The Portland daily press., 1872-04-23

must be confirmed by the Senate or appointed
by officers who are SO confirmed; and by rule
of the Senate the objection of the Senators of
the State for which such appointment is made,
when OF the dominant party, rejects, or their
approval secures, the confirmation of such Off
GERS. t--
1t will be readily seen who would be consult
ed by the President in regard to the appoint
ments under this BILL and it might not even
be necessary to consult at all, as there could
readily be found means to let the President un-
derstand who were preferred by the Senators;
and the President would be placed entirely
within the power of such Senators. If he did
not appoint officers approved, not by the Sem
ate, but by the Senators of the State, in which
the appointment was made the appointment
would be rejected; thus placing the whole pat
ronage of the government in the control of the
Senate, and that without having them in any
way responsible to the people, as all action up
ON nominations is in secret session.
The power of the Federal patronage within
State is much more potential in controlling
State Legislature than in controlling the peo-
ple and regard the growing tendency on the
part of the Senate to control in connection with
the Executive the patronage of the govern
mcnt, and WELD it for their joint advantage,
with infinitely more alarm than any abuses
which can possibly grow out of the connection
| which Representatives have with the appoint
ing power. While the present practice con-
| tinues the responsibility can to a certain ex-
| tent be fixed.
| If an incompetent or dishonest officer is ap-
| pointed, the Representative or the Senator, as
the case may be, upon whose recommendation
| he was appointed Is known, and must take the
responsibility. A Senator who should override
the Representative, who under the practice is
| entitled to designate the appointment, would
not be sustained unless the appointment was
not proper one to be made. Under this bill
all this would be reversed, and, as L have
shown, the Senate acting in secret would have
the whole control of appointments:
Another danger to be apprehended from the
| passage of this bill is that it would increase
| the power of the President to control the &C
| ton of Congress- Suppose a President desired
| the passage of some measure, and having ap-
! pointments to make, he takes into his confidence
whose influence he deemed it most important
to secure, taking their recommendations would
| it not be powerful lever, when skillfully
and unscrupulously used, to influence legisla-
/ ton? -l. s. -a.s ~ s9ei e s. lg&
In every view can take of this bill it is a
| step in the wrong direction. 1t confounds all
distinctions between right and wrong, by pun
ishing as criminal an act which, if properly
performed, is a meritoriOus one; it concentrates
| power in the hands of the Senate, and relieves
from responsibility those nearest to the people,
and who can be most readily reached T7
The substitute which propose provides that
all recommendations of members of Congress
in regard to the appointment and removal OF
officers shall be official acts, and requires such
recommendations to be based upon the fitness
or unfitness of the person to be appointed OF
removed, and that such recommendations shall
| be open to inspection and reported to Congress
This would prevent appointments and removals
| being made upon personal grounds, and would
place the responsibility upon the proper person.
| To go further than this would, in my judgment
| be to infringe upon the rights and duties of the
Representatives of the people. Ae