The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1870-08-11
VAR TOPICS.
Strategic Importance of Paris-The
Position of Paris In the French Mill
tary System.

Strategic Importance Of Paris-The
Position of Paris In the French Mill
tary System.
A military view of the security OF the French
capital is summarized in the following state.
ment compiled from French journal, which
endeavors to tranquillize the public mind on
that point:
There are four routes, in military point Of
view. which an invading army might adopt in
advancing from Germany upon Paris: ]. By
crossing the French frontier between Stras-
bourr and Luxembourg, and then advancing in
| a direct line on Paris. 2. BY crossing the
| Swiss territory situated below Strasbourg, and
marching by the valleys Of the Seine and Marne
on the capital. g. By movement from the
north, passing the fortress OF Metz and reach
ing Paris by way Of the valleys of the Seine
soil, in a direct southern line through the val
| leys of the Disc and Aisne on Paris.
The first course Is regarded as military i'm
possibility France being protected on the
| east by the great natural defences of the
| yosges Mountains, the Moselle River, the Ar
dennes Mountains and the River Meuse, sup
ported by many fortified places, among which
any speculations which this route may suggest,
we arrive at the second line Of advance toward
the French capital. If in this case the Prus-
slams were to violate the neutrality of Swilzer-
| land and attempt to advance upon Paris from
the southeast, they would find themselves con-
fronted by the fortress Of Lyons, which has
been strengthened and rendered very secure
| since the period of the first Empire. Before
arriving at that point the invading forces would
have to capture either Befont or Langres,
| both of which occupy commanding positions
| on the ground through which an army ad-
YaEcng from Switzerland should pass.
The third route is the most feasible, and con-
sists, in military phrase, OF turning the for
tresses on the northeast frontier, including
Metz, and then by continued successes arriv-
| ing on the River Marne, from whence there is
no formidable obstacle to an advance toward
| the immediate neighborhoOd Of the capital.
But an invading force could not. on account OF
Metz and SCrasbourg. wisely adopt this course.
The French army, if defeated, could take ref
uge in Metz and thence harass the rear of the
invaders, who would be open 10 similar at
tacks from Strasbourg and places ofless impor-
tance. The fourth route, by way of Belgium,
is secured by (lefences which the reVerses Of
1914 proved more imperatvely necessary
The French calculated that even If any enc.
nv should arrive in the vicinity of Paris hel
! fortifcations are practically impregnabe
Thirty wears ago. under the administration Of
| NJ. Thiers these defences were completed, the
project being regarded with especial favor by
Louis Philippe. who took an enthusiastic in.
terest in fortifcations. Another resource is
found in the population OF Paris, now mum
bering 2,00O,0O0, who, By acting in concert
with forces operating in the rear of the inva
ders, might overwhelm them. Such was The
hope Of Napoleon I, but in the altered circum
stances of his time it proved impracticable
The Secret Treaty.
The following Is translation of this nov
| celebrated document:
DRAUGHT TREATY.
His Majesty the King of Prussia and His Ma