American citizen. [volume] (Canton, Miss.) 1864-1890, 1877-11-24
The State of the Eastern War.

Ine progress Oh In0 EASTERN war. IL IS
evident that he has not merely infused
new life and vigor into the movements
of the troops, but changed the whole
plan of the campaign. 1t was originally
intended by the Russian commanders to
take Rustchuk, and make their main
line of operations by way of Giurgevo
and that fortress, and to use the Rust
chuk and Varna line of railways as far
south as they could. Instead of this,
they are now making a railway from
Fratesti, the first station north of Giur-
gevo, to Simnitza, and the bridge be-
tween that town and Sistova will con-
tinue to be maintained as their perma-
nent means of access to Bulgaria. 1t
will not be possible for them to con-
struct a line of railway this winter
from Sistova to the Balkans; but
it would seem from the accounts
which reach us that Russian troops
are being echeloned in great
force along the line of road from Sis
tova to the foot of the Shipka Pass, from
which we may infer that it is hoped that
before the winter is too far advanced,
the capture of Plevna will render it pos
sible to make another attempt to reach
Adrianople. Meantime the whole en-
ergies of the new Commander-in-C Chief
for although Gen. Todleben does not
enjoy that title, there can be little doubt
that he is virtually acting in that ca
pacity-have been directed to the ac-
complishment of a complete investment
of Plevna. This he has been able to
carry out by means of the arrival of the
Imperial Guard and considerable other
reinforcements, especially of cavalry,
which are now engaged in attempts to
interrupt the communications to the
rear of Plevna, and hold the passes by
which supplies would reach Orchanie
across the Balkans.
1t is evident that the position of Os-
man Pasha has thus become very criti-
cal, and military authorities who fore
saw the.danger have been predicting
for the last month that he would not
wait at Plevna to be hemmed in, but
make good his retreat to Orchanie while
the way was still open. He would have
been quite as much thorn in the side
of the Russians there as at Plevna, for
they would have been obliged to follow
him, while he would have been nearer
his supplies. Either he did not appre-
ciate the danger-which is not likely,
for he has proved himself an able of
ficer-or he had no means of moving
his large army, and was reluctant to
abandon guns which he would have had
to burst, and military stores which he
had no means of transporting; or else
he has larger supplies than is generally
supposed, and trusts to being able to
maintain a siege under circumstances
in which the besiegers will suffer more
than the besieged. If by any chance
Osman Pasha has three or four months
supplies at Plevna, he is quite right to
remain there; but we believe this to be
extremely improbable. 1t will most
likely be found that he made a great
mistake in not retiring a month ago,
even at considerable sacrifices. AS it
is, if his supplies run short we do not
believe that he is a General to surren-
der, and under no circumstances will
the Turks follow the example of the
French, either at Metz or Sedan.
A great deal will necessarily depend
upon the military capacity of Chevket
Pasha, and upon the amount of rein
forcements which are being sent for
ward to him. A combined operation
upon the Russian positions on the Vid,
by the armies of Chevket and Osman
Pasha, might prove very disastrous to
the investing force if it were skillfully
carried out. So many mistakes have
been made on both sides since the com
mencement of the war, that, although
the military situation is more serious, so
far as the Turks are concerned, than it
has ever been since Abdul Kerim allow
ed the Russians to cross the Balkans, it
is far from hopeless; and successful
advance by Suleiman Pasha on Biela
and Sistova might entirely change the
whole complexion of affairs. This Gen
eral since taking command of the army
at Rasgrad has distinguished himself
only by retreating. In fact no Turkish
commander has proved himself so ut
terly useless as this Shipka hero. Upon
him and the unfortunate influences
which support him at Constantinople
will rest the whole responsibility of
Turkish defeat if the Russians are VIC
torious.
The disasters of the Turks have been
due entirely to jealousies and quarrels
in high places, the chief instigator hav-
ing been, from the beginning, Mahmoud
Pasha, the Sultan's brother-in-law. He
it was who secured the recall of Mehe-
met Ali, who fell victim not only to
intrigues at Court, but to insubordina-
ton in the field. The deliberate refusal
OF his next in command, Ahmed Eyoub,
to obey orders, coupled with the cow
ardice of the Egyptian contingent, fif-
teen battalions of which declined to adj
vance at Cherkovna, lost Mehemet Ali
battle which, had it been victorious,
would have brought him upon the rear
Of the besieging army of Plevna, and in
Volved disaster to the Russian armies
so serious that the only alternative
would have been the evacuation of Bull
garia. Again, the same result must
have followed had Suleiman Pasha, in
stead of attacking the Russians at the |
Shipka pass, effected a junction either
with Osman Pasha or Mehemet Ali; but |
Is he was jealous of beth these Gener-
Ills, he refused to cooperate with them