The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-08-24
RUssIA's FAILURE.


more in Gen. Beauregard's plan Of de-
Tending Turkey than at first appeared
after q cursory reading OF his rather
remarkable letter to Col. Blanton Dun
can. We confess that we are still skep.
tieal as to the effectiveness of those
carrier pigeons, but we concur in
the main idea, that an adequate force
Of Armenians-sa one-fourth the Rus
sian army-commanded by practical
American commander, like Stonewall
Jackson. Jeb Stuart or Forrest, would
long since have passed over or through
the Balkan range and got to Adrian
ople and brought the Turks to terms
and that, with the same force and COM
manders on the Turkish side, the Rus
sian army would have been cut In
twain and driven across the Danube.
just as Burnside and Hooker were
driven from the southern side OF the
Rappahannoek by one-third their
force. Neither OF these belligerents has
done anything great in this war. There
never was so large force 30 badly
handled and SO poorly commanded as
the huge army which Russia has thrown
upon Turkey. The prestige OF this
army and of the Grand Dukes can
hardly be recovered during the present
campaign. Russia will have to fall
back on Grants strategy Of pegging
away and depending upon the process
Of attrition.
The Emperor Is evidently disturbed
and disguised. Gen. Gourka has been
sent to st. Petersburg to bring up the
Imperial Guard, seventy thousand
strong. This is signal for alarm,
and conscious failure and danger. To
use vulgar but expressive phase,
Russia has taken into her potith more
turkey than she can chew.
The solution Of this failure of both
these belligerents to achieve anything
great is to be found in the character OF
the men who compose their armies.
Their soldiers are mere serfs, disci-
plined slaves. machines moved by no
high impulses and directed by the in
telligence which comes of systems of
government and laws that debase and
enervate the minds and souls of men.
Russia thought she could do what
Germany did against France. Alexan
der was jealous Of the fame Of his grim
old uncle William. He had secured
German generals, and Krupp guns and
breech- leaders, but Alexander was no
William: there is no Moltke at the head
OF his army, nor the powerful intelli-
gence and dauntless will and self-reli-
ance Of Bismarck, and more than all, no
educated, intelligent, solid and conf
dent soldiery at his back. sustained by
q strong feeling of nationality. and re-
posing absolute faith in the wisdom and
efficiency of their commanders. It
was in this last respect, in the
earnestness and intelligence of
the common soldiers of the Ger
mans, as contrasted with the
frivolous, vaipglory of the French.
which had grown to be their ruling
trait under the empire, that Kaiser
William possessed his great advantage,
and this is precisely what is most lack
ing in the armies of the Gar. How
different it all was in the days when
Napoleon's conscripts came back from
Italy and sat down by the camp fires of
the Rhine, and astounded these old
veterans by their criticisms of cam
paigns, and the familiar way in which
they told of the grand tactics Of their
young demi-god, who SO outraged the
proprieties Of the old German who had
learned the science of war under Mar
shall Daun-"that hot-headed young
man who flies about from Ulm to the
middle OF Moravia and fights battles in
December"
All that was changed in the last war
and was on the side of Germany, and
that war was but another illustration Of
the value of that sagacious intelligence
in troops which makes them something
more than machines. But it Is most
probable that this advantage is with
the Turks, but the evidence Is that there
is not much of it in either army. 1t is
the old fight Of despots, and the only
elements that can enter into the calcu
lations Of success are purely physical.