Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1869-01-11
The Experience Of the Monitors against
Fort Sumter.


The Experience of the Monitors against
Fort Sumter.
From the Charleston News.l
We have lately published statement
of the Washington correspondent of the
New York Tribune, to the effect that
Chief Engineer Isherwosd, Of the Navy
Department, is said to have spoken in
their engines, asserting that they were
never able to make sea voyage without
an escort, aud making other objections
to them. That part of his report, how
ever, which condemns the monitor IRON
clads as unfit for vessels of war, is said
to have been eliminated by the Secretary
of the Navy from his annual report. Al
most ,cotemporaneously with the above,
the London Times has long article,
commenting on "A Treatise on Coast
Defense, based on the experience gained
by officers of the corps of engineers of the
army of the Confederate States, and COM
piled from official reports Of officers Of
the navy of the United States, made du-
ring the late North American war, from
1861 to 1865, by Won Schelha, Lieuten-
ant Colonel and Chief Engineer Of the
Department of the Gulf of Mexico, of the
army OF the late Confederate States of
America" This treatise contains some
interesting facts germane to the topic we
have referred to, and which are of practi-
cal value % connection with the subject
of coast defense. The Times, while
agreeing generally with the authors
declaration that exposed masonry is in
capable of withstsnding the fire of
modern artillery, takes some exception
to the looseuess of his statement. 1t says !:
Fire of modern artillery from what,
and for how long2 The bombsrdment
of Fort Sumter is given as an illustra-
ton. Yet Font Sumter, weak con-
struction Of brick classmates, with bar
bette guns on the top, only succumbed
TO heavy FIRE from shore batteries al
tacking its weake at part-the gorge-and
then only after many days lombard
ment. When FIVE thousand projectiles
had been hurled against it from riff I'd
guns up to ten inch caliber, including
two eighty-pounder Whitworths, we are
told that Sumter was ruin, and had
only one servicesble gun left But the
garrison was made Of the right material,
if the ramparts were not Seven days
existence from an atmosphere OF dust
from crumblng masonry and smoke
from bursting shells had failed to cow
their spirits or quench their srdor. No
sooner was there lull in the firing than
they commenced the clearing of rubbish
to gain positions for new guns, made the
bomb-proofs more secure, and tried by
every means to render the ruin as tens-
BILE as possible. In this work they were
interrupted by another bombardment
that was opened by all batteries on the
fort, on August 30, and continued for
three days. No vestige of heavy gun
remained in the fort; Wagner had been
evacuated; every chsncs seemed lost,
and the moment appeared to have arrived
when possession might be taken OF the
ruins. A boat attack was ordered, and
failed as signally as it was possible to
fail, more than one hundred men being
taken prisoners by the little garrison.
Then came q third bombardment from
shore batteries and feet combined, and
it was only when not a single gun re-
mained to return q shot, and the defenses
we're levsled to the ground, that the fort
surrendered"
The defense was much more protracted
than the Times supposes, wearing out
the patience of the besiegers, and Fort
Sumter never did surrender to the direct
attack upon it. The fall of Columbia,
through Sherman's march from the inte-
ror, involved that of Charleston, in
cludiHg Fort Sumter and all its other
defenses. What, however, is most peril
neut TO the question of the value of the /,
monitors in contests with forts is the |
bombardment Of Fort Sumter by the |
naval force previous to the land attack. |
They crossed the bar in safety, number |
ing eight monitors and the lronsides, a |
broadside ship, and opened FIRE at dis
tsnees varying from 6ve huHdred and fifty
TO one thousand yards In forty minutes
they retired, and the Times leaves it to
Admiral Dupont to state his opinion of
their condition in the words of his official
report:
"No ships had been exposed to the
severest FIRE Of the enemy for over forty
minutes, and yet, in that brief period, ss
the department will perceive by the de-
tailed reports Of the commanding officers,
FIVE Of the iron-clads were wholly or par
italy disabled disabled, too las the OBJ
structious could not be psssed), in that
which was most essential to our success
Il mean in their armament or their
power ofiDAicting injury with their guns"
The Keokuk had only time to Ere three
rounds before she found herself to be in
danger Of sinking, an event which se-
tually occurred next morning. The Ma
hant was most seriously damaged. Her
I