New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-03-26

asmuch as the felt necessity OF Detter uahi"''o'
would sur ersede the necessity OF any excuse ior
tempting 80 valuable service. Professor Muher 10
n German educated and accomplished IN phiio'oey
in the best German universities. who mas long poe,'
resident IN England Mt the proudest of the English
universities a student and professor III s'uuioS
which are nearly allied to philosophy. lie mas
taught Kant to English pupils and has leathea ny
personal Experience how hard is the task TO initiate
the English mind to the Herman methods OF think
ing, and the proverbaly abstract and technica'
Kantian terminology He has examined the pre-
vious TRANSACTIONS by Others. and discovered INC
reasons for the failure Of the best by careini eN-
animation of their work and an analysis Oh INC
reasons for these failures in the peculiar dialect Vi
Kant and the special more subtle meanings Oh tho
German particles and special phrases. lie glNcsoA
amples of these nceties in his elaborate preface
and of the partial failures in exac'ness a'iu io,'0
which ale observable in the best LnglIsh ',ai,
ton which we have Of the Crtique, that III DOM
Library by Mr.. Meiklejohn.
All students of Kant, whether in the original or
the translation one or both. prepared 10 uhuo'
stand these difficulties and to welcome any anu
which n new translation may bring, whether III
vav of an INTERPRETATION or a commentary. M"sV
scholars even if they are at home In the peIihah
language and in German philosophy, VIII confess
that of all writer's in Philosophy Kant al least III
the Critique of Pure Reason. is the most trouble
some simply for defects of diction. The promise OF
something better from a scholar OF the ability ana
accomplshu ents of Max Muller will be most CRATE
1u to many students.
The first volume, the only one before us, IS occu-
MED with the Preface TO which we have referred
an Historical Introduction by Ludwig Nore, n
writer of good reputation in Germany, and sym
pathizer with the general philosophical direction of
Max Muller and a glowing writer. Thus contains
$50 pages. and includes sketch of Ancient and
Medieval Philosophy. and a detailed review OF
Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Hume. This
sketch is somewhat diilusely written in style
too glowing to be always very discriminating and
exact 1t is well fitted to sustain the interest OF
the uncritical reader while it is by no means deli
Gent IN critical ability. The treatment of the sub
iect is striklngly conrased with that OF hant MN
self As consequence, in some respects 1t IS htted
and in Others it not fitted to set Oft the text TO
the best advantage. We judge that Nore belongs
10 the school of Muller so far at least as to empha
size with him the Office of language In developing
and almost creating thought distinctions as well as
in recording them. AS a whole, it is valuable adj
dition to the somewhat meagre contributions to
the history of philosophy which are found III the
English language.
The remainder of this first volume consists OF the
principal additions made by Kant in the second
edition of the CritiQue. These extend over 100
pages We conclude that the second volume VIII
give us the first edition by itself, we trust from
critical and carefully edited text. This arrange
ment will contribute to the more easy and satisfac-
tory mastery of Rants original doctrines and real
opinions concerning which HINES Fischer, with
Schopenhauer and Trendelenburg held opposite
opinions 1t will certainly be easier for the student
who approaches the Critique for the first time to
master the text of the first edition by itself and
then to interpret and digest the supplementary
matter at his leisure.
We nave compared with some care n few passages
from the TRANSACTIONS of Muller and MeIkejohn, and
find that though the latter is generally accurate
and often slilfu that he is inferior to Muller III
the ease and felicity of his rendering. Now and
then Muller gives evidence of that fatal felicity"
which substitutes smoothly flowing and conven-
tlona phrases for the abrupt and energetic utter
ances that better suit the sense of the original In
general, however both the phosophlc student and
the literary critic will give the preference to the
last translator.
The reader can compare the work of each in the
following passage a somewhat abstruse subject
OF the possibility Of connecting (c0Eunctto IN general
The manifold Of representations may he gwen IN
ING but receptivity, and the form OF that lntul,On
NAV lie pii0ri IN our faculty OF representation,
without being ANYTHING bqt the manner IN which
tiol Of anything manifold can never enter INTO us
through the senses and cannot be contained, there
fore already in the pure form OF sensuons intuition,
Tor il * n spontaneous act of the power of repreSen
tatiou: and as IN order TO distinguish this from
senslbility we must call il understanding, we see
that all connecting whether we are conscious OF 1t
or not. and whether we connect the manifold of in
tuiton or several concepts together, and again,
whether that intuition be sensuous or not sensuous,
is an act of the understanding. This act we shall
call bv the general name of syHh6s's, IN order to
show that we cannot represent To ourselves any
thing as connected in the object, without having
previously connected ~ ourselves, ana lha' OF al
REPRESENTATIONS connection is the only one which
cannot be gwen through the objects. but must be
carried out by the subject itself because 1t Is an act
of its spOntaneIty. 1t can be easily perceived that
This act must be originally and the same for
every kind of correction, and that It's dissolution,
that is the analysis which seems to be ITS opposite,
does ALWAYS presuppOse 1t. For where the under
standing has not previously connected. there Is
nothing for it TO disconnect because, as connected
it could only he given by the understanding through
the faculty of representation.
Meikleiohn translates the same passage thus:
The manifold content in our representations can
he given in an intuition which Is merely sensuOus-
in other words, is nothing but susceptibility; and
the form of this intuition can exist pr'ort IN our
facultv of representation, without being anything
else but the mode in which the subject is affected.
Rut the conjunction (cOniHnciiOl of manifold in
intuition can never be gwen us by the senses IL
cannot therefore be contained in the pure form of
sensuous intuition for it is spontaneous act of the
faculty OF representation. And as we must, to
distn gush it from scnsiblity, entite this faculty
nndeTqfanding: so all conjunction ether CON
scious or unconscious be il of the manifold in in
tution sensuOus nOnsensuous, or oil several CON
centions-is an act OF the understanding. To this
act we shall give the general appeation of syn
thesis thereby to indicate, at the same time, that
we cannot represent anything rs cOnlOned in the
objects without having previously cOnjoined it our
selves. OF all mental notions, that of conjunction
is the only one which cannot he gwen through OH
iects but can be originated only by the subject it
self because il is act OF Its purely spontaneous
activity. The reader will easily enough perceive
that the possibility of conjunction must be equally
valid for all conjunction; and that analysis, which
appears 10 be its contrary must nevertheless always
rresuppose it, for when the understanding has not