The Jackson standard. [volume] (Jackson C.H., Ohio) 1847-1888, 1874-06-18

hlm TO refer me TO some one OF lnOse /
half dozen cases, and he referred me to |
the case of Aquilla j. Randall VS.. the |
State of Ohio, IA Ohio State reports, pa
ges 435 and 436 As the case is not
lengthy, will publish it in full. 1t is as
follows:
Aquilla ]. Randall VS.. the State of Ohio. On |
the trial of an indictment for selling intoxicat-
ing liquors to minor without the written con- |
sent OF his parent, etc, 1t is error 10 exclude
drawn and delivered to the minor in pursuance
of an agreement between the parent and de-
fendant on a previous day, for its purchase and
delivery to the minor.
Error to the Court of Common Plesa of Miami
county.
convicted and sentenced to pay fine and costs
at the August term, 1860, of the Miami Common
Pleas, for unlawfully and knowingly selling
intoxicating liquors to minor without the
written consent of his parent, guardian or fam
1t appears from the bill of exceptions, that
testimony was given to the jury, on the part OF
ceived the liquor from the plaintiff in error in
a bottle which he brought with him, paid for Il,
and took it away and thereupon the pla1ntln
in error, Offered to prove THAT the minor had
been sent by his father for the liquor, on per
sonal order, which the father had given on the
preceding day, and to which the defendant,
the liquor had been delivered in accordance
with that understanding
But the court refused to permit the evidence
NOW plaintiff in error also proposed to show
that the liquor so alleged to have been purchas-
ceding the day it was so furnished him, was,
under the alleged contract of purchase by the
father, separated and set apart from the pack
age or bulk from which it was drawn and de-
livered to the boy
plaintiff in error excepted, and to review the
same, and reverse the judgment, this writ of
Thomas & Sellers, for plaintiff in error.
State. rs
BY THE CoURT.-The testimony offered by
defendant was clearly admissible. and should
have been submitted by the jury: 1t had a le-
gitimate tendency to prove a sale to the Jdther
and not to the son, by proving that 1t was De
livered in accordance with an agreement be-
chase and sale of the liquor, made upon one
day, and to be consummated ON the next day
father The Court seems to have supposed that
the alleged sale to the father was not complete
without delivery of the thing sold, or at least
a separation of it from the bulk out of which
il was eventually drawn. This may be true, but
the subsequent delivery to the son, in pursu-
ance of the previous agreement, if so found by
the jury, would operate By a0dy Of relation, and
constitute a delivery to the father under the
agreement. Judgment reversed, and cause re-
manded."
1t will be seen that this decision is
correct. 1t does not conflict with the
minor on ver6al order from the parent
or guardian, but sale directly to the par
ent, who merely sent his boy after the
liquor which he himself had purchased.
So the Judge must produce some better
authority than that decision.
In my interview with Judge Du Had
way, he claimed that some of the tenn
perance people are disposed to do injus-
tice to the Courts, and not view the mat
ter calmly There is some truth in that !;
but here is the other side of the case.
| heard Judge Du Hallway delive
charge to a jury during the present term,
in liquor case. The charge was an able
one, fair and candid. He told the jury
that they must treat the case precisely
as they would treat a case under any
other statute. Some of the jurors might
think the law was not a good one. But
that is question. for the legislature to
remedy and not for jurors. They were
sworn to render verdict in accordance
with the law and the evidence. That is,
the law as it is, and not as they desired
it should be. do not pretend to give
his exact words. But this is the sub
stance of the charge, and it is correct.
Right here 1 will ask the Judge if the
same rule does not apply to the Judges
Most certainly it does, and he will not
dispute it. VIII Judge Du Halfway
claim for one moment that he, or any
other Judge in this subdivision, except
Judge Harper, ever even pretended to
enforce this law as he did other laws ?
A few years ago few men in this county
were in the habit of committing assault
and battery When they were in liquor
they would knock down any man they
might chance to meet. They had been
! fined from five to twenty-five dollars,
which they never paid, and would COM
NIT the same effense again. At one
term of court the Judge fined three of
these men one hundred dollars each, and
ordered them to stand committed to Jail
until fine and costs be paid. They paid
their fines, and did not assault persons
again. In this matter the Judge did his
duty. More recently a man was before
the court on a charge of assault and bat
terry. He had been fined for the same
offense several times. Now the Judge
put on heavy fine, sent him to Jail
thirty days, ten days of that time on
bread and water. That man has not as
saulted any one since. Now what has
been the practice of the Judges in liquor
cases? The records of the court show
| that some men have been indicted every
year for series of years, and some at
nearly every term of the court, for viola
tions of the liquor laws. They were
fined from fifty to one hundred dollars,
and ordered to give bond in the sum of
one thousand dollars not to violate the
law in the future. They gave the bond,
and went right home and sold as before.
The same farce q can call it by no more
appropriate name) would again and again,
from term to term, and from year to
year, be enacted. These Judges knew
perfectly well, that such penalties never
t0ould compel obedience to the law.
They knew equally well that if they
would send such men to Jail month or
two, that the law would be obeyed.
Why not compel obedience to this law the
same as to the law against assault and
| battery, more especially when every ybody