Savannah morning news. [volume] (Savannah) 1868-1887, 1881-07-30
1850.

X
perience has the peace of the Union been dis
turbed and its permsnence endangered. and
on each occasion the disturbing cause assumed
the form OF an attempt on the part of one
section TO use the Federal Government against
the industrial interests of another. Protection
in 1882 asSailed the interest of the non-manu-
featuring and non-'niniDg States abolition IN
1860 aSSailed the interests of the slaveholding
states, and although on each occasion the
Union has survived and the vanquished have
buried the issue by voluntarily adopting
among themselves that of which the
threatened imposition had provoked their
resistance. the political institutions of
the country exhibit to-day the
modifying effects. not only of those paroxysms
OF excitement, but of the resulting reactions,
so that the simple features of early American
republicanism are hardly any longer discern
ible under the hard lines of national develop
ment II ever again there should unhappily
come diSsension among the States iU can only
have its rise in an effort on the part or one
State or section to use the power Of the Fed
eral Government in a way which shall be re-
garded by other States or sections as detri-
mental to their material interests; for in these
days men are slow to fight for religion or for
political IDEAS but nothing more quickly pro-
duces national strife than greed on the one side
and the fear of spoliation on the other
To allow Congre ess to manage the railroads
will be to multiply the opportunities and there
by to offer the strongest temptations for pre-
cisely such attempts to secure sectional advan-
tages and preferences as would most surely
We who have passed through the evil days of
such strife may well seek to avert from our
children a like experience.
Ii these views are correct, it is the more inn
portant for the States to deal with the subject
promptly, so that there shall be the less excuse
for the action of Congress. There has been no
little effort upon the part of some of the States
to devise and apply such regulations as might
satisfy the public on the one hand and comply
on theo ther with the eXigencies of those natu-
raj laws of trade which are as inviolable by
States as they are by individuals and corpora
tions.
Upon these laws of trade the railroads take
their stand, and their position has of late been
much strengthened by the general improve
ment of trade and by the demand that has
arisen for new lines and quicker transit. The
public have come to understand that legisla-
tion conceived in spirit of mere hostility to
railroads is not only unjust but unwise. because
sure to prove either abortive or more damag-
ing to the people than to the corporations.
Everywhere the people feel this dependence
upon the extension and improvement of exist
ing railroads and upon the building of new
ones for the full development of the resources
of the country; hence both public interest and
moral right require that whatever control is
exerted by the State authorities shall be con-
sistent with the prosperity of the railroads sub
jected to it, 1t is said that no railroad legiSla-
tion has yet proved practical success that
most of it has been suffered to become obso-
lete. and that the ablest men who have had
experience either as legislators or as railroad
COMMISSIONERS arc COnNluCoU lIidb IL iS pEdC-
ticable to devise any general system of laws
where by the cost of transportation can be so
regulated as to give satisfaction to the public
and leave to the railroads proper freedom Of
management-freedom of management within
some limits being not only just, but essential to
the usefulness of the railroad, for without it
there can be no adequate inducement to enter
prise. and no responsibility for results.
Baffied in the effort to regulate railroad rates
by statute the public mind has in some cases
turned in the direction Of trying to do so by
means of commissioners, and in some States
railroad commissioners have been created and
endowed with powers, which, if not sufficient
for the purpose, are at least unusual under
our sy stem of government and seem almost
foreign to the genius of American institutions
If there is one prevailing characteristic of the
political institutions Of this country, Federal,
State and municipal, which is more than any
other relied upon to preserve public liberty
and secure private right it is that principle
which is found in all Of them, uniformly distin-
gushing, separating and carefully defining as
to each other the powers classed respectively
as executive, legislative and judicial
These railroad commissions have been con-
stituted in violation of this principle. The
persons composing these commissions have
been invested, with reference to the same sub
jectS and in their relations to the same Objects
with powers at once executive, legislative and
judicial. Owing no doubt to the high char
acter of the persons heretofore selected as
commissioners, and to the confidence reposed
in them, public attention seems not to have
tenn of government, but as surely as principles
are more persistent than human circumspec-
tion, just so surely will evil arise from vio-
lation OF the principle which the Fathers Of
American liberty have laid down as one of the
fundamentals of our political institutions.
Aside from this objection to the method of
government by commission, which if sane
toned in respect to railroads may come to be
applied to municipalities and eventually by
Congress to the States themselves, experience
has so far only thrown doubt upon the de
pendence to be placed upon the capacity of
any commission to deal with the transporta-
tion question in such way as to meet the
requirements of public interests ON the one
hand and justice to the railroad on the other
without being vested with powers more com
prehensive and more Objectionable than those
which already seem too much so.
A commission endued with powers adequate
to the task would become more dangerous than
the railroads are besides it would almost
surely be made the unconscious instrument of
Spoliation by one railroad upon others So
far il is said the only result of the effort to
manage railroads by commissions has been
to increase the number of State officials, with
the attendant evils of augmented expense to
the public, and the increase of that patronage
which has become so serious an obstacle to
good government
Must we then conclnde that the power of
railroad corporations cannot be regulated by
the State, that no security can be taken
against their abusing that power, to the op-
preston of communities and the injury of in
dividuals. and that the only course left to the
public is to take whatever advantage they can
Of competition among the railroads and trust
to the slow operation of the natural laws of
trade for the adjustment OF inequalities and
the correction of abusesS Surely not unless it
can be shown that there are no methods of
State regulation except those that have been
already tried with so little success.
1t may be that heretofore the States have
had their efforts misdirected. 1t is conceivable
that State attempts the impossible when it
attempts to regulate railroad by, as it " ere,
or T1oN OWaF
opposing only statutory force and the reguIa-
tive influence of commissioners to those ply
sical monetary and trade forces which the
railroads command and which they are skilled
to use. Instead of persevering in a contest
where the State must be at a disadvantage, it
may be better to try to regulate its railroads,
by securing to the public a controlling voice in
their management, and by placing the persons
having the management Of the rates and
trains under such obligations and responsible
ties as will insure their fidelity to the public
interest and thsir attention to the require
ments of the communities they serve.
To accomplish these ends it will not be neces-
sary to decide in advance what the public in
terest requires in each case, or even in all
cases. but to allow the public itself to deter
mine that with reference to each point as il
arises NOminally the railroad is owned by the
public, and on that ground enjoys its fran
chises, but really the public is only the owner
of the railroad securities. The corporation in
which are vested the active and controlling
powers of ownership is, in almost all cases,
governed by a few men who, having once been
elected directors. easily perpetuate their in
Auence, choose their associates and become
practically independent OF the stockholders
and of the public. This is the true source of
all the trouble about the railroads. and this is
the evil which needs correction
1t is inconsistent and unwise for us to initiate
European or monarchical methods in dealing
with these subjects. The State cannot govern,
and should not seek TO govern, either its cor
porations or its individual citizens, by bureaus
or To faff hair hrrcir Evy ofa :
should apply to such cases the American or
republican methods, namely: give to the cor
porations constitutions framed with view to
practical self-government and hold their
officers responsible for results. The corpora
tions of the country are dangerous because
while they are democratic In theory, they are
really in practice monarchical. In our corpo-
rations: as in France under Napoleon III, the
plebiscite is the bulwark Of the empire
Now our system of political government re-
quires LEGAL representation and concurrent
majorities, and we should apply that principle
to our corporations. We should require them
to be so organized as that every important in
terest in the territory dependent upon each
may find representation in its board of directors
and and representation as will be vigilant and
effective To accomplish this it will be neces-
sary only for the State to pass a law that in
every corporation chartered by it each share
shall be entitled to a vote for but one director,
and that the board shall be composed of
fixed number Of the persons obtaining the
largest support in This way.
The effect Of such law will be to prevent
the making of tickets. to give to each share
holder his own special representative in the
board, to make these representatives indepen
dent each Of the other and to fix upon each
director a sole and separate responsibility re-
quiring him individually to be vigilant as TO the
interests Of that particular section of the
shareholders which he has been selected TO rem
resent.
Suppose a railroad with 10000 shares and
twelve directors. II the 10000 votes were