New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1876-03-26

as strong for the defense of our left
as for General Meade's right, 60 that we
could safely have moved to the right"
covering our rear better than in the
position then held, and at the same
time threatening the line Of communication
toward Washington. But suppose that
such move had been made, and we had
been attacked, was not the object of our
maueuvres to draw rather than make the
attack
1t was not intended to fight general
battle at such distance from our base I'm.
less attacked by the enemy.t
Napoleon made similar moves at Maren
go, Ulm and Jena, and one much more haz-
ardous at Arcela. General Early says,
however:
l think it very probable that things
would have assumed very different phase
if General Lee had taken General Long
streets suggestions to move of by the
right flank, for in moving that way, with
all cur trains, in the face Of the enemy
[the enemy that he reports "routed"J We
would have exposed ourselves to almost
certain destruction.
Many a young officer has gone to General
Lee to give information and suggest ideas,
and left profoundly impressed with the be.
lief that he had made most valuable sug-
gestiOns TO the commander in. chief.
As General Lee upon assuming command
of the Army of Northern Virginia, asked
General Longstreet and other superior Off
GERS of that army their counsel as to the
est plans to be pursued in our protection,
and did General Longstreet the honor to
ad opt the plan that he suggested, to cross
the river and turn General McClellan's
right, it may seem possible that General
L Ongstreet had greater claims Tor respect
full consideration than most of the young
officers who volunteer suggestions. The
plan was opposed to that of General D. H.
Hill, who wished to turn the left by pas
sing the swamp near the river, and thus cut
of the change Of base. General Hill is
more severely partisan than General Early,
but l believe that he is as severely truth
full upon points of fact as he is partisan.
1t seems that General Early has at last
learn ed that General depends upon the
valor of his troops for battle record. He
says Of the First Corps:
Its reputation is no. bound up in that of
it's commander, though it did a vast deal to
give him the reputation that he gained.
One might suppose, from the assiduity
with which he has piled his pen, his numer-
GUS little pamphlets, his address. ETC.,
since he left the last fragment Of his com
mand in the hands of General Sheridan
that his testimony might be contrary
to this suggestion. His army in the valley
of Virginia did not add vastly to his reputa
ton, but the gallant officers and troops OF
that army may claim the truth of the con
verse OF this proposition. Although Gen
eral Early contends that General Lee or
dered my attack on the right at daylight
on the second, it is difficult to understand
how he can believe it. He quotes from
nv official report, and must therefore
know that my columns were con
Quoted to the positions assigned them
by General Lees officer Of engineers, and
that they did not reach that position I'll
long after meridian; so that the conduct OF
the troops was virtually in the hands OF
General Lee till they reached their destin
alton, after which the attack was promptly
made.
General r. II. Anderson's division of the
Third Corps, that reached the field Of the
first day long before night and was to pre-
cede me in developing our line, did not re
ceive orders to move until after daylight or
the second; did not move until after sun
rise, and did not receive orders for cooper
alton until after it's deployment into
line and after General Lees return from,
his ride on the morning Of the second. re-
connoitering in person with General Ewel
and Colonel Venable the ground on his left
General Early's battle of Gettysburg is
made under the light Of subsequent devel
opments. Awaiting ourselves of the same
privilege, let us assume that it was possible
for troops Of the First Corps to arrive il
time to be placed in order Of battle acros!
the Emmetsburg pike, under cover of night
for q daylight attack, and that General Lee
could have ordered such blindfold attack
The official reports show that the Fedora
troops were all up before daylight, excep'
the Sixth Corps, which WAS marching from
Manchester, and part Of the Third that wa!
approaching from Emmetsburg. Now, lei
! US suppose that from cur position, take1
during the night, that we had made an at
tack at daylight Between daylight ant
sunrise the absent brigades of the ThirG
Corps came up, and would have been il
most opportune time to attack our rear just
as we became well engaged in front. Any
one must see that the result OF such an I'm
toward event would have been q hasty
march of the troops of the First Carps t,
Fort Warrep, Camp Chase or some othe!
place Of recreation; soon to be followed BY
the balance of the Armysof Northern Vir
ginia. For disaster on eur right woult
have gwen General Meale eootro, Of oul
line of retreat.
He says:
General Longstreet now assumes the rol
of defender Of General Lees fame agains
his enemies.
General Longstree5 is the defender o
no one. He claims that justice shall bt
| meted to all by the same measure; tha
General Lees record is his sufficient
defense: that persons who pretend tt
be his friends and the special expo
nents of his fame, in their nescience and
malevolence have attempted to defame
others in order that they may approach
nearer the central figure, in the hope tina,
the drippings of his robes may remove
blemishes that hang about their names, OF
leave, here and there, a bright spot to re-
lieve the monotony Of obscure record