Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1880-08-04

HANAAo VI ~ UNIV bh AAN AAVAN VI WV
line connecting Cemetery Hill with
Round Top, the lett centre commanded
by me. That line consisted of the lst,
%, and Sd corps, of which | had the
general command. l commanded that
iOhole front. General Gibbons com.
manded the I'd corps in my absence,
General Newton the lst corps, and
General Birney the Sd. That cannon
ado continued for probably an hour
and half. The enemy then made an
assault at the end of that time. 1t
was a very formidable assault, and,
made | should Judge, with about
$4,000 infantry. When the columns
of the enemy appeared it looked as
if they were going to attack the
centre Of our line, but after marching
straight out a little distance, they
seemed to incline little TO their object
was to march through my command
and seize Cemetery Hill, which |
have no doubt was their intention.
They attacked with wonderful spirit
nothing could have been more spirited.
The shock of the assault fell on the I'd
and Sd divisions of the I'd Corps, assio.
ted by a small brigade of Vermont
troops, together with the artillery of
our line, which fired from Round Top
to Cemetery Hill at the enemy all the
way as they advanced whenever they
had the opportunity. Those were the
troops that really met the assault, No
doubt there were other troops that
fired little, but those were troops
that really withstood the shock of the
assault and repulsed it, The attack
of the enemy was met by about six
small brigades OF our troops, and was
finally repulsed after terrific contest
at very close quarters, in which our
troops took about thirty or forty colors
and some 1000 to 5000 prisoners, with
great loss to the enemy in killed and
wounded The repulse was a most
signal one, and that decided the bat.
tie, and was practically the end OF the
fight. | was wounded at the close of
tho assault, and that endad my opara-
tions with the army for that campaign.
| did not follow in its future move
ments.
That practically ended the fighting Of
| the battle of GettSybWg, There was no
serious fighting there after that, save
on the left IN an advance by small
command of the Pennsylvania Re.
serves, made very soon afterwards and
based upon our success. may say
one thing here | think it was proba-
bly, an unfortunate thing that | was
wounded at the time | was, and equally
unfortunate that General Gibbons was
also wounded, because the absence Of
a prominent commander, who knew
the circumstances thoroughly at such
a moment as that, was great disad-
vantage. l think that our lines should
have advanced Immediately, and be-
lieve we should have won great vic
tory. | was very confident that the
advance would be made. General
Meade told me before the fight that if
the enemy attacked me he intended to
put the 9th and 9th Corps on the
enemy's flank therefore, when | was
wounded and lying down in my ambu-
lance and about leaving the field, |
dictated a note to General Meade, and
told him if he would put in the 9th and
9Th corps | believed he would win
great victory. | asked him after.
ward when | returned to tho army
what he had done in the premises, He
said he had ordered the movement,
but the troops were slow IN connecting,
and moved so slowly that nothing was
done before night, except that some OF
the Pennsylvania Reserves went out
and met Hoods division, il was under
stood, of the enemy, and actually over
throw it, assisted, no doubt, in some
measures, by their knowledge OF their
failure in the assault. There were only
two divisions OF the enemy on our ex-
treme left, opposite Round Top, and
there was gap in their line of one
, mile that their assault had left, and !
believe if our whole line had advanced
, with spirit it Is not unlike that we
would have taken all their artillery at
r that point. think that was fault
that we should have pushed the enemy
there for we do not often catch them
f in that position and the rule IS
and il is natural, that when you re
pnlse or defeat an enemy you should
4 pursue him and believe II is q rare
i thing that one party beats another and
does not pursue him and / think that
on that occasion IL only requires ar
order and prompt execution.
; / have no doubt the enemy regarded
, the success Of their assault as certain
{ so much so that they were willing tC
expend all their ammunition. They diJ
not suppose that any troops could live
' under that cannonade but they met
. troops that had been so accustomed tc
artillery fire that il did not have effect
0 on them that they expected II was
;. a most terrific cannonade-one posi-
bly, hardly every parallelcd
{ @. Was there ever, In any battle oi
7 which you have read, more artillery
r brought into action than in that bat
! tle2 A. | doubt whether there has
: ever has been more concentrated upon
r an equal space and opening at one
. time. / think there has been more
!. artillery engaged in many battles, but
0 do not believe there has been more
! upon both sides concentrated on Az
{ equal space,
4, @. You did not follow the army from
there A. No, sir left the field the
moment the fight was over
Q @. When did you join the army
J again2 A. did not join it again m
7 I'll sometimesin December, when active
s operations had ceased. was then
I ordered by the Secretary of War into
] the States from whence tho regiments
s Of my corps came TO fill them up by
! recruitment, and am now on my ro
turn TO the army.
. O. But, with equal numbers, you
! would not hesitate TO attack the enemy
J. anywhere under equal circumstances
4 A. No. sir, | would not In fact thorC
0 is no finer army, IL az fine, in cxistenc,
in tho.world than the army Of tho Po
tomac. The troops will do anything