Morning journal and courier., 1880-11-23

military preparations on the shore can avert
 this danger, and the means of meeting it
 must be purely naval, these means do not
 fall under consideration; or
 2d. By aSSalling one or more of the impor-
 tant points of the coast with large military
 and naval force with view to Immediate
 damage, or more or less protracted occupa-
 tion or,
 Sd. By suddenly appearing with large
 squadron of vessels before our principal com
 mercial cities laying them under contribu-
 tion, and burning or carrying off the ship
 ping, and by making poN@ful attacks upon
 our navy yards in order to destroy those es- tablishments or,
 4th. By attacks on smaller towns and es- tablishments of the coast with small squad rons or single vessels, or with privateers, capturing or destroying the shipping therein, l and bringing contributions and by like
 means intercepting the interior commerce within the bays, sounds and entrances of
 the coast these lesser enterprises being often conducted under the countenance and support of considerable fleets.
 The danger may take any of these forms, l or all of them. And against any or all of | these naval for0o of equal or greater l strength, if 1t could with any certainty be | found at hand, might be an adequate resort | though it would not be the most economical | But, in the first place, we are yet, and shall | be for years, inferior in our naval prepara-
  l in conflict; and next, if we were even far su- | perior, it would be impossible to have at each of the points to be guarded a naval force suf- fcient to secure 1t. because a hostile squad
 ron of powerful, fast running armored steamers would fall with equal ease on either of the important points, and could with no more certainty be expected at one than at an- other; so that to resist successfully we must l be ready at each and all with force not less | than that of the enemy; if less, an unavall- ! ing resistance would but augment the ealam- itous consequences.
 An enemy's squadron, assembled at Hali- | fax, or Bermuda, must be equally looked for l at every important point from the Penobscot | to New Orleans inclusive, for it could with equal ease fall upon either. The same would | be true, moreover, of such force assembled | in any Atlantic port of Europe.
 There has been but one practice among | nations as to the defense of ports and har- l bors, and that has been a resort to fortifca- tions and Instructions by torpedoes or other ! wise. All the experience that history exhib- ! it's is on one side only; 1t is the opposition l of forts or other works comprehended by the term Notifications, to attack by vessels. No nation onits covering the exposed points upon her seaboard with Notifications, nor l hesitates in coIfding in them. Substantiating forcibly this view are the views of Secretaries | of War Cass and Poinsett, which are given with the report.
 It is truly an axiom in military science, and
 one fully illustrated by military history, that
 the worst mode of waging war, although
 strictly defensive, is to allow its field of ac- | tion to be within the borders, and that the | best is that which most frequently assumes
 an offensive attitude. In our case war can only be excluded from our territory by forti-
 cations, and we can only assume the offensive through our navy. The construction of the former secures the means of creating, equip ping and repairing the latter, and leaves it
 unencumbered with duties which it imper- fectly performs to the full exercise of its
 most important and appropriate functions.