Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-02-04

|. courts do have jurisdiction to In
I quire Into the motives of the legis-
lature that induced the passage of
] laws that are contractive i'm their
? character.
And at the same time IL Is adj
] mitted that the legislature (under
! the constitutional restrictions) pos
: sesses the same power to make u
contract for the state that IL has to
make municipal laws. That is to
say, that the legislature possesses
| precisely the same power to make a
contract that it possesses to make a
municipal law.
If this be true, (and it is admitted, }
J it is difficult to understand why the
motives of the legislature may, in
the one case, be challenged by the
courts, and not in both cases. Both
are the equal subjects OF legislative
power.
Then from what source do the
Judiciary derive their power TO in
stitute an inquiry into the motives
of the legislature in the one case
and not in the other also? Ii is
not pretended that this power,
claimed for the judiciary, is found
in the constitution. Then where is
it TO be found? If the enactment
of municipal laws aud contractual
laws are both the equal subjects OF
legislative jurisdiction, and no
power is found in one case more
than in the other to authorize Judi
cial inquiry into the motives Of the
legislature, why is il claimed that
the courts may institute the inquiry
where the legislation is called con-
tractual, and not where It is called
municipal?
The constitution affording no
answer To- the inquiry, we are COM
PEELED to return to cOmplainant5,
the authors of this new and singular
theory, and inquire of them the
reason of this exceeding nice and
abstruse distinction. And they tell
us Z that the courts do possess this
inquisitorial power in the one case
and not in the other, because the
1 legislature possesses the power to
repeal municipal laws but owing to
the Federal constitution, is inhibited
| from repeating contractual laws.
The source of this judicial power,
them rests not in the state constitu-
ton, but in the Federal limitation
upon the power Of the state. That
is, according to complainants'
theory, the courts possess no power
to inquire into the legislative mo-
| tive, where the obnoxious or vicious
law is repeaiable by the legislature
but they do possess this power only
in cases where the law is not re-
pealable. a-.
The reason and only reason which
complainants give for this "moon-
beam" distinction, is, that in the
one case the legislature possesses
the power of relief from the vicious
law in repeating il, and in the other
case the legislature cannot repeal Ii,
and the argument Is because the
| legislature cannot repeal 1t, the
courts may. This logic is both new
and startling
! In order then to further trace this
judicial power to its source, il any
source ii has other than the fertile
fancy of the learned solicitors for
complainants, we now make the
further inquiry why has the legisla-
ture power to repeal municipal laws
and no power to repeal contractual
laws? The answer at once is be-
cause the legislature possesses all
legislative power except only
where restrictions or limitations
are imposed upon its power by
either the state or Fed eral cOnsti-
tuition, and the Federal constitution
forbids the state to pass any "law
imparing the obligation of n con-
tract" therefore the legislature can
repeal no law that would impair a
contract. But for the limitation
upon the power of the state, the
legislature would possess the power
to repeal municipal and contractual
laws alike. And according to COM
plainants' theory and its logic, if the
legislature did possess the power to
repeal contractual laws as 1t does
possess the power to repeal munich
pal laws. then the courts would
have no jurisdiction to question the
legislative motive in either case.
Therefore it follows conclusively, il
the eomplainants' theory on this
subject is correct, that the judicial
power here sought to be invoked Is
found to rest i'm the Federal consti-
tuition, and in that clause which is
an ex press limitation upon the
states power. A strange, new and
startling conclusion, indeed.
To sustain complainants' theory
on this subject the court must hold
the remarkable propositions
First. That limitation on pow
er is a grant of power.
Second. That the state derives
its power from the Federal cOnsti-
tuition.
The first is not more asburb than
the secund is untrue.
This Vapory distinction which
complainants here seek to make
cannot be maintained upon. any
sort of sound reasoning or principle
of law. The law must be that the
courts possess the same and only the
same power over one character OF
that they possess overall
others, and If 1t can inquire into
the legislators motive in the one
case it can in all other cases.
The principle forming the dividing
line between rights of members of
a municipal or county or private
as against the officers
or trustees of such corporation, and
the rights of a mere tax payer Of
state rs against the state, Is well
and we'll defined. The line
the rights in the one case
from the rights in the other is as
wide and deep and vast as the
waters dividing the new from the
old world.
The three departments of the
state government, theeXecutiveand
judicial, each, derive their separate
powers from the same source and
at the same time. The powers Of
the three departments are not
merely equal but are exclusive in
respect to the duties assigned to
each. And they are absolutely in
dependent of each other.
Ii this all be true (and it cannot
be denied) that they each derived
their respective and separate powers
from the same common source and
at the same time, and they are each
equal and exclusive IN their respec-
tive departments, and are absolutely
Of each other, by what
can the judicial depart
ment question the motives of either
Of it's co-eqnal coordinate depart
ments? On what meat hath this
judicial Caesar fed, that it hath
grown so fat? Establish once this
dangerous and revolutionary princi-