The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1879-04-03
rlTZ JOHN PORTER'S CASE.
yur MTTITdRY BOARDS REPORT
rrILY EXONERIIING MN.

r.,,,r,nS TINT his Condemnation Resulted
c..n, IA Nl.cunceptIon of the situation and
utstnkr Of Dates, and that rorter's |
1orduct saved the Army from Defeat.
w,suivGrov. April 2-Thc Board OF ON
,ora orpontcd To reinvcstigate the case Of Gen. |
v,,,Ionn Porter have made unanimous re.
49,, c,nclotoy generating that officer from |
A., charges " which he was found guilty by a |
,,or, martini The report says TINT the now |
.,,l,r,s in addition to the old. has placed be- |
,.,l nueeG1n many important facts which |
rrs before the subject OF dispute, in respect to
rbi,h radically erroneous opinions were en-
terteincd By GEN Portcrs accuscrs, and doubt |
less hy the court martial that pronounced him
Guilty The result has been to establish beyond
reasonable doubt all the facts essential to tho
trmation Of a correct judgment upon tho
merits " Gen. Porter's case.
Concerning the charge OF which Gen. Porter
vos found ruilty-not having moved his COM
mand ON the night OF Aug. q. 1862. in obedl-
rn,e To an order from Gen. Pope-the Board
r,port that IL was "a manifest physical impossi-
hity to march over that road that night; that
nothipg would have been gained by the attempt
md that il would have been wiser II Gen Por-
Ter had delayed the attempt still longer than he
dd; that be- exercised the very ordinary dis
erotion Of a corps commander and that 1t was
his plain duty to so exercise IT,
Regarding the situation OF the armies on tho
29.l Of August 1862. the Board sustain Con.
pyr,er'- p,ca before his original court martial.
That Gen. porc's orders were given under
misaprrcheusiou Of the true situation that in
stead % Jackson having the only force with
whom Porter WAS 60 engage the whole Confcd-
crate army. with Longstreet's command Of
$4,000 men included. were confronting Porter.
who had only q 600 mon. and that Porter's corps
was the only one ready for action OF the IS 900
troops COMPOSING the left wing OF the Union
army.
The Board report that both Mcdowell and
Porter had Information early on the morning
Of Aug. % Of the presence Of the whole force OF
tho enemy within reach 10y noon OF that day
md that Mcdowell. Porters senior in COM
mand. who had control Of the operations up TO
noon and after on that day. arrived on the field
AMI arrested the movement Of Porter at noon.
and that after the separation OF Mcdowell from
Porter by the action Of the former Porter was
left 10 act upon his own responsibility; that
upon the withdrawal by Mcdowell OF his COM
mand Porter was left with but two divisions. OF
about 5000 men in ALL to stand betw cen Lees
main army aud McDowelrs long and weary
column. Among other important facts ii is
made clear that Porters display Of troops in
the early part Of the afternoon OF the Goth gave
rise to the belief on the Confederate side OF an
attack about 10 be made. and that undcr this
belief. LonRstreet sent his reserves from the ex-
ir'me leit to The extreme right of his army. ana
in front OF Porter. thus relieving the Union
army under other commands from this Confed-
With reference 70 the famous 4:30 order thu
Ioari IND that Y was not received by Gen.
officer who wrote the despatch only began 10
write IL M :3O that the messengers who took il
could not have travelled over the route which
they assert they. had taken Il their own testi.
Mouy he true; that one OF the witnesses had
other witness had confessed to the Board that
h. had deliberately made false statements in
regard 20 the route taken while carrying the
d.suac 10; and rs to still another witness on
This point his testimony rs To the early delivery
81 tho despatch was so completely broken down
that no weight whatever was attached to 1t.
On the other hand. testimony as'to the time Of
III" delivery OF the 4:3O order, o. such officers
several other witnesses, all so TO prove that the
order was not delivered until about shutdown.
anlth testimony has been ''singularly con,
hriged ny The production for the llrs! tims,o
Gowei dated al p NJ Of the day in que question.
tae terms Of which show that Gen Por-
session Of the 43o order. The Board re-
fesyea Gem Po q"r ordered an at t S at
dafkn"ss coming on. and rs. using the words
O. the report, the order was based upon con-
what was Impossible 10 be done" Gen. Porter
wisely ordered further preparations 10 cease.
conformation Of Gen. Porter that he had some
order to attack. or some Information Of agrees
titn mans on the part OF Cen Pope. or some
intimutiOn. suggestion. or direction 10 that
effect from Gen. Mcdowell or that there was
such battle going on within his hearing that
required him TO attack the enemy without
orders before receiving the 4 80 order nj sun
SGT, All this was the exact reverse Of the
truth. An attack hy Porter would have been
violation Of the spirit Of his orders and a Grim
ina bunder. leading 10 inevitable disaster. In
short he had no choice as faithful soldier
but 20 do substantially what he did DO"
Inc report adds that an attack hy Gen. Porter
destructive only 10 the force that made il and
followed hy a counter attack disastrous to the
nion army. and that such an attack would have
What Porter did do was only the simple neces
cary action which an intelligent soldier had no
choice but TO take That no court martial would
have condemned such conduct, II correctly I'M
a"rst9qd That Gen. Porter's, conduct was
otedient, subordinate. faithful, and judicial.
j. saved the Union army from disaster on the
The Board decided that to full understand
Ing Of the merits OF the case, the events OF the
Both Of August in which Gen. Porter took u
eonspicnous part. should be briefly narrated,
yithdrawn, was based upon. his action Of that
day II Is shown that the Fifth Army Corps.
important and gallant part in the battle Of, the
Buth that when Longstreet's army. seeing their
opportunity. pressed forward TO strike Pope 8
&'a e si apG P55 r:asiSa Rs o so PiS
alive, Then Sykes and Reynolds also Of
p1r'er's command. with their brigades seized
the commanding ground. and like rock with :
stood tho advance Of the victorious enemy. and
Eaved the Union army from rout.
Thus ala this gallant corps tot Portersl nobly
and amply vindicate the character OF their
trusted chief, and demonstrate to all the world
that dsohedience Of orders and misbehaylor in
the presence Of the enemy are crimes which
could not possibly find "A place in the head OF
heart ~ him who thus commanded that corps.
In concluding the report the Board say:
Gen Pope aptears from his orders from his tesi
nnN to have been at that time wholly ignorant Of the
ifne situation Hc had disaUprovcd u the sending Of
Artt. 90 Thorough are Gap 70 meet Longstreet on the
= i. believing that the main body of Lees army could
reach tie ted Of Manassas before the night of the
oFl Hence he sent the order 10 Porter dated 4 81
! VI, Co. attack Jacksou's right hank rear
Fortunately that order did not reach Porter
lhnl about sunset-too late for any attack
u Boz made Any Attack which Porter could have made
any time mat afternoon ssArily have been fruit
les oi uut good result Gen rorters faithful suborl
mon army from the defeat which would otherWi Use
InNc resulted that day from the enemy's speedy
concentration The only seriously cnnca period ~ that
campaign. viz, between II 4 ant sunset August
WAS thus safely passed Gen Porter hat
appreciated the uutpry situation. ami he had
acted on ms own judgment his acu 30 had been wise and
ludcious For The disaster of the succeeding
IN degree responsible. Mh.ever else may have been
ofhis
The Judgment ~ the court martial upon gen Porter's