The Portland daily press., 1872-10-08

NAPOLEON AND AUsTERLITz,-Such was
the crowning battle of Austerlitz-except
Waterloo and perhaps Jena-the most decs-
sive OF the revolutionary wars, the one too
which military writers have usually consider
ed Napoleon's masterpiece. There was this
peculiarity also in the day, that it was per-
fectly fair fight, the numbers on each side
were not far from equal, and the result was
in no sense caused by an overwhelming pre-
ponderance of force. The victory was due to
the serious error of the allies in uncoYering
their centre, in the attempt to outhank the
French right, and to the admirable skill with
which Napoleon anticipated their faulty ma
noeuvre, massed his forces against the un-
larded point, and, breaking the enemy's line
in two, destroyed it by his redoubtable blows.
Much also was due to the superiority of the
French soldiery over their adversaries, and to
the fexibility, ease and ready supplsness of
| the tactical formations of the conquerors com
| pared with those of the defeated army. The
| Austrians and Russians, it has been said, pre-
sented the image of a bar of steel, unbending,
rigid, difficult to turn; the French were like a
chain of thousand links the strength of
| which is yet compatible with adaptability to
all kinds of forms, and is quickly shaped by
its owners hand and this difference of ''mO-
| bility' proved decisive. 1t has also been re-
| marked that in this encounter ''the system Of
| Frederick came In collision with that of Ma
| poleon, and was shattered to pieces;'' but the
observation, correct as regards the mere tacti-
| cal organization of an army, is, taken more
| widely, an exaggeration, though there is no
| doubt that the aim of Frederick was usually
| to turn and outfank wing, while
Napoleon had a special prediction for
| heavy and reiterated attacks on
\ the centre, The battle of AusterlitZ ended
tbe war by exacting a humiliating peace from
| Austria, and the Grand Army was soon on
| soil again before meeting fresh perils and tri-
umphs. The general estimate of the cam
| paign may be collected from what we have
| written. The operations from first to last IL
lustrate splendidiy Napoleon's genius in max
/ ing and executing military projects, his Won
derful skill in deceiyiDg his enemies, and his
great power of strategic combination; and
| showed the world what great captain could
| do with an army of immense strength and su-
perior in all respects to its adversaries. They
also exhibited the fatal results, on the con-
quered side, of incapacity In war, of reckless
ness, obstinaey and tmidity: of following
plans essentially faulty, and of attempting,
obviously, false movements; and the surren-
der of Mack, the advance from Olmutz, and
the careless and presumptous flank march
before Ausferlitz, remain monuments of ru-
inous errors Yet the blaze of victory can
not hide the facts that Napoleon in his march
to the Danube exposed his army.to real dali
ger, and above all that ia leaving Vienna and
pursuing the allies into Morayia, he threw
down challenge to adverse fortune, and GER
tainly might have incurred defeat. The cam
paign also, as we have remarked, discloses
clearly, the inherent defects Of the Napoleonic
system of making war. The troops living upon
the country, were more than once in pitiable
state; and candid observers gathered from the
misery, the exeesses aud the indiscipine
which necessarily resulted from this state of
things, sinister sugury for the future, which
history was before long to Fealize.-Tempte
! BQr.