Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1871-01-29

The fall of Paris is likely to prove the
virtual close of the war. 1t will release
an immense German army to overrun and
sUbiugste the Provinces. An indefinite
prolongation of the war might be possible
if the self-cOnstituted Committee of
Safety-Gambetts, Favre, ct als.-com-
manded the confidence of the French
people. But such does not seem to be
the case. Lyons, Msrseilles and all
Southern France have remained as
spathetic as if they were located beyond
the Pyrenees. We have been told the
Bretons were enthused, but we have not
heard of single regiment .of Bretons in
the fight anywhere. In military tactics
it is universally conceded that TO change
front in the face of the enemy is most
hazardous maneuvre; and in politics we
may assume that TO change the form of
government in the face of an invading
enemy is an impossibillty bordering on
criminal absurdity. France, with her
forty millions of souls, has proved
powerless, from the utter want of organi-
cation. But there is for France yet a
brighter side TO the picture. With peace
restored it may be found that France has
suffered less than Germany, and will re-
cuperate more rapidly, because her re-
sources remain untouched from the very
want of organization that has over
whelmed her with defeat.
1t is safe to assume that the aggressive
Germans, among hostile people and dis
tsnt from their base of supplies, have
suffered greater losses, both in assault
and in the hospital. than the retreating
French, fighting behind Notifications.
But q lore important item is the charac-
ter of the losses on either side. The
German armies are soldiers; the French
armies are raw recruits. Take the situa-
ton before Paris, for instance. Outside,
We see the very choice AID flower of the
German nation; each man of them
killed, is loss to his country not TO be
estimated in dollars. But inside of Paris
what do we see2 A mere armed pOp1-
lace-nO pick of men, but the old and
young, the strong and feeble, of Paris and
the Immediately surrounding district. And
among these we note large proportion
of restless radical agitatOrs, whose utter
destruction would be an immense relief
to France.
The imperial armies were, perhaps,
picked men, so far as they went-some
45O, 900. But of these, $50, 900 surren-
dered with Sedan, and 12O. 900 more at
Metz; so that the large majority of the
imperial armies are saved to France, and
are doubtless faring much better in prison
than the victorious Germans in the field.
Few doubt that Bazaine's design in sur
rendering was to withdraw his soldiers
from the republic; and we can
hardly credit Napoleon with any
nobler motive at Sedan. An
opinion is gaining ground that Napoleon
was forced into the present war UMPIRE
paled, by the clamors of the mob of
Paris, and that King William has been
really doing Napoleon's work before
Paris. On this theory we may yet see
the French prisoners marching side by
side with their German captors in pursuit
of Gambetta's peripatetic government
At all events, it would seem that
thus far the German losses have been
more severe in the quality of the material
lost, as well as numbers; and that if peace
be soon restored, France will develop
. more speedy recuperatiOn of energies
than her victor. Prussia is wise, there
fore, in securing the close friendship of
unimpaired Russia. Let her be sure that
the friendship is sincere, and that the
Bear does not take advantage of the ex-
haustion which must follow the immense
losses of theyoUth and prime of Germany
on the soil of France.