Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-02-18

rendering the people for the time unah
10 meet the interest; that each Successi
Legislature will be willing in good faith
discharge the duty of levying the necessa
taxes. Still it might in their opinion
necessary for the public good to change Il
manner of payment, and repeal the coupe
section, collect the taxes in money and pa
the coupons at the treasury. This migl
become necessary to prevent the warrior
| taX-c0llectOrS in the State, many of whOl
are unskilled business, from receivir
| counterfeit coupons. The delay in the co
| lection of taxes, even when an amp
amount is levied, may, on account of III
prior claims of the coupon-holders /
found to operate unJustly to the other cree
| itors of the State and create embarras
| ments for want of funds to meet the cul
| rent expenses. The Legislature might dc
sire to obviate this by levying a separat
tax, payable in money to meet the curren
| expenses leaving an ample amount pay
| able as before in coupons 10 take upall tina
remain outstanding.
Neither of these charges suppoSeS an.
| purpose to repudiate the debt. They woul
| be perfectly fair and just and not inconsis
tent with perfect good faith, yet if the con
could be made, Such changes in the law
might be necessary for the public good, AM
yet the Legislature of sovereign Stat
without the power to pay them.
We cannot determine, nor was 1t in tn
power of the last General Assembly to de
termtne, that these changes would .neve
b necessary or important. 1t is power
SouSklIutlIk al 6SSSub1dl SlcH1eIll Ol SONtT
eighty necessary for the purposes of gov
ernment and cannot be surrendered, bu
must remain with the people and their rep
resentatives for the time being. The exten
of the power is not important. If one es
sential element of sovereignty may be sur
rendered, why not all. Where is the limit
1t is argued, however, that for consider
alton Legislature may relinqulSh part o.
the sovereign power, though not all.
know that this doctrine is established by
numerous decisions OF the supreme Court
OF the United States with reference TO pro-
visions in charters of incorporation, by
which, for consideration, the right to levy
taxes in the future has been held released
We are bound by these decisions In SINH
lar cases, but we are not bound to apply the
same doctrine elsewhere. The soundneSs
of the doctrine has always been denied by
some of the ablest judges of the Supreme
Court, and has been met with solemn pro-
tests by some of the ablest of the State
courts, and Mr.. Justice Miller has shown
me one OF his dissenting opinions, that II
the power be conceded to exist, no limit
can be fixed to its exercise. These decl-
sions must be left to stand upon their own
peculiar ground, If indeed they stand upon
any sound principles. | have carefully ex-
amined the case Antonio VS.. wright, decldo
ed by the Supreme Court of Virginia, ~
Gratland, and given to it the respectful con-
sideration due to the courts of sister state,
but cannot concur in the reasoning of the
conclusion. / have already examined the
grounds upon which it mainly rests.
The case of Hartman VS.. Greenhow, II
Otto, did not present the question. The
decision in Antonio VS.. Wright. afterwards
by the same court, had been ac-
quiesced in by the State officers OF Virgin
la. The coupons in the latter case were not
refused; the only effort was to deduct from
them a tax upon the bonds. While the rea-
soning OF the Virginia court Is recited with
apparent approval, yet it is manifest, the
decision was regarded as settling the ques-
ton, leaving only the question OF the pro-
posed tax to be decided in the latter case.
The case of Furman VS.. Nichol, Wallace
"A, at the 18th section Of the charter OF the
Bank OF Tennessee making Its notes recelv-
able for taxes was a contract attaching 10
the notes, that could not be impaired by
legislation. The question, OF
course, has some analogy, but Is not 1denG-
cal. The notes were intended to, anu did
for time, at least circulate as money. At
all events the question as to the power OF
the Legislature to bind the State by con-
tract like the present, was not cons1aereo on n1s
or decided. The same may be said OF Wood-
ruff VS.. Trapnall, 10 Howard.
The Supreme Court of the U n1ted states
has not, in general, been disposed to ques-
make such contracts. l presume, and
have said, the construction OF the state
Constitution as to the power would be
question for the State courts. Though IN
inquiry whether the contracts OF state
has been impaired, the United states courts
do not yield to the construction given by
the State courts to the statues, out OF Whlch
tho contract arises jefferson Bank vs..
5nelIey, Black, 436 Wright VS.. Nayle, II
Otto, 79i We ought to entertain no feeling
Of antagonism toward the Federal supreme
Court. We shsuld adopt its decislons
where they are controlling without hesita-
ton. We eshould not regard their decisions
as those of a foreign jurisdiction. 1t is not
TO be denied that the extension OF the Ju-
riSdictiOn of these courts over the state is
from a political standpoint regarded with
from some quarters, as indicating
a tendency to encroach upon the rights OF
the State and strengthen the general gov
N m this contest IL is NOT the prov
Ince of this court to enter with anything
Of partisan spirit. Upon this character
Of question, however, Mr.. Justice Miller In
D dissenting opinion In which Jusuce
Field and the Chief Justice concurred, in
the case of Washington University VS..
Rouse, 3 Wallace, Az, uses the language:
'BuJ we must be permitted to say, that in
the . validity of the con-
.ract, this court has been at times quick tc
discover a contract that ii might be protect
I'd, and slow to perceive that what are
claimed to be contracts are not SO by reason,
)y want of authority in those who profess
o bind Others"
This, he adds, has been especially appar-
ent in regard to contracts made by the
legislatures of States. When it is seen that
he result, in cases of this character is, by
ontact to surrender to the Federal Court
over the State itself IN It's local
fairs, it cannot be wondered if, in view of
he statement, State courts shall hereafter
'e little slow to see the power to make
1ch contracts. trust, at this day have no
reign ty, but cannot decline to assert so
1uch of the powers OfSovereignty as are yet
onccd to the State.
1t is said, however, that the bill attacks
he act upon the ground that the Legislature
annot pass an irrepealable act, and hence
his law is irrepealable, and at the same
me assumes that the act is unconsti-
ltional because it is not repealable. The ar
ument is earnestly pressed and IL Is insisted
nat the law is either repealable or it is not |
epealable; Il it is repealable no relief is
1aA n will Nnf for a nui n
epeal it at pleasure; If it is not repealable |
le complafnants are entitled to no relief by |
leir own showing. This though ingenious, |
lvors of special pleading" II the section |
purse be repealable, but 1t involves also |
ements of q contract, and If the power ex- |
Is to bind the State to these stipulations
nd the terms be accepted, then the contract |
)uld not be impaired. As to neither of |
lese propositions can there be any doubt.
or can there be any doubt under the de-
lis is contract. No difficulty can exist
to its construction and meaning. 1t was |
ltended to prevent the repeal of the law.
he question 1s not whether 1t is or is not
)ntract, or as to the managing of the con-
act; but the question is whether the Leg-~l
lature had the power to bind the State to
lese stipulations. 1t is not an accurate
of the position of the complain
ats to say that the act is unconstitutional
ecauSe 1t is not repealable, but it is because
processes to authorize contxFct on behalf
In0 SUskUG WHICH Ln6 LeSlSldIur6 has not
le power to make, tnat is, a contract relin-
lishing part of the sovereign power of the
ate, OF course, If the law be unconstitu-
Onal II may be so declared even after the
)nds are issued, but it does not follow that
may not be so declared in advance. 1t is
ISumed that the question cannot arise un-
there is an attempt to repeal the law, TN
then there is no real case. But this
the fact that this is not only q
W that processes to be a contract. If the
'urt has the Jurisdiction and the proper
lrties are before it, no doubt can exist as
the right to declare in advance the want |
power to make the contract and prevent |
conSumInation, II such jurisdiction eX-
IS 1T would in every view be better to eX-
else it now rather than allow the bonds to
issued and afterward allow the coupon
ction to be repealed and the contract
langed. OF course, we cannot know that
e attempt would ever be made to repeal
but the bonds in the form proposed
ould contain an unwarranted assumption
1on their face, and be calculated to deceive
Id mislead innocent purchasers and make
tgation.
The Supreme Court of the United States
Joined the Board of Liquidation of Louis
ma from issuing bonds of the State to GER
in persons, upon the ground that an act
the Legislature authorizing it Indirectly
lpaired the rights of the complainants un-
r a former act, 2 Otto 53l. In Davis V.
ray, the Governor of Texas was enjoined
)m issuing grants to a large body of land,
ION the ground that it would interfere
th other titles, l6 Wallace, and there are
Irious other cases holding that it Is proper
grant the relief in advance Mott V.
enn., 80 Penn. st. rep. Il Bradley. v. Coun,
Hume; Winston V. T. &; p. Il. r., l Baxter,
If this law in terms authorizes the de-
ldantS to enter into contracts in the name
the State, containing stipulations to
hich the State, under the Constitution,
mot be found, then there ought to be no
luctance In so declaring any ''straining OF
e timber" of the law to avoid the result.
maV no doubt. be thought that there are |