Oxford Democrat. [volume] (Paris, Me.) 1833-1933, 1870-04-08
to be taken as proof of inferior general
ship quite rs we'll rs that of commission?


Yorktown, and opened another campaign
there, the "iicrce army" that then oppos-
cd him was exactly SeUen thousand fre
hundred men. Gen. Magruder command
ed all that was then in the pathway of
Mcclellan, while the bulk of the Con.
federatc forces was still in motion in the
neighborhood of the Rappahannock and
the Rapidan, and he had no assurance Of
re-enlorcements. The force of Mcclellan
was then ten times his own; they had
commenced daily cannonading upon
his lines; and council of general oflic-
crs was convened to consult whether the
little army of Z, 800 mon should maintain
its position in the face of ten-lold odds,
or retire before the enemy The opinion
OF the council was unanimous for the
latter alternative, with the exception of
one officer. who declared that every man
should die in the entertainments before
the little army should fall back! "By
clamation of Gen. Magruder in sympa-
thy with the gallant suggestion. And so
Richmond was saved
Mcclellan was defeated ut last by an
army not greatly inferior in numbers,
which he had supinely allowed to be
drawn in from the ends of the Coniedera.
cy. But so far from its being ''iiercc
army we report the fact as it came from
the lips of Gen. Lee: Nearly two-thirds
were raw conscripts, who had never been
under fire, and were only half instruct
ed"
If any balance of generalship is to be
held between Mcclellan and Grant ne to
the numbers Of forces which opposed them
in their respective campaigns in Virginia.
or rs to the veteran material OF these
forces, their condition of discipline, and
in general, their formidable character. we
shall have no hesitation in deciding who
was the greatest General The test is
not the most certain one. but the cores
pondent referred to has chosen to inter-
pose it, and however insignificant this act
of ingenuity may be in his own person,
there are not few Southern newspapers
which have Solemnly adopted it.
As TO to the general question OF COM
paratiyc merits rs commanders between
Mcclellan aud Grant, what we have said
of the former suggests the main differ
cncc between the rivals Mcclellan may
have been an excellent organizer of ar
mics il has been said of him that he had
the pedantry of war without It's inspira-
ton. There could be no greater contrast
to his moral timidity, the mechanical
sense of order, the slow genius, if genius
at all, of "Athclslane, the ready y
than those quick instincts of fight in Grant
which gave him this merit of a great
communicable he Herer deciined a
6attle and that he went at il with force of
decision that sometimes appeared irregu-
lar, simply because il never calculated
the inferior circumstances of the situation.
His military genius might have been the
unbrillant and pondcrous one Of n COM
mandcr determined TO conquer by re-
pcated strokes Of physical force; but no
one can doubt the readiness and detcrmi.
nation with which he struck At all times
Ii he had no fincsse, he had no pI Iocrasti-
nation. He WAS never botherc by that
nice attention To details when is always
adjusting and rc-adjusting, which never
realizes precisely the combinniion 1t de-
sires, and which, instead OF making real
preparations. keeps itself only in CON
slant state of unrcadincss and distrust
But the fact which we we wish espec-
ially TO bring to light, and which may
surprise some readers, j. that the South
ern Conicderacy, So iar from being III the
extremity Of despair described by the
Washington correspondent when Grant
undertook the campaign of 1861, was
never at any time of the war, in a null
tay.y point of view, more able to separate.
The lapse from this condition was sudden
and awful before the year was out, and
from causes mt which we shall presently
glance.
But the truth was indisputable to those
living in the South at that time ,and made
careful and intelligent observations around
them, that the Conlederacy never turned
upon her Toe more imposing and de-
termncd aspect than when, in the early
months Of 1864, Grant took command Of
the Northern forces in Virginia, and found
on his front an army which, though some-
what less numerous than that which de-
leatcd Mcclellan around Richmond, was
much more formidable. 1t was IN army
of 90. 900 men, all told-thc best season
cd army that Virginia had ever put in the
lield-composed entirely of veterans, and
inspired by a combination OF every cir.
cumstance that could breed courage or
insure devotion.
Yet the contest was hopeless before
the wear was out. In this time the South
had been conquered, not indeed by the
transcendent generalship of Grant, but
by the consummate folly OF Jefferson
Davis. Superior numbers never conquer
ed the Southern Confederacy; and here
on this point we may dismiss the COM
parison of generalship between Grant
and Mcclellan as no longer applicable