The New York herald., 1877-09-02
Tn. BATH. or k.r.h.s.anhol.


day last, and of which the fighting hitherto
reported was only Introductory, unless the
Turks, finding the case too dithcult, aban-
doned it and withdrew. The purpose OF
| this battle is to cut the Russian hhe
ofcommunication atSome point between the
| Balkans and the Danube. This was the
operation that it was expected the Ottoman
commanders would undertake in July, and
it was to them the necessary consequence OF
the Russian plan of campaign. In regard
| to the Russian plan it will be remembered
| there was some discussion. On one hand it
was urged that the Turkish fortresses north
| of the mountains should be at once be-
sieged and reduced on the other that the
mountains should be passed at once and
force moved on toward the capital, while
another force should be kept north of the
mountains to guarantee the safety Of the
line from the Danube to the mountains, by
which supplies and ammunition should be
| forwarded for the maintenance of the expe-
dictionary army.
In the first plan there was safety and
prudence. 1t was war OH the slow and
sure system, and consequently did not
commend itself to the Russian fancy BY
the other dashing. brilliant and rapid sue
| cess seemed likely, and it was acted upon.
| For IN invading army to move across an
enemy's country in region SO favorable to
warlike operations as the valley OF the
Danube is proceeding full Of peril.
Prudent commanders, compelled to such
step, will always endeavor to lessen the
necessary dangers by resting one flank OF
their advance on neutral territory, Us the
! Russians would have done If their line OF
advance had been so far west as to rest on
the Servian frontier or on some natural
barrier, as when former Russian IN
vasion was guaranteed on its left
flank by the sea. But in the pres
ent case the Russian line of operations
4nvited the enterprises of the enemy on
either flank, since each was covered only by
one of the small tributaries of the Danube
that could not be regarded as great OBJ
stacle, though excellent as a starting point
for the construction of fortified line 1t
was apparently contemplated by the
| Russian commander that his line would
he vulnerable on the left flank only,
as he hoped to render the country
to his right untenable for the enc emy by the
mere fact of his passage of the river and the
appearance of his light troops on their lines
OF supply. In this particular his anticipa-
tions were not realized because Of the unex-
pected activity OF Osman Pacha, who seized
q strong point at Plevna, which has guaran-
teed the country beyond it and has proved
80 effective o menace to the Russian. advance
as to have enforced on the invader great cir
cumspection in his movements.
Through what thus happened on his
right, and the known position Of the
Turks on his left, the Russian communca-
tions were doubly imperilled through the
presence on each flank Of hostile force,
supported by fortiRcations whish guaian-
teed them against the advance of the Rus
sim commander and enabled them to
choose for their advance against his
communications moment that might
be critical in his fate. For q COM
mander to hold in such circumstances
the ground he had taken as far as the noun
tains implied the possession of an army
greatly outnumbering the enemy, or q con-
tempt for the enemy, or splendid conf
dence in the quality Of his army. 1t is evil
dent that the Russians have not a
great numerical superiority, and that
their contempt for the foe is
only partly justified, while the con-
tidence in the quality of the Russian
troops has been fully deserved. In every
collision with the enemy they have behaved
finely though want of the best talent ut
headquarters has deprived their gallantry
of it's Legitimate effect. But the exhibition
of their qualities has had salutary influ-
ence on the Ottomans in preventing any
rash enterprises. Had it been otherwise
had the Turks had the same confidence in
their men that has been justified in the
Russians it is scarcely possible that the in
vaders line of advance would have been re-
spected until the present time with an army
of not less than sixty thousand men within
striking distance of either flank.
Within the sphere of these operntions it
will be noticed the valley is crossed by four
| Slnill IlNtIs, WuiCH iioC III VIC
and empty in the Danube. These are, pro-
ceeding from east to west, the LON, the
Jantra, the Osem and the Vid On the last
is Plevna, with the army Of Osman Pacha.
Beyond the first is situated Shumla, near to
which was encamped the army of Mehe-
met Ali. Between the inner streams,
the Jantra and the Osem, is the Russian line
OF operations. Against any attempt by Os-
man Pacha the true line of defence for the
protection of the line of operations would
be the Osem. Against any similar attempt
from the other side the limo of defence
would be the Jantra But the Russian COM
mander would not content himself with
holding only the ground on which he ex-