The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1870-10-28

which / believe to be in the highest de.
gree important; / mean its application
to primary elections or to the nomina.
tion of candidates. In fact when re.
form shall have accomplished its work
in the legal elections and shall have in.
vigorated and purified them, it will be
required more than ever in the primary
ones. For as all nominated candidates
will commonly be elected under the
new plan, their nomination must be
made upon sound principles and with
all possible guards against corruption
and abuse. But here it is evident that
the same remedy which will improve
the one class of elections can be used to
improve the other also in other words
that the free vote can often be applied
directly to the nomination of candidates
and always to the choice of delegates to
nominating bodies. Give it such appli-
cation freely, to the fullest possible ex-
tent, and you will find that you have
reached and mastered the ultimate diff
ticulty in the way of electoral reform.
CoNCERNIN THE USE OF FRACTION.
AL VoTEs-THEIR UTILITY AND
CONVENIENCE.
In the Bloomsbury act fractional
votes are allowed when three, four or
six persons are to be chosen, and they
may be allowed with advantage in
other cases. Most commonly they will
be convenient and desirable to maiori-
ties rather than minorities, and there
can be no question that their allowance
will popularize the free vote, render its
reformatory action more effectual and
facilitate its extension generally, to
popular and corporate elections. Frac.
tional votes have been used with ap.
proval many times in recent local elec-
tions in Pennsylvania, they have also
been used in national political conven.
tions for the nomination of candidates
for President and Vice Pres ident of the
United States, and their use will be
found essential to the smooth working
of representative elections under the
amended constitution of Illinois. 1t is
evident that when a voter has three
votes and shall desire to bestow them
equally upon two candidates. he must
divide one of his votes; in other words,
in order to give one vote and half to
each Of two candidates he must break
one of his votes into two equal frac-
lions. When four persons are to be
chosen and the majority of the voters
shall desire to vote for three candidates,
giving an equal support to each), frac-
tions of one-third should be created
that is, each majority voter should di-
vide one of his votes into three equal
parts, so that he can give one vote and
onethird to each of three candidates.
And when six persons are to be chosen
and the voter shall desire to vote for
four, he must, lin order to render them
an equal support), divide two of his
votes into four halves and give one
vote and half to each Of the four can
didates he votes for.
Some other numbers involved in
elections are less adapted than the num-
bers three, four and six for the applica-
cation of fractional voting but many
Others are as much so, and nearly all
admit of such application to a useful
extent. For instance, the number five
admits of the giving of two and half
votes to each of two candidates, or one
and one'fourth to each OF four and the
number nine admits of one and a-half
votes to each of six candidates or two
and one-fourth to each of four. But as
it seems necessary or highly desirable
or. grounds of convenience to avoid
fractions of which the numerator ex-
ceedS unity or one, we cannot very we'll
divide five votes equally among three
candidates, nor seven among five, &c.
There is, however, more than one re-
source in such cases of difficulty. Terms
of official service may be arranged with
reference to the new plan of voting, or
the body of electors in a State or dis
trict, united by party association, may
divide themselves for the purpose of
casting votes. Take the case of court
of five judges, chosen fo- ten year
terms: Instead of electing them all
together it would be well to elect a part
of them every fifth year, say two at one
time and three mt another, and so on at
successive quinquennial elections. And
so to court of seven judges, four might
be chosen at one time and three at an
other. Again, take the case of State
to eight members of Congress
in which the political majority is enti-
tied, by its Numbers, TO elect five. In
party convention or by State commit
tee it might be easily arranged that
while the great mass or principal part
of the majority voters of the State
should vote for four candidates, giving
two votes to each), a district containing
one fifth of their strength should be
set off or set apart in which the
voters of the party should give all
their votes to one candidate. And so
in Pennsylvania, entitled to twenty
four members of Congress, and where
political parties are nearly equal in
strength, either party that supposed it.
self in the majority could vote for
thirteenth member by District vote,
while the general mass of its voters in
The State would vote for twelve. No
law would be necessary to authorize
these and other like arrangements; they
would be made by the voluntary action
Of parties whenever their expediency
became evident.
In fact, by the means mentioned, and
by Others, the use of fractional votes
'an be dispensed with altogether in our
plan of electoral reform, and whole
votes alone retained. But | would not |
dispense with them in all cases, but
would authorize them whenever their |
utility shall be evident and their incon-
yenience slight. At present am pre-.