The Middlebury register. [volume] (Middlebury, Vt.) 1850-1882, 1874-09-22

postponed. The tenth oil the ten days
came, and there was an immense commo.
ton, The whole army we're moving to.
ward Manassas As it approached the
place it was found that the enemy had
evacuated it some days before, and were
in retreat toward Richmond.
at was now painfully apparent that
our immense and agnifceptly appointed
army had been held 10 check for months
by force not one.third as great in mum.
bers and inferior in almost all other re-
spects, and that the impregnable fortifca-
tions which had been so magniiied by our
generals, we're works of little strength
aud incapable of withstanding any vigor-
Gus assault. The Rebel flag had been
fauntcd in our sight from Munson's hill
by an inconsiderable detachment for
months, until it was voluntarily with
drawn, Our generals had never vcntured
an attack on even this weak position
AFTER the evacuation Of Manassas the
mode of advance upon Richmond became
Immediately the subject OF debate. The
President, the secretary of war, myself
and some of the generals favored direct
and rapid march forward. Gen. McClel.
Ian preferred believe the Urbanna route.
Most Of the generals preferred the penin-
sular route, by Fortress Monroe and
Yorktown. Mcclellan preferred this to
the direct advance and it was finally de-
tcrmined upon.
/ 81 do not mean to review the disastrous
campaign Of the peninsula. From the
day the President told me Mcclellan was
beaten, and | saw the dispatches announc'
Ing his retreat towards the James river, |
never entertained doubt OF the necessity
o' Withdrawing the army altogether, it it
was TO remain under his command aud
expressed thus opinion at once to the Ircs-
ldent. The military men said tnat to at
tempt to Withdraw the army would IN
volvc The loss ol all Its material, ammun-
ition, guns provisions and stores. Gen.
Mcclellan himself in his dispatches before
reaching Harrison Landing, referred 20
the possibility OF being obliged to capitu'
late with his entire army aud after reach
Ing that place Gen. Mafcy-hls iather.in'
law and chief OF staff who had been sent
up to explain personally the situation to
the President, spoke of the possibility oil
his capitulation at once. or within two OF
three days. The danger of withdrawal
the impossibility OF strengthening the
army for an advance on Richmond from
the position to which it had retreated
the certainty that no vigorous effort
would be made by Mcclellan, by uuex.
pected blows south of the James, to re.
trieve the disasters north Of it ; the posi-
biity Of the loss OF the entire army, con
vinced me, and convinced the secretary oil
war that the command OF the army Of the
Potomac should be given to some more
active officer We proposed to the Pres
ident to send Pope to the James, and give
Mitchell the command Of the army il
front of Wasuingtou-which had beer
constituted OF the armies of Banks, Ere
mon. and Mcdowell. and called the arm,
of Virginia and placed under Pope. The
President wa. not prepared for ANYTHING
so decisive, and sent for Ilallcck anC
made him comnander.in chief | wai
not consulted as to this step. Ifany mem
her OF the cabinet was. am not informed
OF it.
"On llalleck's arrival, he went at one,
to the James to see Mcclellan. Ga hi
return, at the Presidents instance, he alst
came to see me as to the relations Of tht
war to the finances. | cannot fix th'
date Ii was late i'll July. He uure
servedly condemned McClellan's Who'll,
military operations, and especially th'
conduct of the engagement before Rich
mond, and the subsequent retreat to tn,
James. | told him that to revival o
the credit OF the country two things wer'
necessary First, that some vigorous anC
able general should be placed in command
of the army on the James river instead
OF Mcclellan; and secondly, that tn
Mississippi should be opened. | spok
also of the importance ola more rapid ad
vance into East Tennessee. He guve M
no satisfaction on any point. He SAT-
: Mcclellan would do very well under or
ders from himself that no force could b.
withdrawn from Grant it that general wa
} to take Nicksburg and open the Mississip
pi that Curtis's army was required t
prevent invasion OF Missouri from Arkau
s1s' and that Buell. was marching to
ward Chattnnooga, though his movement
were intolernbly SLOW.
About this time | saw good deal Q
Gen. Pope. 1t was just before he lei
8 Washington where he had been dctaine
! by the President until Hallcck's arriva
to take command oftho army in the field.
' He condemned Gen, McClellau's eonduc
more in stronger terms than Gen. lla'
lcck and said that in conversation h
: found Iialleck quite agreed with him bu
aver,c to Trecipitate action. He ais
said, what from other evidence enter
| iaincd no doubt of that he had warne
j. the President that he Pope could nc
oroly command ,l,a orn,u - N;ro;,;o