Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1883-06-07
THE EPnRATA CHURCH CASf.
Judye PattersOn's Decree declared I'm.
prOvident ana UHlawful

Judge Patterson's Decree declared I'm.
prOvident ana Unlawful.
Following is the opinion in full of the
supreme court, written by Judge Paxsop,
in the Ephrata church case, with tho par
,iculars of which our readers are ia
miliar
"The decree in this case was entered in
the court below by the additional
law judge, the president judge being
present and dissenting the court was
therefore equally divided and the rule in
such cases is that no valid order or decree
can be made. 1t there is motion before
the court it falls. This is the rule every
where, and it requires no argument to
vindicate it. Equal divisions sometimes
occur in this court, owing to the absence
of one of its members The only order We
can make in such a case is to affirm the
Judgment or decree of the court below.
The plaintiff in error or appellant. who is
the actor fails and his motion to reverse
falls to tine ground. An affirmance here
by divided court means merely that the
Judgment or decree below cannot be dis
turbed.
In order to reach his conclusion tie
learned Judge who entered tho deere Q
below reversed the master aud set aside
his findings OF fact. His decree included
an order for perpetual injunction and the
disposition of the costs. To all this tie
president judge. who possessed a: least
equal power, disscnted he had an equal
right to enter decree embodying his own
view of the case. We would then have
had the unusual case of conflicting orders
issued out of the same court. To state
such proposition as this is to answer it.
The learned judge "a. l. j. below was
evidently mislcd by the case of Cahill, VS..
Benn. 9th Binney 80. 1t does not sustain
his position. In that case there had been
q trial at law and verdict for the plain
tiff. The defendant moved for now trial,
and upon this motion tie court was equal
Iy divided. Tho motion necessarily fell.
Afterwards the plaintiffs counsel moved
for Judgment, and two judges being pres
ent, one ordered judgment, as a matter
of course, and the other objected to the
entry. The prothOnotary entered judg-
ment and upon writ of error the judg
mcEt was sustained by this court. 1t is
of course, to judgment upon the verdict
alter the motion for 4 now trial failed,
and il would have been wrong to have
denied it. This WIS the view taken by
TiIghmau, G. j., who delivered the Opin
Jon of the court, in which he said 'We
cannot suppose that Judge Campbell
meant to act with such impropriety as to
arrest the regular course of law, by for
bidding the prOthOnotary to make prop
er entry. We rather think that he wished
his opinion against the verdict to be entered
on record, aud to leave the rest T." tho
law. Any other proceeding would have
been highly improper, and We will not,
without necessity, suppose that Judge
Campbell intended to do what was wrong
The distinction between entering \
Judgment pro forma upon "A verdict I"
which the party was entitled Is of cOur:e,
and granting decree in equity is SD pa
pable that We need not further discuss the
ease. Tile decree belop aoas imprOD,denAy
and wnjustly entered and must be set aside.
50 This leaves the case precisely rs if no
decree had been made. IT the lealne
Judges below cannot agree upon proper
decree, they have the power to call upon
Judge from another district to decide the
case fnr them. But until We have q lawful
decree We cannot reach tho merits. The
decree is reversed ut the costs Of tho
appellees.'