The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-01

suit OF our dcfeat thus looking e. thinks on tAaf
nsUuss w ne ss soi Of Fra sis a ~
this one Described Pruesia and Rnssin Wou11 rHee
themselves up ccrrespoadingiy The ee<tasA usih.
plished fset Austria, trsssed at once as anosher
ing to her behavior during the wa, weuid be at snT
rate secured prey, the German debris q yNcn
one for Russia; the Eastern questiJn wo6n be
settled Rt once without bearing from rs ana Eng
a o o rsce gsG an uGf b Hss e
would not likely cucumber these comhf1akfnB q
the new arbtrators Of the Continent q.
soft than faithful hand. shouid we hea1tske p
throwing aside, at least In ths supreme hour ~ Of
under the itS national M Sass Aud how couls he s.
prize to US II we were obliged hencefofHard - carry
pavilion OF old France, but that could not noat any
more but at the win Of all European capr6es7
II remains ,sa for us 70 examine the hypctseEz cf
OF France while witnessing the coskinukl azEraa-
dizement Of Prussia end the progress o. qskrofn
Wedo lot need 10 issnu,ats mat sAis d "a aast
probable hypothesis Of all tor erery oA~xoe tsafse
Is not that the Prussian Government naeana % po-
woke it; on the contrary, It is wen known tha& by
sincerely attached to peace bat in spite Of ta mn
OF men the situation 10 for II is almoes
possibility that Prussia With al ser prutsnce shenia
it impossible that the French Governnaent wish Al
their f0rbearance, should let Prussia 90 wkhouf
resisting 1t, sword In hand7
But as events In this world very often baffe and
fortune bellies the best grounded provisone OF Han
foresight, it s not absolutely impossible taat
hypothesis Of peace that is the probable oopsateD
| ces of long-continued maction on the paft,zof
truth chow to US very clearly that the resnh OF e
inaction would be about the same II Frapss WsA
thoroughly defeated, with the only -d1Qsrence
| that In the first case 1t would burst foftA on
milder form and IN not so ehert length Of the
single state accompanied in the prssence Of French
inaction after q French defeat that mot alone
would be the declension beyond call OF French
grandeur 1t is said that this long -contnuad peace
OF France , would che check THIS Germany uisN No
relative strength Of Prussia ana Of the rest OF
| many that remains TO be conquered by her: the
always increasing prestige that would be lent her by
the withdrawal OF the French rivalry; and, lastly
the seeds Of death that Austria bears, and the M
! creasiDg influence OF Russia, which hopes for the
| dissolution OF that disgraced empire. What could
do then, with the 81 millions OF united 0ermansf
And, besides this, sill shut eyes TO the tre-
mendous proportion in which the German popuia-
tions multiply themselves7 Take old Prussia aione
from 1917 to 1864 her population increased 81 per
cent-from 10, 900 10 49, 400 0o0whne the French
population only increased 20 per cent 10 the same
| period. What could we do, having at our very
doors 81 millions Of an enlightened, coneeRtrsked,
disciplined people, and fitted up with an resources
Why, il is often asked, why nour.sh 30 gloomy
presaQes and not believe that Germany, onoe
united. win become peaceful power, devoted only
tention OF d0mineering In Europe, ind6erent as to
the acquisition Of Holland, and by no means tempssd
Of reconquering some day the German provinces
OF France? Why? Because this would be the fyst
time IN the uorlds history that we should 500 great
power stopping on its way Of aQgrandisement by Q
feeling OF justice in order to respect the feeble
half-destroyed by its own hand, to refraia from
ing displayed an ambition superior to fss bearn "a
yield to the fear OF much smoition.