Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-03-24

4
The Code or any other. The orders an
DEGREES mentioned in that section, th
execution of which may be superseded b
this Court or either of the Judges are nc
orders and DEGREES made by the Chancello
at chambers but orders and DEGREES whie
can be made only by the Chancellor i
term.
The Code must be taken as one statut
divided into parts, chapters, articles, sec
tons and sub-sections and its differen
provisions which relate to the same sub
| ject matter must be construed with refer
ence to each other When the sam
terms are used ia the Code which appea
in the Constitution of the State they mus
be taken to have the same meaning as il
the Constitution, unless the context o.
other parts of the Code show that they
arc used in different sense.
Section 1888 of the Code is in thesC
words:
'sThe Supreme Court in term or either OF
the Judges in vacation may grant writs Oh
| supersedeas to an interlocutory order Oh
/ decree or execution issued thereon as in
case of final DEGREES, and may require the
party applying to give bond with good Sc
curity, payable to the opposite party, con-
ditioned to pay the amount of the interlO-
cutory order or decree if so required upon
final hearing, and further to pay all such
costs and damages as the opposite party
may sustain"
Section ! of Article VI of the Consti-
tuition of Tennessee is in these words:
''The judicial power of this State shall
be vested in one Supreme Court; in such
inferior courts as the Legislature shall
from time TO time ordain and establish
and the Judges thereof and Justices of
the Peace"
Here a distinction is made between
such inferior Courts as the Legislature
shall from time to time ordain and estab-
fish and the Judges of such Courts.
The distribution of judicial power be-
tween such inferior Courts as the Legis-
lature shall from time TO time ordain and
establish and the Judges of such courts
is left to the Legislative department to
make.
As to the distribution of judicial power
between the Chancery Court and the
Chancellor at chambers, it will suffice for
our present purpose to refer to a few
sections of the Code.
Section a, 410 is in these words:
''The Chancellors have power as well
in vacation as in term time to hear and
determin all such motions and to make
all such interlocutory orders and DEGREES
in any suit as may be necessary or proper
10 prepare the case for final hearing and
determination.
Section 4,4l1. Sand when any decree
or order shall have been made in any suit
pending in the Court the Chancellors in
ike manner have power, as well in vaca-
ton as in term time, to make such further
orders and to issue such writs and process
as may be necessary to carry into effect
such DEGREES or orders
Section 4,412. 'But no such motion
shall be heard, nor such decree or order
made, in vacation, until reasonable notice
shall have been given the adverse party
or his counsel to appear and object"
Section 4, 413. 'The power conferred
in the foregoing sections extends to the
making of rules and orders for the pre-
paration of suits, but not to the making
of DEGREES ordering accounts or such like
DEGREES fixing or settling the rights of
parties, in vacation"
Here we have an outline of the general
powers conferred upon Chancellors at
chambers and the precise limit fixed be-
yond which such powers do not extend.
Thislimit precludes the making of de-
crees ordering accounts, or such like de-
crees fixing or settling the rights of par
ties. Such DEGREES are not to be made in
vacation, but only in term time.
In the distribution of judicial power be-
tween the inferior Court of Chancery,
which bas been ordained and established by
the Legislature, and the Judge of this Court,
it is manifest that large judicial powers
are vested in the Chancery Court which
may not be exercised by the Chancellor at
Chambers.
Now, section A, SIS of the Code, which
makes a summary reference to the two
sections we are now considering, keeps up
this distinction between the ChancerY
Court and the Chancellor at chambers.
That section is in these words:
''They (referring to Judges of the Su-
preme Court may also grant suppressed cas-
to the execution of an interlocutory decree
of an inferior court in the cases pro-
vided for in sections 3, 933 and 1884"
The word inferior court is here used in
the same sense in which it is used in the
Constitution. 1t does not mean the Judge
of the inferior court 1t means the in
ferior court itself which has been or
dained and established by the Legislature.
l conclude that the interlocutory orders
and DEGREES referred to in section 1888,
are such as may fall within that class of
DEGREES and orders which are mentioned
in section 3,157, from which an appeal
may in the discretion of the Chancellor be
taken. The views here expressed are not
in conflict with what is said in the case of
Delap VS.. Hunter, l Sneed 10l, in refer
ence to the act of 1872 CHI. ISL, sec. 4,
which is carried into the Code, section
1888.
The language of section 3, 933 is that
the supersedeas may issue as in case of
final DEGREES.
The jurisdiction to issue it was mani
testify intended to stand and must stand
upOnithe same ground as the supersedeas
to final decree.
1t is mere incident to appellate jurisdic-
ton.
1t cannot be said 10 be incident to ap-
pellate jurisdiction when the.order or de-
cree, the execution of which is superseded,
does not belong to that class of orders and
DEGREES that may be appealed from.
MoCLAIN, Judge.