The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-11-01
THE RETIRING oHrEFrAlN.
(oomcluded from First Pnge.I

concluded from First PaGe.)
links in an endless chain. They have no alb
rupt origin, and they are without conclu-
sion. Peace is but truce After breath
ing space the COM atants recommence their
conflict at the point at which they left Off
In American annals the war of secession
stands by ITSELF and seems destined to stand
by ITSELF While it had as deep-seated an
origin and was as necessary an effect of
causes as the strife of Germany and France,
the eruption was single act OF volcanic So
clal and political forces The mountain it
threw up rises as solitary from the plain of
American history as Mount Tabor from the
plain of Esdraelon. Europe has no power
to shut its eyes against its past feuds and
battles. Its business is to endeavor to secure
that landmarks traced by 4 horrible expend-
lture of blood and treasure shall not be OBJ
liberated. The object of American patriot
ism is to plant over and efface the scars
OF civil discord and to teach the nation
to forget, as far as possible, why the tumult
ragged ana how 1t was appeased. In another
sense, it is natural for Americans to preserve
green and fresh the memory of the one ire
mendous war they have known since their
national existence began. In a military
point OF view, the war of independence is
utterly out of date. Its scientific military
moral is chiefly the moral of reciprocal
military blunders. The war of secession
was fought on a scale on which modern
which were many, were blunders any mod
ern armies might fall into Its trumphs of
tactics and strategy inculcate, like its
errors, lessons by which the abest modern
captains might profit. General Sherman
bore pre-eminent part III the execution of
the mastery movements to which the col
LAPSE of the South was due. In the worlds
military history his famous progress through
the heart of the Confederate States will fill
broader page than the remorseless shock OF
lightweight hurled by his chief against the
insurgent front. Its audacity was q cal
culated audaclty. He inflicted a moral
wound more disastrous than the material
shock. BY his flank march he shattered the
nerve of the enemy. The absence of resist
ance on his expedition through Georgia to
the sea,was not happy accident on which
his success depended. He was prepared to
fight, and would have fought and conquered
if opposed in Georgia, as he fought and con-
quered the next year in the Carolinas In
him the United States had the good fortune
to possess a born general, who has always
understood war as game of skill, as well as
a trial of brute strength and logged endur-
ance. Except General Lee it would be
hard to say what commander on either
side committed fewer mistakes and earned
victory more rightfuhy than General Sher-
man.
The United States army has gained much
by having at its head for nearly fifteen years
the United States, as a country which may,
like other countries, ct some time or other
again require a considerable army, the men,
DRY of the war of secession and it's victorious
issue constitutes a positive danger, Ameri-
cans recollect how the nation modified it.
self and wrestled down instruction by sheer
weight and obstinacy. American opinion is
tempted to rely on the same agencies should
future emergency threaten, and to look
upon war as mere collision of masses. If
the necessity arose, the American people
would doubtless be willing to undergo SINH
lar sacrifices. The necessity, however is
cruel, and it ought to be avoidable
Want of scientific knowledge in the officers
and of organization in the war Office
doubled and trebled the price the nation had
TO pay for its eventual escape from dirrup-
ton. General Sherman knows with what
difficulty the dnwieldy heap of military raw
material was nodded into the supple weapon
with which he pierced the vitals of the
South. Throughout his term of supreme
command he has persistently i'm pressed on
the United States government and legisla-
ture the obligation to maintain the army,
whatever its size, in condition of efficiency
and fitness to march and fight anywhere.
Although he has always asked moderate
numerical increase in the standing army, he
comprehends that the American public
would not sanction, and has no reason to
sanction, the formation of an army on
the European standard. The smaller it
is, the greater is the need that it should
be adapted TO become the perfect nu-
cleus of an extemporized citizen force.
A regular army of 25000 men, kept on
foot by a nation of 60000000, occupying an
area of more than 100000 square miles,
might have the duty thrown upon it of act
ing as the soul and spirit of a huge bulk
which can learn from it alone that war is an
art, and that without discipline an army is a
dangerous mob. General Sheridan may be
expected to have discovered that truth as
we'll as General Sherman. But it is an in
convenient arithmetical certainty that the
supply OF Sbermans and Sheridans cannot
long be available for the United States army
under the rule by which the former is now
retiring. Another inconvenience, equally
incident TO the inevitable lot of the Amer
lean people, is that, while its present happy
condition continues, no means exist for re-
placing uperannuated commanders by jul
niors who have bought experience like
them at first hand.