The Superior times. [volume] (Superior, Wis.) 1870-1912, 1871-06-10
BISMARCK ON PEACE.
why Alsace and Lorraine Must Form
raft OF the German Empire-A Dipio-
matte Secret Revealed.

Fart of the German Empire-A Dipio-
matte Secret Revealed.
In the course of a great speech made
on the lst instant before the German
Re1chstag, Prince Bismarck spoke as
follows; "The wedge formed by the
corner of Alsace in Germany, at Weis-
senburg. divided South Germany more
effectually than the political Maine
line of North Germany. 1t needed the
high degree of determination. of ma
tlonal enthusiasm, and devotion among
our South German confederates. in the
tace OF the closely impending danger to
which they We're exposed had the cam
palgn been skilfully carried On by
France, to see in the danger of North
Germany the danger that menaced
theln-wlthOut moments hesitation
to throw III their lot with ours. and
with us to advance to a common object
For years we have seen that France,
IN this superior pOsitiOn,--in this adj
vanced bastion formed by Strasburc
against Germany-was at all times
ready to succumb to the temptation
whenever internal disturbances made
an outward diversion expedient. 1t is
well known that on the 9Th of August
1866, | was placed In the position of
receiving visit from the French Am
bassador, IN order to hear from him
the CURLY expressed ultimatum: "Give
up Mayence to France, or expect an
immediate declaration of war" [
naturally did not hesitate a second. |
replied to him: ''Then it is war. y
With this reply he returned to Paris
There they came to 4 different conclu-
sion IN a few days, and ] was given to
understand that the instructions had
been extorted from the Emperor Ma
poleon during an attack of illness The
later attempts in reference to Luxem-
bourg and other questions are known.
L need not recur to thCm. | also need
not prove, think, that France was not
always sufficiently strong of purpose to
resist the temptations brought about
by the possession of Alsace.
Nothing remains but to bring this
territory, with It's strong fortresses,
completely into German power, in or
der to defend it as strong outwork of
Germany against France, and to throw
back by several days march the point
of departure of any attacks that may
be made when France, either in recov-
cred strength, OF with the assistance of
allies. shall again throw down the
gauntlet to us. In the realization of
this thought, the satisfaction of the alb
solute need for our security. the chief
difficulty was found III the disincllna-
ton Of the inhabitants themselves to
be separated from France It Is not
for me here to investigate the causes
which have made it possible for an
originally German population to de-
pend to such degree upon country
whose language is foreign, and whose
government has not always been benev-
olent or merciful. There may be some
thing in the fact that all those quail
ties which distinguish the German from
the Erenchman are possessed by the
Alsatians in a high degree, so that the
population of these districts, in ability
and love of order, | may say without
boastfulness, have formed q kind of
aristocracy in France.
They were more capable in office,
more Trustworthy in service, they were
the substitutes in the army. the gend-
armes, the officials; in the service of
the State, the proportion of inhabit-
ants of Alsace and Lorraine vas far in
excess of the populations it was the
million and a half of Germans who
practically exemplitied the character
istic superiority of the German among
a people who have other superiorities,
but not these; they had by their quail
ties acquired a preferential position
which made them forget much legal in
justice. 1t is popularity Of the Ger
man character that each race asserts
for itself certain kind OF superiority,
especially over its nearest neighbor.
Behind the Alsatlan and LOrrainer, so
long as he remained French, was Paris
with its glory and France with its uni
form greatness. he met his German
countryman with a feeling paris is
mine, and found therein q source of
'particularistic" superiority
[ do not go back to the Interior
reason, that everybody is more easily
assimilated IN a wide political system
which gives full play to his capabilities,
than in a nation which, although re-
lated by speech, is distracted AS this
side of the Rhine seemed to be to an
Alsatian. The fact Is that this aversion
is there, and it Is our duty TO overcome
it with patience. 1t seems to me that
we have many means of doing SO. We
Germans have, on the whole, the habit
of ruling more benevolently-s
times, It Is true, more ciumSlly, but
still in the long run more benevOlently
and humanely-than French statesmen.
This is an advantage of the German
way of doing things, which viii soon
come home to the German heart of the
Alsatian, and Will be acknowledged
there We are. moreover, IN position
to give the inhabitants a much higher
degree of communal and individual
freedom than French systems and ira
dItIons permit.
You cannot form fixed idea of the
shape that the future, after several
years, will assume. To my thinking
no human foresight can see thus far
The circumstances are abnormal-they
could not be other0ise-and they are
not only abnormal In the way in which
we have won Alsace, they are also alb
normal in the character of the winner
confederation consisting of sovereign
princes and free towns, making con-
quest which, for the sake of It's own
protection, it must keer, which there
fore comes to be common property.
Such a confederation Is a very rare phe-
nomenon in history; and, if we except
some undertakings of the Swiss can
tons, | believe that IN history scarcely
ANYTHING similar can be found. | also
believe that III this abnormal situation
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