Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1878-01-16
Senator Rdmunds' Letter.


WASHINGTON, Dec. 49, 1877.
Mr. President .-Returning from an absence
from town, find your note Of the 18th instant
In 1t, referring to prior conversation between us
In relation to the Intervention Of Senators and
Representatives in respect to nominations and ap-
pontments by the Executive Department Of the
government, you ask me to give you again my
views and experience on the subject I do 50 with
greater pleasure and freedom, from the circum-
stance that your views aud my own concerning
what ought to be the independence Of the Execu-
tive in making nominations aud submitting
treaties, and the independence Of the Senate in
acting thereon, are entirely in accord and that
believe this independence would be made much
more perfect II what IL suggested below could be
carried into practice
" In the great number Of selections required to
be made to fill the necessary offices in all parts Of
the republic, the capacity and character, and in
many instances the opinions Of persons suggested
for places, ought to be known, and must gener-
ally I've ascertained by information from some
source extraneous 10 the Executive Department
1t has not been possible generally, for the Pres-
dent or heads Of departments personally to know
the propriety Of particular selection. This has
naturally led to the practice Of applicants for
place, and citizens recommending them, COM
municating with the executive branch of the gov
eminent through the Senators and Representa-
tives in Congress, and reciprocally to the Presi-
dent and heads Of departments asking and receiy-
ing the information and sometimes the advice Of
Senators and Representatives on the subject So
far think the process was natural and reason
able, and perhaps in n degree necessary ~ the
simplest and safest means of the Executive De-
/ -. t.,lg Ii .,f.
But, as in almost every kind of affair unre-
strcted by position and binding limitations use
fnl habit became custom and the custom gradu-
ally transformed itself from its true nature IA a
means Of information into the course of practically
dsposing OF executive local appointments accord
ing to the judgment or the will of Senators and
Representatives. They came gradually to vol
nnteer recommendations In every instance, and
the Executive Department in like manner came 10
receive and treat such recommendations as final,
as a relief from personal scrutiny of testimonials
and objections, and from much of the sense Of
responsibility for selections. This was evidently
an abuse and perverson of the constitutional
theory of appointments, as well as of salutary
process in administration.
"The effect of this was of course not bene-
fetal The citizen who secured the prize of office
became too often the personal adherent Of the
Senator or member who secured him the place.
and the disappointed ones became the reverse.
Senators and members were sometimes Influenced
in their recommendations by considerations Of
ambition or Of gratitude to those who had rem
| dered, or were expected to render, aid t., their
| personal aims in politics. The liberty of free
political expression and action belonging to a
| place-hoder ~ citizen became also somewhat
cramped and embarrassed. Perhaps still more
injurious To the public interests was the entangle-
ment of the relations between SENATOR and Repre-
sentatives and the Executive Department Who
can measure in such cases how much Of execu-
tive action in appointments is due to desire to
secure an appropriation. or avoid investigation
or encourage reward legislative or senate
rial following? Who can tell in such case how
far the Senator who votes for or against favorite
treaty or nomination, or the Representative who
votes for or against an appropriation or an in
quiry, has been moved thereto by what has been
| or what is expected to be done or omitted by the
executive branch in the direction Of his wishes?
hardly need say that these things do not mpy
corruption in the ordinary sense in any one
They imply rather bias, prejudice and perver-
sion of judgment, arising from sel-interest, and II
| nature is nowhere free
8 The distinct separation and independence Of
the various branches of the government rest
upon principles drawn from universal experience.
and they cannot be too strongly maintained The
Senate and House Of Representatives must in the
respective spheres watch and scrutinize, and deal
with, if need he, every step of the Executive De-
partment and they in their turn, must admin
lister the law as it is through proper agents. free
from dctition of members Of the legislative
branch and from the temptation either to yield to
their nominations or to influence or corrupt them
by the bestowal Of patronage.
at may he these suggestions are simple truisms
bnt they those that cannot be too often re-
peated They stated in more general terms
in the formal declarations of both the political
parties of the country at their last conventions
How, then, shall we follow them? 1t has ap-
peared to me that much could be accomplished in
the right direction by the absolute abstention Of
Senators and Representatives from recommending
particular appointments at all unless their advice
should be asked by the Executive Department;
and, accordingly, since the incoming Of the ad-
ministration have endeavored consistently and
steadily tn abstain from doing so, and believe
have kept my purpose ! have thought it con-
sistent with this position, when applications of
recommendations for place have been sent me, to
forward them to the proper Office, with II written
statement or memorandum of the characters and
standing of the signers II known to me-and |
have thought it right, indeed n duty, whenever
any Of my constituents in the employ OF the Ex-
ecntive Department have complained of its action
As unjust in respect To them, to make the neces-
sary inquiries and cndeavOr To rectfy what should
appear to be wrong. These, think ought to be
the clear and positive boundaries in respect Of ap-
pointments between the members of the two
branches of the government. am gratifed in
believing this course is satisfactory to my con
stituents, and in feeling that neither my official
course nor that of the Executive Department, 81
far as am concerned, can be affected by the in
fuence to which have alluded
:" But to have fair and proper effect, whatever
course is pursued, it ought to be uniform constant
and universal, Any system will be radically
vicious, and will fail that opens the candidacy for
the duties and honors of public trusts to tile citi-
zens of one state or section only upon the previ-
Gus knowledge of the executive branch or the
simple recommendations of private persons, while
there is brought to bear for the candidates Of other
states and sections the powerful and personal So
llcluulpn- OF SENATORS unn Representative whose
gratitude for success may be drawn upon in any
emergency, or whose disappointment in failure
may prejudice them against some most necessary
measures recommended by the Executive. 1t can
he easily seen, too, that there would be no gain To
the public welfare II the practice of following the
volunteer recommendations Of Senators and Rep
resentatives were To give place to the influence of
private cliques, or to business brokerage In
offices, as it is said has sometimes happened 1t is
not probable that the fitness OF the persons APP
pointed would be increased by such change as
this, and it is clear that the responsibility of the
promoters of such appointments would be less, rs
they would be less easily ascertained and would
not have strong motives to satisfy public opin-
ion as those who had been elected to the House OF
Senate by their fellow-citizens, and who are gen
orally supposed To desire fresh proofs of public
confidence, With the vast extent Of our territory
and population, the number Of place-hoders has,
of necessity, become very great, and the means OF
personal or other deRute knowledge of men by
the executive branch has proportionately de
creased and In the same degree the evils of
patronage, In whatever hands it is to practically
exist is increased. | think these can be greatly
mitigated by an entire cessation by Senators aud
Representatives from volunteer advice or solirit.
tions respecting appointments, and by the estab-
lishment of law Of definite regulations respect