The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-06-12
THE FIELD OF GETTYSBURG
A Soldiers Criticism of the General
ship of the Struggle.


Book.
In the description of this gigantic en-
counter the writer has brought an affiuence
of details which would bewilder the reader if
the many colored threads of the story were
not held and assorted with hand that is as
deft as it is firm. And to the criticism of
this battle he has brought an independence
of judgment which is likely to make his mar
rative as remarkable for its even poise of CEN
sure as for the obvious candor and rectitude
with which his judgments are pronounced.
We are far from intiinating that
these opinions of the noble author
are to- be deemed final and
authoritative; but this we may safely say,
that no subsequent history of the battle of
Gettysburg ever be written, whether
from the Federal or Confederate point of
view. without taking these criticisms of the
French soldier and writer into fair estima-
ton and full account. The battle of Gettys-
burg will doubtless furnish a theme of con-
troversy as lasting as the battle of Waterloo
--as lasting, we may say, as the battle of
Cannae, about which we read that the Ro-
man schoolboys were wont to debate even
in the days of the Roman Empire.
The Comte de Paris makes. no concealment
in many parts of this VOLUME that he holds
the military talents of General Lee in the
highest admiration. This admiration is ex-
pressed again and again; but in his criticisms
of the battle of Gettysburg he does not
hesitate to point out what he conceives to
have been the conspicuous faults of the
Southern chieftain And here, too, the inn
partial reader cannot fail to note the steady
balance of the writer's mnd-the transpar
ent droiture with which he reaches his con-
illusions and the modesty with which he
states them.
The Comte de Paris undertakes to show
that it was from something more than patri-
otto selfsacrifice that General Lee, in full
sight of the disaster which overlook him at
Gettysburg, assumed for himself the whole
blame of that untoward struggle. Hethinks
that General Lee committed serious mis-
takes, both strategic and tactical, in the con-
duct of the battle, and that for some of these
mistakes he must ever be accounted worthy
of censure. Here again we can venture on
no analysis of the battle. 1t is only few of
its salient points that we can recaptulate.
1t is to General Buford that the Comte de
Paris ascribes the honor of having selected
the battlefield for the Federals. He writes
This first inspiration OF cavalry officer
and true soldier decided in every respect
the fate of the campaign. 1t was Buford
who selected the battlefield where the
two armies were about to meet and measure
their strength it must be granted
that he was sure of the appreciation
of his two immediate commanders, both be-
ing animated by the same zeal which
prompted his own acton-Pleasanton who
had sent him from Emmettsburg to Gettys-
burg at the first news of the enemys appear
ance on the Cashtown road, and Reynolds.
whom he knew to be determined to provoke
the conflict as soon as he should find an OPP
portunity. Buford did not deceive himself
in regard to the perls of his situation"
While RufOr1 and General ReVnOldq ara
praised for provoking the battle for the pos
session of Gettysburg, General Meade is
blamed for not at once coming to the front
and reconnoitering the ground.
Meade should have gone in person to re-
connoiter the localities around which the
conflict was carried on, being only separated
from it by about thirteen miles. But, as we
have already stated, the Union generals-in-
chief, notwithstanding their activity and
courage, left their headquarters reluctantly,
for making constant use of the telegraph for
the transmission of their orders, they found it
inconvenent to be any great distance from the
office. Unwilling to go to Gettysburg him
self Meade, upon the advice of Butterfeld
his chief of staff sent General Hancock in his
place. The latter had Just arrived at fancy
town with the Second corps from Frizel-
burg where he had passed the night Meade
who reposed well-deserved confidence in
this chieftain, had Just explained all his plans
to him. He had selected him. although the
junior of Howard and Sickles, to replace
Reynolds in command OF the left wing, re.
questing him to decide, after an inspection
of the ground whether it was expedient to
deliver battle either at Gettysburg or at
some neiGhboring point back of the town, or
to fall back upon Pipe creek. From the mo-
ment that Meade declined assuming the
responsibility OF this decision he could not
have selected a more competent officer to act
in his place than Hancock.
GENERAL LEES TACTICS.
After General Lee had failed to gather the
fruits of the victory on July l. in the pre-
liminary struggle before Gettysburg, and
after he saw the Federal army in front of
him at that defensive point, the Count
thinks that it would have been best for him
not to have ventured on an assault He
SAYS:
HE has four alternatives to select from:
He has the choice to retire into the gaps of
the South mountain, in order to compel
Meade to come after him, or to wait steadily
in his present positions for the attack of the
Federals; or, again. to manoeuver in order to
dislodge them from those they occupy, by
menacing their communications by the right
or The left; or, finally, to storm these
positions in front, in the hope of carrying
them by main force. The best plan would
undoubtedly have been the first. because by
preserving the strategic offensive Lee would
thus secure all the advantages of the tactical
defensive And even if Lee, considering the
temper OF his army, cannot be blamed for
making the a tack the Count thinks that it
is impossible not to recognize the faults he
commits when this determination has once
been settled. We have seen how important
it is for him to carry out his determination
without delay; yet when ne returns from his
conference with Ewell OH the LIST OF July he
n ia hnu Ola ri
ed upon his plan of battle for the following
day. He no doubt desires to wait for day
light in order to reconnoitre the ground, but
this uncertainty causes him to lose much
precious time AT daybreak of the I'd ne is
in the saddle; he has decided to make the
attack on the right, and orders Longstreet to
place his two divisions on that side, along the
nrOlongatinn of uiIns line so as To be n lie