The Ouachita telegraph. [volume] (Monroe, La.) 1865-1889, 1882-06-24

CLASS OF cases ID tAdV ~ SuolA OO AO0V
lstrongly against the corporation. Every
reasonable doubt is to be resolved adj
versely, nothing is to be taken as con-
coded but what is given in unmistakable
terms, or by an implication equally
clear, ii. e., as clear as unmistakable
terms). The affirmation must be shown.
Silence is negatiOn and doubt is fatal
to the claim. This doctrine is vital to
the public welfare. 1t is automatic in
the jurisprudence of this court -
In a recent case decided by us at
New Orleans, we had occasion to apply
those principles, denying an extension
. of charter claimed. New Orleans and
, Carrollton r. r. Co. VS.. City of New
Orleans, No. s,342 of the N. o. Docket
not yet reported. 344. p.
1t is another axiom that, where a law
is clair and free from all ambiguity,
the letter of it Is not to be disregarded
under the pretext OF pursuing its spirit.
N. G. c., IS.
The rule is neither to be disputed,
that, in a doubtful case, an agreement
is interpreted in favor of him who has
contracted the obligation. N.C.C., 1857.
In nu6iis sezapea', quod minimum, seQ,li-
mar.
When the text relied upon in the
case in 80. A., was first presented to our
consideration as defense, we did not
feel any hesitation to read it so that the
exemption claimed had not yet begun
to run and would not do so unless the
road was first completed, and then for
ten years only afterwards. A further
consideration favored by the the light
thrown on the subject by the defendants,
has not convinced us that we then erred,
but has served rather to strengthen us
in our previous convictions.
We find the letter of the text per-
fectly unambiguous, and such as re-
quires no Interpretation at our hands.
We are told that the intention of the
legislature was to confer an exemption
from the adoption of the charter, until
after ten years from the completion of
the road.
The intention of the law-giver, as we'll
as that of contracting parties and of
testators, is to be ascertained, not what
parties concerned in profiting by adj
vantages claimed, say or affirm it is,
but is to be gathered from the words or
usedfor the purpose of garbing
the thought, the intention.
In such cases we are to ascertain not
qatod voluit, sed Quod DIGIT, in other
words we are to ascertain q1tod rol,nI
by interpreting quod ezirit.
1t is claimed that this Intention is
not 10 be found expressed in it, in the
text, invoked which on its face possibly
justifles the meaning already attached
to it, but must be searched by inquiry |
into the manner in which the State
and the defendants have treated the
provision of law in question. 1t is
insisted that if this be done, the court
will conclude in favor of the exemption,
rs it appears clearly that from 1868 to
1877, the State never dreamed to levy
any tax on the property of the corpo-
ration and that in the case of State VS..
Morgan, 2s, ~, 50, affirmed in 5. Otto,
222, in which a similar dispensation
existed and an exemption was resisted,
it never entered the mind either Of the |
attorney general or of the court to read
the exemption clause as a qualified one,
to take effect only after the determine
ton of the road.
The patentintention of the legislature
was to exempt the property only after
the completion of the work. Its oc-
cult or latent intention, not appearing
must be deemed as conducive only to
that indulgence or immunity. If for
the purpose of eking out the motive
which induced the Legislature to make
tho grant, it was legitimate to invade
as the defendants have assumed to do,
the field of conjectures or speculations,
it might be advanced as proposition
more than plausible, that in according
the immunity, the State proposed to
secure a prompt execution Of the work
and to place the beneficiaries of her
bounties in the impcssibility of de-