The sun., 1881-06-19
Is England Safe From Invasion 2

which have been lately made by high pro-
tessional authorities. A year ago the OBJ
jections to the current opinion were stated
by Admiral Sir SPENCER ROBINSON more
recently they were fortified by the argu
ments Of Capt. KIRcHHAMMER, an Austrian
officer; and now Admiral Lord DUNsANY
gives weighty reasons for believing
that England's immunity from inva-
sion by sea has vanished. 1t is
plain that the popular conviction of
security to which Mr.. GLADSTONE
and Sir w. HARcoURT have on several occa
slons given utterance in their speeches, is
not shared by competent observers on the
Continent, or by those Englishmen specially
qualified by professional knowledge to pro-
nounce judgment.
The prevailing impression OF England's
inviolability is mainly based upon two
grounds, neither of which will bear sharp
scrutiny. 1t is said that she can point to
prescriptive immunity of eight hundred
years, and, moreover, that at the present
time her maritime power Is superior to
any two other navies combined, and
practically superior to all other navies
united. Neither OF these assumptions is
we'll founded. Although the argument from
prescription Is relatively OF small impor-
tance, we may point out that descent on
the shores OF the United Kingdom has been
many times effected since WILLIAM the
Norman landed at Pevensey Bay. In the
reign OF JOHN the French Prince LEWIS
transported an army across the Channel; in
1885 the Earl Of RICHMOND brought over the
nucleus Of the force which gained the battle
OF Bosworth Field: in 1858 the English
fleet did not prevent the Prince OF
ORANGE from crossing with the Dutch regi-
ments which helped to make him King
OF England; in 1745 the cruisers OF GEORGE
III. could not intercept the passage OF
CHARLES EDWARD, who made himself mas
ter OF Scotland, and led his army as far as
Derby in the heart Of England. 1t was the
vivid recollection OF some OF these events
which certainly cannot be reconciled with
the theory OF prescriptive immunity, which
justified the lively apprehensions felt in
1905. when NAPOLEON was preparing his
armament at Boulogne.
Let us see now how much truth there Is In
the second assertion, that Great Britain Is
moro than match for the joint naval
forces OF any two European States. This
statement, which was true enough half
u century ago is HOW bO Wlue VI llle
mark that, absolutely, she is almost exactly
matched by France, while relatively to the
necessities OF defence her resources are sig
nally inferior to those OF the latter power.
Sir SPENCER ROBINSON puts the actual SER
viceable line-of-battle ships at "a English to
% French; but while Great Britain has but
additional ironclads in preparation, France
has IL in the same state OF forwardness, and
more are to be Immediately begun. The
special ships adapted to cooperation with
| fleets in general action and for defensive
purposes are about equal in number
| and value on both sides. This estimate
| is less favorable to England than Capt.
| KIRcHHAMMER's, the difference arising from
| the exclusion OF all but really efficient
vessels-a discrimination which Sir SPEN
| GER ROBINSON and Lord DUNsANY are com
petent to make. Another startling aver
| ment Is made by the last-named Admiral,
| viz, that In the number OF fast cruisers ap-
| plicable to the protection or destruction Of
| foreign commerce France has an actual su-
periority. These facts demonstrate that the
prominence OF British maritime power
which unquestionably existed toward the
close OF the Napoeonic wars, has quito
passed away. So far is it from being supe-
rior to any two navles, that If We add one
say the German or the Italian-to that Of
France, the two would be vastly stronger
than the British navy
But while the French naval force intrin-
sically is almost exactly equal to that of
England, and at the present rate OF increase
must soon outstrip it, 1t Is strategically
greatly superior in strength. To this point
Lord DUNsANY directs particular attention,
showing that British Ministry would be
forthwith driven from olllce If it failed to
take measures to keep open the SueZ
route to India and to protect British
commerce on the high seas. These objects
could not possibly be attained without
detachng so largo q force as to leave
the Channel fleet incapable OF coping with
France, But 1t will be said, admitting that
for the purposes of invasion tho French
could dispose Of ships more numerous and
powerful than those which could be massed
against them. the superiority OF British
seamen would suffice to turn tho scale
Lord DUNsANY insists that this notion is q
complete deluslon, now that the conditions
OF navigation have been revolutionized by
steam. For what Is the definition OF al
able seamen but "one who can hand
reef, steer, and heave the lead p But
the first two qualifications have nc
place on an ironclad which has
no masts; the steering Is done by
machinery; and as for heaving the lead
says the Admiral, a young landsman learns
to do 1t In month. Lord DUNsANY sums
up his conclusions on tho supposed advan
tages resulting from British seamanshiE
by saying that II sailor skill In nelson's
day counted for seventy-fve chances In
hundred, 1t does not count for ten now"
sailor on a modern ironclad should, h,
thinks, bo regarded rather as passenge
than an operator. At best he is a marine
, artlleryman In his iron casemate.
, AS to the possibility OF repeling a larg
) invading force once landed, there has neve