The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1879-10-04


and occupation of their country with less
than sixty seventy thousand men, whie
the whole force employed and scattered over the
enormous region never numbered fourteen housand
men, and nearly one-third of this force has been
confined to the line of the Rio Grande to protect the
Mexican frontier. The consequence that every
engagement a forlorn hope and was attended
with loss OF life unparalleled IN warfare NO quar-
ter given by the savages. and the officers ana
men had to enter their duties with the most bar
barous crueities staring them In the lace III case
defeat.
1t extended to the settler who was himself killed or
came home to his wife and children murdered
and his stock stolen Such. in truth. has been the
contest on our Western frontier during the last ten
years. 1t would have been less expensive II an army
of sixty or seventy thousand men had been main
tanned, and, moreover the blood of gallant OH
GERS. soldiers and citizens would not have rested on
our hands. This. then. the first cause OF our
Indian They would have occurred no matter
what course policy the government might have
adopted. We could not deprive these primitive
people of their homes where they had lived in bar
barous contentment for centuries without war And
the only thing strange about these wars was the
manner and means adopted by tho government to
meet them.
THE SECOND CAUSE OF OUTBREAKS
The second outbreak OF Indian hostilites is caused
in this way After he has lost his country and
finds himself compelled to remain reservations.
his limits circumscribed his opportunities OF hunt
ing abridged, his game disappearing, sickness in his
lodge from change OF life anu food, and insuhciency
OF the latter and this irreaularly supplied the
teetion coming to him OF what he and what he
now Is, whle pinched by hunger, creates
feeling Of dissatisfaction which in tho absence of
good strong force of soldiers starts him the
warpath again and unarned people are killed set
Elements are broken up. farms abandoned aud
general confusion exists. To prevent meet
the calamity which may occur we are entirely un-
prepared. for without exposing other important
points collect together but few hundred
men. For instance 1T Fort Sill and vicinity meet
the kiowas, Comanches, Apaches and others located
in the Indian Territory. numbering three four
thousand we have not more than three hundred
effective men. At Fort Reno to guard the Cheyennes
and Arapahoes numbering five or six thousand. we
have not exceeding two hundred effective men. At
Red Cloud Agency. where there are at least six
thousand Indians. we have only two companies and
could not in ten days collect five six hum
dred men. At spotted Tails we have only two
panies. numbering 119 men, and 1t would take two
weeks to collect all the troops could musterand
they would not number more than i've or six hun
dred effective meanwhile the Indians mum.
Der not less than seven thousand. And
at points where there Indians
and agencies and at other strategical points. The
occur. as fear they WILL the consequences would be
appalling.
ENOUGH TROOPS
And desire to warn the General OF the Army that
have not half the troops required to meet these
anticipated troubles. Now that the game
their regular supply of food is gone we
shall require a greater supply of ratons
needs OF these people, together with strong
and stable government, backed up by
sufficient number of soldiers to enforce a spirit of
obedience and to keep these restless savages within
the limits of their reservations
MEASURES OF RELIEF.
lief that in accordance with ideas Of progress
the first war with Indians is inevitable and cannot
be prevented, but that second within our
control and we are responsible for them. and that
the responsibility rests us, first from inj judi
cious treatmensand second from want of sufficient
force to control and render the Indians submissive
to authority and have no hesitation in saying
that after the first troubles. which arise from
taking away from the Indian this country, which he
believes to be his birthrght kind treatment, ad-
ministered with steadiress and justice would re-
lieve our Western frontier of ali its appalling hor
rOraa .iain r. ks hel
with treatment of this kind the Indian can be
deemed and made selfsupporting and in an incredi-
opinions usually entertained by the general public.
and my opinions are sustained by kno Wedge
qured from an intimate association with the SUBJ
ject in all its phases tor the last years.
REPORT GENERAL POPE.
Following the report of General Sheridan comes
the report of General Pope, commanding the Depart
ment of the Missouri. in which the Ute
is located By mistake the request OF the Interior
Department for troops to be sent to the White River
agency sent by Assistant Adjutant General
whipple at Chicago to General Pope. when it should
have been sent to General Crook, commanding the
Department Of the Platte. The agency pa1ng in the
very northwestern part Of General Pope's depart
ment it has been found necessary. on the ground OF
economy. to draw troops from the Depart
ment OF tho Platte when required for an
emergency. When the order to send forward troops
eral Crook. and at the same time wrote to the War
Department that he was than ever convinced
Of the wisdom of his recommendations last year for
o further consolidation of the Ute agencies and
that he should renew them in his forthcoming
report. He says the subject Of the consolidation
of the Ute agencies:-
The Utes are established at several agencies in
Southwestern Colorado, far distant from and very
difficult of comm unication with each other 1t is,
therefore, extremely difficult to keep the emlgrants
protected against these Indians. 1t has long been
my belief, have urged il upon the authorities
that every interest. both Of the Indian Bureau and
War Department. would be promoted by console
se
i BE locality. Il such locality could '''i be
side of the routes of travel into Colo
RADIO, to which section heavy emigration has been
brace a section suitable for Indian occupation but
presenting attractions to miners prospectors
for gold and the Indians could be transferred it
and Kept there by the use OF mixed persuasion and
force, satisfactory settlement of difficulties with
the Utes would be accomplished.
PARTY ''sAFE AND SOUND"
WASHINGTON. Oct. 8. 1879.
Third Assistant Postmaster General Hazen received
a telegram this morning from the Postmaster at
Chey enne stating that General Tyner and party are
al SAFE. tuat tlcy Wcre aoOut Iulics from INC
of the Indian battle. This afternoon the fol-
lowing telegram was received at the Post Office De-
pariment-
LARAMIE CRY. Wy. T.. Oct. 3, 1879.
Postmaster General KEY, Washington
We are here safe aud sound: have seen no Indians
nor had any trouble. Will be home next week.
JAMES N. TYNER,
Assistant Postmaster General.
GENERAL TYNER AT LARAMIE CITY.
CHEYENNE, Wy T.. Oct. s. 1879.
Assistant Postmaster General Tyner aud party
rived at Laramie City this morning.
THE SCENE OF THE FIGHT ON MILK CREEK
THE ROAD FROM RAwLrNs TO THE AGENCY
POSITION OF THE WHITE RIVER UTEs LAST
YEAR--A COUNCIL, WHERE THEY SAID,
''PEACE, BUT NO SOLDIERS"
In September Of last year commission. author
lied by Congress to proceed to the Ute Nation for
the of procuring tho cession the govern