The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30
THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
A REvIEw or THE GREATEST BATTLE
or THE WAR OF THE STATES.
ny Gen. y. A. Early.
Continued

CONTINUED.
But, II we did lose such an oppor-
tunity, why IL 1t that the entire respon-
Anderson'5 division OF Hills corps
came up about the close of the fight, or
4 shortly thereafter, and the most practi-
cable route for moving on Cemetery
ELL was on our right Of the town. The
question OF the propriety of the advance
was submitted to Ewell's judgment,
and he did not think 1t prudent to make
the attempt until the arrival OF john
son; and l must confess that, though
my opinion ut the time was different,
subsequent developments have salts
fed Eme that his decision was right.
johnson did not arrive in time to make
the assault with prospect OF success,
and hence 1t was not made after his ar
rival. There 10, then, no good reason
for imputing to Ewell an intentional
disregard of the wishes or instructions
OF Gen. Lee.
Col. Taylor has either wholly misap-
pretended Gen. Johnson, or the latter
was laborinG under some very great
mistake when they had the converse
tion after the war on the subject. John
son did not get into line OF battle on my
left until after dark; and IL he had been
IL line OF battle before that time It was
when he was halted near the College
before moving to the left. It surely
could not have been the intention for
him TO march from that point over
Rodes and myself to attack the enemy
on Cemetery Hill. II he had then, or
after dark, been ordered to advance
upon either hill for the purpose of at
lacking, Rodes and myself would have
been Informed OF the fact, in order that
II
sure received no such information.
But let us see what Gen. Lee and
Gen. Ewell say on the subject Of the in
gtructions for capturing the enemy's
position that afternoon.
In his report Gen. Lee says:
Without information as to Its prox-
Unity [Meade's main forcel, the strong
position which the enemy had assumed
could not be attacked without danger of
exposing the four divisions present, al
ready weakened by q long and bloody
fresh troops.
Gen. Ewell was therefore instructed
70 carry the hill occupied by the enemy
Il he found 1t practicable, but to avoid
o general engagement until the arrival
Of the other divisions Of the army,
which were ordered to hasten forward.
He decided to await Johnson's division,
which had marched from Carlisle by the
road west Of the mountains, to guard
the trains OF his corps, and consequent
Iy did not reach Gettysburg until late
hour. In the meantime the enemy oc.
cupied the point which Gen. Ewell de-
signed To seize, but In what force could
not be ascertained, owing to the dark
neBs.'s
1t ID now known that that force was
the Twelfth corps.
Here Is Gen. Ewell's explanation of
the whole matter as given in his report
The enemy had fallen back to a
commanding position known as Gene
terry. Hill, south Of Gettysburg, and
quickly showed q formidable front there.
On entering the town / received a mes.
sage from the commanding general to
attack the hill, IL could do so to ad-
vantage. could not bring artillery to
bear on 1t; all the troops with me were
jaded by twelve hours marching and
lighting, and | was notified that Gen.
johnson was close to the town with his
division, the only one Of my corps that
had not been engaged, Anderson's di-
vision Of the Third Corps having been
Matted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill
was not assailable from the town, and I
determined, with Johnson's division, to
take possession Of wooded hill to my
left, on line with and commanding
Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up,
the enemy was reported moving to our
LETT hank-our extreme left-and I
could see what seemed to be his skir-
miShers In that direction. Before this
report could be investigated by Lieuts.
y. =. Turner. OF my staff, and Robert
EARLY, sent to investigate 1t, and John
son placed In position, the night was far
advanced.
II received orders soon after dark to
draw my corps to the right In case 1t
could not be used to advantage where 1t
was; that the commanding general
thought from the nature Of the ground
that the position for attack was favora-
bic one on that side. represented to the
commanding general that the hill above
referred to was unoccupied by the ene-
my at dark, as reported by Lieuts. Tur-
ner and Early, who had gone upon it,
and that 1t commanded their position
and made 1t untenable, SO far as could
]. juaagss r. decided 70 ,e+ y, . ron.,, .na ~
my return to my headquarters, after IL
o'clock at night, sent orders to John
son, by Lieutenant and Aided Camp
f.. 4. Turner, to take possession Of this
hill, II he had not already done 80. Gen.
johnson stated in reply to that order
that, after forming his line of battle
this side or the wooded hill in question,
he had sent accommodating party to
the hill with orders to report as to the
position OF the enemy in reference to it.
This party on nearing the summit was
met by superior force of the enemy,
which succeeded in capturing portion
OF the accommodating party, the rest of
ft making its escape. During this con-
versation with Gen. johnson a man ar
rived, bringing dispatch dated at mid
night. and taken from Federal courier
making his way from Gen. Sykes to
Gen. Slocum, in which the former stated
that his corps was then halted four
miles from Gettysburg, and would re-
sumo its march at a. m. Lieut.. Tur-
quarters, and stated that Gen. John
son would refrain from attacking the
position until had received notice that
the enemy was in possession of the hill,
and had sent him further orders.