New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1872-03-21
THE COURTS.

|
Orleans Railroad Company is set for tra
in the Sixth District Court on the first OF
April tall fools day., and will be tried by d
jury.
In the suit of John Tobin against tie
Canal aud Claiborne Street Railroad Com
pany verdict Of $4,000 was rendered in
favor of plaintiff.
The Louisiana State Lottery Company
have sued BorniO Brothers fJr $4,000 dam
| ages for violation of the act by which
| plaintiffs We're incorporated.
| A suit for divorce has been instituted by
Il wife, who alleges cruel treatment and
abusive epithets before third parties" on
the part of her hus band.
la the suit of the Slaughterhouse Com
paDy against James Stafford the defendant
has answered denying every allegation iu
plaintiffs petition, and he admits he has
! slaughtered beeves in the town of Algiers
as charged in plaintiffs petition, but did
| the same under the special order and pro
lection of this court that the articles claimed
! by plaintiffs are the property OF defendant:
! that the exaction of head, horns and hools
| is contribution Illegally imposed upon
| him, and that he is not bound TO pay it. De
i tcndant AYERS that the company are vio-
| lating their charter by tearing down and
| removing the sheds and stables on the west
bank, and that they have prevented many
butchers from slaughtcring, in violation of
law: that the act to protect the health Of
the city is unconstitutional and void. He
further says ne has suffered damages in the
sum of $500, ard that the company are
further indebted. by the violation of their
charter in the sum of $500 He prays that
the reconventi"nal demand may be filed:
| that he have Judgment against the plain
titfs in the sum of $500, and that the char
ter "t said company may be declared tor
feited. illegal and null and vcid.
In The suit OF Cotton & Levy against
Grace Il Durbridge, the plaintiffs, legal
| firm, sue for fee, urging that both inui-
viduals of the firm are responsible. Judge
Cooley decided the case yesterday. The
fee originated in the employment of the
plaintiffs by Durbridge & Grace in settle
ment of the partnership between them.
In that suit IL judgment for $2S00 was rem
dered III favor of Grace against Durbridge.
During the absence of the plaintiffs the
plaintiff and defendant in the suit compr0-
missed, Grace accepting .Sli00 in payment
| of the judgment against Durbridge. The
plaintiffs now claim that as attorneys they
had a privilege on that judgment to secure
the payment of their fees, which could not
be divested or annulled by any act of the
plaintiff or defendant in the original suit.
II is contended on the part OF Durbrdge
that in order to be effective, the privilege
i'll favor of Cotton X Levy should have
been recorded. That the defendant, pos
sessiDg the property upon which the priv-
lege III favor of Cotton & Levy bore, could
not be affected by it, unless he was in
formed of its existence and amount by
registry made as required by law. In order
to solve the objection raised BY the defend
ant it is necessary to inquire whether Dur
bridge was, in the sense of the law, a third
person. because. under the constitution of
1868 and the laws made to enforce that con-
stitution, privileges may exist as between
the parties. and may be enforced without
any registry whatever. 1t is only when
ever these privileges are set up against
third persons that the law requires as
condition precedent, that the privilege
should be recorded. Was Durbpidge "a
third person in the sense that the law de-
fines third persons! The article OF the
Civil Code, No. 1882. giving definition Of
third persons" says that third persons to
contract or judgment are those who are
not parties to that contract or to that judg-
ment. They are generally considered per
sons who acquire rights outside of Or sub
seGuent to either the judgment or the CON
tract. OF course, those persons are not
bound by that contract. But was Dur
bridge a third person according TO this
definition Can man be said to be
wherein he figures as the Judgment
debtor! He is party to the litigation
which gave rise to the privilege in favor
of the attorney, and that privilege was
obtained contradictOrly with him, Just as
much as the Judgment itself; because if the
plaintiff in that case did not succeed in OBJ
tanning judgment against Durbridge, under
the law he could have no privilege There
fore. the privilege was obtained contradic-
toriy with the defendant. just as much as
the obtaining the judgment itself. Dur.
bridge, then, was not third person, but
was simply the holder, with full knowledge
of the privilege in favor of Cotton e. Levy
Being the custodian of the property. he goes
to work deliberately 10 destroy it; because
by the compromise which he made with
Grace and the satisfaction of the Judgment
which was the result of that compromise,
he etfrctually destroyed the very thing on
which the attorne IS Cotton & Levy had a
privilege. 1t is Just the same as If Dur
bridge had IL his possession "a horse or any
other piece Of movable property, upon
which Il third person had privilege to the
knowledge of Durbridge. If Durbrdge had
taken his pistol and killed that horse de
liberately, or set fire to the movable prop
erty aud destroyed it, would he not be re-
sponsible to the party whom he had injured
10y the destruction of the very object which
was given 10 him by law as security for :he
payment of his debt 1t seems to me that.
under article 229f of the Civil Code, which
says whatever act of man causes damages
oblI2es him by whose fault it happens to
repair II. that the custodian of the object |
upon which the privilege bore, in p case
like that, who has deliberately destroyed
it, is responsible. He has rendered himself
personally liable by the destruction. by his
own act, Of the property upon which the |
privilege bore.
If the law giving a privilege to attorneys |
upon judgments obtained by them were |
differently interpreted, it would amount to
no security whatever to the attorneys in |
cases wherein the Judgment is for sum of |
money. The judgment debtor could at any
moment destroy the privilege by paying to |
his creditor the full amount Of the judg- |
inent. thus leaving the attorney minus of |
the very thing the law intended should be a |
security for his fee. The privilege would be |
then more of sham than a reality. ! can |
not suppose the lawgiver intended such a !
thing. | am Of the opinion Durbridg>, the |
Judgment debtor, having settled with his |
creditor, without retaining sufficient out of |
the judgment to satisfy the privilege of tie
attorney which existed thereon made him |
seli personally responsible for the debt.
The Judgment will be entered in favor OF |
plaintiffs and against both defendants.
AT the opera house of Oporto, not long
ago, young actress, playing the part of
Iertina in ERA Diavolo,' undresse(. so in
iecently in the famous night scene OF the |