Butler citizen. [volume] (Butler, Pa.) 1877-1922, 1882-02-08
JUDGE COx's CHARGE.
A Clear and Impartial Presen.
talon of the Law Govern
ing the Case.

j Ii
ing the Case.
Judge Cox then, at 3:l5 P NJ, pro
ceeded to deliver his charge to tn,
Ijury. He commenced by saying tina
the Constitution provides that, in al
criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right of speedy anC
public trial by an impartial jury, in the
State or District where the crime shsl
have been committed that he shall bt
informed of the cause and the nature
of the accusation against him ; that be
shall be confronted with the witnesses
against him that he shall have com
pulsory process to obtain witnesses il
his favor, and that he shall have as
sistance of counsel in his defense
Those provisions were intended for the
protection of the innocent from injustice
and oppression, and it was only by
| their faithful observance that guilt oil
innocence could be fairly ascertained
Every accused person was presumed to
be innocent until the accusation was
proved With what difficulty and
trouble the law had been administered
in the present case, the jurors had been
daily witnesses. 1t was, however, a
consolation to think that not one OF
those guarantees of the Constitution
hao been violated in the person of the
| accused
At last the long chapter of proof
was ended the task of the advocate
was done, and it now rested with the
jury to determine the issue between
public justice and the prisoner at the
bar. No one could feel more keenly
than himself the great responsibility of
his duties and he felt that be could
only discharge them by close adherence
to the law as laid down by its highest
authorities. Before proceeding further
be wished to notice an incident which
had taken place pending the recent ar
g1ment. The prisoner had frequently
taken occasion to proclaim that public
opinion, as evidenced by the press and
correspondence, was in his favor.
Those declarations could not have been
prevented except by the process of
gagging the prisoner Any suggestion
tnat the jury could be Influenced by
such lawless Gathering of the prisoner
would have seemed to him absurd !;
and he should have felt that he was
insulting the intelligence of the jury if
he had warned them not to regard it.
Counsel for the prosecution had felt it
necessary, however, in the final argu-
ment to iuterpose contradiction to
such statements and an exception had
been taken on the part of the accused
to the form in which that effort was
made. For the sole purpose of purg-
ing the record of any Objectionable mat
ter he should simply say that anything
which had been said on either side in
reference to public excitement or to
newspaper opinion was not to be re-
garded by the jury.
The indictment charged the defend
ant with having murdered James A.
Garfield and it was the duty of the
Court to explain the nature of the
crime charged. Murder was commit
ted where person of sound memory
and discretion unlawfully killed q
reasonable being, in the peace of the
United States, with malice aforethought.
1t had to be proved, first, that the
death was caused by the act of the ac-
cused and, further, that it was caused
with malice atorethought. That did
not mean, however, that the Govern
ment had to prove any ill-will or
hatred on the part of the accused to-
ward the deceased. Wherever q
homicide was shown to have been COM
mitted without lawful authority, and
with deliberate intent, it was sufficient
ly proved to have been done with NAL
ice aforethought; and malice was not
disproved by showing that the accused
had NO personal illwill to the deceased,
and that he killed him from other mo-
tives-as, tor instance, robbery or
through mistaking him tor another, or
las claimed in this case) to produce a
public benefit If it could be shown
that the killing occurred in a heat Of
passion, or under provocation, then it
would appear that there was no pre-
meditated attempt, and, therefore, no
malice aforethought, and that would
reduce the crime to manslaughter. 1t
was hardly necessary, however, to say
that there was nothing of that kind in
the present case. The jury would
have to say either that the defendant
was guilty of murder or that be was
innocent.
THE QUESTION OF INSANITY.
In order to constitute the crime OF
| murder, the assassin must have q
reasonably sane mind in technical
terms he must be of sane mind, memo
ry and discretion An irresponsible
insane man could not commit murder.
Ii he was laboring under q disease OF
the mental faculties to such an extent
that he did not know what he was
doing, or did not know it was wrong,
then be was wanting in that sound
mind, memory and discretion that was
part of the definition Of murder. In
the next place, Notwithstanding this
presumption of innocence, it was equal.
| ly true that defendant was presumed
| to be sane and to have been so at the
time the crime was committed. That
is TO say, that the Government was
not bound to show afiirmatiyely IS q
part of its proofs that the defendant
was sane. AS insanity was the ex
ception, and as the majority of men arc
sane, the law presumed the latter con-
dition of every man, until some reason
was show to believe the contrary. The
burden was, therefore, on the defend
ant, who set up insanity as an excuse
for crime, to produce proofs in the first
instance to show that that presumption
was mistaken, so far as it related tc
the prisoner. Crime, therefore, in
volved three elements, the killing, NAL
ice and responsible mind, in th'
murderer After all the evidence wai
before the jury, if the jury, while bear