Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1869-06-25
ac 4 %ea From this Raleigh Sentinel.
Supreme Court of North Carolina.

-
Chief Justice Pearson delivered the fol-
lowing opinion. all the Court concurring
Er:parte B. r. Moore, Esq, Attorney, dc.
The protestation with which the answer
opens, is irrelevant to any matter for con
sideration at this state of the proceeding,
and would not be noticed save that it is
calculated to create preiudice in the minds
of persons who do not understand the
meaning of terms used in judicial proceed
ings-" laymen," rs brother Battle termed
them.
This was a rule nisi, to-wit that Mr..
Moore, and other gentlemen, be disabled
from hereafter appearing as Attorneys in
this Court. unless they shall severally ap-
pear, on Tuesday, the 10Th of June, 1869,
and show cause to the contrary, and it was
ordered that copy be served on said At
torneys.
The effect of the rule was to deprive Mr..
Moore of his privileges an Attorney Of
this Court, until the matter was disposed
of. No application was made to alter the
form of the rule. Suppose it had been,
and the rule put in this shape: Ordered,
that notice issue to 3. f. Moore, Esq, At
torney, &c, to appear on Tuesday, the
18th inst, and show cause why he shall
pot be disabled, &C., it would have had the
effect of depriving him of the privilege of
appearing as an Attorney in this Court
until the matter was disposed Of. For the
order would not have been made except
upon ps'ina. fdcie evidence to support it
So, in either form, the effect would have
been to deprive Mr. Moore temporarily
of his privileges as an Attorney Of this
Court" necessary incident of the pro-
ceding in either form. Consequently, the
form of the rule is no legitimate ground for
complaint
The other objection, that the rule was
made without affidavit, or other legal proof
of the facts, upon which it is based, is
equally untenable. 1t is admitted that
where the proof is furnished by the senses
Of the Judges, it may be Eacted on. Here
there was such proof. We knew by our
senses that a newspaper containing the pa
per referred to, purporting to be signed by
Mr.. Moore and others, had been extensive
ly circulated and was then in the Court
Room and the want of disavoWa! on his
part that he had signed the paper, or con-
scented to its publication, furnished prime
fdcie proof, not sufficient for final action,
but all sufficient as ground for the rule
On his appearance he was at liberty to
deny the fact, without an oath, and the
denial, like the plea of mot guilty, would
simply have put the fact in issue-and he
would have been entitled to have the rule
discharged, unless the fact was proved by
direct testimony. Instead of that, he
admits the fact. So this is no legislative
ground of complaint. In short, all the
preliminary objections we're waived, and
the reference to them can answer no useful
purpose.
/. 1.-The Respondent insists that the
Supreme Court hath no authority to make,
or jurisdiction to enforce said rule" This
position is put on the ground that the
statute, ratified 10th of April, 1869, defines
all matters of contempt, fixes the punish
ment, fine or imprisonment, or both and,
by implication. Gusts the common law iu-
risdiction of the Court over the morals and
behavior of its Attorneys.
We agree with the learned counsel of
the Respondent, in the opinion that the
statute does not embrace our case. It is
not embraced by subdivision s, section
Sc Misbehavior of any officer of Court in
any official transaction" as receiving money
is, are the Courts deprived, by implication,
of the power of self protection and the
means of relieving themselves from the
presence of unworthy Attorneys, or those
Attorneys who, by combination, q will not
use the harsher word, conspiracy seek to
impair the dignity and veneration with
which the judiciary is invested, by which
it can command the respect and conf
dence of the public-without which its
usefulness will be greatly impaired, or al
together destroyed ? A mere statement of
the proposition is sufficient to show that
the statute has not that effect.
By another statute. persons who apply
for the ecclusive loririleges of Attorneys at
md 1crh$ fo %l,n 1oI
ments of the dignifed position of "a mem
Der of the Bar" are required to produce
satisfactory testimonials of good moral
character, and thereupon the law tacitly
annexes a condition whereby this exclusive
privilege is forfeited after bad conduct !;
and it is not only the right, but the duty
of the courts to enforce the forfeiture.
Suppose an Attorney of Court is tried
and convicted of forgery" and the day
after enduring infamous punishment, ap-
pears in Court is he to be allowed to ex-
ercise the privilege of an Attorney, and has
the Court ' no power to make, or iurisdic-
ton to enforce rule, to show cause why
he shall not be disabled from appearing
before it ? Or, suppose two or more At
torneys are convicted ola conspiracy, which
is an infamous offence or of libel, which
is also an Infamous offence, has the Court
no power to rule them out No one will
venture to question the power or duty Of
the Court to do SO. It may be said these
are extreme cases true, cut If the statute
does not GUST the Common Law jurisdic-
ton in such cases, the learned gentlemen
must yield the position taken by them.
These cases presuppose trial and convic-
ton for an offence where the Court has no
further concern than to preserve the purity
of its Bar. But the power and jurisdiction
of the Court apply with equal clearness to
cases where the integrity of The Court itself
is assai1ed by lbellons publication made
by combination of a part of its Bar,
which, in the argument of this point. is to
be assumed to be our cause. Under these
circumstances, the principle of self-protec
ton, the broad ground on which the whole
doctrine rests, calls into action the powers
of the Court, as soon as there is oraDaa ia
Gle evidence of the fact, without waiting
for trial and conviction in another court
like the case of mutiny among crew.
The captain must put stop to it at once,
else he betrays the confidence reposed in
him; or, the case of the head of a family
who finds some of its members combining
to injure or bring him into disrepute, he