Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1868-09-01
Grant as a Strategist.

Charles A. Dana, formerly Assist
ant Secretary Of War, and now chief
editor of that excellent newspaper,
the New York Sun, has written a life
of General Grant, in which he gives
the following estimate of that officers
ability as a strategist. Those who
know Mr.. Dana will not doubt the
general correctness of his Judgment:
The attention of the reader has al
reaCy been called to his recommends
tion of united command in the Mis-
sissippi Valley, and to the tardy ac-
tion Of the Government in carrying
this recommendation into effect. 1t |
is hardly necessary now TO say that
this combination was the foundation |
of all our substantial victories, not on
ly in the West, but throughout the en-
tire theatre Of war. Fort D0nelsOn |
was won by celebrity, audacity, and he
roic resolution; Shiloh by stubborn
fighting aud unconquerable heroism
Vicksburg by the most brilliant and
original strategy, by rapid marching,
judiciOus combination and self-reli-
ance, which remind one of the inva-
sions of Russia by Charles XII, Or
the yigor displayed in Bonaparte's
campaign Of 1886; but it must not be
forgotten that Charles lost his army
of Pultowa. and that BOnaparte did
not cut loose from his base and plunge
headIong into the interior Of the hos
tile country; but by a judicious and
weli-formed plan Of operations he
broke through the enemy's lines at
such a OOint as to retain his cOmmu-
nicatiOns with France constantly un-
interrupted, while by rapid combina-
tions and severe battles he drove
these lines before him. But Grant.
in the Nicksburg campaign, boldly
threw himself into the midst of hos
tile forces, leaving an army entirely
behind him, until he had seized the.
most important point in the theatre of
operations, aud then turned upon and
defeated that army, and drove it into
the fOrtifcations from which it was
destined never to emerge except at the
will of its conQueror. The closing
victories Of the war were won by
rare combination Of military agencies.
The consolidation of four vast terri
toria! departments into one grand
military division enabled Grant to con
centratc at Chattanooga a splendid
army, heavily outuumbcring the enc
my, and it should be remembered that
Providence lavors strong battalious.
/ BY a series Of strategic and strong
+-.--:-I -l,;..a+ionz thasn <nnpriQr
numbers were 50 directed upon the
field Of battle as to take the enemy at
disadvantage, striking him in the
flank, and actually getting closer to
his aase If supplies than his base was
to his own headquarters.
The Atlanta campaign and the
march to the sea; the selection of
Sheridan aud the formation Of the
middle military division, the consoIi-
datiou OF the Western cavalry; the
establishment of the military division
of the West mississippi, under Candy,
followed by the campaign Of Mobile ;
IShermans grand holiday excursion
and picnic party through the Carroll
mas. again severing the Southern terri
tory, isOlatiug and scattering its ar
mics breaking its communications,
and eating out the vitals of the Con
federacy and lastly, but not least, the
magnificent campaign Of the army Of
the Potomac, from the Rapidan to the
James, and from Petersburg to AppO-
matt0x Court House, bear ample tes-
tim0ny not only to the grandeur Of
Grants conceptions. but to the heroic
and unshakable resolution with which
he carried them into effect. There
was no defeat iu all this, no hesitation,
no doubling, but the clear cOmprehen-
sion of the ends to be aimed at, the
most careful preparation of materials.
and the most perfect confidence in the
men and means by which they were
to be attained. No modern general
except BOnaparte ever welded such
vast and prolonged power; and not
even that great cOnqueror displayed
such remarkable sagacity in his Or
ganizationS and selections of subOrdi.
; mates. Massena and Soult were driv.
en- from Spain Mcdonald was over.
whelmed at katzbach Marmont was
defeated at Montmartre; and NapO
leon himself was driven from Russia
beaten at Leipsic, and finally, after 9
series of unaccountable blunders was
hurled from his throne, recovering il
again only to repeat his blunderS anC
meet an ignominiouS fate.
But Grant knew that no genius
however remarkable, could sufficient
ly command the national armies in {
war of such magnitude without the
assistance of lieutenants who could bt
trusted ITO make their own orders
for the emergencies that were sure tC
=. arise. He therefore gave more tho
! to the proper organization and direc
: tion of armies upon the vital points
! of the enemyS territory and lines
- and to the selection Of men competen
to command them, than to issuing til,
detailed orders of battle. Neithe
Sherman, nor Sheridan, nor Thomas
/ nor Candy, ever failed him, and ha'
L circumstances enabled him to devot
: himself exclusively to the comman,
: of the army of the Potomac, he woul
: doubtless have displayed as muc