The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1870-09-03

Waterloo 70 tho Indian Mutiuies and Mag.
dala.
From the London Times August 27.]
Europe Is In a blaze we, a great European Power
with European duties now confessed are utterly I'M
prepared ior those contests into which we may at
tion but the simple truth to say that for nearly a
quarter Of centurythat 4, for period as long as
we have been bused without tntermission on those
very preparations whIh are sill supposed to be
alarm sounded by the famous letter OF the late
Duke OF Wellington. Twelve months afterwards
Sikh sD the war In f ae rms sn Inc
the Indian M unity, and later still. the ADyssnIan
campaign. Thus, under impulse after Impulse we
have for nearly five andtwentY years together been
laboring to complete those preparations for which 1t
Il now said We may look In vain flow far Is that
saying true? The answer Is not the least wonder.
ful part OF the story, and that may give 1t dis
tincty, we shall place few broad figures before The
parations began we mad as an Old return before ma
states. an army OF some one hundred thousand men.
As the army however, In hose days did not for
statistical purposes. comprise artillery engineers
which were provided for under separate estimates,
we must make little addition to the total 1t will
not be much, for the entire strength OF the artillery
in that year but $780, and that or the engineers
12Ss. We may say, therefore, that England pos
sessed for service IN India In the colonies and at
home about one hundred ana twenty thousand
troops, all told.
Now for the comparison. AT tins moment we pos
sess close upon 100000 Looking TO home service
alone we had IN 1S45, according TO the Duke OIL
Wellingt0n's reckoning an avallabe body OF 5000
men. We nave now at least 400 900. or artillery
instead Of 1000 we have upwards OF So 900 at home
and abroad the regular artillery alone being nearly
10000 strong, In short n we take 10000 the
strength OF the regular army at home, and then add
the numbers Of the militia volunteers and other
forces shall lind that az the present mo
ment we have within these islands q larger military
force than that with which Prussia four years ago
entered the list against Austria, consolidated Ger
many, and raised herself to that eminence which
has provoked the present war. IT. then. all this pro-
digiUus increase has actually been achieved by our
TWENTY-FIVE years preparation, how can we be said
the men, aud, indeed, the material OF war,
we have got nothing else or that machinery
%hcn n ase' Of an re enec,ee , army , out
trace. Our militia is nearly 100000 strong not
merely on paper, but on parade. Our volunteers,
with the Impulse which this new alarm VIII give TO
the movement, may be reckOned at 100000. These
100000 men are there. and they are as good men as
the Prussians who won the battles OF WissembOurg
and Woerth. They have seem indeed. almost as
much service for those Germans OF the first line
were young conscripts enrolled since the campaign
OF SadOwa But the Germans had n complete mill
tary organization, while we have none. Every regi
ment OF those young troops had ts full and sufficient
complement Of skilled and disciplined officers
trained To service the best and most rigorous OF
systems. Every regiment had its own brigade,
every brigade its division, and all THESE divisions
ana brigades their full quotas OF commanders with
conmissariat. hospital and all other services in
the Lowest drummer-oOy every man knew his
place IN that mighty army and every man
Was wa found T IN IT, Here Hes the dnersepese
rs not half ohcered. and of Its few officers
not halI are trained. Our volunteer officers
nave no knowledge but what, spite Of dif-
fculties, they have contrved 10 pick up themselves
For neither iOrce is there anything like STAN admin.
stration. commssariat or other supports The re-
suit is that on the first alarm we perceive the uef
cheney. and instead of relying upon this enormous
mass Of national strength. we hastily pour few
thousand men into the line.
The Prussian army OF 100000 men was in the
space OF a fortnight despatched to The frontier
completely equipped supplied and supported in all
- q
occasionally cOntrive 10 send out OF AldershOtt.
Within three weeks after the declaration OF war
that army had already fought three bloody battles
and won rs many Victories II Is now clear TO what
this success was due. Az purely military clsse the
Prussan soldiers were mol the equals OF the French
soldiers Less OF their lives had been spent In bar
racks camps: they had more Of the
civilian element among then and they went
10 war not much In the way or trade in that OF
exceptional and temporary duty. In other words
they resembled our own volunteers In character
ana composition, Dut there unfortunately for our
selves, the resemblance ceases Accomplished Off
GERS took these levies into battle. and mastery
organization gave them the full advantage OF their
numerical superiority at every point of attack No
troops III the world, II h now plain from our own
correspondence, could nave fought better than the
Freucn, but they were everywhere outnumDered and
10 the end oyerpowered. The citizen soldier has
beaten the professional soldier but only because he
was led 10y professional officers ana sustained by the
most admirable professional organization Our
citizen soldiers have such machinery to render
their strength effective As 10 being .unpreparcd,n
there are many degrees or preparation. IL Is utterly
Impossible that We should hold ourselves absolutely
ready TOT war NJ any moment OF peace. The
strongest military mODaIchies are not prepared
IN that sense. France, with all her astonishing
aplitudes, and what We have always supposed
To be her incessant preparation, was anDreparedn
In 1866. and indeed az the fact seems 70 show, at
this very crisis. Prussia herself was 'unpreparedr
in so far a. her frontier ,vrIrcsses were unarmed
and Impoverished. and her army required q fort
night before II could take the field. But pre-
paratons are far IN arrear of such standards II the
alarm sounded IN reality, we could call out the
militia certainly, and the militia would come, but
without officers ana without rs much organization
~ would enable II 10 keep the field. IL would be
the same With the volunteers: and our authorities
know Il, and SHOW that they know il. The onlg
branch Of opr land forces with any semhance Of or
ganlzafion Is the regular army, ana so when the
emergency arrives we augment tina, army as rap.
IDLY AS possible The militia, real army Of re.
serve. Is only regarded nursery for the line, and
as for volunteers, no military can tell how 10
employ them YET this unuiilized, and therefore
nall useless, force represents nothing less Mdn
200 600 British soidters. the very pith and marrow
or the nation. az wen educated, az courageous and
as apt for duty a. the best Germans who crossed
The Rhine