The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1875-11-06

strongly opposed by the natives and foreign popu-
laiioh. (other than American. y and, though urged
by the King. seems % have been consented 70 as q
kind Of last choice between utter agricultural and
commercial prostFation. and a reciprocity which
they felt tends 10 their ultimate absorption
IL is supposed any attempt At ~parehase wonld
have been thwarted by other Powers They could
offer H5OHeg-as much as the United States. So far
they stood with US on equal ground. and could
with our bids have bid higher; bat they could not
offer reciprocity. A reciprocity between England
or France and the Sandwich Islands would have
been of less benefit TO the Islands than q similar
Interchange with the United States. by the entire
difference Of the Gust of transporting their raw ma
terial to Europe instead Of 10 San Francisco. The
Islands gain by reciprocity with the United States
could gain by reciprocity with England or France.
Mr.. Seward knew where be had the advantage,
aud has taken this course.
I. How far will this treaty tend immediately Ia
convert the Islands into a defence. and assurance
of American miner on the Pacfdct Ii will
naturally promote our intercourse with their pop
ulatiOn. and from that intimacy, combined with
identity Of interests, pursuits and profit. American
influence must increase in the native mind. The
spirit OF enterprise in our people and their close
proximity will induce Americans citizens promptly
to move on to the fields of commercial profit on
the Islands which the treaty opens. Other nation
ailtles move more slowly, are more distant, and
will have less faith in the permanenee OF the union
between the Islands aud main-will, in fact, be
bebind-hand in occupying the ground. The treaty
practically will give q monopoly of the increased
mme and agriculture of the Islands 10 Amer
lean citizens. It's operation viii be that by de-
grees. the native chiefs will sell their lands to the
newcomers, and the real property Of the Islands
pass by purchase. piecemeal, into American hands;
SO that, in all probability, at the expiration of this
treaty 1t will be difficult to say whether the people
viii be Americans in Hawaii, or Hawaiian in
America.
Americans in the Islands would cause a hostile
power to pause before attempting to make them a
naval rendezvous, while the treaty itself will con-
fer upon this Government almost the right-at
least 81 VPFV stFnnO nrpfaYf--f0 arrest nv force
such. occupation should it at any time be attempted.
8. But, ultimately, at the expiration OF the
treaty, what probably will be its effect? 1t is not
unlikely that from twenty to thirty thousand
Americans will be found busy on the Islands,
digging, planting, building, trading, fishing, thirty
ing themselves, and causing thrift in the country.
Already eight-tenths OF the skilled industry of the
capital of these Islands belong to Americans, and
of the twenty-six plantations producing over one
hundred tons OF sugar yearly, twenty are now in
American hands. OF one hundred and four COM
mercial firms in the Islands (Which includes all of
note) ninety are either wholly or partly American.
The material interests, the fortunes, the daily
bread, the accumulated saving of this pushing,
working, intelligent crowd will. at the expiration
OF the treaty, be absolutely dependent on its con-
iinuance. To deprive them, then of reciprocity.
will be to turn their property from a benefit to a
burden, their profits to losses, their industry to
waste, themselves to bankrupts. And more than
this. The revenues of the Government from in
ternal taxation. which by that time will have in
creased, and with that increase its expenditures
also, will be imperilled. 1t is more than probable
that the active influence of the resident Americans,
and the danger OF exasperating them on the one
hand, with the prospective arrangement of the
island revenue on the other, will be sufficient to
induce the royal family and its adherents to yield
to the logic of events and resign gracefully a
position which they cannot maintain with comfort
and honor. -.
The natural finish will be the peaceful ~incorpo-
ration of the Islands into the American Republic,
in order to secure in perpetuity the profits and
property created by reciprocity. -.s
9. Let us next consider the probable profit and
loss to this Coast and the rest OF the United States
in a pecuniary sense resulting from this treaty.
So far as this Coast is concerned, il is impossible
to find any item of loss which will accrue to its
States or Territories. The Reciprocity Treaty ad-
mits into the Sandwich Islands, free of duty, our
lumber, our manufacturers of almost every kind,
our food crops--in fact, everything that we can,
probably to ourselves, export. It's effect is to
make US their bankers. their manufactured, their
carriers ca. nn, and !, generally their agents and these,
ness, but for the prospective Increase under the
treaty. For instance, suppose q sugar plantation
should be started at the Islands. Nearly two
thirds of the total investment will be for machin-
cry, buildings, fence, agricultural implements and
supplies of breadstufs and clothing. These will
come from here almost wholly The loss TO the
United states reveRue IS only in q very small
measure, perhaps one f~orty-ffth of the whole,
borne by us. So far as we on this Coast are con-
cerned, we can but modestly concur, happy that
our position here enables us to catch without cost
or effort the lions share of the benefits of a meas
ure of national policy. Es.fa
The profit and loss to the United States is an en-
tirely different question, and no doubt it has been,
and will be, well counted by the Cabinet and the
Senate. Immediately the treaty looks one-sided
enough. The Hawaiians abolish duties on Amer
can products which last year yielded to them some
S64 O0O, while our Government admits duty free
Hawaiian raw staples on which last year it col
lected about $3.50, 900.
During the seven years of the treaty, in all pro-
liability, this difference Of apparent loss will be
largely increased. The main item from which the
revenueioss will arise is sugar. The Hawaiian
Advertiser, in its yearly resume, in the
spring Of 1866. places the entire amount of grazing
and tillable land In all the Islands at 500, 900
acres, and the amount of land suitable for sugar
cane culture at loo, 900 acres. This may be taken
as an extreme statement, as the writer's object
was TO make the showing IS imposing as
There are at present twenty six sugar planta-
tons estimated to produce from 100 to 1000 tons
the aggregate. about is, 900 acres of land, and they
actually exported TO all quarters, last year,
eighteen millions pounds of sugar. AT the ratio
Of land to sugar, the entire 100, 900 acres suitable
for sugar farming would be capable Of producing
a crop of 100 millions pounds OF sugar or $4,000
net tons. But in wild countries, sugar plantations
develop slowly. 1t will be fair work ii in three
years after tne treaty any new plantation gets
han half the lands adapted for sugar culture will
during the early years be even attempted. A fair
export of sugar under the treaty may be
aiken to be the mean of the actual export of last
rear. and rs, 200 tons the estimated export of the
seventh year, or II 600 net tons yearly.
If this treaty will secure the objects Secretary
has in view, the loss to the revenue is q
matter. How much would it cost to guard
coast such as ours, and a commerce such as that
If the Pacific with a foe entrenched ct the Islands,
n comparison with the same service when no hos
lie feet has a harbor depot, or station on the Pa
life? For every sailor and marine afcat in these
waters the disbursement, all told. for ships, guns,
uel, arsenals, and the numerous requisites of the
ervice, amounts to $4,000 per man per annum
or a single tlOusand men 50 O60 O00 . for ten
thousand men. $50, 900, 600 yearly. The result of
his treaty, in all human probability, will be to
to the United States, in defensive ornaments
lone. three times as much as the revenue loss.
10. But who will gain this supposed loss ? In the
place, consumers in the United States will
Iirectly gain a portion in the reduced price of the
tempted articles, probably at least one-fourth of
he Government loss, leaving three-quarters to
nnre The benefit of the nannle of the Sandwich