The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1881-07-28
FHE WAR OF THE Rebellion.
Fighting Battles Over Again on Paper.
From an i"terricr miM Gen. Lonyst,ec,.


rist. lie never had a practical idea of
war or government in his life that ever
heard Of During the rebellion he never
originated single movement or made O.
practical suggestion, but was the first to
criticise those which others made. pan.
ned and executed. His book will have
no effect either upon the south or the
country at large. 1t will be looked upon
As history of the struggle from his
standpoint, which is stinted and preiu-
diced. He really has no practical
knowledge of the historical matters about
which he undertakes to write"
GREAT BIUNDER.
Davis is severe on Joe Johnston for
his refusal to ADOPT the Tennessee cam
paign when he took command of the
army at Dalton"
ayes, very. was to have re.cnforc-
cd Johnston if that campaign had been
mado, and have no hesitation in saying
that q more absurd and ridiculous mill.
tary movement could never have been
conceived than that. know of no mil
ilary man on earth who could have con-
ceived such plan of campaign, except
Gen. Bragg, and no man on the earth
except JEFF. DHgis would have adopted it.
adopt it is tribute to his military sagac.
about the campaign. Both he and I
to have made such q junction as Davis
proposed, which could have crushed
u.s."
"Do you know whether Lee counseled
or encouraged the Tennessee cam
paign7"
"Yes sir; know very we'll that he
objected to it most emphntically. Before
the military operations in the West be.
gan that year several of us were asked
our opinion as to Il plan Of operations
for campaign in that section. made
out my opinion, urging the detachment
of n sufficient number Of men from points
where they could be spared, to make a
raid through the Cumberland mountains
into Kentucky. Gen. Lee approved it,
and asked me to go with him to Rich
mond when he presented it to the Presi-
dent. told him though it unnecessa-
ry, but he insisted. l finally consented,
and we went. He put the proposition
before the President and Gen. Bragg,
and they spent some two or three
hours discussing it. Finally, was
called in and gave my opinion but it
soon became evident from the Presidents
manner that he had determined TO accept
Gen. Bragg's plan for campaign into
Tennessee, and impose it upon Joe John.
ston. Gen. Lee was vrey much opposed
to it, and evinced great deal Of feeling
although he controlled himself After
he found that there was no further use of
discussing the matter he sat for several
seconds pulling his whiskers, rs was his
won't when veXed, and then got up and
walked out of the room. Gen. Johnston
is right and Davis wrong in the con,ro-
versy which this book has provoked"
THE BATTLE OF CHICKAMAUGA.
'Do you agree with Gen. Johnston,
that ChichRmauga was the bloodiest bat
tie Of the WARP"
"By no means. 1t was q very severe
battle, but not SO desperate as Gettysburg
Some time before the battle took place
Gen. Lee and I had talk, in which 1
said to him that believed, ia battle at
suit followed up, it would be ofinestima-
with my idea, because he would have 10
take re-eEforccments for Bragg from his
army. therefore wrote To the Secretary
OF War, saying that believe if Bragg's
army could be re-enforced, so rs to make
decisive victory at some point near
Chattanooga. it would be great stroke
of policy My letter summoned Gen.
Lee to Richmond, and when he returned
he ordered me to prepare two divisions
oi my corps to go west and participate in
the battle. Knowing Bragg's reputation
for standing and then running, l made
up my mind to make myself square before
left, and said tc Gen. Lee: There is
no use ofmy going, no use of making this
sacrifice of men and effort, unless the
result we shall obtain shall be followed
mp with spirit He replied: The order
has been given, and it shall be repeated
at your diction, that, if we gain a yicto.
~. it shall be pushed with energy
With that understanding | went to the
West, and arrived upon the battlefield
at IL o'clock at night. and the attack
WAS ordered for daylight in the morning.
It did not begin, however, till some time
later. The plan was to make battle as
soon as l arrived. Therefore the enemy
knew that we had reinforced Bragg.
We had to cross the river to make the
light, and it WAS severe one. Tine
troops ! had brought from the East broke
the Federal lines, and largely conlribu-
ted, il they did not control, the events of
that day. / never saw them in bctter
spirits or do better work. When the
victory was gained and Rosccran's forces
demoralized, Gen. Bragg came to me
and said: What shall we do now p
Follow up the success across the Tennes-
see river and move toward Nashville and
Louisville said I, This will leave Rose
Grams at Chattanooga, with us threaten
ing, If not in possession of his base of
supplies, and we can.
FORCE HIM TO ATTACK US
and defeat him at our leisure Bragg
LETT me with this understanding, and ali
OF my troops had crossed the river ex.
ccept one division, when Bragg came rid
ing up to me and said: Order that
division into Chattanooga. Our people
Will be so glad to hear that our truops
are marching through that city, with
bands playing and banners nying.'
sad Gen. Bragg, they will much
prefer to hear that we have cut the line
OF the enemy's communications and
nave him at our mercy than to
hear OF any dress parade such as you
order Bragg was determined, and the
division, not yet across the stream, was
oruered TO Chattanooga, to give tho citi-
zens music, and very soon aiterward the
whole army was halted, while the great
est chance for decisive victory we had
yet had was in our hands. We were
nnally all drawn back to rest, while
Knsccran's defeated army had opportu-
nlty TO recruit its shattered columns and
prepare Tor battle. I had lost 5000 men