New Orleans Republican., 1873-08-10

MY engineer officer. Lieutenant MoAtcufe.oi
Virginia, and lie was ordered back. then
! placed my division Under cover OF some
woods and hills. and TeconnoNered
in person far enough 10 satisfy
myself that I could march direct from the
| point where was 70 the position General
| Lee wished me TO occupy. without oelng
seen by tine enemy. and then returning, sat
ou my horse, looking at the federal troops
| as they came in, hour alter hour, drom the
! direction of Emmetsburs. A. las. came the
| order to move. and Major johnson. OF Gen
| eral Lees staff, appeared 20 conduct the
| head OF column, as lie. so I understood had
! made the reconnaissance. and he and vent
| ahead of the command. wnen suddenly we
arrived on the top Of a hill. giving fair view
| OF the enfsnv on the Roundt"p and to -he
| leit, and of course my troops could De seen
by the opposite side and their number. es-
timated if they were allowed TO proceed.
| l sent back and halted the column. and
| Major johnson and myself rode around II
the vicinity, to find if there was any way
we could proceed without being seen, au'
we could find none. Ireturned and met
| General Longstree., who asked what was
| the matter / turned and rode with him to
| the top Of the hill. and pon.ed out how
plainly the enemy could watch our move
ments if we went on. He said. Tnis won't
do" then told him that l had recon
noitred from the position we halted at IN
| the morning and found the way was prac-
| ticable and the movement could be made
from there without our being seen by the
| enemy. He then said, We viii have to
| countermarch,' and l asserting, he gave
| the order at once and the movement COM
menced. General Hoods division having
followed me closely, the head Of his column
and the head of mine were tapped with each
| other, and the counteImarch was thus
| made more difficult. which coming TO the
knowledge OF General Lcngstreet, ne rode
up and proposed that Hood should head
the movement. ! requested that as l had
started in the lead be allowed to continue
there, which was assented 70. and finally
all the troops were marching i'll proper or
der. out of sight Of the enemy. towards the
position 70 be occupied. This delay in the
reconnaissance, and a faulty reconnaissance
making change Of route necessary N Or
der TO carry ou. General Lees order. were
the reasons why we were so long getting
into position. 60 SO much into detail in
order TO show that General Longstreet was
not to blame for not attacking sooner than
he did on the second day Of July-that
is, after nv division mad arrived on
the ground where General Eee was, which
| think was between and 8 4. N. or ear
her.
And now az 10 the probability OF Long
stree. having been ordered 20 attack at
daylight on the second.
On the thirtietL OF June I had been di-
cected to have my division il readiness TO
follow General Ewe!l's corps, marching 2
toward Gettysburg. which. it was init
mated, would have passed by ten o'clock
the next day, the first of July. My division
was accordingly marched from its camp and
lined along the road in the order OF march
BY eight o'clock On the frs, Of July. When
the troops of Eweli's corps Il, was John
sons division in charge Of Ewells trains.
which were coming from Carlisle By the
road west of the moun,ains'. had passed
the head Of my column. l asked General
Longstreet's staff officer. Major Fairfax. if
nv division should follow. He went of TO
inauire, and returned with orders ior ne to
wait until Ewell's wagon train had passed,
which did not happen until after P. NJ.
I The train was calculated to be fourteen
miles long. When l took up the line Of
march and continued marching until / ar
rived within three miles .of Gettysburg,
where ny command was camped along a
creek, this was far into the night. Ny divi-
sion was leading Longst:ee:'s corps, and. Of
course. the other divisions came up later. /
saw Hoods division :he next morning. and
understood that Picket. had been detached
TO guard the rear and then 10 take charge
of the prisoners captured o.: the first.
While on the march and about ten O'Clock
at night. met General Lonsstreet and
some of his staff coming from the direction
Of Gettysburg. and Lad few moments
conversation with him. He said nothing
of having received an order &c attack at
daylight the next morning; and here
will remark that until General Pendleton
, mentioned it, about two years ago. when ne
, was on lecturing tour. after the death OF
General Lee, never heard !ntimateG even.
, that any such order had ever been given.
General Lee may lave given such an order
before he knew where Longst-eet's corps
was, but on hearing afterward shat it had
not arrived to the front. bad decided on
another plan and time OF attack, which
change Of orders was not communicated
to General Pendleton. Il would have been
a strange order. under the circumstances.
directing Longstreet's corps. which had
been marching the greater part OF the
night and had camped at least three miles
from Gettysburg. to assault the enemy s
position beyond Gettysburg at daylight the
next morning, when at the tine Ewei.'s
and Hills corps were both 20 :he from: N
advance Of Longstreet and We're facing the
enemy. had been engaged with him. had
been successful e their contest
and were flush with ;hei: victory.
whose commanding officers. and :he :ank
!. | and file even. knew the ground the eE-
envy occupied from persona. observation.
and were in position 70 assau.. at a
moments notice. Tha, under these cir
!. instances. as ! have said, Genera! Lee
, should order Longstcest 20 bring forward
hi. corps in the night and assault; over
ground abou. which he. Longstreet. knew
: nothing and his subo;dinates no more. and