National Republican., 1880-07-09
THE NICARAGUAN CANAL.
An Intelligent Review of Mr.. Memo
calls Concessions.
American ideas of Naval Defcnsc-Use of
Marine Rams as "A substitute for Torti-
tions-DisadvantaEes OF Estab-
ll,lincntsin Central America
--Importancc of the
Measure shown.
United states Interests on the rsthmus.


is made of tho Clayton-Bulwer treaty |
q prominent gentleman Of this city, himself
great friend and promoter of tho scheme, has
prepared the following views on the subject, |
which have been submitted to and approved
by ono Of the most prominent persons con.
nectcd with tho judiciary of our country. !
ITo says:
"Our people are not willing and never will
maintain an army or y navy of respectable |
forCo until tho moment has arrived when thoy
are an absolute necessity, aud then will |
abandon lhcr maintenance as soon as the ap |
parent necessity has passed. A navy against
q strong power cannot be improvised |
would say at least five years would be neccs
snry to create ono capable Of meeting that of
Great Britain, France, Italy or Russia, no mat !
ter how much money was spent to make it,
"lf we had Establishments at the terminus
of tho canal in war with any one Of thoso
powers probably ono or both of these c5tab-
lishmenls would fall into the hands Of tho
enemy, aud W. know how reluctantly such
points are yielded when peace Is proposed.
prolonged war would be very destructive TO
our industrial interests, but with Us France,
Italy or Russia could sustain one indefinitely.
Had we Il war with Spain or Germany, before
We could mako navy either OF them could
takn cur establishments. aud could afford TO
prolOng the war indefinitely, not only to our
great cost, but to yet greater loss through
n disturbance ofour industries, und we would
not be ublc to iniict, for years at least, any
material injury on either of them. There
would DO only one way through which our
naval infcrioriiy could be overcome, except
throug, years of labor and an expenditure of
800, 900 900. That would bo through tho
construction Of marine rams, and even they
must have practical development in time of
peace in order to correct defects Of cnnstruc-
ton. etc. before VIC could rely upon them.
"lr we had sufficient number Of marine
rams Of proper construction wo could whom
We chose dominate tho waters of tho canal
and land all the troops We desired on both
coasts, and, in my belief, would be stronger
than If we had fortified points to defend in
| stead of interests only, This species of force
would in time of peace be almost nominal in
cost after the vessels were constructed, which
would say, should bo built for S10,O00,000,
or about the cost of three ordinary arlnor-
plated gun.bcaring ships,
"IIad we in Central America other csab-
lishments than purely military, they would
! be additionally expensive aud at times not
| Crcditable to US as Il people
THE lack of tenure Of Office in tho civil
service aud the little feeling of responsibility
resulting thorcfrom would lead to having
governors from time 10 time who would
mother be efficient nor respectable
"Tho growth of the United States in popu.
latiou and wealth is guaranty that the future
viii make us relatively stronger with Eu-
rupcan powers. Only ono thing is lacking to
assure this in a remarkable degree, aud that
Is the littlO knowledge on national affairs Ol
the greater number Of our Legislators, their
'rnseIcss political wrangling' aud tho irrc-
spnnsib,lly in their minds Of failures OF
opinion. l doubt If there is one in ten Of the
, last congress who suppOscs that ho has not
done nll that hu should have done in forward
! ing legislation. Not even one or two millions
could b1 given rs a permanent yearly allow
ancG for construction of vessels which would
be in itself wholly insufficient to keep aAoat
anything that could be considered q naval
force so, for having an effective navy in any
reasonable time, ii evor thCro is 10 apparent
prospect
"Uuder these circumstances I cannot per.
| Cciyo advantages in our. having establish.
ments in Central America at all comparable to
the disadvantages, and to my mind there
| would bO u great advantage TO US in u
guaranty Of neutrality on tho part OF all ma
tions, the inicrior powers to do so passivoly by
dcnYing the usO OF their ports to those who
should wish to possess themselves Of the
transit or impede it, or TO control tho immo.
diste vicinity OF the approaches, the aroa OF
neutrality would suppose should extend at
sea over radius OF 100 miles from the prinGi-
pal lighthouses at the terminus of the canal,
"The fact that the neutrality might be broken
in the event of hOstilities would not destroy
its general usefulness, or fail to impose on the
powers breaking it not only the onus, but The
positive disadvantage OF dobarmont from the
ports OF many inferior powers, aud this debar-
mont might extend 60 commercial pon'in-
torcoursr, which should take effect as to tbem
only after vessels actually in transit at tho
timo OF the proclamation should have arrived
at their destination, unlondel aud loaded with
tho right 10 remain until tho adjustment OF
the difficulty.
AT all events, an assertion on our part that
we will control the sthmus without any invi'
tntion 10 other powers that they should aid to
4 protect their Interests, in our Geplorabc lacl,
Of any force for the purpose, may wUll excite
an expression Of ridlcule, and would naturally
lead to whatever combination might be poS5l'
bio 10 our dsadvautnge. II would he regarded
by the people OF other nations as pretention
on our part to suppose that we are the only
people who have very considerable interests
in the opening of an American mtor'oceanic
ship canal, and it Is as much duty on the
part of other powers to secure and protect
their interests rs IL Is our duty to protect
tho. @ which exclusively belong to u.s. although
they may be of u double nature aud OF pre-
uOudCrsting importance as compared with any
q, other one nation,
"IMl our congress given notice to Great
Britain OF tho abrognlion OF the Clayton'Bul-
wer treaty, or rather directed the executive to
do so, | nm quite assured that tho Nicara'
guaus would not have given u concession to
our cOuntrymen, but, instead, to NJ Blanchct
4 Flcnchman who was thero 10 ask It,
: with the concession OF Panama and OF Mica
r ragua in tho hands Of Frcnchmeu We would
, DO practically powerlcss; they could build the
: canal or not rs they chose, and II built could
aud probably would, impose such tolls rs would
make passing through ii onlya little better
commercially than going around Cape Horn
With q concession In the hands Of our citizens
. il seems to me the duty of our government tc
{ secure its coastingstrade against IN unloason'
ing aud cOyetous ymonopoy, as all companies
however composed, have Il tendency TO become
/, By limiting tho tolls in the charter to u liberal
reward to the stoGkholder, even though IN
doing so it should think it just TO assure tC
the storkhOllCr interest ON his money, say al
o tho rate Of tho lowest government bonds dur
ing tho period of the construction Of the canal
J I'VE could not say to foreign company
. you shall on You shall not construct canal, il
! il hold q concession from competent authority
, to do so nor, if you make a canal we will
} limit your rates Of transit 10 such an amount
- per ton or TO such per centum OF dividend
I ON your Investment
"liappily these complications have been
O avoided, and there Gully remain such as arc
s contolmblo, such as promoting tho prompt
and economical construction OF the wori. aud