Litchfield enquirer., 1874-02-05

theEe can be no reason to doubt that to
 regulate commerce, hoth with foreign na-
 tons and among the states and that to
 retuse to do this is a refusal to discharge
 eleof the most important dutles of the
 Esdexal government. As already intima-
 ted. she shaekles with which each diff
 fersnt state fettered commerce in their
 selfish efforts to benefit themselves at the
 expense of their confederates was one of
 the main causes which led to the forma-
 ton Of our present Constitution. The
 wonderful growth of that commerce since
 It has been placed exclusively under the
 controlof the Federal Government has
 justified the wisdom of our fathers. But
 are we to remit the most valuable part ot
 that commerce again to the control of the
 States and to the consequent vexations and
 burdens which the States may impose
 through whose territories it must be carri-
 ed on? And must all this be permitted
 because the carrying is done by method
 not thought of when the Constitution
 was framed? For myself I must say I
 have 10 doubt of the right of Congress to
 prescribe all needful and proper regula-
 tions for the conduct of this immense
 traffic over any railroad which has volun- tarily become part of one of those lines of interstate communication, or to authorize
 the creation of such roads when the pur-
 poses of interstate transportation of per sons and property justify, require it. The recent decision of the Supreme Court in the case of the State freight tax (15 Wal lace. 232) seems to the committee entire ly conclusive of the question we are con- sldering. In that case interstate com meree by railroads was held to be the subject exclusively of Congressional con- trol and regulation, and a statute of the State of Pennsylvania was held to be unconstitutional and void because it at- tempted to do that which the court held to be in the nature of regulation of that commerce. The regulation attempt ed by the State was in the shape of tax upon freight carried by any railroad. or other transportation company, ''doing
 business within the State of Pennsylva- mia. The court held that this was re- gulation commerce, and being snch, in so far as It applied to interstate commerce, 1t was unconstitutional The opinion in this case Is itself an admirable and ex- haustive treatise upon the very question we are considering. Its conclusion is that the Sfase can make no law i'll the nature of regulation of commerce which can ap- ply to .freight taken up within the State and carried out, or taken up in other States and brought within her limits" In delivering the opinion of the court, Mr. Justice Strong said:
 Beyond all question the transportation of freight, or of the subjects of commerce, for the purpose of exchange or sale, is a constituent of commerce itself. This has never been doubted, and probably the of articles of trade from one State to another was the prominent idea in the minds of the framers of the Constitution when to Congress was com mltted the power to regulate commerce among the several States. Nor does ltmake any difference whether this interchange of commodities is by land or water. In either case the bringing of the goods from the seller to the buyer is commerce"
 It is by no means important in order to establish the power of Congress to pass the bill reported, that it should be made to appear that the power of Congress over power is ample, whether it be exclusive or not. But 1t seems to the committee that the case first cited is conclusive of the question, and leaves no doubt that the power of Congress is exclusive. Up- on this point the Court say:
 ''lt IS not necessary to the present case to go at large into the much debated question whether the power given to Con- gress by the Constitution to regulate commerce among the States is exclusive. In the earlier decisions of this court it was said to have been so entirely vested in Congress that no part of it can be ex- ercised by State. It has, indeed, often been argued and sometimes intimated by the court that so far as Congress has not legislated on the subject, the States may legislate respecting .inter-St commerce. Yet, If they can, why may they not add regulations to commerce with foreign na- tions beyond those made by Congress, if not inconsistent with them, for the power over both foreign and interstate com merce IS conferred upon the Federal Leg islature by the same words, and certainly 1t has never yet been decided by this court that the power to regulate inter- State as well as foreign commerce is not exclusively in Congress. And again the court says: ''The rule has been asserted with great clearness that whenever the subjects over which power to regulate commerce is asserted are in their nature national, or admit of one uniform system or plan of regulation, they may justly be said to be of such nature as to require ex- elusive legislation by Congress. Surely of passengers or merchan- disc through State, or from one State to another, is of this nature."
 These authorities leave no room for doubt concerning the power of Congress to regulate that commerce among the sev- eral States, which is now carried on by means of railroads. They establish con- clusively that the power of Congress extends to all commerce which concerns more than one State, and that it necessa- uly includes the carrying of freight and passengers from place in one State to place Tn another state. It reaches and controls that commerce which is beyond the reach of any single state, because not completely internal within any one state. This being settled, we come to the con- sideration of the second proposition, which is, that the power to regulate com merce may be exercised by enacting, as proposed in the bill reported, that per
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 lie or common carriers, shall charge no more than reasonable rates for such car riage, and shall in no case be guilty of ex- tortion. It would seem almost self-evi- dent that to so regulate charges is to reg ulate commerce. The term regulate" signifies to fix or establish rules, or regu- lations for the Government, or control of some particular thing. Hence it was said by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons versus Ogden" that commerce is regu- lated by prescribing the rule by which congress is to be governed. Can there be a doubt but that to fix the rate of toll or compensation to be taken by those en- gagged in carrying on commerce is to pre- scribe snch 8 rule. Let it be remember ed that we are not now to consider wheth- CT theprohibitio of unreasonable charges is q reasonable regulation or not. The question is not whether such regulation IS reasonable or unreasonable, proper or improper, expedient or inexpedient, but simply whether 1t IS 8 regulation. If it prescibes a rule to be followed in carry. ing on commerce, then it is regulation of commerce. That it does. prescribe sucE rule is plain. The rule prescribed IS that 'in carrying on commerce upon