The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1882-09-23

greatest alarm along the PIKE, and he saw
teamsters abandon their wagons and rush
down the highway on foot
The wranglo over Gettysburg by Federal
officers has its parallel In tho wrangle over
what followed at Spring Hill Hood asserts
that he rode to point so near the Columbia
pike, that he saw the Federals hurrying along
the road, and no then ordered cheatham for
ward to gain the pike and turn back the Fed
eral column Cleburne followed, and was in
turn supported by Stewart and Johnson
Darkness was coming on, and whatever WAS
done must be done quickly. II is only twenty
minutes walk from where Hood sat his horse
ham moved up, skirmished little, but did
not strike the road. AT dark he reported,
according to Hood, that he had found the
Federals too strong for him, and wanted
achievements Hood is dead, and his only
defense is his book. Cheatham is still living,
and has defended himself from the charges
made by fatty contradicting certain assertions.
There must have been some misconstruction
OF orders in some way, to start with,
Cheatham was one Of the bravest generals
holding a Confederate commission, and he
preferred battle to a day Of rest. II may be
asserted, also, that he was deceived in believ-
ing that any considerable Fede i force OPP
come up there was rally ut Spring Hill of
few Federal regiments to hold him of until
the command could pass, but men who are on
the retreat have no stomach to fight Federal
authority, which in this case must settle the
question at issue, denies that there was any
that hour. He with his corps, ought to have
walked right over the lines and secured the
pike. In the gathering gloom of winters
evening he must have been deceived as to the
fcseral strength.
Stewards whole corps was then advanced to
form on Cheatham's right When the order
was given for the movement, the entire corps
Of it within three miles; and yet the columns
went blowing around through fields and for
ests until 10 o'clock at night, somehow never
getting to the Columbus pike. Lee was fol-
lowing Schofeld down from the river, to hold
him between two fires when Hood should at
tack, and the Federal general understood that
his was perilous position. One cannot say
that he would have been defeated had he
fought battle at Spring Hill, for Schofield
was brave, hard fighter; but Hood certainly
never had an opportunity promising such
brilliant results Three-fOurths of his army
went into bivouac that night within cannon
shot of the pike, along which the Federal
wagons were pushed at agallop, and troops
moved at the double quick. The Federals ex-
Tected an attack at every moment, and that
they were allowed TO pass without Interrupt
ton was great surprise. One OF the pickets
thrown out from Cheathams command
amused himself by counting the wagons which
passed within $50 feet Of his position, and it
was an easy matter to catch every word
spoken by the Federals. One company of
Confederate infantry could have broken that
march with one volley. One hundred Con
federatos formed across the road could have
held it until daylight Let q soldier under
stand that the command is retreating, and no
is more ready TO fly than to fight 1t was
shown hundred times during the war that a
night attack never failed to produce the
greatest confusion, and in many instances
positive terror Had one Confederate regi-
inent seized the road, the Federals would
have reasoned that Hood was holding it with
his whole army Schofeld would have
closed up, taken the best position at
hand, and made brave fight, but there
would have been no battle at Franklin, and
perhaps none at Nashville. II seems ineXplic-
able that if Hoods orders were plainly given
they should have been misunderstood. All his
corps commanders must have known that he
was seeking Schotield's rear, and any lieuten-
ant would have felt himself empowered to cut
the Federal line if possible, but nothing was
done. From dark to daylight Schotields army
was passing within speaking distance Of the
Confederates, and yet the march was not in
terrupted. There are places along that high
way where twenty men and a couple of field
pieces could hold everything until thanked,
and their TANKS could not have been reached
in the,darkness OF a winters night Federal
authority SAYS that when Hood came in sight
of Spring Hill there was only one Federal
division there to oppose him, and two rcgi-
mcnts ont of that division were not in battle
line Later in the even ig, SIX hours after
Hoods arrival a second division reached the
place, followed by the remainder of Schotields
army.
When daylight appeared the last Federal
had passed ont of sight, and Hoods golden OPP
portnnity had slipped away Every man in
that Confederate army now saw for himself
what might have been done. Cheathams one
corps could have swept that one division out
of Spring Hill or gobbled it up There would
then have been several hours in which to in
trench and get the entire army into position
before the arrival of the second division.
While Schofield's retreat was in no manner
a rout, there were plenty of evidences that
he was hurried The pike was lined with
forage thrown out to Tighten the wagons
with abandoned vehicles, broken-down ami
mails, equipments thrown away, and not few
foot-sore stragglers were picked up. Near
Spring Hill many of the Federals had left the
pike and taken to the fields to make a wide
detour of the threatened point.
Schoiield had passed the angle at which he
could be hit, and was pushing direct for
Franklin. Once across the Big Harpeth there
and he was safe If Hood could overtakG
him before the crossing he could bring on
fight, but now it was Schofield who could pick
his position and secure the first advantages.