The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1878-06-06

he was SatiSned. de spoke OF plaH ue
had long thought over and took down a
map. he drew an imaginary line be-
tween two of the Virginia creeks or
rivers, the names of which have escaped
me, and said that I might move on that
line and have the streams for supplies.
1 looked at the plan and saw in mo.
meht that If ! put my ARMY on such q
line would be in much the same POSI-
ton as the army of the James. l would
be powerless I could do no good to our
side and no harm to the other. I would
be locked up. l told Mr.. Lincoln 1
would consider the plan and that was the
last of it. The route was an impossible
route, and was never mentioned again by
Mr.. Lincoln. That is, as far as re-
member, the exact story of the confer.
ence between Mr.. Stanton and myself
when took command of the army. The
question of my plans and their wisdom
and unwisdom was never afterward a
subject of conversation or correspon-
dence. If there were blunders in that
campaign the blunders were mine and
not those of Lincoln or Stanton. They
did everything in the world to assure my
success. Upon me, and upon me alone,
must the whole responsibility fall"
THE RELATIVE POWER OF THE NORTH
AND SOUTH.
"There is another point" said the Cen
eral, "that these historians omit. 1t is
said that we oyerpowered the South. In
foreign journals and foreign assemblies
it is put up this way, that we oyerran
the South with the scum of the world
with hirelings and Hessians. No one
would do more honor to the foreigners
who came into our ranks than myself.
They were brave men and earned our
gratitude. But so far from our armies
being foreign, I question more than three
per cent. were aliens. Yet l have no
doubt many we'll informed authors will
tell you that there were only three per
cent. Americans. This is the way public
option was made during the war, and
this is the way historyis made now. We
never overwhelmed the South, and am
only sorry we could not have done so
and ended the war and its miseries.
What we won from the South we won by
hard fighting, and the odds, when there
were odds, were never decisive. We had
to fight the Southern States. They were
unit and we we're divided. Every able
bodied male in the South from IA to 80
was the army, or was supposed to be
there. We had to depend upon volun-
teers and the conscription.. The South
had 4 600 600 of. negroes. These negroes
kept the farms, protected the families,
supported the armies, and were really q
reserve force, most important reserve
force in fighting nation. These 100000
of negroes did work that white men
would have been compelled to do. Yet
they are never counted in any sum-
mary of the forces of the South. They
are forgotten as if they never had existed,
and yet they kept the acres green and
the haryestErowing while the white men
were, in the war. Men, women and
children went into the fields. The
South was really an organized army.
During the war in the South all progress,
all industry came to halt aud nothing
was allowed to interfere with the war.
Even now the South suffers from war
stagnation, from war paralysis. In the
North industry was never more brisk /;
all the arts of peace were cherished; so
ciety moved on; inventions were dis
covered; the genius of the country were
as keen as ever. We supported an army
and a blockading fleet. We never
tagged in Jour industry. We kept our
place as manufacturing commercial
power. Cites like Chicago, New York,
San Francisco grew and grew, while
Savannah, New Orleans and Charleston
languished.
We not only sustained our part in the
war, but all that was required for peace.
In spite of all the drain upon the re-
sources of the North we were more pros
porous, more powerful, more respected
and feared BY the nations than when the
war broke out. Remember, as l have
said, that we had by no means united
North, while the South was unit. We
had to send troops to suppress riots in
New York we had enemies in our midst
In every Northern State there was q
strong party against the war always re-
ioicing over disaster, always voting to
paralyze our forces ready for any con.
cession or surrender. This party was
strong in every State-strong enough to
carry States like Indiana, Pennsylvania
and New York during the war. Nothing
but Morton's courage saved it from max
ing Indiana rebel State, like Kentucky
This was the party that voted the wal
was failure at the time Sherman was
setting out on his march to the sea, al
the very time when the great General
and his army were about to cover oul
arms with imperishable renown. You
can imagine the effect such resolution
must have had upon the enthusiasm oi
an army, for it is mistake to imagine thai
such things did not affect an army. They
did affect it as know we'll. During oul
war there was scarcely wind that came
from the North, from our own homes
that did not come laden with calumny
and disparagement. The Southern Gen
erals were models of chivalry and valol
our Generals were venal, incompetent
coarse. am speaking now of our peo
pie, of writer's and speakers who were
loyal and to certain extent Republican
Everything that our armies did was
wrong, could have been done so much
better. Everything that our op'
ponents did was perfect. Gen. Lee wa:
a demigod, Jackson was demigod
while our Generals were brutal butch
ers. So it was in Europe. With few
exceptions here and there the public
opinion of the world was against the
North, and our own friends st home
would often grow nervous and fault
finding with the army. You canno
read a file of journals in England of tina
time that did not contain some horrible
calumny about men in the army, ant
copied from our own journals. If W.
won battle like Shiloh, for instance
one of the most useful victories of tht
war, one of the most important in it
results-our own papers set to work t
belittle the victory and give the enem!
as much advantage as possible. Thes'
we're essential elments in war lik'
| o,r, tho ,vor of f-ee neonle 7 do no