New-York tribune., 1874-01-14
END or THE MURCIAN REVOLT

The story of the fall of the Mnrcan insur-
rectiOn ought to be carefully kept from the
Boy of the Period. The buccaneering instinct
in the breast of all healthy youth would be
too much excited by the picturesque narrative
of the flight of the vanquished rebels IN their
stolen irou-cad Numanca from the harbor
of Cartagena to the shores Of Africa.
For several days past. their cause has
been hopeless After the capture OF
the Ataaya fort. the positions remaining
in their hands were untenab.e. and their des-
perate attack upon that work was inspired by
il sense that their campaign was ut an end
unless they could retake it. They failed in
this and at once opened negotiations with the
regular army. Gen. Dominique offered Su1-
| ciently liberal terms to the bulk of the in
surgents, but refused to include the ring
leaders, the officials who had betrayed their
trust, and the officers of the army who had
deserted their duty. While this parley was
going on, the excepted classes were preparing
to dispose of their own eases in more sat
isfactory manner than Serrano could have
done. COntreras and Gavez. with some
$500 OF their associates who had sinned be-
yond amnesty, went on board the fine iron
into the Mediterranean, passing five men-of-
war of the regular navy at the mouth of the
harbor. In spite of the predictions of
many who said they could not handle her,
they steered straight across to the Algerian
coast, and, landing at the port of Slers-el-
Kebir, gave themselves in charge of the French
authorities.
Of course the first words they uttered on
landing were to accuse the officer i'll charge
of the principal fort Of betraying their cause.
The masked battery was not more familiar
piece of machinery in the stories by which
our soldiers used TO account for "a repulse,
than is treason in the explanations OF Span
| lard under similar circumstances. But there
| is no necessity for any such invention here.
| The insurrection fought well enough and held
out as long a. practicable. Under
| CASTELAR, and under SalmerOn the regu-
lars made steady progress toward the
complete investment aud reduction of the
city, and Serrano found the fruit ripencd
| to his hand when he took possession of the
Government. With his usual good luck, he is
likely to gain largely by this event The cap
tule was effected by member of his own
| family. The troops lately employed at Car
tagena will be set free to operate against the
| Carlsts, and if he can now succeed in dispers-
ing this insurrectiOn, his position will DO ma
terially strengthened by it. Even the escape
of COntrerss and his adherents is an advant-
age to Serrano. He is thus delivered from the
embarrassment of their trial and punish
ment. The quarrel between Salmeron and
CASTELAR,, which resulted finally in the
successive downfall Of both Of them, arose
from difference of opinion in regard to the
treatment which these insurgents should re-
ceive after the capture of Cartagena. Serrano
could not have taken either side without more
or less danger. The flight of political culprits
is always rather an advantage to q govern
ment which hesitates to punish them. Gen.
Sherman says that when he met Mr.. Lincoln at
Fort Monroe and asked him whether he should
catch jeff Davis or let him run, the discreet
Illnoisan replied with story of a reformed
topper who, on being offered a drink, said,
al can u take it, because | have signed the
pledge. But, perhaps you could fix 1t so
could drink it unbeknownst to myself
From which the General rightfully concluded
that the President would not break his heart
| if the pseudo President should escape out or
conspicuous martyrdOm into the obscuritY OF
exile.