The New Orleans daily Democrat., 1878-01-06

value OF time, and the supreme neces
sity OF attacking before Meade's whole
army was up, and is 1t credible that ir
talking to Longstreet about the attack
he did not once intimate that he desired
TO attack as early as practicable on the
morning OF the End, before Meade's army
should all be up Swinton says: "The
absence OF Pickett's division on the day
before made Gen. Longstreet very loth
TO make the attack; but Lee thinking
the Union force was not ali up. woul6
not wait" This information he saws he
got from Longstreet. Is 1t not very Ger.
tain, then, that Gen. Lee was deter.
mined to make the attack before
Meade's army was all up, and discussed
with LonstTeet the necessity of making
the attack before Meade had time te
concentrate !? Longstreet's continued
reluctance to make the attack, mani
tested, no doubt, on Gen. Lees re.
turn from Ewell's line, must have
caused the, sending of Col. Marshall tc
Ewell on the night of the 1st, after the
conferences | have spoken of.
Longstreet says:
On the morning Of the I'd / went tc
zen. Lees headquarters at daylight
ana renewed my views against making
an assault. He seemed resolved, how.
ever. and we discussed the results"
zen. Lee had been firmly resolved fol-
near twelve hours to attack the enemy
and to attack him before all OF his
troops had been concentrated, and is ii
to be credited for moment that he had
not then made up his mind when he
should attack, nor where, nor how? Is
1t not palpable that, finding Longstreet
30 pers1stently averse to the attack. and
so 10th to take the steps necessary to
begin 1t, he again sent Col. Venable to
Ewell to see whether, after viewing the
position by daylight, he could net make
the attack from his flank. Let us see
what Gen. Hood says in his letter to
Longstreet. He says:
II arrived with my staff in front o!
the heights of Gettysburg. shortly after
daybreak, as / have already stated, on
the morning OF the I'd Of July. MY divi.
sion soon commenced filing into an Open
field near me, where the troops were al.
lowed to stack arms and rest until
further orders. A short distance in ad-
vance Of this point, and during the early
part OF that same morning, We were both
engaged, in company with Gems. Lee
and A. 2. Hill, in observing the position
Of the Federals. Gen. Lee-with coat
buttoned to the throat, sabre belt
buckled around the waist, and field
glasses pending at his side walked UP
and down in the shade Of large trees
near US, halting now and then to OBJ
serve the enemy. He seemed full OF
hope, yet at times buried in deep
thought
"Col. Freemantle, of England, was
esconced in the forks Of tree not far
off, with glass in constant use, examin-
ing The lofty position OF the Federal
army.
"Gen. Lee was seemingly anxious that
you should attack that morning. He re-
marked to me: THE enemy is here, and
II we don't whip him he will whip us.
You thought it best to await the arrival
OF Pickett's divisional that time still
in the rear-in order to make the at
tack; and you said to me subsequently,
whilst we were seated together near the
trunk of q tree The General is a little
nervous this morning; he wishes me to
attack; | do not wish to do so without
Pickett. I never like to go into battle
with one boot off.
''Thus passed the forenoon of that
eventful day, when, in the afternoon,
about o'clock. it was decided to nc
longer await Piokett's division, but to
proceed to our extreme right and attack
up the Emmettsburg road"
Can there e. longer be any ,ques-
st2es s9n that dsn beg Lee se wanted ssdk 12eg
early in the morning-as early
as possible, and that the latter
threw every obstacle in the wayi
Doubtless, after sending Col. Venable
to Ewell, Gen. Lees impatienoe at
Longstreet's opposition to the attack
and the delay In the movement of his
troops caused him to ride over to
Ewell's line to see for himself If it was
not practicable to make the attack from
that flank. Upon being satisfied that
it could not be made to advantage there
he rode back and gave the peremptory
order, which, Longstreet says, was given
at II q. M. though he did not begin the
attack until about 4 p. m. II, as Col.
Venable supposes, Gen. Lee had been
undecided or vacillating as to how,
when and by whom the attack should
be made, from 5 p. m. the day before
street acknowledges the receipt Of the
order, then Longstreet's opinion that
"there is no doubt that Gen. Lee
during the crisis of that cam
paign lost the matchless equi-
poise that usually characterized
him, and that whatever mistakes were
made were not so much matters of de-
liberate judgment as the impulses
of great mind disturbed by unparal-
leled conditions" is, in plain
English, that Gen. Lee had lost his
senses-has some foundation to rest
on.
All who know Gen. Lees mode OF
giving directions to his subordinates,
can well understand how he indicated
his purposes and wishes, without re-
sorting to technical order, and doubt
less he indicated to Gen. Longstreet in
that way his desire for him to make the
attack, and make it at the earliest prac-
ticable moment, and did not not resort
to the peremptory order until the
time indicated by Gen. Longstreet.
To rely on that is standing
upon mere technicality. But when the
order was given at II a. M, as acknow-
lodged, why was it that it required until
p. m. to begin =? The pretense that he
made the attack with great promptness,
because he attacked before any one else
on that day, is simply ridiculous. Every
one else was awaiting for him to begin,