The New Orleans bulletin. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1874-1876, 1875-07-04
THE NAPoLEONIO LEGEHD.

THE NAP0LEONIO Legend.
One Of the results of the late imperial co
lapse in France has been reaction sgaini
the idol.worship of the great founder OF th
Napoleon dynasty. The political errors {
that extraordinary man had long before bee
pointed out by Theirs, in the last part OF hi
world-famous history Of the Consulate an
the Empire, but it is only within rece1
period that French writer's of eminence hav
ventured to review his military career in
critical spirit, and to suggest what twent
years ago would HAYES been looked upon q
little short of blasphemous and treasonabl
doubts as TO the military infallibility Of th
great captain of the age. 9a e1H
The first telling blow in that direction Wa
delivered by Col. Charras. in his critica
examination of the campaign which came t.
such disastrous ending on the field o
Waterloo. Mr.. Lanfrey, one of the most dis
tirguished writer's of the day, followed suit in
his history of Napoleon the First which is
still unfinished, the fifth volume having just
been issued in Paris, and whatever degree Of
truth and justice there may be in his severe
structures upon the alleged mistakes OF the
popular idol, certain it is that his iconoclastic
zeal has no way injured the circulation of his
work, every volume Of which has been
eagerly read as soon as it appeared. And
now we have before us-a pamphlet entitled,
"Sur lie genie militaire de Bonaparte, which
e. 1oco saSooy p
Eugene Littre, one OF the profoundest think
ers and incomparably the most encyclopedia
mind of the period. ~. u Nh Mail.
In that pamphlet, which is reproduction
in popular form of series of exhaustive
articles published in 1869, in the Revue de
Philosophic Positive, the learned author in
quires how it happened that Napoleon's mill
tary career had two opposite phases the first
being invariably successful, and the other
the reverse, and whether his genius alone is
to be credited with the one, and fatality" to
be charged with the other. His conclusion is
that the disasters which the blind admirers of
Napoleon and almost all his contemporaries
ascribed to fatality" from mistaken patri-
that his military genius, however transoendant
under given state of things, fell below the
capacity of his opponents when the circun-
stances which favored its formidable develop
ment were no longer present. After review
ing his brilliant Italian and German cam
paigns, followed by the browning triumph
over Russia at Friedland, he remarks that in
that series Of successes so grand, so contin-
ued, and so decisive. which placed Austria,
Prussia and Russia hors de combat nothing
was left to chance. As t8.,.4 ea 5.a arr 1
The eye Of the commander fixed upon the
point where the blow was to be struck, his
mind devised TIE means of doing it, and his
will carried every thing out with as much
rapidity as certainty. But-adds Mr.. Littre-
it should not be forgotten that all these opera
tons were Of the offensive kind, and that the
offensive mode of attack can be signally
thwarted by q general skilled in defensive
warfare, and capable OF wearing out the
enemy's strength by the adoption of q Fabian
system of resistance. Such, he says, was not
The case with the enemies he then had to con-
tend against Those armies were flushed |
with military ardor and professional pride,
and Just as anxious for action as his own, but |
with him in powers of combination, 10 de-
cision or rapidity Of execution. Finally, the |
troops which he commanded were eminently |
effective, warlike and imbued with the ira
ditions and the passions Of the Republican
era; no effort was too great for them, whether
Ior attack or defense, and they sustained with
base the heaviest trials of fatigue and endur-
ance. Hence, every thing contributed to
,uccess-the excellence Of the soldiers, the
genius of their leader, the offensive system Of
warfare, whereby campaigns were often de-
'ided in single day and on single battle
ield. OIL sas ~ ss.. Bla
But in 1908, having no enemy to fight ex-
'ept England, whose insular position placed
Ter beyond his reach, he conceived the obi
'us plan of invading and possessing himself
# a neighboring country whose soldiers were
t the very moment incorporated with his own
rmy in the North of Europe. To this treach-
rous act, which, as M. Lttre justly observes,
vas worthy iof the Italian condo.tiri of the
ixteenth century. Spain responded by a
universal rising, whose immediate result,
hanks to Napoleon's want of foresight, was
he ignominious surrender of q French army |
ovps in the South of Spain and the surren-
er of Juaot to the British commander in
'ortugal Recalling his troops from Ger
,any, Napoleon then hunted them into Spain,
spersed the Spanish armies. and after max
ag triumphant entry into Madrid, left that
ountry never to return. a. e-io-5e 81
The pretext of this change was the war
nth Austria, but as this was brought to
issne in 1909, and Napoleon spent
be whole period embraced between 1910 and
81 in his palace of the Tuilleries, Mr.. Littre
uggests that he left the Spanish war to be
onducted by his lieutenants, because he had
10 taste for the mode of fiuhtino which had