Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1868-08-19

EeFOiuslOQ. hhJOIltleSJ the OOuIb snAus
"are to govern ONLY IN THE PRESCRIBED
FORM. II the majority wish the passage
Of certain law, they must elect such
Representatives as will make the law, in
the mode pointed out by the Constitu-
ton. The minority have consented to be
governed by such statutes SIS are passed
in the constitutional manner; but they
have never consented to submit to such
laws as the majority should enact at the
polls; and the Constitution is designed
for the protection Of minorities against
the capriees, recklessness or prejudices Of
majorities. The interest of the
whole community requires that the fuR-
damental compact should be preserved
sacred and inviolste."
And the Supreme Court OF Psnnsylva-
mia said, "If the two Houses can divest
themselves of their Office Of Lawmakers,
and devolve it upon the body of the peo-
pie, what security have We against the
passage Of laws, perhaps well meant, but
liable to be glariugly wrong, because in
considerably adopted? And what check
isleftupOn hasty and ill-advised zeal open
to be influenced and misguided by inter-
ested cunning or blind fanaticism? I'll
I the practice be sanctioned, there may
I follow 8 train Of experiments, which, I'M
arrested at some point Of their progress,
/ must end in the final overthrow Of the
/ Constitution. Every case of doubtful
propriety will be referred to the result of
q ballot; and acts of the Assembly, sub |
/ ject to the popular vote, will be yielded |
to unthinking clamor or partisan impor-
| tunity, by faithless legislators anxious to |
escape the responsibility OF their posi-
tion."
These remarks, of both courts, apply |
as strongly to the case We are consider
ing, as to those in which they were
made.
In amending 8 Constitution, as in |
making laws, majOrities can govern
ONLY IN THE PRESCRIBED FORM. If the
msjOrity wish q particular amendment,
they must either follow the mode pro-
vided by the Constitution, or assemble
in Convention, by delegates duly elected,
to do it. The minority have consented
that the Constitution may be amended
in the prescribed mode and, as seems
now to be too well settled to be disputed,
that, Notwithstanding the Constitution
provides particular mode by which it
shall be amended, Convention may at
any time be called together by the ma
jority, and amend, remodel or utterly
destroy the Constitution. The polOer to
do this, we must eOneede. The right We
deny. The minority have no guarantees
at all, if the Constitution can be amend
ed in any other way than according to
the compact in the instrument itself.
But We do not deny that, under the
exceptional circumstances Of the case in
Tennessee, q Convention OF the loyal
men Of the State could assemble and act
with plenary power in the premises.
They could have abolished the old Con-
stitution but they did not touch it, ex-
cept by the specific amendments pro-
posed. They could have sbrogated the
provision which prescribed the mode of
amending it but they did not. They
adopted and re-stfirmed the whole Con-
stituti on, except so far as they proposed
amendments to it.
The minority Of the loyal men of the
State never consented to submit to such
amendments to the Constitution as the
m iorifv Of tho ,,olIs 81, o,,TI o14Lo-;.,~ =, /
majority of the L legislature to make at
breath. II this can be done, what pro-
lection Is there against the caprices,
or prejudicss OF majorities 4?
How could the Constitutional provision
IS to the mode OF amendment, a part OF
the fundamental compact, be preserved
sacred and inviolste, as II ,0as, and the
Legislature be authorized by vote of the
people at the polls to incorporate new
provisions into the Constitution
lfthe people can in that manner amend
notwithstanding a Consti- L
.utiOnal provision that absolutely ex-
dudes the exercise of such power, what
security is there against the hasty and |,
nconsiderate adoption of Constitutional 8
provisions, procured by interested cum =
ling or blind rancor? The practice of z
% amending, if continued, would neces- Y
arily end in the overthrow of the Con- q
the whole OF it at once becom- =
ng mere ordinary legislative act. A a
popular vote, obtained by unthInking
lamOr or partizan Importantly would q
make and unmake Constitutions, and =.
here would soon be no fundamental
ompact or supreme law at all.
We repeat, the Schedule does not say v
hat the Legislative enaotments as to a.
-oting should become paris of the Con- D.
titution: the people did not vote for the ST
with any knowledge or under 2,
landing that such would be the case: !.
nd the true construction and law of the
natter is, that the Schedule simply re- q
moved from the Constitution all that re- Is
ated to the qualification of voters and
be limitation of the elective franchise, n,
nd placed it among the subjects OF ordi-
airy legislation,-declining, it must be Se
opposed, to introduce proscriptive pro- tu
isions into the Constitution, where they p
-ould be permanent, and removing the N
on the powers of the Legisla. " "
Ire, which thereby become plenary,
lat such temporary provisions might be hs
lade as the exigency of the times re- III
lired, which could be again changed by tn
lie Legislature at pleasure, when q
laBge should be found expedient. kr
- pr
d" De n,ortius nil risi verunr " says the az