The Democratic press. [volume] (Ravenna, O. [Ohio]) 1868-1901, 1876-06-08
GEORGE MccLELLAN.

! Gen. Custer in the Galaxy for June
Regarding Gen. Mcclellan as mill
itary leader whose mental training
and abilities were of higher order,
and whose military qualifications and
knowledge were superior to those of
any officer who subsequently led the
army of the Potomac to battle, may
justly be asked to explain why, if this
is true, did not Mcclellan terminate
the war, and why was it left to others
to lead the armies of the Union to
final victory? To answer these ques-
tions fully and in detail is not the pur-
pose of this article: the answer will
appear in describing later events. Gen.
McClellan's greatest disadvantage,
when we compare his military career
with those of other commanders of
the army of the Potomac, was in the
fact that, while ablcr than they in
nearly all the natural acquired endow-
ments sought for in a great leader, he
alone of all the commanders of the
army of the Potomac, was thrust into
high and almost supreme command
of an army without having first had
an opportunity to prepare himself by
apprenticeship, as his successors had,
by working their way up, step by step
through intermediate grades, from
colOnels or captains, to that of general
commander-in chief, and thus acquir
ing self-confidence and resolution
which sudden elevation to high and
supreme command was not calculated
to give. Yet with all the impediments
due to these causes TO contend with,
Mcclellan would hayc overwhelmed |
the armies of the Confederate States,
suppressed the rebellion against the
national authority, and restored peace
throughout the land, if the only OBJ
stacles TO be overcome by him had
been those presented by the COnfeder-
ATE armies in his front. But this was
not the case. The defeat Of Mcclellan
was not the result of combinations
made either in the confederate capita!
Dr. in the camp of the confederate ar
ny, but in Washington. 1t was the
'esult of an opposition whose birth
md outgrOwth could be traced to the
spirits who at that time
we're largely in control Of the federal
1t was not the open op-
position of enemies i'm his front, but
he hall hidden Interference of foes in
lis rear that succeeded in marring the
ompiete success of McClellans COM
linations for The -snPPressiea- of the .
ebellion. Few persons can realize or +,
'elieve at this late day the extent Of
he opposition which Mcclellan en-
ountered from those from whom his
trOngest support and encouragement
hOuh have come. This opposition
vas well known at the time: in fact
here was little If any effort TO conceal
{. At time when Mcclellan was
bout to engage the confederate army
erious changes tending to weaken his /,
rmy were made. When these were q
eng discussed by group Of promi- !
ent political leaders at tine federal i
apital, most of whom were violently =
pposed to Mcclellan, one more out .
poken than the rest, and who, to-day,
j in high official station, in reply to a
emark that the contemplated change
'ould seriously embarrass McClellans II
replied, at is not OH our I
eoks that Mcclellan shall take Rich
lond." This opposition to Mcclellan
id not cease with his relinquishment
the command of the army of the y
otomac. !