New-York tribune., 1874-10-28
DIR. MCOSH AND PROF. TYNDALL.

DIR. MCOSH AND PROF. TYNDALL.
CRITICISM ON THE FIFTH POINT OF DR. RCOsH's
REPLY-THE INFERENCE OF A PERSONAL GOD NOT
LOGICAL CONSEQUENCE OF THE ARGUMENT.
To the Editor Of the tribune.
SIR: TRIBUNE Extra No. 23 contains an alb
stract of McCosh's answer" TO Tynda. 1 beg word
upon the fifth point Of that answer.
l. McCoshs argument lie that the inference Of per
sona God of wisdom and justice" s arrived at BY On ar
gument which he states and which he implies 70 be
analogous another argument, which he also states.
and which he assumes to be admittedly correct, by
which he represents himself have arrived at the con-
cluson that those before hun persons Of intel
gence."
2. As matter OF fact however,
not true that he arrived at the conclusion shas
those before him "were persons OF intelligence" by
means Of the stated argument:
a. The stated argument Is: "By selfconsciousness
perceive myself doing certain mental things which show
intelligence others doing the same things and
am forced to conclusion that they Intelligent"
a. 1t is impossible that he should see oheSs doing
the things" nssmuch these by the state
men mental things" the doing of which, by "others"
cannot be at all.
1t is not true that the inference of personal God
of wisdom and justice" is arrived at by the argument
which be states:
a. The stated argument is: II see marks OF unds-
pute0 1ntel1gepce In ana am w
clusion that their Author must be intelligent"
a. II is impossible that be should "see marks OF I'M
disputed Intelligence in Nature" inasmuch as there 10
such thing "undisputed intelligence in Nature"
and consequently marks Of it TO be seen.
c. 1t is not true that the two arguments which he
states analogous:
o. We're they analogous the principle of each should
be the to express otherwise the two should
have the major premiss common. and the minor prem
ises and conclusions mutually corresponding, each "
each.
a. The principle Of the two arguments here In ques
ton is not same inasmuch the major not COM
mon and the minOrs and conclusions not mutually cor
responding each to each.
ta) The two arguments, formally stated, as fol-
lows:
FIRST ARGUMENT.
Major-If an organism b Is seen to perform certain
actions similar certain actions previously performed
by A. another organism which is already known to re-
sembe in observable particular; and II, when
performed by A. such actions causally anteceded
by certain changes and states in A. constituting con-
sciousness; it may fairly be inferred that their per
Torrance by likewise causally anteceded by cor
responding states in b.
Mnor-The persons before" McCosh have been seen
perform certain actions similar certain actions pre-
viously performed by McCosh himself the latter being
organism which the former are already known to re-
sembe in every observable particular and such actions
when performed by McCosh, having been causay ante
ceded by certain states and changes In McC0sh cOnst
tuting his consciousness.
Conclusion-It may fairly be inferred that the per-
formance OF the actions in question: the persons be-
fore McCosh" causaly anteceded by states OF con-
sciousness such similar to those occurring in
McCosh as causal antecedents of his performance Of
those actions.
SECOND ARGUMENT.
Major-Nothing could now exist, of such nature and
arranged to constitute the various objects of the
universe, with their capacities for moving as
they observed to move and feeling they are
To feel unless personal God of wisdom and JUSTICE"
existed and things existing and con-
shutting those objects.
Mnor-Certain things "now exist Of sucb nature
aud arranged as TO constitute the various objects OF
they observed to move and feehng as they are OBJ
Conclnsion-A personal God OF wisdom Justice
sts has created the things so existing and const
tuting the objects OF the universe.
b. As is obvious, when they are thus fully stated,
these two arguments have neither common major
and conclusions mutually corresponding each to
l. That the two majors, far from being one, differ
essentially is made clear by the observation that the
assumption of the first is that thing which exactly re-
sembes another thing In all relevant particulars and
which does things which the latter is known to
do by virtue of given attribute, may be assumed to
sem6e ii In also possessing this given attribute, while
assumption of the second that Tor some reason not
given a wholly unknown being may more reasonably be
assumed exist uncaused and to be not an explained
which are directly kn0wnn word that pro nae rce
affair may land musD be credited with the attributes
which produce the observed results, rather than the
things in whose presence those results always III whose
absence never, are produced.
IL, That the minors and conclusions do not mutually
correspond each to each. is also plain The one minor
ponts out the object TO which the given attribute
is credited similar to the object already known to
it, not only generally, but also III doing the very
things which the latter object does by virtue or this at
tribute the other minor, the other hand, merely
serts the existence Of certain things which are not the
thing TO which the argument seeks to give the attribute,
but something entirely distinct As TO the conclusions,
the simply finishes supplements according 10 pat
fern the other makes up out OF whole cloth.
1nhinh
of the much vaunted "answer" OF 1.-THE farfamed
Scotch logician s concerned the great hereslrch Is
still unanswered and that by this pebble at least from
the sling OF David McCosb Goliath Tynda will hardly
be prevented again and again putting to gnomni-
Gus rout the arDies OF assumption.
ke,c- York, Oct l6, 1874 CHARLES +. ADAMS.