National Republican., 1875-06-25
SHERMhNS GEORGIA RAID
Conifnued from First Page.)
HOODS ABSENCE MAKES GRANTS PLAN At
TRACTIyR

Gen. sherman became Strongly possessed with
the idea Of marching through 70 the sea without
hrst destroying Gen. Hood. He saw no risks In
leaving Atlanta, and no longer seemed to think IL
necessary for Grant to first take Savannah and
Canby to take Columbus. Any route through
Georgia, IN the absence Of Hood, was, as Gen.
Sherman expressed It in q telegram to Grant,
mot given IN = the Menoirsl AL oPen with no
Then the discussion between Sherman and
Grant began, not over the plan OF q march 70 the
sea, as has been already stated, but whether Sher
man should be allowed to make it Withou: first
running Hood.
Finally Sherman obtained permission by under
estimating Hoods forces, aud larely overestimat-
ing those proposed to be LEFT with Thomas, and
when Grant had been made to believe that
Thomas would have ample force to meet Hood IN
the field and destroy him, and net till then, did
he allow Sherman to 60.
The misrepresentation OF Thomas and Hoods
forces were as follows:
November !, Sherman telegraphed Grant 1.-THE
dispatch not being given in the Mem oirsl that
Hoods force was 80 900 infantry and from 1907 to
from 5000 to eoOeO, besides large force Of cav.
slry-noW stated in the Memoirs to have been
about 1o0oO-thus representing to Gen. Grant
10000, while Thomas had from e3 90 TO 10000. In
the came dispatch he informed Grant that he
had retained over So coo men for his march to the
sea, when, as the Official returns now printed Ia
his Memoirs (yol 2, p. 172J show, he retained
No wonder Gen. Grant was finally persuaded
to give up that part of his plan, which, for Its
frst step. involved the destruction Of Hood.
Gen. Sherman, in his book, (Vol. 2, p 1927 as
already quoted, now that he deems It necessary
for history to vindicate his march away from the
very enemy that for i've months had so stoutly
resisted the combined forces, and allowing him
to turn upon the fragments Left for Gen. Thomas
to gether up, states tbs forces available to Gen.
Thomas for fight as Nashville as from q, 900 TO
1000, besides 4, 100 cavalry, or total force Of
The ofScisi returns of the forces actually avail
able for the battle of Nashville which returns
were at Gen. Sherman's service when he prepared
cavalry, 10 5e6: artillery 3O61; total S. 72 or27,
22S less than Shermsn's lowest estimate.
A few extracts from Gen. Thomas report Of his
campaign will test all Of the above statements Of
Sherman:
At this time found myself confronted by the
army which, under Gen. j. Z. Johnston, had so
army ef the mifary dVsO1 Of the % Msssspp
from Dalton TO the ChattahOocnie, reinforced by a
Of oTer RTeiVe tRoassnd led y by one or the
boldest and most successful commanders in the
hrmed the reported Strength Of Hoods army to be
from forty to fsrty-hye thousand infantry, and
tive force, at this time, consisted OF the Four I
corps, about twelve thousand: under Major Gen.
thousand, under Major Gen. J. NJ. sehoheld; /;
Hatch's division Of cavalry, about four thousand;
rOn's brigade, OF about tW elys hundred. The ball
anes & Of my force was distributed along the rail-
Bridgeport Huntsville, Decatur and Chattanooga,
10 kseP e1 aPd te% eSiS Th
be EsinfSTced e up 10 this tine Il was impossible
vance on Ma hville, or turn toward Huntsville.
Under the circumstances 1t was mantle tll best to
j1s Try taking tie tfrensiTc.
II wss Therefore with con siderable anxiety that
what course they would pursue With rOgsTS to
Gen. ShermRn's movements, determining thereby
Ing less tbsn SSif those Of HOOD, were to act on
the defensive In Tennessee, or take the o1ensivs
Hoods forces following Gen. sherman were now
At an eld, and quickly took measEres to act on
Mai. Gen. A. j. smith, were reported on their
way to join me from Missouri. which with several
menf, and detGchments collected from points Of
minor Importance, would swell my command
when eoHcentrated to an army nearly as large as
Ny only resource then was 10 retire slowly to-
progress as much as possible to gain time for re-
tnf0rcemG nts to arrive and eoncentrAte.
thousand q, ,6oOj men belonging TO his Column had
collected at Chattanooga, comprising GONZALES
cents returning to their comm and and men re-
These men had been organized into brIgades to
needed. My command had also been REINFORCED
by twenty (2O) new one-year regiments, most OF
regiments wi Ose term Of service had expired.
The very dispatch which Gen. Sherman quotes
as Grants assent to the march shows that he
gave 1t upon the ground that Thomas with the
force Sherman said he had left him could destroy
Hood. This telegram was in reply to one Of No.
vember !, given just above, misstating Thomas
available force. After saying that he had tele-
grRphed Sherman on the same day that Hoods
army should be looked upon as the 'objeot," )" the
dispatch continued:
Gen. Thomas, he must beIa6Ie TO take care OF Hood
and destroy him. - II say, then, go on as you
propose.
Gen. Sherman interprets the last clause Of this
order as II 1t read "Go Oh and execute the march
to the sea, which you had originated" !" when, in
fact, he should have interpreted it "You pro-
pose to march without first destroying Hood. As
Thomas can now take care Of him, say 60"
sHERMAN's MARCH THE "oRIaINAL" PLAN.
There is one expression in the eongratulatory
order issued by Gen. Sherman after reaching
Savannah that cannot we'll be explained In ac-
march to the sea. Some weeks after Capturing
speaking Of Hoods movement to his
rear as an attempt to decoy him out Of Georgia,
were not thus to be led away BY him, and pre-
ferred TO lead and control events ourselves. Gen
erals Thomas and SchOtield, commanding the de-
partments to our rear, returned to their posts and
proposed to decoy Gen. Hood into their meshes
while We came on to complete the original jour
When Gen. Sherman wrote of our "oriRinal
journey" he may have had in mind a letter he
wrote Gen. Banks. then In Louisiana, dated Nash
vile, April 3, 1864. 1t contained the following
paragraph:
you turn against Mobile our forces VIII again act
toward the same end, though from distant points,
less see that all minor objects are disregar de l. and
that all the armies act on a common plan.
Two weeks before this he had returned from
the Cincinnati conference with Gen. Grant,
where the latter communicated to him the plan
Of the Atlanta campaign, and the movement be-
yond to Mobile, as he had In the previous Janu.
ary made them known to Gen. Thomas. As will
be seen, the date Of the letter Is about a month
before the opening OF the Atlanta campaign, and
over i've months before the time (Sept. 21) claimed
by Gen. Sherman as the earliest time when he
had the march to the sea in his minds eye." II
will further be seen by the records produced in
this letter that up to the date Of the last dispatch
Atlanta, he named Mobile as his possible o6jec-
tive.
OMITTED RECORDS.
There are some Singular aud important omis-
sions in Gen. SheTman's story On page lG5 after
quoting Grants dispatch Of Nov. 2, given above,
he says: - This (Nov. p was the first time that
Gen. Grant assentcd to the march to the sea-"
And yet In reply to his telegram Of Oct: IL
three weeks before-Grant had replied as follows:
CITY PoITT T, Oct. IL, 1854, n:So .. m.
Your dispatch u to-day received. If you are sat.
the line OF the Tennessee river firmly, you may
make IL destroying all the railroad south Of Dali
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
In.this permission also the conditions Of hold
Ing firmly against Hood is prominent.
The next day also General Grant again teIe-
graphed as follows:
CRY PoIYT, Oct. Il, 1864, p. m:
General Sherman, Kingston:
on rejection, think better oi your proposition;
70 come North. You Will no doubt, clear the coun-
Try where you go Of railroad tracks and supplies.
US. GRANT, Lieutenant General.
General Sherman, on psgel54 says he received
DO answer to his Kingston dispatch Tat the time"
The reason Is obvious. 1t was dated 11:30 p. Of
he llth, and the nextday Sherman LEFT for Rome.
His telegraphtc communications with Kingston
Ind with Washington, however, remained per-
eet, and 1t is not likely that . dispatch from the
chief, directing the march Of an
lrmy through to the sea coast, would be long de-
aged. If he had never received It In the Held,
loWeVer, he need not have made the above mis-
AXE Of three weeks in his history in so important
date, since General Grants reply Of October IL
printed In full in his hnAl report OF the Oper.
Ltions Of the armies.
On page l5T Sherman says: " So It is clear that
Iboutthat date October ~ ueitheI General Grant
lor GeneralThomas heartily favored my proposed
,lan Of campaign" And yet the day before this
le had telegraphed Halleck:
got the dispatch in cipher about providing me
place TO come out on salt water, but the cipher Is
imperfect, and cannot make out whether savannah
II Mobile be preferred; but also want to know If
ou are willing that should destroy Atlanta and
he railroad.
And on this very date October III he had re-
eeeived the following from General Grant:
The moment know you have started South stores
will be shipped TO Hilton Head, wnere there are
ready to take them to meet you at Savan
ah. In case you 20 South would not propose
olding anything south OF Chattanooga, certainly
lot south OF Dalton. Destroy In such case all OF
Military value In Atlanta.
As early as October 13-tWo weeks before Gen.
raj Sherman claims that he finally decided on
lie msrch-Gensrsl Grant had ordered co-operat-
ng forces to proceed to the coast below Savannah
nd move inland against the Gulf railroad. This