The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-30

Hertfordsbire the Liberals were TO the Conserve
te operation OF the minority clause there were re-
turned one Liberal 70 two Conservstves-a result
exsggersslng the local oonseryatve strength, but
rated the Liberal strength In Berkshire the liberals
were TO the Conservatives In the ratio about OF 20
clause, they returned one memeer and the Conser-
vatiyes two. Again, In Cambridgeshre the Liberals
were to the Conservatives In the relation of 83 to 49,
and there, by the action Of the minority clause they
returned one Liberal member to two Conservative
mempe1a Tnese were, We 1eneye' o Inc ony Sish
there any contest to test the actual strength OF
parties and IN these we see that taking these four
counties together there returned, by the action
OF the minority clause i've Liberals to seven Conser
yatlyes by parties hch may be said to be very nearly
which shows certain loss OF strength, as compared
with the ratio OF their votes to the weaker party,
minority clause they would have carried but one OF
these counties, Hertfordshire and gained, had the
there while the minority seats In Cambridgeshre,
Herefordshire, and Berkshire would have gone TO
sse - @ tne hs Win aorg
clause therefore In those counties has not given the
Liberals representation up to their full party
"Now to pass to the boroughs where the clause has
a Dd N Eefpeo the
being to the Conservatives In about the ratio OF Is to
16, the Liberals returned one member and the Con-
servatives two that In Manchester, the Liberals
being to the Conservatives in the ratio Of say, I'll TO
Is, the Liberals returned two members and tue Con-
seryatyes one that in Leeds, the Liberals being to
the Conservatives about to l. the Liberals returned
two members and the Conservatives one; that In
in about the ratio of % to 8, the Liberals returned
all the three members; and that in Glasgow, the
Liberals being to the Conservatives In about the ratio
OF 81 to IL, the Liberals returned all the members
The result OF which is that the minority clause gave
the Liberals ID to g. nearly to 1, in constituent
cies where their strength, taken on the VIII ole, was
not quite to In other words the minority repre-
SopougS embefs where with the same humber Of
seats TO fight for they would only have had three
e rom m m tbee
had been as many seats to obtain to IA, really gave
the Conservatives considerably less than the
the counties we have named 1t gave the Liberals less
than the strength due to g, their .h PRO pro-
the minority principle in both cases gives
certain representation to the weaker
much less adequate one wheTe the weaker party is
very weak-as the Conservative party was In most
Of the great boroughs we have named-than where
party was in all the counties we have named. The
minority principle has, in TACT, given the Liberals In
given the Conservatives in the three-cornered boz
roughs and for this reason-that in three out OF the
six fhree-cornered borOughs the Conservative party
was practically insignificant while in all the three
cornered counties the power OF the Liberals was
their rivals. Anyhow, the practical result has been
strengthen it." .nt o.
The great defect of this system consists in the
fact, as shown in the above extracts, that it is
possible for the majority to override the mino-
rity in spite of the provisions of law which are
designed to prevent it. In both Birmingham
and Glasgow the Liberals secured all three of
the seats by judicious distribution of their
strength. In Birmingham, where John Brig t
was a candidate, the Liberal committee pre-
pared number of cards equal to the number of
Liberal voters, each card bearing the names of
two of their candidates only, but the names
of each of the three candidates being
used an equal number of times. These
cards were distributed among the Liberal voters
with great care and exactness, and If each
elector had followed strictly his instructions by
voting for the two candidates whose names
were inscribed on the card presented to him.
the three Liberal candidates would have been
elected by equal votes. But many OF the
warmest admirers of Mr.. Bright were afraid
that others of his admirers whose cards did not
bear his name would scratch one of the candi-
dates for whom they were instructed to vote,
and insert the name of the great popular cham
pion, Inspired by this fear, many of his adhe-
rents who were instructed to vote for him sub
sttuted the name of one of the other candidates,
and the result was that Mr.. Bright, the most
lowest on the poll, by very reason of his para
mount popularity. aaHT
But aside from the circumstance that 1t is
possible to still override the minority under the
operation of this system, in districts where
it does not closely approach the majority in
numerical strength, it has the greater defect of
being entirely arbitrary. Thus, If the Congress
sonal districts of Pennsylvania were thrown
together in groups of three, and each voter re-
stricted TO casting ballot for two Representa-
tiyes, while the three highest candidates were
to be declared elected, the relative strength OF
the two parties in one three cornered constitu-
ency might be as to 1, inTanother as to l,
and in another as 2 to /, and inequalities in
representation as great as exist under the pre-
sent system would result. In fact, an equitable
grouping of the districts would be almost ina
possible and every reaction in public sentiment
| would render Encouragement necessary, if o
| show of equality were to be preserved.
| The System Of 'CumulntIve Vottng.o
Free from both these striking defects is the
| system which is known as the cumulative vote
| The principle is very simple and comprehende6
| at glance. Pennsylvania being entitled to "a
Representatives in Congress, each voter has the
privilege of dividing his "A ballots among as
| many candidates as he sees proper. He can dis
| tribute them among a. casting one fer each; he
| can select 12 names, and cast two ballots fol
! EACH he can narrow down his list to 9, an6
| cumulate four ballots on each; he can select any
| lower number or he can heap the whole twenty
| four votes to which he is entitled on single
| candidate. 1t follows, therefore, that the mi
nority can, by the proper concert of action
| render the success of a fair proportion of theil
candidates moral certainty, the only Limitation