Arizona weekly miner., 1874-02-20

defendant, could not effect his legal rights, ] unless it should appear that he in some way
 accepted or assented to them. It does not
 appear that his acceptance or assent was
 shown or proposed Co be shown. This excep- ton Is therefore ovcrruled.
 | The third exception is: The court erred in refusing to give the third instruction asked | for by the plaintiffs' counsel--tbat defendant
 having asserted a right under the deed of ! Degrallo is bound by 1t, and that the statute
 of limitations does not begin to ruh until he
 claims under the right now set up by him"
 It does not clearly appear either from the
 record or argument upon it, what IS meant by this exception. To be at all available for
 the plaintiffs, it must be found to refer tD
 some portion of the evidence in the case.
 The only portion of the evidence Co which
 this exception appears 10 be responsive, IS
 defendants allegation that "early in ls6I
 Brown offered bun a ranch in Chiao valley as
 an indueement for hun to bring his family
 and settle there.' This seems To be that
 which this excepiian describes .the right
 now set up by him" The exception assumes
 that this Is in some way fatally conflicting
 with the def,ndont's having asserted right
 under deed of Degrallo, and that this severed the tenancy in common which is asserted by
 the plaintiffs first exception and formed an
 era in the case, which put the statute of lin- itations in active operation. Such, however,
 is not the legal effect Of this testimony. There is really no conflict in the defendants claiming at one time under Degrallo's deed
 and at another under Browns promise. They
 are parts of one complex transaction in
 which the deed appears as the fulfillment of
 the promise previously made. The defend
 ant might at one time assert that Browns
 promise was the consideration which actua-
 ated him at another the $500 mentioned in
 Degrallo's deed; at another the deed itself ];
 and at other times any two of these; or, ali three of them together; and yet he would forfeit no legal ii Sht and incur no le gal haz. ard. Tue defendant in his conversations on this subject with Brown himself or with Browns grantees, would naturally refer to : Browns promise, with strangers to Degrsllo's deed, and in stating the cost of bis ranch and aier-rigbt to any body, be might aIege : the $500 mentioned in the deed, by which he and his must expect to hold them and be : guilty of no breacb of legal or moral truth and incur forfeiture or hazard. No error appears in the charge thus excepted to and the exception must be overruled.
 The fourth exception Is as follows: The court erred tn its charge to the jury, that plaintiffs g estopped by the declaration Of Brown" The ex-
 ceptiou does not fully state the charge of the
 Judge upon the trial oi this nor the evidence to which it refers. The charge thus: Again. 5 if Brown did represent 10 defendant while he 4 Brown, was In possession of the property now r claimed by the plaintiffs, that onc-fonrth of the water flowing in the ditch was tbe property of
 Degrallo, and used the inducements alleged to in
 duce the defendant to go there and seItle and defendant relying on his representation did so 3 go to that valley and enter upon the possession Of the ranch and water right under and by virtue
 Of any alleged purchase or agreement with Brown f or Brown and Postle from or with Degrallo, :, these plaintiffs are estopped, Brown himself . would be il he were The plaintiff in this action, rom denying such right of defendant 10 one fourth interest in the water right forever after and this If Degrallo had any right or inter. o est in the properly, whatever, or II there xas no v v such man in being. Tbe whole Of this exception . must be taken together with the evidence to iei it feisi-, ln estimating its legal effect On t recurring to the testimony, ind that the de- n fendant took possession of his ranch and one v fourth of the water now in controversy in March lS67 and has since used and enIoyed both i. and that the deed Of Degrailo to defendant was re- 's corded April II, 1867. Browns deed to schnei. e der is dated November, lo67. SenneideTs deed ,e 10 Campbell one or the paintiff- and Buffutn la ,- dated August, 1868 and Csmpbers deed 10 Ba ia ker, the other plaintiff s dated March, 1872 The
 only principle upon which Browns grantees the y present plaintiffs, can deny the binding effect up )r on them Of Browns declarations eoncerning me 0, water 10 tbc defendant, would be that they had ia no notice Of them. In respect to thIs the nre V. sumption oi law is that Cam npbell and Baker eY ,- ercfrea ofuiharf dihsence In ascertaining the conditions and relations Of their ranch at tbr (, time they took possession in November Isg7 and (, In March. isIz The law reqnires of fbe,n o,di D. nary diligence in ali such matters ak tbis wa,n, li controversy, In which others are eoneeybeA ,Ths i law VIII hardly take from Ihe defendant his dc, . water ana give lt to tue plaintiffs in Div II, an ie proya Of their se.i-imposed lgnoranes "i ,L Oi they purchased the ranch Ina ouiuior ,n.,I