The New York herald., 1877-12-11

solely through the Dobrudscha because tho evl
OF that fever haunted region, the absence OF good
roads aud ordinary sized villages, good water,
forage and other requirements put IL out OF the
question that serious blow could be struck from
such base. Therefore the choice OF crossing
places for the body OF the Russian army
| became limited by physical conditions to
some more between Silstria and the mouth
OF the Aluta River, above Turua Magurei. The more
westerly point was selected while the Fourteenth
Army corps, under General Zimmerman. was thrown
into the Dobrudscha, to cut the railroad line between
Kustendje on tho Black Sea and TcherIavoda on the
Danube to force the Turkish gupboas up river 10
Sisra to hold the garrison OF that fortress check
TO cover the communications At Gaatz and other
points between that town and the sea IRON any
pedtonary forces, and to be ready to cooperate
with the main army IN general advance toward
Schamla and varna In accomplishing these move
mcnts and perecting the combinations dependent on
| them The Russians had to contend with many phys
cal dtlculties, descriptions Of which have now
passed into the history Of the campaign and do not
need repetition here. Not the least important Of
| these, however, may be mentioned arising from
bad roads, the absence Of available railroads and the
considerable distances that had TO DO by de-
tachmsnts posted TO mask the general movement.
THE MILITARY DIFFICULTIES or THE CASE.
These, OF course, were created by the activity and
strength the Turks, who feeling that the interior
positions, such as Schumia and Sofia, we're safe so
iorg as the Danube bank was held, drafted their
forces TO Widdn, Ncopolis, Sistova Ruslchuk Tur-
tukai, Sistris Rassova and the intermediate river
side positions, such Rahova LON, Psanka, Aarctn
&c. IL In tho face OF this line OF doence
that the Russian army was 10 cross the Dan
ube The dash at Sistova OF those
military successes that turn the fate OF empires.
Although strong in numbers in the neighborhood the
vii To mi In he Mt
tack ana defeat It, but suffered the Russxns TO seize
nm i'm portant position for torled tee de pont after
very triling loss Before the Danube The
Russians calculated that such success would cost
them ut least thirty thousand men. They
really lost only ono thousand 1t Sistova thus
having not less than twenty-nine thousand good
soldiers TO their credit alter they achieved
entry into Bulgaria Strictly speaking the military
difficulties OF crossing OF the Danube were enormous,
but tho Turks for somo accountable reason allowed
great opportunity to slip from them and suffered
rreparable loss Their army failed defend the steep
southern bank OF the Danube against men In boats
and on RATS, and their gunboats were OF service
whatever in preventing the building Of bridges
POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS wRiaHr-.
Not only had Russia to contend with physical and
military a6lcutes In her advance; she had also TO
guard against the possible consequences OF Austrian
jealousy and Hungarian open enmity. Any extension
Of tho Russian lines into Serva would, 1t declared,
be violation o! certain rights which Austria claimed
possess In that territory. Fortunately for Russia
she had large army. as we'll as prudent diplomat
ists and Austrian interference with her plans
was eGectualiy stayed by influences that could not
| be ignored. With q neutral Servia behind whom
stood powerful military empire, the Turkish lett
flank was not menaced. The fortress OF Widdin
manded the river and watched the Servian
frontier that beyond tho strong garrison OF the
place bus small iorce EXTENDED the Turkish line
westward In Bosnia but sufficiently strong to hold
tho Montenegrins in cheek In that district Thus
although neutral in namo, Austria really influenced
tho situation in favor OF Turkey aud this. with the
pressure OF British diplomacy at Constantinople and
Vienna. weighed heavily in the balance against
Russia's success
TRSovA AND THE BALKAN PASSES . +.
No sooner did the Russian army establish secure
footing Bulgaria than the purpose It's advance
the selected line Sstova began TO DO apparent A
few rapid dashss by the Cossacks aud other cavalry
supported by the disposition OF the other troops put
the Russians In possession OF tho Jsntra Valley from
| the river mouth to the Balkans. with tho
| important positions OF Biela and Tirnova The
| capture Of tho FIRST named place resulted as q
mattcr Of necessity folio wing the increase OF the Rus
sian strength in It's immediate vicinity. The taking
Of Tirnova the result OF surprise. The Russian
Turkish garrison out at the other. But these
minor successes were important In the aggregate mas
much they gave the Russians possession OF open
road TO the balkans, and also lco that divided Bull
garia in two. The real objective at the time the
Rustchuk and varna Railroad which If cut would have
isolated Rus.cnuk and afforded the Russians . line
by which they could gradually approach Shumla, and
SO or Silistra from The failure of these
movements, OF course, depended on one condition
namely, the ability OF the Turks organize and en-
| ploy with effect army on the western side of
the Jantrs Valley which would threaten the commu-
nica,ions Of the Russians at Sisova and Nicopolis
| When tho latter place was carried by assault
| by Baron Krudener's division q strong Turkish
| detachment moving TO Its relief, commanded
| by the now renowned Osman Pacha Finding himself
too late 10 accomplish anything on the Danube bank
| against tho overwhelming numbers OF his enemy
Osman altered The direction OF his march TO ono lead.
ing southeastward and suspccting that Russian de-
tachments would in all probability attempt 10 follow
the main road leading from Sistova, Ruslchuk and
Biela toward Sofia, he threw himself into q small
open town situated that road and near where It
crosses the river Via. This little town was Plevna
THAT ONE CONDITION ARISES
As stated above, the Russian success depended on
the inability OF the Turks to organize an army west
Of the Jantra Valley The Turks organized that army
at Plevna. Osman Pachas force was ITS nucleus and
It grew daily IN strength. II Is needless repeat The
story OF that great military blunder that permitted
tue growth OF the town OF Plcvna from nero open
settlement to intrenched position that has been
proved to have been impreGnabc TO assault.
Flushed with success, the Russians almost ignored
the petty force in Picvna They sent small body OF
troops to the place. 1t temporarily occu.
pied, but tho Turks sent the enemy wniring ou. or
tho town with the loss Of onehali their number Tho
Russians got angry and organized two divisions under
Krudoner and Schakotskoy TO capture Plevna. Mean.
tme Osman Pacns seeing tho advantage held In the
possession OF this place the flank OF the Russians
entrenchcd himself and was reinforced heavily rho
Russian columns gallanty assaulted the Turkish lines
and met with one Of tho boodest repulses record
pievna became atorrbls fact for tho Russian army.
There It lay ike lion in tho path to the sou th ward
II must not ignored any longer It cannot be carried