Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1882-01-18
The Law.

In his decision upon the law points sub
mitted in the Guiteau case, Judge Cox
adopts and announces the very reasonable
doctrine that jurisdiction is complete where
the fatal wound has been inflicted, and that
therefore the place of death is immaterial.
With respect to the legal test Of responsible
ity, the following is the courts rule:
The legal test OF responsibility where insanity
is set up as defence for alleged crime Is whether
the accused at the time of committing the act
charged knew the difference between right and
wrong In respect OF such act. Hence, In the pres
ent case II the jury find that the accused com
mltted the act charged in the indictment, and Mt
the time of the commission OF his crime knew
what he was doing, and that what he was doing
was contrary to the law Of the land, he is respon-
sibe, unless in consequence OF insane mental de-
lusions or other forms OF mental disorder he was
aboring under such defect Of reason as to be inca
pable of understanding the obligation OF the law
Of the land and the duty and necessity OF obedi-
ence to 1t, and Of understanding that his act was
wrong because 1t was in violation OF the law.
Upon the more specific questions raised
by the prayers of counsel, Judge Cox en-
bodies in the following rule all that he
thinks is correct which is not covered by
the foregoing rule
have prepared instruction No. 2, which en-
bodies all that think is correct In the remaining
instructions asked for by the government and in
the first four instructions asked for by the de-
fence. 1t is as follows II the jury find that
the defendant committed the act charged, and at
the time thereof knew what he was doing and
that what he was doing was contrary to the laws
of the land, 1t constitutes no excuse even IL II IL
true, that when he committed the act he really
believed that he was producnga great public ben
eft, and that the death Of the president was re-
quired for the good Of the American people; nor
would such excuse be afforded by the TACT that IN
the commission OF the act he was controlled by a
depraved moral sense, whether innate or acquired,
or by evil passions or indifference to moral obi-
cations; and, even II the Jury find that the de-
PENDANT, as result OF his own reasoning and re-
Election, arrived at the determination to kill the
president, and further result OF his own reas-
oning and reflection believed that his said purpose
was approved, or suggested. or inspired by the
Deity, such belief would afford no excuse. But
it would be different and he would not be re-
sponsible criminally, II the act was done under
the influence, and as the product, OF an insane
mental delusion that the Deity had commanded
him to do the act which had taken possession OF
his mind, not as result of his own reflections,
but independently OF his own will and reason, and
with such force as to deprive him OF the degree OF
reason necessary to distinguish between right and
wrong as to the particular act. In such case, even
If he knew that the act was violation OF the law
OF the land he would not be responsible II his rea
son was perverted by the insanity that he was
incapable OF understanding the obligation OF the
law OF the land, and that the act was wrong under
the obligation OF that law and wrong in itself.
Judge Cox explains that he has added
the words, "wrong in ITSELF" because he
would be unwilling to pronounce a person
irresponsible who might believe, insanely,
that the law provides no punishment for
murder, and who might be perfectly aware
of the moral enormity of the crime. In the
case of person driven by an irresponsible
impulse to do an act which he knows to be
wrong, the judge declines to lay down any
rule because there is no such case before the
court. Guiteau has always insisted that
the act was right, and there is no evidence
except his own declarations that his free
agency was destroyed. In the question, on
whom rests the burden of proof where in
sanity is the defence, the court declined to
instruct the jury to acquit if they feel a
reasonable doubt about any one fact in the
issue, but expressed his purpose to instruct
them as to the nature of the crime and as
to all the elements composing it, including
that of responsibility.
The test of responsibility laid down by
Judge Cox does not vary materially from
that set up by the prosecution. 1t fixes
responsibility where there is capacity to
distinguish between right and wrong, and
the destruction of that capacity by mental
disease constitutes responsibility. The
decision of the judge on all important
points seems to bear with irresistible force
against the prisoner, and if coming events
cast their shadows BEFORE" the tightening
of the hangmans moose around the blasphe-
nous murderer's neck seems an assured
event.