The evening light. [volume] (San Antonio, Tex.) 1881-1883, 1882-02-20
SENATOR COKE ON THE TARIFF.


on the threshold of his senatorial
speech with one or two basic prlncl-
pies on which both parties as to the
tariff must stand or fall.
What Mr.. Coke says against "a pro-
tective tariff like that now in force
must be said against all protective
tariffs or taken back. There are no
degrees of right or wrong. If 1t IS the
qualifying adjective protective that
makes it wrong it is so absolutely, ana
the question arises what kind OF tariff
is not wrong. Mr.. Coke answers a
revenue tariff is not wrong. But II SO
if must be arevenue tariff that's wholly
free from the protective principle, tor
if the word revenue be but another
qualifying adjective and not tree from
it. is is as obnoxious as the former, and
the wrong remains just as absolute. 1t
there can be no revenue tariff without
protection then all revenue tariffs are
as absolutely wrong as all protective
tariffs, and some other qualifying adj
iective must be found that is wholly
free from the protective principle. 1t
there be none then the argument in
support of a constitutional tariff for
revenue is closed.
BY discarding the protective prlncl-
pie the tariff falls. In the language OF
Mr.. Coke, sit falls because it is uncon-
stitutional, is unequal and oppressive"
But Mr.. Coke then goes on to say,
"No citizen can object to a tax judi
ciously levied with an eye single to
the collection of revenue for the sup
port of the government" What has
any citizen to do with objections? Mr..
Coke has just stated that it is the con-
stitution that objects, and that it OBJ
iects because the tax is unequal and
oppressive.' What Mr.. Coke says
about tariffs "judiciously levied' and
tariffs for revenue constructed in
good faith," is blatter. What is re-
quired of a tariff is that it should be
constitutional. No tax can be consti-
tutional that is not equal and uniform.
1t is of the nature of tax for revenue
that it cannot be so, for its very es-
sence is discrimination. "Revenue,"
ouoth the senator, "should be the OBJ.
iect in view and protection the incl
dent" Collect" is motive. What
has motive to do with the constitiOn-
atty of an act, and whether the mo-
tive be revenue or protection who is to
discover or decide Mr.. Coke's re-
lance, therefore, upon the object or
purpose of an act for its constitution
atty is simplicity itself. How could
the senator appear more ridiculous on
the floor of the senate, whether in
company with other grave senator's or
alone, than with 1.-The old doctrine of
equal rights for all, exclusive privil-
eyes for none" in one hand, and a
revenue tariff bill with Incidental pro-
lection in the other
We thus contend that there can be
no constitutional tariff, but that in
which the protective principle is not
discarded, but is made uniform and
equal and hence creates itself the test
of ccnstitutionality. With an ad valo-
rem tax for protection its constitution
atty may be preserved, with discrimi-
nation. for revenue it can not. This
we regard as the true tariff doctrine
under which the wool of Texas may
be constitutionally protected SO as to
compete successfully in foreign or
northern markets with the wool pro.
duct of the world. 1t is upon this plat