The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1881-06-08

III.
Not for the frst time did the fate of an army
depend upon single man. and the fortunes OF
a country hang, as in balance, on the achieve
ments of single army"
Thus eloquently does the Southern ex-Presi-
dent defend the memory of his dead friend,
whose portrait holds place Of honor in the
little library at Beauvoir. OF what the conse-
quences of Shiloh might have been had not
Johnston fallen, Mr.. Davis writes: "The ex-
tracts which have been given sufficiently
prove that when Gen. Johnston fell the Con-
federate army was so fully victorious that, had
the attack been vigorously pressed, Gen. Grant
and his army before the setting of the sun
would have been fugitives or prisoners"
DAVIS ON GRANT.
The capture of Vicksburg does not move Mr.
Davis to censure Gen. Pemberton, but he at
tributes the disaster to Gen. Joe Johnstons OBJ
stlnacy in awaiting re-inforcements before
moving forward. Gen. Grants engineering
feat at Vicksburg in cutting the canal in order
70 make passage for vessels around the "Bluff
| City, is thus spoken of:
His attempt was quite unsuccessful and
whatever credit may be awarded to his enter
| prise, none can be given to his engineering
| skill, as the direction given to his ditch was
| such that, instead of being washed out by the
current of the river it was filled up by the sed-
lment. And the facilities the enemy possessed
| in river transportation and the aid which their
| lron-cad gunboats gave to all operations where
land and naval forces could be combined were
lost to Grant in this interior march which he
| was making. Success gives credit to military
enterprise; had this failed, as think it should,
it would surely have been pronounced an eyre
| gious bunder."
interesting as another phase of the charge of
laundering and unscientific generalship made
| by the critics OF the Unions most successful
commander. Writing of Grants campaign in
| Virginia, Mr.. Davis says:
SIT had, therefore, taken him more than n
month to reach the south side of the James In
his campaign he had sacrificed hecatomb of
men, vast amount of artillery, small arms
munitions OF war and supplies to reach posi-
tion to which Mcclellan had already demon
strated there was easy and inexpensive
route. 1t is true that the Confederate army
had suffered severely, and, though the loss was
comparatively small to that of its opponents, it
could not be repaired, as his might be from the
larger population and his facilities for recruit
ing in Europe. To those who can approve the
policy OF attrition without reference to the
number of lives it might cost this may seem
]ustfable, but it can hardly be regarded an
generalship or be offered to military students
as an example worthy of imitation"
JOE JOHNSTON ATTACKED.
The disagreement on matters of military pol
icy which existed between the Confederate
President and Gen. Joe Johnston from the
battle OF Bull Run to the close of the war is
fully treated in the book. "The whole coun-
try writes Mr.. Davis, shared the hope which
the government entertained, that a decisive
victory would soon be won in the mountains
OF Georgia, which would free the South and
West from invasion, would open to our occupa-
tion and the support of our armies the produc-
tive territory of Tennessee and Kentucky, and
so recruit our army in the West as to render it
lmpracticable for the enemy to accumulate ad-
ditional forces in Virginia" Johnston's fail
ure to redeem Tennessee and Kentucky from
the invader" and his retreat finally to At.
lanta, was tremendous disappointment to the
Confederacy. "If," writes the author, "the
army OF the Tennessee was found to be unable
to hold positions of great strength like those at
Dalton, Resaca, Etowah, Kenesaw and ON the
Chattahooche, could not reasonably hope
tina. it would be more successful in the plains
below Atlanta, where it would find neither
natural nor artificial advantages of position"
SHERMAN COMPARED TO ALvA.
Gen. Sherman is posted in Mr.. Davis's
book as monster Of cruelty, and is compared
to Alva In the Netherlands,and to Wallenstein
in Germany during the 30 years war Sher-
mans order directing the evacuation of At
lanta in five days involved the immediate
expulsion from their homes and only means of
subsistence of thousands of unoffending women
and children whose husbands and fathers were
either in the army, in northern prisons or had
died in battle. In vain did the mayor and
corporate authorities of Atlanta appeal to
Sherman to revoke modify this inhuman
order, representing in piteous accents the woe,
the horror and the suffering, not to be de-
scriDed by words, which its execution would
intiict on helpless women and infant children.
His only reply was, Il give full credit to your
statement of the distress that will be occasioned
by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, be-
cause my orders are not designed to meet the
humanities of the case"
Sherman is charged with either ordering or
permitting the burning of Columbia and his
march to the sea could. alleges Mr.. Davis, "be
traced by the burning dwelling houses and by
the wall of women and children pitilessly left
to die from starvation and exposure in the
depth of winter"
CLOSE OF THE WAR.
Coming down to the close of the war, Mr..
Davis refutes the charge that Gen. Lee ad-
vised the abandonment of the war in 1864 as
hopeless. Mr.. Davis says: "Lee had never
contemplated surrender. He had long before
in language similar to that employed by WASH
ington during the revolution, expressed to me
the belief that in the mountains of Virginia,
he could carry on the war for 20 years, and in
his march toward Lynchburg it may well be
believed that, as an alternative, he hoped to
reach these mountains, and with the advan-
tage which the topography would give, yet to
battle the hosts which were following him"
In March, 1865, Gen. Lee became convinced
that the evacuation of Petersburg and the aban-
donment of Richmond were but questions of
time. Gen. Lee felt the embarrassment which
would result from the abandonment OF the
capital with its workshops and foundrics, but
facilities for repair and manufacture of arms
and Alabama and the importance of Rich
mond in this respect had been lessened. Gen.
Lees programme was to retire to Danville,
at which place supplies should be collected
and a junction made with the troops under
Gen. j. E. Johnston, the combined force to be
hurled upon Sherman in North Carolina with
the hope Of crushing his army before Grant
could reach him."
As to the manner in which the determina-
tion to surrender was reached, Mr.. Davis
writes
son the evening of the Sth Gen. Lee de-
cided, after conference with his corps COM
manders, that he would advance the next
morning, beyond Appomattox Court House,
and if the force reported to be there should
prove to be only Sheridan's cavalry, to dis
perse it and continue the march toward Lynch
burg; but If the infantry should be found in
large force the attempt to break through it was
not to be made, and the correspondence which
Gen. Grant had initiated on the previous day
should be reopened by flag, with propositions
for an interview to arrange the terms of capit-
ulation. Gordon, whose corps formed the rear
guard from Petersburg, and who had fought
daily for the protection of the trains, had now
been transferred to the 'front.' On the next
morning before daylight, Lee sent Col Vena-
BILE, one of his staff, to Gordon, commanding
the advance, to learn his opinion as to the
chances of a successful attack, to which Cor
don replied: "My old corps is reduced to
frazze, and unless am supported by Long
street heavily, do not think we can do any
thing more" When Col. Venable returned
with this answer to Gen. Lee, he said: "Then
there is nothing left me but to go and sec Gen.
Grant"
STILL FOR FIGHTING.
Even after the surrender at Appomattox Mr..
Davis had no thought of abandoning the war.
He telegraphed to Joe Johnston to meet him
at Greensboro to consult on "present condi-
tions and future operations" He says
Though was fully sensible of the gravity of
our position, seriously affected as it was by
the evacuation of the capital, the surrender Of
the army of northern Virginia and the conse-
quent discouragement which these events
would produce, did not think we should de-
spair. We still had effective armies in the
field, and vast extent of rich and productive
territory both east and west of the Mississippi,
whose citizens had evinced no disposition to
surrender Ample supplies had been collect
ed in the railroad depots, and much still re-
manned to be placed at our disposal when need
ed by the army in North Carolina"
Gen. Johnston was reserved" and mot at
all sanguine," and evinced desire to open
negotiations with Sherman, which Mr. Davis
opposed as being likely to demoralize the troops
and people. Says the Confederate president,
81 had never contemplated surrender except
upon such terms as belligerant might claim,
as long as we were able to keep the field, and