The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-03-11

the Qua aIitIes theS soneht Tor 10 their KING; put
they liked on Prince Alfred OF Enc anu anu i as iisoy
to nee ONE a better constitutional king than auy
other European prince who was recommpnoe1
to their attention. The interest aud policy OF
Great Britain rendered the acceptance OF tn5
Greek throne by an English prince measure
not lkely, in the long run, 10 Oe shtlsIac OrJ
ether to Greece or England. Fortunately,
diplometic arrangements had rendered the
Accordance of the crown by an English prince
jmposs BILE. Earl Russell at this corjuncture,
WI h that sound judgment on matters of act
which often contrasts 50 oddly with its absence
as regards the choice OF httng times and
occasions, gave the Greeks lecture
on the qualities they ought to look for IN their
They wire informed that the British Govern
ment considered they would do well not 10
choote "a king under twenty years OF age, hut
rather prince of mature years and OF some
eX Xlerie1ce in the world" (Despach of Earl
Russell to MIR. Scarlet Nov. 20, 1897 TIE
Greeks we're not offended at the style o. ddactc
statesmanship which has so often given oaeuse
to other nations. Indeed, they admired the
institutions of England so much the no ore,
since they saw that those institutions had
made a Socrates Secretary OF State; and, in
order TO ensure the practical execution OF the
wise advice. the National Assembly invited the
British Government TO select prince possess
ing these aud other qualifications of a good
king. Earl Russell had been erronpously
believed by the Greeks TO possess a large ac-
quaintance among royal and serene hlghnesses,
tt, like Themistocles, TO raise q small Safe to
the rank and power of great empire. Earl
Russell had nothing ready bat the lantern OF
his own advice, ana when he went about the
Courts of Europe holding 1t up in the face
Of princes, he was not more successful in his
search for a good king t1an Dlogcnes in
finding his honest Greek. SO, after two mis-
adventures, the loss OF mucn precious time,
and u vast deal Of diplomatic sneering, he car
rled his counsels into practice by selecting tor
Greece king OF the mature age" OF seventeen,
and with the experience in the world" ac.
qulred as a midshipman in the Danish navy.
The Greeks, having received their King from
England, set seriously to work at forming their
own Constitution. The Constitution OF 1864
differs from the ordinary type of Continental
CONSTITUTIONS and Its divergencles are the result
OF state of society aud opinions among East
ern races that cannot fail 10 exert considerable
influence on the political organization of the
Christian governments which have been formed
in the provinces separated from Turkey, and
on the institutions in the course offormation in
the Ottoman Empire ITSELF Some of the enact
men of this Constitution probably foreshadow
the procedure OF democracy, even In the older
States OF the Continent, as they advance
towards liberty. new position is created Tor
the Grown by placing II in direct connection
with a single representative Chamber, without
even an Upper House or Senate nominated
by the soveIe eign or elected by the people. This,
however, was not from anv theoretical prefer
ence for single Chamber. The Greeks abolished
King Otho's Senate because It was nest of COR
ruption, and they found that society in the
Hellenic Kingdom contained no class OF men
whose position OF independence afforded
chance of forming useful Senate. The alter
native was Senate like that which had been
abolished, or single Chamber, aud public
| opinion, not merely the momentary Will OF the
| populace, pronounced an emphauc decision on
the subject by bolishng Council of State
| which the Constitution admitted on trial. after
! it had existed year. On the other hand, this
! Constitution of 1894 constitutes a Cabinet as
responsible feature OF executive admins ration,
standing between the Crown the Chamber,
apd the people. The Ministers are placed
under increased responsibility to the Gro Wn by
being compelled by the Constitution 10 act in
some cases in body. The King has thus the
power of restraining the assumption of too great
authority by the Prime Minister, who, as party
leader of au overwhelming majority in single
chamber, might become the master of his col
leagues. BY holding regular Cabinet Councils,
and compelling each Minister to record his
opinion on every administrative measure
relating to his department, the King may en-
force responsibility by an appeal to facts. A
dis olution will then show whether the people
adopt the opinion of the King or of the leader of
majority in the Chamber The principle of
democracy is Carried ont to It's fullest extent by
electDg single chamber and adopting vote by
ballot, and large electoral districts, Without
reference to municipalities or local interests.
Numbers are all in all. Wealth can ouly make
its way by corruption, knowledge bS hittery of
the mob, and power by intimidation. Aud for
the present. the most promlnent features of
constitutional government in Greece are cor
ruptiOn, nalonal selt-laudauon, and govern
meIt intimidation. The eeks did not overlook
the danger of democracy becoming a des po-
tism when invested with unlimited power, and
they attempted to place 1T under some restraint
DY several arLlCleS OF lne COnsJlCut1OQ. l0e
representatives are invested With independence
by being elected Tor four years. Demagogues
are discouraged by the provision that, TO be
j elected mem Der of the chamber, the deputy
mu t be domiciled, and possess political and civil
rights for two years In the district previously to
the election. He must also be thirty years of
age. Another provision intended to restrain
both corruption and governmental intml lation
excludes mayors OF Municipalities and paid
oftcials from becoming memoers of the chams
Der. Officers of the army and the haVy can only
be members while on halfApay, and minis ers
have always seat and voice in the chamber,
but Can vote only wuen they sit as Deputies.
THIS Constitution presents two important guess
tons for consideration before we can arrive at
any conclusion concerning the probability OF
the new type OF constitutional monarchy which
IT presents working well In practice The irst
Is, how the authority of the crown can be eXs
eIcised by the klug 80 as to control the power
OF the leader OF a majority in the chamber VINO
becomes Prime Minister. The Prime Minister
being the representative of democracy, and the
constitution declaring that all power in the
State has ITS source in the people, the Prime
Minister must he the most po Neriul man 10 the
monarchy. The king, though superior in rank
is only, as lar as the administration goes,
check on the Prime Minister. The second
question is, by what means the power
OF a single chamber can be prevented
rO% m Sae Tp11e TR. ouesian S
more important than the 6rst, for good glvern-
ment has existed, and can exist, without
king, but is hardly po sibe with the exercise oi
} unlimited power, whether in the hands OF
= single individual or q single chamber.
A king placed in constant contact with
r single democratic chamber is IN an extremely
delicate position. Tue authority OF the Gro vi
has lot yet been clearly traced out and il
3 Greece both the constitution aud public opinion
, demand that the king should be something