Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1871-01-26
IMPORTANT DECISION.
A verdict for sI5, 900 Damages.

| NeruIct Tor SlO,OOO manages.
For several days an important law suit
has been progressing in the First Circuit
Court, wherein Mrs Robertson, admiais-
tratrix, sued the Louisville and Nash
vile railroad as lessees of the Memphis
and Ohio railroad for 100000 damages,
caused by the death of her husband, c.
N. Robertson, who was run over and
killed in November, 1868, by locomo-
tive on said road Messrs P. j. Mulvi-
hill and W. Y. c. Humes argued the
case for the plaintiff, and Messrs. Ste
phens and Smith for the defendant. The
case turned upon a decision of the Su-
preme Court Judge Henry G. Smith,
when on the bench of the Supreme
Court, decided in a case reported in 9th
Caldwell, that where a party met with
instantaneous death, no action for dam
ages will accrue" This old common
law doctrine decided several suits of this
character, brought in West Tennessee,
but our present Supreme Court, in a
recent decision, overruled this opinion,
and decided the very opposite doctrine,
claiming that under the provisions of
the Code the common law rule was re-
versed. In the case of Nancy Prince
VS.. the Nashville and Chattanooga rail
road, decided few days since, the Court
said:
The Code, section 1921, says that
the right of action for damages passes,
in the case of death of the party injured,
to his personal representative, for the
benefit of his widow and next of kin.
The opinion Of the Supreme Court, de-
livered some days ago, in relation to the
instant death theory, says: 81 attT
But does the section of the Code
under consideration include and provide
for a case in which the injury produces
instant death2 The answer to this
question must depend upon the intention
of the Legislature, as the same is to be
ascertained from the language used. 1t
will be observed that two classes of
causes are provided for in the section,
connected together by the use of the
distinctive conjunction. The right of
action which a person who dies from
injuries received from another. This
language describes one class of cases
those in which death results after
the injuries received, but not in
simultaneously, as we understand the
language, As to the second class,
I the right Of action which a person
whose death is caused by the wrongful
act or omission of another would have
had against the wrongful doer in case
death had not ensued, shall not be
extinguished by his death The dis
tinction between the classes of cases is
by no means clear. If there is any diff
ference it is in this. that the language
used in describing the second class more
clearly includes cases of instantaneous
death than that used in describing the |
first Class, and we infer thatthe language
was ueed in the alternativewith the view
of more distinctly indicating the purpose
of the Legislature to include cases Of in
stantaneous death as well as those of
death ensuing from injuries previously /
named But whether the Legislature 4
ssed the two different forms Of expires |
sion for the purpose suggested or not, it |
cannot be construed that the language
whose death is caused by the wrongful |
act or omission Of another includes
cases Of instantaneous DEATH and the I
language which Immediately follows
would have had against the wrongful 1
doer in case death had not ensued, shall /
not abate and be extinguished by his I
death necessarily means that the rep
resentative Of the deceased person
shall have a right of action whether ]