The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1873-06-08

decided on, his enemy was upon hin. Lee
Lad assumed the ohenaive with every man
whom hecoald throw npon his foe. 10
To explain whence this appaxent bad
ness came 10 not difficult. From the hour
of his first commend he resolved on raising
the threatened siege by such decisive
stroke as should at once give heartlto the
army and to tho Government which watch
ed himB anxioasly. But to do this with
full effect he resolved to bring jackson se-
cretiy to his aid, and hence the time for &c.
ton was practically chosen by that general,
fore Richmond without being missed from
the Valley for it was absolutely necessary
for the SUCCESS prepared on the Chickahom-
inv that the alarm of tho Federal Govern
ment for the safety Of Washington should
be kept up, and all succour denied Nc
Cleilan. The plan was carried out with o
complete6ess worthy of the conception.
marched and coantermarched in the Shen-
andoah Valley up to the very hour Of his
suddenly .qnittiDg IL deceived thesFede-,
rails effectuaily there: while McClellcn WAS
tricked for the time into the same belief
that w ashington was threatened by the ruse
Of sendfng detatchments northward from
Richmond-for few miles Of course oniy-
when exchanged prisoners were about TO
quit the;eity. Socompletely wasthe Feaefal
commander deceived on This occasion tint
he wrote,eertainlys NOT W ith any pleasurs,
and in Contradiction Of his forner We've,
to the President on June 90, ~ have no
doubt jackson has been reinforced from
here" The achievements imagined had
at the time long safely returned into Lees
lines, and Jackson was then making his
forced march from the Valley to Richmond
with suoh rapidity and secrecy that even
the bulk of his own men knew nothing of
their destination. To all questions, Mr..
Cooke tells us, they were directed to reply,
81 don't know )" and so when the general
himself demanded of straggler his name
and regiment, the soldier using the license
which never left the Confederate army
throughout the war, put his interrogator
off with the answer the order had enjoined
on him, and of course escaped punishment.
Jackson's distance from Richmond being q
straight line, was short comparatively to
that which any Of the forces he had hith-
order to move round to Mcclellan, even
had they discovered their enemy in the act
of vanishing. Never was the advantage of
what are technically called "interior lines"
more finely used than in this first design
of Lee. Never was theexecution of such de-
sign more ably accomplished than by jack
SOB on this memorable occasion. On the
night Of June 25; before one Of the Fede-
raj officers in. the sphere Of his late opera
tons had missed him from their outposts
before Mcclellan, now abandoning present
hope ofsupport, had issued the orders he was
preparing for his change of base from the
York River to the James; before Lee him
self could hope to greet him Jackson had
left his divisions within a few miles of
after dark to meet his new chief. The col
loquy that followed was but brief. Both
were essentially, in their several ways,
men more of action than words. General
Stuart, the henceforward famous cavalry
general of Lee, had just distinguished
himself for the first time by his raid, or
reconnaissance ia force, round McCieIlan's
posure Of the Federal right and rear. The
orders for the attack had been prepared
by Lees own hand the night before. 1t
was only necessary, therefore, to assign
the new conner his part in the action of
the next day, and all would be ready.
Lees plau.in- effect was this. Leaving
but 25, 900 men under Magruder, TO guard
the front of Richmond on the south side of
the Chickahominy, he resolved to march
the remaining $4,000, under Longstreet
and the two Hills, to the north Of that
stream so as to turn and attack McCieliau's
right, which was under General Porter,
Jackson, keeping still more to the north
ward, was to pass behind this mass of
Confederate troops, and throw his divisions
oSSOuu tAcIu IN decisive JurnlDQ move
ment directed against Porter's extreme
right and rear. Ofcourse this scheme of
operation, which threw some 20 900 men
on the 10000 of McClellan's right, could
only be executed at a certain risk to Rich
mond. Mcclellan, if fully acquainted with
his opponents strength and design, would
almost certainly have ordered Porter to. do
no more than defend-the- Chickahominy
bridges, whilst he himself pressed forward
the bulk of his army to crush the two diyi-
sions left alone under Magruder in his own
front, and if it proved not possible to
attempt the wor ks behind them, at least
might have got between these and Lee.
and so cut the latter OFF from the capital
he had to defend. Bat some risk must
needs be- run by general who, with SO
great an inferierity as Lees, attempts
great com binatfons. And he trusted.
rightly as the event shows, to his adyer,
sary's ignorance of his real strength, and
TO the alarm this pressure on Porter,s
wing would certainly occasion, as sufi-
,ient to keep the Federal attention from
the weakness of the force that !
was left in their front.
The battle of the Chickahominy, which |
asted through the Goth and eth Jone
'ook exactly that course which Lee had de-.
,lpned beforehand Tho hrp1k IS kLn O..