The Vancouver independent. (Vancouver, W.T. [Wash.]) 1875-1910, 1878-03-14
TOdleben on Plevna.

The Vossische Zeitung reports the fol-
lowing statement as having been made
by Gen. Todleben with regard to the in
vestment and capture of Plevna
"When l came here" he said, III was
continually tormented by anxiety lest
Osman should make his sortie too soon,
before the Notifications were strong
enough. l was from the beginning OPP
posed to the theory of taking his strong
position by storm. 1t was not l, but
hunger, that conquered him, though this
was only rendered possible by surround
ing him so firmly and effectively as was
at length done by our trenches. Plevna
teaches the lesson that the modern sys-
TEN of defence is quite different from
what it used to be, and possesses enor-
nous advantages against an assailant.
You have in the Vosgcs five or six Plev
mas. In order to be able to surround
natural position or an entrenched camp,
| and at the same time to continue to exc
cute great strategic plans, it is necessary
for the assailant to bring twice as many
soldiers into the field as are required by
the defending army. To take such for
titled positions by storm is with modern
fire. arms impossible, or, at least, mop
perfume. One should never require more
of an officer or soldier, however brave
he may be, than it is possible for him to
do; but the demands made upon our Of
ficers and soldiers in the storming of
Plevna exceeded the bounds of possibil-
ity. Even when such strategical ad
venture succeeds it is mistake. Thought
less men may say, let 10000 troops fall,
so long as we get the position; but they
do not consider that, if the position is
lost, not only that 10000 men fall, but
that $4,000 are demoralized.
My chief care was so to arrange matters
that, wherever Osman might attempt
sortie, sufficient mass of troops should
at once be concentrated to oppose him.
With this object 1 had double row of
trenches and redoubts made around
Plevna, so that while the first was being
attacked at any point, the concentration
might be made behind the second" A
correspondent having asked the General
whether he thought that Osman might
under favorable circumstanc have saved
part of his army, Todleben replied, mo;
Osman made the sortie with $4,000 men,
the whole force under bis command ex-
cept some 5000 or 5000 reserves. If he
had attacked us with only half that
force it might have been said that the
cause of his defeat was the numerical
superiority of his enemy. Osman knew
this, and attempted a brilliant and dar-
ing attack with his whole army; but
success was hopeless. In my opinion
Osman made great strategical mistake
in not attempting his sortie sooner, and
never could understand why he did
not at once evacuate Pevna after the
capture of the positions at Teliche.
Even so late MS six weeks ago he would
have had chance of saving part, if not
the whole, of his army; but he let the
opportunity pass, and we labored inces-
sanity to close him in more and more
firmly. When such position as Plevna
can not be relieved from without, the
besieged army should endeavor at once
to withdraw from it. as the besiegers can
strengthen their circle of Notifications
every day until the garrison is forced by
hunger to capitulate."