New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1871-01-31
ARMY MOVEMENTS IN FRANCE.

pushed on to Paris, but not until sniff
Gent time had been allowed the pioyi-
sional government to prepare for the de-
tense Of the national capital. The central
idea with the Germans was the capture
Paris, and the central idea with TO French
was to defend it. Both governments
therefore, directed their main efforts to
the siege and to the defense OF the city
which Victor Hugo calls the neart OF
civilization All the Germans that could
be spared from the sieges OF -,ietz. !St1as-
burg and Tcul, pushed on toward PARIS,
and all the French forces were rapidly
concentrated inside Of the same city. IN
the meantime Germany continued to raise
troops a: nome, and France commenced
to equip armies in the South. Won
Moltke vas recruited by large reinforce
men.s from the landwehr, and Gambet.a
mustered raw recruits until the armies
of PalaG;2es, Garibaldi and Bourbaki
We're in condition 20 move. Ultimately
Metz, Strashourg and Toul surrendered,
and the troops that We're employed in
bes;eging those places We're released to
auglnen: the central force around Paris.
In the fight with Paiadines the troops
that had been hardened before Metz
were bis v:ctors, when they should have
been bes.eging Bazaine. Aud in the
subsequent contests between Manteliel
and Prince Charles, on the part Of the
Germans. and Chanzy and Bourbal,i on
the par: Of the French, the latter We're
defeated by columns sent out from Paris,
or which We're acting within a reasonable
distance Of Won Moltke. Paris was the
central point all the time, and every de-
feat the French have suffered il the field
since Sedan was in their attempts to re-
lieve Trochu.
What conclusion will military criticism
pconounce upon the Sene:alship which
has attempted to save France: Vas it
good policy to operate IN separate
tUkNA4IES, ti SlloiiltN ZIG 1Siitl Ai.NC vCCI
pushed against the Germans at Paris in
one solid and compact mass: Garibaldi
was operating from Toulouse toward the
Vosges, IN hopes Of cutting the German
lines. EoCrbaki was operating from Havre,
in the no,:h, for the samepurpcSe Their
success wou'd have brought them together
20 the east Q: Paris, but this would have
placed them between Germany and Won
Moltke. which does not seem 70 be u
healthy situation to hunt for. especially
as it would have separated them rom the
assistance OF France. Chanzy was left to
operate from, the South directly against
the main body Of tie beSiegers.
His movements contemplated assistance
from Paris, and sine Iii. guns We're
heard by TrocLu. It is singular that the
garrison did not take some part IN tie
action OF L. Mans. ], (, trr.e that the
armies o: ECr.ua.-i and Faid-
herbe Gale! Off considerable forces from
the siege, and thus rendered 50 much of
an assistance 70 I'rochu and (h.n1v: but
was it impossible FOR the Duke O: ,..eck-
lenbUrg aud General Nante!t.e! TO be
making show against the armies they
were pursuing while their troops were
actually within striking distance Q: PARIS:
It seems .oUs tina: theapproach Q: Ghanzy
with one h1ndred and tit,: :houS.nd men
and four hundred pieces q: artillery to
the relief ot Trocilu, with hal: :: i4iil;on
Of men 1T his back. was an emergency
that required the entire German, army to
be within striking distance of Paris.
And this supposition suggests Tie s,ls-
picon that Do,ubaki and taidh-rie were
both deceived momentarily as to the
actual strength OF The enemy IL from: o.
them.
What renders this suspicion j',s:ifiahie
is the fact that the Germans We're fighting
from the centre, while the French We're
combating from the circumference OF q
diameter that did not exceed two hundred
miles. Paris was the centre. and when
Bourbaki appeared on the north, Faid
herbe on the south and Chanzy o,(the
east, it was possible for column from
the centre to suppress one o. these out
side antagonists and recover its position
IN the centre before any Of the CO.
operating armies could even hear of the
Bonaparte' first italian cam
oaign develops that quality of general
ship which falls upon the enemy in detail
md destroys one army before its support
ng force is aware that it must fight the
victor without hope Of help. Won Moltkc,
40 doubt. has the genius, and he GER
ainly had the advantage tho enabled
aim to operate most disastrously on the
hree armies that divided in order 70 con-
lner. They being on the outside Of a
i'm that measured six hundlel miles, the
enemy, whose camp was only IN i.rndrsd
miles away, had every advantage IN select
ny which one Of his enemies he would
light, and when celebrity was Ill :..at was
wanted.
Suppose the entire French .crce had
)een masscd under one man and had been
pushed upon Paris, slowly as Grant adj
'anced upon Richmond, lighting 40 W.
Necessary pitched battles, but con:enting
tself with progressing under cover OF
,arthworks Eow hundred thousand