The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1870-08-25
THE SITUATION.

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Positions Of the BelIiserents.
The dispatches published this morning are unusu-
ally confused and contradictory. From London are
sent reports that no junction has been effected be-
tween Marshals MacMahon and Bazaine, while from
Paris IL repeated the statement that they have
united. Both reports are likely enough to contain
modlcum OF truth. 1t is not probable that the
whole OF MacMahon's army has been sent
10 Montmedy by way Of Rheims aud
Mezieres, ana this we stated yesterday In our
article on the situation. Undoubtedly the French
force concentrated at Chalons and vicinity after the
battle OF woerth, must have been very large. In adj
dition TO the large force Of regulars which were In
depot prior to that engagement and which mum.
pered some eighty thousand men, there was Marshal
Canrobert's corps, which, united to the corps OF
MacMahon and DE Faly, must certainly have made
no fnconsiderabie force. Furthermore, the Corps
Legislatr enacted law calling into active service
all unmarried and widowed citizens between
certain ages who had served their terms In
the regular army and been discharged between the
years 1859 and 1858. 1t was stated In the Corps
Legislatif that by this law the government would
obtain shree hundred thousand veteran troops; and
even we reject these figures too tign 1t is evil
dent that powerful force OF drilled men were
at once called into active service. This
highest importance, as showing that the army
reported to be at Montmedy and that said to be
between verdun and st. Menenoud are not COM
posed OF raw recruits but or drilled veterans many of
whom participated in the Italian aud Mexican wars
and IN the wars in Algeria. We shall not estimate
the total strength OF the drilled force, but 1t must
be great enough to enable MacMahOn' to reinforce
Bazane heavily by way OF MOntmedy, and to con-
Time his strategic manGuvres towards Verdun by
way OF st. Menehould. What these manGuvres are
II ID dincult to conjecture. We are assured from
Paris that important movements are In progress II
we were certain that MacMahon has the 176, 900 men
he is credited with, ana that the Crown Prince
Of Prussia has not fallen back from ST.
Dizier we should say that the French were
endeavoring to throw force on the left flank Of
Prince Frederick Charles, by moving down from st.
MenehOuld, making Verdun pivot as It were. But
this movement would require strong force to hold
the Crown Prince In check should he endeavOr to
reinforce Prince Frederick Charles, and we have no
knowledge OF The french possessing any such force.
Besides the dispatches repeat the statement pre-
vlousiy made to the erect that the Crown Primo Q
had halted at St. Dizier and was falling back.
Our latest report Of the whereabouts Of Bazaine's
army comes from Brussels. It Is stated to be In
"a Prussian net," between Metz and Grandevange
Csilvange y and the little river Orne and the road
from Meta to Etain. This would place him in o
triangle, and so small one that 1t seems surpris-
ing that the Prussians have not assaied him by the
nank, front and rear. In an open country, without
f0rtifcat0ns his position would be Infinitely worse
than II he were shut up In Metz. 1t Ii altogether
more probable thar he is In the vicinity Of Etain
ana that his Ia not threatened by the Germans
at present. should he be where this correspondent
locates him 1t would make probable the report II
Paris that another battle was fought Sunday II
which the Prussians were repulsed Nothing of thi
| engagement has been reported from Berlin. 1t IL
OF course, possible for the Prussians hold all tn
roads by which Bazaine could retreat or advance bu
II they do they have certainly let whole week pass
80 far as we are aware, without endeavoring to de-
stroy him. That 100, 900 men from Montmedy could
open road to his rear is clearly evident from the
position which he Is said to hold necesstating the
guarding OF extended lines. These, forming tr
angle, would not be less than forty miles in length.
Everything Ii 80 muddled by contradictory reports
that no clear idea can be formed Of the exact posi-
ton Of the French. The reticence OF the military
authorities Is natural enough but IL Ia strange thai
we get nothing from Belgium Of Trustworthy
nature.
That the ROAD to Paris is open to the Prussians II
evident from the fact that force south of Chaons
liz spoken Of In the desDacthes. Undoubtedly 1t II
the policy Of the French to allow the army of the
crown Prince to penetrate into the country even te
fOrtresses surrounding Paris. The fertilizer he gets
from the armies Of Prince Frederick Charles and
General SteinmetZ the greater would be the chance
Of the French defeating both armies in detail. OF
course the Prussian commanders are aware Of this
that accounts for the reiterated reports Of the
falling back Of the Grown Prince. We must not
forget however, that a despatch from Paris reports
vUfr O ont hot allow
departments Of the Aube and Cote d'Or. This has
doubtless been the work Of raidng parties of the
German cavalry, which has shown great boldness
and dash since the opening Of the campaign. II
would be rather singular II the Crown Prince were
to move 30 far south as Troyes, the principal place
IN the department Of Aube, In his movement on
Paris.
OF the movements OF the German forces we ge,
nothing direct, either from Berlin or London, OF
Paris. Charges against them Of firing upon Belgian
troops and violating the neutrality Of Belgium
proves that they have moved north and must be in
the vicinity Of Longwy. We also have them 10.
Gated on the railroad between Thionville and Metz
and on the road between Metz and verdun. Their
line is evidently OF great length and must describe
very nearly q quadrangle. We a-e in the
dark as to whether they are moving
for any particular point. II they have
Bazaine, as The Brussels despatch reports, we
should think they would make desperate effort to
crush him before MacMahon comes up. 1t may be
that they tried TO do this on Sunday and were re.
pulsed. or they may be endeavoring to get between
verdun and Montmedy, and thus prevent the troops
at the first named place and ST. Menehould forming
q junction with the forces at Montmedy. This how.
ever could only be II Bazaine not OF or near Metz
II he is in the triangle referred to- the Prussian
army could not advance without the certainty Of an
attack on Its rear
ADDRESS OF The GERMAN.AMERICANS.