The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1878-01-18
EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS.

we give DelOW the 1ull teAt VI the ieccht iet
ter written by Senator Edmunds, Of Vermont,
to President Hayes, upon the subject OF civil
service appointments. II was in answer TO the
Presidents request for his opinions upon the
subject:
UNITED STATES SENATE CHAMBER,l
WASHINGTON, Dec. 20, 1877. I
Mr.. PRESIDENT: Returning from an absence
from town find your note OF the ilth inst. In H.
referring TO a prior conversation between MS in re-
laton to the intervention of Senators and Represen
tatives In respect TO nominations and appointments
by the Executive Department OF the Government,
you ask me To give you my views and experience ON
the subject. do with greater pleasure and
freedom from the circumstance that your views ana
my own concerning what ought to be the indcpen-
dence Of the Executive in making nominations and
submitting treaties, and. the Independence Of the
Senate In acting thereon, entirely in accord,
and that believe this independence would be made
much moro perfect IL what IL suggested below could
be carried into practice.
In the great number of selections required to be
made to NIL the necessary offices in all parts OF the
Republic, the capacity and character, and in many
instances the opinions, Of persons suggested for
place ought TO be known, and most generally be
asoertained by information from some source
traneous to the Executive Department. II mas not
been possible generally for the President heads
OF departments personally to know the proprety OF
particular selection. This has naturally led to the
practice of applicants for place and citizens recon-
mending them communicating with the Executive
branch of the Government through the Senator's and
President and heads of departments asking aud
receiving the information aud sometimes the al
vice OF Senator's and Representatives on the subject.
So FAR, i think the process natural and
reasonable, and perhaps ia degree necessary ms
the simplest and safest means OF the Executive De-
par.ment acquiring indi. pensabie Information.
But AZ in almost every kind of affair unrestricted
by positive and binding limitations useful habit
becomes a custom, and the custom gradually trans
formed itself from its true nature q Of in
formation into the course of practically disposng
Of Executive local appointments according to the
judgment or the will of Senator'S and Representa-
tves. They came gradually to volunteer recon-
mendations in every instance, and the Executive
Department in like manner came TO receive and
treat such recommendations as final q relief
| from personal scrutiny OF testimonials and
objections, and from much of the sense OF
responsibility for selections. This evident
| ly an abuse and perversion of the constitu-
| tonal theory Of appointments well of a
sautary process in administration. The effect
of this was OF course not beneficial. The citizen
securing the prize OF Office became too often the
personal adherent of the Senator member who
secured him the place and the disappointed ones
became the reverse. Senators and members
sometimes influenced in their recommendations by
considerations of ambition of gratitude to those
who had rendered were expected to render aid TO
their personal aims in politics. The liberty of free
political expression and action belonging to the
| place-holder al a citizen became also somewhat
cramped and embarrassed Perhaps still more in
furious to the public interest the entangle-
nent OF the relations between Senator's and Rep
resentatives and the Executive Department.
| Who measure in such how much
| of Executive action in appointment is due
TO desire to secure an appropriation, avoid an
investigation, or encourage or reward legislative
| or Senatorial following? Who tell in such a
case how far the Senator who votes for against a
| favorite treaty nomination, the Representa-
tive who votes for or against an appropriation an
inquiry, has been moved directly by what has been
or what is expected TO be done omitted by the
ecutive branch in the direction of his wishes ?
hardly need say that these things do not imply
rupton in the ordinary any one. They
imply rather bias or prejudice and perversion of
judgment arising from selflnterest and absence Of
power and success, from which human nature
.s nowhere free. The distinct separation and
independence of the various branches of
| the Government rest upon principles
drawn from universal experience, and they cannot
be too strongly maintained. The Senate and House
of Representatives must in their spheres watch and
scrutnize, and deal with, if need be, every step of
the executive departments, and they in their turn
must administer the law it is through proper
agents, free from the dictation of members of the
Legislative branch and from the temptation either
to yield to their domination influence, corrupt
them by the bestowal of patronage. 1t may be
that these suggestions are simple truisms but they
are those that cannot be too often repeated. They
| IRE stated in more general terms in the formal
declarations of both the political parties of the
| we follow them? 1t has appeared TO me that
much could be accomplished in the right direction
by the absolute abstention of Senators and Repre-
sentatives from recommending particular appoint
ments at all unless their advice should be asked by
the Executive Department, and, accordingly, since
the incoming of the present administration, have
| tnuedNOreu COIhlhleutly ana steadily 10 ABSTAIN
from doing so. and believe have kept my pur-
pose. i have thought II consistent with this
position, when applications or recommendations
for place were sent me, to forward them TO the
proper Office, with written statement or memo
randum of the character and standing of the sign
ers, ii known TO me, and have thought it right,
indeed duty, whenever any OF my con-
stituents in the employment of the execu-
tive departments have complained of its ac-
ton as unjust in respect to MIN, to make
the necessary inquiries and endeavor to
20 rectify what should appear to be wrong. These,
L think, ought to be the clear and positive bounda-
ries in respect OF appointments between the mern-
bers of the two branches of the Government. am
gratfed in believing that the is satisfactory
to my constituents, and in feeling that neither my
official course nor that OF the Executive Depart
ment, far / concerned, can
be affected by the influences to which
have alluded. But to have proper and fair eff.
feet whatever course is pursued ought he UNIFORM
constant, and universal. Any system will be rad
icaly vicious and will fail that opens the candidacy
for the duties and honors of public trust TO citizens
of State section only, upon the previous knowl-
! edge of the executive branch or the simple recon-
mendaons of private persons while there is brought
to bear for the of other states and sections
the powerful and personal solicitations of Senators
| and Representatives whose gratitude for success
may be drawn upon in an emergency, or whose
| disappointment in failure may prejudice them
against some necessary measures recommended by
the Executive. 1t can be easily seen, too, that
there would be gain to the pubic welfare If the
practice of following the volunteer recommended
lions of Senators and Representatives to give
place to the influence of private citizens or
to business of brokerage in offices, it is said
has sometimes happened. 1t is not probable that
| the fitness Of the persons appointed would be in
| creased by such change this, and II is clear
that the responsibility of the promoters of such
appointments would be less, they would be less
easily ascertaned, and would not have so
strong motives to satisfy public opinion as
those who have been elected to the House
or Senate by their felow-citizens. and who
are generally supposed to desire fresh proofs Of
public confidence. With the vast extent Of our
| territory and population the number of place
holders has Of necessity become very great and
the meaus Of personal or other definite knowledge
| of men by the executive branch has proper
| tionaly decreased, and in the same degree
the evils Of patronage, in whatever hands
II is to practically exist increased.
| think these can be greatly mitigated by an en-
| tire cessation by Senators and Representatives
whatever from advice or solicitations respecting
appointments, and by the establishment by law Of
definite regulations respecting selections for many
officers and employments, and the terms upon which
they shall be held so that the executive branch
and the Legislative department may be and feel
perfectly free in their respective spheres and
80 that the holders of Office may feel also that they
are the servants of the law and not the personal
tenants at will in their places of either heads of
| departments Of Congressman. / respectfully
| yours, GEORGE +. EpMUNps
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