Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-04-12
of government move if all the parts were
thus carefully adjusted2

OF government move If all the parts were
Tins carefully adjusted2 $500
EVIL EFFEcTs OF THE PRESENT SYSTEM.
/ The choice of bad men is another evil
| of the present system. The good, men
who find their way into our legislatures
are crippled by it. Their influence is
weakened and their independence mena-
ced. When one of them opposes a ia
vorite scheme of the party managers of
his district he is sure to receive a warning
as web as aremonstrance. Thus the re-.
\ preventative and the constituent are both
| demoralized. The evils do not spring
| from a corrupt community. The maiori-
| ty of the people are not debauched. The
fault lies in a vicious electoral system.
which produces a representation neither
of parties nor of the general public,
which constrains the majority and stiles
the voices of large portions of the people.
HOW THE EVIL CAN BE REMEDIED.
Various plans have been proposed, of
which will now proceed to give an ac-
count The problem is, to get legisla-
tive body which, at the time of its elec-
ton, viii faithfully represent the whole
body of electors. The point to be gained
is the giving to every elector a represent
tative, so that when the legislature meets
the former may feel that he can point to
some one ON the floor to whom he has
| given authority to speak and act for him,
and that the latter may represent only SO
many votes as he has received
THE HARE SCHEME
Speculations on the subject were be-
| gun so early as the latter part of the last
| century. A bill for English parliamentary
reform, introduced by the Duke of Rich
mond in the year ITO, contained a clause
looking to the representation of minori-
ties. In the former part of the present
century scheme having the same object
was preached by the late Mr.. Hill. In
1855 plan proposed by Mr.. Androe was
introduced into the representative system
of Denmark. In 1859 BIr. Hare pub
lished his great work on the election of
| representatives, parliamentary and NUM-
cipal. Since then the subject has re-
ceived much attention, and given rise to
| many discussions in this country and in
England, France, Switzerland, Germany,
Belgium, Sweden, and Australia. Mr..
Hare's scheme is one which, for the sake
of distinction, / will call that of prefer
entail voting. 1t ascertains the quota by
dividing the whole number of representa-
tives. Thus, if the whole number of
voters should be 800, 900, and the number
of representatives to be chosen 200, the
quota of voters to each representa-
tive would be 1000. Then the voter
is to deposit at the polls voting paper,
on which he shall have placed in the or
der of his preference the names of the
candidates, or of so many of them as he
pleases. No vote is to be counted for
more than one candidate; any candidate
receiving 4, 900 votes is to be declared
elected; if the candidate first on voting
paper fails TO obtain the quota, or has al
ready obtained it, the vote descends to the
next in order of preference; when can
didate has obtained the quota, his votes
up to that number are to be laid aside,
and the remaining votes are to be counted
for the candidate next in order of prefer
ence, and so on, till all the votes are ap-
propriated, and the whole number of Re
representatives. is obtained. If there be not
200 persons credited each with 1000
votes, and the Representative body is
consequently deficient in number, the de-
| ficiency is to be made up by taking the
candidates who come nearest to the re-
| quired quota. This method, which Ihave
called that of preferential voting, is also
called by the Swiss reformers that of the
| electoral quotient (Le Q1totient eLectOroL)
CUMULATIVE VOTING.
/ A second plan is that of cumulative
voting. The theory of this is, that,
quota being ascertained as before. each
voter shall have as many votes as there
| are representatives to be elected (either
| from the whole State, or from electoral
| districts less than the whole State, as may
be determined), or divide them among
several, as he pleases. This plan has
been proposed in Congress by Mr.. Bucka-
lew, of Pennsylvania, and in the Illinois
State Convention by Mr.. Joseph Medill
| and others. its operations may be illus
| trated thus Massachusetts has ten repre-
| seniatives in the lower house of Congress;
| each voter has ten votes; he may give
| them to ten candidates, one to each, or he
| may cumulate them upon less number
| than ten, even to one. One tenth of the
voters may thus be sure of representa-
| tive, if they choose to unite upon one
| person. Thus, suppose the number of
| voters to be 200, 900, and each with ten
votes, making 100000 votes in all, of
which 200, 600 shall be sufficient to elect,
| the friends of any one candidate might
secure the concentration or emulation of
200, 600 votes cast by 90, 900 voters, and
| these would have q representative, though
all the remaining votes were cast for one
| person. In practice, no doubt, tickets
| would be made up by the two parties, and
each party would send representatives
merely proportionate to its cOnstitu
ency.
| LIMITED VOTING.
| A third plan is that of limited voting,
by which is to be understood that of re-
quiring the votes to be cast for a less
number of candidates than the whole.
Thus, if the number of voters were 100,
900, and the number of candidates to be
elected from the State or district, ten,
and each voter were allowed to give only
one vote for one candidate, and 10000
| votes were to elect, the result would be
that every 10000 persons might have a
representative if they would. This plan
is generally referred to in connection with
several candidates, rarely in connection
with single ones.
| SUBSTITUTE VOTING.
The fourth plan is that of substitute
voting, which permits candidates to cast
anew the useless votes given to them, and
substitute third person in their place. A
plan of this sort has been recommended
by Mr.. Fisher, of Philadelphia. Thus,
supposing again the number of electors to
be 100,000 and of representatives ten,
and 10, 600 votes to be sufficient for cleo
ton; and then supposing six candidates
to have received each 10, 600, that is,
| 10, 900 in all, and two others each 5000.
Here are 10000 surplus votes cast for the
elected candidates, and 10000 insufficient
votes divided between two persons, so as
to give neither of them enough to elect
him; the plan we are speaking of allows
the six elected candidates to cast 80, 900
surplus votes, and the two defeated candi-
dates to cast the 10,0 900 insufficient votes
for new candidates. Those eight persons
would then substitute four other persons
as the candidates to receive the 10, 600
votes, and would elect them to serve with
I i