Buchanan County bulletin. [volume] (Independence, Iowa) 1869-1891, 1877-12-21
THE POWER 10 LICENSE.
Reply to the Card Of Mayor Hussey.

80
Reply to the Card Of Mayor Hussey.
EDITOR BULLETIN:-A card appear
ed in your last issue from His Hon
Mayor Hussey, in which he seeks t
show that he has no discretionary pow
ers in granting saloon licenses; that thi
authority rests alone with the Git
Council; that the ordinance conveyin
that power on the Mayor is void.
As this is new version OF the law
never before entertained by our city au
thorities, it may not be improper to re
specially investigate the soundness o
this startling proposition. If it prove
true, then all former officers of this cit
have been guilty of mutilating the stat
utory, common and constitutional laws
Surely, in view of the fact that tn
Mayor is ignoring all precedent as ia
as our city government is concerned, a
we'll as the opinion of the present Coun
Gil, he will not ask us to accept hi
proposition without terrifying it by I'm
disputed authorities and convincing log
ic. 1t is fair to presume that his carr
embodies the most logical reasoning an,
the best authorities on the subject a
his command Let us briefly examin
them, and see if they can be construe,
as he claims. The first cited is as fol
lows: The mayor shall sign all com
missions, licenses and permits grantee
by authority of the City Council.-Cod
p 90, Sec. 51S." Does the above lin.i
the granting power to the Council
Does it say that all licenses shall issu,
from the Council? 1t contains but on,
simple affirmation, to-wit: that all Ii
censes the Council does issue shall b,
signed by the Mayor, Suppose the Law
should say, "All licenses to practice Law
granted by the District Judge shall b.
signed by the Clerk" would that limit
the authority to grant such licenses tt
the District Judge? Could he say tt
the Circuit Judge, You cannot grant Ii
censes. [ am the source from which all
such authority flows. The law directs
the Clerk to sign all licences issued by
me, therefore no other person can issue
a license. With just as much reason
can it be asserted that no authority can
be delegated to the Mayor to issue Ii
cense, for the reason that all licenses
issued by the Council shall be signed by
him.
The Mayor further states: ''The part
of the ordinance which provides that the
Mayor may at his discretion issue IL
is void for the reason that no
power, judicial, Legislature or discretion-
arg, can Be by the Council delegated. y
Dillon on Municipal Corporations, p
los, Sec. 60; p 549, Sec 567;; p 5SS, Sec.
CPS.
Let us examine these judicial, legis-
lathe and discretionary powers sepa-
rately. Judicial is defined as proceed
ing emanating from Court of justice.
If granting license is a judicial pro-
ceeding, the Council cannot exercise
that power, for it is not court of JUS
tice But it is not a judicial proceed
ing; consequently, to give their authori
ty to the Mayor is not delegating judi
,ial power. We will draw line across
the word judicial" above, and the May
or's proposition will then stand as fol-
ows: "The Council cannot delegate
legislative or discretionary power"
Legislative is defined as giving or max
ng laws" Signing or issuing a license
S not giving or enacting laws, conse-
luently to give that power to the May
" is not delegating legislative power.
30 we will draw line across the word
legislative" above, and the Mayors
will be narrowed down to
he following: "The Council cannot
delegate discretionary power" Discre-
ion is defined as freedom to act ac-
;ording to ones own judgment" The
Mayor asserts, then, that the Council
delegate to him freedom to act
according to his own judgment. Yet,
It the close of his card, he uses this Ian
,uage: 'Now, when the Council APP
proves the bond, they authorize, under
he statute, the Mayor to issue IN has
liscretion,-that is to say, the Mayor
must issue the license, unless he sees or
NOES some good reason achy he should
lot." In the above he comedies away
lis whole proposition-he can use his
discretion. He first quotes the code to
'rove that he shall sign licenses. To
ay to one, he shall do a certain thing, is
n imperative demand to him to do that
hing. Yet, above, the Mayor admits
lie can use his discretion, his reason, in
ther words, his judgment Discretion,
freedom to act according to ones own
Judgment" Now, Mr.. Editor, think
We may be permitted to draw a line
cross the word discretion in the May
RS proposition. Now, | believe this
isposes of the matter. Still, for the
of following him through, we
7ill examine the authorities he cites.
lie first refers to Dillon on Municipal
p. 10S, Sec 60. This sec
ion simply embraces this doctrine: that
yhen the ordinance empowers the May
+ and Council, jointly, to issue IL
ense, that one cannot exercise the au-
hority alone. 1t is sufficient answer
0 the above to state that it has no APP
LEGATION, whatever, to our ordinance,
yhich clothes the Mayor alone with this
over. His second authority is the
anne author, p. 542, Sec. 567. This sec
ion merely states that the Council can
OF delegate authority to private indi-
iduals outside of its own body. I'm
apply for the Mayor, the above sec
ion does not apply to his case, for the
eason that he is not private individu-
|, but is made by the code a member
f the Council, besides being Mayor.
he last authority cited by him is the
anne author, p. 5S8, Sec. 648. This sec
ion is but reiteration of the same doc
rine contained in section 567, on page
AZ: Neither of the above, as will be
cen, have the remotest bearing on the
of the Mayor.
The same author quoted by him to
ustain his position that the Council
annot delegate power, on page 369, Sec.
"a, says: "A municipal corporation
lay by ordinance, resolution or vote,
10th it's officers, agents, or committees
nth power to act for it. Several pages
f the same work are devoted exclusive
y to discussing the liabilities and obi
atoms of officers clothed by the Coun-
il with discretionary power, recognize
ng and nowhere questioning such right.
We shall watch the Mayor with much
interest, to see that he convenes the
'ouncil every time circus, theatre,
or concert troupe, or pcddler
ONES into town, that they may order
i'm to issue license. For his position
5 that no one can issue license but the
youncil
The Mayor further claims that if the
Jouncil approves the bond, it is
quivalent to an order to him to issue
he license. 1t might be a sufficient an
wer to state that the Council unani-
nously and emphatically told him they
Intended no such thing. The ordinance