The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1881-06-30
tions in reference to the care of my own
troops. He hardly cared to remove me,

tions in reference to the care of my own
troops. He hardly cared to remove me.
but Lee had to go to crafty his spite.
"I notice, however, that he says that
when Sherman was making his march to
the sea the Confederacy was in its death
agonies, and yet understand one of his
charges against me is that I did not pro.
long the war by retreating and maneu'
vering after he himself acknowledges
that the cause was in its death agony.
The point he makes about Stonewall
Jackson's foot cavalry was very trite
saying in 1861, but the condition of that
superb body of men was quite different
in 1864. They were badly shattered
even before Jackson died. His calling
me the Fabius of the civil war, thus con-
trasting me with the famous Roman gen.
eral who won his victories BY avoiding
battles, is amusing. He forgets that
Grant, with no larger force than Sher.
man had, pushed Lee with force equal
to mine further in month than General
Sherman pushed me in two months and
a half of continued fighting. The diff.
ference between Grant and Sherman was
that Sherman seemed to avoid fighting
as much as possible, so as to save his
men, while Grant forced the fighting
from the time he struck Lee.
sHERMAN's SUPERB ARMY.
s'In many respects General Sherman
had the strongest army. 1t was made up
mostly of men raised in the west and
used all their lives to frearms-men who
we're selfreliant, and would fight without
officers almost. The best soldiers do not
come from the populous centers. The
man who has always relied upon himself
is fuller of resource than any other and
safest in an emergency. This bold, self
reliant force of Sherman's was oficered
by. men OF the same meattle, and, I be-
.lieve, it is generally conceded that, TAX
ing it as whole, Sherman's army was
offcered all through with stronger men
than Grants. It was a superb army for
theserEice it undertook"
stMr. Davis charges that when you
took command of the army of Tennessee
he urged upon you an aggressive cam
paign, but that you utterly opposed the
plan of an invasion of Tennessee"
"The history of that matter is pecu-
liar one. General Bragg was one of Mr..
Davis pets, and he had had command in
the, West of a superb body of troops for
long time without doing much more
with them than to stand and then retreat
when the enemy gave battle. Look at
the march through Kentucky where
sBraggsnearly reached the banks of the
Ohio. River and was within gunshot of
Louisville and Lexington. He then re-
treated through the Cumberland Noun.
tains to Knoxville, and thence to Muir
freesboro, where that terrific battle was
fought and his troops beaten. Then
Chattanooga and then the undecisive
battle of Chicamauga, which regard as
the bloodiest battle of the war, and
thence to Dalton, covering series of
disasters under one leadership rarely
known in the history Of war.
"While this army was in Dalton, l re-
ceived an order from MIR. Davis to report
Immediately at Dalton and relieve Cen
eral Bragg of the command; that I
would find instructions awaiting me
there. When arrived I found instruc-
tions the most audicrous I think ever saw
written for like purpose. They con-
sisted in detailing the superb morale and
spirit of the forces of which | had taken
command. After recitiDg their charac-
ter, they concluded with the statement
that I was taking command of as strong
and effective a force as then represented
the Confederate Army in any quarter,
etc. The facts were that there were only
about two thousand mounted efficient
cavalry and about thirty-eight thousand
infantry, just from the serious rererses /
have described and the terrible conflict
of Chickamauga. I realized the neces-
sity of gathering more effective force
of cavalry and of augmenting and put
ting in condition the infantry force
which had so long marched to battle
without an ipspiriting victory before
making an aggressive campaign. My
fear was that before this could be done,
Sherman, who had 280,000 men under
his call, all of whom were not, of course,
at Chattanooga, but under his command,
would strike us at Dalton before my ar
rangements were completed.
General Longstreet, with his corps,
although not with me, was to reinforce
the shattered army I have described.
But the absurdity Of Mr.. Davis PROPOSE
ton to invade Tennessee, the failure to
appreciate which, being one of his griev.
ances, can be seen by the fact that to do
so General Longstreet would have to
march from ore point by circuitous
route to the river, and I by another, and
there form junction, he having an army
on his flank, while I was to leave Sher-
mans army on my flank or rear and
move with wagon train forty miles
long.
lieved of this command, Mr.. Davis took
him to Richmond as one of his advisers,
and gave him position, unknown to the
law, of commander-in.chief of the armies,
and it was through Bragg that I received
many of these suggestions as to the con-
templated military maneuvres in Tennes-
see, which Mr.. Davis evidently thinks
were brilliant. As I expected, General
Sherman attacked me at Dalton before L
could recruit the cavalry and reinforce
the infantry, and then began the running
fight to Atlanta, where I was relieved" :"
BEFORE ATLANTA.
"Mr. Davis in his book undertakes to
prove that you we're removed while at
Atlanta because you would not give him
positive answer as to whether you
would fight General Sherman there, and
quotes an interview with Ben Hill to
show that you evaded his categorical
question as to whether or not you would
make battle there"
"Mr. Davis always kept a class of men
about him for witnesses, and Ben Hill
was one OF the most prominent Of them.
Judah P. Bepjamin's duty was to keep
his record straight. There is not a per-
L. ohort "a