The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1872-06-01
The Prospect Of tho Treaty Falling

thoritatiye statement from England as to what
the British Cabinet will do with the new
| proposition agreed upon by the Senate. Our
special telegram from London, published to-
day, in another part of the paper, shows that
the British government considered on Thurs
day that negotiations were about ended and
that the treaty would fail. but that yesterday
the subject was taken up again and negotia-
tons were reopened on the part of England.
The point of difficulty now appears to be that
the British government does not deem the
amended Supplemental Treaty, as agreed upon
by the Senate, sufficiently explicit as to what
is proposed to be relinquished under the term
indirect claims and seems to apprehend larger
claims under that for direct damages than
could be admissible The Senate and admin
istration have left the public in the dark as to
the precise meaning and phraseology of the
amended Supplemental Treaty, and, therefore,
its merits cannot be discussed. But il is evil
dent the British Cabinet is not satisfied with
it, for the first impression was to abandon
further negotiation, and now, upon second
thought, explanations are asked.
Only six days ago General Schenck informed
Secretary Fish that it was probable the English
government would take such course as would
put an end to arbitration at Geneva and to the
treaty. Then we hear from Washington that
General Grant had put his foot down and
would make no further concessions consider
ing that he had gone far enough. This
appears to have been the decision como
to at the Cabinet meeting yesterday.
This last news, that the British Cabinet
had, on yesterday, resolved to reopen
negotiations, SO far at least, as to ascertain
definitely where direct claims would end and
what is to be relinquished by the term indirect
claims, shows that the treaty is not quite dead,
and that there is bare possibility of coming
to on understanding between the two govern
will yield nothing on the disputed question of
consequential damages, and will exact the most
explicit abandonment of them. If, therefore,
the language of the amended Supplemental
Treaty is the least ambiguous whether to evade
the issue or to soften the effect Of q surrender
upon on indignant public, Mr.. Fish will have
to amend his language again ct the dictation of
Lord Granville, or the treaty will fail We
should like to know what is meant, therefore,
BY General Grant putting down his foot. We
have confidence in the frmness of the Presi-
dent, but not much in that of his Secretary of
State, for we remember how resolutely he
asserted he could not and would not
back down. and that afterwards he
did completely back down. After all,
this cunning hedging of Lord Granville may
be only intended to drive our government
more closely to the wall, and then, when he
has got oil he can, to conclude the bargain.
he knows now the supple instruments he has
to handle, and may only be playing with them
till he attains his object The stockholders,
spectators and the State Department lobby
have still little hope left. Satisfactory expla-
nations may be given to the British govern
ment and the treaty be consummated.
But if these remarkable diplomats should
not be able to twist the English language into
such shape as will be acceptable, and the
treaty should fail, what would be the conse-
quences? Would there be an earthquake?
Would the world be dissolved? Would there
be war? Would anything serious occur? If
we were to pay attention to those who are so
clamorous for the treaty we might think that
some dreadful calamity must follow. But
these are only short-sighted people. Most
of them are merely looking at their own
individual interests and care little for
the national honor or the principles involved.
We have negotiated before treaty with Eng
land, which was rejected by the Senate, and no
war nor any other dreadful calamity followed
In fact, if we remember right, England never
in the whole course of her history, manifested
SO much consideration and kindness for the
United States as she did after that rebuff
Unsettled claims are not necessarily a cause of
war, unless they are clearly admitted, are
long outstanding, and then there should be
refusal to pay. Even under such aggravating
circumstances war does not always follow.
Nations are more disposed to wait for oppor-
tunities to secure their claims than to rush
into war upon an impulse Only fragrant in
suit can lead to such catastrophe between
nations that have such important commercial
relations with each other as England and the
United States have. Disputed questions like
these that would remain unsettled between the
two countries, if the treaty should fail, would
not justify one or the other in declaring war.
England and the United States are SO bound
together by q vast commerce, by financial
relations and by other ties, that war could not
take place except through gross national in
suit or the most extraordinary circumstances.
Both countries would be more careful, proba-
bly,, to avoid giving offence.
Should the Treaty Of Washington fail, as
the Johnson-Clarendon Treaty did, there is
no reason why the two governments should
not try their hands at another. When the
present excitement would be over and the poll
teal circumstances of the time, which have had
rn1,rh 10 do xI.ith Ll,1pdo.r o.aLo