The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1882-04-20
The Second Day at Gettysburg.

The Second Day at Gettysburg
I'M Quad in Detroit Free Pressl
1t was daybreak OF the I'd of July, 1863 0
the hills-in the Yalleys-spread over fields
hidden in the woods around Gettysburg WEI
200 900 men making ready for terrible bal
tie.
In the gray Of morning one could hear tn
chlrp OF birds in the orchards and the lowin
OF cattle in the pastures. 1t was a gloriou
morning. The sky was without a cloud, an
a slight breeze riffled across the wheatfield
and rustled the leaves of the apple-trees.
hundred thousand men were awake and NOV
ing before there was a flush in the East
When the sun showed his face to the world
looked down upon two armies ready to begil
their bloody work.
Hill and Ewell were there the day before
Longstreet and Lee had come up after mid
night-HOWard was there-Doubleday wa
ready for another battle-HancocE1 was order
ing more artillery to the defense of Cemetery
| Ridge. The Second, Fifth and Sixth Corp
were coming up, some of the brigades in The
bands and the tap of drums were heard every
where. Sedgwick and the Sixth must march
thirty miles to reach the field, but they were
hurrying up, determined to be counted in when
| the fight was hottest.
MAKING READY
| From daybreak to o'clock one standing on
Round Top could see regiments, brigades and
divisions moving in every direction Guns
were slowly brought into position, gaps filled
ammunition brought up. The Federal lines
were slowly pushed out until they reached a
front Of five lies, and Lee must push out his
ines to cover the same front. Following the
hills sand keypoints the Federal lines bent al
most in the shape of horseshoe. Lee could
not conform to this, but his lines described a
crescent, with his choicest troops and best
guns at points most exposed. Slocum's
Twelfth Corps was opposite Ewell, Howard
was opposite Hill; Sckles was opposite
Longstreet. Meade reported to the committee
on the conduct of the war that he had between
$4,000 and 1907 900 men on the field of Gettys-
burg. Lees report placed his fighting force at
o200O men. Davis says thsse figures were ex-
act. Confederate reports now in the archives
ofthe government give the force at 10000. Con-
federate reports say Lee left Virginia with less
than 10000 men, and deducting for cavalry off
on raids, guards details and stragglers, they in
sist that he could not have had over 65 900
men on the field that day.
WAITING.
At O'Clock in the morning the Who'll G of the
Federal army was in position except Sedg-
wick's Corps, the head otwhch was yet fifteen
miles away, and the Fifth Corps, which had a
march of ten Then the rumble of cannon
wheels and the tramp of men were hushed
Ten O'Clock came and silence continued
At II o'cosk most of the men were lying
down in line. Aides and Orderlies rushed here
and there, but not a musket broke the still
ness.
1t was noon by the clocks in the houses of
Gettysburg, and yet there had been no ad-
vance,
That waiting meant much. Lee had seen
that the Federal position was well-nigh i'm
pregnable. Meade had seen that the Confeder-
ate position was scarcely inferior If Meade
moved out to attack Lee had the advantage
Ii Lee moved out he must be defeated Stand
to-day where Howard held the center that
morning and you will affirm that assertion
Meade was waiting for Lee to attack-Lee
was waiting for Meade. That was why the
hours slipped past and the clocks struck again
and again. Every hour was loss to Lee
Two Federal corps had swung into position
since sunrise. Every hour was gain to
Meade. Sedgwick and Sykes were coming up,
and every regiment In both corps was stone
wall.
SOMEBODY BLUNDERED."
Confederate military writers say that Lee
intended to attack at sunrise Indeed, his
orders tor snch movement are on record
He had realized that Round Top was the key
of the whole field, and Longstreet was ordered
to mass and attack. The rising sun was to be
his signal, and had he hurled his corps against
that hill at that early hour he must have CAP
tured it, But somebody blundered-orders
miscarried or were not understood, and instead
OF attacking at sunrise Longstreet was not
ready at noon.
LONGsTREET ATTACKS
The clocks have struck 1, 2, 3, yet Meade is
not hurried to leave his strong position and
dash his troops across the open fields against
Lee. 1t was wise decision. Ifthere is ANYTHING
humane N war, it is humane decision. Lee
must attack. 1t is too late now to retreat. He
planned for battle in Pennsylvania, and it is
ready for him. At halfpast clock, lust as
the first regiment of Sykes corps comes limp
ing up, a move is seen all along the Confeder-
ate front, and every Federal springs to his feet.
There is to be an attack all along the Federal
front, out the real movement is against Sickles
VINO has thrown part of his force out in front
OF Round Top as further precaution against
sudden surprise.
Boom! The voice of that single cannon had
scarcely echoed across the fields, when there
came crash of artillery which made the hill
tops shake One could count the explosions
at first, but after three or four minutes lndiyid
ual sounds were merged into one tremendous
crash which Heayen's thunderbolts never
equalled. Hill thundered-Ewell Numbered
Longstreet made the earth rock under the
wheels OF his cannon as he paved the way for
cash at Sickles, and over Sickles to Round
Top. Under cover of the smoke his lines are
forming Hood PLACES himself at the head of
| one dlYlslon-McLaws at the head ofthe other,
AT o'clock the fire of artillery ceases and the
column moves out.
Meade knew what was coming. He knew
where the heaviest blow would fall, and he was
conierrlng personally with Sickles when the
cannonading began. He had thirty minutes
TO prepare tor the infantry attack, and he lost
not moment The artillery fire was appalling
and from the Confederate position it seemed
| as i the ground in front OF Round Top must
pe swept clear. But it was not. The FEEDER
| ais LOOK cover in the rayines and behind the
ridges, and were neither demoralized nor bad