Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-07-26
AFTER BULL RUN.
The Conference at Centreville.
More Reasons Why the COnfed-
crates Did Not Advance on
Washington.
From the Petersburg Va.) Index, July 16.

From the Petersburg (Va.) Index, July 16.
a controversy has lately arisen as to
the causes of the inactions of the Confed-
crate forces subsequent to the battle of
Manassas, July 81, 1861. The question
is an important one to the military and
the historical student of the late struggle,
and the public has repeatedly shown its
interest in it. We yield our space this
morning to the publication of a valuable
paper, giving an account of a conference
held at Manassas in the fall of 1861. This
document, as will be seen, is signed by
three of the four parties to the confer
ence, and has never before appeared in
print. Its authenticity is beyond doubt.
We publish it from no desire to attack or
defend any one in authority in the late
Confederate Government or army, but
solely as an important contribution to the
history of the Confederacy.
TIE CONFERENCE AT CENISEvILLE.
On the 26th Of September, 1861, Gen
ersl Joseph Z Johnston addressed letter
to the Secretary of War in regard to the
importance of putting this army in condi-
ton to assume the offensive, and sug-
gested that his ExcellenCy the President,
or the Secretary of War, or some one
representing them, should, at an early
day, come to the headquarters of the
army at or near Fairfax Courthouse, for
the purpose of deciding whether the army
could be reinforced to the extent that the
Commanding General deemed necessary
for an offensive campaign.
His Excellency, the President arrived
at Fairfax Courthouse a few days there
after, late in the afternoon, and proceed
ed to the quarters of Beauregard. On
the same evening General Johnston and
l called to pay our respects. No official
subjects Of importance were alluded to in
that interview. At eight O'Clock the
next evening, by appointment of the
President, a conference was had between
himself, General Johnston, Gen. Beaure-
gard and myself Various matters of
detail were introduced by the President,
and talked over between himself and the
two senior Generals.
Having but recently arrived, and not
being well acquainted with the special
subjects referred to, l took little or no
part in this conversation. Finally, with
perhaps some abruptness, said, 'Mr.
President, is it not possible to put this
army in condition to assume the active
Offensive!" adding that this was ques-
ton Of vital importance, upon which the
success or failure of our cause might de-
pend.
This question brought on discussion.
The precise conversation which fol-
lowed l do not propose to give. 1t was
an argument There seemed to be little
difference of opinion between us in regard
to general views and principles. 1t was
clearly stated and agreed to that the mill
tary force of the Confederate States was
at the highest point it could attain without
arms from abroad; that the portion of
this particular army present for duty was
in the finest fighting condition; that if
kept inactive it must retrograde immense
ly in every respect during the winter, the
effect of which was foreseen and dreaded
by us all.
The enemy was daily increasing. We
looked forward to a sad state of things at
the opening of spring campaign.
These and other points being agreed
upon without argument, it was again
asked, "Mr. President, is it not possible
to increase the effective strength of this
army and put us il condition to cross the
Potomac and carry the war into the enc
mys country?" ''Can you not by strip
ping other points to the last they will
bear, and even risking defeat at all other
places, put us in condition to move for
ward; success here gains all (" In ex-
PLANTATION and as an illustration of this,