The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-06
THE CATASTROPHE AT SEDAN.

From the N. Y. Sun.
When, instead of retreating toward Paris,
Marshal MacMahon marched northeast from
Chalons, every man of military experience
anticipated Just what has happened to him.
1t is true, probably, that he only obeyed a
positive order from Marshal Bazaine, the
commander chief but after that order
had been given communication with Bazaine
was cut off, and all the circumstances of the
situation were changed. MacMahon should
have known that it was impossible for him.
with his force of only one hundred thousand
solid troops, to extricate Bazaine, surrounded
by two hundred thousand, while Prince
Frederick Williams army of two hundred
and fifty thousand lay in the valley of the
Aube, and the Grown Prince of Saxony, with
eighty thousand more, was on the upper
waters of the Aisne. 1t is true the Prussians
were making great show of rapidly march
ing against Paris; but general fit to lead
where o country is to be saved would have
understood that Paris would not be worth half
so much either to France or Prussia as the
army under his orders; and he would never
have been caught in that trap which has now
closed upon the Marshal, his army, the EN-
peror, and the empire all together. In all
the Incompatible succession of blunders COM
posing the catalogue of French operations
since the beginning of the campaign, this of
MacMahon's is the most fatal. 1t proves
that, however good as q fighter, he is as bad
a strategist as either the Emperor, Marshal
Lebsuf, or Marshal Bazaine; and beyond
that language does not go.
The capture of MacMahons army has been
effected by means substantially the same as
his defeat at Haguenau, and the defeat aud
imprisonment of Bazaine at Metz In each
case the Prussans have won 10y greater
rapidity of movement, superior numbers,
fob
That is the whole mystery. MacMahon had
hundred thousand men or thereabouts
whom he could rely upon, besides from thirty
to fifty thousand whom he did not dare to
bring into action, while Won Moltke had two
hundred and fifty thousand, all experienced
soldiers. Against such an enemy only supe-
rior genius could successfully contend; but
when the superiority is on the other side, the
case becomes doubly hopeless. The battle
field was also unfavorable to the French, and
their only line of retreat led into Belgium.
When the hills that environ Sedan were taken
from them, and they were surrounded on
every side, surrender was their only course.
An army shut up under the walls of Metz can
hold ont for days or weeks, and repel assault
as long as its provisions last; but an army
shut up at Sedan is at the mercy of the
enemy, who, from the neighboring heights,
can destroy it at leisure, almost without suf-
feriDg any injury in return.
With the surrender of MacMabon the last
disciplined troops of France are gone, and
for the time she is at the mercy of the Ger
mans. She has other men under arms, four
or five hundred thousand, all brave and yea
lous. But at present they are as useless as
that considerable portion of MacMahons
army which he dared not lead into battle. 1t
will require at least six months to make
these men effective fighters. No doubt the
patriotic spirit of France will ardently desire
to continue the war. 1t is but justice to say
that as yet no other wish or purpose has been
manifested in all the nation. But common
sense must after all decide; and the prescrip-
tion of common sense is to submit to the
hard necessity, and to make peace on the best
attainable terms. That will probably soon
be the judgment of the men into whose
hands the government of France will fall. 1t
is possible that the more desperate and
heroic alternative may be adopted by the
French people; but it is more likely that the
conclusion of peace at an early day will
leave Europe at liberty to pursue that new
course of development which the war has
commenced.
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