The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1882-12-03
THE MISSISSIPPI x

As the Scribner Series of War Histories
progresses II becomes less and less satisfactory THAI
attempts at writing tho history Of any portion of ou
ClVil war could he made without arousing cOntro.
yeTsy Is not to De expected. Not to arouse contro.
VeTsy would simply be to fail to excite Interest. But
s creditabe history OF the the series proves
be an utter abortion. This Is partly because s con.
ceptlon was Job OF speculative book making placed
under the direction OF some who was totally ig.
norant Of the War OF the Rebellion, unnforined az
to the relative Importance Of different cawpalgns,
and without the knowledge which would qualify an
editor to select the best available writer for each
period TO be treated. Probably to the most competent
OF the historians chosen, Gen. Humphreys, WAS as
signed the Impossible task OF COMPRISING the whole
history OF the campaigns OF the Army of the Potomac
after Gettysburg into single volume. Yet the
movements and battles to De narrated Ia this One
we're at least equal In Importance to those which
were allotted to any other two perhaps three vol
umes OF the series.
The selection Of Lieut.. Greene to write the history
Corporations of which 30 many living participants
survive (sOne OF them undoubtedly better qualified
than he is 10 write VI the events In which they took
par) was not felicitous and as was To be expected
Mr. Greenes abOIs do not add to the historical value Of
the Serlos. some volumes Of this SERIES like those Of
Gen. Cox, though not satisfactory as HISTORIES
possess real value materials for history because
much Of the operatlons as came under his personal
observation. Lieut.. GresDe's work is. of course,
utterly destitute Of value OF tLig sort, and II is
worthless as piece Of military criticism. since he
had evidently determined TO write nothing which
could DO disasefu In the most influential Of military
circles It Is All attempt at historical whitewashlng
written from the point Of view of the auor's self
Interest
wo hayo already had occasion to review work on
fills fruu Ia IA NJ AIr -
aud As we generally coiueide with Dir. Reed 10 his
judgment Of the generals and strategy upon this par
tleuAr theatre Of operations We shall at present
simply quote from his review Of Lieut. Greenes vol
une, though We may perhaps treat OF some Of the
questions raised in future article. AlT. Reed IN
the Cincinnati GaEetts, says
a subaltern who writes history ur the exploits Of
those who can make or mar his destiny la the army
accepts the function TO write under Limitations,
Lieut. Greene was ripe enough 70 perceive these llmi
tauons. Books may DO made IN such bounds, but
not history, lie PROCESSES 20 have gone to the rec
Ords for his sOnfces but the book IL only aDbre-
Waited fellash OF Adam Badeau'B comical history
travelling OseE the same ground, repeating the same
bizarre Ideas aud childish military theories, the
afterthOughts shifted 20 fOrethOggbts 10 give ia.
uona plan 10 blunders and accidents. aud lsyllg the
same notion that truth does not belong To- tds MARIA
tive Of military exploits.
The work Is IT book making, not Of authorship. Il
Is less Interesting than Badeau's. Tbs maker knows
as nlle OF the art OF writing Of the Of war.
Ia aDDTeYatng Badeau h9 lacked the art Of graphic
generalization, and thus he slurred over the Affairs
ohscuriug them. And when he enters Into details,
Il Ia catalogue gsy, which cOnfuses the general
far. Although skimming book, IL might have
been done Ia an Interesting STYLE but II Is du and
mechanical following and shortening Of Bodeau.
Badeau literary style queer, but he gave par
Elcullrs and dispatches, which enabled the critical
reader 10 bee through his shu1ilngs. This book
lacks these Instructive features, aud gives Badeau's
untruths naked.
In the theories OF military strategy the Lieuten-
Rnt shows the credulOuB freshness OF the prentice
hand He assumes that The nguTe OF tho Mississippi
River cutiug tie Confederacy IA two had military
consequence the same AS the cutting Of the human
body IN Two aud that when VIC had taken tbs river
the split Confedefacy must die aud did de- aud that
All after the capture Of NieksbuTg was mere gath
eIing up OF tue severed members. He assumes also
that the only way 10 capture tue river was by river
expedition. Yet II was not taken that way. The
river expedition only delayed tue work. Aud after
that the interior had 10 be occupied through Interior
routes and when that was occupied ths Confederate
pOsls Ou tue river would untenable.
When We had taken the river it did not furnish
bAse for any Interior operation. TIE COufederac J
was as lively when cut Ia two before. 1t nas in
possible " 80 guard tho river tO prevent forces
from crossing Aud our generals all agreed that AZ,