The sun., 1881-06-26


tho Rev. Thomas J. Van Horn. throws n
clearer light upon that period OF the war
than Badeaus book does. and should not
bo overlooked by tho student who desires to
obtain an accurate view OF 1t. 1t Is not neces-
sary at this time to recall the extraordinary
success which had crowned all Grants efforts
up to tho end OF tho Chattanooga campaign. The
campaigns OF Donelson and VicksburR reflect
immense honor upon him and tho army which
made thom. and had II not been for tho disnster
called by some tho surprise OF Shiloh
(which. however. fell moro heavily upon
Sherman than upon Grant,. there would
have been nothing up to that time
to cast doubt upon tho claim for Grant
that he was ono OF tho foremost military
men OF his day. We shall. however. leave
tho much debated question pertaining to the
real nature of the battle OF Shiloh to those who
have n fancy for such wranglng. merely calling
attention to tho fact that much light has been
thrown upon 1t by rebel reports. as we'll as by
articles published by Union officers. since Ba-
deau's first volume was issued.
That part OF tho second volume which refers
to Grants acceptance OF tho rank OF Liouten-
ant-General. and his assumption OF the actual
command OF the Army OF the Potomac with tho
duty Of fighting and defeating Lee. is very well
written. and gives a truthful and dramatic
account OF the motives and considerations
by which Grant must have been controlled on
that occasion. The decision made by him
and the courage with which he undertook the
task which It imposed upon him. wero deserv-
ing OF all praise. Con. Badeau has treated this
part OF his subject with ability. and II all his
work had been rs we'll done. or even as we'll as
that giving tho reasons which led Grant to pre-
fer the overland movement against Richmond
rather than repeat McClelnn's unfortunate
peninsuar campaign. there would have been
but little to criticise in his three volumes.
Gen. Badeau treats the Wilderness cam
paign as though tho first days march had
not boen intended to carry tho army be-
yond the Wilderness, II such was Grants de-
sign. it was n great blunder. inasmuch as
tho Wilderness. being thoroughly known to
Lee. could be used by him. as IL was used. to
mask his own attack upon tho flank OF the
national columns. But while we must agree
with our author that We were not surprised
there. yet tho fact remains that we were
compelled to fight under great disadvantages.
when by a fair degree OF celebrity we might have
cleared the region OF tangled underbrush and
reached the open fold. where by superiority
OF numbers. II not by superior tactics we
could reasonably have hoped fora crushing vic
tory. 1t is true. however. that the Army OF the
Potomac was as yet, unacquaintcd with Grant.
and lack cd confidence in him. and that Grant was
wiso in acting with forbearance toward 1t: but
We cannot suppress the conviction that he
would have saved himself and it great
trouble and much loss II he had insisted
upon its making q forced march on the
first day. Tho greatest defect OF that army
was lack OF promptitude and coerity
and this is among the most fatal OF military
vices. 1t was quite within bounds that the first
nghtng might have been at Spottsylvania
Court House instead of in tho Wilderness. II the
movement had been FASTENED rs rapidly Us the
situation required. What the result would
have been must always remain a matter of spec
ulation. but the chances arc in favor OF Grants
having won Il great victory. The fault was
probably not altogether his. but nrst-clnss
commander with n genius for organization
would have foresecn and prevented it. 1t was
due more to the faulty organization OF the army
and especially to the division of command and
responsibility between Grant and Meade. than
TO all other causes put together. Our author
admits the fact. but endeavors to show that
Grant could not improve upon II. owing to
the necessity OF his directing at tho same time
the general operations OF all the other Union
armies. But this is begging the qucs-
tion. and it may bo fairly said in reply that
hrst-cass Sonius for war would have found q
way TO command the Army OF tho Potomac and
at the same timo to compel all tho other armies
TO act simultaneously and harmoniously with it.
The failure to do this was the fruitful source of
incomplete success and bitter disappointment
to the country. When Grant found himself finally
compelled to ignore Meade and give his orders
directly 10 the corps commanders. he took n
most efficient step toward bringing the war to an
end. We do moi IneaA 10 caattho slightest refec-
ton upon the memory OF Meade. nor to ap-
provo Badeau's structures upon his conduct.
He was an able soldier and loyal subordinate. .
but no army was ever yet successfully and
economically commanded by two Generals at
the same time. The fault OF the Arrangement
WAS Grants. because the power TO change it was
unreservcdly in his hands.
The crisis OF tho campaign occurred on
tho night of the 9th OF May. when
Ewell turned the right OF our army and
overwhelmed the right division OF tho Sixth
Corps. Gen. Dadeau tells us that upon the
receipt OF this news Grant ordered reinforce
ments to the place Of danger. ana then threw
himself upon his camp bed and slept soundly
all might. This is hard to believe. The emer-
gency was very grave one. and II tho rebel
but little doubt that our forces would have been
disorGaniaod and beaten. As it was, great con-
fusion followed. and it was not till nearly mid
night that order was restored. and not till day
light that n reconnaissance by tho cavalry re-
veaed the fact that the Confederaes had aban-
doned or failed to perceive the advantage they
hRd gained tho night before. Grants impertur-
bability had even then come to be looked upon as
notable. but that no should have shown no
emotion and slept soundly under such circum-
stances Is not to be credited. On the contrary
there is reason to think that tho fact was en-
tirely different. and that Grant was deeply con-
cerned by tho news which first reached him
upon that OCCASION Col. Bowers. who was an
eyewitness Of all that took place at headquar-
ters. told us immediately afterward that Grant
after giving mis- orders. threw himself iaco
downward upon his camp bed in u state Of ex-
treme emotion. This is not only more natural
story. but an easier one to understand and
much moro honorable to him than sleeping