The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1871-05-10
HTS SPEECH IN THE REyCHsAATH
What He Thinks About the Troubles
in France.
No French Territory or Fort to be Evacuated
Until the Conclusion Of q Definite Treaty.
The Dangers from an Accumulation Of French
Forces-The Increased Expenditure Of Ger
many-No Faith in French Promises
No Inter .erence in France Unless
the Interests Of Germany
Are Endangered.


Prince Bismarck made the following speech In the
Reichsrath on April 24:-
As could not be present at the last debate on
this question, now take the liberty to give some
explanations regarding the situation. The united
governments hoped, at the conclusion OF the pre-
nminaIy peace at Versailles. that the execution
Of this treaty as well as Its complement by q def
mite treaty OF peace would not meet with any rur-
fable to make new financial demands in this session
OF the Rechsrath, as they were led to hope
tnat tne payments Tor the support OF
as the first lnsalmenJ Of the war indemnity would
be made with the stipulated regularity by the French
government. l nave learned that the french gov
ernment had short time before the outbreak OF the
Paris revolt taken measures to pay the TWO first
milards Of the war indemnity In q comparatively
short time, IN order to bring about important
duction OF the army OF occupation. which was
BY the way, In order to clear up o widespread mis-
understanding, shall here remark that the mere
payment oil half q mllard by France would not lead
to any evacuation territory, not even TO that OF
the forts around Paris. The 1ulhlment OF another
Conclusion Of peace Winch must precede It. Havins
found several erroneous statements on this
s% oS to the Draw ySsE attention. beg smp
third clause Of the preliminarles. It says
L'euacuatton des departments stues entire Ia rive
drOHe de Ia Sstne It la JrOnde7e de pESt, par les
t,oupes Auemandes, S'op6,e,d gradueUenaeiM apres
Ia ratgcation az huus de oatr dei,.ttJ et te
tlon OF the departments situated between the
right bank Of the Seine ana the Eastern frontier by
the definite RATIFICATION Of the treaty or peace and
me payment OF the FIRST instalinent) The pressure
winch TINS s,pulatlo9 ought TO exercise uron
not been effective. 1 cannot say that the negotia-
lions at Brussels are progressing as rapidly
circumstances. ON the contrary, l cannot help
being under the Impression tnat the French govern
ment still entertains the hope OF obtaining other
conditions at later PERIOD Wren stronger Than at
present tIIeer, hear.l
Attempt to abate the terms OF the preliminary
treaty. Shall not, however fC NAV he Mt
tempted from another Observation-Disclosures
It be In the financial or the territorial part OF the
prisoners as were under our charge presented
another danger under the existing state OF affairs.
As guarantee against the perlls which might re.
suit from too large an increase OF the French army
by the union OF the young troops with the dis.
that all the prlsoners-the officers by their pa
roll role :, and the rest by the promise Of the
service In the French army until the definite con-
clusion and the fuihlment OF the Treaty or peace.
tiaors as they in one respect found them offensive
to the army, and in another, because they then
already thought that the army would be needed IN
full force. AS compensa ton for our demands and
as guarantee against this danger, the French ne
position that the French army should be interned
behind the Lon Lore until the definite treaty OF
Loire there would have been wide neutral
strip separating the two armies, which would be
the signal for q renewal OF hosLilities; that is
the part OF the French government OF its lnten.
tion to renew the war. On account OF the pc.
an exception that forty thousand men OF the French
army could remain In Paris to MAINTAIN Order The
existence OF French army between the Seine and
the Lore, that ls at Versailles Is therefore, per-
mitted by the preliminary treaty. After the out.
break Of Of the troubles in Paris, however it was
Gus and reliable enough TO suppress the
movement, and tho government, with which
WE a an1 prfn n
coming again In the possession OF Paris; as they
need for TINS purpose an army between the Seine AMI
men-we have not objected against the concentra-
ton OF troops at Versailles although it is against the
tees obligation return the prisoners ceases as
matter OF course that Is to say, our obligations
able ulnl the counter stipulation not to Keep any
forces between the Seine and the Loire. According
to our promise we proceeded with the liberia.
These circumstances, Il am sorry to say,
render larger expenditure necessary for us than
we could have toreseen at the conclusion Of the pre-
llminaries. do not speak OF the proracted mainte
nance OF two hundred thousand to three hundred
pendure lies in the nnor affairs Of Frauce BY the
existing state OF affairs 1t Is necessary to keep there
much larger forces than It could have been our In
treaty. The army OF the Versailles government Is
estimated at more than one hundred thousand men.
II the government Will carry out with this army the
task which 1t has assumed, wo trust to Its loyalty
for the execution OF the. treaty; but II 1t fails
may result from the union OF the opposing forces,
and under what leadership NAV be fused the existing
to be- es 50 n
ices 1t Is the duty OF the government to adopt a
safe courseawe must remain strong enough to re:
sst all possible emergencies every combination OF
opposing forces. This necesstates large financial
sacrifices. all the larger because the French govern
ment mas as yet not been able to pay for the mante
per month. Besides that there is the running inter.
on the lst of March and April have not been delivered,
but the French government has promised US that
on April 25-tnat is, to.morrow-and that from
March the funds for the support OF our army VIII
french Win IS aSe
Qaughter)-although l cannot understand why 1t |
could not pay this small amount, as we ourselves
Sd % ne si on the Son w but are
gGnS s'a sn"ad Lafheb & d R% - the u -
s seplorsoo necessity Of maElns reaasltons
French for the maintenance Of Of our army,
which they are bound to assume must have their
end TO the present state Of affairs In France by
interference on our part; but have not been able
Ke up rav 3ae r 70 s
ding in these affairs would bring about, will not |
say q union, but. at least mutual approachment
wav OF the French all the evils ofthe Situation would
be ascribed to the interference q 1.-THE foregner"
livery 8OOu)-uHu tueIc WOulu W READINESS OIL I
their part to embrace one another with the endearng
words OF "NOas So'nnaes FrancdiS.n l will not use
DC gg
should not like to deviate from tho programme |
which his Majesty has set up In his speech or the |
throne, and according TO which We intend TO act
the programme OF non-interference In the affairs OF
other nations, even wnen the temptation Is 80 great
and our own financial Interests seemed to urge us |
to 1t. Whether our interests would be advanced by
an interference which would burden us with the
moral responsibility OF regulating the future OF |
France leave 1t for others TO judge 1t Is possible
that We might by. sucn interference, fortify the |
government which we have recognized; but |
It Is also possible that the government, |
after being the OBJECT OF foreign sup. |
port, would find Its position so untenable that IT |
would seize the welcome opportunity to retire. and
then we should have the task to make or to find for
France new government. with which II would be |
left to us then to conclude treaty. ], therefore,
believe that public opinion and the majority OF this
Assembly VIII acknowledge that the government is |
* lt,,o mt