National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1882-01-26
JUDGE COX'S CHARGE
A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL STATEMENT.
What the Judicial Onlcer Said Of the Law aud the
Facts In the Casc--An Attentive Au.
diencc, Including the Assassin,
Drink In Every Word.

main points are given.
Judge Cox commenced by saying that the Consti.
tuition provides that in all criminal prosecutions
the accused shall enjoy the right of Il speedy and
public trial by an impartial jury in the State and
District where the crime shall have been com.
mitted, that he shall be Informed Of the cause
and the nature Of the accusation against him;
that he shall be confronted with the witnesses
against him; that he shall have compulsory
process 10 obtain witnesses in his favor, and that
he shall have assistance Of counsel in his defense.
Those provisions were intended for the protection
of the innocent from injustice and oppression,
and II was only by their faithful observance that
guilt or innocence could be fairly OsccrlHincd
Every accused person was presumed to be limo.
cent until the accusation was proved
with what difficulty and trouble the law
had been administered in the present case
the jurors had been daily witnesses. 1t was, how
ever, consolation to think that not one of those
sncrcd guarantees of the Constitution had been
Violated IN the person of the accused. At last the
long chapter Of proof was ended the task of the
advocate done, and 1t now rested with the jury
to determine the issue between public Justice and
kccnly than himself the great responsibility Of his
duties, and he felt that he could only discharge
them by close adherence to the lawns laid down
by its highest authorities Before proceeding fur.
ther he wished
TO NOTICE AN INCIDENr
which had taken place pending the recent argyll
mcut The prisoner hnd frequently taken coca.
sion to proclaim that bubble opinion. MS evidenced
by the press and correspondence, was in his favor
Those dcclarnticns could not have been prevented
except by the process Of gogcinr. the prisoner.
Any suggestion that the jury could be- influenced
by such lnwleSs Gathering Of the prisoner would
have seemed to him absurd, aud he should have
felt that he was Insulting the intelligence Of the
Jury II he had warned them not TO regard IT..
Counsel for the prosecution had felt II necessary
however in the final argument to intcrposc con.
trHdirtiOn 10 such statements; and mn exception
had been taken on the pat Of the accused to the
form in which that effort was made. For
Of any objectionable matter lie should sim.
ply say that anything which had been
said on either side In reference to public excite.
ment or to newspaper opinion was not Ia be re-
gnrded by the jury. The indictment charged the
defendant with having murdered James A. Gnr
the nature of the crime charged Murder was COM
mltted where person Of sound memory and dis
erection unowfully killed n reasonable being in the
peace of the United States, with malice niorc.
thought. 1t Ind to be proved, first that the dcnth
was caused by the act of the accused; and fur
Their lhft II was caused with malice nloicthought.
That did not mean, however, that the Government
had to prove any ill-wll or hatred on the part of
the accused toward the deceased Whenever
homicide was shown to have been committed,
without lawful authority
AND WITH DELIBERATE INTENT,
1t was sufficiently proved TO have been done with
malice niOrethought; and malice was not dis.
proved by showing that the accused had no per.
sonal illwill to the deceased, and that he killed
him from other mOtiveS-as, for instance robbery
or through INSTALLING him for another or us
claimed in this cnse) to produce n public benefit.
If II could be shown that the killing occurred in
heat of passion or under prOyOcaiOn, then 1t
would appear that there WINS no premediatcd at
tempt, aud therefore no malice aiorethOught; and
that would reduce the crime to m0nslNughter. 1t
was hardly necessary, however, to say that there
was nothing of that kind in the present case. The
jury would have to say either that the defendant
was guilty of murder or that he was innocent In
order to constitute the crime of murder the
assassin must have reasonably sane mind; in
| technical terms lie must be of sound mind, mem
DRY, and discretion" An irresponsibly Insane
man could not commit murder. If he was lnboring
under disease Of the mental faculties To such an
! eNtcut that he did not know what he was doing,
or did not know II was wrong. then he was want
! ing in that sound mind. memory, and discretion
that was part Of the definition Of murder In
the next place every defendant was presumed in
| tablishcd by proof In the next place, notwith.
| standing this presum ptlon of innocence, II was
equally true that defendant was presumed to be
| sane and 10 have been so at the time the crime
was committed. That is to say, that
| THE GOVERNMENT WAS NOT BOUND To SHOW
aiirmavely ms part Of It's proofs that the defend.
| us the majority of men are sane the law presumed
| the latter condition of every man until some rea-
| son was shown TO- believe to the contrary. The
! burden was therefore, on the defendant, who set
/ up insanity MS an excuse for crime, TO produce
proofs in the first instance to show that that pre-
sumption was mistaken so far AS it related to the
| prisoner. Crime, Therefore, involved three cle-
monts-the killing, maliceiand arespon.ible mind
IN the murderer. After nll the evidence was
ing in mind both those presumptiOns-
that u.s., that the defendant is innocent
till he is found guilty, and that he is sane till the
contrary appenrs-still entertained what Is called
a reasonable douOt on any ground, or MS to any of
the essential elements of the crime, then the de-
PENDANT was entitled to the benefit OF that doubt
and to an aCqulttal. 1t was important to explain
TO the Jury here, in the best way that the Court
could, what IS reasonable doubt. He could
term, for he did not know Of any sue
cessiul attempt to- do so. As to questions
relating to human affairs, knowledge Of which is
the kind Of certainty that is created by scicn-
tiiic demonstration. The only certainty that the
| jury could have was moral certainty, depending
on the confidence which the jury had in the in
tcgrly of witnesses and in their capacity and OPP
portunlly to know the truth; lGforexample, fncts
not improbable in themselves were attestGd by
numerous witnesses. credible and uncontradcted,
and who had every opportunity
TO KNOW THE TRUTH,
reasonable or moral certainty would be inspired
by that testimony In such Il case doubt would be
| unreasonable or imaginary or speculative, 1t
ought not 10 be doubt as to whether the party
IN ght not be innocent, in tho face of strong proofs
oC his guilt; but II must be sincere doubt whether
| he had been proved guilty. Even where the tcst
momy was contradictory and where so much more
credit should be given to one side than the other.
| the same result might be produced On the other
hand, the opposing proofs might be so balanced
that the jury might justly DOUBT oil which side,
under all the circumstances the truth lay, and in
benefit of the doubt, AIIthat jury could be ex,
tain ofthe facts which they declared be their
dict. Itwould be well to say word to the jury
AS TO THE KIND OF EVIDENCE
b.. which courts and juries were guided in this
dinicult ana delicate inquiry, That subtle es-
scnce called mind deied, Of course, ocular in
spcclion. II could only be known by its mani.
icstntiOns. The test was to whether the conduct
| of tho man aud his thoughts and emotions con-
| formed with those of persons of sound mind
or whether they contrastod ,hNrshly with 1t.
| BY that n judgment was formed as TO q
| mans soundness of mind. Aud for that
reason evidence was admissible to show conduct
| and language that would indicate to the general
mind some morbid condition OF the inteectuv
powers. Everything relating TO his mental and
physical history was therefore relevant, because
large number Of facts, and letters spontaneously
written afforded one Of the best indications Of
m ntal condition, Evidence of insanity in the
parents was always pertinGnt but juries We're
never allowed to infer insanity in The accused
from the mere lact of its existence In the anccs.
tors. When, however, there was evidence tend.
ing to show insane conduct on the part OF the ac-
Cused evidence of insanity in the ancestors was
admissible Ms corroboraive OF the other. There
| had been allowed to introduce evidence
covering the whole life Of the accused and reach D..
| ing usp his family anteCedentS In a case so full
! OF detail he should deem 1t TO be his duty to call
the attention Of the jury to particular parts Of it,
| but he wished the jury to distinctly understand
! that 1t was their province and not his TO decide
AND If HE AT ANY TINE
seemed TO express or intimate an opinion on the
iNVta NNllch Hc uiu nov utalEn W uo) ~ MOulu Ho'
| be binding on them; but they must draw theiI
! own conclusions from the evidence. The inslruC-
| tons which he had already given 10 the jury inn
ported that the true test OF criminal responsibility
| whCic the defense OF insanity was nlCrpOSed wa;
whether the accused had sufficient use of his rea-
son to understand the nature Of the net with which
| he was charged, and to understand that II was
| wrong for him to commit It, II those were the
| facts he was CriminulS responsible for the act
| whatever peculiaritics might be shown Of him in
! other IespCCs. ON the other hand, If his reason
were so defective in consequence Of brain disease
| that he could not understand what he was doing
or could not understand u I What he was doing