The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1882-10-15
GEORGE II. THOMAS.
cen. Cox ON FRANKLIN, Nashville. and
the March 10 the sen.


the March TO the sen,
Gen. Cox is one of those writer's who.
while enjoying exceptionally good opportunities, vet
because Of inability to rid themselves o1 Cpnlops
founded upon partial Information, and perhaps stIl
more from incnpacity to see clearly the relative i'm
pottance with others Of operations iuwhich their own
commands were engaged, are incapable OF producing
trustworthy histories. Onlccrs who served In the
campaigns Of which Gen. Cox has written have re.
marked that he gives an altogether dispropottIonate
amount Of his limited space to the operations NJ the
Army " the Ohio, atsury so.cicd siucc 1t consisted
ofonly two divisions, and especially to that division oi
1t which was commanded by den, j.D. Cox. lie was
thoroughly good soldier hut II Is ono " the most
common ot ctrors Tor person TO imagine the opera.
tlons with which Ne was Immediately concerned to
have constituted q far greater and moro important
share than they really dd Of the campaign or battle
of which they formed part. None ot the writer's I'm
this series have exhibited this lack of historical per.
spcctlvc to such q painful degree as h,s ton. Cox,
llo seems quite Incapable or believing that his i'm
mediate commander, Schone1, can have committed
the grave faults which Gcn. Oplyckc and Mr. Van
Horne to have proved against him. Aud In en-.
dcivotng to make his account clcir Schonell
aud himself, he finds II necessary to dis
tort the facts aud lay bllnc upon Thomas
and others. In the case of the pcrIlous affair
At spring Inn, Gen. James II. Wilson, who com.
manded the cavalry, Is selected the sclpcgoat and
Gen. Cox distinctly ccnsurcg him for retrcatlng on
tho direct road toward Franklin Instead OF failing
back upon the infantry assembling at Spring mn
The truth Is that his management Of his part ut the
retreat from Columbia tU franklin was icsolutc and
skillful. lie gave both SChOncd and Thomas prompt
notice that Hood had forced crossing ot Duck River
and Informed Suhoncl that he ought to he at Spring
nm Vt 10 o'clock the nest morning. Schcneld dld not
move with ntomptncss, but wasted time 10y sending
an infantry reconnaissance up tho river to verify the
news he had received from Wilson. The latter was
greatly oeer.matchel, rs Forests cavalry force at
this time was probably double his Ills line OF re-
treat was upon the Lewsburg turnpike to Franklin,
SChOheld's upun the Columbia turnpike tn the same
point. 1.-The hid turned westward toward Spring llll
where Schonel Whole force should have been cuncen.,
trated, he would have entirely uncovered Franklin,
which could have then been occupied by Forrest, zap
turing the rrseryearllery aud traus lud entirely cut
thug of the rcttel OF SchoHcll's army, Tho course
which Gen. Cox blames Wilson for not taking would
have been that ot all possible ones tho most cctt,lu
tuIuyitc irropiriblo disaster
Gen. Cox oNcitcs astouislment by repeating the dis
pnragipg statement that Thomas shrlnk ftom respor
slbuiy, lie says:
Ills tThomassl real aud unaffected aversion to
taking the chief responsibility uf command hal kept
regular and volunteer armies would have made him
the head OF a separate army In the ield.
This damniug with faint prasols absolutely untrue,
and 1t ls astonishing that gen. Cox should not have
known its falSty Thomas had refused to be super
seeded by Mitchell In command Of movement into
East Tennessee which lie had conceived. lie had
protested against serving unlcr liosecruus, his In.
fcrior In rank hut aCquicsced when informed that
Rosecraus WAS his seuior stanton having coOlly an-
tedated RoseCrans's commission onee the eNigency.
Gen. Thomas was always ready with plan Of cam
"a hltIlp his ,IppTlDTg missed tho
mark 10y not accepting his wise suggestions IIc
dill however, decidedly object to the appearance
Of Intriguing for advancement By superseding his
seniors in rank As Mr.. Van Horne says this was
kind OF deicacy which sherman and Grant were
simply Incapable of comprehcnding.
Mr.. Samuel H. Reed, of the Cincinnati GdzeHe, who
has made close study OF the campaigns IN the West,
In the course OF y searching review Of Gen. CON's
work, says:
Cox writes expert In military history, aud
In the art or science of war, but he makes strange
Inversion of all military principles aud maXms when
applied to operations in this country. In hls Atlanta
he changed cuds with all military principles tu show
that sherman with double the force could not attack
JOustnn at Dalron on his weak side On the east hc
cause this would uncover his base Johnston take
hoocnsve; aud that he cod not adopt den. .Ihomass
plan and let him Ivy the concealed way through
snake Creek Gap upon JohnslOn railroad IN his rear
because he needed to keep the greater part Of army
to defend his base. Thus does his theory cOnlno Scr
man to defensive tactics IN an offensive campaign,
starting with double tie force. lie shows
all through the campaign that Sherman stuck To these
defensive tactics, keeping back his main army 10 de.
fcnd hts base always facing jOhnson's intrench-
ments where he was best prepared; always trvin: to
encompass them wasting his soldiers in continual in
trenchug work in siege approaches aud in the
slant bushwaCking fire: stretching ont toward John.
son's communications by thin wingS only, as If nvit-
iug him to fan back: thus exposing his army IN the
most risky way to sortes from the encmy's fortified
centre; always leaving to Johnston Inception whether
to fight or not and, with an army of extraordinary
mobility, confidence, aud tghting qualities, never
getting II upon its legs To move boldly forward aud
seize Johnston communications, aud force a fight.
Gen Cox states, as If unconscious NJ the effect, that
this tactics left to Johnston TO choose whether to give
battle or not. Bat by this the SUPERIOR army cOnld
never get battle. Narrating all this with 50 much
of detail of movements of divisions andbrIgados-par-
cularly of the Twenty third COrpsas 10 confuse tho
Idea OF tho general tactics and changing the objective
to Mt the event, from the destruction oC Jehustun's
army to the pushing of 1t back upon Atlanta, aud
presently tu suit another event drUppiu, ont Atlanta
from the objective, the author mentions several times
that these great lessons for the student ot the art
of They must be. for they are different from
anything that has ever been Taught or told Of the tac-
ties OF offensive warfare.
Military principles could have fpretoh the event
from the tactics at the begluning-that Sherman'S
difficulties would increase by the lenShcnIng Of his
line of supplies, aud the reduction OF his force, while
JOhnstOn'S would decInis. by his falling back upon
rciufOrCcmcnts: and that the time when he would
take the offensive against Shcrman'S defensive hy
moving upon his rear was at his own option. Iiut
when Sherman had no alternative but to march back
and thus publish to the world his failure to escape
from this by marching out of the theatre Of war. the
prnciples 10 make all this modeloi generalship, was
equal to the necessity OF making this hight from his
own failure, and this leaving To another the dinculty
which had been too great Tor him, white taking oil
the principal forces, most astonishing feat OF mill
nry genius. But all things work TO
the greatness Of the man TO whom Gen.
Cox Is PARTISAN aud all things reflect Un
the capacity of the others. He has very compre-
hensiye view of the war In the East to make Shor-
man's march out of the theatre OF the war a great
stroke OF strategy to end the war; but 1t Is all dis
posed of by sherlnan's plea 10 Grant that to march
back to fight Hood was TO give up all lie had TAKEN
and confess his campaign Il failure.
But to march out Of the war was TO give II up stiil
more Aud Gen. CON's theory Of great cooperation
with Grant-whO already had hve times Lee's force
against Lee, has queer commentary In the state
ment that when Sherman started he lid not know
whether he would come out ut Savannah, Pensacola,
Mobile, or some other place. The author passes by
lightly the circumstance that the march iO the sea
had avoid all the important places and that all of
this theatrical march, which was to show the very
lmpO tant fact that the Confed cracy she'll and
tho army could 20 anywhere, did nothing for
many thousands Of prisoners starving In Southern
pens OF course ia fails to observe the fact that this
theatrical march had no influence In ending the war.
When tue author comes to the Nashville campaign
Of Gen: rhomas his peculiar qualities OF greatness In
little things, and tleness In great things, and of
partial narrative, arc applied 10 his parislnshlp for
Gen. schOhed, and to belittllng ten. Thomas.
schoneld's discretionary authority In carrying out
Thomas purpose to detain rood on the line OF Duck
River, II possible, and II not there no the Ilarpeth
and 10 avail Of the defensive facilities the c0uutry
to retard Hood as much rs he cOud SchOned'S In.
ability In this, which allowed Hood to get In his rear
divided his army that 1t exposed 10 dGstTnG.
tOn, and converted that which might he a deliberate
retirement through defcnslbls country into hight
Of lorc"l marches, which tagged his troops, mar
iowy escaped cutting nh at spring NM forced him
10 night at Franklin, under dangerous conditions To-
get OIL his tralns, and then continued the forced
march to Nashville Is told In such way rs Ia convey
that u WAS a necessity of Thomas orders.
He casts blame Gen. Wilson, Of the cavalry for
falling back om Duck River before Hood advance
III such way rs to leave SchOelds right IN the rr
treat unprotected. Hut Wilson had Informed Scho-
nrd of Forrest crossing On the 2sll and at 4.
~ tl ths -blh lbllHtu g'Guncll
and making toward spring I'M, and nad advised
Scholeld Ia be there by 10 a, NJ. Thomas h,d ll,n
sent him order at $3.50 A, NJ, Ia fan back. If
SchOneld had moved, his right would have been an
right Wilson could not Withstand Forrest cavalry
and Hood whole army. And SClOled, Instead Of
moving, sent an Infantry reconnaissance, with
woods division to support It, up the river 10 Hoods
crossing, 10 verify Wilson's Information, Gen
Wilson viii probably he heard from on this point.
Gen, CON'H paTliaty cannot cover up the fact that
SGhUheld's conduct at Franklin was strange. lie
took post personally the south side Of tie river
IMn Inllna IInm lLn hAIIln. lnll