Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1875-05-27

true, but hat lies in the nature Of the
subject and not in the fact that there is
more than one embraced.
That the subject is broad constitutes
no objection to the act. Cooley's Con-
stitutional Limitations, IA.
The validity Of a similar mode OF or
ganizing and regulating municipal cor
poratiOns has been more than once sus-
tanned in Ohio, whose Constitution has
a clause similar to our swn on this sub
ject. u Ohio, st. l24; Is Ohio, st. IS.
The latter case also answer the OBJ
lection that the act, after section 30, is
special legislation, and Objectionable on
that ground; that the city Of Memphis is
the only one in the State having the
population to come within its provisions,
and that it would have been as well to
legislate for Memphis by name as by de-
scription, TO which Memphis alone an
swers. The case in Is Ohio statutes in
volved the validity of an act authorizing
cities Of the first class containing over
$50, 900 inhabitants to appropriate ten
million dollars to building q certain rail-
road, The act could apply TO no city
but Cincinnati. Its validity was sus-
tanned throughout,
Both that case and this seem ia me to
demonstrate the folly of applying to mu-
nicipai corporations that clause of the
Constitution declaring that their powers
shall not be granted or enlarged by spe-
cial law. 1t was not the object to reach
the mere form OF the enactment, but its
substance. Local laws, to be sensible,
must 10 most cases, be special in one
sense. And for this reason they have
never been held within that general
clause Of the Constition. which forbids
special legislation or the suspension of
general laws for special objects.
/ think upon all points that there is no
constitutional objection to the charter.
Ii is next insisted for complainant
that ~eonceding the eonstitutionality of
the new charter, it did not authorize the
election OF a Board Of Fire and Police
Commissioners by the present General
Council.
1t is difficult to state briefly the
grounds OF the argument on this point,
except TO say that it is urged for com
plsinsnt that the new charter, In section
"a, provides for the election Of q Mayor
and General Council in January, 1876,
aud that the intent of the set, gathered
from its general scope and spirit was
that the entire new order of things
should be inaugurated OF the same time;
that in the meantime matters should re-
main in statu quo.
There is certainly force in the argu-
meut on this point, but / think the posi-
ton is not tenable. 1t is one of the old
est rules for the construction of statutes
that whilst the courts will look TO and
enforce the spirit and general intent of
an act, it will only act upon well founded
grounds of inference, drawn from the act
itself, OF from other acts, in pafi materia;
it will not adhere blindly to literalisms,
against the manifest intent Of the Legis-
%lature; and on the other hand, it will not
override a plain enactment, upoA vague
inference, or for reasons directed only
against the wisdom or convenience Of
the law.
By the last section of the act it is put
IN force at once.
By section IA it is provided that the
present Mayor and General Council shall
remain in Office until their successors
are elected and qualified by the election
in January. Clearly they remain in
Office, as officers under the nep charter;
their designation under the new is the
same as under the old charter. Until
the election in January, therefore, the
present General Council is constituted
the General Council provided by the new
charter, and therefore has all the powers
therein conferred upon the General
Council.
By section 40 it is enacted that the
General Council shall elect FIVE citizens
Il be known as the Police and Fire Com
%missioners, etc. No time OF election is
prescribed.
We have then a General Council or
ganized and in Office under the new
charter, limited by all the restrictions
imposed on the General Council, but
also with all the powers and obligations
there imposed. Their duty to elect the
Board Of Police and Fire Commission
ers cannot be successfully disputed, and
Of course that Board, when elected, had
all the power and control over the police
and FIRE departments, and the members
thereof (including the right OF removal)
provided by the new charter.
The proposition that the present Gen
eral Council had the right to elect this
Board is much stronghold by the fact
that section 80 enacts that the General
Council first elected" under the act
should lay of the city into wards, etc.
Where the intent was to confer a power
only upon the Council to be elected in
January, it is 50 expressed.
These propositions also dispose OF
compliments fourth ground Of objec.
ton to a removal from Office.
The third ground is, that by section 81
Of the act the old ordinances are kept in
force until repealed or changed; that
complainant held Office under them. and
that, by their provisions, he could not be
removed but for cause, and by a two
thirds vote Of the General Council.
There are two entirely sufficient an
swers to this objection. The first ia, that
the ordinance under which complainant
holds is repealed by the ordinance passed
May 3, 1875, establishing the Board of
Police and Fire Commissioners; and sec.
ond, that the old ordinances in reference
to the police aud FIRE departments must
be considered as excepted from the
clause Of the act keeping the then ordi-
nances in force, inasmuch as those ordi-
nances were in conflict with the new act