New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1874-06-28
The Grant Parish Cnse.

rendered his decision upon the rule for q
new trial submitted a week ago in behalf
of William j. Cruikshank, w. D. Irwin
aud John P. Hadnot, convicted upon six
teen counts of banding and conspiring to
prevent the exercise Of constitutional
rights Of certain citizens Of Grant parish
The length OF this-carefully written. lucid
and well considered opinion prevents our
giving it IN ertenso We present brief
summary Of some of its important and
salient points:
The court reviewed together the first
seven grounds Of defendants rule, as they all
were to the effect that the evidence did not
justify conviction on any Of the sixteen
counts under which q verdict Of guilty was
rendered. As to twelve Of the counts he be-
ieved that the testimony fully justified the
verdict, and as to the remaining four rela-
tive to voting, though his opinion was not
go decided, the jury had given their judg-
ment on the facts before them, and it was
useless to pass upon the matter az the re-
suit in the shape of a sentence would not
be affected whether the finding in this in.
stance we're correct or otherwise. The YER
dict on the other twelve counts would suf
fee for a sentence.
The court recounted at length the facts
testified to on the trial, exhibiting perfect
familiarity with the details of this long
case, and, sustaining his opinion by the mar
rative, and commented on the remarkable
similarity between the testimony given in
the two trials.
The fact that one of the jurors had been
con victed of perjury, and sentenced to i'm
pIisonment therefor, was next adverted to.
This was q positive disqualification; but
could the defense take advantage of it after
verdict 1t was evident from the aff-
davit of attorneys for the accused, that
they had information Of the disqualif-
cation before the verdict. The court
admitted that authorities differed upon
themselves of such disqualification at so
late stage, but the weight of reason and
authority seemed to be in favor of the posi-
ton that the defect should be brought to
the notice of the court on the impanelng
of the jury,cr as soon thereafter as possi-
bic, and before the decision Of the jury. In
this case counsel for the defense should
have directed the courts attention to tn Q
matter as soon as they had reason to be-
lieve the Juror disqualified. They seemed
to have taken their chances In the matter,
hoping for an acquittal, and reserving the
point for case Of need. The jury seemed
good enough to acquit, as in the case of
Hickman and others, and now it was
sought to show that it was not good enough
to convict.
As to the misnomer in the case of the
juror Mulvey, it had been shown that his
residence was that of the juror summoned,
that he was evidently the identical man
selected for the jury, that he had served in
good faith and had the requisite quslifca-
tions for a juror. Under these circum-
stances the verdict could not be set aside
for a mere error in the christian name.
As TO the right of the court to control the
jury III matters of law, the opinion of the
court as expressed in its charge to the jury
had been strengthened and confirmed by a
new examination Of authorities, several OF
which were quoted at length. The other
grounds Of the rule were separately re.
viewed and decided upon adversely to the
movers.
The court concluded by expressing his
belief that fair trial had been accorded
the accused, and that the verdict had been
rendered by the jury after an intelligent
and patient deliberatjon. Taking these
views Of the grounds of the rule and the
nature of the trial, he was constrained to
deny the motion.
At twelve o'clock, Judge Bradley, of the
United States Supreme Court, took the
bench with Judge Woods and proceeded to
read his opinion upon the formal motion in
arrest of judgment filed in behalf Of the
accused, and already argued as motion to
exclude evidence. Judge Bradley's opinion
was an elaborate constitutional argument,
evidently the result of long and deliberate
study of the questions involved. The thir-
teenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments
were considered with reference to their ef-
feet upon national and State legislation and
the rights and responsibilities of individual
citizens.
Certain rights were absolutely guaran-
teed and secured to the citizen, respecting
which it was within the scope of the powers
of Congress to provide protection, il some
cases against State legislation, and in 9th
ers against individual aggression. In other
instances the national legislature, and in
some, the State legislatures, we're absolutely
forbidden to make enactments infringing
personal rights. Where in violation of any
of these provisions, States passed laws in
derogation of personal rights, it was the
duty of Congress to interfere. by appro-
pirate legislation. Were the sixteen counts
under which these accused had been con-
victed authorized by any act Of Congress
and by the federal constitution
Judge Bradley then subjected each of
the sixteen counts to critical analysis.
The first count charged the accused with a
conspiracy, with the intent to prevent a
peaceable assembly. The first amendment
to the constitution declares that Congress
shall not interfere with the right to peace
ably assemble. This does not give the
United States courts jurisdiction to try
persons for conspiring to prevent peace
able assemblage.
The second count alleged a conspiracy to
prevent the exercise of the right to bear
arms. The reasoning applicable to the
first count has equal force with reference
to this. The United States courts have no
jurisdiction ever violation by an in
dividual Of the right of another to be ar
arms.