Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1870-09-16
The Siege OF Paris.

The Siege OF Paris.
In our last article we said that the sue
cessful resistance Of Paris depends upon
two eIements-the material and the moral
1.-THE type, however, changed the last word
into "the nerve" ...
We expressed our opinion that the
moral element is defective, owing to the
want of discipline and confidence.
With regard to the material clement 1t
is also more than whispered that arms and
ammunition are deficient. This may be,
however. the croaking of the timid or dis
affected
Surprising Paris to have Drive ana
annie garrison and two months supplies
of food and ammunition, what are the
conditions of the military problem Of its
capture
It was the opinion Of Wellington, IN
1914, when Paris was not fortified ct all
except by few haStily-built earthworks'
that an attack upon that city was most
difficult and hazardous operation-io be
avoided by all possible means. He ex-
pressed this opinion emphatlcaly, and
Paris fell only owing to political and inter
nal causec.
If such was the Judgment Of so accom-
plished q General in 1914, what would 1t
be now that Paris is encircled by the most
gigantic Notifications in the world? At
an average distance of about three miles
from the thickly settled part Of the city
runs continuous belt, composed OF q
, rampant of solid earth supported by wall
of strongest masonry. Il is forty-1ive feet
from the TOP Of the rampant TO the bottom
S of the ditch, which is twenty metres
(G4 fiji wide and filed with water. IhIa
5 line, twenty-five miles long. forms an ir-
, regular ellipse and has niaety-four bas-
: tions, each armed with ten guns Of heavy
= calib re-
= But before an enemy can approach this
formidable belt, he comes upon an outer
= belt Of fifteen detached forts-all per1na-
0 nent works, revetted with masonry, and at
Q an average distance CT two miles from the
g inner belt. These forts are situated upon
d the most commanding eminences around
: the city and mount altogether 2, 800 heavy
i guns, crossing their fires over all tho IN
i tervening ground. Each has It's own
IL magazines, water, classmates, &C., and
should any one be captured it would be
Immediately made too hot to hold by the
fire of its right and left neighbors. Ii
:. would be impossible for an enemy to ap-
~ proach the inner belt before silencing one
= or more Of these forts, aud each of them
= would require IL regular siege. II straight
lines were drawn, joining these forts, they
would form an irregular polygon OF thirty
Eve miles in perimeter. Consequently al
enemy wishing to cut off the city and Its
defenses from all external communication
Q would have to occupy line about htty
miles around. In addition to the defen
! ces erected by art, others are afforded b.
= the Seine, which makes great doubl
y bend on the West the Canal of Ourcc
. reverted with masonry like great moa
- on the North, and the Seine and Marne
which join on the South East, within can
non range of the inner belt and several o
= the forts. This description which, hk
y all others, must be obscure, without
map, will at least give some idea Of tn
- difficulties in the way of an attackin
~, force.
6
,re of 600, 900 men merely to invest the place
an and even then, the Gordon would be SO thi
o. as to be liable to be broken at any time b
-tv q sortie of 40, 900 men, which could easil
DO made by garrison of 100000. Beside
.va this extended linz would run a continu;
7lv risk OF being pierced and rolled up by
nd relieving army. IF the besiegers should b
itz obliged to concentrate at one point
cir meet such an army, then the Gordon wou
be broken at sore other. 4 siege undo
90 such conditions would certainly illustra
If the remark of On eminent military write
b,e that colossal undertakings fail by reason
,ad their own magnitude.
on Now consider the results of the sieges
md Strasburg, Metz, Thionville, Montmed
de- Toul, Phalsburg, &C., not one OF which b
i've yet capitulated, and all Of which have i
/ of fiicted heavy losses upon the besiegers, al
be you will perceive what time, labor and OF
Eff of life it will take to capture-not Paris
not but any one of the strong forts around
reat But let US suppose the siege to be turn
to into blockade.
Imagine for moment the condition
rtil- 600, 900 men, three hundred miles fri
the their own frontier, with all France In ar
war. swarming like wasps around them. T
heir hundred thousand more would be need
orce | to cover their line OF communicate
oept How would it be possible to supply for o