Iowa voter. [volume] (Knoxville, Iowa) 1867-1874, 1870-02-17
Mills v. Geason, II Wis.,, 41O. g y i


Jones, Esq, III, C.) 323. ...sr .i6ai4I
Powers y. The Inf. CT. of Dough-
erty CO., % Geo. Rep. 65. a ta
The st. Joe, &C., H. II. Go. v. Bu-
chanan Co., 80 Mo-, 4S5. Jleq91
City Of st. Louis V. Alexandria,
% Mo-, is3. sss s.r.,
Strickland V. Miss. II. r. Co., y,
Miss. Rep. 2O9, 22i. aciiaaasle .qra
Cotton v. Com. Of Leon Co., 6 Fia.,.
6lO. ar elrpad isant2 2lf
Police Jury v. Succession of Me-
Donough, s La. An, 34l. II g, ~
San Antonioy. Jones, % Texas, 10,
/ It has also been repeatedly affirmed
by the Supreme Court Of the United
States certainly in more than twenty
cases. See Gilman v. Sheboygan, 2
Black, $40 and cases cited. : ,i't.3tl
And Judge Redfield, inhis treaties
on the law Of railways, says: ut has
been considered that a railway is SO
far in the nature Of an improved
highway, that the legislature may,
empower towns and Counties to sub
scribe for stock in such companies
whose roads pass through such towns
or Counties, and even where they
tend to increase the business of roads
which do pass through any portion
of the territory of such towns or
Countless "The decisions
i'm the several States seem all to have
been in favor of the power OF the
Legislature to build railways, atthe
public expense, of which there is
perhaps, no great question:; for 1t
seems to be species Of internal inn
provement, or INSTRUMENTATION,
which is, In a measure, indispensable
to public interest, a''d public functions
in many ways. ="
1t seems to us, that IL these public
works require public patronage, 1t
would more appropriately come from
the State, than from the municipali-
ties, which are created for limited
purposes, and with no appropriate
facilities for the management OF
peclniary investments in such cx-t
tended enterprises. But the weight
Of authority II all In one direction
|4ne III is.now too iate III bring IN {,
matter Into serious debate. ""
I'd, Rcdfeld on Railways 396, Section :
go, and note 3D., Ed So much
then for the authorities, which, as
stated by Judge Redfield, are all one
way, and number near two hundred.
cases-the majority opinions in this
case are in the face Of and contrary
to all OF them.
fourth. The first clause Of our
state Constitution, quoted to give
strength to the argument of tho
majority, is Section 8, Of the Bill Of
Rights. "No person shall be de-
prived Of life, liberty or property
without due process Of law" Now,
it is as clear upon principle, as it Is
well settled by the authorities, that
this clause Of our Constitution, which
is common TO every State in the
Union, has no reference whatever TO- /.
the taxing power; nor has the term
"duc process Of law" any bearing or 4
limitation upon, that power. This III
clear. For, if the taking of property I
by taxation, Is the stalking OF 1t with
out due process Of law" then this
clause inhibits the Legislature from
all taxation, and it would be power
less to authorize by law, directly, the
levy and collection of any tax. The
argument Of the Chief Justice de- i
rived from this section, then, is too
strong and proves too much; for, n 7
under it, the act In question is uncon- .
then every revenue law
upon our statute book is unconstitli-, !,
tional also; since every tax law now
in force, provides for the collection
of taxes without any process Of law,
that is, judicial process.
The next clause quoted, il Section
18 Of the. Bill OF Rights; "Private
property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation being
first made, or secured to be made, To
the owner thereOfn **'* But this
section, which is also substantially
the same in every State, as has been
repeatedly held, and il clear from its
very terms, Is not y limitation upon
the taxing power, but on the right
of eminent domain. See Gilman vs.
sheboygan, 2 Black, ~. 81 $40, and
eases cited. If this clause did apply
to the taxing power, 1t would be
fatal to its exercise in every instance.
For, II just compensation to the
owner must be made before his prop