The true northerner. [volume] (Paw Paw, Mich.) 1855-1920, 1873-05-30
NAPOLEON.
The Ex-Emperor's story OF HIS Own
MisfOrtunes.


The Ex-Emperor's story OF HIS own
Misfortunes.
There has Just been published in
Paris book of 270 pages, pretentiously
entitled "Guvres Posthumes, Auto
graphes Inedits de Napoleon III. en-
Exil," of which 81 pages are real, the
rest padding. These pages give the
Emperor's own account of the war down
to the surrender ut Sedan. The manu-
script from which this is printed is de-
scribed as written by the hand of the
Emperor. 1t was originally joined to
the treatise entitled Lies Forces
Militaires de la France" which was pub
lished year ago, in view of the new
army law then under discussion in the
Assembly, and partly in answer to the
declaration of Nj. Theirs that the In
perial regime had neglected the army,
and had not known how to organize or
employ the military resources of France !;
but the Emperor concluded not to pub
lish at that time, and hence the present
issue with flourish of trumpets and at
70 francs copy.
The Emperor's journal begins by
justifying the disposition of the different
corps at the opening of the war. An
invading army taking the offensive
against Germany must, writes Napoleon,
either advance on the left against May
ence, or to the right, crossing the Rhine,
and entering Baden. Metz and Stras-
burg are clearly the principal points of
concentration, whence the respective
corps should be able to unite, either for
passage OF the Rhine or passage tow
ards the North. An advance from
Strasburg would have added to the diff
culties of the Rhine the defiles of the
Black Forest, or else the siege of
Bastadt, which did not appear favora-
BILE point Moreover, concentration in
Alsace had the advantage of permitting
France to unite seven corps darmee at
the proper moment, without disclosing
his projects to the enemy. 1t is need
less to enter into any discussion of this
point. 1t is concluded with reserva-
ton which, indicating the inefiiciency of
the army, and the Emperor's ignorance
of the fact, accounts for all that fol-
lowed:
"But, in order that it (the concentra-
tom should take place there, it was
necessary for all the corps to be equally
ready to begin the campaign. Since an
army is a giant body, the limbs of
which should mutually support each
other and should act together, if even
one part only should fail, the whole will
be paralyzed, and it will be no longer
possible to execute the general plan.
Thus it was indispensable not only that
the troops concentrated at Metz should
be ready to move, but that the corps
mustered at Belfort should have arrived
at Strasburg to strengthen that of Mar
shall MacMahon, and that Marshal Can
roberts corps de reserve should have
replaced in Lorraine the troops about to
enter Germany. Unfortunately, the
hopes formed could not be realized"
The reason for this is very simple.
The Emperor had estimated that he
could bring 1856, 900 men into the field,
against the 430, 900 mustered by North
Germany and the Southern States.
This proved delusive. When he arrived
ut Metz, July 25, there were only 220,-
600 men in the field, and there were
many of them comparatively unquipped.
The Army of the Moselle-220, 600 on
paper-mustered only 10000. Mar
shall MacMahon had but 10000 out of
1O7, 900 credited to his command. Gen.
Douays Belfort corps was not up to the
standard number. The real strength of
France was 10000 less than the esti-
mated strength.
The passage of the Rhine was, under
these conditions, abandoned, but, yield
ing to the clamor for !gJoire and some
thing to make show on the bulletins,
the Emperor advanced on the Sarre,
where brief advantage was won in the
capture OF Saarbruck by Frossard' s
corps. The capture enabled Frossard
to preventive Prussians, now concentrate
ing at Treves, from making use of the
railway as means of transport east,
and assured the passage of the river.
The army waited here two golden days,
waiting for that which should have been
ready-for the formation of the Army of
Alsace by a junction with the Seventh
Corps, and for the reserve corps to ar
rive at Metz. August 4, the second day
after the furry at Saarbruck, came the
news of Douay's defeat at Wissembourg.
The Emperor Immediately ordered the
army to concentrate at Metz, and placed
Bazaine in command of the three corps
on the Sarre.
This is Napoleon's account of The
opening of the campaign. Had Mac
Mahon had ibis 100000 instead of his
10000 at Woerth, the fortunes of the
war might have been even then reversed;
but after Woerth the struggle was
against terrible odds. The Emperor
still found himself at the head of 120,-
600 men at Metz, but it was 100000 OPP
posed to three armies, either of which
outnumbered his.