The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-11-12

ernment with a sense of the determination of
the United States, and the futility of using
force to restrain the action of this country
Indeed, instead of leading to war, the display
of such power and preparation for war is the
way to prevent it. We conclude, then, that
the activity in naval matters-the order for
the Miantonomah to be ready for sea, tho or
dering into commission and fitting out rapidly
of the Swatara and two other vessels, the
sudden transfer of stores and army supplies
to the Albany, with orders for that vessel to
sail Immediately for Cuba, and other import
ant movements-indicate that the Govern
ment is about to take a decisive course on
the Cuban question, and in favor of Cuban
independence.
Months ago General Sickles, our Minister
at Madrid, told the Spanish Regency Off
cially. in that famous note which created such
a stir in Spain, that public opinion in the
United States would soon compel his Govern
ment to recognize the Cubans He wrote
what he was instructed to write, and what, as
an experienced and astute public man, he
knew to be true. The Spanish Government
has been forewarned, and must expect such
action on the part of the United States. 1t
knows the irresistible power of public opinion
in this republic, and it has really more reason
to thank the administration for great modera-
ton in delaying to recognize the Cubans so
long, and that against the popular will, than
to be surprised or offended at recognition now
There is no cause of war in such an act, nor
do we imagine Spain would be foolish enough
to make it SO. She cannot even subiugate
the Cubans. Indeed, they have been gaining
strength all along and are stronger to-day than
ever, in spite of the armies and fleets of
Spain. What then, could Spain do in q war
with this mighty republic? She could not
land an army, and if she could it would be
instantly annihilated. Her navy would be
swept from the ocean, and as to any damage
she might do us by letters of marque to pri-
vateers-which would be very little-we could
do far more to her in the same way. We
could extinguish Spanish commerce and de-
prive Spain of her remaining colonies. Such
conflict would be child's play, comparatively,
to the United States.
But it is folly to talk Of war; the Spanish
Government has not the money or other
means for such a QuiXOtic undertaking.
Should Prim and the other leading men of
Spain be insane enough to suppose they could
reunite the people and consolidate thelrpower
by war, they would be much mistaken. Igno-
rant as the Spanish people may be, they must
know that war with the United States would
only bring overwhelming disaster to them
The factions which are now rending that un-
happy country would become more active
and stronger, and the horrors of civil
war would be increased and continued.
Nor could Spain hope for any assistance
from the European powers None, no,
not even France or England, would lift q
finger. They know too well the power of this
country, and the interests they haye'at stake
would prevent their interference. None of
these powers will ever again meddle with
American affairs unless driven TO do 50 on
their own account and to protect their own
honor and interests--a contingency which is
not likely to occur till the future reveals far
greater complications than can be foreseen at
present. All the talk of European sympathy
and aid for Spain this Cuban question is
balderdash. There need not be and will not
be any wax about Cuba, though the United
States should not hesitate to recognize the
Cubans and to take any other action to
secure their independence, even at the risk
of war
If we be right in our conjecture that the
naval movements referred to indicate the
speedy recognition of Cuba by the Govern
1nent, the views we have expressed frequently
as to the Presidents sympathy for and pur-
pose regarding the Cubans will be confirmed.
In spite of tho weakness and timidity OF the
Secretary of State on this question, and the
Spanish influence operating upon him indi-
rectly through those near him and related to
him, as well as through certain newspapers
and Washington correspondence under the
same Spanish influence, we have never
doubted that General Grant would in due
time take this matter in his own hands and
show a vigorous and determined policy. Any
other course would be in direct opposition to
the broad and national views Of the President,
to the republican and generous impulses of
his nature to his love of liberty, to his ardent
patriotism and desire for American progress
and the agGrandiZement OF his country and,
in fact, to his whole character and history.
He has been waiting, probably, for the
assembling of Congress or till he could confer
with the representatives Of the people before
taking decided action in favor of Cuba and
in the meantime has faithfully executed the
neutrality laws, though acting against his OWE
upon the national honor. Now, however, as
the members of Congress begin to reach the
capital, he learns what their sentiments are
and, if we mistake not, is preparing to re.
commend and take a bold course worthy OF
this great republic. The unanimous expires
sion of the House of Representatives. at tho
| close of the last Congress in favor of CubaI
recognition will be reiterated, no doubt, with
much more force by both houses as soon as
! Congress meets. The President will ther
have the full support Of that body, and thC
administration will find itself acting in har
mony both with the representatives of thC
people and public opinion. From all the
signs of the times, we think the helligeren
| rights of the Cubans will soon be recognized
and the independence of Cuba secured.
THE ENGLISH PREMIER AND TIL
LATE GEORGE PEABODY.
From tie N y. Times.
The Lord Mayors dinner is an occasion OF
which it becomes necessary for the Prim