The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1877-04-07
The DAYTON Bridge Case.

We publish by request the IoHoWlnS opinion
OF the Supreme Court of this state in the litiga.
ton between the towns of Dayton and Rutland
in regard to the Dayton bridge. The opinion
was prepared by Justice Walker:
This case was before US at former term (see
60 ILL., So aud II is conceded that the facts IN all
material particulars are the same in this record
as they were in that case. The bridge was at
first built up by private donations III whole or
part. And the questions then as now presented
were whether the bridge had been donated TO
and whether 1t had been accepted by the public.
That II had been donated there can be no doubt,
nor is that seriously controversial And the evi-
dence OF acceptance by appellee is almost If not
conclusive. The road commissioners, on the pc
ttion OF majority of the voters of their town,
recommended to the board Of supervisors that a
tax be levied Of sixty cents on one hundred dol
las OF the taxable property OF their town TO aid
in rebuilding the former bridge at this place.
The road commissioners then opened road
from the mouth OF that to interscct with the
state road and beyond and through tha town
that had crossed at a ford about quarter of a
mile distant from the bridge. They permitted
the old road to be obstructed so as to compel
travel to pass over the bridge. And again when
the bridge got out OF repair one Of the commits.
sloncrs nailed plank across the end OF the
bridge in Rutland SO as to prevent travel over
the bridge to relieve the town from litigation in
case of accident resulting in injury to persons
passing over 1t.
We said in the opinion when this case was
previously before US that these acts all tended
to prove an intention to accept, but even il
what was then said was correct we did net say
that these strong and convincing facts could be
explained by light or trivial circumstances, or
what the individuals acting as commissioners
may have had in their minds. But we left this
strong and convincing proof to be overcome by
proof as strong or stronger than that afforded
by these several acts We, perhaps, would have
made ourselves better understood il we had
omitted the language that the evidence tended
to prove the acceptance OF the dedication and
have said that the facts proved dedication and
that 1t was usual for the jury TO find the intent.
But even under what was said il was not intend.
cd that the jury should disregard the evidence
that was before them, In this case there seems
to be absolutely no pretense for saying that the
evidence Afforded by those acts has been over.
come.
An officer, when he performs an act IN the
course of his official duty cannot be heard to say
that he intended to do one thing or some other.
The law attaches consequences to the act with.
out reference to the private intention OF the Off
Ger. lie has no power to explain away his legal
acts. To do SO would give the intention of the
officer effect, rather than the law. When the
case was before us previously we held that the
commissioners could not limit the legal effect of
their acts in asking the levy of a tax on their
town by protest that it should not render their
Town laDlc 10 repair. nor cOulu we anticipate
on another trial that it would be claimed that
the commissioners could testify us to their uncx.
pressed protest or intention when they did other
acts indicating an acceptance when we had held
that they could not avoid the legal effect of an.
oth& act OF acceptance by written protest
against the legal effect OF the act IN the same
paper cvidencing the act and part OF the res
geStcI. 1t was therefore error to permit the com.
mssoners to testify rs to their intention when
they performed the acts. As well permit an OH
Ger to say he did not intend the legal effect of
levy on property or service Of process or other
Official act. And so far as appellee's instructions
place the acceptance on the intention of the
commissioners they are wrong and should not
have been given.
1t be may possible that if il could be shown tha,
any OF these acts of the commissioners were
procured to be done by fraud, then they would
not be binding. Hence We cannot say thew are
absolutely conclusive. But these acts are strong
evidence approaching conclusive proof, and az
we have said cannot be overcome by slight nnC
unsatisfactory evidence. Appellee had not prov
| ed or attempted to prove that any one O. thes,
acts was procured or Induced by fraud much les.
all OF them, nor that they We're not done volun
rily in view Of all the material facts In the case
1 To permit such officers 10 70 on and perform
| official duties IL the usual course and then [,
be heard to say that they did not intend to bin,
themselves or their town by such acts woulC
well nigh destroy all liability Of such bodies
Suppose they had met the commissioners of TIN
town OF Dayton and agreed to erect the bridge
each town furnishing its share OF the funds an,
II had been so erected, could it he contende,
that the commissioners Of either town could b
heard to say that they did not intend to bin
their town to repairs that should subsequent
become necessary?
The same reason applies with full force whe
these officers have deliberately done an &C
eyincng an acceptance Of dedication of
, bridge from private persons.
hl The evidence clearly moves an SrCcptange
this case and the finding OF the jury is so palp,
bly, against the weight OF evidence that IN
court should have set the verdict aside, and III
s Judgment must be reversed and the cause r,
A manded. JuigmcEt rere1S,d.
DieSey J. Did not participate in the consit
c Grafton Of this case.
n -
Horse BtIis.
Having printed horse bill for over thirty yea
and having on hand a number Of fine cuts, "
=. believe we cannot be excclled in that line
:. work Farmers and horse pncn are invited