The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-02-20
RECORD OF THE COURTS.
Proceedings in the Various Courts of
Record, Yesterday.
Full Abstract of the Opinions Rendered
by the Judges of the Supreme Court
Work in the Local Courts.
supreme COurt-Feb. IL.
Hon. William A. Woods, Chief Justice.
RTII. OF observation-disclosures

aO "HNA - wv ChANA ohhS
BILL OF
1888. George b. Cardwell VS.. Anna Gilmore.
Floyd C. C.
Bicknell, C.-This case was tried at the Febru-
airy term and taken under a~dVisement, and at
the May term appellant nled a tlli of exceptions,
mt no time was given at the February term TO
file the bill. 1t therefore presents no question
as to the rulings Of the court at the trial. al
IND, 1874; 10 i'd, 367) At the May term tho
court found for the appellee, ana gave time TO
file IA bill of exceptions. The bin filed within the
time SO given is sufficient to bring the evidence
before this court as Ind, 1i0I, and the evidence
shows that as To part of the property there
should have been a finding for appellant. Judg-
ment reversed.
PLEADING-sEPARATK ANSWER OF DEFENDANTS.
9,415. Rowland Holman VS.. Sanford Elliott,
Decatur c. C.
Woods, C. Jon petition for rehearing, coun-
sci Tor appellant insist that under sections 569,
597 and GOO of the code Of 1852 the appellant,
DIV appearing and pleading the general denial
did not admit possession by him of all the lands
sought 10 be recovered. II appellant had dis
claimed any interest in the four tracts and con-
fined his denial to the two tracts conveyed to
MN he would have been entitled to IA decision as
10 whether the appellee was entitled to recover
those two tracts, bur Ivy denying the entire com
plant ne Joined Issue with the plaintiff as to all
the land sought to he recovered, aud it being
shown that plaintiff WIS entitled TO recover a
part he was entitled to recover it of appellant,
whose possession was put beyond dispute Just as
II he had been the sole defendant, A defendant
who would have judgment IN bis favor must not
JOIN others III making issues which he cannot
1uiiJ suobdlhs IetlllOu ONtFultu.
LANDS OF wIrE-cRoP RAISED THEREON.
7,ls4. Harrison Scott VS.. Eliza Hudson. Craw-
ford G. G,
Black, C.-Wher the wife owns land, the crop
raised thereon by the joint labor of the wife and
husband Is the sole property of the wife, and no
part of it can be taken for the debts of the husband
or topay apoh tax assessed against hum. t2l Ind,
1l5; 40 i'd, 1913; 81 i'd, 59S; 60 i'd, 245; 40 i'd,
5Ol) Judgment affirmed.
NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. OF DEArH-wIDow's
RIGHT TO TESTIFY.
.1o.004 Catharine Cooper VS.. Thomas Cooper.
Vigo c. c.. U
Best, C.-Appellant was the wife of one Bos-
well, who deserted her, and four yearstne .eafter
she married Cooper without having been divorced
from Boswell. Cooper had two children by
a former wife and two by appellant, and This suit
was by appellant for an interecf u land of
which he died seized. Boswell was never heard
OF FOR twenty. years, until he returned about
TIVE years after appellants marriage with
Cooper. Que witness testified that about that
time a stranger returned and had trouble with
Cooper, and that appellant told her the mar was
her first husband. Appellant denied ever hav-
ing said so, and testified that the man was a
stranger, but on admitting her testimony the
court said that If the case were on trial before a
jury he would nOJ consider her Il competent wit
ness. After the lapse of seven years the pre-
sumption of death arises, ana as against a pre-
sumption OF innocence, the presumption will be
that the death occurred before the act. which
would have been criminal, although the
act was done before seven years had
elapsed. Bishop Mar. and Div, secs. 453 and
456; 43 Iowa, 22SJ The is there
fore that If Boswell was never heard of. he was
dead at the date of appellants marriage with
cooper. When the case was tried this acts of
1881 were in force, and by sec. 500 1t is provided
that if any witness for the heirs testify to an
admission of a party made in tine absence of the
decedent, such party shall he competent to
testify as to such admission. Under this provis-
ion appellant was clearly entitled to testify as TO
The admission claimed to have been made to
another witness. From the statement Of tho
judge the inference is that appellants testimony
was disregarded by him in considering the case,
on the ground of InPOunetencV. This was arrOr-
Judgment reversed.
CRIMINAL EvIDENCE-PRooF OF GUILTY IN
TENT.
1858. George E, Strong VS.. The State. Nor
gan &C.
Nlblack, J.-Appellant was convicted on a
charge of obtaining money by false pretenses
from a Masonic lodge, by claiming TO be a Mason
and exhibiting a receipt for dues paid by him TO
a lodge in Ohio. On the trial one Phelps, who
was secretary of the Ohio lodge, testified that
appellant visited his Office and obtained money
from his lodge by false pretenses similar to those
made in the case GA trial: that appellant re-
manned in his Office a good while, q portion of
which time witness was out, and That he could
have filled ont the receipt and put the seal of the
lodge to it in Phelps's absence. and that IN fact
Phelps had given him no receipt for dues. In
many cases iu Is competent to prove the intent
with which an act was done by showing
other criminal acts of the same Kind,
but this can only be done where the intent is
equlvocal, and thus becomes an issue at the trial.
(Bishop Grim. Prac., Sl,067; Wh0rt. Grim. Ev.,
ZIG; Roscoe Or. Ev., 92D Where the nature of
the oHenBe Is Sucn JhaU PROOF OF lts commission
as charged carries with it the evident implication
of criminal intent, evidence of the preparation
of other like offeHses will not be admitted The
fraudulent representations charged In this case
were concerning matters peculiarly within APP
pellaut's knowledge, and when proven to have
been falsely made, as the evidence fully tended
to prove, the Inference of criminal intent was
inevitable. Judgment reversed.
Elliott, j., dissenting holds that it was com.
petent for the State to prove that the token used
was a false one, and this could be done by PROV
Ing the manner in which it was procured.
Where 1t is competent to prove an act it is al
ways competent to prove conduct aud declara-
tons accompanying the act. The evidence was
also competent to enable tine Jury to judge of the
credibility of Phelps testimony. Without the
conduct and declarations of the accused 1t might
have appeared very improbable that he would
have left an entire stranger IN possession OF his
office, with access to important books and pa
pers. But That it was also competent ON the
broader ground Of the States right to show
guilty knowledge and and Il criminal intent to
practice deception on Others, His Honor cites and
discusses the following authorities: Harris
Grim. Law, 369; 2 Crown Cas-, Rex and Francis;
TX. Gin. Law Bull "a; 80 Ohio ST., 264; % i'd,
100; 3 Greenl, Ev, sec. IS; Sind, 353; Ii i'd,
434; SO i'd, 294; 80 N. Y, 12I.