The People's vindicator. [volume] (Natchitoches, La.) 1874-1883, 1879-01-04
GEN. BCRNSiDE'S BALAkKAVA.
The blunder that made Eredricks
burg ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS into
the gates Of Death-The PotO-
tomac army let into a
Slaughter.pen-Th The Fa.
nous storminy of Ma.
rye'> Heights.
New York Star

New York Star.
On the removal Of Mcclellan in No.
vemlcr 1862. one of his corps com
mandcrs. General Burnside, was
placed in command of the army Of the
Potomac, then near the little town Of
Warrcnton, and occupying the same
ground from which General Pope had
been driven two months previously.
General Mcclellan remained over
three days for the purpose Of initia.
ting the new General in Chief in the
pending plans and operations, after
which no babe farewell to the army
in a formal address. His departure
was greatly regretted by the soldiers,
who had learned through the most
trying ordeal t" put implicit conf
dence in his military management,
aud they could not refrain FROM mis-.
trusting the inexperienco Of his sue.
cessor, especially in view Of the dis
astrous episode furnished in Popc's
jumping career. General Burnside
had listened, apparently with ap.
prevail, to the plan to advance CD
Richmond along the Gordonville, Rail.
road route, but being extremely am
bitious to raise noise in tho world,
he himself had from the first planned
an attack, and he manifested the
greatest eagerness, to execute it re.
gar'lle>s even Of Halleck's influential
suggestions from Washington. His
plan was to concentrate the army in
the immediate ncighborlIoM of War
renton, to make a small movement
across the Rappal,annock as a feint,
with view t0 divert the attention Of
the Confederates, and lead them to
believe that no was going to move in
tho direction Of Gor,lonsville, and
then make u rapid movement of tho
whole army to Fredericksburg, on the
north side Of the river, in order, as he
contemplated, 20 surprise Lee aud
gain a footl'old at a point nearer
Richmond than he would be with his
forces even if he should take Gordons.
vile. At the same time Washington
would be we'll covered to the salts
faction Of the military impresario in
that city, and moreover bis base
would be safer and handler when e.
tahlis|'ed only ten miles away Fred
erickbnrg, or At the conmodious Ac>
qua Greek landing -, the Potomae.
This plan was most family in concep-
ton, and Furthermore, was most
blnnderiOgly carried out. II was
based on the superficial idea of get>
ting from and around Lees army,
we'll on to Richmond without a battle.
This absurd notion, by the way, had
never for moment entered McClel,
lan's head. but it did prevail with
every General. in>Chief the Army of
the Potomac had, excepting Nice lellan
and Grant. Both on the Peninsula
and in Maryland Mcclellan started
straight to meet his antagonist, and
from his first great fight at Shiloh,
Grant had had sufficient perspicacity
to see that there was no use trying 70
win victories by stealing. away from
the enemy and making show If COW
ering vast territory and capturing
material spoils, but by going right at
him wherever met, and killing Oft his
soldiers. This reasoning correctly
located the Confederacy in its men
under arms--it was and could be no.
where else.
In accordance with the new plan Of
campaign, the Army Of the Potomac
was hastily massed and marched to
Falmouth, a picturesque little village
on the north side Of tho Rappalan>
mock, nearly opposite the town Of
Fredericksburg. At Falmouth, Gen.
eral Burnside arrived during the
closing days Of November to find with
dismay, on looking from the Stafford
Heights across the River, that Leo
had been ahead Of him, and had al
ready stationed a sufficient force at
the threatened point, namely, Fred.
ericksburg, to dispute his advance
and deliver battle in hebalf Of the
safety Of Richmond. In fact, the
wouId-be surpriser found lIimself eur.
prised; bat this would have been Of
slight consequence if such short
sightedncss on the part Of the new
Gencral-in Chief bad not clearly
foreshadowed his terrible mistakes
that were to follow on HE chosen
ground. For over two weeks the army
was unable to cross the river owing 10
a lack Of pontoon bridges; meanwhile
Lee, in the rear Of Fredericksburg,
was left free t. fortify and get all
things in complete readiness to deliv.
er rs crushing a blovv a. possible when
the moment Of battle should arrive.
The very damaging delay in securing
pontoons was the first token Of disas.
ter. Instead Of sending to Washing
ton capable officers to see that the
necessary means for crossing the RVS
ct were dispatched without An in.
stant's delay, General Burnside trust.
ed to the Washington authorities,
who, failing to be impressed with the
urgency Of his demand, had leisu rely
sent the poatoons overland, instead
If by water, IL Acquia. where they
laid one whole week without attract.
ing any notice during the eager hunt
after them, and even when found
their slow hauling BY oxen to Stafford
Heights required no days. On A.