The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1877-11-15

| the main attack on the extreme flght. IL
was fully IL O'Clock when General Lee ar
rived at this conclusion and ordered the
movement. In the meantime, by Gen. Lees
authority, McLaw's .brigade, which had been
put upon picket duty, was ordered to rejoin
my command, and upon my suggestion that
| it would be better to await its arrival Gene
ral Lee assented. We waited about forty.
minutes for these troops and then moved
| forward. A delay OF several hours occurred
| in the march of the troops. The cause OF
this DELAY was that we had been ordered by
General Lee to proceed cautiously upon the
forward movement so as to avoid being seen
by the enemy. General Lee ordered Col.
| Johnston, of his engineer corps, to lead and
conduct the head of the column. My troops
therefore moved forward under the guidance
of a special officer of General Lee, and with
instructions to follow his directions. l left
General Lee only after the line had stretched
out on the march, and rode along with
Hoods division, which was in the rear. The
march was necessarily slow, the conductor
frequently encountering points that exposed
the troops to the view of the signal station
on Round Top. At length the column halt
ed. After waiting some time, supposlng
that 1t would soon move forward, sent to
the front to enquire the cause OF the delay.
1t was reported that the column was await
ing the movements of Colonel johnson, who
| was trying to lead it by some route by
which it could pursue its march without fall
ing under view of the Federal signal station.
Looking up toward Round Top, saw that
the signal station was in full view, and, as
we could plainly see this station, it was APP
parent that our heavy columns were seen
from their position and that further efforts
to conceal ourselves would be a waste OF
time.
THE DELAY ON THE MARCH.
became very impatient at this delay. and
determined to take upon myself the respon-
sibility of hurrying the troops forward.
did not order General .McLaws forward be-
cause, as the head of the column, he had di-
rect orders from General Lee to follow the
conduct of Colonel Johnston. Therefore I
sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear
and not encountered by these instructions,
to push his division forward by tine most di-
rect route so as to take position on my right.
He did so, and thus broke up the delay. The
troops were rapidly thrown into position
and preparations were made for the attack.
1t may be proper just here to consider the
relative strength and position of the two
armies. Our army was $4,000 infantry
Meade's was $4,000; these are our highest
figures and the enemy's lowest. We had
learned on the LIST, from some prisoners cap
tured near Seminary Ridge, that the first,
eleventh and third corps had arrived by the
Emmittsburg road and had taken position
on the heights in front OF us, and that REIN
forcemcnts had been seen coming by the
Baltimore road just after the fight of the Isl.
From an intercepted dispatch we learned
that another corps was in camp about four
miles from the field. We had every reason,
therefore, TO believe that the Federals were
prepared to renew the battle. Our army
was stretched in an elliptical curve, reaching
from the front of Round Top around Semi
nary Ridge and Cemetery Heights on the
left; thus covering a space of four or five
miles. The enemy occupied the high ground
in front of us, being nlassed within a, curve
of about two miles, nearly encentric with
the curve described by our forces. His line
was about 400 yards from ours. Any one
will see that the proposition for this inferior
force to assault and drive out the masses OF
troops upon the heights was very problem
atical one. My orders from General Lee
were s'to envelop the cnemy's left and be-
Gin the attack there, following up as near
as possible the direction of the Emmittsville
road.''
THE BATTLE OPENED.
NY corps occupied our right, and Hood on
the extreme right and McI.aws next. Hills
corps was next to mine, in front OF the Fed
eral centre, and Ewell was on our extreme
left. My corps, with Pickett's division abb
sent, numbered hardly $4,000 men. l real
lied that the fight was to be a fearful one,
ut being assured that my flank would be
protected by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry,
Wright, Posey and Malone moving en- cche-
lon, and that Ewell was to cooperate by a
direct attack on the enemy's right, and Hill
! to threaten his centre and attack if oppor-
tunity offered, and thus prevent reinforce
ments from being launched either against
myself or Ewell, it seemed that we might
possibly dislodge the great army in front OF
lis. At half-past 3 o'clock the order was
given Gen. HOOD to advance upon the enc
my, and, hurrying to the head of McLaw's
division, moved with the line. Then was
fairly commenced what l do not hesitate to
pronounce the best three hours fighting ever
done by any troops OIL any battlefield
Directly in front Of us, occupying the peach
orchard, on piece of elevated ground that
General Lee desired me to take and hold for
his artillery, was the third corps OF the Fed
erals, commanded by General Sickles. My
men charged with great spirit and dislodged
the Federals from the peach orchard will
but little delay, though they fought stub
bornly. We were then on the crest of Sem
nary Ridge. The artillery was brought for
ward and put into position at the peacf
|
slope and soon reached the ,narshy grounc
that lay, between Seminary and Cemetery
Ridges, fighting their way over every foot O.
ground and against overwhelming odds
At every step we found that reinforcements
were pouring into the Federals from every
side. Nothing could stop my men, howev'
er, and they commenced their heroic cllarg'
up the side Of Cemetery Ridge. Our attacl
was to progress in the general direction O.
the Emmittsburg road, but the Fedora
troops, as they. were forced from point tt
point, availing themselves of the stone
fences and boulders near the mountains a
rallying posts, SO annoyed our right fanl
that General Hoods division was obliged te
make partial change of front SO as to re
lieve itself of this calling flank fire. Thi
drew General McLaws little further to thu
right than General Lee had anticipated, 81
that the defensive advantages of the grouni
enabled the Federals to delay our purpose
until they could occupy Little Round Top