The Opelousas journal. [volume] (Opelousas, La.) 1868-1878, 1869-10-23
Spain and Cuba.
GEN. sIcKLEs' NoTE--w1LL THE UNITED
d

certainly national courage. They have
met an imagined afr"nt with an i'm
mediate defiance, although th; adver
sary defed VS., ten times as powerful
as themselves. Our columns haze in
formed the public, not ONLY what the
Spanish people thought Of the Ameri
can ambassadors note, but what he
himself thought of it when its effect:
became visible. He was manifestly
alarmed at the result of his own pro
ceedings, and requested furthef' instruc
tioaa from Washington, pending which
as we have now reason to believe. ht
has expressed his desire to withdraw
his note altogether. If this is actually
the position of the case at the present
moment, Spain owes it to her fearless.
ness, fearlessness which may SAVIOR OF
unreason, but which, at any Pate. is no,
bravado. She has declared that, il
driven to it, she will fight, and that she
will fight is not to be doubted. Tha,
she could not obtain any success in war
with the United States is, of course,
out of the question; but, at the same
time, she stands to lose so much less
than her adversary, that Il e Americans
may fairly decline even an easy
victory on such onerous and partial
terms. The Spanish government has
declared, and the Spanish people have
resolved, that they will not allow Cuba
to be .wrenched from their possession
making a fig ght for it, 1t is not do be
imagined that the contest thus accepted
could end in anything but the loss of
'uba, with probably other losses to
boot; but whe cas- it is obvious that
Gen. Sickl's expected no such rcsis-
tance as his note provoked, it is possi-
bic that in the face Of such opposition
his proceedings may BE- qualified or re-
pudlated. Indeed, it is already believed
that the general exceeded his authori-
ty ii the Intervention which hv attempt
I'd, and that the American government is
not responsible tor these acts Of it's
minister. Whatever may be the truth
about the negotiations previously repor
ted or the conditions actually suggrst-d
by the United States, it must be clear
to every American that a war with
Spain would cost the union infinitely
more than any compensation or guarau-
tee by which an amicable emanci patton
OF Cuba might be secured. 1t is not
quite cit r that the acquisition of Cuba
would he any gain to the union at a!l
but it is perfectly evident that the
could never be worth
war. 1t happens also that, though the
two powers are SO uuevenly matched,
the weaker can contemplate the pros
pect IT war with less concern than the
stronger. In fact, the strength of
Spain lies in her weakness-in the lit
tie margin remaining for damage TO
be done. The depreciation of Spanish
securities could hardly be practicable
process the decline of Spanish credit
hardly perceptible event About the
worst that could happen in such res
poets has happened alread Y, nor is there
much ,oom for mischief at home. The
Spaniards are in the midst of a rrvolu-
ion as it is; their administration is
1lsorganized their finances are in con-
:usion, and the prospects OF the country
are not to be- tathomed by any human
,ye. Nevertheless, and for all this,
hey are better ot-at any rate i'll their
,wn opinion-than they werea twelve
month ago, and the people in their sew
sral provinces or cities either govern
or get along tolerably with
,ut any government at all. They have
moreover, under their COIN
maud, and they have ships, and they
are not afraid to employ them. A
state of war would not do them much
harm. Their commerce is comparative
" small, and they are not exposed to in
iasion, They would lose their colonies,
but for that they are prepared, anu they
would rather lose them after fight than
suffer the interference of foreigners IN
.na,r affairs Il X W.
should think it, therefore, not improb-
able that, even if Gen. Sickles' late
was authorized by bis
government, (which is very doubtful -
The Americans would pause before en-
barking in struggle promising such
slig ght advantage. Their interests in Gu
ba, as part Of the American world, are
but no good can be
aous to any party by precipitating
events or resorting to arms. Spain and
Juba must needs settle their own affairs
before long, and it is not likely that the
settlement wsuld be otherwise than ia
vorable in some sense or other to Amer
can views. The terms offered by the
Spanish government to the colonists
lave not been illiberal, and if the colo
aists desire even more, that, there is
title doubt, would be ultimately con-
,eded. ALI that Spain resents is the
hreat Of violent expulsion. Most Span
ards understand that sooner or later
Cuba must probably 60, but they would
ain see the separation accomplished
,n terms compatible with the interests
and not inconsistent with the honor of the
nation. They will not. if they can
aelp it, allow the Cubans to drive them
,ut Of the island by successful revolt;
hey will not, without struggle allow
any foreign power to interfere in the
quarrel. Beyond this their pretsntiops
10 not extend, but thus far they have
,worn to maintain them and they would
be as good as their word.
ZEN. Sickles reckoned apparently on
he embarrassments of the state to
which he addressed his dictation, for
,ettiDg what boldness may come from
despair itself. An enemy who has
lothing to lose is dangerous foe, and
hus far Spain has actually an advan
"a <va snn has :, ,rac.,rA oorAie:or mara