The New Orleans daily Democrat., 1878-11-23
AFGHANISTAN.
THE PLAN OFF CAMPAIGN THAT WELL
RE FOLLOWED BY THE ENGLISH.
rTDn1Ou Daily News

twentieth 81 tnlS month"; btES BRUSH bTOOFS !
will advance Immediately jnto Afghanistan. y
The delay which has taken place will not We {
suppose, make any change In the military o
plans, watch we may safely assume will be :
carried out In the manner indicated by our +
special correspondent at simla in Il telegram {
which we recently published. A telegram
which we print this morning informs us that :
already the plan OF operations ls assuming 8
large dimensions, According to this tele-
gram q Bombay and 81 Madras brigade are to
be naobiized and added to the Quetta force.
There may be political reasons for thus
strengthening our field force 1t Is possible
that the Indian government may wish to /
show Persia that We have an eye On her as
| well as on Afghanisthn. Another reasonable
| theory is that Of q desire to stimulate the 10y
atty of ths native troops Of Bombay and Mad
| ras and to aceetle to their natural wish that
all the glory Of the enterprise should not be
| monopolzed by the Bengal Presidency. Be
that as it may, the more the government con-
template the task they ha7e IN band the more
convinced they must be that they have en-
| tered on On undertaking which will tax their |
resources to the utmost. The demands on
those resources will we anticipate, continue |
to increase At present, however, the gov |
ernrnent have determined not to send any adj !
ditionai regiments to India, but only drafts to
make up the regiments now serving In that
country to their full com pGment.
/ The military plans, as described by our spe |
cjal correspondent at Sirnla in his late tele
gram, are as follows: The Peshawnr valley
, army will, he told us, consist Of $4,000 men,
, with 6G guns; the Koorum valley column OF
5000 men, with "a guns, and the Quetta col
! umn Of 10000 men, with so guns; the whole
, making total Of $4,000 men, with $50 guns
not counting elappen troops, The number OF
guns 1t will be observed, is at the rate Of A
per 1000 men, or even greater II we only count
infantry and cavalry-a proportion which re-
cent experience has taught us is much too
/ large especially In q difficult country badly
= iask assigned to each column is apparent
q from its relative strength. The Peshawur
= column having the town Of that name
9 for it's, immediate, base, IS evidently
t given the most arduOus and important
9 work to perform. It is therefore the
3 strongest Of all the three columns, aud though
s Immediately commanded by Sir s. Browne,
will probably be accoI4panied by Pr I. kred yoo
the Khyber pass naturally extremely
formidable and no doubt much strengthened
by art recently y-and the other difficult defiles
Intervening between our frontier and the enc
~ rny's capital. The task with 5000 men ought
o not to cost us much trouble, seeing that Pol
a a lock accomplished it with half the number
s. At the other end Of our base IL 900 men will
70 advance from Quetta. To this force, on ac-
20 count Of the nature of the country, st least
:, half the total force Of cavalry ought to be
- assigned The two main columns are those
r. which start respectively from PeshaWur and
70 Quetta and Of these the former Is, as we
20 have said, the most important, and will be
IL the regulating force-that is all the other col
umns will conform to its movements. Each
column, even that operating by the koorum
valley, is strong enough to be independent 10
O. certain sense; that is to say, will
In not be exposed to the danger Of being crushed
k, by q concentration Of the enemy. At the same
n time all three columns will combine their
j. movements, so that they may give each other
ID mutual support and cooperate in the general
it design Of the campaign. By this arrange
ID ment not only will the work of the commits
r. will be divided and his attention distracted.
y The Quetta column will be the latest at tbs
n, starting point, on account Of it's great dis
r tance from the sources Of commlssarlat sup
ld plies Having, however q much longer march
Of to make than the other two columns, 1t ought
Il to commence its advance about 8 fortnight
le earlier than the other portions of the army
iy It may possibly also be delayed by the resist
ance Of Candahar, which, however much il
may have been strengthened during the las
few years, is not likely to be In O. position tx
rs offer @ prolonged resistance to the Quetta col
re umD, which is to be provided with q strong
or siege train. Once in possession Of Candahar
ID, it occupies O most imp pOrtant strategical point
II. practically severing the Cabul valley from
he both southern Afghanistan and Herat. It Il
j. true that there is track-lt cannot be calief
Of road-acrosS the mountains from Cabul Il
7g Herat, but as o rule troops marching from th
n capital to Hprat proceed by Candahar
or From Candabar the Quetta force may ethe
SO advance on Ghuznee and Cabul to co-Operat
he directly with the PeshaWur column, or con
II tent itself with giving hand to the Kooruu
n valley column and assist 1t to capture Ghuz
@ nee. telegram from our own correspondent
he intimates that it's ultimate destination is He
ne rat. Such piece Of imperial strategy is not
to however, to be lightly undertaken The diff
Guilty Of obtaining supplies on the road be
tween Candahar and Herat would be yer
great, and the distance Is considerable bein!
f11f fayEar m ruIlna A forrp far From
~ it's base must either be sufficiently strong t
We suffice for all contingencies, or must b
.te strongly supported. Such a support nigh
'0' be placed at FarOn-about half way-or a
100 Cardahar. In either case there must be a
,9o army at Candahar to prevent the Herat gal
l00 rison from being cut off by an advance Of o.
,o0 Afghan force from the northeast. Altogether
,00 If Herat be taken as the objective Of the Quett
l00 column, no fewer than 10000 men would b
ce required for operations in Southern and West
as ern Afghanistan.. There is also the probabiI
% ity-nay almost certainty-that the Rus
%, = SLAMS will respond to British occupatio
ar of Herat by at once establishing themselves
or, at Merv. Then there is the risk OF excitin!
Of the susceptibilites Of Persia, and throwing
o. the arms Of Russia: Unless, therefore, on tn
plea of the necessities OF an Imperial policy
We can see no excuse or justification for on
extending our operations as far as Herat Th
KOorum Valley column will play, In all prob
, ability, but subsidiary and subordinate part
N though circumstances may arise which vii
he enable 1t to deal the decisive blow. Having
n hobart as it's immediate base, it will advanc
or up the Koorum valley, by which it will be abl
be to turn north, and in five or six marches
e. after debouching, reach either Cabul or Ghuz
ke nee. It's great difficulty will be its communi
nd cations till 1t effects junction with one Of tn
rs other two columns. II pressed, however
a either by the enemy Or want OF supplies, /
n will be enabled to entrench itself and, assum
3D. ing an Observation-Disclosures attitude, stand read,
Sc to strike in should opportunity offer. Even
T. however, il it never exchanged shots with th
Ameer's army, it will nevertheless rende
ne good service by drawing off a considerable
or body of troops to watch and check it., Com
Of bined operations by three invading columns
be rated from each other, both as regards actua
n distance and the nature Of the country, arr
v proverbially difficult. The Afghans more
es over acting on interior lines, could, In case o