The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1879-04-06

officers rragning from the United States ser
| vice to enter the Confederate army should pre-
serve their relative rank. This grievance of Gen.
Johnson's. we are told. WIS aggravated for
their own purposes by knot Of politicians ut
| Richmond among whom tho writer specially
| nnmcs Alexander n. Stephens and he proceeds
to sketch a somewhat caustic portrait OF tho
Georgia orator MIR. Stephens. we are ro-
minded. after protesting moderate opinions
! during the exciting period preceding secession.
| suddenly discovered and proclaimed that slav-
| cry was tho corner stone of the Oonfederacy.
an announcement hardly calculated to insure
| the sympathy OF humantarians in Great Brit
| ain. Az the struggle progressed. too. he s said
| to have evinced rigorous impartiaity unusual
| in a patriot. having quick eve to discern tho
virtues OF the Northern Government M we'll NJ
all the vices and blunders of his own. Touch
| ing military questions. he expressed. We are
told. opinions which. If not exactly practicable.
were at all events original. His notion was 1t
seems that the war was defensive contest for
which militia were quite competent. The plant
ors and farmers Of the South could. he thought
always be relied on when n battle was imm-
ncnt. but when no fighting was to be done they
had best be- at home attending TO their families
and interests. Con. Taylor suggests that such
opinions are more comfortably cherished by
political gentlemen two hundred miles away
than bv commanders Immediately In front OF
the enemy.
Like the majority OF professional soldiers.
Gen. Taylor comedies great merit to Mcclellan
~ an organizer Of armies. He considers the
correctness of the system adopted by that OIL
Ger demonstrated by the history Of the great
military machine constructed under It. He re-
minds us that the army Of the Potomac. although
often III directed. cvinccd throughout surpris-
In nIt
frequently defeated. and Mt times apparently
disocated. could not be destroyed. Gen. Tay-
lor thinks. too. that McCleans strategy was
sound the only military road to Richmond "A
events proved. being by the peninsuar and tho
James River Uo secs. however. that the
Washington Government felt itself constrained
to prefer less promising line Of attack. be-
cause a sudden dash Of the Coniederatcs on tho
capital would almost certainly have changed at
certain iuncturcs the attitude Of foreign powers.
After the Manassas campaign the writer of
this book was separated from Gen. Joseph +.
Johnston until the close Of the war but he sets
forth ut length his opinion OF that officer which
is worth quoting. both on account Of the au-
thors personal reputation and his relationship
to President Davis. No member OF the general
stan Of the old United States army had seen so
much actual service and when the civil war broke
out Johnston was esteemed by the Southern pco-
pie east OF the Blue Ridge the foremost cham
pion OF their cause commanding in fact. de-
gree OF confidence analogous to that enjoyed by
A. s. Johnston in the West. OF course his time
y march from Patterson's front in the valley 20
assist Beaurcgard at the baltic OF Bull Run
confirmed the public faith in his capacity. " His
skill" says Gen. Taylor in handling troops
was great. and in retreat the precision and cool
ness Of his movements would have done credit
10 Marian hat 10 TO hf i'm,
TO assume tho offensive during the many turn
ing movements Of his lanks. movements in
volving time and distance" In the judg-
ment OF our author Lee was even more
overweighted in Virginia than Johnston
was in Georgia. and. on the whole,
the latter cannot be said to have proved
a fortunate commander. Leaving out OF view
Bentonvillc and the closing scenes In North
Carolina. which are pronounced rather the
spasmodic efforts Of despair than regular mill
tary movements. Gen. Johnston's offensive"
we are told. must oe limited to Seven Pines or
Fair Oaks. Here two corps Of McClellan's army.
cut of from their supports. ought to have been
crushed and although Johnston fell severely
wounded tn tue action. uon. Taylor iutiuiut-,
that this accident does not excuse the substan-
tial failure OF the engagement. II is noteworthy
that our author. Notwithstanding his sympathy
with Mr.. Davis. does not hesitate TO call the re-
moval OF Johnston from command in front OF
Atlanta an egregious Dunder. II the latter in
tended 10 fight there, he was entitled TO execute
his plan while If. it Is shrewdly added. no had
abandoned Atlanta without struggle. his de-
position would have met tho unqualified ap-
proyal Of the army and people.
Gen. Taylor took part in the seven days night
ing around Richmond. and his discrminative
judgment on the Confederate operations is ex-
tronnelv etrik Ia -
Lee by which Jackson's forces from tho valley
were suddenly thrust between Mcdowell and
McClellan's right. but he has not a word OF
eulogy for the tactics on the field. Indeed he
asserts with confidence that the Southern com
mandcrs knew no more about the topography
OF the country than they did about central
Africa and that all their movements. from Cold
Harbor to Malvern HILL were only series OF
huge blunders. Mcclellan. we are told. was as
superior to them in knowledge OF their own
land. as were the Germans to the French
in 1870. and he owed the success OF his
retreat to 1t. We had much praying" says
| Gen. Taylor, lat various headquarters. and
large reliance on special provdences. but none
were vouchsafed 10 supplement our ignorance.
80 we Numbered on like people trying to read
without knowledge OF their letters" After this
campaign the writer never met Gen. Lee again.
and therefore takes occasion at this point to
make some general remarks on the latter's place
! In Southern history. He considers Lees de-
fensive campaign in 1864 on n level with that Of
| Napoleon in 1873 although he thinks the weak
point Of the comparison lies in an absence Of
sharp returns to the offensive In his iudg-
| ment the Confederate commanders genius for
aggressive warfare had suffered by too long
service rs an engineer. In both the Antetam
and Gettysburg campaigns he allowed his cav
airy 10 separate from him. and was left without
intelligence Of the enemys movements until tho
| latter was upon him, In BOTH too. his army was
widely scattered and had to be brought into ac-
| ton piecemeal. It's affirmed that his own report
! Of Gettysburg coniesses his mistakes, and tho
writer can derive no additional light upon that
action from the rambling accounts since pub
lshed. 1t is plain that Gen. Taylor holds Lee
mistaken In his reluctance to assume a VigOr-
Gus initiative at certain crises Of the war. and
! mputcs his habitual attitude In this regard TO
| his protracted training in the engineer corps.
| II should be said, however that the criticisms
are offered with unaffected dllldence, and that
he does ample justice 10 the pure and lofty
character and the indisputable services OF his