Middletown transcript., 1877-08-25
TaE HArTLE OF eErrYsBURe.
Memorandum by Col. Walter H. Taylor,
Gen. Lee's Adjutant GeneraE-strength
Of the Two Armies from the Records.

Col. Walter Fl. Taylor, Of Norfolk
Va, who was Adjutant General Of the
Confederate Army of Northorn Vir
ginia during the late war, has contrib
uted an interesting paper to the South.
. ern Historical Society in regard to the
battle of Gettysburg, the strength Of
the two armies engaged, etc, of which
I the annexed is the material portion:
The design of Gen. Lee in invading
the Northern States was to free Vir.
ginia of the presence of the enemy-to
-transfer the theatre of war to the enc
my's country, and to take the reasona-
bic chance of defeating his adversary
there-knowing full well that to obtain
an advantage there over the enemy
would operate more powerfully in our
favor than to discomft him in Virginia.
He sought an encounter with his op-
pOnent, but upon his own terms as to
time and place. He justly felt great
confidence in his army, and hoped to
select favorable position where he
could receive the attack which the en-
emy would be compelled to make, and
from which, if successful, he could Sc
riously threaten the federal capital.
The condition of the army at this time
was excellent never was SO impress
ed by its morale as when the two corps
of Hill and Longstreet passed through
Chambersburg.
Now, as to the battle itself. The
first great disadvantage experienced by
Gen. Lee was the unexpected absence
of his cavalry, Certain discretionary
power had to be left with Gen. Stuart
as to where he would cross the Potomac.
It was arranged that the movements of
the enemy and his own judgment should
determine this, but hewas to connect at
once with Gen. Lee, keep on his flank,
and advise him of the enemy's move
melts. After crossing the river Gen.
Stuart consigned some time in pursu-
ing and capturing train Of wagons,
and when he turned to join the main
column Of the army hefound that Gen.
Hooker had interposed between him
and Gen. Lee, and so was compelled to
make the circuit of the federal army.
He did not join Gen. Lee until the
evening Of the I'd of July. On APP
preaching Gettysburg, where General
Lee had directed concentration of his
army, forceofthe enemy was encoun-
tered near that town by the advance of
Hills corps on the 1st of July. This
was the first intimation that Gen. Lee
received of the proximity of the enc
my's infantry. The first encounter
wasunexpected. Hills troops became
engaged; Ewell, whose orders were to
concentrate at Gashtown or Gettys-
burg, heard the firing and turned to-
wards Gettysburg. His advance diyi-
sions-Rhodea' and Early's-became
engaged. The engagement now IN
volved two of Hill's divisions and two
Of Ewell's-all of both corps then up.
The result was success Of no small
to the Confederates. On
the side Of the enemy two corps were
engaged besides Buford's cavalry. The
forces were about balanced in strength
as to infantry-22,OO to $4,000 each.
The maximum average Of Lees divi-
sions were 5000, each 24,OOO; but at
this date the four divisions had not
over $4,000 present. Gen. Butterfeld,
chief Of staff, Army of the Potomac,
testified that the first and eleventh fed {
aral corps had $4,000 on the 10th of
June. Page 42S, vol. l., Conduct of '
HE War. f
We eshOuld have occupied the heights ]
hat evening. 1 took the order to Gen. t
Ewel to press the enemy and secure the ]
heights if possible. Later, Gen. Lee 9
ode over to Gen. EwelPs front and $
conferred as to the future movements. ]
lie wanted to follow up the success
yained thought that with Johnson's '
liyision, then up, that Gen. Ewell could a
70 forward at dawn next day. Ewell, a
Early and Rhodes thought it best to {
wait Longstreet's arrival, and make \
he main attack on the enemy's line. a
This was determined on. Longstreet T
vas then about four miles of, with two e
f his divisions. He was expected e
arly on the morning of the I'd. Or a
.ers were sent him to move up to gain b
he Emuittsburg road. He did not d
each the field early, and his disposi- 81
ions were not completed for attack un- a
i four o'clock in the afternoon. In A
is report Gen. Longstreet says he re- a
eived orders to move with the portion r'
his command that was then up, to a
ain the Emmittsburg road on the en- ei
my's left, bue fearing that he was too Of
eak to attack, he delayed until one of 10
is brigades laws Joined its division,
nd that he begun the movement as Ell
oon after its arrival as his prepara- th
ons could be made. It seemed i'm W
ossible to get the corporations of the m
along the line. When he
ongstreet did attack. he did If in fir