Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1882-11-01

the tenant knew. B recovered iudgmen.
and then the tenant undertook to remove
the building, but the supreme court of
Texas restrained him, In Henderson vs.
Ownby. decided at it's present term, on
the ground that the house was attached
to the land, and was, therefore, fixture,
and that as the landlord could not re-
move fixtures, neither could his tenant
do so.
A FIRE policy had a condition that all
other insurance should be brought to
the notice of the company. After loss
it refused to pay because other insur-
ance had been got after the execution
and delivery of the policy. In the action,
Warwick VS.. Monmouth County Mutual
Insurance Company, this defense was
set up and the court sustained it. The
plaintiff claimed that the condition ap-
piled only to other insurance existing at
the time of the delivery of the policy.
This case was carriedup, and the supreme
court of New Jersey, at it's law term,
affirmed the action OF the court below.
Judge Magic, in the opinion, said: Slip
ulations of this sort are restrictions on
the right of redress of the insured
against the insurers on the contract.
| AS such they impose a burden on the
insured for the insurers benefit, and
must, therefore, be strictly construed.
A BANK, on settling with depositor,
kept back the amount of a check which
had been presented to it, but which it
had refused to pay. The holder of the
check sued the bank, Saylor VS.. Bush
ong, but the court instructed the Jury to
find g. verdict for the bank, and the case
was carried to the supreme court of
| Pennsylvania, who, IL April, reversed
the judgment. Judge Turnkey, in the
opinion, said: If bank expressly or
implicitly promise the drawer to pay the
check the holder may sue if payment be
refused. When depositor settles his
exact amount of an outstanding check
expressly for its payment, and the bank
tacitly retains the money and settles on
that basis, it is liable to the holder on
the implied acceptance. All parties to
the check would naturally infer from
such action that the bank retained the
money for use of the holder.
a BOUGHT pig from B for So. Is, and
paid S. on account. He promised to pay
the balance on the following Monday,
and requested him to keep the animal
well, for which he would pay what it was
worth. A did not call on Monday, and
on Tuesday B sold the pig to G, and A
then sued B for the conversion of his
property, Bowser VS.. Birdsall, in Michi-
gan. Before the suit was brought B of
fered to return the money he had re-
ceived, SIS, which A refused to take. B
| had Judgment and A carried the case to
the supreme court Of Michigan, which,
ID June, reversed the Judgment and
gave A SIS, but put the costs of the suit
on him. The Chief Justice (Graves) in
the opinion said: "The plaintiff was en-
titled to recover the money he had paid,
but no more, In the absence of the proof
of special damage, ard, as he had re-
fused to receive his full damages when
| they were rendered to him, he must pay
the costs of the suit which he had need
lessly brought"
STOCKHOLDERS were sued by the credi-
tors OF an insolvent corporation for the
amount of their unpaid subscriptions
under their right to compel the STOCK
holders to pay the corporate debts to the
extent of their stock The original CAPT.
tai stock was $40, 100000, which was re-
duced to $500, 900 by the stockholders at
an annual meeting. The debts sued
] upon had been incurred before the re-
duction of the capital stock. In this
case, In re State Insurance Company, in
the United States Circuit Court, at Chi
cago, the stockholders denied their liza
bility beyond their interest in the capital
stock as reduced; but they were defeat
ed, and they were held to be bound as
owners of the original stock. They ap-
pealed, and the judgment WAS affirmed.
Judge Drummond, in the opinion, in
August, said: For debts contracted af-
ter the reduction of the capital stock the
stockholders are liable only to the ex-
| tent of their interest, but they must re-
spond upon their proportion of the ORR
| ginal capital to the creditors who con-
tracted with the company before the re-
duction.
| A BANKRUPT was refused his discharge
on the ground that his application
was not made within one year from the
date of the adjudication in bankruptcy.
Subsequently the bankrupt law was
amended so that the application could
be made any time before the final dispo-
sition of the cause, and then second
application for the discharge was made.
In this case, In re Brockway, the United
States circuit court of New York again
refused the discharge. Judge Wallace,
in the opinion, in September, said:
The subsequent amendment of the
bankrupt act did not impair or
affect the controlling force of the pre-
vious adjudication. Assuming, what
may well be controverted, that the
amendment may be given such retroac-
tive effect as to authorize an application
for discharge in pending proceeding,
although the year from the date of the
adjudication of bankruptcy had expired,
it certainly cannot operate retroactively
to overthrow a prior Judgment. A re-
L. L.