The Hawaiian gazette., 1872-02-21
Supreme COurt--In BancO.
JANUARY TERM, lsT2.
KAUHI, appellant, IS. KEOM LnKU1ASI,

KAUHI, appellant, -. KE0NT LIALKULAHI,
appellee.
In t1e Estate Of LidikHlcp,i, deceased iHtestate.
In November, 1859, administration on the intes-
tate's estate was granted by the Probate Court in
Honolulu to the appellants parents, Kaiawa and
Mahai the latter of whom the intestates sister
aud died in 1862 They were also appointed guard
ans Of the appellee the supposed son and heir Of
the intestate, the testimony of the said Kaiawa
and others to that effect In June, 1871 on petition
by the appellee for final distribution OF the estate,
the appellant claimed TO be heir as next Of kin and
denied that the appellee was the intestate's son.
The Court decreed in favor of the appellee, but the
jury appeal found for the appellant. The record
of the probate proceedings OF 1852 was submitted
to the jury, the Court declining to rule that they
were conclusive on the appellants rights. The ap-
pellee moved in arrest OF judgment on the ground
that the appellant is estopped by this record from
denying that he is the intestate's son; and also
moved for trial on the ground of newly dis
covered evidence. Exceptions were taken TO the
denial of these motions.
A F. Judd for the Appellant.
W. c, Jones for the Appellee.
HARTwELL j.:
The decree of court of competent urisdic-
ton is generally conclusive in matters which
required to be adjudicated as a basis for the
decree. In granting administration, the intestacy
of the decedent requires to be determined, and
that fact when so determined should not after
wards be questioned by parties to the proceed
ings. But if the Court should go on to decide
other matters not then requiring adjudication as
for instance who the heirs are, such adjudicatons
would have no conclusive effect In appointing
a guardian, the Court has only to find prima
fdcie cause for such appointment. But that in
any er pdrte or preliminary proceedings in pro-
bate, there is a final adjudication of heirship,
kindred or legitimacy of birth or marriage, is
more than can be admitted. Such questions are
always open on hearings for final distribution
There is then no formal adjudication which is
conclusive on the status of the appellee,
But party may preclude himself from denying
what he has once asserted to be true, on the
principle of equitable estoppel whereby man
can take no advantage from his own wrong. In
order that the representation or act of party
shall operate an estoppel, it must be clear that
it was made advisedly, or at least "negligently
in disregard of the rights of others who are
reasonably authorized to rely upon them" Per
Bayley, j. Heane vs.. Rogers, B. &. c., 577.
The intention TO influence another and the in
fuence must be made clear. Weand Canal vs.
Hathaway Wend., 4sO; Dezell vs.. Odell,
Hill, 2l5; Saunders vs. Robinson, Z Met, 3l4;
Freeman VS.. Cooke, Exch., 654; Watkins vs.
Peck, 13 n. H., 500; Thayer vs.. Bacon,
Allen, l64; Barker vs. BinniDger, IA n. Y, go;
Copeland VS.. Copeland, 2S Me- 529. The fore
going cases fully illustrate the view that no one
is thus estopped by his own acts or words, unless
he was aware of the right of which he is said to
be estopped, and that an estoppel does not arise
from acts or words of which the meaning and
significance are doubtful. The very doubt con-
cerning the meaning of the acts alleged as an
estoppel requires to be considered by the jury,
who might perhaps be instructed concerning
their eonclusiveness provided they were satisfied
of the original intent.
The appellants parents thought that the ap-
peee was the intestate's son and heir, and they
took the appointment as his guardians on the
strength of this belief. But BY native customs
and ideas concerning adopted children, they
would have taken the same course if the appellee
were merely adopted as a son and heir, as if he
had been the child of the blood. We can not
say then, that the appellants parents have
thereby estOpped him from showing the truth in
the matter, although the record is strong evi-
deuce against him. The exception to the denial
of the motion in arrest is accordingly overruled.
The affidavit. of newly discovered and material
evidence shows that Kauhi alleged blythe ap-
pellant's witnesses to be the true father of the
appellee, is ready to testify that he is not the
father and that this evidence was not discovered
until after the trial. That this is new and ma
terial evidence, must be admitted. 1t is not
clear that the appellee used due diligence to as
certain concerning this testimony, but in view OF
the great conflict Of evidence in the case, the
doubt about the exercise of proper diligence may
be given in favor of the appellee, and new trial
ordered.