Nashville union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1868-1875, 1869-11-21
THE BANK OF TENNESSEE
CASE.
supreme Court Of the United states

ION OF the Court.
The main question involved in this suit
is OF more importance than difficulty; but
before we proceed to discuss it, it is ne
cessary to consider the point of jurisdic-
tion which is raised by the defendan. in
error. The circumstances under which
this court is authorized to review the de-
cisions of State tribunals has been SO
often considered and decided, that there
is hardly anything TO do, but to apply the
already well-settled legal principles which
govern this class of cases to particu-
lar record, in order to decide whether or
not we have jurisdiction to hear and de-
termine the matter in controversy 1t
would be useless labor to go through with
the various adjudications of this court ON
this subject Ii is enough for the pur-
poses of this suit to say, that cause can
be removed from State court into this
court under the 18th section of the judi
ciary act of 1889, whenever some one of
the. questions embraced in it was relied
on by the party who brings the cause
here, and when the right he claimed it
gave him. was denied to him by the State
court. 1t is urged that the particular pro-
vision of the constitution, which the
plaintiffs IN error say has been violated in
its application to their case, should be
contained in the pleadings, but this is in
no case necessary. If the record shows
either by express aVerment, or by clear
and necessary intendment, that the con-
stitutional provision did arise, and that
the court below could not have reached
the conclusion and judgment it did reach,
without applying it to the case in hand,
then the jurisdiction of this court at
taches. And it need not appear that the
State court erred in its judgment. 1t is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction that the
question was in the case, was decided adj
yersely to the plaintiff in error, and the
cour: was induced by it to make the judg-
ment which it did.
Testing the case at the bar by these
rules, it is apparent that it is properly
here, and must be disposed of on its
merits.
By the laws of Tennessee the privi-
lege of merchandising is taxable. Any
one who wishes to engage in that calling
must obtain license from the Clerk of
the County Court where he proposes to
carry on the business and give bond that
he will pay certain per centage on the
invoice cost of all goods brought into his
mercantile establishment for sale during
the year. In compliance with these laws,
Francis Furman, of Nashville, obtained,
on the 2Sth day of August, 1865, from
the County Clerk, a license as whole
sale merchant for the ensuing year. Be
ing DESTROYS of forming partnership be-
fore the expiration of his license, it be-
came necessary for him to discharge his
obligation to the State for the business of
the store up TO that time. Accordingly,
on the Sd day of August, 1866, he ap-
peared before the clerk, with Green, his
proposed partner, and rendered the
amount due the State for taxes in the
see, issued prior to the 9th of May, 1861,
and rendered also the bond as required by
law, and demanded that q license be is
| sued to them as wholesale merchants.
But the clerk declined to comply with
this request because these notes were de-
| preciated, and informed the parties that
he would not issue the license unless the
taxes were paid in par funds.
Furman and Green, conceiving them
selves aggrieved by this conduct, applied
| to tn local circuit court for a mandamus
to compel the County Clerk to accept
payment of the Tennessee Bank notes in
discharge of Furnan's obligation, and to
| issue to them a license as wholesale mer-
chants The application for the writ pro-
| ceeded on the theory that the State had,
in the passage of the act creating the
the Bank of Tennessee, in 1888, made a
contract with its people to receive these
notes in payment of State taxes, and that
it was not in the power of a subsequent
Legislature to impair the binding force
of this contract.
The proceeding was an effort on the
part of the plaintiff in error TO test the
of a public officer of the State,
exercising authority under the State,
on the ground that such author
ity was repugnant to that provision of the
Federal Constitution which forbids a state
to pass any law impairing the obligation
| of a contract.
The purpose of the petition, the issue
which it presented and sought to have de
termined, were as plainly to be seen, as II
| the words of the particular constitutional
provision relied on had been inserted in it,
and the obnoxious legislation spread out
at length All courts take notice, without
pleading, of the Constitution of the United
States, and the public laws of the State
where they are exercising their functions.
| 1t is insisted that the petition should have
| ayerred that the State had impaired, or by
some act attempted to impair, the obliga
ton of a contract, but this does sufficient.
ly appear by necessary intendment, for il
| is alleged that Furman was the owner OF
the notes and entitled TO have them re-
ceived for taxes, by virtue of a cOntract
with the State; that he had rendered then
to the defendant, who refused to receive
them, and that it was not in the power OF
the Legislature to impair the validity OF
this contract.
| The mandamus was asked for to enfOre'
| a contract-tO act directly on NichOl, thu
Clerk and Collector, who was exercising
an authority under the State. What i
palmer than that this proceeding i'm
peached this authority, in its application
to their case, because of legislation con
strued by this officer as depriving Furmal
of his right to pay his State taxesin note
of the Bank of Tennessee. If so, theI
the petitioners, insisting on the protection
of the Constitution, drew in question boil
the validity of State legislation and tn
authority of the State officer; and unles
the record disclOses that the Suprem
Court of Tennessee denied relief, on othe
than federal grounds, it is perfectly mani
fest that we are compelled to take juris
diction of this cause.
But to proceed step further. III
cause was heard on the petition and a de
murrer, admitting its truth, but denying it
sufficiency.
There were three principal defenses +
the relief asked, specified in the demurrer
as was required by the Tennessee code o
practice.
These were, first, that the 18th scctio
of the act incorporating the Bank of Ten
nessee, did not constitute contract
Secondly, that there was no contract, he
cause the said 18th section was repeale
by implication by section COS of the Cod
of 1853, and there was no averment tha
the notes were issued before that time
The third and last defence was, that tn
petition did not show that the plaintiff
, became the owners of the notes befOr
} the direct repeal of the 18th section b
, | the Legislature, in 1865. What possibl
2 difference can it make, in deciding til
? question of jurisdiction, on which 0
these three grounds the Supreme Court O
e | Tennessee based their judgment TIL
= right and duty of this court to hear an
I determine this case does not depend O
} our ability to prove that the Suprem
= Court of Tennessee was wrong inits jude
5 ment. Whether that judgment was rigf
, or wrong, it is renewable here, ifft necei
sarily drew in question the validity of
State statute. or of any authority exeI