The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1875-10-22
THE LIQUOR TAX.
The Supreme Court Decides the
Law Constitutional.
FMH Tert Of the Decision of
the Court.

nquor TAX law given by the supreme Court at Lam
sing, recently:
barney f0ungbiOod 81 al, ps. Jared A. !SeIton,
sheriff. Opinion by Cooley, j.:
Inc OIL III this cause was filed To restrain the col
lection from the several complainants of tax as
sessed against them separately in respect 10 the
business IN which each IL engaged IL is personal
tax purely. II was decided at early day i'm this
state that equity had Jurisdiction restrain the
collection of personal tax, conceding IL to be
illegal, the ordinary legal remedies being ample
| for the party's protection. Williams w. Detroit
I'd Mich, $50. The principle has since been
regarded IA not open to controversy in this State
and II was applied without its soundness being
tested in Henry vs.. Gregory, 29th Mich, 81, de-
The question then presents itself how this bill
came to be filed, and what ground the Superior
Court was asked to, and did, proceed TO render
decision the merits The jurisdictional question
has not been argued in this court, but we are not
inclined to pass IL in silence, thereby giving
countenance to the idea that by the mere acques-
cence of parties jurisdiction may be made for q
court of chancery, by means of which the extTaor-
binary remedy by injunction can be made use of to
restrain public officers in their action where neither
the legislation of the State the general princi
Piles which control the action of courts have
given this remedy. The writ of injunction is pecu-
arly liable to abuse; and the practice of resorting
to it in where it is not allowed 10y law relying
upon the opposite party to overlook waive the
! iegality is not one that can safely be encouraged
or sanctioned. The jurisdiction of the courts is
never subject TO be enlarged diminished at the
discretion of parties, and 1t would be peculiarly mis-
chievous to permit jurisdiction to rest upon consent
/
are to be effected by the litigation.
The grounds suggested, but not argued, giving
equitable jurisdiction in the case are, first that
thereby multiplicity Of suits may be avoided;
second that otherwise the proceedings may ripen
! into a cloud upon the title to complainants lands;
and third, that irreparabe injury liz threatened TO
| complainants in their business. As the tax is only
personal, and yet affects no real estate and may
do so, the second ground calls for consid-
Grafton. The force of the third must rest in the
fact that enforcing the tax may in some
pei the suspension of business because it is more
than the person taxed can aord,to pay. But if this
consideration is sufficient to justify the transfer of
a controversy from a court of law TO a court of
equity. then every controversy where money Is de-
manded may be made the subject of equitable cogni-
Zance. To enforce against dealer promssory
note may in some cases etfectually break up his
business az to collect from him a tax of equal
amount This is not what is known to the law
irreparable injury. The courts have
recognized the consequences of the
mere enforcement of money demand
as falling within the category. II rs true the Fed
eral courts have treated the unlawful taxation of
franchise of irrel arabic injury. Osborn
VS.. U. s. Bank, Wheat 1888. But this was on the
ground that the tax, If enforced might destroy the
franchise, and in effect, the corporation itself, the
artificial person which was taxed and the case has
little analogy to that of the taxation of particular
business carried on by individuals.
If complanants rely upon the jurisdiction of
equity to take cognizance of u controversy when
thereby multiplicity OF suits may be prevented,
the reliance fails because the principles that govern
that Jurisdiction have no application to this case.
! IL is sometimes admissible when many parties
alike affected threatened by illegal act, that
they shall unite in suit To restrain ii and this has
been done in this State in tho case of an illegal
sessment of lands. Scoville V. Lansing, IL Mich,
437 But the cases are very few and very peculiar
where this can be permitted unless each of the COM
plainants has equitable action on his own behalf.
Now the of this such that each of these
compliments, If the tax is invalid has remedy at
! law which is complete and ample the law gives
in other cases. He may resist the sherih's process
as he might any other trespass, he may pay the
money under protest and at sue fer and
| II
est with him i'll resisting this tax. The sum demand
ed of each is distinct and separate, and IL does not
concern one of the compliments whether another
pays not All the joint interest the parties have Is
Joint interest in the question of law-just such an
interest as might exist in any case where separate
| demands made of several pesons Such COM
mon interest there might be if several persons
should give several promissory notes distinct
purchases of worthless article; and such there
might have been under the former prohbitory
! liquor law, had demands been made against several
persons for liquors illegally sold to them. We
ture to say that it would not be seriously suggested
! that a common interest in any such question
of law, where the legal interests of the
parties we're wholly distinct, could constitute
any ground of equitable jurisdiction when
the several controversies affected by the question
were purely legal controversies. Suits do not be-
come of equitable cogniZance because of their num-
Der merely. This was affirmed in Lapeer County
Hart, Har ch., 49, and in the two of Sheldon
Va. School District, IS Conn.,. 224, and Dodd VS..
School District, ibid, 232, which in their facts 40
| far this question is concerned, like the
present case, with single exception which is not
| to the advantage of these compliments. In those
cases the single assessment of school tax was in
| volyed and the parties concerned IL permitted to
unite, might have had the whole controversy deter
mined in the one suit In this the controversy
IL either separate as the tax If several against each
individual, II Is general, IL affects all the per-
sons taxed under the law. onsidered as
q controversy which affects all persons taxed,
this suit would wholly fail in the pur-
pose of preventing multiplicity of suits, because
the Court in which it was brought has only local
and limited Jurisdiction Other suits might be
brought outside of Detroit in every county of the
State and at best this suit would only reduce the
number of suits, while it could not prevent multi
plicty of them. On this general principle We con-
tent ourselves with referring further to Jones va
Garcia, | Turn Russ, 297; Yeaton Va. Lenox, y
| Pet 1913; Adams Ed, 0B-202.
Other considerations on this branch of the case
| we abstain from presenting, because an argument
has been withhold and under such circumstances
we deem 1t advisable to present none but those
which are rot only conclusive, but are unquestion-
able. We present these for the purpose of showing
that If the merits OF this controversy were with the
complainants the bill would nevertheless be dis
missed because the parties have standing in a
court of equity. They cannot make remedies for
themselves which the law has not given them. We
do not know whether there was any express assent
the part of the defendant to this jurisdiction il
there was 1T could be of no avail, for reasons al
ready stated. He would be poweress in any case.
But specially so in case like the present where he
il acting in "A public capacity, and the consent if
given would not be on his behalf, but on be-
half of the public whom for any such purpose he
has no authority to represent
The question then arises whether, the case
being one of which the court below had no
jurisdiction, this court on appeal shall pro-
coed to express an opinion upon the merits.
The considerations which bear upon that
question conflicting. Az general rule an
opinion on the merits of a controversy ought to be
declined when the Court is powerless TO give the
relief demanded. But this case is in many par
ticuars exceptional. II has been argued on the
merits. The state intervening for the purpose, and
there IL no reason for any suggestion suspicion
that in tins Court at least IL is not bona-de con-
troversy. The legal points involved in the merits
have been presented in good faith. and we have nc
reason to suppose that, should the controversy be
presented again in a more regular form, the case
would assume any different phase in the argument
There is beside abundant reason apparent on this
record for believing that the public interest de-
mands an early determination of the question in
volved. The pendency OF this suit has TO some ex-
tent delayed for considerable period the enforce
ment of State law, which ia supposed to be of high
Importance and if this should go off ON the juris-
dictionsl question: there is to look for fur
Their litigation which would constitute ground, or
at least pretense, for further delay Under all tn,
} circumstances agreed that an examinati N
of the on the merits and an opinion thereon
, are not only iustihable but are demanded by con
D sideratons of public Importance.
. Tue question which lies at the foundation OF the
litigation relates TO the validity of the act for the
| taxation Of the liquor traffic, passed May g. 1875
> General Laws of 1875, p. 274. The complainants Il
appears, have severally been assessed tax deal
in liquors, and they contest the payment tn,
ground that the Legislature had no constitutions
authority TO impose it, A number Of reasons ar,
assigned for the invaldty of the tax and these WI