The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1875-10-01

was Allut HO COuGl snail llCCllSp I'M OF luN-
ern which shall not be necessary to accommo-
date the public and entertain strangers and
travellers"
In 1896 law was passed specially providing
a mode of procedure to obtain license. BY it
the courts were required to fix time, by rule
or standing order, at which applications for
licenses shall be heard, at which time all persons
applying or making objections to applications
might be heard, by evidence, petition, remon-
STRANGE or counsel
The act of Goth April 1885, requires the Court
to hear evidence other than that presented by
the applicant, and to grant or refuse the license
| in accordance with the evidence.
In 1853 another act was passed providing for
a full hearing Of the applicant, and of those who
| might demonstrate and declaring it lawful for
the Court to refuse the license when in its opin-
ion the hotel or tavern in question was not nee
essary for the accommodation of the public and
the entertainment Of strangers and travellers.
BY proviso TO this act the exercise of discre
ton as to the necessity of inns and taverns is
confined to that given by the act Of March,
1884
Again, on the 22d March, 1867, the Courts
are authorized to hear petitions and remon-
strances and to refuse the license whenever in
the opinion of the Court it is not necessary for
the accommodation of the public and the en-
| tertainment Of strangers and travellers.
The act Of 1872, known as the Local Option
law, did not repeal any previous law; it merely
| suappnInI tba &C tb, Ia f,r
the time being, in the counties which voted "no
license" When that law was repealed by the
first section of the act of 18th April, 1915, the
former laws were again called into active opera
| tion in the no license counties, and were then
the rule throughout the State unless they were
repealed by other portions of this act.
In delivering the opinion of the Supreme
Court in Schlaudecker vs.. Marshall o. p +.
Smith 2O3 Agnew j. after stating the several
acts of Assembly on the subject of license says;
'No subject has been productive of more differ
once of opinion and practice than this in the
different judicial districts in the State. Some
judges holding it to be obligatory on the court
to grant every license where the applicant has
brought himself within the provisions of the
law as to the terms of his application and others
holding That they are not bound to grant any Ii
censes whatsoever. Clearly neither opinion i.
right; the discretion which the courts exercise
being sound discretion upon the circumstances
Of each case as it is presented to the Court, and
not general opinion upon the propriety or i'm
p.opriety Of granting licenses"
lie cites the several acts of assembly from
1891 down to 1872 and from them deducts the
conclusion that "it is the duty of the court to
hear and determine each case on its evidence
and facts to ascertain the fitness Of the appli-
cant and the necessity of the house for the pub
lie accommodation" To be rightful judgment
it must he exercised in the particular case and
upon the facts and circumstances before the
court after they have been heard and duly con-
sdered.
1t is noticeable that the new law, except in
regard to the amount Of the license fee and the
amount and condition Of the bonds required of
applicants, makes no mention of single rcqui-
site necessary to the obtaining of a license. As
to the citizenship of the applicant-the filing
and publication and contents of the petition
the certificate of character, and the action to be
taken by the Court upon petition, remonstran-
ce5 and evidence presented and also in regard
to transfers and revocatons of licences, it is 81
lent. Unless, therefore, the former laws upon
these subjects remain in force, there is nothing
| to guide the practice of the Court, or govern its
decisions upon license questions.
1t is well settled rule, that statute can be
| repealed only by express provision of subse-
quent law or by necessary implication; and this
can only be when there is such repugnancy be-
tween the new law and the old that they can not
stand together. "Wherever," says Black c. j.,
'wo acts can be made to stand together it is the
duty of tho judge to give both of them full cf-
feet; even when they are seemingly repugnant,
they must if possible, have such construction
that one may not repeal the other, unless the
latter one contains negative words or the inten-
ton to repeal is manifest by some Ineligible
form of expression" Brown vs.. County Com
missioncrs 9 Harris 43.
There are no words of repeal in the act Of
1875, except as to the Local Option law. The
natural, if not necessary inference therefore is,
that the Legislature intended it to be auxiliary
to, and in aid of the purpose of the old law In
stead OF eyincing any intention to limit or di-
minish the powers and discretion of the Court
based upon evidence, as conferred by former
laws it expressly re-enacts in the same words So
much of the act of 1856 As requires "the Courts
to fix by rule or standing order time at which
application for Licenses shall be heard at which
time all persons applying or making objections
to applications for license may be heard by evi
dence, petitions, remonstrances or COUNSEL Tho
hearing thus required was not designed to be
mere idle ceremony Its purpose is fully eX
plained by the acts of 1858 and 1867. 1t is mad'
thereby to extend, not only to the fitness of th'
applicant, but the Court is required to refuse the
license if in its opinion the necessities OF th
f public and the entertainment of strangers o
: travellers do not require public house to b.
kept at the point designated If the Legislature
| had intended that the character of objections t
c A license, should not be as broad and compre
u hensiye rs before allowed, it surely would il
= some way have, at least intmaed such inten
. tcntion by appropriate words, In the absenc
y Oh Il clearly SNllNHaVu VI i'hP''V" '"'N'''''"
abrogate the laws which have for forty year
, authorized the Courts to hear and pass upo
G each application according to its meritS hol
e that no such intention existed.
3 1t does not, in my judgment follow, that an
: restriction or Limitation of the powers or dutit
of the Court was intended by the increase of tn
q license fee,
- On the contrary it is manifest that the Leg
lature intended, by continuing the powers an
duties of the Courts as heretofore, by increasin
the license fec and the amount Of bonds, and b
a, adding heavier penalties for violations of IL
!, law, and also by imposing further civil liabil
!, ties, to restrain and regulate the sale of liquors
- In the case cited, the present Chief Jusli'
j. holds this language, "Whether any or all !
L. 4 4.