Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1881-11-30
LAW AND INSANITY.
BY HENRY MAUDsLEY, N. D.

1.-THE following is taken from paper on 'Responsi-
b1lity Ia Mental Diseases, by Henry Maudsey NJ. d.
the celebrated English lecturer and writer ON medical
JURISPRUDENCE and psychological mattersl
Looking back at the strange and erroneous
notions which were formerly entertained Of the
nature and causes Of insanity and considering
what little observation was made Of its mani
fold varieties, we cannot wonder that its juris-
prudence was in very defective state. At first
TWO kinds Of insanity only seem to have been
recognized by English law-idiocy and li.nacy:
the idiot who, from his nativity, by perpetual
1nnrnity Is non cOnlpOs, and the lunatic, who
hath sometimes his understanding, and sometimes
not, dliquando gaudet htcidis interudlis, and
therefore is non cOnsp0s mertis, SO long as he
hath not understanding. But as time went on
partial insanity was recognized as distinct
from total insanity, although this partial insan-
ity was declared not to absolve person from
responsibility for his criminal acts. There is"
says Lord Hale, ga partial insanity and total
insanity. The former is either in respect to
things, q,todd hoe eel ilud i,asdnire Some per-
sons that have competent use Of reason in re-
spect of some subjects are yet under particu-
lar den,entid in respect of some particular dis
courses, subjects or applications; or else it is
partial in respect of degrees; and this is the
condition of very many, especially melancholy
persons, who for the most part discover their
defect in excessive fears and griefs, and yet
are not wholly destitute Of the use of
reason; and this partial insanity seems not to
excuse them in the committing of any offense
for its matter capital; for, doubtless most per-
sons that are fAOns Of themselves and others
are under q degree of partial insanity when
they commit these OffeHses. 1t is very difficult
hat voi1J 4hD& j..
and partial insanity; but it must rest upon cir
cumstances duly to be weighed by Judge and
jury lest, on the one side, there be kind of in
humanity toward the defects of human nature;
or, on the other side, too great an indulgence
given to great crimes" The Invisible line
noted, between sanity and insanity, but between
perfect and partial insanity. 1t was thought no
inhumanity toward the defects of human nature
to punish as fully responsible agent a, person
who was suffering from partial insanity. what
ever influence the disease might have had upon
his unlawful act.
The principle thus laid down by Lord Hale
was subsequently acted upon in English courts.
Thus, in the trial of Arnold, an undoubted
lunatic, for shooting at Lord Onslow, in 1723,
of frantic humor, or something unaccount-
BILE in mans actions, that points
him out to be such a mailman as is ex-
empted from punishment: it must be a man
that is totally deprived of his understanding and
memory, and doth not know what he is doing.
no more than an infant than brute or wild
beast; such one is never the object of punish
ment." In this respect q wide distinction was
maintained between civil and criminal cases;
for while the law would not allow exemption
from punishment for criminal acts unless the
reason was entirely gone, it invalidated per-
sons civil acts, and deprived him of the man
agement of himself and his affairs, when his in
sanity was only partial. and when the act voided
had no discOverable relation to it, mans in
tellect might not be sufficient to enable him to
conduct his AFFAIRS and to dispose Of his prop
erty, though quite sufficient to make him re-
sponsible for criminal act: it was right to hang
for murder one who was not though fit to take
care of himself and his affairs.
1t was at the trial Of Hadfeld, in 1900, for
shooting at the king in Drury Lane Theater.
that Lord Hale's doctrine was first discredited,
and step forward made for the time. The at
tOrney general, who prosecuted, had appealed
to this doctrine, and told the jury, in accord
ance with it, that to exempt person from pun
ishment on the ground of insanity there must
be total deprivation of memory and under
standing. MIR. Erskine, who was counsel for
the defence, argued forcibly in reply that if such
words were taken in their literal sense "no such
madness ever existed in the world;' that in
all the cases that had filled Westminster
insane persons had not only had the
most perfect knowledge and recol-
lection of all the relations they stood in toward
others. and Of the acts and circumstances of
their lives, but had in general been remarkable
for subtlety and acuteness; and that deluson,
of which the criminal act in question was the
immediate unqualified offspring, was the kind
of insanity which should rightly exempt from
punishment. Delusion, therefore, where there
Is no frenzy or raving madness, is the true
character OF insanity" There was no doubt
that Hadtield knew right from wrong. and that
lie was conscious of the nature Of the act
before he committed it; he manifested design in
planning and cunning in executing it; he ex-
pected also that it would subject him to punish
ment, for this was his motive in committing it:
still it was plain to everybody that he was mad,
and that the act was the product of his mad
ness. The result was that he was acquitted. the
acquittal not having taken place in consequence
OF judicial adoption of delusion in place of
sometimes been said. but having been rather
triumph of Erskine's eloQuence, and of COM
nonsense over legal dogma.
In the next remarkable case, that Of Belling-
ham, who was tried for the murder of Mr.
Spencer Perceyal, in 1912, a conviction took
although it was perfectly clear that
he had acted under the influence of
insane delusions the attorney general,
who prosecuted, declaring, and Chief Justice
Mansfield, who tried the case, concurring, upon
the authority of the first sages in the country,
and upon the authority of the established law in
all times which has never been questioned, that
although man might be incapable of conduct
ing his own affairs, he may still be answerable
for his criminal acts, if he possesses mind ca
pable of distinguishing right from wrong"
Note here, then, that a modification had now
been made in the test of responsibility; in place
of its being required that the sufferer. in order
to be exempt from punishment, should be to-
tally deprived Of understanding and memory,
and know not what he was doing, no more than
a brute or wild beast-in place. that is, of
what might be called the 'wild- beast" form of
the power of distinguishing
right from wrong was insisted on as the test of
responsibility. The law had changed consider
ably without ever acknowledging that it had
Let it be observed however, that it
was the power Of distinguishing right from
wrong, not in relation to the particular act. but
generally, which was made the criterion of re-
spOnsibity in this case; for Lord Mansfield.
speaking of the kind of insanity in which the
patient has the delusiOn of being injured, and
revenges himself by some hostile act, said that.
sucha person were capable, in other respects.
OF distinguishing right from wrong; there was
no excuse :or any act Of atrocity which he might
commit under this description of arrangement.
1t must be proved beyond all doubt that, at the
time he committed the atrOcious act. ne did
not consider that murder was crime against the
laws of God and Nature'1
Thus far it is evident that nrincinle wa q oh nr