The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1875-07-25

were born and had always lived-tho Gov
erument of their State. That he was aware
of the illegality of his conduct is evident
frem the many paltry and transparent ex-
cuses he makes to conceal it's true character.
Thus at Nashville he gave orders to seize
ell house, not occupied, and all house rents
| due to absentees, evading an open confisca-
ton of all property belonging to Confede--
| rate soldiers or citizens. But he warned
the people that all who remained would be
considered as having cast in their lot with
the invaders, would be liable tn be called
out in their service, and forced at their peril
to swear allegiance to the Union. and hav-
ing thus driven every honest Sontherner
outside the city, he made their absence an
excuse for robbing them. His troops
systematically stole, pillsged and ravaged;
and, though he professed to discountenance
their conduct, he made not the shadow of
an effort to prevent it. The savage havoc
COMPUTED by Sheridan in the Shenandoah
Valley was excused on the plea that the
enemy might draw supplies thence-a plea
which would justify invaders, Germans in
France or England, or French in Germany
in destroying all food within reach of
their cavalry, and booming millions to
starvation, but which could not excuse
Sheridan in burning houses and furniture
wherever he passt d, or his men in destroy
ing wonen's clothes and forcibly robbiDg
them of their jeweiry. But Sberman's p, o.
ceedipgs were without any plea of military
Advantage. His plea to his own Govern
ment was that he desired to make the rebels
feel the miseries of war, in order to compel
their submission-a plea which puts him
exactly on a level with the worst ruffians
of the Thirty Years. War or with the de-
vastators of the Palatinate.
THE MARCH TO THE SEA.
To Sherman was intrusted the duty of
folio wing up and d stroying the second
army of the South, which, under Joseph
Johnston, was free to move much at it's
pleasure while Grant closed in on the
army of Lee, tethered as it was to Rich
mond and cut of from all reinforcements
except such as the Carolinas and Virginia
herself could furnish from nearly exhaust.
ed population. Both chiefs acted ON the
same principle. Their supply of men was
unlimited if they could kill one Souther-
ner for three of their own soldiers they must
ere long wear ont the Confederate forces.
And both Jared much alike. Grant threw
himself over and over again, upon Lee, and
over and over again was 30 well beaten
that if the Union forces had been only
donble those of the South the spring of
1865 would have eeen another Invasion of
Pennsylvania. Sherman assaiied johnston
somewhat more wisely and warily, but with
equally little honor. But in each case the
beaten army was so overwhelmingly supe.
rior in numbers that it had only to swing
| round part of it's force behind the enemy's
this way Lee was forced back into the lines
of Richmond and Petersburg, and John
ston into those of Atlanta. General Sher-
man pretends that though he had at least
twice as many men as Johnston-and, we
may add, ten times as ample supplies-the
natural and artificial strength of Johnstop's
positions was q full compensation. But the
absurdity of this argument il shown in his
own account of his strategy. He never
succeeded by attacking Johnston's posi-
tions in front, but always by terrifying a
front line against him, holding it with
of his army round Johnston's flank, to an
other position which, if fortified, would
have threatened his communications and
so compelled bis retreat. 1t was simply by
dint of superior numbers that his success
was achieved and it was impossible for
an enemy to make head against such nnm-
bers 30 used. When, after long battling
and delaying his opponent, Johnston reach
ed Atlanta, which he had fortified before
hand, he believed himself able to hold out
Indefinitely, as Wellington at Torres Ve-
dras, against any attacking force. Bat be-
fore his plan was fairly tried President
Davis, who had never appreciated his
genius and had long protested against his
Fabian strategy, removed him in favor of
Hood, a more impetuOus and less skill
full general. Hood threw away the advanS
tages which Johnston had prepared. He
fought, was worsted, and compelled to
abandon Atlanta, the central point of the
Confederate line of defenses and the key of
Georgia. Then, instead of holding his
ground in front of Sherman aud the inva-
ding army, he threw himself across the
communications of the enemy into Tennes-
see. Ap enemy thus attacked may in
genera. be compelled to retire, but Hood
overlooked two material facts. First, the
enemy was able, without weakening Sher
man, to place in Hoods front, and in de-
fence of the line of communication, force
stronger than the Confederate army.
Secondly, Sherman had in front of him an
utterly defenseless country, capable of feed. |
ing his army antil it should reach a new |
base on the sea coast. And this oversight
was tn death blow of the Confederacy-l
perhaps we should rather say the coup de
grace, for there was little real hope tor the
South after the 81 July, 1868.
SOUTHERN VS.. NORTHERN COTTON MILLS A
few days since, says the New York Bulletin, we
published the results of the experiments made
II