Democratic Northwest. [volume] (Napoleon, Ohio) 1869-1894, 1881-03-17
The Veto.
lFron SAs =. 7. Hsraid. !


sent formal objections TO the House in
which il originated or left il 10 the silent
limbo which awaits unsigned bills il Con-
gress adjourns within ten days after their
passage. We think tha President would
have acted more wisely had he left the
Funding Bill to a quiet, natural death
when he found himself unable to approve
il. The veto message, however, suggests
an excuse for staying a measure which
lay in the grasp Of death if let alone, and
for the unexampled promptness with
which the blow was dealt. Il was not
till yesterday morning that President
Hayes received the bill. and at noon his
private secretary was at the Capitol to
deliver the veto message. The explaha-
tion suggested by the President for this
unprecedented haste is his desire that
Congress might substitute another fund
ing bill previous to the final adjourn-
msnt. This excuse is more specious
than convincing. Mr.. Hayes has spent
four years at the head of the government
with little profit if he supposed that Con-
gress would pass new funding bill on
the last day of its existence. 1t could be
done only by the democratic majority,
whom the veto put in no mood to comply
with the wishes of its author. The DEM
ocrats could not adopt the Presidents
recommendation of three and a half
per cent. bond without stultifyipg their
whole course during the session; and they
know how futile it would be to repass the
three per cent. bill without the fifth Sec
ton, since the adoption of that section
was a confession las we have often
shown that three per cent. bonds had lit
tie chance of sale i'll free market. Of
course President Hayss did not expect
new funding bill to go through both
houses on the last day of the session.
There was no good reason for his swift
ness to strike, nor even for veto al all.
since the Funding Bill was dead enough
by his simple refusal to sign it. The
more quiet method would have satisfied
the opponents of the bill and have given
no handle to its supporters.
1t was injudicious for the President,
without any necessity, to step forth into
the arena as champion of the national
banks after the recent demonstration of
their tremendous power to derange the
business of the country. 1t will be
charged by their assailants that they are
not only strong enough suddenly to un-
settle all values and create panic, but
to control the President of the United
| States and induce him to act in their in
terest with haste and zeal such as never
before have been Inhibited in yetoing a
bill passed by Congress. We do not i'm
pute motives. but merely indicate what
is likely to be said by the adversaries of
the national banks. We have not the
least shade of suspicion that President
Hayes has acted from any other motive
than sincere regard for the public well
fare; but he has acted impulsively. pre-
cipitately, without the deliberate and
cautious circumspection which benefits
his great station. When it would have
suficed to let the Funding Bill expire
with the session why need he have done
more?
The effects of the fifth session of the
bill, on which alone the President rests
his veto, have been exaggerated by the
national banks. For the first ten years of
their existence they had no such privilege
of redeeming their circulation by mere
deposit as would have been taken from
them by the vetoed bill. The act of 1874
was not passed to favor the banks, but to
protect the public. There having been
no practical redemption of bank notes
during the first ten years Congress made
provision for it in the act of 1874, and,
being intent on the main purpose, did not
sufficiently guard the method against
possible abuse. Its weak side was first
disclosed in the Wall street furry. 1t
was then demonstrated that the national
banks mo matter whether with or with
out concert) can suddenly depress values
to any extent they please, carrying the
rates of interest up to three or four hum
dred per cent. a year, and that the only
remedy for such calamity Is the bad
remedy of manipulating the currency by
the Secretary of the Treasuary. Such
possibilities should not exist. If we con-
cede that the banks acted in self defence
without combination, that would not dis
prove the power of the banks to produce
similar and greater disasters by combina-
ton. When they have been proved to
possess so much dangerous power the
business of the country cannot safely be
left to their forbearance. They must be
restrained by the strong hand of the law.
While they should have every reasonable
facility for withdrawing their circulation
they must not be allowed to do it without
proper notice nor without precautions
against distress and panic. Their present
stupendous power to put on the screws is
intolerable i'll free country and must
be put under wholesome restrictions,
which equally guard the convenience of
the banks and the rights Of the people.
We will not undertake to say where the
line should be drawn-that is question