The New York herald., 1873-11-30


point OF view the burning is defcnsible. ana even
necessary. Tney argue that long as the span
iards ind IL profitable TO remain in Cuba tho war
will De continued, but that II the Spanish nation
was compelled to 1nd the money as well
as the men hostilfties would soon cease.
| The chief sources Of revenue are the
sugar and coffee industries, and there
| fore the Cubans burn down the crops and the
mills so that neither profit revenue may accrue
to the Spaniards There is also the additional rea-
son that every abandoned plantation becomes
magazine OF provisions to the Cubans. as owing to
the wonderful fertility OF the soil. the crops grow
year alter year. though In diminished quantities.
| without care from tine hand OF man. IL is owing,
| in great part to this peculiar fecundity that the
insurrection has been able to survive the crushing
blows inflicted in the first years OF the war. Every
! effort was made and continues to be made, To de
! stroy the means OF subsistence OF the insurgents
but 1t is simply OF time. II is true that tem-
| porary inconvenience may sometimes be caused by
| cutting down the banana trees and burning the
| sugar canes; but all these grow again, better and
richer Tor their temporary destruction. The varieties
of root food. the yam cassavR, sweet potatoes, &C.
are very numerous, and as they grow for years
without care and many OF them are in an abso
lutely wild state, the supply Of provisions Is NOT
likely ever to give These are supplemented
by beans and other vegetables OF quick growth
In order to prevent IN future even temporary
want, the Cuban government has given orders for
the establishment OF farms In connection with all
the camps and in the recesses oil the woods, so
that, IN case OF retreat the forces may always find
an ample supply OF food at hand. In fact steps are
being taken TO sustain the indefinitely. II the
| Spaniards persist In holding the island. The
| policy Of destroying the plantations and towns
will be vigorously carried out than
ever, so that Spanish settlement may exist
In the interior This policy is the result OF the ex-
| perience drawn from the offensive operations In
the beginning OF the year. which have led to the
abandonment OF many posts and small towns in
the interior by the Spanards, who for safety have
been obliged 10 concentrate their forces, ana are
| almost wholly on the defensive. The military
| aspect OF the Cuban struggle has this year under
| gone most unfavorabe change so far as Spanish
| interests are concerned. In nearly oil the import
| ant engagements the Cubans have been victorious.
The OF artillery prevents the insurgents gath
! ering all the advantages OF their successes, as,
once the Spanish troops take refuge in their forts
and fortifcations they are practically unassallabe
by men unprovided with cannon. 1t is owing to this
! circumstanc that the utmost vaor on the part OF
the Cubans fails TO give the results we naturally look
for, While the great numerical superiority OF the
| Spanish army enables the authorities to conceal
their losses. which are never made known when 1t
can be avoided No reliance whatever can be
placed on the reports OF spanish officers as exhib-
tied TO the public; they are In all cases doctored
| for political effect.
Perhaps the most threatening feature OF the pres
ent situation are the uneasiness and discomfort OF
| the slave population, which in some instances has
exhibited itself in attempts to burn done large dis
tricts-attempts that in part have been successful.
| There is little doubt hut that the slaves nave
been instigated to commit these acts by the Cuban
labOrontes. there seems to be settled determi
nation TO reduce Cuba to desert state rather than
allow the Spanards profit By the great wealth of
the island. The late fires at Havana seem TO be
further development OF the policy OF destruction.
The idea oil carrying the war into the western De-
partment has certainly been seriously entertained
by Cespedes and the Cuban generals Tor, although
the ground is not so favorable for guerilla opera
tions, the amount Of damage that could be inflicted
on Spanish interests would be much greater than
! lhe injury now caused by the
Should the insurgents be able to put their plans
into operation the present pleasant state OF affairs
IN the Western Department Is likely to come soon
to an end, as the continued prosperity OF trade in
that department is contingent on the absolute
Submission OF the slaves. The indications are that
this cannot be depended on. as. were the restrain
! ing force weakened Withdrawn, servile In
surrection would in all probability immediately
follow. However the immediate future Of Cuba
depends on the action OF the Cuban volunteers In
the Spanish service. Should the movement OF de-
sertion continue and assume really large proper
tions the war will unquestionaby spread west
ward. and affect even the country lying round Ha-
vana. At present the Cuoan insurgents are pre-
vented by their comparative nferiority in num-
bers from undertaking serious operations on a
large scale; for under the most favorable circum-
stances it must be cifhcult for 10000 men TO make
! Y
| combined army and volunteers the Spaniards
| claim to have in arms. Probably one-third
| OF this force is made up OF Cubans, who in secret
are as much opposed TO the Spanards az are the
insurgents. II these men could only make up
| their minds to throw themselves into the Cuban
ranks the suppression OF the insurrecton would
! be rendered well nigh impossible. In the Bayamo
and Manzano districts whole villages have
passed over to the insurgents. The deserton OF a
| lew thousand men may not appear very important
but 1t must be remembered that these men are
soldiers. Passing over 10 the enemy, they place
themselves in position from which they cannot
| retire and must either succeed or be extermi
mated Their adhesion, therefore, gives great
moral and material aid to tue insurrecton.
In view OF these circumstances 1t may safely be
assumed tina. within the past II months the
| the conditions OF the Cuban struggle have been
seriously modified, and that Spains chances sup
pressing the nsurrectionary movement have very
| much diminished The establishment OF the Re-
! public in Spain has also caused divisions and
| party struggles in Cuba, which under other forms
| OF government were unknown Indeed badly
have affairs, both political and military, gone dur
ing the past year that the best informed Spanards
look on the island as lost TO Spain. II would he
much better for Spain IL the government had the
courage to make arrangements either with the in
surgents or some reign Power to sell the island,
| and so terminate war that in all prob
ability Will drag on indefinitely, unless
some com promise is effected. SO long
! as the Cubans not recognized
begerents by OF the great Powers they
| can never succeed in establishing their indepen-