The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1873-10-11
THE LIQUOR LAW.
How the Rcddick Temperance Law stands the
FireIof the Supreme Court.

In the case of The People VS.. Doug. StreeteT,
an agreed case to test the constitutionality
of the socalled Reddick temperance law,
taken up on appeal from this county, Justice
Scott, on the LIST inst, announced the decision
of the court in the following opinion:
| This was a prosecution commenced before
(. Justice of the Peace against the appellant,
for selling intoxicating liquors without Ii.
ccnse. The Justice found him guilty, and
assessed fine of $50 against him, and rem
dercd judgment accordingly. On an appeal,
taken to the Circuit Court, the cause was sub
mitted on an agreed state of facts, and the
Court, pro io.ma, found the appellant guilty,
and entered a judgment against him Of $50,
and costs Of suit.
From the statement of facts it appears the
appellant resides near the City of Ottawa, in
La Sale County, but not within the limits OF
any Incorporated town or city; that he has
never given the requisite bond and obtained
license to keep grocery as required by
the first section of an act entitled An act to
provide against the evils resulting from the
sale of intoxicating liquors in the State OF
Illinois," approved Jan. -, 1872, and at his
residence, as stated, he has repeatedly sold
intoxicating liquors in less quantity than
one quart, to any person who desired to pur-
chase, to be drank on his premises by the
glass, and liquors so sold were drank by the
persons purchasing, on his premises, by his
permission.
1t is provided, in the first section Of the act
under which this prosecution was commenced,
it shall be unlawful for any person not hay
ing obtained u license to keep grocery, to
sell, in any quantity, intoxicating liquors to
be drank on the premises where SOLD, or III
any adjoining room, or any place OF pubic
resort connected Herewith, and no person
shall be granted IL license withOuttir giving
a bond to the municipality or authority au-
thorized by law to grant licenses, in the penal
sum of $4,000, with two sufficient securities,
which bond shall be conditioned and for the
purposes as therein directed.
The second section provides 1t shall be un-
lawful for any person TO sell intoxicating
LIQUORS to minors unless upon the written
Of their parents, or guardians or
family physician, or to persOrns intoxicated,
or who are in the habit of getting intoxicated.
In the third section it is provided, all
places wherein intoxicating liquors are sold
in violation of this act shall be taken, held,
and declared to be common nuiSances, ana
all such places shall be shut and abatcd, on
the conviction of the keeper thereof.
The sixth section declares what penalties
shall be inflicted on the persons violating the
provisions of the first and second sections of
this act
The admitted facts show clear violation
of the first section of the statute, but not OF
the second.
1t is insisted a conviction cannot be main
tanned unless the evidence shows violation
of the first and second sections. The objec-
tion seems hypercritical 1t Is founded on
the peculiar phraseology of the sixth section,
oh, in,n tho npnultipS and which
vides that every person guilty of violating
the provisions of the :" first and second sec
tons" shall forfeit and pay certain penalties
The penalties imposed by that section are
for the violation of either section, and it Is
not Indispensable party should be guilty OF
a violation of both before he can be subjected
to the iOrteiturcS enumerated This Is the
obvious meaning of the words used, and is
the construction given to the same language
in the statute of Ohio on the same subject, in
Miller VS.. The State g Ohio, 475). Our stat
ute in many respects is "a substantial, and in
other parts literal, transcript of the Ohio
law and it is n rule that, when the Legisla-
turc adopts substantially the statute of anoth-
er State, it is presumed to adopt also the con
struction previously given it by the Courts of
that State, unless such construction is NEON
sistent with the spirit and policy of our laws.
Campbell VS.. Quinlin, 3 Seam 2SS)
1t is urged, the clause Of the third section,
which declares all places where intoxicating
liquors are sold in violation of this act TO be
common nuisances, and shall be shut up and
abatcd, authorizes the destruction of private
property, and, therefore, Contraycncs Const-
tutional law.
The construction of this section is not in
volvcd, directly in the decision Of this case.
Counsel, however, is in error in Supposing ii
authorizes no such thing. 1t simply declares
all places where intoxicating liquors are sold
in violation of this act common nuisanCcs,
and provides they may be shut up and the
illegal traffic carried on there abatcd. The
! object is to prcvcntth assembling of idle and
IcVlLdisposed persons, for the parpose of vio-
Iating the laws of this State Under what is
called the police power, the Legislature has
The right 10 authorize the abatement of a
} pubic nuisance, and the carrying on of an
/ illegal traffic in intoxicating liquors and the
assembling Of idle and vicious persons for
that purpose, is nuisance, and may he so
declared and abutcd according To law Block
IS. The Town Of Jacksonville, 3G Ill Rem
POI, and cases citcdJ
There is nothing IN this clause of the third
section that we are aware of that contruycnrs.
any provision of our Constitution The same
construction has been given to "A like prov.
sion in the OHIO. statute, in Miller vs. The
| Statc-SHprG.
The point which seems To be relied ON with
the most confidence, the act il in conflict with
| that clause of the twenty second section of
the fourth article of the constitution Of 1870,
which prohibits the passage of local or spc-
cial laws granting to any corporation or in
diyidual any special or exclusive privilege.
immunity, or franchise whatever
The reason assigned is, the nc, OF 1853
which purports 10 rc-cnact the laws which
had been repealed by the act oi 1891, that all.
thorized county authorities 10 grant licenses
to keep a grocery, wa, never legally enacted
accordin TO the forms prescribed in the Con
stltution of 1913, and there was therefore no
law IN force at the passage of the act of 1872
authorizing the granting of licenses, other
than the charters of incorporated towns and
cities; and hence, it is said, a person residing
outside of the limits of such municipal cor
porations could not obtain license, and for
that reason tl,. law ppgrIfgs uugpugllV the