Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1881-11-30

knowledge Of right and wrong, without refse-
ence to the particular act, was plainly declared
by the judge to be the simple and suficient cri-
terion of responsibility, and the jury was in
structed accordingly; but this criterion was
sometimes modified by the qualifications which
judgesintroducedt to meet their individual views.
or to prevent the conviction Of person who
was plainly insane and irresponsible There
was no settled principle, no actual uniformity
OF practice, no certainty Of result.
great sensation was made by the murder, in
1913, Of Mr.. Drummond by McNaughten. who
shot him under the influence Of o
delusion that he was ore of q
number OF persons whom he believed to be
following him everywhere, blasting his charac-
ter and making his life wretched. McNaughten
had transacted business short time before the
deed. and had shown no obvious symptoms of
insanity in his ordinary discourse and conduct.
He was, however, acquitted on the ground of
insanity. Thereupon the House of Lords, par
ticipating~ in the public alarm and indignation
which were occasioned by the acuuittal pro-
pounded to the Judges certain questions with
regard to the law on the subject of insanity
when it was alleged as a defense in criminal
actions; the object being to obtain from
them an authoritative exposition Of the law
for the future guidance of courts. The answers
of the judges to the questions thus put to them
constitute the law of England as it has been ap-
trials.
1t is not necessary to quote the questions and
answers at length; the latter are somewhat con-
fused, and the substance of them may be cor
rectly given in fewer words. 'To establish
defence on the ground of insanity, it must be
clearly proved that at the time of committing
the act the party accused was laboring under
such defect of reason from disease of the mind
as not to know the nature and quality of the act
he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did
n ho dniu hot
will not escape attention that the question of
right and wrong in the abstract was here
abandoned, being allowed quietly to go
the way of the wild-beast form of the
acknowledgement; the question of right and
wrong was to be put in reference to the par
ttcutdr act with which the accused was charged.
Moreover it was to be put in reference to the
particular act at the time of committing It, Did
ne at the time know the nature and quality Of
the act he was doing? Thesetwo points have been
overlooked sometimes by hostile critics. who have
condemned the rule enuncated, as though it
referred to knowledge of right and wrong
generally One may object to the rule as bad
one, and because it is calculated to mslead a
Jury, who are very likely to be misled by the ex
lstence of general knowledge of right and
wrong in the accused person to Judge wrongly
concerning his knowledge Of the particular act
at the time, but it must be allowed at the same
time that it will, if strictly applied, cover and
excuse many acts of insane violence OF few
"
said that they have a full knowledge of the ma
ture and quality of their acts at the time they
are doing them. Can it be truly said of any
person who acts under the influence of great
passion that he has such knowledge at the
timer"
The rule thus laid down. differing so much
from that which was enunciated and mercilessly
acted upon in Bellingham's sad case, was how
ever, limited in it's application by formidable
exception. In reply to the question-''If per-
N doll cin TO
facts, commits an Ofense in consequence there
OF, is he thereby excused?"-the Judges de-
clared that 'on the assumption that he
labors under partial delusion only (whatever that
may mean, and is not in other respects insane,
he must be considered in the same situation as
to responsibility as if the facts with respect to
which the deluSiOn exists were real For eX-
ample, if, under the influence of deusion. he
supposes another man to be in the act of at
tempting to take his life, and he kills that man.
empt from punishment. If his delusion was that
the deceased had inflicted serious injury to
his character and fortune, and he killed him in
revenge for such supposed injury, he would be
liable to punishment" Here is an unhesitating
assumption that man, having an insane de-
fusion, has the power to think and act in regard
to it reasonably; that, at the time of the ofense
he ought to have and to exercise the knowledge
and self-contrOl which sane man would have
and exercise. were the facts with respect TO
" ID.
fact, bound to be reasonable in his unreasOn,
sane in his insanity. The judges thus actually
bar the application of the right and-wrong cri-
terion OF responsibility to a particular case by
authortatively prejudging it; instead of leaving
the question to the jury, they determine it be-
forehand by assuming the possession of the re-
quisite knowledge by the accused person. One
of them, however, Mr.. Justice Maule, SO far dis
sented as to maintain that the general test of
capacity to know right from wrong in the alb
iad tn iS 10
cases.
But this is not all the uncertainty which ap-
pears in these answers. In another part of
them, it is said. in reference to the same SUD-
posed case. that notwithstanding the party
accused did the act complained of with view
under the influence of insane delusion. Of re-
dressing or revenging some supposed grievance
or injury, or of producing some public benefit,
ne is nevertheless punishable, if he knew at the
time Of committing such crime that he was act
ing contrary to the law, by which is meant the
law of the land" This answer really conflicts
with former answer; it is obvious that the
knowledge of right and wrong is different from
the knowledge OF an act being contrary to the
law OF the land; and it is certain that an insane
person may do an act which he knows to be con-
trary to law, because. by reason Of his insanity.
he believes it to be right, because. under the in
fuence of insane delusion, he is law unto HIM
SELF and deems it duty to do it. perhaps
with view of producing some public benefit"
been seldom called in question, but it NAV well
be doubted whether the result of their solemn
deliberations, as embodied in their answers to
the questions put to them by the House of
Lords, will commend their wisdom to the ap-
probation Of foreign nations and future ages
If it be true, as is sometimes said, that the yer
dict of foreign nations is an anticipation of the
verdict of posterity. there are already suffi-
GENTLY strong indications that their conclu-
sions will be no hOnors to them in times
to come. That they are unanimously con-
demned by all physicians who have a practical
knowledge of the insane, may not affect the
confidence OF those who accept them, seeing
that judges and physicians take such different
standpoints; but when the judges of other
countries condemn them with equal earnest
ness. it is impossible for the most confident to
help feeling some hesitation. In the case of
State VS.. Jones, triedin the court of New Hamp-
shire, America, Judge Ladd, after passing in
review the answers of the English Judges thus
speaks OF the doctrine embodied in them:
1.-The doctrine thus promulgated law has found it's
way INTO the boOks and has doubtless been largely
received as the enumeration Of sound legal principle
since that day; Yet it is probable that ingenious
student OF the law ever read it for the first time without
cay holds man, confessed to be insane, accountable
ior the exercise OF the reason, judgment and
troing mental power that required in perfect
Tai nealtn IL 1s IN effect, saving the the