The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-04-23


had committed this murder He continued
his insinuations against the housemaii espe-
cially, the result of which was that the poor
girl was carried to an insane asylum. Mr..
Phillips did his client no good, however for
he was convicted, and in due time executed.
A despatch from this city to the Chicago
Tribune (Which we have reason to believe
substantially correct), in speaking of q crimi-
nal case which has attracted, we may say en-
crossed, the public attention, says of pro-
minent lawyer who has conducted the de-
fense, that he has apologized privately for
indecent illusions to lady, said that he
believed nothing of them, and that he only
made certain remarks (and this is the point
we wish to emphasize) Sin the hope of help
ing his client" 1t is to the general charac-
ter of the professional morality thus in
dicated that we ask the attention of the
reader. 1t must often happen that an
advocate is called upon to defend person
known by him to be guilty, but, the
0nuS p1obdnd6 being upon the prosecu-
ton, the party at bar is entitled to all
the benefits of the laws of evidence; and as
the trial starts with presumption of his in
nocence, it is the duty of his advocate to the
best of his ability, by fair comments upon
the evidence, to secure, if he can, an acquit-
tai. But it should be understood, and we
suspect that it is not generally or well under
sumption of innocence is less intended for
the protection of the prisoner than for the
safety of many innocent men, who, if the
rules of evidence were broken down, might
unjustly suffer. The law simply forbears TO
press a conviction when conviction might
establish dangerous and inequitable pre-
cedent.
So far, then, the duty of counsel to watch
the testimony, and to maintain upon it
4
conceded. But he would err egregiously
who supposes that this great privilege, or this
simple right, if he please SO to consider it, is
not limited both by the good sense and by
the good faith of counsel. The right care
fully and ingeniously to defend one person
who is not on trial by no means implies the
right extra judicially to arraign another per-
son who is not on trial at all. The advocate
for the defense holds no license to travel out
of the record in quest of extraneous facts, or
more probably of notions which may possibly
help his client at the expense of somebody
else. For instance, upon the trial of John
Jones for murder, it is barely possible that the
Court might hold as admissible evidence to
show that the murder was committed by some
highly respectable and perfectly innocent
member of society. Now, such is the nature
of practice that if an advocate sees fit to rise
and suggest guilt in the most astonishing
and uususpected quarter, although the Court
may and would probably silence him as soon
as possible, the mischief would be done
before the scandal could be arrested
This is an inevitable infrmity of legal proce-
dure from which in the nature of things there
is no escape, except through the chivalry and
honor of counsel All the more possessing
this tremendous power, should the advocate
be careful so to use it that the rights of other
parties outside the case may not be in the
least compromised. This, indeed, is his best
policy, for in the end system of rowing in
QUESTIONS in quest of evidence half true to
bolster up theories wholly untenable can do
the advocate no good. 1t is game at which,
if it is to be permitted, the prosecution can,
| in the nature of things, beat him in nine
| cases out of ten.
The general idea is that an advocate, in
managing the cause of his client, should re-
member his client alone; and within proper
limitations, and as between the respondent
and the Government, the idea is q good and
sound one. But surely, even the most remote
deductions from this theory give practitioner
in the criminal courts no moral right, however
he may suppress the true, to suggest the false
| to the damage of innocent persons. In con-
| Quoting q cross examination, for instance, it
may be proper for counsel to presuppose that
the memory of the witness has failed him
| upon the direct, or that he has not shown the
| proper relation TO each other OF the facts
brought out in his evidence; but, except in
rare and palpable cases, we should very much
doubt the moral right of cross examining
counsel to assume that the witness has already
committed perjury; and to do this merely for the
sake of confusing and embarrassing witness
would be ungentlemanly and dishonorable in
the extreme, however it might be profession
ally considered Thus we see that the appa-
rent license which the leniency of the law
allows to a criminal defense is itself hedged
about by certain laws of personal honor. The
| advocate himself is an officer of the court,
and has personal interest in maintaining its
dignity, its equity, and its good name. He
is to save his client, if he can, but he is not
to save him at the expense of other reputa-
tions. If he is paid for furnishing one cha
racter, it does not charter him maliciously to
blacken another. He may comment fairly
upon the evidence; but hint, innuendo, and
malicious suggestion are not now, never have
been, never will be, in court or out of it, such
a commentary.
JUDGE HACKETT AND THE McFAR
LAND CASE.
From the NJ Y. Sun.
We think the opinion is all but unanimous
that Recorder Hackett presides over the Rich
ardson-M McF Farland trial with dignity, ability,
and impartiality. He has made two import.
ant rulings in the case, which have excited a
good deal of comment among the members
OF the legal profession, as well as in other
circles.
The first of the rulings to which we refer
was the exclusion of the testimony offered by
the defense in regard to certain transactions,
such as Richardson's dictation of memoranda