The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1877-10-09
The Russian Fafl0re.

AueIe Is boLHethluS PtIiui III thO pa
raIysis of the Russian armies. but there
is nothing gunaccountable. The Lon
don Times of September. IA, says:
Goa hiIlgoverlooking Plevna plat.
form had been erected, in order that his
Majesty may have good view Of the
combat A grand stand on the field OF
battle is the most surprising OF the
many Injuries which have been added
to warfare. Since the time of Xerxes,
at least, the older race OF Imperial con,
querors have failed to adopt SO easy a
means of seeing the slaughter of their
subjects and their enemies. Yet there
is certain fitness in the arrangement.
It is quite in keeping with much of the
Russian leadership, which has been more
DISTINGUISHED by dignity of title than
by ability"
The Times goes on to show that
Princes are not expected to be men Of
capacity, and that Russia has made a
fatal mistake in following the German
example, and the pith of the matter is
in these terms: T3'
"But the Russian Princes do not seem
to have been ably seconded by their
staff. No great military reputation ap-
pears to be even in the course Of ma
king. There is, no doubt, abundance
Of gallantry among the superior officers
as among the men. General Gourko
and General Skobeleff are soldiers Of
the same type as Murat, and the assault
on Lovatz. as on Plevna, will rank high
among feats OF hardihood. But some
thing more is TO be expected from real
generalship Fore sight is even more
necessary than valor, and the eenni off,
cial print to which we have referred adj
mits that foresight has been conspicu
ously wanting from first to last The
Grand Duke Nicholas does not appear
to have, or at any rate to keep, at his
hand such advisers as the German Prin.
ces had in France, and the causes may
be found, perhaps, in the very constitu-
ton Of Russian society. In despot-
ism the tendency is to develop mere dis
cipline at the expense of qualities vastly
more important in the long run. 10y
atty to the reigning house and, obedience
to the word OF command form a surer
passport to promotion than vigorous in
dependence. Thus when the Princes
assume the military positions assigned
them by right Of birth, they are apt 10
ind counselors who have never been &C.
customed to undertake vast RESPONSE
bility. II they themselves do mot hap
pen to be men Of great ability, they be-
tray in warfare the spirit of amateurs,
while the chiefs Of their staff will usu-
ally be wanting in the sagacious bold.
ness which comes from the habit Of in
dependent command" tl'
A correspondent writing of the re-
| pulse of the Russians from Plevna says I:
sThe Russians do not push their ar
tillery far enough forward to make it an
effective support against earthworks at
long range; consequently, to distract
their attention from the task as repelling
the advance Of the approaching Russian
infantry, the Turks keep concealed un
til the last moment, and II the Russian
artillery we're pushed up within close
range, and opened with shrapnel at this
critical time, it would relieve the fearful
pressure upon the infantry attacking the
Turkish intrenchments. But where men
are equally brave, and one side has
earthworks and the other nothing to
help them, the result is obvious. The
chief Russian Generals and their staff
do not keep we'll enough to the front to
be thoroughly informed Of what is act
ually going on at any particular moment.
This is not the result Of any desire to
svoid danger, but proceeds simply from
unwieldiness and not being accustomed
to move on horseback There are too
many easy carriages around the differ
ent headquarters A stranger visiting
the armies in Bulgaria would naturally
conclude that there was an Emperor
with each army corps. All this prevents
that freedom of action which should
characterize q general staff, who do oil
the hard work, while the rest are gen.
lerally ornamental. The Russian field
and line are good enough for any pur
lpose desired, but the staff departments
need most trenchant reconstruction
\ zoe