Knoxville weekly chronicle. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1870-1875, 1871-11-15
SUPREME COURT OPINION.
Decision in Regard to Carrying Weapons.
PAGE VS.. THE STATE.

PAGE VS.. THE STATE.
Page was indicted for carrying a belt
pistol pocket and revolver. Upon his
trial, on the plea of not guilty, he was
convicted fined and sentenced to imprison-
ment. He has appealed to this court.
1t appears from the evidence in the bill
of exceptions that Page was seen coming
from his house, along the big road, about
a mile distant from his house, carrying in
his hand swinging by his side, a pistol
called a revolver, about eight inches long
but that it was not such n weapon as is
used as weapon of war. He was not on
journey nor was he police officer. No
other instance of his carrying pistol is
proven. He approached prosecutor, pre-
sented the pistol and threatened to shoot
him. Was this such a carrying of wea-
pom as is prohibited by the act of 1870,
chap. Is "a, (Shankl., SSH The evidence
fully establishes the fact that the pistol
carried by Page was not an arm for war
purposes, and therefore, under the ruling
of this Court, in the case of Anderson VS..
the State, decided at Jackson, it was
weapon, the carrying of which the Legis-
lature could Constitutionally prohibit.
But the question here is, what is the
meaning intended by the Legislature to be
conveyed by the word Carry 1t will be
observed that the prohibitory clause of the
Constitution uses the words, keep and
bear arms,u DC The Legislature has
avoided using this language, but has used
a word, which, as connected with wea-
pons, conveys the idea of wearing wea-
ponsr or "goiug armed" When we use
the expression, che carries arms" We
mean "he goes armed" or "he wears
arms.n This is manifestly the sense in
which the word was used by the Legisla-
ture, and we know of no other single
word which could more clearly convey the
meaning intended to be conveyed than
the word carry" In this sense, Page
was not only literally carrying forbid
den weapon, but he was carrying" il, that
is, che was going armed" contrary to the
true meaning of the statute.
1t will be observed, that the interpreta-
ton which we give to the word "carry
meets and carries out the manifest purpose
of the Legislature, which was, not only to
make criminal the habitual carrying or
wearing of dirks, sword-canes, Spanish
stillettos, belt or pocket pistols or revolv-
ers, but, also, to make criminal single act
of so wearing or carrying one of these
weapons, when it is SO worn or carried with
the intent of thus going armed.
But we are far from understanding the
Legislature as intending to make every act
of carrying one of these weapons criminal.
Under the Constitution, every man has a
right to own and keep these weapons-nor
Is InlS rlgnI InUeIIeTeQ WIFI Dy the pro-
hibition against carrying them, in the
sense in which the Legislature uses the
word. To constitute the carrying GRIM
inal, the intent with which it is carried
must be that of going armed or being
armed, or wearing it for the purpose of
being armed. In the case before us, the
intent with which Page was carrying his
pistol was fully developed-he was carry
ing it that he might be armed, as was
shown by his threatened assault upon the
prosecutor. 1t would probably be difficult
10 enumerate all the Instances in which
one of these weapons could be carried in
nocently and without criminality. 1t is
sufficient here to say, that, without the in
tent or purpose of being or going armed,
the offense described in this statute cannot
be committed.
We think the facts proven in the case
before us bring the plaintif-in-error with
in the offense defined in the statute, and
that his conviction was fully warranted by
the evidence. The judgment is affirmed.
NICHOLSON.