Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1872-02-24
MILITARY MISTAKES.
s~saursusrd On the Conduct Of 1.-THE War.

In a recent number Of Southern
magazine General Beauregard com
ments upon the siege of Charleston
and Grants last Virginia campaign
In regard to the attack Of the moni
tors upon Fort Sumter he is evidently
of the opinion that it failed chiefly be.
cause it was undertaken in the day.
time instead of at night:
We had great doubts as to the Inn,
pending result, and / was always Of
the unqualified opinion that, if the
enemy's iron-clad feet made a night
attack against Fort Sumter by com.
ing within sufficiently close range to
see the fort, which was a large and
elevated object, and yet not be seen
from the fort, the latter would certain
be silenced or destroyed in the course
Of few nights without serious injury
to the monitors, and the channel to
Charleston and the haTbOr would have
been opened to them after removing
the torpedOes placed at their entrance.
The failure Of General Gilmore to
appreciate the true point from which
to attack Charleston is thus comment
ed upon:
Being an engineer by profession
and acquainted with General Gill
more, l felt confident, as soon as he
assumed command OF the forces oper-
atIng against Charleston, that he
would turn his attention to attacking
Fort sumter, as he had done Fort
Pulaski, at the entrance OF Savannah
river, the year before, instead of EN-.
plOying his means to the taking of
Charleston, whereas Morris island was
only the window to it; and it was for
tunate indeed for that city and the
Confederacy that General Gilmore
preferred attempting to enter through
the window instead Of the door.
General Besuregard is plainly Of the
opinion that the siege Of Petersburg
by Grant was a mistake. He says:
What General Lee and myself
feared most was that General Grant
should continue to rotate around
Richmond on the south side OF the
James and AppOmattox as he had
done on the north side of the former
river. It Is evident that with our in
fenority Of numbers at the time &C.,
900 against $50 000) and paucity of re.
sources, we could not have checked
him by placing ourselves in his front
without ~uncOvering Petersburg and
Richmond, which required a very
strong garrison (more than we could
safely spare), TO be abandoned to
themselves even for 8 moment. For
the same reason we could not have
threatened his line Of communication
with City Point or the lower James
river, where he could have re.estab.
lished his base at any point most suit
that movement Of r~otatation Grant
would have effectually destroyed the
Weldon and Danville railroads,
the only two lines which con-
inued to furnish Richmond and
the army with scanty supplies
provisions and ammunition rom
Wilmington and the nearly exhausted
States Of South Carolina and Georgia.
were living then, as ii were, from
hand to mouth; and any serious in
corruption to those lines of supply
would have compelled an immediate
evacuation OF Virginia by the C0nfed-
crate government and army for North
Carolina and South Carolina, or for
and Kentucky, where's new
{ theater Of war" might have been
established. But General Grant pre-
erred Ito hammer away all the year
IA that line "(against the fortffca-
ions Of Petersburg like an Infatuated
Dul which, losing sight Of his tormen-
Ors, rushes madly at the red flag
which is daunted Ia his eyes. AS
General Bosquet said of the gallant
barge at Baiaklava, "CeLG est mGq
naGiS &c NEST pas Ia gueyTe -
that is magnificent, but it is not &C.
ording to the art of war"