New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1883-09-09
VAR CLOUDS IN THE EAST

The possibility OF a war between France anu
China is still 40 far remote that its consequences
can be calmly discussed by European statesmen
and Journals. In modern times there Is rather
a long distance between a word and blow.
Nations are SO welded together in commercial
and industrial interests that one of them can
hardly make war without the permission OF
others. and the obstacles thrown in the way by
diplomacy generally prove insuperable. at
nresent China announces its willingness To ac-
cent the good offices of Great Britain. II offered
IN nromote an amcable settlement with France,
ana the astute Cinnamon probably know that
the British Government can hardly help look
ing at the cause of the controversy through
Chinese spectacles. To all appearances, China
has the right OF the matter, and Great Britain
would be quite unlikely to strain point In
favor Of France as against China, even IL the
ouestion were more doubtful. But it is not
clear that Great Britain will desire to prevent
war. Possibly defeat of France in the far East
might be advantageous TO British inter-
ests, and war, however it might end, would
seriously interrupt French commerce while IL
lasted, ana throw a larger share of the carrying
trade of the East into British hands.
Nor is it clear that the party at present hav-
ing the upper hand i'll China desires to prevent
war. 1t has been said by an Englishman who
has unusual knowledge of Chinese affairs that
a war would mean the speedy overthrow oil the
ruling dynasty and greater freedom oil COM
merce in that region. But the reasons given
for that belief are not conclusive. IL Is not
certain that the troops and the navy OF CHINA
NAV not suffice to resist France for consider
able time, and successful war would only
strengthen the railing dynasty in China. Then,
after some months of ineffective effort with
Inadequate forces, France might begin to con =
slider seriously the eXpediency OF employing
large armies and navies and expanding enor-
nous sums in the effort to held the territory
recently occupied and the question might then
become one of the utmost political importance,
possibly involving a change Of rulers in France.
If the Chinese statesmen count upon these
results. and possible interference at last by
England or Germany, it may be that they are
wiser than the men who represent the Govern
ment of France.
Atall events war would not be altogether a
| matter of gOngs and tom-tOms in these days.
| The Chinese have arms of excellent quality,
some discipline, and leaders of some capacity,
| and their war vessels are not to be despsed.
The people have even less tear OF deatn than the
Russians, and, if they possess organiza ton
and discipline enough to fight at all, may prove
very troublesome adversarles. The French
would DO at a great disadvantage because OF
distance from the theatre Of hostillties, and
even more because every movement OF troops
or munitions through the Suez Canal would be
| known to the Chinese long before men or material
| could arrive in Eastern waters. With power to
be thus thoroughly fOrewarned, and with a
vast population from which to recruit its army
or supply its treasury, China would also be
able to keep its military and naval movements
entirely concealed from Europeans. 1t is not
easy to Overestimate the advantage which
these circumstances would give to the Chinese
rulers, aud, in the end, moreover, they could
probably count upon the interposition of Euro
| pean Powers to arrest the struggle.