The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1877-11-22


ridge discovered that they were suffer
ing terribly from fire that swept over
their right and left flanks. | also found
that my left flank was not protected by
the brigades that were to move en- cchcion
with it. McLaws line was consequently
spread out to the left to protect its flank,
and Hoods line was extended to the right
to protect its flank from the sweeping fire
of the large bodies of troops that were
posted on Round Top. These two move
ments of extension sc drew nv forces out
that found myself attacking Cemetery
Hill with single line of battle against
not less than $4,000 Troops.
My two divisions at that time were cut
down to eight or nine thousand men, four
thousand having been killed o. .r0,.ndcd
We felt at every step the heavy stroke of
fresh troops-the rturdy, regular blow
that tells u soldier Instantly that ho has
encountered reserves or renf0rcemcnts
We received no support ut all, and there
was no evidence of cooperation on any
side. To urge my men forward under
these circumstances would have bceu
madness, and | withdrew them in good
order to the peach orchard that we had
taken from the Fcdcrals early in the
afternoon. 1t may he mentioned here as
illustrative of the dauntlcss spirit of these
men that when Gen. Humphreys, of
Mississippi, WAS ordered to Withdraw his
troops from the charge he thought there
was some mistake, and retired to cap
turcd battery near the swalc between the
two ridges, where he halted, and when
ordered to retire to the new line second
time he did so under protest. Our men
had no thought Of retreat. They broke
every line they encountered When the
order to withdraw was given n courier
was sent To Gen. Lee informing him of
the result Of the days work.
A MARVELLOUS ASSAULT.
Before pursuing this narrative further,
shall say Il word or two concerning this
assault | am satisfied that my force,
numbering hardly 10000 men, cncoun-
tered during that three and IL half hours
of bloody work not less than 65 900 Of
the Fcdcrals, and yet their charge was
not checked nor their line broken until
we ordered them to withdraw. found
that night that 1929 OF my men, more
than one third Of their total number, had
been left on the field. History records
no parallel to the fight by these two di-
visions on the 2nd of July at Gettysburg.
EwELI's INACrION.
1t may be imagined that | was aston
ishcd at the fact that we received no sup
port after we had driven the Fcdcrals
from the peach orchard and 900 Yards
beyond. II Gen. Ewell had engaged the
army in his front mt that time (sav 4
o'clock he would have prevented their
massing their whole army in NV front.
and while he and kept their two winrs
engaged Hill would have found their
centre weak, and should have threatened
1t while / broke through their left and
dislodged them. Having failed To move
at 4 o'clock while the enemy was in his
front, It WAS still moro surprising that he
did not advance Mt 5 O'Clock with yiror
and prOmptncss when the trenches in
front of him were vacated, or rather
held by one single brigade, las Gen
hlcade's testimony before the committee
on the conduct of the war states.) Had
he taken these trenches and scattered the
brigade that held them he wo ID have
found himself in The Fcdcrals' flank and
rear. His attack in the rear must have
dlslodged the Federals, as it would have
been totally unexpected! j: bc;ir be-
licved that he was in front with me.
Hill charging unon the centre mt the
same time would have Increased their
disorder, and we should have won the
field.
GEN. LEES DIFFERENTIATION.
did not see Gen. ee that night. On
the next morning he came to see me, and
fearing that he was still in his disposition
to attack, | tried to anticipate him by
saying: General, ! have had my scouts
out all night. and l find that you still
have an exc 'lcnt opportunity to move
around to the right of Meade's army and
mannuvrc him into attacking u.s." lie
replied, pointing with his fist ut Gene
terry Hill: "Thc enemy is there, and /
am going to strike him." ] felt then
that it WAS my duty to express my con-
victions. said: General, | have been
n soldier NIL my life. have been with
soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by
squads, companies, regiments, divisions
and armies, and should know as we'll as
any one what soldiers can do. 1t is my
opinion that no fifteen thousand men
ever arraycd for battle can take that 20
sition," pointing to Cemetery Hill. Gen.
Lee, in reply to this, ordered me to pre-.
pare Pickett's division for the attack. ]
should not have been so urgent had not
forescen the hopelessncss of the proposed
assault. felt that l must say n word
against the sacrifice Of my men, and
then l felt that my record was such that
Gen. Lee would or could not misc0nstrue
my motives. | said no more, however,
but turned away. The most of the morn
ing WAS consumed in waiting for Picketts
!! me:: aid getting into position. The plan
of assault was rs follows: Our artillery
was to be m,,ssed in n wood from which
Pickett was to charge, and it was 20 pour
continuous fire upon the Cemetery.
Under cover Of this fire and supported
by it Pickett was to charge.
Our artillery WAS in charge of General
+. +. Alexander, brave and gifted Off
Ger. had instructed Gen. Alexander
being unwilling to trust myself with the
entire responsibility, ~ carefully observe
the effect of the fire upon the enemy
and when it began to tell to notify Pick
EFT to begin the assault.
PIcKETr's CHARGE.
The cannonading which opened along
both lines was grand. In n few moments
a courier brought note to Gen. Pickett
! whc Haa standing near me, from Alexan-
| der, which, after reading, he handed tc
me. 1t was rs follows: "If you are com
| ing ut all you must come ut once, or
| can't give you proper support; but the
enemy's fire has not slackencd at all al
| least eighteen guns are still firing from
the cemetery itself"
After had read the note Pickett said
to me: General, shall advnnce?" My
feelings had so overcome Inc that would
not aneak for fear of betrnyinp nv want