The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1871-06-26
WHY THE GERMANS HATED TIE
EREMHI


Cornelius ODowd," in the MAY number
of Bldcb1oood, attributes the success of the
Germans, in the late struggle with France, to
certain social reasons, as follows:-
I'm the air of refinement he (the French
man) knew how to throw over vice, in that
mock civilization he could impart to every
step of wickedness he contrive1 to stamp the
more homely habits of other nations with the
impress of an inveterate vulgarity and it was
very hard not to feel that, in passing out of
France into Germany, you we're descending
from the drawing room to the servants hall.
1t was this contrast-a contrast that
Frenchmen took care should be palpably felt
by all Europe-that wounded Germany to the
quick. 1t was that daily sarcasm on their
social inferiority they could neither endure
nor forgive. jena, and Magdeburg, and even
Berlin, in the hands of the Frenchman
might, after long lapse of years, be pardoned.
The insults of the first empire were, in
measure, forgotten but the same grievance
which weighs so heavily with the Americans
in regard to ourselves stimulated the Germans
against the French. There was social dis
paragement, perpetual sneer, at their ways
and habits, and tone of insolent compassion
at their supposed deficiencies, actually intol-
erable 1t was in this way that Count Bis
marck utilized the imaginary insult to the
king at Ems, and proclaimed NJ Benedetti's
impertinence throughout the Vaterland.
''It was this sentiment, cleverly cultivated
and ipgeniously disseminated that gave the
whole spirit to the war, and armed the Ger
mans with an amount of rancor and bitter
ness not to be expected from their national
character. To this was owing the irresistible
determination against which French impetu-
osity broke and scattered like wave against
a rock and without this the ked Prince
might have written scores of pamphlets How
to fight the French in vain. 1t was in
wounded national sentiment lay the strong
hold of those hosts who crossed the Rhine,
resolving never to recross it except as con-
querors. AS for the French, they no more
expected this character of onslaught than
they were able to explain it. That these
same landwehr, whom they had been taught
to believe only homely peasantry, could
storm the heights of Spichern, or Withstand
the attack of five times their number, as at
Gravelotte, was simply incredible. The per-
sonal slight-for it had become such-made
each soldier sworn enemy to France; and
here was an element of combativeness that
discipline could not invent, or Count Moltke
imagine. This was then the cohesion
\ which we all admired, and this that indomi-
table doggedness which we fancied had been
manufactured by drill"
If ''O'Dowd" has somewhat overstated his
argument, we still believe that it contains
large measure of truth. 1t may be questioned
whether social motives in great historical
movements are ever sufficiently measured or
understood by historians and chronicers
Take our own Revolution. The colonists
were continually nettled and stung by the ar
rogance and airs of superiority of the full
born Britisher; and, in the army, every officer
of colonial birth not only suffered in the way
of promotion on account of his BIRTH but
was ceaselessly an object of disparagement
and contempt at the hands of those who were
his official equals and very often his interiors
in intelligence and cultivation. AS an in
stance of the injustice which colonial soldiers
suffered at the hands of the regulars, it may
be mentioned that in the British accounts of
the defeat of Braddock, George Washington 8
name was never mentioned. Great princi-
pies are powerful levers, no one will deny;
but the wounds of pride, the bitterness of
personal resentment, the stipgs of injustice
or contumely suffered, often become the
springs that unite and move men to passionate
deeds, which are aided and justified by higher
motives.