The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1870-08-25
THE WAR OF 1870.
,pron, the Saturday Review, August g.
,,r1xfprR III

II.
military plans supposed to be the Emperor ls
sto infict q fresh wound upon DIS morai
charnoter:bu but the circumstances are aoso!uleiy
sosinst IT, However blind Napoleon ~ may
have been to the national feehng OF Soutn
Germany. he never could have dIeamt tnat
mere detachment Of his army marching over
the Rhine without notice would produce such
manifestation in favor OF French pohcy as 70
Give him apy stronghold in the MINOR klng-
doms. His advisers, whether good or oao
strategists, would OF course Know enough OF
the details Of their business to be certain snat
AMY could not be thrown ACROSS the river
within q fortnight. That fortnight, all the
world knew, would allow the Prussans at the
least to be modified By corps. Three OF these
: fthoae mentioned last week as being put under
General Herwarth) we're close to the. .tIenc5
frontier, and seven others {Nos. to Q, ana
Guard Corps) neartr to Berlin tnap siatIa fIe1Ia
suppoaition possible for the French in South
Germsny-cou!d be. Such detacaed army OF
theirs would therefore be opposed by superior
numbers in front, and be liable TO nave its
communications cut by an equal force, II tpe
Prussians chose to 0Verwhelm IL az onee, a5u
rect strategy against France. AS there ID
nothinr in these condi tioDs that was not known
beforehand, and as the widest French po1tl-
clan Vould hardly expect Bavaria aud Murtem-
berg to rise en n,dsse against the bsmaIck
domination which their people have not les
felt, We may conclude that such project oonlo
have only led to the sacrifice, or at least the
ereat danger, OF the French force proposed
FOR it, and that, if conceived, il could never
! have been seriously maintained by military OF
political considerations.
The inaction shown up to yesterday by the
French (Eor the division that attacked sasr-
briicken was plainly only feeling to see how Tar
the Prussians cared to hold that railroad juno
tionl demonstrates clearly in our view that
tha psr was far more, as to it's exact date, o
matter of impulse than many English writer's
have been dispose&sto believe. And, leaving
politics aside, it Is clear that II the emperor
Was well informed, he could not, after the drst
any great success by discounting the brief
time needed by the Prussians to call in their
,eee,,tTiIn and mobilize their thirteen active
corpe, Whilst confessing that We here come
to conjecture, we see no reason at present TO
beEeys that the French viii pass the Rhine
nnfil events Justify that bold step. It is pro-
hebiv considered that the strain OF long de:
fensiye Var would be terribly felt by the North
Gefnrans. who may be said to be overweight.
: ed Tor : prolonged conflict. like the knights OF
chiyalry whose armor was only desl8 ned 10
be worn in the actual shock OF combat. On
ieft bank would. though not supplyin means
to feed large French army, at least give the
Tnone1nr The sclat OF serving out his troops
ti,e1r rstions ir, German villages and wal aiering
their horses in German streams. For the
present, therefore, we shsu be content TO view
French offensive operations as confined to the
Vesi side Of the Rhine, except possibly BY way
Of demonstration.
The little volume lately published BY the
Duke Of Charities on the Rhine battlefield
might have remained unnoticed but for the
politics Of the hour. Like another book, that
on La Guerrs sl Ia Charte, which several OF
of .our contemporaries have been praislng
within the last few days for its timely appear
ance, it was published some months before the
events to which 1t appears to be SO well adapt
ed. II not being within our province to re-
view it here. We shall only say that it offers g
convenient and pleasant HANDBOOK to the mill
itary aspect and history OF the country where IT
is supposed that the hostile armies will meet.
Iayailee has OF course treated OF the same dis
trict. bet his work, useful aB it has been, 80
thoroughly combines the worst faults OF the
Frepchinan and the Professor, is go one-sided,
dopmatic, and, in points telling against
France, 90 untruthful, that the Engllshmen
can never read it without some dlstaste.
That win not be the case with the volume o.
coming from his gifted family, is, both IN
style and subject. worthy OF high authorship:
We puticeit here merely to say that. with all
its interest, very little OF what has passed 10
former wars in that fine Rhine valley known
to modern history as the Palatlne oears In
any way on tho events We are now about to
Illness. It is interesting as military curl
osity to read, especia ly by the light OF Napo-
Icons st. Helena comments, OF the long R-draWn
mapeuyres of Turenne and Montecuculli; but
the most interesting feature in their study 10
the discovery Of their strong resemblance to
the Virgnian campaigns OF 1928, or, carry.
ing the same analogy further, the discovery OF
the explanation vi this resemblance in the
half-sayage condition OF the Palatine, its
swamps, it's woods, it's sparse cultivation in
the dsys of Turenne. The history of war close
" studied is surprisingly faithful index to
the history of the nations concerned, aud the
wars Of Louis XIV, III their main features, re-
Acct the condition II German soil after the
terrible struggle for religious freedom which
wasted her population and resources. But
nnIess that condition could be restored, and
an railroads and roads exce pt very few be re-
moved, the War OF Positions will not be re-
peated. and its annals afford us no guidance
now. Nor are we much helped by the nara
tiyes, picturesque as they appear in the
language OF the Duke OF Charities, which tell
how the ragged troops Of the Revolution won
their way TO the Rhine despite Austrian sabres
and Prusslan platoons. Interesting in them
selves are the details Of the desperate siege
endured az Mayence in l7ss BY the debris OF
who earned for themselves by their endurance
the applause Of the Prussians to whtm they
finally surrendered, and from Frenchnnen the
title Of the Mayencais. But the strategical
lessons which concern our epoch all come later,
and upon examination yield Us but very mod
crate help at the present moment. Those Of
the years 1875 and 1898 only can bear upon the
subject in hand; for in 1900 and 1905 the Rhine
was merely passed by the armies on their way
to campaigns far beyond, as in 1914 by those
that invaded France.
In 1795, the most important year for pur-
poses Of COMPARISON. the defence Of Germany
was Oased, as now, upon the possession OF that
portion OF the Rhine about Mayepce, and the
free passage over 1T through that fortress
which Cler,alt, fine old Austrian general,
held in his hands The Frvno4. had then. in
the double attempt to reduce Mayence and 1--we
on German soil, got theil armfes into three
separate parts-one investing Mayence on the
vest bank, the olher two Operatln, on the
right or east bank from distant points OF pas
sage at Coblentz and Mannheim, and en-
deavoring TO meet between Frankfort and
Darmstadt, 30 as to shut Mayence altogether
in. Their failure to do this. owing to some
MINOR actions about Mannheim, IN which the
Austrians routed the force which vas feeling
its way north, enabled Clerfalt, relieved for
the time from the most pressing danger to his
rear, to take the offensive boldly. Re beat of |
Jo,,rdan to the north Of Frankfort by out
mpppuvrlng him, and, as suon as he saw him
well on his way to Coblentz turned back from
the pursuit, which his ADVANCE guard cleverly