Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1870-08-15
THE ROUTES TO PARIS.
ITS Position i'm the French Militia
ry system.


ry system.
A military view of the security of the
French capital is summarized in the fol
lowing statement compiled from a
French journal, which endeavors to tran
quilize the public mind on that point:
There are four routes, in military
point of view, which an invading army
might adopt in advancing from Germany
upon Paris; l. By crossing the French
frontier between Strasburg and Luxem-
burg, and than advancing in a direct
line on Paris. 2. By crossing the Swiss
territory situated below Strasburg and
marching by the valleys of the Seine and
Marne on the capital. 3. By move
ment from the north, passing the fortress
of Metz and reaching Paris by way of
the valleys of the Seine and Marne. A..
By advancing through Belgian soil, in a
direct southern line through the valleys
of the Oise and Aisne on Paris.
The first course is regarded as mill
tary impossibility, France being pro-
tected on the east by the great natural
defenses of the Vosges mountains, the
Moselle river, the Ardennes mountains,
and the river Meuse, supported by many
fortified places, among which is the
stronghold of Metz. Dismissing then,
any speculations which this route may
suggest, we arrive at the second line OF
advance toward the French Capital. If,
in this case, the Prussians were to vio-
late the neutrality of Switzerland, and
attempt to advance upon Paris from the
southeast, they would find themselves
confronted by the fortress of Lyons,
which has been strengthened and rem
dered very secure since the period OF the
first Empire. Before arriving at that
point the invading forces would have to
capture either Belfont or Langres, both
of which occupy commanding positions
on the ground through which an army
from Switzerland should pass.
The third route is the most feasible,
and consists, in military phrase, of turn
ing the fortresses on the northeast
frontier, including Metz, and then by
continued successes arriving on the river
Marne, from whence there is no formid-
able obstacle to an advance toward the
immediate neighborhood Of the capital.
But an invading force could not, on ac-
count of Metz and Strasburg, wisely
adopt this course, The French army, if
defeated, could take refuge in Metz and
thence harass the rear of the invaders.
who would be open to similar attacks
from Strasburg and places of less i'm
portance. The fourth ronte, by way of
Belgium, is secured by defenses which
the reverses of 1914 proved more imper-
atively necessary. :.
The French calculated that even if
an enemy should arrive in the vicinity
of Paris, her Notifications were practi-
cally impregnable. Thirty years ago,
under the administration of M. Theirs,
these defenses were completed, the pro-
jeet being regarded with special favor by
Louis Philippe, who took an enthnsias-
tic interest in Notifications. Another
resource is found in the population of
Paris, now numbering 1900, 900, who, by
acting in concert with forces operating
in the rear of the invaders, might over
whelm them. Such was the hope of Ma
poleon l., but in the altered circum-
stances of his time it proved impracti-
cable.