The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1875-09-22

In other respects properly prepared Tor the great
| battle which afterward TOOK place. We uuute as
fonows
variety Of facts support tho assumption
| that neither Gen. IIalleck, Cen. Grant. nnr tne
giVlsi IN Wmanlefs IN the hcid beyond PITTS
! burg Lending had the remutest xpcctntion thet
| the ca my would advance ~ III nc from
| Cntlnih win Iul stlpn-th. Cen. " lIccN pro-
pos 70 commend the unite armies In their
| advance upon Corinth, and { lie was MT to
itdv' iiH hr.uqu rters 1T 81. l. uis, tiu. until
! the ith On the 9th Gen. Sherm w. though not
| the senior div sion commander, yet Virtu ~ so
| from the confidence reposad in him nv Dim.
| CT MT. telCgraplod to the latter: " An Il quirt
| along NV lines now the enemy has cavalry I'm
our front, and think there IRE two reqilucnts
and one battery six miles out" Again " have
| no q nit that nothing will occur to-day more
| than some picket Gdng. The enemy Is siucy,
| picss our pokets Tar. will not De drawn out
| lar. unless with the certainty of advantage, and
| do not pfenend whining Ike an attack upDn
our pneition" Gcn, Grant t-lecrnphed the same
| day us follows; 49, The main force of the enemy
| Is a. COrinth. with trOous at different points
| st. " rho nunber Of men Mt Corlnth, nd
| within supporting distance of IL, caunot be far
| from 5000 men some skrni hing took place
duv and TIE dav before" II have scarcely the
| faintest idea OF an attack General one) being
Hcb pna h p nla W. 9G pt nireI, sn3Tin
! tention to send tnem Oiuelts three foremost
| divisions 10 Hamburg, some iOur miles above
| IittspurE, when thcv all get here.
| IL has been 81 lined. and duuutless with truth.
| that ihe position Of Gen. Grants army before
/
on - suTiaye was br9ken' and II was Banked
! on right aud left bycrccks that ia great meas
! uie, Ion babe turning movements. Hut the loca-
non 81 The several divisions on the G'ld did not
| ia icate the expectation If Il defensive battle
more clearly tnan did the uitcIances Of tho co II
manders
After giving tho positions Of tho various
divisions, he adds:
these divisions had thus their camps mainly
| on the roads leading toward the enciny's posi-
| tpn ~ Curiuth. They were widely scDdr4 ed
f4 tals f.fIt
| mat u was possible To form quicklv a connected
| defensive line they mad no defences ana no
| sudden attack. and there was no general ON the
n,id to take by special authority, the command
OF The whole force In AN emergency.
While the national army was unprepared for
! battle, aud uuCxDeUtiut OF such an event, and
was passing tue night Of the 5'h in fancied Sc
| curtY' johnston army of forty thousand men
was ~ close proximity, and ready for the bloody
revelation of IFS presence and purpose On the
ionowlng morning. zen johnston was already
Jay later, Ia attaining position for attack.
| than he had ANTICIPATED, and this loss of day
| had brought the army OF the ohio one days
M ifch nearer to the conjunction with Cen.
| Grant. TO prevent which was tho object OF his
advance. Usually the Indications Of approach
ing battle arc so palD lble that the men in the
| ranks "a well a. Officers OF all grades, fOresee
| tic deadly struggle, and nerve themselves TO
meet II. Bur IN this case the nearness Of the
enemy In force was not known In the national
army, and there was no special preparation for
the conflict.
| Early IN the morning OF the Oh 81 April. 1862,
sabbath day OF unusual brightness, cannon
was distinctly beard at Savannah. Gen. Grant
supposed thlt II Indicated an attack upon his
most advanced POSITIONS and not waiting to
meet Gen. Buell. IA he had appointed, and not
leaving any Instructions suggestions for his
guidance In moving his army 10 the FIELD, or
even expressing desire that he should give
him support, he gave an order TO Gen. Nelson to
march his division up To Pttsburg Land ug, and
taxing steamer, hastened toward the noise Of
battle. lie did. however advise Gen. Buell., by
note that AN attack had been mode, whose oc-
currencc he had not anticipated before Monday
us
he had contemplated, and mentioned the fact
that he had oruered Gen. Nelson 20 move with
bis division to opposite Pittsburg Landing"
The omission to request him to take any
other divisions TO the Held, or even TO hasten
their march To savannah. must be accept
ed as conclusion that Gen. Grant did
not at the time anticipate such a
battle as would require the assistance OF other
portions 81 the Army " the OAio. Gen Buell.
was thus LEFT free to m maze his army; but be-
ing WITHOUT any kn9Wlcd2e OF roads aud hav-
ing no steamers for his troops he could do little.
except 10 despatch orders TO the rear to hasten
Toward his nearest Observation-Disclosures aud
McCnOk's. As the day wore on. the noise from
the front more and more plainly indicated tn I
general engagement was progressing. aud Zen.
II ell. to learn the tue condition OF Affairs and
procure transportation fOr his forces, ezed a
sequcntly received a note from Gen G rant. id-
dressed 10 the commanding officer. dvlnce
forces. near PttsbuIg. tennessee" advising him
that Ills forces had been engaged since early
AT hundred Thousand men. and that the intro
ducton 81 fresh troops upon the field would
Hastily grouping the main incidents OF the
first days lighting he sums up the result:
The Army Of the Tennessee had fought at
great disadvantage from the fact that Il had
been attacked before il could be well formed.
and the Isolated divisions and bricades had
been well enyelOped before support could he
rendered. Bus though roughly ndled bv the
enemy, barring the immense number of fugi-
tlv' :. f. had fought WITH great rallantry End
persistence. At the close OF the day, with
thinned ranks and broken oreanlzatious IA held
"A mi
had been placed the heavy guns intended for
offensive purpose but al last essential To de-
fence. Gen. sherman said, officially of his COM
uahd, that 1T had become Of mixed characte r."
His central brlgddes had been attacked very
early "a the morning, and though other troops in
the advanced positions had become vigorously
engaged II was not until about a. II. that he
"became satisfied for the first time that the enc.
my designed a determined attack on the whole
camp. The divisions were buried to the front,
ana throughout a day Of hardest lighting all the
divisions had been driven back from point to
point. and all had been shattered. Nearly all OF
Prentlss division, not lied or wounded, had
mortally wounded, aud his division had become
fragmentary. The divisions Of McCiernand and
Hurlbut had maintained greater commencement
nut had lost heavily. But the last line OF the
Army Of the Tennessee before Pittsburg Land
ing was demonstration of the unaecom plished
purpose OF the enemy.
Each army was yet hopeful OF final victory
The success OF the enemy warranted the hope
OF further advantage, and lie had not heard of
the presence Of potion of Buells army on the
Yield, ana the proximity Of such other portions
a, Npuiu hii tue morrow change essentially the
conditions OF the conflict.
The seconds days battle Is described with
great care and detail, particularly such parts OF
u AZ we're fought by Buel's forces. We shall
not follow the story, as the general result is
well known, and there has never been any sefi-
ous controversy as to the part taken by tue two
armies The authors reflect ons aud views are
expressed In the following passages
Tho battle of shiloh, Vie we'd In reference to
the antcrcdent plans aud m uvemt MS which y o.
duccd ~, The strength and losses Of tue armies
engaged, and the persistent ughting Of each,
both Whci flushed with success and hopeless Of
victory. must he regarded as one of vast results
as afectng the general struggle, also, IA one
unique in type as regards suu.e AT least Of its
prominent features.
The position Of the Army Of the Tennessee on
the west bank Of the Tennessee river awaiting
the coming of the Army of the ohio. for COOP
Grafton in offence against the concentrated
forces or tho enemy in position In proximity,
certainly invtied the attack. The invitation was
cess. Gen. Johnston did indeed intend TO de-
liver battle on the 9th; hut the fac. itat ne dfl
not, or could not as he had Planned. proves that
his forecast was 1t FAULT. Gen. Grant did not
anticipate battle before Gen. Buell. could ION
him, especially after he was known 10 he near
and Gen. Johnston deferred his advance until il
was possible for buell. to participate, although
no also knew That he was I'm motion To q com