New Orleans Republican. [volume] (New Orleans, La) 1867-1878, 1870-07-19
THE KING AND THE EMPEROR.

The Prussian dynasty does not rest or
the shifting sands of popular caprice, bu1
is founded on the rock Of things perma
nent The king believes in the divine
right of his family, and what is more
important, his subjects also believe it.
This sentiment, which has always existed
in Prussia, Bismarck has seized every
occasion to strengthen, presenting an
example himself whenever in public be-
fore his sovereign, by extraordinary acts
of Difference, which sometimes, to Ameri-
can ewes. looked like establishment; and
these manifestations of the most power
full man in his dominions, the complacent
king has always received in matter of
course fashion, as if he were Jupiter him
self
This dynastic and personal loyalty, no
disaster or defeat in the field could i'm
pair, or even tarnish, in the public mind
Of Prussia If province after province
were wrested from the North German
grasp and the armies were routed and
driven back into corner, the king would
be as much king over what remained,
as he is now over all his territory in the
zenith of his prestige. The idea Of de-
posing the defeated monarch would not en-
ter the mind of the most discontinued AID
discouraged Prussian. On the contrary,
disaster would strengthen loyalty to the
king as well aS to the country, for the
PrassSsaiss cannot separate one from the
other traits of heroism would be devel-
oped and examples of devotion furnished,
for the present royal house, that would
stimulate the entire population to spirit
of enthusiastic emulation. Thus, in the
event of defeat, King William has nothing
to fear for himself or his dynasty.
The case of the French monarch is
different. He reigns by personal prestige,
and by it he hopes to transmit the sceptre
to his son. A number of the Emperor's
subjects contest his legal claim to the
throne, and call him an usurper. They
never can forget how he got there-his
solemn pledges broken; his treason to the
Republic, and his Nero-like cruelty to his
own people, when he ordered them to be
moved down like grass on the Boulevards
because they stood between him and that
blood-stained throne Thus, from the
point of view of these discontinued SUBJ
jects there is the ghost of the sinful past,
which will always come back to the EN-
peror, as did the bloody Banquo to har-
row up the soul of Scotland's king.
In France, even among the friends of
the Emperor, the sentiment of Loyalty does
not exist as in England for the Queen, or
in Prussia for the King. In the absence
Of love. and reverence, which largely con-
tribute to the feeling of loyalty, there is an
admiration for the genius of the Emperor
among the supporters Of his rule-princi-
pally in the army-which rises to some
hing like enthusiasm, especially when
stimulated by the hope of military renown.
Further than this the feeling does not 60.
The rank and file of the French Empire,
however, do recognise and respect his
genius for governing the French people. !
The country has prospered under the wis
lom of his rule as it would have done
lnder that of none other, is the decided |
opinion Of all. The material prosperity |
las been great and every one knows the
influence Of material interests on political
opinions. Every man who has anything
t stake, is not only satisfied with the
emperor, but supports him with certain
Were they able to put a
member of the Orleans family on the
hrone, as wise ruler as the Emperor,
hey would be averse to it, although Or
eanists at heart, on account of the injury
0 their pecuniary interests such a change
,ould involve. 1t is this feeling which
orms the Emperor's greatest strength.
Unlike the Prussian King, the Emperor
1curs the risk Of losing his throne in the
vent of absolute defeat, for the factions
of the irreconciHables and Or
sanists would speedily avail themselves of
is disaster to accomplish his overthrow
Nth nobody for him, and these factions
5ainst him, such an undertaking might
e attended with success In such a strait,
vanquished and discouraged army would
ardly come to his rescue.
If the Prussians We're to strike him with
70 Sadowas, these enemies in the rear
le opposing factions would swell to
lch dimensions as to render his over
row feasible. This, however, is i'm
'obable, although possible. |,
Thus the risk Of the Prussian King is 1
,ht compared with that of the Emperor.
) for the latter, Il joue le tout pour lie tout. |