Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1871-04-10

! virtue Of which alone contracts grow
ing out of that traffic can be enforced.
/ All these consequences are necessarily
| implied in these amendments, and
"What is implied in q statute is as
much a part of it as what it Is ex-
pressed" .. s. vs. Babbit, Black,
p. 81 Gelpeck vs. City Of Dubuque, 1
Wallace, 221.
| And this retrospective
OPERATION OF THE AMENDMENT,
and the results that flow legitimately
| from them, are not to be avoided by
| considerations of inconvenience and
hardship. 1t might be argued that the
XIII amendment did not divest the
right Of property in slaves in being and
possessed as property at the time Of its
adoption.
If provision, in the same words,
was found in the State statute, it
might very plausibly be cOntended
! that It must be presumed the Legisla-
| ture did not intend to divest and de-
strOy existing rights Of property with
out compensation, and that il must
/ therefore be restricted TO slaves COM
ing into being after the passage Of
the act, and we know that authOri-
/ ties would not be wanting to support
such a construction. Why attempt
to apply the rules for the construction
of statutes divesting vested rights,
and impairing the obligation Of con-
tracts, to one consequence Of the
amendment more than to another?
4" IN CONSTITUTING THE LANGUAGE OF
A CONSTITUTION,
we have nothing to do with the aTgu-
ment d5 incORUeHieIli for the purpose
of contracting or eDlarging its import,
the only sound principle being to de-
clare itd JeE scyiDtG est, to follow and
to obey" People vs.. MOrrel, q
Wend., 5S4.
And, in the matter Of Oliver Lee d
Co.'s Bank, q New York, 9, Judge
DEMO, speaking for the Court Of Ap-
peals, says: "But we are not to inter-
pref the Constitution precisely as we
would an act of the Legislature. The
convention was not obliged, like legis-
lative bodies, to look carefully to the
preservation of vested rights. It was
competent to deal, subject to the rati-
ficatiOn by the people and the COnsti-
tuition of the Federal Government,
with all private and social rights, and
with all the existing laws and institu-
tiOns of the State. If the convention
had so willed, and the people had
cOncurred, all former charters and
grants might have been annihilated.
When, therefore, we are seeking for
the
TRUE CONSTRUCTION OF A CONsTTTU-
TIONAL PROVISION,
we are constantly to bear in mind
that its authors were not executing a
delegated authority, limited BY other
constitutional restraints, but are to
look upon them as the founders Of a
State, intent only upon establishing
such principles as seemed best calcU-
lated to produce good government
and promote the public happiness at
the expense of any and all existing
institutions which might stand in
their way. The rule laid down in
Dash VS.. Van Kleeck, 7 John, Az,
and other cases of that class, by which
courts are admOnished to avoid, if
possible, such an Interpretation as
would give a statute a retrospective
operation, have but a limited appH-
cation, if any, to the construction Of
a constitution - And the court in
LAllo NltoC AGAA NAAC bAONA1AUn5 VI AAlC
constitution of 1916, of the State of
New York, subjecting the stock
holders Of banks to personal liability
was retrospective in its operation, and
subjected stockholders of banks to
liability who we're exempted from
personal liability by their articles Of
association, adopted and in force
when this constitutional provision
went into effect. The whole opinion
in this case is learned and instructive,
and fully
SUPPORTS THE RULING HERE MADE.
The Court was undoubtedly right in
holding that the rule with reference to
giving a statute a retrospective opera
ton on past transactions has but q
limited application, if any, to the
construction of a State Constitution;
and it has none at all in the construc-
ton of the XIII Article of Amend
ment of the Constitution of the United
States, upon the operation of which,
retrOspectively as well as prospective
ly, there is not, and cannot be in the
nature of things, any limitation. And
this principle of giving a retrospect
i've effect to a Constitutional amend
ment, was recognized by the Supreme
Court at a very early day.
In Chisholm, executor, vs.. Georgia,
, Dallas 4l9, the Supreme Court de-
cided that a State could be sued by an
individual citizen of another State.
This decision induced the adoption of
the y amendment to the COnstitu-
ton, declaring that the judicial power
of the United States should not extend
fI gFEnH a. q
was adopted, suits were pending in
the Supreme Court against States,
brought by citizens of other States. 1t
was eOntended that the jurisdiction of
the Court was uuimpaired in relation
to all suits instituted previously to the
adoption Of the amendment. But the
COURT WAS UNANIMOUS IN HOLDING,
that after the adoption of the amend
ment it could not exercise jurisdiction
IN any case, past, present or future.
HollingswOrth ct al. vs.. Virginia, 3
Dallas, S78.
in the opinion in support Of this
Jurisdiction Chisholm vs.. Georgia, ,
Dallas, supra), Justice Cushing uses
this language "phe right Of indi-
yiduals, and the justice due to them,
are as dear and precious as those Of
the States. Indeed, the latter are
founded upon the former, and the
great end and object Of them must be
to secure and support the rights of
individuals, or else vain is govern
ment."
The precious right here spoken
Of was the right to cOerce q
state by suit to comply with
the obligation Of her contract.
But as precious as this right was, the
Court held the XI amendment de-
vested them Of Jurisdiction in all cases,
past and future, thus giving a retro
spective effect to the amendment. and
leaving the creditors Of States reme-
diless.
The XIII amendment works the
same result on all slave contracts.
THIS AMENDMENT IS REMEDIAL IN
ITS NATURE
and according to settled canOns of con-
structiOn, must be so constructed as to
suppress the whole mischief.
The rule that when perfect right
of action has accrued on a contract,
authorized by statute, a repeal Of the
statute does not affect It (Pacific Mail
Steamship Co. vs. Joliffe, 3 Wall, 450),
must rest for its support on one Of
these two grounds: ID that TO give
the repeating statute that effect would
impair the obligation of a contract,
and make it obnoxious to the COnsti-
tutiOnal provisions prohibiting States
from passing such laws; or (2) that
the right of sction on the contract
being perfect before the repeal, the
common law viii afford q remedy in
dependent of the statute. AS to the
first ground, we have seen that it does
not apply when the repeal is affected
by the sovereign pOVeF of the nation,