The New York herald., 1874-11-09

rose to his fun height made q stately iuclin alton
OF the head TO the innkeeper, and said orieny. -
Will 90 10 the entertainment.n The a!de-de-camE
then hustled the man out OF the room, hoasting IN
ms ear that he had done him signal benenr; and
the mnkeeper went away Illuminating over rehec-
tions which were too big Tor woros. The story
came out afterwards, and everybody laughed ut II:
having freed himself IRON dimculty when put 10
MS 'rumps ny playing pig one
To go still higher, and examine into the behavior
4 OF Russian generals would ne. perhaps, thauk-
less tas< Bnt IL Is certain tnat Whenever there
Is war they become mlracuously rich. The mai.
ner in whicl army contracts are disposed OF and
managed IS perfectly astounding Wnen the al
chased several nerd OF imaginary oxen for the
use OF his troops He then reported
that some OF these imaginary oxen had
| died and rhat as their carcasses might
putrefy with EVIL results, he had caused them TO
be buried at some expense, which he duly charged
ia mas accounts. Then he reported that a murrain
had spread among the resi-, tiu all THESE nerds oi
imaginary oxen had disappeared TO the last beast,
causing more and more expense TO the State as
they died. The General had, he observed, caused
So some ssS o. ana sns ne - had empoysd proysioa ner
chant 10 salt and pot their nesh. bnt II mad un-
happily proved nn1t ior uae, ana .nere were e s .ns
and salt wnich they had consumed; even the pots
had TO be thrown away aud destroyed, SO tnat tne
herds oil oxen, after having gone through al these
yicissitudes had lett not vestage behind. and
he mad been necessarily compelled TO BUY other
herds OF oxen. winch were perhaps more VI iess
imaginary also.
THE STRENGTH OF THE ENGINE FOR WAR;
may be told about the Russian army, foreign
statesmen who should underestimate It's strength
as an engine OF war would come TO extremely un-
sound CONCLUSIONS II lilpaid, il-ed. III taught,
but 1t Is composed OF an lnnumeraDe host which
obeys singie VIII ana whlca Is SIMPLY lnylncibse.
purpose now To treat Of the grayer side vi This
subject, and have collected from trustworthy
sources sucn information upon II as IS, or should
be, OIL singular interest at least 10 the European
Powers, and especially 10 England at the present
time. In the hrst place, there IS the all important
question OF expenditure, which there are several
ways OF judging, the easiest but least correct being
the one generally adopted THIS method consists
Iary budget Of one country with that OF
another. Thus Ior example, II the estimates are
parison hially unlavorable may 6e drawn, show.
lug that the percentage ol miiitary expenditure
on expenditure OF al! Kinds IS much greater IN
Russia than IN any 0l the above mentioned states.
Moreover, financial crltics who MAINTAIN that the
war budget could aayanta2eously be reduced. do
not iall 10 point out tnat many OF It's Items, such
as clothing horses forage 50 iortn are cheaper
IN Russia than elsewhere; also that the pay OF
Russian o1cers as well aS OF sodlers ID less than
COMPARED WITH OTHER COUNTRIES.
such comparisons, however, nave no analogy
with the real state OF things inasmuch the sit
uatlons OF the countries compared are not ldenti-
avorne any ano nafs af tay orpanza
ton; their armies can be kept within limited
space; and tner peace establishments demand
only small number OF TROOPS Chiefly as cadres Tor
the full lOrce to be brought out IN time OF var. In
both countries munltion OF war and commssarlat
stores are easily supplied oy native INDUSTRY ana
resources. while Germany has TINS lurther advan-
tage, that owing to the superior education Of her
lower classes she has all the elements at hand 10
base the military hierarchy on solid foundation
OF general education and morality.
FINANCE AND AGRICULTURE AS BASES OF POWER.
Russia, on the other nand, Is poor. Her popula-
tion, SO lar from being educated, Is hardly emerg-
materials she must cover with her troops an ex-
tent OF ground more than ten times the superficial
area OF Austria, France and Germany put TO-
getaer. The development OF her wealth, except
Ia the matter OF Russian agricultural proauce. has
hardly commenced, the energy displayed during
necessares OF ordinary lie have to be reported
lrom abroad a. proportonate cost, while there
are other expenses which are peculiar TO the mill
tary ouoget of RUSSIA, owing to her climate and
geographical situation. Fuel Is necessity to the
would ONLY Se a luxury TO Frenchmen or
Germans Again, IN the northern parts OF the
Empire " nter is almost one long Arctic night,
and light 10 such regions Is neavy Item OF ex-
pense. Those critics who grumD.e most at the
cost Of the army are, nevertheless, the first 10
complain oil AIS insufficient power OF development:
and, indeed, 1t is clear that Russia cannot bring
into the ned an army equal IN numoer 20 that oi
GERMANY AND AUSTRIA CoAAINED.
Those two countries can muster 2 100000 OF men
on a war looting, while Russia. even under the
new organization, could mot bring more tnan
100000 into the held. further increase, rather
than reduction IN the budget, would ue neces.
sary 10 remedy tins interoriry, and in order
no militia tEere would have 10 DC created cadres
propor.ioned 70 those OF Germany me enectlve 1--WE
not exceed 100000 men, say Win maximum OF
1.52e,o ,ooo IN time OF war 10 Obtain numerical
:
tain an effective strength IN time OF peace OF
2,o01, and this constitutes exactly the difficulty
OF the new organization. 10 bring about greater
DEVELOPMENT in time q war and 60 keep the peace
establishment Within the narrowest possible limits
reserve wouid have to be drafted into the cadres.
1t Is obvious, therefore. that greater develop.
meu. Is Impossible without Q relative iccreaee OF
the peace establishment.
Tae erectlve Strength OF the Russian Empire,
which has been reduced during tue last ten years
TO the lowest footing, Is not more taan equal to
/ that OF any army In neignboring countries. The
Russian army Is political and technical instru-
ment, requiring Improvement as much as any
other Institution; and
4 If RUSSIA REALLY WANTS MILITARY FORCE
at all 1t cannot be less Than that Of other coun-
tries, and should always be ready at moments
\ notice to enter into connict with them, while the
quences. IN. vocation of those principles lost
/ k6niggratz tG Austria; Metz and sedan to
France. 4 Prussia came ont Of her wars
vlctorlously ii was because the government
looked at tns army, not as . burden weigh.
ing upon the economical interests OF the
toe Empire its very existence. should, however,
Russia Insist upon the necessity OF having an army
Austria theory involved in tins proposition Is
= curious one, and II as general principle 0i de-
Ience 1t were followed BY ether nations u might
Germany considered Il advisable TO have an army
equal TO those OF Austria and Russia combined or
II Austria should ind IL necessary 20 equal the
united forces OF Russia and Germany, Europe
would soon fnd itse In no ehvlabe position. There
Is ieeing that sooner or later, clash OF inter.
ests IN tue. Baltic may take place. Tie haoltual
hatred entertained by the Muscovite toward
every thing that is German conduces very much to
bring about results which seem likely enough to
produce this danger, even supposing that 1t does
not exist already, and the commercial interests OF
the world should prepare for contingencies.
EDUCATION IN THE ARMY.
Reference has Deen made to the advantages
which the superior education OF her peasantry mas
conlelred on Germany IN respect oi military Or
gan Zatlon. Hsr non-commlssioned officers are
propacly better informed tnan the suoalterns Of
the trench army, or, indeed, OF the British under
the old system. AS Tor Russia she cannot com.
pare with her powerful nelgnbor in regard TO the
Intellectual and moral qualifications OF ofhcers or
men. The standard OF education among officers
OF inferior grade Is latnentably deficient. Often
trey cannot write their own language, and, up to
the rdna OF colonel, great portion OF military
men lack q knowledge oil the ordinary rudInents
OF military duties. 1t IL conte ylated to establish
q rule that all candidates Tor first commissions in
the army shou d be subjected to examination. II
this regulation were TO he enforced against
otncers IN actual service, every second lieutenant