The New York herald., 1875-10-02

pOSI IeIT I6
Baltimore pike on Cemetery ridge. This no literally
did. IL Is little remarkable that he should have 5,
/ quickly and fully compiled with my order with
| did not for orders often msoarry when III,
| fighting is as fierce as It was there II he di,
/ not he "guidcd, you say and some officer u
/ mine must have guided him TO the exact position
pointed out General Hancock found them there L
the south OF the Baltimore pike took from him Wads
worths division and led II himself Cups Hill
while was organizing the retreating brgades reg
ments OF the Eleventh corps and putting them in posi-
ton. As TO General Buford, he my right flank
with his cavalry He gave me information constantly
and kept an officer with an orderly habtualy with
him. He finally moved at my instance, from the right
and prolonged the New Cemetery line OF battle the
left thus giving General Lee his impression that had
at four T. NJ superior force 10 the assault that
contemplated; but the movement checked by
himself for the reason he states Of his uncertainty
Of our strength and his perception OF the exceency 81
our position
OF attempting TO string out his own divisions in one
thin continuous line, &C
| | did not cover a third OF General Lees line. The
artillery, except two batteries of the Eleventh corps
located on Cemetery Hl supported by Steinwehrs
division OF infantry The space between the two corps
was not unusual and two batteries were there TO com
mand the ground The lines OF the Eleventh corps
were thinner than those of the First corps The
simple works. suggested by you could not be thrown
up under a brisk ire Had the lines been shorter
General Lee would have supposed my forces less, and
would much sooner have enveioped them.
'Or, had he made the north bank OF the north
branch Of Stevens Run his main line making the
Almshouse fortified point" Cemetery Hill, as a po-
sltion was better than the Stevens Kun and Aims
house POSITION and was partially fortified under my
eye
on page 75-''when he came upon the field he found
the First corps ground OF It's selection skfuly
posted for meeting front attack, but incapable OF
holding its own when pressed upon its tanks, and in
deed, at that moment most seriously threatened with
capture The position left for him take, and which
he forced to occupy to the First corps
not easily defensible, and by the time his corps
rived upon the field the enemy was already upon the
front and anks Of nat position in easy supporting
distance in numbers treble those he could bring op
pose them.p
The truth is here very well stated. Bear in mind
this primary object-viz 10 keep the enemy back by
boldness and persstency till the main army can join
This done with the loss of mile of ground but
not to my chosen poston-Cemetery HILL
"Reynods had noticed the great advantage 1t pre-
sened, and had designated It as the position which
TO hold his reserves, and as rayng point in case he
was forced back from the more advanced position in
front of the where lie had made his stand and had
himself early faenn
General Reynolds did not designate Cemetery Hill al
all. Had he lived he might have done so-would doubt
less, have done so-but he was cut oil before his lead
ing division was in position and before he had felt the
strength OF the enemy's forces. selected Cemetery
Hill after careful reconnaissance
Page 76.-'Von' Steinwehr accomplished sol
dier,n &c.
What is said OF General Won stenwehr to his praise
like. never mean to detract from anotherS fair
fame. STILL General Steinwehr Will testify himself that
work here imputed to hun certainly done with my
sanction, and much of it by my direction.
Page 18.-''Schemmelfnng, too, while attempting TO
stay his troops and hold them up to the tight taken
prisoner but subsequently managed TO escape and re-
joined his command"
Schemmelfnnig not taken prisoner. Having been
accidentally separated from his troops in the town he
hid himself among some piles Of boards and finally
joined US after the fight was over.
Page ST. LAS the two broken corps Of the Union
army ascendcd Cemetery Hill they met by stat
officers who turned the Eleventh corps to the right and
the First corps the left where they went into posi-
ton along the summit OF the ridge stretching out on
either hand from the Baltimore pike.n
The two corps were met by my stan officers
Page S6-''rhe chief command upon the field then
devolved upon General Doubleday which for upward OF
two hours he continued 10 exercise -
| assumed command upon the announcement Of the
death of General Reynolds, just before eleven A. NJ.
so that your statement regarding General Doubleday
being in CHI er command for two hours is mistake il
he had been in chief command he would have sent to
Sickes, Meade, Slocum, &c, and he being trained
soldier, would have made general field dispositions.
He did not do do not think he regarded himself
in Chief command for half hour. He certainly was
not.
Page s7.-"In my opinion there to be no d.
recting person. &c
cannot contradict the statement Of General Buford's
opinion. l do not wonder that he was full of appre
halsion and he judged me when troops were Civ
ing way l must leave my dispositions and work OF
that day the criticism of military men. believe
the dispositions were what the emergency called or,
and they made with frmness and coolness. Cen
eral Meade himself asked my forgiveness for msappre
hending me with regard to them and thanked me for
securing to his army what did with the timely and
efficient help Of General Hancock in the afternoon
Page S7.--"IL when Howard found that he no
longer able to hold his advanced position he had
dcred some demonstrations different parts of the
field, and planting pieces to have commanded the
main horoughares over which his troops should re-
tire &c.
/ did order demonstrations till the Eleventh corps
and the First hotly engaged control their
movements did send an entire brgade-Costar's, OF
StenwehrS divislon-o the front of the town
the retreat This brigade did efficient In just
the you suggest I'll was finally captured, owing
to the coggng OF troops that had passed them IN the
Streets due to the small neck for egress at the Balt
more pike.
You say further on, 'Howard is without excuse for
holding out 50 long
If had not held out long you would have no vic
tory at Gettysburg to record never'reused to order
retreat never The one referred TO was order TO
corps commander, General Doubleday, 'Hold out as
long you CAM did net believe 1t to deplete
Stenwehr further than had already done; IL not
time when general could throw in his reserves with
safety.
Page ss.-'1, seems that Howard, at council OF
corps commanders held at Chancelorsvie just before
army retired the river, voted TO remain and
fight giving a reason the misconduct OF his corps
forced him always to vote for assaulLng whether il
was the best thing to be done noLn
The remark imputed TO at Charlottesville is
true Ivoted TO Tight and did every General there
except General Slckes. He opposed for political
reasons as he stated. / wished to lead the men Of my
corps the attack because they mortified at the
panic Of the day before and ready for the work
but would not a conscientious man. have voted Tor
the army fight If had not believed It the best thing
tor the army to do. So that the words ''scnseless
polIcyn do not apply
You have given an interesting account OF the battle;
but could you have had my field notes read my letters
and reports conversed with me respecting the field,
as YOU have apparently done with others i feel sure
you would not have rateu me so poorly With General
Meade thanked by Congress, but did not seek
and am quite this Is the nrst letter have ever
written in my defence concerning my work at
Gettysburg. was in many large battles and tried to
do my country with all the energy and ability
my command, but have taken especial pride in
Gettysburg and am therefore, perhaps unduly sensitive
at adverse criticism. would not take from another s
fair record and II surely springs from envy when your
iniormers attempt to rob me Of mine With respect |
remain yours, q. o. HOWARD,
Brigader General U. 5. Army.