The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1878-04-26

rumors of extremely diverse effect, and
thus exhibits happily the uncertain and
contradictory state of opinion in Eu-
rope on the great fact that is before all
the cabinets Prince Gortschakoff is cred
tied with the declaration that the assembly
Of the Congress in May is SO nearly GER
tain that in hundred chances there is
not more than one against it. In the
other sense q mot Of Bismarck's, said to
have been repeated by his physician.
is to the effect that s'short Of o
miracle war is inevitable. Although these
are not strictly contradictory sayings
for the Congress may meet and war still
follow-yet. accepted in the significance in
which they were apparently intended, they
give impressions wide as the poles apart OF
confidence in peace on the one hand and
certainty Of war on the other, since the
meeting of o. Congress has become in prac-
tical use synonyme for peaceful adjust
ment of the difficulties. With the opinions
Of the two most capable and best informed
statesmen in Europe thus Numerically OPP
posed as to the probable issue Of the
present delicate state of the negotia-
tions between England and Russia lesser
mortals may fairly be satisfied to watch the
drift of events and modestly withhold their
prophecies. There are few men to whose
Judgment on doubtful issue Of this nature
the world at large would be inclined to ut
tach greater weight than to Prince Bis
marck's and in this case. though not an in
different observer, he Is still locker on,
whose large survey Of the case is not inter-
fered with by the concentration of his
thoughts on the combinations of one side
Prince Gortschakoff. on the contrary, re-
garding the Congress as the means Of recon-
Cling Europe to Russia's claims, and OF thus
saving her triumph without another war,
may well be more hopeful than accurate in
his speculations of what is to come.
Hitherto it has not been certainly known
that the project for the mutual withdrawal
OF the forces from the neighborhood OF Con-
stantinople had failed; but the circulation
in London ofreasons why it failed or ofrea-
sons why Her Majesty's government rejected
the proposition indicates ut least that the
failure is believed in in that city. IT England
account for Prince Bismarck's opinion rs to
the certainty OF war, for 1t was his plan thus
| to separate the stormy elements and prevent
| that precipitation Of war by accident or mis-
understanding which seemed at one moment
| imminent. In common with all clear-headed
men in Europe he believed that the two
cabinets could in fair discussion overcome
the obstacles to IN agreement, and that
mischance where the armed forces were in
presence was the fact to be most appre-
hended. Hence he may we'll believe that
the refusal of the English government to q
scheme by which that danger could be set
aside implies such ON intention with re-
gard to war as makes the government indif-
ferent to the possible occurrence Of any
event that might precipitate it. In fact, it
must be thought generally that if the British
| government has based its action in this
case ON the grounds given, it has simply
| plead shallow pretexts as reasons why 1t
| should not come to fair agreement. It Is
urged that for England to agree by diplo-
matte instrument in the nature of conven-
ton with Russia as to the point of Ottoman
territory TO which the Russian troops should
withdraw from the neighborhood of Con-
ssantinople would be an agreement to their
occupancy of that point and would be a rec
ognition of the Bismarckian theory of their
tenure, beati possidentes This is much like
fearing to bulge lest one shall be fright
ened to death by his own shadow. To re-
fuse to agree and give no better reason for
it than this implies either that the govern
ment sees no danger in the proximity Of
the Russians to the Turkish capital or in
vites the possibilities OF such danger to put
an end to discussion and precipitate war.
But the projected agreement was only to
prevent accidents. 1t did not touch the
marrow Of the difference between the two
Powers. 1t referred to dangerous likei-
hoods that it was deemed wise to exclude
before proceeding to the elaborate examina-
ton of the differences to be reconciled, lest
some mischsnce might plunge The two
Powers into q confiict that nll the diplo-
matte labors were intended to prevent. If
Her Majesty's government SHES away from
agreement on q topic of that nature, and
SHES away on q plea that is ridiculous
exaggeration Of small obstacles, what is the
chance that at a Congress Of the Powers it
would be present in any happier or more
tractable frame Of mind? 1t accepted the
mutual withdrawal from Constantinople lin
principle" only to carp and get away in
hurry from the first attempt to agree on the
details. II it ever entered Congress would
1t enter in the spirit Of one predetermined
that all negotiations should fail in 80 for as
they sought to gain its approval by compro-
mise or concession for the unpalatablo
provisions Of the San Stefano Treaty. II is
probable it would Indeed. neither the San
Stcfano Treaty nor any other treaty that
Russia could make with Turkey would be
admissible on the ground laid down in the