The Abbeville press and banner. [volume] (Abbeville, S.C.) 1869-1924, 1879-10-08

go referred to do In fact purpOrt to authorize
the issue Of the bonds, except in the case or
the Interest upon the public debt, for which
there does notseem TO have been the shadow
Of authority Of any kind, and which, there
fore, are absolutely void, no ne matter IN whose nose
strued as giving authority for Il sccond issue,
there Is no conceivable reason why third or
fourth or an indefinite unmbe Of issues could
not have been made upon the same construc'
ton; and, certainly, n construction leading to
such a result cannot be the correct one. 1t Is
II mistake to suppose that because the Con
solidation Act authorizes the funding OF ST.
l97, 0W OF bonds Issued under the Act of 18th
! August, 1888, to pay interest upon he pub
under the Act OF sl07 900. The Act does
to si,OOo,ocS, but simply limits the amount
to be raised to that sum-, and, judging from
the prices at which the bonds were then SELL
Ing, the only matter of surprise Is thatn much
larger amount of bonds had not been issued.
II this be so, then the only remaining ques-
ton Is whether these various Acts purporting
10 authorize the issue OF bonds are constitu.
%tional: Various objections have been raised
to their constitutionality, which
WE WILL PROCEED TO CONSIDER.
The constltutionality of the Act entitled
A Act to authorize O loan to redeem the
obligations known as the Bills receivable OF
the State Of South Carolina" ratified 10Th Au-
gust, 1868, I4th Statutes, 49,, IS assailed upon
the following grounds: LIST. Because the debt
thereby purported to be contracted was not
for the purpose OF defraying "extraordinary
expenditures" and Is, therefore, q viola
tIon OF Section Z. Article9, OF the. Constitu-
ton. This objection Is manifestly based upon
the idea that the word "extraordinary' Is used
in that Section In It's popular sense, whereas 1t
Is clear from the context that 1t Is only used
in contradistinction to the word "ordinary"
as the latter word Is used IN the sense OF cur
rent or usual annua expenditures In q pfece-
ding Section of the same article. For in Sec
tIon 3 of that Article the Constitution declares
that 1.-THE General Assembly shall provide an
Of the State for each year.: and whenever 1t
shall happen that such ordinary expenses OF
the State for any year shall exceed the income
Of the state for such year, the General As
sembly shall provide for lcvying u tax for
the ensuing year sufficient, with other sources
OF income, 10 pay the deficiency of the pre-
cedlng year. together with the estimated ex-
penses of the ensuing year. After thus pro-
vidlng for the expenses of the State govern
ment Of course meaning the Government
which was then to go into operation under the
provisions Of the Constitution OF lSos) desis-
mated as Ordinary In the sense OF current
In Section 7, to provide that 'for the purpose
OF defraying extraordinary expenditures, the
State may contract public debts" that Is, for
the purpose OF dcfraying all such eXpendi-
nary current annual expenses. the State may
contract debts. It Is a matter OF history that
upon the reorganization OF the State Govern.
ment of 1868 that Government found Itself
not only with an empty treasury but embar-
raised with debts contracted by the Govern
mcnt to which 1t had succeeded, some OF
which were floating In the shape OF bills re-
ceivable and bills Of the Bank Of the State
and some funded, upon which there was q
large arrearage OF past due Interest. These
debt were manifestly no part Of the ordinary
current annual expenses OF the State Govern
ment then going into operation, which the
| (op cfttpfinp rpouirp1 ShOulI no Drnyi1Pl for
by an annual tax, and to obtain the means OF
providing for such debts, as that Government
was undoubtedly bound to do, 1t was abso.
lutely necessary that extraordinary cxpendl.
therefore, does. not appear to us to be well
founded.
I'd. The next ground Is that the Act in
question does not levy q tax annually sutt'
Client TO pay the annual interest Of the debt
the contracting Of which 1t purports to au'
thoriZe, and Is, therefore, In violation OF one
OF the clauses Of Section 7, Article D, Of tho
Constitution. This objection Is disposed o
by the decision of this Court In the case O
Morton, Bliss 4 Co. vs.. Comptroller-General-
1 S. G.. Rep, 430. Whether that decision bt
right or wrong, until overrulcd by competent
authority 1t stands rs an authoritative con
structlOn of those Sections of the Constitution
which are therein considered, binding no
only upon every citizen Ofthe State, but upon
; every tribunal which undertakes to admins
ter It's laws. TO say, as has been said, thateacl
Judge has q right to determine for hiInsel
the proper construction Of clause OF tn
Constitution, regardless OF the construction
which may have been placed upon it by supe
rlor authority. amounts to saying
THAT WE HAVE nc SETTLED LAW
and that we are living in a state of anarchy
It Is quite true that each Judge. as well ~
each Of the other officers OF the STATE. take
) an oath to observe the Constitution but TIT
Constitution Is not what he CONSTITUTES 1t u
no h1t what II 10 construed 10 be by the tl
bunal invested with the power to determine
what Is the proper construction. AS long a
human language remains Imperfect, IL j
absolutely essential that in every well reg
} ulated community living undera written Con
siitution there should be some tribunal OF las
resort invested with the power to decide au
thoritativeiy upon the true meaning OF IN
terms used In such Constitution. Here tn
supreme Court is such tribunal, and when !
! has determined the proper construction o
any particular clause of the Constitution Suci
construction becomes the supreme law of III
land, binding alike upon every citizen, ever.
officer and every department OF the STATE
Government until IT Is reversed or altered d!
the proper authorlty-that Is, by a subSe
qucnt decision Of the SAINT tribunal. or Q.
the supreme S Court w Of ~ n, G ts,tSIn S ,be isr1 i
Edictioni or That Court. But even were W
now to override the decision In the case Q
Morton, Bliss & Co. vs. Comptroller-Gcncral
that could not affect the result IN the case!
now before the Court. Tha decision wa
rendered 9th August, 1878. and Mt the yer.
next session Of the General Assembly the Ac
was passed under which the bonds were Is
!, sued which are now called in QUESTION: ines
, parties, therefore, must be regarded as hay
Ing acted upon the faith OF the law, rs II wa
then uuthoritatlvciy declared to be, ana thel
rights cannot be affected by my subscquein
change in the law, whether such. change D
effected by statute or judicial decision. Such
!, at least, Is declared to be the lawb by the Su
prcme Court Of the United States. which. q
we have secn. claims and exercises the rlSh
finally TO decide such questions as we are nov
considering.
The rule, as stated by fancy, G. J., In Ohi'
Life Insurance and Trust Company w: De
! bolt, U6 How, ut page 1872 is ;S follows
18th sound and true rule is that If the con
tract when made was valid By the laws OF thu
Stale, rs then eXpOunded by all The deparl
mcnts of its government and administered IL
its Courts Of Justice, It's validity and obligh
ton cannot be impaired by amy Slbscqucn
Act of the Legislature or decision OF II
Courts altering the construction or the law.
This rule was recognized and affirmed IN th'
same terms in Gelpcke vs. Dubuque. Il Wall.
at page 2G,) and to it was added tho follow
ing language: 1.-THE same principle apple
) where there Is q charge OF judlcia! decision ~
to the constitutional power OF the Legislature
TO enact the law. To this rhie. thus enlarged
we adhere. 1t Is the law OF this Court, l
rests upon the plaincSt principles OF justice
ITO hold otherwise would be as unjust as u
hold that rights acquired under a statute ma!
be lost by It's repeal" This rule was agar
atllrlre ed In the case OF Lee County Vs. Rogers
Ia Wall, 1871 and the question WAS ther'
said to be not open for REORGANIZATION IN IN
Supreme Court Of the United States. II l
perfectly manifest, therefore, that even %er'
we now to ~ovcrrule the case OF Morton. Bills:
& Co. VS.. Comptroller General, 1t could no
help the casopf the State, IN view or the run
J thus firmly established, whether correctly o.
} not we are not called upon to say,
by TIL TRIBUNAL OF LAST RESORT.
It is argued, however, that the decision II
the case of Morton, Bliss & Co.. vs.. Compton
ler-General Is confined to the five bonds there
considered, mono Of which are under consider
alton here. This, we think, IS nm entire mis-
conception Of the effect OF that decision
What Is said In that case In regard TO con
particular bonds mentioned In the pleadings
manifestly was not intended to have, anc
could not have, the effect of confining tht
operation Of the decision OF the various con
stitutional questions there discussed to tho
five bonds there in issue. A court OF 1ustlce
when called upon to administer a remedy
under q statute which Is alleged to be uncDn
stitutlonal, must first determine whether the
statute Is liable to the objection urged against
it, and, having determined that question:, u
then proceeds to inquire whether the parties
In The case have shown themselves tntlticd u
such remedy. The lwoinluiries are entireiy
urged against the cGnstitutionallty OF the Ac'
Is we'll founded is one thing, and whether the
parties in the particular case nave SHOWN
themselves entitled 20 the remedy which the
Act purports to give rise to Is quite another
thing. The decision Of the one question was
an authoritative construction of q particular
clause of the Constitution, which necessarily
affects every one, while the decision OF the
other question could only affect the parties
then before the Court. The decisions of the
various constitutional questions raised In the
case must necessarily be conclusive whenever
tho same questions arise In any other case;
though thcapplicatiom Of the remedy claimed
as following from such decision must be con-
H,nd IN tho n.rticular particS who had shown