The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1872-04-15

imagine the tury which this would have excited,
and justly excited, in England and yet the
presentation Of the Confederate bonds on the
part of the English was parallel case Re-
garded as consequential damages or indirect
losses, or claims of British subjects, or what
ever we choose to call them, they were inf
nitely more offensive to us than our Geneva
case could possibly be to the English And
yet we accepted them. We did not threaten
to break the treaty; we made no clamor nor
protest. We felt that the claim was extraordi-
nary, unjust, almost an indignity in itself
But there was the treaty. We had signed it
and we made no murmur. The Board threw
out the Confederate loan, just as the Geneva
Board may throw out the claim for consequent
tial damages
This shows that on our part we accepted the
theory of indirect claims. It shows clearly the
existence of an understanding between the
high contracting Powers by which all such
claims as Confederate bonds and consequential
damages by reason of the Alabama should be
considered and determined now and be no
longer source of anxiety to the two countries
1t is impossible not to believe in the existence
of such an understanding, for thus is it only
possible to explain the presentation of the
claim for consequential damages by reason Of
English investments in the Confederate loan.
Certainly if there were any open questions
under the treaty, any reserved rights, any
privileges of diplomatic scrutiny, the Ameri-
cans would have made war upon the Confed-
crate loan; but wisdom and good faith pre-
vailed and that is dead, just as the Alabama
claims might be dead had wisdom and good
faith controlled the action of English states
men. 1t may be a serious charge to make, but
1T does not seem to us that the English
have shown either wisdom or good faith. 1t
was unwise to make this demonstration against
America. 1t was dishonorable to break
a solemn treaty. Mr.. Gladstone is as much
responsible for this treaty and our construc-
ton of it as Mr.. Fish. His Ministers signed
it with open eyes. They knew the value Of
every provision. They knew perfectly well
that the indirect claims were in the protocols,
and that they would be presented in the case,
and when England rose and protested Mr..
Gladstone should have manfully assumed
responsibility which belonged to him pecu-
liarly, and which he could not divide or shirk.
Here is all the trouble. If our government
responds to the political necessities of Mr..
Gladstone SO far Us to withdraw this case, Mr..
Fish must retire from the Cabinet That
venerable and distinguished statesman cannot
in honor sit in Cabinet which puts upon him
this stigma Nor do we see how General
Grant can go to the country after withdrawing
his case. 1t will be surrender, confession
of insincerity, a pusillanimous concession to
the exigencies of Mr. Gladstone's government
If Mr.. Fish insists upon his ground Mr.
Gladstone may be driven from power. 1t
would be an odd termination of the affair, and
certainly a natural sequence, if the whole
question would resolve into struggle on Mr.
Gladstone's part to retain his position as
Prime Minister, and on the part Of General
Grant to retain the Presidency.