The Bossier banner. [volume] (Bellevue, Bossier Parish, La.) 1859-1952, 1870-09-03
The Routes to Paris.
ITS POSITION IN THE FRENCH
MILITARY SYSTEM.

of the French capital is summar-
lied in the following statement
compiled from a French journal
which endeavors to tranquilize the
public mind on that point: =
H There are four routes in q mill
tary point Of view, which All in-a
vading army might adopt in ad-
vancing from Germany upon
Paris: ]. BY crossing the French
frontier between Strasburg and
Luxembourg, and then advancing
in direct line on Paris. 2. BY
crossing the swiss territory situa-ii
ted below Strasburg.and marching I
by the valleys of the Seine and
Marne on the capital. 8. BY a9l
movement from the north, passing
the fortress of Metz and reaching
Paris BY way of the valleys Of the
Seine and Marne. 4. BY adyanc- j
ing through Belgian soil, in q di,
rect southern line through the
valley OF the OIse and AisDe on
Paris. ,s..a9 HeitfI
The first is regarded as militia
ry 'impossibility, France being
protected on the east by the great
natural defences of the Vosges,
Mountains, the Moselle River, the
Ardennes Mountains, and thei'
River Meuse, supported by many !,
fortified places, among which is
the stronghold of Metz. Dismiss
ing, then, any speculatiOns which !
this route may suggest, we arrive
at the second line of defences to-
ward the French capital. If, in /.
this case, the Prussians were to
violate the neutrality of Switzer,
land, and attempt to advance on
Paris from the southeast, they
would find themselves confronted ]
by the fortress of Lyons, which
has been strengthened and render
ed very secure since the period of
the first Empire. Before arriving
at that point, the invading forces
would have to capture either Bel
font or Langres, both of which oc-
cupy commanding positions on the
ground through which AN army
advancing from Switzerland would
| pass.
The third route is the most FEAST
BILE, and consists, in military
phrase, Of turning the fortresses
on the northeast frontier, includ-
ing Metz, and then by continued
successes arriving on the river
Marine, from whence there is no y
formidable obstacle to an advance
toward the immediate neighbor.
hood Of the capital. But an in
vading force could not, on account
of Metz and Strasburg, wisely
adopt this course. The French
army, defeated, could take refuge
in Metz and then harass the rear
Of the invaders, who would be
open to similar attacks from
Strasburg and places of less i'm
| portance. The fourth route, by
way of Belgium, is secured by de-
fences which the reverse of 1914
proved more imperatively neces-
sary. Hill
The French calculated that even
if an enemy should arrive in the
vicinity of Paris, her Notifications
are practically impregnable.---
Thirty years ago, under the ad-
ministration of M. Theirs, those
defences were completed, the pro-
! ject being regarded with special
favor by Louis Philippe, who took
an enthusiastic interest in fortifi-
cations. Another resource is
found in the population OF Paris,
now numbering two millions, who
by acting in concert with forces
operating in the rear of the inva-
ders, might overwhelm' them.--
Such was the hope of Napoleon /,
but in the altered circumstances
Of his time, it proved impracti-
caDl6. ..# u 44ts4t}a 81