, 1882-10-18


to the weak place. This campaign III
Egypt, like the Russian campaign in the
Balkans. suggests that the East, after a
century of defeat by the West, has hit
upon new and very formidable methods OF
defence. From a very early period, both
East and West have known that II Euro
peans in I could reach ASiaticS III
arms, could actually touch them, as 1t
were. upon the battlefield, the Europeans
would win. Sapor knew that as well as
Saladin, Saladin as well as Iyder. The
early tactics of Asiatics, therefore, were
to avoid pitched battles. The Parthians
against Rome, the Saracens against the
Crusaders. Hyder Ali against the English,
all pursued the same methods. They
raised and half drilled masses of cavalry,
attacked necessarily, retreated without
shame, desolated the country they aban-
dOned, and so gradually wore out troops
always limited in number, hampered as TO
cOmmissariat, and liable to terrible out
breaks of epidemic disease. These tactics,
however. probably from the pride which
comes to dominant races, AVE been DIS
continued, except by the Moors OF AlglerS.
For a hundred years, ASiatics. III Turkey.
in Egypt, in India, China, have usually
met European invaders in the teld, and
have succumbed to their superiority in
morale. discipline, and physical energy
and "go." Everything may 90 wrong
with the invaders till the battle, but then
the defenders are shattered and collapse.
Western troops have within that p4Iod
scarcely lost a pitched battle, unless We
account ChillianWallah lost. Of late, how
ever, the Asiatics, taught by miserable
experience. have shown a disposition to
resort to new and much more effective
+,.4;,-. 81 ,,-,;I hotel. C,,oo ,,n,,o I,pt Inv
retreat, but by the improvisation Of mud
fortresscs capable of holding armies.
They have every advantage in playing
this game. Their leaders command men
with Just sufficient skill for the engineer
ing work required, which is really dyke
building on a plan, a kline of work taml-
liar to all Asiatics, who have always UNI
dcrStO0d irrigation; they control great
masses Offorced laboUr, and, by construct
ing the works, they place their troops IN
the situation in which most may be eX.
pected of them. The old Jest that sailors
are Drawer than soldiers because they can
not run away, may be unfair; but 1T rs
certain that ASiatics, when they cannot
melt away unseen, when their chiefs have
complete hold Of them, as in a fortress,
fight very different from themselves
when retreat depends upon the discretion
Of the private soldiers. Such earthWorks,
so improvised and so defended, are, as
we saw at Plevna, very costly to take;
and yet, if the defending soldiers are
worth anything, they must be taken,
before victory can be achieved. The
European army is scarcely ever numerous
enough, even when the aSsailants are
Russians, to spare the masses of men re
Quired to Hmask"-that is, in fact, to
b~IOckade-the entrenched defenders, or
to risk leaving them to cut off cOmmUni-
cations at will. The invaders mnSt carry
the works, and that involves not only loss
of life, which may be as at Pleyna, very
great, but the further loss Of an immense
amount of time. The transport difficulty
grows huge at once. You need heavy
guns to beat down the fire of the defend
ers, and heavy guns can be moved only by
a powerful transporting force. Men can
be urged on almost anywhere, if the Gene
raj is callous to a certain amount of loss
and suffering among them; but to drag
huge loads of bronze or steel weighing
many tons, and the masses of shells to
feed them, there must be either thousands
of beasts or scientific machines. Either
mules and horses must be collected in
thousands, or railways must be construct
ed or repaired. Either plan consumes
time, increases expense, and adds to the
chance of an outbreak of disease, until, if
many such improvised fortresses have to
be taken, the invasion which was to have
been arapid affair becomes a most tedious
ard costly, and sometimes disastrous, cam
paign. The war is changed from the
modern Crush" in which everything is on