The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1882-10-22

| at least 10000 strong according tn tho figures
given by the author, was in his front. 1nstead
OF falling back with his entire force. schonoid
| sent Stanlcys division 10 Spring Hii and be.
gan reconnaissance after o'clock A. NJ, with
portion Of his remaining infantry. to verify
tho Information sent him several hours before
Fortunately Stanley. q most capable and gal
| liant soldier, reached Spring Hill before the
| head OF Hoods columns. and taking up n fa-
vorable position. compelled the latter to de-
lay his further advance and TO develop his
lines. sharp fight took place. but Stanley
making a great show of his slender forces
firmly held his ground. Meanwhile Schoilcld
| was lettering twelve miles in the rear. and did
| not begin to withdraw the bulk OF his command
from Its perllous position till after nightfal OF
| tho Goth. or over sixteen hours after Wilson had
| told him exactly what the rebels would do and
did do. and what he ought TODD to avoid all un :
| necessary peril.
| Why or how Hood let such splendid oppor-
tunty to annihilato his opponent slip by unim-
proved is still one OF the mysteries OF the rebel
lion. He put tho principal blame upon Cheat
ham. commanding his leading corps and whom
he ordered after dark to take position on the
turnpike, along which Schoted must pass in or
der to reach Franklin and bar 1t. Tho most rea-
sonable explanation OF his failure to do this is
that Cheatlam did not receive this order till
after Scholeld had marched by him and
reached a position Of safety. 1t has boon stated
by Federal officers, who got it from rebel citi-
zens few days later. that Cheatham was on q
visit to lady Of his acquaintance during the
night, and that his Adjutant- General endeav-
orcd to carry tho order into effect. but could not
do So This statement was corroborated to us
by no loss a person than Gen. Forrest. But
whether true or not. the fact remains that Hood
lost the fruits Of his brilliant turning move
ments twelve miles to the rear Of Schoheld by
the absence or incompetence OF Cheatham, and
the Union army was thereby enabled to escape
with but trihng loss. The author touches all
Of this very lightly and it Is worthy OF note that
he has no word Of condemnation. nor even Of
criticism. for Schoned. He suppressos Gen.
Wilson's dispatches. criticises him for falling
back upon tho Lcwisburg pike toward Frank
lin. and says he should have gone to Spring Hill
instead. by the turnpike leading from Rally
Hill to that place.
Now let US consider this proposition. In the
first place. there is no turnpike from Rally Hill
toSpring Hill the road was at that time n COM
mon earth road and a poor one at that. The
Lewisburg turnpike. passing through Hurts
Cross Roa1s. at which Wilson had concentrated
his command. runs nearly north to Franklin.
and is the first broad hard road east Of the
Franklin and Columbia turnpike upon which
Schofeld's entire force OF infantry was sup
posed to be marching. Had Wilson abandoned
the Lewisburg turnpike. in face OF tho in
formation he had obtained and had sent to
Schofeld. there Is no room to doubt that For
rost would have taken possession Of it and
moved rapidly to Franklin. arriving there be-
fore either Wilson or SchoHeld could possibly
do SO. That Wilson was right in his con-
clusion Is shown clearly by the fact that For
rest attacked him on the Lewisburg turnpike
early on the morning OF the Goth. and pressed
heavily upon him. by preponderance of force,
first turning one flank and then the other. till
late in the day. Finding 1t impossible to drive
Wilson from that road. or to get on it in his
rear. and that every foot of the rebel march was
stubbornly contested. Forrest turned Off under
cover of the dense woods abreast OF Spring Hill.
and moved to that place, about five miles
away. Had no found the Lewisbur. turn
pike uncovered. it is reasonable to suppose
that he would have notified Hood. who could
also have turned his columns TO it and moved
rapidly toward Franklin. As it was. with Will
son marching upon it and holding it. and Scho-
field on the Columbia turnpike. there was moth
ing for the rebel leader to do but to cajole
Schoield into holding on at Columbia. which he
did. while he moved the mass OF his army to
Hill. The manpuvrcs OF Hood in carrying out
this plan were eXcele nt. and were executed wi tn
great precision. but his own corps commanders
failed him when victory was within his grasp.
Finally 1t will be observed TINT the dispatches
quoted above suggested To Schoilcld Just how TO
communicate with Wilson during the Goth. and
II he did not approve that officers dctermin ina
ton to cover the Lewisburg pike it was entire
iy practicable. and fully within his province to
send him orders to move on and cover Spring
Hill. Us Cox thinks he should have done. even
without orders In view of the fact however.
that Stanley had gone to that place and Scho-
field had an unobstructed road to it, such orders
for the cavalry would have been strate-
gically wrong. inasmuch as it has been
shown that they would have left the best
road open to Franklin. place Of far
greater strategic Importance than Spring Hill.
In consideration of all the circumstances. the
country may we'll be thankful that Schoheld
did not interfere with the cavalry, and that
Cox did not have the opportunity Of imposing
his IDEAS OF strategy upon its commander. They
would have put the cavalry in front OF Hood =
infantry. while most practical soldiers will
agree with us that Schohold's infantry
should have been in that place. Had Wilson's
suggestions and Thomas's positive orders been
promptly acted upon by Schoield. the pcrils of
and plo time would have been gained to take
position at Franklin and fortify il, or at least
to 80 place his troops in position In front Of it
as to enable them to resist tho assault which
overwhelmed Wagner and. but for the timely
| and heroic advance Of Opdycke. would have
swept our entire infantry line from the field.
This brings us to a consideration OF tho
battle Of Franklin. the details Of which wc
must omit but the salient points of which
must be mentioned in order that tho rcador
may understand wherein the author is at fault.
1t will b. remembered that all the infantry OF
Schohelis command had taken position at
that place before noon Of Nov. 80 and that two
brigades Of Wagner's division were left to take
up IL position about n half mile outside Of the
principal line; that when the rebels advanced
to tho assault they speediy overthrow these
outlying brigtdes. and. following close upon
the hoels of their flying opponent. with
great impe,uosity rushed upon and cap
tured that portion Of our main deic naive line
in rear Of tho outlying force and that Opdycke
without waiting for orders. dashed forward
with his gallant brigade from n position in the
rear. and roGstablished our line. Cox lays the