Arizona weekly citizen., 1882-01-29

g the trial of Guiteau was over, haviD
 lasted just seven days less than the az 9 ony of Garfield.
 9 Upon being removed to the van an an 5 gry hiss broke out "No, no, gentlemen, } cried Deputy Marshal Williams, hold ing up his hand in approximation, "NC [ more of that:l ies I'll over now" Thi: , checked the crowd, though murmur'
 still followed their progress to tho
 van. As Guiteau slunk into it, there
 was a yell from the crowd and the mel
 and boys run along after the van
 screaming and hooting, "Hang himl
 "Hang him." One person in tone
 that must have rung in the ears of tht
 wretched man inside, cried, President
 Garfield's death is avenged"
 JUDGE cox's CHARGE
 At 3.I5 Judge Cox began to deliver
 his charge to the jury.
 He commenced by saying the con
 stitution provides that in all criminal
 prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
 right of speedy and public tual by an
 impartial jury ID the State or District
 where the crime shall be committed; that
 he shall be informed of the cause and
 nature of the accusation against him; that he shall be confronted with witnesses against him; that he shall have compul- sory process to obtain witnesses in his | favor and that he shallhave the assistance of counsel in his defense. These pro- visions are intended for protecting the innocent from injustice and oppres- sion, and il VAS only by these faithful observances that guilt or innocence could be fairly asceriained. Every accused person was presumed 10 be innocent ua- ! til the accusation was proved. With
 what difficulty and trouble the law had been administered in the present case the jurors have been daily witnesses. It was however consolation 10 think that not one Of those sacred guarantees of the l constitution had been violated Tn the person of accused. Before proceeding any further he wished to notice an incident which had taken place pending the recent argument. The --.sOner mad frequently taken c-lasion to proclaim public -oF;aion, as evident by the press ' .-l ,-r,rvasrorI.-ra ,,.,e 1,, he (,
 vor These declarations could not be prevented except by the process of gag ging the prisoner. Any suggestion that tine jury could be influenced by such lawless clattering of the prisoner would have seemed to him absurd, and he should have felt he was insulting the in telligence of the jury if he had warned them not to regard it. Counsel for pros ecution had felt it a necessity, however, in lis final argument, to interpose con tfadiction to such statements, and ex- captions had been taken on the part of accused to the form in which that effort was made for the purpose of purging the record of any objectionable matter. He should simply say fat anything which had been said on either side in reference to public excitement or to newspaper opinion was not to be regard ed by the jury to establish murder. It had to be proven, first, that death was caused by the act of accused; and fur ther was it caused with malice afore- thought That did not mean, however, that the government had to prove any i'll will or hatred on the part of accused toward deceased. Whenever homicide was shown to have been committed without lawful authority and with delib- crate intent it was sufficiently proven to have been done with malice afore- thought and malice was not disproved by showing that accused had no person. al ill-will toward deceased, and that he killed him from other motives, the jury would have to say that defendant was guilty of murder or was innocent. In order to constitute the crime of murder the assassin must have been of reasona- ply sane mind. In technical terms, he must be "of sound mind, memory and discretion Any irresponsibly insane man could not commit murder. If he was laboring under disease of the mental faculties to such an extent that he did not know what he was doing, or know it was wrong, then he was want ing m that sound mind, memory, and discretion. That was part of the definition of murder. Every defen- dant was presumed innocent until the accusation against hum was established by proof. Notwithstanding this pre- sumption of innocence, it was equally true that defendant was presumed to be sane and to have been so at the time the crime was committed. The burden of proof as to insanity was on the defense. The jury was not to infer that the pris- oner was insane because he committed an enormous crime. The only safe rule was for the jury to direct its attention to one test of criminal responsibility, namely: Whether the prisoner possess ed a mental capacity at the time the act was committed to know that it was wrong, or whether he was deprived of that capacity by mental disease. There was one important distinction which the jury must not lose sight of and they must decide how far it was applicable to this case; that was distinction be- tween mental and moral obliquity; be- tween mental incapacity to distinguish between right and wrong, and a moral insensibility to that distinction" And now, gentlemen. to sum up all have said to you. IT you find from the whole evidence that at the time of the commission of the homicide that the prisoner was laboring un- der such defects of his reason, that he l was incapable of understanding what he | was doing. or, seeing that it was a wrong thing 10 do, as, for example, fl he 1 were under an insane delusion that the | Almighty had commanded him to do the | act, then he was not in a responsible | condition of mind but was an object of | and shoHld be now acquit- ted. If, on the other hand, you find he | was undern insane delusion, but had | possession of his faculties and had the | power to know that his act was wrong, | and if, of his own free will, he deiber- | ately conceived the idea and executed a i then whether his motives | were personal vindictiveness, political