The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-09-20

them" Or, Sherman's r1gnJ at $50 Z. NJ, when
the whole federal line had been pushed back
mile to q mile and half from their original posi-
tion2 Which2 l would like to hear Badean
answer. He gives two versions of the order 70
Wallace: First, "with verbal directions for
him to march by the nearest route parallel with
the river" second, Lewis Wallace was directed
TO come up and connect with Sherman's right"
Which cOrrect7
When Wallace received his order to march he
was informed by the officer delivering 1t that
ave are driving them" Had Wallace any rea-
son to believe at chat time that Sherman's right
nad been driven mile to the rear OF the posi-
tlon it occupied In the mOrning1 On the con-
trary, he had the right to believe that Sherman
was at least holding his own. He, therefore,
put his column in motion for Sherman's right as
ii rested in the morning, and at half-past T.
NJ, when he received the order to change dlrec-
ton, his advance guard was at the bridge he had
built over Owl creek. three tourths of mile
from shermau's right when the battle
began. Again: Lewis Wallace, one of
Grants own division commanders, was
equally remss but he, who had
been month on the ground, excused
himself by stating that he had taken the wrong
road, marching toward Purdy instead of Pitts
burg yet his troops had helped build the bridge
over Snake creek for just such emergencies as
had now occurred He was. however, set right
by Capt. Rawlins and Col. Mcpherson, both at
the time on General Grants staff. They put him
in the right direction at O'clock, and 1t took
HIM till that night to march Ave miles in the
directon of the battle" 1 never saw so much
downright, positive. absolute falsehood crowded
into one short sentence.
THE owL-CREEK BRIDGE.
Wallace moved his First brigade out on the
Purdy road, Two miles to Stony-Lonesome, for
the purpose of concentrating his division in the
shortest possible time. The Third brigade had
to marcn from Adamsville (stiIl further ont on
the Purdy road three miles to reach the same
point. When he received the order to march he
took the direct road for sherman's right, that
had previously been reeonnoitercd by him. and
which crossed Owl creek mot Snake creek) on
ha brid Oat hat had division
"fOr just such emergencies as had now oc-
CURED" Badeau's assertion that he took the
wrong road, or claimed to have done So is utter
ly untrue The statement that he was set right
by Rawlins and Mcpherson is equally untrue.
The advance of the division had marched about
five miles from StOny-Lonesome, and reached
the bridge across Owl creek at about 2:3O, when
MCPHERSON and Rawlins overlook Wallace ana
informed him that the army had been driven
back, WHICH was the first lntm "a
our arms, Under instructions from MCPHERSON.
just from Grants headquarters, and under his
direction, Wallace had to retrace his steps in the
direction of Stony-LOnesome, more than three
miles, and then take blind parh with infantry,
cavalry and artillery across the fields and very
rough country, tearing down fences AMI remOv
Ing other distinctions, 70 the river road from
Crump's Landing to Pittsburg, which he struck
about midway between the two points, and from
thence to the battlefield, where he arrived just
as night set in.
Wallace's division marched that afternoon
fully fifteen miles, and instead of its taking
hours TO march five miles, as charged by Babe au,
he actually marched ten mites from the time
Mcpherson changed his direction in less than
four hours. Considering the fact that the road
over which he marched, whore he had road.
was very rough, the depth OF the mud, and that
a considerable portion of the route was over a
rough country, without any read at all, that
would have been deemed good marching for
older troops, more Injured to the hard
later in the war, / think it not out
of place at this point, to mention the fact that
the rebel attack was delayed one day for the
hat rock mir Ua w N cd
his station at Burnesville through Pennington
without entering Corinth, using IA crossroad,
could not pull his wagons through the mud"
and could not get mis- command Into position on
Friday night preparatory to the contemplated
attack on Saturday morning. One moro false
hood from Boswell Badeau and am done with
him. In speaking of the dspos ton of the diff
ferent commands IOr the seeOnti days battle he
SAYS "Lewis Wallace. too, put in the line
on the second day on the extreme right where he
should have been eighteen hours before" When
We consider that eighteen hours before WALLACE
had received no order to move his command TO
the baytlefeld, and that after receiving the
order he marched fifteen miles, the infamy ana
utter falsity of the charge become apparent and
shows how contemplate and ridiculous II man
can make himself in his Efforts to degrade and
belitte others for reasons that are easily under
stood.
Unjust, however, give BadeaH the credit of
SAYING one kind and, believe, truthful thing of
wallace ana his division, to-wir: Lewis
Wallace's men fought well on the extreme right,
re lievmg themselves from any responsibility
for the laggard movements OF the preceding
, day" l. am Iully SAVlSIbu baAeAu WOuu not
have written that il he could have gotten out of
IL decently, for Wallace commanded the division
pthe whole day. and there were Mt iroops in that
army more bravely, skillfully and intelligently
handled than was the Third division.
Grant, in writing TO The War Derartment, April
| 10. 1888, more than one year after the BATTLE
saws; "When Wallace was finally set right ne
absolutely countermarched his entire command,
instead of facing 1T about" That statement is
true, and probably resulted in the loss of half
or three-quarters of an hour. 1t was no doubt
mistake on Wallaces part, and later in the war
when troops had been more thoroughly drilled
and disciplined would have been looked upon
and treated as a very serious matter. The large
majority OF Wallace's command were raw troops,
| just from the farm, the shops and the mines.
The little instruction they had received in tao
tics had been right in front, and to undertake to
drill them left In front at that time would have
resulted in confusion. To take them into their
first battle left in front might have resulted in
very serIous consequences. Wallace counter
marched his division in order to keep his right
in front, expecting tD join in the battle that a
ternOon, and believing that TO go into the fight
left in front, which would reverse the position
of every man IN his command, would he dam
gerous thing to do. do not believe there
general OF field officer in Grants army that
would not have done the same thing under the
same circumstances with the same troops.
REGULAR ARMY HOSTILITY TO WALLACE.
Wallace had rendered himself unpopular with
few officers OF the regular army with whom he
had come in contact, for the that he
with large majority of volunteer officers, oe-
cupyinG prominent positions, was disposed to
"cut the red tame" of the regulars. He had gos
into a warm personal controversy with Cen
eral Charles +. Smith, commanding United
States forces at Paducah, KY, and had allowed
the correspondence between them to be pub
lished, which increased the hostility toward him,
and a few nf them determined to kill him off II
possible by holding him and him alone, of all
the general officers responsible for the disaster
of the 9th. In proof of this assertion it il only
necessary TO cite the of General Nelson
Nelson, is well known, was regular officer
of the navy, who, desiring active service. APP
piled for and obtained au appointments as gen.
eral of division in the army. AT O'Clock on
the morning of the 9Th he received
written order from Grant to move his
command Immediately to a point on the river
opposite PitIsburg Landing. Between l and
~ o'clock he received another written order
informing hlm of the sitnariun on the field, and