The Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1868-1895, 1875-02-02

own votes, but by those, of other counties
and townships which have no right to med
die with it. An act of the legislature is
passed by fifty-one votes in the House and
twenty-six in the Senate. Now, ifthe requi-
site number of representatives and senators
decide that liquor selling shall be licensed
for 500 or 500 a year, that decision makes
it legal in townships and counties that don't
want 1t, just as fully as those that do. Hence
any man who chooses to pay the license fee
can sell anywhere in spite of the people,
even II he be the only man in the township
that favors the traffic. A majority of fifty to
one Is just as powerless to protect itself from
what 1t esteems great evil, as majority of
one in fifty or 500. So the popular will is
forced to yield to a general unbending, un-
accommodating law. Surely nothing can
be further removed from pure democratic
principles OF government than this. What
a tempest OF opposition weuld there be all
through this state IL the legislature were TO
pass law empowering the county commits
slon5rs TO appoint even q road inspector,
without first having the consent of a major
ity of the voters in the road district. And
yet of how mucn more importance is
it te the we'll being of society that the people
should have the right to decide by a msjor-
ity in reference to the granting OF license in
their neighborhoodf Again, license sys-
tenn being established by law may be The
work OF bare majority of the two houses
fifty-one members of the lower, twenty-six
in the upper house. These are furnished by
f0rty-one out of ninety-two counties. A
majority of one Is elected by minority of
ten of the counties, majority of the other
by minority of twenty of the counties.
This is the effect of the difference in popula-
ton. Marion county in connection with
Morgan elects three senators, and in connec-
ton with Shelby elects five representatives,
making her equal in legislative power to
Benton, Newton, Jasper, White, Marshall,
Fulton, Pulaski, KOsciusko and Whitley IN
the Senate, aud equal in the House to Jas
per, White, Crawford, Orange, Martin, Du-
bois, Brown, Bartholomew, Fulton, Pulaski
and Starke. She equals nine counties In the
Senate and eleven in the House. Hence her
legislative power may easily decide the
whole question of license in both houses.
Her vote is big enough to turn large mi
nority into majority, and thus force no less
than eleven other counties to have liquor
sold in them, whether the people want It or
not.
Is THIS RIGHT?
Is 1t republican, On the other hand, If
Marion county Is opposed to license she may
defeat it for the whole state, land force local.
ties tast want liquor to go without it. Is
this right Is it democratic? Under the
local option principle no large township like
Center, or county like Marion, can override
eight or ten others, and compel them to have
~
or 60 without whether they like it or not.
According to the license plan minority of
the counties, because they are large and
populous, can enact prohibition or license
for majority; thirty-six out of ninety-two
can force fifty-six to have LIQUOR or not. lust
as the thirty six please, while the fifty-six
can't help themselves under the license sys-
tenn. In general legislation this may be well
enough, for the interest of majority OF the
Inhabitants is paramount. But in the sale of
liquor, which is creature of statutory on
actment only, where neighborhOods and
townships have different opinions, il is not
well enough. It is unjust and oppressive.
Local option says: "Let each locality do as
ii pleases." License says: each locality
shall not do as it pleases, but as the thirty
six big counties out of ninety-two please. If
the thirty-siX say liquor shall be licensed, it
shall be sold in every neighborhood, let the
people wish it or not" -
1t is therefore seen, that while on The one
hand license is not only I'm direct aniagonism
to public good, but also to public justice, so
local option, on the other hand, is in strict
accordance with public justice and the pub
lie good.
If in l776 our fathers were willing to lay
the foundation of this great nation on the
consent OF the people to rule that thouId
govern the whole land, and to that pledge
their lives, their sacred honor, their all, can
not we in 1875, while preparing tor the CEN
tenDial celebration of the laDors of those
great and good men, trust the people, to say
whether the saloons shall rule Indiana. or
Indiana rule the saloons?" If we are willing
to invest the people with the choice of the
Judge TO whom is committed our property,
reputation and lives. shall we refuse TO en-
dow the same people with the right to toll
crate or forbid traffic whose history Is read
in the broken hearts and the blasted hopes
of our fellow menf Surely the Senators of
Indiana will rot refuse the people this right
SHALL SALOON KEEPERS BR RESPONSIBLE FOR
DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THEIR BUSINESS.
One OF the primary principles of the COM
mon law is, that every man must be held
responsible for the results of his own acts
II, by any act Of his, injury comes to another
he is responsible for that injury and mus!
M AXE reparation, unless he can satisfy the
Judge or jury that he was not to blame Ioy
| his conduct. Sometimes it may happen
that this rule works hsrdships, but the rule
exists for the benefit and protection oil
aggregated society, and the good sense OF
mankind declares the principle Is
founded in justice. Through the multifar.
| ious avocations and pursuits of life we may
relying on our boosted ability and mental
development, deny our responsibility to God
snnaa recklessiy violate the laws os nature
but we can not escape from the operation OF
this great law; com manded by all intelligent
persons-that we are and must be held &C
countable to our fellows for any injury they
may receive through our misconduct, negli-
gence, or wilful wrong doing. Now, let Us
apply this great fundamental principle &c
this traffic in drink, which Is outside the
pale of common law, and only the tickle
| creature of statutory enactment. II, by the
common law, a man is held responsible fol
his acts, should we, when by statute we au
thorize business to be pursued. relieve him
from the responsibility necessarily growing
out of that business. should we renounct
this Statutory provision from a trafhc that W.
can not and never have trusted under tn,
common law7 Nay, rather, as this traffic II
} universally regarded as against the best in
terests of society, should not more rigid
instead OF easier rules be applied to its con
duct so as to form check upon the reckless
evils which are continually flaming from thi
destructive traffic. When a man determine
to sell intoxicants he certainly can no