, 1880-10-13

OF that continuous efI0Ft, An0, OF Gl,ooo,Uoo
a year, we may hold an enormous outlying
cantonment, OF no nse IN tho world except
to invite attack !; and with ls
cations kept up through a narrow line
900 miles long, every mile OF which will
be at the mercy of the tameless Belooch
clans. Candabar would be the Indian
AIsace-L Lorraine Even the late Admins.
t%ratiOn, kas Lord Harrington pointed out,
never dreamed OF such a conquest; and
their plan, the creation of q protected
Native State dependent on the Viceroy.
hos been tried, has failed, and must fail for
ever. No Mussulman, whatever his ability
can rule inC0ndah8r as our vassal, :" because
for being our vassal his own soldiery, his
own "hoase-%c carries, , as our forefathers CALI
ed them, think it a duty and a pleasure to
cut bis throat. A Saisr Jung would be as
powerless as o Shere Ali. 1t would take a
British army to keep him from attack from
withoutAcd from the revolt of bis own
subjects. even If he did not, as he proba-
bly, would, head o rebellion against US
himself. There remains the alternative
to make Abdurrahmau really strong and
friendly by a fresh grant of his most
valued province, 10 leave him to control
Herat, 10 retire, finally. from Atghanlstau,
and to:spend some of the money we should
. waste on Candahar in rendering the galri.
son OF India fit for duty. 1t is not fit now.
Ia the whole history OF India, we can
recall nothing more eminently discredita.
bic to the organising ability OF our race
, that .le Svcno rcocuIiy enactao az Cnaman'
We o~rder-under circumstances of extre-
nifty, recollect-an army or 1000 men to
be collected to relieve Candahar, and it is
collected men and officers are hurried
up from ell parts of Iodia, money is spent
in pro(usion, ~peremptory orders are for.
warded to advance and there the army
STAYS, stranded like q shark on shore, Tor
want OF transport, Of forage, OF animals,
of this, that, or the other, as essential 40
breath, General Phayre and his consider.
able force were as useless for the relief OF
Candahar as if they had not existed, or
had been stationed at Aldershot, or had
been made up of wooden-legged men. 1t
General Roberts had not advanced, Canda'
har would not have been relieved low, or
pcsslb)y month hence. Part of the dis.
credit may be due to want OF energy IN
General Phayre, part to false or ~exaggera-
ted views Of Ayoubs power, part to lnior-
nation about the temper OF his meDF In
possession Of the General alone ; but the
total result is powerlessness, an absence OF
all the force az army ought 10 possess:
This 100, in no accident. 1t has occurred
repeatedly in the recent history OF Intia,
and never SO frequently as in the invasion
of Afghanistan, where, some eight or ten
times, movements urgently required have
been declared impossible from the lnabI.
lity Of the Generals either to secure trans
port or to dispense with it. There must
be a remedy for so discreditable an impo'
tence which is only partly due to the
reckless expenditure of camels on the
frontier; and the Viceroy or Commander
in Chief who will discover and apply it,
will do more TO strengthen our bold on
India than if he took possession OF every
strategic point between Bombay and Merv.
What. indeed, is the use of strategic points
to an arm which is incompetent to
move We might as well provide 40
artistically designed series OF spring.boards
for a lame acrobat, or build bridges at
intervals for q locomotive with the boiler
l. - 49,