Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1870-08-16

against enemies little accustomed Il
drill, because they are usually braver ant
more enterprising On the. contrary
when engaged against regular troop
they fight as skirmishers and withou
order
| 4. An essential principle with thu
French, one indeed that they have con
stantly adopted in these last cam
paigns, is never to defend themselves il
a passive manner, but to act constant,
on the offensive, even when it is only for
the purpose of defensive operations.
think this defensive activity, pushed Il
excess, as we now see it in the French
may be charged to Marshal Bugeaud
We must do our best to raise the mora
force of our own men, and to depresi
that of the enemy. To this end we mus
never wait for attack at the decisive mo
ment, but always seize on the defensive
Attacking movements in flank or rear
even if executed only by handful Of
men, produce an extraordinary mora
impression These lines contain not
only the advice for offensive de
fenses, but the means of resist
ing attack; that is, not front to
front, but as in cavalry tactics front to
flank. | recall, in this respect, the
words of the great King (Frederick)
''The cavalry officer who permits himself
to be attacked by the enemy, instead OF
himself making the attack, ought to be
broken cum infdmid, for Prussian cav
airy ought always to be first in attack. "
This precept, which contains the whole
precept of chivalric spirit, must be
modified in reference to infantry.
Still, at the precise moment we
must advance to meet the enemy,
and not await his, attack. Events
will decide special policy, as, for in
stance, when it would be imprudent to
abandon an advantageous position to
take the offensive. By continued attack
the French, who would fight on a field
with less cover than those of the Italian
campaign, would sustain greater losses.
But if permitted to act with impunity,
they would end by gaining their object
The French soldiers know that in attack
the chances of death are diminished as
they approach the enemy, for the nearer
the enemy is the more rapid the loading
and firing, and the worse the aim. If
the French are attacked in column their
skirmishers spread out and fall back.
The French line closes up. The attack
ing column, which sees the effect of its
advance, still marches on. But speedily
the skirmishers deploy again. One or
two columns advance. The skirmishers
envelope the enemy on three sides. His
attack slackens. Time is lost he can
not retire-he must fight. The French
are ordered in such case not to kill, but
to make prisoners, because while they
are killing one they may take half a
dozen.
5. The French idea in employment of
skirmishers seems to me particularly in
teresting. lis that Skirmishing is but
an expedient (Letirdillemem nest
qu'un pis aller). This mode of fighting
being only loss of time and never de-
cisive is only to be used when it can be
done with freedom. 1t never should be
forced by the enemy, for not his plans
should be forced on us, but ours on
him. This is the real moral supremacy.
The enemy's skirmisning line should not
be opposed by our skirmishing line that
is loss of men and time. Skirmishers.
must act against the flank Better still,
however, is it to repel such an attack to
send in a squadron at charge, and with
out firing to break the opposing line
6. We must pay special attention to
the French attack to that spirit which is
peculiar to them, and which Caesar him.
self has remarked. He considered their
first burst as the most dangerous and
each successive one less imposing. The
vehemence of attack
THE FRENCH FURY
of the wars of the revolution, is to this
day national characteristic. The
French have the habit, in beginning
fight to sound the enemy's line, and so
to take an account of his forces and
their disposal. They have recourse to
partial attacks which seek to penetrate
to the point whose possession is deemed
useful. If these are not Immediately
successful they wait until the support
come up. In Italy, however, they
changed this opening, and by throw
ing out heavy skirmishiDg parties,
and at the same time charging in column.
In this way, at Solterino, they surprised
the Anstrians just as they were forming
for the march after their dinner. The
videttes were driven in without firing a
shot. The outposts fell back and then
the fight began The French had ground
of their own choice, besides the moral
effect of a surprise. This instance
proves how they accommodate them
selves to circumstances The French
habituaily employ their best men. The
corps detite are composed of picked
men, whose ambition is excited and
whose places ever can be supplied by |
those who are emulous of their consider
alton. They march in the front ranks
and thus maintain the French suprem-
acy, and make subsequent work
easier for the less reliable troops. |
1t is . theory that, Immediately |
an attack is decided upon, it
cannot be made too promptly, The
firing is prolonged as little as possible,
and in the Italian war the musketry |
would last quarter Of an hour before
the bayonet was brought into use. The
French attack at the double quick, in
which they are well drilled in time of
peace, so that they do not lose their
breath by the time they come up with
the Iesnemy, Armand says, in writing to
his wife from The primeqi THE English
attacked some strong redogbfs ana lost
more men then we did My bravo boys
run, Khile the Englishmen are satisfied
to walk The FIRST assault being thus
al the double, the sicirmiskcrs advance
without firing until they get within 400
go "a .he ensmy-the columns are
up behIad lhem, This impetu-