Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1869-11-19

One Of the most noticeable things in the
address delivered before the Vermont officers
the other day. by Gen. ". W. Grout, was his
novel and peculiar view Of the part taken by
+ Gen. Sickles at the Battle of Gettysburgh.
I II was Gen. Sickles according to Gen.
circuit. who saved what remained OF the First
and Eleventh corps from being overwhelmed
in the position they had taken on Cemetery
Hill. in the afternoon and evening Of the
first day of the battle. And it was Gen.
Sickles action on the second day Of the bat
tie. according to Gen. Grout, which prevent
ed Gen. Meade from Withdrawing his army
from Gettysburgh, encouraged Lee 70 main
tain the offensive and thus - drew TO wreck
the Argoey of the Rebellion"
Now it Is true that when Gen. Sickles
heard that the First and Eleventh corps were
fighting superior numbers and in danger Of
destruction at Gettysburgh on the first day
Of the fight. he marched to their assistance.
lie is entitled to the credit Of doing what he
would have been a craven and a traitor not
to have done But was his the only corps
that marched to the ala Of the First and
Eleventh? For all that appeared in Gen.
Grouts address it iras But the fact is that
all the corps, save the sixth, concentrated at
Gettysburgh, on Wednesday night. The
order Of their arrival upon the ground, was
determined by their respective distances from
it when the fighting opened. Gen. Slocum
did not start very promptly when called on
/ by Gen. Howard Tor immediate succor But
he did move and reached Cemetery Hill with
the Twelfth corps jgore Gen. Siekles. The
Fifth Corps arrived in the night, and the Sec
ond next morning On the enemy's part, it
is doubtless the truth that the portions of
( Lees army engaged during the first day, had
had lighting enough for that day at its close,
and were pretty well content with the sue
cess they had achieved. There Is no reason
to suppose that they would have attempted
10 storm our strong position on Cemetery
Hill that night, if Gen. Sickles had NOT ar
rived and the comparatively slight attack
made by them in the evening was rot repuls-
ed by ten. Sckles, or any portion Of his COM
mand. There was, therefore, no justice or
propriety in making sole mention Of him, as
par excellence the saccorer of the First and
I Eleventh on Wednesday night
/ As for the second day, the best that has
+ been claimed for Gen. Sckles by any histo-
/ rlan of the battle, is that the advance move
ment by which he left strong position for
] weaker one whence he was at once driven with
terrible loss, vas though unfortunate not with
out excuse under the circumstances. 1t has
| had much severer criticism from others 1t
| certainly came well nigh to involving our
I army IN utter ruin and it cost the lives of
many brave men to repair the consequences of
/ the blunder. We do not believe that Gen.
/ Meade would or could have withdrawn his
army, after the battle was fairly set at Get
tysburgh. We do not see either why be could
not have withdrawn it after, as well as be-
fore the advance and rout Of the Third
I Corps if he had so desired. We cannot see
I how that piece Of business " drew to wreck
the Argosy of the Rebellion any more
than the disastrous results of the first days
fighting, or any other previous disaster of
l the war.
! Gen. Grout is doubtless honest in this dis
tortiun of the history Of the great battle /;
but it is none the less distortion. 1t was
his misfortune that he should have accepted
As veritable history a version Of the affair.
obtained from the most interested and unre-
Liable witness possible, viz from General
Dan Sickles. Nobody else, that we have
ever heard Of, has ever attempted to make
blessing IN disguise of that most unfortunate
movement of the Third Corps, on the second
day of the battle.