American citizen. [volume] (Canton, Miss.) 1864-1890, 1869-03-27
GENERAL JOHN 3. GORDON.
"REMINISCENCES OF TIE LATE wAE

military movements during the late
war:
LOUISVILLE, Feb. 10, 1860.
During a long ride with Gen. john
b. Gordon, from Atlanta to Louis
vile, | was very much entertained
with his remarks relative to his celo-
brated flank movements in the first
day battle with Grant at Cedar Noun
tain. Gen. Gordon is not inclined to
be talkative about himself, but
drew him out by asking him il he
had seen Gen. Early's little work in
which the defeat of the right corps OF
the enemy in the night attack was
treated Of as small and very haz-
ardous affair. He had seen it, and
was at first inclined to reply, but
upon reflection concluded he would
remain silent especially rs General
Lee had written to him for his report
as to that affair, and had endorsed
the facts as given by that report. He
prefers to wait for the publication of
Gen. Lees history is the best reply to
Gen. Early's injustice.
Gordon, when sent to the left OF
our lines, found that his brigade over
| Tapped the right Of the enemy. At
early hour he secuted in front Gf
him and found no troops. He saw
exactly where the right flank Of the
enemy lay, and diScerned at a glance
that not only could our troops on the
right, which We're hard pressed. be
relieved by flank movement ON his
part, but that the entire Federal army
could be doubled up. lis plan was
to charge down on the enemy's flank
and throw it into confusion, and as
he moved down in pursuit, to be join
ed by the other divisions Of our army
/ i'll quick succeSsion-a movement
similar to that which w0s executed
! by Stonewall jackson on a large..
scale in the seven days battle. His
| idea was to attack soon in the morn
ing, but he could not get Early's con
sent. 1t was only late in the daV
when Gen. Lee, after sending repeat
ed orders for diversion to be made
on our left, rode over himself and au-
thGrized Gordon to carry out his plan
at even that late hour. 1t was then
about sUn-SCt. Gordon moved out of
his position, threw his troops across
the enemy's flank and charged. The
effect was magical. The defeat Of
the enemy was complete. The ground
was literally covered with guns and
knapsacks, and an entire corps was
driven back in utter route. Gordon
captured more Of the enemy than his
own troops numbered. and left three
| thousand killed and wounded on the
field. After pursuing the enemy a
mile, and throwing their troops in
ineNtricabie confusion, night came
on, and III consequence of some Viz
ginia troops which had crossed the
breastWorls in their front to ioin in
the charge, firing by accident into
his men, Gordon stopped the advance.
He is confident, that had he been
permitted to make the attack in the
UiNrning, Grant would have been
driven across the river. Gen. Early
i'll his work says that the movement
was dangerous one, because Burn
sides corps was resting in the rear Of
the one attacked by Gordon. This.
however, was not the ease, Burnside,
as may be seen from Swinton's his
tory, was on Che opposite wing of the
Federal army.
The same movement which was
executed SO successfully against
Grant, he afterwards made against
the left of Sheridan at Cedar noun
tain: The plan was originated by
Gordon and carried ont Handsomely
so long as he had execution OF it. He
doubled up the two corps Of the en-
envy and broke them into fragments
with a loss on their side of ten thou
sand, and on his own of only two
hundred and fifty. They threw away
arms and accOutrrmentS and rushed
! through Winchester in utter route
, The remaining corps was democrat
, lied, and would have broken at tho
, first charge. Gordon ordered the
, entire artillery, fifty pieces, to galloi
, up the pike and entilade the reserve
corps. At the same time he preparet
, 10 move against them without delay
j, With infantry. just then Gen. Ear
|, ly rode up and eXclaim d, Gl0ry
# enough for one day - Gordon toit
him that no time was to be lost. ant
n explained what movements he hat
!. ordered for the attack upon the le
p naming corps. Early said it wa
needless, that they would follow tht
< others pretty soon; and so Gordoi
- retired to his immediate command
He anticipated what followed, an,
+ sent repeated messages to Early tina
+ the enemy had rallied and were mass
"a ing upon his lett. Receiving no sup
! port, he at la t rode over and t0l!
+ Early that if something were no
! done his army would be deStr0} e
"a in twenty minutes. One brigade wa
then sent TO his aid, bat in the mean
4 time the enemy had enVel0ped Ou
4 left, and by aid of his superior cav
Il airy, had COTTON completely in on
! rear. We all know what followed
"a the ruin of an army, which, had GoI
3D., don commanded, would have SWep
>, Sheridan ont of existence, 0prne
-, the path to Washington, and life
- the siege of Richmond But it is a
Ia. pas now
- In the autumn nf 1861. Gen GoI
don proposed to Gen. Lee to take
division aad operate i'll the rear ,
Sherman, among the mountains {
- North Alabama and Tennessee /!
h believed mat 10y dispensing his troop
q aud moving without baggage. Ii
could keep the communication {
t Sherman so rficctually destroyed Il
lc to raise the siege Of Atlanta, an
" force him to retire.
I, His plan was not to attack tn
S block lpuses, which w0nld require
T, battle, or burn the bridges, whic
r, could be restored in a day, but [
ne impede the track at fifty or hun
drcd different points, and throw til
engines and trains into the ravine
~ thereby destroying the means
or transportation. \ line Of three hui
drtd miles would have afforded ahu)