The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1882-10-22

| This mistake has been made thousand times.
and 1t gave tho enemy In this case just the ad-
! vantage necessary to insure his success. Cox
has no word Of censuro for himself or Schoflold
| yet 1t IL absolutely certain that Schoticld. In
stead OF riding his lines to SEQ that his troops
| were properly disposed rode through the town
of Franklin and established himself two miles
| In rear OF whore they must fight, II they were
attacked. leaving his most important duties to
be performed by Cox. his second in command.
who also failed to give proper attention to tho
formation OF tho troops to resist the impending
attack. Ho admits that Wagners brigades
sent word at O'Clock fully an hour before the
battle actually began) that the enemy were
forming at tho foot of the hills in heavy
| force" but claims that he reiterated to Gen.
| Wagner tho directions already given him."
| namely to remain I'm observation only till Hood
| should show n disposition to advance. II
| Hoods formation in heavy force" did not
show Il disposition to advance" 1t ia difficult
| to imagine what It did show and hence it Is
difficult to Imagine why Wagner should
remain any longer in observation. These
statements are ncoherent and absurd. II tho
facts are as stated by Cox. and we doubt It, in
stead OF reitcrating the orders to Wagner :" to
remain in observation" he should have or
dcred him to retire ut once to the main limo
and not wait for the enemy to attack The
ders Ito remain in observation. IL they meant
anything under tho circumstances as de-
scribed. meant that Wagner's brigades should
stay where they were. and this they did So the
responsibility for that blunder was Cox's aud no
one else's. while the blundcr OF leaving Wag-
ner " in observation " was Schofleld's first and
Coxs afterward. But this is not tho end of
ochoheius D,uhdors. nc piundered most seri-
ousiy III uiViuins MS army. ana putting ono part
oh INC north 10 nght pattie. ana the other on
INC south slde Oh the Harpeth hiVer. lie also
Numbered In taking up u position two miles to
tho rear OF any possible battlefield. The author
!ustiiles him In this by stating that Schohelds
headquarters not only commanded q view OF
tho Held but wore nearest the bridges by which
communication was kept up. and where alone
he could see the cavalry demonstrations on the
left. where Wilson and Forrest were already
engaged" We happen to know that 1t did not
command view OF the ground upon which
Wilson and Forrest were engaged. for that view
was then and Is doubtless to-day DISTRACTED by
plentiful growth OF trees; but whether 1t did
or not Is immaterial. since no order which
Schoneld could have sent over 80 great q dis
lance could have reached them In timo or been
Of tho slightest advantage to Wilson or Cox.
and still less to Opdycke after the action had
begun. But Opdycke who had been stationed
AT r franklin lot mOntnS In 1919. ana n1u rluuen
his picket line in front OF that town nightly
says that everything In front clear to the forest
in which Hood prepared for the attack, was
best and easiest seen from Carter's Hill on the
south side OF the river. immediately in rear OF
the limo Of battle.
We do not propose going into tho details of
the battle nor To discuss the roIative volue Of
the seryices rendered nv the officers present
but merely to point out TINT Cox has evidently
changed his own mind in repnrd To that mat
ter. The purpose of his account of that battle ia
apparently to relieve Schofleld from blame and
| 10 divide the honors about eaualIy betwcen
Opdycke and White; but we are informed that
immediatelv ofter tbe broken line was restored
Cox rode TO Opdycke. and. shaking him warmly
by the hand. said: "Opdycke. that charge saved
| the davn and that in 1915 and finally only n
fsy d,vs before tho publication ~ b;a hool, bo
reiterated this statament in letters which can
he produced whonever necessary To sunport tha
truth of this ayerment In view Of the further
fact that Sehofeld has been heard remarkable
In saw that Ondvcke was ono 81 tba brovast
men and best soldiers II WINS ever his good for.
tune to meet. IL ia difficult to understand wbv
either Cox or schoasld should now wish 70
qualify the unstinted praise they rayo to On
dycke fin tho DAYS before either of them began
to write history. Can it be that his energetic
protest against an oruer received by MN 10 90
INTO position with Wagner's two advanced
brlgades. or tho disposition manifested by
nm to tell the actual facts OF that cam
paign. nave IN any way modified the
favorable opinions OF COX ana Sehnlleld
| IN regard 10 MN 80 TINS as IL may, - ub-
lcatoh OF MS vigorous anu exhaustive mono
graph IN the Nc'o for6 In'es upon tho cam
| palsn now uhucr consideration. ana It's repub-
lication. enlarged ana IN permanent form. 10
| likely. IN conjunction with van Horns Lie OF
| ihohas' To throw hood OF hsht upon all
| points III controversy In regard to the retreat
| from Co'umpia ana the pattic oil FRANKLIN. II not
| entirety 10 settle them. IL settles Tor good and
al uhe iRc' 'n'' oPuyche maze ms advance AT the
| eri'ieai moment Oh lt"t oatuc without orders
| from any one anu e"',re'y on MS own respoh-
sunny. anu i'''i'tic" III 'shoi""cc ior several
u"'' .""' my oi''o's h'u pecn Soh' MN. rs
a'icsnu ny ,oA' ~ ~ worthy oi remark that
ec.oheiu. ~ MS o'''e''' ieport anu OoN. In the
'o'un'o oe,oro US, oni't 10 mention the I'M
po''aH' INC. INA. inc ueiea' Oh folrest by VIII
SON. occurring si,hu''aheonsiy Win thc uc'eat
VI '.oou' oh'o'eo 'e"oiieiu 10 WIui"raw