The Andrew County Republican. [volume] (Savannah, Mo.) 1871-1876, 1872-11-01
xanoleon and Ausferlitx.

Such was the crowning battle of Aster-
litz-except Wateffoo;; and perhaps
Jena-the most decisive Of the reYo-
Iutionary wars; the one, too, which
military writer's have usually considered
Napoleon's masterpiece. There wasthis
peculiarly also in the day, that it wasia
perfectly fair fight, the numbers on each
eide we're not far from equal, and the
result was in no sense caused by an over
whelming preponderance of force. The
| victory was due to the serious error of
the allies in uncovering their center in
the attempt to outfiank the French
| right, and to the admirable skill with
which Napoleon anticipated their faulty
maneuver, massed his forces against the
unguarded point, and, breaking the
enemy's line in two, destroyed it by his
redoubtable blows. H. y
Much was also due to the superiority
OF the French soldiery over their adj
versaries, and to the fexibility, ease,
and ready suppleness of the tactical
formations of the conquerors COM
pared with those of the defeated
army. The Austrians and Russians,
it has been said, presented the
image of a bar OF steel, unbending, rigid,
difficult to turn; the French were like
a chain of 8 thousand links, the strength
of which is yet compatible with adapt
ability to all kind of forms, and is quick
ly shapedby its owners hands; and this
difference of "mobility" proved de-
cisive. 1t has also been remarked that
in this encounter. "the system of
Frederick came in collision with that
of Napoleon, and was shattered to
pieces" but the observation, correct as
regards the mere tactical organization
of an army, ia, taken more widely, an
exaggeration, though there is no doubt
that the aim of Frederick was u ually
to turn and outhank a wing. while Ma
poleon had q special predilection fol
heavy and reiterated attacks on the
center. r.s., f.r .-r
The battle of Austerlitz ended the
war by exacting a humiliating peace
from Austria, and the grand army wat
on its way homeward, not, however, tc
see French soil again before meeting
|, fresh perils and triumphs. Thegenera
estimate Of the campaign may be col
lected from what we have written. The
operations from first to last illustrate
splendidly Napoleon's genius in making
and executing military project, and his
wonderful skill in deceiving his enemies
and his great power Of strategic comb
nation and showed the world what
great captain could do with an army o.
immenEe strength, and superior in all re
spects to its adversaries. They also ex
hibited the fatal results, on the con
quered side, of incapacity in war. o
recklessness, ohstinacy, and timidity,
of following plans essentially faulty, ane
of attempting obviously false move
!, ments, and the surrender of Mack, The
advance from o mutz, and the careless
and presumptious flank march before
Austerlitz, remain monuments OF ruin
! Gus errors. Yet the blaze Of victor,
J cannot hide the facts that Napoleon il
his march to the Danube exposed hi
army TO real danger, and above all, tina
in leaving Vienna and pursuing the al
lies into Morayia, he threw down 4
challenge TO adverse fortune, and Ger
tainly might have incurred defeat. Th,
campaign also, az re have remarked
discloses clearly the inherent defects od
the Napoleonic system Of making war
The troops, living upon the country
were more than once in n pitiable state
and candid Observers gathered from tn,
misery, the excuses, and the indiscip
line which necessarily resulted from Thu
state OF things a sinister augury for th,
future, which history was before Ion,
to realize Temple Bar.