New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1871-05-15
PRINCE B1sMARCK's DIPLOMACY.

PROBABLE INFLUENCE BROUGHT TO BEAR ON TIE
VERSAILLES GOVERNMENT TO BRING ABOUT
DEFINITIvE TREATY OF PEACE-BISMARCK's
OPINION OF LOUIS NAPOLEON.
fPRoM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT
RERIIN. April 28.-Bismarck's last speech on
the question of extraordinary credit OF l%OOO'O0
taer has been received by ali parties and by the news
papers as very interesting political event; but it seems
70 me that the important features Of the speech
IN the present situation been overlooked For long
time il has open secret that the peace negoua
lions did not advance for the last weeks that the French
dploatists Brussels UNIV Hing 70 make the least
concession even where the words and spirit OF the prem
inares we're against theln that they claimed Mdhau
,en and that in short they tried regain by diplomacy
what they had fairly lost by the force Of arms 1t was
likewise known, that, long it could DO avoided,
Germany, although losing so much In consequence OF
the French disturbances intended to interfere in
the affairs Nevertheless, Bismareks words
and his Interpretation Of the terms Of peace duly
registered the official confirmation OF policy, which
Is In the interest of Germany well OF ali Europe.
But what was to me, and, think TO all those
who on that occasion and heard the Chancellor was
the defiant naughty in which he spoke OF the French
Government the unmstakable contempt with which he
treated the ruling in Versailles, and the intention
which showed not by his words but by his gestures,
Of immediately terminating the present state of airs
necessary In passage only he proved his dsdan in
words when he alluded to the eyerready notemanufac
turing press the produce of which he willing TO take
instead Of CON- but which Theirs withheld Instead Of dis
charging his liabilities Germany. The impression o.
political pretty general here that Bismarck is not
only ready TO allow the overthrow of the Versailles Gov
eminent but Is wiling, indirectly, and even d.
rectly in reaching this end. And which is the
power which he means to substituted II may be gene
raj officer, but likely it Is royal or imperial pre-
tender, a combination Of both, whom Bismarck in bis
interest proposes install as ruler of France Any
will do for him who gives him sufficient guarantee that
he and will make clean sweep Of the present disorder
and that he is honestly pledged to satisfy the German de-
mands. Bismarck's speech contains warning TO the
Versailles Government 10 to terms with him with
out delay and am sure Theirs and Favre understand
well what he means will fully appear from
the sequel of this letter
Bismarck likes to give his ideas to the public in the
way Of conversations rather OF friendly chat with
apparent indifference If he spoke Of sporting mat
ters or OF common gossip. Tho other day one OF
the guests Of the festival which the city Of Berlin
u the Imperial Diet the Court foreign dplomatists
Of science or art Bismarck formed the center
OF attraction; he in his best humor and had hearty
word for his old acquainances, or witty remark and
good Joke for those who introduced to him. 1t
ny good fortune to be present when he approached
group Of liberal representatives. One of them asked
hG Tor the prospect OF the return Of troops from
France. Bismarck availed himself OF the occasion to
make statement Of his relations 10 Louis Napoleon
~ well as TO the present French Government After
having gwen about the same ideas which he afterward
teIea July into eJnversatioD respecting Louis Ma
Ppieoh OF which will repeat 70 you those portions
"ni'h refer TO the contemporary history. Louis Ma
PoiohS great fault he sad his want Of determine
u"' h hesitation, his vaoilatioR between two prnci-
PIES OF TWO sides Of question his aversion quick
oeclSion' "here 1t Ia necessary to choose between
wO evils; he Is HaInletke cbaran4er whose native
Ahe OF Iesounoh Sckled DER with the pale cast Of
%ough In Inc hrt half Of his reign his several great
b'lucal misSDs were redeemed Ony by an army
al some hundred thousand men II ii had not been for
2hen he would hardly have been able to maintain him
sh. His Cnmean war Was in Opposition 10 French
yGhcy, sentiment. and traditions He ought 10 have ac
cepted The Russian alliance, which, tely after
tho capture of 6eysstopOI, offered TO him by OrIo
but he could not make his mind thus lost one Of
the few opportunities OF inurng IL beAtingus An
observing eye could easily discover his weakness Ia the
Italian war the affair at Magenta vss not all credit
able to him. the army however, made good what he had
faded In accomplishing Ia one OF my interviews with
Napoleon told him that he had no better friend than l.
and no siDcerer ally than that. he meant 10 have
Deset the lwe nations nat ssnsrsnd by sntskoss