The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-10-07

swifter and more fearful, but that 1t is sooner
over is, at least, some consolation for those
who witness without being able toprevent the
devastation and suffering wrought by the
combats of modern nations.
THE ARMISTICE QUESTION-A FRESH
OPPORTUNITY FOR INTERVENTION.
From, the N. Y Herald.
The situation as between Prussia and
France it does appear is misunderstood not
only in this country, not only all over Europe,
but by the combatants themselves, and even
by the representatives of the two rival ma
tionalities. The difference of peace and an
armistice we made plain to our readers some
days ago. Because Prussia made certain con-
ditions for an Neutrality-suspicious. which,
though just enough for an armistice, might
not uniustly have been deemed hard for
peace settlement-most of the newspapers,
not perceiving the difference, burst into tow
ering passion and denounced the tyranny and
injustice of Prussia. France was unfortunate
and downtrodden. Prussia, or rather Ger
many, was barbarian and brutal. Bismarck
was fiepd from the lower regions. Jules
Favre was an angel of light. France was all
right Prussia was all wrong.
Now, however, that we are In possession of
Bismarck's S version of what actually did take
place at his interview with Jules Favre, the
difference between peace settlement and an
armistice is no longer misunderstood Nor is
it any longer possible to doubt that if Jules
Favre had been able to find reason In his un-
reasonable colleagues this most unnecessary
and destructive war would have been ended at
least two weeks ago. Bismarck tells us, and
tells us plainly, that "the statement that he
refused an armistice is false" When he met
Jules Favre at Ferrieres ''it was agreed that
an armstice would be possible if France
gave Prussia guarantees against delay
against destroying the advantages of the po-
siton she had won in the war;" These guar
antees included the retention of the fortresses
on the lines of communication between Ger
may and the advance posts of the German
armies. They included also the surrender of
certain Notifications in the neighborhood of
Paris, SO as to prevent the besieged from
taking undue advantage of the armistice to
gather in supplies and so strengthen their
position. On these terms Bismarck was will
ing to grant an armistice of fifteen or twenty
days, thus permitting France to make her
elections and convene her Constituent Assem-
bly, and form responsible government which
could say ''Yea" or May According to
Bismarck M. Jules Favre could not bind
France to any such arrangement; but he
promised to consult his colleagues. Not find.
ing his colleagues in mood to comply with
such terms, Jules Favre wrote a letter to King
William, as ali our readers know, full
of patriotism, but full also of bun
combe With Bismarcks statement of
the case before us, we must repeat that by
the newspaper world generally, the condi-
tions OF peace settlement and of an armis-
tice have been absurdly confounded; that
Prussia had perfect right in view of an
armistice to make such conditions, and that
the Provisional Government was greatly to
blame for not accepting the conditions and
agreeing to temporary suspension of hosti-
lities 1t is natural for the Provisional Gov
ernment and for France generally to regard
these conditions as hard; but it must also be
admitted that the Prussian authorities woald
have revealed a miserably plentiful lack of
that wisdom which has won them SO great
success if they had agreed to grant an armis-
tice on terms more easy. Count Bismarck
was not the man in any circumstances, least
of all when his triumphant legons were
knocking loudly at the gates of Paris, to fling
away a victory which his people had won at a
cost of so much blood and so much treasure,
and which he himself had madeit his life labor
to accomplish. For poor France we all feel;
but sentiment is not always just, and no man
who loves France and loves justice, too, can
have any difficulty in endorsing the senti-
ment, ''Pity that two weeks ago an armistice
was not agreed to-" The fault clearly was
not Bismarcks. 1t was not Jules Favres.
The blame rests with France, and with
France because she has no responsible gov
eminent.
An armistice to-day is more possible and
more desirable than ever. The terrific artil-
lery of Prussia is pointed and ready to burst
upon the doomed city of Paris-a city in the
preservation of which, somehow, all the world
feels interested. If the Prussian guns do open
their mouths and belch forth destruction on
the monuments and art treasures of the fairest
CITY of which IN odern civilization can boast
no one can blame Prussia. 1t will not be the
fault of Count Bismarck or General Moltke,
or of King William, or of the Grown
Prince. 1t will only be their painful duty
their necessity. They have no choices they
cannot help it. 1t will not, we think, be
the fault of Jules Favre or of General Trochu.
With unreasoning colleagues they have no
choice; they cannot help it. But still we
must regret the necessity of the destruction
of Paris. If Prussia has no choice but to
pour upon it destruction and death; if the
Provisional Government is SO feeble that it
can neither repel the invader nor become re-
sponsible for an armistice, there is a loud
and imperative call addressed to the neutral
powers once more to kindly interfere-to
persuade if they cannot compel 1t is now
manifest to all the world that the door for
intervention is open; that both Prussia
and France are willing to listen to rea-
son, if only they are properly ap-
preached. Let the great powers, one and
all, state to France that to save Paris, to
prevent the unnecessary humiliation of the
| French people, and possibly to prevent dis
memberment of the kingdom, more serious
than has yet been contemplated, an armistice
| on Prussian conditions must be accepted
! Vigorous, forceful, decided action on the
part of the great powers is all that is neces
sary to bring France to reason and to give