Eureka daily sentinel. [volume] (Eureka, Nev.) 1871-1887, 1882-07-16
THE EMF.

THE PROBABLE END.
1t looks now as though the war begun
so vigorously at Alexandria will end sim
ply in the occupation of Egypt, or as
much of that ancient land as is needed,
by the English. The other great nations
of Europe are materially interested in
seeing the Suez Canal kept open to com
merce and its affairs well and securely
managed. There is no emergency sug-
gested by the situation at present that
would be at all likely to provoke a gem
eral European war, except that Turkey
NAV undertake to interfere and thereby
provoke an attack OF the English fleet
upon Constantinople. Such an unpoiltlc
move on the part of poor old etfete
Turkey. however, is not expected, be-
cause in the general conflict which would
probably follow she would be swallowed
M bv her neighbors and lose even the
nominal national life that she now en-
lows. The fact is, the great Powers Will
be most likely to invest England form
ally with all the privileges that she as
sumes in the Egyptian affair after her
policy has been clearly established, by
what is in effect a conquest of Egypt now
going on without any remonstrance on
their part. They have no contrary IN
terests involved, and without good cause,
without necessity, we may say, they are
not likely. any one of them, to preclpi-
tate a war with England, the compiled
tions of which, in the present jealous and
feverish condition of European politics,
nobody could ~foretell. England is too
powerful to be trifed with: and this
bold, decisive manner of settling her
affairs with Egypt in her own way, is
probably not unsatisfactory to the other
European Powers. In fact, they seem to
wink at the new departure that England
has made in international policy, that OF
assuming the control Of another nations
affairs as security extraordinary for the
payment of debt. And this has to be re-
garded as a coup d etat, equitable
though irregular. England must have a
guarantee OF protection and safety to her
national interests in the Suez Canal, OF
the enormous business and revenues OF
which she already monopolizes four-ifths;
and her bondholders in the national debt
of Egypt, though private citizens, are
EngIishmen OF prominence and influence,
and their claims for insurance are in
volved in the consideration.
The Suez Canal and its affairs are tn;
kernel of the whole matter. England
would desire, independently of this, tt
hold and possess Egypt for its own gen
eral value as an acquisition OF territor.
and for its strategic Importance; but the
interest Of her Government and OF he
private citizens gives the keynote to tn
present tune Of war. The London Stand
ard ingeniously says:
awe have to secure the Suez Canal
That Admirably is the main object, an(
at first sight 1t seems ample enough
But it is impossible to separate the ques
ton q the Canal from that OF Egyp
generally. 1t ia easy to talk glibly 0
the vast extent of desert which separate
it from Egypt, with which the contro
and the tinanoiers have concern. But
desert is q poor defense in q region il
which the best fighting men are Bedouins
whose home ia in the wilderness, anC
whom, nice a fanatical movement ha
made them convenient tools, a sigma
from Cairo would direct to any desperate
enterprise. We nave been told that thu
ships which pass through the Canal ant
the stations On its banks would somehow
make shift for water if the supply wer'
cut of-as eonfessedly it may be at any
point. Still, tine fact remains that for {
permanent supply both ships and sta
tons depend upon the channel which
brings fresh water from the Nile. The
navigation further depends upon the
security of the European stations, and
ct present there is no force to defend
these from assault. Thus an infnity Of
dangers are disclosed, against which oul
only guarantee is the precarious one that
Arab may not be disposed to press mat.
tiers to extremes. British interests re-
quire something more stable than that.
But to secure the Canal implies virtually
a military occupation of Egypt"