The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1878-01-31


through its Attorney General, judgment
Of custer must go against the defendant.
The State of South Carolina VS.. A. j..
Shaw-O Opinion by Willard, G. J.
The constitution (article 2, section 24)
provides: thatin all elections by the Gen
eral Assembly, oraeither house thereof,
the members shall vote "viua vocs," and
their votes, thus given, shall be entered
upon the Journals of the house to which
they respectively belong. Again 1T. pro-
Yides, tarticle 4, section 13, ethe State
shall be divided into convenient. circuits,
and for each circuit Judge shall be cleo
ted by joint ballot of the General Assem-
Bly, ~, 2.rsf .rt z.
i 1t is contended by the State that the
provision as to electing by joint ballot is
equivalent to "a declaration that the Cir
cult Judges. shall be elected by ballot,
and thus creates an exception to the gen.
erality Of the words declaring that all
elections by the General Assembly shall
be by t"viva, yocs' voting. The respon-
dent, on the other hand contends that
the sole object of the declaration as to
electing by, joint ballot was to designate
the. body that! should elect the: Circuit
Judges, namely; the united bodies con-
stituting the General Assembly, Joined
together for that purpose in one body;
The rule of construction applicable to
the case recognizes. the fact that, words
expressing the universal application of q
statutory requirement to all cases of this
class to which it relates, may be restric.
ted, not only by the use of technical
words, importing exception Or rlimitation,
and by more general expressions having
an equivalent effect and directly disclos-
ing an intention. to create exceptions or
limitations, but also by implication, in
ferring such intent as a necessary means
of reconciling provisions otherwise in
consistent. .i,.i -. go ,. 5ifs
] 1t is only as necessary implication
that such conclusion can be drawn in
ferentially. Itis only the impulsiye force
of necessity, that can justify an encroach-
ment upon the direct terms of a rule OF
universal application.
It follows that when the law-making
authority has established rule in terms
extending to all cases of the class en-
braced in it, and has not subjected it to
express Limitation or exception, an ex-
ception or Limitation can only be implied
where the provisions from which this
Implication is sought admit of no reason
BILE Interpretation consistent with the
direct sense of the term Of the general
rule, ~. ,a.i.5..,.
! It would also follow that where the
sense and intention ;of the words claimed
to operate as a limitation are of doubtful
import, admitting of different construc.
tions, some consistent with the general
rule and others inconsistent with it, an
exception or limitation cannot be i'm
piled. -
:. I am satisfied that at the least the in
tention of the constitution involved in
the present case is doubtful. This might
be inferred from the fact that the Legis:-
lature for eight years Immediately sue
ceeding the adoption of the constitution
adopted the sense claimed for it by the
respondent, and that the entire circuit
Judiciary was organized during that time
upon that understanding of the constitu-
ton. -.
It is not an unreasonable construction
that the trainers of the constitution may
have intended by the language of section
13, article 4, to merely designate the body
by which the Circuit Judges should be
elected, leaving the mode of. election to
be determined by that article and section
that dealt directly with that subject
Whether such was their actual intention
it is not important, under the view | take
of the case, to inquire, it being sufficient
for the purposes of the present case to
ascertain that such is not in itself an
unreasonable construction.
If this be the case we are bound to
adopt that construction which is in har.
mony with the antecedent provision pre-
scribing the mode Of voting in all'cases
of election by the General Assembly. IL
order to warrant an encroachment upon
the terms of the general rule we must
find a construction inconsistent with thai
general rule, for it is only by the fact o
such Inconsistency that we can compe
the terms Of the general rule to give way
before external force. We are not a
liberty to raise up a force to antagonize
great fundamental provision of the con
stitution on speculative grounds or yer
bal refnements, especially where tha
fundamental provision is intended to ap
ply to principle inherent in the nature
of the exercise of representative power
in government.
It is easy to see that the provision a
to vivo uoce voting by the representative
| of the people was based upon the genera
idea that the voting Of representative
should be open and responsible, as the!
act, not in their own interest, but in tn
interest of the public. This principle il
put in opposition to that Of secret voting
which is clearly appropriate when tn
voter acts from his individual choice
arising solely from his sense of persona
| duty or interest.