Morning appeal. [volume] (Carson City, Nev.) 1877-1906, 1883-01-11

1uc llI-S~Hu VGOCI ~0SC.
WASHINGTON, January 9.-General
Longstreet, by request of the National
Repu6Hcaa, sends that paper the fol-
lowing letter
ATLANTA. Ca, December 30, 1882.
GENERAL U. S. GRANT, New York
Dear Sir 1t occurs to me thai an ao-
count of the parallel circumstances &C.
curing in the Army of Northern Viz.
ginia before and during the second Ma
nassas battle and of those relating to
Fitz John Porter's movements, may be
a proper supplement to your recently.
published paper referring to lis case.
1t is but just, however, to meet the ar
guments Of those who hold to the lind
ings of the court martial. They seem
to ignore the well-recogn;zsd custom of
war that superior officers are not con-
fined to the lule that holds the army as
a grand machine, limited, und er all
circumstances, to the letter of the or.
ders OF its chief, but are expected and
required to exercise due discretion when
not in his immediate presence. No
doubt cases have occurred in your ex.
perience where officers were as deserv.
ing of reproof for failing to exercise
such discretion as for failing to obey an
order. Early on the 4.h OF August,
1862, at the head of my column, l ar.
rived in striking distance of the battle
then in progress between part of the
Army of the Potomac and General
Jackson's wing Of the Army OF North
ern Virginia.
Upon seeing the approach of our
column, the Federal troops were with.
drawn to defensive position. Colonel
P. F. Liddle retired bafore noon, as was
testified to by myself and others before
the Schofeld Board. My command was
DE- ployed and formed on Jackscn's right.
at right angles to the WarreDtoE pike,
and extending to and beyond the
Manassas Gap railroad. As soon as de.
ployed General Lee indicated his pur-
pose to have me attack. Intending to
execute his plans, l asked time to re-
connoiter the new position and the
ground intervening. After my recon-
noisancs | reported the position SO
strong that the sacrifice was likely to
be such as TO cause an apprehension OF
failure. He did not seem satisfied, and
was considering the proprie'y OF making
his orders more definite, when inforsna-
ton was received from General Stuart
of the approach of Federal troops upon
my right. This drew our attention to
that part of the field fer a time; but
when it appeared that this force was
hardly strong enough for attack, the
question of All attack by the Fiiss C,rps
was resumed.
AS the day was far spent, | suggest
ed that preparations be made for action
on the day following. This Was accept
ed. A Reconnaissance, however, salts
fed General Lee and myself that battle
should not be given at this point, so |
withdrew abauv midnight to The ground
We bad occupied before our advance.
Next dav the Federals renewed the bat
tie against Jackson. As ave were not
engaged nor seriously threatened, [ re-
turned in advance OF my line III search
of IN opportunity to take my share OF
the battle, and found a number of my
officers collected at point from which
they had fair view OF the masses
swelling up against Jackson. From this
point it was evident that few batteries
having an entiladiog i've could dispose
of the attack, ard some Of our batteries
were ordered forward TO take position
and prepare for action. Meanwhile
message cams from General jackson
asking for reinforcements, aud almost
Immediately after came an order from
General Lee for me to send some OF my
brigade to jackson.
II seemed improbable the troaps could
reach Jackson in time if sent. At the
same time there was no doubt OF our
disposition t" attack by the fire Of our
artillery. Under the circumstances l
felt compelled to disregard orders, and
operate on my nwn Judgment. The
fire OF our batteries produc the results
anticipated. After the attacking forces
were dispersed by my batteries my
command was sprung 10 the charge and