The Worthington advance., 1882-08-17
FEDERAL, CONFEDERATE.
Which was the Better 6Oldter-A
study OF the Civil War.

ucAe~'Su UAuA Vic eleGe OF feterGDuTR
had depleted it's ranks, and the near ap-
proach of Sherman had increased the
disproportion Of numbers to a limit that
left no hope Of success. On the other
hand, this overmatched army had nd.
ministered at least three crush
ing and overwhelming defeats up.
on its adversary. The aris-
tocracy from the south furnished from
the outset most admirable corps ofline
and staff officers. They were just near
enough to their men to permit familiar
arity and receive respect, and far enough
from them to prevent insubordination.
Coming from the same vicenage, eyerv
man knew his officer. Even where the
officer was not personally known to his
men, he represented class whom they
were accustomed to follow. 1t has been
the fashion among both officers and men
of the north to sneer at the discipline of
the confederate army. 1t is true that in
non-essentials We very greatly excelled
them. To the very last the drill of the
southern regiments was slack, dribbling
and uneven. In the essentials of disci.
pline, however, they far excelled US.
For neglect of duty their men were pun
ished and punished speedily and &C.
verely. In trivialities, the southern
soldier was generally SLOUGH with i'm
punity; but when it came to a real neg
lect of duty, Struggling, piilaging, cow
ardice and desertion, the ter
for Of swift and terrible punishment was
ever before his eyes. "What is that?''
the writer once asked a confederate
prisoner as We looked down upon the
camp of his division and saw 3ody Of
troops para led and from the center
shoot up puff of white smoke. "Wal."
vas the cool reply, II reckon it'' ole
bragg a-s'artin' new graveyard;
t'other must be nigh about full" Bragg
was not a very successful general. He
seemed to lack all power of adaptation
to circumstances. But it was the army
thus trained t. obedience that, under
General Joe Johnston, made the wonder
!ul backward movement from Resaca to
Atlanta movement not eQualed in
brilliancy, completeness, and difficulty
by amy other upon either side during
the war, unless it be the death -grapple
around Petersburg. The southern
soldier believed most devoutly in the
martial superiority Of the southron, and
it gave him = confidence in the outcome
Of the struggle which greatly enhanced
his prowess. This was the very
means OF all others likely to make such
troops effective. BY constant employ
ment and repeated victories he trans
had fairly learned the movements from
But this was only half the advantage de-
rived from this belief. The northern
soldier and the northern leaders be-
lieved it also. TO the northern mind
the s0utherner was being especially
delighting in blood and war. The SUI
periority of the southern volunteer
forces was at the outset directly OF indi.
rectly conceded by all. Az ample proof
of this state of mind it is necessary only
to recall the abject terror that was pro-
duced throughout all the land by what
was known as the "Black Horse Caval-
!y"-a legion by no means formidable
in numbers nor remarkable for actual
feats of arms, During the first year of
the confederacy's existence, however.
the bare name of his DEATHS head
and bloody-bones corps was
worth more to her cause than
ten thousand Of the best trained
soldiery on earth could have been. The
southern soldier went into battle con-
fident Of his ewn prowess, and despising
bis foe. The northern soldier entered
the conflict determined to do his best,
not shrinking from his duty, but over
estimating his adversary and under
estimating himself. This Disparity of
spirit--n0t of soldierly qualities-was
greatly enhanced by the issue of the
first general engagement, and the acces-
sion of the Over-cautious Mcclellan to
the command, with his confidence in
pipe-clay and dress-parade, and his
overwhelming dread OF General Lee and
Southern impetuosity. The secret of
Grants success lay in the fact that he
the northern volunteer as fully a match
hesitate to attack whenever he believed
himself to have the advantage in numbert
or position. He appreciated the facs
that the quickest way to make recruit q
veteran was to let him share the sweets
of victory. Instead of opposing the en-
envy with ''time and tactics" he threw
his columns against them, and taught his
men their tactics ander fire. These
conditions can never be paralleled again.
They do not adhere in the people of
either section. They were purely tenn
porary and fortuitous. The south had
no real advantage in the familiarity Of
lis people with firearms. 1t is doubtful
even if as large proportion of their ar
mics a. of our northern regiments were
accustomed to arms OF precision. 50,
too, their horsemanship was a thing
more fanciful than real, at least in its
results. Inthe actual soldierly qualities
of the people of the two sections
tie difference. All the talk
about the impetuosity, reckless daring,
and JOY of battle which is said TO charac-
terlze the south in contrast with the
north is mere twaddle. The charge at
Mission Ridge, when the army Of Grant
outran his orders, and went to the sum-
NIT instead of intrenching At the foot of
the slope, was the great miracle Of i'm
petuoeity Of the whole war. On the
other hand, the claim ofgreater staunch.
ness, of stubborn, bulldog grip on the
part of the north il equally nonsense.
Petersburg is an eternal monument Of
the power of the south to stand
punishment. The man Xh0