New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-03-15

seen, and inpatient to The roads
were In good condition. the sreain' uii-
usually low for the season. our railway
communications we'll protected AMI woihlnS
regularly, az the enemy, only $1,000 strong was
short march distant in an open and wcil->e't cd
country. Still ROsecrans halted, though dalN
urged by Garfield to advance the other armies
were doing. lie finally induced RosrordnS to ad-
dress "A letter 80 each corps aud division commander
asking his opinion as to the advlsahllity OF an ao-
vance, and 10 tins communication SrVeh'e'hl'pIeS
received. all of which sustained hosccra"S
views which were we'll kuown. Garfield was the
only general consulted who ventnTcd To DC 80 I'M
polite aud inpoltic rs to disagree with the known
views Of lis commanding general lie submitted
IN reply June =. lsC3l. document nj remarkable
force. arguing against inactpn and urging
vigorous advance-wlIch paper ray or may
not have reached Washington. think 1t probably
did its general import and the fact that It was the
only reply that favored an advance were well
known at the time. as have stated, by the news
paper correspondents in the field. However,
whether il was ever at Washington or not,
within few DAYS after its date Rosscran5 was or.
dcrel to move. He had been previously urged from
Washington bot between the Sth and 20ih of June
orders came to march. But though thus directed
from Washington, Rosccrans still delayed. As late
as three days before he finally moved he protested
TO HalleCk against the plan. he c!aimet lnat MS
iuaction kept Bragg his immediate front. Look
ing at the matter practically" he says in dispatch
to Hallcck, June 21, 1868, eve and our opposing
forces are so nearly separated that for Bragg macr
ally to aid Johnston Then accommodating forces to
attack Grant in Mississippi he must
abandon our front substantially. If
General Grant then bescigng Vcksburg is de-
featcd both forces will come here, and then we
onght to be near our base" This plausible but er-
r,ncous theory did not prevail, and June 2l fol-
lowing the army moved. Braggs position at Tulla-
h0ua was turned his line Of retreat threatened
aud without accepting battle the Rebels fell back
across the Tennessee River to their case at Chatta
nooga This brief campaign ended about July 3,
and then followed the second delay. which was the
immediate occasion of Garfields letter TO Chase,
now published a proof of his "insncerity,"
"cOwarlice,' trcachery" Hypocrisy and
& lishnc>s" These complimentary terms quote
from Democratic and Stalwart papers,
This second delay after Tullahona was yirtuallyn
violation of the orders of the COmmanGcr-n-Chie
to move for the general plan had contemplated the
destruction OF parsuit of Bragg as TO keep him
too busy to detach troops to aid Johnston in raising
the siege of Yicksburg The delay was ineXcusably
spun out for by July Is the army on the banks
of the Tennessee eager to cross and with its rail
way and other communications repaired. But
Rosccrans still hid to his Cheory Of ina9ton and 1t
was III vain that Garfield urged with all the ear
nestneSs he possessed" that &" a rapid advance"
should be made 1t is thus that he writes. July ~
On the 18th inst. the bridges rebuilt and
the cars Were in full coinnumcaton from the Cum,
berland to the tennessee. 1 have since then urged
with ali the earnestness possess Il rapid advance.
while Bragg army wa, shattered and under c0yrr,
an before johnston and he could effect q Junction.
Thus far the General has been singuarv dlsilclmed
10 grasp the situation with strong hand. and make
The advantage his own. write this with more sor-
tli.I lean ell for lava IN
body, and. next my desire to see the Rebellion
blasted ls my anxiety to see Llm blessed Bat even
the breadth OF my low" is not sufficient to this
almost fatal delay. BY personal relations with Cen
era Rosecrans are all that could desire. Officially.
share his cOunSclS and responsibilities more
tEan desire, bur beg you TO know that this delay
is against my Judgment aud my every wish. Pleas
ant rs my relations here would rather command
battalion that would follow and foH ana strike
and strike than to hang back while such golden |
moments are passing. But the General and my |
self believe that can do more service III ny present
place than III command of division, though | am
aware that it is position that premises better in
the way of promotion OF popular credit Pit
itfhis iqactiOa continues iORg shall ask to he
lieYed and sent somewhere where can be part of
working army. But do hope that yOu VIII soon |
hear that this splendid army Is al least trying 10 do
It's part IN the great work. If the War department |
has not always reen just II has certainly been very
nduigtt to Ills army. But feel hqt the time hds |
por utea shouid aiior no plea to keeD This army
back FROM tie most rigorous actriy.
Ii was under these circumstances and in this |
spirit that Garfield wrote Although marked con-
hdential' the letter probably u+ed-Or, at |
least, ITS contents c!ted-tO influence Lincoln, Stan
ton and lIalleck not to remove Ro,rcran4 but to
max him move his army. If he had done no other
service to the country the writing OF this letter
would alone have entitled Garfield 10 its thanks.
1t had It's desired effect. for within few days
possibly within few hOuIS-dltcrit It's reception III
Washington Hallrck sent the dispatch to Rose
Grams to move and followed II. August in re-
ply to a petulant inquiry from Ro>etraAs If the
order was intended To- take away his discretion as
10 the time and manner OF moving, with the Ie-
iGarhaae dispatch, he orders i'l he advance OF
your army pcTcmptUry.' NaihcidS letter eVl-
ucutlV influenced that OrieT. The advance was !
made. Cha tdnoOga WAS turned, rs Iullahoma had
been. and icll iutu our hands without struggle, |
linus indor,ing the plans and strategy which g l.
field alone had advocated, ana tuliY JnSttylHC the
within, of fine he ter for which he i.Ow condemned
BY those who refuse to look ut the existing CIrculn
stances under which /; was written. Eut iOr The
fatal blnnd r of RoSrcranS III. first, dividing his
army III pursuit 0i an enemy which he Thought,
was running away for dear lie, when, III iarl, 1t
was concentrating AID beng reinforced Tor battle
and second in combining ms scattered forces need
le>s.y ia lin race and under the very nose 81 the
enemy -l,e rimpqign OF Chat, anUogd WOuld have
ben az hloUdlrss "a that OF lulldAola, au.i lar
more signal triumph "i strategy, tl' highest branch
Il Is to be Hoped tia, the letters OF October 1868
said TO have been written from Chattanooga a. let
the disaster at Clchaiu tugI, VII be puV iSlicd
If copies are IN the hands "t GdTrc'dS tfthds or
family the, shouid he rnhcsltatlnsly given "a this
time OF ali Diners 10 jhr PHbHri ~" Props can 'o
trusted 40; To nsindcfS!@nG hc hish a"i patriotic
purpose by which Gatl!cld was aCiH1lcd % condemn
the commander to who he Wa personally 80 StlOlg
IL attached Garfield Will" alive yonrtci anu chai-
lenyed the pub icatj0n of any OF his letters, and
especially those in regard to RoSocIanN. How far
these unpublished letters were Instrumental al IN
bringing ab5nt Rosccrans'- removal cannot BE- de-
ternined now, bat If they tented to that end
the were we'll and wisely prnncd. Whoever
brought about that removal did noble ser
vice. Ii WAS too long delayed. II was for
month after ChiokainaUga was IoSt. Rusecrinss
Individual b'ndels ha robbed Ilci"r} oI liz b"It
fruits He had imprinted a gr"a army hy need
less battle, which promised. If victorious, od-