The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-11-21
PARIS AND PEACE.

destruction of single street would be more
deplorable than would have been the shelling
of Strasburg Cathedral; for human folly
reaches its highest point of practical paradox
when il skaters the results of the labor, taste,
thrift and skill of still living men-as a child
might smear with its fingers the newly COM
pleted work of painter. The great curse of
war will never quit the human race until
the true character of its cAief operations
is so thoroughly known as to be clearly ap-
pretended, even during paroxysms of
tional passion. But meantime, till the great
majority of mankind have bad their opinions
on warfare modified by new order of teach
ing, continued possibly through centuries,
we must take their existing feelings on the
subject as n postulate to start from. Taking
wars we find them, we cannot but think it
doubtful whether it is really expedient, in the
permanent interest of France and Europe,
that negotiations for peace should seriously
commence until Paris has been either taken
or relieved.
The chief ground of this view is the condi-
tion of opinion within the city itself, known
to us with some accuracy through the letters
received by balloon. There may be a small
number of combatants who are under no
illusion whatever, who have no doubt that
Paris will succumb to famine or assault, and
who simply fight because fighting is a duty.
One of the most respectable of human feel
ings is the recognition of the simple duty of
self-sacrifce, and it is very far from being as
uncommon as it might be supposed to be-
There were particular periods of the Ameri-
can war of secession at which this feeling
almost entirely unaccompanied by hope, con-
tinued to sustain the most desperate efforts
first on the part of the North and latterly on
that of the South. In any estimate of the
conduct of the French people, it is but Just
and reasonable to set down to the acceptance
of the necessity of self-sacrifice part of
those desperate struggles which are
| no doubt correctly explained on the
whole by the extreme ignorance of the true
course of the war. But though there may be
certain number of persons who fight behind
the Notifications of Paris in this frame of
mind, q vastly larger number appear to go
on with their military duty in the belief that
success of some kind is far from unattain-
able. 1t would certainly seem that General
Trochu, whose sagacity is not usually blinded
|. by irrational presumption, is under some sort
y of expectation that the provinces will deliver
the capital; and this doubtless is the impress
sion of the more reasonable among those who
! do not wholly despair. But, behind these two
forms of opinion, there are obviously the
delusions Of the ignorant and deceived null
titude. The section of the French Govern
ment in Paris has never shown itself so reck-
lessly mendacious as the section at Tours
but it has never taken the trouble
completely to dispel the presumption which
first showed itself in the acclamations which
bade the French army to march straight on
Berlin. There must be thousands upon
thousands of men in Paris who believe that
France will get the better of the Germans
simply because she is France, or because
her Government is republican, or because
there was a miracle in 1892, or (it may be-
because the story of her misfortunes is a
fable pagsted for sinister and reactionary
purposes Now, is it really desirable that
Il L l. L
been taken on the issues raised by those
n who look for relief from the departments
and those who do not believe that relief is
needed at all ? No Englishman in his senses
believes that the Germans can be driven
4 away from the walls of the capital
/ either 10y the Parsians or by the
provincials; yet, if there he no
| practical proof of the impossibility, the pos
! sibility is more than likely to become an ar
\ ticle of the popular creed of Frenchmen
If peace be concluded and Paris be untaken,
the wilder politicians will instantly declare
that the interruption of the siege was brought
about by the cowardice of Trochu and Favre,
l and even more moderate men will persuade
4 themselves that a little more endurance would
Y have afforded time for the Army of the North
\ OF of the South or of the Loire to make its
appearance behind the Germans. AS the
I. sense of defeat loses its freshness and French
vanity RECEIVERS its bloom, the opinion that
/ great French success WAS at hand when the
n game was given up will probably develop itself
u like the Nspoleonic legend. Although it is
the clear interest of Europe that France should
1 thoroughly understand she has been
4 proved weaker than Germany, the exactly
opposite view is extremely likely to become
one of the fixed opinions of some great
French party, probably of the extreme demo-
cratic party unless the absurdity of the be-
lief is finally placed beyond question by the
\ completion of the operations before the
capital. The peace of Europe will doubtless
be safer if the German demands are moderate;
! but it never Can be safe at all unless France
7 comprehends that her situation is such as to
n Justify even immoderate demands.
Nor do VIC see how the argument of the
second part of NJ. GuiZot's recent letter to
n the Times can be answered, unless there be
decision Oh the great issue of the taking of
Paris. The eminent writer has that very
right to q hearing which is Justly denied to
NJ. Thiers. He has never hattered the pas
sions of his countrymen. His worst enemies
have never questioned his truthfulness.
Whatever unpopularity he incurred, he in
! cured through his love of peace and his clear
perception of the necessity of peace for
! France. One of the coolest heads among
Frenchmen alfirms therefore that the resist
ance preparing in the French provinces is no
mere spasm excited by official lying; that the
great armies said to be organizing have q
real existence and that this fund of national
strength should be taken into account by the
neutral Powers both as a reason for inter
ference and as a consideration which ought
strongly to affect the terms of peace. No
thing is so likely to bring these assertions