The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1879-11-27
UNWRITTEN HISTORY OF THE
WAR:
Why the Confederate Troops Did Not Attack on
the West Side - Why the Advance Was Not
Made Before BarlI's Army Effected
functional Letter From Gen.
BeanFegard.

JunctiOn-A Letter From Gen,
BeauFsgard.
The Battle of Shiloh, or Pittsbure
Landing, was the most desperate of the
war: This arose not from the number
of troops engaged, but because of the
rawness of the men, the topography oI
the country and the character of the
arms. 1t was really the first engage.
ment between the Southern and West
ern troops, and tested the metlle of the
armies Of the Mississippi.
IT has been thought by military critics
that the attack should have been made
on the west side. General Beauregard,
who ranked mex to General Albert sgd
ney Johnston, aud who commanded af
ter his death, furnishes some interesting
information. Of the preliminary move.
ments from the Confederate side.
1t seems thatit was the intention of
the Confederate army to advance on the
l5t of April. This was prevented by
! circumstances which the letter details
for the first time. If the attack had
been made on the lst, or even the 4sh or
9th of April, the Federal army must have
been defeated from the want of union
with Buell's army. General Beauregard
has already stated that he was so anx.
ious for the engagement that he sent his
regiments into battle without single
musket, but who were instructed to arm
themselves from the arms on the field
which they might chance to pick up
during the progress of the engagement.
There were hundreds of double harreled
shot.guus on the field after the battle.
We give the letter for the first time:
New YORK, Sept 26 1879.
Dear sir Having been engaged IN al
most constant travel since the receipt of
your letter of the l0;h ult., have not
found until now the opportunity for re-
plying to its inquiries.
As to your first question: Bragp's
forces were brought from Mobile TO Cor.
NTH at my instance, and he exercised
no command there except as my subor.
dlGate. | attempted no offensive against
the Federals at Plttsburg Landing with.
In the time you refer to, for the reason
that my own forces were their only bnr |
riedly assembling. They were inferior
to the Federals IN numbers, organiza
llon, 1lscl pline and supplies of all kinds |
and, In fact, were in no condition for any |
such movement until the march on |
Pltsburg Landing was actually made
and even then were but imperlectly pre-.
pared; AS to your second question
me Federal position on the west of the
river was III itself exceedingly danger
Gus, and might have proved fatal if
our forces could have been brought 10
greater efficiency as to numbe 8, g.. at
an earlier date. AS to your third ones
tion: Il } The turning point in thy con.
quest at Shiloh was the arrival of Buels
forces. ~ Grant was irre.rievably
beaten, aud but for the arrival of BueIlis
army his remnants would have been de.
stroyed on the second day. (3) During
P'0u ooodult5 maue Dy our
then ditjointed organization upon the
Federal position on the buff at Pitts.
burg Landiog, between and 6 o. m. of
the first day, | expected from the re.
neHed resistance Oftbe Federals thai re.
lnforcements had been received. and
General Prentiss, who was captured in
lhe afternoon, stated in the evening that
Buell. was coming up Later, however,
a dispatch from Colonel Hei m, repu.
lar mean West Point graduate and
in the old service) army officer posted
at Florence positively reported that
Buell. was marching upon Huntsville.
But for this mistaken report of
Helm (aud may add Hardee's ne.
gIect to report to me the infor.
nation acquired by Colonel For
rest during the nighE, that large bodies
of troops were being formed aCfoss the
rlverl | would haze adopted d fferent
for the second day, suited to
the defensive, for which the field uffared
ample opportunity. .s.s..
As to your fourth question: The Oh.
portune arrival OF Blel's army unoues.
llonably saved the Federas from com
plete defeat. (See Chapter w of Jor.
dams Campaigns of Lieu enant General
Forrest, particularly the commentaries, ,
PIP l49 1917 y
Not more than One.fourth of Grants
forces were in The second DAVIS battle {
How many If them could have been col
ected and organized without the pres.
-nGe OF General Buel's army it. is not
iltficnlt to Judge. IL had been the inten.
ion of Genera johnston and myself to
AXE the f.nsve by the lst of April,
nut such movement was prevented by
he reason already stated. nor would
3 have occurred even on the 81, but that
IN the night OF the 81 Gen. Cheatham,
lear Bethel, reported to M through
zen Polk that large Federal force,
afterward proved to be Gen Lew Wal
ace'sJ was operating in that quarter. l
lrIed an immediate movement as op,
,orlune by reason Of this detachment,
md, after some objections by General
IHhnston, based upon our unprepArsd
condition, it was assented to. This
march itself Was attended with unfortu.
late delays arising from the inexperl- v
'nCe of the corps commanders, the Want
If discipline aud rawness in marching of !
most of our troops, and in some degree,
Ilso, from the heavy storm which over.
Ook us. Tne enforced delay arising
rom the above cause, but primarily
rom our unprepared condition, enabled
Buell. 10 come mp in the critical moment.
lam yours, respectfully,
g. I, Beauregard. ,