The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1880-01-10

Police Justice, on the 18th Of September instant
and claimed to be entitled to the goods and chat.
tells in. execution in his own right; that the
Police Justice, after notifying the petitioner
heard evidence on the claim in pursuance Of the
provisions Of chapter % Of the Acts Of 1876,
being an Act to amend the law Of interpleader
and afterwards pronounced judgment in favor OF
the claimant and ordered the Marshal to deliver
him the goods and chattels seized. From this
judgment the petitioner asked for a certificate OF
appeal TO the Intermediary Court, rendering the
costs. The Police Justice refused to grant an
appeal, basing his refusal on the 10th section OF
the Act The petitioner now prays that he may
be ordered 10 grant appeal.
AS HartWell for petition.
The denial Of the appeal ID based on the pro-
vision in section 10, that the Judgment and de-
cision OF the Court in a summary manner shall
be final and conclusive against the parties and all
persons claiming by, from or under them.
But this cannot intend 10 bar the general right
Of appeal provided against all decisions Of a
Police Justice
1. Article 7 OF the Constitution secures a Jury
trial IN all cases heretofore used, and this statute
only provides another method for the adjudication
Of a question which might be brought in troyer
or replevin, and a claimant cannot bar a party Of
his right to go to a jury on appeal by selecting
this method Of proceeding.
There may be an appeal from m
proceedings. g., under the Landlord and Ten
ants Act.
This Act Of 1876 does not expressly repeal the
general statutes respecting appeals. 1t only re-
peals the provision by which q sheriff might
summon a jury 10 try a claim for property seized,
and he could disregard the verdict and sell If
properly UNIDENTIFIED. Now, If the present stat
ute is substituted and all appeal is barred, 1t
would take away the right to a jury trial where
it has heretofore been used.
a right Of appeal is always implied in cases
heard by a Justice Of the Peace. Jones VS.. Rob
bins, 8 Gray 34I; Sullivan vs.. Adams, 3 Gray
476; kenny's case, los Mass. 496. and Beers vs..
Beers, / CT. 53S, TO the effect that a statute not
allowing appeals from a magistrate would be
clearly unconstitutional
III. This statute need not be held uncon5titu-
tiOnai by interpreting it that such Judgments are
final and conclusive, unless appealed from under
the general provision for appeal. In GloVer's
case, Sd Hawaiian Reports 70l, it was held that
no appeal lay on the facts, because such had been
the statute from a time prior to tine Constitution,
and because the licensee expressly waived such
appeal by the terms Of his license
III. q Final judgments Of State Courts are the
only cases appealable to the Supreme Court of the
United States" United States vs.. Bailey, 9
Pei. 272.
W. G. Jones, the Police Justice, respondent,
relied on the terms Of section 10 and the author
ity Of Glover's case, and made no argument.
Per ClTlGm.
In order to obtain a solution of the question,
whether the judgment Of 4 Police Justice upon
the right of property seized by the Marshal in
execution is subject to appeal to a higher Court
or 10 q luEyT Il eAdnlut tue tuLEE ACl.Ol nlc
pleader and make the following observations
Section lst provides a procedure for a defend
ant in a personal action in a Court Of Record,
whereby he may bring to the knowledge of the
Court or any Judge thereof the interest of any
third party. who may then be required to become
a party to proceedings in such action or on a
feigned i~ssue,-that is to say, this statute pro-
vides for what might be done by a bill of inter
pleader in equity.
Section . Is, with an unimpOrtant variation
=. -E-,aa,I1Ov fIarF1caI NTH aaof1np IN m
which the Police Justice has declined to grant
appeal. There is no doubt that section 2 applies
only to the proceeding of Court of Record, as
directed IN section i.
The 81 and 4th sections apply likewise. The
5th section. promising that the Marshal and his
officers are exposed to the hazard and expense of
actions on claims made to goods and chattels in
execution and otherwise, further enacts, relative
to such claims against the Marshal OF officers,
what - found in sections >, ., 7, 8, 9 and 10.
Section ) speaks Of executions issued by the
Courts Of the Kingdom, says the Court OF any
Judge thereof may on application Of such officer
cite parties by rule, order or summons, and exeT-
else Tor his protection and relief all OF any Of the
powers and authorize before gIven-that is.
compel a party to be plaintiff OF defendant, PRO
coed 10 trial on one OF more feigued issues, or
direct such issues to be tried, determine the
merits Of claims IN q summary manner, and make
such rules and orders as to costs and all other
matters a. may appear TO be just and reasonable.
Section 9th provides that tie Court OF Judge
may exercise these powers though the titles Of
the claimants have not a common origin but are
adverse to or independent Of one another.
Section ! gives the Court OF a Judge, when the
claim Is under a bill Of sale, chattel mortgage or
otherwise, 10 order the sale Of the whole or part
on such terms as he may think fit az to the pay
ment Of the whole or part of the secured debt.
Section 8 refers to the rule or order " from a
Court Of Record " as the order previously spoken
of. and empowers the Court or Judge, when the
amount involved is small, at the request Of either
party to determine the same in a summary man
ner, with full authority as to term. costs and
other rules.
The 9th section provides that when 1t is a
question Of law only, the Judge may order a
speciaI case to be stated for the opinion Of the
Supreme Court, which shall proceed thereon as
upon n submission
section 10 provides for the two courses before
given. Viz, fret the trial on an action or issue
ordered by the Court or Judge, and secondly the
summary decision Of the Court or Judge without
such trial, that both shall be final. And section
IL, referring to both the proceedings under the
first four sections of the Act and those under sec
tions ) to 10, provides that all rules, orders, mat
ters and decisions to be made in interpleader
proceedings under this Act shall be entered Of
record IN the Supreme Court.
Now the words .'cOuTt OF Judge - of themselves
imuOrt a court Of record or n Judge thereof, but,
when taken in connection with the express men
ton of 4 s.court Of record in the LIST and 9Th
sections, the close inter connection of all parts of
the Act, and the absence of any expression to
show that the jurisdiction is intended to be con-
ferred on police or district magistrates, my III
ference is that this act does not apply to those
officers. 1t could only be supposed to do so, as
being sscourts," but, the word court is used in
this statute in a connection which is inconsistent
with the court of a district or police Justice for
instance IN the 4th section when it is provided
that if upon application to a judge in the first in
stance. or in any later stage, he shall think it
more fit for the decision Of the court, it shall be
lawful for him to refer the matter to the court,
and the court shall then proceed as if the matter
had originally commenced bya rule of ourtinstead
of the order of a Judge. One may ask what mean
ing such a provision could have if Judge" here
meant a district or police justice, and what court
would be intended.