The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1876-08-31
The Indian Campaign-Why it Has
Failed.

Failed.
At the commencement Of the present war
against the Sioux, and when the confidence
OF the country in q speedy and successful
issue of the operations was raised to the
highest pitch by the announcement of the
movements contemplated by the leaders of
the expeditions, we took occasion to express
doubts regarding the wisdom of the general
plan Of campaign, which have since proved
to have been too well founded. In suggesting
the existence of radical defects in the system
Of warfare which was adopted we entertained
no doubt whatever of the skill and expert
ence Of the commanders in the field or of
the indomitable bravery and devotion of the
troops. But at the same time we credited to
the Indians an equal degree Of skill and
bravery, and certain resources which our men
could not hope to command. In the first place
the enemy was in his own country. with
every creek and ravine of which he was ia
milar from childhood. His mode of life
peculiarly fitted him for the system Of ha-
RAISING attacks and rapid retreats which
have enabled him to paralyze the movements
of his opponents and to elude their pursuit.
His commissariat department and military
train were organized with the utmost SIM
plicity, each warrior carrying his own pro-
visions and ammunition, so that even large
bodies of Sioux were independent of bases
of supply and other military necessities to
civilized warfare. In point of arms and
horses his equipment was decidedly superior
to that of our best troops. His long range
rifles and countless herds of hardy ponies
made him one Of the most formidable oppo-
nents that any soldier could desire to meet.
1t therefore cannot be wondered at that he
should have succeeded in defeating our
troops, with all the advantages on his side.
But it is here that we are called on to expose
the futility of the plan of campaign arranged
by our military authorities With made
quate means of transportation, inexperi-
enced and poorly equipped troops, and an
absolute ignorance of the field Of operations,
the idea Of entrapping the Indians by the
movements Of two converging columns ap-
pears SO absurd that it needs the memory of
disasters like that which overlook Custer to
lend gravity to its consideration. The plan
tanned q thorough contempt for their enemy
and regarded the force sent against him as
something like a sheriffs posse on grand
scale moving to arrest noted horse thieves or
other criminals. 1t shows after all that the
most experienced and talented generally fall
into the greatest errors; for they are moro
liable than others to dispense with that eau
ton which mediocrity would deem indis-
pensable to success. Converging columns
usually have some object to converge on,
and their movements are directed so as to
reach the objective point simultaneously.
In order to do this the position of the point
of conveyance is previously determined
But in the case of the Sioux war; the Indian
force being what was sought to be reached,
not even the most experienced scouts could
determine its probable position and, conse-
quently, the object of the movements
was defeated at their very commencement.
1t became necessity to grope cautiously
through the "bad lands for the Sioux, and
it was soon found that the best way to meet
the Indians was to wait for their attack.
Thus the conditions became reversed, for
the warriors of Sitting Bull held the coun-
try, and chose when to attack or retire, while
the United States armies were compelled to
remain in camp in the vain hope that the
red mans temerity would exceed his pru-
dence. In this the leaders were disap-
pointed, for when the Sioux chief found
that he had practically defeated the columns
in detail he resolved to withdraw, knowing
well that his disappearance would compel
the troops to move out from their camps for
another cropping scout over the deserted
country. Sitting Bull has always been ready
to receive an attack in one of his chosen DO
sitions; but in not one single instance be-
fore the junction of the Crook and Terry
columns have our troops been in a condition
to assume the offensive. 1t is obvious, there
fore, that this union should have taken place
from the very first, and that only one large
column should have been directed against
the Indians. 1t may be pleaded that if the
force was not distributed the Sioux would
escape. But we answer that they have
escaped in the face of two columns and
could have done SO had five been in the
field. The severest blow received by the
Sioux in this campaign was the interruption
to their hunting of the buffalo for the win
ter's provision. They have dispersed be-
cause a prolongation of the fight would
have rendered their position desperate on this
account. With the money and other spoils
taken from Custer and his men Sitting Bull
can purchase supplies enough to sustain the
most valuable of his warriors during the
winter. The Others with the women and
children. will 60 to the agencies to be fed
They will not bring in their arms and ponies,
as is fondly believed by the War Depart
ment. These useful adjuncts to next
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