Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1882-07-30

OF manders account for it. though, as we sh al
" see hereafter, the constitutional hesifancy o.
Mcclellan very greatly enhanced the rea
= disad vantages under which the Federal
in forces acted. But after all this has beer
o weighed, the fact still remains apparent that
l. the Southern soidiery were, man for man
: more effective in that conflict than the North
ern volunteer.
1t Not little of this great effectiveness Of
l. the Southern soldier was no doubt due to the
70 relation which existed between the rank and
, file and their immediate superiors. 1t was q
L mere extension of the relation under which
IL they had grown up. The leaders in the
= field were only the leaders at home
y under a new name. The aristocracy of the
! Seth furnished from the outset most adj
70 mirable corps of line and staff officers. They
II were Just near enough TO their men to per-
e NIT famiarity and receive respect, and far
n enough from Them TO prevent insubordina-
I ton. Coming from the same vicinsge every
= man knew his officer. The commissioned
/ upstart was far more rare in the G. moderate
e army than in our own. Even where the
, | officer was not personally known 10 his men,
] | he represented class whom they were &C.
9 customed to follow. His right TO lead was
= as instructive as their Willingness TO follow.
: Another thing that made in favor of the
3 Southern soldiers effectiveness was the su-
: periority of their discipline. No doubt many
=. Of our officers will demur to this proposition.
: 1t has been the fashion. among both officers
2 and men of the North 10 sneer at the disci-
plins Of the Confederate army. 1t is true
BAT in non essentials we very greatly excel
them. To thevery last the drill of most of
: the Southern regiments was slack, dribbling
and uneven. They neither marched, wheeled
Il nor hand led their arms with the smartness
precision and regularity which characteriz, d
Four troops In the sense in which our gen.
| erals used the term they were 'new recruits"
till the end of the war. There never was an
hour that We could not beat them on dress
| parade and review, even with hall their
numbers In the essential of discipline,
however, they far excelled us. For neglect
| of duty their men were punished, and pun
ished speedily and severely. Strangely
| enough they did not ESQ far as thewriter has |
learned) whip at all. though the whipping |
| post stood in the shadow OF every courthouse |
| in the Copfsderacy, while our army was pre- |
| pared for the battle Of Bull Run by the de- /
| grading spectacle of the whipping of two |
deserters from their regular brigade.
| So far az possible the Confederate officers
| allowed their men TO take their own course,
| thereby preserving their individuality and
| securing all the more readily their obedience
/ in matters of real importance. -BesIdes thai,
\ the Southern soldier was not so important
| political integer as his Northern compeer.
| If punishment was necessary, 1t was meted
out. TO him without fear oil future conse-
quences TO the officer. OF the officers this
was not true. During the whole war there
were very few, il any, instance in which |
commissioned officers of the Confederate
army were punished with any greater sever
ity than by being cashiered or degraded 10
the ranks; while in our army imprisonment,
the ball and chain, shaving the head, drum
ming through the camp and other monde
script -prufstmeut5 tended to degrade tho
rank of the subaltern who was only distin-
gushed from his men BY the commission
which he held. In trivial les the Southern
soldier was generally SLOUGH with i'm
punity, but when 1t came to real neglect
Of duty, struggling, pillsgipg, cow
ardice and desertion, the terror OF
swift and terrible punishment was ever
before his eyes. "What is that?" the writer !
once asked Confederate prisoner as we
looked down upon the camp OF his division
and saw body of troops paraded, and from
the center shoot off puff of white smoke.
"Wal, was the cool reply, 81 reckon its ole
Bragg a-startin' new graveyard; pother
most be nigh about full" Bragg was not
very successful general. He seemed to lack Q
all power of adaptation to circumstances.
But it was the army thus trained to obedience 6
that, under General Joe Johnston, made the :
wonderful backward movement from Ressca
to Atlanta movement not equaled in
brilliancy completeness and difficulty by .
any other upon either side during the war, .
unless it be the death-grspple around Peters
burg.
II is also true that the Southern soldier
had no little advantage at the beginning in p
the fact that his home life had been much A
more primitive, nearer to that of the camp, Y
than the Northern men of that generation b
had generally experienced. Corn bread, i
bacon. beaten biscuits and coffee had been r
the staples of his food. Nearly all of them, \
too, at one time or another, had been sccus- II
toned to prepare this simple but nutritious ST
fare. They had been accustomed TO travel IL
on foot or horseback over country, and limit CT
their needs to the capacity OF the saddle Ii
bags They were therefore, less inclined 10
overload themselves, and better able to SUBJ 8,
list on and prepare their rations. These II
scts did much to render possible that facili- =.
" of movement on which their early sue -
,esses SO much depended. d.
The chief difference between the Northern y
md the Southern soldier has been almost r.
overlooked by those who have written on the -
ubject. The Southern soldier had absolute
confidence, not only in his officers and lead Oh
rs, but in himself and his fellow-soldiers. NJ
he boast that one Southern soldier could Z
hip FIVE Yankees, though it did not prove 4 Z
lself fact, was unquestionably equivalent ma
D duplication OF the Southern army. The ca
outhern soldier believed moet devoutly in ye
be m atrial superiority of the Socthron, and oes
gave him confidence in the outcome of an
he struggle which greatly enhanced his
rowess The Southern leaders, to man in
lmost were impressed with the same belief UNI
nd recklessness, repeated year alter year yes
it'll a boastfuI exaggeration attend a u
Ig each repetition, had become a heI
art of every Southern mans uncon- Tu
ious cerebration. TThe leaders beloved hin
lat if they could press the fight and over \
over the North at the outset, they would ven
in. To do this they relied on the native GOV
lring and impetuosity of their men. Their sin,
st STEP therefore, was TO transform pro- The
ssedly defensive into an offensive war. insl
his was the very means Of all vtherr iiho'y par
make such troops effective. To require the
irscles OF them was to presupPose marvel tiof
s power in them. The campaigns of Jack sen
n were Napoleon in Italy over again. G
With new troops drawn from a people ii
fled up with military vanity and overflow thse.
WIN connuee ~ r,ar,sI o ann. Dul
IS to another, giving no time for considers pr
~ VI Il. -i ~ -. - a,,as,ad - an
les he transformed them into veterans be- ~
e they had fairly learned the movements .e
~ e, my ...o -: a.. -on,bar,, laaJar II,
= Sea uIa-S;,,,.,a ~ Son,ba-r, ~ com
icy and the antecedent Southern life were .ne
in exquisite harmony. The Confederacy ID
ked perfectness of detail-the machinery | excl
and the machine soldier; but to b
81 vbat was of infinitely greater yalue ! artis
abaolute fitness and proportion of Its diff full c
superiority over its adversary. scarf
But this was only half the advantage de- be Il
ed from this belief. The Northern soldier has /.
the Northern leaders believed it also | mess
the Northern mind the Seutherner was Will,
ne especially delighting in blood and war. he b.
) superiority of the Southern volunteer a sto
,es was at the outset conceded directly or Parli
irectly by all. ton
he North openly and professediy put its sculp
YES of success frat OF all in the regular
", and after that in its preponderance of I,
nbers mechanical skill and material re-
rces. The Northern leader, as a rule. of
81 WI psieer oJ Ji. on Inc I'M gardi
NJ III So,.,h.- 49, forever on me issue
!. - ~ Sor.s,, 49,, Iaineo 10 politi
- ,.srr,aJ n. ..s-sis;re :, e. ooynood at mig
suse it was political necessity. The h.at,
. Bull Run campaign was made against $50
protest of the actual comm snder Of our Il,
es. The only hope eur officers had of ocos,
,ess lay in the fact that we had the areo- ins
e." and thought we outnumbered the sc a
ny very considerably. irsn
s for the soldiery, the general feeling was esty,
while they were physically match, nsca.s
for man. for their adversaries, the latter 1870
previously led sort of a semi-ciyilized
of which fighting had been main eIe- ssS ualu
{, and that they would naturally have N'
advantage on their side at the outset -
soldiers, like the leaders OF the Northern ends !;
les, relied on time, numbers, drill and 5uc,;o
Pment TO overcome the tacifIy-admitted csnt;o
onal ascendancy of the Southern soldiers. end !,
is true there was an abundance of boast endov
The press and the stump orators and b.nni,
times the soldiers themselves ridicussd clamat
lain of the Southern man to indi yidua al inc M,
riority az the ciamor of the cowardly achesp