The Andrew County Republican. [volume] (Savannah, Mo.) 1871-1876, 1872-11-29
The Second Presidency of Gen. Grant.
From the Nation

The first term of Gen. Grant began q
probably the most unfortunate moment q
which any man without the training of /,
politician and the experience Of statesman
could have assumed the responsibilities o
the office. This sense of relief from tho grea
strain Of the war was passing away; the ir.
ritation arising from excessive, ill-adjustei
taxation and tho first contraction Of delu
sive inflated currency, was beginning. Tn,
great soldier was dying out, and the deb
due TO him from the country he was regarded
as having saved was supposed by many to b.
paid by the gift of its highest Office while
the reverential love which second genera
ton gives q national hero had not yet begun
The disastrous Administration of Andrew
johnson, with its corrupt system of Office.
bargaining between the President and the
Senate, had surrendered no small part of the
attributes of the Presidency; 80 that ip stead
Of public officers being, as the Constitution
prescribes, appointed by tho President and
confirmed by the Senate, they had come to
be appointed by the Senate on the nomina-
tion Of the President. Tho impeach ept
too. had lessened the public estimation of the
Office; and to such q degree that respectab q
and ordinarily temperate journals and Pc
riodicals had attempted to demonstrate that
by impeachment, though entirely innccfut
of high crimes and misdemeanora. There
were, moreover, certain personal character
istics Of Gen. Grant which tended strongly
to make his Administration failure, but
which, singularly, indicate that his zee c)nd
Administration will be incomparably be ter
than the first.
The FIRST of these personal traits is that
which cannot be readily do
fined, but is well understood in the common
phrase OF "minding his own business" This
charac eristic he possesses in an extraordin-
ary degree. Positively-ret cent, composed,
self contained; negatively-neither curious,
nor ipquring, nor enthusiastic, nor sympa-
thetic. In the army the quality served him
both i'll and we'll. As subaltern, il proba-
bly, contributed to his failure, being mistaken
for indifference and a want Of soldiery, am-
bilious zeal. When he became Brigadier-
General he was content TO be simply General,
not flying about among his regiments, drill
ing, instrrcting, ipguIring, but leaving all
regmsntal work TO his reg mental command.
ers. Officers who served immedia ely uudcr
him, and who, fresh from civil life, felt the
need of an active superior, never saw him,
and regarded him as listless, il.dolent and
perhaps incompetent commander. But
when he roso to more extended commands,
his subordinates gradually learned two
things: frat, that the responsibility of
their command rested entirely upon them
selves; second, that while they would be
justly appreciated and generously commend
cd, they would never be interfered with
within their own official spheres. Hence
grew up that remarkable devotion which led
such soldiers as Sherman and Mcpherson to
refuse TO be transferred to another command
ar nd AT nal - dal IA
his own success; for certainly no other Gen.
cral was served by such efficient subordinates
as Gen. Grant.
But when he left tho army and came 10 d.
rect the civil aSairs Of the Government,
this controlling characteristic of his nature
nearly eau ed his ruin. He had entered
WeAt Point . mere boy and grown up there,
taught little Of civil matters, and from his
nature seeking little beyond his business,
which was 10 become q soldier. His frontier
life and the Mexican war kept him all the
more closely TO that business. When he left
The army in disgrace, his sad secluded life
was bounded by the four walls Of . little
shop; so secluded was it that when he went
back 10 Galeus covered with renown, it was
said that no thirty of his .ownsmen knew
him by sight. During the war he saw moth
ing OF public men save few officious inter-
members OF Congress, and was
By his LieuteDants that Washington
was den of disaster ami iniquity. At the
end Of the war, when he moved his head
quarters to the scat Of Government, he had
never studied the work of the politician CT
the statesman, for it had not been his bus-
ness; aud because it h d not been his busi-
ness he knew nothing Of it or them. Gfciyl
affairs and public men in civil life, be was
probably the most ignorant intelligent man
IN the United States.
The greatest misfortune that has ever be-
fallen Gen. Graut is that he csme to the Pres
Idency too young. IL with his unerripg
instinc: in the selection Of men, his quiet
observation, sound sense, and evenly bal
anced judgment, he had continued four or
eight years longer in Washington at the
head OF the army, he would probably have
made great and useful President. As it
was he came not TO administer but TO be
taught. There are indications enough that
his own modest elf-estimste aud excellent
Judgment told him this but un ortunately
he had beside him a shallow, selfish, un-
'crupulous counselor in Mr.. W Washburn, and
be had been creased and vexed in his brief
of tho War Office by Mr..
Johnson, and reused into the desire for
pcwer which modification frequently awsk-
ans in men Of quiet temperament. He came
10 the Presidency almost absolutely ignorant,
from a civil point of view, Of men and things.
II was inevitable, therefore, that he should
ean upon the few men he knew, and obtain
information only from those Immediately
lround him. Yet he had q clear idea that
he country needed something more than the
of professional politicians. and
Inat the people looked to him to introduce
an era of better things. The idea OF admin
strativc reform was not ripe in the public
mind, and the desire for civil service had
not definite form, yet no increase was ever
more grateful to the nostrils Of people
han the smoke that arose while Gen. Badeau
burnt the ofiico-seekers' lettcrs. When Col.
Mcclure was sent homo with nothing brt
The titlc of "The Pennsylvania Politic ian,"
aud sundry intruding Senators wore turned
back by the assurance that their assistance
was unneeded, the hopes Of nearly all mon
seemed to be no longer deferred. Gen. Grant
saw this plainly, and proceeded in his quiet
way to make up his own practical working
ca binet. But when his private slate" was
broken by the declension OF Mr.. Wilson, and
the inclgibiiity of Mr.. Stewart, it discon-
certed the plan Of his campaign; his ignor-
Rnce of men was an impediment to further
and all his military strategy
to recover the ground lost by the
surprise. The confidence Of the country in
Gen. Grant, especially in his moral courage
and firmress and his supposed determination
' 10 fight it out on this line" caused an ap-
parent apathy, influential men leaving the
matter p!acidly TO the President, believing
that he was abundantly able 10 hold up his
own hands during the emergency. The
willy politicians in Congress saw their ad-
vantage and seized it. They held before
ho fot IF
him that he would have arrayed against
him his own party in Congress, who con-
trolled the press and possessed the car of the
public, and they besought him as friends TO
follow in the beaten pathway Of Presidents,
and warned him that his efforts were con-
sidered blunderings, and were fast becoming
ridiculous. The fear Of causing new dissen-
sions between Congress and the Executive,
q ,ense Of his own inoxperieuce and ignor-
arce, perhaps some dread of having his
high military reputation clouded by the ridi-
:.t L. ~kA 80 IL Il