The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1882-01-27
GUILTY GUirEAU.
HOW the Fellow Received the
- - Verdict.
Efforts Fer a New Trial
The Country Endorses Ghe
Verdict.

~
The Country Endorses the
VerdIef.
Washington, 25.-At 80 Judge Cox
beoan 10 deliver his charge 10 the jury.
he commenced by saying the Constitu-
ton provides that in sll criminal prose-
eutiens the accused shall enjoy the priv
iIege of speedy and public trial by al
impartial Jury in. the state or district
where the crime shall have been COM
mitted; that he shall be informed OF the
cause and nature of the accusation
against him; that he shall be confronted
with the Witnesses against him. that he
shall have compul. DRY process to obtain
witnesses in his favor and that he snail
have the assistance OF counsel IN Inside
tense. These proviSions were intended
for the protection of the innocent, frOm lE-
justice and oppression, and 1t was only
by their faithful Observance that gulitOr
Innocence could be fairly ascertained.
Every accused person was presumed to be
innocent until the accusation was proven.
With what difficulty and trouble the law
had been administered in the present
case the jurors had been daily witnesses.
1t was. however. a consolation 10 think
that not one of those sacred guarantees Of
the Constitution has been violated
in the person of the accused.
Before proceeding further he wished to
notice an incident which had taken
place pending the recent argument. The
prisoner had frequently taken occasion
to proclaim that pub ie opinion, as
evidenced by the press and correspon
dence, was in his favor. These declsrs-
tions could not be prevented, except by
the process of gagging the prisoner. Any
suggestion that the jury could be in1u-
enced by such lawless Gathering Of the
prisoner would have seemed to him ab-
surd, and he should have felt that he was
insulting the intelligence Of the jury
if he had warned them not II regard it.
Counsel for the prosecution had felt It
necessary, however, IN the final argu
ment, to interpose contradiction to
such statements, and exceptions had been
taken on the part of the accused to the
form in which that effort was made.
For the purpose of purging the record of
any Objectionable matter he should sim
ply say that anything which hsd been
said on either side in reference TO public
excitement or to newspaper opinion, was
not TO be regarded by the jury.
To establish murder it had to be proved
first, that death was caused by the act OF
the accused, and further, that it WAS
caused with NAL ce sforethought. That
did net mean, however, that govern
ment had to prove any ill-will or hatred
on the part of The accused towards the
deceased. Wherever homicide was shown
to lave been committed, without lawful
authority, and with deliberate intent it
was sufficiently proved to hsvs been done
with malice aforethought, and malice
was not disproved by showing the &C.
cused had no personal ill<will towards
the deceased aud that he killed him from
other motives. The jury would have to
say the defendant was guilty Of murder
or innocent. In order 10 constitute the
crime Of murder, the assassin must have
reasonably save mind. In technical
terms he must be "of sound mind, mem
DRY and discrstien." Any irresponsibly
insane man could not commit murder.
If be was lAboriug under disease of the
mental faculties to such an extent that he
did not know what he wss doing or know
it waa wrong, then he was wanting in
that sound mind, memory and discretion
that was part Of the definition Of murder.
Every defendant WA presumed innocent
until the accusation agsinst him was
established by proof. Notwithstanding
this presumption Of innocence, il was
equally true TIE defendant was presumed
to be sane, and 10 have been
so At the time the crime was COM
mitsed. The burden of proof as
to insanity was on the defense.
II the jury entertained reasonable doub'
on any grouRd. or as TO any of the essen
tial elements Of thu crime, tie defendant
was entitled to the benefit of that doubt,
and to acquittsl. Doubt, however. must
be sincere and fortified by proofs and
testimony. The jury should be reason
ably and morally certain Of the facts
which they declared by their verdict.
There was no question about the firing of
the shot or its producing death, and (pro-
viding the defendant was capable of
criminal intent or malice) of its malice
aforethought, the prisoners own hand
had written that he contemplated the re-
moval of the President. Six weeks be-
fore the shooting he had deliberately
MANNED it and prepared for it.
These things established malice. Never
theless IL animosity were not established
to the necessary degree it must be al
lowed weight. He had already said q
man WHO is insane In the sense that
makes him irresponsible, can not COM
NIT crime, The defense of insanity has
BEEN so abused as to be brought into
great disersdit. II was the last resort in
cases of unquestioned guilt. It had been
an excuse for juries bringing in verdict
Of acquiital when there was public SYM
psthy for the accused and especially
where there was provocstion FOR homi-
eide. according to lsw. 1t was sufficient
to prove the act was done by deliberate
intent, as distinct from an act done under
certain impulse In the heat of blood.
The jury was not to infer that the pris-
oner was insane because he committed
an enormous crime. The only safe rule
was for the jury to direct its attention TO
oue test of criminal responsibility,
namely, whether the prisoner possessed
mental capacity at tue time the act was
to know that it was wrong,
Dr. whether he was deprived of that ca
Dacity by mental disease. There wssl
one important distinction which the Jury
must not lose sight OF, and they must de- |
Tide how far it was applicable in this
,ase. That was the distinction between |
mental and moral obliquity, between
mental incapacity to distinguish between
light and wrong and moral inseLsibility |
o that distinction.
And now Oantlonoan IN srna IN AL, |