New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1872-06-21

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decided that the owner. of the property,
though rebel and within the confederate
lines, was entitled to appear and contest
the proceedings, or bring a writ of error
upon the Judgment. The writ, therefore,
is regularly brought, and we are obliged to
examine the record.
Many of the questions raised have been
already disposed of, and need not be again
adverted to. There is one objection, how
ever, that has given me some trouble;
namely, the insuffeiency of the infOEma-
ton. 1t is one of the most remarkable
specimens of loose pleading and uncertain
statement that / remember ever to have
seen. After having duly alleged the seizure
of the property, and fully described it, it
states that John Slidell was, at the time of
filing the information and on the SEVENTEEN
of July, 1862, and previously, the owner
thereof Then, having stated the existence
of the rebellion, and the passage eff the con-
fscatiOn act, it proceeds to allege:
V. That the said John Slidel, subsequent
" to the said seventeenth of July, 1862, did
act as an officer of the army or navy of the
rebels in arms against the government of
the United States, or as a member of Con-
gress, or as a judge of a court, or as a cabi-
net officer, or as a foreign minister, or as a
commissioner, or as a consul of the sO-called
Confederate States of America; or that,
while owning property in loyal State or
Territory of the United States, or of the
District of Columbia, he did give aid and
comfort to the rebellion against the United
States, and did assist such rebellion.
Now, from this allegation, can any NOR
tai man tell what John Slidel did
The next article is of the same ambiguous
and inconsequential character.
The extreme ambiguity of these charges
is something more than matter of form
it amounts TO a substantial defect There
is, in truth, no charge at all. There is no
charge that Slidell acted as a foreign minis
ter Of the cOntederacy. The allegation is
that he either did that or something else;
but we are not informed what, If the de-
feet were enc of form, it might be amended;
but being substantial, it seems to me it is
fatal.
The other articles of the information do
not save it. The seventh article alleges
that John Slidell, subsequently to the sew
enteenth of June, 1862, within State or
Territory Of the United States, was engaged
in armed rebellion against the government,
and did not, within sixty days after the
proclamation of the President, made on the
twenty-ffth of July, 1862, cease to aid and
abet such rebellion, etc. And the eighth
article is of similar character to the seventh.
Now. not only is this same ambiguity
kept up in these articles, as in the previous
ones, but they do not set forth any of the
offenses which, in the statute, are made the
basis or cause of cOnfscatiOn. They are
evidently meant to be assigned under the
sixth section of the act. But that section
refers to persons who, in any State or Ter
ritory of the United States, other than
those named as aforesaid, were engaged in
the rebellion. Now, the States named as
aforesaid were the loyal States, which had
lust been named in the last clause of the
fifth section. Therefore, the States and
Territories other than those were the dis
loyal or rebeIliOus States. So that the sixth
section of the act only refers to persons
who, within any dislOyal or rebelllous State
or Territory, were engaged in the rebellion.
Yet the seventh article of the information
merely alleges that John Slidell, within
State and Territory of the United States,
was engaged in rebellion. 1t does not
make charge within the statute
The whole information, therefore, is sub
stantially defective, and the judgment must
be reversed.
The same defect is fatal to the judgments
in the cases of Charles NJ. Conrad VS.. the
United States, No. 6O39; and in Francis II.
Hatch VS.. the United States, No. 6079; and
the judgments in those cases must also be
reversed.
In the cases of Duncan F. Kepner vs. the
United States, No. 6038; Abel Ward BOs-
worth vs. the United States, No 60S0, and
jefferson Davis VS.. the United Slater, No.
$685., the substantial defect appears in the
informations, each taken as a whole, and
have been unable to perceive any other
ground or which the judgments in those
cases should be reversed. They are there
fore affirmed
1t is perhaps not necessary at this time to
decide what will be the effect of reversing
those judgments which have been reversed.
But as the subsequent proceedings may de-
pend on a solution Of the question, and as
the parties in interest will be DESTROYS of
knowing the position in which they stand,
it is proper that l should give my opinion
on the point.
tits a general rule that judicial sale,
under a Judgment which the court had
jurisdiction to render, will stand, although
the Judgment itself be subsequently re-
versed for error. see no reason why that
rule should not apply in these cases. 1t is
true that judgment Of reversal usually
contains a direction that the plaintiff in
error be restored in all things, to that
which he hath lost by reason Of the er-
rOneous judgment.
But the mode of making this restoration,
where a sale Of property has taken place
under the reversed judgment, is by award
ing to the plaintiff in error the proceeds of
sale. This will be the proper mode in these
cases.
One question to which considerable at
tentiOn was given upon the argument, was
whether anything more than an estate for
the life of the owner was transferred by
the confscation proceedings. Indeed, it
was alleged as ground of error that all
right, title and estate of the owner was
condemned and sold,
l do not regard this form Of judgment as
material; although on looking at the judg
ments, it will be found that the form Of
Judgment pursued was, chat the said six
teen lots Of ground, the property OF A. b.,
be and the same are hereby condemned as
forfeited to the United States without any
definition or limitation of the estate for
feited. / regard the judgments as to be
construed by the law which authorizes the
cOnfscatiOn to be made; and am Of opinion
that the several sales by the marshal had
the effect of transferring only such estate
as it was lawful to sell. What that estate
is, is the question. The Joint resolution APP
proved at the same time with the cOntsca-
ton act, provides that no punishment or
proceedings under the act shall be so con.
strued as 10 work a forfeiture of the real
estate Of the offender beyond his natural
life.
1t seems to me that this provision extends
to the whole act and to the proceedings
for confscation as well as to the prosecution
for the crimes of treason and rebellion. 1t
may be very true, and am inclined to think
it is true, that the constitutional provision
which declares that no attainder of treason
shall work corruption of blood or forfeiture,
except during the life of the person at
tainted, does not apply to the confscatiOn
of enemies property, even though those en-
emies be rebels against the government,
and, therefore, guilty of treason.
But whether it applies or not, Congress,
from respect TO the scruples of the Presi-
dent, or for other reasons which seemed to
If sutfic1ent did enact. as il had a right to