The National tribune., 1882-09-28
The Desperate Charge of Hoods Army
Upon the Union BreaStWOrkS.
OPDYCKE TO THE RESCUE.
A Thrilling Account Of a Cele-
brated Engagement.

HarpCth river, on Its left and southern bank
Toward the south its outskirts rise to range
of low hills, which, with the river completely
inclose it. On this range Gen. Cox formed our
line of defense. and had breastworks promptly
thrown up. The brigades of Stiles, Easement,
and Reilly, Of his own division, extended, in
the order named, from the river above the
village to the Columbia road; then came Strick-
lands and Moore's brigades of Ruger's division
to Carter's creek road, and Kimball's division
of the Fourth Corps filed out the line to the
river below the town. The artillery of the
Fourth Corps, under Col. Bridges, was stationed
at intervals along the works. AT Carters Hill,
which was the highest Of the range, and over
which the Columbia road led down into Frank
lin, our intrenchments turning to the right,
formed two salient angles On this hill,
plainly the key of the field, Cox placed a
double limo of infantry and eight pieces of
artillery. About fifty yards in rear of Case
ments right and Reilly's left and centre, the
Twelfth and Sixteenth Kentucky and part of
the Eighth Tennessee formed second line un-
der Col. White. Infront an unobstructed plain
extended for mile to an open forest in which
the rebel general formed his army for battle.
About midway between the forest and Carter's
Hill Schoticld had halted Lanes and Conrad's
brigades of Wagners division. This was
a grave error, because they could observe the
enemy no better from this position of exposure
than from Carter's Hill, and instead of retard-
ing, aided the advance of the confederate army
by screening its columns from the fire of our
guns on the hill. The brigades were not ex-
pected to remain long enough to be over
whclmed and routed, and Gen. Cox, after Scho-
field had crossed the river, verbally ordered
Wagner to retire them in due time, his inten-
tion being to have them join Opdyckes brigade
in reserve; but Schofield had put them into a
position where usefulness was impossible, and
where their peril, at first imminent, soon be-
came so extreme as seriously to endanger the
existence of the whole army. On the way in
from Stevens Ell Opdyclle was ordered by
Wagner into line with the two brigades, but
having in former campaign become familiar
with the military features of the locality, he
thought the position so extremely faulty that
he objected, and so was allowed to so into re-
serve on the rear slope of Carter's Hill about
200 yards from the main line of earthworks.
Gen. Wagner then said to him: "Now, OPP
dycke, fight when and where you think best;
may not see you again." This was the only
order he received during the battle.
THE BATTLE OF FRANKLIN-THE BATTLE LOST
Deeply chagrined at having allowed our
army to escape on the 29th, Hood was now
eager to fail upon US whenever he could
find US, and as soon as he came in sight
Of our position formed his army into such
deep and solid order of battle that
it did not extend further from our left than to
the right of KimbalPs left brigade. Cheath-
ANS corps formed the enemy's left and Stew
arts his right wing, and Lees corps came up
on the Columbia road in rear of the centre as a
reserve. Forrest, with the main body of his
cavalry corps, was at the fords that Wilson
was defending, about two miles up the Har-
peth. He had actually crossed on the Goth, but
being assailed with vigOr by Wilson, was COM
PEELED to recrOSs the river. Hood expected to
overwhelm the National infantry by the first
onset Of superior masses, and then, with his
cavalry, force Wilson out of the way and hasten
around to the Nashville road in time there to
stop the flight of our routed army and give his
own infantry time to come up and complete
our destruction. At p. m. the enemy massed
heavily on the Columbia road, emerged from
the forest and advanced over the plain against
us. The two brigades left out alone to face the
massive centre of the confederate army, not
receiving orders to retire, and so, probably sup
posing that the safety Of the army required of
them a stubborn resistance, held their positions
until compelled to fall back in confusion. fol-
lowed closely by the enemy to and across our
works on Carter's Hill The troops there
yielded to this rush of friends and foes, and at
the opening of the battle more than thousand
prisoners, two batteries of artillery, and the
center and key of our line fell into the hands
OF the enemy.
If, aided by lOng-range ficld-gla5s, Gen.
SchOfeld could, in part see these disasters,
made probable by his ill.judged disposition of
the two brigades, but he had separated himself
and one division so far from his main army
that he could not reach it with that division
nor with orders in time to be of any use. No
attempt was made to do either, and Cox was
left to be crushed utterly, or to win imperish-
able hOnOrs without the aid of his official chief.
who, surrounded by an idle division o: veteran
soldiers seemed content in the distant fort
When Lane and Conrad were routed General
Cox, from his position on the parapet some
distance to the left of the Columbia road, at
once saw the peril of the army A painful
question required his immediate decision
whether or not to open fire on our own men, |
in order to strike and disorder the advancing |
columns Of the enemy before they could reach |
and fatally penetrate our line He decided TO |
withhold fire until the routed troops should |
come in hoping that his double line of infan- |
try would stand firm to the breastwOrks, or, in |
case the line should be broken that the bri- |
gade in reserve might come up and restore it. |
Orders suitable to give effect to this decision |
were given, but those intended for the reserve |
brigade did not reach it, nor did Opdycke |
know that any had been sent until several |
days afterwards. The whole of our line, COW |
cred by the enemy's front, soon became en- |
gagged, and Cox hastened to Carter's Hill, now
the scene of great confusion The confederates
were i'll possession of about 400 yards of our |
and the gap was rapidly widen
ing. Our caissons and men were wildly rush
enemy were turning our own cannon upon us.
THE CHARGE OF oPDYCKE's BRIGADE.
Seeing this state of things, at 4:3O D. m.
Opdycke moved up the hill with his brigade of
seven small, but veteran, regiment the
Wisconsin, Col Macarthur; the
)ne Hundred and Twenty fifth Ohio, Col Bates,
md the Thirty sixth, Forty fourth, Seventy
hird, Seventy fourth, and Eighty eighth Illi-
lois Coils. Olson, Russell, Burrows, BRYAN, and