The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1875-03-06

believe the attack was TO be made mere. The
vited the attack here during the three days which
followed. while Morones, with 20. 900 men, was ex-
ecuas mos Sesye un 't inv way aS
I'd. that Mendlri heard OF the whereabouts OF
Morlones who nad by tnat time reached aonre cal;
entertained hopes OF being able to hold Car
rascal even with Morlones in ITS rear.
SO strong did he consider the position
THE LIBERALS CAUTIOUS.
But, as might have been iOreseen, the liberal
general deemed to attack entrenched positions
wnen there were Others not entrenched, whose
possession was more advantageous. and on the
evening OF the same DAY he sent Primo de Rivera,
VINO commanded the CENTRE against Otelza, winch
place he occupied with scarcely any resistance,
because Mendlrl nad Withdrawn nearly every
cal. IN which he persistently continued TO believe.
Primo de Rivera not only occupied Oteiza, hut
pushed forward. seized the heights OF st. Crsto-
bal, bcnind that place. winch the CarlIsts ought 10
have fortified and held at any cost, and then
descended on the opposite side ana seized lorca,
on the road between Puente Ia Reina ana Estella,
and thus
CUT THE CARLIsr LINE IN TWO.
All OF this occurred on the evening and night OF
the 2d-the same day that Moriones reached
Noain. So far LA sernas plan had succeeded per-
iectly. Mendlri, who received Information OF the
movement, Immediately abandoned Carrascal,
hoping to arrive at Otelza in time to stop it. But
information in time, and the truth is
that he appears to- have been badly
ants 1t was only at SIX O'CLOCK IN the
evening that he finally gave the order TO abandon
by way OF Puente la keina 1t was PROBABLY with
very heavy heart that he dId this The Carlists
caa een mere 20 Ung na tney aG mace
nerable, and 1t was here that they mad expected
to meet and vanquisn the enemy. 10 be obliged
TO abandon such fine positions without striking a
bow to despair almost OF success, and the
murmurs OF the soldiers were loud.
However, there was no help Tor IL. Mend1rl,
scarcely halting at Puente long enough TO see
Don Carlos, who was there, pushed on through
the darkness. in hopes OF reaching Lorca In time
to stop the advance OF Primo dl Rivera. l believe
It was only at Ciranqul ne received the inlorma:
ton that L0rca was IN the hands OF the liberal
troops and the road to Estca barred.
THE ARTILLERY IN DANGER.
IL was critical moment. The infantry, 1t Is
true, could get around LOrca by "a noun tam path |;
but tins was not possible Tor the artillery except
the mountain guns.
turn to Puente 10 Reina, thence take the road to
Pampeluna to within three miles of that place,
EchaurI. 1t appeared almost a hopeless plan.
by this time, and, should he send out detach-
ment to seize either Junction. the artillery would
H ov an tSe n nave
could have been seen from Pampeuna long
before they could reach the EsteIla road,
the night, under cover OF the darkness, there
lgery seized. The artillery vas accordingly
sent oack Dy his road, under u sufficient escort,
aroua Goroa e pasn asasy
spoken Of
EsTELLA.
For besides the danger to the artillery. another,
lar more serious, threatened the Carist army. 1t
was that an attempt should be made upon Estella
commander-ln.chief in command the lett and
Primo al Rivera, IN concert, with the
the departure OF Morlones-about IS, 900
men-and that 1t should be taken before the
there ore continued the march until a late hour
In the night and resumed nc before daylight next
morning; BY noon next day the greater part Of
and taken up positions 10 stop the further prog.
ress of Primo Ill Rivera in tins direction. The
artillery had, in the meantime, gone around by
Ecnauri, and by daylight next morning well
out OF danger on the road TO Es ella. Little did
passing near him ana that II he had nstened
at.entively he might almost have heard Its rum.
two the day before, had already united again.
SEREANO AND THE CARLIsTS.
saw Serrano when ne was in Blarritz, and in
reply to my question as TO whether 1t had not
been his intention to try to break the Carlsy line
at Lorca and Ote,za he replied. somewhat evasvely
as 1t was capable OF sucn rapidly oil movement
that 1t would be united again before any auvan-
spoke with great admiration OF the Carlist troops
and sad there were no better soldiers IN the
regards Cutting the Caess army III wo or
has been seen, 1T was united again eighteen hours
after.
was at Puente when the operations commenced,
ana he only retired from there at eleven O'CLOCK
had been decioed to abandon Puente as well as
Carrascal. He slept al Maneru, and the next
morning had a consultation with Mendlri at Gran.
our lie was very mucn dissatisfied with the
turn affairs had taken, and especially at the loss
of The heights u st. CrlstObal.
may as well say mere that have not yet been
able to get at the truth regarding the loss OF the
important position, althoueh, as ! have al
ned IL TO nave cnao,ed them to hold IL very long
against superior force
ON THE HEIGHTS.
Mendiri had left three battalions, or Iabout wv o
thousand men here, and these would have been
rival Of reiniorccmenrs. Instead OF this they
were abandoned without scarcely firing snOt.
There Is talk, as usual III such cases, of treason,
and 1t Is one oil the reasons That makes one
PAIR Of the cause OF Don Carlos, that whenever
tue Carlists have a very Important position to
hold, on which success victory the safety OF the
army depend, tnat position, either through negll-
gence, cOwardlce or treason, is sure to be aban
doned at the critical moment. Such was the case
at san Marco, where Ceballos ran away alter a
slight resistance. and COMPROMISED the whole
plan OF operations about lrun. such seems to
nave been the case at st. CrlstOba.
BY SURPRISE
1t Is said that OJelza, 81. CristObal and Lorca
were taken by surprise. and have seen SO much
negligence on both SIDES with regard to the plac
ing OF outposts and plckets that l think this eX-
pana1on oil the ai1alr The true one. general
holding the most important point on the whole
line, SIMPLY allowed IL to he surprised without
scarcely any resistance nsa What can be expeced
Carlsts retained possession OF these heights they
would have had an excellent line or defence, that
IRON NlllamayOr, on the Los ARGOS road, through
Ote1Za to Clranqul. AS there ls a range of noun
tains extending from Ciranqui north to Irursun
TINS line could only be turned by one rOad-tnat
from Pampeuna through EchaurI to Estelia. Bat
TINS road is very easily defended. Two or three
battallons, should say would hold 1t against any
force whatever.
The distance from Vlllamayor to Ciranqui is
only about seven mics. and as great part or
the grOund-th, It covered by Monte Jurra as well
as that covered by part oil the mountain between
OteIza and Clranqul-ls quite impossible Tor an
army this line OF defence wOuld have been a Tor
nldable one 1t was very unlike the immense
line TO Carrascal, which could only have been
maintained by chain oil eartnworks extending
the whole distance.
MISTAKE REPEATED.
The truth Is that Mendiri mas made exactly the
same mistake he made before the battle OF Abar.
zuZa, IN allowing the enemy to seize the noun
tain OF st. CrlstoOal. 1t is q much better be.
cause stronger and SAFER line tnan that
OF Abarzuza stronger, because the ground is
more advantageous FOR defence. SAFER, because
when the cnemys right wing Is at AUarZuza, as
cod IIaiIo