The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1874-05-03
GEN. JOSEPH JoHNsroN's BOOK ON THE WAR.
The Reason why he did not Attempt to Capture
Washington.
PRESIDENT DAVIS vINDICArED.
From the New York Tribune. !

| From the New York TIibuneI
Gen. Johnston gives a detailed account
of the first battle of Bull Run, or of Manas.
sas, as it is styled by him, and offers q
series of special pleadings to exculpate
himself from his subsequent failure to
capture Washington. This failure has
been ascribed to the prohibition of the
no orders, and expressed no wish on. the
subject. Taking the situation into view,
says Gen. Johnston, the southern people
could not have expected greater results
from their victory than those accomplish
ed, the defeat of the invasion of Virginia,
and the protection of the Confederate cap
| ital. The reason which he alleges for
declining movement on Washington will
be read with interest.
can the military conditions, we knew,
| forbade an attempt on Washington. The
Confederate army was more disorganized by
victory than that of the United States by
defeat. The southern soldiers believed
that the objects of the war had been ac-
complished by their victory, and that they
had achieved all that their country requir-
ed of them. Many, therefore, in ignorance
of their military obligations, left the army
not to return. Some fastened home to
exhibit the trophies picked up on the
ceremony to attend to wounded friends,
frequently accompanying them to hospitals
in distant towns. Such were the reports
Of general and staff officers and railroad
officials. Exaggerated ideas of the victory
prevailing among our troops cost us more
men than the federal army lost by defeat.
"Besdes this condition of our army, the
reasons for the course condemned by the
non combatant military critic were /:
"The uDfitness Of our raw troops for
marching or assailing intrenchments.
"The want of the necessary supplies OF
A.
porting them. Until near the 10th of
August we never had rations for more
than two days, and sometimes none, nor
half enough ammunition for battle.
"The Notifications upon which skillful
engineers, commanding the resources of
the United States, had been engaged since
April, manned by at least $4,000 Federal
troops, half of whom had not suffered defeat
"The Potomac, a mile wide, bearing
United States vessels of-war, the heavy
guns of which commanded the wooden
bridges and southern shore.
"The confederate army would have been
two days in marching from Bull Run to
the federal intrenchments, with less than
two days' rations, or not more. 1t is as
serted that the country, teeming with grain
and cattle, could have furnished food and
forage in abundance. Those who make
the assertion forget that large fede-
raj army had passed t,ciee over the route
have seen tracts of. country along which a
federal army has passed once they can
Judge, therefore, of the abundance left
where it has passed twice. AS we had
none of the means of besieging, an imme
diate assault upon the forts would have
been unavoidable it would have been
repealed, inevitably, and our half supply
of ammunition exhausted and the enemy,
increased to 10000 men by the
army at Harper's Ferry, and become the
party, could and would have
their march to Richmond without
fear of further opposition.
--"And, if we had miraculously been sue
cessful in our assault, the Potamac would
have protected Washington, and rendered
our further progress impossible.
sit is certain that the federal govern
ment and generals did not regard the cap
ture of Washington by as practicable,
like the non combatan authors of the cri-
ticisms to which l refer. The fact that
the army at Harper's Ferry was left idle
there instead of being Brought to Washing
ton, is conclusive on that point. l have
never doubted the correctness of my course
on that occasion. Had 1 done SO, the re-
suits of the invasions made subsequently
by disciplined and much more numerous
armies, properly equipped and provided,
and commanded by the best soldiers who |
appeared in that war, would have reas
sured me. The first of these expeditions
was after Gen. Lees victory over Pope,
and those of Maj. Gems. Jackson and !
Ewell over Fremont, Banks, and Shields,
in 1862 the second, when the way was
supposed to have been opened by the eff !
feet of Gen: Lees victory at Chancellors-
Vile in 1868.
"The armies defeated on these occasions |
were four times as numerous as that re-
pulsed on the 2lst. of July, 1861, and their |
Losses much greater in proportion to num-
bers yet the spirit of the northern people |
was 80 reused by these invasions of their
country that their armies, previously de-
teated on our soil, met ours on their own
at Sharpsburg and Gettysburg so strong
in numbers and in courage as to send back
the war into Virginia from each of those
battle fields. The failure of those inva
sions, directed by Lee, aided by Longstreet
and jackson, with troops Injured to marches
and mau9uvres as well as to battle, and
attempted under the most favorable cir
cumstances of the war, proves that the
confederacy was too weak for offensive war
fare, and is very strong evidence in favor
OF the course against which southern writ.