The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1876-08-02
The Regular Army Tested Again.

When Gen. TERRY made his last endeavor
to communicate with CROOK, there WAS
not an officer or soldier in his command on
the Yellowstone whom he could use for
the purpose. Each and all were utterly
unified for such service, and he had 10
hire mountaineer. with the promise OF
Eve hundred dollars to undertake the
perilous enterprise. SANDY, trapper,
mounted and started at night. SASDY's
success lay in large part in his ability 10
cover his trail It's a small but unanswer-
able testimony to the inadequacy of
West Points education to teach war
against Indians, that not an officer IN
TERRY command noticed that the horse
gwen TO SANDY was shod or reflected
that the marks OF his shoes would publish
to any Indian who should see them, that
white courier was riding from TERRY 10
Crook. SANDY returned to have the shoes
taken of II the inside OF the horses hoots
had been pared down when he was shod,
rs they probably were. SANDY's second en-
deavor must have betrayed his character
and mission ns inevitably "a the iron shoes
would have DONE since the horses tracks
would have shown the absence OF the frog.
The wise Indian leaves his horse the use Of
his frog; indeed he never touches his hool
with n tool. To him, the absence OF the
frog IN the impression Of the foot Is an i'll
iallible sign OF "A white man. TERRY aud
his officers did not know how to command
the simplest element Of success for an at
tempt at communication.
Again. the accommodating party sent out
by Crook under SHELLEY, West Point
Lieutenant, was saved from destruction by
the mountaineer FRANK GRoUARD. The
Lieutenant did not know how to fight In
dams: he did not know how TO save his
command when oornered. That education
cannot be given at West Point The Of
flcer was brave, aud 20 were his men. They
would have fought TO the death, ana died
without a whimper. But thst is not war.
II il only fine manhood. GRoUARD, though,
was q soldier OF the best education. He
declined a fight so unequal as to end III the
Ger ain destruction orthe entire command,
tied the horses to the trees as a blind,
abandoned even food aud water as imped-
iments, and crawied quickly and silently
through the trees on a rapid forty-fve-
mile retreat over the mountain. The
good sense In placing himself and his
party under GRouARDs direction
from the moment the Sioux first
trailod them. He know that he was at the
end OF his West Point rope-outside of his
drll, his books, and his knowledge; that
he was helpless that his own scalp and
those Of nll the men under him would
dangle before shutdown at the belts OF the
indians. We honor him for pocketing his
pride and asking his scout to save his com
mand. And they were saved. But some
thing was lost. Wherever in the United
States this story is read, portion OF the
faith that our regular army can success
fully fight Indians is lost. And II the regu-
lar army cannot do that, what logic Is
there for its existencel
For Indian warfare the regular army is
wrong from top to bottom. Neither on
cors nor men can scout. They do not know
the country They cannot subsist i'm il
without commissariat They cannot trail
They cannot approach unseen. They cIu-
not estimate numbers from signs left on
the n ound. They cannot read tho Ian
guagc Of monuments aud tokens. They
are not familiar with the habits OF THEN
foes. Every command now in the field has
| r" employ and rely GU large detachments
OF friendly Indians AS guides, scouts, Skin
miahers, and couriers. Our infantry is
| Obviously useless against Indian cavalry.
Its Springfield musket is the best weapon
in the world, but the Indians can keep out
OF its range IN the daylight, and at night
strike with effect The carbiue Of our cav
airy Is n shorl-rangc arm. The Indians
have the Winchester rife, with which they
can extorminate n cavalry regiment If DIS
mounted; or mounted, If they can hold i,
| long enough under fire Our horses are
wrong. They are large and slow and
] clumsy on rough ground, aud IL close llgU =