New-York tribune., 1870-11-15
THE EMPEROR'S APOLOGY.
FILL TEXT OF NAroLEON's PAMPHLET.

had brief telegraphc synopsis III IL 10 appear III
Rrnssels rs a pamphlet, entitled The Campaign OF
1870. some causes which brought about the Capltu-
to,;o, Of Sedan. BY an Officer attached to the
General staff" 1t is asserted however on authority,
that the brochure has been written from the ex-
rnnoror,s dictation. The following translation is
made from advance proofs;
uha, war was declared, and the Emperor assumed the
command in chief Of the French armies, he frequenty
cave expression to the thought reflected In his m,ai
nroclamaton that campaign about 10 open "ou oo
ded Inv the greatest difficulties In tho mlust o
,he satisfaction occasioned by the enthusiasm ~hoh
vervvhere greeted his footsteps. many observed tne
look OF sadness with which he lsIensu ,4 ~ antrSe
"Onward 10 Berlin !" uttered by the excited uu1uIe %
the enterprise were destined to oe merely nl!l
tary promenade, and march ioIWatu mo eyer
d i be profession Of and best prepared for
war. -, .n,. pr,,ssia ,Uas ready 10 call out
=, sbort time eOOOOO men, and, with the ala OF tne
southern states of Germany conq m SUa s o o and AZ
the number Of ghtng men is never more tnan %e % t
Ming INFO the field $4,000 men, while we had only about
To compensate for this numerical inferiory, 1t was
necessary for us by rapid movement, to cross the
Rhine separate southern Germany from the North Ger
man Confederation and by the eldf Of first success
secure the alliance of Austria and Italy.
N we were able 10 prevent the armies OF Southern
SeTS me rctTe Strength Of the Prmssans wond
reduced 100000 and the dsproporton between IHe
and italy made common cause with France then the
superiority of numbers would be In our favor
NApoLEoN's PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.
The Emperors plan Of campaign-which he conhded
AT Paris to Marshas MacMahon and Leb9uf alone-was
TO mass 10000 men Metz 10000 at strasbourg and
10000 at the Camp ChaOns The concentration OF the
first two armies the Sarre and the other on he
Rhine did not reveal his projects for the enemy Tas as
left IN uncertainty TO whether the attack would De
made against the Rhensh Provinces or upon inc Duey Vi
irated at the points indicated it the Emperors pur
pose 10 Immediately unite the two armies OF MeA anu
Strasbour and at the head OF 900 men, TO cross the
Rne AT Maxa leaving at his right the fortress or Ras
tadt and his left that OF GermCrsheiIn Reaching
states of the south to observe neutrality and would then
hurried to encounter the Prussians While TINS
Chaons under the command of Marshal Canrobert were
to proceed 70 Metz TO protect the rear OF te army anu
guard the Northeastern frontier. AT the same time our
fleet cruising in the Baltic would have held stationary III
the north of Prussia part OF the % enemy doIee'
The sole chance of this plan succeeding was 10 srpas
the enemy in rapdy OF movement 10 accomplish 81 ts ms
was necessary to muster in very few days az the
points decided upon, not only the number OF men re-
dured the essential accessories OF the projected
campaign such wagon equiPages artillery parks pom
train gunboats 10 cover the passage on Ine fe
and finally the cOmmsssrat necessary to supply large
army the march. .
TIE Emperor haered himself with the hope OF attain tain
ing these results and in this he was deceived as IN iae
everybody led astray by the suppOsltlOn tha Oy
means OF the men could 6e bs orer anS
precision Indispensable to success where preparations
had not been made long in advance by NSahl adiin'
tstratiOn.
THE FRENCH MILITARY SYSTEM DEFECTIVE.
The delays incurred arose. in a great measure from
the defects Of our military organization it has existed
FOR the last years, and which revealed themselves
from the very beginning Instead of having, as In the
case with Prussia, army corps always in all organized
state recruited in the province ITSELF and possessing
the spot the mdtrc and complete accessories in France
Whole Country While the mGtersl is stored in differ;
cities in crowded magazines In case II Is decided
form active division upon any given point or the
frontier the artillery generally comes from some distant
place and the train eQupage and ambuances from Paris
.,,d Vardu Npa rlN all he
brought from the capital as Tor the soldiers OF lhe
FTsTS Sy T % eSr is the railways are
for the transportation of the men, horses and ma
way stations are often ncumbered with objects OF which
the nature and the destination are equally N ignored
Me second portion of the annual s9ntingent should %
20 he drafted IN time OF war int" the
& ,ST PT ~ those Of 1 Re French system The
belonging TO the reserve being simply obliged to 20 froI
thcr place Of residence to the principal town OF the d
Iurtment there assembled, speedily equipped, al
divided among the different regiments. Stlll athOug
rapidly completed the regiments not, in Prussi
Unfortunately, tins plan modified by the War
service was Immediately assigned to regiment. tn
result that In $780, when the reserve was called out
the men belonging to IT, in order to Join their yarlon
regiments, were, in many instances obliged to follow
long and complicated route Thus for example the mel
who were STasbourg and whose regiments were acu
ally stationed in Asace, instead Of at once Joining tn
mental depOts which might be in the south of France
or in Algers, and were thence obliged to returr
conceived what delays IN the assembling OF the troop
were caused by such an organization as this.
Tie fact existed with respect to the camping ma
teria The ambulance wagons and the officers traispor
in the center Of department " the empire, the!
were all stored in limited number Of military ware
were forced 10 io their corps only imperfecty equipped
destitute Of haversacks enS-dbri, pannkins. sauce
10 these defects must added the limited power in
trusted To the generals IN command OF the department.
aud TO the military COmmssariat. The most trlhlnt
thing required Ministerial authorization. IL fo
instance impossible distribute TO officers or men the
most Indispensable adjuncts-eyen the necessary
without an express order from Paris.
This administrative routine deprived the generals o.
the activity and foresight which may sometimes remedy
defective organization
less account must be taken Of individual intelligence
than of substantial organization, moved by simple
war il has been hdb0ted to working regularly
IN time Of peace Yet notwithstanding all the decep
tions cOuntcred, justice must be rendered 20 the
funconares the War Office, who, at moment of pro
found tranquility were invested With the task OF set
ting in motion The entire military power Of France
Taking into consideration the detective French admin
line in 80 biefa period, armies incompletely formed
previous measure for the purpose having been carried
into effect.
EMBARRAssMESrs AND MIsCALCULATIoSs.
No doubt, the objection will be made that some, at
least the faults heretofore mentioned ought to have
been remedied in advance But the difficulty OF con
quering habits and prejudices be for
gotten The Chambers, too persisteny refused the aid
necessary 10 accomplish the most important reforms
Who does not remember the objections and protestatons
tOn gave rise The Opposition adhered TO their vain
theory OF leyes masse and the bill rywhere
badly received On the other hand the Emperor conf
dent in the armies which had achieved such glorious
successes In the Crimea and In italy, was not in
disposed TO believe that their irresistible rush
(dpD would compensate for many deficiencies and render
victory assured. His illusions not Of long duration
The army of Metz instead Of 10000 men, only mustered
10000; that OF strasbourg only 10000, Instead OF
10000 while the corps of Marshal CanrOber had sill
one division at Paris and another at scissors his
artillery well as his cavalry was not ready Further
no army corps yet completely furnished W M
the equipments necessary for taking the field, The
nrdg m