The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-25
Sherman Sustains Him.
GilImOre's Incapacit.y

during Jne OperaIlonS against MOTIFS lSlanu
and Fort Wagner, and afterwards, General Q.
A. Gilmore and the officers under his COM
mand complained that they did not receive
from the navy an efficient support The
blame for this was laid upon Rear-Admiral
Dahlgren, who assumed the command of the
South Atlantic squadron a short time pre-
yious to the attack on Morris Island, and
military incapacity was not the least serious
charge made against him by Gilmore and the
officers of the army. Whether through his
own fault or not, it is certain that Admiral
Dahlgren did not make distinguished repu-
tation by his management of the fleet before
Charleston, and his differences with Gilmore
excited an intense feeling against him in the
army. Il
Admiral Dahlgrens course, whether judi
cious or otherwise, was approved by the
Navy Department, and he was retained in
command of the South Atlantic squadron
until the conclusion of the war. We are not
aware that he ever made any reply whatever
to the accusations of General Gilmore, and
the public have been somewhat in state of
uncertainty as to the exact nature of the
quarrel between the two commanders. The
following account of the naval operations
before Morris Island and Fort Wagner is an
extract from a brief but comprehensive
sketch of the doings of the South Atlantic
squadron while under the command of Rear
Admiral Dahlgren, which was written by the
Admiral short time before his death for the
second edition of Hamerslys "Records Of
the Living Officers of the United States
Navy" This paper was prepared by the
Admiral at the request of Mr.. Hamersly, and
it is interesting not only as a succinct
account of the performances of the navy
during the active operations against Charles
ton but as an answer from the pen of Admi-
raj Dahlgren himself to the accusations made
against him by General Gilmore. 1t will
be seen that the Admiral retorts upon Gill
more with the charge of incapacity, and
according to his own statements the move
ments of the army under that officers COM
mand were O series of blunders from the
beginning, and that they were only saved
from total failure by the efficient support
which the navy gave at all times. This
narrows the issue between the two officers
down to fine point; and if General Gilmore
had any real grounds of complaint against
Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, now is the time for
him to state specifically what they were. The
following is the naval side of the question
according to Dahlgren-
ADMIRAL DAHLGREN TAKES COMMAND.
Rear-Admiral Dahlgren arrived at Port Royal on
the 4h Of July, 1863 and on the 9th relieved Admiral
Dupont OF the command OF the South Atlantic
ra bupoa Sat Gilmore ny aG
very anxious to proceed with some operations
against Morris Island, Admiral Dahlgren immedi-
ately sought an interview with Gilmore and agreed
TO assist IN the reduction OF the island. He might
well have demurred to the instant action required
for he had no instructions from the Navy Depart
ment authorizing him so to do, and the iron-cl ads
were not ready for such service the experience OF
the Ith Of April had shown the necessity of strength
ening the piOthouses and bases OF turrets and the
work was in progress on three at Port Royal, the
THE ATTACK ON MORRIS ISLAND.
Notwithstanding this disadvantage aud that Of
never having seen the locality OF the contemplated
oPeraof t9s % g agreed t %lt999 aesGat3o to
Island. The work was stopped at once on the mon
itors and before daylight on the 9th m OF Jly he day
ready to enter but the General would not be ready
before the next day. II was still dark when the
Admiral's flag was hoisted on board the Kaatsk
and the monitors began to move for the bar. The
land batteries on Folly Island opened fire soon
as there was light enough, and the monitors crossing
the bar were placed in position so as 10 enade the
Rebel batteries that defended the south end OF
shot from our own batteries passed over the lead
ing vessels The effect of the naval fire was quickly
seen to be decisive, and column OF our troops
being landed the Rebels abandoned their works pre-
cipitately and ned in confusion up the island to
Fort Wagner, more than two miles distant The
Admiral followed with the monitors, skirting the
shore, and by o'clock was in position Off Fort
Wagner, as near as the shoalness or the water
would permit opening fire on the work and sus-
tanning IL until O'Clock in the evening excepting
hour for dinner) Notwithstanding the excessive heat
OF the weather. General Gilmore did nothing more
that day nor night than to secure possession OF the
deserted batteries. But next morning note from
him IN pencil announced that ave attempted 10 carry
Fort Wagner by assault this morning and reached the
pGTGpe but the men recoted and Jeu back eith slight
Admiral
tice in advance and thus was prevented from rem
derng any assistance 1t will be perceived that the
precious moments following the defeat OF the enemy
and the capture OF his southern batteries were en-
Lirey lost for II Fort Wagner could have been
carried by assault 1t was on the 10th OF july when
the southern works OF the island had been captured
and the garrison had ned for shelter into Wagner.
The force assigned TO the position had proved in
adequate-no reiRforcements were coming and
none did come through the day, nor were they got
ten there before midnight-the monitors were
abreast or wagner, enhlading its principal front
towards the troops with steady fire. 10 was only
O'Clock in the morning. our troops had been but a
few hours in movement, had met no resistance
worth mentioning, and the distance TO Wagner was
incOnsiderable. 1t was the enemy's weakest mo-
ment and our opportunity that would ever present
itself 10 us as IL did then.
a1LMoREs REASONS FOR NOT TAXING WAGNER.
The reason for this unaccountabe failure is thus
given by General Gilmore: THE heat being n-
tense and the troops exhausted, offensive operations
were suspended for the day." Aud yet, out o
searv II 900 men, it does not appear that more than
6000 or 1000 were employed in the direct attack and
IN the diversion up the Stono. Why the balance
was not pushed forward. or the landing column, aeI
suitable respite and refresnment, is nowhere eX
planned. That General Gilmore did believe assault
10 be practicable is clearly shown by his attemp
next morning. after the garrison mad been reinforcet
and the enemy permitted 10 recover from mis- defeat
unfortunately too, without any notice for naval aid
And thus the beet chance for taking Wagner by al
pt'baDo assault was lost u is tue mat sixty day