, 1877-12-08

work: nut tln soon discovers that the task he
| has undertaken Il by no means 50 easv as I.o
!maeInc'l. Unforeseen difficulties md co'n1lca-
sons entansea ts TINT s' Il. IL. o~n Nc sSitans
aascre A. s Ia. +.see sea hi. sssSasy repa3stu en-,
tsc result hc ra!'.'s's withdraw, but hs conception
Other motlsea besides benevolent feelings como
into play, 9ni perhaps tho l'cnevotc,,rc Is re-
placed by nm oppoai,e sentiment. We'll, NO
Russlans nrc In similar positiau. We began
imagined that VIC eo,ilA quickly accomplish, it
with very itttlo ultllculty but wo have ,lnex-
poctclfy become irvolvel to such mn extent
TINT nc hare to think chiefly Of cur own Inter.
hard. tltngrccab1e facts, anil In tho minus ii
sorne Of us thcro 10 feeling Of resentment
agalnst those who, tIt certain sc,'sc. led us Into
these combinations Wp cannot however,
them lnay bo changed. Our own reputation de-
their condition."
The Importance for Russia Of possessing Tho
command nf Tue black Seq anil securing tho
neutrality Of Austria ia we'll brought out In an
able article by Gen. Lccr, Professor Of tic
Nicholas staG College. The artiele is 10 inter.
s eating ti!as venture 10 give condensed trans
.'in consequence Of certain geographical and
political conditions tho scat OF war in tho Hal
kan Peninsula has for us n very urfAvorabte
nppearance. eurrouQdel OIL three s!tics by scas
Mediterranean, auu the Airiatle) and o., tic
fourth side nnost entirely shut In ly Austria
except narrow opening between the Carpatlt-
inns at'ti the mouth Of flle Danube, trpm 10 to
10o yerste, Il presents extremely ttsadvanta-
gc0us conditions fur invasion. 1t ts,tn taeta bag
with narrow mouth. Our army haa to crawl
Into the narrow opening. mid then to advance
" long narrow corrt0r between two fences,
l0o to 150 vcrsts apart, neither OF which belong
Gu 1l11A hnpH fHH f13ttQ f1G fNr7 N h Il
ntratcEical condttEons-n short bpsc aud long
iine Of operations. But tne base ts nut only
etsort; 1t "a at thu samc time nsu1Elr!cntlY pro-
and ou The other side It reaches tslo Danube Of
the Black Sea, 1n word. tho base Inns all the
pcculialiiice which 1t ought not to have; It. is
short, its Hanks arc unprotected, and ts rear Is
sca eoast. From sll this NO may easily persnIvo
how Important "a tho part which Austria p1nTs,
and how importnnt It would ba for us to hava
tnc command N az Of tho Black Sea. Tho command
q % ths BLACK. sea would give " at uncc tho pos
same TING would afford US that freedom OF
actfo'' aud security an operations VIC had tn tho
campaign Ut ls2o: Besides this, by means Ut
fv fns,a 'eet wo euu!a move NJ oso
tho solution Of tho question. All tlic difference
between cur eaoW. undecided movements y tho
campa,gn 81 l' 1sss and our decided, brilliant
~ y is Is t. be explained By tlg e
less important in tho strategic scr,sc aro ou&
political relations with Austrln. An offensive
alliance with Austria, like tho cooperation Of
our llcct. would lcngihcn our base to tho right
anil Eiro us complete freedom of nctios. With
out tho cooperation OF tho fleet and with tho
hostility Of Auatrta, tho advance OF Our arniy
into the Balkan Peninsula would 10 completely
Impossible, Of would bp ut least m naycuturous
enterprise like that Of Charles XII. 1'iiinvs
were almost in that condition at tho
beginning Of the campaign Of 1854. Hence, b.
sacs tho main ar,nY OF inynsion. II would be
necessary to have three special armies for pro.
tcetlng tllu two ilanks and thu rear OF 0ur base
of operations. Surprising tho lnaiu army to
consist Ut l5o, ,oo0 nicn, ths first supplementary
arsty, Oh tho west coast uf tic Black Sea and OF,
the Danuae, should have nbuut l0, ,000; tho sce-
ond, On tho northern coast OF tho Black Sea,
should have nbout tho sunio number; and
tho thrtl, IN tho rrincipalltfcs, 1}essnrabia, or
Poland, tn protect tue r:ht ilank against Aus
tra, ut Icaat 30o, ,uN. illus, In order to protect
thu opcrat1ops of the artnY Of 10000, there
ought to bu three supplementary armies con.
talillng together bali million OF men,
THIS article Is Interesting III more than ono
respect. As Il was published In tho S1ornik
GosadarstlvnaBA znaHt before tho curn1nencg.
ncLt Of the war. It proves that there were some
men tn tho lsusslan army who did not imagine
that the campaign would be q nero military
ntoffn