New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1870-03-19


made a study at the Military Academy among the great
battles In history.
II that in the evening after the hrst day
battle Gen. Thomas believed that Hood was In fu re-
treat at least IN the in which the writer INTENDS u
to be understood His dispatches to Gen. Grant ana
Gen HaIleck this. No steps were taken by Gen
Thomas nor any orders given which would imply TINS
He returned to Nashville after dark and made his head
quarters for the night at the st. Cloud Hotel az usual III
his report he says, Preparations were made 10 rene"
the battle early hour on the morrow Oeh' Hcho
field In his report Of the battle, says ION tne h9n, vi
the 18th 7 waited upon the Major General Commanding
at his headquarters and received his orders for the pur
suit OF the enemy on the following day." Gen. A. D.
Smith says nothing indicate any such idea as the let
gives out On advancing his line in the morn
ing II was discovered that the enemy had taken position
at the base OF Brentwood Hills Gen Wilson, commahu'
ing cavalry says Orders were issued for the contnu'
ance operations tho next day. Gen. steedInan says
"At6 m, In obedience TO the orders OF Ma)oruen
Thomas my command moved on the enemy's worRs'
The report OF Gen. Wood commanding the Fourth corps
ia not at hand Moreover riding toward the battle
field the ne xt morning 6th Gen Thomas before reach
ing the lines pointed out the place for his headquarters
that night. This does not look much ike. "a
fun belief that Hood was in fuIl retreat"
On the contrary quite the reverse. The extracts
given above dlsproye also the assertion that
sure was Gen. Thomas that the fight was over that
he could not be induced TO give orders to renew the
attack in the morning" and that consequently many OF
the troops lay idle until late In the day. III Is true that
no formal written orders for the attack were Issued put
verbal orders given. And moreover, Cen Thomas
had that confidence In the skill and ability OF his corps
commanders that he did not deem It necessary TO give
any further orders than might be requisite 10 continue
the movement auspciousy begun on the preceding
dav More than once expressed his pleasure at having
his troops commanded by officers of such merit That he
did not have be giving them orders constantly KNOW
ing that they could carry out details without his inter
ference or direction.
tits more than probable that il the attack had been
made in the morning. Of Hoods artillery or infantry
coud have escaped across the Harpeth says this most
Astounding writer An attack made in the morning,
by the Fourth Corps the Franklin Pike, but with
ont any effective results An attack was made ABOUT
noon ON the extreme left OF our line. and repused The
cavalry was attacking and driving the enemys heaN
krmish-line early IN the morning and the moment
they reached o position the flank and rear where
their operations could be made effective, the attack along
the infantry line was made. OF course "many Of the
roops lay idle until late in the day., as Is always the
ease in every bate-eXcept perhaps Stone RIVER ana
Cblckamauga. In which the Army or the CnmDer-
land was engaged from Mil Spring to Nashville.
The only sowness and ideness that produced any I'M
portant result is that shown in the following extract
from Gen Schoded's report: my order was not exc
cutcd with the promptness energy bad expected;
and the following from Gem A. j. Smiths report; about
o'clock n IN. Gen. Macarthur word that lie could
carry the hill on his right 10y assault MaJor-Gen.
Thomas being present the matter was referred to hn
and I was requested to delay the movement until ne
could hear from Cen Schofeld, to whom he had sent
Gen McA not receiving any reply, and fearing II
the attack should be longer delayed the enemy would
use the night 10 strengthen his works. directed brigade
IN storm the hill" The result that the enemy were
- yhipped broken, and demoralized." Cen Schoheld
repor his total loss in the battles Of the 18th and 10th at
. killed aud ~ WOUNDED.
After the battle. the pursuit was made by the cavalry
along the road, while the infantry was compelled To
follow after 50 slowly that corps could not move ia
length in three days" this writer. AS there were
only three roads which could be followed In pursuit.
the Franklin Granny White. and Hlsboro tpikes-and
"a the Fourth Corps moved the Franklin Pike the rest
OF the infantry following Hatchs Division OF cavalry on
the Granny White and Johnsons Division on the Hills
boro it is difficult to the point the writer w0nd
make The cavalry marched tn point hNe miles below
Franklin. distance OF about ~ nie on .nT y.
drove the enemy from their posltohs WINE me iourh
Corps aud Stecdmans Division reached FRANKLIN 10
neat day reached Rutheriordr IreeE ~ hlles Iioil
Nashville and the infantry closed with it On the l9th
scLohed and smith reached spthg nm 80 i.es molh
Nashville aud on the night OF inc Z1h me ltl,iy 'i.
vance reached Columbia - miles III TINS - marching
80 slowly that "a Corps could not move ia length IN
three days" the Corps with which the writer inalchen
must have struggled more than Shermahs DuIihers III
The next point Of the writer IS that the pontoon train
necessary the Harpeth al Franklin was ordered
Ian Gen Thomas
and that " this ridiculous blunder delayed me pursuit
until "a bridge could he built across the Harptth az
Franklin" II Il true that me pon2oh tran waS orderen
on the MuTlreeHD0fo Ilke, ana ilat u Was q
blunder No one knows TINS more completely than Cen
Thomas but IL not true that this order created any
essential delay or produced any ulsaetous result 1t
OF those bluders which indeed ridiculous but
not harmful for IL early countermanded the next
day mat the train had gone but short distance, and
reached the main column by cross road Inc real
regiment which had Dcep trained ON pontoon duty was
soon used up by the excessive labor and cl-and so the
tran was Of little practical good. The pOnOons which
leIon ged 10 Gen Thomas had been taken by Gen. er
man his march through Georgia he taking MS pck
a pontoon had to be hastily constructed at Nashville
during the delay and troops hurredly and impcHeety
The result Of all this was that Hood made good hs
retreat the Tennessee River with more than 90
and nearly all who had not been killed or cap
rnred IN the trenches ut Nashville" so the writer
River on his advance to Nashville, with 30 pieces
Of artillery. These captured and turned over
which we're taken on the 10Th 10th of December at
Nashville. over 1900 prisoners were captured ZOO
and Nashville total Of 1s2oo-of whom less than TWO
thirds killed or captured III the trenches at Nash
VILE There also destroyed during the campaign
3j wagons With their supplies IL pontoon Doats ana ~
mules belonging 20 the enemy ,,.-..
The also endeavors to convey the idea mat Cen
Thomas thought that the driving Of Hood across the Ten
nesses all that requisite aud that ne az
leisure develop "plan for a campaign during the sum
mer after the close Of the war; Unfortunately Tor MN
thc facts do not sustain
on finding the enemy had escaped the Tennessee
a disheartened and dlsorganized rabbe OF hafarned
and barefoOted men," Cen Thomas announced, Oh the
3Oth OF December successful completion OF the can-
pagn directed the troops 10 90 into Winter quarters
They had fairly earned by their arduous labors ana
almost constant fighting since the LIST VI NOVEMBER
right to short respite during the dreary winter months
IN that locality and, far Gen. Thomas was con-
cerned there nothing for them to do aud no organ
lied enemy either in the Department OF the Cumberland
or the Military Division OF the Mississippi But Gen.
Grant had for them-and the order was immedi-
atey countermanded and the troops concentrated, III
stead Of being scatteedthough IL Is not very PLAIN To
see how IL could make any essential difference Tor the
Intended movements OF the GeneralinChief whether
schoeld was al Columbia Daton-wbether the Fourth
Corps was at Huntsville aud Athens, or at Huntsville
| alone aud whether Wilson was at Huntsville or