The Milan exchange. (Milan, Gibson County, Tenn.) 1874-1978, 1874-04-09
WHY THE SOUTH FAILED.
The True Cause of the Confederate
Collapse
A Chapter from Gen. Joe Iohntson's
Narrative Of Military Operations
Buring the Late War.


Gen. Joseph f. JOHNSON, in his
forthcoming work, gives the following
striking view of the true causes of the
downfall Of the Southern Confedera-
cy:
Much has been written and much
more said of the cause of the over
throw of the Confederate States in
their great contest for independence.
One class, and much the largest -
for itincludes the people who were
victorious in the war, and those Euro
peans who watched the struggle with
interest, as well as many of the South
err people-ascribe it to the superior
population and great resources of the
Northern States. Another class of
Southern people attribute our defeat
to want Of perseverance, unanimity,
and even of loyalty on our part, and
the consequent abandonment of the
Confederacy in its efforts by the peo-
pie themselves. In my view both
are far wrong.
The cause of the subjugation of the
Southern States was neither want of
wealth and population, nor of devo-
ton to their own cause on the part of
the people of those States. That peO-
pie were not guilty of the high crime
Of undertaking a war without the
means Of waging it successfully.
They had ample means, which, I'M
fortunately, were not applied to the
object of equiping great armies and
bringing them into the field. A full
treasury was necessary to defray the
expenses of a great war. The South
had the means Of making one in its
cotton alone. But its Government
rejected those means, and limited its
financial effort to printing bank notes,
with which the country was soon
flooded. The necessity of actual
money in the treasury, and the mode
of raising it, were generally under
stood in the country. 1t was that the
Government should take the cotton
from the owners and send it to Europe
as fast as possible, to be sold there.
This was easily practicable, for the
owners were ready to accept any terms
the Government might fix, and send
ing to Europe was easy in all the first
year of the Confederucy's existence.
Its Government went into operation
early in February. The blockade of
the Southern ports was proclaimed i'll
May, but not ut all effective until the
end of the following winter, 50 that
there was a period of about twelve
months for the operation Of converting
/, 100000 or 5000, 900 bales of cotton
into money. The sum raised in that
way would have enabled the War
Department to procure at once arms
enough for five hundred thousand
men, and after that expenditure the
Confederate Treasury would have
been much richer than that Of the
United States. BY applying the
first money obtained i'll this way to
the purchase Of arms and military ac-
or using for the purpose
the credit which such amount of prop
nrty would have given, the War De
partment would have been able to
equip troops as fast as they could be
assembled and organized. And as
the Southern people we're full of en-
thusiasm, five hundred thousand men
could have been roady and in the field
had such course been pursued at the
time when the first battle was actually
fought, the 2lst of July, 1861. Such
a force placed on the Northern bOrd-
ers Of the Confederacy before the Unit
ed States had brought a fourth ofthe
number into the field, would probably
nave prevented the very idea Of SEQ
ercion." Such disposition of such
an army, and the possession Of finan-
'ial means Of carrying on war for
years, would have secured the success
If the Contederacy. The timely adOp-
ion Of such a financial system would
nave secured 10 us the means of sue
'eSs, even without an extraordinary
Of arms and the immedi-
tie organization Of large armies. 1t
would have given the Contcderacy a
reasure richer than that Of the Unit
,d States. We should thus have had
o the end Of the war the means of
}aying our soldiers; and that would
nave enabled such CT them as belong
d to the laboring class to remain in
he ranks. This class, in the Confcd-
,racv, as in all other countries, formed
he body Of the army. In all the ear
Ter part Of the war, when the Confed-
rate money was not much below that
If the United States in value, our
roops were paid with some regularity
md the soldiers Of the laboring class
Who had families fed and clothed
hem with theirpay, as they had former
Y done with the wages Of their labor.
And so long as that state Of things
the strength Of the Confed-
rate armies was little impaired; and
hose armies we're maintained on such
| footing as to justify the hope, which
vas general in the South until the fall
# 1864. that we were to win in the
contest.
But after the Confederate currency
lad become almost worthlcss-whcn
soldiers months pay would scarcely
,uy one meal for his fdmily-and
hat was the case in the last
,eriod of ten or twelve months
hose soldiers of the laboring class
Who had families were compelled
o choose between their military SER
ices and the strongest obligations
nen kn0w-their duties TO wives and
.hildren. They oheyed the strongest
f these obligations, and left the army
md returned 10 their homes toasup-
port their families. The wretched
laws deprived the army
# many valuable men Of a class less
Door than that just referred to. Those
avs required the impressmeGt Of all
irticles of military necessity that could