The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1868-09-17
THE WAR PROSPECT In EUROPE.

mark of the French emperor, IN one OF his
late "peace speeches" that, however pacific
his words, the journals would prophecy war,
is quite delphic, characteristic, Napoleonic.
Unfortunately for the cause of peace, it is not
only the Journals that make this sort of COM
ment ON his movements and his utterances.
The feverish and agitated pulsation OF the
Paris bourse are not less prophetic. The
moneyed interest, indeed, throughout Europe
is TREMENDOUSLY anticipative of a great and
momently impending war. 1t would be ex-
tremely tedious to review the reasons which
have induced this anticipation. Thous-
ands who entertain it have forgotten, perhaps,
the steps by which their minds were brought
to it. This is no unusual case. belief will
sometimes retain all the force of logical con-
vietion, after the elements of the ratiocination
from which it resulted have slipped from the
memory.
The fact stands out that in all the great
capitals of Europe war is believed in as an
imminent contingency. The expected bellig-
erents are, of course, the North German Con-
federation and France. While King William
and the Emperor Napoleon both profess to
deprecate the idea of approaching hostilities,
they take care to visit the camps and confer
with the generals of their respective armies.
We strongly incline to agree with the opin-
ion prevalent among the moneyed and COM
mercial classes in Europe. We have believed,
in fact, that the battle of Sadowa, not
followed by peaceful readjustment of the
boundary between France and North Germany
on the basis of the Rhine as the French from
tier, made war between those countries
necessary. 1t is well known in France that
this frontier was conceded in the informal
convention of BiarTitz, which was repudiated
by Bismarck after he had profted by Napo-
Icons performance of his promise of neutrali-
ty in the Austro-Prussian war. The French
people chafe under this knowledge. Their
dissatisfaction increases daily, as Napoleon
well knows and he also well knows that, in
such crisis, the pentup, restless, and wrath
full forces of the nation will find vent in revo-
luton within or war without.
On the other hand, the people of the North
German States are not satisfied. The unity
which thearms and diplomacy ofPrussia have
given them, falls short of the united Father
land of which they have dreamed for so many
years. King William is not satisfied. The
confederation of which he has become the
head is far less harmonious and solid than he
would like to have it. A great war with the
traditional enemy of Germany, if successful,
would, he imagines, produce the imperial COM
ii ~oA;o0ol 90 he
desires. But II, little word with gigantic
significance, stands in the way. When he
hesitates, and temporizes, and waits anxious
ly for his opportunity, it is only this little if
that gives him pause and cools the
warm glow of his first impulse.
But the hesitation of the German sovereign
is the opportunity of the French emperor.
And herein lies the strongest ground for
believing in the immediate imminence of
war.
Should war ensue, involving the greater
part of the continent of Europe, its effects
upon. commerce and agriculture would be
serious. The European demand for Ameri-
can breadstuffs would be extraordinarily
increased and the European demand for
American cotton would be greatly diminished;
while the price of one commodity would be en-
HANGED, and the price of the other depressed,
proportionately. But we scarcely apprehend
that war will break out and obtain such
scope as to sensibly affect the cotton market
before the present crop of cotton in the South
has been disposed of by its producers.
Should the conflict be confined to France
and Prussia, it would have, probably, but
short duration. Both powers would be COM
pletely equipped at the outset No time
would be lost in preparations for campaigns.
The belligerent which gained the first signal
advantage would doubtless follow it up with
decisive vigor, and thus bring the struggle to
a speedy conclusion.
Should Russia or Austria, however, be
brought into the contestant one entering,
would be the signal for the other to come
init is impossible to say what would be its
duration or its issue, or what other countries
might not be eventually embraced in its
sweep. In such a case, great change in the
agricultural policy of the South would be
called for The United States would be
drawn on by the beligerents for everything
in the way of subsistence, and the South, not
less than the West, should profit by the occa-
sion in making itself one of the richest COM
missary magazines of warning Europe.