Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1879-10-02
THE LEGAL COMBAT.
Commercial Interests YER
sus Board of Health Or
der No. Six.
The Argument Before Chancellor
Livingston Yesterday-The Peo-
pie Of Brownsville in a
Ferment.
Points Of Moment in the Debate---The
Mind of tho Judge Unsettled,
Etc., Etc.

before Chancellor Livingston at
Brownsville was for an order to enjoin
N. W. Speers, jr., from proceeding
under his injunction granted by
Special Judge j. S. Galloway in the
Circuit Court Of this city, AMI from
taking any steps whatever toward
obtaining cotton from the country or
from acting under said injunction and
also e%njoining J. S. Galloway from
acting as special judge of the Circuit
Court. In other words it was a mo-
ton having for its object the enforce
ment of the State board of health
regulation No. 6 and all its other reg
ulations, being in effect a suit brought
against another suit. One injunction
seeking to enjoin another injunction
and all the effects growing out of the
same.
The scope of the bill is wide, and
covers everything relative to the pur-
chase and dealing in cotton in the
city of Memphis, one of the objects
being to prevent Speers from buying
or dealing in cotton during the tenure
Of the board of.health regulations. 1t
aims to make Mr. Speers guilty of a
violation of the laws should he even
attempt to buy, handle or receive cot
ton at any time until the quarantine is
raised. 1t was said in argument by
Judge Wright hat he wanted such an
order as Mr.. Speers could be arrested
for contempt of court in case
that he advised the bringing Of cotton
into Memphis, or purchased it if
brought here without his agency. He
argued that the powers of the
board of health we're supreme
within the State, both for police
and commercial purposes, and that if,
in their judgment, anything was
necessary to be done, they might do
it, provided it was not repugnant to
the constitution of the United States
and the constitution of the State of
Tennessee, neither of which he
claimed interfered in any way with
the exercise of such power. He
maintained that the State board, if
they thought proper, could cut off all
commerce or intercourse between
Memphis and the country, that they
could burn houses without giving
compensation to the owners, or de-
stroy whatever other property, goods
or effects might be owned by citizens
if they believed it to be necessary to
abate such a nuisance as yellow fever.
He further insisted that as congress
had passed no law interfering with the
power of a State to regulate all such
matters that therefore the power
of the State were supreme also.
This is a remarkable posi-
ton, and, if tenable, places the
State board of health above all law
and gives it more power than any
Russian emperor ever exercised-a
most alarming power indeed. The
opposing counsel, Judge w. S. Flip
pin, combatted these views, insisting
that the board of health had exceeded
the powers conferred by the legislative
act of 1879. He contended that that
power related solely to disinfection
and that the State board could not do
what the power that created it failed
TO do; but if the board had the power
under the act of the legislature then
such act was unconstitutional, null
and void, because it abridged the
privileges and immunities of the citi-
zens of Tennessee and especially those
Of Shelby county, placing them on a
lower footing than the citizens Of
other States. 1t interfered also by
indirect means with the commerce of
the port of Memphis, which is largely
interstate and foreign, thus doing
what congress itself could not do di-
rectly, Notwithstanding that body had
exclusive power over the regulation of
commerce among the States. The
question of the legality of the cleo
ton of Special Judge Galloway was
also argued by the counsel on both
sides. The chancellor made no de-
cision but reserved the same until to-
day or tomorrow for consideration.
He intimated that the election Of
Mr.. Galloway as special judge was
perhaps legal enough, but expressed
himself rather against Judge
Galloway's power to issue a fat
because it was an extraordinary pro-
cess, properly granted by a chancellor,
but by statute conferred upon the
judges of all the other courts in the
State. 1t was a technical point as to
whether a special judge had in that
respect the same powers as the regular
circuit judge, notwithstanding section
1880 of the code in a subsection says
that said special judge shall have all
the powers, and be subject to all the
responsibilities Of the regular judge.
This is the barest technicality. 1t s