Daily Kennebec journal., 1882-01-09
TRIAL OF euITEAu.
Arguments Upon the Legal
Points.
Davidge Opens for the Prosecution
WASHINGTON, Jan. Z.

Mr.. Davidge proceeded to open the argu-
ment on the part of the prosecution. He re-
called the fact that on Wednesday last he
submitted to the court four simple. brief pray
ers for instructions to the jury. The first of
those prayers asked his honor to declare that
the test Of responsibility in respect of human
intelligence is the power to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong. The next PRAYER de-
clared that if any human being, possessed of
that degree of intelligence, commits a crime,
he is responsible for it; in other words, that
that degree of intelligence makes him re-
sponsible for the control of his own moral
nature, his passions his emotions, his intel :.
lectual nature. his beliefs, whatever they
may be. In the third PRAYER he asked his
honor to define just what legal insanity is, to
wit, that it is the product Of a diseased mind.
and in the last of these instructions, he ask
ed his honor TO lay down for the guidance of
the jury what is the Law in respect of what
is called delusiOn. In the present case the
only irresistible impulse was the so-called in
spiration. In the last prayer he asked his
honor to say that if the inspiration was
product of the mans depraved and wicked
nature, it afforded no shadow of excuse, and
that, to be an excuse, it must be the product
of an insane delusion. In order to shut the
door upon controversy in respect of those
prayers, he proposed to read them over
again.
Mr.. Davidge then proceeded to read the
prayers of the prosecution, stating that the
first PRAYER had for its purport simply to find
out what was in the law, the standard of re-
sponsibiity in respect of human intelligence
1t did not deal with irresistible impulses, it
did not deal with delusiOns, it simply UNDER
took to define where. in the infinite grada-
tions of human intelligence, the law drew the
line of responsibility. holding all above that
line responsible, all below irresponsible. The
whole import of the second prayer was that
any human being, whose intelligence reached
the standard described in the first prayer was
responsible for the violation of law, no mat
ter what his belief was, no matter what his
passions were, no matter what his Difference
to duty was. The effect Of this prayer was
to stamp out the modern doctrine. called the
doctrine of ''moral insanity unknown in
courts of law and unrecognized by them. The
law recognized no disease of moral nature,
independent of disease of the brain.
In the third PRAYER the prosecution asked
His Honor to define just what insanity was as
a defence, from the standpoint of law. The
purport of the fourth prayer was that a man
of the standard of intelligence indicated in
the first prayer was bound to know what was
right, and the conviction of inspiration af-
forded no excuse for the commission of crime
by such person. He did not anticipate any
serious controversy in respect to these
prayers.
lie had, however, read in the papers of
yesterday large number of cOunter-prayers
intended to be offered for the defence. So
far as he had been able to examine those
prayers, their tendency Gas far as they i'm
pinged on the rules of law laid down for the
prosecution) was simply to produce confu-
sion and obscurity.
If what they ment was clearly exhibited by
what they appeared to say, there was hardly
one of them that, in his humble Judgment,
ought to be entertained for an instant BY the
court. The great central point in the first
prayer of the prosecution was human intel
ligence. When onght human being to be
held responsible for crime, capacity to make
a contract was one thing, capacity to make
a will was another thing. A man might
make an ordinary contract and not an extra
ordinary contract. A man might make a
very simple will disposing of COW or a cab
bage garden, and yet be wholly unfit to ex-
ercise testamentary power in respect of any
complicated system Of bounty. In this case,
however, they were dealing with crime, what
degree Of Intelligence ought to make hu-
man being responsible for crime, and such q
crime, surely the law fixed that degree of
responsibility. The law in respect of con-
tracts (the power to ALLEVIATE PROPERTY the
power to devise it), said that q man must be
2l years of age. The same law fixed the age
when any human being should be responsible
for crime, IL years of age, he thought. 1t
was hardly possible, therefore, that, in re-
spect of responsibility for crime, the law did
not draw the line somewhere, what was the
definition of the law in respect to this respon-
sibility. 1t had been involved in very great
doubt until the decision of the judges of Eng
land in what was known as the McMaughton
oase. There the House of Lords, alarmed at
the acQuittal of a prisoner who. under an
alleged delusion, had shot Mr.. Drummoned
in the streets of London, summoned all the
judges Of the realm Cat that time fuurteen)
propounded to them certain interrogatories
which were answered by the judge One of
them, Mr.. Justice Mall, delivered a separate
opinion. But the opinions of the Others were
embodied by the Lord Chief Justice Tyndall.
They laid down a rule of responsibility, and
that rule, from that time to the present had
been adhered to by the English courts. That
rule was laid down As far back as lS43. (well
nigh 40 years ago) and from that time to the
present, the English courts had seen no rea-
son whatever to depart from the rule. That
rule had been adopted almost universally in
huieTiCo. ~ WAS rule OF common sense.
rule of common nature. II a child or an
ignorant man was asked when responsibility
began, he would say that it began when the
party had sense enough to know the differ
ence between right and wrong. If he had
that quantum Of human intelligence, he was
thoroughly responsible. Think of the il.
lustrious victim Of this prisoner on the one
hand and this assassin on the other The
law drew no line between a low degree of in.
telligence on the one hand and the highes, on
the other in respect Of responsibility for
crime. The prisoner has been portrayed AZ
an imbecile until he went upon the stand and
tore himself into shreds and atoms. man
might be peculiar. and might even be par
tally insane, but if he rose to the point of
intelligence which enabled him to know the
difference between right and wrong. and that
what he was doing was wrong then he was
responsible before the court for the wrong.
Prisoner-I didn't know the difference. sir.
between right and wrong, had no choice. If
l had would not have done it.
Mr.. Davidge-We will see hereafter
whether he had q choice.
Mr.. Davidge then stated that in the "Mae-
natum" case five questions on the subject of
insanity had been submitted to the Judges of
England. Three Of those questions had a
direct bearing on this case. The flrst was a.
to the responsibility Of person for an act.
when a tho time nf ccrr-:s.:--