The Van Buren press., 1873-06-17
NO. 8
NAPOLEON.
An Ex-Empercr's Story Of His Own
xisfortunes

There has just been published in Paris
a book of 270 pages, pretentiously snti
tied "Guvres Posthnmss, Autographs
Inedits de Napoleon HI. en- Exile" Of
which 81 pages are real, the rest padding.
These pages give the emperor's own &C.
count of the war down to the surrender
Of Sedan The manuscript frsm which
this is printed 10 described as written by
the hand of the emperor. II was origin
ally joined 10 the treatise entitled "Lss
Forces Mlitaires de IL France" which
was published year ago, in view Of the
nav army law then under discussion in
assembly, aud partly in answer TO the
declaration Of N. Thisrs that the impsr;-
al regime had neglected the army, ald
had not known how to organize or en-
ploy the military resources OF France; bus
the emperor concluded not to publish 1t
At that time and hence the present issue
with flourish OF trumpets and st twenty
francs copy.
The emperor's journal begins BY justi-
flying the disposition Of the different csrps
at the opening Of the war. An invading
army taking the offensive against Ger.
many must, writes Napoleon, either ad.
vance on the left against Mayence, or to
tho right, crossing the Rhine and enter
ing Baden Metz and Strasburg are
clearly the principal points of cencsntra
tion, whence the respective corps should
be able to unite, either for passage OF
tbe Rhinc or a passage toward the north.
An advance from Strasburg would have
added to tae difficulties Of the Rhine. the
dehIes of the Black Forest, or elss The
siege OF Bastata, which did not appear o
favorable point Moreover eoncentra-
| tisn ia Alsacs had the advantage OF per-
hitting France to unite seven corps d
armoe at the proper moment, without
disclosing his projects to the enemy. 1t
10 needless TO eater into any discussion
Of this point. 1t is concladed with .
reservation which, indicating the insffl-
cheney OF the army, and the cmperor's
ignorance OF the fact, accounts for all
that followed.
But, in order that it (the ecsncenlra!ion)
should take place there, it was necessary
for all the corps to be equally ready to
begin the eampaien. Since an army isa
giant body the limbs Of vhish should
mutually support each other, and act to-
gether; il even one part only should fail,
the whole will be para!yzsd, and 1t will
bo no longsr possible TO execute the ger.
eral plan. Thus it was indispensable not
only that the troops concentrated At Metz
should be ready TO move, but that the
corps mustered AT Bciort should havo
/ nA OF nolA Tn, Siy nut "a
Of Marshal McMahon, and that Marshal
! Cunrobert's corps de reserve should have
replaced in Lorraine the troops about TO
enter Germany Unfortunately, the
hopes formed could net be realized
The reason for this is very simple.
The emperor had estimated that he could
bring 3S5 900 into the field against the
430. 600 mustered by north Germany and
the southern states. This proved deln-
sive. When lie arrived at Netz, July 20.
there were only 100000 msn in tho field,
and there were many Of them compare
lively unequipped. Tho army Of the Mo.
zellc--220, 900 on papcr--mustered only
| 10000 Marshal McMahon had but 40.
900 ont Of l07 900 credited TO his com
mand Gen. Douay's Belfort corps was
incomplete Canrobcrl's corps was not
up to the standard number The rsa!
strength of France was lG5, 600 less than
the estimated strength.
Tho passage Of thc Rhine WAS under
these conditions abandoned, but yielding
under the clamor for gloiro aud some
thing to maze n show on the bulletins,
the emperor advanced on the Sarre, where
a brief advantage was won IN tho csptufe
Of Saarbruck by Frossard's corps. The
capture enabled Frossard to prevent the
/ Prussians. now concentrating at Treves,
from making use Of the railway as a
means OF transport cast, and assured the
passage OF the river. The army waited
hero two golden days, waiting for that
which should have been ready-for the
formation of the army Of Alsace by
junction With the seventh corps, and for
the reserve corps to arrive at Metz. Au
| gust 4th, the second day after tho furry
st Saarbruck, came the news Of Douays
defeat at Wissomborrg Tho emperor
Immediately ordered ths army to concsn-
trate at Metz, and placed Bszins in com.
mand Of the three corps on the Sarre.
This is Nspoleon's account of the
opening Of the campaign Had McMa-
hon had his I07. 600 instead OF his 40
900 at Wosrtli the fortunes OF the war
might have been even then reversed but
after Wosnh the struggle was against
terrible odds. The emperor still found
himself at the head Of 10000 men at
Metz, but it was 10000 opposed to
three armies, either Of which outnumber-
ed his
1t is miDstructiyc to follow the nara
tive from disaster 10 disaster until Sedan
swampcd imperial France aud its army
together. The story OF the surrender is
told at length, the emperor being at great
pains to explain how little part he had
in that transaction Elsewhere the mo
moir is temperate in its tone, manly and
dignifed. Here, by way OF concluding
tableau, the ex.imperial author INDUCES
in little more pathos and dramatic dis
position of the scenery than is necessary
to historical statement, or even advisa'
BILE except in Bonapartc
Ig- An old friend Of the late chief
Justice tells ne an anecdote, showing Mr..
. CAase's cleverness at repartee. While on
a visit to the Southern states. after the
tr.. l,,nnA N a