The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1881-06-30
tions in reference TO the care of my own
troops. He hardly cared TO remove noe,

tions in reference to the care of my own
troops. He hardly cared 10 remove noe,
but Lee had to go 20 crafty his spite.
u notice, however, that he says that
when Sherman was making his march to
the sea the Confederacy WAS ia it's death
agonies, and yet understand one of hie
charges against me 10 that did not pro-
long the war by retreating end maneu-
yering after he himself acknowledges
that the cause was in its death agony.
The point he makes about Stonowall
Jackeon's foot cavalry was very tfita
saying IN 1861, but the condition or that
superb CODY of men YVES quite diferent
in 1864. They were badly shattered
oven before jackson died. His calling
mo the Fabius of the civil war, thus con.
trasting NE with the famous Roman gen
ernl who won his victories by avoiding
battles, 10 amusing. He forgets that
Grant, with no larger force than Sher.
man had, pushed Ice with force equal
to mine further In month than General
Sherman pushed me in two months and
half of continued fighting. The DIFF.
ference between Grant and Sherman was
that Sherman seemed to avoid fighting
as much as possible, so ae to save his
men, while Grant forced the fighting
from the time he struck Lee.
sHERMAN's SUPERB ARMY.
I'm many respects General Sherman
mad the strongest army. e vas made up
mostly Of men raised in the west and
used al! their lives to firearms-men who
! were self-reliants and would fight without
officers almost. The best soldiers do not
come from the populous centers. The
man who has always relied upon himself
is fuller of resource than any other and
safest in an emergency. This bold, self
reliant force Of Sherman's Was oficered
by men of the same meattle, and, be-
lieve, it is generally conceded that, tax
ing it as whole, Sh ,rman's army was
officezed all through with stronger men
than Grants. It was superb army for
the service it un iertooE.y e Al siW
"Mr. Davis cLergcs that when YOU
took command of tne army of Tennessee
he urged upon you an aggressive cam
paign, but that you utterly opposed the
plan OF en- invasion o, Tennessee."
| "The history of that latter IL a pecu-
liar one. General Bragg was one Of Mr..
Davis pets, and he had had command in
| the West CT o superb body Of troops for
q long time without doing much more
with them than to stand and then retreat
when the enemy gave battle. Look at
the march through Kentucky where
Bragg nearly reached the banks of the
Ohio River and was within -gunshot of
Louisville and Lexington. He then re-
treated through the Cumberland Noun.
tains to Knoxville, and thence to Muir
treesboro, where that terrific battle was
fought and his troops beaten. Then
| Chattanooga and then the undecisive
battle OF Chicamauga, which regard as
the blnodiest battle Of the war, and
thence to Dalton, covering series of
disasters Under one leadership rarely
known in the history Of war.
while this army was in Dalton, 1 re-
coived an order from Mr. Davis to report
Immediately at Dalton and relieve Cen
eral Bragg. of the command; that 7
would find instructions awaiting me
there. When arrived I found instruc-
tions the most ludicrous think ersr saw
written FOR like purpose: They con-
sisted in detailing the superb morale and
command. After reciting their charac.
ter. theY concluded with the statement
that W. taking command of rs strong
and effective force as then represented
the Confederate Army in any quarter,
etc. The facts were that there were only
abont two thousand mounted efficient
cavalry and about thirty eight thousand
infantry, just from the serious reverses I
have described and the terrible conflict
of Chickamauga. I realized the .necps-
sisy of gathering {. moro effective force
OF cavalry and of augmenting and put
ting in condition the infantry force
which had so long marched to battle
Without en- inspiriting victory before
making an aggressive campaign. My
fear was that before this could be done,
Sherman, who had 100000 men under
his call, all of whom were not, of course,
at Chattanooga, but under his command,
would strike us at Dalton before my ar
rangements were completed.
General Longstreet, with his corps,
although not with me, was to reinforce
the shattered army ] have described.
But the absnrdity Of, III. Davis PROPOSE
,tion to invade Tennessoe the faiIure to
appreciate which, being enc of his griev.
ances, can be seen by thc, fact that to do
so General Longstreet would have to
march from one point by q circuitous
route to the river, and by another, and
there form o junction, he having IN army
on his flank, while I was to leave Shsr.
mans army on my flank or rear and
.nove with a wagon train forty miles
long.
"After General Bragg had been re.
! lieved Of this command, Mr.. Davis took
him to Richmond as one of his advisers
and gave him position, unknown to the
law, of commander-in- chief of the armies
and it was through Bragg that I received
many of these suggestions as to the con.
templated military maneuvres in Tennes,
| see, which MIR. Davis evidently thinks
were brilliant. AS I expected, Genera!
i Sherman attacked me ut Dalton before
could recruit the cavalry and reinforce
! the infantry, and then began tho running
| fight to Atlanta, where / wps relieved ,
BEPoRE AATLAEyA.
"Mr. Davis In his book undertakes tt
prove that you were removed while a
Atlanta because you would not give hin
positive answer as to whether yor
would fight General Sherman there, and
quotes an interview, with Ben Hill Ia
show. that you evaded his catsgorica
question as to whether or not you would
mako battle there.n
4 "Mr.l Davis always kept class of mer
/ about him for witnesses, and Ben Hill
was one of the most prominent of them
Judah p. tBeniamin's duty was to keeI
his record straight. There is not per
son who kRoas anything abont Atlantis
who does not know that it could have
been held to this day against any fore;
that could have been sent against it.
SO informed General Hood when turnet
over the command to him, aud detaile(
L A. Ii Al. Al.