, 1877-02-24

good roads, any Of which are fit TO sustain the
march OF armies, nor Is the Russian OrganiZa.
ton fr commis,ariat purposes TO be compared
with that Of The Germans for efficiency. We
may estimate the capabilities Of their Organi.
za'i0n by the speed Of mohiliz ttion, and we
see that the prophecy We vrntured upon some
weeks ago is in process Of ful6lmrnt. for, in
spite OF all eff ,rts, the Russian Army is not
yet in a state to take the i-ld. SJmejhing
more than a clever Minister of War is required
to reOrganlZe the forces of a nation, and the
habits Of centuries cannot be eradlcAted in a
few years. Want Of education will for a long
time tn come hamper tho efficiency Of the
armies Of the Gear. Though Bulgaria is not
50 marShy near the D4nub3 a. Il JuMdnia, nor
are the streams running lowe from tha Balkan
to the great river 50 generally boriersd, by
moraSse+, lateral communication for lar5s
bodies Of troops is almost equally diff cult by
reason Of The steep and rocky rAvines through
which most OF the minor rivers Inv. Inc
CLIMATE is subject to extreme changes Of
temperaIure-hot by day, and cold at night
and an army would doubtless snd'r
in health, especially those portions of it
which have :he task of b4Sieging or
observing the f0rtreSses. Thus tbs EIsSianS
would find B llgaril n, Land Of Promise, and,
whatever nigga have been MS original inten-
tin OF Tie CIV, he could not leave III hostile
Turkish Army to gather Strrpgih h, to Cnnosn-
tra1e where il wIui !, an to- clooSp It's own
Time and place for the attack. H. would be
Necessary to bring matters to Il decisive issue,
and for that purpOs3 the Blikan4 mast be
Cross ID or turutd. 10 turn this m)untdin
chain would ba to expose the flank of the
Russian Army and lMe whole line OF conmuui
cations to an enemy which would always have
a Secure bass on The sea 90 long as such places
as Varn4 We're mo- taken, while to cross the
Balkans would be open % the same objection,
in addition to the inherent difficulty Of the
task. All considerations point to The same
conclusion. The war could not BE- brought
to a successful issue without taking or masking
the chief fortresseS aud thoroughly beating the
Turkish Armies in The Fl lid. If it be true that
less than 200 ,OC0 are a. yet ready to march
from BeSSarabia, with a reserve, in course OF slow
formation, amounting to $4,000, We cannot
believe that Russia is ready for thu task, nor
could the war be brought to a close in one
campaign if the Turks have any good military
advisers.
Besides the road Belgrade Sophia CONSTANT
nOPle, which turns the Balkan and is guarded
by Sophia, and later on by forts between
Tdtar BazArdjik and Iohtimam, there are seven
principal passes which directly cross the chain
Of mountains. First, by the coast line, diff
cult for guns and probably ilupracticable for
an enemy superior at sea, Second, from Var
ma to Burgos and Aides. Third, The Pass of
Nadir Derbtnd, from Pravady to Aides Ivy two
roads, both Of which are very difficult. Fourth,
the Shumla Pass, which is very important,
because Shumla is a grnat focus OF roads, and
strongly fortid ID. Two roads approach this
pass, tut both unite 1T T,haiikavik, when tne
road over the pass leads to ID pbroll, through
deep and PERCEPTIONS ravi1rs. 10 the west Of
this line, but TOO near the Shumla garrison to
he safe for an enemy, there is a road over the
mountains from OSman Btzlr to Klrnabad.
Fifth, there is the Pass of .nir Kapu, or
" Iron Gate, " leading from Tirnova to Sliv-
no. Sixth, the S6ipka Pass, from TirnoYa, by
G4brova 10 Kezaulik. Seventh, a very diff
cult pass from Lnvafz. by the valley Of Os-
man, 20 Tatar b zrj.k in the Valley Of tho
Martha. All Of IN 80 passes run through mar
row Valleys. almost Gu lSmS, ware a few earth.
works would dsIay the march of AZ \ nv for Il
long time. Nov, HE twD towns of Shumla
and TirnOva practically Command all thes3
passes. except these close 10 the sea, and IL
can hardly be supposed that the latter wouli
be selected. A railway runs from Varna, past
ShUmla, to Rustehuk, on The Danube, and
would greatly facilitate supplies for the Turks.
All conditions are 10 favour Of the defence for
a considerable time. If we grant that the
Turks find good leaders either at home or
abroad. the Gear would not have occasion to