New national era. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1870-1874, 1871-06-01
Bismarck and Napoleon.
The Princes Opinion of hts Rtval-Hts Va
etllation and Indecision.

etiIatt0n and fndeefsfon.
Correspondence of the New York Tribune
Bismarck likes to give his ideas to the pub
! lie IN the way of Conversations or rather of a
friendly chat with an apparent Indifference, as
/ if be spoke of sporting matters or of common
! gossip. The other day was one of the guests
of the festival which the city of Berlin gave to
| the Imperial Diet, TO the court, foreign diplo.
matists, and men of science or art. Bismarck
| formed the center Of attraction he was in his
best humor, and had hearty word for his old
acquaintance, or witty remark and good
joke for those who were introduced to him Ii
was my good fortune to be present when he ap-
preached group of Liberal representatives.
| One Of them asked him for the prospect of the
| return of our troops from France. Bismarck
availed himself of the occasion To make clear
statement of his relations to Louis Napoleon
as we'll as to the present French government
After having given about the same ideas which
he had embodied in his speech Of April "A, he
entered fully into q conversation respecting
Louis Napoleon, of which | will repeat to you
those portions which refer TO the contemporary
history. "I.ouis Napoleon's great fault" hs
said, sis his want of determination, his hesita-
ton, his vacillation between two principles or
two sides of question, his aversion to quick
decision, where it is necessary to choose be-
tween two evils /; he is Hamlet-like character
with the pale cast of thought In the first
half of his reign his several GREAT political mis-
takes were redeemed only by an army of some
hundred thousand men. If it had not been for
them he would hardly have been able to
maintain himself His Crimean war was in
opposition to French policy, sentiment, and
traditions. He ought to have accepted the
Russian alliance, which, Immediately after the
capture of SebastOpo, was offered to him by
/ (trin hut n NIL ,nt,x Il
thus lost one of the few opportunities of in.
juring, if not beating u.s. An observing eve
could easily discover his weakness in the Italian
war; the affair at Magenta was not at all
credltable to him; the army, however, made
good what he failed in accomplishing. In one
OF my interviews with Napoleon, | told him
that he had no better friend than /, and no sim
cerer ally than We; that if he meant to have
peace, the nations were not separated by an
tagonistic interests, and that it only depended
upon him to make terms honorable and suit
able to both of US. lncreduously he stared
at me as if he had never seen me before, shook
his head, and said nothing, but | was really in
earnest In 1865, when the final settlement
with Austria could not any longer be avoided
1t was OF the highest importance TO me to ascer-
tain Napoleon's view and objects. At that
time, of course, could not enter into an ALI
ance with him, but wanted to be secure against
any attack In the rear, while we had the Austri-
ans In our front l alluded to the subject
almost every day at Biarritz, but could not get
an answer, nor consent nor an indirect acqui-
escence from him. 1t was, however not di
cult to ascertain that he supposed the Austr
ans would not beat us, and for this reason he
had condescending smile for me. When |
took leave vi him he said, i wish you sue.
cess IN your plans : but with a bittersweet
expression, us If he would say, Il wish you "a
sound thrashng.'" " Even after the snrren
der at Sedan continued Bismark, /" / nego-
tiated to the last with Napoleon. There were
many combinations by which he could have be-
come master OF the Paris republic, and, as well
as we had made it We could unmake it, My
only object in view was, of course, to have a
legitimate power TO treat with. We had not
the least interest to carry on a long war
Ihlers ana Favre We're very superclllous in the
beginning. we had 10 put danper on their
selfconcet, and make them more plant by
proving to them that we were the masters OF
the situation. The remedy in this respect was
good one, but Napoleon could not master the
courage either TO refuse or to accept our terms.
lie knew very well that ia september he could
have bought the peace at cheaper price than
we subsequently demanded in January, and
that We could not have insisted on the cession
of all the territory we have Just taken but
nevertheless he wavered The negotiations
between Versailles and Wilhelmshohe lasted
from the day OF Napoeon's arrival at the
castle until the signing OF the preiminaries
with the French Republic. On the noon of the
same day on the evening of which | signed the
preliminary treaty Of peace with Theirs and
Favre, and in the presence Of the latter, Il re-
ceived note addressed i'll ladys handwriting.
10 opening it, | found that it was written by
Clement Duvernois, Napoleon's secret agent
lie informed me that his master now was will
ling to accept our terms it was, however, too
late | sent word to Duyernois to call on me
in the evening. Late in the afternoon | ar
rived at an understanding with Theirs, and
when DuvernOs came | told him | had Just
signed the treaty with the former" | need not
give you any commentary on these words, but
| can vouch for their correctness.