The Milan exchange. (Milan, Gibson County, Tenn.) 1874-1978, 1880-08-12
The British Di,aster in Afghanistan.

! Aihstoh DANdSbCt III u1hActAA
The official reports of the disaster t.
the English forces in Southern Afghan
lstan, which are now coming in, shov
that the first reports were not eXagger
ated. Worse than this, they prove tina
the disaster was due to recklessness ant
incompeteney on the part of Genera
burrows, the commanding officer. l
was stated in the earlier dispatches tina
| the English were surprised while il
camp and overwhelmed by the superior
weight of AyOob Khan forces. 1t nov
turns out that there was no surprise a
all, but that General Burrows, with
force not much exceeding 1900 men
deliberately marched out and attacked
force of 1900. 1t must also be borne
/ in mind that General Burrows brigade
had but very few English regulars IN it.
and that Shere Airs cooperation
amounted to nothing, since his infantry
deserted and went over to Ayoob Khan
some time before the battle; while on
the other hand the Afghan force was
not only five times larger, but was well
/ provided with small arms and heavy
artillery.
1t appears from the report of General
/ ST. John, stationed at Candahar, that
| General Burrows learned on the morn
ing of July 70 of the approach of Ayoob
/ hhan's forces, came up with his adj
vance guard about nine o clock, and at
once opened fire upon them with his
artillery. Shortly afterwards the entire
force OF the Afghans appeared in su-
perb battle order and in a position
every way superior to that of Burrows
brigade. Ayoob Khan had posted
seven regiments in the center, with
three in reserve, supported by six bat
teries of guns-one of breech-loaderS-
1900 cavalry on the right, 400 cavalry
and 1000 infantry on the left, with other
cavalry and infantry also in reserve.
The battle opened with an artillery
duel, which lasted three or four hours.
Notwithstanding the superiority of the
English guns, they made little or no
impression upon the Afghans. At noon
the English batteries were in a state of
| decentralization, and then the Afghans
charged along the left and entire
front of Burrows forces, and broke
up their entire position. General
Burrows made a futile effort to
rally them, but panic set in. There
was not only no position but no organ
ization left. Every man took to his
heels upon his own account for Canda-
har. The victorious Afghans pursued
them to within ten miles of that city,
and, if the pursuit had been as vigOr-
Gus as the attack, hardly man of the
brigade would have reached it. As it
was, while the brigade was not annihi-
lated, its remnant reached Candahar
in such condition of Generalization
that it can be of little service to Gen
eral Primrose, commanding at that
place, and left almost its entire arma-
ment on the battlefield. Had General
Burrows fallen back upon Candahar,
the position of which is very strong,
instead of rashly hurting his brigade
upon greatly superior force, this dis
aster would not have occurred. Itoply
emphasizes the mistake, which the En-
glish have made many times before, of
undertaking the skill as well as the fight
ing qualities of the Afghans, who are
the most warlike of all the mountain
tribes in Central Asia. 1t was also
CilOhh ny bulo D1bllC uOJ Ollll lDdO
they are good fighters, but that they
are well armed with improved guns
and cannon, and that they know how
to use them. General Primrose him
self in one of his earlier dispatches tel
egraphed that they had heavy guns and
served them well. Reinforcements are
now pouring into Afghanistan after the
mischief has been done, as usual; and,
while the Afghans may not be able to
reduce Candahar, as they are poorly
provided with siege material, it is not
impossible that we may yet hear of fur
Their disasters in the open field if they
follow up their victory with celebrity
and vigOr-the more so as they are
likely to receive fresh accessions to
their ranks from the disconnected
tribes, The moral effect of the victory
is seen even in Cabul, where it has pro-
duced so much excitement and cOmmo-
ton among the followers of the new
Ameer that the proposed interview be-
tween Abdurrahman and General Stew
art has had to be postponed, and the
English had to make a military demon
stratiOn to prevent open disaffection.
1t is evident that the victory of Ayoob
Khan has reopened the whole Afghan
question just at a time when the Liber-
al Ministry was so confident of order
and peace that the English forces at
Cabul were on the point of leaving for
India, and it was even proposed to re-
duce the forces at Candahar. merely
leaving a small garrison there. 1t is
the most serious calamity that has be-
fallen the English since the massacre of
1912, and involves either the abandon
ment or another long and costly war to
hold the ground and establish their
scientific frontier war that must
cost many lives and pile up the fright
full bill of expense which has already
bankrupted India, and left an enormous
deficit, the result of reckless financial
as well as military mismanagement. In
this miserable muddle there appears to
be but one paper in England that has
taken a cOmmOn-sense view of the stu
alton, and that is the Pail Mall Gazette, .
which urges that England should get
out of Afghauistan, bag and baggage
Chicago Trjbatne, august 5.