Daily Los Angeles herald., 1878-06-01
GRANTS MILITARY CHARACTER.
The Inhuman Principle Of Attrition by
Which He Achieved His Success.

A recent article by General D..
Fl. Maury, in the Southern Histor-
zeal Society's papers, on " Grant as
Soldier aud Civilian" says:
In estimating Grants claim as a
principle by which he achieved
success is a new one. 1t is known
in this country as the "principle of
attrition;" and being newly an-
nounced principle of war, may be
appropriately discussed in a paper
like this. Whatever the military
student may find in Grants career
to admire, he should not unadvis-
eddy adopt this "principle of attri-
ton" Humanity revOlts at it,and
history will arraign Grant for the
recklessness with which he dashed
his men to death.
In Virginia, he either could not
or would not maneuver, but know
ing that for every thousand men
who were slain by the rifles of the
Army of Virginia, he could within
ten days receive an equal number
of recruits, he persevered in Grim.
+, inal manner in this new principle
of war. 1t isquite remarkable that
the tactics of the late Commander
of the Army of the United States
and his successor, General Sher-
man. were so at variance, and yet
carried both men to such substau-
tial personal rewards.
the principle, II never maneuver.u
Sherman never fought when he
could avoid 1t, except at Chicka-
saw Bluff, but is the greatest of
living maneuverers.
Without doubt Grant must be
held responsible for the stopt age
of the exchange Of prisoners, which
was the most cruel act of his plan
of attrition. No parallel can be
found for this double crime against
humanity.
After Grant came to the Army
of the Potomac it never left the
field. 1t was punished more Sc
verely under him than it had ever
been under any Of his predecessors.
Some accounts show that it lost
100, 900 men!-one hundred thous-
and men from the first movement
In May, 1864, till the battle of Cold
Harbor closed, In June, 1864! Yet
Grant never suffered it to get be.
yond his control. After this re.
pulse at Cold Harbor he could not
get it to fight any more there, but
he held 1t near the victorious army,
and marched it in order ty flank
to his new base on the James,
where he kept 1t till the end. This
was what no other commander of
that army had ever done, and
stamps him an able general.
He has been severely criticised
for fighting all those battles and
losing so many men to gain po-
sition which he might have
reached without any loss at all.
But, in justice, we can say that he
was not chargeable with want of
military capacity for adopting
that plan OF compaign. 1t was a
moral and not strategical error
on his part. From unquestionable
authority we Know that when
Stanton first told Grant that he
was to be placed in command of
the armies of Virginia he was we'll
pleased and said: II shall at once
change the plan of campaign, and
make my base of operations on the
James river, south of Richmond.n
stanton said, "No; you must oper-
ate from the other direction"
But" said Grant, "if l do it will
cost us one hundred thousand men
before We can get to where we can
take Richmond "Well,o said
Stanton, "you shall have the hun.
dred thousand men to lose rather
than this Administration, by aban-
doning its plan and route of opera
tiOns, in which we lave so long
persisted, shall be convicted before
the country of having persisted in
error" Said Grant, III you will
furnish me the men to do it, / will
execute your plan" so that,
while he had military capacity to
appreciate the surroundings Of the
oecretary's campaign, aud to fore
SEE the tremendous slaughter of his
men which it would involve, he
consented to be the instrument of
its execution!
49,