Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1870-10-18
The War in Europe.
BY REV. L. B. HlBBARD, GRAFTON, VT.

suit Of that of 1866 in Northern Aus,
tria. Europe has been more than
once alarmed by tie prospect of a
collision between Prussia and France.
Indeed, a conflict, sooner or later, has
seemed inevitable; and it has been
only question of time when it would
take place. And European states
men are not surprised at the existence
of the war: their only apparent as
tonishment is at its occurrence just at
present, and the charges on which the
French declaration of war was based.
While Bismarck and Napoleon
lived thoughtful men in Europe and
America have seen that war must
come; that certain events which have
occurred since Sadowa could not, in
the nature Of things, have any other
termination. Some even go so far as
to say that this question of collision
with France entered into Bismarck's
calculations when he pushed matters
to a crisis with Austria, four years
ago. A clearer view of the present
situation may be secured by a brief
survey Of affairs in Prussia and France.
Prussia, prior to 1866. had for a
long time been a member of the old
| Germanic Confederation. AS early
as 1856, however, Bismarck, who was
then Prussian Ambassador to the Fed
eral Diet, elaborated a plan for the
/ reconstruction Of the map Of continent
al Europe. While this plan contem-
plated additions to the domain of Rus
/, sia and France, it, most of all, was to
leave Prussia to form a new central
government, something after the pres
ent state of things. Neither his own
nor the French government favored
, the project, and it was apparently
forgotten by all save its bold and sa-
gacious author. Up to the time OF
his appointment as ambassador he
! had been an admircr of Austria and
her absolutism. At one time he said,
/ q recognize in Austria the represen-
, tative of an ancient German power
that has often and gloriouSly welded
| the German sword" His embassy to
r Frankfort opened his eyes to the an.
? tagonism between the two powers
: and his resolution was taken, viz.
? that Prussia should be aggrandized
/ and Austria humiliated. From that
: purpose he has never turned; and du
r ring his three years diplomatic career
5 at st. Petersburg, and a brief one o.
six months at Paris, he sought the re
: alization Of his scheme.
+ From Paris, in 1862, he was sum
: moned to Berlin by his sovereign
since which time he has been not only
: at the head of Prussias foreign Office
= but virtually her monarch. The foul
g + years intervening between his REGAL
+ from the Tuileries and the campaign
a of S66 were devoted to two ends
J first, the increase of the Prussian ar
l. my, in numbers and efficiency. Ii
} this he had been already anticipated
d by his royal master; second, the fom
e entation of trouble between Prussii
r and Austria. To both these ends th
SchIeswig- Holstein affair contributed
1t not little; and by his daring anC
3 INSCRIPTIONS conduct Bismarck saw
e the realization of his sagacious plan
n in Sadowa and its results.
: He could not incorporate all tn
y states Of Germany into Prussia, thoug
u Hanover, Electoral Hesse, Schleswi
q and Holstein, Nassau and Frankfor
I were thus merged into it. He die
however, secure treaties for an offer
sive and defensive alliance with tn
IL four remaining ones. Whether h
-" expected to secure them all at tha
n time we cannot say, though he wa
- determined to annex Saxony, an
yielded only through the strong opp,
: sition Of Austria aud France.
a. seems certain that his bold ambitio
"a contemplated nothing less than the al
- = sorptiOn, by Prussia, of Hesse Darn
n stadt, Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Bi
, den. The secret treaties formed
- these powers immediately after Sad
y wa gave great offence to France
&c Therefore Bismarck knew full we
!! that any attempt to incorporate the
into the kingdom of Prussia woul
- bring on conflict with France. TW
~ courses Of conduct were open to hiI
~ both securing in the end the same r
- - suit. First, lay violent hands on Il
~ coveted prizes and make them ;
once component parts Of Prussia. !
this plan, however, there were thrt
W serious objections. 1t would stir l
he great hostility in the territory anne
ed. Also, it would lend no sma
err amount of aid to the royal and mob
of families Of Hanover, Hesse, &C., {
I'D ready incorporated into Prussia, larg
on ly against tneir will. Further,
ed would put him before Europe in t
m attitude of an INSCRIPTIONS aggressC
in a position from which he would n
me shrink, but one which he did not &C
oI- ct if it could be avoided. Second,
he arrange affairs in such manner tn
nd when the conflict came France shou
off. be the aggressor. This course CO
in mended itself in view Of two considt
.he ations. 1t would secure for Prus;
1t: and her cause the sympathy of I
7as rope, which was of too much impt
,on tance to be lightly thrown away.
ite Moreover, it would secure the hear
ich cooperation of the allied States. a
,er, crush whatever domestic oppos;ti
of existed in Prussia. Events ha
civ shown the wisdom of this course,
on. all internal discords among the G.
led mans are forgotten in their q
eir against Frances aggrandizement
re- the expense of German territory
lis the left bank OF the Rhine.
ted The absorption of the four all
Ved States Of Prussia, after a success
ex- campaign with France, Bismarck kn
cot would be a natural and inevitable
mi suit. Bismarck has waited these ft
ar years, because the work of consoli
ds. ting the new Prussian Empire was
great and laborious, and also becau
undue haste would retard rather Il
'om hasten the execution of his cherish
dis projecrs.
his Meanwhile the Prussian army