Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1882-01-10
I'd Edition.
THE GUETEAU CASE.
JUDGE COXS RULINGS
NO IRRESISTIBLE IMPULSE SHOWN.
LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY DEFINED.

| by Judge Cox were as follows:
first-lhe legal test OF reSpon> iblity when in
Siillty Is SET UP as defence for alleged crime Is
| Mhether the accused at the tine OF committing
the act charged knew the difference between right
ana wrong IL respect or such an act
Setond-Ii the jury find that the defendant com
miltea the act Charged and at the time Thereof
| Knew what he was doing, and that what he was
uoihg was contrary tetne law of the Ia nd IL con-
sttutes no excuse, even If it We're true that when
ne committed the act he really LIT leved that he was
producing great public benefit and that the death
Oh tAc PRESIDENT Was required Tor the good OF the
American people. Nor would such excuse be a.
Iorded by the fact th2t in the commission OF @
act ne was controlled by a denrayci moral
ns e4,, heIher IN it@ or acqurcd-or 10y evil
passions or Indifference to moral obigations
ana even IL the lgry find that the DEFEND
anu, as result or his own reasoning and refec-
toi, arrived at the determiDat ion 70 XIII the Pres
cent, ana as further result o. his own reasoning
ana reflection, believed that his own said PURPOSE
was approved, or suggested. or inspired by the
Deity, such belief would afford no excuse but il
Would Dc different, AMI Ne would not he Responsible
cfIihtaty, the act was done under he influence
anu as the product OF all insane mental ieiISion
that the Deity had comm landed him TO do the act
when had taken possession OF his mind not the
result OF his own reflections, bur Independently OF
MS VIII and reason, and with such
force as to deprive him Of the degree
OF reason necessary to distinguish between right
ana wrong as to the partir act. Ia such case
even he knew that the act a violation OF the
law OF the land, he would not be responsible If his
reason Was so perverted by the insanity that he
was Incapable OF understanding the obligation of
the law of the land, and that the act was wrong
I'm this connection" said Judge Cox 81 add the
words wrong in itself because / can conceive a
case In which one might believe sanely that the
law OF the land provided no punishment for muir
ger, and yet might be perfectly aware OF the moral
enopmity OF the crime would be unwilling TO
The instruction which / have marked No. 9. 1
give as a substitute tor Nos 2, 3 and 4 OF those
asked on the part OF the government and for Nos.
ana NO. OF those asked on the part of
the defence. / have embodied in it the sub
Stance OF what consider admissible and material
In all these 1nStruc lions. And gave this i'm sub
stltutlon for them. bacluSe there are some things
object enable, as l think, and others not st tied
with sufficient fullneSS, in the different inStruc
tons asked for
81 have omitted from this instruction (No q one
important feature OF those asked for on the part
OF the defence. 1t is expressed in the last nara
graph OF the 1st instructiOn in the words 'or WAS
IL committed under an influence or power which
Ihe accused could not res list by reason OF his
SoundneSS OF mInd?"'
This, presume, seeks to leave to the Jury the
question OF Irresistible impulse the cause OF the
homlclte Now, it cannot be denied that some of
the most respectable courts In the country recog-
ME IL as possible that man may be driven
against his own will TO the commission
or an act wh1ch he knows to be wrong, by an in
sane. irresistible impulse within hin, overriding
hi, VIII and conscience, and they maintain that
as, under such circumstances the will to wron-,
he ought not to be held criminaily responsible.
Inay accordingly hold that the test OF knowledge
general rule, ought to be qualified by the further
condition that the party mist have the power TO
choose between doing and not doing the act.
The question is dangerous one alike for court
and Jury, to handle, and do not intend to express
an opinion upon it further than the facts of the
case require, and they seem to me to relieve me
from the necessity OF discussing it generally.
II we strike out OF this all the declarations
and testimony OF the defendant himself, we have
cumstances, such as his actions and con-
duct, which his counsel may argue, of
ne Of an 1 and
mony: But OF themselves they would have al
foried no indication of the Particular motive or
special form OF delusion that actuated him.
or this we have no indication except in
the declarations, oral or written, or the
defendant himself na But he has never
an act which he knew to be wrong On the con-
trary, he has always claimed that it was right
patriotism And whether he claimed inspiration
early or late, he has claimed that ii was inspired,
and therefore right. He has used the words press
ure and inspiration interchangeably. as it were to
express the idea. They have no meaning, unless
it be that he was under an insane deluson that
the Deity had inspired or commanded the
act He has certainly not separated the idea OF
pressure or impulse from the conviction of inspira
When WIN say that there is N no 'n Evidence Se5s
reslstible IMPULSE as thing by itsef and sepa
rate from this alleged delusion. Therefore, the
case does not seem to me to present or call for any
ruling on the hypothesis OF an irresistible impulse
to do what the accused knew to he wrong, and
what was against his will.
Whether there is such thing as Irresistible in
sane impulse TO commit crime, and whether it has
existed in any particular case, are questions of
fact and not OF law.
In this case, think there is no testimony Show
ing that 1t can exist by itself, an Independent
form OF insanity, but rather the contrary. There
Is, however, testimony tending to show that such
Impulses result from and are associated With
ms ne decisions, and especially with such an
insane delusion as that the party has received a
command from the Deity tc doan act
But such an insane delusion exists so as to de-
Stroy the perceptions OF right and wrong as TO the
act, Which is substantially the defendants claim,
no need to consider the subject OF impulses result
ing from the deluSion. On the other hand
If there was no insanity, but a mere fanatical
opinion or belief, such as before described, the
only impulse that could have actuated the DEFEND
ant must have been sane one, such
as, in the most favorable view OF it, a
mistaken sense OF duty, which the law
requires him to resist and control
In connection with the medical testimony tend
Ing To show that these impulses are always gen.
orally associated with some insane deluson, IL
there are facts tending directly show the pres
ence or absence OF an Irresistible impulse they may
perhaps furnish some evidence OF the existence or
absence or Insane deluSiOn. But, think, in view
OF the undiSputed features of the case. 1t would
only confuse, and perhaps, mislead the jury, to
give them any instruction directly upon
the subject OF irresistible impulse, and that
this particular case does not call for any quail
hcation OF the general rule adopted, as have
mentioned, as the test OF responsibility"