The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1877-06-14
AFTER GETTYSBURG.
Why Meade Did Not attack Lee Upon the
Potomac.

Col james G, Biddle Philadelphia Weekly Times
1t had been General Meade's intention
to order general advance from our left
after the close of the action, but owing to
the lateness of the hour and the wearied
condition Of the army, with "wisdom
that did guide his valor to act in safety"
he abandoned the movement he had con-
templated. For this he has been severe
ly censured. General Howard, ina article
in the atlantic Monthly of July last, says:
II have thought that the fearful exposure
of General Meade's headquarters where
so much havoc was ocCasioned by the
enemy's artillery had go impressed him
that he did not at first realize the vic.
tory he had won." The reverse of this
is true. General Meade was not in the
least demoralized by the enemy's fire,
but realized fully the exact condition of
affairs. Lee had been repulsed, not rout-
ed, and if Meade had yielded 10 his own
inclination to attack, he would have been
repulsed himself, and would thus have
thrown away the fruits of his great vic
tory. That this view is correct is proved
beyond all doubt by the following passage
from Mr. William Swinton's "History of
the Army of the Potomac" Mr.. Swinton
says:
: have become convinced from the
testimony of General Longstreet himself
that attack would have resulted disastro-
usly. Il had" said that the officer to
the writer, "Hood and McLaws, who had
not been engaged; l had a heavy force of
artillery; | should have liked nothing
better than to have been attacked, and
have no doubt that should have given
those who tried as bad reception as
Pickett received"
On July the 4th, Lee, during a heavy
storm, withdrew from our front, and on
the 18th he etook up position at Williams
port, on the Potomac He vas closely
followed to the Potomac. He was close
ly followed by Meade, who came up with
him on the 18th, and who found him in
position naturally almost impregnable
and strongly fortified. Meade's impulse
was to attack at once, but, after consulta-
ton with his corps commanders, he alb
stained from ordering an assault until he
could more fully reConnoiter tie enemy's
position. On the morning of the l4th a
reconnaissance in force, supported by
the whole army, was made at daylight,
but on the night of the 18th Lee had re.
crossed the Potomac. There was great
deal of clamor at the time because Meade
did not destroy or capture Lees army at
Williamsport, but Meade, conscious that
he had acted wisely, always felt that his
tory would do him justice. Had he as
sauted he would certainly have been de-
feated, and the result would have been
disastrous not only to the army, but to
the country, for defeat to our army there
would have opened the road to Washing.
ton and the North, and. all the fruits of
Gettysburg would have been dissipated.
A brief reference to the subsequent ex-
perience of the army of the Potomac will
confirm the truth Of this assertion. In
May 1874, we began the campaign with
one hundred and fifteen thousand men,
and after Spottsylvania Court House were
constantly receiving heavy reinforce
ments. General Lee had about sixty
thousand men. And yet with this great
preponderance of strength, we assaulted
the enemy again and again in positions
not so strong as the one held at Williams,
port, always without success and with
terrible loss. From the crossing of the
Rapidan on May 5th, to the unsuccessful
assault on the enemy's works at Peters
burg, June 18th, a period of about six
weeks, the Army of the Potomac lost moi
less than seventy thousand menl In the
battles between the Army ofthe Potomac
and the Army of Northern Virginia, in no
case was direct assaultupon an intrench-
ed position successful.