The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1870-07-29

apparent in their movements either IN re.
gard to time orsEpace scarcel over an IN
stance of u Enaneayre crlbrae Ing more IMAM
two hattalipns M oregyer when tne pian
of attack fs toterably clearly Geslgnea u
Fgenerally rests on the formation OF several
columns. isolated, dfverging from each
other, starting from points wide apart, and
marching directly upon different points OF
the eneny's position without single NJ
raBgement for concentration among tneM
all"
A reply to Colonel Pisani In the military
journal Of Berlin, the M1lttdrfsche WocheD-
batter, of November, 1853, asserts that the
reason why single companies are employed
In this isolated manner In Prussia Is that
their captains are experienced and care
fully instructed men, accustomed 10 great
responsibility, and to taking upon them,
selves the right to act, which is not allowed
among the French, "Who are thus rem
dered incapable of adopting the Prusslan
tactics, even if they might wish to do So
| It appears, then, that the conditions OF 1850
are reversed that the routine and parade
ground regularity of the Prussians has been
succeeded by want of regularity and q
| want of arrangement so great as to startle
| the French, whose very first principle was
the outbreak Of war the very recollection
of the parade ground"
"The French" says our Prussian writer
| in the Mihtarische Batter, cannot adopG
| the Prussian tactics even if they wish. These
tactics require previous scientific educa-
ton, general as well as military, which rem
ders the officers familiar with the great In
cidents of war, and which, as consequence,
gives them the power of deciding rapidly
and simultaneously and this IL Is lmpossl-
BILE to find, or even to hope for among
| body Of officers where, as in france, Inc
majority have risen from the ranks" FER
ha1s a more remarkable shifting of opinion
| has never been seen since the nrst DAYS Oh
the French revolution.
There can be but little doubt that, where
as the French tactics, which were decided
| " in advance of all others in 1860, have not
undergone any striking change since tnaI
date, those of Prussia have been entirely
modified. The perpendicular order-the
breadth-the theoretical Prussian forma-
| ton for attack, is one OF those recommen-
| dations which has been acted upon. The
great autumn nlanGuvres, the improved
military educational system, are part OF hls
recommendation to give the chiefs OF the
army an acquaintance with the working of
the three arms. Prussia has certainly taken
the lead in the elasticity of her tactics,
which indeed were so stretched at times dll-
ring the war of 1855 as entirely to lose eli
| semblance of their normal shape.
1t may or may not be that she has gone
| too far. At all events, all Europe owes her
| gratitude for taking the lead in abollsMng,
| that painful and cumbrotis system OF drill
which she was the first to lntllct upon Eua
ropean armies.
The Prussians employ in the attack what
is known as perpendicular ORDER" in
which, theoretically, the army is formed in
\ 1t,f a fCnnf
The true spirit of this perpendicular order
is thus defined in the last number of the
Journal of the United Service Institution !:
can advanced guard goes to the front,
reconnoitres, spreads out, feels the enemy,
ascertains which are really the weak points,
and on the principle Of engaging as many
troops as possible, and getting L.: much out
of them as possible, very Otter engages in Il
very severe attack, and very often bears the
brunt of the battle. The main body fol-
lows, not necessarily so near as to be IN
volved in the attack of the advanced guard,
but so near that when the advanced guard
has found the weak points it may attack
with its fresh, unbroken masses upon the
points selected, or following out the system
of flank attack. while the advanced guard
continues its front attack the main body
moves round to the flank and endeayors to
outflank the enemy, so that the attack OF
the advanced guard becomes feint. Then
there is the reserve, the troops OF Which
should be held in hand by the commanding
general, so that they may be used, II neces-
sary, to complete the decisive shock at the
right moment, or to cover the retreat"
The Prussian battalion on war footing
| is composed of four companies of 30 men,
and is thus 1000 strong. The French Dat-
TALON on a war footing contains SIX compa-
MES of from 100 to $50 men, and thus has
mean effective strength Of about S0O.. The
Prussian battalion is thus stronger In the
proportion of about five 60 four. But the
Prussan company is nearly double the
strength of the French company, and Is re-
gulated by the minimum OF troops to be
commanded by mounted officer
whereas the French company is OF the
maximum strength, which can be COM
manded by an officer. on foot. The Prus-
sian colonel of battalion finds under him
| four mounted officers, each OF whom com
mands a body of go men with four
officers, and there is a natural ten
dency, fostered by the system Of drill
and tactics, for each Of these companies
| TO isolate itself and assume independ-
ence in action. How this grows has
been we'll shown by the author of Tack
| tische Ruckbicke THAT remarkable criti-
cism by Prllssian officer on the war OF
1866. On entering under the enemy's tire
the four company columns of the battalion
take different routes to obtain shelter. The
commanding officer of the battalion, dis
mounted, is obliged to attach himself to one
company. The number in each company
being more than can be properly COM
manded by an officer on foot, each captain,
when he is forced by the nature OF the
ground to dismount, loses control over his
men, and they in turn seeking each his own
line for safety's sake, the company itself be-
comes broken up. So long, it is argued,
as there is an advance and success, SO
long this is comparatively unimpor-
tant but as soon rs it becomes ques-
without cohesion, without commanders,
become mixed, and joining together as best
they may, form bodies which are wanting
| in the elements of unity and of strength.
Such were the extraordinary mixed columns
on which the Hanoverian cavalry threw
themselves at LangansalZa, composed not
only Of entire companies, but of detached
individuals and fractions from many bat
talions. Here, say the French, is the weak
point Of the Prussian company system. On
| the other hand, the PrusSians, as we have
seen, claim for this system that SO long rs
they have captains really capable Of taking
command, and acting Independently, SO
long is this company the best unit for
movements under the precise fire of mod
ern arms. It is, in fact, the key of their
whole system of infantry tactics. They say
that in this power of breaking up battle
into number of partial and local actions,
lies their real superiority; but even the
most enthusiastic admirers Of the system
admit that under reverse, and if reyerses