The sun., 1882-06-18
The Atlanta Campaign.

campaign.
The latest addition to the series OF his
torical monographs relating to the civil war
now publishing by the Scribners is an account
Of the movements which resulted in the occu-
patton Of Atlanta in September. 1864. The
author, Gen. j. ID. Cox. was it will be remem-
bered. commander of the Twenty-third Corps
during part Of the year. and Of course speaks
with authority as far as the movements OF tho
Army OF the Ohio are concerned. Indeed. after
tho departure of the Ninth Corps, which was
Incorporated with the Army OF the Potomac, and
OF the Fourth Corps. which resumed its place
in the Army of the Cumberland. the so-called
Army of the Ohio consisted almost exclusively
of the Twentythird Corps, which was tenn
porarily in command Of Gen. Cox. His testi-
mony is that Of an eyewitness SO far as con-
Germs the smallest OF the three armies under
Sherman in this campaign
According to The authors estimate Sherman
entered upon tho movements against Atlanta.
the railway centre OF Johnston's army. with an
effective force Of nearly 100 600 men. and 254
guns. or these. the Army Of the Cumberland
had 60 900 men and 1870 guns the Army OF the
Tennessee. 25.000 men and SO guns and tho
Army of the Ohio. 14000 men and 2S guns
Gen. Cox finds it difficult TO determine the ex-
act force Of the Confederate army in Georgia
at the opening OF the campaign. John
ston's report to President Davis on Jan.
2. 1864, placed the effective total OF his
army at $4,000. On May Johnston gave
his effective force as 44,000, but accord
ing to the author of this volume he fol-
lowed different system OF computation from
that adopted by the Federal commanders. Gen
Cox thinks we ought to add about twenty per
cent. to Johnston's estimate, and that after
Folks corps had joined him the Confederate
commander had about IS 900 men. The posi-
ton occupied by Johnston at Dalton is pro-
nounced imprcgnable to an attack in front
or on either flank; but it seems that Thomas
pointed out to Sherman how it might be turned
by sending column through Snake Creek Gap.
The fact that this route. which. in accordance
with the suggestion OF Thomas. was followed
by the,Army Of the Tennessee under McPher-
son, proved to be almost entirely unguarded
indicates that Johnston supposed this route
to be impracticable for large force. 1t is
hard now to realize how little accurate knowl-
edge either party had of the topography Of the
southern country.
When Mcpherson, following the route
named reached ResGca. in the rear Of Dalton,
Johnston was compelled to fall back. but he
halted, it will be remembered. whenever he
could find position available for defence, it
being his settled conviction that in view Of tho
disparity Of force the Confederate army ought
not 10 fight a battle in northern Georgia unless
great olunder on TIA" other sido should reveal an
opportunity Tor a decisive advantage. Gen. Cox
thinks the results which followed n change of
pohcy later IN the campaign went iar 10 justify
Johnston. The latter adopted plan of care
fully intrenched lines, one necessarily raised
behind another. as he might be compelled to
retire He practsed we are told lynx-eyed
watchiuness Of his adversary, tempting Sher-
man constantly to assault his intrcnchments.
h"i"lhs MS lortlhcd positions to the last mo-
meht' ana choosing that last moment so we'll
as 10 save nearly every gun and wagon In
the hHai wNhuraWaI' ana always presenting
'front.' covered by such defcnccs that one man
pehlnd them was. according TO al! military
rules' eqnal 20 thrce or Tour attacking them. In
TINS way Johnston constantly neutra!lzed tho
superiority oi loree wleIdod by MS opponent,
anu h"ue MS retreat from baIloh 10 the chat
ahoochee mo'ei OF defensive warfare.
As is well known, Johnston was abruptly
relieved from the command on the l7th
OF July. the day before that on which
he had planned an attack with the
greater part oil his own forces on Sher-
mans right wing which would then DO sep
ara'ed from the centre. we are told by Gen.
ooN 'h''t Vie ch"hso Oh confederate command
ers WAS ehrhou WIN satisfaction by every OIL
c'i an" man III 'ii' roucFa army Inc skill
ana "a'chlnlheSs win which johnston had
h'ways coh'roh'eu sherman with imprcgnaoe
lort'"c'l"ohs h''a peeh eS!sPerating. com
plete chahse Oh pol'cy on the part OF the Con-
iederAtes was now looked Tor, both on account
OF hood ilhpulslVe character and because
the rec"ll Oh johnston was known TO
ue ulp 10 M'' DaNIS d!sapprova! OF
ms ranlah operations. NO doubt II ag-
grpSs'oh Was 10 DC tried 1t would be hard to
una u commander better Ntipl than HDtI m