The New York herald., 1879-03-19
THE ZULU VICTORY
Story of the Crushing British De-
feat at Isandula
WHOSE FAILURE is THIS?
Graphic Narrative Of an Eye
Witness.
DEAD AMID THE DARKNESS

Tne letters or all the correspondents Win the
British troops in zululand unanimous in charg-
ing gross mismanagement upon Lord Chelmsford.
The sentiment of this country is that the "noble"
commander should be at once recalled. but there is
every reason to believe that no commands influence
enough with the War Department to keep him in his
place despite public opinion. The most unsatisfac-
tory feature about the disaster, viewed at this dis
lance, is the hippant "oical account of the battle
which Lord Chelmsford has sent home and which is
now made public. Truth. after stigmatizing it as
the most wretched military document con-
cocted by Commander-in-Chief to screen himself
from blame. says
Worse than this, Lord Chelmsford's despatch is.
regards the great point OF the melancholy dis
aster to brave Twenty y-fourh quite insulting in
the fippant tone OF his reference to the British in
fantry, OF which he has the face to speak in such
terms Us these:-.As regards the proceedings cpro-
ceedings. indeedv of the six companies OF British
infantry two guns and two rocket tubes the garri-
of the camp. can obtain but little informa-
tion." How dare he say this when it is only
too well known what they did and how they
died? This astute Lord General next goes on
in the same off-hand style to say:--"One COM
pany went off to the extreme left and has never
stand, engaged the enemy about mile to the left
front OF the camp" He understands! Why, everys
body else Anows too well and the British public ut
any rate will never forget their brave soldiers who
fought as long they had bullet bayonct left.
But this precious Commander-in Chief has the mean-
to say what any fellow soldier would shrink
from uttering of brave men $50 long they kept
their faces to the enemy the Zulus were. am told M
quite unable to drive them back" He has not word
to say Of the ammunition being exhausted He talks Of
the court OF inquiry, but why this delay in getting
the result of that when it would appear that there is
more to tell except the answer to the question,
why Lorc Chelmsford went off to reconnoitre that
imaginary stronghold OF Matyana, leaving his camp
1T the mercy Of the Zulu army?
TWO FATAL BLUNDERs.
The name Of Isandula has been on everybody's lips
for the past week. The name is derived from q
ofh 11s fho in fha
battle occurred. known as the Isandula Mountains.
The extreme southwestern peak OF this range known
as Isandhiwana, the point from which the right
wing of the Zulus outhanked the British troops and
cut the line Of retreat On the night preceding the
disaster the camp was pitched in the following
order:-Beginning with the extreme left we had the
2-3d regiment, N.NC; 13d NN.C.; 2-24th. 1-24th Vol
unteer Mounted Infantry and the Natal Mounted Po-
lice the right The wagons all placed between
the camp and the hill at the back and behind them
Immediately against its base the headquarters tents
were pitched. with their wagons beside them. "I
may here mention" says the correspondent, whose
personal narrative has been mostly followed in this
letter. that at previous camping ground in the
Bashee Valley, although reports came in to us that
large force of Zulus approaching. yet. our
mounted patrols did not corroborate this statement
no defences or >intrenchments Of any kind put
up around 1t until the evening previous to
our departure. when for some cause or another
small stone wall built along two sides Of tho
camp. one facing road we were going and the
other the country between and the Buffalo. This
was al that was done ut the camp; and notwith-
standing the clear and distinct orders evcn and pub
lished in an official book called .Regulations for
Field Forces In South Africa. not single step was
taken in another way to defend new position in
of night day attack from the enemy. either
by forming the wagons into lager by erecting
shelter trench round 1t. is to this of jud-
nient cannot help attributing the awful result"
The two great blunders therefore. first. in the
site chosen for the camp. and, second, the neglect to
properly fortify it. bad ms 1t was For these fatal
oversghts. to say nothing OF his departure from the
face of the enemy Lord Chelmsford was solely re-
sponsible.
THE ATTACK.
AZ II Ii were not enough that the camp should be
defenceless in itself, Lord Chelmsford decided to
withdraw the mounted infsntry and part Of the
Natal contingent to continue his reconnoissa
the enemy country. His departure weakened the
strength of the camp by about 100 men. Very
after the departure of the commander bodies of the
enemy reported the British left, and about
six A. IL. a company of the Natal Native contingent
was ordered to scout in that direction. At nine A.
III. one OF their officers returned and reported that
the Zulus were in immense force and advancing,
driving the pickets and scouts before them Shortly
before this Colonel Durnford. X. E. with $50 mounted
natives. $50 native infantry and rocket battery
der Colonel RUSSELL r. A.. had arrived from Rorke's
Drift making up tho number In camp to about
hundred whites and some eight hundred natives. In
round numbers these consisted of five companies of
the First battalion. Twenty-fourth regiment. 335
mem ono company OF the Second battalion Twenty
fourth regiment. some ~ strong 30 OF the
mounted infantry, 80 artilerymen belonging to the
Fifth brigade, battery: 30 Natal Csrpineers 30
Natal Mounted Police. 10 Buffalo Border Guard
and Newcastle Mounted Rifes 70 of the Rocket
battery or . total of GAO men. exclusive of the
numerous soldier servants and white men engaged
In civil capacities who brought them up to 700 men
ut tho very least. There returns of the
Durnfords men,. 500 strong. there were three
companies OF the Native Contingent and large num-
Der OF civilians so that 800 as total is decidedly be
low the mark As soon as II understood that the
Zulus were advancing in force all the men of the
First battalion. Twenty fourth regiment. who had
Durnford's men were divided into three bodies one
being sent up the hill to the left one to the left
'front.' and one In tbs direction of Rorko's
Drift to act as escort for their baggage train,
not yet arrived. Those sent out to the LETT
became engaged almost Immediately, and Airing. was
soon heard all along the crest of the hill. At this
period Of the day all the troops drawn up along
side Of the guns, some little way out OF the camp,
che hill. At about ten A. M. Colonel Durnford's
mounted men reappcared the crest of the hill,
ovsr e rs ike nees arg az
the First battalion Twenty regiment. believed
to have been Captain Mostyn's. was now ordered to
advance the eastern neck of the Isandula hill.
where IL joined tho ridge where the Zulus were,
about mile and half from camp. and which at
pncc into action with the right wing OF the
enemy. which advancing along the north side of
she Isaldula. preparatory to oufanking the camp
the right The mounted natives who had been forced
20 retire also supported this company.
HEADING OFF DURNfoRD.
The Zulu left being rapidly pushed forward,
driving some of Colonel Durnfords men before IL,
In spite OF the heavy artillery fire which was opened
on itaDd on the more slowly advancing centre. Any
ono who wishes to understand tho tactics employed
BY tho zulus this occasion need only to look at
the diagram illustrating their usual tactics in tho
pamphlet published she. by command of the Lieutenant
wings or horns. as there shown, their main
body meanwhile lcisurely advancing until they
saw the wings had nearly completed tho
circle and then the end came. II not
yet however. On seeing tho Zulus menacing
the camp, some onc--thc officer commanding pre-
sume-ordered the troops to take up the following
ground On the left of the Native Contingent camp,
and facing the hill which the Zulus were pour
Ing was - force consisting Of two or three compa-
mics of the cnty-fourth. with the Native Contin
gent on their right front Immediately to the right
OF the native tents the guns, separated 1t would
appear, by three or four hundred yards from
left. and by at least IN equal distance from
right which OCcuuiod fhc extro,no ri,,ht ~