The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1878-04-18


II all the men leave, and so few!
trust that we with cupid's darts
May capture some-let them beware
Respon6s-'Behold the sorrow Of our hearts,
And Lord with mercy hear our prayer !! ~
THE COUPON CASE.
THE SUPREME COURT DECLARES THAT
THEY SHALL BE RECEIVED FOR FINES.
Judge Christian delivered the opinion of
tile Court, concurred in by Judges Anderson
and Burks. .sf
Judge Moncure, owning some State bonds,
did not sit in the trial of the case.
Judge staples dissented. We published
his opinion last week.
1871. OPINION OF THE COURT.
'rhis case is before us upon petition filed
by James Clarke invoking the original jurs-
corpus. The petition and the record there
with filed show that the petitioner (Clarke)
is confined in Jail under an execution (capias
pro .fns) issued upon Judgment of the
Hastings Court of the city Of Richmond for
the sum of $50, the fine assessed by said
court, and $22.05, the costs Of prosecution
OH behalf of the Commonwealth.
1t is further shown that the petitioner ten
dered to James NJ. Tyler, Sergeant Of the
city of Richmond, 'sa coupon which was due
and past maturity for $50, which said coupon
was cut from bond of the State of Virgin
ia, issued under the provision of the act of
Assembly, passed March 80, 1871, common
ly known as the Funding bill, and the sum
of $22.05 in money, that being the amount
OF costs.
The City Sergeant refused to receive the
coupons rendered in payment of the fine i'm
posed by the court and thereupon Clarke
applied to this court for writ of habeas
corpus, and insists upon his right to pay the
fine assessed against him by the Hastings
Court in coupon Of a bond of the State !;
and that upon such payment, with the costs
Of prosecution, he is entitled to his discharge
from further Imprisonment.
This record, therefore, presents for our
consideration the single question, whether a
fine imposed for violation Of law can be
discharged in coupons, or whether it can
only be demanded and paid IN money?
This is the same question which was elab-
orately argued at the January term of this
Court, in the case of '"Tyler, Sergeant, vs..
Taylor, Auditor" That case was argued
upon petition for a writ of mo1sdomus to
this Court. to compel the Auditor of Pub
lie Accounts to receive from the Sergeant of
the city of Richmond certain coupons which
had been received by him in payment of a
fine imposed on one Mayo for criminal
offence.
In that case this Court unanimously held
that the writ of mandamus could not be is
sued against the Auditor of Public Accounts,
because he was not the public officer whose
duty it was, under the law, to receive fines
collected by the City Sergeant, and declaring
that this Court could only exercise its ex-
traordinary jurisdiction by way of manda-
mas to compel public officer to discharge
a duty which the law imposed on him, and
not on another. And inasmuch as the City
Treasurer, and not the Auditor of Public
Accounts, was the public officer whose duty
it was to receive all fines collected by the
City Sergeant, the rule was discharged and
the case dismissed without deciding the
question on its merits.
In tina. case it was said, and is here repeat
ed: s'This Court is always ready and willing
to decide, to the best of its ability. all ques-
tions, however important or difficult, or
however they may effect public or private
interests, which are properly brought before
it, no matter how great or far. reaching may
be the responsibilities it must assume in
| such decision. But the Court is not willing,
! nor is it any part of its judicial functions, to
| decide questions outside of the case before it.,
| and thus constitute itself moot court, to
determine abstract questions"
| The question argued in the case of Tyler,
Sergeant, vs.. Taylor, Auditor, did not arise
upon the pleadings in the cause, and the
Court did not (for the reasons stated in its
orinion) feel called upon to decide an alb.
stract question. But the same question now
does arise properly upon the records in this
case, and the Court is now prepared to meet
the question and assume all the responsible
tiles which may attach to its decision, how
ever it may effect individual or public rights,
private or political questions.
But the question we have to determine
| (however it is sought to be connected with
questions which are the subject, unhappily,
Of political agitation) is purely legal ques-
ton, to be determined upon well-detined
legal principles, and the rules of construc-
ton universally recognized as applicable to
The salute laao. 1t all depends upon the true
construction to be given to the I'd section of
the act approved March 80, 1871, entitled
san act to provide for the funding and pay
ment of the public debt"
This section, after declaring that the own
ers Of any Of the bonds, stocks, or interest
certificates heretofore issued by this State
may fund two-thirds of the amount
Ut the same in six per percentum
coupons or registered bonds of this States,
&C., &C., contains the following provision !:
"The bonds shall be made payable to order
or bearer and the coupons to bearer at the
Treasury of the State, and bonds payable to
order may be exchanged for bonds payable
to bearer, and registered bonds may be ex-
changed for coupon bonds, or 0ice versa, at
the option Of the holder. The coupons shall
be payable semi-annually aud receivable at
and after maturity for all tares, debts, dues,
and demands, due the State which shall be
SO expressed on their face.'' The only
question, then, we have TO determine is
whether fines imposed for violation of law
are included within the terms Of the statute
l say this is the only question we have to de-
termina hecarsa the question of the cnnsti