The home journal. (Winchester, Tenn.) 1858-188?, 1880-02-19
"Adyancc and Retreat

A portion Of Gen. Hoods book Ten
tiled as aho>e), Is devoted to reply
10 the attack made upon h'm by Gen
Joseph T. Johnston in his Narrative"
Hood summarizes in few words the
plan If the campaign, the failure OF
which led to the trouble between him
and Johnston:
"rhe war department had been anx-
ious that an offensive campaign INTO
Tennessee and Kentucky be initiated
IN the early spring Vi 1854, and made Il
proposition TO Gen Johuston TO rein
force him win Polk's troops, then in
Mississippi, aud Lons,treets corps in
East Tennessee, Johnston, at the up-
pointed time, was expected to move
forward and form IL junction with
these troops. The President and Gen.
Bragg aud also Gen. Lee, were de,i>
rols that the offensive he assumed, and
an attempt he made 10 drive the Fed
rails to the ONO river before II large
army could he concentrated to move
against u.s."
Johnston was to have in addition TO
his own force. Gen. Martins force J.
600 men), Lieut.. Gen. Folks force o.,
OO0), from Gen. Bcaurcgard 10000
men, and from Gen. Longstrcet l6 OOO
men, making, with his own army, a
total force OF 1900 men. Gen. Hood
reported to Gen. Johnston NJ Dalton.
| Hood SAYS that even then Johnston
thought II best for the Conicdelales t"
fail hack and take up some position IN
the rear Of Dalton. "This,' writes
liool, was my Introduction To the
army Of Tennessee albeit not calcu-
lated 10 inspire or encourage military
ardor--sincc it was proposed to re-
treat. even before the enemy became III
earnest-I nevertheless laid before
Gen. Johnston the plan to join Polk
army and Longslreets corps on the
march into Tennessee, gave hun assn
rance that the authorities in Richmond
would afford hun every assistance, and
informed him, moreover, that Gen
Lee favored the objected campaign
Gen Johnston immediately took the
ground that he did not very well know
the country through which it was pro-
posed TO pass to the rear OF the enc>
nv; that there were difficulties 20 he
encountered, etc, etc; lie desired
Folks and Longstreets forces to join
him II. Dalton, where, this large army
being concentrated, he considered he
should be left to decide and act for the
hes, in other words, he left to move
forward, stand his ground or retreat, As
might seem most expedient TO this
demand Gen. Lee was unwilling to rr-
cedc; he WAS reluctant to give W
Longstreel's corps, unless Tor the
purpose of active work and dealing
hard blows, IN the performance OF
which task it had already SO often dis
tinguished itself The war department
ohje tied to the withdrawn! Of Polk
army from Mississippi. until active OPP
cralons were to commence, US. by
such movement, one OF the best re-
sious Of country for supplies would be
abandoned to the enemy
But the " assumed difficulties set
forth by Gen. Johnston prevented the
execution Of. in my opinion. one of tue
most important campaigns projected
during the war; and one fact IS Ger.
tain, whatever may be said con,rari-
wise, President Davis offered every
possible inducemcnt toward its execu>
ton. aud had. in regard. to the wis
dom of the proposed operations, the
support Of Gen. Robert K. Lee" Thus
Gen. Hood vindicates Mr., Davis from
Johnston's charge Of "incapac:ty' and
jealousy" Hood comment. as fol-
lows: IL cannot name one OF Lees
acknowledgement who would not
have met this proposition from the
war department with that spirit of COS
operation which is so essential in time
of war. Moreover. any officer pos
sessed OF even part Of that heroic
self reliance so characteristic Of Lee
and Johnston would not only have
gladly accepted the ninety one ;hous
and (9l, OOO) men, but. having secured
"a competent quartcrmaster, would
soon have found the necessary trans
por,ation; would have sent dispatch
to Richmond that he was moving for
ward, and, God willing, would TAKE
from the enemy all else needed to
equip the army. Such might have
been the result. instead OF unremittine
demands, upon the part OF Gen, John
ston, for an outfit equal to that oI
United States troops, visions OF insaf
ferable difficulties and vacillations un-
ending"
Gen. Hood incidentally refers to
Gen. Saerman's memoirs" wherein il
is said: u did not suppose that Gen
Hood, though rash, would venture to
attack fortified places like ALTOONA
Resacca, Decatur and Nashville; bu,
he did SO, and in so doing, played into
our hands perfectly"
Upon this passage Hood remarks
"And yet from other portions of his
Memoirs it will he seen that did not
attack either Resacca, Decatur or
Nashville. My official report will also
show that Msjor-Geueral French as
saulted Alstoona, while under discre.
tionary orders. Thus, in none of
these instances, is Gen Sherman cor
lec,"
Gen. Hood lets fly some Par
THAN arrows at Joseph Johnston