The New York herald., 1870-07-24


competent judges, most skilful movement
J a movement that battles Napole9n's calculations
and betters Prussia's chances in the event Of
conflict taking place. Others think that the
French Emperor is acting with judgment as
we'll as caution. The agitation Of the
surrounding countries intensifes. The English
army is to 60 on a war footing. Great Britain
is in active naval movement. Russia
| and Austria have notes on the crisis.
The French iron-clad frigate La Gloire is
in motion and being manned. Napo-
leon has issued q proclamation to the
French nation in which he blends democracy
and imperialism with a skilful hand. Couriers
have been despatched from Paris to Copen-
hagen. 1t Is said that Denmark is thus ad-
vised Of coming changes in the Baltic No
battle had been fought, so far as our cable
reports received at an early hour this morning
tell. The Prusslans have blown up the abut-
ments of the bridge at Kehl.
It is quite clear from all this that
Napoleon's great aim is If possible, to
make one battle decisive of the campaign.
This was his purpose in his famous cam
paign against Austria in 1859, and his
purpose was wonderfully carried out. Stun
the enemy by terrific blow and make
terms with him before he has had time to
recover seems to be Napoleons idea of war.
His italian campaign was unquestionaby a
great success. II convinced the world that
the author of the coup d6tat, the hero Of
Strasburg and of Boulogne, the dreamer in
Ham, was as practical as he was thoughtful;
that he was great general, in fact, as well as
great theorist. But the campaign which
resulted in Magenta and Solferino was not
more brilliant, was not greater success than
that which resulted in Sadowa. France
trampled Austria down in 1S59-60. Prussia
laid Austria low in 1866. 1t has thus been
proved that Austria is match for neither
Power; but it has yet to be proved which of
the two victors is master of the other. Both
armies are strong well-equipped and we'll
sciplined-equipped and disciplined as no
armies ever have been In the whole history Of
mankind. Both are well oficered. If left
alone it is really difficult to say which has the
better chance. If it should happen that
superior strategy or the accident of position
should give France the first victory, what
reason is there to conclude that Prussia should
consent to make peace with the invading foe
We know of none. five have any conviction
regarding this war 1t is this-that Prussia, or
rather Germany, will fight 1t to the bitter end.
One battle-no matter which is victor-is but
little likely to settle the trouble between
France and Prussia.
It is impossible to speak too highly Of the
French army. In point of bravery it is
second to no army in the world. That its
chances are good we cannot deny. At the
same time we cannot close our eyes to the
fact that France has more to lose than Ger
many-that Napoleon has more to lose than
King William. It is not possible for any
Power or combination of Powers to keep Ger
many disunited or throw her out of the path
way of progress. Even If Prnsesiia were de-
feated it won..l not be possible for France, or
for France with all the Powers at her back, to
dismember the Fatherland. 1t is not possible
to make South Germany French. A French
victory might check the progress of German
unity, but it would only be for little. There
is a gulf between the Germans and the French,
between the Teutons and the Latins, that no
| French triumph or European artifce can
bridge. 1t is too deep. II is too wide.
Should Prussia win, should Prussia be sue
cessful in driving France back upon herself,
| b,,r <ba of fho
homeward demoralized, as after Leipsic and
Waterloo, how heavy would be the blow to
France, how ruinous to the House of Bona
parte If Napoleon wins France will unques-
tionaby honor him and take more kindly than
ever tC his house. 1t will be at least
q less difficult matter for his son to
succeed. But if be should not win
| republicans, Orleanists, legitimists and
not few Bonapartists would unite against
him. 1t requires no great effort Of imagina-
| ton to picture to the mind another abdication,
another exile, another restoration. The first
fruit of an invasion Of France in such crcum-
stances as those we have described would
most certainly be ''Down with the Bonapartes T.
There are conceivable circumstances in
which this war might, nay, in which of neces-
sity it would assume European character
Let us suppose that France is successful that
in battle after battle she beats Prussia down,
that she has firmly established herself in the
very heart of Germany is it conceivable that
the neighboring Powers will look passively
on? 1t is not conceivable. Russia could not.
Great Britain would not Austria might be
tempted by some magnificent offer to take the
side OF France. France in such case would
be strong enough to compel the neutrality OF
the obedience Of the populations Of the South.
1t is not however, to be denied that another
coalition, sustained by English gold, would
reduce the pride and restore the dimensions OF
France. There is nothing which the