The weekly North-Carolina standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 186?-1869, 1869-06-23


OF April 10th, 1869, and the Court held that
the respondent had misbehaved as an officer
OF this Court in an official transaction If
be was to be punished, it could not be done
under this rule without violation of the
statute just referred to. Counsel was called
upon to show why B. F. Moore should not
be debarred. They presented this act, and
said it declared the Court had no such pow
or. Section 2 said: ''The punishment for
contempt shall be by fine or imprisonment,
or both, in the discretion of the Cont, the
line not to exceed $3.50, and the imprison-
ment not to exceed thirty days" He was
not called upon to answer by fine OF impris-
onment, because it was announced at the
opening of this proceeding that this course
would not be followed.
In England the right to punish misbehav-
Tor in office had grown to an extent that in
America it was thought to be dangerous to
civil liberty, and it was restricted. Still, SO
far as members of the Bar were concerned,
the discretion was left to the Court to dis
bar them. But there came change over
North Carolina. The Judiciary OF the State
were no longer elected for life. The judiciary
of the State were themselves required to 60
before the people for an election, and then
it was that the Legislature of North Caro-
lima, thinking that the time had come when
the people should have the right to criticise
as they saw fit, unless it was done in an
official transaction, and then they should
have no power to punish them save by fine
or imprisonment-passed the act of April
10th, 1860. Therefore this rule ought
to be discharged. If that act is binding
upon the Court, it is clear that this Supreme
Court has no right to make a rule whereby
B. F. Moore, ESQ.,, is disbarred by virtue of
verdict of this Court.
Judge Person followed, and argued at
length that, in the publication of this pro-
test, there was no intention of ibelling the
Court or any members of the Court; and
that the Objectionable features which it may
be supposed to have, upon some construc-
ton of its language, are not to be found in
it, weighed by its intention and by its de-
clarations. 1t is as it was intended to be,
but warning against the examples of evil
tendency; and all that part of it which
seems, or would seem to be most objection
able, is not the assertion of fact accom-
plished, but it is statement of general
proposition, and of the evil consequence
which would result from the habitual in
reference, by judicial officers, in partisan
contest.
There are but two ways known by the law
by which the CO urt can be judicially inform
ed of a fact which pertains to transaction
of this kind, either by their own senses OF
some fact which occurs in the Court in their
own presence, or by proof. This rule was
granted, not upon any allegation, that this
gentlemen had committed a contempt Of
this court in its presence or misbehavior in
his Office as an attorney of the Court. 1t al
ludes to publication made at time when
the Court was not in session.
Mr.. Person continued, arguing at some
length against the unauthorized exercise Of
authority by Court, and cited the case Of
Judge Peck of the District Court of the
United States, for the District of Missouri
in which the author of severe criticism
upon the action of the Court in certain
case, was imprisoned by summary process
At the next session of Congress Judge Peck
was impeached. and in the trial of the i'm
parchment, in the Senate of the U. s
there were 81 members who voted guilty
and % members who voted not guilty. This
was cited as case where judge was pun
ished for high misdemeanor for Furnishing
for contempt an attorney in his own Court
After speaking of the tyrannors action o
the English Courts in cases of contempt
Judge Person read long extracts from thu
case of Bradley vs.. Fisher in the Suprem,
Court of the United States, in which Judg,
Fisher disbarred Mr. Bradley for contempt
and was not sustained by the Supreme Court
In every instance in which attorneys ar,
specified as class of persons who are anne
nable to punishment for contempt, tina
punishment is to be inflicted upon the mis-
conduct in certain specified cases. The powe
of the Court is limited by those cases, ant
unless the misbehavior of any officer il
thought to cover those particular acts, thel
this court finds itself without the jurisdic
ton instituted here to determine this matter
After celebrating the argument that tn
court has no Jurisdiction, he concluded b,
the proposition that if it comes within tn,
clause referring to an officer in an officia
transaction, the power of the Court is limi
ted in respect to the punishment which shall
be inflicted; and that the proper effect o
that limitation, taken in connection with th,
facts of this case, and by the law by which
it is determined, does not warrant the Cour
in continuing the punishment which has al
ready been inflicted upon this respondent
that if he be punished at all, he must be pun
ished in accordance with what the law of tn,
State recently enacted declares shall be in
ficted in cases of this kind. When he an
swers that charge, and answers it efectually
he is to be discharged, and if it turn out that
upon mistaken opinion, upon improyidence o.
want of due consideration upon the subject
he has been called upon to answer an offens,
for which he is not in law guilty; that al