The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-03-02
spTRIT OF TEu PRusa.
editorial Opinions OF the Leading Journals
upon Current Topios-O Compiled Every
Day for the Evening Telegraph.
FRENCH TAXATION AND THE TERMS
OF PEACE.


The pecuniary indemnity which Germany
demands of France is simply enormous.
There is, after the declaration by NJ. Thlers,
no reason to doubt that it has been correctly
reported. France has purchased peace, there
fore, at price which seems absolutely ruin
Gus, and which, if ever paid, will give her
the unenviable distinction of having the
heaviest public debt in the world. at the
beginning of 1870 the official statement of
the public debt shows total of 81, 800, 000,-
600. During 1870 three loans we're con
tracted which, when capitalized, will amount
at least to S400, 000, 600. The war expeDdI-
ture, which the nation has still to cover by
duly authorized loan, cannot be less than
another 5000, 1000, 600. Germany nov de-
mands $1,000 600, 600, and if France can
borrow this at all it will only be on suc'a
terms as must increase the capital of the
obligation by one-half, and so make the in
demnity actually reach the figure of 81, 5OO,-
900, 600. Suppose at the end of three
more, probably of six years, France should
be able to pay this enormous bill, she will
find herself i'll the possession of national
debt which reaches the alarming total of
$4, 700, 900, 900.
We think it extremely questionable whether
the money markets of the world will take up,
even by instalments, the prodigious sum
which the French negotiators propose to
raise. The sensational offer which yesterdays
telegrams attribute to Baron Rothschild is in
the last degree improbable. To tiuauciers
the question has three elements each mutu-
ally affecting each other. The first relates to
the probable stability of the Government to
be selected by the French people; the second,
to the amount of the loan likely to be sub
scribed for by France herself; and the third
to the eXpausveness of French taxation.
Suppose a constitutional monarchy to be
securely established in France, it is
highly probable that the capitalists of the
country would subscribe to the full
measure of their ability for a share of
the national burden. The Orleansts are in
favor with the commercial aud moHeyed
classes, and would, in the estim alton of these
sections of the people, and probably in that
of Europe at large, be credited with larger
expectation of existence than any republic,
however moderate. 1t must not, however, be-
forgotten that the comparative facility with
which the Empire raised money arose fro N its
success in drawing out the heards of petty
proprietors and tradesmen from the very
unproductive places of deposit which still
find favor with this class of Frenchmeu. l.
is extremely doubtful whether either Orleau-
lists or Republicans would have, for SOM
time at least, the same success, while tue
extent to which Prussian acquisitions have
depleted these private accumulations renders
them at the same time less available, and
will make their possessers inclined to
hold on with more than accustomed teuacity
to what remains. In an economical point
of view, moderate republic might have
this advantage over a monarchy, that 1T
could push the reduction Of the army and
the feet to lower point. Neither of them
could, to any sweeping extent reduce tle
cost of civil administration, and exist la
France for a single day. The figure Of ifty-
three millions of dollars which we previously
gave as the limit to which reduction of an
nual expenditure could be carried, could
hardly be exceeded by monarchy aud could
only be passed with some difficulty by a
strong and moderate republic.
The ultimate question must therefore be,
what amount of fresh taxation can be borue
by France without crippling her energies,
and therefore defeating its own purp jse
Take the most favorable view of the case,
and assume that the annual expenditure of
France can be reduced sufficiently to cover
these three items of defcit first, the ten or
twelve millions of revenue which, even under
the reduced territorial cession, will be lost to
the national treasury; second, the per-
petually recurring yearly deficit of some
thirty millions, which formed so notable a
character of the imperial budgets; and third,
the large decrease in the taxable resources
of France resulting from the war. Even un-
der a supposition so favorable, and one whose
realization will call for administrative ener-
gies of very high order, there still remains
an annual increase of at least ninety millions
of dollars of interest on the 81, 100 000,0 of
debt which the events of 1901 will be found
to have added to the liabilities of France.
The main sources of French revenue are sthe
land taxes, taxes on trade aud personal
property, post-office and customs, and
excise and monopolies. Nearly twenty
five per cent. of the entire revenue is
derived from what is called the registration
and stamp duties, which are chiefly levied
upon land in the indirect manner of tax
upon transfers, either by sale or testament,
of real estate. PropTietors pay directly
another nine per cent. of the entire revenue
raised by the National Government in the
form of Foncier tax, besides paying a simi-
lar amount to the local governments
1t has been pointed out that, assuming the
real estate of France to be worth six hundred
and thirty millions of dollars it is already
directly taxed to the amount of ten per
cent, and indirectly by the registration
duties to another five per cent. That any
more can be got out of it either by the local
or National Governments, is hardly to be
credited by any one faniliar with the tenn
per of the peasant proprietors of France,
The excise duties on alcoholic liquors, and
the tobacco and powder monopoles, yield
about thirty-fve per cent. of the entire reve-
nue.. The prospects of an available increase
in this direction are also exceedingly
meagre. The Post Office yields FIVE per cent,
and the customs eight per cent, of the total
revenue. An attempt will doubtless be made
to increase the income from the latter source,
probably at the expense of the reciprocity
treaties with England, Belgium, and Switzer-
land. The chief effect of this will probably
be to enrich French manufacturers and to