New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1878-01-11
THE LETTER.
,ur EXECUTIVE AND CONGRESS EACH TO BE PER-
ypcTry FREE IN THEIR RESPECTIVE SPHERES.
IBY TELEGRAPH TO THE TRIBUNEI
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limited STATES SENATE CHAMBER,
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20, 1871
An pprs,DrST: Returning from an absence from
- 7 find vour note of the 18th instant. In it, re-
frno IN a priOr conversation between us IN rela-
;or to the Intervention of Senators and Representa-
,;res in respect TO nominations and appointments by
.ha Executive Department of the Government you
.ot me TO give y0u again my views and experiences
- +bo spbiect. | do so with greater pleasure and
s..oaom from the circumstance that your views and
,,, own concerning what ought to be the indepen-
dance of the Executive in making nominations ana
admitting treaties. and tho independence of the
Senate in acting thereon, entirely In accord ana
that believe this independence would be made
mich more perfect if what is suggested below could
be carried into practice.
In the great number of selections required to be
made TO fill the necessary offices in all parts OF the
Republic. the capacity and character, and in many
instances the opinions, of persons suggested for
,loces onpht to be known, and must generally be
aocertained bv information from some source extra
neous 70 the Executive Department. 1t has not
boen possible generally for the President or heads
Of departments personally TO know the prOpriety
of particular selection. This has naturally led TO
the practice of applicants for place and citizens
recommending them communicating with TIE Exec
rtiye branch of the Government through the Sena-
tors and REPRESENTATIVES in Congress- and, reciprO
eally TO the President and heads of departments
asking and receiving the information and some
times the advice, of Senators and Representatives
IN the subject. So far, ! think the process was
natural and reasonable, and perhaps, in degree
necessary, as the simplest and safest means OF the
Executive Department acquiring indispensable IN
formation.
A PERvERsION OF THE SYSTEM.
But. rs in almost every kind of affair unrestricted
1 limit o4i pfuI a
became a custom, and the custom gradually trans
formed itself from its true nature as means OF in
formation INTO the course of practically dis
posng of Executive local appointments. ac-
cordjnr to the judgment the will of
Senators and Representatives. They came gradually
toyolunteer recommends tOnsin every instance, and
the Executive Department in like manner came 10
receive and treat such recommendations as nai, as
relief from personal scrutiny of testimonials and OBJ
iections and from much ofthe of responsibility
for selections.
This was evidently an abuse and peryersion Of the
constitutional theory of appointments as well as OF
asautary process in Administrations
The effect of this was of course not beneficial
The citizen who secured the prize of office became
TOO often the personal adherent of the Senator or
member who secured him the place, and the disap-
pointed ones became the reverse. Senators aud
mendations by considerations of ambition or OF
gratitude to those who had rendered
pected to render aid TO their personal aims IN poll
tics The liberty of free political expression and
action belOn ging TO the placehOldcr as citizen be-
came also somewhat cramped and embarrassed
Perhaps still more injurious topublic interests was
the ENHANCEMENT of the relations between Senators
and Representatives and the Executive Department
Who can measure in such cases how much of Ex-
ecutive action in appointments is due to desire TO
secure an appropriation avoid investigation, or
encourage or reward legislative or Senatorial fol-
lowing Who can tell in such case how far the
Senator who votes for against favOrte treaty
nomination. OF the Representative who votes for or
against an appropriation or an inquiry, has been
moved thereto by what has been or what is
expected to be done or omitted by the Executive
branch in the direction of his wishes
hardly need say that these things do not imply
corruption in the ordinary sense in any one. They
imply rather bias, prejudice and perversion of judg
ment arising from self-nteres5 and desire Of
power and success, from which human nature is no.
where free.
CONGRESSIONAL ABsIENTIoN.
The distinct separation and independence of
the various branches of the Government rest
upon principles drawn from universal ex-
perence and they cannot be too strongly main
tanned. The Senate and House of Represen-
tatiyes must. in their respective spheres,
watch and scrutinizs and deal with, if need
be, every step of the Executive departments
and they, in their turn, must administer the law as
it is through proper agents, free from the dctaton
Of members of the Legislative branch and from the
temptation either to yield to their dictatiOn or to
influence or corrupt them by the bestOwal of pat
rOnage. 1t may be that these suggestions are SIM
pie trueisms but they are those that he too
often repeated. They are stated in moro general
terms in the formal declarations of the political
parties of the country at their last conventions.
How, then, shall we follow theni 1t has appeared
to me that much could be accomplished in the right
direction by the absolute abstention of Senators
Gd Representatives from recommending particular
appointments at ALL unless their advice should be
asked by the Executive Department; and accord
mgly. since the incoming Of the present Adninistra-
ton, have endeavored consistently and stead
lly, to abstain from doing 80, and / believe
have kept my purpose. / have thought
1t consistent with this position when ap-
phcations or recommendations for place have
bcen sent me, to forward them to the proper Office.
With written statement OF memorandum of the
character and standing of the signers, if known to
me; and have thought 1t right, indeed a duty,
Whenever any of my constituents in the employ
nent OF the Executive Department has complained
VI It's action as unjust In respect to him, to make
TIE necessary inquiries, and endeavor to rectify
what should appear to be wrong.
These, l think, ought to be the clear
ano positive boundaries in respect to appoint
,neh's between the members of tho two
branches OF the Government. / am gratifed in
''ng That this course is satisfactory to my con-
o1'ueh's' and in feeling that neither my official
"o' mat OF the Executive Department, so far
ssi am concerned, can be affected by tbe influences
~which have alluded.
LEGISLATION SUGGESTED.