Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1873-05-24
An EX.Emperor's story Of His Own
MisfOrtunes.

An EX.Emperor's story Of His Own
MtsfOrtunes.
There has just been published in Paris a book
tiously entitled "Euvres Posthames Auto
graphs Inedits de Napoleon III in Exil," Of
which thirty seven pages are real, the rest pad
ding. These pages give the Emperor's own &C.
count OF the war down TO the surrender at
Sedan. The manuscript from which this is
printed is described as written by the hand OF
the Emperor: 1t was originally Joined TO the
treatise entitled s.Les Forces Milltaires de la
France, which was published a year ago, in
view OF the new army law then under discus
sion in the assembly, and partly in answer TO
the declaration of NJ. Theirs that the imperial
rtgime had neglected the army, and had not
known how to organize or employ the military
resources OF France; but the Emperor conclu-
ded not to publish at that time, and hence the
present issue with flourish OF trumpets and at
twenty francs a copy.
The Emperor's Journal begins by justifyng
the disposition OF the different corps at the
opening Of the war. An invading army taking
the offensive against Germany must, writes
Napoleon, either advance on the left against
Mayence, or TO the right, crossing the Rhine,
and entering Baden. Metz and Strasburg are
clearly the principal points of concentration,
whence the respective corps should be able TO
unite, either for passage of the Rhine or a
passage towards the north. An advance from
Strasburg would have added to the difficulties
of the Rhine the defles of the Black Forest,
or else the siege of Rastadt, which did not APP
pear favorable point. Moreover, concentra-
France TO unite seven corps fdrmee at the pro-
per moment, without disclosing his projects 10
the enemy. 1t is needless to enter into any
discussion Of this point. Ii is concluded with
reservation which, indicating the ineffciency
of the army and the Emperor's ignorance of
the fact, accounts for all that followed.
" But in order that il (the concentrati0n)
should take place there, il was necessary for all
the corps to be equally ready 10 begin the cam
paign. Since an army Is giant body, the limbs
of which should mutually support each other
SbOulI together
should fail, the whole will be paraly Zed, ana il
will be no longer possible to execute the general
the troops concentrated at Metz should be ready
to move, but that the corps mustered at Belfort
should have arrived at Strasburg to strengthen
that of Marshal Mcmahon, and that Marshal
Canrobert's corps de reserre should have replaced
in Lorraine the troops about to entry Germany.
Unfortunately, the hopes formed could not be
realized
The reason for this is very simple. The En-
perOr had estimated that he could bring 3s5 ,ooa
men into the field, against the $50 900 mustered
by North Germany AMI the southern states.
This proved delusve. When he arrived at
Metz, July Is, there were only DO 600 men in
the field, and there were many of them COM
paratively unequipped. The Army of the Mo-
selle122o 600 on paper-mustered only 10000.
Marshal MacMahon had but 40 900 out of lO7 900
credited to his command. General Douay's
Belfort corps was incomplete. Canrobert's
corps was not up to the standard number. The
real strength of France was 165 600 less than the
estimated strength.
The passage of the Rhine was, under these
conditions, abandoned, but, yielding to the
clamOr for qloire and something to make a show
on the bulletins sthe Emperor advanced on the
Sarre, where a brief advantage was won in the
capture of Saarbruck by Frossard's corps. The
capture enabled Frossard 10 prevent the Prus-
slams, now concentrating at Treves, from max
ing use of the railway a means of transport
east, and assured the passage OF the river. The
army waited here for two golden DAYS, waiting
for that which should have been ready-fOr the
formation OF the army of Alsace by a junction
with the 9Th corps, and for the reserve corps to
arrive at Metz. August 4, the second day after
the Hurry at Saarhruck, came the news of Dou-
avs defeat at wissembOurg. The Emperor i'm
mediately ordered the army to concentrate at
Metz, and placed BaZaine in command OF the
three corps on the Sarre.
This is NapOleOn's account of the evening of
the campaign. Had MacMahon had his lO7 900
war might have been even then reversed: but
after WOerth the struggle was against terrible
odds. The Emperor still found himself at the
head of 10 coo men at Metz, bat Ii was I2O.opO
opposed TO three armies either of which outnum-
bered his.
1t is uninstructivet 20 follow the narrative from
disaster to disaster until Sedan swamped i'm
perIal France and its army together. The story
OF the surrender is told at length, the Emperor
being at great pains to explain how little part
he had in that transaction. Elsewhere the me-
moir is temperate in its tone, manly and digni-
fed. Here, by way Of concluding tableau, the
ex-imperial author INDUCES in a little more
pathos and dramatic disposition of the scenery
than is necessary to historical statement or
even advisable except in a Bonaparte.