The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-15

ana on the cOh8t OF NOfJn 0ermAny, comm
ing the German fleet 10 its barbors, attack
ing the coast Notifications, and landing
hostile expeditions. of any suitable points
that may be found. And, in fact, most mag
nifcent naval projects are attributed to
France. Large Prussian forces are to be
kept occupied by harassing coast attacks
nay, French army is to be landed in the
Baltic and march on Berlin, while the Prus-
sian legions on the Rhine are vainly trying
to arrest the onset of the main army of
France. From the first outbreak of the war
such has been the common report of the
daily papers, and it finds good deal of Gre
dence, the French assumption of superiority
imposing itself even more in naval matters
than it did at first with respect to the cam
paign on land. But we confess we are dis
posed to receive with some skeptioism the
accounts of what the French will achieve in
this war at sea- Granting that the German
fleet will be shut up in its ports, it does not
follow that the French navy can inflict any
vital injury on Prussia.
The coast of the rth-German Confedera-
ton to the North Sea is, we believe. almost
too difficult for practical approach. and all
accounts agree that the French will prefer to
operate in the Baltic. Now, our own expert
ence in the Crimean war might have shown
that fleets can be sent to the Baltic without
hurting an enemy much. That sea is not
comfortable one for hostile occupation, nor
are its coasts easily accessible. No doubt the
country against which the French are now
fighting is not the antagonist of 1855, but the
Baltic coast of Prussia is not much more in
viting than that of its northern neighbor,
and its great harbors and coast fortresses-
Kiel, Stralsund, Stettin, Dantzig, Konigsberg
if not fortified like Cronstadt. are at least
strongly fortified, and likely to show some
fight before they are occupied. The
idle promenade of French fleet
in the Baltic is quite conceivable,
assuming that it has nothing
whatever to apprehend from hostile feet;
but "harassing coast attacks, and the reduc-
ton of coast fortresses, however much they
may be INDUCED in, would in no respect be
vital in war like the present. What need
Germany care, if she neglects them all and
manages to win on the Rhine? Such attacks
could be made serious after Prussia was
greatly worsted on the Rhine-if one army
after another was put hOrS de combat, and
the defeated wrecks we're vainly opposing
grand French advance to Berlin; but in such
case they would hardly be needed to put a
diminishing stroke to the campaign, for the
line of the Rhine once gained all Germany is
open to the French. Again, if anything more
than a coast attack is ventured on, if q
serious invasion of Germany is contemplated,
then the task is itself 50 formidable, even if
wholly unopposed by sea, that we confess
to some doubts of the ability of France to
| accomplish it. An army of 100, 900 men at
least would be needed to hold its own, and
| push its way into the interior. under the
necessary condition that the Prussians will
have more than equal numbers to meet it,
while leaving more than equal numbers to
! oppose French troops on the Rhine. Do
people conceive what task it would be to
transport half that number weeks sail from
France and keep them supplied in the face of
an enemy like Prussia? Suppose a good
fortified port on the Baltic to be captured,
which would be an essential condition of sue
cess very difficult to fulfil, where is France to
get the transports? People seldom realize
what such expeditions are. Perhaps forty or
fifty big steamers could carry all the men, but
cavalry, artillery, baggage trains, ammuni-
ton, provisions essential to the very
start of an army in an enemy's country-take
up an immense space.
To transport the English army from the Turk
ish coast to the Crimea-l ess than 80, 600 men,
including only one thousand cavalry, and
without sufficient means for land transport
on arrival-no fewer than 100 large ships
| were necessary. At least four times that
number would be required for afully equipped
army of 100, 900 men, and France has only
400 ships in her marine ogether-fghting
ships, transports, coasting vessels, and every
thing told. The expedition, it is said, will
be conveyed in separate trips, but really such
nonsense should not be talked. No general
would risk an army on a hostile coast without
the means of bringing it all away together;
and if this were not so, how is the expedition
to get footing in country so intersected
by railways as Prussia, unless the landing is
made in full force? We do not predict what
will happen. France may know of some
easily acquired harbor in the Baltic which
can be quickly seized and fortified, may be
able to send an army of invasion there by
degrees, may then advance in such force as
to threaten the heart of Prussia; but the en-
terprise would be perilous in the last degree,
would break down with the least hitch, and
might easily prove calamitous to France, with
Prussian army pushing its way to Paris.
Fancy the commotion in France in that
event, with a large French army in the Baltic
that could only be brought home by degrees.
But if we look more closely into the mat
ter, we doubt whether there is sufficient cause
for leaving the Prussian navy out of account.
There is a great disparity of force, but what
Prussia has got is reputed of excellent
quality, and in the actual circumstances OF
naval warfare we think it is conceivable that
the possibility of having the Prussian fleet on
his hands would affect any projects which the
French naval commander may propose. The
really important parts of the two fleets tc
notice are the iron-clad ships, and under the
condition that the Prussians will be fighting
off their own coasts, the proportion of AZ
French to Prussian iron-clads with which
we started is very seriously affected. Accord
ing to the French official account in the last
annual expose de la Situation de l'Empire,
France has now the following iron-clads il
readiness, or nearly so:-
l. Ships of the first class-armored ships
and frlgateS.