Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1876-08-16
THE REG ULAR ARMY TESTED
AGAIN.

there was not an officer or soldier in
his command on the yellowstone whom
he could use for the purpose. Each and
all were utterly untitled for such SER
vice, and he had TO hire mountaincer,
with the promise of five hundred dol
lars, to undertake the perilous enter
prise. Saniya trapper, mounted and
started at night. Sandy's success lay
in large part in his ability 10 cover his
trail. 'Tis small but unanswerable
testimony to the inadcquacy of West
Points education to teach war against
indians, but not an officer in Terry's
command noticed that the horse given
Sandy was shod, or reflected that the
marks OF his shoes would publish to
any Indian who should see them, that
a white courier was riding from Terry
TO Crook. Sandy returned 10 have
the shoes taken Off If tho inside
of the horses hoofs had been pared
down when he was shod, MS they prob
ably were, Sandy's second cndcavor
must have betrayed his character and
mission rs inevitably as the iron shoes
would have done since the horses
tracks would have shown the absence
of the frog. The wise Indian leaves his
horse the use Of his frog i; indeed he
never touches his hoof with a tool To
him, the absence of the frog III the I'M
preston of the foot is an iniallible sign
of a white man. Terry and his officers
did not know how to command the
simplest element OF success for an at
tempt at communication.
Again, the reconnoitering party sent
out by Crook, under Sibley, West
Point Lieutenant, was saved from de-
struction by the mountainecr, Frank
Grouard. The Lieutenant did not know
how to fight Indians; he did not know
how to save his command when cor
nercd. That education cannot be given
at West Point. The officer was brave,
and SO were his men. They would
have fought to the death, and died
without whimper. But that is not
war. 1t is only fine manhood. Grou.
ard, though, was soldier OF the best
education. He declined fight so I'M
equal as to end in the certain dcstruc-
ton of the entire command, tied the
horses TO the trees as u blind, abandon
doned even food and water as impedi-
mcnts, and crawled quicklyand silently
through the trees on a rapid iorty-iive
mile retreat over the mountain. The
Lieutenant commanding showed his
good sense in placing himself and his
party under Grouard's direction from
the moment the Sioux first trailed
them. He knew that he was ut the
end OF his West Point rope--ontsidc OF
his drill, his books, and his knowledge;
that he was helpless; that his own scalp
and those of all the men under him
would dangle before sundown at the
belts Of the Indians. We honor him
for pocketing his pride and asking his
scout to slvc his command And they
were saved. But something was lost.
Wherever in the United States this
story is read, q portion of the faith
that our regular army can successfully
fight Indians is lost And If the regu-
lar army cannot do that, what logic is
there Tor its existence? ftts w
For Indian warfare the rcgulararmy
is wrong from top TO bottom. Neither
officers nor men can scout. They do
not know the country. They cannot
subsist in il without commissariat.
They cannot trail. They cannot ap-
proach unseen They cannot estimate
numbers from signs left on the ground.
They cannot read the language of mon
uments and tokens They are not
familiar with tho habits OF their foes.
Every command now in the field has
to employ and rely on large detach-
ments OF friendly Indians as guides,
scouts, skiimishers, and couricrs Our
infantry is obviously useless against
Indian cavalry, Its Springfield musket
is the best weapon in the world, but
the Indians can keep out of its range
in the daylight, and at night strike
with effect. The carbinc of our cavalry
is short.r range arm. The Indians
have the Winchester rifle, with which
they can exterminatc cavalry regi-
ment il dismounted or mounted, if
they can hold il long enough under
fire. Our horses are wrong. They are
large and slow and clumsy on rough
ground, and in close fighting. Our
men are wrong. The infantry is re-
cruited from the idle poor of the cities,
and almost wholly from for eigners.
The cavalry, indeed, is recruited mostly
with Americans, and largely from farms,
and therefore is the best arm of our
service.
The right material to fight Indians
with is to be found only on the plains,
and in Montana, Wyoming, Dakota,
Nebraska, Kansas, and Texas. 1t rare
ly enlists. 1t hunts buffalo for their
hides, prospects the mountains for sill
YER and gold, drives team across the
plains, herds cattle on the range, races
and trades horses, drives thousands of
steers up from Texas to the Eastern
trunk railways, chops cord-wood for
Missouri river steamers, hunts deer
and antelope Tor the market, mines in
Colorado and New Mexico, drinks,
CANDLES, fights, murders, but never
runs; and in cunning, GOODNESS, endur-
ance, skill, and courage, is an over
match for the best of the Indians.
Ten or twelve weeks OF fighting
weather remain for the Sioux war. Ii
will go over to another year, and to
other years after that, unless the men
VIC speak of are hired to whip these
savages. Twas so with the Modocs.
when the seemingly easy job of thrash.
ing them had TO be taken off the hands
Of the West Pointers and regulars.
Our army chiefs resist the employment
of our true Indian fighting material,
and for the excellent reason that the
army cannot afford to make the con
icssion that it cannot fight Indians.
That confession would sooner or later
be followed by an act of Congress
the army as useless insti.
tuition. The army chiefs will probably
lot the war drag till the snow falls,
then plead necessity and go into winter
quarters and go likewise to Congress
Tor an increase of the regular army
Nelc York Sun.
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