The Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1868-1895, 1876-06-14
IMPEACHMENT OF BELKNAP
What Senator McDona. Id Said upon
the Subject
A SPEECH

A SPEECH
DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF TIL UNITEl
STATES BY THE HON. ]. E. M'DON. AID, OF
INDIANA, ON THE IMPEACHMENT o. BEL
KNAPP.
Mr.. President - the question for . res
ent consideration before the Semi u
sitting as court of Impeachment
is whether the respondent, William w.
Belknsp, is smensble to trial In this court
tor acts done as secretary of war, net
withdrawing his resignation of said Office,
and, in that connection, whether the mo-
tives which may have influenced him to
resign are material as affecting the ques-
tion of our jurisdiction. The breviiy OF
the constitutional provisions relating to
impeachment and the absence OF any pre-
ceoent in our history add greatly 10 the
difficulties which would ordinarily sur
ccund question of so much Importance.
In the first article of thu
constitution-the one providing for the
organization, prescribing the jurisdiction
ana defining tue powers OF CoDgress-the
sole power of Impeachment is conferred
upon the House OF Representatives,, ana
the Senate is invested with the sole power
| 10 try all impaacbmenis. The limitations
upon the powers thus conferred, as con-
tanned In the same article, are "Ghat judg-
ment in Cases Oh IMPEACHMENT shall not
extend iursher than removal from office
and disqualification to hold or enjoy any
office OF honor, tIus; or profit under the
Unit ed Ssstes " 1t will be seen that thes-
ars limitations upon the power to punish,
and not upOn the jurisdiction of the courI
20 hear and determine matters that may
% the subject OF impeachment. IL is s.
contended that still further limitation is
contained in section of article 2
Of the constitution affecting the ju-
risdiction OF this court, wherein u
is provided that The "presidebt
vice president and all civil officers OF The
United States, shall be removed from
office on impeachment for and conviction
OF treason, bribery or other high crimes
and misdemeanors." Inssmucn as this
section is found in that article of the con
stitution which creates the executive and
administrative department OF the govern
ment, aud is designed to provide mode
for the removal of such officers from office,
If it limits in any degree the general pow
ers of the coordinate branch of govern
ment in which is vested the sole power OF
impeachment, such limitations could only
be by implication, and could not be
HELD TO CRIPPLE THOSE POWERS
80 as To defeat jurisdiction that had once
attached. At the time these mesger pro-
visions we're migrated into the constitu-
ton it can not be claimed that the trainers
OF that instrument supposed they were
comforting an undefiued and undefnable
power. On the contrary, they must have
taken it for granted that the jurisdiction
they were confering upon the House OF
Representatives and the Senate IN matters
of impeachment was as clearly as
ce.tainsble as the jurisdiction conferred
upon the federal courts by the same in
strument which, by article three of the
constitution, embraced all cases in law and
equity arising under the constitution and
laws of the United States. At
the time the constitution was
framed the jurisdiction OF the
British Parliament in matters of impeach-
meBt was as much part OF the coDstii u
tionsl law OF England as was her system
OF civil and criminal Jurisprudence. 1t
rested upon the same immemorial usage
as the common law, and might properly
be termed part OF it. 1t performed a
similar office in respect to political offend
ers in the judicial system of Great Britain
that courts of equity did in matters OF
conscience. Courts OF equity grew out of
the necessity created by the unbending
rules and practice of the courts of COM
mon law. Equity is defined by one of the
eminent iurists of Great Britain to be ''the
correction of that wherein the law by
reason of its universally was detective"
A class of offenders whose close relation
to the affairs OF state as ministers of the
crown or whose personal power and in
huence made it diff cult If not impossible
to deal with them in ordinary courts
of the common law, made it neces-
sary to clothe some more powerful
tribunal with authority to try them, and
in such cases the House of Commons in
the name of the whole people srraigned
them at the bar of the House of Lords as
the highest court OF judicsture in the
re- Sim, and this was called impeachment.
The usual grounds OF accusation were
alleged msdsmeauors committed by per-
soDs employed by the crown, either at
home or in 1Is foreign service, maladmin-
istration of Justice and extrajudicisl con-
duct by judges of the realm, treason and
reasonable practices not specifically
named in the statute. These, as wilt be
seen by consulting Hartseli's Precedents
OF Proceedings in Parliament, were usually
clsssed under the heads OF treason, bribery
and
HIGH CRIMES AND MIsDEMEANoRs.
In early times the power to impeach did
not seem to be limited to official crines. or
crimes committed by persons holding Of
fetal stations. but was invoked against
such offenders as the House of Commons
deemed proper subjects, and for causes the
house OF Lords were willing to entertain.
But in such examination as / have been
able to make l have seen no case that re-
c3ivtd the sanction of both houses in I'M
peschments against commoners which did
not grow out OF mslconduc5 in office, or
was not for some political offsnse, such as
treason or the like. As for the peers OF the
realm, they could only be pro-
ceedtd against for treason, or misprison OF
treason, felony, or misprison of felony, by
Impeachment. 1t was sometimes dou bted
whether q commonsr could be jmpeached
for any capital off ,nse, out the weight of
authority is against this restriction. 1t Is
quite clear, however, that as early as the
Impeachment and trial of Warren Hast-
iDgs, comm )ners were only imp. achs ole
for official crimes or political offenses of
such magnitude as to take them out of the
case of ordinary offenders. Thus stood the
law OF impescr ment at the time the federal
III tr1tin W. frs a.. M or no