Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1877-06-06
AFTER GETTYSBURG.
why MEADE DID NOT ATTACK LEE UPON
THE POTOMAC.

THE POTOMAC.
tCol. james O. Diddlc, in Phila. Weekly Times
IL had been General Mead's inten-
ton to order general advance from
our left after the close of the action, but
owing TO the lateness of the hour and
the wenricd condition of the army, with
"wisdom that did guide his valor to
act in safety" he abandoned the move
ment he bad contemplated. For this
he has been severely censured. Gen.
Howard, in an article in the Atlantic
Monthly Of July last, says:
Il have thought that the fearful cx-
posure OF General Meadc's hendquar.
tiers where no much havoc was occa-
stoned by the enemy's artillery had so
impressed him that he did not at first
realize the victory he had won.'
The reverse OF this is true. General
Meade was not in the least demoral.
lied" by the enemy's fire, but realized
fully the exact condition Of affairs. Lee
had been rcpulsed, not routed, and II
Meade had yielded TO his own inclina-
tion TO attack, he would have been re.
pulsed himself, and would thus have
thrown away the fruits of his great
victory. That this view IS correct is
proved beyond all doubt by the follow
ing passage from Mr. VIM. Swinton's
I" History of tho Army of the Poto-
mae Mr. Swinton says
II have become convinced from the
testimony OF General Longstreet him
self that attack would have resulted
disastrously. | had, said that officer
to the writer, Hood and McLaws, who
had not been engaged had II heavy
force of artillery should have liked
nothing better than to have been at
tackled, aud have no doubt that |
should have given those who tried Ms
bad reception MS Pickett received
On July 4th 1853, Lee, during a
heavy storm, Withdrew from our front,
and on the llth he took up position
ut Williamsport, on the Potomac. lie
was closely followed by Meade, who
came up with him ON the 18th, and
who found him in position naturally
almost impregnable and strongly forti-
fed. Moadc's impulse was TO attack
at once, but, after consultation with
his corps commanders, he abstained
from ordering un assault until be could
more fully reconnoitre the enemy's
position. On the morning Of the lith
reconnaissance in force, supported by
the whole army, was made NJ daylight,
but on the night Of the 18th Lee had
recrossed the Potomac. There was n
great deal of clamor at the time be-
cause Meade did not destroy or capture
Lees army at Williamsport, but Meade,
Lconscious that he bad acted wisely, al.
ways felt that history would do him
justice. Had he assaulted he would
certainly have been defeated, and the
result would have been disastrous not
only to the army, but to the country,
for defent to our army there would
have opened the road TO Washington
and the North, aud all tho fruits of
Gettysburgwould have been dissipated.
A brief reference to the subsequent
experience OF the Army Of the Poto.
mac will confirm the truth of this as
sertion. In May, 1864, we began the
campaign with one hundred aud fifteen
thousand men, and after Spottsylvania
Court House were constantly receiv-
ing heavy reiniorccments. General
Lee had abont sixty thousand men.
And yet with this great prepondcrance
of strength, we assaulted the enemy
again and again in positions not so
strong as the ohe held ut Williamsport,
always without success and with terri.
bio losa. From the crossing of the
Rapidan on May 5tb, TO tho unsuccess-
iul assault on tho cncmy's works at
Petersburg, June 18th, a period OF
about six weeks, the Army Of the Po-
tomac lost not less than seventy thon-
sand men In the battles between
the Army of the Potomac and tho
Army Of Northern Virginia, In no case
was direct assault upon nn intrencbcd
position successful