Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1880-04-03

? would Justify an attorney-at-law in
| course to degrade and scandalize, If no
overawe and influence the court in its ad
ministrations, by publishing to the worl
an attack impeaching the official integrit,,
of the court of which he is an officer. Sucl
proceeding under any other ..circum
, stances, would show him to be great.
wanting in professional fidelity, and to b.
unsafe and unfit to be intrusted with tn,
privileges and powers of his profession.
From malicious and unjust attacks b.
the public press, calculated to impair pub
lie confidence in its integrity and tn
honest administration of public justice, tn
court is protected, not for the sake of th'
judges presiding, but for the sake of tn
public and the sritors in their court. Tht
misconduct in this instance is the act o.
these respondents as lawyers and Officers
of this court, and 70. their act as ordinary
citizens and with them as editors and
publishers we have therefore nothing to dc
in this summary proceeding.
We have already shown, we think, thai
the dual character of lawyer and editor
cannot be pleaded or admitted in justifica
tiOn of the transgressive act for which they
are ruled to answer. Nor is the liberty OF
the press infringed by the supervisory and
summary proceedings exercised by the
court over its officers. That opinion
could only spring from the deficiency of al
accurate knowledge of its true character,
or from desire to unjustly denOunce and
condemn its exercise.
The seventh section of the "Declaration
of Rights declares that 'every citizen
may freely speak, write and print on any
subject, being responsible for the abuse of
that liberty - and the act of 1886 also
gives entire security to the press and to any
citizen to publish and criticize the judges of
our courts and their conduct, and the
officers of the court, etc, without ira
ducny character or having the license of
defamation. The public press, therefore,
can be free in it's widest and safest sense,
without that license, and such freedom of
the press. we, and every right-minded man,
must believe is right, and is indispensable
to the preservation of the freedom of the
people. So that this court could not, If it
would, and it certainly does not for mo-
moment desire to deny that essential right
either to the press or to the assemblage of
the citizens.
At the same time it will be observed,
that the said act of the General Assembly
expressly clothes the courts of the COM
monwealth with power to issue attach
ments for consempt of court for the official
misconduct of their officers. at is pro-
per to remark that the power of the court
to punish the official misconduct of their
officers is expressly reserved in the act of
the 10Th of June, 1885," is the language of
Justice Rogers, in the case of Mclaughlin
VS.. the judges of the district court of
Philadelphia. w. & s., 272.
SO that it is patent that neither the
| if,,ti o1 cin inc Tod
the act of 1896, gives to the public press,
or to an officer of this court, the right to
make and publish articles impeaching its
official character and thereby destroying
confidence in it and leading the community
to disregard its official decrees
That has been and is, we are of the
opinion, the law as held by our supreme
court, and is sanctioned and enforced on
the hypothesis that it is absolutely neces-
sary to the advancement Or due admins
tration of distributive justice. 1t is not
assumed that this proceeding could be
supported, nor is it, because the article
in question was an attack upon the private
character or conduct Of the judges as men,
but only because it was an attack upon the
purity of the motives of the members of
the court while acting officially as Il court.
1t is, by virtue of the same inherent
power, that courts can protect counsel ap-
pearing in its forum. as officers of the
courts from the effects of publications
which are calculated to deter them from a
bold and manly defence of suitOrs. for fear
of the denunciation of the public press.
The publication in question was made
ont Of the presence Of court by these respond
cnts. its attorneys and officers, and in terms
scandalizing and impeaching its integrity.
| A Il Enl ;.h
ment in summary proceeding Of this
nature for constructive contempt or mis-
conduct in Office?
This question has already been decided
by our court of highest jurisdiction In
the Austin case, Rawle 2O4, that distin-
guiShcd jurist, Chief Justice Gibson, cleal-
ly announces the doctrine that officers of
the court are SO liable. He says "It is
one thing to remove from Office for unfit
ness and another to punish for contempt" :"
I'm fact. the court may have recourse to
both together, and there is no reason,
therefore, why it should not be at liberty
to proceed on the ground of unfitness and
waive the contempt"
:: 1t is not doubted that any breach of
the official oath is valid cause for pro-
ceeding for the former, for the man who
deliberately violates the sanction of a law
full oath proves himself to be unworthy of
! further confidence society has no hold
upon him. The most significant breach of
the fidelity enjoined may therefore be visit
ed with this measure" But it is supposed
| that as this fidelity is exacted by the terms
| of the oath, but in the Office of attorney
and within the court the act which may vi
| oate it must be done in the face of the court
The oath undoubtedly looks to nothing
like allegiance to ithe person of the judge,
unless, in those cases where his person is
SO inseparable from his office, that an insult
to the one is an indignity to the other In
matters collateral to official duty, the
judge is on a level with the members of
the bar, as he is with his fellow citizens,
his title to distinction and respect resting
ON no other foundation than his virtues
and qualities as a man.
''But it is nevertheless evident, that pro-
fessonat fidelity may be. violated by acts
which fall acithout the line Of professional
.functions, and which may have been per-
formed out Of tile pale Of the court"
And after remarking that such would be
the consequence of beatin. or insulting a
judge on the street for Judgment in
court,-or of an attempt to control the de-
liberations of the bench by the apprehen-
sive of violence; or by an attempt to
overawe the bench by menace, challenge,
full asi the press, he remarks: "TO i'm
pair the general confidence in the purity
and efficiency of the administration of
distributive Justice is vital injury to it,
and the attorney who abuses the public
credulity with view to that effect can
not complain, if the faculties from which
biS oo no oity nf ,,icobinf ic y,aiplxy Aoriva6