Knoxville Whig and chronicle. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1875-1882, 1875-06-02

i
questionably the true policy, and the
writer of this, having carried to Sher-
man the first news Of his removal,
and Hoods appointment as his sue
cessor. knows from personal knowl-
edge, that not only the Union Com
mander, but all dis associates, felt
relieved by the triumph of Davis
foolish policy and change OF com
manders.
But those who imagine that Sher-
mans ability as 4 Commander, or his
success in the campaign under con-
sideratior, is to be measured by the
number Of graves he left behind him,
know but little of its history. 1t was
one great battle from the day the
tents of the army we're folded about
Dalton to the day they were pitched
about the captured city, which was
the objective point Of the four
months campaign. The part Of
Northern Georgia over which the con-
tending armies passed, was honey.
combed with fortified camps. Every
night miles of formidable earth-worlls
were constructed, and the armies
slept for four months upon their arms
within rifle range of each other. That
Sherman's vigorous and brilliant
maneuvers did not bring pitched bat
ties and bloody victories was because
his wary enemy checkmated his every
advance by defensive movement
quite as brilliant. When, after a
weeks rapid and hard march on John
ston's TANKS, Sherman's veterans
expected to bag a sleeping army,
they found in its stead hardly so
much as a broken, worthless wagon
wheel to mark that army's retreat. it
was not because Of any defect in
their Generals plans. or in the accu-
racy or promptness Of the execution,
hut because their enemy was ably
led, and that leaders army band
Of brave and experienced soldiers,
To measure the need of praise to be
awarded Sherman and his army by
the number of pitched battles fought
or loss in life, would therefore be I'M
just.
But do those who criticise that
campaign and its results have any
conception of the difficulties overcome
by the offensive army: On the Po-
tomac, and all through the campaign
to Richmond, our armies moved par
allel, or nearly 50. with water and
rail routes for transportation. They
were always near their base Of sup
plies, and those supplies we're always
abundant and Of the best. But how
was it with Sherman From the
Ohio, every mile South. his line Of
communication was subject to con-
slant interruption. 1t ran through
the enemy's country. An
army of one hundred thou.
sand men was supplied by a single
line Of railroad threading through
four hundred miles of hostile terri
tory What supplies were needed
A rough estimate made for another
occasion may give some idea. The
transportation for Sherman's army
consisted Of over 5000 wagons,
drawn by $4,000 mules, 500 ambu,
lances drawn by 1000 horses, and
near 800 pieces of artillery drawn by
| 5000 horses. The mounted officers
and orderlies made near 5000 addi
tional horses TO feed. The rations
consumed ereIy dqy by the army
would weigh 100000 pounds. The
forage for As, 500 animals would weigh
. 100000 pounds. The ammunition
transported would weigh 100000 tons
! These G,000 wagons, carrying the
equipments and stores for the army il
moving on one road, would stretch
out nearly sixty miles. The infantry
if moving in one line, would block Q
road for fifteen miles The whole
army if marching on one road would
have reached almost from Chatta
nooga to Atlanta. Let the reader
take his map and glance over north
ern Georgia. Look at its countless
streams, mountains and rough roads
Think then Of maneuvering such an
army in the interminable pine forest:
. Of Such n cOuntrv with an active tire