The National tribune., 1881-10-15

paratiOn for the attack, the only hope of success
was to follow it up promptly with one supreme
effort, concentrating every energy we possessed
into it, and my mind was fully made up that if
the artillery was opened, Pickett must charge.
After the second note from General Longstreet
and the interview with Pickett | didn't feel
justified in making any delay. But to acquaint
General LongStreet with my determination, |
wrote him note, which think quote verbatim
as follows:
"GeneraI: When our artillery fire is doing its
best, shall advise General Pickett to advance
1t was my intention, as he had long distance
to travel that he should start not later than fif
teen minutes after our fire opened. About this
time, to be sure. Richardson, with his seven
underground hOwitzers, should he promptly on
hand. ! sent for him to come through the woods,
and be ready to move ahead Of Pickett's division
in the advance. To my great disappointment l
learned Just as we opened fire and too late to re-
place him. that General PendletOn had sent four
of his guns, without my knowledge to some other
part of the field, and the other of the three had
also moved off and it could not be found. Prob
ably, however, the presence of the guns at the
head OF this column would only have resulted in
their loss. but it would have been brilliant OPP
portunity for them, and l always feel like apollo
giving for their absence
1t was 1 p. m. by my watch when the signal
guns were fired the field at that time being entire
ly silent but for the light picket firing between
the lines, and as suddenly as an organ strikes up
in church the grand roar followed from all the guns
of both armies The enemys fire was heavy and
severe and their accounts represented ours as hav
ing been equally so, though rifle guns were
comparatively few and had very defective ammu-
milton. As an illustration, [ remember that the
casualties in my own battalion (twenty-six guns
were about 147 men and 116 horses in the two
days action, and about eighty per cent. of the
wounds were from artillery fire. General A. S.
Webb, Z. S. A. who commanded a brigade on
Cemetery Hill, told me after the war that a Fed
eral battery, coming into action on the hill, lost
from our artillery fire twentyseven out of thirty
six horses in about ten minutes. Average distan-
ces, should suppose about 1,400 yards.
We had some casualties from canister
I had fully intended to give Pickett the order
to advance as soon as saw our guns had their
ranges, say in ten OF fifteen minutes but the enc
my's fire was so severe that when that time had
elapsed | could not make up nay mind to order
the infantry out into fire which did not believe
they could face for so long charge in so hot a
sun, tired, as they already were, by the march
from Chambersburg, / accordingly waited, in
hopes our fire would produce some visible effect,
or something turn up to make the situation
brighter but fifteen minutes more passed with
out any change in the situation; the fire on
neither side slackened for moment. Even then
] could not bring myself to give peremptory
order to Pickett to advance but feeling the
critical moment would soon pass, wrote him a
=" 70 this effect: d" If Won are cominm OF oil