New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1877-12-11
TILE ELL OF PLETNA.

Russia wins q great victory. The last grand
act in the operations against Plevna closes with
the surrender Of Osman Pasha. Last June, no
one deemed it probable that the great conflict
would hinge upon the possession OF 1T
tie town near the Vid unknown in mil
itary annals, and almost without garrison.
But the Russians by sending an inadequate
force against it, committed two blundeIs at
once; they made feeble attack where the
assault should have been decisive, and they
revealed to the enemy their plan OF opera
TONS Henceforth, in the eye OF the ottoman,
Plevna became place of vital importance, to
be held at any risk against the hated Musco-
vite. Osman Pasha at once dIscerned It's ca
pocity for defence. While the old generals re-
lied on stone walls, he acted on the conviction
that earthworks, defended by the breech-loader
and rihed gun, are practically impregnable.
The Russian assaults in July and Sep
TENDER proved the accuracy OF his pre-
vision. These unfortunate experiments cost
the Russians probably $4,000 men, and
certainly thwarted their plan OF campaign,
which contemplated the capture of Adrianople,
as a sequel to the capture of the Shpka Pass.
Learning from experience the Russians, for
regular siege operations. Reinforced by the
gallant Roumanans, they established line
of intreuchmcnts in face of the Ottoman de-
fences. Then crossing the Vid they carried
the Turkish positions on the Sophia, and soon
encirclcd Plevna in an iron grasp, as strong as
that which compelled the surrender of Metz
and Paris This done, the fall of Plevna was
only question of time.
1t is too soon to determine how far the OF
toman Commander has fallen short of his
duty Although the Russians praise his valor,
it is on record that he has acted throughout
on the defensive, if one feeble attack directed
against PalIshat be excepted. 1t is q military
axiom that commander who defends where
he might attack capitulates where he might
conquer He might have expected aid from
Western Bulgaria, but when he allowed the
Russians to occupy the roads to Sophia and
Widdin, he rendered it impracticable for an
army to fight its way to his relief, and at the
same time made his own escape impossible
This was not Todlebeus way at Sebastopol,
who prolonged q defence, which otherwise
must have been very brief.
The political and military results of the
great victory are immeasurable. 1t will reGs-
tablisb throughout Europe the respect for the
Russian arms, of which her bunders
in Bulgaria and Armenia had well
nigh deprived her. 1t will give a
renewed impulse to the demands of
tho Russian people for the extinction of the
Ottoman power, and awaken the slumberng
hopes of every Christian race under Turk
ISL rule 1t will cement still further
the Imperial alliance, and cause the deepest
anxiety among the governing classes in
Great Britain. Regarded from military
point of view, the Turkish disaster is al
most irrcparable. 1t deprives her of her
main army at q moment when the Russians
hold advanced posts at Shipka Pass and near
Sophia, whence they may swarm into Rou-
melia and complete the work begun nearly
two centuries ago, when Sobiesk rolled back
the tide of Turkish invasion.