Vicksburg weekly herald., 1870-08-27

From tha n. 7, Timssl
Eho Route e PnRis-Develop.
mens oe ehe PFussian Plan el
eh0 CmmpmHwm-sTho RF@ueml
Compared y lth Previous lava
slOnss
In the absence of any movements
from the seat Of war, save what are
indicative Of the pursuance ofplanl
which we have already explained
1t may not bo uninteresting to ad.
vert to the probable course of g
march to Paris, for which the Prus-
SLAMS are evidently preparing,
when the frontier was first violated
twelve days ago, q writer in the
Opinion Nationdle directed atten-
ton to the fact that the invasion Ol
France by the Prussians In 1792,
and that by the Allies In 1913, had
consistently followed the same plan
Of advance-a plan which In both
cases originated with the Major
General of the Prussian forces. On
these occasions an entrance was
made by the valley Of the Moselle.
Metz and Thlonville were avoided,
and Verdun and Longevy having
been captured, descent was made
by the valley Of the Meuse, whence
the valley Of the Marne was gained,
leading by Chalons straight to
Paris. Following the indications
Of the writer we have quoted, we
may calculate with tolerable GER
tainty, that should the maiu body
OF the Prussians troops prove victo.
rious before Metz the valley ofthe
Marne will be again selected 90 the
route to Paris. On the prospects OF
another advance being made from
the south, additional data are want.
ing to warrant further speculation.
Presuming, then, that In the great
battle at Metz, which becomes daily
more imminent, the French army
should be SO thoroughly defeated
as to leave that fortress open to the
invaders or TO warrant them In
leaving 1t behind, they would
doubtless proceed to take posses.
sion Of the important railroad cen.
tire of Frouard, g point about TWEEN.
ty miles south Of Metz, where the
lines cross which lead to that for.
tress on the north, to StrasbUrg on
the east, and to Paris on the west.
Communication between eastern
France and the capital would thus
be thoroughly cut of, and the large
stores Of railroad material depOsi.
ted there would become the spoil
Of the viotors, Nancy is but @ few
miles distant, and another battle
there might be expected to precede
the further advance to Paris. Fol-
lowing the valley of the Moselle
for ten miles the invaders would
have to deal with the fortress Of
Toul--a place, however, only ofthe
second rank. Between this and
the valley ofthe Marne Is q distance
Of thirty to forty miles, across G
hllly tract Of country, where the
movements Of heavy bodies o.
troops would be necessarily slow
aud where the mining Of a few
viaducts would effectually pre-
vent the possibility of using thC
railroad. Once arrived at st. Dizier
on the Marne, the only remaining
exterior defence Of Paris Is Cha
Ions, at a distance of about thirty
miles, and 1t is not at all improba
BILE that around the entrenched
camphere may be fought one of the
greatest and most desperate battles
of the present century.
OF course Freech defeat at Met1
Is the indispensable preliminary t
all such probabilities but from the
overwhelming amount of force
which the Prussians can bring
against the position, such an event
cannot be considered as at all un'
likely. 1t is one of the first princi.
Piles of Prussian tactics 10 strike
heavily and swiftly. The construc.
ton Of their armies out OF men
drawn from peaceful avocations
renders a long campaign a thing tC
be avoided.