The Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1868-1895, 1881-04-20

under their feet. WarfsreH Well, not
much. But neither was the butchery at the
Alamo nor the massacre of Tanning. Well
the victory was won. We drove back,
nearly 400 head Of Mexican horses which,
after the first stampede, had headed for the
river. We brought away more arms and
ammunition than we could have used for q
month and we had broken the enemys
strongestarm- the arm that but for that fight
would have cut us down before we could have
fallen back to place of safety. There was no
time for rejoicing over the victory. Eleven
of our men we knew had fallen. The number
of Mexicsns that persisted will never be
known. Idon't like sometimes to think of
1t myself. Orders were given to begin the
retreat al once. And so at daybreak on
that memorable morning the Americans,
taking a last look at the scene, which was
even then illuminated by the flames that
had not subsidized, turned their faces east
ward to escape the vengeance of the army
of Santa Anna. 1t was none too soon.
Santa Anna with his entire command,
reached the spot on the following day at
noon, and realizing the full strength Of the
blow that had deprived him of the famous
lancers he hastily buried his dead, swore
anew an oath of vengeance and giving
orders for forced marches crossed the river
in pursuit.
FORCED MARCHES UNDER DIFFICULTIES.
The weather and the roads were atrocious.
Heavy rains had swollen the streams, max
ing it difficult to find fords without danger
Gus delay. There was one cause for thank
| c,lv rho Iyro m
peding Santa Annals Army more than our
irregular cavalry. Our horses soon began to
suffer. but we had still about 800 head of
Mexican stock with as and had no difficulty
in getting fresh mounts whe- required.
Soon we overlook large numbers of stray
glers fleeing from the march ofthe Mexicans.
For Santa Annals Army was known not to
be particularly kind even to their own
countrymen and to have q total disregard of
the laws of meum and teum even in respect
to persons as well as property. Three days
from the scene of the conflict on the Brazos
we learned that Santa Anna was gaining on
US and heard that his force had not less than
% 600 men, including 1000 cavalry and q
4 well-served artillery. His Army was ad-
vancing in four columns, all, however,
within easy supporting distance, and there
was no knowing how soon his cavalry would
reach our rear. We soon began, however,
to feel more confidence, for the distance be-
tween us and American soil-which meant
Houston and his force and, if necessary,
Gaines and the Regular Army, still lying on
/ the Neches.
We continued falling back; Santa Anna
advancing. We were now fast approaching
where we supposed Houston's command was
to be found. Unmistakable signs were seen
of the approach of the enemy, and stragglers
knew that to fall behind meant certain de-
structiOn. All our unnecessary stock was
abandoned and we pushed on. Within a
distance of fifty miles from the San Jacinto
River, and about the same distance from the
/ Gulf, our advance guard came upon the out
posts of the main force of Americans. They
were about 5000 strong and Houston him
self was in command The meeting between
the forces can be imagined. Houston him
self was in all his glory, and expressed his
intention to remain right where he was and
annihilate all the force that Santa Anna and
all Mexico could bring against him. Then
he heard that Santa Anna had force of
%, 600 men. Five minutes later he had is.
sued general order to fall back with all
haste, and the retreat was begun. Sam
Houston had reconsidered. He explained
| to his officers that he intended to await at
tack on the San Jacinto near the bayou, but
it was generally believed that he intended
TO fall back on Gaines and allow
the latter to be attacked. 1t must be I'M
derstood that at this time Houston had made
the people very generally believe that ne was
the accredited secret agent of Jackson, and
that he had the whole American Nation at
his back. His principal officers were Gen.
eral Rusk, General Felix Houston, his
cousin, Major Wharton, and Major Arson,
Jones, Lamar and Austin. The retreat
had continued over one week when the
Lancers, in advance of Santa Annals Army,
could be seen in our rear, and it was evil
dent that we were bound to be overtaken
| long before Gaines could be reached Now
to understand what follows it most be re
membered that while Cabler and Harring-
toms commands were operating as part of the
Texas army they were yet indistinct organ
izatlOns and were acting on their own re-
sponsibility and without direct orders from
Houston himself or any of his officers. By
dark we had reached the nigh hills, which
at that point ten miles from the Bayou,
overlook the San Jacinto River. 1t was
impossible to cross the entire command, as
before this could be effected Santa Anna
would have come up and cut our rear to
pieces And so because it could not be
helped the army went into camp on the
western bank of the river, on the same side
that Santa Anna was with his army. We
were in position that is best expressed by
an old saying that first heard about this
time. 1t was ''root, hog or die" with US
We rooted right there.
THE BATTLE OF SAN JAcINTo.
When darkness fell thetwo armies out
post were within gunshot of each other and
the position of both can be best understood
by the following diagram: