Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1883-03-08
SUPREME COURTsDECIsI0N.

The following is synopsis OF the decision
of the Supreme Court of this State in the
case of John Nichols VS.. B. F. Briggs, ap-
pealed by the defendant from the last March
term of the Circuit Court for York county !:
Sealed Note-Statute of Limitations-Mortgage
on Real Estate-Irrelevant Matter in Pleading.
Nichols Us. Briggs.
This was an action to forclose mortgage
upon real estate, executed by the defendant
on June 4th, 1874, to secure the payment of
his note under seal bearing date the same
day. The action was commenced January
14th, 1882. The defense was the Statute of
time the note fell due, June 4th, 1875, until
the action was brought, more than six years
had expired, and recovery at law was barred
by the Statute of Limitations. The Circuit
Judge disallowed the plea of the Statue, on
the ground that under the amendment of the
Code of 1880, enlarging the period of limita-
tions as to "notes secured by mortgage Of
real property,o the note in question was not
barred by the Statute of Limitations. The
defendant appealed.
The Supreme Court decides as follows {:
According to the provisions of the law un-
der the amendment of 1873, 15 Stats, 497,
making the limitation upon all sealed notes
for the payment of money only six years,
the note in this case was barred, as more
than that time had elapsed before the action
was commenced, unless there was some good
reason to the contrary.
There is no doubt that the Legislature had
the power befor the bar was complete as to
contracts then in existence to have extend
ed the time without impairing the Lbllga-
ton of such contracts but the question in
this case is, did the Legislature exercise the
power? The generalrule is that statutes are
not to be construed retrospectively, or so as
to have retrospective effect, unless 1T shall
clearly appear that it was so intended by the
Legislature. Ex parte James Clubhouse, IL
Rich, 237..
Statutes of Limitations relate only to the
remedy and are enforced according to the ter
.ftri, but laws and amendments Thereon Op-
crate only upon matters which arise after
their passage, unless they otherwise eX-
pressly declare. In this country Statutes OF
Limitations are as general rule applied on
ly to right of action which is to commence
IN fut,ro and are not retrospective in their
operation, and courts will give such statutes
prospective operation where there is moth
ing indicating different intention on the
part of the Legislature which enacted the
statute. 7 Waites, A. and d., 22e. In the
amendment of 1880 no such intention is
manifest.
Another question arose of greater diff
Guilty. Assuming that recovery on the note
considered by itself could not be had on ac-
count of the Statute of Limitations, must
the mortgage of real property given to Sc
cure the same debt also be considered as
barred A mortgage on land is an lnstru-
ment of such character as eXempts 1t from
the bar of the statute in less than twenty
years. So that if it is barred in this case 1t
it's relation to the note which impose upon
it like fate. This question has never been
directly decided in this State. The Court
adopts the general rule as laid down by MIR.
Jones, as follows: ''ThOugh the debt be
barred, the lien may be enforced. The fact
that debt secured by a mortgage is barred
by Statute of Limitation does not neces-
sarily or as general rule, extinguish the
mortgage security, or prevent the MAINTAIN
ing an action to enforce it." Jones SI! on
Mortgages, Section | ,204 and notes. This
rule has appropriate application in this
State where the law as it now exists makes
the statutory bar of a bond or other contract
in writing secured by mortgage OF real
property twenty years. Although that law
in terms is not applicable to this case, yet it
may be regarded as at least a Legislative de-
claration that the mortgage given to secure
the debt in such case takes it out of the
general rule in regard to the bar OF the stat
ute.
The Supreme Court also decides that mat
ter is irrelevant in pleading when it has no
substantial relation to the controversy be-
tween the parties to the action, and irrele-
want and redundant matter may be stricken
out on motion of any person aggrieved
thereby. See 2Waite's Practice, 437.
Judgment below affirmed. Opinion by
McGoWan, A. j.
Filed February 15, 1888.
Messrs. Hart& Hart for appellant. Messrs.
O. for