Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1877-08-11


, army moving from the Danub
across the Balkans. If once the Rus
slams reach Adrianople it is praet
cally a certainty that they wi
at once move a force upon Gallipol.
The Turkish forts on the Dardanelle
would then be taken in reverse, an
would, with their armament {
heavy guns, fall into Russian hands
Our sailors may engage the forts al
terwards; that is all they could do
1t comes to this: that if the Russian
go by land to the Dardanelles, the
can bar the passage with their guns
and, without running the gauntle
of their fire, no British ship coulC
approach Constantinople.
The Russians have been slow, very
slow, in their advance thus far. II
Asia there seems no reason to dOub
that they have received a very Sc
we're check. General Loris Melikof
seems to have committed the serious
fault of undertaking the strength O
his enemy. The school-bOoks or
the art of war teach that when q
commander of an invading army
has choice of several lines of adj
vance, he does wisely to make feints
| upon all but one, and to concentrate
his force upon that one line so as to
be superior or equal in numbers to
his adversary. 1t is a maxim OF
strategy that if you divide your for
ces into number of separate col
umns, which cannot support each
other, you run the risk of having
them beaten separately in detail.
Yet this is apparently precisely what
General MelikOff has done. Detach-
ing one force to invest Batoum, and
another to invest Kars, he has bro
ken up the remainder of his troops
into three columns, of which one ad-
vanced by way of Ardahan, and two
others by roads to the east of Ere
roum. These last two detachments
have been separately beaten, and
compelled to retreat hastily, and, if
newspaper reports may be believed,
in disorder. The detachment which
advanced by Ardahan has fallen
back also. The troops investing
Batoum spent their strength in vain
assaults upon a strOngly-intrenched
position; and now that they have
abandoned their object, must be de-
mOraliZed by successive failures.
Whether the force besieging Kars
will be more successful, or whether
the Turks can raise the siege, we do
not yet know but up to the date of
our writing, there is no success there
which can be set against so many
other defeats. Meanwhile rumors
reach us of insurrectiOn spreading to
Georgia and Daghestan, and the
Turks are still on Russian soil at
Sukhum Kale. So far the campaign
in Asia is a history of Russian fail
ure.
1t has been wisely pointed out by
our contemporary, the Observer,
that the most probable result Of the
Turkish victories in Asia will be to
accelerate the march of events south
Of the Danube; that if the Russians
had been successful in Armenia,
they might have acceded to terms
of peace in Europe consistent with
the maintenance of the external fab
ric Of the Ottoman Empire; but that
the repulSe of their armies in Asia
c0mpelS them to deal a decis-
i've blow in Europe. And there can
be little doubt it is their intention
to do this. If their progress thus
far has been slow in Europe, it has
been sure. ROumania has been con-
verted into a vast depot of supplies
for the advancing army. That army
has crossed the Danube, and the
river is no longer an obstacle
in its path. Carefully as the Rus
sian commanders have kept the Sc
cret Of their movements, we have
learnt enough to know that the bulk
of their army has invaded Bulgaria,
and that the fortnight which has
since passed has been employed in
transferring to Turkish soil the
means of supporting the army, in
intrenching the approaches to the
bridges, and in preparing for an adj
vance. Everything now must de-
pend upon the numbers and quality
of troops. In face of what has Oc- |
CURED in Asia, falsifying the predic- |
tiOns of all military authorities, it is
dangerous to predict Russian success
in Europe; but if the Russian troops
are decently commanded, and fight |
well, they should be able
to beSiege Rustchuk, mask Schumla, |
and cross the Balkans farther to the |
west with a force sufficient to deal |
with any army the Turks can bring |
against them in the open field. The |
problem has now become |
one Of extreme interest. The whole |
Russian army is now limited to one |
line of retreat, in case of disaster. |
The exact disposition of the Turkish |
troops is unknown; but we may |
suppose Schumla to be
the headquarters of the main army. |
On its left the Russian army has |
strongly garrisOned; on
it's right are the bodies of Turkish |
troops which have been echeloned |
along the Danube from Widdin to
To invest Rustchuk-
and it must be both invested and
besieged-will take not less than
10000 men. An equal number will
be required as a corps of observation
on the right flank. Thus two whole
corps out of the five or six which |
may possibly have been thrown
across at SistcVa will be absorbed, !
and cannot take part in the advance.
If the army, thus reduced to three
Or four corps, advances directly upon
TirnOva, it must detach half its force
10 guard its flank against an attack
from Schumla, or run the grave risk
Of finding its communications sew
cred after it had become engaged in
the passes of the Balkans, in which
case it must return to fight. On the
other hand, if the army passes the
Balkans with this still furthur re-
luced force, it may find that the
Turks, leaving but a garrison in
have moved their whole
fighting force to meet it south of the
Balkans. The situation is full Of
into which a general, even
Of great ability, might well fall.
The Russian COmmander-in-ch
has before him one of the most diff
icult problems in war; and unless
he is well served by his cavalry,
who should give him information,
Oy his engineers, who must improve
MS means of communication, by his
which must gather in
The supplies of the whole surround
ing country, and by his troops, who
must fight hard. advance is precari-
lus in the extreme. These are his
On the other hand, the
COmmander-in-ch sees
compelled to keep large de-
Widdin, SiliStria, Rust
,huk Schumla and with inferior !