The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1880-02-12
far of, with glass in constaut use, ex.
aminiug tho lofty posi.it ofthe Federal

Army.
"Gen. Lee was, seemingly, anxiou,
you should attack that morning. Ht
remarked to me, sThe enemy Ia here, anc
If we do not whip him, he will whip us.
You thought it better 70 await the arri
val OF Pickett's Divisional that time
still in the rear---in order to make The
attack; and you said to me, subsequent
Iy, whilst VIC we're seated together men,
the trunk Of tree: The General is &
little p .ryous this morning; he wishe,
me TO 4ttack; do not wish to do &C
without Pickett. never like to 60 into
battle with one boot off,
"Thus passed the forenoon of thni
eyentful day, when in the afternoon
about o'clock, twas decided to no longer
await Pickett's Division. but to proceed "a
our extreme right and attack up the
Emme!sburg road. McLaws moved of,
and followed with my division. In O
short time was ordered to quicken the
march OF my troops, and to pass TO the
front of McLaws.
This movement was accomplished by
throwing out an advanced force to tear
| down fences and clear the way. The
| division across the Emmetsburg road,
form line of battle, and attack. Before
reaching this road, however, / had sent
forward come of my picked Texas scouts
to ascertain the position of the enemy's
| extreme left flank. They soon reported
Tn me that It rested upon Round Top
Mountain that the country was open,
and that could march through an open
woodland pasture around Round Top,
and assault the enemy in flank and rear |;
that their wagon trains were parked in
rear of their line, and were badly ex-
posed TO our attack in that direction. As
soon IN arrived upon the Emmetsburg
road. placed one or two batteries in
position and opened fire. a reply from
the enemy's guns soon developed his
lines. His left rested on or near Round
Top, with line bending back and again
forward, forming, as it were. concave
line, as approached by the Emmetsbnrg
road. a considerable body of troops
was posted in front of their main line,
between the Emmetsburg road and
Round Top Mountain. This force was
in line of battle upon a1 eminence near
o peach orchard.
II found that in making the attack
according to orders, viz: up the Emmets.
ter and drive off this advanced line of
battle; secondly, at the base and along
the slope of the mountain, to confront
immense boulders of stone, 80 massed
together as to form narrow openings,
which would break our ranks and cause
the men to scatter whilst climbing up
the rocky precipice. ! found, moreover,
that my division would bo exposed to a
heavy fire from the main fine of the
enemy. N position on the crest of the
high range, of which Round Top was
the extreme left, and, by reason of the
concavity Of the enemy's main line,
thatwe would be subject TO destructive
fire in flank and rear, as we'll as in front,
and deemed it almost an impossibility to
Chamber along the boulders up this steep
and rugged mountain, and, under this
| number of cross.fres, put the enemy to
flight. kne1 if the feat was accom-.
| plished, it plust Oe at a most fearful
sacrifice Of :is brave and gallant soldiers
ss ever engaged in battle.
The reconnaissance of my Texas scouts
and the development Of the Federal
lines were effected in very short space
OF time; in truth, shorter that have
although the scenes and events Of that
day are as clear to my mind as If the
great battle had been fought yesterday.
was in possession of these impor-
tant facts so shortly after reaching the
Emmetsburg road, that considered II
my duty to report to you at once my
opinion that 1t was unwise to attack up
the Emmetsburg road as ordered, and to
urge that you allow me to turn Round
Top, and attack the enemy in flank and
rear. Accordingly / dispatched staff
officer, bearing to you my request to be
allowed to make the proposed movement
on account of the above stated reasons.
Your reply was quickly received. 'G IN.
Lees orders are to attack up the EN-.
metsburg road.' I sens another officer
to say that feared nothing could be ac-
compIished by such an attack, and re-
newed my request to turn Round Top.
Again your answer, Gen. Lees orders
axe to attack up .ho Emmetsburg road.'
During this interim had continued the
use of the batteries upon the enemy, and
had become more and more convinced
that the Federal line extended to Round
Top, and thet could not reasonably
hope to accomplish much by the attack
as ordered. In fact, it seemed to me the
enemy occupied o position by nature SO
stroag--I may say impregnable, that in
dependently of their flank fire, they
conld easily ..eerpei eng attack by merely
throwing and rolling stones down the
mountain side as we approached.
"a third time dispatches one of my
staf to explain fully in regard to the cit
uation, and suggest that yon had better
como and look for yourself. / selected,
in this instance, my adjutant- general,
Col. Harry Sellers, whom you know to
be not only all officer Of great, courage,
bat also of marked ability. Col. Sellers
returned with the same message, Gen.
Less orders are to attack up tho En-.
metsburg road.n Almost simultaneous.
ly Col. Fairfax, of yourstaf, rode up and
repeated the above orders.
After this urgent protest against en-
tArine tl ks..ie .. Getty i.ovvT ding
to instructioDs-wh which protest 10 the first
and only one ever made during my en-
tire military career--I ordered my line
TO advance and make the assault.
GAS my troops wore moving forward
you rode up In person; n DrieI conyersa-
tion passed between us, during which i
again expressed the fears above men
toned, and regret at not being allowed
TO attack in flank around Round Top.
You answered to this effect: we must
obey tsv orders of Gen. Lee.' I then
rode forward viii, my line under o heavy
IRE. In about twenty minutes after
reaching the peIch orchard / was severe.