New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-07-02
EHE CHATTANOOGA CAMPAIGN


oKNKRAL GARTIELD's INFLUENCE AND CONDUCT
THEREIN RosECRANss DECENTRALIZATION AT
OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES OFFICIAL REPORTS CONTRA
DIcToRY OF HIS RECENT LETrERs-GRANT AT
CHATTANooGA-HIs ADMIRATION FOR THE
ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.
To the Editor OF The Tribune
SIR: The letter of General w. S. Rosecrans
contains many remarkable statements that having
personal knowledge Of campaign under discus
non, ssk space to reply.
{yrst-As to General Garfeld's influence upon the
Commander of the Army of tho Cumberland: General
Rosecrans intimates in his letter that "subsan
TALLY nothing He does declare it did not exist at
ell. for he limits his language to reference to single
short campaign. quote his words: 81 state emphat
icay that General Gardelds influence in the planning
and giving the time OF moving for the campaign of Tu
tahoma was substantially nothing"
The facts clearly show this influence to have
been exercised and TO have been effective in opposition
influences jointly employed by all Rosecranss other
corps and division commanders General Rosecrans lay
at Murfreesboro, Tenn, from January to Juno .2f,
ls63-very nearly six months. General Garfield was
his Chief of STAFF during nearly the whole of this time
During at least half that period Rosecrans was con-
stantly urged from Washington to vance, and his
chief argument justification OF his dsobedience OF
Hanecks wishes that 1t impOc to drive Bragg
out of Tennessee as he might reinforce the enemy
against Grant. That the burden OF his excuses
General Rosecrans his testimony before the Commit
repeated refusals to move by the poncy OF
holding Bragg his front rather than driving him out
Of Tennessee. only that he might unite WITH Joseph T.
Johnston, aud fan upon Grant, who was still inefeohl
ally struggling before Vicksbuig" t. OHIO in the War;
Vol l. r. 1851 In his photographer sketch OF
his military record furnished officially to the War De-
parment Rosecraus emphasizes this point by speaking
Of the necessity OF nurSng-so to speak-General
Bragg on my front keep him from retiring behind
the mountains ard the Tennessee whence be could
and would have been Obliged TO send heavy reinforce
rnens to Johnston" In his correspondence with Ha-
leek as Chicf he claimed that TO fight IN
Tennessee while Grant was Vicksburg would violate
one Of the fundamental maXims of war. And so per
eistent in urging these views that two days ne
fore he moved as required Tuahoma he teegraphed
final protest against the movement the same gen
era ground OF seventeen corps and division com
manders oil sustained him in his theory well known TO
them but his Chief OF staff, Garfield. differed Van
Horne in his History Of TIE Army of the Cumberland"
says Vol l. page 299 General ROsecrans, however
st delayed and about the 10th OF June he invited
formal expression OF opinion with regard to advance
against the enemy from his corps and division generals
He was sustained in his delay by MS
sabordinates generally, though General Gar
feld his Chief Of staff urged upon him
speedy movement for both military and politi
cal and chiefly upon the ground tina, he could advance
with 65ls7 Dayonets against army OF A.
Geo men, AS he estimated the strength Of Braggs army
General Garaeds Of June 10 1853 officially adj
dressed General ROsecraDs, Is conclusive that the
Chief OF Stat radically disagreed with Rosecrns az to
the policy OF nursing" Bragg. That letter Ito be
found in full in Ohio the War;" Vol J. PIP 733-7o6),
in it's admirable Of facts shows Bragg to have
already detached aid Johnston that Bragg was then
weaker than at any time since Stone River that the
chances were that in general battle the Army OF the
Cumberland would be able TO oyerwheln Bragg ana that
for Bragg 10 run away was likely dcmoraize his
forces For these and other minor reasons Garfield
urged the which followed eleven days later and
ended in the brief but brilliant campaign of nine days
which dislodged Bragg from Middle Tennessee and his
strong defences there Certainly 1t is fair to assume
That as Rosecans followed the advice Of one as against
oil his other generals and his own Judgment, the In
fucnce of that officer decidedly marked, par
ficulary as Rosecfans protested against moving TO the
last moment. 1t will probably be urged that Garfield
employed these arguments at Washington, rs well as
upon Rosecrans Possibly / have evidence OF
their use at Washington before the Tullahoma cam
paign; aud the country him q debt of gratitude
for afterward using them to on the greater and
later campaign against Chattanooga.
General Rosecrans further says as to Garfelds inhu-
pnce 81 never heard OF the views expressed in the
sGarHeldChase letter until read that letter few
months He expressed any such sentiments
60 me- but on the contrary seemed to appreciate the
views and labors of the General commanding" Your
review to which General Bosecrans is replying said
nothing whatever about any views" or sentiments
In either ROsecTaas the Que to Chase III
spoke particularly OF the arguments employed IN Doh
being Identical, aud anyone WHO Will tWO
the one urgng tho march Tulahoma and the other
6eprecatpg the delay which followed twill find the
same arguments and figures TO forces used In
both. One, however, is official document CAREFUL
detailed and precise while the other confidential
free and fOrobe letter. and the only material difference
a I'm the two styles And In both General Garfield not
only seemed to- but did actually appreciate the views
and labors of the General commanding beyond the
estimates Of many others
GARFIELD AT CHICRAMAUGA.
Second-As TO your alleged error in stating that Gen
eral Garfield TO Thomas at Chckamauga: ills
fec; that Garfield did to Thomas and at his own sng-
eeson while Rosecrans voluntarily went TO the rear
nj Chattanooga General ROsecrGls says that as ne is
yet in the land OF living he is competent witness
That does not always naturally follow, but will admit
a. 20 be so in this instance that may quote General
Rosecrans I'm contradiction OF himself In his letter 10
ypu he says that he "sent Garfield to deneraI
Thomas TO report to him the dispositions TO
be made" and nc goes on to name these
dispositions in detail Yet in the very same para
rranh he savs: Garfield, on being told what was to
b. done said he could 60 Thomas much better than
rive all these orders" Does that leave one To INFER
Shat only the orders to be sentf Ana IN Rose
oranss report written immediately after the battle he
saws he send Garfield TO Thomas, but 10 Ross
Vile The language used is as follows Hearing the
enomy's advancing musketry and cheers, became
doubtful whether the left ThOmas) had held ts ground
aud started for Rossve On consultation and further
reelection determined TO send General Garfield there
fwherei To Rossvilel u while l went TO Chattanooga
Now Rossville IS just 0bout five miles In the rear OF
Tbomas's last position at Chiokamauga. Moreover,
from this description it is apparent that 1t was also In
resr OF the then position OF that to get to
Hossye Garfield had TO ride distance 10 the rear
And later on. to get from Rossyile TO Thomas, Garfield
had 70 run the gauntlet Of the enemys fire. Granger
with the had been at Rossye and going there
frst and finding that Granger had moved without
with fha milf in