Litchfield enquirer., 1870-03-17

1904, it was decided in the case of Dtb6le vs. Haaon l Day 221), that the English chancery practice which allowed the wife to hold separate property without the in- tervention of trustee, ought not to be engrafted into our chancery system" This case arose in reference to gift from husband to wife, and some exceptions to the sweeping opinion of the court were subsequently allowed. Nevertheless in the
 similar case of Fourth Society vs. Muller (l5 Conn. 699), decided in lS43, Chief Justice Church expresses his approval of the de- cision of the court in Di55le vs Hutton in the most emphatic terms* Thirteen years la. ter, in 1856. the legislature having in the meantime interfered with various acts for the protection of the property of married women, and the English equity practice having been sanctioned in most States of the Union, our Supreme Court, in the case of Riley vs. R!sy (25 Conn. 164) over-ruled the old c.se of Dib52e vs
 Hutton;f but it is not little amusing to find the court, in the same decision, de- precating as dangerous innovations stat utes now universally considered as falling far short of the just rights of married wo- men.t Following, and even in part prece- ding, the case of Riley ys. Riley, came a series of Connecticut decisions placing our law fully abreast of the English chaa- cery system in regard to the wife's right to hold separate property. Unfortunately, our legislatures have never kept pace with the increasing liberality of our Courts in that direction. The General Assembly of 1850 did, indeed, seem inclined to follow the equity rather than the common law theory regarding the property of married women, and few provisions of comparatively slight importance, made by that legislature,
 still remain on the statute book; but the general tendency has been heavily the other way; and the equity system of separate pro- perty rights for married women has never been materially extended by our legisla- ture, or met with the favor in this State that it has done in the more progressive States of the Union. a@
 8. 7Ae interest ef Ms surviuor, on the dsath of husband or .Oife, in their re.pectice estates.
 In case of the death of the wife, the husband continues in possession of her re. al estate during his life, provided living chii 1ren have ever been born of the mar. riage, whether they survive or not. This interest is known in law as the husbands estate by curtesy, and he will have that right even in land held for the separate use of the wife. By our statute the husband is also entitled to the nse of all his wife's personal property during his life, except ing her separate personal estate (Baldwin vs. Carter, IT Conn. 2OS). These rights of the husband cannot be affected by any action of the wife, She may, indeed, make will, but it will only affect the re- version of her estate after her husbands life interest has ended.
 The wife, on the other hand, only re- ceives the use of third of her deceased
 husbands real estate, and not even that, unless she was living with him at the time of his death, or absent for legal cause. This right is called the widows estate in do,csr. ln England, and in nearly all the States of this Union, this right is secured by allow ing the widow dover in all the real prop erty her husband owned at any time dur ing marriage. unless she has joined him in deeding it away. By 8 harsh peculiarity of Connecticut law, she is only entitled here, to dover in the real estate of which he died possessed; so that he has only to convert his real property into personal dur ing his lifetime. or to make final disposi- tion of it by deed instead of by will, ,resefv- ing life use of it, to cut of her right alto gether. The widow is entirely dependant on the good will of the husband for what ever she receives from his estate beyond her dover. If he leaves no will, she be- comes heir to one third. or, if he leave no lineal descendants, to one half of his per. sonal property. The law breaks over its usual, sound policy. to allow the husband to place singular restriction on her fu- ture mode of life. Ordinarily, conditions for the restraint of marriage, attached to gifts, or contained in agreements, are held l to be void, as contrary to public policy. A husband, however, may leave property to his widow with condition forbidding her re-marriage attached; and Judge Dag. gett justifss this extremely common mean ness on the part of the husband. in Phil lips vs. Msd6ury (7 Conn 673) (talics ours):
 It would seem very reasonable, that a *-sThe court there seemed to fear, that the in- novations which courts of equity in England were making upon the sacred unity of the persons of husband and wife, might, as manners should lead the law, and law the manners, invade our own jurisprudence; and against such an event they in- tended to protect us. If more loose or liberal views of the nature and legal effect of the marriage relation have been entertained in later times, ei- ther by the legislature or the public until they ] shall be mode to bear upon the courts by some definite legislative act, we must abide by the rules of the common law, which were, without doubt
 recognized by all as long ago as the time of the