Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-07-22

Southern soldier was generally
slouch with impunity /; but whei
it came to real neglect OF duty
struggling, pillaging, cowardice ant
desertion, the terror of swift an(
terrible punishment was ever be
fore his eyes. "What is that ?" tn,
writer once asked a Confederat,
prisoner as we looked down upol
the camp of his division and saw .
body of troops paraded aud iron
the centre shoot up puff of white
smoke. "Wal," was the cool re
ply, 81 reckon it's ole Bragg a
startin' a new graveyard; t'othel
must be nigh about full" Brags
was not very successful general
He seemed to lack all power o
| adoption to circumstances. But i
was the army thus trained to ODE
dience that, under Gen. Joe Johns
ton, made the wonderful backward
movement from Resaca to Atlantis
"a movement not equalled in bril-
liancy, completeness and difficulty
by any other upon either side dur
ing the war, unless 1t be the death
grapple around Petersburg.
1t is also true that the Southern
soldier had no little advantage al
the beginning in the fact that his
home life had been much more
primitive, nearer to that of the
camp, than the Northern men Of
that generation had generally eX-
perienced. Corn bread, bacon beat
en- biscuits and coffee had been the
staples of his food. Nearly all OF
them too, at one time or another,
had been accustomed to prepare
this simple but nutritious fare.
They had been accustomed to travel
on foot or horseback over country
and limit their needs to the capaci-
ty of the saddle-bags. They were
therefore less inclined to overload
themselves and better able to sub
sist ON and prepare their rations.
These facts did much TO render pos
sible that facility OF movement on
which their early successes so much
depended.
The chief difference between the
Northern and the Southern soldier
has been almost overlooked by those
who have written on the subject.
The Southern soldier had absolute
confidence, not only in his officer
and leaders, but in himself and his
fellow. The boast that one South
ern man could whip five yankees,
though it did not prove itself fact,
was unquestionably equivalent to a
duplication of the Southern army.
The Southern soldier believed most
devoutly in the martial superiority
of the Southron and it gave him a
confidence in the outcome of the
struggle which greatly enchanced
his prowess. The Southern leaders,
to a man almost, were impressed
with the same belief. The idea of
Southern impetuosIty, daring and
recklessness, repeated year after
year with boastful eNaggeratlon
each repetition, had be-
come an unconscious part OF every
Southern mans unconscious cere-
bration. The leaders believed that
if they could press the fight and
overpower the North at the outset,
thew would win. To do this they
relied on the native daring and inn
petuosity of their men. Their first
step, therefore, was to transform a
professedly defensive into an often
sive war. This was the very means
of all others likely to make such
troops effective. To require mira
cles of them was to presuppOse mar
yelous power in them. The cam
paigns of Jackson were Napoleon
in Italy over again. With new
troops drawn from a people puffed
up with military vanity and over
flowing with confidence in them
selves, he rushed from point to
point, from one marvellous success
to anpther, giving no time for con-
or apprehension on the
part of his soldiery. By constant
employment and repeated victories
he transformed them into veterans
before they had fairly learned the
from line into column
and their reversals. The Southern
soldier, the Southern leader, the
Southern subordinate, the Southern
war policy and the antecedent
life, were all in exquisite
The Confederacy lacked
perfectness of detail-the machinery
of organization and the machine
soldier; but it had, what was of in
finiteIy greater value, an absolute
fitness and proportion Of $ differ
ent elements and an abiding conf
dence in its superiority over is ad-
But this was only half the advan-
tage derived from this belief. The
soldier and the Northern
leader believed it also. To the
Northern mind the Southerner was
a being especially delighting in
blood and war. The superiority of
the Southern volunteer forces was
ut the outset conceded directly or
indirectly by all.
The North openly and prOfeHsed-
ly put lis hope of success first OF all
in the regular army and after that
in its prepOnderaEce in numbers,
skill and material re-
sources. The Northern leader as
rule looked with perfect contempt
on the unframed volunteer. He
dwelt forever on the fact that the
Southern soldier was trained to
arms and hOrSemanship from his
boyhoOd. He assumed the aggres-
SiVe at first simply because it was a
political necessity. The first Bull
Run campaign was made against
The protest of the actual commander
Of orr forces. The only hope our
officers had of success lay in the
fact that we had the "regulars" and
thought we outnumbered the enc
my very considerably.
AS for the sOldiery, the general
telling was that while they were
a match, man for man,
or their adVersaries, the latter had
led sort of a semi-civ-
lized life of which fighting had
been a main element and that they
would naturally have the advan-
age on their side at the outset.
The soldiers, like the leaders of the
Northern armies, relied on time,
drill and equipment to
overcome the tacitly-admitted per-
Onal a3cendance of the Southern
soldiers.
1t is true there was an abundance |
If boasting. The pres and the |
tump orators and sometimes the |
oldiers themselves ridiculed the |
.laim Of the Southern man to indi-
yidual superiority as the ciamor of
he cowardly braggadoclo. 1t was
he Whistling of the boy who passes |
In orn, xroua ri Of ninht- f6n IrIIInr !