The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1878-04-03

pToihpUeN ny pOlcy ana not by the
great and enlightened principles Of juris
prudence. and then point out two
| or three instances In which the court 'dodged ;
| IT., with reference to so august body, we may
| use 80 rude an expression, and which show a
| fixed and settled purpose to strain the law
| and the authorities for the great overruling
purpose OF releasing an Infamous and con-
victed criminal, whose crime agitated the
whole country and constitutes the foundation
| OF the greatest fraud ever perpetrated upon
constitutional liberty in this or any other CEN
fury
The concluding sentences Of this decision
are truly noble: worthy, indeed, to have fallen
from the lips of the purest and greatest jurist
who ever expounded the law from an enlight-
ened standpoint and 10 the interest Of justice
and society. "Let It be known OF all men,"
says the Chief Justice, speaking for this
high tribunal shat q court can con-
slider neither expediency nor policy; that it
cannot shape It's judgments either to realize
the hopes OF friends or to quiet the fears Of
foes: and that judges may abhor malefac-
tor and yet refuse to condemn him contrary
to the law"
SetLhlIny tleS6 arc HHo WOTuS, WOTuS when
will receive the sanction of all good men. But
has the Supreme Court of Louisiana been
strictly guided by the large and enlightened
theory Of action 1t has here laid down? Has it
been as jealous OF the rights of society and
of the great principles of law as 1t has been
Of those of an odious and most infamous
malefactor2 Has 1t done In this case for the
people, for public justice. as much as 1t has
done for convicted felon2 Has 1t guarded
the rights Of society and the freedom of
elections with the slme ingenuity that it has
those Of the scoundrel who has violated the
law, outraged public decency and alienated
himself from the sympathy and respect Of
mankind2 We believe not.
Without going over this whole decision, we
propose to show the unfairness with which the
Supreme Court acted on two or three points,
and through these points to show the charac-
ter Of the whole decision which has released
Tom Anderson.
In the first decision, reversing that of the
lower court, the Supreme Court declared that
the Supervisors Consolidated Statement was
not such public record as could be forged
The Attorney General, in his brief asking for q
rehearing, assumed that the question as to
what constitutes record is O matter Of fact to
be proved like other facts and had been deter
mined in this case by the jury. In support of
this position, he quoted the language of Chief
Justice Parker. Of Massachusetts, in the case Of
Brier vs. Woodbury(1 Pick, 362), In which that
eminent jurist said "A record Is conclusive
evidence, but what is or is not, record is
matter Of evidence, and may be proved like
other facts; otherwise there would be no
Now, commenting on this illustri-
GUS authority, CT ed by the Attorney General,
the Chief Justice Of Louisiana says:
1t would have been extraordinary II so high
an authority "a Chief JUS ice Parker had sane
toned such d.ci y ana ne Is the Only ju,ist
his language had been given In full. as We shall
give. the identical case cited Ia shown to be In
Brier vs. Woodbury.. 1 Pick. 3s2 and ia cited
with the observation that 1t il conclusive of the
question. whether an instrument Is or Ia not a
t RI|,0 ono'ed is: "a record is conclusive evi
dence. but what Is or is MT record is matter
OF evidence, and may be proved Ike o.her facts
The words Immediately following and not
quoted are: ION the plea II nul tiel record. the
fact is to be judged OF by the court ETC.. p. 36z
1t affords us no qualification to point out
the subterfuge under which the court here at
tempts to shelter itself. Indeed, it Is with
sense Of humiliation that we do 80. The At
torney General did not misquote, garble or
curtail the language Of Chief Justice Par
ker: but the Supreme Court of Louisiana
did do 80. The Attorney General quoted
the eminent Massachusetts jurist only
so far as he laid down great general
principle of law; that principal of law is that
l.. Oh -, ;., ~ ri 10
ter for evidence. and may be proved like other
facts" This principle is laid down by Chief
Justice Parker plainly and distinctly as a
broad general principle, and he concludes his
utterance on 1t with period and a para
graph. The Louisiana court intimates that
the Attorney General has garbled or curtailed
Chief Justice Parkers language, and, to
maintain it's own position and its right
to reverse the verdict OF a jury OF the State
on a question Of fact, tickS on to the general
principle Of law. underlying all Jurisprudence,
by Parker. part Of sentence
and paragraph which follows, and which is
only of the lap of Massachusetts
''The words Immediately following" says
Chief Justice Manning, referring to the At
torney Generals quotation from Parker, are
"On the plea Of naI tiel record (what con-
stitutes record) the fact is to be judged of
by the court" The Chief Justice Of Lou
isiana should in all fairness, have quoted
the whole sentence The Attorney Cen
eral stopped on a period, and with
and an enuncation Of distinct
principle Of law. Chief Justice Manning
stopped on a semicolon, in the midst Of
a paragraph, and contents himself with
half of what Chief Justice Parker said
relative to the law of Massachusetts,. The
Chief Justice of Massachusetts having an
nounced the principle Of law, presented
by Attorney General Ogden, continued in an
other paragraph, thus: ''On the plea Of nal
tiel record, the fact is to be judged by the
court; aolo, no doubt, rould eramine witnesses
upon suggestion that there had been an in
terpolation: and where the question comes