The Salt Lake herald. [volume] (Salt Lake City [Utah]) 1870-1909, 1880-08-01

I et solve IL she must, IOf BUG CaHHot
give it up with either credit or safety.
To withdraw her forces now from
Afghanistsn would result in an i'm
mense shock to her prestige and
would very likely involve other parts
OF India in war by inducing insur-
rection. Dost Mohsmmed, when he
was down in Calcutta, wondered Why
the English. with the fertile plains
of lower India in their possession,
should covet such a mountainous;
rocky, and comparatively poor and
unproductiye country as Afghanistan.
It is act manifested that the English
do covet that country, or much of it.
anyway. More than once have they
been IN possession and have vacated
1t. Their presence there in force
now IS due entirely to Afghan treach-
cry and cruelty. II that country
would remain neutral ground, or
friendly to the English. or not TO-
imical to them, We are inclined TO
think they would be very well pleased
to let Afghanistan alone. The diff
culties between the EDglish and the
AigbaRs during the last two or
three years arose from an ap-
parent necessity to vindicate Eng
lish dignity and prevent probable
disastrous effects to British rule
throughout India, as the Aighans
had viOlsted treaty stipulation By
according to Russia diplomatic favors
which we're refused to England. 1t
is plain enough to be seen that in the
course of a few years, if English iD-
fuence should subside in AfGhanis-
tan, Russian influence would not be
so backward, but would be pushed
there, would be followed by Russian
domination, and would eventuste IN
Russian conquest. This England
could not afford to allow. It would
be q euicidal policy to her. Fol
Russia is the most peIsistently az
gressive power in Europe or Asia
and every liberty-loving man would
prefer the rule Of England to that o
Russia in any part Of the world, if h'
had to choose to live ander one rul'
or the other. England must lool
well to the safety of her Indian EN-
pire and to the border countries tina
} possess military advantages, especial!
? those of a typographical nature. l
is this which necessitstes the pTesenc,
of the English in Afghsnistan. thi
in connection with Afghan treacherI
and gross violation of treaty stipula
tions. For if the Afghans had re
, spected the last treaty instead o
: numbering Major Osvagnari and hi
retlnae, the English would not now be
in force in Afghanistsn, and if tht
Afghans had respected former treat!
the English would not have gon'
to that country in force in 1878
The late reverse to General Burrows
command will necessitate not tht
evacuation of Afghanistan, bu
another military vindication, and how
the business will end is difficult tC
gay. The English will not annex
Afghanistan if they can see any othel
feasible way cut of the difficulty, 8
way that will not tend to weaken
their influence in India. The AfghanE
are vigorous, proud, restless, aspiring,
warlike, fanatical, treacherous, tur,
bulent, fierce and cruel. Il is not an
easy thing to get along peaceably
with such a people. OVershsdoWipg
force is the only means of keeping
them long in subsection. A ruler Of
their own stock must be o man of de.
cided force of character, or he can dc
little with them, and at best will sink
into mere puppet. and rule by suf-
feranoe, perhaps arising out OF mu-
taal jealousies Of rival aspirants &c
power. If the English are to rule in
Afghsnistan, it seems that they must
do it il one of three Nays-5y main.
tanning q large force there, sufficient
to dominate the country and overawe
opposition, which would be very ex-
pensive; or by securing the friendship
o! a native ruler, who is able to SUE
tain himself in power, which would
be very good way. but most difficult
to bring sbout; or to establish geries
of strong and we'll gsrrisoned forts in
commanding military positions, sc
gs to ensure q we'll defended
frontier, but which again would
also be an expensive method of solv-
ing the problem. Nevertheless, this
last appears, in the present state oil
things, to be the most probable and
satisfactory way out of the present
difficulties; this. With perhaps some
use made also OF the eecond method
mentioned. Any way. we may look
tor lively news from India for some
weeks, perhaps months, to come;
perhaps years. For the Aighsns
have this peculisrity-they let strong
force enter and apparently conquer
their country in a comparatively easy
manner, but after while they rise
up in hostility and harass it in every
way possible to them, 60 that it is
extremely difficult for even an over
powering force to make a lasting
peace with them. unless it remains in
the country and maintains its power
by force and vigilance unreIsxed,
IntEigues and cabals and wars, in
testine wars, are chronic affections
with the Afghans.
HANCOCK AND ENGLISH are before
the country as the democratic nomi-
nees fer president and vice-president