Connecticut western news., 1877-12-21
THE EUROPEAN WAR.
After the Capture of Plevnn what is the Rus-
 sian Army Do

After the Capture of Plevnn what is the Rus-
 sian Army to DOe
 What will Russia do next |? is now the momentous question puzzling the Euro pean Cabinets. While the Czar keeps his own counsel, the position of his ar, mics indicate the military opera tions which he may attempt. The force which invested Plevna has been es- timated at 100, ,OOO men, with many hun dred guns. This immense army being now in Plevna and the neighboring viii lages, is within eighteen miles of the Danube on the north: fifty-fve of Tirno- va on the southeast eighty of Rustchuk on the northeast, and ninety of Sophia in the west. Should it follow in the foot steps of portion of the Russian army in 1929, it will advance to Sophia whence it may, without encountering any formid- able defenses or natural obstacles, move leisurely on to Adrianople. The road to Sophia has already been cleared of Turks as far as Etropol, fifty-two miles from Plevna, and although Mehemet Ali mas been contesting the onward march of the invaders, it is evident from the tardy eff forts that his force is insufficient to resist the great army which the Russians are now at liberty to send against him. Should the Moscovites undertake this line of attack, they must be efficiently aided by the Servians, who are impatient for the fray. Their frontier is within 62 miles of Sophia, to which there is main road to Belgrade. Being thus conven- tent to the valley leading to Adrianople, it is possible for the Servians to assail the rear of an Ottoman force defending the Balkan defles which give access to Sophia from the Plevna road. Stimula- ted by the Russian victory at Plevna, Prince Milan may raise easily 30, 900 men for this enterprise, in which they would be materially aided by the friendly pop ulation in that portion of Bulgaria. Un- der other circumstances the fortress of Widdin might stand in the way of this project, but it has been denuded of troops to reinforce Osman Pasha, and may be maSKcd Dy 1U,OUU neu.
 Respectively of this movement, 1t is open to the Russians to recross the Bal kans at the Shipka Pass and descend in that way to Adrianople. They have avail able for this purpose an army of 10000 men at Tirnova, which, reinforced by the victors of Plevna. would be we'll nigh ir- resistable. The main obstacles to this movement would be the presence of Sulieman Pasha at Elena. and the great difficulty of maintaining communication across the steep mountain, crowned with snow. But the dismay which the reap pearance of the Russians in Roumelia, would cause at Stamboul, as we'll as the joy with which their presence would be hailed by the outraged Christians, smart ing for revenge, are considerations which may outweigh the dictates of military prudence.
 Two other Russian armies are also available for active operations of more or less importance. One is that of the Czarewitch, probably 50,00O strong, which has been posted between Jantra and the Lom, for the double purpose oi watching Rustchuk, and preventing Suleiman from going to the aid of Osman Pasha. The other is that of Gen. Zim, merman, 10000 strong, holding the Dobrudja, where it has been inglorious ly inactive throughout the campaign. II is practicable now for the Czarewitch tc prepare for the investment, while Gen Zimmerman, at the opposite angle of the quadrilaterial, threatens Silistria, ant thereby forces the Porte to keep there { large garrison for it's defence.
 While the Russians may thus cherisl great expectations, as sequel to the fal of Plevna, it is not improbable that they will hold the ground they have won, ant allow the work of disintegration to go o1 in the Ottoman Empire, A few months ago typical Turk observed that it wal foolish to lose precious lives in punish Ing the Russians it would be better to leave them to Allan. It may need only great victory to convince fatalists like him that absolute submission is the de cree of destiny.