The Iola register. [volume] (Iola, Allen County, Kansas) 1875-1902, 1880-08-13
The Defeat II the British Fsrces 1.
Afkhanistan.

Tho Defeat u tho British Ferces Il
Aighanistan.
The official reports Of the disaster t.
the English forces in Southern Afghan
istan. which are now coming in, show
that the first reports were not exagger.
ated. Worse than this, they prove that
the disaster was due to recklessness and
incompetency on the part of General
Burrows, the commanding officer. II
was stated in the earlier dispatches that
the English were surprised while in
camp and overwhelmed by the superior
weight of Ay0ob Khan's forces. It now
turns out that there was no surprise at
all, but that General Burrows, with q
force not much exceeding 1900 men,
deliberately marched out and attacked
force OF 1900. It must also be borne
in mind that General Burrows brigade
had but very few English regulars IN it,
and that Shere Airs cooperation
amounted to nothing, since his infantry
deserted and went over to Ayoob Khan
some time before the battle; while on
the other hand the Afghan force was
not only five times larger, but was well
provided with small arms and heavy
artillery.
1t appears from the report of General
st. John, stationed at Candahar, that
General Burrows learned on the morn
ing of July 70 of the approach of Ayoob
hhan's forces, came up with his ad-
vance guard about nine O o'clock, and at
once opened fire upon them with his
artillery. Shortly afterwards the entire
force of the Afghans appeared in SUI
perb battle order and in q position
every way superior to that of Burrows
brigade. Ay0ob Khan had posted
seven regiments in the center, with
three in reserve, supported by six bat
terles OF guns-one of breech-loaders-
1000 cavalry on the right, 400 cavalry
and 2 200 infantry on the left, with other
cavalry and infantry also in reserve.
The battle opened with an artillery
duel. which lasted three or four hours.
Notwithstanding the superiority of the
English guns, they made little or no
upon the Afghans. At noon
the English batteries were in state of
decentralization, and then the Afghans
charged along the left and entire
front of Burrows forces, and broke
up their entire position. General
Burrows made futile effort to
rally them, but a panic set in. There
was not only no position but no organ
ization left. Every man took to his
heels upon his own account for Canda-
bar. The victorious Afghans pursued
them to within ten miles of that city,
and, if the pursuit had been as vigor-
Gus as the attack, hardly man of the
brigade would have reached it. As it
was, while the brigade was not annihi-
lated, its remnant reached Candahar
In such condition of decentralization.
that it can be of little service to Cen
eral Primrose, commanding at that
place, and left almost its entire arma-
ment on the battlefield. Had General
Burrows fallen back upon Candahar,
The position of which is very strong,
instead of rashly hurting his brigade
upon q greatly superior force, this dis
aster would not have occurred. Itonly |
emphasizes the mistake, which the En-
ylish have made many times before, of |
undertaking the skill as well as the fight
ng qualities OF the Afghans, who are
he most warlike of all the mountain
,ribes in Central Asia. It was also
shown by this battle not only that
hey are good fighters, but that they
ire well armed with improved gums
md cannon, and that they know how
o use them. General Primrose him
elf in one of his earlier dispatches tel
,graphed that they had heavy guns and
served them well. Reinforcements are
low pouring into Afghanistan after the
has been done, as usual; and,
While the Afghans may not be able to
educe Candahar, as they are poorly
with siege material, it is not
impossible that we may yet hear of fur
her disasters in the open field if they
ollow up their victory with celebrity
nd vigor-the more so as they are
kelly to receive fresh accessions to
heir ranks from the discontinued
ribes. The moral effect of the victory
) seen even in Cabul, where it has pro-
uced so much excitement and commo-
ion among the followers of the new
Ameer that the proposed interview be-
ween Abdurrahman and General Stew
1T has had to be postponed, and the
,nglish had to make q military de-
,onstration to prevent open disafec-
ion.
1t isevident that the victory of Ayoob
han has reopened the whole Afghan
uestion just at time when the Liber-
| Ministry was so confident of order
nd peace that the English forces at
abul were on the point of leaving for
ndia, and it was even proposed to re-
uce the forces at Candahar, merely
'aving small garrison there. 1t is
re most serious calamity that has be-
lllen the English since the massacre of