The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1879-01-30

.4xI
Tt,is ease differed from Biaf OF sennett
| ns. Hunter In the faes9 TINT there WIS NO
tender Of the tax to the tax commissio geEs:
tby the friend or agent OF The oSy Inc
Iowf,er,s bro.her-in- law merely went to see
after. the paynlent OF the tax but, MADE no
forrnni offer or tender Of it, That De1ng VIZ
| tilaIIy waived by the conmisslo ners 10 de-.
clinina to- ecognize any tender unless MADE
tby the owner in proper person. Judging
/ from tie language OF the Court, The decision
/ in that ease, as i read It, was based not
merely on the presumption that an. Offer
4 would have been made but for the refusal
| to recognize tender by an agent in that
particular instance, but was based also on the
i fact, that it was.tbe rule and practice Of the
commissioners so to refuse. Think care
2Efuf Ind unbiased reading OF the decision In
| Taeey U.s. Irwin ] eads TO the inevitable con-
i yiction that il was based chiefly on the eX-
jistence OF that rule and practice, and but
tpartiaily, II at all, on such declarations or
1.-The commissioners on the occasion when
TWINS bro,her-in-law called 4. to see about
paving the tax" as deferred him from
! making formal tender. But think the
1 highest principle on Which both Of the de-
i cisions under review were rendered was
] that the language quoted, inrsection Seyen,
! implying a, requirement that the owner
/ should pay the tax in person.. was oYefrid-
den by the superior principle Of copstltu-
i tional law that Congress had mo right IN
| leyying tax for purposes, OF revenue 10
impose disabilities or denounce penalties for
political conduct, thereby converting reYe-
nue. laws into instruments for indirectly con-
fscating that entire estate in land which the
| Constitution forbids Congress from confs-
eating by direct laws.
But whatever view might have been In the
mind Of the Court, Bennett Us. Hunter, ana
Tacey Us. Irwin, were cases involving lands
which were sold under that provision OF
section Seue1l, which expressly gave author
ity to sell in all cases where the owners had
not appeared in person before the commits
siopers and paid the tax. The Court de-
cided that sales thus expressly authorized
were nevertheless void, when the owners
had through friends or agents rendered pay
ment Of the tax; and that the law would
presume that owners were ready to make
| offer OF payment by friends or agents II
such offer had not boen rendered nugatorg
in advance by rule and practice OF the
commissioners to receive the tax only
from owners in person, II, therefore,
| sales expressly authorized by the language
OF section scven were void, then for a
stronger reason was the sale OF Arlington
void which could not, as conceive, have
been made under this clause OF section seU-
en-, apparently containing such express au-
thority. but was made under another clause
. Of That section which authorized sales to the
] United States OF such lands as the President
should direct TO be purchased for military,
Ieducational or kindred purposes, without
1 reference TO whether or not the owner had
offered to pay the tax by 4 friend or agent.
I1f the principle On which the Supreme
Court decided the sales OF Hunters and IT.
| wins lands to be void was 50 strong as to
override eX press Language authorizing them,
found in the, law, it certainly. may be follow
| ed in the present case, where the land was
| sold under provision which in terms gave
no authority to sell lands of persons who
! had not appeared in person to pay the tax.
! | cannot agree with defendants counsel
in the opinion that the two clauses in sec
ton seuen, one OF them authorizing sales to
both Government and private persons, but
restricting the Government to bids not ex-
ceedng two thirds the assessed value OF the
LANDS and the other clause directing the
sale Of lands to the United States without
restriction OF price when the President Or
dered their purchase for certain purposes,
as both governing In such sales as that OF
Arlington. I thlnk the clauses are distinct
and several, each OF them authorizing
sales which could not have been made I'M
der the other. The sale OF Arlington could
not have been made under the prior clause
of section Seue,a, because it was not made
to private person, nor made to the United
States at a price less than two thirds OF its
assessed value. How, therefore, could both
clauses have governed in this sale? The
language OF the prior clause imposing disa-
bilities as to the payment Of the tax by re-
strictiny The right TO owners in person is
| for that reason to be construed strictly; is
to be given asiimited an application as pos
sible; and is not unnecessarily to be eX-
tended to other clauses of section SeUen.
But even il this rule Of construction did
not govern, I do not think that the lam
language Of the clause authorizing the sale
4 OF the lands OF all owners who had not ap-
peared in person and paid their taxes
could, by any logical construction, be, en-
tended to the other claus IS of section SeUen.
This clause is an independent provision,
not found in the original law, not necessary
to the sense Of any other. part Of the law
1 either in its original or present form, not
connected grammatically ofin logical course
OF thought with the context, but interiect-
ed into place in the section no better suit.
| ed to its admission than any other place,
and having every characteristic OF piece OF
patchwork. I do not think it has any con-
troll over the other clause. standing at dis
lance from it IN section aeren, under which
| Arlington was sold; and do not think that
the theory Of defendants counsel that the
two clauses apply inseparably to all sales is
tenable. 'n.ua3,'.@ a=
!, do not think, ought to pass unnoticed
the distinction which defendants counsel
drew in their argument for their .Instruc-
| ton No. between tax sale made to pr-
vate purchaser-such as was passed upon
| by the Supreme Court in two cases which
have been under consideration-and sale
made to the United States, no instance OF
| which has been considered by the Supreme
Court in connection withthe question whe-
tier or not an owner could pay his tax by
an agent and not in person.. They base this
distinction upon the pretension hataithough
under the decisions Of the Supreme Court IN
| the two cases referred to fender or offer OF
the tax made before the tax sale by friend
| or agent OF the owner is valid against
the purchaser if the andbe afterwards pur-
chased by private person; yet II the puff
CHASER turn out to be the United States, that
| fact, under the language of the first quoted
clause OF section Seren. will retroactiyely
render the teuder or offer OF the tax by 4
| friend or agent, which was valid and suth-
Gent before the SALE void afterwards as
| against the United States. I have already
expressed tbeopinion that the language IN
| the clause OF section: SeCeni referred to does
not apply to a sale to the Government made
under direction OF the President, as this
| sale Of Arlington was. But even II the
case were otherwise, do not see how such
4 fni~ no