Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1879-10-14
THE COTTON ORDER CASE.
Judge W. S. Fippin's Last Argument.

s. Flippin, in the recent Injunction
trial before Judge Eldridge, is here
with published as relates to the legal
ity OF Judge Galloway's election and
his power to grant fat in the Speers
injunction case. We do so because
this matter has attracted considerable
attention in the State among lawyers
and the general public. We are not
lawyers, consequently our opinion is of
no value but we think the judge
makes the matter very plain to the
non-professional reader:
| lfit please the honorable and learn
ed court, let me say few words about
this election of Galloway, and his
power, if legally elected, to issue a fat
for an Injunction The Judge of the
court, Hon. James o. Pierce. failed
to attend on the first day of the term
Some ten or eleven attorneys we're
present when the clerk adjourned the
court till the next day. We told the
clerk that we did not desire to lose
the term, but such would be the result
unless either Judge Pierce came or a
special judge was elected. lie said
Judge Pierce had been written to by
him, but no answer had been received
as yet; that he was expecting a letter
every hour, On the next day about
ten OF our number attended. (there
were only about eleven in the city).
when, as on the first day, the clerk
opened and adjourned the court. On
the next day we proposed TO elect
special judge for the occasion. The
| clerk was to have opened court at 10
0 clock, but when we went up we
found that he had been there at an
earlier hour. He stated that he had
already Adjourned court; that he had
heard from Judge Pierce, and that the
judge desired the court to be adjourn
ed to the first Monday in November.
| We demonstrated with and told him
that could only be done by a special
judge, and that he could only adjourn
on the fourth day, and then only to
court in course He finally agreed to
open court on the next and fourth day
and hold an election, and accordingly
did, as the record shows. Section
393Oa Of the code was read, and it was
insisted that we had full power to
elect judge for the occasion. The
record shows that eight attorneys were
present at such election, and j. S. Gal
loway was duly elected. Having re-
ceiyed the votes of majority Of the
members present, he took the oath
required by law 1t was stated at the
time said election was held that we
wished to elect special Judge, be-
cause we desired to keep the term;
that we wished an order to extend
the time for making up the plead
lngs; that there were four or five
habeas corpus cases to be tried, and
that there were other matters to be
brought before the court. According.
| ly, an order was entered extending the
| time for pleading to the first Monday
in November; and, after Judge Gallo
way had signed several habeas corpus
orders, the court adjourned for several
days. 1t was adjourned from Thurs
day to Saturday. But before that day
the head of the city government had
released the prisoners, and the court,
which had met to hear these cases,
adjourned to Wednesday, the 24th of
September. On that day the applica-
tion of Speers for an injunction was
heard in open court, and was argued
by counsel on both sides, Judge Gallo
way ruling that he had the power to
issue fat, which he at once did.
The objections to the regularity of
his election are several, but they are
not tenable. There was no necessity
that it should have been stated on the
record that he had all the qualifca-
tions Of a judge of such court, which
relate to his age and residence; nor
that the attorneys are residents of the
State.
This would have been we'll enough,
but by an oversight, or because it was
not deemed material, was not done;
and that oversight naturally came
about because such elections for
special judges are not of unfrcquent
occurrence in the Circuit as we'll as in
the Chancery Court, and if these are
defects and fatal then am inclined
to believe that all or nearly all the
judgments and DEGREES passed in those
courts by special judges are of no val
idity. Without examining should
say so. A record implies absolute
verify. If the courts 60 as far as they
can to uphold as regular the acts and
proceedings Of justices of the peace
who hold no courts of record, how
much more readily will they presume
and hold the proceedings and records
of courts of record TO be true and reg
ular? Moreover, the attorneys of the |
court are officers of the court as well !
as the clerk, the sheriff and the Judge. |
And the presumption is always in
favor of the regularity OF the acts of |
officers of the law and the courts. 1t |
is for gentlemen on the other side to
show in another proceeding that Gal |
loway had not the proper qualiica-
tions and that the attorneys voting
were not citizans of the State). The |
facts are the other way). They can
not do so here. But they say if elect
ed he could only try special causes.
The reverse of this is settled by the
Supreme Court in Ligan VS.. the State
reported in 3 Heisk.-which case |
beg to call the attention of gentlemen |
to, as / conceive it adjudicates the
regularity of this election. The cleo
tion was there held under 3930a. 1t |
was made by the attorneys present, |
and the occasion was the holding ofl
the Carroll Circuit Court until the |
regular judge should arrive. There is
no mention made in the case that