, 1880-08-25

advancing from Herat under Ayoob Khan.
This brigade consisted of about $500 men.
For some time little was heard of Gener-
al Burrows's movements, as the Command
erin Chief had directed the commanding
officer to stop all kilograms relating to the
disposition or numbers of the troops.
What was the motive of this prohibition
does not appear. 1t was, however. a
further example of that strange love of mys-
te-y which the higher military authori-
ties in India have shown throughout the
campaign, and they can hardly complain
if the public begin to attribute it TO their
desire to conceal their own laundering.
However this may be, it was we'll known
by the time that the force reached Girishk,
on the Helmand, if not, indeed, before it
left Candahar, that the whole of the Wallis
contingent were thoroughly untrustworthy.
having been corrupted by a regiment
which had been quartered for ten years
IN Cabul. 1t is strange that, this fact
being known, so weak a brigade was per-
mitted to proceed 70 miles from its sup
port against a force which started from
Herat with a strength of 5000 men
and SO guns, and which was probably
largely increased by the tribal Ievies Join
ing on the march. The general impress
sion here is that General Haines is greatly
to be blamed for this %imprudeuce: and
many expressions Of regrets are heard that
there was not on the spot q soldier like
Sir Donald Stewart to point out the rash
ness CT this proceeding.
Shortly after the brigade arrived at
Girishk, the Wallis infantry and artillery
broke into open mutiny. You are already
acquainted with the particulars of the
affair. People are now asking why they
were not diSarmed before the mutiny;
why the cavalry. which nominally remain.
ed faithful, were not disarmed afterwards :;
and why General Burrows allowed an hour
and a half 10 eIapse before be pursued the
mutineerS. The Correspondent Of the Caa-
dahar Neics, describing the event, says =
They had six guns and any number of
CamelS, and formed q line several miles
long. From our elevated position we
could see them beautifully, and Ionged to
cross the river and head them. For some
reason or other nothing was done for an
hour and a half"
Whether this delay can be satisfactorily
explained remains to be seen. All that is
certain is that the mutineers made off.
They were supposed to have dispersed,
but it is much more probable they went
to swell Ayoob's army. The next step
was the Generals retirement to Khushk-in-
ekhud, about 45 miles from Candahar, ac-
companied by the WALKS cavalry and
about 60 desert RS from Ayoob. Mean
while Ayoob crossed the HeImand at Hy-
derabad, about 20 miles above Girishk,
and advanced to the attack. There are
no clear details, and, indeed little news of
any kind of the events which followed /;
no- arc we likely to learn much until
communication with Candahar has been
restored. The latest official news, dated
Quetta, July g., is that, although no d.
rect tidiugs from Candahar have been
received, accounts have come in from
native sources. These are to the effect
that the enemy drew our cavalry and
artillery into ambush, that Ayoob then
delivered an attack, and that our force.
although by no means routed, yet suffered
so severely in officers and men as to neces-
state a retirement on Candahar. Ayoob's
army, which was in overwhelming num-
bers-the guns alone being IL to one-ls
said to have suffered severely, This story al
though not confirmed officially, is not
unlikely to be correct, aa it is received
from several sources. Moreover, it is, to
some extent, borne out by the fact that