The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1876-12-20
The Impending War Betwe en- Turkey
aud Russia.

uuu Nusslus
In spite of the pacific rumors which reach
us from Constautnoplc, we still adhere to
the opinion that the final result of the
conference will be in war. II may be that
Russia has consented to prolongation of
the armistice to the LIST OF March. and 1t is
not unlikely that IL may be again for her
own reasons extended beyond that date
the somewhat impracticable proposal OF an
occupation of Bulgaria by Belgian troops
may also have been originated by Gen.
lGNATIEF; ana sanguine correspondents
may endcavor 10 calm the fears Of Europe
and inspire confidence among the CONNER
cial classes by describing n diminution of
the war sentiment in Russia. But we arc
unfortunately unable 10 accept these re-
ports as satisfactory evidences OF pacific
solution OF the Eastern question.
To hesitate now would be an admissi on
on the part of Russia that she is not able to
cope with Turkey single-handed. The
Russian Government is irrevocably COM
mitted in the eyes of its people to an occu-
patton of the Christian provinces OF Turkey,
and any proposal by Russia that this occu-
patton should be undertaken by another
power is simply an attempt to persuade
Europe that she has no selfish ends to serve,
and would be glad TO see her charitable
task in the hands of "A nation which could
inspire no jealousy. Had there been the
slightest chance of this scheme being
accepted by the Porte. we may be quite
certain that il would not have been sug-
gested but the occupation of Bulgaria by
any foreign army will never be consented
TO by the Turkish Government and while
Russia Will have given Europe an apparent
~ fresh proof of moderation, the question
at issue between the two countries will re-
main after its rejection precisely where it
was before. Russia will then have her
hands full to carry out her programme OF
dsinteresied philanthropy under the eyes
Of approving Europe. Even England is
distinctly pledged calmly to acquesce in
the crossing OF the Danube for humani-
tartan purposes, aud the idea of occupying
Constantinople in that event, if it ever was
seriously entertained, Is now abandoned.
Tho only thing that Russia still wants is
time. This she obtains by prolonging the
armistce till the lst Of March, and the
conference can easily be protiHcted tn
then by plausible schemes, which are sure,
Ultimately, to tall through.
The only power that is under no delusion
as to the result is Turkey. She has made
up her MUD TO war, because she has deter
mined, firmly and absolutely, to refuse the
only concession that could avert il, VIZ ::
the occupation Of Bulgaria.
There can be little doubt that England
will press the Sultan to yield this; but that
potentate is beginning to see that England
isa broken reed to trust 10. and that 1t would
have been far better for Turkey never to
have made the many concessions which
have been wrung from her under British
pressure. Each one has placed her more
completely at the mercy of Russia. There
never was a greater mistake than to con-
sent, at the instance of Sir HENRY Ell
LOT, 10 the Iirst armistice. Had this been
refused, the Turkish army could have been
at Belgrade before any Russian volunteers
had poured in to reinforce the Servlan
army.
The effect of the proongation Of the ar
mistice will simply be to enable Russia 10
mass her forces more effectively, and COM
plete her war preparations, without cor
responding advantage accruing to Turkey
The weakness of this latter power consists
IN her dread of losing English sympathy
and support aud this continues still par
TALLY to paralyze her diplomatic action,
though she is becoming alive to the dan
ger,
1t is the fashion in England and else
where to maintain that the Turk has only
10 be sufficiently threatened, and that he
is sure TO yield at the last moment. No es-
innate of his policy or character could he
more erroneous. There ia no Government
more stubborn than Mohammedan one
when it is driven 10 bay. The idea there
fore, that the Turkish Government will
finally yield the point of the occupation of
Bulgaria, is a delusiOn.
Assuming, then, war between Russia
and Turkey to be inevitable in the spring,
we are of opinion that it by no means fol-
lows that the rest Of Europe need be com
promised thereby. Russia will carefully
avoid giving any ground OF offence or
suspicion even to England, beyond that
which certain class of diplomatists Will
always entertain of her designs. She will
probably hnd tho occupation Of Bulgaria
10 the north of the Balkan harder nut TO
crack than she now anticipates and, even
if ultimately victorious, will not attempt
TO cross the extremely dmeuit passes Of
that range.
There are two reasons why we may fairly
conjecture that she will be satisfied with
conquest TO the north OF the Balkan. Ono
Is the strategic obstacles which she would
have to encounter, and with which for
mer experience has rendered her familiar;
and the other is that any such attempt
would be the immediate signal for the oc-
cupation of Constantinople by British
army, contingency which Russia is ex-
tremely anxious &c avoid.
A marked char acteristic of the diplo-