The daily gazette., 1877-05-16
5AF1ER GETTYSBURG.
WHY MEADE DID NOT ATTACK LEE UPON
-fn THE POTOMAC. ..

WHY MEADE DID NOT ATTACK LEE UPON
-1h THE POTOMAC.
Col. James @. Biddle, In the Phila Weekly
Times. sar.
1t had been General Meade's inten-
ton to order general advance from our
lett after the close of the action, but ow-
Ing to the lateness of the hour and the
wearied condition of the army, with a
wisdom that did guide his valor to act in
safety" he abandoned the movement he
had contemplated. For this he has been
severely censured General Howard, in
an article in the atlantic Monthly of July
last, says: al have thougt that the fear
ful exposure of General Meade's head
quarters where so much havoc was oc-
casioned By the enemy's artillery had SO
impressed him that he did not at first
realize the victory he had won." The
reverse of this is true. General Meade
was not in the least "demoralized" by
the enemy's fire, but realized fully the
exact condition of affairs. Lee had been
repulsed, not routed, and if Meade had
yielded to his own inclination to attack,
he would have been repulsed himself,
| and would thus have thrown away the
fruits of his great victory. That this
view is correct is proved beyond all
doubt by the following passage from Mr..
William Swinton's "History of the
Army of the Potomac" Mr.. Swinton
says:
l have become convinced from the
testimony of General Longstreet himself
that attack would have resulted disas-
trously. 81 had," said that officer to the
writer, "Hood and McLaws, who had
not been engaged; had heavy force of
artillery; 1 should have liked nothing
better than to have been attacked, and
have no doubt that 1 should have given
those who tried as bad a reception as
' Pickett received"
On July 4th, Lee, during a heavy
storm, withdrew from our front, and on
the 11th he took up position at Will
Transport, on the Potomac. He was
closely followed by Meade, who came up
with him ON the 10Th, and who found
him in aposition naturally almost inpreg-
| nable and strongly fortified. Meade's
impulse was to attack at once, but, after
| consultation with his corps commanders,
he abstained from ordering an assault
until he could more fully reconnoitre the
enemy's position. On the morning of
the 14th reconnaissance in force, sup
ported by the whole army, was made at
daylight, but ON the night of the 18th Lee
had recrossed the Potomac. There was
a great deal of clamor at the time because
Meade did not destroy or capture Lees
army at Williamsport, but Meade, con-
scious that he had tied wisely, always
| felt that history would do him justice
Had he assaulted he would certainly
have been defeated, and the result would
| have been disastrous not only to the
army, but to the country, for defeat to
our army there would have opened the
| road to Washington and the North, and
/ all the fruits of Gettysburg would have
been dissipated A brief reference to the
subsequent experience of the Army oi
the Potomac will confirm the truth OF
this assertion. In May, 1864, we began
the campaign with one hundred and tif-
teen thousand men, and after Spottsyl-
vania Court House were constantly re-
ceiving heavy reinforcements. General
Lee had about sixty thousand men. And
yet with this great preponderance OF
strength, we assaulted the enemy again
and again in positions not so strong as
the one held at Williamsport, always
without success and with terrible loss.
From the crossing of the Rapidan on
May 9Th, to the unsuccessful assault on
the enemy's works at Petersburg, June
18th, a period of about six weeks, the
Army of the Potomac lost not less than
seventy thousand men, In the battles
between the Army of the Potomac and
the Army of Northern Virginia, in no
case was direct assault upon an in,
trenched position successful.