The Newberry herald. [volume] (Newberry, S.C.) 1865-1884, 1870-08-24
IS a Battle Imminent.
vow MOLTKE's PLAN OF ATTACK
TIE FRENCH RESOURCES.

There are some reasons for bo-
lieviaS great an decisive battle
is not SO imminent as is now gen.
orally supposed. The reasons for
so thinking may be thus stated.
1t is beyond question a cardinal
principal in Prussian strategy to
Concentrate superior force be-
tore attack. Thus at Sadowa Won
Moltke only advanced against the
10000 Austrians when, by the
junction of all his corps, lie had
100000 Prussians and at Uage-
nau, on the 9th inst, the Crown
Prince hurled at least three full
army corps upon McMahon's sin
gle corps and FIVE Of DeFailly's di-
vision.
Now, as the Pruss;an army ad-
Vances into Fra:co, and the French
retire before it, it is evident that
the French are necessarily thrown
back closer on their reserves Of
all kinds, while the Prussians are,
just in that proportion, separated
farther and farther from theirs.
To transport reinforcement to and
concentrate all the troops now at
the front in one position is an
easy thing for the French, as their
lines Of communication are short
encd, and q work OF growing diff
Guilty for the Prussians, as their
lines, long enough at first, arc
now greatly extended. Moreover,
it is to be borne in mind that
whilo the Prussian army, when
all its reserves and classes are in,
is considerably larger than the
French, the French standing
army much exceeds that Of the
Prussians. Marshal Bazine has
now subject to his orders close on
to 100000 men, already armed,
uniformed, in camp, ready for
service in ali respects, and amply
provided with magazines, depots,
and so on. The Prussian army
can hardly be as strong as this.
The forces on foot at the outbreak
Of the war We know did not
amount to 100000, aad is doubt
full if tho bare four weeks since
the declaration Of hostilitics have
given time enough to take tho re-
serves from their various avoca-
tions, uniform, arm, and equip
them, put them in their several
organizations, provide the neccs-
sary dcpots, &C., for their service,
and send them on to the front.
In the Austrian war it taskcd the
railroad facilities Of Prussia 10 the
utmost to concentrate 100000
men in three weeks on the front
iers Of Saxony and Silesia; how
unlikely, thon, that in the twenty.
six days she has been able, on the
much longer line leading to
France, to concentrate more than
about that number in France
Every nerve must have been
strained to get the standing army
up to the Rhine, and no chance to
bring the reserves in has been af-
forded, even if we can suppose
the brief space Of four weeks long
enough to fit those reserves fcI
transportation to the front, But,
it may be argued, if this be so,
why have the Prussian forces
made 90 desperate an assault on
the French line, broken through |
in two places, and given every
sign of beng IN force enough to |
march upon Paris? The answer
is easy, Prussia is fighting just |
now IN otIcnsivc.d defensive fight
trying to hold the Rhine frontier
till her reserves can come into &C
tlon, ana, that snc may mold 1t, |
assuming the offensive. The sue !
cess OF this policy in its offensive
aspect may seem to show q delib-
crate purpose 70 advance at once
but the great length Of their pres
cnt line Of communication, the
convenient shortening Of tn G
French lines, and the obvious i'm
possibility Of the Pruss;an rescr-
YES being now ready, are all good
reasons for supposing that the
Prussian generals are anxious to
gain time. Ifso, no great battle
may be looked for in some days.
ADVICE TO AN ApPRESTICE.-