The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1882-01-26

doubt on any groundJ or as 10 any OF the
essential elements of she crime theu the de-
PENDANT is entitled to the benefit of that doubt
and to an acquittal 1t was important to ex-
plain to the jury mere in the best way that the
court could what is reasonable doubt. He
could hardly venture to give an exact defini-
ton of the term for he did not know of any
successful attempt to do SO. As to questions
relating to human affairs, knowledge of
which is derived from the testimony it was
impossible to have the same kind of certainty
that is created by scientific demonstrations.
The only certainty that the jury could have as
moral certainty depending on the confidence
which the jury had in the integrity of the
witnesses and in their capacity and opportuni-
ty to know the truth if, for example, facts
not improbable IN themselves were attested by
numerous witnesses, credible and uncon-
tradicted, and who had every opportunity to
know the TRUTH reasonable or moral certain
ty would be inspired by that testimony. In
such case doubt would be unreasonable or
imaginary or speculative. 1t ought not to be
a doubt as to whether party might nol be
innocent in the face. of strong proof of his
guilt, but it must be sincere doubt whether
he has been proved guilty even where the
testimony was contradictory, and where SO
much more credit should be given to one side
than the other the same result might be pro-
duced.
On the other hand opposing proofs might be
80 balanced that the jury might justly doubt
ON which side under all the circumstances the
truth lay, and in such case the accused party
was entitled to the benefit of the donbt All
that jury could be expected to do wos to be
reasonably and morally certain of the facts
which they declared to be their verdict
In illustration of this point Judge Cox quot
ed the charge of Chief Justice Shaw of Massa-
chusettsin the case of the Commonwealth VS..
Webster. With reference to the evidence in
this case very little comment was required by
the court except upon one question, the others
being hardly matters of dispute: That the de-
PENDANT fired at and shot the deceased Presi-
dent was abundantly proved; that the wound
was fatal had been testified by the surgeons
who were competent to speak and thew were
unconcradcted; that the homicide was com
mitted with malice aforothought Gf the defen-
dent were capable of criminal intent or malice)
could hardly be gainsaid 1t was not neces-
sary to prove that any special or express hatred
or malice was entertained by the accused to-
ward the deceased. 1t was sufficient to prove
that the act was done by deliberate intent as
distinct from an act done under a sudden inn
pulse in the heat of blood and without previous
malice Evidence had been exhibited to the
jury tending to show that the. defen-
dant admitted in his own hand writ
ing that he had conceived the idea
of removing the President, as he called it, six
weeks before the shooting, that he had deliber-
ated upon 1t and come to determination to do
it, and that about two weeks before he accom-
plish it he stationed himself at certain point
to do the act, but for SEINE reason was prevent
ed His preparation for it by the purchase of
the pistol had been shown. All these facts
came up to the full measure of proof required
to establish what the law denominated malice
aforethought. The jury would find little diff
Guilty in reaching conclusion as to all the
elements that made up the crime charged in
the indictment, except it might be as to the
one of unsound mind, memory and discretion,
but that was only technical expression for a
responsible, sane man.
Ea has 4bo+
He had already said that the man who is in
sane in the sence that makes him irresponsi-
Bile cannot commit crime. The defence of
insanity had been so absued as to be brought
into great discredit; it was the last resort in
cases of unquestioned guilt. 1t had been an
excrse for juries to bring in verdict of acbuit-
oil when there was public sympathy for the
accused and especially when there was pro-
vocation for the homicide according to public
sentiment but not according to law. For that
reason the defense of insanity was viewed with
disfavor and public sentiment was hostile to it.
| Nevertheless if insanity we're established to a
| degree necessary, it was perfect defense for
| an Indictment for murder and must be allowed
full weight.
| 1t would be observed that in this case there
was no trouble with any question about what
might be called total insanity, such as raving
manias or absolute imblcility in which all exer-
else olree son is wanting and where there is no
| recognition OF persons or things or their rela-
tIoHS. Dut bu0re was q u6DalADl6 DOfu6r llH6
| between sanity and insanity and there was Of
| ten great difficulty in determining on which
| side OF this line party was to be put There
| were cases in which a mans mental faculties
| generally seemed to be in full vigor but where
on one singlesubiect he seemed to be deranged.
| man was possessed, perhaps, by belief OF
| something absurd which he could not be
| reasoned out of, (what was called an insand de-
| lusion) or he might have some morbid propen-
| sity, seeming in harsh discord with the rest OF
| his Intellectual and moral nature. Those were
| cases, which for want of better term were call
ed "partial insanity" Sometimes its exist
| ence and sometimes its limits were doubtful
and undefnable, and in those cases it was diff
| cult to determine whether the patient had
| passen the line of moral or legal accountability
| for his actions. The jury would bear in mind
| that man does not become irresponsible by
the mere fact of his being probably insane.
| Such mad did not take leave of his passions
| by becoming insane; he might retain as much
| control over them as in health; he might COM
matt offences, too, with which his infirmity bad
nothing to do. He might be sane as TO the
crime he committed, might understand its ma
ture, and might be governed by the Same mo-
tives in relation to it as other people while on
other subjects, having no relations whatever to
the crime, he might be might be the victim of
delusion.
Whenever this partial insanity was relied
on as a defence, it must appear that the crime
charged was a product of delusion or other
morbid condition and connected with it as an
effect with cause, and that it was not the re-
suit OF sane reasoning which the party might
be capable of, notwithstanding his limited and
circumscrbed disorder. Ass inning that that
infirmity of mind had direct influence on the
crime, the difficult was to fix the character of
the disorder which fixed the responsibility or
responsibility in law. The outgiving of the
judicial on that subject had not been always
been satisfactory nor in harmony with the
conclusions of the medical service. The
courts had in former times passed
upon the law in regard to insanity
without regard to the medical aspect of the
subject, but it would be only properly dealt
with by concurrence of harmonious treat
ment between the two sciences of law and
medicine. The courts had therefore adopted
and again discarded one theory after another
in their effort to find some common ground on
which to stand, and his effort would be to give
to the jury the results most commonly accept
ed by the courts. 1t would be well to say
word to the jury as to the kind of evidence by
which courts and juries were guarded in this
difficult and delicate inquiry. That subject
called mind defined of course ocular inspec-
ton. 1t could only be known by its manifesto
tons. The test was as to whether the conduct
OF man and his thought and actions con-
formed with those of persons of sound mind,
or whether they contrasted harshly with them.
By that Judgment was formed as to a mans
soundneSs OF mind and for that reason evil
dence was admissible to show the conduct and
language that would indicate to the general
mind some morbid condition of intellectual
powers Everything relating to his mental
and physical history was therefore relevant be-
cause any conclusion on the subject must often
rest on large number of facts, and letters
spontaneously written afforded one of the best
indications of mental condition. Evidence of
insanity in parents was always pertinent, but
juries were never allowed to infer insanity in
an accused from the mere fact of its existence
in ancestors.
When, however, there was evidence tending
to show insane conduct on the part of the ac-
cused, evidence of insanity in ancestors was
admissible as confederation of the other; there