The New York herald., 1872-09-16

Work on tho War.
BERLIN August Is, 1872
n was announced several months ago that the
fistorlcal division of the German Chief STAFF weuld
publish an account of the FrancoGerman war. AS
this account might fairly be presumed to contain
the views of Count Moltke and the other most dis
singuished chiefs OF the German army, its appear
-nnce was naturally looked forward to with con-
siderable interest. The first instalmcnt OF the
work has just been published, and hasten to give
your readers general outline OF what 1t contains
THE PRESENT VOLUME
deals only with the events in the month OF July,
1870 1t "Opens with an introduction, giving an
account of the origin Of the war from, Of course
the German point OF view. On this subject the
volume says nothing very new. This para
graph, however, Is worthy OF attentionE"ln
the country, indeed, opinion is said to have been
uureservedly for the war in sixteen, against the
war in thrty-four departments, while IN thirty
seven departments opinions were divided. But In
France the word is OF as much Importance as the
deed. People congratulate each other on the
ground of o speech, and IN animated address
which appeals to the glory Of the nation is able to
drag away even reasonable men to the EXTREMIST
resolutions. With the GENERALIZATION which exists
the provinces follow helplessy the impulse to war
as well as to revolution which issues from the
capital Napoleon III. appears to have played In
the whole affair passive, one might almost say,
Q witless part" This is a remarkable admission,
when we remember how passonately 1t
was contended that the war against Ger
many was emphaticaly war OF all France
and not Of dynasty or OF politicians.
THE FRENCH ARMY.
The second chapter OF the volume deals with
.The French Army: Its Plan Of Operation and
March Forward, 18th to the 31st july" 1t sets
down the number Of men whom France could
bring into the field the 1st OF August 33e 00o.
1t states that frances supply OF arms was excel
lent, both as regards quantity and quality. The
Chassepot 1t speaks OF as IAN excellent weapon. of
long range" The artillery was also well supplied
with ammunition But when we come to consider
the reserve army we find everything In confusion
for such an army. There were neither weapons
nor clothes nor ammunition; its artillery and its
cavalry had in almost every respect to be created
out OF the new.
'THE FIELD ARMY"
continues the volume, "could thus alone be
counted upon, and this was not specially fitted by
Its organization for rapid change from peace to
o war footing. y The military administra-
ton was centralized to the last point, and was
thus as well as by its having the duty OF attending
20 cOurtsmartial, overburdened with work. Army
corps and divisions had no cOmmissariat in peace.
In consequence Of this the armament ma
teria was, during peace, concentrated in o few
places. The supplies of Vott,yes de transport were
collected In Vernon and Chateauroux. The maga-
zines for camp requisites for tile most part in
Paris and Versailles. speedy distribution from
these depots to the single corps was In this way
rendered extraordinarily difficult q general
mobilization Having thus criticised the admin
istraton OF the army, We are next presented with
A CRITICISM OF THE ARMY ITSELF.
1.-THE internal condition Of the army" we are
told, "was suffering from many grave defects.
Even in the judgment of his own countrymen the
French soldier was not at the outbreak OF the war
what he had been in the Crimean war and in
Italy. The law with regard to reserves and
bounty had worked dsadvantageously upon him.
II permitted substitution to an excessive degree
For example, In q contingent OF $4,000 men OF the
year 1869 alone there 1000 substitutes, whose
quality is known by experience to deteriorate with
increased length Of service And also
We're were unknown at an earlier time, We're were
described by French authorities as preudicia
non.commissioned ocers no longer stood at t. its IS
early excellence There were In many regiments
sergeants who had discharged their duties for
eleven years and upwards without prospect of
promotion or of the allcviation of an existence
that had been sacrificed to the country almost in
the corps accordingly sought in civil employment
more remuDerative occupation. The corps OF OIL
Homogeneous elements Almost one-third Of them
had risen from the non.commissioned officers. AS
the younger officers did not devote their whole
stood in sharp contrast to them They formed, on
the average, the best element OF the army, Rich
experiences and valuable qualities, ripened
In the different campaigns of the En-
pire, were represented among them. But
missed persons, justly irritated them, and opened
up to them but slight prospects TOR the future.
Nevertheless an increased mental activity had dis
was these very officers who most sought on the
battle fields OF France to wash out with their blood
faults for which they were not responsible. The
same system of favOritism had brought to high
places many elements, which were not equal to the
tasks imposed upon them and exercised, as every
where else where it has force, its unhealthy In
nuence. In addition the political position of parties
the form Of government that fidelity and adherence
70 a hereditary house OF rulers in the army as well
rs In the nation generally, which in other countries
prevents destructive revolutions OF public affairs,
were lost. The French officer and even the private
soldier, serves his country, aud serves 1t with de-
y0tlon and self-sacrlnce, but he does not hold on
10 the changing form OF the head OF the state with
that constant sense OF duty which sacrifices all Its
strength in unconditional recognition OF authority.
The French officer, as well as the entire nation, is
animated with high, and in many respects just
liable self-conscousness, but also with depfecia
60 inspire him with the conviction that France
stands before all other countries. II the pupil OF
saiies he sees scarcely anything but battle pictures
and III all the French are vlctors. In long
rows the heroes stand who have borne the
Orinamme, the lilies, the eagle or the
trfcOlor, but always the banner OF France into the
chief cities of almost every, country. Thus tho
French history OF war is history OF unbroken
triumph, an epic In which defeats are to be ex.
pained merely by subsidiary circumstances, and as
tf they were unimportant, or by treason. TO seek
fhe truth Is not worth the trouble; to express 1t
would be unpatriotic No wonder then II the
young officer troubles himself little about other
c0untries-about their language institutions and
circumstances. The foreigner speaks his language
TO him. be comes to him in order to learn and imi.
tate. In France people had scarcely an idea OF the
Transformation which two campaigns had Effected
In the feelings OF the German race; OF their no
longer conquerable feeling Of solidarity, and they
were completely surprised to find an opponent
equal TO them.
THE NAVY OF FRANCE.
The volume next deals with the navy OF France |;
but as its observations on this point contain moth
ing very interesting, shall go on to the pas.