, 1880-03-17

GOvHrIm4NG I'd take SUepSglor putllIS ieos
fronfiekl EalasiShsi ins theI norfh5west N
a condition of greater ~permanence ana
stability. The Treaty Of Gandamak secur-
ed these objects hnd Though ltsI exact SUI
pulations may NOW need 10 DE revised, Tue
policy it embodied is still accepted by tne
Governmeut and. sanctioned by the couutrysT
Rnt a1 entirely new situationis created by
the 1nIttation now Virtually given 10
Persia. to occupy Herat, and before we
accentI6r approve it WE shall feed tel be
very clearly informed what it means. IL
the ARRANGEMENT is made with thecognr
zaneeand assent Of RUSSIA, it may be only
a part of that, general settlement OF Cen
traI Asian affairs between the two Europe
an Bowers interested at which Lord Duta
fern pointed in his, conversation last sum
merSWith Baron JOaniniD On such a mat.
ter as this We. can express nc opinion until
we know what the general nature of the
settlement is. But in any other case the
Question at once arises whether Persia is
to BE invited to occupy Herat in it's own
interests Or in that Of England and India.
In the former case there is not much to be
said, save that Persia is II weak and decay
ing Power, not too secure against even an AT
ghan enemy, and little better than power
less against a determined Russian attack.
III llt ldtCCI CdSCS VIZ 1tNItoC1Oh
given to Persia involves us at once in u
fresh and very serious responsibility. 1t is,
in fact. only doing VIGOROUSLY what many
Central Asian specialists Insist that we
ought to do directly. Indeed, suggestions
are already being made that q Persian
occupation of HeTat must be guaranteed
against failure by the presence OF English
officers and English political agents. Thus
one step leads TO another ii once we &C
cent the guidance OF authorities who are
so absorbed III Central Asian politics that
they view all ether questions by their
II English statesmen had no other consider
alton to guide them but a regard for the re-
mote contin gencies Of Central Asian politics,
there might be algood deal to be said for
securing the safety of the Indian Empire
by the occupation, whether actual CT vi
c~ariOus, of HeTat. If we grant for the sake
of argument that the Russian descent III
India is decreed by an irresistible fate, and
that the Power which holds Herat has
India at its mercy, the conclusion is in
eviiable that Herat must be virtually in
our hands. But there is not very much
weight in the Premises, except on the as
sumption that Russia is luOre powerful
for purposes OF offence than the former
con4ueforS ofIndia, and that England is
less powerfuI even for defence than those
whom the earlier Conquerors Oyercame. Ii
this be frile, it is not the occupation of He
rat that would secure us against the coming
foe, and we should be Il little puzzled to
say what would. The occupation OfIlerathy
England or even b. Persia as iEngIand's
tocun tenens,T means an advance Beyond
our present. frontier, even If Candahar is
included in it, of no less than -four hundred
miles. We are told that the road lies
along lane bounded On the one hand ty
an impossible 'deserta and on the other by in
accessible mountains; but between that lane
and our Indian frontier would lie the tur-
buFent tribes of Atghanistan, to whose
hostility we should be continually exposed
unless we undertook to subdue them.
Besides, there are other and far more i'm
portland considerations to- be taken into
account before we yield ourselves over to
what Mr. Lowe has very justly called "the
cowardly fear of our 'not being strong
enough to resist Russia It is possible to
purchase a fancied security against a COM
tingentdangeria great deal toodear. To
place Persia at Herat and to guarantee its
position there, however indirectly, involves
a very serious pledge, of interference on
our part in possible contingencies. 1t may
come to mean the employment Of large
bodies of troops, European as well as
native, at a very formidable distance from
our present Indian frontiers. This is a
responsibility which we may have to
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