Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1874-09-23

MADISON, Wis, September 15.-
The following is an abstract of the opin-
ion of the Supreme Court of Wiscon-
sin, prepared by Chief Justice Ryan,
in the case brought by the Attorney
General and Railroad Commissioners
for an injunction to compel compli-
ance by the Chicago and Northwestern
and the Chicago, Milwaukee and St.
Paul Railway Companies with the pro
visions of the Potter law:
This court has no original jurisdic-
ton of proceedings by injunction at the
suit of private persons, or to enforce
private remedies, but has jurisdiction
OF the writ IN matters public, upon in
formation ct the Attorney General, in
the nature Of an injunction bill to re-
strain excess where mandamus would
not 60 to remedy the defect. The writ
given to this court in a group of pre-
rogative writs is given as quasi pre-
rogative writ for prerogative purposes.
[ Attorney General Brossog Wis, 317l.
Considered and approved independent
ly of sections l3 and Il, chapter 14S,
Revised Statues, Courts Of Equity
have jurisdiction upon information of
of the Attorney General, ex oficio, to
restrain corporations from excess or
abuse of corporate franchises or other
violation of public injury. These Sec
tions confer no jurisdiction in this
court Whether they operate to limit
the jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts is
not here considered. It is for the
court to determine, in such an informa-
ton, whether the acts charged work a
public injury. This jurisdiction was
an established equitable jurisdiction at
the time of the adoption of the State
Constitution, and section 5, article l of
the Constitution, in relation to trial by
jury, has no application to it. Were
this otherwise, the questions raised by
these informations are questions of law,
and the jurisdiction of them in equity
deprives the defendants of no right of
trial by jury. Chapter 273, of 1874,
is not repealed by chapters 292 or 34I
of the same session. All the chapters
can and will stand together. The
Court finds no difficulty in holding
that the Chicago, Milwaukee and st.
Paul Railroad Company is the corpora
ton designated as the Milwaukee and
St. Paul Railroad Company in chap
ter 273. The name used is sufficient
ly indicated by the name used in the
statue, although it had "Chicago :"
to its name. The constitutional amend
meut of 1871 prohibiting special acts
of the Legislature for granting corpor-
ate power or privileges except to cities
is prospective only, and has no relation
to existing corporate characters by
special acts before the amendment.
These may be amended or repealed by
special act, as before. The rule estab-
lished in the Dartmouth College, of
Woodward 4. Wheaton 5, Is, is con-
sidered and disapproved as far as it is
extended to quasi private corporations
intrusted by charter with public inter-
ests so as to constitute them quasi pub
lie corportions. The rule is followed,
nevertheless, by the court because it
is the rule of the Supreme Court of
the United States Of the construction
of a clause in the Federal Constitution;
but the reserved power in the state
Constitution to altar or repeal corpor-
ate charters was desi igned to take, and
does take, all corporations created un-
der it out of the rule in the Dartmouth
College case, and the Legislature has
the same power over such corporations
as if the rule in that case had never
existed. The reserved power to alter
or repeal has no other limit in law than
is implied in the words used the pow
er to alter or power to amend a char
ter without entirely changing its pur-
pose or character. The exercise of
the power should be under the guild
ance of extreme moderation and discre-
ton, and should not be oppressive and
unreasonable. But all this rests in
the Legislative discretion. So far as
corporate franchises are concerned, the
Legislature is under no moral obliga-
ton not to reduce the tolls of railroads
below fair and adequate amount, but
their power over the franchise is abso-
lutte. But the power to alter or repeal
cannot affect the property Of corpora
tions other than the franchise. Such
right Of property is inviolable.
1t is not material here whether the
defendants had elected to accept or re-
ject the alteration of their charters.
BY chapter 273 they were bound to
obey the statue or to discontinue their
operations as corporate bodies. In Ell
ther case, they had no right to conduct
their operations in defiance of public
law. Chapter 273, Of 1874, so far as
it's provisions are before the court in
the eases, is a valid amendment of
special charters of defendants, granted
hv the State. Whether it would be a