The Donaldsonville chief. [volume] (Donaldsonville, La.) 1871-current, 1871-11-25
Bismarck and Benedetti.
The Prussian Premiers Reply to The
French Ambassadors Letter.

i a reply 10 some OF the accusations OF
NJ. Benedict, in his recently published
account of his mission to Berlin in
! 1866, when he acted as the agRbassa-
dor of France, and endeavOred to open
the way for the annexation of Belgium
to France. Bismarck sharply reminds
/ the ex-ambassador of the disadvant-
age he is under in making representa-
tions, as follows:
| "Count Benedetti evidently does
not know what portions of the French
secret archives have, in the course of
the war, fallen into the hands of our
troops, or he would have been more
circumspect in his exertions. Above
all, he would not have attempted to
reiterate the denial with which the
Imperial Government met the German
communications respecting the acqui
sition of Belgium by France. Mixing
up the demand for German territory
preferred on the 5th and 9TH of
August, 1866, with the subsequent
demand for Belgium, he strives to
refer the letters which have been
found in the Tuileries, exclusively to
the former. But the Emperor's letter
to the Marquis de Lafayette, quoted
by NJ. Bendetti, on page 105, proves
the demand for German territory to
have been abandoned before Belgium
was mentioned. That these two
phases of the negotiations were re-
garded by NJ. Benedetti himself as
entirely distinct, is moreover proved
by his own reports to his Government,
which the war has. thrown into our
hands,
He then quotes Benedetti's own
account of the early part of the nego-
tions, which he sent home at the time,
and then proceeds:
"This written communication was
succeeded by an interview, which
Count Benedetti has lightly touched
upon in his book. Had he gone into
details, he could not have avoided
telling us that he warmly and reso-
lutely pressed the French. demand.
On the Russian Prime Minister OBJ
serving that such II demand meant
war, and that Count Benedetti had
better go to Paris to prevent a rupture,
the latter replied that he would
indeed return home, but only in order
to recommend to the Emperor to
maintain Il proposition the abandon
ment of which would imperil the
existence of the dynasty. Public
opinion, he added, insisted upon some
such concession on the part of Ger
many. The parting words of khe
Prussian Prime Minister to Count
BeneGletti before he set out for Paris
We're, us nearly as can be remem-
bered, these: please to call his
Maiesty's attention to this. Should a
war arise out of this complication
it might be attended with a revolu-
tionary crisis. In such case the
Germany's dynasties are likely to
prove more solid than that of the
Emperor Napoleon
The Prince then gives san accurate
and precise abstract" of the instruc-
tions brought to Benedetti from Paris
by NJ. Challvoy, in August, 1865, of
which the latter part contains the fol-
lowing:
: 80. In proportion to the chance of
success, our demands will have to be
graduated as follows: In the first
place, you have to combine into one
proposition the recovery of the FROM
tiers of 1914 and the annexation of
Belgium. You have, Therefore, to
ask for the extradition, by formal
treaty, of Landeau, Saarlouis, Saar-
bruck and the Duchy of Luxembourg
and you have to aim at the annexa-
ton of Belgium by the conclusion of
an offensive and defensive treaty
which is to be kept secret. Secondly,
should this basis appear to promise
no result, you will resign Saarlouis,
Saarbruck and even Landeau, which
after all is but a dilapidated nest of
place, the occupation of which might
excite German national feeling against
us. In this eventuality, your public
agreement will be confined to the
Duchy of Luxembourg, ,and your secret
treaty to the reunion of Belgium with
France. Thirdly, supposinga clear and
unmistakable reference to the incor-
poration of Belgium is found unpalata-
BILE, you are authorized to assent to a
clause in which, to obviate the inter-
yention of England, Antwerp is de-
clared q free city. In no case, how
ever, are you to permit the reunion of
Antwerp with Holland, or the incor-
poration of Maestricht with Prussia.
|'Should Herr Won Bismarck put
the question, what advantage would
accrue to him from such a treaty, the
simple reply would be that he would
thereby secure a powerful ally, that
he would consolidate his recent acaui-
sitions, that he was only desired to
consent to the cession of what does
not belong tG him, and that he makes
no sacrifice at all to be compared to
his gains. TO sum up, the minimum
we require is an ostensible treaty
which gives us Luxembourg, and a
secret treaty which, stimulating for
an offensive and defensive alliance,
leaves us the chance of anIexing
BelgiuE ct the right moment, Prussia
engaging to assist as, if necessary, by
force of arms In corruinr, arf +lo nm