The Evening critic., 1881-10-11

cussion between the respective political par
ties represented in the Senate is of suiii-
cient gravity to arrest any haste of con-
clusion. There is not, the slightest
need of vituperation or of sophistry The
issue is not of character to evoke purely
partisan doctrine or to be settled as q ques-
tion of party expediency. on the con-
trary it is an issue that lays hold upon the
foundations of our system and should be
met in a spirit of patriotic discretion quite
irrespective of party zeal,
The real question involved is not upon
technical rendering of the statute which
says that the President of the Senate shall
administer the oath of Office to Senators,
but whether the line of the Presidential
succession shall be dislocatcd.
Under existing law, the person chosen by
the Senate ofthe XLVIIth Congress to be its
presiding officer is the de fdcto Vice-Presi-
dent of the United States, and as such holds
the same relation to the Executive branch
of the Government that the duly elected
vice-Prcsdent ordinarily holds during the
life of duly elected President
By virtue Of n series Of accidents, the
Democrats of the Senate have become in
vested with power to elect President of
the Senate, who is thereby Vice-President
de facto of the United States. They have
exerted this power to the choice of Thomas
f. Bayard. The result of this action is to
vest the Chief Executive succession in the
Opposition, so long as Mr.. Bayard holds the
place to which the series of accidents afore.
said has elevated him.
The main issue in the premises, therefore,
resolves itself into the inquiry whether such
conjunction is not violation of tho spirit
manifest in the framework of our organic
law. 1t will be observed that tho trainers
of the Constitution took infinite pains and
exhausted precaution to yoke the offices of
President and Vice-President inseparably in
the scheme devised for their joint election.
Under the operation of the electoral system
it is impossible that a President Of one
party and Vice-President of another be
chosen by the people, They must stand or
fall together.
This device is to our mind proof positive
that the Fathers intended the executive
succession to remain during the prescribed
term in the party victorious at the last pre-
ceding general election.
The subsequent provision of the Consti-
tuition that Congress shall provide mode
of succession in case of the removal of both
President and Vice-President does not alter
the spirit of the original article. This
grant of power to Congress TO provide for
extraordinary aud unforeseen contingencies
was obviously mere supplement to the
previous device, and the design was that
should be guided by the evident spirit and
tenor of the original or main clause.
We do not attach any Importance to the
argument put forward by some Republicans
that the existence Of Democratic Vice
President de fdcto would be, in effect, per-
petual temptation held out to some crazy
Democrat to assassinate the Republican
President. This is weak plea, unworthy Of
common manhood.
Even if the thing had intrinsic logic, it
would be vitiated by the peculiar choice
that has been made We do not believe
that there is Democrat in the United
States crazy enough to desire to see Mr..
Bayard President; or, if there be such, his
insanity is of two soft and harmless q
variety to render the suspicion of violence
possible.
No; that is snot the question. 1t is not in
any sense an issue reducible to personal
ity. 1t is generic, and takes in the whole
philosophy of executive succession. The
fact that things have been left to run al
loose ends for hundred years argues moth.
ing. Hitherto there has been no succession
beyond the regular constitutional provision
1t has always happened that two lives were
sufficient to cover the four years.
But never before has the succession been
dislocated, Lafayette Foster was doubles:
personally opposed to Andrew Johnson, but
both were elected by the same party, which
preserved intact our theory of the spirit Of
Constitution in its provision for the execu-
tive succession.
However, it is not our purpose to con
fine our analysis to the limits of the pre-
sumption that the existing statute is wise
We look upon the existing statute as being
itself violation of the spirit of the Con
stitution.
The existing statute is, in fact, anoma
Ions In that it transfers the executive sue
cession out of the executive and into the
legislative branch of the Government. On
this point we take pleasure in calling at
tention to the recent review of this whole
subject by Mr.. ID. f. Murphy, Official Re
porter Of the Senate.
No rejecting man can read MIR. Murphy''
admirable review of the legislative histor,
OF this peculiar statute and resist the con
clusion that the statute is wholly defiant o
the spirit of the constitutional clause regu
lating succession to the Chief Magistracy
The effect Of the statute in question
when contrasted with the effect of th'
main constitutional provision, is this:
Under the main constitutional provision
two lives are assigned to cover the acci
dents of four years. Both these lives ar
designated by the people and are essential!
executive.
The Congress, acting by virtue of the sup
Elementary clause, provides for the heri
tage presumptive and, with characteristic
selishness, locates it within the control o
Congress itself. thus transferring the eX