The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-01-10
FITZ JOHN PORTER CASE.
A Letter from General Longstreet to
General Grant Relative Thereto.
He Exercised His Judgment in Disobeying
Orders, Won Battle and Was Pro-
NOTED Therefor.

WASHINGTON, Jan. 9.-General Longstreet,
by request of the National Republican, sends
that paper the following letter:
ATLANTA, Ca. Dec. 80, 1882.
General U. S. Grant, New York:
My Dear Sir-It occurs to me that an ac-
count OF parallel circumstances passing in
the army of Northern Virginia, before and
during the second Manassas to those leading
to the Fitz John Porter trial, may be pro-
per sequel to your recently published paper
referring to his case. 1t is but just how
ever, to admit that the argument OF those who
hold to the finding of the court marshall
is, from their strictly military standpoint,
conclusive; but they seem to ignore the we'll
recognized custom of war; that superior Of
ficers are not confined to the rule that holds
the army as a grand machine, limited under
all circumstances to letter or orders of its
chief, but are expected and required to exer-
else due discretion, when not in his
immediate presence. No doubt cases have
| occurred in your experience where officers
were as deserving of reproof for failing to
exercise such discretion as for failing to obey
orders Early on the Goth of August 1862,
at the head of my column, arrived in Strk-
ing distance of the battle in progress between
a part of the army of the Potomac and Gen
eral Jackson's wing of the army of Northern
ern Virginia. Upon seeing the approach of
our GOlulHD InS TeUeIdl ITOODS WERE WILL
drawn to defensive position, a little re-
tired. Before noon, as testified by myself
and others before the Schofield Board, my
command was deployed, and formed on Jack
sons right, at right angles 10
the WaTenton pike, and extending
to and beyond the Manassas Gap railroad.
As soon as deployed, General Lee indicated
his purpose to have me attack. Intending
to execute his plan, asked time to recon-
hotter the new position and the ground in
tervening. After the reconnaissance | re-
ported the position strong, and that the sac
rifice was likely to be such as to cause appre-
hension of failure He did not seem salts
fed and was considering the propriety OF
making his orders more definite, when lnfor-
nation was received from General Stuart OF
the approach of The Federal troops upon my
right. This drew his attention to that part
of the field for the time, but when it APP
peared this force was hardly strong enough
for an attack, the question of attack by the
First corps was resumed. AS the day
reconnaissance at nightfall, and prepare
tions for action of the day following. This
was accepted. The reconnaissance, however,
satisfied General Lee and myself that a
battle should not be made at this point, and
| so | withdrew about midnight to the ground
we had occupied before our advance. The
| next day the Federals renewed the battle
| seriously threatened, rode out in advance
| of my line in search of an opportunity to
| take my share of the battle, and found a
| number of my officers collected at a point
| from which they had a fair view of the
masses, yelling up against Jackson. From this
| point it was evident that a few batteries
| having an enfilade fire could disperse the
attack, and some of our batteries were ordered
forward for positions and to prepare. Mean
while a message came from General Jackson
| asking for reinforcements, and almost imme-
| diately after came the order from General
| Lee to send some of my brigades to Jack
| 1t did not seem probable that troops could
reach Jackson in time if sent; at the same
time there were no doubts of our dispensing
the attack by the fire OF our artillery. Under
| the circumstances, / felt impelled 10 disre-
gard th orders and operate on my own judg-
ment. The fire of our batteries produced the
results anticipated. When the attacking
force were dispersed, my command sprung
| to the charge and swept the field. Had
thus engaged the day before it is
more than probable that Porter
would be in season to take me on
the wing and in all probability have crushed
me. Had stopped to reinforce on the sec
ond day it is hardly probable that Jackson
could have held till my troops could have
reached him. AS you stated, it was not pos
sible for Porter to attack under the 4.3C
| order, the failure to do which was alleged to
be his high crime. If we may suppose that he
received the order at $50, and had he attacked
| he would have given us the opportunity we
were so earnestly seeking all that day, and in
the dis;ointed condition OF their army on that
| day the result might have been more serious
than that of the next day, the Both. Now, if
| we suppose that my attack on the afternoon
| of the Both had failed we shall see that the
evidence against me would have beer
stronger than that against Porter, yet with
an earnest desire to meet the order of my
chief, | felt was more capable to execute
than disobey them. AS we were successful,
there was no room to question us. The only
safe rule to guide is judgment in such cases,
If, in the exercise of discretion one becomes
the direct cause of failure, he should only be
adjudged as failing in generalship. If the
intention is to bring discontinue upon the
armies it is criminal. Soon after this cam
paign was promoted and assigned as senior
Lieutenant-general of the Confederate Army.
With highest respect, your most obedient
serMnt, JAMES LoN6sTREET.