The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1882-11-21


gave the order desired to have the troops at q
certain point by daylight, and he gave his or
ders 80 as to accomplish that result. Under the
circumstances. his order required of the troops
an impossbility. That was as evident to Port
er, and those with him. before the attempt was
made as it was after. 1t is a little singular that
any one high in rank, connected with the ar
my of Virginia, should be in ignorance of the
arrival of at least portion of Lees amy by
the very route designated by Pope, many hours
before the 4. 30 order was published. Porter
was not in ignorance of that arrival. Between
IL and O'Clock. on arriving at his advanced
position, Porter was shown by Mcdowell dis
patch from Gen. Buford, sent at $50 on the
morning of the Goth, stating that from II to IS
regiments of the enemy had passed through
Gainesville three quarters OF an hour before, or
at S45 O'Clock on their way to reinforce jack
son 30 that the head of the column must have
been not only in supporting distance OF jack
SOD, but at the place OF deployment by 10
o'clock in the morning; and now it is known
by Others, as it was known by Porter at the
time, that Longstreet with some 25,0O0 men
was in position confronting Porter by IL o'clock
on the 29th OF August, four hours and a half
before the 430 order was written.
While at the head of their united forces, be-
tween IL and o'clock, and while Porter was
preparing TO attack the enemy in his immedi-
ate front, Mcdowell, then in command,
showed Porter the ''joint orde " and also Bu-
ford's dispatch. 1t was evident from this dis
patch, corroborated by the enemy's movements
in front, that the main forces of the enemy,
which the "joint ORDER said were far distant,
had not only arrived but had formed juno
ton with jackson and deployed in their front.
Porter knew OF this from another source. He
had prisoners from that force-Longstreet'a
troops. The object of moving toward Gaines
vile had been thus defeated, and any further
advance, if practicable, would only the more
widely separate them from Pope's forces, then
checked at Groveton, at least two miles dis
tant, and with which they were ordered to es-
tablish communication Mcdowell, as he had
the right, at once withdrew his troops leaving
Porter with 10 600 men to confront Longstreet's
5000, while he went by a crcuitous route to
point between Porter and Pope to establish the
communication eDioined.
Thus left alone, facing superior numbers ad-
vaLtageously posted, and ignorant of the needs
/ of Pope, II indeed he had any, Porter had noe
ess .riy to bide McDowells arrivallon his right
In the meantime his duty was manifestly to
engage LoDgstreet's attention and prevent him
fr IN moving against Pope, especially while
Mcdowell was out of support of both Pope and
T rier. Porter all that day did not hear of
Mcdowell, or of what was taking place In
front OF Pope, though he kept the former we'll
informed of affairs with him, and presumed
that his dispatches were sent to the latter He,
however, engaged Longstreets attention by
demonstrations nearly harmless to himself,
and so successfully as to cause Longstreet to
take Wilcox's division from In front of Pope,
In order to strengthen the line confronting Por-
ter, who at the time was aware of this move
ment of forces coming from the right to his
front, and notified Mcdowell of it. Thus Por-
ter, without sacrifice of men, and without en-
dangering any interests. did more for Pope's
relief than ii he had gone directly to that Gem
erals assistance To have done SO would prob
ably have sacrificed his corps without any ben-
eft and jeoparded the safety of pope's army.
So far as have investigated the case--and
have studied it, think, pretty thoroughl.-1
see no fact to base the charge of retreat upon.
do not see that any argument to prove this is
necessary, because any reader of history may
be defied now to find where and when Gen.
Porter retreat during the time specified. In
my Judgment, this dsposes of the charges, and
consequently of all specifications under them,
except the alleged dsobedience of the 4:30
D. m. order
In regard to the charge of disobedience of
the 4:30 order which is the principal one, and
the one that has most deeply impressed the
mind OF the general public, there evidences
which look to the important and conclusive
showing that the court martial which
tried Gen. Porter found him guilty under
mistaken idea of the actual facts, now accessi-
BILE to any one In search f the truth, and
which Porter knew to be the facts at the time
The 4:3O p. m. order OF the 10Th OF August re.
CURED Porter to attack the enemy's right
flank and to get into his rear if possible. This
enemy, in the mind of the commanding Gener-
al, and. no doubt, OF the court, was Jackson's
force of ~, 600 men. Porter was supposed to
occupy. with 10000 troops, the position as
signed to him in the diagram given. THE dia-
gram is necessarily omitted Ed The court
also seems to have been satisfied that the or.
der to make this attack was received BY Porter
from 3 to $50 O'Clock in the afternoon, leaving
him abundance of time to obey the ORDER
That the commanding General believed the
positions as given in the fofeg. ing diagram to
be the positions of the different commands is
shown from the fact that in his joint order of
that morning he stated that ''the indications :.
are that the whole force of the enemy is NOV
ing In this direction at pace that will bring
them here by tomorrow night or next day."
that is, the evening of the 30th or the MORN
ing OF the 31st Of August-aDd from the fact
that in the 4:30 order he stated that
the enemy is massed in the woods in front
OF u.s. thus ignoring the presence of Long.
street. THIS lis confirmed in his map No 5,
furnished to the government. If these had
been the facts of the case, there would have
been no justification whaevter for Porter's fall
ing to make the attack as ordered; but in-
stead OF the facts being as supposed by the
commanding General and the court which
tried Gen. Porter, ey were as shown by the
following diagram. This diagram, also, is
necessarily omitted.-ED.l This Porter knew
on lndlsputable evidence. As shown by this
diagram, Porter was not in position to attack
the right flank Of jackson, because he was at
least three miles away, and not across his flank
as shown in the first diagram. With Loug-
streets presence, to have obeyed that order he
would have been obliged, with 10000 men, to
have defeated %, 900 men in a chosen position,
before he could have moved upon the flank of
the enemy, as the order directed. But even If
the pc iiion of Lees army had been Sc 10 As
hours distant, as asserted in the joint order to
Mcdowell and Porter, it would have been inn
possible-for Porter to have obeyed the 4.30 or
dor. because 1t did not contemplate night
attack, and was not received by Porter Until
about dark. To have obeye it would have re-
CURED some little preparation, movement of
troops and distribution of orders, SO that it
would have been some time after dark before
he could have moved from the position he was
occupying, and at least as late as O'Clock at
night before he could have reached Jackson's
hank to engage 1t. His eff 5rts to execute The
order, Notwithstanding its apparent inapprc-
priateness, demonstrate this assertion.
consider that these facts, with many more
that we're brought to the knowledge of the
s. hofeld Board Fully exonerate Gen Foster
OF the charge OF disobedence of whas is known
AS the 4.3O order, and also of the Im putetion of
lukewarmness III his support of the command
lug general. A great deal might be said OF
the movements, the marching, and the cou lter-
marching OF troops between the date of the
order of the 9th of August ana the receipt
Of the order of the 18th which would throw
light upon this question, but abstain from
giving 1t because / believe that what is stated
mere covers al the points wherein Gen. Porter
has been charged with being delinquent.
Gen. Porter has now for 20 years been labor
ing under the disabilities and penalties inflic-
ted upon him by the court-martial of 1862, all
mat Tune contendlng Tor restoration to his
position in the army and Ia society, and al.
ways, as stated in the beginning of this article,
on the ground of his entire Innocence The
investigation Of the Schofeld Board has, In nv
Judgment, established his innocence of all the
nfenses for which he was tried and cot vcted
Tue suferings of 20 years, under such findings,
Tor himself and family and friends, is some
thing it is now impossible to set right
Twenty years of the best part of his life have
been consumed in trying to have his name
and his reputation restored before his country
men. In his application now before Congress-
he is asking only that he may be restored to
the rolls OF the Army, with the rank that he
would have If the court-marlial had never
been held. This, in my judgment. is a very
small part of what ought to be done Gen.
Porter should, in the way of partial restitution,
be declared by Congress to have been con
vcted on mistaken testimony, and therefore
to have never been out of the Army. This
would make him Maior-General OF volun-
teers until the date might be fixed for the
muster out as of that rank, after which hs
should be continued as Colonel of infantry
and Brevet Brigadier-General of the United
States Army from the date of the act, when he
could be placed upon the retired list with that
rank.
In writing what have here written rnaan