The Hickman courier., 1877-07-20
THE FORTH ESS OF ERE
ROUM.


most part, are built Of mud its streets
are narrow. muddy, tinpayed. and in
tested with crowds Of disgusting dogs ;
while its general features represent rather
the appearance of an extensive and
dilapidated village than that of a wealthy
and important town; but situated as it
is on the highest point'of Anatolia, in the
midst of huge and fertile plains spreading
around it in every direction, and as far
as the eyes can reach, it occupies a STRAIT
tegical position Of such vital Importance
at the head of botss the eastern and
western Euphrates, thatit is in fact the
last barrier against the Russian advance
into Anatolia. Too much stress can not
be laid upon the danger Of this conquest,
and public attentisa, without being
diverted to affairs on 10 Danube ought
to-stsaeiz, e.,rAots-lsasssl y. , lshrates with
that keen interest with which men
watch over what concerns themselves.
Russian ambition has long cast longing
eyes toward Erzeroum. When Erzeroum
is in the power of the car, there viii
not-with the exception of Diarbekir,
scarcely meriting sorespectable a name,
be single strong or even fortified
place between the Russian frontier and
Constantinople. And although it is
true that Turkish troops might dsfend
the mountain passes through which the
road leads to the capital, the Ottoman
commanders would in that case labor
under two terrible disadvantages-frst,
in having no point P0ppui to fall back
upon, and secondly, in having to strug-
Gle against enemies always attacking
them from higher ground. Erzeroum,
although "wretched place" without
theatre or even a hotel, is, nevertheless,
the key to the whole of Asia minor, and,
in the hands of the Russians, bar 10
free communication between Turkey and
Persia, as well as a menace to CONSTANT
nople itself.
When it becomes a Russian fortress,
the great road between Turkey and
Persia will be closed; fer, except by
means of the long and tedious route
through Bagdad, there will then remain
no other way from Constantinople to the
frontiers of the latter kingdom. 1t is
therefore evident that Persia will be
altogether isolated, and from the threat
ening position already taken up by Rus
sia round the eastern as well as the
southern Provinces of the shah, his
kingdom, the moment Armsnia falls,
being almost entirely surrounded, its
conversion into a Russian province can
be predicted with the same certainty as
that with which the astronomer foretells
any other eclipse. EHeroum is not only
the key of Persia, but it Is the pivot on
which the Russian advance toward
India can be most easily worked, because
it's possession, euabHng the HIascovites to
avoid the dreary deserts of Khiva, viii
give a road stretching through fertile
provinces to Herat, that easy highway
which has invariably been followed by
every invader of IndiS, whether IN
dAlNltut VI lAOAEAu NkliE0 1A4E COlll-
manding advantages of Erzeroum---situ-
ated as it is in the centre of vast plains,
producing every requirement for large
armyS besides grain and cattle in gener-
Gus abundance--have long been coveted
by the Muscovites. who, although per
iectly well aware that it is a wretched
! place, are convinced that in their power
ful grasp, it will become an impregnable
fortress, with Trebizond Batoum, and
Kars, notorious quadrilateral, as we'll
as a base of operations threatening En-
glands supremacy as an eastern power.
When once in possession of this
wretched place" it is idle to suppose
that the Russians will ever give it up,
for they have long coveted it; first. on
| account of its grand strategical impor-
tance, and secondly, because it is the
granary of Georgia. 1t can be very
easily argued that, Russia having taken
/ possession Of Erzeroum in her previous
wars, and then retired from it, she viii
display similar moderation, either in
the course of the present year, or, per
haps, when those amiable Christians OF
the neighborhOod, whose grievances so
touch the tender heart of the benefactor
ofPOland, are granted some fresh immuni
ties. Nothing can be more mischievous
or more misleading than line of argu-
ment without patience enough to OBJ
serve the totally different circumstances
under which these several occupations
occurred
In 1928 Pasklevitch abandoned Err
zeroum, not because he considered it a
"wretched place" but for the excellent
reason that, as his base was threatened,
and his position made extremely dan
gerous by the enmity of the unsubdued,
powerful, and fierce tribes of Circassians
and Lesgi inhabiting- the wild countries
through which his way back to Russia
lay, he was not strong enough to hold it.
Prudence and self preservation obliged
the Russians at this time to detach a
vast line OF garrisOns IN order to guard
these delicate communications but, as
the political state of Georgia was such
as to cause serious inquietude in the
minds of the Muscovites commanders.
lest its turbulent population should. by
turning against them, become a power
full ally of the Turks, and suddenly
change a triumphiai advance on Asia
Minor into a disgraceful, disastrous, and
humiliating retreat, they were compelled
to weaken the invading force by leaving
strong bodies of troops, SO as to be ready
against attacks threatened them from
this side also. The army, therefore,
which accompanied Pasklevitch to Err
zeroum was altogether inefficient for
holding that "wretched place. and at
the same time for overawing no. only
the surrounding country, but also the
ill-compacted Russian province of the
Caucasus behind him. The impotence
of the Russian invading force, and the
extreme danger and insecurity of their
position were fully shown by the mas
sacre ofan entire division detached from
Erzeroum with view to cut the COM
munication of that town with Trebizond
at Balboot. The Mussulman population
inspired with patriotism, rose to man
| - Jofo,co - +bo eOuntru D. 4 -