Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1871-08-25

being hardly felt, and four distinct re-
ports heard. What result was occasioned
near the vessel we can only estimate by
the feeble fire of the forts next day. NV
opinion is that, owing to the want of con-
hnement and insufficient fusing of the
mass, much of the powder was blown away
before ignition, and its effect lost. The
fuses were set by the clocks to one hour
and half, but the explosion did not &C.
cur till twenty-five minutes after that time
had elapsed. the after part of the vessel
being then enveloped in flames" Beg ond
all Deradventure the powder was ignited
by the fire that had been rnadein the
stern OF the boat as q des'nier resort for
burning the powder and to prevent the
vessel from falling into the hands of the
enemy. The powder should have been
exploded by the clocks at twenty minutes
past one. But the explosion did not take
place until about quarter to two O'Clock !;
then, as all the spectators admit, the stern
OF the boat was completely wrapped in
flames. 1.-The last thing they did being to
set her on fire under the cabin" accord
ing to Admiral Porter. However ingeni-
Gus the machinery for the ignition of the
fuses was. it is almost certain that it did
not perform It's part. Even if fnses we're
set. they never were properly laid. They
were only run into the upper and outer
bags In the deck house. Holes were then
merely bored through the deck to the
powder below. II the Gomez fuses had
been interlaced through every layer, as
General Butler advised, very different
result would have been accomplished. The
omission 10 run the fuses through the
bags of powder below the decks was Sc
rious error. Lieutenant Commander JET
fers states III his report (see Report OF
Committee on the COnducs Of the War,
Fort Fisher Expedition, y. 250) that it
had been suggested to use the BeardsIee
Electro-Magnetic Machine aud wires to
explode the powder. but that lit was not
favorably considered by those charged
with the execution OF the plan" There
must have been Encouragement in
the preparation Of the appliances by
which the powder was to be ignited.
Every candid person must admit that the
experiment Was no. properly made. Tue
consequence was that a very small part of
the powder was ever burnt ; the remain
der either went down with the wreck or
was blown into the ocean. Therefore the
theory of General Butler, that an Inner Sc
torpedo like that OF the Louisiana would,
if properly exploded near an en=my's for
tficAtion, destroy it and paralyz the gar
rison, has never yet been tested. Il may
be stated in this connection that. had Gen.
Buffers plan baen followed, the torpedo
before firing it. No pesson can estimate
what would have been the effect of the ig-
milton of two hundred and ten tons of
powder under the walls of Fors Fisher
The failure was not in the conception of
the plan, but in it's execution. Another
great error was in attempting to explode
the powder at such an early part of the
night. Even if the effects hoped for had
been accomplished the enemy would
have had ample tins for recovery and re-
pairs. Gould there have been a more in
time selected, not only the hour
of the night, but in the absence of
the army? The Committee on the Con
duct of the War found that 'the time for
the explosion was not such, in the opin-
Of your committee, as was proper to allow
all the results which would have been at
tanned by a more complete explosion to
have been taken advantage of by the Co
operating land force" Every one must
reoollecs that but small part of the pow
der was really EXPLODED, and the fort was
not materially injured.
TO BE CONTINUED,