The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-25

very different result from being so on the Sth OF
September, The one would have found the enemy en-
tely unprepared to resist further ADVANCE either
upon Sumter and the harbor, or upon the seaward
extremity OF Sullivans Island, or upon James Island
by the Stono river, and that with military and
naval force fresh and almost untouched. But the
other did lind us with soldiers, sailors and iron-cads
much the worse for wear, and far less efficient than
at first, while the enemy had improved the same
time by strengthening the defense in every respect
THE ARMY NOT PREPARED.
There had been clearly no preparation by the
General for the occasion, nor ready thought to
1t when it offered: so the golden moments were lost
the enemy gained courage and reinforcements
during the night, our soldiers were pushed at the
work in the morning; those who led were not fol-
been given to the navy, therefore its fire was not
present to assist, and this dilatorY, slight, and lily
prepared assault had Just such aconcluson as might
have been expected TO be paid for afterwards in the
toll and waste Of life that marked the next sixty
days
II this first part of the enterprise against Morris
Island had not been entirely surprise, the enemy
was certainly unpTepared for the force and rapidty
the impotency of the conclusion.
THE SECOND ASSAULT ON WAGNER.
The General now decided to make a S2GJId assault
in force and 10 cover it by some light batteries
established at distances varying from thousand
to seventeen hundred yards. While the prepara-
tions for this design were going on the monitors
were daily at work keeping down the fire at Fort
Wagner, the gunboats assisting at long range
On the 18th OF July the batteries ashore opened
fire violently on the fort and the monitors took posi-
tion as near as the state of the tide would allow
anchoriDg at 1900 yards; just outside of them was
the de Tos tRe he NJ Tng range e
the Admiral's flag, gradually closed in until within
800 yards OF the fort when grape was used. Unable
to endure the severe raking fire from the vessels,
the enemy kept out OF sight-not a gun was
fred in reply nor man to be seem
Gilmore annonnced his Intention U" to assault sssant
and the Admiral perceived our men moving up to
the work, but before they reached it the darkness
hid them from view Until this moment an inces-
SAINT and accurate fire had been maintained by the
vessels and now it became impossible to distinguish
Vx H. n off fao and nf
cessity, was suspended. Quickly came up from the
darkness the rattle OF musketry and the flashes of
light artillery which continued without nermssion
until $50, gradually abated and then ceased. This
attempt to 'make manifest the real and concealed
elements Oh strength OF Wagner $50 styled by Gene
cause of the disaster must be found in the failure to
assault on the 10th Immediately after the capture of
the southern batteries which would either have
ceeded or else have disclosed satisfactorily the real
and concealed elements Of strength with much less loss
to ourselves.
WHY THE NAVY CEASED FIRING.
The naval fire was also placed in abeyance at the
most critical moment by the lateness of the hour,
which was the real cause OF its SUSPENSION and not
as General Gilmore states 'for fear of hitting our
own men" when they approached near the work :"
and yet Notwithstanding these disadvantages the
troops got hold of and held the south east baston
for some time, when further mschance intervened.
Colonel Davis. in his History of the 10th Pennsyl-
vania,' says :-"Here we have the old story, that
somebody whose duty 1t was to support the advance
failed to come up in time, and in consequence the
hard-earned advantage was lost"
A BLOODY AND DIsHEARTENINa FAILURE.
Whatever the cause, the fact OF failure stood out
in bloody and disheartenng figures, and with 1t the
conviction that the work must be reduced by the
slow and laborious operation OF siege, which, after
the severe losses in men, amounting to 33 per cent
demanded reinforcements.
The trenches were accordingly advanced, always
assisted by the fanking fire Of the navy, in the
course Of which General Gilmore determined to
batter Fort Sumter over Fort Wagner, with the in
tention of subduing the fire of the former and pre-
vent its being used to aid in the defense of the lat
ter
THE ATTACK ON SUMTER.
one month was consumed In the preparation, and
Sumter. The Official naval despatch says:-At the
same time the Admiral moved up with his entire
hawken, follow ed by the Kaatskill, Nahant and Mon
tauk, Passaic and Patapsco in reserve for Sumter
long range. BY 920 the navy fire had silenced Wag-
ner, and prevented its cannon and musketry from
troubling our men while pounding Sumter. In a few
to take any further part with its guns in disturbing
the advance OF our trenches, advantage gained at
the expense OF greater, for 10 firing at great
distance the flight even of riheshot shells was so
much dispersed to convert the regular wall into
mass of rubbish on which little If any further i'm
preston was possible 1t would bave been far
better, so far as the preaching OF Sumter was
cerned, if the firing at it had been postponed until
Point, some 1900 yard from Sumter; then the gorge
wall could have been cut through with regularity by
accumulate, round shot and shell would have laid
the interior Of the work more fairly open to the
view 81 our guns rSt The entire novelty OF the feat did
to be illusory on this occasion, the
of repair and for the time of serious consequences
The monitor Catskill was disabled by heavy shot,
which crushed the top of the piot-house and killed
the gallant Captain George Rodgers, the Admiral's
Fleet Captain. Neither he nor the monitor could be
spared under the circumstances.
THE FALL OF FORT WAGNER.
| Fort Wagner finally fell on the 7th of September
after most pertinacous resistance, continued 81
days from the first assault made on the morning OF
the 1lth of July. Soon after dark on the night OF
September sappers pushed by the south face OF
the fort, and next morning the final assault was to
| have been delivered. This was preuded by a tenn
! pest OF fire from the land batteries and vessels,
| which began at daybreak on the 5th, and was con.
several thousand shot and shells were thrown into
Wagner. The enemy rightly comprehendng 1t to be
no longer tenaole, evacuated during the night, and
abandoned Morris Island entirely
! And thus was accomplished the work agreed on
/ by the Admiral and General at Port Royal some two
months previously, and here also terminated the
| JOINT military and naval operations in front Of
Charleston.
THE AID OF THE NAVY INDISPENSABLE.
To what had been done the navy not only con
u1buted, but was indispensable. All that Genera
Gilmore did do was under cover OF the navy can
non. But for the presence OF the iron-clads ht
could not have landed upon Morris Island on the
| 10th OF July, nor have remained there afterwards
much less have operated against Fort Wagner The
safety OF his troops would have been menaced by
the three Rebel irOn-cads Charleston harbor, ant
being cut on by them from supplies OF all kinds
| would probably nave become prisoners OF war
General Gilmore seems TO have been laborng under
some such impressions when he wlote page 1s, s27
''that beyond the capture OF Morris Island and the
demolition OF Fort Sumter, the land fore es, mum
bering scarcely eleven thousand men of all arms
available for offensive operations could not, unless
largely reinforced take the lead in any operations
against the interior or land defenses OF Charleston
that involve their iedUtIg their hold upon the 1drfO
islands, Uhere the hand they had the cO-Ope
ration OF The nGUy against the iTOn-ead and gun
boats Of the enemy and on the other practedy tDtpas
Z sable marshes against Uhich the wel-known supe
rior numbers OF the enemy and their facilities fo
concentrating troops by railroad could be Of TIL