The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1873-09-27


Looking at its causes calmly and scrutinizing
them closely we see Capitalization in business
as in government. There is the same unnatu-
raj preponderance of the one-man rule in the
street as in the Executive chamber. One man
locked mp greenbacks two years ago and almost
created financial panic. One man has it in
his power by the aid of capital and courage to
check the business of the country at almost
any time. This one-man power in Wall
street. this Cesarism in finance, Is disease
of which Vanderbilt, Scott Garrett and others
arc the types It is q common thing in the
street and indeed all over the country to speak
of these men as railway giants-to call them
magnates and kings We never hear nova
days of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, but
| of Carrots road" and the two Centrals. the
Pennsylvania and the New York, are spoken
of with base familiarity as if they were the
private property and were intended merely for
the personal use of ''Tom Scott" and ''the
Commodore" The public interest in the
roads is overlooked or ignored and the stocks
are used as dice for speculative gamblers
The carrying trade and the money market are
both subject to the caprices of these powerful
adventurous. The members of the Stock Ex-
change are mere puppets in their hands
marionettes which dance according to the
pleasure of the men who pull the strings.
Their power is great beyond all precedent too
great for healthy business conditions. Rumors
of Commodore Vanderbilts sickness are often
employed as a method of depressing stocks,
and his death, Wall street believes, would
cause rates to fall twenty per cent The one
man power is supreme in the money market,
and C@sarism in finance as in government
menaces the existence of the Republic.
Stocks are as necessary to our social and
business life as the arteries Of the body to it's
healthful condition. They are the blood of
the body polite and are first to show symp-
toms of disease in business or finance. Never
were the unhealthy conditions more clearly
demonstrated than during what we may now
call the recent panics~ Though the Stock Elk
change was closed and there Were no genuine
transactions in stocks we had daily quotations
at depressed rates. Rumors of all kinds were
put in circulation, not only to depress railroad
and other shares, but to make the downfall of
the buchu bankers an irretrievable disaster
for the whole country. One day we were told
that the national banks were to suspend cur
rency payments, not as matter of extreme
necessity and bankruptcy, but as wise policy
dictated by precaution. The next day Secre-
tary Richardson was reported as favorable to
this plan. Even boy, with no clearer in
sight into business than that afforded by
commercial college, could see that this was
national ruin. The little Caesars without
money or stocks were emulating the example
of the big Ones using for the purpose the only
means at their commando capital Of lies
and hoping to turn an honest penny out of
universal catastrophe The Stock Exchange
was closed against them, and 3d. as they could
not make stocks dance up and down, they
sought to make money out of the sufferings of
the people by destroying the national credit.
Again, nothing more clearly shows the
Cmsarism in finance which now prevails than
a comparison of this panic with the crises of
former years. The panic of 1887 was due to
overtrading and exorbitant rates for money.
From one to one and half per cent per
month were then the ruling rates among the
business classes. At that time money was
actually scarce and the country was far from
being prosperous. Now the conditions are
reversed. The country is extremely prosper
GUS and the currency is inflated. Only the
spectators were paying exorbitant rates for
money, and only the spectators failed.
Caesar simply outdid himself, and it required
no Brutus to STAY him. In 1857 the panic came
because extravagant prices had ruled for some
years and revolution was an absolute neces-
sity This time only the spectators fell, be-
cause the country was prosperous and Cesar
ism in finance had failed seriously to affect it.
The crops are good, money is plenty, and the
national credit is higher than at any time since
the war. The sufferings of other years were not
to be anticipated, and, in spite of almost super
human efforts to precipitate like evils, every
attempt 80 far has failed, and the financial
panic of 1873 will only be known as the
episode of disaster to reckless spectators.
Another evidence of the rapid growth of
C@sarism in finance were the relations, real
or supposed of upstart banking houses with
the government. Jay Cooke & Co. were the
pets of Secretary Chase, and were, in reality,
started in business by the government.
Henry Clews & Co., another upstart house,
sustained by punery and patronage, were, at
the time of their failure, the financial agents of
the government in London. And now we
have report from Washington. which we trust
is unfounded, that the unbroken part of the
broken house of Jay Cooke & Co. is to take
the place Of Clews, Habicht Il Co. as the London
agents of the United States. This would be o
remarkable bit of favoritism, fraught with dan
ger far beyond the security of the money that
would be entrusted to Jay Cooke, McCulloch q
Co. Il is the latest and the worst exhibition
of Cesarism in finance, and it cannot be over