New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1875-01-29
An EPISODE or THE WAR.
REPLY OF W. S. ANDREWS TO GEN. Q. A.
GILMORE.


GILMORE.
FEW INACCURACIES IN THE ARTICLE IN "LoTos
LEAVES" ADMITTED-THE ACCOUNT ESSENTIALLY
CoRRECT-RIvALRY BETWEEN TWO ARMS OF THE
SERVICE ILLUSTRATED BY TIE ATTACK on FORT
SUMTER.
TO the Editor Of The Trlbunt.
SIR In your issue of Jan. IS appeared a
letter from Gen. Q. A. Gilmore, in reference to my
article in Lotos Leaves" entitled "An Episode OF the
War" Owing TO absence 10 the West this letter mas
Just to my notice am forced to ask you to grant
space for my reply.
respect Gen. Gilmore very highly. as am sure must
every man who has served with him. not only for his
great ability but for those genial qualities which always
general officer the afectiOnate regard OF ms
command 1t is with regret that ind myself brought
into controversy with him. lie characterlzes u largo
portion OF the article question sheer fabrication
and fiction OF Mr.. Andre ws's imagination" TINS
I deny ! have neither fabricated nor invented any
thing In attempting to give an account OF an occur
eleven years after il happened should not have
relied, did, solely my memory. That there are
inaccuracies and misssements in that account Gen.
GillmOrcs letter. written, assume, with the aid OF
memoranda convinces me I regret that il IL 80, and
make haste accept such corrections OF fact as he
makes. And l hasten TO offer him my apology and to
whatever there DO Of error in the account
fail to see however, that the inaccuracies of state
ment which guilty affect the main facts regard
Gen. Gilmore and Admiral Dahlgren planned sepa-
raely 10 assault Fort Sumter the same night. An
attempt made to unite the assauing parties under
one command but failed through their inability to
agree a TO whether army or navy officer should
have command; and as they could not unite and rs
neither of the assauIne parties was willing to with
draw in favor of the other precautions were taken 10
avoid collision, and 1t agreed that II one party
should reach the fort first and gain possession, II
TO burn red light as signal Correspondence between
the General and the Admiral regarding these matters
was had by signals Those signals read by the
envy consequence OF which the assault instead Of
beng a surprise, expected and guarded against,
even TO the burning Of the red light by the enemy,
which caused the army party TO turn back. under the
supposiuon that the naval party IN possession OF
the fort. The result serious ana absolutely uu
necessary loss OF life.
These the simple facts as ! have told them. They
the essential features OF the article instead OF
the details aud particulars 10 which Gen Gilmore
fcrs aud he does not aude 10, much less attempt to
deny, them II the assault was made on Fort Sumter
under circums the statement O the fact Is
af cted by mistake 10 the hour 1t which tEe AT
tack was made.
The errors III the account which I admit and ain
GID to have corrected follows The assault did
not take place until several hours after the time
stated. The time when left the flagship, after seeing
Admiral DahgIen, impressed upon my mind 10y the
lection OF the lapse OF time which, rs Gen. Gilmore
points out. must occurred between my return and
the hour Of the assault. What do recoect most dis
tnctly is that Gen. Gilmore ordered to telegraph to
Gen. Stevenson 10 start as soon as possible, and my
recollection that it not then o'clock. had Just
told him that naval boats would not leave the flag
ship uuu O'Clock The impression made upon my mind
that he intended that the army boats should reach
the fort first. That the Admiral had similar iu'en-
ton as TO the naval boats convinced by officer
from the nagship who told the next day that the
Admiral had ordered his boats to get away as soon as
possible, Immediately after had left him There were
at that time humber OF boats towcd astern OF the flag
ship. manned and apparently ready. | have or course
no knowledge intention either OF the General
Admiral simply stated the facts as far as had
knowledge Of them, and drew my own inference from
thcm that each designed 10 take the fort for MN
sc il possible, ana the credit 10 his arm OF the
service. II am wrong IN this, Gen. Gilmore has only
ana his word viii be accepted as conclusive
Tne mere question OF time may be important pre-
sumptve evidence but 1t certainly does not alter the
truth After elegraphng the above order to Gen ste,
vensOn had personal knowledge of what occurred
until heard the filing at the fort and the lapse OF time
was III any way impressed upon my memory; my
recollection was that 1t was very short 1t appears
in AS to those matters IA which was con-
cerned personally they are impressed upon my memory,
and am not IN error.
At the time OF writing the article looked into The
Rebellion Record" aud such reports as found in the
library, and W. Tote this foot note
fDd mention Of this assault the Rebellion records or IN any OF
the Official reports Gen. Gilmore Admiral Dahlgrss
IL should nave read La any reports that nave seen
seen deeply regret any injustice done 10 either ON
by the careless wording OF this sentence lt was un
intentional
II my reeoectio9 has been at fault in some Dqreu-
lars, dtn. Glllnores memory bias played him similar
trick. lie saws did not give him a message from the
Admiral 10 the effect that the naval boats Would leave
the flagship at or later should he desire IT," He for
gets. dd repeat that message TO him twice-once be-
fore and once after his order to telegraph to Gen.
Stevenson TO start at once and did give my record
me although repeatedly asked for it. IL certainly
does not belong to me- but 1t ought TO 20 with the rec
II had been permitted TO do 80, have not pretended
TO give the exact messages that were sent and received
ny their parpOrt, aud think The rec
Orj-DOok Will show that l have not miscon-
from the Admiral that " he had failed upon research
and reflection 10 lind any precedent for putting naval
officer under the command OF army officer aud SO the
expedition must 20 independent as to command oat ne
would cooperate, was verbal, given TO me ON board the
belong with the signaled messages. But that is GER
taDly mmateria IL our signals had not been read Dy
that they were read was solely the fault OF the senior
signal officer present who neglected TO instruct his ON
GERS in the Of the cipher permitting them TO use the
common code. For this Gen Gilmore was IN no sense
responsible be could have had 40 knowledge regarding
In reference TO this whole matter bore about the
same relation that the telegraph operator does 10 the
reader and receiver OF message Gen Gilmore seems
10 think that |" oyeresmate the importance OF that
position. Ii was not my Intention To 90 80 nave
never felt that there anything connected with the
air hat any should be proud Of except was the
personal bravery OF the men who lost Their hves, or
we're captured In the assault believe there Is no man
living who capable OF casting an linputitiOn upon
the honor AMI integrity OF Gen. Gilmore or Admiral
Dahlgrcn certainly soldier or sailor cond nave the
thought 10 do An honorable rivalry frequently eh
isis between Tie two OF the service when operating
together That this sometimes tends 10 disaster Is
know regretted by officers OF hlgh STANDING on pom
sides The article entitled an Episode OF the War
has other purpose tnan 10 Illustrate ths'
Bay Ciiy, Mich Jan. rs, 1875. w b. ANDREWS.
THE CIRCUMsTA NTIAL STORY OF MURDER
Svu. cusp Ian o8-In the trial of Owen