Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1869-06-18
Cuban Anafrs.


Cuban Affairs.
The Cuban question not only remains IN
an unsettled state, but it hos all along been
impossible to derive from the reports OF
the contests between the contending forces
a correct estimate of the probability of the
success of either the Spaniards or the re-
yolutionists. The reports of the last pas
sage at arms, however, are decidedly in
favor of the revolutionists. If these re
ports can be relied upon, which is doubt
full, the insurgents have cause to be san
guine. And the mere question of the
proves of arms is not the only one which
influences the result.
That the government inflicted upon
Cuba has been notedly unpopular and des-
potic for many years past, has been neces-
sariIy and expectedly evidenced in the re-
volution now progressing. By the force Of
its bayonets and the maintenance of friend
ly relations with American governments,
through its shrewd diplomacy. has the
government of Spain only been enabled to
retainit its ascendancy and possessions in the
Island of Cuba these many years past
Colonial governments SO remote are only
maintained at best by the sufferance or
helplessness of the colonists, and are COM
plicated and weak fabrics. Nine times out
of ten will the people, when approaching
the proportions of a nation, desire to be
free and naturally become ambitious of
self-government.
Government being experimental there
is never lack of experimentalists, and
hence the frequency of revolutions and the
overthrow of old and established govern
mental institutions by the disaffected.
But in maintaining its contest in Cuba
the chances of the success Of the Spanish
government are weakened by the disaffec-
tons and troubles at home. No country
can maintain contest at home, preying
upon its very vitals, and exert its power
abroad, even though it be in it's own pos
sessions. The Cnbans, therefore, chose
we'll their time, and though the revolu.
ton in Spain was speedily and successfully
accomplished, the machinery of II new
government required time for its adjust
ment, and was naturally productive of
much contention and consequent weak
ness.
And the government of Spain has mani
tested weakness in it's administration. It
has neglected the vital fact Of cherishing
the confidence of its adherents in Cuba aud
the volunteers it has sent in the campaign
against the revolutionists. It's appoint.
ments to Office in Cuba have been weak,
iniudicious and productive of much injury,
and sacrifice of its revenue. Already do
leading Spanish merchants demand the
appointment of committees from their
own ranks for the protection of their reve-
nues from the pilferings of corrupt car
pet-bag officers from Spain. Confidence
is diminished and disafection is in
creasing.
The United States looks with secret. if
not open, favor upon the efforts of the
revolutionists, and Spain has no sympathy
with either the administration or Con-
gress. Filibussering has been secretly
encouraged, but it has gained little popu-
larity with the people. The summary
punishment of those tilibusters who have
been captured is no encouragement, and
the garotte is an unpleasant vision. Those
who have gone are influenced by the pros
pect Of gain, rather than by that patriot
ism they cannot feel, and in the event of
the success Of the revolutionists will no
doubt do much to embroil the yictors in
a war among themselves,for control Of the
government and spoils.
After all, the fruits OF victory would not
be long enjoyed. Our own government
has determined on the possession of Cuba,
and has too long gazed upon it with a
jealous eye. The ''Queen of the Antilles -
is future American possession, and the
revolutionists form but one grand cats
paw. Governments, like men. are always
honest except where their own advantage
and gain is concerned.