The weekly clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1863-1882, 1875-07-07
FOR LOVE AND LIFE.
Am Important Decision by an In
diana COurt-.-CeremOny OF LII
cense not Necessary 10 a
Valid Marriage
Points in 1Iae Case - The Whole
Ground Carefully Covered by
the COur1..-A Free Love Com
test Void and Vicious.


rion criminal court, Judge Chapman to-
day rendered the following decision in
the case of the State VS. j. R. Buell. and
Susan d. Gilbert, indicted for fornica-
ton: Opinion regarding the various
provisions of the statute together, it
seems to stand on all forms with the com
mon law In regard to effect of the alb
sence Of ceremonial forms upon the
validity of marriage. Ii either of the
parties to the marriage regard it as I'M
ion of husband and wife it shall not be
either void or verbal because the require
ments of the statute in regard to license
or solemnization have not been complied
with, and 1t seems probable by the pro
vlso TO section three, that where parties
take out a marriage license, and acting
under that license appear in person and
pronounce by and through him an agree
ment to become man and wife, the mar
/ rlage will be valid and the parties held to
| the contract without any regard to the
belief the parties may have entertained
in regard to its legality, especially if toll
lowed by Capitalization; but the decision
of this proposition is not necessary TO the
case in hand. The defendants took out
a license, and in the presence of certain
witnesses themselves solemnized a cere-
mony of marriage, and took each other
for husband and wife respectively, using
each the form of words heretofore set
out, without the Interpretation of any
other persons save the persons who APP
peared in the character of witnesses. The
only portion of the formula used by the
defendants in this portion of the ceremony
in which an exception is that embraced
in the words $50 long as the union of
love and life shall last" but | do not
think these words are significant, nor
that they or any other words which may
be employed in a marriage ceremony
touching the duration Of the contract.
are of any legal force or in any wav
qualify the contract. If the parties agree
to be husband and wife, and presently
/ thereafter assume the state, the law set
: ties the nature and duration of the CON
tract, and any stipulations the parties
might make in regard thereto would be
mere idle words or mawkish sentiment.
If the forms now under review had been
pronounced by an authorized person, the
marriage would have been good and reg
ular. If they had been used by an un-
i authorized third person, that incapacity
of the person solemnizing would not have
invalidated the marriage, and all that
can be said in this case is that the per-
sons solemnizing or pronouncing the
marriage-namely, the parties to the
contract-were not made capable by the
statute solemnizing the marriage. 1t is
difficult to see how any additional
strength or sanctity would be given to a
marriage contract where the formula has
b zen said, in the first instance, by some
third person incapable of solemnizing
the marriage by the statute by reason of
any priestly or official function of which
he was possessed, and repeated after him,
or assented to, by the parties themselves.
The incapacity of such person would be
as complete as could be-that is, the par
ties to the contract-and the improperly
of his action certainly as grave. But
/ the defendant, Buell., testifies that he
/ believed at the time of the making of his
marriage contract with Miss Gilbert,
that it was legal marriage, and he fur
/ ther testified to answer, in cross interrog-
I atories by the States counsel, that Miss
4 Gilbert stated at the time that she be-
lieved it to be legal. The counsel for
the State admit that if either party be-
/ lieved the marriage to be legal at the time
she entered into the relationship, it will
stand. 1t is agreed, however, that from
the form adopted, and especially from
the so-called agreement which was signed
by the parties, a clear conclusion may be
drawn that the parties did not either of
them regard it as legal marriage. What
ever may be said of the want of wisdom
and good taste of some of the sentiments
expressed in the sO-called agreement,
do not see that it overthrows the testimo-
ny of Buell. in regard to his belief CON
corning the legality of the marriage,
especially when l regard his statement
that he supposed he could be divorced
from his wife only by decree of court,
and that his provision in the agreement
was only sentiment or protest against
existing laws and prejudices. Neither do
| think this agreement has any legal
efficacy, for two reasons: First, 1t was
signed after the parties had pronounced
themselves husband and wife in public
and, it may be, solemn manner. Second,
Because, if it be regarded as a part of
the marriage ceremony, no part Of it has
any legal force except that which says
that they agree to assume the relations
of husband and wife, and that, ] think,
has full force and effect What the par
ties meant by the protest against the
right of others to "interfere with that
which concerns only ourselves" it is diff
cult to say with certainty from the Ian,
guage employed, but may presume it is
of little consequence, as it is Immediately
followed by an expression of an intent
to comply with the laws of the State, and
the parties agree to assume the relation:
: of husband and wife, with all which
these terms imply" etc. Then follows
this language: Whereas, the courts OF
law have decided that marriage is a civil
contract, and governed by the same rules
as all other contracts, therefore we hereby
agree that this contract exist and be il
force during our physical lives, provided
our mutual love-natures ever blend "a
they do now, but to terminate without
/ prejudice by the wish of either party i
the love of either ever ceases to be mu
tual, which event we trust and believe
never will occur" 1t is this feature
which counsel for the State, as | under
stand them, urge with most confidence
as showing that neither party believed
: the marriage legal, and that, therefore
, it is void, and it is this feature which ha
excited. justly, as | think, some measure
of public indignation. But l DO no
Z think it shows that neither party believed
the marriage to be legal. 1t does shov
that they were ignorant of what tn
l courts of law had decided. If it wer
' the law that marriage was a civil contract
! governed by the same rules as all othe
| contracts, then it might follow that thu
r parties thereto might terminate the con
2 tract, but no such Iicentious law was eve
; pronounced bv any court. The formation