The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1878-04-05

Oh taxes anu 0tler 0cNaQuS OF .bHc StaIS
anything else than gold or silver coin,
United States Treasury notes, Or notes OF
the national banks Of the United States"
obligation OF contract, . and therefore
unconstitutional and void. This decision
OF Antoni us. Wright was recognized and
reaffirmed in Wise Brothers Us. Rogers,
Auditor, and Maury s. Co. Us. same Oath
Grattan), and must. now be held to be the
settled law Of this State. & It is not neces-
sary. therefore, and indeed it would be a
vain and useless task, to attempt to 60 over
again the reasons which governed this
Court in coming to the conclusions then
reached and firmly adhered to ever sine. Il
can only say for myself that after careful
consideration CT all the views which have
been presented on this question the opinion
OF Judge Bouldin in Antoni Us. Wright is
lucid, able, and
CONCLUSIVE EXPOSITION
Of the law, is one based upon judicial logic
and fortified by judicial authority, which
makes it impregnable against every. assault
which may be made upon it,
Adopting, therefore, the principles and
reasoning in the case of Antoni Us. Wright,
we are left in this case to a single and very
narrow inquiry; and that is, Are fines i'm
posed for violation OF law included in the
purvtewo OF the statute? One OF the prin-
cipal and universally adopted rules Of con-
struction OF statutes Is that in the enact
ment of statutes the rule Of Interpretation
is. in respect to the intention Of the Legis-
lature, that where the language is explicit
the courts are bound to seek for the inten-
ton, in the words Of the act itself, and they
are not at liberty to suppose or to hold that
the Legislature intended anything different
from what their language imparts. Pot.
Dwaris on Statutes, p. 146. Words in
statute are never to be considered as un-
meaning and surplusage IL a construction
can be legitimately found which will give
force to and preserve all the words in the
act
THE BEST RULE
by which to arrive at the meaning and in
tention OF law is to abide by the words
which the law-maker has used.-Dwaris,
p. 1893; note. Especially is this the case
where the words used have no double or
doubtful meaning, but are plain and expli-
cit in their signitication, for it is a rule Of
universal application that effect must be
given to the words used by the Legislature
where there is no uncertainty or ambiguity
in their meaning.
Now, the words used in the act we are
called upon to construe are us broad, eX-
plicit, and comprehensive as any terms
which could possibly be used. The act de-
clares that s.coupons shall be receivable at
and after maturity for ALL TAXES, DEBTS,
DUES, AND DEMANDS DUE THE STATE" Is
there any uncertainty Or ambiguity in these
terms They all have q certain definite,
explicit, and technical meaning. We cam
not discard any one OF them as unmeaning
and surplusage, but must, according to the
rules of construction which bind the courts,
glue effect to all. We must suppose the
Legislature knew the ordinary meaning and
LEGAL FORCE OF THE WORDS
which they used. II the provision OF the
act had been that these coupons should be
receivable "for all tdIeS and debts due the
Slate" there might be some room for doubt
whether fines were embraced, for although
fines are recoverable by action Of debt, and
in certain sense a tine is debt due the
State, yet it might be said with much force, !
if not conclusiyely, that the word debt re-
fers to matters OF contract, and that there
fore fine is not embraced in the meaning
Of the statute in this word debt. But the
words DUES AND DEMANDS are added. Shall
we give no effect to these words Of explicit
meaning? Can we take the liberty Of
striking these words out Of the statute? If
we can, then the courts may override the
powers of the Legislature and construe
away any act it may pass. These words
dues and demands are not uncertain and
ambiguous, but have certain definite and
explicit meaning. The word " due I" is
DEFINED BY WEBSTER
to he "that which is owed" .:that which
Of low n q
paid"; and by Worcester, "tbat which
any one has q right to demand,
claim, OF possess" "that which can
Justly be required" The word demand
is 4 word Of still larger significance and"
more comprehensive meaning. Indeed,
Lord Coke says the word demand is the
largest word in law except claim. In I'd
Coke upon Littleton, POI b., he says:
/" Denlandun1 is Il word OF act, and in the
understanding of the common law is Of so
large an extent as no other word in the
law is unless it be cLainoun1 whereof Litrleton
maketh mention" ."-Section 145. Webster
defines "demanded" "the asking or seek
ing what is due or claimed to be due:" and
Worcester, "a calling for thing due or
claimed to be due" No words Of more eX-
plicit or broader signifcation could have
been used than these two words 8 dues and
demands." We cannot discard them, but
must give them effect. Do they embrace
fines? I am bound by every rule OF con-
struction to say they do. A fine is some
thing (which the law requires to be paid"
and that is the meaning Of the word
"dues." I.&
A FINE IS THING "DUE
or claimed to be due" to the State-a fia-
bility which the State has right to en-
force and demand-and that is the
meaning Of the word g demand"
I am therefore of opinion that fines
are clearly. embraced within the meaning
and the very words of the statute. The
Legislature has used words which by their
explicit, comprehensive. and unmistakable
meaning, embrace fines as well as taxes and
debts. II after using the words f." "dues and
demands y they had intended to exclude
fines, how easy it would have been to have
added the words "eXcept fines" after the
words stdues and demands" But having
used these broad and comprehensive terms,
which by their common and explicit mean
ing embrace fines, and having used no
words of exception, it follows upon every
rule OF construction that fines are en-
braced in The terms "dues and demands"
This construction, which would seem to
be free from all doubt, il il rests upon the
language OF the act, is objected to upon
TWO GROUNDS.
First, 1t is insisted that fines are imposed
as one of the potent means Of Furnishing
offences against the law, and that the Of
fender does not satisfy the judgment OF the
court il be pays an amount Tess than the
fine assessed against him, which be does II
.. 80 Il II