Saint Mary's beacon. [volume] (Leonard Town, Md.) 1867-1983, 1877-09-06

The Doslle q oetaysbuFy.
Col. Waiter n. Taylor. OF Noffclk,
Va, who MS Adjutant General Of the
Confederate Army Of Northern Viz
ginia during the late war, has contrib
used "A interesting paper to the South
ern Historical Society In regard to the
battle Of Gettysburg, the strength oil
the two srmles engaged, ETC., Of which
the annexed II the material portioni
The design Of Gen. Lee in invad;ns
IL MostAen ototes WAS 10 free Vir.
80 - 11ezs1 5ouusof shs esemy--se
tfsnsief the theater oil var to the enc
my's country. and to take the reasona.
bic chance Of defeating his adversary
there~knowing full well that to obtain
an advantage there over the enemy
would operate more powerfully in our
favor than to disccmft him in Virginia.
He sought an encounter with his OPP.
ponent, but upon his own terms as to
time and place. He justly felt grea.
confidence in his army. and hoped to
selects favorable position where he
could receive the attack which the en-
envy would be compelled to make, and
from which, il successful, he could Sc.
riously threaten the federal capital
TIE condition of the army at this time
was excellent; never was I 50 impressed
by its morale as when the two corps
OF Hill and Longstreet passed through
Chambersburg.
Now, as 10 the battle itself. The
first great disadvantage experienced BY
Gen. Lee was the unexpected absence
Of his cavalry. Certain discretionary
power had to be left with Gen. Stuar,
as to where he " ould cross the Potomac
1t was arranged that the movements Of
the enemy and his own judgment should
determine this, but he was to connect al
once with Gen. Lee, keep on his flank
and advise hun OF the enemy's move.
ments. Alter crossing the river Gen.
Stuart consumed some time in pursu-
ing and capturing train of wagons,
and when he turned to join the main
column Of the army he found that Gen
Hooker had .interposed between him
and Gen. Lee. and SO was compelled to
make the circuit Of the federal army
He did nc. join Gen. Lee until the
evening Of the Cd ofJuly. On approach.
ing ttysburg, where Lee had direct.
ed concentration Of bis army, a force
of the enemy was encountered nea:
that town by the advance offlil;s corps
on the 1st OF July. This was the first
intimation that Gen. Lee received Of
the proximity the enemy's infantry
The first encounter was unexpected
Hills troops became engaged; Ewell,
whose orders were to concentrate a:
Cashtown or Gettysburg, heard the fir
ing and turned towards Gettysburg
His advance Observation-Disclosures and
Early's-became engaged. The en-
gagement now involved two Of Hills
divisions and two OF Ewell's-all Of both
corps then up. The result was a Sue
cess Of no small proportions to the Con-
federates. On the side of the enemy
two corps were engaged besides Bu-
ford's cavalry. The forces were about
balanced in strength as to infantry
%, 900 to "a 900 each. The maximum
average of Lees divisions were 5000,
each "a, 900; but at this date the four
divisions had not over $4,000 present.
Gen. Bntterfeld, chief Of staff, Army OF
the Potomac, testified that the first and
eleventh federal corps had $4,000 on
the 10th Of June. Page 42s, vol. l.,
Conduct Of the war.
We should have occupied the heights
that evening. took the order to Gen.
Ewell to press the enemy and secure
the heights if possible. Later, Gen.
Lee rode over TO Gen. Ewel's front and
conferred as to the future movements.
He wanted to follow up the success
gained; thought that with Johnson's d.
vision, then up. that Gen. Ewell could
20 forward at dawn next day. Ewell,
Early and Rhodes thought It best to
await Longstreets arrival, and make
the main attack on the senemys line.
This vas determined on. Loncstreet
was then about four miles of. with two
Of his divisions. He was expected
early on the morning Of the Cd. Orders
were sent him to move up to gain the
Emmi,tsburg road. He did not reach
the field early, and his dispositions
were no. completed for attack until four
o'clock IN the afternoon. In his report
Gen. Longstreet says he received or
ders to move with the portion of his
command that was then up, to gain the
the E,nmlttsburg road on the enenv's
left, but fearing that he was too weak
to attack, he delayed until one OF his
brigades (Law'sl joined lis division,
and that he begun the movement as
soon after its arrived as his prepare.
tons could be made. II seemed i'm
possible to get the corporations Of the
commanders along the line. When
Longstreet did attack, he did it in hand.
some style.-drove the enemy ard cap
tused prisoners. artillery and other .ro-
plies.
So far We had succeeded in every
encounter with the enemy. It was
thought that a continuance OF the attack
as made by Longstreet offered promise
of success. He was ordered TO renew
the fight early on the Sd. Ewell vas
to cooperate, Ewell ordered johnson
TO attack at ar early hour anticipating
that Longstreet would do the same
Lcngstteet delayed. He found that .
force Of the enemy occupying high
ground On their len would take his
troops In reverse Is they advanced.
Lorgstreet was then visited BY Gen.
Lee, and they conferred Is TO the mode
OF attack. Ii wss determined ia adhere