Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1870-04-29

the general and field officers. The corps Q
/ Porter had also reached Warrenton June
ton, with a very small supply of pFuvis
ems and but forty rounds Of ammunition
for each man.
Such was the complete fulhIlment O
General Hallecks promises and of Nc
Clellan's performances. Such was tht
force with which Pope was now left, no
to hold the RappahannOck, for that wa.
no longer possible, but to cover Wash,
ington and close in a pitched battle with
Lees triumphant and far out-numbering
army.
Franklin, who had been confidently
expected to reach Gainesville on the af-
ternoon of the Goth, did not bulge from
Alexandra. Fifty thousand troops re-
mained there in mastery inactivity,
| leaving the entire line of the railroad
| from Manassas eastward exposed to
| Jackson's foray. To CentreVille, from
Alexandra, is but a good days march.
| Had Franklin even reached that point
on the 10th, or had Cox and Sturgis been
as far west as Bull Run on that day,
Manassas, at least, would have been Sc
cure. Jackson might possibly still have
struck the railroad at Bealton, but our
supplies, the want of which was Frank
Inns only apology for net moving, would
have been saved. To wait for supplies
| at Alexandra when there was an abun-
dance at Manassas, the exact point
where the troops were needed, seems
like the extreme of folly. The supplies
captured by Jackson, and which Frank
lin should have arrived in time to pro-
tect, would have been amply sufficient
for all present necessities of our troops,
while the railroad, which the prompt ad-
- 81, a l. i
have kept open, could have brought for
ward in any quantity whatever was need
ed for future operations. The disastrous
consequences of Franlzlin's singular, if
we may not say criminal, failure TO move,
we have already in part seen. The ex-
cuses or PreteXts given for it, we pass for
thepresent.
During the night of the 25th Pope, not
yet advised of Jackson's whereabouts
and despairing of the re-enforcements
necessary to maintain his position, de-
termined to abandon the line of the Rap
pahannock On the 10th, therefore,
SigePs corps was Withdrawn from Water
loo and our entire army, excepting
Heintzelman' corps, which remained at
Warrenton Junction, and Porter's not
vet arrived from Bealton, was concen-
ton. Pope's object now was to head off
any attempt on the part of Lee to pass
the Bull Run Mountains and move on
Washington. But during the afternoon
of the 10th he began to discover that
in part accomplished. At 3:zo D. m, !
having discovered something wrong with |
his communications eastward, he for |
Ged \ %1Gf Al II
lowing order to General HeintZelman
The Major General commanding the |
Army of Viginia directs me to re- |
quest that you put a Teginent(O on a train /
of ears and send it down Immediately to |
Manassas, to ascertain what mas occurred |
repair the telegraph wires, and protect the |
railroad there until further orders.
At midnight Aug. 26) he instructed
General Mcdowell as follows
Our communications have been inter-
rupted by the e7leDly's cavalry near Manassas.
Whether his Whole force, or the larger part
of tt, has gone round, is a question we must
settle instantly, and no portion OF his force
must march opposite 10 Us tonight without
our knowing It. l ueIegraphed you an hour
ago what dispositions had made, suppOs-
ing the advance through ThorOughfare Gap
to be column of not more than ten or fif-
teen Thousand men. If his whole force, or
Know Is al dnc. rfs Its lions Ia9 here b91e no
and il the main forces of the en-
forward to Greenwich to be there to-mor-
row evening with the two batteries OF artil-
Kt.arHey. We must Faoy at a Very early
hour in the morning, SO AS to determine our
plans.
These two dispatches give in brief
General Pope's information of the enc
my's movements and purposes up to
midnight of the 10Th A cavalry de-
tachment which he had sent out on the
morning of that day to reconnoitre to-
wards Thoroughfare Gap, had made him
no report. In fact, up to the hour that
Jackson struck the railroad, Pope seems
to have been almost in the dark and
quite deceived as to the formers move
ments. Believing the greater part of
forces were now pushing to
the front to Join him, Pope appears to
have assumed that an infantry raid in
his rear was too hazardous to be under
taken-an assumption, by the way, not at
all unreasonable had its foundations been
real. Indeed, as it was, Jackson had
made a venture no less dangerous than
daring. He had placed Pope's army
between himself and Lee and put his
own in imminent jeopardy of being en-
veloped and overwhelmed by superior
forces. Within twenty-four hours, the
narrow gateway through which he had
passed the Bull Run Mountains might
be efFectually closed against him, bar
ring his retreat, while within the same
length of time Pope might close upon
him from the west, and Mcclellan with
Franklin and Summer from the east
Should Jackson ever be permitted to
get back to Lee or to escape at all from
the forces that now environed him, it
must be only through the inexcusable in
activity or want of cooperation of the
Federal commanders We shall see
how far these elements came to the aid
of an enemy, whose sudden success had
involved him as suddenly in commen-
surate peril.