The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-01-16
FIRST EDITION
The Battle of lie Mans.
The Hope of Paris Gone.
MRS. Logan's EIectioneering.
Practical Women's Rights.
Etcs, Etc.. Etc.s Etc.s Etc.
CHANZY'S DEFEAT.

CHANZY'S DEFEAT.
The DIsa strous Battle of LIE nIans-PrelImI-
nary movements-The StrnteRical Position
No Hope for Paris Now.
To clearly understand the recent operations
in the vicinity of LIE Mans, 1t is necessary to go
back to the situation OF both armies a fortnight
ago. At this time the 'orces under Prince
Frederick Charles occupied line stretching
from the vicinity of DreuX, passing before
Chartres to Vendome. Detached corps at Or
leans and along the Loire protected the German
left wing while the German Army of the Loire
in the vicinity of Glen, kept watch upon the
French Army of Bordeaux which was reported
advancing from Bourges.
At this time the French had the advantagei in the
situation. Their line was shorter and more COM
pact than that of the Germans. Chanzy's army
occupied line extending from Nogent le-Retron
10 point south of LIE Mans, completely cover
ing all the railway lines of communication with
the sea. The northward movement made by
Chanzy after the French defeat at Orleans had
thrown the Germans completely on the de-
fensive. 1t had compelled them to extend their
line immensely, thereby necessarily
weakening 1t at all points; When
upon taking the offensive, he had one of two
movements TO select from. The first was to ex
tend his right wing and take Vendome in flank,
and, by forming junction with the Army of
Bordeaux OF or near Blois, force the Germans
to evacuate Vendome and Orleans and retire
northward. This would have necessitated their
forming new line, which would extend from
Dreux to Chartres and Pithiviers.
The next movement was to continue, or rather
resume, the flank march northward flank Char
tres and advance on Versailles. This involved
the abandonment of lie Mans and its railroad
facilities, and the compulsory dependence upon
the single railroad line to Cherbourg for sup
plying CbaDzy's large army with food aud am-
munition. In addition, a flank march upon
Versailles in the face of q watchful enemy rem
dered possible the isolation and subsequent cap
n W audd Ian advan
on the French centre from Chateauduu.
Chanzy, however, adopted the plan of cd
vance on the left flank of the German army. He
threw forward flying columns to occupy the
attention of his enemy along their whole line,
while his right wing pushed on through st.
Calais in the direction of Vendome. Had he
begun the advance ten days earlier he might
have been successful, but the result could only
have been the withdrawal Of the German left
and the concentration of the entire German
army on shorter line aud one which more
etfectually covered the besiegiDg army before
Paris.
By the time Chanzy began moving the Ger
mans, heavily reinforced, were again in condi-
tion to resume the offeneive. Before the French
column had struck the flank of Vendome Prince
Frederick Charles threw his left wing forward
and drove 1t back. The Grand Duke of Meek
lenburg, commanding the German right wing,
simultaneously advanced upon Nogent-le-
Retron, and 1t very soon became apparent that
the German plan not only embraced the capture
of LIE Mans, but also the preventing of Chanzy
retreating northward in the direction of Cher
bourg. Whether the French line of retreat
northward has been cut off yet we are unaware,
but the fact that in the recent battle at LIE Mans
the French faced eastward, and not southeast,
makes 1t very probable that it has been.
AT er the Germans had advanced beyond st.
Calais and Nogent-le -Retron, Chanzy's chances
of relieving Paris depended solely upon his win
ming great victory. Strategy could do little
then, unless he had evacuated LIE Mans and made
forced marches to Montague, from which place
ha how thrc nod fto rin
compelled it to change front under most disad-
Vantageous circumstances. But Chanzy himself
would have to change front in the open field to
make any such flank movement, and in doing so
he would have run imminent risk of being badly
beaten in detail.
The last alternative of the French was to fight
pitched battle. Prince Frederick Charles does
not appear to have attacked the French all
along the lines. His two wings seem to have
done all the work, while his centre remained CON-
paratively Inactive. In other words he massed on
his wings and drove in the French northward
and southwark.
The battle of LIE Mans was fought some seven
miles from the city, and took place near Mont
fort. Savigne rEveque, the immediate scene of
the engagement, is a village situated northeast
of lie Mans.
By his defeat Chanzy has lost bis last chance
of relieving Paris. The present indications are
that both his wings have been badly beaten, and
If this be the case he will have to retreat west
ward upon the seaboard instead OF northward
in which event he would have stood better
chance of doing something in the future. By
the occupation of lie Mans, with the French cut
off from Alenson, the Germans possess
all the roads by which a successful ad-
vance on Paris can be made in the
future. No flank movements are Longer
practicable, aud it is not likely that Chanzy, if
even his army remains intact, will venture upon
direct advance. Altogether we are inclined
TO regard the recent engagement as the finish
ing stroke to Paris. The German movement
have been admirable throughout. They have
oeen directed with a skill and an energy hardly
surpassed by the movement on Sedan. 1t nov
remains to be seen whether the Germans car
follow up the great advantage they have
gained.-N y. Herald
Sketch of General ChaL2y.
General Chanzy, the commander of tn
Department Of Ardennes, and is aged about A
years. He went to sea at the age of sixteen
but year later he abandoned a sailors life L
join the army. He studied at st. Cyr, and frou
there went, with the rank of lieutenant, t
Agiers, where he remained until the Itala
war OF 1889, wherein he gained the rank O
lieutenant colonel. He next went to Syria wit
the army, and served there with so much credi
that he was made colonel in 1860. On his retur
ne was, at his own request, sent to Africa again
and there attained the rank of general. He wa
recalled from Africa to engage in the presen
war in October, and was soon placed in CON
mand of division. He took part in the battl
of Coulmiers, and at Patay, at the head of th
10th Corps, he carried the strong positions hel
by the right wing of the German army.