The New Orleans bulletin. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1874-1876, 1874-05-17
IMPORTANT HISTORICAL CORREC
TION.


The following letter, which we clip from
the New York Erening Mail, Of May 9th
will be read with interest, as it teaches {
point about which there should be no doubts
in the minds of the people of the South
To the Editor Of the Evening Mail:
In your notice Of Gen. Joseph E. John
stOn's Narrative of Military Operations,
it is stated that +" The best part of the boob
is that which refers to the first Bull Run
campaign. In this Gen. JohstOn is almost
invariably correct in his actions and conclu
siOns. Johnston knew the value
of concentration for fight. He played
with Patterson, deceived him, reinforced
Beauregard, and won victory which equal
commonsense and generalship would have
given to u.s."
This statement, of course, grows out OF
the supposition that the strategy which led
to, and the tactics of the successful Confede-
rate forces in the memorable battle Of the
21st of July, 1861, emanated from Gen.
Johnston. Admitting that something Of the
language Of the work in question warrants
the conclusion cited, the present writer,
who was in the position at the time to
know the facts, feels called upon, in the in
tererest of history, to show that the Con
federate commander was Beuregard, and
none other. Johnson was indeed the supe-
rior officer present, nevertheless, he neither
assumed the chief command upon his arri-
val, Immediately preceding the action, nor
in any substantial manner took direction OF
the battle after it was engaged, and for rea-
sons by no means hard to explain. l. He
did not come upon the theatre of operation
until about noon the day before the battle,
and brought with him barely 5000 men.
Already, on the 18th, Beuregard's
forces had been in collision with and
repealed McDowell's army in an effort
to pass Bull Run at Blackburn's
Ford. A general engagement was evidently
impending, and was already maturely pre-
pared for by Beauregard. e. The RESPONSE
bility for that battle was very grave one.
1t was the first of the war, and defeat would
not only bring supreme disaster to the cause
at stake, but fatal discredit to the general
who had affrOnted battle under so many I'M
favorable circumstances. go The immediate
position and surrounding country were
wholly unknown to Johnston, but as famil-
iar to Beauregard as a nursery tale. a.
Further, the great bulk of the troops assem-
bled were of Beauregard's organization, with
supreme faith in him. They knew nothing
of Johnston, nor he aught of them, except
that they were not regular troops. (5.) The
strategic movement, which had brought
Johnston, with portion of his forces, upon
the scene, was emphatically of Beauregard's
conception. Urgently suggested by him, it
was only acceeded to and carried out by
Johnston, as can be shown, upon Beaure-
CARDS strenuous Geographic appeals made
as late as July 17-for the junction of the
two armies.
Under such circumstances it was very ma
tural for Johnston to leave with Beauregard
the responsibility of SO tremendous an issue
as the one now inevitable and so, waving
the command, he left to Beauregard the
execution of that Generals own plan of
battle, with the details Of which he was
made acquainted during the afternoon and
night of the Goth of July. That Johnston
should have done this was to his credit, and
it is to be regretted that anything in the
language of the narrative should give
countenance to the idea that he now sets
up the claim to any control over a success
full battle, Of the issue of which he is at the
pains to say: "If the tactios of the Federals
had been equal to their strategy, we (the
Confederates) should have been beaten" (p.
57.) For, such being his present view Of
what should have come to pass, the thought
will occur to even the casual reader that he
must have apprehended disaster at the
opening of the battle; and this will be sure
to furnish to some minds conclusive ex-
PLANTATION of his failure to assume the baton
of command until the battle was won.
As proof that he did not assume command
any sooner, it must be held conclusive that
the chief or detailed official report of the
battle addressed to the Confederate adjutant
general at Richmond, was made, not by
Johnston, but by Beauregard.
In that report the precise circumstances
of command, and responsibility for the bat
tie, are expressed in terms which, unless
Beauregard had been in actual direction of
the united forces upon the field, must have
been treated by Johnston as an impudent
assumption, not to pass without cOntradic-
ton. That was the time to raise the ques
ton. 1t was not done, and the mere fact
of abstract superiority Of grade will not sup
port the claim now first made visible.
In conclusion, it should be stated that the
chief honors of the victory were dnequivo-
cally accorded at the period to Beauregard
by the press and the people, as also by the
army. engaged, while the views Of the Con-
federate authorities are made patent by the
following official letters, the one from the
Secretary of War and the other from Gen.
Lee:
C. S. OF A. WAR DEPARTMENT, I
RICHMOND, July "a, 1861.
My Dear General-Accept my congratula-
tions for TIE glorious and most brilliant vic
tory achieved by you.
The country will bless and honor you
for it.
Believe me- dear General, truly your
friend. L. p. WALKER.
General Beauregard.
RICHMOND, July "a, 1861.
My Dear General cannot express the joy
feel at the brilliant victory Of the 2lst.
The skill, courage and endurance displayed
by yourself excite my highest admiration:
You and your troops have the gratitude of
heartfelt congratulations at their success
I The glorious dead are at peace. / grieve
for their loss and sympathize with the liv-
ing.
May your subsequent course be attended
with like success.
Very truly yours, r. E. LEE.
General Beauregard.
The sole purpose Of the present writer
has been to correct the proposition that it
was Johnston who, cOnceiving the plan of
operations which resulted in his junction
with Beauregara, had won the battle of the