New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-09-13

foot the military censOrs would be certain to
sunnress premature reports. The Highland
Brioade snow represented as marching toward
Kassasin and body of cavalry from the indian
contingent is known to have landed nj lsmaila.
But the destination of General Macpherson
with the main column from bombay has not
been mentioned in the dispatches. THIS TACT
taken in connection with General Wolscleys
inexplicable delay in advancing on Tel-el-
Kebir gives weight to the Iumor that there is a
military reason for inaction, namely, a thanking
movement from Guez to Cairo. AT any rate IL
is an interesting military conjecture.
The strongest argument to be urged IN favor
of such movement is the necessity OF cuttngO OH
Arabs line of retreat ard protecting the capital
If General Wolseley were to advance III force,
batter down tie Notifications and defeat the en-
emy in n pitched battle the campaign wonld
not bc closed. Arab could Withdraw to Iaga-
zir and have two lines of retreat to Cairo open
to him by railway, and when pursued his
troons could plumber the city and take refuge
in Upper Egypt. Vow it would be a lasting
disgrace to the British arms If CAIRO were 10
share the fate of Alexandria and be left Il heap
of smOudering ruins, and, moreover inc ulili-
cuties OF the campaign would be InuitlPheu
if Arab were allowed to retreat up the ME- II
lis force can be kept massed III front OF Gen
eral Wolseley's nam column, even played WIN
for season and encouraged to make Slahu'
until Cairo has been secured IN the rear the
British will not only be able to win Il pa'IIe'
but to close the campaign WITHOUT aho'hcI
scene of devastation like the destruction OF
Alexandria. 1t would be IL brilliant Stlatcgicai
device At the same time 1t would be Il very
hazardous movement. The invading army
would he di gided into three camps the garrison
at Alexandra, the main body with It's line OF
c,mmupica tons across the desert from Is
MALTA, and thanking column in the enemy )
capital long distance from its original base
of supplies. A division of forces IS always
attended with danger when the enemy Is Ill
possession of inner lines of railway communl-
cation by which his forces can be masSed
against the weakest column.
The distance to be traversed by General
Macpherson's column, if it be really moving
across the desert from Sucz TO Cairo, Is about
eighty-fve miles There are three principal
roads. the line of the dlsused railway and
the caravan and pilgrim routes. One OF these
is an excellent road for one-half the distance,
and its approaches FROM Suez are only defended
by a single small fort. a laden camel makes
the distance on the caravan road IN sixty
hours. The Indian contingent if unopposed
ought not to be more than week III CLOSING
the desert to Cairo. Two great difficulties
would have to be surmounted First, an abso-
Lutte lack OF water. There Is neither well nor
pool between Suez and Cairo, and all the
water to be used during the march across the
desert under a blistering sun would have to he
carried Secondly, the impossiblity of trans
porting the supplies artillery and baggage OF an
advancing army with ordinary beasts OF
burthen and the improbability that sufficient
number of camels to do the work could be col
lected without protracted delay This flank
ing operation would be attended with almost
insuperable difficulties as we'll as the NEST
serious risks. If those difficulties could be
surmounted and the campaign closed without
disaster, General Wolsecy will afford the
most signal proofs of original genius and au-
dacious generalship. Few commanders would
be willing to assume the responsibility OF Or
dering so hazardous n movement