The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1882-09-23
WAR STORIES.
The Race for Columbia Hoods Great
Move to Trap Schofleld.
How a Federal Army Passed the Point
Of Peril---A Strange Blunder by
Confederate Army.
Detroit Free Press.

Fit was great military move for Sherman
TO march through Georgia with 10000 men,
Hood il entitled to military credit for facing
toward Nashville with an army of ~, 600. Sher-
man could not expect much resistance before
reaching the coast. Hood knew that he would
be tiercely opposed. Sherman left rear
guard strong enough to fight battle, and had
only to look forward. Hood must pick up his
entire command and hold it together on Il ter
rifcally long march straight at the whole
north.
There has been much discussion pro and
con over Hoods plan. 1t is held by some that
had he fallen back before Sherman-to Savan-
nah if need be-the victorious march might
have been arrested at some point If john
ston, with fifteen or twenty thousand more
men than Hood had, could be driven from
field to field, there was little to encourage his
successor. The Confederate army would have
dwindled down to division before reaching
the coast The north would have sent Shcr-
man another hundred thousand men before
seeing his plans baiiled.
Hood certainly drew part of Sherman's
army after him, and his campaign was of
more or less benefit to Lee in Virginia. Had
he fought battle with Sherman after evacu
ating Atlanta, his defeat would have ended the
war within fortnight. Sherman could then
! have spared from 10000 to 10000 men to
swell Grants army and finish Lee, With the
Confederacy cut in two, Lee would probably
have seen the hopelessness of the struggle and
/ itniS oil lv in
TO know best say that Hoods campaign pu-
| longcd the life Of the Confederacy by months
Schotield had been detached from Sherman
to take care of Hood until such time as he
could be opposed by Federal force largo
enough to defeat him. Schofed marched for
Columbia, on the Duck river, by one route;
Hood marched by another. If Hood could
reach that point first he would be iii position
| to defeat tho Federals If Schotield reached
| it first he had an open route to Franklin, and
/ from thence to Nashville, which was now
/ known to be Hoods objective point Thomls
was concentrating everything at Nashville
and every day that Hood was delayed meant
much to the Federals. The COnfodcrates
marched with the speed Of cavalry, but Scho
| field marched faster. He had a large train
and other membranes, but when he found
that he must reach Columbia at any cost, he
sacrificed whatever hindcred his march.
As rode over part of the route taken by his
army made many inquiries of the people re-
garding the conduct of the troops and the
property left behind. The march was 80 hur-
ried that the farmers supposed it to be re
treat Not man stepped out OF the ranks to
forage, and nothing was taken from any OF
the farms At every half mile wagons broke
down and were tumbled against the fences.
If horse or a mule fell lame he was instantly
turned loose, and nothing was permitted to
block the road or halt the column. Scarce
half an hour was allowed for meals, and
on the last night no halt was made. The
abandoned wagons We're fully loaded, and
there are farm-houses along the route yet
having plentiful supply of the sugar, blank
cts and other stores secured at that time One
farmer told me that his wife and mother, who
were then the only members of the family at
home, picked up seven horses and mules, four
muskets, six or eight overcoats, and took
from the wagons ten barrels of sugar, 500
pounds of soap, 400 pounds of coffee, six bar
rels of beans, ave of rice, ten of pork, three
of beef, and various other stuff. These two
women safely preserved every bit of tho
property until the end of the war the next
spring, and enough was then disposed OF for
cash to build new house.
The long night march, by which some of the
brigades covered distance of eighteen miles,
put Schotield into Columbia first but he was
not four hours ahead of Hoods advance.
Schofield had the Duck river at his back, he
being on the south side. lie had only TO lay
his pontoons, cross TO the other bank and
there was the broad pike leading straight to
Franklin and Nashville. Hood had followed
him 30 close that Schofold turned at bay and
protected his position by breastworks, the re-
mains of which can yet be traced for two
miles 1t was pretty strong position, and
had Hood attacked the chances would have
been against him Schofeld felt sure that he
would be attacked then aud there but Hood
had other plans. He pushed forward strong
skirmsh lines and force of sharpshooterr ID
keep the Federals busy and then began to de-
vel0p his grand plan
There were some curious things i'll Hoods
campaign. His plan of attack at Peach Tree
creek has been fayorably reviewed by the best
generals of the war; and yet he was defeated
His plan of attack on the I'd of July has hech
supported by Gems. Sherman and Lee, and vet
he was defeated again His plan at Jonoshoro
seemed certain of success, and yet 1t failed
Fate seemed to ride at his heels TO thwart lbs
every plan
The plan he had at Columbia should have
insured him q brilliant victory Military critics
have complimented it in all its particulars.
The idea was to keep Schoticld III position at
Columbia and cross force above linn and get
in his rear
There was brisk diminishing between the
two armies on the 21th of November, and dur
ing the night pontoons were laid across me
Duck river above Columbia, clear Of Stho-
fields TANKS, and Forest crossed over with MS
cavalry. Hood spent the 2Nth in making ms
preparations, and on the ing of the *,rh
he led the movement across the river III peg
son. Schotield had laid his pontoon- across
the river at the town, and had only crossed
few cavalry to scout the roads. He still be-
leved that he would be attacked where he
was and he had no idea of Hoods stratHgcm.
Hood took with HIM the greater part of has
army, leaving only two divisions TO confront
Schofeld Though his march was made ~
daylight, he was over the river and several
miles ON his way before the Federal scouts
discovered the movement and sent intelligence
to Schofcld. That general had scarcely re-
cciyed the news when he was attacked ny Lee
and his two divisions, and such terrific artil-
lery fire was opened ON him that me could not
hniieIp that any great part of the Confederate