Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1876-07-08
Further Particulars Of the Custer Dis.
aster-GeneraI Terry on the Plan
Of Campaign.
Custer Too Hasty and Too Self.reliant.
but Brave and Full Of Fight to the
Last ast-ExplanatiOns.
The Sioux viii Have to Go TO the Reser.
VatiOn or Succumb to the Inevitable
determination Is the Order.

CHICAGO, July THE following dis.
patch has been received by Gs1ers'
Sheridan: u :"
HEADQUARTERS CAMP On THE YEr1ow.1
| kroNE River,
,,r NkAR MOUTH OF fla HoRs, July2. J
10 heutenant-GsrLers sheridan:
tnInK 1--WE Ct TO myself 60 p,t Won
more Iuiiv N possession Of .ne facts Of
>pe Operations. While at the
>dth ei the Rosebud l submitted my
/, plan to General Gib5on and to General
Custer. They approved 1t heartily. II
! wssithat Custer with his whole regiment,
should move up the Rosebud till he
should meet trail, which heno had
discovered q few dsyB before, but that
he should not follow 1t directly to the
Little Big Horn; that he should send
scouts over it and keep his main force
further to the south, so IS TO prevent the
Indians from slipping in between him
self and the mountains. He was also to
examine the hesdwaters of Tul.
lock's creek as he passed il. and;
TO send me word Of what
ne found there, A scout was fuq... he'd
him .Ur the purpose of croseIng the coun-
sry, which he calculated 1t would take
Gibbons column until the tweuty-sIxth
to reach the mouth OF the Bittlu Sig
born, and that tbs wide sweep which
had proposed Gustef should make would
require 80 much time that Gibbon would
0e able to cooperate with him In at:
taekiGg any Indians that might be
tgond on that stream. asEed General
| Custer how long his marches wostld he.
and he said that they would at first be
about thirty mles day. Measurements
were made AND calculations based on
that rate OF PROCESS. l talked With him
about his strength, and at one time sug-
| gested that perhaps 1t would be well for
me to take Gibbons cavalry and go
with him. To this suggestion he replied,
! that without reference to the command,
he would prefer his own regiment alone,
as homogeneous body, as much could
be done wIrh 1T as with the two com.
bined, ami expressed the utmost conf.
dence that he had sll the force he would
need, and / shared his conndsuce
Tbs plan adopted was the only one
which promised to bring the infantry
into SctioD, and desired to make sure
OF things by getting ue every available
man. offered Custer the battery of
Gsuiing guns, tut he declined 1t saying
it might embsrress hint that he was
strong enough without it, The move
ments proposed by General Gibbons's
column were csrTied out t. the letter,
and bad the attack been deferred until
It was up cannot doubt that We .ould
have bean success al. The Indians had
evidently nerved themselves for q stand.
but as / learn from Captain Bertop. IN
the twenty-sec0nd the cavalry nparehed
twelve miles; on the tHenty-tEifd. thir-
ty-tive miles, from five O'Clock in the
morning to eight o'clock IN the evening.
on the twenty-fourth, i0rty-five miles.
and then after night zen miles further:
theni after resting, but without onssd-
9ilngr twenty-tnree miles to the cattle
neios- tne proposed route was not
IsKen, bul as soon as trail was struck 1t
was lolio'Wed. ] cannot learn that any
examjIation Of Tullock's creek was
maze. do not tell you this to cast sny
REJECTION on General Custer, for what
ever errors he Dlay have commit
ted he has paid the penalty.
aud you cannot regret this loss more
than 90; but feel that oursplan must
have been EucceSsiul had it been carried
out, and desire you to know the facts.
ln the action itself, 80 far as can mage
out, General Custer acted under 3 mis-
apprehension. he theugat confidently
that the Indiaps we're running, and for
fear they might get away, he attacked
them without getting all his taeh I'D,
and divided his command 80 that they |
We-e beaten in detail. do not propose
co give the thing up here; but L think |
that my troops require a little time in |
view OF the strength which the Indians |
have developed. propose to bring up,
what little reinforcemeRts ] can get. l |
should he glad OF any that you can send |
han tcE Ea frvo
fsntry from Powder river, and there are |
q few recruits and detached men whom |
can get for the cavalry. 1 ought to |
have larger mounted force than now |
have, but this fear cannot be obtained. |
/ hear nothing of General Crooks ope.
Tations."
A second dispatch from General Ter.
~ to General Sheridan, of the same !
date says: ION the evening of the
twenty. eighth we commenced moving
down with the wounded, but We were
only able to get on four miles, as our
hsnd-litIers did not answer the purpose.
The mule.litters did eXcellently well,
but they were insufficient in number |
The twenty ninth, therefore, was spent |
In making full supply OF them. On
the evening OF the twenty ninth we
started again, and st two O'clock in the
morning the wounded were placed on
board of the steamer at the mouth OF
Little Big Horn. On the afternoon of
the thirtierh they were brought down to
the depot on the Yellowstone river, and
tomorrow they will be sent by steamer
to Fort Lincoln, and with them Que Of
my aids, Captain e. w. Smith. | have
brought down the troops TO the same
point. They arrived tonight. They
need refittiDg, particularly in The matter
of transportation, before starting again.
Although had on the steamer a good
supply of subsistence and forage, there
are other things we need, and l should
hesitate to trust the boat again on Big
Horn. Colonel SheridRn's dispatches,
informing me Of the reported gathering
OF Indians On the Rosebud, reached me
after came down here. hear nothing
Of General Crooks movements. At least
one hundred horses are needed to re-
mount the cavalry-men which we have
here. "ALFRED H. TERRY,
"Brigadier-General."
A WAR CoNFERENCE-MoRE TROOPS
CALLED FOR.
WASHINGTON, July General Sher-
man telegraphed to Secretary Cameron,
who arrived tuis morning, that he will
leave Philadelphia to-day for this city.
10 il. ~ I, H. 81 ~, |