Daily globe., 1879-04-05
FITZ JOHN PORTER.

quiry-The Generals Conduct at Manassas
as Worthy Of Praise Instead of Censure.
Below are the conclusions of the commits
ion in the Fitz John Porter rehearing, ex-
that officer.
These charges and specifications certainly
bear no discernible resemblance to the facts
Of the case as now established, yet it has been
our duty to carefully compare with these
facts and views entertained by the court
martial as shown in the findings, and in the
review of the case which was prepared for
The information of the President by the judge
advocate general who had conducted the
and thus to clearly perceive
every error into which the court-martial was
led. We trust it is not necessary for us to
submit in detail the results of this COM
parison, and that it will be sufficient for us
to point out the fundamental errors, and to
say that all the essential facts in every in
stance stand out in clear and absolute
contrast to these supposed facts upon which
Gen. Porter was adjudged guilty. The
fundamental errors upon which the convic-
ton of Gen. Porter depended may be
summed up in few words. It was main
tanned, and apparently established to the
satisfaction of the court-martial, that only
about one-half of the confederate army was
on the field of Manassas on the Doth of
August, while Gen. Lee, with the other half,
was still beyond the Bull Run mountains;
that Gen. Pope's army, exclusive of Porter's
corps, was engaged in severe and equal
contest with the enemy, and only needed the |
aid of flank attack. which Porter was OK
pected to make, to insure the defeat and de- |
struction or capture of the confederate force |
in their front under Gen. Jackson that Nc |
Dowell and Port0r, with their joint forces, |
Porter's leading, had advanced toward |
Gainesville until the head of their column |
had reached point near the Warrenton |
turnpike, where they fopnd a division of con-
federate troops, seventeen regiments, which
Buford had counted as they passed through
Gainesville, marching along the road across
Porter's front and going toward the field of
battle at Groveton; that Mcdowell ordered
Porter to at once attack that column, thus
moving to join jackson on the flank and
rear of the line, if they had formed in line,
while he would take his own troops by the
Sudley springs road and throw them upon
the enemy's centre near Groveton; that
Porter, Mcdowell having then separated
from him, disobeyed that order to attack,
| allowed that division of the enemy's troops
| to pass him unmolested, and then fell back
and retreated toward Manassas Junction;
that Porter then remained in the rear all the
afternoon, listening to the sounds of battle
and cody contemplating presumed defeat
of his comrades on the center and right of
| the field; that this division of the enemy,
having passed Porter's column and formed
| on right of Jackson's line near GrovetOn, an
order was sent to Porter to attack the right
flank or rear of the enemy's line, upon which
his own line of march must bring him, but
he had willfully dsobeyed and made no at
tempt to execute that order; that in this way
was lost the opportunity to destroy Jackson's
detached force before the other wing of Gen.
Lees army could join it, and that this juno
ton having been effected during the night OF
the 29th, the defeat of Gen. Pope's army on
the 3Oth thus resulted from Gen. Porter's
neglect and disobedience.
IMPORTANT FACTS ESTABLISHED.
Now, in contrast to these fundamental er
rors the following all-important facts art
fully established: AS Porter was advancing
towards Gainesville and while yet nearly
four miles from that place, and more thar
two miles from the nearest point of tn
Warrenton turnpike, he met the right wint
of the Confederate army, twenty-five thou
! sand strong, which had arrived on the felt
that morning and was already in line of bat
tie. Not being at that moment quite full.
informed of the enemy's movements, ant
\ being then under orders from Pope to pusl
rapidly towards Gainesville, Porter wa
: pressing forward to attack the enemy in hi
, front when Mcdowell arrived on the fell
} with later information of the enemy AM
? later and very different orders from Pope
8 and assumed the command and arreste
= EPorter's advance. This later information
' left no doubt that the main body of Lee
army was already in the field and far in ad
!: vance of Pope's army in preparation fo
battle. Gen. Mcdowell promptly decide
not to attempt to go farther to the from
q but to deploy his column SO 8
to form line in connection wit
y General Pope's right wing, whic
( was then engaged with Jackson. To
k this Gen. Mcdowell separated his corps el
tirely from Gen. Porter's and thus rell,
u quished the command and all right to tt
q q command of Porter's corps. Mcdowell d
- not give Porter any order to attack nor d
~ he give him any order whatever to Cover
his action after their separation. 1t do
es not appear from the testimony that he COZ
n veyed to Gen. Porter in any way the e
ID roneous view of the military situation whit
Q, was afterward maintained before the coul
~ martial, nor that he suggested to Gen. Po
~ ter any expectation that he would make Q
ay attack. On the contrary, the testimony
Sc all the witnesses as to what was actual
at said and done, the information wlich M
y: Dowell then had respecting the enemy al
OF the movement which Mcdowell decided
ne 3s make, and did make with his own troop
Nv nv prove conclusively that there was left !,
,ot room for doubt in Porter's mind that
of duty was to stand on the defensive and no
his position until McDowell's moveme
he could be completed. It would have I'M
MS MS Gated great error of military judgment
lot have done or ordered the contrary in t
ae ne situation as then fully known
See both Mcdowell and Porter. Gen. Pope {
pears from his orders and from his tes
mony to have been at that time wholly
norant of the true situation. He had dis,
proved of the sending of Ricketts,
Thoroughfare gap to meet Longstreet on |
a. 28th, believing that the main body of LIE
army could not reach the field of Manas
NJ before the night of the 30th. Hence
sent the order to Porter, dated 4:30 P. M,
NJ. attack Jackson's right flank or rear. F
Ter. tunately that order cid not reach Pc-
:. until about sunset, too late for an attack
:. be made. Any attack which Porter CO..
: have made at any time that afternoon M
necessarily have been fruitless of any ge
;. result. Porters faithful, subordinate 8
intelligent conduct that afternoon saved
,er. union army from the defeat which wo
:: otherwise have resulted that day from
W.; enemy's more speedy concentration.
'er- only seriously critical period of that ca
paign, viz, between II A. M. and sunset