Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1883-07-30
CAPTURE Of COaIArK.
How Halleck Marched Upon and
Subdued Beauregard and His
Forces, Numbering 100000.
An Undertaking Which Could
Rave steen Accomplished by
NO other Man-Why Was
He Not Promotes?


N. Quad in pstrsit Free Press.
Corinth was one Of the oharnel spot!
Of the war. From the time the Con-
tederstes FIRST occupied it until the
last Federal left It, the spade Of the
grave digger never had an idle hour
The soldier who tented on its soil and
drank of its water faced death as
surely as in battle. Low, fat, its soil
full Of chills and its waters unfit even
for horses to drink, Confederate and
Federal found it a graveyard as well
as a strategic point. Died al
Corinth" is the legend on hundreds
and hundreds Of headstones in the
national cemeteries, and Died at
Corinth" supplies the epitaph of hun
dreds and hundreds OF Uonfederates.
Directly after the battle of Shiloh
Beauregard retreated by slow and
easy marches to Corinth and there in
trenched. 1t has been asserted that
Halleck more than any other man was
to blame for getting Grant into pc.
sition to be annihilated, and it is GER
tain that directly after the battle he
made no secret of his personal hos
tility. He at once proceeded to Shi-
Ion and took command of the army in
person, and in recognizing it he took
care to humiliate Grant by virtually
depriving him of his rank. Grants
own immediate command was divided
aud sandwiched until he could not
find it, nor was he consulted in regard
to its disposition.
1t was the last days of April before
Halleck and his grand army of up
wards of $4,000 men were ready to
move on Corinth, and in the interval
he took due care to keep the nation on
the watch for the end of the rebellion.
PICK AND SPADE.
While Halleck's proclamatious and
dispatches carried the idea that be
meant to walk right ever Beanregard
aud into Corinth when he got started,
he had scarcely lett the Tennessee
river behind when he began to in
trench. There is not to- day a single
mile between Shiloh aud Corinth
where his old intrenchments can not
be found. Whenever his advance
struck Confederate picket and q
dozen carbines we're discharged, the
orders went back for spades aud picks.
The army moved like a hobbled
horse. Its average advance was not
hslt mile day. Corps and divisions
and brigades left one line of breast.
works to advance and erect another,
and had Corinth been twenty miles
further away, Halleck would have been
all summer reaching it. From the
Sd to the 2lst Of May, Halleck
advanced only five miles, although
the Confederate force on his whole
army front had at ne time numbere 1 a
division. Every day he had a dis.
patch for the Northern press, and
every night he Rugged his intrench-
ments and routed out the whole army
at every alarm from the picket posts.
BEoElGlNU OORlNTH.
Beauregard had in and around Cor
NTH a force not to exceed $4,000 men
His lines OF works were erected for
temporary defense, and we're not be-
gun until after Hallack began moving
The Federal works built three miles
out of Corinth, and built in thirty six
hours at that. we're far stronger than
any erected to defend the city.
And yet Hslleck not only got it into
his head that he must lay siege to
Corinth after the regular fashion, but
he got such train Of siege guns on
hand for the purpose that half his
army was worn out in getting the
monsters over the country and in DO.
sitioa. Beauregard had cause Ia
dred a prompt and rapid advance Of
the Federal army, with quick and
vigorous rush upon some one point oil
his works. but there was no cause fol
alarm over Halleck's programme.
DELAYING HALLEcK.
That the great Federal army m arcb
ing on Corinth would eventually ar
rive before it and that its evacuation
was only question of time, mus
have been clear to the Coniederat,
commander, but yet, to delay the tim,
as long as possible, he delayed Halleck
| Two Of the Confederate attacks mad
upon portions Of the Federal arm
while on the march was dignifed a
battles. although only few brigade
we're brought into action. Whateve
Beauregard did puzzled and delaye,
Halleck and proved his incompetence
None of his corps commanders coul,
have committed greater blunders
while Grant, Sherman or Thoma
we're far more qualified to comman,
the army and push it onward to vic
tory.
Il Outside OF the two attacks men
toned the Confederates delayed Hal
leck by such diminishing as woul
have delayed no one else. Wheneve
the Federal advance struck a Uonied
crate picket which held its ground 70
any length Of time, whole brigade
would be ordered up, and if scou
came in with . report OF a ConfeGe
rate division in position on one Of tn
roads the matter was serious enoug
for council Of generals.
IN POSITION.