The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1882-07-25
From the Ohio To the Sea.
Sherman's Advance Into Georgia.
Beginning His Movements as O
FlanKer-The Fight at Reseca
| and JOhnStOn's Retreat.
Detroit Free Press.

ldHhCT. no Il IL HI dL IGcSOCtb
and JOhnstOn'S Retreat.
Detroit Free Press.
Before leaving Chattanooga with Sher
man on his, grand march to the sea, i
will be we'll to note circumstances ant
conditions. Lee, in Virginia, had all b
could do to hold his own. Boys OF L
and men of go were carrying muskets il
his army, and he was losing three me-
by death and desertion where he secure,
one recruit. The Confederate armies il
the West had been driven from pillar II
post, and were little better than mobs
They were in rags, unpaid, half-fed, ant
hanging together u see the end. John
ston's army, confronting SHERMAN, wer
good fighting men, but, If not demoral
lied, they were discouraged. The las
Campaign of The war had come. Wome,
and children iu the North who had rea,
the papers for six months knew that tb
end was near. Confederates with mus
kets in their hands knew it better. Th
Confederate Government had lost th
confidence of the Observation-Disclosures
was the rule in every army-there wa
no hope of foreign interyention-th,
blockade was pertect-the North hat
FIVE to one in the field-the South wa!
in rags and on the verge of starvation
and men were to fight without hope t
stimulate them.
When Grant aud Sheridan decided OF
the great move they knew all this. A!
cutting loose from his base of supplies
Sberman's movement seemed more da
ring thing than it really was. The striI
of country through which he was tc
march had not been visited by war, and
would sustain an army passing through
Sherman knew Johnstou's forces to 6
man, and he knew that he could sweep
him along before him or flank him in
contempt. He knew that neither the
East nor the West could aid the Confed-
crates, and that the general demoralizs-
ton was causing thousands of deser.
tions.
The wonder is that he was opposed
al all. Johnston's men were in rags and
on half-rations. The cartridges furnish
ed by the Confederate Government were
miserablv poor. the artillery ammunition
worse. ard it was impossible TO obtain
anything like a tult ontft for man or
horse, Four-fiIths Of the artillery horses
were in harness made of canvas or old
ropes, and not more than halt of the
cavalry had saddles and sabers. Some
had carbines, some muskets and some
only revolvers. There were four or five
patterns of arms among the infantry, ,and
these were muskets that had been used
so long that the cartridges would fall
out if the barrel was depressed below
1t would be hard to imag-
inc an army worse of in outfit: and TO
his must be added the fact that Confed-
crate money was of no value, rations
we're terribly scarce, and feeling of
and general demoraliza-
lion SO affected the rank and file that
Confederate pickets were posted quite as
much TO prevent desertions as 10 guard
against an advance by the Federals.
have not written this, because
historians follow great rovements, and
10 not stop for details. Sherman has
not admitted il; but it is true, and more
han true, and the reader who was op
;he field and the reader who is not
Digot will give weight to these things
when perusing the pages Of history.
THE SLAUGHTER.
The force under Johnston has been es
timated as low as 10000 and as high as
10000. Hood gives this latter figure in
his controversy with Johnston, while
Johnston claims that his strength should
only be given on the basis Of men pres
ent and ct for duty. During the winter
death and desertion had played havoc
with Bragg's old army, and long enough
after Johnston had taken command it
was no uncommon thing to repor, so de-
sertions OF q morning. Many reported
IS deserving simply paid visit to their
homes and returned thereafter, and this
coming and going was constant If
effective force was $4,000
men he had more than the Confederate
War Department had returns for. He
was deficient in artillery, in transporta-
ion, in equipments of oil sorts, and he
lsd reason to know that neither the
head of the Confederate Government
,or Gen Bragg, who bad been called to
Richmond IS military adviser, owed him
my good will.
Johnston was to stand alone and han.
lie an army Of $4,000 men who saw-the
end of the war approaching and had lost
III hope of success. Sherman was to
move with 10O, 600 meo and ESQ pieces
Of artillery. He had the best OF arms
and equipments, and Federal soldiers
we're never more enthusiastic. 1t was
not a eipgle rmy~which-was to pour
forth from Chattanooga over the soil OF
Georgia, bat three grand columns under
the lead of those steady fighters, Nc
Phersou, Thomas and Schofeld John
ston must have realized that he would in
the end be brushed aside, but be gather.
ed bis army in hand and awaited the
coming of the host. Davis has criti-
cised him sharply-Hood has attacked
with bitter vindictiveness, but Gen Lee
expected no more than was accomplish
ed e 'a'-ss-ae-Ae- >. ASA -
a3g REsAcA. u ~ /.
Johnston might bave successfully de.
Tended his position at Dalton against an
equal force, but he soon discovered that
Sherman was working around to. his
rear, and would quickly box him up>snd
be retreated on Dalton. There had been
hopes held, out that Sherman would be
here, and that the Confederates
would win great victory. When that
hope was dashed by the retreat, over l.
600 Confederates left the army the first
night 10 make their way to their homes,
The Confederate lines at Resacs we're
10 the shape of q, following the high
ridge to the west of the town The po-
sition was not only naturally strong, but
the greater part of the Couiederate army
bad ample time to prepare for the ex
pected attack. Hoods corps was on the
right, Folks on the left aud Hardee's in
the center, aad while one H1nk OF the
army touched the .0ostanula River on
the sou h the other rested on the Gonna.
saoga River on The north.
+. The Federal lines followed the Con-
"A -