Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1869-04-20
rton, Tuesday, April 20, 1859
Divorces in Vermont.


that the statutes define what the age OF le-
gal consent is. 1t may be defined by com
mon law. 1t would probably be under
fourteen years.
When one of the parties was an idiot or
lunatic These terms are defined by stat |
ute so broadly as to include any person |
who is not mentally capable of taking care
of himself, and all those interests most
personal tohimself; l. e., he or she needs |
a guardian and is unable to choose one
discreetly.
When the consent of one Of the parties |
was obtained by fraud. When one of the
parties was physically incapable of enter
ing into the marriage state; and when
there is a former husband or wife living.
The annulling of the marriage in these
cases is on the ground that no proper mar
riage was contracted by the parties, and
the decree simply DECLARES that not to
exist which does not exist. 1t does not
seem that the law is at fault here, though
obviously the administration of the law
may often need great discretion in the
court, in determining who are and who
are not idiots, lunatics, incapables, or in
fants and what is force or fraud in special
cases Much here must be left to the judi
cious action of the court, but we cannot
see that the subject itself is not proper
one for judicious decision.
The causes for which diU0rceS mag be
granted are such as come to exist after mar
riage. They are, adultery in either party
when either party is sentenced to cOnfine-
ment to hard labor in the state prison, for
the term of life, or for three years or more,
and is actually confined at the time for
intolerable severity in either of the parties
for willful desertion for three consecutive
years when either party shall have been
absent seven years and not heard from
during that time and the wife may sue
for divorce when the husband has suffi-
cient pecuniary ability, and without cause
refuses or neglects to provide maintenance
for her.
Here are six different causes for which
divorces may be granted. 1t does not APP
pear from the report of the Secretary of
State in the last registration report, that
divorces have been granted in the last few
years for any other causes. The fifteen
causes therein stated are made up by COM
bining in particular cases, two or more of
the causes named in the statutes.
We hold that our laws are greatly at
fault for permitting divorces for insufficient
causes, and especially for causes of such a
nature that they are perniciously indefinite
and also that they invite restless and I'M
faithful husbands and wives to these breach
es Of the marriage covenant for the very
purpose of making a legal cause for pro-
curing divorces.
1t is quite possible also that the habit of
granting divorces has become so common,
we may almost say so popular, that the
courts have failed to investigate these libels
with sufficient scrutiny and they issue
their DEGREES so freely as to educate the
people into the belief that the marriage
covenant is nothing sacred, and can be
broken without disgrace, or guilt, or evils
to society. The tendency of the popular
feeling in this direction is full of peril to
morals and to the welfare Of the State
Lawyers and judges who by their profess
sional and official action encourage and
increase this popular feeling incur terri
bic responsibility.
That we may understand precisely where
the danger lies let us recall these reported
statutory causes for divOrcewith brief com.
ments. During the five years ending in
1866 there were granted by the Vermont
courts divorces, "for adultery 1914" OF
these decisions we have nothing to say
"For adultery and refusal to support q
The refusal 10 support does not make the
crime of adultery any less, so also in the
following cases "desertion and adultery
q" "willful desertion and adultery g.
These 1863 cases may all be classed under
the one cause, adultery. The greater crime
covers the less. Then we have, "desertioI
CO." That is, any person who desires t.
get rid of wife or husband has only to sep.
arate, remove to some distant place anC
take no further trouble about the deserted
companion. In seven years time the two
may be declared free from the most solemn
oath they ever took "For fraud 3" "fol
former marriage l :" "nullity by reason of
insanity l." These cases are not prop
erly divorces. The court simply decree;
that they were never married legally
For intolerable severity 1875" That is, {
husband who may wickedly desire to break
his marriage VOWS may fall to beating his
wife, or to abusing her in any way, anc
then he may go free. A wife may
well we will not say what she may do t.
her belOUed and then she may be free from
him. "For intolerable severity and deser
ton 5 ;" "intolerable severity and reflsa
to support l y refusal to support l." How
much severity is intolerable? How mucl
tolerable? How much here depends on tn
sensitive nerves of the injured party? HOY
much simply on the temper, on the habits
or ON the demands of an insubordinate AM
unforbearing spirit? Then we have, "fo
willful desertion 1885," the largest humble
for any one cause. A disconnected spiri
may simply leave home, separate, and i
the temper lasts three years, then the di
vorce may be obtained. Sentenced t
States prison 2" Few persons would see
this to find cause for divorce. But it ma
be questioned whether good can be expect
ed from divorce for this cause, either +
the imprisoned or the free partner. As
suming that the prisoner is guilty, on
prominent object of the imprisonment
to reform. Now what will be the best e.
feet upon an imprisoned husband, for in
stance, to know that his wife, and erhaI
the mother of his children, is awaiting hi
release or pardon in the hope of living wit
him again? or that she at once cast hil
of, and gives her hand to another?
may be said that the wife who is free, i
she be true and loving wife would nc
desire to gain divorce. Certainly no tru