The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1877-05-11
Ru.sia.s Advance In Asia.

At two points In Europe the poiicy OF
England is in suspense. In the House OF
Commons it is sought to penetrate and ex-
pose the possible purpose of the govern
ment-to preclude an active cooperation
with the Ottoman forces in any contingency
whatever-for the reason that first, England's
interests are not endangered by Russias
successes, and, second, that England has no
interests in the East that even if endangered
are worth saving at the expense OF the
shame and discredit of further support Of
the Ottoman Empire.
In Armenia the British policy is involved
in way that bids fair to test very practi-
cally within short time the explicit state
ment of government functionary in the
House Of Commons that England would
defend her own interests" Absolute fidelity
to the spirit of that declaration would make
England an immediate party to the war;
but reasonable fidelity to the letter bids
fair to require her participation even earlier
than the government, if relieved OF
the opposition, would care to venture.
There are by the way, some difficulties in
volved in the specific points of that state
ment which would be the clearer, perhaps, for
an official explanation. It is said that Eng
land will protect the Suez Canal and guard
Egypt. Egypt, it should be remembered, isa
party to the wm. That country is not only
regarded by the Sultan as q part Of his
Empire, but it has troops in his army now
in the field against the Russians, and
it promises financial support to his
cause. It is, therefore, a belligerent Power,
and any act of war that Russia may be able
to do in Egypt will be covered by its rights
as belligerent. It is contingency for
from impossible that Russia may be able to
blockade the port at the mouth of the Suez
Canal, and as the canal has not been neu-
tralized by any international compact an
interference on the part of England with
such blockade would be an act of war.
Danger to Egypt and the Suez Canal is,
however, not 80 immediate. as the danger to
some other parts of Englands interests. 1t
may be q sign of the temper Of the govern
ment that it declares very loudly what it
will do when those interests are in danger
that are not now menaced, but says not
word of those in actual peril. Did the gov
eminent not know Of the great Russian
preparations in the Caucasus and of the
threatening movement into Armenia that
has already made such progress that the fall
of Kars is imminent? Assuredly the English
government was fully acquainted with the
details Of that STORY and must have given it
no less attention than has been given to
the Danube campaign. On the Danube
oil is at least as quiet as it was in
some great days we remember on the
Potomac. But if the quietude on the Poto-
mac was as disappointing ct one time to IN
impatient public on this side the water as
the tardy movements in Bulgaria are to peo-
pie in Europe, perhaps there was never q
more palpitating interest felt in the famous
march to the sea than is felt to-day
in England in the possibilities of the
Russian march from the Caucasus into
Armenia.
1t is only twenty days since the DECLARE
ton Of war, and already the Russians, in
overwhelming force are face to face with
the Ottoman army to which has been in
trusted the defence Of that mountain land
whose possession by the Northern Power
will threaten the Turk in every part of Asia
Miner With Russian column at Bajazid,
another at Ardahan and third in front Of
Kars, and with light force on the TANKS of
the force at Arabian sweeping the country
as far as the neighborhood of Batoum, it will
be seen that the Russian front stretches
from the Black Sea to the Persian frontier,
and that every line of advance is utilized for
the movement of this invading horde. Only
the middle column can be resisted. On this
line is Kars, and some twenty-five miles
west Of Kars is the army under Mukhtar
Pacha, in position that it is to be supposed
is capable Of defence, since this commander
expresses confidently the opinion that the
Russians can be successfully resisted there.
Apparently the Russian commander has
force enough not to be stopped in his
advance at Kars, but is able to
leave o force there and move on to
assail the Ottoman lines on the road
to Erzeroum. The approach to this posi-
ton is through gap in the mountains, and
if the Russians had no other means of
operation against it than by direct assault
the Turkish commanders confidence in his
power to hold it might not be misplaced.
But from the position at Abraham, as well as
from Bajazid, good roads lead to Erzeroum
in his rear, and unless he has force enough
to defend both these approaches his only
hope of saving his army from dispersion or
capture lies in timely retreat to Erzeroum.
Even n victory over the Russian force ap-
preaching his front would be of little adj
vantage to him; for if it were decisive
enough to endanger the investment of Kars
the other columns could be concentrated
before advantage could be taken of the
victory. while # it were indeci-