The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1870-08-16
Operations ON tho Observation-Disclosures In
competency.


competency.
The event ON the Moselle, at or near Metz,
In regard to which both sides claim triumph,
was simply disaster to the French, and one
more illustration Of the monstrous incapacty
with which the forces Of France are COM
manded. The King Of Prussia wrote 10 Berlin
Sunday night as follows
A victorious combat occurred near Metz to-day,
the troops OF the First and Seventh corps parttci-
pating. I hasten to the scene Of the conflict
OF the same collision the Emperor Napoleon
wrote thus -
The army commenced to GROSS to the left bank Of
no tnowsaee Of tSe prssenOs Of any force Of the
| enemy. when half our army had crossed over the
PrSssians suddenly attacked In great force After
nght OF four hours they were repulscd with great
| loss to them.
It is no new fact In the history Of war for
each side to claim the victory in the same
fight; for, in fact, this always occurs where
the victory is not 30 decisive that the beaten
army is destroyed. Over Blenheim and Water
loo there was no such difference, and the fact
that the claim is made on both sides only indl-
Gates that the battle was not of the decisive
order, but was like the great majority Of our
American battles In the late unpleasantness,
In regard to which salutes Of rejoicing were
always fred on both sides of the lines, while
the two sections of divided people, with
most embarrassing devotion, simultaneously
thanked ''the God of Battles" for one more
victory.
Napoleon's mote perhaps did not deceive
even the people Of Paris, loath as they natu-
| <o hoo !, 4 20
soldiery of France; for this note is simply
clumsy, selfaccusing acknowledgment Of
stupidity, casting mean blame on some sub
ordinate officer ''The army commenced to
cross to the left bank of the Moselle this
morning 1t was therefore in retreat; and
the statement that an army is in retreat is not
one with which the announcement of victory
begins. 'Our advance guard had no know
ledge Of the presence Of any force of the enc
my" This advance guard" probably means
the force nearest the enemy-the force that
was the advance guard when the faces of the
French were the other way, but which now
would be more appropriately called the rear
guard. Any other suppostion would require
us to believe that the Prussans had crossed
the Moselle at Pont-a-Mousson in such force
and with such celebrity that they had been
able to move down the left side of the Moselle
and anticipate the French in their crossing at
Metz. This seems incredible.
| "When half our army had crossed over the
Prussians suddenly attacked in great force"
| This reaches the height Of military absurdity.
Outposts know nothing of the presence of the
enemy, but they suddenly attack in great
force" Are the Prussians, then, all clothed
with the invisible overcoats Of the fairy story
to such effect that the French cannot see them
till the moment they are ready to hurl their stall
wart cabbage-fed persons against the French
at the critical moment when they are pass
ing great river, with half the army on one
side and half on the other? The stupidity of
this accusing excuse is only paralleled by the
stupidity that made it necessary. Fancy a
great commander crossing river with his
army, after the recent loss Of hard fight,
without taking precautions that the enemy
shall not get a crack at him when his corps
are helplessly astride the stream! Fancy the
same great commander contenting himself
with an advanced guard so astonishingly
organized and commanded that it had no
knowledge Of the presence Of the enemy at the
very moment when he was within striking
distance on French soil. How they used to
clean out such ''great commanders" in the
| vigorous days of the first revolution Is the
guillotine too bad, after all, for that crime of
self-suficiency that assumes positions in which
incapacity leads only to the vain butchery Of
ten thousand men and precipitates the destiny
| of o nation?
conducted with an accuracy and strategic
precision in movement that is altogether
admirable. So far there has been no true
fight of the soldiers fairly matched in force
side against side, and we cannot judge what
may happen when this comes, if it ever comes,
for up to this time it is strategy pure and SIM
pie, work done altogether in the closet Of the
military student; that has driven the French
behind the Moselle. When they were on the
two sides of the salient angle of French terri
tory their immediate communication was
severed by the destruction of the viaduct at
| DitCuc. Luz sOuuu vi tudb cApiOSiOu was tu0
knel Of MacMahon's army but on the French
side it was not understood, and MacMahon
was neither reinforced nor Withdrawn. He
was left out in isolation that the enemy might
crush him at leisure with overwhelming force
This was not his fault, but the fault of Napo-
leon. Again, with Napoleon at Metz and
MacMahon at Nancy, the finger of Prussian
strategy touches the little point of Pont-a-
Mousson, between them, and, rendering unity
of action impossible, makes these points unten-
able, and once more French resistance melts
away in retreat toward Paris At this rate