The Iola register. [volume] (Iola, Allen County, Kansas) 1875-1902, 1883-10-26
COXIlRRC1AL LAW.


lConpilsd Specially for the St Louis Commrr'
cial Gazette.l
CARRIAGE TICKETS AS PROMIssoRY NOTES.
Suit was brought upon certain carriage
tickets issued by appellants to one Fitz-
gerald for teaming done by him for them,
and which appellee bought of Fitzgerald.
The tickets read: Hubbard, Spencer 4
Co. Carriage tickets, SOC. Hubbard,
Spencer 4 Co." They were printed, ex.
cept the name, Hubbard, Spencer & Co.
at the bottom, which was written. Held,
that the appellee was not entitled to re.
cover in his own name upon the tickets
in question. They were neither due
bills nor promissory notes, but merely
Acknowledgements of Indebtedness to the
person to whom they were issued. That
while no particular form of words was
necessary to constitute q promissory
note. and while it need not contain the
words, promise to pay" in the alb
sence of such words there must be other
words of equivalent import. In the
document sued on there was not only no
promise to pay, but no words of similar
import. The most that could be claimed
for these tickets was that they were in
the nature of vouchers or acknowledge.
ments OF services rendered by Fitzgerald
to appellants, upon which the law i'm.
piled a promise to pay. but not to
third person for such services. They
were merely non-negot; able chooses in
action upon which suit could be brought
only in the name of Fitzge rald.-Hib-
bard VS.. Holloway, Chicago Appellate
Court.
BANK AND DEPOSITOR.
Where the practice of bank was to
credit depositOr at once with the
amount of a check upon another bank
deposited by him. and to allow him to
draw against it at once, and in case the
check was not paid, to debit the depos-
itOr with the same amount. the check
until paid remained the property of the
depositOr, SO that if the bank should
fail before the check had passed out of
his possession, and the depositor had
not drawn against it or deposited the
check to straighten an overdrawn ac-
count. court of equity would order the
check to be returned to the deposition
Balbach vs.. Frelinghuysen, United
States Circuit Court. District New Jer.
sey.
A bank had moneys on deposit. in
one account to the credit of S. and in
another to the credit of S. as Sheriff.
After the expiration of the term of office
of S., the bank transferred the money
standing to his credit as Sheriff to his
private account, and afterward, with his
a. sent, applied the money so transferred
80 the payment of his private debt to the
bank. In an action by the bank upon
the official bond of s., as Sheriff, for
moneys of the bank received by him in
his official capacity. it was held that the
transfer and application of the funds
referred TO was defense for the sureties
on the official bond of S. to the amount
for which such transfer was made
Mcmillan ct al. vs.. Boyd ct al, Supreme
Court of Ohio.
RAILROAD PASSENGER AND NEGLIGENCE.
A passenger stepped from train
when it was in station slowing up, but
not stopped, and was thrown down and
injured by a sudden jerking of the
train. He sued the company for dam
ages and recovered Judgment. The
company had defended on the ground
that alighting from a train in motion
was such negligence IN itself that no &C.
ton would lie for damages. On appeal
the court said: 1t is claimed that alight-
ing from a train in motion is such neg
ligence as to preclude recovery, what
ever the circumstances. This is nc
doubt true where the company is not in
&c., II
speed, but it is not necessarily true
where there is question of compare
tive negligence. A train might be bare
ly in motion, moving so slowly that
getting off would be attended with nc
danger whatever. The question was
one for the jury. If a passenger takes
no more risk by alighting than ordinary
prudent men take under the circum-
he is not precluded from recov-
ering for an injury suffered in conse
quence of the company's negligence
Houston & Santa Fe r. X. !
Co. VS.. Smith, Supreme Court of Texas. |
FIRE INSURANCE.
A contract for insurance against loss /,
BY fire is a contract of indemnity A
contract to that end with person who (.
has no ipsurable interest in the property
Or can not sustain any pecuniary loss !
by injury thereto is a mere wager, con- /
trdry to public policy and void. Any
person who has a legal or equitable in I
terest in property, or is 50 related to il
that an injury to it may cause him Pc
cuniary loss, has an insurable interest
therein. A judgment creditor has an
interest IN the property of his ,
debtor, but he can not recover from the /
insurer upon an injury thereto as for
loss to himself, unless he also shows 1
that the judgment debtor has not suff-
Gent property left out of which the
Judgment can be satisfied. While the |
insurer may be estopped to insist on
conditions and restrictions contained id |
3 policy issued with knowledge OF |
facts inconsistent Herewith, neither |
party to a contract of insurance which |
IS void, as being contrary to public |
policy, is estopped to deny its legality. |
Spare VS.. Home Nut. Ins. Co., U. s. |
Circuit Court, District of Oregon.
FIRE FROM LOCOMOTIVE.
There is no legal presumption that
company, while in the exercise |
Of its lawful right to run its locomotive
and trains over its road and to use fire !
in so doing, will not permit fire to es-
cape from them. The fact that rail- |
road company uses good machinery and
The most approved appliances to pre-
vent the escape of fire, and has careful
and competent men in charge thereof,
will not, in case fire does escape, OF
itself rebut the prima tacie inference OF
negligence nor exempt the company
rom liability for damages caused there
BY. Railroad companies must use rea-