The Evansville journal. [volume] (Evansville, Ind.) 1866-1870, 1869-05-27


to do business in each House is de-
termined by the actual membership,
aud not by what the membership I
ought to be or might be by law.
This is the practical construction
given to the Constitution of the
United States. and is thoroughly Re
publican in its character, and is the |
only one which can prevent factious |
in anarchy: and its construction is |
just as necessary an ID proper in its ap
plication to the Constitution of the |
State Of Indian, subject, however, to |
the limitation that the Legislature |
ceases to be vital when the number of !
mem bers in either House is reduced |
to below majority of the members
elected to.that House.
The doctrine eontended for by the |
revGlutionists leads to notification |
and secession, and is but another form
0fzthe Calhoun phil0sophy-that the
government of the majority may OF
right be nullifed by the minority.
1t Is time to have done with all |
these pestiferous doctrines. and to re
ject from State Governments, as we'll
as from the National, every noxious
principle by which INSCRIPTIONS and
desperate factions can block the
wheels of Government and endanger
the peace of the country.
When a minority abdicate to OBJ
struet legislation, they must be held to
resign their power into the hands of
those who remain; and 1T was upon
this principle the majority acted when
the rebel Senators and Representa-
tiTes withdrew from Congress. The
most dangerous revolution Is that
which is perpetrated under constitu-
tiohal forms, and should the princi-
pie be established that a minority Of
either House can consti iutionally de-
stroy Legislature, we can scarcely
be said to have a government.
Passing by the question as to what
quorum may be required in the Legis-
lature for the enactment of laws and
the transaction of business peculiar
to the State, there is another view to
be taken with reference to the ratif-
cation of the Constitutional Amend
ment. The Fifth Article of the Con-
stitution of the United States de-
clares that Congress may, by vote of
two-thirds of each House, submit to
| the Legislatures of the several States
propositions to amend the Constitu-
ton of the United States, which, if
ratified by the Legislatures of three
| fourths of the States, will become
/ part Of that instrument. The duty of
/ the State Legislatures to consider the
propositions thus submitted is i'm
posed by the Constitution of the
/ u United States, aud their members,
under the oath they take to support
that Constitution, are not at liberty
to decline such consideration. The
| duty to consider the amendments not
| being created by the Constitutions of
the States, but by paramount author
ity, the performance of it could not
| be prohibited or prevented by any
provision in the Constitution of a
State The principle that a vote of
the majority, whether of the people
or of legislative body, shall express
the popular will is so essentially in
terwoVen with the theory of the Ma
tional Government, that it would
seem that nothing more should be re-
quired for the ratification of a consti-
tutiOnal amendment than the affirma-
tive vote of majority OF the members
elected to each House of the State
Legislature. Ii compliance with all
the forms prescribed by a State Con-
stitution shall be necessary to the
validity of the ratification, it would
be In the power Of a State In that way
to so hamper the consideration of an
amendment as to practically nullify
the provision in the Constitution of
the United States. EwE
If the Constitution of State should
require all the member elected to the
Legislature to be present, or the votes
of all, TO ratiiy an amendment to the
Constitution Of the United States,
could it be denied that such a provi-
sion would practically nullify the
Constitution of the United States?
and would the notification be less
where the State Constitution put In
the power of a minority of either
House Of the State Legislature to pre-
vent the ratification by destroying the !
LEGISLATURE?
Where a duty is imposed upon a
State Legislature by the Constitution
OF the United States, the perform
anee OF it in such manner as would |
meet the analbgies, or be sufficient
under the Constitution of the United !
States, would seem TO be all that is |
necessary. This principle has re-
ceived a remarkable illustration In |
the act Of Congress approved July |
10Th, 1866, regulating the manner of |
etecting Senators of the United States. |
By the provisions of the first section Of |
this act, on the second Tuesday after |
the meeting of the Legislature, |
each House shall proceed to vote for |
Senator. At II o'clock meridian the |
next day, the members of the two |
houses shall assemble In joint conven- |
ton, and if the same person has re-
ceived a majority of the votes in each |
house, he shall De declared to be duly |
elected; but if not, the joint assembly |
shall proceed, by UtUG U0ce vote, to |
choose a Senator, and the person hav- |
ing a majority of all the votes of said |
joint assem- bly,, :" a majority of all the |
members elected to both houses being |
present and voting" shall be declared |
duly elected. Suppose. for example, |
the Legislature of Indiana consisted |
of one hundred Representatives and |
fifty Senator's; the joint assembly thus |
provided for, might legally consist |
of seventy six members. they being |
a majority Of all the members |
elected to both Houses, and may
all be Representatives, not a SEN |
ator being present, and a ma
joritY of these seventy-six-thirty-
nine-may elect Senator. By this |
regulation, all questions of quorums |
under State Constitutions are left out. |
A joint convention is authorized, |
which may turn out to be no joint |
convention at all. but may consist en-
tiFely of the members of one House
they being majority of all the |
.F-a I'll -
and the votes of one-fifth of all the |
nam hArs alanEad To hnth Hnu-nn md |