The Somerset press. [volume] (Somerset, Ohio) 1873-1977, 1882-01-19
THE PROCEEDINGS
In the Murder Trial of Chas. j. Guiteau.
The Arguments of Counsel Before the
Jury-Nearing the End.
THE ARGUMENTS BEGUN.

THE ARGUMENTS BEGUN.
Davidge opened the arguments on the 7th
inst, upon the legal points, and was followed
with the closest attention. He began by read
ing and then celebrating the prayers of gov
ernment, which ask the Judge to instruct the
jury that if the prisoner knew at the time Of
the shooting the difference between right and
wrong, he was at that time sane and RESPONSE
BILE. Davidge, with the prayers in his hand,
said in low but distinct tones and measured
language, that they consisted, first, of the
above definition Of sanity; second, of the dec
laraton that if the prisoner possessed ability to
80 distinguish between right and wrong, no
Irresistible passion or impulse, no uncontrou-
able desire, no moral depravity would excuse
his act third a declaration that the standard
of insanity must be that of the law; fourth,
that no delusion of ability to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong being present would
prayers of the defense bearing on points
contained in the prayers of the prosecution
ought not to be entertained for mo-
ment. He said that the law drew a line
of responsibility for crime somewhere.
There were infinite degrees of intelligence.
Think of the illustrious victim of this prisoner
on one hand and this assassin on the other.
The law drew no line between a low degree of
intelligence on one hand, and the highest on
the other, in respect of responsibility for
crime This prisoner had been portrayed as an
imbecile until he went upon the stand and tore
himself into shreds and atoms. A man might
be peculiar, and might even be partially insane,
but if he rose to a point of intelligence which
enabled him to know the difference between
right and wrong, and that what he was doing
was wrong, then he was responsible for the
wrong. Davidge read one case after another
sustaining his position. "There's plenty Of
law on the other side of that issue" said
Guiteau. 81 say it was Gods act" Davidge
replied: "We will come to the Deity part after
awhile. I am saying nothing about that
now. If this defense of uncomfortable
impulse is to be found only in the absurd pre-
tense of inspiration, want by this first prayer
to put the conviction of this defendant far be-
yond the possibility of a doubt. I need not
have gone so far as have gone, because we are
gence is merely wrong. We are trying law
yer, theologian, lecturer, a man who,
although imbecile for three weeks Gas claimed
by the defense), was transfgured, in the esti-
nation of the jury and the world, by his own
testimony. The line of precedent from 1843
England, was unbroken, establishing the doc
trine that if q man knows the difference
between right and wrong he is re-
sponsible, though he be of little rea-
son, eccentric, or even partially insane"
Davidge referred to Mormon case decided by
the Supreme Court, wherein the defense that
Mormons practiced poligamy in obedience to
the inspired Word of God was pronounced no
defense. "Yes," said Guiteau, "talk about
Mormons they are breaking the law every
day, and the Government is doing nothing
about it." EYES," said Davidge, impressively,
"they are breaking the law every day, just as
the law was broken in this case, under an al
legged inspiration, which affords no defense to
q criminal. There is no higher law known to
the law. A man must obey the law. He can
k1a 1orr o1ni,
from punishment on the ground that he obeyed
higher law. With these remarks" said Da-
vidge, "I submit the prayers of the prosecu-
ton, merely adding that those propositions
Of law ought to be read together, and, when
SO collected, / think your Honor will come
cover the legal requirements Of the case."
A sensation was created by Judge Porter read
ing from newspaper slips the charge of Judge
Davis New York; to the jury in the
proceeding, but Judge Cox ruled that the mat
ter was undoubted authority and applicable in
this case. When Davidge resumed, Guiteau
again shouted: II want to get this thing right
before the jury. Every one knows all about
that Coleman case. The jury gave verdict
it we'll" The effect was electrical when Davidge,
in q most deliberate and earnest manner. said
" Your Honor, this man for three weeks has
been held up to us as an imbecile, and now
listen to him. He not only knows the differ
stands fully the law Of the case. -
Guiteau shouted "Transitory mania That's
my case. I don't pretend to be insane now.
| I've got as good head as you or Porter. SEQ
vile is fool, though. All want is two hours
and Judge Cox was compelled to rap for order.
| Guiteau subsidized, and Davidge continued with
| out further interruption to the close of his
| argument. Col. Reed opened the argument
for the defense. The question of malice, he
said, need not be discussed. If the Jury had q
reasonable doubt of the guilt Of the accused it
was their duty to acquit him. They had no
discretion. As to insanity, the modern doctrine
| the better doctrine, was that if the jury had 8
reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused
at the time Of committing the act, it was theil
case Of Happs VS.. the People, Thirty-hrst Illi
nois, in which the Judge, in his charge, said
"1n every criminal proceeding, if reasona-
BILE doubt Is entertained of the guilt of tht
accused, the jury is bound to acquit. SANITY
| is guilt insanity is innocence. Therefore,
reasonable doubt of the sanity of the accused
must acquit. The presumption of innocence ii
as strong as the presumption of sanity" Reei
cited other cases in further support of hi
position. He also quoted from decision o.
Chief Justice Cartier, of the Supreme Court G.
the District of Columbia, in the case of th,
United States against Albert Nicholas 1t wal
there held that if the jury had reasonable
doubt on the question Of sanity they wer'
bound to acquit the accused. "I admit,
said Mr.. Reed, "it will be your Honor
duty to tell the jury what reasonable doub
is. The question of what constitutes insanity
we submit, is question solely for the jury.
"Send q lunatic to the gallows" exclaime
Reed. "When the jury considers the evidenc
in the seclusion of the jury-room, they ma
say: well, this man committed an awfu
crime, atrocious, indescribable, unparallele
in history, yet we are not quite certain that h
knew he was doing wrong Is 1t not the doc
trine of humanity to give man the benefit G
that doubt and hesitation and for the Court t
say to the jury: IF you have reasonabl
doubt it is your duty to give the benefit of it t
the accused p" Scoville begun his argumer
shortly after which Court adjourned for th