The New York herald., 1878-11-07
ENGLAND'S AFGHAN DANGER

IMPORTANT LETTER FROM SIR HENRY NJ. HAVE
LocK-How TO MAKE ENGLANDs PosrTIoy
IMpREGNABLE.
Major General Sir Henry NJ. Havelock has written
long letter to the press in reply to that of Lord
Lawrence the Anglo-Afghan difficulty and the pos
sibiities of struggle between England and Russia in
India He declares that he is not in favor of war al
all hazards but objects to inaction which will allow
Russia to make her own game and take her own time
about it. England. he thinks, make her position
in India impregnabe without war; but he believes
that in any case, otherwise it must be mater-
ally strengthened. His proposition is as follows:-
possible present solution would be as foows-
Let us take the separately First as to Afghan
istan. No hostile advance into her territory, now
that coup de main is impossible, till all other means
definitely fail. But. first alternative, between
this and next April obtain friendly understanding
with the Amecr, if that be now pract.
cable which should aim at two things-one
the admission of our diplomatic represents
tives to Herat and Candahar. l would waive
putting agent at Cabul, if the Ameer persstentiy
declines. even though Russia is established there
Second object-An altanoe guaranteeing the protec-
ton cf the noYthcrn and western borders of Afghan-
stan. For totally disagree with Lord Lawrence as
to the possibility OF obtaining any material influence
the Ameer if he do not consent IN return to take
little risk also. Such an agreement would be obyi
ousy one sided and he will never probably consent
would according to Lord Lawrence's own admission
be attended with little risk, because the Ameer has
never shown himself aggressive either toward persis
or Russia. If we deny him this guarantee, as LORD
Lawrence did in 1867, can we wonder that he should
lean exclusively to Russia. who will promise him any
thing !? These points would summarize the proposed
negotiation with Aghanistan.
Then to Russia. would suggest that we ''in.
vite' her, politely and yet firmly to adhere to.
and to return to- her conditional agreement with
Of 1s69-that is not to extend her influence Tor
the future south Of the Oxns. Accepting, equally
,talxr anafin that her Is.
sion is purely commercial would it not be
wise to point out to her that the commerce OF
Cabul is enthusiastically small while that OF CHINA s
and that if she were henceorth to go East
in search of commerce toward China she would u1-
questonably be bcnefited-we should be freed from
not unreasonable disquietude about India and all
chance Of collision would be prevented? This course
might meet that difficulty 1t is neither war nor def.
but prudent foresight urged in the interests OF
peace.
THE INDUS FRONTIER
Then to the strengthening of the Indus from
tier" on which Lord Lawrence suggests nothing but
done? If his views Of STRENGTHENING mean any.
fortresses all along the left Indus bank 1t would
require at least five of them-at Peshawur, Dera
Isrnael Khan, Leila, Dera Ghazee Khan and Sukkur.
Fortrcsses not only cost enormous sums, but,
Judging by what the Danube proved to be in
the summer Of 1877, long line of river and
chain Of fortresses real defence after ALL es-
pecially when the hostile. or western, bank there
exists Of mountains like the Sueiman range,
passable at least FIVE points, and presenting If the
Khyber remain sealed to us-Herat being the first and
Candahar the intermediate base-an impenetraold
opposite to weak defensive line OF 400 miles
behind which from Peshawur to Sukkur. attack could
be prepared at leisure and could choosets own point
Of entry. So much for the present Indus frontier.
But what would in my humble judgment, be
permanent strengthening of that frontier, protecting
FOR sraegically its weak assailable section the
space between Dera Ghaze and Dera ismael Khan
would be that which PROPOSE only in case all at
tempts at conciliaton and alliance absolutely FAIL
viz, the acquisition by purchase OF one or perhaps
two salient points projecting little and very ttle
from Indus frontier and thus actingto use
familiar term in fortfcation-as bastions TO that
river curtain.
These selients are:-On the north the block Of
mountains. some thirty miles long by twenty hve
broad, which contain and enclose the khyber Pass.
and including Dhakka its western exit. see no rea
why. if Shere Ali persists in rejecting our prof
fered friendship and alliance, should not pur.
longs who are now actively friendly subsdize them
to perpetual alliance with fortify points along
its whole length Of road and add 1t per
manently to Peshawur district. In that case we
should not require to go Cabu at ALL either in 1878
later either politically militarily. Because the
road would be always open to use the Ameer's teeth
would be drawn. and Russia would know. and he
would know that we could go there whenever 1t be
came absolutely necessary to do So But to suppose
as Lord Lawrence does that we should be able to
effect this stroke hereafter with Cabul once in de-
fensive alliance with Russia. appears to me Chi
mcrica
THE possrssroN or caNDAHAR.
Similarly, to look south The advanced southern
bastion to our Indus frontier would pc the Pnrchassa
right to put garrison temporarily at Candahar. The
Ameer knows he Is weak there the people are friendly
to they rccollect with gratitude Sir William Motifs
benevolent and friendly occupation from 1889 to 1872
Our trade relations with them have increased much in
late years. believe they won hail our advent and
its pcclniary advantages with delight while the
muncation with Sukkur be made perfectly secure
through the Bolan. and eventually III time
by two direct routes through the suieiman
range to points the Middle Indus. This also could
be effected matter of purchase. Afgfanistan Is
not and never has been a united Kingdom. 1t IL
loose agglomeration of jealous tribes often bitterly
hostile to each other If Shere Ali obstinately rejects
alliance with and its Consequent safety to his
rule and to the succession to his throne no rea
moral political. why should not buy safety
to weak frontier and tranquility to India at Can
dahar well at the khyber Such a bargain
would be at least less "immoral and less costly
than And the force for these two purposes need
we utilize internally the contngents of friendly indie
pendent princes, and thus strengthen their loyalty
and position at and the same time. With
these two points in possession, even with the
Khyber alone. leaving Candahar untouched should
be inclined to let Cabul .'fry in its own juice We
should certainly be in much better position to
wait patiently for Shere Ali to get over his
sulks: and it would be matter of comparative
Indifference whether we had agents ut Herat and
Cabul or not. We should have permanently secured
frontier against the threat of invasion either in
1898 in 1918. accept Lord Lawrence's dates And
why? Because should have gone very far toward
removing out OF Russias way, and for all. the
longer any weak point of frontier for her to operate
against, Herat would no longer be OF the same value
to her base of operations
This second possible solution. It will be seen may
be secured-and hope it will If the first, an alliance.
fa-without the expenditure Of the life of single
British soldier or of one Afghan peasant
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