Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-07-22
THE BETTER SOLDIER.

THE BETTER SOLDIER.
TThe following article y taken
from the first number of the second
volume of "Our Continent" a re-
Gently started magazine edited by
Judge Tourgee, author of "a Fools
Errand," &c. We give it as ra~e
specimen of candor in Northern
man and a Republican in giving a
dispassionatec estimate of the relative
fighting qualities of the Northern
and Southern soldier respectively.
Such generous appreciation of an
antagonists merit go further than
anything else to promote cordial
understanding between men who
are no longer antagonists but COM
radeJ. a
General Doubleday's recent vol
ume has revived the discussion of
| the comparative merits of the
| Northern and Southern volunteer
| soldiery.
No unpreiudiced person can deny
that in the war between the States
the Confederate soldier was worth
more, man for man, than the Fed
eral volunteer. In proof of this
need only be instanCed the fact that
the Army of Northern Virginia,
though constantly overmatched in
numbers and having an adversary
lavishly supplied with material, 4,
though twice checked in its purpo-
ses was never defeated until the
siege of Petersburg had depleted J
ranks and the near approach of
Sherman had increased the dispro-
portion of numbers to limit that
left no hope of success. On the other
hand this overmatched armv had
administered at least three crushing
and overwhelming defeats upon J
adversary.
1t is not enough to say that the
COnfederacy had the advantage of
being on the defensive; no~ is it
strictly true. The offansive-defen-
sive is in its risks, advantages and
disadvantages, little if any different
from an offensive campaign. This
is the strategy Lee adopted. He
pressed the fighting. All his blows
that were successful were delivered
in the aggressive. He was twice
checked, but in neither case did or
Generals dare pursue the stricken
enemy.
Neither can a difference in the
capacities of the respective COM
manders account for it, though, as
we shall see hereafter, the cOnstitu-
tiOnal hesitancy of Mcclellan very
greatly enhanced the real disadvan-
tage under which the Federal force
acted. But after all this has been
weighed, the fact still remains ap-
parent that the southern soldiery
were, man for man, more effective
in that conflict than the Northern
volunteer.
Not little of this greater effect
iveneSS of the Southern soldier was
no doubt due TO the relation which
existed between the rank and file
and their immediate supefiors. 1t
was mere eXtentiOn of the relation
under which they had grown up.
The leaders in the field were only
the leaders at home under new
name. The aristOcracy of the South
furnished from the outset a most ad-
mirable corps of line and staff Off
GERS. They were just near enough
their men to permit familiarity and
receive respect and far enough from
them to prevent INSTRUMENTATION
Coming from the same Vicinage
every man knew his officer.
The commissioned upstart was far
more rare in the Confederate army
than in our own. Even where the
officer was not personally known to
his men, he represented a cla'3
whom they were accustomed to
follow. His right to lead was %
instructive IT'S their Willingness to
follow.
Another thing that made in favor
of the Southern soldiers effective
nG5s was the superiority of their
discipline. No doubt many of our
officers will demur to this PROPOSE
ton. 1t has been the fashion among
both officers and men of the North
to sneer at the discipline of the Con-
federate army. 1t is true that in
none 3entials we very greatly eX-
celled them. To the very last the
drill of most of the Southern regi-
ments was slack, dribbling and un-
even. They neither marched,
wheeled nor handled their arms
with the smartness, precision and
regularity which characterized our
troops. In the sense in which our
generals used the term they were
"neW recruits" till the end of the
war. There never was an hour that
we could not beat them on drG IS pa
rade and review even with half
their numbers. In the essentials OF
discipline, however, they far ex-
celled US. For neglect of duty their
men were punished and punished
speedily and severely. Strangely
enough they did not $50 far IS the
writer has learned) whip at all,
though the whipping-pOst stood in
the shadow OF every court house in
the Confederacy, while our army
was preparing for the battle Of Bull
Run by the degrading spectacle OF
the whipping of two deserters from
their regular brigade.
So far as possible the Confederate
officers allowed their men to take
their own course, thereby preserv-
ing their individuality and securing
all the more readily their obedience
in matters of real importance.
Besides that, the Southern soldier
was not so important a political in
| teger as his Northern coInpeer. If
punishment was necessary, it was
meted out to him without fear OF
| future consequences to the officer.
OF the officers this was not true.
During the whole war there were
very few if any instances in which
a commissioned officer of the Con-
federate army was punished with
any greater severity than by being
cashiered or degraded to the ranks;
while i'm our army, imprisonment,
the ball and chain. shaving the
head, drumming through the camp,
and other nondescript punishments
tended to degrade the ranks of the
subaltern who was only distinguish