The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1881-01-16

"A peudfug cause IN that court anu JUS
been dec,oed by that court tthe refusn! Of
the writ being considered 40 sfhrmaoce o.
the Judgment beiowl and the mandate OF
aAirmance or reversal viii be directed 10
that court.
But II the petition be rejected by the
Judges out of court, and the cause OF relec-
ton be stated to be that the Judgment com
plained Of IL "plainly right" aud ,ne case
be taken IN the Supreme C0t'rf, tnen tne
writ OF error from that court y not d''
rected 10 the Court Of Appeals, ana bas
nothing to do with that court, Du'
Ia directed TO the court In winch
the Judgment was originally ,en'
dcred. and the mandate OF ,ffirmnnce OF
reversal will be directed 10 that court.
The reason assigned for this distinction and
difference is that the jurisdiction OF the
Supreme Court Il 10 review the acton OF
The high, st court In the State having Jars
diction Of The cause, and that after the retec'
ton by the Judges Of the Court OF Appc1l-
out Of court Of a petition for the writ OF
error or appeal In the manner above slateh,
no petition can then be presented TO tue
Court OF Appeals in session for the same
purpose, and therefore that courl
then has no jurisdiction OF the cause,
and the highest court In the Statt
which has jurisdiction II the conrl
In which the judgment was rendered
Whatever may he thought OF the suificiency
of the reason thus assigned for this differ
ence I'm the manner in which the supreme
Court acquires Jurisdiction and the dil1'r-
ence Of me courts in The Stale over when
that jurisdiction Is acquired, The fact oil
such difference is settled and established.
IN Gregory Us. McVeigb, and also In WIND
sor rs. McNeigh, the petition tas in the pre-
SEMI easel was addressed 10 the JudgeS OF
The court and not to the Court OF Appeals.
and was acted upon by the judges out OF
court, while the court was sitting at WSthe-
Vile, IN a district not embracing Alexandra,
where the cases had been decided. and the
petition was rejected by all the judges be-
cause the judgment below was considered
tn be "2lainIy right" and that was en-
dorsed as the reason for the rejection.
Upon application OF the defendant in each
case. writ OF error was awarded from the
Supreme Court, directed to the Corporation
Court OF Alexandria. The counsel for
McVeigb (who was plaintiff in the
court below moved the Supreme Court TO
dismiss the wrifS, upon the ground that
they were directod TO the wrong court, and
that instead If having been directed TO the
|
the State having jurisdiction of the
cause, the writs were directed To the
Corporation Court Of Alexandria. IN
which final judgments had been rendered,
and which had thereby exercised ADD eX-
hlusted its jurisdiction. exc 'pt upon Affirm
auce or reversal of its judgment by the
Court OF Appeals 10 enter the judgment OF
that court and take order accordingly.
ha mi of ho nj dol
! the present able ana respected Chef JUS
tice. and it 80 clearly states the law and
| illustrates the mode in which this case
might properly have been taken TO The Su.
pieme Court. but was not, that full eX
tract will he Given: 1.-THE Court Of AD-
peaIs has revsory jurisdiction over The
judgments OF The Corporation Court OF tbe
city OF Alexandra, but plrtIes are not PEI
mited IN the class OF cases to which this
belongs to take such judgments there for
review as matter OF right. Leave for
that puIp6>e must first he obtained. Two
modes OF obtaining this leave are provided
One by petition 10 the Court Of Appeals
Itself, and The other by petition to a
Judge thereof. II the petition is pre-
Sented TO Judge and be denies
il generally, without more, il may
be again presented to the court. But if the
Judge TO whom the apple ltien is made,
hall deem the judgment. &C., plainly
right and reject 1t on that ground. II the
order OF rejection shall so state, no other
petiiiOn shall afterwards be presented 10 the
same purpose. The parties are left free to
present their petitions To the court or to a
Judge thereof, a. they may find 1t most con-
yenient or desirable.
lit has long been settled that il cause
cannot be taken 10 the highest court OF a
State, except by leave Of the court ITSELF, Il
refusal of the court upon proper applca-
ton made TO grant the leave is equivalent 10
judgment Of affirmarce, and l. such final
Judgment as may be made The basis OF
proceedings under the appellate iurisdlc-
ZION OF this cOurr.-Railroad Company Us.
Railroad Company, 10 Howard, 80.
"In the present case the Court OF Appeals
has now no power TO review the judgment
of the court below. IL cannot even enter
tam motion for leave TO proceed. A
judgment has been rendered by the highest
court Of the Stale in which a decision
can he had. The Court OF Appeals
nas never, in fact, had jurisdiction. A
suit cannot he taken there, except upon
leave, and that leave has. in the regular
order Of proceeding, been refused in this
case. From tins refusal there can be no
appeal. Everything has been done that can
be to effect the transfer OF the cause. The
rejection Of a petition BY one judge does
not prevent lis presentation TO another.
Here the petition has been presented TO
each and every one OF the judges, and they
have all rejected it because the Judgment
was plainly right Thus the doors Of the
Court OF Appeals have been forever closed
against the suit not through neglect, but
in the regular order OF proceeding under
he law governing the practice.
eve think, therefore, that the judgment
Of the Corporation Court OF the city OF Alex
andra is the judgment OF ihe highest court
in the State in which a decision OF the
suit could be bad, and that we may re-
examine it upon error" Gregory Us.
McVeigh, % Wall, 3O5; and iurisdic-
ton being assumed, tue case reaDpeaIs
and is reported in SO u. 5. r., 284,
where the judgment OF the Corp0i alton
Court was affirmed; and see the like case
Of Windsor Us. McVeigh, 90 U. S. r page
pa, where the same mode OF procedure
was adopted with the like results;
and the mandates Of affirmance were
sent down to the Corporation Court.
The plaintiffs, therefore, under the statutes
OF Virginia, had two modes in which TO
take their case TO the Court OF Appeals, and
two modes in which TO take their case to
the Supreme Court. But by the same
statute tue period in which this could be
done was two years from the rendition OF
the judgment against them in the court be-
low. After that time the appellate iurisdic-
ton ceased even 10 receive a petition for
the writ, as has been shown and tue writ,
il granted, must be dismissed. Code 1873,
ch. 17S, 3 and ~.