New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-02-24
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
DoIIBLEDAY'S CHANCELLORSVILLE AND
GETTYSBURG.

monographs has derived more genuine ENJOY
ton, his wor,, than ueneral Doubleday. lie took
most important part in both OF the campaigns ho
has chronicled a part which he knows to have been
usefnl and honorable. and it would he unnatural II
he did not derive satisfaction IN recalling anu
recording the events of those days. lie has spoken
with The utmost modesty and simplicity of his own
work but without aflectation OF reserve, ana mas
unAinchngly used the first person singular where 1t
was most convenient. He has come through that
especial ordeal with perfect success lie has neither
exaltcd his own merits nor detracted from them-ln
which he has treated the reader in fair and manly
fashion, But il is moi in reference to his own WORK
that he has evidently gained the most gratlhcatioh
in writing his brief history. lie has found much
pleasure in doing justice to the heroism ana the
good conduct of a larye number of comrades ana
friends Hancock, PleasaniOn. Sckles. Barlow,
Webb Dahgren, FarnswOrth, Merritt and custer
and large number of other officers are treated with
cordial and generous appreciation, not untempered
With malicious criticism. Many of the rebel officers
engaged have the authors unstinted praise Tor
pallantry and good conduct The shortcomings Oh
Hooker at Chancellorsvlle are d@elt upon with
full sense of the important lesson they convey, but
also with friendly appreciation of all that was
admirable in The character and methods OF General
Hooker But if the reader Of the future should
aftempt TO discover from internal evidence what
especial motive led General Doubleday to write
this book he would not be long in coming to the
conclusion that General Doubleday telt that the
immediate and pressing need OF the hour was
correct aud impartial analysis of the military char
acter and conduct of General 0. o. Howard ms
he has cxered himself, with much industry and
enjoyment, to give.
In the first paragraph where General Howards
name occurs the intention to be rlgidiy accurate,
and not to be carried away by enthusiasm, is evil
dent: Tho position recently occupied by General
Franz Sigt the favoIite commander OF the
Eleventh Corps, had been given to General o. o.
Howard. The large German element in that corps
were discontented at the change. They know
little and cared less for Towards reputation as
great Biblical scholar the iavel0c of the army, as
lie was called owing to his having studied tor the
ministry in the Presbyterian Church They lett,
when their countryman Sigel was deprived OF his
command, that il was blow at their nationality
and therefore lost some of the enthusiasm which
always accompanies the personal influence OF a
popular leader" In working out W05lem' one
object is to see how much can be eliminated from II
IN advance. and if we begin with the idea that the
change from Sigel to Howard was change for the
worse Il e question OF how much llowaru amounted
to becomes at once a comparatively marrow enc.
General Doubleday gives more attention to this
oucs;lOn than TO any other involved his narrative,
and arrives at results which, however they may be
received 10y the world at large, will not be con-
sdered satisfactory at West Point
The beginnings of the movement on Chancellors-
Vile which ended in such disaster were aus
picious enough. The following is clear and sue
clnct account OF Hookcr's plan:
The rainy season was nearly over the time had
come for action, and 1T was essential TO strike
decisive blow before the term OF service OF the nine
months and two years men had drawn 10 clOSe.
Rockers plan OF campaign was smPe eihfaclous'
and should have been successful. The rebels occu-
pied a long line and could not he strong every
where He resolved to make 4 prctcncc OF crossing
with three corps under Maj0r-Gencral Sedgwck.
below Fredericksburg, while the remaining four
corps under Major-Gencral SOcum made detour
and crossed twcnty seven miles above at kelIeyS
Ford The latter were then to march down the
river against the left flank OF the rebel army ana
reopen Bauks's Ford; thus reunting the two wings
of the army and giving secure line OF retreat IN
case of disaster When this was accomplished. 1t
was proposed 10 give battle III the open country
near The ford the position there being command
ING one and taking the whole line OF rcbe works on
the heights of Fredericksburg in reverse OWING to
his great prepOnderanCe OF force, Hooker had niue
reason TO doubt that the result would he favorable
to our arms To carry Oat this plan and make IL
complete surprise TO the enemy. 1t became necessary
to leave GibbonSS division OF Couchs corps behind,
for !is encamPmeut at Falmouth was IN full view
of the Confederate forces on the opposite sac; 10
withdraw il would have been to notify them that
some unusual movement was going on. SO Tar the
idea WAS simply to crush the opposing army, but
Uooker's plan went further and involved the cap
tnre of Lees entire force. To accomplish TINS he
directed S,onoman TO start two weeks IN advance
of the main body with 10000 cavalry, cross at the
upper foIds of the RappahannOCk, and SWEEP down
upon Lees conn unicatons with Richmond, break
ing up railroads and canals, cutting teiegraph wires
ana nterccpting supplies OF ali Kinds AS tie rebel
commSsariat found great dIhculty III keeping more
than four days ratOns on hand at time. stone
mans raid woulL almost necessarily force Lee To
fall back on his depots and give up Fredericksburg.
One column under AveTell was to attack Cn'peper
and GordonSvillc, the other under But0rd TO move
md N IL
ericksl urg Railroad Both columns were 10 unite
behind the Pamunkey, and i'll case our army was
successful StOneman was directed TO plant ms force
behind some river in an advantageous position on
Lees line of retreat where hc could detaln the rebel
army until Hooker could again assai ii and compel
IT to surrender. brave programme! Let us see
how il was carried out.
General Doubleday divides tho responsibility for
the failure of this campaign in manner which IS
probably substantially just. No good resulted from
Stoneman's operations as heavy rains prevented his
starting for two weeks, at the end OF which Hooker
grew impatient and cavalry and infantry went owe
the river together. The first days success was all
that could have been hoped for. AT 6 p. m on the
seth of April. Hooker was at Charlottesville with
four CORPS. and Sckles not far away. Sedgwick's
had so confused Lee at Fredencks-
burg that he was not sure on which side he was to
be attacked. Hooker had only to press forward and
seize his objective. BanKs's Ford. which was four
miles of and slightly defended, and ii would then
have been almost impossible for Lee to have fought
him except at great disadvantage But at this
point began Hookers fatal vacllations which ended
at last in such disaster. All that evening and night
and the next morning till / nothing was done by
him and much was done by the enemy. The fight
ing of the 1st of May is given by General Double
day at considerable length. 1t was destructive but
utterly inconcusivc. Tic events of the next day
were of tho most terrible interest to North and
South as the dav of Stonewall JacksOns glory and
death. Says General Doubleday:
At dawn OF day General Lee and General Jackson
were sitting by the side OF the plank road on some
empty cracker boxes, discussing the situation. when