The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30

once the great opportunity furnished
him, and determined to avail him
self OF 1t, by striking while Meade was
hurrying up his troops and before oil
could arrive and be put in position. l
believe ell now agree that the fullest
success would have attended the effort
II the blow had been struck In the
morning or forenoon Of the I'd, as it
should have been, and as Was Gen. Lee 3
purpose.
II there had before remained any
doubt as to who was responsible for the
failure to strike the blow at the proper
time, the very clear and explicit state.
ment by Gen. Hood, which is q most
valuable contribution to the history Of
the bat tie, would settle that doubt be-
You'd dispute, think.
Gen. Hoods statement furnishes In
formation not before given, in regard to
the time OF the arrival on the ground OF
Longstreet's troops, and renders 1t very
certain that the orders for the attack to
begin were given very early In the
morning, ii not the night before. 1t is
to be remarked that no member Of Gen.
Lees staff can tell when those orders
were given, and what was their precise
character. It Is very manifest that they
were given in person, and orally, as
WdS Olt6u oGUs LIS . DIHCtlCe.
The objection which Gen. Hood made
In regard to attacking up the Emmetts-
burg road would not have existed in the
morning or forenoon, because the Round
Tops were not then occupied, and it was
the delay in the attack that produced
the difficulty he mentions.
The statement Of General Chen
ColoneD Alexander, that the duty and
responsibility Of ordering Pickett's
Division to begin the charge on the 81
was devolved on him by the corps COM
mander, Is one calculated to excite pro-
found, II not painful, attention and in
terest.
/ may add In connection with my pre-
vious remarks in regard to the want OF
decisive results from q mere capture OF
the heights Of Gettysburg, that II we
had gained them, and Meade had at
tackled US and been repulsed, or IL we
had moved to our right to threaten his
communications and he had attacked
us, and then been repulsed, such repulse
would also have been barren of benefi-
cial results, unless 1t had insured the
destruction or demon aliZation Of his ar
my. The same considerations apply to
both cases.
have never thought that our failure at
Gettysburg was due to the absence OF
Stuart's cavalry, though can we'll un-
derstand the perplexity and annoyance
1t caused Gen. Lee before the enemy
was found. He was found, how
ever, without the aid OF cavalry, and
when found, though by accident, he
furnished us the opportunity to strike
him fatal blow. When Hooker was
crossing the Potomac at Edwards Fer
ry, 1t was simply impossible for Stuart
to cross that stream between that point
and Harper's Ferry, as Hooker was
keeping up his communications with
that place, and the interval was narrow.
Stuart's only alternatives, therefore,
were to cross west of the Blue Ridge, at
Shepherdstown or Williamsport, or east
Of Hooker's Crossing. He selected the
latter, in accordance with discretion
given him and 1t Is doubtful whether
the former would have enabled him to
fulfill Gen. Lees expectations, as
Hooker Immediately threw one corps to
Knoxville, on the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad, short distance below Har-
per's Ferry, and three to Middletown.
in the Catoctin Valley, while the passes
OF the South Mountain were seized and
guarded, and Buford's division of cav
airy moved on that flank. 1t is diff
cult, therefore, to perceive Of what
more avail in ascertaining and re-
porting the movements Of the Fed
eral army Stuart's cavalry could have
been IL 1t had moved on the west Of
employed for that purpose, while it is
very certain that his movement on the
other flank greatly perplexed and be-
wildered the Federal commanders, and
compelled them to move slower. It is
not improbable, however, that it would
have been better for him to hurry on,
and not NEEDLE with the wagon train
he captured-but, then, the temptation
was so great to poor Confederate.
will now notice a statement Col.
Taylor has made in reference to the
conference Gen. Lee had with Ewell,
Rodes and myself at the close of the
1st day Of July. In his memorandum
the Colonel says:
"Later Gen. Lee rode over to Gen.
Ewell's front, and conferred as to the
future movements. He wanted to fol-
low up the success gained thought that
with Johnson's division, then up, Gen.
Ewell could go forward at dawn neSt
day. Ewell, Early and Rodes thought
it best to await Longstreet's arrival,
and make the main attack on the enc
my's left. This was determined on.
1OhS5oUl Oou WOO OuCh bDoub lo~~ ~~AASD
off, with two Of his divisions
The statement about this conference
in the paper from the Philadelphia
Times is not entirely accurate; but l
will not notice that specially, as pro.
pose to give full, detailed account OF
the conference itself.
The statement in reference to 1t con-
tanned in the memorandum Is susceltl-
bic Of the construction that Gen. Lae
wanted to go forward at dawn the nelt
lay, though Longstreet should not b.
up, and that Ewell, Rodes and myself
opposed the proposition, and insisted
that we should await Longstreet's arri-
val. Yet Gen. Lee has shown, again
and again, especially in the extract from
MS report have alreadygive that his
purpose was to avoid a general engage
ment until his army was concentrated.
Col. Taylor is under serious misappre-
nension as to that conference, and as I
Am the only surviving person who was
present at it, no one else being there
but Gems: Lee, Ewell, Rodes and my
self, l will state what occurred. I had
ridden to see about the condition Of