The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1878-01-31

svSh mode only should be adopted, sc far
as that particular election was concerned.
Il is said, however, that the words
ejoiIt ballot must s5 , construed as mean
ing merely tho act of voting rather than
the mode Of voting, iu order to avoid on
sbsurdity, inasmuch as there can be no
such thing as joint ballot Id the primary
sense of the term ballot--a small bail or
ticket---and, therefore. as here used It
must DO given its secondary. meaning.
Without stopping 70 consider whether
the word ballot has ever acquired such
secondary meaning except in the loose
and careless language of the public press,
or in the journals Of deliteratiye Assem-.
blies, where abbreviated forms Of expires.
sion are quite common, no Instance Of
ouch meaning having been found in any
work OF authority, emanating either from
Iaxicographers or legal writer's, or to show
that the phrase 'joint vote az found In
section 2 of article 4 is open TO the same
criticism, as it is quite as absurd TO speak
Of joint vote as of joint ballot, IL being
just as impossible for two persons to give
G Joint rita yoce vote rs it is for them to
put in the ballot box joint ballot, US
they can no more vote with q Join, voice
than they can with q joint ball or ticket,
It Is quite obvious that the phrase 'joint
ballot" means jointly by ballot just as
the phrase "joipt vote" mcsns Jointly by
vira Coce vote. In other words, that the
word joint was inserted in each instance
merely for the purpose of showing that
the two branches of the body which was
to elect should act together and not sep
arately as they do in performing their
usual and ordinary duties. Accordingly
we lind, by reference TO the constitutional
and legislative history of this State, as
cited in the argument, that the phrases
and by "ioint ballot" have been indis-
crlminateiy used as interchangeable
terms, signifying always the same thing
as that ehe.e attributed &c thhe tshhe words ''b 'bhy
joint ballot" in the clause OF the present
constitution now under consideration.
am, therefore, most reluctantly forced
to the conclusion that the defendant in
this case, not having been elected In the
mode prescribed by the constitution, has
no valid title to the Office in question,
and that upon the demand Of the State,
through its Attorney General, Judgment
ff custer must go against the defendant.
The State of South Carolina vs. Il, +.
Shaw--OPinion by Willard, G. J.
The constitution (article Q, section 24)
provides thatin all elections by the Gen.
eral Assembly, orseither house thereof,
the members shall vote "viua poce," and
their votes, thus given, shall be entered
upon the journals of the house to which
they respectively belong. Again it pro-
yides, (articl9 4 section 49, "the State
ehall DO divided into convenient. circuits,
and for each circuit judge shall be elec-
ted by joint ballot OF the General Assem-
bly.", .re-s-s If. a4,,I,,7 -
It is oontended by the State that the
provision as to elacting by joint ballot iu
equivalent to % declaration that the Cir
cult Judges. shall be elected by ballot,
and thus creates an exception TO the gen.
erality Of the words declaring that all
elections by the General Assemble shall
be By "riro voce' voting. The :aspon-
dent, on the ether hand, coptends that
the sole object Of the declaration as to
electipg by, Joint. ballot was to designate
the body, that. should elect the Circuit
Judges, namely; the united bodies con.
sttuting the General Assembly, Joined
together for that purpose in one body.
The rule OF construction applicable to
the case recognizes the fact that words
expressing the universal application of o
btatutory requirement to all cases of this
class to which it relates, may be restric.
ted, not only by the use of technical
words, importing exception or Limitation,
and by more general expressions having
an equivalent effect and directly disclos-
ing an intention, to create exceptions cc
limitations, but also by implication, in
ferring such intent "a o necessary means
of reconciling provisions otherwise in
consistent. ;,7rr
1t is only as necessary Implication
that such conclusion can be drawn in
ferentially. Iti only the impulsiye force
of necessity that can justify an eIercach-
::ient upon the direct terms of rule of
universal application. -d .at &.
IL flows that when the law-mnking
authority has established rule in terms
extending TO all cases of the class en-
braced in it, and has not subjected it to
express Limitation or exception, an eg-
ccption or Limitation can pniy pc implied
where the provisions from which this
implication is sought admit of no reason
Bile Interpretation consistent with the
direct eense of the term Of the general
rule. .
It would also. follow that where the
sense and intention of the words claimed
to operate as q limitation are of doubtful
import, admitting Of different construc.
tions isome consistent with the general
rule and others inconsistent with it, an
exception or limitation cannot be i'm.
|iplied.
am satisfied that at the least the in.
tention of the constitution involved in
the present case is doubtful This Nigh,
be inferred from the fact thas inc Legis.
leture for eight years Immediately cue
ceeding the adoption Of tho constitution
adopted the sense claimed for It by the
respondent, and that the entire circuit
ldiciary was organized during that time
E, upon that understanding of the constitn
| II Is not an unreasonable construction
that the trainers of the constitution may
hays intended by the language of sectioI
| Is, article 4, to merely designate the bodj
! by which the Circuit .1ndgea should b.
elected, leaving the mode of election K
| be determined by that article and section
that dealt directly with that subject
| Whether such was their actual intention
| it Is not important, under the view l TAX,
| Of the case, to inquire, 1t being sufficien
for the purposes of the present case Il
ascertain that such ia not In itself al
unTeAavnE4uie Cui.5tr .,Jsi,jIa.
II this be the case wa ere bound {,
adopt that construction which is in har
mony with the antecedent provision pre-
scribing the mode of voting in all case
Of election by the General Assembly. Il
order to warrant an encroachment upoi
| the terms of the general rule we mus