The Cairo bulletin. [volume] (Cairo, Ill.) 1872-1878, 1873-04-27

such Corporations 10 Decoi"c ''"."'"
carriers, and that such common carriers,
when they engaged in the business for
which they were created, become sub
ject to precisely such obligations and
duties as natural persons engaged III
the same business are. Corporations,
| like natural persons, are protected IN
their property by the provisions OF the
constitution and the laws of the land.
Their property cannot be taken for
public uses without just compensation
they are, with respect to prop
erty. subject only to such bur
dens as are imposed upon all they
have an uuquestiopablc right to man
age their own affairs in the manner
permitted by their charter, but, with
respect to the public, corporations en-
gagged in business as common carriers,
are like other common carriers They
may make any rules for the manage
ment of their own business. although
with respect to the receipt transpor'a'
ton or delivering Of passengers or
freight, or with respect to the toll or
compensation they will demand Tor
| their services as common carriers, 'hey
may make only reasonable charges,
and can in theory, at least, enforce no
others. In support of this position
read from au opinion Of the supreme
court of the state. The court, speak
inc by Chief Justice Lawrence, says
III is claimed by the counsel that
the charter of the respondent author
ICES it TO make such contracts and reg
ulations as might be necessary IN ITS
business. But certainly we cannot
suppose the Legislature intended to au.
thorize the making Of such rules or
contracts as would defeat the object it
had in view in granting the charter.
The company can make such rules and
contracts as it pleases, not inconsistent
with its duties as common carrier,
but it can 60 no further, aud any gen
eral language which its charter may
contain must necessarily be con
strued with that limitation. Chicago
aud n. w. railways VS.. the people,
90 Ills. 3S5.
EXToRTIoNs AND UNJUST DIsCRfMA-
| TONS UNLAWFUL.
1t cannot be questioned that the
common law rule forbidding extortion
and unjust discrimination in common
carriers is binding upon the corporate
common carriers of to-day, and that
when such carrier is guilty Of extor-
ton or unjust discrimination the citi-
zens injured may so into the courts
and obtain redress, if he can prove his
case; but unless his case is so plain the
wayfarng man, though fool, may not
err therein, he had better remain out
side the doors of the legal tribunals.
Suppose the Chicago and Alton Rail
road company should charge and re-
ceiye for transporting lumber from
Chicago TO Lexington, distance OF
10 miles, the sum So GO per 1000 feet
while ct the same time it only charged
t for transportation of like lumber from
, Chicago to Bloomlugtuu, aiotonee oil
, 1926 miles, the sum Of So per 1000 feet
The decision of the supreme court il
a tho Mclean case, declares such dis
n elimination to be prima tacie unjust
1t and therefore unlawful, and establishe
@ the doctrine that such Discrimination
J. must be also unjus in fact, il the les
l. rates for the greater distance have beel
It established merely because the com
# pany has ceased to exercise at tina
a point practical monopoly, but, in tn
| Ia az hn ha
may show another reason for the dis
a cri mination, since "the naked fact tina
railway charges a larger sum TO
4 Transporting freight, Of the same clas
/ over given distance than it i
charging for the same distance owe
another part of its road, or in the op
} posite direction, is not, of itself, con
. elusive evidence of an unjust discrim
: nation" The company might estat
fish the fact that the discriminate
grew out of state of affairs whic
took from it the quality of injustice
and yet it might be possible that furthl
/ investigation would prove tho charg
to Bloomington unreasonable. Flo
c instance: the company might sho'
that it transported ears from Chlcag
. to Bloomington full Of freight. Will
IS from Lexington it was compelled t
o return its cars empty. Would it
o fair to ask the company to work {
j. the same wages for city which ga
Y it freight as well as took freight fro
Q it, as Tor L city which received freig
ID bu. compelled it to draw its cars avn
r. empty e? 1t certainly would not b,
" nevertheless, although the discrimin
a. ton might thus be taken out from u
:. der the principle or law which max
1t, it unjust, the rate charged to Lexin
il. ton might be an extortionate rate tic
act could this fact be established la
ny way, unless the rate could be proven
act be not reasonable rate and this Il
yes court says is at best Il mere matter
RS, opinion, depending on great varie
es, OF complicated facts, which but {,
be persons could in;elligently inye,tiga
Is and which it would be wholly in t
lat power Of the company to furnish
,al withhold : la fact, under the prese
lin condition Of affairs, extortion cam
act be established in most eases, the bu
tie den Of proof being ON the plaintiff, Al
lp- the defendant having in possessi,
Of knowledge Of the great variety
ow facts on which the mere matter Of OPT
HE ion in regard TO reasonable rates mn