Fort Worth daily gazette. (Fort Worth, Tex.) 1882-1891, 1883-03-18

sonal security, or the individual note
Of the original signerJ and embracing
additional property in the deed oftrust
does not effect the lein upon such
property rs was originally included in
the security. One piece of property
covered by the deed of trust became
the homestead of Dillon and family a
few weeks before the subrOgation took
place. Held, so far ms the deed held
by the first party Is concerned no
homestead right was acquired and II
cannot prevail against the subrogated
lein Of X. d n, and was subject to be
sold for tbs satisfaction thereof. AT
firmed
Howard vs.. Mayor etc. Of Houston.
From Harris county. Opinion by
Chief Justice Willie. In this case the
act incorporating the city of Houston
not only does not prescribe the sum
mary remedy which Is claimed the
city should have pursued, but 1t spe-
cially permits an action OF debt, and
the mode Of procedure by seizure and
sale Of the property Is prescribed ~ II
different statute long subsequently,
adopted. This is cumulative of the
remedy pursued In this ease, and not
exclusive of IL. The court below prop
erly held, chat the appellee could re-
cover It's nd .alorem taxes by an nc
ton ut law. .The charter in force at
the time made NIL taxes Oh real estate
q lien and charge upon the property,
and all taxes due were allowed to
be collected by an action of debt in
any court having Jurisdiction; and the
city was allowed to adopt, AS near as
circumstances would permit, the same
mode and manner of assessing and
collecting state taxes. II there was "a
manner prescribed by law for the col
lection of state and county taxes differ
tnt from that Of bringing suit for
them, the city should have two RENEE
dies to enforce her taxes, an action at
law and the summary proceedings
prescribed by the statute The act OF
July !, 1879, did not repeal the sec
tons allowing the above privileges,
but gave TO the city another remedy
for the enforcement of its taxes.
Affirmed.
Tabler W. Willis q Bro. From Gal
weston county. Opinion by Judge
Stayton. One VIM desiring to pur-
chase goods from appellees, appellant
wrote them that If they would sell him
goods to the amount of $4,000 that APP
pellant would pay for them if Winn
did not. Winn was ITO purchase his
merchandise on open account, and on
regular terms, and so long
M he continues to buy from your
house, | am responsible for and prom
Use to pay you any debt you may have
against.hiin to the extent of
80, 600 future Held, this guaranty
contemplated course of dealing and
for nm indefinite period of time
and succession of purchases,
and this course of dealing was
subject to be terminated at the
wish of either party, there being no
period fixed by the instrument itself
during which the business or course of
dealing to which the guaranty related
should continue. The extent of the
guaranty was fixed. The continuance
was to be $50 long rs he (Wlnn) con
tinues to buy from your house,
Whenever appellees' consent was with
drawn the business necessarily termin-
ated.
The contract of guaranty not being
ambiguous, parol evidence could not
be had to show in contradiction of its
legal effect, that 1t was intended there
by for n fixed period Of time, to confer
upon VIM the right 10 purchase goods
on credit and provided that credit did
not exceed $4,000. Affirmed.