The New York herald., 1870-11-15


Inc Emperor gave precise orders TO the effect that
pushed on. but he was obsyed slowly, excuses
being made that II was impossible 10 leave Algeria,
Neyertheess, the nope Of Carrying out the org-
nal plan Of the campaign was not rdv ,os. hs,ors mrs
that the oa Ros 1e nor IN wSa
| quarter his forces were being massed; ano ~ was
with view these tings nn aa' Il os saar .ne
bluck. But. on the 4th, Inc attack upon me
po.a dysSn 81 tho aSoSs @ anS
battle Of treischweiier, caused all uncertainty 10
pI1S On ne same day, the 9Th Of August the army
| corps OF General Frossard had hand 10 hand
struggle with . large body OF the enemy upon the
engagement may not have been favorable, 1t may be
| anirmed that n the two divisions which were In
position TO support General frossard mad executed
| more promptly the orders which they had received
| from Marshal Bazalne we should upon that day
However this may be, our position was critical.
BY the bold Initiative OF the German troops, who
poured In simultaneously by the sarre and by the
Rhine, were caught IN the very act OF f0rmatlon
The corps OF General de Faily had not had time to
reinforce that OF Marshal AacMahon, and found
General Douay, which was slowly mastering at Bel.
fort, found itself far distant from the theatre OF
military OperatiOns and the army OF Marshal can.
robert was not yet completely formed at the camp
UNDER these circumstances, profoundly depressed
at Witnessing all his combinations destroyed. and
driven in these few days to think no longer Of any
mediately to lead back the army to the camp OF
Chalols where II might have gathered together
Falllys corps and that OF pouay. This
plan when communicated to Paris, was at frst
ey ns from G
Emperor that, upon mature conslderation, the
Council had decided that 4 had been too hasty In
since the abandonment OF Lorraine could only pro.
duce deporaole effect on the public mind; II con.
his project For the moment, therefore, the Emperor
yielded TO this counsel
brought up to 100000 by the arrival Of Marshal
Canrobert with two DIVISIONS and the re-
ssys dna Y received orders iG5 Y gs
able to fall upon one Of The Prssian armies before
they had effected their junction. Uniortu:
SopcentlsiIoa q army RETARDED s. 6s Combat AZ
Sas By te s IN which
always remained concoI ming the position and the
strength Of the hostile armies SO well ala the
Prussaps conceal their movements behind the
formidable shelter OF cavalry which they deployed
before them N al directions l9a1 notwitnstandlng
the most n, was er really
CONSEQUENCES, Where our chief efforts should be
directed. On the l4th Of August, as also on the 10Th
no one imagined that the whole Prussian army had
to be dealt with; doubted at Gravelotte that
yerdun could easily be reached on the morrow. At
Paris they were no better informed than we.
These melancholy openings OF the campaign
must, naturally enough have affected public opinion
|
held responsible for the wretched situation Of the
army, while that army was charging Marshal
LeeGui win the delays ana with the lnsuiicency Of
the command to Marshal Bazaine, whose ability was
recognized on all sides, and to suppress the func-
While these events were taking place several gen.
erals mplored the Emperor to leave the army point
ing out that 1t might happen that communication
with Paris would be cut on, and that then, locked
up In Metz and separated from the rest Of France,
Quoting the afars OF the country Or OF giving them
proper direction, and that Revolutionary agtatlons
might arise from this situation.
These considera tions had an indisputable weight
which did not escape the Emperor, who, however,
did not wish to leave the army until 1t had recrossed
the Mosele on to the left bank.
This movement, OF which Marshal Bazalne fully
appreciated the Importance. the Emperor hurried
on much as possible; but the bad weather and
the encumbrance OF baggage delayed its prompt
Arrived at Graveotte the Emperor, not feresse,ne
general battle, and only looking for partial en-
| gagements, which might retard the march OF the
the morning Of the 10th of August, and passed by
CONTAINS aud Etain without meeting single enemy
But the uninterrupted succession Of disasters had
produced IN Paris strong impression and the
thought that Sp 70 certain point they could free
ns 70 the Emperor only, since Ss 6ad simply y1s sSen
therefore inc GsamSs wthon
reference 70 the Emperor; and from the tune OF
ties. the opposition which, ITS influence increase
| which paralyzed the patriotism of the majority
From this period Ministers appeared AFRAID to pro.
| nounce the name Of the Emperor; and he, who had
Quilted the army, and had only rellnquished the
command In order to resume the reins OF govern
ment, soon discovered that 1t would be Impossible
for him to play out the part which belonged to him.
AS soon as he reached the camp OF Chaons the
Emperor found there the Duke Of Magenta and
General Irochu; the latter had been nominated By
the camp. These two general officers were sum-
moned by the Emperor to council, at which there
General Trochu's chief STAFF ofacer, and General
Berthaut, the commander OF the National Garde
nominate General Trochu to the command Of the
army IN Paris: that the troops collected at Chaons
should o. BE- directed towards the capital under the
Garde Mobile should go to the camp or st. Maur at
Ymcennes, and thar the Emneror should go to
| Paris where his duties called him.
When this decision was learned by the govern
ment It excited an animated opposition. Several
objections were put forward. "Parls," it was said
| sis in perfect state Of defence; Its garrison Is
numerous. The army Of Chaons ought to be em.
| tiona Garde Mobile would be danger to the tran.
| quilt Of thencapital; the character Of General
Irochu inspires no confidence; in fact, the return
| OF the Emperor to Paris would be very iu-inter-
| preted by pubic opinion"
| Nevertheless, 1t was decided to carry out the
orders OF the Emperor, while the prOpriety OF sue.
coring Bazaine was still insisted upon. But the
Duke Of Magenta informed the Minister Of War that
the march towards Metz would be OF the great
est imprudence and pointed out all the dangers Of
| such an operation.
PraCtcaly, at tnlS period, the Pru6San armies
occupied the two sides Of o triangle OF which we
Charles was blockading Metz with 2lo, 900 men The
QsoWA PTAGs et sfx9ny, VIII 19o o92 psp, held the
| and joined on his right the army Of the Crown
Prince OF Prussia, who at the head Of $50 900 men,
had established his headquarters at Barbecue.
The Marshal, therefore, declared that he was not
willing to expose troops still mperfecty organized
In making an extremely Deril0us flank march In
the lace Of an enemy very superior In point OF num-
bers; and ne announced that he was going to make
his way towards Rheims from whence he could
proceed either to SCISSORS or to Paris. at
is only," said he, ''under the walls OF the capi-
tai that my army, when rested and reconsti-
tuted. VIII be able to offer the enemy any
serious resistance" In consequence Of this, the
army was led toward Rheims, on the 2ist and
took up Its position behind that city. But the Ian
guage Of reason was not understood in Paris; 1t
wished, at all hazards, to give public opinion the