Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1872-08-30
ARMY "REMINISCENCES.
Extracts from Leading Editorials of
the cincinnati Gazette, o Staunch

Extracts from Leading Editorials of
the cincinnati Gazette, o staunch
Grant Paper.
TClose of long article on the "Generalsnlp III
Tennessee" April 10, 1921
Public opinion viii not be suppressed
upon such a needless sacrifice OF our poor
soldiers, and such a peril of the entire ar
my of the West, by palpable military In
competency. The Administration has en-
deavored TO make the war successful by
rapid promotion of Generals. 1t should
also hold them to a rigid responsibility,
even if their downfall be as rapid as their
rise.
From "The Strategy Of the Western Depart
ment," April I6, 1862.
1t is easy to see that with such general
ship on our part the Confederates can
move back and forth on their inner line,
concentrating to attack our columns in de-
tail, without interruption. The strategy
of the Western Department seems to have
been based on the expectation OF co-opera-
ton on the part of the enemy, or al least
that he was not to interrupt our Plans
Its first condition was that the Con-
federates would wait to be attacked.
They were to fortify and concen-
trate, and when we got ready to move
forward by different routes, cut OF their
communications, surround and bag them.
On this plan it was Of no consequences how
near we approached the enemy without
uniting our fore nor how inferior the
force we exposed to his main body, nor
was 1t necessary to make any dispositions
to resist an attack or guard against sur
prise. As our plan was that the enemy
was not to attack, these precautions would
only have been thrown away.
From 'The Bravery Of Our Soldiers" April g.
1852
To the generalship that controlled the
army, and that should have put 1t in stale
| of preparation to repel an attack, nothing IS
| due. unless 1t may be said to deserve the
condemnation of the whole nation. Ii the
intention had been to put the army IN po-
sition to be sui prised, nothing could have
| been left undone to contribute to such re-
| suit that was not omitted. But Wnen
we reflect that many thousands of such men
were sacrificed upon that field, through the
recklessness of a commanding officer or
officers, it makes the heart sick. 1t Is hard
to dwell upon the subject. 1t can Dot be
! dismissed while the mangled bodies OF the
| wounded ara being distributed among the
hospitals. The feelings Of tbs loyal people
are all the more warm because Of the mag
nitude of the disaster that the bravery ana
perseverance of the soldiers prevented.
From "Gsn. Grants Report, April 1s. 1862.
| People usually look to the commanding
! Generals official report Of battle FOX re-
| liable account, but it will be necessary to
| Iook from Gen. Grants reports to the &C
| & Al oovraapnndanta of tho Drp99
| for any information of the battle OF Shiloh,
or Pittsburgh Landing.
The report is such one as GENERA,
conscious that he had sacrificed bis army
by his incOmpeGency and neglect, and oesr-
Gus to cover it up, would make. FOR tne
fact is now pslpable TO every body that zen;
Grants army was sacrificed BY neglect and
ov a refusal to be warned Of the omens OF
an attack, or to provide against It, that can
be accounted for only by total incomPe-
tency or something worse.
The account for the story telegraphed to
the New York Herald Of Gen. Grants
heroism and great generalship, and OF his
leading the charge that broke the enemy's
line on the second day, which is Tow shown
TO be pure romance. 1t is only necessary
TO state that Gen. Grant exercised the
most rigid censorship over the telegraph
and that it was necessary to write such
an account of his services to GET
ont at all This &C
couus for the fiction which was spread over
the country about this affair-fction pas
| sing under the censorship Of Gen. Grant,
and ropbing the officers Of their merit, who
saved the day, in order to make false re-
putation for himself, wherewith to cover up
his criminal sacrifice of his fine army anC
his peril of the whole campaign
This Major General, made so for vic
tory which his incompetency could not pre-
vent, was called from his luxurious quar-
ters, ten miles from bis army, Oy the thun
der of the battle, and arrived on the ground
to find the fine army which had been en-
trusted to his care driven at every point
every division engaged and struggling TO save
itself from humiliation, and the river bank
covered with fagitives who had been routed
unarmed from their tents, or the remnants
of broken regiments, who all, officers anC
men, had given way to the panic and were
skuIking for life. The case was too fal
gone for generalship. He had already done
all he could for that army.
From "Penalties for the Bad Conduct OF
Troops" April %, 1862
We ave no reliable information yet tina
the General who left his army without an
: precautions or preparations against surprls
or attack has been arrested aud put on hi
trial: or that the Generals of Divisions VIII
neglected the ordinary outpost service OF a
army in the enemy's country have beel
disgraced. Is it the principle Of the servic
that a general officer, especially if he hav
a West Point education, can do no wrong
From paragraph, April "A, 1852
For some days past it has been reporte
and generally believed thai Gen. Grant ha
! been put under arrest for conduct at Fit:
/ burg Landing.
: From "Promiscuous Thanksgiving" April =
, 1852.
The thanks dispensed by Gen. Halleck I
, Gen, Grant and his officers and men, an
his continuance in command, estsblis
: the fact that the generalship was accordin
5 to the art of war. 1t was very imprope
r for the enemy to be out over night, whe
/ honest men ought to be in their beds. Out
2 ! posts are obsolete in modern warfare, an
3 for the enemy to attack us when our strat
e egy had appropriated that part to ourseive
: was irregular and calculated to bring th
: art of war into disrepute.
e Yet the chief blame must fall on the 81
Y emy, who attacked US when our strateg
d did not provide for it. How can there D
# any honorable, high toned warfare, Whs
= the enemy thus abuse our connding Oil
position?
Under the circumstances 1t seems mill
tary necessity to thank General Grant an
n retain him in command. He was but ca
T. rylng out the strategy. Let the soldiers
a disgraced for being surprised, Gener'
:. Grant thanked. and the army disciplined.
2, From "Gen. Grant Not Surprised" Quotil
from letter OF Gen. Grant denying any su
A prise.
!. We shall not represent this any wor
# than it was, but we are incompetent for
/ istence as a people if the truth in such ma
! tiers is to be suppressed. Gen. Grant
% army was def ated on Sunday, and wou
> have been annihlated in Two hours nor
~ The gunbOats checked an advance OF Il
, enemy which would have driven his who
g army into the river, or captured
The defeat and sacrifice Of his bI
# army, and all its equipments, was b
N generalship, checked Ouly by the approat
, of night, by The gunboats, and by the
> rival of Other divisions, which were
70 part Of his arrangements for the battl
= No one questions Gen. Grants couras
:, but unfor unately the most reckless dari
49, tNa