, 1875-10-16


guard. Whether the Government will
have the courage to infict an exemplary
punishment on the warrior priest, or even
upon Don Carlos himself, should they
catch him, is more than doubtful. But
until some severe chastisement falls upon
a selfish pretender and his sacerdotal allies,
the tranquility of at least two so called
Latin nations will continue to be in con-
slant peril from their ambition and fanati~
cisn.
On the main theatre of warfare no es.
sential change has recently occurred.
Don Carlos, like Hadji Stavros, is King
of the Mountain, but bis followers only
quit that shelter to meet with defeat, or
at least Illustration. 1t has long since been
correctly observed that no crown can be
won by sitting on the hills, and that until
he could cross the Ebro, the Bourbon
pretender hal no chance of success. That
he has kept a realm at bay for so many
years is creditabIe to his hardy Generals
and brave soldiery, but it is absurd to sup
pose, no matter how obstinate and coura-
geous the Basques and Navarrese may be,
that insuperable military difficulties pro-
tect them from subiugation. Nothing is
more deceptive than the supposed strength
of mountain positions, and few scenes of
combat really offer greater opportunities
to o skiIful a~ssailant. Who can doubt that
a Soult or a Suchet, a Won Werder or Won
Manteuffel, an OchterIoney or a Pallock,
with fifty or sixty thousand good troops,
would have long ago tumbled Don Carlos
into France or the Bay of Biscay, if they
did not briug him to the block. Despite
the indisputabIe excellence of the Carlist
battaIIions, they could not have stood
against welI-pIanned and steadily executed
mannuVres, But since Concha fell, the
Spanish Generals have been able to do
nothing save march and countermarch,
repel toragers or raiders, and relieve the
threatened towns in the debateable land.
Now, we presume, the Ebro army will be
reinforced from Catalonia, and a fresh effort
will be directed against the hills. But the
main reliance of Alfonso's councillors will
probably be upon that species of capitula-
ton styled a i" conyenio, upon the dis
couragcment produced by f~ruitless warfare
upon jealousies and quarrels in the CarIist
camp, upon the somewhat violent and inn
pulsive character of Carlos himself. Ru4
mours Of dist migration have long foated
in the air we are told of generals
dismissed or superseded, and even
the organs Of the Roman Ultramontanes
sound forth %counsels Of despair. Probably
if the Madrid authorities would guarantee
the famous, much-cherished Fueros, offer a
real amnesty to the soldiers and honourable
terms to the officers, the base of the
rebellion would be undermined, and the
Pretender would be compelled to fly in
order to save himself from the falling ruins.
But we have not yet reached that pass.
The allies of Carlos in Europe still supply
him with arms and munition, and ex-
p%erience as old as the Peninsular war shows
how arduous is the task of preventing
hardy and shifty sea-dogs from landing car
goes on the coast between the Bidassoa and
the Bilbao rivers. The English Admiralty
could not, or at least did not, do it in
1914. The Spanish steamers, however,
would be better employed in blockading
than bombarding, and more activity and
seamanship might be shown than is now
exhibited. But the Navy will not terminate
war, nor will its shortcomings materially
defer the end. If the nation is to conquer
by next spring, the work will have to be
accomplished by a stiff combustion of
diplomacy and fighting ashore, and the
signs now visible on. all sides point to
such a desirable result. ~