The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1870-08-11
HOW TO FIGHT FRANCE.
The Views of Prince Frederick Charles of Prus-
sia on the French Soldier-''selzing on the


The Views of Prince Frederick Charles of Prus-
sia the French Soldier-''seizius on the
Onensive.o
Prince Frederick Charles ofPrussia wrote some
years ago military memoir. This memoir
contained some important remarks on the con-
dition of the Prussian troops, and a sort of
comparison between their efficiency, discipline,
and military organization and those of the
French. 1t was prophetic in its very title:-
"The Art of Fighting the French Army" The
opinions are not only valuable in themselves, 4
but they attain an added significance when it is
remembered that the Prince has attained great
military renown, and that he has the power of
carrying into practice the opinions which he ex-'
presses. He SAYS
Those who suppose that the French fight in an
irregular and desultory manner, like the hordes of
Attila, are as much in error as those who suppose
them subject to the strict rules Of military art. The
truth must be sought between the two extremes.
Undoubtedly the French army in time Of war is de-
principles and actual truths, that can be renewed at
WILL For instance, coups de main that had been
practiced by Moreau in the wars Of the Republic,
Bugeaud, tthe most able Instructor and the most ex-
perienced in contemporary military art, knew the
bodied their principles in his own short treatses,
from which they were almost textually extracted by
war, as briefly as can give them, are -
l. Absolutely to lay aside in time OF war the regu
very memory itself Of the parade ground There is
such thing with the French as an order OF battle
a form that prevails on every occasion. The mode
tive and the talents OF the generals
2. The real principle which becomes as familiar to
the soldier as TO the general, rests on this truth:
'moral force is superior to physical force" Napo-
leon himself expressed this idea when he said that
while physical force was only worth one-fourtn.
The entire education OF the French soldier on this
principle. The French disdain to maneuvre one
division against another. There is moral element
In the matter. The French oficer has no sense OF
fear, of Difference to superiors-he does not feel
himself crushed by the presence OF chief, and
every general every oficer goes into action without
misgving, sure Of himself full OF confidence In his
own light and in his own courage.
The French are not above the Machiavellian arts
Of surprise, the unexpected to astonish the enemy.
Thus they attack with terrible cries and the hideous
date young soldiers for which reason 1t is expedent
to warn recruits against such practices.
8. Another French principle Is TO attack in close
column when operating against -enemies little ac-
customed TO drill, because they are usually Drawer
gagged against regular troops they fight as shirmish
| ers and without order.
L. An essential principle with the French one In
deed that they have constantly adopted in these last
campaigns, is never TO defend themselves in pas
sive manner, but to act constantly on the offensive
operations. think this defensive activity pushed
| to excess as we now see 1t in the French may be
| charged TO Marshal Bugeaud. We must do our best
| to raise the moral force OF our own men and to
depress that OF the enemy. Tot end zoe must eUeT
loau for attack at the decisive moment b allOays
seize o.. the o6ensice Attacking movements in flank
or rear, even II executed only by handful Of men,
| produce an extraordinary moral impression. These
1
feBses, but the means of resisting an attack that is
not front to 'front.' but as in cayrry tactics front to
fiank.
g. The French idea In the employment of skir-
mishers seems 10 me particularly interesting. lt is
that 'skrmshing ls out an eSpedlent tLe tmGlte,
being only loss Of time and never decisive Is only
to be used vhenit can be done with freedom: Il
never should be forced by the enemy, for not his
plans should be forced on us, but ours on him. This
is the real moral supremacy. The enemys skir-
ING line; that is loss Of men and time. Skirmish-
ers must act against the nanK. Better sun, now
ever, is il repe such attack TO send in squad
| ron at a charge, and without firing to break the
'tSW tS' We must nav special attention in the French
attack 70 that spirit which is peculiar 70 them, and
| which Caesar himself has remarked. He considered
their first burst as the most dangerous and each sue
cessye one less imposing The yehelnence OF attack
the French fury OF the OF tae revolution, is tc
this day national characteristics. The French have
ne, and SO to take an accoant Of his forces and thel
| disposal. They have recourse 10 partial attacks
0cn
| snccessful they wait until the supports come up
In Italy, however, they changed this opening. and
| by and by throwing out heavy skirmishing parties
and at the same time charging In column In this
way at so.ferino they surprised the Austrlans just
ner The videttes were driven in without firing q
shot. The outposts fell back, and then the fight
besides the moral effect q a surprise. the instance
proves how they accommodate themselves to cir
Ths Tsps s s@p9y % sas5
men. whose ambition is excited and whose places
ever can be supplied BY those who emnlous OF
their consideration. They march in the front rank
and thus maintain the French supremacy, and make
subsequent work easier for thesess reliable troops
il is theory that Immediately on attack
is decided upon; It cannot be made toe
promptly; The firing is prolonged as little
| as possible, and In the Italian war the musketry
would scarcely last quarter OF hour before the
bayonet was brought into use. The French attach
at the double quick, Ia which they are well drilled
| In time Of peace, SO tnat they do not lose theil
breath BY the time they come up with the enemy