The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-10-25
THE FRENCH FAILURE.
the Army and Navy Journal.


Perhaps there is no question which is en-
gaging such general attention at present as
the question, Why have the French failed?
1t is one which we have no intention of de-
Gliding here. Volumes must be written on
every side of the theme before all it's causes
have been set down in print; and those who
hope to explain in a pamphlet or during an
hours talk the why and the wherefore, must
have either very little or a very great deal of
information. We only desire to point out
the fact that the reason why the French
failed is very different from the
reason why the Germans succeeded. 1t
is easy to see how there can be accidents in
war OF single causes which may account
at once for the success and the failure on the
same field of battle. But the roots of German
power have been long in gaining their deep
hold, and the sap which gave the French mill
tary growth its character has been getting thin
and weak for many years. Through all the
struggles in this war there has run current
of unsuccess, fatal lack of power, which has
defeated the French army whether it fought
in the open field or behind intrenchments,
whether it attacked the enemy or defended
itself, whether the engagement was only a
skirmish between cavalry outposts, or the fate
OF the army and every man IN it-of France
and her future for half century-hung in
the balance. The French have fought we'll,
but they have never found themselves in cir
cumstances so critical that victory was felt to
be the only issue that could be accepted;
they have never heard that voice of necessity
which may call the soldier to efforts greater
than are to be expected of man. But
the Germans have. The frontier was not
valuable enough to the Frenchman to make
either Wissembourg or Spicheren Hills vic
tory; the junction of Bazaine with the new
army of MacMahon was not important enough
to arouse in the army before Metz the deter
mination to win Vionville against such Ger
mans as had come up; finally, there was not
enough of disgrace or disaster in the looming
capitulation at Sedan to call forth even one
vigorous stroke on September / against the
extended line that surrounded the French
army. The French have not been out
umbered in every battle, in every
corner of the great field. Spicheren
Hills and Vionville are battles that were
fought by the heads of unconcentrated
armies against an enemy lying in chosen and
fortified places, and both were brilliant sue
cesses. The Germans have held their lines
more than once against charges that would
have been overwhelming in their hands and
were so In numbers. 1t is not to the admi-
rable tactical drill, the intellectual superb
ority, or anything else that pertains to the
! German soldier, thai the fatal ill-fortune of
the French is to be attributed. Causes must
be found within the French themselves for
! such state OF affairs. 1t may be that the
consciousness of inferiority the crushing
effect of the first defeats, the doubt of their
/ generals, the wretched character of their
commissariat, will account for their appa-
rently hopeless spirit; but it is more probable
that the historian who gathers up the causes
of the war-historical, moral, religious, ma
tional, miIitary-will write down as the sum
and consequent Of them all that the French
exhibited marvellous and destructive inefi-
eiency in the field.
In this state of things we have an explana-
ton OF the remarkable inaction of the French
at time when slight successes against the
enemy would be most telling in their effect
Upon the siege of Paris. The two hundred
miles of railway communication, upon the
integrity of which the whole success of the
Germans depends, remains unthreatened by
the leost raid. Undoubtedly the officially of
reaching it is very great A deep border of
cavalry outposts lies along its whole length,
ready to give such early warning of hostile
movements that troops could be concentrated
upon any point in numbers sufficient to