Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1877-03-16

disturb so greatly the common cosrses o
business and OF life.
.. 1t would give occasion to the develop
mept and manifestation of a spirit of sec
tionalism. The interests and aims of ont
section would come to be pitted directly
against another section. There would be 6
tendency to an increasing unanmity in tht
vote of ono section against another section
and it might bring with it the germs OF 9
sectional strife No society is so compac,
and so thoroughly welded as to allow the
action of any disturbing force.
g. 1t would increase the motive for the
perpetration of extensive frauds, and, with
no barrier to break or limit their effect, the
consequence would become vastly more
serious. They would have direct in
fuencc upon the result, and this influence
would he greater in the degree OF its ex'
tent. In remote and less civilized sections,
the best securities might not avail to pre-.
vent frauds ola sweeping character, and the
danger would not be diminished in the dense
population OF cities.
1. 1t would be difficult to organize a
board of returns to count the vote and
ascertain the result. Its procedure would
be withdrawn from the direct oversight OF
the people, and they would be slow to trust
those to whom it was referred and whose
action was so far beyond their knowledge.
The main security is always in the vigilance
of contending parties, and in certain
limited section they are familiar with the
contending forces and can guard tho result.
So also in q close vote, where the returns
were so large and complicated, there would
be increased confusion.
5. The change, whatever tendencies exist
to produce it. would be too extreme in the
distribution of power. The change which
comes should be "ingrOoyed in that which
goes" And, while this change would OBJ
literate all the lines and limits which define
the power Of the separate States, it would
not secure a more complete representation
of the political whole.
The other method, ard the one preferred
by Mr.. Multord, is to vote by Electoral dis
tricts, instead Of as at present by States.
The number of Electors might remain the
same as now, two Electors t-l4rge being
chosen by the people of each STATE, and each
Representative District constituting an Elec-
toral District to choose single Elector. Or.
the Electoral College might be composed
solely Of the Electors chosen BY the separate
districts. If it be considered that the pres
eat number gives disproporticnatc inau-
ence to the smaller States, the basis might be
made the same as that of the popular House
Of the Congress. This form is not open to
the objections against the present system,
nor to those against popular vote.
This system, says Mr.. milford, of Elector-
al districts, would secure more perfect
representation Of the political whole. The
power would be brought nearer to the peo-
pie, as whole. Under this plan, at present,
the City of New York would DO represented
by eight Democratic Electors. while from
the remainder Of the State the larger num-
Der of the Electors would be Republican
and 50 in other States. OF course, under
this method, as general thing the Electors
would be divided politically, in each State,
about as the Congressman are. The author
We are quoting says
This system would limit the effect of
frauds, which TO legal provisions and no
securities could prevent. Their influence
would not be so direct nor would it extend
through the whole. In separate district,
where one political party was so strong rs to
intimidate or circumvent the opposite party,
the presumption would be that the party
oonrrh ha IN md
its only interest would lie in holding fair
election. So, il the city Of New York, there
would be no motive for accommodating its i'm
mcnse msjorities, by even doubtful measures,
since the result Of the election would be as
sured. And the worst influence in these
frauds is often not in the result. but on the
character Of the men who devise them, and
the agents they employ to perpetrate them,
and in the tistrust thcy create in the spirit
of the people. This system would diminish
the increasing political power of great cities.
In one election the city of New York, by its
own influence and by that obtained through
the overflow of its population, has deter
mined the result in three adjacent States
New York New Jersey and Connecticut. And
great cities, with their mayoralty and police
administrations and commercial relations,
have always tended to an imperial more than
a republican form. This system would con-
stitutc an organization coterminous with that
on which the House Of Representatives, the
popular branch of the Congress. is based. In
stead Of referring tho election to the House,
it would bring the power which forms the
llouse to act itself directly in determining
the executive power. This would Effectively
IL. t.,I.,o,- ,,binh y IN.
accumulate the whole power of tho Gov
eminent in the House Of Representatives.
The change to u system Of Electoral Dis
tricts could be effected under the Constitu-
ton for it says each State "shall appoint
the Electors in such manner rs the Legisla-
lure thereof may direct" But it is evident
that its permanent institution would require
its express provision in the Constitution.
Nor can the States be expected to effect the
change, for one would not change the form
without all the rest. When, for instance,
u Democratic State. as Kentucky. voted in
the Electoral College as unit, Republi-
can State, as Iowa, would not consent to a
divided Electorate. 1t is therefore vain to |
presume that the change to a system Of Eec-
toral districts could be established through |
the action Of the separate States and with
out the express provision of the Constitu-
ton. Nor is the Senate or the House Of
Representatives q body best constituted to
consider aud to form the necessary amend
ments to the Constitution. The whole sub
iect should he referred to commission, or
there should be call for convention.
There is also obvious need Of more
definitely prescribed Ian Of counting tho
Electoral vote. The constitutional proyis-
ion is indefinite There should be, Mr.
milford thinks. final board Of returns.
which might consist, as he suggests, Of the
three senior Judges Of the Supreme Court
ard Of three members of the Senate, each
Senator voting for two, aud three members
Of the House, elected in the same way or
simply of the i've senior judges.
But Mr.. Milford would not give the Con
gress or its bosrd of returns very extensive
powers, beyond the formal authorization Of
the certificates Of votes. lie says
The power OF inquiry as to the charac
tor Of the vote itself rhould be carefully pre-
,cribed, if in any instance it is allowed.
The fact is that the most thorough and
ample securities must be provided before
hand, to securs a free and full election, in
laws Of registry ard supervision. Then the