The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-22

ENtfhct from the brlt1sn AmDasSaaor NJ
Vienna 10 Earl Russell, giving an account Of
q subsequent interview with Count Rechberg:
'sThat as 70 Schleswig or Jutand, there was no
thought OF entering either country"
From the beginning Earl Russell endea-
vored TO separate the questions of Schleswig
and Holstein; the right of the Diet to act as
IL thought ft with regard TO the latter Duchy
he frankly acknowledged. The Schleswig
question he, however, firmly asserted was
one of an international nature, and should be
dealt with in concert with the signataries of
the treaty of London. He for long time
strove to procure the assent of Germany to
mediation, but received in return the most
insulting neglect of his representations, and
q contemptuous indifference, which has gone
far to lower the influence of British diplo-
macy on the Continent 1t is true that he
was not, save in one instance, treated with
verbal discourtesy, but in substance the re-
plies he received were-'This is no concern
Of yours; mind your own business"
'Sir A. Malet writes to Earl Russell from
Frankfort
''The tension of the public mind ia very great and
am bound to say that there E wonderful indifer-
ence to our representations while they are at the
same time resented az Interfering with Cherished
project. There is an absolute persuasion that Eng
land will not interfere materially, and our counsels
regarded as unfriendly, have no weight"
On one occasion Sir A. Malet was actually
told by the Bavarian envoy to the Diet that
much waste -paper-an expression for which
Sir A. Malet, however, required and obtained
an ample apology The Bavarian Minister
was, however, correct in his description of
Earl Russell's representations and threats.
Finding that mediation was unavailing, Earl
Russell betook himself to threats. Memo
randum presented by Sir A. Buchanan to
Count Bismarck, November "a, 1861
'Should Federal troops enter Holstein on purely
Federal grounds, her Majesty's Government would
trnons tOs had put ~ appear tnas Eedera
TO Interfere"
Again, see Earl Russell to Sir A. Buchanan,
Dec 25, 1861
'Any precipitate action on the part of the German
Confederation at the present moment may lead to
consequences fatal to the peace of Europe and may
involve Germany, in particular, In difficulties Of
The following extracts from Earl Russell's
correspondence with the British Ambassador
at Paris, under date Jan. "a, 1864, are worthy
of notice.
''Her Majesty's Government seek for the concert
and cooperation OF France Russia, and Sweden,
in order TO give, If necessary material assistance to
Denmark in the resistance Of such dismember-
ment."
'I answered that 1 alluded to material support
but that would define the case in which such
prepared for the cabinet, to be afterwards sub.
mitted for the sanction Of the Queen"
Finding that the threats of England were
looked upon as SO much 6rutun faI,nep Earl
Russell took lower ground, and made the
grant Of any material assistance to Denmark
to depend on the concurrence of France and
Russia. These powers, however, refused that
concurrence, and Earl Russell's warlike inten-
tions oozed out of his fingers ends like "Bob
Acres" courage. England had, nevertheless,
as is spparent from the Danish Ambassadors
despatch, dated February IL, 1864, promised
unconditional aid if Schleswig were at
tackled
"Recently, too, the Cabinet of London gave it to
be understood at Frankfort that in the case Of an
alone in the contest"
Schleswig was attacked and England made
no sign.
The history of the operations in Western
and Northern Germany in 1866 is clearly told,
and forms an interesting supplement to Cap
tain Hozier's history of the war. Sir A.
Malet was living at the time at the scene of
action-was personally acquainted with many
of the actors in the campaign-and, though a
civilian, shows in general considerable
talent for describing and analyzing military
operations.
For the political manuuvres which pre-
ceded the outbreak of war, and the conduct
of Count Bismarck toward his inoffsnsive
neighbors, we refer the reader to the book
itself. AS to the campaign, it was strong
illustration of the ineficiency of the Federal
Hilitdry oiBduiZatlou. Otuor CRUISES, however,
equally contributed to the failure. Speaking
of the troops acting under orders of the Diet,
Sir A. Malet says:-
'When the Diets decision, of June A. called these
troops into immediate activity, the faultiness OF
Federal military arrangements became instantly ap-
parent and it was manifest that much longer term
would be required to prepare the several contin-
gents to take the field In such an efficient state of
preparation as modern warfare demands. The
assembling and training OF horses, especially, was
very mperfecty accomplished, and the cavalry,
and their efficiency proportionatey Imperfect"
The force was divided into two armies one
under Prince Alexander of Hesse, the other
consisting entirely of Bavarians, under the
command of Prince Charles of Bavaria. The
chief command of both armies was also vested
in the latter Prince. The choice of COM
mander-in- chief was unfortunate. Prince
Charles was old, slow, obstinate, and of no
experience in modern warfare. The result
was, that though far superior in numbers, ..he
was everywhere worsted by the inferior Prus-
sian forces By his neglecting to send aid to
Hanover, moreover, he contributed in great
measure to the surrender of the gallant con-
tingent which that kingdom had placed
in the field. Another cause of Prussian
success was the treachery or incapacity
of Prince William of Baden, who
commanded the Baden division of the army
! of the Diet. At the commencement of the
campaign he retired from Giessen without
orders, thereby uncovering the left of Prince
Alexander's army and the City of Frankfort;
later on, in the actions on the Tauber, he
withdrew without orders, after a merely
formal resistance, thereby causing the retreat
of the army from the line of that river.
Lastly, the next day he, without any cause,
declined to support Bavarlan division which