The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-29

perly commanded by an officer on foot, each
captain. when he is forced by the nature of
the ground 20 dismount, loses control over
his men, and they in turn, seeking each his
own line for safety's sake, the company itself
becomes broken up. So long, it is argued,
as there is an advance, and q success, so long
this is comparatively unimpoxtant; but as
soon as it becomes q question Of retreat these
scattered bodies, without cohesion, without
commanders, become mixed, and joining
together as best they may, form bodies which
are wanting in the elements Of unity and of
strength. Such we're the extraordinary
mixed columns o n which the Hanove-
rian cavalry threw themselves at
La~ngansalza, composed not only of
entire companies, but of detached individuals
and fractions from many battalions. Here,
say the French, is the weak point of the
Prussian company system. On the other
hand, the Prussians, as we have seen, claim
for this system that so long as they have cap
tains really capable of taking command, and
acting Independently, so long is this company
the best unit for movements under the pre-
else fire of modern arms. 1t is, in fact, the
key of their whole system Of infantry tactics.
They say that in this power of breaking up a
battle into a number of partial and local
actions lies their real superiority; but even
the most enthusiastic admirers of the system
admit that under q reverse, and if reserves
are not at hand on which to rally, the most
dangerous results may arise. But, they say,
we take the bad with the good; q large bat
talon would be annihilated in advancing
against an enemy, and we neutralize as much
as possible the danger of excessive dispersion
by the instruction given to our officers and
men.
Both Prussians and French recognize that
skirmishers are no longer merely q screen,
| but a line Of attack and defense. Thus the
Prussian advanced guard throws out its skir-
mishers to cover the advance of every COM
pany column, for which purpose one-third of
each company is employed. But here, again,
it is often complained that the Prussian Skin
mishers lose their own companies when they
are driven in, and that hence great confusion
arises, and more than one writer, from Prince
Frederick Charles to the author of the "Tacti-
cal Retros pect, advocates the employment of
whole companies as skirmishers, not of frac-
tons of companies as now.
There is little doubt that the French artil-
lery will be found superior to the Prussian.
The French artillery is always on a war foot
ing; the Prussian artillery has a very different
effective in peace and in war. In peace the
batteries have only four guns, and when they
are modified they have six. Thus the bat
teries which enter on a campaign have raw
horses for one-third of their guns and car
riages, the non- commissioned officers and mon
have to be redistributed, and there is not
that perfect training and understanding be-
tween men and horses, and between officers
and men, which exists in French and English
batteries, and which is absolutely essential to
f~rst-rate service in the field. The author of
the Tactical Retrospect" severely c~riticises
the tactical failure of the P~russiau artillery in
1866. 1t did not, he says, find its proper
place in action. 1t was wasted, and out of
the way, while the Austrian guns were doing
good service. There was a want of tactical
daring among its officers. Infantry columns
were launched to the attack unsupported by
artillery, and on positions which the artillery
had not previously shaken. Doubtless, the
lesson will not be without its effect. AS
regards the actual armament of the rival
powers, there is but little to choose between
them. Prussia, in the midst of abandoning
her steel for bronze will take both into action.
Her breech-loaders have almost the same
range and projectiles as the French muzzle-
leaders; and we may confidently say that,
should they come into collision, it is their
tactical use that will give one or the other the
performance, not their material or nature.
In this point we notice a distinct difference
between the tactics of the two nations, SO far
as we can judge. The Prussians, like the
Austrians, are inclined to keep their guns far
back, and to fire at ranges of from 2000 to
5000 yards over the heads of their advancing
columns. Theoretically, they get all the ad.
vantage of their artillery, and the gunner
can work quietly and undisturbed; practi
cally, lose the confidence of the guns being
at their side. But the attack will not fire or
this distant artillery when they can throw
grape into the bodies of infantry in the front
There is one weapon which Prussia has no
the "witwillear." France has many bat
teries of these, each of eight guns, each gnr
worked by three sub-officers; each gun SHOULD
throw three hundred shots per minute for five
or six consecutive minutes, to considerable
ranges, and with accuracy.