The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1882-06-11

with the members OF Elton. Harrow. and Rugby.
The Campaign OF the Hundred Days.
Mr.. DORSEY GARDNER in his monograph
entitled Quatre Bras. Lionv, and Waterloo Lion
don, Keegan. Paul Il Co... has given us a full
and careful summary Of the literature relating
to the campaign in tho Netherlands during the
hundred days. From the mass OF contradic-
tory evidence and comment the author has en-
deavored to elicit a correct notion Of the mill
tary ability displayed by the several command
ers, and especially to answer the vexed ques-
ton on whose shoulders ought to rest most Of
the responsibility for the defeat Of the French
at Waterloo. He brings into view new reasons
for accepting. on the whole. the conclusions
reached by Col. Charras and Col. Chesney.
which are. we need not say opposed to the cur
rent theory suggested in the first instance by
Napoleon himself and rendered popular by
Theirs. and which sought to shift upon
Marshals Ney and Grouchy the blame OF the
French overthrow. 1t will be remembered that
the latest advocate Of the traditional n.y.
pothesis was Mr.. John C. Ropes, who published.
about year ago. in the AHd,tic Monthly. an
article charging Grouchy with the loss Of the
battle because his march was conducted out
side Of the Prussians. whereas II he had taken
the interior line for his advance thus inter-
POSING his troops between the Prussans and
the grand army. Napoleon might then have
employed his whole force against Wellington.
and have beaten him by3 p. NJ. This course.
Mr. Ropes thinks. would certainly have been
taken by Davoust. whom Napoleon might have
had and ought to have had in Grouchy's place.
Mr.. Gardner holds. however, that the docu-
ments set forward in this volume prove be-
You'd room for doubt that the false drec-
ton OF Grouchy's march and its fatal con-
oh coInlv n Napolnnn
himself and to his Unprecedented apathy about
asccrtaining the purposes OF Bllcher Ii is
suggested further that Mr.. Ropes overooks an
important fact namely that Wellington would
not have accepted baltic except upon the alb
solute certainty OF B1cher's cooperation.
With Grouchy moving on the interior line
there could have been no such certainty. and in
that event no battle would have taken place on
June IS. There seems to be no doubt that the
orders alleged to have been sent by Napoleon
to Grouchy at 10 p. NJ. on June II and A. NJ.
on June IS are entirely apocryphaL There is
not the slightest allusion to them in the
genuine orders sent at 10 A.. NJ. and p. NJ. on
the day OF battle in which the Emperor dis
tinctly orders Grouchy to direct his movements
upon Wavre. the very step for which Mr.. Ropes
| arragns the Marshal.
There was undoubtedly a great disparity OF
numerical strength in the forces welded by the
combatants in this campaign The Prussans
had upward Of 10000 men in the field. and
the Anglo-allied army numbered 100000.
to oppose which array Napoleon had but
$4,000. but Mr.. Gardner thinks that while
Napoleon had commanded larger armies before.
he never had one Of such supremacy fine ma
terial. A third Of 1t was made up OF what NJ.
Theirs calls the novices OF 1918 and 1914 that
is to say. Of soldiers who had gone through the
tremendous campaigns OF Germany and France.
while the other two-thirds were veterans. most
OF whom had recently returned from Russian
and German prisons. The troops of which
Bllcher found himself at tho head. varied in
quality. Nearly half. both infantry and cav
airy. were Landwehr. hastily enrolled un-
der the new system which Scharnhorst had
devised when Germany rose against the French
domination. while Of the regular troops large
proportion were recruits called upon to I'll the
great gaps made by the campaigns of Germany
and France in the ranks Of the patriot volun-
teers OF 1913. Yet though decidedly inferior
to the French in respect OF military training
the Prussian army was well organized well
armed, and enthusiastic. On the other hand.
| the chance medley OF nondes cript organza-
| lions under Wellington's command formed
what he himself called "a villainous army"
and again. the worst nrmy ever brought to-
gether." or some OF the English troops, how
ever included in his heterogeneous force
he wrote after Waterloo. Il never saw
the British infantry behave so we'll" But
only one-third Of his troops were British.
| OF whom many now saw their first campaign
and the other two-thirds-if we except the
Kings German Legion. who were Peninsula
veterans. and the Brunswickers who acquitted
| themselves well-conslsted OF Hanoverlan re-
| cruits not fitted for the field and Of Nassau
| and Dutch Belgian soldiers. in whose fidelity
| TO the allied cause no confidence could be
| placed. and whose conduct in battle was most
| unsatisfactory.
| The numbers just cited are those with which
the combatants began the campaign but OF
| course much smaller forces were actually pres
ent on the field Of Waterloo. In that battle
| Napoleon had in round numbers $4,000 men.
| Wellington 6S. 900. and up to p NJ. $4,000 Prus-
slams had arrived upon the field. 1t must be
borne in mind. however. that so soon as the APP
| proach Of the Prusslans was discovered detach-
ments of cavalry and infantry were sent to check
their advance, so that not more than Sc 600 Of the
| French army were at any time in action against
| that commanded by Wellington. Numerically.
therefore, the Anglo-alled army was the larger.
| but 1t contained no more than $4,000 trust
worthy soldiers, including the British. tho
| Kings German Legion. and tho Brunswickers.
| The Dutch-Bclgian troops had already shown
| at Quatre Bras that, either from disafection or
from abject cowardce. they were worse than
worthless. and besides their contingent.
amounting to more than 10000 men. there
were raw Hanoyeran lcvcs. some 11.O00 In
number. Of whom little service could DO
expected. On the whole. 1t has been
estimated that the entire force with
which Wellington had TO make good his
stand against $4,000 men commanded by
Napoleon until Blncher should come to his
support was equivalent to no more than 10000
men. 1t Is important to bear in mind the forces
actually engaged in order TO appreciate tie