, 1875-12-15

VI uCl NCuCldiS'
This question Biackw00d undertakes to
answer in it's number of the present month.
The French War Preparations of 1870"
is the title of an article which, though it
will not excite so much interest aud con-
t~roversy as that of August last, is Il very
usefulhistoric summary, and treats OF mat
tiers which have an.important bearing on the
present. The writer undertakes to show
from the volumiuous memoirs, reports,
accusations, and apologies which have
been published since the war, as we'll as
from the evidence given at the numerous
military inquiries, that the fate Of France
was not decided by any transcendent act OF
strategy on the part OF the enemy, nor by
any sudden blindness or error on the part
of a French Commander. France went
into the conflict already doomed. She had
neither the men, the material, nor the Or
ganization to make head against the Ger
mans. The French Army was overwhelm-
ed by superior forces. If it had been a
prodigy of equipment and discipline, it
could hardly have prevailed against such
odds but to the disadvantage OF numerical
weakness it added almost every defect
under which a military force can labour.
Artillery and horses, rifles and ammunition,
food and clothing, all were wanting We
cannot say how far the writer is correct
in those statements which are his own
conclusion from a variety of testimony;
but the greater part of what he says is
indubitable fact, established before French
tribunals and admitted by those whom it
most iniuriously affects. In the opinion OF
the writer; tire weak points of the French
Army had been known for years to the
more intelligent officers, but this know
ledge did not avail to produce any real
amendment. What the Army was in
1850 that it was in 1870. Maladministra-
ton might allow $4,000 men to die in
the Crimea of disease and privations,
while only 10000 were killed or died of
their wounds ; nearly the same proportions
OF mortality might be reproduced in the
campaign of Lombardy the wounded of
S0lferino might crawl from their beds into
the road to beg for bread !; but so long
as victory crowned the banners of France
the nation was satisfied, and the chiefs
of the Army were willing to look upon
these CHASTITY circumstances as necessary
imperfections in an Army and inevitable
incidents OF a campaign. The time was
to come when the machine which, with
all its defects, had been strong enough to
break down the resistance of Russia or
Austria was to collapse in its turn before
q more vigorous organization. There can
be little doubt that the discipline of the
Empire became more lax year by year,
and that the army which marched towards
the Rhine was not the army of Solferino
or Sebastopol. Many incidents in proof
of this decay will present themselves to
the memory of our readers, but Blackwood
adduces facts which show that the malady
was deeper and more universal than the
s~everest judges of the campaign have
believed. All this, however, was un-
suspected by the nation, and if known
to the chiefs of the Army, it was con-
cealed by men who were courtiers before
they were Generals. The Battle of Sa-
dowa reused the jealousy of France, but
it only presented to the eyes of the
deluded people the vision of new military
glories. Prussia, by her arrogance and
aggressions, was about to bring on herself
a chastisement from the, Army which had
always proved irresistible Plans for a.
more complete, military organization were
presented to the Legislature and sanctioned
in their main principles, but they remained
almost nugatory, since every one was