The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-04-19

service in return, and that the money and
drafts so subscribed by Price had been placed
upon Brady desk. He would prove that
Brady had passed to Walsh drafts given to
him by Price, who would be here to-day
He also offered to prove that Brady had re-
quested witness to deposit certain sum of
money to his credit, and that Walsh accord
lngly placed $4,000 with Hatch q Foote OF
New York, TO Brady's credit.
Mr., Wilson argued that the subject was
purely collateral in character and evil
dence in that connection was not
proper in rebuttal. He called attention to
the pending civil suit of Walsh against
Brady, and asserted that that issue could not
be tried in this court, because it in nowise
affected the present case
Mr.. Merrick contended that as Brady had
denied the whole conversation sworn to by
walsh, the prosecution had a right to cor
roborate its witness by proof of what had
been described as the collateral portion of it.
The court didn't perceive how the proof
would establish the truth OF Walshs state
ment of that conversation.
Mr.. Merrlck contended that the proof
would be sufficient to get issue. He quoted
Wa!sh's testimony, wherein he says that
Brady referred him to the Price and Peterson
drafts, in proof of his assertion that it was
the custom of the Second Assistant Post
master-general to exact from the con-
tractors portion of the allowances
for increase and expedition. In denying the
whole conversation Brady had denied that
statement, and surely it was but proper that
they be allowed to contradict him.
The court said that the object of rebuttng
evidence was to meet the case of the defense.
The offer would tend to contradict Brady
upon a collateral matter, matter outside of
the case Ii Brady had testified untruly, he
could not be contradicted as to the Price and
Peterson. drafts; they were not connected with
matters set out in the Indictment; they were
collateral, and the prosecution had no right
to rebut in that connection. The evidence
in chief upon that point had been rejected,
and as the court saw no reason to reconsider
that decsiion, it was still more improper
upon rebuttal. The offer was therefore over
ruled.
Mr. Merrick-"Well, Your Honor, that
closes the governments rebuttal."
Counsel for defense announced that they
were all through.
Now we come to an important part of the
cool talk, " said the court, smiling.
question arose as to procedure in pre-
senting the.prayers. Mr. Merrick advocated
an adherence to the plan followed in the
former trial. Mr.. Henkle thought that the
court should limit the argument by defining
the law upon disputed points. Mr. Davidge
believed that the arguments would con-
sumo the remainder OF the year unless some
such plan should be adopted
In order to allow time for the preparation
of arguments on legal points, Mr. Bliss sug-
gested recess until Friday.
The court dwelt on the subject at some
length, carefully reviewing the methods of
practice in different courts and concluding
that it would be better to hear the arguments
upon facts in the case before disposing OF the
legal points, the course pursued in the last
trial. Arguments to the jury would be
first heard, and then counsel might submit
disputed points OF law for discussion at pleas
ure. The jury might render a general ver-
dict but could not pass upon points of law.
Mr. Davdge said that there were certain
! organic points that should be settled before
the arguments were begun. For instance,
there was some doubt as to the statute upon
which the indictment was based, whether
upon section 5,440 OF the revised statutes or
upon the act OF May II, 1879.
The court remarked that where there
were so many statutes it would be safe to
shoot into the-hock in hope of bringing one
down.
Mr. Davidge attached great weight to the
point regarding the statute applicable to the
case.
Mr. Carpenter demanded from the govern
ment statement of their position on the
matter, but his demand was not complied
with. The court finally agreed to hear
gument upon the point after recess.
When court reassembled discussion fol-
lowed upon the order of argument to the
jury, without making any definite arrange
ment. The court said that it would see
that fair division of time was had if
counsel could not agree among themselves
The court would allow the government to
open and to close but would not now say that
it would be allowed more than one argument
in closing. The court did not know that the
government desired more than one closing
argument but had heard intimations that
| the Attorney-general might wish to speak.
81 don't know that l would call that two
arguments" said Ingersoll sneeringly, but
| object to the precedent If the Attorney
| tn in LOT
| him have the courage to make his argument
| where he can be answered-not that think
he would do any particular harm, however.
| Ii he wants to make the closing argument |
| should be delighted, but to two closing argu-
ments | object"
The court remarked that if there were two
closing arguments it would not allow them
| to cover the same ground.
Ingersoll-It is hard to tell what matter
the Encouragement would cover.
The Court-Probably it would be nothing
| in the case.
Mr.. Ingersoll insisted that he would refuse
to make any address if the government were
allowed two closing arguments.
The court reserved until tomorrow the
| settlement of the order of argument to the
| jury, and then listened to an argument from
| Davidge regarding the statute upon which
the indictment is founded. Davdge main
| tanned that the act OF May II, 1879 was an
amendment of section 5,440 of the revised
statutes, and that an amendment of that
| kind covering the whole ground, amounted
to a revocation of the original statute. This
whole case must be governed he said, by
| the last act, and no reliance could be had
upon anything done prior to its passage, May
| II, 1879.
| The court said it should assume Mr..
| navidgess view that the act of May II. 1879,
superseded section $40 of the revised
statutes but then the indictment placed the
date of the conspiracy at May %, 1879, and
that was certainly not barred by the statute
of limitation. Evidence OF facts anterior to
that date had been received only to establish
the character of the relations between the
| parties.