The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1880-10-29
pared to bear.another period of Strengthened dis

pared to bear.another period of Strengthened dis
aster. They have just begun to thrive. A re-
action now, like a relapse Of fever. would be
more dangerous than the original disorder. In
1889, after one year of partial recovery from
the comparatively brief prcstration of 1887, the
country suffered such relapse, and the ter
rible consequences will not be forgotten. The
business of this country is not In the condition
to endure the enormous strain. the grave anxi-
ETY., and the prolonged uncertainty of a COM
plete change of the financial policy.
THE FEAR OF DISASTROUS CHANGES
would PROSTATE the public credit almost as
much as the changes themselves. Even though
none of the unwise steps c ntemplated should
finally be taken by the Democratic party, still
large proportion of the peoplewould fear them,
and would act upon that fear. Creditors and
investors abroad would fear them, and would
actwithout delay. Men would make haste to get
out of trouble before the anticipated blow should
fall, and the panic to escape from supposed peril
often results in greater loss of life than the
dreadful catastrophe. We have to face the fact
that almost every great financial interest would
be threatened by Democratic success. If the
blow should never come, the mere threat might
do ireparabie and incalculable injury. Bond
holders by the tn Jusand distrusting the party
by which payment of bonds in deprecated pa
per has been urged for years. might make haste
to realize. But these sales would PROSTATE
credit scarcely less than the dishonest measure
feared. Banks, savings banks, and insurance
companies, apprehending that their assets
might melt away beyond the limit of safety by
a fall in bonds, would make haste to sell. But
the selling would soon depress the price so
that surplus reserves would vanish. Bank
ruptcy for a few institutions might involve
bankruptcy for many. and that would mean loss
of their savings for millions of people.
1t cannot be expected that the national
banks would wait for the actual spoIiation
which Democrats have threatened.
Not a few would haste to wind up as ma
tional banks, and to get their bonds safely sold.
Loans would be hastily curtailed, by some in
excessive caution. and by others of necessity.
Who can fail to see that the mere apprehension
of injustice to this vast interest would disorder
trade and industry in every department? Long
before Democratic administration could begin
to do good or evil, the evil effects of change
would be felt.
Public credit means what the people think
about the honesty and solvency of their Govern
ment. What the Government really can do and
will do has little effect, if the people have
fixed belief about the matter. The fact can
not be denied that in the financial and CONNER
cial world the Democratic party is profoundly
distrusted. 1t has done nothing for years to
remove distrust, but very much to increase it.
The fact is noted that the Democratic party is
largely controlled by the South. But the South
has but a. small part in the Investments, the
commerce or the industries which change of
policy would affect. 1t is essentially agricult-
ural. It employs 65 per cent. of the manu-
featuring capital of the country, only So per
cent. of the money loaned by banks, only per
cent. OF the tonnage used in domestic COM
merce, and only IA per cent. of the freight cars
used OH railroads. OF the holders of United
States bonds, probably much less than one
tenth are i'll the Southern States.
NO GOVERNMENT BONDS IN THE SOUTH.
| None OF the loan and trust companies are To-
| Gated there Out of 900 shareholders in
national banks, less than 20.000 are i'll all the
| st tes formerly slavcholding. and only Ca 53
depOsitors i'll savings banks ont of 2.204 900 il
| the whole country, or less than 8 per cent. In
| short, the South has but an insignificant share
in the immense and complicated system of COM
merce, manufactures, investments, savings, and
vast credit, which rests upon the public credit
| as q foundation. This is not suggested as re-
! proach, but it prompts the question whether
| any business firm would turn over the manage
ment and control of its affairs to the partner
| having the smallest interest in the concern? II
| the United States intrusts the defense and
maintenance of the public credit to that section
which has least share or interest in it, OF in the
diversified industries and commerce which de-
| pend upon it, there will be real reason for APP
| prehension.
THE ORIGIN OF THE PUBLIC DEBT.
| We cannot forget the origin of the public
debt. The people of the once rebellious States
do not forget thatth debt was created in sup
| pressing the rebellion. Even in the payment Of
debts contracted by themselves, and for their
! own advantage, Southern communities have not
been conspicuous for their fidelity. Can it be
expected that they will be more eager and scru-
pulous to pay. according to the letter and in
any emergency, obligations created in putting
| down a rebellion which they made and sus-
tanned? The men who expect such q thing will
not be thought sagGcious by the civilized world
Nay. more; transfer of all care of the public
credit to party politically controlled by and
dependent upon the South will seem to all the
world little less than public proclamation that
the people of the United States are weary of
protecting its credit and paying its debts.
| E. d. MORGAN, J. j. AsToR,
| HAMILTON FISH, RoBT. LENNox KENNEDY
]. PIERPoNT MORGAN. E.. p FABBRI,
| CHAs. H. RUSSELL. JOHN A. STEWART
J. D. VERDrILYE, HENRY T. VAIL,
| BENZ. b. SHERMAN, DAVID Bows,
| VIM. H. MACY, SAM SLOAN
| LEVI P. MORTON, GEO. BLISS,
JESSE SELIGMAN, GEO. T. ADEE,
CYRUS W. FIELD, JOHN w. ELLIS,
ISAAC SHERMAN, l. N. PHELPS.