The semi-weekly miner. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1882-1886, 1882-09-02
Con. Mcclellan on tho Egyptian
War.

In the September Century, Gen.
Geo. Il. Mcclellan, writing on 1.-THE
War In Egypt" criticises as follows
the war measures Of the English:
The fi,st mutiny Of Arabi, his first
insolence to his master, should have
been promptly and decisively rc-
buketl, even had 1t been necessary to
land . force for the purpose. Ii the
mutual jealousy Of France and Eng
land prevented their nipping this
difficulty In the bud by combined nc
ton, It would have been better for
England had she boldly taken the
matter In hand, aud acted promptly
on her own account, taking the
ground that her Indian Interests and
the free use Of the Suex canal rem
dered such course imperative. But
. temporixing policy prevailed, and,
closing her eyes against the future,
England allowed matters to drift on
from bad to w0rse, now and again
uttering futile protests, but doing
nothing to guard against the inevita-
ble result. At length an Engliyl,
feet was gathered In the harbOr Of
Alexandria, and an u'tinatum sent
to the Egyptian authorities, only to
be csntensptuouslv disregar<led. but,
unlike the practice Of England in
former times, 1t was not promptly
followed by q resort to the "ifin.0
ratio rcgun., and her ignorant and
puny foe not unnaturaiiy concluded
that It never would Ike. Then came
= bloody massacre in the streets Of
Alexandria, the history Of which we
do not fully know as yet-eitfer how
it was commenced or who suffered
l,cst from it. Statements have bccn
published that 1t was commenced by
Europeans. but the probabilities
are that the riot WAS melted by ma
tivcs actuatetl BY fanaticisln aud love
of plunder motives not always en-
tireiy distinct.
Here again was an occasion for
prompt action; but it was allowed to
i,ass, and Arab continued fortifying
the harbor. Certainly, 1t was now
clear that Arali meant to fight, the
only question being the extent to
which his men would stand By linn.
Iy this time the English must have
determined to demand the surrender
of the forts, ana. in case Of refusal,
to Ol,en fire. Their guns could
destroy the forts sud burn the
town-One very likely to follow from
the other. II the garrison retired
as would no doubt l,e the case when
the forts were silenced-it was certain
that the spirit displayed during the
recent massacre would lead to further
scenes OF murder, plumber, aud des-
tsuc. lion, which the guns Of the H. ct
could prevent only by the destruc.
ton Of the very objects II was desira-
ble to save. It was very clear, then.
that the attack hy the fleet ci;ce being
determined upon, common sense de-
n,an(led that there should he present
and available when It commenced q
sufficient body Of troops to he landed
~ seOn as the forts were silcnced, to
protect the city and Immediately fol-
IOw up the retreating garrison, SO as
to destroy the prestige Of ArAbi, aud
prevent the rising from becoming .
general, rational, or religious move
Mcnt.
The dilemma Is unpleasant for any
Of England and her institu-
ti0ns; either she Is unable-thrOugh
organization, ,nal-adminis-
tratiOn, Lack Of energy, or too full
0f her resources nearer
We say, she IL unable
to collect upon reasonable notice IN
expeditionary force of ten or fifteen
thcusand men, or her government
lacked the wisdom to anticipate the
inevitable necessity for such force
1t a given time, and proved their in
competency to direct military ex-
ue<liti0ns abroad. The excuse that
the exigeucies Of diplomacy tied their
hands is not . good one, for in this
instance there was ut stake whatever
of importance the Suex canal and
peace In Egypt may have for Eng
land, and It was one Of those cases
where . strong nation is fully justified
In running, risks and inci,rring re-
,ponsibility On the side Of safety for
10 most vital interesls.