The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1869-03-11

the m rahty OF the Government, aud the pOne
Ministers OF Greece view with avers,ou ard
fear any organized, exercise OF the royal
authority ~ thus direction. They en-.
deavor 20 conviuce the peoole that constitu-
tioDsl KING must reign, aud not gOvero; out
The doctfiLe IS directly opposed to the wish OF
the na'ion. The people want good King who
can and will govern according to the Coust,tu.
tion, and not KING who allows the powers
with which he Is invested by the Coust,t tuition 10
be used by p9rty leaoers or party purposes
1t wns behevt d by thoughtful politicians that
the es aolsnmett OF Cabinet or Co1ucil OF
Ministers as a recognized body in the executive
administration woold enable even a Young ani
inexperienced Kine to perform adequn ely
the duties with which the Crown is in
vested by The Constitution Of 1864. This
provision displays great poliical sagac,ty.
1t forms bridge over VIII ch the Crown
and the people eau communicate for the
purpose of controlling the Ministers and
enforcing rpspons bility on the represeu iatives.
But to maze Cabinet government different
fl ON ministerial government as an admu,s ra-
tive aPent In constitutional monarchy, Cabinet
Councils must be regularly aud frequcGtly bell
In presence Oitle King, ana "a whole system of
PROCEDURE and OF registration OF acts, opinions
and measures must be kept under the monarch's
eve, The King must possess his own record OF
every administrative decision of MS Cab net aud
of overy act III each executive department of hls
Government, for it Is bis d1ty TO see that his
Government IS carried on according TO law and
the Constitution, and not according to the mere
will OF a majority in slOgle Chamber. How
the crown is TO effect this is tue prob
lem, and 10 must be solved, or King
becomes a supeThuity, and an hereditary
crown an evil In the State. AS Earl Russell's SC.
lection did not give Greece q sovereign OF
mature age, and OF the experience in business
required Tor organizing machinery of cuecks
on democracy, and Tor enforcing responsibility
by means of a Cabinet, time must 40 the work.
There exists, however, in all tree countries
power thar can en- orce visibility on Minis
ters Chambers and nIajorities, far greater than
any power with which King can oe invested
by any Constitution. That power is public
opinion. But public opIuion can only be
formed by complete publicity OF every act of
government during long period. Untortu'
Dately, the little kiugdom OF Greece has not
adopted system OF publicity capable OF form
ing a sound puOlic ooln oD. Neither the
Crown nor the people can yet act as shepherds
dogs OF the Constitution. Tue secoud question,
by what meaus the power Ot d single Chamber
can be prevented from eXertlng undue autho-
rlty in democratic STATE Is q question
ans wer satisfactorily Yet, unless the power of
a single chamber be placed under some sys-
temat c and powerful restraint, there will be
constant recurrence OF arbitrary power 10 the
hands OF party majority; and though the
nomlL al first magistrate may be in name king,
the State cannot be correctly called monarchy.
single chamber elected by universal suffrage
can only be restrained from eXerting arbitrary
power by the authority OF mIlitaryldespoI. or
by national institutions and local authorizes
directly elected by the people, more lmmeii-
ately connected with their daily habits and
the dcpuues themselves only 10 tue law and
not to the government. A centralized govern
ment whether with one or two chamoers, tends
to become government OF eendarmes. Local
institutions, or what Is called self govern
ment, can alone protect the people against the
de, ,potism OF a majority, which tends to au-
archy. or the despotsm OF u personal sovereign,
which tends to elective monarch0 The Greeks
are perhaps not yet fully aware OF the necessity
of res raining the unllmiteu power OF a sing ie
Chan Der by local institutions more directly
dependent on The law than on tie Sate Yet a
| sense or the necessity exists. aud the Consult
| ton Of 1854 contains provisions declaring that
| the election OF municipal auth JritIes must take
| place in the same manner as the e'ec ion OF
| menb bers OF the Cham Der, "by direct, universal,
| and secret suffrage bV ballot with ball'.n But
| there are no articles relative 10 the rights aud
| duties of citizen as member OF munici-
pality. The constitution OF the authorities, aud
! the formation OF the national habits, by which
! the unlimited power Of Il single Chamber
| ought 10 be re trained, is relegated to muDi.
| cpal law in which the principles OF self
| government are vitiated by the French sys-
| lem OF government by genarmes. There can
| be no permanent security Tor the Duration
| of constitutional government until the people
| can act Tor themselves In spheres OF local
activity, With barriers circumscri bng III sm to
their local business, aud projecting them by
responsibility 10 the law alone. Local iDsgltus
tioDs o secure communal independence, aud
publicity 10 create public oprnlo0, are sfili
wanting in Greece 10 establish cons ltutional
liberty on tim Il Cunda'iOus.
UCPuS 10 DS secured III all cO0StlLu-
tions in the East, not by vague 0eclara ion
mat all citizens are equal in the eye OF the law
which is never true in government wi h
eepdarmes, but by precise eIac ments announ-
cling that every citizen has duties 10 perform,
rights 10 exercise and national institutions to
Ceend. Some of his rights and duties are
inherent in citizenship in free States, hers are
created and regulated by the constitution and
by laws. Some are natioDal, Others parochal,
| communal, and provincial. Loca charity,
primary education, sanitary measures ponce
regulations, roa ds and streets all pres5nJ local
| Spheres OF outy subordinate to the gene-
raj action of government. Experience
proves that in the present democratic
| coEdidion of society there can be no
| guarantee for liberty. even in constitutional
that where the people elect TO an Office, whether
| IL be to the place OF member OF the chamber,
| OF nay or, common council q an, or alderman,
the person elected canuot be removed rom his
| place or restrained in the exercise of his fuDc-
| tions except by the decision or order OF Iegu-
lar court OF Justice. The only restraint on the
/ unlimited power of a single chamber must
! theroi fore be sought in frAue work OF natioUal
institutions, and no framework OF TINS kind Can
resist the strain of ceutral admin stratlon
unless IL be supported By au lndependent juui-
| cature. Democracy, pers nal sovereignty, Ieli
gious animOsltIes, and ma iona ambitions are
! all likely to be more pu 0ertuI man cOnsti utions
| in the East for ONE lime TO come, and they eau
| only be permanent ly rsstra ned from becoming
frequent causes OF disorder and revolution Hhen
society makes law and not political organiza
! ton, the supreme power III the stare.
Some readers may doubt whether the consti-
tutlon OF the Greek Kiredom eau be theoreli-
cally as good as we haSe represented h, wnen
! they know that the government II has pro iuced
| is practically one OF the worst III Europe. Bat
1t must be- observed that the last tbmg people
learn III the hig hest s.ale OF civilization is to
frame for themselves good ad ninlstratlve
machinery. The CODstItut on is only one OF