The Pioche weekly record. [volume] (Pioche, Nev.) 1877-1900, 1881-07-02
WHO LOST WATERLOO,
[John G. Ropes in Atlantic. !

In . sense, the harsh expressions of
Chesney and others about the utter state
of Ignorance in which the Emperor was
as to the strategy of his enemies, that he
did not take at all into consideration the
possibility of the march OF the whole
Prussian army from Wayre to join Wei
lington, and so on are true. They are
true 50 far as this: That Napoleon, hav-
ing intrusted the whole duty OF finding
out about the Prussans-where they
were, and whether they were going to
unite with the English or MOTTO
Grouchy, and having given him COM
petent force and plenty of cavalry and
express warning as to the danger of the
union of their army with the English,
had considered all that was needful, and
undoubtedly he was taken by surprise
when the blow came. But they are not
true in the sense that Napoleon was
throughout blind to the possibility of this
junction of the allied armies, and took no
measures to prevent it. If an expert
enced sea captain, on approaching a
dangerous coast intrusts the deck to one
of his officers, to whom he gives a suffi-
cient number of men, and whom he
warns to beware of the dangers arising
form the force of certain currents, and
then goes below, he is undoubtedly taken
by surprise when the ship runs ashore.
In his berth, asleep, he certainly did not
foresee the catastrophe. His principal,
il not his only fault was in his choice Of
8 the officer to whom he entrusted the
Il deck, As to his knowledge of the perils
of that part Of the voyage, that cannot
be questioned.
So with Napoleon. His throwing the
entire responsibility of taking care of the
Prussians ON Marshal Grouchy was his
chief fault, for Grouchy was not able tc
sustain such burden. Davoust, whom
he might have had, and ought to have
had, in Grouchy's place, would have sue
cessfully carried out his ideas. Ant
while I fully admit the Emperor's dila
toriness on the morning Of the 18th, by
which the concentration of the Prussial
army at Wavre was assured, which il
fact made it impossible for Grouchy, o
FOR Davoust even to prevent this concen
tfation, and while also fully admit tn
negligence of the Emperor in leaving
4 .Grouchy so long without any instruc
NJ hons, except the warning Of the possibl
NJ intended junction of the allied armie
contained in the Bertrand letter, yet
cannot agree with those who, like Ches
ney, say that "the notion that Crouch
is responsible for the Waterloo defea
must be dismissed, by those who choos
to weigh the evidence, from the domai
of authentic history to the limbo of n,
tional tigments.' The responsible
must be divided between the Empert
and his Lieutenant. Charging upon N
poleon as we must, the faults abo,
n specified, it must yet not be forgotte
that had Grouchy intelligently carrie
! out the Emperors instructions containe
in the Bertrand letter he might ha,
been in a condition te defeat, or at lea
to hinder the junction of the allie
armies.
1t is hardly to be questioned that,
Grouchy had moved at 4 o'clock in Il
morning, by way of Mousty, and had p
himself in communication with the ma
army, his forces would have stopped t
& Prussian advance, and allowed the E
n peror the use of his whole army agair
81 the Dukes forces, which were inferior
# numbers and composition. Instead
8 being obliged to detach 10000 infant
against the Prussians, Napoleon cor
81 have used them against the English, a
Il from what we know of the condition
II Wellington's army in the latter part
4 the afternoon the result would have be
decided victory for Napoleon. If,
the other hand, Grouchy had, even
late as midday, changed his plan, q
followed the advice of Gerard, !
marched to join the Emperor, he wo
certainly have averted the catastrop
even if he had arrived too late to ms
victory for his side.