The Hawaiian gazette. [volume] (Honolulu [Oahu, Hawaii]) 1865-1918, 1869-03-31

a
branch Of that Government protected by the
| longest term of service, it should scrupu-
lousy guard the rights and privileges of the
most numerous and popular branch Of the
Government. The Senate can have no inter-
est in transferring power from the House of
Representatives to the hands of the Presi-
dent. The theory of a republican form of
government is that power is safe in
the hands of many, and dangerous in the
hands of one. The exclusive power of the
| House to originate revenue bills is one of
| the most explicit in the Constitution, and il
was intended TO be so hedged that no plausi-
BILE pretext could be suggested by which it
could be invaded or supplanted This sole
| power being confided to the House, it might
not be exercised elsewhere, nor can it right
| fully be subverted. 1t should remain in its
entirety. Even to allow any other branch &c
consider and amend revenue bills was reluc-
! family conceded by the trainers of the Con-
stitution. A treaty regulating custom duties,
/ the main source of revenue heretofore and
destined to be hereafter, trenches upon
cardinal principle of popular Governments
| the right of the immediate representatives of
the people 10 control the purse of the nation.
1t is obvious that very limited multiplica-
ton of such treaties would soon absorb the
| whole power TO originate revenue bills, so
far as they concern the levying of duties up
on the importation of foreign goods, and
nothing then would be left to Congress ex-
cept the mere husks of tariff and excuses
and direct taxes.
PRIVILEGES OF THE HOUSE
1t has been family argued that such reci-
procal treaties would still leave to the House
Of Representatives the privilege of originat-
ing revenue bills at its pleasure, but this
does not rise to the dignity of a respectable
| sophism. 1t does not even wear the appear
/ oras.a e nom l. hot
prior or subsequent legislative enactments
there may be, a treaty, being according TO
executive Interpretation always the supreme
| law of the land, overrides them, and where
ever such enactments come in conflict with
treaty they are practical utilities, as has
been proved and will be so long as the Ex-
ecutive is sole arbiter of the question. The
House may fling its net for revenue and toll
all night, but they will catch nothing. When
the revenue has been sequestered by force of
treaty stipulations for the benefit of foreign
ers the House will find itself in the old atti-
tude of being forced to make brick without
straw. The pretense that such treaty is
not an invasion of the rights of the House,
it seems to me, adds to the injury contempt
for the intelligence and sensibility of that
body. To say that all this may be done even
with the joint action and assent ofthe House
either alone or conformity with the President
and the Senate, to change or dispense with
any portion of the Constitution. The pow
ers given to the House are given for all time,
as much for one Congress as another, and
cannot be lawfully suspended by them nor
by the taeaty making power, whether direct
ly or indirectly. One house of Representa-
tives has the same powers as any other and
no one can properly or lawfully intercept or
hold them in allegiance for any length of time.
The House of 1870 must be as free to act as
the House of1S6S. One House, indeed, may
have so little spirit as to refuse to exersise
its constitutional powers, but one or both
Houses cannot exhaust their Yigor nor ab-
dictate nor forfeit them for a moment, nor
can any circumstances lift any law to such
high sanctity that a new Congress, fresh
from the people, cannot constitutionally re-
peal it, whatever of misfortune might attend
such repeal
Revenue laws require adjusting annually,
and for years to come the subject will be one |
of paramount importance. Taxation as a
whole may steadily be diminished but a care
ful consideration of the whole subject may
require that burdens resting in one place |
may be removed to another better able to |
bear them or where they will be more wide |
ly and equally distributed. In spite of all |
inclinatiOns for honorable peace, the Just |
claims of the United States may be so long |
delayed that the only remedy for high spir- |
tied people will be war. In such an untOward |
event the whole resources of the country |
should be kept untrammelled, ready TO be |
unleashed for instant use, and no part of |
them should be placed beyond our reach. |
The power to originate revenue bills, then |
becomes Imperative and indispensable to the |
preservation of national life war with |
one nation abrogates no treaties with anoth-
er. A compact of this reciprocity character,
however inopportune or CALLING, must be full
filled. To disregard it gives just cause for
Nrar 49,, -
ment, with the Senate in its executive capaci-
ty, having pledged the faith of the nation,
no explanation of the framework of our Con-
stitution will prevent any foreign nation from
seeking the redemption of the pledge.
In the first article, section eight, of the
Constitution, it will be found that Congress
not the President and Senate alone-was
to have the power " to regulate commerce
with foreign nations" If Congress was to
have the power TO do this it is clear that it
cannot be done by either the judicial or exc
cutive authority, nor was it the purpose to
lodge the power in any body less responsible
than the whole of Congress
If to Congress belongs the power to regu-
late commerce with foreign nations, and the
House has the exclusive right to originate
revenue bills, it follows that the powers thus
delegated should not be curtailed OF frittered
away by any treaty. If laws become weak
and worthless in the face of the assumed su-
premacy of even illegitimate treaties, or
such as cannot properly be considered as
made under the authority of the United
States" the Constitution whenever appealed
to retains its full vigor, and when its agents
transcend its authority let them be disowned,
and not the Constitution.
How greatly it is to be preferred that our
Government should be left at all times unfet-
tered and free to make such laws and regula-
tons as the interest of our people from time
to time demands and that we should be at
liberty to extend favors or withdraw them,
as our own sense of propriety may require,
without any Infringement of a compact, and
of a compact made in conflict
with a provision in the Constitution deemed
most essential to the framework of a free
Government?
| regret that this question has not been
handled by some Senator better able to pre-
sent the argument, but simple statement Of
the question would almost seem to be
enough without argument. In its whole
length and breadth it is this: can the Presi-
dent with two thirds of u quorum Of the
Senate repeal laws passed by both branches
Of Congress and approved by the President,
and at the same time fasten upon the people
an irrepealable law? II this cannot be law
fully done there is an end to reciprocity
treaties.
LATITUDE OF THE POWER CLAIMED.
If such an innovation of the rights Of the
House or of the rights of Congress be allow
ed to go unchallenged there is little else in
the way of legislation that may not be done
by treaty. Why may not the right of suf-
frage be regulated by reciprocal treaties?
Why not SO fix the price of our public
lands? Why may not internal improvements,
canals, and railroads be secured on the inter
national reciprocity plan? Why not have re-
ciprocity in fertilization treaties? Why not
thus regulate the rates of postage? Why not