National Republican., 1883-01-26


of Shiloh meeting house, which at that Time
was Gen. Shermans headquarters lhey
further say that owing to the absence OF
part of their command, the attack was &c
laycd until the next morning, wheh beaure,
gard contondcd that their movements nan |
bccn discovered aud insisted that the attack
should be abandoned.
n must be evident that our officers had not
discovered the rebel force at Mickcy's house,
although in such close proximity to our army
Sherman's report shows the bold attack on nus
front on Friday and Saturday, and yet he did
not belicvo IL TO be anything but n strong
demonstration. With the facts before us we
are compellcd to admit that at that very timo
and hour from thirty TO forty thousand rebels
were within less than two miles oil his own
HEADQUARTERS, and he did not know or believe
there was any danger Why did he not
know? Where was his cavalry and advanced
guards. and what had they been doing? A
great army had been two days within striking
distance and no one knew 1t! surely tins
would be worse than surprise. What did the
rebels come for, and If Sherman knew they
were there what apology can he mako for
disreparding all the rules Of war; Ono
nights labor, he tells us, could have made
his line impremablc and far less time
would IL have taken to have formed
n simple line of battle to meet the coming
foe Yet neither was done, and our forces
wero attacked within and in front of their
TpgDpCtiNe CnCNmplHpnlS VI lNtlI COIUh anu
divisions! The historian of Grant and his
Campaigns" (page So thus describes the posi-
tion of our forces on the morning of the at
tack "A glance at the original position of
Prcntiss and sherman on the map shows a
wide gap between them. Hurlbut is too far
in the rear and MCClcrnand too far TO the
right. Into this gap llardce pushed vigor
ously forming the first rebel line, strength
cned by Glnddcn's brigade of Withcrs's di-
vision sent by Bragg. lie Is almost entirely
unopposed,' &c.
The first day at Shiloh was undoubtedly
unfavOrable to our arms. Every candid stu
dent of history must admit this fact. Gen.
Shermans attempt to palliatc the disaster of
that day by telling us that great many of
our troops "wcro perfectly new had never
Dccn under heavy fire or behcld heavy col
umns of an enemy clearing down on them Us
they did on last Sunday" II might be signiii-
cantly asked how much more experience did
those "heavy columns" have than our force
which they attacked? As to experience, the
soldiers of both armies were about the same
Our disaster of that morning did not arise be-
cause our troops were raw, but because Gen.
Sherman did not expect nor anticipate at
that time an attack from the rebel army, and
he confesses that he never realized it until
about q. m, when he saw heavy masses of
infantry in the woods. He then became
satisfied for the first time that the enemy de-
signed a determined attack on our whole
camp" 1t seems he could not realize the fact
that the enemy dare attack his army He
was only waiting for Buell. to attack them !
and the affairs of Friday and Saturday pre-
ceeding had made but little impression on his
mind. He did not even cOndesceud to follow
the impudent rebels to their camps. Gen.
Sherman at that time had had but little or no
experience in actual battle. His brigade
fought three or four hours at the first Bull
Run, gave way, and left about 3l6 men killed
md hn oil mi
Would it be impertinent or irrelevant to say
that Gen. Sherman on that Sunday morn
ing was a raw man himself in battle, and that
he, like his men, had never seen large masses
of soldiers charging in heavy columns, unless
he had seen them at Bull Run? (See 1 Me-
moirs, 1907 There were quite number OF
officers in the late rebellion, styled "prOfcs.
sional soldiers" who had never been in bat.
tic. The truth is, the armies on both sides
including officers, were only volunteers, and
had no right to be called professional sol
diers." In that army at that time the "regu
lar" and "West Pointer were not superior
to thousands around them, the only science
of war then practiced being fierce hand tC
hand fighting. Gen. Sherman was then tax
ing lessons that taught him how to manage
his army in the brilliant campaign that fol
lowed
When we remember that Gen Grant had gonc
down TO Savannah the day before, not dream
ing of battle before Buell. could arrive; whcr
We know that Lew Wallace, with only 5,00t
men, was isolated at Crump's landing ant
within easy and quick reach Of 30,00l
or 10000 rebels at Mickcy's house, no
eight miles distance; when VIC are told b!
Gen. Sherman that Jls position wa
extremely strong, with the Tennessee river
with Snake, Owl, and Lick creeks almost sur
rounding him, with line only one and a hal
to two miles to defend TO the north and west
which he could have made impregnablc will
one nights intrenchment, and did not do il
when we remember that we had on the fielt
ON Sunday morning at most $4,000 men wh
would, if placed across that line, have formed
q solid body thirteen men deep, and when w
further recall the fact that no general line o
battle was formed by Gen. sherman, and tina
our men, to say the least, in great haste me
the enemy in front of their respective en-
campments; when we remember the gaps de
scribed by the author of Grant and His Cam
paigns" Up. 36) above referred to; whei
we recall the anxiety with which not onl,
Grant and Sherman, but our whole arm.
and the people of the north, watched ant
awaited with bated breath the march of tn
army of The Ohio under Buell.; when W
know that Grant went to Savannah to hastel
that march under the apprehension that John
son might make an attack at Pittsburg land
ing before he could arrive; when we recall
the language of Sherman's historian that 18th
importance of the crisis was apparent, fo
JOHNSON WOulu naIuTNllS SOCK 10 5tTlke 1raH
before Buell's arrival" fisherman and hi
Campaigns" p. Al when we consider all thes
facts and that 10000 or 10000 confederate
were then within two miles of Shiloh meet
ing-house, we are compelled to come TO one
two conclusions: either that Gen. Sherma
had not then learned the art of war, or tina
his whole command was more than SUI
prised before sunrise Sunday, April 8, 1856,
Our lines were penetrated in at least tw
places by the first onset, and before IL IL
was as whole, driven ono or two mile
back toward the landing If any on
doubts the surprise, let him ask ut lea'
10000 soldiers who were over the field of ba
tie after and OH the second day, and saw on
dead lying inside Of their encampmcnt i
confusion. There arc thousands OF Letter
from the boys" eXtant which would, if co
lected, tell the whole story in words thu
could not 10 mistaken.
In justice to Gen. Sherman VIC are con
PEELED to insist upon his surprise,
This simple and truthful admission by hil
would exOnerate thousands of brave soldier
and their officers from the charge of coward
ice and dishonor To prove there was no SUI
prise would reflect too severely on Gen. She
man rs a soldier. Green indeed would an
o!iccr be If he had not probed his front an
placed strong guards from one TO two miles /
advance Of his encampments 10 receive an
check all attacks and give timely warning
Then line OF battle could have been formo
without "gaps" inviting the enemy to marc
in, separate, and conquer.
A tayoritc movement Of Napoleon was