The Princeton union. [volume] (Princeton, Minn.) 1876-1976, 1879-04-09
Napoleon and Moscow.

IL uau UceA pIOpQeSleO that Russia
could not successfully resist Napoleon's
attack, even WHEN much less over
whelming invasion had been contemplate
ed than had now taken place. And
those prophecies had come true. The
Russians had given up one position after
another, had been defeated in the field,
and finally had lost their capital. Only
one anticipation had remained unrealized.
Tia Russians had refused to acknowl-
edge themselves vanquish ed by signing
a treaty of peace. Their armies still
kept the field, and Landwehr had been
set on foot. So far Napoleon's success
had fallen short of his expectation, as it
had done in Spain, where he had like
wise been unable to quell the national
resistance. 1t was possibible that this
obstinacy might so far cmbarrass Ma
poleon as to oblige him to give up the
capital again, to repass Smolensk, and
continue the war in position nearer to
his own frontier. But as this frontier
was not as we are apt to imagine, the
frontier of France, but that of Prussia
and the Duchy of Warsaw, his position
with respect to the enemy would still be
one OF enormous superiority. That he
would remain at Moscow too long and
&H8gHf h. aS ar aod8 9 Rgsisn X9ss
losses, was surely not to
be imagined. A leader Of his experience
would be in no danger of such a mis-
calculation, and even leader accustomed
to strokes of audacity would, when re-
sponsible for so vast an army, be awed
into prudence. And thus the firmness of
the Russian Gear and natien might be
expected not only to prolong the wal, to give
Napoleon such check as he had received
in Spain, to compel him to adopt other
means for quelling their resistance, but
by no means to cause him any serious
disaster, much less such disaster as
might shake the whole fabric of his
power. It would carry us far into the
history OF France if we should try to ex-
plain how it could have happened that
such vast destilies should depend upon
the clearness of judgment Of a single
man, so that fit of rashness and eccen-
tricity in Napoleon should change the
face of the world and doom millions to
death. It is less intricate question how
Napoleon could be capable of making
the mistake he made at Moscow. We are
to consider that the course he took might
have been completely successful. Alex
anders tirmness might have yielded after
little delay to the clamors of his brother
and tie entreaties of his mother. Moth
ing is more characteristic of Napoleon
than his vivid conception of the character
of those with whom he had to deal. We
may imagine that In his mind it was
registered as certainty that Alexander
could not be firm. No doubt anothe.
General would not have dreamed of
stalking the existence even of an ordinary
army upon the soundness of an impression
OF this kind. But Napoleon would not
nave been what he was If he
had not over and over again risked every
thing to obtain result that could not be
gained by ordinary methods. Such a |
calculation as he now acted upon had |
succeeded with him many times before.
He ought, indeed, to have known that he
was not exempt from fsilure. His
failure and his blunder in Spain
must have cost him many moments of
secret chagrin, but the world had been so
blind to all this ill-luck and had so stead
ny persisted in regarding him as invinci-
BILE that he may we'll have come to believe
himself 80. Meanwhile, the scale of his
affairs had become so gigantic that sin
gle exception to his usual good fortune
might have infinite consequences; the
slightest alteration in his mind might be
represented by the complete transforms
ton of Europe; just as the infnitesimal
of telescope will make a
difference of million of miles in an as
Economical calculation. Thus to explain
the largest and most sudden reverse Of
fortune that the world ever saw we have
to put together three conditions each un-
precedented. First, the course of French
history from Louis XIV, through the
Revolution to Napoleon, had produced
N intense autocracy, unparalleled in the
history of civilized States; second, this
autocracy was welded by one who, by a
very peculiar course of life, had been
to hazardous strokes of policy
md strategy, such as are altogether tor
oidden to ordinary rulers; thirdly, its
affairs were on an unprecedented scale
# magnitude.-Lifo and Times Of Stein,
7. e. Seezev.