The Leavenworth weekly times. [volume] (Leavenworth, Kan.) 1870-1880, 1873-05-29
HArolEoN.


NAPOLEON.
An Ex.Eopeees,s ssssy sr HIS ON .
0isGose00es.
There has just heen Published in Paris
book Of go pages. Preientiously entitled
'&Euvres Posthumes, Autographs Inedih
de Napoleon Ill. en- Exile" Of which 81
pases are real, the rest padding. Thess
pages give the Emparors own account Of
the war down to the surrender of Sedan
The manuscript from which this il printed il
described - written BY the hand Of the EN-.
peror. 1t Vas originally joined to the treat
ice entitled ''Les Forces Militaires de ID
France" which was published = year ago.
in view of the new army Law then under dis
cus.ion in the Assembly, and partly in ans.
wer 70 the declaration OF Theirs that the Im-
pefial regime had neglected the army, and
had not known how 70 organize or employ
the military resources Of France but the
Emperor concluded not to publish al
that time, and hence the present issue with q
flourish of trumpe,s aud 20 francs copy.
The Emperor's Journal begins by justify
ing the disposition OF the different corps al
the opening Of the war. An invading army
taking the offensive against Germany mu-t.
writes Napoleon, either advance ON the left
against Meyence, or to the right, crossing
the Rhine, aud entering Baden. Metz and
Strasburg are clearly the principal points OF
concentration, whence the respective
corps should be able to unite, either
for passage Of the Rhine or .
passage toward the North. An advance
from Strssburg would have added to the diff
iculties of the Rhine the defiles of the Black
Forest. or else the siege Of Rastajt, which
did not appear favorable point. Moreover,
concentration in Alsace had the advantage
Of permitting France to unite seven corps
d'armee at the proper moment, without dis
closing his projects to the enemy. II is
needless to enter into any discussion Of this
point. 1t ia concluded with a reservation
which, indicating the inefiiciency of the
army, and the Emperor's ignorance Of the
fact. accounts for all that followed:
But, in order that it (the concentration
should lake place there, it was necessary for
all the corps to be equally ready to begin
the campaign. Since an army is q giant
body, the limbs Of which should mutually
support each other and should act together;
if even one part only should fail, the whole
will be psralyzed, ard it will be no longer
possible to execute the general plan. Thus
it was indispensable not only that the troops
concentrated at Metz should be ready TO
move, but that the corps mustered at BelfOrt
should have arrived at Strasburg TO strength
en- that of Marshal McMahon, and that
Marshal Canrobert's corps de reserve should
have replaced in Lorraine the troops about
to enter Germany. Unfortunately, the hopes
formed couIG not be realized
The reason for this il very simple. The
Emperor has estimated that he could bring
3S5, 900 men into the field, against the 43O,-
600 mustered by North Germany and the
States. This proved delusive.
When he arrived at Metz, July %, there
were only 30, 600 men in the field, and there
were many Of them comparatively une-
lnipped. The Army Of the Moselle-22O,-
700 on paper-mustered only 10000.
Marshal MacMahon had but Al, 600 out of
l07 900 credited to his command. Gen.
Douay's BelfOrt corps was incomplete Can
roberts corps Was not up to the standard
number. The real strength Of France was
l65, 600 less than the estimated strength.
The passage of the Rhine was, under
these conditions, abandoned; but, yielding
10 the clamor for gtoi"e and something to
make show on the bulletins, the Emperor |
on the Sarre, where brief advan- |
Inge was won by the capture of Saarbuck by
Frossards corps. TIE capture enabled |
Frosssrd to prevent the Pr ssians. now con- |
at Treves, from making Use of |
he railway ~ a means OF transport east,
md assured the passage of the river. The |
,rmy waited here two golden days, waiting
or that which should have been ready
or the formation Of the Army |
If Alsace by junction with the Sew
nth Corps, and for the reserve corps to ar
i've a. Metz. Aug. 4, the second day after
he furry at Saarbruck, came the news Of
Dousy's defeat at WissembouIg. The en-
,eror Immediately ordered the army to con-
entrate at Metz, and placed Bazine in COM
nand of the three corps on the Sarre.
This ia NapoleOn's account Of the open
ng of the compaign. Had MacMahon had
lis To-, 900 instead Of his Al, 900 at Woerth,
he fortunes of the war might have been even
hen reversed; but after Woerth the struggle
ras against terrible odds. The Emperor
till found himself at the head OF 100, 900
men a, Metz, but it was 100, 900 opposed to
hree armies, either Of which ou.numhered
lis.
1t is uninstrCctive to follow the narrative
rom dis ister to disaster until Sedan swamp
d imperial France and its army together.
he story of the surrender ia told at length,
be Emperor being at great pains to explain
ow little Fart he had in that transaction.
Elsewhere the memoir ia temperate in its
,ne, manly digniied. Here. by way of
the tableau, the ex-impsrial au-
Tor INDUCES in a little more pathos and
ramatic disposition of the scenery than is
to historical statement. or even ad-
isable except in Bonaparte.