Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1882-02-04

| udIS, ana any I6SlSlatlOQ Wnlcn les
sens the value of the contract j
void"
The power of the general assem-
bly, to make the coupons upon tn
bonds of the state receivable 70
taxes is not now an open question
either in the supreme court of tn
United States or of this state O
elsewhere. However, before leav
ing this branch of the case, we de
sire to call attention to what Ger
tainly appears to us to be the absurt
and contradictory position whicl
complainants in their bill assum
on this subject.
Complainants concede the powe
to any general assembly to refunt
the outstanding bonded indebted
ness of the state by authorizing th'
cancellation of the old bonds anC
the issuance of new ones in thei
stead, with the faith, credit anC
honor of the state pledged for thei
redemption. 1t also comedies the
power to any general assembly tt
provide for the payment of the ma
turing interest on the bonds so isSu.
ed during its legislative term, either
by providing for the reception oI
coupons by the collector of taxes, ol
providing for their payment direct
ly out of the treasury. But it de-
nies the power 10 any general as
sembly to make provision for the
payment of this maturing interest
either by coupons receivable for
taxes, or otherwise, that would be
binding upon and irrepealable by
its successors. In the same breath
and in one unbrOken sentence, the
bill attacks this act of the assembly
on the subject, because, as it alleges,
the general assembly cannot enact
any irrepealable measure, and that
hence this act is repealable, and at
the same time and in the same SEN
tence this act is asSailed because it
is not repealable. 1t is curious to
contemplate this ingeniOusly alb
surd position.
1t is not denied that one legisla-
ture may make treasury warrants,
old issue and new issue indeed, of
the Bank of Tennessee and coupons
of anything else it pleases receiva-
bic for taxes, but it is denied that
ii can bind its successors by making
the act irrepealable. SO long as
the act remains unrepealed it is the
law. Wnen it is repealed it is the
law no longer. The act of the 9Th
of April, 1881, simply makes cou-
pons receivable for taxes IA the act
of 1873 makes old issue of the Bank
of Tennessee, etc., SO receivable,
and as the code, section COS (a) at
one time made coupons. Com
plainants admit that all the acts are
within the legislative power but
insist they may be all repealed.
Suppose we admit, for the sake of
that cOmplainants are
right, that these acts can be re-
pealed. We do know none of
them, except code SOB (a) has yet
been repealed. Hence they are the
law. If the legislature only had
power to make coupons receivable
for taxes for it's legislative term or
until the act was repealed, this is
all it has done. That it had the
power to do this complainants ad-
nit. To argue that the act is un-
because it is not re-
pealable and is binding upon its
successors is a contradiction of terms,
a palpable absurdity' If it is bind
ing and irrepealable this is only
true because of the constitutional
power to enact the law. If no such
power exists it is not binding and
is repealable. The fact (if it be so)
that the law is binding and ire
pealabIe presuppOses and rests up
on the other fact that the legisla-
ture had the power to enact the
law, and if the legislature had the
power to enact the law that is the
end of the inquiry.
The only remaining subject to
which we desire to invite indulgent
is the final attack which
the bill makes upon this act of as
sembly approved April 6, 1881, for
fraud, corruption ana bribery alleg-
ed to have been used with members
Of the general assembly CO procure
the passage of the act. These char
ges of fraud and corruption have
become so common in
the latter day politics of Tennessee
that no public officer in either de-
Dartment of government, however
sincere and honest he is in the con-
discharge of his public
luties, is secure from the reckless
1t is difficult to
.reat these charges in the bill as
and respectfully as it be-
comes our duty to do for the pur-
pose of the argument of this case.
This we shall however, endeavOr
% do, leaving the moral and public
of these grave charges
lpon the heads of their reckless
The question Of law is, can the
judicial department of the state
inquire into the wis
lom, policy or bona fides of any
Ict of the legislative or executive
of the state govern
nent?
If the judicial department can
inquire into the good faith or mo-
ives which induced the enactment |
# the law, and finding these in its
pinion corrupt and impure, and |
an restrain its execution and de- |
lare it no law, why may it not
likewise inquire into the policy and
wisdom of the law, and finding
hese in its opinion impolitic and
nWise, again restrain lis execution
nd declare it no law?
Then, if the judicial department |
ssumes the power to do all these
hings, why not at once abolish the
agislatiye and executive depart
nents as useless appendages tojudi-
ial usurpation ? This power being
to the judiciary, all other
hings follow.
And let it be constantly borne in
lind that in the case at bar it is irt-
lsted that this dangerous power
an be exercised by the courts, not
t the suit of the state, but at the
uit of a few dissatisfied Taxpayers
nd citizens of the state against the
tate.
The theory of c0mplainants upon
his subject seems to be based upon
he falacious and mistaken GSSuDlp-
ION that the general assembly is
ut the agent of the state, like the
luyor and aldermen of a municipal
and the directors of a
or railroad corporation are
gents of their respective corpora
;o1as. The language of the bill on
his subject, in speaking of the act
f 1881, is: "Whilst it is in form
aw it is in nature merely an au-
hority for a contract, in effect a
over of attorney wrongfully and
procured, and that court