The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-10-01
RUSSIAN DESIGNS.
From the N. 7. Tribune.

From the NJ Y. Tribune.
There is little doubt that the army of Russia
has been lately placed on war footing, and
that all its great military strength, 1,135,975
men in the aggregate, has been called into the
field. There have been many indications of
the movement and mobilization of the troops;
and there is no reason, therefore, to disbe-
lieve the telegraphic assurance which now
reaches us of military preparations on a
gigantic scale. Naturally, these demonstra-
tions throw Europe into terrible state of
excitement, the English consols suffer, and
the bourses of every other nation are affected
by it. With us curiosity, if not interest, at
once prompt us to inquire into the purpose
of the Gar. Does he contemplate descent
upon Constantinople, or Intervention in be-
half of France?
Thus far nothing is developed to show his
design; we only know that it must be one of
these two purposes which the Czar has in
view. We lay no stress upon the minor facts
quoted by the English press to show that
while Bismarck has been busy in France
Gortschakoff was intriguing with Austria
and paying fattering and seductive atten-
tions to Saxony, with the evident design OF
detaching them from their alliance and
sympathy with Germany. The suggestion of
the English papers that it is Prussia whom
the Gear threatens, is doubtless born of
mercial nation would much prefer to see
Russia destroying in Protestant Ger
many than aggrandizing in Mohammedan
Turkey. 1t is the theory of England's states
men, born of a period when her policy was
aggressive, that the Turkish Empire is the
great defense of the British possessions in
India, and that once past that barrier Russia
would dominate all Asia. We suspect this
fear is we'll founded. Its existence only
strengthens the reasoning which points to
Turkey as the Russian objective. An alliance
with Austria, in the event of a movement to-
ward Turkey, would be very natural step
for Russia to take, since she would desire to
protect her flank in that direction. The
statement quoted elsewhere which fore
shadows an Austrian and Russian alliance in
| dicates nothing to the point there under con-
sideration: such an alliance is as likely to be
made against Turkey as against Germany.
A consideration of the motives likely to in
huence Russia will afford a safer guide in this
matter than the mere surface indications of
the moment. Russia has much to tempt her
towards the ORIENT absolutely nothing to
drive her towards Germany. She has the i'm
mediate hope of aggrandizement in the East
to attract her there; she has only the fear OF
future and remote complications to urge heI
to strike at Germany. With France paralyzed,
Austria powerless, England undecided, and
| Germany powerless, turkey IS comparatively
weak enemy, hardly capable unaided OF
making against Russia defense more vigor
Gus than that which France made against
Germany. Germany, on the contrary, is the
most powerful and the best prepared enemy
whom Russia could select in all Europe. A wal
against Turkey is likely to make Russia no &C.
tive enemies in the West, for England without
France or Austria could not hope to aid the
Sultan. A war against Prussia would pro-
badly bring about an alliance between the
Contemplating nations, Italy, and Eng
land. One campaign inaugurates a genera
narrow limits.
1t was apparent from the first, when Gorts
!chakoff promised Bismarck to protect hii
rear, that Russia meant to seize the eppor
tunity for war if the success of the Germans
justified it. If she wished to aid France she
would have done SO when France was strong