The Sunday herald. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1866-1887, 1880-11-28
REED ON CURTIS.
The Latest critic of the Campaigns of
Mcclellan.

The Latest Critic of the Campaigns Of
Mcclellan.
There is no task more difficult than that
which civilian undertakes who crticiscs military
operations upon theatre Of with which he Ia moi
familiar and from such tight only ho can obtain
from roadlng and study. There Is In fact nothing
which has hcon more Justly and uniformly treated
With contempt than tho military criticism Of puro
clvillary. Even man OF such commanding ability
the late NJ. Theirs failed to escape ridicuc when he
entered this field. Macaulay was too wise to under
take much In tho way Of military criticism, conRn-
ing himself mainly to narration. War correspond
cnts, of course, occupy n higher place than the
purely civilian writer for their experience In the
Held, II thcy courageous open-cycd, and ontor-
prlsng, gives thcm special preparatory training for
afterwari studying the campaigns they have wit
messed. Kingake though not professional soldier,
was Lord Raglan's secretary, aud therefore In pc-
sion not only 10 what passing In the Crimea
but to gather the contcmporancous opinion Of the best
authorities. We have been led to make these obser-
vaons 10y series OF elaborate articles from the Zen
of Mr.. Samuel Reed, OF the Cincinnati Gazette, who
has undertaken at great length the task, which had
already been partially performed In this Journal, oi
exposing the shaowncss Of MIR. George Tickncr Cur
tis's military acumen rs shown In his attempted
glorincaton Of Gen. Mcclellan In the North imerf-
can Reuietp. While much that MIR. Reed says Is lust
he has not escaped the common lot OF those who
dettake TO criticse art they ignorant Of or of
those who try To write history with imperfect ma
| terials.
In Mr.. Reeds second article he falls Into multi.
| iude OF errors when he says:
| The encmy's army had Haunted It's Nag In NcC1ci.
| an's face for year. The fertile Valley of
the Shenandoah, through which they marched up and
down to the Maryland bor,er, was practicable to
him tn strike Richmond i,y Its communications with
| the Interior. movement In n direction threatening
the lines OF communication Of Richnond would have
| brought the great battle his own ground.
- To go to the Peninsula gave up everything pos
sbic to strategy. u notified The enemy Of tho plan
long before II could begin The transfer Of nm army
oi over 100, 600 men, with all Its Held equipment AMI
stores was unavoi,laly long operation, and costly
enough To staggcr the richest nation II took tho
army further from IIchmond than 1t would bc at
good points on the Potomac. u confined Its move
covered the Capital and the North, in,erpcsing at
least months transit between 1t and the army.
whereas the enemy could reach II with the whole
u offered 10 the enemy, holding Inner conmunica-
tions, the opportunity to draw renforccmcnts from
all Its armies to overcome the entanged army advance
Ing To begin Siege.
Now, In the above Mr.. Heed has condensed abont as
many crude and faulty notions Of the conditions Of the
conflict between the Army of the Potomac aud the
Army of Northern Virginia ms II IL possible 10 con-
ceivc. The faacy that the water line TO Richmond
the "exterior line' and gavo the rebels great
advantages Of those bred 10y the Ignorance Of
the art OF war which almost universal among
Americans at that period Yet II was really in point
or time the shorter line, II proved when the
sixth Corps came from city Point TO Washington In
two days to rcpe Early's fein In fact troops and,
with the amount OF transportation possessed, large
bodies OF them, could be moved from the james.
Pamnnkcy, or York rivers TO Washington In about
the same number Of days as 1t would take weeks t6
march them by land. This possession of the water
line, being In strategic sense tho ''inner coinml-
'nlcatons," was an enormous advantage To the Union
armies which the fatuous politicians and lialleck'
AMI Stanons who ruled at Washington could III
. hrstu %, lAnh
by water quicker than by land Washington could MOI
be said TO lie uncovered when armies on III,
Peninsula II Is about severe criticism rs coult
be made of Grant that he failed to perceive that ,
n | south bank OF the James was the true ronte ant
Petersburg the key to the rebel Defense until after III
> had butchored the noblest Army that inarche,
u and fought In a series Of impossible assaults.
n Instead of tho army In the Peninsula being icon
a fined TO n narrow route, easily obstructed," II
route wdene and liz possession of base Of sup
piles In almost any direction II might turn ut tn
same time assured by command Of the water way
which lay either side OF Its route Had tho rcbl
= gunboats commanded the York and the James, Mr.
Reeds language would have expressed truth.
: The suggestion that the Shenandoah Valley woul
d have hoen good line for an advance 'to strlk
n "Riclnond by Its communications with the In
i "tcrlor" is so amusing that It leads us TO wondc
from what kind OF maps author deriving III
geography. There other routes possible beside
tIiI ny lne James. INC ni lNe orange AieN
andra road so often essaycd by incapable generals wa
yet good one though probably not the best after
' naval supremacy was established. So was the rout
by Fredericksburg, and that proposed by Sumner b
Urbanna on the lower I.uppalannock. Butthe Shen
anloih Valley not one Of them, and one wa
fool enough In those days OF folly to think serl
l. ousy of moving toward Richmond ly such y rounda
o bout road, which had railway nor base of supplies
~ led nowhere, and which uncovered Washington NOR
than any other line which the Northern armit
~ advanced. We have always believed that the arm
il lay In good position Mt Cuipeper during the winte
# of lsG3'6i, but Grant did the worst possible with h
a superior numbers when he entangled them In the
row roads and impossible hckets of the Wilderness
He should have sought the more open country towai
Gordonsvlle. Imt to make successful overland can
IN pagn 1t was necessary that tho commander should
r one VI vigorous Intellect instead OF torpid mil
like Grants with Idea Of strategy instead Of Il
contempt for manuuvreing which Grant eSpressc,
al and one not depending, Grant did, upon the brut
arithmetic of his ability give three for In bloc,
n, encounters when his troops always at n dIsa
vantage and often hopeless one.
Lee went North by the Valley because hs ielt tn
he could not assault Washington directly, and becau
he was therefore driven mp to the shallOwer forlal
waters of the Potomac, while the Blue Ridge furnish
. a useful screen and choice Of passes through Will
e he could debouch onto the rich farmsteads Of Mar
land and Pennsylvania. orco across ths Potomac
could snhsist on tho country as long AS he coi
e" maintain himself In II, condition which applied
MS part OF virginia. Hence Mr.. ReOd's Idea that q
Is Northern Army could the strategy Of these
vasiOns Is essentially fallaciOus.
Mr.. Reeds notion about the costlness Of transport
n ion by water Is false "Cosly enough stage
ell "the richest natIon' he says Il Now Il
zen munitions reinforcements and supplies could DO 70
Us warded To the front far quickly and Geaply
m water than by land. Our critic needs further to
reminded that " going To tho Peninsula 'n0ifed u
"enemy Of the plan long before It could begin. ~
u must not condemn that movement for this reasO
~ without showing how the army could have moved
any direction without the enemy knowing II; N
VI that when he speaks OF "threatening the lines
IN communications of Richmond, ~ he should renrnb
NJ that these lines lines south Inward and sOutwea
" ward from that city This brings us back to the nc
generally admitted fact that Petersburg was the bt
at geographical objective In offensive movements Of o
- Eastern Army. Leo conld doubtless have be
gar brought to battle indeed he often brought to l
Ion tle but not ground chosen by generals whi
pl appears To be Mr.. Reeds meaning when he says
ne 'movenent threatening the lines OF communicate
a 'of Richmond would have brought the great h.
ted ''te on his Mcclellan ' 81 own ground ~
not Mr.. Reed goes out Of his way while discussing
1t Clean's incapacity to make Ming at brave oic
the whowas often tried and found wanting but
on at the time critic writing happened to la
.dy been chosen the Democratic candidate for
Is Presidency Speaking OF Hooker sactona at william
on burg, he says;
hal Among the troops that lay Idle while Hooker NAL
ur- tainel this unequal struggle Hancock higac
IN different caim Is now set up, but our authority
10, Hooker and Drapcr's History.
In. This is one OF the neanest and most eontsmpt
na, exhibitions OF partisan spite have ID
ybo pers History forso0th Hooker. snartng under
M defeat inflicted his division, recorded In his rep
der ''' no ""' "'' "''"p'''" 'o' NUMB nv
tho my '."''o' ',"'''''N " ", wv" '""' "'' "'''"n'
hs. what Hancock was doing away the right. All
oncia reports OF the operations at that time give liza
nil cock the aurels Of the battle Of Williamsburg.
,e. seized advanced and commanding position. viii
of II he had been reinforced would have enoclually
and o'"" ''o P''"S''' '''"A'' ~ "''"'' i''"' :"
ord 'o ""' ~ '' ram" '""'"o"' 'n''"s' ""Pe''''
loes 'aN"s "'o 'o''"' u" was "'"o''' V, o"'""'' W
40 back. 10th 10 leave his - commanding position
,, the left Hank aud rear Of tho troops attack