The union Democrat., 1870-08-13
The Pra..lan military System.

Tkc PrussIan Military System.
/ 1t is dispatched that Napoleon has recalled
the lons-discarded General Changarnier into
the service, and will make him Minister oi
War. rice Leb@uf, who takes command in
the field. This case presents aslight analogy
to that of the recall Of Colonel Blucher tc
command by Frederick William III, nephew
and successor of Frederick the Great. Nc
other army had ever been so fortunate as tc
produce within half century three such
matchless cavalry Generals as Ziethen,
Seidlitx and Blucher; but the latter was dis.
missed the service by Frederick the Great for
his hot remonstrance at q promotion made
over his head.
Fifteen years after he was recalled as above
stated, and the new glories which he added
to the Prussian arms long after the death OF
the king that reinstated him are known to
all. 1t was Blucher who fought fercely to
the last at jena in 1906, but in vain, against
the Napoleonic legions. Prussia was over
run with unparalleled celebrity by the victo-
rious French, who remembered their terrible
defeat by Frederick the Great half a century
before at Rosbach, within sight ofJena. But
it was Blucher, also, for whom when the
fainting English line, weakened by the de-
fection of halfhearted auxiliaries, looked
and looked not in vain, to make the promised
attack upon the flank of the foe which was to
give the Allies the conpletest victory at Wa
terloo that modern history had recorded.
| 1t was the valor of Blucher that again
placed Prussia once more among the Great
Powers, and equal in all but the nominal
rank of Austria in Germany. Her bounda-
ries were not only well defined in the new
lpa Of hnk cha raI
half of Saxony and considerable additions in
Westphalia.
But Prussia was not satisfied. She lily
brooked the conceded Presidency of Austria
in the new German Confederation in virtue of
her old imperial claims. She, therefore,
knew that another battle was to be fought
before her complete nationhood could be es-
tablshed. To consummate the IIohenzollern
policy a military force was provided for far
beyond the natural requirement of her terri
tory. Stein and Scharnhorst, her great War
Ministers, had already begun the new de-
velopmont. Vast aud far-reaching reforms
were part of tie policy.
The remains of feudal servitude were abol-
ished. The towns received increased politi-
cal privileges. Taxation was equalized, and
civil Offices thrown open to every nation.
This was during the period of helpless pros
tration at the feet of the great Bonaparte.
The military system that in the campaign
of 1915 restored glory and freedom to Prussia
was perpetrated with increased efficiency.
All former exemptions from service in favor
of the noblesse were abrogated. Every ma
tive of the State on completing his twentieth
year was to be held bound to form part of its
defensive power.
The system comprised:
l. A Standing Army.
2. A Landwehr of the first CALL
3. A Landwehr of the second call.
4. The Landsturn.-
| The Landwehr of the first call was design
ed to support the standing army in case of
war. aud that of the second call to strengthen
the garrisons and for other special services
which the emergency might require. They
seem to be analogous, in service, to our
famous hundred days men, though the period
of service is not limited. The Landsturn are
only to be called ort in the provinces actual
ly invaded. Such was the system that was
to complete the liberation of Prussia within
( Just half century. This was done at
Sadowa in 1866.
Many defects in the system were corrected
previous to the campaign of Solferino. The
standing army was enlarged to the dimen-
sions which the Landwehr of the first call
would previously have given it, and the an
nual supply of recruits drafted into the line
was increased from 100000 to 63, 900.
The administration aimed in all things to
the great end Of depriving Austria Of the
Presidency of the Bund, to thrust hes out of
the German Confederation, and leave Prussia
free to draw to herself the weaker States by
the centripetal force of the central power.
Sadowa achieved that object. At this battle
the Austrains had the advantage in numbers,
in physical strength, and in the experience
of war. Except in the Danish campaign of
1864, in which the P.ussians did not greatly
distinguish themselves, very few men in their
ranks at Sadowa had seen actual warfare.
France, Pussa aud England anticipated the
success of Austria. But sadly were they dis
appointed. The defeat of the Austrains was
scarcely less decisive than those of Austerlitz
ard Wagram.
The threatened war now agitating the
world is only a complement to Sadowa.
France was humiliated by that victory.
Austria was abased, and, as she believes,
greatly wronged. Prussia has known that
another battle must be fought, and she has
made ready for it. She knew that diploma
tic biggling would be useless, and hence
gave France the free privilege of declaring
war at her own pleasure. She has doubt
less known what to depend upon from Rus
sia, as France has known what Austria
would gladly do. The latter power has been
rapidly recovering from the blow at Ssdowa,
under Minister (Beust) who is worthy of
mention with Bismarck himself. France
has also been preparing for the struggle.
It is believed in London that one Of the OBJ
Iiects of the war on the part of Prussia will
be the recovery of the provinces Of Alsace
aud Lorraine, which contain the modern de-
partments of Meuse, Moselle, Meurthe,
Lower Rhine and Upper Rhine. The terri
tory which it is said Prussia wants may be
summed up thus:
Square XII. Population.
Meuse. 6,103 100000
i Moselle 5.327 100000
Nenrtbe 6,100 10000
Vosces. S, $50 100000