National Republican., 1882-11-30

ing" TO Brulnsburg, n distance OF eight miles, IN |
the night time, crossing tho river Ia boat at |
daylight, marched TO the field OF battle, and was |
o clock that day
Gen. Grant will remember that Gen. McPher-
sons corps, after marching tho greater part Of the
day 70 the sound of Gen. Shermau's guns at the |
battle of Jackson, moved that night att o'clock |
under orders from Gen. Gfaut, marching twenty
two miles over IA muddy road, and by IL the next
day was formed in line of battle and confronting
These things, however, were done under orders
from Gen. Graut, whose orders were always
obeyed.
Suppose his officers had taken 1t upon them.
selves to determine the manner Of obeying i'm
perntive commands, how long does any one sup;
suppose Gen. Grants Justification of tue dsobedi-
ence of orders, as he has stated IL In defense
0i Porter, had been published by MIN Grant 70
erals, does any one suppose by such discipline he
would ever have made the success he did and be-
come the hero he Is? No, srl His officers did
not stop 10 write letters of criticism against him.
They obeyed his orders and fought the enemy
with good will. 1fthey failed to obey his orders
they failed to retain their commands longer under
him.
The Generals present justification of the dis
obedience of q peremptory order, Ii followed out
by generals, would make any army n mob and
the commanding general laughing stock IL
would authorize every officer, down to the lower
ofhcels III rank, 10 determine how and when they
wonld uct under orders
George Washington, who is not yet forgotten In
this country as u leader of an army. issued the
following order TO his army, and until now have
never heard its correctness disputed by any mill
lary man
It is not for every officer to know the principles
upon which every order 8 Issued, and TO Judge now
they may or may not be dispensed with or suspended
utmost puncuality aud exactness They are to con
slider that military movements are like the working
easier II every oeef does his duty. bit without il be
as easily dlsordered, because neglect from any one,
like the stopping of wheel, disorders the whole.
The General theref re expects that every officer VIII
country claims 1t OF them and earnestly calls upon
This order was issued at Geu. washington's
headquarters on the 10th of October, l777, AT
Taoneusing.
testimony, in answer TO Gen. Grants Justification
of Porters disobedience of Pope's order OF 6:3O
=. m, Aug. "a, 1862
THE 4:3o P. N. ORDER.
/ now desire to examine the position of Gen.
Grant in his justification of Porter in the dis
obedience Of what is known as the "4:30 y. IN.
order, of the 29h," delivered to Porter by Capt.
Douglas Pope; but in order TO get better UNDER
standing of this part OF the case 1t will be neces-
sary to take up the orders issued to Porter prior to
hs @ Nny n dSig tSe % shSM Su
all that preceded it.
The situation was about as follows:
jackson, with the confederate army, was be-
hind the Independent aud Manassas Gap Rail-
road cut, which contemplated road was to con-
meet Win me old Manassas Gap Railroad ~
GAINESVILLE his left at Sudey Springs his line fol-
lowing the railroad cut. Longstreet was march
ing down through Thoroughiare Gap to GAINESVILLE
10 the support oi Jackson
Pope was moving his force to the front and left
OF jackson; his right near Sudley Springs; his
left running up the Warrenton, Gainesville, and
Centervllle pike, extending his left beyond the
right flank OF Jackson, on and up the pike beyond
Groveton. Pope issued nn order at o'clock a. m
Tor Porter TO move at daylight TO Cenervilie. This
order being verbal order, Porter did not obey it,
but instead of moving he was III his camp at q
O'Clock a.. M, one hour after sunrise, writing
another letter to Gen. Burnside criticising the
movements OF the general commanding. Gen.
Pope in the meantime, finding that Longstreet was
moving to the support of Jackson, aud that Porter
was still not moving, changed his order and put
it in writing to Porter, TO avoid any excuse on
Porters part. The order was in the following
language:
yILLE, Aug. %, Is62-7b MAJ -9en. Fs-John Porter
which ~ You NV viii tai take WITH you. upon gainesville
am following the enemy down the WarrentOn turn
JoHN PorE, MajorGeneral Commanding.
This order was handed to Gen. Porter about
o'clock. His Troops were then ready 10 move. ;,
Let me ask: How did he obey this order? He
states in his own testimony before the Mcdowell
court of inquiry that he did not move until 10
| o'clock His line of march was on the road from
Manassas Station across Dawkinss Branch to
Gainesville passing some two miles to the left OF
| Groveton-the whole distance being eight miles
Dawkins's Branch at II o'clock, distance of five
| miles. By this time Longstreet had his command
| line on Pageland Lane to the right and rear of
Jackson. his right resting ON the old Manassas
| Gap Railroad, which lay between the Warrenton
and Centrevllle turnpike and the road upon
| which Porter was marching, his (Longstreet's) 81
| right not coming nearer than about one half a
| mile of the route over which Porter would march
! to Gainesville. In fact, If Porter had moved
| forward his command would have come square
upon Longstreets right flank.
AT Dawkins's Branch Gen. Mcdowell came up
| TO the head of Porter's column, having what is
known as the joint order or an order to Mcdowell
and Porter both both 70 proceed to GAINESVILLE Here
| were in his immediate trout Hc put out a few
| skirmishers and stopped his whole command,
stretching along the road back 10 Bethel Chapel,
nearly three miles, and remained in that position
| the whole day.
Al this point Mcdowell showed Porter the joint
| order to proceed ~ Gainesville at the same time
giving him the information sent 10 Pope by Buford
of the passage of the fifteen regiments of infantry
and 500 cavalry through Gainesville that morning.
This was the only information that Porter had on
| the subject Of Longstreets forces, as he stated
| himself.
Mcdowell, finding that 1t was impossible to pass
| Porter's forces in the road with his command,
went back and took his command on road off TO
the right reaching out to the rear of Popes forces
| that we're then engaged in battle. He marched,
| and arrived in time TO put his forces in action,
and fought them until O'clock that evening.
Others as II was known by Porter al the time, that
Longstreet, with some %, 600 men, was in position
confronting Porter by u o'clock on the 29Ih OF
August four and a. half hours before the 430 order
was written"
| Upon what this statement of Gen. Grant is based
| 1t is impossible for me 10 understand In the frs,
| place, Porter did not know that Longstreet was
there with %, 900 men, nor did he know, unless he
made false statement, anything about the force
| except what Gen. Mcdowell told him was his in-
| formation received from Gen. Bulord. Nor was
| Longstreet confronting Porter. He was two and
a.salf miles away from Porter; was not on the
| same road that Porter was, but was forming wcs
| of the old Manassas Railroad on Pagelaud Lane
to the right of Jacks1s's forces, fronting the
forces under Pope, on Pope's left max, that were
then attacking jackson. His front was entirely jr
q different direction from Porter
If Porter had moved forward from Dawkins's
Branch he would have attacked Longstreet on his
right flank and in rear, and no matter how many
| troops Longstreet had Porter would have had al
open road behind him. Whether he could have
| whipped Longstreet or not is not the question
| He could have forced LOngstreeps whole command
to change front and face about, throwing thei
left clear around and fronting the east instead o
the north, and during that movement he woulC
have had the opportunity Of striking him heavily
In the flank, and doubling his forces up, forcing
Pope on his (Popes) left flank. If Porter coulC
not have been successful he had the open roaC
behind him upon which to retreat.
Gen. Grant says that Porter was left with 1000
II Gen. Grant will examine the report he viii
find that Kings Division was no part of Porter
command; Withdrawing 1t did not reduce hi
own force, or the force that he had reported q
under his command that morning. His own re
port shows that he had about $4,000 men.
THE FORCES THAT WE'RE PRESENT.
4 IWould like to put this question TO Gen. Grant
ON his ewn showing, Gen. Grant says that Pop
had 49, 900 men confronting Jackson. Jackson ha'
1000 men, Porter had lO,OSS issn Longstreet haC
1000 men.
Longstreot's own report shows that a large per
ton OF his force was attacking Popes left IN from
OF Jackson.
Add the 25, 900 men OF Longstreets to Jackson
22000, and it would make the confederate arm
1900 strong.
Adding Porter's 10000 men Grants estimaIel /
Pope's 5000 would have made 1900 men con
tending against 1900 men.
But take Porter's report (morning reporD show
ing that he had 1900 men, which with Pope
49, 600 would make 46 900 men on Pope's side AM
1900 men ON the confederate side.
AS military man, would Gen. Grant not say
no matter where the attack was made by Porter
. | IL Wpuld have been using DC O01 men auains