, 1877-02-24

Tutcha, from one OF which pOl1iS the Turks
could undertake a counter-attAck against the
communication of a Russian army mlrcI-
Ing on Silistria. Since the time Of the Crime.
an War much money and trouble have been
spent in strengthening the f%ortrcsses of Widjn,
Rutschuk, and Siistria. Wherever the Rus.
slams attempted to cross there would, or ought
to be, a Turkish naval squadron, and, with re-
gard to this point, We are anxious to correct a
popular Misrepresentation. 1t is commonly sup
posed that if a Russian army arrived at the
Danube, or, as some sly, the Bosphorus or Oar
danelles, it could protect itself and its bridge
operations against the attack of ships Of war by
means of a system of toiped)es. Bat, in the
first place, the number Of ~torpedoes requisite
for such a purpose would be very great aud
would need as much transport as u large siege
train. Even supkosing that they have been
brought 10 the spot contem plated, how are they
to be laid down The river Or channel of The
sea must first be carefully sounded at every
place where q torpedo is 10 be placed, and his
10 face of on enemy commanding the water.
Then the time occupied in laying the t~orpedoes
would be very considerable, aud is to be reck-
oned by months rather than by weeks. The
idea is quite impraclicable. No system of tor
pedoes can be laid down without posses ion Of
the channel where they are to b. anchor>
ed, and one or two %gunboats c}ul1
render the operation impossible. White
head torpedoes, which are discharged into
the water aud move beneath the SUFFICE for
Il considerable distance, might, indeed, be
used against the ships which bar The passage,
but the swi(lncss of the stream would render
anything like accuracy of aim almost impos-
sible tue same Swifiuess would intoi FIRE wi1h
the efficiency of anchored torpcdocs. The
tact is that torpSdoes as a new weapon are ere
dited with many powers they do not possess,
and, whatever may be their value, it will count
in favour of that power which holds the com.
mand Of the water cOmmu.% lection. For one
instance in which th4y might be employed
from the shore by an army there are a hun
dred in which they might be used by gunboats
to prevent a crossing. Surprising the Turks
to be Skilfully handled, we cannot bur believe
that their possession of naval superioriy will
cause all new inventions to aid them in
defending the passage Of the Danube, aud
the operation ought to cost The Russian
army dear, even if it is successful, especially
when we consider that the troops would be
encamped in a district we'll known for its
unhealthy character, while the Turks would
have the advantage Of higher ground aud a
more healthy atmos phcre ON the other hand,
the passage Of a river somewhere is only a
matter of time, and will doubtless be eventually
effected.
Now let US suppose that the Russians have
succeeded in crossing the river somewhere ald
have obtained a footing in Bulgaria. We arc
NOT, of course, surprising The case of an occu.
patton agreed upon by the Great Powers, but
one in which force had been used by Russia alone,
and had still to be used. The Russian Army
would find itself in a country rich indeed in
supplies of food, but possessing a population
accustomed TO look on their rulers with such
suspicion that all stores of corn not exported
are buried in carefully selected hiding places.
Russian officers aud soldiers are not remarka a.
bic for gentleness Of demeanour, and the
passage of an army is always terrible to peace
ful folks so we may be permitted TO doubt
whether the boards of grain would be forth
coming. Certainly not unless they were paid
for. Again, Bulgaria is so full Of woods AMI
whole districts impossible to all but the
Initiated that there is neve: any diff u!ty in
cOncealing focks and herds. The peasants
would already have been deprived of what
ever the Turkish armed forces needed and
could find, they have been trained to conceal
ment during the whole of their lives, and we
cannot suppose that they would take the
trouble to bring supplies of all sorts to the
particular roads on which the Russians were
marching. Moreover, these principal roads
are few and commanded by fO~rtressts which
would have absorbed all the provisions they
could obtain, and along the same roads must
Aa We marched the Turkish army In its ratraat.