Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1881-12-24

to resist this application They hav
not had justice dealt to them in tn
court below and have appealed to thi
court for redress. Such is their CLAIM
by their appeal. The presumption i
that every man for an injury done hin
or threatened against him desires t.
have justice administered to him with
out sale, denial or delay. Delay in af
fording relief for grievance com
planned of, constitutes certainly no lie
gitimate part of his redress. Delay i:
sometimes necessary even in a court
i of last resort however, to the COM
| plete administration of justice, as fol
instance from the intervention Of some
fact between the decision Of the lower
ceurg and the time for hearing in the
superior one. This must appear by
affidavit, and will of course receive at
tention by the court Nothing of the
kind is presented or pretended here
But this may be all true and yet the
court may hear suggestions from any
quarter in regard to its powers and
the exercise of them, its duties and
their obligation. The suggestion,
therefore, of complainant's counsel up
on these matters will be considered
and dealt with by the court according
to their merits.
The only parties, or persons, who
would seem to have a right to COM
plain of an Advancement of this cause
are the other litigants upon the docket,
the hearing of whose causes may be
DELAYED by the interiection of this one.
So far as we know these itigants do
not object, nor do we know in what
form indeed they could do so.
This court will always, however, it
is to be hoped, when matters touching
it's powers and duties are properly
brought to its attention, give them due
consideration, and we are of the opin-
| ion that there has been no impropri-
ETY. in the manner in which these
| questions are now presented
What, then, in absence of positive
restriction by statute, or controlling
| course of decision, would be the pow
er of this court in regard to the order
of business on its dockets? The court
would unquestionably have the power
to try any case brought here by appeal
at any time it should think proper,
giving the parties due time for prep
aration, and there being no legal
grounds for postponement or contin-
uance, except that the case was not
regularly reached on the docket. This
last would be no ground of objection,
so far as the parties were concerned,
even if the court should act caprici-
ously. The mere suggestion that
something might occur IN the future
that would be beneficial or disastrous
to the one or the other by trying the
cause out of its order, would demand
no consideration from the court. This
inherent power of the court should
not, however, be exercised capriciOusly
in reference to the rights OF other llti-
gants, if there were nothing in the
cause proposed to be advanced to dis
| tinguish it in character from other
causes. Such a course in court
would deserve public censure, however
valid its action might be in the cause
thus advanced, or proposed to be ad-
vanced The position here taken, we
think, cannot be successfully assailed.
| If, then, there has been no direct
limitation of this power by statute and
no controlling course or decision as a
guide to the mode of its exercise, we
shall only be left to say in the case be-
| fore us whether it is of sufficient pub
lie importance to offer valid reason
to other suitors for short delay in
| the hearing of their causes while this
can be disposed of. Natural justice
and the tendency OF our legislation
have been toward giving litigant a
| right to have his cause heard in its or
der in the time of his appeal. But
this is not a vested right. 1t has no
| mode of assertion and is subject to be
postponed to more urgent considera-
| tions. No statute has so far affected
/ the inherent power OF the court above
referred to as to require that at all
events causes shall be tried in their
order on the docket. The court have
| examined the sections of the code re-
! ferred to in the argument as possibly
having some bearing upon the lmme-
diate question now under examination,
but none of them reach it, and they
| do not demand discussion. None OF
them undertake to regulate the order
| in which causes shall be taken up
when the docket of any particular
county is before the court. We cite
them, however, that they may be look
ed into if desired by the curious or
hypercritical: Code, sec. 4505a, 45O5a;
sects. 2845 ct seq, as to the lower courts;
sec. 1904 authorizing this court to
make rules and the case upon it OF
Foster VS.. Buren,, Heisk. 784
The cases presented from the decls-
| ion of the supreme court of the Uni
ted States, pro and con, have been
looked to, but nothing has been found
in them bearing by way OF restriction
upon the inherent power above claim
ed for this court.
So far as the decisions of the su-
preme court of this State in the time
past are concerned, the old case of
| ChriSman VS.. Curl has been referred
| to, and it WouA1 seem to favor the idea
that the disposition of causes in courts
was at the discretion of the judges
The cases of York VS.. Gaines and of
Keith vs. Clark Gas stated by counsel,
| for no reference to them has been fur
nished to the court) seem to have been
confined wholly to the construction OF
the act of 1871, ch. 125, and to have no
bearing upon the question of the in
herent power of the court now under
consideration. No doubt seems to ex-
list that this inherent power is posses
sed and exercised by the English court
of chancery. See 2 Dan1 Ch. Pl., S71.
Indeed it is difficult to conceive how,
in all the exigencies OF society and
government a court of last resort
could answer fully the purposes of its
creation without the possession OF such
an inherent and discretionary power.
The very fact that statutes have been
passed regulating in some particulars
the order of business in courts, is an
admission that otherwise this order
would be at the legal, not capricious,
discretion of the judges.
In this connection it may not be I'M
proper to take some notice of the act OF
1S71, chapter 125. 1t has been slightly
argued that this act, even admitting
that the court previously possessed an
unlimited discretionary power as to
the advancement of causes, defines the
power to be thereafter possessed by
the court, and excludes all other pow
er on the subject Now, it is manifest
on the face of this act that it is only
intended to make that duty of the
court which was before but a matter Of
discretion. 1t is not an enaqling stat
ute, but a mandatory one; there are in
it no words of limitation or restriction.
The rule, expressio unius, exclusio al
terius, has here no application.
IF then this court has the inherent
discretionary power, which from the
above considerations it would seem
that ithas, the question still remains. Is
this aproper case forts exercise? Is the
cause of such public importance as to