The Iola register. [volume] (Iola, Allen County, Kansas) 1875-1902, 1878-03-02
WIN There be Wari


Looked at in the light of reason and
the probabilities of English success in q
war with continental nation, nothing
could be more unlikely than the break
ing out of hostilitiess between Great
Britain and Russia. England has no
army and Russia has no fleet. The
former will, therefore, find no enemy on
the sea to oppose her naval movements,
and the latter no army to hold in check
her military advances. Itwould proba-
bly, take England three months to put
1000 men in the field. Long before
that time the contest will be virtually
settled, and even if it were not, such an
insignificant force could make no head
way against the hundreds of thousands
of trained troops which Russia would
have in the field.
But the play of human passion and
the chapter of accidents are by no means
at all times amenable to reason. A war
with Russia would be popular in Eng
land at this time. Public opinion is UNI
nlistakably in favor of taking holder
stand than the Cabinet has hitherto
done. Even apart from patriotism.
there are incentives to war. Chief
among which are that trade and industry
would be stimulated by the expenditure
that a war always entails. Phen, again,
there are accidents to be expected where
large forces with far from friendly in
tentions are in the neighb0rhoOd of each
other. A chance spark may produce q
confagration if it fall among conbusti-
bles, and stray shot of the pickets
may bring on q pitched battle. With
Russian troops in Constantinople and
an English fleet in the Bosphorus, to
preserve the peace will be no easy mat
terror the Porte has now ceased to
exist. --s...
Then, again, it seems very improba-
BILE that the English feet would have
been sent to the Bosph0rus if there were
not behind the movement some well
defined plan for the future. The En-
glish Cabinet must have foreseen the
contingency of war, and Lord Derby's
dispatch to Lord Loftus-protesting
against the entry of the Russian troops
into Observation-Disclosures with dis
tinct threat of war in certain contingent
cies. The entrance of the English fleet
into the Sea of Marmora, not only with
out the consent of the Porte, but against
its protest, is, in any view of it, a step
of the gravest moment. The Porte has
always claimed the right to close the
straits against the fleets of foreign ma
ptions, and for nearly forty years this
right has been conceded by treaty.
England has always insisted that this
was right under the law of nations.
And however onerous this exclusion
may have borne on the Russians, there
can be no question that the Anglo Turk
ish position was the true one. The
Bosphorus, Dardanelles, and the Sea of
Marmora, are as much part of Turkey
as the harbor and bay of New York and
the Hudson River is part of the United
States. The straits are, in nearly every
part, less than six miles wide, and there
fore can be commanded at all points by
cannon from either shore. This GER
tainly gives the nation occupying both
shores full control over them-they
cease to be open sea, over which no
rights of occupation or sovereignty can
be claimed, and become part of the do
main of the nation occupying the shores.
In the next place all the shores of the
Sea of Marmora are controlled by the
Turks, and hence the sea is inland and
is as subject to municipal regulation as
the straits.
BY forcing a passage of the Darda-
nelles England has not only violated the
treaty of Paris of 1856 and the conven-
ton of 1S41, but she has violated one of
the best ascertained rules ofinternation-
al law. She has reversed her whole
policy on the control of the straits, and
has proclaimed to the world that the
Turkish Empire has ceased to exist; for
if it existed in full force, on what plea
short of hostile intentions could the
passage of the straits have been forced?
In the purview of international law, the
straits we're forced, just as much as if
shots were exchanged. Lord Derby may
say this was peaceful movement, but
the fact remains that the fleet had or
ders to pass the Dardanelles peaceably
if they could, fOrcibly if they must.
And Admiral Horribly cleared his decks
for action in anticipation of hostile
meeting. Derby's soothing dispatch is
therefore to be interpreted as humor-
Gus production, for if forcing a passage
into an inland sea is q peaceful act,
what would amount to an act of war?
The seizure of Princes Islands within
sight of COnstantinople is another fact
tending to show that the English add
vance is hostile movement and that the
reason it has not resulted in overt battle
is because the Turk is completely pros
trated-because there is no resistance in
him.
But why has England taken this step?
One reason is to keep Russia from ex-
GLIDING England from the coming con-
ference. With her fleet in the BOspho-
rus the Western nation must be consult
ed as to the settlement of the Eastern
question. Another reason is to stir up
the hostility of Austria against Russia,
by reason of the latter's occupation of
Constantinople, and thus bring about q
rupture of the imperial alliance. Brit
ish interests call loudly for protection
of the Indian Empire, and if Russia was
troll of the Black Sea, there would be
imminent danger to certain advanced
posts of the Indian Empire. The per-
manent appropriation of Constantinople
would be rendered more difficult by the
presence of British fleet in its harbor.
But in all probability the English Cab
met have their eyes upon two things
to save something out of the wreck of
the Turkish Empire, and to seize Egypt.
The Turks have magnificent feet and
England can not look on with compo-
sure while Russia gains possession of it.
England would not, perhaps, care to
avoid naval battle if one should fall in