Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1872-10-02
THE CHRONICLE
Speech of Horace Greeley, at Warren,
Tuesday Evening, Sept. 2S, 1871.

Speeeh Of Horace Greeley, at Warren,
Tuesday Evening, Sept. Is, 1871.
FELLOW CITIZENS Il propose to
sneak on the political questions OF the
time-a topic which has not been
discussed bv me before the public for
very MANY wears. 1 shall deal first
with some that may call temporary
questions. questions of the time, and
with these as briefly as l may, pre-
naratorv to some more elementary
questions. ,. .;,..
is this: Being, as we are, on the eve
of a Presidential contest, can the
Democratic party afford to take power
at this time? This is question
which is not usually considered by
American politicians. 1t is the cur
rent belief whenever We can clutch
power, then is the time 10 take it
| But in England and other countries,
q better and wiser rule prevails
! Gladstone, Disraeli, or any OF the
great statesmen of England. any time
| for the last century, will consider, as
they have always considered. Is my
position such, are my relations to my
party, and that party's relations to
| the country such that L can aHoru
now to take power?
The Democratic party went out OF
( power in 1860 by its own act. IL was
perfectly able TO have maintained us
ascendency, but they quarreied ana
threw their power away. L tnlnk IL
was for the good of the country, but
! the fact remained that the party chose,
I as it were, to go out OF power ul-
vided, fought with itself and abdlca-
ted power 1t is the common re-
proach of parties that they VIII DO
anything to get power and to Keep NJ
| but in this case the Democratic party
/ chose to renounce power. AT the
next election it was plainly seen by
every sober test that it was in no con-
dition to return to power. The coun-
try was distracted and at war, and
with such state of things that the
| Democratic administration coming
/ into mower would have been fettered
and embarrassed, not merely by the
committals but by the impulses and
! feelings of the great mass OF its sup
norters. I do not exaggerste or speak
as a partisan when L say that the
great bulk of those who supported
! Mcclellan and Pendleton, in 1854, to
/ a greater or less extent sympathlzed
with the rebellion then distracting
( the country. l do not mean that the
majority desired or in any manner
would have readily acquiesced in a
division of the country, but they dld
( believe that the true way to restora-
| ton of the country was to arrest the
war, stop the fighting, and commence
negotiating, and to try to see II by
some means we could not coax them
back to US. They believed that every
drop of blood shed in that quarrel
was an obstacle and barrier raised
against the union of the country. l
am not reproaching them for this. L
assert what is the truth, when say
that every Democratic victory in
this country throughout the progress
of the war, was Interpreted by the
rebels as an encouragement to perse-
we're in the struggle, and an assu-
rance that they would certainly pre-
vail. Had Mcclellan been chosen
President, the whole rebel host would
have exulted over ii as their victory
would have taken strength ana heart
in the confident hope that they would
no longer be prosecuted with what
they called the Lincoln war, then
made upon them.
REBELS AND DEMOCRATS IN sYMPA-
THY.
! General Sickles, q shrewed and pa
tient officer, and a good soldier, once
told me that he often asked rebel
prisoners he met after the war was
over to tell him when We struck the
hardest blow in the course of our long
struggle and the uniform answer W as:
"When YOU reelected Abraham Lin
coin. for we all understood that TO
mean four years more of fighting II
Won wanted il, and we were not ready
/ 10 fight; nothing so disheaTtened and
paralyzed US as the reelection of Lin
coln,h IknOw that il this reelection
of Lincoln so disheartened them, the
contrary result would have filled
them with confident hope and joyous
exuItation. l say had the Democratic
party then come into power, they
/ would have been between two fires
its duty 70 maintain the government,
which it had voluntary assumed, and
the expectations of large mass of its
supporters, and a large mass of the
rebels, that its victory would be a
termination of the struggle. 1t was
no time then for them to be looking
to assume power. In 1868 thought
il had a very tolerable chance OF
achieving power in the county.
knew what difficulties and embarras-
ments it must encounter after achiev-
ing power, but / thought it bad 8
chance. The country was burdened
4 with debt, and struggling under taxa
tiun as il was, that party made nc
concealment of its desire to overthrow
the debt. 1t came together in con-
vention, in New York, and proved
itself incapable of governing the
country in the spirit which was es
senual TO its government. 1t com
mence6 by virtually reputation the
debt for, when you saw that you vii
pay the debt in greenbacks, and VII
make greenbacks in order to pay The
debt easily, you virtually say you
will not pay it at all. Europeans who
held hundreds of millions of our bond:
had purchased them in an open mar
ket for gold; they know nothing
about greenbacks-never heard o
them, scarcely-they simply founC
our bonds for sale cheap, and they
bought them, taking the risk of oul
success in our struggle. They under
stood perfectly that if we did no
succeed the bonds would never prob
? ably be paid. They took a great risk
having a great premium offered
They bought large quantities on thu
strength of their faith in our success
and as we did succeed, they made ;
large profit on their purchases. Now
when the Democratic party met II
convention and said "If we succesC
, we will pay our debt in greenbacks,
they as good as said to the foreign
creditor ave will not pay the deb
at all, or only so much of it as we finC
convenient and stop there" To tel
man, say in GemanyI you viii
issue an unlimited amount of prom
ises to pay which you never mean t
redeem, though they may draw sil
Der cent. interest in. gold, IS pre-
cisely the isame as telling him you
will never pay at all.
] Then, again, We say . Large numbel
of the leading gentlemen and leading
persons who had been promoters anC
champions of the rebel cause figuring
in that Convention as heroes, states
men, patriots and leaders, and every
one saw that the Democracy in lS6-
was a restoration of the rebel elemen
TO the governing power of the country
| think when the Convention hat
met and resolved and nominated
= l.