Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1877-09-01
THE SITUATION IN THE EAST

to it forever.
THE SITUATION IN THE EAST.
Two weeks ago we expressed the
opinion that if the Turks took the
initiative in the coming contest, the
lines which connect Tirnova with
the Shipkha Pass of the Balkan
range would be their point of
attack. The event has confirmed
this opinion, though the mode of
attack has been different from what
we anticipated. 1t having been
stated that Suleiman had crossed
the Balkans by the more Eastern
passes and effected a junction with
Mehemet Ali, we anticipated an at
tack on the Balkan lines
from the East by Suleiman and
from the West by Osman simultane-
Ously, the main object being the
iuncture of those two armies. 1t
was known that Suleiman had left
a detachment guarding the Southern
entrance of the Shipkha Pass, SO as
to prevent the return of GOurka's
command into ROumelia it now
either appears that his main force
never passed the Balkan range or
that it returned to its Southern
slope, for he attacked the Russian
position at Shipkha from the South,
Mehemet Ali having apparently
aided him by a flank attack on the
lines North of the Balkan. The
most probable suppOsitiOn is that he
did join Mehemet Ali's force at Os-
man Bazaar and subsequently re-
crossed the Balkans to make this
attack for this suppOsitiOn is the
best explanation of the contradictory
reports, first that he did cross the
Balkan range and effect junction
with Mehemet Ali and afterwards
that he was not in communication
with that General.
However all this may be, it would
appear that he made a most Obsti-
nate attack on the Shipkha position,
which was as Obstinately resisted by
the Russians; that after three days
hard fighting the attack was very
near successful, when the Russians
were reinforced by a large force I'M
der Gen. Radetzky, which repulsed
the Turkish attack, recovered some
fortified positions from them which
were thanking the Russian position,
and finally frustrated the Turkish
attack. 1t is true that there is a
subsequent report that Radetzky
has evacuated the Shipkha Pass,
which may or may not be true; if
it be so it is probably the result not
of the Turkish attack from the
South of the pass, but of the danger
to the communicating lines between
TirnOva and Shipkha, these being
threatened on both sides by Osman
and Mehemet Ali respectively.
On the whole, it is impressed on
our mind that the Turks have lost
their opportunity; for every reason
their assumption of the offensive
ought to have been started imme-
diately after the second battle at
Plevna the Russians at this time
engaged in a series of marches and
counter-marches for the purpose of
taking up a new position OccasiOned
by the presence of Osman at Plevna.
They were demOralized by defeat
and had not men enough to cover
all the defensive positions of their
extended lines. A vigorous attack
on the flank of their marching corps
would at this time have thrown
their ranks into ineXtricable cOnfu-
sion; but the Turkish Generals
waited till GOuTka had secured his
Shipkha position and the lines had
been strengthened thence to TirnO-
va, and the general change of base
had been completed, and (what is
most important of ALI till the steady
tide of re-enfOrcements had COM
menced flowing into the Russian
army in Bulgaria, and then it was
too late. Gen. Radetzky and his
force could not have been spared to
REINFORCE the Shipkha position,
without dangerously weakening
other points, but for these re-en-
fOrcements, and now the OppOrtuni-
ty is gone. We see no prospect of
Suleiman now obtaining a position
which will unite the armies of Me
hemet and Osman in one, and with
out this the war can be nothing but
a series of attacks on detached posts,
with the constant liability on the
part of the Turkish armies for one of
them to be crushed by the weight
of the whole Russian army. The
value of time does not seem to be
appreciated by the Turkish generals.