Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1873-01-22
Supreme Courf.
MINED MARRIAGEs-sov OF
STATE.

MINED GES-SovEREGNTY OF
STATE.
In the case of the State VS. J. z. Bell
IA white man charged with living with
a colOred woman as man and wife),
Judge Peter P. Turney delivered an i'm
portant opinion on Saturday. J. P.
Bell, a white man, married a negro
woman in Mississippi, according to and
under the laws of that State. The two
moved 10 Davidson county, and cOntin-
ued to live together as man and wife.
Bell was indicted for this Offense. The
Indictment, upon motion, was quashed
below, and the State took an appeal.
Judge Turney said: ''The motion of the
defendant to quash was allowed because
1t appeared upon the face of the indiet-
ment, that the parties were married in
the State of Mississippi. The question
to ee determined is: Does a marriage
IN Mississippi protect persons who live
together in this State in violation of the
act of the General Assembly of June q,
1879? This act makes the offense
considered punishable by imprisonment
in the State PRISON. For the defendant
the case of Morgan VS.. McGee, ) Hum,
Is relied on. That case only decides that
marriages solemniZed according to the
law and usages of the country where
made, are good in Tennessee. 1t was the
manner and form of marriage, and not
the capacity of the parties to contract
the marriage, which was passed upon by
the court delivering the opinion. The
reason for such rule is readily seen.
Each State has its peculiar regulation,
some more, some less strict and formal
The general rule resulting from
all this, that marriage, good in
the place where made after the
forms and usages of that place should be
good everywhere, is intended to prevent
mischief that would otherwise grow
out of difference of formal and local
regulations. For instance, in some of
the States a license is not absolutely
necessary. Now if in one of such States
marriage is sOlemnized without license,
being good there, tits good in Tennessee
where license Is necessary, aud where
a marrying and living together without
license would subject the parties to in
dictment for lewdness. A respect for
and recognition by each State, in fact
nation, of the legal ceremonial of mar
riage in another is all that is meant or
intended by the rule. All standard
authors declare that the rule comes not
eI con1ttGti, but er debito .jItstitiUe. Were
it otherwise, each State would be de-
pendent upon the concurring legislation
and adjudication of every other for the
permanency and efficacy of its own.
Each State is sovereign government
within, and of itself, with the inherent
and essential right to declare and main
tain its own political economy for the
good of its citizens, and cannot be SUBJ
jected to q recognition of fact or act
contravening its public policy and
against good morals as lawful because it
was made or existed in a State having
no prohibition against it, or even per-
mitting it, Extending the rule to the
width asked for by defendant, and we
might have in Tennessee the father liv-
ing with the daughter, the son
with the mother, the brother
with the sister, in lawful we'd
lock, because they had formed such re-
lations in State or country where they
were not prohibited, The Turk or Ma
homedan, with his numerous wives,
may establish his harem at the door of
the Capitol, and we are without reme-
dy; yet none of these are more revolt
ing, more to be avoided or more unnat-
ural than the case before us. Chancel-
lor Kent says that the contract of mar
riage is a stable and sacred contract of
as well as municipal law. This
is neither. Reverse the judgment and
the cause for trial.