The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1878-07-30
OUR COURT SYSTEM.

There have appeared in the Evening Delta
a number OF able papers, signed Legislator"
in favor Of the constitutional amendments
and In opposition to the calling of o cOnven-
ton. While conceding the ability of these
articles, and disclaiming any intention Of
| judging them unfairly, we cannot hide from
ourselves the appropriateness Of the writer's
noneme de plume His articles are clearly
meant more as vindication of the Legis-
lature which concocted and submitted
the amendments than as a calm and
logical statement of the merits of the
amendments themselves. Otherwise, so
| ingenious and facile q writer would not
have SO utterly committed himself to the ad-
vocacy of the good and bad alike-sustaining
all with equal earnestness and without
reservation. The fifth article is devoted to
| the judiciary amendments, and the wisdom
and sutficiency Of those are urged with all the
ardor of an advocate The objections to them
urged by the DEMOCRAT are taken up seri-
atm and disputed throughout. The first of
these objections is thus stated:
! It Is said that the amendments are faulty
| in not absolutely fixing the number of dis
I tricts and in leaving something to legislative
discretion.
Legislator" thinks this objection is with
out foundation''-a constitution should be
flexible and not SO rigid as to allow no room
for expansion:
Had the number OF districts been absolute
ly determined then any change would have
required new amendment or a new cOnsti-
tuition. The purpose, accomplished by the
amendments, is, fixing q minimum so as to
secure. under all circumstances, enough dis
| trictS for efficiency, and q maximum, SO as to
nrpVpnf the inOrCinatn creation Of 1IHDpE
leaving the General Assembly, within this
limit, free to exercise legislative discretion,
the judiciary being saved FROM Legislative in
reference by provisO preventing a change
from being made so as to take effect during
| the term Of office OF any judge.
This idea of FLEXIBLE" constitutions is an
invention of quite modern date, and one
which we are by no means disposed to in
dorse. We have been accustomed to believe
that the chief merits of written constitution
is its inflexibility-an enuncation, clear, posi-
tive and comprehensive, of general but funda-
mental truths, under which all exigencies
must be met and to which all legislation must
adapt itself. In any other sort of a coRstitu-
ti0n we can see no safety. A constitution
that can be avoided that can be stretched
to meet and cover any innovation, that
contains none but negative assertions and no
positive prohibitions, without definite grants
and absolute limitations of power, In other
words FLEXIBLE" constitution, does not by
any means fulfill our idea of such an instru-
ment Such vague and indefinite lease Of
power is not the fundamental law which any
people should establish for themselves.
Yet we might concede that, to the extent
and under the limitations mentioned by
Legislator, the discretion might safely and
wisely be left to the Legislature of dividing
the State into judicial districts and creating
the number of courts necessary to the
discharge Of the public business, the
same to be fixed and changed after
wards as exigenCte5 may require. Still
this is not the most dangerous power over the
courts given to the Legislature. Legislator"
has not a word to say of the circuit court
proviso of the amendments, which gives the
Legislature discretion to create, absolutely,
system of courts which have no assured
existence by virtue Of the constitution. These
courts, which are superior to the district
courts, and will, if created, infringe largely
upon the jurisdictions of both the district and
supreme courts, have no actual basis in the
constitution, but will owe their existence alb
solutely to legislative power. We are emphat-
ically opposed to the grant of any judi
cial power, even to justice of the peace, 9th
erwise than by constitutional provision. We
are certainly opposed to giving the Legisla-
ture the power of creating special tribunals,
whose existence will absolutely depend upon
legislative discretion. The judiciary and the
legislative estates are essentially separate
and distinct, and they should be kept so.
They are coordinate, and neither should be
given power over the other, if both are to be
kept free and independent in the discharge of
their several functions. This we announce as
a fundamental principle and it is not neces-
sary, in order to sustain it, to cite suppositi-