Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1870-09-13
THE BRITISH ARMY.
what England Can DO for War
What She Has Done I'm Europe,
Asia and Afrfca-frOm Waterloo
40 the Indian Mutfnies and Mag
nj in

daIa.
From the London Times. August q.
All the country is now crying out that
while Europe is in a blaze we, great
European power, with European duties
now confessed, are utterly unprepared
for those contests into which at any day
we may be drawn. Nevertheless, il is
no exaggeration, but the simple truth, to
say that for nearly quarter of a cen
tury-that is, for a period as long as
that of the great French revolution
and its wars--we have been busted with
out intermission ON those very prepara-
tions which are still supposed to be want
ing. 1t was in January, l847, that the
first note of alarm was sounded by the
famous letter Of the late Duke of yelling
ton. Twelve months afterward came a
new revolution in Paris; then the great
Sikh war; then the war in the
Crimea; then the Indian mutiny, and,
later still, the Abyssinian campaign.
Thus, under impulse after impulse,
we have for nearly five-and-twenty years
together been laboring to complete those
preparations for which it is now said we
may look in vain. How far is that say
ing true? The answer is not the least
wonderful part of the story, and, that we
may give it distinctlySwe shall place a
few broad figures before the reader eye.
In the year lS45. just before our prepara-
tions began, we had, as an old return be-
fore us states, an army of some 100 1000
men. AS the army, however, in those
days did not for statistical purposes
comprise artillery or engineers, which
were provided for under separate esti-
mates, we must make little addition to
the total Ii will not be much, for the
entire strength of the artillery in that
year was but 1890, and that Of the engl-
neers 1898. We may say, therefore,
that England possessed for service in In
dia, in the colonies and at home about
100000 troops, all told.
Now for the comparison. At this mo-
ment we possess close upon 500, 1000 men.
Looking to, home service alone we had
in lS45, according to the Duke of Well
lington's reckoning an available body of
5000 men. We have now at least 400-
900. OF artillery, instead of 1000, we
have upward of $4,000 at home and
abroad, the regular artillery alone being
nearly 10000 strong. In short, If we
take 10000 as the strength of the regu-
lar army at home, and then add the num-
bers of the militia, volunteers and other
reserve forces, we shall find that at the
present moment we have within these
islands larger military force than that
with which Prussia, four years ago, en-
tered the list against Austria, consoli-
dated Germany, and raised herself to
that eminence which has provoked the
present war. II, then, all this prodigious
Increase has actually been achieved by
our twenty-five years preparation, how
can we be said to be unpreparedp We
answer that if we have got the men, and,
indeed, the material of war, we have got
nothing else. OF that machinery which
makes an effective army out of multi
tude of men we have hardly trace.
Our militia ia nearly 100000 strong, not
merely on paper, but on parade. Our
volunteers, with the impulse which this
new arm will give to the movement,
may be reckoned at 100000. These
100000 men are there, and they are as
good men as the Prussians who won the
battles of Weissenburg and Woerth.
They have seen, indeed, almost as much
service, for those Germans of the first
line we're young conscripts enrolled
since the campaign of Sadowa. But the
Germans have complete military or
ganization, while we have none. Every
regiment Of those young troops had its
full and sufficient complement of skilled
and disciplined officers, trained to ser
vice of the best and most rigorous of
systems. Every regiment had its own
brigade, every brigade its division, and
all these divisions and brigades their
full quotas of commanders with com
hospital and all other services
in perfect efficiency. From the Gene
ral-in- Chief to the lowest drummer-boy
every man knows his place in that mighty
army, and every man was found in 1t.
Here lies the difference between Eng
land and Germany. Our militia is not
half officered, and Of its few officers not
half are trained Our volunteer officers
have no knowledge but what, in spite of
they have contrived to pick
up themselves. For neither force is
there anything like staff, administra-
ton, commissariat or other supports.
The result is that on the first alarm we
perceive the deficiency, and, instead of
relying upon the enormous strength, we
hastily pour a few thousand men into
the line.
The Prussian army of 400, 900 men was,
in the space of fortnight, dispatched to
the frontier as completely equipped, sup
piled and supported in all respects as
the flying column of 5000 men which we
occasionally contrive to send out of
Within three weeks after
The declaration of war that army had
already fought three bloody battles and
won as many victories. 1t is now clear
10 what this success was due. AS a
purely military caste the Prussian sol
liers were not the equals of the French
soldiers. Less of their lives had been
spent in the barracks or camps; they had
more of the civilian element among |
hem, and they went to war not so much |
n the way of trade as in that of excep- |
.ional and temporary duty. In other
words, they resembled our own volunteers
N character and composition, but there,
Unfortunately for ourselves, the resem-
)lance ceases Accomplished officers
,ook these levies into battle, and mas
erly organization gave them the full ad-
vantage of their numerical superiority |
1t every point of attack. No troops in
he world, 1t is now plain from our
lwn correspondence, could have fought
better than the French, but they |
we're everywhere outnumbered, and, in
he end, overpowered The citizen sol
ler has beaten the professional soldier,
1nt only because he was led by profess
sional officers and sustained by the most
professional organization.
Our citizen soldiers have no such ma
shinery to render their strength effect
we. As to being "unprepared," there
are many degrees of preparation. 1t
IS utterly impossible that we should hold
ourselves absolutely ready for war at
lny moment Of peace. The strongest
military monarchies are not prepared in
hat sense. France, with all her aston
shing aptitudes, and what we have al
ways supposed to be her incessant pre-
was "unpreparsd" in 1866,
and, indeed, as the fact seems to show,
1t this very crisis Prussia herself was
'unprepared in so far as her frontier
Tortresses were unarmed and unprovi-
stoned, and her army required a fort