The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1868-02-13
THE GRANT-srANToE-RADI PRO
GRAMME.


cult to get over, as political fame goes, than
the manner in which the deception was prac-
ticed. According to Talleyrand, the clever
politician would always know how to deceive
without mourning the charge of mendacity.
That consummate diplomat knew well that
to forfeit ones word of honor, is almost as
fatal to statecraft as it is to private character.
The detected liar becomes equally impotent
and despicable.
While Gen. Grant maintained his reticence
the popular ina gination was magnanimously
disposed to fill up the blank of his undemon-
strated motives and tendencies with manly
qualities, honest designs and noble aspira-
tons. But when he took the war Office with
the intention of holding it in the interest of
Stanton and Congress, and not as the repre-
sentative Of the president. he involved him
self in an intrigue so much surprising his
acumen that he was compelled not only to
break his reticence, but to violate his faith
and incur conviction of deliberate and per-
sistent Justification. This descendants the
popular imagination. This excludes him
from that class Of refined and adroit intrig-
uants, who, in the opinion of the great
French diplomat, would always scorn to OBJ
tain success at the expense of veracity. This
afixes on his name blot which no partisan
whitewash can hide, which time will only
make deeper and history blacker. And this
makes him the slave of the radical conspi-
racy against civil liberty and the constitu-
tional Union-a conspiracy in which a spirit
of bold, but not ignoble, ambition, would
either be master or nothing
But it would be an egregiOus mistake to in
fer that because of this humiliating catas-
trophe to Gen. Grants personal reputation
and prestige, the revolutionary scheme to
which he has lent himself ceases to be for
midable. The congressional extremists are
for moment stunned by the event. There
is brief pause in which they watch tremu-
lousy the various manifestations Of public
opinion. But their purpose does not relax.
1t is rather intensified by the increasing OBJ
loquy which is brought upon it by the Grant
Stanton affair and the dictatorship bill They
feel that now their only hope of success is in
violence; and they are aware, since Grant has
forfeited his general popularity by throwing
himself in their arms, that they are as neces-
sary to him as he is necessary to them. They
know that they can only secure the next pres
idency to their party by capturingit with mil
itary aid; and, having debauched in their in
teIest the general of the army, they must
use him to the utmost in the effort to
cause the authority of the constitutional
commander-in-chief to be universally repu-
dated, and to attach the whole military es-
Enlistment to the Grant-Stanton-radica
conspiracy. How much progress has been
made, or is yet to be made, towards effecting
the conquest of the Presidency by such
means, cannot yet be precisely known. But,
meanwhile, this is certain-that the combina-
ton in question is one which defies all oppo-
siton except that of superior physical, as well
as superior moral force. If the President
mand-in-chief of the army by Grant and
Stanton, he will not be impeached and sum-
marily suspended at the inception of i'm
parchment For these revolutionists are
very systematic and economical in their way,
and do not wish to commit more irregularity
and violence than are necessary. But if the
President insist upon practical vindication
of his authority as commander-in-chief,
against the usurpation of the war Office by
minion Of Congress and against the proposed
military dictatorship over the South, then his
summary removal will be regarded as neces-
sary, and Congress will take measures accord
ingly. In that case, should he desire to re-
sist, what would be his means of resistance?
Senator Wade would be declared by Congress
acting President, and would be recognized as
commander-in-chief by the occupant of the
war Office and the general of the army.
Mr.. Johnson would have to look elsewhere
than to these functionaries for forcible means
of maintaining his constitutional Office.
Where could he look2 To the lieutenant
general, to a major general, to a brigadier
general 1t is true that, in theory, the COM
mander-in. chief may give orders directly to
captain or a sergeant. But it would be a
startling anomaly in military practice to do
so; and, in the case supposed, to pass over
the secretary of war and the general of the
army, because these should recognize an
other person as commander-in-chief, would
be the announcement Of military anarchy.
Inferior oficevs would not know where to
find a common center of supreme COM
mand, and q common basis of discip-
line and subordinstion. They would be
RENTED, in respect to their military
adhesion, to the guidance of their political
sympathies or personal interests. And what
would be the issue, it is impossible to predict
But should affairs come to such pitch, the
disadvantages under which Mr.. johnson would
labor in trying to maintain his presidential
position, would certainly be very great, per-
haps overwhelming If he has any intention,
therefore, to try the argument Of force with
his assailants, now is the time for him to act;
and he could not begin with a more mastery
stroke than to relieve Grant from duty, and put
an officer in his place who would not hesitate