The National tribune., 1882-04-08
BY BRIG gen. S. D. STURGIS.

On the 31st of May, 1864, at the instance
of the maior-general commanding the mill
tary division of the Missouri, 1 was placed
in command of an expedition then being
organized and concentrated at Lafayette,
Tennessee, by the major-general command
ing the district of West Tennessee for the
purpose of operating against the rebel forces
under Forrest, in northeast Mississippi, with
view to creating a diversion in favor of
Gen. sherman's army then engaged in the
campaign against Atlanta. My command
was composed of about 5000 men-infantry,
cavalry, and artillery. My instructions were
to proceed to Corinth, Mississippi, by way of
Salem and Ruckerville; capture any force
that might be there, then proceed south,
destroying the Mobile and Ohio Railroad to
Tupelo, Okolona, and as far as possible to-
ward Macon and Columbus, with portion
of my force; thence to Grenada, and back to
Memphis. On the Cd of June | arrived at
Lafayette, assumed command of the troops,
and at once proceeded on that service, but
owing to heavy rains and bad roads leading
through low, wooded country, and to the
fact that my command was necessarily en-
numbered with some 200 wagons, our progress
was slow, notwithstanding every exertion
was made by me to expedite the march.
We were compelled to carry our supplies, as
the country to be traversed was totally des-
titute of supplies for either man or beast.
For distance of some 75 or 100 miles Il
cannot speak definitely as to the exact dis
tance at this late date) our line of march lay
along a narrow and almost impracticable
road.
Then, too, was ordered to strike a point
200 miles distant, which could only be
reached by long and tedious march, and at
which, the enemy having the interior line
and railway communication, could concen-
trate force superior TO mine in few hours.
The inhabitants of the country through
which we passed were, of course, all hostile
men, women, and children-so that it was
utterly impossible to CLEAN any reliable in
formation from them regarding the enemy
or his movements; whilst, On the other hand,
every hamlet furnished its ready and swift
messenger to the enemy with news Of our
approach, and kept him thoroughly posted
as to our movements from the moment my
command took up it's line of march. On the
tenth day out the enemy was encountered at
Brice's cross roads, about twenty three miles
from Ripley and (some) six miles from Gun
town.
At Ripley three days before the battle) it
became a serious question in my mind as to
whether or not. should proceed further
The rain still fell in torrents-the artillery
and wagons were literally mired down, and
the starved and exhausted animals could
with difficulty drag them along Under
these circumstances l called together my
division commanders and placed before them
mr. views of our situation. AT this inter-
view one brigade commander Col. Hoge, Of
the One Hundred aud Thirteenth Illinois, J
and two members of my staff were incident
ally present also. / called attention to the
great delay we had undergone on account of
the condition Of the roads and the exhausted
condition Of our animals-the great proba-
bility that the enemy would avail himself Of
the time thus afforded to concentrate an over
whelming force against us, and the utter
hOpelessness Of saving our train or artillery
in case of defeat, On account of the narrow
ness and general bad condition of the roads,
and the impossibility of procuring supplies of
forage for the animals. All agreed with me in
the probable consequences of defeat. Some
thought our only safety lay in retracing our
steps and abandoning the expedition. 1t
was urged, however, and with some propri-
ETY., too, that inasmuch as / had abandoned
similar expedition only few weeks before,
and given as my reason for so doing "the
utter and entire destitution of the country. -
and that, in the face of this, we were again
sent through the same country, it would be
ruinous on all sides to return without meet
ing the enemy. Moreover, from all the in
formation General Washbume Commanding
the district had acquired, there could be no
considerable force in our front, and all nv
information led me to the same conclusion.
To be sure, my information was exceedingly
meagre and unsatisfactory; and, had re-
turned, would have been wholly unable to
present any facts to justify my course or to
show why the expedition might not have
been successfully carried forward. All
could have presented would have been my
conjectures as to what the enemy would
naturally do under the circumstances, and
these would have availed but little against