Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1869-04-06
THE KU.KLUx ACT.
Application for a Mandamus
Upon Howard OF the Grim
inal Court.
Alternative Mandamus Granted
by the Supreme Court.

n writ Of naGnd0muS to compel A. "
Howard, Judge of the Grimm:
Court of the First Judicial Circui
to restore petitioner to the privileg
n of practicing his profession as a
attorney of said court.
Petitioner recites that on the =
/ day of August, 1864, he obtaine,
from the District Court of Ohio, Ii
cense to practice law in the sewers
courts of that State; that in No
vember, 1865, he took up his resi-
dence in Greeneville, Tenn, wher,
he still resides that under the pro
visions of the laws of the State O
Tennessee, he was duly qualified and
admitted to practice in the Circuit
Chancery and Supreme Courts Of
Tennessee, and still is an attorney
in said courts; that upon the estab.
lishment of the Criminal Court oil
the first circuit of Tennessee, he was
also dull qualified and admitted to
practice as such attorney of that
court, and did practice as such ats
tOrney until prevented by respon-
dent Howard, judge of said court,
as hereafter shown. That at the
March term, 1869, of said court, for
Greene county, petitioner, upon at
tempting to discharge his duties to
ahis clients, was notified by the clerk
of the court, that by direction of
said Howard, he had destroyed
the rolls of attorneys, and that
Howard had ordered him to make
out new roll, placing the name
of no attorney thereon until he
complied with a new rule which
he had prepared, which rule direct
ed that call attorneys processing
to practice in said court in any Of
the counties in said district, being
permitted to do so, shall, under
oath, give satisfactory evidence that
they are in no way associated OBJ
noxious to the provisions of the
act of the Assembly passed Sep
TENDER 10, 1868, as required by
said act as the same is construed
and understood by the court Pc
titioner further recites that upon
said rule being read in court, he
asked permission to be heard in his
own behalf and on behalf of other
attorneys, upon the new and extra
ordinary rule, but the privilege was
peremptorily refused; that he then
asked leave to enter a motion of re.
cord, that he be allowed to practice
without compliance with the rule,
in order that the question might be |
presented to the Supreme Court, for
presuming to do which petitioner
was fined for contempt of Court
and ordered to his seat; that petit |
toner then procured another attOr-
ney, not under the ban, to make the |
same motion in his behalf but the /
said Howard positively refused to
entertain the motion, and threat |
ened to fine the said attorney for
contempt, declaring that he would |
not permit the correctness of the
said rule to be called in question;
by reason of which arbitrary ruling
of the said Howard petitioner is de-
barred the privilege of discharging
his duties to his clients as an attor-
ney in said court. He prays for an
writ requiring the said
Howard to show cause why petit
toner should not be restored to his
rights and privileges in the prem
ises, and, upon an unsatisfactory
return, that the writ be made per- |
The petition raises the very inter-
esting question of the validity of
the notorious "Kuklux Law" of
which we have recently heard so
much in our court rooms-if, in
deed, the law itself, admitting its
gives any authority for the
extraordinary rule proposed and en-
forced by this fellow, Howard. The
question was fully argued upon its
merits, an behalf of the petitioner
by JnO. Baxter and L. A. r Mel
son, Esqrs. Each of these gentle
men, in his usual happy and forci-
BILE manner, dissected the mon
strous act, not neglecting, by any |
means, the mighty fellow of the
wondrOus parts, who has under
taken to improve upon the law it.
self.
From the Knoxville Press and Herald. April /. |
The Supreme Court yesterday
Judge Shackelford delivering the
opinion-decided the case of H. II.
Ingersoll VS.. A. w. Howard, Judge, |
etc, in favor of the petitioner. An
alternative writ was directed to be |
issued, returnable to a full bench on
the 18th inst, requiring the said |
Howard at that time to show cause
why petitioner should not be re-
stored to his rights and privileges
as an attorney in the Criminal Court
of the first circuit. This case, upon
the return of the writ and the |
coming in of Towards answer,
will then become exceedingly in
tereStinG.