The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1868-07-29
ward through the manipulations OF a
a

LII Is Cuus appdTeHI eu"U y :,
party organizations that provision OF the
Constitution which requires the election
of President and Vice President to be
through the Electoral colleges, has been
made instrumental and potential in de-
feating the great object of conterrlng the
choice of these officers upon the people.
1t may be conceded that party organlza-
tions are inseparable from republican
government, and that, when formed and
managed in subordination to the Consul
tuition, they may be valuable safeguards
of popular liberty; but when they are
perverted to purposes OF bad ambition,
thew are liable to become the dangerous
instruments of overthrowing the Consti-
tuition itself Strongly impressed with
the truth of these views, feel called
upon by an imperative sense OF duty TO
revive substantially the accommodation
so often and so earnestly made By Presi-
dent Jackson, and to urge that the
amendment to the Constitution herewith
presented. or some similar proposition
NAV be submitted to the pccpl 10 loi' their
ratification oE rejection.
kecent events nave Shosli the necessity
of an amendment to thc Constitution,
distinctly defining The persons who shall
dischare the duties of President OF the
United States, in the event Of vacancy
in that office by the DEATH resignation,
or removal of both the President and
Vicc President. 1t is clear that this
should be fixed by the Constitution, and
not he left to lepealable enactments Of
doubtful constitutionality. 1t occurs to
me that in the event OF vacancy in the
Office of President by the death, reslgna-
ton, disability, or removal of both the
President and Vice President, the duties
of the Office should devolve upon an officer
of the Executive Department, rather than
one connected with the Legislative or
Judicial Department. The objections to
DESIGNATING either the President pro
tempore of the Senate or the Chief Justice
of the Supreme Court, especially in the
event of vacancy produced by removal
are SO obvious and so unansweraDle that
they. need not be stated III detail. 1t is
enough TO state that they are both utter
ested in producing a vacancy, and, accord
ing 10 the provisions of the Constitution,
are members OF the tribunal by whose
decree vacancy may be produced. =
Under such circumstances, the improprle-
tv of designating either Of these officers TO
succeed the President so removed is pal
pabe.
The trainers OF the Constitution when
they referred 10 Congress the settlement
of the succession to The office of President
in the event OF !; vacancy III the offices ol
both President aud Vice President did
not, in my opinion, contemplate the dcs-
irnaton of any other than an officer OF
the Executive Department, on whom, in
such contingency, the powers and duties
ot the President should devolve. Until
recently the contingency has been remote,
and serious attention has not been called
10 the manifest incongruity between the
provision of the Constitution on this sub
iect and tie Act OF Congress Of 1892.
Having, however, been brought almost
face TO face with this important question,
it seems an cminentIy proper time for us
to make the legislation conform TO the
language, intent, aud theory of the Con-
stitution, aud thus place the Executive
Department beyond the reach of usurpa-
tion. and remove from the Legislative and
Judicial Departments every temptation
to combine tor the absorption of all the
powers of Government. 1t has occurred to
me. that in the event of such a vacancy,
the duties of President would devolve
most appropriately upon some one of the
heads of the several Executive Depart
ments and under this conviction, pre-
sent for your consideration, an amend
ment to the Constitution on this subject,
with the recommendation that it be sub
mitted to the people for their action.
Experience seems TO have established
the necessity of an amendment to that
clause OF the Constitution which provides
for the election CT Senators by the Legis
latures are so palpable that deem it un-
necessary to do more than submit the
proposition for such an amendment, with
the recommendation that 1t be opened 10
the people for their judgment.
1t is sLrongiy impressed on my mind
that the tenure OF oflicc by tbs ja,:iciary
of the United States during good behavior,
OK for lite is incompa.l:'ie with tie spirit
OF Republican tloEv:ilnlciii ana III lhlS
opinion ! am fully sustained by the evi-
dcnce Of popular judgment upen this
subject in the different States of the
Union.
therefore deem it my duty to recon-
mend an amendment to the Constitution,
by which the terms of the judicial Off
GERS would be limited to period of years,
and I here with present it, in the hope that
Congress will submit it 10 the people for
their decision.
The foregoing views have long been
entertained by me. In 1S45, in the House
of Representatives, and afterwards, in
1860, in the Senate of the United States,
l submitted substantially the same propo-
sitons as those to which the attention OF
Congress- is herein invited