The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1869-02-02
THE RIGHT OF THE coNaUERoR.

THE RIGHT OF THE COHQUER0R.
One of most intrusive, deceptious and mis-
chievous fallacies connected with the policy
of the federal government, is that which pre-
sumes the right of the conqueror to abrogate
or to spare, at his own discretion, any or all
of the rights of the conquered. That North
ern Congressman, upon the close of the late
war, should have accepted this fallacy with
the utmost alacrity was only to be expected.
1t gave them what they wanted for the full
sweep of their ambition and revenge basis
outside alike of constitutional sanction and
natural law. But the acceptance of it by
many Southern minds, some of them eminent
and of no ordinary repute for ability, is not
so easily applicable and we can only account
for the fact by supposing that, weary of the
vexed and extremely complex question of the
proper relations between the Southern States
and the government of the United States,
they we're willing to concede the theory of
the unconditional right of the conqueror to
impose terms upon the conquered, as the
simplest and most direct way for arriving at a
solution
Among those who seem prepared to make
explicitly such concession is the Hon. A. G.
Brown, of Mississippi, who, in late politi-
cal letter, says 81 acknowledge the power
and the right of Congress, speaking for the
conqueror, to dictate terms to the conquered.
If in doing this, it violates the federal consti-
tuition, our appeal is to the Supreme Court.
If it violates the laws of humanity, our appeal
is to the judgment of the world. Beyond these
appeals we are absolutely without remedy"
Now, when Mr.. Brown acknowledged "the
right of Congress, speaking for the conqueror,
to dictate terms to the conquered, he had
said enough. The existence Of such right
in the conqueror is necessarily preclusive of
paramount rights of any Sort constitutional
or natural, in the conquered; and to talk
about appealing to the Supreme Court which,
like Congress, represents the conqueror, and
to the Judgment of the world, an unknown
and Understandable force, is simply imperti-
nent Either Congress may assert the right
at discretion as the illimitable prerogative of
the conqueror or it is bound to admit that the
right confers only qualified authority to be
construed under limitations arising from CO.
existent rights imprescrphbly appertain-
ing to the conquered But the fact is that
there can not be, under any code, written or
unwritten, an illimitable right, preroga-
tive, privilege or liberty. The whole phil
osophy of law is bottomed on the idea of the
correlative, limitary and reciprocal nature of
rights and obligations, whether they concern
the dealings of man with man, of nation with
nation, or of government with people. 1t
is impossible that the Southern people can
have no rights which Congress, speaking for
the conpueror, is bound to respect. For, the
moment it demands from that people obedi-
ence to its laws, it recognizes, by logical i'm
phcation, the fact that they have rights, and
itincurs, by logical necessity, the duty ofpro-
tecting those rights. And, in strict truth, it
is only because the so-called "rebel" popula-
ton of the South do really and inalienably
possess rights such as governments are pre-
sumably instituted to protect, that Congress
may claim on any decent pretext the right to
dictate, within certain limits, the terms of fu-
ture allegiance to federal authority on the
part of that population.
The contrary theory that conquest makes
tdbela rdSd of the entire code of rights and
obligations as far as the conquered are inter-
ested, and confers discretionary authority
without bounds upon the conqueror, so far
from affording the benefits of simple and
direct basis for practical solution, proves,
the longer it is tried more and more confus-
ing, stultifying, vexatious and mischievous.
That the Southern people may be without
present remedy against usurpatory exactions
made by Congress, speaking for the con-
queror, we would not pretend to deny for
the same reason that we would not pretend to
deny that victim of piratical capture would
be without present remedy against spoliation
and personal ill-usage at the hands of his
captors. Assuredly, it is never going to
abolish piracy or redeem the country from
usurpation to say that the actual or the posi-
BILE victims of either have no rights which
pirates or usurpers are bound to respect.