The Republican. [volume] (Oakland, Md.) 1877-current, 1877-05-19
The War and Its Outlook.


is or is not likely to lead to wider
European struggle, involving countries
with which we have more extensive re-
lations. If it leads to such a struggle it is
obvious that the United States may profit
by it in many different ways-through a
probable increase of emigration to this
side of the Atlantic; through an increased
demand in Europe for our agricultural
staples and for certain kinds of our man
ufactures, and through the distrust of
European securities which can scarcely
fail to be awakened among European
capitalists and investors by a general
perturbation of the European political
system. If it fails to lead to such a
struggle our interest in it will be mainly
sentimental and speculative, though the
sentiments it will enlist will be among
the deepest, and the social and political
speculations it will set afoot among the
most important, which can stir the pub
lie mind. -,.-..
The question whether this war shall be
local or a general war will be answered
in the campaign which has now begun.
We can hardly expect with the London
a fortnight" how this first campaign will
go. But Gen. Fadeetf, in his Opinion
on the Eastern question:" estimates
that if Russia can get 250,000 men to the
Danube 10000 of them will reach Cont
stantinople, Austria remaining neutral, in
a single campaign; and, assuming this
opinion to be correct, we may reasonably
count on learning within month whether
Russia can get 100000 men to the
Danube. Her army, as at present mobil-
lied on the ROumanian frontiers, con-
sists, according to the best information
attainable, of about 100000 men, assem-
bled at a distance of about 400 miles
from the Danube. 1t is not at all clear
yet whether this army can count upon
any effective assistance from Roumanian
contingent; nor indeed is it clear that
Germany, which is all-powerful with the
ruler of Roumania, really desires Rou
mania to render Russia such assistance.
From the Roumanian frontier to the
Danube the Russian forces must be
moved along a single line of railway.
This is singletrack railway, laid with
curves as sharp as any known on our
BILE to send long trains over it or to move
over it at any high rate of speed. Com
petent persons estimate its transporta-
ton capacity at 1000 men day, so that
it will require at least ten DAYS to con-
centrate two Russian army corps at Giur-
gevo, on the Danube. At least another
week must be consumed in sending for
ward the artillery and the army train, so
that it is not probable that any attempt
can be made by the Russians to cross the
Danube in force at Giurgevo under three
weeks time. If the rest of the Russian
army of invasion is moved in two sepa-
rate bodies upon the Danube to reach that
river, one in the vicinity of Brailow for
the purpose of crossing it INTO the Do
brudsche, and the other to reach it at
Hirsova, joining there the force in the
Dobrudscha, the Russians may be ex-
pected to be in a position to attempt the
concentration for decisive battle in
Turkish territory, not of $50, 600 but of
80, 900 men, at the end of not less than
a month.
In the meanwhile what will the Turks
be doing?
Recognizing the difficulty of crossing
the Danube, the Russians in previous
campaigns have traversed it at its mouth,
in 1909 at GalatZ, in 1928 at Satunovo,
by pontoons and bridges of boats. In
the latter case, however, it should be
borne in mind that the invasion was in
effect a marine invasion and the Black
Sea the base of operations and supplies.
Greig's fleet victualed the army, crossed
men, munitions and artillery, and even
took the considerable fortress of Sizepoli.
The advantage of the command of the
EuXine rests this time with Turkey. If
the Russians undertake to repeat the eX-
pertinent, besides the disadvantages of
starting from the lower shore, with its
unhealthy and difficult marshes, and of
having the full stress of the current be-
tween its last islands and the Turkish
bank, they will be subject to formidable
opposition from the Turkish gunboats,
and liable to attack in flank and rear by
troops landed from the fleet In front
is the strong line of the railroad behind
the wall of Trajan, from Kustendje to
Tchernavoda, connecting the Black Sea
and the river, some thirty-six miles in
length. Won 'Moltke's estimate, on re-
viewing the campaign of 1889, was
that by crossing at Hirsova with 10000
men, leaving 20, 900 to invest Silistria, as
many more before Varna and 1000 as a
corps d'ObSergatiOn before Schumla, it
would not be impossible for the remain
ing $4,000 men to cross the Balkans,
"having as,a base the Black Sea ports"
This very essential element of the base
is lacking, fact which makes it neces-
sary to revise the whole calculation.
On the other hand the Russians, who
hay hitherto found attacks on Bulgaria
by way of the Lower Dunube unproita-
BILE, might take the more roundabout way
of an advance by the west through Ser
bia. The Danube forms the Roumano-
Serbian frontier for some thirty miles
below the Austrian line, and at Glabowa
there remain some ruins of a bridge built
by Trajan, indicating an available point
of passage. In this connection it is
worth remembering that in the last
French campaign the Germans placed
much dependence on the lines of the old
Roman military roads, and found them
to lead infallibly to advantageous fords
and crossings. To this plan there are
two objections The eastern districts of
Hungary and Pennsylvania here form a