The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1869-03-02

permits were Obtained 1or al the goous' Dooiuee
The testimony OF Lucas, an enploye OF the treasury
department, and the testimony Of Purnell, show
that the goods were sent out of the lines 10 VIOLA
ton of the regulations OF the treasury department.
(See the case of the Sea Lion, WAL, 6So.) BE-
SIDES This the plaintiff has failed 10 estsollsn tne
correctness of the following items OF the account
-ued on, being cash paid amounting to stsOo.
This exceeds the balance of the account sued for.
1t is therefore ordered adjudged and decreed
that the Judgment of the district court against the
defendant, G. NJ. PIERCE, be avoided and reversed,
and that there be judgment against the plaintn.
as in case OF non suit.
II is further ordered that the Judgment In favor
of Jackson & Rosenfeld against the plaintiff. and
the judgment in favor Of plaintiff against the inter-
yenor Mary q. Baker, wife of G. NJ. Peirce, be
affirmed, that the plaintiff pay all the costs Of the
lower court except those created by the interven'
uon, and that the plaintiff pay the costs Of this
appeal.
BY ASSOCIATE JUSTICE WILEY.
No. 19eS-Stste Of Louisiana, appellee, VS..
Frank King, sppellant-Appeal from the First
Justice Court parish Of 0rleans-F. King and ID.
c. Lsbatt. for appellant, and attorney general for
appellee and the State.
The State tax collector has instituted this suit
to recover of the defendant the sum of fifty dol
lars claimed his license for practicing law for
the year 1865. There was judgment in favor OF
theplanlin, and the defendant has appealed.
The defendant bases his defence upon the fol.
lowing grounds in his peremptory exception
l. Because the citation has been instituted by
the State tax collector, who is without authority
in law TO do So The attorney general and the DIS
trict attorney being the only persons authorized
to institute suits in the name OF the State.
2. Because there Is no law OF the State OF Lou
isisns imposing tax or license on defendants oc-
cupaton, the act approved April 4, 1865, being
contrary 10 article l24 of the Constitution of 1864,
and article lis of the Constitution Of 1868, and
therefore null and void.
3. Because attorneys at law are licensed by the
courts under general law Of the State, and can
have no restrictions imposed upon the exercise OF
their profession, except as provided by law for
seine violation of professional duty; that, as at
torney at law. he has vested right in his profess
sion, and the license originally granted to him Is
evidence Of it; that this right cannot be Invested
except by due process of law, and any attemptb by
the State to impose a license onerous condition
upon him. for pursuing his profession, is contrary
to the Constitution Of the United States and OF
this State.
Defendant further pleads in reconvention the
sum Of fifty dollars, which he alleges the State
illegally and unconstitutionay collected from him
for the year 1867 for an alleged license for prac-
ticiDg his profession that year:
There is no contest as to facts, the defendant
being admitted to be practicing attorney OF this
State who has refused to pay his license for 1868.
The constitutional and legal questions presented
by the defendant are neither new nor difficult OF
solution.
They have all been investigated heretofore by
this court, and we regard the Jurisprudence Of
this case.
l. The first ground of exception, that the tax col
lector cannot sue in the name of the State, is not
tenable. In he case of the State, through Thos
Askew, State tax collector, VS.. the Southern
Steamship Company, Is A. 497, this court said ::
." Ii appears TO US that the right to collect the
taxes pTesupposes right to stand in judgment
in suits OF Injunction and even to institute an ac
ton in the name of the State, whenever the taxes
cannot be otherwise collected 1t is true that the
law has indicated more summary proceeding
than suit for the collection OF the taxes, still as
the sheriff is charged with their collection, for
which he is compelled to give bond. we can see
no sufficient reason why he should not be permit
ted to use the name of his principal 10 drec. ac
ton, instead of selling property, If it is evident
that the seizure will occasion an Injunction or ne
cessary delay
1t does not lie in the mouth of a defendant to
question the tight to sue, when he admits the pro-
priety of the anne by the issue he tenders, and q
denial of the State TO recover.
2. The second ground of objection, that there Il
no law authorizing the collection of the license
claimed Of defendant; the act approved April 4,
1865. being contrary, article l24 Of the COnsttu
ton of 1854 and article lis Of the Constitution Of
ls6S ia also untenable.
We think the sixth section Of the act approved
April 4, 1865, does impose q license upon defend
ants occupation and that. IN doing So 10 do3s not
violate article ia of the Constitution of 1854 and
article lis of the Constitution of 1868.
We had occasion TO review this point fully in
lately decided, and for the reasons therein as
signed we are of the opinion that the act impos.
ing the license upon defendants profession or
pursuit is not unconstitutional The license is
equal and uniform upon ali persons pursuing the
occupation Of attorney at law.
3. The third ground of exception, that the de-
PENDANT should not pay a tax or license for pur-
SUNG the occupation Of attorney at law, because
be is licensed by the courts of the State to prae-
tice and because it divests his vested rights etc..
is also invalid.
This point has been frequently determined by
this court adversely to the defendant, and is no
longer an open question.
In the case of the State vs. Rufus NAPLES IL A.
243, this court said "the argument that the per
mission or license to practice law is a contract be-
tween the State and the attorney at law, which
shields him from taxation, and which cannot be
regulated in any manner during his lifetime by
the Legislature, merits no serious reply"
The unconventional demand set up by the de-
PENDANT for the amount of his license paid in 1867
does not merit discussion.
1t is therefore ordered that the judgment ap.
pealed from be affirmed with costs.