The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1877-11-07

The arrival Of Gen. ToDLEBEN at the
headquarters Of the Russian army has al
ready produced marked change in the
PR gross Of the Eastern war. Ii is evident
that he has not merely Infused new life and
vigor into the movements of the troops but
changed tho whole plan of the campaign. 1t
was originally intended by the Russian
commanders 10 take Rustchuk. and make
their main line Of operations by way Of
Giurgcvo ano that fortress. and 10 use the
Rustchuk anG Narna line of railway a. far
south as they could Instead of this, they
arc Low making a railway from Frntest,
the first station north of Gurgcvo, to Sim
nitla, and the bridge between that town and
Sst0ya Will ntnue 10 he maintained
a- their permanent means of access TO
Bulgaria. 1t will not be possible for them
10 construct line Of railway this winter
from Siatova to the Balkans; but it would
seem from the accounts which reach Us that
Russian troops are being ccheOncd in great
force along the Line Of road from Sistova TO
the foot Of the Shipka Pass, from which We
may infer that II is hoped that before the
winter l. too far advanced, the capture Of
PlcYna will render IL possible to make am
other attempt TO reach Adrauople. Mean
time the whole energies oil the new Com
mander-n-C hicf-fur although Gen. IoDLE-
BEN does not enjoy that titlc there can be
little doubt that lac is virtually acting in
that capacty-haye been directed To the ac-
compli,lment II II complete Investment of
plcVua This ne has been able to carry out
10y means of theprrival Of the Imperial Guard
and con idorahlo other rcGnforccmcnts, os-
pecially Of cavalry, which are now engaged
inuttcmpts 10 interrupt the communications
to the rear OF PleNua, and hold the passes
10y which supplies would reach Orchanio
ACROSS the Balkans
IL is evident that the position Of OsMAN
pa-ha has thus become very critical, and
military authorities who foresaw the dan
ger have been predicting for the last month
that hc would not wait at plcvna 10 be holn-
ncl iu, lut u.ko good his retreat 10 Orcha-
ME while tho way WAS still opcn. lie would
have been quit" as much 4. thorn in the side
OF the ltu--ians there rs at IlcYnn for they
would have been Obliged 10 follow him,
whlio he would have been nearer his sup
plies. Either he did not appreciate tho dun
ger which is not likely, for he has proved
himself an able officer or ho had no means
~ moving his large army, and was rcuc-
tlut to abandon guns which he would have
had TO burst, and military stores which hO
had noincans Of transporting; or else lac has
larger supplies than Is generally supposed,
and trusts 10 being able 10 maintain siege
under circumstances in which the bcsi,gore
viii suffer more than the bcslogcd. II by
any chance OsMAN Pasha has three or four
months supplies at Plcyna, he is quite right
to remain there; but we believe this 10 be
"Hii'h"ly Improbable. 1t will most likely
he found that lac made II great mistake in
not retiring IL month ago, even at cOnsidcIa-
bic eacrliicos. A it *, if his supplies run
short We do not believe that he IN u General
to surrender, and under no circumstances
will the Turks follow the example Of the
French, either at Metz or Sedan.
great deal will necessarily depend upon
the military capacity OF CuEyKlr Paeha.