Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-04-12

| SeQtdLlFeSst llSL " receiving J,UuU VOteS
secures three representatives; list ID re-
ceiving 1000 votes secures two represen-
tatives; list E receiving 1000 votes Sc
enres one representative.
l. In. ease of vacancy caused by death
| or resignation, election on more than one
list, or other cause, the place is to be sup
piled by the candidate next in order. This
plan would Operate thus in State having
| 100, 600 voters and ten representatives in
Congress to choose, and three parties with
each list: List A receiving 10000 votes,
| list D receiving so, 600 votes, and list G
receiving 10, 900 votes. The quota or
electoral Vquotient being 1000, list A
would be entitled to six representatives,
list to three, and dist G to one. e The
six highest names on list A, the three
highest on list B, and the one, highest on
list @ would then be chosen as the repre-
sentatiVes of the State in Congress.
have given these different plans in general
terms with very little detail, but sufficient
l think, to show the principle on which
each of them rests. Preferential voting
avoids both the objections of too great
concentration of votes upon one person,
and the loss of votes below the quota,
since no candidate can have counted in
his favor more than enough to elect him,
and every vote win be counted except the
number less than quota left after elect
ing the required number of candidates.
Other difficulties, however, might appear
in the actual working of any of the plans,
| which we do not now foresee. o
no 9di AN EXPERIMENT.
Indeed, though / am confident that any
of these schemes would go far to purify
our elections and our legislation, think
the preference among them can only be
decided by actual experiment. Some of
them may be best in large constituency
and others in small one. If / might
choose which to begin with and where to
begin, would try the plan of cumulative
voting for members of Congress in the
State of Massachusetts, and that of lin
tied voting for Aldermen in the city of
New York. The former might require
concurrent legislation of Congress and of
the general court; the latter only an act of
the New York Legislature. In either
case the process would be simple enough.
To begin with the congressional legisla-
ton in this State You send ten members
to the House of Representatives, and you
have about two hundred thousand voters.
Every voter would give ten votes, which
he might scatter among ten candidates or
cumulate them upon less number, even
upon one. The whole number of votes
TO be counted would be two millions.
Parties are divided between the Repub-
licans and Democrats in nearly the pro-
portion of twO-thirds to the former and
One-third to the latter, giving the Repub-
licans about ! 81, 900 votes, and the Demo
Gratis about 000-thOugh the latter
have not single member of Congress.
Each party would calculate its strength
beforehand and nominate as many candi-
dates as it was confident of electing. If
the Republicans were to nominate full
ticket of ten candidates, they could give
each only 134, 900; while the Democrats,
if they nominated four candidates, could
give each of them 165, 600 votes. The re-
suit would be that the Republicans would
nominate only seven or eight candidates,
and the Democrats three or four. There
would also be an opportunity for any num-
Der of voters, wherever obtained through
out the State, not less than 20, 600 in all,
to elect their own candidate, without re-
gard to either party. If by chance,
most improbable one, the votes should
be cumulated upon less number of can
didates than ten, new election would
have 10 be ordered TO supply the def
cheney.
if irregularities or difficulties appear in
the practical working, and such are likely
to occur in the introduction of every new
scheme, they can be remedied afterward
as occasion offers. When once the theory
of proportional representation is reduced
to practice, and made familiar TO the
people, it viii assert its superiority. If
any one Of the methods of practical ap-
plicatiOn is found imperfect, it will give
way to another and better. All the plans
which have been explained are kindred in
general theory and in purpose. All Of
them viii give to minority party repre-
sentatiOn proportional to its numbers; and
most of them will give to electors who
are not partisans an opportunity of being
heard and felt IN representive halls. The
-elector would be Independent of party in
his choice of candidate, and the person
selected without party nomination would
be beyond the domination of nominating
conventions or party managers. Even
those would be put upon their good behav-
Tor by the knowledge that their favor was
not essential to the success of any man,
and their candidates being placed in COM
petition with men independently nomi-
mated, would have to be selected with
more attention to their fitness. Any per-
son who has the confidence of quota of
electors could be elected to represent
them, whatever party, or partisan tool,
or ruler might say. No bully of the pri-
maries, no tempter of the lobby, no hound
of the party, would have dominion over
him. We boast that popular repre-
sentative republican government is the
| best in the world. have already shown
how far in practice we fall behind our
theory. To this cause is due in no small
degree the corruption, gross and mon
strous, which Oppresses US. We have
saved the life of the nation in its struggle
with slavery and rebellion. We have now
to save it from another enemy more subtle
| and not less fOrmidable-otficial and cleo
toral corruption. There is no time to be
| lost; let us begin at once. -