Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1881-02-11

tAsASA1. AH-SA -
establish Board of Railroad and Warehouse
Commissioners. This board was empowered
to fix the rate o.. charges for the inspection OF
grain and the manner in which the same
should be collected. and to fix the amount OF
compensation TO be paid the chief inspector
and other officers, etc
able delegation Of legislative power. But the
Supreme Court Of that State held that the
right to pass inspection laws belonged to the
police powers of the government, and the
Legislature had the authority to arrange the
distribution Of said powers as the public ext
gencies might require, apporuonlng them 70
local Jurisdictions as the law-Inaklng power
deemed appropriate and committing the exer-
cisss OF the residue TO officers appointed as it
might see flt to order, and that 1t was impor-
tant for the General Assembly to delegate to a
Commission the power to control the subject
Of the inspection of grain, and to prescribe
what fees should be charged for the inspection
of graiH and regulate them from time to time
as circumstances might require.
recognized by this and other courts OF last re-
sort that the General Assembly may author
ize others to do things which it might proper
", yet cannot understanolngly or advanta-
geously do itself seems to apply with peculiar
force to the fixing of the amount of inspec-
ton fees so as to admit them properly with
reference to the expenses Of inspection"
See also Police Commissioners VS.. Louisville,
3 Bush, 59T; The People VS.. Shepherd, 50 N.
Y, 285: The People vs.. Pinckney, 81 N. Y,
81; Bush VS. Simpson. Scam, 1856; Trustees
>. H.
VS. County of Lawrence, IL ILL.,, /; Common
wealth VS.. Duquet Yates, 493.
By the authority cited, it is held that even if
the power conferred on municipal corporations
or special commissions be legislative or quasi
legislative, still it is within the discretion Of
the Legislature to confer it.
My conclusion upon this point is therefore
that the act of October 10, 1879. is not uncon-
stitutional by reason of a delegation to the
Railroad Commissioners of legislative power
1t is claimed that the law is unconstitutional
because by declaring that the schedule OF
rates established by The Commissioners shall
be held and taken in all the courts as sufficient
evidence that the rates therein fixed are just
and reasonable, it depriveS the railroad COM
panies of their constitutional right to trial
by jury.
In this provision the Legislature has exer-
cised the power exercised by all the Legisla-
lures, both Federal and State, of prescribing
the effect of evidence, and it has done nothing
more. Even in several cases Congress has
declared that certain facts proven shall be
evidence of guilt For instance, in section
30S2 of the United States Revised Statutes it is
provided that whenever on an Indictment for
smuggling the defendant is shown to be in
possession of smuggled goods, "such posses
sion shall be deemed evidence sufficient to
authorize conviction, unless the defendant
shall explain the possession to the satisfaction
of the jury" The statute books are full of
such acts, but it has never been considered
that this impairs the right Of trial by jury.
But even if this provision of the act under
consideration were unconstitutional it would
not render imperative the other sections of
the statute from which this provision can be
easily removed, and yet leave the main object
and success of the law unimpaired Packet
Company VS.. Keokuz, 95 U s., so.
1t is next insisted that the Railroad Commits
sionsrs' act is unconstitutional because it
violates that declaration of the bill of rights,
paragraph one, section three, which declares
private property shall not be taken or dam
aged for public uses without just and adequate
compensation is first paid"
This clause Is a regulation of the exercises of
the State s right of universal domain.
An act attempting to fix just and reaSona-
BILE rates of freight and fares upon the rail-
roads of the State, can hardly be considered
as taking or damaging the property of the
railroad for public use. The object of the
law is to regulate the charges which the
corporation may make in the use of its own
property for its own purposes 1t does not
take il or damage it for public use. The act
was passed because its passage was expressly
enioined by the constitution. 1t does not be-
come obnoxious to the constitutional provi-
sion under consideration and become taking
or damaging of private property for public
use. because all the rates fixed are not Just
and reasonable, or because they are thought
so by the railroad companies.
Again the act under consideration is alleged
to be unconstitutional because obnoxious to
paragraph eleven. section one, article one, of
the cons tuition, which declares Protection to
person and property is the paramount duty of
the government and shall be impartial and
complete" and of paragraph three, section
son shall be deprived of life liberty or prop
erty without the process of law"
When it is remembered that these para
graphs are referred to law the only purpose
of which is the performance by the Legisla-
ture of its constitutional duty to prohibit unjust
determinations and unjust and unreasonable
charges by the railroads of the state it is
difficult to see how they are pertinent to the
matter.
In Mum VS.. Illinois, "a U. S. 1f3. it was held
that the limitation by legislative enactment of
charge for services rendered in public employ
ment or for the use Of property in which the
public has an interest does not deprive the
owner OF his property without the process
OF law. Neither can it be said that it Is de-
NAL or impartial and complete protection to
property.
II is next insisted that the law is one of "a
general nature, but that 1T does not have a
uniform operation throughout the State as re-
quired by paragraph one, section four, article
one, of the constitution of the State.
The act assailed is an act affecting railroad
companies only, and it is designed to have uni
| form operation on them throughout the State.
| Its purpose is to require all such companies in
the State to charge just and reasonable rates.
and to prohibit unjust discrimination by them.
| To give the law uniform operation it is not
necessary that it should prescribe the anne
rates for all the railroad companies. It might
as we'll be claimed that the Legislature in franz
ing an act to regulate toll bridges must pre-
scribe the rate of toll for every bridge in the
State; otherwise the act would not have uni
form operation.
The ingenuity of counsel has brought into
the case these various paragraphs of the con-
stitution in the hope that the Railroad Com
missioners' act might be impaled in some one
of them.
have considered them all. Most OF them
have but very remote application to the law
some of them have already been considered
by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Mum vs., Illinois and Peik VS.. Chicago, 81 u
S. supra, and decided to have no control over
similar legislation.
Tba of he r
may be considered unwiSe or even oppressive
but even if it is the remedy is not with the
court, but with the Legislature. If the Gen
erai Assembly in its passage were acting within
the scope of its constitutional power, no mat
ter how cruel and unjust the law may be, the
court cannot apply the remedy.
There is nothing in the act complained of
which indicates disposition on the part of the
Legislature to oppose the railroad companies
1t appears to be rather an attempt in good
faith to discharge duty imperativey de-
manded of the Legislature by the State con-
stitution.
The complaint is not so much against the
Legislature as against the Railroad Commits
sioners Their administration of the law Is
charged to, be oppressive and unjust to the
railroad company in which the complainant is
a stockholder. 1t is alleged thst the schedule
of rates fixed by the Commissioners for said
railroad is, if adhered to, destructive to the
railroad property, and ruinouS to its creditors
and stockholders.
The evidence submitted upon this point by
the complainant, consisting of the affidavits of
Mr.. HaineS, the general manager of the de-
PENDANT railroad company, and others, on the
one side, and the afldavit and reports and cir
culsrs of the Railroad Commissioners on the
other is very conflicting and irreconciIable. 1t
il not so much a conflict as to the facts as it is
in matters of Judgment and differences from
facts
one thing is made clear to my mind by the
evidence. 1t is that there has been an honest
and painstaking effort on the part OF the Com
missioners to perform their duty under the
law firmly and justly. The difference between
the Railroad Commissioners and the officers of
the Savannah, Florida and Western Railroad
Company is an honest difference of judgment.
The company puts the present investment in
its road at 81, 10000, and claimed that profit
of 10 per cent. per annum would be just and
reasonable. The Commissioners placed the
value of the investment at 100000, and a
just and reasonable profit thereon at per
cent.
The railroad company estimated its annual
expenditure for maintaining and operating the
road at 100000. The Commissioners were of
opinion that $550.000 would suffice with good
management and proper economy. The Off
GERS of the railroad company declarethat the
its income that it will not suffice to pay the
running expenses of the road and the interest
on its bonded debt, leaving nothing for diyi
dends to its stockholders The Railroad Com
framed to produce eight per cent income on
the value Of the road after paying cost of
maintt nance and running expenses. Which
view is the correct one it is impossible to de-
eide from the evidence submitted. There is
however, conclusive way, and it seems to me
1t is the only one by which this controversy can
be settled and that is by experiment. re-
duetion of railroad charges is not always fol-
lowed by a reduction Of either gross or net
income 1t can soon be settled which is right
A. Nod nffiCnFR