The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1878-08-11

oil terrible struggle OF the hercest fighting ever
j done on this continent, ending in the Victory
and death Of Johnston, Gen. Bsauregard Ian
fg bis anabule,sce in the rear Of The nrMy,o etc.
assertion Is, first, Gen. Beauregard'g word
and, next, The testimony Of his whole staff,
! some OF whom are now In our midst, and who
accompanied him on that occasion, conveying
bis instructions and orders TO, the above
named ctrps commanders, and wherever else
| he. judged 1t necessary to send them. The
batllea ragged on, our troops gradually and
surely approaching victory.
| There was Swallowed forth the first symp-
tom of one oil several causes, which finally
Beauregard Is as blameless us Gen. Johnston
| himself The delay In our march from Cor
NTH to the battlefield had caused our men, inn
| proyident as oil raw troops are wont to be, to
consume before they had reached the front
| the few days cooked rations which had been
given to them at their. departure. And when
ever, during their triumphant progress on
passed through the well-provisioned camps Of
| the enemy, no human power could prevent
numbers OF them from stopping to appease
their hunger. The germ Of disorganization1
and struggling. thus laid, soon spread and
developed itself on the line as the hours went
on. Most stringent orders were given to drive
out our men from these fatally alluring en-
eampments. They were obeyed by many, and,
| by many, disregarded. SO much SO, that Gen,
Beauregard, three times on that day, ordered
some Of the enGampments to be fred hoping
thus to compel the struggling to cease at
| once. Onward, onward. rolled The tide Of bat
tie: our columns still progressing In their
victory. but having much to accomplish BE-
| fore attaining the h0ped-for end.
| Then came, when many signs OF exhaustion
were already manifest In our ranks, the
crushing news OF the death OF the co1nman-
der-in-chief.
It was about o'clock D. m when Gov. Har-
rts, OF Tennessee, one OF Gen. JohnstOns
| special aids, rode up 70 Gen. Beauregard, a
| little in front OF the Shiloh meeting house,
| where he then was, IN Che saddle, and actively
engaged In collecting stragglers. and, with
emotion easily understood, announced that
viously, had expired from loss OF blood in his
arms at half-past o'clock.
| We will not dwell at any length upon the
shock, the gloom, the inevitable halt in the ihb
| rfghtward. which followed, as an inevitable
result, this greet catastrophe. Care was
taken to conceal 1t from the troops, and
| with some little success; but, like all news
Of evil portent it spread In spite OF every pre-
caution, and, when night fell, was generally
known all over the line.
The whole command now devoIying upon
| Gen. Beauregard, he made superhuman exer-
tions, with entire self-forgetfulness, to re-
| inspire confidence to the troops and urge
them on to victory as vigorously as before.
But, unfortunately, he. found under him not
| the fresh, enthusiastic men SO CALAMITY
handled by Gen. Johnston In the early part
Of the day, but hungry, jaded, dsorganized
kept to their ranks but whose physical
powers were fast failing them. Gen. Beaure-
gard, struck already by the premonitory
symptoms OF failure, now foresaw how
| hazardous O long continued struggle would
become. However, and In spite Of such un-
promising appearances still intent upon pur-
suing our success, he began active prepara-
tions over the line for q renewed combined
attack Of all our available forces. Staff Off
| GERS were dispatched TO the rear In search Of
| more struggling commands; temporary or
| CARNATIONS were Immediately resorted to-,
and at about 4 80 o'clock .. m. q general en-
| gagement was thus resumed, on all points,
with more vgor than could have been ex-
peoted. New lines Of the enemy were again
broken through, until he was driven back TO
the very verge Of the river Gen. Sherman, in
his "Memoirs,' page 247, after speaking Of
the death Of Gen. Johnston, says: "There was
when the attack was renewed, but with much
less vehemence, and continuedup to dark"
At that supreme moment Of cur operations,
| 1t being about s o'clock p. M, o rapid vigor-
| Gus firing was heard from O ridge, in the d-
| recti0n OF Pitsburg Landing. An experienced
| and anxious ear could soon detect that it
| must proceed from tte arrival OF fresh REIN
| fOreements to the enemy; and 1t was feared
that Ley Wallace's command by o rapid
march, had just reached the Federal lines
was, In reality, part of BueIl's command
Ammens brigade Of Nelson's division-which
had been thrown across the river as q timely
support to Websters powerful battery-JSee
Thos B. Van Horne, q. 3. A., page 10S. See,
also, Gen. Jordans Campaigns OF Gen. For
rest" page 1872.
New hope and confidence were thus infused,
| at this last hour, into the overnight, nearly
broken down Federal forces Here. too their
ggnboats came into play, with shots and shells
OF the heaviest calibre, committing havoc
among our advanced columns, now near
enough to be seen from the river banks. Thus
was the enemy saved from utter humiliation.
| We know, by personal experience, that the
| brigade to which oar regiment belonged was,
| just about that time, ordered to charge that
very Webster's battery, somewhat to the left
OF our front, which had opened on us with re-
greater discomfort Though the order to
charge had been given to the whole brigade,
our regiment only 1.-THE Eighteenth Louisana)
made the assault, up the hill, in full view OF
the enemy, but was compelled to retire, SO
murderous was the fire encountered with
loss Of more than 200 men in less than eight
minutes time. Another such assalltlagainst
the same battery was then made by the Or
leans Guard Battalion, under Major Quey-
rouze, who was severely wounded, and whose
against 1t, was also forced TO fall back. as had
previously done the Eighteenth Louisiana
[See official reports of battles, pages 307-311.l
Why did not our entire brigade charge as
ordered? Simply because other regiments
belonging to 1t we're not within reach, and
could not be used to cooperate with the regi-
ment and battalion, which, separately and
unsupported, had executed the order.
At this hour OF that eventful day, all officers
and men who were near the front Of our line,
saw, felt and understood, that our organiza.-
ton YES YES too completely broken up to effect
regiments, brigades, were scattered here and
there, marching, counter-marching, with no
apparent aim or object. Struggling had as
sumed such 3 character as to amount to al
| most open resistance to orders. Corps, divi-
| sion, brigade commanders, hardly knew what
| was taking place In their immediate front,
stu less on other portions OF our line. And
this is another very powerful reason for at
| tatching no over due Importance to The opi,s-
so1ss SO triumphantly relied upon by. your
correspondent, What he called "history,"
he apparently builds on opinions: what we
call history, we only build on facts.