The New York herald., 1873-12-20
THE COPPERMAN CASE.
Stay OF Proceedings Gra ntcd Upon q
Writ Of Error-The Case to Go to the
Supreme Court, General Term-lm-
portant Optnion by Judge EancMer.

Writ OF Error-The Case to Go to the
Supreme Court, General Term-lm-
portant Opinion by Judge Fancher.
The case OF Hyman Copperman, who was tried in
the Court OF General Sessions on the charge OF re.
ceiving stolen goods and found guilty, elected at
the time, from the peculiar circumstances sur.
rounding it, good deal OF attention. Ex.Mayor
A. Oakey Hall and Mr.. William T. Howe, the counsel
for the accused having confidence in the legal
points raised in his defence, moved for a stay OF
proceedings upon writ OF error. This motion was
argued at length before Judge Fancher at Supreme
Court Chambers, Mr.. RUSSELL Assistant District
Attorney, appearing in opposition. Judge Fan
cher gave his decision yesterday in the case
granting the stay. His opinion setting forth his
decision embraces, as Will be seen, q review Of
some interesting legal questi0ns:-
OPINION OF JUDGE FANCHER.
The prisoner was convicted at the General Ses-
verdict OF guilty was accompanied with recon-
mendat0n to mercy. The prisoner is a pawn
and d had s Of to the a ossn the
The thief who stole the goods was the chief wit
ness. He testified that he sold them TO the pris-
the other hand testified that the goods were
pawned and not sold to him. The thief said he had
sold the prisoner goods before. He was asked as
to the goods in question: whether he sold them or
pawned them, and answered 'sold them.' lie
stated that year before he went to the prisoner
them. The District Attorney at this point
Of tns Yer wness he had tassG
in answer to several questions the District Atior
ney asked this question SO. What was SAID be-
rt ntervew2 This was objected to by the prs
oner's counsel, allowed by the Court and the pris
oner excepted 1t is then stated IN the bill or eX-
ceptions as iolows:-'lt is agreed that all which
was said between the accused and the witness as
to transactions prior to the one in the indictment
comes in under the exception" The witness was
thereupon interrogated, and answered as to the
conversations between him and the accused touch
ing former transactions. They were isolated trans
actions. None OF them related to that respecting
which the Indictment was found, nor did they
| tween the accused and the thief. The evidence
| thus given must have had much
INFLUENCE CPoN THE JURY,
| ana the question raised upon the bin OF exccp-
tions is, Was it competent The statute ts r. s.,
| 9th ed, p 959, Sec 7Sj reads:-"Every person who
shall buy OF receive in any manner, upon any con-
slderation, any personal property of any value
whatsoever, that shall have been elonlously taken
away or stolen from any other, knowing the same
10 have been stolen, shan, upon conviction, be
punished" &C. The essence OF the crime is the
specified in the Indictment had been felonously
taken or stolen-whether evidence tending to
show mis- knowledge of other thets be admissible,
as competent 10 prove the crime charged, is a dis
puted question A majority OF the Court in People
vs.. Rando e Park, Cr. ss9 held such evidence
admissible. There was dissenting opinion by
one OF the Judges; and, as appears by note
to the report OF the case, the Judge who
he the th pn0n
In McNin's case Il City Hall Recorder, p. s. 1t
was held that evidence In such case that the
prisoner had purchased other goods OF the thief
not cont aimed In the indictment is improper, but
that a general understanding between them to
vs. Oddly 6 Cox 6. G., 2lo see GREEN. on ef'. EV,
nctc. red ed. p IL, upon charge OF eloniously
receiving stolen goods, it was held tina: the pos
session Of other g olen goods not connected with
the immediate charge was not admissible In
PROOF OF GUILTY KNOWLEDGE,
as IL could not lead to any such conclusion but, on
the Contrary, quite consistent with the SuDDO-
sltion that on the former occasions the goods had
been stolen by the prisoner himself. The principal
iuaton, was the guilty knowledge of the
accused respecting the goods mentioned
goods received previously were offered to be
that they bore upon the question Of the intention
OF the prisoner as TO the goods covered by the In
aiesmen II has been said IN respec. & to such col
down. rex VS.. Salisbury Russ. on Grimes, 776
third ed: Grccnl Ev sec. 49, It would seem
tnat Il the previous conversations show an under
standing with the thief or knowledge OF his crime
tley are admissible; but II they are in substance
consistent with the supposition that the person
receiving the goods was not made acquainted with
and said nothing TO indicate a knowledge OF the
ielonious taking or theft OF them, he Is not, by
inconscquential inference merely, to be held guilty
OF the knowledge OF the unlawful taking or theft.
Conversations PRIOR 70 the act charged cannot be
municated his own CRIME or that the
receiver admitted his knowledge OF the
same. II the conversations come up 10 that grade
they are competent Us Peters. 800; Rosco's
Grim. Ev., S7s; Grcen. Ev., sec. 15 but II they
fall short Of that standard they should not be
allowed to perplex or influence the jury. In this
case some OF the converse tions admitted under
the prisoners objection and exception were con.
sistent with the prisoners integrity. For exam
pie, on one occasion he said s.you come back
again soon.n This may have been honestly re.
marked, with a view OF ascer.a;ning whether
THE GOODS = ERE HONESTLY ACQUIRED.
on another OCCASION when the witness was asked
II certain 'class OF goodsr could be obtained for
the accused, 1t would seem that the intention was
to have purchased some goods OF a particular
Kind IL would naturally be supposed he intended
TO have such goods purchased, and not stolen. IL
Is a violent inference to suppose the accused in
tended to have the goods stolen. A selection OF
color In silks would not probably be indicated by
one who intended they should be stolen. | am not
sure that the prisoner was not prejudiccd by the
doubtful testimony thus given at the trial, and
think he should have stay OF proceedings until
the question can be examined and decided by the
General Term or this Court so ordered.