Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1882-10-11

Following is the Khedive's talk with a
correspondent of the London Times: / do
not Tor a moment believe either in the genu-
Ineness, extent or patriotism of the so-called
national feeling. The agitstion, such as it
is, is the natural result of the weakness of
the Egyptian government on the one hand,
and the success of the Turkish antiques on
the other. Pan-Islam is as old as my time
and older, but 1 would never hear of it.
Different counsels have since prevailed and
we are now face 10 face with the conse-
quences. l always managed by some means
or other to control and direct the religious
feryor of my subjects in Egypt, but when the
control came from Conslautinople and not
from Cairo, religious fervor became religious
fanaticism, and the existence, influence and
temporary success of sn Arab, became a
possibility. L remember hrabi well. He
became a lieutenant colonel when very
young, and in the second or third year of
my administration was tried by court
martial for breach of trust. He should
have been broken, but one of my
generals persuaded me 10 pardon him, and
did so. He was then transferred TO the
commissariaf, and only quite recently re-
turned TO active service in The army. Arab
can be painted in a word. He is what the
French call a bld9uer. He can talk and do
nothing else. He is the tool OF Mahmoud
Fehmia and Toulbi, about both of whom
have nothing good to say Arab il, and al
ways was, an arrant coward. l always said
he would run away, and he certainly de-
camped very quickly at Tel-el-Kebir. The
only brave men in his party are Ali Fehmy
and Addelala. These are soldiers, but l
would defy Arab himself TO define either
patriotism" or national feeling" He GER
tainly has neither one nor the other, al
though half Europe seems inclined to re-
gard him as the would be savior OF bis coun-
try. The truth is that the Egyptian people
must lean on something and follow some one.
The Egyptian government was hopeless and
weak, and Arab snd his friends knew it.
He and his partisans achieved three visible
and striking successes. The Egyptians saw
this, and saw, moreover, The repre-
sentatives OF the great powers prac-
tically in treaty with him. Arab
pointed triumphantly to these facts,
and told the Egyptians that he could
and would restore Egypt TO the Egyptians,
and it is not surprising, in The circumstances,
that the Egyptians chung to him as The
stronger vessel. The movement he headed
was from the first actively encouraged at
Constantinople, but it il very improbable
that either the Sultan himself or any of his
responsible ministers were ever in direct
either with him or his asso-
ciates. Direct communication is not fes-
ture of Turkish intrigue. The desired feet
can be produced without it. Arab and his
accomplices must be severely punished. An
example should certainly be made of the
leaders of the revolt, and half measures will
only be premium TO further disturbances.
They may give TO Egypt a succession OF
Arabs. Arab himself should be treated as
a vulgar mutiueer and rebelious soldier. To
look on him as an Egyptian Garibaldi is a
capital mistake, aud one which augurs i'll
for the future.