The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-02-04


its party has most to fear is that he may draw
to his support so large portion of those who
have hitherto acted with the Democrats, as 70
render the further maintenance OF the orga-
nization of that party impossible.
Our South American Relations.
From the ". Y. World.
Ii it be true, as wise persons in Washington
aver it to be, that Mr.. Seward means to i'm
prove the "shining hour of his return to
private life in a semi-triumphal tour through
out South America, this intention of his may
perhaps explain his extreme anxiety to defeat
General Buffers attempt to reduce our diplo-
matte expenses by cutting off some and cut
ting down others OF our South American mis-
sons. Mr.. Seward is fond OF Splendid
gOvernments.' We dare say he keeps his
famous ''litile bell'' in small blue.velvet
box, and contemplates it in the intervals
of dining and diplomacy with a sort of
proud and passionate sadness. And when
his voice in the Cabinet shall have be-
come, even as the clapper of his 'little
bell," an unwagged, silent, uncopsidered
thing, it will no doubt bs a great conso-
lation to him to pass from point to point
of such comparatively uneniighteDed regions
as the South American republics, in kind of
penumJra of his past official glories. Europe
lives too fast life and too crowded with SEN
satons to make it worth his while to under
take pilgrimage to the eastward. Iu London
or Paris he could hope for nothing but sort
of tepd courtesy resembling the vivid de-
lights of power no more than cold Cruel resem-
bles hot turtle soup. In BogOta or Quito,
where nothing ever happens but a revolution
or an earthquake, and both by reason of their
multiplicity have come to be monotonous,
the arrival of the illustrious the Wustrissimo
Seward would be very likely 10 be hailed
with general ringing of cracked church bell s
and parade of parti-colore patriots in the
plaza.
But, to the full development of Mr.. Seward's
content in such tour, it would obviously be
indispensable that he should fnd at BOgota
and Quito some American functionary of
sufficiently elevated rank to make him a
becoming pedestal for Mr.. Seward to stand
upon. Now, COnsul-General or q Charge
d'Atfaires is at the best, automatically speak
ing, but poor creature. He may do very
well for business purposes, but he is not ex-
alted enough to make him fit and proper
herald for Premier on his travels. OF course,
if the question were as to cutting off few su-
perfuous South Americangenvoys and keeping
Mr. Seward at home, or keeping the superfuous
South American Ministers, and getting Mr.Sew-
ard to visit them, truth would compel us to say
that there has been time, and long time, in
our history during which it would have been
wise to purchase Mr.. Stewards protracted
absence from our domestic councils at a much
a-dozen Ministers Resident. That time has
passed, and as Mr.. Seward is not likely here
after to be more mischievous to us at Wash
| ington or at Auburn than he would be in
| Bogota or in Quito, we may eliminate this
consideration from the question of what our
South American diplomacy is worth to us.
| The practical business test, which Mr..
| Seward himself pretends to be anxious that
we should apply to the value of minister, is
| decidedly favorable to General Buffers pro-
| position. Mr. Seward thinks that we should
| have minister in all the South American
| countries in which England and France have
ministers, on the ground that our commerce
with those countries is larger than that OF
either England or France. Now, the truth is
that, while we have Ministers Resident or En-
VOWS in countries like Chilli Uruguay, Vene-
zuela, Peru, and Ecuador, England and
France are reple sented in those countries
by COnsuls- General and Charges d. d'Afaires.
\ Yet our commerce with those countries is less
Z and not greater than the commerce with them
of England or France. Our whole import and
export trade with Peru, for example, in 1864,
amounted to but a little over one
million dollars. During the same year
the trade of England with Peru amounted
to nearly "a, ,000,000 or $50, 600, 900, being
twenty times as large as our own; while the
1a6ieGu G6HGrGJ du Commerce de la France pu s
the commerce of France with Peru for the
same period ~ 0Z, IUO, UUO francs, or more
than $40, 1000 600, being ten times as large as
our own. Uruguay in 1864 exported to Great
Britain value of 50 209, S44, and TO France a
value of 81, 495, 9l6, against value of only
81, ,4O9,9 ,907 to this country. Chill, in which
country Mr.. Seward is particularly anxious
that we should suffer the vrtuous and discreet
Fitzpatrick to remain as an envoy of the first
Fank, dealt with US in 1862 to the extent ol
81, 7lO, coo, exports and imports, all told, and
including the trade OF California as we'll as OF
our Atlantic ports. In the same year British
consulgeneral and charge d'afaires was found
amply able to look after a British commerce
with Chill amounting TO $2l ,4SS, 600, while 9
French diplomat of the same rank satisfaoto
rily protected French commerce with Chill
of $4, 492 600.
1t is clear, is it not, in the face of these
figures, that, if ministers should be proper
tional to exports and imports, nothing can be
more absurd than for the United States tC
insist on sending diplomats of higher rank
than England and France to Chill or Uruguay
or Peru 7
But Mr.. Stewards test ia as incorrect intrin,
sioally as it is in the applications he makes
of it. The true measures of the powers will
which the United States should clothe thsil