New-York tribune., 1870-08-23
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
.o,us NAPoLECNs COUP DETAT.

iss y translated from the Thirteenth French Edition,
brandon. PIP. $50 New-Iork: Hurd HoughtOn.
This translation of T6nots famous work appears
very opportunely Now that the true features of the
Yelled Prophet of the Tuileries are beginning to be
recognized by the world the history of the one act
by which he BETRAYED and mastered France will be
read with fresh interest especially this the first
fair although still very cautious preseutaton OF the
facts of the No other event at least in our day
has been so sdllfuly manipulated and dressed ana
furbished in order 10 produce an impression taNoi
able to its authors. Papers of legitimate blrlh an"
baptism have been forged for the creature; l'S uc
formities have been concealed by the most consuih
mate political surgery; its blood-staIns nave ocen
carefully "enameled" out of sight, and ITS cloven
hoof fitted into patent-leather boot OF "raheI ue
Cassagnac's most elegant manufacture
Still there is an undying, stubborn instinct OF
truth in the human race which feels what it is un
allie 70 see. I'm spite of flunkeyism in Europe and
America in spite of the pl66scites and prestige of
p,yyer whicn-nOw that il is overthrOwn-seems al
most incredible, men have always spoken of the
Coup dEtat of December, 1851 with mental reserv-
atom its defenders have ncver in their hearts felt
entirely sure of the strength Of their arguments or
apologies Indeed its historians heretofore Except
The Reverend Abbott, who swallows whatever is put
into his mouth and never digess it afterward have
been compelled against their will, and almost
Part of apologists With all the mystery in which
the event was enyelOped-wth all the attempts which
have been made TO suppress it's involuntary records
its main features too palpably prominent to he
misinterpreted Ii has always been the Vulnerable
point in the armOr of the Empire-the one thing
which Napoleon III. most desired to forget-but
which the Opposition took pains to show him never
could be forgotten.
All that the Empire say in its favor has already
been said. Its special parsans, Graner de CasSag-
nae MAYER Belouins and Manduit, have presented
their all of defense, Omitting whatever features OF
the story were embarrassing and inconvenient On
the other side, we have only had, previous to NJ.
T6uots work the celebrated chapter of kingake
in which he has industrOuSly collected such evil
dence as was attanable by him, but has betrayed
in the statement thereof partisan bitterness which
somewhat weakens his authority as historian. NJ
Tenot has avOided-indeed he vigorously COM
PEELED to avoid-any exhibition of his personal pre-
dicctions The appearance of his work was only
rendered possible by the simulated REIMBURSEMENT
of a strict system Of personal government" in
France and the most Of his statements are based
on those of the Imperial apOOgists He has thus
given Us q narrative not only unimpaSsoned, but
remarkably impartial. 1t may be accepted rs the
mdest possible view of the Coup dEtat which can
b. taken by the Opposition, in France. The author
has contcnted himself with comparing and sitting
tie official evidence, nferring the truth from the
public records which dstort it, and enlighteniug the
act by the antecedcnt history of the Government:
he has aIstancd from all unfavOrable comment upon
the latter and the blow he has dealt is consequently
al the more damaging because il cannot be parried
The fact that his work has gone through eighteen
editions since its first publication in December, 1863
shows conclusiycly that, although eighteen years
have elapsed the French people still remember and
still feel.
In hi, opcrinC chapter NJ. T6not frankly points
out the conflicting elements in the Constitution of
the Republic Of 1873, which would, under any cir
cumstanccs. have limited its term of life. 1t con-
frned the concordat with the Catholic Church, re-
cognized the bureaucracy, the standing army, under
its old organization, continued the system OF con-
sciyon-in short, retained the essential features Of
the old regime giving the President power not less
than that exercised by a constitutional monarch
With % singular Inconsistency II conferred ON HIM
supreme authority over a million of men-the Army
and the immense Civil Service-allOwing the Ma
tiGnd Assembly the right 10 impeach him and his
Ministers, but without providing the necessary
material means Of enforcing that right! Louis NapO-
leon was not slow to take advantage of this mistake.
The Army and the Civil Service were won over to
his interests long before the close of his Presidential
term. and his legal arraignment by a number of
Deputies the ID of December, became practically,
afarce. If leaving the way open TO an abuse OF
power morally jusifes such abuse his apOOgists are
welcome to the argument
The movements If parties during the first three
years Of the Presidency are briefly vet clearly
sketched. We could have wished further light upon
the influences which led to the passage of the law of
MAY 81 1850 by which the electoral franchise was so
limited by the terms of residence to strike 100000
from the list of voters. NJ. T6nOt admits that the
Republicans allowed the law to pass almost without
Dpposition claiming that they would restore ii, by
force of arms if necessary for the Presidential cleo
tion of May, 1852 This very threat one of the
elements of uneasinesS and uncertainty which in
duced large class of the people TO submit to the
later exercise of force and every possible was
made Of it by the secret partsans of the Empire We
think he is right in asserting that the restriction of
the franchise was favored by Louis Napoleon it
was certainly presented by his Ministry. He was,
doubt, willing TO experiment with the Reaction,
especially it easy to avoid the appearance of
cooperation; and he had more to gain than to lose
when, eighteen months later he demandedthe restO.
ration of universal suffrage. great deal of manip
ulation had been accomplished in the mean time
The secret Of Louis NapOloan's apparently contra
dictory course as President simply this: he was
endeavoring 10 preserve his personal popularity.
while quietly consolidating his real power. At first
subseryient TO the National Assembly; then alter
nately hostile and yieding disclaning in public
addresses all idea Of coup deta long before he
ready to attempt one: removing Gen. Neumayer for
the silence of the infantry at Satory, and then
storing him in obedience TO pressure; and finally, in
his message of November, 1850 expressing the most
solemn sentiments of devotion 10 the Constitution,
only two months before the first blow struck by
the dismissal of Changanier-aH these acts are
linked together by thread OF cunning preparation,
which it is easy TO trace. Not less clear are the