The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1872-09-19

help in The direct defence of the Upper Rhine
and the Black Forest; that a still greater Sc
curity of The German South would arise from
8 union OF oil the forces on the Middle Rhine,
which IRON there could attack Extensively,
either on the right or The left bank, The flank
of the hostile invasion, and should Thus soon
compel This 10 stand still or return. This lacf,
especially, deserves 10 be brought ont, That
the South German Princes. agreeing with
these views, In devotion 10 the common
cause and confdiDg In The chief commander
| Of the army, did not hesitate 10 deprive Lnelr
own territories of their forces IN order 10 JOIN
Immediately to the North German army. The
task which the North undertook became mus
the more difficult.
THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND
SWITZERLAND.
The MemoIre then goes on TO show that The
neutrality of Belgium, HOLLAND and SWitzer-
land may be- regarded as certain; therefore
| the theatre of war Is limited to the space be-
tween Luxembourg and Bale. s'We may" the
Memolre continues, "theretore, assume with
probability that the French will make their
drst concentration on the line OF Metz-Stras-
bourg, In order that, avoiding our stronger
Rhine front, they may push on to the Main,
separate North and South Germany, come ~
an agreement with the latter, and, With this
as O basis, advance on TO the ElDe.
HOW TO s q EMERGENCY.
"The best way OF parryIng such an attack
would be 10 assemble all our disposable forces
south of the Moselle, and more especially In
the Bavarial Palatinate. By thus slatlUnlng
ourselves In the left flank of the enemy We
shall always be able to force him to stay his
progress In an eastern direction; and Ii the
Baden. Wurtemburg corps Joins our left wing
we may be In o position 10 bring on a decis-
ion not very far from RaslaLt. In which
case defeat must result In the destruction
of the enemy. Should u mere raid into
the country adjoining the Black Forest be
undertaken by o portion of The hostile
troops there will be nothing TO prevent our
detaching a corps or t%o 10 intercept The
Invading army. Our main force will thereby
be no more weakened than the enemy weak
ems himself by employing a portion OF his
strength on q task OF secondary Importance.
If the French fully avail themselves OF the ad-
yantages offered by their railway system,
they will have 10 send their troops to "
poIE,s, Strasoourg and Metz. Surprising The
troops concentrated at Strasoonrg are not dis
patched to the Black Forest, they will proba-
biz Join the army of the Moselle, performing
the distance chiefly on foot. The Palatlnate,
therefore, affords US a position between the
tWo.Wings of the enemy. From thence We
nav turn against his right OF his lett, or
against both should we be strong enough.
The assumption OF the offensive from 30 favor
able o position, If resolved upon In lime, will
probably prevent the enemy from settlog loot
on German soil.
MOBILIZATION OF q GERMAN R
but It may be questioned whether 1t would
be safe to effect the first concentration OF our
troops in the PalaLinate-that lie, In The imme-
diate vicinity of The enemy. In my opinion
there will be no danger In such o step, II being
not at all likely that the first arrivals will be
attacked by superior numbers while yet too
weak to offer adequate resistance. We are
prepared for mobilization at q moments no.
lice. With six railways at our disposal TO
transport the troops to the country between
the Rhine and the Moselle we canpot easily De
taken by surprise, aud, to make sure that
everything shall be In order when the moment
arrives, we have drawn up o llst, showing the
train by which every battalion Is to be con.
veyed, with the lime OF starting and arrival
accurately fixed. On the tenth day after the
order of mobilization the first detachment will
arrive In the neIghborhood Of the French from.
tier. By the thirteenth day they will have
been increased to Two corps d'armee. On the
eighteenth day they will humber 300, 600 men,
and on the twentieth they will be provided
with nearly all the baggage and ammunition
p ISsinR Rt aaa III" to c"" suppose t S%sftViffff, e r Calling g
In of the French reserves and The mo-
bllizltion OF The filed up cadres can
be more rapidly effected than that Ut
our own. Sluce Napoleon /, The French
army has never been modified as a whole,
and the partial notifications which have re-
peatedly occurred eau bs hardly regarded as
on a par 10 point of magnitude with the much
more comprehensive measure that would have
to be adopted on the eve Of q German CAM
paign. It Ia true, If the French determine to
lake the field without reserves, q much shorter
period would suffice 10 assemble one hundred
and fifty thousand men In their northeastern
provinces. Those provinces have plenty OF
garrisons, camps and railways, and the daring
nature OF the enterprise would suit the ma
tional character, and has, indeed, been dis
cussed in military circles. Surprising such on
army, amply provided with cavalry and artIl-
lery, TO be stationed at Metz on the fifth day
after receiving orders to march, 1t might cross
the frontier al Saarlouis on the eighth day. In
such case we need not send our troops across
the Rhine. We might stop our military trains
on the right bank of The river, which could
not be reached by the invao:ng army before
the fourteenth day, when we should be
stronger than the enemy. With the bridges
In our hands we should a few days later as-
sumo the offensive with twice the number OF
the French. The disadvantages of q hasty In
vasion are, therefore, 30 evident that l do not
think IL will be ventured upon"
READY TO COMMENCE WHEN THE WORD WAS
GIVEN.
Il will thus be seen that Germany entered
into war with her plans thoroughly maLured.
When King William received the declaration
of war all he had 10 do was TO express ap-
proyal of Count Moltke's plans, and al once
Count MOlLke proceeded to pue his plan into
execution. Those who watched the war win
allentlon, will zee how closely Moltke, Ia 1870,
followed the scheme he had drawn up nearly
Two years before.
THE WEIGHT OF COTTON BALES.