The New York herald., 1879-08-09
s proper that my own views on some OF them

moval of the head of department thereof "tor
cause only. The meaning of those words, 'for
cause" in the connection which they occur is too
obvious to require extended comment. 1t it had
been intended that the power of removal should
exist in the discretion of the officers to whom
il was conhdcd It would have been acco mpished by
the conferrng thereof generally without the addi-
ton OF any words of restriction. That the words,
the signihcation of which we are discussing were
added AS Limitation upon the power lodged with
the Mayor, shows that the cause OF removal
should be found in some act of omission commits
sion by tho officer in regard to his duties which the
sufficient to justify forfeiture the Office and not
IN the political bias or personal dislike of the citys
executive chief nor his leanings toward another
individual for whom the place is desired.
This view OF the charter OF New York and of the
same words when oesn.ring as they DO in other
novel. but, on the contrary, has oftentmes been
pressed by eminent statesmen and jnrists. On the
18th day OF February. 1878. the Hon. Samuel J.
Tilden then tho Governor or this State. Mr..
Wickham. then Mayor of the city Of New York. in
Counsel. as follows:- WY" st4A ststi
Removals for dstin guishabe from removals
s ssss s
OF removing power power or OF party ascendancy Tho
saes Sa as Tass s sr Is s.s
ss s to- n that s it nsx
lists to Civ, legal , effect sa 70 removal ws
vsad s i.
because the lawhaa not disabled the oicer having
If committed in evident bad faith by abuse i'm
would expose him to removal in the wanner provided by
IT is proper to state that Governor Tiden. in the
letter from which the foregoing quotation has been
made, assumes that the action of the Mayor and
Governor in a case like this Is not renewable by
the courts, the OF which assumption will
be hereafter considered; but, whole. IL is emf
nently worthy of perusr for its clear definition OF a
removal 'for cause and for it's cogent exposition
which converts power limited by such phrase
into one resting upon arbitrary will
The point,we are discussing. however. has been ju-
diciay settled in this State in People rel. Munday
w. Fare Commissioner t72N Y. 445). The reator had
been removed from the Office OF clerk in the Fire De-
partment ofthe city of New York. Section % ofthe
aforesaid chapter 335 of the Laws of 1873 provides
for the appointment and removal by heads of de-
partments of "all chiefs of bureaus Except the
Chamberlain). as also all clerks. officers. employees
and subordinates i'll their respective departmental,
and decares:-.'But no regular clerk or head Of a
bureau shall be removed until he has been informed
of the cause of the proposed removal and has been
allowed III opportunity of making an explanation
The General Term of this court for the rst depart
ent certiorari reversed the action of the Board
Of Fire Commissioners in removing Munday from
versal. Judge Allen, who delivered the opinion of
the latter tribunal tpage 449) d:-''The removal
is prescribed by statute and must be pur-
sued, The party against whom the proceed
ing is taken must be Informed & Of the cause
opportunity OF explanation This necessarily i'm
plies that the cause is to be some dereliction
or general neglect of duty. or incapacty to per-
form the duties, or some delinquency affecting his
general character and his fitness the office. The
cause assigned should be personal to himself. and
implying uniitness tor the place, and such
being assigned II unexplained, the removal may be
made. An explanation may consist either OF excus-
ing any delinquency, or apparent neglect or inca
pacity-that is explaining the unfsvorable appear
ances, or disprovng the charges; that some other
is better man than the accused, or more
genial to the appointing removing power is not
which the incumbent can explain in tho
sense in which that term Is used. and is no cause
OF removal within the statute. That something sub
stantia is intended by the statute is more evident
from the fact that the true grounds OF the
moval are TO be entered upon the records. and "a
statement showing the reason therefor filed in the
department"
- THE MEANING STATUTE.
The case before us is even palmer. Judge Allen.
before defining what ''cause tor removal meant. in
the section OF the statute upon which that proceed
ing reviewed by him was taken, was compelled to
construe the statute If the power of removal
expressly stated to be .for cause only. BY section
taken, however. the only authority conferred upon
the Mayor to remove is "for cause; and II argu-
Of the words could be drawn from the fact that the
net required statement of the reasons for the
moval to be filed in the department the ap-
plcabe to the before MS. for the law provides.
'whenever removal is so effected the Mayor shall.
upon the demand of the officer removed. make in
writing public statement of the reasons therefor"
1t can hardly be necessary to pursue the further
discussion of the proposition that the power to re-
move person from Office ''for cause means that
q must exist which is personal to the ndivid
ual sought be we'd, which the law and sound
public opinion will recognize good cause for his
no longer occupying the place. Many cases estab-
fishing the correctness or this view be found. II
the meaning claimed is not sufficiently clear a. an
original proposition, sustained it is by the
opinion of eminent statesman who once filled the
chief executive chair OF the State. the Judgment of
of last resort must foreclose and end all
It is claimed. however. that the removal of Mr..
Nichols was for cause within the definition given.
and for that reason the order therefor legal 1t
Is fact that the certificate sent by the Mayor to the
tied action, provided the steps which the law re-
quired to be taken in their ascertainment were fol
lowed. criminal act will Justify the punishment
OF its perpetrator only when conviction therefor has
been had under aud through the forms which the
statutes provide. and removal from office. To
be efectua must follow the process prescribed for
il. This brings to the inquiry. What should have
been the or procedure IN the before u.s.
forgotten The removal must be 'Jor caase''-i. e.,
for some good reason which actually exists and not
for false reason, which the removing power
Investigate necessarily conferred upon the in
dividual body, who or which is authorized to act
facts, which furnishes the only basis tor proposed
action and when such action taken will affect the
rig hts OF another he who is to be anected must
DC heard upon investigation which is toascerta.n
truth OF alleged facts which depends the power
sa 40 a.. of ~ this State iIhort vs. serbner Iahn
sons pages 31l-3l5I. Radc j., sad :"I con-
slider II maxim OF natural justice and OF univcr-
sal law. an axiom. not now TO be proved.
that no ought to affected in his
rights by the Judgment decree OF any court with
opportunity OF being previously heard in his
defence The principle thus clearly stated must
also be applicable to any tribunal which has power
to judicaiiy decide quest on aectng the rights OF
another, whether 1t Ii conrt name or not. be-
cause the which II is founded applies to
both and this opportunity" to be heard also in.
wolves, necessarily definite and specific statement
OF the charge, a Reasonable time to answer II. the
right to hear and examine the evidence by which it
is attempted to be sustained. to produce testimony
to show its alsty and the ard and advice OF counsel
in the conduct OF the examination All this seems
be elementary In the minds OF persons living
under the common law that citation authority to
sustain IL is perhaps unnecessary labor. H. however
tho soundness theretf is questioned the following
ufhoritics will remove all uoubt:-
Judge Dillon. III his work municipal corpora
lions second edition. section 1917 in considering the
manner OF removing municipal officer. says:-
1.-THE proceeding in all cases. when motion is
for cause IL adversary Judicial in its character
and II organic law of the corporation is silent
to the mode of procedure the substantial principles
OF tho common law to proceedings affecting private
rights must be observcd.'' In section 1g2 he states
that 'the officer is entitled to personal ntice OF