Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1871-04-20
Railway Signals,

The system of danger signals in use on most
American railways is pronounced on high au-
thority to be founded on a wrong principle
While danger signals are trusted for warning at
places Of special liability to danger, such as
drawbridges, tunnels and the crossing of other
railroads at grade, the engineer is left to pre-
sumo that everything is right unless he has
affirmative evidence that something is wrong.
The true principle, and the one most conducive
TO safety, is to presume something is wrong
unless the engineer has evidence that all is
right Instead of going on past such points of
probable danger unless he secs a danger signal,
the engineer should be instructed to stop his
train unless safety signal is displayed If a
danger signal is used and from defective an
paratus or the neglect of the signal man, the
signal Is not made, or from fog, smoke or other
cause IT Is not seen, the train goes on to destruc-
lion; While II safety signal is not seen, the
worst result is momentary stoppage of the
train. The observance of this rule would
have surely prevented some of the most terrible
railroad disasters. The Norwak calamity.
some twenty years ago, in which about forty
passengers persisted, was caused by the failure
of the engineer to see the signal of danger indi
eating that drawbridge was open. The whole
train was hurled into the chasm. If the
train had been required to stop when there was
no signal visible indicating that the bridge was
right, this catastrophe would have been avoided
A recent accident in England affords another il.
lustration. In that case three trains were
wrecked and formed mass of burning ruins in
the middle of tunnel. When the first train
broke down, the signal of danger was not sent,
or was not seen. The second dashed itself to
pieces upon the first, and the third added its
ruins to the general wreck. II the engineer in.
stead OF looking for evidence that the tunnel
was obstructed, had not gone on until he had
assurance that the way was clear, the acciden,
could not have happened
The safety and danger signals should NOT h,
used in connection, for in that case the engineer
gets into the habit OF looking for the latter an,
depending upon IL alone for guide The rul
should be in all such cases to stop. unless tn
safety signal is seen. The system is just as sim
pie and inexpensive as the older one All tina
Is needed is to display some conspicuous objeC
by such a contriyance that ii cannot remain i
sight except while the condition of things exist
which makes the pa sage safe and must be hiC
den If the apparatus is neglected or out Of Oh
der. These suggestions we find in a repor
made by a committee Of railroad officers
"a winch Mr.. WEIGH, chief engineer Q
Tue united companies of New Jersey
was chairman 1t is strange that the super
OF advantages Of the system of SAFETY SIC
MAJ over signals Of danger, should have been )
long overlooked by railroad managers. Tn
original adoption Of the latter was mature
enough, Out experience should have proved !,
insufnciency In places where danger 4 snee;a !,
% be apprehended. OF cosrse there ars co.,
things which the engineer must presume i ,
nGht nsil be has some evidence tina. tbsv =