Fayetteville observer. [volume] (Fayetteville, Tenn.) 1850-1966, 1880-06-17

advance that the Federals would
make. He stated that, in his
: Judgment, the theater of opera
tons would be in the vicinity
of Manassas, and his troops
should be held for cooperation
with Beauregard's, who COM
manded the forces there. Events
happened precisely as he pre-
dicted. The main battle occur
red at Manassas, and the Con-
federates who gained that bril-
liant and memorable victory,
would have been overwhelmed
but for Johnston's iorecasting
Ofthc campaign, his preparation
on his own responsibility for
co-operation with Beaurcgard,
and his timely arrival on the
battle field in the very crisis of
the conflict which he turned in
the favor Of the Confederates.
This is very striking instance
of Johnston's military sagacity.
1t has been a much mooted
point, hotly discussed, whether
the Confederate army should
and could have followed up the
victory by an immediate at
tempt upon Washington. Much
Irrelevant censure has been
freely administered about this
matter upon various parties,and
the controversy over it has been
a very angry one. Johnston,in
his narrative, coolly takes the
whole responsibility. The truth
is, as he well states, that, with
out ammunition, provisions and
transportation, the movement
was absolutely impracticable.
while the impossible Potomac
River, intcrposing its, broad
current, rendered the attempt
simply impossible. go O 81.
Johnston predicted that the
next movement of the Federal
forces would be a formidable
one, in large numbers, direct
upon Richmond. Mr.. DAVIS
offered him command in Wes-
tern Virginia, but Inc declined.
desiring to conduct the opera
tons at this point. In various
instances he evinced the uner-
ring military perception that
marked his genius. The Adj
ministration not only concentra-
tied large supplies at the front
but established a meat factory
there. Johnston protested a.
Igainst this policy, urging that
The position must be given up
and the accumulation of supplies
at this important point would
but embarrass operations ano
result in the loss of the supplies
all of which happened precisely
as he predicted.
Johnston had a crcwning vim
dication of superlative soldierly
acumen in this campaign. Witt
his accustomed breadth OF grasl
and mastery insight into th'
situation, he urged upon th'
Administration Il gathering of
all the available Confederate
troops in Virginia, the Carolina
and Georgia in grand arm.
before Richmond, as the prope
plan Of operations. Mr.. Davi
was for making the perinsul;
THE arena Of conflict. A coun
Gil of war was held. Genera
Johnston said emphatically tha
the peninsula campaign was i'm
practicable, and it was better t
do Immediately what must b
speedily and inevitably done
. give up Yorktown. and transfe
the contest to the front of Rich
mond. lie was 'oyerruled. Il
, ven the wise Lee was agains
him. But Johnston's trump
Of judg.aent came swiftly an
inexorabIy. The peninsula wa
, untenable. The result followe
precisely as Johnston said
, would. = Yorktown had to b
: given up. The troops had t
: retire from the peninsula an
, gather before Richmond. Th
/ battle ofSeyen Pines was fougt
when Johnston would have pun
: ished the enemy badly but fe
! his being wounded and disable
; i'm the very hour of success. LIE
succeeded him. Johnsten's pol
CIV Of concentration OF trooE
: before Richmond. was fully
: doptcd, and in The mastery e.
ccution Of this policy, which /
= at first opposed, and whic
: Johnston alone had the presc
: encc and the wisdom to disco
G er and urge, Lee won his brlgh
i. est fame, while Johnston hs
o the glory of seeing his col
q demned ideas sindicated to tt
+, letter, and his rejected sngge
/. tions recognized as the true n
r cesSity of the situation
: Johnston was wounded at Il
n battle of Seven Pines, on the ;
OF May, 1862. He returned
! active service November, 1o6
d During his whole career
. seemed fatcd to the evil iortur
o,Ulol r., tho Rio