The New York herald., 1876-11-25
Importance or une Black Sea 20

AmPOrt8nce OF uno BLACK See 70
Russia.
If England limits her interference in the
Turkish troubles to tho defence of Con-
stantinople there is some probability that
the Black Sea will become Russian lake,
such as Aral and the Caspian. The entry
OF a British squadron into the Euxine as
an aggressive force would be practical
abrog,.tion by England of the convention
signed at Paris on March 80, 1856. This
agreement between England. Turkey, Rus
STA, France, Austria, Prussia and Sardinia
provided against the occupation of the Black
Sea by any armed vessels of the subscribing
Powers, except such small ships as were
necessary for the revenue service of Russia
and Turkey. But as the Treaty Of Paris
has been practically ignored by the
Car during the Franco-German war it
is perhaps too much to expect that
Russia will respect its stipulations in any
difficulty with Turkey. In order that Rus
sia should be enabled to make any success
ful attack on European Turkey she must
control the Black Sea with her iron clad
fleets. The heaviest battalions are now the
weakest forces that can be employed in war
unless they are armed with modern breech-
leaders and fed from unfailng depots of
supply. These latter cannot be securely es-
tablished on Turkish territory without the
most extraordinary military and naval sue
cesses and powerful fleets Of war ships and
transports. There are no railroads south Of
the Danube that can be used with effect to
further the operations necessary for success !;
therefore without naval superiority in the
Black Sea the advance Of a Russian army
southwark would be subjected to innumera-
BILE obstacles and delays that could not fail
to tell against the invading forces
Another line ofadvance is open to a Russian
army operating against Constantinople as
the objective point of attack. This starts
from the base of the Caucasus, with Tiflis as
its chief depot, and follows the southern
shore of the Black Sea by Trebizond and
Sinope westward toward the Bosphorus But,
although less Objectionable than the Euro
pean line as regards the military obstacles
to be overcome, it still possesses disadvan-
tages which would necessitate the most extra
ordinary exertions and precautions to con-
quer. In the first place, while the army may
not be menaced on it's front, its left flank and
rear would be continuously open to attack
by the irregular troops raised in the more
southerly districts, and who would rush to
the Sultans standard at the first coll. The
communications of the army would thus
be constantly menaced by q foe that
would not risk regular battle under
any circumstances. Every post passed
by the Russians, such as Kars, should be
occupied, strongly garrisoned and well
provisioned, which would weaken the
strength Of the Cars field forces consider
ably. The chief ports of the coast already
named should be captured and fortified
against attack by the British and Turk
ish fleets. The object being to secure for
the army certain supply from the sea, this
could not be obtained unless the Russian
fleet was strong enough to defend conveys
and hold its own against large number of
the enemy's ships. Without entering into
any details of the operations necessary to
secure success for Russian army of in
vasion by either of the lines referred to we
have shown that, in order to be able to even
attempt the invasion ofSouthern Turkey and
an attack on Constantinople, the Black Sea
must first become Russian lake. So long
as it remains open to the fleets of England
and Turkey the Balkan Mountains mark the
utmost limit of Russia's possible advance
into Turkish territory from the line Of the
Pruth.