Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1870-08-26
HOW THE WAR WILL AFFECT


The New York Bulletin, paper de-
voted to commercial and financial affairs
sees little ground for hoping that peace,
come when it may, will restore our finan-
cial relations with Europe to the same
condition they occupied before the war.
However brief the war may prove to be,
vet it will leave both France and Prussia
weaker in all the elements of national
wealth. The Bulletin says that France
will suffer greatly from invasion, and
although Prussia may escape that curse,
yet the slaughter of her sons in invading
French soil viii constitute terrible drain
upon the resources of the country. Large
numbers of the agricultural and manu-
featuring populations of both France and
Prussia viii either be slaughtered or per-
manently disabled; and while the pro-
ductive resources are thus diminished the
taxation viii be largely increased Rail
roads, bridges and even cities win be laid
waste, calling for millions of capital to
restore them as the first results of peace.
After going through a similar process,
during our late war, we found ourselves
unable to supply our wants from our own
resources of labor and capital, and for
seven years we have been exchanging our
war bonds with Europe, chiefly with the
very people now engaged in hostilities,
for such commodities as We needed, I'M
til we have, in this way, contracted q
foreign debt of about 81, 900, 900, 900.
Until the outbreak OF the war, this pro-
cess of exporting our securities to Ger
many was kept up in full force; can we
reasonably conclude that 1t will be con-
tinued after peace2 We have seen that
after our war, we found it necessary to bor-
row largely abroad; what reason have
we for supposing that Germany and
France will prove so far exceptional to
this rule that, instead of borrowing, like
US, they will actually become lenders to
asl Already, the belligerents are active
borrowers and find free takers of their
loans; and, as the war progresses, their
loans will be increased. With the bust
ness depression that generally succeeds
war, an increase of taxation, and the ma
tural recovery in the value of all home
securities which usually follows peace, 1t
is to be expected that on the conclusion
of the war the demand from French and
German investors would be confined to
their own securities. Following peace
then, there would be this very important
d ference between our exchanges with
Europe and the condition antecedent to
the war; that whereas we have been able
to send out $75, 900. 900 to 500, 00e, 900
Of securities per annum, this resource for
adjusting our foreign Indebtedness would
fail us. Peace, therefore, would be very
far from bringing US the advantages
which sanguine party In Wall street
appear to anticipate. One OF two things
must continue after peace, for consider
able period. Either the prices of securi-
ties must rule low or the spremium on
gold must range high. SO as to keep our
securities at gold values too low to admit
of the return of bonds from Europe, and,
further, also to admit of temporary ship
ments to London when the adverse con-
dition of exchanges is draining us of
specie. 1t is clear that peace will not re-
lieve US of the hecessity of a sweeping
revision of our business with Europe. If
we cannot continue to pay for one-fourth
of our importations with bonds, then we
must import less; and, until we have
learned that lesson, we shall stand ex-
posed to heavy shipments of gold, with
wide fluctuations in the premium and In
the prices of all articles sold at currency
quotations.