New-York tribune., 1877-07-11
NEw-voRK DAILY TRIBUNE. WEDNESDAY JULY H. 1877

kan, and are murmuring, " How big win tate !
Yes; but how about the meals I For armies must
| have their meals The generals may amust
themselves by sticking pins into their maps
| bat the soldiers cannot march on an empty
stomach, nor can they fight unless their powder
is kept dry. They can neither liveen air noi
drag their artillery through the clouds. The
two fundamental conditions of a military cam
| pagn are, first, base OF supplies; ana
secondly. the roads. These are the pivots on
which military strategyturns.
During the campaign of 1923 the Russians
crossed the Danube below Galatz n fortnight
earlier than they have in 1877. They overran
the Dobrudja then as now. and within fourteen
days entered KusteYlje, AT the base OF the pen
insula. Here they met their ileet, and estaD-
ished base of supplies. The Turkish navy
had been destroyed at Navarno in the pre-
yious year, and the Black Sea was a Russian
dock At the close of the first year OF
the campaign the Russians had established a
second base of supplies at Varna, on the coast.
During the second year the fortresses III the
rear were masked, a flying column scaled the
Balkan and peace was dictated at Adrlanople.
The naval conditions are now reyersed the
i
cannot establish a base of supplies on the
coast. The Left Wing, which has swept
through the DObrudja, will have to draw It's
supplies through the swamps from Ga!atz, even
after it occupies Kustcndje. The natural i'll
land base of supplies is the Roumanian railroad
which stretches from Galatz to Giurgeyo, with
branch leading from Bucharest to
Chernetz. The main column in bridg-
ing the Danube at Simntza above Giur-
gevo chose convenient crossing DuJ
an awkward distributing point for supplies
As il is not on the railroad provisions, mill
tary stores and the field artillery of an I'M
mrnse host will have to be transported thirty
miles over the road from GIurgeyO. The
natural distributing point on the Bulganan
bank is opposite the terminus Of the Rou-
manian Railroad. This is Ru,thuk 1t lies
at the head of a road leading to Tirn0va and
the Balkan passes, and is connected by rail
with Varna. With this fortress in their hands
the Russians will have behind them con
venient base Of supplies, and IN front of them
an accessible base of operations against the
Turkish camp at Shumia and at the same
time they will command the most direct roads
to the Balkan. The Left Wing by moving up
the Danube III the direction OF SIiiStrla can
simultaneously establish communication with
the Russian divisions at Kalarash, and draw
ing It's supplies from Roumania lay siege to
Silislria and cooperate with the main army
further up the river. The Turkish camp at
Wddin, which is now isolated from the main
army, will naturally be attacked by the Rou-
manan army and the single corps which con-
stitutpS the Russian Right Wing
According to this view, the concentration of
the Russians mt Biela is more significant than
thc advance of the cavalry to Trn0ya and the
gates of the Gabrova Passes. The roads to,
the Balkan in front of Sstova tempt the staff
to repeat Dlebitschs brilliant march, and
flank movement in the direction of Sophia
would be il bold, Nap)lconc stroke; but how
about the supplies There are Old heads i'll
the Russian camp. They will capture the
fortresses behind them before they sound the
cry, "On to the Balkan"