Butler citizen. [volume] (Butler, Pa.) 1877-1922, 1881-07-27

| OF 1881, and then CONSIDERED nlmSel
fortunate that be was not beaten az
badly as he might have been. The
two brilliant affairs of Kings Mountain
and the Cowpens, it is true, had mean
while temporarily disconnected and de-
layed the British general; but should
he still succeed in delivering damag.
ing blow at Greene, their effect would
be entirely neutralized, and the country
south of the James come under his
power. A blow was finally given on
March Is, 1871, at Guilford Court
House, in North Carolina, near the
Virginia border, and had it proved in
every respect another Camden, the in
terests Of the British in the south
might have become very securely root
ed. But right there at Guilford Court
House we have crisis in the cam
paign, turn in British affairs which
led straight on to the Yorktown catas-
trophe. The victory over Greene was
won at too great cost to be pursued,
and Corn wallis found himself compell-
| ed to retire to the coast to reit and re-
enforce his exhausted and diminished
army. He fell back, or to the right, to
Wilmington, North Carolina, and for
the time being surrendered the situa-
tion to his lately beaten antagonist, so
that the south, at least above the
South Carolina line, yet remained to
be conquered.
Notwithstanding this apparent re-
treat, these operations from the capture
of Charleston to Guilford won for
CORVALLIS great reputation. He had
proved himself the boldest, the most
original, and the most dangerous of the
British leaders, and his successes reviv-
ed the spirits and hopes of the ministry
at home, who still expected that from
Wilmington he would continue his
conquering career. Greene called him
the modern Hannibal" and La Fay
ette referred to him as that "formida-
BILE" Britisher who made no mistakes
His next step was awaited by the
Americans with deep interest and not
q little anxiety.
The course which CORVALLIS deter
mined to pursue from Wilmington in
volved an important personal question
as well as vital consequences. When
Sir Henry Clinton, the commander-in-
chief at New York, subsequently Leld
him responsible for his surrender, he
turned back to this Wilmington decis.
ion as one of the causes, if not, indeed,
the main cause, of the disaster. Corn
wallis had made up bis mind to push
into Virginia, and reduce that power
full province" as he styles it, before
operating again to :he south Of it; for
it is to be noticed that, notwitbstand-
ing his brilliant detour from Charles
ton northward, and the fattering CON-
pliments il provoked at home, he was
secretly conscious that the sum total Of
advantages gained amounted to moth
ing, and that the whole field would
have to be fought over again, by begin
ming, however, at the other end with
the conquest Of Virginia, and there he
proposed to carry the war. Clinton
afterward pronounced the decision to
be contrary to the spirit of his instruc-
tions, which required him to hold and
secure South Carolina. BY marching
to Virginia he was abandoning it.
Had you intimatcd the probability Of
your intention,p wrote Clinton to Corn
wallis in May, II should certainly have
endeavored TO have stopped you, as i
did then as we'll al now consider such
move as likely to be dangerous TO
our interests in the southern colonies" +"
And thirteen years later when Clinton
was answering the criticisms Of the
historian Stedman, he again insisted
that "Corpwallis had been ordered,
and had promised, in case Of failure in
North Carolina, to fall back on South
Carolina and secure it," To all this
CORVALLIS had the ready answer that
a return TO South Carolina was imprac-
ticable, that at 80 great distance he
had TO act according to his best judg-
ment, and that Virginia once sub
dued. the lower provinces would
fall without much difficulty" The
two generals continued the controversy
at later date with some acrimony,
but CORVALLIS had tho moral support
Of the home minister, and the com
mander-in-chief actually found himself
obliged 10 accommodate his own future
plans to this movement Of his subordi-
nate. Whatever the merits Of the case,
we have the undisputcd fact that Corn
wallis entered Virginia against the
expectations and wishes Of his superb
| or,
The final movements Of our modern
Hannibal the ill-timed necessities
which compelled him TO coop himself
up behind intrenchments at Yorktown,
compose distinct and absorbing act
In this military drama. The dream Of
laying Virginia at his feet, which at
one time seemed TO be on the point Of
realization, was rudely interrupted by
an unexpected combination Of oircum-
stances He had now reached point
where he could not act as independ-
emily as before. Hc was just near
enough his chief at New York to find
that the two must thcnceforth cooper
ate, and as Clinton presently discover
cd that HIS agreements must be dcter.
mined by those Of the Americans and
their French allies, both on land and
sea, we find CORVALLIS likewise ham
pered by what may be called triple
contingency, namely. the possible
movements OF Washington, tho uncer-
tain operations Of French and British
fleets, and the consequent plans enforc-
cd upon Clinton. When combinations
finally began TO take definite shape to-
ward tho close Of tho summer, they
patpred 30 rapidly that for the British
the end came like shock.
To summarize these intermediate
events--dctails being beyond our limit
1T will bc recalled that before Corn.
wallis reached Virginia, Clinton had
dispatched two expeditions early Ia
| IN, ha ut Of that tat.