The sun., 1882-01-29

! nllluttu on mo l'lll Dl september, anu lHul,
a' all events the battle should have been
Moved on the succeeding day. This Is an
opinion which the author has Il perfect right to
express. because the evidence ON which he
forms il is laid before us, and we. on our
part arc at liberty to draw different con-
illusions from his facts We believe that
n" man has ever questioned McClcllan's
vcracity and far can discern
Gen. Pafrcy does not dispute his state
| mcnt that at eight o'clock tho morning of
the 18th an order was sent TO Burnside to carry
the stone bridge crossing the Antictam. directly
in front of his troops. to gain possession of
the heights beyond, aud TO advance along their
crest upon Sharpsburf. and its rear. " There
| is excellent reason says the author. for be-
leving that this ordcr did not reach Burnside
till about nine" The excellent reason is not
stated; bat, assuming its existence, and sup
| posing the movement ordered to have been be-
gun at ninc. how did it happen that six hours
elapsed before Burpsidos troops could bo got
across creek and made ready for the projected
| advance on Sharpehury? How was Mcclellan
TO suppose that the commander of his right
, wing. who had had ample time TO obtain infor-
nation. who had in fact been ordered to
obtain it nearly twenty-four hours before.
had totally neglected to acquaint himself with
the country Immediately in his front. that
! one division actually could not find the bridge
hours in searching for an easily accessible and
wc-known ford? Gen. Burns de had been in
trusted with two corps the First and Ninth.
| and his commanding officer justified in
believing that at least one of these. the Ninth.
! would have arrived on the Held of battle by
| twelve o'clock. If not an hour earlier. Asa mat
ter of fact. Burnsidcs troops were not all arross
the bridge until =. W.. when the fighting on
the part of the Federal troops command
| oil by On nd Ernn nh I'm .lI
| Palfrey acknowledges that with the abundant
knowledge now forthcoming. there cannot be
a shadow of doubt that. had the Ninth Corps
been thrown vigorously into action early
on the 17th Ices army must have been
shattered. If not destroyed. In view
| Of this admission. and of the facts
above mentioned. we cannot see why Gen. Pal
| frey who s usually outsroken, should hcsi-
tate to charge Burnside with the partial frus-
tration Of McClellan's plans, and to stcrny
hold him responsible for the shortcomings
which saved Lee from destruction. Gen. Pal
! frey says the question of Burnsdes loyalty to
| his commander is too large Il one for discus
| sion here" To us it seems n much smaller
question than that concerning the capacity and
| conduct Of Gen. Mcclellan. Apropos Of Burn
! side. however there is significant admission
! which we quote: Between the utmost putting
| forth Of the powers of able and energetic
man. and the lukewarm use of the powers IF
n commonplace and sluggish man. there is
vast difference. and the small re-
| suits accomplished hy Burnside on McCcllans
/ left may readily be- understood without any
| imputation Of disloyalty by those who think
/ that they sec in his whole career that he had
! n,i.,,i,or his ,c,tion and thu, !, ,.,s ., nj
,rt,,,,c f,, ,bo country that he ,yn. avon, rro.
/ ,o,,,J b,.,.nJ III. r,nt of rulorcI" so much
for nurpsitt. nerloc, or incnnocitv to oh.v
! o,,c,,- ,, sou, n and Gru N.,Ialrnn,s .o,se-
| uunui i,nhi,it, t. derive all the ndvuntnc.s
! ron, bis nlnn nf hnttI, which no may r,,.,ro.
! IBIS. h.. held to h.y. nuticipntaJ Now, an. word
II. IA, tho failure ia attack In. npain IN tbc
lsth. G.p. pu,frcy cannot find n word or onol
o.,, for ,bis o.t 81 nopfcnsrnrc nltbou,h II.
/ inuIv.r,ontlv si,nnli.s i'm ,b. course. of bis
narrative an annie justification. What must
4 have, been the condition ON the 1stl, Il our
! ,rnops which under Sumner and Franklin
/ had sc,n such dc.prrnte tiuhtin,. and in
c,,rred such crieynu. loss. while burnside
! who hnd done nothinp, and suffered n.vt
| to nothing was on the same doy clnn,orine,
/ for help and making what our author calls far
| from plucky representations until McCloI-
4 Ian directed that MoralIs division shouid bn
| sent To his ~ stance Late in tho afternoon
! says Grn Mcclellan. subsequently alluIfny TO
/ this matter Il found thnt although he had
| not been attacked Ccn. burnside had with
drawn his own corps Ia this side Of the Antie-
tam. and sent over Morcils division alon. to
! hold the opposite side Our author seems sur
rriscd that Gen. Mcclellan allowed this extra
ordinary proceeding to pass without comment:
hut What could he have done? II wa. already
notorious that Burnside was intriguing with
the Washington politicians and that he had
more influence with the War Department than
the General commanding was demonstrated |
not long aItcrwarl by the deplorabl,. blundcr |
that Put him in McClcllan's place.
Here we may mention that the author COM
plctely exoncrates Gen. Fitz-John Porter from |
the charge Of neglect or misconduct Of any
Kind in connection with this b,ttIa "po,-ari, |
, A'"i'
II" says. HAS pcch piaihed Tor lhaction at An |
tetam. but absolutely without reason The |
commander of ona If sev.r,l corns .,,.,;,,,,
va ~ " '''io "''i"s 'o-
@e'her cannot DO as ne likes. or according To |
his individual judgment. He must take his |
ord,r r.; from the Commands in-f,hi.f and mi.