, 1880-03-20

kind would, even in Germany, excite. He
is anxious to convince the people and the
Deputies, and especially the Deputies
from the minor States, like Baden and
Bavaria, that there is real danger; and
knowing their suspicion Of Russia, he
declares that the danger arises from that
side. This poilcy is the more acceptable
to him, because he does not wish the Aus
TRANS to take alarm at his preparations,
and knows that they also are nervous
about Russian irritation at the state of
affairs within the Balkan peninsula,-an
irritation very far from being concealed.
In the second place, it takes two Gov
inner to make a war, and the Govern
ment OF st. Petersburg is palpabIy anxious
at present not TO be drawn into any quar-
rel with its western neighbour. 1t has
ordered the hostile articles in the German
Press to be suppressed 10 Russia, and has
directed its own organs to declare that
Russia always las been, and now is,
friendly 10 Germany, against which she
is making no preparations. Aud thirdly,
1t should be observed that there is no sign
OF alarm amongst the great inanciers, the
Exchanges OF Europe remaining u~nafect-
ed, and the ~moneydealers looking forward
to a rise, as if they held all these verbal
quarrels to be matters of no account.
That Is nc proof that Prince Bismarck
will not strike, for Germany can get into
motion without a loan, but 1t Is proof that
some of the keenest and most interested
men in Europe see no sign of The coming
storm. The total effect Of the facts is not
so much to create an apprehension of war
as a belief that some motive is influencing
German action to which we do Tot as yet
possess the clue.
We do not affect to possess one; but
there is an explanation Of Prince
Blsmarck's action whlcd, though far from
reassuring, fits the facts better than any
project of his for bringing on a frightfuIly
dangerous war. The German Chancellor
must, OF all men in Europe, be the one
most interested in all that is now occurring
within the Russian Empire. Is it not
possible that he, who undoubtedly has
exaggerated the power of the German
Socialists, and who has met their efforts by
a simple aud direct application of force,
may exaggerate the revolutionary forces
In Russia, may expect connections and
change the result Of which, 10 his iudg-
ment, would be either a military Dictator
ship ana a necessity for war, or anarchy
Of a kind which would require and greatly
tempt German interference, and may
desire to be ready with his favourite
expedient ? 1t seems to US that a states
man like Prince Bismarck, essentially
Conservative, if not reactiOnqry. penetrat-
ed, as he has avowed, bv an impression Of
Russian instability, embittered by hls own
contest with SociaIism-a doctrine which,
recollect, he thinks utterly senseless, as
well as bad-and heated by his own very
considerable danger from assassins, may
see 10 Russia all the signs of revolution,
and think that with revolution might arrive
a dangerous readiness for external action.
Or might not he, a diplomatist of the old
school, familiar with the desperate policies
sometimes pressed upon Kings, expect that
il the Nihilists succeeded, and drove the
Emperor Alexander either to his grave or
to abdication, the new Gar, a ~resoIute and
even rash man, might in despair place
everything On the hazard of a die, declare
for the Panslavists, and by an attack on
Austria force on a collision with Germany?
We know nothing, of course, of the Chan
cellor's thoughts, and profess to know
nothing but such thoughts would not be
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