Louisiana capitolian. (Baton Rouge, La.) 1879-1881, 1881-09-08

Be fephEHVeS oetHiu"Ay "Iu SobnOooAy
Ridges, when men hug the ground
closely, don't do much general dam
agb. 1t may 1emoralize green troops
but men who have heard such racket
before know how TO take care OF
themselves; the day has gone by
wien armies arc put to ront by
brSaking pitchers, blowing trumpets,
anil holding up lamps. Lee placed
aiding his lines by noon one hundred
md forty-hve guns. Meade had in
position but eighty, and the scream
OF shot and shell and the roar Of
guns lasted two hours, This two
holrs' fire showed peculiar char
ac}eristic in each army the fiery i'm
peIuosity of the Confederates and the
co;,lness Of our men. They wasted
u tremendous amount of ammunition
In random firing; our firing was
slower, surer, more like target prac-
tica. Better soldiers never marched
oryought than were in both armies
from 1861 to 1865; there was this
ge.eral difference the Southern
troops would come into action with
yhoop, II scream, q yell, load and
frs fast and wild, and empty their
ca;tridge-boxes in II few minutes
ting Northern troops we're cooler,
slower, and better for long pull.
Tie Confederates, thinking their
heavy bombardment had prepared
ths way, formed their column Of as
saqlt, consisting Of about fifteen
Thousand men, and started on the
charge. 1t had to march over Il
spicc Of some fourteen hundred
yasds, in plain view and exposed to
ouI artillery fire all the way, but this
did not stay its steady advance an
instant. 1t approached to within q
cosplc hundred yards Of our lines,
wien il received terrible punish
mint from our musketry, that tore it
sadly, but, with loud yell, chock
fuj of vim and vermin, it's survivors
rulhed upon our works and guns,
where, after a short but severe strug-
Gig, it was repnlsed with awful
slaughter. And The evening and the
morning were the third day, and we
say that it was good
OBSERVATIONS.
}bis badly managed battle on the
pnst of Gen, Lee was always terribly
chtglinning to that sedate and proud
spirited man. He felt and knew that
hil errors here were not only a great
inlMry to his cause, but they were n
hehvy blow to his professional repu-
tatlon. Gen. Ewell told the writer in
Baltimore after the war that the
charge of the third day was "fbol-
isli thing" and shat the fighting an
offensive battle away up there was
nohsense.' Longstfcet almost i'm
plored Lee not to order that charge.
TIE second day was one Of errors too.
TIE Adjutant General of his Army
sa.s Of this day "The whole affair
was disjointcd. There was an utter
absence of accord in the movements
ofsthe several commands, and no de-
cisivc results attended the operations
OF. the second day. This charge was
as :hopelcss Us the charge at Malvern
Hi1l. Men are but men. A soldier
is pot o steam engine or u mule.
There is limit to human endurance
AMI possibilities, and it is the duty
Ola General in command to know
anil figure Oh that fact. 1t is the veri-
esf fudge to try to throw on Long
stlpet's shoulders the failure Of the
third day--to blame him for not put
til,g in his whole corps. Such
movement would have left the right
wing of the Confederate army expos
cd, or rather left that army without
a light wing at all. Lee was on the
field, within immediate view and or
des's; is it to be supposed that il,
LGngstreet had disobeyed the world
Would not have known it right then
anil there 4? Lee said to Wilcox: "This
is jill my fault" Did he not tender
hi! resignation to jeff. Davis imme-
diately afterG Was there not much
"ctooking" in his army9 1t is a mis-
q. Il