New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1881-09-24

TITO OH CAvp lions

An old letter from General Joseph +.
Johnston, late of the rebel army, has just
been published giving his reasons for
conducting the Atlanta campaign of 1864
wholly on the Fabian policy. The letter
was written very shortly after the close
iof that campaign, aud is valuable not
only because freshly written while the facts
were clear in his memory, but for the reason
that it was inditcd before the full results of
the campaign III Shermans March to the
Sea were reaped could be fcreseen.
II is, moreover, invaluable in that it clearly
points out the constant dangers to which Shcr-
mans army was exposed, and the great dill
cultcs which it had to overcome. The follow
ing paragraph of General JohustOn's letter is
well worth quoting here:
The relative strength Of Shcrman's army and mine
made the chances of victory. we attacked, in his
favor At Dalton he had fortified pass close in his
place OF refuge In Of mishap In MOVING
south he advanced forfyng and therefore nways had
an tntrcnchec position close behind him. Victory could
not have been decided for under such circumstances
lille defeat would have been ruin0us We therefore
kept near him to take advantage any exposure OF
himself that he might make, but he made none of gen
era haricter such "a would have Justified battle and
repealed his almost daily partial assaults with rinne
loss, while he all sueh occasions suffered heavily
We fell back before him ninetyhreo miles in seventy
days The losses was about 10 600 uis
we estimated NJ i've times as much--lrom the opinions
OF experienced officers reports of prisoners taken daily
and statements OF Northern papers Ths course II con
tnucd, would sCon have reduced the disparity ~
numbers give the advantage in battle; and # We
could have defeated the enemy this side of the Chat
tahoochcc, his destruction was certain. | therefore
thought and stil think, my plan operation correct
lt is u capital summary of what was prob-
ably the most difficult and the least known
campaign of all the war. 1t was characterized
by no great battle; it was n campaign of
manmuvres, and none of the frequent combats
OF divisions and corps of the armies which
were brought into contact by flank extensions
ana night marches attained to the dignity of
"a pitched battle. 1t was q constant fusilnde
OF small arms and duels of artillery for over
a hundred days--seventy- two General Johnston
says but he speaks only of the time previous
to his removal. For the reason, probably. that
its salient points are not many and its Incl.
dents not marked, the campaign of At
lanta has never had its due need of
praise.
The March to the Sea was n holiday
parade compared to the Advance ON Atlanta
Its only combat was the assault of HAGEN an
the Tort at Savannah, and that was simnIv
recreation for his old veterans; while from
the first combat of McPherson's corps with
Johnston's rear at Resaca, until tho fiank;nc
forces OF our right wing literally ran over
Hardee's corps twenty miles below Atlanta
and forced its evacuation, there were at least
ten minor engagements each of which was more
serious than the single one before Savannah.
During the hundred days Advance on Atlanta
the soldiers slept on their arms, and the pickets
lived in gopher holes, above which they hardly
burst raise their heads for fear of the enemy's
sharpshooters. On the March to the Sea they
carried their muskets at ease; the march was
much what we would now call go-as-you-
please affair. and gopher holes were oxchan ged
for the softest beds In the faircst mansions of