The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1868-12-09
Aitlrmond 1ispattb,
Observation-Disclosures Q, 1868.
THE CIRCULATION OF THE "DIsPATCH''
3 LARGER THAN THE COMBINED CIRCU.
ALTON OF ALL THE OTHER DAILY NEWS
'ArEEs OF THIS CITY.
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS.
Report of Secretary of the Treasur,


| legal-.ender acts. He says that "these
acts have tended to blunt and deaden the
public confidence, and are chargeable in no
small degree with the decentralization which
30 generally prevails" The United States
notes, though declared by law to be lawful
| money, are, nevertheless, the Secretary de-
clarcs, "a dishonored and disreputable
| currency" he maintains that the legal
tender acts were war measures, that they
we're forced loan, that no member Of Con-
| yress or public journal advocated their issue
on any other ground than public necessity.
The Secretary thinks, then, that they should
he divested of the character which was con-
ferred on them in condition of the country
30 different from the present. He there
fore makes the following highly important
recommendation, and emphasizes it in capi-
tal letters. He says: "The Secretary be-
lieves that they should, and he therefore
recommends, in addition TO enactments by
which contracts for the payment of coin
| can be enforced, that it be declared that
after the lst of January, 1870, United
States notes shall cease to be a legal tender
! in payment of all private debts subse-
quently contracted, and that after the lst
Of January, 1871, they shall cease TO be a
legal tender on any contract or for any pur-
pose whatever, except the Government dues
FOR which they are now receivable. The
| law should also authorize the conversion
of these notes, at the pleasure of the holders,
into bondsebearing such interest as may be
| authorized by Congress on the funded debt.
The period for which they would continue to
be "a legal tender would be sufficient to enable
the people and the banks to prepare for the
contemplated change, and the privilege of
| their conversion to save depreciation" The
Secretary then speaks of the large reduc-
ton Of internal revenue, and says that it is
attributable to inefficient collection, and to
q reduction of taxes. He estimates the in
ternal revenue receipts for the present fs-
cal year at $l46,2O9, ,044. If the receipts
from customs should be diminished, even
with large reductions in expenses, q" our in
ternal revenue" the Secretary says, must
be increased" "The first thing to be done
is to introduce economy in every branch,
and not reduce appropriations; and then
bring in deficiency bills. The average ex-
penses for the next ten years of the civil
service ought not, he adds, to exceed
forty millions. The War Department
should be brought down to thirty
five millions, and the Navy to twenty
millions per annum. The interest on the
public debt, when all funded, at five per
cent, will be $125, ,000,0 900. The Secretary
then says: "When the internal revenue
and tariff laws shall be revised go RS to be
made harmonious with each other, it is
supposed that $500, 1000, 900 can annually be
realized from these sources without burden
some taxation" The Secretary does not
| doubt that the best interests Of the country
will be subserved by q reduction of the
tariff and an increase of excise duties. The
| Secretary also recommends tax on sales,
and regards this as good time to thorough
ly revise the tariff. The report shows that
the public debt was increased from Novem-
Der |, 1867, TO November l, 1868, $35 ,625,-
1922. or this increase S24 1852, 900 is
chargeable to the Pacific railways, and
S7,20O,000 to the purchase of Alaska.
| Within the same period there was paid for
bounties $43, ,7S7 APIS. The Secretary
does not consider this bad exhibit in view
of the reduced taxation by Congress and
the donations to railroads. He then pro-
ceeds to censure the New York national
banks which have certified checks Of de-
postors in advance of their deposits, and
says lit is unauthorized, reckless, and in
| furious in the end to the country" He
suggests Legislation to remedy this. The
| report then concludes as follows:
"Complaint has been made that in the
administration of the Treasury Department
since the war there has been too much Of
| interference with the stock and money mar
ket. This complaint, when honestly made,
| has been the result of o want Of reflection
or of imperfect knowledge Of the financial
| condition of the Government. The transac-
tions of the Treasury have from necessity
| been connected with the stock and money
market of New York. If the debt after the
! close Of the war had been funded debt,
with nothing to be done in relation to it but
| to pay the accruing interest, or if business
| had been conducted on specie basis, and
| consequently been free from the constant
| changes to which it has been and must be
subject as long as there is considerable diff
ference between the legal and commercial
standard of value, the Treasury could have
been managed with entire independence Of
the stock exchange or the gold room. Such,
however, was not the fact. More than one
half of the national debt, according to the
foregoing exhibits, consisted of temporary
obligations, which were to be paid in lawful
money or converted into bonds; and. there
was in circulation large amount Of ire
deemable promises, constantly changing in
their convertible value. The Secretary,
therefore, could not be Indifferent to the
condition Of the market, nor avoid ccnnec-
ton with it, for it was in fact with the
market he had to deal. He would have
been happy had it been otherwise. If bonds
were to be sold to provide the rneene for
paving the debts that were naycblc IN
lawful money it was q matter cf great in
portance to the Treasury that the price Of
bonds should not be depressed by artificial
processes. If the seven-thirty notes we're TO
be converted into fve-twenty bonds, II Tns
equally important that they should sus-
tain such relations to each other II regard
to prices that conversions Tcnld be
effected. If bonds were at discount, the
notes would be presented for payment!n
legal tenders, and these could only be op-
tanned by further issues or the sale OF some
kind of securities. For three years, there
fore. the state of the market has been
matter of deep solicitude to the Secretary.
IF he had been Indifferent to it, or waited
carefully to study the influence that con-
trolled It, or had hesitated to exercise the
mower with which Congress had clothed
him for successfully funding the temporary
debt by conversions or sales, he would nave
been false to his trust. The task OF con-
yertipg q thousand millions of temporary
obligations into funded debt on market
constantly subject to natural and artinclal
fluctuations without depressing the prices
i ,ot, inn IL