The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-06-12


and one of the strangest forms of government
the world has ever seen has disappeared
sEcidst bloodshed, fire, and general ruin. For
two months the Commune has been master
of Paris, has welded its resources, controlled
its inhabitants, and made it defy the rest Of
France. concurrence of circumstances
without parallel placed this power in its
hands. The Emperor chose to make war
while utterly unpropared. His precipitation
led to the disaster of Sedan, then Sedan led to
the revolution of September, and the install
lation of Republican Government led to the
arming of all the dangerous classes of Paris.
When peace came there was no French Gov
ernment able to think and act for France. M.
Jules Favre, weak-minded and emotional
Republican, could not think of dis
arming other Republicans, or of allowing
the Germans to disarm them. Subsequently
he asked pardon of God and man for not
having accepted Prince Bismarcks suggestion
that the terms of capitulation should include
the disarming of the National Guard. His
pardon may be easily granted, for it needs
much less than omniscience to know that
gushing rhetorician raised to precarious
power for q moment is not the man to appre-
ciate the gravity of political dangers. When
it was too late the Government of which he
was a member decided to deprive the Ma
tional Guard of its artillery. The attempt
was made in the true modern French fashion.
Nothing was thought of, no preparations were
made. The Government troops easily cap
tured the artillery, but no one had recollected
that artillery cannot move itself. So the troops
had to sit where they we're till horses should
come. Meanwhile the people began to talk
to the troops, and it suddenly struck these
warriors that there was no reason why they
should slay one man more than another
French society had been decomposed into
those loose and conflicting elements which it
is the one business of society to make into a
whole. No one could see why one man, or
one cause, or one set of theorists should be
preferred to another. A few resoute men
saw their opportunity and seized on the Gov
ernment of Paris. What was called
the Government instantly effaced
itself. 1t made no appeal, it
ran no danger. 1t merely walked off gently
and prudently to Versailles, and left Paris to
take care of itself. The day of the insurrec-
tion had been stained by the murder of two
generals in cold blood, and few days subse-
quently, either in panic or at the instigation
of those who wished to bring matters to O
crisis, a body of armed men fired on an uu-
armed crowd in the Rue de la Paix. The
effect was exactly the same as when the same
maneuvre had been practised by the Empe-
ror at the time of the coup detGt. The citi-
ZenS were COWSu, duu tue National Guafds
could no longer retreat from their position.
The reign of the Commune was definitely
installed, and it soon appeared that the
ruling body consisted of two sections
larger body, properly called the Commune,
consisting of persons elected or supposed to
have been elected by the different districts of
Paris; and a smaller body who exercised the
real control, and who were either composed
of, or we're guided by, the Internationale, a
secret society instituted for establishing q
brotherhood of Socialism and Republicanism
in every country. 1t soon appeared, how
ever, that the new Government did not
govern so badly as had been expected; that
it preserved some sort of public order, and
was courteous to foreigners; and that it was
really supported by considerable amount of
public opinion in Paris. The claims aud
wrongs of Paris were thus forced on the at
tention of Europe, and it was generally ac-
knowledge that, if the real issue between Paris
and Versailles had been whether
Paris and the large towns of France
should be kept down by the
army of Government supported by the
priests and peasants of rural France, it was
Paris that had the best of the argument. 1t
was notoriously true, moreover, that the re-
public was not only in danger, but was
doomed SO far as the Assembly of Versailles
could doom it, and the Parisians who thought
republic worth fighting for had at least the
excuse of knowing that. if they did not fight
for it, no one else would. 1t has been natural
in England to talk of the government of the
Commune as of the government of the
mob, and the lesson is supposed to be
set us by the catastrophe of Paris not to
deal gently with our own mobs in case of
need. Certainly English mobs should be
summarily put down with as much force as
may be necessary. But there is very little
similarity between the Commune and an
English mob, excepting so far as that in
each case it is the lowest classes of society
threatening the higher. An English mob is
a tumultuary gathering of useless, obnoxious
people, with no definite purpose and no
notion of fighting, whose principal if not only
object is to see how much the Boobies under
the direction of fearful Secretary of State
can be got to stand The police persuade
them to go away, their leader is made a
County Court Judge, and the matter is
at an end. The reason why such mobs
should be at once put down is that the per-
sons composing them are perilously demora-
lized by having their respect for the law
diminished, and that they subject large num-
bers of quiet, orderly persons to inconveni-
ence and danger. Who can think that such a
description can be applied to the character
and doings of the Commune during the last
two months? The Commune had distinct
aims, distinct organization, and has fought
with courage and resolution. 1t had cause
and power of its own. 1t formed body of
enemies to those who differed from it. 1t had
a creed in which it believed, which it was
prepared to promulgate and to defend al
every risk. 1t was forced into prominence by
the extraordinary accident of having forti.
fed city and an unlimited supply of warliks
stores delivered into his hands at moment
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