The Dallas weekly herald. [volume] (Dallas, Tex.) 1873-1885, 1882-06-08

that court, and hence, no certificate save
that Of the chief Justice would avail. There
was, therefore, no error la the court below.
Affirmed. Watts,j.
McLendon ct al. vs. Harrington; from
Limestone count. Appellants left their
homestead IN Limestone county In 1865 and
| removed to MilliCan, where they purchased
property, lived and engaged In business.
They subsequently sold their property,
removed to Bryan, purchased properly and
engaged in business Subsequently they
sold the Bryan property, removed to Cal-
vert, rented property and engaged in bust
ness, and still later removed to Sterling ana
rented property at Sterling. McLendon
and wife executed mortgage on the ii me-
stone county property, and, upon suit 10
iOreclOse the same. interposed the defense
Of homestead. Held, these acts consti'
luJed abandonment of the Limestone
county property as a homestead, and the
court below did not err in so holding. Al
frmed Watts, j.
Paget vs.. Lockhart ct al; from Navarro
county. The record in this case brings up
only the pleadngs and judgment In the
absence of statement of facts, bill OF exeep'
tons and charges Of the court below, given
or refused, every presumption will be in
dulged in favor of the correctness of the
Judgment. Under Tex, 235, and % Tex.
IS, the judgment should be affirmed
Watts,
LeGieerse q Co. VS.. Getzendaner G. Ferris;
from Ellis county. To create a judgment
lien upon land, the Judgment must be re-
corded in the county where the land lies,
and among other things, it must set out
the amount of the judgment, and the
amount still due on the same. AS the
amount for which the judgment was ren,
dered was stated, the presumption would
obtain that such was the amount still due,
though plausible is not a tenable posi-
ton. The requirements OF the statute
must be strictly implied with in order to
secure judgment lien upon land. Affirmed.
Watts, j.
Adams e. Mitchell VS.. Cox & Leonard;
| from McLennan county. In the absence OF
a special agreement as to the forwarding OF
the goods lost, it was proper to admit evil
dence of all facts and circumstances attend
ing the transaction as well as general GUS
tom with forwarding merchants, to apply
the rule that the forwarding merchant was
bound to reasonable or ordinary diligence.
But where there is special agreement
about forwarding the particular goods, the
contrary is the rule. If the general con-
duct of the appellees had been an issue IN
the case, evidence of their general reputa-
ton as reliable and trustworthy receiving
and forwarding merchants, would be advisa-
BILE. Such not being an issue the court
erred in admitting evidence thereon. Re-
versed and remanded. Watts, j.
Zorn VS.. Tarver and wife; from Guada-
loupe county. Where it appears that the
testimony enormously admitted is wholly
immaterial and could have had
no influence upon the decision of the case
at all, it will be no valid ground for re-
versal This case was before the court on
former appeal. As Tex, 519. Here the same
parties present themselves. We find moth
ing in the record to determine that the
court erred in determining as to whether
the purchase by Miss Y. was real pur-
chase or sham. Upon the last trial it was
proven that after the conveyance by Miss
Y. to Mrs. T., part of the land was sold,
and from the proceeds of the sale the
amount recited in the bond as the consid-
Grafton, together with the interest, was paid
to her. The court below must have con-
sidered the proof as completely rebutting
the presumption that the law was bought
with the community. property OF the hus-
band and wife. If Miss Y. instead of con-
yeying the whole of the land to her cousin
and retaining lien upon it to secure to
herself part of its value, had herself sold
part of the land and conveyed the remain
der to her cousin, she would have accom-
plished directly what the proof shows was
indirectly done. We see no error in the
judgment and are of opinion it should be
affirmed. Affirmed. Delaney, j.
Synopsis of Opinions of Supreme Court
Blum ct al. VS.. Gaines & Gerald; from
Burleson county. The gist of the decision
in the case of Kessler VS.. Draub (52 Texas,
575), is, that when homestead has once
been acquired the subsequent death, mar
rage or removal of all the individuals who
composed the family, except the surviving
husband, does not subject the homestead
to forced. sale under a judgment against
him, he stin occupying it as home. The
one question in7olued in this case is identi-
cal and the one position of appellant is
that the decision in Kessler's case should
be overruled. Upon an Investigation of the
authorities upon which it was decided the
opinion is reafiirmed affirmed Bon
Jackson VS.. Pierce; from Bosque county.
In 1867 the father decedent conveyed to
his son the land in controversy. In 1875
the son reconveyed to the father, and in
1876 the son conveyed to his wife the same
land, and defends this suit in her right.
He testified on the stand that the purchase
money for the conveyance to his father was
never paid and the consideration of his
transfer TO his wife was her separate funds
used by him with reference to the convey
ance of 1875. The court charged that the
superior equitable title as between the
parties remained with the vendor If the
purchase money had not been paid. The
record does not set out the deed, but de-
scribes il as a deed to the land, and 1t must
be presumed TO be an ordinary conveyance,
with no lien reserved on its face. Held,
such deed possesses titie aud gives right
OF possession, hence the charge was errone-
Gus. Reversed and remanded. Gould, c. ].
Grigsby ct al. VS.. Peak; from Dallas
county. This is another one of series Of
those celebrated cases which, on account of
the points of law as well as the amount in
controversy, have become peculiarly in
teresting 20 the profession. The former
cases, Of which full synopsis have been
published, have directed every point at
issue, except that Of the bar by statute OF
limitations. On this point Associate Justice
Stayton dissents, and as soon as prepared
his opinion will be published in full. The
question then is. does Sec. IL, Art. - OF the
Of lS00, have prospective effect
and apply to those parties only who were
married women, infants and insane persons
at the date Of tho acceptance OF
that constitution by congress Held, |
Sec. IL, Art. - of the cOnsti- !
Of 1869 was not restricted in its operation to |
that class Of persons who should. at the !
date Of its acceptance. or subsequently la |
Dor under the disabilities therein named. /
Although In peaceful adverse possession Of
the land for five years before institution Of
suit. yet, under the constitution Of 1860, the !
statute OF Limitations did not obtain, and
the court erred therefore IL its charge TO the
Jury. Reversed and renanded. BOnper, ]. /
Grigsby ct al. We Bowles; from Dallas
caunty. Upon the authority Of the case Of
Grigsby ct Al. ". Peak, the judgment be-
low in this case is reversed and tie cause re-
handed. Reversed and rgna1ded. Bon
nerj.s
GresnEade, guardian, ct al. vs..
Smith: from Bg<dus county. Smith
recovered iudguydut below AGAINST one
g.. rpptl'auts = iuferrened, but their
petition for Intervention. on eNcep-