New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1875-06-02
Sllerln1n'a Mistake,

TOUR cOIufmn crltluue 81 'S0ermlnl
Memoirs" which appear, N the Su,a thi
,Lolning, shows an unusually thorough
knowledge OF the history Of the Western
armies, and doubtless owes its inspiration
TO tho editor, whose opportunities tor obseI
walton were remarkably good. 1t confirms
our own previous impre ssion. that General
SHERMAN hes made the great blunder of his
lie in ventilating the peculiar views claims
and grudges which comparatively few
people knew him to entertain. The main
feature of his work, his claim OF the exclu-
eive credit of the plan Of campaign which
he carried out in his justly famous march
to the sea" Is thus disposed of by the SIN !:
Upon the statements and documents
contained in his memoirs it appears that
Sherman is entitled to the credit of pro
posing, as well as OF conducting, the march
20 the sea. 1t is nnquestiona Bile. however,
that the idea IN various forms mad been
suggested previously, but he first gave it
practical shape; and it is curious fact that
up to the last moment he reserved the priv
iege and considered the desrability of going
20 ApalachicOla, on the Cult OF Mexico
Instead OF to Savannah on the Atlantic. 1t
ID also the truth that this alternative, if
acted upon, would have carried his army
almost as completely out of the theatre of
war as if il had marched to the borders of
Lake Michigan. Indeed, he could have
done nothing which would have inflicted
less injury upon tue enemy, or more fully
neutralized the effect OF his victorious
march to Atlanta. His decision to 90
toward Savannah was iudicious and Ia
strict conformity to the rules of war, since
II gave him what military men call interior
lines in reference to Hood and Lee In
other words, it put it within his power to
form junction with Grant and absolutely
to prevent Hood from forming one with
Lee, and at the same time to devastate the
enemy's country, break up his lines of COM
InunicatiOns and destroy his arsenals and
depots Of supplies.
Ahe march toward Savannah was, there
FORE right, but it should not have extended
to that point nor in fact. further in that
direction than Augusta. Indeed, the time
expended in and about Savannah was time
lost, since the occupation OF Augusta and
the continuance of the march toward Grant
would as certainly have caused the evacua-
ton Of Savannah as the march from that
place toward Raleigh at a later day com
PEELED the evacuation of Charleston. 1t
was mistake, because it enabled John |
son to recall from Alabama all that WAS
left of Hoods broken battalions, and by |
uniting them with the other detach- |
ments OF his widely extended command, |
to concentrate respectable army in the |
CarOlinas and interpose it between She,-
man and Grant. Had Johnston been more
portunity. or could he have gathered |
force sufficiently strong to check Sherman's |
subsequent march, il is difficult to see how
the latter could have corrected his blunder
There would have been no recourse left
him but to commit a still greater blnnder.
namely that Of Transporting his army to
Petersburg by water. and thus removing It
Tor the time consumed in the voyage entirely
from the theatre or war. AS it was, this
latter movement was contemplated both by |
Sherman and Grant, as shown BY the me
moirs, and was only abandoned when it
was discovered that it could not be CON-
pleted in less than two months. There is
nothing in the reports of either to show
that they or have ever seen since the real
danger they would have thereby incurred |
or the advantages that Johnston might
have gained. Sherman shows by Grants
own letter that the latter did not favor the |
march to the sea while Hoods army was |
advancing against Thomas, but he does not
make it clear that the original suggestion |
Of that movement was not made by Grant, |
This Is q criticism founded on the best ac-
cepued accounts of the campaigns referred
to, and will be acquiesceG in by most of the
soldiers of the Western armies whose pred
ictiOns in favor Of Sherman have not OBJ
'cuIed their judgment. Beyond all this. we | !
inow that should General Grant so tar de-
,art from his habitual reticence as to state
lis view of the matter it would be found
lnd proved that he, on several occasions.
developed almost exactly the plan of the
inc Of operations adopted by Sherman, in |
Conversations with various persons. The '
writer of this article remembers very dis i
lnctly that in June, 1862 General Grant. | D
hen in Corintb, Mississippi, told several u
steners what would be his way of endipg}
he war In the course of this conversation,
'hlch was suggested by the fact that Gen
rn Hall had
ashington as General-in- Chief and that |
General Grant was assigned the work of | b
earring out the rebellion down the Missis- | a
ppi. the writer heard General Grant saw. re
, substance: A.
My plan will be, first, to capture Nicks
urg from the rear, and then Port Hudson.
nd thus acquire the free use Of the Missis In
ppi river from its sources to its mouth. &c y,
his will divide the rebel territory, and pre- 81
snt supplies and reintorcements from Gt
'ing to the rebel armies east of the Mis- st
ssippl Then it will be time to bring the 10 10
esfern armies into active cooperation | Mi
it'll the army OF the Potomac. which can St
nothing but hold fast the best rebel army Go
Virginia. l would move an army right "a "a
ross the middle of the Gulf States to +"
me Atlantic seaport, Savannah or Charles
n, and then be ready to cooperate with s.:
Q Army Of the Potomac wi
the same plan of operations I'M
IS indicated in a very elaborate letter an
ut by General Pope in 1862 to the War &c
'partment, which is now on file and can Co
seen by any visitor. Doubtless other at
nerals made like suggestions at the same ev
lie. 1t was Sherman's glory that he had wi
} chance to do what others proposed. The AS
tire of that achievement can never be | ex
nmed, even by Shermap's own extrava. clio
ut and MUST claims.-New York Nail ito
kir
Our Barbar0ns Spelling. hel