The Canton advocate. [volume] (Canton, D.T. [S.D.]) 1877-1897, 1881-12-15

$50 miles-might very well be 81. If,
therefore, the Mobile and Ohio road
competes in the market at Corinth for
cotton, it will be charging less for the
longer haul from Corinth than for the
shorter from Tupelo. And, if the law
should step in and forbid this practice,
the Mobile and Ohio road would simply
have to withdraw from competition at
Corinth.
The shipper at Tupelo claims that the
Mobile and Ohio road is discriminating
against him when it hauls Corinth cot
ton for 81 and charges 81 from Tupelo.
But would it benefit him to have the
road give up all Corinth cotton and
withdraw from competition at that
place? 1t could not afford to reduce at
Tupelo, and twenty other stations
similarly situated, in order to secure a
few hundred bales from Corinth at q
low rate. 1t would then be less able to
reduce rates at Tupelo, and all other
local points on its line; and nobody on
earth would be benefited but the Mem
phis and Charleston railroad, which
would have a monopoly of the hauling
of Corinth cotton, and Corinth would
lose the benefit of competition from
the Gulf.
The effect of any law to restrict the
freedom of roads to act in this manner
would simply destroy competition.
Take another example, illustrating
the same thing, except that the com
petition is between railroad and
water route. Fond du Lac, Wis, is
14S miles from Chicago, on the line of
the Chicago d Northwestern railway.
The numbering interest is very large
there, and the products Of the saw
mills, shingle mills, and sash, door and
blind factories are nearly all shipped
to Chicago, the great distributing point
for the northwest. A carload of lum-
Der from Fond du Lac to Chicago, load
ed and unloaded by the owner, costs
(say) $26. Green Bay is G5 miles far
ther up the line than Fond du Lac, or
2l3 miles from Chicago. Green Bay is
largely interested in the lumber bust
ness also, but it has the advantage of
being on the neck of Lake Michigan,
and ships nearly all its lumber to Chi
cago on vessels, which is cheaper than
by rail. On certain day the North
western railroad has dozen empty
cars standing on the side track at
Green Bay that are to be returned to
Chicago. A lumber dealer telegraphs
the General Manager that he will pay
twenty dollars per car for their use
from thence to Chicago, and load and
unload them himself. The offer is at
once accepted, the service performed,
and two hundred and forty dollars is
paid into the treasury of the company.
The price paid was, say five dollars per
car less than the rate from Fond du
Lac, with sixty-five miles more haul.
But the choice was between two hun
dred and forty dollars and nothing, for
the cost, to a railroad company, be-
tween hauling loaded and empty cars
is Of nominal account. There is little
more wear and tear. and few pounds
more steam, but the extra expense
is inconsiderable. The lumbermen at
Fond du Lac are indignant at what
they call "the unjust discrimination "
of the railroad company in favor Of
their rivals in business at Green Bay,
and the irate newspapers at the former
place call loudly for a pro-rata tariff.
Nobody complains that $25 per car is
too high from Fond du Lac to Chicago,
but the idea that it should cost only
500 per carload for haul that is sixty
five miles farther away from market is
what worries them.
Now, if the Northwestern Railway
company had been prohibited from
making this special agreement by the
enforcement of an inhcxible pro-rata
tariff act, it would have benefited no
body but damaged Q) the railroad cor
poration to the amount Of $500, 1850 to
be added for drawing empty cars); (2)
it would have injured the lumbermen
at Green Bay, because it would have
deprived them of taking advantage of
competition, and placed them wholly
in the power of the vessel owners; and
(3) it would have damaged the lumber
men of Fond du Lac, because, being
prevented from competing with the
water route from Green Bay, the rail-
road corporation must make up its loss
by keeping up its high rates at the for
mer place.