The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30

In the rut of other writer's who have
given their crude views before Ewell's
report was published:
It Is very possible that Gen. johnson
may have supposed that he was ad-
vancing to the attack Of the enemy
when he was halted near the College;
or, IL may be, and probably was the
fact, that Eweil had ordered him to take
possession of Culp's Hill, then supposed
to be unoccupied, when he ordered him
to the position he reached after dark !;
and that, when he received the order to
draw his corps to the right. he counter
manded the order to take possession OF
the hill, until Gen. Lee had. heard the
representations that induced him to
change his purpose In that respect; or,
it may be, that johnson was about to
attack on the morning OF the second,
when the message was sent him that all
movements were to be suspended until
Longstreets guns were heard. In some
one OF these ways Gen. johnson fell
into his mistake, for he was incapable
OF Misrepresentation, and no one can
suspect for moment that Col. Taylor
has Intentionally misstated the CONVEX
sation. There was simply a misconcep-
| ton somewhere.
The reference OF Col. Taylor to this
conversation with Gen. johnson is I'M
fortunate, because both Ewell and John
son are now dead, and of course their
testimony Ia closed. Gen. johnson did
not expect his statement to be incorpor-
ated into the history of that great battle.
and therefore was not as explicit rs he
would have been had he anticipated the
use to be made OF that statement. We
all know how liable oil Of us are to
make mistakes and oversights in speak
ing casually OF past events. This is pc
culiarly the case with many In recalling
the events Of the late war. In response
to an inquiry from myself, have re-
ceived the following note from the gal
liant soldir who commanded the Stone
wall brigade, in Jonson's division, at
Gettysburg:
NEwBERN, VA, October ID, 1877.
Dear General-I do not recollect
where Johnson's division camped the
night Of 30th June, but 1t must have
been some twelve or fifteen miles from
where Rodes and Gordon had fought
late In the evening, after all the troops
had gone. We moved to the left very
late In the evening, and did not get into
position until after dark. I recollect
very distinctly that 1t was dark before
we got to the position where we bivou-
acked for the night 1t seems to me we
reached the field sooner than sunset,
but not earlier than an hour before sun.
set.
Yours very truly,
J. A. WALKER,
This leaves no doubt that great mis-
take has been made, either by Gen.
Johnson in the conversation with Dol.
tion Of 1t. The distance of Johnson's
march was greater than the highest fig
ure Gen. Walker gives. Gen. Long
/ street says that his troops were greatly
delayed on the 1st by Johnson 8 division
and the trains following 1t, which
came into the road from Shippens-
burg. Anderson preceded John
son and halted, somewhere In rear Of
Hills line, for him to pass. Johnson
had camped the night before somewhere
| west Of South Mountain, and north OF
the Chambersburg road to Gettysburg.
On the morning or the first Ewell was
moving with his troops towards Cash
town, In accordance with the orders of
Gen. Lee, when he received note from
Hill, giving the information that he was
moving on Gettysburg with the expecta-
| ton OF encountering the enemy, and
asking Ewell's cooperation. Hill was
Ewell's junior, but, without hesitation,
the latter promptly responded to the
call, and sent information Of his move
ment to Gen. Lee, who in return in
formed him that, II the enemy's force
was found to be very large, he did not
wish general engagement brought on
until the rest Of the army came up.
Ewell found Hill already engaged, and
went at once to his assistance. The ar
rival OF Ewelps divisions was timely,
and converted what threatened to be
reverse into brilliant success and the
imputation on him, that he did not
carry out the commanding generals in
structions, when it was in his power to
do SO, or did not do all that it was
good soldiers duty to do to insure COM
plete success, is most inconsiderate, il
not harsh.
l trust will not be considered dis
courteous to the gallant ccmrade and
friend Of Stuart, whose bright sabre
ever flashed in the very front Of battle
by the side Of his chivalrous leader,
when the ringing voice of the latter
summoned him to action, and as to
whom there was no need Of his own as
sertion to give assurance that he was
always one ito count on, if remind
him that he Is not, perhaps, the very
best judge OF how much marching and
mand Is capable, and that his remark
is rather harsh criticism on the foot.
men who had preceded the cavalry to
the banks Of the Susquehanna.
Nor to the very accomplished and eff
Gent chief Of ordnance of the Second
Corps, to whose worth and services I
have testified officially more than once,
II l tell him that he has not shown on this
occasion his usual research and discrim-
nation by ascertaining and weighing
all the facts before pronouncing his
judgment.
Nor to the very worthy and compe-
tent Adjutant General Of the Army of
Northern Virginia, who Justly possessed
the confidence of its commander and
the esteem Of the whole army, il I |
suggest to him that it would have
been more discreet for him to have
confined himself in his account of
the battle Of Gettysburg to a mar
rative Of the facts and events coming
within his knowledge, and not essayed
a criticism on the conduct Of those en-