New national era. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1870-1874, 1873-09-04
Netaphysic. versus Com ON
sense.


into the character of an adversary what is
called the s. Common Sense" school.
Matter has been brought forward to prove
the existence Of mind, and rice rersd. Meta
physical truths have been learnedly
demolished by physical ammunition. and
neither party are yet convinced of their
error, nor acknowledge their defeat.
The province Of Philosophy and the
domain Of Common Sense are essentially dis
tinct, although the one borders upon the
other. Common Sense is indignant that
Philosophy should tell it that it does not see
nor feel visible objects when it looks at or
| touches them. With DIR. johnson it kicks
| the stone, and thus refutes the theory.
| Philosophy in turn feels unnecessary con-
tempt for its opponent, because il hugs such
delusion.
! Philosophy, We understand to treat OF
thought in the abstract, and of matter grant
/ ing that it eXists) in contradistinction from
the operations of the mind. Now, it is as
absurd to expect that the abstruse specula-
tons of Philosophy on these subjects should
be clearly understood by the vulgar, who do
not understand even the phraseology of
| Philosophy, rs to expect them to understand
at once the language, much less assent to
! the conclusions of abstract mathematics.
Christianity, strangely enough, has helped
to complicate Metaphysical questions, since
| it has made nearly every student Of Philoso-
ply a partizan. Most Of them talk like
I -. I IL.
do they strive TO make out their own cases.
The schoolmen are VIGOROUSLY partizans.
| Berkley brought forward his theory Of mind
| only and ideas in mind, to strengthen Chris
tianity against skepticism. Hume, in the
interests of infdelity, carried the theory a
step further, and annihilated mind, at which
Theology stood aghast. Mill attacks Ham,
| ilton, il would seem, in the interest Of
materialism but Mansel, DR.. McCosh and
others rush to the defence of the great
Scottish scholar az if the defence of Ham
ilton's philosophy and christianity were
identical.
1t is really of little moment whether in
regard to perception We agree with Berkeley,
Reid, Brown; "the sensations and percep-
tons" Of Hamilton "the sensations and
possibilities of sensation" of Mill. Most
Of them appear to agree in this, that when
we look at the table, we see an object which
has extension and color, which are contained
in something we call substance or matter,
underlying these attributes. What this mat
ter is, they do not profess to know. At this
point Berkley's theory comes in, which has
been so absurdly argued against. He merely
declined to acknowledge the existence of
this underlying substance, which neither he
nor the other Philosophers could see. Yet
he believed in the existence Of spirit, which
develops his theological, if not his logical,
bias. Berkeley takes pains to say that he
believes in matter as the vulgar think they
do, but not as the Philosophers do. Now,
the data from which we derive our notions
OF perception must be equally good to-day,
as they were a century ago. A man in pos
session of his bodily health, and normal
mental faculties, must be as able now to
prove this question as at any time. To do
this, we must, in imagination, put ourselves
back to our childhood, and seek to discover
how we became sensible of the existence OF
external objects. We have analogous in
stances in the cases of blind persons restored
to sight We find then, that sight, touch,
and hearing came in to assist us in the COM
prehension of something exterior and
distinct from ourselves. At first, all exter-
nal objects are the same as if one, but by
development Of the senses, the association
of ideas, and the exercise of the judgment,
we learn to discriminate between them.
After We are convinced by our senses that
these appearances or objects are real things,
distinct from ourselves, after We are con-
scious, however feeble that consciousness,
that minds which seem to act as ours, are as
real as they, Common Sense, it seems to us,
has reached her limit; here stops her in yest-
CATION, and Metaphysics, here, has an
opportunity to begin her research.
Philosophy takes notice not only of what
we appear to see, but also throwing out all
eXtraneous and prejudiced ideas, what we
do not appear 10 see. 1t looks deeper into
| that which we call substance than the vulgar,
and just as the artist observes more in the
landscape; the surgeon more in the human
figure than the common man perceiyes, so
does it see more clearly the distinction
between extension, color, hardness, figure,
| and the substance in which they all inhere.
Since mind can only be conversant of
mind, and matter Of matter, it follows
that we do only infer the reality of these
representations from the convictions of our
senses, which. since they differ to wide
degree among people, we are not sure, at
any time, that the house, tree, or object
toward which our gaze is directed, presents
the same appearance to another person.
What this substance or matter il which
underlies every thing, even the Ego in dis
tinction from the Non-Ego. Philosophers
themselves do not pretend to know, nor is it
essential that they should know precisely
what it ia before they attempt TO reason
about it. They know that it exists just as
the Mathematician knows that number and
quantity exists; and since in reasoning only
starting point is required, while the chain Of
reasoning may be infinite, we observe that
Common Sense only deals with what il sees
Metaphysics speculates on mind whose
bounds are infinite, and whose routes are
innCmerable.