Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1882-01-19
Cox's CONCLUSIONS.
Fnll Text Of the Instructions on the
Insanity Doubt, in the Guiteau
Case.


eral comment on Judge Cox's decisions
to-day is that they are absolutely ad-
verse to the defense. The full text of
the two instructions regarding insanity
allowed by Judge Cox, is as follows:
Frst-The legal test of responsibility
when insanity is set up as defense for
alleged crime is whether the accused at
the time of committing the act charged
knew the difference between right and
wrong in respect to such an act.
Second-If the jury find that the de-
fendant committed the act charged. and
at the time thereof knew what he was
doing. and that what he was doing was
contrary to the law, it constitutes no ex-
cuse, even if it were true that when he
committed the act he really believed that
he was producing great public benefit,
and that the death of the President was
intended for the good of the American
people, nor would such excuse be afford
ed by the fact that in the commission of
the act he was controlled by a-depraved
moral sense, whether innate or acquired,
OF by evil passions or Indifference TO mo-
raj obligations and even If the jury find
that the defendant, as result OF his
own reasoning and reflection, arrived at
a determination to kill the President,
and as a further result of his reasoning
and reflection believed that his own said
purpose was approved or suggested or
inspired by the Deity, such belief would
afford no excuse. But it would be diff
ferent, and he would not be responsible
criminally, if the act was done under
the influence and rs the product of All
insane mental delusiOn that the Diety
had commanded him to do the act which
had taken possession of his mind, not
the result of his own reflections, but in
dependently of his will and reason, and
with such force as to deprive him of the
degree of reason necessary to distinguish
between right and wrong to the particu-
lar act. In such case, even if he knew
that his aim was in violation of the law
of the land, he would not be responsible
if his reason was so perverted by the in
sanity that he was incapable of under
standing the obligation of the law of the
land, and that the act was wrong as a
violation of that and wrong in itself. l
have omitted from instruction Nc. 3 one
important feature Of those asked for on
the part of defense. 1t is expressed in
the last paragraph of the first instruc-
tions in the words, "Or was it commit
ted under an influence or power which
accused could not resist by reason of
his unsoundness of mind" This, pre-
sumo, seeks to leave to the jury the
question of irresistible impulse as the
cause of the homicide. Now, it can not
be denied that none Of the most respect
able Courts of the country recognize it
as possible that man may be driven
against his own will to the commission
of an act which he knows is wrong by an
insane, irresistible impulse, without him
overriding his will and conscience, and
they maintain that, as under the circum-
stances the will to do wrong, the very
essence of criminallty, is wanting, he
ought not to be held criminally respon-
sible. They accordingly hold that the
test of knowledge of right and wrong
which / have stated to be a general rule
ought to be qualified by the further con-
dition that the party must have power
the act. The question is dangerous
one alike for Court and jury to handle,
and do not intend to express an opin
ion upon it further than the facts of the
case require, and they seem to me
to relieve me of the necessity of it
generally. If we strike out of the
ease all the declarations and testimony
of the defendant himself, we have no
light whatever on this subject. There
are circumstances, such as his actions
and condnct, which his counsel may ar
que of themselves indicate some aberra-
ton, and are corfoborative of and ex-
planned by his testimony, but of them
selves they would have afforded no indi-
cation of particular motive or special
form of delusien that actuated him. OF
this we have no indication, except in
declarations, oral or written, of the de-
fendant himself; but he has never
claimed that he was irresponsibly i'm
PEELED to do an act which he knew to be
wrong. On the contrary, he has always
claimed it was right. He justified it at
the time and afterward in his papers, as
political necessity and an act of pa
triotism, and whether he claimed inspi-
ration early or late, he has claimed that
he was inspired, and therefore right. He
has used the words pressure and inspira
tion interchRngeayly as it were to ex-
press an idea. They have no meaning.
unless it be he was under deiusion
that the Deity had inspired or COM
manded the act. He has certainly not
separated the idea of pressure or i'm
pulse from the conviction of inspiration
and right and duty, and l feel sure am
not transcending my province when !
say there is no evidence in the case tend
ing to prove an irresistible impulse as a
thing by itself, and separate from his
delusion. Therefore, the case does not
seem to me TO present or call for any
ruling on the hypothesis of an irresisti-
bic impulse to do what the accused knew
TO be wrong, and what was against his
will. Whether there is such thing as
as irresistible insane impulse to commit
crime, and whether it has existed in any
particular case, are questions of fact and
not Of law. In this case think there is
no testimony showing that it can exist
as a separate form of insanity, but rath-
er the contrary. On the other hand, if
there was no insanity, but mere fanat-
ical opinion or belief, such as before de-
scribed, the only impulse that could have
actuated the defendant must have been
sane one.
Delano A. Goddard, editor of the Bos-
ton Advertiser, is hopelessly ill.