New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-09-01
crvrps1 U0LSELEY's CAMPAIGNS.


GENERAL UOLSELEY'S CAMPAIGNS. d.
General Wolseey's military reputation ia
mainly based on the conduct of = campaign in
which his errors of Judgment were less con-
spicuons than his talents and good fortune.
vet glaring wthal. lie was sent out to the
Gold Coast with a stah but without an army,
and the Home Government expected that he
would either organize a native army or render
military operations unnecessary by c0mpacts
and intrigues with the tribes He had not
been long on the ground before he asked for an
army, but he neglected to make adequate ar
rangements for transporting supplies to cam
paign ground in the bush, which was not a
fOod-producing country and throughout the
five months of active operations the chances OF
success we're constantly hazarded by the weak
ness aad yacillaton Of bis diplomacy. On the
march through Ashantee he was forced to make
two long halts until supplies could he iol-
warded to him, and when lie had won two
pitched battles and numerous slirnishes, he
was so crippled by a transport service which
had utterly broken down that he rctreated
from the enemy's capital as rapidly as he en-
tered it. The campaign would have closed
Glover heading Il native army from another
base of operations, had net renewed the assault
upon the Ashantees and forced the fugitive
King to sign n treaty and complete his sur
render by payment of gold. Mr. N:nWood
Readc, in his history Of the campaign, proves
that the early neglect of the transport vitiated
the whole expedition, delayed the troops on
the march, and gave to the return from Coo
maSsie the semblancc of retreat In like
manner he exposes the faulty of General
Wolselcy's diplomatic manGuvres in frltter-
ing away time in negotiations and in ordering
his men not to burn villages nor to fire upon
the natives unless they were themselves at
tackled.
Now it is a dull general who does not avoid
repeating his plumbers. General Wolscley did
not admit when he returned to London that
there had been anything amiss with his trans
port or his diplomatic war-making, but he un-
doubtcdly knew better than anyone else where
lie Lad been least successful in the conduct
of the campaign. and now that he has another
opportunity for the exercise of his military tai
ents he is profiting by his experience. 1t may
be that the difficulty Of organizing proper sys-
TEN of transport by boat, railway or mules
through the inundated delta had not little to
do with the change Of base which he ordered
as soon as he arrived at Alexandria. At all
events, he has devoted his attention from the
outset to this fundamental detail of successful
cambGigning. On the Gold Coast he began by
planning a rai;"ay where it was almost I'M
possible to build one, importing neither mules
borses nor oxen, and acting on the assumption
a.. Io .lfh To
carry on their heads everything his army might
need, and, moreover, could always be had when
asked for. He ended by detailing portion OF
the force to do transport duty and by author
ling Colonel COlley to dragOOn the natives into
service as carriers. In the present campaigns
there have been extensive purchases OF Syrian
mules locomotives have been sent on from
Bombay, and boats have been provided for
temporary use on the Fresh Water Canal. The
main reliance is placed upon the railway, which
is repaired rapidly rs the army advances,
hut all the contingencies seem TO have been
anticipated The rapidity with which the army
has moved across the desert and the health and
spirits OF the troops may be taken as conclusive
evidence that there have been fOrethOught and
excellent management in this indispensable
branch of the service. A general who displays
common sense in matters of transport and
supply can afford to have minor delinquencies
in strategy and engineering exposed.
With respect to the ill-judged leniency and
diplomatic folies which characterized the
Ashantee campaign, il is safe to assume that
there is small risk Of a repetition of any faint
hearted tactics in Egypt. The present war
is sanctioned by the great mass Of public oTin-
ion ut home, and there is no necessity for
avoiding or postponing the vigorous prosecu
lion of hostilites. General Wolseley has been
sent out primarily hard fighter and not
rs a prudent administrator or a slilful dplo-
matst No time is likely to be wasted in idle
negotiations, and while the native villages will
not be burned, the enemy will be forced to the
wall with all the yigOr and dispatch which
modern warfare Will permit. General Nolse-
ley affects to dcspise the foe arraycG against
him, but he is not playing at war; nor expos
ing the lives of his men to the chances Of irres-
olute diplomacy and arab trcachery lie is
making thorough business Of fighting. The
charge Of the Household Cavalry at kassasin
is in marked contrast with the half hearted
orders given to the regiments marching on
Coomassie. The refusal TO grant an armistice,
if the latest rumors are confirmed, will cvince
a determination to bring the campaign to a
speedy close by hard fighting. Diplomatic
dallancc and irresolute action VIII only tend
to prolong the period Of hostilties and uncer-
tainty.
THE INDIAN DISTURBANCE
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