New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1872-05-24
ger OtIeatrs 8ep1lblitatr.
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICIAL JOURNAL OF NfW ORLEANS
Rents for an immoral HOuse-GiIbert Ly
man vs.. Kate TOwnsend-Argument of
Counsel for Appellant.

Rents for an Immoral HOuse-GiIbert L.
man vs. Kate ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS Q
Counsel for Appellant.
We reported yesterday morning the opir
ion Of Associate Justice Taliaferrc, 0
the Supreme court of Louisiana, in the cas-
of Gilbert Lyman vs.. Kate Townsend, OF
appeal from the Fifth District Court Of TIL
parish of Orleans. The decision of Judge
TaliaferrO was in favor Of the plaintiff.
The argument of the counsel for appellant
Hon. j. S. Whitaker, we subjoin as follows
after an appropriate Introduction:
!. That "all things not forbidden by law
NAV legally become the subject OF, OF the
motive for contracts" G. G. 1857.
Admit, for the sake of argument, that the
subject of this contract of lease Is house
of prostitution. Are houses of this nature
forbidden by the law! Are they not, in
fact, actually icensedl
The act OF 1855, section ninety-twO page
l44. reads as follows: Be it further en-
acted, etc, that whoever shall be guilty of
keeping any disOrderly inn, tavern, ale
house, tipping house, gaming house or
brOthel, shall suffer fine and imprisonment"
This we find again enacted, t0tideDa rerbis,
in the last edition of the Revised Statutes
of 1870, section 908, page 179.
We have an authoritative Interpretation
of this section given by the Supreme Court
IA Ann, p. 80, in the following terms: The
ninety-second section of the act of 1855, D.
la, relative to crimes and offenses, does
not prevent the city from levying a tax
upon boardinghOuses kept for these people,
provided they do not license disorderly
houses of this class.
"And because the calling is subject to
Aow hv M fo1 IL
house kept for this class of people shall be
subject to the same tax as other boarding
houses merely because the city ordinance
calls the house q clearinghouse for lewd
and abandoned women instead of using
the true or another name for the establish
ment. We can discover no reason why
such establishment should be classed with
respectable clearinghouse, and subjected
to a tax uniform with them"
In the present case, it does not appear,
nor is it anywhere alleged, that the house
leased to defendant was disOrderly house
The conclusion is, therefore, obvious that
houses Of this description are not only per
mitted by law, but subject to being taxed
tor the support of the government
And further, it appears by reference to
p. us ct seq. Leovy's Digest, that by city
ordinances certain localities are assigned to
these people, and regulations for their gov
eminent there laid down, mode of licensing
and taxing them, etc.
The house leased in this case is within the
limits prescribed by the city ordinances
where they are permitted and licensed to
ply their trade, and, as a matter of course,
the object to which the house was to be de-
voted was well known to the owner thereof
at the time it was leased. There was no
concealment, for the law authorized the
contract, it being for an object not prOhib-
tied by law. DiScretiO est, diScernere per
LegeDi qltod sit jltst1tm. The cOnservatOr of
public morals either is, or should be, the
law. 1t was not the duty of this plaintiff
to become a censor of morals. What the
law permits, and what, by special enact
ment, it authorizes must be binding upon
the citizen.
BY law the citizen holding property with
in the limits of New Orleans and doing his
part in bearing the public burden Of taxa
ton, imposed equally on all, should reason
ably have the right to the use and the reve-
nues of his property, and any law or deci-
sion of court, depriVing him of such
rights, would not only be unjust but in vio-
lation of the protection to which he is en-
titled as a citizen. The city passes a law
or an ordinance by which a certain section,
where his property lies, is to be occupied
for certain purposes. This act of the citv
Injuries him as proprietor, diminishing the
value of his property. He can not sell it,
for no one will buy. He sees fit to lease it,
but he can only lease it to a certain class Of
persons. This defendant, however saws:
II want the use of your property. and
will pay you for it a certain price" She
gets permission and she uses the property.
The proprietor claims the stipulated price.
She responds: II am not bound for it.
True, / must have home and a roof to
shelter me. The city and the State protect
me on payment of license. They say
must stay in this quarter but / owe you
nothing. You can collect nothing from me
because it would be against public morals"
This is, undoubtedly defendants argu- !
ment. But, should it be the argument Of a |
court OF Justice! We think such procedure |
not only contrary to the municipal law, but /
to natural law. Jure naturae eauum est. |
neminem cum alterius detrimentO ct iniuria |
teri l0cupieteOrem.
And who is it that announces this demand |
to be against public mOralsl What a per
version Of right and wrong is here! The
law claims from the strunpet a license or a
tax for the exercise of her calling and she
answers unhesitatingly: "Why such demand
on NET Can immortality pay a tax or IL
censei" And yet the city demands and col
ects her dues But the citizen is estOpped:
60 thy ways. Thy demand is contra bonos
8tOres."
1t may be asked why an owner of prop
/
pose oft, and invest elsewherel But would
such course cure the eyil2 By no means.
The new proprietor would still have the
house to let, and under like difficulties.
But what is forbidden by law, can not
De legally made the subject Of OF motive
or, contracts" G. C.J757.
A city ordinance existed in 1927, prohibit
ng the erection of private hospital within !
he Incorporated limits of New OrleaDs |
i n u | .
davidson house so located, as a hospital |
The court after declaring the city ordi- (
lances made within the powers conferred !
n the city by the Legislature to be as [
Indlng as the laws of the General Assem-
ly, and "the moral and legal obligation /
0 obey them the same" decided that an
greement made in direct violation of such 9
rdlnance, could not be enforced. Milne
q, Davidson 5 N. S. 400: i
But in the case at bar, the house. forming |
he subject Of contract, is permitted. NOT '
My by a general law, but by CITY ordi ! I
anee, and the calling itself actually t
censed. / am led to quote, in this CON /
ectiOn, the language Of Judge Porter upon '
point decidedly german to the present s
natter, and which is found in the above Q
tied case. In the words OF the Judge, THE
atural right to the enjoyment OF property, O
d opposition to the positive regulations of /
Ociety, is subject of little utility in 7
Ourt of justice. 1t is true that the right {
acquire property may be regarded as i
ne of those which is inherent in man; but t
ais right, which took its rise in the law of Z
allure, has received its perfection, L
nd had a permanency given to it L
Y municipal or civil law; and it
in relation to this law that the right t
individuals to the possession and f
IjOyment Of things, must be examined. Il
IA modification which lppislativa r,ovrav U
az make in the possession, use and dis v
IL. ti.r, Of the nrnnertE inEnitn md d