The Pulaski citizen. [volume] (Pulaski, Tenn.) 1866-current, 1870-09-30
GEN. BEAUREGARD on THE WAR.
The Ex-COnfederate soldier nter-
viewed,

viewed,
A correspondent Of the IynchbuTg
Republican writing from Allegheny
! Springs, Virginia, relates . converse
ton with Gen. Beauregard about the
war in Europe, Some Of the Generals
views are of interest:
The question was asked: what is the
matter with France? Consider her
former military fame, that of the first
warning nation in nEuTope-eonsider her
patriotism, the devotion and readiness
with which she went to the field, her
noble, unsurpassed pOstponement Of
every political question, of every fac
ton in her legislative body to win the
safety of her country, even the +" I'M
practicales," like FaYre and, Thiers,
shouting "resistance to the death!'
Look at her ready and even excessive
| loans to the Government her public
spirit risen to height that disdains all
con promises, and hurries to offer all
possible sacrifices. Then why her de-
! feat, and her defeat continued and ag-
| gravated on every fieId?t Why success
sion of disasters Is it not possible
| that there may have been treachery in
| the French camp, as when the Empe-
ror. is reported to have made the excIa-
ton that @ he was betrayed" and in
deed you noticed in the last accounts,
the French soldiers in Belgium turn
ed upon their officers and nlassacred
! them"
| CAUSE OF THE FRENCH FAILURE.
Gen. Beauregard replied at length,
and with q clearness and detail of con-
Yersation that I do not pretend to re-
| port, but in the third and distant per-
! Son. The hypothesis that had been
named, the suspicious of treachery, or
! degross incompetency thrown on par
/ ticular French officers were possible
/ but they were not necessary to answer
| thdebroblem of the French defeat At
| ter all, it might be. found in slight
causes. War, modern war, had got TO
! be such an elaborate competition, one
so close and eXacting, that the least
shade Of superiority in any one respect
might incline the balance. The French
/ system of attack was 4 traditional one.
They relied on momentum, dash, He
referred to an article in the Pail Mall
| Gazette, which compared the military
systems and pTactIce on the field of
France and Prussia. The latter had
/ the advantage in the close and serupu-
| IOUs circulation Of everything calcplat-
ed to give advantage to the single sol
| der acting as q cOn1batant, and inspir
ed with the idea that on his individual
effort depended the fortune Of the field.
Here was a government that had stud
I 81 the military efficiency of the man
ka1most e -ciusively, to the highest
kpoint. a govesAmeng more eXacting
than the Oriental despOtism /; but more
Intelligent than these. The whole So
4.eiety of Prussia was a vast elaborate
organization, n camp; the supreme
/ idea everywhere visible that the man
| belonged TO the government. Form,
severity was the feature of the civiliza-
ton; popular education was enforced
even its social industries were OrganiZ-
led In Prussia no man could pursue q
Ezlde unless he had served an appren-
sl9ceship, or performed certain public
conditions. The idea of the great Fire.
derich had been constantly cultivated
since his time, to make nation of 9
diers; organization and discipline In
every department of life; and to-day
we see its results in the most perfectly
trained armies, and soldiers the most
enskasSiastic, having that peculiar COM
I1t10n of steadinesS with spirit, that
5Ilakes the best soldiers - the world
and that is the end, discrimination
Of all military education.
ATTACKING, IN CLosE COLUMN.
Who''-and GtkI. Beauregard spoke
with a suffused fave" could doubt the
:
bravest people il the world may fall
under the complications of science-the
force of a single fact overlooked in the
grand and elaborate competition Of
war; He had noticed, IS far as any
thing could be discovered from the con-
fused dispatches Of the newspapers,
that the French had adhered to their
fav0rite, traditional practice in the
field, that of attacking in close column.
On the other hand, the Prussials de-
ployed their lines, seemed to have the
constant idea of developing the largest
front Of fire, and all the newspapers had
Invariably remarked the sIowness and
deliberation of their fire. It was q cir
cunlsta1ce noticedWith curious unanin1-
itY by all the wal. correspondents. >. An
article in the Virginian, under his hand,
read: "The Prussians neveEekt tack in
squares"
THE ARMS OF PRECISION.
What the. General designated "a he
arms of precision had changed the
whole character OF modern war, and he
feared that the French had not sUffi-
GENTLY accommodated themselves to
the important and radical innovation
made in small arms. Their faYorite
ideayOf attacking in close column, and
carrying the field with q rush, was good
in former circumstances; brilliant;
supplied the two conditions of physical
momentum and moral inspiration.
But the arm of precision has changed
all that.
BEAUREGARD'S INTERVIEW WITH THE
PERoR.
"I had an Interview. said Gen.
Beauregaard, " with the Emperor. Ma
poleon in 1862 The fact, as known
l..
from Gen. Beauregard, but from a
member of the press, of Paris, is that
Gen. Beauregard visited the French
capitol in 1866, was received there-at
the Grand Hotel-With an ovation that
surprised his modesty, and was invited
to q special interview with the Empe-
ror, who, with characteristic and, IN
deed, noble desire to acquire infOrma-
ton, asked our great Southern general
pointedly what most remarkable and
significant fact he had observed in the
war out Of which he had just come,
with worldwide and immortal reputa-
ton. Gen. Beauregard replied with
dissertation on the use of the small-arm.
| He gave the Emperor a manual illus
| tration Of the subject, repeating his re-
markable conviction of the change
which the arm of precision had made
/ in the art of war. That arm had made
calculation the virtue of the modern
soldier. Formerly, with the old smooth
bore musket, the soldier fired in the
air; his enemy was only mass in
front of him; now, with the chessepot
and needIe-gnn, where a man. could
/ kill at 2, 200 yards, he fired upon an in
GividuaI enemy he could select him
1t had become. an exact mechanical
task for the soldier to kill his enemy.
He. (Gen. b. had. one advice which he
constantly gave to his soldiers on eve
Ty occasion; it was his dogma, his con
slant remark whenever he had the op-
portunity to speak to the private SOL
der: I" fire low and fire slow"
The common fault of the soldier in