, 1868-11-13
A Piece of secrp, Hl.,or..

That the Emperor of France was surprised
and disappointed at the result of the remark
able seven weeks campaign Of Prussia against
Austria, in 1866, was very we'll known, fol
he was unable to conceal his modification
and embarrassment That he had intrigued
With Italy against the interests Of Prussia
was suspected, soon after Sadowa but it is
only recently that the precise nature and ex.
tent of this intrigue has been revealed, in
the course Of quarrel between General La
Marmora, who lost the battle of Custozza, and
the Prussian Count Usedom, who was in 1866
Envoy in Italy. -"i
1t seems now to be established upou good
authority that La Marmora, who was in 1866
President of the Italian Cabinet and Minis,
ter of Foreign Affairs, most treacherously re-
vealed to Napoleon the whole Prussian plan
of campaign, and acted, in the management,
of the Italian part of the war, under the in>
struction of Napoleon, and with a bad faith
toward Prussia, the ally of Italy, which ought
to make his name odious throughout Europe
Napoleon, it seems, could not openly with
stand Bismarck but with characteristic Gun.
ming, and that cynical disregard of human
life which the NapOleons imagine to be states
manship, he prepared to benefit himself by
the war, in which, he believed, with the aid
of the traitor La Marmora, he could SO man
age, without taking an open part, as to cause
Prussia to be crippled and laid at his mercy
The Prussian plan of campaign, communi.
Gated to Prussia's ally, Italy, contemplated
decisive and determined attack upon Aus
tria, in which the Italian armies were to
march directly upon the Austrian capital,
and perform: by energetic movements, the
only useful service which such distant de-
tachment could give-namely, to prevent a
concentration of all the Austrian armies
against the Prussians at the decisive moment.
What Napoleon did. was to instruct La
Marmora to deceive the Prussians, to fight
and lose the battle of Custozza and this
done, to do nothing MORE Napoleon's calcu
laton was, that the Prussians would be ia,
tally embarrassed by this defeat aud inaction
of the Italians; that the Austrans would be
| able to concentrate all their armies against
the Prussiaus; that the war would thus be
protracted. and both parties, to it exhausted
aud then he was to play the part of Mediator,
and demand as his reward the surrender OF
territory to the Rhine He meantime prom.
ised Venice to Italy, many case.
But the decisive battle of SadOwa totally
broke down this we'll planned piece of treach-
cry. The Prussians by their needle guns,
daring and fine soldership, achieved alone
that which they had expected to do only
with the help of Italy. Sadowa placed the
Austrian Capital as completely at the mercy
of the PruSsians as though La Marmora had
been an horest man and Napoleon to his
dismay and chagrin, found that his unscru>
pulous cunning only brought him what he
must have felt double defeat. "The strrs
in their courses fought " against him.
1t is easy to see that this story of La Mar
mora's treachery and of Napoleon's unscru.
pulous use Of Italy to her own disgrace will
not increase the number of the French EN-
peror's friends in Europe or make his reign
pleasanter. The Italians, who came out oi
the war of 1866 disgraced and humbled, will
hate with bitter hatred The French Empe-
ror, who arranged beforehand their deleat
and disgrace. The Prussians, who now see
that Napoleon, by singular act of treachery
planned their defeat, will not hate him the
less that his plan was itself defeated and that
they escaped the trap be had prepared for
| the M Y. Evenina Post.