The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1883-12-27
CAPTURE OF NASHVILLE.
George B. Crittendei's remnant of a division, |
amounting to probably 1900 more.
IContinitea from 1st pege..

amounting to probably 1900 more.
| Leaving guard under Floyd to defend
the storcz and discipline deserters-a task for
which experience in that role eminently fitted
him-Johnston now destroyed the wire bridge
and the railroad bridge over the Cumberland
to check Buelfs advance aid moved out to
Muifreesboro, thirty miles southeast, to which
place he had ordered Crittenden, and there
halted to collect his scattered command.
His troops were disheartened, and the citi-
zens panic-stricl,en. The weather was in
clement, the floods excessive, and ali the avail
able transportation Ald been secured by the
military authorities; but the people, in terror
OF the approaching army, which appeared to
their ailrightcd VISION an avenging Nemesis
fer the crime Of secession, in CONSERVATION at
the thought of their coming doom, fed pre-
cipitately, half crazed with fright,
Governor Harris, morbid in his hatred for
the United States Government, appealed to
them to burn. the city rather than TINT it
should fall into the hands of the invading
army" a suggestion which happily there were
sufficient people who had retained possession
Of their faculties TO successfully oppose.
BUELL. ADVANCES UPON NASHVILLE.
Having dispatched Cruft's brigade and eight
new regiments, without waiting fer orders from
Washington, to re-enforce Hallecls's army at
Fort Henry, Buell., in compliance with the re-
quest of the latter. detached the remainder of
General Thomas l.. Crttenden's division and
those of Generals NeisoH and Thomas TO pro-
coed by water to Fort Donelson. He had thus
contributed to the column moving up The Cum
berland the greater portion of the troops that
composed it, and to a corresponding extent,
weakened his force in front of Bowling Green.
Not sufficiently strong to attack Johnston, he,
| nevertheless determined to prevent the latter
from detaching troops TO re-enforce Fort DON
els0n, by making demonstration against Bow
/ Al.
lith General Mitchell in advance, he came be-
fore the city to find the bridge in flames and
| the rear-guard of the enemy about embarking
! on the waiting train for Nashville. To cross
! the swollen river in midwiI,ter without a
/ bridge was found a difficult task, but it was
vigorously pressed until a few days later a pom
| toon bridge was laid and tic abandoned works
were in possession Of his troops. Taking with
! him 600 men on cars, and leaving General
| Mitchell, McCook and Wood to follow with the
remainder of the army by forced marches re
started straight for Nashville, where he arrived
on the Esd. Meantime he teiegraphed ABOUND
| to Donelson, which had now fallen, for his
! troops to join him al Nashville, where the mar
nifcent army which had responded so nobly
/ to every duty imposed up il was speedily con-
1 centrated.
General Buell. could make no immediate pur-
| suit OF Johnstoa's retTeating army. The coun-
| try was flooded the bridges were destroyed,
and there were no adequate means for the
| transportation of supplies, away from rivers
and rair0ads-a period OF apparent inactivity
now followed. Tennessee was in BGells mill
tary department, and its capital was IN posses
! sion of the Union forces. The objective point
of the campaign was gained, and before an
other could be entered upon, a thorough organ
ization OF transportation suitable for overland
movements must be completed AFbase of sup
! plies ct Nashville must be established under
sf nz.f
back to Louisville must be repaired bridges
1 built, and the entire line guarded against de-
struetion by guerrilla bands and Confederate
cavalry. While the part borne by Buell's army
| in the capture of Nashville had been ardGous
| and invaluable, that of Halleclz's had been the
most glorious. The latter had fought great
battle, and the conflict of arms will always. to
the popular mind be regarded as the cfoWning
| achievement of all military operations. Au-
thority had to be established over the city of
Nashville. The license that had prevailed
| during the last days of its occupation by the
| Confederates had subsidized, but many of the
| rabble who had been most active in its
preparation remained. During tho removal
| of the commssary stores, Floyd allowed the
| people to appropriate to their own use all that
| could not be removed. But so demoralizing
/. is the license Of piliage," says Johnston, that
| the predatory instinct becomes an oyerpoTers
ing, unreasoning impulse blind brute apps
The education in crime, begun on the eyentful
| night of the surrender, extended IN It's far
reaching results TO plans and periods remote
from the point at which it had its origin
While Buell. was busy with preparations for
| the approaching campaign, the Confederate
1 army was pursuing its toilsome way toward
the Tennessee. Hounded by the people, the
press aud by his own soldiers, the commander
was demonstrating the highest military capa-
| city by extricating his disheartened and muir
muring troops from the presence Of a vastly
superior force, and moving them in a strong,
compact body, by easy marches. to join them
70 well-0rganized army under Braeg, then
on its way from the East to unite with Beau
regard at Corinth. Tennessee was lost to the
C0nfederacy never to be regained, but, now
that the horse was stolen, the authorities
at Richmond awoke from their lethargy suii-
cicntly to lock the door.
Success is the great criterion by which the
actions Of public men is gagged, and subjected
to this test the management Of General John
ston during this rnomentous period, was
severely criticised. The disasters at Mill
Springs, Middle Creek, and Forts Henry and
Douelson, followed by the evacuation Of Nash
vile, were visited upon his devoted head.
Every editor instantly became a general, and
he WAS even censured for not concentrating
has army at one point by abandoning all others
ard advancing upon the enemy. With tho
exception of his friends, President Davis
and GoveFnor Harris, no one seemed 10 attach
blame 20 themselves for turning deaf ear TO
his appeals for help. reiterated at q time when,
If heeded, Fort Donelson might have been
placed in q condition 70 hold out Until Nash
vile could have been surrounded by the same
strong Gordon Of defenses which later rendered
it inpreglable IN the hands Of Union forces.
His army, Al all times inadequate to cope with
BuelPs, could not be congeE trated for attack
upon Grants, in his position st Cairo. and a
mOvsnentagainst Smith At Paducah would have
resulted in nothing. The army at that point
might have been REINFORCED or withdrawn,
but the road to Nashville would have been left
open to Buell.. while Grants army, supported by
the gnnb8ats, would have been free to operate
against Johnston. There was 40 position held
by the Union forces that he could assail with
any prospect OF success, and the attempt must
have uncovered points upon his own line
which is was equally Important for him to
hold. If amy blame can be attached TO him, it
is ia trusting 30 subor9iinates the important
duty OF selecting the sites of the forts upon
the two rivers instead OF relying upon his own
superior knowledge in matter upon which
hing such momentoHs results. The work
. upon Forts Henry aud D0Beson was In such
, a state OF forwardness when he assumed
command that be had concluded it was best to
finish it than TO fortify new points, but it is
probable his plans would have been changed
had he foreseen the lukewarmness of the Con-
federate government, or of the people to whom
he made known ths necessity of strength