Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1877-11-09
LoNGsTRBET, ON GETTYSBURG.

DISASTROUS AoSh OAAS OANDIA' " $500
CIRCUMSTANCES PICKETT'S VIRGINIA
DIVISION MADE THE GRAND CHARGE.
&C, &C., "o'
A very full and lengthy paper from LIT.
Gen. Longstreet, on the battle OF Gettys.
burg. appears in the Philadelphia Stiffness
There are many points iii it absolutely new.
The battle was brought on. he thinks, nfsC
by the absence of the Confederate CO., airy.
which caused Lee to ''moye into Pennsyl-
yania as one walking into tie dark" and
second by Lees confidence that his men
could Garry anything before them no mat
ter What the odds. He says:
Lee seems to have been carried away by
overcunfidence in the prowess OF his troops
and to have believer that they could 0n
ANYTHING. 1.-The enemy is there, lie said,
in reply to a remonstlance against the as
slult ON Cemetery Ridge, land mean to
strike him"
On the morning of the 1st General Lee
and myself left his headquarters together,
and had ridden three OF four miles when
we heard heavy firing along HIS front.
The firing became 50 heavy that Gen. Lee
lett me and hurried forward to see what IL
meant. After attending to some details OF
my march followed. The firing proceed
ed from the engagement between our ad-
vance and Reynolds corps, in which the
federals were repulSed. This rencOntre was
totally unexpected on both sides.
When | overlook Gen Lee at 5 O'Clock
that afternoon he said, to my surprise, that
he thought of attacking General Meade
upon the heights the next day. General
Lee was impressed with the fact that by
attacking the federals he could whip them
in detail reminded him that if the fed
erals were there in the morning 1T would
be proof that they had their forces we'll IN
hald. and that with Pickett III Chambers
burg. and Stuart out OF reach, we should
he some hat in detail He, however, did
not seem to abandon the idea of attack on
the next day. He seemed undera subdued
excitement which occasionally took pos
session OF him when 1.-THE hunt was up,
and threatened his superb equipoise. The
Sharp battle fought by Hill and EWell on
that day had given him L taste OF victory.
On the morning of the I'd | went to Gen.
Lees headquarters at daylight and renew
ed my views against making an atta s.h
He seemed resolved, however, and we dis
cussed the probable results. We observed
the position of the federals and got gen.
eral idea of the nature OF the ground.
About sunrise Gen. Lee sent Col. Venable,
of his staff, to Gen. Ewell's headquarters,
ordering him to make reconnaissance OF
the ground in his front, with !. view Of
making the main attack on his left. A
short time afterward he followed Col
Venable in person. He returned at about
8 clock and informed me that it would
not do to have Ewell open the attack,
He finally determined that | should make
the main attack on the extreme right. 1t
was fully II O'Clock when Gen. Lee arrlv-
ed at this conclusion and ordered the
movement In the meantime, by Gen.
Lees authority, Laws brigade, Which had
been put upon picket duty, was ordered 20
rejoin my command, and upon my SuggeS-
ton that it would be better to await its ar
rival Gen. Lee assented. We waited about
forty minutes for these troops and then
moved forward. A delay of several hours
occurred in the march of the troops. The
cause of this delay was that we had been
ordered by General Lee to proceed eau
tiously upon the forward movement so as
to avoid being seen by the enemy. Gener-
al Lee ordered Colonel Johnston, OF his en-
gineer corps, to lead and conduct the head
of the column. My troops tn erefOre NOV
ed forward under the guidance of a special
officer of General Lee, and with lnstruc-
tions to follow his directions. l left Gen
eral Lee Only after the line had stretched
out on the march AND rode along with
Hoods division, which was in the rear
The march was necessarily slow. the con-
ductor frequently encounterlng points That
exposed the troops to the view OF the Sig
nal station on Round Top. At length the
column halted. After waiting sometime,
supposing that it would soon move for
o,.J I to tho front tn 1nnnlrA tlA
cause of the delay. 1t was reported that
the column was awaiting the movements
of Colonel Johnston, who was trying to
lead it by some route by which it could
pursue its march without falling under
view of the federal signal station. Look
ing up TOWARD Bound Top I saw that the
signal station was in full view, and, as we
could plainly see this station, it Was appar-
ent that our heavy columns were seen from
their position and that further efforts to
conceal ourselves would be a waste OF time.
THE ASSAULT ON THE SECOND.
Of the assault made on the End Of July
by his corps, Gen. Longstreet says it was
made against force Of six to one. He
says;
Ny two divisions at that time were cut
down to eight or nine thousand men, four
thousand having been killed or wounded.
We felt at every step the heavy stroke OF
fresh troops-the sturdy regular blow that
tells soldier instantly that he has en-
countered reserves of reinfOrcementS. We
received no support at all, and there was
no evidence of cooperation on any side.
To urge my men forward under these cir
culnstances would have been madness, and
! withdrew them in good order to the
PEACH ORCHARD that we hafs taken from the
federais early in the'afternoon. 1t may De
mentioned here as illustl alive OF the daunt-
less spirit of these men that when General
Humphreys, of Mississippi, was ordered to
withdraw his troops from the charge he
thought there was some mistake. and re-
tired to captured battery near the sWale
between the two ridges, where he halted,
and when ordered to retire to the new line
a second time he did so under protest.
Cur p2en had no thought of retl eat. They
broke every line they enconnt cred. When
the order to withdraw Was gixEn 2 2oHr1er
was sent to Gen. Lee informing him OF the
result OF the days work.
A MARVELLOUS ASSAULT.
Before pursuing this narrative further, l
shall say word CIR two concerning this as
sault. 7 am satisfied that my force, num-
beTing Hardly la.09Q plen, encountered dur
ing that three and a half hDnrs of bloody
work not less than 65,O0Q Of the feaerais,
and yet their charge was not checked nor
their line broken until we ordered them
to withdraw. [ fol. nd that night that a.
529 of my men. more than 0ne-tMrd OF
the total lumber, had been left on the field
History records no parallel 70 the fight
made by these two divisions on the End OF
July at Gettysburg.
GEuERAL LEES DIFFERENTIATION.
I did not see Gen. Lee that night. On
the next morning he came to see me, and
fearing that he was still in his disposition
to attack, tried to anticipate him by say
ing General, have had my scouts out
ali night, and 1 find that you still have an
excellent opportunity to move around to
the right Of Me .deis army and maneuvre
him into attacking u.s., He replied, point