Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1873-04-22
THE DECISION IN THE ATLANTIC
.-4le . DISASTER

The responsible parties for the Atlantic
disaster are no doubt congratulating them
selves over the decision in the Halifax in
vestigation relating to the loss of the
steamer. 1t is far milder than they could
reasonably expect, falling much below the
severity which the case demanded. The
points which the board of investigation
find proved are concisely stated in the fol
lowing epitome.
l. The Atlantic was put to sea with q
dangerously insufficient supply of coal. The
vessel took on board at Liverpool an allow
ance Of coal amounting to 9C7 tons. Of this
quantity eighty tons were consumed before
leaving port The available supply for the
voyage was thus reduced to sS7 tons. Had
this been the best quality Of Welsh coal, u.s.
ually supplied by the Company, it was mere
ly sufficient for a tri1e over fourteen days
consumption. As it was composed partly of
Welsh and partly of an inferior quality of
English coal, it was barely sufficient for thir-
teen days consumption. In other words, the
Atlantic consumed from fifty five to sixty tons
per day of Welsh coal, while of the mixed
quality her consumption was seventy tons per
day. When the vessel was within $50 miles of
Sandy Hook, and therefore within, under the
most favorable circumstances forty eight hours
from New York, she had only forty-two hours
supply Of coal. But the circumstances were the
reverse of favorable, and the decision to put
into Halifax, distant ITO miles, for a fresh
supply of coal, was accordingly forced upon
the Captain Of the Atlantic. His order to al
ter the course of the vessel was, therefore the
only thing left for him to do. For what fol-
lowed Ismay, Imrie & Co., of Liverpool, must
be held primarily responsible. They knew
when they shipped the mixed Goals that the
supply could only be sufficient for a thirteen
days passage, and to run such risk in the
stormiest month Of the year was simply
great crime.
II. From the time the ships course was
altered, till the time she struck, her manage
ment was glaringly defective. The ques-
ton of whether Capt. Williams made sufn-
Gent allowance for the westerly current in
determining the course of the vessel is held
not to be of vital Importance, because the
Atlantic would have been run ashore at an.
other point, even had she been on the course
which her Captain supposed her to be. That
is to say, even on his own calculations, Capt
Williams ought to have known that at A.
M, on the morning of Tuesday, April /, the
Atlantic would be close upon the coast of
Nova Scotia, and, as she was then steered,
would be running directly on the land.
more crushing charge against the compe-
tency and good judgment of the Captain
could hardly be imagined, than the fact that
he made no provision against the palpable
certainty.
III. Capt. Williams blundered grossly in
estimating the ships position at midnight |
on Monday. His calculations were based on
data which he must have known to be high
ly uncertain, yet his conduct in going below
for three hours was calculated to create the
m GsA tt,A l.. 4
there was no necessity for extra vigilance
Among the officers of all grades there was
a striking absence of the most ordinary care
and watchfulness. Sambro Light ought to
have been seen, but was not seen. A look.
out ought to have been sent at intervals
to the masthead, but this was not done.
Most vital precaution of all, the lead ought
to have beeu frequently used, but this was
also entirely neglected, though the ship was
in soundings eight hours before she struck,
and though the soundings are so accurately
laid down upon the chart, that, had they been
taken, the ships position could have been as
certained beyond all doubt, and her safety
guaranteed accordingly. This is neglect,
as the decision put it, "ior which there can
be positively no excuse"
1t is ridiculous conclusion to the pro-
ceedings of the investigation, that after
finding and laying before the public the
most complete proof of the gross culpabili
ty of Capt. Williams, by which more than
five hundred lives were lost, the board
should only impose upon him the "suspcn-
sion of certificate for two years. Public
sentiment will not be satisfied with such
punishment. The company
also win be held responsible for sending
the vessel to sea with an insufficient sup
ply of coal. They may publish their ex
plantations and apologies, but travellers
will seek safer lines, where ample pro-
visions for the trip are made and the Off
GERS DO not sleep at their posts when near
ing dangerous coast