The Emporia news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1859-1881, 1872-06-28
TIE BATTLE OF CHANCELLoRs-
WILLIE.
A Severe Attack On General Hooker by
General AyeriII.

a long report of an interview wit
Gen. Averill, who said in substanc
that he did not wish to review tn
: memories of the war in any shape
II we wanted monuments of it, tn,
graves of our dead would suffice
but as he and his cavalry had beer
impugned by Gen. Hooker's re
marks, he thought it a duty to ex
plain his own view of the battle O.
Charlottesville. As for Gen
Hooker, said he, people don't gene.
rally know that he has lost every.
thing but his inordinate vanity
The sorest spot in poor old Joe's
| life is the terrible fiasco at Chancel.
louisville. He denies that it was a
failure, but it was SO, and to Hook.
er alone is due the fault. He fail
ed to embrace the opportunity to
make it success. Howard says
his subordinates were disaffected,
and Hooker refuses to accept that
as any exoneration, but at the same
time assumes to exonerate him.
self through Towards culpability.
1t Howard was responsible for his
subordlnates, so was Hooker.
But / doubt the whole story. If
he believed Howard culpable, how
came he to swear before the Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War,
that the defeat was altogether due
to General Sedgwick's failure, and
the negligence of the cavalry, leay-
ing out the Eleventh Corps-that
was Howard's Corps-holding the
right. You know Hooker ought
to have beaten Lee. He went
across the Rappahannock with over
one hundred thousand men, and
Lee hadn't over half that number,
and in four or five days he came
back beaten, with twenty thousand
killed and wounded. There were
just two causes for this disaster
Lees capacity and Hooker's in
capacity. If Hooker could realize
the truth of it and say no more
about 1t, SO much the better for
him, but he keeps trying to resur-
rect himself, and the fact is he is
dead as Halleck, only he isn't bur
led. Rockers wac a merciIess
abuse of his cavalry. He obliged
it before the battle to maintain the
twenty-five miles of picket line at
an average distance of eight miles
from the army, when these lines
ought to have been held by infan-
try, with the usual cavalry and
videttes. Consequently third of
his cavalry was disabled when the
time of action came. Out of three
divisions two were organized for
aggressive operations under Blu
ford and myself, while the other
made up of broken down and dis
abled men and horses, was left in!
camp under Gen. Pleasanton. I
started out with my division under
orders to cross the Rappahannock
and engage the enemy's cavalry,
and drive it, if possible, to the
Rapidan Station. That's the way
the order read. Buford was to
pass to the rear of Lees army and
cut off his communications. Both
columns carried out their instruc-
tions to the very letter, and they
were the only portions of the army
of the Potomac that did succeed
in the part laid down for them in
the plan of battle; the only col
umns in the army, sir. It's a pref
ty strong remark, but it's true. I
drove the enemy not only in the
direction of Rapidan Station, but
to and beyond it, and Hooker
could not have failed to have heard
my guns. For at least twenty
hours fought the enemy under
his eye. By driving the enemy in
this way it enabled Stoneman to
get into Lees rear and destroy his
communications. II we hadn't
done what we had, 1 think the enc
my's cavalry would have crossed
to the north bank, and captured
miles and miles of our camps and
stores. While we were progress
ing satisfactorily, however, 1 sud
denly received an order from Hook
er to return. 1 knew at once that
meant disaster. He was whipped
then, and had his cavalry been
anywhere else than just where it
was, he would have been destroy
ed as well. / returned and met
Hooker. He received me kindly.
His face was flushed, his voice
thick, and he seemed utterly wear
led. He said: "Where is Stone
manT 81 suppose he is in the
rear of Lees army" I replied.
"It's strange" said he, 81 do not
hear from him. Lee does not seem
to have been disturbed by him."
He finally directed me to go into
camp. 1 asked about his situa-
ton, and he said, Il am only wait
ing to hear Sedgwick's guns. He
is coming up in Lees rear from
Fredericksburg. When l hear him
I shall pitch in with everything
I've got here. We've got these
fellows now where they can't get
away" l went into camp, and
that afternoon we heard Sedgwick's
guns hot and heavy, coming near
er and nearer, but Hooker didn't
pitch in. There's where he lost
the battle; if he had not already
lost it, when he sent a dispatch to
Howard telling of Jackson's COM
ing attack on his Towards J corps,
instead of going himself and see
ing to it. He had to ride only
two miles. That was the vital
movement of the battle, and yet he
trusted the fate of his army to
dispatch carried by an orderly to
Howard, an officer whom he now
says he knew to be incompetent
The truth is, Hooker was personal
ly whipped the day met him, but
his army was all right. He had
all the tuck taken out of him. He
didn't give it a chance. He hadn't
fought it yet. That evening I re-
ceived an order relieving me of my
command, and directing me to re-
port at Washington. It was sign
ed j. H. Van Allen, Acting A. D.
C. The command was turned over
to sPleasanton. My Adjutant-
General went up to headquarters
to ask some reason for the order,
but he found Hooker asleep, and
Pleasanton and Allen standing
guard to. prevent anybody disturb
ing him. ] went to Washington
in accordance with instructions,
and there met Secretary Stanton
and President Lincoln. Stanton
said in his brusque way, "What
are you doing here?' Ireplied by
showing my order. He said,
aWhere did you leave the armyy'
I said south of the Rappahannock,
near United States Ford. seWhat
have they dene7' asked Stanton
"They have had battle" I re-