Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1869-02-26
Decision of the Supreme Court ON Coin
Contracts

Rodes, to the effect that contracts 60 pay
coin can only be discharged with coin, nat
urally attracts considerable attention and
comment. Certainly, nothing can be more
sensible than that man who has specially
agreed to pay so many dollars IN gold should
be made to pay them in gold, and not be
allowed to put off his creditor with paper
worth only three-quarters as much as gold.
Yet some Of the press seem to be under the
impression that whereas the particular con-
tract on which the suit was based was made
before the legal-tender act was passed, the
| decision includes only contracts of that de-
scription. It is true that Judge Davis,
after the opinion of the court was delivered,
said :
I assent to the result which a majority of
the court has arrived at, that an express
contract to pay coin Of the United States
! made before tie act Of February %, 1862,
commonly called The legal-tender act, is not
within the clause Of that act which makes
treasury notes legal-tender in payment of
debt. But I think it proper to guard
against all possibility of misrepresentation
| by stating that If there be any reasoning Ill
the opinion of the majority which can be
applicable to any other class Of contracts, it
| does not receive my assent.
! But no other of the asserting judges took
| this view, and there was no dissenting opin-
ion except that of Judge Miller, and the
New York Herald we'll says:
| 1t was the clear opinion of the maj GRITTY
| of the court that all contracts STIMULATING
payment in gold, whether prior to the
| legal-tender act or subsequent TO it, are
valid in law. Not only does the whole
reasoning of the court support this conclu-
sion, but it is impossible to imagine any
line Of argument which would uphold the
validity OF previous gold contracts that
| would not apply with equal force to con-
tracts made subsequent to the passage OF
| the act. Nobody has ever contended that
| the legal-tender act was not retrospective
in its operation. The act itself makes no
distinction between past and future debts,
nor has such distinction ever been made
by any Court, State or Federal, in its ex-
positions of it. The very fact that the
contract on which the present decision has
been rendered was made before the war,
| strengthens instead of invalidatipg the
conclusion that it applies to all cases Of the
same kind. For, what is the fact on which
the decision is grounded ? Why, the fact
of q specific contract It is this fact of a
| contract which separates the case from the
great mass of debts incurred before the
legal act was in existence, and
which is assigned by the court as the sole
basis of it's decision. All other previous
debs are left by this decision as capable
of being legally discharged by the tender
of United States notes, which demonstrates
that the retrospective operation of the law
was in no way considered in the decision.
The following extract from the opinion
of the court will bear perusal, as proving,
beyond all doubt, the ample scope of the
decision
GA contract to pay certain number of
doll in c;jr 10
import, nothing else than an agreement to
deliver certain weight Of standard gold to
be ascertalned by count of coins, each Of
which is certified to contain definite pro-
portion Of that weight. II as not Qistin-
guishdble, as eoe think, IN 2orimciple from a
contract 10 dettoey' an equal tCeigM Of bullion
Of equal inenesS. 1T is distiuguishable in
circumstances only by the fact that the
sufficiency of the amount to be rendered
IL payment must be ascartained in the
case of bullion by assay and the scales,
while IN the case Of coin il may be ascer-
tanned by the count
After some further argument on this
point the court says IL does not think it
necessary to examine the question whether
the clauses Of the currency act, making
United States notes legal tender, are
warranted by the constitution in this case;
but it proceeds to inquire whether, upon
the assumption that those clauses are so
warranted, and npou the further assump-
tlon that engagements to pay coined dol
lars may be regarded as ordinary contracts
to pay money rather than as contracts to
deliver certain amounts of standard gold,
it can be maintained that contract to pay
coined money may be satisfied by tender
Of United States notes. Is this perform
ance Of the contract within the true intent
of the acts
It must be observed that the avs of
the coinage of gold and silver have never
been repealed or modified; they remain on
the statute book in full force, and the
emission of gold and silver coin from the
mint continues, the actual coinage during
the last fiscal year having exceeded, accor-
ding to the report of the director OF the
mint, $50, 00O, 900; nor have those provis-
ions of the law which make these coins a
legal tender IN all payments been repealed
Or modified. It follows that there were
two descriptions of money in use at the
time the tender under consideration was
made, both authorized by law, and both
made legal tender in payments. The gen
eraI denomination of both descriptions was
"dollars, but they were essentially un-
like in nature. The coined dollar was, as
we have seen, a piece of gold Or silver of q
p1CSS11OSeA SISS VI WS1Sn1uS
prescribed number of grains; the note dol
lar was a promise to pay a coin dollar, but
it was not promise to pay on demand,
nor at any fixed time, nor was it in fact
convertible into coin dollar.
It is impossible, in the nature of things,
that these two dollars should be the actual
equivalents of each other nor was there
anything in the currency acts purporting
to make them SUCH How far they were at
that time from being actually equivalents
has been already stated. #, then, no e.
press precision TO tie contrary be found in the
acts Of Congress, ii is q just, If not meces-
sa'y inference, from The fact that both descrip-
tons Of money ecere issued by The same goo-
eTnnaent, that contracts 10 pay IN either acere
equally sanctioned by laao. II is indeed diff
cult to see hoao any question can be made on
this point. Doubt concerning it can only
spring from that confusion of ideas which
always attends the introduction of varying
and uncertain measures of value into cir
culation as money. The several statements
relating to money or legal tender must be
construed together. Let it be supposed,
then, that the statutes providing for the
coinage of gold and silver dollars are found