The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1879-02-25
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Napoleon and Moscow.

1t had been prophesied that Russia could not
successfully resist Nspolson's attack, even
when much less overwhelming invasion had
been contemplated than had now taken place.
Aud these prophecies had come true. The
hass;sns had given up one position after an.
other, had been defeated in the field, and fnal-
ly had lost their capital. Only one anticipation
mad remained unrealized. The Russians had
refused to acknowledge themselves vanu uished
by signing treaty of peace. The armies still
kept the field, and a Lasdwehr had been set
on foot. So far Napoleon's success had fallen
short of his expectations, as it had likewise
been unable to quell the national resistance. II
was possible that this obstinscy might so far
embarrsss Napoleon as to oblige him to give up
toe capital again, to repass Smolensk and COD.
tinue the war in a position nearer to his own
rontier. Bat as this frontier was not, as we are
apt to imagine, the frontier of France. bat that
OF Prussia and the Duchy OF Wasaw, his posi-
tion with respect to the enemy would still be
one OF enormous superiority. That be would
remain at Moscow too long and expose bis
army to Russian winter, which might no
doubt cause him serious losses, was surely not
to be imagined. A leader of his experience
would bs in no danger of such misca alton
and even leader accustomed to strokes of
audscity would, when responsible for so vast
an army, be awed into prudence. And thus
the drmness Of the Russian Gear and nation
might bs expe cted only to prolong the war. to
give Napoleon such q check as he had received
10 Spain to compel him to adopt other
means for quelling their resistance but by no
i'm
much less snch q disaster as might shake
the whole fabric of his power. It would
carry US far into the history of France
il we should try to explain hsw
it could have happened that such vast destinies
should depend upon the clearness of judgment
of q single man, SO that fit of rashness and
eccentricity in Napoleon should change the
face of the world and doom millions to death.
1t is less Intricate question how Napoleon
could be capable of making the mistake hs
made at Moscow We are to consider that the
course he took might have been completely
successful. Alexander's hrmness might have
yielded after little delay TO the clamors of his
brother and the entresties Of his mother.
Nothing 10 more characteristic of Napoleon
than his vivid conception of the character Of
those with whom he bad to deal. We may
imagine that in his mind it was registered as q
certainty that Alexanfer could not bs firm.
No doubt another General would not hays
uIoauou OI etaklng the eXlstenc0 even OF
ordinary army upon the sound ness of an i'm
preston of this kind. But Napoleon would
not have been what be was If he had not over
and over again rsked everything to obtain Q
result that could not be gained by ordinary
methods. Such calculation as he now acted
upon had succeeded with him many times be-
fore. He ought, indeed, to have known that
he was not exempt from failure. His Egyp-
tian failure and his blnnder In Spain must
have cost him many moments of secret chagrn,
but the world had been so blind to all this i'll
luck and had so steadily persisted in regarding
him as invincible that he may we'll have come to
believe himself so. Meanwhile the scale Of his
affairs had become so gigantic thst single ex-
cepti0n to his usual good fortune might have
Infinite consequences; the slightest absrra-
ton in his mind might be represented by the
complete transformation of Europe, Just as the
intinitesmal displacement of telescope will
make difference of millions Of miles in an as
Economical calculation. Thus to exolain the
largest and most sudden reverse of fortune
that the world ever saw we have to put togeth-
or three conditions each unprecedeuted First,
the course of French history from Louis XIV,
through the Revolution to Napoleon, had pro-
duced an intense aut0cracy, unparalleled in
the history of civilized States; second this
autocracy was welded BY one who, by very
peculiar course of life, had been trained to
hazardous strokes of policy and strategy, such
as are altogether forbidden to ordinary rulers;
thirdly, its affairs were on an unprecedented
scale of magnitude.-L and Times Of Stein,
j. r. Seely.