The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1874-10-30


perlshed In the fierce struggle for its posses
sion in which the armies OF the North and
South were engaged for nearly four years.
This territory was of great value to the
Confederacy on account of the supplies 1t
furnished to the army, and the recruits
whom its brave and patriotic population sent
to our ranks.
But it was not the supplies and the re-
cruiE which gave it its chief value.
The effectiveness Of any army of the Con-
lederacy depended in great degree upon
| Its proximity to the enemy's country, and it
soon became apparent that the same number
OF Confederate troops could not be placed
where they would give occupation to so
much Of the vastly superior force of the en-
emy as in that region between the james
and the Potomac, within reach of the sensi.
tive southern frontier of the United States,
on whose extreme border stood the city Of
Washington, for the safety of which the
Federal authorities considered no prepara.
tion excessive, no sacrifice too great.
| A few considerations will suggest, rather
than fully explain, the importance to the
Confederacy of being able to maintain in
! Northern Virginia an army sufficiently
strong to keep alive the fears of the Wash.
ington Government for the safety of that
city, and the defence of the avenues OF ap-
prosch to the large cities OF Maryls and
Pennsylvania.
| The resources Of the Federal Government
greatly exceeded those Of the Confederacy.
| After the FIRST battle Of Manassas br.
Line Oln perceived that While the moral effect
of speaking OF the war as one waged for the
suppression Of rebellion was Of service in
uniting the different political parties in the
North and in giving the prestige Of legiti-
macy to his government with those Of other
| naioGs, yet that In truth the North. under
| the name Of the ''United States" had en-
| tered upon war Of conquest, an, he forth
with began to prepare for il OH a scale ade-
quate to the emergency.
More than half million of men were
called to arms, and an army was speedily
launched strong enough to perform the great
! task committed to it OF blockadng the south
ern coast from the capes of Virginia to the
mouth of the Rio Graude, and ultimately to
turn the dubious scale of war in favor OF
| the balicd armies Of the Union.
The results OF this vigorous policy were
soon manifested. Vast armies gathered
along our frontier: the nimble gunboats
and powerful iron-clads swarrned in our
| rivers and along our coasts, and every part
! Of the South felt itself exposed to invasion.
1t was manifestEy impossible for the Con-
! federate Government TO attempt, with any
| hope Of success. 10 oppose this vast force at
every point that might be aSSaled.
Tue undiSputed control Of the water, and
J the extensive coast and great navigable
rivers of the South, epabled the Federal
Government to attack SO many points at
once that the attempt to oppose the enemy
b1,, yppr1lI h,p lnH tp tho
dispersion of the Confederate forces. The
fatal consequences of such an attempt had
been demonstrated as soon as military oper-
atoms were resumed in the beginning
of 1862.
kentucky and a great part of Tennessee
were quickly Overrun, Missouri was practi.
caly lost, the important city of New
Orleans fell into the bands of the enemy,
General Johnston found himself obliged to
retire from Northern Virginia, and strong
expeditions of the enemy succeeded in
establishing themselves along our Atlantic
coast.
Tue Confederates had some troops every
where, but not enough to be efficient any
where. Eut although they must abandon
the hope of being able to oppose the enemy
successfully at every point Of attack they
might still, by concentrating their forces and
threatening some vulnerable part of the
Federal frontier, compel the enemy to pur-
sue the same policy Of concentration, and
leave him with fewer troops with which
TO assail exposed localities. The position
Of the city Of Washington, and the great
importance attached by MIR. Lincoln and
his advisers to its possession, afforded such
an opportunity to tue Confederate COM
maOQer,
The safety of the Federal capital was so
essential TO the successful prosecution OF the
war that the precautions taken by the au-
thoritieS at Washington TO provide tor It's
defence were always in proportion to the
political importance attached TO Its posses
sion rather than to the actual extent CT the
danger that threatened it. The presence of
| the army of General Johnston at Manassas
detained the army of General Mcclellan,
more than three times As strong, ut WASH
ington during the autumn AUG winter OF
| IS6I-'C2. The advance Of the si2ali force
of jackson down the Valley, when he
drove General Banks over the Potomac,
at O time when the Federal arms were
everywhere successful, excited such ap-
Drehepsion for the safety OF Washington
that the strong army of Mcdowell was re-
called from Fredericksburg to oppose him,
and General Mcclellan deprived OF its CO.
operstion in his intended attack on klch-
nond.
These results were so entirely out of pro-
norton to the real danger 10 which at any
| lime Washington was exposed that thcy
naturally suggested the idea that by avail
| iur ourselves Of the extreme senstlveneSs
of the Federal authorities on tue subJect we
could compel the concentration OF tnelr
forces and cause them to abandon some parts
| of our country which we were not strong
enough TO protect.
This will be found to be a marked feature
of the operations of the Army OF Northern
| VIRGINIA uuder the command OF General
| Lee.
II will be remembered that he reSorted to
! this plan to compel the army OF Gcnerai
Mcclellan to withdraw from the James
after it bad been dislodged from It's po-
sjtion on the Chickahomlny. He did not
hesitate, Notwithstanding the declaration
of General Mcclellan of bis lntentlon
| to renew his operations against hien-
mond from his new base, 10 aelach tne
whole of Jackson's command, when was
speedily followed by the strong division Oh
These troops. under the energetic lead o.!
Jackson. crossed the Rapidan ana attackeu
the army of General Pope Win Dosuness
which caused him to conceive very eAus'
| eerated idea of their numbers: .,o
Pope,s advance was checked, ana tue
troons Of General Burnside, which had oeen
recaIlei 10 assist Mcclellan, were pfousu' " "
fredericksburg ] to cooperate with Pope IN
resisting the advance of the Coh'eue,ate :.
army. This movement of Burnside nlaue II
evident that nothing would be undertaken