The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1879-10-05


camp is that he was only allowed to
leave Cabul ON the condition that he
would do his utmost to block the way
to its gates, and that now. he is anxious to get
home as speedily as possible and put himself at
the head OF his mutinous regiments There lies
his chance Of safety. None OF the
London papers believes that he will be
allowed to quit Sir Frederick Roberts
surveillance, although his entry into Cabul with
the Generals forces will ruin him irretrievably
in Afghan estimation. In the end, even if he
escapes death, there can be little doubt that
England will have to set up another ruler in his
place. ~
POSITION OF THE TROOPS.
General Roberts entire force, with all its di-
Visions is rapidly concentrating. The Zargun
Shahr portion was to advance from that
side yesterday. News from Candahar is
brought that the advanced column of
that detachment is satisfactorily settled
at Khelat-i-Ghilzai, whose Governor well
Supplies were abundant and every foraging
party returned laden with vegetables and flour,
with grain and fresh provisions. The adjacent
country is peaceable and well disposed The
chiefs of Zemindawar, whence revolt was re-
Gently reported have come to Candahar to dis
avow their supposed detection, and profess them
whom Yakoob Khan shall name, excepting only
Yusuf, to whom they personally object. Ayoob
Khan, the suspected brother of Yakoob, reports
that tranquility has been restored at Herat.
On the side nearer to India General
Cough, with detachment Of the
Guides, the Ninth regiment and four
mountain guns has arrived at BasawaI.
The Governor of Jelalabad has promised him
assistance. Meanwhile the Ninth Lancers
and Eighty-tfth regiment of foot, with
o wing Of the Eighty-frst, are push
ing forward to reinforce General Gordon,
who is holding Peiwar-Kotal against terri
BILE odds, being surrounded by the Hillmen
and in an extremely pcrilous position. AS for
the significance, in this relation, of the Russian
expedition to Merv, it is generally considered
in England to have temporarily broken down.
General Lomakins reported victory is disbe-
licved. Most people are inclined to argue that
if the plans devised ut st. Petersburg had been
successful the occupation of Merv would before
now lave been accomplished.
WHAT THE LONDON SPECTATOR THINKS OF
AFFAIRS IN THE PASSES AND AROUND
cABuL THE NECESSITY OF VICTORY IN THE
CAMPAIGN.
With respect to the general position of affairs
and the probable intentions of the Afghans the
well informed London Spectator has published
the following:-'The popular Afghan decision
is to resist ut once. to compel Yakoob Khan
to choose between hostility to the British and
disbursement, and to call up the whole people,
now set free for battle by the harvest.
That decision is at least possible, and
ii is to meet some such resolve the government
must address its efforts. The balance of evi-
dence is in favor of the belief that the MOinunts
have shown hostility, thus compelling us to
guard every foot of the Khyber risk the
loss of communication with the advancing
army; that the revolted regiments intend to
throw themselves across General Roberts
path, and that the Ghlzai clan, with its formi-
dnbe numbers and especial renown for personal
bravery, either has declared is about to
declare for the national cause. Whatever an
| individual chief here and there may do,
it is nearly impossible that the body of the
| clansmen should side with the British stand
,lloof and it is evidently OH this decision that
the departmentsin their preparations are quietly
| reckoning Unless the Ghilzas secede, which,
| We repeat is most improbable, we have first to
| capture Cabul, city In the air occupied by
population of armed fanatics, and then to force
| Afghanistan at large, q country large as Ger
many and with a most warlike though thin pop
ulation, to accept peace. If the Afghan lead
| ers yield, we must either retire, or SO garrisou
| the country rs to be indifferent to treachery !;
while if they fight, We have to conquer
u Spain comparatively ill-eultivated, aud with
population habituated to guerilla war. 1t is
foolish to underestimate such task or to Judge
of it by the experience of 1912. Then
we retired after performing the least part
of our present task--that il. ''reading n
lesson to the capital" This time we
are to do something more, not yet de-
fined, to secure permanent control of Afghan
policy, and it Is in that something more that the
serious work is involved. 1t is the conquest of
Afghanstan We have to attempt, and though
Afghanistan is weak State compared with
India, still the conquest Of country with ut
least 300, 900 fighting men In it, and animatcdby
u strong religious and social hatred of the
invaders. is no military promenade, as the
French generals could tell us who beat down
the far less developed power of the Arabs
in Algeria. II is not an expedition we are
beginning. but war, aud n war which may
be MS laborious cxhausting and as
costly us any we have ever wagcd in India;
while 1t has this patent difficulty Of its
own :--Iehind rs, between us and the great sea-