Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1871-09-11
The Rnilronh nisas1er.

The testimony at the inquest on the victims of
the Revere disaster has been closed and the pub
lie has now before it all the evidence bearing on
the question, "who was to blame" 1t was
very clear at first that there was blame some
where; an express train on a well-managed
road does not run over an accommodation train
preceding it on the same track without some
body's fault In this case it was pretty gen.
orally assumed at first that the blame should
rest on some one or more of the officials on The
colliding trains, although there was general
disposition to Withhold censure of any individual
until an investigation could show by whom ii
was deserved. The general management of
the road was, however, warmly commended in
the newspapers and elsewhere by persons
whom subsequent developments have shown
10 have known nothing about the natter
or TO have misreprcsented the facts. The evil
dence proves that the road was very i'll managed
not through incompetence ofits officers so much
as through a contemplate and criminal mig
gardness, which allowed it to be deficient in
the means for transactng its business, which it
nevertheless strove TO keep up and to increase,
Notwithstanding its defective equipment caused
constant delays and embarrassment. Apparent
ly from the same motive the managers of the
road neglected also to provide the safeguards
which recent experience has shown to be most
valuable to prevent dangerous situations, to
give warning of them when they exist, and to
obyiate or mitigate their dangerous consequences
so far as may be up to the latest possible moment
Such safeguards are esteemed indispensable
when a railroad is managed in other respects
with the utmost possible regularity and system.
They are even more essential where there is so
much want Of uniformity and order as on the
Eastern railroad, and where the safety of pas
sengers is therefore to so great degree entrusted
to the personal vigilance OF conductors, enei-
neers, and station men, and the perfection Of APP
planes to detect the presence of danger and
avert it.
But it is also clear that the officials on the col
hding trains cannot be held blameless. Knowing
that the trains were habitually run with irregu
larity and that the Beverly train in this case was
considerably behind time, and in fact epcroacb.
ing the time of the express and that the latter
had already been obliged to wait for it, neither
the engineer who came round the curve ar full
speed where he could not see the lights of a pre-
ceding train until close upon it, nor the conduc-
tor who remained at the station, knowing the
express train was due, without sending signal TO
the rear, can be relieved of share of the RESPONSE
bility for all that sacrifice of life Each seems tc
have trusted thatsome one would be more vigilant
than he, and that everything would come right
somehow, because it would require the concur
rent negligence of several persons to brin!
about catastrophe. From all we can learn
just such au event might have occurred any
week this summer; that it did not is only to bc
ascribed to the fact that on previous occasions
somebody CHANGED to be as alert and watchfu
as everybody in such employments ought al
ways to be; that some Of the precautions were
taken, none ofwhch ought ever to be neglected
The responsibility for the disaster is TIM,
divided among so manypersons that it is hardly
TO be expected that any one or more of them
will incur such punishment as tb,
general voice still demands. This cvept
will probably leave its traces IN the leris
lation Of the state. Laws will be devised re
quiring of railroad corporations more efiicien
safeguards for the lives of their passengers
The management Of the Eastern road, we arr
assured, will be at once reformed. The commit
tee Of the citizens and residents of Swampscot
appointed to take action in reference to thi
matter made the following demands upon til
corporations
i 10 place a sufficient number of men in tn
Boston station, TO be known by uniform or al
omclal badge to answer inquiries and direct pas
sengers to the proper cars.
=. 10 have placards placed on each car of
Tram lhuleatng the stations at which it is I,
stop.
3. To supply additional cars. sufficient IN saa
all passengers aud obviate DELAY in MAKING M
trains. -
4. To adopt modern brakes to ston a train a,
promptly as possible, and within the sbartost
space, ana such other approved appliances 10
secure safety as are IN use upon frsf-.lass al
g. To Immediately station guards nno D'' ~,
curves between Boston aud Revere, and as 90
as practicable establish a thorough systen, ~
Geographic Signals, at least as far as Beverly
and upon the Saugus branch.
6. To Immediately put in a siding Mt III
Sangus branch junction.
Z. To run no extra or excursion trains INT
the rolling stock is adequately increased, and III
best provisions for safety have been adopted.
s. To use no camphene, kerosene, or otht
infammable liquid in the lighting of cars.
y. 70 provide more ample accommodations
the Boston station; and by railing and gait
delay
With the first four the president promised in
medlate compliance; the Others he gave assn
anee should be laid before the directors and \
believed the requests Of the committee would
complied with.
letter from + pnU -