New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-07-20
ENGLANDS MILITARY ORGANIZATION.

There is one department Oh MI OiauSloho
Admiristratit n which has net been exposed to
the malevolent criticism of his political foes.
That is the War Office. Mr.. Chiders has not
made himself conspicuous in the debates OF
the three Irish sessions, but he has been one
of the most industrious members of the Cab-
net. For three years he has kept one object
constantly in view. He has devoted his admin
istrativo skill to the organization of small
army which could be dispatched for active
service in any quarter OF the world without
confusion or delay. In presenting the esti-
mates for his department last March he an
nounced that he had made arrangements
whereby eighteen battalions of infantry, three
battalions of the Guards and the requisite
proportion of cavalry and artillery could be
kept at their full war strength, 80 as to be
ready to move at short notice. This gave him
an available corps of $4,000 men for any
emergency which might arise; and for larger
operations, when the reserve should be called
out, he counted upon having at least 10000
men ready for service within six weeks. The
emergency has found him as good as his word.
When the troops were needed they were at
hand. The War Office was not forced to con-
solidate regiments nor to send raw recruits to
the military depOts The officials were not
taken by surprise, but were prepared to DIS
patch their little army without serious delay.
The supplies were promptly furnished, the
troop ships were close at hand, and there was
order everywhere. If $4,000 men are
not already in Egypt or distributed among
the Mediterranean posts, it is because the Gov
eminent has not required so large force or
such precipitate haste and there IL no reason
to doubt that q second corps can be speedily
prepared for service and another in BON bay.
These results may seem meagre in COMPARE
son with the barrack- musters Of the great
military camps on tho Continent, but they are
highly creditabe to the British War Office.
The French army is nominally the largest in
Europe, but it was only after prolonged delays
aud conspicuous msmanagement that an
effective force could be organized for service
in Tunis, and when there was urgent need of
achievements the War Office was utterly
demoralized The Russian campaigns in
Armenia and Bulgaria were disastrous at the
outset simply because the armies were on
paper, but not in the field Meikolf being given
100. 900 men when he required 100000 for
the work before him, and the force which after
inexplicable delay finally crossed the Danube
being at least IZo,OUO men DelOW us TepuUtu
strength. Now Great Britain, with its island
fortress which can only be assailed when It's
feet is destroyed, does not attempt to vie with
the standing armies of the Continent. Its
military resources are not to be despised, for
Sir Garnet Wolseley has computed that there
are from 1873, 900 to 100000 trained men
available for campaign, apart from the
Mediterranean garrisOns, the militia, the vol
unteers and the second-class reserve. But this
is not force which enters INTO the ordinary
calculations of the War Office. With COM
paratively small army, England stands outside
the circle of armed camps on the Continent,
and is practically unarmed, depending in ii
supreme moment Of danger upon the patriotism
and sef-possession of its people. But while it
is unarmed, it is not wholly unprepared It's
small army has not always been ready for ser
vice, as it is now Administrative skill has
often been lacking in the War Office, and in a
sudden emergency the staff has sometimes been
thrown into panic. Under the present adj
rninistration the effective force has been
strengthened and professional efficiency has
been promoted. The Egyptian crisis finds the
English army in that high state of preparation
which IS equivalent to an actual reserve of
strength. In this respect there has been a
marked improvement since the Crimea.