New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1874-08-16

Sult WAS GROWING VlcUoFg ZOE Juo Union
cause. This battle of Shiloh-frst heralded
abroad as Confederate victory, and after.
wards confessed as q defeat-did more to
weaken the faith of the Confederates in
their final triumph than anything that had
occurred. The silly boast that one South
ern man was a match for tour Northern
men" was NJ more heard of.
When General Grant undertook the serge
of Vicksburg. it was doubted by most per-
sons whether he must necessarily fall.
There never was, perhaps, on the CONT
nent any extemporized Notifications made
stronger than Vicksburg. Its possession
pensable to their vigorous prosecution of
the war. 1t was the key to the navigation
of the Mississippi. When General Grant
formed his lines around the place, mis- enc
mics predicted that the day of his glory
was past; his friends had serious fears OF
the result. Without despOndently express
ing doubts of the practicability of reduc-
ing the place, or without vainly boast
ing of his ability to perform the task,
best. 1t was predicted, and with some
appearance of probability, that, in de-
fiance of all human power, the seige must
necessarily be prOCracted till battle and
disease would either destroy or render in
efficient his army. Never was seige prose-
cnted more vigorously; never was there more
unf1agging determination of purpose, more
daring yet quiet energy displayed. Every
foot CT ground he gained he held to the last.
Finally Vicksburg succumbed to the mas
terly generalship of General Grant. The
Confederates were astOunded-the friends
of the Union were fractic with joy. 1t was
thought that with the loss of the Mississippi
throughout its entire length the Confed-
crates would see the futility of further
resistance, and would propose terms of
accommodation and return to within the
fold OF the Union. But destiny had not yet
accomplished its purpose.
When the waning fortune of the Union
cause in the battle OF Chickamauga caused
thrill of anxiety through the heart of the
nation, public opinion called for General
Grant to take command of that army which
the careless supineness of the Confederate
commander had saved from rOut and ruin.
And here again General Grant showed his
adaptation of his policy to the peculiar
emergencies of the case. Although the
Confederate victory of Chlckamauga was
utterly barren of results, still it had infused
new energy and hope in the Confederate
cause, while the Union army was CORE
spOndingly depressed by the result. Gen
eral Grant saw that something was neces-
sary to awaken the zeal and to arouse
their confidence and their hopes. Here
soon followed the most brilliant ex-
plot of the war. While the Confederate
army was reposing in undOubted security
on the crest Of Missionary Ridge, not dream
General Grant, with rspidity and quietness
of preparation hardly conceivable, with
one portion of his army, charged right up
the steep ascent Of the mountain directly
in the face of the plunging fire, while with
another portion of his force he turned the
enemy's flank, thus gaining a most decided
victory. 1t was one of the battles in which
the Confedei ates were compelled to admit
that they were badly whipped. We are apt
to eXaggeI ate in our minds achievements
at distance from us in time or space; but
the victory of the Anglo-French army over
the Russians at the battle of the Alma,
where similar charge was made up a
mountain ascent, was not more brilliant in
execution or telling in results than the vic
tory achieved by General Grant at Mission
airy Ridge.
When the prestige of the Western army
had been restored, and its organization per-
tected by General Grant, he was again
called to another field of action, to revive
the dropping confidence of the Union forces
In Virginia, the most renowned soldiers
Of the nation had, one after another. failed
to contend successfully with the Fabian
policy of General Lee. There the war still
dragged it's slow length along" General
Grant, without murmur, repaired to the
new scene of conflict. Here he found him
self confronting new adversary of great
ability, with troops of different personnel
on which to rely, and surrounded by Cir
cumstances requiring an adaptation of his
policy to the peculiar purposes of the gov
eminent. In order to a proper understand
ing of General Grants military career
while IL command of the army of Vir-
ginia, the first inquiry which presents it
self is, what the OBJECT to be accomplished
OF course it was to drive General Lee from
his position, where he stood at guard
over the Confederate government at Rich
this in the shortest possible
time and with he least possible cost of
blood. General Lees policy was Fabian
one, defensive in It's character. Nearly all
the great battles during the war were fought
sin line" one army precipitating itself on
tine other behind breastworks, which they
frequently improvised for the OCCASION
This is mainly owing to the face of the
country.
There is so little of very large areas of
open country, so much of dense forest to
Obstruct military evolution, SO few bridges
over our large streams, SO few and such in
different roads compared to those OF Europe,
that while there is no little opportunity for
strategy of planning campaigns, or in tao
tics OF delivering battle, yet these very con-
sideratiOns necessitate the greater tenacity
Of purpose and daring courage in action,
and the greater GOODNESS Of perception in
the pivot points of battle.
General Grant saw that in order to dis
lodge General Lee from his position, and
thus remove all danger and obstruction
from behind him, when he should 60 on to |
rphv nnnd thnp 70 Snn 70 fI,n
could be done in no other way than by the |
lint of desperate battles. General Grant !
las been charged by partisan martinets |
with being military butcher, with having |
10 regard for human life, and with being |
Indebted for his success to his reckless |
expenditure of the lives of his soldiers. !
The great secret of General Grants success |
S that he pursues no routine system in car
wing on war. He varies and adopts his |
policy to the emergencies surrounding him. |
lie saw it must take a great sacrifice of |
hen pursue him on to Richmond. But it
lad to be done.
He calculated and concluded it would be |
the lives of his men and saw
ng time, and Fastening the conclusion of |
he war, by fighting battles, sharp, steady
md bloody, at u heavy cost of life, instead |
II by delay and caution, ultimately losing /
lOuble the number of men in double the
ength of time. Then again he well calcu-
ated, as a sagaciOus commander should |
nave done, that he could well afford to lose
,hree men for the Confederates one. He
knew the quickest way to finish the war
and stop the effusion of human blood was
Dy the defeat and decentralization of Gen
,ral Lees army. The truth is he was
thinking more of moral results-of the end.
ng OF the war and the integrity of the