Whig and tribune. [volume] (Jackson, Tenn.) 1870-1877, 1874-04-04

1
= letter from the President followed
which, like that of the Secretary oi
War, General Johnston says, "was
ostensibly intended for my instruc.
tom This letter so studiedly ig.
HOres the suggestions in General
Rs JohnstOn's reply to the Secretary as
to virtually imply doubt in the au-
thor's mind as to the accuracy oi
1 JohnstoP's presentation of the &C
: tual condition of the army. Thai
n this was Johnston's estimate of il
is shown by the comment which fol
II lows:
81 was unable then, as now. to
imagine any military object fol
which this letter could have been
written, especially by one whose
5. time was supposed to be devoted
y to the most important concerns OF
y government. The President could
n not have thought that l was TO be
n taught the moral and material con-
. ditiOn of the army around me by
E. him, from the observations of his
e aidc-de-camp, who had never seen
:. military service, instead Of learn
- ing them by my own Nor could he
have believed that the army which
q he so described was competent to
? recover the territory from which
~ IT had been driven" AS / had much
!. better means of information on the
4 subjects of this paper than its au-
e thor, il could not have been written
for my Instruction."
~ tsEshis rsnlx to tl1es Tres s ssets
terne forcibly presented the difii-
culties in the way to the recoYe :
of the lost territory in Te e zee,
urged by the Executive. These
obstacles were, viz: Chattanooga,
then n fortress; the Tennr ssee river;
the Cumberland mo ountairS; lack of
subsistence and field transportation;
and an army numerically inferior to
that of the enemy; that less diff
cult march would be from North
Mississippi. He suggested the en-
plOyment of negroes Is substitutes
for soldiers called of for detailed
duty; a division of the army into
three corps and the appointment of
Lieutenant Generals fro so ne 9TH
or army. He supposed that Dalton,
which had little to recOmn end 1t as
a defensive position had not been
selected by Gen. Bragg, for its val
Ue as such, but that the retreat from
Missionary Ridge had ceased at that
point, because it was ascertained
pursuit had been abandon ed by the
Fede al army. The history of this /
| memorable campaign from this !
Is interesting, and throws much |
light upon events then transpiring |
behind the scenes. Ii shows furth- /
er, that the then prevalent suspi- |
| ciOns of antagOnistic views as to the /
plan of operations, thea existing |
between Johnston on the one part, |
and Bragg, Davis and the Admins |
tratiOn on the other, were not alto /
! gethCr grOunless. This correspon- |
uence the Administration and him
self he gives fully, because, as he |
| says, 81 have been accused of DISC |
beying the orders of the President,
and the entreaties of Genl Bragg, !
to assume the offensive" We need /
not here detail the operations from
Dalton to Atlanta, so familiar to
most of our readers, and to many
Of them by personal observation.
We let General Johnston speak for
himself, however, as to the justifica-
ton of his policy:
MY own operations, chen and
subsequently, were determined by
the relative force of the armies, and
a higher estimate of the Northern
soldiers than our Southern editors
and politicians weIc accustomed TO
express, or even the Administra-
ton seemed TO entertain This
opinion had been formed in much
service with them against Indians,
ana four or five battles in Mexico
such actions, at least, as were then
called battles. Observations of al
most twenty years of service ofthis
sort had IRnFNrnecnA On 3 - I
belief that the soldiers of the regu- 4
lar army of the United States-al-
most all Northern men-Were equal,
in lighting qualities, TO any that had
been formed in the wars of Great
Britain and France. | therefore
thought it our policy to stand on
the defensive, to spare the blood of
our soldiers by fighting under cover
habitually, and to attack only when
bad position or division of the enc
mys forces might give US advanta-
9es counterbalancing that of supe-
rior numbers"
General Johnston shows, un-
doubtedly, that it was his deter
mination 10 defend, as far as able,
the city of Atlanta, and, if possible,
with advantage, to give battle. In
the very act OF issusing Instructions
relative to the intrenchment of the
place, he received the following tel
egram from General Cooper:
Il am directed by the Secretary
of War to inform you that, as you
have failed to arrest the advance of
the enemy to the vicinity of Allan
ia, far in the interior of Georgia,
and express no confidence. that YOU
can defeat or repel him, you a. .
hereby relieved from the comm nd
of the Army and Department of
Tennessee, which YOU will imme-
diately turn over to General Hood"
Orders transferring the command
were written and published imme-
diately by Johnston, VINO then re-
piled to Secrctary's telegram as fol-
lows:
''Your dispatch OF yesterday re-
ceived aud Obeyed. Command of
the Army and Department of Ten
ncssee has been transferred to Gen
eral Hood. / assert that Sherman's
army is much stronger, compared
with that of Tennessee, tnan Grants
compared with that of Northern
Virginia. Yet the enemy has been
compelled TO advance much more
slowly to the vicinity of Atlanta
than to that of Richmond and Pc
tersburg; and penetrated much
deeper into Virginia than into
Georgia.
"COntident language by military
commander is not usually regard
ed as evidence of competence"
The disastrous result of this trans
fer is known. The concluding chap
ters of the narrative of this part of
Johnston's campaign furnish, we
think, his complete vindication against
the accusations of Generals Bragg and ]
Hood, and refute the alleged grounds
of his removal, viz: that he persistent
" disregarded the Presidents in ]
structions; that he would not fight;
that he refused to defend Atlanta; ex-
aggeratiOn of losses, etc. He says he /
believed then as he believes now, that
the system pursued was the only one
at his command that;promised success,
and that If adhered to it would have
given success. General Hood asserts
in his published report, that the army
had become demOraliZed when he was
appointed to command it, aud ascribes
his inyariable defeats to that cause.
The allegation Is disproved by the re-
cord of the admirable conduct of those
troops on every occasion on which
that General sent them 10 battle-to
inevitable disaster. Their courage
and discipline were unsubdued by Il
the slaughter to which they were reck-
lessly offered in the four attacks on
the Federal army near Atlanta, rs
they proved IN the useless butchery
at Franklin-and survived the rout
and disorganization at Nashville-as