Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1873-10-22
RRVENUE OFFICERS.


II
Another Krnporsant Decision OF sh
Supreme Court.
| We publish below another important de
cision Of our Supreme Court lately delivers
at jackson.
The State of Tennessee VS.. Joseph Allison G
al-opinion by Mcfarland, Judge.
This is motion By the State against th'
sureties of w. @. Robinson, now deceased
who vas tax collector for Madison county
for the years 1865 and 1857. The motion
| Is made TO recover the amount Of tbs
| States revenue for the year 1867, and /.
made upon the bond given by said Robin,
| son and his sureties on the It'll of April
| 1856, the time Of his induction into Office
The condition Of the bond recites that SAID
Robinson had been elected revenue collect
or for Madison county for two years, from
| the first Saturday in March, 1866, and con.
| cludes: snow If the said VIM. G. Robinson
shall well and truly collect all st to taxes
which by Law he ought to collect, and vel
and truly account for and pay over sll tax.
es by him collected, or which ought to be by
him collected according to law, then this
obligation to be yoid,' etc. The question
made Is whether under this bond the sure
ties are liable for the taxes of the year 1857.
The question we have settled at the pres
ent time in the case of the State and county
of Shelby vs.. VIM. MI Lean and bis sure
ties. We held in that case that where the
bond given by the collector, upon bis in
duction into Office, was in its terms broad
enough to cover The entire term of Office,
that It would be held q valid obligation for
the second as well as the first years. taxes
Of least to the extent Of the penalty. The
srounds upon which this conclusion was
predicated are stated In the opinion in that
sse, aud we deem IL unnecessary to repeat
ilam again.
4 viii be seen that he terms of TIE bond
IL Ibis case are broad and comprehensive
and not limited to any period Of time, and
embraces within the manifest meaning Of
the language the taxes of the entire term
Of two years.
It does not appear whether
any subsequent bond was given
or not. We hole, therefore,
that the sureties on this bond are liable for
the taxes for the year 1867. 1t ia next ar
gted that the snreties are discharged by an
act of the Legislature passed LIST March,
1870, granting further time to the collector
without the consent of the sureties. The
first section of this act is as follows: "Thst
Enseley Jefries, Revenue Collector for the
county Of Smith, and Carter N. Bales, Rev.
enue Collector for the county of Hawkins,
and all revenue and tax collectors for the
various counties in the State of Tennessee,
who have not completed their collections
and settlements as such tax or revenue col
lector, for the years 1866 and 1866, and
1867, be and they are hereby granted and
allowed the further time Of one year from
this date in which to collect and make full
settlements IS such revenue or tax collec-
tors for the years aforesaid" The second
section enscts sfThat nothing contained in
this act shall oparate or be held to release
the present securities Of such revenue or tax
collectors for said years, who may claim the
benefit Of this act-provided the securities
shall consent TO such further time"
1t is argued that the proper construction
Of this act is, that if the sureties agree TO
the extension of time, they shall not be re-
leased. Otherwise, the inference is, they
are released because they have not con-
sented, aud this seems to be the most nat
ural construction of the language; but we
must, il possible, out of respect To the Leg
islature, give reasonable construction to
the act, and the construction commended for
would leave the second section with the
p-oviso without any practical meaning
whatever. For if the effect Of the first sec
ton be, as argued, to release the sureties
by extending time TO the principal without
their assent, then it would be idle and IN
meaning for the next section 10 declare that
the first section shall not operate or
be held to RELEASE them. If the
first section does what it proposes to
do-that is, extend the time without
the assent of the sureties, then the effect
of this is question for the courts to decide,
and it would not be the province of the
Legislature TO declare without more that
the sureties shall not thereby be released.
But this second section is coupled with
proviso, that is, it declares that the sureties
shall rot be released, provided they assent
to the extension Of the time.
Hthey assented to the extension of time
then it would follow IS legal result, that
they would not be released without the Sec
ond section or proviso of this act. In other
words, if the first section Of this act be as
argued an unconditional extension Of time
to tho principal without the assent Of the
sureties, then the effect of this upon the OBJ
legation Of the sureties is question that
the courts alone can decide, and il would be
idle for the Legislature to undertake to de-
care what should or should not be the eff.
feet. The Legislature may of course de-
clare the purpose and intention of law, or
exclude any improper meaning, but the
purpose, intention and meaning being
clear, then the effect is question for the
court.
1t would be perfectly competent for the
Legislature to declare in the second section
that it YVES not their purpose to grant this
extension OF time without the assent of the
sureties. That the act could only be effac-
tive in favor of those who claimed the bene-
fit of it, and that to obtain the benefit of
the act, the assent of the sureties must be
obtained to the extension OF time; and this
is the only constr uction that can be given
to the act consistent with reason. We can
not suppose that the Legislature intended
by sweeping enactment, without induce
ment or consideration to release all the
sureties Of all the defaulting tax collectors
In the State for three years. We should
not so construe their act, if it be suscept-
BILE of any other reasonable construction.
The saving of the second section construed
as commended for by Defendants counsel
would amount to nothing.
To say that the sureties shall not be re-
leased, provided they agree to an extension
of time, but say by inference that they shall
be reles sd if they do noe agree to It, would
be no saving of the rights of the State. The
sureties, upon this sort of proposition,
would hardly agree to an extension. We
hold the proper construction of the act to
be that in order to prevent the release of
the sureties, the act shall not take effect in
favor of any collector without bis sureties
agree to the exclusion of time. The object
of the second section was to prevent the re-
lease of the sureties. This is plainly de-
clared, upon the assumption that the first
section standing alone did relesse them.
Then the only mode in which the Legisls-
ture could prevent this would be to Limit
the operation of the first section to those
cases where the sureties agree to the ex-
tension. The legal effect Of this would be
TO prevent their release, and to give the
second section any meaning, consistent
with any noble purpose in the mind Of the
this construction must be given
TO It. s- ..--......-4..
The defendants proposed to prove by the
records Of the County Court that certain
sums had been allowed by the court for err
rors sud insolvencies. This proof was re-
jected upon the ground that the statement |
of the Comptroller of the amount claimed
bv the State was conclusive. Such was the |