Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1870-08-31
THE SITUATION.
nattIes Around Metx-Subsequen
Movements of the Two Armies
New BattIe-GeIds-P Peace Media
tfOns. NV ue nj

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From the N. Y. World. 26th.l
We have repeatedly pointed out that
the French position between Metz and
Verdun-nortli Of the shortest line of
the German advances, via Nancy and
Bar le Due, through the plains of Cham
pagne towards Chalons and Paris--was
of such Importance that it would not be
given up without the most determined
resistance.
The line of Metz via Verdun to Chal-
ons is not only a very strong one for de-
fensive purposes, but offers uncommon
facilities for communication between the
different army corps stationed along it,
and also for purposes of attack on the
flank of the German armies moving
south Of it. 1t is the very best which
could have been chosen.
1t is, therefore, but natural that Gen
erals Frossard and DeFailly, after hav-
ing lost the battle at Forbach, should
have fallen back on Metz, and taken up
their position there with the main army
under Marshal Bazaine and Generals
Bourbaky and L'Admirault, who up to
this time had not been under fire, and
that Marshal Mcmahon should have con-
tinued his retreat comparatively unmo-
Tested under their protection, via Nancy,
Base and Vitry on to Chalons, for the
purpose of recognizing and filling up
his thinned ranks, doubly thinned be-
cause he had to detach between 10000
and 10000 men at Saverne, while re-
treating, in order to reinforce the garri-
son of Strasburg.
Had it not been for Metz and the very
strong position there, the victorious army
of the Crown Prince might indeed be to-
day where it is reported to be, at Sezan-
ne, only some seventy-Gye miles from
Paris, but we mean to show conclusively
that this is neither probable nor even
possible. pa"
1t is fact that the German advance
was arrested at the Moselle by the threat
ening position of the French army at
Metz ahd neighborhood, and that in con
sequence King William and his generals
decided not to proceed. but to force a
battle there, and if possible, cut through
the. French position and drive part of
their armies toward Verdun, while en-
closing the main body in Metz, which, as
they knew, was not sufficiently provided
with provisions, except to supply gar
rison of some thirty thousand men.
Napoleon and his generals saw through
this their enemys plan readily enough,
and at council Of war held August l3,
it was decided to leave only garrison
of some thirty thousand men at Metz
sufficient to defend this very strong fort
ress against an attack of five times that
/ number-to move out of it at once, and
to take up a position to the northwest
with headquarters at Etain, and place a
strong army corps at Verdun, in order to
be nearer McMahon who was expected
to move up from Chalons with the regu-
lar troops under his command, after hav-
ing sent back to Paris the Garde Mobile,
| equivalent to our militia) Conse-
quently, early on the morning. of August
IA numerous bodies of French cavalry
left Metz in every direction to recon
noiter the whereabouts Of the enemy, and
after they had brought home word that
no enemy was in sight, the French move
ment from Metz began early in the after
noon. AT first a strong body of cavalry
was seen issuing forth escorting half a
dozen carriages, which contained Napo-
leon, the Prince Imperial, and the EN-
peror's staff. They moved rapidly on
towards Verdun ON the highroad. Not
long afterwards, towards two o clock,
strong columns of troops emerged from
the gates of Metz, and while the main
body of them followed the road to Yer
dun, on which the Emperor had pre-
ceded them with some corps marching
to the north towards Conhans, third
army corps marched down in south
westerly direction towards Gorze They
proceeded unmolested on their several
roads till about FIVE o'clock, when pres
emily the Germans, under General Won
Steinmetz, made furious attack in
strong force on the French, near Gore.
They had silently crossed the Moselle
below Metz from the eastern TO the
western shore, and completely surprised
the French, who had not the slightest
apprehension OF an attack so near the
fortress-and only about fifteen miles
south of it. The fight was short and de-
cisive. The French had to return, to-
ward nightfail, to the shelter Of the forti-
fications of Metz; and the Germans fol-
lowed them so closely that they them
selyes got within range of the guns of
Fort hellecroix, on the western side of
Metz, and suffered severely in dead and
wounded. They took. ho%eyer, several
thousand prisoners, a number of guns
and standards, and remained masters of
the battlefield This battle near Gore, !
on the l4th, had the sgeet of retarding
the movements Of Marshal Bazaine
towards Verdpn, and it seems decided !
him 10 offer King William a decisive I
battle under the walls of Metz before at
tempting again any westward movement
toward Verdun, to reach the reinforce
ments of Mcmahon in that neighbor- |
hood he consequently made recon-
noisance IL force towards Gravelotte
and Mars-la-ToBf ~ the afternoon OF
the 18th, at which some besgg Sighting |
was done, but it cannot be called'a bat
tle. At nightfall the French retired as
usual inte Metz. On the 10th the posi-
ton of the two aFssies was, therefore, as |
follows: The French. az Marg-la-Tour, /
Gravelotte and Metz; the Germans seath |
Of theel in various hamlets and villages,
with headquarters st Pont-a-Mousson.
Prince Frederick Charles bod, however,
stopped in his advance on Veraaa ana /
formed a junction with General Won
Steinaeiz, who stood directly under the
walls of Metz. and had done all the
fighting on the 18th alone, and who had
been so much exhausted thar the fresh
troops under Prince Frederick Charles
were necessary for his support.
The battle commenced at. Marsha
Tour By q determined and brilliant at
tack of Prince Frederick Charles, who