Iowa voter. [volume] (Knoxville, Iowa) 1867-1874, 1870-02-17

/ ton, for u purpose whereby no posi-
BILE public benefit, direct or indirect,
could be derived therefrom, that then
the courts might interfere to declare
the law Invalid, still this is not such
a case. And it was said by the SUI
preme Court of Wisconsin in Brod-
head v. the city OF Milwaukee 10
Wis. 652, that, ito justify the court
in arresting the proceedings and in
declaring the tax void, the absence
of all possible public interest in the
purposes for which the funds are
raised must be clear and palpable; so
clear and palpable as 10 be precepti-
BILE to every mind at the first blush. +"
This Is the extent of the doctrine as
it is claimed by those text writers
and courts who assert the ultimate
judicial authority to revise and set
aside the legislative action, upon a
subject matter within its unques-
toned Constitutional authority.
The question then is, whether
there is total "absence Of all posi-
bic public interest in the purpose for
which" the act in controversy au-
thOrizes the tax to be levied? The
majority mistake the real question
in the case; and the Chief Justice, in
his labyrinthian argument, makes
his exit Mt the precise point Of enter
ance without having reached the
real point in contest. He supposes
that the railroad company, is a pri-
vate corporation since the proceeds
Of the tax are to be ultimately re-
ceived by such corporation, that the
use must therefore be private. The
distinction between private corpo-
ration and a public use does not seem
to have been apprehended by the
majority. 1t seems to be claimed
that because the money raised by the
tax Is finally to come to the Golfers
Of private corporation, the tax is
therefore not for public use. But
this argument would nullify every
tax law, since it is true, I presume,
that every dollar raised by taxation
does also finally come to the Golfers
Of private corporations or the purses
Of private individuals in payment of
claims they hold upon the treasury
for the public use they have severally
served.
Let us look at this argument a lit
tie more closely. Private property
can only be taken for public use, and
then only upon compensation being
paid or secured (Const. Art. ]. Sec.
49, But property, towit real estate
Of the citizen may he taken mt the
instance of a railroad company-a
private corporation if you please, for
its use, cit her for the right of way,
depot grounds, wood and water sta
tions, and the like. No court or
judge has been bold enough to deny
or even question this latter PROPOSE
ton. How is it taken then for a
public use when it is taken, as my
Brother Dillon says, for the use of a
private corporation? The answer is
plain, though the majority cannot
see it. The public use is most eco
nomically and efficiently accom-
plished and enjoyed through the
instrumentality Of II corporation.
But the use is none the less public
because it Is secured and effectuated
by the aid of a private corporation.
But / deny, that in common par
lance, a railroad corporation is a |
"private corporations" although / i
admit, that in technical legal defini-
hons or classitications they are called
.private corporations" as distin-
guished from counties, cities, towns,
&C., which are called "public corpor-
ations." See as to this, opinion of
Smith, Oh. j., Barron v. Beatty, "a
Miss. Rep, POT. m
What answer then, does or can the
majority give to the question? By
what constitutional right does a
"private" railroad corporation take
the very homestead ground Of al
citizen, turning him and his wife
and children out of doors, houseless
and homeless, in order to make a
way or depot ground for itself? They
have already said that if the railroad
company takes Ave cents from the
citizen, under the law in question,
and applies tito the construction of
Its road, such taking Is unconstitu-
tional, because 1t is the taking of |
private property and applying it to
the use Of a private corporation. But
W. hc OH lev hxy tlan