The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1879-06-18
HAW Allan GAZETTE
PUBLISHED AND EDITED BY
T. CRAWFORD MACDOWELL.
WEDNESDAY. JUNE Is. 1879.
The Zulu War.


crushing disaster that opened the campaign it is
probable that Sir BartIe Frere's reputation for
decision and sagacity would have stood very diff
ferenllv with his countrymen than is likely now
to be the case. And yet he cannot be held re-
sponsible for The Isandala misfortune, except in
so far as be took the initiative in declaring war
on bis own responsibility while Sir Michael
Hicks-Beach was penning temporising counsels
from Downing Street, and recommending " for
bearance and reasonable compromise" hope
full way of avertng war. But the terrible sue
cess of the Zulus against DurnsfOrd's force must
be allowed TO have justified the High Commits
sioners declaration OF war as proving them every
whit as formidable as he had avowed them to be.
Sir Bartle Frere was 10 this position De had
an unusually large European force at his disposal,
therefore the opportunity of enforcing his de-
MAIDS upon Cetywayo seemed more favorable
than might again occur. What those demands
were, and into the question of how far they were
entirely reasonable, We do not at present pro-
pose 10 enter, more than to say we think it was
a mistake 10 make any fictitious pretexts. De-
mands for the reduction OF menacing arguments
have been allowed before sufficient cdSuS
bsHi. There could be no possible occasion fOI
the Zulu kings formidable army, heInmed IN US
he is by English colonies, except for the purpose
of aggression on bis white negbbors. To them
il was u constant and standing menace. 10 Sir
Barte Frere's words, there might be no def
mite agreement between any Two tribes, there
was common purpose and genral unuerstand-
ing that the time was now come for the black
races to shake of the domination of the white
men, and expel them from the country" The
disarmng aud disbanding of Cetywayos army
hnnaIasSly frns frat 10 snph srhafnps md
failing this, the intctiOn OF sudden and swift
chastisemeDt upon Cetywayo himself-who was
recognised the head and moving spirit" of
these murderous ambitiOns--would be q fatal
blow to their fulfllment. To delay hOstities
was simply TO observe an armed truce. Lord
Chelmsford had expressed his opinion that "a
defensive plan could not be considered as salts
factory unless there the possibility OF taking
the offensive at thu right moment" While Ma
tai was protected by an unusually large force Of
English there seemed no absolute danger of Inva-
sion, but as these numbers could ouly he excused
by emergency, and could not be expected TO be
left to permanently garrison distant colony, the
day of the Zulu kings triumph war merely post
poned. 1t must be admitted that the position
of colony usder the protection of the British
flag IN which no one can really sleep in peace
and security within days run Of The Zulu bor-
der except by sutieraDce OF the Zulu Chief is az
anomalous one and one for which, if any imme-
date remedy offered ITSELF So clear-sghted man
as the High Commissioner was bound to take
instant advantage of. Since the annexation of
the lransvaal the tone OF the Zulu king had be-
come more hostile till 1t had reached the point
OF undisguised inso!ence and contempt. To Sir
Henry Bulwers circumstances against the hide
Gus barbnrlties that disgraced his rule he had re-
piled, " The Governor of Natal and | are equal ;
be is Governor of Natal and | am Governor
here. have killed, and have yet 10 kill il is
the custom of our nation and | shall not depart
from 1t. My people will not listen unless they
are killed.
The possibility of resting on peoceabe terms
with such a neighbOr was the problem Sir Bartle
Frere had to decide 10 situations of danger
and extreme difficulty it is before all things ue
cessary that the head authority should be able to
act without lengthy references. To get any reply
IRON England was question Of SIX weeks Of
waiting. In the meantime, any day powerful
Zulu raid might be made into Natal, and enor-
nous mischief done, without the troops ever
coming into collision with the invaders. With
such an enemy as the Zulus, whose inhuman
crueltles are quite on par with those oil Daho-
mey and Aslmntee, such a raid would mean in
calcuable horrors inflicted on a defenceless pop
uaton. Already, some few months previously,
there had been serious uneasiness at great
gathering of Zulu warriors the Tugela river.
ostenslbly Tor bunting, in locality where game
was known 10 be scarce. it was reported that if
buck crossed the river they would have to fol-
low 1t, and although these men dispersed without
offence, such state of apprehension aud uncer-
talnty could hardly be permitted to endure. AL
though Sir BartIe FreTe had no direct authority
for declaring war, be had what amounted to the
same thing-absolute sanction to do as he might
think it. Writing on January %, Sir Michael
Hlcks-Beach says" do not desire to question
the propriety of any policy which you have
adopted in the face of difficult and complicated
condition of affairs" The High Commissioner
stood by no means alone in his estimate of the
measures required in this complicated condition
of affairs" Sir Garnet Wellesley had lestiGed to
the dangers boded by the Zulu despotism, and
Sir Henry Bulwer, Sir Iheophilus Shenstone,
and MIR. Brownee. all potent authorities on
South African affairs, had approved Sir Bartle
frere's measures, and were in unison with his
views 1t appears TO us, looking at all these
circumstances, that Sir Barte Frere's deliberate
choice of the offensive was wise and judicIous
one Had it received no such terrible reverse as
that which overlook Lord Chemsford's column,
we feel pretty certain that England would have
rung with praises of the fearless decision of the
man who, somewhat in contravention of tie spirit
oil his Instructions from home, equal to the
awful responsibility of preclpitatipga war that be
saw was inevitable.
10 one way there is some consolation for the
sad occurrence at Isanddla. Had the Zulus not
been encouraged by first success it is possible
that the complete breaking up of their military
power would have bee: a matter of greater diff
Guilty the present large reinforcements would
not have been sent out and even an early &C.
ceptance by the Zulu king of terms offered before
the present bitter feeling of hostility had been
engendered could hardly have been an advantage,
as they would probably have been less stringent
than those that will now be enforced The un-
holy sentiment of revenge may act as a useful
ally 10 assisting US to rid Zuluand of the blood
cemented rule of Cetywayo As to the military
conduct OF the campaign, we perhaps hardly
entitleu to venture an opinion, but Lord Chelms-
lords avowed intention of advancing into the
enemys country with five columns each sufficient
for its own protection looks as though be had
terribly moderated the power OF concentration
oil the Zulu army. 1t was necessary TO divide
bis force, probably for fear of counter-invasion,
and the difficulties OF transport for supplies
might be expected to deter him from operating
| 10 too large body, but to divide a small force
would seem to hint at a reckless contempt for
his enemy. But for purely military blunders, if
this was bunder, the High Commissioner can
hardly be held accountable and for his imitation
OF hostilities we hardly think the English nation
will condemn him. His was one of those critical
| positions where, acting as he must be admitted
| TO have done against ORDERS failure meant ruin.