The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1877-11-22
LoNGsTREEr on GETTYSBURG.
The Great Fighters Narrative of that Fatal
Day.

The Great Fighter's Narrative of that Fatal
Day.
A narrative Of the Pennsylvania cam
paign, from the beginning to the close,
written by Gen. James Longstrect, is
published in The Philadelphia Times.
Gen. Longstrect tells some things that
have never been told, and reviews the
operations of 1863 from point of view
that is in many respects more advanta-
gcous than is possible to any other man
now living, since no man now living WAS
so prominently concerned in them.
THE FIGHT ON JULY lsr.
The encounter on the lst of July Gen.
lIOngstrcct shows to have been wholly
accidental, and it was then that he be-
lieves Lee committed an error in not
either vigorously prosecuting the tempo-
rary success, or else mannvering no rs 10
compel Meade 20 make the attack. Gen.
I.ongstreet continues as follows: When
overlook Gen. Lee ct O'Clock that after
noon he said, to my surprise, that he
thought of attacking Gen. Meade upon
the heights the next day. Gen. Lee was
impressed with the idea that by attacking
the Fcderals he could whip them in de-
tail. l reminded him that if the Fed
erals were there in the morning it would
be preof that they had their forces well
in hand, and that with Pickett in Cham
bersburg, and Stuart out Of reach we
should be somewhat in detail. He, how
ever, did not seem to abandon the idea
of attack on the next day. He seemed
under subdued excitement, which occa-
sionally took possession of him when
"the hunt was up" and threatened his
e9uipoise. The sharp battle fought by
Hill and Ewell on that day had given
him taste of victory.
THE PLAN OF ATTACK.
When left Gen. Lee on the niyht of
the LIST | believe that lie had made up
his mind to attack, but was confident
that he had not yet determined as to
when the attack should be made. The
assertion first made by Gen. Pendleton.
and echoed by his confcderates, that
was ordered to open the attack ut sunrise
is totally false. Gen. Lee never in his
life gave me orders to open an attack at
n specific hour. lie was perfectly salts
fled that when l had my troops in posi-
tion and was ordered To attack, no time
was ever lost. On the night of the lst
left him without any orders at all. On
the morning of the End | went to Gen.
Lees headquarters ut daylight and re-
ncwcd my views against making All at-
tack. lie seemed resolved, however. and
we discussed the probable results. We
observed the position Of the Federals,
and got n general idea of the nature of
the ground. About sunrise Gen. Lee
sent Col. Venable, OF his staff, to Gen.
EwelPs headquarters, ordering him 10
make reconnaissance of the ground in
his front, with the view of making the
main attack on his left a short time
afterwards he Enll"a,e.l Ccii. Vc:,sb!o 4.
person. He returned Mt about 8 O'Clock
and informed me that it would not do to
have Ewell upon the attack. lie finally
determined that should make the main
attack on the extreme right. 1t was fully
ii o'clock when Gen. Lee arrived at the
conclusion and ordered the movement.
Our army was stretched in an elliptical
curve, reaching from the front of Round
Top around Seminary Ridge, and envel-
oping Cemetery Heights on the left;
tbus covering n space of four or five
Ill les. The enemy occupied tine hinh
ground il front Of iis, being massed with.
in curve of about two miles, nearly
conccntric with the curve described by
our forces. His lipo was about ! 400
yards from our.. any one will sao that
the proposition for this inferiur force To
assault aud drive out the masses of troops
upon the heights was very problemati-
cal one. My orders from Gen. Lee were
ito envelop the cnemy's left and begin
the attack there, following up as near as
possible the direction of the Emmetts-
burg road"
THE BATTLE OPENED.
My corps occupied our right, with
Hood on the extreme right and McLaws
next Hills corps was next TO mine, in
front Of the Federal centre, and Ewell
was on our extreme left. My corps, with
Pickett's division absent, numbered hard
ly $4,000 men. l realized that the fight
was to be n fearful one, but being assured
that my flank would be protected by the
brigades OF Wilcox, Perry, Wright, Posey
and Malone moving en- echelon, and that
Ewell was to cooperate by direct attack
on the enemy's right, and Hill to threaten
his centre and attack if opportunity Of
fered, and thus prevent reinforcements
from being launched either against my
self or Ewell, it seemed that we might
possibly dislodge the great army in front
of US. AT half-past 3 o'clock the order
| was given Hood to advance upon the
enemy, and hurrying to the head Of Nc
Laws division, I moved with his line.
Then was fairly commenced what do
not hesitate to pronounce the best three
hours fighting ever done by any troops
on any battlefield. Directly in from: c!
us, occupying the peach orchard, on n
piece of elevated ground that Gen. Lee
| desired me to take ard hold fDT his ar:;l-
lery, was the third corps of the Federals,
commanded by Gen. Sickles. My men
charged with great spirit and dislodged
the Federals from the peach orchard with
but little delay, though they fought stub
b0rnly. We were then on the Great of
Seminary Ridge. The artillery was
brought forward and put into position at
the peach orchard. The infantry swept
down the slopes and soon reached the
marshy ground that lay between Semi
nary and Cemetery Ridges, fighting their
way over every foot of ground and against
overwhelming odds. At every step we
found that reintorcements were pouring
into the Federals from every side. Moth
/ ing CouiH 5IoP ny men, however, and
they commenced their heroic charge up
the side of Cemetery Ridge. Our attack
was to progress in the general direction
of the Emmettsburg road, but the Fed
eral troops, as they were forced from
1 point to point, availing themselves of the
stone fences and boulders near the noun
tains es rellying points, 80 annoyed our
right flank that Gen. Hoods division was
obliged to make partial change of front