Martinsburg independent. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1875-1900, 1883-01-27
An Important Decision.

JURY TRIES THE CAsE-iSP0RTANT
TO EVERY LITIGANT, EVERY MAGIs-
TRATE. AND EVERY LAWYER.
In the case Of G. \. Grim vs.. Joseph
Brown ct al, on an appeal from the
Judgment Of Justice, Judge Faulkner
rendered very important decision,
constituting the Justices act of 1881. and
| the amendment Of Sec. 10, Art 3 of the
Constitution adopted in 1880.
The question presented, was, the right
Of a party after trial Of his cause in a
Justices court by jury, and judgment
on the yerdiet,to have the case reviewed
by the Circuit Court, on an appeal taken
under Sec. 1853, Chapter of the Acts of
1881.
The provision Of the Constitution, re-
lied upon by the Appellee is, '.In suits
at common law, where the value in con-
troyersy exceeds twenty dollars, exclu-
sive of interest and costs, the right Of
trial by jury, if required by either par
ty, shall be preserved; and in such suit
before justice, jury may consist Of
six persons. No fact tried by jury
shall be otherwise re-examined in any
case than according to the rules Of the
common law >
The Court held that the Legislature.
recognizing the obligation ofthis proyi-
sion, provided by the I'D sec. of chapter
Sth, acts of 1881, for a trial by jury, in
all cases where the value in controver-
sy or the damages claimed exceeded
$50. 90, and by the subsequent sections
of said chapter, from y to 81 inclusive.
provided, in the most detailed manner
for the organization, empannelling and
control of the jury, the rendition of the
verdict, and the grounds upon which
the same should be set aside by the JUS
tice; and by section 115, excepted his
judgment, upon such verdict, from the
provisions of said act authorizing him
to set aside his judgment within two
weeks from its entry upon his record.
He held this clearly showed the inten-
ton of the trainers of said act, to draw
distinction between judgments rem
dered upon yerdicts, and judgments
without the Intervention of jury-and
that after judgment on a verdict, it was
beyond the further control of the Justice.
lie held: that the appeal authorized
by section 163 of said act, did not en-
brace or include a judgment rendered
citing the 16Sth and 10th sections as
showing, that the Legislature had used
the term, APPEAL, i'll its legal and tech
meal sense, the same being a civil law
proceeding in its origin, and differing
from a writ of error-which was IL
common law proceeding-in this, that
the appeal, subjects both the law and
facts TO review and retrial, while a
writ of error removes matter of law
only for denomination. Cranch, Ill.
This view is fully sustained by the iudg-
ment provided by section 173 on the APP
peal, which judgment is rendered, after
trial, regardless of any proceedings
which may have taken place before the
justice.
lie held: If this construction of sec
ton 1913 was not correct, then. so far as
it could embrace or include judgments
on verdicts rendered by the magistrate,
1t was III violation of the 18th section
article 3 of the Constitution, which pro-
vides, NO fact tried by jury shall be
otherwise re-eXamined in any case han
according 10 the rules of the common
law He held that there could be no
doubt of the construction of that proyi-
sion. 1t was adopted after IA similar
provision of the Constitution of the
United states, to-Wit: the eth amend
ment had been passed upon by the
supreme Court Of the United States,
and which Court, had clearly defined its
guarantees, land construed the extent of
Its prohibition on the powers of the leg
lslative department of the government.
He cited section 9lS ofStory's Common
taries on the Constitution, showing the
origin and reason which induced the
states to adopt that amendment, and
read from the opinion of Justice story,
IN the case OF Parson vs.. Bedford. 3 Pc
tiers All, discussing and constituting the
effect of the said amendment, hold
ing, that 1.-the only modes known to the
law 10 re-eXamine such facts.
are the granting new trial by the
Court where the issue was tried, or to
which the record was properly returna-
bic, or the award of a VENIRE FACIAS
DE NoNo, by an appellate court, for
some error Of law which interviewed in
the proceedings"
He held: there was no Legislative au-
thor!ty for an appeal, writ OF error, or
to the Judgment ola mag
istrate on a verdict of II jury. The APP
pellatc jurisdiction OF the Circuit Court,
under Sth article section u of the Con-
Is not defined, but is left to the
70 prescribe. I'm this ease
1t has made no such provision. Bat the
same section OF the Constitution, gives
,outr0, Of all proceedings before just-
,es and other inferior tribunals, by
prohibition, and CERrIo-
EARL" The principles governing the
of CERTElORARI, as cited III
Inc notes in ease of Drggen vs.. McGru-
Ter, T. American Decisions $50, and the
very clear al, able discussion of these
principles by Judge Green, in the case
If Dryden vs.. SWeinburn, u W Va.
81, would fully sustain and justify the
Use Of this writ-in the absence of all
pther remedy the record of the
Justice showed error, without any APP
zeal to legislative authority for the eX-
,rcise of this power by the Circuit
court. But he held further, that the
legislature of 1882, by chapter 1913, has
Hearty indicated its construction ofthe
9th section, article of the Constitu-
ion, by providing aremedy. for review
ng any errors in the judgments ofmag-