The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1873-01-18

result. The vote OF Wisconsin was counted and
the decision OF Mr. Mason was not afterwards called
rae yRlMHRs OF THE CONSTITUTION
did not contemplate that the President OF the
dent and Vice President should exercise discretion
airy or JUDICIAL powers In determining between the
or validity OF the record Of the Votes Of the electors
In any state, but that he should perform merely
ministerial act, OF which the two houses were 10
De witnesses and to make record. But the exer-
else OF these high powers may devove upon him
eI necessttdte ret, and whatever decision he may
make between the two sets OF electors or upon tne
sufciency and validity OF the record o. the votes
whether on the evidence OF the right OF the electors
to votes whether they have been cast In the
manner prescribed by the constitution, his decision
Is hnal. There are said to be
TWO SETS OF ELECTORAL VOTES
at this time In the hands OF the Vice President
nom the State OF Arkansas, and two rom the state
of Louisiana; and whichever OF these sets ne de-
ward, opens and causes to be counted, must be SO
received and from his action there is no appeal
THE ACTION OF THE TWO HOUSES IN 1921.
in regard to counting the vote Of Missouri is no
exception TO this view Of the power Of the Presi-
was not as to any. irregularity in regard to the
electoral vote of Missouri, but whether Missouri
TO participate in the Presidential election At ali
which was alse the question In the election OF 1917
regard TO Indiana and in 1869 In regard to Geor
gia The President OF the Senate may, indeed, be
| impeached for high crimes and misdemeanors
should he grossly violate his duty and thus iraudu
iehtly count or reject electoral votes; but
| which had been made, undo the wrong, help the
out OF ONCE nor protect the nation from disorder
| and civil war.
Ifit should happen, upon the recurrence OF any
one OF the cases considered, that the decision OF
the President Of the Senate should determine The
result and give the Presidency to the candidate
who would otherwise have been defeated, or throw
| the election into the House OF Representatives
where the candidate who mad been rejected by the
people should be elected by the vote OF the States
all can understand the imminent peril in which the
nation would be placed.
BY the twenty-second joint rule OF the two
houses adopted ia 1865, in the Speakers Judgment,
THE MOST DANGEROUS CONTRIvANCE TO THE PEACE
OF THE NATION
ever invented by COngress-it is provided that
whenever an electoral vote is objected to the Sen
ate shall retire to its chamber and each House shall
separately consider the objection, and the vote
snail not be counted unless the two houses concur
to that effect. II the two houses disagree the vote
es saase Tns IN tie or
have been defeated, or In preventing either Of the
candidates from having majority or all the votes,
| and thus throwing the election into the House OF
question without debate, In q summary manner.
Here IL
A POWERFUL TEMPTATION
the House &c q Of BY S
thus, perhaps, secure the election OF Q candidate
who may have been Overwhelmingly beaten at the
different parties, as in 1851 led by politicians
bitious exasperated and thirsting Tor power, who
defeat an election by the people ana seize the al
mlnistratiOn OF the government into the hands OF
tnelr party T.. ne aia not Deneve the constitution ION
right OF the people OF State to participate IN the
| Presidential election depend upon the contingency
| OIL the agreement of the two houses on the settle
ment OF an objection. The rule is an invitation to
partsans to make captious and factious objections.
| 1t makes the concurrent action OF the two houses
necessary where it should not be and, to sum up
| It's perilous absurdity,
| It's dangerous uncOnstituti0nalty 1t places 1t in
| the power OF q defeated party, which may happen
| to have majority In either House, to defeat an
anarchy or OF q victory by throwing the election
| into the House OF Representatives. But this ex-
BY which either House Is EN-
election OF President Is created by joint rule OF the
two Houses The constitution provides that leach
House may determine the rules OF it's own pro-
ceedines that Ia, the mode OF conducting its bust
ness ana doing those things which, by the consti-
tuition ant laws 1t has right to do. But surely
this clause does not give the two Houses the power
Dy Joint rule to enable each House to disiranchise
States by rejecting their electoral votes The pro.
embraced in a law enacted which has been SUBJ
mitted to the President for his approval and, even
on the statute book, c0nferrng, as 1t does, upon
either House the power to
BLOCK TIE WHEELS OF GOVERNMENT AND PLUNGE
THE NATION INTO ANARCHY.
The proposition that Congress has power to sit
as canvassing board upon the electoral votes OF
the States admitting or rejecting them for reasons
| OF its own, subverts the whole theory BY which
their appointment was conferred upon the States;
qualifications Of President aud vice President; and
10y the operation OF the twenty-secOnd Joint rule
gives that power to each House separately, as In
case Oi It's own memDers There 1 no such ex-
press power given to Congress In the constitution
nor 10 IL necessary to carry out any express power
therein given, and Its exercise would be In direct
conflict with the known purposes Of the trainers to
make the executive and Legislative departments as
nearly independent Of each other as possible.
THE THEORY OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
was that body OF men should be chosen for the
express purpose OF electing President and Vice
dl9tpQulyned
eminent ability aud wisdom; who would be inde
pendent OF popular passion; who would not be in
ruenced by tumut csbal or intrigue; and that in
the choice OF Tie President they would be left per-
1ectly free to exercise their Judgment in the seec
ton OF the proper person. In short, the idea was
that a small body OF select men could be more
safely entrusted with the election Of President and
Vice President than the whole body Of the people.
Now that democracy IL better understood and
tested, we have learned
LARGE ELECTORAL BODIES CAN BE MORE SAFELY
than small ones that while It NAV be possible to
corrupt small bodies 1t Ia impossible to corrupt
| large ones, and that the danger Of tumult, which
was present In the minds Of the trainers Of the
| constitution, arises chiefly rom the exclusion Of
! the masses from power and comforting Ii upon
iew That the candidates for electors should be
pledged In advance to vote Tor particular persons
was not only not contemplated by the trainers Of
| the constitution but was expressly excluded by
| their theory. They were to be Independent, not
Influenced by previous c0mmlttals or engagements.
| 80 that when they came together they could de.
iberate with perfect freedom for the best interests
! OF the Republic How completely this theory has
been overturned In practice Tor more than
! seventy years 1t was unnecessary to recite.
| Tie electoral colleges have turned out to be wholly
useless Every reason given for their original es-
adjustment has absolutely JAILED in practice. But
| while they are poweress Tor good, they may be po-
| tent Tor evil In their election errors may easily
be committed, and in very many instances have
been. While
NOBODY WOULD nnrAxs THE NAME OF GRANT OR
GREELEY,
changes in the names on the long list OF electors