The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1877-08-21
The Failure of the Russian Campaign.

around tn, Russian armies in Bulgaria. The
junction which SULElMAN lasha has succeed
ed in cllccting with MrurMEr ALI. the sick
ness which is Increasing in the army of in
vasion. the state Of the weather and Of the
roads. which impede alike the transportation
Of rconforccmcnts and Of supplies. the com
seriousness Of an intense and growing di~~at
Isfacton in RUSSIA itself with operations
which have 50 far manifested the gro-sost
military incapacity aud Inundated the
whole nation before Europe. all combine to
dcmoralile alike the officers and men of the
Muscovitc forces.
Though not 80 easily discoura god ae the
French, the Slav nature partakcs good deal
of that impulsivc character which depends
Tor its morale on success. while their oppo-
ncnts are of that stubborn and logged type
which peculiarly lit them for protractcd de-
fcnsivc operations. Patient and enduring
under hardship. sustained by the religious
character of the war. the Moslcm soldicry
are capable If an enthusiasm of resistance. II
We may hc allowed the expression. the do
tcrmincd quality Of which their enemies are
now for the iir-i time beginning thoroughly
10 appreciate While tho Turks constantly
seem to lose the siratcgical advantages of
their victories by failing to follow them up
promptly, they make up for this defect If
rapid action 10y their sklful adherence 10
the defensive warfare which property forms
.hc basis ofthcir present strategy.
The war which they are preparing for the
invaders is war OF intrcnchcd camps 1t
Is not likely that the Turks will ever assume
an aggressive attitude. except possibly. in
he Dobrudia, whore the dcfcncclc-s position
ofGcn ZlMNrERMANS is too tempting for them
Ia resist. II seems almost Impossible that
Gen. GoURKHAs corps can maintain itself i'm
The Shipka pass. with its line Of commune
cation threatened 10y OsMAN pa-ha on tho
one side. and SULLIVAN Pa-ha ON the other.
The removal Of the Russian headquarters
from Tirnova to the ncighborhood Of Sisto-
va is strong Indication that the Eighth
Corps will Dee withdrawn from the Balkans
to avoid being cut Off, starved out and ulti-
matcly captured. The whole force of both
armies will then Ice 10 the north of the Bal
kals. and any attempt 10 rcoross them must
be preceded hya decisive victory over the
intrcnchcd positions which the Turks are
-..,..~,,..i~..4 -s,.A. ,---.- w oo,v
see that the fortrcs-rs of the quadlilateral
arc "A source of weakness rather than Of
weapons of precision, a. We pointed out the
other day. carthworks are more easily de-
Tended than stone walls; and an intrcnchcd
camp can b" made in night as imprcgna-
hle a. the most elaborate fortress with the
advantage that il is movable, so to say. and
can be constructed almost instantly in face
Of the enemy wherever his point of attack
may be-
The superiority Of numbers coaSo- to avail
much in this description Of warfare. The
attacking troops advancing over the pen
to storm the long lines of Trenches are
dccimated by the iucessant rain of bullet
before they can reach them; and the best
soldiers in the world refuse at last To- meet
what experience proves to them is useless
massacre. The explanation given by the
Russian commanders at Plcvna for the adj
vance of their troops against the earthworks
in column, thus exposing them to flightiul
slaughter, was that their temperament was
such that they could not attack carthworks
in an ordinary line 81 battle. but must be-
brought w in compact masses. In other
words the Russian soldier is machine i'll
adapted to skirmishing or irregular opera
iions, and fighting best in masses, and in this
respect again they resemble the French.
This criticism does not II course. apply To-
fhe CosSuck- who a. Irregular cavalry are
The most eilieicnt troops In the Rus iauarmy.
Tho consequence of this tendency Of the
Turks to tight always behind iutrcnchmcuts.
and OF their peculiar adaptab.lity to this de-
scuption Of tactics, must be- as We have
said, to cquali1e the disparity Of numbers.
The Russians will hurt their nu-,cs against
these carefully selected and fortified posi-
tions only to be ropused with loss, or they
will be compelled to sit down before them,
and approach also with intrcnchmonts. a
most tedious and dlscouraging operation.
Meantime the rains will begin the roads will
become impas-alle, disease Will Increase
Ms supplies diminish, and 1t will Toe almost
impossible To bring up the heavy ammuni-
ton which wnrof this description requires.
The longer struggle II this kind can be-
prOtractod, the more hopeful do lhe defend
FRS become, and their morale rises just in
proportion as thDh opponents become dis
coulagod.
Again, political questions arise at home
when Success docs not como rapidly enough
and this often forces Generals to undertake.
operations which their calmer military
Judgment condemns Thus We are told that
ih" rash advance across the Balkans was
ll" i0 political pressure and that tine best
% Arry vinw- in the Russian army were
opposed 10 H.. We hear whispers even now
of 'nToroucos ~ opinion between some of
1890 Generals and the members Of the inn
pol1l iu.ilF Whn are utru~tod with high
comnaide;and wo rcmorllrr that a similar
J'"inu9y "i H'u lil' lblk ON tho part ~ the