Litchfield enquirer., 1873-09-11
Must Marriage Involve injustice.

I1"S euu moral ruieSSwhlch relate to marriage
 should regard it as contract between equals. or as contract between astronger and . weaker person, involving subordinati0n for certain pur- poses on the part of the weaker to the stronger.
 say tnat law which proceeded on the former
 ana not on the latter of these views would be
 rounded on totally false assumption. and
 would involve cruel injustice in the sense of ex-
 treme general inexpediency, especially to wo- men: v he parties to contract of moyriage
 are 10 0etredted as equals Is impossible 60 auoid
 the fnJerence thdt n1dy7faqe. slke otler Da,faeT4
 sblps, nady be dissoloed at pleasure * If
 this were the law, it would make women the
 slaves or tne1r husbands. A women loses the
 qualities which make her attractive to men much
 earlier than men lose those which make them at-
 tractive to women The tie between women and young children is generally far closer than the tie between them and their fathers. women l who IS no longer young, and who is the mother of children, would thus be absolutely in her hus- bands power, in nine cases out of ten. if he might put an end to the marriage when he pleased. fs..7 -.
 We give the foregoing extract from a recent work of Mir. Fitzjames Stevens, a Conservative English barrister, who has recently attacked the views of the late John Stuart Mill-as an excellent sample of the assumptions on which conservatism bases it's objections to the emancipation of mar ried women It amounts simply to an assertion that marriage will cease to be permanent whenever it ceases to be des- potism and becomes an equal contract
 'I expect to treat my wife fairly" says the conservative husband, "but you must not put that into our contract. If yotr do, you must also allow me to put her away when I choose :" And why, pray |? Even if an equal marriage contract must be viewed as a partnership, does it follow that it should, therefore, be terminable at any time at the will of either party? Does it not plainly differ from all other contracts of partnership in that it requires lifetime for its due. performance. The nurture of family is: not matter. that can be fairly provided for by temporary arrangement, Hence if the just marriage contract should happen to resemble anor- dinary partnership agreement in that it would provide for fair division of earn ings, it would differ from an ordinary partnership contract in that it would re- quire stronger guarantees for perrna- hence.
 It is very old plea for subjection that it tends to quietness. Formerly it was supposed that the many must be owned, or at least controlled, by the few. to en- sure quiet state. The King ruled his kingdom; the feudal noble, his vassals; the husband, his family; and everyone thought that this ingenious arrangement of servitude within seryitude was all thatsaved society from anarchy. Progress eliminated the slavery of vassal to lord, then that of subject to monarch, and with every enfran- chisement society grew stronger and more peaceable. Yet as progress threatens this last ''relic of barbarism" "-the legal des- potism of the husband over the family the same old cry is raised that this final enfranehisement will disorganize society, and will turn marriage into concubinage
 So far is this from being the natural or probable outcome of the proposed re- form that the facts show tendency in precisely the opposite direction. Any candid thinker would naturally expect that change which should make the contract" of marriage more just, would make it more permanent. Year after year our divorce returns enforce this belief. Those returns prove that it is not the lev ity of man that multiplies divorces in Connecticut-as MT. Stevens would an- ticipate-but the harshness of the exist ing law towards woman. In 1872 one , hundred and forty-one husbands, and three hundred and t,Uenty-ttree apiues ob- tained relief from the bond of marriage in our courts. Year after year the propor- tion varies little from that of two female applicants for divorce, to one male. This remarkable fact proves one of two things: either that woman would be more ready than man to give up the family aad the marriage tie, did the law permit her to do so, which is the precise opposite of Mir. Stephens view; or, that the existing law is so unjust as to compel her to seek di- vorce, however reluctant, as her only ade- quate mode of relief. No doubt the lat ter is the correct view; and hence an ale viation of the present injustice might be expected to check the present frequency of divorce, by rendering divorce unneces- sary. But we believe that Mir. Stephens and other conservative moralists do hu- man nature great injustice when they maintain that it is only the rgor of the law that makes marriage permanent. Mar riage is permanent because p>rmanence l is natural and necessary feature of the relation. Even now, it is the law. of na- ture, not the law of the land, that keeps families together. Though the law does not permit volunatary divorce, it does permit voluntary separation; and divorce usually follows any permanent separa- ton, so that the legal guaranty of mar riage is as weak as its natural guaranty is strong.
 The chief practical hindrance to wom- ans enfranchisement, and to the prog ress of woman towards independence and lucrative employment, is to be found in the dependence of the female of the ''up- per" class. With no adequate or lucra- tive employment open to her enterprise, like those in which the males in her class are occupied. her life is one of unavoida- ble dependence. By marriage she merely transfers her allegiance. and becomes a l burden on husband instead of father.
 The wife of the wealthy man of business toys with religion, fashion, house-keep-
 ing, or all three together-is an ornament to society, the pet of !. doting husband,
 and the lavish dispenser of charity to the poor-an article of luxury, in short, no poor man can afford. and which no rich
 man likes to be withouk That such 8 I nnrsnn shou1d claim on enual Shara of tho