Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1881-12-24

) the flood-gates of excitement and bi
} terness. 1t breeds despair among th,
lovers of peace and order, and quie
and progress. Such gre some of tn
consequences which would certainl
follow upon failure of the court, {.
, hear this cause at the present term
And what legitimate reason can b,
offered against its being heard
That probably few cases between in
dividuals may fail of being heard tina
would otherwise be reached but fol
the consumption of time by this case
These individuals do not complain
and if they did their complaint could
not be listened to, their rights, mus
he held subordinate to this great de-
rnand of the public veal
But there is an argument offered
against this advancement, which from
the pressing manner in which it is
presented, perhaps, deserves some
consideration. 1t is this That should
the case be advanced and the cause
heard now, and as it possibly might
be decided adversely to complainants,
the admission of bribery to the contra
ry notwithstanding the people OF the
+
opportunity of repeating law stained
with corruption, and which, for that
reason, whether a good or a bad law,
should be repealed. Now, it will be
seen by the very statement of this OBJ
lection that it is not an evil conse-
quence that will inevitably or even
probably follow the hearing of the
cause at this term. 1t cannot be for
seen with anything like certainty that
the law would be repealed. True, all
opportunity of repeal would in the
case supposed be lost. And we are
asked upon this suggestion OF bare
opportunity for repeal OF what Is now
prima. facie the law of the land, and
against all the weighty reasons above
mentioned, on the other side, to refuse
to advance the hearing of this cause.
! And if we are to look at all such future
consequences of our action we must
also put into the scales this consldera-
ton. Is the law in itself good or a
bad one, without reference to the
mode of its passage, being by its sup
posed afhrmance valid law OF the
land
Tomake this objection legitimate spec
ulative of future contingencies as 1t is,
there should be at least reasonable
certainty that the delay in hearing
would result in ultimate good to the
state.
In our mode, however, of looking at
this case, future contingent conse-
uuences cannot be considered as rea-
SON for delay. We have here on the
ore side law, or that which is prinla
fteie law, of the land, which has in 1T
| il sustained, certainty of settling a
long-pending subject of agitation in
the state and among its people, and on
| the other charge that the supposed
law was obtained by bribery, and that
for this and other reasons is not law
of the State. Now if, in this state OF
case, the cause should be now heard
decided in favor of complainats, they
| will have obtained all that they can de-
sire, the injunction will be sustained
until their object, new reference
to the people, can be carried out.
On the other hand, if now the case
should be decided adversely to COM
plainants the law will be affirmed
which is already prima facie law OF
the land, and which by that decision
will be declared to be and always to
have been valid law; as much so as
| any otller law upon the statute book.
1t may be decided that the question of
bribery can not be looked to and
though it existed as fact is as if it had
never been. If such should be the
decision, the consequence would FOL
low that the injunction in this case
hnever should have been granted
against the consummation OF that
| which is and always was valid law OF
the land; and it puts the complain
ants in the attitude of asking this
court TO keep upau injunction wrong
| fully obtained until they can accom-
| plish some other Interior object OF
doubtful propriety.
The reasons then offered against the
advancement of this cause in view OF
| what we believe the inherent power of
this court and in view of the gret pub
| lie importance of the case are deemed
insufficient and unsatisfactory.
But if the court should be mistaken
in regard to The Inherent power claimed
for it, there is still another ground on
which the motion to advance should
be allowed: By the act of 1871, chap.
125, addenda to Code, S2947c, it is pro-
vided "that it shall be the duty of the
several courts OF this State to advance
upon their docl-ets causes, the decision
of which shall directly involve ques-
tons concerning the public revenues,
whether of the State, counties or in
corporated towns or cities" Now, is
this case the decision OF which di-
rectly involves questions concerning
the public revenues of the State? If
/ it be, it is made the imperative duty Of
the court to advance it. In consider
ing this question we are to look at aud
construe together the funding bill, the
revenue act and the general appropria-
! ton bill of 1881, and also the existing
revenue bill of the previous year.
Taking these together it is manifest
that, as a result of the funding bill, a
large and definite addition is made to
the amount of revenue to be raised in
the then next succeeding two years,
| and that this is the basis of an appro-
priation of 81, ,125O00 in the appropria-
ton bill for the payment of interest
on the public debt. Whatever might
be the decision in this case it is clear,
that under the revenue bill the whole
of the tax laid must be collected. Ii
the decision should be adverse to the
funding bill, the appropriation would
be void and the bond creditors have
no claim upon the fund. But that
portion of the fund thus raised, which
would not be necessary for the pay
ment of the current expenses OF the
government, having been raised for a
void purpose, would remain in the
treasury as part of the general assets
of the State, or as fund improperly
raised and to be returned to those from
whom it was collected. And though
in the decision of this case, the ques-
ton as to what should be done with
the fund thus remaining in the treasury
does not and cannot arise, nor is any
opinion intended to be expressed upon
that subject, yet the State is directly
interested in the question here, which
by its decision may leave this unap-
prOpriated and undisposed revenue in
its hands, which may or may not form
a part of the general fund in its treas
ury. If this be so, the statute of 1871
directly applies, and our duty arises
under it to advance the case. But il
it be not so, we do not recognize the
doctrine to the extent claimed that
revenue questions arise only in regard
to the incoming revenue, and not as
to the manner in which it is expended
or to be expended. The cases of Yost,
VS.. Gaines, End Keith vs.. Clark, so far as
the recollection of the court goes, we're
cases in which no written opinions
were given; they are not known to be
reported. Nothing in regard to them