The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1877-10-21


his brgadei went near Gettysburg, but did not
enter the town, returning the same evening TO
Cas6towo, reporting that he had not carried
out my orders, as Gettysburg was occupied by
the enemy's cavalry, and that some of his Off
GERS reported bearing drums beating on the
farther side of the town that under these cir
cumstauces he did not deem 1t advisable to
enter Gettysburg. About his time Gen. Kill
rode up, aud this information was given him.
He remarked, tho only force at Gettysburg
is cavalry, probably detachment of observa
ton. l am just from General Lee, and the in
formation he has from his scouts oorroborates
what have received from mine-that is, the
enemy are still at Middleburg, and have not
yet struck their tents.' l then said, if there is
no objection, will take my division tomorrow
and go to Gettysburg and get those shoes! Hill
replied, None in the world"
On July 1st moved my division from Cash
town in the direction of Gettysburg, reaching
the heights, a mile (more or less) from the
town, about O'clock A NJ. No opposition had
been made and no enemy discovered. While
the division was coming up placed several
batteries in position and shelled the woods to
the right and left of the town. No reply was
made. Two brigades were then deployed to
the right and left of the railroad leading into
Getty sburg, and, with the railroad as a point of
direction, were ordered to advance and oocu-
Ply Gettysburg. These brigades. on moving for
ward, soon struck the enemy, which proved
to be Reynolds corps of the Federal army,
and were driven back with some loss. This
was the first intimation that General Lee had
| that the enemy had moved from the point he
buppOSeu HUI W OCCupys pObsluly GhiEbS mlISo
distant.
My division was then formed in a CODED
| ravine to the right of the railroad, the ground
rising in front and in rear. The enemy was
evidently in force in my front. General Rodes,
commanding division of EwelPs corps en-
route to Cashtown, was following a road run
ming north of Gettysburg. Rodes hearing the
J firing at Gettysburg, faced by the left flank aud
| approached the town. He soon became
| heavily engaged, and seeing this, sought for
and found General Lee Saying to the Gen.
Iar odd ia haav ilp ai haA
not better attack - General Lee replied ::
No; l am not prepared to bring on a general
engagement to.dsy-Longstreet is not up"
Returning to my division, soon discovered
that the enemy were moving troops from my
| front and pushing them against Rodes. re-
ported this fact to General Lee and again re-
quested to be permitted to attack. PERMITS sion
| was given. My division numbered some seven
| Thousand muskets. l found in my front u
| heavy skirmish line and two lines of battle.
Ny division swept over these without hating.
| Ny loss was severe. In twenty-five minutes
| lost twenty-seven hundred men, killed and
wounded. The last I saw or remember of this
days fight was seeing the enemy in my front
completely aud utterly routed, and my divis-
ion in hot pursuit. was then shot and rem
dered insensible for, some hours. / mention
this attack, made by my division on the first
observation and opinion goes, that - is
| wrong in SUP posing that the Fedecal troops at
| Gettysburg fought % ten minutes better than in
Virginia. The Federal troops fought quite as
we'll when we attacked them on The second
day at ChsncellorsvilLe, and better on the 5sh
of May in the Wilderness and again at Spot.
| sylvania Courthouse. l speak, of course. of
| my individual experience and observation III
those several engsgements.'
| The fight at Getty burg on July was with
out order or system, the several divisions at
tscking the enemy in their front as they ar
rived the feld-nor do see how there
could have been q Systematic plan of battle
| formed, as have, think, clearly shown that
we accidentally stumbled into this fight.
| Longstreet's attack on Jolly 9 was, in my
Judgment, made entirely too late in the day.
If il could not have been made earlier, it
should not have been made at all. / was by
General Lees side when this attack was made,
and the thought occ urred to me then that if
| Longstreet was successful night would rob
! him of the legitimate fruits of q victory. The
attack on July 3, known as "P!cketts charge"
made by PicKett's division, numbering some
| fsrty-fve hundred siroug, and my own shat
tered division, under General Pettigrew, num-
| beripg abont forty-three hundred muskets, un-
supported, was, said of the famous
charge of the six hundred at Baiaklava, tres
grdnae, neGis ceSt ne pas la guerre'
| In justice to General Lee 1t must be here
stated that orders were given by him for other
| troops to attack at the same time, which or
ders not obeyed. VINO should shoulder
this responsibility | know not. l think the
| fight of the 3D. of July vas mistake; that
| General Lee should have SO mar G 1vred as to
have drawn Meade from his stronghold and
such l believe to have been General Lees
| views after the fight, as he remarked to me, at
| orange COURTHOUSE, during tue WlnLer OF 1OOo-
Ga. when animadverting upon the criticisms
made upon the Gettysburg fight especially re,
ferriDg to the fight of July 3, latter it is all
over, as stupid y fellow am can see the
mistakes that were made" adding, I" notice,
however, my mistakes are never told me until
it is too late, and you, aud all my officers
know that L am always ready and anxious TO
have their suggestions" The fact is, General
Lee believed the army of Northern Virginia,
as it then existed, could accomplish anything.
Had our cavalry been in position. General
Lse would have known of Reynold'e approac
in the direction of Gettysburg twenty. four
hours before this corps reached Gettysburg.
General Lee conld and probably would, had
he known the enemy were in motion, have &C.
cupied Gettysburg on the 29Gh or 30th of June,
and rendered his position impregnable.
Had our cavalry been in position, General
Lee, if he saw proper, could have permitted
Reynolds corps TO have occupied Gettysburg
as he did-but instead of this corps being IN
masked by two brigades of my division, it
would have been attacked by Longstreet,
Z we'll, and Hills corps In that case the fate
of this corps no one can doubt; and had the
enemy thrown forward reinforcements as he
did, they would have been crushed in detail.
Had our cavalry been in position, the
l 100 r,11xl h,--