The Indianapolis leader., 1882-01-28

that doubt and to acquittal II was important to
explain to the Jury here in the best way that the
could hardly venture TO give an exact
did de5nitiqn nni nno 81 Of the term; for he
AS to the question relating ~ human affairs, the
knowledge OF which is derived from the testi-
mony' 1t was impossible 90 have the
sied nv scien,;sc demnstro,in ina' qSo 1y Sre
Certainty that the Jury could have was the moral
certainty depending upon the confidence which
the Jury had in the integrity OF witnesses. and
IN their capacity and opportunity to have
not improbable in them elves were
attested by numerous witnesses credible and un-
know the trnth, reasonable or moral certainty
would be inspired by. that testimony. In
be unreasonable or imaginary or % SPECULATIVE Oui IL
ought not to be a doubt as to whether the party
might not be innocent in the face Of the strong
proof g.. Of ibis, his guilt, but i must
had been proved guilty even where the testimony
was contradictory, aud where so much credit
the same result might be produced. On the other
hand the opposing proofs might be so balanced
that, that The the. Jury Jury might Justly doubt on
lay. and in such case, the accused party
WAS entitled to the benefit of doubt.
All that the Jury could. be expected to do
was to be reasonably and morally certain of the
facts which they declared to he their verdict
In illustrating this point Judge Cox quoted the
in The case of the Commonwealth VS. Webster
with reference to the evidence in
this case, very little comment was required by
hssn tne ooqr. except upon one question: the Others
fendant fred the shot and shot the deceased Pres
ident was abundantly proved; that the wound
was fatal has been testified to by the surgeons
who Were competent TO speak. and they were un,
contradicted; that the homicide was committed
with malice aforethought III the defendant were
capable Of criminal intent or. malIce)
anrl1A hord ho x<ofn
not necessary to prove that any
special or express hatred or malice was entertain
ed by the accused toward the deceased. You will
ind little difhculty In reaching a conclusion as
To- all the elements that made up the
crime charged ia the. Indictment except
1t might be ss TO the one OF sound mind memory
preston for a reasonable, sane man he now APP
proacbes that. difficult question. lie had
s,seaay h ss,d ssnss ,has e man h; VINO
can not commit acrime The defense of insanity
has been so abused as TO be brought into great
discredit. II was the last resort in cases Of un-
for Jnries t. bring ia verdict of ac
quittai when there was public sympathy
timent, bat not according 10 law. For that rea-
SON the usIense Of Insanity was sufficient to prove
inen. Int ae distinct rem Se act asiOeTse done
under certain impulses, In heat of blood and with
previous malice. Evidence has been exhibited 10
miited in his own HANDWRITING he had conceived
the idea Of removing the President" as he
called IL, six weeks before the shooting;
anH two io
fore he ACCOMPLISHED II, he stationed himself at
certain points TO do the act. but for some
it by the purchase Of pistol has been shown. n.
All these facts came to the full measure Of proof
required to establish what the law demon
disisvor and pubic Sentiment de n'e" Wvss wss
hostile TO 1t. Nevertheless II the insanity
were established TO q degree necessary,
murder, and must be allowed full weight |;
would be observed that In this there was no
trouble with any question about what might be
or absolute imbecility, in which all exercise of
reason 10 wanting, and dwhere there is recogni-
ton of persons or things or their relations. but
there WAS debatable border left between sanity
and insanity.
This Is closing part Of Judge Cox's charge The
Jury would bear In mind that the man did not
ae o ss
one at the outset TO be sane
and responsible, the question was what was there
In this case ITO to show the contrary as to the de
fendant? The Jury was not warranted in in
ferring the man was insane frora the mere fact OF
his committing the crime, or from the enormity of
tse Sss oss % ba the law II there Is
malice, II nothing else appears. He had
dwelt upon the. question OF insane de-
sns p 10 iha. ~a eRsenss she ysRss soah
the defendants power or want of power, from
mental disease). 70 distinguish between right and
wrong as the act done By him. This was the
broad question for the Jury to determine, and
was what was relied upon by the
defense. The only. safe rule. however.
was for the Jury TO direct its attention to one
test of criminal responsibility. namely, whether
the prisoner possessed menfsl capacity at the
time the act was committed TO know that il was
wrong, and whether <he dc.
G,!iyed Of that capacity by mental
Iii, tinction which the Jury must not lose sight Of
and they must decide how far IL was applicable
TO this case. That was the distinction between
mental and moral ohliquity, Between mental in
and moral insensibility to that distinction.
The Judge. in conclusion, said: "And now,
gentlemen, To sum up all have said To you II
you find from the whit lie evidence that at the
tme of the commission of the homicide tAs
defect o. his reason thai he was incapable
Of understanding what he was doing or seeing il
was wrong thing to. do. as for example. il he
were under an insane delusion that the Almighty
had commanded him to do The act then he
was not in responsible condition of
mind, but was an. object OF compassion and
should be not acquitted. IT, on the other naDd.
but had possession of his faculties and had power
TO know his act was wrong, and of
his own free will he deliberately conceived
his motives were personal vindicuveness political
animosity, desire to avenge. supposed political
wrongs, or a morbid desire for notoriety;
or you are unable to discover
murder, and 1t Is your duty TO find verdict OF
guilty as indicted or latter the suggestion from
Scoville to that eect) II you ind the prisoner is
not guilty, by reason Of insanity, 1t is your duty
consider your verdict"
ruring the delivery of the Judges charge.