The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1876-04-06
AN IMPORTANT DECISION.

Abstract of the Opinion of the United
States Supreme Court In the Grant
Parish {La.) Cases.
The opinion of the Supreme court III
the Grant parish cases is very elaborate.
It says
There is pothing to show that the elections
voted at were any other than State elections, or
that conspiracy was formed on account of race
OF the parties against whom the conspirators
were to act. The charge as made Is really
nothing more than a conspiracy to commit a
breach OF peace within State Certainly it
Will not De claimed that the United States have
power or are required to do mere police duty In
States. If a State cannot protect itself against
domestic violence, the United States may, upon
the call or the Executive when the Legislature
cannot be convened, lend their assistance for
that purpose. This is guaranty of the Con-
stitution. act four, section four, but it applies
to no case like this. We are, therefore. of
opinion that the first second, third fourth.
sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth, eleventh, twelfth,
fourteenth and fifteenth commits do not contain
charges of a criminal nature made indictablo
under the laws of the United States and that
consequently they are not good and sufficient
Ill law. They do not show that it was the in
tent of the defendants, by their conspiracy, to
hlnder or prevent the enjoyment of any right
granted or secured by the Constitution. We
and eighth and sixteenth counts, which may be
brought together for that purpose The intent
charged in the fifth and thirteenth is to hinder
and prevent parties in their respective free
exercise and enjoyment of the rights privileges,
immunities and protection granted and secured
to them respectively as citizens of the United
States and as citizens of the State OF Louisiana,
for the reason that they being then and there
citizens of said State and of the United States
were persons of African descent and race, and
persons of color and not white citizens thereof,
and In the eighth and sixteenth, to hinder and
prevent them in their several and respective
free exercise and enjoyment of every, EACH all
and singular the several rights and privileges
granted and secured to them by the Constitu-
ton and laws of the United States. The same
general statement of rights to be interfered
with is found in the fifth and thirteenth
counts, according to the view we take of these
counts The question Is not whether it is
enough In general to describe statutory Of
tense in the language of the statute but
whether the offense has here been described
at all. The statute provides for the punish
meDt of those who conspire to iniure, Cypress,
threaten or intiInidate any citizen with intent
to prevent or hinder his free exercise and en-
ioyment of any right or privilege granted or
secured to him by the Constitution or the laws
of the United States. These counts in the in
dictment charge in substance that the intent
in this case was to hinder and prevent these
citizens in the free exercise and enjoyment of
every, each, all and singular the rights granted
them by the Constitution. The accused has
the right to have a specification Of the charge
against him in this respect In order that he may
decide whether he should present his defense
by motion to quash, demurrer or plea, that the
court may determine whether the facts will
sustain the Indictment SO there the crime is
made to consist in unlawful combination with
an intent to prevent the enjoyment of any
right granted or secured by the Constitution.
All rights are not so granted or secured.
Whether one is 80 or not is question of law to
be decided by the court and net the prosecu-
tor. Therefore, the Indictment should state
the particulars, to inform the court as well as
the accused. 1t must be made to appear, that
is to say, appear from the Indictment, without
going further. that the acts charged will, if
proven, support a conviction for the offense
alleged. The conclusion is irresistible that
these counts are too vague and general. They
lack the certainty and precision required by
the established rules of criminal pleading. It
follows that they are not good and sufficient in
law. They are SO defective that no judgment
of conviction should be pronounced upon them.
The order of the Circuit court arresting iudg-
ment upon the verdict is therefore affirmed
and the cause remanded with instructions to
discharge the defendants. Justice Clifford dis
scented from the opinion but concurred in the
Judgment,