The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1883-11-01
THE GERMAN ARMY.
Gam position OF the Greatest Military
Force I'm the World.

history OF the German army, more inter-
esting, especially to its enemies, than the
attention paid to II by its chiefs since 1870.
In most armies niumphs so great and ell
forts sc excessive rs those accomplished m
that year would have been followed by a
period OF relaxation, but In Germany all
men seem to have agreed with the gene
raj OF division who told his men that war
being over "i: was necessary to begin
serious work again." The military chiefs,
instead OF exuting, studied the campaign
to find out defects, and during the thirteen
wears which have elapsed every detail OF
the organization has been improved TO The
utmost the finances would allow. From
siege artillery to buttons everything has
been revised. The chiefs OF the stan are
still believed to be non-content, want
ing improvements for which funds are
moi forthcoming. but 10 other men the
machine appears to have been absolutely
perfected. Slight additions, as Captain
Ernest Braune calls them IN the fort
niohtlu Rerien. have been made TO the
strength of the active or field army, unit
when called out II will be composed oil
TAO. 900. This is what in England we
should call "the army" being the force
ready. upon the order given, TO go any
where aud do anything, but this is only
one foNrth OF the army which would DE-
ready to resist invasion. Behind the fleld'
army Is the field-reserye-army OF Quo ON.
GERS and 10000 men, all ready; behind
this. the garrison-army OF 5000 officers ana
400. 600 men; behind this, the depot-army
of 1000 officers aud 100000 men, or In all
400. 900 men. This is exclusive OF forces
held In further reserve, which no doubt IL
would be difficult to call out except in eX-
tremity, but which would il Germany
were invaded bring up the army ultimate
ly TO 2,S30,000 men. Every man among
these vast hosts is drilled thoroughly,
knows exactly what to do, the single want
n war broke out tomorrow being GER
tain proportion OF officers for The Re
serve. whom il has been found difficult 10
secure. There are, however, sufhclent fol
work, and so complete is the organization,
that in the event OF serious war every
man In the first 1,450,000 men IN the va
rious field armies would be "mobi'
lized that is, would be In his place
ready for action and well provided
with all the supports, necessaries, equip
ments. and war material within ten days ;
that Is to say. the Emperor OF Germany
could In fortnight at iatest throw into
movement for an invasion OF France, Aus
tria, or Russia an army perfectly appointed
exceeding thIeefold the whole army OF the
Roman Empire which governed the world
threefold. the army Of Louis NV. Which
threatened Europe, and one third more
than the revolutionary armies OF
France, which burst out at all points
at once, but were comparatively mere
militia. This army, however, has no de-
ficiencies in the way OF moving, has an adj
equate control Of horses, has perfect rail-
way staff, and an army OF men devoted to
communications, and, as tested by actual
war. is disciplined till its regiments are
machines, and will move steadily TO the
attack when one third OF their number has
already fallen.
IL is difficult in reading such statements
10 understand how any country could re-
sist such force, or how any State could
seriously contemplate war with such
Power. 1t would seem as if nothing could
resist 1t, much less venture to meet 1t upon
its own ground. This. however, is not the
opinion OF German statesmen or soldiers,
who remain confident that they have not
too many men. and are even neryously alive
To certain contingencies i'm which their
marvellous army might be oyerstrained.
Part of this feeling arises no doubt
from their knowledge that in any war their
losses would be as prodigiOus as their
efforts, and would grieyousy affect the
nation. but more is matter Of scientific cal
culatiop. The Germans fear no people,
but they expect to be attacked, IL ever, by
some coalition which would make their
vast army almost insufficient. France,
Russia. and Austria have organized armies
nearly equal to their own, and II attacked
by any two of these Powers. Germany
would at first only have two armies widely
apart of 3J0, 900 men each, either OF which
might conceivably be defeated, or even eX-
hausted. That result is most improbable,
but the perfection OF the German army has
improved all neighboring armies, and Ger
man officers are well aware that the adyane
tage OF organization, however perfect, has
its limits. They would be a few days frs
IN the field, and they would be a lttlS
more perfectly supplied, but, after all. tibet
hostile armies would meet, and then il
would be question Of courage, discipline,
and skilful leading. The courage would
be about equal, the discipline is undis-
tinguishable if all the soldiers will obey to
the death, and in skill there is an incalcu-
liable element Of chance which all this
marvellous energy and Industry cannot
supplv. No human foresight or labor can
provide Germany with the generals who
can use these huge masses 10 the best adj
vantage or prevent Russia or France from
producing Suwarrow or Napoleon whose
mental capacity doubles the strength OF
the force under nis command. No matter
how many scores OF thousands are present,
victories may be unattainable without losses
which are as bad as defeats, aud which, il
repeated, would demoraliZe the men. Even
German army, perfect as 1t is, is only a
collection OF men, and the moment defeat or
even excessive loss, is probable, the men
lose something OF their heart, and the Or
ganization, disturbed in it, central idea,
which Is, OF course, continuous victory,
shows symptoms OF strain. The "etap-
pen," for example, that marvel OF organi-
cation, IL not designed to serve corps
d'drmee In retreat, and on retreat Il days
failure OF food might be fatal. Magnificent
AS the German army undoubtedly Is, II is
hardly more superior to its potential foes
than Napoleon's army was to his foes, and
he was beaten at last, though only by CO.
alition OF all Europe. History does not
show that any army can be permanently
triumphant on field broader than its own
country.
There Is, however, one element in the
German field army which sets calculation
almost ut defiance. IL Is permanently
young. History tells us of all manner OF
armies, but never Of another in which
100000 men were collected, all OF whom
must be under twenty-five, and most under
twenty-three, and therefore unexhausted
by service and the expenditure Of energy.
The officers are older, but the men, while
as well drilled as veterans, have all the fire
and the inexperience OF youth. That is an
immense addition to their strength up 10
the time when the officers grow weary, and
we are by no means sure that the German
army, II driven steadily forward, could