New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1881-12-23

treat but it was directed by General McC!ela ~
its Gral position at Malvern i The lessons
taught the Army of the Potomac during tne pasII
three months were never lost to IT, heAperlenSS o
officers and men became veterans TO serve uuueI
other commanders in "defendiDg the Constitu.oh
of the country and the nationality OF Its people.
And now what saved the at rSn "t mon
forced change of base? 1t was the perfection Oh Is
organization. which was due to the persona an .
tiOn entertained for General Mcclellan ny tno
officers and men of his army. AS an evidence OF le
influence this attachment OF the army 10 thg po,n
commanding had upon the authorities at W asnlngl
ton we quote the following from letter addresstu
TO the writer by one of the abest Generals Oh tno
Regular Army who has from the 1all OF oulnVeff
until to-day enjoyed the respect ana id 70
every Administration: General HliohcOGk Saiu W
me presume about the time he visited the Penin
sula 1T is impossible for me now to cohianu "iaU
army, referring understood, to its training oy
Mcclellan its known devotion to him, 10 me Iaco
that its corps commanders and highest onlceIs VIZ
almost entirely of his selection, so ina! tlo mOo
devoted to him and would thus DO with dliicuitS
guided and controlled by General new 20 IL anu to
to them and whose military reputation oeionseu ~
a long passed war-that with Mexico f .ho
These officers were correct IN their estimate ol tno
influence which this personal affection LOT us coi
mander had upon the Army OF inc fotoniac s 40
so strong that everyone naturally shrahS from III
terferinG between General Mcclellan ana MS men.
His own regard for his troops may have at times
made him unwilling to sacrltce some lot INC sUVoHu
of the whole. 1t is but charitable TO cohsider tn,s
feeling on his pat to have been one cause ol otd
failure. We must write; however III Iest tbosc
facts of history Just as the record presents tio
facts TO MS There was failure, and the causes Oh
that failure have been largely hidden from US We
who belong to the Army of the PotOmac, tllG
qrondeSt army gathered on this continent, at an
times true to It's commander IN chief, whoever IL
might be- hope that he who organized that f atrr
will vet deem it and proper 10 give soIho lutoI
vindication of the policy he adopted no matter
whom he may strike As 1t is, MS lreliuS aIic "u
mirers have to deplOre the necessity OF Wrlting III
General criticism of the results which have been
Yariouslv attributed 10 " want of support inter-
ference" or inactlon.'
In Mr.. Ropes's book, the passion for Importantly
becomes so violent as to lead him into apparent III
consistencies. He is conscious of conviction OF
the worthessness of Mcclellan as the commander
of a great army: he knows him to have been weak
vacilIatinc insubordinate more alive to his own
interests and those of his political party than to
those of the country. He sets these convictions
forth with great force and energy i'll the first
CHAPTER in the following paragraphs:
The distrust of General Mcclellan was greater
than ever-and there were several reasons lor tnS'
FYrst.-His campaign had been characterized by an
assumption on his part that he was entitled 10 deal
ON an canal footing with the Government, as IA Sort
of contracting party Instead OF dong MS WORK az
well as he could with the means ne had OF c"uIu
nrocure he was constantly attempting to drive the
Administration into q corner; TO iasen upon IL the
responsibility for the i'll success OF his military
movements; to threaten IT, even WIN 'nJ cthI ne
desired Such method of procedure Oh the part OF
n General Is wholly without precedent, ana HoV.
ernment which understood It's position would hOI
have mt M with it for moment. Let General,
by all means, advise his superlors OF all mateIai
facts. and warn them III the strongest terms VI tlo
consequences of such or such acts but lot HIM
never forget that tho distribution OF the RESPONSE
bty for military failures is not for HIM to under
take it is the task of posiertN u Is MS 10 90 MS
best let the consequences be what they may. As
an illustration of what we mean IoOk au McCISl-
lan's letter to Mr.. Stanton, of June II, where ne
saws i'm reference to McDowers troops: II can.
fulI,- nj want
them. but would prefer to fight the battle win
what have and let others be responsible Tor the
results" Such remark as tits shows ms cEotlTn
to be excessive indeed. He actually says that ne
wants to have his preferences gratihed whatever
may be the consequences to the country. -
Second-It war impossible not TO discern IN Gen
cTal McClean's attitude toward the ADMINISTRATION
a distinct political bias lie belonged TO the Demo,
cratic party--the party which desired to prevent
the slavery question from Completing the ques-
ton now at issue in the tied-that OF the authority
of the Nation. He may or may not have been
right as to this; but it is very plain that as com
mander of an army, IT was none OF ms business
Nothing is better settled than the desrabliiy OF the
entire subordination of the military 70 tl6 clNu
mower in n free country; yet we find Mcclellan, on
July Z writing from TaTsOns Landing "a long
letter to the President IN winch he gives MN MS
views on the way in which the war shonIu DC con-
Quoted in reference to the institution oil slavery
that "mllitary power should not be aIoWed 10
interfere with the relations of serytuic, either by
supportIng or mparing the authority of the MASTER
except for REFRESHING disorder, rs IN other cases
etc" These views NAV or may not nave Peeh
at all but it Is clear that a general officer mus
going out OF his way TO write long letter on the
policy of the Government III Te,aton 20 sla'crS,
has taken sides IN politics, which mliitaIy man
in the field should never DO. In laGt MS lIlcuuS
were at this time presenting hn to the country as
the great Democratic general, and in two years he
| was the patty candidate for the Presidency. Had
| Mr.. Lincoln removed him from the command imme-
dately on the receipt of this letter. it would have
| been not only justfable but wise IN the end
| 1hird.-It was impossible for anyone who hal care
fllly watched the campaign to iee any great con-
| fdencc that Mcclellan ever would accomplish any
thing. He never satisfied with the advantages
| he possessed, with the numbers he commanded al
| any particular time. There was always something
remaining to be done before he was ready to move
Add to this an entire absence of that clear and cool
Judgment which is essential to the Accomplishment
| of all difficult matters IN tins world nat We
refer to may be well illustrated by the fact that In
! the course of "A single fortnight Mcclellan had I'D
| one telegram told the Secretary of War that ms
numbers were greatly inferior those of tine enemy
that he would however, do all that General could
| do with his army and # il was destroyed by over
whelming numbers he could at least die with 1t and
| share its fate; in another telegram that he lthe
| Secretary must hope for the best, and he lMC-
Clellan) would not deceive the hopes he formerly
placed in him; in another telegram That IL ne had
ten thousand fresh troops he could take Richmond,
vet that he lost tins battle because his force was
too small; that the Secretary had done his best to
| sacrifice the army; and hree days aIer no iau
taken up his position at llarrisons Landing IN thus
| same fortnight be found time TO Law before the
| President, in an elaborate letter his views on the
slavery question, in the course OF which he actually
said that declaration Of radical views especially
upon slavery, would rapidly dslntegrate our pres
| ent armies" -.
| Enough has been said to show that the Admins
tration could not feel that in Mcclellan the country
had a really able or a really snglemnded servant,
1t would he hard to make clearer or more accu-
rate statement of McClelan's leading character
istics than this Yet from the moment the General
lands at Alexandria the tone of Mr.. Ropes toward
him undergoes an entire change and he devotes a
great deal of ingenuity to showing that Mcclellan,
| in thought aud in action, was all that could have
been expected of him, and that in all the matters at
| issue between him on the one side ana Lincoln,
| Haecl, Stanton and Pope on the other, Mcclellan
was right. Halleck is blamed for not beng Deremp-
tory enough in one place and being too peremptOry
in another; every doubtful point is nnhesitatingly
decided against hIm and so calm and judicial does
Mr. Rnnes rrn,y tnMard Lhe end of hls work That he