The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1870-09-20
CAPTAIN Bo1LEAu's CONCLUSIONS

from these experiments are as follows: ID
"For preaching earthwork few heavy rifed
guns are far more useful for the purpose than
a number of smaller calibre. Now, as we ex-
pect to find all iortresses of the present day
armed with rifled guns, possessing destructive
powers, and with accuracy of aim at least
equivalent to the 1l0-pounder Armstrong, we
at once see that the rules which have hitherto
been universally accepted with regard to the
thickness and rel.et OF parapets, In the con-
structlon of earthworks both for offensive and
defensive purposes. have become obsolete,
and that the minimum thickness that should
now be given to a parapet Is twenty-five feet,
with relief Of from ten to twelve feet. Again,
in looking to the increased range, as well as
to the accuracy Of aim and destructive powers
of rife guns OF the present day, fresh difficult
ties present themselves. We find that the
first parallel, with the batteries usually con-
strueted In 1t, can no longer be established at
six hundred yards, but will have to be COM
menced at q much greater distance; that the
| rate of progress OF the saps and approaches
will be much slower; that the undefended
spaces in advance OF a fortress will
now be considerably reduced; that much
more extended front will now be covered by
the fire of It's guns, necessitating the occupa-
tion OF much greater extent OF ground than
would hitherto have been found necessary;
and there is yet one most important fact we
must not loose sght of In consideration OF this
subject, viz, that the guns of the besieged Will
| be Of much larger calibre than those OF he oel
siegers. These are points that tell heavily
against the besegers and their chances OF sue
cess when carrying out the details OF attacks ID
accordance with principles which have hitherto
proved sound and eminently successful. In
| fact the Increased difficulties and vast expen.
dIture OF men and means that must now be
| experienced by q besieging force, are such as
to render the question Of attack one well
worthy of the time and attention ofthe most
competent authorities, with view to the es-
! tablishment-of general principles for iuture
guidance better suited 10 the emergencies OF
| the case than those which have hitherto been
set forth, but have now become deficient and
| inapplicable. 60 T.
with much greater force to the employment OF
| rined 400 and 500.pounders In the defence
than they do to the use OF only llO-pounders.
The anxiety Of the Augsburg Gazette for an
| Immediate advance on Paris before the arrna-
ment OF her forts with naval artillery is COM
pleted, Is very natural, and possibly the design
Of the apparently. precipitate advance of por-
ton of the Prlssfan army on Paris may be to
cnt the railways connecting that capital with
! the great naval arsenals; with the object OF
arresting the armament of the forts. And.
similarly, the intention Of McMahon's raid TO
the West may have been to draw of the Prus-
Sieu e>i uiyt ~ 90 w S'e al 10 0'iie w eoPS
her armaments.
1t Is, of course, possible that the French
War Minister has not avaied himself of his
opportunities for armlng the lines OF Paris
with naval artillery to the extent that the
French papers assert; still more possible that
the defence may be paralyzed By divided coun-
ellis and dylastic jealousies. But, If the rulers
of the hour could but emulate the terrible en-
ergy and more than Roman persistence of the
Committee of Public Safety OF 1893, the llti-
mate result OF Prussian siege of Paris wonld
not admit OF moments doubt. am, sir,
your obedient servant,