Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1882-08-23


to the seventy-eight bonds counter
signed by Bogart after he ceased to be
collector, his signature as collector is q
| forgery, and the complainant is for that
reason not liable upon them. As to
the twenty-four bonds issued by Bogert
while he was collector, conclusion adj
verse to the defendant is reached upon
the constraining authority of Buchanan
VS.. Litchfeld, 102 United States, 27S.
Here, as in that case, the bonds did not
contain any recitals to show that they
were issued in conformity with the act
of the legislature which empowered the
| municipality to create the obligations.
In that case the municipality was re-
stricted in issuing its bonds to the crea-
ton of an Indebtedness which should
not exceed per centum on the value OF
the taxable property of the corporation,
to be ascertained by the last assessment
for state and county purposes. AS the
| bonds did not contain recitals asserting
them to be issued conformably with law,
| it was held that a purchaser for value
! could not recover when it appeared that
the restriction had not been strictly OBJ
served. Applying the rule thus enun-
ciated, the defendant can not rely upon
its title as holder for value, and must
surrender all the bonds in suit.
A FENCE was built across q street in
| 1862 by a railroad company, and In 1881
an owner of one of one of the houses on
the street fled bill in equity to enjoin
the company from maintaining the fence
on the ground that it was public nuis
ance. The bill was dismissed on two
grounds: 1. A court of equity will not
protect person against public nuis
ance unless he shows that ne suffers
some special injury; il his injury is that
| only which is suffered by the public
| generally, he can not procure an inlunc-
| ton. 2. In this case the complainant
has conteD ded with the condition of the
street for nearly thirty years, and he has
slept SO long upon his alleged injury
that he can not find relief In equity. To
fail to assert a right promptly is to for
felt the privilege of enforcing it IN
equity, and that alone is sufficient to
deny the relief asked. The complainant
appealed to the supreme court of Penn
sylvania-Cox's appeal-whO affirmed
| the decree, and dismissed the bill with
costs, in April.
The holder of a check drawn to the
| order of A, and Endorsed by him In
blank, on presenting it was refused pay
| ment unless he also Endorsed it. This
| he declined to do, and had the check
protested for non-payment, and then
| brought an action in the court of COM
| mon pleas of Cuyahoga County, o.,
against the maker of the check
McCurdy VS.. the Society of Savings-to
recover the amount of it. McCurdy had
il 'ement for the full amount of the
cl ok, with interest. Judge Jones, in
July, in the opinion, said there was no
room for doubt that when promissory
note, bill Of exchange or check, payable
to the order of any person, and Endorsed
| by him in blank, on its delivery to a
third person transfers to the holder the
ownership thereof, for the title thereto
passes by delivery, and he may bring
| suit to recover the amount of the instru-
ment against the maker or any prior in
dorsers, upon the refusal of the bank or
any other drawee to pay the amount
stated, unless the holder adds his in
| dorsement, as though the instrument had
| been drawn to bearer. In each case the
| liability of the drawee does not depend
at all upon who actually owns the in
strument; he is only concerned to satisfy
! himself that the signatures of the drawer
| and of the indOrser are genuine. A bank
| is ordinarily presumed to know the
| signatures of its own customers and de-
| pOsitOrs; but it will not be seriously
| doubted that, when a check is drawn on
a bank which is a stranger to the payee
| and his signature, the bank is entitled to
a reasonable time IN which to ascertain
the genuineness of the Endorsement be-
fore paying a check payable to order;
and, indeed, some Of the authorities
seen to justify bank or banker in call
ing on the holder of such bill or check.
| when it is reasonable to do so, to furnish
proof of the signature, nor for reason
able delay to satisfy itself of the
genuineness of the Endorsement; but
there was simply an absolute refusal to
pay unless the person who presented the
check would indorse it. That this re-
fusal to pay without such Endorsement is
not justified by commercial law is, we
think, perfectly clear. It is an attempt
to limit the negotiability of such paper,
| and to fix terms and conditions for its
payment not warranted by the law or by
| the drawer of the check, and to which
neither he nor the holder is obliged to
submit. The implicit contract Of bank
with its customers is to pay their checks
according to the law merchant. The
bank sought to defeat the action by
showing that the local usage required
the holder of a note, check or bill to in
dorse it; but the court said that to make
usage of any particular trade, business,
or place, binding, it must be shown that
1t was certain, established, uniform,
reasonable, and not contrary to law.
A Frontier Trick.