The southern enterprise. [volume] (Greenville, S.C.) 1854-1870, 1869-08-25
VOL. xvI.-.--No. II.

Jess0 order, or by the consent Of
the parties, the prayer for an ab-
solute or qualified divorce onIv
'beibg sfahtable upoti proof Of the
existshce of defined ind establisb,
ed legal cause. i'as1s 's' -. -
! It follows, hence, that the nall.
tioner in this case, John FL. Walker,
has not set; forth any sufficient le.
gal cause In his petition why his
prayer for a divorce a vincuLo
'satr1naonsi should be granted:
and upon the proof su omitted, it
is not admissible to grant divorces
a naehsa Ell thofd.
{ The proof establishes tho iii
temper, petqlance and stubborn!
ness of the Defendant, and upon
one occasion that she struck at
him; Was it such violence and
legal cruelty practiced Ivy a wo:
man towards a man that entities
him to claim even a qualified di-
vorce a ntenSd ct tAoro? "Cru-
city is any conduct in one of the
married parties, which forms his
reasonable apprehension that the
continuance of the cohabitation
would be attended with bodily
harm to the other" Evans W..
Evans, 4 English, E. r. 80. The
learned judge Qord StowelD in
the same case says: d" What mere:
ly wounds the mental feelings ia
In few cases to be admitted where
not accompanied with bodily iniu-
ry other actual or menaced.-
Mere austerity of temper, petu-
lance of manners, rudeness of lam
guage, a want of civil attention
and accommodation, even oeca-
siohal sallies Of passion, if they do
not threaten bodily harm, do non
amount to legal cruelty. They are
high moral offences in the mar
riage state undoubtedly, not limo.
cent surely in any state of life,
but still they are not that cruelty
against which the law can relieve.
Under such misconduct of either
OF the parties, for it may exist on
one side as we'll rs on the other.
the suffering party must bear in
some degree the consequences of
an injudieious .eonheetfon-tnusf
subdue by decent resistance or by
prudent Cancellation ; and if this
cannot be done, both must suffer
in silence"
In lockwood vs. Lockwood. 7
English, Z. r. ia, it was held
that "there must be either actual
violence committed, attended with
danger to life, limb, or health, or
there must be reasonable appre.
hension ofsuch violence" Again
in Evans vs. Evans, Lord Stoweli
says: " In the older cases Of this
sort which I have had an opporta-
nifty of lookinginto, / have observed
that the danger of life, limb, OF
health, is usually inserted as the
ground upon which the Court has
proceeded to a separation. This
doctrine has been repeatedly ap-
piled by the Court in the cases
thst have been decided. The
Court has never been d,iven off
this ground"
| Chancellor Walworth, fm Perry
VS.. Perry, 1 Bart, Ch. r. SIC.
says when the husband is com.
plainant, cit is not sufficient To-
show a single act of violence on
her part towards him, or even q
series of such acts so long as there
is no reason to suppose that hs
will not be able to protect him.
self and family by proper exer-
else of his marital power" From
these authorities, it is manifest that
the Petitioner has not alleged, or
proven any sufficient legal Gauss
emitting him to a decree Of sepat
ration against his wife.
Chancellor Kent lays down the
rule againt the application Of the
petitioner in broader terms than
any of the foregoing authorities.
He says in Van veghten We. Van
Veghten. 4 Johns Oh. r. SOL,
that "the husband cannot file a
bill against bis wife for a divorces
, a naemsG ct Moro, on the ground
', OF cruelty, desertion or improper
conduct" and assigns as the rea-
son therefor, t at "the common
law has given to the husband suE
ficient power and control. over the
wife to protect himself. from suck
conduct"
, Applications to tiig Court 70,