The workingman's advocate. [volume] (Chicago [Ill.]) 1864-1877, 1872-03-23

Misrepresentation by stating that if there
be any reasoning in the opinion Of the ma
lonty which can be applicable to any other
class OF contracts, 1t does rot receive my
assent
The next important constitutional ques-
tion before the court, in which Judge Da-
yis in personally conapica0ps, il that Of the
Veazie Bank in 1869. The question at L.
sue was whether clause Of the ninth sec
tion of the act of Congress of July Is.
1866, imposing tax Of 10 per cent on the
amount Of notes issned for circulation by .
State bank was constitutional. The Veazie
Bank was chartered by the State Of Maine,
and the notes on which the tar Of 10 per
cent. was imposed were issued under the
authority of that State. The bank insist-
ed that the act of Congress imposing the
tax impaired not only franchise granted
by the State Of Maine, but its capacity to
grant other such franchises, and that Con-
greas had no power to pass law which
could do that. Chief Justice Chase deliver
cd the opinion in behalf Of the majority Of
the court and affirmed the constitutiona1ity
OF the tax, chiefly upon the ground that
Congress, having constitutionally under
taken to provide a currency for the whole
country, could secure the benefit therama
to the people by appropriate legislation,
and therefore could restrain by suitable en-
actments the circulation of any notes
not issued under its own authority. From
this opinion Judge Nelson and Davis dis
sented, chiefly upon the ground that the
State Of Maine had authority to charter
the bank and invest it with full banking
powers; that the act Of Congress of July
Is, 1866, imposes An aggregate tax Of some
l6 per cent. upon State banks; that the tax
Of 10 per cent. upon bills in circulation is
not tax upon the property Of that insti-
tuition, but upon the debts Of the bank,
which cannot be distinguished from the
debts Of individuals, and therefore that this
tax was simply mode by which the power
or faculty Of a state TO incorporte a bank N
subject to taxation by the Federal Govern
ment. and which if maintainable can ami
hilate those powers of a State. The dis
senting opinion Of Nelson and Davis then
suggests that power to incorporte banks
was not surrendered to the Federal Gov
emment, but reserved to tine States that
it is the duty Of the Federal Government
to protect the State right encroachment
that there Is the same reason for prohibit
ing the Federal Government from taxing
a franchise of State as TO its banks that
there is in restraining the States from tax
ing bonds of the Federal Government and
that the decision Of the court, while it
touched then only the power to create
banks, affected in its principle the power Of
State to create any other description of
corporations. The dissenting opinion con-
cludes with q denunciation of the act of
Congress under confederation, because the
consequences that have flowed therefrom
show that its purpose was to encourage the
national banks and to destroy the State
banks. There is, as will be readily sup
posed from the fact that Judge Nelson par
ticipated therein, a good supply Of sound
State-rights doctrine in this dissenting
opinion.
The next case before the court touching
important constitutional questions il that
of Hepburn vs. Griswold, wherein major
ity Of the court-consisting of Chase, Ned
son, Grier, Clifford, and Field decided
that the Legal-tender act, so far as it ap-
plies to debts contracted before its passage,
is unwarranted by the Constitution.
From this conclusion Of the majority
Smayne, Miller and Davis diasented, and
their minority opinion was read by Miller.
1t will be remembered that Grier resigned
Immediately after the argument Of this case,
and that President Grant appointed Strong
and Bradley to succeed him. The appoint
ment Of these two judges, who were be.
fore their selection known to be convinced
of the constitutionality of the Legal-tendeI
act, elevated the previous minority Of the
case Overthrew the decision in Hepburn
versus Grisweld. 1t cannot but be that
all Democratic friends Of Judge Davis
will regret the bad association in which
the legal-tender question finds him. land
applanded by all members Of the Labor
Reform Party. EED. ADVOCATE.
But while in the aforementioned case
Judge Davis certainly appears in rather bad
company, it is fair to say that in most oi
his dissenting opinions his association il
excellent.
One who has held an important iudicia
position so long as Judge Davis, and ha,
placed upon record 30 many opinions, af
fords to the public very good opportunities
of forming correct estimate of his habit
Of thought, in legal matters at least. Tn.
cases which we have cited afford some in
dication Of the tendency Of Judge Davis
convictions in respect to the nature and
scope of the Federal Constitution and tn.
true relation of the several States thereto
In those vast concerns which touch the lif,
and individual liberty of the citizen (and
wnnt ..f n
has clearly put himself upon record i'm tn.
Milligan case in o most unexceptionAbls
way. We wish we could say a. much Of hil
concurrence in the dissenting opinion on thu
constitutionslity of the Legal-tender act
wherein the minority greatly exaggerated
a. we think, the extent and the conse.
quences Of ftheimplied powerso the Fedora
government.
The large mass Of the cAses which come
before the Supreme Court Of the United
States are those which do mot involve con,
stitutional questions. In those touchins
private rights his opinions giye evidence d
sound Judgment, excellent sense, and, above
nj, cleaEness Of thought Hin style Of ex.
pression 10 simple and lucid. In that par.
ticulAr he reminds ONE very much Of Judge
Nelson. His opinions are never overloaded
with elementary doctrine, or with a pro
fusion Of cases, which, ~ somebody savs.
present picture Of vanity appealing to IL.
norance.
Al instances Of his faculty of giving in q
brief space straightforward reasons for l
Judgment we would refer the curious read.
er to the case of the Bank Of the Republic
w. Millard, TO be found in the tenth volume
OF Wailace's Reports, wherein the question
was whether the holder of bank check can
sue the bank for refusing payment i'm the
absence of proof that the check had been