, 1872-10-17
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER.

1lr. Lowe, the Chancellor OF the E1chcquer in
England, in his speech at Glasgow upon the
Geneva award, took occasion to denounce tho
provision in the Constitution Of the United States
requiring all treaties to be asaented to by the
Senate. He pronounced this requirement aa
forming q difficulty In the way Of nego-
tiations Of the most dangerous and per-
picking nature, and one which will, if
not corrected, some day involve the
United States in the greatest possible difficulty.
He complains that whon foreign Government
treats with an American Minister, the latter has
really no power to act for his principal; he
treats subject to the future approval Of the
American Sonntc. Tho English Minister used
this argument against those in Eng
land who advocate the policy Of
requiring every treaty to bo approved
by Parliament before becoming law Tho fca-
ture of our Constitution thus complained Of ia,
perhaps, one Of the wisest in it. It is one which
the country will never abandon. The 1egisla-
ton Of Congress- may be repealed at any time.
Treaties have, by the provision OF the Constitu-
tion, the same force as laws, but are not
repealable by Congressional legislation. To
power Of mixing irrepealab1e laws, and binding
contracts with other nations, is step towards
centralized power to which the country will never
assent. The requirement that treaties shall be
ratified by the Senate, and By vote Of two
thirds Of that body. is all that is left to protect
tho nation from irresponsible 1aw-mahing
by the Executive. So far from
the United States ever making any
such change as Mr. Lowe suggests, it is more
likely that hereafter all treaties which require
the payment Of money out Of the Treasury, or
bind tho Government, directly or indirectly, to
the Payment OF money, shall not only be ratified
by two-thirds vote of the Senate, but shall also
receive tho assent Of the House Of Representa-
tives. The Constitution prohibits the oxpendi-
turo Of any money not appropriated by law
that is, o law enacted by both Houses Of Con-
gross. It has boen question how far the Presi-
dent and the Senate, without tho assent of the |
House, can bind Congress to make an appropria-
tion. When 1lr. Jefferson proposed to purchase |
LIZ A@AA +AAS %AS6ty 1~41A0 bohA
Of Congress, because it required the payment Of |
Is, ,000 900, which money would have to be ap-
propriated by the joint action Of |
The two Houses. This WAS unques-
tionably the true doctrine, and, though |
1iaregarded in the case Of the treaty With Rus- |
7ia for the purchase Of Alaska, the House Of
Of late years has shown q dis |
position to resist this violation Of it's preroga-
ire, and this degradation of its privileges to the
mere execution OF laws, in the enactment Of
which it has no voice.
Tho operation Of the rule requiring the assent
# tho Senate to the ratification Of treaties has
'een beneficial. It has resulted in the defeat Of
Joyeral improper treaties, and notably tho
reaty for the purchase Of San Domingo. The
'bjection that the United Ministers have no
,ower to bind thoir Government, and that, in
|ealing with these, foreign Governments are not
lealing with responsible Or authorized repre-
entativeB, is more specious than substantial.
)no Of the most important treaties over made by
he United States wasnegotiated by an unauthor-
zed agent; that treaty gave us peace with Mexico,
nd by it re acquired California and New Mexico.
Yhen that treaty was presented to President
'olh, he did not object to it, Notwithstanding
here were at that time two special envoys in
1exico, s0nt thither TO negotiate with that Cow
rnment. The irresponsible and unauthorized
ct Of Mr. Trist was accepted by the President
nd the Senate, and BECAME Law. It really
makes no possible difference by whom treaty
> prepared; it is the substance OF the treaty
hst gives it all it's consequence, and in the con-
iderstion Of that substance, by which an entire
.atiop ls to be bound, no authority cen BE- go