Butler citizen. [volume] (Butler, Pa.) 1877-1922, 1882-02-08

ters of dispute. That the defendant
fired at and shot the deceased Presi
dent was abundantlv proved. Tha
the wound was fatal had been testified
to by the surgeons, who were compe
tent to speak, and they were uncontra
dicted That the homicide was com
mitted with malice aforethought ii
the defendant was capable of crimina
intent or malice Gould hardly be gain
said. 1t was not necessary to prove
that any special or express hatred ol
~lalice was entertained by the accused
toward the deceased 1t was sufficien
to prove that the act was done by de-
liberate intent, as distinct from an ac
done under certain impulse, in the
heat of blood and without previous
malice Evidence had been exhibited
to the jury tending to show that the
defendant admitted il his own hand
writing that he had conceived the idea
of removing the President as be
called it, six weeks before the shooting
that he had deliberated upon it, and
came to determination to do it; and
that about two weeks before be accom-,
plshed it he stationed himself at certain
points to do the act, but for some
reason was prevented. His prepara.
ton for it by the purchase of the pistol
| had been shown. All these facts came
up to the full measure of the proof re-
quirod to establish what the law de-
! nominated malice aforethought.
WAS GUITEAU RESPONSIBLE.
The jury would find little difficulty
in reaching conclusion as to all the
elements that made up the crime
charged in tho indictment, except, it
might be, as to the one Of sound mind,
memory and discretion-but that was
only technical expression for re-
sponsible, sane man. He now ap-
preached that difficult question. lie
had already said that man who is
insane in the sense that makes him ir-
responsible, cannot commit crime.
The defense of insanity has been 30
abused as to be brought into great dis
credit. 1t was the last resort in cases
of unquestioned guilt. 1t had been
an excuse for juries to bring in q
verdict of acquittsl when there was q
public sympathy for the accused. and
especially where there was provocation
for the homicide according to public
sentiment, but not according to law
For that reason the defense of insanity
was viewed with disfavor, and public
sentiment was hostile to it. Never
theless, if insanity were established to
degree necessary, it was perfect de-
fense for an indictment for murder and
must be allowed full weight
1t would be observed that in this
case there was no trouble with any
question about what might be called
total insanity, such as raving mania
or absolute imbecility, in which all
exercise of reason is wanting. and
where there is no recognition of per.
sons or things, or their relations.
Butthere was debateable border line be-
tween sanity and insanity and there was
often great difficulty in determining on
which side of this line party was to
be put. There were cases in which a
mans mental faculties, generally, SEEM
ed to be deranged. A man was pos
sessed, perhaps, by a belief of some
thing absurd which he could not be
reasoned out of (what was called an
insane delusion); or he might have
some morbid propensity, seemingly in
harsh discord with the rest of his in
tellectual faculties and moral nature.
Those were cases which, for want of
better term, were called partial insan-
ity.
The jury must determine whether,
at the time the homicide was commit
ed, the defendant was laboring under
any insane delusion prompting and
impelling him to do the deed. Natur-
ally, they would look first to any ex-
PLANTATION of the act that might have
been made by the defendant himself at
the time, or Immediately before or after.
Several papers have been laid before
them that had been in the prisoners
possession, and that purported to as
sign the motive for the deed. The
Judge then cited several extracts from
Guiteau's different statements as to
the motives which led him to commit
the crime, growing out of the political
situation.
The jury had now before it every
thing emanating from the prisoner
about the time of the shooting. There
was nothing further from him until
three months afterwsrd. AND now he
would pass to consider the import of
all this. The jury would consider,
first, whether this evidence fairly rep
resented the feelings and ideas that
governed the prisoner at the time OF
the shooting If it did, it represent
ed a thing which he (Judge Cox had
not seen characterized in any judicial
utterance as an insane delusion. They
would consider whether, on the con-
trsry, it showed an ample power OF
reasoning and reflection on the argu-
, ments and evidence for and against,
resulting in the opinion that the Presi-
dent had betrayed his party, and that
if he were out of the way it would be
a benefit to his party, and would save
the country from the predominance oil
their political opponents. So far there
was nothing insane in the conclusion.
1t had doubtless been shared by good
many heated partisans, who were sane
people, but the difference was that the
prisoner reached the conclusion that to
put the President out of the way by as
sassination was political necessity
When men reasoned, the law required
them to reason correctly, 80 far as their
practical duties were concerned. A
man might believe course of action
to be right, and the law might forbid
it as wrong, nevertheless he must obey
the law, and nothing could save him
from the consequences of the violation
of the law, except the fact that he. was
80 crazed by disease as to be unable to