, 1874-01-07

! abandoned. Heavy shippers, whose business Is d
incur the enn.ty Of railroad mauagera who have Ii
their power, by delays in furnishing means Of tran
portahon, aud BY naInberleas other nnnoyances
uonate charges nnI institute suits for redress Of the
| grievances Even when suit il contemplated, the e.
pcnses liable to be incurred b.; OF continuance
change Of venue, attendance ut court, counsel fecs,
vast Anount OF evidence relatg to the necessary
| Of building and operating such road an appeal I
the Supreme Court and the printing Of = volume
evidence, SO cnornous to deter shipper Of o.
dinary nerve md limited means from tnstituting th
suit, for failure In obtaining hnnl Judgment woul
] PROBABLY ruin him. .....
| Again, in tho Language Of ChIef-Justice Lawrence
in the Mclean County Quo Warrauto case, What is
reasonable rate Of freight over raroad te 1t best
OF complicated facts which but few persons could IN
telgenily investigate, and which it would he who'll
n the power OF the Company to furnish Or withhold
Though some, at the present day, claim that III
shippers themselves control railroad corporations
and keep down their charges to reasonable amount
md the assistance Of the State, yet in Judgment
this will rarely if ever be taken by man o
prudence Eince tho risk 1s great and final aucccs
would bp rewarded only with o judgment of lev
dollars at the utmost.
STATE OWNERSHIP OF RAILWAYS.
It hns been recently urged In Massachusetts nnt
elsewhere that railroads can be regulated as to the
charges only by the State ownership Of one OF more
them. Ne satisfied that the people Of this Sast
are not prepared for such m innovation, requiring
/: would large outlay Of the public funds In on.
ever until ali Other apparently reasonable methods
Of regulation have been fairly tried and found nef-
fectual,
Haying considered sonewhat 4. length tho various
prominent policies and methods in regard to railway
transportation, and having shown that noue Of them
las proved ectua1 In Practice to secure Ut reAsona-
bic charges, portation roads owned and oper
ated by corporations, turn nov to the consiaera-
ton Of what has already bean accomplished and whst
is proposal to Ia done, under the Constitution and
Laws Ct this State, for the prevention Of uutust di-
crtnination and cxtortion in railway charges
PREVENTION OF uSIC6r DISCRIMINATION.
The Of April 1871, provided in substance, that
railroad corporation should charge for the t1ans-
porsatdou Of property for less distance the same
transportation Of similar quantity Of like property
for greates distance. In December, 1871, IN In
foruatlon in the naturo Of quo warEanto was filed
in tile Crrult Cuurt of Mclean County, setting forth
that the Chicago 1: Alton Kailroad Company had re-
peatediy charged for transporting lumber FROM Chi
cage to Lexington dstanso of 10 hes' the sum q
charged for the transportation Of like lumbar from
Chicago. through Lexington to Bloomington, dts
tsnee st l2o mues ,he sum q S per thonsaad te,t
BY way Of ustiat auou after reciting its chalt.r,
alleged hrst that tho oct oi april 1871 was In roa
tlou Of the Constitution ct the United Btates, ard,
secondly, that tho charges for transporting lumber
from Chicago to Bloomington we're unreasonab1y low,
and were adopted in order to compete with the Illinois
The Circuit court held that The deYcuses set up by
the Ratlruad Company were insufficient: thu. In the
hrst place the In violation OF tue Constu
competition With tho Illinois Central Railroad Com
1Rny at Bloomington vas no justification for greater
charge st Lexington. On appeal, the Supreme Court
& ts State rc{uted to upon the sucieuc OF tho
first Of these defeusee, md virtually sustained the Ctr
cult Court to the tusuinciency Uf the second Of these
defenses. Upon tho latter question the reasoning OF
the EupTnc Court Is clear and conclusive, and very
important point thus established in favor Of the
people. II is II be borne In mind that the corpora
charges for freight to Lexington reasonable and
that those to Bloomington were uureasonably low
account Of competition With til Illinois Central Rail-
road Company. It IL also 10 be btrue In MUD lhat
tbs real question made by the admitted facts OF tho
whether or not there unjust d;sc1imi-
a3t!ou between these localities.
The SUR renle Court Sag: "na:lroad experts might
be produced who would testify that. in ther oplniou,
lie rats to Lexington in tie present case was rea-
sonahe rate but tue faet th2t less rate wa charged
snce was permanently established and Lot casual
ltntreuce End II II could be Ell atnel only by the
act that there was competing line 1T one Place and
lot at the other might be well accepted conclusive
roof that the rate to Lexington was not reasonable
ate The only ISSUE to be made under Law properly
nation OF not II, Oh the trial Of suca ISSUE the
,ro=ecudon proves permanently ess1blBa3d d1acrm-
nation Like tnst disclosed by tho present record, and
he Company show her re1eOn for it than the
1isreuco Of e4ng line at the favored point
efense must BE- held unsatisfactory notwithstanding
Witnesses may testify that they believe, as matter uf
unreasonable. They cannot be reasonable, aud tho |
discrimination must be unjust II tue lesser rates for
be greater distance have ueen established merely be-
the Comp. has ceased 10 exercise at that point
practical NC EoI,Dly.
I. cannot be supposed that either Of the connecting
would establish permanent rate Of ..arGes ur-
scue that would not furnish reiuner4tire profit.
lie rates to Bloomington would be established under
1e influence OF fair competition, which, BY the or
inary laws that Ctyeln commerce might be relied +
pen estahlieh!uEn rate NOT unreasonab|y low. A.
extngton the rates would be established by the
oiled direction OF the Company, and 1t should not
suke surprise # they we're fixed uurcaRonaby high.
atH |
lcy are uurcasouably high at Lexington II they are
Low at Bloomington, and all other points
ompany will Indemnity Itself BY charging, 1T stations
here there is no conretttion, q rate uurcasonab5
lah7 And will not discrimination arising Eoley
ON sucs, cansc be necessarily unjust and IN
lrtous discrimination to all persons shipping or
living freight ut the non-con,peting stattons7 II
done ia spenl tbs a
IN Of rates, II permanently established, |
i'll diminish its business and cheek It's growth. It
onld this power to benefit particular individuals,
build up particular localities, By arbitrary discrm-
ations In their favor tl.nt must nuy other
rso1s places engaged in rirnl pursuits or occnp5
ch Determinations, made without just cause that
rate Of charges against tho injured person or local
me. An injury, matter Of fact, Is committed In
manner just suggested, and the Legislature has the
yht to require the corporations to snow sufficient
use for the discrimination which produces the In
r and 1t cannot be permitted to Grade the Issue By
,ing the speculative inquiry whether the rates
arged against the injured parties or localities are
It, after AE, reasonable rates. Even II reasonable
regarded In reference to the profit upon the cap
i invested in the road, they are not reasonable in
9 true Of the term, Il no satisfactory reason
be given for charging less rats for the came or
greater services rendered to persons doing bus1-
Is with the Company at neightoring Stations"
Such Ia tho language and ruling Of the Supreme !
urs upon tho question Of competition. When re !
nsideT that the charges complained Of In this cnse
re for frejghts mo7ing In the direction and |
ut competition With the Illinois Central Ra,lrosd !
pany was the only reason given In The plea for the
'c1 1nination in the charges for freghts TO Lexing-
and Bloomington. we sec that the corporation was
t without any justification or e1cnse wh3terer for
ch discrimination. But thu Supreme Court reversed
and held that the act OF Apr7 1871 cou'd not
enforced until amended to Il mike the char-
OF greater compensation for less distance or | ,
the same distance merely prima facie evidence OF
Just discrimination, instead Of conclusive evidence c
che net ot May 2, 1873 upon the subject Of unjust
elimination WAS framed In accordance with the sue-
tsons Of the Supreme Court, and the charging more
transportation to IN intervening nou-conr,efnn
than s charged for transportation for greater
tauco and the other Determinations Of uIe chur-
er specified in the third section Of the act Of 1878
thereby made prina facie evidence of unjust dig
ninationH.
he Law Of 1873 is probably eTectua1 IN practice
hat Of 1871 would have been. The railroad eorpo- n
ions Of this Sate have evidently regarded IT, for =
feaz7anglng their tariffs so to comply in the ! {
In on tue lst d1y Of July last with that portion Of
law which prohibits unjust determinations against