Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1881-11-09
WHAT ARE We GOING TO DO
ABOUT IT.

To the ordinary mind-a railroad man
would saw to the unsophiscated mind
there is no proposition in railroadlng
clearer than this that other things De-
ing equal, it will cost railroad company
more to haul freight and passengers TWO
miles than to perform the same ser''ce
for one mile OF distance.
Nevertheless no fact is better es1aD'
rshed in practice to day, than that rail-
way companies are content to take !ess
for a two-mile than for one. mile
service, and do it.
In these two propositions, the one
theory and the other practice-the Tor
mer maintained as a self evident propo'
sition by the general public, and the
latter adhered to as the practical and
proper policy by the railroad compan'
ies-we have the whole gist oil the con
troversy between the public and the
railroads and between the railroad com
panies themselves.
Now, the theory OF the public, alb
straCtly considered, is sound. 1t 10 gooa
common sense. 1t is good business
sense. The railroad companies do not
attemptto controvert it although they
DO not act upon it.
It is our purpose to show why the
theory and the practice differ; and
there is no better illustration OF tins
than is now furnished by the contest
between the trunk lines.
The explanation might be put IN a
single sentence, viz: the result OF com-
petition between leading lines OF rail-
roads whose distances vary between the
great commercial centers.
The illustration is furnished, We say,
in the present war between the trunk
lines:
The distance from Boston to Chicago
br the iour competing routes is as fol-
lows: New York Central, 1857 miles;
Erie, I,OS6 miles; Pennsylvania, l,l44
miles: Grand Trunk, l,253 miles.
Ii will thus be seen that the New
York Central has Il manifest advantage
in the matter of distance at Boston and
could keep. the field to itself ii distance
was the chief regulation OF rates.
But these other lines being at dis&d-
vantage in the matter OF distance must
evidently carry at less rate than the
shorter line in order to get any business
at all. The shortest line, however, can
better afford to play at that game than
it's long distance competitors.
The war is thus transferred to other
points. The long distance lines at Bos'
ton find another important point at
which the short distance line at Boston
ia at the same disadvantage, and they
can play tit'for-ta..
Thus, for example, the distance, be-
tween New York city and Chicago by
the four competing routes is, by the
Pennsylyania, 9l2 miles; by the Erie
95S miles; by the New York Central,
oSS miles; and by the Baltimore and
Ohio, l,O4l miles.
Here, it is seen, is a fair chance foI
two lines which &re at a disadvantage
at Boston AS compared with the New
York Central, to pus the latter at the
same disadvantage at New York. They
have the cards and play them according
Is, and the war thus extends and In
wolves all tie trunk lines.
This is brief, but We think, Compre
hpnsive explanation both OF the present
railway war and me reason for the lit
ference .ptwecn the common sense
theory OF the public as regards the prop
pr basis OF railroad rates and the practl
cal operations OF the railway companies
regarding rates.
The public may still insist, in supper
OF its theory, that il the roads woui'
charge a stated amount Tor each mill
travelled, this controversy over 4 divl
sion Of the traffic would cease-woulC
never have arisen.
But the railroads reply, how can W
prevent one competing line from drop
ping it's rates and destroying our bust
ness? Ii one road cuts under. what i
left us but to follow suit, in view OF tn
inevitable TACT that the business will 10
! low the lowest rates"
Thus, tine war is not between tn
theory and the practice, but Is the It
gi,imate outcome OF the arbitrary law
/ oi competition.
! What are we going to do about il?