Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1879-08-01
Breaches of Promise.

WlluOut my VI Tie WOuCou SOlaCoS OF
solid cash. This, it seems to us, would
he progress backward. The end to
which the perfected reign of enlightened
law continuously aims is to make con-
tracts more sacred and binding, rather
than to weaken their sanction. The dis.
ciples Of the new dispensation demand
that betrOthal and matrimonial bonds
shall be regarded as mere civil contracts,
to be undone as they are done by the
parties themselves. But granting this
radical demand, we should still have
valid ground for objecting to the repeal
of these laws, inasmuch as it would
manifestly give to one party alone the
power to break the compact without
consent of the other. it requires no
great stretch of imagination to zee that
this would be placing the lambs in the
jaws OF the wolves; would he Of the
nature OF an abdication by the state Of
its prerogativo as arbiter of justice be-
tween man and man, and by 81 much a
return toward barbarIsm and the domi-
nation OF strongest arm and most crafty
wit.
One OF the arguments which is used
in favor OF this repeal is that the law is
powerless to beget love or to preserve
1t, and that it is, therefore, inIquitous
to insist upon the performance of a
promise IN which the existence of love
is implied. But this is based on an ell
tire mlsconception of the purpose OF the
law. The law has never made any at
tempt to create or foster sentimental
affection. Its more modest ambition
has been directed to the punishment of
a substantial and obvious wrong, which
is none the less tangible and real he
Gauge it is complicated by the associa-
tioH of tender feeling. 1t may be true
| that man who is anxious to draw back
frotn his engagement is not likely to be
q desirable husband, but that is no
reason why he should escape the conse-
quences of his conduct. BY the breach
of his promise he intlicts, in many cases,
the gravest injury upon woman's
future; and, although it may be i'm
possible to measure that injury by
money, it is still within the power of a
jury to afford measure OF his disgrace.
Nor are damages which O jury may
award any more remote than in other
actions in which character and reputa-
ton are concerned. There are cases in
which an action for breach of promise
of marriage may be the only means
available to woman to vindIcate her
fame. So long as no penalty attaches
to his withdrawal from solemn engage
ment, q man is at liberty to insinuate
his own explanation of the circumstance,
and this may often act as sort of
grievous injustice to the unfortunate
creature whom he has wronged. With
out going so far as to bring himself
within the law of SANDER, it is easy for
him in such cases to create strong
prejudice in his favor; and it is most
wholesome, to our thinking, that such
tenn station should be subject to the
chez. which an action for breach OF
prom Use affords. Ii that action is to be
abolished, every sentimental young
scat ~ will be encouraged to indalge
himself in an engagement without any
thought of carrying it to serious con
clusion, and every scoundrel, under the
guise OF sentimentalism, will be free to
employ promise of marriage as an
easy means of securing his own ends.
AS further reason why these laws
should be discontinued, it is alleged
that they are resorted to by common
class of people, and that they are rarely
called into use by persons in the higher
and more cultivated circles of society.
There may be some truth in this; but its
truth is rather an argument for the
maintenance of the law as it stands.
The action is used by those who most
need its use, and to whom the pecuniary
compensation which it offers is most ap.
propriate. Long engagements are often
u necessity With young men and women
who have yet to win the means that will
enable them to marry, and it is in the
breach of these engagements that the
cruelest injury is inflicted. 10 the
woman who is abandoned after years of
waiting, such a withdrawal from the
contract means often the complete ruin
of her future prospects, even where 1t
does not, as is often the case, imply the
ruin of her character.
1t is urged against this law, that it
cannot be justly administered under our
present system of jury trials. 1T is
almost impossible" say the advocates
of repeal, "that a man should obtain
justice in an action for breach of
promise. The facts cannot be brought
fairly before Jury. If he attempts to
suggest that tie woman is anything but
an angel in temper, a very embodiment
of all the female virtues, SO that there
would be some reason to justify man
in not marrying her, the mere sugges-
ton is enough to bring down upon him
a whole torrent Of invective from judge,
counsel and jury" This is indeed O
pitiable state of things. That lament
of "man's inhumanity to man." in
which Burns INDUCED, obviously needs
correction. Kepceforth it is woman's
inhumanity to man that must be
reckoned as the crying evil of the world:
But, seriously, this is reason, not for
abolishing the law, but for modifying
the conditions of its administration.
How far the institution of trial by jury
may have failed in regard to this par
ticular action, We are not prepared to
say. Doubtless jurymen occasionally
make astounding blunders, both of
reason and sentiment, but this is not, to
our thinking, O sufficient cause for
abandoning our laws in despair. If
the errors Of juries are to be made the