New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1869-02-12
NEW PUBLICATIONS

Uopkips is involved in the accurate statement Oh
the nature and ground of obligation. II preSuppoSoS
the existence of the moral faculties ana the appe
hension of a supreme end the tendency 10 "hlch
furnishes a criterion Of right. knowledge Oh inc
structure and uses of the eye for instance acquhs
ma with the purpose ultimate end, OF that organ
md establishes the ground of obligation III reference
To its use Our duty is to employ II III such manner
that the purpose or end of the eye may be most per-
fectly attained The basis of Obligation in this
case is the fact that the eye has relation to an end
that is valuable in itself The same holds good of
every part of the body and of every faculty OF the
mind 1t is easy to generalize this statement, and
spply il to man himself His nature includes an END
that has value for its own sake. In the attainment
of this end we are to find the reason OF all moral
action that is say of all rules OF conduct ana the
ground of obligation. The science OF morals may,
accordingly, be defined the knowledge OF the SUI
preme end of human existence and the means OF its
attainment.
In the Introduction to the volume. President Hop
kns takes a comprehensive survey of the systems OF
previous ethical writer's and makes them the subject
of several acute and intelligent criticisms Thus he
Justly condemns the theory of Hobbies who found the
basis of obligation in the authority OF governmental
enactments, making regard to personal advantage
the only possible motive of human action. As de-
sire for his own pleasure is the supreme impulse OF
every man. the state of society is naturally one OF
war But as this is fatal to the attainment OF his SUI
preme end men are obliged to combine ami compro-
mise under the forms of law for the preservation OF
peace On this hypothesis there social affections
no sense of duty, idea of moral Obligation 30
monstrous a violation of the instincts OF humanity
had no germs of permanent life, and 1t had almost
passed from remembrance except in the history OF
opinions when Dr. Hopkins curiously enough. finds
IN
Law" among the favorers of the fugitive slave
act His remarks on this point are conclusive
ns to the political sOphistries. (which were so
much in vogue few years since, and have scarcely
vet ceased to be echoed OF this system it has been
well said that it must either be right to obey the law
and wrong TO disobey it. or indifferent whether we
obey it or not. II it be morally Indifferent whether
we obey ii or not the law which may or may not be
ebeyed with equal virtue cannot be source of viz
tue; and if il be right to obey it, the very SUPPOSE
tion that it is right implies notion of right and
wrong that is antecedent to the law and gives 1T Its
moral efficacy"
The structures of President Hopkins on the theory
of utility as ground of moral obligation, coincide
with the arguments of Sir William Hamilton, but
present them in brighter hight with rare felicity
and pregnant brevity of expression. Utility by its
very definition, he clearly shows, cannot be the Ill
innate ground of moral obligation. Some things
valuable in themselves; other things are valuable
only as conducive to certain Interior ends The former
arc ends the latter means The value OF ends Is
absolute; the value of means is relative. Absolute
value is good in itself; relative value is only ut
ity Whatever is useful, accordingly, has no value,
but in reference to the end which it may be used to
promote A pillow is useful only in relation to the
value of a crop. Means have no value but as con-
ducive to valuable end. to an ultimate good. Hence
there can be no litigation TO choose end that
which has no value except in reference to an end
beyond itself.
In commenting on JoufTroy, perhaps, the soundest
and most sagacOus thinker among the ethical phi
losophers Of France, Dr. Hopkins fails to recognize
the marked resemblance between the theory of moral
= obligation set forth by that writer and his own,
which we apprehend would be made apparent by
more complete analysis of its principles The system
of JouffrOy. Dr. Hopkins tells us, makes order the
basis of obligation He objects to this as i'm
perfect, since order may be predicated of
physical being, in which there can be
nothing moral. Order expresses relation, and
nothing ultimate, and can never be chosen for its
own sake. Hence. according to Dr. Hopkins, it can
never serve as the basis of moral obligation. But
we should remember that the term order" was
selected by JouffrOy to express the harmony of all
beings with their own nature, which is the supreme
end of moral action and as we understand DR.. Hop
kins is so regarded by himself The ground of obi
CATION, in the system of JouffrOy, is placed in the
nature of man which is organized for certain end,
and in the attainment of which he fus his destiny
The supreme good of every being is the attainment
Of the end for which he organized But the
good of each being is only fragment of absolute
good. Absolute good is the realization of the abso
Lutte end of the creation, and this is what Joufroy
means by the expression universal order. The end
of each being is an element of universal order; our
good is a fragment of absolute good; and thus the
idea of obligation attaches itself at the time to
the attainment of our good and the good of all
others. 1t is, accordingly, plain that the order"
for which JOuffrOy contends, the ground of moral
obligation, is abstract, or ideal, order, but the
harmony which arises from the fulfllment of the
supreme end of every being, or what is the same
thing, the highest good of which the nature Of
every being is capable. The main idea OF his
theory is indeed admirably expressed in of
Dr. Hopkins's compact and lucid Statements
"Man was made to promote the good Of others
rs well as his own, and the apprehension of that
good furnishes an immediate ground of obligation to
promote it," Another passage TO the same effect is
perhaps still more significant The action of such
system [of human powersI which would secure the
highest good of the individual and of the whole is
right action. . = 1t presuppOses an end good in
itself and known TO be good. but it can be moral
only as we have moral nature affirming obligation
to such action" The essence of JoufrOy's theory
could scarcely be embodied in more appropriate
terms and it is gratifying TO lind that there is less
discrepancy between the sage conclusions of the
great French moralst and those of our gifted coun-
tryman than he imagines himself.
In the portion of the volume devoted to practical
morals, President Hopkins considers the whole broad
field of human action, bringing no small degree of
zoo and A.