The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1870-09-01
HoYT & CO., Proprietors.
The War of 1870.

Much reproach has been cast upon mlltary
critics for not forecasting truly the results OF
the last two great wars. Even now men Iree-
IL saw that it is useless to anticipate the events
of the coming struggle, since in 1882 as in
1866. the most able predictions were just those
that told, it is, remarked, by experts in the
forner year that the North would certainly
be beaten; two years later we saw the North
completely triumphant We were told four
years since, by those supposed to know best,
that Prussia had no chance against Austria,
that the Imperial armies would emerge from
Bohemia in bold offensive march, and that
the untried levies of the Hohenzollern would
prove altogether unable to stop the way to
Berlin. Exactly the contrary of these events
occurred. The Austrians were unable to get
ready in time to take the offensive; they
proved equally unable to meet the russians
in fair fight; the Prussian armies, ana not the
Austrian, dictated peace before, the enemys
gates. From these two examples 1T has not
Tnnaturally been deduced that the opening of
a great war fnds.the most uninformed and the
most skillful writers on a level as regards
knowledge of the future, and that the only
refuge from falling into error is to reserve all
commentary until the close.
Are not the premises somewhat insufficient
for the conclusion? Is it really the case that
although sixty-fve years, before the campaign
of jena, it was possible for a theorist at Paris
to point the spot of German soil where the
hattie which was to decide the fate OF Prussia
should be fought, and for Wellington during
the peace of 1914 to dictate the Importance OF
Waterloo in the defence of Belgium, matters
are now so changed that the whole progress OF
any future war must be inscrutable from first
to last9 These questions may be best answer
ed by a very brief examination of the causes
which set at naught all attempts to prophesy
the course of the American and bohemian
campaigns, and by seeing how far these apply
to the present crisis.
The American war is now understood by all
well-informed Englishmen to have been Tar
more an affair of politics than of mere soldier
ship. No honest Northern writer disputes the
genius which the chief Southern commanders
showed, or the valor of their troops. The
Unionist historians chronicle fairly enough the
tremendous defeats which their invading ar
mics at first endured, and the tenacity OF re-
sistance which Lee and Johnston showed to
the last when their inferiority threw them en-
tirely on the defensive. But neither genius
nor valor displayed on a single front could
avail against the preponderating force which
the Unionists could exert when once fairly
reused. The ill-fated counter-invasions at
tempted by Jefferson Davis orders were just
sufficiently alarming to waken thoroughly the
sentiment which is called ambition or patriot
ism. according to the feelings with which it is
viewed, whilst made without sufficient force to
carry out any design of conquest. The splen-
did obstinacy which the UniOnists thencetorth
displayed, and the daring policy which made
use of the public feeling to gather overwhel-
ming forces by sea and land on every vulnera-
BILE point of the Coniederacy, did the rest.
The South succumbed, fairly overborne by her
gigantic enemy, her means of resistance 1.-THE
feebleness of which was at the first skillfully
concealed) being quite inadequate to support
the repeated shocks which the resources OF the
North heaped upon her. The victory was
eminently political one, and the result was
assured from the moment the greater power
began unreservedly to put forth its strength.
No military skill could long avail against such
odds when the raw material of the contending
forces was so essentially similar in fibre.
AS the Austro-Prussian campaign, the chief
facts known were that both parties had very
large armies, the one inexperienced but fresh
" reoreanized for war and armed with new
weapon the other proved in action but weight
ed by the leaden government OF narrow
coterie. The improved organization of the
Prussians had not been studied. The effect of
their breech-loader were-as their own printed
tactical instruction show-misdoubte by their
authorities, and appreciated by none but few
far-sighted officers who had served in Schles-
wig. Had we learnt that in rapid arming they
had secured the advantage had Gablenz's
warning to the Emperor been made known
that troops armed with the muzzle-loader had
no fair chance against this needle-gun-pre-
dictions would have been as freely launched
in favor of the Prussians as they undoubtedly
were against them. Jomini, In the last paper
that ever issued from his fertile pen, attributed
the ruin of the Austrians to three distinct dis
adyantages-in numbers, weapons and strate-
gy. The last of these was necessarily doubt
ful element. AS to the first, the full superior
ity of the new Prussian system was altogether
unknown save to those who had created it,
whilst the other was really very grand exper-
iment which had not been fairly tried.
In short, the value of all such forecaste de-
pends not only upon the powers of the diviner,
but on the accuracy of his knowledge. To
take the famous instance Of 1906, before ad-
yertea to, it is only possible that such mar
yellous accuracy as foretold the battle Of Jena
could be attained when great intuitive skill
was favored by practical knowledge of the
conditions. Jomini had been studying Ma
poleon's career with the highest critical in
terest and had served with the Grand Army
in its late brilliant advance to the Danube.
He was, therefore, peculiarly acquainted with
the instrument, and with the genius of him
who welded it, whilst he had, both as an his
torian and a French staff l-oficer, become aware
that the Prussian army was not only inferior
in numbers, but antiquated in its habits. The
process of reasoning by which he drew his ia
NOUS conclusions may be fairly traced some
what as follows:
"Napoleon will certainly follow his bent and
take the offensive. AS Austria is closed to him
by the laEe treaty, he must attack Prussia either
from Bavaria or the Rhine. But his army is
Just now gathered in Bavaria on its way back
from Vienna, and he will never waste time in
going round to get upon the Rhine again.
Therefore, Northern Bavaria will certainly be
his immediate base--no doubt the line of the
Upper Main, where heis screened by mountains,