The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1877-05-24
Eng,.na.. Ass,suas ana Resources.


In what contingency is England likely to
become party to the war in the EastY Is
| there any event the occurrence OF which
will inevitably be followed by an English
| declaration of war or by the certainty that
| England will maintain the attitude OF
more or less disconnected yet peaceful
spectator? England ut present exercises on
the councils Of the belligerents such an in
| huence as follows from standing menace
toward one and hope never desperate
held out toward the other She Is
so far from being an absolute neutral
that if the Sultan did not count upon her
he would make peace tomorrow; and if the
Emperor of Russia did not know that he
must count with her he would put two
hundred thousand more men in the valley
OF the Danube. Her threat that in certain
contingency she will interfere compeis
Russia to hold herself in readiness in other
quarters to that extent, and induces the
Sultan to venture mad struggle on the
chance that happy accident may make
England a party to the conflict ere he is
quite brayed in the mortar Of war. To delude
an ally to his ruin by false hopes will
not rest on the British conscience but the
ethics of threatening attitude are as clear
for nations as for individuals. There is a re-
sponsibility to the common opinion Of man
kind involved in it !; for the Power that threat
ems virtually pledges itself before the world
to act in given way on the occurrence OF a
specified fact, and if it fails it is set down
as vain and noisy bully. Is it possible to
draw precisely ut the present time the line
at which England must redeem her pledge,
or beyond which her threat must be re-
garded as only a part Of the posturing and
attitudinizing by which her government has
sought to frighten Russia from the pursuit
Of its policy!
In the debate on Mr.. Gladstone's resolu-
tions the gentleman who was put up
to respond on the part OF the Minis
try to the onslaught of the great lib
raj orator endeavoered to emphasize by
iteration the declaration that England
wished the war had not occurred and wished
it was well over, and had no concern In it,
and did not wish or intend to fight Russia,
but could not but recognize that there
were certain interests which she must
defend if they were menaced. In
saving this much even the spokesman
for the Ministry was apparently almost
frightened at what he had said, and ex-
planned that really the likelihood of these
interests being menaced was SO remote that
it was hardly worth while for England to
say what she would do in such a contin-
gency. The interests thus referred to were
specified. They are the Suez Canal, Egypt,
the Dardanelles and Constantinople. There
was also vague reference to "Batoum and
other places, as if it were in the Ministe-
rial programme to hint that Russia
must not be over successful in any
neighborhood that was in the direc-
ton of India, and as if sudden
report of Russian successes near Kars had
made it injudicious to put out just then
hint so little likely to be respected by the
Russians. As to Egypt, the Suez Canal and
Constantinople, therefore, the position just
taken by England is clear. AS to Russian
successes gained in countries that command
other important routes to India it is less
clear, but there is in the British official
mind conception that England should not
regard such successes with Indifference, and
this conception may show itself in acts if
the circumstances are favorable at the time
successful in Armenia. She must fight if
Egypt, the canal or Constantinople is in
danger.
Perhaps this is tolerably safe ground for
the British Ministry to take. 1t is vague on
the one point as to which kussia's action is
certain to be precisely what England must
object to if she expresses any opinion at all !;
and the declaration of England becomes
distinct and sharp precisely in proportion as
it approaches those points on which Russia's
course is uncertain, as to which Russia
either has no policy or her policy is not
known. Here it seems safe to vapor and
bluster and the British Ministry does
it, To threaten war in case the Rus
sian armies should rapidly succeed in
any quarter would make it necessary to fight
or apologize early because the Russian
armies are very likely to gain substantial
triumphs in short. time in Armenia.
Hence it was unsafe to be tempted, even for
the sake OF the Euphrates Valley, into words
that might have to be swallowed before mid
summer. But the probability that Russia
will make any naval demonstrations in the
Mediterranean is SO slight that there
can be few things safer than for Eng
land to commit herself to a declar-
alton based on that remote probability.
Consequently the declaration well nigh
positive that England will defend the Suez
Canal and Egypt and the Dardaneles-will
defend in fact, what it does not yet appear
that any one is likely to menace. Indeed,