The Wellington enterprise. [volume] (Wellington, Ohio) 1867-188?, 1882-01-11
cUrrEAU.s TRIAL.


afidavit in the Guiteau trial setting forth that
the defense had been unable TO obtain certain
witnesses before they had rested in direct testi-
mony, and asked that they be allowed 10 intro
duce DIR. Mcfarland as an expert, who would
testify TO Guiteau's insanity. Long arguments
their petition. Judge Cox said that fully appre-
ciating the difhculties under which the defense
than the strict rules Of procedure would allow,
and was disposed TO do 50 in the future.
But the rules Of evidence would not allow evil
DR. Heard, Of New York. was sworn for the
,he prosecution and witness was withdrawn.
J. ]. Brooks, Chief of the Treasury Secret Ser
vice, was sworn and testified that he visited
Guiteau in jail the night after the President
was shot. Guiteau was In bed and got up in
great anger and wanted 20 know what wit.
quiet at so late an hour. Witness told him he
had no right 70 speak in that manner. because
and quiet of the Nation. He called Jack that
he was no murderer, but Christian and q
gentleman Guiteau further told the witness
htical necessity; that he had thought and
prayed over II; and was impelled to the conolu-
roduced slO s '1 letter writsen % % Sy tSe pris rs
oner's father, in which he expressed the opin-
on behalf Of the prosecution, then requested
the defense to make known the law points on
which they desired the ruling of the court.
for proper preparation in this part of the case.
Dayidge replied that the prosecution had al
points upon which they would ask the court
to rule. After the statement OF these points
court adjourned TO the 7th-
JANUARY THE court room was
crowded at the resumption of the Guiteau trial.
The jury was present. although its attendance
was not compulsory, and throughout the first
arguments showed much interest and atten-
ton Mr.. Davidge, who first addressed the
court, desired particularly to direct the atten-
tion of His Honor Judge Cox to the fact that
the first prayer of the prosecution was circum-
scribed within the limits OF human intellf-
legal rule in respect of how much intelligence
IL required to make human beings amenable
the second prayer was that no human being
whose intelligence reached the standard de-
scribed in the first prayer Is responsible for
the violation of law, no matter what his feel
ings, his passions or his indifference to duty
were. The third prayer asked the Court to
define just when insanity was q defense
from the standpoint of the law, and the fourth
set forth that moral irresponsibility had
not been established in this case. Counsel then
read from authorities showing the responsible
fly Of persons suffering from insane delusions,
contending that II the accused was conscious
was punishable. The authorities quoted in
cluded cases in both English and American ju-
sspsudence: During g,S,s the citation ] Of the cases
defense. Porter answered indignantly, and
must end. They had arrived at period in the
trial when the prosecution would stand upon
must not make such broadcast and unfounded
accusations If, exclaimed Porter, .sthe gen.
tleman does not receive a rebuke from this
merely read the decision of Judge Davis in the
Coleman case" Yes" cried Guiteau, "and
man." said Davidge, .swho pretends to be in
sane Listen to him; he not only knows the
difference between right and wrong, but he
nal cases Three weeks ago Scoville claimed
the fellow was a fool. They were not trying
PsH,dgs dI fSsn Sontin 6nS th
ers, and said they simply called for an instruc-
ton TO the jury that insanity was definable by
was no. an impression OF the perceptive fac
ulties or n degraded moral sense. The man is
judged by its operation. Such is the oondi-
ton upon which society Is possible. After the
Mt Reed BEGAN the sr9ument @ fpP the deSeuse
he claimed that there was nothing in
the record of the case opposed to the
to the question of Jurisdiction as fatal to
conviction He was concise and pointed in
impression on hs snS Sour He 70 Ta5 %ske g1oG
OF cases in support of his views, which were to
the effect that a reasonable doubt should al
the one on trial Mr.. Reed, at the close of his
argument, thought 1t was unfair that the jury
snOulu not De present al tnls time. Inc Court
said it was understood that the jury should re-
main away during the arguments If they
thought MT Mr.: Scoville apologized satirically,
saying that " of course IL was an accident that
the jury should be absent" Scoville then fol-
lowed in his remarks much in the line of Mr..
Reed, urging that responsibility was the most
important fact for the jury to pass upon, and
contending that acquittal must follow II due
regard was given it At one junction of the
argument for the defense, Mr.. Davidge inter
rupted with the remark that the question of
responsibility was 10 be decided by the Court,
and that the question of insanity was for the
Jury. Judge Cox approved the suggestion.
The case was adjourned until the 9th, before
Scoville had concluded his argument