New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1883-12-02

The FTenchman is. ne rule, lively, qniek OF CON
! ceptior and inclined to be violent while the Eng
lisinan is stiff slow of understanding, and apt 10
| be obstinate. A machine made OF such GiIerSht
materials could hardly work without u gOod ueal VI
unnecessary friction. Ii was bad enough when one
| element was subordinated to the other, but IL was
much worse when they were placed on the same
level without any third party to c0ntrol bolh. IN
certain cases the situation was still further conpll-
Gated by the introduction of an Egyptian -theoI1t-
| icay on the same level as the two Europeans III
order therefore, to have complete picture Oh IIcI
national administration in Cairo we must peep lIio
a mixed Council in which the Egyptian element Is
also represented. There stands the fluent French
man. gdsticuiating with vvacity and rapidly draw
ing impractical conclusions from nasty eclleraiz11-
tons and abstract principles; before nm suai,u5i
erect his English colleague, with his liahdS puSheu
down to the bottom of his pockets tlNIiiS 10 eN-
plain in an Anglo-Saxon French dialect oil ms own
invention, the simple, practical remedy mon id d
proposes and in the background, at me olIeI sIe
of the table. sits the stOlid Egyptian Gacha, WHO
| always satisfied with things as they gre ana Ior
| whom tomorrow is as to-day, eycng his colleagues
silently with an expression Of benignant compassion
not unmixed with Iii entity, and wondering Naguty
| in the lower depths of his sluggish lntcIhal coz.
seriousness why God in His infinite goodness saw NJ
to create sucn Of dissatisfied. impatient sen
| tormenting mOrtas. Taking into consideration
all these grave defects of the Dual Control IN me
wider sense of the term, must confess that II a,l
| itself open 10 the violent accusations bloughl
against it by the National party. In PASSING Jn9g-
ment on the men who recklessly provoked a IeNoIu-
tionary crisis eliminating in foreign occupailon'
let us admit frankly that, by whatever personal mo-
tiVes they may have been actuated, they hu" lo''i
| grievances to complain OF.
! The account given of the establishment of the
Control and the outbreak of the Instruction is both
lucid and animated. Mr.. Wallace is especially clear
and incisive in his summaries Of the diplomatic MS
tory of the period. The following cauStc deScrIp-
ton of the Turkish Imperial Commission IS an al
| inirable illustration of his method:
! Dervsh Pacha. the First Commissioner. was N
struGted to support the khfdlye anu While
Ahmet Essad. the Second COmmlsslonef, was III
sruccd to cOnciliate Arab and hls trends ana as
sure them that they had in the sultan sure lrlehu
| and allv. The Third Commissioners plan was 10 act
as a spy on his two colleagues. and ne III MS urn
was closely watched by q secretary, " no sent secret
reports direct to COnstantlnoplc. Altogether inc
Commission very characteristic Illustration oi
Abdul Iamid's peculiar statecraft; Dni III spHS ol
or rather perhaps, i'll consequence oi-thc Won9'r-
ful Oriental ingenuity displayed in its organizations
il completely failed in IFS object, rev sIatc u9cu-
ments are more amusing than he cohhifht[al re-; re-
ports of the various members, VINO were all paying
| at crosS-puTpOscS, and all complaining OF td'h
other The only people who 50 far rs am aware
! derived nny advantage from the Commission, were
| one of HE Chief Commissioners who carried of as
bakshiSh something like 10000, and, notwltl!sad-
ing solemn promise to share IL Ggultapl WIN ms
! accompces sclishy kept il all 10 himself; ana
! two of the snbordinates who sold TO tho khediye
for goo and GOO respectively, the keys to the
! telegraph ciphers by which the Sultan coIninuhl-
! Gated with the Chief Commissioners.
As for the future Mr. Wallace is steTnly opposed
! TO the withdrawal Of the British garrison from
| Egypt He contends that England, having under
! taken Sngle-handed the work of restoring order ON
the Nile acted with the tacit approval of all the
| Powers. No foreign Government has any right or
shows any disposition TO complain of the presence
of the garrison The only restrictions upon the pro-
ongaton of the period Of occupation have been
bitrarily imposed by Mr.. Gladstone and his asSoci
ates in their pledges to the English people Mean
while there is serious work To be done in Egypt.
If we were not resolved to create something like
! permanent O1dcr in Egypt why nd We 90 70 Egypt
! at all If We did not mean 10 create really good
government why did We destroy the National
party, which had a far better chance of preserving
order OF some kind than the khcdlye whom We rc-
instated' If we intended 70 let the Egyptians ste"
in their own Juice, why did We wantony inicrcrc
in the operation and send the fat INTO the lire! il
We did not mean to do something serious ~ Egypt,
why did hccdlcssly and ncedleSsly offend France
by abolishng the Dual Control The time for con
siderng the question as 10 whether We should I'M
dertake the work of Egyptian reorganization WAS
in the early part of last year, before overthrow
the Arab Dictatorship and before the destruction
Of Alexandria. 1t is rather late III the day now to
have conscientious scruplcS and very foolish 10 i'm
agine that by Sinking our duties and responsible
ties make for ourselves a reputation of dis
lnterestedness and generosity. The man who begins
10 have CONSCIENTIOUS scrupes after having accom-
pllshed the destructive part of great work aud
who timidly shrinks from the unquestOnabe dlif
culties and possible dangers in the constructive
part does not gam high moral reputation, but
gains-and gains justy-the reputation OF mlscr-
able canting coward. We have done the work of |
destruction III Egypt very thoroughly. | do not
speak merely of the blackcncd ruins of Alexandria
which was previous 10 our dcmonstratiyc naval
visit, of the finest and most prosperous cities of
the Levant; | mean that we have thoroughly de-
strOyed the old dcspOtic system of ruling the
country, and have thoroughly dslocated tile whole
system of government.
The authors argument is that the withdrawal Of
the garrison will be followed by the growth of in
subordination in the native army, that the presence
Of the troops is indispensable to accelerate the in
PRODUCTION Of necessary reforms, and that the for
egn population will feel that their lives and prop
erty are in jeopardy if the country he evacuated.
He describes with extreme lucidty the course Of adj
Inlnstraton since the battle Of Tc-el-Kcbir and
accords TO Lord Dulierin high praise for his firm
ness, dcXterity and sagacity. lie has confidence
in the recognized Egyptan army. lie considers
the presence of British soldiers indispensable, if the
Liberal programme Of administrative, economic and
political reforms is to be conscentiously carried
out. These the reforms which he considers most
urgent l. To create military and police force of
such kind az to insure public tranquility. .. To
introduce certain administrative and judicial re-
forms which urgently required. 3. To amclio-
rate the economic position of the rural population.
4. To endow the Egyptian people with certain pot
zeal institutions, not because there is any immediate
pressing necessity for them, but in order to provide
for future wants, and at the same time redeem one
of the pledges given by the Government
The prospect for Egypt, whether under Home
Rule or British domination, the author regards as
OminOus and dishcartcnng. The native rural pOpu-
lation he describes impoverished and the soil as
losing its fertility The difficulty of paying taxes is
increasing every year, the fcllaheen are sinking
deeper and deeper into debt and large proportion
of the landholders must speedily sell their property
i'll order 10 satisfy the claims of foreigners Egypt
as Mr.. Wallace sees it, is already on the brink of
terrible economic crisis
NeU publications.