Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1876-03-03
NO. g..

swer, as 10 the manner in which the rule
has been administered, il Is proper to re-
mark, that the lawfulness and propriety of
the rule are not 10 he tested or adjudged,
upon the presumption that the penal part
of il will be uUjustly or unwarrantably en-
forced. The presumption is the other way,
viz: that it will bo administered Justly,
and upon, and with reference 10, warranta-
ble occasion. II case should arise in
which 1t should appear that the penalty
had been inflicted outside Of, or beyond
the fair scope and reason OF tho rule, 1t
would he both the province and the duty
of the courts TO accord proper remedy.
But as before demonstrated, this is not
such case; And this leads TO the further
remark, that tho remedy is not sought in
this case as against the refusal of leave 10
to be absent ON the 4th OF June; but as
against the imposing, as the condition Of
RENTING the penalty, promise that ab-
sence for a similar cause should not be re-
peated that term. Such promise being re-
fused, the penalty of exclusion was not re-
mitted, and the children did not return to
the schools. Aud hence the position as
sumed by the Orators-the same as already
stated-that the committee had not the law
ful right TO exclude scholars who should
be absent by the direction of their parents,
contrary TO the established rule of the
school.
As before intinlated, this position takes
no account Of any difference of occasion or
reason for such direction of parents, wbeth-
or la a1i
ployment, or amusement, but is on the
ground only OF the right of the parent as
against the rule of the school. In refer.
ence TO that position, in explicit statement,
as the result CT the discussion, 1t is held,
that scholars Of a school are amenable to
the school authorities as to their conduct
as scholars affecting the school, notwith-
standing the prerogative of their parents
in respect 10 them.
This however does not imply that COM
mittees or teachers are the ultimate judges
whether their measures, either by pre-
scribed rule, or extemporized expedient,
or impulsive act, are ldiefulIy requisite or
proper in given case. The statute, in i'm
posing the duty OF adopting all requisite
measures, &C., does not confer ultimate ju-
risdiction on committees of the question
whether particular measure is requisite
or not, within the sense and intent of the
statute. When such question of LAWFUL
ness under the statute is made between
party, against whom the measure operates,
and the committee or teacher, that ques-
ton is open before tho courts for considera-
tion and decision, in view OF all that ap-
pertains to the subject Of it. The rule in
question in this case, and The enforcement
of it, are subject TO the judgment of the
courts as between the parties to the suit
1t is easy 10 suppose cases in which such
enforcement would be beyond the lawful
right of the committee. The rule itself, in
terms and intent, conte emplates exclusion
as penalty only where permission 10 be
absent is Withheld for want OF reasonable
cause shown. In case of casual sickness
of tue scholar-of sickness or death in the
family OF the scholar-of some impedi-
ment, like fire or flood-in case of various
incidents of current life, giving occasion
for temporary absence, the enforcement OF
the penalty of exclusion would, under
circumstances, be adjudged to be un-
authorized under the statutes and law by
which the subject is governed.
1t is not intended by this to he held that
there may not be cases, in which the deci-
81 on and action OF the committee or teacher
would not be deemed judicial and final.
That subject has been involved iu many Of
the decided cases, under peculiar statutes, es-
pecially in Maine and Massachusetts. We
have no occasion TO pronounce upon it fur
ther in this case.
Upon the facts shown, we are unable to
find any warrant OF law for maintaining
the bill.
The decree dismssing il is affirmed.
All the judges concurred.