The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1878-01-17
EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS.

service appointments. 1t was IN answer to the
Presidents request for his opinlens upon the
subject:
UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,1
WASHINGTON, Dec. 90, 1877.
Nh. PRESIDENT: Returning from an absence
from town find your note of the 18th inst. In it,
referring to prior conversation between us in re-
laton to the intervention of Senators and Represen
tat1yes in respect to nominations and appointments
by the Executive Department of the Government
you ask me to give you my views and experience on
the subject. l do so with greater pleasure and
freedom from the circumstance that your views and
my own concerning what ought to be the indepen-
dence OF the Executive in making nominations and
submitting treaties and the independence of the
Senate in acting thereon, are entirely in accord
and that believe this independence would be made
much more perfect if what is suggested below could
be carried into practice.
In the great number of selections required to be
made to I'LL the necessary offices in all parts of the
Republic, the capacity and character, and in many
instances the opinions, of persons suggested for
place ought to be known, and most generally be
ascertained by information from some source ex-
traneous to the Executive Department It has not
been possible generally for the President heads
OF departments personally to know the propriety of
particular selection. This has naturally led TO the
practice of applicants for place and citizens recon-
mending them communicating with the Executive
branch of the Government through the Senators and
representatives in Congress- and recprCcally to the
President and heads of departments asking and
receiving the information and sometimes the ad-
vice OF Senators and Representatives on the subject
So far. l think the process was natural and
reasonable, and perhaps IN a degree necessary. as
the simplest and safest means of the Executive De
partment acquiring indi- pensable information.
But as i'll almost every kind of affair unrestricted
by positive and binding limitations useful habit
becomes custom, and the custom gradually trans
formed itself from its true nature means of in
formation into the course of practically disposinr
of Executive local appointments according to the
Judgment or the will of Senator's and Representa-
tives. They came gradually to volunteer recon-
mendatlons in every instance, and the Executive
Department in like manner came to receive and
treat such recommendations final as a relief
from personal scrutiny of testimonials and
objections, and from much of the sense of
responsibility for selections This was evident
ly an abuse and perversion of the constitu-
tonal theory Of appointments well as of a
salutary process in administration. The effect
OF this was OF course not beneficial. The citizen
securing the prize of Office became too often the
personal adherent of the Senator member who
| secured him the place, and the disappointed ones
became the reverse. Senators and members were
sometimes influenced in their recommendations by
considerations OF ambition or OF gratitude to those
VINO had rendered or were expected to render aid to
their personal aims in politics. The liberty of free
political expression and action belonging 10 the
| place-holder as a citizen became also somewhat
| cramped and embarrassed. Perhaps still more in
furious to the public interest was the entangle-
ment Of the relations between Senators and Rep
| resentatiyes and the Executive DEPARTMENT
/ Who can measure in such cases how much
|
to desire to secure an appropriation, avoid an
investigation, or encourage reward legislative
! or Senatorial following? Who can tell in such a
case how far the Senator who votes for against a
favor1te treaty or nomination, or the Representa-
tive who votes for against appropriation or an
inquiry, has been moved directly by what has been
or what is expected to be done omitted by the ex-
| ecutIVe branch in the direction of his wishes I
hardly need say that these things do not imply cor
| ruption in the ordinary sense on any one. They
imply rather bias or prejudice and perversion of
judgment arising from self-nterest and absence of
power and success, from which human nature
| is nowhere free. The distinct separation and
| independence of the various branches of
the government rest upon principles
drawn from universal experience, and they cannot
be too strongly maintained. The Senate and House
OF Representatives must in their spheres watch and
scrutinize and deal with, if need be- every step of
the executive DEPARTMENTS and they in their turn
| must administer the law as it is through proper
agents, free from the dictation of members of the
Legislative branch, and from the temptation either
yield to their domination or influence, or corrupt
them by the besJoWal OF patronage. 1t may be
that these suggestions simple truisms, but they
are those that cannot be too often repeated. They
| are stated in more general terms in the formal
| declarations of both the political parties of the
country at their last conventions. How, then shall
| we follow them? 1t has appeared to me that
much could be accomplished in the right direction
by the absolute abstention of Senators and Repre-
sentatives from recommending particular appoint
ments at ALL unless their advice should be asked by
the Executive Department, and, accordingly, since
| the incoming of the present administration, T have
endeavored consistently and steadily to abstain
| from doing SO, and believe have kept my pTr-
! pose. I have thought it consistent with this
/ position, when applications or recommendations
| for place were sent me, to forward them to the
proper Office with a written statement or memo
randum OF the character and standing of the sign
ers, if known to me- and [ have thought it right,
indeed duty, whenever any OF my con-
stituents in the employment OF the execu-
tive departments have complained of it's &C
ton unj Just in respect to MIN, to make
| the necessary inquiries and endeavor to
20 rectify what should appear to be wrong. These,
think, ought to be the clear and positive bounda-
ries in respect of appointments between the men,
| bers of the two branches Of the Government. am
gratifed in believing that the is satisfactory
to my constituents and in feeling that neither my
official course nor that of the Executive Depart
ment, so far as am concerned, can
be affected by the influences to which I
have alluded. But to have proper and fair eff
feet, whatever course pursued ought to be uniform,
| constant, and universal. Any system will be rad
caly vicious and will fail that opens the candidacy
for the duties and honors Of public trust to citizens
Of State or section only, upon the previous know-
edge Of the executive branch or the simple recon-
mendaons of private persons, while there is brought
to bear for the candidates of other States and sections
the powerful and personal solicitations OF Senators
| and Representatives whose gratitude for success
| may be drawn upon in emergency, or whose
disappointment in failure may prejudice them
| against some necessary measures recommended by
| the Executive. It can be easily seen, too, that
there would be gain to the public welfare if the
| practice of following the volunteer recommends
tions of Senators and Representatives were to give
| place to the influence of private citizens or
to business of brokerage in Offices as it is said
has sometimes happened. It is not probable that
the fitness of the persons appointed would be in
| creased by such change as this, and it is clear
that the responsibility Of the promoters of such
appointments would be less, as they would be less
| easily ascertained, and would not have so
strong motives to satisfy public opinion as
those who have been elected to the House
or Senate by their feIlow-citizens, and who
are generally supposed to desire fresh proofs of
public confidence With the vast extent of our
territory and population the number of place
| holders has of necessity become very great, and
the meaus of personal or other definite knowledge
of men by the executive branch has proper
tonally decreased, and in the same degree
the evils of patronage, in whatever hands
it is to practically exist, increased. l
think these can be greatly mitigated by an en-
tire cessation by Senators and Representatives
whatever from advice solicitations respecting
appointments, and by the establishment by law of
definite regulations respecting selections for many
officers and employrnents, and the terms upon which
they shall be held, so that the executive branch
and the legislative department may be and feel
perfectly free in their respective spheres, and
that the holders of Office may feel also that they
are the servants of the law and not the personal
tenants at will in their places OF either heads OF
departments of congressman. l am respectfully