The Emporia news. [volume] (Emporia, Kan.) 1859-1881, 1870-12-02
NAPOLEON's PAMPHLET.

NAPOLEON'S PAMPHLET.
The pamphlet recently put forth by
the late Emperor of the French from
his retreat at Wiihelmshoe, in which he
proposes to give q full and accurate ac-
count of the war from its commence
ment to the capitulation at Sedan, is an
interesting document. Atleast its peru
sal has interested us, having watched
with careful observation the progress of
military operations from their COM
mencement. This pamphlet is entitled,
s"The Campaign of 1870: Some Causes
which brought about the Surrender at
Sedan" The reputed author is an OFF,
GER of the Generals staff, but it is as
serted that it was written from the ex-
Emperor's dictation. No intelligent
reader will for a moment doubt that
this apology for his crime in commence
ing a causeless war, from the effects of
which unhappy France will not recover
for quarter of a century, is the work
of the Emperor's own hand.
The writer states that in declaring
war against Prussia, the Emperor ''only
obeyed q violently excited national
feeling" that France was clamorous for
war, and that while the Emperor was
everywhere greeted with ION to Ber-
lin," by the excited populace, sadness
and depression were plainly visible in
his Majesty's countenance. Napoleon
processes to have known that Prussia
s-ko he Gn1
of 100000 men, while France could
muster but 100000, but he hoped by
great rapidity in the movement of his
troops, to cross the Rhine before the
enemy was prepared, and separate the
South German States from the North,
thus rendering useless an army of 200
600, with which South Germany has
since rendered such effective service to
Prussia. But subsequent events proved
this idea to be more easily conceived
than executed, for Prussia was prepar-
ed, and as the Emperor owns, the
French armies "were caught in the very
act of formation" This was his first
disappointment, and he attributes his
failure to the defects in the French mil
itary system, which renders the concen-
tration of troops q slow process. He
was again disappointed in the actual
number of men he was able to station
at various points. He expected to place
force of 10000 in Metz, 100000 in
Strasburg and reserve army of $4,000
at Chalons, but he could collect only
100000 at the first of these strongholds,
and 10000 at the second and as to his
third army, which was to rendezvous at
| Chalons for the protection of the Capt.
tai, a part of it was at Paris and part
at WILSON'S, and some time elapsed be-
fore he was able to concentrate these
troops at Chalons. 1t is amusing to
read the explanation the Emperor gives
for his inability to cope with the enemy
after his army had entered the field.
The chief cause assigned was the abso-
Lutte impossibility of ascertaining the
movements of the enemyi
| After the unfortunate separation OF
McMahon's and Bazaine's armies, it was
the intention of the Emperor (who was
with McMahon's army to fall back on
| Chalons, Canrobert who was previous
ly stationed there, having Joined Ba-
zaine at Metz. This plan, the Emperor
says, was at first approved by the Gov
eminent at Paris, but on "maturer con-
sideration" the Council of Ministers
thought best to have Mcmahon march
to the relief of Bazaine. Mcmahon is
praised very highly for his willingness
to obey his superiors in Office, though
in this instance, as in several subsequent
cases, he did so against his own judg-
ment. Knowing a conjunction with
Bazaine to be impossible, Mcmahon
turned toward Paris several times, but
was invariably turned back by an order
from the Regency. The Emperor com
plains bitterly of being treated by the
Council of.AIinisters at this time as 6
complementary in both political and
military affairs. The result of this
marching and countermarching was
simply loss of precious time, without
effecting any advantage whatever. Had
Mcmahon been allowed to use his OWL
judgment, it is safe to say-the Emper
or's statement being trustworthy-tha
the best army that France had would
now be assisting in the defense of Paris
instead of having been Inundated a
Sedan. But we can follow this nara
tive no further. The account of the op
eratioAs of McMahon's army, from the
time of its separation from Bazaine's tC
its surrender at Sedan, is deeply inter
esting, and the battle of Sedan, previOu:
to the surrender, the capitalization, anG
the Emperor's subsequent interview
with Bismarck and the King-these arr
especially of absorbing interest. The
Emperor's reasons for the food of dis.
aster which his country has sustained
are briefly these: The defects in the
French military system, the hostility o.
the Opposition, the want of respect fol
authority on the part of the French
and the inferiority of the armies, in
point of number, to those of Prussia
Good reasons, undoubtedly, all will
agree, and had his Majesty added tc
these his own wickedness in Inaugural.
ting q war for which there was no just
cause, and his imbecility in the conduct
of the campaign, their verdict would
not thereby be materially affected.
THE CATTLE SUPPLY.
This question is among those occupy
ing the forefront of topics which en-.
ura0o the attention 0f active husinea,