The Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1855-1875, 1869-06-01
Whole ,ss.. ss"'e''}} NO. 13.

ator Davis, of Kentucky, in the late i'm
parchment trial, that the Senate could
consist only Of two Senators from each
State. But it was negatived, there be-
ing two yeas and forty>nine nays.
The principle is fully established in
the National Government that the legal
character of Congress can not be des,
troyed by the resignation Or secession Of
a portion of its members. That the
members who remain in each House will
constitute the "House;' that the neces>
sary quorum to do business in each
House is determined by the actual mems
bership, and not by what the member
ship ought to be or might be by law.
This is the practical construction
given to the Constitution of the United
States, and is thoroughly Republican in
it's character, and is the only one which
can prevent a factious minority from in
volviag the country in anarchy; and this
construction is just as necessary and
proper in its application to the Consti-
tuition Of the State of Indiana, subject,
however, Ito the limitation that the Leg
islature ceases to be vital when the num-
Der of members in either House is re.
duced below a majority, of the members
elected to that House.
The doctrine contended for by the
revolutionists leads to notification and
secession, and is but another form of
the Calhoun philosophy-that the gov
ernment Of the majority may Of right
be nullified by the minority.
1t is time to have done with all these
pestiferous doctrines, and to reject from
State Governments, as well as from the
National, every noxious principle by
which unscrupulous and desperate fac
tions can block the wheels OF Govern
ment and endanger the peace of the
country.
When minority abdicate to obstruct
Legislation, they must be held to resign
their power into the hands of those who
remain and it was upon this principle
the majority acted when the rebel Sena-
tors and Representatives Withdrew from
Congress. The most dangerous revolu
tion is that which is perpetrated under
constitutional forms ,and should the prin-
ciple be established that minority of
either House can constitutionally de-
stroy legislature, we can scarcely be
said to have government.
Passing by the question as to what
quorum may be required in the Legisla.
transaction OF business peculiar to the
State, there is another view to to be ta-
ken with reference to the ratification of
the Constitutional Amendment. The
Fifth Article Of the Constitution Of til e
United States declares that Congress
may, by a vote of two thirds in each
House, submit to the Legislatures of the
several States propositions to amend the
| Constitution of the United States, which,
if ratified by the Legislatures Of three
| fourths of the States, will become part
of that instrument The duty Of the
| State Legislatures to consider the prop
ositons thus submitted is imposed by
| the institution of the United States,
and their members, under the oath they
take to support that Constitution, are
not at liberty to decline such considera
| ton. The duty to consider the amend
me nts not being created by the Consti-
tutions of the States, but by paramount
authority, the performance Of it could
not be prohibited or prevented by any
provision in the Constitution of State.
/ The principle that a vote of the MAORI
| ty, whether of the people or of a legisla-
tive body, shall express the popular will
is go essentially interviewer with the
/ theory of the National Government, that
it would seem that nothing more should
be required for the ratification of a con-
stitutional amendment than the affirma
tive vote Of majority of the members
elected 10 each House Of the State Leg.
islature IF compliance with all the
forms prescribed by a State constitution
shall be necessary to the validity of the
ratification, it would be in the power OF
a State in that way to SO hamper the
consideration of an amendment as to
practically nullify the provision in the
Constitution Of the United States.
If the Constitution of a State should
require all the members elected to the
Legislature to be present, or the votes
of all, to ratify an uendment to the
Constitution Of the United States, coulc
it be denied that such provision would
practically nullify the Constitution of the
United States and would the null:fica
ton be less where the State Constitu
ton put it in the power Of a minority o
either House of the State Legislature t.
prevent the ratification by destroying
the Legislature
Where duty is imposed upon Stat,
Legislature by the Constitution of th.
United States, the performance of it in
such manner as would meet the analO
gies, or be sufficient under the Consti
tuition of the United States, would seen
to be all that is necessary. This prinei
pie has received remarkable illustra
ton in the act of Congress approved
July Goth, 1866, regulating the manner
of electing Senators of the United States
By the provisions of the first section O.
this act, on the second Tuesday after
the meeting Of the Legislature, eact
House shall proceed to vote for Senator
At IL o'clock meridian the next day, tn,
members of the two houses shall Assem-.
BILE in joint convention, and it the same
person has received a majority of th'
votes in each house, he shall be declar'
ed to be duly elected but if not, tn,
joint assembly shall proceed, by vive