The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1882-10-01
GEORGE IL. THOMAS
Van uoruc's life oreon. Thomas. d.

commanders Gen. Thomas stands aloft figure OF
heroic mould. The more his military history Is
studied the clearly does II appear that he pos
sesscd all the qualities Of great captain, After the
brilliant Victory he at MIN Springs, In January,
1862, Gen. Thomas served under other generals until
he was finally allotted the most dIncult task Of tho
whole war, when sherman had takon the flower OF the
Western armies an idle but picturesque promenade
leaving the whole ot that Confederate army over
which he had been unable 10 achieve any fruitful
victory to be Combattc1 by Thomas with such force
rs ne could imrroyisc from widely scattered corps
and garrsons. with tho war In such hands ~ those
which hngglcd and blundcred In Washington and
at city Point, II an extraordinary piece OF luck
that Hood dld not overthrow everything In his path
and carry the southern cross clear up to the ohio.
THIS luck was embodied In the person Of George II
Thomas, and to him II Is mainly due that the empty
march to the did not bring about terrible dis.
astcr to tho Union cause
Readers Of civil war history have recognized Chap
lain Van Horne History Of the Army OF the Cumber-
land the best work Of Its class which has vet ap-
peircd 1t Is complete aud comprehensive in its
marshang of facts and calm and impartial In tone.
opinions aud criticisms are given With extreme
rarity but the materials for critical Judgment are all
clearly set forth. Fortunate was It for that splendid
army that It found such historian The same com
peent hand has now given us 3 biography Of Gen.
Thomas Of which It is the highest possible praise to
elapsed sncothc publication Of the work OF which this
is the natural complement, and It bears throughout
the marks Of painstaking thuruughness The most
striking difference observable between this Life and the
History ot the Army Of the Cumberland - consists
In the freedom and ability with which the strategy
and tactics OF the campaigns now discussed,
whereas such discussion was almost entirely absent
from the History. 1t win readily bc perceived that
military criticism Is necessarily an Indispensable part
OF this work.
Thls volume viii add to tho fame Of Thomas, bc-
cause VI shows his almost pteternitutal military
sagaclty apd foresight In planning campaigns. as
well rs his fertility NJ and soundness Of
judgment on the battlefield lie early discerned
the strategic Importance Of Knoxville and before he
left Washington Tor the West urged upon Gcn
Scott au offensive movement ON that line IIisyIc-
tory Ut MIN Springs was the triumph sound dlspo-
sitons, aud was not llko many other Of the earlier
combnt of the war solely by the vavr of the roons
with no aid from any directing mind Gen. Thomas
was never without clear conception Of the military
situation aud decided opinion as to what ought to
he done. When Sherman, IN December. 1861, be-
came possessed with anexaggerated Idea of Jolnston's
force and plans and ordered Thomas to retreat from
lis advanced positions In front Of Crab Orchard from
which he threatened Knoxville Thomas replied that he
did not believe In Johnstcns aggressive purpose and
subsequent events showed him to have been right
After Mil Springs tie renewed his plans fot
slNe movement through cumberland GHn, bnt
drawn away to take part In Buell's movement toward
Nashville. lilo early dscerneh Braggs intention to
Invade Kentucky, urged Buell. to concentrate at Nc
Mnnyille, and afterwards at Murfreeshoro and his
dispatches at this time afford numerous ucontcstIbe
prnofstha his head was clearer than Buell. e. and that
lie would have concentrated and fought Bragg on his
norhwarl march instead Of withdrawing to Nashville
as Buell. did, and then being forced to retreat to
Louisville Hts whole career proves that " Thomas
pa1 I,.l.
ferryvillc would have been very different affair
At Stone River we find Thomas restoring battle
that was nearly lost and when ItoSecrans was talking
about retreating, saying decidedly, "This Army
can't rctreat' or the glorious conduct which
caused Thomas to bo called the Rock Of ChIcka.
mauga' no ono IL Ignorant, but not 20 many know
that he opposed the dispersion the corps which in.
vItcl that disaster holding that instead of pursuing
| an army which was not really in retreat the true
| policy was to occupy Chattanooga ani make 1t the
base of new offensive operations. Nor Is 1t gencr
ally known that just before the battle Thomas ad-
vised Rosecrans to take M the strong position on
which he made the hmll stand which saved the army
| from total ruut.
Van ITorne's lucid exposition shows that Grants
| bad plan for attacking Bragg on Missionary Ridge
| failed throughout lie points out that Thomas PRO.
posed good plan which offered every prospect Of a
decisive victory and shows that the result finally at
| tained was due to the manner In which Thomas
handled his force, and In which he perssted IN Lis
idea of having Hooker storm Lookout, for Grants
plan to have sherman force the rebel right failed ut
| ery, first, because It took him long got into
posltion aud then because his assault when tlrdily
delivered was repulSed Tlu spontaneous inspiration
OF Thpmas's three remaining divisions, all
| the rest having been sent to reinforce Sher-
| man, when Grants order for partial ad-
vance had left them without orders under
destructive fire and In untenabe position to rush
forward and solve the dflculty for themselves by
carrying the works Missionary Ridge. is the most
striking Illustration Of the many the war the Re-
beOn affords that the practical ideas Of the soldiers
often better than the Theoretical tactics of their
| generals
| When sherman began his Atlauta campaign Gen.
Thomas proposed plan that he had matured long be-
| fore, and suggested to Grant viz: to take
| the Army OF tue Cumberland through Snake
Greek Gap and establish 1t directly upon john
| ston's line Of communications. This plan sher-
| man spoiled by sending small force through the
GAP, keeping his main body In front Of the impIeg-
| nable positions chosen by his antagonist Here
ThOmas's strategy sOnnd, sherman's radically
| unsound. Mcpherson with twenty three thousand
could not effect anything against the Confederate
except to annoy them while he the risk
ing crushed. The object was to bring Johnston To
battle and destroy his army, not to force him back
upon his base, when at every step he would become
stronger while the Union Army would he growing
weaker not only by the losses fTuess assaults OH
lmpregnabe fortlhcatOns, but because the further 1t
| advanced into the enemy's country the longer and
Insecure became It's line communications aud the
larger the detachmens required to protect It. Thoma
wanted to make the flank march with sixty thousand
| men, leaving htty thousand to fent against Buzz
zard's Roost. our author Justly says that Sin
| rejecting Gen. Thomas's suggestions Gen. Sherman
| lost the supreme opportunity OF the Atlanta cam.
pagn." McPhersondId not take Resaca nor destroy
the railroad north Of 1t. OsSiby he might have ac-
complIshed more, but he was too good soldier not
| to understand the perous position far from the
rest Of tho Army II he should become seriously en-
gagged. Net his march aroused Johnston the posi-
billty Of danger from that direction that en-
| Sherman driven to tako the line OF operations
| Thomas had suggested 1t longer possible to
| achieve the great results that must have followed an
adoption at the start of Thomas's we'll considered
| plan. Then followed number Of turning move
unents aud of frultless cOmbats always upon ground
of the enemy's choosing. Mr. Van Horne sums
| them up by saylug.
The operations OF the montl, Of May cost the Army
| OF the Cumberland nearly nine thousand men, Of
| whom eleven hundred aud nfty-sN were Killed, and
| six thousand seven hundred and nfty-two wounded.
| Aud there had been no general engagement, aud no
success beyond pressing the enemy back by turning
| movements.
Another wise but unheedc1 suggestion Of Thnmas' s
| Is recorded by Gen. sherman himself In despatch
| Of June 22I 10 McPherson. Thomas advised move
| ment on Marietta from the north, having correctly
OWNED that Johnston, driven by superior numbers
To achoce Of dincut Alternatives had uncovered his
right lie magnanimOusly offered 10 send Of his
corps 10 aid Mcpherson In the movement, II s now
known that there was nothing but wheeler's cavalry
guarding that point, yet sherman preferred the move
m1nt to the right which brought him In front uf
| bloody Kenesaw, Notwithstanding the contrary
| statement In sherman's " Memoirs MIR. Van
| Horne asserts that
| The testimony Of several Of Gen. Thomas's staG
officers Is exploit rs "a his opposition To attacking the
| fortified lines before Marietta.
The assault cost the Army OF the CumbarlinI two
| thousand men,
Another hank march forced Johnston utO tho for
| i0catlons Of Atlanta, and with the advantages Of a
fortified camp close at hand, and IN view Of tho fact
that the Sherman strategy had at length greatly dl-
minlshcd tile strength OF the Union armies Johnston