The aegis & intelligencer. [volume] (Bel Air, Md.) 1864-1923, 1872-11-29
Cumulative Voting.

The rapidly growing abuses of our present
electoral system, and the opportunity it fire.
quently gives to one portion of community
to override, in the exercise of power. an al
most equal number OF it's fellow citizens, has
lead to much thought and discussion in re-
gard to devising some plan by which minori-
ties can be proportionately represented in
legislative assemblies Several plans have
been suggested, but the one which seems to
have met with the most general favor is that
known as the Cumulative vote"
The theory of all representative institutions
is, that the majority should rule; and cumu-
lative voting, while it does not directly con-
travene this theory, secures to the minority a
fair share of representation, which, though it
cannot control legislation, can at least have
the opportunity ofmaking itself heard on any
question.
Under the present system the minority in
any electoral district, though less than the
majority by only single vote, has no chance
of sending even one member to represent it.
1t is to provide for such contingencies that
the cumulative system has been devised.
Briefly this system may be described as fol-
lows:
Each voter has as many votes as there are
candidates to be chosen, and may divide those
votes equally or unequally among several
candidates, or cumulate them-whence the
name of the system-upon one. If, for in
stance three members are to be chosen, each
voter may cast one ballot for each of the three
members; or two ballots for one member and
one ballot for another or all three of his bal
lots for one member alone. Thus, in coun-
ty containing 1900 voters, and electng three
members to the Legislature, where the poiti.
cal parties are divided in the proportion of
800 to 400, it is manifest that one-third of the
voters of the county (400) would be without
any representation to press their own pecu-
liar views. Under the cumulative system
this minority could secure one out of the
three representatives chosen, and thus the
parties would stand in the legislative body as
two to one, or in exact proportion to the rela-
tive number of voters by whom they were
chosen.
Suppose the majority nominated three can
didates, A., B. and G.; the minority only one
d. Each majority voter casting one vote for
each of his candidates, and each minority
voter cumulating his three votes on one can
didate, the vote would be: A., 500; B., 300;
c., 800, D., 1900. Here D., the minority
candidate, would be elected, and only two of
the majority candidates could take their seats.
Whether this plan would indeed bea cure
for the evils of the present system or not is,
at least, doubtful. 1t might complicate the
calculations of politicians, SO that the most
astute would get the advantage; and it would
also increase the difficulty of counting votes
or detecting frauds. 1t has recently been
tried in Illinois and in some portions Penn
sylgania, but how it will finally work re-
mains to be seen. 1t is probable that at first
it would be fairly carried out; but rs wire
pullers became more and more familiar with
its mode of operation, very little doubt exists
in our mind that like all other human plans
for the preservation of purity in politics, it
would be found to be wanting. The only
true safeguard, after all, lies in educating the
masses-a work 1t which the newspaper
press may efFectually help.