The Cairo daily bulletin. (Cairo, Ill.) 1870-1872, 1870-08-11
4 SING AMIR ACCURATE MILL
TIRI pROPHESI.

The following very able article; from
correspondent Of the London Observer up
peared in that paper Ms far back as the 10Th
of July, when the armies now in conflict
had had scarcely taken up their line of
march. 1t is strikingly accurate in almost
every one Of its an,icipatons. Ia this it
is in remarkable contrast with the wild
hap-hazard mode Of guessing so generally
INDUCED in by our own and foreign pa
pers and shows also that little Of the
purely accidental has figured thus far in
the present campaign;
have not the slightest belief tina, the
Prussians will fight orattempt to fight u
defensive camrain. The campaign OF 1866
showed them the advantage Of audacity,
the speed with which they could mass
their troops together, and the immense ad-
vantage 10 be secured by combining the
war 70 an enemy's country. Prince
Charles, perhaps the most influential gem
eral in the Pru..iaI army, and CountNon
Moltke, are believed TO be entirely in ac-
cord upon this point and hold that the
only course for Germany l. at any risk and
loss 10 march straight on Paris. II this
policy is finally adopted, and the army Is
ready, Prussia will resisi the passage of the
Rhine q, Kchl, while repeating herself the
tactics Of 1914 aud advancing two great
armies in converging lines into France IL.
self One Of those would start from Sasr.
bruck, and one would cross Vt Breessch,
the two eieciing "A junction ut Rossieres
or Luneville, where On this theory the
mos. decisive engagement would lie fought,
! There are many motives besides the STRAIT
ege,ieal Que which woald temp, the P.us.
SLAMS towards this course; nothing would
tend 80 completely to encourage Germany,
and especially south Germany, which
above al needs encouragement and moth.
ing would 90 disorganize Sspoleon .
plans. lie must stop those armies ~ an
sacrifice, even If victory beyond the from.
tier were just within bis grasp. No
French sovereign ever has been or ever
will be able ~ be indifferent even FOR .
day 70 an army marching on his capital,
and no soldier viii sttemp, TO arrest =
Psussian Amy xiihou, the elite u the
French army a. his back Incredible .,
such an Andaci,, may seem, the frussisn,
have ample means ~ their dsposal for
making the attempt. They have, or in siI
more days will have. ct least 400, CD fn,
troops in movement independent Of gA,
risoh. 90 be supplied BY the LAndwskr and
the French with their forces scattered In
: Algeria and Rome, could certainly no,
, use more Two armies Of 10000 inch
each convereingsIowArdsD Aneyille, would
be supported by two other. Of 5000 each
= keeping open their communications viii
!, the source Of their snpplie-. They coul,
be beaten ,n,y by hard fghiing-migh
= win, and il they won would probably di.
h organize the Imperial government, whie'
= hold. power only by the tenure OF inces
n SAINT victory.
/, This is but speculation, Of course, 70
: half the necessary data are wanting ou
il is a speculation based upon the hi.,or
a Of the past and on some knowledge of III
= policy which ,ince Ssdows, has been nc
. ceptcd In German military circles.
The old slowncss Of movement chnrac
teri.tic of Germany, has entirely di,ap
! peared, and in it, stead We have an audS
, city rivallcd only 10y that of Frenchmet
while the force nj Pru,.ias disposal
More than double the greatnes. that 81
has ever welded She has no frontier 1
guard, for she has evidently arrange
matters with -. Petersburg. Austria can
not attack n German power while resistin,
: an invasion of Germany and the South
h ern States which France hopes TO attaeI
will probably be- ne faithful ne Hanover o
" Saxony, and will consider NJ between Pru-
G sia and France, their loyalty Is dne 10 tn
!. Germsnic power. This is motor iously th
4 opinion Of the King Of Bavaria, and with
:, out aid from Munich II would b. msdncs
for the South Germans 10 run the risk. ia
: | yolysd oven iu lukewhrmness