The new Northwest. [volume] (Portland, Or.) 1871-1887, 1872-03-29

ton whatever. The fallacy here is,
the operation of this second section, so
far as it relates 20 the present question,
is wholly in throwing light upon the
term ''citizen," as used in the first sec
tion, and this operation is just as perfect
after its repeal as before; precisely as a
part of will that has been revoked by
codicil, may yet be read with the rest
of the will if il will throw light upon the
meaning of the whole.
1t is believed, however, that valid
answer can be made to the objection
which is founded upon the second sec
ton, and that the view here presented
will be ultimately sustained by the legal
/ opinion of the country.
/ /. 1t is not a necessary inference that
/ the right to exclude from suffrage is adj
mitted by the second section, for this
section will bear construction that is
consistent with the enlarged cOnstruc
ton which we give to the first section;
and it is a well-settled principle that a
construction that favors the extension
of liberty is itself to be favored, and one
which restricts liberty is not to be
adopted, except under q necessity. This
second section provides for penalty, in
the reduction of its basis of representa-
tion, in every case where State should
deny to any class of citizens the right of
suffrage. Now, this is not necessarily
a concession Of the right, but may be
regarded as punishment of the attempt
to exercise the so-called right. The
matter was practically so much within
the power of the States, (and the States
in view were the disorganiZed Southern
States, that it would be far easier for
Congress to enforce the penalty for de-
nying the right Of suffrage than for the
President to protect that right. It may
be regarded as a case, well known to the
law, of cumulative remedies. 1t is pre-
cisely as if, in addition to the express
prohibition by the Constitution of the
making of war by any State, there had
been a provision that if any State should
make war upon foreign State, such
State should pay the entire expense in
which the General Government should
become involved by the war. This
clearly would be only penalty and not
a concession of the right, the object be-
ing to increase and not TO diminish the
security of the General Government
against any attempt of State to do the
act prohibited.
:. The first section of the fourteenth
amendment is entirely senseless and
idle, except upon the construction which
we claim. The term "citizen" means
either voter or merely "member of
the nation," as distinguished from an
alien. Judge Carter, in his late opinion
in the case of Spencer rs. The Board of
Registration, in the supreme court of
the District of Columbia, sees this neces-
sity, and that there is no intermediate
status, and holds that the term means
merely a person clothed with the civil
rights of an inhabitant, as distinguished
from an alien. Let it be borne in mind,
then, that those who deny the construc-
ton which we claim, must make the
word citizen mean merely "not an
alien" Let it also be borne in mind
| that by the thirteenth amendment,
which abOlishes slavery, every inhab-
liant of the land became a free inhab-
liant, so that nothing is now added to
the force of the term "inhabitant" by
perfiXing TO it the term free" It fol-
lows, therefore, that the fourteenth
amendment, under the adverse construe-
ton claimed, means only that the per-
sons referred to in it are Inhabitants Of
the ldIld Let US see, then, how it will
read: "All persons born or naturalized
in the United States are inhabitants of
the United States and of the State where
in they reside" This is sheer nonsense.
In the construction of an ordinary law,
passed by a legislature in the crowded
7 moments of its last hour, every court
would say that it must, if possible, give
! the law construction that will make
it have a sensible meaning and effect,
| and that of two constructions, one of
which gives il sense and purpose and
: the other none, the former is, without
, question, to be preferred. How much
: more should such rule be applied to an
5 amendment of a national Constitution,
= deliberately adopted, first by Congress
= and then by three-quarters of the legis-
1 latures of the States?
f 8. 1t is a universal rule, in the con-
structiOn of statutes, that the construc-
e ton of an enabling or enlarging statute
must be liberal and in the direction of
= enlargement. The rule is applicable
= with much greater force to the construc-
ton of this amendment, because, i'm the
F: first place it is dealing with the most
e fundamental of all political rights, that
: of free citizenship IN q democracy, and
is besides an amendment of Constitu-
e ton which is Itself the charter Of free
= dom, and the amendment is made fol
: the very purpose of giving larger free.
{ dom than that free Constitution origin
= ally gave. This rule alone is enough to
: settle the question of the construction
I of this amendment, especially as the
} question is between a construction that
, shall make it confer nothing that was
, not before possessed.
: The whole question thus far has been
considered with reference to the four
: teenth amendment alone. The fifteenth
amendment, though, as we think, con-
ferring no new rights, yet should be
briefly noticed. That amendment is as
; follows: "The right Of citizens of the
! United States to vote shall not be denied
or abridged by the United States, or by
any State, on account of race, color, OF
previous condition of servitude." Here
, il will be seen that the language, i'm its
natural meaning, implies pre-existing
right TO UOte. It is not pertinent to the
creation of a new right, but only to the
protection of a right already existing.
1t is like the case occurring in some OF
the State constitutions, where ii is pro-
vided that the right of trial by jury shall
not be denied or impaired, in which case
it has been held not 10 confer new
right, but merely to protect, in its then
existing form, a right that was enjoyed
when the constitution was adopted.
This construction of the fifteenth amend
ment, however, though the natural and
obvious one, is not a necessary one,
since, if there had been no fourteenth
amendment the fifteenth would un-
dOubtedly be held TO create new right
Of suffrage. The argument, from the
language used, though uOt without very
positive weight, cannot be regarded as
decisive of the question, and the claim
that women are entitled to vote must
rest essentially upon the construction OF