The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-09
THE FRENCH DEFEATS.

III IL u IOdl LlllildlJ BOhAUoh oN NOOh ~ ~
head of the French armies, these victories
weuId have been converted into terrible de-
feats. Several of our most distinguished
American generals have expressed the opinion
that if the Austrian commander at Sadowa
had marched his whole force against either
wing of the advancing Prussian army insteado of
waiting for the combined attack of both, he
would have been able to defeat his divided
enemyin detail. The first Napoleon was famous
for his skill in conducting operations of this
character. Time and again when converging
armies we're sent against him he massed his
entire force against one wing of his foes and
then against another, with terrific effect,
thus disposing in succession of adversaries
so numerous in the aggregate that it would
have been utterly impossible for him to con-
tend against them if they had been thoroughly
united. In the late battles an application of
similar tactics would apparently have changed
the fortunes of the war. The Grown Prince
on the Prussian left made an aggressive move
ment which was antagonized by an
inferior force under MacMahon; the
Prussian right or right-centre, under General
Steinmetz, made an aggressive movement
which was antagonized by an inferior French
force under General Frossard; and under
these circumstances a double French defeat
was inevitable. While French eagles, patent
guns, cannon, camps and prisoners were
being captured on account of the suicidal
disposition of the French forces, we are told
that three French army corps, comprising
one hundred thousand men, were lying idle
at points contiguous to the scene of action
so that the Emperor not only neglected a bril-
liant opportunity to strike decisive blows at
his enemies, but he betrayed crimi-
nal stupidity in his choice of
mere defensive measures. The fact that
somebody has Numbered badly is shown by
the announcement that a change Of French
commanders has already been effected, Gene
raj Leboeuf being forced to retire, while Mar
shall Bazaine has been appointed commander
in-chief and General Trochu, who is said to
be the rising military genius of France, is
appointed Major-General. We have little
doubt that Napoleon himself is the real mar
plot, and that if he would retire to a hospital
or an insane asylum to be treated for his
physical and mental maladies, leaving the
entire management of the campaign to the
genuine soldiers who bound in martial
France, there might still be a hope that her
late disgraces would be wiped out. To do this
effectually, however, it is necessary that
there should be a mighty uprising
of the French people, and the
great question is whether they are
willing to pour forth their blood and treasure
like water without a positive assurance that
their best efforts are not to be set at naught
by the mistakes of their Imperial blunderer.
The revolutionary and republican feeling is
almost inseparable from the frenzied national
furore which now alone can stem the tide of
Prussian success. The democratic journals
of Paris and the democratic members of the
French hambers are demanding that every
citizen shall be armed, and if every citizen is
thu armed, who can assure Napoleon that
the weapons of the men whom he has basely
betrayed and cruelty oppressed will not be
turned against himself?
Another alternative is a hasty termination
of the war, a patched-up truce, leaving
France as deeply Inundated as Austria was
after Solferino and Sadowa. The Prussians
have a habit in such contingencies of demand
ing that the aggressor shall pay the bill of
expenses, and they would probably insist that
the old German provinces of Alsace and Lor-
raine'should be surrendered as the fruits of
their late victory. Voluntary consent to such
a loss of territory, however, would scarcely
be less fatal to the Napoleonic dynasty than a
succession of German victories; and let the
Emperor turn which way he will, he finds
himself, like the villain in the last act of a
play, confronted by terrible retributive dan
gers. Cd O.
The fact that fears of the safety of the
French capital absorb a large portion of the
attention of the terror-stricken government
Napoleon established there, and that such
fears have been engendered at the very out
set of the campaign, is a significant proof of
the lack of public confidence in the Imperial
regime. Paris is one of the most strongly
fortified places in the world, and it will be seen
by the description of its elaborate defenses
in another part of to-day's TELEGRAPH that if
it is defended with proper spirit
it cannot be taken by the
combined armies of Europe. Napoleon has
more to dread from the excited populace
within its walls than from any foe that can
march against ii, and we scarcely believe that
the Germans will, in any event, make an
assault upon the French capital. Their great
duties are to punish their wanton a~ssailant,
to secure a recompense for the expenditures
of the conflict (Which they can do by holding
the German provinces of France), and to
avert future disturbances of the peace of
Europe by the brood of Corsican tyrants; and
fhaae dufies NAV he Accommodated now with