The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1882-10-15

CoNs rattial history leaves out this I'm conclusion
OF thl9 aNait 10 gccr Into the uugraciCus work Of
sooner
Complete success generally vludtates the means,
but Gen. Cox volunteers TO this fob "a support the In
Justice which was done Ia thpuis by tho dominant
army ting; TO retpetuate the Grant aud Sherman
slander ot Thomas as sluggish In MUD, ~ slow in
action ana unable TO Grasp grand tactics; to make
reasonable the madness OF stanton; to give decent
color to that military idlocy which at Washington
assumed to know better how and when to fight the
battle than Gen. Thomas dld on the ground; To- Justify
the monsirous assumption ot Giant who had put hors
de combat 700 ouC veteran s1deis against hail their
numbct, N an unhroNcn settles Oi tcruscs all tito way
from the Rarldan to Petersburg; In TOW assuming To-
order Thomas pcrcmptory TO attack, In hatchcllng
him necessarily With Insulting orders, In Issuing an
order to Scholcl1 to sipcrscde him nnd-most absurd
of allhmsel starting 10 llkc the commands startling
from the stupondous failure Of his Vipalrn TO nkc
the command away from such soldier as Thomas
THIS Is q work which an historian would better have
left out No figures are easier sophisticated than the
army rolls Between the number on the rolls, the
number present and absent, the number prcscut
equipped and the number " electives thore Is wide
scope tot hgurinc' Aud while In this we have tho
AuthOr greatness In little things In tho CipCtng
have, on the other hand, his ltcuess In great things
IN ms seeming unconsciouSueSs VI military conditions
and physical limitations In his assuming that rarrI-
sons NJ posts scattered over great country arc all
mobile and that from these while threatened every
where by the Invader, force eau be quickly gathered
up to resist him, when he Is concentrated and on the
march.
To Investigate figures Is not necessary to this re.
NltWs lNe WhlNl NAY Oe disposed OF ly holding to
military common scuse--a quality which Gen. Cox
seems easily tn lose when pursuing his bent. Shcr-
man had taken Tor his marching army all that he
thought prudent to akO from the forces holding posts
to guard his communications. II these forces were
movable, and could he organized Into an army to
cope with Hood when he was stronger than John
ston was when sherman moved toward him at Dalton
then sherman left In uselessness an army which
might have been marched down Into Alabama, CO.
operating With him, and then hc could have held
what he took, instead OF losing All that and more
The guarding of lines In the Is easy white the
Offensive army Is pushing on, and keeping the en-
emy busy; but now the offensive army had marched
out OF the field, aud the enemy had taken the ofCn
slvc stronger than before, aud back upon these
lines, threatening them all the way from Fast Ten
nessee TO the Mississippi and Forests cavalry and
flying artillery were carrying tho war North to KEN
lucky, destroying three gun-boats eight transports,
number of barges and an Immense depot of mill
tlry stores at iohnsouvllc on the Tennessee eighty
miles west OF Nashville. which after al Of Grants and
sherman long PREPARATION they had left no that the
opposite bank commanded thc.whOle.
This was the time when the garrison ~ tbs posts
were needed but Cox counts them as mobiles. lie
makes nothing OF the fact that Sherman took the best
OF everything In equipment and nearly all the SER
vlccable cavalry horses. He makes nothing OF time
or space TO Thonlas Nj Gathering up scattered de-
tHchments Into m army to attack Hood who
concentrated on the Tennessee at Florence before
Sherman decided to leave the rwcnty-third Corps and
woods division to Thomas. He had intended 10
strip him writing after tho event. II IL easy to as
sume that Hood was planted In that spot, and all
THOMAS had to 90 was to gather mp forces toward that
point to meet him; but this was not SO easy when
Hood had all the country from East Tennessee to tho
Mississippi to choose his route Of invasion, and his
cavalry was ranging from East Tennessee to west OF
the Tennessee River In Kentucky.
newspaper general might thus ignore MI military
conditions, but what shall hc said when u soldier
writes In this way for hisory2 II an ungraclous
and superservCcahlo work FOR Gen. Cox. And there
are several mOtsing reflections on Gen. Thomas, In
his narration Of the retreat from Duck River which
a clear statement wunld remove.
To our view neither Atlanta nor this H. worthy
book nor credit to the military aud literary stand.
Ing of the writer. They add nothing to the stock nf
and wrong judgment. In the
matter of military principles they pcrycrson,
making the defensive the tactics for Ofrensr: making
Siege approaches the way to conduct an offensive
campaign with greatly superior force better soldiers,
and more mobile army; making out war TO be In
cesSant bushwharkng killing, and making maraul-
Ing and devastating raid tho greatest military achieve.
ment and the marching out OF the theatre OF Its
CrOWuinp