The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-27


of q Russian General, furnished an occasion.
Count st. Priest, commanding a new corps
of twelve thousand men, placed himself at
RHEIMS between the grand army of the allies
and that of Blucher. Napoleon saw thatit would
be easy to defeat this corps alone, and he put
himself in march on Rheims, leaving Mortier
with 10000 men at Scissors. st. Priests
corps was routed, and himself killed. Napo-
leon remained three days at Rheims to give
some repose to his troops before carrying
them on the Aube and Seine, where the grand
army of the allies had taken the offensive.
Schwartzenberg had returned to Troyes, and
remained there ten days waiting for intelli-
gence from Blucher. The news of Napoleon's
repulse from Laon excited his ardor, aud he
determined to advance. But he did this with
the greatest caution. He pushed back Mac
donald as far as Msison Rouge, between
Provins and Nangis; but here he heard of
Napoleon's approach, and gave himself up to
his habitual perplexities and alarms about his
fanks and rear. His renewed retreat tempted
Napoleon to pursue without even waiting for
the whole of his small available force.
The battle of Arcis.s,lr- -Aube, which fol-
lowed on the 20th of March, may be regarded
as the turning-point of this wonderful cam
paign. The Emperor Alexander began to be
wearied of these indecisive movements, and
he declared in council that they must unite
with Blucher and act in single mass on
Paris. In accordance with the resolution of
this council the allied army concentrated
itself on Arcis, and attacked the French army
which was then on both sides of the Aube.
The bridges on this river were only held by
the personal exertions OF Napoleon, whose
left wing would have been lost if the allies
could have severed his communications.
During the night Napoleon was considerably
reinforced, and, thinking that tSchwartzenberg
had fought only to cover his retreat, he
proposed to pursue the allies in the morning
But the allies, instead of retiring, had united
all their forces and prepared for battle To
accept this battle with o great disparity of
force, in a vast plain, with miry river in the
rear, would have exposed Napoleon's last
resources to destruction. Imperious neces-
sity imposed retreat, which was facilitated
by the cautious advance of the allies, who
had expected to be themselves attacked.
The historian now explains the reasons which
induced Napoleon to throw himself on
the communications of the allies. Only
extreme measures could afford him
chance of safety. The fate of
France depended on him alone, and no place
was of Importance except made SO by his
presence. To make peace and save the EN-
pire, it was necessary to replant the French
eagles on the Rhine. He resolved, therefore,
to throw himself by st. Dizier towards the
Upper Meuse. He there expected strong re-
inforcements from the garrisous of Lorraine
and Alsace, and by raising the departments
which had been overrun by the enemy he
would threaten the line Of operations of the
grand army. By thus compelling the enemy
to retrace his steps, he would draw him on
ground favorable for his own strategic opera
tions. He would leave Paris exposed,
but this was of little Importance to
Napoleon, whose capital was at his
own headquarters. Accordingly, Napo-
leon marched from Arcis-sur-Aube by
Vitry to st. Dizier, which he reached on the
23d of March. Schwartzenberg, instead of
retreating towards Troyes, as was expected,
crossed the Aube and advanced towards Vitry,
to follow Napoleon and connect himself with
Blucher. The Prussian Marshal, unable to
believe that he had gained a victory at Laon,
and intimidated by the defeat of st. Priests
corps, had remained inactive for ten days
behind the Aisne. He then detached strong
force of cavalry to Rheims and himself aa-
vanced towards scissors. Hereupon Mar
mont and Mortier united their small forces at
Fismes, which is on the Aisne, about midway
between Rheims and Scissors. ''Thus, says
Jomini, ''the two grand armies of the enc
my, instead of pursuing diverging lines, con-
centrated their forces towards single line at
the very moment that Nnpoleon's two little
armies separated from each other" The
two French Marshals marched from Fismes
southwest to -Tardenois, and it is
said that Napoleon's order to Join him at
Vitry did not reach them until they arrived
at this latter place. 1t was then impossible
for them to march between the two converg-
ing armies of the allies to join Napoleon,
and after unsuccessfully attempting such a
march they were necessarily thrown back on
Paris We may roughly describe the position
by saying. that Blucher and Schwartzenberg
were approaching one another from north
and south while Napoleon and his two mar
shals were separating from one another
by marching, the former to the east
and the latter to the west Napoleon s
plan had become known to the allies by an
intercepted courier, and the Emperor Alex
| ander proposed to O conference of generals
the question whether it was more advisable
! to advance on Paris without troubling them
| selves about Napoleons move on Lorraine,
or whether the allies should fall back on the
Rhine. All agreed that the first was the pre-
| ferable course. The resolution was commu-
nicated to Blucher, and the two armies, now
in full communication, prepared to march on
| Paris by the roads from Vitry to Sezaine, and
from Ohalons to Montmirail. A strong force
of cavalry belonging to Bluchers army
marched from Vitry on st. Dizier to cover
these movements, and make Napoleon believe
he wasfollowed by the whole armyof Schwart-
zenberg. Napoleon had been at DSulevent
for twenty-four hours, in painful uncertainty,
when an enemys force was seen approaching
from Dizier. The French cavalry Immediately
attacked this enemy and drove him on Bar
le-Duc and st. Mihiel. ''What was Napo
Icons astonishment when he learned from
the prisoners that it was the army of Bluchel
that he had before him" He stopped at ST.
Dizier, and on the 9th made forced recon