Eureka daily sentinel. [volume] (Eureka, Nev.) 1871-1887, 1882-01-27
TELEGRAPHIC.
JUDGE COx's CHARGE TO THE
JURY.
HOW the JURY STOOD IN THE
CASE.
ONLY TWO BALLOTS TAKEN.
scovHIE SAYS THE PRISONER WILL Be A
RAvIAG MANIAC.
scoville Thinks There is Good Ground for a
New Trial.
GENERAL BELIEF THAT THERE is NO CHANGE
FOR A NEW TRIAL.
ESPECIAL TO THE sEsrISEL.I


Cox commenced to deliver his charge to the
jury. He began by saying that the Con-
stitution provides in all criminal prosecu-
tons that the accused shall enjoy the
right Of a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury, in the State or district
where the crime shall have been commit
ted. He shall be informed Of the cause
and the nature Of the charge against him.
He shall be confronted with the witnesses
against him. He shall have compulsory
process to obtain witnesses in his favor,
and shall have the assistance of counsel in
his defence. These provisions are intended
for the protection Of the innocent from in
justice and oppression, and it was only by
their faithful observance that Guiteau's in
nocence could be fairly ascertained. Every
accused person was presumed to be inno-
cent until the accusation was proven.
With what difficulty and trouble the law
had been administered in the present case
the Jurors had been daily witnesses. 1t
was a consolation to think that not one Of
these sacred guarantees OF the Constitu-
ton had been violated in the person of the
accused. Before proceeding further he
wished to notice some of the incidents
which had taken place pending the recent
argument. The prisoner had frequently
taken occasion to proclaim that public opin-
ion, as evidenced by the press and his cor
respondence, was now in his favor. These
declarations could not be prevented, ex-
cept by the process OF gagging the pris-
oner. ANY suggestion that the jury could
be influenced by such lawless chattering Of
the prisoner, would have seemed to him
absurd, and he should have felt that he
was insulting the intelligence Of the jury
if he had warned them not to regard it.
Counsel for the prosecution had felt it
necessary, however, in the final argu-
ment, to interpose a contradiction to such
statements and exception had been taken
on the part of the accused to the form in
which the effort was made. for the purpose
of purging the record of any Objectionable
matter. He would simply say that any
thing which had been said on either side
in reference to the public excitement, or
to newspaper opinions, was not to be re-
garded by the jury. To establish murder
it had to be proved. first, that death was
caused by the act OF the accused, and
further, that il was caused with malice
af~orethought. That did not mean, how
ever, that the Government had TO prove
any ill-will or hatred on the part Of the
accused toward the deceased. Whenever
homicide was shown to have been COM
mittsd without authority, and with de-
hberate intent, il was sufficiently proven
to have been lone with malice afore-
thought, and malice was not disproved by
showing that the accused had no personal
ill-will toward the deceased, aud that be
killed him from other motives. In order
to constitute the crime of murder, the
assassin must have been reasonably sane
in mind. In technical terms, he must be
'of sound mind, memory and discretion"
An irresponsible, insane man could not
commit murder. II he was laboring un-
der the disease Of mental faculties to
such an extent that he did not know what
he was doing, or did not know it was
wrong, then he was wanting in that
Sound mind, memory and discretion"
That was part Of the definition Of murder.
Every defendant was presumed to be
innocent until the accusation against
him was established by proof.
Notwithstanding this presumption OF in
nocence, it was equally true that the de-
PENDANT was presumed to be sane, and to
have been 80 at the time the crime was
committed, the burden Of proof as to in
sanity was on the defense. II the Jury en-
tertained a reasonable doubt on any ground
as to any part Of the essential elements to
the crime, the defendant was entitled to
the benefit Of the doubt and acquittal.
The doubt, however, must be sincere and
fortified by proofs and testimony. The
jury should be reasonably and morally
certain of the facts on which they declared
THAR var1tok Thara Uao No 1-acA41,
about the firing Of the shot, or of its pro-
ducing death, and provided defendant was
capable Of criminal intent or malice, he
was guilty Of the crime Of murder. The
prisoners own hand had written that he
contemplated the removal Of the Presi-
dent six weeks before the shooting I; that
he had deliberately planned ID and pre-
pared for it. These things establish
malice. Nevertheless, il insanity were g.
tablished to o necessary degree, it must be
allowed full weight. He had already said
that q man who is insane, in the sense that
makes him irresponsible, he cannot com
NIT o crime. The defense of insanity had
been SO abused as to be brought into great
discredit. 1t was the last resort in cases
Of unquestioned guilt. 1t had been an ex-
cuse for jurors bringing in a verdict Of ac-
quittal when there was public sympathy
for the accused, and especially when there
was provocation for the homicide. Ac-
cording to law, it was sufficient to show
that the act was done by deliberate intent,
as distinct from an act done under sud
den impulse, in the heat Of blood and with
out malice af~orethought. The jury was
not to infer that the prisoner was insane
because he committed the crime. The only
safe rule was for the jury to direct
Its attention to the test Of criminal re-
sponsibility. namely, whether he possessed
mental capacity at the time the act was
committed TO know that 1t was wrong, or
whether he was deprived OF that capacity
by mental disease. There was a distinc-
ton that the jury must not lose sight Of,
and they must decide how far 1t is appli-
cable to this case; that was the distinction
between mental and moral obliquity, be-,
tween mental ~incapacity to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong, and the moral in
sensibility to that distinction.
And now, gentlemen, to sun up all I
have said TO you, II you find from the
whole evidence that at the time Of the
commission Of the homicide the prisoner
was laboring under such defects in his
reason that he was incapable Of under
standing what he was doing, or Of seeing
that it was the wrong thing TO do; as for
example, II he were under an insane delu-
sion that the Almighty had commanded
him to do the act. then he was mo- in a
responsible condition OF mind, but is an
object Of compassion, and should be now
acquitted. II on the other hand, you find
he was under no insane delusion, but had
possession Of his powers enough to know
that his act was wrong, and that of his
own free will he conceived the idea and
executed the homicide; then whether his
motives were personal vindictiveness, po-
itical luminosity, q desire to ayenge per-
sonal wrongs. or a morbid desire for noto-
riety; or, II You are unable to discover
any motive at all, the act is murder, and
it Is FOUR duty to find a verdict OF guilty
as charged in the Indictment; or, after the
4 aauooatfor fpnun NJ Gn~m4II.L- 49, 49,