Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1877-06-09
ENGLISH OPINION ON THE EAST
ERN WAR.
From the london world.

Time was when a great question
of foreign policy found England
/ united in face of threatened danger
Now those good old days are gone
and the painful spectacle is present
ed to Europe of national Interests
sacrificed to party strife. Yet, in The
midst of this division, certain
unity of opinion may be seen. Lib
erals and Conservatives alike seen
to have made up their minds thaf
| nobody but ourselves is to turn
the Turk out of ConstantinOple
Mr.. Gladstone and his following
would have us go there and turn
him out at once, coercing the Porte
and joining Russia in her crusade
against Islam. The Cabinet is oi
opinion that we should remain neu-
trail till our interests are in danger,
and then protect those interests. II
considers that a Russian advance
upon ConstantinOple would endang-
er our interests, and would call for
action on our part; and this policy
is supported by a large majority, not
only in Parliament, but also in the
lfplntry. we may assume the most
important questions now before US
| to be: AT what point do our inter-
ests commence to be in danger and,
when that point is reached, what
action should we take?
Putting on one side our interests
in Asiatic Turkey, which it is now
too late to defend, we will discuss
only the Russian advance in
Europe. There two objective points,
directly connected with our inter
ests, lie open to Russian attack (:
the first and nearest, the Darda-
nelles the second, and but little
further removed, COnstantinoplea and
the BoSphOrus. 1t can scarcely be
too strongly insisted upon that we
cannot defend Constantinople unless
we defend the Dardanelles. If we
allow Russia to advance to CALI
poll, and seize the neck of the Cher
sOnese, we permit her to Obstruct
the navigation of the Dardanelles
by her batteries, and we should have
to fight hard to turn her out from
this position for, so long as she
might be in possession, we could not
consider as safe our communications
with the BOsphOrOus. Ten thOus-
and men are wanted to hold the
lines of BOulair on the DardanelleS;
seventy thousand to hold the lines
of the Karasu before Constantine
pie. The greatest number of regu-
lar troops that we could, during the
coming summer, despatch from this
country, with the necessary equip
ment for an army in the field, is
about forty thousand. We should
therefore be compelled, if we under
took this task at all, to ally our
selves with the Turks, in order to
bring it within the compass of our
powers.
a general consensus of military
opinion names two months as the
time which Russia, bringing supe-
riOr numbers to bear, would require
to advance from the Danube about
Rustchuk or Silistria to COnstanti-
nOple or the Dardanelies. The dis
tance is under $50 miles to Constan-
tinople from Rustchuk; and the
Balkans are the only great military
obstacle in the way. This estimate
of six miles a day does not seem eX-
cessive for the march of an army
that has so much time for prepara-
ton, through a country most of
which is very fertile, for if once the
Turks are fairly beaten, there is not
much chance of their rallying again
in the open.
Opinions vary as to the length of
time we should require for mObilis-
ing, embarking, and transporting an
on, IA %~ l. N.1
stores. The IuUst saSIfE55 SEIlss ES5IIS ' cIo
in our national genius do not think
we could disembark troops at Con
stantinOple in sufficient numbers in
less than six weeks from the date of
the order for mObilisatiOn; the ma
iOrity of soldiers name seven weeks
or two months as the shortest time
within which we could perform the
task. Itwould so manifestly be un-
safe to calculate upon the shortest
time supposed, that we will assume
two months as necessary. In other
words, if we give the order for mo-
bilisatiOn on the same day that the
Russians commence to advance from
the Danube, we shall probably ar
rive simultaneous with them before
Constantinople, provided they have
not delayed us by seizing Gallip0li,
and Obstructing the passage of the
Dardanelles. But unless, before
meeting the Russians there, we have
thrown up works for our de
fence, we shall be defeated by sheer
weight of numbers; and the only
margin of time left for constructing
works is that between the present
hour and the day when the Russian
troops shall have crossed the Dan
ube, and got ready to advance to-
wards the Balkans. Military stu
dents think that in another fortnight
Russia will be ready to attempt the
passage of the river; so that, if the
Cabinet does really intend to defend
Constantinople by British soldiers
against Russian troops, it has not a
single day to lose in giving the order
for mobilisation. The preparation
of the troops, stores, and ships for
their transport ought to be COM
menced without an hours delay.
Russia'S passage Of the Danube
should the signal for hasten
ing the work for the whole force;
and if we are to have strong in
trenched positions behind which to
fight, our first troops should be des-
patched to the scene of action on the
day that the first soldier of the
Cars advanced guard enters the
plains of Bulgaria.
1t is quite evident that the Gov
ernment cOntemplates sending out
troops to the theatre of war. The
increased activity in the manufac-
turing departments and arsenals, the
steps taken towards preparing regi-
mental transport, the numerous
signs familiar to trained eyeS-all tell
the same tale. 1t is known at AL
dershOtt that the force there IS to be
increased to twenty-One battaliOns,
the infantry of an army corps. But
between all these preliminaries and
the actual mObilisatiOn there is still
q very wide step; and it is only
when mobilization is ordered and
begun that the difficulties to be over
come will be found out. We have
shown how small a margin of time
there is for the task; and it appears
to rs culpable neglect if it be not
Immediately commenced in earnest,
The first act should be the selec-
ton of the commander; and it is
precisely here that the first pinching
of the shoe will be felt. If we are
really going toundertakea campaign
against Russia, if we are going to
nSaaS1ra O1Ir StrpnOth even on linn