The workingman's advocate. [volume] (Chicago [Ill.]) 1864-1877, 1871-03-18


these Bonapartist generals have to ruin
armies-notwith outstanding the illsuccess
Of Chancy's and Faidherbe's opera
tons, | am still firmly convinced that
the war, if the French people persist,
must end i'll the retreat or utter ruin Of
the invading armies. Yet after what
Jules Favre has done, it IS improbable
in the highest degree that the French
people will persist, unless it be driven
to extremities by the demands Of Prus-
sia-a turn not very likely, since Bis
marck has ceased to be master of the
situation. His counter-revolutionary
plan for destroying the French Repub-
lie and restoring the French Empire
has signally failed and should he even
succeed in his annexation schemes, this
would not be sufficient set-off for his
defeat in the principal question. What
strength would Alsace-and may be
LOrraine-bring to the Prussian f" EN-
pire?" None at all. On the contrary,
the French Venetia would draw
strength from Prussia, requiring, like
the Italian Venetia, an army Of 100, 900
men to keep the inhabitants in obedi-
ence during time Of peace--twice as
many IN time of war, and if the war
was to be with France, more soldiers
than were needed to conquer it. Bis
marck is fully aware Of that, and he is
fully aware of the TACT, besides, that the
annexation will render France the n =
ural ally of every enemy who will in tu-
ture rise against Prussia, and that the
fortresses Of Strassbourg and Metz will
prevent the Frenchmen, if prepared for
war, as little from penetrating into the
heart of Germany as they prevented the
Germans from penetrating into the
heart of France. On this point he has
no illusions and would, when France
rose after the disaster of Sed4n, most
willingly have resigned the scheme
could be, by resigning it, have got rid
OF the Republic. The annexation was
always only of secondary Importance to
him, subordinate in every respect to his
chief characterization of the French
Republic. More than four months ago
the VeLkstaGt, the organ Of our party,
wrote:
{" If Count Bismarck destroys the
French Republic and leaves to France
her whole territory, he is victor in this
war and if Count Bismarck does not
succeed in destroying the Republic and
wrests half her territory from France,
lie is vanquished in this war"
And vanquished he is, In spite of a
hundred victories. The French Repub-
lie has, in the Titanic struggle OF the
last FIVE months, amply proven her vi
tally. She has wiped off the infamy
Of the Empire and reconquered for
\ France the esteem of the world. She
has grown into one with the French
people, and her future is the future OF
| France.
Members of our own party-for in
stance, the brave veteran of Social De-
mocracy, L. Phi. Becker, in his VOrbOte
(Pioneer). of Geneva-haVe banned
the French government for not yielding
Alsace and Lorraine without blow.
From the International point of view,
they argued, it is qnite the same
whether these provinces belong to
France or to Germany. All we have
to care for is that Germany and France
NAV be soon won for Social DemOcra
cy. This reasoning would have been
correct if Germany was Republic,
like France, and not a military despo
tism. The Alsacians and Lorrainers dc
not object to- our nationality, which il
in fact theirs, too, but to our poLstIc0
misery, which has been increased by
this war, though gilded with "glOry.'
And then what practical effect would
such submission Oh the part Of the Re
public have had ? Nobody who is ac-
quainted with the character and temper
Of the French people can have the leas
doubt that in this case the people would
either have overturned the Republic a
once or left it to an ignominious dealt
at the hands of the enemy. At presen
the situation is completely changed
and should the Republic be forced t
make territorial concessions, its exist
ence will not be endangered by it an,
more; and if the government sets t
work wisely and is honestly supported
by the people, the wounds of this wa
will soon be healed and France hav
her revenge, and annex not only Alsac
and Lorraine, but whole Germany-nO
by sword and cannon, but, morally, b
institutions guaranteeing the libert,
and welfare of the DeOple
1t is significant that the fall Of Pari
has produced comparatively very littl'
impression in Germany nowhere ha
there been a genuine outburst of pub
lie Joy, nothing except the official ano
business putting illumiDations. On
! Nationals, who are furious at this wan
of patriotic enthusiasm, pretend t
think it was caused by the piecemea
way, in which the news became known
so that the patriotic enthusiasm explod
: ed bit by bit in little tiZzes instead o
one great laundering roar; of cOurs'
that is all nonsense. The long and tn
short Of it is, the Germans are tired 0
the war and save their enthusiasm 70
: the eagerly and anxiously expecte,
peace. Still cooler than with the gen
eral public, was the reception of tn
news on the German exchanges; the,
I celebrated this unparalleled success o
! our arms by a-baisse The meaning
of which is, that the experienced spec
J ulators, who, while peace was yet il
{ infinite distance, had discounted tn,
higb-fown hopes Of patriotic green
, horns, must now treat it as near real
ity, and are under the necessity of di-
vulging the secret, that no treaty o
! peace, be it ever 50 advantageous, vii
fulfill these high-fown hopes that NJ
! sum Of money, which France il mad
: to pay, and be it as large as the mos
sanguine patriot hopes for, will be sui
J ficipnt 10 cover but half Of the losses