The Van Buren press., 1874-04-07
WHAT RUINED THE SOUTHERN
CONFEDERACY.
General Joseph &. Johnston's Views


lished work entitled "A Narrative OF
Military Operations Directed During the
Late War Between the States. " He
shows that Jefferson Davis interfered
with his movements in very provoking
way, and then attempts to show that the
South might have succeeded had it right
ly managed its recources He says:
A full treasury was necessary to defray
the expenses of great war. The South
had the means of making one, in its cot.
ton alone. But its government rejected
those means, and limited its financial eli
forts to printing bank notes. with which
the country was flooded. The necessity
of actual money in the treasury, and the
mode Of raising it. were generally under
stood in the country. 1t was that the
government should take the cotton from
the owners and send it to Europe as fast
as possible, to be sold there. This was
easily practicable, for the owners were
ready to accept any terms the govern
ment might fix, and sending TO Europe
was easy in all the first year of the Con
federacy's existence. Its government
went into operation early in February.
The blockade of the Southern ports was
proclaimed in May, but not at all effec-
tive until the end Of the following winter,
so that there was a period of twelve
months for the operation of converting
100000 or 5000, 900 bales Of cotton
into money. The sum raised in that way
would have enabled the war department
to procure at once arms enough for 5OO,-
900 men, and after that expenditure the
Confederate treasury would have been
much richer than that of the United
States By applying the first money OBJ
tanned in this way to the purchase OF
arms and military accoutrements, or u.s.
ing for the purpose the credit which such
an amount ofproperty would have given,
the war department would have been able
to equip troops as fast as they could be
assembled and organized. And. as the
Southern people were full of enthusiasm,
100000 men could have been ready and
in the field had such course been pur-
sued at the time when the first battle was
actually fought-the 2lst of July, 1861.
Such force placed on the northern
borders of the Confederacy before the
United States had brought fourth of
the number into the field, would prob
ably have paevented the very idea of
F." coercion. Such disposition of such
an army. and the possession OF financial
means OF carrying on war Tor years,
would have secured the success OF the
Confederacy.
The timely adoption Of such financial
system would have secured to us the
means of success, even without an cX-
traordinary importation Of arms and the
organization of large armies.
But after the Confederate currency had
become almost worthless, when a sol
dier's months pay would scarcely buy
one meal for his family--and that was
the case in all the last period of ten or
twelve months-thosc soldiers Of the la
boring class who had families were com
PEELED to choose between their military
service and the strongest obligations
men know--their duties to wives and
children. They obeyed the strongest
OF those obligations, left the army. and
returned to their homes to support their
families
The wrctched impressment laws de-
prved the army of many valuable men
OF a class less poor than that just refer
red to. These laws required the impress
ment of all articles of military necessity
that could not be purchased. The gov
vrnmcnt had the power Of regulating the
prices to be paid by it tor all such com.
modi les; and the commissioners ap.
pointed for the purpose fixed them much
below the market values. No one would
sell to the government, of course, when
he could get from his neighbors twice the
government price for his horses or grain !;
consequently the officers OF the govern.
ment could never purchase but had al
ways to procure supplies by impressment.
No rules for their guidance were pre-
scribed none at least that were observed
by them or known to the public, and
they were subjected to no supervision
All the property of Confederate citizens
applicable to military purposes was,
therefore, under their absolute control.
The bad and Indifferent officers impressed
what they were called upon to furnish, in
the manner least inconvenient to them
selves, usually on the nearest plantations
or farms, or those where opposition was
not to be apprehended. The farms Of
soldiers were generally under the man
agemcnt of women, and therefore were,
not unusually, drawn upon for more than
their proportion. Hence it was not un
common for soldier to be written to by
his wife that so much of the food he had
provided for herself and his children had
been impressed that it was necessary
that he should return to.save them from
suffering and starvation. Such sum
mons. it may be we'll supposed, was never
unhecdcd
The suffering OF the soldiers them
selves, produced by the want of proper
clothing, drove many Of the least hardy
out of the ranks. Want Of food also is
said to have had the same effect, especial.
ly in the army before Richmond in the
last winter Of the war.
1t was by such causes, all due to an
empty treasury, that our armies were so
reduced in the last months Of tho war.
As to the charge OF want of loyalty or
zeal in the war, assert, from as much
opportunity for observation as any indi.
vidual had, that no people ever displayed
SO much under such circumstances, and
NTH CO lttlo AayUinU far sO lone a time