, 1877-09-12
THE WAR IN BULGARIA.
from lie Tines Of August)

In Bulgaria the whole interest Of the war
still turns for the time upon the efforts which
Suleiman Pasha is making to bring his soldiers
in force across the Balkans. Since the battle
Of Plevna the Russians have reversed the sys-
tenn upon which they had previously conducted
the war. They had boosted of their numbers,
displayed their forces, and disclosed their plans,
hoping-and, as for q time events proved, not
unreasonably-to impose upon the imagination
of the Turks, and to win their way at least as
far as AdrianOple without the need of striking
a vigorous blow. The passage of the Danube,
the capture of Tirnova, the bold advance of
General GourkO upon the Balkans and into
ROumelia, seemed to justify the Russian plans,
and to confirm the contempt with which the
Turkish troops were looked upon by their
ardent opponents. But the day of Pleyna
corrected these and many other errors. 1t
was then shown that the Turks were not only
capable of fighting we'll, but were in sufficient
force to resist successfully the invading Army
on one side at any rate. This revelation
brought the whole scheme of the invasion to q
stand-still. There was no longer any question
of overwhelming Bulgaria and Roumelia with a
sudden rush, and ofstupefying the Turkish re,
bis.ance with the terror Of the invaders
approach. The positions Of the Turks, natural
ly strong and defended by powerful forces,
were not to be any longer neglected. It was
acknowledged to be essential to the safety Of
the Russians that the Turkish Armies should
be driven in or centralized by the expensive
guardianship OF an adequate =" containing force.
The Grand Duke Nicholas has thus been
compelled to wait for more, and still more,
EeinfOrcements, and the difficulties he has ex.
perienccd in drawing to him the assistance and
the supplies he needs show how reckless was
the original plan of the campaign. In a Rus.
sian Army the commissariat and transport
services in most wars have been found defec-
tive. Thus it happened that the moveme ants Of
the RUSSIAN Army were, even at the outset,
disastgousIy slow, When the troops placed in
thu beginning at the disposal of the Grand
Duke were brought into the field tho transport
and commissariat services seemed to consider
that their work was done. But the disaster at
Plsvna has created a sudden necessity for the
movement of many thousands of men to tho
front, and the task is increasingly difficult.
Nevertheless, in spite Of the deficiencies in
supplies and carriage, the Russian hosts beyond
the Danube, have been already augmented by
She accession of at least $4,000 fresh troops,
and with tho7c the Grand Duke ought to be
able 10 threaten Osman Pasha on tAe one side
and Mehemet Ali Oh the other with an unchal-
lengeable superiority of strength. AS yet,
however, he is not able to do so, he desires for
some reason to seem unable, We know that the
Russian forces in front Of Plevna and of Ras-
grad have been strongly reinforced, but the
Russians hold their ground as silently and as
lnpersnrbabIy as the Turks themselves.
In each case the cause of the inactiOn which
surprises and disappoints observers is that
those who have the power Of initiative are
awaiting an addition to their available strength .
The Turkish Generals feel themselves safe,
and are making themselves even safer, behind
their Entertainments, and until Suleiman Pasta
has brought his troops across the Bllkans,
neither MehemeS Ali nor Osman Pasha will
venture upon an offensive movement. The
Russians are content to strengthen their posi-
tiO2s in the Jantra Valley aud to threaten a
blow which is never delivered. 1t is understood
that their strategical scheme now limits itself
to the overthrow of the Turkish Armies north
Of the Balkans before the beginning of the win.
ter weather in Roumania and Bulgaria nor is
it OF all improbable that the invaders, if their
SeinfOrcementa come up in time, will be able to
throw a crushing weight upon Osman Pasha,
if not upon Mehemet Ali also. A success of
this kind would not only prepare the way
for . second and more triumphant campaign,
but would enable the Russian advanced posts
to hold the Sbipka Pass, through which next
year a descent might be directly made upon
hs plains Of Roumslia and the Cspital Of the