The Princeton union., 1879-11-19
WASHINGTON.
IMPORTANT DECISIONS By THE y.
S. SUPREME COURT.
State Control Of Taxation Not Subject to
Federal Supervision-The Law Protecting
Trade Marks Declared Unconstitutional
miscellaneous. 4 r

Trade Marks Declared Unconstitutional
miscellaneous. 4
POSTAL. -E
WASHINGTON, Nov 17.-The loss to the gov
ernment in the amount of money received by
nostmasters throughout the country the past
two wears will be less than one-twentieth or
one per cent. "'a - 20 &tr& So
.... TRADE MARKS. ss5gsz.-s
Under the provisions of the federal trade
mark law, which the supreme court to-day pro-
nonnced unconstitutional, about 5000 trade
marks have been registered at the patent Of
fice and about 200 applications for registry are
now pending. IT, "
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.
No. 53-Cnarles W. Kirkland, plaintiff in. er-
ror, vs.. Leonard L. Hotchkiss in error to the
supreme court, error Litchfeld county, Conn.
The question presented by this case is whether
plaintiff in error, a citizen of Connecticut, can
be rightfully taxed by that State under it's laws
on certain bonds owned by him but held in the
citv of Chicago and secured by deeds of trust
on real estate located in that city. The su-
prenle court of errors of Connecticut held that
the assessment of which the plaintiff in error
complained were in conformity to State laws
and that the law didn't in
fringe any of compainant's constitutional sta ;.l
rights: This court sIstalns the , views lew 3
the locality of debt for the purposes of taxa
tion is not affected by the fact that it is
secured by mortgage upon real estate situated
in Illinois, that the debt has it's situs at the
creditors residence, and it is for the State to
determine whether it shall be taxed. The dis
cretion of States in this respect is not in the
opinion of this court subject to supervision or
control by the federal government in any of its
departments, for the reason that such taxation
violates no provision of the federal constitu-
ton. The Judgment of the supreme court of
errors of Connecticut is affirmed, with costs.
No. 705, The United States, plaintiffs, vs..
Emil Sleffens, and No. I'll, The United States.
plaintiff, vs.. Adolphe Whitman, on certificates
of division from the circuit court for the
southern district of New York, and No. 7l9, The
United States, plaintiffs. vs. w. A. johnson ct
al, in certificate of division from the circuit
court of the United States for the southern dis
trict of Ohio. These three cases are prosecutions
for violations of what are known as the trade
mark laws embodied in sections 937 to 4, ,947,
revised statutes. The question upon which the
Judges of the lower courts were divided in
opinion is, whether the acts of Congress on the
subject of trade marks are found on any right
full authority in the constitution of the United
who sought an affirmative answer to
this question, that there are
two clauses of the federal constitution
which furnish sufficient warrant for legisla-
ton in dispute. The first is the 9Th clanse of
section g. article l, which provides that Con-
gress shall have power to pass laws to promote
the progress of science and useful arts by Sc
curing for limited terms to authors and invent
ors the exclusive right to their writings and
discoveries. With regard to this point the
court holds that the ordinary trade mark has
no necessary relation to invention or
diss0vssy dntay"h Of is con,Ssa1ey gSSnsI1y ne,6 the
often the result of accident rather than of de-
sign. The attempt to classify trade mark
with the writings of authors is open to OBJ
jections equally strong. The latter involves
an element of originality, as do also inven-
tions, while the trade mark is generally nothing
more than an adoption of something already in
existence as distinctive symbol of the person
using it. 1t does not depend on novelty, in
of the brain, but is founded on priority of ap-
propriation. The court is therefore of the
opinion that while such legislation as that. in
question may be q judicious aid to the COM
mon law on the subject of trade marks and
may be within the competency of the legisla-
ture, whose general powers embrace that class
of subjects, it is not authorized by constitu-
tional provisions concerning authors and in
ventors and their writings and discoveries.
The other clause of the constitution relied on
to support this legislation is the third of the
same section, which provides that Congress
shall have power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations and among the several 6tates
and with the Indian tribes. The argument is
that trade marks are used to identify particu-
lar class or quality of goods, and that as so
used it is a valuable aid or instrument of COM
merce, and comes within the scope of the
constitutional provision cited. With regard to
fhio mint "a coyrt hn1invoo.
Erst-That the clause quoted does not bring
within control of Congress every species of
property which is subject of commerce or
which is used in commerce. Wallace W. Louis
lana, How, 70; Paul VS.. Virginia, 8 Wall, 168,
and that the legislation now in question does
not limit the use of trade marks to Interstate
OK international commerce, as it should do.
If it he based on the constitutional
provision now quoted in its support it refers
to all trade and to commerce between all points.
It is obviously the exercise of power not con-
ferred upon Congress. That this is the purpose
Of this legislation seems in the opinion Of the
court, to be evident. It co,itemplates the
establishment of an universal system of trade
registration for the benefit of all who have
already used trade mark, or
wish to adopt one in the future, without re-
gard to the character of the trade to which it
is to be applied, or to the locality of the owner.
Such legislation is in the opinion of this court
in excess of Congressional power. It has been
urged that If Congress have power to regulate
trade marks used in commerce with other ma
tions and among the several States, its legisla-
tion so far as 1T relates to that class of
cases should be held I'D valid,
but to this the court . holds
there are two objections, first that there is
nothing to show that trade marks in the three
causes now under consideration were used in
that kind of commerce, and second that it is
not within judicial province to give the words
used by Congress q narrower meaning than
they aye manifestly intended to be. To o so
would be virtually to make law
which would be only partial in
its operation and Il which would
complicate rights which the parties would hold
in the same instance under act of Congress and
in others under State law. The court wishes,
however, to be understood as leaving the
whole question of the treaty making power of
the general government over trade marks, and
the duty of Congress to pass any laws necces-
sary to carry such treaties into effect, untouch-
ed. The question in each of these cases, viz.
whether these statements can be upheld in
whole or in part, as valid and constitutional,
must be answered in the negative and it will
be so certified to the circuit courts. 81.
No. 2, Nixon NJ. Crane, executor, etc., ct al,
appellants, vs.. Kansas Pacific Railway com
pany, appeal from the circuit court of the United
States for the district of Kansas. This was
suit in equity brought by the children
and heirs of Samuel Hallett to enforce q con-