Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1878-12-18

neut reIOTm cOuiu 10 rccuTcNts VI wv
ter administration be permanently had,
unless such notifications be made in
the scope and powers Of government
as existing conditions require.
FURTHER RESTRAINTS UPON LEoIsLA-
TIoS REQUIRED.
Now, in the great States, il has been
found that abuses and corruption in
legislation are mainly the result Of
private and special laws. Legislation
by general law, which affects equally |
all the community, rarely affords op.
portunity for private gain. But the
legislation which gives TO particular
persons special privileges or monopo-
lies--whether II be charters for ferries,
or railways, or banks; whether mo-
nopolies TO light streets, or to carry
passengers, or to land goods; whether
subsidies to construct works OF public
use, or TO carry on commerce; or
whether il be legislation which makes
exception 10 the general burden and
rule, by the relief which IL affords or
the stipend which it pays, or the ad-
vantage which 1t gives to particular
citizens--in short, every form Of legis-
lation for the one at the expense of the
whole; such legislation proves rich in
every inducement to deception, injus-
tice, and evil. And the remedy and
the only remedy which has proved Of.
fectual to prevent this, is found in So
verely, depriving the Legislature OF
the power TO legislaie for any citizen
in preference TO or at the expense OF
the whole.
know it is said that il we would
choose better men TO the legislative
bodies we would have no corruption I;
but when legislation is special and in
private interest, when its power ex.
tends to giving away grants, monopo
lies, lands or other public property,
how can we expect good men 10 be
chosen to the legislative bodies ? They
who seek some gift or privilege from
the state do not want such men there.
They want men who are willing 70
take bribes, or accept contributions, or
receive favors, and vote kindly Tor
monopolies, or subsidies, or special re
lief in return. And the activity of
those interested in Legislative grants
will always largely influence the selec.
ton Of the members of Legislative
bodies whenever there is much TO be
gained from their private or special
legislation.
IL is true that there has been little
corruption in Congress as yet, because
there has been little scope tor private
legislation there. Hitherto the legis.
lation Of Congress has been chiefly
general. Doubtless It's power to deter.
mine what shall be expended for pub
lie works and buildings in particular
localities too often controls Represen-
} tatives, and leads 10 evil combinations
and log-roling. But this influence is
Of quasi public nature; so that, ex.
cept in grants of public lands, subsidies
and those provisions OF the tariff Tor
, protection so shaped as TO give boun'
ties TO particular persons, Congress has
: hitherto had little opportunity for di'
I rect corruption.
: But year by year the private and
. special legislation by Congress increas
8 es. There have been many thousand
= of applications TO Congress- during the
preser,t session alone for some form o.
:. special relief. The very number o.
J, these claims Of course prevents any in
/ telligent consideration Of them, and de
8 feats alike the power Of Congress to DE-
J. justice and TO discriminate against
b injustice, and affords as well opportu
Q nity as inducement to evil and corrupt
Q legislation.
. Now, as | said, the remedy that hal
D proved effectual TO prevent this greai
! and growing cause Of evils, is found il
b further limiting the powers of the leg
Q islatures by depriving them of any
0 power of private or special legislation
: In most Of the great States amend
!. ments have therefore been added &c
! their constitutions preventing legisla
] ton except by general law.
!, What is there now to prevent th'
+ establishment of courts TO determin,
c all claims against the Government ex
9 cept those addressed TO its specia
! grace, and to require judicial ascer
; tainment Of the facts in all cases whicl
Q are dependent upon special favor
n And why should We not prohibit Con
gress from granting favor or grace
. either at all, or except according Il
J, some general rule In short why
i should we not restrict Congress and al
! our State legislatures, as the legisla
y lures OF some of the States have al
: ready been restricted, from any legis
. lation not general and in Tho ee-''a o.
. interest," VI all tho peoplef Just exact
v ly as the country becomes greater AM
u richer, and 80 has more TO give ava.
or TO be plundered of; just as govern
u ment becomes centralized and pattern
6 al, Just so it is the more important tha
J. legislation should be restricted.
d Doubtless, much of the special legit
y lation OF our day is not warranted b,
y y the constructions Of Federal power tina
= formerly prevailed, and to return I
y such constructions would tend to pr'
J vent these evils. But such construt
!" tions involve a general narrowness
:, Federal power in conflict with tho PR
= vailing ideas, which TO restrain CoT
!, y press by direct amendment from sue
~ legislation will conflict with no one
views of how the Constitution shoul
y DO construed.
EXECUTIVE PATRONAGE SHOULD DE r.
" srRIcrEp AND DIMINISHED.
n So, too, with the evils that exist
v. the civil service. When the Cover
AZ ment was established the exccuti'
10 patronage was 30 insignificant that .
IN provision was made Tor its regulation
1" Ii will be seen by the debates OF Il
IN first Congress that the farmers OF Il
rn Constitution wholly overlooked IL.
N. increased gradually with the grow'
a and power Of the nation, until to.ds
be II exceeds tho patronage Of almost at
so monarch. Until the telegraph was
or general use, this patronage, althout
in nominally conferred in the Preslder
in. was, TO o certain extent, restricted al
nm localized. The necessities Of discipli
al. required that, in the days oi tsrdy COZ
ef. munication by mail, the control
on Federal officials in States remote ire
rst the Capital should be relegatcd TO sor
friend Of the Executive there. B
liz. now, by tho aid of the telegraph, :
rn. President can as efficiently dlscipli
ne, a postmaster in Texas as in Marylan
ity and thus II has happened that tod
Ted he absolutely and directly may cont
in the lives and conduct Of more than 0