Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1882-03-14
Confidential I


was not so far from right as General
Rosecrans might have thought him to
be:
Confidential
HEADQUARTERS
DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND,
NASHVILLE, July %, 1863
''MY DEAR GovERNoR-I have for
long time wanted to write to You. not
only to acknowledge your last kind let
ter. but also to say something conf
dentially on the movements in this de-
partment; but l have refraiued hitherto,
lest do injustice to a good man, and
say to you things which were better left
unsaid. We have now, however, reach.
ed point upon which I feel it proper,
and also due to that kind opinion which
l believe you had of me. to acquaint you
with the condition of affairs here.
81 cannot conceal from you the fact
that | have been greatly tried and dis
satisfied with the slow progress that we
have made in this department since the
battle of Stone River. / would say in
the outset that it wOlld be in the highest
degree unjust to say that in the 1862 days
which have elapsed between the battle
of Stone River and the next advance of
this army were spent in idleaess or tri-
fling. During that period was per-
formed the enormous and highly i'm
portant labor which made the Army of
the Cumberland what il is, in many re-
spects by far the best the country has
ever known. But for many weeks prior
to our late movement l could not helm
but feel that there was not that live and
earnest determination TO fling the great
weight of this army into the scale. and
make its power felt in crushing the shell
of the rebellion.
81 have no words to tell you with how
restive and unsatisfied a spirit / waited
and pleaded for striking a sturdy blow.
| could not justly say we were in any
proper condition to advance till the early
days of May. At that time the strings
began to draw sharply upon the rebels,
both on the Mississippi and the East.
They began to fear for the safety of
Vicksburg, and before the middle of Nav
they began quietly TO draw away forces
to aid Pemberton. pleaded for an ad-
vance, but not till June began did Gen.
Rosecrans begin seriously to mediate an
immediate movement.
1.-THE army had grown anxious, with
the exception of its leading Generals.
who seemed blind to the advantage of
the hour. In the first week of the month
council of war was called and, out of
eighteen Generals whose opinions were
asked, seventeen were opposed to an ad-
vance. l was the only one who urged
upon the General the imperative neces-
sity of striking blow at once, while
Bragg was weaker and we stronger than
ever before. IwrOte a careful review of
the opinion of the Generals, and exhlb-
tied the facts, gathered from ample data.
that he could throw 65 600 bayonets and
sabres against Bragg's Al 900, allowing
the most liberal estimates of his force.
'"This paper was drawn up on the 9Th
of June. After its presentation and a
full canvassing of the situation, an ad-
vance was agreed upon, but it was de-
layed through days which seemed
months to me till the Gath, when it was
begun and ended, with what results Won
know. The wisdom of the movement
was not only vindicated, but the seven
teen dissenting Generals were compelled
to confess that if the movement had
been made ten days earlier, while the
weather was prOpitiOus, the army of
Bragg would, ia all human probability.
no longer exist. I shall never cease to
regret the sad delay which lost us so great
an opportunity to iufict mortal blow
upon the centre Of the rebellion The
work of eXpeling Bragg from MiddIn
tennessee occupied nine days, and ezded
July 3D., leaving his troops ia most dis
heartened and demOralized condition:
while our army, with loss OF less than
one thousand men, was in few davs
fuller of potential fight than ever before.
"On the 18Th inst. the bridges were re-
built and the cars were in full eommuni-
cation from the Cumberland to the Ten
nessee. L have since then urged. with
all the earnestpess l possess, a rapid adj
vance, while Bragg's army was shattered
and under cover, and before Johnston
and he could effect junction. Thus far
the General has been singularly disin-
ciined to grasp the situation with a strong
hand and make the advantage his own.
l write this with mora sorrow than I can
tell you, for l love every bone in his
body; and, next to my desire to see the
rebellion blasted, is my anxiety TO see
him blessed. But even the breadth of
my love is not sufficient to cover this
almost fatal delay.
My personal relations with General
Rosecrans are all that | could desire.
Officially. share his councils and re-
sponsibilities, even more than desire.
but beg you to know that this DELAY is
against my judgment and my every wish.
Pleasant as are my relations here I wculd
rather command battalion that cvo,Ild
follow and follow, and strike AID strike
than to hang back while such golden
moments are passing. But the General
and myself believe .nat can do more
service In my present place than in COM
mano OF Division, though / am aware
tnat IL Is position that promises better
IN the way of promotion or popular
cfeolt: But If this inaction continues
long, shall ask to be removed and sent
somewhere where l can be part of a
working army. But do hope that Won
will soon hear that this splendid army is
at least trying to do it's part in the great
work. If the War Department has not
always been just, it has certainly been
very indulgent to this army. But feel
that the time has now come when it
should allow no plea to keep this army
back from the most vigorous activity.
Il do hope that no hopes of pes. .ce or
submissive terms on the part of the
rebels will lead the governmer6 To DELAY
the draft and the vigorous prosecution Of
the war. 1En1eo DdnaGs ct dana flrea5es
Let the nation now display the majesty
OF its power, AID the work will speedily
end. nope you will pardon this
lengthy letter; but wanted you to know
now the case stands, and was unwilling
to have you think me satisfied with the
DELAYS here.
with kindest regards, I am, as ever,
your friend, J. a. GARFTEIn
"HOn. s. z. Chase"