Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1874-01-21

ernmL..t, by its agency, or by corporation
or even by individuals when they obtain
their power to construct it from a legisla-
tive grant. A number of decisions by
State courts TO the same effect are referred
to. One of them as follows: Though the
ownership of a railroad is private, the use
is public. So turnpikeS, bridges, ferries
and canals, although made by individuals
under public grants or by companies, are
regarded as public ways. The right to
enact tolls or charge freights is granted for
a service to the public. The owners may
be private companies, but they are
oompellable to permit the public to
use their works. In a recent argument
against the validity of the Illinois law on
this subject and made in behalf of the
Chicago and Alton Railroad Company
proposition was laid down that a common
carrier acting under a charter or without
one are alike liable for any abuse of the
public in their charges. See argument Of
Beckwith, report of the Illinois Commits
sioDers for 1872, and the authorities fully
sustain this proposition. The authorities
upon the subject are numerous and uni
form, and they leave no doubt as to the
right TO limit by law the charges Of a COM
mon carrier to such as shall be reasonable,
for they show clearly that such a law is
simply declaratory of the common law
itself.
It viii be observed that the question of
the power of Congress to create or charter
a corporation to operate line of commerce
from State 10 State, and to exercise the
right of eminent domain, is not inyolyedin
the passage of the bill reported. it's, how
ever, well settled by decisions of the Su-
preme Court of the United States that Con
gress may charter corporation which is a
necessary or proper instrument for carrying
into effect any of the powers Of the General
Government. If, therefore, Congress should,
deem it necessary, in the exercise of the
power expressly conferred, TO regulate COM
merce among the several States, 10 charter
new lines of railroads or canals as chan
nels OF such commerce, its power to do so
would seem beyond question.
The committee continued: This question
has recently been considered by the Su-
preme Court of Michigan, in the case of
TrOmbley vs.. Humphrey, Auditor General,
% Mich, AL. An elaborate and exhaustive
opinion was delivered in that case by one
of the ableSt jurists in the country, Judge
CoOlly, and we content ourselves with re-
f1TTing to it, and quoting from it the con-
clusiOn reached by the court as follows:
The power of Congress to regulate COM
merce exists independently of the
means or agencies by which that COM
merce is carried on. Steamboat companies
engaged in the navigation of great rivers
are frequently, and, we believe, generally
incorporated under State laws, but it has
never been urged that for this reason the
commerce carried on by these companies is
beyond the control of Congress.
Is IL Expedient:
The committee next proceed to the con-
sideration of expediency. After a general
discussion of the question of transportation
by rail, in all its bearings, the report con-
cludes as follows: "When it is remember
ed that about thiIty-six million toEs of
freight were carried by the great through
lines in the year 1872, probably One-third
of which was Western products, it will at
once be seen how important and vital 10 the
interests and rights of the people it is that
some other interest and some other power
than the combined interest and power of
great monOpOlieS should be invoked in the
regulation of these charges. We assume,
therefore, that this commerce by railroad
should be controlled and regulated
by law. OF course the laws which
shall secure such regulation and con-
troll must be either national
or State laws or both. 1t has been claim
ed that State legislation is itself sufficient,
but on little reflection that is an error.
YOur cOmmitte are not disposed TO recon-
mend the slightest encrOachment by the
Federal Government upon the rightful do
main of State legislation, and we say dis
tinctly that in SO far rs a remedy for these
evils can be found in local or State laws. to
that extent the remedy should be sought in
that direction. But the proposition that
interstate commerce cannot be controlled
and regulated by State laws, is too plain
for argument. The great trunk lines or
through lines as they are called must be
regulated by national law or not regulated
at all. They make contracts 10 carry
freight ifrom the Missouri river 10 the At
lantic, and even sometimes from oIe ocean
to the other without change of cars. In
the transaction of their immense
business they make 10 note of
State lines. True, they may be chartered
by some one or all of the States whose ter
ritory they traverse, but they are to all in
tents and purposes one line operating in
aud through many States. We have al
ready seen that any State law attempting
10 regulate commerce upon such lines as
these would be unconstitutional and void,
because it would be an attempt by the
State to exercise power TO regulate COM
merce among the several States, which is
| coHiided by the Constitution exclusively TO
| Congress. See State freight tax cases, II
! Wallace, 232: Crandell vs.. Negada, 6 Wal
lace, 33; Gibbons vs.. Ogden, 9 Whea-
| ton, /.
But aside from its unc0nstitutiOnality,
| such legislation would Ge Intellectual for
other and very apparent reasons. Let us
suppose that the commerce TO be regulated
| extends over line from Council Bluff, Ia.
to Boston, and passes through the States Of
! Iowa. Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania.
| New York. Connecticut and Massachusetts,.
| Now. can anv rule or regulation for the
| carving on Of commerce upon this line be
| enacted or enforced by State authority? If
| we are To admit that one rule may apply in
one state and different rule in another,
a dozen different ami conflicting rules
| might result. If some of the States should
| pass 10 laws upon ihe subject what is TO
| hinder railroad companies from fixing their
| own rules and arranging their own prices
| for carving freight over the territory of
such StateY Surely it viii NOT be pretended
| that a statute Of Iowa can regulate the
| rights and duties of common carrier in
| the State of Pennsylvania. But again, the
most conclusive of all considerations upon
| this subject is thefact that if the regulation
Of these ions iinGs belongs to the States
alone, they may increase rs well as di;Iin-
| iSh the charges of these carriers, and may
/ thus discriminate in favor Oftheir own peO-
/ pie and agsirst those of other States.
Again, if the laws Of a dozen different
| States are to be applied as q regulation of
the cGBduci Of carrier in the transporta-
tion OF a single cargo, such questions IS
these must arise: Which state shall en-
force its regulation? To how many penal
ties shall the carrier be subjected? In what
and how many Courts shall he be answera-
ble? And finally, if obedience to the laws
| o. Gne State is found to be violation of the
| laws Of another, Ai,4t ehall be the carriers
duty? These suggestions demenstists ihe
proposition that we have before laid down,
| thai state control is simply impossible.