The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1869-08-06

former as Minister to Spain have been re-
ported by telegraph. Save the commonplace
assurances of continued good feeling and cor
dial relations nothing transpired during the
ceremony to predicate an opinion in regard to
the management of the Cuban question. What
special instructions our Minister may be en-
trusted with and how he proposes to dead
with the important subject remain among the
secrets Of diplomacy to be revealed in the
future. In the meantime any consideration
Of the question leads one, in default Of other
information, to accept as q basis Of settle
ment the reported policy of the administration.
This is to induce Spain to sell Cuba to the
Cubans, and the United States to become
guarantee for the payment Of the sum Of money
agreed upon. This, as q matter of course,
presumes that the Cubans would like to pur-
chase. Considered in humane point Of view
this arrangement is no doubt very desirable as
an effective means for putting an end to the
revolving scenes of crime and carnage that
have characterized the war. We have pre-
viously expressed the opinion that such .
policy possessed the advantages OF pfactica-
bity and might prove the best that could be
pursued under existing circumstances. The
progress of events, as developed in late &C
counts from Cuba, justiaes the belief that the
revolution is growing in strength and will be
continued just so long as the Spaniards may
see at to attempt the subjugation of the
patriots. Indeed, there seems to be abso-
lutely little or no chance for Spain to main
tain authority over the island; and the ulti-
mate independence Of Cuba may be accepted
as inevitable by the authorities at Madrid,
since it is regarded az no very remote contin-
gency by the resident Spaniards on the SEVER
Faithful ISLE" Stubborn as Spain may be to
this sacrifice Of national pride, and however
ioath she may feel TO surrender possession
from which she has long derived an enormous
revenue, the utter hopelessness of the struggle
must become apparent to the government and
will doubtless operate powerfully in influencing
decision to sell for handsome promise to
pay endorsed by the United States.
But supposing Spain concludes to accept a
proposition to sell coming from our govern
ment, there are other questions and conditions
which it would be well for the admins
tration of General Grant to consider. The
first and most important one is, do the
Cubans desire to make purchase of a country
to which they hope ere long, and with very
fattering prospects, to make good their
claim to ownership by the force of arms?
After the sacrifices already made, the pro-
gress towards . consummation of the end for
which they are struggling, and the assurances
of triumph at no distant day, the patriots Of
Cuba may reasonably conclude that the addi-
tonal cost of blood aud treasure necessary for
the completion of the work Of independence
is preferable to compromise which involves
an immense debt to Spain and perhaps other
conditions equally embarrassing to the United
States. Whatever may be the relation of free
Cuba to our country-whether the Cubans are
striving for early annexation or not-we must
appreciate sentiment which would prefer
that the election of such relation be voluntary
aud spontaneous, unembarrassed by outside
pressure or the obligations arising from a
surety contract to this government.
We are not prepared to state whether or not
the administration, if the reported policy
above mentioned be really true, took occasion
to consult the agents of Cespedes in regard to
the proposed purchase; but it is quite proba-
BILE, from the manner In which General Grant
and Cabinet have been treating the Cuban
difficulty, and inasmuch as neither the bel
ligerent rights nor the official authority of the
representatives of the patriots have been
openly recognized, that they would not take
the trouble to ascertain their wishes in regard
to any projected scheme, and are acting simply
upon their own responsibility. If such be
the case the question arises would it not be
as well to negotiate for the direct acquisition
Of the island by the United States? Proud
Spain would surely feel less Inundated in
selling to us than to the Cubans; and as
''the United States now more than ever
appreciate the traditional amity of Spain, as
animated by new sympathies and common
participation in constitutional liberty" what
would tend more to increase the amity 80
happily existing between the two peoples than
transaction implying a national obligation to
the extent Of respectable number Of millions,
relieving the Spanish government Of the hope
less task of subjugating the insurgents aud
replenishing suffering exchequer3
Another subject for the consideration of the
administration, in the event Of the Cubans de.
string to purchase and Spain consenting TO sell
may be found in the possible future annexation
Of the island to the United States, and the
probable condition Of that annexation beinf
the assumption Of the debt to Spain. Or, il
case of inability or failure to pay on the part
Of Cuba, would not our government require
q cession Of the island as naturalization for
purchase money to be paid to Spain Sucf
are a few Of the questions suggested BY
| the reported policy" Of the administration.
Lastly, we submit, may Il not be as well tc