The States and Union. [volume] (Ashland, Ohio) 1868-1872, 1871-02-15
The Decline and Fail of the French
Empire. .

Everybody has been more busy
than ever during the last few days in
explaining to everybody else the causes
of the destruction of the power Of
France. The theories are innumera-
bic. But, though they could not be
counted nor yet classified satisfactory.
ly, they may be roughly brought I'M
der three or four general heads.
L. The moral and intellectual head.
A very popular theory in this country
is that the triumph of Prussia was
primarily owing to the fact of her be-
ing a protestant power fighting
against an enfeebled "Popish" power.
This is an idea which has been preach
ed from thousands Of pulpits, and by
hundreds of religious newspapers, and
it is q theory that is held more widely
perhaps than any other. 1t will be
found that the idea here stated in very
broad terms is always associated in the
minds of its holders with a number oil
correlative notions, such as these
That Professionalism stands for person.
al freedom and spiritual Independence,
and also for popular education, en-
lightenment and intelligence, and on
s%equently that it stands for power,
and is power. That Roman Catholic
| ism, on the. other hand, stands for
moral bondage. or priesteraft, and for
mental darkness or ignorance, thus
implying popular ~debasement, and
consequently that it stands for substan-
tial imbecility. In the collision of
these two forces, therefore, we, must
necessarily see what we have SEEM
The spirit of the age and the genius
of intellectual power is or n side,
while on the other side is m efete
principle which is doomed to ruin in
| a struggle with these. In this "Pro-
testant" theory, it. will be observed,
there are several very important
points and features of the case not
taken into account; but still it can
be wroght up in a way which is very
impressive, though it may be rather
deficient In scientific precision.
1 2. The military and administrative
head. A gre t maRy people are en-
tirely satisfied with the idea that the
extraordinary triumph of Prussia is
owing to the great superiority of the
Prussian military system, and the
Prussian administrative system, over
those of France. There was no very
great difference between the strength
of the two armies actually placed il
the feldssb but when the struggle had
fairly begdn, and during the whole
time in which operations were prose
cuted, it was impossible to entertain
any doubt of the superiority of the
Prussian army organization and mill
tary ensemble. The supplies of dis
ciplined men from Germany, for ex'
ample, were regular, continuous, and
always up to the demand as well as
the necessities of the occasion. Drill
ed troops were constantly drawn in
abundant volume from the body Of
the population; and, great as the car
mage has been, there never was any
scarcity of men for the work under
taken. The French, ON the Other
hand, were able to draw no reinforce
ments from the population until The
downfall of the Empire, and the leyies
raised after that time were wholly I'm
disciplined, and totally IMMERSED il
the knowledge of arms. The eyi
dences Of the fundamental differences
between the military methods of Ger
many and France have become more
and more numerous, palpable ane
striking during the progress OF the
war and they were o notable Al
its close than during any period Of it
prosecution. This German military
superiority was shown not merely il
the facility with which armies .were
raised or recruited, but in every de
partment of management, and all the
details of army service. There was
scientific order, a logical precision. ii
the military machinery of Germany
which was not only superior to French
militaryism, but far superior to any
thing ever before known in martha
history. The German military ad
m~inistration was efficient and homes
in the highest degree, while that Q
the Imperial France was inefficien
and corrupt; and the necessary conse
lquence of a trial of strength betweel
two such systems was displayed ii
the des truction of France. OF thi
kind of reasoning, there has been
great deal since the consummation c
the German triumph.
3. Under the head just. indicate
might perhaps come another caus
which a great many spectators hay
considered sufficient to account fo
French defeat. We refer to the sim
. pie superiority of German Genera
| ship. 1t was not the Romans (say
Emerson) who conquered, but Caesar
it was not the French who broke tn
thrones Of Europe, but Napoleon an
9 in like manner, there are people VIII
j think that it is not the Germans VIII
have defeated France, but Won Moltkt
7 The venerable and long headed edito
of the New York Herald has FRI
! quently, in discoursing to his friend
on the war. during the last few months
given expression to an idea similar
t this !: "Whatthe French need" say
$ he, in his strong Scottish accent, an
in his emphatic way, "what the Frenc
need is a maun Give them a gre,
maun, and he will show you what the
can do p In every respect the. &c
e man G~eneralship has been vastly 81
perior to the French. 1t has show
the marvellous power of a leader pos
sessed of military genius when dealin
with mediocrities. And now (sa
e these r~easoners) is not this cause alon
quite sufficient, when viewed in tn
}. light of history and experience, to a,
" count for the triumph of the Germa