The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1870-08-16
rs Il BATTLE IMMINENT?
Won Moltke's Plan of Attnck-The
French Resources.

There are some reasons for believing great
and decisive battle is not 30 imminent as is
now generally supposed. The reasons fof so
thinking may be thus stated. 1t is beyond
question cardinal principle in Prussiau
strategy ID concentrate q superior force before
attack. Thus al Sadowa Won Noltke only ad.
vanced against the 10000 Austrians when, by
the junction OF all his corps, be had 250,00O
Prussians; and at Hasenau, on the 9th inst,
the Crown Prince hurled at least three full
army corps upon McMahon's single corps and
five of DeFailly's division.
Now, as the Prussian army advances into
France and the French retire before it, it ls
evident that the French are necessarily thrown
back closer and closer on their reserves OF all
kinds, while the Prussians are, just IN that
proportion, separated farther and farther from
theirs. To transport achievements to and
concentrate all the troops now at the front in
one position is an easy thing for the French,
as their lines OF communication are shortened,
and work of growing difficulty for the Prus-
sians, as their lines, long enough at first, are
now greatly extended. Moreover, it is to be
borne in mind that while the Prussian army,
when all its reserves and classes are IN, is con-
siderably larger than the French, the French
s,sps Marshal Bazaine has now subject to
his orders close on to 400. 600 men, already
armed, uniformed, 10 camp, ready for service
in all respects, and amply provided with mag
gazines, depots, and so on. The Prusslan
army can hardly BE- as strong as thls. Ihe
forces on foot at the outbreak OF the war We
know did not amount to 400, 600, and 1t ls
doubtful if the bale four weeks since the dec
laration of hostilites have given time enough
to take the reserves from their various ayoca-
tons, uniform, arn aud equip them, put them
in their several organizations, provide the
necessary depots, &c., for their service, and
send them On to the front. II the Austrian
war it tasked the railroad facilities OF Prussia
to the utmost to concentrate 200 0G0 men In
three weeks on the frontiers OF Saxony and
Sl!esis; how unlikely, then, that in twenty-s,x
days she has been able, on the much longer
line leading to Ffance. to concentrate more
than about that nuinber III France. Every
nerve must have been strained to set tie
standing army up 10 the Rhine, aod no chance
TO bring the reserves in has been afforded,
even il we can suppose the brief space of Jour
weeks long enough to tit those reserves for
TRANSPORTATION to the front. But, it may be
argued, If this be 30, why have the Pfussian
forces made so desperate an assault ou the
French nre, broken through IN two places, and
given every sign of being In force enough to
march upon Paris ? The answer is easy.
Prussia is fighting just now an otfensive-deten'
siye fsht-trying to hold the Rhine frontier
till her reserves elm come into action. aud,
that she may hold It, assuming the offensive.
The success Of this policy IN it's offensive aspect
may seem 10 show deliberate purpose to ad-
vance at once; but the great length OF their
present lines OF communication, the convenient
shortening OF the French llnes, and the OBJ
ylous imposslbility of the Prussau reserves
being now ready. are all good reasons tor sup
posing that the Prussian generals are anxious
to gain time. Ii SO, no great battle may be
looked for in some days.