The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1879-08-02

VINO should examine thcNl OF WHAT IL no" aVo"'
= was its real purpose, viz, by simple donation
l to give aid to particular private corporation IS
- taDlishcd for business ends exclusively. ", by
. reason Of the general reference, in the bonds, Il
C the two ordinances Of June and July, 1869, The
. purchaser il chargeable with notice OF their pro
visions, "a propUsislon to be hereafter examined
VI the utmost which the city, in view of the linden
t mite language OF the ordinances can claim Is tha
he had notice that the bonds were issued for The
purpose of developing the manufacturing re-
sources Of the city for manufacturing purposes.
Nothing more. This brings Us to a question
y which counsel have discussed with some elabo
ration in their printed arguments.
We have seen that the charter of the city con
fcrs upon the council power to borrow money,
T. upon the credit OF the city, and to Issue bonds
therefor. No Limitation is prescribed Is to the
{ amount which may be borrowed. Nor is any cX
press restriction imposed rs TO the Objects ana
, purposes for which bonds may be issued II is
( clear, therefore, that the council, having Sc
cured the assent Of the requisite majority OF vot
crs might rightfully borrow money upon bonds
Of the city for every purpose which could fairly
be deemed municipal or corporate But the spe'
citc contention Of the city is that the develop
mcnt Of the natural resources Of the city for
manufacturing purposes is moi, upon principle
or within the meaning Of the Illinois constitution
of 1913, a corporate purpose, After careful eX'
animation Of the decisions or the Supreme Court
of Illinois to which our attention has been called,
we find this question by no means free from aim
Guilty. The leading case, Tdyior rs. Thompson, T.!
M, II, involved the question whether Il tax lev
led under the authority of AN act of legislature,
passed in 1863, upon the property of township,
to pay bountics to persons who should thereafter
enlist or be drafted into the army Of the United
States was for corporate purpose, within the
meaning Of the state constitution. The person
who complained Of the tax, was Il nonresident
ofthc township but owned taxable property with
In its limits. The Supreme Court OF Illinois,
through Judge Lawrence, in an opinion Of
marked ability sustained the validity Of the tax,
defining the phrase corporate purposes" to
mean ga tax to be expended in manner which
shall promote the general prosperity and welfare
Of the municipality which leyies it," 1t is sug-
gcstcd, by learned council for the city, that that
and similar decisions, rendered during the late
civil war, were exceptional and were made al
most or necesStafc, because the courts were un.
willing to cripple the power Of the government
to raise troops by denying the counties, cities,
and towns the right to offer bountes when author
lied by the legislature. An answer to this sug-
gcstion is found in the fact that the same court
rcailirmed the doctrine OF Toy'or ~. 1honn.on in
the cases Of Briscm iHiSon, 4J H., '@G: Mi""t
u.s. Buiiau' H., 40: and johnson u.s. CdWpbeI', ~
/ H., 81 In the subsequent case Of lhjcogo, d.,
rs. Smith ~ m 21S, decided in 1871, the court re-
fcrrng to the definition Of corporate purposes
rs given in Taylor vs.. 1hompson announced
their acceptance Of it, In the FepIIe rc. DprH',
II H., G5G, the same definition was referred to
without disapproval. The court declaring that it
had gone far enough to uphold that tax, said:
" 1t may be difficult to determine with precision
what is corporate purpose, IN the sense Oh the
constitution but it is less difficult to determine
what is not such purpose. The true doctrine
is, such purposes and such only, as are gcrmanc
to the objects Of the welfare of the municipality,
at least such as have II legitimate connection
with these objects, and manifest relation there
Ito" Again, in Bu,7' u.s. GIN Of CarbnDddh, 70
Kh., 455, (Ch. Jus. Breese) the court sustained
"a tax imposed by tie city IN support OF the
Southern Illinois Normal University, to which
the people Of that city had voted tax, and re-
fcrring to Tdyioy rs. WompS,s said that corpor.
ate purpose was there "hcld to mean a tax to be
Expended In manner which should promote the
general prosperity and welfare Of the municipal
itv which levied it. But in that case a vote of the
people authorizing the tax was first to be taken,
and the people in fact voted the tax. This was
an important fact In determining that case. We
thought it difficult to determine with precision
what was Il corporate purpose, in the sense OF
| the constitution, but came To the conclusion
that it was such purpose, and such only, AS
might have Legitimate connection with objects
and purposes pronotye to the welfare Of the
municipality, and manifest relation thereto"
| In view Of the course Of decision in Illinois,
we should hesitate to declare that money hor-
rowcd by the City of Ottawa and expended in
developing its natural resources for manufactur-
Ing PURPOSES was not, in the sense of the Illinois
constitution Of lS4S, as interpreted by the Supreme
Court Of that state, expended "to promote the
general prosperity and welfare of the municipal
| ity"
But direct decision of that question does not
seem To be essential to the disposition of this
case. We content ourselves with stating the
propositions which counsel have urged upon our
reconsideration, and without expressing any set
| tied opinion AS to what are corporate purposes
within the meaning of the Illinois constitution,
We pass to another point which to our Judgement,
Is fatal to the defense. 1t is consistent with the
pleas filed by the city that the testator Of plain,
liiIs in error purchase the bonds before maturity
| for valuable consideration, without any notice
Of want Of authority in the city to issue them,
and without any information as to the objects to
which their proceeds were to be applied, beyond
| that furnished by the rccitcd titles Of the ord
nanccs. For all corporate purposes, rs we have
seen, the council if SO instructed by a majority
Of voters attending an election for that purpose,
had undoubtcd authority under the charter of
the city, to borrow money upon its credit and to
issue bonds therefor. The bonds in suit, by their
recital of the titles Of the ordinances under which
they were issued, in effect, assured the purchaser
that they were to be used for mnncipal purposes,
with the previous sanction, duly given, OF II ma
jority of the legal voters of the city. II he
would have been bound, under some circum.
stances, to take notice. ut his peril, OF the proys
ions Of the ordinances, he was relieved from any
responsibility or duty in that regard by reason of
representation, upon the face of the bonds, that
the ordinances under which they were issued
were ordinances providing for loan for mt
nicjpaI purposes Such representation by the
constituted authorities of the city, under its cor.
porate seal, would naturally avert suspicion of
bad faith upon their part and induce the pur-
chaser to omit an examination Of the ordinances
themselves. II vas substantially, a declaration
10y the city, with the consent Of majority Of its
legal voters, that purchasers need not examine
the ordinances, since their title indicated II loan
for municipal purposes The city is, therefore,
cStoppcd, by its own representation, TO say, as
against bona tdc holder Of the bonds, that
they were not issued or used for municipal or
corporate purposes. 1t cannot now be heard rs
against such holder to dispute their validity
Had the bonds, upon their face, made no refer
ence whatever to the charter of the city or re
cited only those provisions which empowered the
council To borrow money upon the credit Of the
city and To ISSUE bond, therefor, the liability of,
the city to a bona tidc holder could not be ques.