The Cheyenne daily leader. [volume] (Cheyenne, Wyo.) 1870-1884, 1877-05-24
EAuREoARD
Mis- Sympathies with The Turks, and What Ne
Would Do u He Was in Command.

The following letter will be of inter-
est to those studying the Russian-Turk-
ish war. 1t is addressed by Gen. Beau
regard to Col. Blanton Duncan:
In 1866 the Sovereign Prince of Rou-
mania rendered to Gen. B~eauregard,
then in Paris, the command of his
armies. He offered the rank Of Field
Marshal, with a liberal outfit, and $780,
600 a year pay. Gen. Beauregard was
to be at liberty to select his W staff
and certain other officers, and the army
was to be kept at 100000 men. Col.
Duncan would probably have been his
chief of staff.
Gen. Beauregard, believing that it
was his duty to remain and share the
fate of those whose fortunes he had
shared for four years of war, and that
he might be serviceable to his own
friends and fellow Confederates ,declin-
ed the proposals. In view of the posi-
ton which, for his declination, Gen.
Beauregard might now occupy as one
of the conspicuous figures of the great
worlds drama, his letters will be
of peculiar interest. AS armies shape
the destinies of countries, and as mon
archical armies are often welded ac-
cOrding to the will of a popular ON
manding General, it is a great loss to
the Turks that Gen. Beauregard did
not go to Roumania, as the action of
that country might have been shaped
for Turkey instead of for Russia.
GEN. BEAUREGARD's LETTER.
"New Orleans, May 10, 1s77.-My
Dear Colonel: l would indeed have
been in the midst of it. But L must
say that my sympathies, if any, are
with the Turks, for they are the weaker
party. and defending their homes and
firesides.
AS to the pretext for the wal on the
part of Russia 1.-THE protection of the
Christians in Turkey, it reminds me
Of the complaint of the wolf drinking
at the same spring with the lamb.
AS you remark, Turkey offers magni-
ficent lines of defense,-the Danube and
the Balkan Mountains. With two or
three hundred thousand Confederate
troops, l would guarantee to hold them
against any number of Russians. If /
were in command there, | would fortify
those lines well, and with my ironclad
gunboats L would prevent the construc-
ton of any bridge across the Danube.
/ would send Gen. Forrest with $4,000
or 10000 cavalry to destroy all the
depots of supplies, railroads and bridges
from the Danube to Middle Russia,
thence to some port of the Black Sea,
where L would transport his command
to some other favorable point, say in
rear of the Russian forces operating in
Asia, south of the Black Sea. Forrest
would be provided with camels to trans
port his light field artillery, baggage
and light pontoon trains. lie would
have also a full supply Of carrier pigeons
to keep me posted as to his movements.
My feet in the Black Sea would keep
it free Of the enemy's ships. l would
destroy their supplies at Odessa and
any other ports OH the Black Sea. In
other words, l would bring starvation
to my assistance. How long do you
think Russia could stand such Il de-
fensive war? Moreover, L am conf
dent that. the other Powers of Europe
will never allow Russia to get any
nearer to Constantinople than the
Balkan mountains, if even she gets
there. VOLTA mon plan de cumpagne.
"But / am a man of peace, now that
Louisiana is free. l remain your friend,
.i. sc. 7. BEAUREGARD.
"Col. Blanton Duncan,
Louisville, KY"