The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1872-08-25

J
hon. Ali they. ptt|ss.Y kasy hew s9Siine arc
The yistas which Catholic genius here discloses
10 the mind that will but gaze and admire!
90 Ven HATES, pfaa 4ss the Lats VIZ. ~
The first volume Of the ."History Of the
Franco German War;" prepared BY the
section ref the Pruseian German
STAFF, has just appeared ut Berlin. 1t con
tsins very interesting mem m c ,.'n w;n.
tor Of 1858, setting forth q complete plan
Of campaign IN the event Of war WIZ
France, and this plan was carried out IN
Its main features whom the war actaany
broke out in 1870. The memorandum oe-
Of The two armies. At the beginning, says
the General, North Germany would only,
i, consauuence Of difficulties Of transport,
and,siso Of political difficulties, dispose q
ton corps, amounting In all to about 30,
600 men, while France would bring INTO
would DO increased, after calling in the re-
serve, to 343, 0oo. This propcrtion between
the opposing armies would be altared con-
sidersbly in favor of Prussia II the South
German States also took part in the war, or
il the three reserve corps and some Of the
landwehr divisions, we're brought up IN
dun, sshow importantit II to take advsn
tsee Of the superiority We .hould enjoy At
the very beginning, even If the North Ger-
man troops only were employed. This
| advantage would be still further increased
send expeditions to the North Sea coasts
| or to South Germany. Sumcient mesns
would still remain for defending the form !
err AS for South Germany, eonfeTences
have already been held at Berlin Wiz. the
representatives of tho South German Con-
| North
Germany could not efficiently protect the
Upper Rhine and the Black Forest BY
sending her tfoops there, and that the
! South would be much better defended ~ q
| union IL ali the German forces on the MID
/ die Rkine, whence they coafd attack the
BANK of the river. The South German
4 soyereigns agreed to this, and the Whole
weight of the responsibility Of defending
4 the fatherland was then thrown on the
North. =,
dunn, 'confnes the theatre of war to the
space between Luxembourg and Basle'
We NAV therefore assume that the French
win fsrst concentrate on the line OF Meta
i and Strasburg, in order to turn our strong
position on the Rhine, advance on the Main,
an agreement with the latter and then pro.
coed to the Elbe. The most effectual way
of opposing this plan would be to concen
trate all the troops at our disposal to tile
, south of the Moselle, in the Bavarian Paia'
innate. The prospect of an easy success
might induce the French to push INTO
South Germany with part of their force;
from strasburg, but an operation carried
ont along the line Of the Upper Rhine
would strike them in flank, prevent thei
D proceeding any further into the Black FOR
D est, and compel them to seek an outlet OF
= the north. II the corps Of Baden ana Wur
tembuEg form ., junction with our lei
Q wing, we shan be enabled % to strengthen
" It by reinforcement from the Palatine tina
i, | a decisive battle might be expected on tn
= heights of Rastadt, which, If in orr favor
would make the enemy's retreat disasteI
:. For such purpose We might detach
: force from our main army WaehouS oangel
J.. como weaker ON our front. IL the Frenc
/. wish to make the most complete Rse 9
Q their railway systeIn for the rapid copcen
!: tration of their forces, they will be CEN
PEELED to advance in two principal groups
Q BY Strasburg and Metz, separated oy Gu
!. bly The smallest, portion 10 not destined fc
J an invasion of South Germany, its junetio
, with the main force on the Upper MOsell
can only be effected by marching. Ga
% army, on the other hand, is posted IN th
IF Palatinate on the inner llne OF operation!
D. D6bWCCB eu0 SWV 6AVUHo, " SA1S ONSSys W
= may attack either separately, or, if we al
n strong enough, both sim fundamentally.
- The concentration Of all the forces 10 til
Lower Palatinate prOtects both the Lowe
and she Upper Rhine, and permits an o.
fensiye movement into the enemy's cour
try, which If entered upon' at the rigt
time, will probably anticipate an invasio
by the French of German soil. The onl
question therefore 10 whether we coul
j. push forward our army without dang'
\ across the Rhine to the Palatinate, an
}: thence close to the French frontier, an
this question should, in my opinion, be az
o, swered in the affirmative. Our prepar.
- the smallest details. Six uninterrupte
10 &c lines of railway are at our disposal for th
a transport of troops to the district betwee
st the Moselle and the Rhine. The tables c
,r routes which show the day aud hour {
leaving and stopping for each i dsta q .,
g Rrst detachments may ahght near th
u French frontier, aud on the thirteenth til
h contestants of two corps d'armee may q!
# semble there. On the eighteenth day tn
{, numbers of our army in the field would :