The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-06-01
CAUSES OF THE FRENCH Defeat.
Letter from the Due de Persigny.

Letter from the Due de Persigny.
A curious letter has been received by Mrs. V.
Botta from the Duo de Persigny, the autograph
of which will be inserted In an album now pre-
pairing, to be sold for the benefit of the French
sufferers by the war. We print below an English
translation
LONDON, May 5, 1S71.-Our late disasters are
generally attributed to the superiority of the
Prussian army in numbers, discipline, and Or
ganlZatlon. Without denying the influence of
these causes, and recognizing that eur military
science may be improved, this explanation does
not seem to be the true one.
The French army has never possessed and
never will possess the peculiar qualities which
lave distinguished the Prussian army since the
time of Frederick the Great The French char
acter will never submit to that minute attention
TO detail and that strict discipline which charac
teriZe our conquerors of to-day. And yet, in
spite of her defects, France has ever been, aud
ever will be, warlike nation of the first order.
She conquered the Prussians at jena in spite of
their superiority, and would have conquered
them again at Forbach and Woerth, but for one
of those extraordinary mistakes in strategy
which history at times reports, and which are
sufficient in themselves to explain the ruin of
nations and the loss of empires.
At the beginning of hostilites the two armies
were about equal in numbers. The Prussians
IN crossing our frontier, had not 800, 600 men,
and our army nearly equalled their effective
force. But instead of concentrating on one
point, or at least on two-in Alsace and Lor-
raiHe-it was distributed in corps of about 80, 900
men each over line extending more than
eighty leagues; SO that the Prussians, encoun-
tering only isolated and comparatively weak
bodies, overwhelmed them with superior num-
bers
To understand fully the fatal influence of that
first error on the issues of the war itself, one
must take into account the nervous and sensi-
tive nature of the Gallo race. Three centuries
ago it was said by Machavelli that at the sue
cessful opening of battle the French were more
than men, and In q reverse less than women.
However exaggerated this formula may be- it is
certain that the French, when victorious, seem
gifted with extraordinary powers. They obey
their chiefs, bear cheerfully all privations, and
make up by their intelligence and spirit for any
deficiencies of organization.
If, on the contrary, they are defeated with
that mobility peculiar to the Celtic race, they
are too much inclined to accuse their officers
OF incapacity and treachery, to cease to obey
them, and the relaxation of discipline soon in
wolves military disorder.
The principal condition of success then
would be victory at the outset which calls forth
that furfd frdncese which for two thousand
years has never failed US.
VI Now the question is: Have our soldiers degen-
Grated; have they lost that valor and intrepidity
which butlately led them TO triumph over the
Russians a! Malakoff and the Austrians at Sol
ferino? No. thousand times mol
In order to understand the condition of our
army before the demoraizing causes had af-
fected 1t, let us judge 1t from the first battle,
that of Wissembourg.
Here was division taken at random a small
corps of observation consisting of from seven
to eight thousand men.
The commander, General Douay, in case of
an attack by superior force, was to fall back
on the corps of MacMahon. But the General
being killed at the beginning of the engagement
his division found itself face to face with an
army of one hundred and twenty to one hun
dred and ferty thousand men.
1t fought however, whole day with energy
and perseverance. The Crown Prince of Prus-
sia was unable to conceal his admiration for
that handful of brave men, and admitted in his
official report that he lost on this occasion eight
thousand men in killed and wounded. This
from single division of seven or eight thou
sand men Every allowance being made for
time and circumstances, there was never a
nobler deed of arms.
Suppose now that with such soldiers, instead
OF those isolated corps having no connecting
link and but one distinct command, Marshal
AacMahon had held under his hand the corps
OF the Army of Alsace, and Marshal Bazaiue
those of Lorraine in other words, that the
Crown Prince of Prussia and Prince Frederick
Charles, instead of dealing with fragments OF
the army had each of them encountered o real
army comprised of such soldiers as fought at
Wissembeurg, would the result have been the
same?
This first enormous strategical error is then
in my opinion, the true cause of our disasters
That error, hasten to say, can be explained by
unforeseen circumstances, independent of any
will; and far be it from me to throw additional
blame on the august and unfortunate victim who
has borne the weight of 1t.
wish only to assert that our soldiers had
not degenerated from their ancient yalor; tha
our army was as brave as any of those that have
heretofore astonished the world, and that with
out the fatality that caused 1t to be surprised In
detail, before any concentration could take
= place, 1t would have repeated the maryels o.
Austerlitz and jena. PERsIGNY.