The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1868-12-19
Horton on Finance.

Norton on Finance.
from the N. Y. Tribune
MIR. Senator Morton's latest appearance before
the public was in several characters. The
most remarkable of them was that OF Mr..
Mark Tapley. The iollity with which this
new financial Daniel treated certain conditions
Of our situation that to many people have
seemed serious enough was marvellous. The
country had no trouble about an expanded or
redundant currency. II had no trouble about
the flow of gold to Europe, which unearned
people supposed at least an inconvenience in
the way OF g return to specie payments. 1t
had no trouble about an enormous bonded
debt, deprecated shockingly below its real
value, and yet drawing high gold interest.
None of these things gave Mr.. Morton any
concern. He was uneasy solely on the
score of the greenbacks. Even those he did
not want redeemed. He was only anxious
that, having already promised to pay them
when we were able, we should now repeat the
promise. This done, he would, with serene
seltsatsfaction, proceed to withdraw gold by
tho hundred millions from the demands of the
worlds commerce, and lock it up in the Trea-
sury vaults, there to rust in idleness, while
we continued to tax the people heavily for
money TO pay the interest on our bonds. Tax
ing for the interest, while simlessly boarding
the means wherewith we might be paying the
principal-that is the scheme of which Mr..
Morton is enamOred--the Dulcinea del Toboso
for whose matchless sake this modern Don
Quixote rides tilt against all oomers. If his
paper helmet be shattered in the first euooun-
ter, we protest that, like the neighbors of the
Knight of La Manoha, we still look upon him
more in pity than in anger.
We learn from the financial revelations with
which Mr. Morton has favored the Senate that
our bonded debt has nothing to do with the
depreciation Of the currency. We owe less
-yl,,l I
over two thousand millions OF bonds. The fact
of owing two thousand millions on which we
pay heavy interest does not affect our credit at
all; but the fact of owing three hundred odd
millions on which we pay and have contracted
to pay no interest, depreciates it dreadfully
Here is richness Bonds deprecated to one
fourth their par value, and still drawing six
per cent. gold interest would not, we further
learn, affect our credit-we could still keep
our currency at par, not by paying either it or
the bonds, but by locking up gold in the
Treasury. To keep this gold idle would im-
prove peoples faith in our paying our debts;
to pay our debts with it would destroy
peoples faith in us, because it would be
"proclaiming to the world that we do not
intend to return to specie payments ~ The
greenbacks are deprecated solely because
''they are overdue and dishonored;" and yet
we learn, little further on, when the necessi-
ties Of the argument change, that our ''oredit
was never before so good as it is nOw." One
moment the people have lost faith in our in
tention to pay, and 30 refuse to take our
notes except at a heavy discount; the next
moment they never before had so much faith
in our intention to pay, and so improvement
OF the national credit is in no wise necessary
as a preparation for resumption The fact
that We owe two thousand millions, on which
We are bound for heavy interest, has nothing
to do with the value of our due-bills; but the
fact that we owe three hundred millions in
due-bills has great deal to do with the value
of our two thousand millions in interest
bearing bonds 1t is idle to talk about re-
suming until you have boarded in the
Treasury money enough TO redeem all the
greenbacks; but suspended banks used to
resume on one dollar in gold to two and half
OF outstanding circulation, and in his opinion
Government, after boarding awhile, ooald
resume on even lees
If we have dwelt on these contradictions
and crgdities it is not because we have been
unable to agree with many things which Mr..
Morton has said. But the trouble with his
speech is an old complaint that has lain
against the performance OF many previous
experimenter in the fields of finance. He has
said some new things and some true things
but the new things are not true, and the true
things-well, they have been as clearly set
forth often enough before.
Mr.. Morton would resume specie payments
in 1871, by boarding all the gold we get until
then. We would resume specie payments
years sooner, by appreciating the Government
credit. MIR. Morton would make gold scarce
and high, and would thus depreeiate green
backs yet lower by way of getting ready to
resume. We would unlock gold, make Gov
ernment bonds high by showing our ability
and willingness to pay them, bring greenbacks
up with them, and so get ready to resume by
making the currency as good as gold. Mr.
Morton would assure the man who has
United States due-bill in his pocket of the
Governments ability to pay it, by locking up
sorely needed funds, to be used for that pur-
pose three years hence. We would seek to
give such assurance by using the means at
hand to pay OFF now, as fast as we are
able, the most oppressive part Of our indebted
ness. Mr.. Morton would secure the national
credit by continuing to pay burdensome inte-
rest on an enormous debt and giving pledge
to select that which costs us no interest as the
first to be liquidated. We would secure the
national credit, just as we would secure indi-
yidual credit byEstopping the biggest leaks
first, and stopping them just as fast as we
have the means in our power. Mr.. Morton
thinks that paying off our debts after this
common sense fashion would depreciate our
due-bills. We think 1t would give proof that
they were as good az gold, and would speedily