The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1870-01-29

PARTICLES Ir annears TO me, under such circum-
stances that the color of the sugar cannot, in any
sense, be said to have been changed, Dut rather
that it has been disguised.
One other observation will I think expose the
true nature of this transaction. L am not aware
that the obligations of citizens to the Govern
ment are less solemn or less imperative than those
of one citizen to another. Suppose, gentlemen,
that a contract had been made and the money
paid down, by which one of you agreed to deliver
sugar above No. II Dutch standard In color, and
suppose that, as has been proved here, 1t were
possible to impart to sugar OF a dark hue a
lighter appearance by putting into 1t gypsum or
chalk, or some other cOloring matter, your con-
tract in the case supposed would (like the Obliga-
ton of the importer to pay so much to the
Government, in case his goods are above No. II
Dutch standard) be TO give TO the purchaser
sugar above No. u Dutch standard in color. In
both cases the sar1e mode OF classification Is
referred TO. In both cases the same phrase is
used to indicate the kind Of sugar that is the
subject matter of the obligation. The obligation
is in the one case to pay the duty specified in the
Act, if the sugar is of a certain color; in the
other, to deliver for a price already paid sugar of
a certain specified color. Would you conceive
yourselves at liberty to take sugars OF No. = in
color, and put into them gypsum or chalk, and
tender them to the party with whom you had
contracted as sugars above No. u? Would you
expect him to listen to you, if you should say
s. contracted to give you sugar above No. II,
Dutcu eIdnudru III COlOf DuI Will IL IHc DuICL
standard of color? You can only know by look
ing at it through a glass bottle. You can go to
the Appraisers Office and compare the sugar L
offer with sugar above No. II Dutch standard,
and if the colors are the same L claim the right to
tender it Notwithstanding it is in fact No. 6 sugar,
and | have used chalk or gypsum to make it appear
of a lighter color" Can any man mistake as to
the propriety of such a course? 1t appears to
me that there is no difference between the two
cases and the device by which a seller would give
a false appearance Of ~lightness is of the anne
character, and must have the same legal effect as
the device by which the importer would give to
these sugars a false appearance of darkness.
lie that view be correct, then gentlemen. in this
case the importer, consignee, or agent, has mixed
charcoal with these sugars IN order to disguise
the true color, and make them appear to be
below No. II Dutch standard in color, when in
point of fact they were above No. II in color,
with intent to PASS them at the Custom-house as
sugars of the lower grade, and if he has sup
pressed and concealed from the officers of the
customs the fact that he has tempered with and
sought to disguise the color of his goods, then in
my Judgment he has been guilty of a false appli-
ance and fraudulent practice within the meaning
of the statute, and must abide the consequences
which the law imposes.
1t may appear to some of you, gentlemen, that
there has been but an innocent mistake as to the
law, a false construction given to the statute.
That for this mistake the contiscation of the goods
is too severe a penalty, especially as the cOnse-
quences Of that cOntiscation fall In great part
upon innocent parties, and to q considerable
extent upon the representatives of a gentleman
now deceased well known for his public spirit,
his great mental activity and varied attainments.
But you are not at liberty to be influenced by
these considerations. Mr.. Gordon's ignorance
of, or mistake as to the law, cannot excuse him.
He did this act at his peril, and if the act be an
offense under the statute the penalty of the law
attaches. | will read to you in this connection,
from tho Somp authority which one nf the cOunSal
has cited, and then shall conclude my remarks.
In the case which | am about to read Congress
had enacted that where refined sugars were eX-
ported a drawback or return Of duty might be
claimed. The law further provided that if any
goods should be entered by means of any false
denomination they should be forfeited unless it
were shown that such false denomination happened
by accident or mistake, and not from any intention
to defraud the revenue. The party in this case
entered the goods as I" refined SUGARS and
claimed the drawback. They were on the part
of the Government alleged to be not refined sugars
and were seized as having been entered under a
false denomination. The first point to be decided
was whether the sugars were or were not refined
sugars. The Court held they were not. The
claimant then urged that he thought they were,
and that he had merely made n mistake in the
construction of the law. The question then arose
whether this was such a mistake as brought him
within the proviso of the statute exempting the
goods from confiscation when the false denomina-
ton was SHOWN TO De Jnc result or mistake or
accident.
Now upon this state of facts, which l hope you
will bear in mind, as it closely resembles the
state Of the facts with which we have to deal,
Judge Thompson, one of the most eminent Judges
that ever sat upon the bench of the Supreme
Court Of the United States, says: 1.-The first
inquiry which seems naturally to arise is, What
is the nature and character Of the mistake which
will save the forfeiture. Is it restricted to some
matter of fact, or does it include mistake as to
the application of the law to tie subject thus
falsely denominated, the Qualities of such sugars
being fully known to the person making the
entry? Icunnot think that upon any sound con-
struction the prOriSO can cOcer mistakes Of the
later descriptions
"Such are purely mistakes of law. and it is a
principle too well settled to admit of being drawn
in question, that ignorance or mistake Of law
furnishes no excuse in any case civil or criminal.
y And if the term mistake does
not include error of judgment as to matter of
law, Gas L think it does not,) L am unable to dis
cover any ground upon which the false denOmina-
ton can be said to have happened by mistake or
and the only remaining question is
this was done with an intention to de-
fraud the revenue within the sense and meaning
of the prOviso and it appears to me that if the
entry was by design, and not by mistake or
accident, the legal consequence is that it was
done to defraud the revenue"
"Admitting that he himself honestly believed
that his sugars were refined sugars, within the
meaning of the law, and that he was entitled to
the drawback, still it amounts to no more than Il
mistake or error of judgment upon the law, and
does not protect the sugars from forfeiture"
If that be the law, gentlemen, and L see no
reason to doubt it, for the same principle is
affirmed in a case decided by the late Judge of
the Southern District of New York, then the
that the owner of these goods be-
lieved that he might lawfully put charcoal into
them, and lawfully withhold the knowledge of
that fact from the Custom-house authorities, and
that he thereby and within the meaning of the
degraded the sugars and lowered their color,
and converted them from sugar above No. II to
sugar below No. u in color, and that he might
lawfully enter them as of the lower grade-though
he honestly believed all this, such erroneous belief
and mistaken construction of the law afford him
no excuse, and the goods are subject to forfeiture.
If, therefore, in conclusion. gentlemen, you
believe from the evidence, that this sugar, after
it reached the purchasers hands, was mixed with
charcoal for the purpose of reducing its grade
81 III l. H. NJ 10 -