Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1873-12-04
WHAT THE NAVY CAN DO.

all arc dumped iudscrmiuatcly into pit Of
quicklimc.
WHAT THE NAVY CAN DO.
TIE VIEWS or ADMIRAL PORTER IN REGARD
TO TIE EXPECTED WAR;
In the course of a conversation, the other
dav, Admiral Porter said that he considered
that the capture Of the Nirginius was an Gag
gravated case of the Trent" with the addition
that in this instance the crew were taken
ashore and put to death. The disposition Of
the Virginius made after her capture was not
in accordance with the law governing such
cases. Admitting that her errand was illegal,
still the vessel should have been regularly
brought before a properly organized prize
court, tried, and condemned. 1fhe had been
a young officer, and at the time in those wa
tiers, he would have taken the responsibility Of
running his vessel into Santiago de Cuba, re-
taking the Virginius, and if necessary bonn.
harding the town, or exchanging the compli-
ments of the occasion with the Tornado.
When the matter has gone so far as this it is
necessary to follow the example ofa mate who,
when he wants to whip one of his crew, first
goes below and puts on the brass knucklcs
1t is now, therefore, incumbent on our gov
ernment to put the navy, which has been so
much neglected by Congress, in as combatve
a condition as possible, to meet such emergen-
cies as may arise.
IN CASE or IIOSTII.IT1Es
one of the first things to be done is to estab.
lish a rendezvous on ourSouthern coast, within
as convenient distance of Cuba as possible. If
the operations we're to be exclusively naval
/ he presumed that Key West would be a suit
able initial point hut if, as would be proba-
/ ble land forces would cooperate, some more
! accessible point Of concentration on the naln-
! land would be necessary, as either Mobile or
New Orleans the latter being perhaps the
better of the two Itwoud then be necessary
to decide upon a line of cooperative action.
! Ifa sailor was to determine where to land he
would steer for the nearest point, but that
would not always answer if a land force was to
! be employed. The transports carrying the
troops possess no defensive qualities and would
be compelled to lay at safe distance while
the mcn.oi.war were opening the way to de-.
barkation. But this mode Of attack would
be extremely hazardous and probably atten-
ded with the sacrifice OLA great loss of life
and material. 1t would be more desirable to
dcbark
THE LAND FORCE
at some point conveniently accessible to the
objective point Of the expedition. by this
mode landing of all the supplies and muni-
! tions of war necessary to IL prosecution of the
campaign could he simultaneously effected
, with the landing of the troops. The command
ers of the land and naval forces having then
agreed upon plan of operations, the COM
bincd movement could be made by simuta'
ncous attack from the sea and land. In the
opinion of the admiral thirty thousand men
could march from Havana to Santiago de
! Cuba, the whole length Of the island, while the
ships could blockade the whole coast line.
! He did not think, in the present disordered
condition ofdomestic affairs, that Spain would
be able to concentrate any considerable mum,
Der of vessels in American waters. In addl'
ton to the intcrnccine conflict, her
VALUABLE ORIENTAL POSSESSIONS,
the PHILIPPINE Islands, principally, would be
at the mercy Of our Asiatic fleet. In order to
protect herself i'll that quarter she would be
compelled to divert Il number of her best YES
Scls from participating in any operations on
this side. Remembering the formidable fleet
already possessed by the Carlists, the bulk Of
the Spanish navy, Of which so much has been
said, would be compelled to be kept at home,
thus being entirely useless in the American
conflict. Notwithstanding so much has been
said about the odds against us, We can con-
ccntrate the entire weight of our navy, trust
ng to torpedo boats and Notifications for har-
Dor defence at home. 1t is scarcely possible,
however, that Spain would uncover Cuba by
dctaching the bulk Of her protecting squadron,
as would be necessary to make any show III
what at the best would be doubtful expert
nlcnt against any of the principal ports Of the
United States Our perfect system of rail
ways which would enable us to concentrate
at amy point Of
OUR EXTENDED COAST,
puts it in our power to successfully defend any
point which might he assaicd Therefore, in
the opinion ofthc admiral, the danger Of any
serious demonstration upon any important
part Of our coast is very slight. Considering
then, the theatre Of operations as likely to be
confined to the Island of Cuba and the adja-
cent waters in event Of war, his opinion was
that the conflict, after it once commenced,
would be short, sharp and decisive. Another
feature in the struggle is the large disafitctcd
element among the native population of Cuba.
Thcincn<ity of the disaiitclion may be judged
of from the contest which they have so long
wagcd against all the power which the ruling
authorities have been able to bring to bear.
This element, it is to be presumed, will actively
Sympathize with the American forces.