Knoxville daily chronicle. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1870-1882, 1871-09-29
SUPREME COURT OPINION.
L. T., VA. 6. GA. r. r. Co. VS.. ROGERS AND
ra.frs--a 81 II -

tne Heace TO recover Tor the value OF q I0C U
dressed poultry, shipped by Rogers and Hart
Railroad from Chattanooga, for which the com
pany, by their agent gave the following receipt
Received of Rogers and Hartsell, for JohT
F. Hagan, Atlanta the following articles, to-
wit: one barrel and one box of poultry, 23:
lbs., to be forwarded by the East Tennessee and
Georgia Railroad, subject to freight and the reg
| ulations of the company. (Signed,)
-. WU rTT' SAMUEL REESE, Agent"
In the agreed case in the record, it is admitted
by the plaintiffs, that the defendant shipped the
poultry at proper time, and turned the same
over in reasonable time, and in good order, tC
the officers and agents of Western and Atlantic
Railroad, at Dalton, and that Dalton is the ter.
minus of the East Tennessee, Virginia and
Georgia Railroad, and that the Western and
Atlantic road connects with it at Dalton and ex.
tends to Atlanta. Georgia 1t was further adj
mitted that said box and barrel of poultry were
detained by the agents of the Western and At
lantic road for thirteen days, and by this delay
was spoiled and rendered valueess. It was fur
ther agreed, that when freight is shipped from
the East Tennessee, Virginia and Georgia road
to Atlanta it is the usage and custom OF the Off
GERS of the Western and Atlantic road to collect
and settle the freight with the other road-that
is their pro rata. The property having been
lost to the shipper by the neglect of duty on the
part of the Western and Atlantic road, the ques-
ton is as to the liability of the East Tennessee
Virginia and Georgia road for such loss-or how
far one railroad can be held responsible for the
negligence of another, where the transportation
is continuous and entire over the respective
roads, under such contract as the one in this
case. r
This is a question upon which the English
Courts, and many of our American Courts, have
adopted rules and made series of decisions,
the one distinctly opposite to the other-the
English Courts, with great unanimity, holding
the road giving the receipt and undertaking the
carriage of goods from one point to another, is
responsible for all the intermediate route, unless
he shall, by express contract, limit his liability
to the transportation of the goods only to the end
Of his own road - sac E
There has been diversity of opinion in the
courts of the various States of the Union on this
question, but it must be conceded that probably
the weight of American authority is against the
English rule. We have no distinct decision of
this direct question IN our State, though we
think the principle has been adjudged in one
case that would be conclusive of the question,
We allude to the case of Carter & Hough
VS.. Peck, 4th Sneed, p, 205. In that case, the
suit was brought to recover for breach of an al
legged undertaking on the part of Carter d
Hough to carry plaintiff and his family from
Nashville to the city of Memphis. The defend
ants were the proprietors of line of stages from
Nashville to Waynesborough. Sims & Co.
owned the line from that point to Lagrange,
Tennessee, where it connected with Memphis
and Charleston Railroad to Memphis. By al
arrangement between all the parties, 1T was
agreed that passengers M ght pay the whole fare
at either end Of the line, and secure a through
ticket, though it was not shown the plaintiff had
any knowledge of this agreement. This knowl-
edge, however, was treated by The Court as un-
important. The plaintiff bought a ticket at
Nashville for himself and wife to Memphis.
but, when he arrived at Waynesborough, Sims
& Co. refused to take him on for several days.
He was compelled to take another route
and put to considerable expense and
inconvenience The Court holds in that
case when the defendants sold plaintiff ticket
through from Nashville to Memphis, they
thereby became bound for his transportation on
the entire line,n and that the arrangement be-
tween the parties on the various lines of travel
was matter with which the plaintiff had moth
ing to do. He was no party to that agreement,
nor was he bound to look to any person for per-
fOrmance of defendants undertaking but them
selves The Court further say, if defendants,
when they sold plaintiff the tickets, intended
that he should risk the proprietors of the other
portions of the line to carry him through, then
they should have so stipulated and informed
him Of the arrangement, so that he might with
full knowledge of the facts have elected whether
he would pay the entire fare and take through
tickets or pay for that portion of the line of
which they were the proprietors, and make his
own arrangements for the balance of the
Journey. A similar rule is stated in case of
East Tennessee and Georgia Railroad rs. NeL-
son, lst Coldwell, page 276, where Judge
Wright says: If the carrier, or his servant,
within the scope of his employment, enter into
a special contract to deliver in any particular
time or place, even beyond the terminus of his
particular route, it will be binding"
These cases follow the principle of the Eng
lish decisions, and we think lay down the
sounder doctrine on the subject.
The lea ing case in England on this question
is that of Muschamp Us. The Lancaster and
Preston junction Railroad Company, 9Th Muir
81 Welsby, 421 in which it was held by the
Court of Exchequer, that where a carrier re-
ceive goods directed to place beyond the
terminus of his own route without limiting his
responsibility by express agreement, such re-
ceipt of the goods, so directed, is prinaa facie
evidence of an undertaking to carry the goods
to the place where they are directed, and that
the rule applies, although the place be beyond
the terminus of his own usual route, and loss
having occurred, in that case, beyond such
terminus, the carrier was held liable for such
loss.p ID E1|t1IE' .SE
Much more ought the party to be held liable,
when as in this case he has received the goods,
with an express undertaking, as we construe it.
that they shall be forwarded to their destination.
The word ''forwarded,' as used in this receipt,
but means, to be transported or carried, apd
such was no doubt the understanding of both
parties. Such is the construction given to such
a receipt in late case, by the Supreme Court
of Vermont, Cuts VS.. Brainerd, American Re-
ports vol. l, 354, where it was held that the
railroad company giving receipt for goods at
Burlington, marked for W. r. Lewis Brook
lip, Iowa, and promising to forward by its rail-
road, bound itself to carry said box to its desti-
nation. We think the principle of this case
sound and adopt it. We need not go into a re-
view of the cases on the question, which are nu-
merous both in the Unite1 States and in Eng
land, and especially contradictory IN the United
States. We adopt the language of writer in
the American Law Review, vol. 2, 1868, that
this rule, that carrier by simply taking charge
and possession of goods delivered to him for
carriage, marked and destined to particular
place beyond the terminus of his own road, (un-
less he shall in some clear and express manner,
by agreement with the consgnor, limit his re-
responsibility to the mere carriage over his own
road and safe delivery to the next carrier shall
be bound to complete the contract which he i'm
pliedly undertakes to perform, more especially
when he has expressly undertaken so to deliver
the article received will nearer reach the equity
of the case, and carry out the fair terms Of the
contract than any other which can be adopted
We feel no disposition to relax the rule of La
1 70 RI Of railroads bo- Il