The Indiana State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis) 1868-1895, 1874-10-06

1
and defeats the whole object Therefore. the
more we improve the frearm, the more will
be the necessity of good organization, good
discipline, and intelligence on the part of
the individual soldier and officer. There is.
OF course, scch thing as individual cour.
age, which has value in war. but familiar
lily with danger, experience in war and its
common attendants, and personal habit, are
equally valuable traits, and these are the
qualities with which we usually have to
deal in war. All men naturally shrink
from pain and danger, and only incur its
risks from some higher motive or from habit
and
We DEFINE TRUE COURAGE
TO be perfect sensibility of the measure OF
danger and mental willingness to incur il.
rather than the insensibility to danger OF
which 1 have heard far more than 1 have
seen. The most courageous men are gem
orally unconscious of possessing the quality:
and, therefore, when one processes it too
openly py words or bearing. there is reason
TO mistrust it. / would further illus-
trate my meaning by describing n
man OF true courage to be one who
possesses all his faculties and senses per-
fectly when serious danger is actually pres
ent. Modern wars have not materially
changed the relative values or proportions
or the several arms of service: infantry ar
tillery, cavalry and engineers. Ifanything.
the infantry has been increased in value
The danger of cavalry attempting to charge
Infantry armed with breech- loading ri
fies was fully illustrated at Sedan, and
has such a thing become that we
have omitted the infantry square from our
recent tactics. Still, cavalry against cavalry.
and as auxiliary to infantry, will ALWAYS be
valuable, while all great wars will, as here
tofore, depend chiefly on the infantry. Ar
tiiery Is more valuable with new and mex
perienced troops than with veterans. In
the early stages of the war the field guns
often bore the proportion of six 10 a thou
sand men. but toward the close of the war
one gun, or at most two, to a thousand
men was deemed enough. Sieges,
such as characterized the wars of the last
century, are too slow for this period of the
world, and the Prussians recently almost
ignored them altogether, penetrated France
between the forts. and left q superior force
lin observation" 10 watch the garrison and
accept its surrender when the greater events
Of the war made further resistance unless
but earth forts, and especially field
works, will hereafter play an i'm
portant part in wars, because they
enable minor force to hold superior one
in check for time, and time is a most
valuable element in all wars. It was one
of Prof. Mahan's maxims that the spade
was as useful in war as the musket, and to
this will add the ak. The habit of in
trenching certainly does have the effect of
making new troops timid. When line of
banle is once covered by a good parapet.
made by the engineers or by the labor of the
men, it does require an effort to MAKE them
leave it
IN THE FACE OF DANGER;
but when the enemy is intrenche6 il be-.
comes absolutely necessary to permit each
brigade and division of the troops immedi-
ately opposed, to throw up corresponding
trench for their own protection in case OF
sudden sally. We invariably did this in all
our recent campaigns, and it had no i'll
effect, though sometimes our troops were a
little too slow in leaving their
well covered lines to assail the
enemy in position or on retreat. Even
our skirmishers were in the habit of
rolling logs together, or Of making lunette
of rails with dirt in front to cover their
bodies, and though it revealed their posi-
ton, can not say that it worked bad effect:
so that as a rule it may safely be left to the
men themselves On the defensive there
is no doubt of the propriety of fortifying,
but in the assailing army the general must
watch closely to see that his men do not
neglect an opportunity to drop his precau-
tionary defeBses, and act promptly
on the offensive" at every chance.
L have many a time crept forward 10 the
line to avail myself of the cover of
the picket's Sc little fort" to observe more
closely some expected result, and / always
talked Familiarity with the men, and was as
tonished to see how well they comprehended
the general object, and how accurately
they were informed of the state of facts
existing miles away from their particular
corps. Soldiers are very quick to catch
the general drift and purpose of a
and are always sensible when
they are we'll commanded or we'll cared for.
Once impressed with this fact. and that they
are making progress, they bear cheerfully
any amount of labor and privation.
1t is related of Napoleon that his last
words were Tete-d'-Armee." Doubtless
as the shadow of death obscured his MEM
Dry, the last thought that remained for
speech was of some event, when he was di- |
recting an important 'head of column" / |
believe that every general who has handled
armiesin battle must recall from his own
experience the intensity of thoughto on some |
similar occasion, when by single command
he had given
THE FINISHING STROKE
to some complicated action; but to me re-
curs another thought that is worthy of
record. and may encourage others who are
to follow us in our profession. never saw
the rear OF an army engaged in battle but |
feared that some calamity had happened at
wagons, dead horses, men lying about dead
and MANNED, parties Fastening to and fro in
disorder, and a general apprehen-
sion of something dreadful about TO ensue
all these signs, however, lessened as /
neared the front, and there the contrast
was perfect; perfect order. men
and horses full of confidence, and it was
not unusual for general hilarity. laughing,
aud general cheering. Although the cannon
might be firing, the musketIy gathering,
ana the lannon's shot hitting close, there
reigned a general feeling of strength and
security that bore q marked contrast 10 the
bloody signs that had drifted rapidly TO the
rear; therefore for comfort and safety i
surely would rather be at the front line than
the rear lins of battle. 50 also on the
march. the head ola column .noyes on stead
lily, while the rear is alternately hating and
then rushing forward to close up the gap;
and all sorts of rumors, especially the worst,
float back to the rear. Old troops -invaria-
y s,rsx~s m, a