Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1882-11-10

suppose we select the twelve prominent thhi-
,aipns and battles OF the war-allh see what me .
yeflnonters had to do in them. We may take the |
irst battle because 1t was the Drsti Bull lui
BECAUSE, Is MIR. William swin,on says u sh9Wel
mat the war was 10 be n war aud not slNt uays /
riot Shiloh as the defeat OF the iltst lnriuahl'
aggressive campaign OF the Confederate Armies ~
me West: the Ieninsuar Campaign oil lob2, /
memorable for rebel successes; Gettysburg, ~ |
the defeat Of the greatest rebel INVASION Of the !
East N.ckshurg, because II ulrici Mlssissipp, !
To the Union; the Wilderness, which l'an4urdrd !
the "hammcring out OF the toniclerNr!; tcuIl
creek as the most romantic battle OF the war
Atlanta and the march TO the sea. Which showed
that the tunfcdcracy was only II shell; Nashville.
which annihllatrd The rebellion at the West anu
the capture oi Pcicrsburg which was me capture
of richmond aud collapse Oi the tOntt'tcricA
In intcc ct these great critical campaigns the
Vermont troops had no share. We had no regiment
at shiloh or IN the Amy 'oi me tulnbcrlhhu OF
under sherman. Bu II IL certainly noticrihlr that
IN al them the troops OF lliilc STATE
whose quota formed but an cightcih part OF the
grand linton aggregate, should have been engaged
and should have rtnIcrcd important service.
Let US consider this somewhat IN detail. INC
urst actual collision oi thc war,-- or SUMTER was
the bluudlcss haticrng down ui au almost
slcn, fortress, and the AFFAIR at Phippi, West
Virginia, was an unrcsisted rout OF u rcbcl
battalion was At Zig bcthel /; is knDwnas the first
"pa,tv' ui the war and III us consequences oil
ENCOURAGEMENT of the south was really an inpor-
tani battle. AIMED IN ignorance ami iolly,
where thcyn wa, no outpost, and the
capture OF formidable works, which Gen. Butler
and Major winthrop, me authors oi me plau
SIDE ut Back RIVER, 1t Is Il comfort To Remember
that no Nprmontcr was III any way responsible Tor
the scheme. Gen. Phelps disapprovcd OF thr
expedition as planned, and col Mashburn COIN
seized return after the night collision OF mon
regiments. When The enclosed eaith WORN anu
ru pts OF Big Bethel manned by liOl men ana
seven pieces ii arillvry-were reached. II was OF
course fDund that COlOnels Magrulcr anu HI OF
the Confederate army hal not DIcn trained AZ
West Point to Put their main works before instead
uf behind the natural detenceS Inc attack on
them as conducted by Gen. Pierce, consisted chle,
~ IN II aIchng regiments tO.and fro on his sue OF
the creek ami under cover OF the woods. inc
only actual assault by the Union infantry was
made 10y Il battalion OF Vermont and Massachusetts
troops, commanded by a Nermontcr. Coz. WASH
burns was The unly command that crossed the
creek OF inflicted any damage Oh the enemy. II
was an ingorlous affair, bat noteworthy htr.i,G
II cNhIb ted at the outset the incttc ui our vermont
| soldiers and the declaration of IN cye-witnes,
| from another state Will not .bc Gausaldi thai ~
the other troops hal done their duty. as well ana
gone as far a,thOsc Ut Vermont and Massachusetts,
| Big Bethel would not have headed u long isl vi
| Federal rcvcrsCs.
| Al Bul Run the Second Vermont regiment was
not put IN TIL the dag was already lost lts
officers found no organized body of mon troop
IN sight. outside OF their own brigade, when theb
went into action. They rendered very important
service III checking pursuit, While our army Wa'
Withdrawn across Bull Run. The Richmond papers
parlicularIzcd the Vermont regiment as one whOs'
ire inflicted heavy loss on their side; and t0'
| nowatds remarks IN a subsequent address 10 the
regiment was II fair eptonc oi Their cohducl
"COul apd steady a. regular troops, SAID ne, 'Ap'
stood On the brow OF that hill ard hrci You
ihrty.siN rounds, and retired only at the com
mand Of your Colonel. Our NcrmOnters appeale'
to no disadvantage AS compared with any req
mcnt that crossed Bull Eun on that disnstrul
day ami it Is worth remembering that tine hrlgal
OF McD lwell's army, which, taking GOODNESS ah
stern determination from their commander
moved last along the Centley lie ridge and cOvere
the retreat ui our army, was COMMANDED ny
gallant son OF Vermont, COL Israel H. Richardson
The universal modification At the want OF result
from Gen. Mctlcllan's splendid preparations, u
the PENINSULA campaign oil 1867, Is soht"hl
t,If.s .t.t AaVft Oh
only movement below y urkluwn, thut could u
: called "rapld and vigorous which are the adJrc'
ives appic! I" It by Gen. MAglihltr, on ine 1lhp
sidt-was the assault on Inc enemy Wolhn y
Lees Mills by a battalion OF Vermont loops. lia
they been supported by GEN. Mcclellan, instead q
= Withdrawn. the thin line along which few lhuu'
: and confedera,es so long hcld back three time
= their number would have been pierced, and IN
e whole history OF the campaign probably change
i ''Regrgt that the movement was NOT pushed
says Gen. Webb, the latest historian OF ;he Penn
sular campaign, "ls enhanced 10y Gen. smith u
ltciion, that among the four COMPANIES OF ~
: third Vermont, VIM first crossed warwick tret
e there were more individual acts OF htrOlsn pc
= formed, than he ever before read oil, IN gre
i battle" II more complimentary mention Is maj
II of any regiment in that campaign. nave lall,
e To iindn. So at Williamsburg and IN the battles
a the Seven Days Retreat the regiments OF the o
e Vermont brigade showed themselves eager
g advance, and orderly. though suen and quick
u turn, in retreat.
g In the first expedition against vcksburg, ol
u Seventh regiment, though not engaged III Al
u pitched battle for in fact there was none, Sl'
j famed an amount Of suffering and loss from lat
: ship and exposure IN the swamps and IN Il
+ digging Of Gen Buffers cui-on canal, such as
i regiment endured IN battle. The well were II
enough TO care for the sick and bury The dead al
l. "A regiment over eight hundred strong was reduce
l. To one hundred effective men.
j. No detailed history OF the second Ncsshu
i campaign can omit the siegeoi port Hudson, whl
i was in effect an outpost OF Nckshurg, or ought
z omit mention OF the brilliant service of The Elgh
y Vermont. II requires Il stern AMI genuine lIall
:, OF courage TO advance where brave men MA
fal 1at tn. tlI1
J. assault. This was twice the duty oil our Elri
= regimen! AT Port Hudson. In Gen. Banks III
u Col. stephen Thomas formed the third line ui 4
i assaulting column, and the Eighth Vermont ~
e the riglll, and led the advance OF that brlgal
5 The sturdy resistance met blythe first two lines
;. front of inc outer dcfences Of Port Huron h
!, brought them to stand, when ThOmass hrlgi
- was ordered forward. Passing through the brok
lines of battle before them, the Eightn dDd I
l. other regiments of the brigade moved steadily ur
u the Confederate outworks, drove the enemy fro
H. them, pursued them through i1vlhes anu IAN
u TIMBER killing nuLy and capturing more, AMI Il
4, mol Stop I'LL ihey had driven the rem Under Ia
y their main Notifications. AT HE second asslll
= Two weeks later, the Eighth led the stUrming 20
~ unn, which was preceded 10y line OF sklTInlshe
u a regiment with hand grenadcs. ana a regime
|, carrying cotton bags To I'LL the hostile trcnch'
" the prenadlers and cotion-Daggers found the II
~ too not for them To face stepping through me
" broken lilies ami over the bodies OF those
!" were hugglng the ground for shelter, the Elgh
made a gallant, though hopeless dash at the ~
-, fedcrate parapets. Eighty men, among tht
=, NJ AdJuianl spauldihg, ie III hre minutes, but (
n regiment pressed straigIt on Til lew m
N touched the opposing brcastworks, stl crown
~, ~ by a line Of IRE. To do more was n simple Il
~ possibility; but the Eighth held.a position close
=. me confederate works all that day. Inc briga
= commander, Col. Smith. of the Hath New iol
~ fell morlally wounded while fallying hlsGQinlni
v with the assistance of Major BarstOw of the Eig
", Vermont, who was acting as his Assistant Al.
" tant General. The Eighth lost one hundred a
s forty men IN Killed and wounded, or nearly
y
~ reputation for bravery. which II never lost.
VI The batile-naps OF Gettysburg, prepared by
~ War Department-the most careful and elabori
~ maps ever made OF any great battle-have end
a. disputes as To the more important movements II
W W locations of that hattie. These show, upon I
#" flank OF Plcketts column. ami father 10 the fro
" than any other Union force, a Vermont brga'
"a, southern and Northern historians alike have ma
,,h II plain that II any one movement ON the I'M
W. side tan he called the decisive movement OF
W decisive day, aud so the turning point OF
4, battle and so Of the war, il was the charge
,m STANDARDS brigade. For the honor OF Originate
~, movement go brilliant and 50 famous, 1t
~, surprising that there have not been more clal
~ ants. But the credit OF he order viii forever
80 main due 10 the brain. nerve and intuition u
az Vermont lirlgadier. That II was executed unt
81 heavy nre with the prompiness ana precision
~, battalion drlll, was the declaration OF SiaunaI
~ report and that, too. stands undsputed.
lie ! pass on TO The NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. the lie
or understood AMI most insuillclcntly described
re the battles Of the army OF the Potomac. The c
rn tain Of tangled forest which projected the right
re Cen. Lees army. south of the Rapldan, and VIII
90 sim shrOuds the slopes and ravines of that bio,
at Held, has seemed to envelope the battle IN mystic
in and description OF many OF It's details has bt
lie and Will always he impossible. The title OF I
a batile.tO prominence, hOwever,is sufficiently Gle
g. 1t was the trst battle fought by Gen. Grant after
OF took the chlei command ui The CnlOn armies
in the ira IN which he hal to meet the ablesl gene
cr al The Confedcrary. On II rested the hope of
ed summer campaign. and largely Grants rtputat
ny ~ u general. Ills problem was 10 take .throng
ltr wilderness covered with dwarf evcrgreens
he scrub OAK and an underground Ot bristl
en- shrubs, threaded by narrow roads win VIII oh
r. antagonist was lar more liillllar than INNS
irl an army, covering nearly hundred miles OF hi
ic- way with lis 10000 men aud IU1I army WACO
Grant knew that one day WAS his, while as yet
az movement was unfolding 10 his opponent, !
~ next day he must expect to hight, Tor he had
rn antagonist on whose want of insight or OF prom
'rs ness in action II would not do to count, q
M Lees plan was a simple one and had prOba
mo been long formed IN view Of the cuntngen
led =, n, "s " 90, ~ ~ w. "'',s M , u ,m
~, o, "pihar All "a mo-. MA na III nn, li