Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1880-08-04

vi tne eglSldtuIes auu Hot 10 the court.
1t is for the Legislature to say what shall
be sufficient to excuse the elector from
registering as required by law, and when
the Legislature has passed a law which
gives ample opportunity for every
elector to register If he will, the Court is
In my opinion transcending its lower in
declaring the law void, because the Legis.
lature has said to the elector, unless you
register, you cannot vote. There does
not appear to me to be any middle
ground. The elector has the absolute
right to vote on the day of election, if he
has then the qualifications of an elector
under the Constitution, and is then ready
to make proof of his qualification, as was
stated by the Chief Justice in the case of
the State VS.. BAKER, Or else he must, if
required by law, furnish the proof of his
right to vote by registering on the days
fixed by the Legislature previous to the
day of election, Or he may be prohibited
from voting. That tie elector may be
absent on the days fixed for registering q,
that he may be sick or imprisoned, or that
in the hurry of business he may wholly
forget that he is required to register until
1t Is too late, cannot excuse the elector
from doing that which is necessary to
secure fair election. These accidents
are not the fault of the law, and cannot
affect its validity"
The Judge then alludes to the election
law of Massachusetts, to which he says
every objection made to our law, was
made there fifty years ago. He then
gives the reasons of the Supreme
Court of Massachusetts for sustaining
that law, and says that they
are equally applicable to our's.
The Chief Justice of Massachu-
sets said: SIN the particular provision
in regard to which the validity of the
law is now called in question. viz: that
no person shall vote at an election whose
name is not previously placed on the list
of voters, it appears by the facts agreed in
the present case that the name of the
plaintiff was not borne on the list of voters
at the time his vote was rejected, and il
does not appear that he had previously
examined the lists or applied to have his
name inserted on the lists. By the plain
and express terms of the law, the plaintiff
under these circumstances was prohibited
from voting; by asserting the right, there
fore, the plaintiff puts in issue the validity
of these provisions of the law. Aud the
case for the plaintiff Is put upon the
ground that such provision is a restraint
upon the right of voting, inconsistent with
the privileges secured by the Constitution
to the citizens; that the constitutional
privileges are above and beyond the con.
troll of the Legislative power. and that all
such laws are therefore unconstitutional,
imperative and void. This is the CUES
ton which the Court is now called upon to
decide"
The extracts from the Massachusetts de-
clsion are of great length and interest,
but too bulky for newspaper article; the
SOuAt III tunt otdtO AClo lA0t VIC LSRISld
ture had the power to make the same
regulations as hav5 been tried in this,
and the decision has been widely quoted
for many years.
Judge TAYLOR quotes many other
learned authorities and well-known cases
in support of his positions, and con cludes
his opinion as follows: 81 think that the
conditions of registry law are in the
discretion of the Legislature; that in the
enactment of this law it exercised sound
and wise discretion. But if we enter
tanned the opinion that we could have ex.
ercised a wiser discretion in the matter,
we have no power to set aside the act of
the Legislature for that reason. When the
Legislature has discretion to exercise,
courts can only set aside its action when
there is plain, palpable and clear abuse
of such legislative discretion. <
In my judgment, the complaint In the
action failed TO state a cause of action.
and the order sustaining the demurrer
should be affirmed