Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1882-01-20

Mr.. Z. T. Taliaferro followed. He first
argued on the question that the act was un-
constitutional. Ii no important measure can
pass the legislature without money, where is
the remedy unless at the hands OF the court?
The Supreme Court has never decided direct
ly as TO whether court can inquire into the
act of the legislature. Judge Caruthers left
the question open in the case he decided, and
did not say whether there could be case of
such character or not; also, Judge Mar
shall, in the case of Fletcher rs. Peck, left
the case open. Fraud vitiates all contracts.
and there must be some tribunal where it can
he inquired into. This act is a contract, and
by these allegations in the bill it was born
by bribery. Unless the court can inquire
into these, then let the people be told, you
are wronged, but there is no remedy. No
people can afford to purchase honor with
dishonor. The people feel and have right
to feel they have had no voice in the con-
tract that binds them. 1t is safe to predict
that there can be no settlement of this debt,
unless itiean be by the voice of the people,
Judge Gier, in Towards Reports, states that
public policy and morality de manded that
the trust entrusted to representatives of the
people should be carried out to the best of
their ability, and should not be violated by
receiving brides, and the courts are the places
where this may be inquired into. 1t will
thus be seen how rigorous the courts are in
enforcing public policy. The object of the
constitution is to protect the people. Can it
be said that bribery and corruption are up
held by the constitution? Can it be said that
an act so passed is upheld by the constitu-
ton? No. There is no constitutional enact
ment or decision in Tennessee that prohibits
the court from declaring such kind of act, and
so passed void. On coupons, he said: This is the
most troublesome feature in the case. By the
constitution no money shall be drawn from
the treasury except by annual appropriation
made by law, and each assembly estimating
the amount OF taxation necessary to make
the appropriations. The coupons, as Mr..
Burroughs says, is first mortgage on the
funds of the State; the payment of the other
expense is to be postponed until this first
mortgage is paid. Each legislature has the
right to tax property. What right has this
legislature for depriving the legislature that
follows in the future from exercising the
right OF taxation because they are compelled
by this act to levy tax to pay the interest?
What right has this legislature to prevent
the future legislature in 1910 from appro-
priating its own revenues? Ii such feature
could be passed, it places in the hands of one
legislature the right to pass fraudulent con-
tract and bind the people OF the next GEN.
fury. No one legislature can, by its own
act, disown their successors from exercising
their right to sovereignty. There is no power
in our constitution giving this power to any
legislature. This not only compels them to
levy, but appropriates the fund. By the
constitution no act shall become law except
it mention in its caption the subjects con
tanned in the bill. The act does not in its
caption or otherwise mention the act of 1878.
The very object of the act was to avoid the
act of 1873. This act prevents the tax col
lector from receiving coupons for taxes and
he only can receive the currency therein
mentioned, specially prohibiting the receiv
ing of coupons. The act of 1881 and the act
of 1878 are in direct conflict, the one prohib-
iting the receiving and the other allowing
the receiving of coupons for taxes. The act
of 1881 repealed the act OF 1878