The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1874-01-31

Nowhere doe the name Of the Chancellor ap-
pear o. the dcrositary Of the authority Of tic va
cant Throne. The provisions Of the Constitution
arc di-tiuc; aud conclusive az 70 the division II
the supreme Power of thc Kingdom. Article -
provides that this power in It's exercise j. divided
between tie Executive, legislative and judicial,
which shall always De preserved distinct; a pro-
vision fundamental 70 q Constitutional Govern
mcut-that j.. O. a Government Of laws rather
than Of men. We take this provision to require
a real and substantial separation Of these three
functions Of a Government. Not that there is no
mutual dependence OF union among them, for
measurabIy there l. and must be. Thus the
King, who represents the executive power, Is a
constituent Of the Legislature; the executive and
the Legislative departments may require the pin
ion Of the judiciary, the judiciary works through
the executive. But we understand the provision
under review 10 forbid a transfer Of the whole
power Of any one Of the three enumerated branches
to another, such as would be accomplished if the
head Of the Judiciary department were to be
vested with the power Of the Supreme executive
the Royal P~0wer-though for q brief time and
under some restrictions. Nor does it change the
complexion Of the case 70 say that, in that event,
this officer would be acting, not in his judicial ca
pacity but in an xecutiye-which would be to
bubble away a great and vital constitutional
principle. by the same bubble, the King could
cit as Chief Justice, then acting judiciaIly and
%, in short, what was meant for a good deal
would come TO mean nothing at all.
Articles Ga TO @ provide that the Chief Justice
shall preside over the Judiciary Department;
shall be Chancellor Of the Kingdom, and give him
power as such to preside over the House Of No
bles when it sits judicially in impeachment cases;
and to exercise such other jurisdiction in equity
and other cases as the law may confer upon him.
And there is an entire absence throughout the
whole Of this instrument Of words conveying any
such supposed authority as we have mentioned.
Neither can it be derived from the high title Of
Chancellor, for there are surely no great powers
latent in a name alone without some express gift.
The name OF Chancellor IL applied to officers Of
very different functions in different states Of
Europe and in different states Of the United
States. That officer is just what he is expressly
constituted, whether a political Chancellor as in
Prussia; an officer Of legation as with the French;
the Judge Of n Court Of Chancery, otherwise
called Equity, az in some of the United States;
or as here, the head of the judiciary Department,
and n judge with Equity jurisdiction-though
sharing the latter power with both his associates.
On the other hand, the Constitution does pro-
vide otherwise for the temporary and limited ex-
ereise Of the Royal Power, in several emergen-
cies that may arise. In the event of the Throne
falling to a minor heir, and no Regency provided
by the will Of the deceased Sovereign, his Cabinet
call the legislature to elect such Regency, and
meantime themselves act as a Regency exercising
the Royal Powers in the name of the young Sow
ereign. In the same way when there is no sue
eessor, the Cabinet call the Legislature who elect
a King, and if that King were a minor would also
elect his Regent or Council Of Regency. There
is here no more intimatiOn Of the executive power
being welded by the Chancellor of the Kingdom
than by the Marshal of the Kingdom. The only
act of Royal Power and prerogative mentioned
the converting Of the Legislatures expressly
assigned to the Cabinet, of which the Chancellor
is not a member 1t can never be supposed that
the Cabinet, having done this, will then look to
the Chief Justice for further authority, and con-
duct the Government al interim as his Ministers.
The act of converting the Legislature is OF high
authority and great responsibility, when and
where it shall meet; whether in four weeks, as
lately, or whether the interregnum shall be longer
or shorter. Further, the Cabinet might have the
responsibility of deciding who are the Represent
atives to be called-a subject which we discussed
last week-and that responsibility is one that
cannot be shifted to other shoulders. The
Cabinet being responsible for the acts of a
Sovereign, none of which have any force or effect
without being countersigned by a Minister, it
must be held that they cannot shift the response
bility of interregnum acts and administration
- - - t----1T-- - 4. o. Nj
is, however, n provision for asking the opinion of
the Justices.
But perhaps all this is too obvious, notwith-
standing the opinion referred to in the outset as
entertained by some. And in fact, we suppose
that the distinguished official whose executive
jurisdiction we have been considering would be
the last to pretend to any such extraordinary,
inconsistent and conflicting powers.