The sun., 1883-10-28
.n,.r.a tn. 10. Of x.lyi. Bay though, !, lmpo...e.

entered the ice Of Melville Bay thought impossible
to tell when they would appear
Or KANE took eighty days to go over the same
ground This would necesstate my remaining very late
season. quite out OF the question 70 re-
turn home without them.
I'm taking these steps was governed BY what have
previously stated in regard to the possibilities OF Mel
willie hay and the prob abilities OF being beset In the
pack. Once involved In ice knew we would be help
less and imprisonment Of indefinite duration. had
fears for Lieut. GRIZZLY, who living In region re-
ported well stocked with had economical his pro-
visions Should he reach Litteton Island besides the
provisions the west coast the rocks and waters be-
that island and the mainland abound in walrus
the neghborins mainland reindeer are reported nu.
merous the southeast Cary Island there ia cache
OF six months provisions for twenty men, known to
Lieut. GREKLr, who landed there"
This. then, Is the answer OF Commander
WILDEs to Mr.. CHANDLER's second inquiry.
II it Is accepted as satisfactory, and no court
OF investigation ordered, this will doubtless
be because the Navy Department really
takes WILDEs's hopeful view Of GREELYs
prospects. What can be safely affirmed is
that II the Lady Franklin Bay party should
eventually return, and report the sources OF
supply at and near Littleton Island to be
what Commander W1LDES supposes, the
action of this officer in not landing provis-
ions will no longer be called In question by
anybody.
1t is, perhaps. worth noting that Mr..
CHANDLER asks Commander WILDES wheth-
or he saw or heard Of tho unsigned and
surreptitious memorandum Of instructions
which were lately styled by some subordi-
nate officer OF the Signal Office the Supple
mentary instructions" OF DARLINGTON and
WILDEs beginning rs follows: "The naval
t.~t,, <l,xn nj In1,
F., and to proceed With her to the neighbor-
hood Of Littleton Island" Commander
WILDEs says that this memorandum was
never heard Of by him until our arrival in
st. Johns, nor seen until now"
The long correspondence between Gen.
HAzEN and Lieut.. DARLINGTON in regard to
this same expedition can be easily sum-
married.. HAZEN asks, first, why GARL1Na-
TON did not make a depot at Littlcton
Island with what stores he could gather"
DARLINGTON answers that the only stores to
be gathered were at Cape Sabine and on the
west side Of Smith Sound, and these are bet
ter placed for GREELYs use where they are;
and that to wait at Littleton Island endeavor-
ing to support itself on game might have
caused his own party to stay there all winter
and live on GREELYs supplies HAzEN asks,
secondly, why some OF the stores for GREELY,
carried in tho PrOteus, were abandoned on
the ice after the wreck. GARLINGrON answers
that tho ice was alternately crushing and
opening most perilously, and that nothing
was ON the ice except 1.-TWO barrels OF assorted
canned goods, some loose cans, small
quantity OF lumber some scattered clothing,
the theodolite. and some boxes OF news
papers" 1t was risk of life to go back for
these. HAzEN asks, thirdly, why no boats
were left for GREELY's use. GARL1NGToN
answers that GREELY has eight available
boats on the coast, besides one Oh Cary Island,
while his own far larger party needed all
their boats. HAzEN asks, fourthy, why
GARLINGroN took forty days supplies for his
own retreat. GARLINGToN answers that no
party ever provided SO little for this journey.
though he fortunately did not need oil he
took. DR.. KANE was eighty-four days in
going from little north of Littleton Island
to Upernavik. HAzEN asks, finally, why
GARLINaToN came south Of Cape York at all.
DARLINGTON answers that to have quartered
party all winter among the few improvdent
natives would not have helped GREELY, and
might have prevented them, as they are on
the verge OF starvation every winter, from
doing anything for GREELY, should he go to
| Cape York.
The general impression left by all the
correspondence Is that there was careless
ness and ignorance in planning and fitting
out this expedition, and that great peril at-
tends all Arctic exploration whenever cir
cumstances become adverse. What folly it
was to plant q signal station so far north,
and In q situation 50 easily rendered inac-
cessible by ice, when all practical purposes
OF scientific observation would have been
served at some point easily reached. several
hundred miles further south!