New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1877-07-13
ENGLAND AND THE EUROPEAN VAR.

Great britain lCRdluillS ilIc i>uioI'dH ""i'
Should that nation become seriously involved In
the struggle, very remarkable changes may fol-
low in the price of grain and provisions, In
the demand for cotton, in the superiority lately
enjoyed by British manufacturers in many for
eign markets, and in the carrying-trade OF the
world. But the effect upon the finances OF tins
and other nations would not be limited to their
commerce, their shipping, or their productive
industries for Great Britain cannot 90 to war
without greatly disturbing the money markets
of all civilized nations. 1t might become I'M
possible for this country to borrow money at
four per cent all the plans of our Government
for specie resumption or for rounding the
bonded debt, might be altered Indeed, so
close is our connection with Great Britain,
commercially. industraly and financially, that
no other event, except a war between the
United States and some first-cass power,
would so greatly affect us as a war between
Great Britain and "A nation strong either by
land or by sea.
Undoubtedly Great Britain is anxious to
avoid war with Russia. But the ruling classes
in England are even more anxious to hold the
advantage now enjoyed in commerce, III IN
dustIy, and in national prestige, and 1t has
been made quite clear that Great Britain VIII
go to war before it will see those advantages
materially diminished Within a Few weeks
there are signs of a change in British opinion.
An English fleet lies in Besika Bay, but Mr..
CARLYLE does not write another passionate
letter. nor does Mr.. Gladstone deliver another
eloquent speech. Even the expectation that
Ministers would ask Parliament to vote sup
plies for a possible war was not received with
alarm. In short, anxiety respecting the
effect of Russian success upon Dlltlsh
commercial and industrial interests has
already prepared men of the ruling class
to consider seriously the possibility that
war for the defense Of those interests may,
from a British point of view, soon appear nee
cssarv. The declaration of GOrtschakoll, though
accented at Berlin, meets with strong protest
from London, and it is evident that the present
Ministry does not intend to permit Russian oc-
cupation of Constantinople without struggle.
PERHAPS it is even more important that, II the
present Ministry should contemplate such Il
concession, its term of power would probably
be short The controlling opinion i'll England.
which is that of the commercial and arlsto-
cratic classes, would look upon the concession
rs a fatal surrender of British interests.
Already the question is asked "Can Russia
"possibly be contentcd with any settlement
(which England can tolerateW y significant
article III The London Economist OF June 80
puts this question very strongly 1t points to
the obvious fact that Russia if victorious at
all. cannot be expected to demand less than
free passage for Russian vessels through the
Dardanellcs Considering the immcasTabe
importance of the Black Sen to the industry
and commerce of that vast Empire, The EconO-
mist reasons that TO Russia any terms of peace
must be equivalent to a confession of failure
which do not include the freedom of the Oar
dancles to Russian fleets, and 1t bluntly puts
the question whether England can possibly con-
sent to that change France cannot afford to
interfere. Italy, it is thought, may be willing
to see English superiority in the Medlterra-
| mean checked. Austria cares little, and has
already declared that its policy will he to de
! fcnd It's own interests exclusively. Engand
alone must resist with Turkey only as an ally,
if any resistance is to be made to the settle
ment which Russia is likely to demand
If England yields, the Black Sea becomes Il
Russian lake, its large commerce depends
| thereafter upon the pleasure of Russia; and
| from the fortified harbors of that great sea,
which Russia could with little difficulty barri-
cade against all corners, powerful navies could
at any time be sent through the Dardanelles
! to dictate terms at Sucz, or to drive British
commerce from the Mediterranean.
| The apprehension is not wholly unreason-
able. Russia may demand this very thing,
which British commerce will be most unwil
| ling to concede, and the pow r to yield, more
! over, lies with Turkey, whose feeling toward
England has been not IA little embittered by the
! refusal of Great Britain thus far to act iii the
! spirit of representations made to the Porte by
! the diplomatic agents of the Tory Ministers.
| Hope of British aid doubtless went far to push
Turkey into the war, and now, if abandoned
by Britain, the Porte may be not indiSposed
! to disregard English interests i'll terms of peace.
Hence fear of Turkish alienation, not less
| than fear of Russian demands, prompts Eng
| land to prepare for war. If the Russians are
sure to demand what England cannot yield
without a struggle, 1T is the part of wisdom to
! interfere before She I uIks have been crippled
| by defeat, and prepared by vndictive feeling
! to punish England for refusing promised aid.
! These are certainly cogcnt reasons, from the
! British point of view. Others, not less potent
are based upon the evident desire of Russia to
secure possession OF Armenia. These Incentives
to warllke preparation the British Ministry no
longer seems to withstand, and they mques-
/ tionably have strong influence upon that
public opinion which any Ministry must obey
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