Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1882-11-21

post regiment and section OF artillery |
with it.
aBy command of Major General Pope.
"GEoRaH d. RuaGLEs,
"Colonel and Chief of Stat"
His troops had been marching all day were
very much fatigued, some OF them only nav
| ing Just arrived in camp and had not had
their supper, when the order to march et
o'clock was received. The night, as shown
| in testimony before the court which tried
Porter and as confirmed by the evidence
given in what is known as the Schotield
board, was extremely dark; the road very
narrow. with numerous cuts and streams
passing through it; bounded by woods on
both sides in many places, with no place
where the open country could be taken FOR
the march of troops, and blocked up oy
about 1000 army wagons, many OF them
mired in the narrow road, so that tho OF
ficer who conveyed the order to Gen. Por-
ter was over three hours on horseback IN
making the distance of ten miles. Porter
was expected, with fatigued troops worn
with long marches on scanty rations, to
make a march on very dark night,
through blockaded road. more rapidly
than single aide-de-camp, unincumbered,
had been able to get through Oh horse
back.
| When he received the order he showed it
to his leading generals and, apparently
|! with one accord, they decided that the
movement at that hour was impossible;
! 'urther, that no time could possibly be
o, lined by SO early a start, and that il
FL. should start at that hour and get
MA Ugh to Bristos station at the time
desin ,ated the troops would not be at for
either fighting or marching or their ar
rival at hat point. Porter replied how
ever. H. re is the order and it must be
obeyea.n b. ut, after further consultation.
he decided, as did his generals, that q
postponement of two hours in starting the
march would en,sble them to get through
as quick as if the men were kept on foot
and under arms winnie the road was being |
cleared, and that the meu would be in . |
much better condition for service ON their J
arrival at their destination. He was en-
tirely justified in exercising !!
his own judgment in this mat !
ter because the order shows I
that he was not to take part in any battle |
when he arrived there. He did not leave |
the commanding general in ignorance Of
his proposed delay, nor of the reasons Of
it, but at once sent a request that the gen.
eral commanding should send cavalry Che
had none h1mself) and clear the road near
him Of membranes, so that the march
might be unobstructed
It is shown that literal obedience to !
the order of the 9th of August was physi-
Cal impossibiity. It is further shown that
General Porter was DESTROYS of obeying it !
so far as was practicable, but was
prevailed upon by his leading generals
against whom suspicion of disloyalty to |
their commander or to the cause has never
been entertained-to do what his own |
Judgment approved as the best thing to do
to make later start with the view of ar
irving at his destination as early as it was |
possible for him to arrive there and to give
to his jaded and WORKOUT troops two
hours more of needed rest If the night
had been clear and the road an open one
there would not have been as much iustif-
cation for the exercise of his discretion in
the matter, but there is no doubt that he
would have arrived at Bristoe station just
as early and with his troops in much bet
ter condition if he had started at early't
dawn instead of at the hour he did, and
the intervening time had been used in
clearing tLe road for his troops when they
did march. When there were open spaces
along the line of the road. |
stumps of trees, and impossible to march
over, or were crowded with army wagons,
SO that the track of his army was limited
to the incumbered marrow road between
the two points designated in the order,
which could be cleared only by the wagons
being moved ahead, as requested of Pope.
Much of the testimony before the court
and before the army board might be quot
ed to confirm what is here stated, but as
this is all accessible to the reader, I will
not lengthen this statement by quoting it.
Iquestion very much whether there was
an engagement during the war, or a series
of engagements continuing over as much
time as was consumed in the battles about
Bull Run in August: 1862, when not only
one, but number of generals did eX-
ercise their discretion as Porter did on this
occasion and with far less justification.
The commanding general who gave the
order desired to have the troops at a GER
tain point by daylight and he gave his or
ders so as to accomplish that result. Under
the circumstances the order required of
the troops an impossibility. That was as
evident to Porter and those with him be-
fore the attempt was made as it was after.
II is little singular that any one high
in rank, connected with the army Of Vir-
ginia,should be in ignorance of the arrival
of at least portion of Lees army, by the
very route designated by Pope, many hours
before the 4:3O order was published. Por-
tor was not in ignorance Of that arrival.
Between II and l O'Clock, on arriving at
his advance position, Porter was shown by
Mcdowell dispatch from General Ba-
ford, sent at $50 on the morning of tho
29th, stating that from seventeen to eigh-
teen regiments of the enemy had passed
through Gainesville three-quarters of an
hsur before, or at a quarter before nine
O'Clock, on their way to reinforce Jackson,
so that the head of the column must have
been not only in supporting distance of
Jackson, but at the place Of deployment
by 10 O'clock in she morning; and now it
is known, as it was known by Porter at the
time, that Longstreet, with some $4,000
mon, was in position confronting Porter
by IL o'clock on the 29th of August, four
hours and half before the 1870 order was
written.
While at the head of their united forces,
between II and o'clock, and while Porter /