New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1872-05-01
THE COURTS.
United States District COurt-In Bank.
runtcY.

BnAteu SLutes DIBIricC fOOurt-In bank
ruptcy.
In the case of Norton and YarletOn, as
signees, VS.. Brandies and Crawford, judges
Thomas and Randolph have fled an answer
opposing the motion made by plaintiffs fol
a new trial. This cause has already beer
tried on three different occasions, and the
jury, after carefully reviewing all the facts
and the law applicable thereto, returned {
verdict in favor of Brandies and Crawford
The attorneys for plaintiffs make now al
ex parte motion, and ask the cOnrt to give
Judgment for plaintiffs on a verdict by the
jury in favor Of defendants.
Fourth District Court.
Judge Theard decides the following
cases:
Henry Eden VS.. F. Lemaudre and others
On the twentieth of October, 1870, Henry
Eden, owner Of brig Ruatan and schooner
Lizzie Lima, entered into two contracts OF
affreightnent or charter parties, identical
in their language, with +. Lemaudre, j,
Macbeca 81 Co. and NJ. de GregOTiO, of this
city, by which he hired to defendants said
vessels for the purpose Of conveying fruits
from Ruatan to New Orleans until the first
of June, 1871, including any voyage which
might have been commenced on orprevious
TO that date.
The charter parties show that they were
inten led for series of voyages from Rua-
tan and UtilIa to New Orleans. but for the
first voyage the vessels had the privilege OF
loading at Jamaica. The defendants were
to pay a certain sum in advance on each
voyage. and the remainder on the arrival in
New Orleans, and in case of violation OF the
contracts the parties were to pay penalty
stipulated therein.
The voyages went on without any diff
Guilty until the twenty-secOnd of May, 1871,
when both vessels were in this port, and
ready to undertake another voyage from
New Orleans to Ruatan. But the defend
ants, being of opinion that the contracts
had expired by limitation, did not make
the required advance for another voyage.
Hence this suit, which is brought to re-
cover the amount OF penalties stipulated
in the contracts for the On-performance
thereof.
A careful examination Of the evidence
and the law applicable to this case has
satisfied the court that the demand OF the
plaintiff must be rejected.
Under the terms of the charter parties,
VOYAGES were to begin at Ruatan and Utuia,
and to end at New Orleans. A ship is con
sidered to have made a voyage when her
departure from one port and arrival at an
OTHER shlll have taken place. G. Z. 32I@
Consequently, in order to be entitled to
make another voyage, the two vessels should
have been in the ports of Ruatan and Gtllla
prior to the first of June. Now, the evidence
leaves no doubt that it was physical i'm
possibility for the vessels to have LETT New
Orleans after the twenty-secOnd Of May and
Ae in those ports in time to begin another
bvage. Then the contracts were clearly
pired.
Fhe Interpretation of these contracts, as
gtrued by the plaintiffs counsel, is IN
able. A voyage from Ruatan to New
cans can not mean voyage from New
cans to Ruatan and return. The terms
he contract arc clear and free from am.
uity. and from their words the intent OF
parties is to be determined. q. Z. Ig4U
But if there should be any doubt on that
point, the plaintiffs demand must, never
fbeless. be rejected, because the defendants
were not put in default at the proper time
1t is true that they were orally made aware
by frequent conversations, that the plalntl1
was ready and willing to make another
VOYAGE. But it was not Until the thirty
first Of May-the very day on which the
contracts expired by limitatiOu-that the
defendants were regularly put in default
bv one of the modes pointed cut by article
1905 Of the Civil Code. 1t was too late
For these reasons let plaintiffs demand
be rejected with costs.
sixth District Court.
In all the tax license cases tried yester-
bay by iuries in the Sixth District Court,
vpTdicts were given in favor Of the plaintiff
In the case of Leon GodchauX VS. the
o;tv of New Orleans, which was about be
inc Given to the jury to-day Tuesday. the
conrf announced that he had received {
mandamus from the Supreme Court not K
nroeeed anv further with this case, ON tht
pround that it was one OIL Two sWu
brought by the same person, ooIn
which. If consolidated, would exceed al
appealable amount.
In reference to these license TAX suiJs
application has been made by AsslsIan
Civ Attorney II. H. Walsh to the supreme
CONT for a mandamus to compel, wnert
the plaintiff has more than one SUIT incl
consolidation.
The following is the stereotyped charge
Judge Cooley gives in each case TO the jury
and it contains the substratum OF the Oplh
ions therein used:
Gentlemen Of the Jury-There are bu
two questions in this case, and both OF then
depend upon the law: First, whether IN
ordinance imposing the license is or IS no
constitutional; second, whether there wa
a natural obligation to pay the tax.
The Supreme Court has decided bOtl
these points. First, they have decided IN {
case exactly like that at present before you
that the ordinance was clearly UncOnsttu
tiOnal. Second, in another case, the Su
preme Court decided mat party VINO pay
an unconstitutional tax can recOverit back
1t is commended by the city that there wa
natural obligation to pay this license
This to me is prepOsterOus. A license tai
Is an arbitrary exaction, and there is n
natural obligation to pay it. If you fin,
that the plaintiff has paid his license unde
the ordinance in question, l charge yO
that, the ordinance being unconstitutional
ne has right to recover it back from tn
city, and defendant is entitled in law to
verdict lnthis favor. If you find that he ha
not PAID the license under the ordinance
oftered m evidence, then the CITY is Ell
titled TO a verdict. s.. D y -
4 4Rere Is not single case eyer decided b