The Milan exchange. (Milan, Gibson County, Tenn.) 1874-1978, 1880-01-29
QUARANTINE.
Decision of Judge FHipP i'm, on
the Quarantine Ordinance
of the Town of Mason, Dis
eliminating Against the l.. g.
N. Railroad Company The
Ordinance Void.

N. Railroad Company The
Ordinance Void.
At Brownsville, recently. Judge I.
j. Elippin, Of the Upton county cir
cult court, announced ansimportant
opinion on the quarantine ordinances
of the town of Mason, enforced during
the epidemic of last year against the
Louisville railroad trains. The points
decided by Judge Flippin are upon the
ordinance, which provided as follows:
"Section 4. Be 1t further ordained,
That all trains, whatsoever, on the
Louisville and Nashville and Great
Southern railroad, running by and
through the town of Mason, shall be
prohibited from stopping within a
mile of the corporate limits of said
town, and that said trains shall not be
allowed to run at a less rate of speed
through the said town than ten miles
an hour, under penalty of not less
than twenty-five dollars nor more than
ninety dollars"
Judge Flippin holds as follows:
/. Quarantine. Independent of ex-
press provisions in the charter, towns
and cities have power to pass bylaws
to prevent the introduction of conta-
gious epidemic diseases.
2. Stopping trains beyOnd corporate
limits. chartered towns can pass no
ordinances to have effect beyond Its
corporate line.
8. Fine-ertent of-An ordinance
imposing a fine of from twenty-five to
ninety dollars is unconstitutional and
void. Fifty dollars is the constitu-
tional limit.
4. Discrimination -restraint Of trade.
Ordinance of quarantine discrimi'
mating against railroad company or
any Individual, or in restraint of trade
or unreasonable, or oppressive, is null
and void.
Judge Flippin goes on to say that,
by the second section of the ordinance,
it is provided that no goods, supplies,
OF merchandise shall be allowed to be
brought into The said town unless it is
satisfactorily established that they
are not from or near a place infecteI
with yellow fever. 1t further provi-
des that any person or persons villa.
ting the above act shall be fined, etc.
Everybody but the Louisville and
Nashville railroad company could
carry goods into Mason by showing
by satisfactory proof made at the cor
porate line that the goods did not come
from or near an infected district. But
the railroad company must stop their
goods mile from Che corporation line,
either before or after passing through
the town, before they can discharge
their freight, although, as in this case
the goods are not infected and the
cars have not come from and infected
district. nor or they going to an
infected district. This is an unreas-
enable and unjust discrimination and
operates oppressively, and is neither
fair. impartial nor general. The facts
of the case will illustrate the discrim-
ination made against the Louisville
and Nashville railroad company. If
the railroad company had stopped its
train ON the day in question mile
from the corporate limits of the town,
and offered to show by proof that nei-
Their its passengers nor freight had
come from an infected district or near
one, it could not then, under this ordi-
nance, have discharged either at its
own depot on its own grounds in the
town, because said ordinance requires
it to 60 through the town at a rate of
speed not less than ten miles an hour,
and not stop nearer than one mile
from the corporate limits. This was
required Of no other person or persons
as TO themselves or their freights, and
was applied alone to the railroad COM
pany.
For all these PERSONS, | am of the
opinion that the ordinance in question
WAS void.