The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1880-01-22
A Bit of History.
Come Interesting Inside Facts About the
Capture of Lees Raggamufins.
From j. R. Yonng's Grant Talks.

From j. r. Young's Grant Talks.
'There was no time in the war;" said the
general, "when it was more critical than after
the battle of Five Forks, when Lee abandoned
Richmond. 1t was President Lincoln's aim to
end the whole business there, He was most
anxious about the result He desired to avoid
another years fighting, fearing the country
would break down financially under the terri
BILE strain ON its resources. L know when we
met 1t was standing topic of conversation. II
Lee had escaped and joined Johnston in North
Carolina, or reached the mountains, it would
have imposed on US continued armament and
expense. The entire expense of the govern
ment had reached the enormous cost Of S4,000,-
600 per day. 1t was to put an end to this ex-
pense that Lees capture was necessary. 1t was,
in fact, the end and aim of all our Richmond
campagn-the destruction of Lee. and not
merely the defeat of his army. Sheridan led
the pursuit of Lee. He went after him almost
with the force of volition, and the country owes
him great debt of gratitude for the manner
in which he attacked that retreat. 1t was one
of the Incompatible things in the war. The
army that pursued Lee was divided into three
parts, under Gen. Meade, Gen. Ord and Gen.
Sheridan. I was with Ords command, and
remember one evening coming into camp after
being all day on horseback. Our army was on
hot foot after Lee. Just as 1 came into our
lines, two soldiers in rebel uniform were
brought in as prisoners. They said they wished
to see the commanding general. They proved
to be Union soldiers from Sheridan's army
dressed as rebels. They had come through the
rebel lines to avoid long detour. One OF them
took out of his mouth quid of tobacco, in
which was small pellet of tin-foil. This, when
opened, was found to contain a note from Sher-
idan to me, written on tissue paper, saying that
it was most important for the success OF the
movement then being made that should 60 at
once to his headquarters; that Meade had CIV
On his part of the army orders to move in such
a manner that Lee might break through and
escape. l started off at once, taking a fresh
horse without waiting for cup of coffee. AL
though Sheridan's headquarters were not more
than ten miles away had to make such a de-
tour around the rebel lines that rode at least
80 miles before reaching them. l remember
being challenged by pickets, and sometimes L
had great difficulty In getting through the lines.
1 remember picking my way through the sleep
ing soldiers bivouacked in the open field.
reached Sheridan about midnight. He was
very anxious. He explained the position.
Meade had given him orders to move on the
right flank and cover Richmond. This Sheri.
dan thought would be to open the door for Lee
to escape toward Johnston. Meades fear was
that by uncovering Richmond, Lee would get
into our rear and trouble our communications
Sheridan's idea was to move on the lett ffank,
swing between Lee and the road to Johnston,
leave Richmond and our rear to take care Of
themselves, and press Lee and attack him
wherever he could be found. Meade's view
was that of an engineer, and no doubt there
were reasons of high military expediency in IA
vor of his plan. His theory secured the safety
of our army, the safely of Richmond, and all
the triumphs of the campaign; but at the same
time it left the door open to Lee. My judg-