Daily globe. [volume] (St. Paul, Minn.) 1878-1884, 1878-03-20
SYLLABUS.

POI SASuA"A
The plaintiffs having withdrawn assent to
further delay, and requested the court to pro-
coed with the appeals, the request is granted.
OPINION.
The appeals in the foregoing cases were duly
argued and submitted to this court at April
term 1875. On August Oath, 1875, the same
being under advisement and undetermined, the
attorneys for the respective parties submitted
to the judges of this court who sit on these
cases communication the substance of which
is as follows, viz:
ut is the desire Of the parties in interest
that the several appeals now pending in
the supreme court in 'the above entitled cases.
remain for the present at least In statu g,so.
We are not yet sufficiently advised Of the ar
rangement which has been made by the parties
to state to what time they are desired so to re-
MAN, or what exigency may make decisions of
such appeals necessary or desirable, but will
with your honors on thesubject, if agreeable to
you.''
This communication was signed by the at
torneys for the plaintiffs, and by the attorneys
for the defendant, the First Division of the
St. Paul d Pacific railroad company.
nothing more than Joint
request that proceedings in the appeals should
be suspended for the then present. In itself
considered, it contains nothing which binds
any particular length of time.
On August 18th, 1877, another communication
was received, signed by the attorney for the
plaintiffs, withdrawing all assent on the part of
the plaintiffs to any further delay in the deci-
sion of these appeals and asking for a speedy
determination of the same.
The attorneys for defendants objecting to
further proceedings, an order Was issued re-
quiring them to show cause why the appeals
should not be proceeded in.
Upon the hearing it appeared that the pro-
ceedings were suspended in consequence of an
the First Division of the St. Paul Pacific
railroad company as party of the first
part. a committee representing certain bond
holders of the company, together with such
| other bondholders as might come into the
agreement of the second part, and certain
stockholders OF the company as parties of the
third part.
This agreement was entered into with the ex-
| pectation that the bondholders and stockhold-
| ers of the company would be able to unite in
| an arrangement proposed in the agreement for
an amicable and complete adjustment of the
| from the embarrassments by which it was
beset. This expectation appears to have failed.
The agreement was not executed by the
plaintiffs as trustees otherwise, by all the
bondholders, the holders of large number of
| bonds having failed to accede to it.
The agreement provided, among other things,
for the suspension of the proceedings in these
appeals and it also contained provisions for it's
| own rescission. The defendant the First Division
| of the st. Paul & Pacific railroad COMPANY
claims that it is still more scinded and in full
force, and among other things that through its
operation the parties of the second part have
| received certain valuable benefits of which thew
| still retain possession, while as a condition Of
| rescission they were bound to restore the de-
PENDANT, party of the first part, to the status
in quo.
But we are of opinion that upon the facts of
the case the agreement did not bind the plain
tiffs.
In the first place they did not execute it.
| In the second place the plaintiffs are trus-
tees, and as such bring these actions. Certain
the security of certain bondholders. The deeds
of trust make it the duty of the plaintiffs in a
certain contingency, among other things to in
stitute legal proceedings to collect the principal
and interest of the bonds secured by such
deeds. The proceedings in which these appeals
are taken, were instituted for the purpose of
discharging the duty thus imposed. Now what
it might have been competent for the plaintiffs
to have done if all the bondholders whose trus-
tees they are had entered into and executed the
agreement above mentioned, we need not in
qulre. They did not SO enter into or execute it,
It is the duty of the trustees to execute their
/ trusts.
1 And this is duty which they owe to all
the bondholders, for whose benefit the trusts
were created. 1t is therefore matter of great
i doubt whether it would be competent for the
plaintiffs, by agreeing with part of the cestui
Qui trusts, in with part of the bondholders, or
by asserting to any agreement made by such
part to tie up their own hands, SO as to bind
themselves not to execute their trust, as for
instance, not to carry on legal proceedings in
stituted as the present proceedings are pre-
sumed to have been in the discharge of the
trust duty. There is certainly great reason fol-
doubling whether such an agreeing
or asserting would not be clear violation Of
their trust obligations. If this doubt is well
founded, then even if the plaintiffs had been
parties to the agreement before mentioned, o,
had acquiesced in, or otherwise assented to it,
they would not be bound. But whether the
doubts are well founded or not, the plaintiffs
4 4 gre in NO way bound BY the agreement to any
suspension Of proceedings in these appeals fol
the first reason given, viz. that they did moi
execute it, as they were not SO bound for any
particular length of time: by the communities
tion 70 this court Of Aug. 24tb, 1875; there is