Iowa voter. [volume] (Knoxville, Iowa) 1867-1874, 1870-02-17
Mills v. Geason, II Wis, 40. . J

-
Jones, Esq, tN, c. 323. ,ss .srEai4T
Powers v. The Inf. Ct, of Dough-
erty CO., % Geo. Rep. IS. sN ,afa!T
The st. Joe, &C., r. r. Co. v. Bu-
chanan Co., 80 Mo-, 4S5. 3feq9X
City Of st. Louis v. Alexandria.
% Mo-, 4s3. ~, a,.,.t
Strickland v. Miss. r. r.. Co., q,
Miss. Rep. 200, 22i. Is qu 1aeat4 raw
Cotton v. Com. of Leon Co., 6 Fla.,s
6lO. eH 9ieHad t+s-f ha03fs 94t
Police Jury v. Succession of Nc
Donough, SLa. An, S41. - - f, ~
San Antoniov. Jones,2S Texas. 10,
It has also been repeatedly y affirmed
by the Supreme Court Of the United
States certainly in more than twenty
cases. See Gilman v. Sheboygan,2 2
Black, $40 and cases cited. .'amafS y
And Judge Redfield, inhis treaties
on the law of railways, says: ut has
been considered that a railway is SO
far in the nature of an, improved
highway, that the legislature may,
empower towns and Counties to sub
scribe for stock in such companies
whose roads pass through such towns
or Counties, and even where they
tend to increase the business of roads
which do pass through, any portion
of the territory of such towns or /;
Countless" "The decisions,
in the several States seem all to have
been in favor of the power Of the
Legislature to build railways, atthe
public expense, of which there is"
perhaps, no great question:; for 1t
seems to be a species of internal inn
provement, or intereommunication,
which is, in a measure, indispensable :
to public interest, and pu6Hc functions
in many ways. II o*
1t seems to us, that if these public
works require public patronage, it
would more appropriately come from
the State, than from the municipali- 3
ties, which are created for limited
purposes, and with no appropriate
facilities for the management of
pecuniary investments in such eX-t
tended enterprises. But the weight
Of authority is.all In one directions
|1ne sit is.,nw too istS to- bring
matter Into serious debate. xn
I'd, Redfield on Railways 396, Section /,
23O, and note I'D, Ed So much
then for the authorities, which, as
stated by Judge Redfield, are all one
way, and number near two hundred,
cases-the majority opinions in this,
case are in the face Of and contrary
to all Of them.
FOURTH. The first clause of our
State Constitution, quoted to give
strength to the argument of tho
majority, is Section 8, OF the Bill OF
Rights. "No person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty or property
without due process Of law" Now,
it is as clear upon principle, as it is
well settled by the authorities, that
this clause Of our Constitution, which
is common to every State in the
Union, has no reference whatever TO- /.
the taxing power; nor has the term
educ process of law" any bearing or
limitation upon, that power. This isd
clear. For, if the taking of property /
by taxation, is thetaking of 1t "with-
out due process of law" then this
clause inhibits the Legislature from
all taxation, and it would be power
less to authorize by law, directly, tho
levy and collection of any tax. The
Of the Chief Justice de-
rived from this section, then, is too
strong and proves too much; for, n :
under it, the act In question is uncon- J
then every revenue law
upon our statute book is unconstitri-. :
tional also; since every tax law now
in force, provides for the collection
Of taxes without,any process of law
that is, judicial process. a. g.1ar
The next clause quoted, is Section 3
1S Of the, Bill of Rights; ''Priyate
property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation being q
first made, or secured to be made, to 7
the owner thereof" = w But this
section, which is also substantially
the same in every State, as has been,
repeatedly held, and Is clear from its /
very terms, is nota limitation apon
the taxing power, but on the right
of eminent domain. See Gilman vs.
sheboygan, 2 Black, ~. 81 $40, and
cases cited. If this clause did apply
to the taxing power, It would be
fatal to its exercise in every instance.
For, If just compensation TO the 3
owner must be made before his prop