Daily globe., 1882-01-26

onouiu Dc given w oue siue tuai lho OtAci =
The same result might be produced. On the
be so balanced that the jury
might Justify the doubt in
which side, under all the circumstances the
truth lay and in such case the accused party
was entitled to the benefit of the doubt. All
that the jury could be expected to do was to
be reasonably and morally certain of the facts
which they declared to be their verdict. In
illustration Of this point. Judge Cox quoted
the charge of Chief Justice Shaw, OF Massa-
chusetts, in the case of the Commonwealth
against Webster.
With reference to the evidence in this case,
very little comment was required by court
except upon one question, others being hardly
matters of dispute. That defendant fired the
shot and shot the deceased president was
abundantly proved. That the wound
was fatal had been testified to by
they were uncontradicted. That homicide
was committed with malice aforethought Gf
defendant were capable of criminal intent or
malice) could hardly be gainsaid. 1t was not
necessary to prove that any special or express
hatred or malice was entertained by
the accused toward the deceased.
You will find little di sculty in reaching con-
clusion as to all elements that make up the
crime charged in the indictment except 1t
cretion; but that was only technical ex-
preston for responsible and sane man. He
now approaches that difficult question. He
had already said the man who is insane In the
sense that makes him Irresponsible
and cannot commit crime. Defense
of insanity has been so abused
as TO be brought into great dtscredit
It was the last resort in cases OF upquestion-
ed guilt 1t had been the excuse for juries
hri nnro ~, x-ordintc nf aan11iffaI when there
was public sympathy for the accused and es.
pecially where there was provocation for the
homicide, according to public senti-
ment but not according to law. For
that reason defense of insanity was difficult.
It was sufficient to prove that the act was
done by deliberate intent, as distinct from an
act done under certain impulse in the heat of
blood and with malice aforethought.
This is the closing part of Judge Cox's
charge: Jury should bear in mind that the
man had not become irresponsible by the mere
fact of his being partially insane, as the law
assumed every one at outset to be sane and
responsible. The question was what was
there in this case TO show the contrary as to
defendant?
The jury was not warranted in inferring the
man was insane from the mere fact OF his
committing the crime, or from the enormity
of the crime, because the law presumes there
is bad motive, and that the crime is prompted
by malice, if nothing else appears. He had
dwet upon the question of insane deluslon,
simply because the evidence relating to that
was evidence touching defendants power, or
want of power (from mental disease) to dis
tinguish between right or wrong. This was
the broad question for the jury to determine
and it was what was relied upon by the de-
fense. The only safe rule was for the jury to
direct its attention to one test OF criminal re-
cnopciki1ifp WhQihRr the nriSNOpr
possessed mental capacity at the
time the act was committed, to know
that ii was wrong or whether he was deprived
of that capacity by mental disease. There was
one important distinction which the jury
must not lose sight Of, and they must decide
how far it was applicable to this case. That it
is not distinction between mental and moral
obliquity, but, between mental incapaclty to
distinguish between right and wrong and
moral insensibility.
The judge, in conclusion, said, and now gen.
tlemen to sum mp all, have said to you if
you find from the whole evidence that at the
time of the commission of the homicide the
prisoner was laboring under such de-
fects of his reason that he
was incapable Of understanding what he was
dong or of seeing it was the wrong thing to
do, as for example, il ne were under the IN
sane deluslon that the Almighty had COM
manded him to do the act, then he was not in
responsible condition of mind, but
was an object OF compassion
and should be acquitted. If, ON
the other hand, you find that he was
under no insane delusion, but had possession
of his faculties and had power to. know his
act was wrong. and if of his own free will he
deliberately conceived the idea and executed
the homicide then, whether his motives were
personal vindIctiveness, political animosity,
desire to avenge supposed political
wrongs or morbid desire for no.orlefy, or II
you are unable to discover any motive at all,
your verdict should be guilty.