The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-09
THE CONDITIONS OF PEACE.
From the London Spectator.

SuDDOb1DR Ju6 O6TuHuS 10 uICldt6 peace,
either at Chalons or before Paris, what will
be it's terms2 1t may be said that discussion
is premature, but it is the universal topic,
and the first business of journalists is to give
their readers data for an opinion. In this
case, when 80 much depends upon an
individual will, and so much more on the atti-
tude of Cabinets hitherto quescent, COM
plete summary is impossible; but there are,
nevertheless, some considerations which it
may be worth while to state. Three plans,
which are also policies are believed to be
floating about the Chancelleries, not as plans
under consideration, but as embodying in a
more or less brutal way the possibilities of
the situation. The first, and, as we fear, the
most probable basis of peace, is the one
which was popular in Germany before the
retreat of the French army. The Germans
then, as now, expected victory, but only after
long and chequered campaign; and their
decision, freely announced in conversation,
and carefully suggested, though not
to demand the banishment of the
Bonapartes-now styled by that name in all
semi official papers-the payment of the ex-
penses of the war, and the cession of Alsace,
so as to restore the ancient mountain frontier
of the Vosges between Germany and France.
This basis, which is in one way moderate,
and strictly accords with precedent, is open
to the immense objection that while it would
create terrible and permanent feud between
France and Germany, and would violate the
modern principle that populations are not to
be transferred to foreign rulers without their
consent, it would not greatly weaken France.
The first object of any government that may
succeed the Empire would be to recover
French territory, and if at all able or patient,
it would either so re-organize France or so
bind together the three Latin
races, that sooner or later it would
recover it. Moreover, all evidence seems to
show that although Alsace speaks a patois
| which is nearer German than French, the
people, who have been French for two hun
dred years, and who therefore felt the fusing
heat of the Revolution, are still French to
| the bone, and would be a source rather of
weakness than of strength to German en-
pire. At the same time, the loss of actual
| strength to France would be almost imper-
ceptible, France losing fewer people, than
she acquired by the cession of Savoy and
Nice, and obtaining better frontier. The
first grand principle of modern diplomacy,
therefore, the integrity of the self-dependent
States, would be violated, only to deepen the
roots of enmity between the two greatest
States of Europe, and making St. Petersburg,
when once armed, arbitress between them.
That is not good result, either for Germany
or for the world.
Seeing this, and seeing also that their vic.
tory, if obtained at all, will be of the com.
pletest kind, many Germans begin to argue
that it would be better to remodel the mar
altogether, and, as they must incur French
hatred, to reduce the effective power OF
France till that hatred becomes on ordinary
political calculation innocuous. To effec
this end, these reasoners propose seconG
plan, known apparently in Germany as the
"Burgundian" one, under which Belgium
would be aggrandized by great slice Of
Northern France Switzerland by Savoy
which is by nature part of the Alpine Repub
lie; Italy by the restoration of Nice and Cor
sica; and Germany by the cession of Alsace
and Lorraine. France would then be re-
duced to a secona-rate power, incapable Of
maintaining great war alone, and Ger
mary would be surrounded by allies
dependent on her guarantee for the safety of
their territories; while the danger of firm ALI.
ance between Paris and st. Petersburg would
be immensely reduced, probably removed, for
Austria, which Germany can, il she likes,
always conciliate, and, indeed, as we believe,
has conciliated, would alone then be match
for France. This arrangement, if successfully
carried out, would undoubtedly make the
Hohenzollerns arbiters of Europe, and there
are ugly symptoms abroad that some plan of
the kind has passed through Count Bis
marck's mind We do not like those hints
in his papers that il will be necessary after
the war to reward the fidelity of his allies--tC
give, that is, territorial rewards to Bavaris
and Baden. That points to policy which il
one adopted, may, for the sake of safety, bt
made ruthless. Fortunately for Europe
which breads the rise of an almos
universal monarchy, there is reason
still in German councils, there is fear o.
tempting fate too far, and there are enormous
political obstacles in the road. All utterancel
attributed TO the King show spirit of mode
ration, he is known TO deteSt war on its owl
account, and to him, as To his people, thu
campaign has revealed one immense anC
hardly -foreseen truth. Germany, under il