Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1870-04-22

within forty-eight hours strengthen Pope
, sufficiently to enable him to maintain his
, position on the line of the Rappahan-
mock, was no doubt based upon the ex-
Pectation of the immediate arrival of
the Army of the Potomac. That army,
under Mcclellan, had been ordered to
withdraw from the peninsula as early as
the sd Of August. Its instructions were
to proceed by water to Fortress Monroe
and thence up Chesapeake Bay and the
Potomac to the Acquia Creek landing.
Mcclellan, having at his command an
immense feet of transports, immediate
ly but leisurely commenced putting his
entire command, including even the
cavalry, on ship-board, as if about to
set forth on some expeditionary voyage.
The Confederate commander well know
ing that the time consumed by our forces
in embarking and debarking alone
would be ample for falling upon Pope,
| delayed not, as we have seen, to improve
his opportunity. Before Mcclellan had
gotten one quarter of his army afoat
Lee was on the line of the Rapidan.
Mcclellan being notified of this and
urged to hasten forward to Pope's relief
discontinued his embarkation at Harri-
sons Landing and sent the bulk of his
force overland to Fortress Monroe to
take shipping at that point. This change
of programme took place on the 10Th of
August, thirteen precious days after the
order had been given to evacuate the
peninsula and six days after the battle
of Cedar Mountain
And now we come to one of those un-
solved riddles of the war involving if not
a criminal blunder at least some in
scrutable purpose beyond all human
! comprehension. The distance by land
rom Harrison's Bar to Fortress Monroe
is not less than fifty miles and from the
same point to Fredericksburg not over
sixty. Either point was not distant more
than four or at most five days ordinary
marching. One could be reached al |
most as soon as the other so far as dis |
tanCe IS concerned. Why then, at a !
JunCture when delay was so dangerous |
and PrOmPtness SO important, was the |
Army of the Potomac sent by a circuit |
Gus route to Fortress Monroe and thence !
through the tedious processes of en- |
barkatiOn and debarkation to Alexandria !
instead of being marched directly over
land to Fredericksburg Let any one |
glace at the map and see if he can find |
any sufficient reason. Before Mcclellan |
had left HaTTison's Landing, Lee, be it |
remembered, had moved off the bulk of |
his army toward Gordonsville leaving |
the route to Fredericksburg almost un-
obstructed. In fact, at no time during |
this campaign did the enemy occupy in |
force any of the fords of the Rappahan- |
mock below its junction with the Rapi- |
dan. On the contrary we have seen
that General Pope, under instructions
from Washington, held the line Of that |
river to Fredericksburg as late as the |
2Ist of August, by which time McClel- |
Ian should have arrived by the most Ieis-
urely rate of marching.
And even allowing that Lee would |
have attempted to intercept him in his |
overland march to Fredericksburg, he |
could easily have established a new base |
of operations at White House, on the |
Pamunkey, or at almost any point on |
the lower Rappahannock The enemy's |
course northward would then have been |
reversed, Washington would have been
relieved from all danger, Pope, now re-
leased, could have made diversion to-
ward Richmond, the Army of the Poto- |
mac would have been interposed between !
that city and the army of Lee which /
would have been sandwiched between |
that of Mcclellan on the one hand and |
that of Pope on the other, while the
theatre of war would have been trans |
ferred south of the Rappahannock in |
stead of being removed north of it to
Manassas and thence across the PotO- |
mac into Maryland. Let hereader take
any good map of Virginia, locate the |
positions of the different armies on the |
| 10Th of August and see if the common |
est of common sense does not teach him |
that these deductions are both reasonable |
and correct.
! They are supported moreover by an
alogy, and could General Mcclellan |
have forecasted the future he would have !
had practical illustration of the entire |
feasibility of the overland march to |
| Fredericksburg and of the great impolicy !
of the roundabout journey he was about
to make. Directly after General Sher- |
man had completed, by the capture of
| Savannah, his splendid march to the |
sea- he received a very positive request, |
if it did not amount to an order, to en-
| bark his army on transports and take it
by water to Fortress Monroe and thence
up the Potomac to the assistance of
Grant before Richmond Sherman re-
monstrated against this in the strongest
terms, insisting that he could move his
army to the required point nearly as soon
| by land, and so doing accomplish results
of vastly greater consequence. His
wishes were acceded to, his plans car
ried out and the sequel fully proved his
wisdom. He conducted his army with
its transportation and equipments COM
plete to Raleigh, and was about to ad-
vance it thence to Burkesville, in rear of
Petersburg, when Lee surrendered. Had
Sherman made the journey by water his
army would have been landed at City
Point stripped of its supplies and the
greater part of its wagon transportation,
which must necessarily have been left
behind, and so weeks would have been
lost before his command could have
been put in trim again for active move
ments.
The moment Mcclellan set out for
Fortress Monroe his army was for all
practical purposes put out of the fight. p"
Its use and service to the country were
virtually annihilated for the next ten
| eventful, perilous days. General Pope
.. was left single-handed to hold back
Lees legions as best he might. 1t is
doubtful if the country has ever fully
realized the peril which now hung over
it. 1t was period when time was count
ed by hours, and when the fate of the
national capital and probably of the ma
ton itself was balanced in the events of
a moment. General Pope's force had
been reduced by incessant marching
and fighting to scarcely more than Ao,-
900 effectives. Owing to the precarious-
ness of his communications his troops
were but scantily supplied with provisions
| and by the unremitting exactions of duty.