The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-02-14

impossible that two, nay. all the nlty petltoncrs
test the poll Of the entire city. The Legislature
did not mean this vain thing. Les non m
ira na~;,ibst Tr,istrG II is the duty OF a
Court construe statute possible ut res ntrqs
vSent guam Huber vs.; ney, hsnn stotad th n ni9
force and with reference to the highest authority
in Schuylkill Navigation Company vs. Loose, Har-
ris 49, 19 The case comes then right TO this point
The oath must be made from credible information
or not at ALL In the poll Of such city the afiant
cannot swear to more than to the best OF his know
ledge and belief. 1t would be imputatlon on the
trainers OF the law TO think otherwise. The argu-
ment that no Indictment would ne Tor perjury upon
oath In this form, then the oath in that form is an
oath authorized by law, and an indictment for its
corrupt and artful breach will lie.
We must consider also the tribunal TO hear and
decide on the petition IL is O high constitutional
court competent TO decide on Its own jurisdiction.
Its Jurisdiction being exclusive and na it necessa-
rily decides II for itself. There WAS no omission OF
anything to confer jurisdiction. The petition came
from the requisite number OF qualified voters, was
presented In due time, and its truth was sworn to by
two OF their number. The court having a rightful
and general jurisdiction the subject Of the petit
ton, assumed it, heard the proofs, and found the
facts alleged to be actually true and set aside the
return as false.
Now, after a decision on the merits which have
been established on sufficient evidence, can we oust
the Jurisdiction for alleged error in the nterpre
tatioD given to the language of the oath? This
would be dangerous ground to take. The law does
not prescribe the form OF the OATH 1t Certainly was
for the Court in Judging q It's own dG S 70
the case; found the facts to be true; and decided
on the merits. See Carpenters case VS. Harris 4s6.
Overseers of Toga VS.. Overseers OF Lawrence,
Watts, 49, Plunkets Creek Township vs.. Fairfield
Township, p f. Smith, 200.
The question as TO the power OF the City Recorder
to administer the oath stands on the same footing.
1t vas question which the Court below necessarily
decided for itself There was an oath actually taken
administer 0aths. His commission was conferred
by the Governor, by and with the consent Of the
Senate, for term OF ten years and during good be-
hayior. His character is also judcially recognized
as magisterial. Rhodes vB. Commonwealth Har-
rs 277 BY the act OF 1917 he has authority to take
the proof OF deeds and other writings and to issue
fully as the President Of the Common Pleas.
These powers imply his authority to administer
nesses The act OF March 81, 1850, Furnishes perjury
committed upon an oath taken before the Recorder,
CHASING it with oaths taken before any Judge, justice,
alderman, etc., before whom oaths may be taken.
The Court OF Common Pleas had decided also that
he had the authority to administer oaths. schnman
commissioned officer, and having power TO ad-
minister Oaths by his certificate of probate to the
petition he asserted his authority to administer that
oath
Prina tdcie, therefore, the oath was regularly
made, and being accepted was before the Court.
over the subject OF the petition, assumed it, and in
so doing decided the affidavit to be sufficient. 1t is
not the case OF the absence OF any affidavit, but is
the case OF an affidavit prtna Jdcie regularly made.
Now, after having possession OF the case In a man.
ner clearly legal and regular, at least to ga primo
case on its merits and found the truth of all
the facts necessary to case on the merits,
how we go behind the certificate OF the Recorder
to inquire whether his conceded authority to admin
ter Oaths extends to this particular proceeding? The
Which has now been proved by spficent EVIDENCE 70
be well founded and true. II we can now go behind
his certificate, after decision on the merits pro-
ceeding is safe. We may as well inquire whether all
the petitioners qualified voters, and II we find
one disqualified by non-resdenee, non-payment OF
taxes, defect in his naturalization certificate,
set aside the whole proceeding. This would be
dangerous doctrine, and opposed to the principles
decided in the cases just referred to.
The correctness of the oath in these cases is sup
ported by that required to contest the election Of the
Governor, members OF assembly, Judges, county
petition true to the best of their knowledge and
belief" 1t cannot be supposed the Legislature
meant to exact severer terms in order 90 contest an
election of city officers-indeed, TO require impos
sible condition. But analogles are appeaed TO. II
has been decided that an appellant from an award
been done, and less will not suffice.
This is true but the difference lies between know
ledge and belief. 1t is not unjust to require OF q
suitor knowing his case firm belief OF injustice.
On the other hand, suppose we were asked to say
that the appellant must swear the absolute truth
OF Injustice, and thus compel an ignorant man to
swear to the law as well as the facts? This would
be unreasonable, and 1t Is quite as unreasonable to
ask man who cannot know all the facts to swear
absolutely to the nlegalty Of voters, for whom they
voted, the law Of residences OF suffrage, and OF
the duties OF election officers and all else that is
necessary to actual knowledge OF an nudue elec-
ton.
Nor is the argument good that the act OF 1906 re-
quires the directions OF the act OF 1854 to be strictly
pursued. Before statute can be pursued, we
must know what it requires. II the law re-
quire personal knowledge, the oath must be So
But this is the very question to be decided, and II
is Illogical to tell us 1t means personal knowledge
because 1t must be strictly pursued What does the
| act OF 1854 reQuire-personal knowledge OF every
fact averred, or only knowledge to the best OF re
able information and belief? II personal owledgC
be not required that ends the question: and all the
! numerous authorities cited to show how strictly
| statute must be pursued are inapplicable.
Nor can the petition be nkened to response
| in chancery. 1t Is not proceeding to compel {
| discovery OF facts known to the party; bu
is simply complaint to initiate an inquiry in goot
faith. Its foundation can be reliable information
only and therefore not absolutely, but credbly
true. In conclusion, on this the only serious ques
act GAS to the construction of statutes, 1t is
tain they not always to be construed according
to the letter." Bank OF North America VS.. Fltzslm
| mons, Binney, 356. "Acts that give remedy for
wrong are to be taken equitaJly, and the word
shall be extended or restrainfd according TO reasol
words be short or imperfect" schuylklli Navigation
Company VS.. Leon, Harris, Is, citing Just, l52
S4 $5 2 and Hob 1871 S9e TRe EorS ETs,sS s'5s
Browndeld. 2 w. S., $50 .'0r" to mean son.
Levering VS.. r. r. Co., W. X 81 469 "0r" ais
has been held TO mean 'Gnd." Foster VS.. Com
monwealth, Ibid, 70, so.
Was the jurisdiction lost by the expiration OF tn
term in the case Of the Proth9notary In tni
| done is judicial, and not ministerial. The coul
cannot proceed on the merits" OF the contest will
| out Illue 10 Ihht tue JcSIllnOhJ auu w oh
decide. II the testimony be vouminous. as 1t mus
| be to correct so large poll, the merit
| cannot be reached without time nor ca
the merits be reached II delayed as here b
datory motions. 1t would be harsh constructo
to defeat its own purpose by requiring an imposs
bity Of the Court. Analoges are against It, Con
monwealth vs. Sheriff, 16 s. a. r., 304. Sup. Watson
| 2 Wharton, SOL Commonwealth va. Sailor, Watt
| $685. Clark vs. Commonwealth, Casey, 129. |
| these cases similar limitation was held not to out
the jurisdiction OF the Court, and 1t SAID rhel
Is no doubt that necessity, either moral or physlcA
| NAV raise an available exception to the statute
The act OF 1910 REQUIRES certiorares to justices of q