Knoxville journal. [volume] (Knoxville, Iowa) 1874-1986, 1876-11-30
Authorized Judicial Intermed-
ding.
IChicago Times.

81 asF#F OtMWS.
tChicago Times
Assuming that the South Carolina
statute corresponds to the Louisiana
statute In pretending to confer upon
the canvksslng board power to throw
out any returns which may be neces-
sary to reverse the result of the elec.
ton, IL Is plain that the court had TO
Jurisdiction ofthe subject-matter, and
its attempt TO dictate the manner
In which the board should exercise
| its office was an unwarranted as
sumption Of power. This was ex-
actly the case which arose in this
city, q little over a year ago, upon
the election to adopt the new city
charter. 1t was asserted, before the
election had been officially declared,
that monstrous frauds had been per-
petrated. Upon the basis of these
assertions, some persons petitioned
the court OF chancery for an injunc-
tion upon the canvassing body to
restrain them from canvassing and
declaring the result. The court as
sumed Jurisdiction, and granted the
writ prayed FOR, temporarily, citing
| the members OF the board to appear
aud show cause why the injunction
should not be made permanent. The
board disregarded the order of the
court, canvassed the returns, and
proclaimed the result, as the letter Of
| the statute authorized them to do.
Tho court WAS very mild about it,
and attached the whole crowd, inclu-
ding half a dozen lawyers who were
| suspected to have given them legnl
advice upon the subject, and senten-
ced them to be imprisoned, fined and
otherwise punished for contempt OF
its mandate. The respondents car
ried tho matter up to the supreme
court, which very promptly and of.
fectively hoisted the chancellor out
of water by letting him know that q
court Of chancery could not take
| Jurisdiction Of the subject matter;
that the duty of the board was to
proceed in the discharge of its office
according to the terms of the statute;
that ID was not in the judicial pro-
vince to dictate to different branch
Of government In the discharge of its
office; and that ii the election was
conpassed by fraud, the remedy
must he found i'm cont. st Of the re.
suit officially declared, in the way
provided by law.
| The case i'm South Carolina is nj
most exactly analogous to the Chica-
| go case. The result Of the election
was not and could not be known un.
til the returns were canvassed and
the result ascertained and declared.
To canvass the returns was certainly
no part of the Office Of the court, nor
was II any part of the judicial Office
to say how the anvassing should be
done, or how the canvassing body
should or should not proceed i'm the
discharge ofits Office. If the canvass.
ing body had refused or neglected to
discharge its Office, the court, upon
proper exhibition of the facts, might
properly have issued its mandate
commanding the canvass to proceed;
but In so doing the court could not,
without usurpati0n OF an Office not
its own, have prescribed any rule OF
proceeding. That is the legislative
Office, and that Office the legislature
OF South Carolina has, no doubt, ex-
ercised In the act creating the re-
turning board. No doubt, too, the
legislature In so doing has transcen-
ded Its power by assuming to devoIve
Judicial power upon the returning
board; but the court cannot deter
mine that upon an application for a
writ OF mandamus or of Injunction.
The cause Of wonder is, not that the
returning board has paid no attention
TO the mandate OF tho court, but that
the supreme court Of South Carolina
should have been induced to issue
mandate prescribing and command
Ing how the returning board should
and should not discharge its office.