The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-11
MONDAY, JULY II, 1870.
THE WAR CLOUD IN EUROPE

The position taken by Napoleon in the pre-
sent threatening European complication is
not calculated to secure for him sympathy
either in this country or in Europe. He pro-
poses to go to war on account of the eleva-
tion of prince of Prussian extraction to the
Spanish throne, and coupled with this threat
is the statement of the Spanish minister at
Paris that France opposes all nominations
save that of the Prince of Asturias, the son
Of the exiled Isabella In the light of past
events the Emperor of the French cuts
sorry figure in insisting that the people of
Spain must accept a Bourbon as their
monarch, and that he will, by force
of arms, prevent them from exercising
freedom of choice among more acceptable can
didates. Who could have expected the repre-
sentative Of the revolutionary Napoleons to
become the armed champion of the effete
Bourbons, and to insist that, despite the
rigorous exclusion of the latter from France,
they must rule the adjacent country of Spain
in defiance of the protests of her people?
The present Emperor has himself set at def
ance all the traditions and principles alike of
the monarchists and republicans of Europe.
He threw down the gauntlet to the former
when he was elected President of the French
Republic of 1S4S and he outraged the latter by
the coup d'et0t of 1851. He seeks to justify
his assumptions of power by the allegation
that he is sustained by the popular will of
France, as declared in her one-sded cleo
tions, and yet he denies to Spain the privi-
lege of exercising this right of free suffrage
under analogous circumstances. At the pre-
sent moment the war fever seems to rage
feroely in France, and the hatred and jealousy
of Prussia which have been intensified by her
recent accessions of territory, make many
Frenchmen anxious to measure swords with
the Prussians, and to reassert French supre-
macy. If war ensues, however, by Napo-
Icons overt act, all the moving causes of the
conflict will be carefully canvassed,
and if it shall appear that Napoleons dynastic
fears and unprincipled intrigues, rather than
Prussian ambition, provoked the struggle, he
will be more apt to reap ignominy and danger
than glory and safety from the strife. The
attitude assumed by Prussia is dignifed.
When she says she has nothing whatever to
do with the controversy and that it must be
settled by Spain on her own responsibility,
the onus is thrown on Napoleon of either COM
mencing war without sufficient provocation
or of bullying the Spaniards into a rejection
of Hohenzollern.' If the Cortes decide against
him on account of the Napoleonic bluster, a
peaceful solution of the question will thus be
speedily made. If, however, they elect him
King, and Napoleon attempts to dethrone
him by force of arms, in a campaign against
Spain, he will disgust every liberal French
man and become the laughing-stock of the
world, besides encountering the danger that
the Spaniards, in defensive contest, will
prove as troublesome to him as they were to
the founder of his dynasty. Prussia shows
no disposition to precipitate a conflict, dis
playing rather an anxiety to avoid it if it can
be avoided honorably. If Napoleon, however,
thrusts conflict upon her, and she can
satisfy the Germans that they are summoned
to resist aggressive Napoleonic ambition,
the French will find foeman worthy of their
steel, and the contest will be as likely to
wind up with a Sadowa as Solferino.