The Portland daily press., 1870-05-09

| every southern port. A comparatively small force
OF TINS KIND appropriately armed and let loose On
! TIE ocean, under command of bold and intelligent
oHccfs, would be dangerous foe to the commerce
OF any couhtfy In giving up this fed to the ocou-
| commercial advantages which naturally belong to
our own position and resources. we at the same
| sible enemies"
And again.
"TEere is another element OF Cef,nse against the
| time OF danger perhaps as effective as any other
| aHillaoie 70 WISE and Iibt raj craftsmanship Ma
lions, mhe men, hesitate to attack those who are
| PlepaleI ~ GO lhem serious injury, and in tue
means OF restrictive aggression is often found the
surest defence against all who have anything tolose.
ocean going steamers established running out of our
ports IN tne peaceful pursuit of commercial enter
government In time OF need''
| Take now the statement of Admiral Porter.
probably the highest naval authority in the
country, and who has had experience in the
merchant service as commander of a mer-
chant steamship. In his testimony before the
committee, which may be found on pages 1873
to 1913 of its report: to- ss
| at the United States posses sed tie steamships
| plying between New York and Europe tie goSern-4
meht would have better navy than it ever had.
| There was not ship in the american navy that
could compare with the best sbirs on the English
and Ere nch lines i'll point OF speed, stability or for
carrying guns. All those vtses could be fitted with
masls in q very short time and rugged completely.
IL the United States had possessed malt the Lumber
| OF steamships now eng ged in the European trade
with New York he did not think the rebels would
| ever have got OUT bale OF cotton from southern
port, and would have had TO submit long before they
did."-Page 1873.
| In making this statement Admiral Porter
calculated upon sixty Of these first-class for
| elgn steamers as the number running to and
from New York, when in fact the actual num-
Der is nearly double that SO rapidly have they
| increased. =
Again, on page 1S4, to the question
81 understand you to say that if at the commence
meat of the late war we had thirty steamers like
those running to New York from Europe, they
would have beer as efficient entire Navy
the Admiral answers: f.f
| "Twce as efficient. say. xiat without lie station
The ships we had could catch nothing. We never
had vessel that could run down blockade run
ner during the whole war except the Vanderbilt and
two Others Our irOn-c!ads are only suitable tor
harbor defence. In case of with Great Britain
or France our power would be in cutting up their
! six months with fleet Of vessels that we would
send cut after her vessels They would break her
up root and branch; and that kind OF warfare would
be more likely TO bring about peace than fighting
with iron-clads or heavy war vessels"
The amount appropriated from 1850 to 1860
for the Navy was S73,OO0,000. One third of
this amount appropriated in aid OF the iner-
chant steamship service, would have establish
ed and maintained hundred such steamships
as those described by Admiral Porter, thirty
OF which he declares twice as efficient as our
Navy at the commencement of the war. Who
can estimate the millions Of treasure and the
| thousands of lives that would have been saved
it this naval appropriation had been thus d.
vided and applied?
1t would be folly to mourn over the past,
but still greater folly to neglect its hard-learn-
ed lessons. What is the present application
OF our dear-bouebt experience? Our naval
force is that of fi(th-rate Power. 1t ought to
be second to that of no nation, for upon it W
must rely mainly for our means of defense in
all our future wars. We have no powerful
continental neighbors against whose encroach-
ments 1t IS necessary to keep up a large stand
ing army. Our policy is to engage in no wars
ofconquest; but, coDceding to all nations their
rights, stand always in condition to maintain
and defend our own. We cannot expect ex-
emptlon from future wars, but we may lessen
our liability to them by keeping ourselves in
such condition as to make it dangerous for
other nations to encroach upon OF to attack us.
Another reason for keeping respectable
naval force is the necessity for furnishing pro-
lection to our citizens, who travel more than
! those of any other nation to all parts of the
globe. E,ery American should feel that he
cannot travel so far as to get beyond the pro-
lection of his Government. Such is not the
case to-day. The citizen of Great Britain or
OF France isprotected in his rights everywhere.
tths-~ >~~ ---s---sAs. 9>--A--tse~.
nowhere except at home. And however we
may increase in wealth, however much we
may develop our internal resources and COM
merce, our condition in this regard will not be
improved until we re-establish our power up
on the ocean and maintain upon it an armed
police capable of affording such protection to
our citizens as will secure to them their rights
in all parts of the world
10 maintain in peace navy equsl to the
demands of war would involve large and I'M
necessary expense. That the Navy proper
should be more powerful than it is, and that
1t would be real economy to make it so, do
not doubt. 1t should approximate more near
ly to those of other first-class Powers. The
navy of Great Britain has more than four
times the effective force of our own, and the
amount annually appropriated to it is more
than fifty million dollars. She has not only
this powerful navy, armed, differed, and equip
ped to the highest degree of efficiency, but an
immense commercial marine, which is the
most valuable contingent to the actual navy,
and the best portion of which could at any
time, like well. ordered militia, be called into
operation to swell the ranks and add tenfold
to the efficiency of the regular service in case
OF war between her and any maritime Power
ms immense contingent naval force of more
| ou"ii Two LHOuSduu steamers, many OF them OF
the largest class and engaged in foreign COM
merce, supply enc hundred and sixty-four
lines, and is supported by the nations whose
business they perform. We support one hun
dred and seventeen of this fleet of foreign
steamers of the largest class with our business,
and pay for maintaining this part OF the naval
force of foreign nations nearly double the
amount which we appropriate for our own
Navy. 1t has long been the policy of Great
Britain to connect herself by these lines of
steamers and by postal arrangements with all
parts OF the world, thus increasing her trade
and wealth, and at the same time providing
most economical and efficient naval force The
Importance which the statesmen of Great
Britain attach to their commercial steam ma
Irne as source of profit and of power may be
learned from reading the debates in the
House Of Commons in 1867 on the proposition
to employ the French steamer to carry the
mails to India, already referred to.
Mr.. Crawford, free-trader as he is protested
in the interests of commerce and of the coun-
try agaisnt sending the English mails in the
ships of any foreign country, and declared that
it would be carrying the principle of economy
too tar; that such a course would be Stree
trade run mad;" that in case of any difficulty
with the nation upon whose vessels thew de-
pended for carrying their mails they would be
placed at such disadvantage as to erdaneer
| the safety of the nation that it was too mich