The weekly miner. [volume] (Butte, Mont.) 1878-1881, 1881-06-14
Who Lost WaterlooP
John G.. Ropes in June Atlantic.

In sense, the harsh expressions of Ches-
ney and others about the utter state OF ignO-
rance in which the emperor was as to the
ST. ategy of his enemies, that he did not take
at all into consideration the possibility of the
march of the whole of the Prussian army
from Wavra to join Wellington, and so on
are true. They are true so far as this that
Napoleon, having trusted the whole duty of
finding out about the Prussians-where they
were and whether they were going to unite
with the English or MOTTO Grouchy, and
having given him competent force and
plenty of cavalry, and an express warning as
to the danger of the union of their army with
the English, had considerei i that he had done
all that was needful; ard undoubtedly he
was taken by surprise when the blow came.
But they are not true in the sense that Napo-
leon was throughout blind to the possibility
of this junction of the allied armies, and took
no measure to prevent it. If an experienced
sea captain, on seeing dangerous coast, IN
trusts his deck to one of his officers, whom he
gives sufficient number Of men, and whom
he warns to beware of the dangers arising
from the force of certain currents, and then
goes below, he is undoubtedly taken by sur
prise when the ship runs ashore. In his
berth, asleep, he certainly did not foresee the
catastrophe. His principal, if not his only,
fault was in his choice of the officer to whom
he entrusted the deck As to his knowledge
of the perils of that part Of the voyage, that
cannot be questioned.
So with Napoleon. His throwing the en-
tire responsibility of taking care of the Prus-
SLAMS on Marshal Grouchy was his chief fault,
for Grouchy was not able TO sustain such a
burden. Davoust, whom he might have had,
and ought to have had, in Grouchy's place,
would have successfully carried out his ideas.
And while fully admit the enperor's dilato-
riness on the morning OF the 18th, by when
the concentration OF the Prusslah army al
Wavra was assured, which in fact made it i'm
possible for Grouchy,or for Dayoust even, to
prevent this concentration; and while l also
| fully admit the negligence of the emperor in
leaving Grouchy so long without any Instruc-
tions except the warning of the possibly in.
tended junction of the allied armies contained
| in the Bertrand letter, yet L cannot
agree with those who, like Chesney, say that
s.the notion that Grouchy is responsible fol-
the Waterloo defeat must be dismissed, by
| those Who choose to weigh down the evil
! dence, from the domain of authentic hlsto
nv to the limbo of national Pigments" The
responsibility must be divided between the
emperor and his lieutenant. Charging upol
Napoleon sa we must, the faults above speci
| fed. it. must not vet be forgotten that haC
Grouchy intelligently carried out the emper
| or,s instruction contained in the Bertrand let
,er. he might have been in position to de
feat, or at least to hinder the junction OF INT
allied armies. .c c,,
1t is hardly to be questioned that, if Grou
cbv had moved at o'clock in the morning
by way of Mousty, and had put himself IL !,
Communication with the main army, MI
! forces might have stopped the RUSSIAN al
vance, and allowed the emperor the use o
his whole army against the dukes forces
which were inferiqr in numbers 19e;soa AM M
composition. Instead of being obliged to
de- ach 10000 infantry against the Prusslans
Napoleon Ss poll could have used them against , til tn
English and from what we know W., of tlsr the con ns,
dition Of Wellingtons army in the latte latter pal PAL
of he afternoon, the result would have pee
a a. decided @ victory for Napoleon. If, on tn
other hand. Grouchy had, even as late a
midday, changed his plan, and f0lloMeu Oa TN TN
ar,nsror hs wonld have averted the catastro
phe, even if he had arrived too late to lnsur
victory for his side.