The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1877-04-28

The Belligerent Navies.
The analysis of the naval strength of
Russia, England and Turkey, which we print
to-day, gives the readers of the HERALD q
clearer idea of the conditions that will
attend the present contest in tho East. SO
far as it is waged on the seas, than has
ever been presented before. 1t is a notorious
fact that under the semblance of peaceful
effort at improving their navies the three
Powers have been steadily preparing for
the present struggle, which they have re-
garded as inevitable ever since the Crimean
war. Russia then felt how helpless she was
against the combined ornaments of the
Western Powers allied against her, and IN
hesitatingly sacrificed her navy to the ex-
igencies of the defence of Cronstadt and
Sebastopol. She foresaw that the days Of
wooden ships were numbered, and therefore
employed her own in the most effective
manner by sinking them across the channels
and entrances of her harbors. Meantime
she turned her energies toward the creation
of modern navy, in which the monitor and
popoffka or circular ship form the most i'm
portant features. These vessels, although
small when compared with the leviathans Of
England and Turkey, are more efficient for
the special naval warfare which Russia will
wage and may upset some of the most i'm
portant calculations of her enemies. AS it is
Russia has in the Black Sea very for
midable squadron of modern iron-clads,
and can cover the approaches to her dock
yards and naval bases of operations with tor
pedoes, thus rendering them imprcgnable to
sea attack.
while formidable on the ocean, cannot be
said to be wholly serviceable in the
limited areas for operations presented by the
Black Sea and the Baltic Their great
draught Of water will prevent their being
employed against the shallow torpedo
guarded harbors Of Russia, and in estimat-
| ing the naval strength of England in the
present war we must limit it to the actual
degree to which she can employ it. The
| number of serious accidents that have re-
Gently occurred to the English iron-clads
serve to show the risks that attend the en-
ployment of such unwieldy ships. Such a
catastrophe as the loss of the Captain or the
sinking of the Vanguard occurring during a
great engagement would serve to demoralize
an entire feet. by creating q horrible con-
fusion and doubt among the seamen. The
long array of commerce destroyers" or fast
frlgates on the English naval list only gives
her strength against maritime Power whose
1 II ut, har
Russia these vessels are perfectly useless ex-
cept as fast transports The smaller English
gunboats, such as the Comet, for instance,
will be useful in harassing the enemy's
coasts, but for regular offensive operations
against iron-clads they will prove as harmless
as sea gulls The English navy, therefore,
that can be used with effect against the Rus
sian squadrons is remarkably small in COM
parison with what it would be against any
other naval Power.
Turkey u.s. if anything, better provided
than England with iron-clads adapted to
Black Sea warfare. Her monitor fleet is of
modern type and we'll constructed. Com
bined with the English squadron and
differed by Englishmen the united force
will certainly prove more than q match for
the Russian Black Sea fleet, and will probably
succeed in corralling it in either the port of
Odessa or Sebastopol. But to do this it
would neutralize its own offensive power;
for the Russian ships would be always ready
to move on q weak point in the line OF
blockade. Another serious consideration
also presents itself in estimating the prob
able issue of naval struggle in the Black
Sea- If the allied fleets succeed in driving
the Russian ships into ports OF safety the
consumption OF coal by the former will be
as continuous as if they were engaged in
active operations, while the latter can econ
omize mt their. pleasure. We do not hesitate
| to assert that in modern naval warfare the
question of coal is Of predominant impor-
lance for without fuel the most powerful
iron-clad becomes almost rs helpless as a
canal boat. With the monster guns now
arming the belligcrent fleets it is improbable
that general engagement will be fought,
and the operations will necessarily be limited
to naval duels and the blockade and bonn
bardment of fortified ports In the defence
against this system of attack the torpedo will
necessarily receive very extensive appllca-
ton.
esouthcrn Men for Southern Omces.''
Now that the federal interference in the