The Princeton union. [volume] (Princeton, Minn.) 1876-1976, 1881-07-21
GENERAL JAMES l. ,AG TREET

And whatsoever is willed is done
John G. Whittier
GENERAL JAMES Il Jag : TREET
What Lees First Lieutenant, After Jack
sons Death, Has to Say about the Battle
of Gettysburg, the Greatest of the War.
The following is an interesting interview
with Gen. James Longstreet, now ct his
home in Georgia, by q correspondent of the
Philadelphia Press:
HOW GETTYSBURG WAS FOUGHT.
IF Chickamauga was not, which was the
greatest battle of the WARP"
Gettysburg, both in numbers slain and
in decisive results That was the greatest
battle Of the war, and I shall never forget it's
details. If you remember, we had brisk
contest on the first of July. Lees advance
and the troops covering the federal rear
we're engaged. After this brush the feder-
forces moved up and took position upon
Cemetary HILL and began throwing up
breastworks. Lee moved mp ana~took DO
sition directly in front. Ewell, A. P. Hill
and myself commanded the three corps of
Lees army. I came up, joined Lee, and
looked over the position taken by the fed
erals. had ordered my corps around to
the right of the Genet Hill, and as
looked over the field said to Genera Lee:
"'They could nothave taken more ad-
vantageous position for u.s. ..
"The federal troops had naturally
strong place, but we could have thrown our
troops around to the right. and had or
dered more in that direction, supposing
that our plan would be to take position
between Cemetery Hill and Washington
md Pow 90 L. - =
few minutes. General Lee said:
'What would you do?"
G. Throw the troops around the right
flank of the federal army and take posi-
ton between them and Washington, and
you can thus force them to come out and
attack your"
''The Army of the Potomac and the
Army of Northern Virginia were too evenly
matched in numbers and powers to admit
of any mistakes. The army which had the
bestposition forcing the other to attack was
almost sure of success. Between these two
armies at that day generalship was all i'm
portant. otwoarmies more evenly matched
ever faced each other. That was why
wanted the advantage of position and de-
tense, rather than attack. We had gained
LIST and our soldiers were in good spirits.
When Lee looked upon the field he thought
he could assault the position taken by the
federals, and replying to my suggestion to
move to the right, said:
No, I will strike them where they are
right between the eyes,
This was in the evening, and I saw he
had his mind in the direction of assault
and did not urge him to adopt my plan. 1
saw him at daylight in the morning intend
ing to try to get him to reconsider his plan
of direct attack, or, rather, hoping that he
would have done SO himself during the
night. Some time was spent in social talk
and had an idea that he had abandoned
the thought Of direct assault. had, never
theless, the night before withd drawn nv
troops from the direction in which thew
were marching and put them in position to
meet General Lees plan if he should de-
eide to carry it out. He had said nothing
about his plans for 50 long that 1 thought
he had concluded not to attack, when all at
once ne looked up and said: ..
tack O VIZ "'
General Lee, there is not Is, 900 troops
that ever marshaled under flag that can
make that attack and succeed replied. Il
have mile of open ground to march over
before can reach the enemy's position
No, it is not a mile-not more than
1000 or 1900 yards
L saw his mind was made up, and,
mounting my horse, rode out to my CON-
mand and ordered the advance. That whole
day the two divisions under my command
bore the brunt of the attack upon the en-
trenched position Of the sederal army at
Gettysburg" -
'Why didn't Hills and Ewelrs corps
come to your reief?'
1T was partly General, Lees fault, but
very much Ewells and Hills fault L efore
Stonewall jackson was killed he and I
commanded the corps of Lees army. We
understood each other perfectly, and Lee
understood us. All he ever did was to
give us his plans and we executed them.
lie never thought Of interfering with US af-
ter he had explained his wishes. No army
in the world was ever better organized than
Lees army when Jackson was alive. He
and were in perfect accord. We could
tell by the hrlng of our troops exactly each
others position and there was a co-opera-
ton and community of feeling between US
rarely known among military command
ers. 1t was a terrible blow 10 the
confederacy when jackson was killed,
AT gettysburg, Lee seemed to for
get that jackson was not there, and after
explaining to Hill, Ewell and myself his
plan he left 1t to us to execute, but neither
Va UAASAAA AoN OdChSOu COOlueSS. 1OreSlClt
or execution. The result was for & whole
day my two divisions did the work of that
terrible conflict and the carnage was fear
full. lost more men than at Chickamauea
Hancock's, Sickle's and Sedgwick's com
mands were all engaged against us. To-
ward night one of the other CORPS had a
slight engagement and occupied some en-
trenchments on the right which had been
abandoned. The result of the second DAVIS
lighting need not refer to. The damage
had been done, and the mistake made up
on the first day, when direct assault was
made"
Here General Longstreet took from his
pocket memorandum of a letter from
General Lee which read:
If I had taken your advice the result
would have been different at Gettysburg. +"
AT Metz during the Franco russian
war identically the same situation between
the French and Prussian armies was pre-
sented as between ours at Gettysburg. I
was in New Orleans then and had map
OF the country before me. When the French
army moved to Metz, leaving Rheims,
Won Moltke saw his advantage and moved
his army between Metz and Rheims.
When that move was made I said to several