The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-11-03
RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN CUES
TION.

Haggertys.
RUSSIA AND THE EASTERN CUES
TION.
From the N. y Herald.
The rumor of a secret treaty between
Russia and Prussia, destined, if true, to be
known as the Wiesbaden treaty, has lent a
new and somewhat lively interest to the
European situation. The burden of the
rumored treaty is to the effect that Russia
was consulted before the war was COM
menced, and that while Russia bound herself
to hold off for q reasonable length of time
during the continuance of the war, she was
bound, in the event of Prussian defeat, to
step forth and forbid Prussian, or rather Ger
man, dismemberment. Prussia, on the other
hand, in the event of victory, bound herself
to stand by Russia in any attempt she might
make to force the annulment of the obnox-
ious clauses of the treaty of Paris. The
French paper in London, La Situation, in
spired by the imperialists, admits the exist
ence of the treaty That such treaty has
been signed by Russia and Prussia may or
may not be true. 1t is undeniable however,
that the arrangement fits in most admirably
with the events and necessities of the hour.
We are not disposed to regard it as mere
rumor. The action of the Russian Govern
ment, hitherto inexplIcable, now begins to be
ineligible. Since the Crimean war Russia
has been peaceful. Russia, in fact, SO far as
the Government was concerned, practically
ceased to be a European Power. Internal
improvements, the emancipation of the serfs,
the construction of railroads, the strengthen
ing of her position in the East, occupied the
attention and, to all outward seeming salts
fed the ambition of Russian statesmen. To
watchful and knowing observers it was appa-
rent that Russia was making good use of her
quietude and leisure; and such persons felt
satisfied that Russia was preparing for event
ualities after such a fashion that, when the
eventualities came, she would be ready to
make war in the East or in the West, as was
most convenient. In other words, it was the
conviction of many persons well qualified to
judge that Russia was waiting her opportu-
nifty. If the Russian Governmentnowt thinks
that the desired opportunity has arrived, few
will say she has miscalculated.
From Russian standpoint let us look at the
situation. Since the days of Peter the Great
Russian ambition has been directed towards
Constantinople. 1t has been-it still is-her
belief that she has been commissioned by Pro-
vidence to restore the Greek empire, and to
make an end of the work which the tempo
rjZing policy of the Western Powers has left
unfinished, by driving the turbaned Turk out
of Europe. In the pursuance of this policy
the late Emperor Nicholas moved little too
fast. He badly chose his time. A new man
with great name had acquired the control of
the Treasury and the armies of France. The
Crimean war was singularly convenient for
Napoleon. 1t cost France much, but it made
Napoleon the Third secure on the French
throne. Great Britain, which had destroyed
the first French empire, through Napoleonic
cunning strangely lent helping hand to build
up the second. The treaty of Paris, 1856,
saved Turkey and humbled Russia, by driv-
ing her war ships out of the Black Sea- Rus
sia felt then what she remembers now-that
she was beaten down by a foolish, if not ini-
quitous, alliance of the two greatest military
powers of the West Great Britain alone,
France alone, could not have taken Sebasto-
pol; but Great Britain and France combined
were too many for Russia single-handed.
Russia bowed to fate-the fate of the hour
but che bowed most unwillingly. ''Not yet,
but another time, was the sentiment of the
Russian Government and the Russian people
when Sebastopol was dismantled and when
the treaty of Paris was signed. Since
1856 Russia has been waiting and
watching. So long as Napoleon seemed
a power the time was not yet. Even
Napoleonic overtures to undo the treaty of
Paris could not drive Russia from her waiting
and watchful attitude. After her Crimean
experience she was not willing to trust the
Turk even when bringing gifts. But the
ming, no French and English alliance, can
hinder her marching across the Pruth or hur-
rying her war ships to the Golden Horn. II
may be that the Gar Alexander's known love
of peace and universally recognized honesty
of purpose will prevent Russia from availing
herself of her opportunity; but no one can
deny that Russia's opportunity has come 1t il
said, indeed, that Russian agents have been to
Tours, sounding the French Government as
to the feasibility Of a sale of the national feet
to the Car, but that they have had no sue
cess in this direction to the present moment
We are told that the Russians offered France
certain political Inducements" as we'll as
money payment for the vessels. There may
be something in this statement. II the Czal
be really intent on ''going to the East" it il
| good policy to have as powerful navy az
possible. 1t would also be a very astute
| diplomacy TO disarm France at sea by pur
chase of her iron-clads.
If Russia were TO order her armies acros.
the Pruth tomorrow what power in Europe
could hinder their triumphant march to Con
stantinopleg We kno~ Of none. Great
Britain would protest, might fight; but Grea
Britain alone could not arrest the conquerorl
march. Russia in the Black Sea, Russia il
| Constantinople means Russia In the Madi