The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1878-04-18

act of her Legislature under consideration
! how her demands" against her citizen
, shall be satisfied, how the liabilities s'due
, the same propriety and with equal force b
argued that debts and taIes due the Com
monwealth are not fully discharged by pay
ment IN coupons: and yet this is done ever
; day under the statute law, sustained an
enforced by judgment Of this Court. Blu
in point Of fact the judgment for a fine
discharged to ats full eatent, so far as til
State is concerned, because the coupon rep
resents the obligation of the State for tn
face value of the coupon.
Second. 1t is objected that fines are dedi
Gated by the Constitution, and by statute
enacted in pursuance thereof, to the literary
fund for school purposes, and if the act I'm
der consideration embraces fines, TO tina
extent it is unconstitutional.
Now, it is to be observed that neither the
Constitution nor any act passed. in pursuance
thereof requires the collectors of the public
revenues, nor the Auditor, to keep separate
and distinct each particular fine assessed
against offenders and pay it over, as col.
lected, to the literary fund, but the require
ment is upon fair construction, to turn over
to the literary fund aohatercr amount may
come into the Treasury from the source OF
fines, and dedicate that amount to the pur-
pose Indicated. This same argument was
pressed most vigorously in the case of Anto-
nj vs.. Wright (supra), and was answered
1 think, successfully and conclusively by the
lamented Judge Bouldin; and prefer to
adopt his views, so clearly and ably put,
rather than mar and weaken them by words
or views of my own. He says: s'But it is
argued that the contract in this case is void
because it is repugnant to the sth section of
| the Sth article and 3rd section of the 10th ar
ticle Of the State Constition, defeating GER
tain portions Of the State revenue to support
| the free schools. We think there is no such
conflict in the case. 1t only requires
that the obligations of succeeding Legisla-
lures shall be firmly met; that there should
be what the creation of every new debt i'm
peratively demands wit, an increase of
taxation if the existing rate be insufficient.
The argument is based on the assumption
| that subsequent Legislatures will fail in their
duty and pursue such course as may re-
suit in malappropriatlon of the funds refer
red to; that they will decline to meet faith
fully the high obligation resting On them,
and then rely ON the irregular consequences
of their own default as an argument against
the validity of the debt for which they will
have failed to provide. The malappropria-
ton which would follow would not be the
legitimate result of the funding act, but ia
effect would be the act of the Legislature
falling to discharge its duty. The obliga-
ton to provide for the interest due by these
coupons is as higl, as the duty of applying
the capitation tax and other funds to the
schools. Both duties are alike obliga tory,
and both may be discharged, as there is no
conflict between them. 1t is only by fail
ure to discharge the one that the perfor-
nance OF the other can be put in jeopardy,
andits rests with the Legislature, by faith
fully and fearlessly meeting both obliga-
tions. topreserve the plighted faith of the
State and protect her Constitution from vio-
| lation.''
| After this opinion of the Court, delivered
by Judge Bouldin, was announced, there
was motion for rehearing submitted by
the Acknowledgement op6 th,5 no,,t l,ol,1
the case under advisement for several weeks,
anxious to correct its decision if it should
appear in any respect to be erroneous, and
tog give to the case that calm and careful recon-
sldera ton which the gravity aud the impor-
lance of the question involved required. At
ter candid and anxious review of the case,
the Court could find no reason to change its
opinion, but was confirmed in the justice
and reasons of its conclusions. In deliver
ing the Judgment upon the motion for
rehearing, Judge Anderson, in an able and
exhaustive opinion, discusses the whole
question, re-afirming and enforcing the
views of Judge Bouldin and in these views
the same judges concurred as in the original
deliberation and care the questions involved
in the case OF An.oni vs. Wright were con-
sidered, and the futilty of again consider
ing these questions, except to re-affirm and
adopt the principles of that case so for as
they apply to the case before us.
| With repect to the argument made in that
case, as it was pressed in this case, that fines
and other revenues we're dedicated to the
school fund, and therefore cannot be paid
in coupons, Judge Anderson, in his opinion
[22 Grattan, page S74], says: SIT
is said that those provisions of the Constitu.
tlsn which set apart certain funds and GER
tain proportion of the tax for the public
schools would be defeated by this legislation.
IL would seem to be sufficient reply to say
hat ii it were impracticable to raise a suffi-
Gent amount of revenue for both purposes,
the latter did not impose an obligation on
the Legislature paramount to the obligation
to provide for the payment of the interest
on the public debt. That was al obligation
antecedent and paramount to the Constitu-
tlon itsel:, and could not be repudiated by
che Constitution if it had so provided. But
it is not repudaited nor ignored but the
obligation is clearly recognized by sections
Z. 8, 10 and 20 of article l0-at least to pay
Virginia's proportion. Aud, furthermore,
this being an obligation of debt and not ele-
emosynary in its character, as are the other
provisions referred to, and however desira-
BILE and important it may be that they should
be carried ous, hesitate not to say this is of
higher obligation. But there need be no
clashing of duties here. 1t is only required
that the Legislature should levy tax sufi-
cient for both objects-a duty imposed on
it by the Constitution. 1t has not been the
practice to set apart in the public treasury
the identical money received for the public
schools. nor is it required by the Constitu-
ton nor the acts, of Assembly. And the
Legislature has discharged its constitutional
obligation when it has set apart the required
amount for that purpose"
These views, expressed both upon the first
hearing and the rehearino of the case of