Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1875-12-17
BRATTLEBORO, VT, FRIDAY, DECEMBER II, 1875

cu inc conclusion tnal the COntllCl IN CuDa,
dreadful and devastating as were its Incl
dents, did not rise TO The fearful dignity of
war. Regarding 1t now after this lapse of
time am unable to see that any notable
success, or any marked or real advance on
the part of the insurgents has essentially
changed tue character of the contest II
has acquired greater age, but not greater or
more formidable proportions. 1t is possi-
bic that tue acts of foreign powers, and
even of Spain herself, of this very nature
might be pointed to in defense Of such rec
ognition. But nov as in its past history
the United States SHOULD carefully avoid the
false lights which might lead il into the
mazes of doubtful law and questionable
propriety, and adhere rigidly and slernly
to the rule which has been its guide, and
doing only that which is right and honest
and of good report. The question of ac-
cording or of Withholding rights Of bellig-
erency must be Judged In every sense in
view Of the particular attending facts. I'M
less justified by necessity it is always aud
justly regarded as an unIrieudly act and a
gratuitOus demonstration of moral support
TO the rebellion. Ii Is necessary and IL Is
required when the interests and right of
another government Or of its people are so
far affected by pending civil conflict as to
require definition of its relations to the par
ties thereto. But this conflict must be one
which will be recognized in the sense of in-
ternational law as war. Belligerence, too,
Is a fact. The mere existence OF contend
ing armed bodies and their occasional con-
hicts, do not constitute war in the sense re-
ferred to. Applying to the existing condi-
ton Of afflirs in Cuba the tests recognized
by publicsts and writers on international
law, and which have been observed by ma
tions Of dignity, honesty and power, when
free from sensitive or selfish aud unworthy
motives, | fail to find in the insurrectOn
the existence Of such a substantial political
organization, real, palpable, and manifest
to The world, having the forms and capable
OF the ordinary functions OF government
toward It's own people and TO other STATES,
with courts for the administration OF JUS
tice, with local habitation, possessing snch
orglniZ itiun ol lurce, such material, such
occupation of territory, a, to take the con-
test out Of the category of mere rebeilluus
insurrectiOn or OCCASIONAL SkirmisheS, and
place ii on the terrible footing of war to
which recognition Of Uelligereucy would
aim to elevate it, The contest, moreover.
is solely on land. The insurrectiOn has not
posses sed itself Of a single seaport whence
il may send forth its flag, nor has it any
means of communication with foreign pow
ers except through the military lines Of its
adv, rSaries. No apprehension OF any OF
those sudden and difficult complications
which war upon the ocean is apt 10 pre-
cipiato upon the vessels both commercial
and matt, /, and upon the cou sular officers
of other powers, calls for the definition of
their relations to the parties to the contest.
Considered as 4 question Of expedtency,
regard the accordance of belligerent rights
stIll - be As unwisc and premature as re-
gard it 10 be at present inde!ensihlc as a
measure of right. Such recognition entails
upon the country according the rights
which flow from it difhcult and compliclt-
ed dIties and requires the eXactiun from
the cOntending parties Of the strict observ-
ance of their rights and obligations. II
fhn ripif ,f search fine hipl
seas by vessels of both parties, but would
subject the carrying Of arms and mmuni-
tious Of war, which now may he transport
ed freely and without interruption in the
vessels of the United States to detention
and 10 possible seizure. 1t would give rise
to countless voXatious questions, would re-
lease the parent government from respons-
ibility Tor acts done by the insurgents, and
would invest Spain with the right TO eXer-
else the supervision recognized by our
treaty of 1875 over our commerce on the
high seas, a very large part of which is its
traffic be; ween the Atlantic aud Gnlf States,
and between all of tEem aud the States up
on the Pacific, passes through the waters
which wash the shores of Cuba. The eN-
erc.se Of this supervision could scarcely
fail to lead, ii not TO abuses, certainly 10
collisions, perlous TO the peaceful relations
of the two States. There can Lc little doubt
to what result such supervision would be-
fore long draw this nation. Ii would be
unworthy Of the United States to inaugur-
ate The possibilities of such result by meas.
ures of questionable right or eXpedency,
or bv any indirCcliOn. Apart from any
question Of theoretical right, am satisfied
that while the accordance of helligeren
rights to the Insurgents in Cuba might give
them hope aud uducmeut 10 protnct the
struggle, il would he nut deiuSive hope,
and would not remove the evils which this
government and its people are experience
ino I'm | mil al iptn
complications which it has waited long and
suffered much already 10 avoid.
MEDIATION AND INTERVENTION THE LAST
RESORT.
The recognition of independence or OF
bellgerency being thus in my judgment
| equally inadmissbie, il remains to consd-
er what course shall he adopted should the
| conflict not soon be brought to an end by
acts Of tte parties themselves, aud should
the evils which result therefrOm affecting
| all nations, and particularly the United
| States, continue. In such event | am OF
| opinion that other nations Will he com
| PEELED TO assume the responsibility which
| devulves upon them, and to seriously con-
| slider the only remaining measures possi-
| decentralization and Intervention. Owing,
| perhaps, TO the large eXpanse of water sep
| arating the island from the peninsula, the
want Of harmony and personal sympathy
| between the inhabitants of the colony and
| those sent thither TO rule them, and the
wani of adaptation of the ancient colonial
| system of Europe to the present times, and
| to the ideas which the events of the past
| century have developed, the contending
| parties appear to have within themselves
| no depository Of common confidence 10 sug-
| gest wisdom when passion and excitement
| have taken their sway, and 10 assume the
| part of peace-makers. In this view, in the
| early days of the contest, the good offices
| of the United States as a mediator were
| rendered in good faith, without any selfish
purpose, and in the interest Of humanity,
and in sincere friendship for both parties
| but were at the time declined by
Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless,
that at future time they would be indis-
| pensable. No inlimation has been receiv-
ed that in the opinion of Spain that time
| has been reached, and yet the strife contin-
ues, with all its dread horrors and all its
injuries 10 the Interests Of the United States
and of other nations. Each party seems
quite capable of working great injury and
damage to the other, as well rs TO all the
relations aud interests attendant upon the
existence ofpeace in the island. But they
seem incapable of reaching any adjustment
and both have thus far failed of achieving
any success whereby one party shall pos
sess and control the island to the exclusion
of the other. Under these circumstance
che agency Cf others, either by mediation
| or intervention, seems TO be tue only alter
native which must sooner or later be in
vok ed for the termination of the strife. A
the same time, while thus impressed, | Dc
not at this time recommend the adoption
of any measure. L shall be ready at al
times aud as the equal friend OF both par
ties, TO respond 10 a suggestion that tht
good Offices of the United States will be ac
ceptable 10 aid in bringing about peac,
honorable TO both. II is due TO Spain, 81
far as this Government is concerned, tha
the agency of n third power, 10 which
have adverled, shall be adopted only as
last expedient. Had il been the desire o
the United States 10 Interfere in the affair
of Cuba, repeated opportunities for so do