New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1883-07-11
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
THE NV m THE CIvnL WAR.

HAN Commander u. 8. Navy. PIP. z67. onaries
scribners Soma
The second volume Of tho series on SThe Navy
IN the Civil War; 10 distinctly below the stand
ard of excellence established by the preceding series
nm the military operations of the War Of tho Re-
bellion. Admiral Ammen is too evidently unit for
task which demanded literary ability no less than
full information aud capacity to discriminate
an6 Judge HIS style Is very bad. his English very
sloycnly ana he does not appear to have formed
any clear conception of what he was going to DO lie
saws IN his preface: "'Ths writer is indebted to an
able froud for the criticism that these pages are
largely made up of quotations. which is certainly
the fact. This method has been adopted 10 give
occurrences from every point OF view optainaoie
whore tho quotation is apposte and not Designed 10
be deceptive or meretricious" The AdmIrais
employment of the adjective smeretrioious here
can only be compared to Mark Twan's story OF the
man who was fond of using long words without any
reuard 10 thar aeposteness and who on one pcca~
sion objected to the company of q young dog at
night whom the party we're camping out because
be sa,a. the animal was so ineretricious." Inc
Aomiral's friend was no doubt right IN hiS crltl-
cisu, for the book Is largely made up OF quota'a-
tions But unfortunately the gallant author nus
not known how to adjust his literary compasses' 50
IN sneak. and "a q result his endeavors to produce
n perfectly dispassionate narrative are seldom sue
cessful And his deficiencies are the more 10 10 TO-
GREETED because the story he had to tell Is mos.
interesting one and because moro experiences"
writer. with the facts before him, would havo
made brilliant volume OF this. IL was na'uy
necessary for Admiral Ammen ts write the chapter
hsaded q Condition of the NAVY 1t the beginning
of the War because that part of the work mas
alreadv been very much better done by sir. Solely
in the first volume Of the SERIES But notwitn-
standinr the many mperfections of the book tho
,ubiect matter is too interesting for even worse
literary work 10 divest it of attractiveness Inc
Port ROYAL expedition, the raid of the Con1edere'o
ironclads oft Charleston the naval attack upon
that city. the attack upon Fort McAllister. tie
capturs of RosnoSe Island, the reduction OF New
bsrn and Fort Fisher, furnish texts upon winch
some day really good book will be written. Au-
,niral Ammsn, cwever cannot help showing "na'
were the main difficulties of the naval opcratiohs
on both sides, or in emphasizing the fact that tne
Confederstes at no time possessed vessels cspabie
of meeting the Federal feet, poor as that was
upon equal terms. During the rebellion rumor
sxaoeerated the Confederate naval resources very
much. but the Richmond Government was both III
seryed and badly off for material 1t had not inc
men to take advantage of the opportunities pre-
septed The confusion between military ana nsVai
administrations repeatedly paralyzcd tho naval
nrm at critical junctures. Constant plumbers were
maze in estimating the offensive and defensive
mower of forts and ironclads. tis true that tho
Fcdeial Government was embarrassed oy very
similar obstacles, always excepting that OF lack OF
rnorsr;,l But Il appears to have had moro men who
were wise enough to realize that great risks and
gr.at sacrifices were demanded. and who did not
hesitate to encounter the one and make the other.
OF course there were many new problems pre-
ssntea by the war. The comparative force OF lofts
and ships was then unknown Experience proved
that with the artillery then in use there were no
forts which could not be passed with comparative
ease and safety, and few which could not DO
silonced, at least for the time, by the oroadsides
of we-fought ships. One is surprised at the sever
fty of the punishment sustained by lightly armored
vessels at the tack on Charleston, Tor example,
and at the comparatively triing injuries inflicted,
ut snort range and by guns of heavy calihre But
IL cannot be said that there Was at any time much
srrisus fighting between Federal and Confederate
sbips. On few occasions, as when the Confeder-
alta ,ronclad rams Merrimac, Atlanta and Manassas
ventured out the Federals got the worst oil u ior
the moment. Bat all the Confederate ironciads
proved 60 much weaker than they we're originally
believed to be that in the end their DESTRUCTION
WAS BIZ no means difficult Doubtless the deience
of the Confederate ports on the Atlantic could nave
been made much more formidable IL the hichmohd
Government had not had Its hands full OF even
the first hampered by want of means The Federal
navy. however, was handled well throughout the
war and it's few positive failures were largely due
90 the subordnation of practical and military to
political considerations TO the bunders OF army
authorities who should have co-operated. In the
latter category the Fort Fisher failure OF course
falls. There the navy really took the fort but tho
army failed to occupy it. good deal OF bitterness
was also caused by the dishonesty and incapacity
OF naval contractors. Some amazing monstrosities
in the way of vessels were that time forced upon
the navy and 1t had to put mp with them. IL re-
gard to the blockade, Admiral Ammen virtually
admits that there was period when the feet failed
to keen ont the blockade-runners effectively, and
that great many more passed in and out than the
public ever heard of. Perhaps, however, the really
surprising fact is that the blockade was as encent
rs it proved in the end TO be- for IL was certainly
most difficult task, and it was performed with
very inadequate means.
Commander Mahans volume on Tho Gulf and
Inland Waters Is better written than the preceding
one and the narrative is therefore followed with
greater interest. Ths official reports have been
followed in the main, and the same may be said OF
Admiral Ammon's account But Captain Mahan
has also undertaken to FIJI up the many gaps which
occur la such documents by obtaining the statements
of participants in the various operations Described
and he has sought to do this on both sides. The
operations with which the volume deals are those
from Cairo to vicksbarg from the Gulf to Vicks-
l=.g, the opening Of the Mississippi and the move
ments in Iexas and on the Red River. The account
of the passing of the vicksburg forts is very well
done. though the Commander sometimes allows
himself to lapse into professional technicalites
Which the landsman can hardly be expected to
understand For instance, we are told that when
Falragut was preparing his feet for the attack on
q hal YQ1if
tIe,r rigging. while the gunboats came up their
lower rigging carrying it In and securing it close to
the mast.v To the verdsnt eye Of the landsman
All r,rAsent tho singular spectacle OF