Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1882-07-30

II; The congressman and camp-followers
VINO went In the wake of our army to the
nrst Bull Kun put their confidence in the
little band OF regular troops and the greater
effectiveness, as they deemed it, of our artil-
| lery.
As ample proof of this state of mind it is
| necessary only to recall the abject terror that
was produced throughout all the land by
what Uss known as the "BIack-H Horse Cav
alry"--a legion by no means formidable in
numbers nor remark bic for actual feats of
| arms. During the first year of the Con-
iederacy's existence, however the bare name,
OF this deaths head-snd- bloody-bones corps
was worth more to her cause than 10000 of
the best trained soldiery on earth could have
been. The Southern soldier went into the
battle confident of his own proves and
despising his foe. The Northern soldier en-
| tered the conflict determined to do his best
not shrinking from his duty, but oyeres-
timatiDg his adversary and underestim ating
| himself
| This disparity of spirit-not OF soldierly
/ qualItles-was greatly enhanced by the issue
OF the fret general engagement and the ac-
csssion OF the oyer-cautious Mcclellan to
| the command, with his confidence in pipe
i clay and dress-parade, and his overwhelming
dread OF General Lee and Southern impetu-
osity. The secret OF Grants success lay in
| the fact that he did not believe in these. He
| OOhSiucfcu Tue ANOIlnern volunteer as IuilY
match for his Southern adversary, and did
net have the advantage in numbers or posi-
ton. He appreciated the fact THAT the
| quickest way 10 make recruit a veteran
was TO let Kim share the sweets of victory.
To this, more than to all other qualities, his
success was due. Instead of opposing the
| enemy with slime and tactics" he threw his
columns against them. and taught his men
their tactics under FIRE.
Had the North entered upon the conflict
with that appreciation of It's own fighting
| capacity, with that confidence in the soldierly
qualities of its citizens which the war gave.
the struggle would have been of short dura-
ton. Ga the other hand, if the Southern
soldier had appreciated at the outset the
qualities OF The Northern volunteer, as he
did when the war ended, that self-confidence
which was the chief element of his superb
ority would have vanished, and the magnif-
cent record he has made would never have
been written.
These condition can never be paralleled
again. They do not inhere in the people of
either section. They we're purely temporary
and fortuitous. The South had no real adj
vantage In the familiarity of Its people with
firearms. 1t is doubtful even if as large
proportion OF their armies of our North
ern regiments were accustomed to arms of
precision. So, too, their horssm anship was
more fanciful than real, at least in IT'S re-
soldier had in himself and his leader and
the lack OF confidence in himself and an
overestilnate of bis adversary on the part OF
the Northern soldier that made the chief
difference.
In future war between the sections all
these conditions would be reversed, and from
the outset the advantage in confidence and
spirit would be with the Northern army.
The magic of the old boast has been broken,
and the memory of defeat would weigh the
Southern soldier down with apprehension of
disaster, lust as il did the Northern volun-
teer at the outbreak of the civil war.
In the actual soldierly qualities of the peo-
pie OF the two sections there is probably bat |
little difference. All the talk about the |
tie which is said to characterize the South in
contrast with the North is mere twaddle.
The charge at Mission Ridge, when the army
of Grant went to the summit instead OF in
at the foot of the slope, was the
great miracle of impetuosity OF the whole
world.
On the other hand, the claim of greater
stubborn bulldog grip-on
The part of the North is equally nonsense.
Petersburg is an eternal monument of the
power of the South to stand punishment.
The man who could boast of the superior
staying power of the North with the facts OF
hat marvellous defense before him exceeds
IN assurance the traditional government
mule. The truth would seem to be that in
mere soldisrly qualities the men of the two
sections are very fairly balanced. Each has
ertain advantages which are counterbal-
need by certain deficiencies. The South has |
! better general preparation for camp life,
While the North has more ingenuity and is !
etter able to supply deficiencies of equip
nent and The like. The North has more !
Intelligence, but the South has more homo |
eneity. The Southern soldier can subsist
n less, and the Northern volunteer will
,ore intelligently husband his resources and l
azure himself against disease. In short, q
re believe that the excellences and defects r
suddenly recruited army drawn from c
ach section Tor service against common l
nemy are so evenly balanced that no I'M
observer could find ground on 2
hich to base an intelligent preference.