The Cairo bulletin. [volume] (Cairo, Ill.) 1872-1878, 1873-02-28

I 10 qs,ceo9cn, the court says: "
: "fhe u volatility OF railroad charter
regarded Ia The light Of contrasts, h q
. cUosd, but the court holds that the legfSls
tuse has the clsarsst right 10 pass an &C
toprsvent unjust discrimination In rail
, way frsights, snd 70 enforce its obsel
vance by appropriate penalties.
"Ihe ground Of this opinion IL, In brie
. the nature of the functions and duties ca
ercised BY railroad company, which or
those Of u common carrier. Nothing ca
excuse common carrier for the monde
) livery of goods received by him for car
riage, except the act Ct God, or Of tb
public enemy. This stringent liability
not named Ia the charters VI the railroa,
corporations in this state, and yet th
supreme court has firmly held them 4
t-not permitting them to cvade 1t by
notice, or by any means short of = specia
contract with the shipper, to which hi
treo assent must DO shown 10 have beef
given. IL common carriers, In tho Ian
gusge Of Chief Justice Holt exercise
pubiio employment then II necessarily
followsth chat they must deal with tho pub
lie fairly and without unjust discrimipa
sion. IL 10 not necessary that this liabili
W any moro than the other, should bs
stated In the charter. 1t 10 implied. A
corporation, discharging the duties Of q
common carrier, has the same rights, and
10 subject TO the same restrictions and
limitations, as an individual in tho cxer.
else OF tho same function"
| The court then proceeds to consider the
| question Of unjust discrimination, and
shows that II has been discussed before
the court, and decided by 1t in the several
cases set forth in the opinion. II then
proceeds:
"Conceding what 10 claimed for the rail-
road charters as contracts, the constitu-
tional power OF the legislature to prohibit
unjust discrimination rests upon q firm
foundation. The counsel for appellant do
not distinctly assert q right, on the part OF
the company, to make unjust discrunina-
tons. The court understands them, in
tho conclusion Of their argument to con.
cede the power Of tho legislature TO pro-
hibit such DETERMINATIONS; but they in.
sist that no discrimination 10 unjust, II the
person against whom 1t Is made is not
himself charged an unreasonable rate.
They therefore averred, In their plea TO
the information, that their charges for
freight to Lexington, wero IN fact reasoua-
BILE, and those to Bloomington we're un.
reasonably low"
Coming, then, to the real difficulty, the
court says:
"But, in the opinion Of the court, il the
act Of the legislature had directed its pen.
| alties, rs 1t should have done, not against
all determinations, but only against un.
just determinations, and had made that
the issue 10 DO tried, It would have been no
answer 10 aver, in the plea, that the larger
rates for the less distance were reasonable
rates. That would have had only AN
srgumentativeb bearing upon the issue to be
tried, to.wit: The existence Of an unjust
discrimination between neig hboring towns.
What is a reasonable rate VI freight over
railroad Ia, at best, q mere matter Of
opinion, depending on great variety of
complicated facts which but few persons
could intelligently investigate, and which
1t would DO wholly in tao power of the
company 10 furnish or withhold. Rail-
road experts might DO produced who
would testify that, in their opinion, the
rate to Lexington, in the present case,
was q reasonable rate, but the fact
that less rate was charged for
tho grester distance to Bloomington, il
the difference was permanently establish.
I'd, and not . casual difference, and IL il
could be explained only by tho fact that
there was a competiog line al ono place
and not at the other, might DO we'll accep-
Ted rs conclusive proof that the rate 10
Lexington was not reasonable rate. The
only issue to be made under y law prom.
erly framed, would DO whether there was
an unjust discrimination or not. II, on
The trial Of such an issue, the prosecu tor
proves pc. manen,ly established discrim-
nation, like that disclosed by the present
record, and the company can show no
other reason for 1t than the existence of n
competing line ut the favored point, the
defense must DO he.d unsa .isfactory.
Notwithstanding witnesses may testify
that they believe, as matter OF
theoretical opinion, that the rates to
Lexington arc reasonable. They can.
not be reasonable, and the dis
elimination must DO unjust If the lesser
rates for the greater distance have been
established merely because the company
has ceased to exercise, ut that point, u
practical monopoly. 1t cannot be sup
posed that either VI the competing lines
would establish very permanent rate of
charges upon scale that wouli not fur |
nish remunerative price. The rates 10 |
Bloomington would be established under |
the influence Of . fair competition, which |
by the ordinary laws that govern com.
msrco, might be relied upon as establish.
ing q rate not unreasonably low. AtLex.
ington they would DO established by the |
uncontrolled discretion Of the company
and It should not cause surprise, If they
were liked unreasonably high. II the |
rates are not unreasonsbly low At Bloom.
ington, they are unressonably high at
Lexington. II they are unressonsbly
low NJ Bloomington and Ut all other points
touched by competing lines, 10 IL not GER
tain that the company will indemnify it.
self BY charging at the stations where
there Is no composition, q rate unreasons.
lily highp And will not . discr imi = alton
arising solely from such cause, be neces-
sarily IN unjust and injurious discrimins.
ton, rs to all persons shipping or rsceiv.
ing treights 1t the non-competing stations?
II Lexington 10 town where q
considerable business 10 done, it 10
evident that this discrimination of
rates, II permanently established,
will diminish its business and check its
growth. 1t was never intended or ex.
pected that these corporations should use
their power to benefit particular individu.
ais, or build up particular localities by ar.
bitrAry discrimination in their favor that
must cause injury to other persons or
places engaged in rival pursuits or occu-
plying rival positions. Its IN vain to saw,
in defense Of such DETERMINATIONS, made
without just cause, that the rate of charges
against the injured person or locality is a |
reasonable rate, and therefore no injury is |