, 1874-01-31

over, for all of whom this trial will be of lasting
Importance. The era of human wars is unhap-
PLY far from being closed. Any general, French
or foreign, may be placed before long in the posi-.
tion which Bazaine occupied three years ago,
and, under such circumstances, the precedent
of Bazaine's case could not fail to be used,
either by the General himself as a guide for
his conduct, or by a court martial sitting in
judgment on the General, ifhe repeated any of
the offences and errors for which the ex-Com-
mander of Metz has been condemned. The
Trianon court have, in fact, laid down a clear
code ofmilitary duties, and it concerns officers
Of every nation, and to a certain degree civil
lians also, to know accurately what those du-
ties are.
THE COUNTS OF THE BAzAINE IMPEACHMENT
Bazaine was virtually condemned on nine
counts, although these nine were nominally con-
densed into four =
Flrst-For having capitulated with an army
without having done all that was possible to
defeat the enemy, or, at all events, to infict
heavy losses on them.
Seeond-For having surrendered a citadel
under similar condition8-that is, before having
exhausted all the means of resistance.
THlrd-For having surrendered his citadel
without destroying it's Notifications, ~arsenals
and stores, and his forces without having pre-
viously burned their flags, caused their rifles to
be broken and their guns to be rendered
useless.
Fom1h-For having spoken in discouraging
terms to his subalterns and even to private SOL
diers, with a view to impressing upon them that
resistance was useless.
FlfM-For having, at a council of war of
the principal generals under his orders, con-
cealed from these generals that he had already
entered into negotiations with the enemy and
having consequently induced them to approve
certain resolutions Of his, under wrong intor-
nation.
SirA-For having dishonorably tried to
shield his own responsibility behind the appro-
val of the generals who, as above said, had
been deceived by him.
Seoe0M-For having entered into negotia-
tions of a military and political character with
an individual who had no credentials to show,
and for having informed this person. who turn
ed out subsequently to be a spy Of the enemy,
that the citadel and garrison could not hold out
beyond a specified date.
EigA-For having previously to the bloc
kade in Metz acted in defiance of certain des-
patches, which adjured him to march to the re-
lief Of Metz; and for having on his part for
warded untruthful dispatches, declaring that
such a march was impossible.
N1HH-f0f having SaCrl1Ced his military du-
ty to political considerations, and having ; in par
ticular refused to recognize and act in co-ope-
ration with q government that was being obey
ed by the majority of the nation, and which
was de tacto the government Of the land, the
Emperor being a prisoner and the Empress
having fled from the country.
WHAT BAzAINE SHOULD HAVE DONE BEFORE
THE SIEGE OF METZ.
AS it is scarcely probable that a general of
any important country outside France will ever
find himself in Bazaine's political predicament
that is, be under the necessity Of transferring
his allegiance to a revolutionary government,
sprung up in the midst Of a war-we may dis
miss the ninth count, and, examining only the
first eight, proceed to consider what Bazaine
should have done. In the first place, then,
after the Rhine army of 100000 men was en-
trusted to his care be should have spread it
over several roads in order that it might reach
the Neuse the faster and there operate its
junction with MacMahon's forces. Had he
done this, instead of massing all his men on a
single road, the Germans would never have
had time to head him at Mars-la-Tour. But,
granted that by a miracle of promptitude the
Germans had still succeeded in placing them
selves between his army and the Meuse, then
Bazaine, after defeating them at Mars-la-Tour,