Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1879-01-16
senator Edmund,s Letter to the President.

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Mr.. PRESIDENT: Returning from an alb
sence from town, find your note of the
l7th inst. In it. referring to private con-
versation between us in relation to the in
tervenlion of Senators and Representatives
in respect TO nominations and appoint
ments by the Executive Departments of
the Government you ask me to give you
again my views and experience on the
subject. do so with great pleasure and
freedom, from the circumstance that your
views and my own concerning what ought
to be the independence of the Executive in
making nominations and submitting trea-
Ties, and the independence of the Senate in
acting thereon, are entirely in accord, and
that l believe this independence would be
made much more perfect if what is sug-
gested below could be carried into prac-
tice.
In the great number of selections re-
quired TO be made to fill the necessary
Offices in all parts of the republic, the ca
pacity and character, and in many instan-
ces the opinions of persons suggested for
places, ought to be known, and must gen.
orally be ascertained by information from
some source eXtraneous from the EXecu-
tive Department 1t has not been possible,
generally, for the President or heads of
departments personally to know the pro-
priety of particular selection. This has
naturally led TO the practice of applicants
for place, and citizens recommending
them, communicating with the Executive
branch of the Government through the
Senators and Representatives in Congress,
Il 20, tho DraciIapt nd
heads of departments asking and receiving
the information and sometimes the advice
of Senators and Representatives on the
subject So far | think the process was
natural and reasonable, and perhaps in u
degree necessary, as the simplest and
safest means of the Executive Department
acquiring indispensable information.
But, as in almost every kind of affair I'M
restricted by position and binding limita-
tons, useful habit became custom; and
the custom gradually transformed itself
from its true nature rs a means of infor-
nation into the course Of practically dis
posing of Executive local appointments
according to the judgment or will of Sena-
tors and Representatives. They came
gradually to volunteer recommendations
Ill tNtl luSb'itlSC, anu lIC l%ACSullNC DC-
partmcnt in like manner came to receive
and treat such recommendation rs final,
as relief from personal scrutiny of testl-
monials and objections. and from much of
the sense Of responsibility for selections.
This was evidently an abuse and perver-
sion of the constitutional theory Of appoint
ments, rs well us II salutary process in
administration.
The effect of this was, of course, not
beneficial. The citizen who secured the
prize of office became too often the person
al adherent of the Senator or Member who
secured him the place, and the disappoint-
ed ones became the reverse. Senators and
members were sometimes influenced in
their recommendations by considerations
of ambition or of gratitude to those who
had rendered, or were expected TO render,
aid to their personal aims in politics. The
liberty of free political expression and ac-
ton belonging to Il place holder AS citi-
zen, became also somewhat cramped and
embarrassed. Perhaps still more injurious
to the public interests was the enLangle-
ment OF the relation between Senators and
Representatives and the Executive De-
partmcnt. Who can measure in such cases
how much of Executive action in appoint
mentS Is due to u desire to secure appro-
priaton, or avoid investigation, or en-
courage or reward Legislative or Sena-
torial following? Who can tell in such Il
case how far the Senator who votes for or
against II favorite treaty or nomination,
or the Representative who votes for or
against an appropriation or an inquiry,
has been moved thereto by what has been
or what is expected to be done or omitted
by the Executive branch in the direction
Of his wishes? l hardly need say that these
things do not imply corruption in the
ordinary sense in any one. They imply
rather bias, prejudice and IL perversion of
Judgment, arising from self-interest, and n
desire of power and success, from which
human nature is nowhere free.
The distinct separation and indepen-
dence of the various branches of the gov
eminent rest upon principles drawn from
universal experience, and they cannot be
too strongly maintained. The Senate and
House Of Representatives must in their
respective spheres watch and scrutinize,
and deal with, if need to be, every step of
the Executive Department, and they, in
lllCll tulll, luuSU lllc law tS IL
is through proper agents, free from dicta-
ton of members of the legislative branch
and from the temptation either TO yield to
their nominations or to influence or cor
rupt them by the bestowal CT patronage.
1t may be that these suggestions are
simple truisms; but they are those that
cannot be too often repeated. They are
stated in more general terms in the formal
declarations Of both the political parties Of
the country at their last conventions.
How, then, shall we follow them? 1t has
appeared to me that much could be accom-
plished in the right direction by the abso-
lutte abstenton of Senators and Represen-
tatives from recommending particular APP
be asked by the Executive Department.;
and, accordingly, since the incoming of
the Administration, | have endeavored
consistently and steadily to abstain from
doing SO, and l believe l have kept my
purpose. | have thought it consistent with
this position, when applications of recon-
mendations for place have been sent to me-
to forward them to the proper office, with
Il written statement OF memorandum of
the characters and standing of the signers,
if known to me, and | have thought it
right, indeed duty, whenever any of my
constituents in the employment Of the
Executive Department have complained
of its action as unjust or in respect to them,
to make the necessary enquiries and Ell,
deavor to rectify what should appear to be
wrong. These l think ought TO be the
clear and positive boundaries in respect of
appointments between the members of the
two branches of the Government. | am
gratited in believing that this course is
satisfactory to my constituents, and in
feeling that neither my official course nor
that Of the Executive Department, SO far
us am concerned can be affected by the
influence to which have alluded.
But to have proper and fair effect what
ever course is pursued, it ought to be uni
form, constant and universal. Any system
will be radically vicious and will fail that
opens the candidacy for the duties and
honOrs Of public trusts to the citizens of
our state or section only upon the previ-
GUS knowledge of the Executive branch or
the simple recommendations of private
persons while there is brought to bear for
the candidates of other states and sections
tue powerful and personal solicitations of
Senators and Representatives, whose graft
tude for success may be drawn upon in
any emergency, of whose disappointment
in failure may prejudice them against