The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1869-03-18
FIGHTING 1T OUT ON THIS LINE"

lngs OF the war. In popular estlmauon, IL
graphically expressed the indomitable per-
/ sistency of the general in pursuing given
, course after he had once selected it as the
road to his object. But no idea could have
been more erroneous. Practically, it was con-
tradicted by all the subsequent movements of
the campaign. And this contradiction sug-
gests comparison between the method of
Grant as a general and his method thus far as
President comparison that may go far to
explain and foreshadow much of his conduct
in his new position. The method in each
case is to be regarded as in some sort reflex
of character, and character is thing which
remains essentially the same under all
changes of situation. In other words, the
native temperament and the mental structure
which Gen. Grant displayed in his military
operations he brings with him, as matter
of course, into the administration of civil
affairs.
1t will be remembered that for some weeks
after the first collision with Lee at the battle
of the Wilderness, the Northern press blazed
with the Wanting prediction that the tremend-
Gus federal army which had been put in mo-
ton from the Rappahannocb, would be push
ed forward by the direct route to Richmond
against every obstacle and at all hazards. And
this was undoubtedly Grants original con-
ception of the campaign. Apart from his own
declarations and tacit admissions, it was
clearly revealed in the disposition of his
| forces, the selection of his depot of supplies,
| and the direction of his attack upon the Con-
federate general. Nevertheless, while the
North resounded with the cry that he intend
ed to fight it out on that line at whatever
cost, he had already changed his whole plan
! of operations, in consequence of the terrible
checks received in the Wilderness and at
Spottsylvanis. With immense losses he aban-
doned the base of the Rappahannock, and
swung his army round from the north to the
south of Richmond; and after summer had
passed and winter had come and gone, he
made his final movement on a line precisely
opposite to that which he had originally
chosen as the route to his objective point. His
ultimate decision, in the opinion of the sound
est military critics, was far better than the
first. Why did it not occur to his mind in
the beginning? Why did he arrive at it only
under the stern teachings of experience? The
same questions occur in tracing the opera.
tons of Grant against Vicksburg. There,
too, he Numbered in the outset. He first
moved down by land into the interior of Mis-
sissippi, with the design of fianking Vicks-
burg and opening the river at that point as it
had been opened at Columbus, Fort Pillow,
and Memphis. But, losing his camp and sup
plies at Holly Springs, he abruptly abandoned
that line and commenced q new movement by
way of the river. The same pliability to cir
cumstances and events appeared in the subse-
quent stages of the campaign. He took up
the crude notion that he could circumvent
Vicksburg by opening channel for gun
boats and transports through the swamps
of Louisiana from a point seventy miles
above to point somewhere below, and for
some weeks he was diligently employed in ex-
ecuting it. But he soon found that the Job
was one that would consume about as much
time as the completion of the Suez Canal, and
he prudently gave it up. 1t is also worth
noting that his first attack upon the defenses
of Vicksburg was from the north, where they
were strongest, and that after his severe re-
pulse in that quarter, he finally shifted his po-
sition to the south of the city, This sort DIVA
cillation marks his whole military career His
varying decisions and movements have been
In singular opposition to his generally imputed
tenacity of adherence to his original resolu-
tons. No general of either army was further
from illustrating the idea of Fighting it out"
Internationally, and to the extremity, on
this, that or another line. If he dis.
played the quality of obstinate perse-
verance in q remarkable degree, it was
in the facility with which he would change |
his plans and reverse his lines in the endeavor
to reach his ultimate object His outsets in |
all important instances were mistakes and if |
this fact reflects disparagingly on the breadth |
and clearness of his military perceptions, it
must be admitted as not little to the credit
of his military sagacity that he was at once
prompt and cool in rectifying the miscarriage
incident to an injudicious line of operations
by striking out into one entirely different. A |
consummate military genius, to be sure,
would not have waited for discontinue to
teach him the right way. But whatever eler
AAeA19 Va nAhsoAy genius NIdut pOSseSSeO
would seem to have been purely rudimentary.
His final decisions did not fash upon him.
He worked to them tortuously and dimly.
The war was his school, and blunders were his |
lessons This was the case, indeed, in greater
or less measure, with all the generals of the
federal army. But none of them proved so
docile and so patient scholar as he nor
was any one of them SO abundantly favored
with the means and the opportunities of turn
ing the tuition to practical account.
The parallel between the vacillation which
appears in Grants course since he has been
President and the vacillation which ran
through all his military campaigns, is both
striking and suggestive. He seems, thus far,
to be as plastic under the pressure of circum-
stances and events in the one sphere as he
was in the other. What will be the para
mount and ultimate object of his admiration,