The Beaufort tribune and Port Royal commercial. [volume] (Beaufort, S.C.) 1877-1879, 1877-01-25
THE OLD WORLD.
Difficulties of Il Russo Turkish War--A Long
and severe Campaign.

Difficulties of II Russo-TurEsish War--A Long
and severe Campaign.
By recent cable dispatch, Gen. Won
Moltke is reported as predicting long
and severe campaign in case the differ
ences between Russia and Turkey were
not adjusted by the conference and ended
| in war. Won Moltke, besides being the
highest strategical authority in Europe
served himself, before his first promo
ton, as Prussian Colonel in one of the
/ Russo-Turkish wars, and has written a
book upon it. Whether he has publicly
expressed this opinion or not, says the
New York Times, ell past experience of
wars on the Danube will confirm it's cor
rectness. In the war of 1929, which
ended in the peace of Adrianople, the
Russian Army was nearly eight months
in advancing from the Pruth to the Bal
kan, which mountains, indeed, they did
not fairly reach in that year. The Turks
were in miserable plight for defense, and
possessed then none of the modern arma-
ment, and had not then adopted the mod
ern European organization. Their forti-
fed places were poorly strengthened and
defended, and they had no important de-
pots of provisions. Yet, by their remark
able tenacity of defense in the fortified
posts, they delayed each step of the Rus
sian advance, and had their genius for
attack been equal to that for defense,
they could have utterly cut to pieces the
Muscovite army on the right bank of the
Danube. AS it was, the Russians met
with terrific losses both by battle and
disease, in the first year of the campaign,
and only reached the district little be-
yond the Danube. They had then, also,
vessels of war to support the flank OF
their march over the Balkans and along
the sea to Adrianople and Constantinople.
AS to those mountains, the Turks, at that
period, did not seem to fully appreciate
their importance, and the passes were
not well fortified. The great defenses
relied upon were the fortified posts at the
front of them, Shumla, in the interior,
and Varna, on the sea.
1t should, however, be said for the
Russians in that campaign that, owing
to dread of alarming Europe, they en-
tered the contest with very inadequate
army, and fearing for the safety of Po-
land, left large forces in that disturbed
country, and broke up their invading
army by uselessly occupying the prlncl-
pahties.. Many stupid blunders, too,
were made in their conduct of the cam
paign, yet in that respect they were not
unlike their opponents. Among other
deficiencies, they were entirely lacking
in an efficient light cavalry. Though
the Turks were finally beaten, and made
peace very disastrous to themselves,
vet it is believed by good authorities that
had the sultan held out little longer,
the necessities of Russia would have
compelled her to make peace very diff
ferent in it's results to both countries.
Without considering other wars, many OF
our readers will remember the obstinate
defense by the Turks under English Off
GERS, of Silistria and other fortified
places on the Danube and in Asia, in the
war of 1886. In that struggle the te-
nacity of the Ottomans fairly compelled
the Russians to retreat, with heavy
losses. and to leave the Turkish side of
the Danube uninvaded and secure.
In weighing the possibilities of the
coming war-if war there should be-he-
tween Russia and Turkey, We are to re-
member that the sultan has now very
large army and thoroughly equipped.
When the armistice was declared, the
whole Turkish force under arms
amounted in actual numbers to some
300, 900 men, with 666 Krupp guns, and
Is, 900 cavalry. The full number which
can be called out, when& she enrolment is
complete, is 100000 men, with S72 guns,
and, in addition, some 10000 Gap
tick, :" OF veterans, and 20, 900 Circassian
cavalry, the best light armed maraudlng
cavalry in the world.
The heavy Russian cavalry, it should
be borne in mind, are almost useless III
the muddy plains of the Danube and the
wild passes of the Balkans. The Turk
ish infantry are, to large degree,
armed with improved guns. Then, oil
the fortified places, whose Importance
has so often been tested in previous wars,
are put in better condition. The Dan
ube itself makes formidable line OF de-
fense; then behind it come places like
Silistria, Shumla, Varna, and others
Shumla is vast fortified camp. Varna
must be taken before any army would
venture to cross the Balkans and march
on Adrianople. 1t would continually
threaten the flank and rear of the invad-
ing forces. But Varna is on the sea, and
any power holding the sea could make it
impregnable. The. passes Of the Bal
kans, though not more than from a, 600
to 5000 feet high, are yet easily capable
of obstinate defense, and would be ex-
ceedingly difficult to occupy, unless the
invading army had fleet to defend its
flank and furnish supplies. The Turks
would no doubt contest these mountains
with the utmost tenacity, and they would
form q second and powerful line of de-
fense. 1t is at least five hundred miles
from the Danube to Constantinople, and
the Russians have probably no fleet in
the Black sea to support their invading
columns. 1t will be seen that the taking
of Constantinople, even were Turkey
without allies, would be difficult task,
and with England for supporter, would
be impossible. Then, oil recent history
shows that the Russian management of
campaigns is exceedingly blundering, SO
that the war would probably be protract-
ed by the mistakes of the more powerful
combatant. A Russo-Turkish war will
certainly not be short one.