The New Orleans daily Democrat. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1877-1880, 1877-12-30

| aon6osAOot uhu COEpb Oh very 'uu6
lighting men, equal to any In the army.
and we had no doubt that he would be
up In tlme to make the attack, and that
1t would certainly be made early enough
to ensure the victory, for OF the latter
we did not permit ourselves to doubt for
q moment.
The part we proposed to ourselves to
perform in achieving that victory WAS to
follow UP the success that might be
gained on the right, and pursue and de-
stroy the enemy's forces when they had
been thrown in disorder by the capture
OF the commanding positions on their
left. We did not, therefore, by any
means, propose to play the part Of pas
sive spectators.
The remark OF Gen. Lee, which I
have given, demonstrates the strong
conviction he had OF the necessity of an
attack at very early hour In the morn
ing, and of promptness and celebrity In
making 1t; and 1t has very great sig
nihcance in the light OK subsequent
| events.
We were then given to understand
that the attack should beein from our
right at daylight In the morning, or as
soon thereafter as practicable, and that
q diversion should be made on our
flank to favor it, with the direction to
make that diversion real attack ON
discovering any disorder or symptoms
OF giving way on the enemy's part
| which latter Is what is meant by q ia
vOrable opportunity.
| This is substantially correct MARIA
tive OF what was said and concluded
upon at the conference referred to, and
it will be seen that Col. Taylor is
under serious misapprehension In re-
gard to it.
do not wish it to be understood, by
any means, that claim for myself, or
for Ewell. Rodes and myself conformity,
the origination Of the plan that was
adopted for the battle, or that Gen. Lee
consulted us for the purpose Of being
governed by our views. He did not re-
gard his officers as mere machines to
execute his will, but he treated them as
thinking, beings, capable, OF reason
suggestions about matters with
which they were familiar, in arriving
at his conclusions. He had likewise O.
profound knowledge OF human nature,
and 1t was his custom to talk freely to
officers about movements they were to
make, get their views about the proper
mode Of making them, in order to
ascertain whether they could be relied
| upon for the work In hand. adopt any
| judicious views they might suggest, and
leave them under the impression that
they were carrying out plans in the
formation OF which they had some part;
for he knew that one of the very first
| elements OF success was q confidence on
| the part Of an officer entrusted with a
movement in Its feasibility, and there
| fore sought to enlist all his energies in
the task entrusted to him by little hui
moring Of his self-love.
He sought information from US on
this occasion about the matters men,
toned because he thought we possessed
1t, and he heard with attention our sug-
gestions, because he expected us to per-
| form an important part in the ensuing
operations. From the very nature OF
things, he could not rely on his own
observation to find out everything
necessary to enable him to discharge
the functions OF commander in-chief,
and had very often to rely on the eyes
and ears OF others.
When he left us on this occasion, I
was 80 firmly impressed with the con-
viction that the battle was to open at
daylight next morning that I rode into
Gettysburg, and. as soon as it was dark
enough to avoid observation, I drew
Hays brigade out of the town, to the
left OF it, and posted it on line with
Hoke's, under cover OF the low bridge
already mentioned, not far from the
base Of Cemetery Hill, 30 as to be ready
at the earliest moment. The facts SUBJ
sequently developed show that we were
right in anticipating that the enemy
would concentrate in our immediate
front and strongly fortify the position
during the night. He concentrated ON
that flank not only the First, Eleventh
Firth. as they arrived, and all of them
remained there until the morning was
considerably advanced. In fact, Meade
| says that he had contemplated making
a vigorous attack from that flank on our
left, until Slocum reported that the
character OF the ground In front was
unfavorable for making the attack.
Had we, therefore, attacked on the flank
been met by overwhelming numbers,
and bloody repulse must have been
the consequence.
l will here remark that it appears,
from Ewells statement, that Gen. Lee,
after dark, renewed the proposition to
draw our corps to the right, but, upon
his representation of the feasibility of
taking Culp's Hill without fight, con-
cluded to let us remain where we were.
Ii | heard Of that fact at the time. it
had escaped my memory.
Coils. Allan and Taylor in regard to the
fighting on the I'd.
The former says:
"Longstreet's attack on the Federal
left on the I'd was delayed beyond the
expected time, and was not promptly
seconded by Hill and EweIl when made.
Ewell's divisions were not made to act
in concert-Johnson, Early, Rodes at
lacking in succession"
His third condition for successful
result is thus stated
"Third. Had Ewell made his attack
in the afternoon Of the I'd at the same
time as Longstreet, instead Of later,
and then not piece meal so that
Early was beaten back before Rodes
was ready to support him."
Col. Allan should have been a little
more circumspect in his statement and
discriminating in his comments. In
the paragraph OF his report Immediate
ly foil owing what have before quoted,
EWell saws: