The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1872-07-25
THE BLUE RIDGE SCRIP.
WHY JUDGE WILLARD DECLARED
IT'S ISSUE UNCONSTITUTTONAL
The Full Text OF the Decision.

The following ls the full text of the decision
of Judge Willard In the bond scrip case, the
substance of which was given In our Colum-
bia dispatches yesterday morning:
COMMON PLEAs-RICHLAND CouNTY.-The
Stale ex rel. E. F Gary. Auditor, vs. N. G..
Parker, Treasurer aua others.
This motion comes brfUre me under Section
24l of the Code, authorizing q justice Of the
Supreme Court to entertain motion for an
Injunction In case of the ABSENCE of the circuit
Judge from bis circuit, or his inability from
any cause.
The question involved IL, whether an act OF
the LEGISLATURE, entitled IAN act to relieve
the State of South Carolina OF all liability for
Its guaranty of the bonds of the Blue Rldge
Railroad Company, by providing for the &C.
curing and destruction of the same" passed
March 2, 1872, fl5 stat, 49, is unconsututional,
80 far as iU attempts to ''authorize the issue OF
certain obligations from the treasury Of the
State, designated therein as revenue bond
scrip, on the ground that such act contravenes
90 much of the tenth section Of the first
article of the Constitution Of the United States
as declares that no State shall ''emlt bills Of
credit"
Il is claimed BY the plaintiff that the obliga-
tions contemplated by the second and third
sections of that act are bills of credit, Within
the meaning OF the Consultation of the United
States, and that the provisions OF such law,
for the Issue Of such obligations, intend an
emission within the sense and meaning OF that
constl uLlon.
Section provides as follows: "That to
carry out the purposes Of this act the State
treasurer is hereby authorized and required
10 have printed, or engraved on steel, as soon
as practicable, treasury certificates OF indebt-
edness, 10 be known and designated as reVe-
nue. bond scrip of the State OF South Carolina,
in such form and of such denominations as
l.tn na1 hu ha 2fnfn frao 1rlr
and the president of the Blue Ridge Railroad
COMPANY In South Carolina, to the amount OF
81, 800 900; which revenue bond scrip shall be
signed BY the State treasurer, and Shall ex-
press that the sum mentioned therein Is due
by the State of South Carolina to the bearer
thereof, and the same will be received In pay
m-nt of taxes ami all other dues to the State,
except special tax levied to pay interest on
the public debt"
The question arises, are the obligations con-
templaIed by this section 0ils of credit, within
the meaning of the Constitution OF the United
States? The proper definition OF the terms
| 'blIs of credit" has been settled In the Su-
preme Court OF the United States: after much
able and earnest discussion, ellciting marked
difference of opinion. Chief Justice Marshall,
10 delivering the opinion OF the majority Of the
court, in Craig vs.. Missouri, a Peters, 1907
declares that The terms "bllls Of credit" as
employed In the Constitution of the United
States, ''signiiy paper medium Intended 10
circulate between individuals. and between
government and Individuals, for the Ordinary
purposes of society,". and that the prof.blllon
against such emissions cOmprehends the emls-
sion OF any paper medium by State
government for the purpose OF common
Circulation" This definition received much
consideration, as to It's accuracy, In The suose-
ouent case of Bri.coe vs. Bank, III Peters,
| 1871 bat was enforced, rather than impaired,
| by the decision ln the last named case. The
opinion OF the majority OF the judges, 10 brls-
| coe vs. Bank, was delivered by Justice
Mclean, who, it will be observed, was me OF
| the Justices who dissenled 10 Craig VS.. Mis-
sourf. He declares, after reviewing the Varl-
GUS definitions OF the terms In question that
| had been brought into discussion IN Craig vs..
Missouri, that "Lhe defnilion there, which does
the Colonies or States, Is paper medium,
| issued py the sovereign power, containing
| pledge OF lis faith, and designed to circulate
as money"
It is not necessary. for the purposes of the
present case, to Inquire whether the foregoing
deauition Is exhaustive of the whole sense and
| meaning of the constitutional prohbtlon, Tor
the present case Will be found fully Within that
definition, and, therefore, covered by the
authority of the Supreme Court Of the United
i States In the case already cited. 1t remains,
then, only to inquire whether the obligations
contemplated by the act under consideration
are Intended to nave the following charaeter'
lsllcs: =
| LIS sovereign character.
2 That they were 10 contain pledge OF its
faith; and
8. That they were Intended to circulate as
money.
The lrst and second propositions are settlad
in the affirmative by the terms OF Section s.,
which provides, as we holi, for paper 10 De
| Issued BY the State treasurer, importing an
obligation on the part OF the Slate to pay 8
certain sum of money TO the bearer. IL Will,
therefore, be necessary only to inquire
whether it was the Intention of the act chat
this paper should circulate as money.
An inquiry OF this nature calls into exercise
| one of the most Important and Responsible
judicial powers incident TO constitnuonat u,nn a.
government. II Involves the examination OF
an act OF the Legislature, with the View Of
fixing The purpose and Intent of the Legisla'
lure In the passage OF such act, not merely as
8 means of effecluating such purpose and
intent of the law making power by mean' OF
The judicial authority, but fur the purpose OF
testing the authority of the law.maklng power
lIselt 10 the case, under the supreme law OF
the land. The principles that should govern
such an Inquiry are we'll illustrated In the
case of Craig vs. Missouri, already referred to,
and lhs mode In which they are there ap.
| piled to case remarkably similar to the one
In hand, marks out very clearly the line OF IN
ouiry appropriate to be pursued.
To tx the meaning OF the term money" II
must be taken In tue ordinary sense under
stood BY the community N their mutual deal
,ugs, 4 strenuous attempt was made IN Oralg
VS.. Missouri, and 10 Briscue w. Bank, 10 limit
| the sense of the term "money," as entering
| into The question OF what constitutes bilt OF
credit, to the legal or technical sense Of the
term, which embraces only the legal coinage
of the country, and thai which Is 1ts legal
equivalent, or, IN other words, is made legal
tender; but that line OF argument did not pre-.
vail.
The question properly stated is, whether
particular obligation Is what the community
regards and deals With as money? Tne an
swer to 1t is, that whatever is current 10 q
! torn convenient to puss from hand 10 hand,
and that may be used to pay debs or purchase
| commodities, Ia iu this sense money. IL Is mol
| essential to such character that tender OF pay
1 ment in such substituted medium should have
the force aud effect Of legal tender, nor that
it should have an actual capacity Tor paylng
debts and purchasing commodities equal 10
that of money possessing Intrinsic or legal
/ value. That which passes current as money
NAV be depreolated Without losing its charac'
ter ss money, aud depreciation necessarily
implies diminished capacity for paying debts
| and purchasing commodities.
| On the other hand, 1t ls not enough 10 clar-
acterize an obligation as money, merely pe'
cause certain individuals have found IL conVe'
mimi 10 use 1t In the place OF money IN their
| mnr,1al transactions There must be dealing