Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1869-07-03
Judgment of . jury in . court


involved can have, or is authorized
to have, a hearing and to make
defense" Not one of these requi-
sites have been complied with in
the effort to deprive the citizens
who had registered under county
court clerks, and thus acquired a
right of which the Supreme Court.
declares he s"eannot be deprived
otherwise than by due process Of
law "srsJ llfssamea i}sa~'1aI1 efl 7
The Supreme Court very clearly
and unequivoeally declares that
when a person is once invested with
the right to vote, he ''cannot be de-
prived of it otherwise than by due
process of law" h3It will not be-
contended that those who were in4!5l
vested with the right to vote by the !
clerks of the county courts, who
were the commissioners Of registra-
ton under the law of June 5, 1865,
have been deprived of that right.
by "due process Of law. ~ But it is
contended that the act Of May 81
1866, which the Supreme Court had
previously declared a part of the
constitution, "abrogated and an
nulled every certificate given by the
clerks of the county courts" Will
it be contended that any change of
the constitution would diyest a man
/! of his title to his lands? Certainly
not. Then, says the Supreme Court,
s'the rules of law which guard
against deprivation or injury, the
rights of persons in corporeal
properties, are alike and equal
ly applicable to the elective fran-
chise, and alike and equally guard
persons invested with it against de-
privation of or injury to it. And as
if to clinch the argument and leave
no room for doubt or equiyocation,
the court declares emphatically that
"persons invested with it cannot be
prived of it otherwise than by due
process of law" 1t is clear that
the court considered this question
of The validity of certificates issued
by the various officers authorised
to register such citizens as came
within the provisions of the fran
ehise law, before that body, from
the fact that the provisions of the
several laws under which the regis
tration of voters was had are fully
reeited, and also from this para
| graph in the decision: ss,r sE.
''The proper inquiry to follow is: What
effect is to be given to the registration
Of a citizen as qualified voter; and
whether and to what extent the registra-
ton invests the registered person with
the elective franchise and next,
whether the setting aside, and annulling
by the Governor Of the registration Of a
county, in the manner authorized by the
act of March 8, 1867, is in respect of the
persons who have obtained registration
and certificates, proceeding which full
fills the rule of due process of law"
The court here treats two ques-
tions as being before it for its adju-
dication. First, the effect of regis
tration; and second, the power of
the Governor to annul the registra-
ton of a county. The first it de-
elares as property right, of which
the person invested "cannot be de-
prived otherwise than by due pro
cess of law" And this settles
the question that those holding GER
tifcates from clerks of county
courts are legal voters, because
they have not been deprived of that
right by "due process OF law" 1t
follows as a sequence that the reg
istrstion by DIR. Doris has not
been SO abrogated as to
deprive those who were
registered of the right they
acquired upon a compliance with
the provisions of the law Accord
ing to the decision of the Supreme
Court, this was property right OF
which the parties acquiring it could
not be disseized or deprived except
by "due process Of law" We have
never seen a decision of a court
point more clearly to a fact than
this, that every man registered,
whether by a county court clerk or
a registrar, is to-day legal voter,
and the refusal of the judges of
elections to receive the ballots OF
such registered citizens, will GER
tainly subject them to suits for
damages. ... .. ...