New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1873-08-06
REGULATING TIE PRICE OF COIL.

REGULATING THE PRICE OF COAL.
The apologsts for the Coal Conspiracy
represent that it is the intention of the cor
pOrations to keep prices uniform by main
tanning a steady supply, always adequate to
the demand, and thus to put an end to the
panics which have from time to time affected
the public in relation to the supply of fuel.
This, in our opinion, is precisely the thing
which the combination will fail to accomplish.
So long as harmony prevails and good faith
is kept by the several cOnspirators the monop-
oily price may be sustained indefinitely above
the natural price. The higher, however, the
artificial price is carried above the natural price,
the more difficulty there will be in perpetual
ing the alliance. 1t is altogether probable
that before long some of the companies will
cut under the Others by allowing larger COM
missions to purchasers, or in some other OF
the many ways which one of spool" of
gamblers makes use of to cheat the rest. We
may here explain that by the natural price OF
coal we mean the price it could be obtained
for under the free competition of the sellers
in an open market This price could not be
for any great length of time below the cost
of production with a profit at the average
rate obtained in other branches of business.
In all kinds of business profits fuctuate
greatly. In some seasons there are no profits
at all, and in others the gains of men in
business are double the average amount. The
object of the Coal Combination is to secure O
large profit in seasons when free competition
would perhaps give them none at all. We do
not understand that any measures have been
taken to keep down the profits in seasons
when an extraordinary demand might raise
them to an extreme rate. From the very
nature of the business this is impossible
Even if the corporations fixed q maximum
price beyond which they would refuse to CO.
no matter how much the demand might ex-
coed the supply, the result would simply be
that spectators would step in between the
corporations and the consumers and the price
to the latter would be advanced to as high
point as competition could force it. The
game of the corporations is well described in
the vulgar phrase, "Heads l win; tails you
"lose.n
The very existence of this combination is q
great provocation to the miners to strike.
Wages in the coal regions have for long
time been so arranged that upon every ad-
vance in the price of coal there should follow
a propOrtionate rise in wages But under the
old order of things there could be no great
rise in the price of coal without an increase of
demand, and consequently an increase in the
amount of coal called for and of work to be
done. Under the present arrangement of
arbitrary advances of ten cents per
ton per month, any increase in the
miners wages is more than neutral
lied by the diminutiOn of the work re-
quired of him. The increase of forty per cent
in the price of coal since August, 1872, has not
been occasioneds by an increase of the de-
mand, but by q curtaiment of the production.
This is perfectly understood by the miners,
and its effect on them cannot but be de-
moralizing. The natural effect of high wages
paid for piece work is to stimulate produc-
ton, but increased production is just the very
thing which the corporations which employ
the miners now desire to avoid.
If manufacturing is to be checked, and the
present magnificent opportunity to obtain for
eign markets for our coal is to be thrown
away, it is easy to predict that either the
miners will strike as soon as they can do so
with effect, or else they will seek employment
in other parts Of the country. In the latter
event, SnOuIU Jne uenanu IOT anUnraclte coal
again become active, the corporations would
be in no condition to supply it, and coal
would rise even above the price fixed by the
monopoles. .4.. ~.
( 1t is certainly desirable that every manufac-
turing establishment or private family that
can burn other sorts of coal without too great
a sacrifice should do so. There lis said to be
excellent camel coal in West Virginia, on The
line of the Chesapeake and Ohio Railroad,
which can be sold in New-York at q reason
able price. IL this is So the West Virginia
article cannot fail speedily to find market.
If the iron furnaces and rolling mills of the
Lehigh and Schuyikill valleys receive the same
kind of treatment from the monopolies as pri
vate consumers do, the manufacturers of East
ern Ohio and Western Pennsylvania will pros
per at the expense of their Eastern rivals But,
turn which way we may, this great conspiracy
s grievous calamity TO the inhabitants of
New York, w-England, New-Jersey, and
Eastern Pennsylvania In this part of tho |