The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1875-07-31

!
IN seize IN bouses not occupie0s and
all house.rents duesto absentees, evading m
omen confiEaslon OF ail property belonging to
Confederate soldiers or citizens. But De
warned the people that nil. who remained
would be considered as having cast 10
heir lot vfthsthe Invaders, would be liao.e
to be called out In their service, aud ioreeu
al tbeIr peril 10 swear allegiance 10 tne
Union: and baying thus driven eVely
honest sotrbernefs outside The city, ne maoe
their ABSENCE an excuse for roDbing snen;
Ria tronps systematically stole, piitageo, ano
rauoo ed !. and. though be professed TO sais-
80 tenorre their con Inct, be made lot tue
Elm dnw of an effort to prevent It. ine saw
age havoc committed, By Sheridan IN .he
S9benardoah Valley was excused ON the, plea
that the enemy might draw supplies thence-
nlea which would justify invaders, Ger
r,.ps in France or England, or French 10
Garmany-in destroying all food, within
reacf Of their cavalry, and booming millions
n. starvation, but which could not excuse
Sheridan 10 burning houses and furniture
wherever be passed, or bis meH destroying
women's clothes aud forcibly robbiDg them
of their jeweiry. But Sterman's proceed
iugs were without any plea of. military ac-
vantage. His plea to his own Government
was that he desired to make the rebels feel
the miseries of war in order 10 compel their
submission-a plea which puts him exactly
on level with the worst ruffians of the
Thirty Years War, or with the deyastators
of the Palatinate. IEr.Eg
To Sherman was entrusted the duty OF
following up and destroying the second army
OF the South, which, under Joseph John
ston, was free 10 move much at its pleasure;
while Grant closed in on the army of Lee.
tethered as 1t was to Richmond, and cut on
from all reioforcements except such as the
Carolinas and Virginia herself could furnish
from nearly exhausted popu alton. Both
chiefs acted on the same principle.
Their supply Of men was limited. III tney
could kill one southerner for three OF tnclr
own soldiers they must ere long wear out
the Confederate forces. And both tareo
much alike. Grant threw himself, over ana
over ag,iD, upon Lee. and over and over
gain was so we'll beaten that 1t the Union
forces had been only double those OF the
South the spring of 1866 would have seen
another Invasion Of Pennsylvania. Sherman
assailed Johnston somewhat more wisely ano
warily, but with equally little honor. But
in each case the beaten army was go over.
1belmipgly superior in numbers that it bad
only to swing round part Of its force be.
bind the enemy's f1lnks in order to compel
him to retreat. In this way Lee was iorce0
| back into the lines of Richmond and Peters
burg, and Johnston into those OF Atlanta.
General Sherman pretends that though ne
| had at least twice as many men as johnston
land, we may add, ten times as ample sup
pIies) the natural aud artificial strength OF
Johnston's positions was full compensation.
But the absurdity Of this argument IS SHOWN
ia his own account of his strategy. he
never succeeded by attacking Johnston's
position in front, but always by certifying q
front line against him, holding it with equal
forces, aud swinging the other half OF bis
army round Johnston's flank to another po-
sition which, if fortified, would have
threatened bis communications and so com.
peled bis retreat. 1t was simply by dlnt OF
superior numbers that his success was
achieved; and it was impossible for an enc
my to make head against such numbers so
used. When, after long baffling and delay
ing bis opponent, Johnston reached Atlanta,
which he had fortified beforehand, he be-
lieyed himself able to hold out indefinitely,
as Wellington at Torres Vedras, against any
attacking force. But before his plan was
fairly tried President Davis, who had never
appreciated his genius and had long protest.
| ed against bis Fabian strategy, removed him
in favor of Hood, more impetuous and
less skiful general. Hood threw away The
advantages which Johnston had prepared.
( He fought, was worsted. and compelled to
abandon Atlanta, the central point of the
Confederate line of defences and the Key OF
Georgia. Then, instead Of holding his
| ground 10 front OF Sherman and the invading
army, he threw himself across the communi-
cations of the enemy into Tennessee. An
enemy thus attacked may In general be coul-
PEELED to retire, but Hood overlooked two
material facts. First, the enemy were able,
without weakening Sherman, to place in
Hoods front, and 10 defence of the line OF
communication, force stronger than the
Confederate army secondly, Sherman had
in front Of him an utterly defenceless coun-
try, capable of feeding his army until 1t
should reach new base on the sea.coast.
Aud this oversight was the death.blow of the
Confederacy perhaps we should rather say
the coup de grace, for there was little real
hope for the South after the 3D. of July, 1868.