The Emporia news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1859-1881, 1876-05-12
VOLUME 10.

was q continuation of the first. TAX
ing effect as of its date and prOvid-
ing for no new levy. For the
m anifest intent OF the legislature.
an intent not manifested
by the form of rules but by
the purposes to be accomplished
and the surrounding circumstances
repndiates such = construction.
So if in 1875 the legislature had
passed an act in exactly the same
language as chapter 20. of the laws
of 1874, apprOpriating $1,000 to the
Leavenworth Protestant Orphan
Asylum, is it not plain that the
same would have accomplished q
new donation? So again if year
by year we found the legislature
passing acts in the same terms, val
idsting defective tax proceedings
and curing Irregularities therein,
would not any one be constrained
to say that these successive acts
should be construed as separate en-
actments each operating upon all
defects and Irregularities prior to
it and not as simply q continuation
of the first and Oper ating only up
on matters prior to that. For 9TH
erwise, why this repetition of laws?
In the illustrations last cited, the
first enactment would cure SO far as
remedial legislation can cure, all the
pre-existing Irregularities and de-
fects, and q mere repetition would
add nothing to it's curative power.
And to impute to the legislature an
intent to go through the form and
time and expense of legislation, to
do that already fully and complete
lv done, is unwarranted.
Now, is there any principle un-
DERIVING the several cases of legis-
latien which seems to indicate the
legislative intent, any fact which
makes plain its purpose2 This fact
is evident in reference to them all.
The earlier act had accomplished its
purpose and spent it's force prior to
the enactment of the second. Much
of legislation, perhaps most, lie pros
pective IN its reach, and, so to speak,
of continuing operation-that is, 1t
establishes Q rule of action for fu-
ture and indefinite time, operating
upon all matters which may there.
after arise coming within its terms.
Thus the crimes act, defining what
shall constitute certain offences and
prescribing penalties therefor, Oper-
ates upon all acts thereafter done
coming within its terms. In case of
a repetition of such legislation, it
may well be held, in view of the
rule of construction above quoted,
that in the absence of any particu-
lar matters indicating q contrary in
tent, the second enactment simply
keeps alive and continues in force
the prior. This preserves that con-
tinulty of legislation which is the
evident purpose of the rule. 1t pre-
vents those unfortunate breaches
and Interruptions, with their de-
plorable results, which, in the ab-
sence of such q rule, have been so
often felt and so frequently noticed
by courts here and III other States.
But there is some legislation
which, though prospective, operates
only for the performance of q sim
pie, definite act and some RETROSPECT
tive operating upon existing and
past circumstances, and defining the
rights and obligations derived there
from. In both such cases the law is
without any continuing force. In
the first case, when the act author
law has exhausted its purpose and
spent its force, and in the second it
accompanies it's purpose at the very
moment. of its passage. certain
sense ii dies at the moment of its
birth. Thus, an act authorizing an
appropriation accomplishes its pur-
pose and exhausts it's force when
the appropriation has actually been
made; and an act validating prior
defective acknowledgements or ir-
regular tax proceedings, accom-
plishes its purpose as soon as it is
passed. 1t becomes no stronger by
lapse of time, and reaches and op-
crates upon no other matters. Now,
in such cases, if q succeeding legis-
lature enscts 8 similar law, it can
not be that the legislature intended
simply q continuation of the prior
law, tor there is really nothing to
continue. That law has ceased to
have force. 1t has no living present
operation, nothing to be continued.
And the only way in which an in
tent to accomplish anything can be
established, is by constituting the
later law as q new enactment.
1t must be presumed that the leg
islatuIe was familiar with the rules
it had laid down for the construc-
ton of Its own enactments, under
stood the scope and effect of Its leg
isiation, and by every law intended
TO accomplish something.
We think therefore, that this may
be stated So q general rule, that
when the legislature enacts law
which is the same in terms Is q
prior statute, If such prior statute
has accomplished its purpose and
spent it's force, the latter law must
be held, Notwithstanding the rule
of construction quoted. to be q new
enactment and not merely . contin-
uation of the former
We have given this subject care
full thought, for our first impress
sion, after reading the brief of
counsel, was that his point was q
good one. But the disastrous re-
suits which would follow from max
ing this rule one of general applica-
ton caused US to hesitate and re-ex-
anime the matter. That re-examin-
alton has satisfied Rs of the sound
ings of the distinction we have
drawn between the classes of legis-
lation as affected by this rule. Up
on that this motion is denied.
We may be pardoned also for
suggesting this query. Does the
rule in any case prevent the latter
law for operating as a law of the
date of the passage upon all matters
within it's terms? lie it not satisfied
when it preserves q continuing
force to it's legislative command, a
continuing operation to the legista-
tive rule, leaving to each law to
/ act as present expression of legis-
lativs interest upon ali matters
+ within its terms1 Must both laws
, in effect bear date as of the time of
the enactment of the first7
, We have assumed In this case
3 that the law of III was purely retro
3 spective in its operation, that it ap-
f pliedIonly to prior defects and irreg-
' ularities, and was not intended to
r apply to defects that might there
{ after arise in subsequent tax pro.
/