The Manitowoc tribune. [volume] (Manitowoc, Wis.) 1866-1878, 1877-08-09
THE RUSSIAN REVERSES.

The disastrous defeat suffered by the
Russians before Plevna last week, It's
consequent encouragement of the Turks
aha encouragement of the invaders, will
have tendency to greatly prolong the
war; To fully understand the battle OF
Plevna and it's results it will be neces
sary to review the late movements of
both sides.
After the Russians succeeded so east
ly in throwing a pontoon across the
Danube and massing vast armies on the
south side of the river, 1T seemed ap-
parent from tho apathy of the Turks that
the war was half over. There was no
fighting worth speaking of. Nikopolis
was taken with small loss to either side,
and siege was laid to Rustchuk. The
important Quadrilateral contained the
great body CT the Turkish army in Bull
garia. Good military authority were of
opinion that it would be risky, if not
very unwise, for the Russians to attempt
a movement in force on the second line
of defenses, the Balkans, before fighting
O decisive battle between that line and
the Danube. But the tactics of the
Russian commander soon showed that 1t
was the intention to push forward with
vigor through central Bulgaria. After
a partial investment of R..Stchuk the
main body moved south along the road
from Sistova toward Tirnova, forty miles
distant, and midway between the Dan
ube and the Balkans. Gen. GhOurka s
brilliant dash across the Balkans ldcreas
ed the belief that the Turks were either
unprepared to meet an enemy or SO de-
moralized and badly differed that they
could offer no successful resistance to
the advancing Russians. These captur-
ed Tirnova and Biela, two important
strategic points. At Biela they threat
ened Rustchuk and Shumla and from
Tirnova they would be a constant menace
to Osnan- Bazaar, or could cross the Bal
kans by way of the Shipka pass. They
held possession of the entire line of the
Jantra river from the Danube to the
Balkans. Gen. Gourka's forces carried
terror into Roumelia and threatened
Philipopolis and Adrianople. Stretch
ing from the pontoon bridge at Sistova,
the Russians had line of communica-
ton about 100 miles long to guard. 1t
lay through the heart of hostile terri
tory and close to it lay garrisons Of fresh
troops varionsly estimated at from 10, :
900 to $50, 900 fighting men.
The Turkish apathy astonished every
body. 1t was the first case In the world s
History in which an enemy had been
allowed to carry things so far without
fighting battle. Recent developments
show that the Turks had well defined
plan of operations. BY hiding their
strength and apparently yielding they
allowed the Russians to take possession
of longer line than they could possibly
hold. 1t was apparent soon that they
meant to throw themselves in force on
| some point that would command Shipka
pass BY effecting break in the Rus
sian communications here the Russians
south of the Balkans could be cut off
and destroyed by the army under Sulel-
man Pasha. To this end Osman Pasha
concentrated his forces at Plevna. Me-
hemet Ali was doing the same at Osman
Razar Tirnova is about half way be-
tween these two points, and the evident
intention was to make combined move
on the Russian force there.
To prevent this plan from being sue
cessfully carried ont the Russians were
compelled to force the fighting. Forces
were hurried forward from Nikopolis
and Biela and Gen. Krudener made an
attack on Plevna. The fighting lasted
two days and the Russians met very
decided and costly repu,se. The Turk
isi position was very strong one and
they defended 1t with skill and courage.
The Russian regiments showed great
bravery under fire and demeaned them
selves as good soldiers.
1t is impossible even yet to correctly
estimate the losses. Turkish dispatches
place the Russian wounded at $4,000.
ipl,is is doubtless greatly ezaegepatad as
the attacking army did not exceed 60, 600.
The Bashi Bazouks are charged with
killing the wounded as soon as they got
possession of the field, but this Russian
tale may be taken with some allowance.
The defeat is serious but by no means
fatal. 1t will set the Russian operations
back for time, but they still hold the
line of the Jantra river. Late dispatch
es averring that the Gar is anxious or
| friendly intervention are not reliable.
His heart may not be very warm in this
war, but Russia cannot afford to quit
now, and she will not. The mobilization
| of the army goes on and the call for
nearly 200, 900 of the Landwehr shows
that greater vigor will be thrown into
the Bulgarian campaign to make up for
the recent reyerses.
|