The New York herald., 1873-11-30
FROM DEFENSIVE TO OFFENSIVE WAR.
Force in the Towns Against DeSpera-
ton in the Woods.
DgSERTIOnS BY TIE VOLUNTEERS.
An Indefinite PrO.OngatiOn Of The War Under
lis Present Conditions.
To THE EDITOR OF THE HERALD

iLy SO interviewer are wrongs and rights tnat it
Is impossible to do justice full and complete TO one
class with out infllcting hardship even injustice
on some interests that II the duty OF all govern
ments 10 protect. The partlsans OF the various
factions generally conveniently blind to all but
their own special interests, and would fain con-
vince the stranger Of the utter wicKedness ana bad
faith OF their opponents. so that the means OF
forming just appreeations can only be acquired by
a very intimate acquaintance with the inhabitants
and their mode OF thought. To find remedy for
the anarchy in which Cuba has been for ye ars
plunged offers difncultes that can only be success
fully grapped with by the highest order OF
craftsmanship, unless the Gordian knot
can be cut by some heroic policy.
Ill armed and without proper supplies or ammunt
ton, the Cubans from the outset OF the war were
unable to meet the Spanish army in the open
field, and it was necessity as much as choice that
induced them to abandon regular operations and
have recourse to guerilla warfare, for which the
difficult nature OF the country affords unusual
facilities. The want OF military education among
the Cuban Chiefs as well as the encouragement OF
constant failure In important operations, led the
insurgents to limit their efforts to strictly defen-
sive attitude. This mistaken policy soon reduced
them to the greatest misery and the want OF even
the most common necessaries OF life. Those who
survived this defensive policy wandered about like
famished wolves, and, driven by want. they began
a series OF attacks the towns in the possession
OF the Spaniards, An amount OF success scarcely
looked for attended these offensive operations. 1t
was soon discovered that not alone were NUM-
tions and provisions obtained IN these expedi-
tions but that the Spanish forces, harasseo by
their efforts to defend extensive lines were no
longer able to carry on the active offensive opera
In the first period OF the war. The discomfort,
too, OF the Cuban population was intensified
by the necessary rigor OF the precautionary
measures taken by the garrisons and the
interruption and loss caused by the enterprises OF
the insurgents. Up 10 this time II had been COM
paratvely safe TO be loyal Spain, and that large
mass or the population which is Indifferent to po
lltcal questions, and only desires security had
ranged itself under the Spanish nag. The new
policy OF the insurgents changed the situation.
1t was now necessary TO fight and suffer and
large number of the volunteers began to think they
might as well fight for Cuba as for Spain. Rela-
tions were established between the outlying volun-
teer posts and the Insurgents The result has been
the deserton OF whole camps to the Cubans.
Since January, 1873, more than 1000 volunteers
have deserted with arms and munitions. The
gravity OF this disatfection Will understood
when 1t is considered that. without these
irregulars, the Spanish troops could scarcely
carry on the war. The volunteers seldom
show much stomach for fighting. yet the services
they render as scouts and guides are OF the first
Importance. 1t must be Kept well in mind that In
Cuba there are two classes OF volunteers the Gu
ban and Spanish. The latter best known TO
the world by their characterization and blood
thirstiness. Their fame rests on the massacre or
unoffending spectators In the Havana theatres ana
the cold -blooded assassination OF schooboys.
Their valor however, has never gone further. and
up to the present their patriotism has not been
sufficiently pronounced to induce them to take the
neld against the insurgents. The Cuban voun-
teers, on the contrary, are chiefly recruited from
the peasantry or small farmers, los honsoreS del
campo as tney are called, and act as irregular
troops, doing the scouting and really the most
effective part Of the fighting against their country
men. For the most part they are ex-rebes, or
men who have surrendered and been pardoned
on condition Of serving as soldiers. They are very
badly paid and worse treated by the spanish au-
thorties. who look on them with dislike and sus-
picion at the same time that they used to hunt
down the insurgents on all occasions. They
serve, however, more rom fear than from
love. and the majority are in sympathy
while a large proportion are even In direct COM
municaton with the insurgents, whom they sup
ply with provisions and ammunition. During the
first years OF the war these men believed that 1t
was impossible to resist the Spaniards and. de-
string the restoration OF peace, they really fought
bitterly against their late comrades; but the ILL
treatment to which they have been subjected and
the conviction that has now taken root in the
Cuban mind that Spain cannot put down the In
surrection induce them to throw in their fortunes
with their fellow counrrymen, whom they have
vainly striven to conquer If the disafection
should continue to spread, and the whole or the
majority Of the Cuban volunteers armed and
equipped by Spain should throw themselves into
the struggle, the success or the Cuban revolution
would be assured. The reinforcements already
drawn from this source during the current year
and the successful landing OF two distinct exped-
tions have placed the insurgents in position 10
carry on the war with yigor for the next four
years. The chief difficulty in the beginning was
the want Of arms and ammunition. This, com
oined with ignorance OF the most primary
rules OF war, made the Cubans an easy
prey Tor their enemies. Now the conditions
are changed, as the Cubans are now the veterans
while the Spanish regiments are largely made up
ofrecruits. II Is estimated by the Spanish stan
that more than e,ooo oflcers and over 100000 SOL
diers have perished during the war As the num-
ber OF disabled and discharged has to be added 10
these figures II may be judged that the Spanish
Army Is largely composed OF raw material 1t re-
mains TO be seen whether Spain Will continue TO
supply the never-ceaslng demands for men to re.
place the lallen; but IL is probable that II the
armed voIun teers continue TO abandon the Spanish
nag all the sacrifices that Spain may make in the
end will prove useless.
The insurgents depend more on the dishearten
ing effects OF this mortality TO terminate the wal
tnan on driving the spaniards away by force o.
arms. They believe that as st. Domingo wa
abandoned because It was found impossible to dis
pose OF an enemy who would neither fight decisiv
battles nor lay down their arms, so Spain vii
eventually become convinced Of the uselessness o
the sacrifices she is now making. Whether thl
reasoning will prove correct remains to b'
seen, but II is certain that Spain can only pu
down the insurrecton by immense sacrifices o
men and money. Indeed, owing to the extremely
difficult nature OF the country. 1t is open to doub