Litchfield enquirer., 1868-06-04

' 00CGSS1
 means and instruments of performing fl
 executive duty, expressly imposed nn1
 him by the Constitution, of taking ca
 that the laws be faithfully executed. { poace, ct any aud aU tinses of renaovi,,q from S Jfce aN erecutice o1icc,,s for cause to De iul1o !. dy Me President dlone. Answer to Art I cle 4. n Of course this claim would extend n, f only to the act of March 2, 1S67 but won f sweep from the statute book every act fl,
 ing any tenure -of-office except the pleasnl s of the President. The assertion of fines
 extraordinary prerogatives rests upon tl , following words of the constitution.
 ''The executive power shall be vested |. a President of the United States of Anne,
 ica."
 It is not pretended that there is q wor } in the Constitution besides lnse, that con fers upon anybody the power of removs from office, except in cases pf impeacl ment. It behooves Us then to inquire wha
 IS this ' 'ececMire potoer' which is {" pestel
 Tn the President of the Unite,l States q
 America.
 Executive powers differ in different ma
 tons. Russian czar has executive DOW
 CT quite unlike that of British sovereign
 and we have hitherto suppose. that of tn,
 latter to be equally dissimilaf to that of .
 Republican President. How then shall wt
 measure the executive functions in tb, 1 United States? Simply by the Constitu tlon. Does that instrument expressly con fer power? We must submit. Is if si
 lent, and is it necessary to place the powe, somewhere for the we'll of tbe state? We must search tue Constitution to find the authority whichis clothed with the function of creating or dasgnating the proper depository.
 1 The Constitution is silent ol the power of removal; but this is powe that may be needful for the well-ordeing of the state; and turning to the last dallse of the eighth section of the first ahicle of tho Constitution, we find the authority given to Congress "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution all powers vested by this Constitution in the goUe,7saeus of Me United Stettes, or in any departnse'aos oLicer Mereof. D
 1t would certainly seen too plain for ar gument that the ''act regulating the ten, ure of certain civil offics'' is within the very letter of this constitutional authority. The judgment of the Saate three times definitely expressed, hasoeen in conform lty with these views, andto that judgment I adhere.
 The inquiry whether M Stanton is with m tho provisions of tho hw has been con- plicated by the ingenuit of counsel, but. upon a fair consideration of the act, pre- sents little difficulty. he first section is as follows:
 "EUery p(son holding any civil office to which hex been appointed by and with the advj>e apd consent of the Senate, and every person who shall here after be appoinkd to any such office, and
 s, s:ad secessor 4stsls.1Led l1st therein untler appointed and duly qualified, ex- nf as herein otherwise provided: Proui- led, That the Secretaries of State, of the Treasury, of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior, the Postmaster General, and the Attorney General, shall hold their offices for and during the term of the President by whom they may have been appointed, and for one month thereafter, subject to removal by and with the advice and consent of the Senate"
 It is claimed that the debates in Con- gress, and especially in the Senate, upon the passage of the act, demand construc- tion which shall exclude MT. Stanton from it's provisions. I remark here that these debates should not be confounded with what is termed contemporaneous con- struction, 'whichI shall have occasion to con- sider in another place. The debates may be properly examined in order to ascertain the intent of the makers of the law. I was not in Congress at the passage of the act, and must consider it in it's historical and legal aspect The counsel who opened the case for the President very truly remarked, (page 375 Impeachment Trial;
 "This law, as senators very we'll know, had purpose; there was practical object in the view of Congress; and however clear it might seem that the language of the law, when applied to Mir. Stanton's case, would exclude that case; hover clear that might seem on the mere words of the law, Ii the purpose of the law could be discerned, and that purpose plainly required different interpretation, that different interpretation should be given"
 What, now, was the practical object of this law so far as it refers to cabinet off cers? I think no candid reader of the de- bates in the House of Representatives can doubt that that body intended to protect all the members of Mir. Johnson's cabinet against removal by the President alone. Rightly or wrongly, they felt that 1t would be safer for the country to have the depart ments in the hands of the existing cabinet officers, until the Senate should consent to their removal think that it IS also evil dent that the Senate was willing to leave with the President the power of removing all cabinet officers as heretofore practlsed. d. Here the two houses disagreed, and in the bill as reported by the conference com mittee there was 8 compromise: 1 think that the House supposed that it had attain ed it's object by the bill as reported by the conference committee, by keeping ln 1 the cabinet officers until .one month after the close of the current presidential term unless the Senate should sooner consent tt their removal I think that the Senate supposed that it had gained it's point so fa as the Secretaries appointed by MT. Lln
 coin were concerned. am thus brough
 to the necessity of construing law passed by one House with different intention
 from that which animated the other am of course, left to determine the true Tn tent and meaning of the law by the law it
 self, giving to it's language It's ordinary ie
 gal scope and signi6cation.. Coming thus to the consideration of tn . | first section of the act, (which alone is ma terial to this inquiry,) it will be observe
 that it does not deal with the incidents offices, but with the franchises of person: | .> o& yo.,,7c of offian