The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1870-12-29
THE WINTER CAMPAIGN IN
FRANCE.


4 PcTspicUOUs Review.
From ne F-'iia. Month Amcriaqns
Although it is difficult 10 convey to the
general reader, without the aid OF maps
aud u somewhat confusing maze o! names
OF persons and places, q definite idea OF
the movements in the pending campaign IN
in France, yet we can perhaps convey sutii'
Cicnt notion Of the dritlnt events. II must
be understood, however, that we omit all
! details and notice no subsidiary move
mcnts The grand object OF The French
campaign is not torclicyc Paris, rs Is sup.
posed by nOn.miitary readers. 1t is not
desirable at present that the PruSsian
army should be driven aiicld, for then
the French forces would be OycrmatChcd,
the Prussians being superior to them in
numbers and military effectiveness. This
was arranged in advance among the Re
publican leaders, and the plans all pre-.
pared accordingly Strange rs it may
seem to the common reader, the scigc has
been an actual advantage 10 the French.
For within the city is apopulatiOn Of two
millions in which the males prcpOndcrated
and where Il great military force could
be mustered and drilled under the severe
pressure of siege as ii could not in any
other way. All military experience proves
this, soldiers whose discipline has been
tina, of garrison duty being always under
the hardest regulations and the most ri.
icCtivc in the held.
1.-THE reader will always bear this III
3 III 80. Ill. Ina.
Of the meaning Of events in the pending
war The extreme bitterness Of the
French against BaZanc is caused 10y the
fact that they expected him TO accOmp.
! lish ut Metz what they are now Obliged To
achieve for themselves at PariS-that is
to hold the enemy in position and occupy
his attention, while the government arms
the whole country and prepares the mill.
tarv system in better way than it has
been. We are not now arguing on the
French side. We are merely taking the
view n soldier would take OF the matter.
Moltke, Of course, understood all this,
and hence the extreme eagcrneSS with
which he pushes on, and tue huge forces
he used. OF C0use he also understands
the same situation now at Paris, and this
is proven by the TACT that the whole of the
| German reserves Ol the lundwehr have
bccn sent into the field and into France,
some Of them having fallen in the recent
battles, MS Is asccriaincd by the date Of
their muster. As for his capturing Paris
nv any process short Of starvation, he has
known that to be impossible. His siege
batteries are, every one Of them, directly
under tho range Of the Partisan forts, and
cannot and have not been used. To cs.
cape this danger, there has been talk OF
runs OF longer range, and 81 on. But
these are not MOltkc's plans. His gamcis
starvation, and TrOchu knows it so well
that recently he took some German pri-
soncrs through the immense stores Of
provisions, and showed them all and then
released them, that they might tell Moltkc
how soon he could starvc the city.
In the meantime Mollkc tries another
and boldcr game. lie has sent or into
the field every man he could spare and
brought up every man from Germany,
and he is now trying to crush France nj
all points outside OF the city by the sheer
force of numbers. There is no need Of
our repeating details, which all merely
form parts Of this plan OF campaign
What then, do the French answer this
move with ? They have fought eve.
rywhCre galhntly and successfully, Of
course, as far as circumstances would adj.
nit That was to have been expected;
and in so doing they have wasted pre-.
cious German lives that soon tell on the
prodigious armies of Moltke. That is the
first part of their pIan-to fight at all
points, to draw the enemy into pitched
battles and sicgcs, and to wear them out,
Their second point is one universal and
immediate call to arms, All France is
ahcld as well rs all Germany. There are
camps OF instruction everywhere; and the