New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1883-11-02
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
SECRETARY SEWARD.

loht the patriotic lsboTs Of that distinguished
statesman ai,d the remarkable service 90 his c0un-
tyy by which It MAS his happy fortune TO close q
long and honorable career. The war time was a
period of excited and haSiy Judgment when many
good nam fell under popular suspicion, ana many
a chariitan rose la aOmentaTy honor. MI Se"aIo
was sometimes grieyOusly misunderstood; Oul as
the history of LincOlns administration becomes oct
fer known and its Diplomatic secrets especially are
revealed tho reputation of the Secretary OF STATE
grows more and more brilliant. Often. and for long
pcrod> the aayest dangers to the country proceeded
NOT from the ConfedeTateS but from foreign powers,
and there were anxiaas months when single diplo-
matic blnndcr would have cntaed rrcparahle dis
astcr Mr. Seward had rare combination
of the qualities adapted To his difficult functions
His natural adroitncss had been cultivated by
a long life of political contests he had learned the
value OF patience persistence and composnre; MS
sense of the popular temper was almost an instinct
he was shrewd, far-sighted, aud pcrSplcacous; ana
in the conflict between slavery and freedom ne
had acuui.cd the habit of testing questions OF I'M
mediate puicy by high considerations OF prme'pie
80 that in the nuV and difficult controversies WIN
Great Britain and France which pressed upon nm
from the first months of the war his dispatches
were marked by a breadth of view ana hrlnneSS oi
reasoning clearly beyond either Downing Stree' OF
the Tnilerics His sSnguine temperament aithoush
IL often ftanpted him 10 rash predictions was really
a most valuable part Of his equipment In the most
serious difficulties of the National cause he never
lost heart Mr. Baker has been at the pains of col
Iccting from his diplomatic correspondence
diary" or series Of notes on the war, by which
he used 10 inform our Ministers abroad of the pro
press of military operations. Read in the light Of
later events the Secretarys version of the struggle
seems unwarrantably optimistic; but II was nnch
nearer tho truth than was the current OPINION OF inc
time and although it may have sometimes belittled
the National failures il had the great merit OF keep
ing in view under all circumstances, the constant
causes which must lead TO the failure OF the Re
bclon. Occasionally Mr.. Seward missed the slgni-
fcance of our OWE victories: he seems to have
strangely misunderstood Gettysburg for instance;
but there were some things in the military situation
which he saw more clearly than great many of
the military authorities. 1t would be difficult to
everest innate the value of his bnOyant and confident
dispatches at times when his political associates
We're discouraged ard demOralized, and when the |
tone of ali foreign legations was in the last de
gree Respondent. To persuade incredulous aud !
unfriendly governments of our ability to save the
Union was the first means Ofpreventing Intervention.
and before he could do that he had 10 persuade our
own ambassadors.
Following these brief extracts in Mr.. Bakers vol |
nlne an, copors selections from Mr. Stewards gen
eIal diplomatic correspondence from 1861 to 1868. |
We believe that all these dispatches except one have
been printed 10y the Government but in the huge mass
of the official publication they are practically in
accessible to the ordinary reader Mr.. Seward saw |
ut once that the question of foreign Intervention
was going 10 be of paramount importance, and he
did not lose a day in supplying our representatives
abroad with copiouS and careful instructions. He
varied his dispatches very shrewdly TO suit the cir
cumstances and interests of the different powers,
but there were certain ideas which he emphasized in
all cases from the beginning Of the to the end.
He never permitted those whom he addressed to lose
sight of these facts: that the was not struggle
between rival States but an unjustiiiabe insurrec
ton against the National authority; that there was
and could be only one lawful government in tins
country; that the loyal people were passionately
devoted to the Union and would maintain it at
whatever cost; aud that no compromise with in
surrecton was poSsibe-especially that the idea of
compromise through foreign Intervention wOuld not
be- tolerated for moment. In common with most
of the loyal party he was slow to admit that the
CoufcdcIa'y acquired beliigerent rights a de
fact0 government and he never ceased To regard the
rebel cruisers pirates, IN which II is now admitted
that like many OF the rest of us, hc WAS wrong
Most of his positions however questions of inter-
national law have been completely sustained, and
the principles which he promptly asserted in the
controversy with Great Britain signally vindi-
!
The foundation of the American before that
high court was laid by Secretary Seward in the first
months of the war.
In confronting the danger Of foreign Intervention,
which far serious than tho people I'M
agincd. Mr., Seward displayed admirable dignity
and courage. He made Il plain H. France and Eng
land that they would not he allowed to interfere
without lighting Tie wrote to MIR Adams. as early
as April 10 1861. that if the Government Of Great
Britain chose to recognize the independence of the
Confederate States. that act would be interpreted
as AN alliance with the enemies of the Republic:
" You alone will represent your country at London
and YOU will represent the whole of il there When
you are asked 10 divide that duty with others dip
lomatc relations between the Government Of Great
Britain and this Government will be suspended,
and will remain until it shall be seen which Of
the two is most strongly intrenchcd in the conf
dencc Of their respective nations and of mankind"
month later, in writing to the same Minister ne I
referred frankly TO the chances of war: But if it
come it will be fully that it results from the
action of Great Britain. not our own; that Great
Britain viii have decided to frateruize with orr
domestic enemy either without waiting 10 hear !
from yoa oar circumstances and on warnings. or |
after having heard them" In Jul,, 1863. when
the rulings of the Chief Baron of the Exehequer in ,
the Alexandra seemed TO place all the ship
yards of Great Britain unreservodly at the DISPOSE
ton OF the rebels. and when British ports open
10 them as harborS of refuge aud depots of supplies
The Secretary wrote to Mr.. Adams that if this con-
1iton of things received the deliberate sanction OF
Ihe British Government. the Navy Of the United j
states would be instructed to pursue the Confcd- {
crate cruisers into the ports which in violation of
,he law OF nations gave them shelter. He added
hat the President fully understood the risks of q
uch course that if war cnsed the responsibility
Tould not be his. Later he spoke of this country
IS " drifting toward war with Great Britain" and
lsked If Earl Russell imagined that England would
bear such wrongs against her commerce aud her b
ovorc iguty as she was inhictiup upon the Inited y