New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1875-04-21

very few. We may ndd that the num-
brr of those who would trust them
in such cases il siill smaller. II is q dangerous
gift If ono has it; fatal one If, having and
undertaking to exercise it, an incrodulOus pub
lie refuse faith in his impartiaity. 1t Is a fac
ulty in short, which, If it exists in anybody,
ought never to be exercised. The service OF
two masters has been pronounced by the highest
authority impossible. Evon if the wisdom OF
this age of attorney politicians and political
attorneys has discovered its possibility. it will
hardly be denied by the discoveries themselves
that it is always unsafe.
1t Is an admitted canon of political morals,
recognized in all the rules and usages of legis-
latiye bodies that no member shall vote upon
any question In the decision OF which he has
direct personal interest. OF late years, and
among our State Legislatures and i'll Congress,
it has fnllen into desuetude 1t began with the
evil of over-legishtiOn. Holders Of bank
stocks and railroad stocks legislating in the
most general way upon banks and railroads, or
voting without hesitation or question, upon
laws, the passage of which affected their pc
cuniary interests in the most direct and posi-
tive manner, could not complain If the re-
tanned attorney of corporation managed to
be elected to the Legislature, in order to secure
by direct influence and his own vote
az a legislator, what he had failed to
secure as attorney in the lobby. The pro-
cess of decentralization was as simple as Sill,
and the steps as easy. If attorney one year,
and legislator the next, why not attorney and
legislator both at tho same timci And If the
vote and influence of an attorney in the Lcgis-
latrre may be paid for under retainer
whether last years retainer or this-why may
not any layman in tho Legislature do
the same business in the same way 7
| That il bribery to be sure but where Is the
| line between retainer and bride ! And II men
may 90 to the Legislature to make laws Tor
their own pecuniary profit, why may not others
who have no stocks nor bonds nor canal con-
| tracts, nor fees contingent upon contracts, use
their votes for their pecuniary profit That 5
bribery again. And there is where it ends.
Who shall say just where it begins
| Here il Senator COnkling acting under re-
| taine,s from great corporations when the very
questions involved are liable at any moment
| TO take such shape as b. require his action In
judicial relation upon them. Here was Sem
ator Carpenter retained Ivy one Of the parties
to political complication certain to
come before him as Senator. Here, III
almost every Legislature in the country we
have had men legislating for the public under
retainers as attorneys. And II little while ago
we had great scandal over the fact that
Senators and Representatives in Congress
had followed these practices to their
logical conclusion, and engaged in spec'La-
TONS the success Of which depended
upon their legislation. There is much
confusion upon this matter in the public mind.
Plainly enough the tendency of the practice to
which we have referred is evil. Ii leads by "a
very short and direct process to political cor
rupton of the very worst and most rlunous
sort. Is there no remedy possible