule OF law,
which compels government TO remain passive
while its laws are openly violated, simply because
of the sanctity which is supposed TO surround a
has allowed its neutrality to be infring I'd by the
cruisers of one belligerent, it justify itself
| the other by putting forward sech plea. With
| st onger reason, ship-of-war whose very exist.
| ence is q consequence of evasions or infringe.
nary immunities When, therefore, the Alabam q
and the Florida, vessels that had been allowed to
go to sea from English ports in violation of In
glish neutrality, at a su bseQuent period entered
ports OF the same power, while engaged in their
Delligerent enterprises. the government could not
the Confederate commission; and, b. refusing ;
either to exclude to detain the cruisers it added
| TO the wrong which it had already committed
In view Of the respect which civilized States ex-
act for their public vessels it is desirable that
cry safeguard shold be employed by the state it
| self to protect this character from abuse The
Confederate government showed considerable
laIity in this respect II 1t had not been incapable
sued the ordinary policy of neutrals, it would
doubtless have received some emphatic remon-
| strances the subject II procured cruisers
abroad through "shifts and stratagems," cleared
| them under the names of fictitious owners, or
| brought them out without clearance, took formal
| possession OF them on the high teas though thew
were ostensibly and according to their papers for
egn vessels, and put them in commission a. ships
of-wsr. It procured other vessels abroad, not IN
tended for war purposes, which it owned and con-
troled, and in some cases ofhcered from its navy.
andwhich ii employed in trade-thst ia, as blockade
| vessels,
differed by the Confederate government, sailed
sometimes under the British nag and with British
papers, and sometimes with those of the govern
ment to which they belonged They were lifted
| out now ships-of-war, now q merchant vessels,
according as the one character or the other would
best satisfy the exigency of the moment, and the
demands Of the local authorities in foreign ports
| A few of the prominent cases viii serve to show
| the nature of these arrangements. The Japan or
Georgia left the Clyde. registered in the name of q
British subject as q British vessel, and sbe re-
manned, for nearly three months, still registered
| in the name of ner ostensible owner. though she
xss all that time engaged in hostilies against The
fEnited States. A year later she returned to Liv-
| srpool and was dismantled. Whether she was
| then o ship-of-war or 9 merchant vessel does not
! appear. She was soon After sold 70 an English