The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1877-11-27
Tn. Cause OF the Huron Disaster.

4
Huron, impels us to deal with the questions
that have arisen out of the circum-
stances of the wreck with grave eau
ton But there are facts which force
| themselves upon rs in connection with this
appalling disaster that cannot be ignored,
| and which must form an important part OF
| the evidence that will be gathered by an
official investigation. The statements OF
the survivors, made SO soon after
their wonderful escape from death.
are singularly lucid and well ar
ranged. We do not perceive that there
are any serious contradictions in them
when comparison is made, and such as
occur are traceable to the differences In
the conditions under which each survivor
found himself when he experienced the
calamity Of the wreck and his fortunate
escape. It is very evident however, that
before any idea was formed of danger the
ship was very near-too near the shore,
and that, with foreknowledge OF the
approach of storm, there was exhibited IN
the navigation Of the Huron n bold and,
we might say, foolhardy disregard for posi-
bilities on such dangerous coast. TO this
one fact we must attribute the loss of the
ship, because all that followed depended
mainly on the primary danger created by
the position of the Huron with relation to
the land.
We do not suppose that there is any part
of the Atlantic coast of the United States
that is so we'll known to navigators as that
in the immediate vicinity OF Cape Hat
teras. The earliest operations Of the
United States Coast Survey Bureau were
devoted to the defining of the photography
of that fatal shore line, every mile Of which
has been marked by wrecks. 1t cannot be
pleaded, therefore, that the navigating Off
GERS were unfamiliar with it's character or Of
the dangers that threaten ship from the time
she approaches its latitude and longitude.
Even the soundings found on this line OF
coast give it n distinctive feature, and are
almost as safe guides to navigation in fog
and darkness as the beacons and other OBJ
jects that are visible in clear weather
Hence We must assume that after the
Huron left port and took her bearings
from Cape Henry her course was di-
rected deliberately toward that point where
force of the wind and sen. She was then
under steam and ordinary sails Her sur
viving officers state that there was nothing
very remarkable in the violence of the wind
that would call for extraordinary meas
ures Of precaution. Some of the lighter
sails were taken in and the watches
were set as usual, preparation being
made for rough spell and nothing more.
But the weather grew thicker and dense
fog descended on the sea, obscurng every
sign of land, and rendering the position of
ship so near land perilous one indeed,
even though the wind and waves did
not contribute to make it so. The next
that is known Of the ship is that she struck
with heavy shock on the sandy bottom.
The cropping preliminary to this occurrence
described by one of the officers was done
probably rs soon as certain evidences Of the
immediate proximity of the land were OBJ
served by the officer in charge. One says
he heard the order to slow up for soundings
and then the other order to go ahead, after
which he felt the ship strike heavily. This
would lead us to suppose that the case of
the Amerique found its parallel in that Of
the Huron, and that both vessels were SIM
ply run ashore in thick weather under only
slightly different circumstances.
The question arises, Why did the officers
Of the Huron hug the shore SO closely be-
fore the storm set in with such considera-
BILE force? The answer is very easily
given. It was to avoid the current
of the Gulf Stream on the voyage
southwark and to take advantage of
the counter current or slack water
that lies inside the Gulf Stream along this
part Of the coast. It must be remembered
that the velocity of the latter in the latitude
of Cape Hatteras is between three and four
miles an hour, setting north. and that
vessel entering it on southwark course
would have to overcome the drift by the ex-
be applied to her direct progress. If, for
instance, n ship makes ten miles an hour
under ordinary circumstances, and enters
the Gulf Stream near Cape Hatteras, bound
south, she really progresses in that direction
only six miles an hour, because the other four
miles Of her speed are neutralized by the
counter drift carrying her in the opposite
direction. 1t was to avoid this loss OF
speed and time that the Huron was kept out
side the western margin Of the Gulf Stream,
and in water that had current, if any, in
the direction in which the ship was
steering. But why did not the Huron
run across the Gulf Stream and get into the
ocean beyond its eastern margin? This
would have involved dctour which, in the
navigators' estimation, would have been
equal in loss Of time. as represented by the
increased distance passed over, to the loss
experienced by passing through the Gulf
Stream az described. Safety was therefore
not weighed against expedition, and the