The Aberdeen examiner. [volume] (Aberdeen, Miss.) 1866-current, 1883-06-07

STATE td2cS, we md that the rates OF
charges levied for passage and freight
are to be regulated by bylaws, the
conclusion is that only such charges
can be collected as are allowed by
State laws.
This implies that, in the absence of
direct Legislation on the subject, the
power of the directors over rates is
subject only to the common law limit
of reasonableness, for in the absence
of statute or other appropriate in
dication of Legislative will the com.
mon law forms part of the laws of the
State to which corporate bylaws
must conform.
But since, IN the absence of some
restraining contract, the State may
establish a maximum of rates to be
charged by rail road companies for
the transportation of persons and
property, it follows that when max
imum is so established the rates fixed
by the directors must confrom to its
requirements, otherwise the bylaws
will be repugnant to the State laws.
1t is argued, however, that this
cannot be the meaning of the amend
ing act, because, if the company had
under its old charter, the absolute
right to fix rates subject only to u
limit of three cents a mile on passen-
gers, and the State had no right to
interfere except to keep annual pro-
fits down to fifteen per cent, on
paid up capital, no one can relieve it
would have surrendered such a privi-
lege and taken in lieu of it another
so unfavorable as this.
1t is undoubtedly true as claimed,
that amendments to charters are
usually made at solicitation of the
corporations themselves, who cause
the bills to be prepared and submit
ted to the Legislatures for enactment,
and that, if there is doubt as to the
construction of enactments this fact
may be resorted to in aid of interpre-
tation. But Vattels first general
maxim of Interpretation is that "it is
not allowable to interpret what has
no need of interpretation" and he
continues: "When a deed is worded
in clear and precise terms,--when its
meaning is evident and leads to no
absurd conclusion,-there can be no
| reason for refusing to admit the
meaning which such deed naturally
presents. To go elsewhere in search
of coniectures, in order to restrict or
extend it, is but to elude it." Here
the words are plain and interpret
themselves. The directors may es-
tablish such bylaws as they please,
provided they are not repugnant to
the constitution and laws, and they
may by their bylaws regulate the
rates of fare and freight. AS their by
laws must conform to the laws of the
State, so must their rates. If the
State had not the Legislative power
to regulate the charges of carriers for
hire, the case would be different. But
that question has been settled, and
the amended charter which this com
pany secured from the legislature
must be construed in the light of that
established power.
Without, therefore, undertaking to
determine what rights as to fares and
freights were secured to the company
under the old charter, nor whether
more was gained under the other pro-
visions of the new charter than was
lost by the acceptance of Section six
as it was enacted, we affirm the judy
ment.
THE ILLINOIS CENTRAL r. r.. CASE.
In the case of the Illinois Central
rail road decided at the same term, the
Chief Justice merely cited the other
decision, saying "The provision of the
charter of the Illinois Central rail
road company relied on, as showing a
contract, is almost identical with that
of the Central Military Tract Com
pany considered in the Ruggles case"