Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1870-05-27

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/ For two days Mcclellan had been ad.
| vising Haleck that he was pushing
Franklin forward, and now, on the goth,
he says. II should not have moYed him
but for your pressing order Of last
night
At noon he telegraphed again s.'Your
telegram Is received. Do you wish the
movement Of FranlSlin's corps to con-
tinue Franklin has only be-
tween 1000 and II 900 ready for duty,
How far do you wish this force to ad-
vance r nre.s -a
At one o clock p. m. Mcclellan halted
Franklin at Annandale, only ten miles
from Alexandria At 2 p. m, he receiv-
ed the following from Halleck IN reply
to his last dispatch 81 want Franklin s
corps to go far enough to find out some
thing about the enemy. : 0m
people Rf1fSt move more actively, and
ind out where the enemy IS. ] am tired
of guesses.
A few minutes before he received this
Mcclellan had telegraphed to President
lincoln: Il am clear that one of two
courses should be adopted Ist. To con-
centrate all our available forces to open
communication with Pope I'd. To Ieaz,e
P2be 10 get cat 0f his Scrnf5e, and al
once use all our means to make the
Capital perfectly safe.
To which the President at 4:Io p. M,
responded: Yours of to-day just re-
ceived. l think your first alternative
to wit: to concentrate all our available
forces to open communication with
Pope'-is the right one. But wish not
to control. ThatI now leave. to Gen.
Halleclz, aided by your counsels.
BY this time Mcclellan had not only
stopped franklin atAnnandaler but had
sent Summers corps to the Chain Bridge
over the Potomac instead of toward the
enemy. At 7:5o pm. General Halleck
telegraphed him thus "You viii inn
mediately send construction train and
guards to repair the railroad to Man
assas. Let there be no delay in this.
l have Just been told that Franklin's
corps stopped at Annandale, and that
he was this evening in Alexandria. This
is all contrary to my orders. Investigate
and report the fact of this disobedience.
That corps mist push forward, as /
directed, to protect the railroad and open
our communications with Manassas
To this Mcclellan, at 8 p. m, respond
ed /: at was not SAFE for Franklin to
move beyond Annandale, under the
circumstances, until we knew what was.
at Vienna. Gen. Franklin remained here
until about I p. m, tendeavoring to ar
range for supplies for his command.
am responsible for both these circum-
stances and do not see that either was in
disobediehee to your orders. Please
give distinct orders in reference to Frank
i1fs,ie m rs4va77s aT9fc fr-77a O1T-rayrr -
AT 10 p. m. he telegraphed again
"Not hearing from you, have sent or
ders to General Franklin to place him
selfin communication with Gen. Pope
by advancing, as soon as possible, and,
at the same time, cover the transit Of
Pope's supplies.
August 3o.-This was the third day of
the fighting near Groveton. At o:4o a.
m. Gen. F1alleck telegraphed Mcclellan:
81 am by no means satisfied with Gen.
Franklln's march of yesterday, consider
ing the circumstances of the case. He
was very wrong in stopping at AMMAN
dale. Moreover, learned last night
night that the quartermaster' depart
ment would have given him plenty Of
transportation if he had applied for ii
any time since his arrival at Alexandra.
He knew the importance of opening
communication with Gen. Pope's army,
and should have acted more promptly. :"
At II a. m. Mcclellan replied Have
ordered Sumner to leave one brigade in
the vicinity of Chain Bridge, and to
move the rest ala Columbia pike, on
Annandale and Fairfax Court House, if
this is the route you wish them to take.
He and Franklin are both instructed to
ioin Pope as promptly as possible Shall
Couch move also when he arrives
To this General Halleck, at 1920 p.
m, replied briefly but explicitly, as fol
lows a think Couch should land at
Alexandria and be immediately pushed
out to Pope. Send tie h,0obs 70here tie
fe5lfne- Is. Let me know when Couch
arrives.
Two hours later General Halleck ad-
ded: "Franklins and all of Summers
corps should be pushed forward with all
possible dispatch. They must use their
legs and make forced marches. Time
is now everything.
But the opportunity TO profit by ener-
getic and rapid movements was now
gone. Franklin and Sumner went no
farther than Centreville, where General
Popc's hungry and weary army arrived
bloody scenes of Groveton.
On the merits Of McClellan's S behavior
from the time he was ordered to with
draw from the Peninsula down to this
period. it is unnecessary to comment.
They are. sufficiently apparent from
the above cited orders and dispatch
es. That neither he nor any Of his
favorite lieutenants desired Pope's sue
cess, if indeed they did not connive
and conspire at his defeat, could
have no stronger proof or clearer state
ment than these dispatches furnish.
The. enormity of the crime t1us com
mitted can scarcely be fully realized
| without having experienced the suffer
| ings of that memorable campaign and
Witnessed its closing scenes of desperate
gallantrv and unavailing slaugter When
in the ensuing November the field OF
/ Groveton was reoccupied by Sigeps adj
vance, large numbers ofthe Union dead
yet lay unburied. On some portions OF
the field, particularly where MilrOy
| Hooker and Kearney charged, and
where Schenck and Tower so heroically
1 held back the enemy, the half-covereo
/ bodies for long distances lay as they fell
| almost touching each other. Itwas mel
ancholy sight such as no one need de-
sire to witness. But the saddest refiec-
ton it occasioned was the one that the
| victory which so many brave men died
to achieve was thrown away because
| jealousy, treachery or malice denied
them the support they might have hae
and should have had in their gallant ct,
/ forts.
The history of the campaign may be
| ftly closed with the following letter
which General Pope wrote on the first o
September from Cenneville to Genera
Halleck:
l. All was quiet yesterday morningi m.
1 men ali resting. They need II much. For
/ ace Tor our horses is being bt ought up. Ou
/ cavalry is completely broken down, SO tina
| there are not i've horses 10 company ina
i can raise n trot. The eonseauenee Is that
am forced to keep considerable inIentr.
along the roads in my rear t0 make then
| secure and even then it is dthcult TO Keel
he enemy Is cavalry of the roads. ! shal
attack again tomorrow II can-the mex
| day certainly. think 1t my duty 70 cal
votlr attention to the unsoldierIy ana uan
gerous conduct OF many hrigade ana SOM
division commanders of the forces sen
here from the Penins ula. Every Wofd am