New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1883-10-25
REPLYING TO GENERAL HAzEN'
WHY CERTAIN THINGS WERE DONE AND olhhhS
WERE LEFT UNDoNE.

III
.;on0 osked him by General Hazen, after the re-
oaint of his official report Of the expedition 10
smitb,s Sound In reply to the question why nc
did not endeavor to make depot at Lltteuon
IIond 1v;tb what store he could gather during the
roo. &c +3e time he might have remained in that
region. Lieutenant Darlington says: AS stated
in nv report, decided while at Cape SABINE 10
make prompt and earnest effort to communicate
With the Yantic. and to proceed south at once for
that purpose. My reasons gave in my report, Dut
Twill enter into them moro fully. After the Pro-
teus was lost determined to communicate with
the Yantic as soon as it was possible to do so to
get from her all the supplies that could be spared,
and establish a depot at Lifeboat Cove. intended
TO remain there with small party, While the
Yantic could proceed to st. Johns report the u'sas
ter, and endeavOr to secure vessel smtaole
for ice navigation to come north with addiuohal
supplies If anything was to be done TINS season
looking TO the relief of Lieutenant Greedy, 1t was
of the greatest Importance to communicate with
tho Yantic at once. When the Proteus encoun-
tered the pack in Melville Bay 10 one on board that
vessel thought the Yantic would cross the bay.
This opinion was formed from the known intention
of the commander of the Yantic not to put his
vessel into the ice
"If had remained fortnight at LittletOn Island
for the chance of the Yantics arrival, my supplies
would have been reduced to dangerously small
margin Ii she did not arrive, would have had to
commence my retreat during rapidly closing sea-
son, with inadequate provisions. 1t would prob
ably have been necessary TO force our way through
much young ice, which at even that date formed
one quarter of an inch thick during calm nights.
This would have delayed the progress of the boats,
and prevented, communication of the disaster to
the Yantic in time that she might render
any assistance to Lieutenant Greely, 1t
did not prevent me entirely from reaching
the Danish settlements this season, and
the sending of the news of the disaster
home this year. If had remained in that region
until it too late to reach the Danish settlements
it would have been necessary to draw on the sup
plies already deposited for Lieutenant Greely, and
if he should arrive he would find his own supplies
diminished and the addition to his party of another
body of men no better off than his own party at the
Danish settlements before the close of the season.
/ left Littleton Island on July 20, and on August
z We had made but 130 miles. ] reached Cape
York on August IT, and was confirmed III my belief
that the Yantic had not crossed Melville Bay. The
natives at Cape York had not seen any vessel pass
tc the nOrthward and westward lately, and they
knew nothing of the Swedish steamer Sofia which
was to have come there for series of scien-
tic observations. This fact convinced me that the
Sofia had not been able to get through the Melville
Bay pack and if she had not thought the Yantic
most certainly had not.
WHAT WOULD HAVE B1EN LOST BY DELAY.
"If | had concluded to take the risk Of waiting
at Litteton Island for the Yantic IwOuld not have
gathered any of the supplies az Cape Sabine and the
west coast of Smith Sound to form depot at Lit
tletOn Island. These stores are much more avail
able to Lieutenant Greey where they are than they
could be if on LittletOn Island. l no natives
about Life-bOat Cove OF Littleton Island, nor any
recent signs of their presence, so could not have
formed depot of supplies procured from that quar-
ter Birds were plentiful, but had but one shot
gun and eighty-sx cartridges in my party so could
not have secured many birds Although 1 made
every effort to do so was unable to find the guns
and ammunition provided for the expedition Wal
rus were very numerous, but at that season they
were very wild and wary taking to the water at
the slightest alarm; moreover they sink when shot
in the water. Seals are difficult to secure for the
same reason, Several were shot during the retreat,
but sank Immediately. Any attempt at securing
game would have seriously retarded my progress
south, which desired TO hasten Us much as possible
for reasons already given"
TIE STORES LEFT on THE ICE FLoE.
In response to the question why a large part of
Lieutenant Greely's stores abandoned on an
ice foe, SO long as the season still per-
mitted work with boats, Lieutenant Gar
linQtOn saws: "The boats worked all night
and until IL o'clock the next day getting
the stores saved from the ship on Cape Sabine.
Each trip attended with great danger the ice
was all in motion and running rapidly to the south
east before strong wind from the northwest and
the of-tide. The large foes of heavy Arctic ice
were continually crushing and grinding together,
cracks opening and closing; the edges of the foes
marked by ridges of ice blocks piled up ten
twelve feet high by the enormous pressure Of the
great masses of ice as they jammed against each
other. The risk of handling the boats in that sea
of moving ice 80 great that it was seriously
argued by part Of tho crew of the PrOtcus then
the foe, to give up the attempt to reach Cape
Sabine and trust their fortunes to the solid iceoe
they were then on, rather than run the chances of
being crushed while eadeayOTing to make land.
When last saw the foe having the provisions it,
it was about two miles away, the sea between
covered with heavy broken running ice, and the
foe itself moving to the southwark aud eastward
at the rate Of two and half miles an hour. The men
had now been working almost continuously for
twenty-One hours having eaten nothing except
hard bread and tea during that time, and were
worn out with fatigue and loss of sleep did not
consider the stores remaining on the foe OF suffi-
cient Importance again to endanger the lives of my
men or seriously risk the loss of my boats As near
as can ascertain when the last boat left the foe.
there remained on it two barrels of assorted canned
goods, some loose cans. small quantity of lumber,
TWO sails, some scattered clothing, the theodolite
and some boxes Of newspapers"
WHY NO BOAT WAS LEFT FOR GREELY
Lieutenant Darlington answers the question why
out of six boats left for Lieutenant Greely
and party, as follows: II had two ordinary navy
built whale-boats and dingy. The dngy was a
very light shallow cedar boat for use in perfectly
smooth water. She would have been Of no use to
Leutenant Greedy, and took her along in tow that
she might tighten the cargoes of the othor boats
and serve as u shelter for the men when ON land.
The two whale-boats were necessary to carry nv
own party Of thirteen men one would not have
been sufficient. The boats of the Proteus were old