Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1882-08-26
GENERAL MoLELLAN's VIEWS.
A Sharp Criticism of the Slow Move
ments OF the English In EgYpv,

In the September Century Gen. Geo. B.
Mcclellan, writing on "The War in Egvof y
criticises as follows the war measures Of the
English:
The first mutIny of Arab, his first inso-
lence to his master, should have been
promptly and decisively rebuked, even had
1t been necessary to land force for the
purpose. II the mutual jealousy of France
and England prevented their nippinp this
difficulty In the bud by combined action. n
would have been better for England had
she boldly taken the matter in hand and
acted promptly on her own account, taking
the ground that her Indian interests and
the free use of the Suez canal rendered
such course imperative. But tempo
rizing policy prevailed, aud, closing her
eyes against the future Engleud allowed
matters to drift on from bad to worse. now
and again uttering futile protests, but doing
nothing to guard against the inevitable re-
suit. At length an English feet was gath
cred In the harbor OF Alexandra, and an
ultimstum sent to the Egyptian authorities.
only TO be contemptuously disregarded.
But, unlike the practice of England In former
times, It was not promptly followed by re-
sort 10 5ne mtlnad ratio re9aSna, and her igno-
rant and puny toe not unnaturally concluded
that 1t never would be. Then came bloody
massacre In the streets of Alexandria the
history Of which we do not fully know ss
yet-either how it was commenced or who
suffered most from 1t. Statements have
been published that 1t was commenced bv
Europeans; but the probabilities are that
the riot was melted by natives actuated bv
fanaticism and love of plunder-motives not
always entirely distinct.
Here again was an occasion for prompt
action; but it was allowed to pass, aud Arabi
continued fortitying the harbor. Certainly,
hot Arab 70 Rerbe
the only question being the extent to which
his men would stand by him. By this time
the English must have determined to de-
mand the surrender of the forts, and, In case
OF refusal, to open fire. Their guns could
destroy the forts and burn the ToWn-one
very likely TO follow from the other II the
garrison retired-as would no doubt be the
case when the forts were silenced-it was
certain that the spirit displayed dur
ing the recent massacre would lead
to further scenes of murder, plunder
and destruction, which the guns Of
the feet could prevent only by the destruc-
tion of the very objects 1t was desirable to
save. 1t was very clear, then, that the at
tack by the feet once being determined
upon, common sense demanded that there
should be present and available when It
commenced a sufficient body of troops to
be landed as soon as the forts were silenced,
to protect the city and Immediately follow
up the retreating garrison, so as to destroy
the prestige of Arab, and prevent the
rising from becoming general, national, or
religious movement.
The dilemma is unpleasant for any ad-
mirer OF England and her institutions; either
she is unable-through defective organiza-
tion, nal administration, lack of energy, or
too full occupation OF her resources nearer
home-either, we say, she is unable to col
lect upon reasonable notice, an expedition
ary force of 10000 or $4,000 men, or her
government lacked the wisdom to anticipate
the inevitable necessity for such a force at a
given time, and proved their incompetency
to direct military expeditions abroad. The
excuse that the exlgencies of diplomacy
tied their hands is not good one, for IN
this instance there was at stake whatever OF
Importance the Suez canal and peace in
Egypt may have for England, and it was
one OF those cases where a strong nation IS
fully justified in,running risk aa6 iucurf'ne
on the side OF ssfssv sor i5s
most vital interests.