The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1878-08-31
II
nlrrtialAOOcrtls
SATURDAY,. AUGUST 81.
SUPREME COURT OF THE HAWAIIAN
ISLANDS-July Term, 1878, In Equity.

SUPREME COURT OF THE HAWAIIAN
I~sLANDS-July Term, 1878, In Equity.
KrAmU (w.) Er AL. vs.. KAELEU (w.)
BEroRE HARRIS, {. J.; JUDD AND McCCLLr, il.
Opinion By MeCuAg, J.-APpeaLJ from ChiG
Justice Harris.
The plaintiff cher husband ~joining) brought
4 bill 10 equity praying that a deed purporting
to be executed by one Kikipine III favor OF the
defendant, conveying real estate in Manoa Val
ley, be cancelled as being fraudulent. The date
Of the execution Of the deed is June 14th, 1873,
and Kikipine died on the 18th day of June. The
plaintiff brings the bill as the cousin OF the de-
ceased intestate and his next of kin and heir at
law. In proof Of this, she brings forward several
reputable witnesses who testify that the deceased
was known to them to have been born at
Waimea, in the Island of Hawaii; that his real
name was Naihe; but that coming 20 Homo
lulu IN his youth, he had acquired the name
Kikipine (Six Pins) from his service in a bowl
ing alley; that he went TO ManOa Valley, &C
quired property and lived there till his death;
and that Kuamu was his first cousin and
only surviving relative. The case had proceeded
thus far when the defendant offered to destroy
the plaintiffs standing in the case by showing
that the deceased was another man than the per
son born at Waimea, and that the real Kikiplne
had a surviving brother, by name kahula. They
bring this Kahula and a body OF credible wit
nesses, who testify that the deceased was born at
Waimanalo, in this Island, giving the names of
his parents, who are different persons from the
Waimea people; that his original name was
Naihe; but that coming to Honolulu when u
young man he was given the name hlklpIne-
from his employment in a bowling alley; that he
went to Manao Valley, where he lived and died;
and that Kahula is his own brother.
Both parties offered further testimony before
this Court to establish the identity of the de-
ceased with the Naihe of Waimea and Wanna
nalo.
The defendant, claiming that she has proved
that the deceased was a different man from the
one TO whom the plaintiff is cousin, argues to
the Court that the plaintiff has no interest in the
question of the validity of the deed and therefore
no standing in Court.
The Chief Justice, in his opinion, after dis
cussing at large the testimony relating to the
two Kikipines or Naihes, says: Fol the pur-
poses of this case it seems to me that the rela-
tionship Of Kuamu is fully made out; though in
a trial between Kahula and Kuamu l should be
quite unbiased, yet the weight OF testimony is In
favor of Kuamu, as it appears to me, and l so
decide that Kuamu is shown to me to be the heir
of Kikipine, though l do so without prejudice to
Kahula's right in any action that he may bring,
for he is not a party to this action"
The new evidence cannot be said to contribute
to the decision of the question of Kikiplne's
origin and identity, for it is about an equal ad-
dition to both sides. But we do not think 1t nec-
essary for the purposes of this case to make q de-
cision between them, even to the extent and with
the qualification expressed by the Chief Justice.
We do not intend to express an opinion sub
s~tantially different, for we agree with the con-
illusions of that Court, and only desire to qualify
the terms of our opinion, so that we may more
certainly guard against any color of a decision In
favor of the claims of either the alleged cousin or
the alleged brother of deceased to be his sole heir
at law, which might be pleaded as res GdJudiCdtd
in other proceedings. 1t is sufficient to say that
Kuamu has made a case, aside from the claim OF
Kahula, to stand In this Court as heir at law Of
the deceased, and entitled to bring a bill In equity
for the cancellation of a fraudulent deed, and
that Kahula has been shown (the claim of Kuamu
not having been advanced) to be the brother of
the deceased and would be entitled TO bring u
bill relating to the estate. That is to say, either
party establishes his right to the estate against
all persons known to the Court, except the other,
for the purposes of this case. Kahula has not
brought his bill. The interests of the claimants
are adverse, and they cannot Join in the same bill,
for neither of them will admit the pretensions of
the other. IF Kahula should also bring his bill
it would not diminish the right of the present
plaintiff to bring hers; and if it is held that the
Court could not determine the question of the
| validity of the deed without first deciding which
was the real heir at law, it would be in no better
position to do so than it is now, for it is doubt
full If the subject matter, the contestlDg OF each
others helrShlp, would De Within the JurlSulc-
ton of the Court. If the bill is dismissed for
the want of a proper party, or, rather, because
there are two different persons apparently entitled
as heirs, the deed not being cancelled, there is no
estate of the deceased to be taken, whereupon a
proceeding could be properly founded to deter
mine the question of identity and helrship. We
hold, therefore, that the plaintiff in this bill hay
ing shown what may be called a right of litiga-
ton, a right to claim the estate, may show cause
by her bill why the deed to the defendant should
be cancelled for fraud.
On this matter of fraud, no further testimony
was offered on the appeal and no argument was
made. We have examined the testimony, and
agree with the Chief Justice in finding the deed
to be fraudulent. 1t will not be necessary to set
forth the facts on which that conclusion is based,
for they involve no new principles, and every such
case must be judged by itself. They are fully
set forth in the opinion of the Chief Justice.
In this way we concur with the result reached
by the Chief Justice.
Judgment for the plaintiff.
Castle & Hatch and j. NJ. Davidson for COM
plainants.
E. Preston and C.. Brown for defendant.
HONOLULU, August 18th, 1878.