The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-09-22

political system, consistently and therefore
TOO exclusively carried out, has its advan-
ttages as well as its disadvantages; and since |
England has already enioyed the former, il 1
is probable that she will soon be called upon |
to pay the natural penalty; but the sum of !
our disadvantages will greatly depend upon |
our own capacity to understand what the new |
time promised for France means to other
european nations, and to our own in parti-
cular.
The treaties of 1915, notwithstanding all
the natural weakness of the principles in
volved in them, had one incontestable merit
that OF establishing a certain basis for the
pohtlcal relations of different countries These
treaues have given us practical illustration
OF the proverb, ''Bad rule better than no
rnle Tor they kept Europe at peace for more
tnan thirty years, and proclaimed the princ-
pie OF European equilibrium in critical cases
even long after this equilibrium had been dis
turbed, and the basis of the treaties weak
ened-by the events in Poland and France in
looO, ana by the general conflict between
peoples and governments in 1913. And if dur
ing this period continental governments
olten showed an inclination to violate the
balance OF power, England had the strongest
interest IN preventing such violations by
others, and no good reason for attempting
them itself. And thus it was that England
became the arbiter and regulator of European
poht1cs, position which was naturally
strengthened by the part the country played
IN the coalition. Such was the part we then
had to play; and while it was very advan-
tageous one to us, it was beneficial to other
European nations, with the least offense to
their pride and the least embarrassment TO
their designs. 1t was beneficial because there
can be no doubt we prevented many con-
hlcts; 1T was comparatively inoffen sive be-
cause, as we have already explained, England
always gave fair opportunities of calculating
beforehand the course she was likely to take
This noble and advantageous position is no
longer ours. We have now new part to play
| In Europe The treaties of 1915 are dead
not by decree of the Emperor Napoleon in
| deed, as he himself more or less imagines,
but OF natural causes. All the pompous de-
| clarations of the French Emperor about their
| decease are merely proclamations of fat ac-
| comp6 The first great blow was inflicted on
| them by the events of 1S4S; the second blow
| was afterwards inflicted in Italy; Poland,
| Schleswlg-Holstein and Sadowa finished them
in such way as to make post-mortem exami-
nation idle. Whether it is for good or harm
| that the old foundation stone of European
| policy Is shattered, to what degree we our
selves are answerable for the ills that may
| fellow its destruction, we may consider on
| some future occasion; all that we wish to say
now is that there is no longer any kind of
| stamped political weighing-machine in Eu-
| rope. The balance of power has fallen to
| pieces under the hand that held
| it. The ponderative role, so to speak,
| which England SO long enjoyed
| is made impracticable in future by one change
alone out of many. AS long as the great Eu-
ropean powers were at certain geographical
distance, and had no very large standing
| armies, there was always time for due con-
| sideration of circumstances as well as for in
| reference, diplomatical or military. But
now, with large agglomerations of territory,
| with the frontiers of great European States
almost touching each other, with colossal
armies, with swiftly destructive guns, and
with railways running in all directions, it is
| easy for European powers to declare war; to
! destroy whole armies between them, and alto
| gether to change their respective positions.
before England could take any resolution in
| the matter or any practical step.
| Next we have to consider the change of the
| governmental system in France. From the
| proceedings of the old French Parliaments in
| questions of war and peace, no conclusions
| applicable to the present time can be drawn.
| In the first place, all international questions
seemed to be pretty well fixed and settled
then, which is not the case now. In the
second place, the French people being quite
| unframed for participation in parliamentary
| form OF government, the form continued but
a form; power still remaining in the hands of
the Grown, supported first by the aristo-
cracy, afterwards by the bourgeoisie,
both of them becoming SO wearied
and impoverished by the Revolution
and the wars of Napoleon as to get sick
OF foreign politics. Again. the Bourbons as
well as the Orleans family were too much in
debted to Europe, and too much daunted by
permanent conspiracies in France ITSELF to
attempt any bold enterprise abroad, even had
occasion offered. All this is changed now.
The country has recovered its strength; the
bourgeolsie as well as the aristocracy are
swamped In universal suffrage; the number
OF pending political questions the Roman
question, the Eastern question, the German
questlon-are more than considerable; and the
people OF France, although not much improved
In Its political education, is unquestionably
more advanced and more interested in foreign
affairs. And we can hardly overrate this pc
culiarity Of the French nation, that every
time its people has come to power one of its
first steps has been to interpose in European
affairs. Poland, Italy, Spain have long had
hrm hold upon popular sympathies in
France; and cry for war in favor of the
hrst OF these countries was loud after the
July as well as after the February revolutions.
lt is hardly to be expected, therefore, that
the Forthcoming changes in the Government
OF France are in favor of peace. And it is
still more doubtful whether people like the
French, if 1t resolves on war for any purpose
or any idea, will pay much attention to any
diplomatic representations about the balance
of power. And there are many difficulties
which invite war. Not to speak of the Polish,
the Slavonian, and kindred questions, are
the Roman, the Eastern, and the Ger
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