Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1879-08-08
Ills VIEWS OF THE WAR AND THE CAPABIL
TIES OF THE GENERALS.

\ correspondent of the Philadelphia Times
has had a long talk with General Longstrect
at the latters home in Gainesville, Ga.
In regard to the Confederate leaders Cen
eral LongStreet said: 81 am inclined to
think that General Joe Johnston was the
ablest and most accomplished man that the
Confederate armies produced. He never had
the opportunity accorded TO many Others
hut he showed wonderful power as tacti-
clan and a commander do not think that
We had his equal for handling an army and
conducting campaign. General Lee was a
great lcader-wise, deep and sagacous. His
moral influence was something wonderful.
But he lost his praise on certain occasions.
No one who is acquainted with the facts can
believe that he would have fought the battle
| of Gettysburg had he not been under great
excitement, or that he would have ordered
the sacrifice of Pickett and his Virginians on
the day after the battle He said to me
afterwards, Why didn't you stop all that
thing that day At the Wilderness when
our lines had been driven in and was just
getting TO the field General Lee put himself
at the head of one of my brigades and lead
ing it into action my men pressed him back,
and said TO him that if he would leave my
commands in my own hands | would reform
|
within him when crisis or disaster threat
ened. This tended to disturb his admirable
cquipoise. loved General Lee as brother
while he lived and revere his memory. He
was great man, born leader, wise gen.
| eral hut | think Johnston was the most
accomplished and capable commander that
we had
As to the Union generals, General Long
| street said = Grant was incomparably the
greatest He possessed an individually that
impressed itself upon all that he did. Nc
Clellan was skilful engineer, but never rose
above the average conclusions of his council.
| Sherman never fought great battle and dis
played no extraordinary power. But Grant
was great. He understood the terrible
power of concentration and persistancy.
How stuhhornlv he stuck 10 Nicksburg and
to Richmond He concentrated all his
strength, trained his energies to a single
purpose and then delivered terrible sledge-
hammer blows against which strategy and
tactics and valor could avail nothing He
knew that majorities properly handled must
triumph in war AS in politics, and he always
gathered his resources together before strik-
! inT."
Did YOU agree with Lee as to the ncces-
| sily of the surrender at AppOmattox?
Il did. For some time | had felt that we
were fighting against hope. kept my lips
closed, and fought ahead in silence. For
the week proceeding the surrender fought
| almost without ceasing. | was covering
Gen Lees retreat. while Gordon opened a
way for him in front. had Fields division,
all that was left. The federals pressed upon
us rclentlessy and we fell back, fighting
night and day, inch by inch, covering the
| slow retreat of our wagon trains. Our lines
! Were never once broken or disordered My
men fought with the finest regularity and
hcroism. Wherever placed brigade, there
il would stand until ordered it away. !
was anon" my men constantly, 20 that
knew little of the general situation. Early
in the morning Gen Lee sent for me, and
| at once went TO him He was in deep
concern lie stated To me that his re
treat had been cut off and it was impossible
for him 10 escape from the circle that had
been drawn about him. III that is the case,
General, replied YOU should surrender
the army. If escape is impossible, not an
other life should he sacrificed Gen. Lee
then BEGAN to talk about the distress and
trouble that a surrender would bring upon
his country and his people That cannot
he put against the useless shedding of these
brave mems blood. If You arc satisfied
that you cannot save the army, it should be
surrendered. The people will know that you
have done all that man can do He then
told me that he had discovered that there
were heavy masses of infantry in front, and
that he could not hope to cut through. 1t was
terrible moment for Gen. Lee. Having
fought for rcars with high and lofty purposes,
having won victory after victory and made
"A record for his army not equalled In our
history. it was hard that he must surrender
everything. ] cannot tell YOU how my heart
went to him.
"Dii YOU sav To Gen. Lee when parting
with him that You regretted You had gone
into the war =
No. sir: | said that before drew my
sword again would be sure that it was nee
cssarv | did not believe, and do not now
believe, that the war was justified on either
side 1t is a terrible thing and should be
rcsorted to only in absolute sclf-defencc,
just as killing in private life. Besides, had
Tough all the time knowing that our plans
were wrong and believing that we could
not succeed Still did not and do not regret
my services. | fought for my people. |
fought steadily, unc1mplainingly, as best !
knew how. and there never was an hour
that | would not have gladly laid my life
down to have secured the success OF our
cause. The war was gricvOus error-an
error Of both sections, and for which both
sections have deeply atoncd-'
What was the most desperate battle OF
the war =
Gettysburg far as my observation
extended. There was never any fighting
done anywhere to surpass the battle made by
my men on the Cd of July. led 12,0O0
men into that charge. Over onc-thlrd oil
this number were killed or wounded These
veterans charged the whole Federal army,
l.. L ooh
flank until the line was stretched, and at last
found myself charging 1900 intrenched
men, in the face of volcano Of artillery,
with a single line of battle My two divi-
sinns encountered and drove back the Third
Corps, the Fifth Corps, the Sixth Corps, the
Second Corps one division Of the Twelfth,
and the PENNSYLVANIA Reserves. As they
broke line after line they encountered new
ones, and felt the steady shock oi fresh
troops. The FcdeIals contend that the bulk
of Lees army was in this charge, and put
the strength of the attacking column at A.
600 men, when il was only my $1,000 with
1000 Of these knocked out of ranks before
they had hardly started up the slope. do
not think the records of war can show any
thing to approach this work.
We venture to doubt that Gen Longslrect
said all that is attributed to him in this last
paragraph. He knows very we'll beyond
doubt, that the sixth Corps was not ON the
field when his assault On Slcklrs Corps
(Which h. calls his ''chlrg.' of the 2d OF
.lulyj bcEin, anL that il WIS not engaged
that day Lpng5trrci drove back, that day,
the Third Corps, division OF the Second
Corps and four briGui.s of the Fifth Corps
The 'ptnnsylvInii Rcsrrvr4' which he
speaks "l asst it Was a separate corps, was a
brigade oi the Fifth Corps LnnsstrccI was
in Turn driven nblek by portions of the Fifth,
Third second and First Corps No drlihcr-
ate Federal account ol the battle, ~ far as
W. are aware, ever put the strength of his
column at Al. .OO0 men lie had, as is well
known, and stated in al reputable ninn I,
histories of the battle. twn divisions in his
attacking force, the strength OF the two,
probably not cNcrrdng l5,oO0 men. lie
probably docs not cVasgcratr his loss when
he puts it At over ouc-thiri
Ia the broad flush ii tn, gold sun
rise th. farmers duughi.r. neatly halnuc-
me- milk pul upon har head, wrnds her .
way through the dcvy mead to draw the .
luct.M unurisIm.ul from the bursting
udlrrs of tn hrndlr h1Vruc. At least.
that - the WAY Tho story books rcnd ; but .
1t isn't So At all The cows are MIXED by
the hired man before daylight, md the .
sun - three hours high before any farm
crs dlughtnr throws usidr the dime nov
clctic she has been reading III bed and