, 1880-10-27

must have a certain individuality, and
not only in the matter of the DEGREES,
but in foreign policy, and in the extra
ordinary controversy which he kept
up with M. Gambetta through the
French Correspondent of the Times he
e~ndeavoured to assert a separate opin-
ion. So would any other Premier,
and it is only by using Premiers up,
and that very rapidly, hat the present
arrangement can be made to go on at
all. Still, the Chamber must be per-
fectly aware of this evil, which among
other mischiefs impedes its own con-
duct of business; and fit deliberately
decides that it will endure the evil "a
Their than depose NJ. Gambetta Or COM
pei him to take power prematurely; it
is clearly within its right, and foreign
ers have only to wonder at the strength
of a self-command which no other Par
lament would display. If, in short,
NJ. Gambetta is sustained by France in
his assumption to be a power above
Ministers, he cannot, SO long as he
only ~persuades France, be blamed
for exercising ascendancy.
Whether NJ. Gambetta has been wise in
his use on this occasion of the singular and
exceptional power conided to him is a very
different matter, and M which will be
Judged according to the critics belief in
his impelling motive. 1t is said to be "the
universal belief of the Continent and is GER
n i'll kIo Io1iaf nf n or~oo
and correspondents, that M. de Freycinet's
policy of cancellation towards Rome was
only the pretcXt for his dismissal, and that
NJ. Gambetta was really irritated by %
foreign policy radically at variance with
his own views, and there arc some obvious
facts to be produced i'll support of this
theory. NJ. de Freycinot was, no doubt,
strongly inclined to reserve in foreign poll
cy, to q withdrawal from all enterprises
not tending to colonial extension, and
especially TO u display of forbearance
towards the Turk. lie almost prevented
the European Demonstration, he delayed
assent till the moment had all but passed,
and even when he yielded to urgent pres
sure, he ISSUED separate instructions to Tho
Admiral, which Turks and Tories hope
may be fatal to the European concord. 1t
was well understood, moreover, that +"
change had passed over French views"
with respect to Greece, and that Athens
had little to hope from the support of tho
Power hitherto moss friendly 10 the extern
sion of Greek dominion. NJ. de F~reycinet,
i'll fact, was on Eastern politics i'll harmony
with moderate English Tories. All this
cannot have been agreeable to III. Gambetta,
who holds the old idea that France has
vital interests in the East, and who is pledg-
ed by every public declaration, and, it is
said, By many private assurances, TO tho
support of the Greek claim. He may have
desired strongly a more decided policy in
the French Foreign Office, and may have
resented his want of influence in q depart
ment over which he is very watchful. and
III which he has not yet obtained any
remarkable success. Indeed. he has rather
failed, until his enemies are able 10 say
that this is the direction in which his
of breadth OF sympathy, will become most
manifest and most injurious to France.
The theory is supported too, by the ad
interim character Of the appointment made
to the Foreign Ofice, NJ. Barthelemy st.
Hilaire only taking the portfolio until M.
Gambetta has make arrangements which
will probably seat NJ. Challemel Lacour or
some one equally trusted by himself. in
the Foreign Ministry. The evidence for
this theory, however, although entitled to
attention, is nOt.Overwhelming. The men,
bers of the Cabinet who have not been
dismissed, and especially General Fare,
must nave assented to NJ. de Freycinet's
dispatches, while he on that subject did
not prove himself incurably obstinate. He