The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1869-09-02
H0YT & CO., Proprietors.

tion permanent as their own lives i'o
duration not depending upon the whim or
caprice of either, and only to be dissolved
when the improper conduct of one OF the
parties shall render the connection wholly
intolerable or inconsistent with the hap
piness or safety of the other" Griffin
vs.. Griffin, 8 B. Munroe, 12O.
Judge Swift observes: "The render
ing of the contract of matrimony lndls-
soluble, is running into the opposite ex-
treme from that of permitting divorces
at the pleasure of the parties. There are
many persons who, on the idea that the
marriage contract cannot be vacated tor
anv misconduct, will not behave with the
propriety they would if the continuance
of the contract were dependent on their
exertions to render themselves agreeable
to the persons with whom they are con-
nected. 1t is great hardship that per
son who has been unfortunate in forming
a matrimonial connection, must be tor
ever precluded from any possibility OF
extrcating himself from such misfor-
tune, and be shut out from enjoying the
best pleasures Of life This consideration,
instead of adding to the happiness of the
connection, must frighten persons from
entering into it. 1t is, therefore, the best
policy to admit dissolution of the con-
tract, when it is evident that the parties
cannot derive from it the benefits for
which it was instituted, and when in
stead of being source of the highest
pleasure and most enduring felicity, it
becomes the source of the deepest woe
and misery" Swift's System, l9l.
Whether the jurisdiction should be ex-
tended in granting divorces a utnculo
matrimonii beyond the causes pre-existing
at marriage, and to adultery and mali,
cious dcsertion subsequent thereto, need
not now be discussed. Up to this point,
at least, the judicial tribunals of most
civilized countries exercise jurisdiction.
In this State heretofore, marriage, from
any cause and under all circumstances,
has been absolutely indissoluble--the
Courts taking the ground that the Leg
islature had not invested them with pow
er to declare divorce, and have uniform
ly declined to exercise it. The Legisla-
ture has steadily refused to grant a dis
solution of the marriage tie. There is,
perhaps, no other civilized country, Ell
ther protestant or catholic, that has not
made some provision. either legislatively
or judicially, for dissolving marriage for
adequate cause, except this State. In
England, the Ecclesiastical Courts grant
divorces mensa ct thora, and the British
Parliament a vinculo matrimonli. In
Scotland the marriage is dissolved for
adultery or malicious dcsertion, by the
Courts, and in the States of the American
Union, the samo powers are exercised by
most of the Courts for causes already
enumerated, and for others not mention
ed
In Rhame vs.. Rhamo. McCord's G R.
1877, Judge Mott, in & bill filed for alimo-
nv, admitted that in England such cases
belonged to the Eccesiaf :ica Courts, but
considered that alimon. was an excep'
tion in this State by the practice Of the
Court of Equity, and from necessity, and
held that "the Jurisdiction of the Court
must be limited to the allowing of alimo-
ny, and to such orders as arc necessarily
incident to the efectual execution of such
a decree" Again he says: "Although
our Courts of Equity have not the power
to grant divorces, yet, as the two sub
iects-divorce and alimony-are tnsepa-
BILE companions in England, we must look
to the causes of diuorce to ascertain the
grounds on which alimony will be allow
ed"
In Prather VS.. Prather, DeS., G. R.
81. in considering a bill for alimony,
Chas. DeSaussure says: Sand this, from
the necessity of the case, and to redress an
injury not otherwise remediable-I allude
to several cases which were decided in
this Court some years since-erpressly on
the ground that no other tribunal could
give redress, and thatit would be unseem-
" and highly mischievous If this Court
did not interfere"
Chief Justice Dunkin, in the case of
Mattison vs.. Mattison, l Strobhart, G. R.
3SS. which was bill to declare nullity
of marriage, said "that there was no dis
tinction in such bill and bill for di-
vorce; that the Legislature had not con-
ferred any such jurisdiction on the Court,
and that there was no inherent power in
the Court TO exercise it. He adopts the
ruling of Judge Mott, that the allowance
of alimony and incidental orders for car
rying it into effect, was properly cogni-
Fable by the Court of Equity from "prac-
tice and necessity" but could not be cx-
tended to divorce or declaring mar
riage null and void
In all the cases in this State, jurisdio-
ton in alimony is taken by the Court
from "neccssity and tho practice of the
Court" There was no "practice" of the
Court in such case until necessity" in
duced it's introduction, and therefore tho
only ground for assuming jurisdiction
was necessity The Court of Equity
in this State takes jurisdiction in cases of
alimony withou any Legislative authorizd-
tion when such cases are cognizable alone