Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1870-07-25

capital and carry the war into thel
own country. i answered fifty thou
sand seasoned soldiers plainin
that by seasoned soldiers / meant sue
men as we had here present for duty
| And added that they would kaYe t
be drawn from the Peninsula abou
[ Yorktown, Norfolk, from HWesterl
I Virginia, Pensacola, or Whereve
might be most expedient. Gems
| Johnson and Beauregard both sal.
| that a force of sixty thousand sucl
men would be necessary, and tha
this force would require large and ad
! ditiOnal transportation and muni
tions of war, the Supplies herr
being entirely. inadequate for al
! active campaign in the eneny's coun
try, even with our present force. IL
this connection there was some dis
cussion of the dffiieulties to be over.
come, and the probabilities of success
but no one questioned the disastrous
results of remaining inactive through
out the winter. notwithstanding the
belief that many in the Northern
army were opposed on principle to in.
vadlng the Southern States, and that
they would fight better in their own
homes than in attacking ours, it was
| believed that the best, if not the only
plan to insure success was TO cOncen-
trate our forces and attack the enemy
in their own country. The President,
l think, gave no definite opinion in
regard to the number of men neces-
sary for that purpose, and | am sure
| that no one present considered this a
question to be finally decided by any
other person than the command
ing General of this army. Returning
to the question that had been twice
asked, the president expressed sur
prise and regret that the number Oi
surplus arms here was so small, and l
thought, spoke bitterly of this disap-
poihtment. He then stated that at
that time no reinforcements could be
furnished to this army of the charac-
ter asked for, and thatsthe most that
could be done would be to furnish r, :
cruits to take the surplus arms in
store here SAY 300 stand); that the
whole country was demanding pre-
lection at his hands, and praying ftr
arms and troops for defense. He had
long been expecting arms from abroad,
but he had been disappoin ted. He
still hoped to get them, but he had no
positive assurance that they. would be
received at all. The manufacture OF
arms in the Confederate States was as
yet undeveloped to any considerable
extent. Want of arms was the great
difficulty. He could not take any
troops from the points named, and
without arms from abroad could not
reinforce this army. He expressed
regret, and seemed to feel deeply, as
did every one present. lE .-zl-se
When the President had thus clear
ly and positively stated his inability
to put this army in the condition
deemed by the Generals necessary
before entering upon an active offen-
sive campaign, it was felt that it might
be better to run the risk of almost
certain destruction, fighting upon the
other side of the Potomac, rath 4r than
see the gradual dying out and deteri-
alton Of this army during a winter, at
the end of which the term of enlist
ment of half the force would expire.
The prOsp 9ct of the spring campaign
to be commenced under such discoar-
aging circumstances was rendered all
the more gloomy by the dailyincreas-
ing strength of an enemy already
much superior in numbers. On the
other hand was the hope and expecta-
ton that before the end Of winter
arms would be introduced into the
country, and all were confident that
we could then not only protect our
own country, but successfully invade
that of the enemy. General John
stOn said that he did not feel at liberty
to express an opinion as to the pracu
cability of reducing the strength of
our force at points not within the linn
its of his command and with but few
further remarks from any one, the
answer of the President was accept
ed as final, and it WAS felt that there
was no other course left but to take
a defensive position and await the en-
eny. ......
II they did not advance we had but
to await the winter andi results.
After the main question was dropped
the President proposed, instead of an
active, offensive campaign, we should
attempt certain partial operations. A
sudden blow against Sickles and
Banks, or to break the bridge over
the Monocacy. This, he thought,
besides ipjuring the enemy, would ex-
ert good influence over our troops,
and encourage the people Of the Con-
federate States generally.
In regard TO attacking Sickles, il was
stated in reply that, as the enemy con-
troled the river with his ships of war,
it would be necessary for US to occupy
Two points on the river, one above
and the other below our point of cross
ing, that we might, by our batteries,
prevent their armed vessels from In
terfering with the passage of the
troops. In any case, the difficulty of
crossing large bodies over wide rivers
in the vicinity of an enemy and the
recrOssing made such expeditions nag
ardous. 1t was agreed, however,
that, if any opportunity should occur
offering reasonable chances of success,
the attempt should De made.
During this conference or council,
which lasted perhaps two hours, all
was earnest, serious, deliberate. The
impression made upon me was deep
and lasting, and / am convinced that
the foregoing statement is not only
correct as far as it goes, but, in my
opinion, it gives a fair idea of all that
occurred at that time in regard to the
question of our crossing the Potomac.
CENTERYILLE, VA, Jan. 81, 1862.
Signed in tripliGate.. szzz.s1.
ESignedJ Ct. w. SMITH, pal.
Major General.
My recollection of the above con-
ference agrees fully with this state
ment of Gen. q. W. Smith.
[Signedl 3 @. T. BEAUREGARD,
......e -.a-lr q General G.. s. A.
ISigned1 J. r. JOHNSTON,
General.
From the Jackson Clarion Of the I'D.
BETWEEN VICE
PRESIDENT STEPHENS AMI. HON.
z. BARKsDALE, OF MISSISSIPPI.
LIBERTY HALL,