The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1883-01-07
The Nashville Campaign


The New York 73mrS, in reviewing Gen.
Cox, takes the ground heretofore taken In these
columns. 1t says:
" Neither Atlanta, nor Augusta, nor Savannah, 80
says sherman in his Memoirs, a. was the objective
but the army OF Joseph Johnston, 20 where II
might. 80 'fhe army OF johnston under Hood, after
the fan OF Atlanta, went into Tennessee; hence, ac-
cordug to sherman's declarations upon Gen.
George II. Thomas and the army under his charge
was imposed the task Of accomplishing sherman's
real objective, while the march to Savannah and the
sea, picturesque and dramatic though 1t was and
highly Important though 1t proved, would have lost
us value had the less ellttering and grayer duty
signed to shcrmans lieutenant failed to be per-
formed Under these circumstances II would seem
natural that there should he universal laudaIon of
that memorable Tennessee campaign, In which
Thomas, left to organize into defensive force the
leavings OF shermans troops and trains, not only
checked hut wrecked invading column which
could compare well In numerical strength with Lees
own army at Petersburg. But, the readers OF the
Tones have Often been made aware, the auIels Of
Thomas are not by everybody ungrudingly bestowed
Gen. Cox In the present volume does not, OF course
In any way underrate the Importance Ut the part s.
signed to Thomas In the double campaign from At
lantA-the "hetVy eul Of the log for his own
command was one OF those that fought Hood. But
he chimes In with the cry of depreciation set to
the key-note of 1holnas's alleged sluggishness,
which has always seemed to us not only unjust hut
abomnaOly unCrateful.
Without attempting to quote all the passages in
which this impression IS conveyed, the following may
serve as summary; gen. Cox holds that IIoll
ought TO have been met and fought much the
Tennessee River than he was; that Thomas's mod
esty aud shrinking from supreme responsibility In
some degree untitled him for an independent com
mand: that he needed a stimulus in the form OF ur-
gency from the Government aud peremptOry orders
from the General-in Chief; that Thomas could have
fought HsOl GdVautageously at Pulaski or At Co.
umh!a; that he gave undue Importance to getting IN
the sixteenth Corps. "a. j. Smiths: that when the
battle of Nashville was fought Roussean.s oOO ,neN
or more at Murfreesboro, were AS much ont of The
account as II north Of the Ohio and nearly s. 600 of
Crutts division, besides the post garrison, were
Kept in the works at the city, with Doneson' & en-
poyes and not brought into The acton--so that these
troops could have been long before used instead of
waiting for Smiths corps; that in place of promptly
concentrating his forces, Thomas, when Hood
campaign began in earnest, sent Granger a hundred
miles TO the east instead of reinforcing Schofel and
ne put the Johnstonyille garrison in the of
Nashville In fine, 1.-THE delay in concentration saw
Cox was also traught with the very gravest perils
10 the portion OF the army under SclOneld Ii was
Hoods policy to force the fighting with this in the
hope of destroying or capturing 1t before could be
aided, yet nothing was further from ThOinas's wish
thah that 1t should make precptate retreat Had
1t Reached Nashville single day sooner, Thongs
would have been wholly unpreplred to meet his al,
Hersary, and steedman' renfoTcements would bava
been cut oil, To save time, Schofeld took Tho
gravest risks; but he wellsaid the slightest ns, ne
on hspart, or the failure OF a subordinate might nav
proved disastrous. The misconduct of Wagner M
franklin would certainly have proved 50, but for
the herosn of Opdycke and White aud The nruv,
men OF their commands. consideration of AN ma
facts therefore, seems to show that Thomas should
nave concentrated every available man in front Of
Hood before the latter moved; and that tho syy,.,l
success OF the closing part of the cainnalgn yy5SS
in spite Of this in its beginning apd' nv nn
means because of il. - " - ~
While Gen. Cox $ sympathy with sckoGeLd, in the
Claims made by the latter for large share Of the
honors of the Nashville campaign Is not surnrIsn@
IN view OF Lis intimate military association with
scnohes fest rs division cOIutuauder and then ne
corps commander under hun, yet tho operations he
proposed as substitutes for those undertaken Nv
Ihoinhs are purely hypothetical as cnntrasted win
actual operations whose sequel logical or not was an
9Esfwheming success. Hence the case Is wholly
inherent from studying after the event, how Frad
erlcksDurg OF characteristics for examine cnIia !
nave Oeeh turned into victory for the Union arn,.
do do 'rte Hasnye campaign We have a crushiurt
ueat 10 an aggressive army-its rout, night low
tal dislntegration. win It DO pTetsnS. Id par
IN battle at Pulaski or Columbia "a I,v tninder
mon force to contend against ,vitr an infcrior
that Thomas fought - 10 D. od > n mt tourpe
le did IS purely speculatir va fonght sooner than
jn,a i SEnlhuent VIZ e. Whathe did do resuitef
ana ,h"t go w. ", mou .Ory: whatever he might ha'
Nh Lnnh, d. possibly have resulted in der .at
rhomass 8 larger part of the whole case.
Chey~ { is possible, also for the deiendr rs Of
- % answer the criticisms on him IN 9 atail.
might insist, for example, that II was WY gene
ship first of ALL to provide against the Inn mediate
peril of destructive raid his tanks and re by the
enemy cavaryi while his own was stil i'm perfectly
mounted and equipped. They could point out that "a
considerable part OF Thomas available Forces
scattered garrisons new troops whose serviceabe
quality could only be couectured aud ina the had but
two organized infantry corps until SmluIs arrived
1t is admitted that Florence, during the first week
OF November, Hood had with him an aggregate Of
a. 729 in one compact army, anu that about the
middle of the month Forrest scaNalry corps Increased
RMS number SO, 935 officers and men. ON the LIST
of November Thomas had field force of only p, 600
troops, exclusive OF those scattered through the
district Of Tennessee and his attachments.
Rakng and scrlping all these together from the rail-
road lines and the fortified depots OF supply through
out the district, and supposng them 10 be concen-
trated in one army, they would have yielded fewer
than co. 600 officers and men present for duty on
November 20-at a time when Hood had %, 600.
Even suppOsing such a concentration practicable, II
was with no such equality OF numbers that other
Union commanders expected 10 Instantly anuihi-
late the hostile armies In their fronts