The Mankato free press. [volume] (Mankato, Blue Earth County, Minn.) 1879-1924, 1881-05-27
Who Lost UCaferlOO E.
June Atlantic.

In a sense, the harsh expressions
of CheSney and others about the utter
state of ignorance in which the empe'
rOr was as to the strategy of his enc
mics, that he did not take at all into
consideration the possibility Of the
march of the whole l'russian army
from Wavre To join Wellington, and
so OH, are true. They dre true so far
as this: that Napoleon, having in.
trusted the whole duty of finding out
about the Russians - where they
were, and whether they were going
to unite with the English or MOTTO
GrOuchy, and having given him Il
competent force and plenty of cavalry
and an express warning as to the dan.
ger of the union Of their army with
the English, had considered that he
had done all that was needful and
undoubtedly he was taken by surprise
when the blow came. But they are
not true in the sense that Napoleon
was throughout blind to the posi-
bility of this junction Of the allied
armies, and took no measures to pre-
vent il. If an experienced SEA cap
tain, on approaching a dangerous
coast, intrusts the deck to one of his
officers, to whom he gives a sufficient
number of men, and whom he warns
to beware of the dangers arising from
the force of certain currents, and
then goes below, he is undoubtedly
taken by surprise when the ship runs
ashore. In his berth. asleep, he GER
tainly did not forcsee the catastrophe.
His principal, if not his only, fault
was in the choice of the officer to
whom he intrusted the deck. AS to
his knowledge of the perils of that
part of the voyage, that cannot be
questioned.
SO with Napoleon. His throwing
the entire responsibility Of taking
care of the Prussians on Marshal
Grouchy was his chief fault, for
Grouchy was not able to sustain such
a burden. Davoust, whom he might
have had. and ought to have had, in
Grouchy's place, would successfully
have carried out his ideas. And
while | fully admit the emperor's
dilatorineSs on the morning of the
18th, by which the concentration of
the PruSsian army at Wavre was as
sured. which III fact made it impOssi-
BILE for Grouchy, Or for Davoust even,
to prevent this concentration {; and
while ! also fully admit the negligence
of the emperor in leaving Grouchy so
long without any instructions, except
the warning of the possibly intended
junction of the allied armies contained
in the Bertrand letter, yet l cannot
agree with those who, like Chesney,
say that 1.-THE notion that Grouchy is
responsible for the Waterloo defeat
mnst be dismissed, by those who
choose to weigh the evidence, from
the domain of authentic history to
the limbo of national iigments.' The
responsibility must be divided be-
tween the emperor and his lieutenant.
Charging npon Napoleon, as we must,
the faults above specified, it must yet
not he forgotten that had Grouchy
intelligently carried ont the empcror's
instructions contained in the Bertrand
letter he might have been in a posi-
ton to defeat, or at least hinder, the
junction of the allied armies.
1t is hardly to he questioned that,
if Grouchy had mOyed at four O'Clock
in the morning by way of Mousty, and
had put himself in communication
with the main army, his forces would
have stopped the Prussian advance,
and allowed the emperor to use his
whole army against the dukes forces,
which were inferior in numbers and
composition. Instead of being obliged
to detatch 10000 infantry against the
Prussians, Napoleon could have used
them against the English, and from
what we know of the condition of
Wellington's army in the latter part
Of the afternoon, the result would
have been a decided victory for Ma
poleon. II, on the other hand.
Grouchy had, even aslate as midday,
changed his plan, and. following the
advice of Gerard, had marched to join
the emperor, he would certainly have
averted the catastrophe, even if he
had arrived too late to insure vic
tory for his side.