The New Orleans Democrat. (New Orleans, La.) 1875-1876, 1876-03-15

i Wktt0lCS N1tGHGtyS 0t0 WetC tVuSC4bCnbhl
Indefinite and imperfect II the extrAc
lis taken from genuine report of tina
character, then / would call Genera
Lohgstreet's attention to another sx
| tract given by Professor Bates. on pages
W-s, in which General Lee Ii made II
say,
afternoon. the ehemy's force being IN
known. and 1t being considered advisa
BILE to await the arrival Of the rest 81
the troops orders mere sent Jdch Il
hasten their march. and In the mean
time every effort was made to ascertain
the. number and positions Of the enemy
aud find the most favorable point d
attack"
In General Lees authentic detailed
reports, pages 2i2-g of the So,,iter,
Mtgasiue for August. 1879. Is the follow
ing statement M
1.-THE enemy occupied u strong posi-
ton, with his fight upon two command
ing elevations adjacent 70 each Otbet-
one southeast. and the other, known as
Cemetery Hill, Immediately south of the
town. which lay At Its base. His llbf
extended thence upon the high ground
along the Emmsttsburg rood. with q
steep ridge In the rear. which was also
occupied. This ridge WINS difficult 81
ascent, particularly Tho two hills above
mentioned, rs forming Its northern ex-
treinity. ana third at The other end, ot,
which the ensmy's left rested. MI
mefous stone and rail fences along the
slope served H. afford protection to his
troops and to impede Our advance. In
his front The ground was undulatiDg aud
gebefally open for about three-auartefs
of n milo.
General Ewells corps constituted
our left. Juhnson's division being oppo-
site tho height adjoining Cemetery fill.
Eany's In the centre, In front 0f the
north face NJ the latter. and Hodes' up
on his fight. HIS. corps faeed the
west side " Cemetery Hill and extended
nearly parallel ~ tho Emmettsburg foad
making an angle with Ewell's. Pender's
right Ueth, under Brig. Gen. Petit
grus. being In reserve. His artillery.
under Colonel Walker, was posted In
eligible positions along the line.
Ut was determined to make tho prin-
clpal httack upon the eilemys left, md
endeavof to ghib position from which
IT. was thought otr artillery could be
brought 10 bear with effect. Longstteet
was directed to place the divisions ri
MeLaws mud Hood on The right of HILL
partially enveloping the eneny's left.
which he was to drive it, Gen. Hill was
ordered to threaten the ehenly's centre
to prevent teinforcetnents being drawn
to either wing, ana cooperate with his
right division In Johgstreet's attack.
Uen. Ewell was Instructed 10 make
Simultaneous Demonstrations upon tho
eneinys right. TO be converted into n
real attack should opportunity offer"
In his report. page 6Dt. Southern Maya
zine for June. 1878. Ewell says
EARLY In the morning | received
communication from tho general com
the tenor ~ which was that
he intended The main attack W be made
by the First Corps. on our right, aud
wished me. as soon tis their guns opened.
~ mike q diversion In their favor, ~ be
converted into real attack II M oppor
tunlty offered"
This Is precisely IN accord with the
statement of General Lee, and submit
there Is anything In either
statement that conflicts with mine.
Johhson's division, facing Culp's Hill.
where Sl0euin was. being in close ptox-
Unity with the enemy. had more or less
lighting or skirmishiug with tho enemy
vi tho morning and In fact MI day
In his testimony before the
committee on tho conduct OF ths war.
page 4sG, vol !, ri series OF the reports
II the committee. says Everything
remained comparatively quiet during
hat morning, except that the enemy
General blocum but that WIS
IN the other part of the line. tho extreme
right. directly behind the position !
ing going on there all the morning (of |
The cd with portions of Ewell's corps,
b,it We did not know at that time
whether that was going To be the main
tttaGk or not.
Whom JoDgstrset's guns opened In |
,he afternoon, Ewell's also opened and |
to fire for some time, and his |
divisions were held In readiness to as
'hult. But u demonstration is not mn
lttiiek. and therefore whom We did make
,he attack, IL WIS in consequence Of new
riders. and understood at the time that
hose orders emanntsd from Gen. Lee.
" Gun be easily understood that In Civ
pg - general sketch Of the military |
'nreer of u commander who had con
iucto1 so many brilliant campaigns rs
Ion. Lee had conducted, IT wins itnpos-
ible for mo toembody in one address q
detailed account OF every battle, and the
most ] could do was to give general
outline Of ehoh 1t was 10 be taken FOR
granted TINT my audience, which was an
exceedingly intelligent ono, would I'M
lerstapd that / did not mean that
divisions were to fight
he whole battle. and that the rest of the
lrniy were to remain indifferent spectA-
ors to the close. Previous To making
he remarks General Longstrest quotes,
had stated that General Lee had asked |
Gwcll, Rodes and myself, the evening
Il the flrst, whether we could attack the |
nemy from our position ut daylight |
,ext morning and that we had informed
lin of the difficulties Of the ground and
suggested the probability Of the eDemy's
and fortifying against US
Turing the night, and then | say: "He
determined ~ make the attack from
'ur right on tho enemy's left, and left
IS for the purpose Of ordering up Long
troets corps In time to begin the attack
t. dawn next morning." Docs this
imply that Longstreet's corps was
o do all the fighting ? The first
ttack Is not the whole Of bat
le, nor is the principal attack the
Whole Of It, / have shown by General
Icc's own statement that his orders
,cre for Longstrcet to make the princi-
al attack, while the other troops were
o make demonstrations to be converted
pto real attacks when occasion offered,
,hich occasion would certainly have
cen offered by his SUCCESS In gaining
POSITIONS on the enemy's
Eft. His attack certainly failed Of the
uccess anticipated from it., and hence
he whole plan Of the battle was thwart-