Knoxville weekly chronicle. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1870-1875, 1872-08-07

L
association but belle wing Mr.. Sanders to
be a sincere and Jealous friend of the con-
federacy, thinking that on this occasion
! his peculiar talent might render him USE
full in acquiring the information we desir-
| cd. and feeling that if the safe conduct was
| rendered, his wishes on this subject would
be entitled to some consideration, we per-
mitted the note to be sent without correc-
! ton. 1t is, however, incumbent upon me
! to add that, with all proper respect for Mr.
| Sanders, he was at no time taken into my
! confidence, nor | believe into that of Mr..
! Clay. In Il few days we received u letter
| from Mr.. Greeley advising us of his ar
rival at the International Hotel, on the
American side of the fails, and rendering
us a safe conduct to Washington, and his
own escort, upon the hypothesis that we
were duly accredited from Richmond as
the bearers of PROPOSE tions, looking to the
establishment of peace, and desired to visit
Washington in the fultilmcnt of our mis-
sion. Mr.. Clay and myself were so deeply
impressed with the grave responsibility
which would attach to any action we might
take on this communication, that we tele-
graphed to Colonel Thompson to meet us
at st. Catharines and unite in our delibcr-
ations. Whilst | can only report the rea-
sOning which led my own mind to its con-
illusions, yet may add that the response
which was made to Greeley received the
appreciation of Mr.. Thompson, as we'll as of
Mr.. Clay and myself. Our most obvious
course was to have informed Mr.. Greeley
that he lahored under a strange delusion,
both as to our character and our wishes,
and that we could only meet him as private
citizens, and for an informal Interchange
of opinion. This course, however, as /
thought, would have given to the party now
in power in the United States the means
of defending itself against the charge which
was used with most effect by its political
advesaries. Neither the present nor any
other RepubLicon administration can Sc
cure the same degree of public support in
the prosecution of the war on policy of
contiscation and emancipation, as on
policy which looks simply to the restora-
ton of the Union.
Mr.. Lincoln was reproached with an un-
willingness to make peace on any terms
short of the subjugation of the States of
this confederacy, and the utter overthrow
of their peculiar social system, and conse-
quent indispositon TO ascertain the senti-
ments of the Southern people, for fear they
might profess readiness to submit to the
authority of the United States on more
reasonable conditions. Although no prop
osition for peace which did not concede our
absolute independence would have been
entertained by us for moment, it did not
seem to me wise to give our enemies the
moral and material benefit to be derived
from position they were not honestly en-
titled to occupy.
Had we returned the answer which has
been suggested, the friends of President
Lincoln could have appealed to the letter
of Mr.. Greeley as proof of his willingness
to open negotiations on the most liberal
basis. That letter wholly abandoned the
attitude which the Government of the
United States had maintained since the
secession of North Carolina, aud to which,
according to the declaration of Mr.. Sew
ard in his recent speech at Auburn, it has
returned of ''no negotiations with rebels in
arms 1t expressed q readiness to open
negotiations, and attempt to settle through
diplomacy the questions which had been
so long in vain submitted to the arbitra-
ment of war. II did not even announce
that that restoration of the Union was an
indispensable condition of peace, but prof
fered free and untrammeled conference.
Had the Correspondence closed at that point,
it must have added strength to the admin
istration of Mr.. Lincoln, and thus increas-
ed its capacity to carry on the war. Within
our own borders, it would have nourished
| the delusive and dangerous hope of a COM
promise with our enemy on terms consist
ent with liberty and salf-respect. A re-
| newed pressure would have been brought
to bear on the President to sent commits
sioners to Washington with the view of
opening negotiations, at the hazard of
fresh indignities to the confederacy.
In framing our reply to the letter of Mr..
| Greeley, we endeavored to shape ii So us to
compel such new developments nom Mr.
! Lincoln as would disclose the true policy
| of his administration, or such an adher-
ence to the position assumed in that letter
as would enable our Government to act up
on il with safety. This purpose was fully
accomplished in calling forth the celebrat-
ed document. addressed "To whom it may
concern No paper probably ever pro-
duced so great revolution of public senti-
ment in this same space of time. Although
a gross delusion as to the extent of their
recent military successes has induced a re-
action and secured the reelection of Mr..
! Lincoln, it is destined to exercise an en-
during influence for good. 1t has perma-
nently weakened and distracted the War
party of the North, and there is much rea-
son to hope that before many months inter
vene it will wholly deprive il of Democrat
ic support. However this may be, it has
! united and animated our own people more
than any political action of our adversaries
since the commencement of the war.
1t has been suggested that the effect OF
this correspondence, by rendering proba-
ble the defeat of Mr.. Lincoln at the polls,
was unfavorable in the Northwest by re-
pressing a growing tendency to revolution
in that quarter. This was, no doubt, to
some extent, its temporary effect, but il
has worked no injury to our cause. The
revolutionary element has been hitherto
too feeble to be employed in our service
: with any advantage. Before this cores
| DOndence took place our sanguine friends in