, 1875-08-25

Prince Bismarck .0Vef-fateS and under
rates all spiritual p~owers-favour the
U~Itramontanes. The Bonapartists on
the other hand, besides being ready to
use Ultramontanism like any other weapon,
would nave every interest," in urging on
the reranche. 1t is essential to the Napo-
leonic legend, which is the foundation of
their power, that the tradition Of victory
should be renewed, and Napoleon III. be
shown, by his sons victory over Germans,
to have been rather a betrayed man than
an incompetent one. These two are the
only MonarchicaI parties, for the Orlean-
lists have no chance till the Comte de
Chambord is dead, aud then they would
become the Legitimists,- and the Prince
deliberately prefers the Republicans to
either. Up to the middle of July, there
fore, the course of Prince Hohenlohe
was clear, and whatever the opposition
the Left Centre had to encounter, none
came from the German Embassy, but now
the situation has changed again. The dis
pute is now between the pseudo-Republic
and the real Republic, and it is not by
any means clear which side Prince Bis
marek thinks it desirable to countenance.
Ii he reasoned, as an English Wing would
reason, he would, it seems unques-
tionable, prefer the true Republic. A
Republican party once in power, amid
Republican institutions, would find so
much to do, so many enemies to repress,
and so many supporters to cOnciliate, that
it would be little inclined for a wal
which, even if it Were successful, could
advance no one except a soldier, who
might not be by any means a devoted Re-
publican. The Republicans would be most
reluctant, too, either to increase taxes, or
to stain the repute and injure the populari-
ty of their system, by running any risk of
reputation. Utterly disconnected with
the past, they would have little tempta-
ton to seek revenge as a luxury, and
though they must seek to regain Lorraine
and Alsace, might for a time at all events
trust, as NJ. Theirs said he trusted, to re-
cover their provinces by diplomatic pres
sure. Although, moreover, gossiping
stories about the private sentiments of
monarchs are rarely Of much value, mon
archs being compelled every day, like other
people, to prefer duty to sentiment, still tits
not unreasonable to believe that a Gar OF
Russia, though he did enfranchise the serls,
is at heart an anti, Republican, and inclined
to distrust a form of government aptto elicit
in France sympathy for Poles and other
down-trodden nationalities. The rough
remark of NJ. de la Observation-Disclosures
to the Left, " Your Republic will never
have an ally among the Kings of
Europe" is unfounded, for the Austrian
Court in 1870 accepted M. Gambetta's
overtures in principle; but Kings, no
doubt, trust more readily to individuals
than nations. Any regime in France
which Gar Alexander would dislike must
be pro tonto acceptable to the Chancellor
of Germany. And finally, atrue Republic
in France could not be Ultramontane.
Whether guided by M. Theirs or M.
Gambetta, it would be secular, and its
policy, if it ever conceded with that of
the Vatican in its progress, would drift
away from it the moment either victory
had been achieved or peace secured. But
it is by no means certain that Prince
Bismarck does reason like an English
Wing. He is surrounded by men who
hate the very name Of a Republic, he
retains much Of the traditionary fear as
well as dislike of the Ultras, and he may
we'll think that a real Republic in France
might be very attractive, as well as
possibly very strong. Every great triumph