Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-02-18

1
when by the Constitution the court coul
not take Jurisdiction directly. Had thi
construction prevailed then the form of OF
fhigatlon olI entered lnto4iby the state would no
elgh could not be coerced to perform the oh
legations in either event, and in maxim
such contracts, no higher power would b
| exercised in the one case than the other
But as we have seen the decision of tn
question was obtained, it was held tina
when provisions like the present are en-
| acted as to the manner of payment, th
| Federal Court will take jurisdiction of th'
| states officers and enforces the law as
contract denying the State all right to re
| peal or impair 1t and virtually in that even
1 the State ceases to be sovereign in respect tC
| her own obligations, and hence, in makinI
| such contracts the State has surrendered
| with respect to her own obligations, but
| also 10 enact such laws as may incidentally
affect them. And we must bear in mind
acts similar in this respect to the cou-
pom feature of the act the law
out OF which the contract results
| becomes irrepealable. The difference,
| therefore, between the two characters OF
| bonds is this: The ordinary bond pledges
| the honor and faith of the State, each sue
| cessive Legislature as the representative OF
| the people is left to meet Its part of the
obligation F; in doing so they act from the
sense of honor and good faith which is
supposed to actuate the people of soyer-
eign State and their Representatives. 1t is
for them to determine what honor and
good faith require, but there can be no
power to coerce their action They are not
bound by previous legislation further than
honor and good faith require they should
be bound, and of this they are to judge. By
the issuance of the ordinary bonds the
power to legislate in the future for the
public good is in no sense reiinauished.
On the other hand, the bonds with the
coupon feature not only pledges the honor
and faithOf tho State. but practically takes
the matter entirely out of the control of the
people or any future Legislature, while the
obligations last, not only as to the question
as to whether the coupons shall be paid, but
also as to the manner of their payment.
The revenues to be raised by future LegiS-
latures are to this extent not only pledged,
but actually appropriated and put beyond
their control. To this extent they are de-
prived of all power of legislating on the
subject. So it is apparent that the power
exercised in the two cases are essentially
different. Had the Legislature the power
by contract to place the coupon provision
of the law absolutely beyond repeal while
the coupons remain unpaid =? 1t is said the
question can never arise unless we suppose
that future Legislatures may disregard their
obligations and refuse to levy the necessary
taxes TO meet the interest on the debt and
other expenses of the State. Without this
the necessity for a repeal can never exist
and it cannot be presumed that they will
thus disregard their duty. / agree that we
are to predicate no argument upon pre-
violate its duty or act in bad faith. But the
error of this argument is in the court as
cumstances be the duty Of every succeed
ing Legislature to levy taxes to pay the
coupons. This is not a question for the
court. II future Legislature should be-
come satisfied that the debt was unjust
and fraudulent, procured by bribery and
corruption, the honor and faith of the State
would not require that it be paid. OF this
the Legislature would have to Judge 1t is
said that this debt is an honest and Just
debt. If SO, / trust the Legislative Depart
ment will always so recognize 1t. certain
Il ~ -
lfdity, but the court has no Jurisdiction to
pass upon the question. The State as SOW
ereign power must determine for itself
through It's Legislature the measure of JUS
tice that good faith requires it to render to
its creditors.
Ofcourse the State has the power to re-
pudiate an honest debt, but we are to pre-
sumo that the power will not be exercised.
But however just and honest this debt may
be, If one Legislature has the power thus to
tie the hands of the future Legislatures as
to the payments of honest debts, they may
bind them for the payment of un-
Just debts. 1t is perhaps not impossible
that Legislatures may be bribed and cor
rupted to enter into obligations that ought
not tn be binding upon the people of the
State. In such an event the State could not
go into the courts tos set aside its obligations
upon the grounds that its own Legislature
had been bribed and corrupted, and when
the action of the Federal Courts should be
invoked to enforce the coupons contract
and protect 1t from impairments. They
would not listen to the charge that the
State legislature had been bribed to make
the contract, so that in such an event the
State could practically no more resist the
of a debt created by bribery than
any other.
But aside from this and assuming that no
future Legislature will ever doubt that this
is a Just debt, will it under all circumstances
be their duty to levy taxes to pay the cou-
pons? Public debts are to be paid by tax
against the citizen. do not undertake to
1efine the extent to which the taxing power
may go. But the right of the people and of
The State to exist is superior to the claim |
If the creditor. The creditor who takes the |
bonds of a sovereign Government risks not /
)nly its honor and good faith but also the |
possibility that its debt may become to
,nerous to be borne. The Government |
must exist, its people must live, otherwise |
Ill ability to pay debts would be destroyed,
md whatever may be said of it, we know
hat upon the supposed want of ability to
Jay or for other cause the power to repudi-
tie public debts in whole or in part, has
,een frequently exercised in modern times,
ven by the most enlightened governments.
'here are infirmities attaching to all debts
f this character.
But am not to be understood as advocat-
ng the doctrine of reputation or encour-
ging any tendency in that direction.
My assert that the right of the State to
reserve its own existence and good gov
rnment and the right OF the people to sup
ort and maintain themselves is superior
0 the right of the creditor. This principle
recognized even in regard to private con-
|
ne event of war, famine or pestilence, is it
OSsible that Legislature would not have
he power to sustain the payment of these
oupons, or postpone them to the superior
emand for the preservation of the State
nd the people themselves? In such an
vent do not think it can be denied that
ne power to repeal the laws would exist.
We can not know that such emergenceS |
lay not arise within the next ninety-nine |
ears. 1t will not do to say that the |
legislature that passed this act determined
V1OIn
nd that 1t would never be necessary to |
epeal it; this is absurd.
1t is said that such emergencies are i'm /
extreme cases that may never |
ccur, and that we need not now undertake
provide against them. True, we need
OF; but we must preserve in the Govern |
sncies if they should occur, the power to |
roteot itself and its people in times of Gala |
.ity and peril. Extreme cases may al
avs be supposed in order to test principles.
his is not arguing that the fact in ques-
on may become unconstitutional upon |
lch future contingency. The happening {
such future contingency Is referred TO Tor
le purpose of showing that the act was In {
ZcesS of Legislative power at the time 1t
as passed, Then, if it be conceded that, !
nder any emergency that may reasonably
2 supposed, the power to repeal the law
ould exist, then it seems to me to follow, I
levitably that the act which, according to !
le construction placed upon such acts,
ipuIates tnat 1t shall not be repealed was {
eyond legislative power.
1t will not do to say that the Legislature {
light make such contract, but that 1--WE
i'll annex to it the implied qualification,
lat upon sufficient emergency the law may
: repealed and the contract impaired. !
his qualification necessarily destroys the !
hole contract. If the law may be repealed
any emergency, then who is to Judge of |
le Sufficfency of the emergency? Certainly
Ot the courts; it can not be said that the {
,urtS would uphold q repeal OF the act
in their opinion it was upon an emergen- ]
justifying it and disregard the repeal If '
le emergency was not deemed sufficient. l
The considerations upon which the suff- .
ency of the emergency would have to be /
9termined are not judicial in their charac-
r, but purely political and legislative. If Q
len we consider that the Suffictency of the 4
is to be determined by the Leg t
lature, itinevitably results that they may q
peal the law at pleasure and the contract i
without validity. d
axe such contracts be conceded them f
10 right to repeal the law and abrogate the n
'ntTaGt would not be recognized in any | Y
The question would come di- '
city within thejuriSdiGtion Gfthe Federal | +
1urt. The decisions ofthat court at least +
they now stand, leave no room for doubt. >
ley say, If the State Legislature makes 9
e contract and has the power TO make IL, | 4
EN- it cannot be impaired by any subse- q
lent legislation and to ascertain the mean y
g OF the contract they disregard the con- c
ruction ofthe State Courts and construe 1t | r
r themselves. I
Fhe Court would not undertake to en- /
lire into the circumstances of emergency | g
necessity under which The State Legisla- s
re may have undertaken to repeal the law h
Id impair the contract. 1t is said, how | 1,
or, that the jurisdiction is vested in that 4
art, and whatever it might decide would | n
the law of the case and we must presume s
ey would decide correctly. 8
~ !