The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1881-12-12
THE oH1LrAN DIFFICULTY.
Secretary Blanca Instructions 20 Our
Ministers to Chill and Peru.

Stats with the approval OF the President
WASHINGTON, May 9. 1881.
j. p. Christidncy, Esq, etc., ETC., Lima.
Sir-In your last despatch you informed this
department. that the Gillian government re-
fused absolutely to recognize Gen. Pierola as
representing civil authority in Peru. and that
Senior Calderon was at the head Of the
provisional government. If the Calderon
government is supported BY the character
and intelligence Of Peru and Y really
government with q view both to do
nestle order and negotiation with Chilli for
peace you may recognize 1t as the existing pro-
Visional government and render what aid you
can by advice and good offices to that end.
Gilmore has been received by me as conhden-
am, sir, ETC.,
JAS. G.. BLAINE.
[Note.--In pursuance of this instruction,
Christiancy on the 26th Of June, 1881. formally
recognized the Calderon government, several
weeks In advance of the arrival of Gen. Hurl-
burt at Lima.
WASHINGTON, d. c., June Is.
Stephen A. H1rlbslrt Esq, etc.
Sir-The deplorable condition OF Peru, the
disorganization of Its government and the
absence of precise and trustworthy infor mation
as to the state of affairs now existing IN that
unhappy country renders it impossible TO give
you instructions as full and definite as l would
desire Judging from the most recent des-
patches from our ministers you will probably
find on the part of the Gillian authorities In
possession Of Peru willingness to facilitate the
establishment Of the provisional government
which has been attempted by Senior Calderon.
III 30, you will do all you properly can to eu-
courage the Peruvians to accept any reasonable
conditions and limitations with which this
concession may be accompanied. 1t IS
vitality important to Peru that she
ba allowed to resume the functions of ma
k~ft,f aNf
poses of internal administration and the nego-
tiation of peace. To obtain this end 1t would be
far better to accept conditions which may
be hard and unwelcome than by demanding
too much to forcs the continuance OF the mill
tary control Of Chill. 1t Is hoped that you
the Chillan authorities to impress upon them
that the more liberal and conservative their
policy the surer 1t will be to obtain q lasting
and satisfactory settlement.
The Peruviaps are certainly aware of the
sympathy and interest IF the people of the
United States, and will. feel confident. be
prepared to give to your representations ii Q
consideration 70 which the friendly anxiety of
this Government entities them. The United
States cannot refuse to recognize the rights
which the Gillian Government has acquired
by the successes Of the war, and 1t may be that
a cession of territory will be the necessary
price to be paid for peace. 1t would seem to be
injudicious for Peru to declare that under no
circumstances could the loss OF territory be
accepted as the result Of negotiation. The
great objects of the provisio lal authorities of
Peru would seem to be to secure the establish
ment of a constitutional government, and
next to succeed in the opening of negotia-
tions for peace without the declaration
of preliminary conditions, as an ultimatum on
either side. 1t will be difficult, perhaps, to
obtain this from Chill, but as the CHILEAN gov
eminent has distinctly repudiated the idea
that this was a war of conquest the govern
ment of Peru may fairly claim the opportunity
10 make proposition Of indemnity and guar
antee before submitting TO q. cession of terrific
ry. AS far as the influence of the United
States will go in Chill, 1t will be exerted to In
duce the Gillian government to consent that
the question of the cession of territory should
be the subject of litigation, and not the condi-
ton precedent upon which alone negotiation
shall commence. II you can aid the govern
ment of Peru in securing such result you
will have rendered the service which seems
most pressing Whether 1t is in the power Of
the Peruvian government to make any ar.
rangement, at home or abroad, singly or with
the assistance of friendly powers which will
furnish the necessary indemnity or supply the
required guarantee, you will be better able to
advise me, after you have reached your post,
as YOU are aware more than one proposition
has been submitted to the consideration of this
government, looking to a friendly intervention
by which Peru might be enabled to meet the
conditions which would probably be imposed.
circumstances do not seem, at present. oppor-
tune for such action, but II, upon full knowl-
edge of the condition OF Peru YOU can inform
this government that Peru can devise and car
nv into practical effect a plan by which all the
reasonable conditions of Chill can be met with
out sacrificing the integrity of Peruvian terri
tory, the government OF the United States
would be willing to tender its offices toward
the execution OF such project. As strictly
confidential communication, | enclose you a
copy of instructions sent this day to the United
States Minister at Santiago. You will thus be
advised of the position which the government
assumes toward all the parties to this
ed States to act in spirit of the sincerest fde-
ity to the three republics and SO use its intiu-
ence solely in the interest OF an honorable and
lasting peace. am, sir, etc,
JAS. g. BLAINE.
WARRINGTON, June 10, 1881.
.Judson Fitzpatrick, ETC.:
Sir-Tbe unfortunate condition of the rea-
ton between Chill and Peru makes the mis-
sion upon the duties of which you are now en-
tering one of great responsibility and great
dhlicacy. Difficult rs would be any iDterven-
ton Of the United States under ordinary r
cnmstances,o our position Is further embarrassed
by the failure of the conference at africa UNI
dertaken at our suggestion. 1t Is evident from
the protocols Of that conference that Chill was
prepared 70 dictate and not to
discuss terms OF peace. and that
the arbitration of the United States upon any
onestions of difference with the allied powers
Of Peru and Bolivia was not acceptable, and
would not be accepted BY the CHILEAN Gov
ernmept, Since that time the war has closed
in the complete success OF Chill, and In what
can scarcely be considered less than the con-
ouest of Peru and Bolivia This Government
cannot. therefore anticipate the offer of friend
Iy intervention in the settlement OF the very
serious questions now pending would be agree
able to the Government OF Chilli. 1t would
scarcely comport with self respect That such an
offer should be refused, and it would be OF no
benefit TO Peru and Bolivia that 1t should be
offered and declined. But ] am sure the Chill
ian Government will appreciate the natural
and deem interest which the United States
feels in the termination of condition so ca
lamitous in Its consequences TO the Dest Inter
ests of all the South American republics Il
should also know that II at any time the inter-
ms; ion of the good offices of this Government
can contribute to the restoration OF friendly re-
lations between the belligerent powers they
will, upon proper intimation, be promptly o.
fered. While, therefore, no instructions are
given you to tender officially sny advice to the
Government OF Chit which is unsought, you
will, on such opportunity as may occur,
govern your condact and representations BY
the considerations to which shall now call
YOUR attention. Without entering upon any
discussion as to the causes OF the late war pc
tween Chill on the one side and Peru and Bo-
liyia on the other, this Government recognizes
the right which the successful conduct OF that
war has conferred upon Chill, and In doing so
7 will not undertake to estimate the extent to
which the Gillian Government has the right TO
carry its calculations of the indemnities to
which it is entitled, nor the security Tor the
future which its interest may seem to require.
But il the CHILEAN government as Its represent
tatiyes have declared, seeks only guarantees
of future peace, 1t would eeem natural that
Perm and Bolivia should be allowed to offer
such indemnity or guarantee before the annexa-
ton of territory which ia the right OF conquest
is insisted upon Ifthese powers fail to offer what
is a reasonable, sufficient indemnity and guaran-
tee. h nj tecomes a fair subject OF constdera-
ton whether such territory may not be exacted
as the necessary price of peace. But al the
conclusion of war, avowedly not OF conquest,
hut for the solution OF differences which dipio-
macy had failed to settle, to make acquisition
of territory sine qua non OF peace IS calculate
ed to cast suspicion upon the professions with
which the war was originally declared. 1t
NAV very we'll be that at the termination OF
such a contest the changed condition and rela-
ton of all the parties to it may make read
instment of boundaries and territorial changes
wise, as we'll as necessary; but this, when the
war is not one of conquest, should Do the re-
suit of negotiation, aud not the absolute pre-
Iiminary condition on which alone the victor
should consent to negotiate At this day,wn
the right of the people to govern themselves.
the fundamental basis of republican lnstltu-
lions, is SO widely recognized, there 10 nothing
more difficult or more dangerous than the
forced transfer Of territory, carrying with u an
indignant and hostile population. and mourning
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