The Vermont transcript. [volume] (St. Albans, Vt.) 1864-1870, 1868-08-14
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of at excellent newspaper, the New
York San, has written life of General
Grant, in which he gives the following
estimate of that officers ability as a
strategist. Those who know Mr.. Dana
will not doubt the general correctness
of his judgment:
The attention Of the reader mas already
been called to his recommendation of q
united command in the Mississippi Val
ley. and to the tardy action of the Gov
eminent in carrying this recommended
ton into effect. 1t Is hardly necessary
now to say that this combination was
the foundation of all our substantial
victories, not only III the West, but
throughout the entire theatre of war.
Fort Donelson was won by CELEBRITY,
audRcity, and heroic resolution Shiloh
by stubborn fighting and unc0nquer-
able heroism; Nicksburg by the most
brilliant and original strategy, BY rapid
marching, iudiciOus combination and
self-reliance, which remind one of the
invasiOns Of Russia by Charles AL, or
the vigor displayed in Bonaparte's cam
paign of 1885, but it must not be for
gotten that Charles los. his army at
Pultowa, and that Bonaparte did not
cut loose from his base and plunge head
long into the interior Ofthe hostile cOun-
try but by a iudicious and well-fomed
plan Ofoperations he broke through the
enemy's lines at such a point IS 10 re-
tain his communications with France
constantly uninterrupted, while by
rapid combinations and severe battles
he drove these lines before him. But
Grant, in the Nicksburg campaign,
boldly threw himself into the midst Of
hostile forces, leaving an army entirely
behind him, until he had seized the
most important point in the theatre OF
operations, and then turned upon and
defeated that army, and drove 1t into
the Notifications from which it was des-
tined never to emerge eXceptat the VIII
OF its cOnqueror The closing victories
of the war Were won by rare combine
ton OF military agencies. The CONSOLE
dation of four vast territorial depart
ments into one grand military division
enabled Grant TO concentrate AT Chatt-
anooga a splendid army, heavily out
numbering the enemy, aud il should be
remembered that Providence favOrs
strong hattalions. BY a series Of stra-
tegic and strong tactical combinations,
these superior numbers We're so directed
upon the field OF battle as to take the
enemy at disadvantage, striking him in
the flank, and actually getting closer to
his base Of supplies than his base was 10
his own Headquarters.
The Atlanta campaign and the march
to the sea the selectiOnOf Sheridan and
the formation OF the middle military di-
vision; the consolidation Of the West
ern cavalry; the establishment OF the
military division of the West Mississippi,
under Candy, followed by the campaign
Of Mobile Sheman's grand holiday
excursion and picnic party through the
Carolinas. again seYering the Southern
territory, isolating and scattering its
armies, breaking its communications,
and eating out the Yitals Ofthe Confcdcr-
acv: and lastly, but not least, the mag
nifieent campaign of the Army OF the
Potomac, from the Rapidan TO the james,
and from Petersburg TO AppOmattoX
Court House, bear ample testimony
not only to the grandeur of Grant con-
ceptions. but to the heroic and unshak-
ale resolution with which he carried
them into effect There was no defeat
in all this. no hesitation, no doubling,
but the clear comprehension of the ends
TO be aimed at, the most careful prepare
ton of materials, and the most perfect
confidence in the men and means by
which they were to be attained. No
modern General except Bonaparte ever
welded such vast and prolonged power;
and not even that great cOnqueror dis
played such remarkable sagaclty in his
organizations and selections of subOrdi-
mates. Massena and SOult were driven
from Spain; Mcdonald was oyerwhelm-
ed at katZbach ; Marm0nt was defeated
al Alonunartre and Napoleon himself
was driven from Russia, beaten at Leip-
sic, and finally, after a series of unac-
cOuntable blunders, was hurled from his
throne, recovering IT again only 10 re-
peat his biunders and meet an ignoni-
nious fate
But Grant knew that no genius, how
ever remarkable, could sufficiently COM
mand the national armies in a war Of
such magnitude without the assistance
of lieutenants who could be trusted ITO
make their own orders for the cmer-
gencies that were sure to arise. he
therefore gave more thought TO the prop
er organization ana direction of armies
upon the vital points Of the enemy
territory and lines, and to the selection
Of men competent to command them,
than to issuing the detailed orders of
battle. Neither Sherman, nor Sheridan,
I
and had circumstances enabled him to
devote himself exclusively to the COM
mand of the Army Of the Potomac, he
would doubtless have displayed as much
skill in the tactics Of battle as he did in
the strategy of campaigns.
The quick judgment by which he dis
covered the enemy's plan to evacuate
fort Donelson, and the sudden resolu-
ton which he based thereupon, TO at
tack at once, are evidences ofsomething
more than aggressive temper or mere
brute courage. The tactics of Lookout
Mountain, Chattanooga Valley, and
Mission Ridge have never been surpass-
ed. The tactics, or more properly, the
grand tactics displayed during the over
land campaign, are worthy of the
highest commentator, and had the eX-
ecution of details been as faultless asthe
conception of the movements, there
would have been nothing to regret. But
il was precisely in the details with
which Grant studiOusly avoided inter
fering that the greatest, and in fact the
only, failures took place. Grants con-
duct at Belmont, Fort DonelsOn, Shiloh,
Nicksburg and the Wilderness was all
that could have been wished. and shows,
beyond chance Of dispute, that he pos
sesses IN the highest degree that Two
k-in-the-morning courage" which
Napoleon declared to be the rarcst thing
among Generals while his conception
and execution of the Nicksburg cam
paign are complete proof that his judg-
ment is in exact equilibrium with his
courage. His UNMARRIED course ofsuccess
through four years Of warfare shows
that he is entitled to be ranked in the
! category of Generals who never lost a
campaign or a battle, and the easy sim
| plicity with which he did the most eX-
traordinary things points strongly to
the possession of remarkable genius for
war
Those Questions.
The questions asked by a correspond
ent with a request that Mr.. Soule, the