The news and herald. (Winnsboro, S.C.) 1877-1900, 1880-01-17

ton is that such usage shall not be re-
felrcd to fl L the purpose Of contradict
ing T varying Il Q obviIu, sense of the
language of the Statute. The object
Of construction rs applied to a Statute
| is to give effect to the intention Of the
Legislature in cnacting it. Says Mr..
Justice Cooley, "In the case of all writ
ten laws it is the intent Of the law
givcr that is to be enforced" Cooley
Con. Linn, 55.) The learned counsel
for the Respondent, however, while adj
mitting that the Statute ia question
requires construction, and that there
/ fore its import is not obvious, objects
to any reference TO contemporary usage
as Il safe standard of Interpretation.
This objection is opposed by the over
whclming weight ofauthority in such
cases. Said ChicfJustice Marshall ,dcliv-
cring the opinion of the Supreme Court
Of the United States in celebrated
cause, "Grcat weight has always been
attached, and very rightly attached, to
contemporancous eXposition," Co.
hens vs.. Virginia, 6 Wheaton, 2G4.)
In the case of Stuart VS.. Laird, the
Supreme Court Of the United States
say, in reply to the objection, that
Judges Of the Court had no no right
i y
jcction, which is OF recent date, it is
sufficient to observe that practice and
acquicscencc under ii fora period ofscv-
zation Of the judicial system, affords
al Irresistible answer. 1t is a contcan-
pOrarv Interpretation Of the most folci-
bic nature. This practical exposition is
too strong and obstinate to be shaken
or controlled" I Crancll, 299.) In
the case ofThc King We, Osborne (4
East, $3.50 Lord Ellcnborough said, I'll
consider it rs established OH the best
authorities in the law, that contcmpo-
rancous and subsequently continuing
usage may be rcsortcd to for the con-
structiOn Of u charter" Lord Mans
field enforced she same principle in
Cook vs.. Booth (Cowpcr, S2S.) And
Lord 1Iardwick said 6 Ak, 574): "In
the construction ancient grants and
deeds there is no better way Of con-
strung them than by usage, and con-
tcmpoTonca czpoSifio is the best way
to go by" In the case of Livingston
VS., Tcnbrock &C johnson, 14) the rule
was applied in terms that are exceed
ingly opposite TO the matter now under
consideration. The question before
the court in that case was whether Il
party authorized by the terms Of his
grant to "cuL and hcw timber for
building" in the woods Of tho Manor
Of Livingston was thereby empowered
to cut and heW timber for fencing.
Chief Justice Spencer delivering tile
the opinions Of the Supreme Court Of
New York said, eff Il witness would
be admitted under these circumstances
and If from the lapse Of time we are not
to expect any proof Of that kind, the
next best evidence arises from the acts
ofthc parties, which 90 to demonstrate
the construction they put OH the grant,
and tho sense in which they understood
the words used" (Scc also Pcrriuc
VS.. Ches. e Del. Canal. 8 Howard, ll8.)
Authorities to the same effect might be
readily multiplied, but l shall close
my citations on this point with the
following extract from Phillips on the
Law of Evidence (vol. 2, 745): "Con-
tinual usage is u strong practical eX-
position of the meaning Of the par
ties. And modern usage of forty or
fifty years duration is evidence not
only for that reriod, but evidence from
which it may be presumed, if nothing
is shown to the contrary, that the same
course was pursued in earlier times.
Even in the case of III Act Of Purliu-
mcnt universal usage has been referred
to as proper cxpositor, where the
the language is doubtful.' See also 2
Coke Inst. 282, and the Bank Of Eng
land vs. Anderson, Bingham's
New Cases, G6G.) The question
now rccurs, has there been long
continued practical construction
! OF the terms of this charter, by
contcmporanc0us and uniform usage?
l think that this can be established be-
yond reasonable doubt, and that the
words i'll question have been inter
prctcd by an unbrokcn usage, cxtcnd-
ing over a period of more than fifty
years. Twenty years prior to the
date of this Respondents charter, the
General Assembly passed an Act i'll
cooperating the South Carolina Canal
Railroad Company (Act Dec. 10, 1927,
VIII. Statutes 35l) and embodied the
following words in Section 4 of the
same: "Thc charge for the transporta-
ton of goods, produce. &C., shall not
exceed thirty-iive cents per hundred
pounds, on heavy articles, and ten
cents per cubic foot OH articles Oy
measurement, for every one hundred
miles. These words arc identical
with those contained in Respondents
charter, except as to the rate Of tolls.
Yet the South Carolina Railroad Com
pany has invariably, during tho long
period above stated and down to the
present day, classcd cotton in bales
as "heavy articles" and charged
thereon by weight and not by meas
urcmcnt. At the date Of Respond
cnt's charter the South Carolina Rail
road was in full operation, and had
been running its freight and passcn-
ger trains for years to Columbia, tho
Capital of the State, where the Lcgis-
laturc annually convened. That body
was largely composed Of cotton plant
crs, and it must bo assumed from
their direct individual interest in tho
matter OF freight charges on cotton,
that whom they inserted tho words
"hcavy articles" and "articlcs OF
measurement" in Respondents char
ter in tho year 1916, they were fully
aware Of tho construction that had
bccn given to tho Same words in tho
charter of another company granted
by them in tho year 1927. That con-
| StruCtiOn was m0reover fhc Ono fhot