The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1869-10-05
General siciles' Note-WiN the United Statos
Wur for Gubae

/
General sieiSles' Note-Wii the United Staios
Wnr for Cubae
| From the London Times Sept. 2al
The Spanlards have found their advantage In
bold display Of what may perhaps, be termed patri-
otlsm. ana IS certainly national courage They have
met an imagined arront with immediate defiance,
although the adversary defed was ten tunes as
the public, not only what tbs Spanish peo-
pie thought of the American Ambassadors
when It's effects became visible. Ee was
manilestly alarmed OF the result OF his proceed
ings, and requested further instructions from Wash
in2ton, pending which. as we have nov reason TO
believe, he has expressed his desire withdraw his
note altogether. II this is actually the position or
the case at the present moment Spain owes IT to her
fearessness, iearlessness which may SAVIOR OF un-
reason reason, but which at any rate, :, is not
TO II she VIII Fight aud that she VIII fight
Is not to be doubted. That she could obtain any
Ia a with the United States IS or course,
out OF the question; but, AT the same time she stands
20 loose SO much less than her adversary, that tho
Americans may fairly decline even an easy victory
on such onerous and partial terms Tie Spanish
governments has declared and the spanish people
have resolved that they win not allow Cuba
to be wrenched from their possession without
making nght Tor it. 1t is not TO be imagined
that the contest thus accepted could end III any
losses TO boot; but whereas Is obvious tnat Cone
raj Sicse5 expected no such resistance as his note
PROVOKED is possible tnat the face u such oppo
sltion his proceedings may be Gualned or repaii-
ated Indeed, 1t Is already believed that the General
exceeded his authority In the intervention which lie
attempted, aud that the American government
Is not responsible for these acts OF It's Minister.
Whateger may bs the truth about the negotta.
tons previously reported or the conditions actually
suggested by the United States, IL must be clear
every American that war with SPAN would cost
the Union Infinitely more than any compensation
OF guarantee 10y wlicl on amcabe emancipation OF
Cuba might be secured. Ii is not quite GEAR that
the acquisition OF CUBA would be any gam TO the
Union 1t ali; but IL Is perfectly evident that the
acquisition could never be worth war. IL happens
also that, though the two Powers are
mo hah wa an aN. g..tA ~
prospect Of war VITA less concern than tile stronger
IL iact the strength o. Spain lies in her weakness
IN the little margin remaining for damage TO DO
Done. Tue depreciation oil Spanish securities could
hardly be practicable process; the decline OF
the worst that could happen In such respects has
happened already, nor Is there much room for
more mischief at home. The spaniards are in the
midst OF revolution as 1t Is; their administra-
tion 10 disorganzed; their finances are IN con-
fusion. and the prospects OF the country NOT 10
be fatnomed By any human eye. Nevertheless, and
for ali this, they are better onat any rate In their
OVID opinon-tnan they were twelyemonth ago
aud the people IN their several provinces or cities
whto1t any government at all. they have
s1sti=Ts. moreover, at their command, and
s9 slp.oY them. state or war would
aaG 70 them much nsrn. Their commerce is com
garS5.yey small ana they are nos exposed to lnva,
AG1- They would lose their colonies, but for tnat
slsy are prepared, and they would rather lose them
l1.sE ight tnan sutier the interference OF foreign
gE-Eefore not improbable that, even il General
Sicses late communication was authorized by his
goysrlment-which IS veiy doubt1ul-the Amerl-
cans would pause before embarkiBg in O strug-
gle promising such slight advantage. Their
sT s. done 10 any Sg9 parr : Pssa q ns a@e
| resorting to arms. Spain and Cuba must needs
/ settle their own AFFAIRS before long. antt IL is not
1 likely that the settlement would be otherwise than
favorable In some sense or other 10 W.
toiSdsts lave not been ilfbera and II the colonsts
desire even tha there is little DOUBT would be
| ultimately conceded All that Spain reseuls Is the
I
stand that sooner or later Cuba must probably go,
| but they would fam see the separation accom-.
| pshed on terms compatible with the interests
and not inconsistent with the honor or the nation.
they VIII not, II they can help It, allow tue Cubans
TO drive them out OF the island by successful revolt
they VIII not without struggle, allow any foreign
Power to interfere Ia the quarrel Beyond this their
be as good as theli word. General sickles
the state to which he addressed his dictation,
forgetting what holiness may come from
despair tell An enemy na ,y who has nothing to lose
an Advantage ia her present condition. A more
| powerful government might have hestated longer
| before deying so formidable an adversary. Twice,
entity without feeling 1t. True she took
made no impression on Chile; but Chile,
damage Il would be otherwise Win America as ia
would be with ourselves. There no measuring the
! mischief which war, even with weak enemy may
| lnnlct on commercial Power The Americans, az
they have nothing to be angry about, may look upon
this matter with prudent indifference and refuse to
| commit themselves TO needless and expensive
quarrel but we really believe that the attitude OF
1 the Spaniards has been dictated by courage alone.
/ The genuine Cdstian may probably regard the
| resources and proves Of Spain with q satisfied
eye, ana without the east disposition to accept the
| European estimate of his cOuntry's power. Cen
| eral Sckles' note offended the national pride, and
the nation took IRE. His own message 10 his own
4 government yoGchcs for The fact, and he was evil
IDENTITY astOnished at the split he ha0 raised such
4
| principles OF peace or prudence, bat II Is not
unlikely after all, 70 avert quarrel. We ourselves
! once became involved in war because IL was
/ thought we shond never resolve to fight; SPAN has
| promptly resolved TO hght, ana perhaps She may
escape the consequence 10 which we were com.
United. II il not every State which could venture
| on such defiance with fair prospect OF I'm.
punlty; but the SpaRards are nevertheless entitled
10 the cred Of national nrepdity ana pk5ttc spirt
whatever may be thought Of the issue before tnem