The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1883-12-29
beng under any legal obligation to build 1t.

construed as to create liability on tn
part of the town Of Lancaster where nom
existed At the time OF Its passage"
It's quite plain that the question befor
the Court in that case was not whether ad
joining towns could under any circum
stances bind themselves by contract 4
erect AMI MAINTAIN within the limits Of ,
city bridge over u stream which divide,
them, but II was whether, under the statute
above quoted, there was an absolute llabl
ity on the part of town to pay onc.hal
the cost OF bridge lying within the limit,
Of city.
In view OF the subsequent ruling of III,
Supreme Court IN Rutiand vs. Ddytos, 81
Ill. 63, that even as to bridges over stream!
dividing towns without the limits Of city
there was under that statute no liability OF
the part of either town, in the absence OF I
contract to build it or of acts amounting t
q recognition of such liability, il Is Difficult
to see how the Supreme Court could have
held the town of Lancaster liable.
There Is another sufficient reason why
the cases cited cannot be regarded as au
thority In the case in hand and that Is
that the language Of the law as it theE
read was essentially different from the Law
rs 1t now stands. The law of 1861 only
authorized the building OF bridges by The
towns "pheneoer any adj0inI0g torn is la
b'e," whereas the law now to be construed
declares that "brsdges oger streams nhtci
digide to,chs shdU be juW dad repdir
ed at tie expense Of such tOwns" The power
and duty OF the towns by the present law
is not confined to the building of bridge.
which the towns have made themselves le
gaiy liable to build, but the statue Itself
creates the liability and nakes il absolute
and It's terms are broad enough 10 include
bridges within as we'll as those without tie
limits of the city.
To construe this statute 10 apply only 10
bridges without the limits of city ls
equivalent to making the statute read
bridges over streams dividing towns, ec-
ceptiag bridges WitAin tie limits eta city,
shall lie butt and repaired at the expense
OF such towns"
Such AN addition ought not TO be made
to the statute unless no other construction
is possible, for it oughtto be assumed that,
had the legislature intended such con
struction, they would have added the words
necessary to make it plain.
Again, the language Of the act concern.
ing cities and villages IS such that the
power gwen the city to build bridges Is
general and includes all bridges. So like.
wise is the power given the Commissioners
Of Highways to open ROADS and build
bridges. Such powers may well be held
to limit each other and TO require con
struction giving the city power to build
bridges within ani the Commissioners
power to build those without the city.
But the statute in question is special
provision concerning particular kind OF
bridges and hence, by the well known rule
Of construction, ii ought to be regarded as
II limitation at the general powers con
ferred upon city authorities anu Commits
sioners of Highways. Besides, it is the
lates: enactment Of the Legislature, and II
there is any inconsistency between Its
terms aud those of previous acts, the latter
must give way.
No one can doubt the power of the legis-
lature to confer authority upon towns to
build bridges within the limits OF city,
aud if statute construed as 1t reads con-
Iers such authority, 1t should be taken to
mean what ii says, unless there Is some
good reason requiring different con
struCtlOn.
The chief argumeI; advanced why a
different construction should be adopted Is
that to authorize the towns to build bridge
within the limits ot q city would interfere
with the control OF the city over It's streets
and lead to strife and confusion. The best
answer to this argument Is, that ii the le-
gislature has seen fit 10 confer ibis author
Nv upon the towns 1t follows that such au-
horily becomes superior by virtue OF the
statute to that of the city authorities, and II
he latter are disposed to be iaw.abidlng
here can be no occasion for any strife or
confusion, and # they are not law abid-I
ny, they are no. worthy Of any consldera-
ion. Another answer Is, that the probabi-
ity of the existence OF any disposition tol
create strife and confusion IS extremely
remote. The city is within the territorial
limits and forms part Of the greater muui
opal corporation called the town, its clti-
,ens and legal voters are likewise citizens
md legal voters OF the town and contribute
II the same manner and to the same extent
% the payment of taxes for its support that
hose do who live without the limits of the
,ity. Those VINO see danger Of strife be
ween municipal corporations thus consti-
uted must certainly give little thought toI
he tact that ever since the formation Of our
government cities have been situated with.
n towns, towns within counties, counties
within states, and states within the United
States, each exercising powers within the
errltorial limits of the others, and no such
conflicts have yet arisen as 10 demonstrate
he imprsctlcability of a system of govern.
nent
Athird answer to make Is that when such
enterprises as the one III question are to be
the consent CT the city may be-
obtained by the towns.
But the argument may be made that the
,ity cannot give this consent
There can be no doubt upon this point. |
Though the city holds the fee OF Its streets
n trust for the uses and purposes for
which they were dedicated, it has neverj
been held that they may not permit their
use by public corporations for certain
purposes. though the effect Of such
use may be such as to practically exclude
public travel over them by carriages and
loot passengers. No one has ever doubted
the right Of a city to permit its streets to
be blockaded by building materials to be
used in erecting building upon an adj i
Joining lo:. Such use is for the public
good. Nor has any one questioned Its,
right to permit railway companies 10 CON-
struct permanent tracks upon them 10 the
practical exclusion OF such ordinary meth