New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1883-11-18
THE DEEEyCES or NEW-YORK.

| Cantain Bulloch, in his account OF the prep
aration of the Confederate cruisers, states that
if tbe Governments of France and England
had pcrmitted tho irOnclads built i'll their
| countries for the COnfederacy to be completed,
an attack would have been made upon New
York. and the city would have been held to
ransom. He points out, what is perfectly true,
that the Federal Government Mt that time pos
sessed no naval vessels capable OF withstand
ing the ronclads referred to, and that the fortD-
cations of New-YOrk and other Northern
ports were wholly inadequate to resist an attack
of the kind. In fact, it must be admitted that IL
Earl Russell and Earl Clarendon had not
strained the English municipal law to obhge
Mr.. Adams and his Government, and II the En-
pcror Louis Napoleon had not rcpudlated his
own assurances given to the Confederate agents
and the Richmond Government, New York ana
Boston and Philadelphia would all have been
subjected to very unpleasant experiences at that
time, whatever the ultimate outcome might
have been. That danger passed away, ana
possibly because although there were certainly
plenty of apprehcnsions when the Mcrrimac
came out the Northern people did not realize Its
full extent, they have never given themselves
IiuCll uncaSDcSS slICt III Ah' Nii'
The recent report to the Naval authorities mt
Washington recalls the whole subject TO public
attention. however and the opinions expressed
i'm that report are so emphatic that IT Is lmposSl-
Bile not TO give them consideration. The pub
lie arc told not indeed for the first time, but
with the weight of expert testimony that the
dcfcnccs of New York are altogether useless;
that there is nothing to prevent an ironclad be-
longing to some third OF fourth rate Power from
steaming past all the batteries or from shcllms
the city without engaging the batteries at all.
In fact, il is declared that an irOnclad pirate
could at any time hold the city to ransom, and
that there arc no ships in our navy, and no guns
in our forts, capable of resisting such raid.
Now il is perfectly true that the United states
j., and is likely to be- at peace with the world.
There are at present no warliko clouds on our
horizon But we have not the same assurance
for the continuance of peace that We have for
the uniformity of any natural law. National
affairs, both internal and external. are in state
of inccs,ant mutation. And however peace
fully inclined we may be- it must be- borne in
mind that our success in avoiding war depends
at least as much upon others ~ upon ourselves.
And should war come to us by any miSchancc,
il is certain that it would be- Il naval war. No
Power could invade lis, and We should ~ rec
tainy not think of sending an army abroad.
But we should have Ia do our fighting on the
high seas, and in the defence of our coasts. All
this is quite Sclf-Cyidcnt No one can assert
that there il no danger of war. And yet We
have neither an effective navy nor adequate
coast dcfcnccs. The recent naval report states
that We cannot even hope to keep ont an enemy
by improvising torpedo lines I'm improving
the approaChc, 10 the city we have facilitated |
the approach of foe, and deprived ourselves
of several previously available means of de
fence. In fact, We are told that Ncw-Yorl is to-
day naked and helpless before all possible |
enemies and it is significantly added that the /
rcparation of this serious oversight cannot be
Effected after war has been declared
The case then stand, thus We are unlikely Ia /
be- involved in a quarrel with any Power which /
Ocs not POSSESS u stronger navy than our own. /
Any Power with a stronger navy than our own /
FAN enter and seize upon, hold to ransom, or .
destroy, our wcalthicat and most important |
,itcS New York, the virtual capital of the |
country, and inevitably a shining mark for naval /
attack, is utterly dcfcncccss against modern .
artillery and naval armor And what is more,
she cannot be put in a state of defence at short |
notice. The implications of thi, state of affairs
ire so obvious that it is scarcely necessary to
state them. II is the part of wisdom 10 prepare
Tor war in time Of peace, to the extent at least
If providing means Of defence If we cannot
nave a navy capable Of meeting an enemy upon
he sea, we should have coast defence, capable
If beating off irOncladS and also CAPABLE of
preventing amy vessel from approaching near
.nOugh to destroy property at long range. Not
o take 20 urgent and necessary II prccaulion
gould be to manifest positive incapacity for
DISSECTION IRON THE ARWY.