, 1875-03-27

such we'll wishers as happen to be English, for
somewhat selfish reasons. Germany may dread
an able French Caesar, as Italy might dread a
foolish one, but it is the conviction of English
men, we'll or ill founded, but in either case IT,
removable by anything except experience, that
the ADLER the man at the head of France, the
wider his knowledge, the more far-reaching his
policy, the more cordial will be his estimate of
the English alliance. Indeed, the foreign
policy of this country is so exceptional, its in
terests SO widely spread, its people so slow to
comprehend anything outside their own imme-
date concerns, that it takes an able man to
perceive what that alliance is worth. That is
a selfish reason, perhaps, but nations are sell
fish, and in this instance the selishness Of Eng
lishmen and Frenohmen necessarily coincide.
1t is not the desire of either people that France
should be ruined in order that the danger of
C8sarism should be manifested to the world, or
that the descendants Of Charles Bonaparte
should be finally expelled from the lists of the
AImanacb de GOTTA,
While, however, we consider the pleasure
felt by Englishmen in the success of their guest
both natural and excusable, we have some
doubt as to the course adopted both by the
Commander-in-Ch chief and the authorities at
Woolwich. They have made more fuss with
the Prince than if he had been the undOubted
heir to q throne, and much more than has ever
been made with our OWn Prince Arthur, and
the object of the fuss is clearly to tell the
French people how very considerable q person
the Emperor Napoleon's son now is. That is
surely q mistake in policy. There was no
warrant whatever for the repeated and official
use Of q title which Prince Louis Napoleon
does not take. and which therefore is not de-
manded by courtesy, and which implies, on the
part of those who use it, a kind of recognition
of the Princes claims. There was no reason
why the OOmmanderin-Chi should 20 out
of his way to pay compliments to the seventh
officer on the list, and no excuse for Sir Lintorn
Simmons's special and public report upon his
career, bis invariable punctuality and respect
for authority and submission to discipline.
Apart altogether from political questions, it
would have been better taste to treat the
Prince as an ordinary competitor, and not to
excite a gratuitous suspicion that the Director
General of Military Education had prede-
termined that the examination should result in
favour of a Prince already admitted to the COM
petition by a special act of authority. Sir
Lintorn Simmons is not likely to have pursued
such a course without knowing that it would be
acceptable at Headquarters, and the result
of his action will be that the Republican
Journals Will call the examination a pre-
arranged comedy; that the French people
will deem the British Army not only
favourable to France, which it is, but
favourable to NapoIeonic pretensions; and
that the British Government will be
held to be at heart hostile to a Re-
publican programme. The alliance of the
French Republic is as valuable as that of
the French Empire, Or more valuable, for the
Republic will survive all rivals; and it is bad
statecraft to create suspicion in men who are
now in power, and who, for aught the Duke
of Cambridge can tell, may remain there
for a generation. Or if, as is very pro-
bable,~ there was no statecraft in the affair,
there vas a great deal Of very i~nartistic blunder-
ing. France and England alike may re-
cognise with a certain pleasure the success of q
possible ruler of France, without the Horse
Guards going out of its way to emit so very
noisy a hurrah.