Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1874-06-21

of the Fire Committee, or the Boards of |
Aldermen and Common Council.
/. And for other good causes to be shown |
upon argument, and prays the judgment of |
the court whether he shall make further or |
other answer to the suit.
DEM0ss x MALONE,
Attorneys.
The original writ having been amended, |
the defendant by leave of the court filed |
another demurrer TO the original and
amended writ, assigning the following spe-
cial causes:
1. From the face Of the paper it appears
that the ordinance in question was not car
ried over the Mayors veto by vote Of two
thirds Of both branches of the City COun-
Gil.
2. Ii does not appear that the Mayor re-
turned the bill to the next meeting of the
body in which it originated with his objec-
tions, or that the ordinance in question was
acted upon at the first meeting after the ~
turn of the ordinance.
;. 1t does not appear either from the
original or amended writ that the ordinance
in question was passed as required by law.
4. Ii the ordinance in question is valid
one, then there would I've no necessity for
his signing the paper rendered.
). The ordinance in question leaves him
a discretion which he has a right TO eXer-
else. DEMOss " MALONE, AttOrnyeS.
THE ARGUMENTS.
Mr.. DemoSS then proceeded with his ar
cmnent, commencing by reading law
passed by the Legislature providing for the
election of members Of the City Council,
and defining the duties of the Mayor in Te-
card 10 ordinances that are sent TO him for
| his consideration. An ordinance that the
CIV Council had attempted to enforce re-
0uired the Mayor and Fire Committee to
execute contract. The Mayor had re-
| fused to sign that contract, and has refused
TO concur in the action of the two Boards
| in passing, what they considered,
a valid ordinance. If the ordi-
nance was a valid one, then the
signature of the Mayor to the contract
would not affect it one way or the other.
If the contract was valid they had no right
to the mandamus against the Mayor. If
there was anything to be done after the
passage of the ordinance over the Mayors
veto, under this ordinance to effectuate the
contract, the ordnance itself left the dis
cretion with the Mayor. The Mayors dis
| cretion could not be controlled any more
| than the Governors or members of the
Legislature. If anybody had he right to
| enforce the contract upon the Mayor it
| would be the City Council, and when he
refused to concur in their action the Ordi-
nance would have to be sent back
to the Board in which it originated, at the
right meeting, with his objections. Il must
be acted upon at that meeting, and unless
| it was passed over the Mayors veto by two
thirds of the City Council, it would not
become law.
The Legislature had fixed the number of
persons composing the City Council, and if
they had Intended that two thirds of the
members present would be a sufficient
| number To pass an ordinance over the May
or's veto, they would certainly have said
so. The law never intended to arm the
two Boards with any less authority than
the plain letter Of the charter had given
them.
Mr.. Cant maintained that the PROPOSE
ton made by Gamewell & CO., to the City
Council and the passage Of the ordinance,
substantially accepting the proposition,
| made contract between them and the
city, but that Gamewell & Co, were en-
titled to formal paper, formally executed,
as objected by the ordinance and that the
Mayor having been directed by the Ordi-
nance to execute such paper and having
refused to do so, could be compelled TO DO
so by nlandumas. That if the submission
of the proposition and the action of the
| City Council in regard thereto did not con-
stitute a contract, yet the ordinance having
directed the Mayor to execute CONTRACT
with Gomewell x Co, in accordance with
their proposals, il was mere ministerial
duty which he could be compelled to per-
form.
That GameWell X Co. were the proper
parties to apply for the writ, and, if they
were not, that the Fire Committee, official
ly and as citizens, who were also parties,
certainly had the right TO make the aPplica-
ton.
That the ordinance was a valid Ordi-
nance, having been legally passed over the
Mayors veto. That the twO-third vote re-
quired to pass it was not twO-thir,ls Of all
the members elect, but twO-thirds Of those
present, there being a quorum present.
He showed that the words '.twO-thirds
Of each house, had been held in the Sen
ate and House Of Representatives of the
United States, and in nine States of
the Union TO mean twO-thirdS of those
present, there being not less than quorum
present. That the question had been before
| the supreme Courts OF I'VE OF the OtaleS,
and had been judicially determined the
same way. That the improvement con-
templated was one eminently judicious and
necessary for the welfare of the city.
That the losses by fire in the
city of Nashville during the last
rine years, as shown by the official re-
ports of the fire officers, amounted to with
in fraction of $500, 900, or about $4,000
per year; that the rates of insurance in
this city were nearly double that of New
York city, but that these rates would be
reduced very materially by the construc-
ton of the fire alarm telegraph; that it was
not an untTied experiment, but that the
system of Gamewell x Co. was now in
successful operation in about siXty-eight
towns aud cities in the United States; that
twenty-eight of these cities were smaller
places than Nashville; that owing to the
amount saved in property and insurance
by the fire alarm, the citizens of Nashville
could well afford to submit to the tax, and
the creditors of the city to submit to short
delay in the payment Of their debts.
The foregoing is but brief synopsis OF
the argument, which was not concluded
Yesterday, but will be resumed next Satur-
day, at which time, no doubt, decision Of
the case will be reached.