The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1878-01-13
and changing the tactical unit of forma-

and changing the tactical unit OF forma-
tfon and manDuvre to correspond to
such improvement. The Italian cam
paign of the Third Napoleon established
some advance In field artillery, but the
supreme Importance of "bTeech-load.
ers" was not admitted until ''Sadowa,"
! In 1866. ALI this must be considered in
determining the value Of McClellan's
work. Taking the raw material in
trusted to him, he converted 1t into
great military machine, complete
In ell Its parts, fitted for its intended
purpose Moreover, he resisted the
natural Impotence of the government
and people, and the follies ofpoliticianss
and newspapers. and for months refused
to put his machine at work before all It's
delicate adjustments were perfected.
Thus, much to It's own despite, the North
obtained armies and the foundation OF
success. The correctness Of the system
adopted by Mcclellan proved equal to
all emergencies, and remained I'M
changed until the close of the war. Dis
appointed In his hands, and suffering
successors, the Army of the Potomac"
always recovered, showed itself q vital
organism, and finally triumphed. Nc
Clellan organized victory for his section,
and those who deem the preservation OF
the Union" the first Of earthly duties,
and, judging from their readiness
to violate the commandments" OF
heavenly. also, should not cease
Co do him reverence. | have here
spoken of Mcclellan not as q leader,
but as an organizer; as such he de-
serves to rank with the Won Moltkes,
Scharnhorsts and Louvois. Of the Old
World. The constant struggle against
the. fatal interference of politicians
with his military plans and duties sep
ssrated Mcclellan from the civil depart
ment Of his government, and led him
to adopt policy OF his own. The mil
itary road to Richmond, and the only
sula and the James river, and 1t was
his duty 30 to advise he insisted. and had
his way, but not for long. A little Of
that selfishness, which serves lower in
telligences as an instinct Of self-preser-
walton, would have shown him
that his most dangerous enemies
were not In his front. The Admin
istration at Washington had to deal
with q people blind with rage, an ig-
norant and meddlesome Congress. and
wolfish horde OF place hunters. A
sudden dash of the Confederates on the
Capital might change the attitude Of
foreign powers. These political consid-
erations weighed heavily at the seat Of
government, but were OF small moment
to the military commander. In con-
flict between civil policy and military
strategy, the latter must yield. The
jealousy manifested by the Venetian
fnanders has often been criticised; but
1t should be remembered that they kept
the military In strict subsection to the
civil power, and, when they were over
thrown, 1t was by foreign invasion, not
by military usurpation. Their annals
afford no example Of the declaration by
their generals that the special purpose
OF republican armies is to preserve civil
order and enforce civil law.
After the battle of Ohickamauga, in
1868, Gen. Grant was promoted to the
command OF the armies Of the United
States, and called to Washington. In
q conference at the War Office between
him, President Lincoln, and Secretary
Stanton, the approaching campaign in
Virginia was discussed Grant said the
advance on Richmond should be made
by the James river. It was replied that
the government required the interposi-
tion OF an army between Lee and Wash
ington, and would not consent, at that
late day, to the adoption of a plan that
would be taken by the public as con-
fession Of previous error. Grant OBJ.
served he was Indifferent as to routes,
but Ii the government preferred
its own - 80 often tried - to the
one he suggested. 1t must
be prepared for the additional loss
OF a hundred thousand men. The men
governmental plan Of campaign. and
was supported to the end. The above
came to me well authenticated, and
have no doubt of its correctness. Dur
ing his operations in the Peninsula and
near Richmond. Gen. Mcclellan com.
splained much of the want Of support. !
think the constancy with which Presi-
ident Lincoln adhered to him was, under
the circumstances, surprising. He had
ington sentiment, and alienated the
sympathies Of his government. His
fall was inevitable-the affections oil
the army but fastened it. Even
victory could not save him. he
fell into the habit of saying. "My
army" "My soldiers" Such phraseo-
logy may be used by a Frederick or a
Napoleon-sovereigns as we'll as gen.
erals-but officers command the armies
OF their governments: Gen. Mcclellan
is an upright, patriotic man, incapable
OF wrong doing. He has high stand.
ard Of morality, and lives closer to II
than most men do to lower one; but
1t Is to be remembered that the exam
pies of the good are temptations and
opportunities to the INSCRIPTIONS. The
habit of thought underlying such Ian
guage, or soon engendered by its use
has made Mexico and the South Ameri
can republics the wonder and scorn Of
civilization. The foregoing account Of
McClellan's fall, and the causes thereof
is deemed pertinent, because he was
the central figure in the Northern field
and laid the foundation OF Northern
success. Above all, he, and a gallan
band of officers supporting him
impressed generous, chivalri'
spirit on the conduct Of the war
which soon faded away after his down
fall; and the future historian, in re
counting some later operations, will
doubt IL he is dealing with campaigns
OF generals or expeditions OF brigands
I have now reached point at which the
great campaign Of 1852 opens to view
ton Of Cram ri scenc es,