Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1881-08-13
France and italy.

Inc pF0lSCJS OF france IN IunlS con-
tinue to be looked upon with some anx-
| ietv BY Italy. The arrangement of the
two nations has been slowly growing
for some time. Count Cavour, the ablest
| minister italy ever had sought to create
friends and influence for the new Italy
he had conceived in his mind by causing
his countrymen to join in the Crimean
war, and by taking advantage of the
french Emperor's dreams of a united
Latin race, succeeded in winning the in
dispensable aid of France But Napo-
;eon Ill. undoubtedly hoped, in assisting
Italy to expel Austria from the Italian
provinces, to build up strong nation
that would be firmly bound to France
by ties of gratitude. and would
share his devotion to the idea of Latin
rather than Italian unity. His plan was
the formatian of an Italian confedera.
tion, dependent upon and auxiliary to
the power of France, the leading people
of the Latin race. Hence the war of
1859 and the victories of Magenta and
SolferinO. Lombardy fell to Victor
Emanuel in consequence of the Aus
trian's defeat, at cost, however, of
$40, 900 900, but it was stipulated that
the Dukes of Modena and Tuscany were
to be restored to their dominions, despite
the hopes which had been held
out to the Italians to the
contrary. The idea of a confedera-
ton of the free Italian States. under the
presidency of the Pope, broached by Ma.
poleOn, receiving no general favor. the
war was suddenly stopped. to the great
disgust of the Italians. By rebellions.
hn hn
various petty rulers, they ultimately car
ried their point of uniting rather than
confederating the States of Italy. Asan
indemnity for the expenses incurred in
the war with Austria. Napoleon, in
February, 1860, demanded and received
from King Emanuel the cession of Nice
and Savoy to France. Hence, although
much had been done for Italy, and indi-
rectly for Italian unity, yet France had
run counter to the national sentiment by
the terms of the peace of Villatranca,
and again later, after the erection of
Italy into kingdom, had wounded Ital-
ian susceptibilities by delaying, if not
absolutely prohibiting, Italian occupa-
tion of Rome. The abrupt abandon
ment by Napoleon III. of his pro-
gramme of an 'Italv free from the Alps
to the Adriatic, and his unnecessary
crushing out of Garibaldl's movement
against the Papal city, checked the feel
ings of gratitude his prior action
had inspired. while his peremptory de-
mand for compensation in the shape of
territory effectually put an end to it.
The Italians since that transaction have
considered their debt paid, and them
selves as under no obligations to France.
In her own troubles in 1870 France did
not receive from Italy that sympathy or
active support to which she conceived
herself entitled, but, on the contrary,
saw her own helplessness taken advan-
tage CT to her Southern neighbor's profit.
Nevertheless. as between the two gov
ernments, show of amity has been
maintained in the face of much ill-con-
cealed animosity of the two peoples. No
government can entirely repress the ex-
preston OF popular opinion. The French
occupation OF TuniS, the forced retire
ment of the Italian representative. the
expulsion of the venerable Italian Arch
bishop, followed by the riots of Mar
seilles, might have led to very serious
complications and possibly to war had
Italy been in condition to resort to arms.
But single-handed, harassed by debt and
by social, political and financial troubles.
what could she do, or hope to do in a
war with France united, compact and
prosperous, having vastly larger army,
finely equipped, and possessed of un-
limited credit? What could Italy, whose
entire resources are estimated at SIS, ,500,-
200, hope to accomplish against an
enemy operating upon a capital of $780,
100000, ,O002 Nor could she count upon
any aid from other powers. 1t is an
open secret that tue appropriation of
Tunis by France was with the conniv-
ance, if not at the suggestion, of
ltaly's former ally, the Chancellor of
the German empire, and the acquies-
cence of England in the transaction
had been secured by NJ. Waddington
long before at the Berlin conference by
promise of withdrawal of French oppo-
stion to English designs on Cyprus.
French diplomacy had forestalled oppo.
sition. Even were Italy disposed to
enter on a hopeless contest with France
1t is not likely the other European DOW
ers would permit it. They cannot
afford to let the two nations come into
collision; the shock might precipitate a
general conflict, for which none but
France is ready There is throughout
Europe at the present moment too much
dry political tinder lying exposed for
Italy to be permitted to light a match
which might cause a confagration, of
which no one can foresee the limits or
the consequences.