Liberal Republican. [volume] (Dallas, Or.) 1872-1???, 1873-04-19

property. The distinction between
the liability of the husband for the con-
tracts of the wife before merriage, and
for her torts during marriage, asa for
slander uttered by her alone, is too
dim to be easily seen. He was made
liable for her debts, at the period OF
marriage, because the law gave to him
all her personal estate in possession,
aud the power to recover her personal
property in action. He was bound to
pay her indebtedness, because he adopt
ed her aud her circumsta together
The law made him liable TO the debts
to which he took her subject. because
he acquired an absolute interest in
her peasonal property; had the receipts
of the rents and profits Of her real
estate during cove rturc, and was en-
titled to whatever accrued TO her by
her industry or otherwise, during the
same period The reason for the liabil
ity, aecor ling to some authorities, is
that by the marriage the wife was
deprived OF the use aud disposal of her
property, and could acquire none by
her industry, as her person aud
earnings belonged to the husband
Tyler on infancy and Gov, sec. ZIG
The same author, after declaring the
husbands liability for the debts and
torts of the wife, says: "The reason
assigned for such liabilities at common
law, is that he was entitled to the rents
and profits of the wife's real estate,
during coyerture, and to the absolute
dominion over her personal property
in possession" The common law was
never guilty OF the absurdity of impos
ing obligations so onerous, without
comforting corresponding rights.
Hence, besides the rights of property,
the legal pre- eminence was exclusively
vested in the husband. He was
answcrablc for her behavior, and hence
had the
RIGHT OR RESTRAINT OVER HER PER
Lord Kames, in his sketches, says
"The man bears rule over his wife's
person and conduct; she bears rule
over his inelinations he governs
by law, she by persuasion"
In the matter of Cochrane, 8 Dowl, p.
c., 6S2, the wife was, upon the hear
ing of writ of habeas corpus, restored
to her husband, upon the principle that
she was under his guardianship, and
that the law entitled him for the
sake of truth to protect her from the
danger of unrestrained intercourse
with the world, by enforcing cohabita-
tion and a common resi- ience. So
long a. the husband was entitled TO
the property of the wife and to her
industry, so long as he had power to
direct and control her, and thus
prevent her from the Com mission of
torts. there was some reason for his |
liability. The reason has ceased.
THE ANCIENT LANDMARKS ARE GONE. |
The maxims, and authority, and adj
publications OF the past have faded
away The foundations hitherto DEEM
ed so essential for the preservation of
the nuptial contract, and the mainte-
nance of the marriage relation, ARE crum>
bling away. The unity cf husband and
wife has been severed. They are now
distinct persons, and may have separate
legal estates, contracts, debts
aud injuries. To this conclusion have
all the decisions of the court tended.
So far as the separate personal proper
ty of the wife is concerned, she is now
the same as q femme sofa. She need
not join her husband in law in a suit
to recover it, or for trespass to it, as her
rights only are affected, and she must
sue alone for any invasion Of them.
She may even prosecute.
A SUIT AGAINST HER HUSBAND
for any unlawful interference with her
property, contrary to her wishes. The
right of action for personal injury to
the wife is property. She may sue
alone for the recovery of damages