The sun. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1833-1916, 1875-09-22

sentiments az the two sections. After n,.,..
son the enemy to9t posi- in far to tho .o,i,s
To gather strength tor decisive orrn.l,o i"n,
to restore prestige t. his arms, and ROOM,
ya5t inr Tie relwn of county, which h. dg.ii'~,s
assist Gen. ~ nsun in the assumpiio, ~ a.,
Offensive m kentucty. Whsn that " %. we
qu rtcrs 10 Coruth. Ira-t's vcinr,
Fort picken-, aud Pollts fore 3 ~ ~ tr'al
M .sissirui river at Columbus. Kout irl., 80
called thl''cr. ana the Governors Of tl,' 80,
81 Ie9ne Sc, Ms isilppi ,Allbovr ~
forces that the speedy concont ai,.,,
vast army might assure success. rwfa1t
advance from the protection Of the ,i.t.... -
and tne 500 M and X eater ono wa. t. -.i,.es
Grant. NOV po- ion r berore pny g91 zen
and in the direction ~ Say lnulh, hrf .rr e,
could be reinforced by Cen IS tell. Per- 40. ~
battle o. the W r was projected vita Nd, ..er
objects than that Of shiio.. The aims wen. ~
crush; first, Grant, then ~ VI, and th,t ssas
the Offensive throughout tho West. a.. ~
magntudo OF the Interests involved dIl -
hni correspondence In The strength ol IT,, -
gathered at COtinth. and the initial uiu,,n,~,
Of tho grand scheme was undcrt ken t,'. 40
To- succeed. To cover M the total failure ofti.
report Of Gcn. Bcauregard. aud an adruit .r.,,,.y
the battle iicii. The Ierdcrs dcci,red tac,. IN
saishe wi N the result. an tho press tn~,rtgt.
out the South EXPRESSED the houeiulnc.s 80 f7,i
triumph which Gen. lcauic gard 81 inti fr
himself aud his defeated army. But lefrs,5
this show of hope th r. must havo heem tas
profoundest disappointment; A hppcle-- deien.
ID
freighted with the rrdndcst autic patcd results
"smoh' buried hopes which had -'ronscr
| foundations than any OF the admitted oAperia.
| ions OF subsequent campaigns ana battles.
| THIS battle was to the enemy not merely another
proof Of what "Mill Spring" and "D1ncison'
| had papably reve The per-irt'uc" aud
| pluck OF the national troons but IL was the mis-
carrlaec Of new mode of RI re, for the qapk
| destruction Of two armies destined fur tlr.
diffusion Of their forces to defend ter
cameo to tue issue Of the battle OF shiboa. 4
grand plan there failed through Inadequate ~.
! sources and comparative fecbleness Of ex,ri.
| ton. Ana failure from either cause. wher- ne
possibilities living beyond initial success YER y
| promising, meant the loss OF tue cause stlet
than that OF n great battle. But the Northern
people, though claiming victory, meas red rs
| suits. IL was victory because II was ntt
| crushing defeat; The Confederate ARM vac
from the field and enter upon prepdrati ltis Tor
battle Oh some. other field. IT did not therci,fs
appear especially decisive. Aud this feet =
coupled with the sadness engendered - trs
| multitude Of the slain, aud the suffering uf rhs
| fr greater multitude Of the wounded was a
| heavy Offset to the joy which the victory prs
| duced.
We shall not attempt to follow the narrative
| through the campaign of Curiuth. nor to dwell
upon the unfortunate results which followed
the dissemination of the great army which had
been collected on that line. The advance aloug
the Memphis and Charleston Railroad toward
Chattanooga. and the ultimate retreat Of Bueu,s
have been repeatedly described. butsby no
one with az much minuteness and care
rs In this work. This retreat eliminated
/ In the battle of Pcrryve, a bloody
| but disjointed aud indecisive action. IN
which Sheridan first appears a. prominent
| figure. 1t was followed by the dismissal OF
Buell. who succeeded by Rosccrans, after
the command had been offered to zen. Thomas,
who modestly declined It.
Gen. Halleck and President Lincoln now con-
Cured In desiring Rosecrans, In assuming the
offensive, to advance directly into Est lenncs-
see ; but the latter properly preferred kssh.t 10
as the objective point for bis operations. AID
moved in that direction, repossessne that ctT
without much opposition, and advancing a. f,r
south As stone River, where a bloody but incc-
| csive battle was fought on the Both aud SIT
| December, 1852, anil the lst and I'd Of Jdhu ~,
1868 The rebel leader finally abandoned she
| neli and Rosecrans followed him as fan ~ Maf-
| freesboro, where he remained IN camp Tor six
months This period OF inactivity was spent In
| pedantic correspondence between Halleck and
| ltosecrans for the particulars Of which We refer
the reader 10 the pages OF this WORK. The army
remained idle during Grants campaign against
vcksburg, but finally assumed the offensive
late In June and reached TullahOma, wh re IL
again halted. Haleck now urged Rose,iau- 70
advance against the enemy south OF the rnbes-
| see river:
But there were difficulties In the way ~ an
early movement, which q u X lsecran- uecuet
| insurmountible. In his Judgment, three luta..-
lions were essential to the successful adyaa.en q
| his army. These we're the repair # the railroad
| 10 the tennessee river. ripe corn IA the trids,
| and support u his Hanks. For the lr-t, he aas
himself responsible; the second depend,G uIoa
| time and favorable weather; aud the ti--!
rested with the military authorities at fst-
ingtun, anu the commanders Of the armies esst
ana west Of him on the line Of the Tennessee
river.
However, on the 5th OF August, In dlsrec nj u
ing his army, Gen. HallecS gave percmlfofy
orders .or its advance. The former. bourttr,
deferred movement until tho middle q tie
month. By this time his preparations we've ctai4-
plete, and the fields promised the lorrl-e itf
which he mad been waiting; but no further a.
surance had been given that he should have sup
porting iofce5 ON right or lett.
Chattanooga was now the objective point. sns
although Rosecrans regarded his forces A. ,yit
inadequate to the undertaking, he soon found
himself In possession OF that important I-ats.
The marches and straiegical combina,lons ~
which this success was gained are given With
great minuteness, aud afford an instnices
and interesting chapter In the history ii re
war. They eliminated In the battle OF Cnicat.
IN uga, which resulted IN the defeat OF N,ss-
Grams and several Of his generals in rson,
though the bulk OF his army under Thomas re-
NAMED steadfost ON the neld, defying the enc
nly's most desperate efforts to drive II back.
The arrival Of Granger and Stecdman at tluOy
juncture enabled the sturdy aud lL,ncbs
thomas not only t. maintain his h'e, un-
broken, but 10 withdraw them unmoe-ted ne
day after the battle into the work. 90 Cbal-
tapooga. The authors account Of Tho events
which took place before, during, and ai'or me
battle Is complete, aud must be 10 lt, 'n-n
satisfactory to both the oii cr- dua i O. eDs
gagged.
\ few weeks after the battle of a.. o.'aaacs
Grant was placed in command ol the uutaY
division OF the Mi s-sppi Ro,ecrtu, ICES re-
lieved, and Thomas was assigned 20 'or ~1ni
The Army OF the Cumberland. Now that "a. 70
desperate straits, he did not seek 90 avoid re
re- possibility. but accepted II chccrfuf, Az
resolved TO mold the town till We stag'o. l-e
author SAYS that the national forccs "fe
uesiegcd, but this IS not correct In,y
pied the works surrounding lie town on no
south side, and its comuuni alton "Itl 'lr
country 10 the southwark Was cat n ~ has
army; bat NO siege operations were undert ikff.'
II D. true thar Rrses sat down M front Of Chatil-
urny1. and fora short time seemed 10 men.