Mineral Point tribune. (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1869-1938, 1872-10-31

to carry his ideas into effect if his
character or courage be inferior to his
| Judgment. By way of illustrating
this principle Napoleon went on to as
sert that 1T was impossible for Murat
and Ney not to be brave, but added
that .'no men ever possessed less judg-
ment. Speaking of moral courage, he
said: 81 have very rarely met the two
n'clock-in- the-morning courage; Imean
unprepared courage; that which is
oecessary on an unexpected occasion.
Kleber was endowed with the highest
1 talents, but was merely the man of the
moment, and pursued glory as the only
road to enjoyment, while Desaix pos
! sessed, III very superior degree, the
important equilibrium just described. -
! Marshal Marmont classifies generals
| INTO four categories, counting first
those who have never lost a battle,
whose courage aud judgment were
equal to every emergency" such as
Alexander and Caesar in ancient times,
and Gustavus Adolphus. Turenne.
Conde, Luxembourg, and Napoleon, I'M
! til 1872, In modern times. In the sec
ond class he places "those who, if they
! have often gained victories, have some
| times lost them" III spite of desperate
| fighting and good generalship. Among
! these are the Archduke Charles, Suwa-
! row, and Wellington. The third cate
cory contains ''those generals who have
been habitually unfortunate IN the war,
but have never allowed their armies to
be destroyed, nor been personally dis
couraged, always offering a mena-
cling front and impressing the
enemy with fear" Such III ancient
! times were Sertorius and Mithri-
dates, and in modern times Wallen-
stein and William III, of England
FINALLY, the fourth category contains
''that numerous class, common to every
country and every epoch, who have
lost their armies without serious fight
ing, or without making the enemy pay
! dearly for his victory" In describing
the qualities of a great leader, Mar
mont speaks of n union of intelligence
and courage, but prefers, if either be
in excess, that it should be courage,
for reasons which are obvious. Anoth-
er writer declares that the distinctive
characteristic of genius, is the appar-
ent case and simplicity with which ltac
complishes the most difficult things.
| Now let Grant be tried by these rules,
and what rank must be assigned to
him in history Where must he be
placedl Clearly in the highest category
of great soldiers.
HIS GENERALsHIP.
Grants recommendation of n united
command in the valley of the Mississ-
! ippi will be remembered by the
reader, and the tardy action of the
government in carrying this recommen
| dation into effect. 1t is hardly neces.
sary now to say this combination was
! the foundation of all our substantial
victories, not only in the west, but
throughout the entire theatre of war
Fort Donelson. was won by celebrity,
audacity and heroic resolution. Shiloh
by stubborn fighting and unconque.-
able heroism. Vicksbnrg by the most
brilliant aud original strategy, by rapid
marching, iudlclous combinations, and
! self-reliance, which remind one of the
invasion of Russia by Charles XII.
or in the vigor displayed in Bona
( parties campaign Of 1896; but it must
not be forgotten that Charles lost his
army at Pultowa, and that Bonaparte
| did not cut loose from his base and
/ plunge headlong into the interior OF
! the hostile country; but by a judlcious
and well-formed plan of operations he
! broke through the enemy's line ut such
point as TO retain his communications
with France constantly uninterrupted,
while by rapid combinations and severe
battles he drove these lines before
I l., p,,t IN, h, ,l.ciN ,a,,
paign, boldly threw himself into the /
midst of hostile forces. leaving an
army entirely behind him, until he had |
seized the most important point IN the |
| theatre of operations. and then turned |
upon and defeated that army, and I
drove it into the Notifications, from I
which it was destined never to emerge I
except at the will of its conqueror.
The closing victories of the war were
won by rare combination of military /
agencies. The consolidation of foui
vast territorial departments into one
grand military division, enabled Grant .
to concentrate ut Chattanooga splen-
did army, heavily ont numbering the |
enemy, and it should be remembered
that Providence iavors strong bat
talions. By series of strategic and
strong tactical combinations, these SUI
peror numbers were so directed upon .
the field Of battle as to take the enemy .
at disadvantage, striking him IN flank, I
and actually getting closer to his base .
of supplies than his base was to his
own headquarters. /
The Atlanta campaign and the march I
To the sea, the selection of Sheridan /
and the formation of the middle mill T
tary division: the consolidation of the .
Western cavalry; the establishment of