The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1876-12-08
No More Money for Fortifcations.

Con. Humphreys, the Chief of Engineer
of the army, man who holds the first rank
In his profession. in his annual report re-
news the stereOtyped demand for large APP
preparations tor our sea-cOast foTtitcations.
For forty Yeas we have heard the same
old story, aud il has so far been listened
10 by Congress that millions and millions
OF dollars have been given for purposes So
utterly valueless that the money might rs
well have been spent on a railroad TO the
moon. These fortihcations, which line the
coast from the Mississippi to the Penob
scot. are very pretty pieces of work, look
even formidable 10 the uneducated eve,
aud the classmates afford nice quarters for
the troops TO get chiil- and fever M but
they have never served any useful pur-
pose whatever. On the contrary. when
ever they have been put Ia any practical
test they have always failed
Take the experience of the war. FAR
RAGUT captured New Orleans with ease,
without the loss OF vessel and with only
an Insignificant loss OF life, in spite of forts
built expressly for the defence OF the city.
lie did II with fleet less formidable
than one which could have been brought
against it nj that time by any Of the great
European powers. Aud SINCE that day the
relations between forts and ships have be-
come still more in favor of the attack, that
is where forts are relied on To prevent the
passage of steam fleet through "A deep
channel. such a. that, for instance, Of New
York harbor or Fort Monroe. FARRAGUr
also took Mobile without serious difficulty,
| and all he endurcd--tha blowing up of the
| monitor Tecumsch---was owing TO q tor
pedo OF which she ran afoul in the chan
mel The forts placed along Mobile bay.
| f0r all they did to prevent the entrance of
| his fleet. might rs well not have existed.
| They did him little or no harm ana offered
no real impeachment 10 his progress up 10
the city.
Itmay be objected that the present guns
are such as 10 alter the conditions of the
problem-that the relations between ships
! aud permanent fortiticitiOn~ have changed
since the days of FARRAGUT, and that the
! forts have become more important than
| they were then. But the now obsolete
guns which were used against his ships
twelve OF fourteen years ago, were practi-
cally just rs potent against them IA the
| present monster guns OF Europeare against
the latest types of ironclads-such moni F.
tors rs the InneXible, Devastation Peter
the Great, and Duilo. All that any gun
| can do is to send its shot or shell through
the sides of the enemys vessel This is all
that the ope-hundre1 ton wrought iron
rifle, lately tried in Italy against a twenty
two inch armor plate can do; AL that the
cighty-one ton English rifle can do. All
that the shell guns of the Kearsarge lid to
the Alabama was to penetrate her sides
and explode within, and everybody know
that was sufficient TO settle her fate.
Relatively, therefore, the ships and forti
| ncations stand Just about whore they did
in FARRAGUT's time. The guns then were
sufficient topcncirato the ships, and SO they
are now. As fast rs the armor X thickrnci
on the so-cullcd sca-going ironclads, gun
can be built to 20 through them. Gen.
| Humphreys loses slghi OF the ilcl that n
was not the Application Of nrInor to yosr"l
of war than sounded Tho knrll Of pcrunucul
fortihcniions built 10 prevent the pnrsnY'
OF deep channels, but the npplirutlon, by
capt ERIcssoN, Of the screw prop"ll IT,
vessels Of war This gave shIps nutuI
Independent OF the tickle wind. II thci
became not "a case of masts and sails nm,
well -trained seamen. For these were sub
stituted q gang OF stokers shovelllng ooa