North Iowa times. [volume] (McGregor, Iowa) 1867-current, 1869-10-27
Grant and Congress.

Washington Correspondence of the n y. Herald.
That was good saying Of Bossuct, tha
the more a man is written about the les,
the world knows of him. IF all the phi
losophers and scribes in the country hat
confined their pens to simple narrations O
fact in regard to Mr.. Grant, instead O
trying, as they have done, to impress the
i public mind with imaginary ideas of hi,
veiled ability and virtues, and explain
away his manifest errors, what would be
the universal estimate of the eighteenth
President?
i On the one side it has been customary
|ts credit Gen. Grant as the savior of the
fepnblic, ard attribute tohim extraordinary
military genius. On the other, his militia
ry career has been written down BY wri
ters disgusted by the indiscriininating ad
ulation bestowed upon him, and, there.
fore, inclined to be unfair. Perhaps the
statement respecting Grants success as II
general that would come nearest the SIM
pie truth is that it was won by "fortu.
itous concourse Of circumstances" There
never was time when this remarkable
man appeared to have any pride. His
''doggcdness," his dull resolution, his in.
sensibility to doubt ur chagrin. never
changed. By sheer luck, the staff of
cronies and recommended officers whom
he gathered about him proved to be an
excellent one. Gen Rawlins, whose death
is the greatest loss this great man ever
suffered, was, in sooth, the power behind
the General; yet he was never fully cons
scious of his power, for the reason that
Gen. Grant was better listener than talk.
er on military subjects, and was accustom
ed to decide upon other mems opinions
without letting them know that he had not
| evolved his decisions out of his own con.
sc!ousness. But Gen. Grant knew how to
value Gen. Rawlins, and knew. also, how
to value and respect, or rather tolerate,
the great services which such men as
Sherman, Sheridan and Thomas were
rendering to the cause of which he found
the country and the good natnred Presi-
dent Lincoln willing enough to consider
him, Grant, the military leader. He new
er attempted to dictate to those men, be-
cadse he had sense enough to see that they
were doing well, and because he knew
that the less he seemed to control them the
better they would like him and his for
bsarance. Everybody ought to remember
that the three great campaigns which
boke up the rebellion-Shelidan's Shen
aHdoah campaign, Sherman's march from
Athnta to the sea, and the battle of Fiv,
Folks preceding Lees surrender--wer,
eaSh suggested and planned by the com.
msoders named, and not BY the then lieu
tenant general.
| fGen.' Grant, though he did not make
imself popular with the troops--the com
non soldiers, whom he habitually ordered
! rhen in personal command, to pitiless
saughter-made himself befriended by a
set of iIcers to Thom he had the tact
ttact is too fine word for it) to give abun.
liant tether. And when the war closed,
and these men willingly joined with glad
IriYilinns in according to the lieutenant
general pre-eminence commensurate
with his command, and which nothing de-
tracted from their own honors, great
number of the line officers and common
soldiers, who had hated Grant rs butch.
er, We're gradually won over to concede
that a butcher, alter all, must have been
a necessary evil, and that he had actually
turned out to be hero of the old style.
4 In the opinion of many Of the General S
best friends, it was an evil hour for him,
if not for the country, when he accepted
the presidential Office. Grant himself was
wary, and listened long to the objections
Of his cronies and the indolent protest OF
his own soul. No such ambition tempted,
or had ever tempted, him a. that which
commonly burns in the bosoms of aspiring
politicians. Instead of being dazzled by
the prospect of political eminerce, he
preferred the military ascendency which
he had obtained; and when at last he
consented to relinquish his commission as
General Of the United States armies, it was
with the secret understanding with himself,
and tacitly with a few others, that he
would carry with him and maintain at the
white house the same strong, conSenial
domination over the affairs of the nation
that he had maintained over the army.
| And he accepted the presidency with no
Intention Of relinquishing it at the end OF
the ensuing four years
In previous letters have explained the
Idesigns of this man-of military char
acter and scope, all-for the acquisition ol
more territory to tho national domain.
The apparent failure of every design oil
this sort, and Of his reported attempt to
coerce congress are susceptible Of some
explanation which will not convict him Of
having yet lost the game. President Grant
could not have anticipated the terrible raid
upon him which was made by tn polit
clans of the republican party Immediately
after his installation, and kept up until
long after the adjournment of congress.
That hubbub, it is true, bewildsred him.
1t left him no leisure to mature any plans
OF his own, and so stunned his faculties
that he was unable even to appreciate the
plans Of those political friends who were
really his worst enemies, and who wanted
to obtain early and complete cohtrol over
him. But, looking at the result Of the
attack, it must be confessed that, although
the nreSiaanf lost nnA serioua adyantaea