The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1868-02-20

| taken as their judgment, that there is no
| thing in il in conflict with the Constitution
| Of the United States or the Constitution
Of this State. This fact truly admonishes
us to the greater caution in our delibera
tions and the closer scrutiny into Our rea
sonines but it cannot exonerate as from
the duty of following our convictions
where, by the Constitution, public inte
rests and private rights are made to abide
our independent judgments in the last re.
sort.
The first step in our inquiries should be
to acquire clear and definite idea of the
constitutional prohibition. Its sinsertion in
the Constitution of the United States was
to preserve a ami form sanctity of con-
tracts in all the States. How it came, in
almost the same language, to find place
in the State Constitutions is not so clear.
1t appears in the Federal Constitution as a
restriction upon the States, which would
seem to supersede the necessity of q
similar provision by the States. But,
doubtless, the principle had been cas,onized
as fundamental guarantee Of private
rights, and, along with the interdict upon
bills of attainder and &c post facto laws,
been ranged among the indisputable max
inns Of individual right and liberty, and the
essential barriers for their protection
against the invasions of the Legislature.
1t was first introduced into the Constitu-
tion Of this State at its revision and amend
ment in 1S29-'30, and was reported among
the provisions of the legislative depart
ment by Mr.. Madison, who had borne so
conspicuous part in the formation and
adoption of the Federal Constitution. Our
Constitution, as we'll as the Constitutions of
a large majority of the States, adopts the
language Of the Constitution of the United
States-namely, "any lao inpairing the
obligation Of contracts" In Ohio, Indiana,
and Illinois, the term obligation " is sub
stituted by "validity," and in Kentucky
and Pennsylvania dropped, so as to leave
However varied the phraseology, it is sub
stantially the same provision, and aims at
the accomplishment of the same object.
In Ogden Us. Saunders, IL Wheaton, p.
256, Justice Washington seeks to establish
"a distinction between law which i'm
pairs contract and one which impairs it's
obligation" This case, indeed, abounds
with subtle reasonings and metaphysical
refnements, which are rather curious than
practical; but it is sufficient for our pur-
pose to treat this language as designed to
secure the inuiolabilty Of contracts. This
is denied by none. The attempts that have
been made through the resources of q
learned etymology to explain this phrase
seem to have darkened the sense, and to
have given rise to the charge of obScurity.
There is no use in Strai7ling after an occult
meaning. Its plain import to the common
| understanding is more reliable, and far
better than the subtleties of scholastic de-
rivation. Chief Justice Marshall has well
| and summarily disposed of all these re-
| inements by tersely declaring sit would
seem difficult to substitute words which
| are more ineligible or less liable to mis-
construction" (Sturges Us. Crowninshield,
4 Wheat. 1917 He further adds: "The
law binds one to perform his undertaking !;
| and this is, of course, the obligation Of his
contract" The same idea is conveyed in
apt words by Justice Curtis in Curran Us.
State of Arkansas, Is How. 304. "The
obligation of contract in the sense in
| which these words are used in the Consti-
tuition is that duty Of performing it which
is recognized and enforced by the laws"
These definitions, of course, exclude the
obligation growing out of the moral and
natural law as resting upon the sanctions of
conscience and the universal governing
principles of our nature and being. The
former is beyond the reach of the human
lawgiver; and the latter, while still con-
trolling the intercourse of nations, is SUBJ
stituted in society by civu or municipal law.
Still our contracts are sensibly Influenced
by considerations pertaining to their moral
or natural obligation on the one hand, and
their legal obligation on the other. Thus, in
our dealings, what a different value do we
attach to the pecuniary obligation Of man
of probity, punctuality, and means; and
of another, doubtful in his circumstances
and careless Of his engagements In the
former case, there will be no thought of
day in court or the services of sheriff;
in the latter, it would be imprudent to
reckon upon payment save at the end Of
the law; so that it is not without reason
that Justice johnson Ogden Us. Saunders)
contended that "the obligation of con-
tracts will be found to be measured nei-
ther by the moral law alone, nor by
the universal law, nor by the laws
of society alone, but by q combina-
tion of the three-an operation in which
the moral law is explained and applied by
the law of nature, and both modified and
adapted to the emergencies Of society by
positive law" (Story on Const'n; section
1879
Let us now advance another step in this
inquiry, and consider what is meant by
the term " inaparing." To this end it will
be useful to advert briefly to the history of
this constitutional provision and the mis-
chiefs which led to it. In reply to the
question, "What were the lawsin the mind
of the trainers of this provision ?" Judge
Marshall (Sturges Us. Crowninshield, 4
Wheat. 204,) said "they were such as grew
out of the general distress following the
war. Paper money was issued; worthless
lands and other property of no use to the
creditor were made tender; and the time
of payrnent stipulated in the contract
anaS extended By loao." In his Life of w ash
ington, the state of parties upon these
measures is thus graphically sketched !:
"The discontents and uneasiness, arising
in a great measure from the embarrass-
ments in which a great number of indiVi-
duals were involved, continued to become
more extensive. At length, two great par
ties were. formed in every State, which
were distinctly marked, and which pur-
sued distinct objects with systematic ar
rangement. The one struggled with una
bated zeal for the exact observance of
public and private engagements. The
distresses of individuals were, they
thought, to be only alleviated by in
dustry and frugality, not by the re-
Taxation of the laws, or sacrifice OF the
rights of others. The other party marked
out for itself more indulgent course.