The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-30

Sui association of the NatioadI- Verein became
in the hands of M. de Bismarck blind aad
ready instrument for his purposes. At the
same time he endeavored to cut up by the
root those governments which, by giving
them certificates of their continued exist
ence, he induced to enter into the
new Confederation. He destroyed their
popularity by imposing upon them
the same military charges as were laid on the
Prussian provinces. The minor German
States thus found their expenses almost tre-
bled at one stroke. The duchy of SAKE
Cobourg had entered into a convention with
Prussia, some years before, for military
contingent, paying annually to Prussia so
thalers or 300 francs for the support of each
of its men, but this figure was reduction
accorded the duchy as a sort of inducement
to others, when Prussia still dreaded Aus
tria's outbidding her for influence with
them. To-day Prussia requires from the
duchy 10 thalers or 637 francs so eentimes
for the same support. The contingent
imposed by the Germanic Confederation upon
the grand duchy of SAKE cost about 2I0,OO0
thalers, or 900, 600 francs year; to sustain
the new military state will entail upon it an
expense of SO0,000 thalers, or 5000, 600 of
francs. The small German Governments
had known how to conciliate the population
by letting them escape those crushing
charges which pressed so heavily on their
more powerful neighbors. The first care of
Prussia has been to deprive them of this ad-
vantage, and this reason for their continued
existence.
AVERSION OF THE MINOR STATES TO THEIR ABB
soRPTIoN BY PRUSSIA.
In the midst of such state of things, the
Prussian system, coHfding in the force of it's
organization, presents itself as necessity
which is imposed upon Germany. It will
ho.,1 a.
ments, quite dissimilar, but equally opposed
to it's domination, the one in the North, which
is averse to Capitalization, the other in the
South, which contemplates q new confede-
ration.
The nature of the former is easily explained
The present position of Germany satisfies it's
national self-love. This position gained, it
does not see the necessity of sacrificing all
its traditions and local institutions, its par
ticular interests, to the uniformity Of the
Prussian system. Those who have the most
ardent desire to see Prussian hegemony esta-
blished, find it advisable not to push the
matter further at present. Annexation, pure
and simple, has to-day fewer partisans in the
smaller States than it had when they
entered, willingly or unwillingly, INTO
the Confederation of the North They
know what their capitals wouldlose by becom
ing Prussian sub-prefectures. The universi-
ties, even, although they have always been the
chief toci of the desire for unity do not wish
to lower their flag before Berlin, whilst in
the armies of these States you will find senti-
ments of jealousy and sometimes of rancor
towards the Prussian army. In fine, the men,
bers of these administrations are fully aware
that the result of such would be to remove
them from their present position, and prevent
them from occupying other than inferior
places, leaving the more important to
functionaries of Prussian origin. SO
far as the masses are concerned,
they hesitate. Prussia seems to say to
them, ''Since you have to bear all the bur-
dens of Prussian subjects, is it not better
You should participate in all the advantages ?"
but they dread the despotic tendencies of the
administration, and the difficulties of every
kind which it has had to encounter in the
provinces it annexed are not encouraging to
the friends of annexation in the adjacent
countries. There does not exist, in fact, in
the minor states of the Confederation of the
North that great administrative .machinery
necessary for the establishment of central
lied despotism, nor will it be established
either easily or rapidly.
SHALL THERE BE SOUTHERN GERMANIc CON-
FEDERATION?
Opinion tends in contrary direction in
the Southern States of Germany, upon whom
the isolation in which they have been placed
by the treaty OF Prague weighs heavily. The
cline of the Main," traced in all sincerity
by M. de Bismarck, who was afraid of dilut-
ing the Prussian element has never been re-
garded as serious proceeding by the Ger
mans. 1t would not have been possible ex-
cept with Prussian factions on one bank of
the river and Austrians on the ether; but
the power of Austria once got rid of, the sti-
pulations of Prague were for the South
nothing more than a sort of pepance a stake
at picquet, as collegians say, from which
sooner or later they must be relieved. Would
the people of the States of the South be
able to contend against the military
power of Prussia by making themselves
the champions of the ''liberal cause" in Ger
many, and initiating the Swiss and Belgians,
who, placed by the side of powerful neigh
bors, have compensated for their material
inferiority by the superiority of their institu-
tions? This is doubtful. A certain amount
of wind is necessary to float fiag-even the
flag of liberty-and no breath of air would
come to unfold that which the States of the
South would raise in the face of Prussia In
no case, however, have their governments
dreamt, for moment, of trying so hazardous
an experiment.. The Germany of the North
and that of the South must, in fact, become
one and the same nation. 1t is not the ques-
ton of religion which divides them.
GERMANY, NORTH AND SOUTH MUST ULTIMATELY
BE ONE.
Take, for example, the Valley of the Rhine
and the adjacent provinces; in the South, the
country of Baden, Darmstadt, and Wurtem-
burg are chiefly Protestant, while, in the
North, Westphalia and the Rhenish Provinces
are almost entirely Catholic. The south of
Germany lives by means of its connection
with the north. Its quasi capitals, Carls-
/ C&,,ft sol a II