Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1874-05-16
HooD ON IoHNsroNs g MARIA
TIVEo

ductlOn 10 No. or reply 10 certain
statements in Johnston's Narrative"
ana he requests hearing through
some of the principal journals of the
South and North. In seating himself
to write chapter or so under the inspi-
ration of the museof history, hehas not
disappointed the expectations of those
who examined the Narrative" But,
in point of logical clearness and inteli-
gibility, the reading public had a right
to expect something better than what
Gen. Hood has furnished. AS regards
perspicuity and lucidness of reasoning,
his first paper is exceedingly uhfortu-
nate. 1t is literal tumble or agglom-
Grafton of statements and figures worse
confused by an intermixture of suppo.
sitions, assumptions, probabilities. and
possibilities, all strung together in a
strange sort of connection, or rather
disconnection. If the paper is to
be preserved in the Southern
archives, the future historian Ia
parsonage now frequently invoked with
terms of the most distinguished res
pect and consideration is, to our think.
ing a proper object of compassion.
The confusion of Hoods article would
stagger the perseverance of Gibbon.
Out of Difference to said future histo-
rian and the editorial profession
who would gladly allow Gen. Hood
the benefit of their columns, to incul-
cate juster notions In the mind Of the
country, it would be well for him to
rub out" and write his composition
over again.
This disagreement between Hood
and Johnston, as we understand it,
may be stated IN few words. John
ston asserts that the effective strength
of the Army of Tennessee, cat and
near" Dalton, when he assumed CON-
mand, was 1854; Hood argues that
the available" strength sin the easy
direction" of Johnston at that time,
was not less than seventy thou
sand. Again, Johnston states, upon
the AUTHORITY of DIR. Foard, Medical Di-
rector Of the Army, that the loss in
killed and wounded during the subse-
quent retreat was 1872; Hood has no
doubt Of the correctness Of this esti-
mate. but proceeds to demonstrate"
in his own strange manner, that the
loss from all causes, especially deser-
ton, was $4,000 men.
1t seems TO us that there is no point |
blank dispute between the two Gen
erals, either as to the numbers of the |
army at Dalton or the subsequent loss. |
There is, however, difference of opin-
ion as to the effective force GUaiLable
for decisive struggle at Dalton; and,
as we infer from the tedious and en-
-barrassing argument, Gen. Hood is of
the opinion that Johnston did the I'M
fair thing to give only the killed and
wounded as his loss. 1t is possible that
Hood could, upon asecond trial, clearly
show that the totalloss was much great
er. The rule by which to approximate
the actual loss from all causes is simple
enough: from the whole number of men
participating in the campaign, subtract
the number at the end of the campaign
plus the number sent away during the
campaign. The rule pursued by Gen.
Hood is no safe guide, as viii appear at
first sight:
We must first ascertain the full ef-
fective force at the beginning of hostil-
tiles, and when the battle is over, or
the siege or campaign ended, again find
out the effective total, which, sub
tracted from the number at the outset,
viii unquestionably give the loss.
This takes no account of reinforce
ments and detachments during the
campaign, which items beset Gen.
Hood in the practical solution of the
problem so much that he departs from
his own rule, and all rule. If he pos
sesses the data to carry out the rule in
dicated by us above, the loss during the
may be calculated without
the charge of verbosity, con-
fusion or obscurity.
Concerning the propriety of giving
battle at Dalton, Gen. Hood has this to
say:
The plea urged by this General, that
he was justified in his retreat from !
Dalton on the night of the 18th by the
report that Sherman had moved with
MS army down the valley beyond Rocky
Face Ridge, is not warrantable. 1t was
'nly necessary to have thoroughly for
,ifed Mill Greek and Snake Greek gaps,
fifteen or twenty days rations
n Dalton, then to have sent the trains /
md engines to some place of safety be- p
Tond the Ettowah; to have held our po- .,
ition until the arrival of Folks army, 5,
when a grand assault upon Sherman's ?
eft flank and rear could have been
made near Tunnel Hill, by passing over \
he northern slope of Rocky Face b
Ridge, with an army of over 10000 ST
Electives, which might easily have "
'een increased to $4,000 by lessen b,
ng the extra-duty men. This move, Is
n my opinion, would have eliminated
n an overwhelming victory; and in the
vent of defeat, we had by holding
dill creek and Snake creek gaps, the p
hort line of retreat, since the railroad
outh of Kingston defects greatly to
he east. One blow in the rear of an at
rmy is always more to be feared than o.
en- in front, and it would only have re- -
uired good roar of musketry near
tunnel Hill to have FASTENED the
nemy back to the firing. / have too 4
Ugh a regard for Ger. Sherman's =
agacity as soldier to believe that he n
7ould have moved the main body of Az
is army down the valley beyond Rocky sa
ACE and Horn mountains, in the direc- II
ion of Rome, leaving an army of
O,OO0 at Dalton, In his rear, unless he =