New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1875-02-07

| tice, ON the contrary. is intended to author
ize meaus of defense between or anon,
parties having legal standing prims facii
in the cOarts: "L'except;on ne tendsit pa
q detruire lie droit invoqus par le demaa
deur, nais uniquement y en- paralyzer lee
get, section 297. 1.-THE wife can not appes,
in court against any one without the au
thorlzaoion Of her hus Rnd," etc. This is q
positive prohibition, aud if she can dispense
with the authorization of the husband and
of the court in one case, there is no reason
why sac may not do it in arg. Suppose, then
she sue her husband for divorce, and the
court fail to authorize her to stand
in Judgment. the husband believing
she can not appear in court against any
one without being authorized, permits a
default to be entered up against him, and a
judgment of divorce follows. Would this
be legal divorce! Would it put an end
to the community and affect the rights of
creditors think that considerations of
public policy dictated the necessity for the
incorporation of this Article of the Code of
Practice, and made the wife's ineapacity
absolute. Under it she can not, uader any
circumstances. have a prima facie standing
in court. without beiag authorized a. she
can have no standing whatever. II she
could have prima facie status, then the
doctrine of exceptions in lin,ine would ap-
ply to her, as it does to all such "a the law
permits to stand in Judgment. Her mere
statement, that she is authorized is insult
ficient, as held by the court in LacOur Vs.
Delamere ct al, 2 A., 140. The same point
was decided in the successionOf POmerOy,
q A., SIC. Under the article of the Code Of
Practice she has no greater capacity to sue
independently Of her husband and Of the
court, than to be sued. A Judgment
against her in . proceeding wherein she
had not been Authorized would be null and
could produce no effect; Rils vs.. Hamilton,
Is An, 1872; Washington We. Hackett. lS An.
l46; Champlin vs. Lee, b. A., l4S; White
VS.. Bird, 2Sl; see also article l2l. n. G. c.;
G. r., ll8; tutorship of James Stokes. @.
An, 204; succession of Amanda hatcher,
% An, l36. The same doctrine Is implied
in the case of Mrs. NJ. p. L, Evans ct al. va.
NJ. A. H. G. de rIsle ct al, "a An, aAS;
Somers va. Schmidt, Is An. AZ see also
article 2l5 of the Napoleon Code. which is
in every essential feature Identical! with
our c. c., article 12l Q23). It reads as fol-
lows:
LA femme ne peut pas etre On jugemeut
sans pautorisation de son mari, quand
meme ellie serait marehands publique. GU
non commune, GU separee de biens." Mar
cade says. section 72S, in commenting on
consequence de la commission que Ia femme
dOit son epoux, c'est pincapacite pour
celle-ci de proceder en- general, q aucun
acte civil sans Fassehtiment de son epoux.
Cette inospacite est applique par Ia loi
d'abord, dams les articles suivants. aux
cOntrats que Ia femme peut avoir q passer.
Ainsi, dabord. Ia femme ne peut, sans Pau
tOrisatiOn maritale. etre en- jugement, stare
in .jsst3ieio, c'est . dire SO presenter devant
~I-
manderesse, sOit comme defenderesse. Nous
dieons pour plaider, car sill s'agissait de
comparative CONNIE tem0in, le Commencement
du mari ne serait pas necessaire; ma;s des
que Ia femme est On cause cOmme partie en-
process, GU CONNIE interessee au iugement
Intervene, raut0risatiOn maritale est in
dispensable, sauf Ia seule exception indi-
quee par le second de nos articles
This second article reads as follows:
az autorisation du mari nest pas neces.
saire lorsque la femme est poursaivie en-
matiere criminelle GU de police, y, and. con.
sequently. has nothing to do Wish article
2l5. Toullier, volume one, page 1ai, Of the
introduction, gives some reasons why the
wife's incapac'ty is declared to be q matter
of natural law, as we'll az one Of public
policy: "O:, par lie d-oit naturel, CO Que le
marriage permet dempire appartient au
mari plutot qua Ia femme; legalits ny
peut etre absolue: le marriage est tiii6 sociata
entire deux personnes, ct il est done neces.
saire que Pun des deux ait la voix decisive
quand runanimite ne Sc rencontre pas.
II est lie mari lie chef de famille; il dot
TRAVELLER pour clio, la defendre ct la pro.
teger. De la les prerogatives que Ia loi
civile dome un sexe sur Pautre, au mas.
culin sur lie feminin. Files prennen: leur
source non settlement dams la difference
ply sique, mais encore dams I'm instinct
moral qui veut que lie mari soft certain quill
est le pere des enfants de sa femme De
la Went Ia reserve impesee aux
femmes, referees aux SONS purement do.
mestiques, taudis que lie mari veille aux
atfaires du dchOrs, culture, negoce, depense
des biens cOmmuns, etc. DE la il s'ensuit
que la femme ne peut contractor nj d'etre
en- jugement sans fautorisation de son mari,
etc." ellie est frappee dune incapacite
legaIe de contractor TART. 1924 ct d'etre en-
1ugement TART. 2l5) sans lautorisatlon de
son mari" Col. p II par 6lS. "Cette au-
torisation peut etre espresso. on tactic ct
Par $50. "Cette incapacite est
I'm effet de la puissance, CO principe est
suivi avec une telle rigueur, que 81 une pro.
cedure await etc commence pour un autre,
la femme, pendant 4u'elle etait file, il
faudrait, pour la continuer depuis son
marriage, qu'elle tut autorisee dc son mari
author run parallel with the remarks of
Marcade already quoted, and both writers
clearly inculcate the idea already advanced
that the wife's incapacity grows out Of
public policy, aud is therefore absolute,
unless removed by marital Or judicial au
thorization.
If the failure Of .itigants except in
l'n'ine htis authorize the wife to appear in
court, then the laws are nugatory, and
must have effect ouly when parties see
proper not to remain silent; or in other
words. the codes say they can not appear,
and litigants say they can.
Lawsuits. Rays Domat, vol. |, D. 32.
Strahan's translation, are one of the three
sorts Of troubles which disturb the order Of
society. This author Gays women are in.
capable of discharging certain functions
appertaining to men, upon the bare account
Of their sex; p. i'd, l35, see. "a. The hitherto
almost slavish dependence of the wife on
the will and caprice Of the husband, her
AFFECT subsection to the fluctuations of his
fortunes, and heiplessness from the absolute
ruin lie might bring her in, have been
ameliorated to some extent by the enact
nent of homestead, exemption laws,
out her lncapacity to appear in court
remains precisely what it has been
tor nearly century OF years.
feel great relectuance in differing in opin-
ION from some of the decisions Of the Su-
preme Court of this State, but feel con-
strained to do so by my deliberate
of what the texts Of the laws
prescribe, and by quite number of the
decisions of that learned tribunal itself
That they are at variaoce in several cases
will not be disputed, and that those con-
,rar;eties have sprung from q confusion of
he rules relating to ordinary exceptions
Y hich were intended as mere means OF
lefensa, afforded for the benefit Of litigants,
With the behests of prohibitory laws adopted
% subserve public policy, seem to roe
,qually clear.
First District Court.
SENTENCED