The sun., 1881-06-26

WILSON WITH announcer 10 DToHk up LHOSo JOuln
Of Petersburg. This was blunder, because
both detachmcnts were compelled to operate on
eccentric lines. while the rebel cavalry was
massed under Hampton. and was able to
operate on interior lines. Sherldan's move
ment was failure 30 far as concerned
breaking up tho roads. Ho fought
drawn battle ut Trevillian's Station. and was
compelled to mako wide detour to the
NORTH east and south to rejoin the army.
being beaten ut st. Mary's Church while
covering the wagon trains which had
been left at West Point. On the other
hand. Wilson's column. although It was
thrown straight out into the Confederncy and
was also roughly handled In returning to the
army. accomplished all 1t was sent out for. 1t
broke up tho Danville and Southside Railroads
rs far down as the Stanton River SO efrectually
that the rebels did not run car over them into
Petersburg for over two months. During this
time they had to supply their army by wagon
trains. and II is a striking and to us a dis
reputable fact that these trains were kept up
between Lees camps and Weldon. without
serious interruption. till Petersburg WINS cap
tured. II will now be generally admitted
that Lee handled his cavalry much better
inasmuch as he kept 1t together. and used 1t
effectively first against Sheridan and next
against Wilson; whereas. II Grant had massed
ulb Ol ulNluluR tu0 enub OF DOtn
expeditions would have been successfully
accomplished. Hampton would have been
beaten. and the rebel communications COM
pletely destroyed.
Gen. Badeau is very severe in his COM
ments upon Buffers failure to capture
Richmond. and Baldy Smiths to capture
Petersburg: and 1t must be confessed that
he makes out strong case against both OF them.
but We can leave them to settle the question
with him. He blames Meade and Hancock for
failing to properly supplement Smiths efforts
to take Petersburg. and pronounces judgment
against Warren. not only for tardiness at Five
Forks. but for irresolution and censoriousness
generally. With the exception OF Meade these
officers are all living. and abundantly able to
justify their conduct II they have been mis-
judged. The author has criticised them freely.
and must expect that they will defend them
selves not only against him. but against his
principal. whom they will hold primarily re-
sponsible for any misstatement OF facts or
misrepresentation OF motives in this narrative.
Our authors gravest controversy. however.
will doubtless be with the friends OF Gen.
Thomas. 1t will be remembered that when
Sherman marched down to the sea-" he left
Thomas to gather VI the scattered detachments.
garrisons. dismounted cavalry. recruits. and
non-combatants OF the Departments OF the Ohio.
Tennessee. and Cumberland. and weld them
into an army with which to resist the march OF
Hoods veterans into middle Tennessee Gen.
Badeau lauds the policy OF this arrangement
whilo he condemns Thomas in unmeasured
terms for slowness throughout the campaign.
and especially for delaying to bring on the
battle at Nashville. On the other hand. he
praises Schofed for the victory ut Franklin. in
gaining which he had nothing to do. and says
,rha 4,
in retiring from Columbia after Hood had
crossed the Duck River and reached Spring
Hill. fourteen miles in his rear. There is
much room in all this for intelligent COM
ment and criticism but our historian does
not improve 1t. He puts forth his best
efforts in showing how slow Thomas
was, and how great the danger was that
Hood would cross the Cumberland River.
and drive him back to tho Ohio. He is silent.
however. as to the fatal results which would have
followed II Thomas had fought n battle end
ing in defeat He ignores the difficulty Of or
Canizng an army out OF the heterogeneous ma
torials at hand in the face OF an advancing force
led by such n General as Hood. He seems to
forget that Hoods command was ut least 900
strong. counting cavalry. and had been able
not only to elude. but when suited it's purpose.
to give battle to Shermans magnificent army
campaign began. Thomas had less than 25.00O
servceable infantry. and 5000 overworked
and disorganzed cavalry. 1t ID true that
Gen. A. j. Smith. gallant veteran. with
10000 more good infantry was on the
way from Missouri to join Thomas. and
that he had detached garrsons. dsmount-
ed cavalry returning furlouGh men and quar-
termasters' employees sufficient to bring his
force up to nearly 10000 men; but these
troops required first to be concentrated.
next to be organized. and lastly to bo armed,
equipped and mounted This was done with
extraordinary rapidity and completeness when
oil the circumstances OF the situation are duly
considered. 1t doubtless seemed to Gen. Grant
and tho Administration at Washington that
Thomas was acting with too much deliberation.
and was running great risk; but they
should havo remembered that he was a
veteran General of unblemished reputation.
tho hero OF Mill Spring. Perryville. Murfrees-
boro. and Chickamauga, and tho peer OF any
commander in the Union service. Thcy should
havelcft him free to take his own measures and
fight at his own discretion. instead Of treating
him as though he were II schoolboy unable to
manage campaign or deliver n battle. No
competent critic can read this Military History
Of Gen. Grant and fairly consider these facts
without coming to the conclusion that his
interference with Thomas during the Nash
ville campaign was not only wrong. as
admitted by Grant in his official report. but
was false in principle aud pepnicious in
tendency. Had Thomas given battle when or
dered positively to do 30 without further delay.
his army must have boon driven back. If not
disgracelully defeated. for at that time the en-
tire country was so covered with ice and the
ground was frozen so hard that neither men
nor horses could have gone into action
against a strongly intrenchcd enemy. with tho
slightest hope of success. Thomas's conduct at
this juncture was in tho highest de-
gree loyal and praiseworthy. He cheer
fully offered to surrender the COM
mand to whomsouver might DO designated TO
succeed him. but he would not consent to at-
tack against his judgment. In this he was
unanimously supported by his corps COM