The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1874-10-30
bloody contests between the few and the
many that strewed the road from the Rapi-
dan TO the james With thousands OF dead and

dan TO the james With thousands Of dead ane
Il wounded.
/ But while Richmond could thus be easily
approached by water, and while il bad none
OF the advantages Of an inferior CITY even a.
against an adrarce Of the enemy by land
the difficulty of defending it in case q Fede.
raj army too strong to De dislodged should
succeed in establishing itself near the city
was lnsuperabe. Such a state Of affairs re.
Tersed all the conditions of successful re.
slstance by weak to strong force.
IL would impose upon the weaker army
the protection of long lines OF railroad,
without which neither the troops nor the
population could be supplied. while the
stronger army would be perfectly safe in its
communications and free to use every man
for the purpose of attack.
But 1t is unnecessary for me to point out
to those who took par; in the defence OF
Richmond the manifold and fatal disadyan.
tages they struggled so brayely to overcome.
have said enough 10 show the difficulties
that beset that defence, and yet all these
difficulties wire added to the duties, cares,
and labors of the Army of Northern Yir-
ginia.
| have only time to refer to one or two
| Illustrations OF the disadvantages which the
defence OF Richmond, in order to maintain
itself in Northern Virginia, imposed upon
the army-disadVau.ages proceeding alto
| gether from the exposed situation OF the
city and the absolute naval supremacy of the
| enemy.
1t is plain that the necessity of looking to
the defence of the city against the great
peril to which it was constantly exposed d
conld not fail to Influence and control the
| operations Of the army.
| You will remember how. in the winter of
| 1S62-'63, tine fear OF an advance oi tue enemy
on the south side Of the james caused the
detachment from the army ut Fredericks.
burg of the greater part of Lonsstreet's
corps. and the apprehension of danger to
| Richmond from that direction was so great
! that it NaS not considered t2pCdient 10 ic-
| turn these troops 10 the army even for the
purpose Of taking part in the battle OF
| Charlottesville. The aDscuce of these troops
exposed the army Of General Lee to the
greatest peril, and perhaps stripped the vic
tory of Charlottesville OF lie ii uits IL mignt
| have borne.
| Again, you will remember that the pre-.
| sence of a Federal fleet in the James
and the movement Of a Federal army
| from Bermuda Hundreds detained from
Us one Of the strongest divisions
of Longstreet's corps while we were
| graphing with our gigantic enemy IN the
Wilderness and at Spotsylvania Courthouse.
| The same necessity prevented Us from
| calling to our assistance the other troops. un-
| der General Beauregard, on the south side of
| the james, with whose aid We might once
more have rolled the tide Of war back to
our northern border and made the result OF
| the enemy's campaign of 1864 like that Of
1862 and of 1863.
| But the most marked influence which the
| situation OF Richmond and the necessity of
providing for its defence eXerted upon the
conduct Of the war in Virginia was in its
connection with the expeditions Of the army
beyond the Potomac.
| This | shall endeayor briefly to explain.
| The great advantages which the enemy
would have in besieging Richmond We're SO
Apparent that it was a saying of the COM
mander of the Army Of Northern Virginia
| that Richmond was never so safe as when its
| defenders were absent. His meaning was
that the safely OF Richmond depended upon
our ability TO employ the enemy at dis.
tance and prevent his near approach to the
| city.
Such was the policy adopted by him, and
which secured the comparative safety OF
| Richmond from the time the army moved
| northward in 1862 TO the time when, worn
out with more than two years OF cXhauStlng
| war, it was forced to retire within the en-.
| trenchments of Richmond before the great
| and erer-increasing multitudes OF its adYer-
sary.
But it was only bv acting upon the appre.
| tensions of the enemy that such result
could be attained with the force under Gene
| raj Lees command.
Accordingly, when By the second battle OF
Manassas he had driyeG the united forces OF
Pope and Nc cClellan, with all the rtlnforce-
pents that had been added TO them, back
| upon the defences of Washington. it DecauIe
necessary tor General Lee to decide how he
could prevent them from sending an
expedition by water against Richmond. and
thus necessitating the withdrawal or the
army from Northern Virginia to defend tie
city. TO do this would De practically To
give up the advantages We hau gained IN
the campaign from Richmond TO Manassas.
Il was out Of the question 10 attempt
to besie9e the Federal army III tue ue-
fences OF Washington south OF the Poto-
mac even bad General Lee been provided
with the means to do so; nor, could thoSe
works have been taken, would any advant-
age have resulted at all commensurate with
the sacrifice of life that would have attended
the effort, as the army would still have been
separated from Washington by q river,
crossed bya single bridge, more than mile
long, and commanded by the enemy's gun
boats.
Nor was it possible for the army to re-
main near It's lale battle e-teds as the country
around was entirely stripped OF supplies,
and there was no railroad to Richmond ex-
c.pt from the RapidaD. TO fall back
far enough Southward TO open railroad
communication with Richmond, besides sac
rificiug to great extent the moral effect OF
the Confederate succeS es, might invite re.
| newal of the attempt on the city by way OF
| the James river.
Under these circumstances there was but
one course lett for him 10 pursue il he would
save Richmond from the peril which ne
knew would attend IFS investment by
the large army of the enemy. lie
| must give occupation to the Federal
| army. and that occupation must be such
| as TO necessitate the largcSt concentration OF
its forces. BY this means he might even
induce the euemy to withdraw troops from
other parts of the Confederacy. and thus OBJ
tain additional reflioicements for himself.
These results, no wever, required that ne
should continue to threaten Washington and
the mort hern States and this he could not
do efrsctually unless he should keep his
army near Washington, and where it could
be supported. .,
It was for these reasons, as we learn from
tho renort of General Lees tirst invasion OF
MARYLAND, that be crossed the Potomac; ano
for like reasons, as it would be easy TO show.
be invaded Maryland and Pennsylvania III
II is not my intention to trace the cam
| ~ .. -. a.,nu hatonl the Polo