Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1869-11-19
Col. G.. G.. BENEDICT {:

cOQtrOlleu, 10 NC buEt, ~
Believing your article in yesterday FLEE
Press was written in this spirit, would repl:
in the same spirit, barely saying, 10y way oil
preface, that it was no part of my intention to
make Gen Sickles " the chief hero" OF Gettys-
burph. as YOUR abstract Of my address, hereto
fore given in the FREE Press, stated. only
attended TO give little of the unwritten history
~ that battle. a. showing hour il happened that
Gettvsbur.h y-- mqde historic as the ground
on which culmi0ated the rebellion in which
elimination Vermont mnde so brilliant record.
But 70 the paint You say though doubt
less honest he ii-toris the history Of this great
battle Under this charge one specialization
is that untruthtuly maintain that
General Sickes' action on the second
,iay prevented Meade from Withdrawing
his army from Gettysburgh, encouraged Lee 20
maintain the offensive, aud thus Ore" 10 wreck
the argo.y of the rebellion "
Whether Gen. Sickles' action was wise 10 IT,
self, as mere military msnGuyre, IS NOT under
discussion. He saws it had the approval OF
General Mesde-ghich General Meade denies.
Certain il ia that the advance position" which
Siekles took was examined and approved by
General Hunt. General Meades Chief q Artil
lery and Hunt expressed to Sickles his belief that
Meade would also approve. II it had the aq-
nroyal of Nesde-which | do not say, but
which balance of the proof before the COM
rnittee on the conduct of the war would seem to
indicste-then. whether wise or unwlse, the
responsibility vas as much upon Meade as upon
Sickles. | propose, however, to raise no side
issue. but to meet at once the grave charge
which you prefer against me. Though some
what rhetoricalIy stated, it will, | think, be
conceded that " the argosy of the rebellion went
to wreck Just south Of Cemetery hlA IL
will also. | think, be conceded, that SicAles
action in taking the " advance position pre-
cipitated the second days fighting. should
not take this for granted, only that beAeNe
YOUR customary fairness will concede It a. sell
evident This leaves rs the only real question
whether Meade, on the second day, intended 10
yet away from Gettysburgh, and whether the
collision between Sickles' snd LOugstreet corps
prevented In settlement Of this question
offer not nv own speculations merely, nor yer
the testimony alone " Of that most interested
and unreliable witness possible, viz: General
ban Sickle," This YOU call my misfortune ;
and 81 it i. language pretty strong IN derogA
ton Of a man whose acquaintance and friend
ship highly prize, feel called upon IN passing
10 testify nv fun belief in his honor and truth
fIlnes, General Sckles has had his misior
tunes. and. of course has his failings {" ho
has not7) but look upon him 81 having been q
sorelv tried. much abused, yet msgnsnimous
and f5rgiying man with much Of genuine hu-
man sympathy in his makeup, and as possessed
Of A strong heart and clear head, with quite
TOO much Of honor and integrity 10 deliberately
ialsify But to the proof General Sickles test
6es in substance before the committee On INC
conduct Of the war, that on the morning OF me
second dsv. he ascer;ainel that the enemy wer'
massing in his front for an attack, and that BE-
went in person to General Meade with that M
formation, and asked for orders That Genera
Meade did not share in his apprehensions OF AZ
attack upon his lines, and gave him no orders
That General Meade, though requested by hin
10 visit that part Of the field, did not, aud thai
from what he learned at headquarters he ct wa
satisfied that it Was intended TO retreat iron
Gettvsburch" This shows that Meade min
was on some other subject than preparations fli
the great battle then impending. What wa
the subject occupying his thoughts Mayo
General Daniel Butterfe.i, General Meade
Chief If staff, his most intimate and couhieu
iial dfhser. whom, | trust you viii not summa
lilv DISPOSE Of As &c most interested and IN
reliable witness, " fortunately gives a. full in
formation on this point. lie had the lest on
plrtuuity Of any living man to know the in'en
lion of his chief and shat he knew upon ihi
point the committee On the conduct Il the va
drew from him on examination, As follows
General Meade then directed me 90 prepare a.
order 10 withdraw the army from that position
This WAS the II July''-the second LAY o
the fight E" stated % General Meade ttl,
could not prepare that order properly, w.th0u
first going over the field and ascertaininc ID
POSITION OF esch division and corps with re.atlo
10 the roads General Meade replied that b
could not wait f1r that, and with pencil an
paper gave me + sketch Of the position OF ih
t-aaus " ] ask, utg could ts nv rIt fa
rat' The answer inyolunurily arises. De va
ii hurry 90 cet away The historian il try
irst1 smooth this over for Meade, s'ys o. Vs.
Il. more than a prudent general would o., p
provide for the contingency of Necessary rt
treat Let me ask, would the Ge-erl. who DO
tended 10 fight have been IN such hurry 90 nav
an order for retreat prepared, that he cou.
not wait for his chief q staff TO get full Iu
formation as 10 the position Of the troops IhI
believe Is the first time that history has eve
represented commanding general, on the mora
ing Of the day Of a great battle, preparing a
order for retreat, az the frst step In preparat'o
for battle The truth is, be was thinking ou.
e getting away, ami vas making bis prepau
ton. accordingly, As is further shown by Gen
Blterfeil'- testimony. see Vol II page B, Re
mort Committee 90 Contact q War only ii
lie of which space will allow here 20 be given
Buuerheld says
I stAtei to him that the order -
one requiring a Erel; deal Of care IN II
preparation. that II involves more than ie-istc'
as we we're in the presence OF the enemy. an
tina, while preparing it must not be interrupt
eli hv any one coming with dispatches or orders
Ne s,ii very well. / should not be- interrupted.
| told him | thought I could not prepare ;a
orders without a sketch more accurate, and
would have TO send out 20 the corps clmmsnieT
90 give me q report Of the position Of their troop
in regard TO the various roads, that ~ th
meanwhile | could be studying the msps. u
.aii Sc very well, do So then went up stair
and after carefully studying the maps pre-
pared the order for the withdrawal OF the arm
from the field Of Gettyshurgh After finishing
/ presented it 10 General Meade, and II met h
approval
General Butterfed then says that he suEse-,
ei TO General Meade the importance Of havin
the order thoroughly Understood by the cenera
officers. 80 that no misunderstanding should ari-
in its execution. 70 which General Meade assent
ed and that General Meade sent for the corp
commander to report TO headquarters, and tina
he passed the order which be had prepared owe
- General Williams 10 be copied by the clerks.
This was about O'Clock in the afternoon
IN 20 that time there had been no heavy fghi
ing, though constant skirmishing. Il Wa que
along the whole line In Sickles front, however
"a storm was gathering which, he knew, woul
. burst upon them before nightfall. Sickles ha
informed Meade Of the danger, Meade was TO
busy to attend His order for the retreat Of tn
army, however. was prepared and, SAYS Butter
field he had " called the corps commanders {
headquarters " For what purpose ask. Mani
fesjly for the purpose Of placing before them tli
orders he had prepared. But General Sickle
; did not report. He was busy preparing
reception for the enemy. In dong this h
2 had moved ou: about half mile 10 the front {
2 a ridge which he felt it would be exiremei
dangerous 10 allow the enemy to occupy. II
: sent word to Meade begging to be excused
Meade sent peremptory order to report o
headquarters, which Sickles At once obeyel
Let me pause here to ask, if from the above ther
can be any doubt that it was 1Ieade's in,eutio
and expectation to leave Gettysburgh for som
other position. and not risk a general eucac,
= ment at that place hoping al the time tins
the enemy would not attack that day ftui
r IL made out it only remains to be shown tn,
I the collision between Sickes and Lougstre,
turned Mesde from that purpose and made Gel
tysburgh the Waterloo Of The Wsr; and il this o
= 50, then Gid not " distort the history OF thi
| great battle
Upon this point again produce the testimon
| Of General Buttsrfeld, who says AS Gener,
Sickles rode up to headquarters, in pursuance ,
the request of General Meade, the battle brok
out in front OF General Sickles' corps. and ther
was no council held" (The italics are mine.
. General Sickles returned Immediately to hi
corps, and every other corps commander r,
turned Immediately to his command" Frol
, the foregoing is it not apparent that this fight
> ing on the left did g break up the council an
a prevent the possible retreat Of the army 10 Pin
Greek, and thus, next day, "drew to wrec
the argosy of the rebellion" Did i. not dete
Meade from carrying that order into effect tha
afternoon at least, and from making prepars
tons that afternoon to carry it into effect tbs
r night? True it is, that he called council agai
. in the evening, and submitted to it whether
retreat should be ordered, which voted to - fql
it out there But who can say what the cour
! Gil might have done had it not been broken u
in the afternoon. The language Meade used {