The Somerset press. [volume] (Somerset, Ohio) 1873-1977, 1874-10-09
MISCELLANY.
GENERAL SHERMAN on WAR.
The Military Lessons Of the Civil
Strife in the United States.

SIT1Ie III the u nlbeu SldltSs
We take pleasure in copying from the
Army and Navy Journal portions of
General Sherman's statement of the de-
ductions drawn by him from his exper-
ience as commander This statement
is announced to be the concluding chap
ter of "Memoir of Events of the
War;" of which the previous portions
have not yet been published.
SUFFRAGE IN THE ARMY.
In the United States the people are
the Sovereign" and all power original
ly proceeds from them and therefore the
election of officers by the men is the
common rule. But an army is not a
popular organization but is an animated
machine; an instrument in the hand of
the executive for enforcing the law and
maintaining the honor and dignity of
the nation; and the President, as the
constitutional Commanderin-C -Chiefo the
army and navy should exercise the pow
er of appointment-subiect to the con-
6rmation of the Senate-of the officers
of "volunteers" as well as regulars"
No army can be efficient unless it be a
unit for action; and the power must come
from above, nor from below; the Presi-
dent usually delegates his power to the
Commander-in-chief next below, and he
to the next, and so on down to the low
est actual commander of troops, however
small the detachment. No matter how
troops come together, when once united
the highest officer in rank is held re-
sponsible, and is consequently armed
with the fullest power of the Executive
subject only to law and existing orders
The more simple the principle
the greater the likelihood of de-
termined action, and the less a com
manding officer is circumscribed !by
bounds and by precedent the greater is
the probability that he will make the
best use of his command and produce
the best results.
MILITARY EDUCATION.
The regular army and the Military
Academy at West Point have in the past
provided, and doubtless will in the fu-
ture provide, an ample supply Of good
officers for future wars, but should their
numbers be insufficient we can always
safely rely on the great number of young
men of education and force of character
throughout the country, to supplement
them. At the close of our civil war,
lasting four years, some of our best corps
and division Generals, as well as staff
officers, were from civil life, but can
not recall any of the most successful who
did not regret that he had not received
in early life instruction in the elemen-
tary principles that underlie the art of
war, and which he had been forced to
acquire in the dangerous and expensive
school of actual war.
RECRUITMENT.
But the real difficulty was, and will
be again, to obtain an adequate number
of good soldiers. We tried almost every
system known to modern nations, all
with more or less success. Voluntary
enlistment, the draft, and bought sub
stitutes, and think that all officers Of
experience will confirm my assertion
that the men who voluntarily enlisted
at the outbreak of the war were the
best, better than the conscript, and far
better than che bought substitute. When
regiment is once organized in State,
and mustered into the service of the
United States, the officers and men be-
come subject to the same laws of disci,
pline and government as the regular
troops. They are in no sense militia, u
but compose a part of the army of the
United States, and only retain theil
State title for convenience, and yet may
be principally recruited from the neigh
borhood of their original organization
Once organized the regiment should be
kept full by recruits, and when it be-
comes difficult to obtain more recruits
the pay should be raised by Congress
instead of tempting new men by exag,
gerated bounties. 1 believe it would
| have been more economical to have rails
ed the pay of the soldier to $50 or ever
$50 a month than to have held out the
promise of $500 and even 5000 in the
| form of bounty. Towards the close O.
the war I have often heard the soldier.
complain that the "stay at home men
got better pay, bounties, and food thar
they who were exposed to all the dan
gers and vicissitudes of the battles ant
marches at the front. The feeling o.
the soldier should be that IN every event
the sympathy and preference of the GOV
ernment is for him who fights, rathe
than for him who is on provost or guarC
duty to the rear, and like most men h
measures this by the amount of pay
Of course the soldier must be trained
to obedience and should be "cOntenteC
with his wages" But whoever has com
manded an army in the field knows tn
difference between a willing, contentec
mass of men, and one that feels a caus
of grievance. There is a soul to al
army as we'll as to the individual man
and no general can accomplish the ful
work of his army, unless he command
the souls of his men as well as thei
bodies and legs. The greatest mistak
made in our civil war was in the mod
of recruitment and promotion. When
regiment became reduced by the neces
sary wear and tear of the service, in
stead of being filled up at the bottom
and the vacancies among the officer
filled from the best ncn-commissione
officers and men, the habit was to rails
new regiments with new colonies, caE
tains and men, leaving the old and e1
perienced battalions to dwindle ava
into mere skeleton organizations. l b'
lieve with the volunteers this matte
was left to the States exclusively, and
remember that Wisconsin kept her reg
ments filled with recruits, whereas, oth'
;. States generally filled their quotas b
new regiments, and the result was thi
8 we estimated a Wisconsin regimen
L. II.