New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1870-07-11
France IND CUBA.

Tn n communication to THE TRIBUNE, pub
lisbed on Saturday, Gen. Jordan showed how
the United States might possibly become III
yolyed in the threatened European war, anu
how, in his opinion, we might relieve our
selves from the impending embarrassment. IL
France and Prussia come to blows on the Spanish
ouestion, he says, one of the first acts OF France
will be to seize upon Cuba; and as we have
virtually abiured the Monroe doctrine by re-
fusine to recognize Cuban belligerency, we
cannot consistently interfere unless we are
prepared to take sides formally in general
international struggle. But we have only TO
recognize the belligerency of Cuba, and the
difficulty, so far as we are concerned, Is at an
end. Heartily as we sympathize with the OBJ
iects to which Gen. Jordan has so noby de-
voted himself, we fear that we cannot follow
him to ali the conclusions which he has tersely
reasoned out in his strong and soldierly letter.
In the first place. it is not clear that we have
departed from the Monroe doctrine. The national
policy, as laid down by President Monroe in his
famous message of 1923, was that we should
neither entangle ourselves in the broils OF the
Old World, nor suffer the European Powers
TO extend their system to any portion OF
"this hemisphere We thus declared our pur-
pose to oppose any attempt OF the European
Powers to subjugate the republics of the New
World and we proved our devotion to that
principle when we insisted upon Napoleon's
eyacuating Mexico. We never bound ourselves
however, to fly to the assistance of American
colonies fighting to secure independence Of
their mother countries. We must naturally
Ill off lint We have
never admitted that we are bound to give
them material help. We cannot make our
selves the Don Quixote of nations. When
Cuba has once established herself as an indie
pendent republic, then the Monroe doctrine
will bind us Gf it is to be considered binding)
to resist any attempt by the Powers OF Europe
to subject her again to monarchical rule; but
so long as she is only trying to throw Oft her
allegiance to the State which has been her
owner ever since the first settlement by Eu-
rOpeans, we are not required, by any accepted
Interpretation of the Monroe doctrine, to in
terfere.
In the second place, we are not debarred, by
our present attitude on the Cuban question,
from taking any steps we may deem prudent
to prevent France from acquiring the island
Great international questions of this sort are
not settled by strict rules of law, but by
broad considerations of equity and expedience
Nobody supposes for instance, that France has
any exact legal right to object to the choice
of Prince Leopold as King of Spain; yet
many will admit that she has moral right to
declare war if that choice is persisted in. So
in the case of Cuba. While Spain is fighting
to preserve the rights which have been con-
coded to her there for generations, we may
silently acquiesce but if another Power, which
never had any rights over Cuba, should try to
establish itself in the Island, we should not
wait for an examination of technical propriety
or consistency, but interfere at once; and the
world would hold us perfectly justified. Gen.
Jordan, moreover, urges that if we did this we
should be Obliged after the contest was over,
to give the island back to the Spaniards.
This is by no means clear. We should inter-
fere not to help Spain but to protect ourselves,
and at the end of the war our obvious duty
would be to let the Cubans themselves decide
to whom they would belong.
Finally, we doubt whether one of the
"frst acts of France would be to seize
Havana The war of France is really against
Prussia, not Spain; and upon Prussia, of
course, the capture of Cuba would have no
effect whatever. Even to Spain its loss would
not be vital, for since the revolution it has
been only an embarrassment and an expense,
and the mother country would really be
stronger without it, Napoleon is too shrewd
to embroil himself with the United States for
the sake of conquest which would be of no
practical advantage to him, but great relief
!. L. IL
provinces; and to shoot at them by aiming
toward the West Indies would be too much
like undertaking the Liberation of Ireland by
a battle at Pigeon Hill