The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1881-07-28
HOW GETTYSBURG WAS FOUGHT.

never forget its details. If you remem.
9er' we had brisk contest on the Ist of
July. Lees advance and the troona
covering tho Federal position were en-.
gagged. After this brush the Fedora,
sorces moved up and took position upon
Cemetery Hill, and began throwing up
breastworks. Ice moved up and tooF
position directly in front. Ewell, A. p
hiii and myself commanded the three
corps of Lees army. The first two we're
IN position when came up, joined Lee,
and looked over the position taken by
the Federals: had ordered my corps
around to the right of Cemetery Hill
ana, as L looked over the field, l said to
Gen Lee: They could not have taken a
more advantageous position for u.s.. The
federai troops had naturally strong
place, but we could have thrown our
troops around to the right, and had or.
dered Ellne in that direction, supposinp
our plan would be to take position be-
tween Cemetery Hill and Washington
and wait for an attack. After l had
looked few moments, Gen. Lee said ::
What would you do?' Throw the troo ps
around upon the right flank of the Fed
eral army and take position between
them and Washington, and you can thus
force them TO come out and attack YOU
The army Of the Potomac and the army of
Northern Virginia were too evenly
matched in numbers and prowess to
admit ofany mistakes. The army which
had the best position, forcing the other
to attack, was almost sure of success.
Between these two armies at that day
generalship was all important. No two
a. tnI,
each other. That was why ] wanted the
advantage of position and of defense
rather than attack We had gained
temporary advantage in the night of July
!, and our soldiers were in good spirits.
When Lee looked upon the field hc
thought he could assault the position
taken by the Federals, and, replying to
my suggestion to move to the right, aaid !:
No, will strike th>n where they are,
right between the eyes,
WAITING FOR THE DECISION.
This was in the evening, and | saw
he had his mind in the direction Of the
assault, and l did not urge him to adopt
my plan. saw him at daylight, intend.
ing to try and get him TO reconsider his
plan Of direct attack, or rather hoping he
would have done SO himself during the
night. Some time was spent in social
talk, and | had an idea. that he had
abandoned the thought of direct assault.
had, nevertheless, the night before with
drawn my troops from the direction in
which they were marching, aud put then
in position to meet Gen. Lees plan, il he
should decide to carry it out. He had
said nothing about his plans for so long
that thought he had concluded not to
attack, when, all at once, he looked up
and said: 'Longstrcet, you must make
the attack. Gen. Lee; there are not
l5,OO0 troops that ever marshaled under
flag that can make that attack and sue
ceed,' / replied. L have mile of open
ground to march over before I can reach
the enemy's position. NO, it is not a
mile, not more than 900 or 500 yards
| saw his mind WAS made up, and
mounting my horse, rode out to my COM
mand and ordered the advance. That
whole day the two divisions unde. my
command bore the blunt of the attack
upon the entre..ched position Of the Fed
eral Army at Gettysburg"
"Why didn't HIPS and Ewcll's corps
come to your relief?"
sToNEwALL JACKSON NEEDED.
at was partly Gen. Lees fault, but
very much Ewell's and Hills fault. Be.
fore Stonewall jackson was killed, he
aud | commanded the corps of Lees
army. We understood each other per-
fectly, and Lee understood us. All he
ever did was to give us his plans and
we executed them. lie never thought of
interfering with lis after he had explain
ed his wishes. No army in this world
was ever better organized than Lees
army when Jackson WAS alive. He and
were in perfect accord We could tell
by the firing Of our troops exactly each
others position, and there was co opera
ton and community Of feeling between
us rarely known between military com
manders. 1t was terrible blow to the
Confederacy when Jackson was killed.
At Gettysburg, Lee seemed to forget that
Js 3kson was not there and, after ex-
pressing to Hill, Ewell and myself his
plan, he left it to us to execute it, but
neither of them had Jacksons GOODNESS,
foresight or execution. The result was,
for whole day my two divisions did the
work of that terrible conflict, and the
carnage was fearful. lost more men
than at Chickamauga. Hancock's, Sick
les and Sedgwick's commands were all
engaged against US. Toward night one
OF the other corps had q slight engage
ment, and occupied some entrenchments
on the right which had been abandoned.
The result of the second days fighting |
need not refer to. The damage had been
done, and the mistake made upon the
first dav, when direct assault was
made"
Here Gen. Longstreet took from his
pocket memorandum of a letter from
Gen. Lee, which read: If had taken
you advice, the result would have been
different at Gettysburg"
A COMPARISON WITH METZ.
cat Metz during the Franco Prussan
war, identically the same station between
the French and Prussian armies was
presented rs between ours at Gettysburg.
was ut New Orleans then, and had Il
map of the country before me. When
the French army moved to Metz, leaving
Rheims, Won Moltke sou, HE advantage
and moved his army in between Metz
and Rheims. When that move was
made said to several gentlemen, who
were watching the progress of that war
with me, that there was the position OF
Gettysburg over again, but that Won
Moltke had taken advantage of the
movemen. from Rheims to Metz, and
was master of the situation. He was
nearer Rheims and nearer Paris than the
French commander, and, if we had made
the same move at Gettysburg, we would
have been nearer Washington or Phila
dclphia than Meade, aud could have
forced him to attack us. If we had
moved to the right Of Cemetery Hill, and
taken position between it and Washing.
ton, the result ut Gettysburg would have