Staunton spectator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1896, 1869-01-05


sons which govern military men, especially sucl
military men as Generals Lee and Jackson, art
very different from those which govern politi
Clans in dealing with newspaper statements.
Nothing, therefore, is to be inferred In favor
OF the truth of an anonymous statement In re
gard to the military operations In the Army o.
Northern Virginia because it has gone uncon,
tradicted
The statement Of your correspondent, if true
shows either that General Jackson proposed tc
commit very great blunder, or that General
Lee was guilty Of an unpardonable negligence.
think there is as little truth IN that state
ment as there is in the one made by Pollard
and | wili state the following facts to show why
think SO:
At the battle of Fredericksburg [ commanded
g division in General Jackson corps (the Sec
oDd), and my division met q part Of the enemy,
who had broken through our lines on the right,
and drove him back into the plains beyond a
fact which will be well recollected by some OF
your readers, as Georgia brigade (Lawton's S,
afterwards Gordon's.) led in the attack and
greatly distinguished itself Two of my brig
aces, which had met the enemy and aided In
his repulse, then occupied portions of the front
line for the rest of the day; and it was very
apparent to US that, while the enemy's attack
had been repulsed, he had very large force
that had not been engaged which still threat
ened another attack on our right Late in the
afternoon General Jackson did determine to at
tack the enemy after the repulse of the attacks
on our left, and [ was ordered to lead In the
proposed attack with my infantry, preceded by
artillery, while General D. Ell. Hill followed me
with his division, in support. Everything was
got ready for the attack, and the movement
was begun, but the enemy opened such ter
rifle fire from his artillery, which swept all the
wide plain la our front, that General Jackson,
who was out with the advance countermanded
his orders, because, as he says in his report,
''the first gun had hardly moved forward from
the wood hundred yards when the enemy's
artillery re-opened, and SO completely swept
movement should be abandoned (" It was get
ting dark when this movement was abandoned !;
and 1t was well that it vas given up, for the
enemy had AN immense force of infantry, that
had not been engaged, massed in the road
which ran through the middle of the river bot
toms behind the high, thick, and solid EN-.
bankment Of earth which served as an enclo-
sure for the adjacent fields. sssand furnished g
breastwork 60 extensive with cur whole front
on this part Of the line. and much stronger
than the famous stone wall at the base Of Ma
rye's Hill. There was similar embaukment
on the other side of the road, forming second
lice, and the front one had been pierced in nu-
merous places for artillery, so that from behind
it storm OF canister and rifle balls would
have belcbed forth that would have rendered
it utterly impossible for anything to live while
passing over the open plain Of about mile In
width between us and the road However
ready they we're to obey the orders of their
General to advance, there was not man of all
the force ordered forward, whether ip the front
or in support, that did not breathe freer when
the countermand came.
Much has been said ia unofficial quarters
about General jackson S supposed proposition
to drive the enemy into the river, but it will be
seen from the foregoing statement that he did
make the attempt, and was compelled to aban
don it. | did not hear of any other PROPOSE
ton to attack the enemy on that occasion
A little after dark on that day received an
order from General jackson to take my brig
AIDES to the rear to enable them to get rations
and rest, preparatory to their taking position
on the front hne for the next day, which | was
not able to do because no troops cane to my
relief About midnight another order came for
jackson old division, then under Brigadier-
General Ialiateao, and since, to relieve A. z.
Hills division, on the front nne, at noonrise,
which was then after middle Of the night, as
the moon was in It's last quarter. Iaiaierro
did move up my Drigades being already in
tront-and our former position on the second
line was taken by D. H Hill, while A. p Hill
retired TO the rear to rest and recruit his men.
There was no order to make the men strip to
the waist for an attack, or for any attack, but
cur orders were to await the renewal OF the
enemy S attack next day. The first | have
ever heard OF the proposal your correspondent
mentions Is his statement Of it. think that
if there, bad been any order for the men to
strip would certainly have heard OF that -
There vas a silly story published In some Of
the papers that at council of war held that
night General Jackson fell into doze, and
when walked up and asked what his opinion
was, he replied, Drive 'em in the river; drive
'em ia the river But no one who knew the
Generals exemplary piety and very temperate
habits, it is to be presumed, gave particle OF
credence TO that story. | heard of 40 council
Of war at ALL either then Or afterwards, except
from the foolish report alluded to.
1t is morally impossible that the statement
Of your correspondent can be correct, for these
reasons Burnside's sruly consisted Of three
grand divisions, each an army Of itself, under
Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker respectively.
Franklin s grand division had attacked our
right, and Summers our left, while Hooker's
remained comparatively inactive. After Sum
ner's repulse the whole OF Hooker's grand d.
vision crossed over to the support, and though
a small part of it made another advance against
MaTyes Hill tie greater part remained intact
to cover the reformation OF the troops that had
been engaged Franklin still remained con-
fronting our right, and in such strong force and
position as to have compelled General jackson
to desist from his attempted attack from that
flank. The Second corps would have had to
march more than i've miles to get to Frede-
ricksburg, by any route open to it, and there
was not the first preparation made for such a
march To have moved that corps from the
right would have been the abandonment to the
enemy of all that part of the line to stake every
thing on the proposed attack, for If that failed
the left was untenabe with the enemy in pos
session Of the right. The difficulties of advanc-
ing upon the enemy in Fredericksburg from the
hills In rear we're even greater than on the right
because of the impracticable character of the
ground. There was no such evidence of the
decentralization of the enemy as that mentioned :;
for though his assaulting columns were repulsed
with great slaughter they always had many
reserves to fall back on The expedient of
stripping to the waist would have been a very
shallow one, as the night was very dark ia the
fore part, and in the latter part, when the moon
rose, heavy fog overhung the river bottoms,
including the town, while cur men did not wear
white shirts, and in the dark, at little dis
tance, it would have been Impossible to tell
man without jacket from one with jacket
If this had furnished the means Of telling the
men apart, the advantage would have beea all
with the enemy, who would have awaited the
attack in compact form, while our men would
have had to separate into innumerable parties
to get through the streets. La an attack Of
this sort it would have been impossible TO pre-
serve any control Of our men, and they would
have gotten into inextricable confusion. A
large portion Of our men (nore than third
had no bayonets, as the greater part Of their