, 1872-01-22

MORNING. JANUAR,
After reciting the provisions of the
law of Congress making the laws of the
several States rules for decision in the
courts Of the United States in trials at
common law. he says: :: But it has been
decided that the adoption Of the State
practice must noihe understood as con-
founding the principles of law and equi-
ty; that the distinction between law and
eqnity is established by the national
Constitution; and that, therefore, though
a party seeking to enforce a title or
claim at law in the courts of the United
States may proceed according to the
form of practice adopted in the State
where the remedy is pursued; yet, if the
claim is an equitable one, he must pro-
ceed according to the rules which the
Supreme Court of the United States has
prescribed for the regulation of proceed
ings in equity; notwithstanding the State
laws have abolished the distinction of
forms of proceedings at law and in equi-
ty, and have established one uniform
and peculiar mode of remedy for all cas-
es." II How. S. G. r. 669, Bennett VS..
Butterworth; 9 Peters S. G. r, 632,
Livingston VS.. Story; Is Peters s. G. r.
8, Gaines vs.. Rolf.
That the Supreme and District Courts
of this Territory, in cases arising under
the laws of the Territory and the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States,
possess all the jurisdiction of the regu-
lar Circuit and District Courts of the
United States, is manifest from the pas
sage quoted heretofore from the 9th sec.
of the Organic Act of this Territory.
The regular Circuit and District Courts
of the United States were created by act
of Congress by virtue it is true, of a
constitutional grant of power SO to do.
The Circuit Courts of this Territory
were also created by act of Congress
either by virtue of the constitutional
grant of power to Congress "to make all
needful rules and regulations respecting
the Territories, &c. of the United States, -
or as an inevitable consequence of the
right to acquire territory. Although
Territorial, they are nevertheless courts
of the United States.
In Waterman's Chancery Digest, vol.
l, page So, issfound the following: "The
Judicial power of the United States is
vested in ono Supreme Court, in Cir
cult Courts, District Courts and Terri
torial Courts" The Judges are officers
of the United States, appointed by the
President by and with the advice and
consent Of the Senate of the United
States. Theyare attended by Marshal
and U. S. District Attorney officers of
the United States. The disposition Of
their records will be within the power
aud control of Congress when the Terri
tory becomes a State and is admitted
into the Union as such. 16 Curtis, 2O9,
Hunt VS.. Pale; see Act concerning Ore
gon, IL Stat. at Large, 437.
That the rules adopted by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in ad-
miralty causes are binding on the courts
of this Territory as courts of the United
States, is too plain for argument. These
courts obtain their jurisdiction in admi-
rally by virtue of the fact of their being
District Courts and courts of the United
States. See Judiciary Act; Stat. at
Large, sec. 8.
Now if the rules adopted by the Su-
preme Court of the United States are
obligatory upon them in admiralty caus-
es, why are not the rules in equity pro-
ceedings binding when they are acting
as courts of chancery? We cannot re-
sist the conclusion that the latter is just
as obligatory as the former, especially
when there is no local equity system in
the Territory. What power the Terri
torial legislature may possess, if any, to
adopt a modified system of equity pro-
cedure, and how far any such system
would be binding ON the court. is a
question not raised in this case and not
decided by us. We find ourselves with
out any such local system, and in such
a case we are fully convinced that the
chancery powers of the Supreme and
District Courts of this Territory must
be exercised in the manner and form
prescribed by the rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
The late case of Dunphy VS.. Klein
smith. though brief, correctly understood
sustains fully the foregoing views. II
Wallace, GA.
In the Territory bf Montana, from
which this case was taken to the Su-
preme Court of the United States, there
had also been legislative abolition of
the distinction between law and equity.
The Court, after quoting the provisions
of the Organic Act which is the same
as ours-says: 1T is apparent that the
Territorial legislature has no power to
pass any law in contravention Of the
Constitution Of the United Stat,s, OF
which shall deprive the Supreme and