Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1872-09-29

plaintiff is % years Of age, and in April OF
last year the defendent, shopkeeper and
shoemaker, began to court her. She was at
that time dressmaker, and the librarian
at Poole Library. She was earning about
$50 per year. One of the defendant s let
tiers contained an original poem in which
the following verse occurred:
''Oh she was good as she was fair,
None, none on earth above her,
As pure in thought as angels are,
To know her was to love her."
An enigmatical poem caused much
amusement in court. The chief letter en-
ployed was o. This was to be read as cy-
pher (sigh for. Thus 1 0 U meant II
sigh for you" Defendant set up business
near Poole, and the marriage was fixed for
the 18th of February last. Defendant, how
ever, became "cool," and it was said that
he had since married some one else. The
Jury assessed damages at ESQ.
The frequency of suits for breach of pro-
mise of marriage, both in this country and
Europe has of late directed attention to the
question as to what constitutes promise
of marriage. The Albany Lao Journal re-
views the decisions in England and in the
different States of the Union, and from
these arrives at the conclusion that the
promise to marry may BE- inferred from cir
cumstances. 1t may be made without
words. The fact of keeping up correspon-
dence is good evidence for jury, and, in
deed, it will be remembered it was so in
Mr.. Pickwick's case, though he only wrote
about chops and tomato sauce to his land
lady. In Massachusetts,, "mutual engage
ments are inferred from a course of devo-
ted attention and apparently exclusive at
tachment;'' and it is relief to find that
in Rhode Island Chief Justice declares
that "ordinsry politeness and civility which
a gentleman extends to a lady are not to
be considered as furnishing proof of pro-
mise to marry" But West Virginia, being
a young State, allows slender epithets" to
afford proof of an engagement. In fact, af-
ter reading this learned essay, the review
er feels disposed to change the question,
and ask: "What does not constitute pro-
mise of marraige?" The law is indeed, in a
very uncertain and unsatisfactory condition
on this subject. preliminary attentions
may be as binding as marriage itself, peo-
pie may as well be married Eat sight," and
take no time to consider the matter. Yet
every sensible person will agree that it is
far better to recede from an engagement Oh
intention to marry, if there is alepugnance
to it in either party. 1t is pitiable thing
to marry, not for love, but for fear of the
sheriff. Damages ought not to be given ex-
cept for some expenditure that can be made
good in money. If woman jilt man,
she might be made to pay for carriage hire,
or presents, or like expenses incurred by
him in making himself agreeable. What a
woman has spent in dress upon reasona-
bic expectation Of marriage, should be re-
| funded by the man who had encouraged it.
But for sentimental or vindictive damages
there ought to be ne room, as there is no
occasion for them. 1t is no damage to the
subtantial interests of either party to end
an engagement that is no longer agreeable
to both. In fact, suits under these circum-
stances are rarely brought, except by &C.
signing women, who have entrapped IN
wary young fellows, or old fellows,
into some of those ambiguous acts
from which the law extracts promise
to marry.