The weekly democratic statesman. [volume] (Austin, Tex.) 1871-1883, 1875-07-29
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land, IN the course OF which IT says:
The writers who An this country have
espoused the Federal cause have labored to
keep out Of sight the Northern violations
systematic and deliberate--of all the laws oil
war; the wholesale pillage ID private prop |
erty, without a shadow of a pretense OF
military need the wanton ravage OF vast |
and fertile regions the destruction OF pub
lie archives OF libraries, OF colleges ana OF /
Thousands of defenseless dwellings,; return, |
in. fact Ia the methods of war ill usage Of
Ivon,en excepted) practised by lilly. We |
know Of none who would venture 10 defend |
these as acts of Legitimate warfare, and !
among the chiefs Of the Federal armies few
were more guilty in this respect than Gen
w. n. sherman. We cannot say that our
perusaI of the work has raised our estimate
of the writer. There is a display of per
sonal vanity. OF anxiety to claim the utmost
possible credit, and TO throw the blame of
all failure on Others petulant spirit of
animosity against rivals and opponents. a
controversial tone in regard "a passages
creditable neither to the General, nor TO his
superiors, and childish impatience OF pop
ular clamor which appear to us little conso-|
Dant with the simple self-respect Of the sol
der. No one could imagine the Duke OF
Wellington or Gen. Lee writing as Sherman
writes-no one has seen anything of the
kind from the pen Of officers who have real
grounds OF complaint-from Mcclellan, who
first created an army out of the mob of
United States volunteers, or Halleck, who
maintained, recruited and enlarged that
army till it became the irresistible weapon
which won for Grant aud Sherman trumphs
as easy as those Of Achilles in his impene-
trable armor, or of the heroes of fairy legend
with charmed swords and shoes Of swift
ness.
Gen. Sherman had the misfortune at Ball
Run to share in the signal route of the
Union army. He does his best for the rep
utation of his countrymen by maintaining
that II they had not run away the Southern
ers would-an hypothesis which is as little
supported by the history of that battle as
by the subsequent facts of the war. He re-
turned to the West, and for the remainder
Of the war shared the fortunes of the
Western army, which, having the least ex-
cellent of the Southern troops and leaders
in its front, and being recruited from among
the hardy population OF the agricultural
Northwest, was able TO achieve much more
than the invaders Of Virginia, and really
did far more to determine the issue of the
war. Ger. Sherman rose steadily in mill
tary authority and in favor with the govern
ment, and played prominent part in the
federates the command of the Mississippi
aud determined the result of the entire con-
test. There can be little doubt that even
after the fall OF Fort Donelson the triumph
OF the invaders was due to an accident.
Had Gen. a. S. Johnston not been wounded
ut Shiloh, or, being wounded, had he had
his wound at once attended to, and go saved
his life and his control over tue army, Grant
would have been annihiated, and all that
had been won up to that time would have
been lost IN a week. The ronte of the
Federal forces was complete, and had the
Confederate chef pressed on, they must
have surrendered or dispersed. The trans
fer of command was fatal; and next day
new Federal army appeared on the field and
defeated the WORKOUT Confederates. On
this as on other occasions, Gen. Sherman
anxiously endeavors to overrate the forces
opposed to him. The fact is, that when
they gave or invited battle the Confederates
were rarely more than one to two; when
they were forced to battle, they were often
one TO three or four, and in Sherman's later
campaigns, after leaving Atlanta, lie had
seldom or never one.fourth Of his own NUM-
bers in front. And, as we shall see, it was
10 numbers alone that he owed his success
The next perind, while Sherman occupied
subordinate but independent commands, at
forded him opportunity OF showing the
spirit in which he was determined 10 carry
on the struggle and illustrated Northern
ideas Of the laws Of civilized war. No,
only did he, like other Federal chiefs, seize
everything that could be useful To his army
and destroy everything that could be ser.
viceable to.the enemy, bu. he made point
of confiscating and destroying private prop
erty simply on the plea that it belonged to
men who, in the war he was waging, were
loyal to the government under which they
were born and had always liyed-the gov
eminent of their State. That he was aware
OF the illegality of his conduct is evident
from the many paltry and transparent ex-
cuses he makes TO conceal its true character.
Thus at Nashville he gave orders to seize
all houses not occupied, and all house-rents
due to absentees, evading an open coniisca,
ton ofallproperty belonging to Confederate
soldiers or citizens. But he warned the
people that all who remained would be con
sidered as having cast in theirlot with thcin-
vaders, would be liable TO be called out in
their service, and forced at their peril to
swear allegiance 70 the Union, and having
thus driven every honest Southerner outside
the city, he made their absence an excuse
tor robbing them. His troops systematically
stole, piliaged and ravaged and, though he
pr0fessed TO discountenance their conduct,
he made not the shadow OF an effort to pre-
vent II. The savage havoc committed by
Sheridan in the Shenandoah Valley was ex-
cused on the plea that the enemy might
draw supplies thence-a plea which would
justify invaders, Germans in France or Eng.
land, or French in Gernany--ln DESTROYING
allfood within reach of their cavalry, and
booming millions TO starvation, but which
could not excuse Sheridan in burning houses
and furniture wherever he passed, or ms
men in destroying women's clothes and
forcibly rob5ing them Of their jewelry. But
Sherman's proceedings We're without any
plea Of military advantage. HIS plea to bis
owa government was that he desired to
make the rebels feel the miseries Of war
In order TO compel their submissions piles
which puts him exactly on level with tn,
worst rntlians of the Thirty Years War ol
with the devastators of the Palatinate..,
To sherman was instructed the duty Of
following mp and destroying the second
army of the South, which, under JOSEPH
Johnston, was free to- move much at IT:
pleasure; while Grant closed in on the army
OF Lee, tethered as il was to Richmond ano
cut OIL from all endorsements except such
as the Carolinas or Virginia herself could
furnish from. nearly exhausted population.
Both chiefs acted on the same principle,
AnSI supply u thcu MAS u0nmlteu; II they
could kill one Southerner for three of theil
own soldiers they must soon ere long wea
out the Confederate forces. And both faree
much alike. Grant threw himself, over ant
over again, upon Lee, and over and owe
again was so well beaten that If the UnioI
forces had been only double those Of tn
South the spring Of 1865 would have seer
another invasion Of Pennsylvania. Sherman
assaulted Johnston somewhat more wlsel'
and wariiy, but with equally little honor
But In each case the beaten army was 5,
overwhelmingly superior in nambefs that i
had only 70 swing round part OF its fore,
beh,nd the enenay's flank In order to compe
him ~ tr4fr,.af n, ~. - n ~ - 1