The New York herald., 1870-01-07

Aso&OHUO VUlUt0 ~ tuo SuU~u AsO'~.~-
tisn-What Our Government Should DO.
In our Washington correspondence to-day
will be found dispatches which, II absolutely
true, leave us little room to doubt that the
patriot cause in Cuba is practically dead.
Our correspondent, who has access to the
best sources of information, is evidently salts
fed with the crcdibility and general accuracy
of the report which he has made. II, as We
have said the report be true, there is, in point
of fact, no rebellion on the island. The insur-
gents 1t is said, have been reduced to a mere
handful of men, some armed and some un-
armed, who are living by plumber, and whose
only remaining strength consists in the
Micawber-like hope that something may turn
up. They occupy no town, they possess no
stronghold, and when seen at all they are seen
on the narrow roads, obscure bride paths and
generally in places where the soldiers of the
regular army are least likely to be found.
This, however, is not all. It appears from
certain intercepted letters that the Junta
itself is badly demoralized, and that petty
wrangling about precedence and leadership
occupies their time, to the exclusion almost OF
their proper business. The letters generally
betray distrust. One letter denounces Lemus;
actually proposes surrender to the Captain
General. The fact that so many soldiers had
to be sent from Spain to put down the insur-
rection, and which to so many seemed to imply
that the rising was really powerful, is explained
by the other fact that cholera, yellow fever
and other diseases have done more to kill of
Spaniards than Cuban bullets and sabres. We
have again to say that If this intelligence Is
found to be truthful in its essential features
there is no longer any rebellion in Cuba, and
the revolution has turned out lamentable
failure.
1t Is our conviction, however, that, much as
the Cubans are themselves to blame, much as
they have bungled their proper work, and much
as they allowed opportunity to slip, the Ameri-
can government, unless 1t is quick to clear it's
skirts, will have some sins to answer for. No
one who has watched this Cuban business
from its commencement will refuse to admit
that in the earlier months of General Grants
administration the Cubans had good rea-
son to count on American sympathy and
support. Our government had conferences
with the Spanish Minister In Washington; our
Minister at Madrid had conferences with the
Spanish government, and the conferences in
both capitals had Cuba for their subject. 1t
is q fact also that Minister Lemus had dealings
Eioh Ioo1irrc uuhtch iunpli-
Gated our government, which encouraged the
Cubans, and which, unless covered by some
early and daring stroke Of policy, will leave
permanent stain on General Grants admins
tration. If Secretary Fish encouraged the
Cubans to buy munitions of war and other
supplies, and promised protection in American
waters he did much, 80 much, in fact, that he
ought to have done more. General Grant,
too, ought to have known that this was half
hearted policy that was dangerous in the
extreme unless contingencies were carefully
provided for That the Cuban Junta and
those who acted with them proved themselves
parcel of laundering blockheads is no justifi-
cation of the conduct Of our present admins
tratiOn. The administration has not in this
Cuban business proved itself true to the
American people, and certainly we have
yet to wait for evidence of high, broad
and farseeing craftsmanship in the same
direction. Facts, however, are facts, and,
whatever our inclinations, we have no choice
but to bow to them. Between the laundering
Of Cubans on the one hand and the laundering
of our administration on the other there are no
longer any grounds on which belligerent rights
can be granted to what has been called the
Cuban republic.
If the news which we publish be correct
and we have no reason to doubt that it is
correct-the situation is new We must look
at it as it is, and make the best of it. If six
months ago, or even later, the administration
had followed our advice and accorded bellge-
rent rights to the Cuban insurgents one of two
things must have resulted-either Cuba would
have won her independence or Spain would
have been compelled to offer us the island on
reasonable terms In the earlier stages of the
insurrection, according even to Secretary Fish
himself, there was good reason to believe that
the insurgents were making headway, and that
they would soon be masters of the situation.
This was the time for the administration to
act. Had the action been prompt and
emphatic lovers Of liberty and justice
all the world over would have ap-
proved, and trouble in Cuba would have
been ended. In such circumstances the
dreaded comparison suggested by the Alabama
depredatons would have been impossible. But
the opportunity has been lost, and the ques-
tion now is, what should the administration do?
To grant belligerent rights at this stage would
make the American people the laughing stock
of the nations. What, then, is the proper course
for the administration They are in o diff
Guilty. The American people are indignant.