The Jackson standard. [volume] (Jackson C.H., Ohio) 1847-1888, 1883-07-12
The Temperance Question.


every drinking shop in the State, ant
sustaining the constitutionality of the
Scott Law, 1 am more than ever confirmed
in that opinion.
Section of Article of the Constitu
ton provides that the Legislative power
of the State shall be vested in the General
Assembly, and this provision is, not that
the legislative power as conferred by the
Constitution shall be so vested, but that
the legislative power of the State shall be
so vested. This provision includes all leg
islative power, and it remains absolute
unless qualified or restricted by some
other provision of the Constitution. Our
State Constitution is in marked contrast
with the Constitution of the United
States. In the latter, we look to see if a
power is expressly given; in the former,
to see if it is denied or limited; so that
while the Congress can only do what the
general constitution authorizes or per-
mits, the General Assembly may do what
ever the State Constitution does not limit
or deny and this is not mere individual
opinion, but is found in the decisions of
the Supreme Court of the State.
Now in the Constitution of Ohio, pro-
hibition is nowhere in express terms either
denied or limited, and if there be in said
Constitution any such denial or limita-
tion, it must be by implication, and this
implication, though claimed by some and
denied by others, fail to find. If there
be any such implication that forbids the
total and absolute prohibition of the
entire traffic in Intoxicating liquors, still
it does not follow that we cannot have
prohibition of some portions of the traffic
notably the drink traffic, that is, the
sale of Intoxicating liquors to be used as
a beverage.
By little analysis, we may readily per-
ceive that the traffic in intoxicating liquors
may be divided into two brancheS-the
one comprising the sale of Intoxicating
liquors to be used as a beverage-the
other comprising the sale of such liquors
to be used for other purposes. 1t seems
to be the considerate judgment of man
kind in general, that Intoxicating liquors
for some purposes are absolutely neces-
sary for the welfare of society, and in re-
lation to such purposes, prohibition would
most obviously be against public policy.
This plea of necessity however will hardly
be claimed and certainly not allowed for
the drink traffic, and there is therefore no
obstacle to it's prohibition on the ground
of public policy, and no one yet has been
able to show just cause or good reason
why this species of the traffic should not
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purposes placed under suitable regulation.
To certain extent we already have pro-
hibition of the drink traffic. We have
laws prohibiting the sale of Intoxicating
liquors to minors, and to persons in the
habit of becoming intoxicated. Until
recently, it was unlawful to sell liquors to
be drunk where sold. These laws, and
perhaps Others of a similar nature have
all been tested and declared to be consti-
tutional, and there seems to be nothing in
the Constitution to prevent the General
Assembly from extending its legislation
so as to forbid the sale of Intoxicating
liquors to be used as beverage to any
body and everybody, under any and all
circumstances.
And now, come to a further consider
alton of the proposed amendments. The
first proposition contemplates such
legislation as shall provide against the
evils resulting from the traffic. 1t will
not be denied that all the evils complained
of, result directly and indirectly from the
drink traffic, and not from the traffic for
other purposes. Regulation may do for
the traffic for other purposes; but for the
drink traffic, prohibition is required, or if
you choose to call it by the name of regu-
lation, then such regulation as in effect
amounts to nothing less than prohibition.
The best and most sensible way to pro-
vide against an evil, is to provide against
the thing that causes the evil. We should
not wait for results, but should provide
against the thing which produces the re-
suits. We know that the drink traffic, of
necessity, produces evils, and nothing but
evils. Prohibit the drink traffic, and no
evils can result therefrom. Provide
against the evils by prohibition in other
words, provide against the evil by prohib-
iting it.
The first proposition is altogether un-
necessary, and would confer on the Gen
eral Assembly no regulating powers in
excess of those it now has, save the power
to license, and unless license be a neces-
sary element of regulation, no benefit
could accrue from the adoption of this
proposition which renders license posi-
bic. If, under the constitution as it is, we
can have with the solitary exception of
license) full and complete regulation of
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tion of the drink traffic, we do not need
the adoption of the first proposition, and
we are better without it.
Possibly we should gain nothing by
adopting the second amendment, save tC
render it possible for the General Assem-.
bly, to license the traffic for all purposes
save the sale of Intoxicating liquors to be
used as a beverage. The adoption of this
T proposition would however require the
;, General Assembly under their oaths tC
+, enforce prohibition of the drink traffic by
i appropriate legislation, which at present
!, they may or may not do, just as they may
:, see fit. 1t would however give us consti
d tutional prohibition of the drink traffic il
IS such a permanent form that it could no
,e be bone of contention at every session
of the General Assembly, and liable to b.
abolished or reinstated from year to yea
D. at the mere whim of an accidental major
ity of bare quorum of the members.
Finally, no constituti onal provision vii
execute itself-it must be enforced by aI
re propriate legislation. Upon the Genera
&c Assembly, after all, will devolve the dut
of enacting the necessary laws to give et
feet to such provision. The penalty fo