Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-09-18
GEN. BEAUREGARD ON THE
WAR. a L.-.
The EX-COnfederateS Soldier In
terViewed.
why the French We've whipped
Fatal Errors i'm Attack-An OPln-
ion OF Napoleon and TrOchu.

HeOUOL1cCJl, Writing HUN Au0SaHg
Springs, Virginia, relates a conversation
with Gen. Beauregard about the war in
Europe. Some of the Generals views
are of interest:
The question was ask ed: What is the
matter with France2 Consider her for
mer military fame, that of the first war
ing nation in Europe-consider her pa
triotism, the devotion and readiness with
which she went to the field, her noble,
unsurpassed postponement of every politI-
cal question, Ofevery faction in her legisla-
tive body to win'the safety of her country,
even the '1mpractica5lesn like Favre and
Theirs shouting resistance to the
DEATH" Look at her ready and
even excessive loans to the Gov
Government; her public spirit risen to
height that disdains all compromises and
hurries to offer all possible sacrifices.
Then why her defeat, and her defeat con-
tinued and aggravated on every field2
Why succession of disasters? Is it not
possible that there may have been
treachery in the French camp, as when
the Emperor is reported to have made the
exclamation that che was betrayed. -
and indeed you noticed the last accounts,
''the French soldiers in Belgium turned
upon their officers and mastered theml !"
CAUSE OF THE FRENCH FAILURE.
Gen. BeauTegard replied at length, and
with a clcarness and detail of converse
ton hat do not pretend to report, but
in the third and distant person. The
hypothesis that had been named, the sus-
picions of treachery, or of gross incom-
potency thrown on particular French
officers were possible; but they were not
necessary TO answer the problem of the
French defeat. After all, it might be
found in slight causes. War, modern
war, had got TO be such an elaborate
competition, one 50 close and exscting,
that the least shade of superiority in any
one respect might incline the balance
The French system of attack was ira
ditional one they relied on momentum,
dash. He referred to an article in
the Pail Mall Gazette which
compared the military systems and
practice on the field of France and
Prussia The latter had the advantage in
the close aud scrIpulous circulation of
everything calculated TO give advantage
to he single soldier acting as a combat
ant, and inspired with the idea that on his
individual effort depended the fortune of
the field. Here was q government that
had studied the military efficiency of the
man almost exclusively, to the highest
point. A government more eXaCting than
the Oriental despostism; but more intel
ligent than these. The whole society of
Prussia was vast, elaborate organization,
a camp; the supreme idea everywhere
visible that the man belonged to the gov
ernment. Form, severity was the feature
Other civilization; populare1ucation was
enforced; even its social industries were
organized; in Prussia no man could pursue
q trade unless he had served an appren-
ticeship, or performed certain public con-
ditions. The idea of the great Frederick
had been constantly cultivated since his
time, to make a nation of soldiers; organ
ization and discipline in every department
of life; and to-day we see its results in the
most perfectly trained armies soldiers
the most Obedient, yet enthusiastic, hav-
ing that peculiar combination of steadi-
ness with spirit, that makes the best
soldiers in the woodland that is the end,
the elimination of all military education.
ATTACKING IN CLOSE COLUMN.
'Who''-and Gen. Beauregard spoke
with q suffused face-''cOuld doubt the
courage of the French sOldierl TIE
bravest people in the world may fall I'M
der the complications of science-the
force of a single fact overlooked in the
grand and elaborate competition of wal"
He had noticed, as far as anything could
be discovered from the confused dis
patches of the newspapers, that the
French had adhered to their favOrite, ira
ditional practice in the field, that of at
lacking in close column. On the other
hand, the Prussians deployed their lines,
seemed TO have the constant idea of de-
veloping the largest front of fire, and all
the newspapers had invariably remarked
the slowness and deliberatiOn of their fire.
It was a circumstance noticed with curl
Gus unanimity by all the war correspond
ents. An article in the IirginiGn, under
his hand, read ''The Prussians never
attack ia squares"
THE ARMS OF PRECISION.
What the general designated as ''the
arm Of precision had changed the whole
character of modern war, aud he feared
that the French had not sufficiently &C
cDmmodated themselves to the important
and radical innovation made in small
arms. Their favOrite idea of attacking
in close column and carrying the field
with a rush was good in former Circum-
stances; brilliant; supplied the two con-
ditions of physical momentum and moral
inspiration. But the arm of precision
lad changed all that.
d EAURE CARDS INTERVIEW WITH THR RM-
PEROR.
81 had an Interview said Gen. Beau
regard, with the Emperor Napoleon in
1866" The fact, as known to this writer,
and obtained by him, not from Gen.
B aureEasd, but from a member of the
DIT, IS Of Paris, is that Gen. Beaurcgard
visited the French capitol in 1866 was
received there-at the Grand Hotel-with
an ovation that surprised his mOdesty,
ali vas invited to a special interview
with the Emperor, who, with Characters
tic and, indeed, noble desire TO acquire in
formation, asked our great Southern
general pointedv what most remarkable
and significant fact he had observed
in the war out Of which he had just come
with world wide and immortal reputation.
Gen. Beaurcgard replied with disseria-
ton on the use Of the small-arm. He
gave the Emperor a manual illustration
of the subject, repeating his remarkable
conviction of the change which the arm
of precision had made in the art of war.
That arm had made calculation the virtue
of the modern soldier Formerly, with
the old smO til bore muskct, the solder
fired in the air; his enemy was only amass
in front of him; now with the chassepot
and needle gun, where man could kill at
1900 yards, he fired upon an individual
enemy; he could select him. 1t had be-
com: an exact mechanical task for the
soldier to kill his enemy. He, CGen. B. }
had one advice which he constantly gave
TO his soldiers on every occasion; it was
his dogma, his constant remark whenever
he had the opportunity to speak 10 the