Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1878-01-16
TIED STATES SENATE CHAMBER. |


the Government you ask me to give you
again my views and experience on the
subject. do so with great pleasure and
freedom, from the circumstance that your
views and my own concerning what ought
to be the independence of the Executive in
making nominations and submitting trea-
ties, and the independence of the Senate in
acting thereon, are entirely in accord, and
that believe this independence would be
made much more perfect if what is sug-
gested below could be carried into prac-
tce.
In the great number of selections re-
uuired TO be made to fill the necessary
offices in all parts of the republic, the Ca
pacity and character, and in many instan-
ces the opinions of persons suggested for
places, ought to be known, and must gen
orally be ascertained by information from
some source extraneous from the Execu-
tive Department. 1t has not been possible,
generally, for the President or heads of
departments personally to know the pro-
priety of a particular selection. This has
naturally led to the practice of applicants
for place, and citizens recommending
them, communicating with the Executive
branch of the Government through the
Senators and Representatives in Congress,
and reciprocally to the President and
heads of departments asking an1receiving
the information and sometimes the advice
of Senators and Representatives on the
subject. So far think the process was
natural and reasonable, and perhaps in a
degree necessary, us the simplest and
safest means of the Executive Department
acquiring indispensable information.
But, rs in almost every kind of affair I'M
restricted by position and binding limita'
tons, useful habit became custom; and
the custom gradually transformed itself
from its true nature as a means of infor'
nation into the course of practically dis
posing of Executive local appointments
according to the judgment or will of Sena'
tors and Representatives, They came
gradually to volunteer recommendation:
in every instance, and the Executive De
partmcnt in like manner came to receive
and treat such recommendations rs final
rs a relief from personal scrutiny of testi-
monials and objections, and from much o.
the sense of responsibility for selections
This was evidently an abuse and perver
sion of the constitutional theory of appoint
ments, as well as II salutary process in
administration.
The effect of this was, of course, no
beneficial. The citizen who secured the
prize of Office became too often the person
al adherent of the Senator or Member who
secured him the place, and the disappoint
ed ones became the reverse. Senators ant
members were sometimes influenced in
their recommendations by considerations
of ambition or of gratitude TO those who
had rendered, or were expected TO render
aid to their personal aims in politics. The
liberty of free political expression and &C
ton belonging to a place holder as citi
zen, became also somewhat cramped anC
embarrassed. Perhaps still more injurious
to the public interests was the entangle
ment of the relation between Senators and
Representatives and the Executive De
partment. Who can measure in such case.
how much of Executive action in appoint
ments Is due to desire to secure appro
priation, or avoid investigation, or en-
courage OF reward Legislative or Sena
toral following? Who can tell in such :
case how fur the Senator who votes for OF
against favorite treaty or nomination
or the Representative who votes for OF
against an appropriation or an inquiry
has been moved thereto by what has beer
or what is expected to be done or omitted
by the Executive branch in the direction
Of his wishes? ! hardly need say that these
things do not imply corruption in the
ordinary sense in any one. They imply
rather bias, prejudice and II perversion Of
Judgment arising from self-interest, and {
desire of power and success, from which
human nature is nowhere free.
The distinct separation and indepen
dence of the various branches of the gov,
eminent rest upon principles drawn from
universal experience, and they cannot be
too strongly maintained. The Senate ant
House OF Representatives must in theil
Irrespective spheres watch and scrutinize
and deal with, if need to be, every step Of
the Executive Department, and they, in
their turn, must administer the law us il
is through proper agents, free from dicta,
ton of members of the Legislative branch
and from the temptation either to yield tC
their nominations or to influence or cor.
rupt them by the bcstowal CT patronage.
1t may be that these suggestions are
simple truisns; but they are those that
cannot be too often repeated. They are
stated in more general terms in the forma
declarations of both the political parties o.
the country ut their last conventions
How, then, shall we follow them? 1t has
appeared to me that much could be accom-
plished in the right direction by the abso
lutte abstention of Senators and Represent
tatiyes from recommending particular APP
pointmentS at all unless their advice should
be asked by the Executive Department
and, accordingly, since the incoming Of
the Administration, have endeavoret
consistently and steadily to abstain from
doing so, and | believe | have kept my
purpose. have thought it consistent with
this position, when applications of recon-.
mendations for place have been sent to me
to forward them to the proper Office, will
Il written statement or memorandum o.
the characters and standing of the signers,
| if known to me, and | have thought il
right, indeed Il duty, whenever any of my
constituents in the employment of the
Executive Department have complained
of its action as unjust or in respect to them
to make the necessary enquiries and en-.
deavor TO rectify what should appear to bt
wrong. These | think ought 10 be the
clear and positive boundaries in respect o.
appointments between the members of the
two branches of the Government. | an
gratitied in believing that this course i,
satisfactory to my constituents, and il
feeling that neither my official course MOI
that of the Executive Department, so fal
as am concerned can be affected by the
influence to which | have alluded.
But to have proper and fair effect what
ever course is pursued, it ought to be uni
form, constant and universal. Any system
will be radically vicious and will fail thai
opens the candidacy for the duties ant
hon0rs of public trusts to the citizens OIL
our state Or section only upon the previ
GUS knowledge of the Executive branch OIL
the simple recommendation of private
persons while there is brought TO bear fol
the candidates of other states and sections
the powerful and personal solicitations Of
Senators and Representatives, whose graft.
tude for success may be drawn upon in
any emergency, of whose disappointment
in failure may prejudice them against
some most necessary measures recon-
mended by the Executive. 1t can be
easily seen, too, that there would be no
gain to the public welfare if the practice
of following the volunteer recommends