The Superior times. [volume] (Superior, Wis.) 1870-1912, 1874-06-06
THE RAILROAD LAW.
The Attorney General Declares it Con.
stitutiOnal.
A synopsis of His Opinion.

At the Governors request, Attorney
General Sloan has written an opinion
III regard to the constitutionality of
the Potter law, of which the following
is a synopsis
The Attorney General first states the
fact of the passage of the act, and that
it classified all the roads, fixed and
limited the compensation for freight
and passengers thereon, and provided
for the appointment of commissioners
and their duties, that the question as
submitted to him is as to the constitu-
tlonality of this enactment.
Then follows reference to the Con-
st1tutlon of this state, article II, Sec
ton l. The railroads take and hold
their franchises subject to this article
But upon this there is a difference of
opinion. Since the decision of the
Dartmouth College case by the Su-
preme Court of the United States, in
which 1t was held that charter of in
corporation was in the nature
OF grant creating contract
beyond the power of the Legisla-
tllre to impair, many of the states have
adopted articles reserving that right.
To sustain this he gives the following
reference, Is Wells Reports, 454. Our
courts have also referred to this consti-
tutional provision. Although they have
not passed directly upon this question,
they have expressed opinions as to the
purpose of its adoption and it's effect,
) Wis, 2S7. And SO III the case of
Pratt VS.. Brown, 3 Wis. SOB Mr.. JUS
tlse Smith, after referring to the doc
trine established in the Dartmouth
College case, proceeds to say it is COM
petent, nevertheless, for each state by
constitutional regulation or specific
Legislative enactment, to reverse the
power to modify or repeal all such acts
OF incorporation where the power of
modification or repeal is reserved either
III the one mode or the other 1t is OBJ
vlous that the grantees must rely for
the perpetuity and integrity Of the
franchise granted to them solely upon
the faith of the sovereign grantor, and
all such corporations now rest upon the
faith of the state, taking care to deserve
It's favor or command its Justice by OBJ
serving strictly the limits of their powers
and accomplishing by all legitimate
means the objects of their creation.
These citations sufficiently show the
of our own state ~.
sign 81 az ia Tia ia
-, .-"n extent ii, tA6 reservation.
and setaiA u warrant the conclusion that
there can be no such limitation Of the
power as Is now claimed fc- It, or that
can effect the Validity of the law under
consideration, and the adiudications in
the courts of the other states and of the
Supreme Court of the United States
are IN entire harmony with our own,
ard ~bundantly sustain the legislation
OF last session and its constitutional va
idity.
In the case of McLaren V. penning-
ton, l Paige, l02, Chancellor Walworth
delivering the opinion. said That not
only the power to Iapeal existed under
tie reservation, but that the court
would not presume it to have been i'm
property exercised, In the, Penn Congo
cases, 13 Wall, 100, Mr.. Justice Clif
ford uses this language "Char-
tefs of private corporations are
| regarded as executed contracts be
tween the government and the corpora
tors, and the rule is well settled that
tlle legislature cannot repeal, impair or
alter such a charter against the consent
or without the default of the CORPORA
ton Judlclally ascertained and declared
VI course these remarks apply only to
| acts OF incorporation which do not con-
tam any reservations or provisions an
neXlng conditions to the charter modi-
lying and limiting the nature of the
| contract. Cases often arise where the
Legislature. IN granting an act of incor-
poraton Tor private purpose, either
makes the duration of the charter con-
dltlonal, or reserves to the state the
power to alter, modify or repeal the
same at pleasure. When such a pro-
vision is incorporated In the charter it
is clear that it qualities the grant, and
that the subsequent exercise of that
reserved power cannot be regarded as
an act within the prohibition of the
constitution.
After great many more references
the attorney general enters upon a dis |
cusslon OF the opinions that have been |
gwen lii opposition to it's constitutions |
alIty, and then a general discussion of |
the reservation of this power and its
effect. The corporations have no natu-
raj existence, but are created by legis-
latlye enactments, and their power to
act is derived from the state. He then
answers some of the claims that are
set up by the railroads as to what is
granted by the state and accepted 'bv
the corporation.
The creditor of the corporation con
tracts with it subject to the power of
the grantor to alter or impair the obi
cation. No right can vest, for it is
agreed by both the grantor and credi-
tor that none shall vest. The creditor
makes his investment cum Onere, and
cannot complain that the alteration of
the charter impairs his obligation, be
cause by its terms it admits of the very
imposed.
The conclusion reached is that said
chapter 273 is not obnoxious to anv of
the objections urged against it, but is
Il constitutional enactment, and as
such entitled to obedience.