Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1871-03-16

tors rebelied. State vs.. kOSS, Y 1er.s "a.
In the case of Mari va. Enloe, LIST Yer,
452, this principle is asserted in reference
to the right of taxation delegated by the
act of 1927, Oh. 40, sec. l, to County
Courts to fix at discretion the amouAt of
tax to be levied. E8
1t is well said by the Court of Appeals
of New York, in the case of the People
VS.. the Mayor, etc., of Brooklyn, vol.
N. Y. Repts., 426, that this svital power,
that of taxation, may be abused, but the
interest, wisdom and justice of the repre-
sentative body, and its relations with its
constituents, furnish the only security
against unjust and excessive taxation, as
well as against unwise legislation" and
by Chief Justice Marshall, in the case Of
McCullock VS.. Mangland, 4 Wheaton,
42S, ''The only security against the abuse
of power is found in the structure of cur
Government itself. In imposing a tax
the Government acts upon its constitu-
ents, - and, we add in his own language,
that the theory our Government assumes,
s'that the influence of their constituents
over their representatives to guard them
against the abuse, is principle that can
never be departed from without vitality
affecting the rights of liberty and
property of the people. Whoever has
the power to impose tax upon another,
has to that extent the right to take the
proceeds of his labor for the public use,
or in payment of that tax. One OF the
most prominent features of state OF
slavery, is that the labor of one man, and
its proceeds, may be taken and applied TO
the use of another, without his consent.
80 that we can see that the power of
taxation, whenever exercised without
consent, and without clearly defined linn
itations, has in it, in fact one of the
harshest features of tyranny, as well as
one of the most essential elements OF
state of slavery.
1t will be seen that all the power of
taxation for county purposes, formerly
exercised by the Quarterly Courts, who
were elected by the people and RESPONSE
bic to them-who occupied the position
of representative in fact, practically,
though perhaps not in theory, is by these
enactments transferred to these Commits
sioners, and they appointed by the Cow
ernor of the State-it is true, after awhile
to be elected by the people-but the de-
PENDANTS of the bill hold the tenure of
their offices by virtue alone of the will OF
the Governor of the State.
Can it be believed for a moment that
the power was ever intended to be dele
gated by the people to the legislature to
authorize such body, 80 appointed and
constituted. to perform the functions as
signed to them IN this act2 We think no
reasonable man can come to such a con-
clusion.
Another view of this question: Here is
power to take from the people their
property by taxation, by which they may
be destroyed, or burdened with burdens
grievous to be borne; and that by spe-
cial enactment applicable only to few
counties, which are either made the spe-
cial recipients of this favor by the legis-
lature, or the special objects for imposi-
ton of these bur ems, as it may happen
to be viewed. This is not, then, In any
sense, a law of the land, upon sound
principle; and by it--or by and through
the agencies put in operation by it--de-
prives the people of their property at the
will of the men appointed by the Gov
ernor of the State. We think this view
of the question conclusive as to the
| unconstitutionalty of this law; and up
on this last ground, would be
bound to hold it not Claw of the land, ="
and therefore of no validity. The clause
'1aw of the land, " in our constitution is q
general public law, equally binding upon
every member of the community. Van
CANT vs.. Waddell, 2 Yer, $50; Wallys
heirs vs.. Kennedy, 2 Yer, 554.
We add in conclusion, that the very
| idea of law is exclusive of, and forbids
| such exceptional legislation---thst ia sssA
rule of action prescribed by the supreme
power in a States This involves the
idea, not of local regulation, upon matters
| of general interest at least, but of gene
raj rule, alike applicable to all the State.
| We are aware that there may be excep-
tons to this rule, but this is not one of
them. We can see clearly that the evils
intended to be guarded against by re-
quiring laws to be general and operative
upon all the people Ut parts of the State
| alike, are to be found in this case as well
as any other. One reason that underlies
and is the basis of objection to all excep-
tional legislation in country like ours,
is, that the principle of responsibility of
the representative of the people,
TO that people, for the correctness
of bis conduct, as a legislator,
is fundamental one, and furnishes in
most cases, the only check upon his con-
duct. If all laws are required as the
general rule to be operative upon all the
people of the State, each representative is
compelled to take the responsibility by
any legislation in which he may concur,
of fi&ing its burdens, if any imposed,
upon his own constituency, as well as
| that of the other parts of the State. He
thereby is compelled to assume the re-
sponsibility for the propriety of the law
passed by the body of which he is a
member. If the contrary character of
legislation may be allowed, then he may
and will be willing to fix burdens en-
others, to whom he is not responsible,
and we have no responsibility imposed
upon him, as the result of his action, to
the people whose representative he is in
the Legislative Assembly of the State.
We can see how members of the
Legislature may be willing to oblige parti-
sans or designing men, by organizing
| boards of commissioners for other coun-
ties, who would not dare to vote for such
a measure if it was general aud operative
alike upon their own constituency as well,
or the people or the whole State, instead
of spending its force upon the interests of
one or more obnoxious counties, or upon
community with whom the larger por-
| ton of the members of the Legislature
had no connection, and TO whom they
feel no sense of responsibility, and to
whom taey are not personally account
| able for their conduct.
We hold, then, that a law of this
character, which proposes to break up
the established order of things in the
ancient organized machinery of the State,
should, if allowable at all, be general
law, operative alike upon all parts of the
State, in order that the people may be
guarded from hasty and ruinous legisla-
ton, by a sense of wholesome RESPONSE
bility, imposed upon the representative
to that people upon whom the laws en-
acted must be operative. This is essen
tial to guard the weak from oppression on
the psrt of the strong, and give all an
equal measure of justice, of benefits and
advantages from the laws, and to secure
an equality alike necessary to the public
good in the burdens and impositions that