, 1877-10-13

- ~ NOu'u pSIldpS NC uuaUlo
even If it We're willing, to resist the de-
mand Of the Mahomadans for veogeanc3
against the people who. they would natu.
rally say, were the real cause of the war.
Already, indeed, the Bulgayians in Rou-
meIIa seem to be suffering sufficiently
from the tender mercies of the ruling caste.
Scenes OF horror are already witnessed ia
Adrlanople. Russia will be asked whe-
Their she can honourably abandon u people
OF whom she has constituted herself Tie
guardian and the avenger, and whom she
has placed at TIE mercy Of piti'ess rules.
The Emperor'S proclamation viii bear
witness against him, for it declared that
the hour Of liberation had at Last come to
Blu '9aril Can il lie that he is uuable to
tajt. his word7 Is despised Turkey,
lately the pupil and the ward of Europe,
more than a match in the field for Russia
herself? 1t viii b. difficult ia max tho
kasSlan people accept 50 humiIiali 4 u
conclusion, and, unless the teaching of
history is wonderfully misleading. it
would seem ell but impossible for such a
confession to be made by a military des
poIism We think it more than doubtful,
therefore, whether the Car can afford to
make peace untiI he is either victorious o.
at thu end Of his resources.
Let us assume that his troops will b. dri-
ven from Pievna and defeated at Biala:
would he be at the end Of his resources
then Scarcely, unless Russia is q
C'cond-rate Power. With the he of the
Guards, who are already crossing the
IN.,r' 49,, ,,;rIt 81 Z 49, -.
defend he bridge sc SiNcYa, an thus
keep The way open for 0oshcr campaign.
1t would theI be necessary for her to put
forth DE Whole of her military strength.
As yer her f.. ccs in the field have been
utterly insufficient, the ta,e that she set
out with 500, 600 men being a gross exag.
gefati0n. According 10 our Special
Correspondent at Buchares+, she has
never had 60 600 Russian troops even at
Pievra. In fact, ker soldiers have in nine
contests cut Of ten been outuumb4red bv
the Turks. Such a fact bcttays a dis
slcceiui wait OF fArethought, aud it il
clear that Russia will have a slender
chuuce Of victory unless she at least don
6os tie stIel 9Th Of cr amy in the field.
Her temper will soon be shown by the
amount Of The calls which she makes on
her reserves. But even the addition of a
couple OF hundred thousand men to her
fighting army may not suffice to repair the
terrible bluuder Of the carspaign. uuless it
should be better organized and led. All
the preparations for the var have been
models of " hat military authorities should
avoid. The cOmmiSSariat appliances have
been bad, The means of sendIug re-Iu.osca-
meuts to the front have been worse. The
sanitary arrangements Of the various
camps might seem designed to facilitate
the outbreak of a pe>tilence. But The
most astonishing fact is the i|Dcompetency
of The leaders. Blundering as the gener-
alstip of the French was in 1870, it was
less open to criticism, because they were
outwitted by a consummate strategist,
while the errors of the Turks have already
offered golden opportunities of triumph.
The Russians will have to abandon the
system of nurling masses of brave men
against intrenched positions, aud to pro-
coed by the slower, surer methods of
which Count Moltke made so brilliant a
use. Nine-tenths of their defeats are the
result of the undue haste witch has at
tended the determination to iGish the war
in a single campaign. The Russian PEG.
pie, as we'll as The Russian Go7ernment,
are e pdine ont that they have underfakon