Morris tribune., 1882-08-17
FEDERAL, CONFEDERATE.
Which Was the Better Soldier-A
Study of the Civil War.

AD411S&AAs wv LDLlllA L La
Which Was the Better Soldier-A
Study Of the Civil War.
A Union veteran contributes the fol-
lowing remarkable paper to late mum.
sber of "Our Continent" edited by Albion
Tourgee author of the "Phools Errand:" :"
No unprejudiced person can deny that
in the war between the states the con-
federate soldier was worth more, man
for man, than the federal volunteer. In
proof of this need only be instanced the
fact that the army of Northern Vir-
glnia, though constantly overmatched in
numbers, and having an adversary Law
ishly supplied with material, though
twice checked in its purposes was never
defeated until the siege of Petersburg
had depleted its ranks, and the near ap-
proach of Sherman had increased the
disproportion of numbers to limit that
left no hope Of success. On the other
hand, this overmatched army had ad-
ministered at least three crush
ing and overwhelming defeats up
on its adversary. The aris-
tocracy from the south furnished from
the outset a most admirable corps ofline
and staff officers. They were just near
enough to their men to permit familiar
| arity and receive respect, and far enough
from them to prevent insubordination.
| Coming from the same vicenage, every
| man knew his officer. Even where the
off l. L.
| men, he represented class whom they
were accustomed to follow. 1t has been
| the fashion among both officers and men
of the north to sneer at the discipline of
the confederate army. 1t is true that in
| non-essentials We very greatly excelled
them. To the very last the drill of the
southern regiments was slack, dribbling
| and uneven. In the essentials of disci-
pline, however, they far eXcelled us.
For neglect of duty their men were pun
| ished and punished speedily and Sc
verely. In trivialities, the southern
soldier was generally SLOUGH with i'm
punity; but when it came to real neg
1ect of duty, struggling, pillaging, cow
ardice and desertion, the ter
for of swift and terrible punishment was
| ever before his eyes. "What is that?"
| the writer once asked confederate
prisoner as we looked down upon the
camp of his division and saw body of
troops para led and from the center
shoot up puff of white smoke. oval"
was the cool reply, "I reckon it's ole
Bragg as sartln' new graveyard; !;
t'other must be nigh about full" Bragg
was not very successful general. He
seemed to lack all power of adaptation
to circumstances. But it was the army
1 fI,,,1 fpos 4 &o IL
General Joe Johnston, made the wonder
iul backward movement from Resaca to
| Atlanta-a movement not eQualed in
brilliancy, completeness, and difficulty
| by any other upon either side during
the war, unless it be the death-grapple
around Petersburg. The southern
soldier believed most devoutly in the
martial superiority of the southron, and
it gave him confidence in the outcome
of the struggle which greatly enhanced
his prowess. This was the very
means of all others likely to make such
troops effective. By constant employ
ment and repeated victories he trans
formed them into veterans before they
had fairly learned the movements from
| line into column and their reversals.
But this was only half the advantage de-
rived from this belief. The northern
soldier and the northern leaders be-
lieved it also. To the northern mind
the southerner was a being especially
delighting in blood and war. The SUI
periority of the southern volunteer
forces was at the outset directly or indi.
rectly conceded by all. AS ample proof
of this state of mind it is necessary only
duced throughout all the land by what
was known as the "Black Horse Caval-
ry"-a legion by no means formidable
in numbers nor remarkable for actual
feats of arms, During the first year OF
the confederacy's existence, however.
the bare name of his death's-h head
and bloody-bones corps was
worth more to her cause than
ten thousand of the best trained
soldiery on earth could have been. The
southern soldier went into battle con-
| fident of his own prowess, and despising
his foe. The northern soldier entered
the conflict determined to do his best,
not shrinking from his duty, but over
1 estimating his adversary and under
estimating himself. This disparity of
spirit-not of soldierly qualities was
greatly enhanced by the issue of the
first general engagement, and the acces-
sion Of the over-cautious Mcclellan to
| IiiC SohiiAdllNy Wllh LID CObLluSuCC
pipe-clay and dress-parade, and his
Overwhelming dread of General Lee and
Southern impetuosity. The secret of
Grants success lay in the fact that he
did not believe in these. He considered
the northern volunteer as fully match
for his southern adversary, and did not
hesitate to attack whenever he believed
himself to have the advantage in numbert
or position. He appreciated the facs
that the quickest way to make a recruit q
veteran was to let him share the sweets
of victory. Instead of opposing the en-
emy with "time and tactics, he threw
his columns against them, and taught his
men their tactics dnder fire. These
conditions can never be paralleled again
They do not adhere in the people OF
either section. They were purely tenn
| porary and fortuitous. The south had
no real advantage in the familiarity Of
lis people with firearms. 1t is doubtful
even if as large proportion of their ar.
mics as of our northern regiments were
accustomed to arms of precision. So,
too, their horsemanship was thing
more fanciful than real, at least in its
results. Inthe actual soldierly qualities
/ of the people of the two sections
| there is probably but lit