The Abbeville press and banner. [volume] (Abbeville, S.C.) 1869-1924, 1871-01-20
TROcHU'S NEW PLAN.
3 Paris to be Abandoned to Her Fate
Trochu Moving to the lntrenchsd
CamD at Mont Valelien-Extraorid'
narv Stratsgical Movement,

| Camp at Mont NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS.
1arT sratsgical Movement
| from nrivate information. as well as
L ON the dispatches and%orrespou0cnct
(which 1--WE publish this morning, it is
evident that the seigc Of Paris is about
to undergo Il modification of character
hitherto entirely unlocked for. fol
months the Germans have invested the
CITY, but to-day they are no nearc: to the
| line OF defenccs than they We're when
they first Completed the investment
Not a parallel has been opened, nor
single important movement made TO-
wards forcing Trochu to surrender. Inc
German Gazette Of Eidr end F%dca, "
journal OF the highest military authority
lin Prussia, openly admits that faFis Is
ibevoad the reach Of boMbardGlent, ana
inlprcprablc to assault. The outlyln9
forts are at q distance Of about three
thousand PAGES from. the cnccntc, anu
Their guns command q range OF from
four TO five thousand PAGES. The Pfus,
sian batteries cannot therefore be placed
nearer than six or seven thousand PAGES
from the city. The bonlba*dment OF
Paris frcrl such distance Is tNpr1ctica,
bic and the Gazette expressly says that
tba Gnrn,ans "a"e not i'll position to
lombard the centre o. the capital, "hlle
the nart;u, ,.omhacdMCut OF q few 1nG-
| ibont~s would not affect the resistance OF
! the Icseired.n The first step towards
!. the capturc Of the city by directly oifeh-
! sivc Opera;inns must be, tn@cio:c' t!!e
reduction of the forts. These are so
! fskillfuliv nlaccd that zach is commanded
! by the runs of the two nearest 1ofts, anu
! the sci.e of one involves the Se;ge OF
all three, it hGing necessary TO silence
two before the third and intervening
one can be occupied. This would be q
wcrk of the utmost difficulty and DAN
rcr. The mere dropping OF shells mt"
the forts accamp!ishs little, since the
garrison can easily take refuge III the!r
bomb4roofs. The walls OF the forts
must be knocked to pieces to such an
extent as to permit the entrance OF
storminr column. But when the Ger
mans attempt to make regular approach
cs su efficiently near to plant their ba'-
teries, they are exposed not only to the
direct fires of the fort against which
their operations are primarily directed,
but to a cross-iire from the five or SIX
nearest forts. No parallels can be con-
structcd which will not be swept by the
cross-tire f some one Of these iOTtS.
Their reduction, which is an indispcn-
sable preliminary to the bombardmcnt
Of Paris or an attack cnccintc, is there
fore seen to be task Of the utmost dill
cu,ty. The Gazette honestly admits that
"the forts were erected to protect the
eat,ital and have not failed to do So"
What is called the "bombardment O!
par;sn is the vcyiest farce. 1t is simply
anoisy discharge of artillery, kept np
either for the purpose of making II
aspcar that Paris, when it may surrcn-
der from famine, has been compelled to
Weld to the irresistible weight OF hrupp's
%uns. or in order to prevent Iroehu from
removing the guns from the 1orls, III
pursuance OF the startling movement
which he is aboNt to make. =,
The starvation of Paris, unless tie
c;ty should be relieved by the armies ol
of the Drov;nccs, is of course II mere
Question of time. Forcsecing this, and
knowipg his inability to break through
the German lines, it is believed that
Trochu contcmpiatcS 10 less b0id =
movement than the evacuation or TIC
CITY. and the concentration OF his army
in an imr,"nse intrenched camp at Mont
Voicricu. Oh the west side of Paris. G!.
Russrll in y letter to the Times, distinct
lv foreshadows this movement, ana
rrmarl:s that day s.ter day he las seen
l6advd wagon trains entering tNc loT! oii
Mont Valericn, and returning to Paris
cYDty. The recent sort!c which was
,nsdn on the east side Of the city was =
mart of this plan, and was intended 70
i;stroct the attention of the enemy from
.be movement of guns and provisions
fo Mont Naicrien That tie Germans
haye an idea Of i'rcchu's intcnt:ons
would anpear from their violent bnm-
herdment of forts I>sv, Nanvrs, ard
?jnntrouce. which arc in tho ncigEbo!-
hood OF Mont VaicrieA. 1t is from these
forts that Trocho would naturally Ef*!
remove the guns which 1t is R!s Queer
to carry. 10 his intrenchco cGmp. rae
Gcwnans aim to prevent ,his ny coH-
t:nued and heavy fire. The very si!ence
of the forts is, however, q pr0hat!e
evidence that the guns arc al:caQy re-
moved.
The advantages to be gained By thus
evacuaiing Paris is plain: Mcht vac
rieu is now work OF tremen"a''S
strength, commanding the whole city.
If Trochu can place within its lines t!e
army and the guns and provisions OF the
copifal he can easily afford to throw
omen the rates of Paris to the bcsiegcrs.
The latter will have whole population
to feed, and will capture no materials o;
war of any consequence. Inc army Q;
Pariaw1ll, however, be'atHt. sheltered
by works capable of standing a pro-
lonred siege, and armed with the hcav-
lest guns. and pvovisioncd for year, to
come. The Germans will really be be-
Isicccd in Paris, for they will be at the
mercy of ITochu's guns, should he lpa
willing to bGmbard the capital. Sa'c III
his camp, Trocnu can wait for spring,
knowing that every week is a gam To
France and q loss to the invaders. Ihe
war will thus be indefinitely po*tFoned,
and the chances OF war Will all be i'll
favor Of the French. 1t shou.A- be re-
| mcmbered that Trochu's army, and not
the c:tv sf Paris itself, is the real object
i've of Won Mol;lle. If Trochu saves ms
army and pre:ongs the war at the cost
of surrenAering Paris, lie will have
earned the title OF one OF the ab!e:t
istrategists of the age. That this Is h!S
'pHrpose, all the Indications seem tc
4show. Indeed, it is said that he is Sc
confident in the SUCCESS OF the conttm
plated movement that lie has fully de-
scribed it in his will, so that in case q
his sudden death his successor can carry
lit out.-N. Y. World.