The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1870-08-17
THE WIR OF 1870.
From the Saturday Review.]

Much reproach has been cast upon military
critics for not forecasting truly tho results OF
the last two great wars. Even now men freely
say that it is useless to anticipate the events
Of tue coming struggle, sace III 1862 as III 1855,
the most able predictions were just those that
events falsidea The most oupletely. we We're
| told, it is remarked, by experts IN the former
wear that the North would certainly be beaten;
| two wears later we saw the North completely
| triumphant. We we're told four years since,
| by those supposed to know best, that Prussia
had no chance against Austria, that the In
perial a,mles would emerge from Bohemia in q
| bold offensive. and that the uutried levies OF
the Hohenzollern would prove altogether un-
able 10 stop the way to Berlin. Exactly the
contrary Of these events occurred. The Aus
| trains were unable to get ready in time to
| take the offensive; they proved equally unable
| to meet the Prusslans in fair fight; the Prus
sian armies, and not the Austrian, dictated
peace before the enemy's gates. From these
| two examples it has not unnaturally been de-
dnced that the opening OF great war finds
the most uniformed and the most sklltul
writer's on level Us regards knowledge Of the
future, and that the only refuge from falling
| into error 10 to reserve oil commentary until
| the close.
| for the CONCLUSION Is it really the case that
although slxty-ive years since, before the cam
paicn of Jena, 1t was possible for theorist at
Paris to point to the spot OF Geim MIN soil where
sia should be fought, and for Wellington dur
ing the peace Of 1914 to indicate the impor-
raHcs of Waterloo ID the defence OF Belgium,
matters are now so changed that the whole
progress of any futnte war must be inscrutab!e
! from first to last? These questions may be
best answered by very brief examination OF
the causes which set at naueht all attempts to
ktx, nf tl1E a.
hemian campaigns, and By seeing how far
these apply to the present crisis
The American wlr IS now understood by all
wel,-intormed Englishmen to have been far
more an affair Of politics than OF mere soldier
ship. No honest Northern writer disputes the
genius which the chief Southern commanders
showed. or the vslor of their troops. The
IJnlonist historians chronicle fairly enough the
tremendous defeats which their invading
armies at first endured, and the tenacity of re-
sistance which Lee and Johnston showed to
the last. when their iDferiorlty threw them en-
tirely on the defensive. But neither genius
nor yalor displayed on o single front could
avail against the .preponderatlng force which
the Unionists coul. exert when once fairly
roused. The ill-fated counter-invasions at
tempted by Jefferson Davis's orders were just
suficieptly alarming to waken thoroughly the
sentiment which is called ambition or patriot
lam. according to the feelings with which it is
viewed whilst made without sufficient force 10
carry out any design Of conquest. The splen-
did obstlnacy which the Unlonlsts tbenceforth
displayed, and the daring pollcy which made
nse of the pubIic feeling to gather overwhelm-
ire forces by sea and land on every vulnerable
point of the Confederacy, did the rest. The
Soutb succumbed, fairly oyerborne BY her Si-
pantic enemy, her means OF resistance (the
feebleness Of which was at the first skiltully
conceale u being quite inadequate to supporG
the repeated shocFs which the resources OF The
North heaped upon her. Inc victory was emf
nently political one, and the result was cs-
sur. d from the moment the greater power be-
GAN nnreseryedly II to put forth Its strength. No
military skill could long avail against such
odds when the raw material Of the contending
fore g was SO essentially similar in fibre.
AS the Austro-Prussian campaign, the chief
facts known we're that both parties had very
large armies, the one inexperienced but fresh
ly reorgunized for war aud armed With new
weapon the other proved in action but weight
ed bv the Ieaden government of narrow
colerIc The improved organization Of the
Prussiaus had not been stldled. The effects
of their breech-loader were-as their own print
cd tactical instructions show-mlsdoubted by
their authorities, and appreciated oy none but
few fur-slghted officers who had served IN
SchleswIr. Had we learnt that IN rapid ann
Inr thew had secured the Advantage, had
Ciab,euzs warning to the Emperor been made
known that troops armed with the muzze-
loader had no far chance against the needle
gun, predictions would have neen as freely
launched in favor of the Russians as they un-
dOubtedy were against them. Jomlnl, IN the
iast paper that ever issued from his fertile pen,
attributed the ruin Of the Aus trans to three
distinct dlsadyautages--lu numbers, weapons
and strategy. The las :of these was ueces-
sariIy doubtful element. As to the irst, the
full superiority OF the new Prussian system
was altogether unknown save to those who had
created 1t, whilst tue otuer was really very
graud experiment, which had not been fairly
tried.