The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1875-03-06
l. lie w AN LIN pI Al1N.
The Battle of Lacar--- Special
Details Of the Famous Span
ish Engagement.
TWO KINGS IN THE FIELD.
A Victory for the Carlists With an
Army Cut in Two.
THE FLIGHT FROM CARRASCAL
General Serrano Explains His
-a Difficulty.
Don Carlos Takes Commanded
Bloody Revenge.
THE FLIGHT FROM CARRAsCAL
Don Carlos Takes Commander
Bloody Revenge.
DESPERATION, DISASTER AND DEATH


make an attempt upon his house, should lock all
the front doors and leave one back door wide
open, would be considered very foolish man in
deed Yet this is just what the Carlists did in
terrifying the approaches to Burrun or Carrascal
and leaving unfortned the road IRON Sanguesa.
cARLIsT STRATEGY.
As have explained in a previous letter, the only
object the Carists had in holding the 1afalla road
1T Carrascal was to cut the communication
with Pampeluna, because they hoped to
take the place by starvation. But besides the
roads through Carrascal and Puente la Reina,
bosh OF which were fortified by the Carlists there
was the one from Sanguesa. This road joins the
one from Tafalla between Carrascal and Pampe-
luna, at the village OF Noa!n, about six miles from
the latter and three rom the former place. Con-
bequently, If the liberal General could push a
strong force forward as lar as Noain. the formid-
able positions OF Carrascal would be turned and
rendered untenaDle, the Taalla road opened
PAMPELUNA RELIEVED,
and all the Notifications the CarliStS had spent
much time upon rendered useless. 1t does not
seem to have occurred 10 the Carlist generals that
this plan, simple as it is, would be adopted by
their adversares and they did not, therefore, GO
to the trouble OF fortIfying the Sanguesa road at
all. They relied upon three or four battalions for
holding 1t against any force that would probably
sent IN that direction, and indeed, until within
the last few days Its defence was ntrusted to two
or three companies only. Their reasons for
Bupposing the enemy would not make an attempt
by this road were, as well as can make out. that
for distance OF several miles it Is unfinished,
and, therefore, impossible for convoy or for
heavy artillery, besides which, passing through
narrow defIes and valleys, it is very easy OF de-
fence. Everything considered, they thought
THE ROAD THROUGH CARRASCAL,
even with Its forti1cations weaker point and
that the attack for that reason would be made
here.
They, therefore, concentrated their forces at
Carrascal and Puente, and left only five battaions
to defend the Sanguesa road. 1t does not seem
to have occurred to them that although
convoy for the relief OF Pampeuna could
not pass by this route II sufficient force Of in
fantry and mountain artillery, carried on mules,
could get through, the result would be the same
In forcing them to open the road by which a con.
vOy could pass. And yet such plan, one would
think, should be elementary in strategy. had
never been out on the Sanguesa road but sup
posed, as matter OF course that 1t, as we'll the
otDers, was fortified, until two or three days be.
fore the attack ana was greatly astonlshed to learn
that 1t was not. General Mendirl, one would have
supposed. might have thought that just because
Carrascal was strongly lortined no attack would
be made there, or that II there were a small num-
fed as it was. Tor a day or two. Had he, there
fore. gone out the Sanguesa road with a large
force he might have whipped Moriones and then
returned in time to beat Primo de Rivera al Car
rascal or Puente, wherever ne might in the mean
time have attacked. This, however, would have
required better 1ortfcations than the Carls's
h; d--fortincatons that would enable a lew men
at any given point In the line TO STAND siege as
1t were unll reinforced
THE CARLIsT TRENCHES.
as nave already explained Ia previous letter,
were not OF the KIND, Ior the most par:, 10
resist an assault. unless heavily manned, owing
to the want OF bitches before them to stop an as
sauting column. And the truth that the
weakest points IN the nne-the low hills and open
fields between Puente la Relna and ArtaIona and
the low woody mountains OF ST. Crlstobal, be-
tween ote'za and Lorca-were not entrenched
at all. The Carlist leaders seem to have
been aborng under the deusion That the
enemy would only come by, the roads
the ther would try to get into the house Dy the
front door IN broad daylight. They therefore.
did not ortliy the positions between :ne roads,
1antry might pass with case. In other words, they
locked toe doors and lett The windows wide open.
Had Mendlrl therefore met ana even whipped
Moriones ON the sanguesa ROAD. the probabilities
are that Esiela would nave been taken, or his
this last mentioned evenluallty actually occurred,
rs 1t was.
THE CARLIsr LINE TOO LONG.
The truth Is the Carist line was too long to be
defended with any chance OF success, aud am not
dSposed TO quarrel with Mendlrl tor having been
beaten. From Vlllamayor tho Los ARGOS
road tthe Carlist right. to Carrascal, Oh the road
to Pampeluna ther lam, Is q distance of twenty.
eight miles, while, II we count the extreme left,
at Montreal, on the Sanguesa road, ten miles
more, the Carst line was thirty-cight mlles long.
TO deiend this enormous distance MendIr had
less than $4,000 men. while his enemy had 60, 900.
The task was impossible.
Oi course Napoleon l., as soon as Moroncs had
separated rom the rest vi the army aud gUnc to
Sanguesa would nave gathered up $1,000 men and
dung them against Primo Klvcra's 20, 900 forming
the centre and crushed 1t IN time to turn around
ana whip MorOncs III HIS turn. But TINS woulu have
required certainty OF Information With regaid
to the encmy's movements an lntuitivc know-
edge oil his designs and prOmptncss OF decision
only possessed by the great Napoleon. ! am even
inclined TO think, from hints received before The
affair, that Mendirl had some plan analogous TO
this which he was not enabled to carry OUT, first,
because he did not receive correct information
either OF the Pill MS or the movements of the enemy,
ana second, as the sequel VIII show, because The
low, woody mountain OF st. Cri~topal between
Oteza and Lorca, not flied TO hold 1t against
o sudden onslaught. Cndcr tile circumstances,
therefore, am not surprised at Mendri having
lost Carrascal ana Pucnlc In Kena, AMI do not
think, everything considered, mat lie Is TO blame
except Tor having neglected 10 iortliy the line.
whether he be res ponsiOe Tor this know not.
CARLIsr BRAGGiNG.
But what l do blame the Carllsts Tor was their
uncOnsci0nabe Dragging For the last SIX months
tbey have been deiying their adversarics TO take
Carrascal, inviting them to come on, assuring the
world 1t could never be taken, and raising expec-
tations among the people with regard " Pam
peluna that were not TO tie realized, as they had
done AZ rum Artcr all TINS boasting IL turns out
tnat Carrascal was taken without nring shOt.
Nothing could be natter. more ridlculous or better
calculated TO discourage the people tnan such IAN.
uTcS. III was, vi course. quite rEut
that the Carlists should occupy Carrascal
ana hOJ IL as Ona as possible, because
u made them masters OF large tract OF country
from which they drew supplies Tor six or eight
months; but they should never have fortified IL
mn,ess indeed, they intended to forty the Whole
line 20 thc Sanguesd ROAD, ana, above all. tney
should not nave Dragged.
r, OPERATIONS IN THE FIELD.
Inc Carlist line cXiendcu ron NiamayOr on
thc Los ARGOS road. through Dlcastilo, Otelza and
Mendigorrla, to Carrascal or Blurrun ON the road
ABOUT uaI way be wccn faiaila and Pampeluna
tnc lDefal army occupying the positions opposite
ol LoRrono Scsina. Lcrin Larratsa and Ia la la.
me Carlists besides occupied the two villages
Of Fueyo and AitaJona as advance posts OF Car.
rascal.
on the 30.h OF January the liberal tfoops ad.
vanced and seized these two villages. TINS iloyc.
ment was made probaby with the Ii 70 ntIon OF de.