The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1881-06-23

so. To defeat him in battle and gair
great consequent strength in supplies
men and productive territory.
rs To prevent the waste of the army
incident to inactivity.
.'6. To inspirit the troops and the
country by success and discourage the
enemy.
seq. To obviste the necessity of falling
back, which might probably occur if oui
antagonist be allowed to consummate
his plaus without molestation.
Seen. Johnston cordially approved oi
an aggressive movement, and informed
me Of his purpose to make itas soon as
.reinforcements and supplies, then on the
way, should reach him. He did not ap.
prove of the proposed advance into
Tennessee. He believed that the Fed
erai forces in Tennessee were not weaker,
but if anything stronger, than at Mis-
sionarY Ridge that defeat beyond the
Tennessee would probably prove ruinous
to us, resulting in the loss of Ills army,
the occupation of Georgia by the enemy,
the piercing of the Confederacy in its
vitals,' and the loss of all the Southwes-
tern Territory. He proposed, therefore,
to stand: on the defensive until strength
ened; sto watch, prepare, and strike aa
soon as possible. As soon as reinforced
he declared his purpose to advance to
Ringgold, attack there, and, if successful,
as he expected to be, TO strike at Cleve-
land, cut the railroad, control the river,
and thus isolate East Tennessee, and as
q consequence, force his antagonist to
give battle on this side of the Tennessee
River. 70 enable Gen. Johnston to re.
pulse the hostile advance and assume the
offensive, no effort was spared on the
part of the Government. Almost all the
available military strength of the South
and West, in men and supplies was
pressed forward and placed at his dispo-
sal. The supplies: of the commissary,
quartermaster, and ordinance depart
'ment of his army were represented as
ample and suitably located. The troops,
encouraged by the large accessions OF
strength which they saw arriving daily,
and which they knew we're marching
rapidly to their support, were eager to
advance and confident lin their power to
achieve yictory.and recover the territory
which they. had lost. Their position was
such as to warrant the confident expec-
tation of successful resistance at least.
Long mountain ranges penetrated by few
and difficult roads and paths and deep
and wide rivers, seemed to render our
position one from which we could not be
dislodged or turned, while that of the
enemy, dependent for supplies upon a
single line of railroad from Nashville to
the point where he was operating, was
manifestly perilous. The whole country
shared the hope which the government
entertained, that a decisive victory would
soon be won in the mountains of Geor-
gia, which would free the South and
West from invasion, would open to our
occupation aud support of our armies
the productive territory of Tennessee
and Kentucky, and so recruit our army
in the West as to render it impracticable
for the enemy to accumulate additional
forces in Virginia"
After detailing retreat after retreat of
Johnston with his splendid army of
nearly seventy thousand men from the
strongest positions to be had, the author
says:
whether the superior numerical
strength of the enemy, by enabling him
to extend his force beyond the flank of
ours, did thereby uecessitate the aoan-
Comment of every position taken by our
army, and whether the enemy, declining
to assault any of our intrenched camps,
would have ventured to leave it in rear,
upon his only line of communication
and supply, or whether-we might have
obtained more advantageous results by a
vigorous and determined effort to attack
him in detail during some of his army
Hank movements, are questions upon
which there has been decided conflict
Of opinion and upon which it would be
for me now neither useful noi pleasant
to enter. When it became known that
The Army of Tennessee had been success
sively driven from one strong position
to another until iinally it had reached
the earth.works constructed for the ex-
terror defence of Atlanta, the popular
disappointment was extreme. The pos
bible fall of the Gate City, with its i'm
portant railroad communication, vast
stores, factories for che manufacture Of
all sorts of military supplies, rolling
mills and foundries, was now contempla.
ted for the first time at its full value, and
produced intense anxiety far and wide.
From many quarters, including such as
had most urged his assignment, came
delegations, petitions and letters urging
me to- remove Gen. Johnston from the
command. of the army and assign that
important trust to some officer who would
resolutely hold and defend Atlanta
While sharing in the keen disappoint.
ment. at the failure of the campaign
which pervaded the whole country I was
perhapsimor apprehensive than others
of the disasters likely to result from it,
because I was in position to estimate
more accurately their probable extent.
II \ Still resisted the stead.
lily increasing pressure which was brought
W uedT W iuuuce ue u [eVOke ulS u.s.
sigument, and only issued the order re.
lieving him from command when be-
came satisfied that his declared purpose
to occupy the works at Atlanta with
militia levies and withdraw his army
into the open country for freer operations
would inevitably result in the loss of
that important point. and where the re-.
treat would cease could not be foretold.
If the Army Of Tennessee was found to
be unable to hold positions of great
strength like those at Dalton, Resaca,
Etowah, Kennesaw and on the Chatta-
hooche could not reasonably hope that
it would be more successful in the plains
below Atlanta, where it would find
neither natural nor artificial advantages
of position"
ATTACK ON SHERMAN.
Abiding to Sherman's order that all
civilians, male and female, living in AT.
lanta must leave it within FIVE days from
the issuance of the order, Mr.. Davis