The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1877-10-21

numerical strength of the Army of Northern
Virginia, on this occasion, was greater than
statement Of the strength of that army, taken
from the official returns now on file in Wash
|ington, will show:
Confederate Federal;
Frederic sbuIg, 1862 ..---...... 70 coo Ilo0C U0
iis SSS
wilderness, 1854. 63.95i Hl,l6O
It has been said that the morutsof nn army
rect the Army of Northern Virginia was never
stronger than on entering Psnnsylvania, and
II am perfectly satisfied in my own mind, that
this fact entered very largely in determining
General Lee to make the attack on the 81 OF
July, at Gettysburg for there was not an OFF,
Ger or soldier in the Army of Northern Virgin
ia from General Lee to the drummer boy who
did not believe, when We invaded Pepnsylva-
MIA in 1868, that it was able to drive the Fed
eral army into the Atlantic Ocean. Not that
the fighting capacity of it's great adversary
was nnder estimated, but possibly the Army
of Northern Virginia had an over-weenlhg
opinion of it's own prowess.
just here let US take a Retrospective view,
and consider what the Army of Northern
Virginia had in one year accomplished. In
1862, eighty thousand strong, it attacked the
Federal army, one hundred ana fifteen thous and
strong, and after seven days fighting drove that
army to shelter under its gunboats. Following
up this success, after series of engagem Q ITS,
Pope was driven across the Potomac. Then
follow ed the battle of Sharpsburg (Antietam)
Wl6n possibly inc uRuLlnR Cap6Clby Vi VIC
Army of Northern Virginia never shone
brighter. Its numbers reduced by fighting,
Fatigue, and hard marching to less than forty
Thousand strong, it gained drawn battle
AGAINST it's adversary, who numbered nearly,
"a not quite one hundred thousand men. Then
came fredericksburg, where, with it's ranks
|recuperated to seventy-eight Thousand, 1T
Ehurled across the Rsppahannock river an ad-
Eversary who had crossed with one hundred
Eand ten Thousand men. Then follows that
most daring and wonderful battle, Chanoel-
|lorsville, where it again triumphed, fifty
Thousand strong, against its adversary, num-
bering one hundred and thirty-two thousand,
compelling him again to seek shelter behind
the Rappahannock. After such series of
succeese with such disparity of Members, is
L it wonderful that the Army of Northern Vir-
/ GINA and it's great leader should have be-
|lieved it capable of accomplishing any thing
Hin the power of an army to accomplish
H -sa says sit was o mistake to invade the
Northern States at ALL" and then gives very
clearly and conoisely his reasons for entertain
stantiating this view shall answer hereafter.
b think from IS standpoint, and especi-
ally looking at the sequel of the invasion of
zPennsy lvania in 1868. he is correct, and have
/ no don bit that by tar the greater number of
Historians who may follow him will entertain
like opinions. IL is, possibly, very natural
1 for myself and other officers who served in the
sArmy of Northern Virginia to permit our
Judgments to be biased by the opinions of one
Thom we loved, admired and trusted in, as
puch as we die, in any opinion entertained by
: D
Lees views in regard to the invasion OF Pen.
sylvania, as given by him to me and to an
bther A short time before General Grant
crossed the Rapidau, il the spring of 1864.
fortunately l cannot would again cross the
Potomac and invade Pennsylvania. l believe
i to be our true policy notwithstanding the
knemy's country breaks up AN of his precon-
beived plans, relieves country of his
presence, and we subsist while there on his re-
Sources. The question of food for this army
gives me more trouble and uneasiness than
Frery thing else combined; the absence of the
army from Virginia gives our people an OPP
portunity to collect supplies ahead. The leg
innate fruits of victory, if gained in
Pennsylvania, could be more readily reaped
Than on our own soil We would have been
10 few days. march of Philadelphia, and the
occupation of that CITY would have given US
9eace." It is very difficult for any one not
connected with the Army of Northern Virginia
realize how straitened we were for supplies
all kinds, especially food. The ration of q
eneral officer double that of private,
pd so meagre was that double supply that
fequently to appease my hunger l robbed my
Prise of handful of corn, which, parched in
pc fire, served to allay the cravings of nature.
nat must have been the condition of the
Srivate3
After the battle of Gettysburg the President
n the Confederate States, desiring to commu-
icate with General Lee, sent Major Seldom, a
brother of the Secretary of War, to General
bees headquarters, when the following con-
4oGbblIOu LOOK place. NeueE8l 1e0 bBIu, ma
Seldom, from what you have observed, are
pc people as much depressed at the battle of
gettysburg as the newspapers appear to indi-
ateP Upon Major seddone reply that he
bought they were, General Lee continued
/ To show you how little value is to be at.
Rched to popular sentiment in such matters,
beg to call your attention to the popular
eeling after the battles of Fredericksburg and
Ghancellorsville. At fredericksburg we gain
battle, infictng very severe loss on the
Enemy in men and material our people were
Greatly elated-I was much depressed. We
lad really accomplished nothing we had not
eained foot of ground, and knew the
nemy could easily replace the men he had
ost, and the loss of material was, if any thing
ather beneficial to him, as it gave an op:
lortunity to contractors to make money. At
hancellorsville we gained another victory
pr people were wild with deIight-I, on the
Rntrsry, was more depressed than after
fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and
gain we had gained not an inch of ground
ID the enemy could not be pursued. After
e battle of Chancellorsville matters stood
us: Hooker in my front, with an army more
Rn hundred thousand strong Foster pre-
ring to advance into North Carolina Dix
eparing to advance on Richmond from
prtress Monroe; Tyler in the Kanawha Val