The Stark County Democrat. [volume] (Canton, Ohio) 1833-1912, 1874-06-18

therefore provided (Sec- 33) that members shall
be compensated only by a fixed annual salary.
4. Annual Sessions. Biennial sessions Of the
General Assembly, as provided In the Conshtu-
ton of 1851, have not been observed. The neces-
sity for annual sessions in a State Of such vast
wealth, business and population as ONO, having
been demonstrated by experience, a return to that
system is provided. (Sec. 2S)
3. The Veto. Hasty, inconsiderate, and some
times partisan legislation is incident TO an unre-
strained legislative body; and where large sums
are to be expended, and the purposes of monopo-
lies and powerful corporations to be promoted, It's
deliberations are not always free from the in
huence of the lobby. To more efectually guard
against these abuses, the Convention, after much
nearly all the other States, and clothe the Governor
with a qualified veto. (Sec. 49, The difference
pass a bill over a veto, and the mere majority,
which a law must obtain in any case, Is only ten
Senate. 1t ~ as thought that ten days of delibera-
ton by the Governor, free from the excitement
and influences which sometimes control popular
bodies, might often prevent great mischief
6. Appropriation Bus. A change of the great
passage of appropriation bills. Under the existing
Constitution, the general appropriation Dill, ike
the general appropriation bhlln Congress, has been
made the vehicle Tor the grossest PecuIailons IN
the public funds. Absenteeism often reduces the
attendance to a mere quorum. A bare majority
OF this quorum can incorporate IN the general ap-
preparation bill, by amendment or rider, any
scheme for depicting the treasury. On the final
passage of the bill, itmust be voted on as an entire
ty; and unless it receive the vote of a majority
I Of all the members elected to each house it is lost.
Appropriations necessary TO carry on the govern
ment are thus coupled with, and made to
abide the fate of, schemes Of mere pecula-
lion and plunder. Members are compelled,
against their convictions, to vote for the
bill including these obnoxious items or
suffer a stOppage of the wheels Of government,
To prevent this is the purpose of the new provis-
ions in sections twenty-three and twenty-five.
Each item Of appropriation must stand on its own
merits and be voted on separately, by yeas and
nays, on the demand Of any member. II 1t fail to
receive the constitutional majority, 1t is to be
aIly responsible to his constituents for the vote he
may cast. He can no longer have the PTetense
that unless he vote for the bill, including the OBJ
noxious item, it must fail, and the government
suspend for want OF funds.
Another check and safeguard is the
power vested in the Governor to veto any
item in the appropriation bill, and ap-
prove the residue. It is believed that these pro-
visions will result in an annual saving to the
treasury Of many thousands OF dollars.
ARTICLE m.-THE EXECUTIVE.
The only changes of any Importance in this Ar
ticle are in the first, fourteenth and fifteenth sec
The time of electing the State officers is changed
from October to November, bienniailyj for the
reason already explained under the foregoing
article. Section fourteen requires the General
Assembly to provide by law for the case OF va
cancy occurring at the same time IN the once or
Governor and Lieutenant-GOyernOr. Under the
existing Constitution, an actual allegiance Of the
Executive is by no means an unlikely event. As
the existing power OF the ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS to
vote when the Senate is equally divided has
become a subject Of contention, it Is so modified
by section fifteen as to remove any fair ground
for Jealousy Of his control hereafter
ARTICLE U.-oUR COURTS.
Chief among the purposes for which the Conven-
ton was called was the reorganization Of the Ju-
dietary. The accumulation of judicial business
had blockaded the courts. From one to two years
was re0uired to reach The hearing of a cause in
the Common Pleas, and from 1--WE to seven years in
reaching an end in the Supreme Court. This was
a virtual denial of Justice, often working the
bankruptcy of litigants even when successful Its
causes were obvious. The practice Of second
trials duplicated the labors Of the Common Pleas
Judges. The time which ought to have been de-
voted to that Court was diminished by their with
drawal from one to three months in each year to
review their own decisions in the District Court;
while the few days or hours allotted to this Court
in each county rendered its decisions q judicial
farce, and caused it to fall into popular contempt.
From a general want OF confidence in this Court,
a large proportion Of the causes have found their
way to the Supreme Court, and thus have over
To mature a system that will secure stability,
learning and efficiency in the courts; command
public confidence and respect; relieve existing,
and prevent future blockades; and of such hexi-
blity as to be readily adapted to the exigencies OF
business, was the aim and effort Of the Conven-
ton. This, 1t was believed, could be done by ere
ating an independent tribunal intermediate be-
tween the Common Pleas and Supreme
Courts; frightening the judicial tenure so
as to give it greater stability, and TO
it; requiring semi-annual sittings of Circuit Courts
in each county; providing a commission 10 dis
pose Of the accumulated business of the Supreme
Court; and starting the Supreme Court upon a new
calendar.
Accordingly, it is proposed that the State be
divided into twelve Common Pleas districts; thai
the f~orty-six Common Pleas Judges provided for
be distributed to these districts and the suDdi-
Visions thereon, according 10 LueI DSCces4ileSs ludl
the judicial service OF each district. be equltaoly
Apportioned among the judges therein; that quar-
terly terms of this Court be held in every county
and that each Judge be requir ed TO annually per
form two hundred and forty days labor, unless
the business assigned to him be sooner disposed OF.
1t is further proposed that the General Assembly
shall provide by law for supplying the place OF any
Judge who may be temporarily unable 10 attend 70
his duties; and in emergiences q Judge OF one dis
trict may be transferred for a time to aid II
another. The force thus provided, If faithful &c
its official trust, and the people elect competent
men. will be annie TO discharge all the business
brought into the courts, with promptness ano
prevented, the attendance Of Witnesses from term
10 term, at ruinous costs, avoided, and speedy
Justice done without denial or delay.
1t is also proposed to divide the state into seven
circuits, in each Of which there shall be a Circuit
Court, TO consist Of three Judges, two Of whom
shall be a quorum; and that sem1-annual terms
thereof shall be held in each county 1t shall
have Jurisdiction TO review and correct the find
other inferior courts. With a wide scope Of terri
tory from which TO select competent Judges. witt
a power in the General Assembly to diminish Of
augment the capacity of this Court according u
necessity, and with a length Of official term guar
anteeing reasonable stability, it is believed tina
the Circuit Court NAV become in all respects, ex
cept in authority, the equal OF the Supreme Codrt
and command such confidence ana respect as .
satisfy most itigants and prevent them from iur
Their prosecuting their cOntrOversies-thus rehev
ing themselves from u great additional expense
and the Supreme Court from an excessive accumu
latiOn of causes. The Circuit Judges may serve il
any part Of the State and as any two of them vii
form u quorum, II Will be seen that Ten OF ines
courts might be held at the same time neces
sary.
The Supreme Court remains unchanged, ex
cept that the official term Of the Judges Is ex
tended to ten years. At the first election /
is provided that no electOr shall vote for NOR
than three OF the five Judges Of thi
Court. This method Of election was applied i
New York in the choice of the Court Of Appeals
and is conceded to have worked well. Each o
the great political parties is certain to elect
portion of the Judges, and will therefore be re
sponsible for their character, integrity and ability
II is suppos ed that a better class of nomination
will thus be secured, the Court Invested OF any az
= pearance Of political bias, and Its decisions com
mand a more general and hearty confidence.
The Schedule submits to a separate vote OF 10
people, under the title Proposition number on
Minority representation" an additional section
by which, il adopted, this method Of election b
in the restricted vote will be made permanently al
plicable to all elections of Judges Of the Suprem
and Circuit Courts for a full termi so that eAc
= elector can thereafter vote for but three OF the nv
Judges Of the Supreme Court, and two OF III
u three Judges of a Circuit Court If this secuo
n be adopted, the majority party in any circuit wi
" generally elect two, and the minority party one
fhe .Lndaes for that circnit: Mhllo The maiOrll