, 1874-11-03
THE SUPREME COURT ON RAILROAD LEG
rHrATfnN

THE 6UPnEME COURT ON RAILROAD Leg
1SLATI0N.
Tho last number Of tho Nation contains q
losser from Afr. David 4. Wallis on tho legality Of
tho stato lawa fixing railroad frcights and farea.
1lo arg1ios tint tho Supreme Court ot tho United
etateB Inns slroady passed upon tho points n-
vo1vel Iii tito Granger caBes now OH It's docket,
aild TINT its decisions upon these polnta prove
that 1t Will decide recent Western logls1ation In
rcasraint OF railroad management iluconatitu-
tlonal and void, 1Gr. Wells n1akcs four points.
Tho frat La that charter Is MI executed con.
tract. In tho case Of tho Holyoko Company us.
Lyman, tho Supreme Court laid down tho follow.
ing rule:
charsora OF private rporatIons duly acceMed, II
must ho admitted ure executed contracts, but tho
different propafons, uncas they arc clear unnmig,-
o>s nna free OF doubt, subject to construction,
and their true ansont and meaning must bu ascertaIncd
by tho aao rule Of Interpretation an oAer legislative
grants.
An executed contract cannot be intorfarod with,
except On equitabie gronnds. such Us fraud, etc.
Tue charter Of railroad corporation cnnnot,
then. DO altered BY subsequent legislation.
Tho second point Is that rosorvcd right on
tho part Of tho State to altor charters IL not
Wild. Tho United States Supromo Court baa
not decided this however, The Supreme Court
Of Minnesota hold, in Goonar Us. Schroeder, that
q statute giving d subsequent Legislature tho
power to change. impair, or modify . contrast
which is valid when made IL not law, and thore-
fore does not enter into tho contract. Ju1eo
in, 1.tu f3aa
" II We adopt tho principle that State may
enact laws that nil subsequent contracts shall
DO subject to DO impaired by aubsoquont
Legislative action. tue constitutional provision.
againat impairiug contracts will DO nugatory."
hlr. Wells infers from tho Minncsota case md
from Judge Story's reasoning that tho rocont
Granger legislation Is valid only In regard to tho
railroads Or parts Of railroads which aro built
hereafter. Thin inference soems to DO tho yul-
nerablo point, tho Achillea' heel, Of his argu-
tween statute Of State and a provision OF
State Constitution. Both Of his authorities arc
confined to statutory interference with vested
rights. II may be TINT, whila this would DO in
valid, Interference undor constitutional pro-
viao would not. Suppose tho Grangors nrguo
TINT, under tho Constitution Of Wisconsin, no
Legislature Of TINT State iad my right to grant
charter which . subsequent Legislature could
not modify. A. fine distinction might perhaps DO
drawn horo.
hEr. Wolla' third point is much stronger. To
states the familiar legal principle that rosoryn-
tlon inconssten: with the body Of tho inatru-
mont containing 1t il void. Thus graut Of
lnud in fec coupled with proYiso that tho
grantee shall not sell, gives tho latter tie land
with the power to sell, because this power ii
part Of tho absolute ownership yeasod In him by
tho main part Of tho conveyance. Tho provizo
is hold utterly void. On this principle, q re-
served right to diminish tho proftB of corpora
tion which sought chartor for tho aalo Of
making all tho profit it could il null. Moreover,
such reservation con affect, q. any rate, only
the prsrogati.o righta, that il, those granted
by the charter. It cannot touch common-law
rights. Now tho right OF q common calTior to
charge reasonable rates is not QUO conferred by
| charter. It ia natural ono, independent Of
State legislation. It caauot, therefore, ho at-
fccted by reservation, Alr. Wells quotes In
this connection part Of a decision Of tho United
States Supreme Court, which he says hes not
hitherto attracted attention. 1t was given in
Mi1lor us. Tho State (15 Wall, p. 49s). The
language usod is as follows:
Power 10 lezls1ate, founded upon Burh reservation
III charter To private corporation, III certainly not
In
not exercised 10 take away destroy rights nc-
quiscd by yirtuo Of such charter, md Which, by
legitimate Of tho power granted have become
vested IN tic corporation but 1t may be safcly af-
trlnea that tle reservel powor ay be exercised, aud
to almost sny extent to carry Into OBJECT tho original
purposes Of the grant, to tho tlue adninfg
trndou u lila affairs, 80 aa to protect the rights Of the
poc9hodcra mud o. croditors for the proper dis.
position of tho aasea. Such reservation 1t il hcd
will not warrant tho Legislature IL pushing laws to
chQuKe tho control Of institution from one religious
sect to another, or to divert tie funds Of tho donors
to Auy new uso Inconsistent With the intent and uur-
pose Of Its charter, to compel subscribers to tho
soek, whose subscription Ia con1doua to waive any
| OF tho conditions Of the contract.
| Tho fourth poiut iH tho relation Of tho
Fourteenth Amendment to tho Granger lawg.
| In 1883, tho Supreme Court hold Daron rs. Tile
Mayor OF Daltiuors) that tho Fifth Amendment,
which prohibits taking private property fol
public use without just compensation, applied
only to tho Federal Government, and TINT tue
States could conflscnte whatever thoy wished,
Tho Fourteenth Amendment, however. forbida
any State to deprive any porson OF llfet liberty,
or properly without due process OF law. The
| Supreme Court has since hold TINT q Legislative
act appropslatng. inJuring, or destroying private
property without making due payment therefor
was not "due process OF law" We aEo con.
strained to say that hezs again tue question
recurs whether such AL act, II paused in pur'
Baauce Of tho Constitution under wAicl. the
right to hold the property waa acquired, would
not be ''duc process?
It 10 not likoly that tho Supreme Bench oi
Wisconsin doolcd tho Potter law to ho yaliG
without carefully reviewing tho dooiaions Of ths