Daily Los Angeles herald. [microfilm reel] (Los Angeles [Calif.]) 1876-1884, 1878-01-18
gus Sagelss gera'd.
GEN. necLELLAE's OPINION OF osMAN
PASHA.

General Mcclellan is contribute
ing . series of valuable papers to
the North american Reuiew, close
II following the events of the war
between the Russ and the Turk.
He INDUCES in running criticisms
as he goes along, and in concluding
his last paper, having just learned
OF the fall Of Plevna, he disappoints
US In his estimate both Of the value
OF that stronghold as Turkish de-
Tense and Of the military qualities OF
Its commander, Osman Pasha, who
was so greatly admired after the
surrender by the Russian military
chiefs. General Mcclellan says:
Osman was treated by the Gar
with q degree of courtesy and con-
sideration justified, perhaps, by his
not by the inhuman brISality
which constantly characterized the
conduct of his troops toward the
Wouuueu IsueSiouS VIM AoiA ~ eoSA
hands.
We do not yet know with suf1i-
cient accuracy the means at
Osman's disposal, or all the cir,
cumstances which surrounded
him, to justify final judg-
4 ment upon the merits of his defense
from q professional point Of view.
He certainly deserves the credit OF
obstinate gallantry, but it now sp-
pears more like the conduct Of
wild beast at bay than that of a
skillful general. He selected his
position well and fortified it
with skill, but it does not
appear that he took advantage of
his successes, which were due more
to the plumbers of his antagonists
than to his own merits.
This much is certain: from the
moment when Todieben took
charge of the siege-operations,
when Imeretinski became chief OF
the staff, when Skobaleff re-
ceived an important command, and
Ghourka was placed in charge OF
the operations on the Sophia road;
from the moment, in fact, when
knowledge and skill directed the
operations of the Russians-Osman
became helpless as child In their
hands, and his fate was sealed.
Plevna had no such value in itseli
as to justify the loss of an army in
holding it few weeks longer. If
Osman had been great OF
even o good general, he would
have abandoned his position
the moment he found the Sophia
road seriously endangered, for his
army would have been of infinitely
more use elsewhere. With Plevna
and the army which held it, the
line Of the Balkans has fallen. The
weather usually encountered at
this season will, no doubt,
offer serious obstacles to the Rus.
slams, but they are not insuperable,
operations will be suspended. The
army Of the Cssarovitch has shown
itself fully capable of masking the
quadrilateral. 1t is possible tnel
we shall soon hear of the
fall of Sophia, the occupation Of
Philipopolis; and an advance
in force on Adrianople. This
will oblige Suleiman Pasha tc
move with at least portion
of his force to the succor of Adri.
anople and the capital, in which
case the whole of the commands oil
the Cesarovitch and Zimmerman
will not be required for the reduc-
ton of the fortresses north of the
Balkans, and q part can re-
enforce the active army in Roume-
liza. The nature of the for
trssses of the quadrilateral is
such that armies, not mere
garrisons Of moderate strength, are
necessary to defend them.
Ifa large Russian army advances
into Roumelia, as it readily may,
the fate of Turkey must be
determined under the walls of
Adrianople or in front of the lines
Of Buyuk Chekmedje, and, in the
present condition Of the once for
--<tnidable empire of the Osmanlis, it
need surprise no one to hear
of the virtual abandonment OF
all the region north of the
Balkans, in order to concentrate
In Roumelia for last desperate
effort to hurl back the invaders.
Should events prolong the
war into another summer cam
paign, the Turks have not much to
gain by the delay. Their resources
are nearly exhausted, while those
of Russia are not. The Servians,
the Montenegrins, and the Greeks,
will occupy them so fully on the
west that the Russians and
Roumanians can devote the
entire strength of the main
army to the direct operations
against Constantinople. From
their vantage-ground in Armenia,
It will be perfectly practicable for
the Russians to conduct q |
campaign in Anatolia, which, |
even if 1t does not actually lead to
Scutari, will at least completely |
paralyze the Turks in that quarter,
and deprive then of the large re-
sources with which that region has |
always furnished them. 1t now
seems probable that nothing short
of foreign interference-and that
In the shape of very numerous and
strong battalions and for
midable navy-can save them.
There Is only one power, if there be
even one, that has any disposition
to interfere, and it is doubtful
whether other and stronger powers
will permit that interference. 1t
would appear to be wise for the
TURKS In Re 4