Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1883-10-16
Text of the Decision.

The titles of these cases, and the States
fro from 1!,d which they come are as follows; No |,
United States Circuit Court for the district of
Kansas No. 2, the United States cs. Michael
Ryan. from the United States Circuit Court for
the District of California; No. 3, the United
States us; Samuel Nichols, from the United States
Circuit Court for the Western District of Mis-
Singleton, from the United States Circuit Court
for the, Southern District of New York, and
cs. the Memphis and Charleston Railroad
Company. from the United States Circuit Court
M T the 9trit t Of These
civil rights act of 1877, and were respectively
prosecutions under that act for not admitting col
privileges in inns and hotels, in railroad and
in theaters. The defense set up in every case was
the alleged uneonstitutionality of the law. The
first and second sections of the act, which were
the parts directly in conflict, are as follows:
diction of the United States shall be entitled to
the full and equal enjoyment of the accommoda-
tons, advantages, facilities and privileges ofpub
lie conveyances on land and water, theaters and
other places of public amusement, subject only to
the conditions and limitations established by law,
and applicable alike to citizens regardless of any
previous condition of servitude,
The second section provides that any person
who violates t the first section shall be liable TO
civil action, and also to penalty of from $500 to
$1,000 fine, or imprisonment Of thirty days, to be
risdicton is given TO the District and Circuit
Courts of the United States in cases arising under
tue law.
THE RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES
claimed by and denied to colored persons in these
cases were full and equal accommodations in
hotels, the ladies' cars on railway trains and in
the dress circle in theaters. The court, in a long
and carefully prepared opinion by Justice Brad
fiirsf.1That Congress had no Institutional au-
thority to pass the sections in question under the
thirteenth or fourteenth amendment of the con-
Seeond-That the fourteenth amendment is
prohibitory in States only, ana that the leglsla-
tion authorized to be adopted by Congress for en-
forcing that amendment Is not direct leglsla-
ton on matters respecting which States
are prohibited from making or enforcing certain
laws ordaning certain acts, but is corrective leg
and redressing the effects which the law enacts;
that in forbdding States, for example, to deprive
any person of life, liberty property without due
process of law, and giving Congress the power to
enforce protection, it was not intended TO give
Congress power to provide due process of law
for the protection of life, liberty and property,
which would mbarrass almost all sub sub,
modes of redress for counteracting the
operation and effect of State laws obnoxious
TO prohibition; that the thirteenth amend
ment gives power to Congress to pass the sec
tions referred to, because that amendment relates
it aboishes and gives Congress the power to pass
laws for its enforcement; that this power only
itself, namely, slavery and involuntary servitude
and thenecessary incidents and consequences Of
these conditions; that it has nothing to do with
the different
RACES OR COLoRS,
but only refers TO slavery, the legal equality of
the different races and classes of citizens being
provided for in the fourteenth amendment, which
prohibits the States from doing anything to inter-
tere with such equality; that it rs not an infringe
ment of the thirteenth amendment to refuse to
any person equal accommodation and privileges
in an inn or public entertainment, however
it may be violative of his legal rights:
that l. imposes upon him no badge of
slavery. or involuntary servitude, which inn
piled the subjection of one, person to another
and the incapaeity incident thereto, such as ina
bility to hold property, to make contracts, to be
parties in court, etc, and that if the original
civil rights act, which abolished these incapaci-
ties, might be supplied by the thirteenth amend
ment, it does not therefore, follow that the act of
1871 can be supported by it.
Fourth.-That this decision affects only the
validity of the law in the States, and not in the
Territories or District of Columbia, where the
legislative power of Congress is unlimited, and it
does not undertake to decide what Congress
might or might not do under the power to reg
ulate commerce with foreign nations and among
the several States, the law not being drawn with
any such view.
FYtk-That, therefore, it is the opinion of the
of Congress of March |, 1871, entitled. An act to
protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights,
are unconstitutional and void, and judgment
should not be rendered upon indictments accord
ingly.
AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE READING
of Justice Bradley's opinion, which occupied
more than an hour, Justice Harlan said under
ordinary circumstances, and in ordinary cases.
he should hesitate TO set up his individual
opinion in opposition to his eight col
thought the people of this country
and no Sx Sd bdS 1G
plished by means of this legislation, he must
press his dissent from the opinion of the court.
He had not time since hearing that opinion to
prepare statement of the grounds of his dissent,
but he should prepare and file one as soon pos
sible. and in the meantime he desired to put upon
record this expression of his individual Judgment