New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1874-10-04

OF Plenty and Peace
Stand guard DER the West.
i -Lottie NJ. Rose, in the Prairie Farmer.
General Sherman and the Army.
The last number of the Army and Mar
Journal received here contains . chapte
on the Military lessons of the war" fron
the pen of General w. r. Sherman. 1t i
given a. the concluding chapter Of an un
published Memoir Of events Of the war,
the entire publication Of which is for tn
present reserved. just previous to the wa
General Sherman was connected with tn,
Louisiana State University. and he looked
upon the inception Of the rebellion from
Southern standpoint. We give in his owl
words his abatement of the condition il
which our army was found by the rebel
lion-badly organized and restricted il
operations by inadequate laws
! That civil war, by reason Of the existence
OF slavery" was appHehended by most Of
the leading statesmen OF tho half century
preceding its outbreak. General Scott told
me on my arrival at New York, as early al
1850. that the country was on the eve OF
''civil war; and the Southern politicians
openly asserted that it was their purpose to
l accept az q casus bclli the election of Gen.
eral Fremont in 1885, but, fortunately o.
unfortunately, he was beaten by Mr.. Buchan.
| an, which simply postponed its occurrence
for four years. Mr.. Seward had also pub
! licly declared that no government could
possibly exist half slave and half free: and
I yet the government made no military prepa-
ration, and the Northern people, generally.
paid no attention, took no warning of its
| coming, and would not realize its existence
| until Fort Sumter was fired on by batteries
| Of artillery. handled by declared enemies,
from the surrounding islands, and the city
| Of Charleston.
General Bragg, who certainly was a man
OF intelligence. and who. in early life, ridi-
culed a thousand times in my hearing the
threats Of the people OF South Carolina to
secede from the federal Union, said to me
in New Orleans, in February, 1861, that he
was convinced that the feeling between the
slave and free States had become SO embit-
tered that it was better to part in peace:
better 10 part anyhow. and as a separation
was inevitable that the South should begin
at once, because the possibility OF a success.
ful effort was yearly iessened by the rapid
and increasing inequality between the two
sections, from the tact that all the European
immigrants were coming to the Northern
States and Territories. aud none to the
Southern.
The slave population in 1860 was near
1000. 600, and the money value thereof not
far from 81, 100000. Now, ignoring the
moral side OF the question, accuse that en-
dangered 90 vast u mOneyed interest was
an adequate cause Of anxiety and prepare
ton, and the Northern leaders surely ought
to have foreseen the danger and prepared
for it. Alter the election Of Mr.. Lincoln in
1901. there was no cOnceaiment of the
declaration and preparation for war in the !
South. In Louisiana, as I have related, |
men were openly enlisted, officers were ap- |
pointed, ana war was actually begun in |
January, 1861. The forts at the mouth of |
the Mississippi were seized and occupied |
BY garrisons that hauled down the United |
States flag and hoisted that OF the State.
Ihe United States arsenal at Baton Rouge |
was captured by New Orleans militia; its
garrison ANONYMOUSLY sent of, and tie
OF the arsenal distributed
These were as much acts OF war as was
the subsequent firing on Fort Sumter. vet
no public notice was taken thereof; and
when months atterward l came North,
found not one single sign of preparation 1t !
was the reason. somewhat, that the people
OF the South became convinced that those
Of the North were puslllanimeus and cow.
ar1ly, and the Southern leaders were there.
by enabled to commit their people to the
war nominally in defense Of their slave
property. Up to the hour of the firing on
Fort Sumter. in April, 1861, it does seem to
ne that our public men, our politicians.
we're blameable for not sounding the note
II alarm.
Then when war was actually begun, it
vas by a call for $1,000 "niuety.Iay" men
suppose TO fulfill Mr. Stewards prophecy
hat the war would last but ninety days.
The earlier steps by our political govern.
nent were extremely wayering and weak.
or winch an excuse can be found in the
act tina: many Of the Southern representa-.
ives renamed III Congress, sharing in the
ublic councils and influenced LEGISLATION.
SUIT as soon as Mr.. Lincoln was installed.
here was no longer any reason WHY Con. ;
ress and the Cabinet should have hesita.
"a. 1heE should have measured the ,
ause, provided the means. ant. left the
xecutive to apply the remedy.
At the time of Mr.. Lincoln's lnaurura.
on. viz: March !, 1861. the regular army.
: law. consisted OF two regiments of {
two regiments of cavalry, one j.
glment of mounted rifles. four regiments | d
artillery and ten regiments OF infantry. /
Uniting OF an aggregate strength Of O
.02l officers and men: and on the subse. i
LEM ioutil OF May the President. by his il
w cr1ers ,atterward sanctioned by Con. E
: $50 dAtteA q ItssiHcEI Ol cavalry, | 4
glmen. Of artillery, and eight regiments "
infantry. which with the former army, i:
united o: a strength OF 1898, but no z
ne during the war did the regular army ,
tam d strength Of 5000 men. Il
Followin: this the Genera! proceeds to Il
mmens on the manner in which tie army e.
As increased and the methods adopted by 81
'tereat States 20 keep in the field their 4
'o'a o. troops. For effectiveness he gave =,
preference 70 Wisconsin regiments, a,
npiy because Few recruits were put in e
i Organizations. with drilled officers. in. lie
'a0 OF being formed into new and untried %
,iments. A'
His suggestions as TO the formation and I'll
eipline OF the regular army are iull Of 81 81
'cticai good sense. and. comm: from the W
hest military authority in our land. will, IN
nmand respectful attention. It ia to he til
retted that the entire memoir viii, he In
-,- y,Os<h ny o,,hi;oo<;o, i