The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-30

quire successively Mayence. Landau. or Lux
emburg. The Germans, latterly much occu-
pied with their own affairs, have known less
about France for some years. The distin-
guished eloquence of M. Thiers has naturally
attracted much attention beyond the Rhine
but the Germans have remembered little of
his speeches except his remarks against the
movement for German unity" without
thinking that they would have been,
without doubt, very different, if the move
ment had not had force and violence as its
auxiliaries; or taking into account the posi-
tion in which the great orator was placed, or
the rest of the discussion illustrated by his
words After having searched for the views
of the Government in the articles in the
ConStttutio9nd, the Germans believe they
have found in the columns Of some sheets
lately issued in Paris what constitutes the
universal sentiment of all shades of the
liberal party in France. They have believed,
and still believe, that the Emperor is per-
sonally anxious to make war on Germany,
and that he is equally urged to do so by the
bellicose passions of the French people, aud
they say then, if war be inevitable, it is better
1t should take place at once, it is better
to make it short and decisive, and thus
get rid of this stake of inquietude, rather
than purchase temporary peace by conces-
sion to a neighbor upon whose good faith no
reliance can be placed. Here there is no de-
sire to provoke war; but there is no spirit
of Cancellation to prevent it, Deploring all
this, they resign themselves to it as neces-
sary evil, and when once commenced, that it
may be finished soon, they will strike with
passionate eagerness. Germany does not
push M. de Bismarck into war; it would be
even thankful if he avoided it, but it places
in his hands the means of kindling it and sus-
tanning it.
THE PEACE OF EUROPE DEPENDENT ON PRUSSIA.
The peace of Europe, then, depends to-day
upon the interests of Prussian policy. What
is that policyp M. de Bismarck wishes it to
be believed that he used his influence to its
utmost limits to prevent war from being
declared in the case of Luxemburg. Even
last year he tried to persuade the sovereigns
deposed by Prussia that the plundering of
them had been done by the orders of the
King in spite of his renonstrances With
reference to this point it is somewhat diff
cult to separate what is farcical from what is
true. But be it as it may, the motives which
might have made him anxious for
war in the spring and the rea-
sons he may have had for question
ing its prudence are easily understood The
condition of the Prussian forces, better pre-
pared and armed, more numerous than ours,
with the prestige of victory attached to them,
and the desire to cement the ''unity" of Ger
many by fire in foreign Var seemed to coua-
sci him to precipitate the crisis. However,
after much hesitation the Prussian Govern
ment felt desirous of peace. 1t felt that it
would be oppressive to Germany to impose
upon it so soon new and great war. Once
excited public opinion, however, did not
calm down until the instant when the conflict
seemed imminent The States of the South,
pressed to sign the treaties of alliance, were
by no means prepared to fulfil the stipula-
tions. They had not yet transformed their
military force, except by disorganizing it,
and were not ready to take their part in an
effective union. Hanover had suffered from
an extensive conspiracy, to develop which
the presence of the French flag at the mouth
of the Elbe appeared only.needed. 1t would,
doubtless, have proved abortive, orsuccumbed
to the national sentiment, which was SO hostile
to foreign interference, but it was impossible
not to see the symptoms of grave disasters in
the event of meeting reverses. The avowed
enemies of Prussia were those who then ap-
peared most anxious for war, as if they ex-
pected defeat on the Rhine and the over
throw of it's domination. Here was matter
for reflections the war was avoided. The
situation will be the same next year. Prussia
| will have the same difficulties to meet, the
same problems to solve. The States of the
South will certainly be better organized but
| their progress will not compensate for that
of the French army during the same period.
| Prussia will have no greater interest in max
ing war then than it has had in the past three
months; on the contrary, the reasons for
| avoiding it will be stronger The Govern
ment will be perhaps led to it by chain of
events, but it is Jar from having resolved.
War is then possible, but by no means GER
tain; hesitate to say even probable.
RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS IN PRUSSIA, AND
DUTY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY.
If war, however, should be declared, it
might overthrow the ediice of Prussian domi-
nation by undermining it, but its first effect
would be to put an end to all resistance to
| that domination, and accomplish the union
of North and South, not to the advantage of
Germany, but solely to that of Prussia, as
! the representative of the national military
power. If, on the other hand, owing to the
maintenance of peace and the prompt admis-
sion of the States of the South into the con-
federation, Germany might find itself sufi-
GENTLY strong to hold its head above the
Prussian system, and absorb Prussia, instead
of being absorbed by it, it is in the name
of and by means of liberal ideas alone
that it could accomplish this fortunate
| result. 1t is only around the
liberal party, reformed and strengthened, that
the elements of resistance to C@sdrisne can
rally The party has been disorganized, but
it has not for all that been destroyed; and in
| the midst of the conflict of SO many diverse
! opinions and interests which the Constituent
Assembly has faithfully reflected, their course
is strictly defined. To form that assembly
M. de Bismarck has had recourse to universal
suffrage direct, of which he expected more
favorable results than from the system
adopted in the Prussian constitution. This
mode of election, as is everywhere evident,
has sent to the new assembly men belonging
kl.~co l.ol1