Saint Mary's beacon. [volume] (Leonard Town, Md.) 1867-1983, 1872-04-18

srt Z Lee" The article resss Lec's title
70 military distinction solely spou his SUE
cess - defensive eommsnder. IN Ne
gard 10 the battles Of Frederirksburg and
Gettysburg. several historical points which
will be new to many Of our readers. are
made-and they are therefore suhjciued
a. follows:
Having paid our tribute to Lees great
It not matehless. qualities ~ defensive
soldier. We proceed. in conclusion to offer
. few remarks upon the causes of his fail
IRE when called upon to assume the oHen-
sive or to turn to advantage the victories
which he had gained when acting on the
defensive. 1T cannot be doubted that the
two great stains On his military reputation
we're, frss. his omission to use up the
Federal army Of General Burnside bckre
it recrossed the river Rappahannock AFTER
the battle Of Fredericksburg. and second
". bis handling Of the Confederate army
in the Gettysburg campaign. Anybody
Who carefully studies Lees genius viii
come to the conclusion that he was admi-
rably bold when weak. bu, that he became
unduly cautious when he was compare
lively speaking. strong. To our think.
ing. the unhappiest mistake which be ever
made was his rejection Of Che earnest ad-
vice offered on the-evc Of ite baltic d
Fredericksburg BY General J. E B. Stu
art. 1t was the opinion Of this i"ry young
Confederate general that Burnside's host.
. hnddled together in and about the little
city Of Fredericksburg. and with broad
and deep river, spanned only BY three
pontoon bridges. in its rear, would offer
little resistance il vigorously attacked on
the night Of the 18th or l4th of December
the battle itself, in which not more than
| 26, 900 Confederate soldiers had taken ac.
tive part. having been fought on the 18th
Unfortunately. Lee cherished the belief
that Burnside would renew his attack and
he was satisfied that. in that event. he
would have the Federal army at his mcr-
cy. But when the morrow Of the battle
passed without any fresh attack on the
part Of the Fcdcrals. it was a lamcntablc
error on Lees part not to have attacked
shortly before dawn Of the 18th In our
opinion such an attack would have led to
the cari;ulation Of at least one-half, If not
two-,hirds. Of Burnsidc's army; and is
extremely doubtful whether it would nc,
have ended the war. Europcrn ccsui.
ton Of Southern undergraduates could hard :
, " have been withheld If the victory OF
! fredericksburg lad been turned into a
Waterloo. No one who is acquainted with
the low morals Ct the Fcderals after their
bloody rcpulsc before Maryc's Heights,
will entertain any doubt that during those
critical days which interviewed between
the battle and the Federal retreat across
the river. Lee had his enemy in his pow
er. AS for the Fedora! guns on Stafford
| Heights. Of which the fire, acc riding to
some critics. would have decimina;ed the
Confederates. there is little doubt that
their prcjectilcs would have been equally
destructive to both armies.
! But if Lees inaction after Frcdcrcks-
burg was. as We have called it, an un-
happy or negative blunder. undoubtedly
the greatest positive hlundcr of which he
was ever guilty was the unnecessary on
slaught which he gratuisousiy made
against the'strong position into which. by
accident. General Meade fell back at Get. !.
tysburs. We have goo,i reason for say
ing that. during the five years of calm re-
Election which General Lee passed at Lex
ington after the conclusion of the Ameri-
can war. his maladroit manipulation of the
Confederate army during the Gettysburg
campaign was to him a matter Of ceaseless
selfreproach. IF" said he. on many
occasions. Il had taken General Long
streets advice on the eve Of the second
day Of the battle at Gettysburg. and had
fled of the left corps of my army behind
the right corps in the direction Of Wash
ing.on and Baltimore. along the Emmitts-
burg road. the Confederates would to-day
be free people," There can now be no
doubt that before Gettysburg. Gen. LIE
was. to use homely expression. TOO big
for his brooches Never had the Confed-
crates been % full Of fight; and on the
FIRST day Of battle. the Feacrals who, uu-
der General Reynolds. came into collision
with Stoncwall J.cksou's old corps. then
commended by Ewell. were driven like
chaff before the wind. Lees true policy.
ahcr accommodating the position into which
by the merest chance. anu in no degree
by his own deliberate choice General
Meade had been driven, was to have alb
stained from attacking his enemy. "You
are at the head Of an invading army"
wrote Napoleon to Marmont not long be-
fore the battle Of Salamanca. land ought
never to fight battle except on ground
Of your own choosing. Hn'y nj. 81 nj
n,ais : choose your own battlefield, force
your enemy to attack you upon it. aud
never leave it so long IS one living French
man is left Wise words. which i, would
have been we'll if General Lee-who. BIZ
the way. was little familiar with any Of
Napoleon's campaigns or maxims-had
known and taken to heart during those three
opening days Of July which. in 1868. he
passed in Pennsylvania. But even AFTER
the second day Of battle. which had taught
him the strength Of his enemy's position.
there was time for him to have reconsider
ed bis plan. and to have followed Gen.
eral Longstreet's advice We close the
volume Of General Lees life with the
conviction that the contemplation Of this
battle Of Gettysburg will forever prevent
his being ranked as great offensive gen.
eral. But en- reuancke when il became
necessary for him TO assume the often
sive-defersivc, he will bear comparison
with any general Of modern times. His
tactical management Of the troops which
drove Mcclellan away from before Rich
moud in 1862. and Of those which won
the battle Of Chancellorsville in 1868, is