South Branch intelligencer. [volume] (Romney, Va. [W. Va.]) 1830-1896, 1870-09-09
The Science of Going to War
Hor Prussia is Superior 10 France
FROM the New York Daily Times.

/
II is scarcely possible to over-estimate tho ad
! vantage which the Prussians have gained within
the last fortnight. They have DESTROYED the con
I hdence of the French in their generals and are
now pursuing defeated and dropping armies with
I an elated and overwhelming force. Only very
enthusiastic Frenchmen can suppose that the
Emperor Napoleon is retiring Tor tactical purpo-
ses. If be could not cover Paris Mt Metz he
stands far less chance Of being able to do so at
I Chalons. Every inch of ground which he is O.
bliged TO give up to the Prussians Is an immense
advantage to them, and great loss 10 him. IL
/ is the side which is pursuing an offensive cam
paign that stands the best chance Of winning in
the end. When this month opened, Napoleon
seemed to have this element OF success in his "a
yor. In six days he lost il, and ever since then
he has constantly been Obliged TO recede before
the irresistible pressure Of the Prussan hosts
/ That he is out-numbered, we have no Doubt
But how will he justify himself before the French
people for entering upon war for which he was
! SO fatally unprepared2
| The superiority which the Prussiaus have thus
far shown, they seem likely to retain until the
close OF the war. Some people appear 10 suppose
/ that the disproPorton in numbers between the
| Prussian and French armies will disappear the
campaign goes on. We believe, on the contrary,
| that il will remain very much as IL is now-or
that IL any change be made it will be in favor of
/ the Prussians. They have more efficient sys-
tenn of keeping their forces at given level than
| the French. As soon as the mobilization of the
I
| formed all over the country. Supplies Of men
and horses are dispatched from these depots to
the front on the first day of every month, the
number being calculated on an accurate estimate,
based upon carefully prepared statistics. The
! soldiers thus constantly gathered in TO make up
losses in the field one half called up from the
/ Landwehr who have already served, and
know their dutes-while the other half are re-
cruts. They leave the depots provided with eve
! rything they need so that they are ready for
/ service the moment they reach the front. This
is the system which has called forth the enthusi-
astic praises of every foreign observer who has
carefully studied the organization of the Prus-
sian army. Levies Of raw recruits cannot cope
with force raised in this scientific manner.
There are the French fortresses, ii is true, but
! they are useless while the French armies are held
in check. II seemed impossible, a fortnight ago
! that Prussia would be able 10 isolate Metz with
out AN effort. Yet that is what she seems to be
doing now. She can afford to detach from her
main armies a force sufficient 10 give employment
to the French troops in Metz. The invading
force can thus march on, and the army inside
Metz could neither follow 1t nor cut OF its retreat
/ If worsted in open engagements. This is the eX-
perience Of Prussia in the Austrian cnmpaign.-
She had then small Ter foftresses TO deal with than
she has now. but, on the other hand, she has
larger armies at her disposal. "Josephstadt and
KoniggratZ,' says Capt. Hozier, ibid not delay
! the Prussian armies for day, though they are
! both strong places, and would possibly have
| stood long siege but they were both masked
I by attachments, the loss of which from the line
| of battle hardly felt by the main body, aud
| though no trenches were opened, and no guns
mounted against them, the great line Of the Prus-
sian communications passed in safety within a
| few miles of their paralyzed garrisons." This
/ operation, on a larger SCALE the Prussian com
manders now adopting in dealing with Metz,
i For this as for everything else, Napoleon seems
| to be "unprepared." But that explanation will
not soothe France under the disastrous blows
which are being inflicted upon her.
| The Prussan losses are filed up as fast as they
| occur The French seem TO be under the impress
sion that the forces they first sent into the field
would be amply sufficient 10 finish the war II
was only under the surprise and alarm Of the
first great reverse that they began to talk Of "hl
! ing up the void in the army. Within a month
! first supply Of men from the depot reserves was
| forwarded TO the front. There was no waiting
| for kilograms or orders The reserves are for
warded at stated intervals, whether they are
| wanted or not The French armies have not on
/ " been weakened by heavy losses, but further
depleted by the necessity Of detaching large for
ccs for the defense Of Strasbourg, Metz, aud 9TH
| er places. Again, the French cOmmissariat sys-
tenn seems 20 have completely broken down, just
rs the English system did in the Crimea-when
the only breakfast served out 10 men who had
spent bitter winters night on the bleak hill
sides was green, unroasted coffee. Now the
| Prussian cOmmissariat cannot fail in this way
! II would take too long 10 describe the method
upon which il is organized-but, as was proved
in 1866, its success is assured from the first mo-
ment Of the war 70 the last.
These are some Of the points in which the
! Prussians have an advantage over the French.
They help TO explain the many dscomftures al
ready sustained by the French-and incidentally
they show how absurd was the sympathy lately
| expressed for poor Prussia" because Napoleon
had taken her 'by surprise" a nation in
/ which every able-bodied man, except clergymeu,
is obliged 20 serve in the army, and which has
I the finest military organization tho world has e.
I yer seen, cannot very well be taken by surprise
/ Count Bismarck, while no doubt very thankful
Tor the good wishes which greet him and his
cause from this country, must have been not q
/ little amused with the idea that Napoleon had
Outwitted him. and had forced war upon a COun-
try intent only upon the arts Of peace.