The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1883-02-03
getting a cabIns! officer Of III. own selection

Electors In Illinois that year, and wns IT,
lected 10 carry the vote Of our State 10
Washington. Mr.. Lincoln asked me M
was passing through Harrisburg on my
way 10 the Capital, to stop and request
General Cameron to come 10 Springfield for
a conference with him.
i 81 did So and he went ont. then knew
that he was TO 20 into the Cabinet, because
| ! had heard Mr.. Lincoln sny 30. do not
think that hU knew Il then. lie was the
unanimous choice OihtsState for the place"
"Did Mr.. Lincoln OtItr him any pArtiCu.
lar place"
"I do not know. was not present At
the conference. | think Mr. Lincoln wrote
TO him after they hRd their talk, that he
would make him Secretary Of the Treas.
ury, or Secretary OF War. ! know that
there was quite good deal Of uncertainty
for some time ~ TO whether Mr.. Cameron
or Mr.. Chase should be Secretary Of the
Treasury. II waA finally decided in Dir.
Chases favor, but for wllat reason do not
know"
CAMERON ASD THE wAR OrIICE.
"Wm there any friction between Mr.
Lincoln and General Cameron when he.
left the Cabinet"
"SOne at all. know that Mr.. Lincoln
always retained the highest respect for him,
aud the most perfect confidence In his in
tegrity. heard him rebuke man one
evening who made some reflections upnn
the honesty Of his admiration OF the War
Department lie Answered the gentle
mans structures by saying: i know Of
nothing TO justify your remnfks, there Ger.
tAinly was nothing In his administration Of
the War office that reelected upon his Inle.
gritty The facts in relation 10 the change
in the War office that sent Mr. Cameron 10
st. Petersburg are well known to many
men. There WAS great deal Oi friction In
the Cabinet between the conservative Gle
ment represented by Seward and Chase
and the aggressive war spirit represented
by General Cameron aud Montgomery
Blair. Almost all the Cabinet except these
two believed the differences between the
sections could be settled without II resort to
arms. Cameron as well RS blair thought
war was inevitable and wanted to make
active preparations for il. This conflict Of
ideas aud purposes naturally caused more
OF lees feeling. Then General Cameron,
in his inst annual report, recommended |
Armingthe negroes, and the President wiIs |
not up to that advanced position. To be |
sure this recommendation did not get into |
the Presidents message, but il was printed
in the newspapers and called out vast |
amount OF severe criticism. The Cabinet
was afraid Of its effect upon the border
States"
CAMERON ASD TIIuRLOW WEED,
"Did General CameroH leave the Cabi.
net ON this account"
"SO. lie changed the War office for the |
mission TO Russia on his own motion. lie |
felt the discomfort in the Cabinet and was |
glad TO get rest. | recall distinctly the
circumstances under which he left. Thur |
low Weed came on 10 Washington M he
frequently did for conference with the
Administration. lie saw the feeling Oi
unrest in the Cabinet and went TO have
talk with General Cameron about il. Cam.
erOn was not very well, and Mr. Weed
began the conversation by telling him that
he ought 10 take vacation
"WhaL, vacation with the war on our |
hands? There Is no rest for anybody in
these days"
"Wecd suggested that he should cx.
change the War Department for foreign
mission. 1T would be great relief |
II could, was Mr.. Camuron's response
The Russian mission iS vacant, replied
Weed" Il should be glad to make the
exchange, WAS Cameron's answer. They
went to the President upon the subject |
and the transfer was made, without any
feeling whatever on either side. know
that by MIR. Lincoln's acts and utterAnCes."
"Mr. Weed played quite M important
part then in Mr.. Lincoln's administration
during the war;"
AYES, quite hand. Tho President was
very fond OF him, aud hnd great respect for
his ability. A conference with Mr.. Weed
was always vAlna blc TO any public man.
From that standpoint Mr.. Weed had u pow
eriul influence everywhere among men Of
his own party. His advice WAS all the
better and safrr because he didn't want OF.
fice.h
"Did he represent the Seward idea Of re-
Cancellation 2"
"Neither he nor Mr.. Seward were as far
in advance rs Mr.. Lincoln. They were
willing TO make concessions that he was
not. That became apparent to mu at the
Springfield conference, OF which ! spoke,
when the formation Of the Cabinet was dis
cussed. Mr.. Weeds statements and nrgIi-
munts at that meeting made great i'm.
preston upon the President. lie
almost convinced him that there
was going to war. Up TO that time he had
not tiought seriously Of Au armed conflict.
THE EMANCIPATION PROCLAMATION.
WAS il alter that time that lie said that
"lree,lOm for the whole country, WAS greater
than slavery IN section md that he wOnld
not yield u fraction Of his duty to favor the
slave power
ale often made that remark In substance,
but do not now recall whether he made
il at this conference with Mr.. Weed or not.
Mr.. Lincoln WAS cautious but very Tes.
olute man, and when he made up his mind
il WAS as liked us the hills. do not think
he was ever more perplexed III to the right
thing to DO than when lie framed the
proclamation Of emancipation. ! happrn-
pd in Washington while he was writing il.
| lie was very glad to see nlG and asked mn
| 10 sit down for talk. lie said he wasal-
most in prison with the work lIO had TO do
aud WIS glad to see friend from the out
side world. lie went TO his drawer and
took out letter from Robert Dale Owen.
Il WIS a twelve page Argument, OF 4 friend
! " character, III favor OF emancipation.
Mr. LinColn read il aloud TO me. 1t was a
pOweIiul document. Several times he
stopped while reading II aud said:
This IL very able, this is very able
Once he said, ! have written something
upon this subject, but nothing so able as
uiiA. lie referred to the proclamation
he afterwards signed. When he finished
reading Owens letter hH laid It down and
began to raise points agaiuRt emancipation.
| Ills mind was not then settled ~ TO Wheth.
or Il would be source Of strength or
weakness to us. II was however no eVi-
dence Of his opposition TO measure, that
he raised points against II, in discussing il
with friends. lie would often have an
answer 10 his own mind for the very points
he made. For three hOuB on until the
arrival OF the Cabinet broke up our con.
yersa,ion, Sir. Lincoln disguised with great
force all the phases OF emancipation. He
brought out great number Of olletterSsevOr
~ crl.iching his war policy, written by gem
tlemen in the various sections OF the Coun.
try. They had been sent him in friendly
spirit, by Charles 4. Dana Tor his iniOrma.
ton ~ 10 the temper Of the people. They
had made some impression on his mind,
but he was yet undecided aE 10 the policy
OF issuing the proclamation. We lad
auother small talk next day Of the same
tenor, aud the proclamation was issued not
long afterwards. | gD sure that while
he was writing it Mr. l.incOln's
mind WIS in conflict As 10 the
policy Of issuing 1t, and think he signed