Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1881-06-16
6. To inspirit the troops and the country

6. To inspirit the troops and the countr
by success and discourage the enemy.
7. To obviate the necessity of falling bacl
which might probably occur if our antag'
mist be allowed to consummate his plan
without molestation. :,
Gen. Johnston cordially approved of a
aggressive movement, and informed me Of hi
purpose to make it as soon as reinforcement
and supplies, then on the way, should reac
him. He did not approve of the propose
advance into Tennessee. He believed tha
the Federal forces in Tennessee were nc
weaker, but if anything stronger, than O
Missionary Ridge; that defeat beyond til
Tennessee would probably prove ruinous t
US, resulting in the loss Of his army, the oe
cupation of Georgia by the enemy, the "piere
ing of the Confederacy in its vitals," and tn
loss of all the Southwestern Territory. H
proposed, therefore, to stand on the defensiv
until strengthened ito watch, prepare, ant
strike" as soon as possible. As soon as re
inforced he declared his purpose to advanc
to Ringgold, attack there, and, if successful
as he expected to be, to strike at Cleveland
cut the railroad, control the river, and thu
isolate East Tennessee, and as consequence
force his antagonist Il give battle on thi
side of the Tennessee River. To enable Gen
Johnston to repulse the hostile advance ant
assume the offensive, no effort was spared OF
the part of the Government. Almost all th'
available military strength Of the South and
West, in men and supplies was pressed for
ward and placed at his disposal. The sup
plies of the commissary, quartermaster, ant
ordipance department Of his army were rep
resented as ample and suitably located. Th'
troops encouraged by the large accessions o
strength which they saw arriving daily, ane
which they knew were marching rapidly tt
their support, were eager to advance and con
ident in their power to achieve victory anc
recover the territory. which they had lost
Their position was such as to warrant thu
confident expectation of successful resistance
at least. Long mountain ranges penetrated by
few and difficult roads and paths and deeE
and wide rivers, seemed to render our posi-
ticn one from which we could not be dislodg
ed or turned, while that of the enemy, de
pendent for supplies upon single line o.
railroad from Nashville to the point where
he was operating, was manifestly perlous
The whole country shared the hope which
the government entertained, that decisive
victory would soon be won in the mountains
of Georgia, which would free the South and
West from invasion, would open to our occu
patton and support Of our armies the produc
tive territory of Tennessee and Kentucky,
and so recruit our army in the West as tc
render it impracticable for the enemy to &C
cumulate additional forces in Virginia.
After detailing retreat after retreat Of
Johnston with his splendid army of nearly
seventy thousand men from the strongest posi-
tions to be had, the author says:
Whether the superior numerical strength
of the enemy, by enabling him to extend bis
force beyond the flank of ours, did thereby
necessitate the abandonment of every posi-.
ton taken by our army, and whether the
enemy, declining to assault any of our in
trenched camps, would have ventured to
leave it in rear, upon his only line of commu'
nication and supply, or whether we might
have obtained more advantageous results by
vigorous and determined effort to attack
him in detail during some of his army flank
movements, are questions upon which there
has been decided conflict of opinion and
upon which it would be for me now neither
useful nor pleasant to enter. When it be.
came known that the Army of Tennessee had
been successfully driven from one strong po.
sition to another until finally it had reached
the earth.works constructed for the exterior
defence of Atlanta, the popular disappoint.
ment was extreme. The possible fall of the
"Gate City," with its important railroad COM
munication, vast stores, factories for the man.
ufacture of all sorts of military supplies,
rolling mills and foundries, was now contem.
plated for the first time at its full value, and
produced intense anxiety far and wide.
FROM many quarters, including such as had
most urged his assignment came delegations,
petitions and letters urging me to remove
Gen. Johnston from the command of the ar
my and assign that important trust to some
officer who would resolutely hold and defend
Atlanta. While sharing in the keen sense of
disappointment at the failure of the campaign
which pervaded the whole country WAS per.
haps more apprehensive than others Of the
disasters likely to result frcm it, because I
was in a position to estimate more accurate
ly their. probable extent. x x
Still 1 resisted the steadily increasing pres.
sure which was brought to bear to induce me
to revoke his assignment, and only issued the
order relieving him from command when l
became satisfied that his declared purpose to
occupy the works at Atlanta with militia lev
les and withdraw his army into the open coun-
try for freer operations would inevitably re-.
suit in the loss Of that important point, and
where the retreat would cease could not be
foretold. If the Army of Tennessee was
found to be unable to hold positions of great
strength like those at Dalton, Resaca, Etowah,
Kennesaw and on the Chattahoochee l could
not reasonably hope that it would be more
successful in the plains below Atlanta, where
it would find neither natural nor artificial ad.
vantages of position.
ATTACK ON SHERMAN.
Abiding to Sherman's order that all civil
ians, male and female, living in Atlanta
must leave it within FIVE days from the issu-
ance of the order, Mr.. Davis says:
Since Alva's atrocious cruelties to the non
combatant population of the Low Countries,
in the sixteenth century, the history of war
records no instance of such barbarous cruelty
as that which this order designed to perpe-
trate 1t involved the immediate expulsion
from their homes and only meaus of subsis-
tence of thousands of unofendng women and
children, whose husbands and fathers were
either in the army, in Northern prisons or
had died in battle. In vain did the mayor
and corporate authorities of Atlanta appeal
to Sherman to revoke or modify this inhu.
man order, representing in piteous language
"the woe, the horror and the suffering, not to