, 1880-09-15

the advice and responsibility of the mill
tary authorities in India, and that, this
being resolved upon, the evacuation of
Cabul became. according to the same
advisers expedient. It is conceivable that
Sir F, Roberts's enterprise may be, as
certain of his critics assert, reckless and
hazardous; but it would be altogether
impossible to take matters of this kind out
OF the hands OF those who are responsible
for the conduct of the campaign aud 10
commit it to the direction OF persons Nm.
acquainted either with its beginning, its
end, or Its objects. When it is contended
that the evacuation of Cabul exposes the
advance OF Sir F. Roberts upon Candahar
to unnecessary risk because it deprives the
General in command of the advancing CO.
Iumn OF his base of operations, there is an
obvious tendency to transfer to differ.
ens conditions the rules and terms Of
European strategy. 1t does no doubt
Involve a risk-perhaps a considerable risk
TOR Sir +. Roberts to leave Cabul and to
plunge into the almost ~unexplored country
III the direction of Canadian, but how, it
may be asked, would this risk be Iessened
by maintaining Genera! Stewart in the can
comments OF Sherpur with force so weak
ened as in itself to give occasion for
anxiety? II General Stewart were left at
Cabul and We're with difficulty TO keep
open communications with General Ro-
berts's force, the base thus supplied would
be merely nominal. II would be
@ @~S,'y '0e Sr '9assp6 tGt p{f00yT'dee etbSs2} aal
Roberts's ENJOYABLE column" and in
the event Of a general Afghan rising,
which must be regarded as at any rate q
possibility, the retention of the attenu ated
garrison in the citadel Of Caoul would, in
point OF fact, give US two centres Of ankle.
ty instead Of one, without Strengthening
the force OF resistance at either the one or
the other,
1t would be, as we have repeatedly said. a
discredilable confession of weakness and COW
ardioe if we were to be carried away from the
policy which We had deliberately taken up by
a petty check 10 a handful Of our troops in q
far1of corner of Afghanistan. 1t was resolved
many months ago. by Lord Beaconsfeld's Ad-
HllIlStIbtiJut 40 WCii as ny 4nIs OlduSIOuBE.
that the British troops should be withdrawn
from Cabul as early as possible, and before the
disaster to General Buirows's force this rolicv
was impressed upon The Government of India.
1t would be despicable TO recede form it from
an imaginary fear lest the Afghans may deem
it TO be inspired by panic. Sir F.. Roberts's
march, whatever may be thought of its pru-
dence as a strategical operation, cannot BIZ re-
garded as the act of a panic-stricken Power.
It's success. of which we do not permit our
selves to doubt, will convince the Afghans
that we are in earnest. They will understand
thai, though Sir Donald Stewart retired on We'd
nesday from Cabul to Gandamak, the Govern.
meDt of India is both able and prepared to ad.
vance again, and TO strike a swift and telling blow
at the heart of the Afghan power should there be
occasion for 80 doing The Treaty of Ganda.
max is, in a certain sense, q dead letter, and
the "scientifc frontier" has never been pre-
cisely defined. 1t Is nevertheless, clearly
understood, both in India and in Afganistan.
that the Anglo-Indian Government ia to retain
possession of the gates of India at one end and
the other, and is to remain within striking dis
lance of the centre of Afghan power at Cabul.
We cannot believe that in these %circumstan-
ces the withdrawal from Cabul of General
Stewards diminished force, which, instead of
giving support to General Roberts during his
Advance, would rather become in itself a cause
for apprehension, can be fairly made an ex cuse
for censuring the Government either at CaIcut-
ia or at home. The immediate responsibility
rests upon the military advisers OF the Viceroy,
and we trust it will he found that their ooun-
sells have been Justified by events.
VVho q,aIaorop,e nnalishad r. IF