New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1874-03-17
.srneelallx s,an,on end


sm,crs we've ready TO append uN w., Yas m tIe hand.
declined - s@ t not hat did Of disapUroye OF 1s
course Of the general out ~ tbe President who had
ippctad his Cabinet to consult an nn Of the charges
20 conspire against MN raosr s1ew nothing of,
ana baI doubted the wisdom V'hcrcn differing from
OF the Potomac from Mss oset in bringing that army
Chase and Stanton. The o start anew march over
NY IN Washnctonin order % .s,tien did not IN
land and regain the abspdohf "a Mcclellan; and II
that was the object il would have De .sspy while it
place another general at the mead on t 81 'ee Ctplnet
was yet the James bnt a majority ,d,v '1e Isl
finally united in this prOceeulng, Un aa a,d s,cn,"
of September me paroIa rs as SpoWgbt me Mr.
S.ysra was AT the time absent from WashlDgt"h,
hTv ,'mber NV refusal and perhaps my remarks
prevented the matter from prOceeuns ,onsa
ndign9tion aS nS the country The President never
knew of this paper but ws not unaware Oh tnc pId
and Of the sentiments of the members OF The CaOine
aggravated by the hostility ana srong II No W. In,b
Stanton, and Halleck were, however hhed WIN appre
hensons on the last Of August and first OF
tember came rushing toward washington a.. n, y,
At the stated Cabinet meeting on Iuesday, the ~ Va
santennber while the whole community was stIIcad
mn and M confusion and affairs were gloomy pogV
ANYTHING that had preVlosS g, dvance Of Mr.
Lincoln anu sau' nneet that the President had placed
McCelan i'm command OF the forces 10 washington Ing
Information was surprising and, in WEN o. TN preNaii
ing excitement against that oincer, elarIning tno
from Mr. Chase confirmed what Stanton had stated.
General regret expressed ana stanton WIN soihe
feeng remarked that no order to tha eecs had sSuo
frow fhe War Department. The President, calmly but
WITH some emphasis, said the order was MS, ana nc
r,yfsating and demoralzed army tumbng in upon
us, and alarm and panic IN me eoltinul,.. ~
should be done, but there seemed 10 Do no
one 10 do it. He therefore had directed McCeah VINO
tneNg this whole ground who the best OrcanZ'r IN
tine army r@Id here act upon the defensive to take
hat re ~.
fnll well the infrmities or MCCLELLAN VINO was not an
ai.r,otive man. WAS worth little for onward move
rceut but beyond any other olhcer he h6d the cChn
dcnce of the army. and he could more eicientW anu
enneSiy re0rcanize It and put 1t in condition than sry
ofhcT General II the Secretary OF War, any member
of the Cabinet, would name q general mat co1lt
do this as promptly ana well, he WOuIu appoInt
him For an active fighting general he was sorry
10 saw Mcclellan was u failure; he had " the
| slows :" twas never ready for battle, and probably
never vonld be; but for THIS exgency when orgaulzl-
non and defense needed, no considered bun TIE
hest man FOR tue service and the country must nave inc
henedts OF his talents though he had behaved badly
The President said he had seen and gwen ms opinion 70
Cen Halleck who was sun SeheTa-lnCneIi O1t mar
leck mad no plan views OF his own, proposed 10 90
nothing himself, and fully approved his calling upon
I'm stating what he had done the President wac delb
crate but firm and decisive HIS language ana manner
were kind and ahectonate, espeeiany to~atu TWO vi
| tne members VINO were greatly disturbed but every
nersOn present felt that lac was truly the chief and
fTeTy one knew his decision though mildly expressed
| vss as fixed and unalterabe AS II gwen out WIN
| rne mperOus command and determined VIII OF Andrew
Jackson. long discussion cIsinE H w., az VI
essence III the decision OF the PRESIDENT nut before
rat
that the reinstatement OF Mcclellan Would
| prove "A national calamity
I'm this instance the President unaided by Others put
forth with fiIInness and determination the executive will
the one-man pOwer-against the temporary general
sense of community as wei as OF his Cabinet; two
Of whom has been gcnefay supposed hau WIN nm an
influence almost great AS the secretary OF state They
had been ready 10 make issue ana resign Their PAGES
unlesa Mcclellan was dsmlsSd; but yet knowing
their opposition, and IN spite of 1t and OF
The President had in that pcious moment exalted hun
Ia new and important trusts Ia an interview with the
no ID ne nd
myself were present he unDurdtned MS mind freely
Military matter. MeLe jul ~ M I "ltH w p, VI
popes defeat and McClcilan's einstaement, was not
ouiy disappointed, but detected and disprited. The
dent said most of troubles grew out OF military
ir,lousies Whether changing the plan OF operlticns
ldiscarding Mcclellan and placing Pope IN command IN
f,cp was wise not, not the matter In hand
These things right or %ISng, haa Deen done IL TIE Ad
made 10 suffer brave men be cut down ana butch
erred Pope should nave been sustained, hut he was NOT
| These personal and professional quarTels came IN.
or NAV been said 10 the contrary, 1t could
not be denied that the army was with Mcclellan He
had "A sbjfllly handed ms troops not getting 70
RcbJnond ne To retain their confidence. The soldiers
certainly had transferred their confidence to Pope
| lie could however, do no more good IN this quarter
II WAS himating after what had trauspned and all
We knew to reward Mcclellan and those VINO failed 10
do their hole duty IN the hour of trial; but IT
Personal considerations must be sacrificed for the pub
lie good. He had kept aloof from the discussions that
prevailed aud INTENDED 10; " but" said he, must
nave Mcclellan 10 reOrganze the army and
bring II out Of chaos. There has been a de-
sign. purpose in breaking down Pope, without regard
10 the consequences the country that is aIrocous IL
il shocking and know this, but there omedy
at nre.eu Mcclellan has the army with him" Tlese
we're the views and this tine course OF the President
when there was general dmay III the country aud con
fusion ia the army the Rebels near tue lntrechnehts
of WasAlng On, and some OF the Cabinet alarmed and
preparing TO leave. The President was insensibe
10 the deficiencies OF ignorant Oi the iauts OF mcclellan
nor vet bind and stubborn regarded his better
qualities In placing him at the head Ot the army lie
went counter 81 the wishes OF bis friends, and
forgetful Of all else he subdued every personal
solved 70 do what was Tor the true interest OF the
country Had the General followed up tho battle Of
Antietam, which took place fortnight later, he would
have retrieved the mstOrtunes OF the peninsula and
gwen the President additional reason to congratulate
frn.y remained which STRENGTHENED the influence that
ersteuty opposed him. aud soon after led 70 his DciLg
! retired FROM tLo command OF the army
| Mr.. Welless account of the respective shares OF
Lincoln and Seward in the Emancipation Act, pre-
sents the subject in quite different light from that
in which il appears in the Memorial Discourse" This
measure was not anticipated by the president at the
time of bis election. 1t forced upon him by the
progress of events during the war. 1t was his own
act saws Mr.. Welles the bold suggestion Of his own
mind, for which he was alone responsible, and which
was warranted by military necessity. The result
has shown the wisdom of the movement 1t was all
act of cOnsummate craftsmanship, marked alike
by courage and sagacty The secretary Of
state, according to Mr.. Welles, stood aloOf
! from the measure lie studlOusly avoided any
expression OF opinion in regard to it. Not only 50.
| He advised the administration to abstain from any
! decisive stand on that embarrassing subject When
consulted by the president, who announced that
| he intended by an executive order to emancipate
the slaves Mr. Seward startled by the PROPOSE
ton, and asked for delay before giving his Judgment
While he still hesitating, the president drafted
his preliminary proclamation. He devised the whole
scheme took the entire responsibility upon himself
and without aid from his cabinet, prepared each of
| the proclamations of freedom Mr. Seward had no
part in that mOmentOus step. Yet he is represented