, 1877-06-20

Au0 p1eElt!tu48 uh1uG1 III WulCu kQG 1uIE-
ish iron-clad at Matchin wont to tic bottom
Of the Danube recently, Under tho explosion
Of Russian torpedo, is q now and porple1-
ing problom In naval warfare. espscially 10
tho Euglisb, who boast themselves now, as
they always have done, on tho size and
strength Of their navy. OF whit a,nll, how
svor, are iron-clads and turrnt-ships, Dovaata-
tons, Thundcrsrs, and Horculoscs, Of In
mense size, bearing armaments Of 81-ton
guns, II littlo Insignificant torpalo-boat,
threo-fourths submerged, can drivo through
the water at tho ratio Of twonty kuots MI
hour, ovcrtako ono Of these huge unwieldy
1ovlaahans, and with ono blow send hor In On
instant Of time sky-Mgh, or with aqual dis
patch send her down to the bottom Of tho
sca7 Whether, aa in this case, tho. torpedo
is quietly and secretly placed agnfnsk the
iron-clad by daring sailors mud exploded
from shore, or It Is exploded by tho con-
cuRsion Of tho torpodo-boat, ruakes 1ittlo dif-
ference. Tho result 10 tho same a,aa tho de-
ssFuotion Ia equally completa. How far
naval discipline Ia 10 bo nnintatnod
In tho future upon thoso izon-clads. whose
hugo strength is In reality m clomont OF
weakness, whom their crews know that any
instant they may DO sent flying into the air
by an inaldious md unseen onemy, lis ces-
tainly problom worth studying. The
Turkish monitor was three-maatod turrpt
veaael Of larger size, hoayiez armament and
greater strongth and speed than tho average
war vessel, and yet ono nun on cloudy
night, unperccivea by tho crow, fixed tho
torpedo to her hull, which in IN instant Of
time sent ber aud every 1nan on board to the
bottom OF "the beautiful bluo Danubo."
The torpedo has already developed itself
rs one Of tue most destructive agencies in
naval warfare, and bids fair 10 rovolutlonlzo
tho whole syatem Of that warfare. Tho
chiot valuo OF navy to any Power Ia In its
effectiveness for blockadipg purposes. How
long can my feet naaiptaip itself In scaling
up harbor which Is not only thick.
ly sown with torpedoos, but from which
nj any moment d torpodo-boat may emerge,
scattering doath ald destruction In its roth ?
As ono Of tho English pspoEs, In discussing
the perplexing problem, asserts, 1t equalizes
for nil purposes OF nggreaAon tho great
naval Powers with tho smallest "Under
Bucll circumstances, tho term ssuporlor
force loses its meaning, 1t IL no longer gu.
porior, since its greater bulk involves much
greater preliminary risk, without increaa-
Ing tho resources available foz naval war till
after immonae preliminary risk has boon
safely overcome. And WHOM would It bo
safely overcome? Not TIL tho bloctadine
fcrce hns assured itself that tho supply Of
these torEih!o naval mosquitoes was exhaust
Cd, and that no more would be supplied
which ia a roundabout way for saying
never" II, however, the power OF block.
ado Is broken or interrupted, and The addi-
tional risk Of the destruction Of the
navy IL involved, then ta tho gu.
premacy IN naval power 1t IN end,
tor II one nation with powerful
nary at war with another cannot block up It's
ports, prevent war 1uatcrial from entering
and commercial vessels from leaving, aoal up
Its war vessels, and ruin or cripple lts trade,
then the weaker Power Ii, In one respect, on
terms Of equality will. The stronger. Sup
pose, for instance, iu Our own War, tho
scientific use Of tospadoes lad made Il impos-
sibls to blockade cur Southern ports, and,
iuatoad OF ono blockade-ruuuer here md
there getting In o. out, they had beon open
TO the EugI.h marine pouring in war mate
rial and provisions, when would the War
have come to an end7
It Is this view OF tho problem, the posas-
blllties which tho weakest Power 1nay have
not only Of preventing tho blockade OF its
ports, but also of destroying the huge naval