Knoxville daily chronicle. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1870-1882, 1882-11-12

an unusual footstep. He at once
pricks up his ears and gives half
suppressed growl Must we not
suppose In such a case as this the
footstep suggests to the dog the idea
OF strange man? And, if so, will
not the suggestion-of what charac-
ter it might be-be general rather
than particular? If it be mental
picture-and we are often told that
dogs think onlyin pictures-must not
the picture be generic in it's charac-
ter, like Mr.. Cations compost pho>
tograph of the average blackguard I?
And, if it be symbol of some kind,
must it not be symbol that stands
for strange man in general, since
there is nothing to suggest any par>
ticular strange man? But, if this
be so, and if general conception is
one which stands not for any par
ticular object, but for a group of OBJ
jects, do not see how We can deny
general conceptions, in this sense of
the word, to our four >footed friends
And, if the word abstract idea stand,
as it is sometimes made to do, for
general conception, we must admit,
[ think, that such abstract ideas are
possible for the brute.
We come now to such abstract
ideas as result from the process I
termed isolation. Are these, too,
possible for the brute? I have only
to say that it has always seemed to
me that, when we speak of being
able to form abstract ideas of red
ness, emptiness, justice and the like,
all we can possibly mean is, that we
can make use of the words as sym>
bols in train of thought. [ have
only to say this to indicate the ma
ture of my answer to this question {:
l believe such abstract ideas to be
impossible for the brute; [ believe
them to be the outcome of the use
of language. We see a plum, and
we find that it is round, and blue,
and resisting. From these words
we form abstract nouns-roundness,
blueness, resistance. We then pros
coed to manufacture a something to
which each of these words may am
swer, and we call that somee
thing quality. Having thus
made the quality, the next thing we
do is to try and endow it with sep
arate existence, and to the results of
our endeavOrs we give the name
abstract idea. All this is process
which grows out of our use of words
under the influence of a developed
power of reflection; it is an attempt
to conceive reaity-in-thought au~
swerlng to certain of our symbols.
Without a considerably developed
use of symbols such process is
impossible. Hence | believe that
no animal can form an abstract idea
in this sense of the term. He does
not possess the only possible means
of doing so. To form such abstract
ideas as these is certainly ian excel>
lency which the faculties of brutes do
by no means attain to- Here we
may agree with Locke and his fol~
lowers.
May we say, then, that the power
of forming abstract ideas, in this
sense, is that which distinguishes the
intelligence of man from the intellie
gence of the brute? [ think net.
There are, [ believe, among the lower
race of man, whole tribes which are
unable to form abstract ideas. Abs
stract ideas are made possible by
language, but the use of language
does not necessarily imply the ability
to form abstract ideas. Philologists
tell us that there are languages or
dialects, in which no abstract words
are to be found. This, however, is
certain, that there is no known sav>
age tribe which has no language.
Man is the one being that make use
of spoken signs.