The Opelousas journal. [volume] (Opelousas, La.) 1868-1878, 1869-06-19

the eligibility oath, In other word', it is
assumed that the tinng of the rccantation
certificate, relieves every officer from the
necessity of taking any other oath than
that prescribed by article 100 Of the State
Constitution. 10 sustain this position the
plaintiff counsel give a literal construc-
ton to that clause of section three which
says:
THAT when any person is required to
take either of the above atti1avits to test
his eligibility to office, he must take in adj
dilion the following oath"
The Court carnc agree with the counsel
in their conclusion, without disregardlng
all the established rules Of Interpretation
and we need 20 no farther than Cur v
Code to ascertain what these rules are. Ar.
iicle lG of the Civil Code says;
"IVhcn the words Of law are dubious,
their meaning may be sought by eTamtnt"y
tie CONTEXT, with which the analogous words,
phrases and sentences may be compared,
in order to ascertain their true meaning.'
By examining the context, it appears
that the first aud second sections of the
Act require that the oath prescribed by
section three shall be taken by all officers.
The word oath" is used in the singular
number everywhere in the Act, which seems
to contemplate that the eligibility oath shall,
,,nlar all o.va,,p,cfe pcac ha toI-ap ,,p1nSc ttn
party is relieve by the action of Congress,
in which case, another oath is substituted.
10 give the Interpretation %contendcd for,
by the plaintiff S counsel, would be to rem
der nugatory two sections of the law,
which the Court is prohibited from doing
by the Article just quoted. The 18th art.
of the Civil Code says;
Laws in p0ri moter", or upon the same
subject matter, must be construed with a
one statute may be called in aid to eX-
plain what is doubtful in another
If, with this article before US, we exam
inc the Acts of Congress and the Act No.
80, and construc them together, it is obvi-
Gus that the leading object Of the Legi>la-
ture was to meet the requirements of
Congress, and to provide the means of
testing the eligibility of officers under the
State Constitution rs amended by Congress.
Article Is of the Civil Code provides:
THE most universal and e~ffectual way
of discovering the true meaning of a law,
when its expressions are dubious, is by
considering the reason and spirit of it, or
the cause uhich induced tile Legislature to
enact It,"
Applying this test, we find that it was
the inte"tion of the Legislature. to insist
vigorously on the enforcement Of the disa-
bility prescribed in the third section Of the
amendment, which is a part of
the State Constitution. TO form any other
conclusion, the Court would be compelled
to lose sight of the public history of the
country, and of the debates in the Lccis-
laturc of the State-considerations which
no Judge can disregard without an on'is-
sion ofduty. To give an Interpretation to
the law, which would exonerate any Off
Ger from taking the eligibility oath, would
be 30 ascribe to the Legislature, intentions
different from those which have been pub,
expressed.
The Interpretation contended for, would
e ,,%l ~- -, ,,-o 30 49,, nrtr1,k,rn %1,
power of relieving a public officer from
the disability in question, when this pow
er is given exclusively to the Congress of
The United States.
A great deal has been said in argument
lbout the harshness of the law, its proscr1p.
i've character, and its odiousness to the
Toese are considerations which
he Court is not permitted to entertain.
The Court did not make the law, and is not
responsible for its good or bad features.
t is the act of a coordinate branch IF the
Government, which it is made the duty of
Court to interpret, according to the
cCelfeu IuleS vi iHtel ptetdllou. III, DIS al
,ucd, the law is onerous, the Court can
,rant no relief. The rules of construction
cmain the same. Our own Code Art. 20
avs that
THE distinction between odious laws
nd laws entitled to favor, with a view of
narrowing or extending their construction
annot be made by those whose duty it is
C interpret them"
We conclude therefore, that the Act No.
9, is valid in its application to this case,
nd that the office of Sheriff became vacant
y the failure of the plaintiff to file the
oath within the time prescribed
y the seventh Section.
1t is contended however that the plain
If is really eligible, and did, in April 1869,
end through the Post-Ohice, the eligibility
ath, which did not reach the Office of the
ecretary of State. Assuming this to be
established, our view of the law as given
Dove, precludes the Court from consider
'g any evidence Of eligibility, other than
lat prescribed by Act No. 80, viz; the !
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