The Iola register. [volume] (Iola, Allen County, Kansas) 1875-1902, 1876-11-04
BEFORE YOU VOTE
Consider Well the Results Of Demo.
cratic Victory.

!.
cratic Victory.
From the New York Tribune.l
Every person who proposes to vote
for Mr.. Tilden must be prepared to be
satisfied with the following results OF a
Democratic Administration:
I. "THE SOUTH " would participate
in such an Administration as POLITI-
CAL UNIT. Whatever such voter may
J think of the present attitude OF the
Southern States, he can not doubt that
Democratic Administration would,
with all the resources at its command,
ultimately bring all of them under the
control of the Democratic party. He
has only to consider, then, how they
would be likely to act in such case.
He will remember that, even before the
late war, they always exhibited ten
dency to unity, andto the discipline of
unity, when their sec tional feeling was
excited, and that the habit of acting as
unit was educated by that war. OF
course he will not expect them to put
aside an habitual inclination, so invet-
crate and so recently strengthened by
practice. On the other hand, he can
not fail to know that the Democratic
party in the North accepts and relies
upon that organized unity. The Ian
guage and tone in which its leaders and
organs are now asserting that "he
South is solid for 1ilden" are something
more than an assertion of fact; they as
sent to and approve sectional unity.
The tendencies of the South, confirmed
by such encouragement, can not fail to
accomplish that result. Every voter
for Mr.. Tilden must accept it, then, as
foregone conclusion, that the South
Do,lld participate in Democratic 3D.
ministration as political unit.
II. That political unit must constitute
the controlling element of the Demo
cratic party. Under Democratic Ad-
ministration the States which regard
and describe themselves as "the South"
would be able to send to Congress about
one hundred Democratic Representa-
tives and, ultimately, Mirty-t,Do Demo-
cratic Senators. With this strength in
Congress and their one hundred and
thirty-eight votes in the College of
Electors, they would, by reason of their |
numbers and of The discipline of which |
experience shows them to be capable,
and which their situation would mex
orably impose upon them, constitute a
SOLID FORCE to which the Northern |
Democrats could oppose no equivalent.
Even in days when the South was not a
Democratic unit the Southern Demo-
Gratis were able, by reason of their num-
bers and their supe rior unity, to con-
troll their party. 1t is not to be sup
posed that they would accomplish less
with the same unity and larger num-
bers. Every person who proposes to
vote for Mr.. Tilden must, therefore, ac-
cept it as fact beyond question that
under a Democratic Administration the
South would not only operate as a unit,
but would be the dominant force OF the
Democratic party. This statement is
not made for the purpose of arousing
the antipathies and passions of the late
war. 1t demands, on the contrary, the
most dispassionate reflection. Every
person who admits its correctness is
under an obligation to consider what
course the South, occupying such a
position in a Democratic Administra-
ton, would be likely to pursue.
Ill. At the outset the South would as
sumo that attitude with full apprecia-
ton of its natural effect to intensity gen.
eral feeling of opposition at the North,
and of the increased necessity, therefore,
for the use of every instrumentality
which would secure enough Northern
States to complete a majority in the
Electoral College. Having once taken
its ground, the Southern Democracy
would run no risk of failure which
could possibly be avoided. OF course
they would insist upon the use of pat
ronage, and would regard every thing
that could be truly called a system of
civil service as dangerous. For them
the abandonment of patronage could
only be the abandonment of strength.
The South, then, would inevitably re-
sist because it could not afford to do
otherwise), every system of civil service
except that of bestowing Offices as re-
wards for party services, and it is impos-
sible to doubt that its resistance would
be successful, even if Mr.. Tilden were
disposed to inaugurate better system.
But Mr.. Tilden's letter of acceptance
promises nothing that would con-
tlict with this inevitable policy of the
South. While he says that care must
be taken to support only good officers
and promptness used in removing bad
ones, and that at some future time, with
due deliberation, system of civil SER
vice should be contrived, he plainly re-
serves the intention to effect general
from Office. Under the plea
that only corrupt officers were removed,
and that this was civil service reform,