Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1878-01-18
Senator Edmund. on civil service RE-
form.

/
from town, | find your note of the 9TH inst.
In it, referring to prior conversation between
| us in relation to the Intervention of senators
and representatives, in respect to nominations
! and appointments by the executive depart
ment of the government, you ask me to give
| you again my views and experience ON the
subject do so with greater pleasure and
! freedom, from the circumstance that your
| views and my own concerning what ought TO
be the independence of the Executive in maxi
ing nominations and submitting treaties, and
! the independence of the Senate in acting
| thereon, are entirely in accord, and that be-
! lieve this independence would be made much
more perfect if what is suggested below could
be carried into practice
In the great number of selections required
TO be made to fill the necessary offices in all
parts of the republic, the capacity and charac-
! ter, and in many instances the opinions of
persons suggested for place ought to be
known, aud must generally be ascertaincd by
! information from some source eXtraneous to
! the executive department 1t has not been
| possible, generally, for the President or heads
| of departments personally to know the pro-
priety of particular selection. This has nat
urally led to the practice of applicants for
| place and citizens recommending them com
municating with the executive branch of the
! government through the senators and repre-
| III AbLBlthss biii ittllliOtbliN " AAt
| President and heads of departments asking
and receiving information and sometimes the
advice of senators and representatives ON the
subject.
So far / think the process was natural and
reasonable, and perhaps in degree necessa-
ry, as the simplest and safest means of the
executive department acquiring indispensable
information. But rs in almost every kind of
| affair unrestricted by position and binding
] h,l,t4
and the custom gradually transformed itself
from its true nature as means of informa-
ton into the course of practically disposing of
! executive local appointments according to the
! Judgment or the will or senators and repre-
sentatives. They came gradually to volun-
! tecr recommendations in every instance and
! the executive department in like manner
came to receive and treat such recommends
tions ms final, as "A relief from personal scru-
tiny Of testimonials and objections, and from
much of the sense of responsibility for selec-
tons.
This was evidently an abuse and perverson
of the constitutional theory of appointments,
as well as Of a salutary process in administra-
| ton. The effect of this was, of course not
beneficial The citizens who secured the
| prize of Office became too often the personal
udherent of the senator or member who Sc
| cured him the place, and the disappointed ones
the reverse Senators and members We're
sometimes influenced in their recommenda-
tons by considerations of ambition or graft
tude to those who had rendered or were ex-
| pected to render aid to their personal aims in
| politics. The liberty of free political express
sion and action belonging to place-holder as
Il citizen became also somewhat cramped and
! embarrassed
Perhaps still more injurious to the public i'll
terests was the ENHANCEMENT of the relations
/ between senators and representatives and the
| executive department. Who can measure in
such eases how much Of executive action in
! appointments is due to a desire to secure an
| appropriation or avoid investigation, or en-
! courage or reward a Legislative or senatorial
| following; Who can tell in such a case how
/ far tho senator who votes for or against ia
yorite treaty or nomination, or the reprcsen-
! tative who votes for or against an apprOprla-
| ton or an inquiry has been moved thereto by
! what has been or what is expected to be done
or omitted by the executive branch in the di-
rection of his wishes l hardly need say that
these things do not imply corruption in the
ordinary sense in any one They imply ra-
ther bias prejudice and perversion of judg-
nent, arising from self-interest, and a desire
of power and success, fIUni which human ma
| ture is nowhere free.
The distinct separation and independence
of the various branches of the government
rest upon principles drawn from universal ex-
| perience. and they cannot be too strongly
maintained. The Senate and House of Rep
resentatives must in their respective spheres
watch and scrutinize and deal with, if need be-
| every step of the executive department and
| they. in their turn must administer the law as
| it is through proper agents free from the die
tation of members of the legislative branch
and from the temptation either to yield to
their domination or to influence or corrupt
| them by the bestowal of patronage
1t may be that these suggestions are simple
! truisIus bat they are those which cannot be
| too often repeated. They are stated in more
! general terms in the formal declarations of
both the political parties Of the country at
their last conventions How, then, shall we
follow them? 1t has appeared to me that
much could be accomplished in the right di-
rectiOn by the absolute abstention of senators
and Representatives from recommending par
! ticular appointments at all unless their advice
should be asked by the executive department.
and accordingly, since the incoming of the pres
ent administration, | have endeavored con-
| sist.ntly and steadily to abstain from doing
so, and believe have kept my purpose
have thought it consistent with this posi-
! tiOn. when applications or recommendations
for place have been sent to me to forward
them to the proper office, with written state
ment or memorandum of the characters and
standing of the signers, if known 10 me. and
| have thought it right indeed duty. when
ever any of my constituents in the employ
ment of the executive department has COM
planned of its action as unjust in respect to
him, to make the necessary inquiries and en-
deavor to roctify what should appear to be
wrong. There, | think. ought TO be the clear
and positive boundaries in respect to appoint
ments between the members of the two
branches of the government
| am gratifed in believing that this course
Is satisfactory to my constituents and i'll feel
ing that neither my official course nor that of
the executive department, SO far as | am con-
cened can be affected by the influences to
which | have alluded. But to have proper
and fair effect, whatever course is pursued, it
ought to be uniform, constant and universal.
Any system will be radically vicious and will
fail that opens the candidacy for the duties
and honors of public trusts to the citizens of
one State or section only. Upon the previ-
| Gus knowledge of the executive branch or the
simple recommendations of private persons,
while there is brought to bear for the candi-
dates of other States and sections the power
full and personal solicitations of senators and
representatives, whose gratitude for success
may be drawn upon in any emergency, or
whose disappointment in failure may pref
udce them against some most necessary meas
ures recommended by the Executive, it can
easily be seen, too, that there would be no
gain to the public welfare if the practice of
following the recommendations of senator's
and representatives We're to give place to the
influence of private cliques, or to business
brokerage in offices, as it is said has some
times happened 1t is not probable that the
fitness of the persons appointed would be in
creased by such change as this, and it is
clear that the responsibility of the promoters
of such appointments would be less easily as
eertained and would not have so strong mo-
tives to satisfy public opinion as those who
had been elected to the House or Senate by
their fellow-citizens, and who are generally
supposed to desire fresh proof of public con-
idence.
With the vast extent of our territory and
population, the number of place-holders has
of necessity become very great, and the means