New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-01-31
NEW PUBLICATIONS
pAIFBEYs ANTIETAM AND FREDERlChS-
BIJRG
CIupArcNs OF THE CIVIL WAX. Y. Inc Ne II ~

This volume shows no decline tro-l NV ~ ~
ard set by its predecessors IN the sciV'' " -
the publisbers seem likely to give to o''' -
nj tbs military operations between lSol an" i0V'
which we have as yet had, and one "hlc" u W." -
daicnlt matter even for future historians 20 excel
Tbev are written mainly by eyewitness anu
go, in the scenes which are described hut the lapse
80 ,i,r has already gwen them so much opportunity
Cor reelection and research. that IN almost every
case the writers Of these little books have pr"ducoo
awork entirely different in most eSsenual IeSp'o's
from 1T they wOnld have done II they han SAT
down to write immediately at the end OF 'he VIII
Ncue of the voiumes show this III moro
marked degree than the present-hoV 7N0N
tbe work of General Webb upon the Itnn-
s,lar canuaign. thor GA IL displays IN every page
the unavailing struggle of an old love 70 Mcclellan
against the ovcrpowcriug force of facts. We as
rern in General Palfrcy's narrative the traces OF
stronger prejudice more vital tendency 10 irau@
and blame but the story Is admirably '"iu' anu
with an intec.ity and fairness If intention "h,cH
eyasles no issues aud sights no essential iac'S. h'
frankly admits p. 1870 that he " began as passion
are enthusiast for Mcclellan and ends bis account
a. the operations in Maryland with page OF nm
.tinted eulory of that General. written evidently
from the heart--but an tue rest of the book L.
written from, the head and gives the coTpde-Ddce
to the military reputation OF the first commander
Of the Amy Of tho Potomac. already SO seriously
damaged bv the volumes OF Webb and Ropes.
few extracts will show how low an opinion
General Pafrey has OF the military character ana
capacity Of his chief, whom be snli regards WIN
such affection Speaking of Lees plans ~. - ne
saws; 81 lie had fcr his opponent Mcclellan
ana experience had shown hr that Mcclellan
never attacked and always let him choose
lis own time aud place for fighting The General
of whom this can truthflly Ue said may As well he
dismissed from any further consideration. on p~ge
- General Pallrcv refers to the rar, good loInn"
by which General Mcclellan became possessed Oh
Lees plan OF campaign, one of the most W"2,'iihi
pieces of luck which ever happened TO the cori-
,iiandcr OF an army 1t pia'e the Army OF North
ern Virginia at the mercy OF Mcclellan. provided
only that he came up with il and struck while lt9
separation continued" That he did not do TINS is
clearly told in the -eq.el and 10 defence Is At
tempted. General pallley gives copy VI Mctiei-
Ian's letter TO Franklin, founded upon Lees lost
order and SAYS tLat MCCLELLAN, In issuing IT, made
n mistake which made his Maryland campaign
moderate success bought ~ great price. instead
al . cheap and overwhelming victory. Hf gen
tral idea was excellent. but tune was IF the
essence Of the enterprise, aud he lot time hy aad
o. failed 20 relieve Miles and failed 10 nepose ms
masses between the WINGS of Lee separated army
The following is Characteristic passage il which
tl,e author accustomed 10 clcrress and accuracy !
takes his hero severely 10 task for his loose and
reckless reports:
General McCIcllau's estimate Of the number on !
eaca side ,at South Mountain Is Gbor rs oriental
as usual lie coils the Confederate 'oTce probably |
sone 20 OOA IN aIn aud saws " we went into action |
with about 80 600 mtu. This Is an extract RON /
lis Teuort da ed Angus. :, 1868. when he had had
,,cntv OF time to think. and must be accented aS
dr.iberate IL deserves attentive consideration. IN
Il the FIRST place let consider her own Numbers.
l. is impossible. from his own figures, TO place
The aggregate Of the First aud Ninth corps present
Tor duty september H. lNG2, higher IMAM 37,l"3
II he went into action with 600 he took ln more
chan hve-siXths 81 rs d@glegaie present l"l Hu'y'
AND 10 soldier who served III the second year OF or
war will believe that he even appropriated that. |
In the second place ala he believe iu August 1900 |
did be believe in September lSG2-that he had |
driven 80 900 of Lees army hom very ST lCng |
positjon with so 900 OF his Ownf Bunker Hill. II /
Sc had read no fur her ia tho history OF waI, migho
lave taught him the absolute FOLLY OF such an ld'a
An1 re's men we're not enhaItled farmers. OF raw
lsyies OF dIscoutentcd cOuscnptS. They /
were men paSSonately IN earnest, men WI" |
had developed natural aptitude Tor tight
ing by fourteen months Of sharp and |
usually successful campaigning. They had |
.how'i that they could tight hard and march hard |
that their audaclty and tenacity were alike remark
sbIe-that they we're lar more uktS % carry ali
tcult pO,itluns than 70 nc driven from Them. OF
heve that he drove Lorgstrett and Hill with 10000
from the heights Of South Mountain with $4,000 OF
ms own men, is one of those extraordinary, NEON
ceivsble aggravaung things that SUITS everything |
that is acrd IN the nature of those who follow his
career
Further on, in summing up The result of this en-
csg.ment General PallTey says Of Mcclellan:
lie WAS not equal 10 the occasion. lie threw !
,Vf,v his chance, and precious opportunity .Or |
making great name passed away. IL is no wonder |
that Lee and Jackson were auttaclons at Ch&hcel,
louisville. After their experiences with POPE ana |
Mcclellan they had some right 10 believe that a |
division In their forces the Immediate presence OF
the enemy might Toe ventuIed upon. 1t may be said |
thai Mcclellan did better Than Po0e and this IS |
yrne but such faint praise In the most that can be !
said of his action tLs important occasion, and rs
for his tactical victory, IL is curious TO read,
snail presently that he did not learn till daylight
The following morning that the enemy mad aban- |
CoDed his positions
The fighting at Antietam is described in a vlgor-
c,. .bapter in which tho lahorCTs research Of the
historian has corrected most Of the hasy impress
sious of the Young and ENTHUSIASTIC participation III
in the battle. Bat Of these impressions un-
guestionably survive, and few OF the men who 80
idolizcd Mcclellan in 1862 ever aftcTward,
even whom their own eyes are opened to il weak
Iesses bring themselves TO do justice to his success
ors or 10 the men at Washington who Were com
peled 10 remove him from command. General |
Palfrey not content with describing. ID vivid ana
faithful manner the terrible bunGers and blood
shed Of Fredericksburg. which clearly enough de-
,aorstrated the inca paciy of General Burnside for
high command. goes 50 far as TO pnnf on the last
PAGE of his history this cruel and utterly unfoundcd
;nsinuaton: o" II he intrigued for the command Of !
tho Army Of The Potomac. it is hard 10 understand
how he eve could have slept soundiy after the bat
lie Of Fredericksburg" There is not the slightest
foundation for this charge Of intrigue, which, ID |
fact many people know 10 be absolutely false.
ide from this injustice TO RurDsdes moral charac-
ter the account of the Fredericksburg slaughter |
Is singularly we'll DONE and can hardly be read |
without a shudder, at this distance Of time. |
II WAS the most hideoGs page in the whole history |
OF a horribly wasteful There arc lew who |
will not agree with General Palfrey Ia tho words |
with which he closes his narrative.
4 LnLA L. ~