The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1874-01-09

Tho Responsibility Of Bagainc Before His
tsTy-What He Did and What
lie Should Have Done.
Duty Of Military Commanders
Henceforth.
A Warning to Generals
IN All Lands.

PARIS. Dec. q, 1878.
Before Marshal Bazaine's trial assumes the dim
moss Of historical event IL may be wen to take
last glance at It's main bearings and to consider the
permanent impression which IL is destined to leave
on she minds OF the French army There Is the more
reason for doing, the opinions Of French mill
tary men will but reflect those OF soldiers the
whole world over, for all Of whom this trial Will
be Of lasting Importance. The era OF human wars
n unhappily tar from closed. ANY general, French
or foreign, may be placed before long In the posi-
tion which Bazaine occupied three years ago, and,
under such circumstances. the precedent OF Ba-
3aine's case could not fail to be used either by
tho General himself as guide for his conoucs, or
by court martial sitting In Judgment on the Gen.
eral IL he repeated any OF the offences and errors
for which the ex-Commander OF Metz has been con-
demned The Tranon court have, in TACT, laid
down clear code Of military Duties and it con-
Germs officers OF every nation, and TO certain. de-
gree civilians also to know accurately what those
duties are.
THE COUNTS OF THE BAzAINE IMPEACHMENT.
Bazaine was virtually condemned on nine
counts, although these nine we're nomlnaly con-
densed into four:-
Ftrst-For having capitulated with an army with
out having done all that was possible TO oeeat the
enemy, or, at all events to infict heavy losses on
them.
Sscond-For having surrendered citadel under
similar conditions that is, before having ex-
Aausted all the means Of resistance.
Thfrd-FOr having surrendered his citadel With
ont destroying Its iortlfications, arsenas and
stores, and MS forces without having previously
and their guns to be rendered useless
Fotrth-For having spoken in discouragtng
Terms TO MS suDalterns and even TO private SOL
FVth--For having, at council Of war Of the
from these generals that he had already entered
into negotiations with the enemy and having con-
DeQuentiy induced them to approve certain resolu-
lions Of his, under wrong Information.
StIth-FOr having dishonorabiy tried to shield
his own responsibility behind the approval OF the
generals who, as ABOVE said had been deceived by
Sepentn-For having entered into negotiations Of
4 military and political character with an indi-
v1dual who had no credentials to show, and for
having informed this person. who turned out SUBJ
eequentiy to be spy OF the enemy, that the cita-
del and garrison could not hold out beyond speci
Hs0htn-For having previously to the blockade in
Metz acted IN defiance OF certain dispatches.
which adjured him to march to the relief OF Metz;
or ayg On ms sch @
N1ntn-For having sacrificed his military duty to
political considerations, and having IN particular
refused TO recognize and act IN cooperation with
government that was being obeyed ny the ma
government Of the land, the Emperor being q
prisoner and the Empress having fed from the
country.
WHAT BAzAINE SHOULD HAVE DONE BEFORE THE
SIEGE OF METZ
As it Is scarcely probable that general OF any
important country outside France will ever find
himself in Bazaine's political predcament-that is
be under the necessity OF transferring his ale-
glance to revolutionary government, sprung up
In the midst OF war-we may dismiss the ninth
count, and, examining only the first eight, proceed
% consider what Bazaine should have done. In
the first place. them after the Rhine army OF 100 900
men was entrusted to his care he should have
spread 1t over several roads in order that 1t might
reach the Meuse the faster and there operate its
junction with MacMahon's forces. Had he done
this, instead Of massing all his men on a single
road, the Germans would never have had time to
head him at Marsha Tour. But granted that by
miracle Of promptitude the Germans had still sue
ceeded IN placing themselves between his army
and the Meuse, then Bazaine, after defeating them
~ Aars-la-TOur. as he actually did, should have
attacked them on the following day before
achievements had arrived to their rescue.
Prince Frederic Charles acknowledges That If
Baxaine had followed up his advantage at
Aars-la-Tour by coming to action early the next
morning the Germans would have been obliged to
retreat, not being numerous enough TO oppose the
100 900 men, and as consequence Of their retreat,
Baxaine and MacMahon would have been able to
OF Chalons, where with SOC, 900 men between them,
they would have been almost invlncibe. Far from
doing this Bazaine spent the day after Marsha
Tour in complete inactivity, then began back
ward march upon Metz. The Germans, reinforced
by this time accordingly went in pursuit of HIM
defeated him at Gravelotte, and, having thus per-
manently cut on his communications with the
Neuse, drove him into Metz and set to work to
blockade him.
WHAT BAzAINE SHOULD HAVE DONE IN METZ.
Bazaine's incapacity-putting the most favor
able construction on his negligence thus caused
the defeat of MacMahon, by allowing the latter to
Be outnumbered. But admitting. for arguments
sake, that after doing his best to reach the Mouse
Dazaine had been vanquished by superior forces,
strategy or by q combination Of unfortunately
adverse in fact, that his
retreat into Metz had been inevitable-then what
should have been his conduct once he was
blockadedf Here his duty became clear To have
attacked the Germans on the morrow of Marsha
Tour perhaps required certain dose of genius for
The absence Of which . general cannot be held
criminal but to play his part worthily inside Metz
N only needed the common sum of good sense
which must iurk in every ONCE Of nigh rank.
The German army around Metz never at any time
numbered more than 100000 men; and, having in
M no less than 10000 men under him in Metz,
Baxaine should have attacked the 200 900 without
respite at all points, every day and night. He
should have ordered sortie after sortie kept the
enemy continually the lookout, rsked any losses
on his own side in order to nnict losses on them,
harass, fatigue and dishearten them. In the
solitary sorte or any consequence which Bazaine
did maze but 10 days only before the capitularion
October 10y, the Germans sunered such loss as
proved concusively what would have been the re-
suit had these sorties been commenced and re-
peated without cease since the beginning OF
September. But the Germans themselves ad-