New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1876-04-01

| Of the national government 10 limited to the
| enforcement of this guarantee.
No question arises under the civil rights
act of April 9, 1866 ia Stat, ~, which is
intended for tho protection of citizens OF
the United States in the enjoyment of Ger
tain rights, without discrimination on &C.
count of race, color or previous condition
of servitude, because, as has already been
stated, it is nowhere alleged in these counts
that the wrong contemplated against the
rights of these citizens was on account of
their race or color
Another objection is made to these counts
that they are too. vague and uncertain.
This will be considered hereafter in con-
nection with the same objection to other
counts.
The sixth and fourteenth counts state the
intent of the defendants to have been to
hinder and prevent the citizens named,
being of African descent and cO]Ored. Tin
the free exercise and enjoyment of their
several and respective right and privilege
to vote at any election to be thereafter by
law had and held by the people in and Of
the said State of Louisiana, or by the pe0-
pie of and in the parish of Grant aforesaid"
In Minor VS.. Happersett, 81 Wall, 17S,
we decided that the constitution of the
United States has not conferred the right of
suffrage upon any one, and that the United
States have no voters of their own creation
in the States. In United States vs.. Reese,
lust decided, we hold that the fifteenth
amendment has invested the citizens of the
Uaitec States with new constitutional
right, which is, exemption from discrimina-
ton in the exercise of the elective fran
chise on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude. From this it ap-
pears that the right of suffrage is not a
necessary attribute Of national citizenship,
but that exemption from discrimination in
the exercise Of that right on account of
race, etc, is. The right to vote in the
States comes from the States, but the right
of exemption from the prohibited discrimi-
nation comes from the United States. The
first has not been granted or secured by
the constitution of the United States, but
the last has been.
Inasmuch, therefore, as it does not ap-
pear in these counts that the intent of the
defendants was to prevent these parties
from exercising their right to vote on ac-
count Of their race, etc., it does not appear
that it was their intent to interfere with any
right granted or secured by the cOnstitu-
ton or laws of the United States. We may
suppose that race was the cause of the hos
tiiity, but it is not so averred. This is ma
terial to description of the substance of
the offense, and can not be supplied by inn
pllcatiOn. Everything essential must be
charged positively and not inferentially.
The defect here is not in form but in sub
stance.
The seventh and fifteenth counts are NO
better than the sixth and fourteenth. The
intent here charged is to put the parties
named in great fear of bodily harm and to
iDjure and Cypress them, because, being
and having been in all things qualified,
they had voted lat an election before that
time, had and held according to law by the
people of the said State of louisiana in
said State, to wit: ON the fourth day of Nc
vember, A. D. 1872, and at divers other
elections by the people of the State, also
before that time, had and held according to
law"
There is nothing to show that the cleo
tons voted at we're any other than State
elections, or that the conspiracy was formed
on account Of the race of the parties
against whom the conspirators were to act
The charge as made is really of nothing
more than conspiracy to commit breach
of the peace within a State. Certainly il
will not be claimed that the United States
have the power, or are required to do mere
police duty in the States. 1t State can
not protect itself against domestic violence
the United States may, upon the call of the
executive, when the Legislature can not be
| convened, lend their assistance for that
purpose. This is guarantee of the consti
tuition ldEtlClc stCtlOu UuU IL
applies to no case like this.
We are. therefore, of the opinion, tina.
| the first, second, third, fourth, sixth, sew
| enth, ninth. tenth, eleventh, twelfth, four
| teenth and fifteenth counts do not contain
| charges of a criminal nature made lndict
| able under the laws Of the United States
| and that consequently they are not good
| and sufficient in law. They do not show
| that it was the intent of the defendants by
their conspiracy to binder and prevent the
| enjoyment Of any right granted or secured
| by the constitution.
We come now to consider the fifth and
thirteenth and the eighth and sixteenth
counts, which may be brought together fol
| the purpose. The intent charged in the fifth
| and thirteenth is "tO hinder and prevent
the parties in their respective free exercise
| and enjoyment Of the rights, privileges, i'm
munities and protection granted and SO
cured to them respectively as citizens OF th n
| United States and as citizens OF said State
of Louisiana" ''fOr the reason that they
being then and there citizens Of
said State and of the United States, were
| persons of African descent and race, and
| persons of color, and not white citizent
| thereof" and in the eighth and sixteenth
| to hinder and prevent them "in their sew
eral and respective free exercise and enjoy
ment of every, each. all and singular the
| several TlSutS ouu PAlNACSOo oACCu CIV
secured to them by the constitution of the
| United States" The same general state
ment of the rights to be interfered with ii
found in the fifth and thirteenth counts.
According to the view we take OF the
| counts the question is not whether it il
enough, in general, to describe statutory
offense in the language Of the statute, bu
| whether the offense has here been described
| at all. The statute provides for the pun
| ishment of those who cOnspire ito iDjure
Cypress, threaten or intimidate any citizen
with intent to prevent or hinder his fret
exercise and enjoyment of any right OF
| privilege granted or secured to him by the
| constitution or laws of the United States.
These counts in the Indictment charge, il
substance, that the intent in this case wal
| to hinder and prevent these citizens in thu
free exercise and enjoyment OF ''every
each, all and singular" che rights granted
them by the constitution, etc. There is NJ
specification of any particular right. Thu
language is broad enough to cover all.
In criminal cases, prosecuted under tn
laws of the United States, the accused ha
the constitutional right "tO be informed o
the nature and cause of the accusation.
| amendment VIZ In United States vs.
Mills, Pet, l42, this was construed t,
mean that the indictment must set fOrtl
the offense with clesrness and all necessar.
certainty, to apprise the accused of tn
crime with which he stands charged" an.
in United States VS.. Cook, II Wall, l7A