The New York herald., 1876-03-11
omciaI Responsibility in England and
the United states.


the weak and crude part of our political
system. After such revolving exposures as
have recently been made in Washington an
English Ministry could not stand a day;
and punishment is always more salutary
in proportion it is prompt. The English
government is superior to ours in being more
directly responsible to the people and more
completely under the control of public opin-
ion. When an English Ministry falls into
disgrace it can be got rid of at once, without
the tedious process of impeaching individual
members or the more tedious waiting for the
expiration Of long terms of Office. Impeach-
ment is troublesome remedy, even
when it succeeds, and it is always
liable to fail, even when there is no moral
doubt of the guilt of the accused officer The
impeachment of Belknap is at dead halt for
want of legal evidence although he is self
confessed criminal and even when evidence
is found the trial will be obstructed by tech
nicalities, while the two-thirds majority
necessary to convict is an additional obstacle
to success. And yet this tedious, cumbrous,
inefficient process is the only method which
exists under our government for deposing
officers who abuse their trust. Besides it
operates only on the individual officer who,
is arraigned; whereas the more prompt
method of the English government puts out
the whole Ministry by simple vote of the
House of Commons. The storm bursts at
once, the political atmosphere is purified,
the public sense of justice is satisfied, and
the government moves quietly on under new
auspices. 1t is greatly to be wished that
the Executive Department of our govern
ment were SO organized as to put the
administration equally under the control of
public opinion and make it as directly re-
sponsible to the people We do not advo-
cate a servile copy of this part of the British
constitution. For tame imitation evinces
poverty of resources, and is sure to fail by
lack of adaptation to circumstances. But
there is no reason why we may not reach the
same result by political machinery suited to
the peculiar nature of our government and
the temper of our people. We need to put a
helm in the ship on which the people can
place their hands in an emergency, and
promptly change its course when it is in
danger of running aground.
No part of the praise which our statesmen
so habitually and justly bestow on the fed
eral constitution is due to the organization
of the Executive Department, which is not
model of wisdom, but monument of crudity
and folly. We do not here refer to the re-
eligibility of our Presidents, which major
ity of sound thinkers have long regarded as
10 h,,f Ao
mental objections The method of electing
the President, to begin WITH proved so alb
surd in practice that it has been dead letter
during the whole period of our political exist
ence. The trainers the constitution intend
ed that the Presidential electors should really
choose the President, and elaborate pains
were taken to protect their independence.
No person holding federal Office can be q
Presidential ela tor, and they are required
to meet and vote N the same day in their
separate States, means of preventing
the intrigues and bargaining which might
result from assembling the whole body in
one place The idea was to create scattered
bodies of independent citizens, free from
official influence and without facilities for
combination, who should vote in accordance
with their own convictions and really choose
the President 1t is needless to say how
abortive and grotesque this careful plan,
which seemed so wise on paper has proved
in practice. The Presidential electors are
mere automatons, who have no will
of their own, and passively register the
choice of their political party declared
no rlu in o6v Of ha inoa vh
they give their votes. The exclusion of
federal oflice-holders amounts to nothing.
because federal office-holders pack and con-
troll the conventions which nominate the
candidates for whom the Presidential cleo
tors are compelled to vote. The meeting of
electors as separate bodies in their own
States does not prevent corrupt combinations,
because such combinations are perfected in
the national nominating conventions at
the opening of the Presidential canvass, and
the electoral colleges servilely obey the party
mandates. Nobody can dispute that this
part of the constitution is n total failure and
a monument of political folly.
1t is quite as little open to dispute that
another part of the original plan for electing
the President was q short-sighted failure.
The constitution, as first adopted, required
each Presidential elector to vote for two
persons without designating which he
preferred for President and which for
Vice President The person receiving
the highest number of votes was to
be President and the next highest Vice
President. At the fourth trial this method
of voting came near destroying the govern
ment The election was thrown into the
House of Representatives, and during thirty
six ballotings it seemed doubtful whether
jefferson or Burr would be elected, or
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