The weekly clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1863-1882, 1874-04-30

Hi Narrative of the War.
From the New York sun

I from the New York sun
The Narrative Of Military Operations
by Joseph T. Johnston, General, G. 5
A. ID. Appleton q Coz has been looked
for with much curiosity, on account OF
the high rank and disting aished services
OF the author both in the United States
army and that Of the so-caIled Confeder
acy Nevertheless we judge, after read
ing it with great care, that it will gen
orally be received with exceeding disap
pointment, and especially for the reason
that Gen. Johnston enjoys among Us q
very high reputation as a professional and
intellectual man, due very much to the
generous appreciation of Gen. Sherman
and his deutenants, who always beat
him and praised him with equal cordial
ity
It will be remembered that Johnston
was the only general officer who resigned
from the United States army to take
part in the rebellion, and rule was
adopted by the Confederate States Con
! gress requiring that officers who had
/ served in the United States army and
resigned TO join the rebellion, should in
the same grade take precedence accord
/ ing to their relative rank in the United
/ States service. This rule strictly applied
would have given Gen. Johnston the po-
sition of General-in-Chiei of the Confed-
crate army, Lee, Beamegard, Albert Sid
ney Johnston, Bragg, Hardee, and 9th
ers having held no higher grade than that
| Of colonel or Northumberland in the
| old sevice Indeed, it appears from the
Narrative, that Gen. Johnston was
assigned at the commencement OF HOSTILE
ties to what Mr.. Davis evidently regard
ed as the most important command within
the probable theater OF war-that of the
troops in and around Harper's Ferry.
His instructions delivered at Montgomery
showed that Davis regarded that place as
OF great strategic consequence, IN view
Of lis strong natural features and prox-
unity to the border of the Northern
States.
Gen. Johnston accepted this command,
perfectly aware that his superiors looked
upon it as Of special Importance, and yet
he had scarcely reached his post when he
proposed its evacuation, and opened q
correspondence with the Confederate War
| Department to that end. His reasons
were possibly sound enough in them
selves. but such movement at that stage
Of the game could not have been very
mountaineering to the seeding States, nor
reassuring to their Government Indeed,
the latter did ali it could to induce him to
hold the advanced post to which be had
been assigned, but in vain. lie aban-
doned the place before it had really been
threatened, and thereby seriously and
very naturally shook the confidence of
Davis in his discretion if not in his cour
age.
Shortly after wltndrawlng from Har-
per's Ferry, Gen. Johnston marched
and transported his command by rail to
Manassas Junction. where Beauregard
was confronting Mcdowell, and, as is well
known, thereby secured to the Confed-
crate arms their first great victory at Bull
Run. Whether he made this junction of
his own v9lition or under the repeated
orders Of Davis and his Secretary Of War
/ is question not yet settled between the
disDutants, though the facts detailed in
this volume seem to leave the probability
IN favor Of Johnston. Under the enthu-
siasm engendered throughout the South
by the victory, Johnston's name became
very prominent, and he was left in COM
mand notwithstanding his failure to adj
vance against the defeated army Of Nc
DowelI,
There is no doubt now that he erred
greatly in not pressing forward after Bull
Run with his entire army, much Of which,
according to his own narrative, had not
been engaged, and all Of which must have
been inspired with the highestenthuslasm.
Holmes, Eaelt 9nd others reported aad
asked for orders after the firing had
ceased. but they were told their troops
srwonld not be wanted, and were request
ed to lead them back to camp Consld-
cred purely as a matter Of duty 10 the
cause in which Johnston WAS engaged,
these orders were in the highest degree
unmilitary. and showed that the General
was not equal to the great energy OF the
time.
Writers apon warfare generally agree
as TO the best method OF conducting q bat
tile. There are some circumstances
which Justify the defensive, and some
which make the offensive absolutely nee
essarv. At the battle of Bull Run the
/ Union commander chose the latter. and
was right in doing so, and thus perforce
compelled Johnston 10 make the former
Itill he had gained the victory; but. then.
according to all rules and all the great
precedents of generalship, he should
/ have assumed the offensive, and compile
! ted his success He could not have suf
fered more than a repuIse, and might
| have captured Washington. In spite of
/ the large force gathered there, the chan
i ces were ninety-nine out Of hundred in
! his favor The opinion of the best officers
/ in the Union army was that he would
have swept everything before him VIC
/ tory would have given him arms, NUM-
tons, and supplies of every description.
/ His excuse is that the strength Of the
+ Union army and its position were too
/ formidable to be successfully assailed,
and that his own force was more disor-
gained by victory than the Union army
bv defeat" This cannot be true, for a
/ large part of his army had not fired a
shot; bat if true, there was this difference,
which he never should have lost sight of.
namely, that while he had in his favor
/ the d organization of victory, which adj
/ ded ten fold to the confidence, however
much it might have shaken the Conference
OF his troops, McDowell's troops we're
flying under the disqualification OF defeat,
accompanied by panic, which rendered
them entirely uncomfortable tor the time
being. 1t is not to be wondered at that
Davis, military man himself, and one,
who, Notwithstanding his arbitrary
and injudicious character, held the
I Confederacy to its work with constancy
and courage rarely surpassed, should have
been disheartened by Johnston's lack of
aggressive temper and good generalship,
and should have sought to supersede him