New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1880-11-25
HARBOR DEFENCE.

MrYTED BY CHANNEL TORPHDORS TIE ONN
PERFECT SAFEGUARD
To tie RAZOR Of Thc TrfbUhe.
SIR: Some newspaper criticisms upon the method
| Of harbor defence advocated by the Chief OF Eng
ncers of the Amy have recently appeared when are
deemed to be so essentially illogical and unsound as
fo demand notice. II is asserted ID That some
authorities wonld place their whole dependence
upon liues of channel torpedors; ~ that Others
! would trnst to nothing but hastily constructed
| eartbwOrks to meet an expected naval attack, ana
that our late war settled the fact that such works
are better than Notifications Of iron and stone; 49,
and that still others regard Oh iron clad navy rs me
! only sure and safe defence. These several points
| will be briefly discussed in tho order named
| First-The requirements Of Il good defence are de-
| termined by the character aud magnitude OF the
attack This is especially the IN artillery CON-
hats between shore batteries and fleets II m enemy
brings heavy cannon against we must protect our
guns from heavy shOt they VIII soon DC dc-
stroyed And if his vessels also carry thick dcfons-
i've amor wo are forced to use heavy prop ctiies
or our defence IS worthless, for where large gun
is needed TO deliver n crushing blow, no possible
accumulation of smaller guns VIII answer instead
Cumulative fierce implies unity Of mass and impact.
thousand pounds Of RraDesh0t even II tired az Que
volley can be stopped by Inch steel plate, bus
If sent as single bolt it will shater the best l2-inch
armor.
Having The heavy guns, so mounted as TO be SHIT
ably urotected from destruction by the eaemys
fire. let us add another condition, that these gdns
shall have time to do their proper work; that IS that
the hostile feet cannot run past them without stop
ping but will be arrested by torpedoes orsomo other
channel obstruction, aud we have The whole theory
and practice OF modern harbor defence by forct-
cations and their accessories. 1t is popular erFor'
supported by no experience and by Lc
Authority either military or naval, VINE.
assumos that defence by torpedOes.
however perfect in itself can stand
alone TO be Of any the torpedoes must be pro
tccted from removal by the enemy, the best and
cheapest protection yet devised being shore bate
RIGS OF heavy guns. Otherwise they are harmless,
and therefore, n worthless obstruction. Fortihca-
lions and channel torpedoes mutually supplement
and support each other. II the torpedoes he omitted
an armorcd flee: can by the forts without stop
ping and perhaps without suffering material injury.
If the forts be omitted the enemy could stop and re-
move The lorpcdces at his leisure, and then
The experience of cur civil and OF the Russo
Turkish war furnishes ample testimony to the fact
that torpedoes which can be approached by the en-
envy unmoles,ed afford no defence to a channel and
cause but tri1ing delay to the passage O a hostile
fleet.
Seeona--It is not only admitted bat claimed. by
military engineers that casemated forts built OF
stone or brick after the old types do not satisfy the
essential conditions of a good defence against an
armed fleet. for tho simple reason thar the scarp
wall, which should protect the guns and gnnners,
cannot withstand the shocks Of heavy projec,iles.
The wall around the embrasure would with few
exceptions, be pierced through and through by
shot from a heavy rife. The obvious remedy for
this weakness-the one universally adopted in
modern practice-is to strengthen the walls with
metal shields or armor plating, rather than discard
all protection By resOrtng TO open batteries or
eartnwor5s, in which both guns and gunuers are
exposed to full view. Indeod in these open bat
tories unless exceptional circumstances favor their
being sea tered IN gle guns over "A long line, it
might not be possible TO the glns at all even
for brief period, against 9rmored ships sh0wering
.napo and canister fcom large guns, and leaden bull
lets from machine-guns and other rifles. The pro-
tecton of the cannoneers at their pieces is certainly
a consideration of the highest moment. 1t is indeed
an essential consideration. Even IN our casemated
works "a leading object has been to give the least
possible room for the entrance Of missiles Ia those
last bullt the embrasures. though smaller than ever
before. were supplied with iron shutters 10 stop
crane, canister and rifle bullets. General Totem
late Chef OF Engineers, deemed this precaution
mates, might DO able TO stand to t.e,r guns.
The lessons of our civil war, and 81 all modern
wars so fer from jusffying recourse 10 earthwork
for channel defence. all point the other way. Al
Port ROYAL oar feet although composed OF wooden
vessels only drove the gar1Isous precip'atelv from
their works on both sides Of the harbor. L. the
operations before Charleston it was no uHcolonOn
sight to see the " New lr0nsdes alone silence ire
fire OF Eor Wagner Ia very strong ear.hwOrk SO ,Aa.
the work IN the trenches could proceed uumolcsted
and on oar Western waters running a battery
became almost an every day occurrence,
the important question in such cases
being whether tho channel itself was tree
from obstruction. good defence, there
fore. AGAINST armorcd vessels of modern type,
requires that tue batteries shall be arUod with
heavy guns, that the guns shalt be protected from
th. eu.my'5 fire. and that the auxiliary defence by
chanuel-torpedoas shall be of such magnitude TIA,
80 vessel can attempt 90 run the ga1ndet through
them without ircurriug the most imminent risk of
destruction. defence cf dis potential character
"a defence designed quite rs mueb TO prevent an
attack as 10 defeat it's most powerful cousarva-
tor OF tGc uatoll. peace Illo,d, tho true Oi;o OF
permanent defenccs is to avert war. They are the
guardians lataer tlan tho champions Of the public
good aud of the lives and substance of the people
Ihyd-Iho idea ,h.t an iron-clad navy " alone
Will furnish sHge defence IS both attractive Sud
popular, but it Is oa1 winch finds no practical exist
enoe even among naval powers. It's truth as a
theory is freely admitted because "a harbor feet, il
as powerful rs the eneny's would be expected TO
make, and no dorbt would make, good defence
Bat at tine very best. ia that case the chances of
victory for us would be emily equal 10 those of dc
feat while the risks taken aud tho consequences TO
ensue from failure wonlI be greatly unequal ior
while the enemy could lose nothing but his lsot We
codld lose not only our hler, but those much more
valuable possessions which the feet was
designed 80 protect. Where interests Of
great magnitude are at stake ordinary prudence
suggests that az little as possible should be loft to
The cagrices Of chance a safe and perfect defence
OF this kind implies therefore q har0Or l,et soma