The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-04-01
Good Taste.
ON Snti,rdnn Repfeir.


From, the London Saturday Re0tew
An aphorism has been for some time going
about the world, which, like most other
aphorisms, is palpably false, or we should
rather say, palpably incomplete asserting the
impropriety of disputing about tastes. 1t
has, of course, superficial plausibility, or it
would not have attained so extensive cur
rency. When one person says, 81 like my
meat half raw" and another says, II like
mine roasted to rag, there is apparently
no further room for argument. Each con-
troversialist relies upon the testimony of his
own palate, and of that testimony no one,
by the necessity of the case, can be a
sufficient judge except himself. Yet the
doctrine inferred is in open conflict
with our daily experience. Civilized beings
are, as a rule, rather unwilling to talk at
great length about such strictly sensual
pleasures as those of eating and drinking
Yet in certain places where the instincts of
the male animal are not kept in check by the
refining influences of feminine society-such,
for example, as regimental messes, college,
halls, and club coffee ee-rooms-there are few
topics discussed with more eagerness than the
merits of wines and cookery. According to
the popular doctrine, such discussions ought
to come to a speedy termination. When one
man has confessed that he likes public-house
port, black and sweet and strong and capable
Vi luJOAlCuIlOu dJ u Oh
time and expenditure, and another has asserted
his possession of more refined tastes, there
should be no more to be said.
The final appeal has been made, and there
is no way of bringing the question again into
court. Experience, however, shows that few
men, even of most undoubted moral courage,
will dare to make such an assertion as we
have just mentioned. Most men would be
far more willing to admit that they were reli-
gious or political heretics than to confess to a
perverted taste in regard to wine, and would
be almost as willing to admit that they were
inclined to some moral depravity. 1t is
fact, therefore, that even in such matters
where, as one might have thought, the in
huence OF authority would be reduced to
minimum, and the competence of each mans
own consciousness unreservedly admitted
there is body of accepted doctrine, and that
there are as great varieties of skill and judg-
ment as in questions which by common con
sent are capable of being brought to some de-
cisive test.
In fact we might, with some degree of
plausibility, reverse the ordinary doctrine.
We might say that matters of taste are pre-
cisely those on which any amount of discus
sion may fairly take place. There is not
much use in arguing mathematical ques-
tion; because one man is absolutely right
and another is absolutely wrong and the
properly speaking, upon argument, but
upon unravelling some confusion of ideas.
But where taste is in some way involved,
there is always room for comparing O great
variety of views, and for turning a subject
about in different lights until its true bear
ings become evident.
The logic of the question is worth little
examination, because it applies to matters of
much more importance than those in which
4l,a &c koc4 ~, &c
is principally concerned. In most discussions
about art, for example, we are met by SINH
lar perplexity. One man likes Raffaelle,
another has q distinct preference for Hogarth;
is 1t matter of right or wrong, or is it
perfectly open question, to be settled ulti-
mately by counting heads? Most people
would revolt from the last conclusion, and
yet they have a certain difficulty in seeing
their way to the first We may talk about
the eternal and immutable princi pies of the
beautiful, and declare that failure to per-
ceive them indicates sheer stupidity and
bluntness of the perceptive faculties.
But then the difficulty occurs which pre-
sents itself in discussions about morality.
The assertion that certain principles are
everlastingly true is very convenient, and
would save much trouble if it were accepted.
But does it mean more than that the man
who makes the assertion is right, and that his
adversary Is WronBE Wnen we apply 1T to
questions if there are any such questions, on
which we are all agreed, it is superfuous.
When we apply it to disputed questions, the
very fact that there is a dispute is a sufficient
answer. We are all agreed that it is wrong
to commit murder; and therefore, for prac-
tieal purposes, it does not much matter
whether we know that it is wrong by a direct
intuition or by process of observation and
| reasoning. But when we come to a more
| doubtful point, such as the comparative
| merits of an ascetic or a utilitarian school of
morality, our intuitions do not help us out,
because they appear to tell in opposite direc-
| tions.
This is the case in most matters of art; one
mans consciousness tells him that certain
picture is beautiful, and another mans that it
is ugly; which is right, and who is to be
| Judge? There is not even claimant to in
fallibility upon such matters, and apparently
we are landed in hopeless and diametrical
contradiction of opinion. Yet, if we give up
these everlasting and intuitive principles, we
apparently come to the equally awkward con-
clusion that every man is his own Pope, or,
in other words, that there is no right or
wrong in the matter. The admirer of Mozart
is on the same level with the admirer of the
popular melodies of the music halls, and all
tat can be said is that anything which
pleses anybody is so far good, and the more
1t phases the better. We have at best the
old dt>trine of the greatest happiness of tho
greAtes number, which would apparently
sanction my art, however vulgar and often
gIx ha ~ Il.