, 1880-11-06

it, whatever it is worth, and Candahar is
certainly in no sense within that frontier.
As to the very strong hint 10 Mondays
Daily Neus that the Queen is averse to q
withdrawal, that aversion, it it exists. can
be but one of the many points which the
Ministry have to consider. The Queens
unrivalled experience cannot, on q question
of Central Asia, add to the weight OF her
opinion, and mere authority the Cabinet is
bound to disregard. If the OBJ lection
were strenuously pressed-wbich, of course
it will not be, the Queen being now, as
ever, Constitutional, as she showed after
the elections--it would be the clear duty
of the Ministry to resign aud appeal to the
country, and of the opinion of the country
under such circumstances they may be GER
tain. Not TO mention that the people in
tend to be governed by q selected Commit
tee of Parliament, and not by the Sovereign
alone, the constituencies have from the first
recorded their opinion that the invasion of
Afghanistan was a foolish and immoral
enterprise, undertaken without cause, and
to be abandoned 1T the earliest practicable
moment. That was their decision during
the elections, and nothing has occurred
even to suggest the idea that they have
modified their opinion. Their judgment
was formed at o time when retreat might
have looked like defeat, and still thay
ordered retreat, and now retreat is nothing
but the REIMBURSEMENT of an invasion 10
the course of which 10 opponent has been
able to withstand our arms. We retire,
having defeated every enemy who attempt
ed to face us in the field. If the Ministry
do not retire now that the road is open,
every disaster which will follow-and dis.
aster insuch a position is inevitable-wiIl
be carried to their account. Hitherto, Lord
BeaconsGeId has baen responsible for all
that has been done, every disaster having
arisen naturally from the invasion; but
henceforward, the Ministry being free, the
responsibility is theirs. We do NOT be-
lieve that they will hesitate to shake it off.
We wish, however, now that the dis
cussiou is dying to its dregs, to point out
one fact which has hitherto escaped all
adequate comment. Ii we retainsC andahar,
we, must make up our minds either to SUBJ
iugate .Beloocbistau, or to guarantee its
s~uzerain, the Khan OF Khelat, against all
attempts at insurrectiou. The public Is
aware OF the extreme excitement caused
among all Anglo-Indians, and indeed all
soldiers of experience, by the recent report
of a mutiny in KheIat, which turned out
to be a small affair, but they are only part
ly aware of lis cause. This was a clear
perception that if the Khan bad lost hold
OF the reins, or had been deposed by an
Instruction, Candahar, General Roberts,
and General Phayre. might all be lost to-
gether, The route fromScinde to Candahar,
as long as from London to Exeter in
itself a terrible one, full of defles IN which
an army might be crushed, without for
age, and 10 places without water, lies
through two-tbirds OF its length at the
mercy of the Beloochees. They could
throw out on it 10000 of the bravest men
in the world, armed with j@ezails, accustom-
ed to mountain wsrfare, and possessing
always the means of rapid and safe retreSt.
The whole campaign in West Afghanistan
was fought through, as the Russian war
in the Balkans was fought through, under
liability to a deadly attack in flank from a
very doubtful friend. Relying on the
assurances of the federal head of the Belooch
clans, the Khan of Khelat, and the opinion
of the very able officer, Colonel Sandemann,
who watches and controls him, the Govern
ment ran the risk successfully but they
knew it was a risk, and the rumoured mu-
tiny struck them as q very serious disaster.
The Beloochee mutinsers. might have
-