Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1877-11-22
1tlistellaueuns &eadiug.
GETTYSBURG.
The Decisive Battle Of the War Between the
States.

SIaCeSs
The Philadelphia Weekly &c.,; publishe
an extensive paper by General James Long
street, giving a narrative of General Lee
advance into Pennsylvania, from the incep
ton of the movement to it's disastrous close
including an account of the battle of Gettys
burg, with review of the campaign. Gen
eral Longstreet tells some things that have
never been told before, and reviews the opera
tions Of 1863 from point of view that is il
many respects more advantageous than il
possible to any other man now living, since
no man now living was so prominently con
cerned in them.
The point upon which General Longstree
mainly insists, is that the campaign into Penn
sylvania, while offensive in strategy, was in
tended to be purely defensive in tactics, th'
purpose being to choose position in the enc
my's rear and compel him to attack. 1t wa'
the abandonment of this policy that, in hi
opinion, led to the fatal result at Gettysburg
and this mistake he believes to have been moi
matter of deliberate judgment, but "the
impulse of great mind disturbed by unpar
alleled conditions" In the absence of hi
cavalry, Lee moved into Pennsylvania, a
one walking in the dark, and it was the report
of a scout that gave him the first intimatior
of Meade's whereabouts and turned him aside
from his march on Harrisburg. The encoun
ter on the 1st of July, General Longstreet
shows to have been wholly accidental and il
was then that he believes Lee committed an
error in not either vigorously prosecuting the
temporary success, or else manoeuvering 80 a.
to compel Meade to make the attack. When
the assault was made on the I'd, it was by
Longstreet's corps alone, whereas, if Hill and
Ewell had simultaneously advanced, Meade
might have been dislodged. But that attack
sufficiently showed that the Federal position
was then impregnable, and Pickett's charge
on the third day was forlorn hope that ought
never to have been made. These are only
some of the main points brought forward in
General Longstreet's paper, large portion Of
which is occupied with defense of himself
against the accusation Of tardiness. After
the battle, General Lee said to his officers
"It is all my fault" an acknowledgment char
acteristic of the man, and which his subordi'
mates have 80 far respected as to lay the re-
sponsibility anywhere but On him. Lee seems
to have been carried away by over.con6dence
in the proves of his troops, and to have be-
lieved that they could do anything. "The
enemy is there" he said in reply to reInon'
STRANGE against the assault on Cemetery Ridge,
"and mean to strike him."
On the morning ofthe LIST, General Lee and
myself left his headquarters together, and
had ridden three or four miles when we heard
heavy firing along Hills front. The firing
became so heavy that General Lee left me
and hurried forward to see what it meant.
After attending to some details of my march,
1 followed. The firing proceeded from the
engagement between our advance and Rey-
nold's corps, in which the Federals were re-
pulsed. This rencontre was totally uneXpec-
ted on both sides.
When | overlook General Lee, at o'clock
that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he
thought of attacking General Mead upon the
heights the next day. General Lee was i'm.
pressed with the idea that by attacking the
Federals he could whip them in detail. re-
minded him that if the Federals were there
in the morning, it would be proof that they
had their forces we'll in hand, and that with
Pickett in Chambersburg, and Stuart out of
reach, we should be somewhat in detail. He,
however, did not seem to abandon the idea of
attack on the next day. He seemed under a
subdued excitement, which occasionally took
possession of him when "the hunt WAS up"
and threatened his superb equipoise. The
sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on
that day had given him taste of victory.
THE PLAN OF ATTACK
When I left Gen. Lee on the night Of the
1st, believed that he had made up his mind
to attack, but was confident that he had not
yet determined as to when the attack should
he made. The assertion first made by Gen.
Pendleton, and echoed by his confederates,
that l was ordered to open the attack at sun.
rise, is totally false. Gen. Lee never in his
life gave me orders to open an attack at a
specific hour He was perfectly satisfied that
when had my troops in position and was or
dered to attack, no time was ever lost. On
the night of the 1st, | left him without any
orders at all. On the morning of the End, |
went to Gen. Lees headquarters at daylight
and renewed my views against making an at.
tack. He seemed resolved, however, and we
discussed the probable results. We observed
the position of the Federals and got geDer-
al idea of the nature Of the ground. About
sunrise, Gen. Lee sent Col. Venable, of his
staff, to Gen. Ewells headquarters, ordering
him to make reconnaissance of the ground
in his front, with view of making the main
attack on his left A short time afterward he
followed Col. Venablein in person He returned
at about 9 o'clock and informed me that it
would not do to have Ewell open the attack.
He finally determined that I should make the
main attack on the extreme right. 1t was
full II o'clock when Gen. Lee arrived ut this
conclusion and ordered the movement. In
the meantime, by Gen. Lees authority, Law
brigade, which had been put upon picket du-
ty, was ordered to rejoin my command, and
upon my suggestion that it would be better
to await its arrival, Gen. Lee assented. We
waited about forty minutes for these troops
and then moved forward A delay of sever.
al hours occurred in the march of the troops
The cause of this delay was that we had been
ordered by General Lee to proceed cautiously
upon the forward movement, 80 as to avoid
being seen by the enemy. Gen. Lee ordered
Colonel johnson, of his engineer corps, to
lead and conduct the head of the column.
My troops, therefore, moved forward under
the guidance of special officer of Gen. Lee,
and with instructions to follow his directions.
| left Gen. Lee only after the line had been
stretched out on the march, and rode along
with Hoods division, which was in the rear.
The march was necessarily slow, the conduc-
tor frequently encountering points that ex-
posed the troops to the view of the signal sta
ton on Round Top. At length the column
halted. After waiting sometime, supposing
that it would soon move forward, | sent to the
front t.. inquire the cause Of the delay. 1t
was reported that the column was awaiting
the movements of Colonel Johnston, who was