Daily Kennebec journal. [microfilm reel] (Augusta, Me.) 1870-1975, 1872-08-01

labored under q strange delusion, both as to
our character and our wishes, and that VIC
could only meet him as private citizens, and
for an informal interchange of opinion. This
course, however, as thought, would be giving
to the party new il power in the United States
the means of defending itself against the
charge which was used with most effect by its
political adversaries. Neither the present nor
any other Republican administration can Sc
cure the same degree of public support in the
prosecution of the war on policy Of con-
fscation aud emancipation, as on a policy
which looks simply to the restoration OF the
Union. Mr. Lincoln was reproached with al
unwillingness to make peace on any terms
short of the subjugation OF the States of this
confederacy, and the utter overthrow Of their
peculiar social system, and consequent in
disposition to ascertain the sentiments of the |
Southern people, for fear they might profess
readiness to submit to the authority of the
URited States on more reasonable conditions.
Although no proposition for peace which did
not concede our absolute independence would
have been entertained by US tor a moment, it
did not seem TO me wise to give our enemies
the moral and material benefit to be derived
from position they were not honestly entt-
led to occupy.
Had we returned the answer which has
been suggested the friends Of President
Lincoln could have appealed to the letter to
Mr.. Greeley as proof of his Willingness to
open negotiations on the most liberal basis.
That letter wholly abandoned the attitude
which the Government of the United States
had maintained since the secession of South
Carolina, and to which, according to the dec
| laration of Mr.. Seward in his recent speech
at Auburn 1t has returned Of mo negotiations
with rebels in arms" 1t expressed readiness
to open negotiations, and attempt to settle
through diplomacy the questions which had
| been so long in vain Submitted to the arbitra-
ment of war. 1t did not even announce that
the restoration Of the Union was AT indispen-
sable condition Of peace, but proffered tree
and untrammelled conference. Had the cor.
respondence closed at that point, it must have
added strength to the administration OF Mr..
Lincoln. and thus increased its capacity to
carry on the war. Within our own borders,
it would have nourished the delusive and dan
gerous hope of a compromise with our enemy
on terms consistent with liberty and self
respect. A renewed pressure would have
been brought to bear on the President to send
commissioners to Washington with the view
of opening negotiations, at the hazard of fresh
indcnities to the confederacy.
In framing our reply 20 the letter OF Mr..
Greeley, we endeavored to shape it to COM
pei such new developments from Mr.. Lincoln
ministration, or such an adherence to the pc.
sition assumed in that letter as would enable
our Government to act upoa it with safety.
This purpose was fully accomplished in calling
forth the celebrated document addressed
ITO whom it may concern No paper prob
ably ever produced so great revolution of
public sentiment in the same space of time.
Although gross delusion as to the extent of
their recent military successes has induced
a. ~. "a
Lincoln, it is destined to exercise an enduring
influence for good. 1t has permanently
weakened and distracted the War party OF the
North, and there 10 much reason to hope that
before many months intervene it will wholly
deprive it of Democratic support, However
shis may be, it has united and animated our
own people more than any political action OF
onr adversaries since the commencement of
the war.
1t has been suggested that the effect Of this
correspondence, by rendering probable the
defeat of Mr.. Lincoln at the polls, was uA-
favorable in the Northwest by REFRESHING a
growing tendency to revolution in that quarter
/ This was, no doubt, to some extent, its
temporary effect, but it has worked no injury
to our cause. The revolutionary element has
been hitherto too feeble to be employed in
our service with any advantage. Before this
correspondence took place our sangulne
friends in that region had fixed upon various
periods of revolutionary outbreak, but they
were deferred at their own instance from time
to time, as the conviction gradually dawned
upon their own minds Of the extent to which
they had exaggerated their strength. From
all the developments which have been made
l am satisfied that no explosion could have
taken place previous to the election, which
would not have resulted In permanent injury
to our cause. The Northwest Is not now
and, without the systematic and possibly long
continued application of the agencies which
control the popular mind, may ever be, ripe
for revolution. But 1t is fermenting with the
passions, out of which revolutions have been
created. In Illinois, Indians, and possibly
Ohio, majority of the population are hostile
to the present administration. The recent
election furnished no evidence to the contrary,
for with large body Of the peace party, Nc
Clellan was held in as much odlum as Lin.
coin himself. The bitterness between these
two hostile factions is intense. The one has
received from the other every outrage which
the strong can perpetrate on the weak. 1t
would be fatal mistake, in my opinion, to
abandon all effort to separate this section
from the United States, because no results
have as yet been achieved commensurate with
our expectations. The hope of closing the
war by negotiation has been extinguished.
Our resources are diminishing more rapidly,
for obvious reasons. than those of our enemy.
To keep alive such degree of spprehensions
as will lead to concentration OF large bodies of
troops to repress insurrection within their
own limits, will, of itself, be an important d.
version in our favor. We should employ
money and talent without stint, to give this
brooding resentment the proportions Of anar-
chy and civil strife. Let US preserve our COM
munication with our friends in the North.
Warned by our past experience, let US intro
duce arms more gradually and cautiously, as
far as practicable subsidize leading presses,
and through the ordinary channel of newspa-
pers, as well as of campaign documents, en-
tighten and influence the public mind.
Enlist public men of character and infu-
ence whose principles and sympathies are
with us, by indemnifying them against the haz-
ards to which bold and decisive action may
expose them. With arms, leaders, and an
opportunity, we would strike a deadly blow.
1t is proper to add that have expressed
only my j" ;vilual opinions, and do not know
to what extent they would meet the concur
renee of Messrs. Clay and Thompson.
have the honor to remain, very respect
fully, JAMES p. HOLCoMBF