The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1877-11-15
LoNesrREET ON GETTYSBURG.


The soul that trusted Him indeed.
LONGSTREET ON GETTYSBURG.
HIS VIEWS OF THE CAUSE OF THE CON-
FEDERATE FAILURE-ALLEGED CHANGE
OF PLANS, ETC.
The Philadelphia Weekly Times publishes.
an extensive paper by Gen. James Long
street, giving narrative OF General Lees
advance into Pennsylvania, from the incep-
ton of the movement to its disastrous close,
including an account of the battle OF Gcttys-
burg, with a review of the campaign. Gen.
Longstreet tells some things that have never
been told before, and reviews the operations
of 1868 from point of view that is in many
respects more advantageous than is possible
to any other man now living, since no man
now living was so prominently concerned in
them.
The point upon which General Lonstreet
mainly insists is that the campaign into
Pennsylvania, while offensive in strategy,
was intended to be purely defensive in tao
tics, the purpose being to choose a position
in Che enemy;s rear and compel him to at
tack. It was the abandonment of this poll
cy that. in his opinion, led to the fatal result
at Gettysburg, and this mistake he believes
to have been not matter Of deliberate judg-
ment, but ''the impulse of a great mind dis
turbed by unparalleled conditions" In
the absence of his cavalry Lee moved into
Pennsylvania as one walking into the dark,
and it was the report Of a scout that gave
him the first intimation of Meade's where
abouts and turned bin aside from his march
on Harrisburg The encounter Oh the LIST
of July Gen. Longstreet shows to have been
purely accidental, and it was then that he
believes Lee committed an error in not
either vigorously prosecuting the temporary
success, or else maneuvering so as to com
pei Meade to make the attack. When the
assault was made on the I'd it was by Long,
streets corps alone, whereas, if Hill
and Ewell had simultaneously advanced,
Meade might have been dslodged, But
that attack sufficiently showed that the Fed
eral position was then impregnable,- and
Picketts charge on the third day was a for
lorn hope that ought never to have been
made. These are only some Of the main
points brought forward in Gen. Longstreet's
paper, large portion Of which is occupied
with a defense OF himself against the accu-
sation Of hardness. After the battle Gen.
Lee said to his officers: sit is all my fault, ?"
an acknowledged characteristic of the man,
and which his subordinates have so far re-
spected as to lay the responsibility anywhere
but on him. Lee seems to have been carried
away by over confidence in the proves Of
his troops, and to have believed that they
could do anything. ''rhe enemy is there, -
he said, in reply to a remonstrance against
the assault on Cemetery Ridge, land mean
to strike him.
On the morning of the 1st General Lee
and myself left his headquarters together
and had ridden three or four miles, when we
heard heavy firing along Hills front. The
| firing became so heavy that General Lee
left me and hurried forward to see what 1t
meant. After attending.to some details Of
my march 1 followed. The firing proceeded
from an engagement between our advance
and Reynolds corps, in which the Federals
were repulsed. This rencontrc was totally
unexpected on both sides.
When overlook General Lee at O'Clock
that afternoon lie said, to my surprise, that
he thought of attacking General Meade upon
the heights the next day. General Lee was
impressed with the idea that by attacking
the Federals lie could whip them in detail.
I reminded him if the Federals were there
| in the morningsit would be proof that they
had their forces well in hand, and that with
| Pickett in Chambersburg, and Stuart out Of
reach, we should be somewhatin de tail. He.
| however, did not seem to abandon the idea
of attack on the next day. He seemed I'm.
der suodued excitement which occasional.
| ly took possession Of him when 1.-THE hunt
was up,'' and threatened his superb equi
poise. The sharp battle fought by Hill anG
Ewell on that day had given him a taste Of
| victory.
| THE PLAN OF ATTACK.
/! When left General Lee on the night O.
the 1st believed that he had made up hi;
! mind to attack, but was confident that he
had not vet determined as to when the at
| tack should be made. The assertion frs
made by Gen. Pendleton, and echoed by hi;
confederates, that l was ordered to make
the attack by sunrise is totally false. Gen,
Lee never in his life gave me orders to at
tack at a specific hour. He was perfectly
satisfied that when had my troops in posi-
ton and was ordered to attack, no time wa
lost. On the night OF the 1st l left hin
without any orders ut all. On the morning
of the I'd went to Gen. Lees headquarters
at daylight and renewed my views agains
making an attack. He seemed resolved
however, and we discussed the probable re
suits. We observed the position of the Fed
erals and got a general idea of the nature o
the ground. About sunrise Gen. Lee an,
sent Col. Vcnable. OF his staff, to Gen. Ew
ell's headquarters, ordering him to make
reconnaissance of the ground in his front
with view OF making the main attack OF
his left. A short time afterward he followe'
Col. Venable in person. He returned
about o'clock and informed me that
| would not do to have Ewell open the attack
~