Staunton spectator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1896, 1877-08-21
The Battle of Gettysburg.

MEMORANDUM BY COL. WALTER II. TAY-
LOR, GEN. LEES ADJUTANT-GENERAL
STRENGTH OF THE TWO ARMIES
FROM THE RECORDS.
Col. Walter II. Taylor, of Norfolk,
Va, who was acknowledgement of the
Confederate army of Northern Virginia
during the late war, has contributed an
interesting paper to the Southern His
torical Society in regard to the battle OF
Gettysburg, the strength of the two
armies engaged, etc., Of which the an
nexed is the material portion:
The design of Gen. Lee in invading
the Northern States was to free Virgin
ia of the presence of the enemy-to
transfer the theatre of war to the enemy's
country, and to take the reasonable
chance Of defeating his adversary there
knowing full well that to obtain an
advantage there over the enemy would
operate more powerfully in our favor
than to discomtit him in Virginia. He
sought an encounter with his opponent,
but upon his own terms as to time and
place. He justly felt great confidence
in his army, and hoped to select favor
able position where he could receive the
attack which the enemy would be COM
PEELED to make, and from which, if sue
cesSful, he could seriously threaten the
federal capital. The condition of the
army at this time was excellent; never
was I so impressed by its morale as
when the two corps of Hill and Long
street passed through Chambersburg.
Now, as to the battle itself. The first
great disadvantage experienced by Gen.
Lee was the unexpected absence of his
cavalry. Certain discretionary power
had to be left with Gen. Stuart as to
where he would cross the Potomac. It
was arranged that the movements of the
enemy and his own judgment should
determine this, but he was to connect at
once with Gen. Lee, keep on his flank,
and advise him Of the enemy's move
ments. After crossing the river Gen.
Stuart consumed some time in pursuing
and capturing train of wagons, and
when he turned to join the main column
of the army he found that Gen. Hooker
had interposed between him and Gen.
Lee, and SO was compelled to make the
circuit of the Federal army. He did not
join Gen. Lee until the evening of the
I'd of July. On approaching Gettysburg,
where Gen. Lee had directed concen.
tration of his army, force of the enemy
was encountered near that town by the
advance of Hills corps on the 1st of July.
This was the first intimation that Gen.
Lee received of the proximity of the
enemy's infantry. The first encounter
was unexpected. HilI's troops became
engaged. Ewell, whose orders were so
concentrate at Cashtown or Gettysburg,
heard the firing and turned towards
Gettysburg. His advance divisions
Rhodes and Early's-became engaged.
The engagements now involved two Of
Hills divisions and two of Ewell's-all
of both corps then up. The result was
a success of no small proportions TO the
Confederates. On theside of the enemy
two corps were engaged besides Buford's
cavalry. The forces were about balanc-
ed in strength as to infantry-22,O 900 to
$4,000 each. The maximum average of
Lees divisions was 5000 each, "a 900 !;
but at this date the four divisions had
not over $4,000 present. Gen. Butter
field, chief of staff, Army Of the Poto-
mac, testified that the First and Elev-
enth Federal corps had "a 900 on the 10th
Of June. Page 428, vol. l., Conduct of the
war.
We should have occupied the heights
that evening. I took the order to Gen.
Ewell to press the enemy and secure the
heights if possible. Later, Gen. Lee
rode over to Gen. Ewell's front and con-
ferred as to the future movements. He
wanted to follow up the success gained
thought that with Johnson's division,
then up, that Gen. Ewell could go for
ward at dawn next day. Ewell, Early,
and Rhodes thought it best to await
Longstreet's arrival, and make the main
attack en- the enemy's left. This was
determined on. Longstreet was then
about four miles off, with two of his di-
visions. He was expected early on the
morning of the second. Orders were
sent him to move up to gain the EN-
mittsburg road. He did not reach the
field early, and his dispositions were not
completed for attack until o'clock in
the afternoon. In his report General
Longstreet says he received orders to
III ove with the portion of his command
that was then up, to gain the Emmitts-
burg road on the enemy's left, but fear
ing that he was too weak to attack, he
delayed until one of his brigades (Law's)
j. ned it's division, and that he begun
the movement as soon after its arrival
as his preparations could be made. 1t
g .emed impossible to get the co-opera-
Ii ms of the commanders along the line.
" hen Longstreet did attack, he did it
in handsome style-drove the enemy
q ID captured prisoners, artillery and
o her trophies.
50 far we had succeeded in every en-
Co inter with the enemy. 1t was thought
[ at continuance of the attack as made |
l,y Longstreet offered promise of sue
ross. He was ordered 10 renew the fight |
{. .rIy on the Sd; Ewell was to cooperate. |
+ veil ordered johnson to attack at an |
ca rly hour, anticipating that Longstreet