, 1877-04-14

H0uE or Danger exposes 10 tue nate ana
vengeance OF millions of injured subjects.
From the narrowest military point Of
view, therefore, Turkey cannot on land be
a match for Russia, and ii larger conside-
rations are borne in mind, the superiority
OF Russia Is even more decisive.
Looking at these facts simply, we might
imagine that q war between these long
hostile Powers could at present have one
result o%cly~-the speedy conquest OF the
weaker belligerent. But Major Russell
shows, on the whole clearly, that even at
this time q Russian invasion of Turkey is
! critical matter, by no means promising
complete success and, though bis COZ"
illusions might be more distinct, this IS
one of the most ueetul parts OF his work.
In the first place, the command OF the
sea by the Turks would prevent q descent
on the shores of the Bosphorous, their
most serious danger, Won Moltke thought;
it would protect ConstantinOple for q con-
siderable time; it would, to "a certain ex-
tent, impede a Muscovite advance in Asia
Minor, especially as the Straits were ap-
preached. It would probably conine the
main attack therefore to the vast, difficult
and p~erilOus theatre which extends from
the Danube south OF the Balkans. But II
Russia were obliged to select this line,
Austria, as Major Russell correctly points
out. could interpose with decisive effect;
having the means of throwing a powerful
force on the flank and rear Of tho Russian
armies, she holds, it has been aptly said,
=" the key Of the chest :; " and no matter
what Treaties were made. Russia, III an
advance from the Pruth to the Balkans,
would probably find it expedient to place
O strong detachment along the Austrian
frontier, which would greatly reduce her
powers for Invasion. Let US assume, how
ever, that Russia is able to break up from
the Pruth with 100000 men, supported
by imposing reserves. and resolves to cross
the Danube and assail Turkey. CONSTANT
nople being hoF real object; for no other
prize, Minor Russell insists, would COM
pcnsate her for the cost of the effort, and
otherwise, in fact, the war would be
aimless. Two modes of operating would
be then open to her in oil probability, in
the case supposed. her army might pass
the river at several points, concentrating
at or near Hirsova, or it might unite it's
chief mass near Giurgevo ; the advau CO
being in either instance connected, per-
haps, with q diversion from the Ser
Wan and Montenegro frontier. The
main body would then make directly
for ShumIa and the Balkans, while the
auxiliary would march on Sophia and
descend the valley of the ancient Hebrus /;
the two columns efecting their junction
At a point to the north of Adrianopls, and
moving thence through the Roumelian
plains, backed perhaps by a Christian in
surrection, towards the Imperial city
which would lie before them. Major
RUSSELL evidently thinks that the Turks
would scarcely be able unaided to offer on
efectual resistance to such an invasion.
The line of the Danube. he plainly as
sumes. would have to be given up at once;
indeed, otherwise, t%heproposed- plan OF as.
sembliue divided corps at Hirsovs would
be obviously contrary to sound principles.
The Turks. he believes, would attempt a
stand at Shhiumla, but he does not augur
success from the effort; for, besides that
the defensive owe of Shumla and its ia
trenched camp has greatly diminished. he
has no faith in the Ottoman Army, or"ln
ice ability to fght q w~sll-appolnted enemy.
The barrier OF the Balkans, too, be conan
- A~T1rfnwNwsAmk III . kkA