Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-03-24
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.


Thomas IL. COIdwclI, AttOrne
z General and Reporter
The McMinnville and Manchester Railroad Cor
pany and J. II. Msrberry, Receiver, VS.. w.
Higgins ct ais.
The original bill in this cause chargt
that the McNIinnYille and Manchestt
Railroad Company having failed to pa
the interest due upon the bonds issued
it by the State of Tennessee, the Govern
or, as authorized by law, took posseSsiJ
of the road, and appointed ID. L. Day
export a receiver, who proceeded to TAX
possession of and TO run the road on be
half of the State; that said Davenport
with the assent of the then Governor, bu
without authority of law, on tie 18th 0
January, 1859, executed a lease of sal
railroad and its appurtenances to fine dc
PENDANTS, Higgins and Price, for tn
term of three years, which term was by
subsequent agreement between said Dav
export and said lessees, extended to fiv
years.
1t is further alleged that said lease wa
without authority of law and wholly void
that in pursuance of a subsequent genera
statute, the complainant Marberry was ap
pointed and qualified as receiver in tn
place of Davenport, and that said Hug
gins and Price, claiming to hold undo
their lease from Davenport, refuse to sur
render the possession thereof TO him.
The bill prays amongst other things fol
the issuance of an Injunction to RESTRAIN
the defendants Higgins and Price from
controlling, directing, or running the rail
road, and from interfering with complain
ant MarbeTy in the discharge of his duty
as receiver of said road; and that sail
Marberry be put in full and complete pos.
session thereof.
Upon this bill and on ex parte applica
ton, the Chancellor directed that an in
junction issue as prayed for.
Upon this fiat of the Chancellor, th,
Clerk issued a writ of injunction, not only
restraining the defendants as prayed il
the bill, but also commanding the Sheriff
to put the complainant, Marberry, as re
ceiver, in full and complete possession OF
the railroad and the Sheriff thereupOI
executed the writ and placed Marberry
IN possession as commanded.
The defendants Higgins and Price FLEE
their answer, asserting their right to the
possession of the road and the validity OF
the lease under which they claimed, and
moved before the Chancellor at chambers
for . dissolution of the injunction, and
they be reinstated in the possession of the
road.
Upon the argument of this motion, the
Chancellor dissolved the injunction and
ordered that Marberry re-deliVer the rail.
road TO the lessees Higgins and Price.
Under this order the road was restored to
the possession of the lessees, though il
does not appear from this record in what
manner this was accomplished.
Higgins and Price then filed a cross
bill, reciting the proceedings already had,
and charging among other things, that the
complainant Marberry and other parties
who were operating with him, and who
expected TO make money by obtaining
possession of said railroad, were making
efforts to have law passed by the Legis-
lature, the object Of which was 10 turn
the present complainants, Higgins and
Price, out of possession and that if the
threatened legislation was delayed, these
parties would institute pretended action
of replevin to recover possession of the
road. Il was further charged that the law
now attempted to be passed in the Legis-
laiure purpOrts to authorize the Governor
of the State without notice, to issue his
warrant to the sheriffs of the counties
through which said road passes, requir-
ing them to eject the compliments in the
cross-bill without opportunity of testing
their right to the possession; and that
said statute, when perfected, would be
invalid as against the right of said com
plainants.
The defendants named in the crOss-bil
were ID. w. c. Senier, Governor of this
State, the Sheriffs and the Clerks of the
Circuit Courts of Coffee county and War
rem county, and Marberry and the Nc
Minnville and Manchester Railroad Com
pany. 1t was prayed that writ of in.
junction issue, restraining the Governor
from issuing any warrant or other process;
for the purpose of interfering with the
possession of the compliments; that said
Clerks be enjOined from issuing any pro
cess out of said Courts in the name of the
Governor, the State, or of any one else,
for the purpose Of depriving compliments
of the possession of said road; that SAID
Sheriffs be enjOined from executing any
warrant issued by the Governor, or any
process issued by said Clerks at the suit OF
any of said parties while this suit should
be pending; and that the McMinnville and
Manchester Railroad Company be also
enJOined from commencing any Other
suits or proceedings against the COM
plainants, and from interfering with their
possession.
Upon eXparte application at chambers,
the Chancellor granted the injunction as
prayed for, against all the defendants and
officers named, except the Governor.
Nlarberry and the railroad company
filed their answer TO the cross-bill, ant
moved TO dissolve the injunction, which
motion was refused by the Chancellor.
Some proceedings were had in the cause
and much matter stated in the proceed
inCs, which it is not necessary for thu
purposes of this decision to recapitulate
The McMinnville and Manchester Rail
road Company, and J. II. Marbcrry, Re
ceiver, the compliments in the Origina
bill, now file petitions in this court, pray
ing that the action of the Chancellor il
dissolving the injunction upon the origina
bill, and in restoring the possession of tht
road to Higgins and Price, the lessees
and also the action Of the Chancellor il
granting the injunction upon the eros
bill, and in refusing TO dissolve the same
be revised and reversed, aud that the pos
session Of the road be again delivered {,
them.
The present application is based upor
section ), 933, of the Code, which is a
follows:
''The Supreme Court in term, or eithe
of the Judges in vacation, may gran
writs of supersedeas to an interlocutOr
order OF decree, or execution issued there
on, as in case of final DEGREES, and may re
quire the party applying to give bond witt
good security payable TO opposite party
conditioned 10 pay the amount of III
interlocutory order or decree, if so re-
uuired upon final hearing, and furthe
TO pay all such costs and damages as tn,
opposite party may sustain.
Section 4, 5l3 of the Code provides tina
the Judges of the Supreme Court ''lna
also grant supersedeas to the execution O
an interlocuiory decree of an inferiC
Court, in the cases provided for in sec
tons $3.50, 1881"
Section 1894 is not material to this dis
cussion.
The petition is resisted upon the grOun
that the sections of the Code above quote
do not authorize this Court or a judy
thereof, TO set aside or supersede an intel
locutoTy order or decree of the nature c
those made by The Chancellor in Obi