The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1878-08-15

Vicksburg, ne was on his way to raise
the siege was very sorry. If l had
known Johnston was coming, would
haveJtold Pemberton to wait in Vicks-
burg until wanted him, awaited john
ston's advance, and given him battle.
He could never have beaten; that Vicks-
burg army. and thus l would have de-
stroyed two armies, perhaps. Pember-
toms was already gone, and I was quite
sure of Johnston's. l was sorry / did
not know Johnston was coming until it
was too late. Take it all in all, the
South, in my opinion, had no better SOL
.dier than Joe Johnston-none, at least,
that gave me more trouble.
NO COUNCILS OF WAR.
Some remark was made about councils
of war, and how far their deliberations
affected an army's movements. Il never
held council of war in my life. I
never heard of Sherman or Sheridan do
ing so. Of course I heard ali that every
one had to say, and in headquarters there
is an interesting and constant stream of
talk. But | always made up my mind
to act, and the first that even my staff
knew of any movement was when l wrote
it out in rough and gave it to be copied
off"
GRANT THINKS POORLY OF PILLOW,
FLOYD, &C.
People think that Donelson was cap
tured by pouring men into it ten to one,
or some such odds. The truth is our
army-a new army-invested fortified
place and compelled a surrender of a
force much larger than our own. A
large number of the rebels escaped under
Floyd and Pillow, ,2but. ~as twas I took
more prisoners than 1 had under my
command for the first two days of my in
yestment. After the investmentwe were
enforced, so that at the surrender
there were $4,000 Union troops, about
1000 of which were sent back to guard
the road to where the steamers lay with
our supplies. There were $4,000 effec-
tive men in Donelson at the beginning OF
the siege. Of course there was risk in
attacking Donelson as I did, but" said
the General, smiling, "I knew the men
who commanded it. / knew some OF
them in Mexico. knowledge of that
kind goes far toward determining a
movement like this."S>
THE ATTACK ON FORT DoNELsoN.
{ Suppose Longstreet or Jackson had
been in command 2" said your correspon-
dent.
"If Longstreet or Jackson" said the
General, cor even if Buckner had been
in command, I would have made diff
ferent campaign. In the beginning we
all did things more rashly than later,
just as Jackson did in his earlier CAM
paigns. The Mexican war made the OFF,
GERS of the old regular armies more OF
less acquainted, and when we knew the
name Of the general opposing we knew
enough about him to make our plans ac-
cordingly. What determined my attack
| on Donelson," said the General, "was as
much the knowledge I had gained of its
commanders in Mexico as anything else
But as the war progressed and each side
kept improving its army these expert,
ments were not possible. Then it be-
came hard, earnest war, and neither side
could depend upon any chance with the
other. Neither: side dared. to, make 6
mistake. It was steady, ,shard pounding
and the result could only be ruin to the
defeated party. That was a peculiarly
in our war that we were not fighting fol
a peace, Butsto destroy our adversary
That made it 50 hard for both sides, land
espeeiallylfor theiSo1th." 20