The New York herald., 1879-12-17
THE BATTLE OF SAN FRANCISCO
Graphic Description OF the
Conflict.
DISGUSTED BOLIVIANS.
Critical State OF Affairs
in Lima.

which was confded the task Of driving back the IN
vading chilean army which had landed at Pisagua
aud pushed to the interior. has suffered defeat
place called San Francisco. which has led to its
complete collapse and. employ the words Of Gen.
sral Prado, the supreme director Of the war;. what
''has become OF the army is unknown. VT
although that apparently incapable officer commu-
nicates nothing. either by wire or mail with respect
to the disaster which has followed the first attempt
of the Peruvians to assume the offensive, fugi-
tves who have arrived in africa are by no means so
reserved and from their communications it is to be
feared that the death roll of those who have
perished from hunger and thirst after the
battle will be even greater than that of
those who fell In the combat. Immediately
after the capture Of Psagua the allied forces under
Buenda retired to Aqua Santa. the terminus OF the
railroad fifty miles from the coast. and there re-
manned. being gradually strengthened by the other
forces which had been stationed for months past in
southern half of the Department Of Tarapaca to
which, up to the present. actual strife by land has
been confined. Acting under orders issued by Gen.
eral Prado by telegraph from africa. Buen-
dia put his men in motion. and during
the night of the 18th commenced to
his steps over the same route he had taken
when driven out of Pisagua He had with him 5.355
Peruvisus and 3.425 Bovians. giving total of $3.50
men. Passing through two positions which had
been held by the enemy but were found deserted.
and of which they had evidently ut first intended
to defend. by three P. III. on the 10th he was in
front Of hill called San Francisco. which COM
mands the valley through which the railroad runs.
and on which earthworks had been thrown up.
GENERAL BuENDIA's xRRoR.
They defended by strong Chilean force
pentifulIy supplied with Krupp field pieces and Cat
ling guns. Here Buendia committed the error which
Instead of making detour. which he could easily
have done. and thus compelling the enemy to
descend to attack him in the pampa at the rear of
the hill. or submit to having his communications
with Pisagua cut of. Buendia gave the order to
charge up the rugged hill and carry the works by
storm. The attempt was gaantly made Three times
the shattered regiments which had undertaken
feat which 1t was impossible to perform were
compelled fall back to reform, leaving the hill
side thckly covered with their dead and dying who
had fallen in before the Krupps and Gatlings
long they could make their rifles tell. At length
ut nghtfau Buendia determined to retreat and then
it became apparent that his authority had disap-
peared together with whatever prestige he had
before enjoyed. and that the men whose lives he
had unwisely imperilled during the day were
now determined to think and act for themselves and
to disregard all general orders. If attempt
were made to enforce them. Naturally enough hor-
rible dsorganization ensued, and what might have
easily enough have boen orderly retreat became
frightful rout. Some went one way. some went
another. But all sought the same end. Some
hamlet town, some oasis in that desert
of rugged hill and salty arid plain where water
might be procured. if not provisions, and thus
enable them sustain life until the hrst fright
Of defeat having passed calmer reflection might en-
able them to determine the wiser course to pursue
ix
Perhaps no body of men ever yet placed in the
position in which this fleeing wreck of Buendia's
army found themselves; and perhaps, whsp the full
truth becomes known it will be found thatUo greater
proportionate mortality has occurred to any force
since Napoleons retreat from Moscow.
WRECK OF AN ARMY.
What has become OF the greater number CT the
$500 men who left Aqua Santa with Buendia is alb
solutely unknown. 1t is reported that only about
four thousand men took part in the engagement and
that OF these 5000 were either killed. wounded or
are said to have reached Tana, a rather small
mining works situated about eighteen miles
they proposed to exist no one can say They
had either to starve where they were, march and
probably starve on the march ere they could reach
any place containing provisions for SO many men,
or surrender to the Chleans. This latter course 1t
is not believed they would follow unless compelled
by superior forces such IL the terror evnced by the
soldiers At the idea of falling into the hands of tho
enemy. Buendia. with about two hundred officers
and cavalry. has reached Tarapaca. small town ut
about fourteen leagues from the OF the fight,
which Is but scanty supplied with provisions, ana
perhaps hfty in all have , succeeded nj in reach. reach,
the remainder OF the men are Is still mystery.
General Prado himself SO confesses. and the truth
must be confessed that probably the greater number
of them have already died frem thirst, hunger
fatigue. so entirely has the army disappeared
that although the defeat TOOK place
the 19th up to the time OF writing official report
any description has been furnished, and neither
or ns ssa in m Area 'ne or the
War Office in Lima. has attempted to explain or de-
scribe the disaster II Is true the acting President
La Puerta. has issued q proclamation in which he
acknowledges \ reverse, but he does not attempt to
explain the character It has assumed the causes
which have led to IL. The Tarapaca department
offers every obstacle to the successful execu-
ton OF military operations, and on this fact
have deceived. and instead of having success
fully compelled the to take to the wateress
pampas or retreat to his vessels. the disorganized
remnant OF their best division has been compelled to
seek sustenance In country which Is almost en-
tirely desert.
1t was intended to second the movement COM
menccd by Bucndia by an attack on the Chilean
reach the point at which he was to operate he re-
qurcd to travel $50 miles n desert. lie
discovered PROVISIONS were already short and that
they would be exhausted long before they
reached the enemy. The men commenced to
Rrumbie and were soon In open mutiny. Daza,
fequently. ordered them TO return. while he
kept with 450 picked men for the
purpose OF meeting and joining guerrilla band
known to be seeking n chance to operate ON tho
snemy's flank. Learning two days subsequently of
the defeat at San Francisco he determined return
TO africa. where a general state OF decentralization
now prevails. The Bolivian troops having from tho
Grst demanded 10 be taken to Chile to light. have
become disgusted with the management
ut the war. Worn out with six months
camping out. and marching aud counter
marching, they now consider that their lives
nsecssly sacrificed by bundering leaders, and
openly express desire and determination to re-
turn their homes in the interior, there quietly to
await the impossible contingency of the Cllean
army attempting to invade those next to inacessf-
bic regions. This mutinous spirit among the troops
is also fonentcd by Bolivian intrgucrs In higher
position, who are desrous, mentioned below,
that overtures should he accepted which have been
covertiy rendered by Chile.
IN LIMA.
The receipt of the OF the dcfeat was followed
by an outburst of public feeling. General Prado
was accused of being traitor, General Buendia and
his stan with exhibiting cowardice and Ignorance.
and all in high official position, beginning with
President La Puerta and his Cabinet were declared