The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1872-09-19
COUNT MOLTKE'S STORY.
THE GREAT SOLDIERS HISTORY OF
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIIN VAR.

THE GREAT SOLDIERS HISTORY OF
THE FRANCO-PRUSSIIN VAR.
What He Thinks of the French Sol
diers-EvIIs In the French Army-Na-
poleon's Plan Of Camraign-The Fart
the French Navy Was to Plny-Differ-
ence in the Numerical Strength OF the
Two Armies-GermaHy Thoroughly
Prepnr.d-France Unprerared and
Her Army Disorganized.
fCorr. spondence OF the New York Herald
BERLIN, August Is.
It was announced several months ago that
the historical division of the German chief of
staff would publish an account OF the Franco.
German war. AS this account might fairly be
presumed to contain the views of Count
Moltke and the other most distinguished
chiefs Of the German army, its appearance
was naturally looked forward 10 with consid.
cradle interest. The first instalment of the
work has Just been published, and I hasten to
give your readers q general outline of what it
contains.
THE PRESENT VOLUME
dea1e only with the events In the month OF
JULY 1870. 1t opens with an Introduction,
giving an account of the origin Of the war
from, OF course, the German point OF view.
On this subject the volume says nothing very
new. This paragraph, however, is ,Wortny OIL
attention.: I'm the country, Indeed, opinion
is said 10 have been unreservedly for the war
In sixteen, against the war In lhlrty-four de-
partments, while In thlrty.seven departments
0%piniops were divided. But In France the
word Is of as much importance as the deed.
People congratulate each other on the ground
of q speech. and an animated address which
appeals to the glory OF the nation Is able to
drag away even reasonable men to the ex-
tremest resolutions. With the GENERALIZATION
which exists the provinces follow helplessly
the impulse to war as well as to revolution,
which Issues from the capital. Napoleon Ill
appears to have played In the whole affair a
passive, one might almost saya Witless part"
This Ia q remarkable admission, when we re,
member how passlonately 1t was contended
that the war against Germany was emphatt-
cslly q war of all France and not OF a dynasty
o rof politicians.
THE FRENCH ARMY.
The second chapter Of the volume deals with
1.-THE French Army: Its Plan Of Operation and
March Forward, 10Th to the 3lst July" 1t sets
down the number ormen whom France could
bring into the field on the lst of August as 1886,
600. 1t states that frances supply OF arms
was excellent. both as regards quantity and
quality. The Chassep0t 1t speaks Of as IAN
excellent weapon, o floDg range" The arlil-
lery was also well supplied with ammunition.
But when We com 10 consider the reserve
army we find everything In confusion for such
an army. There were neither weapons nor
clothes nor ammunition; lis artillery and lis
cavalry had in almost every respect to be
created ont Of the new"
1.-THE FIELD ARMY"
continues the volume, s'could thus alone be
counted upon, and this was not specially 1T
ted by It's organization for a rapid change
military administration was centralized to the
lastpeint, and was thus, as well as by Its hav-
Ing the duty OF attending to courts-martial.
overburdened with work. Army corps and
divisions had 10 commissarlat 10 peace.
So In consequence of this the arma.
ment material was, during peace, concentra.
ted In a few places. The supplies OF uottures
de transport were collected In Vernon and
.Chateauronx. The MAGAZINES for camn. rsgiil--
sites were for the most part ID faris ano Yer-
sailes. A speedy distribution from these de-
pots to the single corps was In this way
rendered extraordinarily difficult on Q
general mobilization" Having thus critt.
ccised Inc administration IF the army, we are
next presented with
A CRITICISM OF TIE ARMY ITSELF.
1.-THE internal condition OF the army" we
are told, was suffering from many grave de-
fects. Even in the judgment Of his own coun-
trymen, the French soldier was not OF lDe
outbreak of the war what he had been IN Inc
Crimean war and in Italy. The law with re-
card to reserves and bounty had worked dis
advsntageously upon him. 1t permitted sub:
siItntIon to an excessive degree. For exam
nile. in q contingent Of rs, 900 men OF the year
1853 alone there were AZ. 900 substitutes, whose
quality Is known by experience to deterlorate
with increased length OF service. AND aieo
extended furloughs ior a longer period, which
were unknown at an earlier time, were de-
scrjbed >by French authorities as prejudicial to
military discipline. In addition, The corps OF
non-commissioned officers no longer stood at
its early excellence. There were IN many re-
eiments sergeaHts who had discharged their
duties for eleven years and upwards Without q
prospect Of promotion or OF the alienation OF
an existence that bad been sacrificed to The
country almost In uninterrupted conflicts.
MANY good elements of The corps a.
copdIpgiy sought in civil employment q
more remunerative occupation. The corps OF
officers in like manner was just as little COM
posed OF homogeneous elements. Almost one
third of them had risen from the non-com-
missioned officers. As the young officers did
not devote their whole strength to the service,
the older subaltern officers stood in sharp
contrast to them. They formed, on the aver
AGE. the best element OF Inc army. Rlcn e4-
periences and valuable qualities, ripened.in
the different campaigns Of the Empire, were
Represented among them. But the prevalent
fsyoritism often of deeply compromised per-
sons, iuetly irritated Them and opened up TO
them but slight prospects for the future:
Nevertheless an Increased mental activity had
displayed itself In this class since the year
1860, and 1t was these very officers who most
songht on the battle fields OF France TO wash
ont with their blood faults for which they
were not responsible. The same system OF
fayoritisn had brought to high places many
elements which were not equal TO the tasks
imposed upon them, and exercised, as every
where else where It has force, Its unhealthy
influence. In addition, the political position
of parties come into consideration. BY the
constant change of the form OF government
that fidelity and adherence 10 q hereditary
house Of rulers In the army as well as IN the
nation generally, which In other countries pre-
vents destructive revolutions OF public al
fairp, were lost.t The French officer, and even
the private soldier, serves his country, and
serves It with devotion and selt-sacriftce,
but ne does not hold on to the changing
form Of the head of the State with
that constant sense of duty which sacrifices
all It's strength In unconditional recognition
of authority, The French officer, as well as
the entire nation, Is animated with. q high,
and In many respects justilable, s%elf-con-
sclousness, but also with a depreciation of
others His whole education Ia calculated 10
inspire him with the conviction that France
stands before all other countries. If The pupil