Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1879-05-28

social evils were all IN attenoauCe, auu we're
thanked by fair sized audience of men, only.
The business came up on the argument in
the matter of the county attorneys demurrer
to the special pleas interposed by Mary j.
France ct al. to the Indictment for keeping
house of iIl-fame resorted to for the pur
poses of prostitution.
County Attorney Rogers spoke upon the
questions involved, last Saturday. The court
signifed his readiness to hear counsel for |
defendants
Thereupon MIR. Erwin arose and stated |
that Mr.. H. F. Masterson had been associated |
with him in the defense, and that he would |
first address the court upon the matter at |
issue.
M. Mastersom,se argument.
Mr. Masterson then began his argument, |
prefacing it with the remark that he had
only been retained within the last twenty
four hours. He then opened by remarking
that in 1869 the same number of indict- |
ments were found for the same oHense, coun-
sci having been retained in tue case of Hen
rietta Charles. Counsel then gave history
of that affair, which is familiar to the general
reader.
TWICE PUNISHED FOR SINGLE OFFENsE.
Mr. Masterson then asked this question,
whether the defendants actually convicted
by the provisions of city ordinance were
amenabIe under the State. statute,
both ordinance and statute being in
force? He confessed that the supreme
court had left this question unsolved or I'M
answered in the case above referred to, that
of Henrietta Charles. The court thus acted
because of grave doubts, and for the reason
moreover, that the attorney general had
failed to make reply to. the argument of
counsel and others allied in the case; and
thus on technical point this question was
left unanswered or undetermined by the
court. Counsel believed, however, that
once convicted the defendants were
relieved from further prosecution under the
municipal or State law.
Addressing himself to the main argument
of the question, which was stated as follows:
That no person should be placed twice in
jeopardy of life, liberty, etc., Mr.. Masterson
in substance held that defendants could be
classed under this class in view of the fact of
the fines imposed and collected against them
in due process of law emenating from
tho municipal court. This provision
Of the law places no restriction as to what
court or courts the offense was tried and the
penalty imposed.
DELEGATED AUTHORITY.
The law declaring that no one should be
jeopardiZed twice for the same offense, also
established the courts to try offenses against
the law. At this point counsel argued at
length the power of the legislature to dele
gate to the city the authority to regulate and
suppress prostitution, and the extent thereof
If this delegated authority under which
st. Paul has been acting
were illegal, then these defendants
were entitled to a restitution of all the fines
imposed for long years. The city had no in
herent right in itself to pass the ordinance
under which it had been acting, and if un
der legislative authority conferred upon the
city, the ordinance was passed, then tn
special pleas of defendants in bar of trial
must be held to be sufficient. Counsel con
tended that the authority was legally vestet
in the city, to regulate the offense will
which defendants are charged, anc
that once convicted unde
the city ordinance of the offense, that they
could not be held amenable for the same of
Tense. 10 be sure two jurisdictions wer
involved in the matter, but double penalt,
can not be imposed for the same act II
support of this view, counsel quoted a
length from the decisions in Missouri, Con
necticut, Kansas and other States, respecting
similar cases. The principle and declaration
of law was that the courts abhorred multi
plicity of civil suits, and equally SO an &C
cumulative charge of criminal nature
Counsel cited case, where party had bee
convicted of arson, burning house. Sui
sequently he was arraigned for murder,
person having been burnt up in the house
49, Ia l1l J>o.. I; fo~n ,,1,;<
ton, and it was deemed sufficient; thong
the offenses charged we're laid under differ
ent statutes. If this be good law, as III
doubtedly it is, the application comes wit
great force, when the nature of these defenc
ants case is considered, under tt
provision of our statute, wherein n
authority is retained or delegate,
to infict double punishment for sing
act or offence.
THE CITY LIABLE TO SUIT FOR THE FINES 60.
.s---. LECTED.
Coming again to the question of Il
legislative delegation of authority to tt
city of St. Paul for the control of this or al
other matter, counsel held that the questit
of sovereignty arose. The city of st. Pa
had no sovereignty in itself, but derived s
power from the State, its legislature. Co
sequently no analogy could be made betwe,
the acts of the federal government and Il
State governments. These latter retain'
rights; the city as part of the State b
no rights which were not specially conferre
Hence it might be presumed, and was he
as principle, that what was an often
against St. Paul was also against the Stat
and if authority were conferred to impo
penalties for the city, the same, when do
by the city, was done for the State und
the conferred authority. This therefore l,
no action for the State if the city had fl
assumed to act in the matter; or if this VII
could not be entertained, the city had act
without authority and was liable to suit I
restitution of fines imposed N the fo1
of penalties.
WHAT PUNISHMENT is FOR.
Counsel then took up and discussed
purposes of punishment. TWAS fiction
the law that punishment was imposed
reformatory purposes. To attain this 81
the justice of the punishment must be
parent. But in this case such could not
held, for these defendants are to be tried a
punished for an offense for which they
already been punished the same 6
Such an action would r
the penalty of the feat,
of Justice, and the force of punishment
contemplated in the law would fail in eff
as a reformatory measure. The control
the social evil by the city of St. Paul /
been conferred by the legislature, and the
hot 1r 1891