Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-02-04
STATE DEBT.
Arguments of Mr. Hill, for De-
PENDANTS.

PENDANTS.
At the conclusion of Mr.. Cham
pion's argument, Mr.. Sr1. Hill, OF
counsel for the defendants, deliy-
cred portion of his argument, of
which the following is Synopsis:
After recital of the provisions of
the bill of injunction against the
funding board, which bill, "When
disrobed of ali ambiguity, insists
upon the proposition of law that
the sovereign will of asoverign pow
er, exercised in constitutional way,
can be questioned, delayed and de-
feated by its own courts; that the
J sovereign's motives can be inquired
into, its wisdom questioned, its bona
fCLes doubted, and its will defeated" J"
Mr.. Hill said:
The constitutional objection urged
against the act is the third section
thereof, which objection is general
in its terms and obscure in its mean
ing. If it means that one legisla-
ture cannot make a valid contract
or destroy, then it is simply absurd.
If it means, then, that one legis-
lature may pass no law of either
general or special character, not par
| taking of the nature of q contract,
which may not be altered, amended
or repealed by its successors, its
meaning is as readily understood as
it is admitted, and in this view the
total want of application of this
principle to the case at bar is the
only subject OF comment.
The second objection in the order
of our division is hardly less OBJ
scure in its meaning. This sem
tence, or part of a sentence, when
translated into plain English means,
t1f it has anything at all, that the
legislature has no power to make
provision for the payment of the
debts of the State that would be
binding upon subsequent legisla
ture. That the legislature-the
source of the political power of the
state-has no power to make con-
tract for the state, for it must inev-
itably follow that if the power to
make the contract is conceded to
any legislature, the obligation of
this contract cannot be impaired by
any subsequent legislature.
Can it now be seriously doubted
that the legislature is capable of
making a contract binding upon
ion in the state constitution prOhib-
iting it? Is the state not bound by
its legislative grants forever part
ing with its real or personal prop
erty? Is it not bound by its char
tiers of interpretations unless the
right to revise, repeal or amend
them is reserved? Is it not bound
by its legislative grants of exempt
ions from taxation to individuals
and corporations when there is no
express Limitation in the state con-
stitution? These powers have been
too often exercised by the legisla- |
lures and sustained by the courts
to be at this late day questioned.
Judge Mcfarland, in delivering
the opinion of the courts in the |
case Of the Knoxville d Ohio rail-
road company VS.. Hicks, 8 Baxter,
445-6, in speaking of this legisia-
tive power, says "that such power
belongs to the legislative depart
ment of the state lOhen there is no
special limitation of that power, is
too well settled to be questioned.
The decisions of the supreme court |
of the United States are numerous |
and uniform, beginning with the |
Dartmouth college case, and COM |
ing down to the present time"
If this be true, if the legislature !
Possesses the power to create new
obligation, binding upon its success !
Ors forever, how much the more |
must it possess the power to provide |
for the payment of the existing OBJ |
legations of the state? This power |
is a necessary element of sovereignty. |
The power exercised in the cases re-
ferred to, goes far beyond the power
sought to be exercised in this case,
for here no righttul power is surren-
dered, but simply q proUision for a
debt. The power to create a debt
necessarily includes the power to
provide for its payment. This re-
markable bill does not question the
power of the previous legislatures
which authorized the creation of
the debt, and does not doubt the
power of any subsequent legislature
to compromise, refund or provide
for its payment. Hence, if the leg
islature possessed the power to Gre
ate the debt, (and this is not denied)
it necessarily possesses this power to
provide for its payment, and the
mode and manner of its payment
are matters of Legislative discretion,
which the judicial department
would not undertake to question or
control.
What matters it to the state that
the collector receives the coupons
from the taxpayer instead of the
money which otherwise he would
receive and pay over to the comp
troller or treasurer, who would i'm
have to pay the same to
the taxpayer? To permit the col
lector to receive the taxes in cou-
pons from the taxpayer is certainly
a cheaper, more convenient, and
simpler process. 1t is certainly
more convenient and less eXpen-
sive for both the taxpayer and the I
state.
Is it not the presumption every
where, by each department of the
that its coordinate
will faithfully perform
its duties? ;
Hence, in all decency it must fol-
low that this court will presume {
that where the legislative depart
ment has the power to authorize
the issuance of the states Obliga-
tiOns, and they are duly issued with {
the states honor pledged for their {
that the legislative de-
partment will ever afterwards pro-
vide a revenue to meet these Obli- l
cations as they mature. For the s
judicial department to hold other {
wise would be to hold that the leg {
islative department was not only s
unWise but dishonest, and were 1
ready 10 practice a fraud in the s
name of the state npOn the credit
Ors of the state.
The whole of the argument against
the receivability of coupons for tax
es is based upon the hypothesis that
the state never intends to pay her =
debts, and that her plighted faith {
and honor is a falsehOOd and a
fraud. If she intends to pay them, {
whether the coupons are or are not
for taxes is immaterlal.
The argument that war or famine
or other misfortunes may, in the !
future years, Overtake Tennessee
and render her unable to meet the |
accruing interest upon this debt, is