Morning journal and courier., 1882-08-22

Gen. Mcclellan on the Egyptian War.
 In the September Century, Gen. Geo. B.
 Mcclellan, writing on 'The War in Egypt
 criticises as follows the war measures of the
 English
 The first mutiny of Arabi, his first inso-
 lence to his master, should have been prompt
 ly and decisively rebuked, even had it been necessary to land 8 force for the purpose. If
 the mutual jealousy of France and England prevented their nipping this difficulty in the bud by combined action, it would have been
 better for England had she boldly taken the matter in hand and acted promptly on her own account, taking the ground that her In, dian interests and the free of the Suez canal rendered such a course imperative. But temporizing policy prevailed, and, closing her eyes against the future, England allowed matters to drift on from bad to worse, now and again uttering futile protests, but doing nothing to guard against the in evitable result At length an English fleet was gathered in the harbor of Alexandria, and an ultimatum sent to the Egyptian au- thorities only to be contemptuously disre- garded But, unlike the practice of England in former times, it wes not promptly followed by resort to the ultinaG aatio qeg1la,a and her ignorant and puny foe not unnaturally con cluded that it never would be. Then came 8 bloody massacre in the streets of Alexandria, tue history of which we do not fully know as yet-either how it was commenced or who suffered most from it Statements have been published that it was commenced by Euro peans. But the probabilities are that the riot was melted by natives actuated by fanaticism and love of plunder-motives not always en- tirely distinct.
 Here again was occasion for prompt action; but it was allowed to pass and Arabi continued fortifying the harbor. Certainly, it was now clear that Arabi meant to fight, the only question being the extent to which his men would stand by him. By this time the Fno11Sh noust hava 9Atarmined to 1arnap1 the surrender of the forts, and in case of refusal, to open fire. Their guns could de- stroy the forts and burn the town-one very likely to follow from the other. If the garri-
 son retired-as would no doubt be the case when the forts were silenced-it was certain that the spirit displayed during the recent massacre would lead to further scenes of murder, plunder and destruction, which the guns of the fleet could prevent only by the destruction of the very objects it was desira- the attack by the fleet once being determined upon, common sense demanded that there should be present and available when it com menced sufficient body of troops to be landed as soon as the forts were silenced, to protect the city and immediately follow up the retreating garrison, so as to destroy the prestige of Arabl, and prevent the rising from becoming general, national, or religious movement.
 The dilemma is unpleasant for any admirer of England and her institutions either she is unable-through defective organization l maladministration, lack of energy, or too full occupation of her resources nearer home either, we say, she is unable to collect upon I reasonable notice an expeditionary force of ten or fifteen thousand men, or her govern ment lacked the wisdom to anticipate the in evitable necessity for such force at a given time, and proved their incompetency to di- rect military expeditions abroad. The ex- cuse that the exigencies of diplomacy tied their hands is not good one, for in this in-
 stance there was at stake whatever of import
 ance the Susz canal and peace in Egypt may
 have for England, and it was one of those
 cases where @ strong nation is fully justified
 in running risks and mourning responsibility the side of safety for its most vital inter- eStS