The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1879-08-14

/ HtNooNSNs AAO uCtCI lti1 tllc ODDOTLu-
nifty accorded to many others, but he
showed wonderful power as tactician
and commander. l do not think that
we had his equal for handling an army
and conducting q campaign. Gen. Lee
was great leader-wise, deep and saga
clous. His moral influence was some
thing wonderful. But he lost his poise
on certain occasions. No one who is ac-
quairted with the facts can believe that
he would have fought the battle of Get
tysburg had he not been under great ex-
citement, or that he would have ordered
the sacrifice of Pickett and his Virgin.
ians on the day after the battle. He
said to me afterwards, why didn't YOU
stop all that thing that day?' AT the
Wilderness, when our lines had been
driven in, and was getting to the field,
one of my brigades, and leading it into
said to him that if he would leave my
re- form hiS lines. His great soul rose
masterful within him when a crisis or
diaster tbre atened. This tended to dis.
turb his admiral equipoise. 1 loved Gen
eral Lee as q brother while he lived and
l revere his memory. He was O great
man, born leader, wise general.
but think Johnston was the most accom-.
plished and capable commander that we
had"
"WhO was the greatest general on the
Northern side 2"
"Grant--incomparably the greatest.
He possessed an individuality that i'm.
pressed itself upon all that he did. Nc
Clellan was skilful engineer, but never
rose above the average conclusions of his
council. Sherman never fought great
battle, and displayed no extraordinary
power. But Grant was great. He un.
derstood the terrible power of cnncen-
tration and persistency. How stubborn
ly he struck to Vicksburg and to Rich
mond. He concentrated all his strength.
trained his energies to single purpose,
and then delivered terrible sledge ham
mer blows against which strategy and
tactics and yalor could avail nothing.
He knew that majorities properly handled
must triumph in war as in politics, and
he always gathered his resources together
before striking"
"!Vhat was the n1os. desperate battle
of the war?"
"Gettysburg-as far as my observation
extended. There never was any fighting
done anywhere to surpass the battle
made by my men on the I'd of July. I
led $4,000 men into that charge. Over
one-third of this number were killed or
wounded. These veterans charged the
whole Federal army, entrencbed on q
crest, harsased on each flank until the
line was stretched, and at last l found
myself charging $4,000 entrenched men
in the face of a volcano of artillery, with
q single line of battle. My two divisions
encountered and drove back the Third
Corps, the Fifth Corps, the Sixth Corps,
the Second Corps, one division Of the
Twelfth and the Pennsylvania Reserves.
AS they broke line after line they en-
countered new ones and felt the steady
shock of fresh troops. The Federals
contend that the bulk of Lees army was
I in this charge, and put the strength OF
| the attacking column at 45 900 men, when
it was only 10000, with 1000 of these
knocked out of ranks before they had
hardly started up the slope. 1 do not
think the records of the war can show
anything to approach this work."
THE SURRENDER AT APPOMATTOX.
"Did you agree with Lee as to the ne.
cessity of the surrender ut Appomat-
| tox?"
81 did. For some time had felt that
we were fighting against hope. kept
my lips closed and fought ahead in silence
For the week preceding the surrender !
fought almost without ceasiEg. / was
covering Gen. Lees retreat, while Cor
don opened way for MIN in front. j
had Fields divisions, all that was left
The Federals pressed upon us relentlessly
and we fell back, fighting night and day
inch by inch, covering the slow retreat
of our wagon trains. Our lines were
never once broken or disordered. NY
men fought with the finest regularity and
heroism. Wherever l placed n brigade
there it would stand until I ordered il
away. was among my men constantly
so that knew little of the general situa,
tion. EARLY in the morning Gen. Lee
sent for me and at once went to him
He was in deep concern. He stated tc
me that his retreat had been cut off and
it Was impossible for him to escape from
the circle that had been drawn about
him. If that is the case, General re-
piled, you should surrender tho army
If escape is impossible, not another life
should be sacrificed Gen Lee then be-
gan to talk about the distress and trouble
that surrender would bring upon his coun,
try and his people. That cannot be puI
against the useless shedding of these
brave mems blood. If you are satisfied
that you cannot save the army, it should
be surrendered. The people will know
that you have done all that man car
do He then told me that he had dis
covered that there were heavy masses O.
infantry in front and that he could no.
hope to cut through. Il was terrible
moment for Gen. Lee. Having fought
for years with high and lofty purposes
having won victory after victory ant
made record for his army not equallet
in our history, it was hard that he mus
surrender everything. cannot tell yor
how my heart went to him." (But thu
noistcned eyes and the fine voice, growr
husky, as Gen. Lsngstreet went over thu
story, did tell me.) 81 left Gen. Lee ant
went back to my men. / ordered firing
stopped. stood quietly awaiting events
Suddenly horse came Gathering dowr
my front. looked up md saw d smar
looking officer, with yellow hair stream
ing behind him, hurrying forward t.
where stood. He was in great excite
ment, and urged his horse to where
stood. Then he wrenched him suddenly
to his launches. and said, in somewhat
violent tone: in the name of Gen. Phil
Sheridan demand the instant surrender
of this aimyP was not in humor fol
trihingjust then, but replied as calmly
as l could: 1 am not the commando
OF this army, and if were should no
surrender to you, meaning, of course
that | would treat with the proper au