The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1883-01-10
P0RTER'S PLEADER.
FROM GEN. LoNasraeEr
To General Graut, Containing an.IuEsnlOus Arru
msnt Striving To Show POrter's Probable
Innocence Distinction between Success
and Defeat In DlsObeylns Orders.

WASHINGTON, January 9.-General Long
street, by request Of the National Repub
lican sends that paper the following letter
ATLANTA, GA, December 80.
Geueral us. Grant. New York.
My DEARs SIR 1t occurs to me that an &C
count OF the parellel circumstances pass
ing in the army Of Northern Virginia be
fore and during the second Manassas bat
tie to those leading to Fitz John Porter
trial may be proper sequel t
your recently published paper referring e
his case. 1t Is but Just however, to admi
that the argument OF those who hold tt
the finding Of tho court martial Is from
their strictly military standpoint conclu
siye, but they seem 10 ignore the well rec
ognized custom Of war that superior oiHcer
arc not confined to the rule tha
holds the army as grand machine, ant
limited under all circumstances 10 the let
ter OF the order OF its chief, but art
expected and required 10 exercise due dis
cretion when not in his immediate pres
ence. No doubt cases have occurred IN
YOUR experience where officers were at
deserving Of reproof for failing 10 exercise
due discretion Us for falling to obey orders.
THE BATTLE OF MANASSAS
Early on the Goth Of August, 1892, at the
head OF my column, arrived in striking
distance OF the battle in progress between
part Of the Army OF the Potomac and
General Jackson's wing OF the Army
Of Northern Virginia, and, on see
ing the approach Of our column
the Federal troops were Withdrawn to the
defensive position little before noon. AS
testified by myself and others before the
Scho6eld Board, the command was de-
ployed and formed on Jackson's right, at
right angles 10 the Warrenton Pike and ex.
tending 10 and beyond the Manassas Gap
Rail Road. Gen. Lee announced his pur-
pose to have me attack. Intending to ex-
ecute his plan, 1 asked time to reconnoitre
the new position and ground interven:.
ing. After reconnaissance | reported
the position so strong that the sacrifice was
likely to be such as to cause an apprehen.
sion Of failure. He did not seem to be sat
isfied and was considering the pro-
priety OF making his orders more definite
when information was received from Gen.
eral Stuart Of the approach Of Federal
troops upon my right. This drew attention
to that part OF the field for the time, but
when it appeared this force was hardly
strong enough for an attack. The question
Of attack by the first corps was resumed.
As the day was far Spent l suggested
q forced reconnaissance at nightfall and
for action on the day following.
DlsoDEYISG ORDERS
This plan was accepted. A recon.
noisance, however, satisfied General Lee
and myself that the battle should not be
made at this point, 80 / withdrew about
midnight to the ground we had occupied
before our advance. The next day the
Federals renewed the battle against Jack
son. AS air were not engaged nor serious.
" threatened ! rode out in advance OF
my line in search Of an opportunity to take
my share in the battle and found number
Of my officers collected at a pointfrom which
they had fair view OF the masses swelling
up against jackson. From this point It
was evident that few batteries having
Enfield guns could dispose OF the attack,
and some of our batteries were ordered
forward for position. Meanwhile mes
sage came from General Jackson asking
for reinforcements, and almost immediate.
" af..er came an order from General Lee
10 send my brigades to Jackson. 1t did
not seem probable that the troops
could reach Jackson in time. II sent. At
the same time there was no doubt Of our
the attack by the fire OF our
artillery. Under the circumstances felt
impelled to disregard orders and operate
on my own judgment. The fire Of our bat
teries produced the results anticipated
When the attacking forces were dispersed
my command was sprung to the charge
and swept the field. Had thus engaged
the day before it is more than probable
Porter would have been in good season to
take me on the wing, and would in
all probability have crushed me.
Had L stopped to reinforce on the second
day it is hardly probable Jackson could
have held till my troops could have reached
him.
poRrRR's CASE.
As you state it was not advisable for
Porter to attack under the 4:30 order, the
allure to do which was alleged to be his
high crime. II We may suppose that he re.
:eived the order at 400 and had attacked
neywould have given US the opportunity
hat We were so earnestly seeking
Ill that day, and in the disjointed condi.
lion OF the army on that day the result
might. have been more serious than that OF
he next day. Now, il we suppose that
my attack on the afternoon OF the S0th had
[ailed we shall see that the.eyidence against
me would have been stronger than that
against Porter. Yet, with an earnest de-
sire to help my chief, l felt that 1t would be
more culpable 10 execute the orders than
10 disobey. AS we were successful there
was no room to question.
II in the exercise oil discretion one fails,
he should be adjudged as failing in general
ship. II the intention is discontinue upon
The arms It is criminal. Soon after this
l was promoted and assigned as
senior Lieutenant General Of the Confeder.
lte army. With highest respect
"Your most obedient servant"
JAMES LoN0sTREET.
Probably False.
ROCHESTER, N. Y, January GA man