The Camden journal. [volume] (Camden, S.C.) 1866-1891, 1869-05-06

her armies home covered with glory,
while England was left in the lurch
and automatically snubbed for becom'
ing the tool to cut dynasty issue be-
tween Louis Napoleon and Alexander
A similar diplomatic combination wa'
coutriyed to bring England into trouble
and enable France I'd carry out her aims
for the frontier of the Rhine In this
Mexico was mixed up, and the United
States was to play the part Russia had
acted in the previous scheme. hapo'
leon used every possible effort to induce
ENGLAND to assist in his Mexican plans
and to recognize the Confederate govern
ments. He will knew that such step
would BIZ followed by a war between the
United States and England, and this
would leave him to work the policy Of
Continental Europe to suit hts views
Prussia would have lost the makeweight
on her side, and Sadowa would not have
been fought; for while England would
have had her hands full with war with
US the weight of France in the diploma:
tic scale would have saved Austria and
planted the French eagles on the Rhine.
| Wisely did the British statesmen keep
out of the snare spread for them, and
Louis Napoleon was forced to retrace
his steps in his abandonment of the pol
icy of his great uncle regarding America.
This was his mistake Neither the
people of France nor the traditional
Napoleonic policy have any feeling of
sutagouism to this country, nor does any
anti. French feeling exist with us; but
any efforts to convert the United States
into makeweight in his continental
schemes will surely fail.
This, however, is the part it is sought
to make England play in the present
state of European politics. France and
Russia alike have aims against Prussia;
but so long as England is free to throw
her sword or purse into the scale the
odds are far too even to be pleasant
If the fears of England can be reused
on the Cuban question and she be ln-
duced to send a strong feet into the
American Mediterranean, on the plea
of securing her own possessions, the
course of events will assume promis-
ing aspect. Louis Napolean knows
very well that an American and a French
feet could rub against each other for
a agenera,ion and produce not ouly no
expulsion, but not even spark. But
let strong American and British fleets
gather in American waters, and not on
ly will sparks hy from constant collis-
ions, but an explosion Inlay be confident
anticipated. BY next fall a fame of
war would be brought out to consume
English and American commerce, and
neither the sword nor the pnrse of Eng
land would find time to employ its
weight in continental diplomacy. The
aims which were defeated in 1864 might
be accomplished in 1868. With Rus,
sia as an ally France could control Eu-
rope.
We have had one great war you know
we'll what it cost in blood and treasure.
Years must elapse before VIC recover
from its evils. While, therefore, we do
not desire another, at the SAME time
We do not fear it. We know our power,
and know better how to use it than we
did ten years ago. For these reasons
we would calmly advise the British peo-
pie and British statesmen to beware OF
being made the tools of Nepoleonic in
trigue. If they will scnh the field close,
ly they will perceive that while he is
eontriving collision between England
and ourselves on he one hand, he is
using the revolutionary movement in
Cuba to prevent the accession of the
younger Bourbon branch III the per
son of the Duke of Montpeusier to the
throne of Spain. The fear of a recogni
tion of free Cuba by France is potent
argument in the Bourbon controversy
These Napoleonic schemes will not af
feet the march of the administration o.
President Grant, nor will they deprive
it of the SUPPORT of the country in it
American policy but they may serious
ly complicate the position of Eng lan'