The weekly Union times. [volume] (Union C.H., South Carolina) 1871-1894, 1877-11-30
The Battle at Gettysburg.
GenI LOngstreets Narrative OF that Fatal
hay.


ing Of tie First Corps on Jnly 2-Me
Repulse Of Pichcu-Ne Charges
Ayuinst "OM Pete" Conclus,vely An
s,oered
"A narrative of tie Pennsylvania cam
Paign, from the beginning to the close, writ.
ten by Gen James I.ongstreet, is publshc,..
in the Philadelphia Times. Gen Long
street tells some thugs that have never been
told, and reviews the operations of 1863
from point of view that is in many respects
more advantageous than is possible to any
other man now living, since no man now
living was SO prominently concerned in
them.
TIE FIGHT ON JULY lst.
The encounter on the lst of July Gen
Lonsstrcet shows to have been wholly acci
dental, and it was then that he believes
Lee committed an error i'll not either vigor.
ousy prosecuting the temporary success, or
else manGuvring SO rs to compel Meade to
make tho attack. Gen. Lonestrcet contn-
ues rs follows: When | overlook Gen Lee
at 3 o'clock that afternoon he said, to my
surprise, that he thought Of attacking Gen
Meade upon the heights the next day.
Gen. Lee was impressed with the idea that
by attacking the FctNraE Ec could whip
them in detail. | reminded him that if
the Fedcrals were there in the morning it
would be proof that they had their forces
well in hand, and that with Pickett in
Chambersburg, aud Stuart out of reach. we
should be somewhat in detail. He, how
ever, did not seem to abandon the idea Of
attack on the next day. He seemed under
4 subdued excitement, which occasionally
took possession of him when "thc hunt was
up, and threatened his superb cqu:poisc.
The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewcll
an that day had given him Il taste Of vic
toTy
TIE PLAN OF ATTACK.
When | left Gen. Lee on the night of
the 1st believe that he had made up his
mind to attack, but was confident that he
had not determined as to whcs the attack
should be made The assertion first made
by Gen. Pcndleton, and echoed by his con
icdcrates, that | was ordered to open the
attack at sunrise is totally false. Gen. Ice
never i'll his life gave me orders to open I'm
attack at a specific hour. He Was perfectly
satisfied that when | had my troops in po-
sition and was ordered to attack, no time
was lost. On the night of the 1st left
him without any orders at ALL On the
morning of the 2d | went to Gen Lees
headquarters at daylight and renewed my
views against making All attack. IIe seemed
resolved, however, and We discussed the
probable results. We observed the position
of the Federals and got a geneaal idea of
the nature of the ground. About sunrise
Gen. Lee sent Col Ncnablc, of his staff, to
Gen. Ewells headquarters, ordering him to
make Il reconnaissance of the ground in his
front, with the view Of making the main
attack on his left. \ short time afterwards
he followed Col. Ncnable in person. lie
returned at about o'clock and Informed
me that it would not do to have Ewell upon
the attack. lie finally determined that /
should make the main attack on the ex-
trcme right. 1t was fully l | o'clock when
Gen. Lee arrived at this conclusion aud or
dercd the movement.
Our army was stretched in an cliptcal
curve, reaching from tho front Of Round
Top around Seminary Ridge, and envelop
CspetfEy tloshts 5a On on vl TIL S!s thps
enemy occupied the high ground in front
OF US, being nlasscd ia a curve Of about two
miles, nearly concentric with the curve dcs.
cribed by our forces. His line was about
l,ioO yards from ours. Any one will see
that the proposition for this inferior force
to assault and drive out the masses cf troops
upon the heights was a very probematical
one. Ny orders from Gen. Lee were "to
cnyelop the encmy's left and begin the at
tack there, following up as near as possible
the direction Of the Emmcttsburg road"
TIE RATTLE opENpD
My corps occupied our right, with Hood
on the extreme right and McLaws next
ilills corps was next to mine, in front Of
the Federal centre, and Ewcll was ON our
division absent, numbered hardly 13 900
men. L realized that the fight was to be
fearful one but being assured that nv flank
would be protected by the brigadcs Of Viii
cox, Perry, Wright, Posey and Malone
moving en- echeion, and that Ewell was TO
cooperate by direct attack on the encmv's
right, and Hill to threaten his centre and
attack if opportunity offered, and thus pre-
vent reinforccmcnts from being launched
either against myself or Ewcl, it seemed
that we might possibly disl6dge the great
army in front Of us. At alfpast 3 o'c lock
the order was given Gen. Hood to advance
upon the enemy, and hurrying> to the head
of McLaw's division, moved with his line