New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1871-04-26

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The proposition Of plsintifs counsel il,
| that becsuse no return Of tho maruhal was
made that he seized the property under this
| inonition. the court had no Jurisdiction Of
the case, and its subsequent condemnation
and sale were void. @~4
When We consider that it was the eame
officer and the same individual who had al
ready seized the property, and had it in his
control and his possession, and that his
statement to that effect was before the
court, with the addition that he held it sHp-
ject to the order of the court, that he was
the only executive officer of the court who
could make the seizure, the point raised
seems to be as narrow and unsubstantial as
the second seizure would be useless.
The argument is based upon the analogy
of revenue seizures, which are always Of
personal and movable property. and which
are always mede in the iirst instance by
some other officer or individual than the
marshal, and which must be taken posses
zion of by the marshal as the n, resenta-
tive Of the court. This is usually done un-
der process Of the court for the purpose of
bringing the property under it's recognized
control. And this is at once the reason, and
suggests the limit of the two seizures in
revenue cases 10 much relied on by counsel.
Now, suppose the property in this case had
been personal property. how could the mar
sba! make seizure of that which was al
ready in his manual possession Whose
possession would he displacei Could one
hand represent the seizure under the mont
ton, and the other the seizure under the act
OF Congress? And can it be seriously con-
tended that this must be done to give the
court jurisdiction, when the officer of the
court held the property already for condem-
nation or discharge as the court might
ortler9
1t may, however, be said that he should
have made return OF the writ, that he had
seized and held the property under that.
Such return as to seizure would have been
false, because he had seized it before and
could make no second seizure, in fact, by
taking it from his own possession. And he
had already informed the court that he de-
tanned the property subject to its order
The proceeding inaugurated by the dis
trict attorney is designed to bring the prop
erty before the court. It can have no other
purpose or end, unless it is released by his
order. The district attorney and the mar
shat are both officers of the court, and for
that reason are selected to institute the pro-
ceedings by which the power Of the court is
called into exercise. When, therefore, the
property is in the course of this proceeding
seized by the marshal, and when with tie
filing of the libel all that has been done is
brought before the court, and it adopts and
recognizes this seizure, the property is held
by him subject to the order Of the court, aud
is under its control, and no second seizure
BY the same officer can be necessary.
In regard to real estate, the argument is
still more fOrcible. The remarks of this
court in Cooper We. Reynolds, already cited,
are directly in point. Speaking of the various
modes Of acquiring jurisdiction, it was there
said that "while the general rule in regard
to Jurisdiction in rem requires the actual
seizure and possession Of the res by the Off
Ger of the court, such jurisdiction may he
acquired by acts which are of equivalent
import, and which. stand for and represent
the dominion Of the court over the thing,
and in effect subject it to the control Of the
court. Among this latter class is the levy
of writ Of attachment, or seizure of real
estate. which being incapable of removal,
and being within the territorial jurisdiction
Of the court, is for an practical purposes
brought under the jurisdiction of the court
by the officers levy of the writ and return
Of that fact in the court" u
When, therefore, the officer, as in this
case, had seized the property for cOndemna-
ton, and had made known that fact to the
court, it wac quite certain that it would be
within reach Of its process when condemned
for sale, and when it became necessary to
put the purchaser in possession of it. No
change Of the title or possession could lie
made, pending the judicial proceedings,
which would defeat the final decree. The
seizure was therefore, in our Judgment, sui
ficient to subject the land to the jurisdictio
Of the court.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of |
the District OF Columbia is therefore af-
frmed.
Mr.. Justice Davis concurring:
l concur in the judgment entered by the |
court in this case, though have not been |
abie to concur in all that issaid by the court |
n it's opinion.
A true copy:
Clerk Supreme Court United States.