The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1879-01-09

DOlQ at Tic emu VI tWeIll. III lHeoi!
at least, the bonds of a government
should be always at par, as the credit oi
the whole State, when the property Of all
individuals is bound, should exceed the
credit of any single member. 1t is ob.
vious that when these bonds were used
as collaterals there was wide departure
from their common use. Seldom have
State bonds been used as guarantee tor
the payment of doubtful obligations,
Ought not the very use to which they
were applied have been warning that
something WIS wrong?
The credit of State is sacred thing,
should not be prostituted to every COM
mon purpose, and hawked about on
'Change like the note of huckster.
Certainly the circumstances surrounding
these bonds would have suggested Il rigid
scrutiny Of their legal origin and of the
power of the possessor to dispose Of them.
Objection is taken by the defendant that
the bonds issued under the two acts OF
18th August, 1868, could neither be sold
nor hypothecated after the expiration of
two years from the date Of said acts.
The act passed 18th of February, A. D.
1869, limits the time for loans to twelve
months, and authorizes hypothecation
for loans. The act of 26th March, 1869,
extends the time for negotiating loans
under the acts Of August 26, 1868, to two
years, and authorizes the pledging of
bonds as security. These loans are:
1872, July loan from Morton, Bliss
& Co., $4,000, collaterals S720,000; 3.
r. R. B., S423, 900. Total, 81 $4,000.
1872, May 22-Loan from L. K. Will
lard, 500, 900, collaterals S250,000; B. r..
r. B., $4,000. Total S425 900.
1872, April LOAN from Isaac Fl.
Knox, treasurer, 100000, collaterals
100000.
1871, September 21-Loan from Dry
Dock Savings Bank, $lOO, 1000, collaterals
S35O,000.
1872, April 9O-Loan from German
Uptown Savings Bank, $4,000, collat-
erals 100000.
1872, September 1O-Loan from Com
mercial Warehouse Company, S47, $40,
collaterals S126,300.
From this statement it appears that all
the loans were made after 10Th August,
A. D. 1870, more than one year after
loans were authorized to be made under
the acts.
The act of 2Gth March, 1869, declares
the financial agent is authorized to
pledge The bonds of the State which the
State now has or may hereafter have in
its possession, as collateral security for
State loans," with proviso that in all
transactions he shall conform to the pro-
visions of the acts of 26th August, 1868.
1t is to be observed that the power to
hypothecate is connected with the loans.
Hypothecation, however, was adopted as
a mode of effecting the loans. The SIM
pie question then is, within what time
do the acts authorize loan and hypoth-
ecation?
The answer is given by the acts-with-
in two years from the passage Of the acts
of 26th August, A. D., 1868, and one
year from the passage Of the act of 18th
February, 1869.
1t is needless to say that after the time
limited by the acts the Governor could
not under acts of 26th August, 1868, nor
the Governor, comptroller-general and
treasurer, under the act of 18th Febru-
airy, 1869, negotiate State bonds, nor au-
thorize the financial agent to do so.
1t may be submitted in reply to thi,
that time was not Ghe essence of the COIL
tract. The law is otherwise.
In Green VS.. Biddle, Wharton, 81, it
is said in regard to the law impairing the
obligation of contracts, that "the obliga-
ton of contract can never depend upon
the extent of the change which the law
effects in it. Any deviation from the
terms by postponing or accelerating the
period of performance which it pre-
scribes, imposing conditions not express.
ed in the contract or dispensing with the
performance of those which are, however
minute or apparently immaterial in their
effect upon the contract of the parties,
impairs its obligation"
That time may not be OF the essence of
a contract is Il principal of equity juris-
prudence. In cases like the one under
consideration, equity follows the law.
"lf, therefore," says Baron Anderson,
"the thing sold be of greater or less
value, according to the eilluxion of time,
it is manifest that time is Of the essence
of the contract; and stipulation rs to
time must then be literally complied
with in equity, as well as in law. The
cases of the sale of stocks and Of rever-
sion are instances of this" Hipwcll vs..
Knight, l Younge and Collyer, AS; 2
Story, secs. 775, 776; 9 Kent, 621, Note
E.; Batty VS.. Carswell, 9 j. r., 4S.
That time was regarded as an essential
element of the contract is shown by the
action of the Legislature extending the
time to effect the loans from one to two
years. In plain language, power of at
torney was given to certain officers of the
State to borrow money within twelve
months or two years, and when not ac-
complished in that time their power
ceased. 1t was not power which these
officers could exercise ex-of1icio. There
was q conferred power, special, from
which they derived the right to act,
which they could not modify, and from
which they could not deviate.
1t is deemed scarcely necessary to refer
to the question of notice in relation to
the contract contained in the acts. All
the bonds refer to the acts under which
they were issued in such unmistakable
language as to give full notice of their
provisions upon reference to them.
There is notice of another character
affecting the bonds-not only that they
were issued after the power had ended,
but that those dealing with them were
not bona fide holders without notice.
Governor Scott, at an early day-in his
message of November, A. d. 1S7l--states
the fierce warnings given by the press of
the State that the bonds in question
would never be paid; that they were
Bayonet bonds issued by bogus Legis.
lature; warning capitalists of New York
they would not be paid; that the whole
scheme was a job and \ swindle, and that
the bonds would never be recognized
when property-holders and honest men
had majority in the councils of the
State. A page of Language of this char
| aclpr wns inserted in lis messapa--a Dub-