The Cheyenne daily leader. [volume] (Cheyenne, Wyo.) 1870-1884, 1882-01-27

ion, was not to be regarded by the jury.
To establish murder, it had to be
proved-First, that death was caused
by the RGL of the assassin, and further
that it was caused with malice afore-
thought. That did not mean, how
ever, that the government had to prove
any ill-will or hatred on the part of ac-
cused toward deceased, wherever homi-
| d was shown to have been commit
ted, without lawful authority and with
deliberate intent. 1t was sufficiently
proved to have been done with malice
aforethought, and malice was not dis
proved by showing the accused had no
personal ill-will towards the deceased,
aud that he killed him from other mo-
tives. The jury would have to say the
defendant was guilty of mdrder or in
nocent. In order to constitute the
crime of murder the assassin must have
a reasonably sane mind; in technical
terms he must be ''of sound mind,
memory and discretion" Any IRE
sponsibly insane man could not commit
murder. If he was laboring under a
disease Of mental faculties to such an
extent he did not know what he was
doing, or know 1t was wrong, then lie
was wanting in that sound mind, men,
oryand discretion; that he was presumed
innocent until the accusation against
HIM was established by proof. Not
w~itbstanding this presumption of inno-
cence, it was equally true defendant
was presumed to be sane, and to have
been so at the time the crime was COM
mitted. The burden of proof as to in
sanity was on the defense. The jury
was not to infer the prisoner was insane
because he committed an enormous
crime. The only safe rule was for the
jury to direct its attention to the one
test of criminal responsibility, namely,
whether the prisoner possessed mental
capacity at the time the act was CON-
mitted, to know that it was wrong, or
whether he was deprived of that capac-
ity by mental disease. There was one
important distinction which the jury
must not lose sight of, and they must
decide how far it was applicable to this
case. That WAS, distinction between
mental and moral obliquity, between
mental incapacity to distinguish be-
tween right and wrong, and moral in
s%ensibility to that destination; and
now, gentlemen, to sum up all l have
said to you, if you find from the whole
of the evidence that, at the time of the
commission of the homicide, the pri-
soner was laboring under such a defect
of his reason, he was incapable of I'M
Outstanding what he was doing, or Of
seeing it was a wrong thing to do; as for
example, if he were under an insane
delusion that the Almighty had COM
manded him to do the act, then he was
not in a responsible condition of mind,
but was an object of compassion, and
should be now acquitted. III, on the
other hand, you find he was under no
insane delusion, but had possession of
his faculties, and has power to know
his act was wrong, and if of his own
free will he deliberately conceived the
idea and executed homicide, then,
whether his motive personal vindlctive-
ness of political luminosity, a desire to
avenge supposed political wrongs or a
morbid desire for notoriety, or if you
are unable to discover any motive at
all, the act is simply murder, and it is
your duty to find a verdict of guilty, as
indicated. Or latter a suggestion of
Scoville to that effect) if you can find the
prisoner is not guilty by reason of in
sanity, it is your duty to do so. You
will now retire to your room and con-
slider the verdict.
During the delivery of the judges
charge, which was completed at 4:40 p.
p. M, there was a perfect stiffness in
the crowded court room, and ever the
prisoner kept absolutely quiet, with the
exception of one or two simple inter-
ruptions. The jury Immediately re-
tired and many spectators left the coart
room.