The Louisiana Democrat. [volume] (Alexandria, La.) 1845-1918, 1883-04-18

tracts previously entered into by her
az a sovereign, that expression Of her
will must stand as good unless she be
amenahle to the processes OF the
Courts, and if she be so amenable, her
sovereignty is denied and she is placed
on the same level with her private
citizens. To say as Judge Field that
"the inhibition of the Federal Cousti-
tuition is upon tho State and not mere
ly upon her Legislature" is to dispose
of tile whole matter without argument.
This proposition conceded, there is no
room for further discussion. If when
the State assumes to speak as so7er'
eign her acts are liable to review and
reversal by any superior authority
anywhere lodged, then she is not SOW
ereign but subject. It is conceded that
the States are not to be permitted to
violate the organic and fundamental
law which governs them all. and it as
the dissenting judge says State Con
stitution should authorize the Legisla-
ture to pass bill Of attainder or an
ex post facto law or law impairing
the obligations of private contracts,
these laws when passed would clearly
be subject to review by the Courts in
actions between private persons, bat
to grant this does not assist him IN Eis
conclusions. In tho matter before the
Court nothing had been referred to the
Legislature of Louisiana. The SOW
ereign had acted directly, had com
pleted the entire work in hand, aud to
attack her action it was necessary to
overstep or entirely pull down the bar
of her sovereignty. The case quoted,
Wolf VS.. New Orleans, does not con
tlict will, this view rs it involved the
consideration of legislation and not
the direct action of the State. A mu-
nicipal corporation was defendant and
the points here at issue could hardly
have arisen and were certainly not de-
terminei in such case.
The next point made by him, that
the officers of State are subject to the
processes of the Courts might present
more difficulty if it had not already
been decided and if the majority of
the Court had not followed the rule
established by previous adjudications.
The dissenting Judge is unfortunate in
his citation Of authority to sustain his
position. In the case of the Board of
Liquidation Us. McComb, from which
he quotes the language of Justice Brad
ley, as the organ of the Court, / find
him using and the whole Court endor-
sing the following language: "The OBJ
iections to proceeding against State
officers by n,antlanNs or injunction are,
first, that it is in effect proceeding
against the State itself. and, secondly
that it interferes with tho official dis
erection vested in the officers. 1t is
conceded that neither Of these things ca,.
be done. A State, without its consent,
cannot be sued by an individual and
a Court cannot substitute it's own dis
erection for that of executive officers in
matters belonging to the proper juris
diction of the latter" The Court then
proceeds to fad other grounds upon
which to base its decree in that case
| In the cases now under confederation
the State officers who we're defendants
in the uandamus and injunction pro.
cesses before the Court had been ex.
pressly deprived of any discretion OF
power to carry out the debt settlement
of 1874 and their authority was ex.
pressly limited by the Constitution O
1879 to the enforcement of the deb
settlement proposed by that instru
ment. These cases were, therefore, al
the Court holds, in effect, if not il
fact, against the State itself, and tn,
majority hold now as it has Away
been held, that "a State, without it
consent can not be sued by AN indi
vidual."
Judge Field holds that "when ,
State enters into the markets of tn
world as a borrower she, for the time
lays aside her sovereignty aud become
! responsible as Civil Corporation. H.
And although suits against her eve
en- MAY not be a!lo,ccd, her officer
: can be compelled to do what she the
6 contracts that they shall do" If tn
Constitution of 1879 had not changes
> the debt settlement of 1874, and al
tered her engagements, then the dut
of these State officers would have bee
;, purely ministerial, and they Nigh
f have been forced by process to pei
= form that duty. But to say that in til
u face of that change, they can neverthe
i less be compelled to carry out the orig
inal agreement, is to say that in sui,
:, against those officers upon the pretez
of requiring them to perform purel
. ministerial functions, it can be az
y Judged that the organic act of the Stat
- changing those functions is unconst
y tutional and void. A mere statemer
:, = of the position shows the State to be
" necessary party defendent and Jude
! Field admits himself that even undo
F. the circumstances stated, tue State ca
not be sued. The other cases quote
4 where snits have been entertaine
~ against State officers do not confli,
:, ~ Will, the well recognized rule abo1
~ quoted and all come under the excel
II ton that an officer may he compelle
J., to perform ministerial functions whe
70 the State is not party to tho suit an
II that in controversies between the cit
- liens of different States a State la
= may be declared to be unconstitutiona
~ Judge Field does not like the pro-
~ osition that the obligation of the Sta
ia are only honorary because she can nj
If be forced by judicial powers to carr
r out her obligations. No one will di
+. pute the proposition that in the Cou
y, of morals and conscience the State
-. "a as mucl. bound BY the recognized pril
ID ciples of honesty and fair dealing
~ the individual, but this considerable
=, ~ does not change the rule Of strict la
~ under consideration.
n. In Ills criticism of the decision of O
,h State Supreme Court in the cases
in The State va. Burke and Hart VS.. Bur-
ed he overlooks the necessity that Cou
c. was nuder Of following the latest Q
is preston of the sovereign will Of Il
" State as found in the Constitution