The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-12-24

their clutch, would not dare to allow the
signal for o contest which would first OF all
overthrow their own usurped authority. II
is true that there is a war party in
Spain, but it is the party who seek
to get rid of Prim and Serrano
in order to enjoy the public plunder them
selves. This party is looking to Cabal-
lero de Rodas, Captain General at Havana,
for it's leader. He is desirous of getting back
to Spain to enjoy his chances, and is con-
stanty telegraphing to Madrid that the Cuban
revolt is finished, in the hope that he may be
ordered home again. He is for war with the
United States, and we happen to know that he
has repeatedly written to his private friends
in Madrid in favor of such war; on the
ground that they could make great deal of
money by selling letters of marquette operate
against American commerce. But De Rodas
and his friends are not likely to gain their
ends Prim is too smart for them and there
will be no war even if we should go so far as
TO recognize the independence of the Cuban
Republic.
However, in the case of a war, should we be
likely to suffer q defeat? That is the first
question to be answered; and we should like
to see Mr.. Fish, or Mr. Sumner, or Mr. Sid
ney Webster, or any other advocate of Span
ish rule in America stand up before an
American audience and say that we should be
costly war? By no means. If 40, 600 Cubans
can defy the whole power of Spain, and gain
ground daily in their war for the possession
Of that island, how would it be if an Ameri-
can feet were to be sent down there to open
their ports and an American volunteer force
of 10000 er 20, 600 men to be added to their
fighting ability? Would not Spain finally
aud irredeemably lose both Cuba and Porto
Rico within a month from the beginning of
the war? Do Mr.. Fish and Mr.. Sumner en-
tertaln any doubt on that point And would
not fifty or n hundred millions of dollars
spent in helping the republicans of these
islands to independence be first-rate invest
ment ? Mr.. Sumner displayed a great genius
for statistics in demonstrating that Alaska
was worth seven millions. What would the
value of the Spanish West Indies be by his
arithmetic?
But it would not he principally in the West
Indies that we should strike at Spain. That
is a good point but not vital enough for q
short, sharp, and decisive war. We need a
naval station in the Mediterranean, and such
war would give us an opportunity to ac-
quire one. The Balearic Islands lie fairly
out in that sea-Maiorca, Minorca Ivica,
and two little islets--and they would Just
suit our purposes. Their trade is conside-
rable, their people are docile and we'll suited
to enjoy republican institutions of the
American pattern; we could take those
islands easily, and hold them with advan-
tage. That is where we should aim in the
event of war. Admiral Farragut, him
self descended from a family of Minorca,
would go out with fleet and small army
and capture the group of islands. Not only
would they be of use to us as a naval station,
but their vicinity to the Suez Canal would
give them great importance as a depot for
American commerce with the East. The
conquest would not be difficult, and it
would more than repay the whole cost of
the war.
But we repeat it, there is no probability
of such an event. If we should recognize the
independence of Cuba, it would not lead to
any hostilities with Spain. We may act to-
wards that young republic the part which our
principles and our position require, without
putting ourselves under any necessity of ac-
quiring the Balearic Islands by conquest, or
of annexing the Spanish Antilles as prizes of
war.