Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-07-26

( ShOuiu eohC LuliltdIy pOSScccAOH VI JudL
whole State, and even enter and occupy a
portion of Tennessee, victory gained
by this army beyond the Potomac
would, by threatening the heart of
the Northern States, compel their
armies to fall back, free Kentucky, and
give us the line of the Ohio within ten
days thereafter On the other hand,
should our forces in Tennessee and South
ern Kentucky be strengthened so as to en-
able as to take and hold the Ohio river as a
boundary disastrous defeat of this army
would at once be followed by an over
whelming wave of northern invaders,
that would sweep over Kentucky and
Tennessee, extending to the northern part
| of the cotton States, if not TO New Or
leans. Similar views were expressed in
regard to ultimate results in northwestern
Virginia being dependent upon the success
or failure of this army, and various other
illustrations were offered showing that
success here was success everywhere; de-
feat here, defeat everywhere; and that this
was the point upon which all the availa-
| BILE forces of the Confederate States should
be concentrated. r.t
| 1t seemed to be conceded by all that
our force, at this time here, was not suffi-
Gent for assuming the offensive beyond
the Potomac; and that, even with much
larger force, an attack upon their army,
under the guns of their Notifications on
| this side of the river, was out of the
| question. The President asked me what
number of men was necessary, in my
| opinion, TO warrant an offensive cam
no 10 4ha pOfn nut of ha
communications of the enemy with their
fortified capital and carry the war into
their own country. answered fifty thou
sand seasoned soldiers-explaining that
by seasoned soldiers | meant such men as
we had here present for duty. And add
ed that they would have to be drawn
from the Peninsula about Yorktown,
Norfolk, from Western Virginia, Pensa-
cola, or wherever might be most expedi-
ent. Gems. Johnston and Beauregard
both said that force of sixty thousand
such men would be necessary, and that
this force would require large additional
transportation and munitions of war,
the supplies here being entirely in
adequate for an active campaign
in the enemy's country, even
with our present force. In this connec-
ton there was some discussion of the diff
ticulties to be overcome, AMI the proba-
bllities of success, but no one questioned
the disastrous results of remaining mac
tive throughout the winter. Notwith- |
standing the belief that many in the |
Northern army were opposed on princi- |
pie to invading the Southern States, and |
that they would fight better in their own |
homes than in attacking ours, it was be- |
lieved that the best if not the only plan |
to insure success was to concentrate Our |
forces and attack the enemy in their own |
country. The President, think, gave |
no definite opinion in regard to the num- |
Der of men necessary for that purpose, |
and am sure that no one present consid- |
cred this question to be finally decided |
by any other person than the command |
ing General of this army. Returning to
the question that had been twice asked, |
the President expressed surprise and re-
greet that the number of surplus arms here
was so small, and, l thought, spoke
bitterly of this disappointment. He
then stated that at that time |
no achievements could be fur
nished to this army of the character asked l
for, and that the most that could be done
would be to furnish recruits to take the
surplus arms in store here (say $500
stand;) that the whole country was de-
handing protection at his hands and
praying for arms and troops for defense.
He had long been expecting arms from
abroad, but he had been disappointed.
He still hoped to get them, but he had no
positive assurance that they would be re-
ceived at all. The manufacture of arms
in the Confederate States was as yet I'M
developed to any considerable extent.
Want of arms was the great difficulty.
He could not take any troops from the
points named, and without arms from
abroad could not reinforce this army. He
expressed regret and seemed to feel
deeply, as did every one present
When the President had thus clearly
and positively stated his inability to put
this army in the condition deemed by the
Generals necessary before entering upon
an active offensive campaign, it was felt
that it might be better TO run the risk of
almost certain destruction, fighting upon
the other side of the Potomac, rather
than see the gradual dying out and deteri-
Grafton of this army during winter, at
the end of which the term of enlistment
of half the force would expire. The
prospect of the spring campaign to be
commenced under such discOUraging cir
cumstances was rendered all the more
gloomy by the daily increasing strength
of an enemy already much superior in
numbers. On the other band was the
hope and expectation that before the end
e L. |
the country, and all were confident that
we could then not only protect our own
country, but successfully invade that of
the enemy. Gen. Johnston said that he
did not feel at liberty to express an opin-
ion as to the practicability of reducing the
strength of our force at points not within
the limits of his command; and with but
few further remarks from any one, the
answer of the President was accepted as
final, and it was felt that there was no
other course left but to take a defensive
position and await the enemy.
If they did not advance we had but to
await the winter and its results.
After the main question was dropped
the President proposed, instead of an &C
tive, offensive campaign, we should at
tempt certain partial operations. A sud
den blow against Sickles and Banks, or
to break the bridge over the Monocacy.
This, he thought, besides injuring the
enemy, would exert good influence over
our troops and encourage the people of
the Confederate States generally.
In regard to attacking Sickles, it was
stated in reply that, as the enemy con-
trolled the river with his ships of war
it would be necessary for us to occupy
two points on the river, one above and
the other below our point of crossing,
that we might by our batteries, prevent
their armed vessels from interfering with
the passage of the troops. In any case,
the difficulty of crossing large bodies
over wide rivers in the vicinity of an
enemy and the recrOssing made such ex-
petitions hazardous. 1t was agreed,
however, that, if any opportunity should
occur offering reasonable chances of sue
cess, the attempt should be made.
During this conference, or council,
which lasted perhaps two hours, all was
earnest, serious, deliberate. The impress
sion made unOn me- was deem and LASTING |