The weekly clarion. [volume] (Jackson, Miss.) 1863-1882, 1874-05-28
HOOD VS.. JOHNSTON.
GENERAE. =. NJ. HOODS REPLY
To Certain Statements Contained
in los T. <BOhnstOn-s Book.
No. II.

Dalt0n) to the crossing OF tho Chattahoo
chez. General Wigtall acknowledge,
sixtyfour thousand etfectives Of all arm
at New Hope Church on the 26th o
May, but he failed 10 count 2,139 o
"Wheeler's cavalry, which gave US OF
that date sc, 139 in lieu OF 81, 900 etfec
tives. In making his estimate of the en-
tire loss from New Hope Church, thirteen
days out from Dalton, 10 Atlanta, he
says, page 522, cit leaves but fourteen
thousand seven hundred and forty-fou
total loss in killed, wounded, deserters,
stragglers and prisoners, OF his infantry
and artillery" Add to this Wheeler's
2, 1856, he failed To include or account for,
and we have a loss from New Hope
Church to the Chattahoochee River OF
sixteen thousand eight hundred and
eighty-three (16,SS3); if we include
| 1888 three thousand and eighty
eight killed and wounded prior TO reach
ing New Hope Church, as stated on page
| 325, we have, according to the figures
contained in Gen. Johnston's book, IA loss
of GO, 27D, twenty thousand two hun
dred and seventy-one. in this we exclude
the prisoners, deserters and stragglers
from Dalton to this point, the number of
which | have frequently heard estimated
at over ZOO by officers of that army.
Our loss from this source was especially
large at the time of our retreat from
Resaca
From various statements and summa-
ries, it cannot be doubted that Gen.
Johnston had, after the arrival of Folks
forces, an army of seventy thousand co.
000) effective men. From this number
subtract AZ $50 turned over to me on the
18th Of July, and we have loss of twenty
two thousand seven hundred and fifty
90, 800 from all causes. When | under
estimated his loss IN my official report,
| knew it amounted to %, 900 from the
assertion Of his own Adjutant General in
the presence of two of my staff officers
and Mr.. James Haggerty, and from
comparison | had made at New Hope
Church with Gems. Polk and Hardee, the
two remaining corps commanders.
Having established that we had over
20, 600 electives after Gen. Folks corps
joined us, it only remains to be shown that
these reinforcements were available.
Gen. Johnston says, page 3O4: ION the
9th the confederate troops We're formed
to receive the enemy On the next page,
referring to the same date, (the nth OF
May,) he says: Gin the evening a tele-
gram from Lieut.. Gen. Polk Informed
me that he had been ordered to join the
army of Tennessee with all his infantry"
also, cat daybreak on the 18th the Federal
army moved forward; !, x = in the after
noon the Federal army placed itself in
front Of the Confederate line, its right a
little south of Mill Creek Gap, and It's
left near the Cleveland road" Gen.
Wigfall, page $50, gives the following
information as obtained from the War
Office: lit was not till the 4th of May
that Gen. Polk was ordered to move with
L0ring's Division and other available
force ut your command 10 Rome, Ga,
and thence unite with Gen Johnston
On the same page he states that on the
9th of May the following dispatch was
sent to Gen. Cooper, at Richmond, by
Gen. Polk, from Demopolis, Ala: My
troops are concentrating and moving rs
directed.
blow in rear of an army is always more
to be feared than ten in front, and it
would have required only good roar OF
musketry near Tunnel Hill TO have has
tened the enemy back to the firing.
have too high a regard for Gen. Sher
mans sagacity as a soldier to believe chat
he would have moved the main body of
his army down the valley beyond Rocky
Face and Horn Mountains, in the direc-
ton of Rome, leaving an army of 10000 !
at Dalton, in his rear, unless he felt
assured from past history that his adver-
ssry would retreat.
1t will be seen that on the 4th day Of
May Folks army had been ordered to
Join Gen. Johnston, who was concentrating
and moving forward rapidly by rail from |
Demopolis OH the 9th, having but a short |
distance to march, and that Gen. Sher
man did not take up his position in front
of Rocky Face Ridge until the after |
noon Of the 9TH Of May There was, |
might say, between the two armies, il |
high wall Of stone, as the name Rocky !
Face Ridge indicates Our position was
enc Of the strongest We could have de |
sired we had but two gaps in the noun |
tains 10 hold-Will Greek and Snake /
Creek, as shown on the map, page 276. |
The approach OF the Federal army down !
the railroad from Chattanooga, III lieu OF |
down the road from Cleypi and, rendered |
our position the more secure. Gen. john |
ston would not have had a stOnewall be- /
tween him and his adversary, had Gen. |
Sherman advanced by the latter route. |
| have always thought Gen. sherman |
did not wish to accept pitched battle or
he would have moved upon Dalton from |
that direction. His advance by the |
road, and subsequent by in !
front of Rocky Face convinces me that
his intention was to initiate the policy of |
,oh -.
tually accomplished in the conpaign |
from Dalton to Atlanta. Thus he came
to the position Of all others we could |
have desired, i. G., IN front of Rocky /
Face Ridge, if our commander could !
have been induced TO hold his ground.
Gen. Polk was not far distant from |
Dalton, when We consider that he had |
eight thousand of his troops at Resaca /
on the 9th aud 18th, and he III person |
was in Dalton on the 18th. We could !
well have awaited the arrival Of the whole !
of his army, since it required so small
force to hold Mill Greek and Snake |
Greek gaps, as was most practically de-
mOnstrated by Gen. Sherman's use of !
them after they fell into his possession,
When en- route to Tennessee during the |
campaign in the fall of 1864, our army
having captured the troops stationed in
Dalton, attempted To march through Mill |
Creek gap, but was prevented from so
doing by a squad of men posted within a
little fort, covered with railroad iron and
constructed of logs of large size, around
which was thrown up an embankment Of
earth to protect the troops against field |
artillery port holes were cut, so as to
allow the men to fire in all directions,
and especially upon the line of railroad
1t was reported to me that field artillery
had little or no effect upon this inn
Qualification, and - IL.