New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1870-03-19
THE SECRETS OF HISTORY.
THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.
NEW IsSUE-DID GEN. THOMAS BLUNDER IN
HIS PLAN OF ATTACK

1
HIS PLAN OF Attack
TO the Editor Of The Tribune.
SIR: The letter in your issue OF the 18th, by
One who Fought at Nashville" wide OF the facts
variety Of ways that 1t would he hardly worth while
to reply TO IL. the oahedrd manner in which the
statements made did not convey the idea that the
writer competent witness in the at ISSUE both as
| 10 facts and opinions.
The correspondent sates!that the army at Nashville
corps ~ of the Army OF the Cumberland, the
| Twenty-thrd Corps, Army of the Ohio, A. j. Smiths
two divisions Army OF the Tennessee aud mihed troops
Of paros organizations or no organization ana new
regiments SO that Thomas had but one corps tthe
Fourth Of his old army and Schofeld the same" inc
facts are. that in addition to the organizations above
enumerated. there were Steedman's DIVISION number
ing from 600 men, all OF them belonging to the
Army OF the Cumberland and which reached Nashville
at about the time with A. j. Smiths troops, ana
the cavalry under Gen. Wilson; all of which, but one
division QIachl belonged to the Army Of the Cumber
land proper Moreover the Twenty.thlrd Corps, al
| though a separate army, had long been under Gen.
| Thomas's command, and identified with the for
tunes OF the Army OF the Cumberland. Gen. sehoheId
had commanded Gen. Thomass old First Division OF the
| Army OF the Cumberland. The name and fame OF the
armies is nseparabe and the Society Of the Army
of the Cumberland today includes in its membership
and recognizes part Of its organization their breth
| rem Of the Army OF the Ohio.
AL OF the troops at Nashville, except the two corps OF
infantry and the two divisions OF cavalry which had been
operating against Hood the march from the Tennessee
River TO Nashville, concentrated on the very day
or subsequently to Hoods investment OF Nashville
Coopor's Division reached Nashville only on the 9TH OF
| December. During the entire march Of Hoods army
from the moment sherman commenced his march to the
sea- until recrosssd the Tennessee dOrganzcd and
| demoraZed that IL never came together again. Geh
Thomas command not merely of the two corps i'm
medatey with schoed, but Of all the troops in his De
If NJ
| der steedman North Alabama huntsville, Athens
! Sci, under Gen. Il. 8. Granger; Murfreosboro
under Rousseau Johnsonylc and Northwestern H. NJ
under Gen {. T. Thompson, and the garrison at Nash
Vile under Gen j. f. Miller, well rs all the troops Of
the Military Division Of the Mississippi not Immediately
! with Gen. Sherman.
The battle Of Franklin for the hghtiug Of which ample
and unstnted credit should be given 10 schohe aud d"
which 10 one would attempt to deprive him-was a
scratch" Ut fought from necessity and from no
premedtated design. All the more credit 10 Schodeld
for his manfu and determined bravery and success 80
far from its being that there was not the remoest
possibility OF This attacking Nashville" anybody VINO
knows the Will testify that Hood intended TO attack
on the I7th days after Thomass movement put the
| idea ont of his head.
II is true, that troops had been for some da
lying quietly in their trenches" the Infantry but
the quiet forced one, and due everybody there
knows. the weather; and moreover, the cavalry lad
been anything but lying quietly as up 10 tFte uaS >
before the attack they had not been mounted In sufficient
number 10 be effective and up TO the very moment of
attack the army transportation not m such cond
ton as 10 justify movement. All these things were
well known TO the proper officers but for obvious reasons
have not been mentioned I'm the reports or accounts o
the battle hitherto Besides, until he had crossed tho
Dutch River at Columbia, IL was by no means certain
what course Hood would adopt II had been anticipated
by Sherman that lie would follow the cour-e of the
Union army through Georgia Gen. Thomas was there
fore compelled keep his army in such position - 10
enable him TO concentrate at Chattanooga Decatur, or
Nashville, as circumstances might require.
All these things, however merely preliminary. and
of little account compared with the serious charges
which follow The writer of the letter goes To
As TO the plan OF attack in that Gen. Thomas made the
only mistake it possible that man having any li
| tary knowledge not to say experience, could make
The only practical question as TO the strength that
should be given the attacking force, or the number OF
men necessarily be left comparatively idle and IN ths
Gen Thomas made mistake Of fully 1000 men! Upon
this error being Explained 10 him, he gave verbal orders
fo IT'S correction far to place the surplus 10000 men
i'm reserve near the attacking force where lay Idle from
early in the morning until o'clock in the afternoon
So much for the writer 1t would be impossible TO pack
more Ignorance and issatement than here contained
ipo the same number Of words The plan OF attack was
for our left to make strong denomination, While the
| cavalry on the right should gain the enemy :
! left flank aud rear, and W other troops should
pres any opportunity that might offer, A. j. Smiths
troops being our right ufantrytben the Fourth corps
with schoncld's Twenty-third Corps in reserve, and
seedmaps Division The left Everybody at the battle
remembers that very dense fog overhung the valleys
and bsdes on the morning OF the 18th OF December 80
| that the movement which would have been made with
vgor by the cavalry at daylight II clear, was made
1ovlg and cautiously until as late or o'clock Al.
Smith could not until the cavalry had commenced
their flank attack seedman's division on the left hav-
an, an omen country In 'front.' moved first aud drove back
the thin line opposing II mile or two before any other
| attack was commenced, making very formidable
demonstration OF what was intended only as fent and
| CARRYING and occupying points beyond what had been
anticipated in the plan Of battle, thus shortening both
| our own and the enemy's line, and epractcaly
| deciding what should be done with the re-
| serve. Gen. Thomas received they Information
OF steedmans unexpected progress after o'clock and
the officer who conveyed to him rode for very con
siderable distance with Knpe division Of cavalry. the
| division supporting and cooperating with Hatch's d.
vision in advance but ut that time invisible on account
of the fog Gen. Thomas's headquarters were on the
| most advanced point OF our lines. high hill, almost
Immediately in the OF the junction OF Smiths leit
| and the right OF the Fonrh Corps Smiths troops had
got outside OF their works but had not made any move
| ment When the fog had pretty much cleared away,
and revealed the whole field from the NIL
where Gen Thomas stationed the skrmishers OF the
Fourth Corps began push TO the front. and In few
minutes enemys artillery opened with good deal oil
| yicor Presently musketry heard along srnthH
| right and an aid sent down TO see how thing were
| going He found Smith delayed by the difficulties oil
crossing Richland, some other OF the creeks that
flowed along the front parallel to the enemy's main line
where the passage disputed Soon after, not lar
from 10 o'clock one OF the divisions Of the Fourth Corps
by splendid assault carried Montgomery Hill, to the
right of the Uillsboro Pkethe advanced salient OF the
enemy THIS permitted readjustment OF the lines, so