The daily phoenix. [volume] (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, 1872-08-13


hands and seals, tho day and year first
signed and sealed by tue Republican
Printing Company. j. Woodruff, Clerk
Of the Sc ate, and 4. 0. Jones, Clerk of
House of Representatives..
This contract is an engagement to
print all the work required to be printed
by the General Assembly within the de-
scription of current aud permanent
printing, at certain fixed rates. 1t does
not designate all the work intended to be
Included in the classes designated per
manent and current, although certain
descriptions of work are designated rs
apperLaining respectively to these classes
Other kinds IF work than these speciti-
cally enumerated are contemplated, both
by the terms Of tho contract and Of the
Act under which it was made. It does
not preclude tho Legislature from de-
termining, from time to time, as the
public convenience may require, both the
kinds and quantity Of matter that shall
be printed, within the description of
permanent and current. The amount to
be claimed under this contract is not
capable Of being ascertnined by an ex-
animation OF the action of the Legislu-
ture alone, but can only be determined
after ascertuining the amount of work
performed by the direction aud with the
sanction of the General Assembly It
follows, therefore, that in the absence of
specific appropriation, and in the ab-
sence of legislation determining what
kinds and quantity of work shall be an
nually printed, there is no legal limit to
the amount Of money that may. in any
year, be- demanded under this contract,
and nothing by which that amount is
capable of being computed.
The question here arises, are the Act
authorizing this contract, and the subse-
quent approval OF the contract, eQuiva-
lent to an appropriation, in the seuse Of
that portion of the Constitution pre-
scribing that "no money shall be drawn
from the Treasury but in pursuance Of
an appropriation made by law"
The clause just mentioned contem-
plates two things-that there shall he al
appropriation, aud that it shall be made
by law. What is al appropriation, then,
in the sense of the Constitution? No
authorities defining the import of the
term appropriation have been referred
to in the argument.
Although the clause of the Constitu-
ton in question is primarily limit of
the powers of the executive officers con-
trolling the moneys in the Treasury, yet
it is reasonable to conclude that it was
intended, to some extent, to give for
NAL character to legislation Intended to
authorize the drawing Of moneys from
the Treasury.
1t certainly cannot be successfully
maintained that, TO constitute an appro-
priation in the sense of the Constitution,
the Legislative action must conform to u
certain formula, such ns that followed in
the case of the annual Appropriation
Act. The practice of legislative bodies
does not warrant such conclusion for
appropriations habitually assumed in
variety of forms. That such is not the
legislative sense of the term is clear,
and the constitutional aense ought to
conform to the Legislative sense.
On tho other hand, it is equally clear
that an appropriation must go further
than to designate an object toward which
the moneys Of the State may be applied,
snd confer authority on the Treasurer
to apply them to an indefinite extent.
To draw the line theoretically aud prac-
tically between these extreme views, is
essential to the present question.
The sound conclusion would seem to
be, that an appropriation, taken in the
sense Of the Constitution, should not
only indicate the object for the disburse-
ment OF public moneys, and confer au-
thority for that purpose, bnt should
either impose a peouniary limit, or,
taken by itself, or in conjunction with
other Legislation, should afford means of
ascertaining the extent to which such
disbursement should be- made.
1t is necessary to look more closely
into the proposition already enunciated,
that the iden that an appropriation that
simply indicates an object, and author
izce the disbursement of public moneys
toward such object, without limit az TO
the extent of such disbursement, does
not satisfy the expression and intention
Of the Constitution.
If the object of that clause was limited
to simply requiring that every payment
should have the authority of law, a sim
pler form of expression might have been
used. Fo- instance. it would have been
sufficient to have said that "no money
shall be drawn from the Treasury but in
pursuance of law" If that was the only
limit upon the authority of the Legsa-
ture, it might have been competent for