The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1878-10-29
M'CLELLANyrARDIXEss IN TnEwxn
A Letter or PRECEDENT Lineoin to MeCieI.
Ian Not Heretofore Published.
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WASHINGTON, April 8, 1862.
Major-Generai Mcclellan:
DEAR srR-Your dispatches complaining
that you are not properly sustained, while
they do not offend me, do pain me very
much. Blencker's Division was with
drawn from you before you left here, and
you know the pressure under which did
II, and, as l thought, acquiesced in it
certainly not without reluctance. After
you left l ascertained that less than 10000
unorganized men, without single field
battery, were all you designed to be left
for the defense OF Washington and Man
assas Junction, and part Of this, even, was
to 60 to General Hooker's old position.
General Banks corps, once designed for
Manassas Junction, was divided and tied
up on the line Of the Winchester and stras:
burg, and could not leave it without again
exposing the Upper, Potomac and the
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. This pres.
ented, or would present, when McDougall
and Sumner should be gone, "a great TEN.
ptation to the enemy" to turn back from
the Rappahannock, and sack Washington.
MY explicit order that Washington should,
by the judgement Of all the commanders
I oi the army corps, be left entirely secure
had been neglected. It was precisely this
that drove me TO detain Mcdowell. l do
not forget that I was satisfied with your
arrangement to leave Banks at Manassas
Junction, but when that arrangement was
broken up, and nothing was substituted
for Il, OF course I was not satisfied was
constrained to-substitute something for it
myself. 800 1,.Fli;
Now, allow me to ask, do you, really
think / should permit the line from Rich
mond via Manassas JUNCTION TO this city to
be entirely open, except what resistance nSa
could be presented by less than e, 900 un-
organized troops? This is q question
which the country will not allow me TO
evade. ~ AIS. $50. So e.p r.,E
There is a curious mystery about the
number OF troops now with you. When !
tclegraphed you on the 9th saying you had
over 100, 900 with you, | had Just obtained
from the Secretary OF War q statement
taken, az he said, from your own returns,
making los, 900 then with you and en- route
to you. You now say you will have but
81, 600 when all an route TO you shall have
reached you. How can this discrepancy
OF 5000 be accounted for? As TO General
Wooi's command, understand it is doing
for you precisely what q like number OF
your own would have TO do il that COM
mand was away. f 80 If ,i.I, LIT
/ suppose the whole force which has
gone forward for you is with you by this
time, and il so, I think it is the precise
time for you tostrik blow. By delay the
enemy will relatively gain upon you-that
Is, he will gain faster by Notifications and
reinforcements than you can by reinforce.
ments alone. And once more let me tell
you, it is indispensable to you that you
strike blow. / am powerless TO help
this. You will do me the justice TO remem-
Dor 1 always insisted that going down the
bay in search OF field, instead oitghtng
at or near Manassas, was only shifting and
not surmounting difficulty; that you would
find the same enemy, and the same or
equal intrenchments at either place, The
country will not fail to note-is now not
ing-that the present hesitation TO move
upon an intrenched enemy is but the
story OF Manassas repeated.
i beg 10 assure you that l have never
written you, or spoken to You in greater
kindness OF feeling than now, nor with a
fuller purpose to sustain you 80 lar as IN
my most anxious Judgement j consistent
" can, but you mustact Yours very truly,
.,'..us'Tg 80 A!LINCoLS. j