The herald and mail. [volume] (Columbia, Tenn.) 1873-188?, 1874-04-10


tent to recover "the territory from whicl
it had been driven" He had visited i
some two months before, and seen tina
i. it could make no forward movement fo
: the purpose then, when the opposing
federal army had not been increase,
by the corps of 10000 veterans lee
from Mississippi by Sherman ; nor ours
!, weakened by the withdrawal from it o.
Longstreet's corps, and it's losses al
Missionary Ridge. Those losses mus
have been severe, for such troops are
; not easily driven from strong and in
trenched positions, still less easily rout
ed. AS had much better means oi
information on the subjects of this pa
per than its author, it could not have
.. been written for my instruction.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE SOUTH.
Much has been written and much
more said of the cause of the overthrow
of the confederate states in their great
contest for independence. One class,
and much the largest-for it includes
the people who were victorious in the
war, and those Europeans who watched
the struggle with interest, as well as
many of the southern people-ascribes
1t to the superior population and great
er resources Of the northern states. An
other, class of Sc uthera people, attri-
butes our defeat to a want of perseve-
rvance, unanimity, and even of loyalty
on our own part, and the consequent
abandonment of the government of the
confederacy in its efforts by the people
themselves. In my view both are far
wrong.
The cause of the subjugation of the
| southern states was neither want of
wealth and population nor of devotion
to their own cause on the part of the
people of those states. That people
was not guilty of the high crime of un-
dertaking war without the means of
waging it successfully. They had am
pie means, which, unfortunately, were
not applied to the object of equipping
great armies and bringing them into the
field.
A full treasury was necessary to de-
fray the expenses of a great war. The
soath had the means of making one, in
its cotton alone. But its government
rejected those means, and limited its
financial efforts to printing bank-notes,
with which the country was soon
flooded. The necessity of actual money
in the treasury, and the mode of rails
ing it, were generally understood in the
country. It was that the government
should take the cotton from the owners
and send it to Europe as fast as posi-
BILE, to be sold there. This was easily
practicable, for the owners were ready
to accept any terms the government
might fix, and sending to Europe was
easy In all the first year of the confed-
eracy's existence. It's government went
into operation early in February. The
blockade of the southern ports was pro-
claimed in May, but not at all effective
until the end of the following winter,
so that there was period of about
twelve months for the operation of
converting 4, ZOO, 600 or 100000 bales
of cotton into money. The sum raised
in that way would have enabled the war
department to procure at once arms
enough for five hundred thousand men,
and after that expenditure the confed-
crate treasury would have been much
richer than that of the United States.
By applying the first money received in
this way to the purchase of arms and
military accoutrements or using for the
purpose the credit which such an
amount of property would have given,
the war department would have been
able to equip troops as fast as they
could be assembled and organized.
And, as the southern people we're full
of enthusiasm, five hundred thousand
men could have been ready and in the
field, had such a course been pursued,
at the time when tke first battle was
actually fought-the 21st of July, 1861.
Such a force placed on the northern
borders of the confederacy, before the
United States had brought fourth of
the number into the field, would prob
ably have prevented the very idea of
coercion" Such a disposition of such
an army, and the possession of financial
means of carrying on war for years,
would have secured the success of the
confederacy.
The timely adoption of such finan-
cial system would have secured to us
the means of success, even without an
extraordinary expectation of arms and
the immediate organization of large ar
mics. It would have given the confed-
eracy a treasure richer than that of the
United States. We should thus have
had, to the end of the war, the means
of paying our soldiers, and that would
have enabled such of them as belonged
to the laboring class to remain in the
ranks. This class, in the confederacy,
as in all other countries, formed the
body of the army, In all the earlier
part of the war, when the confederate
money was not much below that of the
United States in value, our troops were
paid with some regularity, and solti' rs
of the laboring class who had families
fed and clothed them with their pay, az
they had formerly done with the wages
of their labor. And so long as that
state of things continued the strength !
of the confederate armies was little i'm |
paired and those armi' were main |
tanned on such footing as to justify |
the hope, which was general in the |
south until the fall of 1864, that we |
were to win in the contest. But after |
the confederate currency had become
almost worthless when a soldiers |
months pay would scarcely buy one
meal for his family-aDd that was the |
case in all the last period of ten or
twelve months-those soldiers of the
laboriDg class who had families were
compelled to choose between their mil
tary service and the strongest obliga-
tions men know-their duties to wives
and children. They obeyed the strong
est of those obligations, left the army
and returned to their homes to support
their families.
The wretched impressment laws de-
prived the army of many valuable men
of a class less poor than that just re-
ferred to. Those laws required the
impressment of all articles of military
necessity that could not be purchased.
The government had the power reg
ulating the prices to be paid by it for
all such commodities and it's commits
sioners appointed for the purpose fixed
them much below the market values.
No one would sell to the government,
of course, when he could get from his
neighbors twice the government price
for his horses or grain; consequently
the officers of the government could
never purchase, but had always to pro-
cure supplies by impressment. No
rules for their guidance were pre-
scribed none at least were observed by
them or known TO the public, and they
were subjected to no supervision. All
the property of confederate citizens
applicable to military purposes was,
therefore, under their absolute control.
The bad and indifferent officers I'M