The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1876-08-29


Judicial Distractions to Rapid Transit.
1t is to be hoped that an appeal will be
taken from the annoying decision of Judge
Sedgwick in the recent rapid transit suit,
for the grounds on which the decision rests
seem so strained and technical that they
ought to be reviewed by court which has
q broader sense Of equity in the interpreta-
ton of statute. We have little doubt that
Judge Sedgwick's decision would be re-
versed by the Court of Appeals. If the
court of final resort should set it aside as
bad law the Judge who rendered it will
suffer in public estimation more than he
could from an erroneous decision which did
not so cross popular wishes and obstruct the
public interest To be sure an appellate
court may correct his error, if he has commit
responsible for the delay in prosecuting
work which this whole community regards
as of paramount necessity.
In view of the loose comments which q
portion of the city press has made on this
adjudication it may not be amiss to state
precisely what Judge Sedgwick has decided.
He does not deny that the rapid transit
law of 1876 is, in its main features, ,>con-
stitutional lie does not dispute that the
commissioners appointed under that law
were legally empowered to select the
routes which they did select or to pre-
scribe the plan of construction which they
did prescribe. Had new company, organ
Al~.k
to build steam railroad in Sixth avenue,
on the plan adopted by the commission
ers, there is nothing in Judge Sedgwick's
decision or in his reasoning which could
arrest the work. His whole argument
rests on the fact that the Gilbert Company
is not new corporation. He admits that
the constitutional amendments cannot affect
railway franchises which had been granted
by the Legislature previous to their adop-
ton, and that the Gilbert Company retains
all the rights conferred by its charter. His
decision stands entirely on the technical
point that the Rapid Transit Commission
could not modify the Gilbert charter in any
particular. He maintains that the act of in
corporation gave the company q right to
build road in Sixth avenue according to
the plan of structure described in the act,
but that its rights cannot survive modii-
cation Of the plan. The Rapid Transit act
OF 1875 gives the commissioners authority to
modify the plan, but Judge Sedgwick holds
that the act is, in that respect, repugnant to
the new amendments of the constitution In
nsmuch as the amendments forbid the lay
ing down of railroad tracks, except under q
general law, Judge Sedgwick decides that
q law which gives preference to an existing
corporation in constructing q road on differ
ent plan from that permitted in its charter
is unconstitutional, because the prohibition
to give special franchises to q new corpora
ton equally forbids enlargement of the
franchises OF an existing corporation beyond
the strict letter of it's original charter. We
cannot believe that the Court OF Appeals
will sustain O decision in which q quibbling
technicality is brought into such evident
conflict with broad public interests.
Judge Sedgwick's extremely narrow and
technical decision arrays the letter of the
constitution against its spirit and its evident
crate opinion the constitutional amendments
do not interfere with or abridge the vested
rights of existing corporations, even when
those rights are at variance with the purpose
of the amendments. But, with singular men
tai obliqui.y, he maintains that, while
existing corporations can hold their
vested rights against the spirit OF
the amendments, they cannot yield
any part of them in conformity with
the amendments. He comedies that the
Gilbert Company may build the kind of
road authorized in its charter, but denies
that it can yield any part of its original plan
to the new system. In other words, it has
perfect right to stand on its franchise against
the constitutional amendments but no right
to yield any part of its franchise in accord
ance with them. We believe that this is
neither law nor common sense. If it be
sound policy to have general railroad law
instead of special acts it does not contra
vene that policy, but aids to make it uni
form for the owners of vested rights to make
a voluntary surrender Of privileges to the
new constitutional requirements. The Gill
bert Company, instead of building the kind
of road authorized in its charter consents TO
modify its plan in accordance with the
amended constitution, and Judge Sedgwick
decides that the amendments are thwarted
by this consent to conform TO this spirit