The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-11-20

I
citizens. A cOlored citizen of Ohio or lodi
ana, being in the jurisdiction of Tennessee,
is entitled to enjoy any privilege or lmmu-
nifty fundamental in citizenship which is
given to citizens of the white race in the
latter State 1t is not to be supposed that
any one will controvert this proposition.
But what was secured to Colored citi-
zens of the United States-as between them
and their respective States-by the grant
to them OF State citizenship? With what
rights, privileges or immunities did this grant
from the nation invest them? There IS one,
if there be no others-exemption from race
| discrimination in respect OF any civil right
| belonging to citizens of the white race in the
same State That, surely, is their constitu-
tional privilege when within the jurisdiction
of other States. And such must be their
constitutional right in their own State, un-
less the recent amendments be splendid
baubles," thrown out to deude those who
deserved fair and generous treatment at the
hands of the nation. Citizenship in this
country necessarily imports equality OF civil
rights among citizens of every race in the
same State 1t is fundamental in American
citizenship that, in respect of such rights,
there shall be no discrimination by the State
or its officers. or by individuals or corpora
lions exercising public functions or authori-
ty, against any citizen because of his race or
previous condition of servitude In q. S.
VS.. Cruikshank, 90 U. s., 800, it was said that
1.-THE equality of rights of citi-
4 pnSlioansm" And RI" GEeare %rgin fs
100 U. S., 1874, the emphatic language of this
court is that lone great purpose of these
amendments was to raise the colored race
from that condition Of inferiority and serv-
tude in which most of them had previously
stood into perfect equality of civil rights
with all other persons within the jurisdic-
ton of the States" So, in Strauder VS.. West
Virginia, ib., 306 the court, alluding to the
Fourtee nth amendment, said: This is one of
a series of constitutional provisions having a
common purpose, namely, securing to race
recently emancipated a race that through
many generations had been held in slavery,
all the civil rights that the superior race en-
joys" Again, in Neal VS.. Delaware, 103 U. S..
1856 it was ruled that this amendment was
designed, primarily, Ito secure to the colored
race, thereby invested with the rights, privi-
leges, and responsb ilities of citizenship, the
enjoyment of all the civil rights that, under
the law, are enjoyed by white persons"
Much light is thrown upon this part of the
discussion by the language of this court in
reference to the Fifteenth amendment. In
U. S. VS.. Cruikshank, it was said;
In U. s. vs. Reese 90 U. S., 2l4, we held that
the Fifteenth amendment has invested the citi-
Zens OF the United states with new consfitu-
tioual right, which Is exemption from discrim-
nation In the exercise OF the elective franchise,
on account Of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude. From this it appears that the
right of suffrage is not a necessary attribute OF
national citizenship, but that exemption from
discrimination in the exercise OF that right on
account of race, etc, is. The right to vote in
the States comes from the States; hut the right
OF exemption from the prohibited discrimin alton
comes from the United States. The first has not
been granted or secured by the constitution of
the United States, hut the last has been.
Here, in language at once clear and forci-
BILE, is stated the principle for which l con-
tend 1t can hardly be claimed that ex-
euntiOn from raoa discrir n tiop in reSrao+
of civil rights, against those to whom State
citizenship was granted by the nation, is
any less for the colored race new constitu-
tional right, derived from and secured by
the national constitution, than is exemption
from such discrimination in the exercise of
the elective francise. 1t cannot be that the
latter is an attribute of national citizenship
while the other is not essential in national
citizenship, or fundamental in State citizen
ship.
If, then, exemption from discrimination,
in respect of civil rights is a new constitu-
tional right, secured by the grant of State
citizenship to colored citizens of the United
States, why may not the nation, by means
of its own legislation of primary, direcc
character, guard. protect and enforce that
right 1t is right and privilege which the
nation conferred. 1t did not come from the
States in which those colored citizens reside.
1t has been the established doctrine of this
court during all its history, accepted as vital
to the national supremacy. that Congress, in
the absence of a-positive delegation of power
to the State legislatures, may by legislation,
enforce and protect any right derived from
or created by the national constitution. 1t
was SO declared in Prigg VS.. Commonwealth
of Pennsylvania. 1t was reiterated in U. s.
VS.. Reese, 80 U. S., pa, where the court said
that rights and immunities created by and
dependent upon the constitution of the Uni
ted States can be protected by Congress. The
form and manner of the protection may be
such as Congress, in the legitimate exercise
of its discretion, shall provide. These may
be varied to meet the necessities of the par
ticular right to be protected" 1t was dis
tinctly reaffirmed in Strauder vs. West Vir-
ginia, 100 U. S., 80, where we said that
"a right or immunity created by the const-
tuition or only guaranteed by it, even with
out any express delegation of power may be
protected by Congress-" Will any one claim
in view of the declarations of this court in
former cases, or even without them, that ex-
emption of colored citizens, within their
states, from race discrimination, in respect of
the civil rights of citizens, is not an i'm
munity created or derived from the national
constitution?
CONSTITUTING THE CONSTITUTION.
This court has always given a broad and
liberal construction to the constitution, so
as to enable Congress, by legislation, to en-
force rights secured by that instrument. The
legislation Congress may enact IN execution
of its power to enforce the provisions of this
amendment, is that which is appropriate to
protect the right granted Under given cir
cumstances, that which the court character
ICES as corrective legislation might be suf-
ficient. Under other circumstances primary,
direct direct legislation may be required.
But it is for Congress- not the Judiciary to
say which is best adapted to the end to be
attained. In United States VS.. Fisher, Or,
35S this court said that CONGRESS must