Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-12-10
THE GREAT PILLOW CASE.
Riddle, Coleman s. Co VS.. Gid
con j. Pillow and Others.
The Charge of Judge EmyuOns-
Verdict for the plaintiffs
From the Memphis Appeal, Dec. s

From the Memphis Appeal, Dec.s
| The arguments of counsel 10 the gres
damage case of Riddle, Coleman s. Co
ys. Pillow ct al, was concluded befor,
Judge Emmons in the United States CIR
cut yesterday. In the afternoon thS
Judge gave his charge to the Jury.
JUDGE ENNoNs' CHARGE.
be said that in cases where the fact,
have bsen much contested by Opposing
counsel il was his habit to collate them
The very signal ability displayed in the
concucE of this case left him vary Ii tie 4
say in the way of elucida ion. He should
forbesr all reference to facts save in sc
far as they may be necessary in showing
the application of plain principles of law.
The first question they would try tC
dispose of wss-did the plain if own the
| property in debate in such sense as to
authorize him to maintain this action.
The plaintiff, it is granted, owned prop
erty in coal and bargts. Ii is put in, il
| defense, that in April, 81, Packard, the
agent of the plaintiff, received letters or
kilograms authorizing him to sell this
| property. Itsshould be bone ia mind that
those instructions did not constitute a sale
or transfer Of the property. There is
no proof tina. any actual transfer of the
right in the property took place in pursu
| ance of those instructions. The gentle
men of the jury wOuldssherefore, en-
| iirely d s. ard This part of the evidence,
| and pass il over as of no value in dett r
mining the question before them. II
appears that on the 28th of the same
month, Packard received another let
ter which contained offers for coal, tie
pay to be made by notes faliDg
due 4, 8 and II months after the pro-
posed negotiation. 1t is said that the
telegram which the plaintiff sent wss in
reply to that letter, and not to the previous
Communication. You will lave to con
slider whether that was reply to lhc let
Ter or communication of the 18th or 2S.h.
! will give you no charge on that point;
that will be left wholly to your own dis
cTeti The defense set up tina, if even
liab!l ty UGs GRATED on The psrt of the
defendants Tor these goods, alleged to
have been seized, yet they held certain
acceptances against plaintiff as a set-Off
which gave them lien on that property.
Tie Judge htld that the fact of The lien,
if it were admitted, could have no iu-
fluence in the case, and resting the de-
tense on that view slJnC it would be the
duty of the jury to award verdict 10 the
plaintiff. The next question they would
have TO consider was: Is there any proof
that tie defendants have taxi the prop
erty as alleged in the bill of complaint. The
Court charges that if the defendant, Pill
low, ordered, either verbally or in writ
inc, and that plaintiff was notified of the
intended seizure, then the order So given
WIS of such effect that the plaintiff was
e6titled to damages for trespass. The
actual rtmOvGl, OF even the formal taking
Of possession, was not necessary 70 TIE
validity OF an action fol tIespAss. If q
sheriff levy on span of horses in your
possession as being the property of d third
party, while they really belonged to you,
that is tTespass. The fact of asserting
dominion over the property, when that
assertion is recognized as of power, con
stitutes ground for damages without any
removal or taking of formal possession.
If it shall appear plsin that Murphy, one
of the defendants in the case, notified
the agent, Packard, If TIE seizure,
that constitutes just grounds for
seton for iresp2ss. The fact of
Pillow being commander of the army,
and acting under instructions from the
authorities of the Safe of Tennessee, is
set up in defense as justification Of the
transaction. The plea IL not of value
His brother Judge, who had heard this
case argued before, held thst such plea
was of no account as justification. he
saw no reason for departing from that
opinion. It is to be looked upon as one
citizen. without the color Of law, apprO-
priariug the property of another.
THE EXTENT OF BELLIGEREST RIGHTS.
One Of the learned c unsellOIs held, in
an able argument, that the belligerent
rights of the powers or forces arrayed
against each were equal. That argument
has some color, but will not stand the
test of investigation. If the learned
counsel, who held that view, were
sitting az a legislator, he would not
vote to make such law. 1t is held,
that when any people rise in re-
volt, then the sovereign or pO-
litical power has the right to
cOnfscate the property and take
the life of the rebel This is the befsg-
eTent right aof the sovereign or political
power. If equal rights be accorded tn
both parties, then the persons in revolt
have the right 10 ccnfiscate the property
and take the lives of those who remain
attached to the sovereign or political pow
er. Such a proposition appears TO be alb
surd. That view was never held by any
court. Neither is it true that the soyer-
eign power, in the event of rebellion, is
reduced to the alternative, on the one
hand, of confiscatiDg the property OF
those in revolt, and of Staying them-tO
shoot, hang and exterminate indiscrimin-
ately and by wholessle-or, on the other,
to allow perfect equality of belligerent
rights with the political power, which has
the discretion TO say what measure of bel
ligerent rights it should allow those in
revolt. This is regulated by the necessities
OF the case. The United States Courts
have not laid down, as yet, any general
rule which would allow action for dam
ages against Generals who seized property
all over the country during the war. He
would be slow to charge for the plaintiff
in q case where action for damages
should be brought against General who,
in dire necessity and for the sole purpose
of feeding or sffording shelter to his men,
had seized what was needed. However,
there are none of the United States
Courts that have laid down any rule on
that point yet. A defense of that sort
cannot be set up in this case. There is
no army in the feld-nO dire necessity;
the General was not actually in the field.
The Judge then referred to cases de-
cided in the Supreme Court of the State
as bearing upon the question, and an
swered the objection of counsel made in
previous argument as to the authority OF
the court, inRsmuch as political disabili-
ties were spoken of in connection there
with, that the decision of the Supreme
Court should DE taken az of force. No
attention could be paid by him to hearsay
or newspapers reports. He must look
upon all defactO courts as courts de jure,
until the contrary be proven. The Court
in question was certainly de facto the
| Supreme Court OF the State, and there
| was no reason to doubt their entire legal
| ity. Another point of defense Offered
was that the military COMMITTEES in this
city, after application to have the prop
erty restored had been made, consented
| that it should be restored to Packard if
he would give bond y the effect that the
proceeds of the property should be ap-
propriated to the use of the COnfede-
rate government. Now the fact that
the property was seized being admitted,
then the restoration of some of it TO
Packard does not authorize the jOry to
abate any of the damages claimed for the
whole loss sustained by the seizure. Let
US illustrate: You are on your way home
and stop at an inn, your horses are seized
on all execution issued against the land