Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1882-11-28
LAW OF LIBEL.
An Important Decision by the Supreme
Court.

An Important Decision by the Supreme
Court.
The supreme court, through Associate
Justice Mitchell, fled an importand opin-
ion in the libel suit of DR.. Pratt, of Min
neapolis against The Pioneer Press COM
pany. The history of the case, in brief, is
as follows: DR.. Pratt, a practicing physi-
clan of Minneapolis, was accused by the
Pioneer Press newspaper, of malpractice
and culpable neglect in certain case, the
words ''culDable neglect forming the cap
ton Or heading of the article, in which DR..
Pratt's professional character was most
grossly ridiculed and stigmatized. Soon af
ter the publication DR.. Leonard Pratt COM
menced suit for libel in the district court
of Hennepin county, Judge Young on the
bench. claiming damages in $4,000. Upon
the hearing of the cause the jury re-
turned verdict in favor of
plaintiff for $4,000. This verdict Judge
Young, holding that the evidence justified
the publication of the article in ques-
ton, set aside, and gave the de-
PENDANT company the right to demand and
have a new trial. From this order of
Judge Young, DR.. Leonard Pratt appealed
to the supreme court
In the opinion Of the court, given
in full below, it will be seen
that the court following the
principle laid down by repeated decis-
ions IL similar cases, the appeal is denied.
But the court does not stop here but goes
on and administers severe rebuke to the
finding of Judge Young, which it says was
not warranted as matter Of law, and that
had he refused a new trial, the court would
have sustained his decision. The opinion
further reviews some of the points in the
libelous publication, the responsibility of
publishers, and very clearly lays down the
principle which should govern inferior
courts in the hearing of such cases. Fol-
lowing is
THE OPINION.
D. Leonard Pratt, appellant, VS.. The
Pioneer Press Company, respondent.
This is an action for libel. The appeal
is from an order granting new trial on
the ground that the verdict was not justi-
fed by the evidence and was contrary to
law.
The rules which will govern this court
in reviewing the action OF the trial court
in such cases, have been settled by re-
peated decisions.
In Saltwater Street Railway Transfer
| company VS.. Renter, IL, N. W. Rep. 449,
we held: ''That we would not be war
ranted in resisting an order of this kind,
simply because, if the judge below had re-
fused to grant new trial, we should have
10 tot h
there was evidence reasonably tending
to support the verdict; not because
! if the motion for a new trial had been
made before Us in the first instance we
should have, upon consideration of the
evidence, denied the motion. But, if upon
| careful perusal of the testimony and ma
| ture reflection, we feel satisfied that the
proponderance of the evidence is mani
we would then deem it our duty to reverse
| the order granting a new trial.
In view of the judicial discretion which
a trial court has always possessed and
| ought to possess in the matter of granting
new trial, we think these rules sound in
| principle and salutary in practice.
| In view of the fact that new trial Of
| this action may be had, it is inexped1ent
for US to enter into discussion of the evil
dence.
| But after an examination of the whole
case, our conclusion is that while we think
there is evidence reasonably tending to
support the verdict, and that if the court
below had refused new trial, we would
| have sustained his decision, yet we cannot
is n,anifestiy and palpGbly in favor
Of he Siof hat bo ri
below in granting a new trial COM
| mitted an abuse of his reasonable judicial
discretion. The order appealed from must
| therefore be affirmed. This view Of the
matter disposes of the appeal.
II. But as another trial of the action will
probably be had, we deem it advisable to
| refer to some views expressed by the learn
ed court who tried the action, with which
| we are unable to fully concur. He express
es the opinion that there is nothing either
in the alleged libel itself, or in the evil
dence tending to show that the publication
| complained of, referred to or affected
plaintiff in his professional capacity as
physician and surgeon.
We do not think the case, as before us,
| would warrant court in so holding as a
matter of law.
Words may be divided into three classes:
1st-Those that cannot possibly bear
defamatory meaning.
2d-Those that are reasonably suscepti-
bic of defamatory meaning as well as an
| innocent one.
3d-Those that are clearly defamatory
| on their face.
The publication in this case belongs to
the second class. Therefore, the question
would be which meaning the defamatory
or the innocent one-would the words con-
vey to ordinary men who read them with
out any previous knowledge of the circum-
stances to which they relate This would be
question for the jury. The fact referred
to by the court, that no evidence was offer
ed tending to show that the care of the re-
mains of the deceased persons is part of
the professional duties of the attending
physician, would not by any means be de-
cisive. The mere neglect to care for the
remains of the child was not in itself the
gist of the libel, according to the innunen
but the fact that it endangered the health
and life of the mother.
III. Further, we do not think, upon the
case as here presented. court would have