The New York herald., 1872-09-16

and Leboeuf alone, the nrst concentra-
place around Metz, with 100 600 men at Strasbourg
and with $4,000 men more IN the camp at Chaions.
nearer on to Strashourg and to cross the Rhine at
Mapau with o strength OF $50, 600 men. After tne
South German States had thus been compelled into
neutrality, the Prussian army was to be sought
out 3nd conquered. During these operations thc
task was assigned to the Reserve H0rps e the
army and to watch the northeast boundary. Az
the same time It was expected that the appear.
ance OF the fleet in the Baltic Sea would retain |
p0rtien OF the hostile forces to guard the coasts
The plan thus detailed was based on the GER
enemy could only be counterbalanced by rapdity OF
movement but iilusory as TO the relations OF south
sftne Prussan forces were moderated. This last
fact the more striking as 1t should De known
shat naa already IL the S OF
into the field and that its strengta had since
received not inconsiderable increase Besides, II
was not then known how little the French army In
It's then condition fitted for rapid opening OF
the campaign and the rapid carrying on OF opera.
it was the defective arrangements Of the
misunderstanding ! mean IN military
sions, nnateriel &C., and the length OF time neces
sary for making the Indispensable distributions,
which principally prevented the rapid m3Sillzstlon
Also 'The experiences "it says, "of the last war
IN Italy had by no means proved that French
marching. At least people in Prussia could well
remember that the army OF the Emperor. which then
OF Magenta to the day Of solicrino, marched on an
average but one mile day French diplomacy
s IN S to the
declared &c war the ta a wns decaa IN
ton, and it thus happened afterwards that the
forces OF France, before they were fully collected
and ready for offensive operations, were attacKea
by the German armies on their own ground" The
preliminaries OF the struggles being thus gven the
volume next describes the events which trans
pired
BETWEEN THE DECLARATION OF WAR AND TIE FIRST
OF the campaign. No story can be more pitifu than
that told in these pages Of the volume. How
rapidity the very first necessity o! success, and
now this division and now that was found deiec-
tive how the Emperor, coming to Metz found dis
the plan Of invading Germany ssS wayered and was
persisted In and then wavered again; how While the
movements Of the French troops were well known Known
down like an avalancne-al these things are told
is already Wen known, and the present volume is
valuable for Its general observations than for
its history OF particular movements, with whcn We
are all more or less acquainted. l SHALL therefore
now pass to the next chapter OF the work-a chap-
'THE GERMAN ARMIEs-rHEIR PLAN OF OPERATIONS
| and their march forward up to the 3lst OF july"
Of e g German Gndpiee oee give The d
amounted to 800 men; the reserve to 297, 500
part of the bookDthe part in Which Won Moke de.
tails the plan he had matnred OF dealing with the
French army long time before the war broke out
at forms one OF the duties OF the Chief Stan," we
most detailed manner, the grouping and the trans
eventuaties, and to hold sketches for this purpose
SsSs msfea Masn al IN inas aT
Of political and geographical considerations
| have to be taken into account as well as military
tion OF the army can scarcely be repaired in the
whole course OF campaign All these arrange
| n
the organization of the transport service being pre-
supposed, they must lead to the intended result.
| II Is otherwise with strategy-with the employment
In war OF the means already prepared. Here our
will is met by the independent will OF our opponent:
for and resolved upon the initiative at the proper
moment, and it can only be proven by a battle The
SO wde sprsSsag that ne
different situation and, as result new basis for
operations can go beyond tue first rencontre with
the enemys chief force with any certainty. No
re-
plan that has been definitely fixed beforehand in
e The aa sa 70
always keep his great objects before his eyes, un-
disturbed BY the vicissitudes OF events but the
paths by which he hopes to attain them can never
be designated with safety long beforehand" De-
tailed proposals for the collection of all the German
arrangement and division OF the single armies, as
the basis of all further operations, we find laid
object OF operations laid down to be ITO find the
foand.S In this III simple plan u the the diiculty
lso. Is pointed out which arises from the
r SUCH % anS as ssdns aes
| Even from the first movements the effort may be
recognized to cut Off the powerful army OF the
| enemy In northerly direction from its communi-
| Cation with Paris. The abOve-m entiOned mem0ire
Of General Won Moltke then estimates the proper
| tionate
STRENGTH OF THE FIRST ARMIES OF THE TWO sIDEs
Setting out with the suppositlon that, in conse-
| Germany would dispose OF only ten corps-these
are set down at 330, 900 men-tO which France could
after the enrolment OF It's reserves s4S 900 men, this
| proportion OF the forces in the beginning must
act to considerable }s I, extent in % our favor. II Which
States at the same time took part IL the war, If
only the three disposable reserve corps and some Of
the Landwehr divisions in course OF formation could
be drawn from North Germany at the proper time.
1t is clear how important 1t Is that we should
beginning, even with the North German forces
alone These win be still further Increased at the
tions against the North Sea Coast against South
Germany. To defend us against the first, sufficient
latter operation, conversations had already taken
place at Berlin with the representatives OF the
that GERMANY wsS no IN eo aa
dition to give at the first moment, even from dis
tance, an effective immediate help in the direct
defence Of the Upper Rhine ana the Black Forest:
that q still greater security OF the German South
would arise from a union Of oil the forces on the
Mluue nnlllc WHICH from tncTe COulu 6IbdCk OHen-
sively, either on The right or the left bank the
flank OF the hostile invasion, and should thus
compel this to stand still or return This fact,
especially deserves to be brought ont, that the
South German Princes, agreeing with these views,
in devotion to the common cause and confding in
the chief commander of the army, did not hesitate
to deprive their territories or their forces in
order to join Immediately to the North German
army. The task which the North undertook became
thus the more difficult.
THE NEUTRALITY OF BELGIUM, HOLLAND AND swift
ZERLAND.
M5InOi-P
trality OF Belgium, Holland and Switzerland may
be regarded as certain; therefore, the theatre OF
war is limited to the space between Luxembourg
and Bale. "We may,n the Memoire, continues,
"thereiQre assume with probability that the french
will make their first cohcentrat6n ON the line OF
etzStrasburg, in order that avoiding our stronger
Rhine front. they maY push on to the Main