Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1872-11-30

I.Nls
pel!ant, agt- Patterson Jones. appellee, land,
lord and pant, and it will be read with inter
eat by persons Interested in real estase
Ih1e action va commenced before a -u.tice
of the peace of the District OF Columbia utdsr
The statute ITO regulate procee4tngs between
landlord and tenant, judgment was rendered IN
ises in dispute, and the defendant spoesie,i 10
this court. On the trial in the special term the
JUDGE presiding instructed the jury that "There
was no evidence contucing TO prove 50 CHI ten
anSy as authorized this proceeding, and they
must therefore find verdict for defendant" A
verdict Wa returned in accordance with this in
stuchon, and On appeal vas taken therefrom
to the general term upon q bill OF exceptions
IL also appears that the plaintiff read in evil
dence at the trial deed of trust executed by the
defendant Who WAS the owner OF the premises
nellie, trustee, and dated March s, 1910. The
deed recites that the defendant Jones had given
his promissory note to George p. Needharn for
the sum OF $3.50, payable In twelve months, and
to secure the payment OF this note the said deed
OF trust was executed. 1t contains the usual
power authorizing the trustee upon default
being made In the payment OF the note to sell
the premises, and TO convey them in fee simple
TO the purchaser. DaTneille was introduced by
The plaintiff and swore that he WAS the
trustee named in the Geed, and that
ne sold the premises and convened
the TO the plaintiff, who was the purch tser
The plaintiff also proved that the defendant
remained in possession without his content, aAd
that he had served him with notice of thirty
days To quit and surrender the premises. This
II substantial statement of the facts contained
IN the bill OF exceptions upon which the court
below directed a verdict for defendant. was
OF opinion then that the relation OF landlord and
teI ant between the parties could not be inferred
from these circumstances, as TO bring the
cause within the statute upon which II WAS
founded. A careful examination of the Ian
guage used in the first section has satisfied me
that IN this respect nv construction OF the act
WAS erroneous, and all the judges WHO heard the
case here are of the same opinion.
That portion Of the first section which is to be
considered in disposing of this case reads as fol-
lows; That tenancy at will shall not arise OF
be created without an express contract or letting
TO that effect, and that all 0ccu patton, possess
SION, or holding of any messuage or real estate
without express contract or lease, or by such
contract or lease the terms Of which have ex-
PRED, shall be deemed and held TO be tenancies
by sufteraBce; and all estate at will or suffer-
apce may be determined by notice in writing,
10 quit, or thirty days. delivered to the tenant In
hand or to some person Of proper age upon the
premises, or in the absence OF such tenant or
person, then such notice may be served, BY
All king the same to a conspic uous part OF the
Iremises, where Ii may be Commemorative read >,
ii viii be seen that tenAncfes Of two kinds are
here provided fOr-one being at will and the
oner BY sufferance, and that both may be de-
ter mined by a notice to quit Of thirty DAYS 1t
also appears that Q tenancy ct will cannot be
created without an expressed contract, butthst
an occupation, possession, or holding of real &C.
OF which have expired, shall he deemed ten
ancy by sufferance. The simple fact of possess
son where there Is no contract, Is a Sufficient
circumstance to create such tenancy: and if a
man therefore holds possession of premises be-
longing 10 another, and there is no agreement
between them, the relation of landlord and
ute.
AT common law an estate at sufferance is
where one comes into possession OF land
BY lawful title, but keeps 1t afterwards,
without any title at all. As If a man takes a
lease for year, and after the wear is expired
continues to hold the premises without any fresh
leave from the owner of the estate.-I2 Black
stone, 1901 1t also occurs where the tenant
wilfully holds over after the determination of
his term. But the act in force here relates to
all occupation or possession, whether with or
without a previous contract, and declares in
explicit terms that such possession is the ample
requisite to constitute q tenancy by sufferance
am aware that In several OF the states 1t has
been decided that in order to authorize the
institution of summary proceedings to recover
the possession of land the relation of landlord
and tenant must be shown to have existed be- |
however, under which these decisions have been |
made differ from the enc in force in this Dis |
. .let. they do not undertake TO create a new |
KIND OF tenancy, and q remedy to enforce IT.
They generally provide for cases of forcible and
unlawful entries upon land, and for a wrongful |
noiding over by tenant after the expiration of
lie ased to him. The language used in the pres-
ent act OF Congress is more comprehen We for |
y was evidently their design, in addition to |
.nese cases 10 declare that where person is in |
OF land belonging to another without |
lease or agreement, he is to be deemed a tenant |
by suferance, and that upon his being served |
ni,h nouce OF thirty days to quit he is to be
liable to the summary process furnished py tie |
second section OF the act We hold, therefore
mat THESE proceedings may be maintained In |
ms , DlstIlct against person In possession OF |
rea estate, although the conventional relation
y landlord and tenant does not exist between |
The parties.
In the case at bar, it appears that the prem
ses were owned by the defendant at the time he /
'xecuted the deed of trust, and that upon the |
ale being made by the trustee the pTaintiff |
became the purchaser. As q matter of law the |
egai ute was vested by virtue OF such purchase
y The plalEtiff. and the defendant, remaining
u possession ~ Inc prem without any agree
nent 10 that eject, became, by operation OF |
ne statute, tenant by sufferance, and, upon
'eihs noehed to quit in thirty days, was liable
0 6e turned out by proceeding of this kind.
ufd section provides that If defendant,
A. 1t before 1s justice, pleads title in
pom uI- Vt 10 be removed into this court |
mself, thesG possession is without agree |
the defendants ability or sstoppeI rom |
ent, he IL under no a.. -AR he pleads tb At
sserting title in himself, Al ',to an ann,o |
yet the cause is removed at once of such
rate tribunal for the determina alton -sni.
q issue. We can, therefore, see no incon,
nee likely to arise from the construction we
Entertaining these views, We would be /
bliged to reverse the judgment, II .ne case |
ERE properly before Us. Out We think the
enersl term has 80 jurisdiction of the appeal.
ives an appeal from Judgments Of Justices Of
be peace, but expressly declares that such ap- !
eals shall be heard and decided ct q special 1
erm. We have determined In several instances |
hat the judgment Of the special term in these |
ppeal cases is final, and that We have
70 jurisdiction to review them here. We
till think this Is the obvious meaning of |
he statute. The right of appeal to
his court In cases arising under the landlord
nd tenant act Is given in the fourth section,
Tut only In the same manner as appeals are |
AIKEN In other cases. The Judgment Of the |
peeial term In this respect has, therefore, the
anne final effect Is in other cases of appeal |
rom justices Of the peace, and 1t Is equally |
lesr that we can exercise no more jurisdiction |
n one case than in the other.
Although We are obliged to dismiss this appeal
or the reasons stated, we have thought 1t o
uitable opportunity to construe that portion OF |
he law which was presented in the argument,
Is judicial Interpretation was Of constant and /
almost daily Importance.
Let the appeal be dismissed for want of juris-
fiction,
AMERICAN sterling ware, new metal, all |
white, will not tarnish; spoons and forks, re- |
ceived at the agents-Prigg's jewelry store, No. |
i57 Pennsylvania avenue.