Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1870-03-30

e "Our material can only be saved by using
a the whole army to oOverit IL we are pressed.
: result might be the loss Of much material
/. and many men. / will be at the telegraph
. office Tomorrow morning."
: This is twelve days after the first
order was given to remove the sick,
: and nine days after the peremptOry
order was given to remove his army
/ with all dispatch, and thirteen DAYS
after General Pope had started on his
campaign. Dates are very important
: in this matter. On August 0 General
/, Halleck telegraDhed to General Nc
Clellan:
D II am of the opinion that the enemy is
S massing his forces in front Of Generals Pope
! and Burnside, and that he expects to crush
them and move forward to the PotOmac-
You must send reinforcements instantly to
r Aqua Creek.
considering the amount of transporta-
tton at your disposal, your delay is not sat
, CELEBRITY"
That was August 8; and on the 18th
] of August Mcclellan says the army
cannot be moved in less than a month";
! 1t was moved in less than fifteen days.
As | said before, dates are of the ut
most importance in this connection.
On August Is General Halleck tele-
) graphed to General Pope:
"I fully approve OF your movement. hope
TO push part of Burnside's forces TO near
Barnetts ford by tomorrow night to assist
you in holding that pass. Stand firm on the
line Of the RappahannOck till can help
you. Fight hard, and aid will soon come"
General Pope in lfis report says:
my orders require me to keep myself
closely in communication with Fredericks-
4 arTfa Of HNaa Dot,
mac was being brought from the peninsula
with the purpose of reinforcing me from
that place by the side Of the RappahannOcl.
My force was too small to enable me to ex-
tend my right further without so weakening
my line as TO render II easy for the enemy 10
break throu h it at any point. I telegraph
ed again and again to Washington, repre-
senting this movement of the enemy toward
my right, and the impossibility OF my being
able to extend my lines so as to resist with
out abandoning my connections with Fred
ericksburg. was assured on the 2lst that If
| l would hold the line of the river two days
longer should be 50 strongly reinforced as
not only to be secure, but TO be able TO re-
sumo offensive operations"
On the 2lst of August General Hal
leck telegraphs:
General Pope: have telegFaphed General
burnside TO know at what hour he can re-
| enforce Reno. Am waiting his answer
! Every effort must be mi de to hold the Rap
| pahannock. Large forces viii be in to-
II. W. HALLECK, Generat-f,,- Chief
And again on the same day-bear
in mind, this was on the 2lst, or nine
| days before the final battle on the 3Oth
General Halleck telegraphs:
/ UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.
/ WAR DEPARTN'T, WAsHINGT'N, dug. p, 1862
General Pope: / have inst sent General
\ Burnside's reply. General CoX's forces are
/ coming in from Parkersburg and will be
v,N
/ inch of ground, and fight like the devil till !
| we can reinforce you. Forty-eight hours !
more, and we can make you strong enough. /
/ Don't yield an inch If you can helpit.
| H. w. HALLECK. GeneraE-iIi-C -ChieE.
These were his orders, and he car
ried them out literally, and fought for
| eight days longer like" whatever
/ you please to say. On the ODD of Au-
gust General Pope telegraphs to the
General-in-Chief:
81 think it altogether well to bring Frank
Inns force to Alexandria. Lee made his
headquarters at Culpepper last night. He
! has the whole of his army in front of me -
! Its numbers you can estiInateas well as my
I self As soon as his plans are fully develop
! ed shall be ready to act"
/ Here Gene al Pope was, the whole
rebel army upon his hands, fighting
I in accordance with General Halleck's
( directions. On the 24th of August
General Haupt telegraphed to General
| Pope from Alexandria:
/ [Received August q, 1862, from Alexandria.
August p, 1852
UNITED STATES MILITARY TELEGRAPH.
To Major General Pope:
| Thirty thousand troops or more demand /
transportation. II is clear that the sudden 7
demand exceeds the capacity Of the road
We can manage twelve thousand troops per /
day with supplies If no accident occurs. The /
new troops might march, the veterans go in 1
eas RStses y e be 9%ggag tsfS les S Sat
precedence. HAUPT.
This was on the 9th of August, or |
six days before the final battle in /
which Pope was overwhelmed. Thirty 4
thousand troops were awaiting trans |
portation, and not man of them ever .
reached General Pope, and yet they /
were within twenty-siX miles of the .
field of battle! Not one man OF them 1
reached the battlefield, and yet they
were awaiting transportation on the
9th day of that month. On the Goth 4
of August, at eleven o'clock and forty
five minutes q. In. General Halleck
telegraphs:
Major General Pope: Not the slightest
dissatisfaction has been felt in regard 70 your
operations on the Rappahannock. The main
troops from the peninsula, although they
nave been delayed by storms. Moreover,
the telegraph has been interrupted, leaving
US for time ignorant Of the progress Of the
evacuation.
Mr.. President, what 1 have been
saying is simply preliminary to the
facts in the case of Fitz John Porter. I
On the 26th of August, 1865, at eight
o'clock, p. M, General Pope sent to
Fitz John Porter, who commanded
the freshest and largest and best corps
of the army, a dispatch, of which he
gives this account in his report:
Thinking it altogether likely that Jack
son would mass his whole force and attempt
to turn our right at BristOe station, ami ]
knowing that Hooker, for want Of amuni- ,
ton, was in little condition to make long re-
sistance. ! sent back orders to General Por-
ter about dark OF the 9th, 10 move forward ;
at one O'Clock in the night, apd report TO me
at BristOe by daylight In the morning leay-
ing instructions in some detail for Banks,
who was expected at WarrentOn junction
during that night or early in tie morning.
The orders for all those movements are here
with appended. General Porter failed utter /
" to obey the orders that were sent to him,
giving as an excuse that his men were tired;
that they would straggle in the night; and {
that wagon train proceeding eastward in ,
the rear of Hooker'S division would offer
distractions TO his march. He, however,
made no attempt whatever to comply with
this order, although II was stated to him in ,
the order itself that his presence was neees-
sary on all accounts at daylight, and that !
the officer delivering the dispatch was in
structed 10 conduct him to the field" /
The officer who carried that dis I
patch was oriered to conduct him to
the field. The whole testimony goes ,
to show that he might have been on {
the field. Thanks to the want of :
knowledge on the part of the rebel !
general, the attack was not made; no I
thanks to the Knowledge of Fitz John !
Porter, that Hooker was in front of I
the enemy without ammunition, that j
he was not destroyed before the arri- ]
val of POrter's troops. And here per- .
NIT me to say that am not making |
these statements because 1 deem it {
necessary that they should be made Z
in the FitZ John Porter case, but to [
correct the truth of history" The /
duty of general is TO march under I
his orders, and il is none of his busi- q
ness what the difficulties or the dan. I
gers of the march may be. FitZ John i
Porter, in disObeyiDg that order, rem 7
dered himself amenable to court mar
tial, to trial, and to death if that were
the Judgment of the court. But he ;
did not even try to execute the order. :
On the 27th day of August, or three
days before the final battle, none of
these troops having left Alexandria. y