Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1870-07-25
Battle of Manassas.
The Question, Why the C0nfsdsFafes
Did Not Advance upon
Washington.
The Conference at CentsrVIle Be-
tween President Davis and Gen.
IOe E Johnston, Bsagre-
gard and Vi 6. Smith.
Correspondence in Reference to the
Matter between Vice President
Stephens and Hoa. {.
BarksdaIs, of Mss.
From the Petersburg Index, l6th. ]

From The Petersburg Index, 10th.
A controversy Stately arisen as to
the causes OF the inaction of the Con-
iederate forces subsequent to the bat
tie Of Manassas, July q, 1861.
The question is an important one to
the military aud the historical student
Of the late struggle, and the public
has repeatedly shown its interest in
it.
We yield our space this morning to
the publication of a valuable paper,
giving an account Ofa conference held
at Manassas in the fall of 1861. a
The document, as viii be seen, is
signed by three of the four par les to
the conference, and has never before
appeared in print. Its authenticity
is beyond a doubt.
We publish it from no desire to at
tack or defend any one in authority
in the late Confederate government or
army, but solely as an important con-
tributiOn to the history of the Con-
federacy. Editors Hader.
a COPY
On the 18th of September, 1861,
General Joseph +. johnson addressed
a letter to the Secretary of War in re-
gard to the importance of putting this
army in condition tOassume the often
sive, and suggested that his Excel
lency the, President, or the Secretary
of War, or some one representing
them, should, at an early day, come
to the headquarters of the army at or
near Fairfax Courthouse, for the pur-
Of r0nfflfra1r hsf 1,n
could be reinforced TO the extent that
the commanding General deemed nee
essary for an offensive campaign.
His Excellency, the President, ar
rived at Fair ak Courthouse a few
days thereafter, late in the afternoon,
and proceeded to the quarters of Gen
eral Beauregard. On the same eve
ming General Johnston and l called TO
pay our respects. No official subjects
of importance were alluded TO in that
interview. At s O'clock the next
evening, by appointment of the Presi-
dent, a conference was had between
himself, General Johnston, General
Beauregard and myself. Various mat
ters of detail were introduced by the
President, and talked over between
himself and the two senior Generals.
Having but recently arrived, and
not being well acquainted with the
special subjects referred to, took little
or no part in this conversation.
Finally, with perhaps some abrupt
ness, 1 said: Mr.. President, is it not
possible to put this army in condition
to assume the active Ofiensive?" add
ing that this was a question of vital
importance, upon which the success or
failure of our cause might depend.
This question brought on discus
sion.
The precise conversation which fol-
leBed do not propose to give. 1t
was an argument. There seemed to
be little difference Of opinion between
us in regard to general views and
principles. 1t was clearly stated and
agreed to that the military force of the
Confederate States was at the highest
point it could attain without arms
from abroad; that the portion of this
particular army present for duty was
In the finest lighting condition; that
if kept inactive it must retrograde
immensely in every respect during
the winter, the effect of which was
ioreseen and dreaded by US all.
The enemy was daily Increasing.
We looked forward to sad state of
things at the opening OF a spring cam
paign. --- s.--
These and other points being agreed
upon without argument, it was again
asked: Mr.. President, is it not pos
siblg to increase the effective strength
OF this army and put US ia condition
70 cross the Potomac and carry the
var into the enemy's country 2'' fsCan
you not, by stripping other points to
the last they viii bear, and even risk
ing defeat at all other places, put US in
condition to move forwarda Success
here gains all.h In explanation and
as an illustration Of this, the unquali-
fed opinion was advanced that if for
want OF adequate strength on our part
in Kentucky the Federal forces should
take military possession of that whole
State, and even enter and occupy a
portion Of Tennessee, a victory gained
By this army beyond the Potomac
wGEldd, By threatening the heart of the
Northern States, compel their armies
70 fall back, free Kentgcky, and give
rs tlaG line OF the Ohio within ten
days thereafter. On the other hand.
should our forces in Tennessee and
Southern Kentucky be strengthened
So e 70 enable US TO take and to. hold
the Ohio riSsS as a boundary, disas-
trOgs defeat OF this aFaly you'd at
once be f0lloWed by an overwhelming
wave Of Northern Invaders, that
would sweep over Kentucky and FEN
nessee, extending 10 the northern part
Of TIE cotton States, if not to New
Orleans. Similar views were ex-
pressed In regard to ulahssts results
in Northwestern Virginia being de.
pendent Upon the success or failure of
this, and various other Illustrations
were offered showing that suGGass here
was success everywhere; defeat here,
defeat everywhere; and that this was
the point upon which all the availa-
bic. toFces Of the Confederate States
sh0uld bec0ncGntrafed.
1t seemed to be conceded by an thai
out force, az this time here, was moi
sufficient for assuming the offensive
beyond the Potomaci and that even