New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-01-27

Judge Cox has been so sharply criticised TOR
other things that he should receive most hearty
and unrcspryed commentator for his admir-
able charge to the jury. In this at least, there
was no sign of weakness or irresOlution. With
q firm grasp of the subject, and an unwaver-
Ing purpose to prevent any error OF Judgment
arising from misunderstanding of the law, the
Judge placed tho case so clearly and strongly
before the Jury that, even if they had not been
virtually decided long before the charge was
given, it would have been hardly possible for
them to err. In Icalty, there was no room Tor
doubt about any essential fact, and the only
ouestioD of difficulty was in regard to the mcan-
inc and application of the law. We do not
know that the law as to insanity has ever been
~ clearly and thoroughly oXp0undcd III any
other case in this country or elsewhere, as it
was in the charge Of Judge Cox. lie had the
benefit of the abest decisions OF ali other
courts, it is true. But he deserves very high
credit for improving upon the best OF them.
In the main, the test of criminal responsibility
which he laws down is the one announced by
the best authorities. But his decision surpasses
any other known to us, i'll making clear
and sharp the distinction between general uG-
soundncss of mind and legal inSanity-between
those dclusions, impulses or weaknesses which
do constitute responsibility for crime and
those which do not.
The general rule that the accused is reSPOn-
sible if, at the commission Of a crime, he was
conscious of the nature Of the act and knew
that it was wrong, is liable to abuse, as
Judge Cox has shown, and is at times a very
difficult one to apply. lin this case, taking the
Drisonpr's own statements, it would have been
difficult to say that he was conscious that his
act was wrong If he had actually been pos
scssed 10y an insane dcusiOn that he was com
mandcd to do it by the Deity, and for the
purpose OF preventing great harm to the coun-
try. But Judge Cox makes a sharp distinc-
ton between belief caused by disease of the
brain and IA belief having any other cause
whatever. Thousands of most worthy citizens
sincerely believe that they are led, in many
things, by Divine guidance; that iii answer
to prayer they are directed by the Infinite
Ruler. 1t is beyond the power of il
Judge or jury to determine, in some
cases, whether such belief is actu-
ally and sincerely held; but if it results
in the commission of a crime, the law pun
ishes that crime and cares nothing about the
Dcllel DtlllUu IL, UNLESS lllll Dtltl WAS llt It.
suit Of mental disease. a sane man is bound
to obey the law or to suffer the penalty, no
matter what he believes. \ deluSion, or false
belief is no excuse for crime, therefore, unless
it is the fruit of the disease of mind which
the law knows as insanity. This distinction
brushes away altogether the defence so often
set up that the accused really believed it his
religious or patriotic duty to do what lie did.
Judge Cox laws down this, as the most certain
rule for distinguishing one class of deluSion
from another that can insane dclusiOn is never
the result of reasoning aud reflection Cut
team repeatedly declared that his belief came
10 him as the result Of reading Stalwart neWs-
papcrs, and much reflection upon their aSscr-
tions. Says the Judge. "When men reason,
"the law requires them to reason correctly, 80
"far rs their practical duties are concerned"
The law does not punish the reading OF Stai-
wart falsehoods, or the forming of Stall,art
bclicfs. however mOnstrOus but it does punish
for crime ANY man who can reason.
Ia another respect the charge was palticu-
larIy timely aud clear. The Judge showed
that partial insanity does not necessarily cx-
cuse man from crime Unless the insanity
is of such II degree and kind as to render the
accused incapable Of distinguishing or choos-
ing right from wrong ,nifh respect 10 the