Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1882-06-15

Is any such thing as the CalderOn question
between us, and then said: "Do YOU mean,
Mr.. Secretary, that both my original in
structions and the instructions from the pre-
sent administration are pubIished?" He
said, Eyes, before you had received
them. l have 3 telegram not In cipher, but
opeI." To which replied that I supposed
SO, because l could not see the use OF a
cipher dispatch in referring to papers al
ready published. He added, 'Yes; they
have been published, and will be soon pub
shed here in La PLtrid"
He then went out Of the room and return
ed with q telegram which he said had come
from Paris only two days before, and of
which he read the first line, which as
Iecoll6ct, was: ''The 8Iaine-Trescott in
structiOns have been published" and then
paused, smiling and looking over the tele-
gram as II he were uncertain whether he
should communicate the rest.
| said: "As you say that all this is conf
dental, don't make half confidence Of it. If
| am to receive any instructions through
you, let me know them In full"
He smiled, shook his head, and folded up
the telegram, saying: "This, however, will
not interfere with our negotiations"
He then proceeded at some length to
state and to explain what he considered the
advantages of the condition OF things un-
der the new instructions.
l said to him: "That may all be so, Mr..
Secretary, but l think that a diplomatist of
ordinary experience would conclude, when
he learns that his instructions have been
which he is negotiating before he
receives them himself, that it is time
for him to be silent until he does receive
them. | think there must be some mistake
about all this, but at any rate l must de-
cline to say a word more until | learn from
my government what 1t has done, and what
it means to do"
He said that he hoped that 1 would re.
ceiVe my Instructions very soon, that the
position was strained and could not be
maintained for an indefinite time. That is,
Chilli could not wait much longer for the
United States to decide what action it would
take.
Having thus given you a concise account
of the interview, you will allow me to eX-
press my hope that my conduct will be ap
proved. Ny original Instructions were in
the alternative, and If | fail to obtain such
settlement as the President deemed he had
to take action which could not
have been agreeable to the Chilian
Government. 1 could not suppose that
such an instruction would be made public
while | was endeavoring to secure, and not
without some hope of success, an amicable
solution of this delicate and difficult ques-
tion. S i'll less could | believe that, II my
original instructions had been serious
ly modified, any communication
of such charges would have been
made publicly, or even confdentially, to the
Chilian Government before | could possibly
have received it. But as his language and
actions were evidently based upon his conf
dent knowledge of these supposed instruc-
tions, any further conference with him was
useless.
In another communication Mr. Trescott
writes that the Chilian Secretary of Foreign
Affairs delared himself seriously embar
rassed by the publication of Trescott's
cipher dispatch to Secretary Frelinghuysen
setting forth the terms which Chili had con-
fidentially proposed to offer. The Chilian
Secreta maintained, Trescott says, that
since these terms had been made pub
lie Chilli could not modify them
without seeming to do so under pressure
from the United States. Trescott then say
that the communication to the Government
of chilli of the determination OF the United
States not to take part in any negotiation
based upon the considerations proposed,
and the reply OF the Government OF Chill
that 1t is not prepared to modify these con-
ditions, practically closes the mission.
TrescOtt closes by expressing the hope
that he may be recalled.
Ia a final letter, dated Washington, June
5th, Trescott reviews at length his efforts to
bring about truce between Chill and Peru
as an indispensable preliminary to peace
neg Jtiations, and concludes as follows: 81
believe the reason which induces the hesi-
tation OF Chilli Is that she believes that
so long as the Peruvisns are convinced
that the United States will finally
intervene they never will negotiate In earn
est. 1t is unquestionablY true that the
Peruvian Government does believe that the
United States will intervene. At any rate
they consider that the question of interven-
tion, as one of their leading officials ex-
pressed 1t to me, was still a pending
question. 1t is observed that neither
Chilli nor Peru will approach the solu-
tion OF their difficulties in the proper
spirit or In any hope of a result satisfactory
to both as long as this impression lasts. II
the United States intends to intervene effec.
lively to prevent the disintegratlon of Peru
the time has come when that intention
should be avowed. If it does not, still more
urgent is the necessity that Chilli
and Peru should understand exactly
where the action OF the United States
ends. 1t would be entirely beyond my duty
to discuss the character or consequences of
either lines of conduct, but trust you will
not deem that l am going beyond that duty
In impressing upon the government that the
present position OF the United States Is an
embarrassment to all the belligerents, and
that 1t should be terminated as promptly as
possible.
There is another conviction which 1t is
clearly my duty to express. l believe
that whenever the United States
formally withdraws from further inter-
vention Peru will apply to the Eu-
ropean powers, and that a joint inter
vention Of two or more is probable. 1t is
not for me to anticipate what view the de-
partment will take Of such a possibility.