Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1879-06-13
What Will the British do now in
Zululand.

must be owned the course taken by
Lord Chelmsford after relieving Ekowe
scarcely points to any present purpose
Of strenuous aggression. They could
burn score or two of kraals, and lay
waste the fields adjoining those fenced
enclosures but they could not over
take the Zulu army, and an attempt to
reduce by starvation force of 60, 600
men would simply constrain the latter
to make raids into the Transvaal. They
might hope, indeed, to profit by dis
sensions in the Zulu camp, if it were
not probable that discipline and loyalty
had been fortified by the experience OF
the campaign. There remains the al
tentative of compromise and peace
nor shall we be surprised to hear of
overtures to that end plausibly repre-
scented in the dispatches as concessions
to the British claims, but really tanta.
mount to waiver of the sole substan-
tial point at issue. But for Sir Bartle
Frere's abrupt summons to disband the
Zulh army within thirty days. there
would have been no war at all and
there is little reason to suppose that
Cetywayo would reject terms of peace
involving withdrawal of that prepos-
ferrous demand.
1t will be remembered that the pres
ent Zulu king, as well as his father and
uncle, had at all times shown the ut
most Difference to the English, and had
carefully refrained from incursions into
Natal or British Kaffraria. They lad
always claimed, on the other hand, o part
Of the Transvaal, and have often washed
their spears in the blood of the Dutch
settlers on their western frontier. Yet
even this question of ownership they
were glad to submit to British arbitra-
ton, and, as is we'll known, the award
of the Natal Commissioners was recent
ly given in their favor. But when the
ENJOYS of the Zulu chief expected the
execution of the sentence, what was their
establishment to find the delivery of
land adjudged their own saddled with
the most arduous and insolent stipula-
tions. They were informed that the
great army on which their national ex-
istence depended must be forthwith
disorganized and discharged, not to be
again called into the field without the
consent of the British Government.
Under the circumstances, this demand
has been properly stigmatized by Lord
Blanchford and others, as the acme of
arrogance and injustice. It is, they
say, as if the emperor Of Germany. in
concluding with Great Britain treaty
of commerce, suddenly annexed a no.
tice that he would make war in six
weeks, unless before the expiration of
that time the English burned their
navy.
1t appears, moreover, that in sending
this remarkable ultimatum, Sir Bartle
Frere acted upon his own responsible
ity against the spirit and obvious in
tentions of his instructions, and fairly
exposed himself, therefore, to the sharp
criticism since passed upon his course
in Parliament. The mischief wrought
by this self willed and injudicious Off
cial is probably in q large degree ire
parable. For although species Of &C.
cord should be arranged by q waiver of
that ultimatum, the relations between
Cetywayo and the English could hardly
be replaced on the old footing during
the present generation. The Zulus lost
their faith in English integrity when
they saw the award of the Natal Commits
sioners rejected from interested mo-
tives; and they lost at Isandlana their
belief in English invincibility. If, as
the Governor. General affirmed some
months ago, 1000 soldiers were at that
date required to guard the frontier
settlements, it is clear that their pro-
lection, in view of recent events, will
need to be organized ON still larger
scale. This brings us to the broad and
really pregnant question, namely, on
what principles the relation of the
crown to the South African colonies
will be hereafter based.
For the past quarter of century the
Liberal party in England has advocated
and applied the principle that the col
onial dependencies must be left to de-
fend themselves. This theory may be
said to have broken down at Isandlana.
It has been demonstrated that, no mat
ter where the responsibility for mis-
takes may lie, no English Minister
would be sustained by public opinion
in refusing aid to British colonists
whose lives and property are in peril.
If, therefore, the weight Of defense is
to fall on the mother country in the
hour of pressure, it would be we'll. ap-
parently, to forestall such exigencies
by assuming the minor burdens of pre-
caution. Instead of reducing to a
minimum the troops stationed at the
Cape, it may be deemed prudent to
maintain garrisons in sufficient strength
to eliminate the most obvious cause of
war, the expectation of impunity. But
as Earl Grey has lately pointed out, a
country incapable Of self-protection can
hardly expect to be trusted with respon-
sible government. If the British Col
onial Office is to bear all the cost of
hostilities, its agents must be allowed
the opportunity of averting them. If
the parent State is to do all the fight.
ing, the offshoot cannot be allowed to
do all the legislation. The spectacle Of
a community unable to shield itself
against body of black savages, and
yet claiming to enjoy parliamentary in
situations, is sufficiently droll and we
apprehend that Mr.. Gladstone's notions
Of colonial independence will be pretty
thoroughly discredited when the Eng
lish people come to audit the bills Of
the Zulu war. In q word, the future
| policy of Great Britain toward its