Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1881-05-14

his army wen in hand, resolved to force Les
out OF his works to tight him. At midnight on
the 4tn Of May the federal troops, carving
and three days beef. with supply trains car
rying ten days forage ,na and subsistence
esdge dof the o1%ea B. cen an sssg
Wick s and Gen. Hancock. Gen. Grant
started from Culpeper 'about eight O'clock
s ans roa U1g the eea ay spd the
were in fine spirits." "The crossing Of
the Rapdsn Gel Grant regarded as I'M
cred the movement he put his troops In motion.
meaning to strike Grant on the right. Gen.
Grant discovering this faced his army west
without giving the confederate commander
the opportunity OF attacking him. Thus
began the tremendous battle known as the
preston that Grant was surprised by Lee is
dispelled by the dispatch trim Gen. Grant
to Gen Meade written before s O'Clock in
the morning, In which he says: eff an oppor-
tuntty presents itself for pitching into Lees
army, do so without giving time for disposi-
tons BY noon Gen. Warren was engaged,
him back. The contest was terrible. At 2
o'clock Gen. Hancocks column was In sight, and
Hancock himself began that brilliant record
details. Gen. Hancock fought outside OF his
breastworks. The battle was terrible: the
sound was like one incessant peal of thunder.
and most remarkable to those familiar With
battles because SO seldom interrupted by ar
tiilery; for neither cavalry nor artillery could
be used where infantry was hardly able
no nierlsson OF tbs te1rio s DS unusa a
sound. Maneuvering, was impossible; neither
Officers nor men could see .ifvy yards before
them. and Wadsworth was compelled to direct
the march OF his troops by the compass" The
day ended without decisive results. Gen.
Grant had drawn Gen. Lee out OF his intrench-
md nlIpdh in ntSt l,n}n.
endeavOrs. 1.-THE men On both sides fought
splendidly. whether they attacked or repelled:
but the battle was as wrestle, as blind as at
midnight, In wilderness, that made maneu-
vers 1mpracicable as In jungle, where regl-
ments stumbled on each other and on the
enemy by turns, firing sometimes into their
next morning at half past 4, but Gen. Meade
thought he could not be ready In time, and 80
the hour was postponed till s.
HANCOCK IN THE WILDERNESS.
During this battle Gen. Badeau pays O high
tribute to the generaship OF Hancock, who
received the brunt OF Lees attack, and although
badly handled succeeded In winning all that he
bad lost. A good deal OF the delay In the first
days action is attributed to Cen Burnside's
corps becoming, as it were, engulfed In the I'M
passable density OF the wilderness. 1t is
Grant that in the very crisis Of the battle. when
the result appeared doubtful he discussed with
some OF his officers the possibility of throwing
his whole army between Lee and Richmond.
results. Although there were panicky ex-
element and gloom in the national camp,
we learn from the confederates that the
same condition OF affairs existed in the camp OF
the enemy. "It was Fortunate" writes the
Confederate General Early, "that the directions
came to close the affair, as had the enemy been
have brought up fresh troops and awaited him.
self OF our condition during the night The
Tumor came to the eff CT that Gen. Sedg Wick
driven In, the right OF the army b ad been
turned, and headquarters were In danger of
capture 'Gen. Grant," says Gen. Badeau,
could not know at FIRST whether these rdmor5
quietly. ordered troops to be sent to Sedgwick S
support. the second line to be formed inside of
that which had been broken, and when his
orders were given went back to his pillow and
slept till morning. His Officers discussed the
situation for hours, and sat up to learn the fate
OF Sedgwick, wondering at their Chief, who slept
amid such danger"
GRANTS GENERALsHIP-"PUsH ON"
Although the 18th OF May was a day OF terri
Bile fighting. Gen. Grant allowed his army no
rest. ''Have the men" he said to Gen. Burnside
woke up and under arms at half past g." Gen
, Mott. VINO did so badly under Gen. Hancock,
had his division reduced to brigade. The dis
ciplne OF the army for thef first time began to be
stern: Although 1t appeared that the President
mad given Grant complete control OF the military
forces, we see in many cases that this control
was nominal. Political considerations were
still allowed to sway the selection OF Generals.
At time when the fortunes OF the republic
were trembling In the balance OF military
success such a man as Sigel was allowed an
important command. When Grant was forcing
were entirely folled. Butler failed to make his
connection at Petersburg and HaiIeck tele-
graphed: ''Sigel is in full retreat On Strasourg;
ne VIII 90 o,s ncthing out run; ne never dd
fault OF Butler to the INSTRUMENTATION OF Gen.
Badly smith Gen. smith," he said, while
condemn what is not suggested by himself. y
The fault of Butler. the defeat OF Sigel. still
superadded to the news Of Banks defeat 10 the
Department OF the Gulf, made the campaign OF
new commander ln-chief open gloomlly.
Grant, however, determined to keep ahead,
ana formed the curious military resolution OF
throwing aside his artillery, cutting down his
his orders at this time were to go ahead.
DIE vlgor." Push the enemy With all
':Act on the offensive" .sKeeu
up threatening attitude "FIght
the IN whatever vel for force you can ind
him well employed" These are extracts from rom
the orders Of Gen. Grant, and show the resoiu-
tion which he had In beginning his campaign
and which were to bring him victory In the
From the sth to the 2lst Of May the total
losses OF Gen. Grant were 1901, OF which
| 2,279 were killed. Lees losses are not given by
| Gen. Badeau, although among the captures
| made by Grant were 600 prisoners and twenty
guns. IL Is TAR presu mption that the killed
duu WVuuuCu Ill tuS COulSucfaCo army cQUaieC
| the loss OF the Federal army. The fact, now
| ever that this famous Wilderness campaign
| Which inflicted fatal blow on the COnfed
| eracy. only cost sol men Is O remarkable
statement and puts an end to the stories which
nave been generally accepted for the last fifteen
| years That Grants losses were $4,000 or 60, OO(
| at least.
THE EFFECTS OF THE CAMPAIGN.
Grant regarded the result of the campaign
as virtual success over Lees army. He had
| conquered the spirit OF the adversary, and tns
| only question was 10 force him to surrender
| There Is sketch OF the disastrous attack or
Colo HarbOr, one OF the causes OF which IL
| attributed to Warren'S opening With artillery
Instead OF attacking In force. This whole
movement annoyed Grant; In fact. the only
general who seems to have shown enterprise
and ability In the movement was Hancock
Gen. Badeau gives Gen. Lee high praise for his
Lee watched his antagonist as closely, as
| warily as one wild beast does another before
the hnal spring. He followed the movements
| Of his adversary skillfully; he put forth hits
| whole force; he thwarted many Of Grant;
| attempts, but, as uaual. he LETT every great
| aggressive opportunity unused" What Lee
| hoped for after this Campaign according tf
Gen. Badeau was Ito hold Grant off as lone
| as possible, to tire out, ii neither him nor ms
| army, perhaps the country at the north. re-
| lying on the probability of English or Frencr
! interference In favor OF the rebellion and tins
| Efforts OF the democratic party in his pen alt"
| LOSSES OF THE CAMPAIGN.
| Gen. Badeau dwells at length upon the nu
| merlcal strength OF the two armies In this cam
| WI fhnro rno