The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1882-08-27
NEW PUBLICATIONS
QuATRE BRAS, L1GNY, AND WATERLOO.
Narrative ot the Campaign In belgium In 1915,
By DORSEY GARDNER. Boston, lIoughton,
Minim 3 Go. From Mohun,


Konr dy, and others to get what can here he found
IN on compact volume. Tho Gruuchy controversy, |
whiti had been iucnectiyey revived by Mr. John c.
Rops in his contention In the itoutic that the
Mahal was chiefly reronsibic for the disaster Is cf
fprtyely disposed OF by Mr. Gardner WHO shows that
urdchy clearly obeyed his orders. The fart Is that
the World dsstll unwilling TO rcnouuce Its belief In
thehclions NJ rhlers and other romanclss, and In
sist,u upon finding some other explanation than his
owl faults Tor Naroloon's military failures. There
ls ~ such excuse however, for those who, like Mr.
Rops, set themselves up rs military critics. They
mus recognize the fact that whllc Napoleon had a
dcciUod genius for war, he not an ideally perfect
general. II ho had possessed more solid qualities,
Will the resources aud means ut his disposal he could
hnt'ly have failed IN consolidating his power and
would not have died ST. Helena lie totally failed
~ understand tho limitations Of hs own genius and
sometimes the most Insane enterprises attracted him
hc most strongly, The expedition Into Egypt was
enc which the risk was great and the possible gain
Insignificant. But this experience had no effect In
iecrrlng him fiom the stu foulhardy llustlan
INVASION. Tho fate Of Charles NII could not
convince him Of the danger Of campaign
n region whose frigld climate and vast
iSteut both Indicated the imposslbllltv Of per-
nanent conquest Instead OF crossing tho Nicmcn had
he set the ancient Kingdom Of Poland fairly Its feet,
he could have then retired and easily made himself mas
ter Of Western Europe But his arrogance know no
bounds Crassus marching Into iarlhin not less
nmenabc to reason or all great conquerors Napoleon
| Is almost the only one whose downfall was absolute
aud wholly his own fault. ilo rose TO tho surface
when the military organizations OF adjacent states hal
fallen into decadrnce. Their atmcs were commanded
either by generals too aged for or by court favor
| lies without military experience. Tho FronCh armts
OF the Revolution animated by y spirit which
| hid made them generally victorious before Napoleon
took the chief command. The system of universal con
nF
siblc aud which the key to Napoleon ssucccss was
| the system OF the Revolution, and not his
tlon Coming TO the head Of state animated by q
most martial spirit with the system OF universal
military service ready to his hand lie took command
Of tho armies Of the young republic and handled them
With boldness and skil but with utter rockessness AZ
TO the cost of his victories In human lives. There is
growing conviction that his succcsscs were as much
due to the nretiolty of his advorslries as to his own
sim. At least many other successful generals have
| managed 10 win equally decisive victories without
such terrible sacrifice uf life. lie fully understood
that the secret Of success To have the preponder
of force at thedeCsive point and not to endcavO
to have troops everywhere, at the cost of being power
ful nowhere. Yet he violated this very maxim In the
Belgian campaign when he left Rapp's corps of 90 900
men in Alsare, wheie they useless, though they
| would have been nr Tremendous value to him ut
| Waterloo.
Napoleon conception of the campaign was admit
r5ble. Napoleon anl Butcher covered d front of a
hundred miles, their wings meeting near the Charlie
rCi Brussels rnad. His plan to quickly Concen-
ttte on the frontier advance upon this point, thrust
item apart, and fight them separately Napoleon had
i22 ooO men, Wellington io5 600, Butcher ii6, 900.
but Of the huglo- Allied army about 80, 600 were
Dutch Begians, the former raw lcvics, the latter en-
rey disafected. All proved yalueless they broke
for the rear as as attacked, and sometimes
sooner. The disparity Of force made the greatest
lcrlty, decision, and skin necessary to Vel
Napulcon, after having begun In good STYLE wasted
many hours before striking the prusslans, and every
hours delay Increased their strength, for they
busily concentrating. After battle fairly Joined
lat Lgny 1t was not pushed with much vigor OF
g skill The French wasted their troops and time it
nghtiug through group of villagers, which were oh
stinately contested and taken and retaken, when
we'll directed blow on the flank might have ended til,
lnair. Even when lust before nightfalI u Erlon'
. cops, which had been aimlessy marching back AM
i toth between the two simultaneous combats n
, QatIe Bras and Lgny, came mp In plain sight oi
th Piussian right flank, where II vigorously brough
ito action, II must have made the overthrow of TIN
| Pussians complete, it was told by of Napoleon
ads that It not expected on that part Of the field
$ ad marched oil again toward Ney. II seems al
most Incredible that Napoleon, seeing this body .
~ roops, should not have either gone himself or sen
i Isuult, some other oflcer Of rank, to brin
y them into action. II they friends, o
take measures to repel them If foes Ate
, | the inJecsIve but costly victory of Lgny, Hapo
hCp seemed to assume that Butcher had done th
wrong Instead of the right thing, and had Ieteate
70 away from wellington Instead of toward lin. We
j Napoleon had had enough bitter experience wit
Blucler In 1913 to know that lie was of all general
atout the least likely to make such mistake. Vic
:: tory was almost impossible unless Butcher should &
n tho wrong way, so the wish father to the though
Mat he had retreaed toward Namur. We may re
mark In passing that this June ~, 1871, the da
Quatrc Bras and Ligny ms well as on the Two heN
decisive days, Napoleon sta service seems to ha'
been about as Ineffective It H. possible to conceive
That any officer ut for commission, not to say head
uuarter sar duty should fail to appreciate the va
e Importance of u Erlon'S arrival near Ligny, seem
= Incredible. Napoleon and Ncy wero all day litt
Is more than ten miles apart, yet neither seemed
have any idea of what the other was doing until houl
a had elapsed And II VIII surprise the unreal soil,
n to learn that Grouchy during the time when his h
ID action has been complained Of was never more than
IS dozen miles away all the time really within
of tho commander In chief, who ought to have bee
II receiving hourly reports from him. But he had III
aken the precauon to have the Intervening countr
patroed by his cavalry, and it had consequently bee
Is occupied by the more vigiant Prussian horsemcr
10 Tho delay on tho morning Of the 18th, the day
Waterloo, is uneXpainable. Napoleon attributed 1t
the rain, which had made the ground soft. But til
consideration ought not TO have prevailed with gei
III era who has his army concentrated and In position
aud who Is lost unless he can win decisive victor
= before his opponent gains strength Even the bait
~ itself was badly ordered. 1t consisted OF isoat,
N and unsupported attacks directly upon the front
AT tho English position where the steadineas OF the Brit
VI Infantry aud the yalnr of their cavalry enabled the
10 hold the ground. The hight of the Du,ch-Belgia
10 divisions gave Napoleon actual superiority of for
~ until late IN the afternoon, when tie fIussan NJ
10 proaCh made his case hopeless. burnR this period
wel-orered aud powerful attack on the EngllSh IL
\, flank would apparently have been lsrul. Att
le getler, tile campaign cannot be regarded as mode
r nor as iusfying tho claim for uansacnlent gent
a for Napoleon.
:. Wellington and Bliclier both here appear as Ii
" peers II Tot supcriors. They had agreed weeks bco
re that the battle would he fought this ground. We
lingOn had actually had 1t mapped by his officers, al
disposed his troops with their maps In his hands, al
" they had agreed upon their respective movements
IL case they were attacked they actually ",
nj ngon' battle wasdefcientin those mastery strok
no of genius by which he had maintained his ascenden
Id on 80 many fields against the ablest of Napoleon
Il, Marshas, Sout Massena, MarmOnt, Jourdan, etc
ct IL must he remembered that he was condemned
~ purely defensive game until Bicher arrived. hut
every critical moment IN tho contest no was personal
ri at the vital point making effective dispositions
Sad oliiters Vas kiied OF w6nhdeti. Letrno sude
of note how different this from the way In whlC
Grant conducted the Wilderness campaign, when
WAS never present at tho vital point when tho crisis
er a movement demanded the supreme commander
IN presence.
he OF fGrouchy's part, We need only say that while
Of course was Justified by strict Interpretation OF
N orders u genius for war would have made Him agr
!" with Count Gerard when they heard the cannona
d at Mont St. Jean, TO direct their march thtlier.
10 In concluding We have only space to say that
Gardner's volume is very well written and makes M
Interesting reading But while the poetry OF Waer
which he appends Is much Of 1t interesting. even
this day. there Is no excuse whatever for his attack
Sir Walter Scott which has no relation whatever to
Il, subject.
10 TWO HARD CASES. Sketches from Physlcar
Portfolio. By " W, doDDlNG, NJ ID. Bosto
Iioughton, Mimln Co, For sale by Robert Bea
10 DR.. Godding, the well-known Superinten
ent OF the Government Hospital for The Insane in Il
y District has accomplished the dileult task Of sayi
O. something now and interesting about tho strange
tI.Ia NrIR. nTaai tIg