The sun., 1873-08-16
The Orld-A COrre-pOudcut is Indignant at
its Follies on the Law OF Libel

10 re EtG0t Or NE sun
SIR: An editorial article in the H'orld of
the 18th inst. entitled "Lhels In the District Of
Columbia" Ia answer to- an article of yours on
the same general subject, deserves attention for
the fallacie- o. it, reasoning and It's unfoundcd
assumptions. some of these propose to point
out.
In reply t. the argument that as the Constitu-
tlon expressly authorizes Congress to exercise
exclusive legislation Ia all cas.s Whatsoever
over the District Of Columbia. therefore Com
grc-> c4n enact "A law authorizing criminal
prose 'ution for libel there, the I0rid seems to
think ID sufficient talthougn II replies turthori to
SAY that exclusive power Of legislation dpesn'
mean unlimited power Il legislation: as though
IHE - were niaiuta aiming that. by virtue OF
the constitutional provision referred 20. Con-
grcsS had fun power tu make at discretion any
law It pleased Tor the District.
Now ill iHE SIN cltim- In the MASSAGE cited
from it hy the uord is tn1t this provision ought
t. give Congress lower To- UroVidc Tor The pun
were crimes or Wi~'lcmeanuis at common law.
Aud might not 'iHE SIS if 1t wished to do sol
maintain NJ the same time. with perfect con-
Si-lthcN' lhht thtro were some acts. neither
crimes nor mi-demednorS ~ common law, from
puni-hnS the doing of which Congress was pro-
hlnied hN ih' '"ii,iiiuti"n' and - "Ner.i'cd
not AN unlimited power ~ legislation. tat "a
power which, though exclusive In that CpnsIcSs
only can leg.slhtc, Is limited 10y constitutional
plohihitlonf And how can IuE SUS hc con-
Ni't,d 81 saying 10y implication IN the passage
quoted 10y the horti that Congress has an TN
limited power of legislation in the Districtg
suppose the position of THL SCN i that Con-
cress has % general legislative po,ver over the
District, and that il would 90 no further than To
say that 1t has full power to legi-late when there
Is no actual constitutional prohibition. In order
u relute this position would II not he neces-
sary To show that Congress has not power 10
lesi-iate generally, hut only power 10 e,i~late
in certain specified citscSf ana wouldn't that be-
natu I NI"N rom me simple proposition tlat
the Congress shall have power 10 cSerci-e eN-
elusive lerl-lation IN all cases whatsoever over"
fhep 'Wers which the lIortd's reasoning seems
To assume that the position Of rHE ~ s inpii-
cdN attribute. to Congress, such "a, that ot pass
ing law authorizing Titles uf nobility. would
involve, A. the u 0td very correctly saws. a
u inssrr- son Of imperative prohibitions ct tho
Cons itut ION, and the hoIij would seem to i'm
rN that IN" authorization Of criminal uruScril-
tion- for libel Involves trans -re-sinn + som.
can the writer I the noiW article really think
And, to conclude upon This point are there
any %. hrr ouruc"S " hlch cannot toe made puu-
i,hahle M th" District under congressional law.
Hld Wilth tu- congress only con leLi-lAtrl must
- unpuh~hcdf or, putting h in another form,
are there any offences whlrh, when committed
m a." District, are pltnlshthl hN law
lhcrt Is note ur two tu be- made on another
point.
me uori says that THE SrN makes mis-
leading statement. htcaua" 70 speaks ui u statute
a. referring tu criminal Prosecutions. though
the word r'lW!tal does not occur ia the statute:
and says also That IuE SIS tries To make its
readers believe that the word criminal does oc-
G.. 10 m ,ur statute. NOW, lhE SrN'S st.tcfut ut
T. not misleading, unless to those who ,ln u,,f
know what u Prosecution b. Aud those VINO ,iu
not uuI stand a term are always Liable tu hc
lu~lrd Toy II, or. more properly 81 eakiur To- mis-
lead thctu-clND- hN itl. As all pru~ccut uu- are
pWnutdt prn, ucuih-s, the statute, il 10 l- 10 be-
G!derSt.od IN It's correct sense, docs rClcr ~
criminal proceedings, ito put u tuutulu-ically
n Is very often done even in legal duCumcuts):
and the language ot tnE SUN doesn't by ANY
means imply that the word criminal occurs IN
the -thtuto,
The boiii sa,s that the statute in question is
copied from the Constitution of New York with
some changes and that these changes have NO
other object than to adapt the statute to cii.
proceedings for libel tur. In tht " urti language
cNil U.uscCutiunsl. Now a~ the statute speaks
only OF prosecutions and Indictments, il refers
10 no proceedings Of a CiyiI nature, and this
position II confirmed 10y the TACT that, IN spcaN-
lng oi the result Of the proceedings, the term
acquitted II used, "A term only employed with
reference to criminal proceedings
Ine ll0rld thinks that in copying he provision
oI the New York Constitution the word inlict-
mcnt WAS retained 10y an oversight. There il
certainly nothing 10 show this. On the con
trtrS the statute 80 far from afordIng evidence
ol oversight gives proof uf the most careful re-
VISION. The craftsman seems to have drnpIcd
the word crlminalt 10 AVOID the tautOlogy which
would result from its use in connection with
either prosecution or indictment (iind here both
terms occur and, for the sake Of precision Ia
nave SAID, " the defendant mot the paltyl
" snail be acquitted - since II is the defendant
and not any party, who may hc acquitted.
., Ihtre ls another conclusive answer tn the
0Itds suppoSltiun that the statute WAS in
TINS KIND was needed Tor such cases the truth
was, before the enactment of the statute, "A com
pIoio dcfousc IN a CNil case, but would not have
hetl IA criminal cases yunerdlly unless specially
made 50 by statute, L.