The New Orleans daily Democrat., 1878-01-06

it's position. Had the attack been made
at daylight, as contemplated, it must
have resulted in a brilliant
victory, as all Meade's army
had not then arrived, and a
very small portion of 1t was In position.
A considerable portion Of his army did
not get up until after sunrise, one corps
not arriving until o'clock In the after
noon; and prompt advance to the at
tack must have resulted in his defeat in
detail. The position which Longstreet
attacked at was not occupied by the
enemy until late in the afternoon. and
Round Top Hill, which commanded the
enemy's position, could have been taken
In the morning without struggle. The
attack was made by two divisions, and
though the, usual gallantry was dis
played by the troops engaged in 1t. no
material advantage was gained"
This constituted my sole criticism on
Longstreet's operations on the second
day. In speaking of the assault on the
third day, I said:
son the next day, when the assault
was made by Pickett's Division in such
gallant style, there was again miscar-
riage in not properly supporting 1t &C.
cording to the plan and orders OF the
Commanding General. You must recol-
| lect that a Commanding General cannot
do the actual marching and fighting OF
his army. These must, necessarily, be
entrusted to his subordinates, and any
hesitation, delay or miscarriage in the
execution OF his orders, may defeat the
best-devised schemes. Contending
against such odds as we did, it was me-
cessary, always, that there should be
| the utmost dispatch, energy and un-
doubling confidence in carrying out the
plans of the Commanding General. A
| subordinate who undertakes to doubt
| the wisdom of his superior's plans, and
enters upon their execution with re-
luctance and distrust, will not be likely
| to insure SUCCESS. It was Gen. Jack
sons unhesitating confidence and faith
In the chances Of success that caused it
50 often to perch on his banners, and
made him such an invaluable executor
of Gen. Lees plans. II Mr.. Swinton has
told the truth, in repeating In his book
what is alleged to have been said
to him by Gen. Longstreet, there was
at least one of Gen. Lees corps COM
manders at Gettysburg who did not
enter upon the execution of his plans
with that confidence and faith neces-
sary to success, and hence, perhaps, it
was not achieved"
| The foregoing constituted all the cri-
ticisms had made on Gen. Longstreet's
operations at Gettysburg, or on any
other theatre during the war, previous
to the controversy before alluded to.
The views in regard to the delay in the
attack on the I'd had been repeated
more sucoinctly In notes to my own re-
port, which was published In the Sep
tember and October numbers of the
Southern Mdgasine for the year 1872
No where do assert that Gen. Lee had
ordered Gen. Longstreet to make the
attack at sunrise, or at any other speci-
| fic time. l merely state that he
had announced to Gems. Ewell,
Rodes and myself his purpose
to attack at dawn on the morning of
the I'd, and that he had left us for the
purpose of ordering up Longstreet's
troops to begin at that time. I do not
know what were tine specific orders
given to Longstreet, and in that respect
L am as good witness for him as either
Of those he has produced, who simply
| do not know what were the orders
given, nor when they were given. Those
orders were manifestly given in person,
and no living man can say precisely
what they were. except Gen. Longstreet,
IL he indeed recsliects them.
was prompted to make the remarks
/ did make in my address at the Wash
ington and Lee University from the
fact that [ had read Mr.. Swinton's
Campaigns of the Army of the Poto-
mac" and discovered that his criticisms
on Gen. Lees conduct of the battle Of
Gettysburg. which are amplified in
those now made in Gen. Longstreet's
name with great similarity of express
sion in several respects, was based on
information given by the latter to Mr..
Swinton after the war. / here give
some extracts from Swinton's book.
On page $40 he says:
"Indeed, In entering on the campaign,
Gen. Lee expressly promised his corps
commanders that he would not assume
tactical offensive, but force his an
tagonist to attack him. Having, how
ever, gotten a taste Of blood in the con-
siderable success Of the first day, the
Confederate commander seems to have
lost that equipoise in which his facul-
ties commonly moved, and he deter
mined to give BATTLE"
There is a foot note to this statement
as follows:
This and subsequent revelations of
the purposes and sentiments of Lee I
derive from Gen. Longstreet, who, in a
full and free conversation with the
writer after the close of the war, threw
much light on the motives and conduct
Of Lee during this campaign"
On pages 340.1, he says
"Longstreet, holding the right of the
Confederate line, had one flank secure
ly posted on the Emmetsburg road, so
that he was really between the Army of
the Potomac and Washington, and by
marching towards Frederick could un-
doubtedly have man@uvered Meade
out of the Gettysburg position. This
operation Gen. Longstreet, who fore
boded the worst from an attack on the
army In position, and was anxious to
hold Gen. Lee to his promise, begged
in vain to be allowed to execute"
To this there is foot note as follows:
1.-The officer named is my authority
for this statement"
On page 1853 there is this foot note:
1.-THE absence Of Pickett's division on
the day before made Gen. Longstreet
very 10th to make the attack; but Lee,
thinking the Union force was not all up,
would not wait. Longstreet urged In
reply that this advantage (or supposed
advantaua for the TInion foroa wau all