The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1880-12-16
CHARGE OF THE COURT
In the Murder Trial, State Of Ohio vs.
Alexander MCKuSiC,
Delivered by Judge Seraphim Meyer,
Friday, December 10th, 1880.
Charge of the Court.
OHIO !
vs., )
ALEXANDER MCCUsIC

Gentlemen of the Jury
The defendant Alexander McCuslc, stands
charged In the indict ment with the crime of
murder in the second gree, in this that he.
on the I'd day of October, 1880, at the County
of Stark, did purposely and mallciously kill
one John Maer. To this charge the defend
ant pleads that he is not guilty. This raises
the Issues, which you, Gentlemen of the Jury,
have been sworn to try and to determine
from the proof and from the law as given to
you in charge by the Court
Before calling the attention Of the Jury to
the different degrees Of criminal homicide
and olher minor offences, embraced in the
charge so made in the Indictment and the
proofrequiIed to sustain the same, will I'M
vite their particular attention to the leading
and prominent principles of criminal juris-
prudence governing trials in criminal cases,
and especially in reference 10 the character of
proofrequlred to convict party accused of
crime.
The first of these principles is that the law
presumes the accused to be innocent until
his guilt be fully proven.
Another main principle is this, that after
the accused has interposed the plea of Not
Guilty, it is incumbent on the state to prove
him guilty as charged before he can be con-
victed The party accused is not called upon
to prove his innocence, as that is presumed
until his guilt be proven.
Next, as to what amounts to proof neces-
sary to work conviction in criminal cases.
Absolute, or mathematical certainty is not
and cannot be required in judicial trials,
criminal or civil, any more than it could be
attained or required in the ordinary trans
actions oflIfe. But degree of certainty, re-
posing on faith in human testimony and
amounting to what we call moral ce7tdiRty
can be attained in judicial pro eedings. This
degree OF certainty Is required in all criminal
trials, We express this requirement of the
law by saying That the accused can be con
victed only when his guilt is proved beyond
the existence of reasonable doubt. The
guilt of the accuse must be proved beyond
reasonable doubt, or he must be ac-
quilted. If the proof be of so uncertain a char
aGter as to leave reasonable doubt
on the minds of the jury respect
ing the guilt of the accused, he is
entitled to the benefit OF that doubt, and must
be acquitted, THE doubt so recognized 10y law
must, however, be reasonable and not u
captfous dOu / serious doubt left on the
honestly inqulring human mind, acting
under the solemn obligations of an oath,
after having conscientiously sifted and
weighed all the facts and circumstances dis
closed by the evidence, with view to arrive
atthe truth in the case. | may add, that to
establish guilt, the proof should be such as TO
exclude every reasonable hypothesis of the
prisoners innocence; or, in other words, it
should appear that the prisoners innocence
is inconsistent with the facts established by
the proof
On this subject of proof may add, that in
criminal as well as civil cases the facts may
be established by direct or cirCum st4ntial evil
denre, for cirCumsIantial evidence may be,
and oitentimes Is, rs reliable ~ direct eVi"
dence and often more so. A chain of circum-
stances well established by the proof and
pointing to the guilt of the accused, may suf-
flee to fix the guilt of he party with as great
degree of certainty as that resulting from the
testimony of witnesses giving direct evidence
OF his guilt.
have said that the prisoner is, charged in
the indictment with the crime of murder in
the second degree The charge Of mu der in
the second degree embraces also the charge
of manslaughtsr; and may add, las request
ed on behalf Of the defendant, it further EN-
braces the charge of assault and battery.
Hence 1t becomes the duty of the Court to m
facts constitute these several and distinct
crimes and otfenses. Before doing
this may, because of the line of argument
adopted by some of the counsel, especially in
of criminal law, call the attention of the Jury
TO the fact that in the State of Ohio we have
no crimes and Otfenses except such as are eX.
pressly enacted by statute. WehaVe no COM
mon law crimes or otienses Our statutory
crimes, in the case of criminal homicide, are
essentially different from the common law
definitions of such crimes. Hence also much
OF the common law criminal adjudication in
cases ofhomCide and of tn learning result
ing therefrom, is not applicable TO the crimi-
tttpi uNst1H n n Gfnt Ag NpfTN NJ
homicide in Ohio is divided into murder in
the first degree, murder in the second degree
and mansaughter, whilst at common law 1t
consisted only of murder and manslaughter
IL Is obvious that the definitions of murder
and OF manslaughter at common law are in
applicable as definitions for our statutory
crimes of murder in the first degree, mur-
der in the second degree, and of
manslaughter Tor what may be considered
murder at common law, may be either
murder In the first degree or murder in the
second degree under our statute and that
which may be deemed manslaughter at COM
mon law may either amount to murder in
the second degree or to manslaughter only
under our statute. Hence we must look to
our statute and the decisions of our own
Courts for correct definition of these re-
speetive crimes in Ohio.
Our statute defines with much clearness
the different degrees of criminal homicide.
Murder in the first degree 1t substantially de-
fines to be the killing Of another pWpoSeiy
an 1 of deliberate and premeditated malice.
Murder in the second degree 1t substantially
defines to be the killing of another ptRpOSelV
and nlaliciOltSLy, but without deliberate and
premeditated malice. (See Section BSlO of our
Code of Laws.)
Manslaughter the Statute defines to be sub
stantially the unlawful killing of another,
where such killing comes neither within the
definition Of murder in the fir. degree or of
murder in the second degree, (See Sec. 6Sll
| OF the code.)
Whoever unlawfully assaults or threatens
another in q menacing manner is declared
| to be punishable for. an assault; andwhOever
unlawfully strikes or wounds another is de-
clared to be punishable for assault and bat
| terry (See sec. 1923 of the Code)
Little need be added on the part of the
| Court by way of explanation or elucidatiOn
| to make these statutory definitions fully un-
ders ood, unless 1t be to call particular atten-
| tiOn to the line OF ofdemarcatiOn between muir
| der in the second degree and mans laughter.
The Jury will understand that murder in
| the second degree consists in the killing OF
another plTpoaeIy and nlaltct91tSlg, and 1t is
first degree in this, that the killing
need not to be of de iberate and premeditated
| malice, as In that crime. At common law,
| II the homicide was committed without de-
liberation and without premedltated malice,
| 1t did not amount to murder, but was man.
slaughter only, Whether such homicide
amounts to murder in the seCoud degree, or
to manslaughter depends upon the definition
OF our statute. If 1t was committed purpose
| ly and maliciOusly 1t is murier in the second
| degree In our State, and not manslaughteI
only as 1t might probably be at common
| law.
To determine in the present case whether
the accused is guilty of the charge of murder
in the second degree, the Jury will have tC
pass upon, and determine from the proof
these three essential propositions:
| |, Did the accused kill the deceased John
Maier?
2. Did he kill him pltrpoSelyP
| g. Did he kill him mdLiciOuSiy2
NIf the jury should find all these PROPOSE
| tIons, about which | shall have more to say
presently, in detail against the prisoner; 4
| 1t should find that the prisoner did kill Mailer
purposely and maiiciously, then he is guilty
of murder in the second degree, and may be
| convicted OF that crime. But II the Jury
should find that he killed the deceased, buI
that the killing was either not purposed, OF
not malicious, then he could not oe found
guilty Of murder in the second degree; and
the question would at once arise whether hC
would be guilty OF manslaughter. For the
present will, therefore, pass over to the con
sideration of mansIaughter. AS the statute
defines manslaughter to be the unlawful kill
| ing OF another, where such killing does mo-
| amount 10 murder in the first de 4ree or muir