Keowee courier. [volume] (Pickens Court House, S.C.) 1849-current, 1879-03-20

Tho Circuit Court discharged rulo against
tho Sheriff for failure to enforce m execution
against personal property, consisting Of cotton
in bales, seed cotton and corn, tho defendant
claiming that they are exempt from levy
under tho provisions Of tho act Of March l3.
1872, rs Stat. 229, Sec 0.) ho beng an "agr-
cultural laborcr." 1t is stated in appellants
argument that tho contract upon which tho
Judgment was obtained bore date prior to tho
passage of the net in question, contending
that such exemption could not be claimed rs
agalnst an antecedent contract; but that fact
does not appear in tho brief. and, therefore,
is not available to the appellant. Tho quos-
ton to be considered is, whether tho Lcgisa
ture could create new subjects Of exemption
in addition to those enumerated in the consti,
| tuition. Tho provisions of tho constitution
relating to the exemption Of personal property
from execution arc contained in section 49,
article Q. After providing for uhomc stead
exemption on tho land Of debtor, the ON.
stitution goes on to say: "ro secure tho full
enjoyment of said homestead exemption to
the person entitled thereto or the hend or any
family, the personal property of such person
of the following character. to wit: household
furniture, beds and bedding, fnmiy library,
arms, carts, wagons. farming implements.
tools, ncnt cnttle, work animals swine, goats
and sheep, not to exceed in yaluo in the uggre.
gate tho sum Of five hundred dollars, shnll
be subject to like exemption rs said homcr
stead and there shall be EXEMPT in addition
thereto nll necessary wearing apparel" The
question ia, whether the snbsequeGt attempt
- Il Al. a..
third of the annual products Of agricultural
luburers" by the act Of 1873 was consistent
with tho provisions Of the constitutional en-
acmcnt or tended to deny tho proper force
due to the same and if the latter conclusion
is reached, such conflicting provisions must
be held unconstitutional and void.
This involves question Of intention to be
made out constructively on the provisions of
the constitution. 1t is contendod that the
enumeration Of kinds Of property intended
for exemption is exclusive. and general rules
Of Interpretation arc urged rs leading to that
conclusion. Ii will not DO necessary to re-
sort to such general rules. or to place the dc
cision any technical rule or reasoning, as
the nature Of the subject with which tho con.
stitu'on deals points very distinctly to the
solution OF the question mt issue.
The question Of allowing legislative cx-
| cmptinn to debtors is in its nature urdamcn-
tnI, as involving an inquiry into the princi-
pies of government Until within few
years it has not been regarded as Legitimate
exercise of legislative power to place the pros
pcrty OF tho debtor beyond the reach of his
creditor, except to an inconsidcrable extent
Not that tho competency Of the Legislature
to make such exemptions independently of
constitutional restrictions, was doubted, but
because the spirit of tho laws was supposed
to oppose such exercise Of legislative power.
1t may well be considered that in solving the |
question of the Legitimacy Of such legislation
the constitution had in view limit that
should be imposed to its unrestricted exercise
When sis treating of subjects that have been
constantly dealt with by legislative bodies
with the sanction Of the courts and the c,m,
munitj, such an interference does not ncccs-
sariv arise.
In such cases some special ground xould
have to appear by infcrring, in the absence
Of an express declaration to that effect, that
the constitution, in prescribing the mode in
which power Of that class should be cAers
cised, intended to exclude its exercise in any
other mode. But in the present case where
the constitution was dealing with n principle
fundamental to the policy Of our iurspru-
dence, and which, by its abuse might unsetle
the very cornerstone on which that iurispru.
dcncc rests, it is obvious that in imposing
ilmIls to sucii power Of exemption regard
was had to the general question, to what
, extent government should 50 in relaxing the
laws for tho enforcement. Of obligations.
There can be no doubt that the object of he
section in question was to limit the Lcgisla,
,ure. 1t the constitution had been silen,
altogether on the subject, the Legislature
would have, doubtless, been competent, rs
affecting future contracts to create such ex-
, emptions, and to give them any measure of
extent that might appear desirable.
Again, section 20 Of article | confers ex.
press powers on the Legislature to grant
homestead exemptions to reasonable extent,
| leaving the determination Of what is to he
regarded as reasonable to the Legislature, so
lar as nnfe!tered by subsequent clauses of
that instrument. If that section bad stood
alonc it would lenyc in doubt as to the power
OF the Legislature being unrestricted. But
the constitution was not content with estnb~
, fishing this as a principle, and in section SO.
article 2, assumes to give more accurate
definition Of the kind Of legislation contcm.
| plated in the Goth section of article 2, emu
merating the subjects to which it should
extend and tho limitations that should bo
established as affecting these subjects. Such