Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1873-03-21
THE TIPPING LAW.
Protest OF Hon. r. Lindsey.
Mr.. Lindslev YESTERDAY presented the fol-

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owing to the House of Representatives
MIR. SPEAKER-The undersigned desires
to have entered on the journal Of the House
this, his protest, and reasons for voting
against the passage of Senate bill 240,
entitled "An Act to remedy the evils result
ing from the sale of intoxicating liquors in
the State Of Tennessee"
In the passage of the bill, the mandatory
requirements of the Constitution were
plainly violated House bill 304, ENTITLED
San Actto amend the Tipping Laws" was
rejected on its final reading in the House,
for want of a constitutional majority, and
motion entered to reconsider. On subse-
quent day the motion was called up, and
prevailed. Thereupon the gentleman from
Wilson (Mr. Preston) offered, as q bill in
lieu, Senate bill 240. The House then
adopted Senate bill 240, in lieu of House
bill 304, and passed the same on its third
and last reading. This Senate bill $40, had
not been read on any previous day In the
House. The provisions of the Senate bill
are different, in nearly all Of Its particulars,
from the House bill. This was In viola
ton Of the Constitution.
Art. 2, sec. II of the constitution pro-
vides that bills may originate in either
House, but may be amended, altered, or re-
jected by the other. Neither the title nor
enactiDg clause of House bill 304, nor any
of the special provisions of the House bill,
were retained in the Senate bill, 90 that 1t
cannot properly be called an amendment to
or alteration of the House bill.
Again: Art. 2, sec. Is, provides that ev-
cry bill shall be read once on three differ
ent days, and be passed each time in the
House where 1t originated before trans
mission to the other. No bill shall
become a law until it shall have
been read and passed on three different days
in each House, and shall have received"
etc. Senate bill 240 was never read but
once in the House. Under my oath, as a
member of this House, l am bound to sup
port the Constitution of the State. know
of no way to test the 'constitutionality of
the act but by the Constitution itself, and
the decisions of the courts. Ipropose to be
governed in my action as a legislator by
the requirements of the one, and the decis-
ions of the other. The Supreme Court of
Tennessee, case of Ferguson vs.. The
Miner3' and Manufacturers Bank, 3
Sneed, 626, earnestly condemns such
a practice by the Legislature, and
throws out strong intimation that an act
so passed in case made out, will be de-
clared unconstitutional. Say the Court:
GA more plausible constitutional objection,
to say the least of it, might be made to this
cnarter, if the fact be assumed, that the
section containing it was offered and adopt
ed as an amendment on the third reading
of the bill, grounded on art. II, sec. IS of
the Constitution. It is GER
tain that conformity to the Constitution in
this respect would tend to prevent such an
occurrence as that presented in the
argument. 1t is said that it is not unfre-
quently the case, and that the fact was so
in this instance, that provisions entirely dis
tinct from those in bill will be thrown in
under the name of amendments, on the
third and last reading, and sent to the
House, where the bill originated, for con-
currence, when q favorable action will
make it, as well as the original bill, the law
Of the land. Now, this has the appear
ance, at least, Of an evasion of the consti-
tuition. 1t Is certainly very
unsafe and improvident mode of legislation
and not to be favored. How this question
should be brought up, and what would be
the decision upon it, Is left for case in
which it may arise" In this case the
Journal of the House was used as evidence.
And equally in point is the following: "The
rule respecting three several readings on
different days, is specific and capable of
being precisely complied with, and we do
not see how, even under the rules applied
to statutes, it can be regarded as directory
merely, provided it has purpose beyond
the mere regular and orderly transaction of
business. That it has such a purpose, that
it is designed to prevent hasty and improvi-
dent lie 4islation, and is therefore not mere
rule of order, but one of protection for the
public and to the citizens at large, is very
clear, and Independent of the question
whether definite constitutional principles
can be dispensed with in any case on the
ground of their being merely directory, we
can not see how this can be treated as any
thing but mandatory" People VS.. Camp
bell' GiIm, 466; McCollogh vs.. State, IL
Ind 424; both cited and approved by Mr..
Cooley in his able and brilliant work on
Constitutional Limitations.
Taking the Constitution as my guide, l
regard the supreme will of the people, SIS
therein expressed, paramount to that of
their representatives., expressed in any law.
PHILIP LINDSEY.