, 1870-08-19

IN WHICH tAFy ouSnL 10 0nTc caught
the Pr,,ssians. After two dsys' conflict,
ending Monday night, the French were
driven bace into their fo1tidca.ious. On
Tuesday, however, they were permitted to |
march cut, and take country road toward
Scraun, which they pursued until they
reached Etain, twelve miles east of yerdnn,
and twenty miles west of Metz How tho
French could expect to retreat with
prussian army already between them and |
the point to which they wels rctseating,
passes comprehension. We expect to hear
that the reason why the French army is
concentrating at Etain, instead OF march
ing direct 10 Vsrdun, aa had been previous |
ly proposed, is, that tho Prussisns are Mt
Vert1un before them. In short, the Prns-
asans ure getting tho French rs far away
from fortresses as possible, with the view |
TO forcing them to a general conflict with
QUO force under Prince Frederick
Charles 10 the west, and another
under King William, iu person,
to the east Of them. Az Prince Frederick
Charles forces opened the battle OF Sun
day in position between the French army
under Bazaine and verduu, we do not see
how he could lose this underground. If
Bazaine repulses the PrassiAns. he drives
them in front Of him toward Paris, the
very point they waut to reach. It tho
Prussians repulse Bazaine they are left
free to march to Paris, from, which they arc
now distant only weeks march, with
np intervening obstacle of consequence
cxcep! the camp at Chslons.
1t Is altogether probable, therefore, that
the French army which left Metz for Yer
dun hes kept the Prussians l'e.ween It anl
Verdun, and is, consequently, stopped ut
Etain. The latter is not a point at which
the French would desire to stop, if they
could get either forward to verdnn OF
back to Metz Etain is an open village
Of 5000 inhabitants, which is described
| AZ s1tuxted +in a mnrshy trnct, On
an afHuent OF the Moselle, l. miles
T. n. Z of verdun." Verdun, on the
other hand, though by no means SO strong
or important as Metz, is strongly fortified
towr, on the line Of the Acuse, at tho base
of the Argonnen Mountains, where so
latge forca rs Bazaino commands would
have leen allie to make a powerful stand.
But if, as We suppose, Prince Frederick
Charles conh reach the west bank of the
Meusa in ahance of Bazaine, the latter
would te practically hemmed in. If the
+! French low R Etain hlve only the army
Of Frederick Charles on their right, and
that of the Crown Prince on their left,
they would seem TO have no Icxouyce hut
to fight it out on th.ir umarshy tract u
until they surrender, OF p retreat, and they
cannot retreat twenty mtss without being
driven into Luxembourg ol Belgium. Dul
it shonld be remembered hat, according
TO the early statements Of Ae orsauiza
tion of the P1ussian army, Ae extrcmt
r right wing has not yet been calAd into nc
. ton, except at the capture OF Suck, nni
NOW lies near Thionville. In suta case
this third force is already in the TOR o
Etaip, and whntever forces hare left Net
for Etain are surrounded on eycEy aide, O.
;. virtually entrapped. NacMahon!s forue =
= Toul. the forces remaining Mt Metz, and Il
:, Emperura zoo, 600 Mt Chalons arc all crt q
fruu effective participation in the resct
= Of the bo5y at Etain- Those at Chalor
- - are too far away, aud, indeed, will haso q
- - they can do to be equipped and organize
q for battle by the time the Prussians 1eat
4 Chalons. MacNahon is too weak, as h,t
- few detach,nents Of his army ever reacht
Is Toul. tue bulk Of them having, at last r
mainiue At Metz viii haSs ,.ropas %hs troops
- - too much of the dangers Of leaving fe
- ,Resses for the open field to desi
the ,tp repeat this last great blunder OF Bnzaif
u.s. oe,'~ nazaine could not raash Var1
ch. 70 leave Aetz "---,as, it was folly for hi
M his forces united 1T Me,1,-l. intent, Wi
tch have been hemmcd in but he Il, indos
Va. been lion Mt hay, MI the mes, - III
,.;r for being penned. Being ''ponnea= +,
~ allowing the Prussiana 10 su rr,a1ud hin,
all sides, he had no course hut 10 o,
10. general battle, under such ci:cun,sta,
;n. rs would give him tho utmost aid from
l,v Notifications. II Metz il prosisioued
,na even week, he wonld have had no d
an, Guilty in holding the Pzussiana 1t bar TT
var Napoleon could come TO his relef fr'
nc1 Chalona with the French s'se~'nd liue '
-. I'm, OK, men, I,.,tea.3 of snis. the Freu
'.n array is mr. severed ir.. five fragments,
- or- aIetz, one a. toul, one at Etain. a
sn ri Strssbonrg.;, AMI one at Chalons, s,-asa t
,rh fT.,ssians command the means Ut comm
,s;. 1''eation between any two of the five, I,
cat 1ess it may re, possibly, besweuu tie fr.
sacut ut Toul and tho relerves at Chal,,n
,.t Assuming that the retreating F.en
be army concentrates at Etain bsca,.se it c,
nj get neither forward to verdun nor hack
Id Aetz, 1t becomes evident that the line
IN the Meuse is lost hy tile French, as effect
vt nlly as the line Of the Moselle Il the pr,
Ell s'ans have not already crossed it, it is on
n, because they deem it necessary to dispo
re- OF the French army now foundering in Il
of marshes Of Etain. If the army at Chalop
N. under Napoleon and Trochu, should lca
~ its camps and make rapid march la,
be sard' orsr the Argonncn Mountains, to Il
ID line of the Meuse, and the relief of II
st a1my at Etain, they would eou
N the PFussinns in numbers at the scene
" sct'on, and might give Prince Frede.i,
at Charles serious trouble. But no SUI
al movement is yet indicated by tic d
1t apatches, 1nd, probably, none such il i,
It tended. If the army ut Etain is to ,,a IL
ia to e1tricate itself while the army at Ch
i Ions inactive]y awaits the prusaian attac]
"a then it may be assumed TINT the u1t;ms
It entry OF the prlssians into Paris becom,
q c1trenely probable. Gibbons, though su
o rounded by old walls, is not a position {
n any strength whatever, nor is there an
/. line Of defence between the Rhine NJ,
d Paris which can Withstand an army wlic
tENkt