New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1876-03-26
GETTYSBURG.
General Longstrest Reviews General
Early's Papers.


gi,ian of the tenth instant, containing
contribution from the pen OF General Early.
| which is designated as reply to letter OF
| mine of the seventeenth ultimo upon the
battle of Gettysburg, called out by dis
paraging letter of General Fitz Hugh Lee.
| General Early assumes that he is the
powerful objective, calls himself the ''in-
fantry and artillery" General Fitz Hugh
Lees letter cavalry raid, and only JUS
titles my remarks upon bis criticisms Of
Gettysburg as q natural advance of my
'.heavy guns" upon the infantry and ar
tillery" after the discontinue OF the cav
airy. If he had been SO discreet as to ask
some young friend to read and interpret
my letter, he would in all probability have
! learned that that which he takes for the
sound Of "heavy guns" was only scout
sent out tor information.
He reaffirms the context of his address,
and informs US that it had gone through
two editions before it was compiled in
| the book. l thank him for this in
formation; was aware that it had gone
| through one edition, but had no idea that
| it would reach the second. 1t would not be
| bad idea to have it 60 through one or two
more. The only new light that he
gives us of Gettysburg, is an extract from
the monumental address of the Hon. Ed
ward Everett, "in the presence of President
Lincoln, some of his cabinet, many mem
| bers of Congress and officers of the army
| and an immense concurse of citizens" the
| substance of which is that had the success of
the first day been followed early by we'll
| combined aggressive operations nothing but
| q miracle could have saved the federal army
| from disaster.
This does appear formidable array
| of evidence against General Longstreet.
Fortunately, however, it is known that
President Lincoln had declared that the
days of miracles had passed" The orator
himself does not claim that General Long
street was the chosen instrument through
whom marvellous work was 20 be done,
which would have invoked the miraculous
interpretation of Providence
General Early roams through Swim
| ton, and discredits his own witness, viz:
That Swinton was mistaken in saying
that the Union force was all up is shown
by the testimony that / have already
quoted.
He then goes through the proceedings Of
Congress, and the reports Of several subor-
dinate federal officers to prove that Hays
and Hoke's brigades did splendid fighting
| fact that no one has ever questioned.
of <ha fad 10 ia
established. 1t was about the same whether
he was from Louisiana, Virginia OF North
| Carolina. The only points at Issue are, were
| the strategy and tactics OF the Generals
equal to the valor of the soldiers! Realiz-
| ing the faulty Of his efforts to sustain his
assertions of the second day. he flies over
over to the third, "still delaying unaccount.
! ably on the third. and exclaims, Whose
| fault was it Them
| Let US finish the work of the second day
before entering upon that Of the third. To
DO this we should analyze the address Of
| this sage military critic. Referring 10 Cen
| eral Lee, he says:
| Ia conference with General Exell, Cen
| eral Rhodes and myself, when he did reach
| us, after the enemy had been routed, he ex
| pressed his determination to assault the
| enemy's position at daylight the next morn
| ing, and wished to know whether We could
| make the attack from onr flank, the left. at
| the designated time. We informed him OF
| the fact that the ground immediately in oar
front leading to the enemys position tMr.
| nished much greater obstacles to a successful
assault than eristed at any other point, and
,ce concurred in suggesting to hin, that as oar
corps (EueUs) constituted The only troops
| then Immediately con fronting the enemy. he
acouH manitestly concentrate and fOrtity
against as during the night as proved 10
be- the case according to subsequent lntOr-
| nation.
But in enumeratirg excuses for not pur.
suing this ':routed" army as General Lee
wished, he says:
Moreover, 1t is not impossible that the
arrival Of the two fresh corps may have
turned the fate Of the day against the troops
we then had on the field.
A contradiction of himself in the same
paragraph. Another peculiar feature Of
this modest suggestion is the complacency
with which the suggestion is made that
some one else should make the fight.
He then assumes and claims to prove
that the battle of Gettysburg was lost by
the delay that occurred On The right on the
second, "and that l was the cause of the
delay" In the same paragraph he men
tons his attack at P. NJ. as decided
success, but admits that ne was obliged to
retire from the field. Thus, he says:
After having victory in their grasp they
were compelled TO relinquish it because
General Lees orders had again failed to be
carried out.
The attack at 9 P. NJ. OF the third day,
and it's failure, he also ailudes to as result
ing from my delay. SO, according to the
testimony of this empirical warrior, the
federal army was routed on the first day at
iP. NJ; the Confederates lost the battle on
the second day by delay, made useless
sacrifice by the attack at $40 F. NJ; another
by the attack of P. M. on the same day,
and yet another by the attack at 2. NJ. on
the third. Practical minds may inquire
why a routed foe could not have been fell
lowed until nightfall, at least! Why, when
the battle had been lost by delay, was the
sacrifice of thousands of troops by Our first
attack on the second madt? Why was not
the sacrifice of this attack sufficient to eau
ton us not to. venture the later attack at
P.M' Why was not the attack by our
right on the second sufficient to warn Us
against renewal Of that attack upon the
third?
This array Of evidence adduced by Gen.
era Early only provee, however, that after
} thirteen years. study of the battle and its
! records he ID still unable to comprehend it.