The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1878-02-24

tho number Of mon who might bc prop
orly organized In the second army, and
for that reason the writer In the MitttS
Woch,pblau abstains from making any cs-
innate. According to law, however, the re-
serve covers the contingencies OF the four
years lsGs-7l and these should give, In the
opinion Of the writer In Unsere Neu, total
of five hundred and ten thousand mon.
As regards the efficiency of this force we
must boar in mind that tho state Of the
French finances has not yet permitted the
Government To call out the reserve for
more than ono of the two annual periods
prescribed for tactical manuuvrcs, nor IL
there at present any likelihood Of such
increase in the military budget as Will in
sure prompt Improvement in this direction.
The reserve. therefore, cannot he expected
To reach state Of thorough efficiency be-
fore 1881, when it will entirely consist OF dis
cplincd soldiers, zach of whom has finished
his term of active service This conclusion
substantially comedies with that OF Sir GAR
NET WoLsELEy, who, however disposed
toward favorable view Of her resources,
conceivcs that the military system of
France, even az regards the reserve of her
active army, is still inchoatc.
We need not dwell ON the territorial army
and territorial reserve which correspond
respectively TO the German Ldnd,rehr and
Ldndshum, for as yet these organizations
can hardly he said to exist. except ON paper.
Their present nullity IL practically admitted
by Sir GARNET WoLsELEY. who upuna
long calculation to show what may be- looked
for from those forces in 1892. when we rc-
H.,. I'm tA tt
the iruition of these plans, We are not sur
priscd that the Miiudr WochenbtU should
discard such problomatic elements in its cal
culatlon OF the lighting strength Of France"
II we supplement the figures above assigned
to the active army on war footing with
some four hundred thousand men ~ all arms
as the true quota OF the reserve, we shall
offer an estimate hut little inferior To that
OF Sir GAKSgr WoLsELEY, and more in ac-
cordancc with the defective framework Of
the reserve. ~ disclosed in the report Of the
general staff. To sum up, the cntir" number
Of disciplined and organized soldiers avail
able to France in the year 1873 for all pur-
poses, including garrison duty, the main
tcnancc Of communications, and service in
the field does not exceed twelve hundred
Thousand men.
As regards speed Of mobilization the Mli-
tdr Wochenbtau asserts that France has now
nothing to learn from Germany, but there
IL reason 10 think this statement disingcnu-
Qua, and designed to reconcile German opin-
ion to further military cxactlons. This IL,
al all events. the Judgment of the French re-
viewer, who tcstios that the PROCESS Of con-
ccntration could not be- executed with equal
prompttudc in France. On the whole, our
conclusion is that France viii entor the Con
frrcnc" IA a military power of the first mag
nitudc, compared with any State except the
German Empire But whether she has ac-
quircd the means of defence against German
invasion Is still extremely doubtful. and IL
il certain that all projects 81 revenge must
be postponed for very many years.