Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1877-11-22

ring that three and half hours of bloody
work, not less than $4,000 of the Federals,
and yet their charge was not checked nor
their line broken until we ordered them to
withdraw. found that night that 4,529 of
my men, more than one.third of the total
number, had been left on the field. History
records no parallel to the fight made by those
two divisions on the End of July at Gettys.
burg.
EwELL's INACTION.
1t may be imagined that was astonished
at the fact that We received no support after
we had driven the Federals from the peach
orchard and one thousand yards beyond.
If General Ewel had engaged the army in
his front at that time (say 4 o'clock) he would
have prevented their massing their whole
army in my front; and while he and kept
their two wings engaged Hill, would have
found their centre weak and should have
threatened it while broke through their
left and dislodged them. Having failed to
move at o'clock, while the enemy was in
his front, it was still more surprising that he
did not advance at o'clock with vigor and
promptness, when the trenches In front of
him were vacated, or rather held by one sim
gle brigade Gas General Meade's testimony
before the committee on the conduct of the
war states). Had he taken these trenches
and scattered the brigade that held them, he
would have found himself in the Federal's
flank and rear. His attack in the rear must
have dislodged the Federals, as it would have
been totally unexpected being believed
that he was in front with me. Hill, charging
upon the centre at the same time, would have
increased their disorder and we should have
won the field. But Ewell did not advance
until had withdrawn my troops, and the first
corps, after winning position after position,
was forced to withdraw from the field with
two corps of their comrades within sight and
resting upon their arms. Ewell did not move
until about dusk (according to his own report).
He then occupied the trenches that the enemy
had vacated (see General Meade's report).
The real cause of Ewell's noncompliance
with General Lees orders, was that he had
broken his line of battle by sending two brig
ades off on some duty up the York road.
General Early says that my failure to attack
at sunrise was the cause of Ewell's line being
broken at the time did attack. This is not
only absurd, but impossible After sunrise
that morning, Colonel Venable and General
Lee we're at Ewell's headquarters discussing
the attack with Ewell's corps. They left
Ewell with this definite order That he was
to hold himself in readiness to support my
attack when it was made. 1t is silly to say
that he was ready at sunrise. when he was not
ready at four o'clock, when the attack was
really made. His orders were to hold him
self in readiness to cooperate with my attack
when it was made. In breaking his line of
battle, he rendered himself unable to support
me when he would have been potential.
Touching the failure of the supporting brig.
ades of Anderson's division to cover McLaw's
flank by echelon movements, as directed, there
is little to be said. Those brigades acted gal
lantly, but went astray early in the fight.
General Anderson, in his report, says: "a
strong fire was poured upon our right flank,
which had become detached from McLaw's
left" General Lee, alluding to the action of
these two brigades, says: "But having be-
come separated from McLaws, Wicox's and
Wright's brigades advanced with great gal.
lantry, breaking successive lines of the ene-
my's infantry and compelling him to abandon
much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the
foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge
itself, driving the enemy down the opposite
side, but having become separated from Nc.
Laws, and gone beyond the other two brig
ades of the division, they were attacked in
front and on both Aanks, and compelled to
ret;-o, being unable to bring off any of the
captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell
back, and it being now nearly dark, General
Lonsstreet determined to await the arrival of
Pickett" So much for the action of the first
day.
GEN. LEES DETERMINATION.
did not see General Lee that night. On
the next morning he came to see me, and
fearing that he was still in his disposition to
attack, tried to anticipate him by saying:
General, have had my scouts out all night,
and find that you still have an excellent
opportunity to move around to the right of
Meades army and maneuvre him into at
tacking u.s." He replied, pointing with his
fist at Cemetery Hill: "The enemy is there,
and I am going to strike him" felt then
that it was my duty to express my convic'
tion said : General, have been soldier
all my life. I have been with soldiers en-
gagged in fights by couples, by squads, compa:
nes, regiments, divisions and armies, and
should know as we'll as any one what soldiers
can d.. 1t is my opinion that no $4,000 men
ever arrayed for battle can take that posi-
tion," pointing to Cemetery Hill. General
Lee, in reply to this, ordered me to prepare
Picketts division for the attack. should
not have been so urgent had I not foreseen
the hopelessness Of the proposed assault. l
felt that must say word against the sacri-
fee of my men and then felt that my re.
cord was such that General Lee would or
could not misconstrue my motives. / Isaid no
more, however, but turned away. The most
of the morning was consumed in waiting for
Pickett's men and getting into position. The
plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery
was to be massed in wood from which Pick
ett was to charge, and it was to pour con-
tinuous fire upon the cemetery. Under COW
er of this fire and supported by it, Pickett
was to charge
Our artillery was in charge of General E.
P. Alexander, brave and gifted officer. Col.
onel Walton was my Chief of Artillery, but
Alexander being at the head of the column,
and being first in position, and being besides
an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity
and intelligence, was given charge Of the ar.
tillery. The arrangements were completed
about one o'clock. General Alexander had
arranged that battery of seven 11-pound
howitzers, with fresh horses and full caissons,
were to charge with Pickett at the head of
his line, but General Pendleton, from whom
the guns had been borrowed, recalled them
just before the charge was made, and thus de-
ranged this wise plan. Never was so de-
pressed as upon that day. l felt that my men
were to be sacrificed, and that should have
m order them Tn make honaless charge.