Southern standard. (McMinnville, Tenn.) 1879-current, 1881-08-13
flor Schools and Tfar1rrs.
1880 ------------- $500 1890
Series of Lectures for Schools.
Consciousness.


that consciousness is a separate and dis
tinct faculty of the mind, whose dis
tinct Office it is to testify to the mind
its own existence and the various oper-
atoms of the other faculties. A faculty
is the power the mind has to do GER
tain thing; the mind has the power of
testifying to itself its own existence
and operations; this power is conscious
ness; therefore consciousness is a dis
tinct faculty of the mind. This view
of the subject accords with the ety.
mology of the term which recognizes
the mind as that which knO,US, and this
faculty as the power by which it knows,
from CON, with, and Scio, to know, hence
to knOaO with itself, or aVithin itself with
out any medium whatever.
DR.. Reid contends that the whole
scope of consciousness is subjective.
That is to say, that Consciousness
takes no notice of anything except
the mind itself and its operations
that all the knowledge derived
from consciousness alone is sub
jective, that it does not and can not
cognize external objects, such as the
book which you read or the paper on
which you write.
We have been thus particular in
stating DR.. Reds position on this part
of the subject because he stands almost
alone in his advocacy of these views.
Sir William Hamilton and DR.. Thomas
Brown have labored hard to overthrow
Reds position and to establish the op.
posite, namely, that we can cognize
external objects as well as mental acts.
The issue, then, between these great
lights in philosophy is this: DR.. Reid
asserts that we can cognize only men.
tai acts and states. Sir William Ham.
ilton and DR.. Thomas Brown deny
this, and assert that we can cognize ex
ternal objects, and that we are there
fore as conscious of the external world
as we are Of the internal, or subjective
states of our minds.
1t is with becoming Difference, ye'
without moments hesitation that W.
take sides with Reid on this great ques
ton. We are aware of the fact tina
it is generally considered in our day
with Sir William Hamilton as it wa
with Caesar in his day, that nemonen
seclrm sine s,ta pernicie contendiSSe Ono
body ever contended with him withou
his own destruction). Nevertheless
no mere greatness of name, such as h
, Justly has, can ever be substituted 70
the truth, to whose tribunal we no,
appeal, consoling ourselves that if W
are against Hamilton, we are with
greater than Hamilton.
|
| Now for the law and the testimony
DR.. Reid affirms that we are consciou
of our own existence and the operf
!. tions of our own minds, and these only
q that we are not conscious of the extel
e nal objects around us, but gain know
4 edge of them only as they are reporte
+ to the mind through perception, an
8 when so reported we are conscious {
f the sensations thus made, and thes
s sensations are cognized by the min
p through consciousness which testifes I
v their correctness, and they thus becon
r. knowledge of the external objects thi
e made the sensations through perception
IS For example, | hold in my hand
d book. | see it and feel it. A sens
II u ton is made upon my mind bot
% through the sense of sight and toucl
Consciousness testifes to my mind ,
n to the correctness of these sensation
e and | pronounce the object so reporte,
u a book. | am not conscious of Il
= book, but am of the sensation, whiC
a is d subjective state of the mind, on
}. side of whose empire consciousness co
IS nizes nothing. Here Sir VIM. Ham
l ton says unequivocally that am co
g scious of the book as well as the sens
ton Of it produced through percSptl'
1t on the mind. He says cannot
n conscious of perceiving the book wit
- - out being conscious of the book pc
i ceived. He maintains that consciou
ness apprehends and takes hold of Il
j. book, whereas Reid says it cognizes Il
d sensation made on the mind by Il
!, book through perception of the sens
d of sight and touch. To the unerril
y dicta of each readers's own consciou
1t ness in experiencing these operation