Clarksville weekly chronicle. (Clarksville, Tenn.) 1873-1890, 1877-07-14
THE RUSSIAN FAILURE IN ARME.
MA.

articles which we have published
within the last five weeks relatingto
the Russian campaigns in Armenia
and Asia Minor, and we shall not
only refer to them but reprint con-
extracts from them.
The following extract is taken
from an article we published june
I'd, at time when all our cOntem-
poraries were predicting the imme-
diate fall of Erzeroum, the with
drawal of Mukhtar Pasha from the
defence of Southern Euxine coast
and the loss of Trebizond, and even
Sinope to the Turks, and the sue
cess of the Russians in converting |
the Black Sea into Russian lake.
We noted at the time several cir
cumstances which did not look so
promising for the Russians, such as
the great fortresses at Kars, BatOum
and Sukhgum-Kaleh remaining
unreduced in the rear of the Russian
advance, therevOlt of the Abkhasian
Circassians in the neighborhoOd of
the fortresses alluded to, the posses
sion of the Caucasian passes by war
like tribes whom it had taken the
Russian Empire years to subdue, the
consequent danger to their cOmmu-
nicatiOns which were through those
very passes, the isolation of the left
wing which had been sent far beyond
supporting distance in order to
threaten Erzeroum on its right,
the consequent weakening gifts CEN
tire, ETC., etc. The inference from
all this was summed up as follows:
To us the Russian army seems in a very
hazardous position. The farther they adj
vance into that very difficult country the
more difficult to secure their communion
tiOns-they leave BatOum and kars, power
ful forteSses, in their rear and must have de-
tached large forces to mask them. Under all
these circumstances it seems safer for the
Turks to retreat than for Russians to adj
vance; TO the Russians single reverse would
be fatal and necessitate surrender OF the
whole army or disastrous retreat through
very difficult country occupied by hostile
forces; which would be tantamOunt to
virtual destruction of that army.
on the other hand, the Turkish army could
sustein reverse after reverse without serious
danger, as their line of retreat is through
friendly country occupied with their fortifi-
cations and well supplied by the magazines
at TrebiZ0nd and SinOpe on the Black sea,
which is their base of supplies.
The mode of attack at Erzeroum suggested
above seems a very hazardous one. The
idea seems to be to deplete the centre of the
Russian army for the purpose Ofstrengthen-
ing the two wings, which are to advance on
the two TANKS of the Turks from widely dis
stations gRnnFatp1 nv INN ct iPlDle
mountain ranges. If there is a Napoleon or
a Stonewan Jackson at Erzeroum this mode
of attack would seem to furnish an Oppor-
tunity to him which he would embrace with
eagerness-that Of attacking the two wings
successfully in detail with superior forces
and thus at once infiicting irremedtable dis
aster, but we shall see. In the difficulty of
getting reliable accounts il is best TO be
prepared for any event. All we contend for
at present is that, taking the facts as we can
get them, the Russian success is by no means
the fOregOne conclusion, which journals like
the New York Herald would representa-
Two weeks after this was written
wewere a little surprised at learning
that nothing had been done, and
while we retained our former Opin-
ion of the incOnceivable rashness of
the Russian mode of conducting the
game, we inferred that Mukhtar
Pasha lacked the skill and enter
prise to avail himselfOf the errors of
his antagonist. The information,
however, arrived that the number
of men with Mukhtar in the field
were less than 10000 all told, and
then we were able to comprehend
that it was lack of numbers which
kept him inactive. Spite of this de-
feet, however, we soon heard stimuli
taneOusly of a battle won by the
Turks near their new acquisition of
Sukhum Kaleh and the retreat of
the Russian army, first from Olti
and then from Pennck. The week
after that, we heard of large rein
fOrcemeIts sent by sea to Mukhtar
and then in rapid succession of dis
asteT to the left wing of the Russians
ut Bayazid, to their right near Ba-
toum, and finally a crushing defeat
of their centre at levin, showing
that even by that time the disioint-
ed members of the Russian army
were not sufficiently within support
ing distance to prevent their being
crushed in detail by an enemy of
ordinary activity. In other words,
the faulty dispositions of the Rus
sian General had produced their
natural effect, and that the recent
disasters of the Russian army were
attributable to faulty strategy is con-
tirmed by the significant recall of
Gen. MelekOff from the scene of his
blunders and disasters. 1t has been
said indeed that the plumbers are at
tributable not to the Adjutant-Gen-
eral, but tOsthe Archduke Nicholas,
which may or may not be; Adiu-
tants who attend on Archdukes in
command are expected to give the
advice by which their masters are
to win victories, and while his i'm
perial highness, takes the glory if
all goes well, the Adiutant takes the
blame if disaster results.
But all this is beside the question
we only contend that the blunders
have been made and that the result
ing disasters have been the necessary
consequence of them. If we are
asked what are those plumbers, we
answer that only two need be men,
toned, which any sciolist in mill
tary science would condemn, viz,
First, An advance into Il hostile
country leaving great fortresses I'M
reduced in the rear, and
Second, 4 flank march of one
wing completely separated from
the main body, in the presence of
the enemy.
Any first class West Point student
who failed to condemn both of these
errors would be found in his eXami-
nation and richly deserve it.
But now comes the main subject
which these remarks are intended
70 lead. During all these six weeks,