Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-11-23

such alteration of the law as the Legisla-
ture may deem it expedient to make. But
it is not necessary In this opinion to hold,
nor is it intended to be decided, that if the
specific intent to kill the party slain were
shown to exist that defendant might not,
by the placing of obstructiens upon rail-
road track to accomplish that object, be
convicted, upon proper indictment, of
the highest grade of homicide under the
provisions of 5 4, sos of the Code.
The judgment of the Criminal Court
must be arrested, and the prisoner must
be remanded to the custody of the Sheriff
of Greene county, to be held to answer
any new Indictment that may be brought
against him. DEADRRIOE, Judge.
A true copy.
Test: ]. F. DKADERIcK, Clerk.
No 60
william Henderson VS.. Shannon Felker, ct: al
The act of 1885, CHI. 10. Z, extending the time
ofredemptlon, and providing that the time, fIom
the 9Th Of May, 1851, to the LIST of January,
1887, shall not be computed, has no application
TO sales made after its passage.
Case cited, Reynolds VS.. Baker; 9 Cold. 221.
From the Chancery Court at Knoxville,
o. P. Temple, j., presiding.
Geo. Brown for complainant.
E. C. Camp, U. s. Dist. Att, for res
pendent.
OPINION.
We are called upon by the facts in the
record 10 construe ) of ch. 10 of the act
of 1865.
The following are the facts: Shannon
Felker, being judgment creditor of
Samuel B. Henderson, had his execution
levied on Henderson's house and lot, and
at the sale, on the 18th of February, 1866,
became the purchaser; and Cd the 23d of
July, 1868, complainant, VIM. Hender-
son, being also judgment creditor of
Ssm'l B. Henderson, rendered to defend
ant, Felker, the amount of his bid and
interest, and claimed the right to redeem.
Felker refused to receive the amount ten
dered, on the ground that more than two
years had elapsed since the day of SAFE
These facts are alleged by complainant
in his bill, and upon demurrer thereto,
the Chancellor sustained the demurrer
and dismissed the bill; from which de-
cree complainant appealed to this court.
If the act of 1866, oh. 10, s. 4, is con-
strued to embrace sales of land to be
made after its passage, the decree of the
Chancellor in sustaining the demurrer was
erroneous. This is the question to be de-
cided. The act of 1865, ch. 25, is en-
titled Gan act to provide for the Tmita
ton of actions and other purposes" Sec.
provides for the suspension of all stat
utes of limitation, from and after the 9th
of May, 1861, to the LIST of January,
1867, Sec. 2 provides that the statutes
of limitation prescribed in PIT. Ill, Title
], CHI. 2, art. 8, g. 2,7S4, of the Code,
shall be held not to operate from the 9th
of May, 1861, to the LIST of January,
1857. Sec provides for the suspension
of the statute of limitation as to persons
absent or residing out of the State
Sec. is in the following words:
Sec. 4. SIN all cases where real estate
is subject to redemption, as prescribed in
Oh. 5, 2, 1874 to 2,l37, inclusive, of the
Code of Tennessee, the time between the
9th of May, 1861, and the 1st of Janu-
airy, 1867, shall not be held to operate or
be computed, and all persons entitled to
redeem such real estate, shall have six
months from and after the LIST day of jan
uary, 1867, to redeem the same according
to existing laws"
This statute was, manifestly, passed for
the purpose of giving legislative effect to
sec. of the schedule to the amendments
to the Constitution adopted in 1865, in
the following words: Sec. 4. 'No statute
of limitation shall be held to operate from
and after the 9th day of May, 1861, until
such time hereafter as the Legislature
may prescribe"
The public history of the State, from
May 6, 1861, to the passage of the act OF
May 80, 1865, above quoted, furnishes a
satisfactory reason for the adoption of
the 4th 5. of the Schedule, as well as for
the enactment of said statute. The
hardships that would necessarily arise
| from the enforcement of the statutes of
limitations, during period of civil war,
naturally suggested the propriety of sus.
pending their operation, not only during
the time of its continuance, but for q
time beyond that, sufficiently long for
the restoration of civil order and law.
Hence, it was enacted, that the statutes Of
limitation should not operate from May
6, 1851, the practical commencement
of the war, until Jan. /, 1867. Tit
same reason for suspending the operation
of the statutes of limitation, suggested
and enforced the propriety of enlarging
and extending the time, within which
real estate, sold under execution, etc.,
during the existence of the war, nigh
be redeemed. Accordingly, we find the rro,
visions for the relief of both classes OF
hardships contained in the same statute.
But it is well settled that, whilst thu
Legislature might pass laws operating
retrospectively, on the limitation of &C
ton, and extending the time for thei
operation, they could not so legislate a
to rights which were already vested
Hence it has been decided by this cour
that the law giving two years for the re
demption of real estate, was not Law
for the limitation of actions, but law o.
property. From this it follows, and wal
SO held, that the fourth section of th,
act of 1866, c. 10, was unconstitutional
so far as ii undertakes to authorize thi
redemption of land, which was sold NOR
than two years before the passage of thu
act, and which the debtor did not offer h
redeem within two years after the sale.
Cold, 221. Reynolds VS.. Baker. Il
that case, the court make only partia
construction of the section under consid
Grafton. Ii was held that the section wa
intended to have retrospective opera
ton That this holding, as to the retro
speetive character of the ststute, wa
correct, is fully sustained by the proyis
ion, that the limitation should not ope
rate from and after May 9, 1851. Tn