St. Johnsbury Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1867-1919, 1882-11-03
Superf1uOus Truth.

The verdict in the Prescott libel suit
THAT of Marie Prescott, an actress.
against the American news company,
for circulating malicious libel against
her character had unquestionably ex-
cited the liveliest feelings of satisfac-
ton on the part of the public. There
was deliberate attempt by reckless
libeller, as malicious as he was ire
spOnsible, to put what Judge Russell
termed an ineradical stigma on a wO-
man and her children, and there was a
subsequent effort on the part of the re-
spOnsible news-agency circulating that
libel to justify it in fact. The verdict
was source of satisfaction, first, be-
cause it vindicated the good name of
an actress who had been systematical-
ly imposed upon and fOully traduced :
and, secondly, because it fastened the
responsibility upon well established
corporation which would not only be
mulcted but be enabled to take meas
ures to protect itself and the public
against the occurrence of similar out
RACES upon personal reputation and
common decency.
The effect of this verdict is to vindi-
cate the reputation of this wife and
mother and to restore to her good
name which had been maliciously
clouded with suspicion. We repeat
this assertion because we wish to dis
cuss another aspect of the case without
being misunderstood. In the opinion
of the jury the libel was not justified
by the evidence adduced in support of
it. What would have been the effect
if the evidence had supp Drted the Ii
bel2 This is a nice question of public
morals which deserves serious cOnsid-
Grafton. If the libel had been true,
could its publication have been justi-
fed In legal sense it could have
been justified. The news-agency would
have been released from responsibility,
and the woman would have gone out of
court disgraced for life. But what
would have been the moral effect if
the libel had been proved to be no Ii
bel, but only the cold truth Would
the mischievOus scribbler who had
wantOnly and maliciOusly told the
truth and thereby brought disgrace and
ruin upon a household, have been NOR
| ally justified in his course of action
To illustrate this point, we may cite
a celebrated case in the English courts.
| Ten years ago a solicitor brought
charges of glaring immortality against
the wife of a well-known Englishman
prominent i'll society, public life and
the Established church. He had at
tempted to extOrt money from her,
but had finally made his charges pub
lie and been prosecuted for libel in a
police court. During the trial, which
attracted general attention, as cher
Ladyship" had been presented at court
and was conspicuous figure in Lon
don society, the evidence seemed to
be going against the solicitor, and
there was good prospect of his con
viction. Suddenly the prosecution
was abandoned and cher Ladyshipn
disappeared. Her guilt was conceded
on all sides, the common impression
being that she had hastily resolved
upon flight on being made acquainted
with new evidence which she would
be pOwerless to refute. Apparently
the solicitor had told the truth and eX-
pected to be complimented by the
bench for performing public duty.
In this respect he was disappointed,
for the magistrate turned upon him
with gesture of scorn and words of
lOathing. "To the end of your days."
said he, "fOr your conduct in making
these charges as IL part of your defence
in this court, you will probably be an
object of contempt to all well thinking
men,"
The magistrate was right. The En-
glish solicitor was not justified, in a
moral sense, in telling the truth about
this woman when there was no provo
cation for divulging it. She had
emerged from the period of her guilt,
had made not only reputable but Il
brilliant marriage, and was leading an
honorable and useful life. The eff
feet of the malicious truth-telling was
to remand her to those evil courses
which she had abandoned. The effect
would have been the same in the Pres
colt case, if the libel had been sus-
tained, as happily it was not. The
fact that the charge is true does not,
as matter of course, Justify mischiev-
Gus, wantOH, unprOvOked and unneces
sary defamation. 1t may do so in
courts of law, but it does not before
the bar of public morals and Christian
ethics. The truth must often be blurt-
ed out, and impOstOrs, thieves and
scOundrels he exposed in private as
well as public life but not always.
Wanton truth-telling in some instances
is an outrage as deadly as the most
constituencies defamation.
Truth may he as poisonous
a barb as calumny. OF course, this
would be a better world if there were
more truth-telling but it would be IA
still better world if there were less of
some kinds of telling. Indeed,
there are few things which society can
afford to dispense with so readily as
sIIperf1uOus truth-truth that is told
wantonly, capriciOusly and malicious
ly-truth that is as Improbable as it
is unnecessary.-[New York Tribune.