The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1870-08-10
stragelic Importance OF pnri.

THE POSITION OF PARIS IN THE FRENCH MIL
ITARY SYSTEM
A military view of the security of the French
Capital is summarized in the following state.
ment compiled from French journal, which
endeavors to tranquilize the public mind on
that points
Ihere are four routes, i'm military point of
view, which an invading army might adopt in
advancing from Germanysupon Paris: 1. By
crossing the French frontier between Stras-
purg and Auxemburg, and then advancing in
airect line upon Paris. 2. By crossing the
Swiss territory situated below Strasburg, aud
marching by the valley of the Seine and Marine
on the capital. .. By movement from the
North, passing the fortress of Metz, and reach
ing Parls by way of the valleys of Seine and
Marine. 4 by advancing through Belgian
soil, IN direct southern line through the val
leys of Disc and Aisne on Paris.
Inc hrst course is regarded as military inn
possiplity, France Being protected on the east
" the great natural defences of the Vosges
mOuntains, the Moselle river, the Ardepnes
mountains and the river Meuse, supported by
many 1orhhed places, among which is the
stronghold of Metz. Diminishing, then, any
specuations which this route may suggest, we
arrive at the second line of advance toward
the French capital. Ii in this case the Prus-
SLAMS were to violate the neutrality of Switzer-
lana and attempt to advarc roe upon Paris from
the southeast, they would find themselves con-
fronted by the fortress of Lyons which has
been strengthened and rendered very secure
SINCE the period of the first empire. Before
arriving at that point the invading forces would
nave to capture either Befont or Langres,
both OF which occupy commanding positions
on the ground through which an army advance
nag from Switzerland should pass.
The third route is the most feasible, and con-
slsts, IN military phrase, OF turning the fort
resses on the northeast frontier, including
Metz and then by continued successes arriv,
ing on the river Marine, from whence there is
no formidable obstacle to an advance toward
the immediate neighborhood OF the capitaI.
But an invading force could not on acconnt nj
Metz and Strasbonrg, wisely adopt this course.
The French army if defeated, could take re-
fuge in Metz, and thence harass the rear of the
invaders, who would be open 10 similar At
tacks from Strasbourg and places of less i'm
portance. The fourth route by way of BeIoi
um, is secured by the defences which the Re-
verses of 1914 proved more imperativeIy nee
essary.
The French calculated that even il an enemy
should arrive IN the vicinity of Paris her forli-
cations are practically impregnable. Thirty
years ago, under the administration of Nj,
THEIRS, these defences were completed, the
project being regarded with special favor by
Louis Philippe, who took an enthusiastic in
terest in Notifications. Another resource is
found in the population of Paris, now number
ing 2'ooO GOO, who, by acting with forces oper-
az. IN the rear of the invaders, might over
Wheln them. Such was the hone of Napo]eon
T. out IN the altered circumstances of his time
IL proved imDractieahla " " ''o