The Vancouver independent. (Vancouver, W.T. [Wash.]) 1875-1910, 1877-06-21
England's Interest in War.

| 1el0grapn1c news from Aonuon dOun-
dainty justifes the forecast of our cor
respondent, whose analysis of the con-
ficting elements of British interest and
temper has prepared US to expect even
such document as the dispatch of Lord
Derby. The reply to the note of Russia
is trifle more tart than the Russian de-
claratiOn of war against Turkey; it does
not definitely terminate amicable rela-
tons between Great Britain and Russia,
but it leaves very few amicable relations
to be terminated. In view of such
dispatch, the energetic preparations which
the Government is said to be making for
active hostilities occasion no surprise.
From the British point of view, it is a
strongly reasoned paper, and presents in
the most forcible light whatever excuses
Great Britain can find for otjecting to
the presence of Russian armies on the
Danube and in Armenia; but its temper
would be inexplicable were it not known
that England is spending sleepless nights,
thinking of the Dardanelles, and vet
more of India. The changed tone of the
London Times is not less significant.
That public opinion which still rules the
British Empire-the opinion of the aris-
tocratic and commercial classes-is evil
IDENTIFY turning in favor of war. Since a
war in behalf of "such Turk" as Mr..
Carlyle says, must seem the very height
of folly and wickedness to the intelligent
and commercial classes on this side the
Atlantic, it is we'll worth while, if for NO
other reason than to aid judgment re-
specting the prospect of British interfer-
snce, to look at the subject from the
English commercial standpoint.
If war comes between Great Britain
and Russia, it will be essentially CON-
mercial war. These many years, cash
and commerce have been at the bottom
of British International relations. The
selfish interests of commerce dictated
the taxation against which American
colonies rebelled, sustained England
through the long struggle with Napoleon,
caused the conquest of India and the
opium war in China, and sent British
troops to the Crimea. To British COM
merce, India and the Black Sea seem
necessities. India consumes annually
1900, 900, 900 yards of cotton cloth from
English mills. The Black Sea supplies
to England large and necessary portion
of the grain which sustains its manufac-
turing operatives. These are only the
larger items in long account. The
British merchant has been educated to
consider two things necessary to English
prosperity-control of Indian ports and
possession of the Dardanelles by
friendly power. Hence, though Mig
gardly in much, the British Government
has been lavish, and British capitalists
have been not less lavish in defending
their interests in Turkey and India. The
enormous loans to Turkey, which have
resulted SO disastrously, were largely
prompted by the desire OF the commercial
classes to sustain Turkey and to hold the
closest relations with the Turkish Gov
eminent.
British commerce doubtless realises
that other European Powers have the
strongest motives to prevent an advance
of Russia to Constantinople. Hence, in
that quarter there is less of interested
apprehension, though memories Of the
Crimean war always suffice TO rouse
British temper against Russia. But
when Russia threatens to establish itself
between the Mediterranean and the Black
Sea, within striking distance Of the Suez
Canal, now great artery of commerce,
and in position to assail the British En-
pire in India with the aid Of Persia, then
British apprehension is aroused to the
utmost Even the London Ecoaomist,
which has not cOuntensnced policy OF
interference as to Turkey, says that the
gravcst possible questions of public pol
icy would arise if Russia should advance
with success in Asia. The thought of
abandoning Indian possessions, no Brit
ish ruler dare entertain. But to defend
those possessions, in the event supposed,
will involve an enormously increased
military expenditure. This vast in
crease of expenditure, ~ the Ecoxemisf
plainly declares, would involve changes
in the social and governmental structure
which would be intOlerxble. Hence, to
men who will not contemplate the posi-.
bility of prospecting without control in
India, the question comes with great
force whether it is not better to bear oil
the expense of temporary war with
Russia than to permit that Power to es-
tablish itself within striking distance Of
India, and thus force upon Great Britain
those intolerable changes.
Upon the character of these changes it
Is not necessary TO dwell. To those who
realise how largely absence Of import
duties has been the basis Of Bitish dscal
and commercial policy, tho prospect that
greatly increased military expenses might
involve permanent change in the modes
Of taxation will be enough. In no re-
spect is Great Britain prepared. rich a