The New York herald., 1873-11-17

De ready in few weeks; but the supply for smaller
ports and reserve for all ports is needed. The
channel distractions are things to be provided az
actually required upon plans already prepared Tor
each port, and the floating batteries exist only in
experimental. designs.
WHAT WE LACK.
The most serious deficiency is the want OF
proper armament Tor fOrts and batteries. over
ll,ooo smooth bore guns. OF 20 is and 10 inches
caliDre, are required to arm the works, or which
less than one-tnrd are in existence. There are
only some so mortars where 300 are required. Of
the 5000 r.fed gun, needed IN the plan OF a.ma-
ment not one can be made until a successful issue
results from trials and experiments that are yet far
from completion. In case OF emergency, however
sucn guns as ar in existence could be mounted
and with late improvements in powder, might be
used effectively. 1t Is evident that army officers
who have any Knowledge at all upon the subject
such as engineer AMI ordnance oilicers, have q
wholesome respect for the offensive power OF the
Spanish navy, aud would, IN case or need, feel
bound to put iortn their best efforts in preparing
our sea coast de.ences against the passage OF hos
tile Spanish vessels into our harDoTs.
CUBAN INVASION.
Y The opinions gained upon the subject OF invasion
and conquest OF Cuba may be summarized as fol-
lows;-
The invading army should consist Of at least
$4,000 men, heny II not wholly volunteers The
regulars beng confined to the requisite number
oil batteries OF light artillery and sufficient
cavalry for scouting and escort duty From
considerations OF economy In transporta-
tions, ter reader power OF becoming acc
mated, the possibility Of Withdrawing them from
the country win less disturbance TO industry ana
the opportunity o. winning back their allegiance
to the nag. the volunteers should be taken princi-
paly from the South. Volunteers are preferred by
the War Department TO militia organizations for
the same reasons that controlled the choice OF
volunteers in the civil war.
THE POSSIBLE LEADERS.
Gener i Sheridan was named in answer to my
inquiry concerning the probable commander or
such an expedition, II IL sent, it being belief
in the army that "Little Pn Is possessed OF
genus for tactical combinations and strategy that
has oeen overlooked by the country in its admira-
tion o the dashing qualities that made him re-
nowned as q cavalry olicer and the presumption
being that General Sherman. as Commaider-in-
CHIEF, would find his proper field OF duty at Wash
ington.
Among The names of the officers now on the
active list OF the army VINO, by reason OF present
rank and reputation made in the late war or
service, are regarded as probable selections for
subordinate Commands are those OF SchOfeld
Mcdowell, Terry and Crook. among the generals;
Mckenzie. Custer, Merritt, Baker Merrill, Carr
and Alexander, OF the cavalry; Upton, OF the
artillery; and Hazen, Miles, Tuly, Stanley, Davis
Crittenden and McCook, OF the infantry.
| AS there would be great deal OF detached SER
vice. much admixture OF military and civil admin
stration and quite large number OF virtually in
dependent garrsons, 1t IS thought that there would
be ample employment Tor the larger half OF the
| officers just named, besides the rank and talent
coming into service temporarily with the voun.
| tcers. AS the success OF military operations de-
pends largely apon the staf the exploration OF the
resources OF the army list necessarily extended to
| the principal staT corps, discovering among the
adjutant generals OF approved reputation WhIpple
| Vincent, relouse, McKeever and Taylor: among
| the Inspector generals, Hardis, Davis, Baird and
| Ludn- ton among the quartermasters, Hoablrd,
| Chandler, Batchelder, Bingham Ludington and
| SawGelle; among the engineers Barnard, Tower,
| Wright, Newton, Gilmore, Warren Craighill, Com.
! stock ano Elliott; and among the surgeons-in
chieI, Cooper, Baxter. McFarlin, vallum ana
! Webster.
WORK FOR THE NAVY.
The most dificult question come cted with an
invasion OF Cuba Is conceaed TO be the landing OF
| troops and their material on the island. Ali the
officers lnterrogated confessed that the under
taking would be one OF great doubt and danger,
and none were prepared 20 suggest at the mo-
mentany better plan tnah to raise and embark the
| force as speedil, as possible, surround It with
the full strength OF the navy, trust TO our
war vessels to give iul employment to the feet
that Spain would be sure to Concentrate, even II
| they had TO draw on and run for home or neu-
! tral port after landing was effected, and land
| the troops wherever Landing could be
made either together or-what would proba.
bly, become necessary-in isolated detach-
ments strong enough to defend themselves
with Cuban aid and assistance, and near
| enough to concentrate for offensive operations
after all are ashore. But even that would not be
leasble unless our navy were able to wrest safe
and commodous harbor from Spanish possession,
or We were willing to bear the loss OF such OF the
transports as could not eude or outrun the
| Spanish cruisers after unloading.
THE QUESTION OF SUPPLIES.
| 1t would be necessary. too, to keep open COM
municati0n with the United States to obtain sup
| plies although 1t is believed that an invading
! iorce could maintain Itself Tor a considerable time
on such supplies as might be in the island and the
| corn, rice, coffee and sugar that are products
| IN abundance. Once safely ashore, an In
vading army would not encounter insur-
mountable difficulties. Though but little is
personally known OF the country among army
| officers, there are excellent Typographical maps
| and charts in the War Department, which, with
other means OF Information now under examina-
| tion give assurance that the Eastern Department
where the insurgents are in force is far the worst
part Of the island for military operations and that
| on the favorable side or the account there
are in other parts wagon roads enough
and good enough Tor those who have fought in our
own war OF rebellion, and eomparat lively few engi-
neering difficulties such the passage OF wide and
deep rivers,
In brie, ,almost anybody in army uniform is ready
to undertake the conquest OF the island, though
| nnn rn1 20 ,,,at
liie and property and in what time the conquest
could be effected.
SMALL ARMS
Any war with Spain, should 1t follow from the
present complication would lind the country short
breec leaders of the lataa N attarn ,ho,rh ,na