Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1873-08-22
GB.r DOUBLBD.fy,s SPEECH 1T
THE SOLDIERS RB UyyIOyv.

THE SOLDIBRS RBU.vEO.v.
am not in the habit Of making speeches,
but will give you plain statement of my
connection with the Vermont regiments at
the battle of Gettysburg. had heard of
the First Vermont brigade all through the
war as belngI one of the bravest in the ar
my, so that when the 2nd Vermont brigade
was assigned to my division I placed great
reliance upon what they would do.
They reported TO me at the close of the
first days fight at Gettysburg, the most
desperate fight of the war, where the First
Corps went in $500 strong and came out
2,45O.
On the morning of the second day 1 had
this brigade formed in close column by di-
visions, ready to go TO any part OF the field
at moments notice. As a highly distin-
gushed regular officer, General Tidbal,
was riding past he was much struck by the
soldierly appearance of the men, and in
qulred the name of the organization and
corps TO which it belonged. Later in the
day when Sickles and his supports were
driven back and Longstreet was makinga
gap in our lines, Gen. Tidbal happened to
DC ul anu ItCOlIlutDueu Ob0.
Meade to put the Vermonters in at the
threatened point. The order was immedi-
ately issued 10 that effect. Without going
into details I will merely state that STAN
nard's three regiments under Colonels
Randall, and Nichols and Veazey behaved
in the most gallant manner. formed
them in column of regiments, supported
by the remainder of the division and charged
to the front. They re-establshed our line,
drove the enemy back, reganed battery
which had been captured and had belong
cd TO the End corps and lastly took two guns
belonging 10 the enemy.
We remained on this part OF the field
until the contest was over, ST nnard's
brigade in front and the old troops ia the
rear.
On the third day the crisis of the battle
came. / shall never forget, and the coun-
try will never foget that crow ming and de-
cisve movement at Gettysburg when, az
| ter a cannonade almost unprece Tented in
war, 1900 of Lees veterans under Gen.
Pickett attempted 10 break through our
center and scatter the Union army 10 the
winds. Picketts first movement was di-
lGClly lONdluS DuI lOT
some reason he turned OFT TO his left and
came out in front of the End corps. Per-
| haps he did not like the looks of the Yer.
mont boys. He had taken the precaution
| to guard his right with two brigades, but
as they did not follow the last movement
of his, they left his flank fully exposed.
About this time, as heavy reinforcements
were coming in and was assigning them
to position, Stsnnard changed front for
ward, formed directly on the right flank
of the enemy and poured in deadly volleys
of musketry at short range. The rebels
could not stand this double fire upon their
front and flank. They crowded in towards
their center, 10 try to get away from these
troublesome Vermonters. The force of
their charge was entirely broken on their
right, but the rebel General Amistead on
the left succeeded in penetrating our lines
and in placing his hands upon one of our
guns. 1t was only for a moment He fell
mortally wounded and with his fall the in
vasion of the North ended. Lee was only
too happy TO get away aud recross the Po-
tomac.
Stannard now turned upon the brigade
| which Pickett had assigned 10 defend his
flank, tried the same mode of attack upon
them, and helped them TO enter our lines,
but closely guarded by his men.
I think the Vermonters must have
chronic way of getting on the enemy's
flank. That battle of Bennington was q
kind of flank attack upon Burgoyne's army,
and l noticed that he (Burgoyne) wrote to
the British Government complaining that
he could not reach Albany because the
Green Mountain Boys were formed, as he
expressed it, like dark cloud on his left
flank.
thank you comrades for the attention
with which you have listened to me, and
for the cordial welcome have received at
your hands, and wish every one of you a
happy and a prosperous future.