, 1877-11-03
REASONS FOR RUSSIA TO CON-
TINUE THE WAR.

The delight and enthusiasm excited oy
the idea that Russia had entered on a great
and glorious mission have almost disap-
peared, and the question which now pre-.
sents itself to most minds is. How 10
Russia to get out of the extremely difficult
position in which she has placed herselt3
1t would be, however. a complete error
to suppose that Russia would accept
peace on any terms. The "great mission"
idea may have retreated TO the background
and many fantastic notions may have been
rudeIy d%ispelled by experience but the
patriotic feelings and The regards for the
national honour are as strong as ever. It
10 keenly felt that Russia has not duly
supported her military reputation. Her
soldiers have fought like heroes, and
every Russian speaks with enthusiasm Of
their bravery and self sacrifice, calling
them occasionally by such names as ''hero
martyrs ;" but Russia has not yet shown
herself incomparably stronger than Tur-
kew in the military sense of the term.
The successful defence of the Shipka Pass
may be regarded as counterbalancing the
defeat at PIevna, but it proves nothing
beyond the individual courage of Russian
soldiers and oficers-a thing which did
UOG TOQuliG My pIOOl' N0t GubORO0N
public opinion should place Russia on the
same level with Turkey-that is an idea
Russiqns would never submit to. Plainly,
therefore, the Russian Army must gain at
least one great, decisive victory before any
proposals. Of mediation can be entertained.
Even if Turkey should consent to accept
the programme of the Conference, Russia
could not be satisfied with such q result.
The necessity OF supporting her military
reputation would be OF itselt a sufficient
reason for Russia to reject for the present
all proposals of mediation founded on the
programme Of the Conference; but there are
at the same time, other aud equally potent
reasons. The Rus. ians are convinced thai
if the authority of the Porte were re-es-
tablished in Bulgaria, the last state of the
Bulgarian Christians would be worse than
the first. In spite of solemn promises
which might be given 10 the Powers, The
Porte and it's Mussuiman subjects would
certainly, as on former occasions, r~etaliate
on the Christians as soon as the Russian
armies withdrew. The unfortunate
Kayaks have already had a ~foretaste of the
treatment they world receive if they were
deserted by their liberators. The awful
HCeUeS VI IuO FdACJ vi "a AuH"J" uoFO
naturally made a profound impression
here. The Russians cannot but feel
though they may not confess it-that they
are, at least, Indirectly responsible for
those atrocities, in comparison with which
the atrocities Of last year were a mere
triAe. They are in the position Of a sur.
geon who has beguna horrible operation and
cannot leave his patient till it is completed.
IfRussiam made peace at present without tho
roughly securing the future safety Of the
Bulgarians she would be held responsible
for all future atrocities. What should we
say of a surgeon who began a serious ope-
ration and then retired, leaving bis patient
to bleed to death3
All this is more or less clearly perceived
by the great mass Of intelligent Russians.
Their attempts, which have of late bscoms
more frequent, to throw the responsibility
of the war OH the British Government are
a mere DIS aUer. Thsy feel that, even If it
be admitted that the British Government
raised false hopes 10 the Turkish mind,
Russia was not, therefore, compelled to
declare war. She did so because she believ-
ed that che could, single handed, fulfil ber
supposed mission. The task turns out to
be much more difficult than she imagined,
n - 4A u NaEn. AaAE -