Orleans County monitor. [volume] (Barton, Vt.) 1872-1953, 1881-01-10
Gen. John SedgWick.
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| Look to the safety of your corps. Fall
| back on Fredericksburg or cross the riv-
| er at Banks Ford as you deem best
But to the strong and earnest appeal,
sCan you help me strongly if I am at
| tackled" there was no reply. In the di-
rection of Charlottesville there was the
silence of death. Not an answering gun
replied to the crash of our artillery which
echoed from every battery. The enemy
on our front, in fact | may say on our
three fronts, replied. The commanders
| of the other corps who stood inactive near
! Charlottesville heard the incessant roar
of the artillery near Salem chapel. They
chafed almost to mutiny, because while
| this gallant little band, less than one-fifth
| of the army, was contending against these
| desperate odds, six corps stood idle with
| in the sound of their guns. Sedgwick
and Hooker have passed away, and have
undergone that final judgment from which
there is no appeal. I am not here to say
one word Of disparagement Of the dead,
much less of a gallant soldier like General
Joseph Hooker, but I do stand here to
vindicate the memory of one Of the purest
men, one of the truest patriots, one of
the best and bravest-aye, and greatest
| soldiers that.ever honored any land by
| life of honorable service and a glorious
death upon the field Of battle. 1t has been
| stated before committee Of the National
| Congress, whose sole business seemed to
| be during the several years Of their con-
tinuance, to dishonor the names of the
best and truest of our soldiers, that Sedg-
wick's failure to obey the orders of Hook.
er was one of the chief causes of the fail
ure of the Charlottesville campaign.
This statement was principally made by
man who still lives and whom therefore
am at full liberty to answer. Daniel
Butterfeld, Major-General, chief of staff
of the Army of the Potomac, absent from
every position of danger during these OPP
erations, controlling at the old headquar-
tiers at Falmouth Prof. Lowe, the chief of
balloons, and doing a large correspond
ence in Napoleonic style by telegraph and
stenographer, has stated before this COM
mittee that General Sedgwick's delay was
the primal cause of the failure. General
Sedgwicks order to advance to Chancel-
louisville and be there at daylight included
another and more important commission
He was directed to make this march, i'm
possible in itself in the time allowed
impossible if the march was unresisted.
He was ordered to capture Fredericks-
burgh and everything in it, which he did.
He was ordered to carry Marye's Heights,
which he did magnifcently. He was or
dered to advance upon the plank-road,
which he did. He was also ordered to
between him and the General command
ing. This he CALAMITY attempted, and
did as much in the line of destruction as
. it was possible to do with the force at his
command. The same dispatch which or
dered him to destroy any intervening
r force informed him that the army COM
i manded by General Robert E. Lee was
between him and the position he was or.
Il
order to destroy General Lee and his
3. army was very easy to issue. Its eXecu
Z ton, as some of you gentlemen will per
haps remember, was attended will
considerable difficulty; and when it is
. considered that during the thirty-si1
~ hours that Sedgwick was struggling tt
y, execute this part Of the order, the mail
v body of our army, consisting of six corps
4 never fired shot, although within sounC
', of Sedgwicks guns, l submit that an,
= man who says that the failure could il
s. any degree whatever be attributed tt
IL Sedgwick, insults every soldier of hi
III command and dishonors the memory O
the dead.
When the day came, Lee overestimat
ing, as appears from his report made sub
: sequently, the extent of Sedgwick's forces
failed to make his attack in force unit
| about five o'clock in the afternoon HI
: believed that Sedgwick was accompanie
= by Reynolds Corps, and he hesitated t
attack until he could withdraw a sufficien
force from Hooker's front to make hi
victory certain. The main attack wa
made in the afternoon about five O'Clock
from the direction of Fredericksburgf
and made CALAMITY and with vigor. On
brigade of Howe's division, strongly pos
ed, received the assault and was broker
Then, as on many other days in the Ion
war for the Union, the farmyards and til
10 workshops, the schoolrooms and the CO
leges, the mountains and valleys, the cit
by the lake, and the hamlet on the hills
T! the Green Mountain State, spoke out t
the world for ''freedom and unity" spok
from the barrels of two thousand CLEAN
ing muskets and by the ringing cheers
two thousand Of the best and bravest me
that ever served a State The Vernon
= Brigade on the flank of NeilPs, holdin
the woods which fanked also the reb
advance, poured in their steady contrib
ton of well-directed bullets on the a,
vancing masses of the rebellion, and Il
! Sixth Corps and the army and the Unic
- were saved by Vermont. The night can
down upon anxious hearts. The bait
was over, nor gun nor color was lost; b
the position Of the old corps was still
critical as ever. | pass over the mela
IT choly history of the hours that followe
j. filed as they were with contradictory c
ders, one revoking the other, and thi
renewing the first The Sixt Corps eros
- ed the river that night making their pas
y age over the pontoons lighted by t
bursting shells which the enemy, wi
very creditable practice, was dropping
the vicinity of the bridges, and the. ne
day Hooker, far above, recrossed the RI
love love er, and this campaign was over. SEQ
eful wick lost five thousand men in his hone
pest -rf