The Somerset herald. [volume] (Somerset, Pa.) 1870-1936, 1882-02-01

jdoubt-.. He could hardly venture t(
give the exact definition Of the term
lor he did not know of any success
lfhl attempt TO do SO. As 10 ques
tons relating to human affairs
knowledge of which is derived from
testimony il was impossible to hav,
the same mind. Certaidty. that i,
created by scientific demonstration
Ne o..Iy certainty tb- fury coule
have wss moral cei il;liniy, depend
ing on lae confidence which the ju
lrv had II. their capacity and oppor
tunity IL know the truth. If, for ex
ample, facts notimprobable in them
selves were attested by numerous
witnesses, credible and unco contra.
dicted, and who had every. opportu.
nifty to know the truth q reasona-
bic or moral certainty would be in.
Ispired by that testimony. In such
case doubt should be unreasonable,
or imaginary or speculative. l
ought not to be a doubt as to wheth-
er the party might not be innocent
in the face of the strong eroofs of his
guilt, but it must be sincere doubt
whether he had been proved guilty,
Even where the testimony was con.
Trajectory, and where 30 much more
credit should be given TO one side
than the other, the same result
might be produced. On the other
hand, opposing proof might be 30
balanced that the jury might justly
doubt on which side, under all the
circumstances. the truth lay, and in
such case theaccused party was enti.
tied to the benefit ofthe doubt. All
that the jury could be expected to
do was to be reasonably and moral
ly certain of the facts which they de-
clared to be their verdict. In illus
tration of this point Judge Cox quo
ted the charge of Chief Justice Shaw
of Massachusetts,. in the case of the
Commonwealth vs.. Webster.
With reference to the evidence in
this case very little comment was
required by the Court, except upon
the question of insanity, the others
being hardly matters of dispute.
That the defendant fred it and shot
the deceased President was aband-
antly proved. That the wound was
fatal had been testified to by sur.
geons who were competent to speak,
and they were uncontradicted. That
the homicide was committed with
malice afore thought (if the defend
ant was capable of criminal intent
or malice) could hardly begainsaid.
II WIS not necessary to prove that
any special or express hatred or ma
lice was entertained by the accused
toward the deceased. You will
find little difficulty in reaching a
conclusion as to all the elements
that made up the crime charged in
the indictment, except it might be as
to the one of sound mind, memory
and discretion" But that was only
a technical expression Of a resDon-
sl0le sane man.
He now approached that difficult
question. He had already said u
man who is insane in the sense that
makes him irresponsible cannot
commit crime. The defense of in
sanity had been 10 abused as to be
brought into great discredit. 1t was
the last resort in cases of unques-
toned guilt. 1t had been an ex-
cuse for juries to bring in verdict
of acquittal when there was public
sympathy for the accused, and espe-
cially where there was prevocation
tor homicide, according to public
sentiment but not according to law.
For that reason the defense of insan-
ity was set up. 1t was sufficient to
prove the act was done with deliber-
ate intent as distinct from an act
done under certain impulse, in the
heat of blood and without malice.
Evidence had been admitted to
the jury tending ts show the de-
fendant admitted in his own hand
writing he had conceived the idea of
removing the President" as he
called it, six weeks before the shoot
ing that he had deliberated upon
it and come of the determination to
do it, and that about two weeks be-
fore he accomplished it he stationed
himself at certain points to do the
act, but for some reason was prevent
ed. His preparation for it by the
purchase OF a pistol had been shown.
All these facts came up to the full
measure of proof required 10 estab-
lish what the law denominated ma
lice aforethought. Nevertheless, it
insanity were established to the de-
gree necessary, it was perfect de-
fense 10 the indictment for murder,
and must he allowed full weight.
1t would be observed that in this
case there was no trouble with any
question about what might be called
total insanity, such as raving mania
or absolute imbecility, in which all
exercise of reason is wanting. and
where there is no recognition of per-
sons or things or their relations. but
there vas a debatable border line
between sanity and insanity, and
there was great difficulty in deter
mining on which side OF this line the
party stood.
The jury would bear in mind that
a man did not become irresponsible
by the mere fact OF his being par
TALLY insane. As the law assumed
everyone, at the outest, to be sane
and responsible the question was,
What was there in this case to show
the contrary as TO the defendant :?
The jury was not warranted in inter
ferring the man was insane from the
mere fact of his committing crime,
or from the enormity of the crime,
because the Law assumes there is
bad nature and that the criminals
promoted BY malice, If nothing else
appears. He had dwelt upon the
question Of insane delusion simply
because the evidence relating to that
was evidence touching the defend
ants power or want of power (from
mental disease) to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong as to the act
done by him. This was the broad
question for the jury to determine,
and was what was relied upon by