The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-10-04
SEDAN.


Onictal Report Of the Preliminary Move-
ments.
The German official report of the opera
tions that resulted in the battle of Sedan is as
foll6ws:- r -.
The long delay of the French main army
at Metz permitted us to fight the battles of the
14th. 10th, and 18th ult in the immediate
neighborhood of that fortress, and cut off
General Bazaine from all communications
with Paris or any other part of France. But
there remained considerable portion of the
French forces ready for further action. In
consequence of the introductory operations
of the campaign, the two corps MacMahon
and Douay, as we'll as The corps Fally, dis
patched to their assistance from the capital,
had been entirely separated from the main
army. These troops retreated to Chalons,
where the 10Th Corps was then forming
under General Trochu, while another, the
18th, was being organized by General Viuoy
near Paris. With its large depots Chalons
was the very place in which to repair the
losses of the regiments that had been already
under fire, as also to organize the fresh rein
forcements sent there from different parts of
the country. The command of the new
army, consisting of these various bodies,
was entrusted to General MacMahon, the
Emperor being at his headquarters.
While such measures were being taken by
the enemy, those Prussan corps not required
before Metz had continued to advance in
westerly direction. The Sd Army, under
the command of the Grown Prince of Prussia,
which had' been steadily pushing on all the
while, now proceeded with greater rapidity.
In its onward march it was accompanied by
a new army formed of a portion of the forces
under Prince Frederick Charles, aud placed
under the Crown Prince of Saxony. Both
these armies, the latter of which consisted of
the Guards and 4th and 10Th Corps dArmee
marched in the direction of Paris. 1t would
have been decidedly desirable if they had
found their way blocked up by the French
and if a battle could have been fought on the
road to the capital. Marshal MacMahon
might have awaited us in strong position,
or under the very ramparts of Paris. Another
course open to him was to assume the offen-
sive with view to rescue General
Bazaine. As much depended upon our
aScertaining the intentions of the enemy
as soon as possible, our cavalry were sent
far in advance of the army to watch his move
ments. Up to the 24th of August the Mar
.shal held the camp of Chalons. The two
Prussian armies, not allowing their advance
to be delayed by the fortiications of Verdun,
marched straight on, and had already
reached the line Clermont- Vitry, when, Just
as they were concentrating preparatory to the
attack upon Chalons, news arrived on the
25th which rendered it probable that
MacMahon had evacuated his camp He
was reported to have taken the road to
Rheims. One of the inferences to be deduced
from this was that, picking his way along the
narrow strip of land between the Belgian
frontier and the right wing of the Gro vn
Prince of Saxony, the Marshal might possibly
attempt to relieve Metz. 1t was evident that
if the proper measures were taken instan-
taneously by us, the Marshal would find it
very difficult to succeed in his
enterprise Accordingly, our ad-
vance upon Paris was suspended on the
night of the 25th. On the 26th the S5th
Corps d'Armee, which had been marching
west, effected change of front, and, turning
north, prepared to intercept the enemy on
his march along our flank. The difficulties
of this movement were increased by our
march lying partly through the Argonne
forest. Care was, moreover taken to pre-
vent the enemy from falling back upon Paris,
in case he should find it impossible to pene-
trate to Metz. Supposing our being able to
surround MacMahon, he would be obliged to
fight under the most unfavorable conditions,
or to find safety for his ar my in Belgium.
The Corps Vinoy not having as yet arrived,
we had great numerical superiority over the
French, then estimated at about 120, 900; but
it was not so easy for us to bring up our
forces in time to use them. While our troops
were approaching from a considerable dis
tance, it became certain that MacMahon had
really flank march in view. On the 10Th,
his four corps were stationed on the two roads
from LIE Chene to Stenay, two being eche-
tonnes on each. On that day our troops ex-
tended from Grand Pre- to Stenay, our van
being in. front of the enemy The 18th Corps
dArmee, by the engagement at Nouart,
prevented the most easterly division of
the French from continuing its march.
Under these circumstances, Marshal
MacMahon had only to choose between
fighting on the left or the right bank of the
Meuse, in which latter case he would be able
to profit by the vicinity of Sedan. He chose
the latter alternative, and on the Both Of
August began to cross the Meuse. Before
his retreat could be effected, the left wing
was attacked by the Crown Prince of Saxony
at Beaumont, and his rear surprised at Mou-
zon. The French corps sent to the rescue of
the latter force suffered much in crossing the
river in presence of our troops. What fol-
lowed is known. We may add that from what
has recently come to light, MacMahon's army
was not 12O, 900 strong, as had been supposed,
but very nearly $4,000"