The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-04-12

1
The Cubsm Campaign.
| From the N. y. Tribune.
Given, as a seat OF popular insurrection. a
| long, narrow island, with unhealthy coast and
| a back bone OF mountain Businesses, with tbou.
| sands of situations admirably adapted to an
| isolated defensive warfare, but without ready
means Of communication through a territory
which, though not so large as New York, pre-
sents distances between it's leading oitias
greater than from tide water to CHICAGO:
given population alarmed and too scattered
for CLOSE organization, but generally in svm-
patby with the insurgents a power three
thousand miles away, itself in the later stages
of revolution, with few troops and less
money, strainiDg its resources and its credit
to the utmost In the effort to reduce this island
to subjection; the Government forces unaccli-
mated, i'll fitted for active operations, and
comparatively ignorant of the country. the
insurgents hardy, familiar with the regions
through which they move, and exempt from
the terrors which the approaching unhealthy
season brings to newcomers.
With such conditions, what features would
campaign be likely to exhibits The problem
does not seem one of remarkable difficulty; the
journals which complain so vehemently of the
confusion in the Cuban news might almost in
Emersonisn style, evolve its solution from
their own consciousness.
There could be no great battles, because
rapid concentration. There could be even no
effective cooperation. Each little band, having
its own stretch of country on which to forage,
and its own easy line of retreat to the noun
tains, would make little campaign of it's own.
The insurgents Of to-day would, on occasion,
sink into the peaceful planters of tomorrow.
The country would be turbulent, outbreaks
would be frequent, property and lite would be
unsafe, but the insurrection itself would be
hard to fix.
There would be many attacks on isolated
outposts, many devices to harass the garri-
cons, every effort to wear out the enemy and
prolong the struggles; but there would be few
attempts to hold large towns or extensive
tracts Of the country. Operating in this way,
the insurgents would have nothing to defend;
they would be free to embrace every oppor-
tunity for attack; and their movements
would compel the enemy to waste his re-
sources in keeping up a number Of posts,
and leave him DO troops to take the field.
Thus the contest would be prolonged the
financial distress of the mother country would
| be increased; the army OF the enemy would be
gradually weakened; and, as the hot season ap-
preached would come at last the Cuban oppor-
| tunity. Meanwhile the whole field of the strug-
| gle would be covered by mist of exaggeration
and uncertainty. In the absence OF great en-
gagements, there would be multitudinous ac-
counts of small ones, which We might be sure
Woulu IOso notniuB III tneH ProPoIIohs a. tno
| hands of the grRndiloquent Spanish reporters.
| The day when the skirmishes in West Vir-
ginia were pronounced the campaign of a
| second Napoleon is not yet 80 remote that We
| need to express very much wonder at the
imposing display in the bulletins of other
peoples wars. We should quite naturally
have casual rife shots reported as heavy
bombardments; little gatherings of half-armed
guerrillas masquerading in the newspapers as
heavy columns of insurgents; marches from
| q camp when the forage was exhausted to
another that offered better supply appearing
as stragetic movements OF the gravest and
most mysterious import; while each little
affray that actually occurred might very well
be expected to assume the proportions OF 9
terrific contest, in which the side that told the
story gained a brilliant victory, with loss o
none killed and two or three disabled, though
the field was strown with the oorpses of the
enemy, and no hospitals could be found Il
accommodate their wounded. Before ou
armies were consolidated and our raw troop
taught war, we went through all this our
selves; we might now be able, without an.
great stretch OF the imagination, to concsiv
how at least O similar experience might befal
, the Cubans.
We have been treated of late to grea
many sneers at the Cuban insurrecton. Tha
l the ready organs of the slave power, while |
2 lasted, and of the bogus Democracy whicl
now inherits its vices without its virtues
= should make haste to oppose any struggle 70
: liberty anywhere, was to be expected. Bu
3 that Journals which sympathized with tn
j. effort of Spain to secure popular government
' for herself should sympathize, alse, with he
Q effort to deny 1t to her richest and most In
8 portant possession, is inexplieable. Whe
= these seek, therefore, to make light of th
8 struggle In progress on our neighboring island
!, we are forced to believe that they cannot hav
, sufficiently considered the conditions unde
@ which it is made. We have had no reason
d expect great battles thus far, and there cs
k tainly have been none. We have had Il
9 reason to expect even a fully organized insu
4 rectionary army, and there is none;-r
: reason to look for the capture of importal
z towns, or for any effort, save to nurse IL
s flame of hostility to the Spaniaid, and pr
1 long the revolt into the unhealthy SUNNI,
9 months. 1t is too soon yet to pronounce Il
8 insurrection a success but it Is not too soc
Il to say that these aims have been attaine
9 and that, with them attained, the prospect (,
: Cuban independence was never brighter ths
j. now.
J. Our Legation i'm spain.