The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-05-27

BHeHo
rights effective against all the States Of the
Union, instead of confning their operation to
the single commonwealth in which the person
may reside. While the citizen is clothed with
th ese rights directed against State and re-
ferring to its Legislative action, to its high
function of law-making; while he has right
that the State laws shall protect him in the
enjoyment of all the immunities which are
based upon the fundamental facts of his free
dom and equality, he has no jural right-that
is, no right which can be made the
subject of legislation, or which
can be taken cognizance of by the
courts-against a State in reference to
the due administration of its proper and valid
laws by its executive and judicial officers
We wish to dwell upon this proposition with
emphasis. confusion in the minds of legis-
lators and of the public in reference to this
very subject lies at the foundation of the
Force bill. The proposition we have thus
stated must be maintained by all those who
wish to preserve the nationality of the Union
and the supremacy of its Government, and
at the salue time, the principle and practice
OF local self-government in respect to all
things local and private. We repeat, there
fore, that when a State has passed laws in
agreement with the fundamental facts of
freedom and equality, its organic legal duty
to the Constitution and to the citizen is dis
charged the Constitution can no
longer be invoked to compel
its action, and the citizen has no iural
right as against it that these proper laws
shall be duly administered by the executive
and judicial officers. That this must be true
is seen at once, when we consider that if such
a right exists at all it can have no limit if the
| citizen has such right in respect to the due
administration of proper laws, it cannot stop
short of requiring absolute perfection in the
course of administration, which would be
simply impossible. When, therefore, the laws
| of a State proper, the citizen has no jural
| right, as against the State, that prosecuting
and police officers shall be vigilant in acts of
| prevention, of inquisition and of apprehen-
sion, that grand juries shall be ready to find
indictments and petit jures to convict, that
| judges shall be quick and stern to punish.
All this is beyond the reach of the United
States constitutional sanctions and, we
may add, of State constitutional sane
tions. We desire, upon this point,
! to be exactly understood. By iural right
is meant right which can be the sub
| ject-matter of statutory enactment and of
| judicial cogniZance. The citizen, beyond all
question, has rights-or we should prefer to
say privileges-in respect to the due admin
istration of the laws, but they are political,
merely, and not jural; they are held by him
in connection with all other persons, and are
to be maintained and enforced by him
public opinion which he helps to create.
This is necessary incident of all govern
ments, and especially of those which are re-
publican and representative. If the good and
valid laws which legislatures have enacted
are not duly administered, there is no legal
remedy to be obtained either from Congress
or from the State governments; redress must
be found alone in change of officers through
the ordinary processes of election and ap-
pointment. So much of the responsibility of
government does the organic law leave with
the people themselves as the final depositaries
of power. 1t is hardly necessary to state that
we do not here refer to the exceptional cases
of positive corruption or maladministration
in Office, where the offenders become liable
to the ordinary punishments for crime or
to impeachment. The first question is
thus, as we believe, plainly and accu-
rately, though briefly, answered. We
have not referred to rights which may flow
from the fifteenth amendment, because none
of our readers need be told that the electoral
capacity does not belong to any person
merely by virtue of his being a citizen of
the United States. What has already been
said suggests the ready answer to the second
question. The language used by our CORES
pondent shows that he has the fourteenth
amendment in mind. The phrase ''appro-
pirate legislation" is used in the last three
amendments, and nowhere else in the Consti-
tuition. In the present connection, such
appropriate legislation" must relate to the
rights which, though originally implied in
the organic law, were first expressed in the
first section of the fourteenth amendment
The nature of these rights, as already de-
scribed, tells what legislation is appropriate.
In the first place. no legislation at all is neces-
sary. All the various constitutional pro
hibitions directed against particular acts or
classes of legislation, either by Congress or
by the States, execute themselves. Being
negative and mandatory in their form and
effect, any statute passed in contraveHtion of
their requirements is simply null and void
The remedy for their violation is judicial
rather than legislative. 1t has never been
thought necessary for Congress to pass
statutes in aid of the three important pro-
hibitions which are found in the tenth section
of Article l. and which protect life, liberty,
and property by forbidding the States
to pass any bill of attainder, er-
p0St-fdctO law, or law impairing the obli-
cation of contracts. The new prohibitions
of the fourteenth amendment stand upon
the same basis as the old ones, are similar in
form and nature, and, like them, are to re-
ceiye their force and sanction from the
courts. Congress may clothe the national
tribunals with ample jurisdiction over all
cases arising under such invalid local laws,
and the citizen will thus be fully protected
condly. If the Legislature of State should
place upon its statute-book any law which
violated the provisions of the fourteenth
amendment, and which thus infringed the
rights of citizens as above described, Con-
II 4 4 III a