The Louisiana Democrat. [volume] (Alexandria, La.) 1845-1918, 1869-03-31

In
The rnrHose Of tf,at move will be fully
| disclosed IN The following passage, which
'hfows an entirely new light on the purpo
sHs OF the Confederate Conlmmagaer in
,h's INVASION. and also explains a great
deal OF manoeuveriag that is otherwise
i9nlte incomprahensible
1T was expected that as soon as the Fed
eral army should cross the Potomac Gen
Stuart would give notice Of lis movements;
ana, nothing having been heard from him
SINCE our entrance into Maryland, it was
inferred that the enemy had not yet left
Virginia. Orders were therefore issued to
move upon Harrisburg The expedition
OIL General Early to York was intended, in
part. TO prepare for this undertaking by
breaking the railroad between Baltimore
and Harrisburg, and SEEING the bridges
over the Susquehanna at Wrghts vlle.-
zen. Early succeeded in the first object.
destroying number of bridges above and
below DIRK; but, on the approach of the
troops sent by him to WrightsyiIe, body
of militia stationed OF that place fed across
the river and burnt the bridge in their re-
treat. Gen. Fairly then marched to rejoiu
his corps. The advance against Harris
burg was arrested by intelligence received
from scout, on the night of the 2Sth, 10
the effect that the army of Gen. Hooker
had crossed the Potomac and was an
preaching the South Mountains. In the
absence of the cavalry it was impossible to
ascertain lis intentions, but to deter him
from advancing further west and intercept-
ing our communications from Virginia, it
was determined to concentrate the army
east OF the mountains.
From this passage the following remark
able facts appear:
L. That Lee, owing to the absence of the
cavalry of Stewart, (who, making a bad
botch OF his work, had allowed the Union
army TO interpose itself between him and
Lees army during the whole march north
wald from the Potomac, and had therefore
not been able to follow ont his instructions
of placing himself on Ewel's rightly was,
on the night ofthe 9th of June, at which
time he was at Chambersburg, not aware
that the Union army had crossed to the
north side of the Potomac. In point of
fact, this move had not only been made,
but on that day, the 9th of June, o CON
centration Of the entire Union army had
been effected at/Frederiek.
2. That Lees purpose in his march into
Pennsylvania was to cross the Susquehan-
mas and move upon Harrisburg, and proba-
bly, Philadelphia. This is q stretch of au-
daclty far beyond what has been supposed
to have been entertained by the Confede-
rate Commander. Yet it is rendered man
testify his own avowal: "Orders were is
sued to move upon Harrisburg" The ey-
petition Of Early to York had been design
ed to prepare for this undertaking. The
yistas OF possibility opened up by this bold
design heighten our conception Of the mag
nItute and Importance of that decisive ac-
lion of Gettysburg, which checked Lee in
his invasive ardor and compelled him to
seek safety in retreat into Virginia.
g. That he was prevented from carrying
this plan into execution by a curious error.
lie heard through q scout on the night of
the 2Sth of June that the Union army,
having crossed the Potomac, "was ap-
preaching the South Mountain" This was
a movement that would menace the line of
communication of the Confederate army !;
and, in consequence, Lee determined to
| concentrate tho army east of the noun
| tains." This requires word of eXplana-
ton. When Hooker had concentrated his
! army ut Frederick on the 9th, he from
westward through the passes of the South
| Mountain to lIarper's Ferry, at which
point he expected to have this force joined
! by the local garrison of ten thousand men,
when he designed moving this special col
umn up the Cumberland Valley to menace
Lees rear But Haleck would not con-
sent that the iIarpers Ferry garrison
| should join this force, so it was drawn
back to Frederick by Hooker. Next day
Hooker was relieved by Meade, who NOV
| ed his entire army northward on the east
side of the mountains, towards the Susque-
hanna. 1t thus appears that, by the time
when on the night of The 29th of June, Lee
| received the information of this movement,
which threatened his communications, the
movement had been entirely abandoned !
GETTYSBURG.
The manoeuvrcs just pointed out make
plain the tram of accidental circumstances
which brought about the decisive conflict
burg-a place which certainly was the OBJ
jective of neither army, and of which, in
deed, neither the Union nor the Confede-
rate commander had ever heard Meade
was moving nothward without knowing
scarcely anything of the whereabouts of
his enemy, and without any very definite
aim save that he would move northward
till he should cause Lee to unloose his
hold of the Susquehanna. His left flank
on the march naturally skirted Gettysburg.
Lee, wrongly fancying that the Union ar
my was moving on his line of communica-
tions towards Harper's Ferry, resolved, as
counter move, to march eastward from
Chambersburg to the east side Of the
mountains. This line of march inevitably
brought him to Gettysburg. Thus it was
that the respective line of march of the
hostile armies intersected each other, and
it was matter of fate that the opposing
forces should meet. The point of deadly
encounter was Gettysburg.
TIE BATTLE.
Lees description of the three days. ac-
ton at Gettysburg is very detailed, but
fragmentary extracts would be of little val
ue. 1t is well known that the action was
precipitated unknown to each commander
it was, in fact, the accidental meeting Of
two heads of columns. The enemy was
successful on the first days attack, and it
seems to have been only after Lee came on
the field, after this flush OF victory, that he
seriously entertained the idea of giving
battle, for he had promised his corps COM