The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1877-07-08

COW by drawing a mathematical line be-
tween those points. II we bear In mind,
however, that by this system many large
towns and recruiting dcpots have been
passed over, that very few roads have
double track, and finally, CHANGING at the
map, mark the ratio OF their aggregate
length to the area OF the country, we must
pronounce the means OF concentration ex-
ceedingly Inadequate Thus in the present
contest, Bessarabia, which is the natural
basis Of Russian operations In Europe, Is
only connected with the heart Of the empire
by branch line running northward from
Odessa and parallel to the Pruth, yet by no
means favorable to the rapid massing Of
troops upon that river. So, too, on the south
Of the Caucasus, Russia has only from Poti
TO Tiilis the first section Of line parallel
TO the chain, destined to connect the Cas-
plan with the Black sea, but without
strategic value in a war with Turkey.
A reformed commssariat and a scheme OF
railway transport were mere prelimnaries
or accessories to the fundamental change OF
1874. BY the measure long meditated, but
first published in that year, the principle Of
compulsory military service was applied to
all classes OF Russians. and at the same
time tho term Of active service, which In the
present generation had been successfully re-
duced from twenty-five TO twenty. fifteen,
and ten years. was finally fixed at six. After
spending six years in the active army, the
citizen remains nine years in the so-called re-
serve, and afterward for five years longer in
the home guard. In twenty years this sys-
TEN If faithfully applied. will furnish an in
exhaustiblc fund Of disciplined soldiers. At
present the project is mere Pigment; no.
thing but raw material exists either in the
reserves or the home guard and the only
troops on which Russia can now rely are
those OF her active, or, as we should call 1t,
regular army We need not say that no
European State, and certainly not a country
well-nigh bankrupt could repeat the exper-
iment OF the United States, and sustain
protracted war with the view Of educating
its raw leves. As matter Of fact, at this
moment OF transition Russia is not only far
weaker than Germany in respect Of trained
soldiers, but is inferior to Austria, and per-
haps to France. The present system, al
though it is but three years old, would show
larger results but for the financial straits Of
the empire The annual draft for the active
army presents the enormous nominal total
Of 100000 men, but on various grounds five
scvenths were dispensed from service, the
levy of 1875 reaching only 1s0, 900. and even
that of 1876, when war seemed probable,
falling short of 100000. We are, therefore,
prepared to hear that the nominal total OF
the European forces does not exceed 7750O0
men, showing an increase OF but $4,000 since
1874; or that, including the armies OF the
Caucasus and OF Asia, as well as the Cos
sacks and all other effective reGnforcements,
the empire cannot muster more than one
million disciplined men.
Notwithstanding the universal applica-
tion Of compulsory service, the recruits fur
nished 10y the classes formerly privileged
constitute less than two per cent. Of the an
nual levy. The signal benefit Of the new law
will not be looked for in the presence Of these
men, but in the better material now fur
nishcd 10y the peasant class, whose richer or
more intelligent members formerly con-
trived to escape CONSUMPTION. The abolition
OF the knout, and of every form of corporal
| punishment except Imprisonment, has tend
ed to raise the moral level of the soldier,
who, moreover has felt the stimulus Of the
social transformation wrought in Russia by
the emancipation of the serfs single fact
will indicate marked improvement in dis
cipline: The number Of convictions of mill
tary offences and the number Of desertions
have decreased nearly fifty per cent. since
1870 The Russian soldier. in short, while
always good, il now perhaps somewhat bet
| ter; but a like Improvement Is not observed
among the officers. The mass of THOSE in the
| line (which in this respect, ms well as In So
cial prestige, is sharply Disseminated from
| the imperial guard are perhaps, the worst
educated in Europe. The military schools
can neither turn out enough graduates nor
bestow satisfactory training The term Of
| study Is too short, while at least half Of It Is
engrossed by mere rudmcntary instruction.
| The want Of competent nOn-commissoned
| officers Is still more conspicuous, nor has n
tempting array Of honorary distinctions and
substantial compcnsations hitherto awaited
to remedy it, On the other hand, the general
stan may reasonably be compared with that
Of the best armies of Europe. No pains or
cost has been spared to secure theoretical
and practical efficiency. The fact is not 10
be overlooked that officers Of German de-
scent coming from the Baltic provinces or
from foreign parts form large proportion
OF the stan, as much according TO the pre-
| btLhtu STATISTICS Ol Il St. petersburg news
paper, as eighty per cent. 1t is likewise
| an suspicious circumstance for Russia that
| the War ONCE is still controlled by Mr.
MILUTINE, who for fifteen years, has adj
dressed himself to the business OF rcorgan-
zatlon with pertinacity and judgment.
To sum up, the appliances of mobilization
are still defective in Russia, as compared
with some other countries. And this de-
iiciency might have more serious conse-
quences should reSnforccments be called for
than at the outset Of an offensive war.
| Faults Of strategy, either in the choice OF
objective or in detail, are not to be expected
from the accomplished general staff. II is
certain that the common soldiers will fight
WELL although there is no reason to suppose
the Turkish nisdm at all inferior To them In
patience and fortitude. And finally, the
troops available upon the Danube far out
number any Ottoman force which could be
marshalled against them.
Mr.. Bennett and the Herald.
The Evening Post OF Thursday contained
the subjoined interesting and important