The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1877-11-22

they had fairly started up the second
ridge l discovered that they were suffer
ing terribly from fire that swept over
their right and left flanks. | also found
that my left flank was not protected by
the brigades that were to move en- cchcton
with it. McLaws' line was consequently
spread out to the left to protect its flank,
and Hoods line was extended to the right
to protect its flank from the sweeping fire
of the large bodies of troops that were
posted on Round Top. These two move
ments of extension so drew my forces out
that found myself attacking Cemetery
Hill with single line of battle against
not less than $4,000 troops.
My two divisions at that time were cut
down to eight or nine thousand men, four
thousand having been killed or wounded.
We felt at every step the heavy stroke OF
fresh troops-the sturdy, regular blow
that tells a soldier instantly that he has
encountered reserves or reinforcements.
We received no support at all, and there
was no evidence Of cooperation on any
side. To urge my men forward under
these circumstances would have been
madress, and 1 withdrew them in good
order to the peach orchard that we had
taken from the Federals early in the
afternoon. 1t may be mentioned here as
illustrative of the dauntless spirit of these
men that when Gen. Humphreys, Of
Mississippi, was ordered % withdraw bis
troops from the charge he thought there
was some mistake, and retired to a cap,
tured battery near the swale between the
two ridges, where he halted, and when
ordered to retire to the new line second
time he did so under protest Our men
| had no thought of retreat. They broke
every line they encountered. When the
order to withdraw was given a courier
was sent to Gen. Lee informing him Of
the result of the days work.
A MARVELLOUS ASSAULT.
Before pursuing this narrative further,
1 shall say word or two concerning this
assault. T am satisfied that my force,
numbering hardly $4,000 men, encoun.
tered during that three and half hours
of bloody work not less than $4,000 Of
the Federals, and yet their charge was
not checked nor their line broken until
we ordered them to withdraw. found
that night that 1929 of my men, more
than one third of their total number, had
been left on the field. History records
no parallel to the fight by these two di-
VI. ons on the 2nd of July at Gettysburg.
EwEIJ,s INACTION
1t may be imagined that I was aston
ished at the fact that we received no sup
port after we had driven the Federals
from the peach orchard and 1000 yards
beyond. If Gen. Ewell had engaged the
army in his front at that time say 4
o'clock) he would have prevented their
massing their whole army in my front,
and while he and l kept their two wings
engaged Hill would have found their
centre weak, and should have threatened
it while I broke through their left and
dislodged them. Having failed to move
at o'clock while the enemy was in his
front, it was still more surprising that he
did not advance at S o'clock with vigor
and promptness when the trenches in
front of him were vacated, or rather
held by one single brigade, las Gen.
Meade's testimony before the committee
on the conduct Of the war states. Had
he taken these trenches and scattered the
brigade that held them he would have
found himself in the Federals' flank and
rear. His attack in the rear must have
dislodged the Federals, as it would have
been totally unexpected-it being be-
lieved that he was in front with me.
Hill charging upon the centre at the
same time would have increased their
disorder, and we should have won the
field.
GEN. LEES DETERMINATIONS.
did not see Gen. Lee that night. On
the next morning he came to see me, and
fearing that he was still in his disposition
to attack, I tried to anticipate him by
SAYING: General, have had my scouts
out all night, and l find that you still
have an excellent opportunity to move
around to the right of Meade's army and
maneuvre him into attacking u.s." He
replied, pointing with his fist at Gene
terry Hill: "The enemy is there, and l
am going to strike him." J. felt then
that Il was my duty to express my con-
victions. said: General, I have been
soldier all my life. l have been with
soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by
squads, companies, regiments, divisions
and armies, and should know as we'll as
any one what soldiers can do. 1t is my
opinion that no fifteen thousand men
ever arrayed for battle can take that po-
sition," pointing to Cemetery Hill. Gen.
Lee, in reply to this, ordered me to pre-
pare Pickett's division for the attack. l
should not have been so urgent had not
foreseen the hopelessness of the proposed
assault. l felt that l must say word
against the sacrifice of my men; and
then felt that my record was such that
Gen. Lee would or could not misconstrue
nv motives. I said no more, however,
but turned away. The most Of the morn
ing was consumed in waiting for Picketts
men and getting into position. The plan
of assault was as follows: Our artillery
was to be massed in wood from which
Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour
continuous fire upon the Cemetery:
Under cover of this fire and supported
by it Pickett was to charge.
Our artillery was in charge of General
E. P. Alexander, brave and gifted Off
Ger. | had instructed Gen. Alexander,
being unwilling to trust myself with the
entire responsibility, to carefully observe
the effect of the fire upon the enemy,
and when it began to tell to notify Pick
ett to begin the assault.
PICKETT's CHARGE.
The cannonading which opened along
both lines was grand. In few moments
courier brought note to Gen. Pickett,
who was standing near me, from AleXan-
der, which, after reading, he handed to
me. 1t was as follows: "If you are COM
ing at all you must come at once, or l
can't give you proper support; but the
enemy55s enc fire has not slackeasd !, at all; at
least eighteen guns are still firing from
the cemetery itself" :,