New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1873-04-04
r,pr,,v WIIIJAMSs STATEMENT

Tho later accounts of the Cape Prospect
disaster do not improve tho reputation OF the
sb,n,s officers for care and seamanship. 1t APP
nears from the story of Captain Williams that
however other persons may have been deceived
"a To the lights, he made no error on that
score. for he saw no lights at all. He judged
of his position entirely by the reckoning, and
that seems to have been at fault. AT
o'clock on Monday he believed himself to be
40 miles from SambrO Head and steamng
north at the rate of "from to IL knots per
.'hour." The exsct speed he evidently does
not know. In another place he says "about
al knots" This loose estimate gave him
1919 miles up to midnight, and made
his position at that time as miles
south of Sambro. 1t seems incredible
thst. with no other idea of his whereabouts
than this mixture of conjecture and calcula-
ton afforded, he should have quietly gone TO
his cabin but this is just what he did. lie
was well aware of the danger of approaching
the coast at night in heavy sea, for he states
that his purpose was to put about at 8
o'clock and wait for daylight Now, at 3
o'clock. if the steamer was making IL knots
An hour, he would have been 10 miles from
shore, suppOsing his reckoning to be correct.
That was dangerously near under the circum-
stances. He was bound to know that his
reckoning was possibly not correct He was
bound to make ample allowance for error in
hi, estimate of the speed. He seems, however,
to have trusted as implicitly to his calculation
"a if he had measured off the ocean with a
rule and compasses. At o'clock instead
of being 10 miles from shore he was close
upon the breakers.
But the recklessness of Capt. Williams is
equaled apparently by the recklessness of the
second and fourth officers, who were left IN
charge when he went below. 1t was at a.
m. that Quartermaster Thomas cautioned the
sc cond officer against standing in so close to
land, as, according to his calculations, enough
distance had been run to make Sambro Light.
The officer, thus warned, roughly re-
buked his adviser and reminded him that
he was no officer of the ship. Not
altogether discouraged, Thomas applied to
the fourth officer for leave to go alOft to look
out for breakers. He was sure there was
danger ahead, and that the ship would strike
before the breakers could be seen from be-
low. He was told that it was " no USE"
These debates occurred after a. m. Thomas
says the ship struck at 315 a. m. We have
concurrent testimony that she was then max
ing 10 knots an hour. When Capt Williams re-
tired, he left orders with the second and fourth
officers that he should be warned if they saw
anything, and should be called at any rate at
o'clock. Neither of these orders was obeyed.
Capt. Williams knew nothing that happened
until he was aroused by the shock at Is
. ha haA n
quarter of an hour earlier the disaster even
then might have been averted. For the lights
ON Sambro Head and Peggy's Point must
have been visible long before that. Those
LIGHTS told the whole story of the midnight
blunder. We must presume that Capt. Will
liams, before turning in, explained to the Off
Ger of the watch what he supposed to be
the position of the ship, and his
purpose to put about when he came
within II or IS miles of shore.
Now Sambro light Is visible 20 miles.
In half an hour after it was descried-sup-
posing the night to be clear-it would there
fore have been time to put about. 1t should
have been seen according to the captains cal
culation at half past 2. And yet the look
out, if he kept his eyes open, must have seen
it as early as / o'clock. This showed of
course that they were much nearer shore than
they had imagined Yet they rushed on for
two hours longer. The supposition that they
mistook one light for another does not justify
them. Any light proved the error in their
reckoning, and was warning enough to cause
them to stop. Their destination that night
was not Halifax Harbor, as we at first
supposed; it was some point Is miles of
shore. How, indeed, ship could be allowed
to run upon a rocky shore, midway between
two lights, both of which should have been
visible for an hour or more, when her officers
knew she had no business TO be near shore at
all, when the skies were clear and the wind
in her favor, is a problem which we confess
ourselves at q loss to solve.