The weekly clarion., 1874-06-25

Again, IN reference to operations near
New Hope Church, the author of this re-
markable narrative says, page 333:
" When the three Lieutenant Generals
We're together in my quarters that day
(the 28th), as usual, Lieut.. Gen. Hood
suggested that we should make an attack
upon the Federal army, to commence on
It's left flank. The suggestion was accept
ed, and the three officers were desired TO
be ready for battle next morning. Lieut..
Gen. Hood was instructed to draw his
corps out of the line to the rear, and to
march during the night around our right
and form it facing the enemy's left flank,
somewhat obliquely to his line, and TO
assail that flank at dawn next day. Polk
and Hardee were instructed to JOIN in the
battle successively, obliquely to the
present formation, when the progress
made on the right of each should enable
him to do so.
g We waited the next morning for the
signal agreed upon-the musketry Of
Hoods Corps-from the appointed time
until about 10 A. NJ, when a message
from the LieuteDant-General was deliv-
cred to me by one OF his aide-de-c camps,
to the effect that he had found Johnson's
division, on the Federal lett, thrown back
almost at right angles to the general line,
and intrenchiDg; that, under such cir
cumstances he had thought it inexpedient
to attack, and asked for instructions. |
supposed from the terms of the message
that Hoods Corps was in the presence of
the enemy, and that his movement and
position being known to them, they would
be prepared to repel his assault as soon
as he to make it, after his aide-de-camp's
return. If the attack had been expedient
when Lieutenant General Hoods mes
sage was dispatched, the resulting delay,
by enabling the enemy to reinforce the
threatened points and complete the en-
trenchments beyond, made it no longer
SO. He was therefore recalled" Before
from the right Of our army,
which rested on Little Pumpkin Vine
Creek, with Cleburne's division still on
my extreme right and under my orders,
i. e., before Withdrawing on the night Of
the 28th of May from the position, Gen.
j Johnston enormously asst igns Gen. Polk,
during the 26th, 9th and 28th, | re-
ceived information from General Wheel
er's cavalry, stationed on Clebnrnes right
just across Little Pumpkin Vine Creek,
that the enemy had its left flank beyond
this stream in an exposed position, by
reason of the difficulty Of passage back to
the main body of their army; and that if
| could withdraw that night (28th) and
get in position by early morning, | might
attack this corps or division thus exposed
and destroy it before it could recross
Little Pumpkin Vine Creek or receive
reinforcements. This information | re-
ceiyed on the morning of the 2Sth, after
Cleburne's repulse OF the enemy on the
afternoon and night of the 9th, as before
With this favorable op-
portunity of dealing the enemy hard
blow, instantly repaired to Gen. John
ston's headquarters and asked his per
mission to withdraw my corps at dark
from our extreme right and attack this
exposed flank next morning. He said
that it might result in a general engage
ment, to which | replied that if could
destroy one portion of the enemy before
it could be reinforced it would give us
greatly the advantage if a general battle
ensued that TIardee and Polk could De
in readiness to come to my assistance if
necessary. Having obtained his consent,
couriers were dispatched for the two re-
corps commanders, Hardee and
Polk, who shortly joined US. They were
to hold their corps in readiness
for action the next day, as | was going to
march that night upon the above report
from Wheelers Cavalry, and attack the
left flank of the enemy, provided | found
it as reported, l. e., the whole of the pro-
posed movement was to depend'upon the
enemy's left flank remaining as repre-
sented. Polk was then for the first time
ordered to my position, the right Of the
army, and accordingly [ withdrew after
night and took up my line of march with
guides from Wheeler's Cavalry. Just
about dawn, as we were approaching the
place the enemy was reported to be in an
exposed position, | received from the
same cavalry message to the effect that
[ need proceed no farther, as the Federals
had during the night drawn back their
left flank, recrossed Little Pumpkin Vine
Greek, and were entrenched. From
some feeling of insecurity, they had re-
crossed to the side of the creek [ had left
the evening previous, placing between us
a swamp and difficult stream to cross, in
addition to entertainments on the opposite
bank Our cavalry had evidently seen the
folly of attacking the Federals across
this creek, and therefore advised me to
proceed no farther. | reported these
facts to General Johnston and was order
ed to return.
The following extract from a letter just
received from General Wheeler, General
Johnston's chief of cavalry, will show that
the enemv was heavily entrenching the
night of my march around our right
flank:
WHEELER, ALA, May %, 1864.
q recall the movement to attack the
enemy's left flank with your corps and
my cavalry, which think was on the
night of the 28th. / remember you send
ing for me on the morning of the 29th,
and telling me why you did not attack,
which was owing to a change in position
of the enemy, and their invariable custom
of entrenchment. | remember that the
enemy, were cutting down trees during
the night, which was one of their favor
ite plans of Strengthening and even build
ing works, especially in SO densely wood
ed a country | cannot recall what Off
Ger to whom Gen Wheeler refers was
the gallant Gen Kelly, who afterwards
fell at Franklin.
1t might be supposed upon reading
Gen. Johnston's recital of this his second
attempt to fight, that was ordered to
assault the enemy under any circum-
stances. and that was again the cause
of his not delivering battle. Never
within my history was | ordered to fight
and failed to so. [ have never expert
enced pleasure in being shot at; and,
although have been charged with being
too reckless of the lives of my men, |
had sufficient caution to know that some
positions should not be attacked-such as