Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1871-04-10
EsTABLISHED 1910.

Gray VS.. Clinton Bridge, u. S. G. O
for Dist. of Iowa, Law Reg, 149.
/ II. s. vs. Tobacco Factory, u. s.
Dist. Court for Western Dist. OF Ark
Under our Constitution of govern,
ment the people are the source Of all
pOwer-they are the supreme power
and their will, when embodied in the
form Of a Constitutional provision, il
declared by the Constitution itself tC
be "the supreme law of the land"
1t was this supreme law Of the land
that struck out of existence the laws
| sanctiOnings slavery, on which theslave
dealer could alone rely to recover the
fruits Of his traffic.
Mr.. SedgWiCk says,
! THE EFFECTS OF THE REPEAL OF A
STATUTE,
when il is clear and absolute. are OF a
very sweeping character. And after
/ referring to the cases on that subject,
he says: ait will be observed that the
/ operation of the general rule is to give
| repeating statutes a very retroactive
effect. . Efforts have been made
to resist these results, and certain ex-
ceptiOns have been made to this retro.
active application. The first is, that
where a right, in the nature of con-
! tract, has vested under the original
statute, then the repeal does not dis
| tuTb It. And In this country this prin-
ciple is carried out and firmly estab-
| lished by the clause Of the Constitution
of the United States, that no State can
pass any law impairing the obligation
Of contracts"
Now, the sOundness Of this rule is
not questioned, but its application to
this case is denied. The repeal in this
case was not by a State statute, nor
yet by a law Of Congress, but by the
Thirteenth Amendment to the COnsti-
tuition Of the United States, which was
the work Of the sovereign people of
the United States, on whose political
and law making powers there are no
limitations, If we except those imposed
by the Deity. They can devest vested
rights, and annUl and impair the obi
cation of contracts.
THE IAIPEDIAIENT IN THE WAY OF
REPEALING ACTS
passed by the States, having their le-
gitimate and full operation on execu-
tory contracts, depending for their
force and validity on the act repealed,
does not obtain when the repeal is ef-
fected byan amendment TO the COnsti-
tuition of the United States.
Mr.. SedgwiCk says that when a
right, in the nature of a contract, has
vested under the original statute,
then the repeal does not disturb it;
and he cites in support of this Fletcher
vs.. Peck, 6 CranCh 81; Gilmore VS..
Shooters, EX'r., 2 Mod. 30; Couch vs..
Jefiries, 4, Burr, 2460; Churchill VS..
Crease, . Moore and Payne, AS; Ter
riDgtOn vs.. HaTgreaves, 3 Moore and
Payne, l37.
1 have examined all these cases.
Fletcher VS.. Peck, as we all know,
was ruled upon the ground that the
act Of the Georgia Legislature was re-
pugnant to the clause Of the COnstitu-
tiOns inhibiting States from passing
laws impairing the obligation of con
tracts. All the English cases cited
arose under positive enactments, and
no question was made in any one of
them rs to the effect of a repeating
statute, and they do no more than re-
cOgOniZe the well settled rule, that an
act OF Parliament cannot have q retro
specUve operation on past transac-
tiOns, unless that intention is express
ed, or appears by an unavoidable i'm
plicatiOn. In Couch VS.. Jefiries, Lord
Mansfield, speaking Of the intention
Of Parliament, says:
80 THEY CLEARLY MEANT FUTURE
ACTION"
The next and last case cited for this
position is Butler vs.. Palmer, Hill,
324. The opinion Of Judge COWen in
this case is a learned and unansWera-
bic argument in favor of the rule l
have laid down. A few passages
taken from his elaborate opinion will
show this very COnclUsively. He
quotes approvingly the language OF
Lord Chief Justice Tindal, in Key VS..
Goodwin, 4 Moore and Payne, 81,
35l. where that learned Judge said:
II take the effect of a repeating statute
TO be, 10 Obliterate it (the statute re-
pealed) as completely from the rec
Ords of the parliament as if it had
never passed, and that it must be
considered as a law that never exist
ed, except for the purpose of those aC-
tiOns or suits which were commenced,
prosecuted and concluded whilst it was
an existing law"
And he saws: s. A number of cases
have been cited by the counsel for the
defendent, and some very strong
ones, to show that any enactment Of
the Legislature annulling contracts,
or creating new exceptions and de
fences, shall be so construed as not to
affect contracts or rights Of action eX-
isting at the time Of the enactment" ,"
HERE FOLLOWS THE CASES CITED BY
Mr.. BEDGWICK,
and given above, and in addition the
case Of Dash vs. Van Kleeck, Z Johns.
r. AZ. This last case will be noticed
in another part of this opinion. He
then SAYS: But these are all cases
relating TO positive enactments. None
of them arose on q repeating clause;
and they merely recognize the well
settled rule, as laid down by Best, Q,
J., in the late case Of TerringtOn vs..
HargIeaves, viz: "that the provisions
Of a statute cannot have a retrOspec-
tive OF er post fGotO operations, unless
declared 10 be so by express words, or
positive enactment" (Nid. 3 Moore
and PAYNE, l43). But, bOth in that
case. and Churchill vs.. Grease, an ex-
press provision was allowed to have
such an operation. / know the rights
Of action and other eXeCutOry rights
arising under a statute are said to be
vested. Couch vs.. Jeffries 4, Burr
2462, and vid, BeadlestOn vs. Sprague,
6 John. r. 101). They are so, and sub
sequent statute ought not to repeal
them, though it may do 30 by eK-
press words, unless they amount to
contract within the meaning of the
Constitution. But that being out of
the way land it is, when the repeal is
effected as in this case by amendment
to the Constitution OF the United
States), and the statute being simply
repealed, the very stock on which
they were engrafted is cut down, and
there Is no rule Of construction under
which they can be saved. A
right carried into Judgment, or taking
the form Of an express eXecutOry
contract under a repealed statute,
might, perhaps, also stand on the
same ground with the devise in Jen-
kins; and so Of other rights having
means Of vitality independent Of the
statute. But where everything de-
pends on this, it seems to be equally
a violation of principle as of authorf-
ty to say, that any one OF its proVi-
siOns can be enforced OF executed az
ter it has been repealed by a general
clause" E"
SLAVE CONTRACTS " HAVE NO MEANS
OF VITALITY INDERENB kl1T or THE
STATUTE"
Everyone who asserts right
grounded on slavery, or right under
Contracts growing out Of that institu-
tion, must show an existing positive
rule of law that authorizes him TO
assert and claim such rights, 1t can
not be asserted, under the common