The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1875-05-29

rom the very corps tnat he asserts was sioN''
ana unenterprising. do not propose to attempt
the defence OF General sherman's army against
the charge made by its commander. with that
have nothing 70 DO; out as we had driven brave
ana we'll commanded FOE through a noun ainous
country Tor over one hundred miles ana rom
one entrenched position AFTER another, II
seemed TO us that our morale was not 50
badly impaired that an unsuccessful ana
bloody assault was necessary to restore 10. twas
the first decided repuse we had encountered, and
for the first time IN the campaign the troops we're
depressed. and with that keen intelligence with
which they so often searched the armor OF those
high in command they felt and said thst the nank
movement made after the assault could Just as
easily and safely have been made before It. It
was TOO. rumored and generally believed that
General Thomas had protested against it; that he
had, by his protests, prevented sherman rom
dashlng the Army or the Cumberland 10 pieces
against the position OF Rocky Face Rfge and
Buzzard's Roost early in the campaign, ana !
know that it was the general BELIEF that "Old
Pop had been the salvation OF the army. AS
before stated. have been unable 10 find General
Sherman's o1icial report OF this assault and the
reasons for it in his Memoirs" ana surely his
fame viii rest on a nrmer basis in consequence
or ts not being there.
This same corps. or a portion or 1t, fought side
BY side with HOOKER at Beecn-tree Greek, where
for over an hour Hood attacked with vgor and
vehemence mat showed marked contrast 70 the
cautious but successful policy OF MS predecessor,
and although the action was one OF the most I'M
portant OF the campaign II does not appear 70
have impressed General Sherman at all, as he
scarcely mentions It, Upon the assignment OF
General Davis TO the command or the corps GEN.
eral Sherman does indeed appear 70 have changed
bis opinion oft, bur while am second 10 no one
General Davis, the officers and men OF his COM
mand were not conscious or any great change IN
their morale or their ability 10 move promptly
and fight vigorously. At JonesDoro' the corps
made, SO lar as know, the only successful assault
OF the campaign. fairly running over the
enemy's works, capturing Govan's brigade ana
ten guns. From Atlanta TO the sea 1t was not
whit behind It's comrades, and on the march
through the Caroinas 1t formed generally the
left or exposed nank. ana w0s sharply attacked az
Bentonville by johnston, where it fully NAM
tanned It's reputation and fought the last battle in
which the army was engaged.
When the Fourteenth corps started on the At
lanta campaign IL numbered, present for duty,
10 6S7 officers and men. During the month Of May
it lost In killed, wounded and missing, so2; during
June 1s1e and during July, LOLA total Of 4,O22.
This included substantially the time wnen II was
commanded by General Palmer and up 10 the
period when IL ceased being "slow" and
"unenterprislng.n Simply for the purposes or
comparison, and dsclaiming all intention
to glorify the Fourteenth at the expense OF any
other corps, / give The present for duty and
losses for the same period OF the Fifteenth corps,
the one fashioned by General Sherman himself,
and a BODY OF men who, on every field nom
Shiloh TO Atlanta, were never found deficient. on
the 10Th OF April the Fifteenth corps numbered
49, s69 officers and men present for duty. IL lost
during the month or May 74e killed, wounded and
missing; during June 500, and during July LISA
total OF 2 999. These figures are taken from Gen.
eral Sherman's own book. and while they show that
the Fourteenth corps was numerically 1000 men
stronger than the Fifteenth he losses OF the
former were excess or the latter over 1000 OH
GERS and men. The disproporion was stll greater
during the months OF August and September, for
we nnd thai the Fourteenth corps lost 2,253 ON
GERS and men. while the Fifteenth lost but 573.
Tne natural and proper historian Of the Four
teenth corps sleeps quietly in the cemetery al
Troy, but were George H. Thomas alive we would
doubtless have different version OF the part II
bore IN the Atlanta campaign.
have writer the so0ve very imperfect defence
OF the Fourteenth corps TO but poor purpose II
anything has been said that could be construed
into a glorincaton or that corps a. the expense OF
any or the Others. Such, certainly, was not my
inten ion. There were no petty Jealousles among
us and we or the Fourteenth reloiced at the sue
cess and gloried in the proves OF the Fifteenth,
Seventeenth Twentieth, Fourth ana Twenty
third equally with our own. So far as / am
aware there was claim Of pre-emI-
nence no assumption or superiority, no belief
tnat was slower than the otner,
or that one was better qualified for offensive or
aggressive movements. General Sherman Is alone
responsible for this assertion, and suppose that
ike mis- assault at Kenesaw, he Is willing TO
assume It. With the exception or one or the
corps the men were all from the west, and Il vas
no unusual thing 10 mud regiments from the same
county and Congressional district different
corps. There was the utmost goodfellowshlp and
kindness among US; 50 strong, indeed, that even
the Memoirs cannot anect IT, and | am greatly
mistaken II toe gallant fellows 81 the other corps
will not learn with surprise at tnls late daY that
their brothers and comrades OF the Fourteenth
corps we're 'slowr and 'unenterprisIngr ana
that Pap Thomas "was slow In mind and
action" an. Sir. your oDedlent servant
AN OLD PoURrEENTH CORPS MAN.
NEW YORK, May 20, 1875.
WHO PLANNED THE MARCH TO THE sEA?-oEy-
ERAL GRANT AND THE CAMPAIGNS N eEoRoIA
TO THE EDITOR or THE HERALD
The publication Dy General sherman OF his MIS-
tory or the war OF the rebellion will not be likely,
in my opinion. to provoke any answer from Gen
eraI Grant IL Is one OF Grants pecull arlties-a
PECULIARLY that his friends have always regret
duct draw rom him contradiction or explana-
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