The New Orleans Democrat. (New Orleans, La.) 1875-1876, 1876-01-22
DANIEL CONES TO JUDO
MENT.

SvflVe w, II. DeWttS VII OohSacs 49,
ing the informations filed by the Az
torney General, charging the parties
with bribery, under the act OF 1873, was
n marvel OF judicial research and bril-
liancy, and should not fail to evoke the
approval of the legal fraternity
The first proposition in his mastery
argument conveys the information
that "the motion to quash is n adj
dressed to the judicial discretion OF the
court, which discretion must be gov
erned by judicial rule"
Shade of Themis! How s~tartlingly
new Is this learning. We had thought
that the Court had no discretion to ex-
ercise in deciding a motion to quash, 1t
being entirely q question OF law.
But the learned Judge says that he
intends his judicial discretion shall be
governed by judicial rule" We are
glad to find him thus intimating that he
will not arbitrarily exercise it.
We discover that Judge Steele an
nounces the governing rule to be as
follows: ''The principle is well estab-
Iished, that when 1t appears from any
reason that the prosecution cannot be
proceeded with a~duantdge0usly to public
Justice, the prosecution shall be quash-
ed.o It must be confessed that this
principle which the Judge says is well
established Is new to us; we never saw
It in q law book and did not know before
that It was intended that public justice
should haze the adrantdge In the mode
! of prosecuting offenders for violation Of
law.
But, nevertheless, we are pleased with
| the solicitude that the Judge manlfests
in the interest Of the people when hav-
ing discovered that the prosecution
"cannot be proceeded NTH ddrdntd-
geously to public justice" he thinks 1t
should bequashed SO "thatthe State may
be enabled to institute proper proceed
ings before the offense could be pun
ished," and he holds "that IL in this case
It appears that a conviction cannot be
maintained upon the information as
filed. or If eren the question Is doubtful,
then the information should be quashed
while there is yet time for the proper
proceedings to be had"
Does not his Honor, however, here
look too much to the consequences OF
his decision Of a mere question OF law?
The question is, can the crime OF
bribery, under the act OF 1873, be prose
cuted by information?
Tt seems to us that this question
should be decided without regard to the
consequences eventually resulting to
the State or to the defendants.
The rule, however, is n Of the lights
by which the Judge intends to gorer,'
his discretion in quashing, or not quash-
ing, the information, and in considera-
ton Of the light thus afforded, his
Honor now cites article 6 OF the
constitution, which enacts that prose
cutions shall be by indictment on In
formation; and says the Legislature
may prescribe either mode Of prosecu-
tiOns.
He proceeds, in his wisdom, as fol
lows: "In the statute referred to TACT OF
1871, and under the prosecution as in
stituted, the Legislature does pro-
vide, that If any person shall
commit an offense" (reciting at
length the various acts OF commission,
which It is the intention of the law
maker to punish), she shall be liable to
Indictment before any court of compe.
tent jurisdiction, aud on conviction shall
be fined" etc.
This act creating a new crime became
a law December 6, 1872, and to the ex'
tent that authority is given under this
law the courts are authorized to deal
with those who commit the crime o.
bribery, and no further.
The prosecution must stand OF fall by
this law, nor can we bring to u aid
other acts Of a general character passed
previously to give to this act more OF
less meaning than can be fairly inter.
preted from its plain letter!
But il the letter Of the law be plain and,
therefore, it's meaning unquestiOndble, il
seems to us it needs no Interpretation,
fair or otherwise.
With due respect to the opinion OF the
Judge, il we closely examine the law
in question, We discover that although
it says the Offender shall be liable tc
Indictment" it does not say he shall no.
be prosecuted by Information. Nor was
it necessary it should have read "liable
to indictment or information" in order
that a person could be prosecuted by the
latter proceeding.
For first, the Legislature had long age
declared that the word indictment
should be understood to include Gin.
formation" and "presentment." [Sec
1866, Revised Statutes.] The Legisla'
ture has in this section Intending tc
simplify criminal p~roceedings) made
the word indictment a generic term, in
Guiding p~resentment and Information
and is it to be supposed, that
subsequent Legislatures would use
the word in a different sense-excludine
informations-when making new Of
fences. What possible reason could ex-
list, that in making the crime Of bribery
they should confine the mode Of prose
cution to Indictment alone? Andif any
such reason did exist, would they moi
have used restrictive words, knowing
that by the law and practice OF the State