Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1873-04-08
Continuation of the Investigation
into the Loss of the Atlantic,
Near Halifax.
Examination of Officers and Sea-
Statements as to the
Causes of the Awful
Horror.
Justice for the Dead and the LiV-
ing-Warning to Careless and
Reckless .NaYigatOrs.

HALIFAX, April 7.--Investigation in
to the Atlantic disaster was resumed
this morning. Cornelius L. Brady, third
officer, after telling the story of the po-
sition of the vessel when it was decided
to run for Halifax, said he was lying in
bed when the ship struck. The state
ment that there were efforts made to
keep the passengers below deck was
absurd and incorrect. When she struck
he rushed on deck, and being obliged to
take to the rigging, worked his way for
ward and made communication with
the rock as previously related. Nothing
was said or done to impede the passen-
gers from coming on deck. He did not
know what the speed of the vessel was
when she struck. The captain did all
any man could to save life. He could
see and hear him from the
rock, exerting himself. From my
knowledge and experience of crews, that
of the Atlantic was far better, physical
ly, and fully as well disciplined as are
the average.
At the close of his examination, Mr..
Brady stated on oath that the stories of
the robbery of the dead are entirely
true.
John Brown, the fourth officer of the
Atlantic testified: The captain, at one
o'clock Monday, directed him to alter
the course of the vessel TO north twenty
four degrees east, for Halifax. They
were then running seven knots an hour;
coal was afterward increased, and at
four o'clock the speed was eleven knots.
At midnight, the third officer told me
the distance to Sambro light was forty
eight miles, the ship having run one
hundred and twenty-five miles since
noon. The ship was running nine knots at
midnight. At half-past one the wind
was noTth-northwest, with a little
swell. The leads were all on the bridge,
ready for sounding. Between half-past
one and the time the ship struck, l was
on the saloon deck, about ten feet below
the bridge. told the captains boy not
to call him till three, and the second
officer told him he would call the cap
tain. The second mate was on the
bridge. The night was cloudy but not
thick. Before / left the deck l went to
the weatherside and looked for a light,
but could not see anything but open sea.
About half an hour afterward the ship
struck. 1 did not let the boy
call the captain, because i
knew the ship could not run
anything like forty-eight miles; all the
officers knew we were running in to
make the shore; no one, in my hearing,
told the second officer that that distance
had been run; one of the quartermasters
asked me if he should go to the main
yards to look for land, but told him it
was too soon; l did not hear the roar of
the sea on the shore, probably because OF
the noise of the engines; we must have
been a good mile from Pennant Point
when we run in, but l neither saw the
breakers nor heard the roar; was
in the steerage At the time; had not
looked at the cHart and do not know the
coast; to my knowledge nothing was
done to prevent the passengers from
on deck; the captain did every
thing ne could to save life; none of the
officers spoke of heaving the leads or
stopping the ship; the leads were not
hove on account of the clearnesS of the
night and certainty of seeing the light;
don't think the vessel, after she struck,
was aground astern; went below at a
quarter to three o'clock to inspect the
steerage; returned Immediately after
[ had performed that duty; the door
between the wheel-hOuse and the chart
room was open at two O'Clock; the cap
tain was within six feet of the man at
the wheel; the crew worked well; the
captain and officers were attentive and
efficient, and all temperate men. No
cards or other games were allowed; it is
not true that the captain was playing
cards half an hour before the ship struck.
William Hogan, steerage-ps ssenger,
testified that he went to bed at nine
o'clock the night of the disaster, and re-
manned till half-past two; then went to
the upper deck, and walked up and
down near the engine-rOom; heard the
watch call out three o'clock, and then
went below; before doing so, looked
out on the side afterward found to be
nearest to the land; the sea was light; l
neither saw nor heard anything to in
dicate the close proximity of land; al
most Immediately after | laid down the
second time, ] heard a fearful crash;
and the windows were instantaneously
opened; l looked out through the port
hole and saw the rock; my companion
and myself made our way to the
second deck; / do not know
how we got up, as the conclusion
had knC cked the cOmpanion-ladder
away. Some of the passengers cried out
below: "The doors are closed,n but /
think they had in their hurry missd the
place where the doors were. ] found it
very hard to get out. positively be-
leve a great many more would have
been saved had the means of exit been
more ample. There was, l think, only
room for one to get out at time.
Joseph Carroll, an able seaman, testi-
fed that he was on the lookout forward
of the bridge, and knew that they
were making the land and coast very
dangerous. The ship was going at the
rate of about ten knots eight or nine
minutes before she struck. l saw the
breakers first, and then land over the
starboard bow. I sung out, ''Breakers
ahead,n to the officers on the bridge. l
did not hear the breakers at all. stood
about thirty yards from the bridge, and
am sure my cry was heard by the second
officer. Don't think if the engines had
been reversed the ship could have been
prevented from striking.
Patrick Kiely, an able seaman, testi-
fed that he was on the lookout or bridge
with the second officer, when he saw
breakers. | called out, "breakers or
ice ahead" One of the quartermasters
saw them at the same time, and told
the second officer, who Immediately
gave the signal for full power astern;
heard no noise of the breakers; as near
as can judge the ship was within a
quarter of mile of the breakers when
l saw them.
Quartermaster Thomas, in the course
of his testimony, repeated the words
which he addressed to the second Of
fieer, and said the latter replied that he
was not captain, and that | was not
mate, and he couldn't do as he pleased.
Thomas then asked the fourth officer if
he should go to the main-yard and look
for the land, and was answered it was of
no use; told fourth officer he did not see
the land until struck upon it; the cap
tain was called at half past three in the
didn't arouse at first, and wit
ness told second officer he had better
shake him and get him up; just then
Carroll cried out, "Ice ahead" witness
left the wheel and ran to the door; saw
white foam and ice; ran back to the
wheel and put the helm harder star
board; then ran to the telegraph con-
Meeting with the engine room, but at
that instant she struck.
Chief-Engineer Faxley testified that
at noon on the thirty-first of March
there were one hundred and twenty
seven tons of coal on board, the expend-
itures of the previous day having been
sixty tons. The ship was four hundred
and eighty miles from Sandy Hook and
one hundred and seventy from Halifax.
The barometer was falling. All the Off
GERS agreed to the captains proposition
to put about for Halifax. Eight hun
dred and forty-seven tons of coal were
put aboard at Liverpool, and there were
one hundred anu twenty tons remaining
from the previous voyage, making 3
total of nine hundred and sixty-seven
tons. We used about eighty tons before
starting on the voyage. The average