Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1873-09-18
The NARROW GAUGE RAIL ROAD.
JUDGE MACKEY'S DECREE.
THE INJUNCTION DISSOLVED.

State or South Carolina. ..C0unCy OF YORK.
IN THE COMMON PLEAS.
Ephraim IT, Glenn and others, Plaintiffs, against
Hugh X. Roberts, VIM B. Allison and Frank
ty, Defendants. Complaint for Relief.
An interlocutory Injunction was granted in
this action on the 3rd day of July, 1873, re.
straining the defendants from issuing the bonds
proposed to be issued by them, as the County
Commissioners of York county, in payment Of
a subscription of one hundred thousand dol
lars to the capital stock of the Chester and
Lenoir Narrow Guage Railroad company
which said subscription was made by the de-
PENDANTS, for and on behalf of the county Of
York. The defendants having been required
to show cause why the said injunction should
not be continued in full force, the case came
up on the 18th day of the said month, for q
final hearing upon the merits, under the gen.
eral issues involved in the pleadings.
It appears that the respondents, as County
Commissioners of York county, have subscrib'
ed, as alleged by the plaintiffs, and now propose
to issue bonds in the name of the county Of
York, in payment of said subscription; such
bonds to be redeemable in twenty years from
the date of issue, and to bear interest at the
rate of seven per cent. per annum, and for the
payment of the annual interest on such bonds,
the said defendants, as County Commissioners,
propose to levy an annual tax on the real and
personal property, subject to taxation, in the
county of York.
The plaintiffs, who are tax payers of York
county, deny the right of the defendants, the
County Commissioners, to subscribe and issue
the said bonds, and allege that the issuing of
the said bonds, by the defendants, is not au-
thorized by law, and will subject the plaintiffs
to an additional annual tax upon their real
and personal property, in the county of. York,
which tax, the plaintiffs allege, will be wrong
full and illegal, and will inAict upon them, as
tax payers of York county, a loss and dam
age to the extent and amount Of such pro-
posed tax.
The defendants reply that they are author:
lied by law to subscribe and issue the said
bonds, and that they derive such authority,
directly, from section II of an Act of the
General Assembly of South Carolina, approx
ed February 26, 1873, entitled can Act to
incorporate the Chester and Lenoir Marrow
Gauge Railroad Company, and to authorize
the consolidation Of said company with the
Carolina Narrow Gauge Railroad Company,
and the Kings Mountain Railroad Company"
Section II, of said Act, is as follows to wit:
"Sec. II. That it shall be lawful for any county
or town. interested in the construction of the said
Chester and Lenoir Railroad, to subscribe to the
capital stock of said company, or of any company
with which it may consolidate or unite, such sum,
and to be payable in such manner, as the people,
proper authorities Of such county or town, shall
deem best, determine and authorize, and in all
meetings of Stockholders the County Commits
sioners of the respective counties, and the Town
Councils of the respective towns, shal! appoint
person to represent the stock of their respec-
tive counties and towns: Provided, That the
property of the said Railroad Company, situated
in this State, shall be subject to taxation during
the existence of their charter"
The real issue, the qtestio vsrata in this
case, springs from the diverse interpretations
given to the words in the above section, "the
people or proper authorities Of such county or
toson," &c.
The learned counsel for the plaintiffs pre-
sented an exposition Of these words hostile to
the powers claimed by the defendants, which
exposition was marked by the greatest opu-
lence of legal research, and most profound
analysis and rational and plausible application
of the rules of grammar, which should guide
the judgment in its Interpretation of spoken
and written language.
1t is an exposition, however, which, while it
strikes the mind with invincible force when
applied to the words in question-isolated from
the body of the Act of which they are an in
tegral part, yet-in the judgment of the Court,
it is not supported by the context. The conclu.
sion of the learned counsel upon this point
appears to be the result Of viewing the statute