Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1881-06-10

JET. Davis on the war.
The recently published history of the
Southern Oonfederacy, by Jefferson Davis,
probably will never come to be recognized at
the North rs a standard historical work, any
more than its author will be regarded as
model statesman and patriot but the book
contains, nevertheless, some matters which
will be new and interesting to northern peo-
pie.
As TO his election to the Presidency of the
Confederaoy, Davis says; Gas this had been
suggested as a probable event, and what APP
peared TO me adequate precautions had been
taken to prevent it, l was surprised, and still
more, disappointed. For reasons which IL is
not now necessary to state had not believed
myself as well fitted to the Office as some
others. l thought myself better adapted to
command in the field, and Mississippi had
given me the position which l preferred to
any other-the highest rank in her army. II
was, therefore, that afterward said, in an
address delivered in the capitol before the
legislature of the state, with reference to my
election to the Presidency of the Confedera-
cy, that the duty to which 1 was thus called
was temporary, and that l expected soon to
be with the Army of the Mississippi again"
As to the battles Of the war, Davis places
the blame of the failure to pursue the FEEDER
al army at the disastrous battle Of Bull Run
on Gen. Joseph E. Johnston. The battle of
Shiloh was, in his opinion, most decisive.
He believes that Gen. Johnstons dispositions
were faultless, and that, despite the late ar
rival of certain troops and the arrival of re-
Inducements for the Federals, a complete
victory had been won, when Gen. Johnston
was killed.
The capture of Vicksburg, he says, "sev-
cred the Confederacy." He finds no fault
with Pemberton, whom he praises as wise
and patriotic, but attributes the disaster to
Johnston's alleged obstinacy in waiting for
achievements before moving forward and
in his forcing Pemberton to reverse his march
in the presence of the enemy, and to the con.
fusion that existed between the two COM
manders from their not being together. II
appears throughout the book that General
Johnston and Davis never agreed on policy
after the first battle of Manassas Showing
that his was the fault that prevented the
AA'NoeAhB VI huu Chub6u ltb Iull, ne
then goes on to show that Johnston's disre.
gard of suggestions and orders gave Sherman
an open road to Atlanta and enabled him TO
cut the Confederacy in twain. He says that
when Johnston was appointed to the COM
mand of the army of Tennessee it was under
distinct orders to make an aggressive cam
paign, instead of which he nj ade retreat after
retreat with his splendid army of nearly sew
enty thousand men from the strongest posi-
tions to be had He dispels the belief, which
General Grant is said to share, that he
kept Lee At Petersburg against his wishes
This strikes us as severe criticism upon
Lees generalship. He criticises Grants
march on Richmond, and shows low Nc
Clellan gained position on the James with
out loss, while Grant in doing the same thing
fought many battles. We might add in fur
Their comment that while Grant reached the
james he did not come back until he brought
the corpse of the rebellion with him, and not
like Mcclellan at the tail of routed army.
1t is true that Grant fought Lee down to the
james, but on the other hand Lee fought
Mcclellan back to the Potomac. More lives
were lost in the retreats of 1862 and 1868
than in the advances of 1864 and 1865.
After the surrender of Gen. Lees army
Mr.. Davis had no thought that the war was
over. Upon this point he says:
"We still had effective armies in the field,
and vast extent of rich and productive ter
ritory both east and west of the Mississippi,
whose citizens had evinced no disposition to
surrender. Ample supplies had been collect
| ed in the railroad depots and much still re-
manned to be placed at our disposal when
needed by the army in North Carolina.
had never contemplated a surrender, except
upon such terms as belligerent might claim,
as long as We were able to keep the field,
and never expected Confederate army to
surrender while it was either able to fight or
| to retreat"
Mr.. Davis thinks that had Gen. Johnston
obeyed his order to cooperate with the re-
naming forces Of the South, 1--WE could have
continued the war until our enemy, foiled in
the purpose of subjugation, should, in &C
cordance with his repeated declaration, have
agreed on the basis of a return to the Union,
to acknowledge the constitutional rights of
the states and by a convention or quasi treaty
to guarantee security of person and proper
ty." But the order was not obeyed, and the
end came.
Regarding the circumstances of his own
capture, Mr.. Davis writes graphically. The
waterproof" story he disposes of in this
way
I LAS it was quite dark in the tent, picked
up what was supposed to be my raglan a
waterproof light overcoat, without sleeves
it was subsequently found to be my wife's, so
very like my own as to be mistaken for it.
AS started my wife thoughtfully threw over
my head and shoulders a shawl had gone
perhaps 10 or 20 yards when a trooper gal
Hoped up and ordered me to halt and surren-
der, to which l gave a defiant answer and,
dropping the shawl and raglan from my
shoulders, advanced towards him. He lev
elled his carbine at me, but / expected il he
fred he would miss me, and my intention
was, in that event, to put my hand under his
foot, tumble him off on the other side, spring
into his saddle and attempt to escape Ny
wife, who had been watching, when she saw
the soldier aim his carbne at me, ran for
ward and threw her arms around me. Sue
cess depended on instantaneous action, and
recognizing that the opportunity had been
lost, turned back, and, the morning being
damp and chilly, passed on to fire beyond
| the tent"
|
The Albany Fight.
| Until Wednasdav of this wall fhara MAS