The Louisiana Democrat. [volume] (Alexandria, La.) 1845-1918, 1873-09-17
The Mode Of Choosing the PreSi-
dent.

the Senate authorized the Committee
on Privileges and Elections, of which
Mr.. Morton is chairman, to sit during
the recess for the purpose Of consider.
inc the best mode of choosing the
President and Vice President of the
limited States. Mr.. Norton is said to
have been giving his attention to the
suliect, but no meeting of the commit
tee has vet been held, and Mr.. Morton
has not favored the pnblic with any
statement of his views. AS for the
other members of the committee, they
are probably too much occupied in
hack nay, to bestow much thought up
IN the mode of choosing Presidents
The newspapers, however, ale paying
some attention to the subject, and evil
IDENTIFY do not mean that the committee
shall fail Tor lack f suggestion.
The prevailing opinion seems to be
that the existing system is defective,
and even dangerous, bit there is no
agreement upon any substitute for it.
Some think that the electoral college
has survived it's usefulness, if il ever
was useful, and others think that the
electoral college is well enough, and
that no change is necessary except as
to the mode of ascertaining results and
settling disputed questions. So think
that the President shOnld he chosen by
the popular majority, others thata ma
iority OF congressional districts should
elect, and still others that the smaller
States should, at present, have more
influence in the choice than they would
he entitled to on the basis of mere
numbers. If there shall be as great
difference of opinion among Congress
men AS there is among editors, it will
hardly he possible to secure the requis-
lite two-tlirds majority for an amend
ment embodying any one electoral
plan.
The principal objections urged
arlinst the present plan are these: |.
That it gives the smaller States more
influence than they are entitled to ex-
ercise. Delaware, for example, casts
three electoral votes, whereas she would
cast only one it her wei ght in the cleo
toral college depended solely on opn-
lation. 2. That it gives the State, as
such, too much Influence. To illus
trate, there are niue States which are
entitled to 1874 electors, or a majority
OF the whole number. If there is a
bare maiorit, in each of these States
for particular candidate their entire
electoral vote must he cast for him,
and he will be elected, although the
oppnsing candidate may receive tn. en-
tire electoral vote of the other twenty
eight States, and a million majority
of the popular vote. This is no: mere
IL tleoreiic objection, for the coun-
trv has already had more than one
minority President. Mr.. Lincoln, for
exarple, was elected in 1860. although
he received less than forty per cent, of
the popular vote. A system which
makes it impossible for the popular
will to be to thus thwartpd is thought
to be not only detective but danger
ons. 3. That as the electors are not
constitutionally bound to vote for the
Candidate they are expected to vote
for, but may vote for whom they
please, there is possibility ot thwart-
i ing the popular will by corrupt means.
\ 1t is just possible for wealthy cand-
8 date lacking the votes of one or two
8 States to buy them up, and thus Sc
s cure an election by bribery. 4. That
4 the system makes no adequate pro-
D vision for the settlement of disputed
= questions. Two sets of electoral votes,
for example, may he returned for the
8 same State, which of them is to be re-
Il ceived and counted7 The constitu-
q ton does not provide for any sncI, con
tingency. Neither Congress nor the
courts can presume to decide ques-
3 tiuns of this character without usur-
patton of power.
Such are the chief objections to the
s. existing system. The first of them
cannot he regarded as serious one by
any body, and very many will not con-
& slider it an objection at all. The Sc
cond certainly is an objection, but is
lone that cannot be obviated without
& WHOLLY abandoning the principle Of
The system, and res0rting either to a
direct popular vote or to vote by con.
gressional districts. Either of these
plans would ignore State lines in Presi-
#dential elections, and would require,
for the sake ut consistency, a radical
change in the mode of final choice in
4 cases where there was no popular
choice. If tie people were to vote di-
rectly or by congressional districts. it
would obviously be inconsistent, when
they fail to make choice, to throw
the election into the House of Repre-
sentatives and give alt the States an
equal voice. Consistency would re-