Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1870-02-14
THE CUBAN QUESTION.
Why the Administrator Does not Risk 8
war Iith Spain.
Result Of an Interview with SumEeF BY a
Newspaper correspondent.
From the \. Y. World. Of Tbursdav- ]

Correspondent yesterday called on Mr.
Sumner, by previous invitation, ID
have an ajter-breakfast chat on such
tOpi55 as are now brought prominently
forward in the COmmJt=e on Foreign
Relations. Mr.. Sumner having aQ-
jOufned TO his working cabinet, the
same one described IN former inter-
view with the HOTid pOndent,
brought uut q large pile OF small,
yellow envelopes, which he proceeded
10 frank. Your spOndeRt seized
on the opportunity 10 open the follow
ing conversation:
Correspondent - Mr.. Sumner, do
you think that, in vieW.ot the late re-
ported successes Of the Cubans and
the generally more promising aspect
OF their affairs, the attitude Of the ad-
ministrauOn on the question Of accord
ing Cuba belligerent rights Will
undergo any immCd ate chauges
SIr. Sumuer-NO. sir. The question
Is. in ny opinion, as Tar from a solu-
ZION as ever. Indeed, the position of
fhe GoverDuaent on this question Is
made even still more delicate from the
very fact of the possible ruth Of the
reports to which you ailCde,
Granting that these reports are cor
rect, which, however, l am strongly
inclined 10 doubt, considering the
channels through which they reach
rs, the successes gained are not in
themselves OF any material lGpor-
tanc,a to the Cubans, nor Of any sigDai
disadvantage to the bpaniards. In
this view OF the case, the Government
cannot commit itself 10 any liked iiie
OF policy, either Iav0rahie OF adverse
tive TO the cause OF the rev0sntlODists,
until evidence shall have been sd
aaced which shall cOnclusiVely
prove that the one power or the
other Is clearly in the ascendant,
without the possibility, or rather the
probability, of reverse. General Pu-
clio may or may not have been de-
feated at Guiamara; he yet has at his
disposSl large fOrce Of men, and an
exhausted eXchequer-twG most vital
elements t0 The successful prosecution
of var. no fuaI!er where may be the
theater Of action. These the Cubans
do not possess, at lest IL an equal de-
gree, and their defeat l.. the l2te bat
ties would probably have sealed the.-
fate beyond the power or hope OF re-
suscitaJIUn. There Is no probability,
Il seems To me, OF this government
yielding 10 The popular clamOr on the
Cuban question until the Cubans shall
have accomplished the following re-
suits: Elrst, given evidence Of their
abIity As military power TO accom-
pilsh the purpose they profess 10 be
able 10 accJmp piish, VIZ; The driving
out OF the Spaniards from the islanC
at the point of the hayOuet; second,
ghe occupation OF some Guy or lH-
pTegnable position where all matters
having an international or legal bear
ing may be adjusted without fear OF
reversal OF Judgment IN case Of span
Ssh SUCCESS in the field. The latter
event necessarily implies the former,
but / state IL as distinct proposition
in order "a clOiEe IL with s degree OF
Importance that Il IN my opinion de-
serves. The government is not, then,
sufficiently assured on these to enable
il 10 uX It's line OF policy. CnQurs-
tiOnabiy lhe ietfiug Of the American
people Is in favor OF the recognition of
Cuba without further delay, but
hardly think hat il is their cool, sober
judgment that spHaks. We afss
DGT erceLLsHcs, IS nation. creatures OF I
impulse, and are prone 70 give free I
rsln 10 our ideas without sufficiently 4
ElLtAh AL- h aLAs AA- BlODAHa.r ANGl-tA D
9hrreirym, il carried into practical ei- 4
fect. This question OF Cuba Is not F,
really understood 8y one out OF 3 hun /
dred Of our sO-caiied thinking men. /
The workings OF the secret machinery |
nave not yeL been exposed 10 tue pub 4
lie gaze. il j. not so much what 4
fle Cubans have failed, or may
Eal. 70 accomplish, to which Is attriJ- 4
HEn rnFsa uHFrFH4Fta
Government on this question, IS il is 4
the lEobabss results That viii follow 4
the recognition o. her belligereucy by /
the United States. IN the latter case /
Spain has distinctly svOwed her IN 4
renliun OF making il q CH5ES be5J, not
standing that the re-ult O. war /
betWeel, the Two Governments could /
have but one possible resulJ-the dis I
comtture OF tle weaker power. / /
hsve no doubt Dot that SPAN would 4
gladly reliBauIsh CUbR-but it cannot 4
ba done through Intimidation or 4
threat on cur part, implied or eX- I
pressed. In spite Of tie degener8cy o. T,
The times, As evidenced in all the pur-
suits compreheDded within the mean
ing Of the words agriculture and com
merce. Spain still preserved her old /
Castilian pride IN all its pristine yigcr. /
The recOIlectiOns Of times gone by
when her Tag hOated over hundred I
citadels OF Europe-When England, 4
France, Austria, Germany, and Italy, .
10 whole or in part, bowed an humble 4
acknowledgement 70 the supremacy of /
her arms-Nhen, IN tact, her power 4
on the continent of Europe was little,
At any less than that Of ancient Rome .
COMES 10 her mind with too start
ling a force 70 suffer her pride to un-
dergo the stii iuTther humiliation Of I
yieiding, without desperate strug-
ole. Cuba-IhB brightest and most /
precious OF her island Jewels. J have /
no doubt but that, within tWeDty-tOur |
Ffvurs alter the accordance by this gov
vernnent OF beiligerent rights to .
Goba, the Spanish telegraph would .
flash q thousand contT8cts to the ship 4
Wards Of the Clyde and the Mersey for
The fitting cut Of vessels destined 70
DreV on our commerce. You see the
result at a glancS, The Alabama, a
single vessel, injured our commerce 70 1
the extent Of scores Of millions OF dol
lars; what would be the damage,
then, when a thousand Alaoamas
were let loose against us3 can hard
Iy estimate the amount In money; but
a financial cr6sh would ensUe that
would shake The pillars Of the Gov
verpnent 10 their very foundations.
C.-BHt, Mr.. Senator, could Spain
nossibly maintain such war with ide
rressnt low state Of her public credit;
and woIld not the certainty Of the
anDlication Of the iec teii0ats be suth-
ciest to deter ser from any sach eX-
frenoe course ~ the one you suggest?
Mr.. 81 do not think that Spain
would stop to consider consequences.
Tnis same Castilian pride which re-
ferred 10 a moment ago would proDa-
bly blind her to all possible results,
and until her honor was satishea shs
would struggle on TO the bitter end.
After al, I an not so sure as 10 1cfo
aC0btd come ont fret best Ia The eUsht 9f
q contest 6etageea Us and Spain. She
certainly has very little TO lose, whiie
we have everything. We might, ana
probably should, crush her on the seas,
ut the victory would be like that Of
= -rhu5-nOt 10 be repeated too Oiten'
! How long, sir, do you suppose
- war would last?
thSt sueH Until Spain felt that her
M. - ,dicated. Il might be
honoI va fa,V decisive battles on
iinil'eq lin Slgb 70 seas, an,d perhaps a single
sne -, -, the islan0 OF CUBA. der