, 1880-02-18

won Speicheren was placed in obscurity,
for spending too many lives. The Army is
the nation, and even the rapid success and
gigantic consequences of the war with
France hardly reconciled the country to it's
domestic sufferings, and greatly increased
the sense, which neither the war with Den
mark nor that with Austria had fully devel-
oped, that a great war is a horrible thing.
a war with Russia might, as regards loss
OF civilized life, be the greatest war OF
modern times. Prince Bismarck will not
wage that wal, will not put a million OF
Germans in danger of life without pressing
necessity and he himself tells us what, IN
his Judgment, would be a pressing neces-
sity,-namely, an alliance between France
and Russia, of which there is as yet, ever
to him, who must know fairly well the
secret history of each great State, no sign
whatever. Prince Hohenlohe would not
have made that speech to NJ. de F~reycinet,
if he had suspected anything OF the kind,
nor would the German Chancellor be ruStl-
eating at Varzin.
We cannot believe either IN Q Russian
attack on Germany, c. . German 2V3acA Oh
Russia, and should explain the eoEcentra-
ton Of troops in POLAND, 50 Tar as IL mas
occurred, and reseryine the question OF
fact. by one of two theories, either or both
of which may be correct. Ahere can pe no
doubt that the Russian Court has peen
made both angry ana suspicious by lne
AuStrO-G German alliance, that IL dlstFuStS
Prince Bismarck, and that it regards with
alarm the possibility, II CanStahlihoplo
explodes-a contingency posSlol9 dt any
moment-that Austria may take steps
which it would be imperative Tor a RUSSIAN
M ~ IT AnnGtlDt1nDlIA
is. for a Russian Emperor, a vital question:
because it might arouse the hah-Tei9louS'
half-tradltional feeling among Russians be
fnrn wbic, the Cars have throughout his
tory always had to bow. THE hussian
Conrt NAV easily reason that nothing would
prevent such action on the part OF Austria
so COMPLETELY, as the spectacle OF a great
army collected and ready for movement III
Russian Poland. It's concentration there
is not much more expensive than It's mann
tenance anywhere else, while d
cation reveals weaknesses which the GOV
errment is very eager 20 correct, ana as
regards one point at least, the disparity
between the paper strength and the erect
i've strength OF Russian regiments IS correct
inc. The Drafts for the cOnScrlptlon never
were so heavy. And finally, Russia has
every motive for convincing both BERN ana
Vienna that the breaking-ur Of the ora, I'M
written alliance, which has A35>o1, WITH enc
interval, since 1872, through tEo entire
generations, was a mistake; and no klnd
of conviction would be SO perfect as one re-
sulting from a consequent sense OF danger'
a diplomatist al the head OF an emp-.9
always speaks with effect, but the effect -
never SO strong as when the dlpiomaCloV
controls a great army, yisi0ly ready to to
take the field. And this IS especially the
case lust after a great war, in which that
army, though it accomplished some splen-
did teats and ultimately was victorious,
did not appear to great soldiers in the most
formidable light. The Russian Govern
ment, threatened from within by revolution
and shut in from without by a great ALL
ance, has reason enough from its own
point of view, for making It's resources Fl5l-
bic. without assuming that it intends TO
begin what, without France, would be the
maddest enterprise Of Y ttmc, I'D with
France, would be a most Dangerous, bloody,
and Improbable wax.