Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1872-01-16
THE LEGAL TENDER ACTS.
New Decision Of Supreme Court.
EXigenCies Of SeIf.PreSerVatiOn.
ANeedy Nation Knows no Law.
Mexican I,restamOs Justified.

SeASS
ally as follows:
The debts which have been contracted
since Feb. 25, 1862, are by far the greatest
portion of the indebtedness of the country.
They were contracted in view of the acts
of Congress declaring Treasury notes a
legal-terder and in reliance upon that de-
claration, and Iegal-tender notes have be-
coihe the universal measure of value. If
the court should decide that these obliga-
tions can be discharged only by gold, the
Government has been the instrument of the
grossest injustice. There is no well founded
| distinction to. be tdsde bet#esn The c6nsti-
| tJtioual validity Of The act of Congress de
| claring Treasury notes a legal tender for the
| payment of debts contracted after its pas
sage, and that of an act making them legal
tender for the discharge of all debts, as well
those incurred before as those made after
| its enactment. But IN both cases the, fun
damental question which tests the validity
| Of the lerislati5E l., Can Congress cOnstitu-
tionally give to Treasury notes he charac-
ter and qualities of money? Can such
notes be constituted a legitimate eircu
lating medium, having lesal value 3?
! A lengthy examination of the rules OF
! Constitutional construction is made; and
the conclusion is that C6ngress has author
! ity in al, casfs 10 enact tie laws necessary
and proper for the execution of all powers
| created by the Constitution, and that the
necessity spoken Of is not aRsslute hut il
in tl1e judgment and discretion of Congress.
1t is determined that one of the duties of
! Government is to preserve itself, and it is
held that this Government is possessed of
all necessary powers to that end, and that
| after statement OF fhe condition Or the
coiuLry at the date of the issue of the legal
tenders-the circumstances of war, and the
means required to maintain the army
and navy, it is said that
If were certain that nothing else would
have supplied the absolute necessities of the
| treasury, that nothing else would have en-
abled the government to maintain its armies
and navy, that nothing else would have
saved the government and the constitution
from destruction, while the legal-tender
acts would, it cannot be said that Con-
gress transferred its TtHer Il the enact
re9, o. those laws, or if those enactments
did work the result, it cannot be maintained
now that it was not for a legitimate end
and appropriate, and adapted to that end.
In the language of Marshall in Mccullough
VS. Maryland, that It diI WORK such results
can't be doubted, and if it be conceded that
some other means might have been chosen
for the accomplishment of the same neces-
Sary object, the argument is not weakened
by the concession. Congress had choice of
means and it chose a sufficient and proper
one, and that it had a right to do, and that
was all Il could have done.
If the court were to hold that the means
selected were beyond the constitutional
power Of Congress, because in their opinion
some other IEeans would have been equally
appropriate and efficient that would be to
assume the legislative power, and to disre
gard accepted rules for constituting the Con-
stitution.
The grant TO Congress of the power to
coin money cannot be regarded as contain
ing an implied prohibition against the issue
Of legal-tender notes, and if it raises any i'm
plications, they are of a complete power over
the currency rather than of restraining.
The objection that the legal-tender act
impairs the obligations of contracts can't be
accepted, for it is not an obligation of debt
to paw gold or silver as to contracts, but to
pay money generally, not contracts to pay
specifically the defined money or the kind of
money recognized by law at the time when
the contract was made; nor is it his duty to
pay money of equal intrinsic value in the
market. The expectation of the creditor
and anticipation Of the debtor may have
been that the contract would be discharged
by the payment Of coined metals, but neith-
er the expectation of the one party TO the
contract concerning its fruits nor the antici-
pations of the other constitutes its Obliga-
ton. The obligation Of the contract to pay
money is to pay that which the law shall
recognize as money when the payment is
to be made. If anything is settled by de-
cision, it is this, and it can't be understood
to be cOntrOveIted.
As to the objection that the legal tender
acts are prohibited by the constitutional
provisions, prohibiting the taking Of private
property for the public use without just
compensation, its said the provision has
always been understood to refer only to the
appropriation and not to consequential in
lures resulting from the exercise Of lawful
power.
The objection that the unit of money
value must possess an intrinsic value, is re-
garded as foreign to the subject. The
legal tender acts do not attempt to make
standard Of value. Their validity was not
vested upon an assertion that their emission
is coinage or any regulation of the value of
money. nor is it asserted that Congress has
the power to enact that the governmental
promises to pay money shall be for the
time being equivalent in value to the repre-
sentative Of value determined by the coin
age acts or 20 the multiplcs thereof.
This decision OyeTulCS SO much Of what
was decided in Hepburn vs.. IGriSwOld, s
Wall, COB, as ruled that the legal-tender
acts were unwaTanted by the Constitution,
so far as they apply to contracts made be-
fore their enactment.
Mr. Justice Bradley read a lengthy Opin-
ion, COnCurTing in the conclusion of Justice
Strong.
The Chief Justice and justices Clifford
and Field, and all the dissenting Justices,
except Justice Nelson, who was not present,
read dissenting opinions, setting forth at
great length the minority views, with which
the country is familiar, as having been the
opinion of the court in the former decision
Of the legal-tender question. In concluding
the Chief Justice says:
"If, then, the plain sense Of words, if
ContempOraneOus exposition by parties Of a
common consent in understanding, if the
opinions Of courts, avail anything in de .er-
mining the meaning of the Constitution, it
seems impossible to doubt that the pO Wer
to coin money is power to establish uni
form standard Of value, and that no other
power to establish such a standard is con-
ferred on Congress by the Constitution.
Nv brothers Clifford and Field concur in
these views, but in consideration of the i'm
portance of the principles inyOly ed will dc
liver their separate Opinions. My brother
NeSOn also dissentS."
No other opinions were delivered and the
court sat until ) O'Clock for the reading of
the five opinions in these cases. The Chief
Justice announced that the court would not
sit tomorrow but would be engaged in
conference.
The dissenting opinions refer TO the fact
that the question on its former decision was
as ably argued and decided with as mature
deliberatiOn as any cause ever before the
court by full court, the decision being con-
CURED in by five justices against three de-
senting. The court by law then consisted
of eight justices, and its decision is now
overruled by five justices to four.
LOUISVILLE.
Sale Of the Louisville Hotel.
LOUISVILLE, Jan. 15.-The Louisville
~, OH or cold Of