, 1872-12-15

the Court could rale it out, and he would take
exception to the ruling.
The following question VAS then put to the
witness:
O., After you entered the service and employ:
ment of Mr.. Turner, did you st any time receive
instructions from him as to the person or per-
sons to whom you ought not to sell Iquor7
Mr. Reed-I object.
The Court thought the question not fairly put,
and said that in this case It would protest itself.
1t would put the question in these words:
Q. Did you receive any such instructions with
reference to Hannhan?
Witness-Yes, sir.
The Court-By nan1es
Nttnebs-No: sir he was pointed out to rne.
The Coutt-That is different thing, if the
fectly.
Witness-The man was pointed out to me
when he entered the saloon. Mr. Turner said,
Don't sell that man any liquor" did not
know the mans name it WAS the man who was
here to-day. Sold liquor to Hanahan once or
twice, when he Was sober; Turner gave him in
structions after this not to sell him liquor. He
had refused to sell Hanahnn liquor after that.
G.. ". HENDERSON,
sworn Was bartender for h1r. Turner from
January to Aug. 6, and from Aug. 12 to date !;
had received no instructions from Mr.. Turner
not to sell liquor to Hanahan did not know
him Z; might have seen him there were many
people who drank in the saloon whom witness
dlQ not Know.
THIS CLOSED THE TESTIMONY,
and Mr. Bellows contended that the second
section OF the act under which the case Was
brought VAS unconstitutional; it Was prohibi-
tory. There we're two subject matters in the
act, while the title only referred to one. The
title referred to the evils of the SALE but adj
mitted it's legality, while the second section was
q prohibition Of the sale.
Mr. Bellows offered the following instruction
without argument:
The jury are instructed matter Of law that the
defendant cannot be convicted under the second
ton Of act OF the Legislature Of Illinois, which act
is entitled ''An Act to provide against the evils
snlting from the sale Of Intoxicating liquors In the
State Of Illinois,, and under which the defendant is
indicted, as the same is unconstitutional and Of no
force.
The following. instruction was also submitted
by defendants counsel, but the Court refused to
give it,:
The Court instructs the Jury that the relation Of
principal and agent whenever the agent steps
beyond the bounds of authority expressly given him
by the principal; and if they believe from the ey-
the liquor to Hanahan, in express violation Of insruc
tons given by the defendant to his AGENT the bar
keeper that he shall not se liquor to intoxicated per
or to persons in the habit Of getting intoxicated
then the defendant should be acquitted
After the recess 1T 2 o'clock, Mr. Vocke ad-
dressed the jury On behalf OF the defendant, and
Was followed by NIr. Bellows.
Mr. Reed argued the case briefly on behalf OF
INSTRUCTIONS.
The Court then instructed the jury as folloWs
on the part Of the people:
The Court gives these instructions II the jury be-
that in August last the defendant had knowledge that
Daniel Hanahan in the habit Of getting intoxca-
ted and that afterwards Intoxicating liquors sold
to said Hnpahan in the saloon Of the defendant, by
himself or By his bartender, then the defendant Is
guilty, and is the duty Of jury to find him guilty.
The Court said that the instruction WAS to be
considered in relation with the third instruction
offered for the defence.
On the part Of the defence the Court irstructs the
jury that it is material for the prosecuhon to
knowledge on the part OF the defendant is not suf
hcent to show merely THAT the injured party whose
getting Intoxicated but It must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge
Of this fae; and il the jury believed from the evidence
that this knowledge his not been shown. then the do
fendant should be acquitted.
The Court 1nstructs the jury that the evidence of
said Hanahan being in the habit Of drinking sptuous
liquors is not conclusive proof that he in the habit
Of getting intodcated noz is evidence showing thas
he has once twice been in state Of intodca-
ton sufficient proof Of this fact; person In the habit
Of getting intoxicated, meant by the statute, IL one
given to drunkenness, and one who is in the habit OF
getting drunk that he ia unable to perform proper
his family while intoHcated and If the jury beieve,
from the evidence that this has not been shown then
the defendant should be acquitted.
The Court, in submitting the following in
as *sthe third"
But the jury believe from the evidence, that the
defendant had expressly forbidden his bartender to
make sale Of liquors to Daniel HaoahAn and that he
was in the habit Of getting intoxicated, and hat such
bartender without the knowledge assent OF the de
feadant after such prohibition, ao}d liquor to such
perHon defendant would not be Hable for such sales
by the barkeeper provided the jury also beeve,
from the EVIDENCE that such prohibition was given in
good fa and with honest intention that it should
be obeyed.
The Court insructs the jury that the pending case
which appy to prosecutions for felony. The charge
must be made out beyond reasonable doubt, and
the evidence Of the prosecution ia shaken sufficiently
to create reasonable doubt to the guilt Of the de-
fendant, then the defendant should be acquitted.
THE JUDY,
after an absence Of some time, reported that
there was no prospect Of their agreeing, if kept
in durance q week.
The jury was therefore discharged. It stood
For acquitta1, 7; for conviction, S.
L new trial will be had next term.