The Northern Pacific farmer., 1880-02-26
ENGLAND'S VULNERABILITY.

How Great Britain Can be Starved Out
in Case of War.--A Remarkable Ad.
mission.
London Saturday Review.
It has often been asked what England
would do if she found herself at wal
with another maritime power. Sc
long as America is able to send us az
much corn as we want it matters moth.
ing to the consumer whether or not il
pays the English farmer to grow corn.
If it does not that is only a reason why
the farmer should grow something else
instead. If the American producer
can underseu him in wheat, or even in
beef, he may in his turn undersell the
American producer in vegetables or in
dairy produce. But in the event OF
England being at war this cheerful way
of looking At the question would plain
ly be out Of place. A whole population
cannot be fed on early vegetables or on
eggs fresh from the nest. The quartern
loaf is the only thing that can do the
work on large scale, and the quartern
loaf is no longer to be had within the
four seas. It ls made for the most part
of American wheat, and that wheat
must be brought to this country before
it can be turned into bread. It is USE
less to talk of breaking up pastures and
laying down land in wheat once more.
That might serve our turn if we were
still in the days when the next longest
thing to war was the preparation made
for waging it. But, if England were
engaged in a conflict conducted on the
latest models, the whole business
liminaries, fighting, and negotiations
for peace-might be over in less than a
year; in less, that is to say, than the
interval between one harvest and anoth-
er. Where would the food of the ma.
ton come from during that time
Where, for example, would it have
come from if we had found ourselves
at war with great power last autumn
We must either have drawn our sup
plies from the same quarters which are
yielding them now, or have gone with
out them altogether. One look at the
figures which tell Of the weekly import
of wheat from the United States, and OF
that "visible supply" which is to fur
nish the imports of future weeks is
enough to make this plain. With this
source of food closed against them
the great majority of Engiishmen must
half starved. The moment that war
had broken out, an adversary, if he
commanded any naval strength what
ever, would have devoted the whole of
it to closing this supply against us. Ia
no possible way could he have served
his own ends so well, or compassed our
defeat go easily. Supposing him to
have succeeded, there would have been
nothing for it but to sue for peace. If
once the government had been con-
fronted by the alternative of submission
or famine, no amount of resolution
would have availed them anything.
They might have been willing to choose
famine in their own persons, but they
would speedily have been set aside in
favor of cabinet cast in a less heroic
mold. No doubt we have a large and
very costly navy ahoat; that is not
denied. But, large as it is and costly as
it's, is it large enough to answer all the
purposes which, in case of need, it
would have to answer? It must be re-
membered that if England we've at war
with maritime powe1-perhaps with
two maritime powers at once-she
would not be in a position to send her
whole navy to protect her commerce
with food producing countries. Her
ships would constitute an indispensable
element in her offensive strength, while,
as regards both her own shores and
those of her colonies, they would also
constitute an indispensable element in
her defensive strength. With one con-
siderable fleet engaged in bombarding
an enemy's ports, and another busy in
protecting our own coasts against even
the possibility of invasion, and third
cruising in Indian or colonial waters,
how many ships could be spared for the
yet more essential work of conveying
grain ships from America? It may be
answered that this, as being the most
essential of all the functions which the
feet would have to discharge, would
be, so to say, first charge on our naval
resources. Then which of the other
three is to be neglected? Are we to
forego what might conceivably be the
only means open to us Of crippling our
adversary, or to leave our own coast un-
defended? Or, if neither of these
duties are neglected, which of the COL
onies is it that is to be left a prey to the
sudden descent of some daring COM
mander? What is needed, If the food sup
ply of the country is to be really
secure in time of war, is navy strong
enough to spare all the ships that are
wanted for protection of the grain ships
without unduly weakening any one OF
the three other fleets that will have each
its work marked out for it. Can this,
or anything like this, be said of the
English navy in 1880?
How She was Saved.