The Daily state journal. [volume] (Alexandria, Va.) 1868-1874, 1874-02-20

advertcd in former paper to the deep debt
which the nation owes to the bank for its
services through that long and trying crisis.
believe they cannot be too highly appre.
ciated and | believe, further, that the |
same services could not have been so
beneiicially performed by any new bank Of |
| the state, or by anybody whatever less in |
timately bound up in all its interests and
relations with the commercial affairs and |
prosperity of the country. That asiu be
an epil day for England, aohen the supreme
erecutire authority Of this country shall
take The administration Of credit circu-
lation into its oWn hands. / trust never to
see it; and hold the sort OF levity with
which the possibility of such an arrange
ment has sometimes of late been alluded
to, and even limited in the way of menace
to the Bank of England, to be one Of the
worst indications OF the existing state of
public opinion on these all-important con-
GERMS"
MIR. CALHoUN'S OBSERVATIONS ON
THE SAME SUBJECT.
Such have been the British utterances
on the subject. Mr.. Calhoun, in his speech
on the sub-treasury, already referred to,
Isee works, vol. 3 ,pp. 110-l11l gives some
American experiences. Speaking.of the
suspension of our banks, caused by the de-
claration of war with England, in 1912, he
said, in October, 1887: I lf .l8ttg
81 shall never forget the sensation which
, the suspension, and the certain anticipa-
ton OF the prostration Of the currency of
the country, as a consequence, excited in
!, my mind. We could resort to no tender
act; we had no great central regulating
power, like the Bank of England and
the credit and resources of the govern
, ment were comparatively small. Under
such circumstances, l looked forward
6 to sudden and great depreciation
, of bank notes, and that they would
fall speedily as low as the old continental
money. Guess my surprise when l saw
!, them sustain their credit with scarcely any
depreciation, for time, from the shock. |
distinctly recollect when / first asked my
self the question, What was the cause +? and
: which directed my inquiry into the extra
ordinary phenomenon. / soon saw that
n the system contained within itself self.
n sustaining power that there was between
/? the banks and the community, mutually,
r the relation of debtor and creditor-there
y being at all times something more due to
! the banks from the community thar
= from the latter to the former.
n saw in this reciprocal relation O.
IS debts and credit, that the demand D
the banks on the community was greater
q than the amount Of their notes in circula
tion could meet and that, consequently
;. so long as their debtors were solvent, ant
:. bound to pay at short periods, their note!
Il could not fail to be at or near a par will
80 gold and silver. also saw, that as thei
i debtors were principally the merchants
=. they would take bank notes to meet thei
&c bank debts, and that that which the mer
q q chant and the government, who are th
Sf great money-dealers, take, the rest of tn
Of community will also take. Seeing all this
n clearly perceived that self-sustalnin
~ principle which poised the system, sell
Ia balanced, like some celestial body, movin
Of with scarcely a perceptible deviation fror
y. its path, from the conclusion it had re
= ceived."
II AMERICAN OPINION DRIFTING IN TIL
~ SAME DIRECTION.
ne The intelligence of the country is rapit
TX ly arriving at the conclusion that there ca
be no arbitrary method of ascertaining til
n proper amount Of currency that shout
be maintained in circulation. The Ne
OF York Times, in recent article, says:
q "This is o duty for which the govern
az ment Is not fitted. 1t devolves on Con
y. gress, and Congress, of all department
to of the government, IS the least able
es perform it. Indeed, it is not too muc
as to say that the task is one that surpasst
he the powers of any set of men. III
on amount of knowledge, experience, discr
he ton, and foresight necessary to dete
'ss mine the question never has been, and
nd not likely ever to be, found in any s.
of lected body of men,"
ID. And the New York Bulletin, adoptir
K the same view, justly concludes, that Il
s.; amount of the currency can only be regl
as lated with safety by the business transa,
it tons of the country, most wisely remarl
n ing:
tanning how much currency q country r.
OF quires than by allowing the banks. und'
proper conditions for the protection Of Il
note-holder, to issue what their custome
~. insuring the redemption ofthe notes. TIL
u nc amount will never be the same on tw
y. successive days but it will always be ju
~ what is wanted neither more nor les
~ We should be glad to see the existing ci
~ culation subjected to this test. If Il
h volume is really in excess, it would ce
~ tainly be contracted, and in way SO nat,
~ raj as to hurt no one; if it is inadequat
nn it would be increased; and in a way to be-
en eft all. There is no other natural and sa
gauge for the currency requirements of
D. community
AL The Philadelphia Press seconds the
views, remarking that, "before the wa
is. when banking was free and the issue
nd the banknotes limited only by the niece
bv sity ofredemption, the amount in crcul'
mi ton constantly varied, according to Il
EN- needs of business, being $204, 100000
de 1854, $1S7 200, 900 IN 1855, $2l4, 100000
of 1867, and $193, 100000 in 1859. The
nv were in addition to the large amount off 90
le. and silver in circulation. The volume
ed currency then shown to be demanded
nd the country cannot be taken as indicatil
BE- even approximately our present need
fer Long credits were then almost universe
an and scarcely any business was conduct
ial on a cash basis. The plentifulness al
convenience OF the greenback curren,
,1 during the war worked a great and ben
'N fetal change in this respect. Debts we
promptly paid, and long credits BEGAN
NJ the exception" ae3 9
re- REGULATING THE CURRENCY NOT
PROPER FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT