, 1880-06-27
GEN. MCCLELLAN.
Was He a Great So1dfer4
Netn Tork Nnffn1


OF Mr.. George Ticknor Curtis articles or
~ McClellan's Last Service to tho Republic" II
the April, May, and June numbers Of the No:tI
Amcricdn Reuiclp, grave, earnest, and apparent,
ly well-reasoncd as they are, it Is not easy tt
speak with respect Belief In Gen. Mcclellan
in his genius, his vigor, his wrongs, was once q
cult With many people In this country. They
held it altogether the fault OF the Gov
ernment, and in no sense or degree his
fault, that he did not crush the Confederate
army and capture Richmond in the second year
Of the War. With the fuller knowledge and
more careful thought which time has brought,
the number of true believers has dwindled, but
Mr.. Curtis articles show that the race is not ex-
tinct.
Tho questions which Mr.. Curtis discusses are
nor now Of great importance. The world knows
that Mcclellan did not succeed: and there is SO
much fighting going On MI the time, and so many
Generals make great names In every quarter Of
century, TINT an inquiry Tito the causes of the
admitted non-success OF Gen. A or Gen. 3 pro-
vokes only langufd interest when very few
years have passed We take it to be tho settled
opinion Of those most competent to Judge, that
Gen. Mcclellan was good but not n great
soldier; that he Was very efficient organizer, q
fair but not brilliant straRetist; that he was so
careful OF his men that he never exposed them
to great reverses, and so wanting In decision,
vigor, and dash that he never led them to great
victories. Indeed, he never led them, in the
proper sense Of the word, at all. From Will
ian1sburg to the Antietam it was always the
same,-either total absence from the field, or
total failure to make his presence felt there
Mr.. Curtis reasoning is based upon series OF
assumptions, some OF which are at variance
With established facts, and the rest arc
probably @ 9ot tTne: His leading postulate
7pH1 Aely9 1N 81
patriotism, the most elevated character, and the
most consummate ability: Whatever he did was
srandly successful; whatever good thing he
ness or folly Of others. He WAS SO great that
Lincoln, and Halleck, and Stanton did not dare
to leave him IN command. because, IT they did,
to make him too formidable as soldier, while
as citizen the rare. wisdom Of his Hnrrison's
Landing letter would have raised him to too
high a pinnacle.
With the political Or personal reasons which
may have contributed to Gen. McCleliun's re-
Moval, we do not propose to occupy ourselves.
I me Interesting question: and the one which we
nave ample knowledge for discussing, is this:
HI Had 4 Mcclellan, in the year and more during
fa fhe Potomac proved ai1,.sf IT instrument
or II be bad so fur failed to do 80 to make Mr.
Lincoln grayely doubt bis capacity, we mny, lay
aside the consideration Of the personal and
political 1ealousies of the time No doubt they
they existed, as they do among all people, es-
pecialy in periods Of great excitement and trial;
e1 out re re incline to give Ereat weight, IN seeking
Inc expressive language OF our homely PresI-
dent: HE has got the slows NJ. Blair
We have suited vi hat We consider to be tho
real M question, but shall discuss it only incident
ally, as we proceed with our examination Of Mr..
Curtis fitness for the task which he Inns UNDER
taken. The tnreterateness Of his prejudices
strikingly shown by his constantly speaking Of
Mcclellan as gslning the battle ut the Autietam,
shlle h t be declares that the Confederates were
hat at tho Antieraln we, with IL large army got
little, and only very little, the better OF Lee
sith a. small army: and that at Gettysburg. with
yinia received a blow lror1 which it never re-
So with tho question Of supplies. 1t
vas always Impossible, Mr.. Curtis thinks, for
gas filled, while he seems to think that Lee was
llways ready for anything, no matter how far
rom bis base he might be, nor how much fight
nay appear, Mr., Curtis reproduccs the utterly
Exploded story that Lees forces before Rich
nond, at the commencement Of the Seven Days,
hsnrd theory that Mcclellan saved" ' his his
rmy, at that time, "from a vastly su-
,erior force Of the enemy"; and TINT Lee. at
re. The trath is, that Lee had less men than
7e on the Peninsula, and that to allow him two
nen to Our three Ut the 4ntictam is a liberal
stimate: a and it may be re- remarked paren-
lcClellan's own fault that he did not win great
ictOry in the lAst-nutned action.
1t Ia easy to use strong language, but strong
anguage amounts to little uuless supported by !
ccurate knowledge and clear Thought. vi.
urtis, writing In 1850, speaks of the Crimean
FAR as lone OF the most gigantic wars of
lodcru Europe and declares that In that war |
[cC1ellan saw the science Of war zap
lied on the grandest scale, and |
/ the most exact methods, by tho |
r1nics OF three nations" This shows hopeless |
ase, and 1t is no wonder that military critic |
no can write such sentences should be ready to |
eclare Us he does, that Mcclellan, when he was I
Ike and defcat the Confederate forces" and |
Int he WAS then :: on the very eve OF great |
lccess' There Is nothing In McClellan's his !
,ry to justify such claims, and we who fought
uder him, while VIC recognize in him the pos
.ssion of many valuable qualities, know that
lere is not How. Ear he might have improved
ossih1e to eay. Undoubtedly he would have
2ne better Than Burnside did, Or than Hooker.