The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1877-07-16
The Present Aspect of the war between
Russin and Turkey.


certainty has been increased since the in
PRODUCTION Of modern weapons has altered
the old conditions Of war, and greater facili- |
ties of communication have modified those
arrangements which belong more cxclu-
sivcly to the Quartcrmaster-Gcncra de- |
partmcnt.
The impression has been almost universal
In this country that the Russians, owing 10
their vastly superior military strength,
more perfect organizations and higher civ
ilzation, would make short work of the Turk
Ssh armies opposed to them. and that both III
Armenia and Bulgaria their successes would
be rapid and complete. So far from such be-
ing the case, however. the Turkish armies
have already proved that their cause is by
no means so desperate as has been supposed.
Now reaction of opinion is slowly setting
In, and the bare possibility Of the Russian
campaign in the East terminating in disas
ter seems gradually to be forcing itself upon
men minds.
II may bc interesting to examine the mill
tary position at this juncture. in connection
both with the causes which have produced it
and the results to which it may lead. In con-
sequence Of the difficulties of TRANSPORT and
of complications arising out of the fact that
the frontiers of Russia We're not contcrmi-
nous with those of Turkey proper. but with
those of the Danuhian principalitics. great
delay took place in massing the Russian
armies ON the Danube, while that river
Itself ntcrposcd the first serious obstacle to
their progress. Hence il happened that the
war opened in Armenia, where no such diff
cultics existed, and in some ill-informed
quarters the impression was thereby pro-
huccd that the main attack of the Russians
"jr,,s, 49,. 49," Turkish expire was 10 be from
this direction. While this conjecture seemed
utterly absurd to those familiar with the
topography of the country even they were
hardly prepared for the sudden and COM
plete collapse which has ovcrtaken the Rus
sian forces in that region, and which there
is no doubt was mainly due To de-
fective strategy. The attack Of the
Russians ON three separate lines. one by
Batoum. one 10y Kars, and the other by Bay
aid, the objective point being between hars
and ErZcroum, before the former stronghold
had been taken, seems contrary to the iirst
principles of war. The idea appears Ia have
been that the central column should mask
Kars, while the two others each inferior TO
the Turkish army in strength, should en-
deavOr To form a junction before Erzeroum.
The result was that they were beaten in de-
tail, and the central column, finding itself
alone and unsupported, was compelled to
raise The Siege OF Kars and retire precpi-
lately across the Russian frontier. There
can be little doubt that the evacuation of
Arabian and Bay azid must immediately fol-
low and that the Turkish army will reoccu-
py their old line Of frontier without fear OF
any more serious mocstation from the Rus
sians for this year at all events. They will
need rctnforccments, which must be draw
from Central Asia, and cannot reach the
scene Of war before the winter sets ill., while
the disturbed state Of the Caucasus in thcii
rear will fully occupy the defeated Russian
troops, whose morale cannot fail to have
been affected by their recent reverscs.
the Turks are wise, they will not think O
pressing their advantage across their owl
frontier They would lose men, and gail
nothing which could possibly compensate
Tor the absence Of their troops from IA
more important field Of operation.
The whole effort Of Turkey should be un
uucstonahly directed upon Bulgaria; for
Is upon these once fertile but now dcsoat
PLAINS that the fate of the empire will b
decided That the Russians should, NOR
than two months after the declaration {
war. have succeeded in crossing III
Danube at Sistova, does not surprise u
The defence Of so Tonga line Of frontier vii
an army numerically 50 far Inferior in nun
bers TO the invading force was practic
impossibilty The question is, now that
large part OF the Russian army Is across IL
river whether their position is very sa
al.al itftt
reached rs, the Turks have pursued the po
icy Of laying waste the country before Il
advance Of the enemy. This has notab
been the case ia the Dohrudscha. Pra
tically, therefore, We may consider u
Russians almost entirely dependent up'
their own commissarlat for supplies. II
yond this, they have all their ammunition
bring up The modern weapons o. precise
requiring this to be specially adapted, bo
in the ease Of infantry and artillery, to q
particular weapon used exclusively III I
Russian army, they cannot, AZ was the ga
IN our own rebellion depend to the smalle
extent upon what they may capture nc
the enemy.
All the provisions stores, and reserve al
munition for an army Of at least 2Oo,oVl m
rand with a smaller force il would be fut
10 attempt to cross the Balkans must
brought first, by a long single line Of railw
from tine heart Of Russia through soum
mia to the Danube; they must then be tran
ported across single fragile bridge, viii
nrcccnt storm sodainaged that "A whole d
WAS occupied in repairing it, and which
liable tomprc serious INJURY atauy molnei
and finally, either railroad must be bu
expressly for the army a. IL advances FRI