The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-04-02

fighter, appears to have been most to blame
for the DISTURBANCE, although McCook, Negley
and some others appear to have been accused,
Justly or unjustly, of lack of promptness
or a misconception of the necessities of the
situation.
Polk was still hammering away at Thomas
with such leaders as Cleburne, Cheatham,
Breckenridge, Walker and Liddell, when
Longstreet asked Bragg if he had not better
attack. as Polk seemed to be making no head
way. Bragg said yes, and he began massing
his troops for desperate effort to sever the
Federal lines in his front Folks delay in
making the attack had given this commander
an opportunity to ride his lines, to take
careful survey OF the field and make his dis
positions with great care. He had his force
in hand for hard work, and when it came
his turn to attack he moved his troops for
ward to the assault with thorough under
standing of the desperate duty before him.
1t was unfortunate for the Federals that
Wood had Withdrawn his troops from the
line, leaving a breach in it just as Longstreet
sent his fresh and determined soldiers for
ward under Hood, with orders to push their
antagonists off the field at any cost. They
went with rush, and struck the Union
troops where Wood had weakened the line
and Davis was trying to patch it up with his
reserve brigade.
To attempt to describe this charge of Long
streets and>its effect upon the Federal line
would be like picturing whirlwind striking
a forest and cutting winrow through sturdy
trees.
As will appear from General Longstreet's
narrative, which is to follow, there were sew
eral reasons that combined to make it one of
the most remarkable assaults of the war. 1t
was the first time in our history a nation
that troops in such formation had been sent
against ar enemy. Hancock afterward tried
it with success against a fortified position in
+ba nnO1a ut SnoffSvlyapio altar InDCSt ppt
demonstrated at Chickamauga how impos-
sible it was for troops in the field to with
stand the fury of such an onset Woods
action in Withdrawing his force from the
line was no doubt indefensible, and other
commanders may have been to blame for de-
fects in their line, but the plain facts seem
to be that Rosecrans had massed much of
his force on the left under Thomas, and the
right and center were forced to yield to the
fury of such a rush as Longstreet made
against it. Hood, leading five brigades of
Longstreefs wing, in column by brigades at
half distance, to use military phrase,
crushed through the Federal line shortly
after noon, and beat McCoo'- and Crittenden
before they had a chance to recover. He
followed up his advantage with great spirit,
cutting the army in two, capturing many
pieces of artillery, stands of colors and
prisoners. Rosecrans. who was caught in
the wreck that flowed off the battlefield as
the Confederates mad with the flush of sue
cess pushed on after the demoralized battal-
ions, was nearly made prisoner. He thought
he could stay the tide of defeat as he did at
Murfreesboro by his personal daring, but
this was different field and here a greater
peril. The more he tried to bring order out
of chaos and to rally his retreating soldiers,
as the enemy were pushing toward him, the
greater the confusion. 1t finally carried
him off the field just in time to save him
from capture He thought of making his
way to Thomas, but he was so firmly caught
in the debris of the battle that he found his
only chance was to move with his staff to
the rear, toward Rossville, from which point
he sent Garfield back to urge Thomas to hold
on to the left if possible.