Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1874-05-06

case that those decisions were based upO1
statutes where the legislature had not its
elf fixed the period, and hence were distin
guishabe from this case, for here, the legis
lature had fixed time for cases over 81,
years standing, at one year, and that the
courts were bound by that time as much as
they were by the six years time in cases
where that was applicable. In other words
that the Legislature had thereby fixed one
year as reasonable time, ard the courts
could not inquire into. or question the wis
dom of their decision in establishing it,
and cited Cooley on Limitations, page 366,
in support of this proposition. The cases
cited by Mr.. Cooley as sustaining that doc
trlne, do not think, go 10 that extent,
nor do think he intended to. In Call
VS.. Hager, 8 Mass, page 430, the court
held that rs the short statute WAS pass ed
after the Cause of action had accrued, it
did not extend to the case What was
SAID upon the discretion of the legislature
was therefore not necessary and the decs-
ION was not placed On that ground.
The case in 90 Illinois, 387, and Is
Michigan, 3l8, and ~ Pick, 452 do not
present the question involved here. But
the case Of Berry VS.. Ram8dal, Met.
| (ky) 292. lays down q contrary rule and
hoIus that limitation of thirty days up
on existing cIauges was unreasonable
The court did not regard the authority Of
the legislature to FIX the time as absolute,
but as subject to the control and iudg-
ment Of the court | think this the better
rule. When The statute relates to causes
of action accrung after the passage, it
may be conceded that the power Of the
legislature is absolute IN fixing the time
within which an action shall be prosecut-
ed.
In such cases tie parties are supposed
to have contracted in reference to it, and
the question of its impairng the obiga-
tons Of the contract would not arise But
very different rule applies, [ think, to
statutes of limitation intended to apply to
existing causes Of action. The LIE ,slature
cannot directly impair the obligation of
such contract , nor can it deprive party
OF his property without due process Of law.
lhe hXln9 Of unreasonable time 10 sue
Is deemed an Impairment SO by holding
that the legislature were the sale Judges of
what was reasonable time, is inferen.ial-
~ concedlng them The power of impair
lEg and even destroying the obligation Of
a cOu tract.
ms seems to me to be the logicll result
OF such doctrine, and [ cannot adopt it.
think the time fixed by the legislature
within which actions must be brought up
on existing contracts, is not conctusiye,
out Is SUBJECT to be reviewed by courts,
anu II they deem it unreasonable, it is
tneir duty TO disregard such statutes as
Vlolatlve to the constitutional inhibition
against passing laws imparing the 90 liga-
tonS OF contracts. A statute prescribing
an unreasonable short time, is not a statute
OF limitation, but an unlawful destruction
OF a right whatever it may purport to be
by It's terms. 1t was claimed that limita-
tlon laws were statutes Of repose, and were
now regarded with favor they undoubed-
ly are, but they should allow cilizeDs al
needful remedies, and should there fore
give fair opportunity for all to apply to
the courts for redress after their passage.
The SUPP enc Court of this State | think,
have rs directly passed upon this question
as any court whose decision l have been
able to find. In Van Baunback vs. Wade,
Wis, p. $40, Dixon, Ch j., says, $50
far, then, as the Constitution of the U. S.
reaches or affects the alterations of the
enemy. such alterations are, first, matters
of sound discretion with the Legislature
and secondly, with the Courts The Leg
Islature, having power within those limits
to control the remedy and to determine
whether parties are left with a substantial
remedy according to the laws as they ex-
listed before such change, subject to revis-
ION IN the last particular by the Courts"
This, think, fully sustains my opinion
AS to the authority of Courts in such cases.
hrin A.
the year allowed after the passage. of this
act for parties holding the. bonds TO bring
suits was a reasonable time. 1 do not
think, in view of the facts and circum-
stances OF the case, it was. That more
time is essential in some cases, than in
others, is apparent
These bonds were issued when it must
have been known to the defendant that
they could not be negotiated in this State,
but would necessarily have to fad market
IN distant places, where money was more
abundant than in a new country, and it is
| well known to all, and may properly be
assumed by the Court, l think, that the
bonds so issued by these defendants, like
| the bonds of other municipal corporations
are negotiated in the money markets in
this country and perhaps OF Europe, and
that when this act was passed. portion
of them at least, was held by parties resid-
ing out of the State, and with no means,
except by keeping close watch of the Leg
islaturs of the State, to know of this act
and | think they could not reasonably
have anticipated any such radical change
in its Limitation laws. The time of Ii mi
tation when the bonds were issued was
twenty years, and when this act WAS pas
sed, over ten years still remained for them
to enforce their remedy. They had no rea-
son, so far as this case shows, to apprehend
any such great and extraordinary change
in the policy of the state in its limitation
laws. And their position did not impose
upon them the duty of a constant watch
fulness over the legislature, and are there
fore chargeable with latches in not finding
out the existence Of such law sooner.
To hold the bar AS valid under such cir
| cumstances would be an act Of great injus-
tice to the holder of these bonds, and
would greatly depreciate, if not absolutely
destroy the value of large quantities OF
securities Of this character, contrary to the
express protection guaranteed in the fun
damental law Of the land. Such legisla-