The New York herald., 1868-06-29
General Napier'S Report Of the Assault
and Capture Of MagdaIa.
The Battle and Operations
which Preceded 1t.
Why Theod0rus was Assailed After His
Surrender Of the Captives.
ASSASSINATION OF AN ENGLISH OFFICER.

BY steamship at this port learn that the follow
ing despatch from Lieutenant General Sir Ropert
Napier G. c. B., G. g. s. L. has been received at the
India ONCE, London
CoMMANDER-IN-CHIEFs'sO OFFICEl
HEADQUARTERS, CAMP ASTALO, May IL, 1858.
RIGHT HON. SIR-On the Sd OF April, when en-.
camped on the Waddea Platau, received intimation
from the chiefs OF Dalanta that Theodore having
moved from Magdala and encamped on the plain ol
ArOge, preparing for an expeditions letters from
the captives also warned me to be on my guard
Between the British force and the plain OF Dalanta
sage OF this formidable obstacle so easily delensibie
could not have been effected in the face OF enemy
without serious loss, made a forced march OF
eighteen miles, crossed the Jedda and established
myself On the plain Of Daanta. The mere distance
in miles gives little idea Of the labor and fatigue of
the march; the excessively steep descent and ascent
the great heat were very distressing for troops
Theodore however, did not cross the Bashilo, but
plundered and burnt the villages between that river
and Magdala, which has always been faithful to and
trusted him.
distant but clear view of the position of Magdsla
and its approaches l was able, with 4 good tee-
scope to appreciate the formidable character OF the
whole position and became aware that should re-
quire all the infantry that could possibly collect to
make the attack effective, and that every cavalry
sary for the investment. Even with all the force
that could hope to gather up felt could not
plete the investment by sending column to close
the Kafflr Burr or southern gate OF Magdala but
deputed an officer OF the Intelligence Department
Meer Akbar Ali to Mustiale the Queen of the W0olla
muster to to close all escape on that side Meer ASbar
Alps report will be forwarded and will show how
effectualy he accomplished his mission.
Reluctant as | was to incur any delay SO near to
Magdala these considerations and the necessity OF
having supplies sufficient to carry me through the
operations against that fortress obliged me to defer
crossing the Bashio for several days.
had not overlooked the probability or the un-
stable Abyssinian people despsing the small postal
detachments and the pacific demeanor of our troops
but the various difficulties of our transport and
city OF our supplies kept me without sufficient
troops to make the posts of communication as strong
as the circumstances required. Each day, however
was bringing forward some accession OF strength
and in the meantime had endeavored by liberality
and every means OF cOnciiatOn to engage the petty
chiefs between AnalO and the Tacassie river to MAIN
tain their friendly assistance in forwarding native
conveys OF supplies. 1t twas tine only course that
gave chance Of success unfortunately, 1t succeeded
but partially.
Relieved from the pressure OF onr main force, the
chiefs commenced to interfere with the Abyssinan
carriers OF our supplies and TO make attacks ON our
posts and conveys; the local carriage, which had en-
abled me to advance from Antao, was suspended
just at the time when its maintenance was most I'M
portant thus it happened that on the sth OF April
had only five days. supplies to depend upon.
The force had left all Its baggage at Lat, one hun
dred miles in rear taking on merely the clothes in
which they marched, and carrying greatcoats blank
cts and waterproof sheets; they had no other en-
cumbrances than bell tent for twelve officers or
twenty soldiers. The daily storms which we expert
enced rendered this shelter Indispensable. The
rage so released sent back for provisions the
points where native transport was doubtful, and
gave me sure hope OF ultimate relief from my COM
nssarat difficulties, but the immediate urgency
was pressing
on the I'd inst. deputed Brgadier General Mere
wether to the Tacassie TO arrange with the chiefs
| there to bring in supplies OF nour.
| Major Grant was directed to return to Lat and
Captain Moore to Lake Ashange, TO remove Obstruc-
tions which had arisen at those places. Captain
speedy and Mr. Munzinger proceeded, the former TO
Daoun the latter to the borders OF Dalanta that had
been ravished by Theodore, and through the exer-
tions OF these officers was enabled to feed my cat.
tie and to obtain -four enough for eleven days sup
py at eight ounces for each soldier. The native fol-
lowers received wheat in the grain instead of nour
| prepared 10 commit myself against Naglala with
| these means.
| and It's approaches received most valuable lnfor-
nation from chief named Beitwuddun Halo, VINO
had recently deserted from Magdala; having engaged
| in some intrgues with Menelek, King OF Shoa, he
knew well that his lot would be instant death on his
| masters arrival.
IL is difficult to give by description alone sum.
| ccnt idea Of the formidable position which were
about to assail. The fortress Of Magdala s about
twelve miles from the right bank OF the Bashilo but
the great altitude and thepurty OF the atmosphere
| exhibited the whole outline distinctly.
The centre OF the position Is the Rock OF Selassie
| elevated more than 1900 feet above the and
| standing on a plateau called Islamgie which is
divided into several extensive terraces with pepen
Terraces in ihe nil called Fahla. Fahia is pigan.
tie natural saston, level on the top. entirely open
! aud commanded by lslamge. II domlneers CON-
| pletely at an elevation OF LOO feet all ap-
proaches to lsamge: the sides appeared PERCEPTIONS
| ana ihe summit surrounded by natural scarp OF
| rock accessible only In few places and from eigh-
| teen 10 twenty feet in height.
Nearly concealed from view by SelaSsie and Faha,
| the top OF Magdaa was partially visible.
The road 10 Magdala winds mp the steep side OF
Faha. subject To s IRE and to the descent of rocks
and stones OS part OF the road IA 80 steep that few
horses except those bred In the country could carry
their riders up ordown it. The whole road y fanked
! by the end Selassie, and the broad side scarp OF
! Islamgie Altogether without taking into account
Mag.lala ITSELF the formidable character OF its earth
/ works exceeded anything which we could possibly
have anticipated from the faint description OF the
| position winch had reached us.
/ The refugee chief, Beitwudden Halo. was very
anxious that should try the south side, at kaffI
Burr Gate, from the opposite range called Janta
SAYING, 'lfyou want to take Seassic 70 irom hence
| but II YOU want Magdala you must go from
Janta." This. however. would have been impossible
J HAD not force enough TO divide, aud | could
not place this vast combination Of natural fortresses
/ between me and my direct line OF communication.
also perceived that the real point 10 be taken was
not Magdaa. but lslamgie, where Theodore had
taken post with all his guns, aud that Faha was the
| KEY to the whole.
! On the I'm descended to the bed OF the Bashilo
| anu reconnotred The crossing.
. The ordinary approach % Magdala IL by Tho
Arogie rayine, which commences under Islamgie
and ~ bounded on ~ righ y spur, which extends
from lslamgie. In u serrat6d'ndge, to the Bashilo
| similar spur from Faha stretches To the water o
| the l,ashilo and bounds the ravne on is left.
| The highest point of this ridge Is about 1000 fee
! above The bed Of the Arogle ravine.
The grand features Of the ground rendered 1t i'm
possible for me- with my small iorce OF infantry.
| hold b0h sides Of the ravine. | considered fahl.
! the key OF the position and determined TO occupy
the ridge, bearing in different parts the names o
Gunbor and Aao, which leads TO that imp0sn,
outwork. Established on this ridge could Operate
either side Of Fahla, as might seem expcdicnt oI
| closer examination.
| Between the 4th and 9th inst. nv force was in
! creased by six companies OF the forty-fifth reri
| ment. under Lieutenant Colonel Parish, which
| though long delayed for want OF carriage, ha'
marched from Zouila In twenty-five days. A wing o
the Third Bombay Native infantry, under Lieutenan
Colonel Campbell, detained seven marcnes II
| the owing to the urgent want or carflage, an
thus lost the services Of an able officer and an ex
cellent body of soldiers, on whom had calculates
| for the attack.
ON the oth tie whole force concentrated on IN
edge OF the plateau overlooking the Bashllo, whic
flows >, 900 feet below IL.
pioneers, supported by a wing OF the Beloochees
occupied the bed OF the Bashilo aud repaired Theo
dorus' road.
The slgnaIlers OF the Tenth company Royal or
gineers maintained communications.
The Royal engineers and the Madras and Bomba