The New York herald., 1877-10-20
True Reason OF Russia's Failures
Lack of Good Gemeralship.

| Lack of Good Generalship.
The unaccountable folly and sloth Of the
Turkish government at the beginning OF the
war offered to the Russian army an oppor-
tunity to finish, by single seasons cam
paign. the work it had undertaken; but TINS
chance has been almost hopelessly lost by
bad generalship and mismanagement' and
the Russian situation. although improved by
the victory in Armenia and the perilous
position Of Osman Pacha at Plevna, Is by no
means o satisfactory one. Added to the
severity of winter already commenced, and
to the depletion Of battalions smarting under
reverses, lies the graver question OF future
supplies, should any serious interruption
occur to the operation of the Roumanian
railroads, the transit across the Danube, or
the wagon roads become impossible in Bull
garia. It may be. however, that the Turks
will be as unfortunate in this respect as
their enemy, and that the war may drag its
weary length through the winter in the diff
fcult transportation of supplies to be con-
sumed by ill-fed soldiers holding present
positions.
The Russian soldier has proved his great
marching powers, his stolid courage and his
admirable discipline to the satisfaction OF his
warmest admirers, but the Russian generals
have displayed incapacities such as their
most bitter critics would hardly have dared
to predict The war has failed to produce
on the Russian side many general officers
who would have been deemed fit to COM
mand brigade in any of the late great
wars of the world, and the heroism OF
the fighting soldier has been neutralized
by the inefficiency of the generals The
position is yet far from desperate but
continuance of such generalship as the
Cars ieutenants have displayed must
result either in defeat or in victory won by
gigantic brute force against constantly
weakening army-a spectacle not calculated
to retain for Russia the respect ofher present
sympathizers. -sguah t ~ eaFIee
1t is painful to contemplate the results
Of defeat to Russia. Not alone on account
Of the restored and strengthened arrogance
of the Turk sure to be most displayed
toward his Christian vassals; not alone
on account of the humiliation to Russia in
seeing her lately budding civilization
also in the political chaos sure to arise
in such international policies as are now
based upon decided, if only tenn
porary, balance Of power. Indeed, one
promise for Russias ultimate success in the
struggle lies in the fact that the political
complexion of Europe can hardly allow
such changes as Russias defeat would en-
tail. It is idle for Great Britain to fancy
that European peace would be strength
ened were Russia to fail in the present war.
Germany, released from apprehensions of
interference from Russia, would bethe freer
to realize her astute Chancellors desire to
again see France crushed and humiliated,
and France herself might Mt any hour fur
nish the pretext. Should this or any other
important strife be among the indirect Sc
uuences of disaster to Russia it would be
nearly impossible to exclude the clerical
question, now more than ever smouldering
fire amid the passions and prejudices Of
Europe.
Russia is to-day far more important
factor in European politics than is gener-
ally believed either in Great Britain or in
this country. Germany is the military ar
bitter of Europe; but even Germany must
consider Russias power and position before
deciding too arbitrarily on any question
concerning her neighbors. One proof
of this, were proof needed. lies in
the coquetting Of France with Russia
ever since the Franco-Prussian war; an
other, in the frequent colloquies of the in
spired agents OF the three empires Of Ger
many, Austria and Russia on subjects,
perhaps, passing beyond the strict boun-
daries of the Eastern question" 1t can
not be doubted that Russia in entering upon
the present war acted with the sanction of,
Germany, and the existence Of secret
treaty between Russia and Austria in the
same direction is credited by some Of the
best informed statesmen Of Europe How
ever this may be, it is more than doubtful
if Europe can allow Russia to fail utterly,
even though inefficient generals may make
failure almost a certainty. English prejus
dices would be gratifed and English fears
for those very shadowy properties called
British interests" would be calmed, but
Europe at large cannot afford to witness
Russia's defeat or dshonoring peace. nrn2
The finances of Russia have q much
slighter bearing on the present conflict
than is usually the case in wars. The army
can be fed, clad and nearly armed from
Russian products, and the only pressing
exterior necessity is for some eighty mill
ion dollars payable annually abroad in coin
as interest upon the foreign debt. Within
the Empire paper currency will continue to
be perfectly acceptable to the masses at its
face value. The average Russian would
think it impiety to question the printed
staten rent in the imperial name as to the