The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-05-26
AFTER GETTYSBURG.
The Direct Assault On an snfFenehea
Position Never successful.
M. tt,n lu1a

The Direct Assault On an snffenfhea
Position Never successful.
ECol. James G. Biddle, in the Philadelphla Weekly
Times.l
It mad been Gen. ffesde ) intention to
order q general advance from our left
after the close of the action, but owing
to the lateness OF the hour and the
wearied condition of the army, with o
''wisdom that did guide his valor to act
in safety" he abandoned the movement
he had contemplated. Tor this he has
been severely ceEsured. Gen. Howard,
in an article in the atlantic Monthly OF
July last, says:
posuEe of Gen. Meade's headquarters,
where SO much havoc was occasioned by
the enemy's artillery, had SO impressed
him that he did not at first realize the
victory he had won." The reverse OF
this ia true. Gen. Meade was not in the
least "demoraIizeds' by the enemy's
fire. but realized fully the exact condi-
ton of affairs. Lee had been repulsed,
not routed, and il Meade had yielded to
his own inclination to attack, he would
have been repulsed himself. and would
thus have thrown away the fruits OF his
great victory. Thatthis view Is correct,
Is proved beyond all doubt by the fol-
lowing DhEBHE6 NIL. w SWsh
toms "History of the Army OF the Poto-
mac" Mr.. Swinton says:
I have become convinced from the
testimony of Gen. Longstreet himself
that attack would have resulted disas-
trously. 81 had" said that officer to
the writer, "Hood and McLaws, who
had not been engaged: had heavy
force of artillery; I should have liked
nothing better than to have been
attacked. and have no doubt that L
should have given those who tried as
bad reception as Pickett received"
On July 4, Lee, during heavy storm.
withdrew from our front, and on the
18th he took up O. position at Williams
port, on the Potomac. He was closely
followed by Meade, who came up with
him on the 18th, and who found him in
q position naturally almost impregna-
BILE and strongly fortified. Meade's i'm
pulse was TO attack at once, but, after
consultation with his corps command
ers, he abstained from ordering an as
sault until he could more fully recon-
noitre the enemy's position. On the
morning of the 14th reconnaissance
in force. supported by the whole
army, was made at daylight, but on
the night Of the 1ath Lee had recrossed
the Potomac. There was great
deal of clamor at the time because
Meade did not destroy or capture Lees
army at Williarnsport, but Meade. con-
scious that he had acted wisely, always
felt that history would do him justice.
Had he assaulted he would certainly
have been defeated, and the result
would have been disastrous not only to
the army but to the country, for defeat
to our army there would have opened the
road to Washington and the North, and
all the fruits of Gettysburg would
have been dissipated. A brief refer
ence to the subsequent experience OF
the Army Of the Potomac will confirm
the truth OF this assertion. In May,
1864, we began the campaign with
one hundred and fifteen thousand
men, and after Spottsylvania Court
house were constantly receiving heavy
reinforcements. Gen. Lee had about
sixty thousand men. And yet with this
great preponderance of strength, we
assaulted the enemy again and again 10
positions not so strong as the one held
at Williamsport, always without sue
cess and with terrible loss. From the
crossing of the Rapidan on May 5, to
the unsuccessful assault on the enemy's
works at Petersburg, June 10, period
Of Abort six weeks, the Army OF the
Potomac lost not less than seventy
thousand men! In the battles between
the Army of the Potomac and the Army
of Northern Virginia, in no case was q
direct assault upon an intrenched posi-
ton successful.