Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1878-05-14
SUPREME COURT.
DECISION OF CASE FILED JESTER
DAY.

OF CASE FILED JESTER
DAY.
The State Of Minnesota, Respondent, rs A'sdre,o
anderson, appellant.
OPINION.
The ofense charged against the defendant is
that of larceny committed as is alleged, "by
taking, stealing and carrying away
from the possession Of the complainant four
dollars and sixty cents lawful money of the
United States of America, of the following de-
nominations, to-wit: One two dollar bill, two
one dollar bills, and one fifty cent scrip.
and one ten cent scrip, the
property of the complainant . &c. The phrase
: -four dollars and sixty cents lawful money of
the United States of America necessarily i'm
would not nave been any more clear if the
pleader had added thereto the words
''of the value of four dollars and
sixty cents The objection that the
warrant fails to state the value of the property
stolen is, therefore, untenable. The descrip-
ton of the property is sufficiently definite and
certain. fully to apprise the accused of the
specific offense with which he was charged, and
to enable the court to pronounce Judgment
upon conviction according to the right of the
case" 1t is perfectly clear to the most common
apprehension that the property which the de-
such bills and scrip as are authorized by the
laws of the United States to circulate as money.
The omission, therefore, to state in the warrant
whether the bill were treasury notes or national
bank notes is not in our judgment fatal de-
feet. The denomination and the number of
each denomination are given. The offense was
the same whether the bills stolen were all
treasury notes or bank notes, or whether they
consisted partly of each. The main Office of the
description was to specify the offense with such
degree of particularly as to guard the accused
against any surprise on the trial and fully to pro-
tect him from q second conviction for the same
offense. In case defendant is ever subjected
to another prosecution for the same offense
charged against him in this warrant upon
which he has been convicted, there can be
difficulty, under plea of former conviction,
in identifying it, and the particular transac-
ton out of which it arose. Within the doc
trine of the State vs.. Tamet, 16 MINI. 10, the
warrant is good; see also State VS.. Beebe, II
MINI. 249, and State VS.. Hallenburg, 80 Iowa
5O4.
II. 1t is objected that the justice had no
jurisdiction over the offense because it was
committed just outside the territorial limits
of Scott county, though within one hundred
rods of the boundary line.
In the State vs.. Robinson, IA Mimi.
447, this court sustained an indict-
ment found by the grand jury of Carver county
for an offense committed in Scott county, with
in one hundred rods of the dividing line be-
tween those counties, on the ground that sec.
20, chap. 1o8, Gen. Stats, extended, territor-
tally, the criminal jurisdiction of the district
court that distance beyond the boundary line
of the county wherein it was sitting. The
question now presented, is whether this section
is also applicable to Justices courts. 1t is in
sisted by appellant, that it is not because the
introduction of the section into the chapter re-
lating to indictments, and the of the word
indictment in the section itself, both indi-
cate an intention to confne its provisions to
criminal proceedings by indictment alone. The
section is as follows: ''Offenses committed on
the boundary lines of two counties, OF within
one hundred rods of the dividing line between
them may be alleged in the indict-
| 1nent to have been committed in either
of them, and may be prosecuted and
punished in either county.
| The fact that this section is found under the
| head of sIndictments," is by no means con-
elusive of legislative intent to limit its appli
cation to proceedings by Indictment. The in
! ference sought to be drawn from this fact, is
rebutted in part at least by the fact that the
provisions of sections twelve and thirteen of
the same chapter, have general application to
! pleadings in all courts.
so near a dividing line between two counties as
to render it difficult, if not altogether imprac-
ticable to determine with certainty within
| which of the two, they were in fact committed.
In such cases, in the absence of any suitable
statutory, provision meeting them, doubts
| necessarily exist concerning the right venue for
their prosecution and trial, many embarrassing
questions growing out of this uncertainty must
! frequently arise, difficult of solution, if not
prejudicial to the interests of public justice.
To obviate these doubts and avoid all such
questions. was the obvious purpose of this sec
ton of our statutes and It's provisions should
be benignly interpreted to this end. Thus con-
sidered and construed, the provision that
''offenses committed in the places
mentioned may be alleged in the
Indictment to have been committed in
either county must be held as simply provid-
ing rule Of pleading for such cases and not
as limiting the general scope of the section of
the offenses which it declares may be punished
in either county, The beneficial purpose of
the statute is best subserved in holding the lat
ter clause as applicable to all offenses commit
| ted within the territorial limits designated,
whether indictable or not, and in harmony
! Herewith is the preceding clause which obvi-
ates all difficulty in pleading the fact Us to the
precise place of the commission of the offense
whenever it becomes necessary to state it in an
indictment. If, in the administration of Grim
| inal law, this enactment is needful for district
courts, it is equally so and for like reasons of
public policy for justices of the peace as exam
lining and committing magistrates, or as trial
courts for minor ofenses, this suggests that it's
provisions should be construed as extending to
both, unless contrary construction is con-
strained by the plain import of its language.
In Commonwealth vs.. Gellon. 2Allen, 500, the
precise question here presented was considered
| and determined. In that case the jurisdiction
| of police court over an 0fense committed in
an adjoining county but within one hundred
rods of the boundary line, was objected to un-
der statute substantially identical with our
own, and upon the same grounds urged by APP
| pellant in this case, The objections were over
| rula cd inrfC cd cfio h,y} he
supreme court in an opinion in which con-
struction was given to the statute such as we
feel no hesitation in adopting and following as
correct. Appellants second point is therefore
| overruled.
| III. The facts testified to in connection with
the alleged larceny briefly stated are these
The accused being in buggy and in hurry
to Cross the Minnesota river, applied
to one Baldwin, the complaining witness,
herein who was operating ferry, to Cross him
over as quickly possible, in order to enable
him to reach train on the Minneapolis g. St.
Louis railroad. While being ferried hurriedly
over, but before reaching the opposite shore, he
asked Baldwin, on being told the amount of the
fesaor charge, if he could change five dollar
bill. The latter at once took out his wallet,
stepped between the wheels, and as the wind
was blowing at the time, proceeded to count out
the required amount in change over and above
the ferriage fee-placing it in the bottom of
the buggy in front of defendant who was on
the seat. About this time the boat struck the
shore and the ferryman stepped back and seized
the rope in order to hold the boat, leaving the
money in the buggy. Thereupon, the accused,
without delivering over five dollar bill, i'm
mediately drove off and took with him the
| money SO counted out for change.
There was also further testimony in regard
! to his subsequent conduct bearing upon the
| question of felonious intent. Upon this state
of facts it is claimed by appellant that the
possession of the money. which is the property
lsllr f1,h Ral11 10