The daily phoenix. [volume] (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, 1872-07-24
- Bius Ridys scrip 'UneonstivutlonA9. -

tsss Blue Ridge Scrip p'Unebnssiyutlonnz. ,~
The following is the decision OF Judge
Willard in the bond scrip aase. which
I,was'announced yesterdaa,.S : ~,
ECoMMoN PLEAs-RStsAsp CouNrY,-
H The State &c rel E.aaf Gary, Auditor.
/ %. N. G. Parker. - Trsasurer, and
others. ssi f''3 fl'3s ,!.S5' ,',e !,
This motion comes before me under
Section 24l Of the Code. authorizing O
Justice of, the Supreme, Court to enter
tain a motion for Tan injunction in
case OF the absence of the Circuit Judge
from his OircuiJ pr his inability from
any cause.
The question involved is, whether an
Act of the Legislature. entitled can Act
to relieve the State of South Carolina of
all liability for its guaranty of the bonds
Of the Blue Ridge Railroad Company,
by providing for the securing and de-.
struction of the same" passed March 2,
1872, (l5 stat, 49, unconstitutional, SO
far as it attempts to authorize the
issue of certain obligations from the
Treasury of the State, designated therein
as revenue bond scrip, on the ground
that such Act Contravenes 80 much of
the tenth section of the first article Of
the Constitution OF the United States us
declares that no State shall ''emit bills of
credit"
It is claimed by the plaintff that the
obligations contemplated by the second
and third sections of that ACT are bills
of credit, within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States, and
that the provisions of such law, for the
issue of such obligations, intend an
emission within the sense and meaninn
of that Constitution.
Section 3 provides as follows: sThat
to carry ont the purposes of this Act,
the State Treasurer is hereby authorized
and required to have printed, or en-
graved on steel, as soon as practicable,
treasury certificates of Indebtedness, to
be know and designated as revenue
bond scrip Of the State Of South Caro-
lima, in such form and of such denomi-
nations as may be determined on by the
State Treasurer and the President of the
Blue Ridge Railroad Company in South
Carolina, to the amount of $780, 600;
which revenue bond scrip shall be
signed by the State Treasurer, and shall
express that the sum mentioned therein
is duo by the State of South Carolina to
the bearer thereof, and the same will be
received in payment of taxes and all
other dues to the State, except special
tax levied to pay interest on the public
debt"
The question arises, are the obliga-
tions contemplated by this eection, bills
of credit, within the meaning of the
Constitution of the United States? The
proper definition of the terms 'bills of
credit" has been settled in the Supreme
Court Of the United States, after much
able and earnest discussion, eliciting
marked difference of opinion. Chief
Justice Marshall. in delivering the OPT
nion of the majority of the court, in
Craig cs. Missouri, a Peters, ,41O,) declares
that the terms "bills of credit" as en-.
ployed in the Constitution of the United
States, "signify paper medium in.
tended to circulate between individuals,
and between government and indivi-
duals, for the ordinary purposes of So
ciety. and that the prohibition against
such emissions comprehends the ennis
sion iof any paper medium by State
Government for the purpose of common
circulation" This definition received
much consideration, as to its accuracy,
in the subsequent case of Briscoe os.
Bank, III Peters. 257, but was enforced,
rather than impaired, by the decision in
the last named case. The opinion of the
majority of the judges, in Briscoe ps.
Bank, was delivered by Justice Mclean,
who, it will be observed. was one of the
justices who dissented in Craig vs. Mis-
souri,. He declares, after reviewing the
various definitions of the terms In ques-
ton that had been brought into dis.
cussion, in Craig ps.cMissouri, that "the
definition there, which does include all
classes of bills of credit emitted by the
colonies or States, is paper medium.
issned by the sovereign power, contain
ing pledge Of its faith and designed to
circulate as money"
1t is not necessary, for the purposes of
the present case, to inquire whether the
foregoing definition is exhaustive of the
whole sense and meaning of the consti-
tutional prohibition; for the present case
will be found fully within that defini-
tioD, and, therefore, covered by the au.
thority of the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case already cited.
1t remains, then. only to inquire whether
the obligations contemplated by the Act
under consideration are intended to have
the following characteristics:
l. That they were TO be issued by