The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1874-10-17
again, without having even

business. Had Laserna marched upon EsteIIa
then ne might have taken IT almost without firing
a shot, as there were only four battaons OF Carsts
to oppose his whole army OF nearly $4,000 men. lt
Is utterly impossible to account Tor this movement
m mssesna a, Hs went avor Of Morones
that is to draw the Carlist troops TO that side o.
the circle But a. long a. ne had met no troops u
was very evident that object had not been accom-
plshed Besides IL 10 one OF the first principles OF
strategy that ieint should always be turned INTO
a real attack should the occasion offer. Here was
an opportunity TO achieve most brilliant success
TO nave given crushing blow 10 Carllsm, AND yet
ne quietly turned to the rightabout and marcaea
back 10 Logrono without having seen single
Carlist soldier. This AFFAIR - Laserna's debut as
COMMANDMENTS Chief. and 1t certainly does not lead
Carlos.
A GRAND MARCH.
rapid msrcSes en a No 81 sooner did Dorpe
garay perceive that Laserna had retired than he
wheeled MS army and started back 80 Biurrnn.
nave SAID That he started for Estea on the morn
ing OF the goth. The distance Is ut least twenty
one miles as any one may satisfy himself BY
measuring II on the map, in addition TO which he
had marched out a mile and half on the road to
Los ARGOS: making IN all twenty-five and half
he turned around O AND started l'' BACK over
the same road, first sending orders to
halted until he reached Blurrun some troops
having thus made Iorts-nye miles IN 1T
the Carlist troops wipe out the mistakes OF their
generals last they are made, and the rapidlty
OF their movements 10 such US to double their
strength.
WHAT x0RIoNES DID.
In the meantime Moriones mad taken advantage
OF the absence OF the Carists to occupy the posi-
tons abandoned by them, selling. of course, Bur
rum which commands the road 70 Puerto, as well
s on to aes oos
to nave hurried himself. however. and spent most
OF the day OF the 10th IN receiving an ovation
from people living on the road who counted the
carts. AMI who have every reason 70 believe told
the truth, that he only passed one hundred and
hlty OF the thousand that had been collected
at Taialla and these were very Agntiy laden In
suates Certainly aa very slender relief for city
VI thirty thousand inhabitants, like Pampeluna
AFTER OPERATIONS.
ana PROMISED plentiful supply OF provisions he
started back on the morning or the 2lst, expect
had stopped at a little wayside inn called the
Venta de las Campanas, a short distance IRON the
lug between Pampeluna and TafaIla. Biurrun
Is situated 900 yards east OF the latter exactly FAC
OF low, woody mountain, which overooks IT,
ana immediately behind II, or on the side next to
Pampeluna, isa low, sharp ridge, which runs d.
rectiy across the road aud unlteS with the noun
talns on the other side.
Instead OF occupying the village OF Biurrun
Moriones ought to have deployed his trooDs along
the top OF this ridge, which is q natural breast
work and which commands al the roads leading
ever. that the republicans in this war always oc-
cgpy and Try to hold villages; whereas the Carlsts,
when defending town, always choose some sd-
vantageouS position near IT,
AORIONEs' PLACE OF REST.
The vents de las Campaha, where Moriones
next Pampeluna. A part OF the convoy was stin
passing when suddenly came the noise firing and
shouting and all the other sounds OF battle borne
down from Biurrun on the still morning air. A
moment after an orderly came gaiiopfng down
the road with the news that the Carlists were At
"But it is not possible exclaimed Moriones;
there are ne Cariists there" He himself had
been over tho ground the day before nearly to
Puente, and he had satisfied himself that thero
the Carists were there, nevertheless. OF which
fact be was soon convinced by seeing his own
troops streaming over the ridge In q dlsorderiy
mass. some without heir arms. which they had
thrown away in their hurried night.
The attack had been made by the same troops
that had marched to Esteiia ana back in twenty
four hours, and who had just arrived Enraged at
what they considered useless march--at being
obliged to abandon the position OF Biurrun, pur-
Pad BEEN SHOUTING Openly snd they
now demanded TO be led TO the attack They were
all Navarrese, ana we're. BESIDES mad with hunger
and fatigue. and led ny General Pirula. They
looking yiurrun. and came sweeping down
the most diabocai yeils. The republicans
were completely taken by surprise, and ned IN
near losing battery OF artillery that had been
planted here TO cover the Puente road. and 1T was
81 Inc ofcers wno with their own Rands attached
the horses and helped to drag or the pieces, that
the battery was saved But they ost here sshsy
N~ANA~N ~->N
wounded.
THE MEN WHO FOUGHT.
This attack WAS make by three battaiiOns OF
Navarrese. about 1000 men, and the Carlists main
tain that the village was defended BY 5000 repub
as the place is the key OF the position, command.
ing as 1t does, the road TO Puente, the only road
by which the Carsts could come, 1t should have
it was not BE that as 1t may, the republicans fed
before very inferior force IN point OF numbers.
MORIoNEs' RETREAr.
General M0rkOneS was completely taken DIV sur
prise, ana, not knowing what mad become OF La
be cut or decided TO retire before 1t was TOO late.
This he Immediately did, followed Dy the Carlsrs,
who Kept up continual attack upon mis- rear
guard and occupied the positions as fast as he
abandoned them. BY the evening Of the ed no
had reached Barossum and Pueyo, near Tsialla,
where ne made halt before finally retiring into
Tafalla. 4
THE RRsULTa
As TO the results OF the AFFAIR, 1t will be seen that
neither party has much to boast OF except mis-.
takes.
me Carnsts took Biurrun at the point OF the
over the republican troops but then in doing this
they only reconquered their own position which
sent through $50 carloads OF provisions TO Pampe.
luna, but tnis was only small fraction 0! what no
should have sent, and It cost MIN nearly three
very DEAR Besides this he had to retreat, with q
half victorious and insoent enemy at his heels.
effect on his raw haf disciplined troops. But
then, again, although the Carists were victorious
at Burrun, their attack upon that place at that
time was q mistake. II was not Biurrun. but
Pueyo, they should have taken. Pneyo Is village
situated on the summit OF range OF hills over
which passes the road rom Tafaila to Pampeluna,
and a0out Jour miles from the former place. II Is
very strong position, and was almost entirely
unprotected on the 2lst. Had this place been
seized Moriones' retreat would have been chr
Oh, and he would have been placed In very awk-
ward position, indeed. Indeed, General Dorre.
garay thought OF this plan, but little too late
and actually sent a detachment, under Perulla, to
seize II. But as 1t had been already reinforced
by Moriones Perulla retired, after little skir-
mlshlng.
N WHO rs TO BLAME?
As to the graver mistakes committed by both
sides, they require no comment. 10 leave Estella
completely uncovered was certainly bad enough,
but that It seems, was caused by mis-
carnage OF orders. But Laserna's conduct
in not taking advantage OF such q mistake - IN
expcable, except on the suppositlon OF pure inn
becility. or else his Jealousy OF Moriones and Q
desire to get him into position from which he
could not extricate himself. This latter theory is
the one exulttngly maintained by the Carists. In