The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1869-12-23
e p!o9ens Wen that time win arrive, Dut 1t win
ccfteiny yave arrived whenever the British govern
naent snall propose discussion, or shall intimate
desire TO reopen the negotiation.
am, SIR your 0bedient servant,
HAMILTON FISH,
TO JOHN LoTnRoP MOTLEY Esq.
MIR. Fish 10 MIR. Motley.

HAMAAAORS AhSsAs
TO JOHN LoTnRoP MOTLEY, Esq.
MIR. Fish 10 Mr.. Motley.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE, I
WASHINGTON, Sept. rs, 1885,
moment was not thought Se Inc most hopeful to
enter upon renewed dscussi0n or negotiations with
the ne , o. Great Britain on the subject o.
Majesty. aud you were instructed TO convey 20 Lord
Clarendon the opinion OF the President that sus
pension Of the discussion for short period might
allow the supsidence OF any excitement or irritation
growing out Of events then recent, and might
Oily to a solution OF their differences You have
informed me that Lord Clarendon saw no objection
10 TINS course and agreed with you that would be
well TO give time for emotions which had been ex.
cited OF late TO snDsde. the President III inclined to
believe that Sufficient time may have now elapsed TO
may be opportune and convenient az the present
couJuncture o place IN your hands for appropriate
81 ns q
against that oil Great Britain In order to do THIS In
satisfactory manner II IS necessary to 20 back To
the very beginning OF the acts and events which
have IN their progress and CONTAMINATION SO mucn
disturbed the otherwise amicable relations of the
two governments
When in The winter OF 1860 ana 1851 certain States
OF the American Union undertook by ordinances or
secession to separate themselves from the others
aud to constitute OF their own v0tOn ana by force
new and independent republic, under the name OF
the Confederate states OF America there existed be-
tween Great Britain and the United states cOndi-
ton Of profound peace; their political relations were
prolessedly and apparently OF the most friendly cha
Fdcter, ana Their commercial anu financial fcatlOnS
were as close and intimate IN fact they seemed TO
be cordial In sprit-such as became the two great
LIBERAL progressive and maritime and commercial
Powers OF the world. Associated as they were by
strong ties OF common interest," language and tradl-
TONS the government Of the United States mad no
reason TO presume that the amIcaDle sentiment OF
the British government would DO diminished or
otherwise preudiclay affected by the occurrence
OF domestic lnsurrection wilnin the United states
any more than those OF the latter had been impaired
by the occurrence or the rebellion In British India,
Or might be impaired by such occurrences elsewhere
IN the dominion Of Great Britain. Least OF all,
could the government OF the United States antici-
pate hostility towards II and special friendship
Tor the INSURGENTS OF the seeding States IN view Of
the Inducements and objects OF that insur-
rection, which avowedly. and as every states
man, whether IN Europe or America, wei!
the lnsunection in the House OF commons
Indicated, were to secure the establishment
OF perpetual and exclusive slavenolding republic.
In such contest the government OF the United
States was entitled to expect the earnest good will,
sympathy ana moral support OF Great Britain Ii
was with painful astOnsnment. therefore, that the
United States government received information OF
the decision OF her Majesty's government winch
and was announced on that day In the House OF
Commons by her Ministers, and was followed by
the issue on the 18th OF May, 1851, Of proclama-
ton which, ID effect, recognized the insur-
gents as belligerent power and raised
them to the same level OF neutral rights
with the United States The President does
not deny, on the contrary ne maintains that every
sovereign Power decides for ITSELF on its RESPONSE
bllty the question whether or not 1t Will at given
time accord the status OF begerency 70 the insur-
gent subjects OF another Power, as also the larger
question OF tue independence Of such subjecta and
tnelr accession to the family Of sovereign States.
But the rlghtuness OF snch an act depends on the
occasion and the iance6 and It is an act like
the sovereign act OF war which The morality Of the
pubic law and practice requires should be delber-
ale, reasonable ana Just In reference surrounding
1acts, national delinquency, indeed, like national
independence, being but an existing fact officially
recognized as sucn, without which such q declara-
ton is only the Indirect manifestation OF particular
hue OF policy.
The precipitancy OF The declaration OF the Queens
government, as Mr.. Bright characterized 1t, the
markabie celebrity: undue and unrienaiy haste with
which 1t was made, appears In its having been de-
termlned the 9Th OF May, four days prior to the
arrival IN London OF any Official knowledge OF the
Presidents proclamation OF April IL, 1891 by refer
ence to which the Queens proclamation has since
been defended ana that 1t was actually signed on
the ls'h OF May the very day Of the arrival Of Mr.
Adams the new American Minister as n In the par
tlcular aim OF fOrestalling and preventing expana-
nations on the part OF The United states. The pre-
matureness Of the measure Is further shown
by the very tenor OF the proclamation, which sets
forth its own reason, namely:-"Wn Whereas hostitles
have unlappIly commenced ccJween the United
STATES OF America and certain States styling
selves 'rhe Confederate states Of Amerlca.'n More
over it Is not pretended by the proclamation tnat
war exists, but only contest reference to which
II Is not dnlmpOrtant to note that the language used
Is such as would ntly apply to parties wholly inde-
pendent one OF the other SO as thus to negative or to
suppress at least the critical circumstances that ths
bare commencement OF nostltes, this incipient
test was a mere domestic act OF Insurrecton within
the United States. But that which concusiveiy
shows the unreasonable precipltancy OF the measure
Is The TACT that on that day MAY Is, Is6 and, IN
deed, until long Afterwards, not battle mad been
fought between the insurgents and the United States
nor a combat even, save the solitary and isolated
attack on Fort Sumter. Did such bare commence
ment OF nostllites constitute beligerency? Plainly
n0t There was al that time no such thing as
population elevated into force and by the prosecu
tlon Of war, which Mr.. Canning points out as the
test OF Delligerent condition. The assumed bel
hgerency OF the insurgents was nction-a war on
paper only, not the Held; Ike paper blockade. the
anticipation OF q supposed belllgerency " come,
but whIch might never have come II not thus an
ment. indeed, as iorciSy put by NJ Adams. the
Queens declaration had the effect OF creating pos
terror belilgercncy instead Of merely acknowledging
an actual fact and that belRerency, fur 1t
maintained, proceeded from the ports Of Great
Britain and her dependencies alone, with the AID
and cooperation OF the subjects OF Great Britain
The government or the United States that OF Great
Brltaln aud other European Powers, had repeatedly
had occasion to consider tLis question In ali
ITS bearings. II was perceived that the
recognition of begerency on the part OF the
Insurgents although not so serious an act as The re-
dicial to the legitimate government and therefore
be regarded by IL as act Of unriendiness Ii was
ami with due regard to exirent crcnmstances
Governments had waited months, sometimes years.
In the face OF actual hosttes without taking this
step. But the circumstances might arise to call Tor
IT, A ship OF the insurgents might appear in tho
port Of the neutral, or collision might occur at
imposing on the neutral the necessity to act, or
actual hostlties might have continued to rage IN
the theatre VI insurgent war; combat after combat
might have been fought for such period OF times a
mass OF men may have engaged in actual war until
they should have acquired the consistency mill tary
power to repeat the idea OF Mr.. Canning, 90 az evil
IDENTITY to constitute the fact Of begerency and to
justify the recognition by the neutral or the near
ness OF the seat OF hosties to the neutral may CON-
pei the latter to act on either OF these contingencies.
The neutral would have right to act; It might be
his sovereign duty 10 act, however announcement
such action should be TO the legitimate government
There was no sucn fact OF necessity, no such fact
OF continued and agrant existing h0stiities to JUS
tfy the action OF Great Britain In the present case
Hence the United States felt constrained at the tlo
n a nnrr
OF unirendliness to them and Of friendness to the
insurgents which purpose could not fail to agravate
all the evils or the pending contest TO strengthen
the insurgents and to embarrass the legitimate gov
ernmenL And so 1t proved. For, US time went on
as the insurrecton from political came OF length
TO be military, as the sectional controversy
In the United states proceeded TO exhibit ITSELF
M the organization OF great armies and ieets and In
the prosecution OF hostllties on scale OF gigantic
magnitude, then 1t that the spirit or the
Queens proclamation showed itself in the event.
seeing that by virtue Of that proclamation maritime