New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-10-12

of the English press under tie lehuersnip Oh
The Spectator has advocated n settlement OF the
Suez question on the lines defined by Dir. Blaine
in the Panama negotiations, and that the
strongest argument against this solution is Mr..
Motley's plea that Lord Granville after re-
pudiatng that doctrine In his controversy with
Mr. Blaine cannot now adopt 1t rs a principle of
action. The diplomatic correspondence of last
year does not afford precedent, of which the
British Ministry can avail themselves IN dspos-
ing OF the Suez question. Lord Granvilles
plan would be utterly impractlcable. If Alr.
Banes were adopted the British Foreign
Office would be entanglcd in the meshos of its
own logic and compelled to recede from its
position in regard to the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty.
The inherent probabilities of the case
imply inaction. The British Ministry, con-
sidcring themselves pledged against the per-
mauent military occupation of Egypt, and find
ing international action respecting neutraliza-
ton inconvenient, Will not do anything nor
allow anything TO be done. They have every
reason to be satisfied with the present cOndi-
tons. They have been able to II axe the Suez
Canal and its banks base OF military opera
tons without violating any principle OF inter
national law. Any system of naturalization
which may be sanctioned by the Powers
will impose restraints upon the nation that
has conquered Egypt. Consequently, inter-
national action on the subject is very unlikely.
Mr.. Morley's reasoning on this point will be
tactly accepted England does not need to
@occupy the banks c. the canal to control the
"capa As the frat naval Power she can seize
4. nsf
CONSTITUTES her the real but informal guardian
u of the freedom of the canal. The Power that Is
"Sovereign of the Seas is necessarily by her
"poStion the custodian of the canal"
This reminds us very forcibiy of passage in
Mr. Blaiues letter to Lord Granvillc-a state pa
per only indilerently appreciated and under
stoo when first published, but destined to be-
come historical. The Secretary contended that
the operation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
practically conceded to Great Britain the control
Of any canal which might be constructed i'll the
isthmus, as that country was required by Its
inSuar position and colonial possessions to
maintain naval establishment with which the
United States could not compete. AS our
Government had bound itself not to fight
in the isthmus nor to fortify the mouths
of any waterway that might be con-
structed, the Secretary argued that if any
struggle for the control Of the Canal were to
arise England would have an advantage at
the outset which would prove decisive. The
"Clayton- Bulwer Treaty." he added, "cOm-
"mands this Government not to use single
"regment of troops to protect its interests in
"connecton with the interoceanic canal, but
"to surrender the transit to the guardianship
"and control of the British ma Wy" To that
navy which, as Mr.. Morley says constitutes
England "the real but informal guardian of
the freedom of the Suez Canal" If, therefore,
the supremacy of that navy be SO marked that
it is unnecessary for England to occupy the
banks OF the Suez Canal, Mr. Blaine was not
far out of the way when he asserted that by
the Clayton Bulwer Treaty the Panama Canal
would be surrendered, if not III form, yet in
effect, to the control of Great Britain" Or,
to repeat Mr.. Morley's phrase. the Sovereign
/" of the Seas is necessarily by her position the
custodian of the canal" Mr.. Blaine sagacity
in the Panama correspondence has been already
indicated by the English themselves.