The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30

given rs at the conference OF the even |
Ing before. It was expected that the at
tack would begin at an early hour, be-
fore all the enemy's troops were up,
and when his left was weak. The pro-
crastination that had taken place on
the right was excessively wearying and
annoying, and had deranged every
thing. The success anticipated from
the attack In the early morning d1d not
follow that made late in the afternoon.
It was not part of the programme that
Ewell's real attack should be stimuli.
taneous with that OF Longstreet, and
therefore he is not liable to the censure
having delayed that attack. too long, as
would seem to be the Inference from
Col. Allan's remark. My understand
ing at the time was that, after the par
right. Gen. Lee directed Ewell to make
an attack from his position. Ewell or
dered that attack to be made by his
whole corps. Rodes and myself
were to be in readiness to begin the at
tack as soon us Johnson's muskets
should be heard on the left. The rea-
son for this was that Johnson confront
ed wooded hill, and had to feel his
way through the woods with skirmish-
ers to find the enemy, while the ground
over which Rodes and myself had to
of skirmishers, but when we started we
could 20 right on. My two brigades
started promptly at the sound of john
sons muskets, moved over to space in
tervening between them and The base OF
Cemetery Hill, fought their way up the
face Of that hill, over stone fences or
walls held by successive lines Of infant
ry, and got into the works on the top OF
the hill while johnson was yet fighting
on the slopes of Culp's Hill. There
was, then, no attack by "piece-meal."
SO far as Johnson and myself were con-
cerned, nor is the remark that Ewell's
divisions were not made to act in con-
cert applicable to US. Col. Allan should
have recollected that he was writing for
the use Of one engaged in writing lis
tory Of that battle, and not made his
charge OF want Of concert SO broad. l
believe that If Rodes had advanced at
the time designated, especially il one Of
Hills divisions on his right had coop
Grated, we would then have gained per-
manent possession of that hill; but /
am not willing to submit to the imputa-
tion Of q want Of concert or co-opera-
ton 80 far az am concerned, and Yin
sist that the proper discrimination
should be made. ..
The assertion that EARLY was beaten
back before Rodes was ready to support
him" is a mode Of characterizing that
brilliant charge by my two brigades
that does them great injustice. Prof.
Bates description Of that charge con-
tains some Of the finest writing in his
book, and Is very graphic, as well as
correct in its main features, though he
over-estimates very greatly the num-
bers contained in my two brigades, es
pecially Hays, as well as the loss sus-
tanned by them.
Col. Taylor gives Gen. Rodes' expla-
nation of his failure to advance as fol-
lows:
Gen. Rodes, who was on Gen. Ear
Iy's right, states in his report that, after
he had conferred with Gen. Early on his
lift and Gen. Lane on his right, and ar
ranged to attack in concert, he pro-
ceeded at once to make the necessary
preparations; but, as he had to draw
bis troops out of town by the flank,
change the direction of the line Of bat
tie. and then traverse, distance OF
1900 or 1400 yards, while Early had to
move only half that distance. without
change Of front, it resulted that, be-
fore he drove in the enemy's skirmish-
ers, Gen. Early had attacked and been
compelled to withdraw"
am very far from intending to reflect
in the slightest degree on Gen. Rodes,
of whom I had very high appreciation
as a man and a soldier, and to whose
skill, gallantry and efficiency l have
borne the fullest testimony when speak
ing Of his unfortunate death in most
brilliant charge, under my command,
against vastly superior numbers. He
was new in his position OF division com
mander at Gettysburg, but when killed
at Winchester, on the 10Th of Septem-
Der, 1864, he had learned to be less SEN
ssitive about his TANKS, and would not at
that day have given such an explana-
ton Of his failure to Operate in an
attack similar to that made by Johnson
and myself at Gettysburg.
When Ewell's order was received /
prepared for the attack by issuing the
necessary orders to my brigades, which
were already in position, and saw that
they started promptly at the signal,
and Prof. Bates is not far wrong when
he says they moved with the steadi-
ness and precision of parade"
He further says:
AS the rebels came within range,
Howard's infantry, who had lain com
pletely protected by the stone wall,
poured in volley after volley, sweeping
down the charging host. But that res.
,olute body Of men believed themselves
invincible, and now, with the eyes OF
Dotn armies upon tnem, they would not
break so long as any were left to &C
forward. The stone walls were passed
at bound, and when once among the
Union men, Stevens was obliged tc
cease firing for fear of killing friend
and foe alike, and Weiderick was unable
to withstand the shock, his supports
and his own men being swept back with
a whirlwind's force"
The two brigades, one of Louisianians
aud the other North Carolinians, con
tinued to ascend the hill while blaze O.
fire covered it's face until they reached
thu enemy's works and entered them
While fighting for the possession Of the
guns In the enemy's works, brigade
and three regiments were brought from
the front, which Rodes should have as
saulted, and after a sharp struggle my
brigades were compelled to retire, bu
not in disorder. Hays men brought of
1ln rricpparc an1 fo1r h,++lo ao ~xo INV