The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-09-16
THE TURCO-RUSSIAN WAR.
THE CHANGE THE BREECH-LOADER
HAS MADE IN MILITARY
CAMPAIGNS.

HAS Made IN Wlhs
CAMPAIGNS.
Lessons Taught the Russians mt Pievna
ana the Turks mt schipka Pass.
Tspecial Correspondence of the Democrat
NEW York, September 10, 1877
In default of any more pressing topic part
Iy. and partly because there LIS good deal to
he said on that subject just now, take my
non IN hand. as IL were, to write few lines
touching my old friends,
THE TURKS.
yon may remember that just about the
sime war was declared by the Gar last
x,pripg / wrote several letters from Washing
Ton. setting forth such facts as l could COM
nile at the time concerning the relative mill
tary capabilities of the two powers; going
into some detail respecting the abilities OF
the opposng officers and the character OF the
rank and file of the two armies. Thus FAR 1
do not observe that the progress OF events
has necessitated any material amendment OF
what / wrote then. But | see prevalent
tiisposition among our press writers to jump
mt the conclusion that, because the turks
have succeeded at the outset OF the cam
paign, they will win the conflict generally
But there are some facts In this conhec-
ton which my able friends, the press
writer's aforesaid, seem to overlook.
There are two reasons for the successes
achieved by the Turks thus far which cannot
be depended on to hold good throughout the
war. First their success has been due to the
pig-headed
JNCAPACITY OF THE RUSSIAN COMMANDERS,
not to any fault OF the Muscovite soldiery;
and, second, they have succeeded because all
their important battles have been defensive
Now. gentlemen of the press who desire to
discuss the progress of this war inteli1gently
should bear In mind one vital fact: That Is to
SAY, the fact that the changes which modern in
vention has wrought In the science OF war
f,trp the tffffet.ttii efefaess ef weapons etc
have multiplied the defensive power of CIV
en- force of troops In vastly greater ratio than
they have increased the offensive capacity OF
the same or q similar force / have studied
this point with some care and have concluded
that for defending works
THE BREECH-LoADER
multiplies the capacity of given number OF
troops about five times, while for the ordin-
column armed with breech-loaders Is neces-
sarily any more formidable than one carrying
muzzIe-loaders- so long at least as they are
in front of the works and the defenders stand
firm. Take, for example, Plevna. There the
Turks were defending strong position
against heavy and direct assault The course
of the conflict and Its results seem to me to
bear out the above proposition In every par
ticular. Taking official figures as basis, we
find that 1900 Turks were engaged against
$4,000 Russians. We find from the concurrent
testimony of all who saw the action
that the Russians delivered their attack, or
series OF attacks, in style unsurpassed In
modern warfare; In far better style, In fact
than most observers expected of them. Under
the old conditions of warfare Scholarships
men must have taken the second line of
works upon at least their second charge.
Those Of us who fought in the recent war
know that no force as small as that OF the
Turks could have delivered musketry from
muzzle-loaders fast enough to arrest such a
charge as Schakosky led against the NAME
Toned hill, which constituted the second Turk
ish line, after his troops had carried the strong
line OF rifle pits and casual breastworks which
made up the first line. The fate that befel
the Russians in their rush across the narrow
space between the first and second Turkish
lines, tells unerringly the story OF the breech-
loader as defensive weapon. 1t teaches us,
and should teach the Russian commanders,
that the day of direct assault is past. To hurl
soldiery against any cover whatsoever, shell
tering men with nerve to stand rush and so
armed that they can deliver volley for every
hundred feet of the assailants advance, Is
like giving them away. We know of old how
well the Turks stand behind cover; with what
patient, calm courage the descendants Of the
men who followed Gilman die in their tracks
when their traditional enemy is the attacking
party.
sUwARRow
took Ismail after seventeen successive
assaults, grimly explaining his tactics by the
the celebrated mot "My mistress can spare
blood better than she can spare time, accord
ing to some historians, or "Blood is cheaper
than time" according to others, meaning
that his plan OF campaign made the lives of
his men less valuable than would be the time
required for siege operations. But set Plev-
ma over against Ismail and we discover that
time is become cheaper than even Russian
blood for that time is not worth any more
now than it was then, while it requires at
least five times the expenditure of blood now
that would have been required to accomplish
a given design by direct assault in Suwar-
rows day.
Unless livery much mistake the significance
of the present behavior of the Russians, they
have read
THE LESSON OF PLEvNA
precisely as l have set it down above, and
have included to spend time and spare
blood in the future. II SO, Shakosky's ex-
pertinent was richly worth all it cost. 1t has
probably saved the Russians from the horrors
of similar attempt on much larger, and
thereby more disastrous scale against Rust
chuck or Schuma. use the word "horrors''
advisedly, for it is difficult to conceive what
would have been the butchery had the main
Russian army, or the left and centre thereof