Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1882-08-06
rNeLAND,s EnaAERAssmENrr


The drama of the invasion of Egypt goes
on, but the most striking feature in the per-
Torrance continues to be the attitude Of the
performers, who are all at cross-purposes,
while those whs do nothing in the piece rail
r. I tA-ei1. might AZ those who proceed 10
action. All the other nations are intensely
Jealous of England, and now England is dis
playing bitter jealousy of Turkey. After
calling upon that power as suzerain, the
holder OF dominion, to send its troops to
Egypt, 1t hesitates as to whether it should
allow those troops to landi A very open
display of its feeling was made when Sir A
Calvin, the British consul-general, visited all
the banks in Alexandria and warned them
to negotiate no draft of the Turkish govern
ment. To call upon an ally to bring along
his troops, and then endeavor to prevent him
getting the money essential to that end, Is
an apparently Pickwickian proceeding pecu-
liarly preposterous. Money or no money,
however, the troops will come and will I'M
dertake to enforce the sultan's suzerainty.
Here comes a knotty point, and there
is no little interest in how ii will be settled
will Turkey fight with Arab or against him?
That is Just what England wants TO know,
and that is why she insisted that, before en-
tering Egypt, Turkey shall proclaim Arab
rebel. This Turkey declines to do until her
army is on Egyptian ground. All that
Arab has done, so far, has not convinced her
hat he is a rebel, and such a conviction cam
not be entertained until Arab formally re-
sists the Turkish army. The sultan, since
Arab resisted the authority OF the khedive,
has conferred upon him a complimentary
decoration expressive of appreciation. Since
that act the sultan has done and expressed
nothing that is not conformable with that
act. Arab stands, after all that has taken
place, as an official who has performed his
duty to his master. How then Is England
to know that the troops of the crafty Turkish
monarch Will not, in effect if not in appear
ance, SO act as to favor Arab and be an OBJ
struction to England? To have an enemy
in front, and then to admit another possible I
enemy into her midst is more than England |
considers good generalship or sound policy. ]
To admit the Turks uncommitted against |
Arab may be TO admit the very |
party most concerned in the success of |
Arabs designs. Since the time of Mehemet |
Ali the sultan's suzerainty over Egypt has |
been merely nominal thing, and England |
has aided to keep it so. The sultan has |
bitterly felt this deprivation of one of his |
finest provinces. By aiding the schemes of |
Arab be may get back his lost possession
and resume his suspended powers. II he |
assist England to drive out Arab he remains |
as before, suzerain only in name. We see on |
considering these things why England objects
to Turkish troops entering Egypt unless their
master declares Arab his enemy. The posi-
ton is a singular one, and the arrival OF the
Turkish soldiers, and what they viii do if
they have entrance into the country, will all
be watched with intense curiosity. The
other powers -see clearly the difficulty of |
Engand's position-the embarrassment of
allowing troops to enter that she may
yet have to fght-but none of them
care to aid in relieving her of the
difficulty, while Russia sustains Turkey /
in Its tortuous policy, so much so that it is
stated she has postponed the payment OF an
due of Turkeys debt to her, SO
as to assist the sultan to send its troops
where they will probably be used to neutral
ize all England can do. This is the knot
into which cunning and diplomacy have tied
Egyptian affairs; how will that knot be I'M
raveled?