Burlington weekly free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1866-1928, 1869-11-26

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: opinions of but two or three generals entitieu
to especial weight. Gen. Hancock's remark
that the Hill could not well be taken mas
been ouoted above. Gen. Sickles himself says,
Il found his (Howard'sl troops well posted IN
a secure position. The enemy, in the mean
while. had not made any serious attack on him
; during my march, that is in the three
hours preceding his arrival - pretty good
ground for superstition that the enemy did
not purpoee to renew the attack that night.
, Gen Wadsworth, Of the LIST corps, says ::
=. We think that We punished the enemy 70
severely in that contest, and that they lost 50
heavily, that they were in no condition to
Cemetery HILL" Col Freemantle, Of the
English army, who was with Lee, and wrote
an extended account Of the battle, as seen
from the rebel side, for Blackuoods Maya
-inc. explains the failure Of Ewell to assault
Cemetery Hill that night by the fact that
" the enemy was too strongly posted.
After all. the hest witness j. Gen. Lee,
who SAYS in his report - 1t was ascertained
from the prisoners that We had been engaged
with two corps Of the army formerly com
manded by Gen. Hooker, and that the re-
mainder Of that army, under Gen. Meade,
was approaching Gettysburgh Without in
formation as to It's proximity, the strong
position which the enemy had assumed could
not be attacked without danger Of exposing
the four divisions present, already weakened
and exhausted by long and bloody struggle,
to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops.
Under these circumstances, II
,cas decided not 10 attack I'LL tie arrirol 81
| L,rqstreef, who did not arrive that night
/ We submit that this does not sustain Gen.
CIRCUITS rather confident assertion that there
is 80 er-ry reason " to suppose that Cemetery
Hill could have been storncd that night if
Sckles had not arrived
We may remark here that the rebel pre-
ponderance on the first day, though sufficient
ly tremendous, was by no means as great as
Gen. Grout supposes. The entire corps Of
Ewell and HILL did not number GO,OOO, and /
but four divisions, two-third.. of their corps .
were engaged on the first day.
Gen. Sickles, a. We have said, is entitled |
To his full share Of the creditof coming to the /
rescue on Wednesday night i he had been .
the first or only corps to reinforce Howard |
and II Gen. Lee had not supposed the whole /
Of Meade's army was at hand and If the /
position selected by Howard and nancock) /
had not been 50 strong, Gen. 5. might, per-
haps, he allowed the chief credit OF saving
the list and llth Corps. As it Is, he can .
only share that credit with the other corps .
commanders of the army Of the Potomac
Having disposed Of the claim made for .
Gen. Sickles, that he was the man who .
&" saved the remnant of the lst corps from
the annihilation, and the llth corps the ne
cessity Of further tall running on the first
day at Gettysburgh, we proceed 70 consider
the statement that it was his part in the
proceedings Of the second day, which made
Gettysburgh historic, and wrecked the rebel
lion. We are asked to cOnccie that Sckles'
advance movement precipitated the second
day fighting, which Ne cheerfully do. We
are also asked to admit that it was that fight
ing which turned Gen Meade from his pur-
pose to retreat from ,ettysburgh. and thus
made it the Waterloo of the Warwick
we hy no means admit.
1t is to be noted that the famous " advance
movement and repulse of Gen. Sie6les was
not one Of those events which form a clear
stage of progress for one side or tie other in
ka~ hs+ bio ]
affair twas the leaving DIV the ID corps) Of
a very good line with both fanks protected
for a less favorable position in front. with
unprotected TANKS. Its results were that
Sckes, though aided by troops Of the 2nd
and 9Th corps and reserve artillery. was
driven from the position with terrible loss
that our troops held at the close Of the day
exactly the position they would have held
had Sckles not moved out, with this differ
ence. that the ground for half mile ont in i
front Of that line was covered with the bodies !,
Of Union soldiers. who would otherwise have s
been in the ranks and that the enemy occu- \
pied some ground which be would have oc- :.
,upied anyway, with the additional satisiac- :,
ton, to be sure, that he had driven our troops i
ron 1t, with far greater loss than DE had re- f
'eiyed. Now what was there in this % l.
Keep Meade at Gettysburgh surprising he had II
Deen, as zen. Grout saws he was. .. in ~.
hurry to get away? - Was it the simple N,
act that there was fighting on our left? But r
here would have been fighting on our left 81.
Without shat Our authority for this asser-
ion is Gen. Lee, who states in hi. report
f the battle that the success Of his tr00ps
n the first days fighting, encouraged him
D renew the offensive on the second Law, Of
nd that he ordered Longstrect 10 drive our a
roops from the position occupied by Sickles by
his advanced line), with a view TO 81 assail- 81.
u the more elevated ground beyond" This
lore elevated ground was the ridge from X
cemetery Hill to Little Round Top. And by
lis, it Is plain, would have been assailed on tn
thursday afternoon even though Gen. Sick th
s had not gone out exactly where the enemy 4,
anted him. Or was it our heavy loss. the e..
'nsequence Of Sickles' mistake that kept
cade at Gettysburgh2 Disaster commonly IN
Ids motive for fight to a general already bet
mt on retreat. the
This brings Us to the question whether ua1
en-. Meade 'ras In hurry to get away" br
en-. circuit says he was. Our correspond
It " L. thinks he was and both base their vel
Union on the testimony of Gen Daniel the
ltterfield before the Committee on the Con Sen
let OF the War, % the effect that he was or CO,
red by ten. Meade on the morningof July ,,,
to prepare an order to Withdraw the army f1'
IN Gettysburgh. Gen. Grout laws some
ess on the very intimate and confidential anl
ations Of Butterteld 10 Gen. Meade.and on fort
; consequcn: knowledge Of the intentions ma,
his chief. This would, in ordinary cases.
natural assumption from the fact that
tter6eld was Meade's chiec-ofstaff But
Is to he remembered that Gen Meade sud Gen
ply relieved Gen. Hooker in command Of iea
= army but two days before the battle; and plai
1t he took HOoker's staff substantially as ist;
found it. lie did, indeed. invite another ~
GER, Gen. Humphreys, to be his chief-of- '---
4 but Humphreys declined to take the s'ai
itlOn till after the coming battle. and Gen. tim,
ade accordingly retained Butterfeld. Four on
IS after the battle, Butterfeld was relieved ron,
Humphreys made chieEoEstaf. These n.
do not indicate any speciqI in a.
acy with or confidence in Buttcrfield. on was
part Of Gen. Meade Butterfeld. as we glas
e heard and as it is reasonable to supposc. stag
not take his supersedure very kindly. fran
subsequently, had a controversy with Gen. Sob,
lde, over what he (Butterfied) consider
a derogatOry assertion, emanating from o-is'
/. Meade, which appeared ina published sign
'rt of Gen fIallcck and he was obviously hack
ing when he appeared before the com be il
ZEE, to give coloring to his facts uniavor- oro-
to Gen. Meade. That Butterfeld drew :,
such an order as he describes. we DO net 'ne''
'tion; but it was never issued. and Gen.
de earnestly denies that it was drawn up II
M direction. Gen. Meades declaration der
follows: man,
utterly deny, under the full solemnity and The
tity Of my oath, and in the firm conviction tho
the day will come when the secrets Of all =,
shall be made known-I utterly deny ever UAi''
ne intended or thought, for one instant. 10 ago,
draw that army, unless the military contin- slider
les which the future should develop, during a.,
course of the day, might render it a matter
''essity that the army should be withdrawn. Dr.