The river press. [volume] (Fort Benton, Mont.) 1880-current, 1881-06-01
TIE ARROGANT SENATE.
a History Of the Growth Of its Prerogatives
and the Danger Of It's Existence.
IChicago Times. ]

The body called the Senate IS the most an
amolous part Of the American Constitution.
It is a part Of the Legislature it j., viii the
President, the whole Legislature It is a
part Of the judiciary it is q priVy council
it is an assembly Of co-equal provinces; It ls
q coordinate pert Of the executive; 1t is, &C.
cording to MFR. Conkling, 8 board OF directors
placed over the executive. i is 9 combina-
ton Of all these characters, not upon any ra-
tional rule OF upon any coherent theory, but
by purely arbitrary arrangement.
How it came to be the queer body it is fur
uishes an interesting subject Of inquiry for
all who wish to get some clear idea Of what
kind of 8 constitution the American Consti-
tuition is.
One fact should be kept always in mlnd
the manufacturers OF the enacted instrument
in the terms Of which most people have the
erroneous habit Of eupposing the Constltu-
ton to be wholly contained, had continually
before them, as q model, the constitution Of
England. They aimed not to copy the model
yet believed it necessary 70 pattern after It.
They had q notion that there was great vlr-
tue ii q tWo-chamber legislature, while they
rejected the aristocratic basis of the upper"
chamber in the British constitution that is,
they rejected the substantive goodness Of the
British arrangement, and preserved the mere
form. The British House of Commons was
an assembly Of the common people; there
fore the American House of Representatives
must be an assembly of the common people.
The British House Of Lords was an assembly
of the nobility but they had resolved that
in America there should be no nobility
therefore, the American Senate could not Be
an assembly Of the nobility. Still, it occurred
to but few that an upper house" could be
dispensed with. The question was, upon
what foundation to build that house, which.
it was agreed, should hold a conservative re-
straint upon the more democratical charac-
ter and tendency Of the lower or popular as
sembly. For q considerable time after it had
been agreed that the legislature should be
comprised IN two independent chambers, no
character or condition was fixed upon to dis
tinguish one from the other.
IL was during this interval. when the Sen
hstO w go EtAA1 III VIZ uLAAC 6LaUC VI uEU-
ulosity, that some remarkable powers were
assigned to ii, "There was a strong dispo-
sition to accumulate power in the BODY"
says a historian Of the Constitution, s.for
which this peculiar character" Of q second
chamber without any special reason for its
existence had been gained. Nor did this dis
position cease to influence action after the
prepOsterous scheme of an 'sequal represen-
tatIon of States" had been accepted as one
which, it was supposed, would give to the
Senate q restraining force Upon the House.
The latter feature had been determined s'be-
fore the powers Of the other departments, or
their origin or relations, had been set led.
consequence was that wherever jealousy
was felt with regard to the executive or the
Judiciary, wherever 8 chasm presented itself
and the right means Of filling it did not oc-
cur, there was q tendency TO resort to the
Senate"
The Americans ascrihed all their troubles
TO the king, who was then supposed by ev-
erybody to be the actual executive Of the
English constitution. He was wholly indie
pendent Of the legislature, and this the |
Americans supposed to be q necessary ar
rangment Of the executive. Being indepen-
dent, he was under no responsibility or ac-
countability to the Legislative assembly-an
SaA ssA5SIAIAt Az LlC I1LICl lCHLS uGlQ 10 DC /
unnecessary and undesirable. He would do
no wrong, because all wrong actions were
ascribed to his ministers, who alone could be
brought to q reckoning. But the Americans
TO snch vicarious responsibility.
They imagined it possible to combine execu-
independence with executive RESPONSE
bility. Lest the President should not be in
dependent, they determined that he must be
appointed for a definitely fixed term. Lest
he should Shift the responsibility from his
own shoulders to those Of his ministry, they
determined to give him no ministers. But
now a chasm appeared. How should Judges.
ambassadors and other necessary functiona-
RED be appointed By the President, out of
his independent personal will? That would
him o king indeed; so the chasm was
by giving the appointment Of Judges
and ambassadors to the Senate. The Senate
made o branch Of the executive.
Presently, another chasm appeared. The
king held in his own independent will the
5reaty making power, though he exercised it
his ministers. The President was
DOT to have any ministers, lest they should
give him bad advice. Was the President,
then to hold the kiugly power Of making
That would not do; SO they adj
led treaty-making to the other functions of
the Senate. The Senate and President, to-
gether, were made the supreme Legislative
power with respect to this kind OF public
law.
In like manner the trial of impeachmen1s
and the adjudication Of boundary questions
were assigned to the Senate, giving to that
general receptacle Of dubious powers a iu-
dicial character, in addition to its legislative
and executive characters. The fact that it
had been overloaded with an assortment Of
powers at length dawned up
on the leading minds in the convention. and