, 1875-01-24

THE PROSPECTS OF WAR IN EUROPE.
There has for many months been sup
pressed apprehension on both continents
of European war in the near future.
This apprehension has more recently taken
form and expression in the newspaper press
Of England aud America, where alone such o
topic may be discussed with freedom. The
turning point in the transition from peace to
Wet is set at the death Of the Pope, an event
which is soon expected; the war to be poht-
ico-ecclesiastical struggle, in which all the
European powers must take part on one side
made to do service as prophet. The veri-
fcation of his prediction Of the Franco-Prus-
sian War Of 1901 is cited to give his
''Lothair musings the color Of authority as
to the religious war to be waged upon the
death Of the long-lived P1us.
Willie we admit that the European situa~
ton is sufficiently complicated to warrant
serious apprehensions, we can hardly conceive
TINT Europe can at this day be plugged into
a general wnr over a theoretical dif-
ference as to Church dogma or discipline !;
and this is now all that the Papol question
means. The temporal power Of the Pope
has been definitely disposed Of for oil time.
Italy has settled that question without prnc-
tical help On the one side or practical opposi-
ton on the other. Civilization has advanced
too far to be now absorbed in gigantic
struggle Of peoples over dogmatic disputa-
ton. The struggle is one Of Intelligence
and Reason against Ignorance and Supersti-
ton in our age, when the latter must give way
before the superior mental forces Of the
former, and is denieAeven an appeal to its sole
resort of arns> In any general European
war, growing out Of aggressive tendencies or
national traditions, the Ultramontane ques-
ton might exert an important influence; but
it could not Of itself call Europe to arms.
War is a temporal institution, and religious
wars belonged to the times when Kings were
instruments Of the Popes and whole nations
swayed by tue priesthood That time is long
since passed The temporal power Of the
Church is no longer dominant; it needs no
general war to put it down
We must look elsewhere for nm explanation
Of the apprehensive feelings which unques-
tionably exist as to European war, and
which found significant expression in re-
cent "inspired" editorial in the London
Times. We may group the possible causes Of
war in Europe Us follows: () Frances hos
tile disposition towards the German Empire;
(2) the alleged greed Of the German En-
pirs for tho acquisition Of territory
and the extension of power; (3) Russia's
designs on the Dandane]les and that
portion Of Turkey commanding the Black
Sea; {4) the jealousy Of Austria and England
as to Eussia's proposed acquisitions; 80 the
OF all the European powers,
except Russia, as to the commercial aud mill
tary growth Of the German Empire. ANY or
all Of these provocatives TO war may be mod
ifed by tho Ultramontane question; in some
cases it would exert on adverse, and in others
a favorable, influence, but it cannot in itself
precipitate general struggle. The warliko
powers OF Europe to-aay, so far as general
wager Of battles goes, are narrowed down TO
hree,--Russia, Germany, and France. Great
Britain could only bs drawn into war to
defend her possessions Of commercial value,
and hardly for that purpose Austria's weak
ness was demonstrated BY the SIX weeks war
of 1866, which cost her so dearly, and she
would only take part as an ally, if at all.
1taly is Loo happy in the solution OF the
Bourbon and ecclesiastical troubles which
have Distracted her for centuries to court any
trial of strength that may be avorted. Spain
is torn by dissennons at homo which
she cannot control, md will have
to do to hold Cuba. The
smaller powers-Belgiun, Denmark, Holland.
Sweden, Norway, and Turkey-only tremble
at the vast armaments Of their neighbors, and
will only fight in desperation for self-e1ist-
ence. War to them means disaster and bunk
ruptcy, md perhaps annihilation.
Narrowed down to France, Germany, and
Russia, We find: France, eager n the tiger
10 spring upon its traditional foe, lacks the
.iger's strength. It requires more than four
years to obiterate such an experience as
France has suffered. She has had no time
nor system for rccuperation; if unable
% cope with half-united Germany four
years ago, NoAA 10 SAee1 1ou4
% attempt it now against united Germany.
France still lacks the physical strength, the
military system, and the educational enlight-
,nment for war with Germany. The
French family is too small to battle with the
German family. It's avernge number is four,
With but ono efficient male member. The
ather, married late in life, is old and dccrep-
d when the single son becomes Of fighting
Ige- France is decreasing in population at
he rate Of 100, 600 year, though she suffers
nothing from emigration; once Frenchnan,
lwaysa Frenchman- Germany isincreasinz in
population at the ratio Of 50o,o 600 year in spite
# the constant drain made upon her adoles-
ence by America Tbs German family gen.
rally numbers six to ten souls, and when one
on falls there is another to take his place.
The result ia that France has but one army,
nd that light weight; Germany has
hree armies,-tho standing, the militia,
nd the reserves,-hale, strong, efficient, and
ystemntic. France is in NO condition, alone
nd singlo-handed, to renew tho attack on |
aud Rusaia is the only power that
ou1d, by any tmn of events, DO brought toto
d alliance But nlrasta, alon& Of III ths