The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1869-06-17
THE HOMESTEAD LAW.


to the applicability of prior liens and judgments
to the Homestead. The case came up before him
at Chambers on IN appeal taken before him, by
consent, and he has decided that the Homestead
clause of the Constitution of this State, and the
act of the Legislature carrying out its provisions
are not in conflict with the Constitution Of the
United States 1t is likewise decided by him that
the $1,000 exempt under this law includes the
value Of the dwelling house and out-buildings,
and the appraisement having excluded the dwell
ling in this case and assigned $1,000 in land, a
re-appraisement was ordered to be made. We
furnish the full text of this decision:
IN THE COURT COMMON PLEAs-GREEN-
WILLIE COUNTY.
4. d. Hoke and T. @. Donaldson, Administrator,
of Dapid Hoke, Us. r. Edwnn Ware-la FL. Fa.,
June, 1859. I'd FL. Fa.. $1,000 Interest compu-
ted annually from 24M September, 1885,
The second execution above was levied upon
certain lots and real estate, the property of the
Defendant, by the Sheriff of Greenvie County, in
cluding tract or lot of land in the clown of
Greenville containing thirty acres, more or less,
adjoining W. A. ToHnes and others" Upon this
tract of land the dwelling and outhouses of the
Defendant were situated.
He claimed that his homestead should be set off
to him and personal property Of the value of i've
hundred dollars, in conformity to the provisions of
an Act Of the General Assembly, entitled San Act
to determine and perpetuate the Homestead"
passed 9th day of September, 1868. Three ap-
praisers were appointed-one by the Plaintiffs,
one by the Defendant, and the third by the Sher-
if, Vickers. These appraisers set off by metes
and bounds homestead Of the estate OF the debt
or, with description and plat of the same, also
personal property Of the value of five hundred
dollars, and made separate returns Of the same
certifying the execution Of their duties conforma-
bly, TO law, to the Sheriff, for record in Court
The Plaintiffs in Execution have filed various
grounds Of objection to these returns Of the ap-
praisers, and ask Of this Court re-assignment
and re re-appraisement of the real aud personal prop
erty Of the debtor.
The objections of the Plaintiffs, when analyzed,
may be reduced to three: First, that the Home
stead Law is unconstitutional as to liens existing
at the date of its passage. Second, that in the
valuation and assignment Of the personal proper
ty injustice is done to Plaintiffs, because the esti
mated value of the personal property is greatly
below its market value. Third that the real es-
tate assigned and set off greatly exceeds in value
the sum of one thousand dollars, and that In ma
king such estimate, the appraisers did not take
into the estimate the vaue of the dwelllng-house
and the outbuildings connected Herewith and in
cident thereto.
The first objection is overruled The State of
South Carolina had no constitutional existence
from the close of the war in April, 1865, until
July, 1868, when representation under, and IN
conformity to the Reconstruction Acts of Congress,
was admitted. 1t is practically matter of little
consequence whether the State was legally in or
r. .lo TT-.n 1,tyfh fha onf of aaHp
State certainly had no constitutional rights recog-
nized until July, 1868, when she was readmtted
in consummation of the Reconstruction Acts.
From 1865 to 1868 the State was not represented
in the Senate or House. If State, the right of
representation could not have been denied, and
vet the Courts of the United States have decided
that the Reconstruction Acts of Congress were
constitutional. Again, if within the dates above,
South Carolina had been Constitutional State the
Civil would have been superior to the Military
law of the United States-the rebellion having
ended and the supremacy of the authority of the
United States having been established after April,
1S65-and yet, it is notorious and conceded
fact, that no civil government existed in the State
after the passage of the Reconstruction Acts Of
March, 1867, that was not subordinate to the Mil
itary authority of the United States. The Militia
ry Commandant of this District under these Acts,
was authorized to abrogate oil civil government in
this and ether States, and it is well known that
this authority was exercised in 1867 in Georgia,
and few months later in Mississippi.
The Convention that was called in this State to
frame a new Constitution was called, not by the
civil authority of the State, but by the Military
Commandment of the United States. A large ma-
iority of the persons who were declared entitled
to vote for delegates to this Convention had never
been recognized rs citizens by the laws or Consti
tuition of South Carolina as they existed prior to,
or during the war, but were made citizens by Act
of Congress and enforced by military orders in
the election of delegates to the Constitutional Con-
veption. They assembled in Convention and adop-
ted Constitution which, according to the provis-
ions of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, was
a mere nullity, unless Congress accepted the same
after its ratification by the people of the State,
including the new citizens. The people of the
State ratified the Constitution by q majority very
decisive, and Congress accepted it as presented,
and thereupon admitted the State to representa-
ton in both Houses of Congress- If the Home
stead provision had been Objectionable to Con-
gress applying to existing liens at the date of the
adoption Of the Constitution, it would doubtless
have been excepted to in the Act admitting the
State to representation, as was done by Congress
with reference TO certain features in the Consitu-
ton Of Georgia.
The view now presented, that the Homestead
Act o, to liens existing at the date of the adop-
ton of the Constitution, violates that clause of the
Constitution of the United States which prohibits
any State from passing ''any law impairng the
obligation of contracts" would seem to be fully
met and answered by the foregoing statement Of
the history of tho enactment.
But the objection may be answered very salts
factorily by this view Of the question: Suppose
the Constitutional Convention in Charleston, in
January, 1868, had refused to recognize any lien
whatever, whether mortgage or judgment) given
or created, or any property by or under the pro-
visional, rebel or ante-war governments that had
existed in South Carolina and directed all officers
created by their Constitution ts refuse to enforce
such liens could its power have been questioned,
and if so, how and before what tribunal could the
liens have been enforced? Now, if they could
have ignored all liens by declining to provide for
their enforcement what prevented the Convention
from recognizing the liens with such conditions as