Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1874-04-01

! front of Hichmond by one quite as Numerous,
] formed by uniting there all the available forces
in the COnfederacy in North Carolina, South
| Carolina and Georgia, with those at Norfolk, On
the Peninsula, and then near Richmond, In
Guiding Smiths and L0ngtreet's divisions,
which had arrived. The great army thus form
| I'd. surprising That OF the United States by an
attack when it was expecting to besiege Rich
mOnd, would be almost certain to win; and the
enemy. defeated a hundred miles from Fort
Monroe, their place OF refuge, could scarcely
escape destruction. Such a victory would de-
eide. not only the campaign, but the war, while
the present plan could produce no decisive re-
suit"
Here was the idea of vigorous concen-
tration, of yielding many miles of territory
for the time being and risking danger to
other important points. Is
ssGen. Lee opposed it, saws Gen. Johnston,
because he thought that the withdrawal from
South Carolina and Georgia, of any consider
! able number of troops, would expose the impOr-
tant seapOrts of Charleston and Savannah 10
the danger of capture. He thought, too, that
! the Peninsula had excellent fields of battle for
asmall army contending with n great one, and
| that we should for that reason make the contest
with McClelIan's army there"
Gen. Lees suggestion was adopted by
! the President. 1t certainly does not lower
ones estimate o fthe plan proposed by Gen.
| Johnston TO reflect thai the real and effec-
tual resistance of Mcclellan had to be
made near Richmond after all. II is i'm
possible, however, to know that Johnston's
plan would have made the ~adversary's de-
feat more expeditions and complete. 1t re-
| quires experiment to test the value of tao
tics. 1t viii be observed that Gen. john
| son was more thoroughly possessed of the
idea of concentration than even Lee. 1t
| was almost as strong in him as in Gen.
Grant, who dsubtless owe most of his sue
cess 10 it. If it was a sound device, the ne
cessity of it TO the SOuthernarms was great
er than TO the Northern.
Gen. Johnston devotes many pagesto the
long and dubious campaign of Mississippi,
which resulted in the fall of Vicksburg.
There is not room here to clearly present
the case as he makes it out. He does not
| admit that the failure was due to any mis-
take Of his own. He shoulders all the re-
spOnsibility upon Gen. Pemberton and the
government. He charges il to the disobe-
dience of the one and the delay of the other
to reinforce him from the army Of Tennes-
see. lie would not use his authority TO do
the latter, for he held that it involved the
sacrifice of Tennessee, which was more a
political than military affair, and therefore
proper for the government todecide. Heheld
that Mississippi or Tennessee, one, had TO
be yielded. But PembertOn'S diSobedience
of orders had brought about this crisis.
Gen. Johnston's scheme of uniting all the
available forces in Mississippi wa frustrat-
ed by that d~isohedience, and Gen. Grants
scheme of concentration facilitated. Gen.
Johnston. is very severe in his structures
upon Pemberton for his conduct. He sums
up his remarks on the act Of diSObedience
thus: seen. PembertOn determined to eX-
ecute a measure which he diSapprOved,
which his council Of war opposed, and
which was in violation of the orders of his
commander The case made out against
Pemberton is a very strong one, and We
think is quite conclusive. Touching the
whole transaction, Gen. Johnston remarks:
eIf l and the reinforcements sent from
Be~auregard's department had been ordered
to Mississippi in April, in time TO Join Penn
berton's army, l could have directed the
Confederate forces, and trOUid have been
responsible for events; but by heSitating to
transfer troops and send a new commander
until too late, the Administrator made IL
self and Gen. PembertOn responsible for
consequences, and those consequences were
the ruin of our affairs in Tennessee as we'll
as in Mississippi
Before all this, Immediately after Gen.
Johnston was assigned to the command of
the army Of Tennessee and Mississippi, lie
suggested 10 the President a plan, which
certainly would have changed the whole
progress of the Mississippi campaign if not
its result. The suggestion was not needed,
but its aim was to unite Holmes command,
stationed at Arkansas, consisting of about
$1,000 men, and opposed to no enemy, with
PembertOn's east ofthe Mississippi, in order
10 fall upon Gen. Grants army with every
chance to destroy him. Gen. Johnston
found that tie Administration had before
entertained this idea. Why it was relin-
pushed is not clear. Probably Mr.. Davis
aversion to an exposed territory, even if
unthreatened, as Arkansas would be.
caused him to abandon the idea ofdrawing
off Holmes army. 4 large population west
of the Mississippi would have had ostensi-
bic grounds to complain, as our people
We're too prone TO do when exposed. OF
the probable results Of uniting Holmes
and Pemberton's commands, Gen. John
stOn says:
"By this junction we should bring about
10000 men against 5000, and secure all
the chances of victory, and even the de-
strUctiOn Of the Federal army; which, de-
feated so far from its base, could have little
chance of escape. That success would en-
able us TO Overwhelm RoSecrans, by joining
Gen. Bragg with the victorious army, and
transfer the wal to the Ohio river and to
the State Of Missouri, in which the best
part Of the population was friendly to
US"
In all the affairs TO which we have thus
far alluded it must be obvious that central
ism, which is a great reliance in war, was
G4ron~ap in lnipSFprn fhnu in rha a1p,fnsa
tTation. HIS centralism looked beyond ev-
cry other consideration to success alone, IN
whatever manner and at whatever sacrifice
il might be had. Ii we should express a
preference for this as 4 policy of war, we
would not necessarily imply that the adj
ministratiOn was incompetent. It was
against centr3liSm that 1t was arrayed, and
il was not without reason hoped that we
could achieve victory without adopting cen
tralism with its despotism, apparent
or real. Every foot of ground should be
contested TO prevent complaints from the
people Of the districts yielded. No great
area should be left UngUarded for the same
reason. These causes and others similar,
together with the hope Of acquiring addi-
tiOnal States must have tendedtO make the
policy Of the Government what il was.
The famous retreat from Dalton to the
vicinity Of Atlanta is regarded rs the
grandest feat of the kind on record. Gen.
Johnston's account of it is entirely praeti-
cal and does not show a trace Of selEcom-
placeHcy. an extract or two will sufii-
GENTLY show what his tactics were. He
says.
'The disposition Of the Confederate army
about Dalton was predicated on the belief that
the Federal general would attack it there with
his whole force. For that reason its entire
strength was concentrated there, and the pro |
lection OF its Communication left 10 Lieut.. Gen. |
Folks troops, then ON their way from Alabama, |
through Rome, to join Us. / supposed, from /
Gen. Sherman's great superiority Of numbers, |
that he intended to decide the contest by a bat
tie, and that he would make that battle as near
his own and a. far from our base As possible |
that i to say, at Dalton. On general principles, !
that was his true policy. II l. evident that he
did not 50 act because lac thought, as / did
that, in the cycntOf his a~SSIiling Us, the chances /
would nave been very strong in our favor. Nv
own operations, then and subsequently, were
determined by the relative forces Of the aTmies, /
and a higher estimate of the Northern soldiers /
than Southern editors and politicians were ac-
custGmed To express, or even the administration
seemed to entertain"
His aim during the whole retreat was to
give battle whenever the chances should be
in his favor, and they would be more and
more in his favor until he reached his own
base, Atlanta. For be would thus have
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