The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1877-08-15

III invading army, but there are others
ehargcablc on the incapacity Of com
mandrrs which cloud with doubt the
Issue not only of campaign but of
war. The late defeat OF the Russians
before Plcvna seems to belong to the latter
class NAPOLEON /. used to say that in
lighting battle he 50 ordered matters a.
~ have seventy chances out OF the hundred
In his favor; the rest he left to fate. In
their recent assaults Of Turkish carthworks
the Cars Generals have done just the OPP
posite.
Mr.. WALLACE and other authorities tell
ne that IN point Of technical education the
Russian officers Of the line are far below the
standard maintained in western Europe.
or the general stan, which Is largely COM
posed of Germans, they give Il better ac-
count but this hardly seems to bc justified
by recent events. The abortivc movements
Of the past two weeks, which have aimed Ia
dslodgo the Turks from their positions
north Of the Balkans, have been marked not
only by faults Of execution but by grave
tactical lundcr n violation Of accepted
principles, and strange blindness to the
changed conditions of modern warfare.
We need not point out such an obvious
lault as the want Of concert between Gen.
KRupENER and Prince SHACKAsKoY in the
attack on Plcvna. But the lattcr's assault
Of an intrcnched force with an army numcr-
lcally inferior which would have been ac-
counted venturcsome in the last century.
appears foolhardy and preposterous In this
day of the magazine gun and the Mimic bull
let No doubt SHACKAsKoY despiscd his
Enemy, and we must infer from his contlnu-
Ance In command that this feeling is shared
and its consequences cOndoned by his supe
riors. But the Turkish nisdm, or infantry
soldier, Is cool and steady, and has quite
Intelligence enough to pull trigger; and,
what is Of the most consequence, he is armed
with the Henry-Martini repeating rifle.
What, therefore, the Russian Generals have
allowed themselves TO despisc II those re-
ioubtable arms Of precision which have
revolutionizcd war.
AZ regards the merits of repeating guns.
We are aware that two commissions Of
American army officers have inclined, after
mature considerations to prefer for military
purposes weapon which shouldbe reloaded
after each discharge. II was claimed that,
owing 10 the greater ease and celebrity of
loading with single cartridge a large
number Of discharges-say fortnight be
Effected in less time than with a magazine
arm. This Is the case no doubt; but both
The commissions of which we have spoken
overlooked in their inquiry facts which could
only bc observed in actual war and Of which
none of their members happened to have
had any actual experience. These facts are
simply that in making or in rcpeling
an attach Il hundred ,Ulleys discharged NJ
A. regards their material AMI their
moral effect on the enemy, than six
or ten volleys discharged without
any interval whatever. Thus to take
the case at Plevna, where the storm
Ing column must have advanced for n con-
siderable distance without cover against
men behind breastwOrks while any arm Of
precision would have suliced to break their
ranks, the fire from the nryMartlni rifle
was, of necessity, from its continuous success
sion, far more destructive and demorali2ing.
Especially in the defence Of eaIthwurks, it
Is certain that from six 10 ten vOlleys dcliv-
Fred in instantaneous succession, without a
pause to reload must not only kill and
wound an astonishing number, but must
also shattcr the morale Of the attacking
column To "a degree out Of all proportion to
the actual execution done, and quite unap-
proachablcb by any kind Of firing with pau-es.
But with or without the magazine adjunct,
the modern weapon Of precision, like every
other great innovation in warfare, has
evoked a new system Of tactics which may,
according to circumstances, prove either a
supplement or a shield. II wa, our civil war
which taught intelligent commanders how
the improved gun, more formidable at five
hundred yards than was the old nu h,t at
one-iiith that distance, H.ight be- ho~t 'ui-
ploycd for attack, on best ncutidliI'4l in de-
fence. From Il very early period of that
contest, or say from tie battle of Shiloh,
1t was perceived that the carthWurk
was the corOllary Of the Minit bullet The
spade, which had almost vanished with the
Roman legionary, acquired once moro it,,
old Importance, or rather an Importance be-
fore undreamcd of In both the NorthclA
and southern armies the soldier learned to
throw up in tlicc a ridge Of earth,
Ierhaps not moro than two feet high,
hut which, with its complimentary trench,
necessarily opened IN the operation, insured
him complete immu.nly from AN enemy =
hr" as well n, ether conditions essential to
That slca,in,ss 81 aim which the new pom
had made Il point of capital concern.
Throughout the dreadful slaughter OF the
WILDERNESS 1t is notorious that LEES success
was purchased with the spade. In fact, long
before that time it had become manifest to
our stragetsts on both sides that earth
works defended hy the modern arm of pre-
cision, might be nanAed or surprised, but
could not be storIned. Al all events the ey-
pertinent could not be ri7kel without an inn
Incnso prcponderanco Of force, nor even then
without terrible slaughter, such a5 no COM
lnandcr could assent To-, not even GRANT
with his stold coolies, amid bloolshcd.
This supreme Impeachment the carthwori
fcgad cd as an allUact to the new weapon,
tins coupling 81 SPADE au'l gun, and the aw-
ful lulleNlhltyo i l" b % combination is the
one substantial contribution Of our war to
military science II Is loY thirteen wear.
since the lessons 81 Nir.iDl and Tennessee
wor" oninrcrd upon the siul,ut al warfare
ana We -l'mld expect T., bnl tt.u scored
upon the Ilin.i IT tA Hl'.' t.lluuttnnf tttti ilt