Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1882-11-21

Immediately. If BANKS is not at the juno
| ton, instruct Colonel Clary to run the
trains back to this side of Cedar Run. and
post regiment and section of artillery
with it.
| Shy command of Major General Pope.
| ssGEoaGH D. RUGeLEs,
| Colonel and Chief Of Staff"
| His troops had been marching all day were
very much fatigued, some of them only hav
ing just arrived in camp and had not had
their supper, when the order to march at
o'clock was received. The night, as shown
in testimony before the court which tried
Porter and as confirmed by the evidence
given in what is known as the Schofeld
board, was extremely dark; the road very
narrow, with numerous cuts and streams
passing through it; bounded by woods on
both sides in many places, with no place
| where the open country could be taken for
the march Of troops, and blocked up by
about 1000 army wagons, many of them
| mired III the narrow road. so that the Of
| icer who conveyed the order 10 Gen. Por
! ter was over three hours on horseback in
making the distance of ten miles. Porter
was expected, with fatigued troops worn
with long marches on scanty rations, to
| make a march. on a very dark night,
through a blockaded road, more rapidly
than a single aiGe-de-camp, unincumbered,
had been able to get through on horse
back.
When ne received the order he showed it
to his leading generals and, apparently
with ore accord, they decided that the
movement at that hour was impossible;
further, that no tius could possibly be
gained by 50 early a start, and that if
they should start at that hour and get
through to Bristoe station ct the time
designated the troops would not be fit for
either fighting or marching on their ar
rival at that point. Porter replied how
ever, Here is the order and it must be
obeyed,'' but, after further consultation,
he decided, as did his generals, that a
postponsner Of two hours in starting the
march would enable them to get through
as quick as if the men were kept on foot
and under arms while the road was being
cleared, and that the men would be in a
much better condition for service on their
arrival at their destination. He was en-
tirely justified in exercising
his own judgment in this mat
ter because the order shows !
that he was moi to take part in any battle |
when he arrived there. He did not leave |
the commanding general in ignorance of |
his proposed delay, nor of the reasons Of !
it, but at once sent request that the gen !
erai commanding should send cavalry (he |!
had none hlmself) and clear the road near |;
him Of membranes, SO that the march |
might be unobstructed. |
It is shown that a literal obedience to |
the order of the 27sh OF August was a physi- |
CT lC2,>DSsihhty. I. is further shown that !
General Porter was desirous of oDeyi1g i. !
literally, so far as was practicable, but was
prevailed upon by his leading generals
against whom a suspicion of disloyalty to
their commander or 10 the cause has never
been entertanea-to do what his own
Judgment approved as the best thing to do
to make Il later start with the view of ar
irving at his destination as early as it was
possible for him to arrive there and to give
to his Jaded and WORKOUT troops two
hours more of needed rest. If the night
had been clear and the road an open one
there would not have been as much justifi-
cation for the exercise of his discretion in !
the matter, but there is no doubt that he
would have arrived at Bristoe station just
as early and with his troops in much bet
ter condition if ne had started at early
dawn instead of at the hour he did, and
the intervening time had been used in
clearing the road for his troops when they
did march. When there were open spaces
along the line OF the road,
they were either marshy, filled with
stumps of trees, and impossible to march
over, or were crowded with army wagons.
SO that the track CT his army was limited
to the incumbered narrow road between
the two points designated in the order,
which could be cleared only by the wagons
being moved ahead, as requested Of Pope.
Much Of the testimony before the court
and before the army board might be quot
I'D to confirm what is here stated, but as
this is all accessible to the reader. I will
lot lengthen this statement by quoting it.
question very much whether there was ,
In engagement during the war, OR series
IF engagements continuing over as much
time as was consumed in the battles about !
Bull Run in August: 1862, when not only {
one, but p number of generals did ex- ,
,rcise their discretion as Porter did ON this
occasion and with far less justification. ,
The commanding general who gave the ,
order desired to have the troops at cor I
ain point by daylight and he gave his Or
1ers so as to accomplish that result. Under I
The circumstances the order required of | s
he troops an impossibility. That was as ,
evident to Porter and those with him be- I
.ore the attempt was made as it was after E
1t is little singular that any one high
n rank, connected with the army of Vir- 7
yinia, should be in ignorance of the arrival
If at least portion of Lees army, by the {
very route designated by Pope, many hours 6
before the 4:s0 order was published. Por-
;er was not 10 ignorance Of that arrival. ,
Between II and O'clock, on arriving ut
lis advance position. Porter was shown by ,
Mcdowell dispatch from General Bu- {
lord, sent at $50 on the morning of the ]
10Th, stating that from seventeen to eigh ,
,een regiments of the enemy had passed ,
through Gainesville three-quarters of an {
aour before, or at quarter before nine
pollock, on their way to reinforce Jackson, !
70 that the head of the column must have {
been not only in supporting distance Of I
Jackson, but at the place Of deployment {
BY 10 o'clock in the morning; and now it ,
is known, as it was known by Porter at the ,
lime. that Longssreet, with some $4,000
men, was in position confronting Porter {
hv 10 o,olocL ~, fho OOH oe e1--y