The Hawaiian gazette., 1868-09-09

LnaJ OlstricJY WHICH was ctii Cohsiucicu 10
the bulwark of Cretan independence 1t
would have been wise on the part of the
Greeks to have strongly fortified the
mountain defile of Krapi where the Turks,
in 1921, had met with terrible disaster;
but they had so far dealt with the Egyp-
tan soldiers, who had shown in several
encounters more nimbleness than power of
resistance They determined, accordingly,
to wait for the enemy outside of the de-
file, in a well selected position at Vafe, a
little in front Of Prosnero. This decision
was arrived at in opposition to the advice
of the native captains, but in accordance
with the opinions of the Grecian officers,
who, being accustomed to the fighting Of
European armies, were sanguine of success.
1t was on toe oath of October that this
memorable battle took place. The Greeks
were intrenched in houses and behind the
trunks of trees, which they had cut down.
While the battle was confined to firing
guns, the Turks, being without shelter
lost a great many men, and their return
fire could do little harm to the Greeks,
but the Turkish officers soon got tired Of
seeing their men killed without retaliating,
and ordered them to charge with the bay
onet. When they reached the positions
of the enemy, they were found deserted.
The Cretans had not for moment enter
tanned the idea of sustaining the charge Of
the Turks, and were running as fast as
they could towards Prosnero. The Greek
volunteers were the only ones to stand,
and attempt to resist it. Some of them
were killed on the barricades they were
defending; some were taken prisoners,
and treated with regard by Moustafa Pa
sha The very evening after the battle,
the vanguard occupied Prosnero without
firing a shot. They were within few
hours march of the plain and village Of
Askyfo, situated in the heart of the STA
kiote territory.
Why did not Moustafa Pasha improve
his victory? Why did he not pursue the
disbanded Cretans Old age had not yet
obscured the brightness of his faculties,
nor did it abate his energy. During the
course of the whole campaign, he evinced
an activity admired even by his adverse
ries. 1t is probable that, relying on his
past experience of Cretan revolts, he be-
lieyed that the insurgents, after their
defeat, would dispense, and that the rival
ries between the leaders would quickly
terminate the war. He did not know
what excitement had been created in the
minds of the insurgents by recent events
which had taken place in Occidental
countries, and by the incentive articles of
the Greek press. 1t would be unfair, on
the other hand, not to give him credit for
an honorable feeling which may have had
weight in his resolution: he probably dis
liked the idea Of bringing the devastation
and desolation of a murderous struggle
upon country in which he had spent so
many years of his life, and where he had
achieved his fortune and reputation. An
other motive for his action $50 complex
are the causes of human action, may have
been that the owner of so many rich es-
tates in every part of Crete, did not care
to see his orchards, orange and olive trees
destroyed. These were the main consid-
erations by which he was led to stop after
the battle of Vafe. The lost opportunity
could not be recovered. A week later,
learning that numerous bands of insur-
gents were concentrating at Askyfo, he
went eastward. 1t was believed for some
time that he would reach Sakia from an
other side-from the road passing by the
ruins of old Lappa, but after useless de-
he withdrew all his troops on
Retimo. A few days after, he came out
with $4,000 men, to besiege the Convent
of Arkadi, situated on the northern side
of Mount Ida.
This monastery is the most important
and the richest of Crete. The Abbot, or
has right to the Episcopal
title of the ancient town of Arkadia. In
order to find refuge from the attacks of
the Turkish bands, several hundreds of
men, children and old people, had fed
thither. Colonel Coroneos occupied, with
a large body of men, the neighboring sum-
mits of the Arkadi table-lands. and every
body believed that his assistance would be
given, in case of an attack by the Moham-
medans. The Convent was, nevertheless,
and blocked up by Turkish
which received constant supplies,
while Colonel Coroneos never appeared.
The Mussulmans summoned the Christians
to surrender They answered by shouts
and the discharge of firearms. The fol-
owing day, heavy guns were placed, by
great exertion, on the heights overlooking
the monastery; and new summons sent
TO the besieged, which met with the same
reply as the first. The terrible fight went
IN, and it was only in the middle of the
second day that one of the walls gave
way, and allowed the DIussulmans access
IN tho ward of tbe Convent Int they wore