The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1880-02-12
far of, with glass in constant use, ex:
amining the lofty position ofthe Federal

Army.
"Gen. Lee was, seemingly, anxious
YOU should attack that morning. He
remarked to me, The enemy is here, and
if we do not whip him, he will whip US.
You thought it better to await the arri'
val of Pickett's Divisional that time
still in the rear-in order to make the
attack; and you said to me, subsequent
ly, whilst we were seated together neal
the trunk of tree: The General is O
little nervous this morning; he wishes
me to attack; do not wish to do SO
without Pickett I never like to go into
battle with one boot off,
"Thus passed the forenoon of that
eventful day, when in the afternoon,
about 8 o'clock, it was decided to no longer
await Pickett's Division, but to proceed to
our extreme right and attack up the
Emmetsburg road. McLaws moved off,
and I followed with my division. In q
short time was ordered to quicken the
march of my troops, and to pass to the
front of McLaws.
'This movement was accomplished by
throwing out an advanced force to tear
down fences and clear the way. The
instructions received were to place my
division across the Emmetsburg road, ,
form line of battle, and attack. Before
reaching this road, however, had sent
forward some of my picked Texas scouts
to ascertain the position of the enemy's
extreme left flank. They soon reported
to me that it rested upon Round Top
Mountain ; that the country was open,
and that 1 could march through an open
woodland pasture around Round Top,
and assault the enemy in flank and rear /;
that their wagon trains were parked in
rear of their line, and were badly ex-
posed to our attack in that direction. AS
soon as I arrived upon the Emmetsburg
road. I placed one or two batteries in
position and opened fire. A reply from
the enemy's guns soon developed his
lines. His left rested on or near Round
Top, with line bending back and again
forward, forming, as it we're, concave
line, as approached by the Emmetsburg
road. A considerable body of troops
was posted in front of their main line,
between the Emmetsburg road and
Round Top Mountain. This force was
in line of battle upon an eminence near
peach orchard.
~ found that in making the attack
according 10 orders, viz: up the Emmets-
burg road, should have first to encoun.
ter and drive off this advanced line OF
battle; secondly, at the base and along
the slope of the mountain, to confront
immense boulders of stone, SO massed
together as to form narrow openings,
which would break our ranks and cause
the men to scatter whilst climbing up
the rocky precipice. found, moreover,
that nv division would be exposed to n
heavy fire from the main line of the
enemy in position on the crest of the
high range, of which Round Top was
the extreme left, and, by reason of the
concavity of the enemy's main line,
thatwe would be subject to destructive
fire in flank and rear, as well as in front,
and deemed it almost an impossibility to
Chamber along the boulders up this steep
and rugged mountain, and, under this
number of cross.fres, put the enemy to
flight. knew if the feat was accom-. :.
plished, it must be at most fearful
sacrifice of as brave and gallant soldiers
as ever engaged in battle.
The reconnaissance of my Texas scouts
and the development OF the Federal
lines were effected il very short space
of time; in truth, shorter that have
taken to recall and jot down these facts,
although the scenes and events of that
day are as clear to my mind as if the
great battle had been fought yesterday.
[ was in possession of these impor-
tant facts so shortly after reaching the
Emmetsburg road, that considered 1t
my duty to report to you at once my
opinion that it was unwise to attack up
the Emmetsburg road as ordered, and to
urge that you allow me to turn Round
TOP, and attack the enemy in flank and
rear. Accordingly 1 dispatched staff
officer, bearing to you my request to be
allowed to make the proposed movement
on account of the above stated reasons.
Your reply was quickly received, Gen.
Lees orders are to attack up the EN-
metsburg road I sent another officer
to saw that feared nothing could be ac-
complished by such an attack, and re-
newed my request to turn Round Top.
Again YOUR answer, Gen. Lees orders
are to attack up the Emmetsburg road
During this interim I had continued the
use of the batteries upon the enemy, and
had become more and more convinced
that the Federal line extended to Round
Ton. and that could not reasonably
hope to accomplish much by the attack
as ordered. In fact, it seemed to me the
enemy occupied position by nature SO
strong-I may say impregnable, that In
dependently of their flank fire, they
could easily repel our attack by merely
throwing and rolling stones down the
mountain side as we approached.
ga third time dispatched one of my
staff to explain fully in regard to the sit
uation, and suggest that you had better
come and look for yourself | selected,
in this instance, my adjutant.general,
Col. Harry Sellers, whom you know to
be not only an officer of great courage,
but also of marked ability. Col. Sellers
returned with the same message, Gen.
Lees orders are to attack up the En-
metsburg road" Almost simultaneous.
| " Col. Fairfax, of your staff, rode up and
repeated the above orders.
After this urgent protest against en-
tering the battle at Gettysburg according
to Instructions which protest is the first
and only one ever made during my en-
tire military career-I ordered my line
to advance and make the assault.
GAS my troors were moving forward
you rode up in person; brief conversa.
tion passed between US, during which l
again expressed the fears above men,
toned, and regret at not being allowed
to attack in flank around Round Top
You answered to this effect: 'We must
obey the orders of Gen. Lee l then
rode forward with my line under heavy
fire. In about twenty minutes after
reaching the peach orchard was severe,
ly wounded in the arm and borne from
the field
| t.IiJ;.l .l;, n,o,p6 Terminated NV mar.