New-York tribune., 1881-12-03
GAuBETTPS FOREIGN POLICY.

his official utteranc6s His supplementary votes
of credit for the Tunisan expedition have been
carried by a majority of 34S, the Extreme Leit
abstaining from voting and the previous
minority of II dwindling to 81 negative
votes. A new Premier could not reasonably
expect heavier majOr.ties, and apparently they
have been. secured with little effort. Gamsetta
brought the first debate to an abrupt close
without deigning to reply to the structures OF
the Opposition, and his appeal to the Deputies
for the necessary money grants is weak
and evasive. lie discams any intention OF
annexing Tunis and protests as vigorously
against the abandonment of the Principaity,
but neglects to define the middle course which
he regards as practicable. He appreciates the
potency of national vanity. He knows that the
mass of the constituencies would resent any
loss of prestige abroad. They may I've utterly
Indifferent TO colonial enterprises and openly
hostile to schemes of conquest and adventure,
but they are unwilling to have retreat
sounded if an advance has been deliberately
planned and laboriously executed. lie knows
that the Nation has been anxious to regain It's
influence in Europe, and that policy similar
TO that which Mr.. Gladstone had the
moral courage to adopt in Afghan
istan and Zulnlanl would be unpop-
ular throughout France. a withdrawal from
Tunis would expose his Ministry to popular
condemnation. 1t would be confession OF
failure and wrong doing in the first foreign
enterprise in which the country has engaged
since its retirement from European politics af-
ter Sedan. The Radicals are staunch advO-
Gates of peace, but they cannot convince their
countrymen that the ends of international JUS
tcc should be promoted mt the expense of ma
tional sclf-esteem. Gambctta can well afford,
therefore, to treat his critics of the Extreme
Left with indifference.
1t is to be regretted, however, that the
Premier in his first uttcrances respecting
foreign affairs should not have risen to the
level of plain speaking and honest dealing.
st. IIilaire had brought French diplomacy into
disrcpute 10y ntrcacies and cquivocatiOns bor-
dcring upon wiful misrepresentation. There
was no reason why the Foreign Minister of
self-respecting Republic should have deliber-
ately attempted to deceive the Courts and to
outrival the diplomats of the Empire in dis
stimulation and intrigue. That department of
the Government had fallen into contempt and
the succession of the new Premier should have
marked a return to the hOmcly virtues of truth
and soberness. Yet we find Gamhctta iustifying
the occupation of the Principally on the
ground that the treaty sanctions the suppress
sion of abuses in the Bey's administration,
and that this policy is in the interest of all
nations. The troops are there he would have
the world believe, not To promote schemes OF
aggression and annexation, but 10 protect the
interests of France AID to secure good gov
ernment in misgOverned country. NJ.
ROustan has given different explana-
ton Of the causes which led to the in
vasion of Tunis. Certainly" he has said,
at is business war which we have
"made, or better still, war for business. |
"say, candidly, in assuming the protectOrate of
"Tunis we hay, wished to open a large field
TO capitalists to the industrial and commercial
"activity of France" There is little doubt that
the war was commercial speculation, and
that there were many financial societies which
were interested in it as a stock -jobbing en-
terprse. The Premier was not called
upon to tell the plain facts about this
predatory campaign, but he ought to have
avoided the pretences and subterfuges of his
predecessor. The French did not encamp in
Tunis in order to civilize it or to project their
own borders. Their motives were more selfish:
diplomatic glory and commercial profit.