, 1875-05-12

a combination and Germany, in this view,
is in the position of Great Britain, a powerful
island State, isolated by circumstances, and
surrounded by potential foes. That the Ger
man chiefs feel this dread in some fashion is
evident from the recent military laws which
place the whole population at their disposal,
from the large concessions they would make to
Denmark if she would enter the Federation,
from the anxious desire to remain more than
friends with Russia, and from the frequent
repetition of the threat that were the danger to
increase, Germany would not wait to be attack
ed. The immediate danger is always repre-
sented as arising from the side Of France,
because Germans are more easily moved from
that side, and because the war of 1870 makes
such a statement reasonable, and consequently
Englishmen always expect that any blow or
menace of a blow from Berlin will be directed
first against Versailles. But they may be mis-
taken in that opinion. The German Chancellor,
when reasoning on concrete facts, Is the ablest,
as we'll as the most daring, statesman in
Europe, and he may hold a very different view
of the situation. 1t is not France he breads,
but q coalition. He can fight France easily
enough, if France has no ally. 1t ID not vic
tory he desires, but additional and permanent
strength for Germany. To follow his thought,
one must not watch kilograms or ssmi-inspired
leaders, but look around, and see whether any
great addition Of strength is to be obtained for
Germany and if so, where. Clearly it is not
to be obtained in France. Surprising the Ger
man Government suddenly to insist that
French ornaments should stop, to demand
Champagne as a material guarantee, and by
a supreme e~xertiOn Of strength to march once
more on Paris, what would it permanently
gain Nothing, except a larger disaffected
territory to garrison and a larger population
to be kept down by force. Russia would not
be weaker because France was occupied, but
stronger; the Hapsburgs would not be less
hostile because Germany had her Poland, but
more hopeful; Germany would not be more
fitted for battle, but more distracted by new
and most exhausting labOur. Of course the
extinction of France would end one of the
German difficulties, but how is France to be
extinguished without permanent military
repression 2 Nor is the advantage sought
to be obtained in Russia. That Ger
many might beat Russia is conceivable
in spite of the recent improvements in
the mobility of the Russian Army, and the
acquiescence of the people in the new con-
s%cription, and she might then reclaim the Bal
tic provinces but the quick defeat Of Russia
is, from the ~tenacity of the national character
ana Inc VAST ucptu VI tO " uoHAHAohHI
nearly impossible, and a long campaign to the
eastward would bring France into the field.
It would, in fact, give the word for the very
coalition we are assuming Germany to dread.
The difficulty, too, of inducing the Hohenzol-
Tern family TO attack relatives who have 80
often helped it, and who have shared with it
the spoiIs of Poland, might prove to be in
superable; while the Baltic provinces, unde-
Tended and indefens.b BILE as they are to the
east, might prove a most dangerous possession.
While, therefore, we hold a spring on France
unlikely unless provoked by Versailles, VIZ
deem one upon Moscow nearly beyond that
list of possibilities which statesmen are war
ranted in taking into consideration. But is
the third member of the possible coalition
equally secure ? It seems to US that if the
German Government really saw occasion to
put everything once more to hazzard-an
occasion which we do not assume, and can
hardly believe in-its temptation would lie
southwark, to spring rapidly and deeisively
on Vienna, and gain ten, million more German
subjects, before Presidents or Cars could
seriously interfere. The risk involved in such
an effort would be dreadful, for it could only
be successful if victory were az Immediate,
crushing, and final as it was In the Seven
Days War; but then victory would not only
not be barren, but would secure most of the
results for which it is assumed that Germany
longs,-secnrity against coalitions and outlet
II to the Southern world. No power could touch
Germany if the Hapsburgs were once driven
q