Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-12-08
How Porter was Beaten by
Grant and Grant
by Butler.

NORTH ATLANTIC OQUADR0N, U. .. |
FLAGSHIP MALVERN, CAPE FEAR RIVER,
Jan. 81, 1S65.-My Dear Sir: received |
your kind letter OF the 18th inst, and |
thank you warmly for the confidence you |
reposed in my good opinion that this |
place could be taken. To the Navy De- |
pariment alone is the country indebted |
for the capture of this rebel stronghold; |
for had it not been for your perseverance |
in keeping the feet here, and your con- |
slant propositions made to lhe army,
nothing would have been done. AS it |
was, after the proposition had been re-
ceived, and Gen. Grant promised that |
troops should be sent, it was not done IN
til Gen. Butler consented to let the matter |
20 on, and when he hoped 10 reap some !
little credit for the explosion of the |
powder boat. Now, the country gives |
Gen. Grant the credit of inaugural |
ing the expedition, when, on both Occa- |
sions, be permitted it to go improperly |
provided. In the first place it had neither |
head nor tail as far as the army was con-
cerned. In the second place he GRANT |
sent too few men, when he ought to have |
calculated that the Rebels would have |
more strongly defended the works, after
seeing what narrow escape they had
Nothing but the most desperate. fighting
and determination to win on the part 81
the army gave us the victory. The gal
liant band of sailors who fesrlessly went
into the works amidst q shower of can
mister and bullets, drew the enemy's at
tention away from the assault on the land
side, and enabled the troops to obtain
secure footing. 1 don't say this to de-
tract from the gallantry of the soldiers,
for never did men fight harder or more
handsomely than did our troops that
day. Now that the most important fort
on the coast has been gained, as
usual you will hear but little of what the
navy did. and no doubt efforts will be
made again to show that the work was
''not substantially injured as defensive
work To Gen. Grant, who is always
willing to take the credit when anything
is done, and equally ready to lay the
blame of the failure on the navy, when
a failure takes place, feel under no obi
cations for receiving and allowing re-
port to be spread from his headquarters
that there were three days whe1fhe navy
might have operated and didSOt. He
| knows as much about It as he didwhen he
wrote to me, saying ''the only way in
| which the place could be taken was by
running the ships past the batteries, " show
| ing evidently that he had not studied the
photography of Cape Fear River, and did
| not know the virtue there was in our
| wooden walls when they went in for q
| fair stand up fight. Any fOIt in rebeldom
| can be taken if we can only getin reach II.
l have served with the Lieutenant General
| before. where never worked 50 hard in
nv life to make a man succeed as l did
| for him. You will scarcely notice in his
reports that the navy did him any ser
| vice, when without the help it has given
| him all the way through, he never would
have been Lieutenant General He wants
magnanimity, like most officers of the
army. and is go avariciOus as regards
fame that he will never, if he can help
it, do Justice to our department When
the Rebels write the history of this war,
then, and only then, will the country be
made to feel what the navy has done.
| do not feel at all kindly toward Gen.
Grant for the indifference he displayed
=. in this matter until he found his own re-
putation at stake; then he was glad 70
throw the elephant overheard that had
weighed him down so heavily. He could
not help but know that Gen. Butler was
going in command of this expedition.
The matter was constantly discussed with
him: he knew that he had placed himself
and all of his numerous staff on board
the flagship Ben de Ford, and everybody
smoke of him as commander of the troops.
In a conversation with Gen. Grant, |
expressly told him that wanted nothing
to do with Gen. Butler, and he promised
Inc faithfully that he should not have any
connection with the expedition. Two
months waited, the fleet ready to sail al
an hours notice. and acquiescad in the
Generals decision that he could not spare
troops for fear of endangeIing the de
fences in his front. | said, ''Then The
expedition will never go until Butler hai
, a finger in the pie, and sure enough, wheI
) Butler said go, we wenf Inc rear OF
. weakening the defences disappeared OF
r Buffers presenting his plan for blowing
the forts down, and an army
was shipped so quick (unprepared
? on the transports, that they almost salEeo
3 | in the middle of a heavy gale. Gen
\ Grant knew that / did not care tg 10
. the powder boat, though l was very vii
( ling to try it as an experiment, but no
j disDosed TO trust it altogether. think
| most unhandsome 10 him to listen for
o moment TO the idle talk of Buffers statf
h and his timid, calculating engineer, Com
\ stock. who wanted some excuse for nc
Q doing their duty. The Lieutenant Gen
Y ersI and were together eighteen month
before Vicksburg-never had TO Walt 1C
me-. nor did any of his Generals (but
Q have had to wait for them), and
,e should have supposed from the past an
10 my anxiety to go to work, that had NJ
become any slower in my movements tha
was on the Mississippi. His c0ur;
nroyes to me that he would sacrifice h
heal friend rather than let any odium Is
ON Lieut.. Gen. Grant He will take
himself all the credit of this move no
2 that it is successful, when he deserves
the blame for the first failure to take u
place. All tllS is now s1ddled on de
is Butler, and history will tell nothing
Gen. Grants share in it.
I tell it to you for your own person
satisfaction that you may know and re
that YOU are entitled to the entire cred
for getting this expedition off and Tor
ID success. am merely the sgent and on
used to advantage the ample mea
If placed at my disposal, which any one e
could have done as well as ]. l exp'
be Won sometimes think l am little too IL
noli,ic in what l say, but that IS I
IN nature. | am always ready to fight rig
of away. if any one reflects upon the nav
7 know that no country under the
on ever raised navy as you have done IN
of same space of time, and that no ma
ever did more. Could the navy oper
,ff in James river, Richmond would now
nd ours. Vicksburg, a strong place,
when the navy was brought to pear on
M Every place has fallen where naval g
on non have been brought into play.
in This is not pet place with the Lieu
General. aud he leaves 1t W
bo ahout seven thousand men q
hio 7 don't think knows much of the SIT
mo- tiop An army man thinks If he has
-,S o,,nboat at his back be is all safe, but
"a one case where at times the gunoo
Inc are driven off BY bad weather, and tn
. s% inside cannot CO operate effectively.
mo have given you long letter. but find
Of apology for myself in the fact tina,
know your whole heart is in tue ma
the and that everything concerning tinter
in you. Again permit me to thank you
he The confidence you have always placed
nd me. and the opportunities you have q
mo me for distinction, and assuring you
pht it has been my wsrmest WISH 10 II
of only your appreciation, remain, resp
fully and sincerely, your obedient sery
i''"' DAVID d. PoBTEI
70 To Hon. Gideon Welles, SecretaryIo1
Uav Navy, Washington. D. c.
az, The Memphis appeal of the 9th
% | ,,I,l. nn-t rnnidpnnn in the