The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1877-07-20
A Military Prophet.

4uo IuIkO-husSldu Wdr llko all OluerS uaS
brought to the front many strategists who,
in the newspapers and through other medi-
ums of communication with the public, have
pointed out with great c,earness how the
Russians should go to work to beat the
Turks, or how the Turks can with ease re-
pulse the Russian attack Men of military
training have amused themselves with these
campaigns. In this country Generals Nc
Clellan and Beauregard have informed us in
characteristic articles just what the combat
ants ought to do. Beauregard advises the
adoption of scheme which no commander
il his senses would pay the least attention to,
and Mcclellan submits plan of campaign
which it would take hundred years to carry
into effect. But the men who lead the con-
tending forces have, singularly enough, paid
no attention to the advice of their critics,
military or other, on either side the Atlantic,
and have gone on pounding each other in a
fashion oftteir own.
There is, however, one exception to be
made. Colonel James Baker in his work on
Turkey assumed that the combatants would
pursue certain line of action. Up to this
date his prediction has been closely verified.
Last January he said that Russia would
have 100000 men in the European campaign !;
that 900 of these would be held in re-
serve, 100000 be employed in masking fort
resses, and 100000 be sent on the advance
into the heart of Turkey. ''The plan of
attack" he writes, ''can only be assumed; !;
but looking at the line OF the Balkan as a
long fortress, it is possible that the first Rus
sian army might unite with the Servians and
advance by Sofia, the second army by Rust
chuck and Trnova, and the third by the Do
rubdia, Varna and Shumla." This is the plan
which the Russians have carried out, with
the exception that the enforced neutrality of
Servia has necessitated delay at Sofia. As
to the crossing of the Danube, he said, and
spoke, too, when the advantage of the use
of tQrpedoes was unacknowledged, "We
mayapass over the line of the Danube, as the
forces of the Russians are so superior in
number 10 those of the Turks that it would
be impossible for the latter to prevent pas
sage. 1t is true that the Turks have numer-
GUS gunboats on the Danube, but that ad-
vantage can in these days be neutralized by
the employment of torpedoes." He believed
that the Balkans do not form strong line
of defense, that the difficulties of their pass
age have been exaggerated, and that the
Russians would cross them with ease.
Thus far his prediction has been borne out
by the events. Three hundred thousand
Russians are in Bulgaria, and the Russian
advance guard has crossed the Balkans. In
view of these facts the plan of campaign he
suggests for the Turks becomes of great inter-
est, as it is the plan they will probably at
tempt TO carry out. He believes the waiting
and retreating game to be the only one they
can with safety adopt. The Danube he
would abandon and the Balkans also, except
in so far as the passage might be made
troublesome to the enemy without too great
hazard to the Turks. His plan would be to
leave about 10000 men. in the almost i'm
pregnable fortified town of Varna, which has
communication with Constantinople by the
Black Sea, of which the Turks have COM
mand. The army thus stationed would
threaten the Russian base of supplies and
require at least 10000 Russians to hold it in
check. The main Turkish army he would
have retreat, as occasion required, before the
advancing Russians until the neighborhood of
Adrianople was reaceed. By this time the
Russian force would be reduced to its lowest
point, and battle might be ventured upon
with the best prospects OF success. In the
campaign of 1929 Russia started with 6S, 900
men and had only $1,000 left when she
reached Adrianople, the remainder being re-
quired to mask iortresses aud keep open lines
of communication. 1t is calculated that in
the present campaign Russia cannot employ
more than 100000 men south of the Balkans.
Turkey will also have there the advantage in
point of railways which Russia possesses on
the north of the Danube.