The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1879-04-10
TIE HOMESTEAD LAW.
An Important Decision-State of South
Carolina In the Supreme Court, Novcm-
ber Term, 1S10-D. T. Duncan vs.. Bar
rctt-Opinion by Willard, C. j.

The Circuit Court discharged a rule
against the sheriff for failure to enforce
an execution against personal property,
consisting of cotton in bales, seed cotton
and corn, the defendant claiming that
they are exempt from levy under the
provisions Of the act of March 13, 1872,
Us Stat. 229, Sec. 81 he being an "agri-
cultural laborer." 1t is stated in appel.
lant's argument that the contract upon
which the judgment was obtained bore
date prior to the passage OF the act in
question, contending that such eXemp-
ton could not be claimed as against an
antecedent contract; but that fact does
not appear in the brief, and therefore is
not available 10 the appellant. The
question to the considered is, whether
the Legislature could create new subjects
of exemption in addition to those EMU
merated in the Constitution. The pro-
visions of the Constitution relating to
the exemption of personal property from
execution are contained in Section 80,
Article 2. After providing for home
stead exemption on the land Of a debtor,
the Constitution goes no to say: ITO Sc
cure the :ull enjoyment of said home
stead exemption to the person entitled
thereto or the head of any family, the
personal property Of such person of the
following character, to wit: household
furniture, beds, bedding, family library,
arms, carts, wagons, farming implements,
tools, neat cattle, work animals, swine,
goats and sheep not to exceed in value
in the aggregate the sum Of five hundred
dollars, shall be subject to like exemp-
ton as said homestead, and there shall
be exempt in addition thereto all neces-
sary wearing apparel" The question is,
whether the subsequent attempt to add
the list of articles exempted zone third
of annual products of agricultural labor
ers," by the act Of 1873 was consistent
with the provisions of the Constitutional
enactment or tended to deny the proper
force due to same; and if the latter con-
clusion is reached, such conflicting pro-
visions must be held unconstitutional
and void.
This involves question ofintention to
be made out constructiyely on the provi-
sions of the Constitution. 1t is contend
ed that the enumeration of kinds of prop
erty intended for exemption is exclusive,
and general rules of Interpretation are
urged as leading to that conclusion. 1t
will not be necessary to resort to such
general rules, or to place the decision on
any technical rule or reasoning, as the
nature of the subject with which the
Constitution deals points very distinctly
to the solution of the question at issue.
The question of allowing legislative
exemption to debtors is in its nature fun
damental, as involving an inquiry into
the principles of government. Until
within few years it has not been re-
garded as legitimate exercise oflegisla-
tive power to place the property of the
debtor beyond the reach of his creditor,
except to an inconsiderable extent. Not
that the competency of the Legislature
to make such exemptions independently
of constitutional restrictions, was doubt
ed, but because the spirit of the laws was
supposed to oppose such exercise of leg
islative power. 1t may we'll be consid-
cred that in solving the question of the
legitimacy of such legislation, the consti-
tuition had in view limit that should be
imposed on its unrestricted exercise.
When it is treating of subjects that have
been constantly dealt with by legislative
bodies, the sanction of the courts and the
community, such an inference does not
necessarily arise.
In such cases some special ground
would have to appear, by inferring, in
the absence of an express declaration to
that effect, that the constitution, i'll pres.
cribing the mode in which power of
that class should be exercised, intended
to exclude its exercise, in any other
mode. But in the present case, where
the constitution was dealing with a prin-
ciple fundamental to the policy of our
jurisprudence, and which, by its abuse
might unsettle the very cornerstone on
which that Jurisprudence rests, it is OBJ
vious that imposing limits to such power
of exemption regard was had to the gen.
eral question, to what extent government
should go in relaxing the laws for the en-
forcement of obligations. There can be
no doubt that the object of the section in
question was to limit the Legislature. Ifthe
constitution had been silent altogether on
the subject, the Legislature would have,
doubtless, been competent as affecting fu-
ture contracts, to create such exemp-
tions, and to give them any measure OF
extent that might appear desirable.
Again, section 90 of article l confers
express powers on the Legislature to
grant home stead exemptions to reason
able extent, leaving the determination OF
what is to be regarded as reasonable to
the Legislature, so far as unfettered by
subsequent, clauses of that instrument
If that section had stood alone it would
leave in doubt as to the power of the
Legislature being unrestricted. But the
constitution was not content with estab-
fishing this as principle, and in section
80, article 2, assumes to give more ac-
curate definition of the kind oflegisation
contemplated in the Goth section of arti-
Gle 2, enumerating the subjects to which
it should extend and the limitations that
should be established as affecting these
subjects. Such definition as applied to
a kind Of legislation not sanctioned al
the time ofthe adoption ofthe constitution
but introduced by that instrument, must
be regarded as intending limitation oi
the legislative authority. True, it is moi
the case of power entirely new and moi
before capable of being exercised, given
upon conditions and subjected to limita.
tions, in which case such conditions and
limitations must be regarded as Limitations
oftlle right of exercise as well as the mode
ofexercise; but it isa case within thesa
principle as calling into exercise fnnc
ton OF general legislation that lad lain
dormant through the conviction that il
was not a legitimate exercise of legisla
tive power consistently with the princi
Piles of our jurisprudence. This view
leads us to the conclusion that the ex
emptions allowed by the constitution
cannot be extended or restricted by any
act of the Legislature. This view does
not conflict with what was said in Home
stead Building and Loan Association VS.
Enslow, Is. c. where, speaking Of the
douraa of outhnritv nOsSosSpl nv the own.