Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1876-03-25
Il. wHITMORE,
Publisher and Proprietor.
TIE LAW OF COURTSHIP.

Wuuhhn mhh y FefIeot Right to
Court a Man IL He DOn't object.
Pittsburg Post. 2Oth.l
All marriageably inclined ladies
should have been in attendance in
the Common Pleas No. 2 yesterday,
in order to be able to reap full
fruition from their leap year priyi-
leges.
The breach of promise case of
Connell VS.. Blue was argued, the
jury were charged, and retired and
at the close Of the court had not
made up their minds as to their
duty in the case.
Mr.. Reardon, in his argument
for the defense, claimed that if any
courtihg was done at all it was
done by the plaintiff herself,
and claimed the same protection
for his client as would be accorded
him were he a weaker vessel.
Mr.. McKenna claimed that the
evidence showed the existence of a
contract, and that his client had
sustained injury by defendants de-
ception.
The following is the way the
Judge looked at the matter: "To
be entitled to recover there must
have been an actual contract of
marriage entered into between the
parties. Mere courtship, no matter
how long it lasted, would not make
a contract. Formerly, when the
parties themselves were not per-
mitted to testify, the fact of long
continued courtship was very strong
evidence of a contract. 1t gem
orally happened, the Judge said,
that when such contracts as these
were made the occasion was con-
spicuous for the absence of wit
nesses, and hence it was that close
attentions went very far to prove
the contract. But it was not
so now. The parties themselves
being witnesses, the contract must
be proven by direct testimony. The
fact of courtship, Of course, has its
WEIGHT as n circumstance. but IL ia
not conclusive,
"It is a custom for gentlemen to
pay their addresses to ladies, and
not for ladies to seek out and follow
gentlemen. Indeed, this custom is
so strictly adhered to that one nat
urally reGoils at the idea of a lady
undertaking to reverse il. But
still she has right to do it. There
wSs no law to prevent her, and
even If she did all the cOurting
and made the proposition Of mar
riage, the defendant was liable if
he accepted the proposition, II
the defendant agreed to marry her,
ever if he never had any intention
Of carrying out his promise, he was
liable. Still it was not incumbent
upon him TO treat her rudely mere
" because he did not want to mar
~ her. He admitted that he did
accept presents from her, and be
had right TO do it; but he was
not at liberty TO designedly do or
say anything which would lead her
to believe that he meant to marry
her. Something more than acts
were needed to make such q con-
tract Declarations were necessary,
and if the defendant, when in con
yersation Oh the subject Of mar
riage, said that he would "make il
all right with her,Y and meant
thereby that he would marry her,
on mesnt to convey to her the idea
that he would marry her, that was
sufficient. II was not necessary
that any special form be observed
in the contract. But the defend:
ant denied that he had ever made
such y remark, and the jury would
have to ascertain whether he did
or not. r.s
'Ifa the defendant were guilty. ol
this breach Of PROMISE he ought
to compensate the plaintiff fol
what she had expended for him il
the way Of presents, aud be made
to pay just what the jury should
think she was entitled to by reason
Of the manner in which her afec
tions had been trifed with, ant
herself held up to public scorn y
/ = ! I.