The sun., 1881-06-26

| bTAul COnCcpllO0S, BoInB Oh lnb InObt bucCesb-
ful OF which ho earnestly opposed. 1t did not
tako Grant and Rawlns to make Grant. MS some
have said who know neither intimately. Raw
| Inns himself would havo been the frat to ropci
tho prctcnsion. Ho was simply an earnest.
| able man. who devoted himself absolutely to
serving his country. and for him this was sy-
nonymous with serving Grant"
| Now. those who arc acquainted with tho real
relationship OF Gen. Rawlns to Gen. Grant will
be astounded at tho presumption. no less than
| the Injustice. OF all this. Tho truth can do
no wrong to Con Grant. but tho contrary:
! and. Notwithstanding tho authors opinion.
| there are many who believed then. as they do
now that Con. Grant and Gen. Rnwlns wero
| alike necessary to each othor. Grant was
professional soldier. OF but limited scholarship.
/ little experience in war, and no experience in
! civil affairs, when ho became acquainted with
| Rawlins Mt Galena 1t is no disgrace or dis
credit to him that no was at that time lack
ing In political convictions as much ms he
was lacking in experience: while Rawlins.
an ardent Democrat and supposed to partako
OF the sympathies Of his party for the robels.
very greatly to the surprise OF his friends and
associates Immediately after the rebels fred
upon Fort Sumter. became a no less ardent
Unionist At the age of % this remarkable man.
the son OF poor Irish parents. was engaged In
burning charcoal for n living: he had not gono
to school during his whole life for an aggregate
period OF six months. and was necessarily but
poorly educated. 1t is true. however. that
he was man OF undoubtod ability.
OF instructive sympathy with popular feel
ings. passionately patriotic. and having n
natural genius for public affairs both
civil and military" Gen. Badcau should
have added that in those respects he was. In the
estimation OF those who know him best. quite
tho equal OF any man who made his mark dur
ing tho civil war. His strength OF mind was ex-
traordinary. his ouickness OF perception aston
ishing. and his force OF will UNSURPASSED. He
was virtuous and austero in the highest degree;
his habits were simple and unaffected. his
appettes and passions were perfectly under
subJugation, lie could become extraorii-
nariy violent upon occasion. but it is also
true that he never gave rein to anger ex-
copt to denounce vice. insubordnation. or
incf1iciency. Our author tells us that he
could seize the ideas of his chief and present
them SO completely that bystanders often
thought them his own. Wo knew both OF them
well enough to venture the assertion that Gen.
Grant himself would admit that thoy were quite
as frequently Rawlnss ideas as his own.
1t is part OF tho unwritten and hitherto un-
disputed history OF our times that throughout
the period OF Grants greatest performances.
extending from the Doneson campaign to
tho end OF the Chattanooga campaign, Raw
Inns was his most constant companion and
ablest adviser. Indeed. he was as much to
Grant as Gneisenau to BlHcher or Berthier to
Bonaparte; for although he was not an ed
ucnted soldier. his was q positive. aggressive.
and outspoken nature. acting upon ono who
possessed these qualities in q far less degree
than himself 1t was Rawlins who reproved tho
fno olnun oin pf 10 rin wall
rs pressed him forward vigorously on the
path OF duty and victory. 1t was Rawlins who
reflected tho best sentiments OF the army rs well
as Of the people. held Mt bay tho sycophants and
bummers who shamelessly attached themselves
to Grants staff, and SO persistcntly followed his
fortunes to the end, 1t was he who strength
ened the good resolutions OF his chief till they
were victorious and combate1 tho bad ones
till they were suppressed and abandoned.
The author admits in the note lust quoted
that Rawl!ns was man OF instructive sympa-
thy with the popular feeling. whether in the
army or out OF it. but he might more properly
have stated that he was fearless in represent
ing at all times and all occasions to his chief
the best sentiments OF the people and the bcst
ideas of the army In this respect his conduct
was altogether admirable Tho weak. incom-
potent. and corrupt stunned him rs they would
have Stunned the plague: the strong and zeal
ous found in him their ablcst and most fearless
friend. 1t was Rawins who persstenty
urged upon Gen. Grant the propriety OF rum
ming tho batteries at NicSsburg. although the
idea did not originate with him. and OF conduct
ing q campaign eastward from some suitable
point below TO Jackson before turning against
Yicksburg. It Is true that Rawlns never
claimed credit for these things. and that the
records in most cases fail to show what course
he recommended or what ideas he advanced
1t is nevertheless known to many who are still
living that Rawlins had views OF his own on all
questions. and never feared to advocate them.
II was Rawins who constantly besought Grant to
give the enemy no rest. but to press him con-
tinualiy until driven from the field; but it was
not Rawlns who advised him to attack fortitlca-
tons in front. nor to use constantly the parallel
order OF battle. 1t was Rawlins who wished to
fight IL out on that line il it took all summer:
but it was not Raw!ins who proposed the use-
less assaults at Spotsylvania and Cold Harbor.
Tho second and last time that Rawlins is
mentioned by the author Is on pages l56 and 157
OF volume 3. as follows:
RGwlins. however. was intensely opposed to
the proposed march OF sherman 10 tho sea.
so long ms Hood was in the rear. and had
combatel 1t with every argument ut his dis
posal. Grant rs n rule allowed his stan to pre-
sent their views on military matters freely. and
soma OF them were accustomed to do SO with
great ability. but when once his decisions were
made they received them as final and did what
ever was in their power to make them succeed,
but in this instance the anxiety Of Rawlins led
him to an act OF downright insubordination.
He started for the West bearing the order above
quoted. and stopped n day at Washington.
Here he saw tho President and the Secretary of
War and expressed 40 iorcibly his apprchen-
sions MS to the result OF allowing Sherman to
move south and leave Thomas to contend with
Hood. that he actually induced the Government
toscnd II despatch to Grant desiring him TO re-
consider his decision"
In this instance It will be observed that Raw
lns is condemned without argument and with
out effort to show that his judgment WAS at
fault. We do not intend here to discuss tho
strategyIoL this campaign. but merely to point
out that wiser military writer's than Badeau have
criticised it severely. The merest tyro in mil
itary science could show the defects OF tho
plan under which Sherman. Grant. and