Arizona citizen., 1876-03-18
SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA.
JANUARY TERM, 1876.
Pedro CharRuIeau. Plaintiff and Appellant, ys Richard WOfrenden, Defendant and Respondent.

The action was eiectment for tbre, quarter sections of land, lying in Pima county and contiguous to each other described in the complaint by their le gal subdivisions and as being generally known as the RObledo, Moreno anC Duran ranches
 In his complaint, the plaintiff allege; that he was seized in fee of the premises on the eleventh day of February, 1874 and that while 50 seized tO-wit, on the fifth day Of July, 1S75, he was busted by the defendant
 The answer denies that the plaintiff was ever seized of the premises, ol was ever entitled to the possession oi the same or any part thereof; denIe, that the defendant entered into the pos session of the premises while the plain tiff was 50 seized, as alleged in the complaint, and denies that he unlaw fully withholds, or at any other time has unlawfUlly withheld, the possession of the premises from the plaintiff; al leges seizure in himself of one quarter section of the lands, on the first of De- tober, 1873, by virtue of deed of bar gain and sale for the consideration of $j00, from Abram Moreno and his wife Mariana Moreno, 10 Anna (. NOtlen- den, the wife of the defendant, bearing the date above mentioned, and alleges seizure of the other two quarter sec tiOnS, on the tenth of December, 1873, bv deed of bargain and sale of that date, for the consideration of $2.lOO, from Ygnacio Robledo and Romula RObledO, his wife, to the said wife of the defen dant; alleges that the said Anna C. WOticnden was on the first of October 1873, and on the tenth day of December 1873, and still was, at the date of the answer, the wife of the defendant
 On the trial, the plaintiff offered in evidence deed for the premises from Anna C. Wofenden- to the plaintiff, made February II, 1S15, for the con sideratiOn of SJOOO.
 Defendants counsel objected to the admission of the deed on the grounds First, that the acknowledgment Was defective. having been taken before d Justice of the Peace, nOt a proper off cer; Second, that it did not contain the declaration required by the statute, as to the person signing the same hay ing been examined separate and apart from and without the hearing of her husband, &c., &c., Third, that il had not been shown that Anna (. Woficndcn had power To convey the premises; that II Lad been admitted in open court, by plaintiffs C. unsel, that from August, 1872, the said Anna C. Wotlcnden had been and then was the wife Of the de tendant. and that no showing had been madc or offered that the premiso were her separate property. Those oh,cc- lions were collectively sustained by the court, and the plamliif excepted To the ruliuT
 Assuming for the present tliat the premises in the controversy were the separate property of the grantor, and passing for the present also the question whether any acknowledgement on the part of the granJOr of the decd Was necessary to entitle it to be received in evidence in the case between these par. ties, was the acknowledgment defective in having been taken before d Justice Of the Peace, or in that il was not made upon an examination separate and apart from and without the hearing of her husband?
 In Miller vs Fisher, decided at the last term of this court on q hearing had before d full bench, it was held without dissent on the part of either member of the court, that under the Act of 1871, It was not necessary that 8 contract by a married woman of the age of 2l years and upwards, as to her separate property, should be evidenced by writing signed by her and acknowl- edged by her, upon an examination separate and apart from her husband, &c, &c.
 We are now asked to reconsider this ruling, and adopt the theory that the Act of 1871 operated, to change the law in this regard to this extent on ly.-that the wife may convey without being joined with the husband in the conveyance, but must still acknowledge the execution of the instrument, sepa rate and apart, &c., &c., as required by the Act of 1865. One year has passed since the decision in Miller vs Fisher was made and published, and important rights have doubtless grown up and vested under the construction which we then gave tO the statutes i'll question In such a case the reasons for overrul ing a former decision should be very clear and conclusive. Besides thls unless it very clearly appears that the former ruling was erroneous, the cour' may properly consider whether the con strtlction given to the statute, by lt' former decision on the ruling 1t Is now urged to make, is most beneficial to tho parties whose rights are to be controlled thereby.
 Conceding then, for the present, tha there may be reasonable doubts as tC the correctness of the former ruling does the construction thus given to th' statute deprive the wife of any subStan tial right, or in any manner make sucl rights less secure: does Il deprive he of any safeguard in the cOntroi or dis position of her separate property, Ol make less simple and safe the rules io its disposal? In other words, Is or Wa the provision in our statutes requiring this acknowledgment of q contract o conveyance by the wife, on an eXami ton separate and apart from her hns band, &c., of any practical use what ever? Of course there can be no doub that under the Act of 1871, the wifi may convey her separate property by her deed, without being joined by he husband. This she may do withon any consultation with or consent iron him. To what end then, having exc cuted a decd for her separate property should she be required to go before notary. or other officer, and mak thi acknowledgement upon an examination separate and apart from her husband |&ce If she desires to convey he ,,rlt,,nrtr she may do so without hl