The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1869-03-18
FIoHrIsO II OUT on THIS LINE"

mcr, became one OF the most famous say
ings Of the war. In popular estimation, IL
| graphically expressed the indomitable per-
sisteDcy Of the general in pursuing given
course after he had once selected it as the
road to his object. But no idea could have
been more erroneous. Practically, it was con-
tradicted by all the subsequent movements of
| the campaign. And this contradiction sug-
| gests comparison between the method of
Grant as general and his method thus far as
President a comparison that may go far to
| explain and fcreshadow much of his conduct
in his new position. The method in each
case is to be regarded as in some sort reflex
of character, and character is thing which
remains essentially the same under all
changes of situation. In other words, the
native temperament and the mental structure
which Gen. Grant displayed in his military
operations he brings with him, as a matter
of course, into the administration of civil
affairs.
1t will be remembered that for some weeks
after the first collision with Lee at the battle
of the Wilderness, the Northern press blazed
Gus federal army which had been put in mo-
ton from the Rappahannock, would be push
ed forward by the direct route to Richmond
against every obstacle and at all hazards. And
this was undoubtedly Grants original con-
ception of the campaign. Apart from his own
declarations and tacit admissions, it was
clearly revealed in the disposition of his
forces, the selection of his depot of supplies,
and the direction of his attack upon the Con-
federate general. Nevertheless, while the
North resounded with the cry that he intend
ed to fight it out on that line at whatever
cost, he had already changed his whole plan
of operations, in consequence of the terrible
checks received in the Wilderness and at
Spottsylvania. With immense losses he aban-
doned the base of the Rappahannock, and
swung his army round from the north to the
south of Richmond; and after summer had
passed and winter had come and gone, he
made his final movement on line precisely
opposite to that which he had originally
chosen as the route to his objective point. His
ultimate decision, in the opinion of the sound
est military critics, was far better than the
first. Why did it not occur to his mind in
the beginning? Why did he arrive at it only
under the stern teachings of experience? The
same questions occur in tracing the opera.
tons of Grant against Vicksburg. There,
too, he blundered in the outset He first
moved down by land into the interior of Mis-
sissippi, with the design of flanking Vicks-
burg and opening the river at that point as it
had been opened at Columbus, Fort Pillow,
and Memphis. But, losing his camp and sup,
plies at Holly Springs, he abruptly abandoned
that line and commenced o new movement by
way of the river. The same pliability to cir
and events appeared in the subse-
quent stages of the campaign. He took up
the crude notion that he could circumvent
by opening channel for gun
boats and transports through the swamps
Of Louisiana from point seventy miles |
above to point somewhere below, and for |
some weeks he was diligently employed in ex-
scuting it. But he soon found that the Job |
was one that would consume about as much |
time as the completion of the Suez Canal, and |
be prudently gave it up. 1t is also worth
noting that his first attack upon the defenses
Of Vicksburg was from the north, where they
we're strongest, and that after his severe re-
pulse in that quarter, he finally shifted his po-
'ition to the south of the city. This sort ofva-
'illation marks his whole military career His
Tarying decisions and movements have been |
n singular opposition to his generally imputed |
enacity of adherence to his original resolu-
ions. No general of either army was further
rom illustrating the idea of Fighting it out"
and to the extremity, on
his, that or another line. If he dis
'layed the quality of obstinate perse-
erance in o remarkable degree, it was
n the facility with which he would change
lis plans and reverse his lines in the endeavor
0 reach his ultimate object His outsets in
II important instances were mistakes and if
his fact reflects disparagingly on the breadth
nd clearness of his military perceptions, it
aust be admitted as not little to the credit
his military sagacity that he was at once
rompt and cool in rectifying the miscarriage
accident to an injudicious line Of operations
y striking out into one entirely different. A
military genius, to be sure,
'ould not have waited for discontinue to
each him the right way. But whatever eler
lents of military genius Grant possessed
'ould seem to have been purely rudimentary
lis final decisions did not flash upon him.
lie worked to them tortuously and dimly
he war was his school, and blunders were his
'ssons. This was the case, indeed, in greater
r less measure, with all the generals of the
'deral army. But none of them proved so
ocile and SO patient a scholar as he nor
as any one of them so abundantly favored
18th the means and the opportunities of turn
g the tuition to practical accoant.
The parallel between the meditation (which
,pears in Grants course since he has been
resident and the vacillation which ran
trough all his military campaigns, is both
riking and suggestive. He seems, thus far,
be as plastic under the pressure of circum-
ances and events in the one sphere as he
as in the other. What will be the para
cunt and ultimate object of his admiration,