Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-11-23

il nom anu altel 0Lt9 y, lOOiy slAatz fAoe W
computed. But the decision goes no far
ther than to hold, that the section is un-
constitutional, so far as it undertakes TO
enlarge the time of redemption, in case
where the land was sold more than two
wears before the passage of the act, leay-
ing II undetermined, whether the act Is
constitutional, where the period of two
years after the sale had not elapsed, at
the date of the act; or whether the act
was intended to operate as to sales of
lands, which might be made after the
passage of the act. II deyolves upon this
court to ascertain and declare the inten-
ton of the Legislature on these questions.
1t is hardly necessary for us to state
| that we recognize, In its full force cur
obligation to seek diligently for the inten-
ton of the Legislature, and when found,
to carry it out faithfully, unless, in our
| Judgment, that intention comes In con-
fiiet with the paramount law, and, in that
case, our obligation is equally clear to
upheld the constitution, and to declare its
violation null and void.
| We are to ascertain the intention of the
Legislature, by fair Interpretation of its
language. The language of the section,
under examination is, 'sIn ali cases where
real estate is subject to redemption.
This language wasused by the Legislature,
| on the S0th of May, 1866. Was it meant
SIN all cases were real estate Is sgOtD, on
the SOth of May, 1855, subject to redemp-
ton; or was it meant, in all cases here
after, where real estate is subject to re-
demption Either Interpretation of the
language is legitimate, and, hence, the in
| tention cannot be ascertained from these
| words alone. 1t is rule of constituting
statutes, that their language shall be so
interpreted, as not to bring the Legisla-
ture in conflict with the Constitution, if
there is nothing in the language itself,
which forbids such Interpretation. TAX
| ing this language by itself, this rule of
construction would require Us to interpret
it, as meaning, in all cases, hereafter,
| where real estate is subject to redemp-
| ton; because the Constitution discounte-
nances, retrospective legislation-but by
the same rule we were required to see If
there is other language, which forbids
this Interpretation. We may pass over
the next word in the statute namely
"as prescribed in $50, 1914 to /, 1877 inclu-
sive of the Code of Tennessee since
| they shed no light on the question we
are discussing-but the language which
follows them is Importance he time be-
tween the 9th day of May, 1851, and the
1st day of January, 1867, shall not be
held to operate or be computed" This
language contains the gist of the enact
ment. 1t is plain and unambiguous-
time from May 9th, 1851, to January l,
1867, shall not be computed. Then,
most clearly, the Legislature meant to
provide for cases of sales of land, which
took place as long ago as May 8, 1861,
more than four years before the date of
the statute. 1t is apparent, beyond con-
troversy, tnat the language means, that
in all cases of lands sold, where the time
for redemption had commenced running
before, or on, the 9th of May, 1861, or
between the 9th of May, 1861, and the
30th of May, 1866, the date of the act I;
which lands were subject to redemption,
the time should cease running, and should
not be computed, until January /, 1867.
We are forbidden, therefore, by the plain
language of the statute, to interpret it as
applying exclusively to sales of lands
after the passage of the act.
1t can hardly admit of doubt, that the
Legislature assumed, that they had the
same power under the fourth section of
the Schedule to revive the right of re-
demption, if it had expired after the 9th
of May, 1861, and to give it continued
vitality until January l, 1857, and for
six months after, as they had to revive
actions barred by the statute of limita-
tons, after the 9th of May, 1861, and to
suspend its operation until January l,
1867. Hence it was that they intended
| to provide, that in all cases where lands
had been sold and the right of redemp-
ton had been lost, by the two years ex-
piring after May 6, 1861, the right to re-
deem should be revived and continue in
operation until January /, 1857. And
this was what they meant by the Ian
guage; SIN all cases where real es ate IS
subject to redemption, the time between
May 6, 1861, and January l, 1867, shall
not be computed"
There was urgent reason for some such
relief measure, and the Legislature sup
pOocQ lucy udu dCCO1tp1icHCu IL Ny ehO CA-
sctment of this statute. But, in so doing,
they misconstrued their powers under the
fourth section of the Schedule, and made
provisions which are unauthorized by the
Constitution. Upon the same authorities
on which the court in the case of Rey-
nolds VS.. Baker, Col. 219, held that so
much of sec. 4, chap. 10, of the act of
1865, as authorizes the redemption of
land, which was sold more than two years
before the passage of the act of May 30,
1865, was unconstitutional and void, we
hold that all of said act which undertakes
to extend the right of redemption in all
cases of sales of lands before the passage
of that act, whether the two years had
then expired or not, is unconstitutional
and void. When land is sold under exc
cution, the whole estate is vested in the
purchaser by the sale. The right of the
debtor is strictly right to purchase, by
payment or tender of the money, within
the prescribed time. Whenever the rights
of the purchaser and of the debtor be-
come thus vested, they are beyond the
control of the Legislature, and any act
which undertakes to alter, destroy, or sus-
DCuu buCLl, 10 OuNO14olAtuuO1oAs
But it was competent for the Leglsls-
ture, in 1865, to enact new law of
property, which would control the rights
derived from the sale and purchase of
| lands made after its enactment. We have
determined that the act of 30th May, 1866,
was intended to have retrospective ope-
ration but it is insisted that it may also
| have prospective operation. We admit
that, if the language will bear the inter-
probation, that it was the intention of the
Legislature to give to it prospective ope-
ration, it is our duty to adopt that inter-
probation, rather than that the whole act
should be declared nullity.
We have construed the first member of
the sentence, which constitutes the act of
May 80, 1865. We have interpreted the
language-'1n all cases where real estate
is subject to redemption, the time be-
tween the 9th of May, 1861, and the LIST
of Jan. 1867, shall not be computed
we hold it to have, necessarily, q retro
spective meaning. Does it also have, by
fair Interpretation, prospective mean
ingl In other words, was it intended to
operate upon sales of land, that might
/ occur after May 80, 1866, and before Jan.
1, 1862 This must be determined by
the language of the remaining member of
the sentence, to-wit: 'and all persons
entitled to redeem such real estate, shall
have six months from and after the 1st
day of January, 1867, to redeem the same
according to existing laws" The words
''such real estate" furnish key to the
meaning OF the Legislature. These
words refer, Enthusiastically, to the
cases of real estate sales, provided
for in the first member of the sent
ence. The two members of the sentence
are connected by the copulative conjunc-
ton. The intention, then, was not only
to provide that the time between May
9th, 1861, and Jan. 1, 1867, should not
be computed, in all cases where real es-
~