, 1874-04-08

have been inflated and overset by too great
success. But we do not regard this as a pro-
bable explanation of Prince BiSmarck's un-
usual and reiterated TRADES against France.
If that were the true explanation, we should
in all probability see other signs of moral
intoxication. We are strongly disposed, then,
to believe that the wish to keep up vigil
lance and alarm in Germany and hearty
union amongst the Professionals, whom he
probably rightly regards as the true core
of the empire, is even more truly the expIana-
ton of his apparently eXcitable outbreaks
against France, than any motive which has It's
end in French national action. But IN addl-
ton to this, it is quite likely, we think, that he
persuades himself that i~nvective against France
must have one of two effects. Either it must
COW the French, who are, as he knows, usually
a cautious and very nervous people or it
must inhame them into one of their sudden
spasms of passion and he probably says to
himself that either of these results would serve
his purpose equally well. If they are cowed
by hearing the great statesman who has COM
passed their downfall talking of them with such
contemptuous disgust, he will by that means
secure a respite from war without any danger
that Germany will relapse into apathetlc secu-
rity. The tranquility ensured by language SO
high and aggressive as his can never be regard
ed as more than an armed peace that armed
peace which Count Won M0ltke said must last
for fifty wears at least. If, on the contrary,
this language should provoke France into some
new spasmodic OutburSt Of wrath, then Prince
Bismarck would get the opportunity that ru-
mour says he is so a~nXiOusly waiting tor, to Sc
cure Germany from her foe by a military DIS
memberment of France and for this policy
too, he would have prepared Germany by the
language he has so Sedulously used against
France. Thus, as we understand Prince Bis
marks very unusual regimen of bllstering for
the patient he has already so effectually bled,
it is meant, in the first instance, to keep up in
Germany the sense of danger and of vigilance
which tends to distract the national attention
from critical home questions next, to subdue
and break the spirit of France by the evidence
it gives of naughty contempt for French power
and complete Indifference to French feeling /;
or, lastly, if that should not be the effect, to
accustom Europe and Germany to the idea
that France is an intoIerable neighbour, whose
next attack upon Germany must be punished
with something worse than fine and trivial rec
tifcations of boundary,-by dismemberment on
a large scale.
But while we hold it quite likely that this is
Prince Bismarck's deliberate policy, and not
in any way the result of the political intoxica-
ton of success, we cannot doubt thaG such q
policy itself betrays something of that over-con-
fdence of purpose and dictatorial presnmptu-
BUSINESS of feeling which is a much milder, be-
cause an intellectual, form of undue exaltation
of mind. Deliberate 8corn, publicly expressed,
is a most dangerous political weapon, which
hardly any man can use securely. 1t has a
tendency to alarm and ALLEVIATE other nations
besides the object of it. There is a s0Hdarst6
of feeling between nations on this head which
it is impossible to destroy. No one will forget
that though French vanity was ready to his
hand, Prince Bismarck deliberately ~irritated it in
to the outbreak which led to the great victo-
ries of 1870. The ostentatious adoption of a
similar policy a second time, and this time
with so much greater a power at his disposal,
will gradually alarm all Europe and should
the French show any kind Of fortitude and pa
tience under it, as it is reasonable after such a
disaster to expect, it is more than probable,
that they will be gaining and he will be losing
allies, by every taunt which Prince Bismarck
filings at them. We do not think Prince Bis
marck is off his head. We think he is playing
one of his old, deep, candid games. But we
believe he is playing a very dangerous game
which he may be very likely indeed to find a
losing one for German influence, and indeed
one better calculated than any other he could
adopt to win new friendships and alliances for
France. No European Power, however great,