The weekly clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1863-1882, 1876-01-05
GOvRRNOR'S MESSAGE.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
jackson, Jan. 4, 1875

corning the condition and interests of the
government and State, and the condition of
| the people, call your attention TO the late
State election, and the events incident there
TO- As a subject whose magnitude and i'm
portance demand the wisest and calmest
consideration.
On the fourth day of September last, a
| political meeting at Clinton, Kinds county,
was interfered with and dispersed by vio-
| lence, which resulted in the death of a num-
Der of persons, and which was followed,
subsequently. by the pursuit and shooting
| of others, by armed men riding through the
county. Impelled, through fear OF violence,
| men abandoned their homes, and fled by
hundreds to this city for safety.
The fifth and following days of Septem-
| Der found this city crowded with panic.
| imploring suck assistance as would enable
them TO return to their homes and shield
them in the peaceful pursuit of their labors.
While a city full of refugees was one IL
lustration of the violence and the success
| of lawlessness, another was to be found IN
| the fact that a sheriff's posse, which was sent
to Clinton from this point, was headed by a
| flag OF truce.
! At this juncture, business was suspended,
| and dlsquiet or terror existed in the minds
| of all. The authority OF the county was par
ally Zed. The sheriff reported his utter help
! lessress to give the needed protection. Ii
| then became the duty of the SfaIe govern
| ment to furnish him the means to overcome
and suppress the lawles- bands which, tor
| some purpose other than the punishment OF
crime, or the pursuit of criminals, had es-
/ tablished SO lamentable a condition OF az
| fairs.
The spirit which precipitated the Clinton
| outrage. by no means had its origin then
and there. Previous TO that day, the sher
| If OF two adjacent counties had been eX-
| PEELED by force, or, what is substantially the
| same, alter encountering much lawless viO-
! lence, which no power at their command
| could control, had made their escape beyond
the borders of their counties, leaving them
| without the chief peace officer which the
| law has made SO Indispensable.
Nor was violence, or the fear of it, con-
| ii ned to two or three counties. Appeals for
| protection and aid came from all directions
The State was without militia or con-
| stabulary force. Although previous poli5-
| zeal disturbances had occurred, of a magni-
| !ude too great for local or State authorities
| to col pc with the sentiment against militia,
| or other armed force, was so powerful and
| SO gene al as to prevent Its successful or
| ganiZation. This hostile sentiment to main
tanning peace ard affording protection by
| force, was chiefly due to dread of i con-
| fiict of races. While one part of the people
/ were thus discountenancing the militia in
| the interest of peace. another part was con-
| verting the State into a broad military en-
campment, which called forth a proclama-
| tion, bearing date of 9TH September, 1875,
| commanding, though Intellectually. their
| DISARMAMENT. The evil day anticipated ,
when the State should need force and be
without it. had arrived.
| Under such a comb ination of circum-
| stances, which could exist only in a State
| where the Inhabitants are of TWO distinct
races, with strong race prejudices and an
| tagonisms, | WAS constrained to cali upon
| the National government for assistance to
| protect against domestic violence. This call
| was unsuccessful. 1t was followed by a
succession of demonstrations by the armed
| part OF the people towards the unarmed.
| causing a feeling of insecurity and danger,
which continued until and after the day of
| the election.
| A renewed effort to organize a military
| force, developed the deep-seated bitterness
of he race issue. and the extent of the in
| limitation which prevailed.
| While appeals for aid and protection came
| from all sides, and often from sherffs, it
was held by them that such forces as might
! be organized under the State laws. could
not be serviceable. On the contrary, the
conviction prevailed that they would only
precipitate the conflict it was sought to
| avoid.
The seizure of State Arms on their way to
| The Capitol; the liability of seizure in send
ing them away from the Capitol, and the
necessity of storing the few arms on hand
| at the United States camp, for safe keeping
We're additional causes which embarrassed
| and prevented the organization OF the mil
| tia. Consequently only few companies
| could be organized. and those with one eX
ceptiOn) but in one counLy-this. the seat of
government. Many who took arms, did so
| 10 obtain the means of self-defense; few
| were accustomed to their use, and instruc-
| ton and discipline were quite impractical
| ble
The fund for militia purposes, appropri-
ated by the late Legislature. was sky
| thousand ($60000) dollars, but with the
| condition ttIat fifty five Thousand (55.000)
| dollars should be used only in case the mil
| itia should he called into active service
An early Injunction from the courts pre-
vented he expenditure of Apy part of the
batter sam.
The r. naming five thousand Is, OOO) dol
lars were soon expended, aud there were
u" means to transport beyond the borders
| of this county, the recruiting ground and
depot, the few undisciplined com paLies
formed within it.
Preparations had heen made to protecf
h" sheriff of Yazao county IN his return to
his county, he having previously been
driven away. Drrming the means inad
cquate. he declined 10 make the attempt
H. has rot been allie to return 70 this day
Becau-e of the attempt 10 organize and
use a nfHlitia to i'rotect citizens in the eXer-
else of their riYhss and privileges. as be-
slowed upon them by the constitution and
The laws. IL class OF people rebelled against
it. To aVoi threatened deeds OF resistance
and violence TO State authority, as well as
towards county officials and individuals.
IF prominent citizens. powerful in cOntroll-
ing one of thu political organizations of the
State, gave their pledges that they would
do all in their power to preserve peace and
good order, and secure II fair election" As
to heir power ''tO preserve peace and good
order, and secure a fair election" did not
entertain doubt.
This novel and humiliating spectacle, in
the government of free people, was pre-
sented regularly organized legal authority
nah fO GOOD
and secure a fair election; the leaders OF
political organization assume TO do 1t with
The accredited.
The deeds of violence already alluded to,
and many similar ones of greater or less
magnitude, in various parts of the State,
had the effect TO intimidate many voters.
The extent of such intimidation may be
Judged by the following facts:
In various counties the meeting together
and consulting of voters before election, an
i'm portant proceeding in a government like
ours, had to be wholly or partially aband-
oned.
In one county not only was there no pre-
limiTiary canvass, but the danger was re-
gardcd so great that no convention was held |
10 nominate candidates for offices.
In certain counties, tickets could not be |
freely and safely distributed, and in one |
county not at all.
From county prominent candidates |
for Office fled before election, fearing vio-
lence, if not assassination.
In another county one party. through |
fear of the evil consequences if they re-
fused, struck from their tickets names Of
candidates formerly and regularly nomi-
mated, and substituted those of their oppo-
nents with whom there existed no political
affinity,
In certain counties, on the day of election,
voters were driven from the polls by armed
men, or so intimidated by them that they
feared To vote.
In one county the principal county off,
cials were driven away from their posts on
the day following the election, and have
been refugees since. This county, Amite.
was the one remote from the seat of gov
ornn,ant har the afforf n nrna nj the |