The New York herald., 1879-09-07
a-Hungary's New East.
ern Difficulty.
AUSTRIA'S LAMENTATIONS
The Slavic Tendency OF the
Hapsburg Empire.


the other informed that the
Mohammedans determined to oppose the
invasion Of the ''Schwsb." Again we have
been informed that Russia ia angry at seeing
Austria push her sway over newer Turkish
territory. and that Russian agents are at among
the populations Of tho Sandjak. stirring them up
to energetic resistance Tho GOODNESS which has lately
sprung up between Russia and Germany and Austria
is thought and doubtless correctly. have arisen
from the Novi-Bszar occupation, which apparently
Austria has been hesitating to carry out for
some time past. Whatever the cause Of Rus
sa's anger was 1t Is clear. that question had
arisen which united Austria and Germany and
which to a certain extent separated both from Rus
sia.
THE BERLIN TREATY THE ROOT OF THE DIFFICULTY.
Whatever other explanations of q secondary char
acter it may be necessary oder this much must be
said at the outset:-The difficulty which is unit
ing Austria and Germany in the bonds of friendly
alliance. and which is dividing them both from
Russia has it's in the Treaty of Berlin. 1t is
provided by article % OF that treaty that the prov
nces of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be occupied
and administered by Austrla-Hungary. 1t was
stipulated, however that as the government of Aus
tra-Hungary unwilling to charge itself with the
administration of the Sandjak of Novi-Bazar which
extends between Servia and Montenegro in south
easery direction to beyond Mitrovitza the Turkish
a0m10IetratlOn commune
trict At the same time. in order to insure the
maintenance of the political condition, az we'll
freedom and security OF communications. Aus
Hungary reserved to itself tho right establish
garrisons and maintain military and commercial
routes over the whole extent OF that part of the
ancient vilayet of Bosnia. Such. in substance and
almost in full. is the wording Of the article in the
treaty. according to which Austria Hungary has
charged herself with the occupation and admin
istration Of Bosnia and the Herzegovina. It is
plain from this article that whatever the
government Of ria-Hungary may have had for
not wishing to be saddled with the responsibility Of
administering the affairs of Novi-Bazar, 1t was not
unwilling to run all the risks Of occupation. 1t is
equally plain that the right of administration re-
Turkey in this extreme southeast Of
the province but thin guise to conceal the fact
Of what might be called practical annexation. 1t
would be simply absurd to imagine that Count
Andrassy and his master. Francis Joseph. went into
this arrangement blindfolded. It would hardly be
less absurd to suppose that they were
not fully of the difficulties which
they would be called upon to encounter, or
that they had not made preparations accordingly.
From whatever quarter this suggestion came, that
Austria Hungary should occupy and administer
affairs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. or whatever was
their object. 1t was just such suggestion har
monized with the ambitious designs Of the House of
Hapsburg- Lorraine, and fitted In with the deep
laid schemes and farprojccting plans of the German
Chancellor The suggestion is credited to Lord
Bcaconsfeld. If 1t his suggestion it only shows
that he knew and that he had rightly measured the
men with whom he had to deal. It practically
Offering augmentation OF territory to Austria-Hun-
gary; IL was creating An opportunity for Prince
Bismarck to complete his designs, and to crown the
edhce OF German unity and for varions reasons IL
did not ut the time provoke the jealousy Russia
In spite of the difficulty to which it has given rise
it has been pronounced by some most competent
judges be the satisfactory part of the treaty.
RUssrAs EXPECTATIONS.
1t has been shrewdly guessed that the consent OF
Russia to the occupation OF the above named prov
inces by Austria Hungary was the moro readily
given that her rulers and statesmen felt satisfied that
such occupation would SO task the energies and
source Of weakness rather than of strength. II
Austria Hungary failed the prestige of Russia would
south of tho Danube. and from the confines
OF Croatia and Dalmatfa in the west to the
eompod mola .na % tns
to the Czar OF Russia their protecting friend
dtion OF the provinces to be occupied and in the
condition Of the Austro-Hungarian Empire itself, to
justify such calculations: Bosnia and Herzegovina
people. led by their boys and but little accustomed
to the yoke Of authority, have always revealed some
of the worst characteristics OF mountsneers.
Bosnia, in particular, has always been considered
the least loyal OF the provinces in the sutans do
mnons The two provinces havo hitherto been
controlled by . nrrt class vali. or Governor Gem
| eral; but their history since the date of their
history OF chronic rebellion. II was against their
people that Omar Pacha, of Crimesn farue afterward
was seh' IN ,sss ana the which ne ssps
| brought out all his best qualities gencral-fur-
nished abundant evidence that the insurgent noun
| tainecrs by means dcspicable soldiers.
When besieeed in laitsa rhoy provot themselves
capable artillorymen; and on the morning after
being made for assault they illustrated their SOL
dcry tactics by timely and successful retreat
mia and another handful of peasants In Herzegovina
had, ut the time Of the Berlin Congress. been for
three years In open rebellion, and all the efforts Of
the Turks, aided by the native Moslsins had been
unable to reduce the insurgents and restore order
| 1t was certainly natural 10 expect that in ouch
country AMI among such people invasion and
occupation would be bcset with difficulty
all the difnculty tho native chiefs are all
| OF them of the Moslcm faith. rhs. however,
not all. II was not unreasonable tor Russia to ex-
pect that the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
would be unpopular with certain sections of the
Austro-Hungaran populations. II would entail
| heavy expenses on an already we'll depleted
chcqucr 1t would attended with tho loss OF much
valuable life; II might not be successful: IL would.
II successful involve serious responsibilities tor the
future. and, after all, the advantages promised were
OF doubtful value such reasoning IL was surely not
unfair to mputc to tho average mind throughout
the domnons m M, OF Francis Joseph, But whatever
tionalitics which compose tho population of the
Empire OF the Hapsburss II was not for mo:
nent to be imagined that the invasion and
| occupation OF Bosnia and Herzegovina would
hnd favor with the MaRyars OF Hungary. They
|
meant ultimate annexation. and that aiinexation
meant large increase ot the Slavic population OF
the Empire. Such an increase Of the population of
| the Empire wns. they we'll knew. opposed to their
interests They were In = minority OF less than
half ns compared with the German element in the
Empire They were already in a more wretched
minority. as compared with the Slavs. Yet they
had conrived to obtain possession of the reins OF
\ government, and with nrm and steady hnuis they
had held those reins for acontinuous period OF eight
years. AZ things were they constituted tho balance
OF power. But with any large increase of the
Slavic population the balance of power would he
disturbed to their disadvantage This, how
ever, was not all. With tho increase of
the Slavic population there might Le
an excison of the German provinces. What
| mil l.n