St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1882-08-25
Gen. Mcclellan on the Egyp-
tian War.

III lHc september century, Nen.
Geo. b. Mcclellan, writing on "1he
War in Egypt criticiscs as follows
the war measures of the English: The
first mutiny of Arab. his first insolence
to his master, should have been
promptly and decisively rebuked, even
had it been necessary to land force
for the purpose. If the mutual jealousy
of France and England prevented their
nipping this difficulty in the bud by
combined action, it would have been
better for England had she boldly tax
en- the matter in hand, and acted
on her own account, taking the ground
that her Indian interests and the free
use of the SueZ canal rendered such a
course imperative. But temporizing
policy prevailed, and, closing her eyes
against the future, England allowed
matters to drift on from bad to worse,
now and again uttering futile protests,
but doing nothing to guard against the
inevitable result. AT length an Eng
lish fleet was gathered in the harbor of
Alexandria, and an ultimatum sent to
the Egyptian authorities, only to be
contemptuously disregarded. But, un-
like the practice of England in former
times, it was not promptly followed by
a resort to the ultima ratio regum, and
her ignorant and puny foe not unnatu-
rally concluded that it never would he.
| Then came a bloody massacre in the
streets of Alexandria, the history OF
which we do not fully know as yet
| either how it was commenced or who
suffered most from it. Statements
| have been published that it was com
menced by Europeans. But the prob
abilities are that the riot was melted
| by natives actuated by fanaticism and
love of plunder-motives not always
entirely distinct.
Here again was an occasion fOI
prompt action; but it was allowed to
pass, and Arab continued fortifying
the harbOr. Certain, it was now clear
that Arab meant to fight, the only
question being the extent to which his
men would stand by him. By this
time the English must have determined
to demand the surrender of the forts
and, in case of refusal, to open fire
Their guns could destroy the forts and
burn the tOwn-One very likely to fol
low from the other. If the garrison re-
tired-as would no doubt be the cast
when the forts were silenced-it wa.
certain that the spirit displayed during
the recent massacre would lead to fur.
ther scenes of murder, plunder, anC
destruction, which the guns of the flee
could prevent only by the destruction
of the very objects it was desirable t.
save. 1t was very clear, then, that til,
attack by the fleet once being deter
mined upon, common sense demanded
that there should be present and avail
able when it commenced a sufficien
body of troops to be landed as soon a
the forts were silenced, to protect tn,
city and Immediately follow up the re
treating garrison, so as to destroy TIN
prestige of Arab, and prevent the ris
ing from becoming general, national
or religious movement.
j The dilemma is unpleasant for an,
admirer of England and her institu
tions either she is unable-througl
defective organization, maladministra
ton, lack of energy, or too full occu
patton of her resources nearer home
either, we say, she is unable to collec
upon reasonable notice an expedition
AIRY force of ten or fifteen thousan,
men, or her government lacked tin
Nlsuonl 10 anticipate tnc lneNltaDl
necessity for such force at a givel
time, and proved their incompetence,
to direct military expeditions abroad
The excuse that the exigencies of di
plOmacy tied their hands is not "A goo,
one, for in this instance there was a
stake whatever importance the Sue
canal and peace in Egypt may hav
for England, and it was one of thOs
cases where strong nation is full.
justified in running risks and incurrinj
responsibility on the side of safety fo
its most vital interests.