New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1872-03-16
THE COURTS.

aats upon the issues Of fact, and orders that
Judgment be entered accordingly.
THE COURTS.
Touching the question of slave considera-
tion for notes the Supreme Court rendered
an opinion, W. II. Wyly being the organ of
sideration had not been made. w. II.
Letchford & Co., who filed a claim in sue
cession. appealed from a Judgment which
dismisses the claim on the ground OF its
slave consideration. '1t is true,' said the
Supreme Court. 1.-The consideration innul-
ing to the maker OF the note was slave, but
that between Well, the indorser, and
Letchford & Co., the indorsee, was not
slave, and it is true they sued the indorsers,
who confessed Judgment. The indorsers
resisted the execution of the Judgment in
consequence of the slave consideration.
The court determined that every indorse-
ment is a new contract. which imposes
conditional obligation on the indorser in
favor of the indorsee. 1t was this agree
ment which was enforced against We'll in
the Judgment, which can not be treated as
an absolute nulliry. 1t is in no wise affected
by article 1873 declaring that contracts for
the sale OF persons are null and void. and
shall not be enforced by the courts of this
State
The lower court having based its decree
rejecting the Letchtord claim in the case OF
Graves against Clarke. in the Twenty-tirst
Annual. where it Was held that an indorsee
before maturity could not recover against
the maker of note given for the price Of
slaves, the Supreme Court concluded that
decision does not support his Judgment.
There the maker was pursued upon his Obli-
CATION. the consideration OF which was the
price of slaves. and article I2S was held to be
applicable, because the only obligation con-
tracted by the maker of the note was to pay
the amount thereof. Here the indorsers,
Letchfprd K Co.. had judgment against
Samuel We'll on his contract of Endorsement,
the consideration of which was not for
laves. This ontract may be Ell {, d. and
article l2S OF the constitution not violated.
In the case of Carroll Hoy against Ann
c. McCann and her husband, the Supreme
Court pronounced Judgment viewing the
question of a married woman legal rights.
The plaintiff sued the defendant, "a married
woman, on a promissory note.
The plaintiffs alleged that the note was
given for moneys advanced and supplies
furnished for the benefit of the defendant
for her separate advantages, and for the
Improvement of her paraphernal property.
The defense is that the debt for which the
note was given was an obligation of the hus
band, contracted by him in his planting
operations. in which she had no interest,
anH that she did not receive any separate
advantage therairOln.
Under this title OF facts. it would seem
that the debtor was DIR. Manning, and not
bis wife. and that in signing the note she
was binding herself for his debt
1t is for those who treat with married
woman to be on their guard and see that
the obligation she contracts inures to her
separate advantage. Branergu VS.. Kerr
and wife, I n. S. "A: 10 La l46; / K. 5GS: =
An. 519: } An. 595: An. 41S; An. 1888.
But in this case the debt does not appear to
have been created by the wife. She signed
the note. which was for an account Gre
ated by her husband for his benefit. The
law forbids the wife from making such a
contract. The wife. whether separated i'll
property by contract or by Judgment, can
not bind herself for her husband, nor con-
Jointly with him. for debts contracted by
him before or during marriage" c. {.
art. 1898: - An. 725: IA An. 700: II An. 525.
1t is therefore ordered and adiudged that
the Judgment of the lower court be affirmed.
with costs OF appeal.
A. =. Gray has sued the Crescent City
Railroad Company for Si06 us damages,
alleging that on January II he was pro-
ceedlng up Chippewa street with his float
when it became burrowed in the mud so
far that his mules could not Immediately
extract it, whereupon the superintendent
of the company, calling to his aid several
other employees. released it, whereby it was
broken and rendered useless until SIS
worth of repairs had been put on it.
Plaintiff claims that according to the terms
OF the charter the company is compelled to
keep the street in passable condition, but
which not having been done they have
subjected him to the loss aforesaid, arising
from interruption to his business in the
breaking of his wagon.
Thomas j. Throop. of Kentucky, qualified
as administrator of the succession of Mil
ton Taylor. under the order of the Probate
Court of Mason county, Kentucky, has
brought suit in the Second District Court
against the succession of Milton Taylor
Mary Ann Rogers and P. b. Fouke, public
administrator. Throop alleges that Mil
ton Taylor was domicied in Mason county,
Kentucky. from his birth to his death: that
his succession in the State of his domicile
is under the control and administration of
ThroOp, the succession in Louisiana being
auxiliary to that of his domicile.
Milton Taylor left last will and testa-
ment, which was probated and ordered to
be executed
That about the twenty-siXth July. 1871,
Mary Ann Jane Rogers, wife of Milton
Rogers, of Ohio, obtained from the Second
District Court an ex parte decree, recogniz-
ing her as sole heir OF Milton Taylor, order
ing her to be put in possession, and order
ing the public administrator, who is acting
as datiye executor, to deliver the property
to her, reserving the right of any heir at
law TO set up any claim they may have.
Plaintiff AYERS that the decree is null and
void. because obtained by fraud and false
testimony; that Mary Ann Jane Rogers was
not the child of Milton Taylor; that she was
born in slavery in Kentucky, and is the
child of q negro slave woman, at the time
OF Mary James birth the property of Milton
Taylor; that her mother was lewd wp-
man. and had many children by as mary
different fathers. and that said Mary Jane
i an adulterous bastard, incapable of inher-I
ting. 4
Petitioner prays that the will of Milton'
Taylor be carried into effect, and all other
claims be repressed.
Milton Taylor bequeathed an annuity of
$1,000 for ten years to Mason County Court.
for the benefit OF illegitimate white children
and mothers of such illegitimate white
children in necesstous circumstances in
Mason county, Kentucky. Petitioner, as
executor of the estate of the dOmicil OF de-
ceased, prays that the property may be