New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1879-07-21
EILLLNG No MTRDER.


matter of form. 1t does not import any de-
liberate judicial doubt of the correctness OF
the trial. 1t means nothing, one way or che
other, as to the prisoners ultimate doom.
Having been tried in the General Sessions he
had a right to be heard in the Supreme
Court upon any questions of law; and the
Judges have now simply opened the door to that
court In so far as the questions to be argued
relate to the proper organization OF the jury,
decision Of the Supreme Court in the prs
oner's favor would only give him new trial
before properly convened jury, with little
reason to expect q different result; for the
case does not depend upon evidence which 1t
might be difficult to preserve. The proof as
to the possession of the jewelry, the confession
and the like, though they will not grow
stronger, need not weaken.
One question only was suggested on the
trial which can in any manner involve the
merits of the case It is that relating to the
degree of murder chargeable. The prisoners
counsel commended that Cox never, at any in
slant, intended to kill Mrs. Hull, but only to
confne her while he should obtain the jew
els and escape. This, he argued, could
Lot be murder in the first degree, which
requires a deliberate purpose to kill. But
the Judge ruled that under the wording
of the statute defining the degrees, the first
degree Is shown either when there is proof OF
a deliberate purpose, or, equally, when the
killing, though unintentiOnal, is done in the
course of committing another felony. The
decision of this question in the prisoners
favor would send HIM back to a second trial
with opportunity for a verdict of the second
degree instead of the first, and a sentence TO
Imprisonment fo life instead of hanging.
This division oil murder into two degrees is
a modern plan to relieve juries. somewhat, of
the responsibility of INJECTING the death pen
atty. So long as all cases of murder were
punishable with death, 1T grew yearly more
difficult, under the constant fire of arguments
against capital punishment, for juries TO say
Guilty. even upon clear proof, If there
were extenuating circumstances. The max
ing of two grades of the offence enables the
Jury TO send one class of offenders to the State
Prison for life, while others may be condemned
to death as Of old. Twelve or fifteen of the
States at least, have adopted this principle.
In New-Yoik it has been established since
1860, though the present statutory definition
dates chiefly from 1862. The manner in
which the line Of division is stated varies in
the different statutes; hence the same action
NAV be murder in the first degree in NewYO
which is murder in the second degree just over
the line in Connecticut; the reason being
slight verbal differences in the law. But the
general intention is to COniinc the death pen
atty to the cas"s involving extreme depravity.
Proof that there was an actual, deliberate,
Iong-considered purpose to kill the victim Is
accepted by all these statutes as showing
depravity deserving of death, and there
fore characterizing the first degree On
the same principle modes of killing which
evince deiberaiOn are classed in the first
degree. If lying-in-wait is shown, if slow
poisoning, starvation or torture were empOyed,
there is no need to inquire whether there was
generalization accordingly these forms OF the
crime are specified, in many of the statutes,
rs falling always within the first degree
Then, again. and this is the matter pertinent
to COx's case, in our statute and some Others,
if the killing is perpetrated by person in the
commission of another felony, it is classed in
the first degree.
Whether this means any killing, inadyertent
AS well as intentional, or whether il embraces
only cases where person entering upon another
felony, finds himself involved III IN emergency
in which he suddenly resolves upon homicide
"a the only means of success or Of escape, is
the question: 1t has been differently decided,
under various statutes, according TO their
variations of language. Ia HanloD's case,
in PENNSYLVANIA, where little girl died
AS the result of atrOciOus and bar
barous violence, inflicted however, with
10 particular intent TO Kill her, and in
entire indifference whether she lived or died,
the Judge ruled that murder in the irst de-
gree was shOwn-a specific purpose to cause
death was not needed if another felony was
in progress In Indiana there has been n
trial where the accused gave n potion TO
woman with no purpose of doing her harm,
but merely TO produce excitement. 1t was,
however, an overdose or more hurtful than
WAS supposed, and she died. The Court said
there could be no conviction of murder in the
first degree, because, though there was poi
soping, there was no intention TO cause death.
The reason for the opposite decision of the
two cases is not so much in any difference Of
moral principle between them as in the fact
that the statute laws applicable were differ
emily expressed. The judges have no official
duty in these cases except to ascertain the
meaning of tho law as found written in the
books. and apply it to the case. The general
public is concerned with the higher
question, What ought the law to be I