The Pascagoula democrat-star. (Pascagoula, Miss.) 1878-1920, 1881-05-06

Iue principles anu objects OF the
new parties must be defined be.
fore AN intelligent answer eau be
given. A political party must have,
or ought to have, a raisom d'etre in
the convictions OF its members as
to certain principles, or as to the
application of principles to ques-
tons arising 10 the course of pub.
lie events. IL the people are gen.
e,ally agreed as to these, there is
no occasion for parties. Such WAS
actually the case at one period of
our history-that OF the second
term Of Monroe's administI alton
when the whole country was
'solid,n and no complaint was made
Of 1t, nor did any harm ensue. When diff
ferences arise, parties are formed--net ar
bitarily, nor for the sake Of divisions-not
n disputants are divided in debating So
cieties OF players in game Of base ball,
hut - . natural outgrowth Of q diversity
ot convictions. These convictions are, no
doubt, much influenced by mems conflict
ing interests and passions and prejudices
bat yet the theoretical basis-the only
actual basis on which party can be con-
stituted, to possrss any moral force or vi
tslity-is still conviction aud principle,
whether right or wrong. | cannot under
stand, therefore, the proposition to create
new parties merely for the purpose OF di-
viding or destroying the old ones. IL is
not only illogical, but impracticable.
| 40 not believe that the white people
of the South are Influenced by any blind
or superstitious attachment TO existing
party organizations. Agreement in gen.
cral principles and the instinct Of self
defense have hitherto united them in ad.
hcrence to the democratic party, but in
case new issues should lead to the forma-
tion Of new parties, IL is presumable that
they would conform to the changes Of cir
cuaistances. IL the meaning Of the in-
quiry is to ask whether they would diridc
among new parties, il is impossible to an
swer Il without any knowledge of the is
sues on which tho new are TO be organ.
lied. There are questions, those relating
to finance and currency, for eIample,-on
which there is great diversity Of opinion
in tho South. Should these become the
leading questions at issue, presume there
would be much division among us, and
the bette Roire of Southern selidity might
disappear; but this would result from diff
ferences Of conviction from division
for its own sake.
y. "what have been the errors in the
treatment Of tho South by the Northern
powerT
A full answer TO this question would
cover vast field. Il would require rc-
view Of tho history of the last sixteen
years. cannot attempt IL, but will more
ly Indicate what conceive to have been
the primary and radical error, from which
all the others have sprung.
At the close Of the war, two lines Of
policy wero open to tho North, either OF
which might have been adopted and
prosecuted, ut least with consistency. The
subjugated States might have been re-
garled as conquered provinces, and gov
erned ~ such at the pleasure of the con-
querer, avowedly, and without disguise or
the prctcnce OF any ether theory. No op-
position (I think would have been made
to this,-certainly, no resistance could
have been made. All that could have
been asked would have been thas the
laws and usagcs Of conquest acknowl-
edged by civilized nations should be ap-
Piled, and that the personal rights and
private property Of the vanqushed should
be respected. The difficulty with regard
to this theory was that 1t would imply on
acknowledgment that the secession sf the
Southern States had been fat dcoompi,
aud that they had actually been "out Of
the Union,n-a fact which, turing the
war, I 10 government OF the United States
.d persistently denied.
The only consistent alternative would
have been the immediate recognition of
the co-equal rights Of the Southern States,
their admission representation IN con-
gress. the withdrawal of military repres-
sion and of the psraphernalis Of procon-
sular and provincial government, aud ab-
stention from any intermcddlng with
their local and internal affairs. IL il was
really believed that individuals had been
uuilty of treason, they might have been
prosecuted according to law, aud the
auestion tested In the courts but the
States. az States, should hayo been lett in
tact, and the Masses of their people nn'
molested aud in the enjoyment OF all their
original and constitutional rights. There
would have been neither difficulty nor
danger In the adoption OF this policy. The
avowed objects Of the war ON the part
of the North had been fully achieved.
Slavery had been practically abolished by
military force, and was legally, formally
and irrevocably abolished Immediately
after the war by the action of State con-
ventions. The impracticability OF seces-
sion against the will of determined ma
jority had been demonstrated. The snb-
mission of the defeated was absolute. The
policy which has just been Indicated
would have been not only that prescribed
by Justice, generosity, and magnanimity,
but Of . wise aud patriotic statcsmanshlp.
Il would have bound tho U ion together
with cords stronger than steel, and wonld
have given the North n moral weight aud
influence far eyond that Of mere num-
bers and physical and material power.
p,t us;tber Of these two plans of recon-
s,rn.t;an was adopted aud put in execu-
s;'.a On the contrary, the worst feartures
~ aseh ware combincd,-featmres which
would have been merely necessary evils as