The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-17

was among French sympathizers. It hiss been
sought to accouptfor what happened by saving
that the military reputation Of France was
undeserved and that in fact she had no army
worthy of the name. This seems plausible
enough at the first blush but it will not stand
examination for one moment. Weknow that
the French army did good things in the Rus
sian war, and that some of the very men who
now speak contemptuously of it were never
tired of comparing it with the British force it
acted with, and always to the disadvantage of
the latter. The men aud the commanders
who fought with brilliant success against the
Russians, then held to be the first of military
races, must have been good soldiers; and the
effect of that war was greatly to increase the
spirit and audacity of the French service.
We know that the French army behaved
splendidly In the Italian war, and that it de-
feated the Austrians though not without hard
fighting and great exertions, in two great
pitched battles, and on lesser fields; and that
at the same time that SO large part of it was
employed in Italy, another part of it said to
have been 200, 900 strong, was so massed as to
be ready to make head against the Germans,
who were anxious to prevent the overthrow
of German rule in the italian Peninsula
this last force being commanded by Marshal
Pellisier, who had his headquarters at Nancy,
the very place which is now of SO frequent
mention in the daily history of the Prussian
war. We know that for some years past the
attention of the French Government has been
closely directed to military subjects, and that
1t has had the service recast as it we're, so as
to make all the able-bodied men of the Empire
available for the work of war, while it has
provided new infantry weapon of excellent
killing qualities. Such being the facts, the
idea that the French had not an effective
force on foot when the war began must be
given up. France had such force, and one
abundantly capable of doing all that soldiers
can be expected to do. Why. then, did it fail?
Because it was badly led. Better an army of
deer with lion at their head than an army of
lions with deer at their head" is saying
that all military history justifes. Napoleon
III is no common man, but he does not pos
sess the military faculty; and hence, instead
of adding to his army by heading it, he para
lyzed it by his presence. He lost days. when
he should have saved hours; and this made
his men all the more unfit for action, for SOL
diers are sharp in estimating the character of
q commander and the feebleness of the head
was felt throughout all the limbs of the great
force that had been assembled so promptly to
do-nothing; for it does not ap-
pear that anything had been resolved
upon down to the 4th of August,
when the Prussians advanced; and had they
not advanced, there would, it is probable,
have been no fighting down to the present
moment. The Emperor was averse to put
ting everything on one throw of the bloody
dice, and for this he scarcely can be blamed
but it was monstrous exhibition of human
folly when he left his men in positions that
enabled the enemy to cut them to pieces
in detail. There is a wide difference between
the prudence that prevents an army
from advancing against power
full enemy, and the sluttishness that
leaves an army exposed to such an enemys
advance upon it. Had the French army been
SO posted as to have been able properly to
receive the most powerful assaults the Prus-
slams could have made upon it, the Emperor's
prudence in not invading Germany would
have been praised, for then the Prus-
slams would have been repulsed, and
their rashness, and not his slowness,
would have been censured by all men,
and particularly by the friends of what then
would have been the beaten cause. The EN-
peror was guilty of two gross blunders--the
one involved in the loss of time, and the
other in the bad arrangement of his forces
For the first it may be possible to find some
thing that will serve for an excuse; but the
other never can be excused, for it involved
disregard of the very primary elements of
military business, and did more than half the
enemy's work to his hand, and made his
victory matter of necessity as we'll as of
certainty.