The Milan exchange. (Milan, Gibson County, Tenn.) 1874-1978, 1880-02-05
JUDICIAL LEGISLATION.
A New State Bankrupt Law
Brought Into Active Ex-
istence.
Thousands of Judgments and
DEGREES, Possibly Involving
Millions, Wiped Out.

| FROM the RaSnFlllo American.
Below will be found an opinion of
the Supreme Court, delivered yester-
day, that, in its bearings, is highly
important. 1t decides that all judg-
ments or DEGREES not satisfied, or new
suit brought on the same, within ten
years from its rendition, are fully and
effectually barred from enforcement at
the option of the defendant. Ofcourse
the defendant will always claim this
option. The decision practically wipes
out of existence hundreds, if not thou
sands, of judgments and DEGREES, pos
sibly involving millions of dollars, now
standing in the civil courts of the
State; thus, in effect, becoming kind
Of State bankrupt law. The decision
seems to have been received with ap-
proval by the members of the bar
present in Court.
g. w. McGrew VS.. G. B. Reasons.
This is a petition for certiorari and
supersedeas. seeking to have certain
judgment before a magistrate declar-
ed void, and execution on the same
quashed.
'The facts as found in the petition
and record are, that there appears on
the docket of one Merideth Justice
of the Peace for Giles county, a judg-
ment in favor of McGrew against the
present plaintiff for ,S35.93 rendered
May 3, 1858. The docket appears
regularly kept and shows under the
title returning officer" the name of
Lewis, a constable of the county, and
the officer returning the warrant, also
entries of various executions issued,
the first in 1850, the last in October,
1873, which was superseded by this
proceeding, commenced November of
last year.
1.-The claim of relief is based on the
allegations, very definitely made,
that he was never served with process
and never knew Of the judgment until
about a year before, when constable
informed him he had an execution on
said judgment. 1t is also insisted that
he not only did never owe McGrew,
hut that, on the contrary, McGrew
owed him at the date of the judgment
This comprises the ground of attack
OH the judgment as originally render
ed.
1t is then insisted that the judgment
was about nineteen or twenty years
old when the execution was issued,
never had been revived within ten
years, consequently was barred by our
statute of limitation, Code, sec. 2776,
providing actions on judgments and
DEGREES of courts of record of this or
any state, or government, and all 9TH
or cases not expressly provided for,
shall be brought, within ten years af-
ter the cause of action accrues. Plain>
tiff alsU relies on the presumption Of
payment, arising from the lapse of six
teen years, since the rendition of the
Judgment.
We need not discuss the question as
to the judgment presented. The de-
cision of the question OF the statute of
limitations is conclusive of the case, in
the view we have taken of. Section
2776 of the Code provides thatactions
Oh judgments and DEGREES of courts OF
record of this or any other State or
Government, and all other cases not
expressly provided for, shall be COM
menced within ten years after cause
of action accrues.
This last clause includes judgments
before a justice of the peace. IL is in
tended to be bar 20 its enforcement.
To give it any effective operation we
must hold that the issuance of an ex-
ecution, after the ten years, is an ac-
ton on said judgment; otherwise,
party having such a judgment would
never sue ON it at all, SO as to permit
the bar of the statute to be interposed,
and we might always, by his own tes-
timony, rebut the presumption of pay
ment in sixteen years, where both
parties were living, and thus, by issH-
ing an execution, even at the end of
twenty-five pears, evade the bar of the
statute.
1t is argued the Judgment should
be revived by sci. fil. before the ten
years expired, but there would be an
anomaly in such a proceeding before
the ten years had expired, for the pay
ment would be in full force and need
no revivar; and after that time the
statute would be interposed as q bar
and defeat it.
1t is true suit might be brought
on the judgment before the ten years,
and thus party can always secure
himself in such a case. If he failed
to do so, then we think the time fixed
by the statute should be effective to
bar the enforcement of thejudgment.
There is no more convenient or appro
pirate remedy than the one presented
in the case by certiorari and superse-
deas.
We, therefore, hold the execution
was properly quashed for these rea>
SONS. FREEMAN, Judge.