, 1877-09-15
ONE SOURCE OF RUSSIAN
WEAKNESS.

49, %S
Russian arms-a disappointment felt
even Ivy those who are no friends Of Rus
sia-is 20 doubt unreasonable. The pub
lie had no right TO expect that an ordl.
nary army, commanded by ordinary
Generals, moving through a country
without roads. and resisted by an enemy
who Stunned the open field. would advance
as IA st or do as much as tbs moss perfect
army in the world, commanded by q man
Of exceptional genius, moving through
regions in which its base always rested
upon a completed railway network, and
faced from the first by a foe only too ca
ger to give battle. It would have been
fairer to think OF old campaigns. Of wars
like those which were wagsd previous to
thu Napoleopic times. Nevertheless,
when all drawbacks are allowed for, the
progress of the Russians has not come UP
to general expectation. With every all
vantage of numb rs and resources in their
favour, they have not succeeded rapidly /;
but have displayed a kind Of weakness, and
want OF administrative power which was
not expected, AMI which, unless redeem
ed by subsequent successes, will greatly
impair their military prestige in Europe.
II is already slear that they could rot
cope with Germany, and it is doubtful il
they could cope with Austria, and the
causes of that weakness, much OF
which, if not all. is unexpected. demand
patient consideration. Some Of them IRE
to be found ia the m%ilItary circumstances,
but the majority are rclucib e to one,-
the pecu lar dstect of the modatn G2Ysra-
ment of Russia.
The character OF the Government tells
against military success fist Of al in this
way. The Russian au.ocracv, though
limited in c.rtain ways by the feeling OF
the people, by the sensibiIitlss OF ths
army, and by the political opinion Of the
group of families which for a century has
stood closely around the throne. and amid
which q Russian CIR G-st of all seeks
advisers, is ~siugu'arly perfect as to it's
iaflu ence over the fortunes Of the indivi-
duals. The Gar can promote anybody
md neglect anybody, undeterred by any
consideration excepting his own will. Hs
can make a General by fiat, and the Gene
raj Will be obeyed as if he had been made
By merit. Until a catastrophe happens.
there is no audible %murmuliug and ex.
tramely little secret discomfort. The
effective use Of this power involves inn
mense Ia5our, AMI though Invaluable to o
Frederick the G eat PISS ssed of original
genius, or to al Emperor Ct Germany who
will work twelve hours a day rather than
not know the record Of his men, ii is surs
under a weak reign to be transferred to
the Court, to the circle which has habituaI
access to the S6vereign,-and a Court
never dispenses patronage on considerations
Of merit alone. Its most powerful mem
bers, unlike heads of departments, have
no direct responsibility. They have no
motive, as the Emperor has, for securing
efficiency first of all. Their temptation
when they are honest is to promote their
friends, and when they are dishonest, to
promote men who will give them servics
in return. Men Of the most average kind,
and men sometimes beneath tho average.
rise rapidly, by their manners, by their
slbservienc9, or by ability for intrigue, to
the very top, and when the hour of trial
comes exhaust their thin energies in con.
cealing ineficiency. The consequence is
thai in the beginning of q war. incapacity
of q certain kind-incapacity, that ia, to
get out of the usual and into the unusual,
to meet thu new circumstances and au-