Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1869-02-18
GOLD CONTRACTS.
Text of the Decision of the Supreu
Court of the limited STATES

Text of the Decision of the Supreme
Court of the United states.
| The decision of the Supreme Court o.
the United States on the 18th inst. re-
lated wholly to gold contracts made be-
fore the legal tender acts were passed.
The Court said that as the law making
gold and silver legal tender had never
been repealed, they could be exacted for
the payment Of coin contracts and it VOL
unteered the further opinion that coin
contracts could be made now which
would be legal and valid. In the coarse
of its opinion, the Court after reciting
the laws creating a coin currency, held
the following language
The inquiry concerning the legal i'm
port of the words dollars payable in
| gold and silver coin, lawful money of the
U. s." may be answered without much
difficulty. Every such dollar is a piece
OF gold or silver certified to be of certain
weight and purity by the form and i'm
press given to it at the mint of the United
States, and therefore declared to be
legal tender in payment and any NUNS
Der OF such dollars is the number of
grains OF standard gold or silver in dol
lar multiplied by the given number.
Payment Of money is the delivery by
one to another Of the amount due, A
contract to pay a certain number of dolls
lars in gold and silver coins is therefore
in legal import nothing else than an
agreement to deliver certain weight or
standard of gold, to be ascertained by a
count of coins, each of which is certified
to contain q certain, definite proportion
OF that weight. 1t is not distinguished,
as we think, in principle from
contract to deliver an equal weight
of bullion Of equal fineness. 1t
is distinguishable in circumstance
only by the fact that the sufficiency of the
amount to be rendered in payment must
be ascertained in thecaSe Of bullion by as
say and the scales, while in the case of coin
it may be aScertained by the count. We
cannot suppose that it was intended by
the provisions Of the currency acts to
enforce satisfaction of any contract by
the tender Of deprecated currency of any
description equivalent only in nominal
amount to the real value Of the bullion
on the coin dollars. Our conclusion,
therefore, upon this part Of the case, is
that the bond under consideration was in
legal import precisely what it was in the
understanding ofthe parties-a valid obli-
cation, to be satisfied by tender of actual
payment according to its terms, and not by |
an offer Of mere nominal payment. ATgu> |
ments and illustrations of much force and |
value in support of this conclusion might |
be drawn from the possible case of the |
repeal Of the legal tender laws relating |
to coin and the consequent reduction Of |
coined money to the legal consideration
of bullion, and also from the actual con-
dition Of partial decentralization to which |
gold and silver money was reduced by |
the introduction into circulation OF the |
United States notes and National bank |
currency, but we think it unnecessary to
pursue this branch of the subject fur |
Their, nor do we think it necessary to ex, |
anime the question whether the clauses
of the currency act mixing United States |
notes a legal tender are warranted by |
the constitution.
In this case, after the Chief Justice
concluded, Judge Davis said:
| assent to the result which a majority |
of the court has arrived at, that an ex>
press contract TO pay coin Of the United |
States made before the act of February
20, 1862, commonly called the legal>
tender act, is not within the clause of
that act which makes treasury notes
legal tender in payment of debts; but |
think it proper to guard against all pos
sibility of Misrepresentation by stating
that if there be any reasoning in the
majority which can be applicable to
any other class of contracts, it does not
receive my assent.
Mr.. Justice Swayne said :
| concur in the conclusion announced
by the Chief Justice. My opinion pro-
ceeds entirely upon the language of the
contract and the construction Of the
statutes. The question of the constitu-
tional power of Congress, in my judgment,
does not arise in the case.