The Middlebury register. [volume] (Middlebury, Vt.) 1850-1882, 1870-03-01

CEDAR CREEK.
The now historic stream which gave it,
name to the remarkable battle which is
the subject of the present chapter is O
shallow, rapid river, perhaps thirty yards
wide, flowing accross the Upper Shenan.
doah Valley just where it debouches into
the Lower Valley, which, it will be re.
membered, from Cedar Greek to the
Potomac unites the width of the Upper
Valley and the Luray. The Shenandoah
here sweeps round the base of the rocky
and precipitous Massannutten mountain
hugging its foot and turning to the east
with sharp right angle, at the very
apex of which it receives the waters Of
Cedar Greek, coming from prolongation
Of the new direction Of the river The
turnpike from Winchester to Staunton
crosses the creek abont mile above its
junction with the Shenandoah Middle
town is two miles this side ofth bridge
Strasburg two miles beyond it. Hills,
pc, haps three hundred feet high, rise
irregularly on each side of the creek.
The army was facing south; General
Crooks command lay on the left of the
turnpike, occupying several hills which
overlook ed the junction fthetwo streams,
their pickets protecting the left flank of
the army, though without watching suf-
ficiently the fords of the rivers. The
18th corps was across the pike on Crooks
right, on other hills along the hither side
of the creek the 9th corps was next in
line, and the last of the infantry Getty's
I'd division, on the extreme right of all,
being refused so that it faced westerly ;
the cavalry corps lay out right and be-
hind us pickets from our division were
four miles from camp, guarding, in con-
nection with the cavalry, the line Of the
creek clear across the valley.
General Wright being now in com
mand of the army, General Ricketts, sue
ceeded to the command Of tho corps
Our position was good one, and, as
far as human foresight could reach, a safe
one, though perhaps too much reliance
was placed on the decentralization of the
enemy In fanking it General Early
adopted Sheridan's tactics at Fishers
Hill, where the same 9Th corps that was
first attacked and routed here. by climb
ing the mountain side, had turned the
line which Early assumed his men could
by no possibility be Hanked. The sue
cessful attack of Early at Cedar Greek
was AZ admirable as our own at Fishers
Hill, and even more audaeious, as it in.
volved the double fording Of rapid river
to commence with, and the certainty OF
complete destruction in case Of failure
1t has always been somewhat Of a
mystery where Early obtained the troops
with which he fought this battle The
previous engagements had cost him fully
twelve thousand men hors du combdt, in.
Guiding prisoners, and as many more III
stragglers. Kershaw's division, however
which had retired through the Lnray Val.
ley, had been recalled, and pegram'.
division had joined him, entire, from
Longstreet's corps The scattered rem
nants of other divisions had been collect.
ed from their hiding places in the forests
and the mountains. 1t is certain, also
that large body estimated by druid
at from twelve to fifteen thousand more
had been raised by the last rentlees con
scription in the vicinity of Gordonsvil,
and Lynchburg. II has been asserted
that many Of these men were without
muskets, hoping to gather arms on the
field in our anticipated rout. Probably
however, but few unarmed men were il
the enemy's lines A letter from Rich
mond 10 paper further south at the tim,
in question says that the force thus con
centrated was good for $4,000 men
and that $4,000 reserves were to be cal
led out. This however, was great,
exaggerated estimate. Sheridan had re
ceived no reenforcements, and we coul,
not have had $4,000 men present 70
duty equipped" including the cavalry
which did nothing until evening Earl,
must have had 10000 infantry at tn
very least. His plan was to attack us il
detail and rout our divisions successivel,
from the left. We shall see that h
succeeded until he reached the last divi
sion in the line, Getty's, which Sheridan
truly says was the only division of tn
infantry which confronted the enem,
from the first attack in the morning unit
the battle was decided"
Every circumstance, save the difficult.
OF the ground, favored Earlys project
The night was utterly dark, the mornin
chilly and raw, ewing to dense fog whic
did net lift until 8 O'Clock, and complete
ly yelled all the movements of the enem
whereas the position Of our camps haC
been previously carefully studied an
mapped By his officers from the SUNNI
Of the three-top mountain Between tn
base OF the mountain and the Shenandoa
river, there was space amid the debri
for wagon road and then dismantle
railroad leading from Strasburg to From
7 Royal. The river was crossed near ths
0 village at dark ON the 18th by the diyi
ions of Gordon. Pegram, and Ramseu
which at once commenced cautiousl
picking their way down the rugged roa
and the railroad, no officer mounted,
the darkness and forest and fog, unit
they reached what is known as Bowman
Ford, outside of Crooks furthest picket
Powell's cavalry division was still inrth,
down the river opposite Front Royal,a
out of reach Had the ford betwee
Crook and Powell been carefully protec
ed, it il probable that the surprise coul
not have taken place. 1t had been SUI
= posed and with great reason, that ol
right was the enemy's only feasible poll
Of approach.
. As the column reached Bowman's Fol
!, il again crossed the breast-high Shena
doah and stole in single file close up
: the fires of our confident outpostr, IN,
=, at 4 A. 1.-the gray battions had de- 10
ed, with Gordon on the right complete
a overlapping Crooks encampmcnt