The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1883-01-19
Longstreet On Porter.
HE HOLDS THAT GOOD JUDGMENT IS
HIGHER THAN BLIND oBEDI-

bVuEotitSh Ou IOIItIt
HE HOLDS THAT GOOD JUDGMENT IS
HIGHER THAN BLIND oBEDI-
ENCE.
The following letter, asked of the
writer by the National Republican,
has been sent to that paper, and is now
given the public for the first time:
ATLANTA, Dec. 80, lS92.-Gen. L.
5. Grant, New York. My Dear Sir:
1t occurs to me that an account of
parallel circumstances passing in the
Army of Northern Virginia, before
and during the second Manassas, to
those leading to the Fitz John Porter
trial, may be proper sequel to your
recently published paper referring to
his case. 1t is but just, however, to
admit that the argument of those who
hold to the finding of the court mar
tial is, from their strictly military
standpoint, conclusive. But they seem
to ignore the well-recognized custom
OF war that superior officers are not
confined to the rule that holds an army
as a grand machine, limited, under all
circumstances, to the letter of the or
ders of its chief, but are expected and
required to exercise due discretion
when not in his immediate presence.
No doubt cases have occurred in your
experience where officers were as de-
serving of reproof for falling to exer-
else such discretion as for failing to
obey orders. Early on the 29th of
August, 1862, at the head of my col
umn, l arrived in striking distance of
the battle in progress between part of
the Army of the Potomac and General
Jackson's wing of the Army of North.
ern Virginia. Upon seeing the ap-
proach of our column the Federal
troops were withdrawn to a defensive
position, little retired. Before noon,
as testified by myself ard others be-
fore the Schotield Board, my command
was deployed and formed on Jackson's
right, at right angles to the Warren
ton pike, and extending to and beyond
the Manassas Gap Railroad. AS soon
as Geployed General Lee indicated his
purpose to have me attack. Intending
to execute his plan, / asked time to re-
connoitre the new position and the
ground intervening. After the re-
connoissance / reported the position
strong and that the sacrifice was likely
to be such as to cause apprehension of
failure. He did not seem satisfied,
and was considering the propriety of
making his orders more definite when
information was received from General
Stuart of the approach Of Federal
troops upon my right. This drew at
tention to that part of the field for the
time, but when it appeared that this
force was hardly strong enough to at
tack, the question of attack by the
First Corps was resumed AS the day
was far spent, l suggested force re
connoissance at nightfall, and prepara.
tions for the action of the day follow
ing. This was accepted The recon-
noisance, however, satisfied General
Lee aud myself that the battle should
not be made at this point. So with
drew about midnight to the ground we
had occupied before our advance. The
next day the Federals renewed the
battle against Jackson.
AS we were not engaged or serious
ly threatened, / rode out in advance OF
my line in search of opportunity tc
take my share of the battle, and found
number of my officers collected at q
point from which they had fair view
of the masses yelling up against Jack
sou. From this point it was evident
that a few batteries, having enflad,
fire, could disperse the attack, ant
some of our batteries were ordered for
ward for the position, and to prepare
Meanwhile message came from Gen
eral Jackson asking for reinforcements
and .almost Immediately after came al
order from Lee to send some of m,
brigades to Jackson. 1t did not seen
probable that the troops could reacl
Jackson in time, if sent at the sam,
time there was no doubt of our dis
persing the attack by the fire of ou
Al tilery, Under the circumstances
felt impelled to disregard the orders
and to operate on my own Judgment
The fire of our batteries produced re
suits anticipated. When the attackin,
forces were dispersed, my comman
was sprung to the charge and swep
the field. Had | thus engaged th
day before, it is more than probabl
that Porter would have been in goo
season to take me on the wing, an
would in all probability have crushe
me. Had | stopped to re-enforce o
the second day, it is hardly probabl
that Jackson could have held till m
troops could have reached him. A
you state, it was not possible for POI
ter to attack under the 430 order, tn
failure to do which was alleged to b
his high crime, If we may suppos
that he received the order at 4.5O, an
had attacked, he would have given u
the opportunity that we were so ca
nestly seeking all of that day, and i
the disjointed condition of their arm
on that day the result might have bee
more serious than that of the next day
the 3Oth. Now if we suppose that M
attack on the afternoon of the got
had failed, we shall see that the ev
dence against me would have bee
stronger than that against Porte
Yet, with an earnest desire to me,
the orders of my chief, felt that
would be more culpable to execut
than to disobey them, AS we wei
successful, there was no room to que
tion as to the only safe rule to guiG
the judgment in such cases. If in I'll
exercise of discretion one becomes ii
direct cause of failure, he should onl
be adjudged as failing in generalshi
If the intention is to bring discomfituI
upon the arms it is criminal. Soc
after this campaign was promote,
and assigned as Senior Lieutenal
General of the Confederate Arm
With highest respect, your most oDed
ent servant, JAMES LoNGsrREET
| Ia xnnY A., ,fats l,,1,l