Saturday press. [volume] (Honolulu, H.I.) 1880-1885, 1882-12-02
4 DECISION Rkn1knrp.
AUGUST DREIER vs.. KUAA-ocToBER TERM
SUPREME COURT, 1882

Il
SUPREME COURT, 1882.
The principle on which defendant relied in
this case, be it said with the greatest Difference
to the learned Justices who decided agains,
him, seems to be sound one. 1t was that
the personal relation between master and
servant, which is one Of the essentials Of a
labor contract, Is an inviolable relation, and
cannot be lawfully set aside by either party
The master can no more substitute a new man
in his place than the servant can in his.
Should either be guilty of a breach Of contract
in this respect he would be liable to all the
legal consequences.
"a contract Is a mutual promise upon law.
full consideration which binds the parties to
performance. Mutually is essential. a labor
contract differs from an ordinary contract in
that 1t is strictly PERSONAL Neither party can
assign his interest in it to another. 1t termi-
mates on the death Of either. Much stress was
laid on this personal relation between the par.
ties in the important case Of Wnihee Planta.
ton pt. Kalapu, 3 II. r., p. 76i. The case
in fact hinges upon that point. The Court
there says, in effect, that one cannot be a mas.
ter but by the consen, of the servant, duly ex
pressed in a contract between them. Under
the common law covenants for personal service
could not in general be specifically enforced.
Under our Master and Servant Act labor con.
tracts can be penalty enforced on both sides.
They generally provide that the master may
| also direct the servant, through his agent or
overseer. In the contract between the parties
in this case the personnel is just as much
part Of it as the labor, the wages and the lodg
ings. Plaintiff is to be master; defendant, the
servant. Plaintiff, by himself his agent, or
overseer, is to "direct" and lawfully com
mand." Defendant is to obey. These two
only have or can have part or lot in the con-
tract. Their mutual obligation requires mu.
tual performance, and either Of them in neg.
lecting or refusing due performance breaks the
contract at his peril. Defendant alleged in the
lower courts that plaintiff had ordered him to
work for the Koloa Sugar Company, and he
had so done for about nine months, taking his
orders, receiving his wages, ETC.. from them
During all this time plaintiff had ceased to act
as his master, did not direct, pay or lodge
him, or look after him in any way whatever.
plaintiff admitted all this.) While thus stu.
ated defendant did not waive any rights he
may have had, not being sufficiently informed
as to what they were. But he used all posi-
Bile diligence in ascertaining and asserting
II
Sugar Company soon as he learned that
plaintiffs copartnership interest therein was
only anominal one. Defendant claimed that
plaintiff, by dismissing him to the Kooa Sugar
Company in the manner above, and entirely
neglecting and abandoning him for long
time, had violated his personal obligations as
master, and committed breach of contract.
1t would seem difficult to avoid this conclu.
sion. The supreme court held May 80, 1882,
in the case Of Dreier Us. Kuaa ct al that the
Koloa Sugar Company were "not the agents,
overseers or representatives Of the original
master" this plaintiff). They must have
been, therefore, strangers to defendants con-
tract, and what they did in the premises in
directing, paying and lodging him was not
"caused to be done" by plaintiff; was not
done by his ORDER or on his account, and in
no way brought him into relation to defend
| ant.
How the Court rcconcies Its order, In the
present case, that the time during which de.
PENDANT worked at Koloa Plantation shall be
counted on his contract with plaintiff) with its
former decision that his work there was not
for plaintiff PAcrUM.