Lancaster daily intelligencer. [volume] (Lancaster, Pa.) 1864-1928, 1880-04-05
1anraster fnteIligerlcer.
MONDAY EVENING, APRIL s, 1890.
PatterSOn's Patent Law.

f0tterS0n'S Patent Law.
There is nothing of judicial charac-
ter about the opinion of the court in the
matter of our disbarment, except its
judgment; it is, in its temper and its ar
gument, the effort of an attorney to make
the worse appear the better cause. It
indulges in denunciation, which judge
never needs to do; it makes deliberate
misstatements, which a good judge
would not do and contradicts itself in
them, which even a wise lawyer would
not do; it fails to meet the marrow OF
the argument, which judge would not,
unless through stupidity or unfair
ness. The "moral obliquity" which
could permit judge to deliver an Opin-
ion open to such criticisms as these,
will surely seem, in the public judgment,
to unfit him for his position, and will 60
far to sustain the imputation, which we
are said to have made, that the judges
of our court have been Influenced by pol
itical considerations in their judicial
judgments.
In speaking of this opinion We include
Judge Livingston with Judge Patter-
son; holding him to an equal
responsibility by reason of his as
sent to the deliverance. We understand
from Judge Livingston's friends that ne
had no faith in the wisdom of Judge
Patterson s proceeding and has no belief
in the soundness of his judgment never
theless he assents and it is just this sub
ordination of his judgment to the behest
of some other interest which laid Judge
Livingston fairly open to criticism for
his failure to bring to account
Messrs. Eshleman and Brown for
the deception practiced upon him
which led to the release of lone of
the best workers in the Eighth ward"
A Judge is bound to act according to his
honest judgment and when he fails to
do so, through fear, favor, or affection,
who can defend his integrity?
For the particular stupidities and
falsehoods of the opinion of the court.
Judge Livingston probably is not to be
held equally responsible with Judge Pat
terson, since, in the very vicious way in
which these judges are accustomed to
dispose of their business, the opinions of
one do not come under the notice of the
other until they are delivered. Judge
Livingston's responsibility is limited by
his assent to the judgment at that it is
heavy enough to be of crushing weight
the milestone about his neck will be all
the more troublesome, if it be true, as
alleged, that he has asSented to what he
does not believe.
There is statement made in the opin-
ion, which is false, and which in the
opinion itself subsequently is shown to
be false. 1t is declared that We ''pub-
lished to the world an article of the char
acter admitted to be wholly unwarrant-
ed ;" the article referred to being the one
for which we are called to account. 1t
is not true that we ever admitted that ar
ticle to be wholly, or in any degree: un-
~a;ranted. This is confessed afterwards
m the opinion when it is said that an op-
portunity was offered us to disavOw a
wrong motive or meaning, and that we
declined TO do either which CONSTITUTES a
deliberate affirmation of the original ar
ticle, with all its inherent consequences
and meaning" People who dare to
charge others with moral obliquity :"
ought, it would seem, to be careful not
to convict themselves of miSstatementS !;
at least not in the very article in which
they seek to air their virtuous indigna-
tiOn.
Nor would a decent Judge, when dis
barring us for degree of "moral OBJ
liquity'' uniting us to be members of
the bar, and while defining that moral
obliquity to be our disposition to charge
a judge with being influenced by politi-
cal considerations in his conduct, be
guilty himself of the same moral OBJ
liquity" by accusing us of being animat-
ed to make that charge by Bipartisan
malice or a willful, headstrong zeal to
promote partisan interests" Especially
would no decent judge so far forget his
judicial function as to make this allega-
tion without evidence, as he admits,
and in the face of the sworn statement in
our answer, that we wrote and published
the article in question in good faith
and for the public good" In this opin-
ion it is declared that our motive,
though not openly or at all avowed in
the publication, is too obvious to admit
tf Doubt" and then ii proceeds to ascribe
to us different motive from the one to
which we had sworn! How emphati-
cally does the Judge bring himself under
the harrow of his own denunciation of
us, and how clearly does he show that he
is neither good man nor a good judge
by declaring, lin a judicial opinion and
confessedly without evidence, that we
have fOrsworn ourselves.
If he can make this appear he need not
go farther to justify his disbarment of
us; and if he cannot make it appear, no
body will deny that he is fool to say it,
even if he says it only as man and not
as 4 judge.
We have said that this opinion fails to
touch the marrow of the case. 1t in
dulges in great deal of shambling talk
about the necessity of confidence between
the bench and the bar; and we agree to
it all and to much more that could have
been said, with forcible illustrations at
this bar, to the same point. The charac-
ter sof the court cannot be kept at too