The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1876-01-09
SOME NEW BOOKS.
The Army Of tho Cumberland.

tNnbetidnd Robert Clarke & Co., CinciDnatD is
| by far the most accurate account yet published
Of the operations Of any OF our armies and seems
| 20 have been prepared In literal accordance with
/ Gen. Thomaa's directions to the author, to
write nothing but the truth" Being confined
exclusively to one subject, II is defective "a a
| history of campaigns and battles in which other
| organizations took part. II omits nothing which
concerns the Army Of the Cumberland, or the
various subdivisions which composed II. |; mem
lions officers Of every grade bv name, aud gives
fair outline Of their services in the field but 1t
stops there, and affords the reader no lnforIna-
tlon whatever as to their personality and pecu-
liarites Of character. II relates nothing further
| oil Thomas than his services In connection with
| the Army Of the Cumberland. 1t does not even
mention the fact that he was a Virgnan a
| graduate Of West Point, and an officer Of the
regular army, who remained loyal to the nag
| when 40 many OF his brother officers from the
South were leaving II. II treats Buell. and
hosecrans In the same manner, and the reader
might Infer that they and all the other generals
who were from time to time connected with the
Army OF the Cumberland were equally merito-
rious. We cannot but think that the author
has greatly detracted from the value Of his
work by telling us nothing about the life and
character Of these officers. In the case Of
Thomas, so far az his services during the rebel
Hon are concerned, the work before MS leaves
little to be desired; but It tells us absolutely
nothing about the exalted and heroic character
OF the man who made the Army OF the Cum
berland what II was, and was really its aoul from
Chioamauga to its browning victory at Nash
Vile. lie was soldier OF splendid pbysique,
ana OF Roman virtues. His loyalty to the nag
and his devotion TO duty, along with his mod
esty, steadiness, and courage, marked him early
"A al tho nplIeaf 0pnraa In American hia-
tory, and we cannot help regrettinR that one
who knew him so well IA our author must have
known him did not describe him as the expo
nent Of tho army which derived its highest
characteristics from the exalted example he
continually act before n.
The concluding volume now before us begins
with an account OF the minor operations which
took place In the Department OF the Cumbcr-
land after the Victories about Chattanooga, and
which Immediately preceded the campaign OF
Atlanta Tnc author shows that Thomas rocom-
mended to Grant, and subsequently to Sherman,
a plan Of campaign almost Identical with the
one which was afterward adopted. Recognize
ing the folly Of undertaking to force Johnstons
position " at Buzzard Roost by direct attack"
he proposed to turn that position by marching
with his whole army Of 10000 men through
Snake Creek Gap. and falling on the Confederate
line Of communications at Resaca, while the
armies OF Mcpherson and Schoaeld, aggregatiug
In round numbers 1900 men, should menace the
enemy In front. lie was not permitted, how
ever, TO carry out this plan, for the reason, az
Sherman explains In his memoirs, that he de-
sired the Army Of the Cumberland to act ~ the
centre Of the grand army, while the two smaller
armies Of the Tennessee and Ohio should ac, as
the night and left wings respectively. Accord
iugly, Mcpherson, with his force Of about 1900
men, was sent to make this turning movement.
from which 50 much was expected, and which
nevertheless resulted In a complete failure. Al
though Mcpherson had a great opportunity, ard
might have gained greater ronown by moro bold
ness he acted with the discretion which Sher-
man specially allowed him IN his instructions,
and fell back to the dtbouche OF the Gap with
out INJECTING any damage whatever upon the
enemy. This showed Johnston the essential
weakness Of his position, and caused him
TO fall back to Resaca. Sherman blamed Nc
Pherson severely for his timldity, and not with
out show OF reason; but did he not commit "A
far graver fault himself IN detacLing Mcpherson
and his small army instead Of Thomas with his
splendid force Of G0tVO menI II will be rcmem-
bered that this was no turning movement on the
FIELD OF battle, which could be supported
| promptly before the enemy could counter
against Il; but II was a detachment from the
main army moving on an eccentric line, for the
! purpose OF breaking up the cnemys communal
! cations and cutting him uf from his base of
suppies. \ moments consideration OF the sub
! ject, aided by Capt Rugcr's complete map Illus.
/ trAuug this campaign, Will show that with Ne.
| rher-on at Rcsaca, aud Johnstous army at HUI
gard Roo-t and Rocky F.cc, on the railroad.
| well In hand aud ready 10 move at a moments
notice, IL would have been an easy thing for the
| Confederate General to leave small force to
hold hl- almost impregnable front against the
bulk OF the national army, still further 10 the
northward, and fall with the mass OF his own
army upon Mcpherson. Johnston could have
reached the point OF danger within from eight
| e. twelve hours, whereas II would have taken
Sherman from eighteen to twenty-four hours.
| Can any one acquainted with tho character and
abilities Of Johnston doubt what would have
been the result had McPhofsOn waited for the
crisis which his own movement must necessarily
| have brought onf
On the other hand. suppose that sherman had
sent Thomas, with his army Of 60.000 veterans, or
even Mcpherson, reinforced by SchoHeld, upon
I hot frEaa a