Morning journal and courier., 1882-01-11
News by Telegraph FROM ALL QUARTERS. JUDGE COX DECIDES On the Questions Raised
 By Counsel IN THE GUITEAU TRIAL. His Rulings Adverse to the
 Defense.
THE ASSASSIN GROWS ANXIOUS
Seriously Alarmed by Judge
 Porter's Remarks.
THE NATIONAL CAPITAL.

but he spoke with such earnestness and rhet- orical force that the speech was never tedi- ous. Judge Porter reviewed the conduct of his counsel in this court. The crime in all it's hideous ugliness was held up to the detesta- tion of his hearers. The silence became op pressive and the presence of averaging jus tice in the near future was suggested with a force of conviction that swept from the court room every vestige of that leyity which has so long attended upon every utterance of the prisoner, and, like veil, obscured from the consciousness of the spectators the horrors of the crime and what should be the solemni- ty of its judicial atonement. The prisoner winced and nervously twisted in his place, and for several minutes was unable to say anything that in any sense could approach to an Interruption. MT. Porter's review of the inspiration theory was scorching in it's severity. ''Was this worthless vagabond," he exclaimed, "the man to be selected and inspired by God Q cheat swindler, a creature of the vilest habits :? He then is the junior in the firm of Jesus Christ & Co.-this murderer tracking his vic- tim at night, at church, at the railroad sta tion everywhere till the deed is done. But grant this hideous pretension, and allow him the inspiration of Paul, which he impiously quotes-that does not protect him, as it did not protect Paul from stripes and death" Guiteau here burst out with a furious inter- ruption, saying he was ready to take the con- sequences of his act he was in the hands of the Lord if the Lord wished him to go to the gallows, he was ready; he wanted no moro bosh about his fears of death he was ready to take his appointed fate like 8 man if the Lord willed. Ex-Judge Porter's speech closed effectively with the letter from Gene ral Garfield congratulating Judge Paine on his charge in the Gallatin murder case, in which the judge had taken strong ground against the plea of emotional and transitory mania. "How little thought the victim, D exclaimed Mir. Porter, 'that this letter was to be thus introduced at the trial of his murder er."
 Judge Coxs opinion on the points raised was then rendered, the first being that the court had jurisdiction. He cited the statutes bearing on the subject, and gave his opinion that no statutory law governed it. He then considered the common law, upon which, he said, he should rest his opinion that the court Lad jurisdiction. The death was caused here. The final event determined, but did not locate the crime. He reviewed the history of English common law to show that all the precedents bore him out in this view. Judge Cox's opinion on this point was very long and learned. He showed, in brief, that the English authorities were predomi- nately in favor of such jurisdiction, while the American authorities were more divided. In view of this history he felt at liberty to decide upon the ground of common sense, which was that the court had jurisdiction.
 The full text of the two instructions re- garding insanity allowed by Judge Cox is as follows:
 First-The legal test of responsibility when nsani- whether the accused, at the time of committing the act charged, knew the difference between right and wrong in respect of such an act.
 Second-If the jury find that the defendant com mitted the act charged and at the time thereof knew what he doing and that what he was doing was contrary to law it constitutes excuse, even if it trus that when he committed the act he really believed that he producing great public benefit and that the death of the President required for the good or the American people nor would such ex- be afforded by the fact that in the commission of the act he was controlled by depraved moral whether innate acquired by will passions indifference to moral obligations, and even if the jury find that defendant result of his ing and reflection arrived at the determination to kill the President, and further result of his own reasoning and reflection believed that his said purpose was approved and suggested or inspired by the Deity, such belief would afford excuse but it would be different and he would not be responsible criminaily if the act done under influence and a product Of an insane mental delusion that the Deity had commanded him to do the act, which had taken possession of his mind, not a dependentIy of his will and reason and with such force to deprive him of the degree of wrong to his particular act In such case if he knew that his act was violation of the law of the land he would not be responsible if his perverted by insanity that he incapable of un- dersand ing the obligation of the law of the and and that the act wrong violation of that law and wrong in itself. In this connection said Judge Cox, I add the words wrong-tself because can conceive
 in which might believe sanity that the law of the land provided no punishment for murder and yet might be perfectly aware of the moral enormity of the crime would be unwilling to r2n pronounce him marked Mo- 3, give substitute for Nos 2, and of those asked the part of the and for Nos. 2, and of those asked the part of the de- fense. I have embodied in it the substance of what consider admissible and material in all these in structions and I gave this in substitution for objectionable, think, and others not stated with sufficient fullness in the different in structions asked for. have omitted from this in- struction (No. 2 one important feature of those
 in the last paragraph of the first instructions the words "or was the act committed under an influence power which the accused could not resist by req son of his unsoundness of mind" This, I presume, Seeks to leave to the jury the question of irresistible impulse the cause of the homicide. Now 1t cannot be denied that of the most respectable courts of the country recognize 1t as possible that man may be driven against his own will to the commission of irresistible impulse within him, overriding his viii
 and conscience, and they maintain that under such circumstances the will to do wrong,-the very essence of criminaty,-is wanting, he ought not to be held criminally responsible. They accordingly hold that test of knowledge of right and wrong
 be quaied by the further condition that the party must have the power to choose between doing and not doing the act The question Is dangerous one
 alike for the court and jury to handle and do not intend to express an opinion upon il seem to relieve of the necessity of discussing it generally If strike out of the all the de-
 carations and testimony of the defendant himself we have light whatever this subject. There are circumstances such as his actions and conduct which his counsel may argue of themselves indicate some olNarr oTdQ QTlha his testimony. But of themselves they would have afforded indication of the particular motive or special form of deluson that actuated him. Of this have indication except in the oral or written of the defendant himself. But he has claimed that he was irresistby impeled to dc an act which he knew to be wrong. On the contrary he always claimed that 1t right. He justified it at the time ana afterwards in his papers as Po
 cal necessity and as an act of patriotism, and wheth CT he claimed inspiration early or late and therefore right He has used the words pressure
 and inspiration, and interchangeably it were tC express his idea They have meaning unless it be that he was under an insane deusion that the Deity hsd inspired commanded the act He has certain
 y not separated the idea of pressure impulse from the conviction of inspiration and right aud duty and feel sure that not transcendng the province of
 the court when say there ts evidence in the case tending to prove an irresistible impulse This is
 thing by itself and separate this alleged delu sion. Therefore the does not seem to to pre-
 sent call for any ruling on the hypothesis of an r- resstible impulse to do what the accused knew to be
 wrong and was sh against ., his will m Whether ilre
 there is sueh i1oE,i.o a thing % as @ an ire 
 1t has existed in any particular case is question o
 fact and not of law In this think there is nc | testimony showing that 1t can exist as separate
 form of insanity, but rather the contrary There is however, testimony tending to show that such i'm
 pulses result from and associated with insane de
 lusons and especially with such insane delusior
 as that the party has received command from the Deity to do act. But if such insane delusioI
 exists to destroy the perception of right ant
 wrong to an act which is substantially the defend
 ants claim, this of itself is irresponsible insanity
 and there is need to consider the subject of i'm pulses resulting from deluson. On the other hand there was insanity, but fanatical opinion or a belief such as before described, the only i'm
 pulse that could have actuated defendant must have been one such as, in the most favorable view
 t,a mistaken sense of duty, which the law requires him to resist and control In connection with medi cal testimony tending to show that these impulses are always or generally associated with insan
 delusion if there facts tending directly to show the presence absence of irresistible impulse
 they may perhaps furnish evidence of the pres ence absence of an insane deuston. But think in view of the undisputed features of the case, i
 only confuse and misead the jury to give then
 any instructions directly upon the subject of ire sistbe impulse and that this particular case doe not call for any qualification of the general rul
 adopted have mentio ned as q test of responsi
 bility.
 Judpe Cox concluded his decision at 1:2!