The Louisiana Democrat. [volume] (Alexandria, La.) 1845-1918, 1878-12-25
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CoNVEN-
TION.

! How. often should the Legislature
meet? II any one was asked why |.
the Legislature should meet every
year, he would, be surprised to find
unable sogive a reason. We
doubt If he wouldFnot be troubled to
find even. a plausible reason why it
should meet once in two years. The
public have taken it for granted that
the object or necessity of these an
nual OR biennial meetings is to make
laws, buta moments reflection will
convince them that no such necessity
exists. There are three great sys-I
TENS Of law, the civil, the common
and the commercial low. Neither Of |
these systems were created by legis- |
Ilative enactments, but we're built upI
|by the opinions of jnrists. The
com monsand commercial LAW, by the
decisions Of the courts and, perhaps,
1.-THE civil law in similar manner, al
Though reported as the digested
iopinions of the most celebrated Of
1.-THE Roman jurists. n England and
lin this country their opinions Of the
bench are often condensed into q
single legislative enactment, and, ini
dependent OF this mode, legislative
/ enactment has added almost nothing
to the Improvement of thefaw. We
hare pointed out these facts to shor'
how slow Is the growth oftaN, and
from thesyery nature Of things, it
4 cannot be Otherwise. = Il il equally
(evidens that it is not necessary that
l tue Legislature should meet every
two or even three years 60 keep pace
I with this Allow growth. The slight
I changes which have been: made in
1.-The last Is years, Notwithstanding
; the incessant legislation, is equally
corroborative of this conclusion.
In what cause, then, did the fire.
7 quent meetings of,the Legislature
take their origin? We think it can
be distinctly traced to the contest
! between the English Parliament and
: the Crown under the Stuarts. The
meetiag Of Parliament was consid:
ered as a bulwark against the, en-.
i. croachment Of the Crown. We in
J. herited this idea with the laws o.
J, England and it stands ont promi
nently in the provisions OF the Fede
Il raj Constitution. The majority o
p its trainers were afraid Of the en-
'iicroachm ents OF the executive, Gen
e eral Washington, Mr.. Hamilton ant
Of Mr.. Adams of the encroachments o
t. the Legislatures. The idea whicl
c. ruled the majority has pervaded tn
stl States, but the fearful legislative en-
Sc croachments upon the executive
|both' federal and state, during tn
~ last fifteen years, have verified th
r fears of General Washington an
q q Mr.. Hamilton. During the last te
y. years the executive of Louisiana ha
virtually surrendered q large shar
4 of his appointing power to the Ser
70 ate, BY granting to each Senator til
IN right OF selecting the appointees I
81. be made in his district. There al
Of other tyrannies OF che Legislative, d
% partment upon the executive, equa
81 ly Objectionable, but our space 70
ed bids US to dwell upon them, Thes
se aggressions would cease with ii
y frequency Of the sessions, But u
re argument is stronger than a mel
lnes. negative. Tie first is its enormot
9 cost, but as strong as this is, it
.'s perhaps not the strongest. The'
No frequent meetings create, an ince
= SAINT tinkering with the laws, m ey
~ ~ which can hardly be oyerestimate
= How often. then, ought the Gen
II raj Assembly to meet2 just ofte
~ ~ enough to check executive aggre
ss' sion and to conform the law to Il
80 necessities of society which ha'
M been clearly pointed out. How q
q ten will it be necessary to meet the
Co. demands? We know. from our e
E. perience under the Constitution
~ 1862, that once in two years is n
Nv too seldom, and we believe that, on
~ in three will be found amply suffi'
~ ent, if not once. in four. At s
- events. with the power Of the exec
w ~ tive to call an extra session when
- ~ thinks the necessity Of the State
M quires, we will incur no srisk. q 4
she
an We have recently attempted
solve the problem why there shot
? be House Of Representatives ant
tho Senate, and we confess that consti
a.. ted as they have been under all {