The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1871-01-18

prepnable to assault. The outlying lortS are aI
| a distance OF about three thousand PAGES IRON
the e,acesnte, and their guns command ranSe I
of from four to five thousand PAGES. Tue
Prussian batteries cannot, therefore, be placed
nearer than six OF seven thousand PAGES
! from the city. The bombardment OF Paris from
| snch a distance Is impracticable, anu the ia
zette expressly says that the Germans ARE
| not in q position to lombard the centre OIL tne
capital, while the partial bomoafdmenI Oh
few fanbourns would not affect The resistance
! of the besieged" The first step towards the
capture OF the city by directly offensive opera
tions must be. therefore, the reduction OF Tue
forts. These are so skiifuly placed That each
Is commanded by the guns OF the TWO nearest
forts, and the siege of one involves the siege
Of all three, 1t being necessary TO silence TWO
before the third and Intervening one can 90
eccupied. This would be a work OF the utmost
difficulty and danger. The mere dropping OF
shells into the forts acconpllshes little, since
the garrison can easily take refuge IN their
bomb-prools The walls OF The forts must De
knocked to pieces to such an extent as 70 per
mft the entrance of Storning column
But when the Germans attempt 10 make reSu-
| lar approaches sufficiently near to plant their
batteries. .theyare exposed not "uly to the dlrect
| fires of the fort against which lneir operations
are primarily directed, but to a cross-are from
the five or six nearest forts. No parallels can oe
constructed which will not be swept by the
|
reduction, which Is an indispensable preliinl-
| nary to the bombardment OF Paris or an attack
upon the enceinte. Is therefore seen to be task
| OF the utmost difficulty. The Gazette honestly
admits that '.the forts were erected to protect
the capital, and have not failed to do So
What Is called the "Bombardment of Paris"
is the veriest farce. 1t is simply a noisy as
discharge OF artillery, kept up either Tor the
purpose of making it appear that Paris. when
1t may surrender from famine, has been COM
rpelled to yield to the irresistible weight OF
krupp's guns, or in order to prevent Trochu
from removing the guns from the furts, IN pur-
suance of the startling movement which ne ID
about to make.
The Starvation OF Paris, unless the city should
be relieved by the armies of the provinces, is
of course mere question Of lime Foreseeing
this, and knowing bis inability to break through
the German lines, 1t Is believed that Trocnu
contempates no less bold movement than
the evacuation OF the city and the coneentra,
tion of his army in an immense jntrenched
camp at Mont Valerien, on the west side Of
Paris. Dr. Russell, in recent letter to the
Times, distinctly foreshadows this movement,
| and remarks that day after day he has seen
loaded wagon trains entering the fort on Mont
Valerien and returning to Paris empty. Tne
| recent sortie which was made on the east
side of the city was a part OF this plan, and was
intended to distract the attention OF the enemy
Mont Valerlen. That the GermGns have an
Idea Of Trochu's intentions would appear from
their violent bombardment OF forts !ssy, van
yes, and Montrouge. which are In the neigh
borhood Of Mont Valerien. 1t Is from these
| forts that Trochu would naturally first remove
the guns which it is his object to carry to his
intrenched camp. The Germans aim to pre-
vent this by a continued and heavy fire. The
very silence of the forts Is, however. prob
able evidence that the guns are already re-
moved
The advantages to be gained by thus evacu-
ating Paris is plain. Mont Valerien Is now
work of tremendous strength, commanding
the whole city. If Trochu can place within
It's lines the army and the guns and provisions
Of the capital, he can easily afford TO throw
open the gates Of Paris to the besiegers.
The latter will have whole population to feed,
and will capture no materials OF war OF any
consequence. The army OF Paris will. how
ever, be intact. sheltered by works capable OF
standing prolonged siege, and armed with
the heaviest guns aud provlsioned for year
to come. The Germans will really be besleged
In Paris, for they will be at the mercy OF Tro-
chu's guns, should he be willing to bonn
bard the capital. Safe in his camp, Trochu can
wait for spring, knowing that every week ls
gain TO France and loss to the invaders. Iii.
war will be thus indefinitely prolonged, and
the chances of war will all be 10 favor OF the
French. It should he remembered that Tro-
chu's army, and not the City OF Paris itself, Is
the real objective Of Won Moitke. II Trochu
saves his aruy and prolongs the war at the
cost OF surrendering Paris, he will have earn
ed the title Of one Of the ablest strategists OF
the age. That this Is his purpose. oil the indi-
cations would seem to show. Indeed, it Is
said that he Is so confident IN the success OF
the contemplated movement that he has fully
described it In his will, 30 that in case OF his
sudden death his successor should carry It OUT.
The City Cannot be shelled.
The German Gazette of War and Peace,
which is the successor of the Military Gazette,
has published an article on the bombardment
of Paris which contains the following remarks: 1:
We do not hesitate to admit that we were
radically mistaken as to the strength OF tne
Notifications of Paris, as we'll as with regard
TO the resources Of the capital, the formation
and bearing of the army OF the defence, and,
moreover, as to the difficulties which nave
been in the way of bringing up the materlel
for the siege. Paris is great place OF arms,
the principal strength of which consists In It's
numerous detached forts, provided they are
supported by sufficient army. Without an
sarmy which should occupy the ground be-
tween the forts and Paris. the forts would be
of no more Importance than that OF little tor
tresses which could be attacked BY regular
that the ground before Paris Is in fact tortt-
fed battlefield, npon which all the siege works
combine the greatest difficulties. In order to OBJ
tain an idea of the difficulties which we must
surmount. we are about to calculate the chances
upon the southern front Of Paris, where five of
the forts are situated in advance Of the torti-
fed enceinte OF the town. The eRceinte of Fort
Issy Is 5000 PAGES from the enceinte OF the town;
that of Fort Vanves. 5000 PAGES; Fort Mont
Rouge, 340O; Bicetre, 1900; Iyry, 3000 All these
neiGhboring forts sustain each other recipro-
caly, and their average distance from the
euceinte of the town Is about $500 PAGES Being
armed with guns of the largest calibre, they
command ground in advance to the extent OF
of 1000 to 5000 PAGES, so that their fire
reaches the Village of Mendon, and even pass.
es beyond Clamart, SceauX, Chevilly and
ChOiSy. Even where the form Of the ground
allows us 10 approach nearer, as for example
on the heights of Camart, we cannot place
our batteries nearer than 5000 10 1000 PAGES
from the enceinte OF the town, so that we could
only with guns of the largest calibre reach the
faubourgs OF Grenele and Vauslrard. AS to
the capital, 1t would remain secure
and out of range OF our fire. 1t is,
then. evident that we are not in position TO
lombard the centre oil the capital, Will lie the
partial bombardment OF lev faubourgs
would not affect the resis ance OF the besieged.
The French engineers fully foresaw what Is
happening now; the forts were erected to pro-
tect the capital, and have not failed to do 80.
1t is natural that persons who are not an tdn
In military science should express astonish-
ment that the forts have not yet been bonn