The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1873-03-15

wholly surrendered. An entire peaceahle sur
render, with a full cession Of sovereign power Is
annexation. \ partial surrender may be made in
a treaty OF commercial reciprocity. or by cessiun
OF a portion OF territory with the sovereignty Of the
remainder unimpaired, or By parting with the
general sovereignty, and TeseTFlng. unfortunately
a portion Of territory and / qualified or dependent
sovereignty. Any or all of these results are prac-
ticable By diplomatic usage. Il i 10 be considered,
therefore. whether any. and If any. how complete
a surrender Of Hawaiian independence is now
called for
ABSOLUTE INDEPENDENCE No LONGER PRACTICABLE.
Hawaiian independence. although secure against
foreign interference, by violence or intrigue is eX-
posed TO important moral Influences. which will
ultimately control its destiny. The influence Of
neIgnborhood, common origin, common language,
similar institutions Is perfectly familiar. But the
influence Of trade produces the strongest affinity.
II the necessities of position and the character of
products. operating commercially, upon valuable
Interests. make 1t tor the interest Of two nations TO
come together, they will ultimately do so, and the
smaller will g~rayitate 10 the larger. Such relations
now exist between the Hawaiian Islands and the
United states. Experience has demonstrated that
tue former can no longer be wholly independent
Of It's powerful n%eighbOr. Its natural life, requires
free access to the American markets. and must be
sustained If need be, by the sacrifice of national
pride. II the mountain will not come 10 Mahomet,
Mahomet must go to the mountain. The Hawalians
must lead of.
HOW FAR NUsrHAwAUAN INDEPENDENCE BE SACRIFICED
International negotiation Is not like horse-trad-
ing. 1t must be direct, simple. with all object
clearly in view and fairly stated. The weaker
party, seeking relief, should be ready 10 state the
measure reqEired. By every rule, the Hawaiian
nation is bound to take the initiative and submit to
the United States the desirable forms of relief. IT
Is also lit and proper. according TO our Constitution
for citizens TO assemble in an orderly and peaceable
manner to consult upon the common good, and con-
slider the most radical schemes for changing our re-
lations with the United States.
DISCUSSION OF MEASURES PUBLICLY PROPOSED.
This community has been exercised for some
weeks by the so-cailed Pearl RiUer Project,-a
plan TOR Il ReCiDrOCitV Treaty. on the general basis
of the last one, which was rejected by the Ameri-
cans Senate, but enlarged by a proposal 20 grant
territory and Sovereign jurisdiction over an area
OF ten or twelve miles square, including land and
water In the Pearl River neighborhoOd at Eva, to
be occupied and improved by the United States as
an integral part OF its domain. Such u grant in
wolves the incidental rights essential to its enjoy
ment. Experiences have demonstrated it to be
hopeless to ask for a Reciprocity Treaty, pure aud
simple, and that something more tempting must be
offered.
FEASIBILITY or PEARL RIVER SCHEME.
| shall discuss the Pearl River scheme on two
grounds its acceptableness to the United States.
and Its benefits to these islands.
l. l entertain the gTAvest doubts whether this
scheme will recommend itself to Americans. These
doubts are suggested by past experience and the
generally understood instincts of the American ma
ton. The friends of this measure, by enlarging the
offer, admit the hopelessness of a request for simple
reciprocity. They are wise. Reciprocity. popular
ten years ago. is now odious. The Canadian treaty
on one continent, and the British and French on the
ONlNA u yum " WIN uhNIhNi4Ns II III
age OF such treaties is all on one side. 1t is evil
dent that our neighbors see no advantage in this
one, and | am not aware of any new arguments by
which it can be More than this. the
principle of reciprocity is so exceptional, and irreg-
ular, that it disturbs all system of national revenue.
Governments hesitate to adopt 1t unless important
results can be secured. Valuable time and national
energy would probably be wasted in the effort to
obtain a Reciprocity Treaty, pure and simple.
Is the offer made sufficiently tempting by the
proposed cessiOn of the Pearl River tract? The
ITnTFA1 ara nN,ra I.-f,.= =. @nlsn ta8Ha
and accommodation for it's merchantmen. Were
the Pearl River tract a detached island. it might be
available, although the experience of Midway ISL
and suggests the small value of a mere harbor.
But the United States could not maintain exclusive
jurisdiction over so small a territory, separated by
artificial lines from the rest of a populOus island
without constant alteration with their ncighboTs.
y good harbOr might be obtained there by the eX-
penditure of a large SUN of money but, if u
good harbOr in time of peace is all which is de-
sired, some rights might be economically purchased
in Honolulu, where the crowd of vessels is not eX-
cessive. If we regard the necessities of war, and
the attitude of the United States as a belligerent.
every military man will tell you that the control
of the whole roadstead from Diamond Head to
BARRIERS Point, is essential to the security of such
a harbOr. which would also be of little use, if
Shenandoahs and Alabamas could rendezvous and
coal themselves at Honolulu. ~Interminable ques-
tons of neutral right could be raised within the
marine league outside. Dividing this bay between
two nations is like biting twice at a cherry. Moth
ing can it to the United States but the
expectation, tnat when the dlScomiOrtS OF q divided
jurisdiction have become unbearable, the islanders
will clamor for annexation in despair. Others can
determine whether such a mode of acquiring terri
tory is consistent with the dignity of a great ma
ton. Neither should | care to be- responsible for
exactly characterising the transaction on the other
side. Some might consider 1t irregular to lead up
to annexation in so sly a way, while appearing to
act in the interest of HawaiianS. Besides. il the
United States require a harbor. they can afford to
pay the money for it. The experience of land
grants and the Credit Mobilier rather indicates
that governments do not save much money by in
direct transactions.
Again, the success of this measure at Washing
ton calls for a twO-thirds vote in the Senate. which
can never be assured in advance. a large annex
alton party VIGOROUSLY exists in this kingdom.
which will resist all halfway measures and is both
able and determined to make itself heard at Wash
ington. By detaching a few Senators, they can
prevent the required majority. In fact, no measure
can obtain q twO-thirds vote. which does not have
the undivided support of the American residents
here. For these reasons, | think the Pearl River
scheme so sure to fail that it Is worse than useless
to consume our exhausted vitality in trying TO
carry it through. Hope deferred maketh the
heart sick" Our business community cannot en-
dure two or three years of anxiety, ending in failure.
If the Pearl River project could be made accept
able at Washington is it for the advantage of Ha-
waiians? Those interested in sugar may be tempted
to say: Give us anything to open the San Fran
cisco market. Sufficient for the day is the evil
thereof" They should consider, however, whether
even they can endure the attendant evils. Nocif-
erous anneXationists IN imitation of those who
recommend this measure to the United States
because 1t leads TO annexation are impatient to
accept the scheme for the state of its indirect re-
suits. The scheme is really on both
sides as annexation in disguise. To those who like
to sail under false colors, L will only say that an
enemy abhors disguise. and if you mean
annexation. please offer the genuine article. There
is small profit and no satisfaction in dealing in
shams.
To those, however, who honestly believe in the fea-
sibility and advantages of the project, l have some
thing to say, but with great difidence, because they
are some of our best and wisest citizens whose judy
ment ought TO be better than mine. Have they con-
sidered the mischievous consequences of establishing
an independent sovereign power in the heart of the
Island of Oahu? The United States desire something
more than a dOck-yard, whose safety requires that it
should be surrounded by territory enough to be left
beyond the range of the largest guns. a town site