The New York herald., 1870-11-15
The Franco-Prussian Campaign OF
1870 by BOnaparte.
HIS MAJESTy's REVIEW OF EVENTS.
Causes of the French Re-
verses.
EopEs OF THE FINAL RESULT.

history Of the campaign, literally translated from
proof sheets Of the brochure about to appear In
BRUSSELS under the title OF Champagne de 1870 des
Causes dui ont amene Ia Captulation dc Sedan.
Par un onicer attache pEtat MAJOR General"
This statement has, we are informed, been dictated
by the Emperor during his retnement at Wnhelms-
h1he. 1t reads:-
when war was declared, and the Emperor as-
sumed the command in chief OF the French armies,
he frequently gave expression 70 Ine snougnt,
csmnaicn about to open would be surrounded
nv the greatest difficulties. In the midst OF
the satisfaction occasoneS, S,s iootsens ae os
served the look OF sadness With wnicn ne listened 70
Shouts or "0nward 10 Berlin 7, uttered oy tne ex,
to be merely military promenade, and narcn Ior-
ward would suffice 10 vanqulsh the nation OF Europe
and best preraied for war. The Emperor knew that
Prussia was ready to call cut In short time 100000
Germany could count upon 100 900 soldiers France
was emily able to muster 99o,ol0 and, as the number
Of lighting men is never more than ons-haI the
bring into the field $4,000 men, while we had only
about 100000 TO confront the enemy. To compen-
safe for this numerical aie lniieriorty n, u was
cross the Rhine, separate Southern Germany
from the North German Confederation, and by
The COAT or first success secure the alliance OF
armss 4 ap2 SOUTHERN GefaSy from rom ioF%ns sheir
o WIN S e N01 S s
Iaen. and the disproporton between tue NUMBER OF
Combatants thus much diminished. II Austria and
Italy made common cause with France then the su-
perlOrity sf numbers would be in our favor.
The Emperor's pan Of campaign-which ne con.
alonc--was to mass l5o 600 men at Metz, 100000 ut
Strasbourg and $4,000 ut the Camp OF Chalons
The concentration OF the first two armies, one on
the Sarre and the other on the Rhine did not reveal
his projects; for the enemy was left in uncertainty
as 10 whether the attack would 6e made against the
As soon as the q oops should have been concen-
trated at The points Indicated 1t was the Emperors
purpose 10 Immediately unite the two armies OF
men, to cross the Rhine at MaXau leaving at his
right the fortress OF Rastadt and at his lett tnat of
Germersheim. Reaching the other side OF the
Rhine he would have forced the States of the South
TO observe neutrality and would then have hurried
on to encounter the Prussians. While this move
ment was In course Of execution the sc, 900 men at
Chalons under the command OF Marshal CanrO.
the army ana to guard the northeastern frontier
Al the same time our neet cruising In the Baltic
would have ned stationary, in the north OF Prussia,
part OF the enemy's forces, ODlged to defend the
coasts threatened with invasion.
The sole cnance OF this plan succeeding was to
surpass the enemyin rapidity OF movement. To
accomplish this II was necessary TO muster very
few days, at the points decided upon, not only the
cessores Of the projected campaign, such as wagon
equlpages, artillery parks pontOon train gunboats
commissariat necessary to supply . large army on
the Emperor nat,ered himself with the hope Of
attaining these results, and In this he was de-
ceived; as in TACT, everybody was led asiray by the
supposlllon that by means of the railways. mer
could be concentrated aud horses and TlGterie
brought forward with the order and precision In
dispensabe to success, where preparation had no
been made long in advance by yigiant admins
traton. i. -..,-- -
, The delays incurred arose. in a great measure
from the defects OF our military organization, as II
has existed for the last fifty years, and which re-
yealed themselves from the very beginning
Instead Of having as Is The Case wtn Prussia army
corps always IN an organized state, recruited In the
province ITSELF and possessing on the spot their ma
t6rte and complete accessories In France the troops
composing an army are dispersed over the whole
country while the nsateriet is stored In different
cities, IN crowded magazines. Three years ago
orders were given by the Emperor to ascertain the
time necessary TO set up the wagons dismOunted at
Vernon when 1t was proved that this simple opera.
tion would require SIX months labor. These wagons
were thereupon divided between Paris, ChaOns and
SatOry. The concentration still renamed too great
and has been fraught with deplOrabe consequences.
In case IL Is deciied 10 form an active division
upon any given point OF the frontier the artillery
generally comes from some distant place and the
tram equipage and ambuances from Paris and YER
dun. Nearly all the munitions and p. DIVISIONS are
brought from tue capital; as lor the soldiers OF the
reserve they reon their regiments from all parts OF
France. The consequence Is that the railways are
insufficient for the transportation OF the men, horses
and n1dte7tet; confusion takes place everywhere,
and me railway stations are often encountered with
objects oil which The nature ana the destination are
In 1870 the Emperor had resolved that the recruits
OF the second portion OF the annual contingent
should be drilled In the depOtS OF their respective
Provinces thence TO be drafted, in time OF war, into
combined the advantages OF the Prussian to those Of
the French system Inc men belonging to the re-
residence 70 the principal town Of the department,
were there. assembled, speedily equipped ana d.
ylded among the different regiments STILL al
as IN Prussia, made up from the population OF an
entire province.
Unfortunately, this plan was modified by the War
Ofice IN 1865, and each soldier. after being mus
tered into the service was immediately assigned to
u regiment The result was that IN 1870, when the
belonging
order to relon their various regiments, were, in
many instances, obliged TO follow. long and COM
Wee at % strabourg and whose rsgiments @ sn WIZ
actually stationed II Asace instead of At once join
spective regimental depots, which might be In the
south OF France, or even In Agers, ana were thence
Obliged e return again to Strasbourg for incorpora
tio IL may be easily conceived what delays In the
assembling OF the troops were caused BY SUCH an
organization as this.
The same fact existed with respect to the camp
ing material, the ambulance wagons and the officers
transportation. Instead OF being distributed among
Ie depois IN the centre Of each department. Of tue
military warehouses, SO tnat many troops belonging
to the reserve were forced to join their corps only
imperiecty equipped, destitute oil haversacks tentes
abi pannlkins, saucepans and camp Kettles, all OBJ
Jec,s OF first necessity.
entrusted to the generals in command OF the Depart
ments and to the military commissartat. The most
trinlng thing required ministerial authorization.
IL was, ior Instance, Impossible to distribute to
officers or men the most indispensable adJuncts-
even the necessary arms-without an express order
from Paris. st
This administrative routine deprived the generals
of the activity and foresight which may sometimes
remedy defective orxanizatlon.
We hasten to add. however, that, to make up an
army less account must be taken OF individual IN
1eligence than vi substantial organization, moved
by simple machinery, and capable OF working regu-
1arlY In time OF war, because II has been haDlLuaied
TO working regularly in time Of peace.
Yet notwilns andng all the deceptions we en-
Countered justice must be rendered TO the function
aries at the War Once, who, at 2 moment OF pro-
found tranquility, were investedlwth the task Of
setting IN motion the entire military power of
France. Taking into consideration tne delective
1orce to bring into iine In so brief period, armies
lncompIeeiY formed no previous measure for the
purpose having been carried into effect.
: No doubt the objection Will be made that some, at
least OF the faults heretofore mentioned ought to
pf csnauerng inyeterale habits and prejudices must
not be forgotten. The Chambers too, perslsientiy
fnfIiu old n mnSh the most