Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1870-05-13
FINANCE AND TRADE.
OFFICE OF THE DAILY APPEAL,1
MEMPHIS, May II, 1870.
FTNANCR

We have no very material change to
note in local finances except that the in
creased offerings and large supply of ex-
change has caused some weakening in the
selling rate, which is somewhat irregular,
ranging from = to = premium. The de-
mand for money continues active, and
prompt customers are accommodated at
the regular rate.
There is some improvement in City
Bonds, or at least there is a better de-
mand for them, but no sales that we could
learn Of. Dealers would, we think, pay
44c. Memphis and Charleston stock is
also better; 4lc was refused for a lot to-
day.
County Warrants are weaker; nc only
was bid by dealers to-day, with light
transactions. City Scrip and Tennessee
money are unchanged, with a small de-
mand for either.
Dealers buy gold at 1l4@1l4k in small
amount and sell at l15G1l5Lc.
An important suit has inst been decided
in the Supreme Court Of Missouri by
Judge Carrier, the other Judges concur
ring. The Court decides that a collecting
agent has no authority to indorse for his
employers:
In the Supreme Court of Missouri,
March term, lS70.-Henry B. Graham, ct
al. res, VS.. The United States Savings In
stitution, appellant. Appeal from 81.
Louis Circuit Court.
OF THE COURT.
This suit is brought to recover the
amoun OF two checks, which were drawn
on h defendants by third parties in IA
vor of the plaintiffs, and made payable to
their order. The drawers delivered the
checks to the plaintig's collecting agent,
one Dixon, in settlement of certain bills
which the latter had in charge for col
lecting, being bills due from the drawers
of the checks TO the plaintiffs. Dixon in
dorsed the PLAINTIFFS firm name upon the
checks and presented them at the bank
and drew the money upon them. which
he seems to have appropriated to brown
use without rendering any account
thereof TO the plaintiffs. Thus far there
appears 10 be no serious controversy o
the facts.
If Dixon had authority, general or spe-
cial, to indOrse the checks In the manne
stated, or the defendants were authorized
to pay them without the personal indOrse-
ment Of the plaintiffs, it is not commended
tina defendants would be liable in this ac-
ton.
The verdict ofthe Jury, however, mega
tives the suppositiOn of the existence of
any such express authority. The de-
PENDANTS nevertheless undertake to de-
duce the authority from the nature and
character of Dixon's general agency in
making collections and the transaction of
business in behalf of plaintiffs. Their
chief complaint of the action of the Court
below is founded upon the refusal of the
Court TO give the following instructions,
namely: If the jury believe from the
evidence that Charles Dickson was at the
time stated in the petition, the clerk and
collector Of the plaintiffs, and that as
such, he received from the plaintiffs
among other accounts for collection, two.
accounts against Kramer and 10th,
and one against Effort and Petring, and
that he was fully authorized and en-
powered to receive payment Of and re-
ceipt said bills or accounts, and that, in
pursuance of his duties and authority, he
received in payment of said accounts the
checks set u in the petition, and after
ward collected the money on said checks,
from draft, in accordance with his au-
thority TO collect said accounts, that they
will ind for this defendant"
The logic of this instruction is that
Dixon was authorized TO indOrse and col
lect the checks, since he was authorized
to receive them in lieu of cash in pay
ment OF the bills he held for collection.
The deduction is a 0 Seq1i5Hr. The
check required the bank to pay the sums
therein specified to such person as the
payees might direct. But b payees
never directed payment to be made to any
one unless Dixon was their agent for that
purpose; and such agency is not inferra-
bic from the mere fact that he was their
agent In efecting the collection, nor from
ali the facts recited in the instruction.
His primary duty was to collect the bills,
not the checks given in sdj ustment OF b
bills.
The question presented is purely one OF
agency. Was Dixon the plaintiff 8 agent
to indorse negotiable paper given in set
Element of debts due TO his e~mployees2
He was then agent to adjust such claims
and receive the amounts due upon them,
snd to do those subordinate and inclden-
tai things usual and customary in the ac-
complishment of the main purpose had in
view, to-wit, the collection. That main
purpose had been accomplished when he
received the checks, payable to his prin-
cipals. His duties as a collector ceased at
that point. His next duty was to account
with his employers Tor the proceeds OF his
collection and turn over the checks to
them, 10 be disposed of as they might
Judge proper.
The Endorsement of the checks was no
necessary incident ofIhe collection Of the
accounts. The instruction was, in my
opinion, properly refused, so was the de
feudant's second instruction. 1t travelled
out of the issues made by the pleadings.
At the instance of the defendants, the
Co. directed the jury to find for them
in case they found from the evidence that
Dixon was authorized to collect and re-
ceive payment Of checks, payable to plain
tifs at the time the checks in question
were presented and paid. This fairly pre-
scented the real point in controversy, and
in the form selected by the defendants
council.
The Judgment will be affirmed.