Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-12-04
SOUTHERN CREDIT-H0W ITHAS
BEEN INJURED.


The credit of the Southern States has
been utterly Frustrated by the carpet
baGgcrs and scalawags who obtained con-
troll of these States Immediately after the
close of the war. The facts as 10 how
this was done and for whose benefit it
was done, although clearly understood at
the South, are gradually coming to light
through Northern journals. For instance,
the New York BuLICtiTB an authority in
financial matters, says: 1T is unfortu
Date for the South that, at q time when
The reconstruction Of its finances was re
quired, the control Of its State affairs
should have fallen into the hands of mere
political adventures. There was a time
when II was sufficient guarantee of q
Southern State obligation that i was
backed by Southern men of intlcXible
honor and conspicuous integrity. At
present, there is scarcely a State in the
South whose debts have this sOTj Of back |
Ing. For the last five yesrs, the finances
Of the several States have been controlled
10y men who have acquired position
through the political 3 yicissiludes
consequent upon the War. With
no experience in statcspauship or
finance and no record but that OF aiVen-
ureTs, these men have undertaken 10 re-
adjust the revenues and debts of TIE
States. We kuow what We say when we
affirm that the main object with these
raw tiuaucicrs has not been the good credit
OF The State, but the manipulation Of the
finances SO rs to produce the largest pos
sille gains ont of speculation. Their
schemes have hccu, in most cases, Matched
in Wall street. banking houses; and the
legislators. Governors. and officials have
been paid tools for carrying out The plans
of ,hrewd bankers. Tic main point
aimed at was 10 produce the widest pos
siblc fluctuations in the prices of The State
bonds, irrespective of the interest of the
State. the party to he ''milkCd' being the
innocent public, Most Of The States
have found il necessary 10 issue new
obligations to provide for their over
due bo0ds or their unpaid interest.
The new issues have in most
cases been pat out by secret sale on the
market. and in amounts known only TO
The u,uotialor and the d'qUr- in anlici-
nation Of The issue, the parties TO the So
crct would sell on time large amounts of
The new State securities, and SO soon as the
new bonds had been marketed, the fact
would he anrounccl, with thr result Of n
heavy fall in the markct-valuc OF the obi
raiiou5 Attending the ring Spectators
an opportunity FOR covering their previous
Isruc sales. In Other instances, a hgis-
la,ive " ring has authorized large issues
of bonds to rsilruad schemes for which
there WAS no necessity arising out of
The commerce Of the State. These Loans
had the double speculative advantage of
involving large contracts for building the
roads and of yielding profit on the ma
ninulai.on of The bond market, The gains
on both Operatives falling into The hands
of the clique. In other instances, the pc
Itical spectators have sought Illicit gains
through Fictitious cxpcdicuts for stimu-
Iating the credit of the State. I'm these
cases. they would first of all buy through
| New York capitalists large amounts of
the. obligations aud then augment the
taxes 10 retire Unexpectedly considerable
amount of Gcbl, aud, ne still further
cXp,dicut, compel certain corporations
doing business within the State 10 hold a
| considerable amount of the State obliga-
tions. which the corporations had to buy
| from the clique. To our certain knoWl-
| cl.r. State officials have contrivcd iomakc
large profits directly through commissions
paid by the bankers negotiating loans for
The STATE. We know Of instances where
finance officers have boldly proposed, in
letters to New York bankers, to give large
commissions on the sale OF securities,
provided the allowance should be divided
with them. And equally possible would
| il be to cite instances in which
a Governor OF a Comptroller have delib-
c arclv involved the State in advances
upon secret issues of obligations, the cf-
fec. of which could only he 20 cmta~rass
the finances aud weaken the credit Of The
Government. We a'ludc to This discrcji-
table management of State finances at
the South for no other purpose than 10
promote public investigation and to re
deem the credit Of the Southern govern
mcnts from the faithlcss hands into which
it has faIlc-. A knowledge Of these
abuses ought TO suffice for their overthrow
and for The Punishment of political spccula-
tors from public position. There Is hut
one means of restoring the credit % the
Southern States, Wis the restoration Of
unimpcachablc Southern citizens to rep.
rescntarivc and official positions. Men Of
wealth and ability and character cannot
afford to stand sullenly by and witness
the degradation of their State 10y interlo,