, 1877-07-05
TIE DANUBE.
JUST DHFonB THE CROSSING.
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At any hour We may hear that tho Ru&sIans
arc crossing, Or trying to Cross, the Danube:
and several things tend to show that tho mo-
mcnt uf action >ls near. Already, Indeed, The
invaders have lost 20 much valuable time thatit
tnay bo difficult for them to finish their work
this yoar It the Turks show respectable powers
Of rcsletanee. 8ueh delay can be explained
only bT tho supposition that The army was far
from being 80 well prepared for campaign a.
1t w0s supposcd to be when Russia declared
war. But DO long time eau now elApee before
tho attempt Is made 70 execute one Of
tue greatest military operations in tho
history Of war, Tho Danube ls slnking--ln .
few days tbs level waa lowered three fcet-thc
rays Of midsummer sun arc drying tho soaked
lands on tho northern bank, and tho Russians
must soon attempt the pertlous passage. It IL
useless to speculate On place, manner, chances,
snaneu7rce, probable losses, or possible results.
There Is something prstent!ous In amateur
strategy, which IL generally bascd on msp Of
the scale to which Lord Salisbury attributes tho
tcrrors Of his alarmtst, and Oh sonlu volume not
moro recondlte than 4 popular History Of
Turkey" What is morally certaln IL that
tho pasaagu Of the Daaube by 25o.0oo
tncn IN 1871 will be = military operation
u different as possible from the psssngc by
u General as auy one to be found now on the
staff Of tho Grand Duke Nicholas, but wero he
living he would recognize that tho maacuvro he
accomplished was simple aud obvious In CON-
pastson with the movements which must bc cx-
ecuted by ILLS succcs&ofa. The TURKS arc. At
the leaat. $4,000 strong In Dulgaria, and u
they arc nqk ready To contcss tho passage 1t Is.
not for whnt o. fsd@ doe~ know
wards. Tller hare had time to erect
works wherever they might think 1T to
place them. They hage hal aons oi the best
tie1asi.. ii.iisn, ilunsa5iaa. IT, ssid, Indeed.
that tho serasktes and the Serdss are botlI
Jealous Of military Interference and are possess
e. T!.h the !dea ih.. Turkish geasralship, nke
not be surpassed. There has certainly been
much less disposition than was expected to AZ
cspt the services Of foreign officers, It least fur
high commands; hut the Turks have,
@ fofeign .ugsesttons II 'ae,'' hey were ssa thei1
own inspirations. Then they haye the tee-
graph, which necessarily placcs tho who!e
army under tho immediate orders OF the CON-
tton; On thc other hand. we u.ay be sure that
all that could be anteccdeatly determined on
the subject has Icen long determined BY the
kusslans. OF course, the piaa must be modified
Of preparation VI the enemy, hut The alternative
movements arc doubtless consistent with geu-
cru! scheme. Another thing We may expect Is
that what Is done will lu done suddsnlJ, and,
placu. The fault Of the Turks, - far II We esu
Judge, L. thc maalug their men be-
| hind their fortsesaes. They have great
faith In theiF power vi holding works, and
this quality has been made the subject ol un.
w!se culogtum By their EuRl!sh frie,lds. What
they have donu or Will do u Batouul or ksEs,
Kustchuk or shuu,la, IL dxelt upon ~ heroic.
But nothing Is more certain than that an army
| which Eenounces the ofen&4ve IL fusedoomot,
TIC Turks III the bulgarian fostresscs u behind
the works Of this Balkan can, after I'll, only 70.
pulse tho enemy; II they DO not pursue HIN aud
drive him out Of thclF country, there eau b.
but ono cnd. It is trom this poiut Of view that
tbs passage Of the Danube b tho great opeFa-
| tlou Of tue war. Here the offensive 10 tho most
pertlous, the defense may bo the meat complete
| and ckushloX.
The Danube will b bstdged It the cost Of
shcer hard lighting. Thess, Is no doubt ono
wy 10 Which tho passa9e for =: Least fow
BY march Into beEyi4u territory. II haa hxeu