The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1881-06-23

men and productive territory.
20. To prevent the waste of the army
incident TO inactivity.
"6. TO inspirit the troops and the
country by success and discourage the
enemy.
~. To ohys6te The necessity of falling
back, which might probably occur If our
antagonist be allowed to consummate
his plans without molestatiop.
Gen. Johnston cordially approved of
an aggressive movemsisFs AH5s Informed
mo OF his purpose 10 maze 1t as soon as
reipfoTcesnents and supplies, then on The
way, should reach him. He d,ll a,. ap-
prove Of the proposed advance into
Tennessee. He believed that the Fed.
erai forces in Tennessee were not weaker.
but If anything stroDg,r, than ut Mie.
sionary Ridge; that defeat beyond the
Tennessee would probably prove ruinous
to US, resulting in the loss Of l,is army.
the occupation of Georgia by the enemy,
the piercing of the Confederacy in lis
vitals,' and the loss of all the Eoutbwes.
tern Territory. He proposed, therefore.
to stand on the defensive until strength
ened; to watch, prepare, and strike as
soon as possible AS soon as reinforced
he declared his purpose to advance to
kinggold, attack there, and, if successful,
as he expected to be, 10 strike at Cleve.
land, cut the railroad, control the river,
and thus isolate East Tennessee, and as
q consequence, force his antagonist to
give battle on this side Of the Tennessee
River. 10 enable Gen. Johnston to re-.
pulse the hostile advance and assume the
offensive, no effort was spared on the
part OF the Government. Almost all the
available military strength Of the South
ana west, IN men and supplies was
pressed forward and placed at his dispo-
sal. The supplies Of the commisaary,
quartermaster, and ordinance depart.
ment of his army were represented as
ample and suitably located. The troops.
encouraged by the large accessions OF
strength which they saw arriving daily.
aud which they knew were march;rg
rapidly to their support, were eager to
advance and confident in their power TO
achieve victory aud recover the territory
which they had lost. Their position was
such as to warraut the confident expec.
tation OF successful resistance at least.
Long mountain ranges penetrated by few
and difficult roads and paths and deep
ana wide rivers, seemed to render our
position one from which we could not be
dlslodged or turned, while that of the
enemy. dependent for supplies upon
single line of railroad from Nashville to
the point where he was operating, was
manifestly perilous. The whole country
shared the hope which the government
entertained, that decisive victory would
soon be won in the mountains of Geor.
gia, which would free the South and
West f.om invasion, would open to our
occupation and support of our armies
the productive territory of Tennessee
and Kentucky, and 30 recruit our army
in the West as TO render it impracticable
for the enemy to accumulate additional
forces in Virginia"
After detailing retreat after retreat of
Johnston with his splendid army of
nearly seventy thousand men from the
strongest positions to be had, the author
says: --
whether the superior numerical
strength of the enemy, by enabling him
to extend his force beyond the flank of
ours, did thereby necessitate the aban-
donment OF every position taken by our
army, and whether the enamy, declining
to assault any of our intrenched camps.
would have veniured to leave Il in rear.
upon his only line of communication
and supply. or whether we might have
obtained more advantageous results by d
viSorous and determined effort to isttack
him in detail during some sof his army
nank movements, are questions upon
which there has been q decided conflict
OF opinion and upon which it would be
ior me now neither useful nUf pleasant
to enter. When it became known that
the Army of Tennessee had been succeE.
eively driven from one strong position
to another unit, finally it had reached
The earth. works constructed for the ex.
terror defence of Atlanta, the popular
disappointment was extreme. The nos.
sible tall of the Gate City, with its i'm.
pOrtant railroad communication. vast
bteres, factories for the manufacture of
ell sorts of military supplies, rolling
mills aud 1oundries, was now contempla.
TED Tor the first time at its full value, and
produced intense anxiety far and wide.
From many quarters, including such as
had most urged his assignment, came
delegations, petitions and letters urging
me TO remove Gen. johnston from the
command of the army and assign that
Important trust TO some officer who would
resoluteiy hold and defend Atlanta
While sharing in the keen disappoint-
inent st. the failure of the campaign
whichsperyaded the whole country / was
perhgps more apprehensive than others
OF the disasters likely to result from it,
because was in position to estimate
more accurately their probable extent.
= Still resisted the stead.
lily increasing pressure which was brought
to bear to induce me to revoke his as.
signment, and only issued the order re.
lieving him from command when be.
camo satisfied that his declared purpose
to occupy the works at Atlanta with
militia levies and withdraw his army
into the open country for freer operations
would inevitably result in the loss of
that important point. aud where the re-.
treat would cease could not be foretoid.
If the Army of Tennessee was found to
be ueable to hold positions of great
ai irAngth lie those 9. DDsS!!ssGafs, TIssssaoF.
Etowab, sKennesaw and on the Chstta.
hoochc / could not reasonably hope that
it would be more successful in the plains
below Atlanta, where &c would find
neither natural nor artificial advantages
of position"
ATTACK ON sHERMAN.
Abiding TO Sherman's order that ell
civilians, male and female, living in at.
lanta must leave it within FIVE DAYS from
the Issuance Of the order, Mr. Davis
says:
"Since Alva's atrocious crnelties 10
tho non combatsnt population of the
Low Countries, in the sixteenth century,
the history of war records no instance or
such haFbarous cruelty as that which