Louisiana capitolian. (Baton Rouge, La.) 1879-1881, 1881-09-10
lay. Artillery fire at such distance

age. 1t may demoralize green troop
. but men who have heard such racke
: before know how to take care O
: themselves the day has gone b,
} when armies are put to rout b,
breaking pitchers, blowing trumpets
. and holding up lamps. Lee PLACED
along his lines by noon one hundred
and forty five guns. Meade had il
position but eighty, and the scream
of shot and shell and the roar o
guns lasted two hours, This two
hours fire showed a peculiar char
acteristic in each army the fiery i'm.
petuosity of the Confederates and the
GOODNESS of our men. They wasted
tremendous amount of ammunition
in random firing; our firing was
slower, surer, more like target prac-
tlce. Better soldiers never marched
or fought than were in both armies
from 1861 to 1865; there was this
general difference the Southern
troops would come into action with
o whoop, q scream, q yell, load and
fire fast and wild, and empty their
cartridge-b boxes in few minutes
the Northern troops were cooler,
slower, and better for a long pull.
The Confederates, thinking their
heavy bombardment had prepared
the way, formed their column of as
sault, consisting of about fifteen
thousand men, and started on the
charge. 1t had to march over a
space of some fourteen hundred
yards, in plain view and exposed to
our artillery fire all the way, but this
did not stay its steady advance an
instant. 1t approached to within a
couple hundred yards of our lines,
when it received terrible punish
ment from our musketry, that tore it
sadly, but, with q loud yell, chock
full of vim and vermin, it's survivors
rushed upon our works and guns,
where, after short but severe strug-
gle, it was rcpulsed with awful
slaughter. And the evening and the
morning were the third day, and we
saw that it was good.
OBSERVATIONS.
ThisSbadly managed battle on the
part OF Gen, Lee was always terribly
chagrinning to that sedate and proud
spirited man. He felt and knew that
his errors here were not only great
injury to his cause, but they we're
heavy blow to his professional repu-
tatlon. Gen. Ewell told the writer in
Baltimore after the war that the
charge of the third day was Cool
ish thing and "that the fighting an
offensive battle away up there was
nonsense" Longstreet almost i'm
plored Lee not to order that charge. |
The second day was one of errors too.
The Adjutant General of his Army
says of this day "The whole affair
was disjointed. There was an utter
absence Of accord in the movements
If the several commands, and no de-
'isive results attended the operations
If the second day. This charge was
Is hopeless as the charge at Malvern
Hill. Men are but men. A soldier
not a steam engine or a mule.
There is limit to human endurance
nd possibilities, and it is the duty
# General in command to know
nd figure on that fact. It is the veri-
st fudge to try to throw on Long
treets shoulders the failure of the
bird day--to blame him for not put
ing in his whole corps. Such ,
,ovoment would have left the right
ing of the Confederate army expos
d, or rather left that army without
right wing at all. Lee was on the
cid, within immediate view and Or
ers; is it to be supposed that if 7
ongstreet had disobeyed the world !
ould not have known it right then
I'd there? Lee said to Wilcox: "This
all my fault" Did he not tender
s resignation to jeff. Davis imme-
ately after9 Was thele not much
in his army? 1t is a mis- +
Ike to suppose, as many do, that he y
lily was the Southern ideal of a Gen
nj. Even in his nativn St,+o ~