, 1874-01-31
IN METZ.

Ch~1A ~ ho
caused the defeat Of MacMahon, by allowing
the latter to be outnumbered. But admitting,
for arguments sake, that after doing his best
to reach the Meuse Bazaine had been yanquish-
ed by superior forces, strategy or by a combi-
nation OF unfortunately adverse circumstances
admitting, in fact, that his retreat into Metz
had been neyitable-then what should have
been his conduct once he was blOckaded Here
his duty became clear. To have attacked the
Germans on the morrow Of Mars la-Tour per
hapS required a certain dose of genius for the
absence Of which a general cannot be held
criminal but to play his part worthily inside
Metz it only needed the common sum of good
sense which must Turk in every Office of high
rank. The German army around Metz never
at any time numbered more than 100000 men;
and, having in all no less than 10000 men
under him in Metz, Bazaine should have at
tackled the 200, 600 without respite, at all
points, every day and night. He should have
ordered sortie after %sortie, kept the enemy con
tinually on the lookout, risked any losses on
his w side in order to infliet losses on them
harass, fatigue and diShearten them. In the
solitary sOrtie of any consequence which
Bazaine did make, but 10 days only before the
capitulation October l0), the Germans suffer
ed such loss as proved cOnGlusively what
would have been the result had these sorties
been commenced and repeated without cease
since the beginning of September. But the
Germans themselves admit that if Bazaine had
offered a determ ned resistance the c0nseQuen-
Ces must have been these: the Germans could
not have kept up the siege with 200, 900 men,
and would have been obliged to send for rein
f0rcementS and so weaken the forces around
Paris and on the Loire. Meanwhile the French
armies on the Loire having less or no hostile
fArpal tn aOptond with would houo 49, -.
position to relieve Paris, which was onlv
bIockaded by 10000 men, and the Germans,
too prudent to risk a struggle with the Loire
armies and with the garrison of Paris at such
unequal odds, would have raised the siege OF
the capital. Indeed, as it was General MCitke
doubted at the beginning Of October whether
it would be possible to continue tie siege OF
Paris, and was making preparations for re-
Great. The siege of Paris was only commenced
under the suppoSition that the Parisians
would not resist. Once it became evident that
they meant to hold out it would have been
Impossible to blockade them effectually had the
army in Metz done its duty. General Moltke
was too shrewd to expose himself to q
defeat under the walls of Paris, for such a de-
feat must have degenerated into a rout.
WHAT .~BAzA1NE SHOULD HAVE DONE If FORCED
TO CAPITULATE.
"But," it may be urged, 'ifBaz4ino had prop
erly defended himself in Metz he would only
have succeeded in m%assing the entire strength
Of the Germans round his citadel, aud he would
have been forced to yield in the end" Posi-
bly, but a generals duty is to consider how
best he may serve the common interests Of the
country, and the prospect of losing his W
entire army has no business to check his ope-
%rations, If Bazaine had forced the Germans
to raise the siege of Paris the capitulation Of
3letz would have been but of secondary impor-
lance. He was bounl !, however, to prolong his
resistance in Metz until it was absolutely i'm.
possible, from want of food and ammunition, to
hold out any longer, and, when the capitulation
loomed ahead as unavoidable, then he should
have opened negotiations with the enemy and
stipulated that all his garrison should march
out with the honours Of war-that is, free to
go away with their arms under pledge of not
lighting again during the campaign. If the
enemy had been kept in ignorance of the ex-
h%austion of supplies inside the city it is proba,
BILE they might have aeceeded to these terms
but had they not done 50, then it was Bazaine's
duty to act as Todleben did at Sebastopol-
blow up his Notifications, destroy the a~rsenals
and casemates, smash all his rifles and cannon,
drench his ammunition aud burn his flags and
stores, so that nothing whatever should have
follop into fbo bool, &c H. n..-. mn