The Iola register. [volume] (Iola, Allen County, Kansas) 1875-1902, 1882-02-03
GUIrsAU GUILTYl

GUITBAU GUILTY!
Judge Coz Charges the Jury-fen lIinutes'
Delibera4ioa and . Verdict IT Murder N
tho First Degree.
WARRINGTON. D. c., Jan. q.
Tho jury in the case Of tho United States
against Charles Julius Guitean. for the muir
der of James A. Garfield. returaed Q verdict
of guilty as indicted" AZ the close Of Mr..
Porter's argument. Judge Cox proceeded to
deliver his charge to the jury. He commenced
by saying the Constitution provides that IN
all criminal prosecutions the accused shall
enjoy the right of speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury in the State or district
With what dif1iculty and trouble the lsw
has been administered in the present case
the jurors have been daily witnesses 1t was.
however, consolatlon TO think tnat not one
had been violated in the person of the ac-
cnsed, IS the last long chapter OF the proof
was ended. No one could feel more keeniy
than himself the great responsibility OF his
duties, and he felt that he could only dis
charge them by adherence to the law as laid
down by its highest authorities. Before pro-
ceeding further Ire wished to notice an Incl
dent which had taken place pending recent ar.
gument. The prisoner had frequently taken &C.
casion 20 proclaim that public opinion, as EVIL
denced by the pres andcorrespondence,w asfn
his favor. These declarations could not be pro.
vented except by the process of gaG8inS tho
prisoner. Any suggestion that the jury could
the prisoner would have seemed 70 him ABB
surd, and he should have felt that he was in
sulting the intelligence of the jury If he had
charged defendant with havfog murdered
James A. Garfield, and it was the duty Of the
Court to explain the nature of the crime
person of sound memory and discretion un-
lawfully killed n reasonable being in tho
peace OF the United States with malice afore-
Thought. Il had to be proved; arss, tAst death a
further, it was caused with malice and afOfe-
thought That did net mean, hOwevaF. that
the Go iernment had to prove an, will or
hatred on the part of the accused toward tho
deceased. Wherever homicide was shown to
have been committed without lawful author.
ity and with deliberate intent it was safh-
afOrethOught. and malice was not disPrOve0
by showing that the accused had no personal
III will toward the deceased. and that he
killed him from other motives. IS, for in
stance, robbery, or through lnistaking him
for another, or Gas claimed in this CASEY to
produce public benefit. lift could be shown
that the killing occurred in the hoat of pas
sion or under provocasion, then it would APP
pear there was no premeditated attempt, and
therefore no malice aforethought, and
.hsS woud redSse the crime 70 man
to say there was nothing of that kind in the
present case. The jury would have to say
either the defendant was guilty of murder or
he was innocent. In order to constitute the
crime of murder the assassin must have q
reasonably sane mind. In technical terms, he
must be "of sound miro, memory and discre-
commit murder. If he was IabOring under a
disease of the mental faculties to such an
extent that he did not know what
he WAS doing, or know it was wrong, then he
was wanting in that sound mind memory,
and discretion that was part of the deAnitiOn
of murder. In the first place, every defend
ton against him was established by proof.
In the next place, Notwithstanding this pre-
sumption OF innocence, it WAS equally true
to have BEEN 5" st the time the "e crime s W s
committed; that is to say, the Government
was not bound to show afirmatively. as part
Of its proofs: that the defendant ~as sane;
the burden of proof was thrown on the de-
PENDANT, who set mp insanity as an excuse for
his crime. To produce proofs in the first in
stance it has to show that the presumption
was mistaken 40 far as it related to the pris-
ouer. The crime. therefore, involved three
elements: the killing malice, and responsible
mind in the murderer. That the defendant
fired the shot at the deceased President was
abundantly proved. That the wound WAS
fatal has been testified to by surgeons compe-
tent to speak. and they were uncontradicted,
aforethought If defendant were capable Of
criminal intent o. malioe) could hardly be
gadnsaid. 1t was not necessary to prove that
entertained by the accused toward tie De.
ceased to find little difficulty in reaching q
conclusion as to all the elements that made
up the crime charged in the indictment. except
that It mightbe as to the one of unsound mind,
memory and discretion; but that was only
atechnica expression for a res onsible, sane
man. Evidence has been exhiDtei to the jury
tending to show that the defndant admiCtcd
in hie own handwriting that he had conceived
the idea of removing the President" as he
called 1t, six weeks before the shooting; that
he had deiiberased u ,on it, and come to the |
determination to do 1t, and that about two
weeks before he accomplished it he stationed
himself at certain points TO do the act, but for
for it by the purchase of pistol has been
shown. All these facts came up to the full !
measure of proof required 70 establish what !
The jury would bear in mind that the man
did not become irresponsible by the mere fact |
of his being partially insane, as tile law as |
sumed every one at the outset to be same |
was there in this case to show the contrary Is |
to the defendant. They we've not warranted |
in in'erring that he was insane from the mere
fact of his committing the crime or from tive |
enoI1niey Of the crime, because the law pre-
sunes there is Q bad motive and that the |
crime is prompted by malice if n~tling cleo
appears. The only safe rule was for the Jury
to direct it's attention to the one test of Grim
inal sp0asibility-naRefy, whether tho
prisoner possessed lneatal capacity at tho
wrong, and whether he was deprived of that
capacity ~ mental dieease. There was
one important distinction which the
they must decide now. for it was ap-
plicable to this case that was the distinction
between mental and moral obliquity. between
mental incapacity to distinguish between
right and wrong. and moral insensibility to
that distinction. If you find from the Whole
evidence that ut the time of the commission
of the homicide the prisoner was lxboring an
der such q defcet Of his reason that he Yves
incapable Of understanding what he ives do
ing, or seeing It was wrong thing TO do, as
for example II he were under an iRsane delu.
sion that the Almighty had commanded him
to do the. act, then he was not in 4 responsible
condition of mind, hat was an object of com
passion and should be acquitted. If, on the
other hand, you find he was under ne insane
delusion, but had possession Of his faculties
and had power 20 know his act was wrong,
and OF his own free will he deliberately con.
ceived the idea and executed the homicide.
then, whether his motives were personal vim.
political amnesty, desire to
nv x,<adv