, 1873-12-04
THE VILE DU HAVHE.


catastrophe occurred and the largo proportion
of foreiEnera among tho Loaf, ,ovory one acoma to
realize tho full horror Of the sudden and rt-
moreoless aaoriloo Of human life. Tito later &C.
counts Of tho disaster are not calculated to loss-
on ita revolting character, for 1t becomes ap-
parent, as was suspected at tho very first,
that tho collision between tho Vil1o du
Aayre and tho Loeb Earn was tho
result Of want OF discipline on tho
Htoamor. and criminal neglect TO tnIeo tho ordi-
nary precautions that might have ayertcd tho
disaster. II this suspicion shall be absolutely
confirmed tho catastrophe will take on new tor
rora, for tho loss Of 22o human lives will then
havo boom q sacrifice to tho prevailing rcck1esa-
mesa Of tho time. We must always tako tho
chanccB Of lightning, storm, hurricane, tornado,
and other disturbances in Nnsuro, whercvor and
howovcr we travel. But whom to theso IL added
tho risk Of Incompetent or raokleas acamaustip,
the assurance Of safety is comparatively aliglt,
and disaster is moro likely to DO criminal than
accidental.
To say that purely accidental collision be-
tween . steamer and saillng-vessol at Hoa is
utterly impossible, is not, we beliovo, an unfair
proposition. Tho very e1panso OF ocean, aud
tho iuanisosimal proportion Of it which two ves-
sells pow in thcir progress, rcndera 1t almost in,
possible. In addition to this. tho transatlantic
atoamora profoss to have such thoroughucss Of
organization. discipline, aud appliances us to
surely avert 1t. In tho case OF 4 sailing vessel.
Its course may DO wrcstod from huAnn control
by adverse winds; 1t iB managed by losa
numerous crew and furnished with inferior &C.
| ooutroments; 1T moro likely in q hundred ways
to become unmanagoabls. This Ia attestod by
the fact that sailingveases given tho right Of
way over steamers under the common law OF ocean
| navigation. Alarge and woll-appointed steamer,
on the other hand, has steam powor to check as
we'll as propcl, to vcor around nt tho shortest
notice, aud to answer tho command OF its officer
with the docility Of MI automaton. Its officers
| and crew aro numerous and well paid, aud sup
| poae1 to DO experienced and educated. Mon arc
not ovorworted, and the watches arc changed
| frequently enough to insure vigilance. These
| things arc among the advertised advantages Of a
hrat claaa ocoan.stoan1er. together with the most
complete life-saving apparatus In caso OF acci-
| dent. Tho circumstances Of the late collision
bcen supplied ind uayigated according to this
| programme, tho catastrophe would haye been
| avertel
Au unavoidable collision could only occur to
! steamer in open sea In q condition whore the
| fog is 60 denso that nothing cnn DO acen, and
| tl&p storm 30 violent that nothing can be heard.
If there is moroly fog, thesteamer lts whis-
tics, cannon, nnd othor signals with which to warn
other vessels OF it's location If there it a.orm
( and fog, it has ita lights, rockets. and still
other signals. A denso fog and violent storm
cannot occur at tho same tl1no, as the fog is
always local, md must be soon scattered by
strong winds. And. aB q matter Of fact, tho
Villo du Havro WAS too far east to encounter
fogs. The conclusion that there was groas neg
loot somewhere is therefore ineyitable. It ia
stated, iii fact, that the sailor Oh tho look
out on the Vile du Havro now maintains that
he sighted aud reported yesaol ten minutes
before tho collision. II tha is true, nothing but
| drunkenness, incompetence. or decentralization
il the discipline Of the force could havo male a
collision possible. From present accounts, inef-
tlciency on tho part Of the officer In charge aud
. general lack Of discipline appear to be the ex-
planation OF tho disaster. Tho lack OF discipline
ia fully confirmed by tho wild confusion which
prevailed on tho steamer after she waa struck,
and tho dastardly scramble for boats on tho part
OF tue orow. It is also attested by the Captains
Eroposal, after tho Loch Earn had rescued tho
survivors, to transfar his crow to the frat steam
Or they met and leave tho passengers TO look out
for thomselver.
It IL said TINT tho French Government will
Institute an immediate inquiry into tho causoa
OF tho disaster. There ia reason to botioYo that
tho investigation will DO thorough, and that the
punishment for any criminal neglect or recklasa-
neas which may bo proved will bo prompt and
ample Wo hope this may bo 80. Thoro aro
only Two ways In which tho management OF
Atlantic passenger stoamors can DO controlled
| in the intereat Of public safety. Ono Ia
tho sovoro and prompt punishment Of the
men WHO neglect their duticB or whc
hayo assumed responsibilities for which thoy
aro untitled. Tho other Ia refusal on the parl
Of the public to patronlzc steamship companies
under whoso management demonstrated inca,
pacity Or neglect laa resulted In disaster. Both
theao corrcctiyca should DO applied whelaoyoI
tho responsibility for loas Of life can be traced
to iueihcienoy or reohlosbneBa, and to thia ont
tho most thorough aud impartial official inyeat1-
CATION ia ncceHHary. Tho French Government
lIas tho reputation Of probing such casos to ttt
bottom, and ne hope tho Villa du Hayrs collision
Mill not be an exception.
|
A correspondent Of the New York Tribune
reviewing tho History Of tho Union Trust Com
pauy OF that city, atates SONS facts which place
It in worry damaging posltlon. It vas chartered
In 1864 AZ strictly truat company, composed oI
man yh0 ueYh nrnp,1n,cd m In r,,oio1, ~ h,,,i