Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1869-08-18
Vol. 64.-3279. No. 43.


through exposure to many temptations, It is the
Judgment Of your committee that these appre-
hended evils should he avoided BY an amendment
Of the constitution which shall give their app
pointment to the Governor and Senate.
Another obvious advantage of the proposed
methed Of appointing the judges consists in the
better opportunities which would be possessed by
the Governor 20 ascertain the fitness Of indyidu-
ais proposed for the office in respect TO each and
all the various rare qualifications, herein before
enumerated, than can be possessed BY n BODY Of
men whose very election under which they will
be called upon TO discharge this duty occurs only
q few weeks before they are required 10 exercise
Judgment, and good sense, and uprghtncss Of in
tention, will be wholly unacquainted il may be
with the candidates proposed for Judges, or with
their qualifications, simply from the want Of op-
portunity, their pursuits in life rarely bringing
them in contact with the courts or its proctition-
ers. And under the present system it may hap
pen that some person, amiable in respect to all
that constitutes the pleasing gentleman, but yet
deplornbly destitute Of all, or Of many of the es-
sontinl qualifications Of an excellent, or even
moderately efficient judge, will become ambitious
for the place and procure himself 10 be elected
to the legislature for the very purpose Of influence
ing its members 70 bestow, by the usual appliances
and arts Of pleasing address, and adrot supplica-
tion, the very mask OF apparent ind ference which
il often wears, making it still more effective in
procuring the bestowment Of the Office upon him
self. Or if not done through his own personal
efforts it may be done BY an irresponsible friend
more anxious to do good turn to his neighbor,
than TO secure well qualified officer for the State
But in the case Of the appointment by the Gov
ern0r, the circumstance are bravey altered. lie
is to he responsible to all his constituents for the
faithful, honest and fearless discharge Of this,
the most important OF all his duties lie will
know that il he makes n bad appointment the
curses will fall upon his head, rather than upon
the appointee. Should he attempt to elect some
iav0rite, destitute Of the qualifications required
in an efficient judge, he would know that he
would have the indignant irowns of all the wi-cst
and hest men in the State to meet. This cOndi-
tOn of things, therefore, would constitute an ir-
resistible motive TO a good man and we elect no
others 10 our chief executive office in this State,
and do not expect 10 do SOTO be oyer-circum-
spect, IT anything, IN making the most searching
inquiry into all the things that should be reQuir-
ed to enabled him TO form u correct Judgment, in
respect TO the fitness of the candidate to be pro-
posed by him for the office. And 80 of the SEN
ate. II an instance should possibly occur, of the
nomination by the Governor of an unfit person.
seduced so TO do by the over Importantly of in
terested parties with whom he is closely related
by ties of kindred OF of interest the senate
would well know that if they confirmed the ap-
pointment they must share the responsibility of
IL equally with the Executive And this con-
sciOusness would be q most powerful motive 10
restrain their action. Indeed, these advantages
of the proposed method of appointment have been
universally conceded and recognized by the wisest
and best men in our country, from the orglniza-
ton of its government t0 the pres ent time, and
needed not to have been enforced at such length
even, as We have attempted to do
On the other hand, the motive arising from
this sense of responsibility is almost entirely lost
under system Of annual elections in a popular
assembly, and where the responsibility instead
Of being concentrated upon few, is attenuated
and dissipated, by distribution, to a body 50 large
as the General Assembly Of Vermont
The notion thar by conierring the appointment
Of the judges upon the Governor and Senate, the
people will surrender up in any degree, the exer-
else of their essential sovereign power, is based
upon no other foundation than the mere unsub-
stantial creation of the imagination 1t is hne-
ton, conferred by the people for good reasons
upon their own servants, the Governor and Sena-
tors, servants who are required to be, by pro-
vision OF the Constitution, linen most noted for
wisdom and virtue, and to be discharged under
a fearful responsibility, that of the abiding exc
Grafton Of the people while living, and of the his
torian it may be, after their decease if not most
ably, and honestly performed
The people are busily employed about their
personal affairs, aud accumulating provision for
old age They say to their servant, the Cover
nor, 20 and find us the best man in the State To
the duties of the office of Judge and be
careful that you discharge this duty faithfully.
And to the Senators we have employed you be-
cause of your peculiar qualifications and opportu-
mites TO Judge to the fitness of persons to ill the
office Of judge, TO act as an advisory body to the
Governor, in their selection and appointment, and
we direct you to make exhaustive inquiry into the
fitness, in all particulars, of such persons as the
Governor may nominate, and we will hold you to
a stern accountability likewise in the performance
Of this important trust. Is not this the attitude
rather OF sovereigns toward their subjects, than
Of menials toward their lordsi
But there is still another aspect in which this
objection may be viewed, and which will, if pos
sible, still more strikngly illustrate its utter fall
aciousness. Under the present mode of choosing
Judges, the people themselves do not exercise any
direct voice. They are elected by body Of rep
constituting the two branches of one
department only OF the government. This is not,
then, question as 10 the surrender by the peo-
pie of the privilege of eecting the Judges by
their own ballots, but as TO whether il is wise to
transfer the appointing power from one class of
The pe0ple's representatives, and from class not
slected upon The basis Of popular representation,
srccllt IN small part, 10 another irhich is elected
upon that bdsis lt is 10 leave with one co-ordi-
nate branch of the Legislature the same power 10
in the election of judges ii now pos
'esses only that its power is to be exercised mega
lively in case its choice does not accord with that
li the Executive And then in place of the other
coordinate branch OF the Legislature, there is
substituted for the performance of this important
function, the Chief Magistrate of the whole peo-
ole-the head of an entire coordinate and CO.
squal department of the government, thus yir-
uay securing the united action and concurrence
lf two departments, instead of one, in the selec-
ion of those who shall fill the Offices in the Judi
,ial department The advantage of dividing this
between two departments is obvious
10 Il II.
lction of the other, thus preventing hasty and
unfit appointments And it is not to be forgotten
that it has always been regarded serious obec-
ion TO reposing the choice of Judges solely in
hat department which makes the laws, the con
of which the judges who are depend
mt upon the body that enacted them, and on
which they must rely for the seats they hold, will
De called upon to pass.
Still another thing in this connection, peculiar
% our State, will demonstrate the entire absence
# any basis whatever upon which to place the
objection under consideration. Under our pres
INT frame Of government, while each voter has
IN equal voice in the election of the Governor
md Senators, it is far otherwise in the election of
he members of the House of representatives
lhe members Of the latter body, instead of being
elected By the people, in the sense of each voter
,xercsing an equal voice, are elected by IA congo
lies, so % speak, of municipal corporations each
corporation having an equal voice. The one of
hem, as for instance, Goshen, may have no more
han five hundred inhabitants, while another, as
or instance the town Of Rutland has fifteen thou
and 1t is plain to be seen that under this une-
lual system of representation, the five hundred
inhabitants of Goshen may neutralze BY the vote
If its representative for judge, the choice OF the
ifteen thousand inhabitants of Rutland in other
words, setting the five hundred inhabitants of the
ormer town against an equal number of the in
iabitants of the latter, leaves fourteen thousand
i've hundred inhabitants of Rutland without any
'oce whatever in the choice of the judges who
ire TO sit in final Judgment upon her vastly greater
interests, that frequently become involved in liti-
,ation, while the inhabitants of Goshen rarely
layo use for a judge at ALL Thus Goshen, with
population of only five hundred souls, with
carcey ever lawsuit before the supreme Court,
irtually casts thirty uotes for each Of our judges,
making one hundred and eighty p0tcs for the six
comprising the present bench, while Rutland,
With population Of about fifteen thousand, hav-
ng interests 50 vast and complicated as 10 require
he frequent adjudication of the judges of the last
esort, casts but ONE Uote for each Judge, and six
'otes for dHi And this only illustrates the uni |
orm inequality of the system, the only difference |
'eing in the degree. So that practically. by this
method of electing judges, they are chosen by
greatly unequal in membership and
wealth, through the action of their agents, called
IL Al - -