Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1871-10-11
The CHRONICLE.
Speech Of Horace Greeley, at Warren,
Thursday Evening, Sept. 2S, 1871.

THURSDAY Evening, sept 70, 1871
FELLOW CITIZENS Il propose to
speak on the political questions of the
time-a topic which has not been
discussed by me before the public for
very many years. I shall deal first
with some that may call temporary
questions, questions Of the time, and
with these as briefly es I may pre-
paratory to some more elementary
questions.
The fret question l would consider
is this Being, as we are, on the eve
of a Presidential contest, can the
Democratic party afford to take power
at this time? This is a question
which is not usually considered by
American politicians. 1t is the cur
rent belief whenever we can clutch
power, then is the time to take it.
But in England and other countries,
a better and wiser rule prevails.
Gladstone, Disrseli, or any of the
great statesmen of England, any time
for the last century, will consider, as
they have always considered, Is my
position such, are my relations to my
party, and that party's relations to
the country such that 1 can afford
now to take power?
The Democratic party went out Of
power in 1860 by its own act. 1t was
perfectly able to have maintained its
ascendaney, but they quarreled and
threw their power away. / think il
was for the good of the country, but
the fact remained that the party chose,
as it were, to go out of power; di-
vided, fought with itself and abdi-
/ faA se h. 70
proach of parties that they will do
anything to get power and to keep it,
but in this case the Democratic party
chose to renOunce power. At the
next election it was plainly seen by
every sober test that it was in no con-
ditiOn to return to power. The coun-
try was distracted and at war, and
with such a state Of things that the
Democratic administration coming
into power would have been fettered
and embarrassed, not merely by the
committals but by the impulses and
| feelings of the great mass of its sup
porters. do not exaggerate or speak
as q partisan when / say that the
great bulk of those who supported
Mcclellan and Pendleton, in 1854, to
greater or less extent sympathiZed
with the rebellion then distracting
the country. 1 do not mean that the
majority desired or il any manner
would have readily acquiesced in
division of the country, but they did
believe that the true way to a restora-
9ion Of the country was to arrest the
war, stop the fighting, and commence
negotiating, and to try to see if by
some means we could not coax them
back to US. They believed that every
drop of blood shed in that quarrel
was an obstacle and barrier raised
against the union of the country.
am not reproaching them for this. 1
assert what is the truth, when 1 |
say that every Democratic victory |
in this country throughout the pro-
gress of that war, was interpreted by |
the rebels as an encouragement to |
perseYere in their struggle, and an |
assurance that they would certainly |
prevail. Had Mcclellan been chosen
President, the whole rebel host would |
have exulted over it as their victory |
would have taken strength and heart |
in the confident hope that they would |
no longer be prosecuted with what
they called the Lincoln war, then
made upon them.
REBELS AND DEMOCRATS IN SYM
PATHY.
General Sickles, a shrewd and pa
tient off1cer, End q good soldier, once
told me that he often asked rebel
prisoners he met after the war was
over to tell him when we struck the
hardest blow in the course of our long
struggle, and theuniform answer was:
when you reelected Abraham Lin
coin, for we all understood that TO
mean four years more of fighting if
you wanted it, and we were not ready
TO fight; nothing 80 disheartened and
paralyZed US as the reelection OF Lin
coln." know that if this reelection
of Lincoln so disheartened them, the
contrary result would have filled
them with confident hope and Joyous
exultation. say had the Democratic
party then come into power, they
would have been between two fires
Its duty to maintain the government,
which II had voluntary assumed, and
the expectations of large mass of its
supporters, and a large mass of the
rebels, that its victory would be a
termination of the struggle. It was
no time then for them to be looking
to assume power. In 1853 thought
1t had q very tolerable chance of
achieving power in the country.
knew what difficulties and embarrass-
ments it must encounter after achiey- ,
ing power, but 1 thought it had a
chance. The country was burdened
with debt, and struggling under taxa i
lion as it was, that party made no ,
of its desire to overthrow
lhe debt. 1t came together in con-
Vention, in New York, and proved
Itself incapable of governing the ,
country in the spirit which was es-
,ential to its government. 1t COM :
nenced by virtually repudiating the /,
debt; for, when you say that you will :
pay the debt In greenbacks, and will !,
make greenbacks in order TO pay the .
le6t easily, you virtually say you ,
will not pay it at all. Europeans who .
held hundred of millions of our bonds /,
had purchased them in an open mar ,
ket for gold they knew nothing !
about greenbacks never heard Of :
hem, scarcely,-they simply found ,
bur bonds for sale cheap, and they ,
bought them, taking the risk of our ;
success in ou struggle They under
stood perfectly that if we did not ;
succeed the bonds would never prob :
ably be paid. They took a great risk,
having a great preminm offered.
They bought large quantities on the !
strength Of their faith in our success. !
and as we did succeed, they made a !
large profit on their purchases. Now !
when the Democratic party met in ,,
and said: If we succeed
We will pay our debt in greenbacks," !
hey as good as said to the foreign :
creditor: We will not pay the debt I
It all, or only so much of It as we find )
and stop there To tell :
man, cay in Germany, you will
ssue an Unlimited amount of pro- :
nises to pay which you never mean !
o redeem, though they may draw ,
TX per cent. interest in god, is pre-
'iseiy the same as telling him you I
will never pay at all.
Then, again, we saw large number
u the leading gentlemen and leading n
,ersons who had been promoters and +
'namplons Of the rebel cause figuring i
n that Convention as heroes, states y
men, patriots and leaders, and every n
ne saw that the Democracy in 1854 +
vas restoration of the rebel element Il
o the governing power of the country. n
think when the Convention had a