The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1873-11-26

the nation and entirely just in themselves.
/ This great statesman looks to the time
when British Columbia viii tall peacefully,
and by the mere force Of circumstances,
into the United States. Already he is
clearing away the impeachment of private
interests by negotiating for the Hudson
Bay Company'S property and claims.
These acquired. British Columbia will be
only a wedge of coast uneomfortably IN
serted in American territory, cause of
irritation by the United States without
corresponding benefit TO Great Britain-a
distant and Isolated appendaSe of that
Power, costly to maintain, entirely unre-
munerative, mere care, barren of honor,
and nationally valueleSS, which, in the
progress Of the present consolidating po-
hey Of Great Britain, will be Yielded to
the United States for some equivalent ad-
vantageous TO both nations, and thus be-
come portion Of this eompaeted Repub-
lie. VI
/ The policy Of the age is to natural CON-
paetneSS-to territorial unity with broad
and marked divisions. Great Britain is
eompaoting; Germany is eompaoting;
Italy is eompacting; this Republic is com
pacing, and with this eompaeting, nations
are Kidding themselves and the world of a
thousand irritating points of contact,
which, however pUerile and slight in them
selves, have been fruitleSS causes of great
wars.
Our business Is with the Pacific Coast.
Let us suppose that Secretary Stewards
magnificent policy, seconded by the ma
D a
IA TO Sonora there is no foot of coast, no
harbor, landing place or anchorage, which
Is not American, and that these islands
become, instead OF hostile stronghold,
an outpost of American uuity-an Am
erlean fortress guarding this long line of
seaboard, and watching in mid Pacific
over our extended and extending COM
meree- It's SAFETY as evidently GSstsrsd
/ Where could hostile Power obtain an
inch of teTTa frBlG on which to plant his
/ foot Where an anchorage, landing or
3 shelterI Where could he get fuel or
water for his feet Where repsir his ma
I chinerY, reit his ships or hospital his
/ crews, except III the tropics south of us,
or in China? And is it probable that any
/ such Power viii come all ahoat from the
other side of the world to butt his prows
[ against an immense line of coast, if forced
/ TO renoyate his ships and men amongst
the feyers of the tropics VIII come a
7 voyage of 10000 miles into a sea where
Land no - cannot be sung from the
masthead without Wear off, being
echoed back?
There appears but one conclusion on
this topic, viz That the honor and infiu-
ence OF the United States as a nation. the
safety Of its commerce generally, and the
prosperity of the commerce of this State
and Coast particularly, would be promoted
by strengthening our alliance with the
Islands at present, and their ultimate
peaceful acquisition hereafter.
VIII this treaty secure these objects
Can they be secured by any other and
better method 7 1t appears both from the
printed and secret history of the dealings
Of these Islands with England. France
and the United States, that every attempt
heretofore made by either of these Powers
to obtain them by seizure or cession, has
been thwarted by the powerful influences
brought to bear by the others. The at
tempt tending to this end which was the
most nearl ' crowned with success. was a
reciprocity treaty adopted BY the Island
Government through the influence of the
Hon. Mr.. Allen, in 1854, which failed in
the American Senate through the votes
Of Messrs- Benjamin and SlidelL
The present proposed treaty, though !
upon its face offering very large benefits !
TO the Islands-immediate and direct pc
euniary emoluments-was strongly oD-
posed by the native and foreign popula- /
ton, (other than American and, though /
urged by the King, seems to have been 1
consented to as q kind of last choice be /
tween utter agricultural and commercial I
prostratiOn, and reciprocity which they |
felt tends to their ultimate absorption.
1t Is supposed any attempt at purchase 1
would have been thwarted by other /
Powers. They could offer Hq0aey-as
much IS the United States. So far they /
stood with US on equal ground, and could /
with our bids have bid higher; but they
could not offer reciprocity. A reciprocity 1
between England or France and the Sand |
witch Islands would have been of less
benefit to the Islands than similar inter
change with the United States. by the
entire difference of the cost of transport
ing their raw material to Europe instead
of to San Francisco. The Islands gain
by reciprocity with the United States $50
per ton on their raw material more than
they eould gain by reciprocity with Eng
land or France
Mr.. Seward knew where he had the ad-
vantage, and has taken this course
VII
How far viii this treaty tend immedi-
ately to convert the Islands into defence,
aud assurance of American commerce on
the Pacific? It viii naturally promote our
intercourse with their population, and
from that intimacy, combined with identi-
t. Of interests, pursuits and profit, Am
erican influence must increase In the ma
tive mind The spirit Of enterprise in our
people and their close proximity viii in
duce American citizens promptly to move
on to the fields of commercial profit on
the Islands which the treaty opens. Other
nationalities move more slowly, are more
distant, and will have less faith in the per-
maneuce Of the union between the Islands
and main-Eill, in fact, be behind-hand
IN occupying the ground The treaty