The Fremont weekly journal. [volume] (Fremont, Sandusky County, Ohio) 1867-1877, 1869-06-04

ton intended that no claim should be
paid which shall not have arisen under
and in pursuance of some law enacted
anterior to Its origin, authorizing or
/ providing for the matter, circumstance
or event out Of which it arose, unless
such claim be allowed by two-thirds
of the members elected to each
House. The act of April 80, 1869, was
not passed anterior to the origin of the
claims under consideration. As to the
subject matter of these claims, It is,
therefore, not 'pre-existing law 10 the
sense of the constitution. Hence, to
constitute it valid law, che tWo-thiTds
required by the constitution must have
concuFred in its passage, unless the sub
ject matter of these claims was, in point
Of fact, authorized or provided for by
some law enacted anterior to their
origin. Is such the cases.
1t will hardly be contended that the
acts, seizures and destruction which
were the subject matter of the Morgan
raid claims, and out of which they
arose, were authorized or provided for
by aOy law enacted prior to their COM
mission, unless it were law of the Con
federacy. Nor were the acts, seizures
and destruction Of the national troops
provided for by any law of this state
enacted prior thereto. Therefore these
claims fall within the class which the
constitution declares shall not be paid
unless allowed by two-thirds of the
members elected to each branch Of the
general assembly; and hence, until the
concurrence Of such number shall
authorize and direct it, no money can
be lawfully applied TO their payment.
This conclusion is necessarily reached
unless the provisions of that clause of
the constitution under review are merely
directory. Are theyl
AS a general rule the mandatory pro-
visions of the constitution, which affect
legistion, have respect to substantive re-
suits, and must be strictly observe,
while the directory provisions have re
spect to the mode or preliminary steps
by which these results are attained, and
need not be literally observed. Its re-
quirements in regard to the ultimate ex-
preston of the legislative will in the en-
actment of law are peremptory, and
their literal observance essential to the
passage and validity. This was distinct
ly held in Miller & Gibson's case, supra.
ia which Thurman, justice, announcing
the opinion of the court, said
No bill can become law without
receiving the number of votes required
by the constituting for its passage In
terpreting the clause of the constitution
under review in the light of this judi
cial decision, its terms are clearly man
datory. Hence, no bill for the payment
of claims, the subject matter Of which
shall not have been provided for by
same statute enacted prior to their
origin, can become a law unless it be
coucurred in, or the claims allowed by
two-thirds Of the members elected to
each House. The subject matter ofthe
Morgan Raid claims was not provided
for by any such pre-existipg law. No
act for their allowance or payment has
been passed since their origin prior to
the legislation Of April 30th and May
9Th, 1859. Neither one of these acts
was concurred in by two-thirds of the
members elected TO either House.
Therefore, not having received the
number Of votes required BY the con
stitution, the act of April sOth, and the
part of the act of May 9Th, 1869, in
question never became and are not laws.
But the General Assembly has de-
clared this act and part Of act duly pas
sed, and caused them to be published
in the statute book. Are the executive
officers of the state acting under their
official oaths to support the constitution
bound to execute these pretended acts,
notwithstanding their palpable inyali-
dity9 The commands of the constitu-
ton are general and address themselves
to every department and official of the
state government embracing therein
the whole administration of the public
finances. The provision above quoted,
which directs that no money shall be
drawn from the treasury except in pur-
suance Of a specific appropriation made
by law ia clearly addressed to the huan-
cial officers of the state. No money can
be paid out by them unless authorized
by some valid law. But the twenty
ninth section of article two in substance
and effect declares that no valid law,
making specific appropriation for the
payment of claims Of the class under
consideration, can be passed unless two
thirds of the members elected to each
House shall concur in their allowance
The required two-thirds have never so
concurred. Hence, no law making a
specific appropriation for their payment
has ever been constitutionally passed,
and consequently no lsH exist in pursu-
ance of which money can be drawn from
the treasury by the financial officers for
such purpose. These officers, are there
fore, not only justified in refusing, but
by the express terms Of the constitution
are required to refuse payment of these
claims, unless they are bound to exc
cute whatever in the statute book pur-
ports to be a law, and are prohibited
from looking into and inspecting the
Legislative journals to ascertain whether
any such law has been passed. Are they |
so prohibited Hfu js
The constitution of 1902, Article
Section 8, ordained that "each House
shall keep journol of its proceedings
and publish thew.n In LOomis's case
Is o. R. S6S), the supreme court said
''This journal, when taken in con-
nection with the laws and resolutions,
would seem to be the appropriate evil
dence of the action of the general assem-
bly,, The authority of the courts to go
behind the volume of published laws,
and inspect the legislative journals,
vas thus early recognized,
But as The constitution of 1902 did |
not require the yeas and nays to be
taken on the passage of a bill, all acts
in statute book were pre-
sumed to have received the number of
votes required for their passage, unless
the contrary affirmatiyely appeared in
the Journals. To enable judicial and |
executive officers to guard against the
abuses incident to this presumtion, the
constitution has chanOed the