Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1882-01-06

THE WAY MESsRS. SC0yIILR AND REED WANT tn
COURT TO INSTRUCT Tue JURY.

THE WAY MESSKS SC0yILE AND REED WANT THE
COURT TO INSTRUCT TIE JURY.
Judge Cox adjourned the Guiteau trial Wednes-
day for two days in order to allow Messrs Sco-
Vile and Reed time to prepare their prayers to the
court for instructions to the jury Messrs Scoville
and Reed were in consultation long time yester-
day regarding the substance OF the prayers. and
Mr. Scovlle did not finish the last paragraph
until quite late last evening. The prayers have a
special interest as indicating the construction
placed by the defence upon the law and practice
regarding insanity. Following is the full text OF
the document:
In the Supreme Court OF the District OF Col,s71,-
Ola, holding a Criminal Term:
THE UNITED STATES VS.. CHARLES j. GuITEAU-
Case No. 4o56-Indictinent for murder.
=. fae court is respectfully asked by counsel for
the defence in this case to instruct the jury as
follows, viz:
l. The legal test OF responsibility. when insanity
Is set up as a defence for alleged crime, is not
merely whether the accused knew at the time wha t
he was DOING and that the act was contrary to
law, for an irresponsible insane person may know
those things but was the act Gone the result OF
an insane deIusion, or was it committed under an
influence or power which the accused could net
resist by reason of his unscundness OF mind. And
II the jury find from the evidence that either of
these laSt-named conditions existed then the ac-
cused Is not legally responsible, and the verdict
should be "not guilty by reason OF insanity"
n AIT Ath3ngn oa the a accused & may have known what
contrary to the law OF the land, yet II when he
performed the act he really believed that he was
thereby producing public benefit, and was actu-
ated by an insane delusion, that he was carrying
out an inspiration OF Divine origin or approval,
and would not have done the act but for such in
sane deluson, then the accused is not guilty of the
crime charged against him, and the jury should
find him mot guilty by reason of insanity"
3. Insanity constitutes defence If by reason OF
it the accused at the time OF committing the act
charged did not know what he was doing, or II he
did not know that what he was doing was con-
trary to lawi or If the act would not have been
done by him but for reason OF the insanity.
4. The only evidence in the present case tending
to show an irresistible impulse to commit the
homicide, or that the accused acted under the
pressure OF an insane delusion in doing that act Is
found In the conduct and words OF the accused as
free agency OF the accused was destroyed by con-
V1cton on his part that the death OF the President
was required for the good OF the American people,
and that he was divinely inspired to remove him
by death, is one OF fact to be determined by the
jury from all the evidence in the case, and such
accused. But such conviction, If it really existed
party knew what he was doing, and that it was
OF an insane delusion, and he was impelled to do
the act by such delusion. Such delusion may
aS 70 DGne s to an IT.
be the product OF an unsound mind, nor error OF
Judgment; not even the fixed belief that what is
prohibited by the law is commanded or approved
by Divine authority, can exempt the accused from
responsibility for breaking the law, IT, at the time
he knew what he was doing, and that it was con-
sane delusion. To have such effect, the commit
ting OF the act charged must have been the result
OF an insane deluscn, OF such force as to deprive
the accused OF the degree OF reason necessary to
distinguish between right and wrong in respect of
the act, as sane people generally Judge OF such
conduct. The delusion must have been such that,
at tie time OF committing the act, he either did
not know what he was doing, or, If he did, he must
have acted under controlling conviction that the
the act was contrary to the law OF the land yet If
he did it under the insane delusOn, that it was
commanded to be done by God, such knowledge
On his part would not make him liable to punish
meHt -
s. Whether insanity exists, or has existed at any
time with the prisoner, and the degree of insanity
II any such exists or has existed are questions OF
fact to oe determined entirely fy the jury from
the evidence.
g. Ii the jury find from the evidence that the
prisoner Was Of unsound mind at the time of the
doing OF the act charged against him as criminal
In this case, then 1t is also the duty OF the jury to
find whether said act was the result OF such
unSOundneSS OF mind
:; The punishments of the law are intended for
rational persons, and no one out rational person
can commit the crime of murder.
g. Insanity may be interposed as a legal defence
in any prosecution for an otherwise criminal act,
and II such defence be established by the evidence,
1T takes away the criminality, and the act ceases
to be crime in contemplation of law.
II the jury have reasonable doubt as to the
sanity OF the accused at the time of committing
the act charged against him as a crime, they
should give him the benefit OF that doubt, and
should find him mot guilty by reason Of in
SANITY"
10 The jury are sole Judges OF the credibity of
witnesses, and have a riybt to take into account
in weighing the evidence, any apparent feeling or
interest manifested by witnesses On the stand;
their manner o. testi ying, their compensation or
want OF compeMns n ton an, and any other creum
jury may think would influence them.
II. II the jury believe from the evidence that
the prosecution have wi1tully suppressed evidence
OF the mentil condition OF the accused, during two
weeks next following the shooting or President
Garfield, which it was in their power to have pro-
11.pi haU Ua rrh n fal-n
that fact into consideration as raising presllnp-
ton that suc h evidence, if produced, would have
been unfavorable to the prosecution.
II, Ii the jury shall believe IRON the evidence
that the prisoner was OF sound mind, or not so
insane as TO be irresponsible for the act, at the
time of shoot ng at the Presi lant the 2I day of
July, 1884, and that he then unlawfully and will
fully, but without malice in fatt in the district OF
Columbia, shot at and thereby injured the Presi-
dent, OF which shooting and injury the person so
injured subsequently died in the state OF New Jer-
sey, and W thin the United States, then the pris-
Oner is guilty Of the crime OF manSlaughter and
'he jury could SO find. Section 5,341. Rev. Statutes
49, Tie jury are instructed to find separate
verdict upon each count IN the Indictment, and
1naSmuch as 1T is charged In the first, second,
fourth, fifth, seventh and eighth counts of the
President took place @ In the County Of Wash,ngton
In the said District OF Columbia, and there is evil
dence OF such fact therefore the jury are directed
to IND the accused not guilty upon each OF said
H. 1nasmuch as the evidence is uncontradfcted
IN tn1S case CnaG the wound was inflicted upOE
the President by the accused on the 2l day OF July
A. D. 1881, in the county OF Washington, in the
District OF Columbia, and that the President sub
sequently, and In the month Of September, A. d.
1881, died OF such wound in the state OF New Jer-
Sey the jury are instructed that by reason these
facts the accused is not guilty OF the crime OF
murder as charged in the Indictment, and the
verdict must be not guilty, unless the jury shall
find him guilty of manslaughter. charged in the
18th prayer OF the defence
The Question Of JurisdictiOm.
It will be observed that MI. Scoville has raised
the question of jurisdiction In the closing para
graph in his prayers In the minds of many law
yers there Is considerable ground for debate on the
question. At the City Hall this morning the sub
Ject was rather freely discussed among lawyers
Some who had paid little attention to the subject
consider 1t an error due to ignorance or inadvert
ence to state that the case might be excluded from
the court unless verdict OF nnanSlaughter was
rendered, as the opinion prevailed that the plea Of
jurisdiction would be equally strong either in a
case OF murder or one OF manSlaughter. It was
thought that the alternative verdict, under the
presumption that the plea OF want OF Jurisdiction
could be maintained, should be guilty OF
assault with intent to kill. A STAR
reporter applied to the district attorneys
Office for enlightenment on the law, and was In
formed that there was a distinction as to the
matter OF Jurisdiction between the crimes OF man.
slaughter and murder. Murder being capital
crime it is set around with rules OF law entirely
distinct from penitentary offences. and II iS he