The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1882-10-01

none which was success, and whenever his advice
was rejected the outcome proved that his plan would
have met with every condition Of success.
After they had entered Atlanta, Thomas, as he
afterwards told Gen. W. r. Smith, went to Sherman
and said; "Now you have no further use for me-
let me take my little command and 20 eastward 10
the sea- sherman said he would consult Grant
and Thomas heard nothing moro Of 1t tl he was or
dercd 10 face Hoods army-the only effective organi.
zation In the southweSt-whilo sherman took his
Army to encounter the Georgia militia under Cobb
The difference between Sherman's plan and Thomas 8
for march to tho soa was the radically important
one that sherman took away the pick Of all tho
armies, including rhomas's, to do what Thomas had
offered TO undertake with the Army Of the Cumber-
land alone, and left an entirely inadequate force TO
oppose Hood. To collect force enough to defeat Hood
II was necessary that aconccntraton should be effect
ed Of widely scattered forces; that A. j. smith $
command should bc brought from Missouri, and that
Kirby Smith should not effect junction with Hood
Doubtless q jackson or Forrest " command ot the
Confederate Trans. Mississippi army would have
found means to cross the great river aud Join Hood
The lattcr's strategy not approved by johnston
aud we know that he paid little attention to tile
Views Of Bcaurcgard, who was his nominal superior
That he did not strike effective blow before 1t was
possible Tor Thomas to concentrate and prepare FOR II
Is no proof that 1t was not possible to strike one
How many chances the situation In all It's combina-
mans withdrawal ot the bulk Of the effective forces
including almost all the cavalry horses and ranspor-
tation, certainly gave Hood opening such Us none
OF Ills predecessors In command ever had, with the
single modifying fact that he was now confronted by
George II. Thomas.
The most Interesting part OF Gen. Thomis's career
Is the Nashville campaign, for II gave him a chance
10 demonstrate his superior capacity to organize
armies, To plan campaigns, and to fight battles The
three combined armies under Sherman had been un-
able to win decisive victory over the Confederate
Army OF the Tennessee. Now Hood had moved
westward, AMI 1t was known that Kirby Smith had
been ordered to iOln him. Yet Gen. Sherman coolly
told Thomas that he would only need movable col
umn OF twenty five thousand men to oppose Hood
Invasion Of Tennessee. Absolute disregard of gen.
Thomas's feelings and of the propretes of military
command was shown by taking away his old Four
teenth Corps, containing the original brigade and
division he hal first commanded and disciplined ana
giving him Instead the Twenty third Corps This
also raised an unpleasant question Of rank since Cen
Stanley was Gen. SChohcids senior as major general
The last dispatches from Shcrmnn to Thomas fun OF
admonlton, advice, aud interference, showed that
he expected Hood to follow him soon as he found
he WAS marching Into Georgia, As often happened
with sherman, his theory was wrong.
Gen. Thomas's difficulties IN the earlier stages OF
the campaign were Increased by the fact that the
terms of service of many Of his regiments were OK
pirng, while others lad been North to vote so
that Al the very ,i,nr ,yb., ,:r,n, am, shar,,, -
rompl,Innr of hIs Iu,,tivitv hIs ,r,rv 900 rr,,,
Jrss rather Than cre,,,r , t,c, ,h,,,, ,,s, ,,,,,s
and their U,Ie,u b,y, ,o,vont,,,i, i,,r,,,1 s,
field bv hIs rs,,,yauc, a, sr,,,, i,,m ,r, hi, ,,,,
i,s,csi,,ons ,t Fr,ntt,n ,,y,ro n,r,,,,,r ,aa,.,,
1,s,s,or ar th. sr,o,,,, h,,,i, -, ,,,,,,u I
nb,tic,uv +, so,liars, h,,tio ,,o h,,a -, s,,,., g.,
spo,l .1c,,, mat !, ,,,,h, ,,o, d, h,, ,,, -,
A, All ,s /, w,s 1Ir.c,,, cn,,r,,y q, ,rh,, ,,,,'.
and o,,,,J,,b,v t,,,,n,on, d, n,y , ,, =, A.,
army instructed to rrrf,rm , ,.a,t,, d,G,,,, IL,
tenslvo tule drawn Into serious action before his
COnCcntt ration was completed and hIg cavalry mnuut
cd Gan Thom,a yv,a mn. of ,,,cs,, n,,,,,,s ,,
...,, -, ., 80, VIM
'o''"S ieJeolo" I'ie "'tr'.oh strategy ne ue-
neNed IN delivering battle only when fruitful vie
torIs were to he expected He had mo ida, of n,hiiur
, d.risIya h,t,la ,y,,h,,, ,,y,,,, a., ,,,,,,,,,, 80.
A., ~ '. W '"'H'o "." 'o'P
tended analysis OF the Nashville campaign. 1t isa
noble example for the student of war IJe viii uud
WI" III u ten 'ho'S eNhipits all the powers of the
greatest gehera'sir' ASan org'nhcr In capacity to
penetrate MS oplohrhtS pans aui I" provide for all
the varying possibilities "t most uncertain game, he
st"nus without peer among the Northern generals,
win the possible exception ot sheridan. Abcreal lie
h' ''t rare dscehdalry ot Stl', the result OF con-
"cons WISDOM that refuses I" ho hurried ont Of sound
course "i o'S ny any an"n, "l unrcasoning clhmor.
or through any deietencc to that improper exercise of
authority by which those higher In rank often
Ih, ItI1I al