The Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1868-1895, 1876-06-14


= Indictment, trial, Judgment, and pun
1snment In the courts according 10 Law
thhsld from this court the power exer
cised by the House of Lords of coverin
by their Judgment the
WHOLE PUNISHMENT
attached by law to the offense, and sep
arated the offeDse into two distinct parts
vestlng in the Senate as court of i'm
parchment the power to impose the politi
cal punishment authorized ~ the consti
tuition. leaving the party to be tried for th
\ criminal violation of law by iurv. b
ne Judgment in impeachment the offsudel
Is simply Invested of his political capacity
it T. 0uc6es neither his person nor his prop
erty. Impeachment, therefore, under ou
constr tuition is that procedure bv which
persons who holding civil Offices under the
United : tates, including the president snC
vice presb lie Mt, may be brought to tria
tor the commission of treason
bribery, or other high crimes snC
misdemeanerA committed in Office, and
De sdiudged TO suffer such p )liti-
cal penalties are provided in the constitu.
ton. Aud the question tor determination
at this time is whether one who while in
| office has become liable to these penalties
can be proceeded against after he mss vol
UNFAIRLY terminated his official existence,
and when II is no longer in the power OF
this court TO impose the full measure OF
| the political punishment which may be in
cident 10 the jud gment against him. In
other words is the power 10 order the Tt
| movsl Of the offender from Office essential
TO the jurisdiction of this court, AMI does
the want OF such power take away from it
the authority to hear and determine the
accusation and 10 impose such political
punishment as may remain, namely, to di-
vest him oil his political capacity? If this
is true, then it must follow, if party &C.
cused should cease to be a civil officer at
at any time before final Judgment is rem
dered against him and the fact should be
made known to this court by proper sug
gestioD, that the proceeding would sbate,
and therefore the accused might 90 through
the entire trial in the hope OF defeating the
cause upon its merits, and falling in that
could, at any time he saw proper to do D,
withdraw himself from the jurisdiction OF
this court by a voluntary surrender of his
office. In the case under consideration,
that voluntary surrender of official station
took place on the same day, and within
few hours before the House of Represent a.
tives took cognizaDce of this case; but II
the Senate has no power to try after the
Judgment OF removal could no longer be
operative on account of the voluntary act
of the accused in vacsting the Office, it
could make no difference when
tnst vacation occurred, provided it
snte-dsted the finding and judgment
of the court on the merits.
But, as have already stated,
THE LIMITATIONS IN THE CONSTITUTION
relied on are not limitations upon the jur-
isdictlon of the court to hear and determine
matters of impeachment. but are limit
atoms only upon the judgment of the
court. These can extend no further than
the limitations prescribe; and, while il
might be true that the court might be dis
inclined to 90 on with the case when it was
informed that no part of a Judgment it had
power to render could be operative for
any cause, yet l apprehend that so long
as there was party against whom
the suit might De prosecuted such party
could not arrest the power OF the court TO
hear and determine the cause by the inter
position of any such plea. Nor could it be
claimed that, because the whole Judgment
which it might be in the power of the
court to enter against the party could not
in all its parts be effsctusl, therefore the
part which could operate must also fail
because it is only part of what might
have been imposed, but for the act of the
accused. Such construction as this, with
such results ss it would lead to, ought not
TO be adopted unless from the provisions
given to them and at the same time
carry into effect the intent of its fra.
mers. But there Is another consideration
that is'strongly opposed 10 the construc-
ton That is claimed by the counsel for the
accused, and that Is the fact that judg-
ments in impeachment are excepted out
OF the pardoning power conferred by the
constitution upon the president. In Eng
land it was mooted question whether q
pardon under the great seal was pleadable
TO an impeachment by the Commons in
Parliament. 1t was conceded that the
king might pardon after conviction, but il
was claimed that he could not arrest the
proceedings pending the trial by Parlia-
ment. This question, so far as England
provisions in the act of settle
ment adopted and passed in the
reign of William OF Orange, and was one
OF the results OF the great revolution, by
which il was exprt ssly provided that no
such pardon was pleadable. The trainers
OF our constitution undoubtedly had this
feature of the British constitution in view
when they withheld from the chief exc
cutive all power over the proceedings and
judgments OF this court in matters of i'm
peachment, and thus rendered lit certain
that official Offenders liable to the psnsl-
ties provided for off cisl crime, so far as
those penalties were political, could not
escape the sequences of their official
misconduc-, the chief of which is to
divest the offender of his po-
liticsl capacity for ell time. But if
this political incapscity can be avoided by
simple resignation, then the safeguards
provided against such a result are wholly
Ii. fficient. Entertaining these views,
must OF necessity hold that the plea of the
accused to the jurisdiction OF this court is
not sufficient in law, and that the trial
may pre- coed against him on its merits,
not notwithstanding the facts set up in his
plea. IL also follows from the views that
1 have already expressed that the motives
which may have induced him TO resign his
Office are wholly immaterial.
THE LIFE OF MAN.
To ascertain how long q man should live