, 1873-04-07


Tho official investigation into the causes Of tie
Atlantio disaster does not place the seaman
Hhip Of Capt Williams or his crow in nny moro
favorable light; on tho contrary, 1t slowa that,
after making radical errors in Ills rockonings,
and having misgiyings that ho WAS wrong, ho
deliberately vent to sloop at critical time,
without giving orders tor ehore-soundIngs to bo
takon-wont to Bloop as coolly ind with aa little
conoern as ii his vesael were lying at anchor in
tho harbor Of Halifax. From his own testimony
before the CuRsom-Houso officials, It is
cloar that no had no positive knowledge
Of his whereabouts, although ho had takou OBJ
sorvatsons by tho stars and tho chronomotor ut
o'clock in tho evening and ngain at midnight.
Ho did not even have cloar idoa Of the spood OF
his vessel. Tho whole business Of determining
his poaition aeems to have been nttlo bottor than
guesswork, aud then, after calculating part
and jumping at the rest, he went to bed. II Ills
calculation had been correct and he had full con-
adcnce in it, even then his leaving thodeck would
have baen m act Of gross negligence nnd
reckleBsnoss. 1t will bo remembered that ho
said in his first etatomont, and repeats It in lis
second, that at o'clock On Monday he beloved
1limBelf to be ITO rniloB from Cape sambro, snil-
ing northward and westward at the rate Of
from eight to twelve knots por hour, At mid
night the vessel had made 122 mloB, which loft
hor 48 miles from sambro. Ho thon retired, after
leaving orders to be called ut o'clock, when ho
intended to shift her courso and wait until day
light. But at 8 o'clock, II tho steamer was
making twelve miles M hour, ho would have
beon within twolye milos Of shore, which
OF itself should havo kept him on dock, Us ho
admitH that he had never sailed Into Halifax
larbor before, had my of lis officers, except
tho Third, ever been there, and they al know TINT
"the coast was IN iron-bount and dangerous
one." Under such circumstanooB tho conduct
Of Capt. Williams is simply ncomprehonBiblc,
unless it may bo explained by tho theory of
utter rooAlossnosa and incompotcucy. It is tho
universal practice amoug sea~gong Captains,
| when they arc approaching q coast, to remain
upon dcch, oven though they inay be familiar
| With it; but horo was Captain sail
ing bend on to const with which ho was on
an exceedingly dangerous ono,-going to bed
with misgivings about his own calculations,
whom only forty miles away from it, mud leaving
orders to DO called, when, according to his own
calculations, ho would hayo boon but twolye
miles of. It ia another instance Of tho general
TINT tho Captain WAS not eallod az ho had
ordored, at 8 o'clock, although, ut 2
o'clock, Quartermastor Owens had ca1,-
toned tho Second Officer against stand
Ing in so close to land, aa, according to
Lis calculations, thoy wore close on shore, aud
had mot with q rebuff for his pains and IN inti-
nation that ho had better attend to his own
business. Tic Captain was awakened by the
shock Of the yeAsol aB aho struck tho rock, and
this WAS at 20 minutes past 3. Had Ia boon
called ut 8, tho vessel at the rate allo was t,on
! sailing, would hayo been at loaat four miles dis
tant from tho fatal roof, and tho tisastor might
evon then have beon prevented. But, with o
reoklcRB Captain asleep below, with all incomps-
| tont officer on deck In charge Of the
boat and ita thousand passengers, with
only ono man Oh board who had
| q clear floa tint thero waa something
wrong but waa not allowed to ofror hia suggos-
tiona, tho ilfatod vessel wan atoerol into swift
destruction. Every suspicion Of danger WAS
| thrown to the winds. Every warming WAS lsro-
! garlod aud, as II doath itbe1f were at tho
helm, tho Atlantic WAS stoered midway Dctween
tho two lightB, which must haye boon visible Tor
houra to any one who had eyos, full upon the
| rocks only two or tAroa hundred foot away
tEqm tho DANGEROUS and kou-boun1 shore. Itlz