The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1877-10-21

Uus
pose these movements 1 had sixty thousand
| men. 1t would have been folly to have
DIVIDED my army the armies of the enemy
| were too far apart for me to attempt to fall
upon them in detail l considered the prob
lem in every possible phase, aud to my mind
| it resolved itself into the choice of one of
| two thinGs-eithsr to retire ON Richmond and
stand siege, which must ultimately have
ended in surrender, or to invade Pennsy lvania
| 1 chose the latter. Miiroy in my route
| crushed him, and as soon IS the First corps
| of my army crossed the Potomac, orders were
| issued oountermanding the advance of Foster
| and Dix. AS soon as my Second corps CROSSED
Hooker loosened his hold, and Old Virginia
was freer of Federal troops than she had ever
been since the commencem of the war HAD
my cavalry been in place my plans would
have been very different and think the re-
suit very different"
In speaking of the e ght of the Sd of July at
Gettysburg, General Lee said: ~ shall ever
believe if General Pender had remained on his
horse half an hour longer, We you'd nave car Jar,
ried the enemy's position. After FENDER fell
the command of his division devolved on an
officer unknown to the division; hence the fail
ure of Pickett's receiving the support OF this
division. Our loss was heavy at Gettysburg; but
in my opinion no greater than it would have
been from the series of battles would have
been compelled to fight had remained In virgi-
rose from his seat, and with an emphatic ges-
ture said, 'and sir, we did whip them at Gettys-
burg, and it will be seen for the next six
months that that army will be as quiet ae "A
sucking dove." The army of the Potomac
made no aggressive movement, saving the
faseo known as Mine Run, from the Sd of
July, 1868, until General Grant crossed the
Rapidan in May, 1864, precisely ten months
afterwsrd
whatever opinions may be entertained in
regard to the details Of the Battle of Gettys-
| burg, whether if Stonewall jackson had been
] in command of Hills corps on the first day
July 1st-a different result would have bsen
| obtained whether Longstreet unnecessarily
delayed his attack on the second day whether,
| as - expresses it, " the way in which the
fl gifts of the second day were directed does not
show the same coordination which insured the
success of the Southern arms at Gaines Mill
and Chsncellorsville )" whether the sht on
| the second of July should have been 81 all !;
whether the attack on the third, known as
" Pickett's CHARGE" should have been made, or
| whether the failure of this attack WAS due to
| the fact that General Lees orders were shame
| fully disobeyed, in its not being supported,
| thereby causing him TO lose the battle-or,
| whether General Lee, seeing the great strength
| of the enemy's position, should have turned it,
are opinions upon which men will differ but
| they sink into insignihcance' in my Judgment,
| when compared with the great cause which
brought about the failure of the Pennsy lvani \
campaign OF 1868.
| The failure to crush the Federal army in
1863 in the opinion of almost all the officers of
| the Army of Northern Virginia, can be ex-
| pressed in five words-the absence of our cavalry
Train giant for an encounter and he can be
| whipped by o. pigmy-if you put out his eyes.
| The eyes of an army are its cavalry. Before
Ewell crossed the Potomac General Lee wrote
| to General Stuart, commanding the cavalry, in
| substance, as follows: "Ewell will cross the
Potomac on q certain day at q certain point.
Hill will follow Ewell, crossing on given day
at given point; Longstreet will hold the gaps
these two corps; after Hill has crossed Long
| street will vacaJe the gaps and follow Hill !;
| on Longstreet vacatiDg the gaps in the noun
tains, you will seize them and protect Long
streets crossing; then follow Longstreet,
| throw yourself on the right Il ank of the army,
watch the enemy, give me all the information
supplies" General Stuart, probably thinking
! he could carry out General Lees orders and at
| the same time make O brilliant dash toward
aud threatening Washington, worked by his
| right flank, separating himself from Long
| street, crossing the Potomac river between the
enemy aud Washington City-makiDg swoop
toward Washington, then turning west to join
| the Army of Northern Virginia, hen he found
| the enemy had crossed the Potomac and were
between him and that army. This necessitated
his riding entirely around the Federal army,
| and ght him, whether from necessity or
not, cannot say, to Carlisle, Pa. From this
point he struck south and joined the Army of
Northern Virginia, being late IN the erening Of
July second. IL is thus evident that so far as
| deriving any assistance from his cavalry from
the - of June to the evening of July I'd, it
| might we'll have had DO existence. Every
| Off Ger who conversed with General Lee for
several days previous to. the Battle of Gettys.
burg, well remembers having heard such OK
pressions these: Can you tell me where
| General Stuart is - where on earth is my
cavalry ?" "Have you any news of the enemy g
movements ~ "What is the enemy going to
DOR " If the enemy does not find us, we must
| try and find him, in the absence of our cavalry,
as best we can w The eyes of the giant were
out he knew net where to strike movement
in any direction might prove q disastrous
| blunder.
have stated above that General Lees pur-
| pose in invading Pennsylvania was to break
up the enemys combinations, to draw him
from orr own territory, and to subsist his army
on that of the enemys. While this is true, his
intention was to strike his enemy the very first
available opportunity that Offored-be believing
he could, when such an opportunity otfered,
crush him. And here beg leave to differ from
-, when referring to the invasion of Penn
sylvania, he says: CO. The proof is that soon
as the latter (Meade) beg an to move, Lee, who
had undertaken nothing but a raid on too large
q scale, found himself so much endangered that
he was obliged to fight an offensive battle on
the ground where Meade chose to await him"
This determination to strike his enemy was not,
from the position he found himself, consequent
upon invasion, but from leading characters-
tic of the man. General Lee, not excepting
jackson, was the most aggressive man in his
army. This cannot and will not be contradict
ed, am satisfied. General Lee had he seen