The Donaldsonville chief. [volume] (Donaldsonville, La.) 1871-current, 1883-06-16
MoRaANzA. OR pLAoUEMINE ?

the State treasury to the credit of the Ievee
and drainage fund, and the fact has sug-
gested various methods for expanding the
money; among them is a proposition to use
the sum for closing existing crevasses.
This brings us squarely anent the cues
ton whether it is advisable to close Nor
ganza. The people who are ruined by the
Morganza crevayse are entitled to have their
claims considered, and the State can not
recklessly disregard the interests of part
of her citizens, even though others be ben
Gifted.
1t is argued that, at the best, the ability
of New Orleans and the lower coast to es-
cape overflow is q question of inches and
not of feet In 1874 and 1888 high winds
rolled the waves Of the river over the city
levees and few inches more of water
would have run good sized river down
Canal street.
In New Orleans is more than half Of the
wealth of the State and nearly all the CAPT
tai that furnishes the means of developing
the resources of the State outside of the
city. Its claim, not only for bare exist
ence, but for effective protection, can not
be ignored, and therefore if the closing of
Morganza injuriously affect the city and
the fertile parishes above and below it, it
behooves the State to proceed with the ut
most caution.
1t is claimed that New Orleans and the
lower coast have never been called upon to
face great flood in the Mississippi with all
the outlets below Red river closed except
the Lafourche. In ante bellunl days, when
there was o complete levee system and no
crevasses were open, it is asserted that the
lower coast and New Orleans always had
the benefit of two outlets, viz: Plaquemine
and Lafourche, through which vast quanti-
ties of flood waters escaped; but in 1874 the
country below Red river was required to
only the Bayou Lafourche open. The lesson
of that year is very instructive. AS the
water continued to rise, great and increas-
ing apprehension was felt, especially in the
city, and SO strong were these feelings that,
after consultation with some of the most
representative and responsible citizens,
Gov Kellogg was induced to take steps for
the immediate opening of Bayou Plaque
mine. Gen. JEFF. Thompson, the Chief
State Engineer, was ordered to proceed
with a party of men and cut the dixie at
Plaquemine.
The harshness of this scheme is apparent
when we consider that the people living be-
hind this dixie and trusting to its protection
had thrown up no levees and would there
fore be exposed to total destruction if the
dixie was cut. This consideration was urged
upon the Governor and his advisers, but it
was replied that the Plaquemine had been
unlawfully closed, that the effect of it was
to endanger New Orleans, and that it was
better few should suffer who might be in
demnifed than that the city of New Or
leans, with its great population and greater
wealth, as well as the whole coast below
Plaquemine should be destroyed Or even
seriously endangered. These views con-
trolled the Governor and his advisers, and
the Jeff. Thompson expedition was ordered
to cut the dixie; but the people of Iberville
organized for their own defense and by
force of arms and numbers prevented the
State Engineer from executing the orders
of the Governor.
But in the midst of all this perplexity ma
ture wrought out solution of the difficult
sizes of the situation by violently opening at
Morganza, Hickey and Bonnet Care three
the Mississippi. When this was effected the
rise of the river, still continuous above Red
river, was not only checked from Baton
Rouge down, but the water fell to the safety
line and the greatest crisis that ever New
Orleans experienced was safely passed.
Capt. Eads has just stated that the flood
of 1882 IVES eighteen inches higher at the
mouth of Red river than ever before. If,
then, this enormous flood had descended
upon New Orleans without diminution
through outlets, it should have raised the
river there over the gauge of 1874; but as
Morganza and Bonnet Care were both
open, the water failed to reach the altitude
Of 1874.
Let Us see what occurred in 1888. Bon
net Care was closed, and with a lesser flood
than in 1882 the river rose higher at New
Orleans and attained the level of 1874. If
the closing of Bonnet Care SO dangerously
raised the food level at New Orleans, even
when Morganza was open, imagine the re-
suit when Morganza also be closed.
The conclusion of parties who argue in
his way is that the safety of the coast and
New Orleans demands at the least two es-
,apes below Red river for the flood waters,
me at Lafourche AID one at Morganza or
If this be so, we will stand
~ our Iberville friends and advocate the
Of the outlet at Morganza in
preference to the cutting of the dixie at
olaquemine.
A fertile and populons section has grown
Up behind the Iberviile levees that wou Id
,e severely injured if not destroyed If the |
like was cut, while at Morganza the des- |
'lation is now complete and the area of !
destruction will be small if lateral levees
7ere made to conduct the creyasse water |
Without dispersion to the proper.communi- |
alton with the Atchafalaya river.
While we side with Iberville in this view,
re are not disposed to ignore the equitable |
laims of parties injured by Morganza
nd we think that the lateral levees
nould be built and an indemnify paid
rom the $4,000 levee fund now in the
tate treasury.
We advocate this scheme because we are
,tisfied that Morgnnza alone will exercise |