The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1870-07-20

In regard to what constitutes contraband of
war, and therefore not included In this eXemp-
tlon from seizure, the practice, since the decla.
ration, has been far more liberal than formerly
towards the belligerents.
Now, 1t Is customary for the belligerents to
declare by proclamation the list of forbidden
articles, wfiichis allowed to include many not
| formerly forbidden. Until such official Lists
appear, shippers from this country will do
well to be cautious about shipping anything of
q doubtful character, or that can by stretch OF
| construction be classed as c0ntraband. It
easy to see that as France Is superior to Prus-
| sia IN naval force, and as all priVateering is
abolished, there will be q great temptation to
stretch the Emperor's authority, and to render
| the exemption clause of little effect by inclu-
ding everything possible under the contra.
band exemption. We toresee much trouble
from this source, and we, therefore, desire to
not throw away the profits Of large legitimate
trade by an attempt to supply any warlike
material to either combatant. With these re-
marks we append In full the text Of the agree
ment now binding on the belligerents:
Declaration respecting maritime law, signed
| by the plenipotentiaries Of Great Britain, Aus.
| tria, France, Prussia, Russia, Sardinia and
Turkey, assembled In congress at Paris, April
18th, 1856:
"The plenipotentiarles who signed the
treaty of Paris of the 30th of March, 1885, as
sembled In conference, considlng-
"That maritime law in time Of war, has
long been the subject of deplorable disputes;
| t'That the uncertainty of the law, and Of the
duties in such matter, gives Rise to difference
| of opinion between neutrals and belligerents
which may occasion serious difficulties, and
even conflicts;
NThat 1t Is consequently advantageous to es-
tablish uniform doctrince on so Important
point;
"Thst the plenlpotentiaries assembled in
congress at Paris cannot better respond to the
| intention by which their governments are AMI
mated than by seeking to introduce into In
ternational relations fixed principles in this re-
spect.
"The above mentioned plenipotentlaries, De-
| ing duly authorized, resolved to concert
among themselves as to the means OF attaining
this object; and. having come to On agree
ment, have adopted the following solemn de-
claration: 10
81. Privateering Is aHd remains abolished.
t2. The neutral flag covers enemy's goods
with the exception Of contraband of war.
SO. Neutral goods, with the exception of
contraband Of war, are not liable to capture
under enemy's flag.
"4. Blockades, In order to be binding, must
be effective; that is to say, maintained by q
force sufficient really to prevent access to the
coast of the enemy.
"The governments of the undersigned pleni-
potentiaries engage to bring the present de-
claration to the knowledge OF the States
which have not taken part In the Congress Of
Paris, and to invite them to accede to 1t.
"ConYinced that the maxims which they
now proclaim cannot but be received with
gratitude by the whole world, the undersigned
plenipotentiaries doubt no. that the efforts OF
their governments to obtain the general adop7
| ton thereof will be crowned with full success.
| 1.-THE present declaration is not and shall not
| IA tindinp except betHeen those powers VINO
| have acceded, or shall accedc to 1t.
"Done at Paris, the sixteenth Of April, one
thousand eight hundred and ftty-sX."
Signed by Buol Schauenstein, Hubner, Wa
teuffel, Hatfield, Orlof, Brunnow, Cavour,
| De Viliamarina Aall, and Mehemmed Djemil
How will Spain stnndl
From the New York Journal Of Commerce.
We are at, this moment without sufficient
data for forming a sound opinion concerning
| the probable course Of Austria, Italy, Russia,
and certain other continental nations In the
| impending struggle between France and Prus-
sia. But, with reference to Spain. which until
within few days, was apparently enlisted on
the side of Prussia, 1t may be confidently said
that no necessity longer exists for her TO array
herself against France, and that her future in
terests seem to demand 1mperatively that she
should be neutral In the contest Until Prince
/
the Spanish throne, Spain was bound in honor
to Join Prussia In war with France,
should such an event be precipitated.
But, with the retirement of that can
| didate, no such obligation Is strictly Inn
posed upon her. The difficulty between France
and Prussia nominally grows out Of the origi,,
nal dispute about conferring the crown ,ot
Spain upon the Prince of Hohenzollern Prns-
sia now declines to give France formal disa-
vowal Of having taken any part or interest in
\ the Princes candidature, and refuses to re-
nounce now and forever all pretensions
Of the Hohenzollern family to the Span
ish throne. To the rest Of the world France
| may seem over-sensitVe and exacting In re-
auiring such ackn0wledg and such guar
antees. But the French people and the French
Emperor, who are the best Judges Of their
| own affairs, choose TO consider such pledges
of future security as necessary. Coupled with
the imputed violation by Prussia OF the treaty
OF Prague, and the general apprehension OF
the gravest dangers to France II Prnsslan am
tIon regards the refusal of Prussia to enter into
the required obligations as sufficient cause
for war. With all the other difficulties between
France and Prussia excepting the candidature
OF Prince Leopold (from which, as 1t seems to
us, she is entirely extricated by the withdraw
al Of the Prince,) Spain has nothing whatever
to do. No point of honor, and certainly no po-
litical or material interest, cOmpels her, or
makes 1t expedient for her, to enlist with Prus-
sla In the quarrel. If she keeps out Of 1t,
France will possess one advantage In her con-
test with Prussia, compared to what her posi-
| ton would have been had Prince Leopold ac-
cepted the candidature, and the Spanish Gov
ernment committed itself to making him King.
Napoleon would then have been obliged to
fight with an enemy on either side. He would
have been compelled to send an army into
Spain, or at least to keep powerful corps OF
observation on the Pyrenees frontier, while
he contended with Prussia on the Rhine. "A
large portion OF his feet would have been
set to blockade Spanish ports, and perhaps
to operate in the West Indies. His forces, by
| land aud sea. would have been divided. Al
though Spain could not do much to help Pri,s-
sia, she could do something, II only by divert
ing France from an effective concentration of
ali her strength against her great antagonist
Spanish neutrality, under these circumstances,
becomes of considerable importance to France;
and we can easily understand that the French
Government is much better satisfied with the
present status of the dispute with Prussia than
with the aspect it presented some days ago.
Spanish interests, as we have said, unques-
| tionably require an observance OF neutrality.
She has nothing to fear from Prussia In any
event; but everything from France. Prussia
could never get at her by land without march
ing clear across France; and the Prusslan navy
Is so small that French war vessels could easily
protect Spain from Prussan invasion OF her