Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1870-08-26
rhe war-rhe situation Mt tn. Last Ac-

The Wharf.-The situation ne the Last Ac-
counts.
One o: the most difficult problems con-
nected with military operations is that OF
supplies. Historians tell us that Xerzes
invaded Greece with two millions of men |;
but they do not explain how he victuaIed
them in a small and barren country like
Greece We are left In the same ignof-
ance with regard to the manner in which
the immense armies OF Attlla and those of
the Crusaders subsisted in regions much
less po pulous and much less fertile at that
day than in ours.
The French have always prided them
selves upon the superiority OF their III
te,adence," branch of service correspond
| ing TO our Commissary and Qcartermaster
departments combined. This inferiority
was manifested in contrast with the British
inefficiency daring the Crimean war. But
in tbs present WEI the intendence seems to
have been utterly wanting in efficiency
Although the French armies are in their
own country they have suffered severely
from the scarcity and bad quality of their
supplies, and the English papers go 60 far
as to assert that the French troops engaged
in the battles Of Forback and uagncnau
went into action '>ir starving condition.
This is proof Of gross mismanagement.
/ We have no evidence to show that tho
Prussians have suffered from snch cause,
and il they succeed in snbsibting their I'M
mense army of such distance from their
own baec, it will establish dey Ond dOtIbt
tie superiority Of their army administra-
ton. One of the greatest difficulties will
be forage The season has been Hniavor-
able, and the French Government have
had to make immense contracts Tor hay III
st. Louis and other points in the United
States. It will be n very difficult matter
for the Prussians to forage the great
number of animals necessary to such an
army as theirs.
The lato dispatches are very meagre and
unsatisfactory. The commanders Oh both
sides are wisely reticent. From oil that
we gather, up to tho present moment.
we conclude that the engagement near
Mars Ia Tour was victory for the French.
The purpose of the Prussians was to break
the communication between the army of
Bazaine at Metz and Verdun and tho army
OF Trochu at Chalons. In this they have
been unsuccessful and have been driven
back with considerable loss. But, never
theless, nothing decisive has occurred.
The great battle must take place on the
plains of Chalons.
The probabilities which We discussed in
former article seem to approach realiza-
ton. The main body of the army under
Bazaine is about Etain The tank of the
Prussian limo of advance. The road to
Chalons and Paris is open to the Prus-
SLAMS upon the condition of their leaving
on their flank and rear this formidable army,
while meeting in front the army of Chal-
ons and the Notifications Of Paris defend
ed by 150, 600 mon. The real difficulties of
the Prussians are yet before them. Hither
to they have had but one army in their
front, that now commanded by Bazaine.
Now this army has wheeled to the right of
the Prussians, who have the armies of
Chalons and of Paris in their front. This
position is perilous to them. IF defeated,
their retreat will be almost impossible.
But there is no position however danger
Gus, which victory will not convert into
an advantage. IF the Prussians haye sue
ceeded, rs. would appear from to-day's
(2Oth) room dispatches. in cutting the
French line between Verdun and Metz,
and driving back Baznine's left wing into
Motz, it docs not materially ehange the
situation although the moral effect may
BIO great. The decisive battle must still
be fought at Cllalons. Even after that Il
powerful and desperate army viii have to
be defeated under the walls of Paris before
France gives up the contest.