The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-01-13

o.
prinoiple and in habituAl action, thoroughly
faithful to the Constitution:
Undar the quidanos of these 'simple, but
fxed rules. !" il faithfully adhered to in their
spirit as we'll as letter, the COMMITTEES will have
little difficulty in making it reasonably Ger.
tain that ''no name of a certainly corrupt or
olaripgly incompetent IN" will be sent up
10 the Senate. The head Of each department
will probably b. charged with the special duty
of selecting the men to be appointed for SER
vice in his own department. and will probably
he made to understand-as such things are
understood only in military circles, or by men
accustomed to a military rfgime--,hat he is to
he held responsible for the men appointed to
Office in his department, responsible fer their
integrity as well as their capacity-for what
they do, and for what they fail to do, in the
line OF their legitimate duty.
The thing of first Importance in this matter
is, of course, the selection of these committee
men-or, in more familiar phrase, the selection
of Cabinet. The whole country understands
perfectly that upon this depends the success
or the failure of General Grants administra-
tion; and the country awaits with intense but
patient anxiety, tempered only by its conf
dence in his good judgment and upright pur-
pose, General Grants announcement of the
selections he may make.
But there is another point of very great i'm
portance behind this, but following very
closely upon it. Who shall advise the heads
eff departments, in their selection No man
can know all the applicants, be he Secretary
or President; and no man can, therefore, from
his own knowledge and of his own motion,
select from them the men best fitted in all
things for Office. Whoever makes the selec-
tions must depend upon somebody for advice,
or at least for information, at once full,
reliable, and disinterested, which may guide
him in coming to decision. To whom shall
he look for such informationH
OF late years, members of Congress belong
ing to the dominant party have claimed the
right, not only to advise the Executive in re-
gard to appointments in their respective dis
tricts, but absolutely to dictate those appoint
ments to him. The word is not too strong.
In form they ask certain appointments at his
hands; if he makes them, all is serene and
they are his "friends" But if he refuses to
make them, they array themselves against
him, and denounce him false to his friends
and traitor to his party. Very much of the
| hostility of individual members of Congress
! against Mr.. Johnson was due to his refusal to
make appointments to Office in obedience to
their dictatiOn. 1t is held that the President
| has no business to go behind the Endorsement
| and recommendation of a member of Congress
for appointments in his district The patron
age of the diserict is claimed as, of right, the
property of the member. State delegations
combine and agree to support in body the
claim of each member to the selection of Office
| holders in his own district. The Republican
members from New York have held meetings
and formally voted that they would insist tha
the President should appoint to Office in each
Congressional district OF New York the Off GERS
| whom the member from that district might
select The same thing has been done in
other States, and ID the general practice with
members from them ALL
The plea urged is that the member from any
district is naturally presumed to know more
about the political interests of his own dis
trict, and of the character, political and per-
sopal, of the applicants for Office within it,
than the President possibly can; and that he
is therefore the proper person to designate
the appointments for it. The members, it is
true, ask these appointments; they do not, in
form, dictate them, but in point of fact, that
is precisely what they try to do. And if their
requests are not complied with, they feel at
perfect liberty to make open war, personal
and political, upon the Executive who dares
to refuse. General Butler, in his recent can
vass for reelection, openly declared that if
General Grant did not give him his rightful
share of the offices in his district (Which
usually means all of them), he would give
him enough to do to take care of himself dur
ing the rest of his term. This was meant as
a menace, and is incapable Of any other con-
structon. And while all the members of
Congress are not so open and frank in their
avowals as is General Butler, they all hold, as
tenaciously as he does, that the right of select
ing the office holders, each for his own district
belongs to them and that no President who
is true to his party and his friends will refuse
it to them. None but a "traitor' would
dream of such a thing.
Precisely the same feeling perVades the
Senate. Senators assert the same right ap6
enforce it in the same way. They ''claim'
certain appointments as theirs by right; if the
claim is conceded, very well. If not they are
at war with the Executive. We venture tc
say that more votes were controlled for convict
ing Mr. Johnson, when impeached, by his re-
, fusal of patronage when demanded by indivi
dual Senators, than were gained for acquittine
him by the concession of such claims, or BY
more open bribery.
There are at least two serious objections tC
this practice and to the theory ON which i
rests:-
l. 1t is in violation of the spirit and intent
as well as the language and letter of the Con
, situation, which gives to the President the
, selection OF officers of the Government, subject
only to the ''advice and consent" of the
Senate. 1t makes members of the House the
, real and actual appointing power when in
sense have they rightfully anything whatever
I to do with it,
! 2. Even as advisers Congressman are no
dlsintereSted. The yconsult their own politica
t interests or their own personal feelings. AnG
! some of them actually make a pecuniary
: profit from the Offices which they can control
/ Even the best cf them use the Executive
patronage, so far as they can control it, to pay
their political debts, or to secure their futur,
4 political advancement. They pay for wha
their personal supporters have already done
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