Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1882-10-24

such bylaws, though given the force OF
law by the charter, for the purposes of the
government, yet relate to that
solely, and prosecutions for, their viola
ton have no reference as a general rule to
the administration of criminal Justice by
the state. Mayor VS.. Rouse, Ala. SIT.
The term 'police," as used to define
the character of such regulations
and prosecutions, is used in its
limited sense and more common
acceptation, or relating to public order,
health, etc.
The term crime or public offense, as
used in the general laws, is not understood
as referring to the so-called offenses
against municipal government. General
statutes, p. 1913. Kansas City VS.. Clark, GO
Mo. $50.
By the constitution of the state of Iowa
it is provided that all prosecutions shall
be conducted in the name and by the au-
thority of the state" TWAS held that this
applied only to prosecutions for violations
of the criminal laws of the state, and that
it was not intended that the state
should be party to petty prosecu-
items under the police regulations of mu-
nicipai corporation, City of Davenport
vs.. Bird, "a Iowa, 52S. City of Emporia
VS.. Volner, IL Kansas, p. 629.
And when by the terms of a city ordi-
nance it is provided that Its violation shall
be punished by the infection of pecunia-
ry penalty enforced by imprisonment, the
procedure in the name of the city, though
commenced by warrant and criminal in
form, is usually held quasi criminal rather
than criminal in character, on the ground
that it is not properly crime against pub
lie law. Ex-parte Holdemd, "a
Mo-, 4O1.' Kansas City VS..
Clark, So Mo. supre. Platteville VS..
McKennan, 81, Wis. p. 4S7. Williams vs..
City Council, Ga. 512; Williamson VS..
Carr, 4, B. Mon. $50; City of Goshen We.
Croxton, 81 Ind, 239.
trial by jury may be entitled in cases O;
summary trials inIpolice courts Byers::ivs.
Com. ~, Pa. st. SO, Howe VS.. Plainfeld,
I'd edition.
structive as serving to illustrate the ma
ture of the municipal jurisdiction, and the
legitimate purpose of prosecutions
under municipal ordinances. Offenses
against them require summary treatment
and no great stress is laid upon the form of
the procedure. Severe penalties would
from the nature of the case seem to be in
appropriate to such summary trials. Nor
are they followed by the obvious conse-
Guences which usually attach to convictions
upon the more solemn trials for ofenses
under the general laws.
The city ordinance does not have re-
spect to the guilt or moral turpitude
of act constituting the offense
considered as crime but only to the pur-
pose of police regulation. Shafer VS..
Mausnia, II Nd, 331.
In England and many of the older states,
where the prosecution usually takes the
form of penal actions for the recovery of
fines the question in dispute here could not
arise.i
The confusion and difficulty have arisen
not of the form and nomenclature given to
The proceedings under such bylaws. And
yet they remain the same in substance,
and the distinction is more nominal than
real. The same municipal needs require
the same police remedies. They are
styled criminal even when in fact only
quasi criminal, and offenses designated
in the charter as 'offenses against
bylaws" come to be classed in
common usuage with crimes and public
offenses under the constitution and laws of
the state. Wiggin VS.. City of Chicago, 6S
Ill. 375.
One who has been imprisoned in pursu-
ance of judgment in bastardy proceed
ings, criminal in form, though not in fact
(23 MIMI and who has also been pun
ished for the same act under the criminal
laws of the state, or one who has been
mulcted in damages to the injured party,
and has also suffered the penalty of a
breach of the peace, may be said in COM
mon parlance to have been punished
twice.
So in one way or another in order to
render them effectual, the infection of PEN
alties is resorted to to enforce municipal
regulations, and offenders against them
are punished notJfor police offense of
which the municipal authorities can not
take Jurisdiction, and with which they
have no concern, but for an offense against
q bylaw cognizable by them alone. One
who is within the limits of the municipal
jurisdiction must not obey the laws of the
state, but also adjust his conduct to
the requirements of the local by
laws. And an act which
outside city would subject him to punish
ment by the state only, committed inside
its limits, by reason of the place and the
consequent aggravation attending it, will
render him liable also for the additional
penalty.
The same act prohibited by both the
city and the state, may thus constitute two
offenses, which are intrinsically and legal
ly distinguishable. In support of this
proposition the authorities are abundant
and nearly unanimous. Waldo vs.. Wal
ace, IL Ind, 584; Wragg VS.. Penn. Town,
"a IL. %; Robbins VS.. People, IS Ill. ITS;
Greenwood VS.. Stats, 6 Jere. Baxter (Tenn)
SGT; State VS.. Williams, IL Smith Car. 292;
Howe VS.. Plainfeld, 8 Vroom, $50; Mayor
VS.. Allaire, IA Ala, 4O4; State vs.. Hamil-
ton, Texas, app. SAB; Shafer VS.. Mamma,
IL Nd; 331; State vs.. Sly, Ore, 27S-9;
State VS.. Bergman, 6 Ore, 343; Browns
vile VS.. Cook, Neb., los; Mclaughlin VS..
Stevens, Cranch, G. G. R., 149; approved
in PoIniska vs.. People, II Hure, 1893.
The text writers Cooley, Dillon and
Bishop concur in the same
conclusion. We think the au-
thorities on the subject altogether too re-
spectacle and weighty to be disregarded.
The analogy frequently suggested in the
case of an offense against state and the
United States, growing out of the same