Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1878-01-18
TOdIcbcn on the Fall OF PIevna.

A correspondent of the TosSiSche Zeitung,
writing from TutchenitZa on the 18th of De
cember, communicates to that paper an ac-
count of an interesting conversation with Gen
Todleben on the siege of Pleyna. The CORES
pendent describes the General as a calm, re
Elective looking man, very different in appear
ance and manner from the hot headed and
thoughtleSS Russian officers 10y whom he
Is surrounded, and speaking German fuently-
when came here, he said, - was con
tinually tormented 10y anxiety lest OSman
should make his sortie too soon, before the
Notifications were strong enough. l was from
the beginning opposed 10 the theory of taking
his strong positions by storm. IL was not l.
but hunger that conquered him, though this
was only rendered possible by surrounding
him SO firmly and effectively as was at length
done by our trenches. Pleyna teaches the
lesson that the modern system of defence is
quite different from what il used To be, and
possesses enormous advantages against an
aSSailant. You have in the NoSgeS five or six
PlevnaS.
"In order to be able to surround a natural
position or an entrenched camp. and at the
same time 10 continue to execute great Strate-
gic plans, il is necessary for the aSSailant TO
bring twice as many soldiers into the field as
are required 10y the defending army. To take
such fortified position by storm Is with mod
ern firearms impossible, or at least inOppor-
tune. One should never require more of an
officer or a soldier, however brave he may be,
than il is possible for him 10 do; but the de-
mandS made upon our officers and soldiers i'm
the StOrming of Pleyna exceeded the bounds
of possibility. Even when such a strategicaI
adventure succeeds. il Is a mistake. Thought
less men must say, let ten thousand troops
fall, SO long as We get the position; but they
do not consider that. if the position is lost not
only that ten thousand men fall, but fifty
thousand are demoralized.
My chief care was so TO arrange matters
that wherever OSman might attempt a Sortie a
sufficient mass of troops should at once be
contracted to oppose him. With this object,
had double row OF trenches and redOubtS
made around Plevna, SO that while the first
was being attacked at any point the concen-
tratiOn might be made behind the second. ~
The correspondent having asked the general
whether he thought that OSman might, under
favorable circumstances, have saved part OF
his armO. T0dleben replied: mo BOSNIAN made
the Sortie with y 900 men, the whole force UNI
der his command except some 5000 or 5000 re-
serves. If he had attacked us with half that
force il might have been said that the cause Of
his defeat was the numerical superiority of his
enemy OSman knew this, and attempted a
brilliant and daring attack with his whole
army; but success was hopeless.
"In my opinion 0Sman made a great Strate-
gical mistake in not attempting his SOrtic
sooner; and never could understand why he
did not at once evacuate Pleyna after the
capture of the positions at Teliche. Even SO
late as six weeks ago he would have had n
chance of saving part, IL not the whole, of his
army; but he let the opportunity pass, and We
labored necessarily to close him in more and
cannot be relieved from without, the be-
Sieged army should endeayor at once 10 with
draw from il, as the beSiegerS can strengthen
their circle of Notifications every day until the
garrison is forced by hunger TO capitulate."-
Pal Mall Gazette.