Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1877-03-03

Revision. 1t is noted in the margin
thus: legislatures not to grant
special charters" and provides thai
"the legislative assemblies of the
several Territories shall not grant
private characters or especial priv
leges." Manifestly there was some
cogent reason for the enactment of
this statute by Congress, some evil
to he prevented. Let Us examine as
to the reason and policy of this law.
Within a period comparatively re-
cent, the Legislatures of many of the
States, following the example of the
English act of 5 and 6 Will. ", have
passed general acts respecting NUM-
cipal corporations. The usual scheme
is to grade corporations into classes,
cities of the first and second classes,
and towns, but the powers of each
class are uniform. So in Ohio, Iowa,
Tennessee, Missouri, Indiana, Penn
sylvania and many other States.
General incorporation acts, rather
than special charters, would seem to
be the best method of creating and
organizing municipal corporations,
because-1st. It tends to prevent
favoritism and abuse, in procuring
extraordinary grants of special pow
ers; I'd. It secures uniformity of
rule and construction; Sd, All being
endowed alike, real wants are sooner
felt and provided for, and real griev-
ances are sooner redressed.-Dillon
on NJ. c., sec. 20.
This mode of incorporating by gen.
aral law was begun in Ohio in 1852,
ind has from that time been growing
favor; and as early as 1865 it may
be said to have become the settled
policy of most of the States. Prior
to and about the time of the enact
ment of the statute of 1867, the Leg
islatures of the Territories were
granting private and special charters
Unfortunately, without thought or
consideration. Powers most extra
ordinary were granted, monopolies
created and favoritism manifest. To
correct these-evils and conform the
legislation to the policy of State leg
islation, no doubt was the purpose of
this limitation by the act of 1867.
Equality of rights and privileges de-
fined by general law applicable to
the whole Territory, was the object
aimed to be accomplished by Con-
gress. Judge Dillon, in his able
work on Municipal Corporations,
does not in express terms give an
opinion as the effect of this legis-
lation by Congress, but seems to have
assumed that, since the enactment,
the Legislatures of the Territories
can only by general law provide for
the incorporation OF cities and towns.
Dillon, sec. IS, note 2.
So the editor of Brice Ultra Wires,
page 81, note.
This view seems to be in accord
with the policy of the national gov
eminent to secure to all tho citizens
equality of rights land privileges,
and prohibit class legislation, which
in a republic is obnoxious.
lam fully convinced that the spe-
cial acts in question are within the
prohibition OF the act of Congress,
and that the intent and purpose of
this limitation was to require the in
corporation of all corporations within
the Territory, whether public or
private, under general law for such
purposes.
Counsel object that this question
cannot be here raised in this pro.
ceeding. There is no question but
that is the rule as to irregularities
and informalities of organization;
but here the question goes to the
power of the Legislature to create
the body corporate by special act.
If the corporation may exist under
this act, the question cannot be
raised; but there can be no corpora
ton de facio unless there might be
one de jure under the law.
The demurrer will be sustained.
j. r. LEWIS, Chief Justice.
Jenkins Il McGilvra for the city;
Mcknight & Leary for defendants.