, 1882-01-28

the Mediterranean She holds the con
trolling interest in the Suez Canal; and by
her Notifications at Alden and on the
Island Of Perrin, excludes all other Powers
from the waters Of the Red Sea" What
Great Britain claims with regard to the
waterway to India, the United States
claim with regard to the waterway from
the Atlantic to the Pacific coast of the
Union. .'AS England insists, by might of
her power, that her enemies should strike
at her Indian possessions only by doubling
the Cape of Good Hope, so the United
States equally insist that the interior,
more speedy, and safer route Of the Canal
be reserved for ourselves while our enc
mics, five ever be so unfortunate as to
have amy, shall be remanded to a voyage
round Cape Horn.r Mr.. Blaine then makes
use Of an argument which would have
equal force if applied to the position OF
Great Britain towards the Suez Canal.
IAN agreement Of neutrality on paper
between the great Powers OF Europe might
prove Intellectual to preserve the Canal i'll
time Of hoStilitieS. The first sound. of
cann0n in a general European war would,
in AL probability annul the treaty of neu-
t|rality. The strategic position of a Canal
commanding both oceans might be held by
the first naval Power that would seize it."
The difference between the two positions is
that Great Britain can afford to make
fewer stipulati0nS about the Suez Canal
than the United States are obliged to
make about the Panama Canal, for the
very reason that q Canal, commanding
botl oceans can be held by the first
naval Power that could seize it. Eng
land is fully capable Of Selling the Suez
canal rs jle mare use Of her Fleet; the
United states mast LOOK to her troops,
aaI to Qualifications garrisoned by her
troops, t0mlhe good her naval deficiencies.
England, therefore, has two very good
reasons Tor not challenging the claim put
forward on behalf OF the United States.
Tue tirsti is that it is not worth her while.
Coln"h.eIly, the existence Of the Clayton
BuIWer FeatY gives usra technical locus
Stda Il, Of ". ii w may avail our Ives, if
we choose. rs matters stand, the United
States are under ano0,igltion not to fOrtify
the Canal, and they cannot get properly
rid OF this obligation, if we do not choose
10 release them from it. In other words,
under the CIayton-BulWer Treaty, we
have q right to make the assertion
Of this claim to set aside certain of it's
py0visions'a caSag bej}j. If we went to war
in defence. OF the Treaty as it stands, ave
should not be going beyond our rights in
the view Of international law. But what
should we gain by indicating them 4? The
maintenance in time of peace OF a state of
things which would necessarily. come to
an end in time OF war. Let ii be granted
that, either by threatening or actually
fighting, we succeeded in maintaining the
Ciayton-Bulwe Treaty in its present shape,
what would happen if war should, after
all, break OUT between us and America or
some other question {? Obviously, that the
United States would at once. occupy and
tOrtify both ends OF the Canal. We should
be 10 better off in the end, therefore, by
rejecting Mr.. Blaine'S proposal. If ever
the need arises, the United States will
deal with the Panama Canal with primary
reference to their own military necessities.
Those necessities will not be altered by
anything in the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
and it is consequently useless to insist on
keeping alive a provision of that treaty
which would certainly conflict with them.
The second reason is that we could not
dispute the justice Of Mr.. Blaine'S claim to
the exclusive control in time of war of the
Panama Canal, without making admissions
which would be very damaging to our own
claim TO the exclusive control in time of
war Of the Suez Canal. There are very
good reasons why we should say no more
than we can help about this latter claim,
but it would be the height Of unwisdom to
let a word drop which could possibly be
construed into an abandonment of it.