The Carbon advocate. [volume] (Lehighton, Pa.) 1872-1924, 1875-12-11


after this lapse of time, am unable TO see that
any notable success OF any marked real ad-
| vance on the part of the insurgents has essen
| TALLY changed the character of the contest. II
has acquired gre ater age but not greater more
| formidable proportions. 1t is possiole that the
acts Of foreign powers, and even acts OF spain
herself, OF this very nature might be pointed to
| In defense of such recognition; but now, as in
past history, the United States should carefully
avoid the false lights which might lead 1t into
tbe mazes Of doubtful law, of questionable pro.
| priety, and adhere risidly and sternly to the
| rule which has been Its guide, doing only
that which is right and honest and of good re-
port.
The question of according OF of Withholding
rights of belligerency must be judged in every
H Unless nstiaed by by necessity it % is always eSs and
| justly regarded as an unfriendly act and gra-
| tuitous demonstration of moral support to the
rebellion. 1t is necessary and 1t is required when
the interests and rights Of another government,
| or of its people are so far affected by
a pending or civil conflict to require definition
conflict must be one which will be recognized In
| the sense of international law as war. Belliger-
| ence, too, ia q fact. The mere existence Of
contending armed bodies and their occasional
| ferred to. Applying to the existing condition of
affairs In Cuba the tests recognized by publicists
| and writer's ON international law, and which
| have been observed by nations Of dignity, hon.
| esty and power, when free from sensitive or
| selfish and unworthy motives fail to find in
the insurrection the existence of such substan-
tial political organization real palpable and man.
| ifest to the world, having the forms and capable
Of the ordinary functions Of government toward
| its own people and to other states, with courts
| for the administration of Justice, with a
| local habitation, possessing such organization
| of force, such material, such occupation Of ter
ritory to take the concet Of the contest out OF
the category of q mere rcbellious insurrection or
occasional skirmish and place It on the terrible
| footing of war, to which recognition of bellg-
| erency would aim to elevate it. The contests,
moreover, ia solely on land the insurrection has
not possessed itself of single seaport whence It
may send forth the flag, nor has 1t any means Of
| communication with foreign powers, except
| through the military lines OF Its adversaries. No
apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult
complications which war upon the ocean is
| apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both
| commercial and national, and upon the consular
officers Of other powers calls for the definition of
| their relations to the parties to the contest,
| Considered as n question of expediency, regard
the accordance of belhgerent rights still to be es
\ unwse and premature as l regard IL to be at
present indefensible as measure of right.
| Such recognition entails upon the country ac-
| cOrdng it the rights which flow from it, difficult
| and complicated duties, and require the exac-
servance of their rights and obligations. 1t con-
| fers the right Of search upon the high seas by
vessels OF both parties. 1t would subject the
| carrying of arms and munitions Of war which now
| are transported freely and without inter
vention in the vessels Of the United
| States to detention and to possible seizure.
! II would give rise TO countless veNatious
| questions, would release the parent government
| from responsibility for acts done by the nsurg-
ents amt would invest Spain with the right to
| ercse the supervision recognized by our treaty
| of 1895 over our commerce Oh the high seas, q
| very large part of which, in its traffic between
! the atlantic and gulf states and between all Of
| them and the states upon the Pacific, passes
| through the waters which wash the shores of
Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could
scarcely fail to lead, if not to abuse, certainly to
collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the
two states. There can be little doubt to what re-
| suit such supervision would before long draw
| this nation. 1t would be unworthy OF the United
/ Sfntn tVnnai
suit by measures Of questionable right or eX-
pediency or by any indlrection.
| Apart from any question of theoretical rights
| am satisfied that while the accordance Of bel
| ligerent rights to the insurgents in Cuba might
\ give to them a hope and an inducement to pro-
tract the struggIe it would be but a delusive
hope, and it would not remove the evils which
| this government and Its people are experiencing,
but would draw the United States government
| into complications which it has waited long and
already suffered much to avoid.
| The recognition of independence, or of the
belligerency, being thus, in my judgment,
| equally inadmssible, itremains to consider what
| course shall be adopted. Should the conflict not
| themselves and should the evils which result
| therefrom, affecting all nations, and particu-
| larly the United States, continue, In such event
| am of the opinion that other nations will be
compelled to assume the responsibility which de-
| wolves upon them, and to seriously consider the
only remaining measures possible, mediation
and intermediaton. Owing, perhaps, to the
| large expanse of water separating the island
| from the peninsular government, the want
of harmony, OF personal sympathy between the
| TO rule them, and want Of adoption of the an
| Client colonial system of Europe to the present
| times, and to the ideas which the events of the
past century have developed the contendlng
| parties appear to have within themselves
| no depository Of common confidence to suggest
| wisdom when passion and excitement have their
| way, and TO assume the part of peacemaker.
In this view, in the earlier days of the contest,
the good onices Of the United States as a media
tor were rendered IN good faith, without any sell
fish PURPOSE, in the interest of humanity, and in
| sincere friendship for both parties, though at
| the time declined by spain with the declaration
nevertheless that mt future time they would be
| Indispensable. No intimation has been received
4 that In the opinion of Spain that time has been
reached, and yet the strife continues with all its
Tread horrors and all its injuries to the United
States and other nations. Each party seems
| qAite capable OF working great injury and
damage 20 the other, as well as to all the rela-
| tions and interests dependent on the eN-
| isterre of peace ON the Island, but they seem in
| capa. lie Of reaching any adjustment, and both
have thus far failed of reaching any adjustment,
| and bolh have thus far failed OF achieving any
| Success whereby party shall possess and
control 10 island to the exclusion OF the other.
| Under tn, sc circumstances the agency of others,
either by, 1ediation OF by intervention, seems to
| be the on alternative which must sooner
later be In, oked for the termination Of the
| strife. At the same time, while thus
! Impressed, = do not, at this time recommend
| the adoptionCf any measure of Intervention. l
| shall be ready at all times, and as the equal
friends of those parties, to respond TO a sugges-
tlon that the good offices Of the United states
viii be acceptable TO aid In bringing about a
| peace honot able TO both.
1t Is due TO Spain, so FAR as this government is
concerned that the agency OF third power, TO
| which have adverted, shall be adopted only as
| last ezptdient. Had IL been the desire OF the
United States TO interfere in the affairs OF Ouoa
repeated opportunities for 50 doing have been
| presented within the last few yesrs, but we
have remained passive aud have performed our
| our whois duty and all international obliga-