The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30

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but the unselfishness Of his character
induced him to trust rather to time for
his vindication than to incur the risk Of
q discussion that might In the slightest
degree injure the cause In which he was
enlisted.
His subsequent career proved how
ready and prompt he was to respond to
all calls on his endurance or his courage.
His military record for the year 1862 Is
80 intimately identified with that of
Stonewall Jackson that one cannot exist
without the other.
The flight and pursuit of Banks down
the Valley, Gross Keys, Port Republic,
Gold Harbor, SlaCghter's Mountain, and
that most wonderful dash to Pope's rear
in August, 1862, would ell be shorn Of
half their proportions IL Ewell's name
was blotted from the record. jackson
never made demand upon his energy,
courage or skill that was not promptly
honored; and he was manned for life
in earnestly seconding his immortal
leader in that most brilliant of all his
achievements, the Devil iering display
Of grand tactics, between the armies of
Pope and Mcclellan, on the plains Of
Manassas In the last days OF August,
1862.
The green turf now covers all that was
mortal OF Jackson's chief lieutenant.
His voice is silent and his pen is still.
In departing he has left behind him no
sentence or word to wither q solitary
leaf OF the laurels won by any Of his
comrades. or to cause feather in the
cap Of one Of them to moult, and trust
will be pardoned for putting on record
my protest against the injustice done
the memory OF as true a soldier as ever
drew his sword In defense of a righteous
cause.
I freely exempt the gentlemen named
from all intentional injustice. and from
all imputation Of unkind motives in CIV
ing expression to their views. 1t Is this
very fact that renders it necessary to
vindicate Gen. Ewell against the i'm
plications and differences to be deduced
from their utterances.
now proceed to consider the ques-
ton In Its general aspect. The idea
upon which all the criticisms upon the
failure to take Cemetery Hill on the
afternoon Of the 1st are based, is the
assumption that the possession OF that
hill itself would have been Of material
advantage to us. We had already in
hicted upon the enemy very serious
loss, and the probability Is that II we had
pursued, and his troops were so demo-
rallied as to make no resistance at all,
we would have inflicted no further dam
age on him, but merely have sent his
flying corps further to the rear, to the
cover Of Meade's advancing columns.
It is not necessary for me to inform
experienced soldiers that an infantry
force In fighting trim cannot overtake q
flying one and 1t is well known that we
had no cavalry up at that time, except q
small regiment Of Jenkins cavalry and
Whites battalion which had been with
me, and which had to use in guarding
the prisoners and the trains. What we
wanted was not the possession of Gene
terry or Culp's Hill merely, buta decisive
victory and crushing defeat OF the en-
envy on the soil OF Pennsylvania. The
that afternoon might have made that
fight complete one and a victory for
US, but it would not have insured the
kind OF victory we wanted, for we would
have had to seek the enemy elsewhere
and fight him again.
II asked why it was that was myself
80 anxious to 20 on, my reply Is, that l
knew nothing Of the rest OF Meade's
army, but that 1t was moving north
that / took 1t for granted there
was an object in fgting there; and
that regarded it my duty to fight
the enemy when / met him, and CON
tinue to 90 80 until the victory was COM
plete,. or the orders of my superiors ar
rested me. II had known then all L
know now. probably I would have had
different view.
Meade had selected Pipe creek as the
position for his army to receive our at
tack, ana presume 1t was strong one,
as it was selected by the corps Of engi-
neers under his chief engineer, Warren.
Ii we had seized the hills at Gettys-
burg, Meade would not have attacked
us, but would have waited for us to at
tack him, as before stated; for that was
his manifest policy. We would have
had to reconnoitre his position before
going into action, and before we could
have got ready to attack him, our short
stock OF provisions would have been
We were compelled to get
our provisions from the country we
were in. Ewell's Corps was pretty we'll
supplied for a few days, my division
best of all, for which the town of York
is not yet done paying. We had pretty
we'll Cleaned the country through which
and Hill afterwards came,
and they were not SO we'll sup.
piled. The country around Gettysburg
for miles furnished no supplies Of con-
sequence, and the presence Of Meade's |
army in the vicinity, with its superior
cavalry force, would have rendered it
to send out foraging par
ties. Moreover, the country people |
would have been stimulated to resist
ance to our demands, which we had not |
met with at first, though many of them |
fed with their herds and focks before
US across the Susquehanna. The proba-
bility. therefore, is that before we got |
ready to fight Meade in his position |
when found, our army would have been |
the food necessary to sustain it,
and we would have been compelled to |
retreat without fighting another battle. |
10 sustain the horses and mules of the |
army alone, a very large amount of
forage was necessary, and that part of |
the country did not afford it.
The failure, therefore, to seize the |
heights on the afternoon of the 1st,
whoever may have been responsible for |
it, cannot be legitimately assigned as |
one Of the causes of our failure at Get |
tysburg. Their seizure may have pre-
vented the battle from taking place |
there, but if we had been compelled to |