The Ouachita telegraph. [volume] (Monroe, La.) 1865-1889, 1881-07-08

| " HlH, ANU uet.tlleu 10 MIN my plan
for then and there resisting Shcrmau's
attacS. l have never had any doubt
but that Con. Hood left his innprecna.
able position at Atlanta and went of,
into Tennessee from suggestion made
to him either directly or Indirectly by
Mr.. Davis himself, and that he is
primarily responsible for Gen. Hoods
operations which he characterizes now
in such severe terms. did not, to bC
surc, coniidG by telegram to Mr.. Davis
or any one else my plans. did not
think it ssafe to do so. Mr.. Davis was
constantly asking questions by telc-
graph which would have most cer-
tainly made common property of the
most important military movements in
advance of their execution. 1fe did
not seem to have the slightest idea
OF THE NECESSITY OF sECEEsN.
'I remember distinctly that some
time after the battle of Manassas MIR.
Davis scnt for me. He desired my
presence i'll Richmond, he said. on mat
ters so important and secret that he
dared not trust to the mail or tele-
graph. went and had II conference
with him and the cabinet which had
lasted nearly all day, ana when | finish
ed went to the hotel. Just after walk
ing into tho corridor n colonel of one
OF the regiments came up aud said !:
"General, these people say" waving
his hand toward tho crowd, "that the
cabinet have been discussing with you
all day the reasons for your failure to
capture Washington after the battle of
Bull Run" This early experience,
perhaps, illustrates the reason why /
did not always so promptly disclose to
MIR. Davis by telegraph my plans, as
he seems to have desired.
"Mr. Davis says in his book that
your answer to his telegram whether
you would surrender Atlanta without
a fight was not only cVasivc, but indi-
Gated the contingency of tho surrender
OF Atlanta, ON tho ground that tho
governor of the State had not furnished
as was expected, sufficient State troops
to defend the city while the army was
giving battle outside.
ssTIIIs Is ABSURD,
and utterly without truth. Incvor had
any intention of surrcndcring Atlanta
without fight, AS all my statements
to Gen. Hood will show. When I
took command of the army after Column
bia fell, all that was to be done was to
confer with Gen. Sherman upon some
military basis of peace that would be
equitable 10 both tho contcnding forces.
1t was not alone tho surrender of the
army, but tho basis of peace that was
most important"
"Wcre you forced to meet Gen. Sher-
man to treat for peace pr
"About twenty-five miles west of
Raleigh, N. c., wc were aionc in Il
little room in u Wrctchcd hovcl, when
we talked over the basis of surrender.
never shall forget that meeting. Be-
fore we proceeded to tho discussion of
the tormS of capitulatiOn General Shcr-
man handed mo Il dispatch from Mr..
Stanton, then secretary of war, stating
that
MIR. LINCOLN HAD BEEN l>saAsSIN-
ATEb.
1 was greatly shocked at tho announce
mcnt, ~ was Gen. Sherman, for il
seemed to us both to boar with great |
force upon important events that called
him and together. Gen. Sherman ut
that time told INC that he had been
called to City Point not many days bo-
fore to confer with Mr.. Lincoln upon |
tho terms of surrender which should be
offered to me. Tho basis of surrender
and peace, which was agreed upon be-
tween Gen. Sherman and myself ut
that time, were such that Gen. Sherman
understood Mr.. Lincoln had himself
suggested to him. Tho question how
his death would affect them was dis
cussed, and both thought as President
Johnson retained Mr.. Lincoln's cabi-
net, that it would carry out Mr.. Lin
coins plans for my surrender, ;ts stated
by Mr.. Lincoln himself.
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