Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1870-10-18

That the causes OF the war which |
have now been indicated are the true
ones, so far as relates to Prussia, we
are fully persuaded, and for these rea-
sons: They are in harmony with the
well known history Of Bismarck's |
treatment Of Austria from 1862 to
1866; as French correspondent of
London paper says: II am not sur
prised to find some keen politicians on
your side of the Channel suspecting
that Bismarck may have planned this |
Spanish candidature merely to call
forth that French anger which is to
aid his policy" Also, the candida
ture Of Leopold very early ceased to
have any significance in its bearing on
the question of war. AS Mr.. Olivier
said in the French Chamber of Depu-
ties, soon after the withdrawal of Lee
opold, "There is no longer a Hohen-
zollern candidature; we would not
suffer it; there is not any incident"
Leopold, as a candidate for the va
cant throne of the SpaniardS, was not
the cause, but the occasion Of the war,
viewed from either a French or a
Prussian standpoint. In France the
causes Of the war were moro numer-
Gus and complicated. They arose
from two classes of influences; one
foreign, the other domestic.
Some months before the campaign
Of 1866, Bismarck, during personal
interview at Biarritz, secured from
Napoleon a pledge of French neutral
ity in case Of collision between Prus-
sia and Austria. The French Empe-
ror was, perhaps, led to make this
promise from his personal regard for
Bismarck, who had been, as was
known at the French Court, q warm
admirer Of the Napoleonic regime.-
Soon after the decisive blow at Sado-
wa, the French Ambassador at Berlin
proposed to Bismrck the ces8ion to
France Of some Of the left bank Of
the Rhine, in consideration of the re-
cent large territorial acquisitions
made by Prussia. To the unwise sug-
gestion the premier replied NO" too
emphatically to be misunderstood.
: Perhaps this was the first time that
, Napoleon felt himself outwitted by
Count Bismarck. The French prop
ositiOn the Count made known to the
four South German States, which,
though a few weeks only before they
had been outspoken in their hostility
to Prussia and Bismarck, now, after
his magnificent success, and out Of
the Germans old, traditional enmity
, to France, entered at once into an
alliance, offensive and defensive, with
Prussia. This was a further humili-
alton to the French Emperor, and he
| does not submit to such things with
! the highest Christian meeknesS. Then
: came the Luxembourg affair, and more
: recently the dispute as to the Belgian
! railways. The climax was reached
/ in the plans for placing Leopold on
: the Spanish throne. The Hohenzol-
a lerI prince was not acceptable to Ma
e poleon--he saw a further extension
! of PrusSia'S influence, and then the
i secrecy with which the negotiations
Y had been conducted, while he of all
$ sovereigns claimed the right to know
all that took place in respect to the
c Spanish throne, and further, perhaps
b Leopold's accession would displace
2 his favorite candidate, Al phonSo MI
t Among the domestic causes of the
l, war, in France, was the Emperor:
J. personal feelings. To be thus, thro
c four years, outwitted by the Prussiar
e premier was more than the hero o
It the coup detat could well endure
S For many years he has gloried in be
d ing the Arbiter Of Europe; his i'm
J. perial hands held the balance of pow
1t er, but Sadowa robbed him of that
n and he therefore hates Prussia, th,
B. victor on that eventful field. AM
Il even in France the last year had wit
q messed some decrease in his authority
y though the recent ple0iscitum had re
O. stored this.
: Then his soIicitude for the success
IL sion of his son led him to calculat
IA on brilliant and successful campaig
ID as q means Of giving the Prince Impe
70 rial a secure place in the hearts c
II, the French nation, and thus rende
e certain his possession of the throne
le If the war could be a short and sue
al cessful one, Napoleon calculated righ
% ", but if otherwise, woe to him an
&c his son; aud we think ne saw all this
iP and accepted the dread alternative Q
\, n war. Surely the gods first make ma
Il III those whom they will destroy. More
ne over, the French, especially the Paris
IL ans, felt keenly the humiliation whic
e. the nation had received at the hand
II of Prussia. The temper Of the pei
ne pie was not to be misunderstood
'f' they in a sense demanded the humil
OF alton of their German rival, and if th
" Emperor could not do this, he wa
70 not longer wanted as the ruler of til
at French nation.
~ ~ In a word, Napoleon has entere
~ ~ upon the war for the purpose of r
- tanning his throne for himself and b
- son. Too long has France been 70
~ bed of liberty, and too deep in ii
. hearts Of the people is the memory
.+v the last eighteen years debauchir
n despotism to submit much longer
~ the man who is the author Of her woe
Va There is a large and daily increaSir
ro~ party in France who have no symp
o. thy with Napoleon or the war.
oaI one French writer says, "The war e
- cites no enthusiasm" and further add
~ ~ truly, France has nothing to gai
and liberty much to lose" That su
a man as Theirs puts himself again
leI e the war is also significant.
80 Of the result of the war we ha
ro no question the God of battles
,nr not the ally of despotism, nor of dc
oa pots who have such a personal reco
so as Napoleon III.
use The American people, fresh frc
ian their holocaust on the altar of libert
led cannot long hesitate as to whom.
this struggle, their sympathy belong
,as Prussia, with all her faults, a
they are not few. is the leader a