The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-03-12
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN
The Federal and Confederate Accounts
of the Desperate Day,
when Hood Lost Thirteen Brigadiers by
Federal BulIets-The Death of Gem
eral Pat CIeburne.
r. A. Burr in Cincinnati Enquirer.

The battle of Franklin was fought upon as
charming day as ever was seen in this
semi-temperate cline. The sun shone warm
Nv, the atmosphere was clear and the sky
free from clouds. 1t was about $3.50 o'clock
when the Confederates formed for the battle
and marched forward in single line, showing
front of two corps-Cheatham' and Stew
art's-slde by side. Ed Johnson's division of
Stephen D. Lees corps was up and remained
in reserve. They formed with Winstead's
Hill as background and threw their troops
in position with the utmost deliberation.
After they were all ready they stood mo-
ment as if taking careful survey of the
beautiful plain they were to traverse
and the position they were to assault. At
last the whole force moved forward almost
with the precision of a single man. The artil
lery followed, and occasionally stopped to
unlimber and drop she'll into the Federal
line. The Union troops in the meantime
were carefully steadying themselves in the
works to resist determined assault. The
march OF the Confederates into this battle
was military pageant such as is rarely seen
in actual war. They were so long in view
that men almost forgot their deadly errand
In the grandeur of the spectacle. The main
line followed the skirmishers very closely
for the Confederates had noticed the isolated
position of Wagner's two brigades, and di-
rected their march to take advantage of the
mistake. Wagners slender force made but
feeble resistance to the overwhelming num-
bers that pressed sharply upon them. They
broke and in confusion rushed back
toward the main line Brown as
they scattered, shouted to Cleburne: 1--WE
will go into the works with them" and
the Confederate line of battle was pushed
rapidly forward; so rapidly that on the right
of the pike it reached the intrenchments
amost'as soon as Wagner's demoralized men,
The main body of the Union troops were
obliged to hold their fire until the panic
stricken soldiers from the advance could get
inside the works. This delay brought the
troops in the Notifications face to face with
the enemy, and with a peril that is not often
overcome. The Confederates came with a
rush, and when the opposing forces struck
each other there was a culver ofsuncertanty
that was pregnant with great danger to the
Union soldiers, 1t was at this almost vital
moment that Opdycke rushed forward with
his brigade, and not only steadied the waver-
idg line, but gave it spirit and support Cox
and Stanley also dashed up at this critical
moment, threw themselves into the hazards
of the situation. and did their part in turn
ing the tide of battle just when it was tremb-
ing in desperate uncertainty Many men
trained and hardened in the pestle of war
lost their heads in the demands of that try
ing situation that some ones blunder, neglect
or ignorance forced them to face.
When Wagners men broke, Cox, who was
1Of +IaH all sr,fr4 ! / La
the line. In an instant he saw the peril, and
dashed toward the center with all possible
speed to repair the damage to his main line.
Stanley of the Fourth corps, was worn out
and sick from his exciting work of the day
before, and was resting on the north side of
the Harpeth river when the firing began. He
mounted his horse like shot and dashed to
the front Cox and himself struck the pike
simultaneously, at an important point. OPP
dycke who was in reserve, had seen the great
danger, and was charging up the road toward
the main line. He struck the opening at the
pike just in the nick of time General G. w.
Gordon, of Browns division, was leading his
men through it, and but for this charge of
Opdycke's must have thrown the line in the
lntrenchments into confusion Opdycke's adj
vance not only restored confidence at criti-
cal moment, but captured General Gordon
and something more than hundred of his
men. The captured Confederate general,
speaking to me of this charge, said But
for the rush of this brigade the whole Fed
eral force would have been thrown into dis
order, and Schofield's army badly beaten"
This charge was the work of level-headed
and resolute man in great emergency. Cox
found him on his way to the breach, when
he reached the pike to see what could be
done to prevent a great disaster. When
Wagners panic-stricken troops struck the
Federal position, the front line of Rely's
brigade with its right resting on the Column
bia pike was thrown into confusion, and for
a moment gave way. His second line, COM
posed of the Twelfth and Sixteenth Ken
lucky and Twelfth Tennessee, seeing the
peril, rushed forward about the same time as
Opdycke, gained the front and occupied the
works on the left of the pike, facing the enc
my, just as the Confederates struck that
point These troops with Opdycke stayed
the tide of assault right here. 1t was life
and death struggle for time. AT no point
was the fighting hotter, the carnage greater
pr the result more important than where
0pdycke and these others fought.
Timely as was Opdycke's service, it was not
more important than that rendered by Cox
and Stanley AS they met on the pike they
took different directions, pressed to the front
line, and rode up and down, giving new con-
fidence to the confused men by their almost
recklessly bravery Stanley was seriously
wounded in the face at the very beginning of
this task, but he kept upon the battlefield
riding the lines in the most fearless disregard
OF his personal safety, with the blood from
his wound flowing over his uniform He LETT
the field with reluctance after order was re-
stored, and Cox had requested him to seek
surgical aid.
at is military maxim as old as the arts
of war that force large enough to affect in
case of attack the free action of the main line
should never be placed in its front while 1t is
awaiting attack" says the greatest of mill
tary writer's General Cox says that Wagner
was ordered to withdraw behind the main
line as soon as he saw that Hood in
tended to advance in force, and that
it was Wagner's mistake that his
troops made stand and opened fire
instead Hoods line of battle was formed
just at the foot of Winsteads hill, two and