The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-29

RIVAL TACTICS.

~ hlIAAhhI b1SlEmn VI EhCDoAn AM HhhNOh
THE DIFFERENCE IN THEIR TACTICS.
The great Napoleon said 1--WE must change
our tactics every ten years if we would pre-
serve our superiority upon the field of battle"
The French used in the olden time to be re-
markable for their elan, for the ardor of indi-
viduals and regiments-every sergeant felt
that he might become q general. This French
characteristic was specially noted at Solferino
and in the Italian campaign, and it was recog-
nized that the brilliant personality of the sol
diers of the first republic and the first empire
had nothing diminished from the days of
Arcola and Austerlitz. As late rs 1860 Prince
Frederick Charles of Prussia issued "a
Military Memorial, +" and his exalted rank and
subsequent position as commander-in-chief
gave great weight to his Judgment. In this
memorial he asserted that the French had a
certain freedom from routine and an elasti-
CITY of movement which the Prussians would
do we'll to initiate. His military ideal was
the French soldier, the thinking bayonet."
Prussia would conquer France in a war if she
could shake herself free from the routine of
parade, the demands of regulations, and her
system of skirmishing. The first principle
on which the French act is to set aside, as
soon as the army enters the field, the regula-
tions of the barracks. The three points that
should be at once attended to in order to
make the Prussian army capable of conquer
ing that of France are, first, to develop the
military qualities of each individual soldier
earnestly in time of peace; secondly, to give
the army leaders who have a thorough ac-
quaintance with the three principal arms;
and, thirdly, to oppose to the French a more
varied and elastic system of tactics. Colonel
Ferri- Pisani, of the French staff, in the Mont
teur de pArmee of September, 1868, says of
the Prussians:-
orders OF battle become dispersed; the continuity
Of lines is broken up to such an extent that there is
ton Of the movement. We see numerous partial
attacks, executed by battalionS, Authorizations,
there is little or no unity apparent in their move
ments, either in regard to time or space; scarcely
ever an instance OF q manpuvre embracing. more
than two battalions. Moreover, when the plan OF
attack is tolerably clearly designed, it generally
rests on the formation of several columns, isolated,
diverging from each other, starting from points wide
apart, and marching directly upon different points
OF the enemy's position, without a single arrange
ment for concentration among them all.
A reply to Colonel Pisani in the military
journal of Berlin, the MjitarSsche Wochen-
Mdtter, asserts that the reason why single
companies are employed in this isolated man
ner in Prussia is that their captains are expe-
rienced and carefully instructed men, accus-
toned to great responsibility, and to taking
upon themselves the right to act, which is
not allowed among the French, ''who are thus
rendered incapable of adopting the Prussian
tactics, even if they might wish to do SO. ="
1t appears, then, that the conditions of 1860
are reversed; that the routine and parade
ground regularity of the Prussians had been
succeeded by a want of regularity and a want
of arrangement so great as to startle the
French, whose very first principle was sap
posed to be absolutely to set aside at the
outbreak of war the very recollection Of the
parade ground"
1.-THE French, says our Prussian writer, in
the MSitd1Ssche BIattey, "cannot adopt the
Prussian tactics even if they wish. These
tactics require a previous scientific education,
general as we'll as military, which renders the
officers familiar with the great incidents of
war, and which, as a consequence, gives
them the power of deciding rapidly and in
staneously; and this it is impossible to find,
or even to hope for, among a body of officers
where, as in France, the majority have risen
from the ranks" Perhaps q more remarkable
shifting of opinion has never been seen since
the first days of the French revolution.
There can be little doubt that, whereas the
French tactics, which were decidedly in adj
vance of all others in 1853, have not under
gone any striking change since that date,
those of Prussia have been entirely modified.
The perpendicular order-the disposition of
the army in depth rather than in breadth-the
theoretical Prussian formation for attack, is
one of those recommendations which has been
acted upon. The great autumn manouvres,
the improved military educational system, are
part of his recommendation to give the chiefs
of the army an acquaintance with the work
ing of the three arms. Prussia has certainly
taken the lead in the elasticity of her tactics,
which, indeed, were so stretched at times
during 1866 as entirely to lose all semblance
of their normal shape. 1t may or may no,
be that she has gone too far. At all events,
all Europe owes her gratitude for taking the
lead in abolishing that painful and cumbrons
system of drill which she was the first to in
tict upon European armies.
The Prussians employ in the attack what is
known as the perpendicular ORDER" in
which, theoretically, the army is formed in
considerable depth, but on a small front.
The true spirit of this perpendicular order is
thus defined in the last number of the Jour.
nal of tie United Ser0ice Institutions
An advanced guard goes to the front, recon.
n0itres, spreads out, feels the enemy, a5certains
which are really the weak points, and on the princi-
pie OF engaging as many troops as possible, and get.
ting as much out of them as possible, very often en-,
cages in a very severe attack, and very often bears
the brunt of the battle. The main body follows
not necessarily so near as to be involved in the
when the advanced guard has found the weaB
points, 1t may attack with its fresh, unbrekeI
masses upon the points selected, or folio wing out
the system of Hank attack, while the advanced
guard continues its front attack, the main bod
moves round to the flank, and endeavors TO out
guard becomes q feint. Then there is the reserve
the troops OF which should be held In hand by the
commanding general, so that they may be used. /
right moment, or to cover the retreat.
The Prussian battalion on a war footing il
composed of four companies of $50 men. ant
is thus 1000 strong. The French battalion OF
a war footing contains six companies of from
l20 to $50 men, and thus has a mean e~ffectiv,
strength of about 800. The Prussian bat
TALON is thus stronger in the proportion o.
aA.-N a D. Al. :