Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1876-04-05

THE EVACUATION OF BOSTON.
How the British were Driven Out
scarcity of Food in the City-DOrches-
tor Heights OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES Of the
British army and Fleet.
| Among the centennial anniversaries
which are now so frequently occurring
! few are more interesting than that Of
the abandonment of the town of Bos-
ton by the Ministerial Forces" on the
18th of March, 1776. The moral and
material results of the event were con-
siderable. 1t was the first military sue
cess of Washington during the war,
and it maintained at critical moment
the reputation which he had in other
contests acquired as commander of
remarkable sagacity and prudence, and
OF tirst-rate, if not consummate, ability.
To the town itself the relief must have
been very great. For eleven months
an insolent soldiery had held it in sub
| lection. Its homes had been invaded
It's churches desecrated, its inhabitants
insulted, and its business suspended.
Something like famine had been
threatened, and the cheapest articles of
food sold at exorbitant prices So COM
mon necessity as frewood had reach
ed the price of Ais. 3d. the cord, and
finally it was not to be procured at any
price. Even the British masters of the
town experienced great hardships.
Numbers Of the poorer people had
been expelled. The royal troops on
Bunker Hill remained under canvas
the whole winter, and suffered severely,
The blockade maintained by the Amer
lean forces was of the strictest descrip-
ton, while the British officers strove to
temper the austerities of the siege bv
various festivities and the diversion of
amateur theatrical performances.
REsIEGERs AND BEsEIGED.
Gen. Gage had sailed for England
about the 10th of October, 1875, and
| the command of the British army had
devolved upon Gen. William Howe.
His strength may be stated roundly at
about 10000 men, a part of them
strongly intrenched upon Bunker Hill.
Washington, 9th of July, 1775, compu-
ted his own force at 16, O00men. X
| Gen. Washington's efforts to main
tain the discipline of the army were
unceasing and extremely judicious; but
| the men seem to have come and gone
somewhatat their pleasure, and lifted,
ill-clothed, and illpaid, they were con-
stantly longing for home, and often de-
parted for it without any regular fur
Tough. Under these circumstances,
true to his theory that nothing was
more advantageous to an army than
action, even with but partial success,
Washington had done allin his power
to bring on general engagement with
the enemy. In August, 1775, he had
fortified hill within point blank shot
of the enemy's lines on Charlestown
Neck, but nothing came Of it save Sc
we're cannonade for day or two. He
was puzzled, he says, to know what the
British "were staying there for, or
why, cas- they affect to despise the
Americans, they do not come forth,
and put an end to the contest at once"
But they had no stomachs for a repe-
tition of Lexington and Bunker Hill,
and kept close on the two peninsulas
of Boston and Charlestown, surround
ed by ships OF war and floating batter
les, with the necks of land strongly
fortified. With its left.wing upon the
Medford River, its center occupying
Cambridge, and it's right wing at Rox-
bury, the American army left no way
of egress to Gen. Howe except by sea.
Supplies by land were out of the ques-
ton, while the supplies by water were
dilatory and insufficient. The con-
tempt entertained by the mother coun-
try at the start the courage and re-
sources of the colonies was bearing it's
legitimate fruit. The royalists had
committed the most fatal of military
blunders, for they had moderated their
adversaries. In March 1776, Washing
ton, by the most unwearied industry and
anxious care, had brought the Ameri-
can army into state of tolerable effect
iveness. All winter he had waited in
vain for degree of cold which should
freeze the waters of the harbor and of
the rivers flowing into it so that it might
cross the arm of the sea which separ-
ates the peninsula from the continent,
when it might have been in his power
to capture both the naval and military
forces Of the British. The delay, how
| OVOA3 he1u OOCA LII OO1uC 1cSpCCCS dC-
vantageous to his army; and ice
enough had formed on the 18th of
February to justify in the opinion of
| Washington, an assault. He had, how
ever, been instructed by the Congress
not to undertake this, unless the move
ment should be sanctioned by coun-
Gil of general officers; and this upon
| being called, was found, not little to
| Washington's chagrin, unanimously
| opposed to the attempt. He wrote to
the President of the Congress that he
found it irksome ito have the eyes of
the whole continent fixed with anxious
expectation of hearing of some great
event, and to be restrained in every
military operation" On the 26th Of
February he wrote to Gen. Lee that the
enemy showed signs of "going off"
as they had taken all the top-sail YES
sells IL the harbor into their service and
removed their nlQrtars from Bunk or