New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-08-09
POLICY ANn M0R1LG

ment The high praise bestowed upon IL by
our regular London correspondent is fully Justl'
fed by the passages which have been laid be"
fore our readers 1t was a supreme Intellect
nal effort. and an unanswerable defence OF the
Premier's Egyptian policy on the highest
grounds of international and moral law. Two
important distinctions must, however be borne
III mind.
First, a sharp discrimination must DC maze
between the Prcmier's policy and the Anglo
French policy for which his predecessor was
RESPONSIBLE Lord Beaconsheld, percelVihg
that the French Government was taking al at
tive interest in Egyptian affairs ana support
ing the claims of the bondholders, assisted III inc
deposition of Islnail and i'll the establishment Oh
the Joint Financial Control. Vow we thihk IL
requires very little argument to prove that u"S
was "a mischievous and embarrassing alliance
so far as England was concerned, ana, more
over. that on moral grounds vt was lhdeleh-
sil,e Lord Beaconsfeld favored the partner
shin because he was afraid the hhahc"ii
agents of the French Government woulu ac-
ouire undue influence III CAIRO. but riNaily
was directly promoted by the Joint Control
and when "a necessity arose Tor tnter'ehtioh
neither Government could act Win freedom
and energy. Meanwhile, the hostility OF 'he
natives TO Europeans, which, as we have re-
peatedly said, is the only evidence OF nauohal
movement in Egypt, was increasing lhe civil
service svarmed with foreigners who hved I'D
GRAND style the Europeans were not taxed ana
tbe country seemed Ito be governed III the IN
forests of the bondholders. The financial part
nership was bad morals and worse policy. 1t
hop1uDliplg who
invested in Egyptian securities at their own
risks and at low rates had no nSht 10 expect
! the two Governments to intervene III their be-
| half and to supervise the hhedlVe : auIh'ills-
| tration. 1t was worse policy because IL tehueu
| TO promote diplomatic intrigue, to excite the
natives, to exasperate the soldIer-moo ana u
naralvzc the action Of England and France
when Intervention became necessary. NOW,
| let il be observed that Mr.. Gladstone does not
| defend this iniquitous financial partnership. III
WAS the work of his predecessor ana he mas
| found it an endless source OF danger, emDar-
rassment and confusion He does not eyade
the subject, Ebut leaves the impression
| that if he he allowed to have his own
wov. the Joint Control Will not be revived, the
bondholders will be left TO SHIFT Tor them
selves. and Europeans i'll Egypt will not be ex-
| empt from taxation.
Secondly. a distinction must he made between
public policy and Observation-Disclosures. fuohc
motley would have been promOtedt the Govern
ment had been more resolute ana determined
in the preliminary stages OF the Egyptian con-
fict. and less scrupulous in fulfilling It's en-
cagements with France and It's European ooll-
cations. We do not say that If there had been
more vigor and less conscience the soldler-mob
might have been dispersed and Its Leader
driven into exile, without the destruction oil
| Alexandria and the horrors OF campaign
That >yould be an unwarI antablc assumption,
for order could not have been restored by
di,lomacy or threats or compromises so long as
there WAS an organized soditr-mob with an
o,,bitious leader. But time would have been
saved and the revolt could have been more
oosiIv sunpressed if sEngland had not dallied
with France and finally appealed TO the Pow
ers. Int had declared her purpose and made
,-gorous efforts TO enforce her will without
reference to the consent OF the Powers or the
sanctions of European law. That Is to say, II
the policy had been better and the morals moi
unite so good, if there had been fewer scruple'
and more courage and foresight, the practlca
ends of craftsmanship would have been accom-
plished. This, we think, is the strongest pom
which can be made against Mr.. Gladstone
course. 1t might have been better policy t.
waive formalities with the Sultan and to dc
what was necessary without waiting to con-
vince Europe that it was right The mora
sensitiveness of the Powers is not so acute tina
an English statesman needs to be unreasonably
squeamish
But Mr. Gladstone is apurist in lnternatlona
morals. He could not do what he knew woult
he right until he had convinced Europe that !
was necessary and had fulfilled all the require
mects of public law. He was forced to recon
ollie his policy to his conscience, and now tina
he has done that he will have nothing to fea
from the moral sensibities of the cOnstitu
ences. The high-born ruilians who go dowr
70 the Commons every night to insult him will
malevolent innuendoes, coarse laughter ant
brntal taunts will not appreciate these ethica
qualities. But he is not responsible to them
but TO the English peOple-a tribunal with So
sensitive a conscience that 1t condemned Lort
Beaconsfeld's foreign policy because 1t wa
grossly immoral as well as wholly Improbable
That was diplomacy based on public polio!
and material interests rather than moral con
sid.rations. The national conscience wa
ignored and all questions OF morals were
secuted and after years of swagger, racket AM
warfare the only practical gain was Cyprus-aI
island without harbor costing England
$500 900 a year in tribute, and OF no practca
value in its relations to either Constantinop
or the Suez Canal. Remembering what was th
outcome OF craftsmanship which followed
public policy rather than public morals, w
are inclined to have more patience with
Premier who looks upon international engage
ments and the moral law as the only basis o
|