Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-02-18
Concluded from Isl Page.

pursuing In the main a sort of centralizing
policy and running in the grooves of a worn
out lego political philosophy.
This argument Is attempted to be fortihed
by the fact that IN the Convention which
adopted the Constitution OF 1870, a PROPOSE
ton was introduced and rejected TO make
coupons OF the public bonded debt receivable
for taxes. The case of Mott VS. Pennsy lvania
Railroad Co., so Penn. 8, Is introduced as
authority TO show that stats sl,st ~
taxation and then put letters on future Leg
islatures, and finally, Ii is argued that the
tendency OF the courts IN these Iater I'LL
is to get rid ofthe authority ofthe Dartmouth
College case that many regrets nave Deen
expressed that it was ever decided and much
doubt now hangs over us prlnelp,ieS In lrss
ented with much force and ingenuity, Dut
they have failed to reach my CONVICTIONS
The Convention of 1870 might Wei refuse 70
mt this coupon feature into the organic
law and still leave such power in the dlscre-
ton of the Legislature, can wen unuer-
stand II is certain, too, tnat n t the lare s
majority by which this proposition was
rejected in the Convention had tnoughLlt
power dangerous to be entrusted 10 the Leg
tslature, they had only 10 S SpeaHi ;hev aid
is only to be looked to, not what tney oIulltSu
or failed TO do. If there had been PROPOSE
ton to grant this power to the Legislature
and thai mad been refused, some deductions
might be drawn from IL In favor OF CONF
plainants' position. The question mere is
not like that of proposed exemption, even
of a Martial character. We have an existing
debt which every consideration OF morality
and our true interests should prompt us 10
bring to a speedy and favorable settlement
The proposition involves at most a partial
and probably temporary anticipation OF
revenue and no permanent shaclSle upon
legislation. It brings about in a practical
way favorable settlement of interest upon
n debt, the payment OF the principal OF
which isat our discretion, In snort NUMBER
ihe only direct and analogous authority
upon the subject Sustains the exercise OF
Ircwer by the act OF 1881 and Dy clear ana
cogent reasoning. This meaning is sane
toned and approved by the highest court
of the United States, and the vague fear, ex-
pressed here Of future danger, are looked
upon as illusory and visionary, without
being an ardent advocate or defender OF the
teachings and principles of the Dartmouth
College case. i may say that they nave
never been, by the best of courts, disgraced
nor their authority broken or abandoned.
The case in Pennsylvania referred TO has In
effect as to the action of the court, directing
a mandamus against the Governor) been
oveIruled in that State by the subsequent
case of Hartranft Government 50 Penn. 444,
and as 10 the question OF exemption over
borne by a number of existing and subSe-
quent authorities in the Supreme Court OF
the United States. Among these are the
cases OF the Piqua Bank VS.. KNOCK, IA How.
$40; Mechanics Bank VS.. Debalt, Is How
$40, directly everything an Ohio case upon
appeal; Dodge VS.. WOolsey, Ibid, 3Sl.
The Ohio cases upon this subject of exemp-
ton cited, though some of them are reasoned
with ability, do not demand much consider
alton here, as some OF them have been re-
petent authority of the Supreme Court OF
the United States.
At last II seems TO me scarcely legitimate
to argue against the conStitutionaltty OF a
law upon the superstition that future Legis-
latures will not discharge their duty, and
this In my view is what the argument OF
cOmplainants' counsel comes to in the end.
II they, the General Assembly, do their duty
in imposing the necessary tax to meet In
terest and also government expenses. In
times when the coupon does not endanger
the healthful action of the organs of the
state, and IL they do their duty when the
life of the State is threatened by legislative
withdrawal of the privilege OF presenting
coupon as tax receivable, the imaginary
fetter will never become real one.
The real danger is that the Supreme Court
of the United States may not regard this
last as duty, but as an authorized attempt
TO rid the State of binding contract. II
this result should arise, 1t will be because
the Legislature of 1881 had the power to offer
as well as to make such contract and, that
being so, end the question here. We may
fret at this restraint, but when we reflect
upon the unbOunded blessings that flow to
us otherwise, from the partial surrender OF
our sovereignty, and that the apprehended
danger is remote and really improbable, our
minds should be quoted and we should rest
in a dignified submission. This court is
asked TO seize upon the opportunity which
il is said now occurs to fOrestal the antict
pated difficulty. In my view OF the act
under discussion the court ought not to do
so if IL could, and in duty could not IL ii
would.
something has been said in argument OF
the right of a State to scale its debts, with
the assent of the creditors. The debt as ii
now exists will be heavily scaled under the
pending appropriation, and II such a right
really exists, when the proper time comes
IL may be scaled again, with or without the
creditors consent, but such a scaling must
be done always subject &c our relations as a
member of the union of States. But have
already said enough upon this question.