Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1874-04-03
wHaV THE SOUTH EAEs.ED
Extract From Gen. Zoe ; SissstoH>s
Narrative Of Military Operations
Barring the Late War.

Much has been written and much |
more said of the cause OF the over
throw OF the Confederate States in
their great contest for indepcn(i auee
One Class, and much tne larGest-fo,
it inc!ndes the people who Were Veto
rious IN the war, and those Europeans
who watched the struggle with inter
est, Us well as many of the Sou. hern
peopie-ascribe it TO the superior pop
ulation and greater resources Of the
Northern States. Another, q class OF
Southern people, attribute our defeat
to a want of perseverance, unanimity,
and even of loyalty on our own part,
and the consequent abandonment of
it's efforts by the people Themselves.
In my view both are far wrong
THE CAUSE OF THE sUBJUGATIoS
of the Southern States was neither
want of wealth and population, nor Of
devotion to their own cause On the
part of the people of those States
That people was not guilty Of the high
crime Of undertaking a war without
the means Of waging 1t successfully.
They had ample means, which, uufor-
tunately, were not applied to the OBJ
iect OF equipping great armies and
bringing them into the field. A full
treasury was necessary to defray the
expenses Of great war. The South
had the means of making one, in its
cotton alone. But it's Government re-
jected those means, and limited its
financial efforts to printing bank notes,
with which the country was soon
flooded. The necessity of actual money
in the treasury, and the mode of rails
ing it, were generally understood in
the country. 1t was that the Govern
ment should take the cotton from the
owners and send it to Europe as fast
as possible, to be sold there. This was
easily practicable, for the owners were
'cady to accept any terms the Gov
eminent might fix, and sending
to Europe was easy in all the
first year of the Confederacy's exist
ence. Its government went into opera
ton early in February. The blockade
OF the Southern ports was proclaimed
in May, but not at all effective until
the end of the winter, so that there
was period of about twelve months
for the operation of converting 4,00O,-
900 or 100000 bales of cotton into
money. The sum raised in that way
would have enabled the War Depart
ment to procure at once arms enough
for five hundred thousand men, aud
after that expenditure
THE CONFEDERATE TREASURY
would have been much richer than that
of the United States. By applying the
first money obtained in this way to the
f1ylrphnSa of anl ,,1ilitor,-
trements, or using for the purpose the
credit which such an amount Of prop
erty would have given, the War De-
partment would have been able to
equip troop a fast as they could be as
sembled and organized. And as the
Southern men were full of enthusiasm,
800, GOO men could have been ready
and in the field had such q course been
/ pursued at the time wnen the first
/ battle was actually fougnt-the DIST Of
! July. 1861. Such a force placed on
! the Northern borders OF the Confe,i-
eracy before the United States had
brought q fourth Of the number into
the field, would probably have pre-
/ vented The Tery idea OF coercion.
+ Such disposition OF such an army,
and the possession Of financial means
/ of carrying on war for years, would
have secured the success Of the Con-
federacy. The timely adoption Of
such a financial system would have
secured to us the means OF success,
even without an extraordinary impor-
tation of arms and the immediate Or
ganization of large armies. It would
have given the Confederaey treasure
richer than that of the United States.