The New York herald., 1873-12-08


tons were made to inaugurate the movement in
! April, 1862 at which time IL was thought all the
| arms and necessary supplies could be obtained
and properly distributed but the intention having
been discovered by the Spaniards the outbreak
was anticipated by several months. and on the
10th OF October OF the year previous 1t took place.
The Cubans preferred to go to the field without
! arms rather than remain and be executed
IN cold blood by the Spanards. From
| that moment the only question has been
how TO obtain arms from abroad. The Spanish
government, being well aware that the oppressed
people OF the great Antille had means enough to
arm their forces and 10 create navy, connscated
the property Of a great part OF them. This prop
erty amounted to several hundreds OF millions OF
dollars US can be proved by the ofical records in
Havana. This measure could not, however, pre-
vent the patriots from buying arms, though II d.
minished. TO an immense extent the revolutionary
resources BY private subscriptions OF Cubans
only there have been purchased IA steamers, 10
sailing vessels and 10000 rifles. Unfortunately, as
the requisite funds could not be collected rapidly.
1t was impossible TO Apply them on as large scale
as necessary to evade the Spanish blockade and
not 10 break in any respect the neutrality laws OF
this country. The expeditions, sometimes owing
20 the scarcity OF resources and at others TO the
want OF experience natural under the circum-
stances-have not always arrived at their destina-
uons. II was essential 10 employ greater amount
OF money at one time than could be obtained from
private subscriptions. There were three methods
or raising such money-sendng TO sea to prey
upon Spanish commerce, exchanging for funds
those products remaining within the extent OF the
insurgent lines and to negotiate a foreign loan.
To the first was presented the obstacle that the
worthy representatives or the Cuban Republic ut
that time did not dare TO assume the responsibility,
as they were made aware that the American
government would not view favorably the exist.
ence OF Cuban pryateers when IL was pressing the
Alabama claims. To the second existed the OBJ
stacle that, Cuban bellgerency not being recog-
nized. it was impossible to excite the spirit of gain
to engage in any enterprises the object OF which
was to run the blockade. The third had for its
obstacle that all the European and some
American houses disposed TO enter upon It's
negotiation imposed always as sine qua
non condition the previous recognition OF Cuban
pelhgerency by the United States Consequently
the main object OF all our diplomatic efforts has
been, during certain time, to bring about such
| recognition. The Spauiards on their part know
! ing that the immediate loss OF the island would
result from this recognition, stopped at no means
TO prevent its accomplishment, and without doubt
they have displayed herein great diplomatic
sagacity. But II on the field OF intrigue they
/ gained the result which they desired they were
not equally fortunate on the field OF battle AS was
natural, the greater part OF the unarmed Cubans
and families who were within the theatre of the
war were dispersed or sent away in The midst Of
/ the military movements. AT the same time a reg
uar army was formed equipped by the arms and
materials furnished by her successful expeditions
and with those taken from the enemy, which army
has, during the past five years. been increasing in
numbers, morale and strength.
In order to make proper estimate OF the i'm
portance OF the war it is sufficient to refer to the
ofhcal data collected by Mr.. sickles, the American
Minister to Madrid. and sent by him the Depart
ment OF State. One year ago he stated that the
Spanish army in Cuba had lost during the first
four years Of the war; 60 900 men, and it was sup
posed that the Cuban loss had been correspond
ingly great. Admitting that the loss, during the
past year, the most bloody OF all, has been pro-
portion equally large, ii will be seen that since the
beginning OF the war 10000 men have persisted.
The loss resulting from the destruction OF p1op-
the VALUE OF THE PREDICTIONS
which could have been controlled by the republi-
can government OF Cuba during the first months Of
the war is estimated at slO,o90,0oo These produc-
| operations which followed. The value OF the crops
in those districts which constitute the seat OF war,
ana which have been lost, can be estimated at
sl5,o00,0Oo year. The stock farms, the sugar
! plantations destroyed and the towns reduced 10
! ashes, extending over an immense area, represent
uninsured loss OF $500 900; for 1t is mpossi
Bile TO estimate at less amount the rich and now
deSOldte districts or Santiago de CUBA. Guantana-
mo, Bayamo Manzanillo, Holguin, Tunas, CANA
quay and a part OF Cinco Villas And what is the
most wonderful, Notwithstanding all these i'm
mense losses OF lie and property the non-recognt
ton OF the belgerency OF the Cubans by the United
states and the supreme EFFORTS made to suppress
viii deny, stronger than ever, aud they have an
army which renders nugatory all the efforts OF
their foes IN the field Their hearts have been
tempered until they injustice proof They
proceed, step by step, but with firm determina-
tion though lamenting that the protracted task,
/ Nghf Ap enn1n hy rhn hn in fha
cogntlon OF their beligerency by this country, VIII
compel the postponement OF their independence
until the ruin OF the island Is complete. With the
slow but inevitable march OF the cancer the liberia
ting army Is encroachng upon the Spanish
dominion III the island. As time moves on this do
minion Is constantly growing weaker IN the midst
OF its furious convulsons while the revolution is
constantly spreading. and the ultimate result VIII
be to destroy IN America the lgnominous power OF
the nation oil Torquemada Alva and Burriel.
The Cubans, notwithstanding the embargoes and
confscatlons from which they have suffered,
always enabled TO raise funds among themselves,
and every effort made by them 10 give assistance
to the liDerating army is always succeeded by an
other, and there is possibility OF cessation OF
those efforts. Those VINO are compelled 10 remain
In the island under the Spanish yoke, whatever
may he their position Ia the estimation or the
Spanish government, always contribute something
10 the treasury OF the patriots, evadlng the vigil
lance OF the oppressors while those who reside
elsewhere continually labor that they may deposit
the result upon the altar of their country. And, ii
1t Is true that the expeditions sent out are not
formidable as they would be, following the success
ful negotiation OF loan, they have ever,
TO some extent, resulted IN advancing the
cause. The patriots have never been
wanting IN fghtlng material, as every man
capable OF bearing arms has always been inclined
to do SO, They have done and they do everything
alone, entirely alone, Notwithstanding the fact
taat they nave been opposed by an army stronger
than that which Great Britain sent to this country
to suppress the American Revolution, ADDED To
the number winch spain herself sent ont to sup
press the revolts against her power in Mexico and
In her South American colonies. With all this ex-
traordinary force, wlth formidable navy ami the
best American weapons tie Spanish government
has year after year its battalions disappear,
and IL has no resources to-day 10 replace then 10
fDliy appreciate
THE PATRIOTISM AND STRENGTH or THE cUBANs
II is wen to consider dspassonately the history OF
those peoples who have achieved their indepen-
dence. Your Excelency Will recall that no OF
them has succeeded IN breaking the yoke OF oppres-
SION without extraneous assistance. IL is easy TO
comprehend this TACT. When one people subdues
another II takes every precaution to ortfy It's rule
and TO prevent the yanquished from obtaining