Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1877-08-04
TURKEY AND MONTENEGRO.
A london Times correspondence
Views ON the IOntenegrin War.

GETTINGE, June 25.-With regard
to some remarks I have seen made
as to the relative strength of
the armies which attacked Monte
negro last year and this, it is as well
to know that the army of Suleiman
is the largest and by far the most eff
cient (which has been brought against
Montenegro since the war began in
any single operation. Previously
operations were more complicated,
because there was a necessity of
guarding all the places in Herzego-
vina which might be attacked by
the Montenegrins; but they, under
their present conditions renouncing
all idea of conquest in Herzegovina,
menace those positions no longer;
and therefore Suleiman has been
able to concentrate the whole force
in herzegovina with most of that
in Bosnia, compelling Christians to
do the service of the trains, that his
force might not be diminished.
Among his battalions were some
from Diunis, and all in state of
high preparation. The Prince was
also enabled concentrate his troops,
but such is the MOntenegrin organ
ization, or rather want of organiZa-
ton, that an army of more than
5000 or 5000 men is less effective
than that number, and Vukotics,
who is only an efficient commander
of two or three battaliOns, knows
absolutely nothing of the art of war
as developed by modern armies, and
can only command what is under
his eyes. The unfortunate family
considerations which still retain him
in chief command appear too strong
to be overcome even by the menace
of the graVest disasters. The real
state Of things is better shown by
the Southern Army, where / may
now say freely, since all the cOndi-
tiOns are changed, BOzO and Pla-
menza had only five hattaliOns and
even from these the elite had been
drawn off to the Northern, leaving
the battaliOns | saw at Plana, most
ly boys and old men, opposed to
movable force of 20 full battalions,
with Il more in the Notifications.
Yet every effort of this Turkish force
to break from its central positions
through the thin circle of five bat
taliOns was defeated with disaster.
In the last effort of Ali Saib Pasha
to break through and meet Suleiman
Pasha the attack was made in full
force, and the only MOntenegrin adj
ditiOn was one battalion of Kutchi,
making six in all; and these being
enfeebled by the killed and wound
ed of the previous battles, it was not
Montenegro, but VukOtics and gen.
eral incapacity which were defeated
by Suleiman Pasha, aided by bitter
personal jealousies among the chiefs,
which there is no central control
strong enough to repreSs.
The passage Of Suleiman Pasha
through BjelOpaVlite was one of
those disastrous successes which,
were there more iron in the nature
of the Prince, would leave no cause
for triumph to the victor, who, ha-
raSsed to the last steps of his march
by the active and infuriated noun
taineers, could not halt before Dan
ilOgrad, or even bestOW a shot on
the batteries and battalions playing
on him across the river, but hurried
on, leaving a trail of dead and dy-
ING behind him which reached from
OstrOg to MartinitZa. In five days
of inceSsant combat, with one inter-
Vening day Ofrest, the Turkish Army
has passed over q distance which
only a few days ago | accomplished
in a walk of three hours. What
proves the enormous pressure felt by
the Turkish Army is the fact that
the right or western bank of the
river and the wider part of the plain
beyond it were unmolested, the Ar
nv not daring to send force down
that side. After Wednesday the
principal MOntenegrin force was act
ing in the rear and the left flank
above the Turks, the latter being
engaged in constant struggle for
the higher ground and pressed down
by the MOntenegrins in the first
three days, when the fighting was
limited to the high lands about Os-
trog. The artillery under the
Princes command played on the
Turks across the valley, and when
the fOrds had been passed they
moved down to Orealuk, when they
commanded the road as far as Dan
ilograd, where the bridge was strong
lydefended, and, useless precaution,
a section nearest the left bank was
burnt. Communication was eStab-
Iished across the river, behind the
Turks, as soon as they passed the
fOrdS. The Turkish losses can only
be guessed at, yet from the Monte
negrin, which will not be much less
than | 900 men killed and wounded,
.and from various data gathered from
partial report, | am satisfied that the
Turkish loss cannot be much less
than 1000 hOrS de combat. The Of
fetal report of the Turkish losses
yesterday alone puts them at 5000.
But in spite of everything, discip-
line and numbers have triumphed,
and / apprehend that the desperate
and undYing resistance of the Olden
times of Montenegro is no longer
possible, and that the general result
of the weeks work is fatal to Mon
tenegrO. To show the ipsOucidace
which has prepared the way for such
a disaster, | may say that the inva-
sion of WaSsOivichi by Mehemet Ali
found the Army armed only with
the old fiint-lOck smOOth-bOreS, and
it is only about two weeks ago that
rifles and ammunition were diStrib-
uted. The results were shown in
the defeat of two columns, endeaV-
Oring to enter the mountain cOun-
try; in one of which, the invading
force was pursued to KolOschin with
heavy loss.
Three days ago an express came
with news of q Turkish advance on
the Tchermnitza from two points,
and the additional information that
! there was no ammunition to resist
with. | cannot conceive the utility
of a Russian military delegation in
the Principality, unless it were to
! give some advice or exercise some
! supervision over the primitive and
everywhere defective organization
of the country. Thus far its only eff
feet seems to have been to confirm
the Prince in his blind course. | an
unable to telegraph from here the
real condition of affairs, which seem
to me to be desperate. The cOnfu
sion arising from the utter want o
head in the general direction cannot
we'll be exaggerated, and | fear tha
the week on which we are now en-
tering will see Montenegro succumb
There is still a chance that a decisive
battle on the well-knOwn grOunG
at Plana may be favorable; bu
if the armies are united it is no
likely that BOZO will be permit