The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-09


sion terrible retribution. This revelation
will of itself inspire moderate counsels; |
while, on the other hand, Germany, If she |
pushed her advantages too far, might be met |
by coalition. France would fight to the last |
against such peace, and difficult as it is
under the conditions of modern life to main |
tain q popular war, the people of France,
with England to draw upon for aid, and half
Europe sympathizing, would be most ter
rible foe. Germany is q nation in the field,
aud docs not want long wars, or wars with |
powers from whom she has received neither
injury nor insult, who indeed, are not indis-
posed to regard her rise as a new aud power
full security for the repose of mankind. There
would always, too, be the risk of the props-
gapdist force which France, as a free Repub-
lie, is certain to exercise, and of that alliance
of Latin races under republican institutions
which Germany, if she is carried too far by
the exulta,ion of triumph, is certain to pre-
cipitste. France, moderately treated, may be
Orleanist Iuthlessly treated, she must be re-
publican; and France republican must be, in
Southern Europe, as a fuse burning down
in an open powder barrel.
There is therefore chance, and, as we
deem more than a chance, that the Emperor
of Germany, if completely and rapidly vic
toTious-for long struggle would embitter
| all sides-may set magnificent example of
magnanimity; may by an effort of tran
| SceDQeDJ SELL OeCAare, as ne mas Oe
| clared, that his enemy is not France, but only
| the Empire; may decline to dismember
| France, and may content himself with the
! full and formal recognition that Germany is
| one, with the glory of a victory beyond all
| precedent with fame which fills the world,
| and the payment of the expenses of the
war; The latter, though not generous
| demand, is not an unfair one,
there being no reason whatever why Rhenish
| conf oh ha
for his own purposes chose to endeavor to
turn him without his own consent into O clti-
zen of France, and 40 reasonable estimate of
those expenses could injure France SO much
as the expenses which will be involved in a
continuance of the war. A treaty of this kind
would not rankle more than the treaty of
1915, while it would leave Germany in mag
nifcent position, mistress of her own desti-
MES, conspicuously unaggressive, but so
powerful that in all regions where
she has pressing interests, as in the
valley of the Danube, her voice would be
almost final; and with full possibility
of an alliance with England which, if it could
be carried out honestly and thor oughly,
would for half century guarantee the peace
of the world. 1t is certain that the neutral
powers will press towards this arrangement,
and it should not be forgotten that they have
in their hands at least one consideration to
offer-namely, Luxembourg, which was Ger
man up to 1866, the King Duke sitting in the
Diet by his representative-which is of the
highest value to Germany, and which would
still retain its autonomy, entering the fede-
ration under new duke, say, Prince Frede-
rick Charles. The Inhabitants, 1t is true,
wish for neutrality; but that is only to avoid
military service, from which they have no
right to be exempt at the expense of other
powers and which the Belgians do not at
tempt to shrk. Luxemburg is not guaran-
teed for itself, but for the general good of
Europe, and as the King-Duke is willing to
give up his rights, such as they are, the qua
rantors may, for the general good of Europe,
withdraw from their position, and
replace Luxemburg in her recent
place as one of the States of Germany.
There is one point in all the discussion or
the terms of peace which, we confess greatly
perplexes us. 1t is repeated on all hands,
in Germany, in Paris, and in England, that
King William insists upon securing some
guarantee other than his victories against q
! renewal of the recent attack. This guarantee,
it is clear from all published statements is
not to be territory, which, unless taken on
an enormous scale, would be no guarantee al
ALL but change of some kind in the inter
nal organization of France; and it is difficult
to see what that change is to be. Is France
to pledge herself, as Prussia once did, to
, keep her army below a certain fixed point
, repetition of Hardenberg's plan, an army ap
, parently below the strength fixed, bu
necessarily changed until ever,
man in the country has passed
through the military MILL and France woulC
be better armed than she is now. Or il
4 France to abolish the conscription? That
l no doubt, would be subtle, and, it Nigh
Q be, terrible blow at her power, for it would
!, delight the peasantry, and if they were ex
t empted for five years, it may be doubted i
o any Government would be able, in the teetl
It alike of the German armies and its own sub
/, jects, to reimpose so terrible burden. Th
. result would be to compel France to adop
y the Swiss system of defense; but there i
still a question whether that system, abl
) managed by Ministry at the head of a will
/ ing people, and welding the resources of
o country like France, might not be made a
D any moment a terrible weapon of offense
b The Germans may have some third plal
# of which we have no conception, bu
v any interference with internal law
It tends to make war inevitable, and German
d needs no guarantee beyond her own strength
@ now consolidated, manifested past all doubt
n and increasing with every decade We ar
# not blind to the grand danger which he
- statesmen see ahead, that whenever en-
J. gagged in the war with Russia, which, soone
? or later, is inevitable, France, in revenge TO
q 1870, may, in American phrase, Jump upoi
y her back" but that danger will be increased
# not diminished, by clause in the treaty
= which every Frenchman would feel, an
IS rightly feel, to be an atfront TO her indepen
T depce.
4 SPECIAL NOTICES.