The New York herald., 1870-08-31

lHc urst 90 ecC or the Frencn must nec"SSarlly De
TO endeavor TO meet the Prussans at whatever poin
they select, whether Chal0ns or elsewhere with
equal forces. This will clearly be accomplished
force can be made to s.cOntain, or hold in check
larger Prdssian orce. NOW the Prssilns, advancila
beyond the MOselle. win have 10 draw their supplies
forage-as they collect by requisitons IN France
from German territory. Great conveys must con.
stantly pass the Mosele to the armies on its left
bank, and the capture OF these convoys would ak
the Prussan troops run short OF food, OF ammnnl
that the day OF fortrcsses Is over Metz Is an
example TO the contrary. In the first place
It has detained the Prusslans for week.
Will be equal for the next few weeks to 10000 Prus
sian soldiers. And last, but not least 1t cl ,ses
owsrIs ths Us Menas ne mr Save
drawn supplies concentrated from Treves, Mayence
and Mannheim. Strasbourg is another instance OF
the Rhine trom Eaden, and 30 long as it u held even
by few thousand National Guards the Prussians
near the Junction OF WendenneiIn from demolition,
and their conveys passing that way from capture or
destruction. Even Toul, II IT could hold out for .
to the Prusstans. and make IL evcn more difitcult
than &C present to draw supplies from Germany.
The attempt by the PrusSans TO interrupt the re-
treat OF the French IS also confirmed by the same
French despatch which announces the Emperor's
arrival at Chalons. Two Prussnn divisions are OIL
cally reported 10 have endcayOred 10 haraSs the
army on the march, and TO have been repused. This
comedies with Count Palika0s statement OF the pre-
teearams leads US to believe the to be true.
theory was promulgated yesterday morning, based
upon the kilograms OF the actions OF Sunday. that
the French were wing IN rOut, short OF subsistence,
which they cannot draw with certainty from
the country In which they are for the mo-
ln, ment auastered. It. follows that they must
guard these conveys from the possibility OF
capture. The next point is, That the only line
OF railway by which these supplies can be
drawn Is that which passes through WisSembourg,
and thence by Haguenau 70 Yandenheim; where II
II runs In the main line from StrasbOurg to Paris,
which passes through Saverne SaarDurg, Lunevle,
Nancy and Fr0uard. This last named town 10 On
the Mosclie, less than forty miles from Metz sup.
pose now that the French have q corps or $1,000
men In Metz, with communications by tile bridges
within the fortidcatons 10 both banks OF the Moselie
Then the Prussans must leave two corps 10 observe
this ore corps and protect the communications OF
the main Prussan army through FrOuard--because
II they only leave corps on Que bank, the French
corps Can sally out IN the night on the other bank
gage the Prussians upon one bank with
han its numbers, while It's other hall passes
down the opposite bank and GUS the rai-
way. Ii, Oh tie other hand, the Pr,lSsans
divide one corps between the two banks. the
whole French army will sally out upon one
bank and defeat the half corps opposed TO It. Thus
hold Metz double the force which the fortress
contains. This Is one OF the great advantages OF q
OF the river on both banks. We believe the French
TO be retreattng IN perfect order, aud that there
NO no sucn number OF russian troops across the Mo.
sele as could prevent the completion Of their move
ment. 1t Ii all very we'll to talk about cutting or
the French retreat, but retreat cannot be cut on
except by superior or, at all events, equal numbers.
The Bavartans tried il once with Napoleon. They
threw themselves across his line OF retreat at Hanau
with inferior numbers and tLey were simply cut TO
pieces. Have We any reason TO suppose Jhat the
PruS3anS have pushed forward In such force as to
be able to stop the French between Etam and
Chalons! SO Tar as we can Judge there is reason
for such an idea.
Many arguments, indeed, point the other way
The French must nave been able TO get rapid inte
gence as to the appearance OF Prnssans at any
point west OF the VCSges, and BaZalne v Oud surely
not have delayed at Metz long as to be intercepted
by superior forces In his retreat on Chalons He has
to the last moment, and thus gam time for the con.
at Chalons Of fresh trOOps-and now he
retlres In time IL may he; and apparently has been,
TO strike heavy blow such Prnssian forces as at
tempted to annoy his march, ana 70 get clear away
70 the Meuse Its worthy OF notice that Etain the
town at which the French were said 10 be c0ncen-
traced yesterday Is not on the most direct road from
METZ 10 verdun, but on road rather to the north.
From Gravelotte, village four or five miles
through Mars la Tour Harville and Manheules direct
10 Veidun, passing little TO the north OF frcsne;
the other strikes on in north westerly direction by
Con1ans, and thence along the lett bank OF the
Orne TO Etain some ten miles north OF Fresno
whence 1t descends In a southwesterly direction 10
verdun 1t is probably some ten miles further TO
Vefdun by this roaa th n by the other. why. then,
we have heard 1t asked, did the Marshal choose ty
His own despatch received at two O'Clock this morn
ing. tells us tnat on Tuesday very severe action
took place at Grayelotte but that The French ga ned
the advantage although suffering heavy losses II
probable that retreat being his object he prefer
red to retire along the reverse bank of the Orne so
hat his left flank would be etectuay protected by
he Orne from the Prussian cavalry, While his own
cavalry and large nanking parties would be thrown
,ut IRON the southern road. But indeed It does
oiloW that the telegram, which speaks OF the bulk
II the French army as concentrated about btan
)recludes the PROBABILITY OF large portion OF the
irny being on the southern road AT least 900
men must have retreGted from Metz, and we rencin
ser an answer Of General Mcclellan TO President
Lincoln who blamed him for marching his army by
i've roads instead OF Keeping 10 one along the bank
army oil 600 men by one road 1t would have oc-
cupied with It's train dity mes III length, anu the
enemy might have deiea ed the fro long before
Ihc cUuid have reached the scene OF acion." 1t
Is Jolerably certain on the whole that BaZaine's
troops moved by both roads parallel 10 each other,
nearly So and tius II his left 1ank threatened
the troops facing 10 receive The attack would fall back
II defeated on the rest OF the army on the northern
road victorious, would re e!ve the support OF the
no thern portion, fastening up at tie sound OF the
guns. The Frencn nave practised aank marches
before an enemy at Chalons, ani they are not likely
10 have been caught mapping on his march, how
ever badly their outpost duty was performed at
Wissembourg. Bui II must be remembered that we
have, up 10 the moment OF going TO press only the
French version OF the acton
We stu believe the French will make good their
retreat to Chalons. II or 80 ether reason, because
1t seems TO US Impossible tAat the Prussi0nS can
push on sur1cient numbers Of troops to interpose
eiccLually, because oil this question OF sup
plies which seems tTesone ana uriIl-
teresting to CIVILIAN readers, and winch our
government SO niasnIhceDtly pooh-poohs in
the organization OF our reserves, hui whch is
armies of 400, 600 russians or more cannot push on
INTO the heart Of France at the rate or twenty miles
q day without a complete system o. supply and
ample means OF transport. Iniess they remain CON
centrated they are useless for offence and de.cnee;
witness the French corps spr al over The whole
frontier, from Elonvllle 10 mulhouse. II they con-
een.ratc without supplies they starve. "a starving
army Is than none,n wrote wellington, after
The battle Of Talavera when he found himself de-
ceVed by spanish promises OF help and his men ior
days reduced to living on one-tlrd OF their proper
supply OF ratiOns-'A starving army Is worse than
none. The men punder under the very eyes OF their
officers. The officers themselves are dIscOuented,
and with the army that fortnight ago beat double
It's plumbers should now hesitate to attack French
corps OF half it's strength And whence aCe the
pru5stans TO yet supplies as they advance in such
vast numbers over country that has been drained
by the French of all 1t posSessedY How long VIII 1t
take for that llne OF railway to supply iuagaziIeS
TO FEED 400, 900 menY
We dwell 50 much upon this because we are
anxious TO make our non-mllilary readers under
sand how entirely all the movements Of an army
depend upon the question oi supply. "An
arnyp it has been said, ''marches upon
its belly.u The saying Is expressive. No
sooner does want set in than sickness follows