The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1882-04-30

main engagement at Stones River on Dec. 81
1852. was concerned. there is no doubt that II
resulted in Bragg's favor; but the ultimate re-
suit OF the operations which took place on tho
following days was to compel Bragg to evacuate
Murfrecsboro. Although however. the Union
forces attained their objective point, Bragg
invariably described the battle at Stones River
as a rebel victory. We can see some foundation
for his claim II we look rather to a comparison
OF casualties than to strategic results. Braggs
loss amounted to 1925 men and cannon.
against ii 900 men. % pieces of artillery, and
u large portion OF the wagon train on the Union
side. Why" asks the writer. did Rose
crans's plan OF the battle miscarry. and Braggs
come so near to absolute success?" The fault.
he thinks was not in the scheme conceived by
the former. but in tho gross Incompetence OF
certain corps and division commanders who
were called upon to execute It, II is note
worthy. ON the other hand. that at Stones
River the centre Of the army under Thomas
evinced in marked degree the same admira-
bic power Of rock-like resistance which was
afterward to be shown 30 conspicuously at
Chckamauga.
During the first six months OF 1868 the Army
OF the Cumberland did nothing but fortify its
base OF operations at Murfreesboro and protect
its lines OF communication and supply. which
were necessarily interrupted by rebel raids.
According to the writer. what Rosecrans neod-
ed for the latter purpose was cavalry. but this.
owing TO his being anything but II favorite OF
Halleck's. he found it we'll nigh impossible to
obtain But although the requests OF Rosecrans
for the Improvement of the efficiency of his army
were treated with great GOODNESS. yet almost
every communication from Washington init
mated that he was unnecessarily delaying his
advance upon Bragg. Gen. Cist thinks that
Rosecrans ought not to have left Murlreesboro
without re inforcements. and he points out that
on June 90. when Rosecrans gave orders for
forward movement. this was done in opposition
to the universal sentiment OF his division and
corps commanders. all of whom were formally
consulted on the subject.
Gen. Clst considers that the battle OF Chicka-
manga was on the whole the most desperately
contested and bloodiest engagement OF the rebel
lion. The Confederate Gen. Hindman said in his
official report that he had never known Federal
troops to fight so well. and that he never saw
Confederate troops fight better. The whole
force under the command Of Rosecrans during
the two days fighting was $4,000. whereas
Bragg had about 10 600 men OF all arms. The
first battle Sept 10. 1861 was series OF brill
liant charges and counter charges in favor Of
first one side and then the other but on the
whole the Union forces came of the better in
the action. for Bragg was foiled in his
attempt to secure the roads for whose pos
session the conflict had been begun. In
the battle OF the goth. on the other
hand. the whole Union army. with the
exception OF the part commanded by Thomas
was completely crushed. calamity for which
the author again denies that Rosecrans was ac
countable. the fault being again laid at the
doors Of the subordinate commanders. Gu
riously enough. although Chckamauga was
undoubtedly a rebel victory. Bragg's loss was
considerably larger than that Of Rosecrans,
most OF it being incurred in the terrific assault
on Gen. Thomas. which was persistently main
tanned and successfully resisted for nearly six
hours. Not only was Bragg's army crippled by
the unavailinR dash against the " Rock Of
| Chickamauga," but his victory brought with 1t
| no substantial benefits for. thanks to Thomas.
the Union forces retained control of Chatta-
| nooga. the main gateway OF the mountains
| and the objective point of the campaign.
/ Halleck. in his report Of operations for the
year 1868. says that Rosecrans was relieved Of
| the command OF the Army of the Cumberland
upon the recommendation of Gen. Grant. We
| infer from what the writer has said elsewhere
| that Gen. Halleck had long waited for pre-
| text. but Gen. Cst seems to think that it was
really afforded by Grant He reminds us that
| Rosecrans. during the summer OF 1862. had
served under Grant at Iuka and Corinth and 1t
is added that some hasty criticism made by
| him at that time brought him into collision
with his commanding officer. which subse-
Quently entailed the unpleasant consequences
| just noted.
1t is plain that the author OF this volume is
an enthusiastic admirer Of Gen. Rosecrans
He pronounces him the greatest strategist OF
the war; and thinks that his merit az the plan
/ ~ will ha oJa al
ognized by posterity than by his contempora-
ries. A disposition to appreciate perhaps over
rapturousy the capacity Of General OF
whose military household he was a member
may not DO tho temper most desirable for the
writing of history; but it is far more creditable
TO Gen. Cist than the sly surveillance and I'M
derhand detraction practised by another mem
Der OF Rosecranss staff.