The New York herald., 1876-10-10
Spain and Cuba.

The announcement that Martinez Cam pos
has been appointed Commander-in-Chief of
the Spanish forces in Cuba is a significant
proof of the growing influence of the ex-
Queen Isabella in the government of King
Alfonso The reactionary policy lately
adopted by the young Kings government has
been generally attributed to this influence,
soon the good work Jovellar has been doing
in reforming the government service is for
gotten. Hitherto the Captain General has
always been considered the Commander-in-
Chief, and the arrival of Campos will tend
to divide the councils at the palace in Ha-
vana, and perhaps lead to that general panic
which has long been feared in case Jovellar
should resign and return to Spain.
Nothing could be more unfortunate for
Spain at this juncture. AS far as Cuba is
concerned the change is of no consequence,
for no matter who may be commandant and
Captain General the war will be carried
on in the future in much the same manner
as has been done up to the present. The
new commander will be able to accomplish
as little as his predecessors in the field,
and the war will drag on its weary length
until Spain has completely exhausted her
treasury and wasted the flower of her youth
in the vain effort to subdue the Queen Of tho
Antilles. Thousands of soldiers arrive
yearly in Cuba bent upon crushing the insur-
gents; but the soil seems to swallow them
up, and the insurgents, year by year,
grow more powerful. Eight years have
passed since Cespedos raised the flag
of revolt at Yara, and not year has
passed without the solemn announcement
that the government was about to finally
crush the insurrection. Yet all these prom
ises and efforts have proved vain, and the
insurrection is stronger to-day than at any
time since the capture of Bayamo. Great
was the CONSERVATION when that event oc-
Cured; but the news brought by cable from
Havana of the capture Of Las Tunas, with
its garrison, by the insurgents was far more
important, because it told that the Cubans
had broken through the system of trochas
upon which the Spaniards depended for
isolating the different Cuban armies and
crushing them in detail. Las Tunas occu-
pied the apex of the southern trocha, which
cut off the Central from the Eastern Depart
ment. It was a point of the greatest stra-
tegic importance and its seizure and de-
struction have been long contemplated by the
insurgents. The aspect of affairs in the
Western Department is not much more fa-
vorable. The forces under Maximo Gomez
have steadily forced their way from Bayamo
to Colon, some two hundred miles west, and
have been able to maintain themselves, not
withstanding the advantage the Spaniards
derive from the network of railways which
centre in Havana The district of Colon,
which is the scene of Gomezs operations,
can be reached from Havana by rail in six
or eight hours. In 1873 there was no i'm
portant band of insurgents west Of Puerto
Principe. which is hundred and fifty
miles further east than Colon; yet Spain
has been putting forth the greatest
efforts to crush out the instruction
The time has passed when it was possible to
put down the insurrection. Spain may pro-
tract the war until the population has be-
come thoroughly dsmoralized by it, but
she cannot reconquer her hold on the
island. The rebels, Injured to hardship and
now skilled in the terrible guerilla warfare
they wage, can afford to laugh at the raw
troops sent against them. The nature of
the country and the deadly effects
of the climate on foreigners assure the
insurgents that they have only to await
patiently the hour of victory.