National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1882-01-11
POINTS OF LAW.
THE RULINGS BY JUDGE cox.
Judge Porter Makes an Eloquent Speech-Thc As
sassin Inilamed at 1.-THE Review OF tho
Law by the Judge on Jurisdiction
and Irresistible Impulse.

Tuesday witnessed an important feature in the
GuiteOu trial. Judge Porter occupied the greater
part of the day in his argument on the prayers,
and the prisoner was unusually outrageous and
impudont in his Interruptions. The manner of
Judge Porter and his severe structures upon the
prisoner seemed to innamc Guitcau to the highest
pitch Of excitement, and, in consequence, there
were some very lively passages. Then Judge Cox
followed in carefully. prepared ruling upon the
prayers He distinctly placed the defense of in
sanity solely upon the ground of the accused's in
ability to decide upon the difference between
right and wrong. lie rejected entrclytho defense
Of an irresistible impulse, which the prisoners
counsel have almost entirely rested their defense
upon. On this account the ruling Is considered TO
be against the prisoner, although the reasonable
doubt as TO his sanity is len with the jury.
JUDGE coNs RULINGS.
After the eloquent speech Of Judge Porter Judge
Cox then began to give his rulings on the points
of law. A number of propositions he said, have
been submitted to him to be given to the jury as
instructions. The first question that was presented
in due order of precedence was that Of the juris.
dctiOn of this court to try the case The jurisdc-
ton of the court had been fully discussed and Sc
riously challenged. lie had deemed II his duty to
investigate II somewhat and he would read his
opinion, however tedious 1t might be. Judge Cox
then read his opinion ON this point from manu-
script.
lie REVIEWED THE LAW
at length, and held that a common. sense applica-
ton ofcommon-law principles sustained the juris.
diction Of the court 1t follows from the author-
ties he had quoted, he said that the place of death
prayers of the defense would have to be denied.
When II became his duty to charge the Jury in this
case he would enlarge further upon certain points
e am glad Your Honor" said the prisoner, has
excluded the thirteenth instruction. 1t went In
without my consent"
UPON THE FIRST PRAYER
of the United States he said it his conclusion
that the first proposition in the first prayer Of the
prosecution was correct As the third, hnh, sixth,
and eighth prayers of the defense seemed 10 in.
corporate the New Hampshire rulings, he did not
consider II safe to adopt them in the Instructions
to the jury. lie could not find an authority that
held that knowledge that the act was contrary
tolaw created responsibility. In reference to the
second proposition of the prosecution he said 1t
had too much vagueneSs. As the other instruc.
tions of the prosecution, he said, councted with
the views he had announced, he had substituted
for them another.
HE CONSIDERED THE SEVENTH PRAYER
of the defense also as Objectionable. In regard to
the ninth prayer raising the question of reasonable
doubt, he suid he would not instruct the jury II
they had reasonable doubt upon one element "a
acquit but he would instruct them, after consld-
erng all the elements OF the case II they had o
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused
they should acquit
THE TWELFTH INSTRUCTION Is DRAWN
with reference to section 53i2 of the Revised
Statutes. / do not understand that statute to
create any new species of mansnughter II uses
the common Jaw definitions of both murder ana
manslaughter, and (perhaps in view of the doubts
l have already spoken OF applies them TO cases
where the mortal wound was inflicted in one uris-
diction and the death occurred in another; The
terms malice" and malciousy' used in the
statute would have no meaning, except by refer.
ence to the common law We know that the term
malice in The definition of murder does not re.
| quire that proof shall be given Of any special
hatred or ill-wl to the deceased, but that the de-
liberate intent TO KILL from whatever motive, con
stiutes all the malice that the law requires to be
| shown, and that the term withOutmnlice" IN the
| definition of manslaughter means simply without
| premeditated intent-as, where the killing occur;
| IN the heat of passion or on sudden quarrel. Al
| this will explain to the jury when 1t becomes
necessary to charge them. But the instruction IN
| its use of the phrase
| WITHOUT MALICE IN FACT"
might convey the idea to the jury that If the kill
| ing was done from the motives declared by the
| prisoner, and If he had, as he says, no persona
| ill-will toward the President ii was not murder
1t is objectionable on this ground and every OBJ
jeCt that could be properly sought under this heat
| will be attained by the explanations which have
| indicated to be made to the jury. II becomes i'm
porant in the first place, to Settle the rules of evi
dence by which the jury Is 10 be guarded II
weighing the proofs IN reference to the question
| on whom rests the burden of proof whcr'
insanity is relied OH MS defense three
different and conflicting views have been held b!
| three different courts. According to one view /
IS incumbent on the accused to establish the fac
of his insanity at the time of the commission of thu
alleged crime by evidence so conclusive as TO eX
| cludc all reasonable doubt of IT, But this view
be passed over without comment as inadmssble
Another view is that the defense of insanity Is Al
affirmative one, which the party asserting II mus
establish to the satisfaction of the jury by ut le1s
| Il preponderance of evdenee-that is to say, tn
evidence III favor of 1t need not be so conclusive
TO leave 10 room for reasonable doubt, but IT mus
have more weight with the jury than the eyidenc
against II, so that they would feel justified In find
lug the fact rs they would find any fact in q civil
| suit in which all questions of fact are decided nc
| cording to the weight Of the evidence,
STILL ANOTHER VIEW
is that the sanity of the accused Is just rs much
part of the Of the prosecution rs the hOmiCid
itself ana Just as much an element in the crime O
murder, the only difference being that, rs the lay
presnmes every one to be sane, 1t is not necessary
deuce of the sanity; but that, If the jury have
reasonable doubt of the sanity, they are just a
Il reasonable doubt of the commission q
the homicide by the accused. Ahcr
careful examination of the authorities, som
of which are mere dtcsd. and others not well con
sidGrcd or even consistent statements of opinions
| am satisfied that the best reasoned and mos
weighty of them sustain the views which nov
proceed to state. i have examined all the au
thOricS with great care over and over again. III
cases that are referred TO in support OF the sccOn
rule are somewhat more numerous than the other
some Of them, however, turn ON the statuIor
definition Of the crime of murder. great man
Of the cases are mere dictG and some of them IN
| volve utter contradiction.
| NOT ONE OF THEM
contains the least show of argument. with u
there is no statutory definition of murder, w
have the Common-law definition of murder as oC
curing when IL homicide is committed by pei
son of sound memory, discretion, &C. The opln
ions which support the last view are decided
entitled to most confidence. They are reasone
have been unanswered and are, in nj
Judgment, unanswerable. In the case {
Stone, tried in this court few yeal
ago the instructions were MS follows l
Il capital case the defense of insanity Is require
to be made out by most clear aud conyincin
proof. In this case the jury must judge of the ev
| defense.
consideration of all the evidence, in ConneCtiO
with the presumption that what man does
doubt as to whether the prisoner committed IL
homicide as charged, or as to whether at the tin
OF its commission he was in sane state OF min
they must acquit him." shall, however,
ADOPT THE SUGGESTION
which is found in some of the later authorities
that Is, not to instruct the jury TO OCquit If thu
feel reasonable doubt about any one fact IN Il
issuC-but shall instruct them as to the nature
| the crime and AS to all the elements composing
including that Of responsibility: l shall inslru
them as TO the GTesnmPtiom Of innocence eng and 4
whole evidence and on the consideration OF bot
those assumptions II they have a Teasonab
doubt Of the guilt Of the prisoner, the prisoner
entitled to an acquittal.
THE TENTH AND ELEVENTH INSTRUCTIONS
asked for on the pnrt Of the defense do not involN
any serious question. The eleventh instructiC
evidence that the prosecution has willlully SUI
pressed evidence OF the mental condition Of u
prisoner during two weeks next following u
, Shooting of President Garfield, which Il was
their power TO have produced on the trial, u
jury have right TO take that fact In considerable
, as Il presumption that such evidence, If II III
been produced would have been unavo
, able 10 the prosecution" Amy insructit
! ought to be based on some evidence
the case aud If | were TO grant the iustructiC
, in that form would be assuming that there wi
} some evidence in the case tending to show vii
: lul suppression Of evidence by the prosecution,
, cannot so assume. II is always, however open
! either side to argue that evidence which mig
have been produced and which has not been pr