, 1877-11-17

THE REAL DIRECTOR OF THE OPERATION
WHICH LED on TO VICTORY.


WHICH LED on TO VICTORY
Xenophon's account Of the retreat of tn.
ten Thousand is as nearly immortal rs any
Greek prose classic is likely to be. Sher
mans march to the sea, as a campaign
crushing all before it, is and will remain one
of the most notable on record. And How
ards march of two Thousand miles across
and ND and down the Rocky Mountains in
hot pursuit of the Indian chief Joseph, with
his desperate band of Nez Perces, consider
ing the natural, one might almost say the
preternatural, difficulties in the way. Is a
feat or achieviment Of personal, heroic hard.
ihood, persistence, pluck and ready resource
never before surpassed. But the truth COM
pels one to add there probably never was a
campaign, which, at the time of 1t, was more
misunderstood or more mlsrepresented and
egregiously lied about than this.
The long agony of the march, with Its re.
peated and tierce battles, Is over. General
Howard was in this city few hours yester-
day, looking in rugged health, yet showing
abundant signs of the wear and tear necessa-
rily incident to such an experience. He Is
now on his way to the Pacific coast again.
We learn that both he and his men feel
somewhat keenly thegross, and. as 1t seemed
to them under the circumstances, the infin-
ately unkind Misrepresentation with which
large part of the daily press for time fol-
lowed them, And it must be acknowledged
that for a while kind Of epidemic Of re-
mOrseless disparagement and OF wit. grown
bold chiefly by its ignorance and safe distance
from the scenes of action, prevailed, which
did not shew off the American character or
the American press to the best advantage.
1t should he said, however, In truth Is LII
charity, that much of this was the result
of mere ignorance rather than of malice ur
downright meanness. Before the matter
passes out of mind it seems proper to correct
certain popular misapprehensions and cur
rent misstatements.
1t is said that General Howard failed to
Overtake Joseph because he would insist on
having his men keep Sunday III camp. The
fact is, however, they never stopped for this
purpose; that during the march of 1000 miles
occupying nearly five months, they stopped
to rest, all told, only four days. And that
was done at the imperative command Of the
army. surgeon For the whole time OF tho
march the daily average of the distance was
nineteen miles. As to the story that he
peddled out bibles to the soldiers, he might
have been glad enoug III to have had bibles to
give them but there was not one III the
force, the General himself having ''Dally
Food selection of bible texts, which he car
ried in his vest pocket
Again, it was said that he was delayed by
his wagon trains. He started without any
wagons at all, using only pack mules. In
course of the march in Montana, whenever
he could, he impressed teams into his service
to carry provisions to the wounded and sick,
and at the earliest moment, when they were
either not absolutely needed or else could
not be used to advantage, dropped them and
pushed on. The Indians had the advantage
of him in an abundant supply of fresh ponies
aud mules, and yet never got any further
ahead of their pursuers than they were al
the start.
As to General Gibbon the facts are that, lI
spite Of the most desperate fighting, he was
finally surrounded, and had not Gen. Howard
arrived as he did there would have beei
left of him and of his command Just ST
much as was left of Custer and his brave
troops. And as to General Sturgis, his splen
did management of his forces: alike on the
march and III battle, deserve and receive the
highest praise And no one was more will
ing that he should have it than Gen Howard
himself, to whose command General Stursls
with his cavalry, had been attached Indeed
it was due to Howards characteristic, and
many will regard excessive, generosity thai
the whole credit of the third battle was given
to Sturgis.
But perhaps the greatest misrepresenta
tions current have related to the surrender
1t has been generally reported that Genera
Howard did not arrive at General Miles
camp until several hours after Joseph's sur
render; it Is also stated that Joseph con
temptuously refused to surrender to Howard
while willing to give his arms to Miles. Tht
facts are these. General Howard had sem
courier from Musselshell creek to Genera
Miles, then near the mouth of Tongue river
| telling him Just when and where twlthln 81
milesl Joseph would be likely to cross tn
Missouri, and directing Miles to intercep
him at that point. General Miles sent baei
word asking for nine days to get ready an'
i'll position, and requesting General Howar'
to ''slow up" accordingly, so as To keep tn
| Indians back. This was done. The battl
was fought in the Bear Paw Mountain. Gen
Howard, with thirteen of his men, arrlve'
at the scene of action twenty-four hours be
fore the surrender. Joseph stuhbornly refus
ed to surrender, and afterward declared tina
he had no idea Of surrenderlng to Genera
Miles until he heard Howard had come NJ
And he did not decide to surrender unit
General Howards Interpreters went over t
,Joseph's camp and, in General Howard
name, demanded the surrender. And whe
the conquered chief with his men came int
camp he first offered his arms to Genera
Howard, who, with very extraordinary gel
erosity not often witnessed among rlvs
army otfeers-and IN spite of the fact thu
Howard was the ranking officer, and Mile
had only done what Howard suggested, all
after 1000 miles pursuit, enabled hip
do-declined to receive them, at the san
time waving him to General Miles. IL
iealousies of army officers are well known
in striking contrast this instance of extren
disinterestedness and generosity Is deservlI
of recognition. Probably very few Won
have done as General Howard did; We a
not sure that it was quite the wisest thing
do; but he may be allowed to be his OW
judge on that point.
The facts a. here stated. We give the
only in the interest Of truth ana justie
Generals Howard, Miles, Sturgisand Glbb'
have each dane well. Absolute Drawer
conjoined with heroic endurance, was nev
{ more signally illustrated That an arm
| shamefully left by their country to go +
nine months without pay, should have ser
, ed their country with such sublime devoti'
: is a wonder and cause for the higne
= admiration Heartily to acknowledge it
now the least We can do.-.iuter-Oceap-
KITCHEN CRITICISM French lat
e | uo,,ooa, bor ;nfapfion of v,oifin0 q ri