The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1883-09-16
THE LAST ARCTIC DISASTER
ANOTHER RELIEF EXPEDITION
PROPOSED.
Lieutenant GarIington's Explanations and
Suggestions-Comment and Discussion OF
the Subject in Washington.
Try telegram 70 the Dispatch.

W.
chief .Signdl- Officer United States Arinu
| WdShinqton, d. g.: Stores were not left at
Littleton Island because it was not in my
programme to do so. 1t was my intention
TO establish depot nj or near Cape Pres
colt and TO the nOrthwaTd. as recommended
by Lieutenant Greely, and to ill the gaps
caused by the Neptune's failure to get
above Cape Sabine. (See Greedy letter.
Beebe report, and my instructions.) Five
hundred and fiity-fiye rations were left at
Upernavik by the Yantic for my party. A
part OF these met me at point forty miles
north OF TeSSusauk. All have since been
returned to the Yantic. The ultimate re-
suit OF any undertaking to go north at
this time is extremely problematic. tie
i. chances against its success, owing to the
dark nights now beginning in those re-
gions. making ice navigation extremely
critical work. There is no safe winter an
chorage on the west shore OF Greenland
between Disco and Pandora Harbor eX-
cept, perhaps. North-Star bay. In winter
quarters at Saunders. however. there Is
lair chance OF success. and ii my recon-
mendations are approved | am ready and
anxious to make the effort. Ny plan is to
buy q suitable sealer, take a crew OF y0un-
teers from the crews OF the lantic and Pow
latan. now ia this harbor, paying them extra
compensation. Lieutenant j. c. Colwcll to
command the snip, two ensiSns, and one
engineer TO be taken from those who may
volunteer, and from same ship: also employ
a competent ice-pilot here. The ship must
be under United States laws and subject
TO military discipline. | believe nothing
can he done with foreign civilian officers
and crew. in the event OF not enough
seamen volunteering the remainder TO be
enlisted here. Commander Wildes will
communicate with the Navy Department.
II anything Is to be done ii must be done
| at once. T.. n. DARLINGTON.
Darlington has been advised that the
Secretary OF War will not authorize the
proposed expedition this fall, but will
order one next year.
A DISPATCH FROM COMMANDER wILDEs.
WASHINGTON, September 15.-COmmo-
dore English, Acting Secretary OF the
Navy. has received the following dispatch
81. Johns, N. T., September 15.-Com-
m0dore English, Acting Secretary Of the
! NdUu: TO charter another foreign ship,
with foreign crew for duty, to go north
ut this late season, would simply invite
/ fresh disaster The Proteus was handled
very unskiledly. and the crew behaved
| shameiully at the wreck. The ship must
/ be American, manned and Offered by the
navy. and thoroughly equipped. Unless
winter quarters can be reached north OF
Cape Atbal the attempt would be useless.
| This cannot be done. Melville bay will be
! impossible by October 1st at the latest. y
/ ship cannot winter at Upernavik, and cam
not slcdge north from there.
+. WHDEs,
| Commanding United states Steamer IaEtic.
WHAT Is SAID AND THOUGHT IL WASHINGTON.
WASHINGTON, September 1j.-The dis
patches received to-day by the Acting CHIEF
! Signal Officer OF the Army and Acting
Secretary Of the Navy from Lieutenant
Darlington, of the Greedy relief expedition,
| and Commander WIldes, OF the United
| States steamer Yantic, have excited here
much comment and discussion. The tele
grain from Lieutenant Darlington, it Is
said, seem, to be z reply to the categorical
question: "Why did you not land your
stores at Littcton island or Lifeboat cove
on your way NORTH" The reply is:
! because it was not in my programme to
do so. See my instructions" This reply,
it is argued, seems to indicate either that
Lieutenant Darlington never received the
so-caled supplemental orders y to land
his stores NJ Littlcton island on
his way north, or that ii he re-
ceiyed such supplemental orders he
did not regard them as imperative,
and did not suppose that they were H.
tend, d to supersede earlier instructions -
not TO leave his stores at Liltleton Island
on his way north. 1t seems TO he generally
admitted bv those who discuss the sub
iect that the landing of the Proteus stores
NJ the mouth Of Smiths sound before the
ship herself encountered ports OF heavy
pack north Of Cape Sabine was OF the
utmost importance. Prudent Arctic nayi-
gators, under similar circumstances. have
ALWAYS endeavored to insure the safety
Of their food-Supply by getting the bulk
OF if on solid land as soon a possible
after reaching their base OF operations.
and before running the extreme risk
which is necessarily involved in the
attempt TO penetrate any part Of the
great Polar pack. The experienced
Arctic navigator Leigh Smith, on his
last voyage to Franz josef Land two
years ago, took the precaution TO put
large part OF his provisions ashore at
the very earliest possible moment, so ~ not
TO be entirely at the mercy OF the ice. The
wisdom Of This course was demonstrated
only few DAYS later by the crushing and
sinking OF his ship. Ii the bulk OF the
Proteus's stores and the ready-made house
which she had on board had been landed III
this way on Littleton island or Cape Sabine
as soon as the ship reached either OF those
points il would not have been necessary
for Lieutenant darlington TO seek safety AZ
Upernayik, 500 miles away, and the lives
of Lieutenant Greely's party would not
have been imperiled. as they now are, by
an insufficient supply OF provisions at
Doint where they had reason TO en-
pect an abundance. The responsibility
for this fatal omission must rest IT'S
head either upon the Department which
MANNED the campaign or upon the officers
IN whom was entrusted the execution OF 1t.
The DEPARTMENT refers to its supplemental
orders as evidence that ii had guarded
AGAINST such a misfortune rs that which
Lcfell the Proteus, by directing that her
: stores be landed before she entered Smith
sound. Lieutenant Darlington, on the
other hand. seems, it is said, to have had
.. no knowledge OF the supplemental orders,
and TO have acted upon his original instruc-
: tions, which were TO land his stores on ms
! retreat. after he had tried to get through
Smith sound and had failed. This apparent
. misunderstanding between Lieutenant
Darlington and the Department as to the
most important step OF the summers Are
tic campaign will doubtless be cleared up
1 when further information shall have been
received from Lieutenant Darlington by
mail. As the situation now stands, Leu
l tenant Darlington seems to have been act
e ing strictly in accordance with his original
t instructions, and his telegram of to-day
$ hears. it's said, 10 evidence OF any know
G ledge of modification of those instruc-
> tions by the supplemental orders.
Some surprise is expressed here TO- day
G that lieutenant Darlington, after the loss