The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1872-08-26

the eve Of a watching supervision, to have 1t
known whether an armament went on board, IN
order that then they might be reported ana, IL
may be, Intercepted. The whole administrative
question OF the practical application OF authority
by the British government IN our ald ior tne IN
cumstance OF whether the vessel was armed or
was not armed. Under the administration OF that
question they went out without ornaments, not
wishing to be stopped. and by pre-arrangement,
took their ornaments from tenders that subse-
quently brought them-which also could not be
stopped.
WHEN VESSELS SHOULD BE SEIZED BY NEUTRAL.
Certain observations OF Baron Bramwell are
quoted by the learned counsel In this connection,
which are useful to US as illustrating the turning
point in the question as to armed and unarmed YES
sells. They are to this effect and exhibit the British
vessel fitted to receive her armament and
armed is vessel that should be stopped under an
prOximate hostility which neutral is bound to
arrest Baron Bramwell held that the emission
OF vessel armed Is undoubtedly hostile expe-
ditlon within the meaning OF the law Of nations
But vessel lifted to receive her armament In
the neutral port, and sent out OF that port by
is not an en.erDrise in vloatom ~ The n law ~
nations and Is not hostile expedition in the sense
OF that law. by consequence Baron Bramwell
argued, nothing in such an enterprise of bellige
rent from neutral port calls for the exercise of
authority ON the part OF the neutral either by law
or bv executive interference, and, until the arma-
ment gets ON board, there Is nothing to bring the
case within the province OF international proscrip-
1t was them he argues, only a question for Great
Britain whether the provisions OF the Foreign En-
listment act can touch such vessel, and the only
question Tor the British government was as towards
the United States-have they done their duty to
themselves in the enforcement of the municipal law
which involves question OF International RESPONSE
bility to the United States? We insist therefore
that so far from nothing practical turning upon
this distinction, all the doubts and dinicHties turn
upon 1t, especially In connection with the ancary
proposition that these vessels could be provided
by means OF their tenders with armaments without
any accountability for the complete hostile exped-
ton.
BRITISH LAW IN 1919 AND 1870.
It is said that we can draw no argument as to
the deficiency Of their old act from the improved
provisions OF the new act OF 1870 Why not When
we say that your act of 1919 was not adequate
to the situation, and that, II you had no pre-
supplied them by act of Parliament-that you
should have furnished by legislation the means
Tor the performance OF duty, which required
which we complain Oft is certainly competent
for us to resort to the fact that, when our war
was over, from thenceforth movements were made
towards the amendment OF your law, and that,
when the late
WAR ON THE CONTINENT or EUROPE
opened, your new act was Immediately passed con-
tanning all the present provisions of practical ex-
ecutive interrogation OF such Illegal enterprses-it
is l. say, competent for us to refer to all this
strong as well as fair argument, to show that,
even in the opinion OF the British Parliament, the
old act was not adequate to the performance OF the
international duties OF Great Britain to the United
States
Sections twenty-seven to thirty Of the special ar
gqment are occupied with discussion Of that part
diligence, the entire failure of Great Britain to
have an active, effectve and spontaneous investi-
OF enterprises Of this kind Well, the comments
upon this are OF two kinds: first concern
ing the question under somewhat pro-
ment did or did not do this, that, OF the other
things and, then, concerning the more general
question, to whether the rules of this treaty call
upon this tribunal to llQutrc into Ruch def
cheney OF diligence which was not applicable to the
case Of vessel respecting which the British gov.
a violation Of the law was meditated.
Our answer to this latter question is, that the
the application Of due diligence (particuariy Under
the special emphasis of the third rule) Ito pre-.
vent" the occurrence OF any Of the attractions Of
the law OF nations prescribed by the rules
There are two propositions in these rules Ger
tain things are assigned as violations Of the law of
nations, and as involving duty on the part of q
neutral government to prevent them, and besides
in and towards preventing them it is
ITS DUTY TO USE DUE DILIGENCE.
fractions of these rules, there comes to be an in
quiry, first whether In the circumstances and facts
which are assigned, the alleged infractions are a
tons as prescribed by those rules. II not, they
are dismissed from your. consideration. But II
vigor, become applicable to the situation. and
then comes the inquiry whether Great Britain did,
It IS under the sectons now
under review, that the learned counsel suggests
whether 1t is supposed that this general require
ment OF the use OF due diligence by Great Britain Is
intended to cover the cases of vessels like the
SHENANDOAH AND THE GEORGIA
no reasonable ground to believe We're meditat nu
or preparing an evasion OF the laws or VIC.
lation OF the duties OF Great BRITAIN, or the
cases OF these tenders that supplied the Georgia
and the Shenandoah and the Florida and the
Alabama, with their ornaments and munitions of
war-it is under these sections that this discussion
answer cuun atior
is that the general means OF diligence to keep the
government informed of facts and enable 1t to
Judge whether there was reasonable ground to
believe" in any given case, and thus enable il to
be prepared to intercept the illegal enterprise are
required In cases that the rules prescribe as nrac
tons OF neutrality.
will agree that under the first clause Of the first
rule the duty IL applied to vessel concerning which
the government .'shall have reasonable ground to
believe" &C. Under the second clause OF the first
rule the phrase is omitted, and the question OF
reasonable ground to believe" forms only an ele-
ment i'll the more general question of "due dill
gence." Under the second lule also the whole
subject OF the use OF the neutral ports and waters
as base OF naval operations Is open; and II there
has been defect of diligence in providing the oiil.
GERS OF Great Britain with the means OF knowledge
and the means OF action to prevent such use OF its
ports and waters q base of operations why
then, Great Britain is ut fault in not having used
due diligence to
PREVENT stCH USE ITS PORTS AND WATERS
That is our argument, and it seems to us il is q
sound argument. 1t is very strange IL it is not,
and If the duty OF government to due diligence
o base of naval operations does not include the use
of due diligence to ascertain whether they were
being or were to be so used.
ENGLAND'S GROSS FAULT
1T was fault not TO use due diligence to prevent
the ports and waters OF Great Britain from being
used as base OF naval operations, for the aug
mentation OF force, or the recruitment OF men,
And to admit that it was fault in any case not TO
act where the government had cause to believe that
there was to he violation OF law and yet to claim
that II was no fault for the government to be guilty
OF negligence in not procuring intelligence and in
formation which might give u reasonable ground TO
believe, seems to me absurd.
FALSE REASONING EXPOSED.
This indeed, would be to stamp the lesser ncg-
gence OF not applying due diligence in particular
case when there was reasonable ground to be-
iievc" as fault, entailing responsibility upon a
neutral government and to excuse the same gov
ernment for the systematic want OF due diligence
which, through Indifference to duty and voluntary
ignorance, did not allow itself to be placed I'm a
position 10 Judge whether the ground OF belief was
reasonable, or whether there was any ground at all
for its action The lesser fault liners that the same
greater responsibility Is imputable to the greater
I'm