Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1880-02-13

| were never married, signed by Charles H.
Budd, attorney al law; BENZ, Fullerton, E.
w. Mccain, wheat inspector; Joseph d.
Baker, clerk of the district court; A. O.
Arutson, county auditor; j. M. Severens,
postmaster, a I'd in fact by every town and
county officer, tesides whole host Of citl-
zens.
In the Court.
The object MI. Knappen had in accompany
st. Paul. He put himself in communication
with Hon. I. V. D. Heard, and together they
concluded to invoke the power of the writ of
habeas corpus.
At noon the writ was issued, made return
able before Judge Wilkin, in chambers, at
2 o'clock P. M. Sheriff King got service on
Sheriff Mullen, who made the ordinary re-
turn. Thereupon Mr.. Heard filed the fol-
lowing answer:
District Court Second District. State of
Minnesota, ex rel, G. w. Frink VS.. A. J.
Mullen.
Now comss G. W. Frink and in answer to the
sheriff's return herein. alleges:
First. That no copy of an indictment found
or affidavit charging the said Frink with hav-
ing committed treason, felony or other crime
was ever produced to tho governor of Mime
sofa.
Second No evidence was ever furnished to
the governor of Colorado or the governor of
Minnesota, and il nowhere appears from any
| papers upon which the warrant produced with
| the return herein is founded that the said Frink
WAS ever in the State of Colorado or fugitive
| from its justice.
Third. That the said papers and warrant
are in other respects insufficient and void
and not properly certified, and are informal.
Wherefore the said Frink asks TO be dis
charged from custody.
Subscribed and sworn to, Feb. 10. 1880.
G.. w. FRINK,
THE ARGUMENT.
The case having assumed this status, at
o'clock came into court. Messrs. Knappen
and Heard appeared for the relator, and At
| torney General @. Nj. Start for the re-
spondent.
| Gen. Start opened the case in few pre-
liminary remarks disavowing that he was
| champion for any particular party to the
matter at issue, but he simply appeared as
| representative of the State, as provided In
| law, and solely to see the interests of Justice
subserved. He WIS free to confess that at
| first he doubted the ACCESSIBILITY of issuing a
warrant on the requisition. But in view of
the punctilious feeling existing between gov
ernors in this respect and for fear of rep
risal, as it we're, he had succumb, and the
warrant was duly issued. He presented
these Introductory remarks to explain his
standing, and further, in view of a late
ruling of this court, to show he took no ex-
ceptions to the jurisdiction of the court, or
would he raise the question of State or fed
efal Jurisdiction in the matter at issue.
Mr.. Heard, for the lelator, said he had two
or three points 10 submit to substantiate the
claim that the relator should be discharged
from custody. First. tae papers in the case
were defective. The isquisition was not &c
companied By an Indictment or an affidavit
setting forth crime which was indictable,
or the particulars OF en- otfense which would
lead to an indictment. Moreover, nowhere
in the affidavit does it set forth that Mr.Frink
was fugitive from justice from the State
of Colorado, or that be had ever been in that
State. 1t lis not alone sufficient that the
requisition on its face should recite this,
but it must be supported 10y an
affidavit, as we'll, distinctly
alleging the fact. Mr.. Heard referred to
Attorney General F. K. E. Cornells opin-
ion in the case of George p. f. Carney,
wherein it was set forth that the governor
of Massachusetts has required on Governor
Austin for Carney, ETC., and quoted largely
from the opinion to show that something in
the way of "proof," beyond the mere recital
on the requisition, was necessary to secure
the apprehension of an alleged fugitive, etc.
At this juncture, Mr.. Knappen came into
court with "the original papers," Continuing
Mr.. Heard referred to the requisition and
affidavit or complaint, and, quoting from
the statute (Colorsdo), said it made it crime
when the abduction was forcible or fraudu-
lent. And if forcible and fraudulent the
complaint should set forth what means we're
used either In fraud or force, or the crime |
should be particularized so as to afford an |
to Judge whether it came within !
in the law as specified. Mr.. Heard called at
tention to the famous Frank case, and |
referred to the ruling of the
court in that case, where 1t
was decided that in obtaining
goods by false pretenses, the pretenses used |.
must be set forth in the complaint. and not
the general charge alone was sufficient to
hold the prisoner. If that ruling was good !
in case where party was charged with
goods under false pretenses, how
II uch more was it applicable to the case at
issue. The complaint Should Sc. forth the
pretenses or fraud or force used in the alb
duc:ion OF this married woman. In this
Mr.. Heard alluded to the eb-
surdity of the charge, somewhat, claiming
that the crime, if such, as charged bordered
upon the verge of the impossible. Again,
if this crime was committed tbs Governor of
Colorado failed in SUI hitting proof to show
that the relator was fugitive from the JUS
tice of Colorado or had ever been in the
State. He referred again to the Cornell
opinion, to show that it was held that illegal
must be submitted to allow the
Governor upon which the demand is made
o judge.
The Court-The Cornell opinion in re-
gard to the Garvey case speaks
If that case, where there were no proofs, but
n this case the proofs accompany the re-
luisiton, in the complaint.
At this iuncture the Cornell opinion was
gain read, and Mr.. Heard laid particular
.ress upon "the legal evidence necessary
n such cases, as referred to above. Mr.
Heard further continued by saying that the
1iine charged was not crime in this State. I