The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1882-05-04
An Important Decision.

An Important Decision.
The Wing Of the 2sth gives the following
statement of the cases taken before the Su-
preme Court of the State concerning the con-
stitutonaity of the Riddleberger bill
The Riddleberger bill yesterday was passed
on by the Supreme Court OF Appeals Of Virginia. All
or the judges present except Judge Moncure,
W. l.. Royal ESD, had asked for nnndnnUS TO
compel Greenhow, city treasurer of Richmond, to
accept cou pons in payment takes. The Common
wealth of Virginia, by her ACKNOWLEDGEMENT F. 5.
Blair resisted the payment In coupons. The case,
it is well known, was elaborately argued by Mr.;
Royal and the Attorney General each making Oral
arguments in court of two hours each, In addition
to printed arguments and briefs The court having
held the matter under adyfsement till yesterday re-
fused the mnndo1nuS.
Judge Burks and Staples were with the Attorney
General while Judges Anderson and Christian were
with Mr.. Royal The opinion of the court was that
the ndadanus is refused the effect Of which Is that
the coupon Killer No. - forerunner OF the Rid
dleberger bill, is constitutional and Valid and tnat
each payer shall be required to prove before
jury that his coupon is genuine before any ax-gath-
shall be required to receive 1t for taxes the
decision in the of Antoni Wright, sheriff of
Richmond, compelled the officers to receive coupons
in payment of taxes. This decision virtually
affrms, by divided court, that the Riddleberger
bill is not unconstitutional and that the remedy
named therein OF a separate and distinct trlal py
jury of each separate and distinct couponholderis
proper and right. The fact that this decision was
rendered by court poll eally hostile to the party
in power is the strongest endorsatlon OF the
propriety and necessity OF the bill
Mr.. Royal indicated his intention yesterday
to appeal to the supreme Court of the United
States.
Judge Staples, in giving his opinion merely
referred to the views he had expressed in the
adjudicated case of Antoni VS.. Wright, involv-
ing the same question as that presented in the
case before the court, and reiterating the con-
cusiOn he had then announced, that the Fund
ing bill Of 1871, because of its coupon feature,
was unconstitutional.
Judge BurkS was not then on the bench,
and as he was not in sympathy with the Read
justers as a party, we publish his opinion in
full, as furnished by the Dispatch.
JUDGE BURKs's OPINION
Aatont u.s. GreenAoto, Treasurer.
When the validity of a statute is judicialy drawn
in question as being repugnant to the Constitution,
Federal 1t is the rule of all the courts and
has been from the foundation Of the Government,
declare the void unless its nullity and
reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt must be
solved in favor OF the legislative action and the act
be sustained. -(Cooley on Constitutional Limita-
tonsS and cited, 152, side p) ''The opposition
between the Constitution and the law must be such
that the Judge feels clear and strong conviction
OF their fncompatiblity.'- Chief Justice Marshall in
Fletcher VS.. Peck, Crouch 81.
This court has often laid down the same rule 1t
is not necessity to cite all the cases. Reference to
few will suffice.
1.-THE question whether law is in accordance
with the Constitution Says Judge Brooke) Is all
times very delicate and important question.
1t should not be in doubtful case that
the acts of that body the Legslature should be de-
cided by the court to be unconstitutional sharp
VS.. Robertson, Grattan. 518-642
In the homestead cases. % Grattan, 266-280, Judge
Christian, in whose opinion the other judges
CURED, while stating it to be lone of the highest
duties and most solemn Obligations (of the Court to
st is the duty of the Judicial department generally
to give effect to the acts Of it's coequa and coordi
nate department, the Legislature, and always in
doubtful to solve the doubt In favor OF
the validity Of the law
Speaking for the Court In Commonwealth VS..
Moore Goodsons, 25 Gratan $751; 53 he re-iterates
the rule: 1--WE can declare an act of the General
Assembly void only when such act clearly and
plainly violates the Constitution and in such man
ner as to leave no doubt or hesitation in our
minds
After careful examination of the subject, am
not satisfied that the legislative acts ques toned in
this proceeding in conflict with clause
of the Constitutional least my conviction of their
inyafd1ty is not SO clear and strong
Judgment to that effect, and L feel bound, there
lore, not to solve my doubts against the validity OF
the acts
Previous to the act of January a. 1882, tie holder
OF coupon had his remedy by lNumdnnus, the pro-
ceedtngS on which were regulated by the provisions
to be found in the Code Of 1875 chapter ISL This
remedy was not wholly abolished by the act in
question. 1t was only modified and the proceed
ings under the writ somewhat altered. This cir
cumstance, however, is not very material, the
remedy by the writ, according to my construction
is en- rely taken away in like the present by
the subsequent act of April 1882. Legislation is
necessary to enable this court to exercise It's orig
nal Jurisdiction by mnndanaus under the Constitu-
tion.-Barnett 2; Meredith, 10; Grattan, ESQ., Page
VS.. Clopton, judge, 30 Grattan, 415-417.
The remedy provided as substitute for the writ
is found in sections l. 2, and of the January
II, 1882 The question is whether it is adequate
substitute for the remedy abolished If it is not
then, according to long line of decisions OF the
preme Court OF the United States, which need
cited, in cannot be sustained.
nv at porp law
somewhat anomalous The return to the aternat-
tive writ was taken true. Its statements could
not be directly controverted in that proceeding. If
legally sufficient, but not admitted to be true, the
relator compelled to his action against
the respondent as for false return If he succeed
ed IN the action, peremptory nomdano@s was award
ed; otherwise not. The proceeding was so changed
at at early day by statute chapter Isl of Code of
1873 as to dispense with the collateral action the
return. The relator allowed to traverse the
turn and All issue was made up and tried by jury.
If found for the relator the peremptory writ was
awarded. Now If under that statute the respondent
had averred in his that the coupon rendered
was spurious, there would have been an issue duly
made up on that question and tried in that proceed
ing, and the peremptory manda,aus would have
| been awarded or not according to the finding
| Suppose the Legislature. upon the of facts
recited in the of January a. 1882 he truth asi
ty which recials and motive actuatg the leg
slature, do not inquire into because such inquiry
seems 20 to be of questionable right In the Judi
ciary Department. had provided in that act that on
| The return in every case jury should be empanel
| led in that proceeding to determine whether the
coupon was genuine or no and that the writ fner-
| emptory) should be awarded not according to
| the finding, would such provision have been tnval
! i'd? 1t would have amounted to a plea Of denial,
| such every defendant may put in to action
against him in any case, and such in fact the
officer might have pleaded if he chose to do in
| every proceeding by ndaddnuS against him prose-
cuted under the law 1t stood before the late act
This act understand it, provides for just such
| an inquiry as the one suggested. 1t admits the
ce1vabilfty of the coupons, If genuine in payment
| OF all taxes, debts, and demands due the Common
wealth. The proceeding is 60 determine whether it
oe genuine or not and would seem TO be as eXpedi-
ttous and effective as the proceeding by mamdomus,
where the same matter may be put in issue-in
both proceedings the coupon is to be received in
| payment If aScertained to be genuine.
The issue to be framed is whetherthe coupons ten
dered are genuine legal coupons, which legally
receivable for taxes, debts, and demands" &c. If
by this language it is intended submit to the ju
the question of the legal validity and receivable
| ty of genuine coupon, should be of opinion that
the act could not be sustained But this does ap
pear to to be the fair construction Such con-
struction would be wholly inconsistent with the
ects and purposes declared in the preamble. take
it that the question to be submitted is whether the
coupons "are genuine, and therefore 'legal' and
| receivable &C.
One of the most Objectionable features of the act
would seem to be that the holder Of the coupon is
required to pay his other dues in money or
Its equivalent and await the result of his action
have it refunded to him in he succeeds In the
action.
Butin the case of Tenn VS. sneed SO U. s. Is otto)
SO, upon which the Virginia act avowedly franz
ed the same thing was required by the Tennessee
act and the Supreme Court of the United States did
not consider that feature as invalidating the act
although the notes rendered were receivable there
as the coupons are here, in payment Of taxes and
0Jner QueS TO STATE. IL would that the writ
of mnnddnuS was not remedy against the State of
Tennessee its officers at the time the act was
passed that made the notes bills in question
receivable by the State. Such was not the
here With US the remedy did lie against the Off
Ger when the funding acts of 1871 and 1879 respect
lively, were passed. But understand the Supreme
Court in their opinion to hold that If mGmdn
had been remedy the action given against the
officer would have been an adequate substitute. l
consider this case in which, Judge Lee said in I
Eyre Jacob, A. Graft 49, sto doubt is to AFFIRM
have less hesitation in yielding this doubt be-
the decision of the court in my opinion, fur
nishes the tgants an opportunity to speedily test
the correctness of the conclusions here the one
side the other in the Supreme Court of the Uni
ted State whose decision whatever 1t may be, must
be a final and conclusive settlement of much-veX-
ed question.
I of opinion that the peremptory mandanlus
should be refused.
We also append tie opinion of Judge An |
derson, who sustained the application for
peremptory 0aGnd0naus against Greenhow-
Judge Christian did not write out an opinion,
but concurred orally with the general view
taken by Judge Anderson.
JUDGE ANDERSONs OPINION,
of opinion that the act of Assembly, approx
ed January a. 1882, which Is relied justify the
refusal of Greenhow (Treasurer) to receive the
pom rendered by the petitioner for his due the
State is plainly In violation of the Constitution of
the State and of the United states. Whilst its pro-
fesSed object in Its title to fraud upon
the Commonwealth and the holders of her secllri-
IL nffn .JSCt a.