The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1875-03-21

Guilty; but the rest OF the ridge was moderately
steep, covered In some places with viney ards, In
others with olive orchards and other places still
with low. scrubby oak trees. Opposite Aburzuza,
however, the ascent was so gentle that but for
the inequalities OF the ground . cavalry charge
might have been made to the very top. And
these inequalities, SO far from Offering obstacles
to the advance OF the infantry, assisted them, on
the contrary. by Offering them cover at every step.
CONoHA's ASSAULT.
After Smelling the Carlist positions two days and
q half Concha ordered the assault all along the
line. The real attack, however, was directed
against the heights opposite ADurZuza, for, with
the eye OF true General, Concha detected the
weak spots In the Carlist line, which happened to
be the very place most favorable 10 his
plan That plan was to throw forward his
right wing, seize these heights and the entrance
10 the Amescoas, and thus cut of the Carst
retreat; then sweep them down to the Ebro,
where they would have been inevitably obliged to
surrender. 1t was In attempting to urge his
waverng troops forward to third or fourth
attack upon these heights that he was killed. The
plan was an admirable one, and had It succeeded
the Carllst army would have been bagged as
surely as was the French at sedan. 1t was plan
that, with his numerical superiority, ought to
have succeeded. and would have succeeded mad his
troops fought half as well as the Carlsts.
TIE PRESENT POSITION.
The position has materially changed since The
battle OF Aburzuza. The Uarlists have taken
Puente la Reina, and extended their left to Blur
run, at the mountain OF Carrascal, where the road
from Tafalla to Pampeluna leads through a mar
row pass. This IS the road by which communica-
ton had been kept up with Pampeluna and the
Carlists, Immediately after the battle, invested
that place. Pampeluna, all Unknown to the
world, underwent for seven or eight months the
process of starvation, aud sustain ed siege longer
tnan that OF Paris. The investment, 1t Is true,
not very close at first, and provisions were al.
lowed 10 get in occasionally, but during the last
four months nothing was permitted to enter.
Had Pampeluna fallen into the hands Of Don
Carlos, Alfonso XII might as well have abdcated
at once. But although the Carst positions are
very strong naturally and has been fortified, Es-
tella and the pass OF Csrrascal could not both be
held with the forces the Csrsts had against well
directed and resolute attack upon both POINTS at
once. The Carlisr line was-countng from
Eilamayor ON the road to Los ARGOS, The extreme
right, to Biurrun or Oarrasca, the extreme left
twenty eight miles long. They could not bring
more than 5000 men to the defence of this line,
without completely leaving the roads leading from
St. Sebastian, Bilbao and Victoria unprotected.
They had more troops than they had at AbuIz1za,
but their line was ten times as long as IT then was,
while she enemy had fifteen or twenty thousand
more len to bring against 1t than they had then
that is, about $4,000 men. Although the Carllst
right and lett at Esela and Carrascal were exceed
ipgly strong the centre At Paente la Relna was
comparatively weak. The pos tons before Estella,
forming The Carst right, have already do
scribed, and win now give short description OF
the left and centre.
TIE LEFT,
as have already explained, rested on the road
from Tafalla 10 Pampelupa. The road here runs
through narrow pass between the mountain Of
Carrasca on the side OF Biurrun, and the noun
tains called the Sierra de Aliaz on the other. It
Is place easily defended, and the Carlsts be-
sides strengthened 1t with trenches
THE CARLTsT 'FRONT.'
1t should be stated, extended rom Pueyo, on the
le1t wing, through Artajona, Mendigorria, Oteiza
ana Dicasto to Villamayor, at the extreme right.
Pueyo and ArtaJona will, however, probably not
are mucn stronger. The line OF defence of the
centre, IN front 81 Puente. wiz be a little behind
the Carlst line. There is a range of hills. IT is
true, extending from the Artaiona road 70 Puente;
but o1erng ony gentle ascen,s on 'n ns, sce' neg
open fields and afford as much protection to the
attacking party as to The attacked
AN OPEN PLAIN.
The whole country between Puente, Mendi-
gorria and the ArLajona ROAD may prac-
e ye G 3. sI s an in saen wSes
can pass snySnsrs Ao wing the
ana . good army may give, 1t Is, nevertheless,
evident that as their enemy could sr1na :
vastly superior force against the whole
driven in by resou,e ana persistent attack.
And this because the eropDd offers no advantage
weakness in point Of numbers. Pnente taken,
the Carlist army would be cut IN two, unless the
CarIlst General shoule ahandoa either Carrascal
N'ousIsrs. the road would be open from mat place
TO Pampeluna even though Catrascal and Estea
SeeS MoaS be- NO to d
were any otI.er roah open t. Pampelnna. the
part OF the Carlisr line between Mendigorria and
Oteiza is also comparatively weak. Extending
! the whole distance between these two places
there is low mountain, covered with a thin, low,
scruOpy wood This mountain offers some advan.
rages Tor defence but the greater part OF ~ Is by
no means inaccessible TO inlanty. An attacking
force double that OF defenders ought to carry 1t
I with case. AS have already shown, the LIBERAL
army I'll be able 10 bring not only double but
line. Oteiza and this mountain carried, they would
get possession OF the Fuente road rom Clrangin
10 Villatuerta. and az In the other case. the Car
! list army would be cut in two.
TIE CARIISr FoRTIFICATToNs.
! A great deal has been said about the forf1ca.
tiops around Es,elia and Carrascal. ana IL is
usually supposed has they are Of the most for
midable kind. Their strength has, however, In
my opinion. been greatly exaggerated. They
consist simply OF barrow trenches about eighteen
incnes wide and TOUR or five eet deep. rather re-
sembling what were called rife pits IN our war
than regular earrhworks Artillery is almost
useless against them, 10 ID true for unless shell
explodes exactly In the trench It does no harm,
and then It rarely XII ls more than one man. THIS
! was proven at the battles OF Somorrostro and
/ Autobiography In the latter, where Concha
ehelled the Carlists' positions two days and q haf
I without killing q hundred men. They are equally
proof Of course. against smail arms As long as
/ the attacking army stays on and shoots at long
/ rage small force Will hold such trenches
! aRalnsL ten times its number. But the
| case rs different when II comes to
repelling an ssaut with the bayonet. Such forti-
ncations are incomplete, ana At most can only be
called hall made, because they lack the ditch be-
fore the trenches necessary 10 stop An assaultng
column. There Is really nothing before MANY or
! these trenches TO prevent a charge OF cavalry
right over them. not 10 speak OF a bayonet charge
/ by resolute infantry. heavy assauting column
i strong Commercially az their defender, must tn
evitably Garry them, with heavy loss, IL IL true.
| A GREAT WANT.
THIS Is the defect OF the Carist Notifications
There Is nothing TO STOP an assaultirg column but
| the bayonets OF the defenders. Any fortlncatIou