The river press. [volume] (Fort Benton, Mont.) 1880-current, 1881-04-06
THE METTERNIOH MEMOIRS.
A Brilliant Review Of Napoleon's Most
Able Adversary and a Comparison
with Bismarck and Oavour,
from the Americana

1AAASo >'oA4SAt WILL N1CGLClH lCu3 WIZ III IL 50
fashionable to denounce and ridicule. Peo-
pie of the present day, and notably believers
in Republican ideas, can have little sympathy
with the absolutism of which he is the ablest
champion but il is impossible not to admire
the consistency, integrity and ability Of the
man, and his place in history as the foremost
representative of Europe in its death struggle
with Napoleon is assured. There were few
cooler and more accurate observers of that
most fascinating Of games, politics; and it may
be doubted whether there everlived a prophet
whose predictions were more frequently and
strikingly verified by long subsequent events.
Even where he was wrong in his apprecia-
tons the result was one which at some ear
lier period he had foreseen. It is the custom
to regard his u%nshrlnking and unaccomodat-
ing fidelity to principle as an evidence Of
sterility, but we challenge the accuracy Of
such q judgment. To be sure, when q man
represents an idea, and especially a conserv-
alive idea-much of his work is done for him
in advance, much of his labor saved, even if
it is at the expense of his reputation for fer
tility and versatility. And we do not rank
Metternich with the greatest statesman of
modern times-Cavour nor with the next
greatest Bismarck. The suppleness and
b~rilliancy of the great Italian who
"bore up his Piedmont ten years,
Till she suddenly miled and was Italy"
were beyond the Austrian diplomatist nor
had he the audacious inconsistency of the
Prussian chancellor. Bismarck's immense
luck has blinded the world to the rashness of
many Of his enterprises. It was the oppor-
tune death Of the king Of Denmark which de-
cided for him the direction Of his career.
Though it was a sublime accomplishment to
force the Austrian war upon an unwilling
king and a reluctant people, if the advice of
the late NJ. Drouyn de Lhuys had been fol-
lowed on the morrow Of Sadowa, Prussia
would not have reaped the harvest of 1866.
The French opposition helped him to pre-
pare for the victory of 1870, but even there
he played q risky game for France had ne
gotiated 8 secret treaty with Italy and Austria
and all was staked on the overwhelming de-
feat Of the French armies within the first
month of the campaign. Bismarck's sue
cessor-especially now that Alexander Ill.
sits on the Russian throne-Will be better
able to judge of Bismarck success than con-
temporary and superficial critics. Bismarck
may be called q devotee Of ''draw poker" di-
plomacy. Cavour was rather an accomp-
lished whist player Of the modern school,
brilliant in tneese and able to play the grand
xon.o ~ - III Kfo%Ao-nsoI ,-,. ys1~1 -
old fashioned whist-player, steady and safe,
rather than dashing, and convinced Of
the truth Of the adage that one must be
sure of saving the game before he plays to
win it. In patience and practically, he was
unrivalled by any of his contemporaries.
Tallyrand's imperturable temper and chronic
aversion to activity always stood him in good
stead-he was the most consummate expo
nent of the policy Of Lord Melbourne, whose
favorite mot. when confronted by an aWk-
ward Issue, was, "Can't you do nothing in
the matter?' Unlike Talleyrand, but like
Cavour, Metternich always acted with a view
to the future. He saw in 1906 that Napoleon
had overstepped the limits Of the possible,
and must, ultimately, fall, and prepared to
profit by the inevitable catastrophe. By
1870, he had found that Napoleon meditated
a supreme war with Russia, and being con-
WINGED that il would be an exhausting con-
fict, prepared Austria to bid the peace at its
conclusion. When Napoleon was defeated,
and the time was ripe to join the coalition,
Metternich was careful to eliminate from the
calculation the last chance of failure, or even
advantage; and by what Bismarck would
call ''dilatory negotiations, after the battle
of Bautzen, he gained time to perfect the
alliance, and bring Schwartzenberg's army
safely into the field. But once embarked in
the great enterprise, Metternich never turned
back. Nine. de Krudner's prophecy Of Ma
poleon's return from Elba made her fortune.
Metternich had declared, when reluctantly
signing the Treaty Of 1914, that it would
bring the allies back into the field within two
years, and all the other signers, including
even the French envoy, agreed with him. It
was curious how exactly his estimate Of Ma
poleon agreed with that Of Madame Remusat.
Metternich's creed will be found in the sec
ond chapter of his autobiography, but his
system had one defect. There was no man
in Europe who could more accurately guage
men or a situation. Given q number Of ma
tons, with certain interests and means, he
could almost infallibly predict the action each
rv,,,Ia &a1~a on3 40 a,1Aiy,of 70 rncn1f Rlrf hiS