The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1875-06-16

Ia Boston. Every LAND avenue Was ABSOLUTELY ciosSe
10 supplies. CATTLE hay ana iuel. which the BTU
iGh supposed 70 be safs on ths islands IN the mar.
Dor, mad oGen captured or destroyed and the loai
OF them wes severely lelt. In these afalTs several
quite spirited skirmlahes had occurred between
the belllgerents, and the result or them had been
such as 70 give the Americans con hdence In thom'
selves. The British mad determined to occupy
Bunker Hill, which could easily be defended oy
works AT the Neck, aided by floating batteries on
the tanks, and its possession would give them
considerable grass and pasture LAND. ana would
also keep the reos at Il safe distance.
me COMMITTEE OF SAFETY.
The Committee or Saety-the Executive OF Mas
sacnusetts-was tampant for vigorous prose.
cution OF the war; without much consideration Of
the want OF discipline among the troops or the
scantlness or the supply OF ammunition; and
taking advantage OF report that the BRUSH IN
iendcd to occupy Bunker's Hin on the 18TH OF June,
they urged General Ward 10 seize and occupy II
himself Ii was wise thing TO do; for strong
WORK on the highest point of the peninsula would
give the Americans such a foothold there as would
make Ii possible Tor them approach Boston
dangerously near; and would almost certainly
forbid British occupancy OF the lower land.
was pretty safe thing 10 do. FOR the land ap
prolch oil an attacking force must nave been long
under lire, ana over broken put open ground
ana from the water the British could hardly eie
its defenders.
COLONEL PREscoTT's COMMAND.
Colonel Prescott was no doubt selected 70 COM
mand the expedition because he was mature IN
years and Judgment and mad proved himseniu
tue campaign at Cape Breton to be not only cour
aceous but cautious. Tue number OF men assigned
to the duty Q,20o) was sufficient to 90 It, and ne
more than sufficient. The orders given were ex.
plieit and simple. Colonel Prescott was directed
10 proceed 10 Bunker's Hill, to build fort there,
and to defend it until he was relieved. These or.
de.s did not contemplate battle nor dld the
supply OF ammunition or rations indicate any In
tention beyond what appeared on the lace OF the
orders namely, the outfit OF o working party whicA
within twenty -four hours was to be renewed Dy
garrison detachment. Military ideas ihen-a-daya
were crude among the Provincials ana appear 10
have been very dim as 10 superiority In rank and
Difference to orders. Prescott's command included
the regiment or Colonel Frye who seems to nave
been oY six days his senior ia rank; ana altnougl
the over siaugn may have peeh the cause OF the
ooIng with MS regiment 1t did not prevent his
joining ana acting with II, under prescott, when
he iound next day that the detail Tor what we nov
cali fatigue dutJn was likely TO become hghtinG
FoRrIFYINa BUNKER HILL.
Arrived at the Neck rnere was q halt and Cap
tain Nutting, VITA some hlty or sixty men, was
detached 10 picket CharlestoWn AMI the snore OPP
poste COpp's Hin. Tney took the lower ana d.
rect TO their station, aud soon the main body
moved up tne slope 10 the place they were ordered
by two or three generals, whose names are not
glven-very likely Putnam was one OF them. as
200 OF the Connecticut troops were In the detacn-
ment, and here Tor quite long time the omcera
TO whom the commana had neen entrusted de-
bated with TWO or three generals lneltner OF whom
had gwen him MS ordersl as to the execution oil
written orders from his and their superior. When
an oncer is directed TO fortify NIL It means tnat
nIs works are to include tue highest point OF that
hui. Prescott knew This, Tor under mis- orders ne
marched To the proper point. halted, and douot
less out Tor offcious interference would have
bull his fort on the summit OF Bunkers Hill. II ne
Breeds he would not have detached Nutung at the
Neck but q: some point nearer his destination.
tional alsobedlence that the site OF fornhcauon
was liked at a point lower on the hill ana nearer
to Boston than the oroers prescribed, the results
ment from the pushing forward OF the trenchea
easy to be reached BY relnforcemsnts to . bold
menace which would compel the British 10 RISK
what General Ward expressly desired to avoid, 9
generaT engagement OF the two armies. doubt
II GenerGI Ward realized the extent Of Prescotrs
variation from his orders Until Major BROOKS told
hun Ut or about eleven O'Clock on the 18th when
the British were actually crossing. Then, evidently,
he the gravity oftne situation, and buried Tor
ward stark with the remainder or the New Hamp
sure troops, and, indeed, all OF MS disposaole
iorce. and ~ about the same time Putnam turnsd
colt as he mad promised. All OF these troops, un-
brigaded, but half equipped, and not mali sup
pushed forward 10 the direction Of Cnarlestown.
STARK with his command arrived In good order and
nre at tne Neck. the haste ana c0nfusisn OF the
forced marcn. and the effects OF the midday hGat
on raw troops clrcumstanced, IL Is probable
that bot small portion OF the intended reinforce
meDt actually reached tue front, ana raose rev
nto the ranks with those already 10 position be-
hind the defences. The higher onlcers appear 70
have succeeded IN getting TO the front In greater
proportion than the soldiers, Dut when they ar.
rived II was too late TO give up time to the con.
we're sSyancnS on the SorIs ana tne evident
duty Of all was 10 repulse them. There Was no
pluck 10 holo 4 position. Generals and colonies
well their suoalterns Wed with eacn other 10
DONG ana sryns for w3 eSs time noasht es or e
other duty or privilege as attached 10 tnen
rank.
party and whose men mad built the fort ana the
wing eartnwork near IL, naturally continued 10
exercise command over oil The men a. tnat post
Colonel STARK, whose men had constructed the
deIences on toe lett, ~ naturally commanded all
WAC were there. Captain knowlton, Commanding
200 men OF the Connecticut troops, may very
probably have deferred TO General Putnam, who
onicers Prescott stark ana Kno wilton, recognized
the fact that mis- was part OF general line. an
each did what he coula TO support those on mis-
HANKS put Il Is eyIdent that neither Of them
exercised or had any occasion 70 exercise COM
mand beyond his lmIneoiats vicinity.
PUrNAM's STRATEGY.
Putnam seems 10 nave been nervously active
tie miitary skill IL as Is very likely, IL was MS
aovice tnat leo Prescott 10 deyiate from his or.
ior the result. and he appears TO have done ali
that lie could TO rectify tue error Az early az
nine O'clock on the LTD ne nauS is 20
tools back TO Bunker Hill, ana he made great ex.
ertions TO get the men as tney struggled oy nom
'front.' aud rear 10 WORK upon y fedOuDt a. the
summit; out Il was too late. He was one OF tbs
lew, perhaps the only one OF the oficers WHO WA
mouut ted, ana ne was. therefore, no doubt y means
vi commuaIcAtion bstween the front and the real
aud even the headquarters At Cambridge, and
he would De apt 10 appear frequently AZ
different parts OF Lne line. A mounted
onieer, and one whose person and rank were well
Known, he would DC and was asked bT the later
detachments as TO the direction to Je taken py
them. But excepting as any unattached on1oer
might properly and would naturally Ia time o.
battle give orders 90 further the purposes Of the
action, IL d0es not appear that he assumed All
command hey ond that OF his own regiment. The
battle vas fought Tor the possession OF the lori
which Prescott commanded. Inc Americans whe
fought outside OF the fore fought Ia AID Of anc
subsidiary TO the defence OF the fort; and wnen
Prescott ordered the men within reach Of nl5
voice TO retreat, the battle was decided, and 81
: ~ La anil q az ln