The New York herald., 1872-12-19

added however that had better be careful not to
go abroad at night without trnsty companion,
az he feared that the Cubans were on the alert TO
kill me and thus bring odium on the Spanards.
HoMEwARD BOUND.
determined, however, now to at once 60 home.
Having visited such portions OF the helnsurRentioices
as was able, l judged that my duty was COM
pleted and that there was nothing more for me to
at this time, too there came luckily an opportunity
TO depart in the French steamer, which left the
next day at five O'Clock. said nothing about TINS
then, having notified General Riquelme and the
British and American Consuls OF my purpose, left
without molestation and made the best OF my way
home.
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS
Let me now briefly sum up, as well as am able,
the results oil my mission. We are told each
month, each week, each day almost, tnat the
Spaniards win certainly succeed or rather, more
generally, that they have already succeeded in ex
tinguish,ng this long, tedlons and bloody struggle.
All the DrppA.--Sz9 xvsvSW esenerals now In the
field ha.e been time and again slain in the offcial
Spanish newspapers, and so persstently has this
kind OF policy been persevered in that many even
OF the Spaniards themselves, have blind belief IN
OF the practical collapse already OF the insurrec-
tion. Ny conclusions, however, lead me to q
totally different estimate OF the situation as II
exists at present. ] have shown that the insur-
IN NUMBERS
far more serious than 1t is generally credited with
being. The Captain General at Havana told me
that there were ut the most only three thousand
men in the field; but this calculation grew even
Puerto Principe General Fajardo admitted that the
number must be between five and six thousand
men, while General Rquelme's confession sweed
the estimate to eight thousand men. This latter
computation does not vary very seriously from the
accounts OF the Cubans themselves, who claim from
eight to twelve thousand men. Their strength
nuctuates, no doubt according to the season or
the year and to the supplies OF arms smuggled INTO
the "unpacltedn provinces; but 1t Is rarely below
seven or eight thousand men. The greatest need
OF the rebels indeed is arms, not men
munitlon, and manage, by means OF the
rude though ingenious shifts have already de-
scribed to furnish themselves with food and med
icines and the various other necessarles OF cam
pagn. And AZ tney are volunteers, serving with
out pay, and living on the country or by their own
labor, the patriot army needs but the smallest
pecuniary resources for It's maintenance. Thus 1t
Is clear that on the Cuban side the struggle can be
INDEFINITELY PROLONGED,
or at least as long as the patriotic enthusiasm OF
the people remains at it's present height unless the
spanlards throw IN force sufficient to garrison
every village in every district, ard by the sure pro-
cess or the absolute determination OF every pa
triotc Cuban make the Gem Of the Antilles what it
was once boasted to be, "the ever faithu isle But
that such gigantic undertaking that is within
the means OF the Spaniards have no hesitation
whatever in stating is impossible. To effect 1t the
Spanish army would have to be numbered not In
tens, but in hundreds of thousands and as it's
soldiers are but conscripts or mercenaries they
would require sums for their support altogether
too enormous for the slender OF crippled
and bankrupt Spain. Perhaps, too, many of the
prominent Spanish military officers do not sin
cerely wish the immediate crushing out OF the in.
surrection. To them the war IL an ever ready
means OF plumber and profit. Both officers ana
men loot the country without mercy, and not i'm
probably at heart desire that the struggle may last
few years longer, until they can return to Spain
their pockets filled with spoil and their hearts still
aname In an ecstacy OF loyalty.
WHAT MAY END THE STRUGGLE.
But how long viii this terrible conflict continue?
At present it seems far Off nom the end rs ever.