New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1871-08-26

treason in fee. That is. whether the
property of rebel, confscated for the
crime of treason, could be held, after the
death of the offender, against his heirs.
This question was decided in the negative
by the Supreme Court, and the son,
Douglas Forrest, was put in possession OF
the property in Virginia, forfeited by his
father, French Forrest, of the rebel navy.
At the time the Forrest case was sub
mitted to the court there were some i've
or six others, involving nearly the same
principles, but which were continued over
Among others, was that of Miller's execu-
tors VS.. the United States, involving the
right of ownership in sundry shares OF
railroad stock. The decision of the court
in this case was delivered by the same
justice, Judge Strong, as in the Forrest
case, but the principles of law which were
considered and adopted were SO essentially
different as to warrant the assumption
that the court had departed from the doc
trine laid down in the Forrest case. For
in the Miller case the point was squarely
made that the proceedings were instituted
against the estate, property, money,
stocks, credits and effects hereinafter de-
scribed, and against all persons interven-
ing for their interest therein, in case of
seizure and forfeiture. 1t was held that
the confscation act, as it is called, was an
exercise of both sovereign authority and
the belligerent right of confscating enc
mics property in time Of war. In other
words, the court expressly ruled that the
property was not confscated under the
act Of the seventeenth July, 1862, as the
property Of offenders, but as ''enemies'
property" The language Of the court in
this case is:
It is sufficient that the right to contiscate
the property of all public enemies is a con-
ceded right. New, what is that right, and
why is it allowed! It may be remarked
that it has no reference whatever to the
personal guilt of the owner of confiscated
property, and the act of contiscatlon Is not
proceeding against him. The confscation
III
the relation of the property to the opposing
belligerent, q relation in which it has been
brought in consequence of its ownership.
1t is immaterial to it whether the owner be
an alien or friend, or even citizen or sub
iect of the power that attempts to appro-
pirate the property. Venus, 8 Cranch, 233.)
In either case the property may be liable to
contscation under the rules of war. 1t Is
certainly enough to warrant the exercise OF
Al. = I'LL. forI,t hot nuvnQ 10 a
resident of the enemy's country, no matter
what his nationality.
1t is the act of 1862, the constitutionality
of which has been principally assaiied.
That act had several purposes, as indicated
in its title. AS described, it was an act
to suppress insurrection, to punish treason
and rebellion, to seize and conhscate the
property of rebels, and for other purposes
The first four sections provided for the
punishment of treason, melting or engaging
in rebellion or Instruction, or giving aid
and comfort thereto. They are aimed at
individual offenders, and they were I'M
dOubtedly an exercise of the sovereign,
not the belligerent rights of the govern
ment. But when we come to the fifth and
the following sections we find another pur-
pose avowed, not Furnishing treason and
rebellion, as described in the title, but that
other purpose, described in the title, as
"seizing and confscating the property of
rebels"
The purpose avowed then was legitimate,
such as Congress, in the situation of the
country, might constitutionally entertain,
and the provisions made to carry out the
purpose, viz: confscation, were legitimate,
| unless applied to Others than enemies. 1t Is
argued, however, that the enactments were
for the confscation of the property OF rebels
designated as such, and that the law of
nations allows contiscation only OF enemies
property. But the argument overlooks the
fact that the rebellion then existing was a
war. And, if so, those engaged in it were
public enemies.
1t is impossible to read the entire act
without observing clear distinction be-
tween the first four sections, which look
to the punishment of individual crime, and
which were, therefore, enacted in virtue of
the sovereign power, and the subsequent
sections, which have in view state of pub
lie war, and which direct the seizure of the
property of those who were in fact enc
mics, for the support of the armies OF the
country.
We do not understand the acts, or either
of them, to be applicable to any other than
the property of enemies. All the classes of
persons described in the fifth and sixth sec
lions of the act Of 1862 were enemies within
the laws and usages of war.
If it be true that all the persons described
in the fifth, sixth and seventh sections were
enemies, as we have endeavored to show
they were, it can not matter by what name
they were called, or how they were de-
scribed. The express declaration of the
seventh section was that their property
should be condemned las enemies prop
erty," and become the property of the
United States, to be disposed of as the
court should decree, the proceeds being
paid into the treasury for the purposes de-
scribed, to wit, the support of the army. 1t
was, therefore, as enemies property, and
not as that of offenders against municipal
law, that the statute directed its contiscation.
1t is therefore seen that property was
not confscated as the property of offend
ers, but as the property of enemies. !
This is an important distinction, and
places confscaions on very different
ground and footing from what they occu-
pied under the former decision in Bigelow
VS.. Forrest. That case proceeded on the
ground that the property which was in
controversy had been confscated as the
property of an offender, and was, there
fore within the influence of the joint reso-
luton of Congress, passed in connection
with the confscation act, which provided:
Nor shall any punishment or proceedings
under said act be so construed as to work a
forfeiture of the real estate of the offender
beyond his natural life.
Such being the language of the resola-
ton, it is self-evident proposition that it
can not apply to the confscation of enc
mics property, which the Supreme Court