The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1878-10-18
!, the Editor 4 Of the Tribune: !:

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TO The Editor Of the Tribune:
81 Sir.--There exists to some extent mis-.
apprehension in regard to the character and
purposes OF the q $40 notes issued by the
Government In 1854 and 1866. 1t has been
stated by imitation Journals, and iteratee
and reiterated by inaatiei, speakers, Ina'
these notes were issued as money. i MS
statement has been In q measure confirmed
By remarks attributed to General Spinner,
but the statement is only partially true, ano
as to comparatively small part OF Tue nrs1
issue.
The exigencies OF the Treasury in 1854
and the early part of 1865 were so great that
the Secretary was compelled to avail him.
self OF all means under his control to meet
the enormous requirements Of the War and
Navy Departments, and, authorized as ne
was to sell these notes, or to use them 10
payment OF debts due by the Government,
he did direct that some OF them should be
sent to the army paymasters and to the AS
sistant Treasurer in San Francisco, with IN
structions, however, that they should De
paid only to such soldiers and other credit.
ors as might be willing to receive them.
They were not used nor intended to be
used as money, but as securities, which the
creditors might receive or decline to re.
ceiye at their own good pleas ure. Ac.
cording to my present recollection, all OF
the notes which were used for the payment
OF soldiers were so used while MIR. Chase
was at the head of the Treasury Depart
ment, and speak advisedly for [ was in
daily communication with him) when say
that it was not his intention or expectation
that they should be even temporarily cir
crlating medium. He was hard pressed for
money. and he was also anxious that the
soldiers should save rs much as was possible
OF their hard-earned wages; and he thought,
as these notes bore high rate of interest,
and were convertible at maturity into
$40 six per cent. gold bonds, that
they would be gladly received and
held as an investment. The experiment
was not a success, and it was soon dis.
continued. OF the $3.50, 100000 7 $40 notes
outstanding in October, 1865. at least $780,
0Oo, 900 bad been offered and sold by popu.
lar subscription, as were the first issues OF
$40 bonds. The bonds and other securi-
ties issued during the war were Issued to
provide means to prosecute the war, when,
us the result was by many regarded doubt
full, subscriptions to the loans were consid.
cred patriotic; those issued after the close
OF the war were issued to provide means
for paying Off the soldiers and closing up
the expenses OF the war. And it is worthy
OF remark that it was not until long
after the war had been brought 10
successful conclusion, and the SOL
yency OF the Government had become
assured, that the holders OF securitie;
which had been freely offered to every
man in the United States became the OBJ.
iects OF denunciation and it is also worthy
of remark that the denunciation OF the bond.
holders almost invariably comes from those
whose prudence, to use no stronger term,
prevented them not only from subscribing
to the loans when the Union was in peril,
but also to the subsequent ones, upon the
success OF which depended the ability OF the
Government to pay the gallant men by
whose yalor it had been preserved The
reason for raising money by sale OF
7 3-1Oths, instead OF bonds having longer
time to run and bearing lower rate OF in.
tercst, was given by the Secretary, in bis
report OF 1868, In the following language
Gas long as the Government was in dan.
ger. BY the continuance Of hostilities, the pa.
triotism OF the people could be successfully
appealed to for the purpose Of raising money
and sustaining the public credit, without
which the war could not be vigorously
prosecuted. When hostiIties ceased, and
the safety and unity OF the Government
were assured, self-interest became again the
controlling power. 1t will be remembered
that it was then generally supposed that the
country was already fully supplied with
securities, and that there was also through
out the Union prevailing apprehen-
sion that financial disaster would speedily
follow the termination Of the war. The
greatness OF the emergency gave the
Secretary no time to try experiments for
borrowing on new security OF long time
and lower interest, and removed from his
mind all doubts and hesitation in regard to
the course to be pursued. It was estimated
that at least S700,000,000 should be raised,
in addition to the revenue receipts, for the
payments Of the acquisitions already drawn
and those that must soon follow-prepara-
tory to the disarmament OF the great Union
army-and OF other demands upon the
Treasury. The anxious inquiries then
were by what means can this large amount
of money be raised, and not what will be
the cost of raisingit. How can the soldiers
be paid and the army be disbanded SC that
the extraordinary expenses OF the War De-
partment may be stopped, and not what rate
of interest shall be paid for the money.
These were the inquiries pressed upon the
Secretary. He answered them by calling to
his aid the well-tried agent who had been
employed by his Immediate predecessors,
and by offering the seven and thrce-tenth
notes.-the most popular loan ever offered
to the people-in every city and village, and
by securing the advocacy Of the press
throughout the length and breadth Of the
land. In less than four months from The
time the work OF obtaining subscriptions
was actively commenced the Treasury was
in condition to meet every demand upon
it,"
The 3-lOths were made payable, interest
and principal, in lawful money Qegal-tender
notes., but they were not themselves legal
tender, as some have asserted; and nobody
so considered them until ten years after
they had been retired. In October, 1865.