The New York herald., 1870-05-07
ST. DOMINGO.
President Grants Negotiations for a
FOothOld in the Antilles.
sewarGs Real Estate Aims-The Fabens Mis-
don-Plan Of Annexation-The Financial
Condition Of Dominica Aims
The Babcock Mission-The Vote Of tho
Dominican People on Annexation.

Inc baDcOcK 0leNon-Ino Vote OF tho
Dominican People on Annexation.
The following extracts. taken from pamphlet by
Mr.. William l.. Cazneau, and recently published In
St Domingo City, throws new light and furnishes
additional deras Of the negotiations relative TO the
St Domingo annexation scheme The pamphlet
treats very fully on the subject and reviews the
previous negotiations inaugurated In this country
under the Pierce and Buchanan administrations
looking towards the securing Of o naval station in
the West Indies. The following extracts. however,
more particularly apply to recent events:-
SANTANA AND ANNEXATION. ~
About the close Of the preceding administration OF
President Cabral the Dominican Cabinet decided TO
accept Mr. Sewards offer OF 81 for the penin-
sula OF Samana. This much was known to the new
government, and hat the treaty was left incomplete
from the inability OF the negotiators to fulfil the
doubt as TO whether the Dominican republic was
committed to al absolute sale. To clear up this
uncertainty and to learn what relations the United
States government was disposed 70 establish with
the restored State, Colonel J. w. Fabens was des-
patched on Q confidential mission to Washington.
There remained no doubt that the offer and accept
ance OF Two millions for the cessi0n In sovereignty
OF samana mad liked the minimum price, and con-
sidering the situation and character OF that penins
Ia the terms were scarcely open to criticism. 1t may
rank tn pecuniary fairness with the beat OF ma
having proceeded no farther than executive neg0tta
tion It could only be binding after II had been sub
Of the contracting parties Tiat result was hopeless.
The Congress OF the United States certain to
fuse to the Johnson administration the and the
means 10 perfect the Samana purchase and the Baez
Cabinet was equally certain not 70 carry on the
project OF Its Caba rival unless forced to 1t by de.
cslve prcactiOn 1T washington in recognizing and
confirming the Seward agreement. That failing all
failed for the time. The Fabens mission was never
theess, success, IL brought President Baez into
complete and confidential Communication with our
government on subjects OF the very highest national
Importance These negotiations rapidly changed
fhn m 81 In N n N m fnPa a nex
THE SITUATION OF THE REPUBLIC.
Colonel FabeIs was personally Instructed by
President BaeZ ITO state the situation OF the Dominl-
can republic with bhe most absolute frankness.n
The washington Cabinet was TO fully understand
that the cession OF Samana would be painful sacri
hce, only submitted to as last resort TO save
the republic from stlli greater misIortunes. In
tnat conversation the Incorporation oil the Do
minican republic as State OF the Union on the
Texas precedent, was suggested as the only radical
cure Tor the evils to which small republic sur
rounded by uncongenia Powers must necessarily be
subjected. The Dominican envoy departed Tor
Washington well informed OF what the principal
ctizens OF the republic without distinction OF party
official position thought OF the wants or the co,l-
try. He was in every way prepared to meet almost
any question that could arse with accurate explain.
ati0n Secretary Seward was stiil at the head OF
the State Department and still intent on securing
PERMANENT NAVAL STATION IN THE WEST INDIES;
but Congress was nexorably opposed TO the Execu,
tive, and no unanimity OF action was 60 be hoped
for however Samana and St. Domingo might be pre-
sented. Members OF the Committees on Foreign Re-
iatIons in both houses OF Congress were privately
consulted, and so were several distinguished
and most Of these gentlemen were Of
republic would be grand and decisive step in be-
half OF the naLl0nal creed, 'America for the Ameri
cans" With this party SANTANA, whatever might
be the expressed terms Of the cesson, was cOnsid.
cred but the entering wedge for a course of action
which must eventuate In Withdrawing oil the Antilles
from European domination.
A NEGLECTED. AMERICAN STATE.
The resolutions offered BY Generals Banks and
did not pass bnt they did the work principally In
tended. 1t was apubc declaration Of an interest III
young ana nitnerto negiected american state, well
States, while It significantly hinted to other Powers
tnat 1t had ceased 10 be an altogether endless ma
tO,.allty 1t also Justified system OF thorough in-
curry and frank response which, without these kindly
anlecedent 1t would not have been easy to make at
once so complete and yet so closely confidential. The
| friends Of annexation at Washington had laid the
| whole case before President Grant, with reliable
| statements Of the revenues public debt civil and
military situation Of the country, and the general
position of the Dominican government. The requi
site data mad been carefully collected reduced to the
Clearest detail, and conveyed by C0one Fabens to
Washington.
HOME AND FOREIGN DOMINICAN DEBT.
These authentic statements proved that the Do
minican debt, foreign and domestic, scarcely
reached one million and half while the Custom
n%ae e sr~e sSc N anas
mines was almost intact, and tnat the reports to
the contrary were simply misrepresentation. Care
had been taken to have the array OF facts candid and
complete for chain OF consequences yet unweigned
| in American policy hung upon General Grants
| IN CASE THE UNITED STATES REFUSE
Ia st. Domingo and the other Antilles to be received
IN the American Union or shall 1t become the start
ing point for the confederation OF outside power
! under European influence and protection? 1t is too
freely assumed in the United States that 'nevltable
OF precautiOn or craftsmanship; tnat Cuba and all
other territorial fruits will gravtae TO her, unasked,
as they npen; but tnis lonn may y prove rove mistake
European capitalists and European enterprise are
| initiating policy tn ST. Domingo which, II Wash
ingtOn were to remain passive, might end in con-
| federatlng the Antilles into power Of unexpected
Importance. The growth Of ideas Is keeping. pace
with steam and telegraph and the creation OF sucn
| than most people imagine IA
THE BABCOCK MISSION.
| President Grant comprehended the situation and
| acted upon it, He despatched General Orvilie +.
Babcock on q confidential mission OF inquiry to the
! Dominican Executive. He was met with candor!
| Views were interchanged as to what was possible
and desirable on both sides, and after several un-
brief memorandum. These interviews were held
| directly with President Baez In his private Office.
| One or two members Of his Cabinet were usually
present. and was invited to attend them and assist
In explaining various details which naturally came
up In settling the basis OF the future treaty. Colonel
| Fabens, VINO had accompanied General Babcock
| from Washington, and who, with what unofficial
assistance could render from here, had conducted
the negotiation up to this point was OF course
| plan was created and shaped by the exlgencies Of
Inc PERIOD General BabcOck left for Washington
| -,
dtiOns, aud he returned on the 18th of November to
perfect the arrangement for SANTANA and annexa-
| ton The terms OF the double treaty and the mo-
tves for their adoption may be stated in u few SEN
| tences. The Samana cesson was separately elnbO-
died, because 1t was suitable pivot for instant
| ton, and instant action was imperative The Do
! minican Cabinet, knowing how much more had been
offered for the inferior area OF ST. Thomas, would
not entertain proposals for less than two millions for
| the bay and peninsula OF Samana and In any case
would greatly prefer the annexation Of the whole
republic to the alienation OF any section Of its terri.
tory.
THE DOMINICAN PEOPLE TO VOTE ON THE SUBJECT.
The Will OF the Dominican people was to be con-
| suited by o plebiscftu'n Should they vote for an
neXation, and the Congress of the United States
firm IT, the sum OF s., 500 600 was agreed upon a
just equivalent for the forts, public edces &C., per-
tanning to the supreme national sovereignty. Presl-
dent Baez stipulated for this amount, as simply
sulcienr to cancel the outstanding paper issues and
other liabilities OF the republic and enable the State
to enter upon its status unembarrassed by debt
| The valuable mines and public lands, which are