The Columbia herald. [volume] (Columbia, Tenn.) 1850-1873, 1872-12-06

der consideration should f66o1
construction as will effectuate the inrel5
ton OF the Legislature, provided it doe!
not come in conflict with some provis
ION OF the constitution or some well es
tsblished legal principle.
And this 5rings US to an examination
OF the several positions assumed BY
counsel for the defense. And, First, il
Is argued that as the lands may have
changed hands or owners between the
time OF the assessment, levy, condemna-
ton and sale, and the time of filing these
| bills. 1t would be illegal aud inequitable
| to compel the present Ownor to pay the
debt o: account for the defalcation OF
| another. But this position is fully met
and refuted upon the assumption that
the State has lien upon the land itself;
and no sale or conveyance of the land
could defeat such lien. If it could, then
it would be in the power of any citizen
to defraud the State Of her revenue by
destroying or defeating her lien. But
the lien being specific one, IN rem, fol-
lows the land into whosoever ownership
or possession it may psss. We there
fore think there is nothing in this posi-
ton.
ID. But it is further insisted in argus
ment that the State, having already be-
come the purchaser of these lands
through her agent, the revenue collector
cannot now, repudiate, waive or aban-
don her rigtt thus acquired, and treat
ing tire property AS that of the original
debtor or his deedee, institute these pro-
ceedings to enforce her lien. In other
words it is insisted that she has no Le,,
and whatever lien she once had has been
merged, by her purchase, into right or
title to the land and thus the lien has
been lost.
The answer to this argument is that
the Supreme Court has, at its last session
at Jackson, adjudicated this question,
holding that in such cases, the State,
having taken no deed, may waive CT
abandon her right to deed and regard
the land as still the property of the
tax debtor-permit the debtor still to
remain in possession and then enforce
her lien not only for the taxes for which
it was sold, but also for taxes subse1
quently accrued and assessed. And il
this we see nothing but commendahle
disposition on the part of the State to
favor the taxpayer, giving him the OPP
portunity of securing and holding lands
upon payment of his ,taxes. 1t GER
tainly does not lie in his mouth to sly
to the State: "You have bought my
land and because you wish to be leni-
ent, do not desire it and prefer that
you should hold to my land and strip
myself and family OF what real estate
we have"
This is the substance of the argument.
But the State is too much interested i'm
the prosperity and well-being of her
citizens to appreciate such an argument
or to seek any such advantage over
them. But whatever difficulties we
nay encounter in reasoning on this
point, it is enough for us to say, TIA
lea scriptd est"
8. Is this partial or class legislation as
is insisted? We think not. 1t APPLIES
alike to all delinquent taxpayers
throughout the State, without except
ton. In many respects it differs entries
ly from the case of the State Bank as.
Cooper, reported in Yerger, and cited
and relied on by counsel. In that case
special and extraordinary tribunal,
before unknown, was created by the
Legislature, from whose decision there
was no appeal, to adjudicate the claims
of a particular Institution, against
particular class of debtors. The whole
machinery and operation of the Court
was entirely new and unknown to our
Judicial systematic Court itself created
after the delinqencies occurred about
which it was to adjudicate. and clothed
with uneXampled jurisdiction. In this
case no nesv court ia created, but simply
an extension or enlargement of its Juris-
diction-a course of proceeding which
has grown up with and been sanctioned
by our legislative and judicial history.
The rights of parties are guarded and
protected in the same manner as in all
other Equity proceedings.
4th. If we are right in supposing that
the State, after having purchased, could
original lien would still remain, then
the Act We are discussing, could no. be
retrospective, in as much as it impairs no
vested right, but only provides mode
of enforcing her lien. There is no
vested right in the debtor that could be
infriuged by the Act. II, as was insisted,
the land purchased belongs to the State,
is there any good reason why she may
not proceed to sell her own land in this
way, thus choosing to give the present
claimant an opportunity to secure title
TO himself, and if the State got no title,
does not her lien remain and may she
not enforce it by bill in Equity? And if
she got an inohoate title but no deed
and chooses to waive such inchGate title
and fall back upon her lieu, may she
not do so? Upon none of these supp'-
sitions is there any vested right in the
Defendant which could be impaired.
5th. Now let us examine the last
position assumed by Defendants coun>
sci, to-wit: liant Of Jurisdiction ia the
Court as to AMOUNT.
by the general law the jurisdiction of
the Chancery Court is limited to sums
above Fifty Dollars, or, more properly
speaking, it has no Jurisdiction of any
cause where tho amount involved is
below Fifty Dollars.
Now, does the 18th section of the Act
under consideration, change The general
law in this particular class OF cases?
Does it repeal the general law in these
cases2 1t does not expressly. Does it
Ivy implicatiop9 We think not. All
that is said on the subject in the Act is
contained in section Z, which provides
that all necessary jurisdiction is con-
ferred to ex' cute the objects and pur-
poses Of the Act. "All necessary juris-
diction" as to what? AS to amount or
as to Sutjcct-mdtter' We think the
latter merely. Statutes are not to be
easily and readily repealed by impIicd-
ton. This is done onlv where there is
there such conflict here? We think
not. What is the equitable construc
ton of the Act9 What did tie trainers
of the law intend? Most clearly to my
mind they did not intend to permit a
large class Of delinquents ranging in
amount of indebtedness from one to
fifty dollars, to he harassed singly.
separately and in detail by Bills i'm Chan
Gerry and 0yerWhelmed by bills of cost
and attorneys fees; nor did they intend
the Chancery Courts all over the State,
already crowded to overlooking with
suits, to be still further glutted and over
slaughed with an unnecessary accumula-
| ton of such cases. Section 9th of the
! Act sustains this view which declares
that any number of distinct persons or
distinct TRACTS may he included in one
| Bill and that no Bill should be dismissed
| OH that account for multifariousness or
misioinder of parties. The spirit of the
law requires that as many as practicable
should be embraced in asingle Bill, and
certainly a ndmber sufficient to bring
| the aggregate amount within the juris-
diotion of tie Court,
On this last ground alone, the motion
| to dismiss is sustained and the Bill dis
missed, but without prejudice.
First Round OF Quarterly Meetings
for Columbia District.
Duck River at Bigbyville, DEG. 7 and s.
Columbia station, Dec, Ii and IL.
Culleoka station, Dec. u and %.