The Cambria freeman. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1867-1938, 1873-10-24

torsl influence than Delaware. Now, if
the electoral influence were determined by
population alone, Pennsylvania would have
thirty times more influence, and if it were
determined by equality, PeDhsylv7nl1
would have only equal influence. Again,
let it be supposed that fifty thousand be
the ratio of representation, then Delaware
would be entitled TO two Representatives
and Pennsylvania to sixty; to each of these
numbers add two, to correspond with the
number of Senators; then Pennsylvania
| will have sixty-two electors and Delaware
! will have four-that is to say, in this case
Pennsylvania will have more than fifteen
| times more electoral influence than Della
ware, whereas, i'll the case before men,
| toned, it had but eleven times more.
| Again, let it be supposed that FIVE hundred
thousand be the ratio of representation,
then Pennsylvania will be entitled to six
| Representatives and Delaware will still be
entitled to at least one, because each State
| is entitled to at least one Representative.
Now to the representation of PennSylva-
| mia and Delaware again add two, to corTe-
spOnd with the number of Senators; then
| Pennsylvania will have eight electoral
| votes and Delaware will have thres-that
is to say, in this case the electoral intiu-
ence of Pennsylvania will not be much
more than double that of Delaware, where
| as, in the cases before menticT1ed, it was in
one eleven times as much and in another
| fifteen times as much.
! Thus you can see that according as the
House of Representatives is made more
! numerous, the electoral influence of each
| State approaches nearer and nearer to the
proportion of its populations; and on the
! other hand, according as the House of
| Representatives is less numerous; the cleo
| toral influence of each State approaches
| nearer and nearer to the proportion OF
equality with that Of the other States.
Now, AS Congress has power to increase
or diminish the number of members be-
longing to the House of Representatives,
| it must be said that Congress has power,
| within certain limits, to determine how
! far the ratio of equality or the ratio of
! population shall prevail in the electoral in
! fluence of the sovereign States.
| | have said above that the power of
| Congress is confined within certain limits,
| and so it is. AS each State is entitled to
| at least one Representative the number of
! Representatives must be at least equal to
! the number of States; and, on the other
! hand, the fundamental law expressly pro-
! hibits the number of Representatives. from
| beirg extended beyond the rate of one for
! every thirty thousand of the population.
! However, the actual number of RepreSen-
tativcs never even vergCs towards either
| of these extreme limits. l have dwelt
upon this power Of Congress for the pur-
| pose of exhibiting in full another item
| connected with the election of the Ameri-
can President. The members of both
councils of Congress are, as may well be
! coniCctured, under the great influence and
control of their respective State govern
ments and their respective State popula-
tions. Hence, it might be expected that
| the larger States might desire to effect, and
combine to effect, an enormous increase in
the number of members belonging to the
| House of Representatives, in order to make
II Il n NJ l.
more affected by .he ratio of population,
which state of things would, of course,
| make the larger States prevail more in the
| election of the President than it would un-
der different circumstances. This tend
ency, which the larger States may be ex-
| pected to have, is, IL various ways, coun-
! teracted by one of the most beautiful po-
| litical coutrivances that the world has ever
! seen. In the first place, it is counteracted
by the consideration that it is impossible
to draw a strict line of demarkatiOn be-
| tween the States that are very populous
aud the States that are not very populous
and hence the States whose population
| is intermediate, have no interest i'll work
| ing out a scheme of that kind-and such
| States form the bulk of the political en-
| pire. In the next place, such an arrange
ment, to be made by Congress, must meet
| the appreciation of the Senate. And the
smaller States (whose rights are, in the
| supposed case, to be endangered) can make
themselves felt i'll that body much more
| than may suppose necessary to defeat
| the scheme itself.
This same supposed tendency of the
larger States is also cOuuteracted by other
political agencies, which are so numerous
and various that they cannot be detailed,
| though they may, without much political
sagacity, be appreciated-and especially
this consideration is to be taken into ac-
count-that the power OF Congress, to
make such an arrangement in regard to
the House of Representatives, is not con-
tinual, but is only periodical-they can do
| so only once in every zen years-and hence
their inability to forcsce its consequences
upon the politics of the country has a tend
ency to prevent them from embarkmg III
the scheme at all. However, even if all
these considerations were not sufficient,
there is an express provision i'll the funda-
mental law, which in this country they
call the Constitution, which must inyaria-
bly, deter the States with very large popu-
lations from attempting to compass TINS
purpose, which have described-and that
| is what | have called, and which l now
again call, one of the most beautiful po-
Iitical contriyances that the world has ever
seen. 1t is this: If the House )f Repre-
sentatives was made to contain an enor-
nous number of members the number of
Presidential electors would be more numer-
Gus still. Now, reason and experience
/ both teach us that it is much more difficult
to obtain a majority out of a larger num-
Der than it is to obtain majority out of a
smaller number-and hence the greater
the number the greater the difficulty i'll
obtaining a majority, whether in the cleo
tion of magistrate or in the enactment of
law; and especially i'll the election OF a
magistrate, on account of the liability ct
having several canddates-and hence, If
the number of Presidential electors were
enormously large, that circumstance alone
would carry with it an intrinsic difficulty
III the centering of majority on any one
candidate in the first electoral act. Now,
the Constitution, or fundamental law OF
the United States, expressly provides that
! if a majority of the electors do not, III the
/ cap+re ~, ono midi then