The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1879-05-11

stein cannot pc credlted Wltn any uirecL OF
important share in the military reform which
reconstructed the Prussian army. On tho other
hand. he was tho most conspicuous and power
full agent In the creation OF that twofold enthu-
siasln for liberty and unity which eliminated
in the tremendous uprising OF 1918. On his in
innate relation. however. to this movement we
need not dwell, for 1t is the one aspect Of his
life with which English and American readers
are sufficiently familiar. But the precise nature
and the supreme moment OF the services which
he was enabled to render Germany in his hour
Of exile are very imperfeetly understood. In
deed tho stability OF Nnpoleon's position in CEN
trail Europe. after the Russian campaign. Is
greatly underestimate. and the inscparable
connection Of tho retreat from Moscow. with the
downfall OF the First Empire has been too
much taken for granted. Tie penetration and
completeness with which Prof Scelcy has
treated this question Is one OF the capital merits
Of his book; aud we may glance ut some Of his
suggestions not only because they rcctify
popular misconception. but because they ex-
hibit in n new and most impressive light
STEMS political ability.
The common notion Is that the fall OF the
first Napoleon after the Russian disaster was
quite as natural as that OF his nephew after
Sedan; that the rising Of the nations against
him. their alliances, and finally their victories
and successes. were but links in a chain Of in
exorabe logic. and should have been looked for
as a mere matter Of course. This idea will not
bear inspection in view OF tho documents and
considerations adduced by Prof sccley in tho
second volume OF his history. We are reminded.
in the first place. that tho French themselves
did not. and could not desert Napoleon as they
did his nephew after his defeat. but chung to
him more closely than ever. France made
sacrifices for her despot in his need such as she
had made for her revolution in 1893. and within
five months enabled him to create another
army which outnumbered all that Russia and
Prussia could bring against him. Nor is 1t
true that Napoleons loss in reputation
and resources was such that tho other
nations Immediately threw of their fear
and united to seize their opportunity. Nothing
OF the sort happened within the limits Of what
may DO called tho French autocrnts personal
dominion. For somo time there was no defec-
ton from the Confederation OF tho Rhine. while
Italy. Holland. Switzerland. and Belgium re-
NAMED quiet. What is still moro to be noted.
Austria did not stir. nor though she looked for
ward to recovering part OF what she had lost.
had any thought OF taking up position OF hos
tility toward Napoleon. Thus instead OF
crumbling away at tho first touch. his power
showed an astonishing stability. Faint from
hcmorrhage no doubt his empire was. but In
o,aer respects. through It's great enlargement
through tho Austrian marriage. and tire birth
Of one who represented ut once the old order
and the now It was now more imposing fabric
than II was in 1907. The actual political effect
Of tho Russian catastrophe was simply to rally
against France the same two beigerents. viz
Prussia and Russia. encountered and defeated
in that year campaign.
Even the alliance Of those combatants against
thoir old enemy ought not by any means TO be
regarded as inevitable. We hear much Of Ma
polcon's vast losses in Russia but we seldom
remark that tho latter country had suffered
quito rs much. In such n condition 1t was far
nom being a matter Of course that sho should
pursue her enemy beyond her own frontier.
hunt him through Germany into France. and
not rest till she had crushed him. Even II she
were bent upon obtaining some indemnity for
her sacrifices. why should she seek 1t from Ma
poison himself. She had something TO gain upon
tho Yistula but nothing upon the Rhine.
Among Napoleon's accomplices had been Prus-
STA. and what moro natural than for tho Gar to
indemnify himself at Prussia's expense by OK
tnnding his frontiers on the west Nor. on the
other hand. was 1t plainly and indisputabiy the
interest OF Prussia TO become tho obvious ally
81 russia against Napoleon. rno had suf-
fercd much from tho Northern Empire at
tho peace OF Tilsit and an alliance with that
power would be certain to food tho country
with Cossacks. as 1t had lately been overrun by
the French. II was more natural for Prussia to
assume her old attitude OF neutrality and Join
Austria In keeping the balance oven between
the great Western and tho great Eastern en-
Dire. This ia not coniecturai. Prof. Seeley
brings forward positive evidence. both Of tho
Of L.
war against Napoleon, and Of her disposition to
seizo Prussian territory and. on tho other
hand Of Prussia's Discrimination to side with
Russia against Franco. Tho court OF the Car
was almost unanimous in its desire to come TO
some agreement with the French Emperor.
The politicians Of Berlin opposed almost to a
man, league with Russia at this juncture.
Thus 1t was not by an easy aud unavoidable
calculation Of interests and chances that the two
powers were led 10 conclude their offensive al
iianco. This alliance was great and memora-
bio work concerning which il is reasonable to
inquire who were its authors. and by what
means did thoy bring 1t to pass
Ono Of its principal authors II his influence
was not It's solo efficient cause WIS Stcin-thus
much will probably be acknowledged by the
readers OF this history. When VIC remember
what had happened after the battle OF Fried
lhhu, now lftehsuDly RUSSIAN ieeling had de-
clared itself against continuing tho war tho mo-
ment 40 Russian interest was directly involved.
aud observe that the exhaustion Of the country
was much greater now than then. we cannot fail
to see the importance Of tho fact that a Prussian
statesman OF European celebrity of the largest
views and the strongest character. stood beside
Alexander That the Car acted In accordance
with STEMS views. and in opposition to those OF
his own court, seems to DO conclusively cstab-
lshed by trustworthy documents 1t is clear
indeed. that had Alexander followed the coun-
ellis OF kutusof and RomHnzon instead Of those
OF tho Prussian exile. tho campaign Of 1918
would have been fought in Russia. and it might
not improbably have redressed Napoleon 6
fortunes Yet II must DO acknowledged that as
Stein shares with Hardenberg the honor OF ro-
generating the Prussian Institutions. and with
Scharnhorst that Of revivinR the German
national spirit. SO in this work Of renewing the
Russian alliance no had q colleague in Gen,
Yorck. who. by single bold. unauthorized act
procured for himself an imporshable namo in
Prussian history.
To oyory one the fall OF Napoleon and tho un-
expected deliveranco OF Europe camo homo az
an event impressive far above tho average in
human history. But scarcely to any other man