Watertown republican. [volume] (Watertown, Wis.) 1860-1906, 1870-08-24
The Approaches TO ParIs.-Its Strategic
Position and Security.

The Approaches TO ParIS.-Its Strategic
Position and Security.
A military view of the security of the
French capital is summarized in the fol-
lowing statement compiled from a French
journal, which endeavors to tranquilize the
public mind on that point:
There are four routes, in a military point
of view, which an invading army might
adopt ia advancing from Germany upon
Paris:-1. By crossing the French frontier
between Strasbourg and Luxembourg, and
then advancing IN direct line on Paris. g.
By crossing the Swiss territory situated
! below Strasbourg, and marching by the
valleys of the Seine and Marne on the capi-
tai. 3. By movement from the north,
passing the fortress of Metz, and reaching
Paris by way of the valleys of the Seine and
Marine. 4. By advancing through Belgian
soil, in direct southern line through the
valleys of the Disc and Aisne on Paris
The first course is regarded as military
impossibility. France being protected on
the East by the great natural defenses of
! the Vosges Mountains, the Moseile river,
! the Ardennes Mountains, and the river
| Mense, supported by many fortifi, places,
among which is the stronghold of Metz.
Dismissing then any speculations which
this route may suggest, we arrive at the
second line of advance toward the French
| Capital. II in this case the Prussians were
to violate the neutrality of Switzerland and
attempt to advance upon Paris from the
| southeast, they would find themselves con
fronted by the fortress of Lyons, which
has been strengthened and rendered very
secure since the period of the first Empir e.
Before arriving at that point the invading
forces would have to capture either Bel
/ ont np hot 81 l.
occupy commanding positions on the
ground through which an army adj
vancing from Switzerland should pass.
The third route is the most feasible, and
consists in military phrase, of turning the
fortresses on the northeast frontier, includ-
ing Metz, and then by continued successes
arriving at the river Marne from whence
there is no formidable obstacle to an ad-
vance toward the immediate neighborhood
of the capital. But an invading force
could not, on account of Metz and Stras-
bourg, wisely adopt this course. The
French army, if defeated, could take refuge
in Metz and thence harrass the rear of the
invaders, who would be open to similar
attacks from StrasboUrg and places of less
importance. The fourth route by way OF
Belgium, is secured by defences which the
reverses of 1914 proved most imperatiyely
necessary.
The French calculated that even if an
enemy should arrive in the vicinity of Paris
her Notifications are impregnable.
Thirty years ago, under the administration
Of NJ. TIMERS, these defenses were complet-
ed, the project being regarded with special
favor by Louis Philippe, who took an en-
thusiastic interest in Notifications Another
resource is found in the population of
Paris, now numbering 2,0000 600, who, by
acting in concert, with forces operating III
the rear of the invaders, might overwhelm
| them. Such was the hope OF Napoleon l.,
but in the altered circumstance of his time
it proved imnracticahle