Liberal Republican. [volume] (Dallas, Or.) 1872-1???, 1873-12-06

which the rights Of each were
recognized and adjusted among
themselves. The first Of these agree
ments, reduced to writing and found in
the record, was made before the
passage of the donation law. The last
seems to have been made in conse-
quence OF that enactment, and was
evidently designed to give effect to
their previous compromise agreements,
to enable each to acquire under that
act the title to the property, according
to those agreements, and to protect
each other and their vendees when the
title should have been SO acquired.
We are satisfied that by the true
intent and meaning Of these agreements
the equitable right to all the lots in
controversy had been transferred by
Lownsdale TO Coffin before the passage
of the donation act, and that,
as between Lownsdale, Coffin and
Chapman, the equitable interest, such
as we have described it. of the lots in
controversy, was in Coffin or his
vendees.
The record shows that this interest
or claim, whatever 1t was, at the
commencement Of this suit was vested
in Davenport, while the legal title Was
in the heirs Of LowFsdale.
According to well settled principles
of equity often asserted by this Court,
Davenport is entitled to the conveyance
of this title from those heirs, unless
rome exceptional reason is found 70 the
contrary.
Counsel for appellants urge two
propositions as inconsistent with this
claim Of right on behalf of Davenport.
/. 1t is said that the prcviso 10
the fourth section of the donation act
renders void the agreements between
L9wnsdale, Coffin and Chapman.
The proviso referred 10 declares that
all future contracts by any person or
persons entitled to the benefit Of this
act for the sale of the land to which
he may be entitled under the act
before he or they have received q
patent therefor, shall be void. The
act was on its face intended to cover
settlements already made, and the
careful limitation of the proviso to
future contracts Of sale, tha. is, sales
made after the passage OF the act,
raises strong implication of the va
lidity of such contracts made before
the passage of the statute. It was
we'll Known that many actual settlers
held under such contracts, and while
Congress intended TO protect the donee
from future improvident sales, it left
90 ntracts already made undisturbed.
But counsel, resting solely on the
latest written agreement between
Lownsdale, Coffin and Chapman, in
sists that it was void because made
after the donation act was passed.
That agreement was only designed
10 give effect TO the previous contracts
o0 the same subject, and is in accord
with the spirit OF the proviso. And if
this latter agreement is rejected as
altogether void, ii is still apparent that {
by the contracts made prior to the
donation act, the equitable right Of
Cofin to these lots is sufficiently e.
tablished.
The same error is found in the
argument that two OF tho lots in
controversy were sold By Coffin after
the passage Of that act, and the sale is
therefore, VOID. The answer is that
Coffin is not the donee who takes title
under the act Of Congress, but Lowns-
dale. and Lowusdals had made valid
agreement by which has interest in
them was transferred to Cofkn, before
sEas statute was passed.
q. The donation set provides thai
whore the settler has q wife, the
quantity OF land granted is double
that 10 Q single man, and that one
half Of it shall be set apart 10 the wife
BY the surveyor>0sheral, and the title
to it vests in her, and If either Of them
shall have died befoge the patent
issues. the survivor and children, OF
heirs Of the deceased, shall be entitled
to the share or intere st Of the deceased.
\ y.