The New York herald., 1879-10-24

If the plan that the kilograms from Lon
don say is now favored by the British Cab
met Tor the settlement of Afghanistan
shall be put into execution how will the
difference between that and the annexation
of the country be more than nominal? And
is it in fact not an economical equivalent to
annexation? Are the dominions OF the
Nizam of Hyderabad not virtually part
of Englands Indian Empire, notwithstand-
ing the thin fiction that he possesses the at
tributes of sovereignty? And If the Afghans
are organized" into the same Empire on
similar plan will they become less part OF
it because this settlement is ostentatiously
adopted as one that falls short OF formal
annexation?
Afghauistan, if this system is adopted, Is
to be bound by treaty which shall make
an English Resident at Cabul the actual
governor of the country. though q native
machinery of government may exist on the
sole condition that it shall never assert it
self contrary to the will of the Resident
There may be sovereign prince, and the
throne may be hereditary in his family.
England shall collect the taxes aud pay the
sovereign salary. There shall be an
army of native troops with British officers,
or with officers from Indian regiments but
there shall always be in the country another
army than that of this sovereign on wires.
But Afghanistan is to be sbound" by
treaty thus framed. and that treaty is to be
made-with whom? With some renegade
prince of the Atghans who will be chosen
simply for his readiness to sign such o
treaty. From the Ameer's family or from
some affiliated family England's agents will
select creature to be set up as the repre-
sentative of Afghan sovereignty, in order
that he may thus "bind" the country; and
he will not be selected because of his dig
nifty or because of such status as may
force the moral assent of the country to his
representative character, but because of his
readiness to form ring with England.
England will. therefore, make this treaty
with confederate in her interest, prac-
tically with herself, and will consider the
Afghans bound by it, and yet will not re-
gard that as the annexation of the country.
Russia may not regard with satisfied
spirit these adroit devices of British poll
tics to give annexation another name and
pretend that it is thereby not reached by
the objections raised against it. The
christening of beefsteaks and calling them
mackerel, in order that good Indians may
eat them on Friday, is an ancient device,
honored, perhaps, in all countries of new
converts but we doubt if the diplomatists
Of England's sharp sighted rival in
these concerns will regard that idea as
one that may be fairly applied against them
in practical politics In the negotiations
with Lord Dufferin the objections Of Rus
sia to England's permanent annexation Of
Afghanistan" were distinctly made known,
and were presented in such form as to
imply that this was the limit to which in
no case England's relations could go with
| out the opposition of Russia England
might destroy Cabul or otherwise punish
the Afghans to take proper and exem-
pary satisfaction for the revolt; but to
annex Afghanistan would be to transcend
the limits Of her relations with that people,
and to touch the territorial relations Of that
country with Russian interests.
The British Cabinet seems to have ac-
cepted this point presented by Russia as a
practical one on which further action in
that country should turn-seems to have
| to annexation, and then to have proposed
to circumvent the difficulty by calling
things new names The first point laid
down in the English plan is 'that Afghan
istan shall not be annexed" That is
Russias demand now, as it was at the time
of the march into the country last year,
and with that point the present English
| plan starts. And the development
of that plan seems to indicate very
clearly that this primary ground Of
consideration is not taken from any
of those reasons of Indian policy which
might deter England from annexing the
country if she were entirely free from for
egn pressure. Those reasons principally
relate to the financial difficulties of such q
course; but all the financial difficulties of
annexation are involved in this permanent
military occupation and civil administra-
ton. The maintenance of an effective force
OF from twelve to twenty thousand men,
the policing of the country, the construc-
tion of railways and telegraph lines-these
are the facts that would impose an enor-
nous burden on Indian finances, with
little hope of return tor great while from
Afghan contributions. Yet all these bur-
dens are undertaken in the settlement as
now proposed, and are necessary part of
it. 1t is to be inferred, therefore, that
| England has determined on her new plan,
not for reasons of her own policy, but out
Of respect for Russia's demand.
Russia, however, is not very likely to be
satisfied with this absorption of the dis
puted territory merely because the process
is classed by name contrived to meet her