Morning journal and courier., 1880-11-24
Long Island Sound.
The Nations Harbor and Sen Coast De- fences-An Important Report. IIIT,l

The Nations Harbor and Sen Coast De-
 fences-An Important Report.
 GCoNTNUEDl
 The opinion that the navy is the only true defence of the country has been so ac- ceptable and popular that it demands care- ful examination.
 For the purpose of first considering this proposition in it's simplest terms, we will be- gin by supposing the nation to possess but 8 single seaport, and that this is to be defend ed by fleet alone.
 By remaining constantly within this port our fleet would be certain of meeting the enemy should he assail it. But if inferior to the enemy there would be no reason to look for successful defense; and as there would be no escape for defeated vessels, the pres ence of the fleet, instead of averting the is- sue would only render it the more calami- tous.
 Should our fleet be equal to the enemy's the defense might be complete, and proba- bly, it would be so Still, hazard some of the many mishaps liable to attend con tests of this nature, might decide against us, and in that event the consequences would be even more disas- trous than on the preceding supposition In this case the chances of victory to the two parties would be equal, but the consequences very unequal. It might be the enemy's fate to lose his whole fleet, but he could lose noth- ing more, while we, in 8 similar attempt, would lose not only the whole feet but also the object that the fleet was designed to pro- tect.
 If superior to the enemy the defense of the port would in all respects be complete. But instead of making an attack the enemy would in such case employ himself in cutting up our commerce on the ocean, and nothing could be done to protect this commerce without leaving the port in condition to be success fully assailed.
 In either of the above cases the fleet might await the enemy in front of the harbor in- stead of lying within. But no advantage is apparent from such an arrangement and there would be superadded the risk of being injured by tempests and thereby dis qualified for the duty of defense, or of being driven off the coast by gales of wind, thus for time removing all opposition.
 In the same cases also, especially when equal or superior to the enemy, our fleet, de- pending on having correct or timely notice as to the position and state of preparation of the enemys forces, might think proper to meet him at the outlet of his own port, or intercept him on the way, instead of await ing him within or off our own harbor. Here It must be noticed that the enemy, like our selves, is supposed to possess single harbor only; but having protected it by oth- CT means that his navy is sdisposa- ble for offensive operations. If it were attempted thus to shut him up in his own port, he, in any case but that of decided infe- riorlty, would not hesitate to come out and risk battle; because, if defeated he could retire under shelter of his defenses to reft, and If successful, he could proceed with a small portion of his force-even a single ves- sel would suffice-to the capture of our port now defenseless while with the remainder he would follow up his advantage over our defeated vessels, not failing to pursue them into their harbor should they return thither
 Actual superiority on our part would keep the enemy from volunteering a battle; but it would be indispensable that the superiority be steadily maintained and that the superior fleet be constantly present. If driven off by tempests or absent from any other cause the blockaded fleet would escape, when it would be necessary for our fleet to fly back to the defense of it's own port. Experience abun- dantly proves, moreover, that 1t is in vain to attempt to shut hostile squadron in port for any length of time. It seems then that whether we defend by remaining at home, or by shutting the enemy's fleet within his own harbor, actual superiority in vessels is indis- pensable to the security of our port
 With this superiority the defense will be complete, provided our fleet remain within it's harbor. But then all the commerce of the country upon the ocean must be left to it's fate; and no attempt can be made to react offensiVely upon the foe, unless we can con- trol the chances of finding the enemy's fleet
 
 chance of keeping him there; the escape of a single vessel being sufficient to cause the loss of our harbor
 Let us next see what will be the state of the question the supposition of numerous important ports on either side, instead of Q single one; relying, on our part, still, exclu- s1vely on navy.
 In order to examine this question we will suppose our adversary to be fortified in all his harbors and possessed of available naval means equal to own. This is cer- tainly fair supposition, because what is assumed as regards his harbor is true of all maritime nations except the United States :; and as regards naval means, it is elevating our own strength considerably above it's present measure, and above that it is likely to attain for years.
 Being thus relatively situated, the first diff ference that strikes us is that the enemy, be- heving all his ports to be safe, without the presence of his vessels, sets at once about making our seas and shores the theatre of operations, while we are left without choice in the matter; for if he thinks proper to come and we are not present. he attains his object without resistance.