The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1876-04-13

the enjoyment of certain rights without
discrimination on account of race, color
or previous condition of servitude, be-
cause, as has already been stated, it
is no where alleged in these counts that
the wrong contemplated against the
rights of these citizens was on account OF
their race or color. Another objection is
made to these counts that they are too
vague and uncertain.
The sixth and fourteenth counts state
the intent of the defendants to have been
to hinder and prevent the citizens named,
being of African descent and colored.
In the United States vs.. Reese, just de-
cided we hold that the fifteenth amend
ment has invested the citizens of the
United States with new constitutional
right, which is exemption from discrimi-
nation in the exercise of the elective
franchise on account of race, color or
previous condition of servitude. From
this it appears that the right of suffrage
is not a necessary attribute of national
citizenship, but that exemption from dis
elimination in the exercise of that right
on account of race, &C., is. The right to
vote in the States comes from the States,
but the right of exemption from the pro-
hibited discrimination comes from the
United States. The first has not been
granted or secured by the Constitution of
the United States, but the last has been.
Inasmuch, therefore, as it does not ap-
pear in these counts that the intent Of
the defendants was to prevent these par
ties from exercising their rights to- vote
on account of their race, &C., it does, not
appear that it was their intent to inter-
fere with any right granted or secured by
the Constitution or laws of the United
States. We may suspect that race was
the cause of the hostility, but it is not so
averred; tn is material to description
of the substance of the offence. and can:
not be supplied by implication. Every
thing essential must be chargedpositively
and not inferentially. The defect is not
in form but in substance, ~ .,,s.,a.,i
The seventh and fifteenth counts are
no better than the sixth and fourteenth.
The intent here charged is to put the
parties named in great fear OF bodily
harm, There is nothing to showthat the
elections voted at were any other than
State elections, or that the conspiracy
was formed on account OF the race OF the
parties against whom the conspirators
were to act. The charge as made is
really nothing more than conspiracy to
commit breach of the peace within
State.
We are. therefore. of the opinion that
the first, second, third, fourth, sixth,
seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth,
fourteenth and fifteenth counts do not
contain charges of criminal nature
made indictable under the laws OF the
United States, and consequently they are
not good and sufficient in law. They do
not show that it was the intent of the; de
PENDANTS, by their conspiracy, to hinder
or prevent the enjoyment of any right
granted or secured by the constitution:
The fifth and thirteenth, the eighth
and sixteenth counts are now, considered.
The intent in the first two Is to hinder
and prevent in their rights as citizens OF
the United States and the State of Lou
isiana, for the reason that compliments
were persons of African descent and race;
and in the other two to hinder and pre-
vent them in the exercise of rights grant
ed by the constitution and laws OF the
United States. The conclusion u is ire
sistible that these counts are too vague
and general. They lack the, certainty
and precision required by the established
rules of criminal pleading. 1t follows
that they are not good and sufficient in
law. They are so defective that no judg..
ment of conviction should be pronounced
upon them. The order. of the Circuit
Court arresting the judgment upon the
verdict is therefore affirmed, and the
cause remanded with instructions to dis
CHARGE the defendants. Mr.. Justice
Clifford dissented from the opinion, but
concurred in the judgment.
THE KENTUCKY CASE.
The United States, plaintiff, VS.. Hiram
Reese and Matthew Foushe, in error to
the Circuit Court of the United States tor
the District of Kentucky, Mr.. Chief JUS
tice Waite delivered the opinion of the
court. This case comes here by reason
of division of the opinion between the
Judges of the Circuit Court in the District
of Kentucky. 1t presents an indictment
Containing four counts, under Sections 8
and of the act of May 81, 1870, 16 Stat
14O, against two of the inspectors of the
municipal election in the State OF Ken
tucky. for refusing to receive and count
at such election the vote of VIM. Garner,
a citizen of the United States of African
descent. All the questions presented by
the certificate of division arose upon gen.
eral demurrers to the several counts OF
the Indictment. ..-., ..>
In this court the United States aban-
don the first and third counts and ex-
pressly waive the consideration of all
claims not arising out of the enforcement
of the fifteenth amendment. The power
of Congress to legislate at all upon the
subject of voting at State elections rests
upon this amendment, and the inquiry
arises whether the act now under consid-
Grafton is appropriate legislation, for its
enforcement. Every man should be able
to know with certainty whether he is
committing a crime, and it remains to be
considered whether statute so general
in its provisions as this can be made
available for the punishment Of those
who may be guilty of unlawful discrimi..
nation against citizens of the United
States while exercising the elective fran
chise on account of their race, &c.
The question then to be determined is
whether we can introduce words of linn
tation into penal statute so as to make
it specific, when as expressed it is gener-
al only. 1t would certainly be dangerous
if the Legislature could set a net large
enough to catch all possible offenders and
| leave it to the courts to step inside and
cav who could be rightfully detained