The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1875-01-12

on the same principle among as many
candidates rs he shall think ft; and such
directors or managers shall not be elected
in any other manner"
This clause vas no doubt intended by
those who inserted itin the chapter IN
regard to Banks to protect the rights Of
the minority, but It Is difficult to see
why the rights d the majority should be
sacrificed in order to do this. That the
rights Of the majority can be thus sacri-
feed Is easily shown by an example
Let us suppose a banking institution rep
resenting 100000 capital, divided into
say 1000 shares of SlOO each. Amaiority
of this stock lSay $40 shares can be
deieated BY minority OfRit, say 400
shares, The parties who hold the 400
shares can, II they so choose, form ring,
unknown to the balance, and by the Gu
mulatiye process elect eight out Of the
nine directors. That Is, by emitting
simply one name ont Of the nine, and
concentrating and Cumllatipg on eight
names they can elect eight HiRtAs pi q
Board iof nine directors. Or BY con-
centratiug aud cumulating on mere ma
jOrity OF the Board-say five directOrS-
they can elect them by q large majority
over any Eve Of the regular ticket 4
Now, 1t is plain that such power as
this, lodged In the hands Of the minority,
is perverslon OF all Justice, Not only
that, but, as the petition observes, ills de-
structive Of harmony and confidence in
the management Of a monied institution,
and consequently instead Of protecting
anybody's rights really injuries those Of
all concerned, the majority and minority,
1t is the experience Of all persons who
have had much to do withjOint stock com.
panies that there are always adiscOntented
few who are on hand at every election with
a grievance Of fsome kind, They are ready
to overturn the established order Of things
10 order to crafty their feelings, The
facilities for doing this are generally
ABUNDANT, enough irrespective Of The ad'
vantagts offered by cumulative voting
A few industrious sore heads can generally
gather. up "a large ppiohnt Of proxies
among the shareholders Of any corpora
tiOn in the city. As u common thing
shareholders are very accessible to APP
proaches Of this kind. They are really
too prone to give proxies to those who
seek them. And where there Ia u real
cause Of complaint against Board Of
Dirsetorsit j. generally an. easy matter
for those willing toiundSrgo tie tfonble
TO administer severe II not effective
rebuke to them, Why then put
It In the power Of q minority
to fetter the operations Of the
majority by springing trap on them
at elections. A concealed ticket, under
the cumulative system, that seeks to
elect a mere majority Of board Of
directors, cat always defeat q regular
ticket tllat expends its strength in voting
for the full complement Of directors.
There Is therefore . radical defect in
such a System, And the clause ought to be
so amended by the Legislature as to ac.
complish, instead Of defeat, the object OF
its trainers. Why not provide for scaling
the yoteoi large stockholders, "a isdOne
In some corporationS' Thut Is, allow
every share Of stock to represent one
vote npto certain point, and after that
only fraction of vote, This Is one OF
the most unobjectipnable method, Of pro.
testing the rights Of tic minority that
our laws hive yet provided.