Daily globe., 1882-01-26
Judge Co1's Charge.


Judge Cox, at S-15 p. M, proceeded to de-
liver his charge to the jury. He commenced
by saying the constitution provides that in all
criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy
the right of speedy and public trial by an i'm
partial jury in the state or district where the
crime shall have been committed. That he
shall be informed of the course and natare
of the accusation against him.
That he shall be confronted with
witnesses against him; that he shall have
compulsory process to obtain witnesses in his
favor, and that he shall have assistance of
counsel in his defense These provisions are
intended for the protection of the innocent
from injustice and oppression and it was only
by their faithful observance guilt or fnnO-
cence could be fairly ascertained. Every ac-
cused person was presumed to be in
nocent until the accuasatlOn was
proved with what difficulty
and trouble it has been administered In the
present case the jurors have been daily wit
nesses. 1t was, however, consolation to think
that not one of those sacred guarantees of the
constitution had been violated in the person
of the accused. At last the long chapter of
proof was ended. The task of the advocate
was done, and it now rested with the jury to
determine the issue between public justice and
the prisoner at the bar.
No one could feel N ore keenly than himsel
the great responsibility of his duties and he
felt that be could only discharge them by
close adherence to law laid down by the high
est authorities. Before he proceeded further
he wished to notice an incident which had
taken place during the recent argument. The
prisoner had frequently taken occasion to pro-
claim that public opinion was evidently. by
press and correspondence, in his favor. These
daolorafinno oOr1I6 not Travpntnd aYpnpf
by process of gagging the prisoner. Any
suggestion that the jury could be Influenced
by such lawless Gathering OF the prisoner,
would have seemed to him absurd, and he
should have felt he was insulting the intelli.
gence of the jury if he had warned them not
to regard it. Counsel for the prosecution
had felt it necessary, however, in the
final argument to interpose contradiction
to such statements and exceptions had been
taken on the part of the accused to the form
in which that effort was made For the pur
pose of purgipg the record OF any objectiona-
BILE matter, he should simply say, anything
which had been said. on either side in refer
ence to public excitement or to newspaper
opinion was not to be regarded by the
jury.
The indictment charged defendant with
having murdered Jas. A. Garfield, ana it was
the duty of the court to explain the nature of
crime charged. Murder was committed where
person of sound memory and discretion un-
lawfully killed a reasonable being in the peace
of the United States, with malice and fore
thought. It had to be proved first that death
was caused by the act of the accused and
further it was caused with malice
and forethought. That did not mean
however, that the government had to prove
any illwill or hatred on the part OF the accused
toward the deceased. Whenever homicide
was committed without lawful authority and
with willful intent, it was sufficiently proved
to have been done with malice afofethought,
and malice was not disproved by showing the
accused had no personal illw1ll toward the de-
ceased, and that he killed hum from other mo-
tives as for instance through mistaking him
for another or las claimed In this case) to pro-
duce public benefit.
If it could be shown the killing occurred in
the heat of passion or under provocation,
then it would appear there was no premedi-
tated attempt, and therefore no malice afore-
thought, and that would reduce the crime to
manslaughter. 1t was hardly necessary, how
ever, to say there was nothing of that kind in
the present case. The jury would have to say
the defendant was guilty of murder or he was
innocent.
In order to constitute the crime of murder
the assassin must have reasonably sane
mind. In technical terms, he must be ''Of
sound Emind, memory and discretion" Any
irresponsible, insane man could not commit
murder. If he was labOring under q disease
of mental faculties to such an extent that he
did not know what he was doing or know it
was wrong, then he was wanting in that
sound mind, memory and discretion that was
part of the definition of murder.
In the next place every defendant was pre-
sumed innocent until the accusation against
him was established by proof In the next
place, Notwithstanding the presumption of in
nocence, If was equally true that defendant
was presumed to be sane, and 10 have been SO
at the time the crime was committed. That's
to say, the government was not bound to show
afhrmatively as part OF its proofs
that defendant was sane. AS insanity was an
exception, land as majority Of men are sane, the
law presumed the latter condition in every man
until some reason was shown to believe to the
contrary. The burden was therefore on the
defendant who set up insanity as an excuse
for the crime. To produce proofs in first in
stance to show that the presumption was mis-
taken so far as it related 10 the prisoner S
crimes. Therefore it involved three elements
The killing, malice and responsible mind in the
murderer. After all the evidence was before
the jury, if the jury, while bearing in mind
both of those presump ptions, that is that the
defendant is innocent Till he is proven guilty,
that he is sane till the contrary appears, still
entertained what is called unreasonable doubt
on any ground, or as to any Of the essential
elements of crime, then defendant
was entitled to the benefit of that doubt and
to acquittal. 1t was important to
explain to the jury herein the best way that
the court could determine what is a reasona-
BILE doubt He could hardly venture to give
| the exact definition of the term, for he did not
know of any such successful attempt to do
so. As to questions relating to human affairs,
knowledge of which is derived from testimo-
ny, it was impossible to have a sane mind.
Certainly that is created by sci.
entifc demonstration, only the jury could
have no moral certainty depending on the
confidence which the jury had in the integrity
of witnesses, and in their capacity and oppor
| tunity to knownEthe truth. If, for example,
f! facts not improbable in themselves were at.
tested by numerous witnesses, credible, and
who had every opportunity to know the
truth, reasonable or moral certainty would
| be inspired by that testimony. In such case
doubt would be unreasonable or imaginary or
| speculative. 1t ought not to he doubt
as to whether the party might not be limo.
cent. In the face of strong proofs of his
guilt it must be sincere doubt whether he
J had been proved guilty, even where testimony