The Hawaiian gazette., 1869-03-31

understood that the work for the time ad-
judged by the Court was without pay-stiT,
when he asked him for money, or fish, or
beef he always gave him; but It was not
pretended that these occasional supplies
were in fun satisfaction of the terms of the
original contract
1t is contended by the counsel for the re-
spondent that, although the service adjudged
by the Court to be performed on account of
desertion was in addition to the term speci-
fed in the contract, still, neither in terms
nor in its spirit, does the statute justify the
position taken by the complainant that he
was not under obligation to pay him wages.
The wages by the contract are nine dollars
per month-the employee to find himself If
the doctrine contended for by the complain
ant is sound, from what source is his daily
food to be furnisheds All that can be asked
Of party is TO fulfill the contract, with the
damages or penalties which the law imposes.
In cases of this character, the law author
ICES the magistrate to impose additional term
of service, but is silent on the sabject of wa
ges. The clear inference is, therefore, that
the only penalty intended was the extension
of the term of service to deserter who had
shown determined disposition not to fulfill
his contract. A law of this character must
be construed strictly; therefore it is clear
that wages should have been paid if the par
ty complied with the Judgment of the Court,
by performing the labor required of him. 1t
is due to the complainant to say that he fur
nished food when requested.
The respondent, during the term of service
adjudged by the Court, frequently absented
himself, in violation of the Judgment, and
the complainant paid him no wages, in con-
formity TO the contract, and we regard it as
a case in which neither party fulfilled his OBJ
legations. 1t is not clear which violated
those obligations in the first instance; but it
may be regarded as a mixed case, where
there was continual violation by both par
ties. 1t being, however, incumbent on the
complainant to make out his case, we are of
opinion that he has not done so.
1t is proper to remark that the complain
ant was of opinion that the respondent, for
the additional term of service imposed by
the Court for willful absence, was not enti-
tied to wages.
1t is further commended that the Judgment
was illegal because the additional term of
service imposed extended beyond one year
next after the end of the original term of
service
The question which arises in this case is
this: When does q contract terminate-at
the time specified in its terms, or on its full
fillments II is a sound legal proposition
that party is not relieved of the response
bilities of his contract until it is fulfilled
unless by agreement.
Contracts of this character are usually
made conditioned for an advance, and, il
this construction of the law should obtain,
it would be an inducement to make con-
tract, receive the advance, ship as q seaman,
as the respondent did, and remain abroad
till the time has expired, and then come into
Court and claim an exemption; or, if he
preferred not to remain at sea so long at one
time, he can do as the respondent did, desert
two or three times, and, after short absences,
the time will have elapsed. He enjoys his
advance, and complies, as it is con-
tended, with his contract This could
not have been the intention of the
Legislatnre-the law never aids a man in q
dishonest purpose. We regard this view of
the statute as against sound legal construc-
ton, as well as against the authorities
Judgment of the Circuit Judge affirmed.
fully concur with the final decision of
this case, and with the rulings of the Court
on all the questions 1t presents, with the ex-
ception of the construction of section 1419.
With deep respect and Difference to the opin-
ion of His Honor, the Chief Justice, and of
my associate, respectfully dissent from the
construction given to the words of the sta
tute, fixing as a limit for additional service,
+" one year next after the end of the original
term of service"
1t seems clear to me that this limit is to be
computed by time alone, computing from
the date at which the services, by the con-
tract, begin, and that the end of the ''original
term of service" cannot mean the perform
dnce of the service, and that penal service be-
You'd this limit of time is not under this sta
tute. ALFRED S. HARTwELL,
Associate Justice
Judgment rendered March Goth, 1869, by
consent, as of the last of the January Term
Mr.. W. C. Jones, for plaintiff.
Messrs. F. H. Harris and Kahalewai, for
defendants.
Wood as. Ldnh,lu, similar case to the
above, was concluded by the court to fall
under the principles of the above judgement
W. C. Jones, for Plaintiff.
Messrs. A. F. Judd, and Keawehunahala,
for defendant