The daily phoenix. [volume] (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, 1870-04-13

ber OF sle6tsfa to Be 100. .00N, and 81
Representatives 10, and 10. 600 votes to be
sufficient for election; and then suppos-
ing six candidates to have received each
15, 600, that ISL 80, 000aiin all, and two
others each 5000. Here are 10000 bur-
plus votes cast for the elected candidates,
and 10000 insuf1oient votes divided be-
tween two persons, so s;to give neither
OF them enough to elect him; the plan we
are speaking of allows the three elected
candidates to cast 10000 surplus votes,
and the two defeated candidates to cast
10, 600 insufficient votes for new capdi-
dates. Those eight persons would substi-
tute four other persons as the candidates
to receive the 10000 votes, and would
elect them to serve with the six fret
elected.
The fifth plan is sometimes called that
OF pro:ry voting, which permits every
voter to givo his vote or proxy to any
person he pleases, and that person to
represent him in the Representative
Chamber if lie can unite upon himself
other proxies sufficient to make up the
electoral quota, and if he receives more
than this sufficient number, then to cast
additional votes in the chamber, pro-
portional to the number of proxies re-
ceived. This is the plan put forth three
years ago by the Personal Representa-.
ton Society Of New York.
The sixth plan is that of list-voting, or
what is called the free concurrence of
lists or the open list-a plan recommend
ed by the Reformers OF Germany, second
in merit only to the plan OF preferential
voting. It supposes lists Of candidates
containing each the names of as many
as there are representatives to be chosen,
ranged in the order of preference, to be
deposited with the proper authorities q
certain time before the election and num-
bered. Each elector gives his vote for q
particular list. The whole number of
votes for that list is divided by the
electoral quotion, and the result gives
the number of candidates chosen on
that list. For example, If there be
fifteen representatives to be elected.
1900 voters, and five lists of candi-
dates. List A receiving 5000 votes
secures five representatives; list B re-
oeiving 1000 votes secures four repre-
sentatives; list G receiving 5000 votes
secures three representatives; liat D re-
ceiving 1000 votes secures two repre-.
sentatives; list E receiving 1000 votes
secures one representative.
In case of o vacancy caused by death
or resignation, election on more than
one list, or other cause, the place is to
be supplied by the candidate next in
order. This plan would operate thus in
q State having 100000 voters and ten
Representatives. in Congress to choose,
and three parties with each list: List
receiving GO. 600 votes, list B receiving
30, 600 votes, and list @ receiving 10000.
The quota or electoral quotient being
10. 900, list A would be entitled to six
representatives, list B to three, and list
@ to one. The six highest names on list
A, the three highest on list B, and the
one highest on list G would then be
chosen as the Representatives of the
State in Congress. I have given these
different plans in general terms with
very little detail, but sufficient, think,
to show the principle on which each of
them rests. Preferential voting avoids
both the objection of too great concen-
tration of votes upon one person and
the loss of votes below the quota, since
no candidate can have counted in his
favor more than enough to elect him,
and every vote will be counted except
the number less than quota left after
electing the required number of candi-
dates. Other difficulties, however, might
appear in the actual working of any of
the plans, which we do not now fore
see.