New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-06-01
TIE NEXT MOVE IN EGYPT


ordered by Arab, the Sultan or the Western
Powers, will not be critical move on the
Egyptian chess board. The game cannot be
won by either side through substitution OF
pieces on the Kings square. The attack oil
the rebellOus Knight and his attendant mill
tary pawns must be broken up, or the foreign
Governments which are supporting the be-
leaguered sovereign will be defeated. SO long
as Arab remains Mayor Of the Palace 1t
matters little whether Tewfik or Hahn be on
the throne. ANY change in the succession will
embarrass the allied Governments, because
the present sovereign has been faithful to his
engagements with them. The ruler who
signed tie decree ntrustng the Controllers
General with the supervision of the financial
administration has been under foreign tute-
lage throughout his reign. He has acted under
the advice of the French and English Govern
ments, and if he be overthrown it will be because
he has persistently followed their instructions.
A new sovereign could not be more dependent
upon foreign support or less disposed to assert
his own independence. Under the most fav-
orable circumstances the allied Governments
would have n puppet that could not be more
easily worked than the present Khedive But
the circumstances could scarcely fail to be less
favorable. The new sovereign, although
created by the Sutan's firman, would have
more sympathy with the military party, which
had virtually nominated him, and less conf
dence in foreign support than his unfortunate
predecessor.
Foreign prestige cannot be reestablshed in
Egypt until the Egyptian Army is dispersed.
Changes of sovereign and ministers are or little
avail when tho military barracks are the source
and centre of political power So long as there
is Prptorian Guard outside the palace gates,
which can make and unmake ministers and
dictate Its terms to sovereigns and national
assemblies, there can be no permanent basis OF
settlement In this instance the soldicry have
the people on their side While the number OF
troops is limited to $4,000 and the effective
force does not exceed $4,000 men, the system
of enlistments and service is national. Every
Egyptian between the ages OF nineteen and
forty is liable to service, and after leaving the
active army he is mustered for twelve years
with the reserves The strength of the military
party is not correctly represented by the
twenty-One depleted regiments serving with
the colors, or i'll the coast-guard and the gen.
darmerie. The reserves, by which the army can
be heavily reinforced in an emergency. must
also be counted, and with them the mass OF the
people, whose most definite idea of citizenship
is that of military service. Arab, ambitious
and imaginative as he is, would not have ven
tured to defy his sovereign and the Western
Powers, if he had merely succeeded in winning
the good will and confidence of a Prntorian
Guard. 1t is because the army expresses
whatever national sentiment there may he in
Egypt that its leader has become really formid-
able 1t is the national prestige which he has
acquired as the opponent of foreign interfer-
ence and the advocate of a native civil service
that adequately explains his power. On this
account it will not be easy for the allied
Powers to discipline him; yet they cannot
allow him to remain Mayor of the Palace under
any sovereign, new or old, without impairing
their own influence in a country which each
covets for itself. Evidently he cannot be intim-
idated by fleet of ironclads A military ex-
petition must be planned, either from COnstan-
tinople or from MarseIles and Portsmouth,