Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1874-04-02
WHY THE SOUTH FAILED.
The True Cause of the COnfed-
crate Collapse.
A Chapter from Gen. Joe Johnston's
Narrative of Military Operations
n.-ar- tho Late War

coming work.. i've the following striking
view of the true causes of the downfall of
the Southern C~onfederacy:
Much has been written and much more
said of the cause of the overthrow of the
Confederate States in theirgreat contest for
independence. One class, and much the
largest-for it includes the people who
were victorious inthe war, and those Euro
peans who watched the struggle with inter-
terest, as well as many of the Southern
people-ascribe it to the superior popula-
tion and greater resources of tie Northern
States. Another, a class Of Southern peo-
pie, attribute our defeat to a want of per-
severance, unanimity, and wen of loyalty
OF u own part, and the consequent aban-
donment of the Government of the Confed-
eracy in its efforts by the people themselves.
In my view both are far wrong.
THE CAUSE OF THE SUBJ UGATIoN
of the Southern States was neither want of
wealth and population, nor OF devotion to
their own cause on the part of the people
of those States. That people were not
guilty of the high crime Of undertaking a
war without the means of waging it sue
cessfully. They had ample means, which,
unfortunately were not applied TO the OBJ
jet of e~quipping great armies and bringing
them into the field. A full treasury was
necessary to defray the expenses of a great
war. The South had the means Of making
one, in its cotton alone. But its Govern
ment rejected those means, and limited its
financial efforts to printing bank notes, with
which b country was soon flooded. The
necessity of actual money in the treasury,
and the mode Of raising it.. were gen.
nrrl- Dn1nrafon1 In AhA .W-
1t was that the Government should
il to Europe as fast as possible, to be sold
there. This was easily practicable, for the
owners were ready to accept any terms the
Government might fix, and sending to Eu-
rope was easy in all the first year of the
Confederacy's existence. Its government
went into operation early in February.
The blockade of the Southern ports was
proclaimed in May, but not at all effective
until the end of the following winter, so
that there was a period Of about twelve
months for the operation of converting A.
100000 or 100000 bales of cotton into
money. The sum raised in that way
would have enabled the War Department
to procure at once arms enough for five
hundred thousand MEN, and after that ex-
penditure
THE CONFEDERATE TREASURY
would have been much richer than that of
the United States. By applying the first
money obtained in this way to the pur-
chase of arms and military accoutrements.
or using for the purpose the credit which
such an amount of property would have
| given, the War Department would have
been able to equip troops as fast as they
could be assembled and organized. And
as the Southern people were full of en-
thusiasm, five hundred thousand men
could have been ready and in the field had
such a course been pursued al the time
when the firs' battle was actually fought
the 21st of July, 1861. Such aforce placed
on the Northern borders of the Confedera-
CIV before the United States had brought a
fourth Of the number into the field. would
probably nave prevented the Very idea
of scoercion." Such a disposition of
such an army, and the possession of
financial mears of carrying on war for
years. would have secured the success of
the C~onfederacy. The timely adoption
of such a financial system would have
secured to us the means of success. even
without an extraordinary importation of
arms and the immediate organization of
large armies. 1t would have given the
Confederacy a treasure richer than that of
the United States. We should thus have
! had. to the end of the war, the means OF
paving our soldiers; and that would have
enabled such of them as belonged TO the
laboring class to remain in the ranks. This
class. in the C~unfederacy as in all other
countries, formed the body of the army. In
all the earlier part of the war, when the
Confederate money was not much below
that of the United States in value, cur
troops were paid with some regularity, and
the soldiers of the labOring class who had
families, fed and clothed them with theil
paw. as they had formerly done with the
wages of their labor. And 20 long as that
state of things continued the strength o.
the Confederate armies was little. impaired.
and those armies were maintained on sucl
a footing as to justify the hepe which wa.
general in the South until the fall of 1864
that
WE WERE To WIN IN THE CONTEST.
But after the Confederate currency had be.
come almost wUrthleSs-when a soldier:
months pay would scarcely buy one mea
for his family-and that was the case in al
the last period Of ten or twelve months
those soldiers of the labOring class whe haC
families were compelled to choo e between
their military Services and the strongest oh
legations men knOw-their duties to wive.
aud children. They obeyed the stronges
of those obligations, left the army and re
turned TO their homes 10 support thei
families. The wretched impressment law
deprived the army of many valuable men q
a class less poor than that just ~referre
to. Those laws required th
impreSsment of Nil articles O
military necessity that could not be pun
chased. The Government had the pOwe
of regulating the prices to be paid by it fe
all such commodities; and its cOfnIiiSsiOn
es appointed for the purpose fixed theI
much below the market values. No on,
would sell to the Government, of course
when he could get from his neighbors twic
the Government price for his horses or graiI
consequently the officers of the Govern
menttcould never purchase, but had AWAY
to procure supplies by impre.sment. n
rules for their guidance were prescribed
none at least that were observed by theI
or known TO the public, and they were snl
iected to no supervision. All the propert
of Confederate citizens applicable to mil
tary purposes was, therefore, under the
absolute control.
II BAD AND INDIFFERENT OFFICER
impressed what they were called upon [
furnish, in the manner least incOnvenien
to themselves, usually on the nearest plar
tations or farms, or those where oppositio
was not to be apprehended. The farms
soldiers were generally under the manag,
ment of women, and therefore were NJ
unusually drawn upon for much more tina
their proportion. Hence il was not unc II
mon for a soldier TO be written TO by h
wife that so much Of the food he had PR
vided for herself and children had been in
pressed, that it was necessary that 1
should return to save them froI
suffering or starvation. Such a sun
: mons, it may well be supposed, W;
never unheeded. The su~fferings of IL
soldiers themselves, produced by the wal
of proper clothing, drove many of the lea.
hardy out of the ranks. Want of food ais
is said to have had the same effect, espec
ally in the army before Richmond in Il
last winter of the war. 1t was by sue
causes, all due to an empty treasury, TIL
/ our armies were so reduced in the la
months of the war. As TO the charge
want of loyalty or zeal in the war, l asser
from as much opportunity for Observable
as any individual had, that no people ev,
displayed so much under such circumstanc
and with so little tagging for so long
| time ~cOnfinuOusly. This was nrovad