Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1878-10-26
THE PERILs OF EMPIRE.

suggest serious thoughts 10 all WHO
feel interested in the permanency
of that vast colony. We do not
hesitate to class ourselves among
the number who do feel thus
interested, and, though a little of
that irrational feeling still survives
among us which suggests feeling
Oftriumph whenever England meets
a check, we hardly think that a
rejecting man will deliberately
adopt the opinion that it would be
TO the advantage of that congeries
Of barbaric principalities which we
call Hindoostan either that the en-
pire should suffer dissolution or that
the rule of England should be re-
placed by that of Russia. In the
former case internecine war would
soon break out between the cOnstit-
uent principalities, and in the latter
the rapid progress of civilization
would receive a check which it
would not recover from for centuries,
if ever. For Russia has not sue
cceded so far in extending even a
superficial civilization fifty miles
around st. Petersburg, and all the
rest of her territory is as brutality
barbarous as it was in the days of
the primitive Ivans who first bore
sway within its limits. An empire
which fails to civilize itself is not
promising agent for civilizing its
dependencies. When, therefore, we
point out the dangers which threaten
the Anglo-Indian Empire, it is not
in the spirit in which
Tyre laughed when Salem fell,
but with the earnest hope that in
the end England will surmOunt the
troubles and complications through
which we confess that we do not see
a way to a prosperous issue.
We desire our readers to be fully
informed on all great events which
may be occupying the worlds at
tentiOn, and as this Afghan trouble,
with the complications which may
arise from it, seems likely to be the
event of 1879, we think it we'll to
begin with the task of exhibiting
the question from every point of
view, and for that purpose present
them entire a letter written by
Lord Lawrence upon the present
complication, the more so because
though we accept Lord l.. as con-
elusive authority on all subjects
requiring a knowledge of Indian
affairs, we cannot adopt the cOnclu-
sion which he arrives at. 1t would
be absurd presumption for us to dis
pute his statements, but, assuming
their correctness, we still think it
impossible for the British Govern
ment to act as he advises. The fol-
lowing is his letter:
The news from Peshawur which appeared
in the Times of the 22d inst, telling us that
the Ameer of Cabul had refused to receive
TAI, and had forced Major Cavagnari to turn
back from Ali MuSiid, is no doubt a serious
rebuff to the Government of India, more
particularly rs the Mission had actually
started. It seems 10 me to have been Seri-
Gus mistake organizing Mission to Cabul
before we had ascertained whether Amer
Shere Ali was prepared to receive our over
lures or not, and a still greater mistake dis
patching the Mission until we had received
his consent to our doing so. Had these pre-
cautions been observed, the aftrOnt which
we have met with would not have appeared
to be so fragrant as il now does. But, how
ever vcNatious is the Ameer's conduct in
this matter, il ought not 10 lead us to declare
war against him. 1t appears to me to be
contrary to sound policy that we should
resent our disappointment by force of arms ;
for by doing so we play the enemy's game,
and force the Atghans into union with the
Russians.
We ought not, indeed, to be surprised that
the Amer has acted as he has done. From
the time Ofthe Treaty of 1897 the late Amer
DOSt MOhammed Khan refused TO allow US
10 have a Mission at Cabul, or even t. Stud
one there as temporary arrangement, sol
EMMY assuring that such "A step would
lead To mischief, and not 70 peaceful rela-
lions with the Atghans. We accepted his
excuses. In 1909 the present Ameer affirmed
the same policy. Whatever may be his own
faults and shortcomings, he has never con-
cr8led from us his views on this subject.
What occurred at the meeting in PeShawur
towards the end of 1876 between the Ameer :
agent and Sir Lewis Pelly has not actually
transpired, but believe that our wishes on
the subject of Mission to Cabul were at
that time reiterated, though in vain.
The old policy was to bear with the At
rhanS aS far as we could reasonably do so,
and to endeaVor by kindness and cOncilla-
ton 10 bring about friendly relations, grad
ually leading them to see that their interests
and ours did not conflict. of late, however,
we have seemed to- think that we understood
the interests of the AfShans better than they
did themselves. We appear TO thlnk that
we can, in short, force our policy on them
without their taking offence at such con-
duct.
What are we to gain by going to war with
the Ameer" Can we dethrone him without
turning the mass OF his cOuntrymen against
uSs Can We follow the policy of lS5S-39
without, in all probability, incurrlng similar
rpSultS9 If we succeed in driving Shcrc Ali
out of Cabul, whom can we put in his place
Aud how are we to insure the maintenance
of our own creature on the throne. except
by occupying the country? And when Is
such an occupation To terminateS
have no doubt that we can clear the
detiIes and valleys of AfghaniStan from end
20 end of their defenders, and that no force
of AfghauS could stand against our troops
when properly brought 10 Dear against
them. The country, however, consists of
mountain ranges Tor the most part broken
up into rugged and dithcult plateSuN, where
brave men standing on the defensive have
considerable advantages; and when we
force such positions we cannot continue To
hold them.
The cost of invading such a country will
prove very great, and the means for so doing
must be drawn from elsewhere. The cOun-
try held by the Amer can afford neither
rha money nor the transport, nor even. the
subsistence IN adequate quantity Tor the
support Of the invading army. IL is impoS-
sible TO forsee the end of such war, and in
the meantime its prosecution would utterly
ruin the finances of India.
such are the political and military con-
sidrratiOns which lead me to raise my voice
against the present policy towards Ameer
Shgra Ali Are not moral considerations
also very strong against such a ware Have
NOT the Afghans a right to resist our forcing
n Mission on them, bearing in mind TO what
surh Missions often lead, and what Barnes
Mission in 1897 did actually bring upon
have heard il contended that no nation
has a right 10 isolate itself in this way and
refuse to have intercourse with its neigh
bor,s This may be reasonable objection
among civilized nations, but ought not 10
oDpIy 1 submit, between civilized govern
,6snts on the one hand and barbarous peo-
nIeS on the other.
NJ Doubt Ameer Shere Ali has aggravated
his offence by the mode In which he has
t,sist.,l our oyertureS, more particularly in
- tbraaf If his Mir Akhor at Ali MaSjid 20
Shoot Major Cavagnari If he did not turn
mack But we should not Dear 700 hardlS
m tbe AIneer on this account. nave no
doubt that II we promise TO give up IorclhS
n Mission on him he would make any aI'olT
ogv that we could reasonably cs.ll 10 ~, ,, !
S,T,Ja that we We're wrong in the outset ~ ouI
,rn7icV 10 the Ameer in many instances
which could be pointed out, ana th etSlo,e
on0bt not to be over hard on MN IN ac 49, y
~ mis- excuses. l insist that there VIII De
NO real dfshonol to us in coming 70 leItllS
win him whereas, by pressing on MN o ~
own policy, we may incur IlostseIAous NaiAA
culties, and even disasters. al. -, that
The last kilograms from 1ndla are Tia
three considerable bodies of troops are 10 o.