The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1877-11-15

S77.
ridge discovered that they were suffering
terribly from fire that swept over theil
right and left tanks. also found that my
left flank was not protected by the brlgades
that were to move en- echelon with 1t. Nc
Laws line was consequently spread out to
the left to protect its flank, and Hoods line
was extended to the right to protect its
flank from the sweeping fire of the large
bodies of troops that were posted on Round
Top*. These two movements of extension
so drew my forces out that I found myself
attacking Cemetery Hill with a single line
of battle against not less than $4,000 troops.
NV two divisions at that time were cut
down to eight or nine thousand men, four
thousand having been killed o- wounded.
We felt at every step the heavy stroke of
fresh troops-.he sturdy regular blow tn at
tells soldier instantly that lie has en-
countered reverses or re;nforcements. We
received no supper at all, and there was no
evidence Of cooperation on any side. 10
urge my men forward under these cir
cunstances would have been madness, and
l withdrew them in good order to the peach
orchard that we had taken from the FEEDER
ais early in the afternoon. 1t may be mem
toned here as illustrative of the dauntless
spirit of these men that when Gen. Hum
phreys, of Mississippi, was ordered to with
draw his troops from the charge he thought
there was some mistake, and retired to a
captured battery near the swale between
the two ridges, where he halted, and when
ordered to retire to the new line second
time he did so under protest.t Our men had
no thought of retreat. They broke every
lire they encountered. When the order to
withdraw was given courier was sent to
Gen. Lee informing him of the result of the
days work. 4
A MARVELLOUS ASSAULT. ~
Before pursuing this narrative further, [
shall say word or two concerning this as
sault. am satisfied that my force, NUM-
bering hardly 900 men. encountered dur
ing that three and half hours of bloody
work rot less than 60, 900 of the Federals, land
yet the charge was not checked nor their
line broken until we ordered them to with
daw. found that night that 1929 OF my
men, more than one third of their total
number, had been left on the field. His
tory records no parallel to the fight made
by these two divisions on the End Ct July
at Gettysburg.
EWELL's INACTION. fpiH
1t may be imagined that was astonished
at the fact that we received no support after
we had driven the felerals from the peach
orchard and one thousand yards beyond. If
General Ewell had engaged the army in his
front at that time (say o'clock he would
have prevented their massing their whole
army in my front, and while he and Kept
their two wings engaged Hill would have;
found their centre weak, and should have
threatened it while 1 broke through their
left and d;slodged them. Having failed to
move at O'Clock while tile enemy was in
his front it was still more surprising that he
did not advance at o'clock with vigor and
promptness when the trenches in front OF
him were vacated, or rather held by one
single brigade, las General Meade's testl-
mOny before the committee on the conduct
of the war states.) Had he taken these
trenches and scattered the brigade that held
them he would have found himself In the
federals' flank and rear. His attack in the
rear must have dislodged the federals, as it
would have been totally unexpectedly be-
ing believed that he was in front of ME. Hill
charging upon the center at the same tine
would have increased their disorder and we
should have won the field. But Ewell did
not advance until had withdrawn my
troops, and the first corps, after winning
position after position, was forced to with
draw from the field with two corps Of their
comrades within sight and resting upon
their arms. Ewell did not move until about
dusk according to his own report.) He then
occupied the trenches that the enemy had
vacated, (see General Meade's report.) The
real cause OF Ewell's noncompliance with
General Lees orders was that he had broken
his line of battle by sending two brigades
OFT on some duty up the York road. Gen.
eral Early says that my failure to attack at
sunrise was the cause of Ewell's line being
broken at the time I did attack. This is not
only absurd, but impossible. After sunrise
that morning Colonel venable and General
Lee were at Ewell's headquarters discuss
ing the policy Of opening the attack with
Ewell's corps. They left Ewell with this
definite order that he was to hold himself
in readiness to support my attack when it
was made. Ills silly to say that he was
ready at sunrise, when he was not ready at
four O'Clock when the attack was really
made. His orders were to hold himself in
readiness to cooperate with my attack when
it was made. In breaking his lire Of battle
he rendered himself unable to support me
when he would have been potential. Touch
| Ing the failure of the supporting bfigades Of
Anderson's division to cover McLaws' flank
by eehelon movements, as directed, there il
little to be said. Those brigades acted gal
llantly, but went astray early in the fight
General Anderson in his report says. 90 A
strong fire was poured upon our right flank
which had become detached from McLaws
left.' General Lee, alluding to the actor
of these two brigades, says !: ''But having
become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's
and Wright's brigades advanced with grea
gallantry, breaking successive lines Of thu
enemy's Infantry and compelling him tt
abandon much Of his artillery. Wilcox
reached the foot and Wright gained thu
crest Of the ridge itself, driving the enemy
down the opposite side, but having beeom'
separated from McLaws, and gone beyond
the other two brigades of she division the!
were to attack in front and on both TANKS
and compelled to retire, being unable t,
bring off any Of the captured artillery, Nc
Laws left also fell back, and it being nov
. nearly dark General Longstreet determined
| to await the arrival of Pickett So mucl
for the action of the first day. al
| GENERAL LEES DETERMINATION
| l did not see General Lee that night. Oh