Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1870-07-11
MIR. DAVIS AND GEN. JOHNSTON.
The First battle Of Manassas.


To the Editor of the COURIER Journal:
The Mississippi Clarion has com
mented upon the second volume of Alex
ander Stephens great work, pronouncing
as untrue the Statement therein made
that Mr. Davis Twas responsible for the
failure of the Confederate troops to ad-
vance after the victory of Manassas. l."
Probably the Vice President of the Con
federate States is as good authority as
the editor of the Clarion. And the asser-
ton of Mr.. Stephens is true The Cla-
rion publishes a correspondence between
Mr. Davis and General ohnston, in which
the question is asked whether Davis
prevented General Beauregard from
pursuing the enemy after the battle of
Manassas, and had subsequently re-
strained him from advancing upon Wash
ington city'sz To the first clause of
course General Johnston responds nc"
To the second clause there is qualified
answer, which is not generally under
stood. With your permission ] propose
to throw a little light upon this subject,
and to give some information which
ought long since to have been known.
The writer recollects distinctly when
Mr.. Davis came upon the battlefield.
Gen. Beauregard was, miles away in the
pursuit of the enemy, and therefore
after the battle there was no prohibition.
But before the battle was fought Mr.,
Davis and his agents had done things
and left others undone which established
the truth of Mr.. Stephens assertion,
that Mr.. Davis was responsible" for the
failure to reap any benefits from that
When Gen. Johnston took command
at Harper's Ferry, he pronounced the
position to be man-trap," verified
afterward by the act of Stonewall Jack
son in capturing the entire Federal gar
rison of 10000 men. The tart CORE
spondence, inaugurated by Gen. Whit
ing on the subject, in May, 1861, was no
doubt the cause of renewed dislike from
Mr.. Davis toward Gen. Johnston, be-
cause it demonstrated that the President
was not infallible upon military affairs,
and that his policy of attempting to hold
that position was unwise. The first day
after Gen. j Johnston's installation there
as commanding general it was deter
mined by him to evacuate it. he read
then the movements of Gen. SCOTS
mind, and stated in official documents
exactly what maneuvers would be subse-
quently made by the Federal general. He
was urgent upon Mr.. Davis to allow a
junction of his forces with those OF
Beauregard at Manassas, and the per
mission to do SO was not given until
General Patterson had marched down
within five miles of Winchester and it
was deemed certain battle would
ensue. Sldlfully General Johnston then
slipped from that place, and was enabled
to get portion of his army over to Ma
nassas. The few thousand men thus
added to Beauregard's forces were the
means of preventing Federal success
But Mr.. Davis obstinacy mad periled the
safety of the army under Beauregard,
only one-half the number of the troops
of Mcdowell; for the Confederate forces
were stretched over distance of twelve
miles, in order to hold the various fords
of Bull Run. Bees Bartow's and Jack
sons brigados, fatigued as they were by
the long forced march under broiling
sun, had only just arrived, and were
placed on the extreme left, where they
bore the brunt of the battle and were
cut to pieces. Many of the distant
forces of Beauregard could net get up in
time, and but for the opportune arrival
of Kirby Smith and his two brigades,
which ended long march by a desperate
attack, the battle Of Manassas would
have been exactly what McDowell's tele-
grams described it up to % pm, re-
sistless and sweeping Federal tri-
umph. Joe Johnston troops were
fatigued by the march, and yet
they fought nobly nearly one-half being
killed or wounded. 1t was impossible
for them to move upon Washington, and
it was equally impossible for the troops
of Beauregard, miles away down the
creek, to do so. Whilst urging the Pres
idept to carry out the views of General
Johnston about their junction, or that
Johnston should move across the coun
try. interposing the mountains between
himself and Patterson's forces, and at
tack the army sf Mcdowell in the rear,
Gen. Beanregard had mepBed opt plan
by which Washington was 70 be taken |
simultaneously with the defeat OF Nc
Dowell. 10 bad in pursuance thereof
demanded certain Supplies from the COM
missariat and ample transportation:
Both wers denied him. When Arnold
Harris came 70 ibe camp, a few days
after the batie, he expgessed ihe general
asto6;shment In Washington that our
forces had net come right IN with the
Semoraiized Fedora, ..roOps. And when
the writer repeated this to zen. John
ston Ne said '-' Il would have been mad
ness in us TO have attempted It with our
fatigued troops, because there were
heavy defenses, which we had every rea-
son to suppose were manned by at least
20 600 reserves. fresh and undenioralized-
And. besides, we had neither transporta-
ton nor supplies.
General Beauregard, in bis report, al.
luded to the denial Of his demands, and
in unmistakabie terms placed upon the
the failure 20 capture
Congress resolved itself
into secret session. and debated reso-
luton to expunge che clauses which re-
fiected upon the President. This debate