The weekly clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1863-1882, 1874-04-30


and that he abandoned them because
there was too much danger in waiting tas
them TO be sent to the rear. Danger from
what? Certainly not. from ta' Union
army, for that was commanded by Atc-
Clellan, who had no idea oi advancing 10y
that line, and even if he bad, hi timidity
was greater than that OF Johns oa. and
might have safely been depend J upon,
as the sequel showed, long euou "a 10 per
nit the withdrawal of all the sto.rs which
had been accumulated for johnston
army General Johnston shows that he
protested against the accumulation Of
these stores at points so TAR advanced. and
he thereby leaves fair ground for presump-
ton, ii the facts were not already appa-
rent by his own admissions, that it was
no part of his plan to advance further
with his army; but it does not seem to
have ever occurred 10 him that it might
have been the essence of Davis policy 30
capture Washington at least.
Under these circumstances, although It
NAV have been a stretch OF authority, 10
was natural and every way lusuIiable for
Davis, in appointing the Generals to tnll
rank authorized by the Confederate Con
gress, to overslaugh Johnston by putting
Lee and Albert Sidney Johnston ahead OF
him; and herein seems to lie the entire
cause of the trouble which never ceased
to exist between Gen. Johnston and the
Confederate authorities Their disagree
ments were continuous, and they form
the theme upon which this Narrative Is
strung. They mar the symmetry OF the
story, and while their exposition throws
light upon the history Of the Contcderacy
they also cast shade upon 4 character
which has hitherto been regarded by many
as one Of the most symmetrical 0t all in
the rebellion. The more they are studied,
the more they damage the reputation Of
Johnston, though it is not probable that
they viii much benefit that Of Mr. Davis.
So strongly is the Narrative colored by the
interests, passions and heart-burEings OF
the author that we are constrained 10 say
that for his sske it should never have been
published. His fame would have been
clearer, had it been left entirely 30 his
enemies But to return to the story.
Shortly after the Confederate army re-
tired to the camp on the Rappahannock,
McClellan's movement down the Chesa-
peake was discovered, though Johnston
coniesses he did not know whether pc WJs
intended for Fortress Monroe or North
CoroIina, a fact which goes to snow that
they were not keptso Wei informed OF the
plans Of the Northern Generals as has us
ually been supposed.
1t is well known that Mcclellan landed
at Fortress Monroe, and at the end OF
about month from the time has move
ment from Washington began, moved
out to the position which had been taken
up and weakly fortified by Gen lIagru-
der, between Yorktown and Lees Mills.
Instead Of turning these works or carry
ing them by vigorous assault, AcCtei-
Ian began a seige, and thus gave the enc
my time to concentrate q strong force, the
command OF which Johnston assumed
His first consideration seems % have been
how to retreat, and without bong forced
he took up his line Of march toward Rich
mond, in the aeighbOrhoaj oi Whica he
had counselled Davis to concentrate ati
the available forces Of the Confederate
States This plan did not receive the
appreciation OF his Government. Mr.
Davis and his advisors preferred To- defend
the approaches to the Capita. by foot, and
it must be confessed that Lee was right ,u
supposing that the Peninsula afforded
good ground for defensive warfare. John
stOn, however, persisted in thinking ht1-
self unable, with the forces at hand, o.
hold Mcclellan in check, AMI therefore
made no effort to do So The affair at
Williamsburg is explained by hima being
without design, except to permit hls trains
to get out OF the way OF toe retIcaLnlE
troops. After his army had been finally
concentrated about Richmond ami
strengthened by tine troops drawn from
other points, he decided to assume the
offensive, but not before he bad learned
that Mcdowell was reported as moving
his army from Fredericksburg for the
purpose of forming junction with Nc
ClelIan.
This is the first and only instance iu
the entire Narrative IN winch Johnston
represents himself as absolutely taking the
initiative, and fighting battle On his
own notion, and in view )I thf- singular
fact il is probably fair to -,ata tilat NJ.
Davis claims that il was not done y5lun
taily, but under the repeated orders o.
the Government The baJls which b..
suited is known rs FAIR Oaks, or seven
Pines, and was not decisive. Both par
ties claimed the victory, but the advantaga
appears to have been in favor Of Johnston,
who was severely wounded, and had to
leave his command in the hands Of Gus
tavus w. Smith. Smith faded to PFC.
his opponents that night, and did not It-
new the action next day. Tie was then
superseded by Lee, who aflerword com
PEELED Mcclellan to chang his base anI
fall back upon the James.
What might have been the result had
Johnston not been wound must alwtys
remain a matter Of speculation. l. B..
certain, however, that this vas the most
important epoch IN bis career. Whetaor
fortune or Davis vs., s 20 blame Tor his as
signment to other and less conspicuous
commands after his recovery, l. not
cleared up entirely by The Narrative.
He does not say 50 in w'ris, bat j is
evident that he feels that be was greatly
wronged by Lees assignment to the sup
rene command in Virginia. while be was
sent to Tennessee and Mississippi. b.
what personal or officia! reasons Davis
was controlled in making this assignment
cannot be clearly known till he shall nave
published his side Of the story; bat K Is
evident that he was tir-t Out bv the DE-
fensive policy Of Johnston, and desired 10
give the war in Virginia a more agrees we
character.
This object was accom- plished while
Johnston received a territorial supervis-
ion in the West, with Pemberton
and Bragg as the actual commanders in
the field. He joined the latter at Tulla-
homa, and was shortly afterward followed
to the Southwest by Davis. They had a
personal interview at Chattanooga, during
which it appears that Davis wanted him
to relieve Brace owing To the latter's fail