Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1874-11-07
THE WORK-HOUSE CASE.
Adams Bill for Injunction Pals
Chancellor Cooper 8 Opinion.

Chancellor Cooper read an opinion yes
terday in the case of w. l.. Adams, vs.. th,
Mayor and City Council, refusing to gram
the injunction asked for to restrain the cor
pOratiOn from ejecting the complainant.
from the office of Keeper of the wOrk-hOuse
The opinion recites that, on the 29th Of
Nov, 1873, the complainant was appointed
Keeper of the wOrk-house by the Work.
house Committee, by and with the advice
and consent of the Mayor; that the record
of the appointment states that it was for
twelve months thereafter. On the 31st OF
Oct, 1874, the Work-house Committee, by
and with the advice and consent of the
Mayor, appointed another Keeper, and the
complainant refused to give way.
The authority, continues the opinion,
under which the appointments were made,
reads as follows: "That the Committee on
the Work-house be authorized and EN-
powered, ty and with the advice and con-
sent of the Mayor, to appoint Keeper of
the wOrk-house and such assistants as they
may find necessary, and to remove the same
at their discretion"
The compliments counsel, in the bill as
finally amended, took the ground that this
ordinance was invalid, and rested his cause
upon this. In support of this position the
acts of 1855, amending the charter of the
city of Nashville, were cited as follows:
"That said City Council shall have DOW
er, and they are hereby authorized, to pro-
vide for the appointment or election, in
such manner as they may see fit, of all
necessary officers for the good government
of the city. They shall also have
full power, twO-thirds of both branches of
the City Council concurring, to dismiss
from Office any person that has been, or
may hereafter be, elected TO fill any office
created by the ordinances of the Mayor and
Aldermen heretofore, or that may be by the
City Council hereafter"
On this point, the Chancellor says:
"Tbe argument is that the City Council
might delegate the power to appoint to
offi'e, but could not delegate the power to
remove, which can only be exercised in the
mode prescribed by the statute 1t is
obvious, however, that this provision was
intended to give the power of remdeaI
where the officer Twas elected for a fixed
term of Office, the term being either fixed
by the charter or some positive ordinance
Even in that case, says the law, the CITY
Council may remove upon a two4hirds
vote. But, of course, no vote is required.
either by two-thirds, or any other number.
where the term Of office by disappointment
itself is made to depend upon
the discretion of the appointing
power. Unless restrained by the charter.
the City Council are not required to elect
to Office for definite period. They NAV
make the term of Office dependent upon
their will, OF the will of some third party.
and. If they do, and the Office il Accented
under the ordinance, the appOintee is
to dispute the tenure. The dele
CATION of the power Of appointment is far
more doubtful than the coupling that dele
CATION with limitation of the term of
office either by a definite period, or by
making it depend on the discretion of the
power. The latter is not del
sgation of the power to remove under the
vet of 1855, but simply fixing of the term
# Office of the p1intee.