Grant County herald. [volume] (Lancaster, Wis.) 1850-1968, 1877-10-11
THE HERALD.
Is the Reduction of the Army Eco
nomicalp

AuOtuSt piluCipl0 uidWu HUN Oui
own experience is that too great a re-
duction OF the regular army often re-
suits in an increase of the transporta-
ton expenses more than sufficient to
maintain q much larger number of
troops, while in other cases this def
cheney in numbers has prevented the
government from nipping in the bud
difficulties which resulted in long and
costly wars, with vast augmentations
oil the armed force.
OF the first class of cases we may
mention the Modoc war, where the
expenses of bringing numerous small
attachments from distant posts would
have maintained for years a force
that would have prevented the troub>
lie and saved all the valuable lives
lost. The same may be said of the
recent Sioux war, and that now in
progress in Idaho, where the like
thing has occurred. This difficulty
arises constantly, and forms one main
element in the large charges for the
transportation of the army.
OF the second class ofcases may be
mentioned the wars against the
Creeks, the Seminoles, the Sacs and
Foxes, which would have been GER
tainly avoided, or at least brought to
an immediate conclusion, had the reg
ular army been somewhat larger.
When the Mexican war broke out,
the actual strength of the regular
army was about $500. The force
with which General Taylor reached
the Rio Grande was 5000, and that
with which he fought the battles of
Palo Alto and Resaca de Ia Palma
only 210o. There can be no doubt
that if the strength of the army had
sufficed to enable him to move to the
Rio Grande with 10000 men, the
MexIcans would not have crossed the
river, and in all human probability the
war would have been avoided The
cost of maintaining the 1000 addi-
tional men during the whole period
from the close of the war of1SI2 to
the commencement of the Mexican
war would not have amounted to two
thirds of the direct expenses OF the
latter war, not taking into account
the large cost of the Seminole and
other Indian wars, or the heavy losses
by disease and in battle, or the indi-
rect losses inseparable from all wars.
But the most instructive case of all
is that of the civil war. We do not
doubt that $4,000 regulars on the
field of the first Manassas would have
insured the complete rout of the raw
Confederates, and in all probability
put an end to the war. They would
certainly have enabled us to drive the
Confederate government out of Vir-
ginia, and have cleared the eastern
portion OF the State as completely as
the work was accomplished a little
earlier in West Virginia. The cost
of maintaining these 1000 additional
troops from the close OF the Mexican
war to the commencement of the war
of secession would not have amounted
to one-fiftieth part of the war debts of
the general government, the states,
counties, and municipalities. Should
we compare it with the total amount
of direct and indirect expenditures
by both parties to the war, the losses
OF the two sections in lives, in prop.
erty destroyed, business ruined, and
capital sunk. we should be al loss
to express the relation, so absurdly
small would be the relative cost OF
those additional troops.
To present the subject in a some
what different aspect, let as take as a
basis the debt of the United States
government at the close of the war,
emitting the large amounts paid d.
rectlY from the current revenues, the
war debts, and expenditures of the
states, counties, and municipalities,
the losses ; caused by the war, and
the Confederate expenditures and
losses; let us, moreover, neglect the
diminution of cost per capita, which
holds in q large as against a small
force.
1t may be stated that the interest
at ave per cent. upon the debt of the
United States government at the
close IS the war would, according to
the cost of the present establishment,
support an army of 100000 men in
perpetuity; let us add to this the fact
that the amount we have already paid
in pensions would have supported
10000 additional men from the Mexi>
can war to that of secession.
When we consider this last fact
that is, that our pension expenditure
alone would have maintained larger
force than was necessary to prevent
the wsr-and think of the very large
amounts we have omitted in making
the last comparison, it would appear
impossible to deny that undue econ
omy in the present often leads to inn
mense ultimate expenditure. Mr..
Calhoun says: ECONOMY is certainly
a very high political virtue, intimately
connected with the power and public
virtue of the community. In military
operations, which, under the best
management, are so expensive, it is
of the utmost Importance; but by no
propriety of language can that ar
rangement be called economical
which, in order that our military es-
tablishment in peace should be rather
less expensive, would, regardless of
the purposes for which it ought to be
maintained, render it unfit to meet
the dangers incident to a state of
war" GEORGE B. M'CLEL-
LAN,in Hdrper's Magazine for Octo-
Der.
MSnmA of unn nhildran NAV now