Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1878-04-12
THE QUESTION SETTLED.

THE COURT OF APPEALS RE-AFFIRMS THE
DECISION ON THE FUNDING BILL-DIS-
sENTING OPINION OF JUDGE STAPLES
COUPONS AS GOOD as GOLD IN THE
PAYMENT OF ALI. DUES TO THE STATE
THE COURT UNANIMOUS THAT THE
LEGISLATURES MUST PROVIDE BY TAX
TON FOR THE PAYMENT OF TIL DEBT.
&c Sc, &C.
1t was announced by us Friday that on
Thursday the Court of appeals Of Vir-
GINA, sitting in Ricbm ond, all the Judges
on the bench except Judge Moncure, who,
being a holder of State bonds, declined t.
sit IN the case, had decided that coupe Us
must be received for all dues to the State
of whatever character when rendered.
Judge Staples alone disseRted from thu
decision, which how ever receives the ell
corsement of Judge MOncure. The Gas
before the court was Clarke VS.. the Con-
.nonwealth, in which the plaintiff havll.'
rendered coupons i'll pigment of fine anG
they being refused by the Auditor, declipe.
to pay in any other way and Was held II
custody. It was decided for tire plaintiff
nd he was discharged on payment i'll
coupons. Judge Christian delivered the
op MON, which opens by saying that this
question was not decided in the case Of
Tyler vs. the Commonwealth recently be-
fore the Court, because it was outside Of
the case:
But the question we have to determine
fa,,v r 10 N hQ or
questions which are the subject, unhappily
of political agitation) is purely LEGAL
QUESTION, to be determined upon well de-
tined legal principles, and the rules OF con-
sGruction universally recognized as applica-
ble to the statute ldU. 1t all depends upon
the true construction to be given to the
I'd section of the act approved March 80,
1871, entitled IAN act to provide for the
funding and payment Of the public debt"
THIS SECTION,
after declaring that the owners of any of
| the bonds, stocks, or interest-certifcates
| heretofore issued by this State y
may fund two thirds of the amount OF the
same i in six-percentum coupons
| OF registered bonds of this State, &c., &C.,
contains the following provision: 1.-The
bonds shall be made payable to order or
bearer and the coupons to bearer at the
Treasury OF tie State, and bonds payable
to order may he exchanged for bonds pay
! able to bearer, and registered bonds may
be exchanged for coupon bonds, or uice Ter
sa, at the option of the holder. The cou-
pons shall be payable semi-annually and
receivable at and after maturity for all
tdGes, debts, dues, and demands, due the
State which shall be so expressed on their
face - The only question, then. we have
| to determine is whether fines imposed for
| a violation of law are included within the
| terms of the statute ? / say this is the
only question we have to determine, be-
cause the question Of the constitutional
| ty of the act above REFER to, known as
the funding act, has already been deter
mined by this Court. The case of Antoni
vs.. Wright (22 GrattaD) settles this ques-
ton. The same arguments against its
constitutionality made in this case were
urged in that. [ refer to that case, and
adopt its principles and reasoning as a
! clear and conclusive exposition of the law,
and am of opinion that this decision CT the
Court declaring the
| CONsTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT OF
MARCH 80, 1871,
and declaring that any act of the legisla-
ture in conflict with the provisions of that
| act, so far as it may forbid collecting
|
| of taxes and other demands of the State
any thing else than geld or silver coin,
| United States Treasury notes, or notes OF
the national banks of the United States
must be held to be an acc ''impai1ing the
obligation of contract and therefore
unconstitutional and void. This dec Son
| Of Antenl VS.. Wright was recognized and
re-affirmed in Wise Brothers VS.. Rogers
| Auditor, and Maury Il Co. VS. same (24th
Grattan.) and must now be held to be the
settled law Of this State. 1t is not neces-
sary, therefore, and indeed 1t would be a
vain and useless task, to attempt to 90
over again the reasons which governed this
| Court in coming to the conclusions then
reached and firmly adhered to ever since.
I can only say for myself that after care
| full consideration of all the views which
have been presented on this question the
opinion of Judge Bouldin in Antoni VS..
Wright is lucid, able, and
CONCLUSIVE EXPOSITION
of the law, and is one based upon judicial
logic and fortified by judicial authority,
which makes it impregnable against every
assault which may be made upon it.
Adopting, therefore, the principles and
reasoning in the case of Antoni VS.. Wright,
we are left in this case to a single and very
narrow inquiry; and that is, Are fines inn
posed for violation of law included in
| the purview of the statute ? One of the
| principal and universally adopted rules of
construction of statuteS-is that in the en-
actment of statutes the rule Of interpreta-
ton is. in respect to the intention OF the
| legislature, that where the language is ex-
plicit the courts are bound to seek for the
detention, in the words of the act itself,
and they are not at liberty to suppose or
| to hold that the legislature intended any
| thing different from what their language
| imports-Pot. Dwaris on Statutes. p. 146.
Words in a statute are never to be con-
sidered as unmeaning and surplusage if a
construction can be legitimately found
which will give force to and preserve all
the words in the act.
| THE BEST RULE
by which to arrive at the meaning and in
tention of a law is to abide by the words
which the law-maker has used.-DWaris,
! p. 1893; note. Especially is this the case
! where the words used have no double or
doubtful meaning, but are plain and expli-
| cit in their Specification, for it is a rule of
| universal application that effect must be
given to the words used by the Legislature
| where here is 20 uncertainty or ambgui-
| ty in their meaning.
| Now, the words used in the act we are
called upon to cOnstrue are AS broad, ex-
plicit. and comprehensive as any terms
which could possibly be used. The act
declares that coupons shall be receivable
at and after maturity for ALL TAXES,
DEBTS, DUES, AND ALL DEMANDS DUE
THE STATE" Is there any uncertainty
or ambiguity in these terms? They all
have certain definite, explicit, and tech
nical meaning. We cannot discard any
one of them as unmeaning and surplusage,
but must, according to the rules Of con-
struction which bind the courts, glue effect
to all. We must suppose the legislature
knew the ordinary meaning and
LEGAL FORCE OF THE WORDS