, 1876-07-19

AuSltSu pUIlCy Win REGARD W uuCIVIjIZ6u COuU-
tries is to allow traders to push their way at
their own risk, and we avoid as far as possible
the expense and danger of military occupation.
Yet even we find ourselves sometimes forced
into a policy inconsistent with our honest pro-
fessi0ns and most cherished convictions. At
this very time we are illustrating the victory
of necessity over theory 10 the Malay Peninsu,
la, and no injustice would be greater than to
charge Russia with criminality because she is
continually impelled forwards by the same for
oes to which we find ourselves obliged to yield.
Not the least serious thought with regard to
the road which both England and Russia are
pursuing is that, however beset with dangers
The advance may be, retreat would in most
cases be ruin. A small European force holds
its position in the midst Of hostile Asiatics as
much by the moral power of its name as by
its actual physical superiority. To advance
is to add to its prestige. to retreat would be to
court the contempt of races which know no
other reason for obedience than the power OF
the rulers to punish contumacy.
So far, the circumstances of the two great
Asatio Powers are similar but here the pa
rallel ends. England is rich Russia, compare
lively speaking, is poor. The English Colo
MES pay their WI way, while the Provinces
ln Central Asia annexed to Russia are a per.
petual drain upon the resources of the Empire,
and the more so in proportion to their increas-
ed distance from st. Petersburg. If proof Of
the difficulties accommodating round the Rus
sian advance were needed, they are to be fouad
in the Report of Colonel VENYUKoFF on the
contemplated railway lines, which we publish
ed on Friday last. Speaking of some of these,
he admits that they would traverse uninhabited
regions, supplying comparatively few freights,
and that they would be exposed to snow storms
likely to hinder traffic In Winter. "Yet,' he
adds, " there is no denying that Russia has to
: construct these railroads. She needs them
" to secure her hold on Turkestan, which she
d" would else have to fill with troops, daily
d" becoming more expensive" In other words,
the cost of maintaining the necessary force
In Central Asia is now so great and so ~inoreas,
es in magnitude that it may be l~ightened by
the construction of unprOductive railroads.
Let US for a moment suppose that all the re.
quisite lines we're built, and even pushed on to
the borders of India. Not even then would
the means of Russia for attack have nearly
attained the level of ours for defence or, if
need be, counter. stroke. A line of railway
passing through savage regions inhabited by
tribes hostile at heart is so inferior as q means
Of communication to a line of great ocean
steamers possessed by q Power which holds the
command of the sea that there is really no
comparison between them. The railway ia
vulnerable at every point, and to the smallest
marauding parties. The destruction of few
yards of rails, the burning or blowing up of O
bridge, are fatal to the advance, not of one
train, but of all traffic whatever and suppos-
ing Russia at war with q nation able to inlu-
enoe the wild races of the steppes, the GEAR
would have to place at least two men to
watch the railway for every one he paraded at
the end of 1t. Moreover, railways have se-
veral most important disadvantages as carriers
Of troops and stores when compared with ocean
steamers. They are fixed, and cannot in any
way escape attack. Troops in trains undergo
much fatigue and are perfectly helpless to de-
fend themselves only q small number at q
time can be unloaded at any given point, and
that point must be out of reach of the enemy.
They are dependent on frequent supplies of
fuel and water, and any accident destroys not
a small detachment only, but the carrying
power of the whole line. Though the speed Of
trains is greater than that of ships, 1t Is p:acti-
oally reduced by the necessity for frequent
short halts in all journeys, and long detentions
for rest and refreshment if the time exceeds a
few hours. On the other hand, transports and
troop.ships can always run and sometimes
fight. The men on board are almos as com-
Portable as if in barracks. The loss of one is
but that of q detachment, and not otherwise
embarrassing if proper arrangements have been
made. Ships contain every requisite for a
voyage of so many days that they need only
touch at q small number of we'll fortified places.
TT a 1itf1o fora .fhouOht has haon aYhroiand a