The Bolivar bulletin. [volume] (Bolivar, Hardeman County, Tenn.) 1865-1888, 1871-06-23

AA-AHeAA NoSNs AObAlAiiE7 WIZ AfAudtL CACClfN
70 enforce it. Where a law is plain and
unambiguous, whether it be expressed in
general or limited terms, the Legislature
should be intended to mean what they
have plainly expressed, and consequently
no room is left for construction. Posi-
bic or even probable meanings, when one
is plainly declared in the instrument it
self, the courts are not at liberty to search
for elsewhere Cooleys constitutional
Limitations, PIP. 55-G.
1t is the duty Of courts to apply this
rule with all its force and meaning to
constitutional more especially than to
Legislative enactments The latter is the
subject of ready and easy change-mod-
iiications, explanation, or repeal, while
the former is organic, the test by which
all other law must be tried, the chart by
which tho law making power must be
governed, and is for wise reasons slow,
cumbrous and expensive in alteration or
amendment.
The language of the clause in question
IS plain and unambiguous. "NO part of
the county shall be taken of without the
consent Of two thirds of the qualified Yo-
tiers in such part" The word consent
here means the active concurrence and
cannot be substituted by passive acqui-
essence. The argument that two~thirds
Of the votes cast, and the authorities per-
suasive to that view of the question, can
be Of no service here. First and mainly
because it is not contemplated by the
trainers OF the constitution that the "con-
sent" shall be ascertained by ballot any
moro than i was, that it should be arr
rived at in any other mode the legislature
may have seen proper to adopt; and to
hold that two thirds vote Of those who
attended the election and east their bal
lots shall determine the matter, would be
to hold that on election 10 the ordinary
way is the only mode m which the con-
sent required may be obtained or made
certain, this would place tho legislature
above the constitution, and independent
ofthe people. The fact that the consti-
tuition demands IN general terms the con-
sent of two thirds, and fixes no means of
getting at that consent, but leaves the
means to an enabling act of the legisla-
turc, is of itself conclusive that it intends
its language to have the active construc-
ton that two thirds shall speak afirma-
lively.
In the instrument itself we have posi-.
tiVe Authority for the Interpolation al
ready given. In article ., section q, it
is provided, "But the credit OF no County,
city OF town shall be given or loaned to
or in aid of any person, company, asso-
citation or corporation, except upon an
election to be first held by the qualified
voters of such county, city or town, and
the assent Of three fourths of the votes
cast at said election. Nor shall any
county, city or town become a stock
holder with others in any company, asso
citation or corporation except u pom like
election, and the assent of a like major
ity."
Here We have an expression for cleo
tons that shall be binding upon those moi
voting, and in it the milder term assent
is used because their actual appreciation
is not required az in the clause under
consideration.
| Having in this cause prescribed the
mode in which the people may proceed
to Onerato themselves with burdens o.
taxations in terms understood by them,
selves without the aid of argumentatiYC
construction, we must conclude tina
the clause before us, being of a nature
kindred to the one just referred to, was
intended to be equally clear and certain
expressing on its face the full and true
intent and meaning of the instrumen
containing it. We cannot presume tina
the trainers of the constitution did no
+ understand the force Of this language, o.
that they meant the plain and unambig-
uous expressions employed to mean NOR,
or less than their face imports.
In this connection we may adopt thu
r language of the Supreme Court of Tndi
ana: This power of construction il
courts is n mighty one, and unrestrajnet
by settled rules, would tend to throw
painful uncertainty over the effect tina
might be given to the most plainly word
cd statute" (hcre constitutional land rem
der the courts in reality the legislative
T (hcre constitution making) "powcr of thu
State" In amplifoation of this idea, VI
f appropriate the language of Mr.. Justic,
Bronson in People vs.. Purdy, 81 ILL., II
this way solemn instrument, fer so
think the constitution should be consid
cred, is made to mean one thing BY
one man, and something else by another
until in the end it is in danger OF bein,
rendered dead letter, and that, too, wheI
the language is so plain and explicit tina
1t is impossible to mean moro than ont
thing unless we first lose sight of She in
strument itself, and allow ourselves t.
roam at large upon the boundless field
Of speculation. For one l dare not ven
ture upon such course. Written con
situations of government will soon com
, to be regarded as Of little value, if thei
f injunctions may be thus lightly over
looked, and the experiment of setting
t boundary to power will prove failure.
If this warning, in language we ar
| tempted to call prophetic, had been heed
cd, we might to day.as did Judge Caruth
f ers in 1854, have boastcd-"There is n,
= higher law than the constitution. Thu