Morning journal and courier., 1880-12-06
gournal arlo Coluier.
Monday Morning, Dec. 6. 1880.
Local News.
Long Island Sound
The Nations HarbOr and Sen Coast De- fences-An Important Report.
 

or the many points he may have selected, there will exist no previous indica tiens of bis particular choice, and consequently no req son for preparing our defense in one DO rather tn an another, so that the chances of not being present and ready on his arrv al are directly in proportion to the number Of our posts; that is to say, the greater he number of posts, the greater the chances that he will meet with no opposition whatever.
 Another difference is that the enc my can choose the mode of warfare as well as the plan of operations, leaving as little option to us in the one case as in the other. It will be necessary for us to act in the first instance on the supposition that an assault will be made with his entire fleet; because, shou Id we act otherwise, his coming in that array would involve both fleet and coast in inevita- ble defeat and ruin. Being in this state of concentration, then, should the enemy have any apprehensions as to the result of @ gen eral engagement should he be unwilling to put anything at hazard; or should he, for any other reason, prefer acting by attachments, he can, on approaching the coast, disperse his force into small squadrons and single ships, and make simultaneous at tacks on numerous points. There enterprises would be speedily consummated, because, as the single point occupied by our
 fleet would be avoided, all the attachments would be unoPposed, and after few hours devoted to burning cities or shipping, or public establishments, and taking in spoil the several expeditions would leave the coast for some convenient rendezvous, whence they might return, either in fleet or in de- tachments, to visit other portions with the scourge.
 Is it insisted that our fleet might, notwith- standing, be so arranged as to meet these en- | terprises? l As it cannot be denied that the enemy may select his point of attack out of the whole | extent of coast where is the precedence that 1 can indicate the spot And if it cannot be | foretold, how is that ubiquity to be imparted
 that shall always place our fleet in the path | of the advancing foe? Suppose we attempt | to cover the coast by cruising in front of it, | shall we sweep it's whole length,-a distance 1 scarcely less than that which the enemy must l traverse in passing from his coast to ours
 Must the Gulf of Mexico be swept, as well as
 the Atlantic? or shall we give up the Gulf to | the enemy? Shall we cover the southern 1 cities or give them up also? The uncertainty of the point on which an | enemy may direct his attack, the suddenness ! with which he may reach it, and the power 1 full masses which he can concentrate at dis
 tance out of our reach and knowledge, or
 suddenly, and at the very moment of attack,
 require that every important point be duly prepared to repel his attempt, or 1 retard it, until reinforcements can
 arrive and adequate means of resistance | be organized. By land we are acquainted l with the motions of an enemy, with | the movements and directions of his columns 1 we know the roads by which he must pass | But the ocean is & vast plain without obstacle 1 there his movements made out of sight, l and we know nothing of his approach until 1 he is already within the range of the eye
 We must consequently do one of two things either relinquish great extent of coast. con
 
 include so much that the chances of inter. l cepting enemy would seem to be out o1 | the question.
 But what are the enemy's means ? They consist of his whole seagoing force which he
 concentrates for the sake of infiicting the | blow.
 Says Secretary of War Cass "From the
 nature of maritime operations such fleet | could bring it's whole strength to bear upon
 any particular position, and by threatening ol 1 assailing various portions of the coast either l anticipate the tardy movements of troops | upon land and effect the object before theil concentration, or render 1t necessary to keeE | in service c force far superior to that of the
 enemy, but so divided as to be inferior to il
 on any onslpoint."
 On the impracticability of covering even SC
 small an extent of coast by cruising in front
 of it, or in other words, the impossibility o1 | anticipating an enemys operations; of dis
 covering the object of movements of which 1 we get no glimpse and hear no tidings and | of seeing the impress of his footstepss on the | surface of the ocean, it would be well to con-
 suit experience.
 It may be asked what use will there be in 1 fortifying but comparatively small number
 of our harbors, when the enemy can land at l hundreds of other places on our coasts? It | is true that, in comparison with the length of | our seaboards the system of defense by per
 manent Notifications has so far contemplated 1 but few of the harbors and cities, to wit, the | Penobscot and Kennebec rivers; the harbors 1 of Portland, Portsmouth, N. Y, Boston and
 New Bedford; Narragansett Bay; the har- 1 bors of Now London and New York; Dela- | ware river; the harbor of Baltimore, and ap- | breaches to Washington via Hampton Roads :; | the harbor of Beaufort, N. O.; the mouth of 1 the Cape Fear river; the harbors of Charles 1 ton and Savannah; Cumberland Sound; the harbors of San Augustine Key West, Dry
 Tortugas and Mobile; Ship Island, Missis- | sippi Sound the mouth of the Mississippi | and the other approaches to New Orleans ; | the harbor of Galveston; the bays of San 1 Diego and San Francisco, and the mouth of | the Columbia-less than thirty in all, but l most of them have sufficient depth of water ! to admit the entrance of armored vessels car 1 rying powerful rified ordnance. They con- l tain all of our navy yards, and include the
 main objects of the enemy. The report l here quotes remarks from Secretary of War l 1O1QS6GJ, omplaS1Z1ng the VleW taken l Of all the circumstances of danger to the coast, the chance of an attempt by an enemy 1 to land and march any distance into popu- lous district is least to be regarded, whether | there be or be not, speedy mode of receiving endorsements, and our system of fortifca- | tions has little to do with such danger. In preparing for maritime assaults the security of | the points to be covered is considered to be l greatly augmented whenever the distance can l so so arranged as to oblige an enemy to land at distance, for thereason that opportunity is l thereby allowed, in the only possible way, l for the spirit and enterprise of the people to come into play.
 Instead of being designed to prevent a landing upon any part of the coast, many seem to suppose, and sure to allege in proof of extravagant views on the part of the sys- tenn for defense, the system often leaves this landing as an open alternative to the en- emy, and aims so to cover the really impor- tant and dangerous points to necessitate distant landing and march towards the ob- ject through the people It is because the expedition would otherwise easily accomplish its object without landing, and without al- lowing the population to partake in the de- fense, that Notifications are resorted to-. For instance, without forts low down in Dela- ware Bay, an enemy could place his fleet of steamers in front of Philadelphia by the time his appearance on the coast had been we'll announced throughout the city, and in spite O4 du N0W DoIdWdTC duu IOW0E Pennsylvania he could levy his contributions and burn the navy yard and shipping, and be away in few hours. But being obliged by the forts above mentioned to land forty miles below the city, the resistance to his march may be safely left to the cour- age and patriotism that will find am- pie time to array themselves in opposition.
 A distant landing is deemed to be great advantage to the defense in all cases, and in populous districts, if the forts be sufficient for this particular duty, it makes the security complete.
 It is no part of the task assumed by the system of Notifications, as has just been stated, to guard against the invasion and protracted occupation of 8 welLpeopled dis trict, of point around which the forces of the country could soon be rallied. But there are places important in themselves, or necessary to the general welfare, that have not the advantage of alarge population at hand or within call, and which may nevertheless be very tempting objects to an enterprising enemy. The harbor of the Dry Tortugas and Key West, and the navy yard at Pensa- cola, will, for instance, in time of war, be of infinite value in reference to the commerce ,f 1T GrI of