Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1877-08-22

Big Hole country and within fifteen
miles of the Indians, who are moving
slowly about nine miles day, leaving
a wake of exhausted horses TO tell the
crippled condition and the lessened re-
sources of the band.
Hearing this and believing an en-
gagement must take place within
day or two General Howard will leave
tomorrow with an escort of twenty
men, and il it lie within the capabili-
ties of horse.fesh will be with Gibbon
before night. Lieutenant Wood, one
of his aids, and Mr.. Bonny, his clerk,
accompany him. The rest Of his staff
and the Cavalry remain behind, though
they are within reach by making one
days forced march.
The editor of the Philadelphia Times,
in alluding to the useless slaughter Of
human life, recently, in hunting In
dams, terms it3"a wanton sacrifice,
and continues:
Feelings of sorrow and Indignation
struggle for the mastery as we read Of
the terrible slaughter Of General Glib
bon's command-sorrow for the dead
who fought 80 bravely and bitter in.
dignation at the wicked plans that
sent these noble fellows TO meet their
death. 1t is the story OF the Custer
massacre over again, without redeem
ing feature and hardly a ray Of COM
fort to tighten the sombre tale. Gen,
Terry set out on the campaign against
Sitting Bull and met powerful, brave
and strategic foe on battle-ground Of
his own choosing. Clusters brave soul
disdained thoughts of prudence and
caution, and his lite paid the penalty
of his rashness The army had barely
enough men left TO get back to rein
forcements. That General Howards
campaign against the Nez Perces
could have any better ending was al
most hoping against hope. Had he
been conducting Moody and Sankey
movement or a Murphy temperance
revival his egotistical and despicable
bulletins might have been less out of
place. But he was pursuing the bray
est and the strongest tribe OF Indians
in the country through region with
which they were thoroughly familiar,
its conformation such that they could
choose their ground so that one man
might well stand against thousand.
He was entering on a campaign such
as has baked the energies and defed
the strategy of our ablest Generals,
and he spent bis time telling the peo-
pie in the East how skillfully General
Howard was concentrating his forces,
how he was driving Joseph and how
the capture OF his whole force was on.
ly question of days. At last he learns
that Joseph rs ready TO surrender, and
while he hastens TO inform the War
Department and an anxious public
whom he has appointed to receive Jo.
seph's surrender, the willy Indian chief
is quietly planning the trap which has
cost us two score Of our bravest mon.
General Howard's plan Of fighting the
Indians by telegraph has the merit of
novelty, 1t is true, but its success does
not seem to warrant its general use in
the future.
Brave General Gibbon pushed ahead
with his little command, numbering
, less than hall regiment-lS2 men all
told-wth Howard thirty six or forty
eight hours in the rear. Coming up
, with the Indians at night he lett q
guard with the transportation, and at
, daylight he was at the Indian camp.
The volunteers fired at an Indian going
/ after the horses, and this little force,
weakened still further by losing the
. guard left with the train charged into
a the camp. Howard was behind them
. with 750 men, but the fate of Custer
1 had no warning for them. They rush
/ cd in single.handed, charged upon the
! lodges and were repulsed Tho fight
d ing continued all day and ended by
Q the troops holding their own. But
/ the had gained nothing; they had lost
' man for every Inoian that bit the
I. dust, and were entirely cut off from
their supplies, having neither food,
clothing nor medical attendance.
General Howard is primarily re-
sponsible for the sacrifice Of these men.
The soldiers who had won laurels on
nobler fields only to lay them down on
> the prairies in vain contest with saw
: ages were lost because we had not q
4 General in Howard's place. II was
!, on Wednesday that Gibbons forces at
Il tackled the main body of the Indians.
Howard, with the main body Of the
pursuing force, was 30 far in the rear
u that he had not heard of tho battle
II when courier left on Friday. Gen
T. Howard must answer for moving in
: this struggling way. Then General
y Gibbon must render an account for the
foolhardiness which led him to risk
the attack that he did with reinforce.
Q ments almost two days march IN the
:, rear, assailing force quite as great as
u his own in camp with natural de-
o fenses and on a battle-ground chosen
!, by the enemy. The whole sad affair
q is only another Of the many lessons
. that we have learned with stripes and
u sores, that Indians must be fought in
y their own way. They do not attack
Z by rule nor defend in accordance with
y Upton. In short, one ought to move
IS sainst them not with gold lace and
Q epaulcts, but with buckskin and moe
9 casins. We must fight Indians with
. Indian fighters. A trapper Is worth
y all the Generals that West Point evel
\, turned out to plan the campaign, ant
D one frontersman is worth dozen reg
IS ulars, bravo as they are, to carry II
out. How many more precious live'
J, must be lost before this lesson is fairly
W l.ow.nI