Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1868-04-15
MR.. BUTLER's ARGUMENT.
The Power OF RemOvnI--What the
Issue Really Is.

The much vexed question of the
power of the President to remove Off
GERS under him, involving as At does !
the validity of the tenure of Office act, /
received mastery treatment in the I
following paragraph from Gen. Buffers /
opening impeachment argument:
This, then, is the plan aud inevitable |
issue before the Senate and the Ameri- !
can people: Has the President, under |
the Constitution, the more than kiDgly
prerogative at will toremove from Office,
and suspend from office indefnitely,all
executive officers of the United States,
either civil, military, or naval, at any
and all times, and fill the vacancies
with creatures Of his own appointment,
for his own purposes, without any
restraint whatever, or possibility Of
restraint by the Senate or by Congress
through laws duly enacted? The House
of Representatives. in behalf of the
people, join this issue by affirming that
the exercise of such powers is a high
misdemeanor IN office. If the affirma-
tion is maintained by the respondent,
then, so FIR as the first eight articles
are concerned-unless such corrupt
purposes are shows as will of themselves
make the exercise of a legal power a
crime-the respondent must go, and
ought to 60, quiet and free. Therefore,
! by these articles and the answers
| thereto, the momentous question. here
and now, is raised whether the Presi-
Dental office Itself (1i has the prsrogatigSs
and p0a9er claimed for ~ ought IN fact. 70
srist is part Of ths Constitutional gOVsrH-
nsHt Of a free people, while by the last
:hree articles the simpler ana less i'm
| pOrtant inquiry is to be determined,
whether Andrew johnson has so con-
Quoted himself that he ought logger
to hold any constitutional Office what
ever. The latter sinks to merited
insigni6cance compared with the gran
deur of the former.
If that is sustained, then a right to
the people of the country is engrafted
on the Constitution, most alarming il
its extent, most corrupting in its inhu
ence, most dangerous in its tendencies
and most tyrannical in its exercise
Whoever, therefore, votes mot guilty
on these articles votes to enchain oul
free institutions, and % prostitute then
at the feet of any man, who, beini
President, may choose to control them
For this most stupendous and unlimit
ed prerogative, the respondent cites NJ
line and adduces no word Of constitu
tional enactment,-indeed, he could
not, for the only mention of removal
from Office in the Constitution, is as &
part of the judgment in cass of i'm
peachment, and the only power o.
appointment is by nomination to the
Senate of officers, to be appointed BY
their advice and consent, save q quail
fed and limited power of appointment
by the President, when the SeDate Is
not in session. Whence, then, does
the respondent in his answer claim to
have derived this power? l give him
the benefit of his own words, "that il
was practically settled by the first Con
gFess of the United States" Again.
give him the benefit of his own phrases
as set forth in his message to the Senate
of the ID of March, 1867, made a part
of his answer: "the question was set
tied by the House of Representatives
by a vote of "a to 20 lin this, however,
he is mistaken and in the Senate BY
the casting vote of the Vice President" /"
In the same answer he admits that
before he understood the exercise oil
this most dangerous and stupendous
power. after Is years of study and ex.
animation of the Constitution by the
people living under it. another Congress
has decided that there was no such
unlimited power. So that he admits
that this tremendous power which ne
claims, from the legislative construction
of one Congress by a vote Of 81 to 20 in
the House, and tie vote in the Senate,
has been denied by another House oi
more than three times the number OF
members by vote of l33 to 81; and by
Senate Of more than double the
number Of Senators by vote OF SO to
10, and this, too, after he had present
ed to them all the arguments in its
favor that he could find to sustain his
claim of power. If he derives this
power from the practical settlement of
one Congress, of the legislative cou-
stIuction of the constitutional pro-
visions, why may not such construction
be as practically settled more authori-
tavely by tie greater unanimity of an
other Congress-yea, as we shall see, OF
many other Congresses?