The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1880-09-25
The Former Siege of Candahar.

The Former Siege OF Candahar.
In consequence of the great interest
taken in the present siege of Candahar
and the recent attempt to storm it made
by Ayoob Khan, sketch of the former
siege of 1912 will be read with attention
In November, 1912, affairs were in a
peaceful condition at Candahar, al
though there was some trouble at Cabul.
While things were in this satisfactory
state it was decided to reduce the garri-
son and to send an English brigade and
three of the native regiments back to
India under the command of Colonel
Maclaren. The brigade had even COM
menced its march toward Quetta when
alarming news from the north necessi-
tated its immediate recall, and, instead
of proceeding to their homes in the
plains of Scinde, the Sepoys advanced
northward with the intention of rein
forcing Elphinstone at Cabul. For I'M
known reasons Maclaren, after months
absence, abandoned the attempt OF
marching on Cabul and returned to
Candahar, thus raising the garrison to
its original strength. The consequences
of this blunder were very serious, for,
had he persisted in his advance, not
only Ghazni would have been saved but
the final catastrophe at Cabul might
have been averted. Before the year 1841
closed it was evident that the English
garrison at Candahar was environed by
enemies. At this crisis Candahar, in
trusted to General Mott and Major Raw
inson, stood forth as rock amid
troubled waters, in face of the hostility
of the powerful tribes of Western AZ
ghanistan.
In January an Afghan army approach
ed Candahar and pitched their camp at
the village of illa-Chuk, on the Argan-
dab: Mott marched out with the greater
part of his force and Observation-Disclosures
ed the enemy. The Afghans were COM
pletely defeated and suffered severe
loss. Although successful in the field,
the position of the English at Candahar
became more perlous THAI before in
consequence of the declared hostility of
the Durani clans. Early in March Raw
linson took the final precaution of clear
ing the city of its Afghan inhabitants.
Only 1000 families were permitted
to remain. No sooner had this been
done than Mott again took the field,
leaving Rawlinson in charge of the city.
During three days Mott kept up run
ming fight with the Afghans, and by that
time he had drawn considerable dis
lance away from Candahar. The At
CHAN troops were at once led back by a
circuitous route to Candahar in the hope
of surprising and overwhelming the
small garrison. Rawlins at once sent
messengers post haste to inform General
Mott. During three hours that night a
contest ragged at the Herat gate, where
the Afghans were forcing an entrance,
and scarcely less severely at the Cabul
and SINGAPORE gates; but toward mid
night the Ghazis could not be brought
again to the charge and the Afghans
retired, baffled by the skill and deter
mination of the small body of men I'M
der the command of Majors Rawlinson
and Lane.
During these later months great prep
arations had been in progress in Scinde
for the reinforcement of the Candahar
army. A brigade under General Eng
land had been formed and sent through
the Bolan to Quetta before the close of
March. Unfortunately, General Eng
land did not prove equal to the occa-
sion, and when show of resistance was
made to his advance at Haekalzae, he at
once gave up the attempt and retired to
Quetta. General England made another
attempt, but it is only necessary to add
that General Motifs forces cleared the
neighborhood of Candahar of the enemy
in the course of the following spring.
In June every thing was in readiness
for the withdrawal Of the English forces
from Candahar; but Mott, with his two
European regiments, retired northward
by way of Ghazni and Cabul. In that
journey he was completely successful,
defeating the enemy in two pitched en-
counters, capturing the fortress Of
Ghazni, and reaching Cabul only
two days later than General Pollock,
who had advanced from Jellalabad.
The salient point of difference between
General Motifs defense of Candahar and
that of General Primrose appears to be
that, whereas the former held the city
in its entirety, the latter has been COM
PEELED to abandon the city and concen-
trate his force in the citadel. General
Mott, with larger body of troops, was
able to hold his ground mainly by clear
ing the city of its Afghan inhabitants,
and, as General Primrose was unable to
perform similar task, there was no al
Tentative to placing his force in as ad-
vantageous position for defense as
possible. For this reason there is more
ground for anxiety now than there was
in 1912, and a greater necessity in pro-
portion to hurry up reinforceIhents.