Sacramento daily record-union. [volume] (Sacramento [Calif.]) 1875-1891, 1882-03-15
THE GARFIELD IETTfR.

to Judge Chase IN 1868, and concerning
which SO much controversy has arisen. 1t
must be said that the letter appears to be
genuine, and it is by no means the incen-
diary document which the comments of
some of the casters papers have made it
appear. In fact there is nothing IN 1t
which could not have been written in per-
feet good faith by man who at the time
of writing was friend of General Rose.
Grams, as indeed Garfield distinctly repre-
sents himself to be in this correspondence.
The circumstances under which it was
written were probably about as follows !;
Judge Chase was in the Cabinet, and natu-
rally wanted all the information &c could
obtain concerning the policy and capacity
| of the commanders in the field. Garfield,
| as Chief of Staff to General Rosecrans, was
in position to know everything that was
proposed or attempted by the Army of
| the Cumberland He was personal
friend of Judge Chase, and no doubt
the latter had asked him to write to
him fully and frankly, and in con-
fidence. This Garfield did. His letters,
as matter of course, was intended
for Judge Chase's eye alone, and it may be
said in passing that there has been shame
ful breach of confidence and propriety in
the publication of it now. But though
there is such improperly in publishing a
confidential letter, there is nothing in the
letter itself of which either Garfield or his
friends need be ashamed, or which General
Rosecrans has any right to feel offended at
We are indeed astonished, after reading
the letter, at the language attributed to the
| General on hearing of it. He is said to
have observed that if he had known Gar
field was writing such letters at that time
there would have been a court martial
We cannot believe that General Rosecrans
really said this, for it is the language Of a
| fool. It would be news indeed that an Of
fcer could not venture to disapprove the
policy of his commander in confidential
letter to a friend, without rendering him.
self amenable to punishment.
This letter was written at the end OF
July, 1868, from Nashville, then the head
quarters of the army of the Cumberland.
| It was therefore written some time before
both the Chattanooga and Chickamauga
campaigns, and before the army OF the
| Cumberland had taken the field. 1t was
| natural that man OF action like Garfield
should become impatient at the cautious
and tedious preparations of Rosecrans, and
that, knowing the army to be ready for
work, he should have cnafed at delays
which his keen mind showed him to be
unnecessary. But at the same time he
! himself shows that he was alone in this
Impotence, and that all Rosecrans' briga-
diers conceded in their commanders
policy. The fact that Rosecraus called a
Council of War, indeed, may be regarded
as indicating fatal timidity on his part,
for the saying that Councils of War
"never fight" has been SO approved by
experience that all really great commanders
have refused to seek guidance in that way.
Napoleon, Wellington, Grant, never waited
on the decisions of Councils of War, but
struck out their own campaigns and merely
gave their orders to their lieutenants.
| Rosecrans was not great commander, but
Garfield had the military genius, and prob
ably would have distinguished himself
greatly had he remained in the field. His
criticism upon Rosecrans at the time
referred to is fully indicated by all the
subsequent events, and yet those events
have also shown how loyal Garfield was tc
his old commander.
When the disastrous battle of Chicka.
manga had broken Rosecrans reputation,
Garfield rose in his place in Congress and
boldly defended the unpopular commander.
In fact he seems to have defended him
when there was no sound excuse for his
conduct, for his withdrawal from the field
of Chickamauga on the second day, and his
consequent shifting of the whole weight Of
the battle upon General Thomas, has never
been explained in such way as to vindi.
cate him. He appears to have been com.
pletely confused and even panic stricken
on that occasion. Rushing back to Chat.
tanooga, he telegraphed excitedly and de.
spairingly to Washington that his whole
army had been routed. Yet while he was
making this headlong retreat, Garfield and
Thomas were holding the entire rebel
army at bay with less than one. third of its
force, and when the telegraph was sent
they had actually brought partial victory
out of defeat, and had effectually barred
the way against the enemy's advance.
Garfeld's bravery was so fully demon.
strated that day, both in his ride across to
Thomas, and in his subsequent service tc
the latter, that no anonymous malice can
ever impair the luster of his reputation in
that respect.
The verdict of history has been agains.
Rosecrans, and it will not be reversed. A
General who loses self.control in battle
can never achieve greatness, or be useful
to his country in the field, no matter what
his skill in organization or his theoretical
knowledge of strategy and tactics. Gar
fisld evidently believed in Rosecrans more
firmly than the facts warrant, and if he
made any mistake it was in that direction
But as patriot first of all it was his duty
as well as his right to call attention to hi:
commanders faults. His duty was to de-
wise measures for putting down the REBEL
ion, not to devise measures for bolsterine
up Rosecrans. He wrote to Chase tht
results of his own certainly unbiased OBJ
servations, and his Judgment appears t.
have been better on that occasion than i
was afterwards, when he sought to claim
for that General share of the commenda
, ton which Thomas alone had earned
There is, however, nothing inconsistent
with his subsequent expressions in thi
letter, and we are extremely surprised
that certain journals should have though