New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1870-03-12
PRICE FOUR CENTS.
SECRETS OF HISTORY.
THE BATTLE OF NASHVILLE.
WAS GRANTS ORDER 4 BLUYDERf
70 ihs Ediior o Z Ths TIL u


| TO the Edftor Of The TribUpe.
SIR: The Washington correspondent Of TIE
Cincinnati Gaeeus and the reporter Of me LoH'fc.M
CourierJO,TnaI have succeeded In bringing 20 Eight
many OF the facts connected with the famous order
relieving Gen. Thomas of Nashville, and thus gratifying
curiosity which has long existed In the public mind or
that subject SO long the publication confined TO
q solution OF the question, Who Struck BlD Patter
son or who parted the blow il need not have excited
any interest beyond that public curiosity which IL wac
intended to crafty. Bnt The ChcinnGh odscH %
Feb. in commenting upon the subject, and me C0Wt"
Journal from which The Gazette quotes, assert az fae
which they assume everybody to admit that Gen
Grants order relieving Thomas and putting echohed 10
command was great blunder and that by Hailechs
intervention OF other fortunate Circumstance The
country was saved from the disastrous consequence
which otherwise have resulted from THE blunde
OF the Gene ral-in-Chief.
This language must sound strangely enough TO The
soldiers who then composed Gen. Thomass army. less
than half Of whom had few days before defeated
Hoods army and put combat 5000 Of his best
men, including 10 general officers and this under the
commander whose supersedure Of Thomas The Gd'eih
and CoTtrJOWndl think would have been disastrous
blunder
There many things connected with the late war
that might better be kept secret during this geDeranh
but since much has been said this subject justice
requires that the truth be told at this early day
The facts arc that, after the battle OF Franklin and
Hoods farccal attempt at siege Of Nashville, nobody
at Nashville had any doubt but the result would be the
total defeat and destruction OF Hoods army The only
ground Of apprehension that Hood would run away
or in q fit OF desperation make raid into Kentucky
where he could do some damage and scare everybody
north OF the Ohio. But for this IL was OF very slight
consequence whether Thomas attacked Hood at once or
| waited week or two.
As to the time being favorable unayorabe TO mako
change OF commanders, the facts 10 be entirely
aod Arp,t NaCily 10 gag
OF one corps Cthe 4h of the Army OF the Cumberland
the 23d Corps Army OF the Ohio A. J. Smiths two d.
visions Army Of the Tennessee. and mixed troops W VA
rious organizations, or no organization, ana ne" HSI
ments that Thomas had but one corps, the sh OF MS
old army schoHeld the These two corps under
schoHeld had been hghtng Hood for two weeks ehdhS
with Franklin. during all Of which time Gen Thomas
was in Nashville II would have been quite rs easy Tor
schofeld 20 continue command after the Junction Wild
Thomas at Nashville 10 resume it after few days rs
| 1t was TO exercise IL az and before Franklin mdeeo'
| much easier for the enemy had then been whipped
| until there was very little fight IN him, ard
| there was not the remotest possibility OF his at
tacking Nashville Our troops were and had been for
daye lying quietly in their trenches, ana the Only
question was when and in what manner TO attack TIE
enemy Upon the former part Of this subject enough ha'
been perhaps already published. As to the plan o. az
tack in that Gen. Thomas made the only mistake u Wa
possible that man having any military knowledge mol
TO say experience, could make There was but one pan
Of attack worthy OF serious consideration under te .
| cumstances, which was TO strike the enenys 'eiI
while pressing the Of his line enough to eompel DID
to occupy it in force guarding position SUBJ
GENTLY to secure against successful eouhteratS
| The only practical question was as 70 the
| strength that should be given tie attacH
| ing force, or the number OF men heees
sary TO he left comparatively idle and IN TINS Gen
| Thomas made mistake Of full 10000 men! bPoh lbs
error beng explained TO him. he gave verbal orders or
I I've
the attacking force, where IL lay 'e o'p
early the morning until o'clock IN the AFTERNOON. ~
that time Thomas discovered that his attacking foree
was not sufficient and ordered in the reserve Even TINS
partial correction Of his contributed largely TO TIE
success OF the first days attack Had the error been
fully corrected by putting In the loo lde men IA Tie
morning. H Is safe 10 that the success would nave
been much greater. Gen. Thomas IN his ohical report
quotes his original order, and says II was carried out
without material modification" Those who kno"
Thomas give him credit for the utmost honesty ara
uutfulnoss as wen ethan A. h q"sitio9 Of man
and soldier All such will readily believe that he did not
sec anything material in the modification Of his Plan Of
battle. But IL quite certain that HE principal sub
| ordlDates saw it very clearly.
In the evening after the days battle Gen Thomas
gave orders for the pursuit Of Hood the next morning. IN
the firm belief that he was then in full retreat and q
was only by earnest assurance Of his that lie
induced 10 suspend these orders until daylight should
develop the fact whether Hood really was in full retreat,
or WAS ready to give battle So Thomas that
the st was over that he could not be induced To give
orders to renew the attack in the morning. Conse-
duently many OF the troops lay idle until late ID the day.
and when they did attack II too late 10 profit by the
brilliant success which was gained only few minutes
before dark II is more than probable that the attack
had been made in the morning OF Hoods artillery
or infantry could have escaped across the lIsrpeth
After the battle. pursuit made by The cavalry
along the main road, while the Infantry was compelled
to follow after slowly that corps could LOT move us
length in three days IL requires 10 military genus To
see that the pursuit the main pike should have been
made by infantry with ratOns in hayersacks and That
the cavalry should have been sent by other roads upon
the eueuys TANKS In this way the cavalry might have
rendered some service TO justify the long delay TO mount
| IT, Asst was. its only service was on foot
Az single incident illustrate the character OF THO
nrovlsions made rapid and effective pursuit % Hood
Il may he mentioned that after the pursuit had com
,oenced the pontoon train at Nashville, which necc
sary 10 cross the Harpeh at Franklin was ordered by
| cen Thomas 20 move out the Mnrfreeshoro Pike
This ridiculous buner delayed the pursuit until bridge
could te,built across the Harpeth at Franklin.
The result OF all this that Hood made good MS 70
treat across the Tennessee with more than % pieces OF
artillery much the larger portion Of bis tFans aud
nearly ALI his men who were not killed captured In he
trenches near Nashville.
II was hardly possible, with the splendid army Gen
rbomas had under his command have done lees. Bat
a great victory had been gained The end OF the Re
beon began 10 be visible the people % the eounf,
and they were satisfied All glad 10 honor ana re-
yard the commander under whom this had been accom-
,u.hod and who had already and deserycdly won tie
ad.ctons and esteem OF bis troops and OF the people
When Hood had made his escape, Gen. Ibom- pun
,,hod an order announcing that the enemy Lad been
dr,vop s,ros, the Tennessee 90 and that the campaign
as ended He then ordered the troops TO ga INTO Winter
- a. oaa corys AZ Dalton where the last Spring