The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1872-09-19

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| llshed under the auspices of the Emperor, it is
| concluded that the superiority of the German
forces TO the forces of France was by no means
unknown to the French military authorities;
they, 10 fact, had concluded that their troops
| should be set down at 300. 900 men, and the
troops u Germany at $4,000 men. 'But,"
says the volume, "the Emperor hoped not
only to paralyze this numerical superiority OF
almost double his numbers, but even 10 trans-
The condition of accomplishing this was that
he should succeed In crossing the Rhine un-
awares In it's course upwards, and thus sepa.
rate Southern and Northern Germany from
| one another. Isolated Prussia was cal
| cuiated to have forces to the number OF
$4,000 %combatants, and, as a result OF a first
| victory, the adhesion of Austria and Italy
was expected. In accordance with his plan.
! which the Emperor communicated In Paris to
| Marshals Mcmahon and Lebput alone, the
first concentration of the army with l60,OOO
| men should lake place around MelZ. with l00,
900 men at Strasbourg and with $4,000 men
more In the camp at Chalons. 1t was linen
| intended to draw the army of Metz nearer on
to Strasbourg and to cross the Rhine at Ma
nau with a strength OF $50, 900 men. After the
| South German States had thus been compelitu
| into neutrality, the PruEslan army was 10 %
| sought out and conquered. During these OPP
erations the task was assigned 10 the reserve
| corpa, directed from Chalons on Melz, 10 coV-
| er the back of the army and 10 Watch Tue
| northeast boundary. At the same time IL was
| expecIed that the appearance of the fleet In
The Baltic Sea would retain a portion OF Inc
hostile forces to guard the coasts. The plan
tbus detailed vas based on the Certainly cor
rect idea that the superiority Oh the enemy
could only be counterbalanced by rapldlty OF
movement, but illnsory as to the relations OF
South and North Germany, just as the force
and numbers of The Prusslan forces were I'M
derrated. This last fact was the more strlk-
ing as It should be known that Prussia had
already. In the campaign OF 1856, brought
about three hundred and fly thousand men
into the field, and that Its strength
had since received a not inconslderaole
increase. Besides, 1t was not then
lis then condition was fitted tor q rapid open
Ing of the campaign and the rapid carrying on
of operations" The volume then goes on to
point out that IL was The defective arrange
ments of the rallways-detective l mean In q
military point Of view-the concentration OF
provisions, materiel, &C., and the Length Oh
time necessary for making the indispensable
distributions, which principally prevented ire
rapid mobilization of the French forces. 1t
points ont another cause also. ''The expert
ences,r 1t GAYS, s'Of the last war In Italy had
BY no means proved that French troops In
large masses could do much In the way OF
marching. At least people In Prussia could
we'll remember that the army OF the Emperor,
which then numbered onty one hundred
thousand men, had, alter the victory of Ma
genta 10 the day of Solferino, marched on an
average OF but one mile q day. French diplo-
macy might have been able to prevent the
outbreak of the war till they were ready 10
strike the blow, but 1t declared war before the
government was In q position to give immedi-
ate effect to tbis declaration, and 1t thus hap
pened afterwards That the forces of France,
before they were fully collected and ready for
offensive operations, were attacked by the
German armies on their own ground" The
prelIminarles of the struggles being thus
given, the volume next describes the events
which TRANSFERRED
BETWEEN THE DECLARATION OF WAR n q
FIRST SCENES
of the campaign. No story can be more pill
full than that told In these pages OF the volume.
How rapidity was the very first necessity OF
success, and yet everything went on with
now that was found defective; how the En-
peror, comiug to Metz, found dIsorganization
and unpreparedness everywhere; now the
plan of invading Germany wavered and was
p MH}s al IN manod1e InsR S 81 e6s rf afa!Ri tr 6oSopSss
were well known to the Germans those Of the
German troops were scarcely thought OF until
they came down like an aValauche-all these
things are told with graphic and forcible SIM
plicity. But the story is already well known,
and the present volume is more valuable LOT
it's general observations than for LIS history OF
particular movements, With which we are
all more OF less acquainted. ! shall, there
fore. now pass to the next chapter OF the
work-a chapter Of deep interest. 1t ID
headed,
s.rHE GERMAN ARMIEs-THEIR PLAN OF OPERA
and their march forward up to the 3lst OF
july" The first pages of this chapter give 10
detail an account Of the German forces. The
field army amounted to 462 300 men; the re-
serve 10 297, 500 men. But we now come 10
the most Interesting part OF the b~ook-the
part in which Won Mollke details the plan he
had matnred of dealing with the French army
q long time before The war broke out: "is
forms one of the duties OF the chief OF STALL"
we are told, Yin times of peace 10 work out,
in The most detailed manner, the grouping
and the transport of bodies OF troops for all
probable warlike eventualities, and to hold
sketches for this purpose ready by anl1cipa-
ton. When an army begins lis march for.
ward all kinds of political and geographical
as well as military considerations. Defects In
the original concentration of the army can
scarcely be repaired In the whole course OF q
campaign. All these arrangements, however,
eau be considered long beforehand. and the
readiness for war of The troops and the organ
ization of the transport service being presup-
posed, they must lead to the Intended result.
II Is otherwise with sl~rategy-wlth The EN-.
ployment In war of the meaus already pre-
pared. Here our will Is met by the independent
will OF our opponent. This can certainly be re-
strained if one has prepared for and resolved
upon the initiative at the proper moment, and
It can only be proven by g buttle. The mate
rial and moral consequences OF every great
battle are now so wide spreading that an en-
tirely different situation, and, rs o result, q
new basis for new operations may be created
by 1t. No plan of operations can go beyond
the first rencontre with the enemJ's chief
force with any certainty. No one but a civilian
believes that he can perceive In the course OF q
campaign The carrying through Of q plan that
has been definitely fixed before hand In every
particular, and that has been stuck to
ever to the end. The commander-in-chiei
will of course always keep his great objects
before his eyes, undisLurbed by the vicissl-
tudes of events; but the paths by which he
hopes to attain them Can never BIZ designated
with safety long beforehand" Detailed propo-
salst for the collection OF all the German forces
in case OF o war against France, and Tor the ar
raneement and division Of the single armies,
as the basis of all further operations, we ind
laid down In a memoir Of the Prusslan chief Of
slaff, which dates from the winter OF ls6s-'69.
The first object of operations Is laid down 10
- - mi, nrrnu nf tho 0namu