New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1877-10-10
democratic It shoad be defeated ana the
"Boss" system broken up.


MOVEMENTS IN THE EAST
We cannot interpret the recent movements
or rtimors thereof, in Armenia as well as bu-
! garia, rs Indicating more than the strategy
prescribed to bo.h c)mbatlnts, in order to Sc
| cure strong positions for Winter-quarters.
| The Grand Duke Michaers attack ON MGkhtar
| Pasha was made in the hope OF crushing the
resistance of the latter at one blow, ana e.
fccting a lodgment in Kars But 1t seems 10
have been as decided a failure as the attempts
to storm Plevna, and for the same rcasons-the
ineiiciency of artillery against trenches ana the
efficiency of breech-loading rifles against at
tack i'm front The Turkish estimate OF the
Russian losses is probably much exaggerated,
but since the Grand Duke has fallen back to
the frontier, and the severe Winter OF Ar
menia is already creeping down the mountain
sides. we may take it for granted that Kars
is safe until next Spring. In fact, the huS-
81 rs would gam little, so near the close OF the
season, by the possession of that single point.
The disastrous campaign in Armenia seems to
DO at an end
From Bulgaria. we now hear more from the
Turkish than from the Russian side. The
giving of Mehemet Ais command to Suleiman
Pasha the Council of Generals at Shumla, and
the appearance of Chefket Pasha with con-
siderable reserve force in the rear OF Plevna,
all point to the immediate Strengthening OF
both Turkish lines, in anticipation OF further at
tacks before the close of the season or during the
Winter. BY this time the Russian armies must
lie reinforced by the Guard, and by large
portion of the three modified corps; and there
is no better preparation for the Winter both
as regards the armies and the Empire Itself,
than victory. An additional defeat, now,
would be an incalcuabe misfortune; hence,
the caution, the delay, tine restriction upon cor
respoudents But it will be difficult to make
any movement in force without encOunteTlng
Turkish army in "a strong position. The MoSiem
generals or engineers have admirable topo-
graphical eyes, and their soldiers improylSo
lines of defence with an energy worthy OF
Anglo-Saxons. 1t is clear that they expect an
advance of the army of the Czarewitch toward
the LON, on one side, and an attempt to cut oil
Pleyna on the other. The cooperation of Chef
ket with Osman Pasha may defeat the latter
design but, in any case, we may be sure that
Osman Pasha will not eyacuate Pleyna, except
for the purpose of occupying another position
equally strong, with Widdin and Sophia as his
bases.
The most, therefore, which the Russians may
be able to accomplish will be to extend their
lines IN Bulgaria, an3 then to hold them until
Spring. 1t is almost like a fatality, that
phenomenal Winter should follow upon the
heels of such dcplorable strategy; the stars III
their courses fight against buuderers Snow
in ConstantinOpe on Monday-snow on the
cypress and myrtle; storms III the interior,
and frost and rain threatening the bridges on
the Danube The mud of Bulgaria is equal
in depth and tenacity TO that Of Virginia, and
sudden cold transforms it as rapidly into iron.
This is an obstacle which the Russians, accus-
toned to q long, solid Winter, and an instln
taneOus Spring, Will find particularly annoy
ing; and the good roads that might have been
made are not only lacking, but the bad ones
have not even been supplied with good bridges.
The Turkish soldiers are seasoned to mud,
and their march is Lighter; they will be able
to concentrate more rapidly upon threatened
points, or, if pressed back, to take new post
tons. After the unexpected skill and success
with which they have carried on the struggle,
thus far, they ought, certainly, to be able to
hold the lines of the LON and the Wild, or
adjacent lines, during the coming Winter