The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1882-03-13
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command Of the Army Of the Cumberland,
and a confidential letter to Mr.. Chase,
when be was Secretary Of the Treasury, Is
produced to show that Garfield was secret
IL hostile to Rosecrans while acting as his
Chief Of staff.
No one can read the correspondence and
not feel that General Garfield occupied
most delicate and embarrassing position as
Chief OF STAFF: he was attached to Gen
erll Rosecrans loyalty and deSotedly, and
20 expressed himself not only in the letter
to Mr.. Chase but on the floor Of Congress
In advocacy Of resolution OF thanks, and
also at Baltimore in 1864, where he was
anxious 10 have General RoseCrans nomin.
ated for Vice President INSTEAD Of Andy
johnson. He wanted Rosecrans TO be q
great success as commander. He wanted
him to move weeks or even months before
he did finally move, prior TO tho baltic Of
Chickamauga. Whether Garfield was
right or not III his judgment is as yet an
unsettled point. Rosecrans will perhaps
throw some light on il, and he will await
that light. But Garfield was deeply i'm.
pressed that valuable time had been and
was being lost, and so expressed himself in
hisletter to.Secretary Chase, with whom he
was on terms Of personal intimacy, and to
whom his letter was addressed in conf.
dencc.
To appreciate that letter We must go
back to the days otiS6s when it was writ
ten. Garfield held a most responsible
position in the Army ofthe Cumberland,
then main pillar in the Union cause. He
had to do, and did do, all that he could to
put that army in effective condition, and
finally he believed it to be ready for great
iinot decisive blow. He wanted to see
1t strike the blow and urged and urged
Rosecans to move. A Conncit Of war de-
cided that the time had not come to move.
Still Garfield was not convinced, and in the
confidence ofintimate personal friendship
he wrote in his own Vindication to Secretary
Chase, then member ofthe Cabinet. He
told the Secretary Of his love and devotion
to Rosecrans, but told him also OF his vivid
impressions that the policy Of delay was
great mistake.
The question arises, what was u man,
situated as Garfield was situated, to do2 He
had been a success in the war, MS Mr..
Blaine forcibiy shows; had evinced rare
good judgement in his campaign against
Humphrey Marshall, and had been traps
ferred to very high and responsible post,
where he was felt to DO the right arm OF the
Commanding General. He had studied
every detail OF the situation with thought
fulness; was Rosecrans' man Of all work,
and was probably one Of the very best
posted officers in that or any other army Of
the republic, He knew that the country was
in critical condition, and that its saliva
tion rested largely on the army with which
he was connected. Thus situated and thus
impressed, he poured out his mind to his
intimate friend, Secretary Chase, under the
seal Of confidence. lie had not one harsh
word for his COMMUNICATING but kind
words-Snd simply told his own story rs
to his own impressions OF the situation.
Was this his privilege or not2 Yea,
more, was it his duty or not? He
had exhausted his influence in the Campt to
achieve agreat result, momentous Us he
believed to the cause Of the Union. The
Government was looking to the army of
which he was chief Of staff for results, and
these results came not. Whose fault was
II? General Garfield knew that it was not
his fault, and 1t was no more than right
that those who were looking to him
lin part for expected results should know
that he was in nowise responsible for their
disappointment. Not only this, but it was
Garaeldsteeling, occupying the responsible
position held by him, that some member
otthe Government, like Secretary Chase,
should be fully acquainted with the exact
situation, and this view is after all the
highest Justification Of the letter which he
wrote to Mr.. Chase. Here is an extract
from it that shows its animus:
l write this with more sorrow than l can
tell yon, for love every bone in his body:
and, next TO my desire to see the rebellion
blasted, Is my anxiety to see him blessed.
But even the breadth OF my love is not
/ sufficient to cover this almost iatal delay.
My personal relations with General
Rosecrans are all that could desire. OF.
fciaily share his counsels and responsi.
bilihes, even more than desire; but beg
you'to know that this delay is against my
judgment and my every wish. Pleasant as |
are my relations here, would rather com.
1nand a battalion that would follow and
follow, and strike and strike, than to hang
back while such golden moments are
passing. But the General and myself
believe that ] can do more service
in my present place than in com.
mand oil q division, though am
aware that it is a position, that promises
better in the way Of promotion or popular
credit. But II this inaction continues long,
Ishall ASH to be removed, and sent some. |
where where can be part Of working
army. But do hope that you will soon
hear that this splendid army is at last try.
ipgto do Its part in the great work. II the
War Department has not always been Just
il has certainly been very indulgent to this
army. But ] feel that the time has now
come when 1t should allow no plea to keen
this army back from the most vigorous &C.
tivity.
As showing that General Garfield never
feared to have this or any other correspond.
ence with Secretary Chase made known to
theworld, We here append letter which
hewrote to General Rosecrans as late as
January, 1880:
House, OF REPRESENTATIVES,,
WASHINGTON, D. O., Jan, 10, 1880.
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