The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1877-05-24


not more than thrcc-quartcrs of n million
would be thoroughly disciplined; another
quarter would have seen six months SER
vice, while the remainder would have had
no experience at all. Nevertheless, as the
two latter catcgOrcs would naturally be
| placed at first in garrison, they would prob
| ably gain some proficiency before going
under fire. We may say, therefore, that not
only is the French military force ample in
respect of magnitude, but that i'm character
| It is greatly superior to the same force at
the time Of the German war.
As to the second step in the preparation
for war; namely concentration. we are left
to some extent in the dark because it il i'm
possible to forcscc the strategic conditions
under which such movement would have
to bc effected. We observe, however, that
the general staff has at last initiated the
Pruss.in custom OF drawing up at the be-
ginning of every year an ideal plan Of
action, or academic" project, as the Ger
mans call IT, whereby an imaginary attack
and defence is carried out ON paper. OF
course. the details OF this operation are kept
secret but its existence is sign Of prog
rc-s. Yet, although the precise method Of
concentration cannot be described, the time
requisite can be estimated. Not that
France, in tho Judgment Of the English
reviewer, could chcct this movement i'm
nineteen days. as the rrussian- did in 1870
or. MT all events. in fifteen, q IL is thought
NoN MoLTKE might to-day. But it may bc
affirmed rs the result Of cautious calculations
that the whole operation might be completed
in a period ranging from twenty to twenty
two days. Moreover, oven If France
should he somewhat slower than Germany,
no pcrceptible detrimcnt would follow, since.
as We shall see. it is morally certain that the
French must act ON the defensive. aud might
therefore gain in distance whit their assail-
ants would gain in time. So far we have
spoken only Of the so-callcd active army;
but this would be reinforced by the terri
toria lcvics whose organization IS now com
riotc which could he modified in thirty
days. and which. after all deductions, could
not add less than half IA million men, max
ing the aggregate of organized troops Of
which France could speedily dispose, one
million eight hundred thousand. This is the
state of things IN 1877; and its significance
can be gagged by comparing it with 1870.
when only quarter OF million could Toe
concentrated in a month. The position IL
obviously revolui.oni1cd. Money, labor,
and time have transformed the impotent
French army into tremendous machine
But what ends can it serve; l. il available
for attacking Germany, or Is it limited by
the very nature Of things ~ defensive
acti0ny
Upon this crucial question the English
student of the military situation aud his
French critic entirely agree. 1t is MAIN
tanned by the one and frankly conceded 10y
the other. that when Prussia Crasped the
fOrtr,sses 81 Alsacc- Lorraine and girdlcd
them with extra works which rendered them
impregnablc except to long siege, she vir-
tually stripped France Of the power to I'M
dcrtake an offensive campaign The annexa-
tion Of those strongholds proves to have
been something moro precious than terri
torial Acknowledgement. something moro sub
etantial than homage to German sentiment
il shines forth to-day u, an achievement Of
con~umnate military genius, for it has
blocked the road To Germany without
citing the grounds for the conclusion, which
are -ot forth in much detail by our authufi-
tics, We may affirm that not In our day
whether by stratcglcal comb nations sheer
weight, or emotional lcrvor. can France hope
to cleavc that barrier. In case Of war she
must undergo nNasiOn, that is an event for
which public OF inion must bc prepared. II
proves nothing. however, n To- the inal is
-uc If the struggle; indeed the ultimate
Success Of the French is only possible on
that condition. This is a conviction which
the French General whom we quote seeks
with peculiar carnc~tue~s to enforce upon
his cuuutrymrna as thcuuo safeguard against
illusions and d.-oouiasomcut But while he
insists that they must await attack, lac
allrns with equal confidence that they
would triumph over IL.
IL word, after five years ~ mistakes,
false starts, ana yacllations, France ut last
has created an army. No doubt some time
il yet required t. perfect il in detail, but the
main work is done; il is an army whose
magnitude rcadincss, completeness 81
equipment and sricntilic organization now
satisfy NoN MoLrhE's definition. Thus pre-
pared, nation il sclf-prntccting and the
English reviewer points out that should
Germany repeat the menace Of two years
ago, France would no LONGER owe her exist
cncc to tAc Intervention Of Europe. Were
the purpps" again proclaimed to crush her
once for all before she could be ready totaie
the field, France might look her enemy in
the face, and say" 1t il too later