The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-11-23


whom come promotion and other good gifts, |
is always to be taken with reserve. Without |
fully condemning the Marshal, therefore, |
until we have heard his defense, we shall con-
tent ourselves for the present with stating |
the case as it stands, so that we may the bet
ter comprehend his story whenever he shall |
see fit to tell it,
The opinion of the subordinate officers is |
apparently very positive that there was no
reason why the army of the Rhine should |
have been fastened up under the walls of
Metz, and there was no time, until the horses |
were all dead of starvation or slaughtered for
food, when vigorous sally would not have
released it. The last serious engagement was
on the 31st of Augustine day before the
Emperor's surrender-and according to the
Prussian official statements the condition of
the field was such at the close of the day that
Bazaine by bold night march might have
effected junction with MacMahon, aud so
prevented the disaster of the 1st of Septem-
Der. That he failed to do this does not ne
cessarily imply treachery; it is more probable
that the Marshal lacked the supreme military
virtues of decision and moral courage which
enable commander at critical moments to
seize great opportunity in the face of for
mdable dangers. But after the overthrow of
the empire, the state of the case was different.
A correspondent of the Manchester Guardian
was in Metz all through the siege, and his last
letters which have just been received tell
some remarkable facts. 'After Sedan and
the fall Of the empire" says this writer,
''the news of which reached us on the 7th
of September, it became evident to all
that Marshal Bazaine refused to act
on the aggressive. He would not COM
promise himself in any way-to play a
waiting game was his policy" He had be-
tween 10000 and 100000 men, and the be-
siegers were but slightly more numerous.
Ia hpd of Of oil
kinds. He had horses and artillery. On all
principles of military science it ought to
have been comparatively easy for him to cut
through the investing lines and make his way
to Paris, while the gates of the capital were
still open. OF course, the loss would have
been heavy, but the result would have been
ample compensation. Yet the sorties which
he made from time to time, when the clam or
of the soldiers and citizens could no longer
| be resisted, were never earnest, and appa-
rently were never meant to succeed Officers
who insisted upon vigorous fighting were i'm
prisoned. Newspapers which talked of active
| operations were suppressed.
| But if it was clear that Bazaine did not
mean to cut his way out, it was equally clear
| that he did not mean to stand long siege
| No care whatever was taken of the stores
| The commissaries petitioned again and again
| for reduction of the rations, and only sue
ceeded at last, according to Colonel de Val
court, ''by using actually violent language to
the Marsbals face" During at least fifty of
the seventy days siege, officers were not only
allowed to draw and use double rations in
camp, but to live upon the provisions of the
town besides. The horses of the cavalry and
artillery received full rations to the very last;
but this was not that they might be in good
condition for sortie, for as soon as forage
became scarce they were killed and eaten.
There never was any systematic collection
o,,1 k.,tS ,<~ck -.
and at the time of the surrender, though
luxuries were scarce, there was still supply
Of food, nobody really knows how much.
All this, it is true, does not prove treachery.
But the escape from the charge of treachery
is in confession Of incompetency-to which,
indeed, we have heretofore been disposed to
assign most of the extraordinary circum-
stances connected with the siege and the
surrender.
In the meantime, Bazaine carried on nego-
tiations with the Empress and the Imperial
lists, the exact history of which will perhaps
never be fully divulged. A score of different
versions have been published of the mission
of Bourbaki to England, and the missions of
Gen. Boyer to Versailles. 1t is unnecessary
to know the particulars; it is enough that
Bazaine continued to recognize the dynasty,
and, though false to France, remained true to
the man who had made him Marshal. He
never proclaimed the Republic; he never al
lowed the army or the citizens of Metz to
know the names of the Provisional Govern
ment; he never announced any other authority
as ruling in Paris except the purely military
authority Of General Trochu. At last he pro-
posed TO march his army out on parole not to
fight against Prussia again during this war,
and lead them into Paris there to "protect"
the Legislative Chamber until it should exta-
blish a permanent government in place of
the ''mob" now controlling affairs. This
proposal Bazaine himself acknowledges that
he made, and il was not carried out only be-
cause Won Moltks would not consent to it,
The provisions being nearly exhausted, the
horses gone, and relief hopeless, he had then
no alternative but surrender
Now we think it will be difficult for any
to read this story without the conviction that
Bazaine fully expected, by keeping an army
of 5000 men intact and we'll fed while the
Prussians ovorran the rest of the country, to
find himself virtually dictator of the political
situation. He probably calculated upon .
radical uprising in Paris, and made little
doubt that the Germans, rather than face the
danger of republican infection, would allow
him to intervene at the last moment, and re-
store the Empire. The loss of Alsace and
Lorraine would be charged to the incom Pc
tsncy Of the Government of the National De-
fense. What sort of protection" would be
shal and the German Generals
can easily divine. The Prussisn strate
sist was too wary to listen to the Marshal,
} proposal. He knew that whatever Bazlins
might promise, il would be impossible to
trust his men; and to suffer the army from
. | Hatx In ouk for Paris ~auld ONLY ha IA