The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-12-09

mans were in degree proud, when placed
in direct conflict with France, France will
only hate.
But we suspect that there is much more in
Count Bismarcks s present aggressiveuess that
is due to the third cause than TO either of the
others 1t breathes disappointment aud dis
gust against France for not accepting what
seems to him the logic of the situation. He
is little anxious at the defeat of his calcula-
tons as to French pliancy, he
is a little uneasy under
his responsibility for this terrible war, with
all its uncertainties; and he vents his anxiety
and uneasiness on the French, who are its
cause. Some years ago, in defending him
self to o friend from tue charge of uusorupu-
lousness-it was in 1865, after the Danish
war, but before the Austrian war, and at a
time when no doubt that war was becoming
visible to him-Count Bismarck wrote of
himself:-"As a statesman, l am not even,
according to my own feeling. sufficiently in-
dependent (TuchSichtslos) rather, indeed,
cowardly, and simply because it is not easy
in relation to the kind of questions which
come before me, always to attain that clear
ness of view in the soil of which grows trust
in God" And though since 1865 Count Bis
marcks arrogance and self-confdenee have
very probably grown, and grown rapidly, yet
so also has the scale of his responsibilities,
which is, indeed, far greater just now than
has perhaps ever fallen to the lot of Euro
pean statesman before. Animperious states
man committed to course of the
wisdom of which he is uncertain
very naturally grows more imperious in
manner than ever, for all sell. distrust acts as
q stimulus to a mans habitual tone of action,
even when that habitual tone is one of self
confidence. The First Napoleon was never
so imperious as when he began to feel his
power totter, and the Third Napoleon was
never so irresolute as when he began to see
that he had failed. Those who distrust them
selves habitually, distrust themselves specially
when they have new reason for self-distrust;
but those who trust themselves hsbitually,
for all practical purposes trust themselves
most, nay, insist on trusting themselves
almost fanatically, when they first begin
to be conscious of bottom of
self-distrust. And we are disposed to
think, therefore, that Count Bismarek's wan
ton excess of aggressiveness in this last cir
cular on the armistice, is at least as much
due to a sense of annoyance both with France
and with himself for his miscalculation, as
! to the domineering habit of nsind which has
become chronic with him, and which, no
! doubt he justifes politically by the awe it
has SO often inspired, and the prestige of
masterliness it has given to his great career.
In this case, however, he has overshot his
own mark. He excites superhuous hatred
among the French, and induces neutrals to
speculate on the true meanings of expressions
! the truthfulness of which his very air of vexa-
ton disproves. If he thought the French
capable of nothing during the time of the
armistice but waste of powder and shot-de-
pend upon it, he would either not have Of
fered it at all, or if he had felt compelled to
defer so far to the wishes of the neutrals, he
would have felt inward delight at its
| failure