Pioche daily record. [volume] (Pioche, Nev.) 1872-1876, 1876-05-18

ollows: 1T shall be the daiy Of the
County Treasurer of Lincoln county to :
make such arrangements for the pay
ment of the interest of said bonds when
The same falls due, at least thirty days
before tie time of payment; and in the
event said Interest Fund is insufficient.
the Treasurer shall draw on the General
Fund of the county for such purpose"
(Sec. 81
1t may be that the Legislature thought
that the ordinary taxes for county pur-
poses would be sufficient to keep the f.
nancial transactions of the county on a
cash basis and that the Interest Fund
would be sufficient to pay the coupons
as they became due. But the Legis-
laturs made provision for any contin-
geney that might arise by the insufiicien-
CIV of the Interest Fund, and authorized
the Treasurer in the event of such con-
tingency, to draw bis draft upon the
General Fund for the payment of the in
terest; and further provided that If there
was not sufficient money in the General
Fund, then the Treasurer was ''author-
lied and required to make such contracts
and arrangements as may be neces-
sary for the payment of said interest
and for the protection of the credit |
of the county Of Lincoln" (Section |
81, and did not make any provision for |
keeping the financial transactions of the
unity on cash basis if the ordinary |
taxes for county purposes should prove
insufficient, but did provide for in
curing an Indebtedness by the commits
sioners not exceeding $4,000. (Sec. I'D
That the financial transactions of the
county have not been kept on cash
basis is probably owing to the fact that
the revenues of the county have de-
creased since the passage OF the Act. or
the Legislature may have been mistaken
as to the amount necessarily required to
keep the machinery Of the county gov
eminent in motion, and, therefore. COM
mitted an error of judgment in limiting
the amount OF taxes to be levied for tbs
purpose of paying the interest on the
bonds and in limiting the amount OF in
debtedness to be incurred by the conf
missioners. But it is manifest that the
Legislature intended to make, and did
make, provision for the payment Of the
interest on the bonds, regardless Of the
question whether the financial tranctions
of the county could be kept on a cash
basis or not. We are told that this con-
struction Of the act has produced the ef-
feet .'of closing hospitals, unbarring
prisons and paralyzing justice" This
plored. Ii there was any ambiguity In
the language OF the Act, or if it was sus-
ceptible of two constructions, then q
construction which would produce such
disastrous results, or BIO of practical in
convenience to the community, would be
rejected and the construction that would
} prove most beneficial to the public would
be adopted. But the Legislative body is
, the supreme law-making power of the
State, and as long as it acts within the
pale of its constitutional authority this
/ Court is bound by its action, and
> where the language of the law given
l il SO plain as not to admit of different
t construction we have no other duty tc
perform than to execute the legislative
. will. This must be done without any
a regard TO our own views as to the wis
} dom. justice, policy or effect of the law
I When all its various sections are taker
+ and compared together, we think thu
y language of the Act is clear. plain, sim.
{. pie, unambiguous and susceptible of bu
5 one construction. In such q case tn,
: Legislature must be understood to near
t Just what it has plainly and explicit,
) expressed, and there is nothing left to
i this Court to construe This genera
5 principal has been frequently decide,
t by this Court. Lewis vs.. Doron. New
Ali; Virginia e. Truckee Railroad Com
It pany vs.. Commissioners OF Lyon County
y 6. New. rs; Hess VS.. Commissioners Q
l. Washoe County, 6 New. 107; Fitch vs.
Elko County, 8 New 274)
n In Newell VS.. The People, in tn
a Court Of Appeals of New York. johnson
TX Judge, said "Whether we are consider
'e ing an agreement between parties.
IS statute or q constitution, with a view /
its Interpretation, the thing we are
N seek is the thought which it expresses
re To ascertain this, the first resort in u
n cases ia to the natural Specification {
er the words employed, in the order an
SO grammatical arrangement in which th
Of trainers of the instrument have place
II them If thus regarded the words Gu
N body definite meaning which involve
II, no absutdity and no contradiction b.
at tween different parts of the same writing
IL then that meaning apparent upon Il
rs face OF the instrument is the one whit
to alone we are at liberty to say was il
We tended to be conveyed. In such q ca
TO there is no room for construction. Til
Ter which the words declare is the meanii
N of the instrument, and neither the Cour
al. nor Legislatures have the right to add
,ty to take away from that meaning"
list N. Y. 90
to In McCluskey w. Cromwell, Allen, )
lot said. ut is beyond question the du
OF of Courts in constituting statutes to gi
effect to the intent of the law-maki
he power. and seek for that intent in eve
he legitimate way But in the constrr
n ton, both of statutes and contracts, I
rip intent Of the trainers and parties is to
to sought first of ALL in the words a
the language employed, and if the words 9
ms free from ambiguity and doubt, and {
to press plainly, clearly aud distinctly
fiji sense of the trainers OF the instrumel
the there ia no occasion to resort to otl
RS means OF Interpretation. II MY. 60
he These rules, by which Courts ha
mt. been guided in seeking for the intent
raj of the Legislature, in the language
Chancellor Kent. "are maxims OF sou
tier Interpretation. which have accumulal
ase by the experience and ratified by the ,
de- probation of ages" If the construct
APP given to this Act has produced. or v
this produce, the bardships referred to
gis- are powerless to rectify the evil. Re
OF must be sought by legislative ena
lan- ments, not by judicial decisions.
lere The order appealed from is affirm
ress HAwLEY, G.
In We concur: EAR1L, j.