The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1869-11-11
Extraordinary Naval M0vcments-Hnve They
Reference to Cubas

Reference to Cubas
The unusual activity Of the Navy Depart
ment and extraordinary movements of war
vessels are not without cause, or they indicate
precautionary steps, at least, to meet some
particular or possible contingency. The ques-
ton naturally arises whether all this has not
reference to Cuba and the policy the govern
ment is about to pursue with regard to that
island. 1t is certain there can be no other
reason for these movements for there is not
the least probability of trouble, either at home
or with foreign nations, except that which
might possibly arise with Spain relative to the
Cuban question. Not that we believe or that
the government thinks there would be reason
to apprehend war with Spain should the
United States recognize the belligerent rights
or independence of Cuba, but if such step
be contemplated by the administration precau-
tionary measures to meet even contingency
so unlikely are proper. Besides, powerful
naval force in the neighborhood of Cuba, in
the event OF our government resolving on such
a policy, would impress the Spanish govern
ment with sense of the determination OF the
United States and the futility of using force
to restrain the action of this country. Indeed,
instead of leading to war, the display of such
power and preparation for war is the way to
prevent it. We conclude then, that the activ-
ity in naval matters-the order for the Mianto-
nomoh to be ready for sea, the ordering into COM
mission and fitting out rapidly of the Swatara
and two other vessels, the sudden transfer of
stores and army supplies to the Albany, with
orders for that vessel to sail Immediately for
Cuba, and other important movements-indi-
cate that the government is about to take a
decisive course on the Cuban question and in
favor of Cuban independence.
Months ago General Sickles, our Minister at
Madrid, told the Spanish regency officially, in
that famous note which created such stir in
Spain, that public opinion in the United States
would soon compel his government to recog-
nize the Cubans. He wrote what he
was instructed to write, and what as
an experienced and astute public man. he
knew to be true. The Spanish government
has been forewarned and must expect such
action on the part Of the United States. II
knows the irresistible power Of public opinion
in this republic, and it has really more reason
to thank the administration for great modera-
ton in delaying to recognize the Cubans 80
long, and that against the popular will, than
to be surprised or offended at recognition now.
There is no cause of war in such an act, nor
do we imagine Spain would be foolish enough
to make it So She cannot even subjugate the
Cubans. Indeed, they have been gaining
strength all along and are stronger to-day
than ever in spite of the armies and fleets of
Spain. What, then, could Spain do in war
with this mighty republic? She could not
land an army, and if she could it would be
instantly annihilatcd. Her navy would be
swept from the ocean, and as to any damage
she might do US by letters of marque to pri-
vateers-which would be very lttle--we could
do far more to her in the same way. We
could exinguish Spanish commerce and
deprive Spain Of her remaining colonies. Such
conflict would be child's play comparatively,
to the United States.
But it is folly to talk Of war; the Spanish
government has not the money or other means
for such Quixotic undertaking. Should Prim
and the other leading men Of Spain be insane
enough to suppose they could reunite the peo-
pie and consolidate their power by war, they
would be much mistaken. Ignorant os the
Spanish people may DO, they must know that