Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1880-04-09
Drunkenness and Crime.

In view Of the dying declaration of Edward
Tatro, that rum caused him to do the deed
for which he was hung, and made him forget
it afterward, it may be well to recall the facts
that his counsel, on his trial, while resting
the defence chiefly on the ground that Tatros
mental condition was so affected by intoxica-
tion at the time of the killing as to make him
incapable Of premeditation, utterly failed to
show that on the day of the murder he had
taken more than one drink, and that of some
"bitters' composed of an infusion of wild
cherry bark in whiskey. The evidence was
permitted to 20 to the jury for what it was
worth. The judge charged the jury that the
voluntary intoXication of one who without
provocation commits homicide, though
amounting to a drunken frenzy, is no pallia-
ton of the crime. That is, said the Judge
''if a party gets so intoxicated that he is era
~ drunk, that it amounts to a frenzy, so that
lie does not know what he is doing, and if in
such condition he should commit crime
which if committed by sober man would be
murder, it is equally murder in the man that
is thus drunk" Upon the appeal to the Su-
preme Court, Judge Redfeld quoted the prin-
ciple laid down by Lord Coke, that what.
ever hurt or i'll he doeth, his drunkenness
doth aggravate it, and although he that is
drunk is for the time nan c0mpoS meHtis, yet
his drunkenness does not extenuate his act
or offence, or turn to his avail :" also the
opinion of Sir Matthew Hale, that this vice
doth deprive men of the use of reason aud
puts many men in perfect but temporary
| frenzy: but by the laws of England
such person shall have no privileges by his
| voluntary contracted madness, but shall have
the same judgment as if he were in his right
senses :" and the declaration of Lord Bacon
in his "NIaxims of the Law" that IF mad
man commit a felony he shall not lose his
life for it, because his infrmty came by act
| of God but if drunken man commit a fell
ony, he shall not be excused because the i'm
perfection came by his own default" In re-
| gard to the claim of Tatro's counsel that un-
der our statute, which makes degrees in muir
der, drunkenness qualities and mitigates the
higher offence, Judge Redfeld said
This statute provides that all murder
which shall be perpetrated by means of poi
son, or by lying in wait or by any other kind
of witul, deliberate and premeditated killing
or which shall be committed in perpetrating
or attempting to perpetrate any arson, rape,
robbery or burglary, shall be deemed murder
| of the first degree and all other kinds of
murders shall be deemed murder of the sec
| ond degree" After reviewing n number of
decisions in other States the learned Judge
| concludes: The evidence 80 far as detailed
| in this case, if believed, shows murder most
fiendsh and shocking He destroyed the last
|
her life with an axe, which shows malice
and malgnity of purpose The language of
| Chief Justice Mckay, while discussing like
| statute in Pennsylvania, and in case quite
similar to this, is fitting and sensible. He
says: 1t has been objected that the amend
| ment of our penal code renders reconciliation
an indispensable ingredient to constitute muir
der in the first degree. But still it must be
allowed that the intention remains. as much
as ever, the true criterion of crime, in law as
well as in ethics and the intention of the
party can only be collected from his words
and actions But let it be suppos-
ed that a man. without uttering a word,
should strike another ON the head with an
axe, it must on every principle by which we
| can Judge human actions be deemed a pre-
| meoitated violence The statute has in no
| degree altered the common-law definition of
murder. But the killing of human being
by poison or lying in wait, or by purposely
using a deadly weapon to that end, is murder
in the first degree and the purpose and in
tent to kill must be determined by the cir
cumstances that surround each case for the
murderer takes with him no witnesses and
does not often avow his purpose. Where the
requisite proof is adduced to show a wicked,
intentional murder, he is not permitted to
show a voluntary and temporary intoxication
in extenuation of his crime"
Since the rendering of this opinion, the
same question has been several times up in
the courts of other States and has been re.
peatedly decided in the same way-viz., that
voluntary ntoxication furnishes no palliatioI
for crime Free Press.