The Bossier banner. [volume] (Bellevue, Bossier Parish, La.) 1859-1952, 1878-02-28
THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE.
The Gradual Waning of the Crescent.
From the New York SUM-

fairly reported, what will be left of the
Ottoman powerp How does the extent
of the Sultan's authority compare with
that of earlier members of his dynasty
whose resources were danger to Eu-
rope? The truth, is that the present
ruler, as regards breadth of dominions,
will remain more formidable poten-
tate than Bajazet or Mohammed H.,
and may fairly vie with any of his house
prior to the reign of Solyman the Mag
nifcent. dh@ tf7a
is worth while to trace the success
sive strokes by which the Turkish en-
pire has been curtailed since the acme
of its greatness under Solyman and his
son, SeIim H., in the sixteenth century.
Let US bear in mind that at the latter
epoch, besides all his present dominions
except Crete--the Sultan controlled
part of Poland, all the southern prov
inces of Russia skirting the Black Sea,
together with Austrian Creotia, the So
called military frontiers, and independ
ent Seryia on the west and Russian
Georgia on the east. The first signs of
decadence in the aggressive power of
Turkey were the double defeats of Soly-
man before Vienna in 1929 and 1882,
and his repeated repulses by the Hun
garians at the. fortress OF Sziget, one OF
which cost the Sultan his life. The next
blow was struck at Lepanto, in 1911,
where the Turkish fleets lost the pres
tige and dominance which, since the
downfall of Rhodes. they had maintain
ed throughoutthe n editerranean. About
d century later, under the impulse of a
remarkable family of statesmen, the OF
toman armies undertook to renew ag-
gressive movements, but they were routed
before Vienna by the heroic Pole, John
Sobieski. In the subsequent war against
Austria, whose II oops were command
ed by the famous generals, Prince Eu-
gene and Louis f Baden, the Turkish
strength on the middle Danube was de-
stroyed. With the loss of fortresses in
this quarter, the hope of Ottoman ag-
grandizement north of the river seems
to have been abandoned; and at the
peace of Carlowitz, in 1899, Mustapha
Ii. surrendered nearly all his Hungarian
possessions to Austria, Azovto Peter the
Great, Podolia, and the Ukraine to Po-
land, and the Morea to Venice. No
terms which at the present juncture
Russia could hope to see ratified by the
European powers could possibly APP
proach in severity the conditions of the
peace of Carlowitz.
During the whole of the last century
Turkey was at war, now with Russia,
now with Austria. Notwithstanding
some partial successes, such as the re
conquest of the Morea in 1715, the gen.
I-eraf result of this long contest was dis
astrous to the Ottoman sovereign. He
lost, for instance, the Crimea and all his
outlying possessions north of the Black
Sea, and by the treaty concluded with
Russia, at Jassy, in 1892, the Dniester
was made the frontier between the two
Empires. The present century has wit
messed a series OF rebellions usually fol-
lowed by the concession of partial inde-
pendenee : to provincial governors.
Thus, in 1905 Servia rose under
the leadership of Czerny George, and
subsequently achieved a notable meas
ure of self-government. The insurrec-
ton of Ali P;ssha at Janina in 1922 was
crushed, but the Greek revelation which
followed was success sful, WeshouId re-
mark, however, that il was not until the
Turkish-Egyptian fleet had been destroy
ed at Navarino, and the Russian armies,
under Diebitsh, had crossed the Balkans
and arrived at Adiianople, that the
Porte would acknowledge the independ-
ence of Greece. i
Three years after the treaty of Adrian
ople, namely, in 1882, began the peril
Gus contest of the Sultan with his too
powerful vassal, Mehemet Ali, the Vice
roy of Egypt. In this struggle NAH
mould Ii. was repeatedly defeated, and
the quarrel was only ended after alapse
OF several yeals, and when the loss of
the Sultan's Asiatic dominions seemed
inevitable, by the direct intervention of
England and her allies on behalf of the
Porte. This action constitutes an epoch
in European diplomacy. The official
! admission of Turkey into the political
system of Europe dates no further back
than the treaties of 1910 and 1S4l To
the same principle must be referred The
acceptance of the integrity of Turkey as
a cardinal principle of international
policy on the part of the Western pow
ers. Thirteen years after its adoption
this principle led to the Crimean war,
which resulted in the discontinue of
Russia and the apparent rehabilitation
of the Ottoman power But it has been
disavowed and set at naught by the at
titude OF England since Russia's resets
sion of the treaty OF Paris, and through
out the present conflict.
1t is now FIVE centuries and half
since the crescent appeared in Eastern
Europe. Two centuries remain to be
completed, If the Turks are TO exhibit a
teDacifv equal to that shown bv the