The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-20

the ally of France against Germany, or the
armed Intervention of Austria, or perhaps
the formation of a Polish legion, would
tempt the Gear to swerve from his neutrality,
or to abandon the common interest of all the
neutral States in circumscribing the
area of hostilities. For, if Russia,
in the sense of the Russian Govern
ment, is certainly not unfavorable to
the German cause, very different
is the public opinion of Russia as
far as it finds expression in the journals of
that party which is supposed to represent the
national sentiment of the Russian people
These journals, and especially the most inde-
pendent and influential of them all, are loud
and emphatic in their sympathy for France in
her present trials and troubles. They COM
plain of the partiality of the official kilograms
which exaggerate the successes and disguise
the losses of the German armies. They
swear as valiantly as the GdulOis or the S0ir
that the victories of France are yet to come,
and rejoice by anticipation in the disastrous
retreat of King William and his confederates
across the Rhine. To what are we to ascribe
these Museovite sentiments? To chivalrous
compassion for the gallant heroes of the
Malakoff, the descendants of the heroes of
the retreat from Moscow? To belief in the
democratic and socialistic ideas of Louis Ma
poeop? To the love of the Russian aristocraoy
for Paris? Or is it to the Musco.
vite hatred of all that is German-of German
statesmen, German generals, German admin
istrators, and German bureaucrats? Or to
the natural antipathy of near neighbors? Or
to jealousy of the copartitioners of Poland?
Or to dim fear of future revivifcation by
united Germany of the Baltic provinces?
The last we take to be the best of all the
good reasons and bal passions that may be
found in the Prusso. .phobia of the Russian
press, especially in the organs of the Old
Russia party. If we add the spirit of resist
ance to whatever may be the course Of the
Government this extreme tenderness for the
hereditary patrons (and betrayers) of Polish
nationality is perhaps sufficiently explained
Without attaching too much Importance to
the stories, in which the French official
press appears to take comfort of the
| extraordinary social successes of General
Fleury at the Russian Court, and of the En-
peror Alexander leaning on the arm of the
Ambassador and putting him on terms of
| confidential and almost affectionate intimacy,
! there is reason to believe that these lively
demonstrations have more than personal
significance. The Emperor Alexander is
kind-hearted man, and he must feel for the
woes of the ruler of France. Common gene
rosity-not to speak of Imperial magnanimity
would, under existing circumstances, re-
commend one of Louis Napoleon's nearest
and dearest friends to the sympathies of the
sovereign to whom he is accredited. Personal
courtesy is not necessarily an act of
policy, and personal kindness to a recon-
ciled enemy and hospitable friend who has
fallen upon evil days is grateful to
ones feelings without compromising ones
interests. Alexander III may be glad to break
the fall of the French Emperor by lavshing
attentions upon his favorite agent. To sup
pose that all this enforced ceremony" means
deliberate design on the part of The Czar to
relinqnish SECURE and profitable neutrality
in favor of France, to exchange an old and
tried alliance for a new and hazardous one,
to stand, armed and menacing, between a
liberated Germany and defeated aggressor,
as France stood between Austria and Prussia
at Nlkosbufg, to snatch from King Will
liam the results of hard-won victories,
and to save the disturber of Euro
pean peace from merited retribution-
this appears to us very wild hypothesis.
The Russian people-or, rather, the knot of
eccentric politicians who impersonate a
people-may be jealous of the triumphs of
German arms and of her vast defensive mill
tary organization, which is henceforth to be
supreme in Central Europe. Looking to the
present. and not into some far and shadowy
future, the military supremacy of Germany,
united under Prussian leadership, in Central
Europe should be guarantee, rather than a
danger or an obstacle, to the peaceful growth
and prosperity of Russia, so long as Russia
remains defensive power. An alliance with
France is an alliance with the revolution.
This might please the communists, but what
have the old Russian party, the exterminators
of the Polish nationality, what have the new
Russian party, the Panslavic agitators in
Bohemia, to hope from it? If by an alliance
with France the old Russian party means a
division of the empire of the East, it can
hardly be the common interest of the pre-
sent neutral powers to prevent Prussia from
exacting full securities against such expert
ments. Russia may regard with evil eyes the
development of German naval power, but this
development is only the natural and inevita.
BILE consequence of the territorial extension
and unity of nation whose mercantile ma
rine is already the second in the world. II
Russia dislikes the unity of Germany, she
must learn to accept one more accomplished
fact The Russian Government is in no con
dition to go to war to prevent it; and if il
tried to do so, it would seek in vain for allies
and would provoke disasters compared witt
which the retribution that is falling upon the
inordinate ambition and the fl i.ebrand policy
of Napoleonic France would be but passing
cloud.