The southern enterprise. [volume] (Greenville, S.C.) 1854-1870, 1869-08-25
y Is sEFLEXss PeoFgJI,, IL 81,
.aGREENvHLEs SOUTH CAROLINA. 81 AUGUST q, tsse,s

lnents; and notifications hereafter
70 be made by the Legislature.
The oljett Of this section, when
ascertained will remove all doubt
as to it's proper constructions
the conventions framing tlis Con-
stitution, profiting by the expert
ence of other States, where Legis-
lativedivofcesahaye been granted,
'aud where caprice, favoritism and
importantly controlled the enact
ment in disregard of all general
principles of law and often times
totally inconsistent with the pre-
'vious acts. Of the same body, in
tended to prohibit all divorces by
the Legislative-eontidins the
power exclusively in the courts
which would be bound to decide
snch cases conformably to settled
principles Of law. Divorces are
~ be granted conformably to law
and not BY Legislative caprice.
If, the phraseology of the section
had ,beenn"as now prescribed by
law" it.would have precluded the
Legislature from amendments in
the future, il - as may hereafter
be- prescribed by law" it would
have excluded the enforcement OF
the existing law by the courts and
thereby defeated the grant OF iuris,
diction contained in the fourth
article. The word "law" in the
section embraces ecclesiastical and
common law as well as statute law.
If the section should be construed
to refer alone to law hereafter to
be enacted by the Legislature it
excludes all except statute law.
The phraseology covers what was
intended by the convention that
the courts in determining divorce
cases should be governed by the
existing common law and such
statnte laws as may hereafter be
enacted. The phrase could not be
constructed more perspicuously to
embrace existing law and future
enactments. Any other construe-
tion defeats the other provisions OF
the constitution giving present
jurisdiction to the court of COM
mon pleas in all cases of divorce
and is in palpable conflict with the
well established rule of construc-
ton that remedial legislation must
be literally construed. "No
statutes can be more manifestly
remedial than those which author.
ize divorce; and, therefore, &C.
cording to established principles,
they should be literally and equi.
tably construed to give effect to
the remedy" Bishop on, mar
riage end divorce, 290-lhe same
liberal rule of construction applies
to remedial provisions in the con
stitution as to statutes. ..g
But it may be objected that al
though the constitution gives the
Court of Common Pleas jurisdic
ton, it does not provide how j,
shall be exerciscd-whether in tn,
Common Pleas or on the Equit,
| side of the Common Pleas. i
might be sufficient answer tha
the Common Pleas Courts are in
vested with jurisdiction in all mat
ters of Equity, and that the Equi
| ty side of the Court is the only fo
rum where such causes can b.
plead, and the various orders
passed to give effect to its jndg
ments. Hence the Equity side o
the Common Pleas is the only ap
propriate tribunal to exercise tn,
jurisdiction conferred. In PER-,
VS.. Perry 2, page sol, Chancello
Walworth says: but whenevc
the legislature (or constitution) dis
tinctly gives the right without ere
ating or appointing any particu
lar tribunal to administer the rem
edy, it is fairly to be inferred tha
they intended to vest that powe
in some of the existing tribunal
Of the country" Here the con
stitution gives the right of pres
ent jurisdiction, expressly pre-
scribes the Court of Common
Pleas as the tribunal, and the in
ference is that the power is vestet
on the Equity side, because of th
adaptation of the practice of tia
Court, to give efficiency to all neG
essary DEGREES and orders in dt
termining such cases. ! conclud
therefore, that the Equity side O
the Court of Common Pleas ba
, Jurisdiction Of divorces mems
ct tMoro and vinculo naatrimonit