The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1882-11-24

make a march on very dark night,
through blockaded road, more rapi-
dly than single aide-de- camp, unin-
numbered, had been able to get through
on horseback.
"When he received the order, he
showed it to his leading generals, and
apparently with one accord, they deci-
ded that the movement at that hour
was impossible further, that no time
could possibly be gained by so early
start, and that If they should start at
that hour and get through to Bristoe
Station at the time designated, the
troops would not be fit for either fight
ing or marching on their arrival at
that point. Porter replied, however,
Here is the order, and it must be
obeyed; but, after further consultation,
he decided, as did his generals, that a
postponement of two hours in starting
the march would enable them to get
through as quick as If the men we're
kept on foot and under arms while the
road was being cleared, and that the
men would be in a much better con-
dition for service on their arrival at
their destination. He was entirely
justified in exercising his own judg-
ment in this matter, because the order
shows that he was not to take part in
any battle when he arrived there, but
was wanted to pursue fleeing enemy.
He did not leave the commanding
general in ignorance of his proposed
delay, nor of the reasons for it, but at
once sent request that the general
commanding should send back cavalry
Che had none himselD and clear the
road near him of membranes, so
that the march might be unobstructed.
"There is no doubt but that he would
have arrived just as early and with his
troops If he had started at early dawn
instead Of at the hour he did and the
intervening time had been used in
clearing the road for his troops when
they did march.
at was between IL and l o'clock
that, on arriving at his advanced posi-
ton, Porter was shown by Mcdowell a
despatch from General Buford, sent at
$50 on the morning of the 29th, stat
ing that from seventeen to eighteen
regiments of the enemy had passed
through Gainesville three-quarters of
an hour before, or at a quarter before 9
O'clock ,on their way to re-enforce Jack
son, SO that the head of the column
must have been not only in supporting
distance of jackson, but at the place OF
development by 10 o'clock in the morn
ing. And now," continues General
Porters defender, sit is known by
others, as it was known by Porter al
the time, that Longstreet. with some
25,O00 men, was in position confront
ing Porter by - o'clock on the goth Of
August, four hours and half before
the 4:2O order was written"
Mcdowell withdrew his troops, leav
ing Porter with 10000 men to confront
Longstreets 25,000.
"Thus left alone" continues Genera
Grant, "facing superior numbers advan
tageously posted, and ignorant of tn,
needs of Pope, if indeed he had any
Porter had necessarily to bidc Mellow
ellis arrival on his right In the mean
time his duty was manifestly to engag
Longstreet's attention and prevent hin
:, from moving against Pope, especiall,
while Mcdowell was out of support O
= both Pope and Porter. Porter all tha
day did not hear of Mcdowell, or o
" what was taking place in front o
o Pope, though he kept the former we
}. informed of affairs with him, and pre-
g sumed that his dispatches were sent t
the latter. He, however, engage
q Longstreets attention by demonstrs
u tions nearly harmless to himself, and s
e successfully as to cause Longstreet {
q take Wilcoxs division from in front {
'e Pope, in order to strengthen the lin
$ confronting Porter.
HE DID NOT RETREAT.
Y, 'Thus Porter, without sacrifice
IS men and without endangering any i
o. terests, did more for Pope's relief tha
if he had gone directly to that general
Sc assistance. To have done so wou
IN probably have sacrificed his corps wit
as out any benefit and jeopardized IL
~ safety of Pope's army. So far as
er have investigated the case-and l ha,
,e studied it, think, pretty thoroughly
te | see no fact to base the charge of 7
of treat upon.
he "In my Judgment" General Ora
at emphatically adds, "this disposes of Il
ks charges, and consequently of all spe,
n fcations under them, except the alleg,
ly disobedienco of the 4:5O p. m. order.
ty sin regard TO the charge of disoh
We dience of the 4:30 order, which is 4
st, principal one and the one that has me
m. deeply impressed the mind of 4
an general public, there are evidenc
at which look to me important and CO
IL elusive, showing that the court-mart
g. which tried General Porter found hi
y guilty under mistaken idea of t
tn actual facts, now accessible TO any 0
Id in search of the truth, and viii
lat Porter knew to be the facts at t
an time
Ill Diagrams in the article illustrate t
ers position of Porter's and Popes fort
and the troops under Longstreet a
of Jackson, "and," writes General Ora
is "that the commanding general belle,
On, the positions as given in the diagrt
on to be the positions of the differ,
1 / commands, is shown from the fact Il
.he in his point order of that morning
stated that the indications are that
whole force of the enemy is moving
this direction at pace that will br
10 them here by to morrow night or n
,ck day Porter was
'er in a position to attack the right fla
OF of Jackson, because he was at le
10 three miles away. With Longstre
Get presence, to have o. eyed the order
on would have been obliged with TO-,
RAJ men to have defeated $4,000 men il
'nt chosen position before he could b
RAJ moved upon the flank of the enemy
ys, the order directed.
a. GENERAL PORTER EXoNERATRD.
II