Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-08-02
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Suppose a>French army to be ready TO
march into Germany, what lines of oper7
alton lie open. to it2 From Metz there
are three roads, diverging into Rhenish
Prussia. The first or most westerly,
turning off at ThionviEe from the great
Luxembourg road, strikes the river Saar
at Saarburg, and the Moselle at Treves.
Thence there are roads through the diff
cult and rugged country of the Eifel,
which lead 10 the Rhine at CoblentZ, at
Bonn, and Cologne. A second road leads
direct from Metz 10 Saar-Louis, strong
and important Prussian fortress while a
third leads to SaaIbuck, some twenty
miles higher up the Saar; whence, as
from Saar-Louis, there is railway com
munication with Treves, and line lead
ing directly down the valley of the Maize
to Bingen, and thence TO Coblentz and
Mainz. A French army adopting this
line of operations, and using any of these
roads, must be prepared to mask or be-
siege the strong fortress of Saar-Louis, on
which Prussian labor has of late been
most freely expended must also be pre-
| pared to meet an enemy concentrated
from the provinces east of the Rhine. in
tne denies OF the Hochwald or the Eifel;
while even should it be victorious here, it
1nds in its further progress the great
fortress of Coblentz, beyond which it
would not dare to advance in the
direction of Cologne, inasmuch as it
would then have its only line of supply
! Immediately threatened, and liable to be
compelled to fight with its back to the
neutral territory of Belgium. From Saar-
Druck al other road and railway lead to
; the famous battle field of KaiseIslantern.
ID hlemsh Bavaria, and thence due east
10 The Rhine at Mannheim; but no other
road of importance crosses this Bavarian
frontier, except the rail and road from
Strasbourg and Weissenburg, which lead |
direct upon the fortress of Landau on the |
river lueich, and thence to the Rhine at |
Mannheim, leaving the fortress of Ger !
mersheim on the right, which closes the
road from Suasbourg along the left bank /
OF the Rhine. 1t was rot till 1916 that
the fortresses of Saar-Louis and Landau |
were taken away from France and given
to Germany, and now they close the two
chief lines leading across the northern |
frontier of France, to the Rhine Both,
however, may be turned by the Saar-
bruck- Bingen or Saarbruck- Mannheim
road; and, should France cross the north
ern side of the angle, this will be probably |
her line of operations, leading her on the
Rhine either above or below the Main.
A road from Bitsch, French fort on the
NOsges, meets the Saarbruck- Kaislerslan-
tern road at Homburg, and would facili-
tate the advance of an army, while serY-
ing as safe line for supplies.
Should Mannheim be the point aimed
at, Landau would have to be masked OF be-
seiged by troops from Strasbourg. Such
will be the most probable line of opera
lions, if the northern side of the frontier
should be crossed. But it is on the Rhine
or eastern side that the French might
without difficulty meet with first easy
success. Crossing at STasbrrg, she
might penetrate the Black Forest by the
valleys of the Rench or the KinZig and
the Enz, all Of which are perfectly open,
toward the valleys of the Neckar, or turn
ing Rastadt, which closes the road and !
railway on the right bank of the Rhine,
and also the valley of the Murg, advance
upon Piorzheim or Stuttgardt. Ulm. the
only strong fortress on that side, is too |
distant to be of avail against such move
ments, and Rastadt would only serve to
hold the troops of Baden, who would
hasten to its shelter to rally at TIE first
sound OF the enemy's trumpet ON the
Grand Dukes bank of the Rhine. Nei-
ther Baden nor Bavaria need be much |
feared by France, if the experience of
1866 is to be trusted. With her foot once
firmly planted in WurtemburC, France
might advance to the Main and into |
Bavaria, anu hold the same position that
Napoleon held before the opening of the |
Jena campaign, were it not that he then |
held the fortress of Mayence, which is
now the bulWark of Germany. Both |
French and German writers have pointed
of late to the invasion of Southern Ger
many as the best chance of success for
France.
A German pamphlet, called ''The An
nexation of South Germany to the North
German Confederation, has attracted |
attention both in Germany |
and IN France, from the strong arguments
of the writer that the extension of its |
frontier is cause of the greatest weakness
to the North German Bund. He shows |
that there is nothing to prevent France
from overrunning Baden, Wurtemburg
and Bavaria, and tnat the temptation in
such case would be almost too strong
for Austria. In reply, it has been urged
that Prussia could concentrate forces and
cast them into Lorraine before France |
could penetrate into the South, and force
her to recall her troops to defend Paris.
And it has been pointed out that by an
alliance with Belgium more direct road
to Paris would be opened up. 10 our |
mind, however, the question is more
whether France will consider any foe
worthy of her steel, except the Prussian
army, and whether she will not strike at
the Rhine, at Mannheim, or at BiDgen,
and laying thus hold of a portion of the
Rhine provinces compel Prussia TO an
carly battle. Prussia has in Mayence and
COblentz the vast advantage of great for
tresses, round which she can maneuver,
and which enable her to operate at pleas
Urc on either bank of the Rhine.