The Bolivar bulletin. [volume] (Bolivar, Hardeman County, Tenn.) 1865-1888, 1874-04-17

Smith and Longstreet, General John
ston proposed that instead of only de
laying the federal army in its approach,
/ 1t should be encountered in front oi
| Richmond by one quite as numerous,
formed by uniting there all the avail
able forces in the confederacy in North
Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia
with those at Norfolk, on the peninsula
and then near Richmond, including
Smiths and Longstreet's divisions,
which had arrived. The great army
thus formed, surprising that of the
United States by an attack when it was
expecting to besiege Richmond, would
be almost certain TO win; and the en-
envy, defeated a hundred miles from
Fort Monroe, their place of re uge,
could scarcely escape destruction. Such
a victory would decide, not only the
campaign, but the war, while the pres
ent plan could produce no decisive re-
suit.
General Lee opposed it, because he
thought that the withdrawal from South
Carolina and Georgia of any consider
able number of troops would expsse the
important seaports of Charleston and
Savannah to the danger of capture. He
thought, too, that the peninsula had ex-
cellent fields of battle for a small army
contending with a great one, and that
we should for that reason make the con-
test with McClellan's army there. Gen
eral Longstreet took little part, which
attributed to his deafness. X The
discussion was continued until I o'clock
in the morning, when the president,
who previously had expressed no opin-
41,n ryY7acAsOra hI0 do
cision IN favor of General Lees opinion,
and directed that Smiths and Long
streets divisions should join the army
of the peninsula, and ordered me to go
there and take command.
WHY THE ARMY FELL BACK FROM DALTON.
The disposition of the confederate
army about Dalton was predicated on
the belief that the federal general
would attack it there with his whole
force. For that reason its entire strength
was concentrated there, and the protec-
tion of its communications left to
Lietenant-G General Polk's troops, then
on their way from Alabama, through
Rome, to join us. I supposed from
General Sherman's great superiority of
numbers, that he intended to decide the
contest by battle, and that he would
make that battle as near his own and as
far from our base as possible-that is to
say, at Dalton. On general principles,
that was his true policy. 1t is evident
that he did not so act, because he
thought as I did-that, in the event of
his assaiIing US, the chances would have
been very strong in our favor. Ny own
operations, then and subsequently, were
determined by the relative forces of the
armies, and a higher estimate of the
northern soldiers than southern editors
and politicians were accustomed to eX-
press, or even the administration
seemed to entertain. This opinion had
been formed in much service with them
against the Indians, and four or five
battles i'm Mexico-such actions, at
least, as were then called battles. OBJ
servation of almost twenty years of SER
vice of this sort had impressed on my
mind the belief that the soldiers of the
regular army of the United States-al-
most all northern men-Were equal, in
fighting qualities, to any that had been
formed in the wars of Great Britain and
France. General Sherman's troops,
with whom we were contending, had re-
ceived q longer training IN war than any
of those with whom l had served in
former times. It was not to be sup
posed that such troops, under saga
cious and resolute leader, and covered
by retTenchments, were to be beaten
by greatly inferior numbers. [ there
fore thought it our policy TO stand on
the defensive, to spare the blood of our
soldiers by fighting under cover habit
ually, and to attack only when bad posi-
tion or division of the enemy's forces
might give us advantages counterbal-
ancing that of superior numbers. So
we held every position occupied until
our communications were strongly
threatened, then fell back only far
enough to secure them, watching for
opportunities to attack, keeping near
enough to the federal army to assure
the confederate administration that
Sherman could not send reinfOrcements
to Grant, and hoping toreduce the odds
against us by partial engagements. A
material reduction of the federal army
might also be reasonably expected be-
fore the end Of June, by the expiration
of the terms of service of the regi-
ments that had not re-enlisted. I was
confident, too, that the administration
would see the expediency OF employing
Forrest and his cavalry to break the en-
emy's railroad communications, by
which he could have been defeated.
THE BATTLE OF KgNEsAw MOUNTAIN.
In the morning OF the twenty-seventh,
after q furious cannOnade, the federal
army made a general assault upon the
confederate position, which was received
everywhere with firmness, and repelled
with loss to the assailants enormously
disproportiOnate to that which they in
iieted. At several points the character
istic fortitude of the northwestern SOL
diers held them under a close and des-
tructiYe fire long after reasonable hope
of success was gone. The attack upon
Loring's corps was by the Army of
the Tennessee that upon Hardee's by
the Army of the Cumberland. The
principal efforts of the enemy were di-
rected against Loring's right and left
brigades, and the left of Hardee's corps.
The attack upon Loring's right
SCOTS brigade of Featherston's divis-
iOn-was by troops of the seventeenth
| corps, advancing in. three lines, proceed
/ ed by skirmishers. They received five
or six volleys from Nelson's Twelfth
/ Louisiana) regiment, depIoyed as skir-
mishers, in rihe-pits, six hundred yards
| in front of the brigade. This regiment
| held its ground until the first federal
/ line had approached within twenty-five
/ PAGES. It then retired to the line OF
/ battle. The federal troops advanced
steadily, and two hundred PAGES from
! the confed, rate line met the first ol
! Scott's infantry, and received in THEN
/ fianks that of four batteries. This con.
centrsted fire compelled them TO halt
/ Unable to advance further, and unwiI
! ling to retreat, they remained where
! tbey had halted almost an hour, before
Withdrawing ffom the shower of mis-
/ siles.
During this time single line of fed
eral infantry was engaged with Wheel
| er's troops, the skirmishers of Feather
tons own, and Adams brigades, anC