The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-13
NUMBERS AND GENERALsHIP.
From the N. Y. Times.

From the NJ Y. Times.
In the absence of commanding military
genius, it may be safely assumed that num-
bers are almost certain in any given contest
to carry the day. 1t is asserted that the Prus-
sian forces, in the present campaign, have
outnumbered the French on every important
occasion when they have come into collision.
To direct matters SO that such preponder-
ance in critical moments and places should
exist, NAV, of course, be declared to be
proof of the possession of high military
ability, and SO, no doubt, it is. But apart
from skill in logistics or strategy, and
assuming each combatant to bring into the
field his utmost available force, experience
iustifes the saying imputed to Napoleon 1,
that Providence fights on the side having the
strongest battalions. That great captain
certainly tested the truth of his maxim to
his cost at Leipsic, where, according to the
best authority-that of Cathcart-the allies
had 230, 900 men and the French 100, 600. At
Koniggratz, again, the Prussians had 25O, 900
troops, the Austrians but $4,000. In the
immediate neighborhood of the scene of the
existing conflict, the same results have been
repeatedly witnessed. At Lutzen the Prus-
slams had but $4,000 soldiers, while Bona
parte opposed them with 100000, and at
Bautzen there was a similar disparity.
1t seems extraordinary that after having
been the first to declare war, the Emperor
Napoleon should have been at fault in this
supremely important particular. The French
army, as enumerated by the official and un-
contradieted documents, is, or was, greater
than that of Prussia, including all the various
contingents. Paris is nearer the frontier
than Berlin, and the system of railway con-
nections is in France, if anything, superior to
that of Germany. In spite of all this, and
in spite of the tremendous character of the
stake for which he fights, the Emperor ac-
tually appears to have been thus far over
whelmed by superior numbers. The fact, it
must be admitted, gives strong color to the
statement, lately made, that in reality he did
not wish to bring about this war, and that
the people had, indeed, slipped out of his
hands. If that representation is true, it
is easy to see how, after the first bitter
pang of mortified pride over their disap-
pointment, the French should feel more
kindly towards the Emperor than they did
Immediately after their late defeat The
theory that better generalship is to be cred
tied to King William and his officers than
to their opponents may render partially
needless the hypothesis of unequal numbers.
1t may be that with equal numbers in each
action the Prussians would still have been
victorious Be this as it may, the further
they advance into France, and the longer
they wait before striking afresh at the EN-.
peror's army, the less likely they are to re.
tain, if they have possessed it, the advantage
of superior numerical force A delay which
should givel all France time to concentrate
might make the Prussian campaign, so auspi
ciously begun, result as disastrously as that
of Napoleon in Russia. There is scarcely 6
doubt, then, that another battle on a great
scale is imminent; that the forces engaged on
the French side will be relatively greater
than they have hitherto been, and that the
event will be likely, consequently, to show
beyond dispute how far the previous victories
have depended on superior generalship, ant
how far on greater numbers.