The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1877-08-03

tions that has occurred in the war, the Rus
slams have been calamitously beaten. ms
result is the more discreditable because VIC
tory was within their reach. because the
ruinous defeat OF Monday was not neces-
sary result of the conditions in military
sense but was simply the consequence OF
bad administration, and OF the neglect not
of any great principles Of war, but OF very
simple primary principles. Common sense
could have won this battle Genius was not
called for.
Osman Pachas position on the Vid was
held by an army estimated at fifty thousand
men, and the strength of the position
made this force equivalent to treble the
number. 1t was, therefore, folly to assail
it. save with force large enough to make
the conditions practically equal, and the
first blunder Of the Russians was therefore
in the fact that they sent one corps where
they should have sent two. They imperiled
their success in a great occasion by the
wretched error of undertaking the enemy's
resistance. The Turkish position was not
impregnable, nor the Russians wanting in
the intelligence and the valor to force it
these differences flow simply from what oc-
curred-for the Ottoman line was pierced,
Russian guns had silenced its artillery,
Russian infantry had stormed its intrench-
ments and Russian soldiers of the left col
umn had made their way into Plevna The
position was, therefore, turned; it was
necessary to have the force to hold on only;
for the force of Prince Schackosky, which
had driven the Turks from their stronghold
behind Radisevo. was fought down and
exhausted by its efforts and unequal to new
exertions. But the fresh men who should
have come in behind them to hold on to
what they had so gallantly gained were not
there. And when the Ottoman troops in
front Of Schackosky, reinforced no doubt
from the other end of their line, were sent
forward at shutdown the exhausted troops in
their front were unequal to the occasion, be-
cause they were only human.
Was the failure to support Prince Setback
osky due to General Brudener, whose efforts
at Grivica, on the Bulgareni road, had been
less successful? Apparently, the Prince,
operating nearer to the line Of the Vid, had
found the flank Of the position and sue
ceeded because less resistance was made Mt
that point than was made in front, where
the main force Of the Ninth corps was en-
gagged. And probably the persistency of
the battle on the front facilitated Setback
osky's progress on the Russian left by COM
polling the Turkish commander to keep his
force in hand to meet Brudener. General
Brudeners operations covered front of five
or six miles, and he there suffered great
loss, and it is not likely he had man to
spare, even for the important duty Of hold
ing on to the Turkish line when it had been
gained though a division sent to the as
sistance Of Schackosky would have en-
abled the Russian to see in reverse next
day all the positions before which Brudener
wasted his efforts on Monday. There is
only one man in hundred thousand who,
being in Brudener's position, would have
spared men to support the left; and, on the
ground of the average judgment Of hu-
mainly, he is free from blame. The fault
was at general headquarters, where there
was misconception OF the amount of re-
sistance to be overcome, and failure to
send adequate force for the purpose to be
accomplished, while that force was idly
waiting elsewhere for the accomplishment
of this purpose.
AS the Russians have now twice made the
same blunder at the same place it is to be
supposed that at the third attempt they will
crush Osman Pacha, for they must make
third attempt. All their operations on the
Jantra and toward Jeni Saghra may as we'll
stand still until they have crushed the stub
bornly maintained resistance at Plevna.
The latest reports inform us that they have
already taken Lovatz, and that the Grand
Duke is going to take personal charge Of
the new attack on Plevna Simple pre-
caution made it necessary from the
first that they should whip the Turkish
force there at once, and it should
have been done two weeks since. There
was an army of fifty thousand men left in o
position that enabled the Russians to assail
it with two hundred thousand men if they
they should have assailed it Immediately
and crushed it, because Turkey would then
have been fifty thousand men the weaker
and because battle gained is in every war
o great piece Of moral capital. What is to
be thought of commander who, finding in
his neighborhood an isolated force of the
enemy that cannot be succored from his as
sault and that he can strike with impunity
to himself, yet fails to strike 1t? But if this
place was to be assailed ut once for reasons
of that nature, how much more is it to be
assailed now, when experience develops
that it is position with almost the strength
OF another Shumla and fairly on the Rus
sian line Of communications Shumla
would be always a danger in regard to
movements over the Balkan; but with
Shumla Oh one side and Plevna on the other
the slightest misstep might induce disaster.