Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1883-09-17
GREELY FAST IN THE ICE.
HIS IMMEDIATE SUCCOR PRO
NOUNCED IMPOSSIBLE.

Commodore English, Actirq .Secretoyy Of
the Macy:
To charter another foreign ship with a
foreign crew for this duty to go North at
this late season, would simply invite fresh
disaster. The Proteus was handled very
unskillfully, and her crew behaved shame
fully at the wreck. The ship must be
American-manned and officered by the
navy and thoroughly equipped Unless
winter quarters can be reached north of
Cape Athol, the attempt would be useless.
This cannot be done. Melville Bay will
be impossible bv October at the latest.
ship cannot winter at Upernavik, and
men cannot sledge north from there.
f. WILDE,
Commanding U. ;. steamship Yantic.
The following dispatch from Lieutenant
Darlington was received at the Signal
Office to-day:
ST. JOHN, y. F., Sept. ID, 1888.
10 the CHEF ,Signdt officer Of the L. s. A..
ltdShingtOR, ID. o.
Stores were not left at Littleton Island
because it was not in my programme to
do SO. 1t was my intention to establish
depot at or near Cape Prescott and to
the nOrthWard as recommended bv Lieu
tenant Greedy and to fill the gaps caused
by the NepIune's failure to get above
Cape Sabine. See Greely letter, Beebe
report and my instructions. Five hum
dred and tiity-five rations were left at
Dpernavik by the Yantic for my party.
Fart of these met at point forty miles
north of Tessusak. All have since
been returned to the Yantic. The
ultimate result OF any undertaking to 90
North at this time is extremely problem
atlcal, and the chances are agsinst its
success, owing to the dark nights now
beginning in those regions, making ice
navigation extremely critical work.
There is no safe winter anchorage on the
west shore of Greenland between Disco
and Pandora harbor, except, perhaps, North
Star Bay, the winter quarters of Saun-
ders. However there is bare chance of
success, and if my recommendations are
approved, | am ready and anxious to
make the effort. NV Dlan
is to buy a suitable sealer.
take a crew from volunteers from the
crews of the Yantic and Powhatan, now
IN this harbor, paying them extra COM
pensatiOn, Lieutenant j. G. COlwelI to
command the ship, two ensigns and one
engineer, to be taken from those who
may volunteer from the same ship.
Also employ competent ice pilot
here. The ship must be under
United States laws and subject to mill
tary discipline. | believe nothing can be
done with foreign civilian officers and
crews. In the event of not enough sea-
men volunteering the remainder are to be
enlisted here. Commodore Wilde will
communicate with the Navy Department.
If anything Is to be done it must be done
at once. K. A. DARLINGTON.
1
vised that the Secretary of War will not
the proposed expedition this
fall but will order one next year.
The dispatches received to-day by the
Acting Chief Signal Officer of the army,
and the Acting Secretary of Navy from
Lieut.. Darlington, of the Greely relief
expedition, and Commander Wilde, of
the United States steamship Yantic, havO
excited much comment here and discus
sion. The telegram from Lieutenant Gar
lingtOn, it is said, seems to be a reply to
categorical questions:
''Why did you not land your stores at
Littleton Island or Life Boat Cove on
your way nOrth?"
The reply is: Because it was not in
my programme to do so. See my instruc-
tiOns.'
This reply, it is argued, seems to indi-
cate either that Lieutenant Darlington
never received the sO-called''supplemen
orders" to land his stores at Littleton
Island on his way north, or that if he re-
ceived such supplemental order he did
not regard them as imperative and did
not suppose that they were intended to
supersede the earlier instructions not to
leave his stores at Littleton Island on his
way north.
1t seems to be generally admitted here
by those who discuss the subject that the
landing of the PrOteus' stores at the
mouth of Smiths Sound, before the ship
herself encountered the perils of the heavy
pack north of Cape Sabine, was of
the utmost Importance. Prudent Arctic
navigators under similar circumstances
have always endeavOred to secure the
safety of their food supply by getting the
bulk of it on solid land as soon as possi-
bic after reaching their base of operations
and before running the extreme risk
which is necessarily involved in the at
tempt to penetrate any part of the great
polar pack. The experienced Arctic navi-
gator Leigh Smith, on his last voyage to
Franz Josef Land. two years ago, took
the precautiOn to put a large part
of his provisions ashore at the very
earliest possible moment, so as not to be
entirely at the mercy of the ice. The wis
dom Of this course was demonstrated only
a few days later by the crushing and sink
ing of his ship. If the bulk of the Pro-
teus' stores and the ready made house
which she had on board, had been landed
in this way on Littleton Island or Cape
Sabine, as soon as the ship reached either
Of those points, it would not have been ne
cessary for Lieutenant Darlington to seek
safety at Uppernavik, 800 miles away,
and the lives of Lieutenant Greely's par
ty would not have been i'm
perilled as they now are by
an insufficient supply of provisions at the
point where they had reason to expect an
The responsibility for this
fatal omission must, it is said, either be
upon the department which planned the
or upon the officer to whom
was entrusted the execution of it. The
department refers to its supplemental
orders as evidence that it had fOreseen
and guarded against such misfortune
as that which befell the Proteus by direct
ing that her stores be landed before she
entered Smith Sound. Lieutenant Gar
lington, on the other hand seems it is
said, to have had no knowledge of
the supplemental orders and to have act
ed upon his original orders, which were
to land his stores on his retreat after he
had tried to get through Smith Sound and
had failed. This apparent misunderstand-
ing between Lieut.. Darlington and the
department as to the most important
step of the summers Arctic campaign, !
will doubtless be cleared up when furth- |
er information shall have been received |
from Lieut.. Darlington by mail AS the sit |
latiOn now stands, Lieut.. Darlington
seems to have been acting strictly in ac-
with his original orders and his
of to-day bears, it is said, no eY-
dence'of any knowledge of a mOdifica-
ton of those instructions by later supple
mental orders
Some surprise is expressed here to-day
that Lieutenant Darlington, after the loss
Of his ship, did not wait at Cape Sabine or
LittletOn Island for the arrival of the
Yantic instead of undertaking the long
and hazardous journey in open boats to
Upernayik, July %, when the Proteus
was crushed. 1t was near the beginning
Of the best season for Arctic navigation,
and was the height of the
Arctic summer. The shipwrecked
crew would have had to wait for
the Yantic, as events proved, only eleven
days, and if the latter ship had not been
obliged to search for Lieutenant CARING
ton and his men, she might have remained
two or three weeks longer at the mouth
Of Smiths Sound and have gwen Lieu
tenant Greely that much more time to
reach there if he was on his way in boats.
After the receipt to-day of the telegrams
from Lieutenant Darlington and Comman-
der Wilde, the Secretary of War had con-
with the Acting Secretary of the
Navy and the Acting Chief Signal officer,
and it was finally decided that the send
ing cut of another expedition this fall
was impracticable, and would only put
more lives in imminent peril.
WASHINGTON, Sept. 16.-Dr. Emil Bes-
sells, who was chief of the scientific staff
of the Arctic exploring steamer Polaris
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