Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1870-12-09
NoRrH ATLANTIC SQUADRON. 4
UNITFp STATES FLAGSHIP MALVERN,
n -. Ep,. ptvpp Ianuarv 81 lSbO.

| / received your KIM ltttcf VI 'ne -"
instant, and thank you warmly for the |
confidence you reposed in my good opln- !
ion that this place could be taken. TO
the Navy Department alone is the coun-
try indebted for the capture of this rebel
stronghold; for if it had not been for
your perseverance in keeping the fleet
here and your constant propositions
made TO the army, nothing would have
been done. AS il was, after the PROPOSE
ton had been received, and Gen. Grant
promised that troops should be sent It
was not done until Gen. Butler consented
to let the matter go on, and when he
hoped to reap some little credit for the
explosion of the powder boat. Now,
the country gives General Grant the
credit Of inaugurating the expedi-
ton. when, on both occasions, he
permitted it to go improperly pro
vided. In the first place it had neither
head nor tail as far as the army was
concerned In the second place he
Grant sent too few men, when he ought
70 have calculated that the rebels would
have more strongly defended the works,
after seeing what narrow escape they
had. Nothing but the most desperate
fighting and determination to win on
the part of the army gave us the victory
The gallant band of sailors who fear
lessly went into the works amidst a
shower of canister and bullets, drew the
enemys attention away from the assault
on the land side, and enabled the troops |
TO obtain secure footing don't say |
this to detract from the gallantry oilthe |
soldiers, for never did men fight harder
or more handsomely than did our troops
that day. Now that the most important /
fort on the coast has been gained, as
usual you will hear but little of what the
navy did, and no doubt efforts will be
made again to show that the work was
not substantially injured as defensive
work" To General Grant, who is al
ways willing to take the credit when
ANYTHING is done, and equally ready to
Law the blame of the failure on the navy,
when failure takes place, feel under no
obligation for receiving and allowing re-
port to be spread from his headquarters
that there were three days when the navy
might have operated and did not He
knows as much about it as he did when
he wrote to me, saying the only way in
which the place could be taken was by
running the ships past the batteries,
showing evidently that he had not studied
the photography of Cape Fear river, and
did not know the virtue there was in our
wooden walls when they went in for a
fair stand-up fight Any fort in rebel
dom can be taken if we can only get IN
reach of it. have served with the
Lieutenant General before, where never
worked so hard in my life to make man
succeed as | did for him. You will I
scarcely notice in his reports that the t
navy did him any service, when without S
the help it has given him all the way t
through, he never would have been Lieu i
tenant General He wants magnanim- a
ty, like most officers OF. the army, and is I
20 avaricious as regards fame that he
will never, if he can help it, do justice to q
our department. When the rebels write 4
he history of this war, then, and only 4
hen, will the country be made to feel Z
What the navy has done. |
| do not feel at all kindly toward Gen. .
irant for the Indifference he displayed n
n this matter until he found his own 4
equation at stake; then he was glad to
brow tae elephant overheard that had
geighed him down so heavily He could
lot help but know that Gen. Butler was =,
ding in command of this expedition.
he matter was constantly discussed
nth him; he knew that he had placed
imself and all of his numerous staff on
GARD the flagship Ben de Ford, and ev- m
rybody spoke Of him as commander OF
he troops ~
In conversation with Gen Grant, IN
Expressly told him that | wanted nothing TO
0 do with Gen Butler, and he promised NJ
ne faithfully that he should not have any !,
with the expedition. Two -
ionths waited, the feet ready to sail at su
n hours notice. and acquiesced in the pc
Ienerar decision that he could not spare &,
oops for fear of endangering the de- \,
,nses in his front. ] said, Then the ~
Expedition will never 90 until Butlerhas II
finger in the pie, and sure enough, when ca
utler said go, we went. The fear Of ST,
the defenses disappeared on ad
iutler's presenting his plan for blowing -
he forts down, and an army was
hipped so quick (unprepared) on a
ne transports, that they almost sailed Ii
4 the middle Of heavy gale. General 20
rant knew tina. | did not care a fig for ~,
he powder boat, though /. was very -
lot disposed to trust il altogether / to
hink it most unhandsome in him 10 or
1n,lers staT and ~ ia oaIoniat;na V,
ngineer, Comstock, who wanted some Nj
xcuse for not doing their duty. The co
lieutenant General and | we're together p,
Eighteen months before Vicksburg -
lever had to wait for me, nor did any of mi
lis Generals (but have had to wait for
hem), and he should have supposed Al
rom the past and my anxiety 10 20 to -;
york, that | had not become any slower W
n my movements than when / was on
he Mississippi. His course proves to de
ne that he would sacrifice his best friend
ather than let any odium fall on Lieut.. o.,
zen. Grant. He will take TO himself all ?, ~
he credit of this move, now that il is lie
successful, when he deserves all the
blame for the first failure to take the ne
place. All this is now saddled on Gen.
Butler, and history will tell nothing Of
zen. Grants share in it, =.
tell IT to you for your own personal vi
satisfaction, that you may know and feel
mat you are entitled TO the entire credit co
Tor getting this expedition off and for its =,
success l am merely the agent, and -
only used to advantage the ample means tn
placed at my disposal, which any one $
else could have done as well as l. / ex- eli
pect you sometimes think / am a little
loo impolitie in what | say, but that is ="
my nature. | am always ready 10 fight
right away if any one reflects upon Inc on
navy know that no country under Ia,
he sun ever raised navy as Won have :,
lone in the same space Of time. and
hat no navy ever did more Could the th'
navy operate in James river, Richmond pa
would now be ours Vicksburg, a strong w
place, fell when the navy was bronsh!.;; 1, ! :.
bear on IT, Every place has fallen ,''
where naval cannon have been brought lo'
into play
This IS not pet place with the Lieutea- ~,
ant General, aud he leaves il with about =.
seven thousand men, and | don't tbink w
knows much Of the situation. An armv CT
man thinks if he has a gunboat Al ~ fol
back he is all safe, but this is one case 40
where at times the gunboats are driven