Gold Hill daily news. [volume] (Gold Hill, N.T. [Nev.]) 1863-1882, 1871-01-24
Can Psri. DO sheiiedt

IeGce, WHICH Is. tic succeSSOr VI Lhc
Military Gazette, has published an artl-
Gle on the bombardment of Paris,
which contains the following remarks /:
We do not hesitate to admit that we
were radically mistaken as to the
strength of the Notifications Of Paris,
as we'll rs with regard to the resources
of the capital, the formation and bear
ing Of the army Of the defenss,s and,
moreover, as to the difficulties which
have been in the way Of bringing up
the matericl for the siege. Paris is a
great place Of arms, the principal
strength of which consists in Its nu-
neroIs detached forts, provided they
are supported by a sufficient army.
without an army which should occupy
the ground between the forts and Paris,
the forts would be of no more impor-
lance than that of little fortresses
which could be attacked by a regular
siege. But the situation Is very differ
ent now that the ground before Paris
Is in fact q fortified battlefield, upon
which all the siege works combine the
greatest difficulties. In order to OBJ
tain an idea of the difficulties which we
must surmount, We are about to calcu-
late the chances upon the southern
front of Paris, where five Of the forts
are situated In advance of the fortified
enceinte of the town. 1Yle enceiate- Of
Fort Issy Is 1900 PAGES from the enceinte
of the town; that of Fort Valves,
3.O20 paces: Fort Montrouge, 3,400 ;
Bicetre, 2,800; Ivry, 5000, All these
neighboring forts sustain each other
reciprocally, and their average dis
lance from the encsiate Of the town Is
about $500 PAGES. Being armed with
guns of the largest calibre, they COM
mand ground In advance to the extent
Of 1000 to 5000 PAGES, so that their
fire reaches the village Of Meudon, and
even passes beyond Clamart, Sceaux,
Cheyiily and Choisy. Even where the
form ofthe ground allows usto approach
nearer, as, for example, on the nights
of Claimant, VIC cannot place batteries
nearer than 6,00O to 1000 PAGES from
the enceinteo of the town, so that we could
only with guns Of the largest calibre
reach the faubourgs Of Grenelle and
Vanguard. AS to the capital, 1t would
remain secure and out of range of our
fire. 1t is, then, evident that we are
not In a position to lombard the center
of the capital, while q partial bonn.
bardment of q few huburgs would not
affect the resistance Of the besieged.
The French engineers fully forcsaid
what il happening now /; tho forts were
erected to protect the capital, and have
not failed to do 500 1t Is natural that
persons who are not at Jat In military
science should express a~stonishment
that the forts have not yet been bonn
barded-a course which ought soon to
force them to yield In the same manner
as Verdun, Toni and Thlonvllle. 1t
must be remembered, in the first place.
that the bombardment of the fortress
which we have latterly conquered In
no way spared the interior of the
towns; so that the surrender was
rather decided by motives Of humanity
and by n regard due to the inhabitants
than by the impossibility of maintain
ing these places. But 1t Is altogether
different with a detached fort where
these considerations have no weight.
The armament of the forts is such that
we should be obliged to have recourse
to mortars of the greatest calibre, and
we should advance our batteries In case
we wished to batter breaches for an
assault. Lastly, we should make
preparations for n regular siege, rs we
did at Strasburg, to attain our end.
The opening and approach Of the par
allels In which the batteries should be
mounted, and the works Of approach,
should be made with a relative safety
which would be impossible before the
forts of Paris. In cas- we were to
advance the first and second parallels
to 500 PAGES from forts Issy and Vanves,
the corps which should have to protect
our works should remain at least 1000
PAGES In the rear Of the parallel, while
we should always be ready to repulse
sorties from the north, east and west.
1t would not be impossible for General
Trochu some fine morning to with
draw his forces from his eastern and
northern faces to concentrate all his
forces In rear Of forts Vanves and
Montrougc, In order to make o sortie
en- masse ngainst the siege works. We
should have to abandon all our works,
unless we accepted battle under the
cross-fre Of the enemy's forts.