The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-06-21

"What do about slavery and the coIored race,
do because l believe it helps to save this
Union;- and what l forbear, 1 forbear be-
cause do not believe that it will help to
save the Union," was one of his trite
and pungent sentences addressed in reply to a
sincere criticism; and 1t frankly defined his
convulsing friends and foes alike. Had he been
a supreme trickster, or what the world calls n
trained and subtle statesman, he might have
made the wounds of the country seem less
ghastly than they were and deluded the people
to be content with healing the surface, leaving
the terrible gangrene deeply imbedded in the
body politic to sap its vitality and finally break
out afresh with resistless virulence. Bat he
believed in self-government, and, believing, he
maintained it. At Gettysburg, in dedicating the
resting-place of the martyrs who fell n the de-
cisive battle of the war, he declared the high
resolve that ever animated him-"that govern
ment of the people, by the people, and for the
people, shall not perish from the earth" He
advanced only as the people advanced.
When they faltered under the grinding eX-
actions and sore sacrifices of the conflict, he
parleyed until they were renspired. His whole
administration, touching the threatened dis
memberment of the republic, was but the
varying record of the everyday current and
inspiration of the great fountain of popular
power. It's violence was severely criticized, but
it was ever rocked upon the boisterous waves
of revolution. The whole contest, from its
inception until its issues were finally decided,
was but one continuous revolutionary progress
the highest waves of partisan hostility, but he
was faithful in the one supreme purpose of
national unity, and people equally faithful
generously forgave in all minor issues what
they could not approve. Had he been called to
the Presidency before the war, with
nothing but the ordinary political
strife to quicken the pulsatons of the
national heart, he would have been but an ordi-
nary, and perhaps an unsuccessful, executive.
Unschooed and unapt in political management,
he would have been paralyzed by the abler and
more adroit Vaccinations of jealous rivalry, and
the logical sequence must have been failure.
But great occasion imposed great duties upon
the people and upon their chief ruler. 1t
for them to count the cost aud to pay the ap-
palling tribute. They felt, as their President SO
forcibly expressed it in his first message-"This
is essentially peoples contest. On the side of
the Union IL is struggle for maintaining in the
world that form and substance of government
whose leading object is to elevate the condition
of men," and the man of the people only could
successfully lead them, through fearful tribula-
ton, 10 their national delI erauce.
Had Mr.. Lincoln been a citizen of the South,
and ardently in sympathy with its cause, he
could not have administered the government of
the Confederacy for twelvemonth. Nor could
Mr.. Davis, with his confessed administrative
ability, have conducted the war as the EXecu-
tive of the Union. Men of the type of these two
rulers were not rare in both the North and South
during the war, and sincerely devoted TO their
respective sections; but they were felt or unfelt
just as their leading characteristics were in
accord or in antagonism with the great purpose
of their people. Had the causes of these two
civil leaders not been essentially and itrecon-
cilably at variance, there would have been no
discovered States and no war; and being vitality
discordant, their rulers and heroes were
created for widely different purposes, aud
of necessity from the most opposite of ele-
ments. Each was the true creation
of his own people, and believe that both filled
the possible measure of the duties assigned
them. One was successful, and success is the
most successful Of all human rewards. The
other failed, and must answer for all the errors
that failure so greedily groups and magnifes.
The Confederacy was reared upon despotism.
Its boasted corner stone was caste. Its theory
of government avowed the inequality of human
rights before the law. A cold, polished, able,
and sincere despot only could crystalize such
movement, and accept u conflict that braved
the progress OF enlightened civilization. He
was the offspring, not the parent, of mon
strous wrong. However diversified their views
may have been at the beginning, for four
years the Southern people waged
war for the dissolution of the Union, and proved
their degotlon on many orayeiy- contested battle
fields. Their President was their chosen leader,
their faithful exponent, and his failure was sut
the accomplished failure CT the everyday life
of the habits, convictions, and teachings for
more than generation of eight millions of our
fellow-citizens.
Equally marked were the opposite require
ments of the Northern and Southern peoples, in
selecting their great captains from widely oppo-
and Lee were confessedly the heroes of the san
culinary struggle. In their respective positions
none could have been greater-none more sue
cessful. But had Grant been Confederate and
Lee Federal, both would have been good SOL
diers-neither q successful general. Both reached
supreme command over stars which had glittered
and paled, because they respectively filed the
measure of their peoples necessities The con-
| test was unequal with respect to numbers and
| resources. The South required the genius to
| husband, to protract, to give battle only when
| superior forces were neutraliZed by position or
circumstances. The North demanded swift and
| crushing blows. Its hunger-cry was battle -
victory! One sought its most trusted aud skilful
defender the other called for its most persistent
and obstinate assailant. The South found it's
| true type of q warrior early in the strife. The
| North would have revolted at the Wilderness
| campaign had 1t been attempted one year earlier.
| In the late fall of 1861 heard the inquiry made
of gallant officer, who subsequently COM
manded the Army of the Potomac-''Why
| do you not advances? The answer
was, " We could move. directly upon
| Manassas and Richmond, and capture
both, but it would cost ten thousand men to do
| it," and cavil was silenced. Ten times ten
| thousand men we're killed, wounded, and miss
ing in military movements well meant to econo-
mize the terrible sacrifice. Then half as many
more fell in the campaign of 1864, which was
wisely planned in accord with the nations in
evitable need, and executed with marvellous
heroism and skill. Grant fought just one de-
fensive battle during the war. He lost it, and
lost his command. Lee conducted two offensive
campaigns and both were disasters. II propose
to fight it out On this line If it takes all sum
mer," was Grants echo, from the Wilderness, oi
the throbbing popular heart in the North. "a
renewal of the engagement could not be ha.
Lee assured the South that though Gettysburg
was lost the army was not sacrificed. These
chieftains were the faithful creatures of the
| everyday lives, the purposes, the hopes, anC
! fha Of nannla9. nd