Wheeling register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1878-1935, 1879-11-13

the communion to which they, the
Jurors, belonged. He then proceeded
to expound the law applicable to the
case, as follows;
Ii being admitted that the plaintiff
was engaged in the business OF using
hacks In the city of Holyoke, the ques-
ton is whether the defendant wrong
fully and maliciously interfered with
that business by threats and intimida-
ton of any one, so as to prevent the
customers OF the plaintiff from hiring
hacks OF him. IL is alleged that he did
this by the use OF certain language,
which is set out in the declaration. The
Jury must find, in the first place, by
fair prepOnderance OF evidence, that he
did use the words set out in the counts,
or some one Of them. The material part
of them is that which relates to threat,
or what the plaintiff CONSTITUTES as
threat, TO those who employed him.
That must be proved before you can
find for the plaintiff. And you must
remember that the evidence OF the de
PENDANT and his witnesses was that ne
only threatened those who used the
plaintiff for church purposes. The
plaintiff must not only prove his allega-
lions rs TO threats, but must satisfy you
that the declarations of the defendant
were made TO deter his customers
from employing him. Not only that,
but the defendant must have uttered
them not only as threats, but malicious
ly, either i'm fact or in law. III he ut
tered them as expressions OF ill-ieellng
or spite toward the plaintiff, that would
be malice in fact, although he may have
had an idea in his mind that his ecclesl-
astical position required him to inter
iere with the plaintiffs business. IL,
however, be had no malice IN TACT, but
uttered these declarations without Iustl-
fable cause, and they were OF nature
tending To injure the plaintiff, then he
would have malice in law. IL would be
no excuse for him that he believed 1t
10 be his duty-if he did utter
what is in fact justiliable-what
il injurious to this plaintif-that
he had an idea that his ccclesias-
teal authority authorized him to do 1t.
There is no ecclesiastical authority to
be recognized under our government
which allows a wanton and unreaSona-
Bile interference with a mans private
business, not connected with the church
from which he has been eXcOmmunl-
Gated. Our institutions and our laws
recognize no such power. The church
NAV eNcOmmunicate him, but they
must not pursue him further and inter
fere with lis private business. Ii they
10 that, they do wrongful act. IL Is
no justification Tor such acts that he has
been communicated from the church.
In other words, our laws do not allow
any ecclesiastical authority To inter
diet a man from pursuing his ordinary
business, or prevent even the members
of the same denomination from which
he has been communicated To deal
with him. | am disposed to rule, so lar
as this case is concerned, a matter which
is not wholly free from doubt, that II
the defendant only forbade the custom
erS OF this mau from employing HIM 10
bring them to church To take some part
i'm the proceedings and offices OF the
church, then the plaintiff cannot recov-
or. In short, there must be threats,
threats uttered To the customers OF the
plaintiff; these threats must have been
uttered maliciOusly in fact or IN law,
they must have taken effect and pre-
vented the customers of the plalntlh
from employing him, and 50 they must
have an effect To injure the plaintiff IN
his Lawful and laudable business. III the
deiendent did all these things, the
plaintiff is entitled 10 recover.