The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1870-08-20
Some Speculations about the Franco
prussian War.

fused and conflicting reports We are enabled
to extract tolerably clear idea Of the strate-
gic plans of the belligerents and the mode in
which they have been carried, or attempted to
be carried, into execution. The result is not
at all creditable to the generalship Of the
French Emperor
He assembled his army near that frontier of
France which, just below, that is, north of,
Strasburg, projects like cape, with its salient
angle pointing east, into the Prussian terrific
ry. So far nothing could be better. Thion-
VILE is at the left Cooking east of the base of
this triangle, and about twelve miles from the
Prussian frontier: Metz, where there are vast
Notifications, is on the base line closing this
triangle, and is about twenty miles south of
Thionville; from Metz to Nancy, still south
on the same base line, is about thirty miles;
and then the base line, bending to the east,
runs straight to Strasburg on the Rhine, about
80 miles, and passing on its way, at about
equal distances, Lunevile, Sarr emont and Sa-
vern. All the places mentioned are connected
with each other and the interior by railroad
The southern part of the line, on the Prussian
frontier, follows down the Rhine northward
about thirty mile to Lauterburg, and then
| turns sharply to the northwest towards Metz
and Thionville. Along the Prussian frontier
on the French side, besides Lauterburg, are
HAGUENAU, Weis@aburg, Bitsche and Sarre-
guemines, and on the Prussian side Saarlouis
Saarbruck, and at short distance east OF Lau-
| terburg, Carlsruhe, and 90 mile east of Saar-
bruck is Homburg, which is, therefore, nearly
- miles east of Metz. The Prussian army
were assembled from Kaiserlautern, 80 miles
northeast of Homburg, at Landshut, Homborg,
Zweibruecken, and from this place southeast
towards Nessenburg.
The Emperor of the French assembled his
| army, the left resting on Thionville, the cen
| tire under the guns of Metz, and the right at
| Chateau Salins, and in the direction Of Saar-
| burg and Savern towards Strasburg. These
| dispositions of the respective armies brought
| the French right, near Saarburg, within fifty
miles of the Prussan left at Wessenburg,
while the left at Thionville was about ninety
miles from the Prussian right at Kalserlaut
ern and the centre at Metz was rather less
| from the Prussian centre back OF Homburg
With these dispositions, the military critics
say, it was evident that the French left at
Thionville was useless; that it ought instant
| ly to have debouchcd on Saar Able, and, if
| possible, on Bitsche, while the centre should
| debouch from Metz by Falquemont on Saar
Union, and the right from Chateau Salins and
Nancy on Saarburg, and then on Savern. This
movement, if promptly adopted, could have
| been carried into effect, but delay enabled the
| Prussans to Illustrate it. The French army
| would then have occupied a line not over 20
miles in length, nearly opposite the Prussian
centre, and ready to assume the offensive by
falling in mass upon the Prussan left, which
would probably be the nearest and most vul-
nerabe part of their line, or upon their centre
or right, if the situation of the Prussians at
the time indicated either to be preferable If,
on the contrary, by quick movement, the
Prussians had been prepared to fall in mass
upon the French corps du buttaHe in the posi-.
ton described, the French would have been
in a situation to terminate the whole cam
paign in single battle, as Napoleon did at
Jena in 1906: and their confidence of success
in general battle was scarcely inferior to the
great Captains in that memorable campaign.
But the French commander committed the
inconceivable folly Of lettering ten days USE
lessly about Metz, ThiOnville and Chateau Sa.
Inns, and, worse than all, projected his right
towards Haguenau and Weissenburg, into the
very jaws of the Prussians, in force too large
for mere outposts, to retire on the approach of
the enemy in force; too distant to be support
ed, and too few to sustain battle against
overwhelming numbers. The result was what
must inevitably have happened, unless the
Prussians had been as stupid as the French
commander. The French right was over
thrown, leaving the Prussians to act in mass
against the centre, which they have just driv-
! en- over the Moselle, beyond Metz towards Pa
rs, compelling the French to fall back in or
der to concentrate and form new line of op-
erations.
These facts make it certain that the French
can never succeed until some one beside the
Emperor is placed at the head of the army,
unless the Prussians should in their turn COM
NIT series of errors as great as those which
the French commander has already COM
mittcQ