The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30
THE NEW ORLEANS DEMOCRAT, SUNDAY DECEMBER 80 1877

|
flank at daylight Tomorrow" was
the first to speak. for / had examined
more thoroughly and critically than the
others the enemy's position east of Get
| tysburg, extending along Cemetery Hill
and the adjacent heights to Culp's Hill,
rs my two brigades Immediately con-
fronted It,. and 1t was peculiarly my
duty to do 80. Moreover, had
been In Gettysburg the week before,
when there was no enemy there, and
| had noticed the general character Of the
surrounding country; and, while 1 was
seeking that afternoon to have q fur
Their advance made, had observed that
on our right Of the town southwest of
| it) the ascent to the ridge was much
easier and gentler than on the other
side, rs we'll as that the Round Tops
commanded the whole position, though
did not then know their names.
The purport OF what l said Was, that
the ground over which we would have
to advance on our flank was very rug
ged and steep; that the enemy was then
evidently concentrating and fortifying
| Ia our i'm Immediate front, and by morn
| ing would probably have the greater
part of his force concentrated on that
flank and the position strongly fortified,
rs ours were the only troops then con-
| fronting him in close proximity; that
we could not move through the town In
line of battle, and would therefore have
to go .on the left Of the town right up
against Cemetery Hill and the rugged
hills on the left OF it; and that the
result OF an attack there might
| be doubtful, but IL successful it
would inevitably be at very great
loss. ! then called Gen. Lees at
tention to the Round Tops, the out
line Of which we could see, though dusk
| was approaching, and suggested that
those heights must evidently command
the enemy's position and render it un-
tenable and I also called his attention
to the more practicable nature Of the
ascents on that side of the town, adding
| the suggestion that the attack could be
| made on that side, and from our right
flank, with better chances of success.
With these views both Ewell and
Rodes conceded, and they submitted
| further considerations in the same d.
rection. There was some conversation
upon the several points suggested,
when Gen. Lee, being satisfied that it
was not advisable to make the main
assault from our flank, remarked, in
terrogatively: '"Then perhaps / had
better draw you around toward my
right, as the line will be very long and
thin IL you remain here, and the enemy
may come down and break through it?"
This was very nearly the language he
used, and | spoke at once in reply, for it
was q conceded fact that the arrival of
my division had decided the fortunes of
the day, and did not like the idea OF
giving up anything we had gained. My
men, who had marched to the Sus-
rious opposition, were very much
elated with the success Of the day,
and / shared their feelings. / knew
what damper it would be to their en-
thusiasm to be withdrawn from the po-
sition they had gained by fighting, as it
might appear to them as il q reverse
had occurred somewhere and we had not
gained much of victory after ALL
Moreover, there were some OF my
wounded not In q condition to be re-
moved, and / did not like the idea Of
leaving those brave fellows to the mercy
Of the enemy, and there were a great
many muskets stacked In the streets OF
Gettysburg which did not want to lose.
So I replied at once to Gen. Lee, and
| assured him that he need not fear that
the enemy would break through our
line, and that we could repulse any force
he could send against u5. The fact was,
| that on that part Of the line it was more
difficult for the enemy to come down
| from the heights to attack us than for
US to ascend them to attack him, as diff
ficult as the latter would have been.
Ewell and Rodes again agreed with
me, and urged views Of their own. the
| fact being that / merely spoke first
time Longstreet's name or corps was
mentioned. Ii 1t was, 1t was only on
the assumption that he would certainly
be up during the night, OF which neither
Of us doubted. We knew that Long
street had been at Cham ersburg when
Gen. Lee had sent the order to Ewell at
Carlisle for the concentration OF the
army, and that Ewell had then sent it
to me at York, with the information
that the Federal army had crossed the
Potona c and was moving north. York
the direct route, the McAdamized road,
while [ believe Chambersburg is only
twenty-five, certainly not more than
thirty from the same place. After get
ting my orders by the circuitous route
mentioned, l had moved from York, by
the way OF Heidlersburg, several miles
further than by the direct route, and
Rodes had come from Carlisle, and we
had both reached Gettysburg in time
to participate in the first days fight,
which closed about 4 p. m. We, there
fore, had no thought but that Long
street would be up in time to begin the
battle at dawn next morning; and that
question did not enter at all into the
considerations that governed us in our
views. The first mention of Long
streets name in connection with the at
tack was in this wise: When Gen.
Lee had heard our views, both In
regard to attacking from our flank
and our being removed towards the
right, he said, in these very words,
which are indelibly impressed on
my memory: SWELL, il I attack
rom my right, Longstreet will have to
make the attack and after moments
pause, during which he held his head
down in deep thought, he raised it and
added: "Longstreet is very good fight
er yhen he gets in position and gets
everything ready, but he is so slo5O."
Theemphasis was just as I have given
it, ard the words seemed to come from
Gen. Lee with pain. give this express
sion ly Gen. Lee now with great hesita-