The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-05

opens to her once more. 10 predlcJ the re-
suit of such an engagement would be folly,
but the great French soldiers who have
studied Germany know well how nearly equal
the resources and the courage aud the enthu-
siasm of the two armies are, and they at least
do not, As most of our contemporaries do, for
oct Leipsic to remember only Jena, or conceal
from themselves that France, with all her bril-
liant staff, has not yet discovered the equal
of the great Italian who, at jena, at the head
of her troops, struck Prussia Down. That
sense Of equality, existing on both Sides,
manifested in the Emperors long prepare
tons as in King Williams address to his
Parliament, in the French exultation in the
ulitrdilleuso as in the Prussian pledges to
FIGHT to the last, will of itself make the first
great battle unspeakably important, for it will
tend to make the generals on both sides
dread q numerical inferiority, not only for
the effect it may exercise on their stra-
teey, but the effect it is certain to produce on
the imaginations of their men. Soldiers
must be very contemptuous of their foes to
be careless about being o~utnumbered, and at
heart neither Prussian nor Frenchman is
contemptuous of the other. Add tnat in
Germany society is almost d~isorganlzed by
the mobilization of the army, and that in
France speedy victory is politically
almost as important as victory itself,
and every consideration will be seen
to point to a battle on a prodigious scale.
That it should be q decisive one is, we
imagine, beyond either hope or fear. The
countries engaged are too powerful, the army
reserves too strong, the interests at stake too
great for a battle to secure a peace; but,
nevertheless, the result of that battle must be
so great that all previous study of the situa-
ton NAV well be postponed. All alliances
will depend on its result, and SO, it may be,
will the very meaning of the war. Which
ever wins, the other will feel that it fights
almost for independence, and will offer to
every available ally terms now pronounced
absurd. The map of Europe, if not its fate,
will depend upon that engagement.
THEOHANCES OF PRUSSIA.
From the Pail Mall Gazette.
Although many of the data for a detailed
comparison of the chances under which the
belligerents will enter the field are still want
ing, some of the conditions on which the
ultimate success of either side must more or
less depend may already be pointed out.
First of all, it must be borne in mind that
the war will be as original III character as any
war ever was. The new ornaments change
the whole tactics of the past, and even to a
| considerable extent affect strategic principles.
Assuming that France and Prussia can at
once bring into the field pretty nearly the
same number of land forces, let us see on
which side the balance of advantage is shown
by a review of the general conditions. The
Danish war, the Austro-P russian war, as we'll
as the last Italian campaign, in all of which
the new arms were only partially introduced on
one side of the contest, give no
ground for such an estimate, which must
therefore remain to q considerable extent O
speculative one.
On the whole, the belligerents appear to be
equally well armed; but, asfar as it is known,
the Chassepot mas a slight advantage over the
needle-gun; the former being lighter, less
liable to get out of order, and shooting a little
quicker. The respective merits of the French
and the Prussian soldiery as marksmen,
crease the difference in their arms, remain to
be decided OH the field. The guns of the
artillery may be taken as equally good, but
the French gunners ought to be better
trained, because the men and horses remain
permanently in the ranks, while in Prussia
only two-thirds of the electives remain on
service in time of peace. The French battery,
also, has two guns more than the Prussian;
thus it may be that a smaller
battery, with a considerable number of
raw horses and fresh men, will often
have to act against a larger one, in which
officers, men, and horses are uniformly up to
their business. But as the Austrian and
Danish war happened only a few years since,
it may be calculated that Prussia will be able
to bring at once into the ranks many an
artilleryman who has been actually engaged,
and thus this disadvantage will be remedied,
to q certain extent at least. There remain as
probable advantages to France the mitrailleuse
and the new revolving cannon. True, the
merits of the latter arm are by no means esta.
blished at present; of the former there are
several batteries in the French army and none
in the Prussian, we believe. But even this arm
is known only by reports of French expert
ment, and its realimportauce remains also to be
ascertained. With regard to cavalry, the ad,
vantage will probably be on the side of Prus-
STA, whenever there is an opportunity of heavy
attack in more or less considerable masses,
which opportunities, however, may not be
very frequent. And should the mitrailleuse
batteries prove really effective, and if they
are well distributed among the various French
corps, the massive action of the Prussiar
cavalry will be considerably paralyzed; for
supposing even that the mitrailleuse has nc
very deadly effect beyond 1000 yards, it will
still avail to brighten the horses beyond due
control. Moreover, for action in small
bodies, and for Reconnaissance, the Frenct
cavalry is at least as effective and as well
trained as the Prussian.
With regard to the command of the two
armies nothing can be said yet, as even the
names of the generals who are to play the pro
minent parts are not all or accurately known
To be sure, Prince Charles is a better genera
than the Emperor Napoleon; but it remain
to be shown how far the military abilities o.
Count Moltke are preferable to those of Can
robert, McMahon, or Bazaine.
The tactical and strategic aspects of the
conflict remain to be considered. If the tele
grams conveying the promises of bellige
rents to preserve the neutrality of the ada
cent countries be trustworthy, there will bt
little choice but for the French to go to Der