The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-11

and to obtain from them any valuable hints
they may offer. The breaking out Of the war
between France and Prussia will probably
facilitate the work of these officers. Even
though engineers express grave doubts as to
the power Of masonry works to resist the
assaults of modern artillery, still, when we
remember how long Fort Sumter withstood
the attacks of our iron-clads, after oil its
walls seemed crumbling to ruins, we shall not
be inclined to lose all faith in granite walls,
even should they be without shields of iron.
A work which served to keep back such
vessels as we had before Charleston would
seem to be of decided practical value,
although in the eye of military science it may
be but dismantled wreck. LII .-r
While in the matter of construction there
is still some uncertainty, we are on a much
better footing as regards heavy artillery for
the armament of forts. Our system of heavy
ordnance is as perfect as that of any other
country, and we lead the world in the con-
struction of pieces of large calibre AT Fort
Hamilton there is battery of fifteen-inch
guns, and also one monster twenty-inch,
which, we are assured, can throw a heavier
weight of metal to a greater distance than
any similar number of guns, not of the same
make, anywhere else on the face of the globe.
A change seems likely to be made in the
common system of barbette mounting
that is, firing over an earthen parapet-for
heavy guns at least, by the substitution
of carriage which will admit of the depres-
sion of the gun for loading. 1t is laborious
process to load large gun, and if the can
noneer is exposed to the enemys fire while so
engaged, the result is a damaging loss of
gunners. To obviate this difficulty, the
English have adopted the MoncrieH carriage,
and as this subject is now being studied
here, we may hope shortly to be able to have
system of barbette mounting for heavy
guns suited to the peculiar needs of our
forts and coast. Enough, however, has been
said to show that we have a good system of
sea-coast defense, and that the officers having
this matter in charge are constantly engaged
in constructing, improving, and strengthen
ing the works that have already been begun.
NAPoLEoNs UNLUCKY DELAYS.
From the N. Y. Herald.
In the beginning of our own civil war we
had great many theories. Generals who
knew Just how to quell the Rebellion in three
weeks or ninety days. and would need only
seventy-fve thousand men and a few dozen
cannon for the purpose, were as plentiful as
blackberries. All these theories were dis
cussed and digested, and consequently caused
delay, and in war delay is ruin. We had
another class of persons who dreaded that
every weak point of our army had was known
to the enemy, that our exact force was a mat
ter of certain knowledge in the opposing camp,
and that every movement we might contem-
plate was faithfully noted on the ensmy's
chart. 1t was not until General Grant made
his first brilliant successes that we compre-
hended that we might be as strong as the
enemy. When he moved edimmediately on the
enemys works at Fort Donelson and captured
an army of prisoners, there was a general feel
ing that he had made blindly reckless dash
and by the mercy of Providence had sue
L 49,
country behind Vicksburg many good people
thought he was as good as swallowed up by
the fierce hordes of Southrons that would fall
upon him. But when he took Vicksburg and
took another army with it, then people COM
pretended that General Grant was general
who meant business, that he knew his own
strength and found out as nearly as possible
his enemy's and that he did not terrify HIM
self with the belief that the enemy knew more
or was able to do more than he. He was never
guilty of vacillation or delay. He struck as
soon as he was ready, and he got ready as soon
as he could.
Napoleons great mistake in the present
campaign lay in his vacillation and delay. 1t
| was his purpose to invade Prussia, and at the
first enthusiastic uprising of the French army
Son to Berlin" was the demand. There was
necessity for delay. The French army was,
at least, much reader for the battle than the
| GruSSlanS; out Uu6 demon Oh VacllldIlOu Setzeu
Napoleon. 1t may have been that he feared
the war would be over too soon for political
effect if he crushed out the Prussians at once,
just as some of our ninety day prophets pre-
dicted in our civil war. Or it may be that he
dreaded his own weak points, and believed, as
some of our earlier generals believed, that the
enemy knew all about them. So he delayed
and waited to strengthen his army when he
should have been striking with it across South
Germany for Berlin with the speed and energy
of the first Napoleon sixty-four years ago.
Such rapid movement might have served to
divide to some extent the sentiment of the
South Germans, and it would certainly have
had the advantage of taking the Prussian
army, still unready, on its own soil. But
there came vacillation and delay on his part
and steady concentration on the part of
Prussia. The result is that where Napoleon
should have, invaded Prussia United
Germany invades France; where he should
have struck an almost unorganized army of
| Prussia he falls upon solid wall of uRited
German bayonets; where heand Louis should
have been long ago in Berlin, ''our Fritz" and
old King Wilhelm and the whole German
family seem determined to summer in Paris.
WHY NOT, MIR. GREELEY?
From the NJ Y. World.
The Tribune censures us for permitting
our Richmond correspondent to set forth the