Louisiana capitolian. (Baton Rouge, La.) 1879-1881, 1881-09-08

| that ground DO intrenched, were again
| illustrated here. Buford sent word
laway back to Meade that Reynolds
was dead, and in his opinion, there
was no directing person. Meade Or
dered Hancock to the field with d.
rcctions to take command, and, ifthe
position was good one, he Meade,
would order up the rest Of the army
| When Hancock arrived, after a
mad gallop Of twelve miles, our
troops were falling back in confus-
ed mass from the field through these
streets, and all there was Of order
was n reserve brigade Of Steinwler's
Division, on Cemetery Ridge, with n
battery or two, and Buford's cavalry
fighting as infantry, IN the plain.
Nearly I'LL else was confusion and the
enemy coming on. Hancock soon re-
stored order, took advantage Of the
fine natural position, posted the
troops as they came in, turned over
the command of tho field to SlOCum
when he arrived, returned to Meade's
headquarters ut Taneytown, and re
ported the position good. Our losses
that day we're ten thousand; we had
been driven from the field our new
POSITIONS strength was not then
known to the Confeaerates- the
evening and the morning were the
first day, and they saw that 1t was
good.
SECOND DAY, THURSDAY, JULY2, 1868.
Meade, after Ilancock's report,
dropped rs obsolete the Pipe Creek
line, and gave orders for an imme-
dtate concentration ut Gettysburg,
he himself arriving at | r. NJ, and he
inspected tho position rs well as he
could before daylight and approved
Of it. 1t proved to be u bloody good
one. As the different corps arrived
they were placed with rare Judgment.
Above all else our Army had secured
the defensive, and this was very
great deal. No man who has ever
been soldering in earnest, whether
he wore stars or searched for gray
backs, lived on canned goods or on
hard tack, could stand on Round Top,
Cemetery Ridge, or Culp's Hill, and
not know, see, and appreciate that
tor once we had u position rs was Il
position, aud the Coniederates
thought so too. They felt around
lodg time ; they tried to lure us ont
of it; they badgered Meade to at
tack the wary, long-necked, cool
headed, hard student and good sol
der, with his goggles on, saw his ad-
vantage, stuck to it, and defeated
the enemy before he got through.
A heavy pressure was brought to
bear upon him at headquarters to
mass his troops and plunge through
the enemy's centre; he couldn't see
it. He did think of ordering Slocum,
who commanded on the right, to
take the initiative there, but Slocum
and Warren reported against it, and
that was given up. In the mean
time the men worked like beavers in
throwing up crude breastworks to
strengthen what was already strong.
SiciSle's error in advancing his
troops to'take advantage of rise in
front Pf the general line Gun be seen
by any 1oldier. His anomalous fix did
not become known to Meade till the
afternoon when he (Meade) reached
there, but it was too late to withdraw
him, Us the enemy, about 4 p. NJ,
began the attack. And such an at
tack. Longstreet threw his corps in
by brigades, crowded Sickles and
all who came to reinforce him stead
lily back, fighting like devils against
heavy odds; but our main position
remained unbroken, and the day, in
that part of the field, our left and
their right, ended. We had drawn
heavily from our right to reinforce
our left, and that left our right poor
~ manned. Ewell, taking advan-
tage of this, by u furious rush, got
possession of our lines there and
part of his troops slept within them
that night. And the evening and
tbp OornipU ware thn snronl DIV