Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1882-11-29

at the same time giving him the informs
ton sent to Pope by Buford of the passag
of the fifteen regiments of infantry an
500 cavalry through Gainesville that morn
ing. This was the only information tina
Porter had on the subject of Longstreet'
forces, as he stated himself.
| Mcdowell, finding that it was impossi
BILE to pass Porter's forces in the road wit
his command. went back and took his com
mand on road off to the right, reachin,
out to the rear of Pope's forces that wer
then engaged in battle. He marched, an,
arrived in time to put his forces in actor
and fought them until 9 O'Clock that even
| ing.
Gen. Grant says: "And now it is know
by others: as it was known by Porter a
| the time, that Longstreet, with some %,
600 men, was in position confronting Por
ter by IL o'clock on the 29th of August
four and half hours before the 4:3O or
der was written
Upon what this statement of Gen. Gran
| is based it is impossible for me to under
stand. In the first place, Porter did mo-
know that Longstreet was there with %.
600 men, nor did he know, unless he made
false statement, anything about the
force, except what Gen. Mcdowell told
him was his information received from
Gen. Buford. Nor was Longstreet con
fronting Porter. He was two and a halt
miles away from Porter; was not on the
same road that Porter was, but was form
ing west of the cid Manassas railroad, on
Pageland lane, to the right rear of Jack
sons forces, fronting the forces under
Pope, on Pope's left flank, that were then
attacking Jackson. His front was entire
ly in different direction from Porter.
If Porter had moved forward from Daw-
kins' Branch he would have attacked
LongstTeet on his right fla * and in rear,
and no matter how many troops Long
street had, Porter would have had an open
road behind him. Whether he could have
whipped Longstreet o. not is not the que.-
ton. He could have forced Long streets
whole command to change front and face
about, throwing their left clear around,
and fronting the east instead of the north
and during that movement he would have
had the opportunity of striking him heav-
lily in the flank, and doubling his forces
up, forcing him to withdraw his whole
force from attacking Pope on his (Pope's)
left flank. If Porter could not have been
SUCCESSFUL ne udO the open ROAD DeniNQ
him upon which to retreat.
Gen. Grant says that Porter was left with
10000 men.
If Gen. Grant will examine the repor.
he will find that Kings division was no
part of Porter's command; withdrawing. ii
did not reduce his own force, or the force
that he had reported as under his COM
mand that morning. His own report
shows that he had about $4,000 men.
THE FORCES THAT WERE PRESENT.
would like to put this question to Gen.
Grant: On his own showing Gen. Grant
says that Pope had $4,000 men confront
ing Jackson. jackson had $4,000 men,
Porter had 10000 men, Longstreet had 90
900 men.
Longstreet's own report shows that a
large portion of his force was attacking
Pope's left in front of jackson.
Add the $4,000 men eff Longstreet to
Jackson's $4,000, and it makes the Con-
federate army $4,000 strong.
Adding Porter's 10000 men, Grants es-
innate, to Pope's $4,000, would have made
$4,000 men contending against Al 900 men.
But take Porter's report morning re-
port) showing that he had $4,000 men,
which with Pope's $4,000 would make 49,
600 men on Pope's side, and AZ 900 men on
the confederate side.
AS a military man, would Gen. Grant
not say, no matter where the attack was
made by Porter, it would have been using
5000 men against $4,000 men, instead of
using $4,000 men against $4,000 men?
In all battles Gen. Grant we'll knows that
men are not formed in one straight line,
or attacked in one place; but the attacks
are made wherever the enemy is found,
and wherever there is position for attack
ing, and will he say that flank attack is
not the best attack that one army can
make upon another unless the rear is left
open to attack?
Will he contend (as he has in his article9
that the intention was that Porter should
attack jackson on his left, when he was
directed to attack the enemy in the flank!
Does he consider Longstreet's command
any less the enemy than Jackson's COM
mand?
Gen. Longstreet in his report of that
battle to Gen. Lee states that:
''About o'clock in the afternoon the
enemy began to press forward against
Gen. Jackson's position. Wilcox's brigadss
were moved back to their former position,
and Hoods two brigades, supported by
Evans, were quickly thrust forward to the
attack. At the same time Wilcox's three
brigades made like advance, as also
Hunton's brigade of Kemper's command"
Now we will see how many troops there
were.
Wilcox had three brigades and Hood two
brigades, Evans one, and Hunton one.
Seven brigades of Longstreet's command
(besides his artillery, that were formed in
battery and playing furiously upon Pope's
left in the direction of Groveton, and at
O'Clock were attacking Pope's left at that
very time, and they were not withdrawn,
but continued the onslaught. At O'Clock
Zone hour later Gen. Porter received the
II 80 order" to attack the enemy's right
and rear at once. At this very moment
when he was ordered to attack the larger
portion of Longtreet's forces were engaged
against Pope's forces in front of jackson,
leaving but small force back under
Longstreet for the protection of the flank of
the army.
Will Gen. Grant pretend to say, as a
military man, that this attack at that time
if made by Porter would have been a
failure? His troops we're rested, had been
lying on the road. had not been in action,
had not been formed in line of battle, but