Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1873-04-19

posed these dm9numoutS, uoI W eho A0e
stature of the State which ratified them:
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIEs OF cITI-
ZENs.
Having shown that the privileges and
| irnmunities relied on in the argument are
those which belong to the citizens OF the
| States as such, are left to the State Govern
ments for security and protection, and not
bythis article placed under the special care
of the Federal Government, we may hold
ourselves excused from defining the priv
leges and immunities OF citizens OF the
Uni.ed States, which no State can aDrloge,
until some case involving those privileges
may make it necessary to do SO. NO case
in this court until that OF Ward ag'. Mary
land ia 1872, required consideration OF
those words as used in the original Constl-
tuition in eference to citizens OF the States;
and 1t may be long before we are called
upon to furnish definition OF the term as
applying to citiZsns OF the United States.
But lest it should be said that no such priv
ileges and immunities are to be found II
those we have been considering are exclu-
ded, we venture to suggest some which
owe their existence 70 the Federal Govern
ment, its essential character, lis Constitu-
ton or its laws.
O06 OF these is well ucoCIlDCu III NhO
case of Crandall agt. Nevada 70 Wallace,
36). 1t is said 10 be the right OF the citizen
of this grea county, protected BY implied
guarantees of its Constitution, ito come TO
the seat of Government to assert any claim
he may have upon that Government, or
transact any business he may have with 1t,
to seek its protection, TO share its ofhces,
to engage in administering its functions.
He has the right to free access to IFS sea-
ports, through which all operations OF for
eign commerce are conducted, to the sub
treasures, land offices, and courts ofjustice
in the several States" And, quoting from
the language of Chief Justice fancy, in an
other case it is said ''that for all the great
purposes for which the Federal Govern
ment was established we are one people,
with one common country. We are all
citizens of the United States;" and it is as
such citizens that these rilhts are support
ed in this Court in Crandall agt. Nevada.
Another privilege of citizen Of the Uni
ted States is to demand the care and pro-
lection of the Federal Government over his
life, liberty and property when on the high
seas, o. within the jurisdiction of foreign
Government. OF this there can be no
doubt, nor that the right depends upon his
character as citizen of the United States.
The right to peaceably assemble. and petit
ton redress of grievances, the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus, ave rights Of the
citizen guaranteed by the Federal Consti-
tuition. The right to use the navigable wa
tiers of the United States, however they
may penetrate the territories of the several
States, all righ,s secured to our citizens by
treaties with foreign nations are depend
ent upon citizenship of the United States
and not citizenship of a State. One of these
privileges is conferred by the very article
under consideration. 1t is that being cit
izen Of the United States any person can Ct
bis own volition become q citizen Of any
State of the Union by acquiring residence
therein, with the same rights as other citi-
zens of that State.
But it is useless to pursue this bran ch Of
the inquiry, since we are of opinion that
the rights claimed by these plaintiffs In er.
ror, even if they exist, are not privileges
and immunities of citizens of the United
States within the meaning of the clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment under consider
alton.
"An persons born or naturalized in the
United States, and subject to ths iurisdic-
ton thereof, are citizens of the United
States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
mites of citizens OF the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty or property, without due process of
law, nor deny to any person within its ju-
risdiction the equal protection ofth laws"
The argument has not been much pressed
in these cases, that the defendants charter
deprives The plaintiffs of their property with
out due process of law, or that it depriVes
then of the equal protection of the laws.
The first of these paragraphs has been in
the Federal Constitution since the adop-
ton Of the fifth amendment as a restraint
upon the power Of the States. The law
then has practically been the same as it now
is during the existence of the government,
except so far as the present amendment
may place the restraining power over the
States in this matter in the hands of the
Federal Government.
THE POSITION OF THE BUTCHERS NOT
SUSTAINED.
We are not without judicial interpreta-
ton, therefore, both State and national, of
the meaning of this clause. 1t is sufficient
to say here that under no construction of
the third provision that We have ever seen,
nor anyLhat we deem admissible, can the
restraint imposed by the State of Louisiana
upon the exercise of their trades by the
butchers of New Orleans be held to be a
deprivation Of property within the meaning
of that provision.
''Nor shall any State deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws"
In the light of the history of these
amendments, and the pervadiDg purpose of
them, which we have already discussed, it
is not difficult to give a meaning to this
clause. The existence of laws, in the States
where the newly ema ncipated negroes re-
side, which Disseminated with gross injus-
tice and hardship against them as a class,
was the end to be remedied by this clause,
and by it such laws are forbidden. But if
the States did not conform their laws TO its
requirements, then by the fifth section of the
article Congress was authorized to enforce it
by suitable legislation. We doubt very
much whether any action of a State
not directed by way of discrimination
against the negro race as class,
or on account of their race, will
ever be held cause within
the purview Of this provision. 1t is so
clearly provision for that race and that
emergency that strong case would be
necessary for its application to any other.
But as it is State that is to be dealt with,
and not the validity of its laws, we may
safely leave that matter until Congress
shall have exercised its power, or some case
of State oppression by denial of equal
justice in its courts, shall demand decision
at our hands. We find no such cas- as in
this one before us, and do not deem it ne
cessary to go over the argument again as it
may have relation to this particular clause
of the amendment.
In the early history of the organization of
the Government its statesmen seem TO
have divided on the line which should
separate the powers of the National Gov
ernment from those of the State Govern
ments, and though this line has never been
very well defined in public opinion such a
division has continued from that day 10
this.
The adoption of the first eleven amend
ments TO the Constitution so soon after the
original instrument was accepted, shows a
preva ling sense, at that time, of danger
from the Federal power. And it cannot be
denied that such a jealousy continued to
exist with many pstriotic men until the
breaking out Of the late civil war. 1t was
then discovered that the true danger to the
perpetuily of the Union was in the capacity