Frostburg mining journal. [volume] (Frostburg, Md.) 1871-1913, 1872-11-09

Such was the browning battle of Aster-
litz-except Waterloo, and perhaps
Jena-the most decisive of the revo-
lutionary wars; the one, too, which
military writer's have usually considered
Napoleon's master, liccc There was this
peculiarly also in the day, that it was
perfectly fair fight, the numbers on each
side were not far from equal, and the
result was in no sense caused Dy an over
whelming preponderance of force. The
victory was due to the serious error of
the allies in uncovering their center in
the attempt to outtlank the French
right, and to the admirable skill with
which Napoleon anticipated their faulty
vancouver, massed his forces against the
unguarded point, and, breaking the
enemy's line in two, destroyed it by his
redoubtable blows.
Much was also due to the superiority
OF the French soldiery over their adj
versaries, and to the flexibility, ease,
and ready suppleness of the tactical
formations of the conqucrors COM
pared with those of the defeated
army. The Austrians and Russians,
it has been said, presented the
difficult to turn; the French were like
chain Of q thousand links, the strength
of which is yet compatible with adapt
ability to all kind of forms, and is quick
ly shapcdby its owners hands and this
difference of mobility" proved de-
clslve. 1t has also been remarked that
in this encounter "the system of
Frederick came in collision with that
of Napoleon, and was shattered to
pieces;" but the observation, correct as
regards the mere tactical organization
of an army, is, taken more widely, an
eXaggeration, though there is no doubt
that the aim of Frederick was IL ually
to turn and outtlank a wing, while Ma
poleon had special prediction for
heavy and reiterated attacks on the
center.
The battle of Austerlitz ended the
war by exacting humiliating peace
from Austria, and the grand army was
on its way homeward, not, however, to
see French soil again before meeting
fresh perils and triumphs. The general
estimate OF the campaign may be col
lected from what we have written. The
operations from first to last illustrate
splcndidly Napoleons genius in making
and executing military project, and his
wonderful skill in deceiving his enemies,
and his great power OF strategic comb
nation; and showed the world what Il
great captain could do with an army of
immense strength, and superior in all re-
spects to its adversaries. They also ex-
hibltcd the fatal results, on the con.
quered side, of incapacity in war. of
recklcssness, obstinacy, and timidity,
of following plans essentially faulty, and
of attempting obviously false move
ments, and the surrender of Mack, the
advance from 0 mutt, and the careless
and presumptious flank march before
Austerlitz, remain monuments Of ruin
Gus errors. Yet the blaze of victory
cannot hide the facts that Napoleon in
his march to the Danube exposed his
army to real danger, and above all, that
in leaving Vienna and pursuing the al
lies into Moravia, he threw down Il
challenge to adverse fortune, and GER
tainly might have incurred defeat. The
campaign also, as we have remark ed :,
discloscs clearly the inherent defects of
the Napoleonic system Of making war.
The troops, living upon the country,
were more than once IN Il pltlablc state /;
and candid Observers gathered from the
misery. the excuses, and the indlscip-
line which necessarily resulted from this
state of things a sinister augury for the
future, which history was before long
to realizc.-7cmp(c Bar.