, 1877-06-29
England's Interest in War.

hictng elements of British interest and
temper has prepared US to expect even
such document as the dispatch of Lord
Derby. The reply to the note of Russia
is trife more tart than the Russian de-
claratiOn of war against Turkey; it does
not definitely terminate amicable rela-
! tiOns between Great Britain and Russia
but 1t leaves very few amicable relations
to be terminated. In view of such a
dispatch, the energetic preparations which
the Government is said to be making for
active hOstilities occasion no SURPRISE
From the British point of view, it is a
strongly reasoned paper, and presents in
the most forcible light whatever excuses
Great Britain can find for otjecting to
the presence of Russian armies on the
Danube and in Armenia; but its temper
would be inexplicable were it not known
that England is spending sleepless nights,
thinking of the Dardanelles, aud vet
more of India. The changed tone of the
London Times is not less significant.
That public opinion which still rules the
British Empire-the opinion of the aris-
tOcratic and commercial classes-is evil
IDENTIFY turning in favor of war. Since a
war in behalf of "such Turk" as Mr..
Carlyle says, must seem the very height
of folly and wickedness to the intelligent
and commercial classes on this side the
Atlantic, it is well worth while, if for no
other reason than to aid Judgment re-
specting the prospect of British interfer-
Once, to look at the subject from the
English commercial standpoint.
If war comes between Great Britain
and Russia, it will be essentially a con-
mercisl war. These many years, cash
and commerce have been at the bottom
of British international relations. The
selfish interests of commerce dictated
the taxation against which American
colonies rebelled, sustained England
through the long struggle with Napoleon,
caused the conquest of India and the
opium war in China, and sent British
troops to the Crimea. To British COM
merce, India and the Black Sea seem
necessities. India consumes annually
1900, 600, 900 yards of cotton cloth from
English mills. The Black Sea supplies
to England large and necessary portion
of the grain which sustains its manufac-
turing operatives. These are only the
larger items in a long account. The
consider two things necessary to English
prosperity-control of Indian ports and
possession of the Dardanelles by
friendly power. Hence, though mig
gardly in much, the British Government
has been lavish, and British capitalists
have been not less lavish in defending
their interests in Turkey and India. The
enormous loans to Turkey, which have
resulted so disastrously, were largely
prompted by the desire OF the commercial
classes to sustain Turkey and to hold the
closest relations with the Turkish Gov
ernment.
British commerce doubtless realizes
that other European Powers have the
strongest motives to prevent an advance
of Russia to Constantinople. Hence, in
that quarter there is less of interested
apprehension, though memories of the
Crimean war always suffice to rouse
British temper against Russia. But
when Russia threatens to establish itself
between the Mediterranean and the Black
Sea, within striking distance of the Suez
Canal, now great artery Of commerce,
and in position to assail the British En-
pire in India with the aid of Persia, then
British apprehension is aroused to the
utmost. Even the London Econ0mist,
which has not countenanced policy of
interference as to Turkey, says that the
gravest possible questions of public pol
icy would arise if Russia should advance
with success in Asia. The thought of
abandoning Indian possessions, no Brit
ish ruler dare entertain. But to defend
those possessions, in the event supposed,
will involve an enormously increased
military expenditure. This vast In
crease Of expenditure, as the Economist
plainly declares, would involve changes
in the social and governmental structure
which would be intolerable. Hence, to
men who will not contemplate the posi-
bility of prospering without control in
India, the question comes with great
force whether it is not better to bear all
the expense of temporary war with
Russia than to permit that Power to es-
tablish itself within striking distance of
India, and thus force upon Great Britain
those intolerable changes.
Upon the character of these changes it
is not necessary to dwell. To those who
realize how largely absence of import
duties has been the basis of British fiscal
and commercial policy, the prospect that
greatly increased military expenses might
involve permanent change in themodes
of taxation will be enough. In no re-
spect is Great Britain prepared, rich as
the country is, for large increase of taxa
tion. But why cling to imperial power
in India3 Every American will see that
the colonial policy, which has been both
the glory of Great Britain and the source
of much of its commercial greatness, now
threatens to involve the Government In a
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