, 1882-10-18

which impeded the Russians IN their
Turkestan campaign and before PleVna,
this is the scheme now Sbeing prepared by
the Chinese against their next war, ana
this is the device which is now delaying
General Wolseley. 1t will not succeed
with him, we believe, first, because the
cultivated portion of Lower Egypt is an
exceedingly small place, hardly half as
LARGE again as Suffolk secondly, because
the Egyptian Regulars are few and third
~, because they are not quite equal to reap
inc the full benefit of their own system.
But if they were Turks. or were really as
numerous as they seem to be from the mul-
titude of peasants they impress, or would
fcht as MaOries used to fight III their
stOckades, we should never conquer Egypt
without putting out our full strength as
against a frst-class Power,-that IS send
inc out 100000 men, spending a hundred
millions, and wasting an entire year OF
strenuous effort. Fortunately for us, the
effort will not be required; but q very
SLIGHT Improvement in the working OF tho
new plan would involve almost inevitably
that consequence,
At the very moment when they have
thus ascertaiued the value OF the spade,
the Asiatics have obtained also another
advantage. They have brought their
weapons nearly to an equality with those
of Europeans. There can be little doubt,
in spite of the Franc0-German War, that
the total effect of the new weapons OF
precision is, crtcljS paribuS, favourable
to the defence. 1t is rarely indeed, and
under very peculiar circumstances, tnat
an invader dare eXpend lives by tens OF
thousands as they were expended IN the
early operations of the German invasion
of L7ra,oa md II aOu11 Day-ar bonppO in q
war Of invasion in Asia, where the whole
idea is that a small superior army, welded
till it is a bar of steel, shall cut through a
much greater, but also much less harden
ed mass. Lives cannot be thrown away
by such an army, one Speicheren is its
ruin, and when they cannot, the numbers
of the defenders, armed with breech-Ioad-
erS and firing krUppS, makes them very
formidable. The men may not be equal
to the invaders, the batteries may not be
as we'll laid, and the manmuvring may be
far inferior; but if the natives will fight at
all, they can take a terrible number OF
lives. They bring up extravaganza mum
bers of the best guns, they accumulate
endless munitions, and they care nothing
about waste EOf any sort. No intellectual
ability will save men under a storm OF
bullets, if only they are we'll directed; and
there is nothing in the ASiatlc soldier to
prevent his shooting straight, if he is
taught the way. Sikhs do it. If the
Egyptian artillerists had been equal to
Sikh artillerist, no impossible demand,
Sir Beauchamp Seymour would have lost
a third of his Fleet, perhaps have been
obliged to retire from Alexandria, while
in the recent Skirmishes the few British
cavalry, who have done so much, would
just have been swept away. Their lndlvi-
dual superiority would no more have help
ed them than Newton's brain would have
helped him against a hallstorm. The
storm of Tel-eI-Kebir would be a most
serious operation, and when the Army
had succeeded, it would probably be pow
erless until reinfOrcements had arrived.
That will not happen, for the conditions
are not present, the defenders not being
quite brave enough, or quite numerous
enough, or quite enough instructed; but
they might all be present, without any
change in the nature of Orientals. Any
General up to the level, say, OF Osman
Ghazee. with troops equal, say, to Turks,
Sikhs, or trained ArabS-real Arabs, not
F~ellaheen-with the ordinary present
resources in guns and rides OF an ordinary
Oriental State, could in six months make
the conquest o fthat State by any European
Power whatever a work Of excessive dan
ger, e%xertiOn, and eXpense-aS great a
work, in fact, as the conquest OF a Euro
pean country. He would only have to
use the spade constantly, not shutting
himself up as Osmar did, but shutting up
a lieutenant in each successive Plevna,
teach his men to lay their guns, and trust