New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1877-01-18

and therefore, upon tnl5 tneOIys Cohhoo "o
counted at all. What would be tho cOnse-
ouence7 This :.tlIat a numerical majority OF
the House can at any time throw out enough
votes to prevent an election by the people,
and secure for the House the right to elect.
No one who considers that the States were
intended to be represented as States III our
form of government, having equal power
through the Senate with that other branch oil
the Government which represents the numerical
majority of the people, will hesitate to say
that the proposed change would be complete
revolution State lines, State separateness, and
local government might as well DO blotted out
altogether, and, in the end, with intent to give
the numerical majority more absolute power,
they would he blotted out. A party strongly
intrenched in either section of tho country, II
able to WELD the vast power OF Federai
patronage, and to promise sure reelection
to any Executive willing to act as the
tool of the House, would easily secure,
by coercion or bribery, the election OF enough
members from other sections to insure IL
continued majority in the House. Moreover, II
worst came to worst, the outgoing House could
determine. through its clerk, what newly
elected members should be excluded from the
roll mt tic organization of the new House, ana
then the prevailing faction would bnd no df-
ficulty in maintaining its power by decison
regarding contested seats. Virtually, 'he
House of Representatives would become inc
governments, and any party having once ODD
tanned majority in that House, with the
Executive and the army and navy, could per-
petuate itself in power indefinitely.
The Constitution gives no such power 10
either branch of the legislative department..
II intrusrs the whole duty of receiving and
opepine the certificates from the States and
counting the votes to the second officer in the
Government, whose duties, otherwise not so
rcspopsible as to invite men of high character
and ability. are dignifcd by two provisions
that he shall succeed if the Presidency be-
comes vacant, and that he shall count the
electoral votes. Chosen by the people ahso-
lntcly independent Of both houses OF Cen
gress, not likely to be personally IN
tercstcd in the result of an election
since q Vice-Presdent is rarely nom
mated for the Presidency, this officer has
10 power which he can wish to pelpetuatc by
a false decision Either house OF Congress,
composed OF men actively engaged III politlcai
strife, possesses y large share OF power, which
it not unnatura,ly strives 10 consolidate ana
completc by control Of the Executive Most
wisely. the Constitution sought to render tie
executive independent of the legislative branch,
and most wisely, therefore, If gave entire con-
troll of the counting of electoral votes to
an officer equally Independent OF both houses.
The force of this reasoning Is not lesSehed
bv the circumstance that the acting Wee
President now happens to be President
chosen Nv the Senate But let us consider, on
the OTHER hand, what dangerous power would
bc given to the Senate in this emergency by
the contemplated departure from the con
stitutiOnal provision. Ii the two houses are
to supervise and count, they have right TO
investigate and discuss. Each house, IN that
case, has right to investigate and discuss
under its own rules. If the Senate chooses, 1t
can discuss until March 4, and then its
President will become, President of the
United states for time Not to either of the
two men for whom millions of citizens voted
will the vast executive power he intrrst"d, but
to the man who may cOntrlve to secure the
support of less than forty Senator'S. II tins
sort of thing can be done once, 1t can be done
after every succeeding election, special or reg
ular. The will OF the people can be indeii-
nitcy defeated as long as forty men can re-
tain their places in the senate, with all the
power of the Federal Government To aid thCm
Or either band, there is complete revolu-
ton. When we conccde to either house the
power to count or supervise electoral votes
we may rs well abandon altogether what may
then become the miserable farce of election by
the people. One house or the other will gain,
ard can indefinitely piOlong its power-the
Senate, if discussion can be prolonged; the
House, if it can be limited In either case, the
form of government established by our fathers
will have vanished from the earth.