The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1879-08-14
swhoop them up.' as the saving goes.

replied that l thought not. There is
nothing like quiet assurance and conf
dence. A general need never be noisy,
and I think quiet troops are the best
fighters. 1 once sent out brigade to
occupy q certain point. AS it was
mounting little crest, it came full upon
immense masses of Federals. The mer
were panic-strickeu, and thoug ght I had
made mistake in ordering them for
ward. They halted irresolute, and then
dropped down upon the ground. 1t wa:
important that they should advance and
make feint, at least. I, therefore, rode
quietly through their ranks, on to the
crest, and there halting my horse, ad-
justed my glass and calmly surveyed the
scene in front. l turned carelessly
around, and as I expected, there was my
brigade at my back, every man in posi-.
tion ready for anything-con6dent and
assured"
"But were not the Southern troops, in
defending their own soil, inspired by
stronger motives than the Northern
troops, who were intruders 2"
~ think not. The sentiment in favor
of the Union and the memories that
cling about the old flag were just as
strong, if not stronger, than the love oi
the soil of the States and the feeling
aroused in defending homes. There were
thousands of men in every State who
turned against their native States in de.
ference to this love of the Union, and
Joined with the Federals, in invading
their own homes. 1t is impossible to
over-estimate the love that the Federals
had for the Union and the old flag. 1t
was love that was born with the Revo-
luton and cemented with the blood OF
our fathers. I remember myself that af-
ter the battle of Chattanooga Gen. Breck-
enridge made a speech congratulating
bis men at being able for the first time in
their lives to sleep on the battlefield, and
he said that they had to thank me for it.
The next day some one remarked that ]
must feel very proud of this. I replied
that the war and all connected with it
filled me with inexpressible sadness, and
that 1 felt Just as if I was being congrat-
ulated over whipping my own brother.
The truth is, the soldiers on both sides
were nerved by lofty and desperate emo
tons, and knew from the first that there
would be heroism displayed by both ar
mics, and that the struggle must be pro-
longed and strenuous"
aWhat we're the decisive battles of the
war;"
"It is my opinion that We were whipped
when we failed at Gettysburg. AT,
ter that we had only chance. After
Bragg's failure to follow up the advan-
tage at Chattanooga I felt that only a
miracle could save US, and you know q
soldier does not rely to any great extent
on miracles. You see, as regards Get
tysburg, we had staked great deal on
the invasion of which it was the turning
point. 1t had been decided that we must
make an offensive campaign. I did moi
favor the invasion of Pennsylvania. My
idea was to hurry the army, then concen-
traiting at Jackson, for the purpose OF
succoring Vicksburg, forward to Tulla-
homa, where Bragg was confronting Rose
Grams, and to send my corps to the same
point. With these combined forces Ro-
secrans might have been easily crushed,
and with our grand army we could have
swept through Tennessee and Kentucky
and pierced Ohio. By sending this great
force, with prestige of victory, through
Tennessee and Kentucky we would have
won over both of those doubtful States.
I found, however, that Gen. Lee had his
head very much set on invading Penn
sylvania. agreed to his plans, only
making one point, viz: That we should
never attack the Federals but force them
to attack US. I remember Jsckson's say
ing: 'We sometimes fail to drive the
enemy from position. They always
fail to drive US"
THE SOUTH BEATEN AT GETTYSBURG.
"The invasion was made. Its wise
plan was changed by the battle of Get
tysburg and We were forced back across
the river. I felt then that we were beat
en-. I considered it simply question
of time. Once after this was there q
chance IA bare chance) of saving the
Confederacy. This was after the battle
of Chickamauga, which was in many re-
spects the most brilliant victory of the
war, The enemy was more thoroughly
put to rout here than before or since. II
there ever was an occasion that de-
manded pursuit pell-mell this was the
time. The Federals were rushing back
on Chattanooga in the utmost confusion.
1t was a bright moonlight night and our
people were anxious to pursue. We
might actually have entered Chattanooga
with the flying Federals and thus recov-
cred the key to Georgia and East Ten
nessee. Gen. Bragg declined to follow
up his advantage. The enemy rallied,
reformed, and Bragg was driven back to
Missionary Ridge. had talk with
Mr.. Davis shortly after Chickamauga. !
told him that there was no hope for the
triumph of our arms. He has very much
discouraged, and finally grew petulant
He said he never remembered having
seen such a movement as l proposed at
Chickamauga. replied that if his
memory would carry him as far back as
the first Manassas he would see such q
movement. He replied very tartly, and
we had some sharp words. These were
arranged, however, and we parted on good
terms"
"You say, General, that organization
was the deficiency of the military system
of the Confederacy. What was the fault
of its operations?"
"Chiefy this-the failure to concen-
trate troops. The government, moved
doubtless by desire to protect our soil
as much as possible, kept our troops scat
tered, and thus made them inefficient.
There was scarcely time when we had
a really grand army at any one point.
The policy of the Federals, and especial
ly Gen. Grants policy, was to mass ever
thing available at one single point, and
then drive straight at it. Of course our
government disliked to leave any section
Of the Confederacy at the mercy of the
Federals. Therefore our men were scat
tered over our whole extent of territory.
do not think that our best generals even
comprehended the necessity of concen-
tration of forces. They relied too much
on the valor of their men. They seemed
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