National Republican., 1877-02-03
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OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES. .. Is,-.
FEDERAL Jurisdiction OF Federal AZ.
fairs
II vould seem . selEevident proposition,
requiring no argument TO affirm its correct
nets, that Il ts Just as clearly the business of
the people Of the United States, as citizens
thereof, to conduct all the affairs Of the ma
tion I'm which they have . common interest as
u Is the privilege Of the people Of the several
States to control their own purely local con-
eern.. Ard that II ought % be so, as well In
relation to the election Of President as in re-
gard to any other Federal interest, Is obvious
when We reflect that, II LEFT to the States,
they have ID In their power at any time to
Dissolve the Union, BY declining to participate
In the election, thus suspending the executive
branch Of the Government by the failure OF
succession. II for any cause arising in the
future, liable to occur at any period, q num-
her Of States, sufficient to control majority Of
the electoral vote, should combine for the
purpose Of defeating an election, aud refuse
toopsn the polls, simultaneously withdraw
ing their representation In Congress,
there would be an immediate dissolution Of
the Union, by the operation OF negative
forces, In the absence of duly-constituted
authority 10 resist the process of dlsIntegra-
ton. And the Southern States, in their late
attempt TO throw OF the Federal power,
needed only such peaceful cooperation as
would have effected this result to have accom-
plished, by civil means, what the march of
armies was not equal to, as against the power
OF . lsgAlly-slected Executive. So we see that
In point OF fact we have no security against
disruption and downfall, while the duty OF
eleeting the President is conided to the States,
for they VIII have IL within their power at
any time, by concerted action, to overthrow
the Government by holding no elections, end
by that means securing default of executive
power.
This consideration, superadjed to the reason
ableress Of the proposition stated as postu-
late, makes II the clear duty Of the people to
50 amend the Constitution as TO transfer the
responsibility for the continuance Of admins
tratiye authority from the jurisdiction of the
states to that OF the General Government
and particularly so since, as now conducted,
the Federal power exercises the right of re-
view, and thus determines In the last resort
by rsurped authority what has been eSclu-
siyeiy reserved to the States originally and
finally to decide. There would then be no
cause Of conflict or for disturbance between the
tuo agencies of the people, and we should
EnJv 10 returns of present danger. Nor
would there then be left to the States any
possible opportunity BY the means pointed out
to eonspire against the permanency of the
Government. And II IL be objected that this
would be to deprive the States Of their at
tribute Of Sovereignty, and to concentrate
dangerous powers in the Federal Government
by authorizing u to invade their domains and
Wild the suffrages Of their citizens, sufi-
eiest answer Is that IL is only turning over to
that power . natural constituent OF Its func-
tions, which could be thus legitimately eIsr-
eised In prescribed form, without . resort
to violent constructions of the law, as now
prseticed; and that the cttizens Of the States
are also citizens Of the United States, inter-
ested alike In ths ysshsfui exertion Of authority
ty both governments, anu msI,ItzIning dis
tlnetivsly their respective spheres Of action,
and thai the sufifage exercised in this election
properly falls under the supervision OF the
Cuifed States; and that In the light of to-day
the existence OF State sovereignty Is q delu.
sion-a mere nction-when set up as bar to
the execution Of Just power BY the General
Government.
II cannot be denied that such an authority
vested In the General Government would add
largely to its strength and stability, no more
than n can be maintained that It would have
the effect to endanger or diminish the liberty
Of the citizen and the general freedom OF the
country. Il would give the same additional
guarantees Of security to the citizen that It
would TO the country; and upon q careful sur
yey Of the circumstances under which the
Government was established, and the peculiar
condition Of the States At the time, It is more
than probable that this power would have
been originally vested In the United States,
but for the controlling fear Of a central des-
potisn then prevalent, inspired by recent ex-
perisnces Of tyranny, and the still more de-
terminate dread on the part Of the institution
Of ofslayery that too great latitude In the powers
Of the General Government would be danger
Gus to the integrity of its code and the con-
tinuancs Of Its career.