The National tribune. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1877-1917, 1883-11-01
FORT DONELSON
Continued from LIST page.1


of sick. OF this number, $1,000 electives, under
command of General Grant, were free to ope-
rate against Confederate troops east of the
Mississippi, and the remainder were required
for service in Missouri against Price and Nc
Cullough. Grant used 5000 in his demonstra-
tions under Smith and McClernand, leaving
5000 inactive at Cairo Paducah and other
points. The ease with which Grants troops
could be transported by water toward the OBJ
jective points up the Tennessee and the Cum
berland rendered it necessary, 10 insure the
success of general movement against the
enemy, that Buell's army should be well on its
way towards the Cumberland before the enemy
should be made aware that the forts were
threatened. Surprising that Buell. had COM
menced moving thanking column of 10000 on
the Doth of January, leaving force OF
$4,000 electives in Johnston's front, cover
ing his advance with cavalry, it is fair
TO presume that the column would have reach
ed point parallel with Bowling Green before
the movement would have been made known
to the enemy Immediately following this in
teligence would have reached Johnston an
noancing an attack upon Fort Henry. IL
would have been impossible to respond to Thigh
mans call for assistance by detaching EloydS
and Buckner's brigades from Bowling Green,
as all the force at that point would have been
required TO meet Buell.. Johnston would not
have dared TO risk retreat and the demorali
cation of his troops that would naturally en-
sue, and the result must have been an engage
ment in the open field, in which the superior
numbers, discipline, and equipment of the
Union troops would, doubtless, have resulted
in defeat TO Johnston's army. Meanwhile the
capture of Fort Henry would have taken place
and Grant, with a force superior to Pillows,
unaided by the 5000 electives of Floyd and
Buckner, could have captured Fort Donelson
by land attack, the gunboats would have
pushed on to Nashville, and the destruction of
Johnston's army would have been complete.
Instead of concert of action, the first intima-
ton that Buell. had of the intended movement
was conveyed by dispatch from Halleek, dated
on the same day in which the expedition was
ordered, January 80: 9" have ordered an at
tack on Fort Henry and Dover. 1t will be
made Immediately to which Buell. replied on
the same day: - Please let me know your plan
aud force and the timen The next day Hal
leck telegraphed: Movement already ordered
to take and hold Fort Henry, and cut railroad
between Columbus and Dover Force about
Il. 600 men; viii be e-enforced as soon as pos
sible: viii telegraph the day of investment or
attack" Buell. Immediately asked Do you
consider active cooperation essential to your
success Because, In that case, IL would be
necessary TO know what the other has to do. 1t
would be several days before / could seriously
engage the enemy, and your operations ought
not to fail : the operation which was suggested
!
ant preliminary 10 the next step" 1t may be
stated here that the letter referred to suggested
that tie gunboats should endeav0r TO run past
the batteries at Forts Donelson and Henry and
destroy the railroad bridges over the two rivers.
There is no trace Of chagrin that the leading
role iii the military drama had been assumed
BIZ rival: his whole concern was fer the sue
cess Of the performance. Halleck replied, Feb
ruary L: Co operation at present not essen
tial. Fort Henry has been re-enforced, but
where from / have not learned. The roads are
III such horrible condition as 70 render move
nents impossible by land. VIII write you fully
ny plans as soon as ! receive your letter Of the
50th ut Write me your plans and / viii try
TO assist you" In letter dated February 2,
after the reception of the letter from Buell.
above referred 10, Halleck said: " at present it
isonly proposed TO take and occupy Forts Henry
and Dover ti)onelsont, and. if possible, cut the
railroad from Columbus 10 Bowling Green. How
far We may send the gunboats up the river Will
be left for after consideration. The West
ern boats ere a failure: they cannot be taken
up the river, and it remains to be seen
/ whether the gunboats are worth half the
money spent on them. Only part OF them have
/ yet received crews. The garrison at Fort Henry
( at last accounts was 5000; il may be further
I re-eDforced from Columbus Keep me informed
f Of your forces and plans, and | VIII endeavor
/ to assist You as much as possible. If we take
+ Fort Henry and concentrate all available forces
i there. troops must be withdrawn either from
! Bowling Green or Columbus TO protect the
railroads. If the former, you can advance; if
the latter, we can take New Madrid and cut
! of the river communications with Columbus,
! but it viii take some time TO get troops ready to
advance Ear south of Fort Henry" To this
letter Buell. replied. referring 20 the diversion
of portion Of his troops in the Mill Springs
1 campaign. and regretted that he had not sooner
I hear inf nj he ,.f
1 His troops had been thrown somewhat out of
I position, and it would take sometime to restore
I IT, Referring TO an advance upon Bowling
Green, be said BY progress must be slow for
! we are dependent upon the railroad for supplies,
aud that has been destroyed for forty miles in
front of Bowling Green" The enemy being
+ strongly intrenched behind river, he would
require siege train to operate against heavy
/ artillery. The roads were in condition TO
4 oebar him from any plan requiring CELEBRITY of
/ movement, and, in fact, there was 10 further
I necessity for a flank movement TO produce the
evacuation Of Bowling Green, as that must fol-
low as a result Of the capture 81 Fort Donelson.
4 He concludes as follows: The work Won have
undertaken Is, therefore, Of the very highest
I importance. without reference TO the Injurious
/ effects Of failure. There is not IN the whole
( field Of operations point az which every man
you can raise can be mployed with more effect
or with the prospect Of as important results y
I On February eth. General Baileek teiegraphed,
agreeing with Buell. in everything He thought
the enemy, after evacuating Bowling Green,
would endeayor TO regain his lost advantage at
1 Fort Henry or Dover or would concentrate at
Nashville, GAINESVILLE, or Paris, Tenn lie now
abandoned his idea OF simply holding the forts,
and asked Buell. to send him all the force he
could spare from his own lines Of defense by
river 10 Paducah, whence he could send them
TO points most in need Of re-enforceIaents. On
the 9TH he announced the capture of Fort
Henry aud becoming fearful for the safety OF
Grant, in case the enemy should concentrate
upon him, urged Buell. to send him re-enforce-
ments at once. II was well for the success Of
the attack upon Fort D0neison that this appeal
was not UNDECIDED. Buell., ehivalrous as he was
cautious, sent at once four organized bril-
gades, with artillery, and eight separate regi-
nents. in all 10000 men, by water to re-en-
force Balleck's columns on the Tennessee
and Cumberland. part Of which arrived in
time TO take part IN the assault upon Fort
D0nelson, and set the remainer of his army in
motion towards Bowling Green. Six days after
, the capture Of Fort Henry, the divisions Of
Generals Smith and McClernand were on thu
march across 70 invest Fort D0nelson. Re-en.
forcements had, in the meantime, been ordered
up the Cumberland, to be landed as near D0nel
son as circumstances woald permit, wheuct
49,.