The Indianapolis journal. [volume] (Indianapolis [Ind.]) 1867-1904, 1883-01-24
THE DISSENT IN IOWA.

II III bS&b W II QlSS6ullIb OBiliOn VI
Justice Beck, of the Iowa Supreme Court,
has been received. 1t is a long, exhaustive
and complete examination of the questions
involved in the case of the prohibition
amendment, answering the points made by
the majority of the court, and reaching the
conclusion that the amendment should be
upheld. 1t will be of interest to note a few
paragraphs of this able opinion, with respect
to the alleged defect relied upon In Indiana
to inValidate the pending amendments. In
the first place, Justice Beck insists that the
General Assembly of the State has a perfect
right, and it is its duty, to determine the
questions of fact involved in its own pro-
ceedings, and, therefore, the Nineteenth
General Assembly was warranted in de-
termining the regularity of the action of the
Eighteenth, so far as to warrant proceeding
with the amendment. Having done
this, it is a legislative construction which
the majority of the court say should not
dina the present General Assembly can de-
termine for itself the facts of the action of
the last Assembly, and if it determines that
a substantial compliance with the constitu-
ton was had, and agrees to the amendment
and submits it to q popular vote, it is not
competent for the courts to go behind this
action Of the Legislature and decide that
they had no jurisdiction of the matter. The
jurisdictional question is for the Assembly
to determine for itself, and that determine
ton must be respected by the courts.
In the examination of the second objection
urged against the amendment-that it was
not entered at length upon the journals
Justice Beck argues the question a priori.
As we have stated, the custom in Iowa has
been to spread the amendments upon the
journals at length, while in Indiana the Gus
tom has been the reverse, and Justice Beck's
reasoning goes to sustain the validity of the
Indiana practice. He says:
'The definition of the words TO enter as
given by Webster, which is applicable to it
in the connection it occupies in the clause of
the constitution under consideration, is this;
To inscribe, to enroll, to record, to enter
a name, or date, or a statement of facts; to
enter a'debt on a ledger; a manifest of a ship
or of merchandise in a custom-house,' and
the like. Worcester's definition is: TO set
down in writing; to register 1t will be OBJ
served that none of the definitions necessari-
ly conveys the idea of copying or TRANSCRIPT
ing an instrument in writing. There can be
no claim to the contrary, except possibly as
to the word record used in Webster's def
milton, but one of his definitions of record
is to make a note Of 1 think l may safely
say hat the word TO enter in its common
use has not a meaning synonymous WITH to
copy or to 'transcribe.' Without qualifying
words, the idea conveyed by its use in rela-
ton to papers or accounts is the writing
down of their substance, character or de-
scription for purposes expressed or under
stood,
The word is doubtless used in the
practice prevailing in legislative
assemblies in keeping their journals. Bills
and other matters are not commonly tran
scribed or copied upon the journals, but are
entered by their titles or a statement of their
contents or otherwise. y y Cushing
says: The constitutional requirement that a
journal be kept, though imperative as to the
keeping OF a record of the proceedings, leaves
the form and manner of keeping it wholly to
the assemblies themselves, who may, not
withstanding, direct what entries shall be
made therein This author may be quoted
Will COullttilC0 III VIEW VI bHt ldCL LDdt TIE
rules of parliamentary practice announced
by him are recognized by legislative enact
ment in this State"
Justice Beck ~collates forty-four instances
in which the word ito enter is used in the
constitution and statutes of Iowa, and no.
where, without qualifying words, has it the
significance to transcribe at length, but Gin
variably implies the making of a record or a
writing showing facts, memoranda, state
ments of the character, title or contents of
written instruments" After a further ex-
animation of the word ito enter" as used
with respect to judicial proceedings, the
entries of judgments, ct %cetera, Justice Beck
says:
81 reach the very satisfactory conclusion,
based upon the uniform practice of legisla-
tive assemblies and the meaning of the
words of the constitutional requirement
under consideration, as commonly under
stood, and as taught by their use in the
laws of the State, that article 10,
section l, of the constitution
does not require a proposition for
amendment to be copied, transcribed, en-
tered in full upon the journals of the re-
~spectiye records of the General Assembly
adopting the measure, and that its directions
were followed by the General Assembly in
the proceedings under consideration"
The question of the value of the journals
of the two houses as evidence against the
enrolled copy of an act or joint resolution
is investigated at great length, and a full
citation OF all cases made in which the ques-
ton is adjudicated. Justice Beck makes
this broad declaration:
81 challenge the production Of acase where
a solemn instrument, public or private, has
been annulled or set aside upon the evidence
of these Journals. The rule contended for
makes the weaker and more imperfect evil
L iaaAa.f unaaIo.aGsanA Aln.n liz na,nn I'D