The Evening critic., 1882-01-06
GUiTEAu's PRAYERS,
which viii be Submitted 90 tn
Court by Wis Counsel.

defense for instructions to bo given by the
Court to the Jury.
First-The legal test off responsibility,
when insanity is set up as a defense for al
legged crime, is not merely whether the ac-
cused knew at the time what he was doing,
ands that the act was contrary to law, for
an irresponsible insane person may know
those things, but was the act done as the
result Of an insane deusion or was it cont
mitted under an influence or power which
the accused could not resist, by reason of
his unsoundness of mind?
Second-Although the accused may have
known what he was doing, and that what
he was doing was contrary to the law of
the land, yet if, when he performed the
act, he really believed that lie was thereby
producing public benefit, and was actu-
ated by an insane delusion that he was
carrying out an inspiration of divine origin
or approval, and would not have done tho
act but for such insane delusion, then the
accused is not guilty of the crime charged
against him, and the jury should find him
mot guilty by reason of insanity"
Third-Insanity constitutes a defense If,
by reason of 1t, the accused at the tme OF
committing the act charged, did not know
what he was doing, or If he did not know
that what he was doing was contrary to
law, or if the act would not have been done
by him but for reason of the insanity.
Fourth-The only evidence in the pres
ent case tending to show an irresistible i'm
pulse to commit the homicide, or that the
accused acted under the pressure Of an in
sane delusion in doing that act, is found in
the conduct and words of the accused as
detailed in evidence. The question whether
the free agency of the accused was destroyed
by a conviction on his part that the death
of the President was required for the good
of the American people, and that he was
divinely inspired to remove him by death,
is one of fact to be determined by the jury
from all the evidence in the case, aud such
evidence includes the acts as well as the
words of the accused. But such convic-
ton, if IL really existed, could not afford
any excuse when the party knew what he
was doing, and that it was contrary to
law, unless it was the product Of an insane
| delusion and he was impelled to do the
| act by such delusion. Such delusion may
| exist as to q divine requirement, or as to
an inspiration from God. No mere delusion,
unless it be the product of an unsound
mind, nor errorsof Judgment, nor even the
fixed belief that what is prohibited by the
law is commanded or approved by Divine
authority, can exempt the accused from
| responsibility for breaking the law, if at
| the time he knew what he was doing and
| that it was contrary to law and he was not
| acting under an insane delusion. To have
| such effect the committing of the act
charged must have been the result of an
insane delusion of such force as to deprive
| the accused of the degree of reason neces-
sary to distinguish between right and
wrong in respect of the act, as sane
| people generally judge of such conduct.
| The delusion must have been such that, at
the time of committing the act. he either
did not know what he was doing, or, if he
did, he must have acted under controll-
ing conviction that the act was right
Although he may have known that the act
was contrary to the law of the land, yet, if
he did it under the insane delusion that it
was commanded to be done by God, such
knowledge on his part would not make him
| liable to punishment.
Fifth-Whether insanity exists, or has
existed at any time, with the prisoner, and
the degree of insanity, if any existed or
has existed, are questions of fact to be
determined entirely by the jury from the
evidence.
Sixth-If tho jury find from the evi-
dence that the prisoner was of unsound
mind at the time of the doing of the act
charged against him as criminal in this
case, then it is also the duty of the jury to
find whether said act was the result of such
unsoundness of mind of the prisoner.
Seventh-The punishments of the law
are intended for rational persons, and no
| OGt DuU " peT5Ou CAN Iue
crime of murder.
Eighth-Insanity may be intcrposed as
a legal defense in any prosecution for an
otherwise criminal act and if such defense
be established by the evidence it takes away
the criminality and the act ceases to be a
crime in contemplation of law.
Ninth-If the jury have a reasonable
doubt as to the sanity of the accused, at the
time of committing the act charged against
| l.; -l,o Ia. l.
benefit of that doubt and should find him
mot guilty by reason of insanity"
Tenth-The jury are the sole judges of
the credibility Of witnesses, and have a
right to take into account, in weighing the
evidence, any apparent feeling or interest
manifested by witnesses on the stand, their
manner of testifying, their compensation OIL
want of compensation. and any other Cir
cumstances connected with their testimony
which the jury may think would influence
them.
Eleventh-If the jury believe from the
evidence that the prosecution have will.
fully suppressed evidence of the mental
condition of the accused during two weeks
next following the shooting of President
Garfield, which it was in their power to
have produced on the trial, the jury have
a right to take that fact into considera.
tion as raising a presumption that such
evidence, ii produced, would have been un,
favorable for the prosecution.
Twelfth-If the jury shall believe from
the evidence that the prisoner was of sound
mind or not SO insane as to be irresponsible
for the act at the time of shooting at the
President, on the I'd day of July, 1881, and
that he then unlawfully and willfully, but
without malice in fact, in the District o
Columbia, shot at and thereby injured tn,
President, Of which shooting and injury
the person so injured subsequently died il
the State of New Jersey, and within tn,
United States, then the prisoner is guiltl
of the crime Of manslaughter and the iur!
should 30 find.
Thirteentl-The jury are instructed t,
find a separate verdict upon each count il
the indictment, and inasmueh as il /
charged in the first, second, fourth, lftl
seventh and eighth counts of the indict
meut in this case, that the death of tn
President took place in the county Of Wash
ingtOn, in the said District of Columbia
and there is no evidence of such fact there
fore the jury are directed to find the ac
oused not guilty upon each Of said counts
separately.
ourteenth-Inasmuch as the evidence |
uncontradieted in this case, that the woun'
was inflicted upon the President by tn
accused on second day of July, A. ID, 1881
in the county Of Washington, District o
Columbia and that the President subse
quently and in the month of September
ID. 1851, died of such wound in the State o