The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1872-03-25
| WASHINGTON.
A PROTECTORATE OVER MEXICO.
President Grant on the Sit
uati0n There.
EARL GRAEVILLE'S SECOID NOTE.
v-~--~--c~-~---,~~.~>~.OU
Something that Schenck Could Not
Epit0mize---What Must II Be?
Our Private Claims Against Great
Britain, $25,OOO,OOO.
POLO De DARNABE A FRIENDLY SPAN!ARD
Murmurs Of Change in the For
eign Ministries.
Value of GOvernme Sc
curitics.
Our Private Claims Against Great
Britain, $25,OOO,OOO.
POLO De BARNABE A FRieNDL Y SPAN!ARD
Murmurs Of Change in the For
eign Ministries.
Value of GOvernn So
clritics.
COLFAX ON COLD WATER.

WASHINGTON, March "a. 1872
| A ProtectOrRto for Mcxico-What tho Presi.
dent Thinks willing, but Congress Must
Move First.
The articles III the HERALD In favor OF the annexa.
| ton OF Mexico, Or OF establishing proiectorate
over that unhappy country, have created great at
tention ere and have been under discussion by the
administration. President Grant is known to take
deep interest In all Mexican questions. HIS ser.
vice in that country during the war made q favor.
able impression upon his mind as to the resources
OF The country Its capacities for good government
and what might come OF the country under q firm
and resolute authority. He thinks thai there could
be no greater blessing to the Mexican people
than the establishment Of a protectorate by
the United States. He feels that 1t would
be triumph or the administrator, and would 20
far towards carrying those theories of manifest
destiny, which are so dear tosthe American people,
He feels that we should not leave the country at the
mercy OF foreign prince like Macmillan, ana tnat
as long as the country In unable either to command
respect for It's flag abroad or obedience 10 its laws
at home 1t win be az the mercy OF any adventurous
Power.
The argument that in the event Of such an occu-
patton OF Mexico by a foreign army we should be
justified in going TO war unoer under the Monroe
doctrine he regards as an argument In favor Of a
protectorate now. 1t would be much cheaper
and easier TO prevent the landing OF
foreign force or the intervention
Of foreign prince than to drive them out after in.
PREVENTION had begun. The difficulty In the Next
can question is twotoid. In the first place his
experiences with st. Domingo are not calculated to
inspire him new enterprises IN the tropics nor
would he to invite the misrepresentation ana
criticisms that were inspired by his independent
efforts to annex st. Domingo. II there Is to be
any movement looking towards annexation 1t must
come from Congress. The protectorate theory is
only another phase Of annexation.
The idea has long been familiar to our
politics. Sam Houston, Of Texas, when In the
Senate, was the champion OF the protectorate
scheme, but the cold judgment OF President Bu-
chanan was against IT, his experience with Mexico
when Secretary OF State during the Mexican war
not being Of character to excite him in favor Of
any measure that might lead 10 war; II protec-
t0rate were decreed 1t is thought that Senator
Schurz would support 1t, as he pronounced himself
The difficulty about protectorate would be legal
one. In ST. Domingo we had the assent Of Baez, the
President. and the Legislature to annexation. But
there Is no assurance ana no intimason that Juarez
and his Congress would consent to any interference
Oh the part OF the United States The Mexicans have
all the pride OF their Casiilan ancestors, and would
rather he an independent nation Of banditti than
dependency Of any Power. A protectorate, until
asked for by Juarez, could only be by an occupa-
ton OF the country In force ana this would be war;
War can only be declared by Congress. We have
no army to march into Mexico Even II a protec-
torate was established aceably we should have to
send So 900 men 10 exermnate the bandtti and sup
press The smouldering Instructions. All OF these
considerations have-been carefully reviewed bv the
President, to whom the Mexican question is one OF
great interest, and upon which he is as well In.
formed as any man In the country. He appreciates
the force OF that public opinion which the HERALD
so clearly represents, ard would most heartily
give 1t effect and purpose but lie In the hands OF
the law.maKing power The administration viii
not look unkindly upon the movement, and II 1t
takes shape no one will more Willingly support 1t
than the President.
The Alabama Claims-Grnnville's Second
Letter-Schemck's Epigrammatic ImpOssi.
biIities-The Private Claims.
The contents OF the despatch Of Lord Granville to
Mr. Fish, In reply TO our recent note on the subject
OF consequential damages, are not known. Mr.. !
Schenck telegraphs that the note is elaborate and
argues the question, but that 10 IS impossible for
him 10 give even an idea OF what 1t contains The !
Generals incapaciy TO indicate In two three preg-
nant Geographic sentences the meaning OF an i'm. |
portant public document and thus give his govern. !
ment valuable and timely Information and enable Il
to take advantage OF time In continuing the discus
sion. has excited little surprise and leads TO the |
suggestion that o good HERALD news editor would |
he an accession TO our London Legation. In
the absence or this Information, The administration
advances no theories or problems rs to the /
result OF the negotiations. IL Is believed that Lord
Granville simply discusses the whole question from
the generally understood English point Of view,
and makes no proposition for compromise other
than an absolute surrender OF the case for conse.
quential damages. II It were otherwise General
SchencS would have telegraphed ". Tho impress.
sion Is that Lord Granville ana Mr.. Fish look upon
time the great pacincator, after all and that they
Dlean to gain time by prolongng the discussion so
"a TO allow the passions OF the people to end and
the statesmen TO come to a better understanding.
The State Department viii send to the American
agent and the counsel AFFAIRS, In day or two n
England on account OF the rebel privatc.rs. The
CaIma for dir act and actual loaaea ovuou.. A. -.