New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1882-05-12

the Notables and represented that feeling Jeal-
Gus distrust of foreign OfficehOlders and Euro
pean Intervention which is the only National
impulse to be discerned in Egypt. The Army
was supreme; the popular assembly was its
plant instrument; the Sultan and the Khedive
were puppets in the background; and the for
eign Controllers, who guarded the treasury IN
the interest of the bondholders, were its natu-
raj foes.
The leader of the military party in its cam
paign against the European civil service Is
Ahmed cl Arab. Early i'll January he was
appointed Under Secretary of War, ana not
long afterward he induced the Notables to de-
mand the right of regulating the annual bud
get of receipts and expenditures. The Con-
trollers appealed to the Khedive to respect the
special privileges which had been conferred
upon them but the Notabes, being dependent
upon the support of the Army, persisted III their
demand Arab forced Cherif, who had HIM
self been nominated ly the soldiery, TO resign
the Premiership, and then appointed as his sue
cessor one of the favOrites OF the military
party. The Controllers, fOreseeing tina the
direction of the treasury was passing out OF
their hands, protested that the Khedives
authority, on which their own was grounded,
had been usurped. They retained nominal
control OF the public debt and its special reve-
nucs but were forced to look on while the
Notables increased the general expenditures for
the benefit of the Army. Arab, who was now
Minister of War, began to raise new regiments
and to distribute rewards among the soldiers.
During March seventeen officers were made
colonies, and as many as 300 promotions OF
all grades were ordered. In this way he stroye
to conciate the favor Of the Army and to
maintain his ascendancy.
There WERE however, sixteen officers, ten Of
them Circassians, who fancicd that their own
merits had not been regarded, and accordingly
they plotted his assassination and the restora-
ton of Ismail, the former Khedive, to the
throne. The discovery of the plot was fol-
lowed by the arrest and conviction of the ring
leaders, but the Khedive, acting upon the adj
vice of the foreign Controllers, has committed
the sentences. This act has been the signal for
revolution. The Ministry having demanded Il
modification of this decree receives flat re-
fusa and Immediately summons the Notables
over the head Of the Khediye. SO palpable
violation of the organic law will probably III
vove dynastic change. Arab is apparently
he may be willing to act as Tewiik's Mayor of
the Palace, there is more likelihood of his be-
coming Khedive. Bat whether he has his eyes
on the throne or will content himself with
standing guard over n royal prisoner, he must
have more money. There must be lavish MILL
tary expenditures and another series Of indis-
eliminate promotions. lie must have complete
control of the treasury, even if the bOndhOlders
never get another penny of interest, ana if he
can turn out of Office the swarm of Europeans
who are maintained under the scheme of linan-
cial control his soldiers and the population at
large will like him the better for it.
This revolutionary movement i'll Egypt in
creases the embarrassments Of Mr.. GladstOnes
Ministry and menaces the peace of Europe.
Early in the year the British and French Gov
ernments declared their intention of maintain
ing Tewiik on the throne by joint action. The
remaining European Powers replied that If
there must be any change i'll the existing ar
rangements general conference should be
called. After Gambetta's downfall, the French
Foreign Office receded from its position and
readily accepted Lord GranVilles counsel that
Egvpt should be regulated through European
rather than Joint Intervention. If, therefore,
either England or France or the Sultan attempt
to disperse the Army, to arrest Arab, and to
keep Tewlik on the throne, it will be with the
consent of Europe. Joint Intervention will be
a dangerous experiment; neither France nor
England viii permit the intervention of
single Power; Turkish coercion implies bar
barity, misruc and future complications; and
European diplomacy involves a confession of
impotence. Every contingency carries with it It's
own menace The only other alternative will
be the recognition of Arab as Khcdive with
the certainty that payments to the bondholders
will cease and reforms in administration be
brought 20 an end, and with the possibility
that Europeans may not be protected from
violence, and that the security of the Suez
Canal NAV be endangered.