The new Northwest. [volume] (Portland, Or.) 1871-1887, 1876-01-28
MAY WOMEN PRACTICE LAW INTHE
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN,

SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN,
Miss Lavina Goodell, of GAINESVILLE,
Wisconsin, was admitted to the Wis
eonsin bar by His Honor Judge Conger,
at Janesville, more than year ago, af-
ter the usual examination, and has
since that time been engaged in the
practice of her profession. One morn
ing in December she appeared before
the Supreme Court at Madison with an
application for admission to its bar, and
a written argument to enforce the same.
Having a case in the Supreme Court,
she found it necessary to make applica-
tion for admission, and learning that
there was difference of opinion among
the learned judges as to her right to be
admitted, she came prepared to argue
the case, should necessity require.
Hon. I. c. Sloan, the Assistant At
torney- General, appeared with Miss
GoOdell, and in her behalf motioned
her admittance, read her petition and
argument, and enforced the same with
eloquence, vigor, and sound logic. The
petition of Miss Goodell abounds in
arguments that are unanswerable, and
opens in this wise:
Now comes your petitioner, Miss r. Lavina
GoudeIl, resident Of Janesville, Wisconsin,
over twenty-one years of age, and presents to
your honors the certificate OF A. W. Baldwin,
Clerk of the Circuit Court of the Twelfth Ju-
dieal Circuit OF the State of Wisconsin, stating
thst at a term Of said Court, begun and held at
the Courthouse, in the city Of GAINESVILLE
aforesaid, on the 18th day OF June, A. D. 1874
your petitioner was examined in open Court;
and that, it appearing that she was q resident
of the State of Wisconsin, more than twenty
one years Of age, Of good, moral character, and
possessed OF sufficient legal knowledge and
ability, she was duly admitted by said Court as
an attorney and counselor-at-laW; and moves
your honors that an order Of this honorable
Court may be entered, granting license to
your petitioner TO practice as an attorney in
said Court.
Your petitioner respectfully suggests that
the only question involved in her case-if in
deed there be any question at all-is, whether
the fact Of her being woman disqualifes her,
under the laws of Wisconsin, or the rules of
this honorable Court, for receiving license to
practice as attorney in said Court; and claims
that she is not so disqualified.
After reading the statute providing
for the admission of attorneys, she con-
tin ues:
There is nothing contained in these provis-
ions which can be so construed as to debar
awoman from the privilege of obtaining a Ii
cense under them, unless it be the use of the
masculine pronoun. But by statute, relating
To nF - &c
that "every word importing the masculine
gender only may extend and be applied to fe-
males as we'll as to males" Tay, Stats, L, p.
Isl. This rule Of Interpretation is followed in
the construction of all the statutes, and there
appears no reason why it should not be applied
10 the particular statute under consideration,
as well as to the statutes generally. 1t has
been so applied to the statute providing for
notaries public and defining their duties, un-
der which your petitioner has been appointed
and now holds the office of notary.
The cases of Mrs. Myra Bradwell, who
had been refused admission to the bar OF
the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Sep
tember, 1869, and of Mrs. Belva Lock
wood, who was refused admission to the
Court of Claims, Washington, D. c., in
1874, solely on the ground of their disa-
bilities as married women, were cited
and were shown to be wholly inapplica-
BILE to the case of the petitioner. One Of
the limitations to the discretion left by
legislation to the Court as specified by
the Supreme Court of Illinois was that
''the Court shall establish such terms OF
admission as will promote the proper
administration of justice" No argu.
ment was made against the admission
Of women under this head, and Mis-.
Goodell submitted that the "proper ad
ministration of justice" would be better
promoted by the admission of womer
to the practice of law than by their ex
elusion, for the following reasons
among others:
]. That a class wholly unrepresented fl
courts OF justice can never obtain full justic
in such courts; and that when that class is s.
numerous as to include one-half the human
race, the promotion of"the proper administrs
ton Of justice" requires that they be repre-
sented.
2. That union OF the peculiar delicacy, re
nnement, and conscientiousness attributed Z
women, with the decision, hrmness, and vigo
Of man, are not only desirable, but necessar
in promoting "the proper administration c
justice" in our courts.
g. That in excluding women from the prac
tice OF law, an injustice is done the communit
in preventing free and wholesome competitio
Of the best existing talent.
4. That great injustice is done to one-ha
the community, by shutting them out arbitr,
rily from an honorable and remunerative fel
OF industry, for which many OF them hay
both taste and ability.
The Court, after hearing the argu
ment, reserved Its decision. Its actor
and If the motion is denied, its reaso
for such denial, will be looked for wit
more than ordinary interest, not onl
by the legal profession generally, bu
By the public, as involving principles
interest to the whole community.