The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1881-05-21
Waterloo,
Fl h ng Over the Old Battle.
(John c. Ropes in June Atlantic 7

lJohn c. Ropes in June Atlantc.1
In sense, the harsh expressions of Chesney
and others about the utter state of ignorance
in which the Emperor was as to the strategy of
his enemies, that he did not take at all into
consideration the possibility of the march of
the whole Prussian army from Wavre to join
Wellington, and so on, are true. They are
true SO far as this: that Napoleon, having en-
trusted the whole duty of finding out about the
Prussians-where they were, and whether they
were going to unite with the English or not
ID Grouchy, and having given him a compe-
tent force and plenty of cavalry and an ex-
press warning as to the danger of the union of
their army with the English, had considered
snat he had done all that was needful and I'M
doubleday he was taken by surprise when the
blow came. But they are not true in the sense
that Napoleon was throughout blind to the
possibility OF this junction of the allied armies,
and took no measures to prevent it. If an ex-
perienced sea captain, on approaching dan
gerous coast, intrusts the deck to one of his Of
fcers, to whom he gives sufficient number of
men, and whom he warns to beware of the
dangers arising from the force of certain cur
rents, and then goes below, he is undoubtedly
taken by surprise when the ship runs ashore
In his berth, asleep, he certainly did no. fore
see the catastrophe. His principal, if not his
only, fault was in his choice of the officer to
whom he intrusted the deck. AS to his knowl-
edge of the perils of that part of the voyage
that cannot be questioned.
SO with Napoleon. His throwing the entire
responsibility of taking care of the Prussians
on Marshal Grouchy was his chief fault, for
Grouchy was not able to sustain such a burden
Davoust, whom he might have had, and ought
TO have had, in Grouchys place, would have
successfully carried out his ideas. And while
L fully admit the Emperor's dilatoriness on the
morning OF the 18th, by which the concentra-
ton of the Prussian army at Wavre was as
sured, which in fact made it impossible for
Grouchy, or for Davoust even, to prevent this
concentration; and while l also fully admit
the negligence of the Emperor in leaving
Grouchy so long without any instruc-
tons, except tho warning of the possibly
intended junction of the allied armies
contained in the Bertrand letter, yet 1
cannot agree with those who, like Ches-
ney, say that 1.-The notion that Grouchy is re-
sponsible for the Waterloo defeat must be dis
missed, by those who choose to weigh the evil
dence, from the domain of authentic history to
the limbo of national fgments.' The respon-
slbility must be divided between the Emperor
and his lieutenant Charging upon Napoleon,
as we must, the faults above specified, it must
yet not be forgotten that had Grouchy intelli-
gently carried out the emperor's instructions
contained in the Bertrand letter he might have
been In position to defeat, or at least to him
der, the junction of the allied armies
1t is hardly to be questioned that if Grouchy
had moved at four o'clock in the morning by
way OF Mousty, and had put himself in COM
munication with the main army, his forces
would have stopped the Prussian advance, and
allowed the Emperor the use of his whole ar
my against the dukes forces, which were infe-
rior in numbers and composition Instead of
being obliged to detach 10000 infantry against
the Prussians, Napoleon could have used them
against the English, and from what we know
of the condition of Wellington's army in the
latter part of the afternoon the result would
have been decided victory for Napoleon. If,
as midday. changed his plan, and, following
the advice of Gerard had marched to join the
emperor, he would certainly have averted the
catastrophe, even had he arrived too late to
insure victory for his side