The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1873-11-07

| sttfhtion. "a.
There have already been numerous deci.
sions Of the United States courts constituting
these exemption clauses In the bankrupt
act. To test the soundness of these decisions
the appeal is,to the appellate courts of the
United States, but not to Congress. ~
| Prior to the act OF 9th Of June, 1872, ths
exemption allowed a bankrupt both ~ to
amount and the estate out Of which it war
to be taken and the description or person to
whom it was TO be allowed, was fixed BY
State laws In force In 1854. The bankrupt
| act was decided to be uniform by reason OF
| this characteristic.
Such State laws as were In force In 1884
governed In these three respects the allow.
ance of exemption In bankrupt courts. The
act of 1872 merely changed the date to EN-.
brace State laws Of exemption in force In
1871. But who was to have exemption, out
OF what property and to what extent, re-
NAMED unaltsred, the declaratory part OF
the act of 1873 to the contrary notwithstand-
ing.
1t Is contended at bar that the act of
March 3, 1873, IS not an act which gives
wider scope or more force to the State ex.
emptiOn laws, which heretofore have been
| the only authority for homestead exemption
in the Bankruptcy Courts, but that 1t itself
provides statutory exemption paramou Mt
to all liens Of judgments and DEGREES of
whatever date, and is only limited in amount
by the provision of the State statute
II the act Of March 3, 1873, intend to give
the State exemption laws qud Stale laws a
force and power which the State could not
give them, then it is void, because it has
been decided by the Supreme Court in Gum
Barry that to give q bankrupt an exemp-
ton from debts or liens created antecedent
| to the passage OF the exemption law is TO i'm
pair the obligation of a contract.
This the States are forbidden to do by the
Constitution Of the United States. No act Of
Congress can enable them TO do 1t in the
face of this constitutional provision by de-
clarng that State statutes shall have this
force.
If 1t be maintained, on the other hand, that
the act Of March s, 1878, although it refers
to the act Of 1872, itself an amendment to
the bankrupt act, which had always been
construed as directing the Bankrupt Court
to look to the exemption law Of the States
for the description of person who might
claim exemption, and for the amount and
species Of property to be exempted, pro-
vided a direct statutory exemption of 50
much property In value az was exempted by
State laws, and that this exemption was to
override and be paramount TO all antecedent
liens of judgments and DEGREES, we meet this
difficulty. L.
The Supreme Court of the United States,
In Gum & Barry, speaking ola law of Geor-
gia to which was given this construction,
says:
alt (meaning the statute of Georgia.
withdraws the land from the lien of the
tl,,u AAxf fnA pi<
of property which the creditor bad acquired
in the pursuit Of his remedy. 1t is, in effect,
taking person's property and giving it to
another without compensation. This is con-
trary to reason and justice, and to the fun
damentsl principles of the social compact"
We must not, II We can avoid II, give 10
the act Of Congress such construction as
would be contrary to reason and justice.
We must not suppose they intended to
violate the fundamental principles Of the 80
cial compact. Yet, TO cay Congress has pro.
vided by the act Of March 8, 1878, that every
bankrupt shall have his property restored to
him freed from the liens vested In his credi.
hold that they have done as the Legislature
of Georgia bad dOue--t. e., enacted law
contrary to reason and justice, and. In the
view of the Supreme Court, subyersivo Of
the fundamental principles OF the social CON-
pact.-Gunn Q. Barry, Il Val.
Such view cannot be entertained.
There IL but one other construction to be
given to the ststute, and that IL, that like all
statutes it Is prospective. The statute
itself, after declaring what "should" or
ought to be the exemption, declares that
such it "shall be" in future--,. e., utter the
passage of that act; that it Is intended to
provide that no judgment or decree OF any
State court, rendered after the passage of
that act, shall debar bankrupt Of his ex.
emption to the extent allowed him under
the statutes OF the State where he resides.
This can be promotiye OF no hardship.
Every creditor will know what In future is the
effect of his Judgment lien acquired since the
passage of the act of March 3, 1873.
Every decree of State court to enforce the
PAYMENT of a debt or the obligation of
contract created OF entered into since the
passage Of that act will be made in view of
the supreme law.
The statute of Virginia gives an exemption
out of the property of the bankrupt. 1t
does not give it to him ont Of other peoples
property. Where his property is incum-
bered by lien, it is only the bankrupts SUB
n,odo. The lien creditor, in the language of
the Supreme Court. has vested Interest in
it also, and the bankrupt can only be allowed
IN exemption out of such estate as remains
to him after the vested Interests of others
have been satisfied. ~a. ~. b.
With these views we do not think the
bankrupts in these cases are entitled to the
| homesteads claimed, and will sign an order
reversing the DEGREES Of the District Court
which allowed them. s.s :..-.n@i -..
The james River and Kanawha Canal.
| from the Washington Chronicle