The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-07-23
SPIRIT OF THE PRESS.
Editorial Opinions of the Leading Journals
upon Current Topics-Compiled Every
Day for the Evening Telegraph.

NOtnlDB VIII III Jue emu DC BaluoQ Dy re-
fusing to recognize the almost certain effects
Of European war upon the public credit, the
finances, and the business interests of this
country. 1t is well to look upon the bright
side of things as frequently and as long as
possible; but we shall probably find ourselves
in better condition, after six months
foreign hostilities, if we acknowledge plainly
the inconveniences and embarrassments we
shall meanwhile encounter
The first popular impression was that the
United States might gain much, and could
lose little, from the conflict between France
and Prussia. eve shall not suffer bit, was
the hasty Judgment of a well-known Wall
street philosopher, when the imminence of
war ceased to be doubtful; and we believe
that the opinion he expressed is still gene
rally entertained. ''We shall get high prices
for all the breadstuffs we export; there will
be large demand for American arms; and
when Congress discards the laundering self
ishness of our navigation laws, we
may hope to acquire the largest
share of the worlds carrying trade"
Such is the gist of the argument
which many people have accepted as con-
elusive. They have not paused to reflect that
the,best of these possibilities-tha referring to
the carrying trade-presupposes liberal legis-
lation, and that unless public opinion speedily
compels the Congressional majority to throw
Ius
the golden opportunity will pass unimproved.
Nor have they attached sufficient importance
to the fact that the demand for our bread
stuffs, at the prices anticipated, is in part
conditional upon the expansion of the war
area. So long as the contest in confined to
France and Prussia the legitimate effect upon
the American market will be comparatively
slight. The great granaries of Europe must be
rendered inaccessible before the expected re-
cult io hot
that Russia and other leading powers will be
active particlpators in the struggle.
We see, then, that the advantages which
may be gained by this country are few in
number, and in their nature contingent upon
occurrences that are yet uncertain On the
other hand, the very contingencies which are
relied upon to produce us solid advantages
are those which will inhict upon us the most
serious evils. Thus, the general and pro-
tracted war which will materially enrich our
grain growers and grain-merchants and fur
nish an unparalleled chance for building up
colossal and prosperous shipping interest,
will quickly operate adversely in other
directions. The gain on our bread
stufs will be wellnigh counteracted
10y losses on cotton, and by the stoppage of
the petroleum and other branches of trade.
The exceptional activity in some lines of
business will be counterbalanced by stagna-
revenue will suffer. And we may make up
our minds to meet financial and business dis
turbance as consequence of large return
of bonds from Europe, rise in the gold
premium, and an extensive unsettlement of
values corresponding to the fresh deprecia-
tion of our currency.
There can be no escape from the penalties
which at time like this are sure to follow an
inconvertible currency and heavy debt,
Z 10 n lorp avta
creditors The former circumstance exposes
us to evils which, on gold basis, would be
much less formidable; the latter places our
credit and our financial safety, in some de-
gree, at the mercy of peoples whom general
war would precipitate into the gravest of all
financial difficulties. Were hopes and wishes
the bases of reasoning, we might rest assured
that European investors would not SEND back
securities so remunerative and so solid as oul
own. We might insist that they are too shrewt
to exchange United States bonds, yielding
high rate of interest, for the bonds of any
European Government engulfed in the un
cretainties of a conflict of which no mar
knows the end. But experience is better
guide than hypothesis And the brief expe
rience We have had since France issued it,
declaration of war proves sufficiently wha
may be expected when the dimensions of tn,
strife grow larger, and its dangers are NOR,
or London, United States bonds have been tn
first to fall and their fall has been heaviest
At Frankfort there is literally no market TO
them; at London their decline is out of al
proportion to that borne by English consol
or French rentes. An effect upol
prices at once so startling and so i'm
mediate should dispel delusion whicl
many among us have cherished, and shoul
induce us to prepare for the heavy return o
bonds which must follow their continued de
probation in foreign markets. Had we go
back to specie payments, even this return
though embarrassing, would not necessaril
be disastrous. Our people took the bond
when they were issued, and will doubtles
be able to absorb them anew. But the re
turn of Government bonds now means th
export Of gold to pay for them; and the eI
port of large amounts of gold means furthe
depreciation in the value of greenbacks. Tai
as we may-try as we may to explain ava
the unpleasant prospect-this is what the r,
turn of bonds ina plies
Nor is this all. There ars vast sums G
railroad and other American securities, apal
from Government bonds, which, being hel
abroad, must closely sympathize with tt
declining price of fve-twenties. With theS
bonds we have been for some years accu
toned to adjust commercial balances "
have discharged current European indebte
ness with obligations which will now
forced upon the market. Of these securiti
not a few represent new railroad enterpris
which have no place in the Wall street lis
and these, we assume, must remain whe
they are. Others will follow in the track
the Government bonds. And any excess
imports over exports must be paid in coin i
stead of bonds, so swelling the source
disturbance and difficulty in the gold mark
of this country.