The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-13

Editorial Opinions Of the Leading Journals
upon Current Topios-CompiIed Every
Day for the Evening Telegraph.
THE TREASURY AND THE GOLD
MARKET

FFOTr " .
Caution is at all times most desirable
quality in Secretary of the Treasury; at the
present moment it is imperatively needed.
Theorize as we may in reference to the
improvement of our national credit, and our
comparative exemption from the immediate
effects Of financial shock in Europe, this at
least is clear-we cannot too carefully
weigh the possible effects of such a shock
upon American finance, nor too carefully
prepare for contingencies which at any mo-
ment may be precpitated upon u.s. The
snake of the gold market is scotched merely,
not killed. as the more sanguine have sup
posed. Whether its capacity for inaicting
future mischief shall be great or small de-
pends in no small degree upon the course
pursued by the Treasury.
The tendency of the Treasury policy first
60 force down, and then to keep down, the
gold premium, has been derived less from the
actual sales of surplus coin than from the
known determination of the Secretary to
thwart the game of the ''bulls' among the
spectators by the use of the coin at his com-
mand The 'bulls" learned that they we're
playing not only against the "bears," but
against the Government, and prudently with
drew from q contest in which the odds were
so decidedly against them. The periodical
sales by order of the Treasury may have
sometimes served to avert slight fluctuations
the result of legitimate banking necessities
but with the will of the officials at Washing
ton understood, the effect upon the gamblers
would probably have been the same, though
actual sales had been few and far between.
All this implies strength the part of the
Treasury. and strength in this case presup-
poses certain accumulation of coin.
We have spoken only of period during
which other causes impaired additional force
to the action OF the Treasury. There has been
no homeward flow of United States bonds: the
movement has been quiet, but always in the
opposite direction. Enormous amounts of
railroad bonds have also been sent to Europe,
SO serving to adjust temporarily the finan-
cial balance, and to keep our gold market
in a condition favorable to decline of the
premium.
The events of the last few days should
satisfy us that these influences, from which
the country has derived much substantial
assistance, are exposed to sudden and serious
disturbance. Say what we may, Wall street
sympathizes with quickened pulsations at the
money centres of Europe With disturbing
forces at work there, we cannot hope to pre-
serve absolute undergraduates here. Mat
ters will exhibit more than ordinary unsettle-
ment if the effect of panic at London, Paris,
or Frankfort be to send hither our Govern
ment bonds, and to close those markets to
the railroad bonds on whose sale there we
rely for aid In arranging mercantile differ
ences between the countries. The Treasury
will then find itself in conflict with influences
less easily controlled than those against which
it has hitherto contended 1t has thus far
sailed in smooth water. It's task will be in
fnitely more arduous if the natural laws of
trade and finance come to the relief of the
spectators.
We speak only of what may happen But
the cautious financier will not overlook con-
tipgencies so fraught with embarrassment
He will SO mould his policy as to be prepared
for them. Now, his first essential is a reserve
of strength. He must have an accumula-
everyday purposes His ability to prevent
violent fluctuations in the gold market aud
to frustrate the plans to which, at such a
time, the spectators will resort, will be, to a
large extent, regulated by the amount of
coin at his command. The knowledge that
it is there, and that in the presence of GER
tain events it will be used to prevent any
great vicissitude, will of itself operate bene-
fcially But no vain display of power will
suffice. The Treasury must be positively
strong in its own resources, or its hold upon
Wall street will indeed be feeble.
This aspect of the subject derives more
urgent importance from the evident inclina-
ton of Congress to sanction a continuance of
the policy which would render any large accu-
mutation of coin impossible. Any financial
legislation that may now be adopted should
have direct reference to the peris and pro-
liabilities of the hour. These seem to us to
suggest the desirableness of a policy which
shall enable the Government in some mea
sure to protect the community from disasters
which may follow the difficulties now arising
on the other side of the sea.