The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-03-26
THE sENATE AND THE CHIEF JUsrIOE

THE SENATE AND THE CHIEF JUSTICE.
Ftoon thc NJ Y. Mutton
Nothing has of late occurred to show more
clearly the moral disorganization of our day
than the talk which is found in the press, and
which has by no means been confined to the
press alone, in regard to the late legal-tender
decision of the Supreme Court The very
suggestion of obtaining new decision by
the means proposed was an outrage on all
the national ideas of respect for law, and the
Outrage was the greater because there seems
to have been no popular uneasiness to Justify
or excuse it. A few politicians and moneyed
corporations alone have made all the noise
that has been heard. 1t is true that q
part of the legal profession-certain men,
bers of the bench and bar who had
strongly committed Themselves to the
principle of legal-tender during the
war-were angry with Chief Justice Chase for
overruling their opinion, for which, if it was
mistaken at all, he was himself principally
responsible; but the bar does not conspire
against the bench. This is the work of politi-
cans. The scheme of reversing the decision
was a political intrigue, based on the we'll
known fancy of the Senate for grasping at
power, and on the notorious dislike of Sena-
tors for the Chief Justice. SO far as the
public is concerned, there has not been a
breath of popular discomfort to justify any
doubted the result; Senators have freely ex-
pressed their opinion that the decision would
be reversed; Congressman have furiou5ly de-
nounced it as rivalling the Dred Scott dec-
sion in bad pre-eminence; and, worst of all,
it has been assumed, as matter of course,
that Justices Miller, Swayne, and Davis would
consent to join in this conspiracy to degrade
their own dignity.
All this is probably empty talk; but, if the
ID.
they will put stop to the discussion at once.
Nothing can be more discreditable to them
than to encourage clamor of this kind. If
any of them gravely entertain the idea of
pressing the intrigue to a result, they had
better not confess it. There are many rea-
sons why this issue is very unfavorable one
for the Senate to choose as the basis of its
assault on the Chief Justice or on the Supreme
Court. The decision in the case of Hepburn
VS.. Griswold has a very narrow scope, so far
as the principle of legal tender is concerned
1t avoids with great skill any inter
ference with the constitutional power
of Congress over the general subject
of legal tender, and no issue can be made
with it by Congress on that score. All that
the court has ruled is that tho legal-tender
clause of the act of 25th Febru Try, 1862, as
applied to contracts previously existing, was
not essential to carry out the constitutional
powers of Congress- or, III other words, that
private rights should be interfered with by
Congress only So far as is necessary;
and in this Case the interference was
not necessary far as previous contracts
were concerned, and was prohibited by the
Constitution. AS matter of fact, no one
doubts that this decision is perfectly true
Neither Mr.. Justice Miller, nor the Senate
nor any one else, has ventured to maintain
that the legal tender might not without trou-
ble have been made to affect only future con-
tracts. That the objects of the law would
have been as we'll or better reached had its
eg post .tdcto operation been ex-
cluded is truth almost self
evident, and until it is questioned, we
shall not argue upon it, more especially as
| its truth or error is not a point on which the
| dissenters rest The truth of the Chief
| Justices opinion, as matter of fact, may be
freely conceded without affecting the legal
issue, and though both opinions argue the
| general question of necessity, and, on that
score, ale equally open to criticism, the only
solid objection to the Chief Justice is based
ON the ground, not that his facts are untrue,
but that, whether true or false, it is for Con-
gress and not for the court to determine, in
case an exigency exists, what degree of ne
| cessty iuntides interference with private
| rights. 1t Ii not insisted that the court has
| decided wrongly as to the facts, but only that
| it had no right to decide at all.
But if the decision were overruled, the
result, SO far as legal teader is concerned,
| must be to establish the principle that not
only the Chief Justices law but his facts are
incorrect, and consequently the Court will be
| compelled to affirm, what every one knows to
| be false, that the application of legal tender
| to past contracts was essential to the preser.
| walton Of the country. 1t matters little
! Whe ther COp0reSS or the Court is respOnsl ble
or this result. IL is enough that because
| Congress originally made a mistake which
cannot he defended in reason, the Supreme
Court must be compelled to make that mis-
take law, and decide against truth aud equity.
| We al know that the Legal Act did
not depend for its efficacy on Its retroactive
| APPLICATION, but the Court must assert that II
oId, and must reverse the Chief Justice Judg-
ment given on the opposite understanding
OF all countries III the world, America Is the
| last where law can be safely divorced from
common sense, and where politicians can
with safety intrigue to bring about such a
result. The law and the public good are far
more deeply interested in obtaining justice
,hau in asserting tho infallibility Of Congress
1t dogma that has never been fanatlcally
held 10y the American public. In the present
instance the attempt to perpetuate as law the
mistakes of Congress may have results much
more mischievous than the mistakes them
selves-results which may be particularly
en- bnTrassing to the very persons who are
t1yiIg TO bring them about. One OF these Is
suggested in IA problem commonly known al
"Genelal Gathed8 Conundrum, because
Geuclul Garfield is said to have proposed II
IN conversation to Mr. Justice Miller. Il
runs much as folovs:-
| II a OpiniOu of the Court carefully avoids