The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1878-04-07

correspondents pretend to have discovers
Beaconsfeld's true policy at last There
no doubt that he has completely mystifie,
everybody Russia has been compellet
to change face, to alter It's peace propo
sitions score OF times, and finds to
day that 1t is no nearer satisfying England
than when, weeks ago, 1t decided not tx
seize the Turkish fleet, lest this might pre-
Cipitate war. The policy that Beaconstield
Is pursuing is, these correspondents claim, tt
keep Russia aggravated, suspicious and un.
certain as to his real Intentions. and to delay
real action on the Eastern question as long
as possible; to thus compel Russia to keep
her present large and costly army modified
while diplomacy moves slowly along; in
other words. to break down Russia by the ex-
pense Of her own army.
There is no doubt that delay benefits Eng
land. Every day not only enables her better
to prepare for war, but strikes another blow
ut Russia. The gigantic army OF Russia Is
proving her great weakness and bugbear.
She started out In the late war in a very un-
promising financial condition; the war proved
alarmingly costly, and Turkey cannot posi-
bly, foot the bills for it; but now, when it Is
ended, Russia finds her army more expensive
than In the hottest part of the campaign.
Since the peace Of San Stefano, In consequence
OF the threatening position of England, Rus
STA has called from their peaceful pursuits I've
hundred thousand men, whom she Is drilling,
uniforming and making ready for the field as
fast as she possibly can.
Delay is ruinous to her; every day costs
her two million rubles and hurries her on to
that inevitable bankruptcy that awaits her.
The English papers see this clearly, and
are rejoicing over it. They openly congratu-
late the country ON the ruinous way in which
Russia Is bankruptlng herself; breaking her.
self down In order to maintain her gigantic
army on its present war footing. They want
to see Russia kept irritated and alarmed as
long as possible, convinced that II she can be
compelled to continue long in her present DO
sition her power and strength will be com
pletely broken down without England
striking blow. England can afford to
watch and wait until the proper moment ar
rives, and then pounce down on her
colossal but bankrupt rival. In the mean
time. the singular picture is presented of
public opinion that reioices at the unprece-
denied development Of fighting strength Of a
rival, with which its armies are about to cone.
Every telegram that informs England that
another division OF the Russian landwehr
has been ordered out. is received with low in
that country because 1t increases the bur-
den OF Russia and hastens its bank
ruptcy and fall. The war, il war
should come, will be one of material re-
sources. England's policy, in that event, |
would be to have just enough men in the !
Held In Turkey to harass Russia and compel |
her to keep her army at its present standing.
Such warfare could be carried on by Eng
land for years; Russia must sink under it in |
a very short time.
The military strength of Russia the i'm
mense army she possesses, is, therefore a |
burden to her rather than benefit. This
system promises to be one OF the favorite
modes Of warfare in future It was in this
way that England fought Napoleon in the
Peninsula. She had small army in. the
Held, just sufficient to harass France and
compel Napoleon to keep several hundred
men always in Spain.
England seems to have already begun this
policy OF delay, and is moving slowly in her
diplomacy, keeping Russia harassed, ex-
dted and alarmed. The negotiations since
The peace Of San Stefano have cost Russia
more than the war itself, and it is probable
hat II the Eastern question is kept open
much longer, the Gar will see the necessity
surrendering to Englands demands with
'ut war.