The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1872-07-03
Decision of the Law Court ON New Trials.
Nathaniel AueriH Us. Feli1 Rooney.

Nathaniel AUerM Us. Felir Rooney.
Byi1s ch. II R, s., it is provided that
among the cases which s'come before the Court
motions for rev trials upon evidence reported
by the judge" Under this provision heretofore
all motions for such new trials have been heard
and determined by the law court.
By the statute of 1872 it is provided, that any
justice of the Supreme Judicial Court may set
aside verdict and grant new trial in case
tried before him when, in his opinion, the EVIL
dence in the case demands it. Such verdict
must be set aside at the same term, at which it
was rendered, but it shall not be set aside by
single justice where there have been two ver-
diets rendered against the applicant. The
question is, how far do these provisions. of the
new statute abrogate, modify or affect the for
mer statute?
We think it clear that the legislature did not
intend to repeal the provision in the Revised
Statutes, and thus take away from the law
court the consideration and determination of
all such motions for new trial. There are no
words in the new statute which indicate any
such intention. Nor do we think it was the
intention to give right to a hearing of the
same motion by two distinct tribunals, either
by appeal or by exceptions. But it was intend
ed that two distinct tribunals might have cog
nisance of such motions, each exclusive of the
other, and that an aggrieved party might Sc
lect the tribunal. He may file his motion and
obtain report of the evidence, certified by the
Judge, according to the provision in the revised
statutes; in which case the whole matter goes
to the law court-or he may without obtaining
any such report of the whole evidence, certified
by the Judge submit the questions arising un-
der his motion to the determination of the pre-
siding Judge at the term, on the evidence in
the case of which the Judge has knowledge
from his minutes or recollections. If he does
thus submit the matter to the presiding Judge,
the decision is final on both parties 1t is a
matter of discretion and not of law and no ex-
ceptions or appeal lie in such cases unless ex-
pressly given by statute. The limitations of
the right of single judge, contained in the
new statute, by which the powers must be ex-
ercised at the term when the trial is had, and
the other limitations as to the number of YER
diets which he moy set aside, clearly show that
it was not the intention of the legislature to re-
peal or abro2ate the existing right of party to
have hearing before the law court which is
not thus limited-unless he voluntarily selected
the new tribunal-a single judge at the term
If the Legislature had intended to take away
the existing power in the law court, or to give
right of appeal or exceptions from the decisions
of the single judge, they would have used Ian
guage plainly expressing such intent. We
think the construction we have gwen will
reconcile both statutes and give rule of prac-
tiee plain and efficient in securing the rights of
all parties.
In the case before us as the was motion made
to and passed upon by the judge at Nisi Prius
Motion and exceptions overruled.