, 1875-12-15

satisfied that France was already strong
enough to overthrow any Power that
might cross her path.
Those who happened to be in France
at the outbreak OF the war will remember
how universal this confidence was up to
the very day of Worth, aud how the only
fear of the Republicans was that the EMpE-
o might be fixed more firmly on the
Throne by his coming victories. We now
know on how fraii a foundation these ex-
pectations rested. The result of eighteen
years OF Empire and of grandiose schemes
recommended by great military names was
that to oppose the enormous masses which
Germany was bringing into the field the
French had less than 100000 men in the
neighbourhood of the Rhine. Of the
100000 men composing the nominal Army
votes in the Budget less than 800, 900 were
under arms at the time of the declaration
of war. At the same date the Garde
Mobile existed on paper only. The mate
REL was in q worse state than the men.
The most important places were encum-
bered with old cannon, some of them
dating from the time of LOUIS XIV. When
the campaign began the Commanders
wrote and telegraghed continually inn
ploring supplies. In short, success was
impossible, except through the appear
ance of some extraordinary military genius
who should rise superior to every difficulty.
1t need hardly be said that the campaign
not only did not exhibit any such gifted
leader, but that there was an inertness and
imbecility in action corresponding to the
defects in preparation. The writer con-
trasts the energy and resource shown IN
the later phase of the war, when the de-
fence Of the ruined country was conduct
ed under the direction of civilians, with
the shortsightedness and laundering of the
military chiefs. The Government of Ma
tional Defence, though it could not save
France, redeemed her fall, and showed
what elements of strength had been ne
elected or wasted by professional inca
pacity. u
The question of who is to blame for
this great collapse is one which naturally
suggests itself, but Inquiry only reveals
that no power in the State was free from
blame. We can easily perceive that the.
EMPEROR was responsible, that successive
Ministers of War were responsible also,
that the chief officers Of the Army knew
or might have known the truth, that even
the members of the Senate and the Corps
L6gisIatif must have failed in their duty
when indiscipline and corruption were
gaining ground year by year and these
notabilities of the State or representatives
of the people made no sign. The guilt was
national, and it has had a national expia-
ton. So it must ever be when SO vast and
complicated a machine as the army of q
great Power breaks in a variety of places
like this of France. A more useful employ
ment than recrimination or over-curious
inquiry is to consider what have been the
causes of the French collapse, and to ask,
ourselves whether our own military and
naval strength may not at this moment be
affected by similar disorders. To this coun-
try we are free from some of the defects
oil the Second Empire; II political and
professional chiefs. are above suspicion,
and we ourselves are not afraid to criticize
Official people are really anxious toDado
their best, and there are others always
ready with advice as to what the best is.9
But, after all, every thinking man raasti
feel how very little is known ofthe details
of the two Services outside a I'M lNprofes1
sioual class, and that the nation which REL
poses in confidence that it5has the MOST
complete army the best ships and guus
thatil9 are toGbe obtained formoney,a may