The Union and journal., 1870-04-22

anu IN gttltNh, lntl lOTHliubDlt CuhtC-
ter. we shall nave no hesitation in decid
ing who WAS tho greatest general. The
test is not the most certain one, but In,
correspondent referred to has chosen u
intcrposc IL, and however insignificant
this act OF ingenuity may be- in his own
person. there are not n few southern
newspapers which have solcmnly adopted
Il.
AS to the general question Of compara'
tive merits ~ commanders between Nc
Clcllan and Grant, what we have said OF
the former suggests the main difference
between the rivals. Mcclellan may have
been an excellcns organizer of armies; II
has been said of him that he had the ped.
antry Of war without its inspiration.
There could b. no greater contrast to his
moral timidity, the mechanical sense oi
ORDER, the slow genius, If genius at all, oi
"hthclstanc," the "Unrcndy," than those
quick instincts OF fight in Grant which
gave him this merit Of great command
cr-that he Rerer declined 20 bdttie, and
that no went at il with force OF decision
that sometimes appeared irregular, SIM
ply because IL never calculated the inie-
riOr circumstances of the situation. His
military genius might have been the un-
brill ant and pondorous ono of n COM
mander determined To conquer by repeat
cd strokes Of physical force; but no one
can doubt the readiness and dctcrmina-
ton with which he struck ut all times. II
he had NO iinesse. he had no procrlstina'
tion. lie was never bothered by that nice
attention to details which is always AL
justing and re-adjusting, which never rc-
allies precisely the combination IL desires,
and which, instead of making real prepa.
rrtions, keeps itself only in constant
state Of unreadiness and distrust.
But the fact which we wish especially
to bring TO light, and which may surprise
some readers, is that the Southern Confcd-
cracy. so far from being in the extremity
Of despair described by the Washington
correspondents when Grant undertook the
campaign of 1864, WAS never at any time
of tho war, in militGry point of view,
more able to separate. Tho lapse from
this condition was sudden and awful be-
fore the year was out, and from causes nj
which wo shall presently glance.
But the truth was indisputlblo to those
living in the South ut that time. and made
careful and Intelligent observations around
them. that the ConlelcrIcy never turned
upon her toe moro imposing and deter
mined aspect then when, in the early
months of 1864, Grant took command OF
the Northern forces in Virginia, and found
ON his front an army which, though some
what less numerous than that which dc-
feated Mcclellan around Richmond, was
much more formidable. lt was an army
Of 10000 men. all told-the best season.
ed army that Virginia had ever put In the
fisld- composed entirely of. Veterans, AMI
inspired by combination ofteyery cir
emnss.pse that could breed u
sure devotion
Yet the contest was hopeless before the
year WAS out. In this time tho South hal
been conquered, not indeed by the tran
cendent generalship of Grant, but by the
consumate folly of Jefferson Davis. SUI
perior numbers never conquered the
Southern conlederacy; and here on this
point we may dismiss the comparison oi
gcneralship between Grant and McClel-
Ian rs no longer applicable, or rs having
been treated Ia the extent Of justice. and
4 DlINlt l'Ai'NNAoh WI
the subject, viz. What were tho real ca'ls-
Of tho failure Of the Southern Conied-
erlcy?
We answer that the South was conquer
cd in 1864 by acts Of Is own government,
occurring principally after General Grant
hal fought the most important battles ot
the campaign. IL WAS conquered by the
removal Of Johnston ut Atlanta which
broke the heart Of great army and struck
down the confidence of the people by a
single deccitful blow; by such destruction
of diciplino in the Confederate armies that
General longstrcct reported ir December,
1864. that in single day out of | 200 men
there were 100 confined in the guard
house for desertion; 10y such mismanaSc-
mcnt of the commisSlriat that there were
Confederate soldiers actually starving,
while there was grain rotting in depots
| from which the government hisd neglected
to remove it. and the enemy was constant
ly cxclaiminS his surprise ut tho richness
of subsistence i'm every district he invaded ;
by physical exhaustion so prcmaturely
and wantonly brought about that but two
months before the surrender 9th of Feb.
1861 Gen. Lee hail written in an OIL
cial report that must now remain the char
and everlasting condemnation of the au-
thorities tn whom 1t was addrcssed-"our
resources litly and vigorously employed
are ample"
Such were tho things that conquered
the Southern Confcderacy. Tho theory
! that IL fell under the accumulation Of the
superior numbers of the North, sounds
pleasantly To tho vanity of tho South,
an'l impresscs the vulgar imagination.
which Is apt, in mere statistical parallels
or in coarse estimates Of numbers, to seek
the solution of the most intricate prob
lens.
The truth must 10 told or IL will tell
itself eventually. 10 the increased disas-
ter of those who would suppress 1t. No
matter what may be tho ostentation and
sclf.praise of our times, the complaccnt
phrases of gallant struggles, &C., il Is
certain that IN future history IL will be
ingloriolis for the South that IL failed In
cause where il had 50 many adran-
tagcs, and where the Judgement OF the
world had reasoned a pyfOri that II would
succeed. Again and again has this wri-
ter, interpoSed his pom TO avert this con-
demnatiOn of history on tho South, and
To point out tho true cause of its failure
in tho unworthincSs and paltriness of the
government Of Jefferson Davis, misem-
ploying the resources Of tho South, dc
mor,lizing ut last its people, and finally
giving 1t, u despairing and brokcn-heart-
ci prey, TO its enemy. To be sure he
has hail some small thanks for doing
this. But .ho Is in no impatience or hur-
ry; nc c,n wait the Judgment of poster
ity; and he hail Ear rather be known 10y
| IL rs the Apologist Of the South than rs
the panegyrist of Jefferson Davis.
The emergency amounts to this-thai
there is no possible hypothesis to save
the p.,oplc of the South from the shame
that. In tho reflections Of time, will rs
surc,ily E,ll on their surrender, cxccp,
n -