The Evansville journal. [volume] (Evansville, Ind.) 1866-1870, 1869-07-02

comprised an area CT not less Cndu
eight hundred thousand square miles,
diversified by vast ranges OF noun
tains, deep rivers, tangled Wudefhess'
and far-stretching swamps; ana every
where presenting natural detenses be-
hind which a small force could hold
a large one at bay.
/ The lines Of communication were
necessarily Of great length, and main
/ tanned with difficulty. a large por-
| ton Of our forces were constantly
employed In this way, and in garrl-
soning posts, so that it was seldom
we were able to meet the enemy with
| superior force upon the field.
These immense difficulties went far
| to counterbalance our superiority IN
population and resources, and was so
/ great as to lead military observers
/ throughout Europe to prophecy,
almost with one accord that we
could not conquer the South. 1t
was said there. was no instance IN
history where so large a population
! scattered over even one-third of ter
/ ritory so great as that embraced by
the rebellion, had been subdUed, 1t
was said we could not conquer space
that conquest would be a geographical
Eimpossibility; that three millions OF
Emen could not garrison the South;
| and that when we had captured their
4 towns and overrun the inhabited parts
of their country, they would still
/ maintain the war In morass, mountain
and forest, almost impenetrable to
regular armies, until the North, ex-
i hausted In blood aud treasure, and
broken in hope, would give up the
contest.
Such was the belief of leading mill
tary minds in Europe, and of the
politicians of the South when the war
began. These opinions seemed well
founded in reason and in history, and
the suppression of the rebellion, all
things considered, may be justly re
garded as the greatest of all military
achievements.
+ The fact that the rebels fought
upon their own soil, in a country with
which they were familiar, protected
from the approach of loyal armies by
the natural advantages before de-
scribed, was full compensation for
the difference between the population
and resources of the two sections,
and the final triumph of our arms
and the suppression of the rebellion,
, must be sought for in other causes.
What these causes were may be
brief ystated.
First-In the strength, courage and
endurance impaired to armies, by the
/ conviction that they are fighting in a
just and patriotic cause. The hum
J blest privates in our army believed
they were fighting to preserve the best
: government in the world; to preserve
liberty and to extinguish slavery; in
behalf of civilization and ChristianI-
ty; against advancing barbarism and
J inhumanity. These convictions gave
: inspiration, courage and hope to the
! \ army, and animated the great mass OF
f the people of the North, VINO sustain
, ed the government throughout the
contest, constituting an immense
7 moral power, In opposition to which
the South had but little to offer.
The people of the South had bitter
| preiudices, which had been carefully
} fosIered by designing politicians
Many of them believed in the abstract
doctrine, under the Constitution, OF
State sovereignty and the right Of Sc
eession. Some believed in the right
falluess of slavery, but more in Its
} profitableness, its convenience, and
} its contribution to luxury and pride.
But all of these constituted no moral
power to inspire the patriot, nerve
/ the soldier, give consolation in the
: DYING hour, or determine people
) never to surrender, and to
struggle on to the last. When
therefore, the principal armies
of the rebellion were overcome and
had surrendered, the war was at an
2 end. Hostility was not maintained IN
) the forest and mountain as had been
= predicted. The convictions, hopes
and purposes of the masses had been
. extinguished before their armies were
= and although they were iull of bitter
ness and humiliation, yet there was
t nothing left for which they might sac
2 rifice their homes, and the future
] quiet and prosperity of their lives
? Their cause failed IN advance OF their
armies and resources.
The rebel historian of the Lost
t Cause, In descanting upon the sub
) ject, spoke as follows:
| THE whole fabric of Confederate
!, defense tumbled down at a stroke oil
r arms that did not amount to a battle
Y There was no last great convulsion
y such as usually marks the final strug.
;. giles of a peoples devotion, or the
' expiring hours Of their desperation
| The word surrender travelled from
! Virginia to Texas. A four years
: contest terminated with the smallest
i incident OF bloodshed; il lapsed; Il
: passed by a rapid and easy transition
e into a profound and abject submission
o There must be some explanation Of
t this fiat conclusion of the war. 1t il
z | l.
e only take place IN a thorough demon
= alization of the armies and people Of
the Confederacy; there must have
!, been a general decay Of public spirit
T a general rottenness of public affairs
|, when a great war was thus terminated
y and contest was abandoned so shor
= of positive defeat, and so far from
T. the historical necessity of subjuga
:, lion.
:. And again he says:
h We fear that the lessons and ex
It amples of history are to the contrary
t. and we search in vain for one in
: stance wheHe a country of such extern
/ as the confederacy has been so thor
t oughly subdued by any amount o
# military force, unless where popular
# decentralization has INTERVIEWED"
r History records that many nations
l. far more exhausted than they, have
:, struggled on to final victory. Ga
!. Revolutionary Fathers, at the end o
) four years, defeated, exhausted, anC
IS overrun, did not despair, but, ami
/ mated by the justice Of thei
= cause, and the belief that i
Il would triumph, because it wa.
: just, struggled on, and at the end o
e seven years were blessed with peace
y and the rich raMard which shall hl