The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1868-07-21


should devolve upon an officer of the Exc
cutive Department rather than one con
nected with the Legislative or Judicial
Department. The objections 10 designating
either the President pro tempore Of the
Senate or the Chief Justice Of the su.
preme Court, especially in the event of
vacancy produced by removal, are SO
obvious and SO unanswerable that they
need not be stated in detail II is enough
to state that they are both interested IL
producing vacancy, and, according to the
provisions of the Constitution, are members
OF the tribunal by whose decree vacancy
may be produced. Under such circum-
stances, the improperly of designating
either of these officers to succeed the Presi-
dent 80 removed is palpable. The trainers
Of the Constitution, when they referred to
Congress the settlement of the succession to
the Office of President In the event of a va
eancy in the Offices of both President and
VicePresident did not, in my opinion, con-
template the designation Of any other than
an officer of the Executive Department, on
whom in such contingency the powers
and duties of the President should devolye
Until recently the contingency has been
remote, and serious attention has moi
been called to the manifest incongru-
ity between the provision of the
Constitution on this subject, and the act
IF Congress of 1892. Having, however,
been brought almost face to face with this
important question, it seems an eminently
proper time for us to make the legislation
conform to the language, intent, and theory
Of the Constitution, and thus place the Ex-
ecutive Department beyond the reach of
usurpation, and remove from the Legisla-
tive and Judicial Departments every temp
tation to combine for the absorption of all
the powers of Government. 1t has occurred
tome that in the event of such a vacancy
the duties of President would devolve most
appropriately upon some one of the heads
Of the several Executive Departments and
under this conviction, present for your
consideration an amendment to the Consti-
tuition on this subject, with the recommen-
lation that it be submitted to the people for
their action.
Experience seems to have established the
necessity of an amendment of that clause
If the Constitution which provides for the
election of senators to Congress by the
Legislatures of the several States. 1t
would be more consistent with the genius Of
our form of government if the senators
were chosen directly by the people Of the
several States. The objections to the cleo
ton Of senators by the Legislatures are so
palpable that | deem it unnecessary to do
more than submit the proposition for such
an amendment, with the recommendation
that it be opened to the people for their
judgment.
1t is strongly impressed on my mind that
the tenure of Office by the judiciary of the
United States during good behavior, or for
life, is incompatible with the spirit Of re-
publican government and in this opinion
| am fully sustained by the evidence Of
popular Judgment upon this subject II the
different States of the Union.
therefore deem it my duty to recommend
m amendment to the Constitution by which
the terms of the judicial officers would be
limited to period Of years, and herewith
present it, in the hope that Congress will
submit it to the people for their decision.
The foregoing views have long been en-
tcrtaincd by me. In lS45. in the House OF
Representatives, and afterwards, in $50, in
the Senate of the United States, submit
ted substantially the same propositions as
those to which the attention Of Congress is
herein invited.
Time, observation, and experience have
confirmed these convictions; and as a mat
ter of public duty, and with deep sense Of
my constitutional obligation "to recon-
mend to the consideration Of Congress such
measures " as may deem " necessary and
expcdient," submit the accompanying pro-
positions, and urge their adoption and sub
mission to the judgment of the people.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
Ii IL