The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1876-08-04
EUROPE.
The Possibii es of n General War Dis
cussed.

EUROPE.
The Possibil es of n General War Dis
cussed.
[From the New York Times.l
The great importance of the war on
the Danube to the world must depend
ON how far the European Governments
are drawn into it. The insurgent pro-
vinces might hold the Turkish army at
bay for years, or Servia might succeed
in establishing considerable Sclavonic
state, which should be under the NOM
inal suzerainty of Turkey, and yet the
peace of Europe be not endangered.
But the day on which an Austrian corps
crosses the Danube, or Russian army
enters the Principalities, or an English
feet supports the attacking columns of
the Porte, then begin complications and
dangers to Europe, and disturbances to
the peace of the world whose end no
man can foresee. 1t is the possibility of
such interference which makes the ex
changes of France, England, and Ger
many so sensitive.
How far is there danger of such an in
tervention, and how great is the proba-
bility of q serious disturbance of the
peace of the world2 The threatening
power is unauestionably Russia. Her
people, though belonging to the north
ern branch of the Sclavonic race, are in
the deepest sympathy with the trials
and sufferings of their brethren under
the rule of the Ottomans. The Turk is
their historical enemy also, and equally
hated. Every instance of Mussulman
,fv.xy nd oil w. IN,
insult to the Greek Church, every tale
of oppression and suffering among the
long-injured Sclavonians, passes from
mouth to mouth among the Russian
peasantry, and the masses burn to
avenge these wrongs, and to fulfill the
Russian destiny, which is to drive the
Mohammedans from Europe. These
feelings and these traditions are much
stronger with a half-civilized peasantry
like the Muscov;te than in more artificial
communities. In the political and
governing class there is also great de-
sire to wipe away the disgrace of the
Crimean campaign, and an ambition to
advance the Russian eagles toward the
Dardanelles.
The glorious prize of Constantinople
still hangs glittering before the ambi-
tious members of the ruling house and
before the imagination of the military
leaders. These are some of the motives
and forces pressing to an inference. On
the other hand, are even more powerful
influences constraining to peace. Rus
sia, since emancipation and the Crimean
war, has become a conservative govern
ment. Her own internal affairs are much
more difficult and dangerous since the
freedom of the serfs than before. She
has entered on the commercial and bank
ing era of her progress, and money-mak
ing tends to peace. She has learned the
power of the civilized states of Europe,
and has not that confidence in her mill
tary genius or that ambition which Ma
poleon's wars encouraged or implanted.
The Gar himself is anxious for peace,
and, though the Young Russia party are
eager for war, his influence must be con-
trolling. Moreover, all the military
movements of Russia must be governed
absolutely by those of Germany and
there is every reason to believe that,
however much Bismarck may seek to
ally the Gar with the German Kaiser,
his interests and purposes are all on the
side of peace. Interference by Russia
means inevitably war with Austria, and
perhaps with England, which might rem
der the chances of winning Constantine
pie more remote than ever, and even
leave Turkey still more strongly in
trenched in Europe than before. These
motives must outweigh with the Rus
sian Cabinet any possible present advan-
tages from assisting the insurgents or
allying with Servia.
Austria is even more bound to con-
dition of non-interference. She is
struggling with debt, weighed down by
taxes and an irredeemable currency, and
her councils divided by the most serious
differences between the two parts of the
"Dual Empire" Her Sclavonic sub
jects number some four millions, and
these are already assisting Bosnians and
Servians by the most liberal aid of
means and men. A war in alliance with
Turkey would be in the highest degree
unpopular in Sclavopic Hungary, and
would defeat the great policy of the vi
emma CubiDet-to array the Croat and
Serb against the Magyar, and thus gov
ern both.
The Austrian Empire is clearly in no
condition for war. In England, certain
ly, no war would be more against the
popular liberal feeling than one to sup
port Turkish cruelty and oppression
over the insurgent provinces. Nothing
but the most urgent necessity could pos
sibly bring Great Britain into the strife
on the Danube, and that OH the side Of the
Mussulman against the Christian. We
hold, then, that all these forces will keep
back the great European powers, and
that the effort of all will be to "localize'
the struggle.