The New Orleans daily Democrat., 1878-01-06
THE NEW ORLEANS DEMOCRAT, SUNDAY, JANUARY g. 1878.

Barksdale's brigade, had not been as
heavily engaged there as the other
troops. Ewell's oorps had captured
Winchester and cleared the valley on
it's advance into Pennsylvania, and two
OF its divisions, as we'll as two Of Hills,
had been heavily engaged on the 1st.
Can 1t be that Gen. Longstreet appre-
hended that il the advantage gained on
the first day was promptly and vigor-
ously prosecuted, the chief glory Of the
battle would devolve on the two corps
which had first encountered the enemy
and brought him to bay, and hence de-
sired to change the theatre Of the bat
tie that was Inevitable?
A careful study of the testimony Of
Meade and his officers, contained in
the first volume, second series, Of the
Congressional Report on the Conduct
OF the War, will satisfy any one that the
bulk Of the Federal army that was up
was massed on the right, confronting
Ewell's corps, all the forenoon of the
I'd, and that the Round Tops, the key to
the position on the enemy's left were
occupied until Longstreet's movement
began at p. m. The distance which
Longstreet's corps had to march from
it's camp of the night of the 3Oth. to
reach the town OF Gettysburg itself.
could not have exceeded fifteen miles,
and 1t had the whole day Of the 1st to
make it, though 1t was somewhat de-
layed by Johnson's division of Ewell's
corps, which got the road first, by
moving more promptly 1t is presumed.
The FifthlCorps of Meade's army was
twenty-three miles from Gettysburg at
the close OF the fight on the first day,
away, yet the former reached the field
on the morning Of the I'd, and the latter
at p. m.
To show that great opportunity to
inflict q crushing defeat on Meade's
army was lost by the failure to make
the attack in the morning, I here repro
duce what [ said on that point in the
discussion with Gen. Longstreet which
has been mentioned. as follows:
'"That Gen. Lee was correct in select
ing the enemys left for his attack there
can be no question, for that was the
weakest and most assailable part Of the
enemy's lines. That the possession Of
/ Round Top by us would have rendered
by the enemy, is proved by the testi-
mony OF Meade himself. contained in
the same volume Of Reports on the
Conduct Of the War from which I have
already quoted. and to which / will
fTefer hereafter by page alone, to pre-
vent unnecessary repetition. On page
332, in describing the attack on Siekles,
Meade says AT the same time that
they threw immense masses on Sickles'
corps, a heavy column was thrown upon
the Round Top Mountain, which was
the key point Of my whole position. III
they had succeeded in occupying that,
it would have prevented me from hold.
ing any of the ground which / subse-
quently held to the last That Sickles
did not occupy the position assaulted
by Gen. Longstreet until late in the
afternoon, is proved by the testimony
of Hancock and others. On page 4o6,
Hancock says: Everything remained
quiet, except artillery firing and en-
gagements with pickets on our front,
until o'clock that afternoon, when
Gen. sickles moved out to the front. ,
After stating that he had made a
an attack could be made on our
left, Warren, on page 377, says ::
Soon afterwards I rode out with
Gen. Meade to examine the left of
our line, where Gen. Sickles was. His
troops could hardly be said to be in po-
sition.' On page 332, Meade says he
arrived on the ground where Sickles
was, 81 few minutes before o'clock in
the afternoon That Round Top was
unoeeupied until after Longstreet's at
tack began, is proved by the testimony
Of Warren, who says, on page BIT: I
then went, by Gen. Meade's direction,
to what is called Bald Top, and from
that point | could see the enemy's lines
of battle. I sent word to Gen. Meade
that we would at once have to occupy
that place very strongly. He sent as
quickly as possible division Of Gen.
Sykes corps; but before they arrived
the enemy's line Of battle-I should
| think mile and half long began 10
advance, and the battle became very
heavy at once. The troops under Gen.
Round Top Hill, and they had very
desperate fight to hold it, During
all the forenoon the bulk Of
Meade's troops which had arrived
were massed on the right (enemy's), as
Meade contemplated an attack from
that flank -Hancock's corps connected
with Howard's, and Sickles was on the
left Of Hancock, but he did not go into
position until the afternoon. On page
405 Hancock says: I was placed on the
line connecting Cemetery Hill with Lit
tie Round Top Mountain, my line, how
ever, not extending to Round Top, prob
ably only about half way. Gen. Sickles
was directed to connect with my left and
| the Round Top Mountain, thus forming
a continuous line from Cemetery Hill
| (Which was held by Gen. Howard) to
Round Top Mountain
"These arrangements were not made
until the morning was considerably ad-
vanced.
"On page S31, Meade after stating his
purpose to make an attack from his
right says:
"Major Gen. Slocum, however, report
| aI 10 tho oh ro oter 0f tho oronpH in
front was unfavorable to making an at
tack; and the Sixth Corps having 80
long distance to march, and leaving
at o'clock at night, did not reach the
scene until about 2 o'clock in the after
noon. Under these circumstances [
abandoned my intention to make an
attack from nay right, and as soon as
the Sixth Corps arrived, directed the
Fifth Corps, then in reserve on the
right, to move over and be in reserve
on the left
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