The morning star and Catholic messenger. [volume] (New Orleans [La.]) 1868-1881, 1870-09-11

OEFECTIvE 6ENERA4AHIPs-An 1nteln-
gent, and apparently Impartial English
critic, thus exposes defecfsSof French
generalship:
1t is clear that the apparent dilatorfness
of the Emper0R was forced upon him by the
we have just named but
there Is NO excuse whatever for ignorance
of the vast masses Of the enemy collecting
on the frontier, nor for the adventurous
position Of the corps of MeMahon and De
Failly without support at hand as
would enable them to retreat and concen-
trate their forces If attacked by an adj
vancing party. But ignorance of the
whereabouts of the enemy and OF his force
is about the greatest fault general can
commit. 1t cost the first Napoleon the field
of Waterloo, and Benedek that of Sadowa.
Each of these battles would, in all proba-
bility, have had @ quite different issue If
the general had used his cavalry before the
battle instead of sacrificing it during the
battle, or to protect his retreat. At Water
ance of the whereabouts of ninety thousand
Prussians, and at Sadowa Benedek fought
in ignorance of the whereabouts of a hun-
dred and eighty thousand Prussians. Each
general might have fought and won his
battle if he would only have c0ndescended
| to inform his mind Of the most material
facts on which the issue depended. We'll
lington, partially ignorant of the advance
of the French in 1915, was only saved by
greater laundering on the other side from
losing his communication with Butcher.
An army of 120, 900 men, however well it's
movements may be masked, cannot be hid
den it is always big enough to be seen it
people have but eyes-that is, cavalry. 1t
cannot move as fast as man can walk,
much less as fast as horse can gallop. 1t
covers a great space of ground, and gives
unmistakable evidences of its march to the
eye of an experienced campaigner. But if
all due precautions are taken and fail, a
corps d armee should still not be annihilated,
as practically was Marshal McMahon's, if
taken unawares. Five-and- thirty thou
sand men cannot be eaten up even by
hundred thousand men in no time. 1t
takes two or three hours ut least before
the numerical superiority is much available.
The tail of an army of l2O, 900 men is miles
away from the vanguard. Before it comes
to hard fighting at s(Raquarters DISPOSE
lions have to be made, 8rders transmitted,
guns and men brought into position; and
then, with good troops in a good defensive
position, the first, second, perhaps the third
| and fourth attacks are repulsed. And
then, if it become impossible to hold the
ground, there ia timely retreat-dithcult
before victorious and numerically SUI
| perior force-impossible without supports
If the contest has been carried on too long
On a review of the whole subject, the
writer continues
So complete collapse, so utter moral
prostration, such deficiency in professional
resource, such absence of military enter
prise, in the great army of brave and
chivalrous people, is without precedent
In despair Of finding a rational explanation
of this unaccountable phenomenon, we are
almost driven to the solution, "Quem Deus
| vult perdere prius dementat." The simplest
rules of campaigning have been neglected
The very rudiments of the military art, the
commonest maxims of war seem alike u
have been forgotten by the most accom-
plislled and scientific warriors in Europe