National Republican., 1879-08-08
The John Morgan Raid and Capture.

there is nothing to investigate worth pur-
suing.
The John Morgan Raid and Capture.
To The Editor of The National Republican:
SIR: The several notices in The NATIONAL
REPUBLICAN OF the 10TH 10Th aud 22d of July,
relative to the battle Of Butlington Island, and
subsequent capture of John Morgan, might
pass without comment, but for commuuica-
tion in II subsequent issue, signed H. w."
which endcavors to correct your first publica-
tions and in doing so misstates the facts.
The most important error In his staten ent
is that General Shackeliord's command was
the first to strike Morgans raiders "in force,n
fighting the battle of Burlington Island ami
capturing large portion of his command and
re-capturing the gun lost by General Judah in
an ambuscade of his advance guard. The fact
is, General Shackelford's command never
reached Burlington lsland-was at no time
nearer the battle-ground than thirty five miles
away--six miles. from Gallipolis, and conse.
quently could not have participated in the
fight.
He further states, referring TO General Hob
sons command, that "unless his memory is
wrong, General Hobson left us at the crossing
of the Ohio river below Louisville" the infer
ence being that Gcperal Hobson's command
was not at Burlington Island, and that Judah,
after his first repulse was no further heard
from.
The fact is, General Judal's command was
the attacking party. Immediately after the
ambuscade and repulse of his advance guard,
with the loss of one gun the head of his main
column reached tho bluff overlooking the plain
in which Norgan's raiders were drawn up in
double line of battle. The Fourteenth Illinois
Cavalry and the Fifth Indiana Cavalry with
the remaining gun of Henshaw's battery
inn, 1iat In, Ar hatt
confronting Morgan's forces, whose first line
was commanded by Basil Duke, his best of
ticer. An immediate attack was ordered by
General Judah, resulting in forcing back Nor
gan's first line of battle in confusion upon the
second, and retaking the gun lost by the ad.
vance guard.
[Let it be here noticed that this gun was re.
taken by Judah's own troops and not by
Shackelford's las stated by l.. wy, who was
thirty-fve miles distant from the field of bat
tie.
Morgan's second line of battle was formed
upon advantageous ground, with his guns in
position to check any advance either by Ju-
dah's forces in his front, or of the gun toat
upon the river, the smoke of which warned
Morgan that further retreat in that direction
was impossible. His position was well chosen
| aud considering he great disparity in the two
forces-Judahs numbering 200 and Morgan's
estimated at 2,400-must have encouraged
Morgan aud his followers with great hopes for
| successful issue.
Judah, on the completion of the organization
of his second line battle, immediately ordered
| an advance upon the enemy. 1t was obeyed with
promptncss and determination and met with
equal firmness by the enemy promising a most
| fierce and bloody termination. At this critical
moment tine booming of heavy guns in Nor.
| gan's rear was the first notice OF the near ap-
proach of General Hobson's command, which
| had been following Morgan on another route.
| The effect, as may be supposed was instantane-
| Gus. The whole Of Morgan's forces, with the
| General at their head, made break for the
| timber in one confused mass. Guns, ambulan-
ces, or what was substituted in.every conceiva-
| BILE character of wheeled vehicle taken up upon
their raid were hurried along pell-mell, cap.
| sized, demolished. and at last abandoned.
| About 700 men and horses, with large num-
Der of guns and pistols five field pieces, and all
the camp equipage-such as it was-fell into
| Judah's hands and about the same number OF
prisoners were taken by General Hobsons
command. Anumberof Morgans officers were
brought into Judahs headquarters and turned
over to Colonel Capnen, of the Fourteenth Illi-
| nois Cavalry, then in temporary command OF
| Judah's forces, and amongst the number were
| Basil Duke, Colonel Cluke, Colonel Morgan
(brother to the Generan and several others.
General Hobson being the ranking officer,
and learning of the escape Of Morgan with a
very considerable portion of his command les,
timated at fully 1000), he took immediate steps
| to follow him up. As Morgan was heading for
any obtainable crossing OF the Ohio river be-
low, General Judah ordered Colonel Capnen,
with the Fourteenth Illinois Cavalry, ol
Judah's Division, to proceed down tho river on
an interior line by forced marches to intercept
and prevent at all and every hazard his accom-
plshing his object.
General Hobson was apprlscd of General
Shackelford's movements and position below
and aimed by this movement to eventually
drive Morgan into Shackelford's hands The
result was exactly what was anticipated
| After most furious race of over thirty five
miles, often interceptlng and capturing Nor.
gan's scouts sent out as feelers for any possible
opening for him 10 reach the Ohio river, he
was, during the night, driven right into
shack keliord's clutches who was lying in wait
for his approach. Morgan Immediately sur
rendered with, as Shackelford understood IT,
all of his followers, But alas as tho morning
broke IL disclosed the mortifying fact that Nor
gan, with some 600 of his men, true to their
instincts, were again on the wing and off for
another long chase in his struggle for freedom
General Shackelford Immediately ordered
an inspection of his forces present. calling for
one thousand men, If so many could be found
fit for duty, 10 follow up and again capture the
ubiquitous raiders. Tho inspection revealed
the fact, that so worn down and crippled were
both horses and men by their long chase after
Morgan that no moro than six hundred men
and horses were reported 6t for duty. Three
hundred of these were taken from the Four
teenth Illinois Cavalry, and the balance from
the First Kontucliy aud other of General
Shackelford's immediate command. With this
force General ShaokeltOld ut once commenced
his further chase after Morgan, Colonel Wool
ford aud Colonel Capneu being the only officers
of the field or staff to accompany him.
Five more days of desperate riding with nc
continuous rest night or day, for over two
hours; daily in contact with the enemys real
guard; skirmishing with now and then 8
sudden halt, under some false information 70.
ceived from tho Rebel sympathzers (who,
am sorry TO say, were not scarce even in the
loyal State of OhioG thrown into line of battle
under the immediate expectation OF an order
| 10 attack when nresLo | and AWAY 90 thu