The National tribune., 1881-10-15

less to maintain their fire from where they were
| had advanced several batteries and parts of
batteries in this way when Picketts division APP
peared on the slope of Cemetery HILL and a con-
siderable force of the enemy were thrown out
attacking his unprotected right flank Mean
while, too, several batteries which had been
withdrawn were run out again and were firing on
him heavily. We opened on these troops and
batteries fiercely as we were able, and appeared
to do them considerable damage, but meanwhile
Picketts division seemed to melt away in the
blue musketry smoke which now covered the
hill. Nothing but stragglers came back. As
soon as it was clear Pickett's division was de
strOyed, | ceased firing saving what little am
munition was left for fear Of an advance by the
enemy. About this time General Lee came up to
our guns alone, and remained there half an
hour or more, speaking to Pickett's men as they
came struggling back and encouraging them to
form again in the first cover they could find.
\ little before this, WilcOx's division had been
advanced also, but | cannot recall the moment or
the place | saw them but only the impression on
my mind as the men passed that the charge must
surely be some misapprehension of ORDERS as the
circumstances at that moment made it utterly
impossible that it should accomplish anything
and | thought what a pity it was so many of
them were to be sacrificed in vain. It was in
tended, | believe that Wilcox should support
Pickett's right flank, but the distance that had
to be traversed in the charge got such an inter
val between the two that Pickett'S force was
spent and his division dsintegrated before Will
got under close fire. | have always believed
that the enemy here lost the greatest opportunity
they ever had of routing Lees army by prompt
offensive. They occupied line shaped some
what like a horseshoe. | suppose the greatest
diameter of this horseshoe was not more than
one mile, and the ground within was entirely
sheltered from our observation and fire, with
communications by signals all over it, and they
could concentrate their whole force at any point
and in very short time, without our knowledge.
Our line was an envelOping semi-circle, over four
miles in development, and communication from
flank to flank, even by courier, was difficult the
country being well cleared and exposed to the
enemys view and fire. the roads all running at
right angles to our lines, and some of them at
least broad turnpikes where the enemys guns
could rake for two miles. Is it necessary now to
add any statement as to the superiority Of the
Federal force, or the exhausted and shattered
condition of the COnfederates for a space of at
least mile in their very center, to show that q
great opportunity was thrown away? I think
General Lee himself was quite apprehensive the
enemy would ri pOste,' and that it was that APP
prehension which brought him alone out to my
guns where he could observe all the indications.
We waited on the ground we had chosen for
an attack, but we were not molested. The eAe-
my about dark sent out skirmsh line, and oc-
casionally sent random shot in the direction OF
our batteries but effort was made to capture