Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1877-09-27
Is the Reduction of the Army Eeonom-
iaaf


Another principle drawn from oul
own experience is that too great re
duction of the regular army often re
suits in an increase of the transportation
expenses more than sufficient to main
tain a much larger number of troops
while in other cases this deficiency il
numbers has prevented the government
from nipping in the bud difficulties
which resulted in long and costly wars
I with vast augmentatiOns of the armed
force.
OF the first class of cases we may men
ton the Modoc war, where the expense
of bringing numerous small detachmentS
from distant posts would have maintain
ed 1or yeaIo o force that would have
prevented the trouble and saved all the
valuable lives lost The same NAV be
said of the recent Sioux war, and that
now in progress in Idaho, where the
like thing has occurred. This difficulty
arises constantly, and forms one main
element in the large charges for the
transportation Of the army.
Of the second class of cases may be
mentioned the wars against the Creeks,
the Seminoles, the Sacs and Foxes, which
would have been certainly avoided, or
at least brought to an immediate con-
clusion, had the regulara army been
somewhat larger.
| When the Mexican war broke out, the
actual strength of the regular army was
about $500. The force with which Gen.
Taylor reached the Rio Grande was 5000,
and that with which he fought the bat
| ties of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma
only 2,100. There can be no doubt that
if the strength of the army had suffoed
to enable him to move to the Rio Grande
with 10000 men, tlfe Mexicans would
not have crossed the river, and in all
human probability the war would have
been avoided. The cost of maintaining
the 1000 additional men during the
whole period from the close Of the war
Of 1872 to the commencement of the
Mexican war would not have amounted
to two-thirds of the direct expenses of
the latter war, not taking into account
the large cost of the Seminole and other
Indian wars, or the heavy losses by dis
ease and in battle, or the indirect losses
inseparable from all wars.
But the most instructive case of all is
that of the civil war. We do not doubt
that $4,000 regulars on the field of the
first Manassas would have insured the
complete rout of the raw Confederates,
and in all probability put an end to the
war. They would certainly have enabled
us to drive the Confederate government
out of Virginia, and have cleared the
eastern portion of the State as complete
ly as the work was accomplished q little
earlier in West Virginia. The cost of
maintaining these $4,000 additional
troops from the close Of the Mexican
war to the commencement of the war
Of secession would not have amounted
to one-fiftieth part of the war debts of
the general government, the states, coun-
ties, and municipalities. Should we
compare it with the total amount Of di-
rect and indirect expenditures by both
parties to the war, the losses of the two
sections in lives, in property destroyed,
business ruined, and capital sunk, we
should be at a loss to express the rela-
ton, so absurdly small would be the rel
atiye cost of those additional troops.
To present the subject in a somewhat
different aspect, let us take as a basis
the debt of the United States government
at the close of the war, Omitting the
large amounts paid directly from the
current revenues, the war debts, and
expenditures of the states, counties, and
municipalities, the losses caused by the
war, and the Confederate expenditures
and losses; let us, moreover, neglect the
diminution of cost per capita, which
holds IN large as against small force.
1t may be stated that the interest at
five per cent on the debt of the United
States government at the close Of the
war would, according to the cost of the
present establishment, support an army
of 1000 men in perpetuity; let us add
to this the fact that the amount we have
already paid in pensions would have
supported 10000 additional men from
the Mexican war to that Of secession.
When we consider this last fact-that
is, that our pension expenditure alone
would have maintained larger force
than was necessary to prevent the war
and think of the very large amounts
we have omitted in making the last
comparison, it would appear impossibles
to deny that undue economy in the pres
ent often leads to immense ultimate ex-
penditure. Mr.. Calhoun says: "Econo-
my is certainly very high political
virtue, intimately connected with the
power and public virtue of the commu-
nifty. In military operations, which,
under the best management, are so eX-
pensive, it is Of the utmost importance;
but by no propriety of language can
that arrangement be called economical
which, in order that our military estab-
lishment in peace should be rather less
expensive, would, regardless of the pur-
poses for which it ought to be maintain
ed, render it unfit to meet the dangers
incident to a state Of war."-Gen. GEO
B. MCCLELLAN, in Hape's Magazine for
October.