Daily press and Dakotaian. [volume] (Yankton, Dakota Territory [S.D.]) 1875-1880, 1877-09-29
INCREASE OF the ARMY.
A Notable Article by Gen. George
Mcclellan

INCREASE OF the ARMY.
Notable Article by Gen. George II,
Mcclellan.
The October number of Harper,s Mara.
zine contains an article attributed to Gen,
George B. Mcclellan, on ''rhe regular
army of the United States" 1t is an sreu.
ment not only against the proposed reduc-
tion of the army, but in favor Of its increase,
He holds the idea that there is danger from
a standing army to be entirely fallacious,
and cites the willingness of our veteran
volunteers and army recruits in all our wars
to return to ordinary pursuits as soon as
peace was established-the war of the revo-
luton, the Mexican war and that of the
rebellion being instances as furnishing suffi-
cient evidence on this point. The general
touches delicately upon the part performed
struction, holding that volunteers from the
northern states could not have performed
there the military duty demanded by the
government without arousing the prejudices
ofthe southern people to much greater degree
than that excited by the regulars. A large
standing army is held to be much more
economical than small one, ON the prin-
ciple that prevention is better than cure.
When the Mexican war broke out the stand
ing army of the United States numbering
only $500, and General Taylor went into
the battle of Reseca de la Palma and Palo
Alto with only 100 regular troops. If the
army had been 10000 strong at the outset
the Mexicans would not have been permit
ted to cross the Rio Grande, "and in all
human probability the war would have
been prevented" We are not told, however.
whether the rich domains of Texas, Cali
fornia and New Mexico would even have
come into the possession of the United
States but for the brilliant result of the
Mexican war
The same theory is applied to the opening
battles of the rebellion. If there had been,
he says, $4,000 regulars on the union side at
the first battle of Manassas, the federals
probably ended the war at the outset. They
would at least have driven the enemy out of
Virginia; and it is stated that the cost Of
maintaining $4,000 regular troops from the
close of the Mexican war to 1860 "would
not have amounted to one-fftieth of the war
debts of the general government, the states,
counties and municipalities" Considering
the expenses in contrast with the whole
cost of the war, in the way of destruction
and depreciation of property, the outlay
for standing: army during the period mem
toned would be aabsurdly small" In this
connection, the writer makes the following
point:
"It may be stated that the interest at 5
per cent, upon the debt of the United States
government at the close of the war would,
according to the cost ofthe present establish.
ment, support an army of 100000 men in
perpetuity. Let US add to this the fact that
the amount we have already paid in pen
sions would have supported 10000 addition
al men from the Mexican war to that of
secession"
This is given as an argument in favor of
economy as carried out by the support of a
large standing army. In passing this point
the reader will naturally recur to the possi-
bility of danger from the existence of large
bodies of regular troops moving away their
lives in camps and forts, and becoming
weary of the monotonous hun-drum Of
peace, and conceive how easy it would be
for some ambitious commander to make
trouble by precipitating quarrels with neigh
boring nations, of developing domineering
disposition towards our own people. Such
probability seems altogether foreign to the
generals theory, who sees only a love Of
peace and the pos ession ofthe highest grade
Of patriotism in the regular soldier. Thepro
fessional man-at-arms in the ranks is gener-
all devoted to his flag and is pretty we'll drill.
ed in obedience to the orders Of his command
er. But camp-life is not well calculated to
appreciation of republican from of govern
ment. General McC discusses a primary
element of our system of nationality with
out seeming to look beyond the question he
is Immediately considering. As for the
theory that large standing army would
have the effect of preventing war, the as
sumption may we'll be doubted as truism,
if, indeed, history does not disprove it.
The principal involves, in its essential ele-
ments, an attitude of menace which is as
we'll calculated to precipitate war as to pre-
vent it. If rival or antagonistic nations
observe any attempt at an increase of the
war powers Of each other, the consequence
is general placing of more than one of
them on war footing, thus increasing tax.
alton and tending to an impoverishment of
the people. While we have peace, we can
get along without large army; aud peace
is what we want. If we have large army,
it will want something to do, and hot head.
ed politicians will not be slow in lending
to the work Of bringing about
the opportunity.
Previous to considering the proposition
luoG luC u4llltld uuu Volunteer SOlGleES COulu
be depended upon in case Of war, the fol-
lowing compliment is paid to the volunteer
force in the war of the rebellion:
Before entering upon the argument in
favor of reducing the regular army to We
~ small body it is due to ourselves to say
that no one appreciates the American vol. |
unteers more highly than we do; no man
living owes more of respect, confidence and
love to that noble body of men than does
the writer of this article He commanded |
them in the west and in the east. from the
time when they came into his hands undis.
cplined, unorganized, ignorant of all that
makes up the profession of the soldier
with nothing but brave hearts, strong arms
and the noblest impulses of patrietism-
until he saw them moving, with all the pre-.
cision and GOODNESS of veterans, upon strong
positions held by the most stubborn and
valiant foes they could encounter-their
own countrymcn. No one knows better
than he of what material they were com
posed, to what perfection they can be
brought, and what they can achieve. But
none know better than they and he the
necpssifv Of instr,,rFion ond doo; ,1;o,