Centre Democrat. [volume] (Bellefonte, Pa.) 1848-1989, 1882-09-07
Gen. Mcclellan on the Egyptian War.

In the September Century, Gen.
George b. Mcclellan writing on "The
War in Egypt" criticises as follows
the war measures of the English
The first mutiny of Arab, his first
insolence to his master, should have
been promptly and decisively rebuked,
even had it been necessary to land a
force for the purpose. If the mutual
jealousy of France and England pre-
vented their nipping this difficulty in
the bud by combined action, it would
have been better for England had she
boldly taken the matter in hand, and
acted promptly on her own account,
taking the ground that her Indian in
terests and the free use of the Suez
canal rendered such a course impera
tive. But temporizing policy pre-
vailed, and, closing her eyes against
the future, England allowed matters
to drift on from bad to worse, now and
again uttering futile protests, but do
ing nothing to guard against the in.
evitable result. At length an English
fleet was gathered in the harbor of
Alexandria, and an ultimatum sent to
the Egyptian authorities, only to be
contemptuously disregarded. But, un-
like the practice of England in former
times, it was not promptly followed by
q resort to the ultima ratio regltpl, and
her ignorant and puny foe not unna-
turally concluded that it never would
be. Then came a bloody massacre in
the streets of Alexandra, the history
of which we do not fully know as yet
either how it was commenced or who
suffered most from it. Statements
have been published that it was COM
menced by Europeans. But the pro-
liabilities are that the riot was melted
by natives actuated by fanaticism and
love of plunder-motives not always
entirely distinct.
Here again was an occasion for
prompt action but it was allowed to
pass, and Arab continued fortifying
the harbor. Certainly, it was now
clear that Arab meant to fight, the
only question being the extent to
which his men would stand by him.
By this time the English must have
determined to demand the surrender
of the forts, and, in case of refusal, to
open fire. Their guns could destroy
the forts and burn the town-one
very likely to follow from the other.
If the garrison retired-as would no
doubt be the case when the forts were
silenced-it was certain that the spirit
displayed during the recent massacre
would lead to further scenes of mur.
der, plunder, and destruction, which
the guns of the fleet could prevent
only by the destruction of the very
objects it was desirable to save. 1t
was very clear, then, that the attack
by the fleet once being determined
upon, common sense demanded that
there should be present and available
when it commenced a sufficient body
of troops to be landed as soon as the
forts were silenced, to protect the city
and Immediately follow up the retreat
ing garrison, so as to destroy the pres
tige of Arab, and prevent the rising
from becoming n general. national. or
religious movement.
The dilemma is unpleasant for any
admirer of England and her institu
tions either she is unable-through
defective organization, mal-adminis-
tration, lack of energy, or too full oe-
cupat ion of her resources nearer home
either, we say, she is unable to col
lect upon reasonable notice an expedi-
tionary force of ten or fifteen thou
sand men, or her government lacked
the wisdom to anticipate the inevita-
BILE necessity for such force at
given time, and proved their incom-
potency to direct military expeditions
abroad. The excuse that the exigen-
cies of diplomacy tied their hands is
not good one, for in this instance
there was at stake whatever of impor-
tance the Suez canal and peace in
Egypt may have for England, and it
was one of those cases where a strong
nation is fully justified in running
risks and incurring responsibility on
the side of safety for its most vital
interests.