Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1881-06-10
~aslcasler f,ltelliQencer.
FRIDAY EVENING, JUNE 10. 1881.
The krt OF War,


regular toast, "The benefit Of judicious
training" Mr.. Samuel L. Clemmens,
(Mark Twain) responded as follows:
..Iot but the thoughtful civilian instruct
the soldier in his duties, and tho victory Is
Of War.
Mn. CHAIRMAN: gladly join with my
fellow-townsmen in extending a hearty
welcome to these illustrious generals and
these war -scarrei soldiers Of the republic.
This is proud day for US, and, if the sim
ccre desire Of our hearts has been full
filed it has not been an unpleasant day
for them. l am iu full accord, sir, with
the sentiment of the toast, for I have al
ways maintained with enthusiasm that the
only wise and true way is for the soldier to
fight the battle and the unprejudiced
civilian to tell him how to do it. Yet
when I was invited to respond to this toast
and furnish this advice and instruction, /
was almost ~ much embarrassed as was
gra,ified, for could bring to this great
service but the one virtue of absence of
prejudice and set opinion. Still, but one
other qualification was needed and it was
of only minor importance. mean knOwl-
edge of the subject. Therefore l was not
disheartened, for I could acquire that,
there being two weeks to spare. A gener-
al of high rank in this army of the Poto-
mac said two weeks was really more than I
would need for the purpose. He had
known people Of my style who had learned
enough in 48 hours to enable them to ad-
wise an army. Aside from the compli
ment, this was gratifying, because
it confirmed an impression l had had
before. He told me to 60 to the United
States military academy at West Point and
said in his aowery professional way that the
cadets would "load me up" l went
there and staid two days, and his predic-
ton proved correct. make no boast on
my own account-none. All | know
about military matters l got from the
gentlemen at West Point and to them be-
longs the credit. They treated me with
courtesy from the first, but when my mis-
sion was revealed, this nero courtesy bios
somed into warmest zeal. Everybody,
officers and all, put down their work and
turned their whole attention to giving me
military information. Every question
asked was promptly and cxhaustively
answered; therefore, I feel proud to
state that in the advice which am about
to give you as soldiers, am backed up by
the highest military authority in the land
yes, in the world, if an American does
say it-West Point.
To begin, gentlemen, when an engage
ment is meditated, il is best to feel the
enemy first, that is, if it is night, for, as
one of the cadets explained to me, you do
not need to feel him in the day time, be-
cause you can see him then. l never
should have thought Of that, but It is true
perfectly true. In tho day-t the
methods of procedure are various, but the
best, it seems to me, is one which was in
troduced by Gen. Grant. Gen. Grant a.
ways sent an active young man rcdoubt to
rcconnOitre and get the encny's bearings.
got this from high officer at the Point,
who told me he used to be a redOubt on
Gen. Grants staff, and had done it
often. When the hour for the battle
is come, move to the front with celebrity
fool away no time. Under this
dams. Gen. Sheridan always said, ''If the
siege train isn't reado, don't wait1go 10y
any trains that arc handy to get there is
rect idea. AS You approach the field it is
better to get out and walk. This gives
you a better chance to dispose of your
forces judiciously for the assault. Get
your artillery in position and throw out
stragglers to the right and left to hold your
lines of communication against surprise.
See that every hod-carrier connected with
a mortar battery is at his post. They told
me at the Point that Napoleon despised
mortar batteries, and never would use
them. He said that for real cfficie ncy
he wouldn't give hatful of brickba,s
for ton of mortar. However. that is all
he knew about it. Everything being ready
for the assault, you want to enter the
field with your baggage to the front.
This idea was invented by our renowned
guest, Gen. Sherman. They told me that
Gen. Sherman said that the trunks and
baggage make a good protection for the
soldiers, but that chiefly they attract the
attention and rivet the interest Of the
enemy, and this gives you an opportunity
to whirl the other end of the column
around and attack him in the rear. have
given a good deal of study to this tactic
since learned about it, and it appears to
me it is a rattling good idea. Never
fetch on your reserves at start. This
was NapOleOn's first mistake at Waterloo
Next, he assaulted with his bomb-proofs
and ambulances and embrasures, when
no ought to have used heavier artil-
lery. Thirdly, he retired his right by
ricochef which uncovered his pickcts-
when his only possibility of success lay in
doubling up his centre, flank by flank, and
throwing out his cheoaur de .frise by the
left Oblique to relieve the skirmish line aud
confuse the enemy-if such a maneuvre
would confuse him. and at West Point
they said it would. 1t was about this
time that tho emperor had two horses
shot under him. How often you see the
remark that Gen. So-and-So at such and
such a battle had two or three horses
shot under him. General Burnside and
many great European military men, as
was Informed by high artillery Of
ficer at West Point, have justly
characterized this as wanton waste Of
projectiles, and he impressed upon me cou-
versation in the tent of the Prussian chiefs
at Gravel0tte, in the course Of which our
honored guest just referred tc-Gen Burn
side-observed that if ''you can't aim
horse SO as to hit the general with it, shoot
it over him, and you may bag something
on the other side, whereas horse shot
under . general does no sort of damage
agree cordially with Gen. Burnside, and
heaven knows shall rejoice to see the ar
tilleries of this land and of all lands cease
from this wicked and idietic custom. At
West Point they told me of another mis-
take at Waterloo, namely, that the French
were under fire from the beginning of the
fight till the end of it-which was plainly
most efeminate and ill-timed attention to
comfort, and foolish division of military
strength for it probably took as many
men to keep up the fires as it did
to do the fighting. It would have |
a. H. n