Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1874-05-22

We lost 8,021 men from the time of
our arrival near Marietta $50 miles
from Dalton) to the crossing of the
Chattahoochee. General Wigfan ac-
knowledged sixty -four thousand effec-
tives of all arms at New Hope Church
on the 26th of May, but he failed to
count 9, 139 of Wheeler's cavalry. which
gave us on that date 66, 1879 in lieu of
"a, 900 electives. In making his esti-
mate of the entire loss from New Hope
Church, thirteen days outfrom Dalton,
to Atlanta, he says, page $50, 'sitleaves
but fourteen thousand seven hundred
and fortyfour total loss in killed,
wounded, deserters, stragglcrs aud
prisoners, of his infantry and artillery"
Ada to CHS Wheeler's 2, 1879, he failed
to include or account for, aud we have
a loss from New Hope Church TO the
Chattahoochie River of sixteen thou
sand eight hundred and eighty-thrre.
I6, $3.50 IT we include 3.3SS) three
thousand three hundred and eighty
eight killed and wounded prior to
reaching New Hope Church, as stated
on page 32o, We have according to the
figures contained in Gen. Johnston's
book, a loss Of go, 27I, twenty thou
ooiNa t"o anu StNt IliNb one. III
tins we exclude the prisoners, desert
ers and stragglers from Dalton t6 this
point, the number of which | have fire.
quently heard estimated at over 5000
by officers of that army. Our loss from
this source was especially large at the
time of our retreat from Resaca.
From various statements and sum-
marles, it cannot be doubted that Gen.
n ha6 Il
Polk forces, an armyof seventy thou
sand (70,G00) effective men. From
this number subtract 47,25O turned
over to me on the 18th of July, and we
have loss of TWENTY-FIVE thousand
seven hundred and fifty 90. 75O) from
all causes. When l underestimated
his loss i'll my official report, I knew it
amounted to 25, 900 from the assertion
of his own Adjutant General in the
presence of two of my staff officers and
Mr.. James Haggerty, and from COM
parison l had made at New Hope
Church with Gems. Polk and Hardee,
the two remaining corps commanders.
| Having established that we had over
| 10000 effecives after General Polk s
corps joined us, it only remains to be
| shown that these reinforcements were
available" General Johnston says
page 304:) Son the 9TH the Confeder-
ate troops were arranged to receive
the enemy On the next page. refer
ring to the same date. May 9Th, he
says: ''In the evening, a telegram from
Lieut.. Gen, Polk informed me that he
had been ordered to join the army OF
Tennessee with all his infantry" also,
at daybreak on the 7th the Federal
army moved forward; j. in the
afternoon the Federal army placed
itself in front of the Confederate line,
its right little south of Mill Greek
Gap, and its left near the Cleaveland
road. " General Wigfall page $50,
gives the following information as OBJ
tanned from the War Office: cit was
not till the 4th day of May that Gen
eral Polk was ordered to move will
Loring's Division and other available
! forces at yOur command to Rome, GA.
and thence unite with General John
ston." On the same pnge he state:
that on the 10Th of May the following
dispatch was sent to General Cooper
at Richmond, by General Polk, from
Demopolis, Ala: MY troops are con
centrating and m oving as directed"
1t will be seen that on the 4th o.
May General Folks army had bcel
) ordered to join Genera! Johnston
was concentrating and moving forward
| rapidly by lail from Demopolis OH the
9th, having but a short distance tc
. march, and that General Sherman die
not take up his position in front OF
) Rocky Face Ridge until the Afternoon
of the rth of May. There was, I NIGH
say, between the two armies, a higl
wall of stone, as the name Rocky Face
: Ridge indicates. Our position wa:
one of the strongest t. be desired: We
had but two gaps in the mountains tc
hold-Will Greek and Snake Creek, as
shown on the map, page 276. The
approach of the Federal army
) down the railroad from Chatta
nooga, in lieu of down the
road from Cleaveland, rendered
our position the more secure. Gen.
Johnston would not have had Il stone
wall between him and his adversary.
had Gen. Sherman advanced by the
latter route, as the country is open to-
ward Cleveland. l have ala avs thought
Gen. Sherman did not wish to accept
a pitched battle or be would have
moved upon Dalton from that direc
ton. His advance by the Chattanoo-
ga road, and subsequent in front oi
Rocky Face cQnvinces me that his in
tentiOn was to initiate the policy of
wasting our strength, which he SO eff
fectually accomplished in the campaign
from Dalton to Atlanta. Thus he came
to the position of all others we could
have desired. /. e, in front of Rocky
Face Ridge, if our commander could
have been induced to hold his ground.
Gen. Polk was not far distant from
Dalton, when we consider that he had
eight thousand of his troops at Resaca
on the 9th and 18th. and he in person
was i'll Dalton on the 18th. We could
well have awaited the arrival of the
whole of his army, since it REQUIRED SO
small force to hold Mill Greek and
Snake Creek Gaps, as was most prac-
tically demonstrated by Gen. Sher-
mans use of them after they fell into
his possession. When en- route to
Tennessee during the campaign in the
fall of 1864, our army having captured
| the troops stationed il Dalton, at
tempted to march through Mill Creek
| gap, but was prevented from so doing
by squad of men posted within a lit
| tie fort, covered with railroad iron and
| constructed of logs of large size.
around which was thrown up an en-
| bankment of earth to protec. the troops
against field artillery; port holes were
cnt, SO as to allow the men to fire in
all directions, and especially upon the
line of railroad It was reported to
me that field artillery had little or no
effect upon this impromptu fortifica-
ton, and that when the men charged
up to it they could not find an en-
trance; therefore, it could not be taken
without much loss of time and consid-
cradle cost. Major kinlocke Falconer
was, I think, severely wounded whilst
experimenting with this little fortress,
which obliged me to march some TWEEN
ty miles around it.
1t is not often the case that all the
troops to be brought into action are
assembled beforehand at the precise
point where a great battle is imminent.
On the contrary, Whel two armies ore
IL.