The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1868-12-05

lDbuuCJlVe 10 know WnaJ the Onlet Justice
means by ''the nation,' and where "the
national capital" is to be found. Authority
for this nomenclature is nowhere to be had in
the Constitution. The preamble to THAI in-
stIument says:-"We, the people of the United
States, etc etc, do Ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of Amerjca /"
This then, is the official designation of the
republic, and we have right to expect that
the Chief Justice will pay that much respect
to his country as not to call it out OF
its name. Surely he would not have a case
entered on his docket as 'The Nation vs.
B., and wherefore, then, employ a mis-
nomer at the termination of a suit that he
would not admit at its beginning As to ''ths
national capital" and "the national authority"
and 'the national government" the same OBJ
lection holds. The official designation of all
these matters is set forth in the Constitution,
and the Chief Justice is not above the duty OF
regard thereto, as "the seat of government OF
the United States' Cart. l., sec. s, par. 16;
Art. All. Amendments, par. y, and not the
national capital; "the authority of the United
States" Cart. l., sec. 9, par. q Art VI, par.
y not the national authority; and "the Gov
ernment of the United States" Cart. l., sec.
8, par. lG, ib., par I'D, not the National Gov
ernment-all of which latter are bOsb, and,
while exceedingly unbecoming in the mouth
OF the Chief Justice at any time, are most
especially so when, as in this case of Keppel
VS.. The Petersburg Railroad Comp any, the
gist of his opinion turns upon legal herme-
neutics. He is discussing the nature of a de
tacto government, and how impertinent, le-
gally speaking, in such connection this use of
unwarrantable colloquialisms!
The second point made by the Chief Justice
is, so far as it is possible to discern a cloudy
meaning, that the Confederate Government
was not de tdcto government. As it is also
his opinion that it was not de jure govern
hat 10 nd ,Sal,l hat
the words of the Chief Justice himself, in this
very case, it was actually organized as a
government, and actually exercising the
powers of a government, within large extent
of territory, not merely in hostility to the
regular aud lawful government, but in COM
plete exclusion of it from the whole terri
tory subject to the insurgent CONTROL" and
it would seem that, on this showing, it was,
beyond all doubt, de 1acto, but the Chief Jus
tice hesitates doubt Perhaps he thinks
it a myth, for myth it was unless a de fuCto
or q do jure government, and he cannot ex-
aotly concede that it was either. The point
is of importance for this reason. In law,
allegiance and protection are reciprocal, and
where government fails or refuses to
protect the citizen, such fault or inability
works, for its continuance, solution of
allegiance. 3 s the Government of the United
States was unable for some years to protect
many citizens, those citizens it is contrary to
public law to now punish for acts then done
in obedience to that Government which, pro
tempore, prevailed, the presumption being
always that each citizen would have been faith
ful to his allegiance unless therein prevented
by what is technically known as the viS
major, or force. This just, sensible, aud ten
der rule originated in the wars of the Roses,
and of force in English law for four centuries
Chief Justice Chase sees fit to trample
under foot, and, at a time when peace is the
hearts desire, to reopen the keenest sores of
the war Interest reipablicG Jnis sat htium is the
rule that should receive its weight; but, go far
from this, direct invitation is extended in
Keppell VS.. The Petersburg Railroad Com
pany to the institution of the most annoying,
complicated, and, for the most part, worthless
suits.
Before the foodgates open, it is to be
hoped the Supreme Court may have the op-
portunity to review so very re remarkable de-
cision.