Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1879-10-25

.Thelengthy Declarations Of the Jury
Ia the BtxtR mnrder case st Newsrk,
N. J. and the hesitation which led to
the bsTefth hey woaldnes Asrss, al
though they finally succeeded IN ccer-
cling the obstinate man, is one OF many
cases which have given rise to the dis
cussion as 10 whether the principle OF
requiring unanimity to convict of
crime, is Of any value in our Jury system.
Was il Of any value, for ex-
ample, in the BLAIR case that one man
was eoercsd by long continued pressure
10 acQuiese in the verdict Of the eleven
Others with whom he disagreedp
We recognize the fact that il is next
to an impossibility to bring twelve men
together who will agree upon the sim
plest proposition. To require twelve
men TO render a verdict of guilty, is
almost equivalent to saying that no
guilty man shall be punished. We
have always eontended that the apPll-
cation Of such rule in civil cases is
great wrong. but we are not prepared to
admit that il is in criminal cases. The
man whose life or liberty is at stake
should have the benefit OF the doubt
and the difficulty involved in twelve
men agreeing that he is guilty. 1t Is no
hardship to society that he should have
twelve chances in favor Of his aequittal
10 one OF his conviction. it would be
hardship to the accused il it were other
wise.
We would go further and say that il a
Jury of twelve fail 20 agree upon a YER
diet, il should operate as an acquittal OF
the accused. II there is any virtue in
the constitutional principle that a man
shall not be placed twice in jeopardy OF
his life or liberty for the same otense,
we believe il is good enough to reach the
case of man whose life or liberty has
been so far jeopardized as to be placed,
by due course of law, in the hands OF
Jury who have said they were unable to
determine whether he is guilty or not.
Therein is the conclusive evidence OF "a
reasonable doubt" of which the law
purports 10 give him the benefit
A second jury may not reach verdict
any more than the first. II It should,
il will be- because the second twelve
have minds somewhat differently con-
stituted from the the first. Yet the first
was a lawful jury, and they were in
doubt; they failed to reach unanimous
opinion as to the guilt Of the prisoner;
who, then, is competent 10 say that the
unanimity of the second should deter
mine the fate Of the prisoner rather than
the disagreement of the first?
II is certainly very hard, to say the
least of this ruling of our Courts, to
subject man 10 pecuniary ruin by the
repeated necessity Of attempting to sat
isiy a Jury of his innocence. Ii is
question that has been extensively ar
gued on both sides, and has only the
technical point in its favor that trial is
not complete until jury has rendered
a verdict, but the question upon its
merits should have a different decision.
1--WE, the jury, are unable to agree,
ought to be regarded as verdict quite
as conclusive as I'VE, the jury, find him
guilty." or mot guilty" They have in
the first instance met the re-
quirements OF the law which are neces-
sary to convict or acquit as fully as they
have in the second where they did &C
quit or convict. There was unanimity
in the verdict that they "were unable to
agree" lust as there was in a verdict OF
conviction or acquittal. When, there
fore, one jury has said We cannot agree
that the accused is guilty of the crime |
charged, it places the prisoner properly
beyond the reach Of the penalty Of the
law. Twelve men have said that 1t Is
impossible that twelve men agree, as the
law requires, that he should be punish
Ell. and that should end it.