National Republican., 1878-07-11
SECOND BULL RUN-AUGUsT 81.

General G. X. WARREN's testimony be-
fore the PORTER court Of inquiry regarding
the night Of the 27th Of August, before the
second battle of Bull Run, is really very
amusing. WARREN is eminent in his Corps,
and had much experience during the war.
His own opinion regarding that eventful
night would be worth something; but the
amusing part of his testimonyis the gravity
with which he announces that PORTER,
SYKES, and MoRRELL advised against q
movement of PoRTER's command that night
because 1t was dark, because the troops
were hungry, and because the roads on the
line Of march were crowded with q confusion
of unparked baggage-trains. Within one
week after this these same troops-MCCLEL-
Lam having been restored to Command
marched through Washington out the old
Columbia pike, past Rockville, regardless of
baggage-trains, hunger, or fatigue or any
thing else, to win the fruitless victory at
Antietam. Subsequently, if not before that
noted 9th of August, as everybody knows,
such obstacles rs darkness and crowded
roads were never regarded as serious. In
fact, hunger, fatigue, or anything else neces-
sarily incident to the hardshps of active
campaigning, were never before offered MS
excuses for noncompliance with or obedi-
ence to orders to march in such an emer-
gency as the one then confronting General
POPg.
But there are other incidents of record as
occurring that night which prove PoRTERs
fiimsy excuse to be nothing more nor less
than insubordinatiOn. HOOKER had fought
JACKSON at Bristow Station on the 26th, the
precedingday and PoPEattempted to concen-
trate not only PoRTER's entire corps,
but the divisions of kEARNEY and RENO,
of HEISTzELMAN's corps, and MCDowEIL's
command in position TO bag" JACKSON,
who fell back from HoOKER's front in the
direction of Gum Springs. To effect this
concentration orders were sent post-haste
through the enemy's vidette lines at that
to RENO, KEARNEY, and Mcdowell to
march without delay on Manassas; RICK
ETTs division was thrown into Thorough
fare Gap to prevent LONGsTREEr from COM
ing through that mountain pass to REIN
force JACKSON, and SIGELs division with
portions of MCDowELL's command were to
be deployed in nearly continuous line from
Thorougfare to connect with HETNTZEL-
MAN at or near Manassas. These orders
were carried and their execution promptly
begun on the night Of the 27th, which PoR-
TER describes as so dark, &c. The avidity
of KEARSEY to obey the order delivered to
him and the eagerness of RENO to do the
same were in strange contrast with the tardy,
evasive, hesitating aud insubordnate con.
duct of PORTER. 1t was n critical moment,
and the situation had been explicitly ex-
planned to them in their orders. They were
patriotic in desire to al | Pope in winning
a further victory over JACKSON, and they
consequently entered into his plans with
true soldierly ardor. They marched over
blind country roads" black jack roads,
the Virginia farmers call them-that night
to Manassas, while PORTER waited for the
darkness to disappear for his troops to ill
their stomachs, and for the parking of
wagon trains There are volumes of argu-
ment in this comparison of facts
But it is capable of demonstration that