National Republican. (Washington City (D.C.)) 1872-1888, 1875-10-30

Army of the Cumberland from the insinua
tons of General Sherman, in the last number
of the Gdldry. He was present, (as was also
General Boynton,) and knows the whole his
tory of the battle, and the movements that led
to it, and what was expected and what was
accomplished by each of the armies partici-
pating. His authority is indisputable, and in
his article is seen the generous tribute of
true soldier to his brave comrades.
The puerility of the excuses given by Gen.
eral Sherman for many of his mistakes and
plumbers is made apparent. These excuses
would be absolutely ludicrous If the subject
was one that admitted of levity in dealing
with it. For instance, in relation to the battle
of Shiloh General Sherman says:
'Tt was necessary that a combat, fierce and
bitter, to test the manhood of the two armies,
should come of, and that was as good place
as any. 1t was not then question of military
skill and strategy, but the courage and pluck,
and am convinced that every life lost that
day to us was necessary, for otherwise, at
Corinth, at Memphis, at Vicksburg, we would
have found harder resistance had we not shown
our enemies that rude and untutored as we
were we could fight as well as they"
OF this General Boynton Justly remarks
"A well-ordered line of battle, some rifle
pits and vigilant watch for an approaching
enemy, followed by such fighting as these pre-
cautions would have insured, might have made
even better impression upon the rebels with
a good saving oflife."
Read General Sherman's excuse for the as
sault on Kenesaw:
1.-THE assault made was no mistake. I
had to do it. The enemy aud our own army
and officers had settled down into the convic-
hot tho of 1inac fOru1ad M part
of my game, and the moment the enemy was
found behind anything like parapet, why
everybody would deploy, throw up counter
works and take it easy, leaving it to the odd
Man to turn the position"
And this is his excuse for an
UTTERLY USELESS SACRIFICE OF TWO THOU
SAND SOLDIERS,
killed and wounded, who were hurled against
an impregnable mountainl 1t was to teach
their surviving comrades that the business of
the army was to fight, and to teach the rebels
that our army could fight.
Read this excuse for permitting the Army of
the Tennessee to fight the desperate battle of
the 22d of July in front of Atlanta,unaided:
I" purposely allowed the Army of the Ten
nessee to fight this battle almost unaided, save
by demonstrations .on the part of Generals
Sehofield and Thomas against the fortified
lines TO their immediate fronts, and by de-
taching, as described, one of Schofield's brig
AIDES to Decatur, because knew that the at
lacking force could only be part of Hoods
army, and that, if any assistance were rem
dered by either of the other armies, the Army of
the Tennessee would be jealous. Nobly did
they do their work that day, and terrible
was the slaughter done 70 our enemy, though
at sad cost to ourselves"
Remember that this army was engaged in
an almost hand-to-hand contest with the
enemy; they were surrounded on three sides and
being slaughtered by hundreds, and imagine
how jealousy they would have looked upon one
or two divisions Of the army which was lying
idly by, within sight and hearing, coming to
their rescue! But General Sherman, much to
the surprise of all officers present on the field,
did not send any assistance, and now we know
why.
A chapter is devoted to the far-famed march
to the sea, and the question of whether it was
planned by General Grant or General Sherman.
General Sherman quotes portion of the record
by which General Grant is made to appear as
rather opposing at first and finally reluctantly
consenting to the movement on the representa-
tions of General Sherman. General Beynton
publishes the whole of the record, by which It
appears that General Grants reluctance to
consent to the movement was caused solely by
his anxiety to have some guaranty that Hoods
army should not make counter-rad to the
Ohio river while Sherman made his march
through an unprotected country to the sea.
General Sherman finally carried his point, and
started for the sea with the most mobile, best
equipped and most thoroughly organized por-
ton of his army, leaving his Heutenants,
Thomas and Schofeld, with an inferior force of
scattered troops, poorly supplied with Ill
equipped cavalry, to cope with the only army
that could have opposed or thrown any obsta-
cles in the way of General Sherman's army.
How well the duty assigned to these officers
was performed let Franklin and Nashville at
test. Had these battles not been fought and
won in spite of all these disadvantages, the
march to the sea would have been adjudged,
to use the language of General Sherman, 'fthe
wild adventure of a crazy fool"
The most valuable and interesting portion
of the volume before us is that which treats of
THE SURRENDER OF JOHNSTON TO SHERMAN;
or, rather of the attempted surrender of Sher-
man to Johnston. The friends of Mr.. Stanton
should be grateful for the patience and intelli-
gent fidelity to the memory of the great War
Minister with which the author has collated
and published to the world the facts in relation
to the unfortunate controversy between two
among the most prominent actors in the great
struggle which each in his proper place had
contributed so materially to bring to a success
full close. In describing his interview with
General Johnston, General Sherman says,in..his
"Memoirs:"
"While we were in consultation a messen-
ger came with parcel OF papers, which Gen.
eral Johnston said were from Mr.. Reagan,
Postmaster General. he and Breekinridge
looked over them, and, after some side CONVEX
satson, he handed one of the papers to me. It
was in Resgan's handwriting, and began with
q long premable and terms, so general
and verbose that said they were inadmis-
sible." "Neither Mr.. Breckenridge
nor General Johnston wrote one word of that
paper. / wrote 1t myself, and announced 1t as
the best that could do, and the5 readily as
seuted."
We suppose General Sherman tells the truth
when he says, a. wrote II myself" But for
all that 1t very curiously resembles, in phrase
ology, the paper " in Reagan's handwriting"
"a fac simile OF which paper is published in the
book which Breckinridge handed to General
Sherman. General Johnston, in his narrative
of the affair, says that the terms prepared by
General Sherman differed from those drafted
by Mr.. Reagan ''only in being fuller" aud
comparison of the. two papers shows that
General Johnston is correct, and General sher-
man mistaken. The terms were substantially
those proposed and drafted by member Of
JEFF. Davis Cabinet, and approved by that
Cabinet, as Is evidenced by the letters from all