The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1878-08-11

were bursting over tls III every d1reGti0n, and
my Impression was this was also the eoncl11-
ell that they would do and had better be with
drawn"
This opinion OF Gen. Braggs. given in DR.
| Motifs presence on the battlefield, Is widely
as expressed In his official report Of the battle
| OF Shiloh. That report it appears, Was only
directly 1.-THE case also with the reports Of the
| other corps cotnnanders), instead OF hrst
passing through Gen. Beauregards head
| quarters, as military rule and etiquette I'M
| Dsratively required. SEQ note at foot OF page
| 1874 of Gen. Jordan's Campaigns OF Gen.
| Forrest"
Another remark, and not an unirnportant
one, to be made about these reports is, that
those ernanating from brigade and reglmental
com handlers we're oil, or nearly all, in con-
tradiction to the opinions advanced by the
corps commanders. The latter are better able
to judge OF and direct general movements
but the former, being nearer the ranks, have
clearer conception Of the capacity, tone and
spirit of their men. See lin "Offieial Reports
Of Battles, from page I'll to 312), reports OF
Chalmers, Gibson, Pond, Anderson, Hodge,
ard ard Fagan, Stanley, Mouton, Chadwick,
Jones, Claek,. Dubroca and others. .... ~,
Now, in all earnestness and sincerity, we
put to our readers these questions:
Surprising Gen. Johnston had survived
A4u IE3Iilhlu5A LII G0AlflAAa W. Itu5G IA uitI
day, how could he have prevented the fearful
STRUGGLING and marauding which VS. have de-
scribed above? By what superhuman means
| would he have revived our laded ana ex-
hausted troops, to inspire which !, he had sac
| ritieed his life, so tagging had they already
shown themselves to be, at that hour OF the
day2 How would he have prevented the ar
| rival Of o portion OF Buelrs command, to
wit: Ammen's brigade, which had already
| taken Its position In support OF Webstsr,s
l..44 ,rs1~y r. ft5nt m Slrfh
day? Would two hours time have sufficed
| him to complete the destruction OF the enc
| my's line, and, on the appearance OF his col
| umns near the river bank, would not the gun
boats have shellsd, annoyed and demoralized
them, under him, as they actually did, when
Beauregard broke their last extraordinarily
Under sllci, appalling circumstances, with
exhaustion and characterization staring us in
the face, how could our success have been
further pursued? --.5
TO place the responsibility of our insuccess
that evening on Gen .Beauregard's order to
Withdraw The troops from the field, is either
the result Of complete Ignorance Of the cir
cumstances or bitter prejudice, against which
all reasoning Is necessarily powerless.
The hours lost between the time Of Gen.
Johnston's death and the time Of Gen. Beau
regards assuming command, whether at
tributable TIC. the increasing exhaustion and
struggling Of our men, or to the shock pro-
dueed by the news Of the fell Of their COM
mander. can In no wise be laid at Gen. Beau
regards door. The struggling Gen Beaure-
gard had made unceasing efforts TO, check
since the morning; and he certainly did not
cause the death OF Gen Johnston.
No. Gen. Beauregard's Inability TO hold his
columns together and complete q victory so
gloriously begun under his own plan cannot
be- attributed to any personal lack OF power or
want Of initatory capacity On his part. The
dominant traits Of his military career have
ever been clear strategic perception, great IA
eility in handling masses Of troops and rapid
ity Of execution In his man0euyres. But here
he had to contend with an homogeneous army
wanting in discipline, harassed by fatigue,
depleted by, struggling, and whose division,
brigade and other commanders, eager to dis
play personal devotion and bravery, had
rushed to the front since the early part Of the
day, forgetful of their duty to stand by their
troops, and unable thereby to keep them in
hand and rapidly mass them for action when
the occasion arose.
These assertions, derived from personal OBJ
servation, are strengthened by @ very graphic
and conclusive passage in Gen. Jordans
Cam paigns Of Forrest to be found at page
t51 Of his book.
IF Gen. Johnston had not fallen; If our
success could have been pursued; If our men
had not SO suffered from hunger and gxhaus-
ton; IF there had not been so much stray
CLING, from midday; i Ammen's brigade Of
portunely for us; we could and would no
doubt initiate your correspondent in his
imaginative conclusions, and draw most fas-
cinating pictures OF fanciful victories to our
armies, and of coveted glory to the Confed-
eracy. But, under the circumstances of the
case, and like unto the Lacedernonians Of old,
when threatened by Wanting foe with
death and destruction If he should invade
their territory, we can merely repeat, with
much less poetry than truth-yes. III
We cannot close our communication with
out referring tx, the very singular manner in
which it has pleased your correspondent to
alter the sense Of our language with reference
to that patriotic and illustrious chieftain-Al-
bert Sidney Johnston.
Your correspondent says:
"The idea that q man OF the record the ex-
perience, the large brain, the great military
pride and cool Judgment and self-poise OF
Johnston, should be incapable Of conceiving
and executing the simple, direct and Napo-
leonic plan upon which the battle of Shiloh
was fought Ia worse than spuerile.'"
We have already given an answer to the
above in our former communication, to which,
strange to say, your correspondents article
Of the fourth instant purpOrts to be o reply.
Is 1t possible that he should have omitted to
read It?
We quote from that communication "We
never said, nor did we even imply, that Gen.
Johnston could not have planned the move
ments OF the army he commanded, nor did
we say that he was unable to conceive and
execute as good q plan of operations as any
Of the ablest generals who led our flag to VIC
tory, before or after the hard-fOught battle OF
Shiloh. What we stated, and what we will
soon establish is, that in this particular CASE
1t was his second In command-to wit. Beau
regard, and not he-who planned the battle
and prepared the order of march of our
army"
And in another portion Of the same COM
munication, speaking again Of Gen. j ohm 5ton
we said: sHe certainly could have made a
plan himself; his right and capacity to do SO
were unquestionable" etc.
We will not allow ourself to be imputed
with casting o slur upon the memory of SO
distinguished soldier and patriot a. Gen
Johnston, about whom we have never spoken
other than words Of praise and admiration
All the facts we have eIucidated we feel sure
would have been substantiated and confirmed
by the hero himself, or we very much mistake
his generous manly and unseffish nature. To
no one would unmerited praise be more dis
tasteful than to Albert Sidney Johnston
Your correspondent asserts that Mr.. Davis
did no wrong to Gen. Beauregard by giving
to Gen. Johnston the merit Of having con-
ceived and drawn out the best battle plan Of
the war-the only one, within his knowledge,
which had been s'etecuted as 1t acas devised"
.lSsI~ IL - H.