Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1882-10-24
THE DECISION.

The State of Minnesota, respondent, VS.
Emma Lee, appellant.
Syllabus: A prosecution and conviction
under an ordinance of the city Of st. Paul
for keeping house of ill-fame in said
city, constituted no bar to the prosecution
for the same act by Indictment under Sec
ton 8, ch. 100, general statutes, 1878.
Order denying a new trial affirmed.
JuGge Tanderbmry's Cp:nion.
The defendant was indicted and tried in
the district court of Ramsey county, at the
October term, 1881, for the ofense of
keeping a house of ill-fame resorted to
for tho purpose of prostitution. Upon
the trial the defendant offered to prove
under plea of former conviction, that
she had been duly convicted of the same
offense, under an ordinance of the city of
st. Paul. The principal question to be
considered here is whether the court erred
in rejecting this evidence.
The same question was considered
in the State VS.. Olson, 26 Mimi,
512, and it was held by majority of
the court as then constituted, that
such former conviction was no bar to the
state prosecution, though the justices rested
their conclusions upon different grounds.
The decision was nevertheless an authori-
ty which properly governed the district
court in its decision. But the division
in opinion in that case required reconsi-
deration of the question in this.
It is the Judgment of majority of the
court that the law of the state which pun
ishes this offense as felony has not been
superseded by the charter and ordinances
of this city; but that the Jurisdiction of the
state to try this offense remains wholly
unaffected and unimpaired; that the state
has not surrendered or delegated to the
municipality the power to punish it as a
crime against the commonwealth; that the
general law and the local ordinance must
stand together, and also, that conviction
under the latter must be adiudged to be no
bar to rosscution under the former.
Though this last proposition was not di-
rectly decided in State VS.. Charles, and
State VS.. Ludwig, yet we think the opinion
in each case contains clear intimation in
support of the doctrine. 16 MINI. p. 47S,
q MINI. p. POI.
Municipal corporations are chartered
and vested with the powers of local gov
eminent in addition to the powers exer-
cised by the state under the general laws,
because the concentration of population
and business in particular locality re-
quires special police regulations, with the
power in the local jurisdiction to enfore
them in summary way. Waldo VS.. Wal
lace, IL Ind, 584.
Hence these powers, in SO far as they re-
late to the public order and morals, must
be regarded as purely municipal in their
character, to be exercised through
such police regulations, and in no
sense substitute for the ad-
ministration of the general criminal laws
of the state through its own tribunals, ex-
cept where the legislature plainly SO pro-
vides.
Says Mr.. Cody: Gan act may be penal
offense under the laws of the state, and
further penalties under proper legislative
authority be imposed for its commission,
by municipal by-laws,and the enforcement
of the one would not preclude the enforce
ment of the other.'
Const. Linn, 18th ed. 242. It is usual to
give the local courts in such cases jurisdic-
ton, also over inferior offenses under
the general laws. And as to such Of
lenses their proceedings and judgments
are on the same footing with those of
other state courts of similar jurisdiction.
In some instances, also, from the nature of
the case and the terms of the charter, it
may be reasonably implied, particularly
as to minor offenses properly of police or
municipal cognizance, (as frequently in the
case of liquor icenses) that the enforce
ment of the municipal bylaw is intended
to supersede and bar prosecutions by the
state.
How far the legislature might authorize
the corporation to prohibit and punish IN
der its own bylaws criminal offenses under
the general laws, Or how far such bylaws
might be substituted by charter provis-
ions for such general laws, is not
necessary to be discussed in this case, be-
cause nothing of the kind is attempted in
the charter under consideration. Such
legislation, if indeed permissible, is not
usual. however, as tothe higher grade of
offenses.
Howe vs.. Plainfeld, s Brown Isl.
Cone VS.. Turner, Cush. 495.
An offense against a municipal bylaw,
proceeding from the same act
which also constitutes a felony under
bllc HCilcItlI ldW ID lOG LUZ tuitc ISdSOl W NC
considered the same oifense, because the
two are distinct in their legal char
acter both as to the nature and quail
lily OF the ofense, and the
Jurisdictions offended against. And q con-
viction TO be a bar must be upon prose-
cation for the same identical act and
crime" 4 Black. Com, 1856, Wragg vs..
Penn. Township 81 I'll. %. FreeIand VS..
the People, 1e Ill. 563. Severance VS.. the
people, 81 ILL.,, 414.
The terms bylaw, ordinance and mu-
nicipal regulation. have substantially the
same meaning, and are defined ito be the
laws OF the corporate district made by the
authorized body in distinction from the
general law Of the state" They
are local regulations for the govern
nent of the inhabitants of the particular
place. Dill. Maine Court, I'd ed, secs. pa,
300.
The authority to make ''by-laws'' is a
widely different thing from the general