New-York tribune., 1870-11-15
TIVE EupRROR,y APOLOGy.

| form of a pamphlet OstensIbly written by an
officer of the general staff, but really dictated,
"a we are assured on good authority, by tho
imperiaI prisoner himself. The London Figaro,
| for which this brochure has beon translated
| from advance proofs, is BOnapartist organ,
| undisguisedly devoted to the interests OF the
exiled dynasty, and refecting the sentiments
| of that faction-by no means 80 inslgnihcaht
az one might s1ppose--wbich dreams OF
restoration OF the fallen house after Franco
| has suffered while longer from tho anarchy
of q so-called republic. This faction is eDer
getc, able, and apparently sanguine. Prac-
| ticed in the dark ways of diplomacy and in
trigue, it has established comfortable relations
with high circles in several of the European
capitals and we presume that absolutists gen
| orally would regard its success with cOmpOsure
| if not with delight Napoleons pamphlet is its
| first manifesto-a document intended to
smooth the way to q restoration, by proving
that the Man of Sedan is the only person who
has understood the condition of France from the
start, and that had the country submitted to
his guidance, generals Obeyed his orders and
ministers and deputies trusted in his capacity,
all would have gone well.
The defense seems even weaker, now that
we read it in full, than it did in the tee-
| graphic synopsis. If any evidence were
| needed that Louis Napoleon never possessed
the talent for government for which the world
| has given him credit, that evidence is here.
| He shows himself drifting hither and thither
| on the tide of circumstances, making war to
catch the breath of popular applause, though
conscious all the while of his own weakness,
and letting the reins fall from his hand in
that supreme hour of peril when, if ever, the
nation needed resolute master From the
first, he tells us, he knew that Prussia could
call out 100000 men, while France could
muster only 100000, and his sole hope was to
throw himself suddenly across the Rhine, and
separate the Southern States from the North
| German Confederation. And yet he knew
| according to his own confession. that the
organization of the French army was so
radically bad that a movement OF tins KIND
| against Prussia was impossible. lie knew that
while the Prussan corps and materel were so
posted that at O moments warning the entire
army could be modified, the labor of weeks
would be required to bring the French regi-
ments up to war-footing, and months to
concentrate them on any part of the frontier.
| He draws an appalling picture of the defects
| in the French military system, the mischievOus
location of the various depOts, and above all
the complications arising from the policy of
| Capitalization, which rendered it impossible
| even TO give a recruit musket without an
| order from Paris, and paralyzed the energies
of subordinate commanders by tying them up
! with administrative routine. And who, pray,
was responsible for this wrctched system
Napoleon is impudcnt enough to throw the
blame on the Opposition in the Chambers,
| which persistently refused the aid necessary
"to accomplish the most important reforms"
| Nobody needs to be reminded that the Cham
bers have been little better than recorders OF
the imperial WILL that the Opposition never
had the power to refuse the necessary and,
that the organization Of the French army was
the work of tho Emperor himself and the late
Marshal Mel and whatever he has required to
place it in q condition of efficiency he has
been in position to demand He dares not
tell the truth. The faults of organization
were those of hopeessly bad design, aggra-
waited by fraud and incapacity in the admins
tratiOn. The creatures of the Tuilerles were
pensioned with army contracts; the service
was full of swinders and corruptOnists,
whom the Court was afraid to punish and
woman's wics could almost always obtain for
favorite concession" to plunder the
treasury by providing the troops with worth
less arms ammunition, and stores. Promo
ton was granted by favortisIn soldiers lost
respect for their commanders and the corps
d'elte of the French army were filled with
dissoute ignorant, and dishonest officers until
they became absolutely rotten IL Napoleon
and LebGuf knew the true state of things,
what shall we say of their voluntarily plung
ing into q war with the most formidable
Power in the world I If they did not know
it, how shall we find words to characterize
their shameful incapacityf
1t was with no light heart, if we can believe
this apology, that Napoleon entered upon the
campaign. In the midst of the satisfaction
" Occasioned by the enthusiasm which every
"where greeted his footsteps, many observed
L" the look of sadness with which he listened
"tO shouts of Onward to Berinn uttered by
"the excited multitude But he provoked the
war on the most frivolous Of pretexts, and the
archives of the 1uilerics, brought to light since
his overthrow, have shown that he knew the
| French people were averse to war quite as
well rs he knew that they were unready for
it, There was no shout of Onward to Berlin !"
till he raised it himself Olivier, Magne, the
departmental officers, all had warned him that
the public wanted peace. The French were
busy with industry and trade, and had no
uneasiness about Prussia What drove him
into war was not the impulse of the people,
but the necessities of the dynasty. The decla-
ration of hostilties was inspired neither by
the aggressions of Prussia nor by the ridicu-
lous Hohenzollern business, but simply by dis