Grant County herald. [volume] (Lancaster, Wis.) 1850-1968, 1882-01-12
The DEATH GRIP,
Tightening the Tolls Of the Law Grad
ually Around the Accused Body
OF Charles Guiteau.
Both Sides Locked in Fierce Embrace.
Straining Every Nerve as they
Near the End.
With Titanic Blows the Prosecution
Batters Down the Defenses of the
Accused Wretch.
spireted Sketch Of the Scene Presented by the
Court During the Arguments OF Counsel.
The Murderer will Speak.
OPENING TIE BALL.

OPENING THE BALL.
WASHINGTON, Jan. I'm the Gui-
teau case this morning, Dayidge made
the opening speech On the legal points,
and was followed with the closest atten-
ton. The jury was told by the Judge
that they would be excused for the day,
but all preferred to remain and list to
| the arguments.
The prisoner assured his counsel that
he wouldn't ask to take part to-day,
but he should insist on making any COM
ments he deemed necessary to set them
| right on the other side.
As the argument progressed, Guitcau
| pretended to read a letter, but followed
Davidge with the closest attention. The
few Interruptions which he made were
unnoticed by the counsel.
Guiteau called out: 81 didn't know
the difference between right and wrong.
II | had, would not have done it,
To this, Davidge said: 1--WE will
come to that by and by
THE FIRST SENSATION
Of the day was caused by the reading of
Judge Davis (of New York;, charge to
the jury in the Coleman murder case.
Judge Porter relieved Dayidge and read
| from newspaper slips.
Scoyille, with Impotence, objected
to any more such dramatic efforts on
the part of Judge Porter, intended for
an effect on the jury, and insisted that
he (Porter) might as well read a stump
speech; that he (Porter) knew that it
had no bearing on the case.
"Of course he knows it, Guiteau
shouted. "It is directly against the
| charge of this court
Judge Porter repealed the intimation,
and insisted that this farce which had
SO long been enacted by counsel for the
defense, must now stop if not rebuked
by the court it would be by others.
Judge Cox ended the dispute by say
ing the matter read was undoubtedly
authority. Its applicability to this case
could be commented upon by counsel
at the proper time.
As Davidge resumed, Guiteau again
shouted Il want to get this thing
right before the jury. Every one knows
all about that Coleman case. The Jury
gave verdict against that charge, and
The effect was electrical when Dav-
idge, in the most deliberate and earnest
manner, said: Your Honor, this man
was for three weeks held up to us as an
imbecile, and now listen to him; he not
only knows the difference between right
and wrong, but he understands fully the
law of the CASE
Guiteau-" Transitory mania-that's
my case. ] don't pretend / am insane
now. I've got as good head as you
or Porter, either. Scoville is fool,
though. | repudiate him, and his
whole theory of defense. All | want is
two hours before that jury, and can
settle this thing all right
THE SCENE
was lively one for a few minutes.
Judge Cox raped for order, and
soon Guiteau subsidized and Davidge
continued, without further Interrupt
tons, to the end of his argument.
Davidge opened by reading and then
celebrating the prayers of the Govern
ment, which asked the Judge to instruct
the jury that, if the prisoner knew, at
the time of the shooting, the difference
between right and wrong, he was at
that time sane and responsible. Davidge.
with the prayers in mis- hand, said in
a low but distinct tone and measured
language: "And that they considered,
first, of the above definition of sanity
second, of the declaration that if the
prisoner possessed ability to distinguish
between right and wrong. no irresisti-
bic passion or impulse, no uncontrolla-
hi Il a
excuse his act third, declaration that
the standard of insanity must be that
of law fourth, that no delusion, ability
to distinguish between right and wrong
being present, would excuse the pris-
oner.
Dayidge thought the prayers of the
defense bearing on the points contained
in the prayers of the prosecution ought
not to be entertained for a moment. He
said that
TIE LAW DREW LINE
of responsibility for crime somewhere.
1t had not been fully defined until the
Judges of England in 1843, at the re-
quest of the House of Lords, laid down
the legal rule defining responsibility.
This rule was the good old right and
wrong test, the rule of common sense
There were infinite degrees of inteli-
gence Think of the illustrious victim
of this prisoner on the one hand and
this assassin on the other. The law
drew no line between the low degree of
intelligence on the one hand and the
highest on the other in the respect of
responsibility for crime. This prisoner
had been portrayed as an imbecile until
he went upon the stand and tore him.
self into shreds and atoms. A man
might be peculiar, and might even be
partially insane, but if he rose 70 the
point of intelligence which enabled him
to know the difference between right
and wrong and that what he was doing
was wrong, then he was responsible for
the wrong.
Davidge then stated the magnatum of
the case. Five questions on the subject
of insanity had been submitted to the
JUDGES OF ENGLAND,
three of these questions had direct bear
ing on this case. The first question was
as to the responsibility of the person for
an act when, at the time of committing
the act. he knew he was acting contrary
TO law, but did the act complained of
with view, under the influence of an
insane delusion, of redressing sup
posed injury or of producing some sup
posed public benefit.
The answers of all the Judges Except
ing Chief Justice Mall1 was that they
were of the opinion that, notwithstand-
ing the party accused did the act with
view. under the influence of an insane
delusion, of redressing some supposed
injury, or of producing some supposed
public benefit, he was, nevertheless,
punishable according to the nature Of
the crime committed, if he knew at the
time of committing such crime he was
actin,- contrary to law.
Colonel Reed addressed the court
In REPLY
to Judge Davidge, and confined his ar
guments to the consideration of two
questions: First, the definition laid down
in the Revised Statutes of murder and
manslaughter. under which if malice be
not proven, he contcnded, the crime