The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-09-12

Metz, and their retention as assurances OF
frontier safety, would have been accepted as
q prudent and not immoderate proceeding.
II, in addition to either of these conditions,
Germany had demanded pecuniary compen-
sation for the cost of the campaign, few out
of France would have deemed the demand
extortionate, or, in its nature, unjust
How far are these considerations affected
by the altered position of Frsnce2 The Pro-
visisnal Government declares that the policy
of the Republic is peace, and is understood,
as an evidence of its sincerity, to be willing
to reduce the military and naval establish
ments to peace standard. The expression
of the purpose is, no doubt, much easier than
its realization-and in the meantime 1t must
be token for what it is worth. We may
further assume that the republic would con-
sent to pay as indemnity any sum not inor-
dinately extravagant. But the relinquish-
ment of fortresses and territory implies a
degree of national humiliation to which the
government dare not be oonsenting party.
On either side the republic is beset with
danger If it be required to submit to terri
torial sacrifices, it is in jeopardy from the re-
sentiment of the French people, who may not
discriminate as to responsibility between the
Empire that is gone and the Republic that
exists. If, impelled by sense of what is
due to the pride of its people, it resolves to
co ntinue the struggle, in spite of the over
whelming odds that are against it, nothing
but some sudden and marvellous turn of for
tune can save it from destruction. Its only
hope of life rests upon peace. And the pro-
liabilities of peace are measured by the gene
rosity of King Williams nature and the mo-
deration of his counsellors.
We should have greater expectations of
magnanimity on the part of the King if the
new France were aught else than republic.
To royalty, republican institutions are not
usually objects of admiration. We rely more
on the sagacity of Bismarck and the pruden-
tial suggestions of other advisers. They are
not likely to overlook the democratic element
that runs through Germany, or the odium
that would follow war of destruction-begun
against an Emperor-continued against re-
public. Nor can successive military triumphs
blind them to the possibilities which are al
ways hidden behind war. The German
armies are not prepared for an indefinite
continuance of the hardships they have
endured, or the climatic vicissitudes
incident to the season. There is a
report that cholera has already appeared
among them, and against enemies of that
sort even the wondrous strategy of Won
Moltke cannot adequately provide. Besides,
delay makes complications possible. A dis
position to crush France-and an attempt to
exact impossible terms would be equivalent
to an attempt to destroy the nation-may
rouse other powers to the necessity of making
common cause with the republic. The rumor
which ascribes to Russia willingness to en-
tertain the idea of an alliance is probably
premature, but, at least, it implies nothing
essentially unlikely. And Bismarck is too
wise to despise these contingencies. He
knows that it is not the interest of United
Germany to make of Europe common
enemy.
formal Conpress for the settlement of
the territorial question is an alternative which
France can accept only as last resort. 1t is
Objectionable more by reason of danger to
the Republic than to the boundaries of
France. In such body, moreover, this
could play no part. The only Government
in the world on which republican France
should be able instintively to rely, would be
powerless in the adjudication of its fate. The
fact should stimulate President Grant to the
prompt exercise of all the influence he car
command as a mediator in the cause OF
humanity and freedom