Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1870-07-20
War Between France and Prussia.

Last week We duuouuCSu Il DIOoapiC up
ture between France and Prussia Now comes
the intelligence of the commencement of
hostilities-an engagement having taken
place at Forbach, on the Rhine. The Prus-
sian loss is given at 5000 and the French at
1000, but needs confirmation. The Pitts
burgh Dispatch after announcing the be
ginning of hostilities continues:
1t was regarded as entirely probable, from
the first explosion of i'll feeling over the
candidature Of Prince Leopold, that war
between these two powers would ensue.
But il is not necessary to look Tor the cause
in recent events--these have been mrely
/ the pretext. The trouble lies far deeper.
/ In one sense, ii is family fued between
/ the Napoeous and the Hohenzollerns, hand
/ ed down from the First NaI oleon and Fred
/ erick William In the wars of the great
/ Napolien, Prussia was at one time despolled
/ OF half her territory, which was confirmed
( to France by the treaty Of Iilsi. This act
Of spoliation embittered the royal family OF
/ Prussia ex ,eediDgly, especially Queen Lou
| isa, who from that time necessarily plotted
against France, and was an important agent
/ III bringing about the Continental alliance.
/ 1t Is said that she was with the column OF
/ Blucher at the battle Of Waterloo, and IN
I
hatred against Napoleon. The treaty of
/ Paris more than restored to Prussia her
/ original territory. That portion lying on
/ the French side Of the Rhine has been 4
source OF trouble and controversy from the
! time of the accession OF Napoleon Third to
/ the throne. War has seemed imminent
several times, with the ostensible object of
/ rectiication of boundary, but was aycrted
/ by dlsplomecy. At the close OF the Of
/ 1866, France would haYe engaged Prussia
! in war wele it not for the fact that the Prus-
sian army was mobIlized and in the flush of
/ victory, aud therefore in better condition
/ for ttial Of strength than it might be at
/ some subsequent time. But the bitter feel
/ Ing between the two families Was clearly APP
/ paren. at the time
The political cause for the war is, the
large accession of territory and population
to PrussIs as the result Of the campaign OF
| 1866 against Austria. This dii much to
ward consolidating all the German princi
! palities under Prussian protection, If it did
not indeed combine them A. a part of the
! Prussian nationality. This, for all practical
/ purposes, gave Prussia cue of the largest
! populations Of Europe, and elevated her to
! a first calss position among the powers Of
/ Europe. Added to this, Prussia has pur-
sued a careful, but aggressive policy, and
since 1866, has really contested with France
the POLITICAL dominaLcy of Europe. Ii has
| been evident for some time that she was
| drawing other great powers into close
friendly alliance but for what purpose could
| only be conjectured But the close alliance
/ sought with Spain, by the elevation Of
! Prussian Prince to the throne, could not be
/ misunderstood. Taken IN connection with
ether intrigues, of which the French I'm
| peTOr could not be ignorant, 1t was threat
| against France Ii meant the extension OF
| the power and influence of Prussia, as 4
! part ct her preparation for the incytab,e
collision with France. In getting hold of
! Prlm, and inducing him TO accept Prince
/ Leopold, Bismarck gained a victory oyer
! Napoleon. But the sudden action Of France
! dcpriyes Prussia OF the advantage Of the
/ diplomatic success, unless a a result Spain
should JOIN fortunes with her. 1t is then
/ contest for influence and power. 1t trans
/ ters the decision from the realms of intrigue
and diplomacy TO the field OF battle. The
| victor there will gain tremendously over
! his opponent.
The appeal to the fortune of arms involves
| lar reaching consequences tc both parties al
, issue. Prussia, If she gains the day, will be
the dominant POLITICAL power of Europe,
unless Russia should dispute the claims.
| If she fail she will be shorn OF her Rh ne
| pro'i"ces, and reduced in point of political
| influence TO ssecoud rate power The pres
! tige OF SJdowa and 1866 will be broken
| On the other hand, France, if successful,
| viii gain largely in territory aud population,
vail recover her waning political prestige,
| Eill sep dissensious al home, will extend
her pawcr into, and perhaps over Spain, aud
! Napoleon viii have apparently securely cs
tablished his dynasty. He will stand on a
his her pinnacle than ever. Bat If he tails,
:acre Is great reason Tor believing that his
dynasty viii be blOttcd out and France torn
with internal GIssensioHs lie therefore
takes larger risk than Prussia, and plays
Tor larger spoils. The urgency with which
he has pushed on to war, leads to the opin-
ION that ne i confident Of success. or that
he Is IiuT e!cd Ny some danger not apparent
20 the public The force OF the armies of
France aad Prussia are too nearly equal for
nHch advantage 10 be predicted on these
alone. 1t is said that France has SO. .O0O
men ready To march at the tap Of the drum.
Whllc Prussia, with North Germany, can
command $40, GOO men at once. Thus, so
i-r as mere war!ike force is concerned, the
iT0 poTers arc very nearly equal. Much
must, therefore, depend ou he facility with
which troops can be concentrated at given
POINTS by either Of the two powers. The
character Of the arms furnished the troops
Is smother important consideration II, as
Is generally supposed, france can concen-
tr1te the largest force at given points and if
the ChasSapot rife shall prove as destruc
tive as 1t is claimed 10 be, the Prussisns
VIII hnG the French too strong TO resist
But If Prussia succeeds i'm nlassing her
troops, and the needle gun has been greatly
improved, the French will find vigorous |
enemy. But all that can be said on this |
subject Is mere speculation, except that the /
teiegtams indicate SO far, that the French /
are ahead IN nassing troops on the Rhine. I
On the ocean the French arc vastly superior /
in the number Of ships and in armament. /
10 every appearance 10 this direction, Prus- /
sia must be utterly beaten.
The war is to be utterly regretted, as oc
casioRIng an immense slaughter, yet il is /
possible that in Is ultimSte effects it may
be beneficial to the race.
China, with a generosity which does inf
mite credit to its civilization b.s o,,,rc,,,.;o