Brownlow's Knoxville Whig. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1866-1869, 1868-10-07
TENN, WEDNESDAY OCTOBER T. 1868.

deed and when expressed 1t is only prima facia ev
dence Of the amount and may be varied By parole proof
II consideration be expressed upon the face ef the deed
the ganor is thereby esoped and i'll not be permitted
10 against the dc ID ITSELF unless there be fraud
iegaiity In It. 4th Kent, 465 5th Barb IN Yl ass
/ 10th Conn 3S3 I'd WIS, 347.
And although the gEantor s estopped by the recital in
the deed from denying the consideration expressed W.
he is not est0pped from proving there wore other consid
eraons than the one expressed In the deod 18th Maine
2s3 And parol evidence may be given 10 varF the con-
sderatiOn as expressed l4th Johns 2l0 2eth Johns:
33s 10th Wurd, 460; 18th Mass, 2l9 sth Conn., 3I4
In the Of Geodspeed Butler 46th Maine 14I il
was held that the only effect Of the usual clause ac
knowedging consideration paid to eslep the raasor
every other purpose may be explained varied or con-
tradcted BY paro and this il tcems to u.s. is correct
and exact statement Of the principle.
In the case of Whitley, Ct 81. vs.. Whitley ct al,
Sneeds 473, which bin in equity to enforce the
specific performance Of contract Richardson Whitley
had executed bond by which he contracted to convey
to John Whitley certain land the bond reced know
all men whom it may concern that Richardson Whit
ley of the State of Tennessee Shelby county for and In
consideration Of the Of, received do obligate
myself ect" specific execution Of the contract was re-
sisted upon the ground that the title bond was not Of IL
self sufficient writing under the statute Of sauds and
peues, because it did not disclose tho confederation
This court held that in constituting the statute the CON
sdcraon is nos TO be regarded pan Of the contract
but merely IS indueement to It, and therefore no pr
chile Of law is violated by the admission Of paro evidence
of the consideration whenever it becomes necessary to be
shown. rH w 80 1affE Pass lef.f =
Parcl evidence is offered in this case not for the pur-
pose Of varying the contract avoiding the deed but
for the purpose Of showing the truo consideration and
this we think the grantor NEST clearly has the right 10
do by parol evidence, especially in like the
present where the consideration expressed is merely
nominal
Thereeal in the instrement Of the con sdsration as
have already en-, is only prima dee evidence of the
amount, and may be varied by parOl proof; and the
gantor not esopped from proving these other con-
slderatiOns than those expressed
As general rule pGTo contompofaneous evidence is
nadmissibe TO contradict vary the terms Of valid
written instrument" And this ruie has been applied
generally if not universally to simple contracts n writ
ing 70 the extent and with the same except one as
to speeiaties contracts under seal Greenleaf on
Evidence, s. s. 275, 276 But this rule is not infringed
by the introduction Of parol evidence showing the insu
ment never had any legal existence bind ng force
either by of fraud want Of consideration and
par0l evidence is also inadmissibe under this neral
rule, conradicng explaining the ns rumc1t in some
Of its csls of facts when such recas do not on other
principles esop the party TO deny them. Greeneaf on
Evidence, S. S. 2S2, 2S4.
But VIC think the testimony was admissible upon
another ground The object Of the proof was to esab
lish agr ment betws the parties made subsequent
to the making of the Decd aud the general rule before
stated Is not innged by the admission Of orei evidence
to prove and distinct agreement upon new con-
sderaGon, whether it be as substitute for the old or in
addition TO and beyond IT, LIST Greeneaf on Ev,, sec
303. So upon the whole think the rejection Of
the testimony was erroneous 1
The judgment viii be reversed and tho cause reman
ded. HAWKINS, Judge
Attest; ]. G. FRAZER, Clerk.