, 1870-10-13

OF lsAsnnrk on 1hc StGuotion-The
weed OF Guarantees for the Fueurcs
The following is the ts1t Of the ciscular
notes addressed to tho North German Ambas-
sadosu:
Our rolations with Franco having been mis-
approhended, even in friendly quarters, I an
induced to communicate to yptl the yiaws of
the hing, which ara shared by the allied Ger
man Governments. We regarded the plebis-
&c. aud tho apparently satisfactory state OF
peace. and a. an expression Of the plci6c dis
poattioD OF tho French nation. Subseauent
eyents have undecelyed us, or, at any tato.
hAvo shown bow eAsily pacific sentiments NAV
be converted into hostile action fu Francs.
Deputies. Senatots and newspapers almost
unanimously inaisted upon wat, with = view
to oconqueat in Germany. So ioud and i'm
netuous were they that the few remaining
friends Of peaee dared not oppose them. nna
the Emperor Napoleon probably told His
Majesty no untruth whom he asserted that tho
etate Of public opinion hsd compelled him to
not in q position to rely upon French feelinss
as Euafantee Of peace. Wemust NOT con-
coal fFoE curselyoH th4t, In conAeuuencn Of
this present war, France will always be long
ing 70 attack u again, Irrespective Of aus
conditions which We may think dt to impose.
1snn'.a u u ,he.f dassfsas' i + our victorious
.efAA0S w. <ASaA eA4F4QAH AktkCNt "QEQ
the French nation will mover for
give us. Even were wo to cyaca.te
France now, without requiring any accession
OF territory, pecuuiary Indemnity, or other
advantage except martial glory, the French
patton would. nevertheless, cherisn deep
offence 70 their vanity and the check We haze
put to lheir lust Of conquest. They would
wait for q day when they might hope TO act
mp to these feelings with a chance Of suc:ess.
It was no doubt Of the justice Of our CAUSE,
Or of the adequacy OF our strength. wllch
forced upon US in 1867, bat We had no wish.
the passions Of tho French. aud to
bring on an era OF irritation and war.
while VIC yet hoped, by carefully and
patiently developing tho amic.blo re-
lations between the two countries, to create .
solid basis for an css Of peace and prosperity
for both countries. Bat, having beon com.
pelled TO unsheath the svord, which we hAd
Uished TO leave in its fcabbard, We must en-.
dcavor TO gain come better guarantees against
future attack on the part Of the French poo
pie than can be found in their friendly dispo-
aision toward us. In 1916, the Holy Alliance
and other Arrangements were resoeted to, to
protect European peace against similar ctav-
ings OF French ambition, but thesa o1pedients
have sincc lost their efficiency. and Germany
has had to prevent French invasion single
handed. Such An effort Germany hss no wish
TO repeat again knd again, and We are, tlers-
fore, compelled to seecpt material guarantees
Tor the eafety OF Germany against futnrc
attacks from Franco guarantees which
Germany being pacific natiou) will Nkowiee
protect the peace Of al Europe. Those gusr-
antees we ahall demand, not OF anr tempora-
~ Government Of France. but of tbs Froach
rulers, has for centuries been IN the habit OF
invading Germany. Ono condition OF pe1co
Will, therefore, mainlY, DO directed. to render
1t more difficult for France to make auothar
attack on tho German frontier, and more par
ticularly on tho South German frontier, so
long deieneeless. To effect thls We shall en-
dcavor to remove our frontier, aud with it
the point OF attack, further west. We shall
ale0 endeagor to possess ourselves OF those
French forsresaes, and shall conyert theu
into defensive stronghold OF Germany, re-
quest yonr Excellency to answer all inquiries
iu this eenso."
SECOND CIRCULAR.
Count uienAEcks second circular is dated
Meanx, September 1G:
"Yonr Excellency will have noticed the
eommuEica1ton which II. Jules Favre. in tho
name Of tbs present rulers in Paris. o~lliug
NntionAe, has addressed 10 the French rcpee.
saata:i7es ahruad. an also informed that II.
1hters has undertaken \ confidential mission
to come foreign Courts. He will, have tnA
ron 10 think, mako It his task to cre1te be-
1 lief in tho pacific disposition Of the presen,
veution OF fo1tign Powers IN behalf OF =
resca which is toaeprive Germany OF the fruit,
| Of her victory, and exclude all conditions cal
| culattd to rcudor the next French attacl
oa Germany more difficult. We can
| not credit the present Paris Gov
alto tho war while it continues b: its 1Acgu.gt
and acts to stimulate tho passions Of the
French n1tion. to aggravato the hstred OF .
people Already trutated bv sufrerings OF war,
and to declare in advance, as acceptable Il
France, all tenns acceptable to fi"rul.ny. DJ
this demea6or tho present rut. Hovernn mi
impatrs its ability to conclnjs peace. II i
wi:hed us to attribute to l. an honest inten
tinn to enter iuto negotiations, It would laya
to prepare tts people for IL by calm 1anguRg,
In harmony with the ecr1ous character Of III
situation. As to the cool sugsestio,
,h.t We should conclude an .5n!stie,
our terms Of peace, it could DO soriousl;
meant only Il we were supposed to b.
deficient In military and political Judgment
or indifferent to the interests OF Germsny
Another important circumstance prevcntin,
the French people from realizing the necessit
Of concluding peace with Germany is the bop
encouraged By their present rulers tia. III
neutral powers will diplomatically or Activel
interfere In their favor. II the French ono
hecomc persuaded that As they alone con
joEed mp the ws1, and as Germany has had t
struggle alone through It, 90 thoy will ais
alone have 10 ecst1es With Germany, they wi
it is proved 10 be undoubtedly unavail
Ing. It ia 4 cruelty on the part 0
neut1als II they allow the Paris Gov
esnment to encourage impossible hopc
Of Intervention among the people, an
thereby pzo'oDg Tho VA; We have no wis
to Interfere With the domestic concerns Q
France. It ls Indifferent to us what govern
mcnt tho Frooch people may choose to sslec
for theu1selves. We have formally recog
nized no government except that Of tho EN-
pe1or Napoleon, but with wh4tever sa!a.ient
II authorized government We may have t
negotiate the terms OF peace, they will be in
dependent Of the question OF how and b
whom the French people arc 10 be governed
Our terms will be dictated BY the nature 0
things and the right Of eelf-defence sgains
restless and Aggressive neighoor. Th
unanlmous voice of the German Government
aud German people deusnds that Garman
sha1l 10 protected BY stronger frontier
than ehs has hitherto had against
less invasions that hare been prat
tlced againat US for centuries by all Fsenc
Governments In SUCCESSION. Whilc Ftauc
roescsse. Stsnsbourg and Metz. she hxs be.
Ter stratceicil bass for attacking Southcz
Germany and tho lett bank or the Rhine tha
We have TO defend them. strasbours, in Frenc
hands, il m ever open s.,lypor against Soutl
en- Germany. In German hands, Sra sbouI
and Metz will acquire purely defensive cha
ecteT. In the course OF moro than tuent
warB with France, We never tere the attael
ing pstty. and even uow We hare nothing 1
ask OF the French nA.ion but to permit !
TO rmain in the erJoynent Of our safety, (
often imrerilled b. THIN. Bat wnstav,
. peace We may conclude With Frauca, 81
will only regard 1t as An aEmistice, aoj,
avonee her present deseat, will Alta
US ~ uniustidat'ly. and as 1uta'cssly
.ha fhipta hsr4Alf str,nr enoneh FAR tho q,