The Columbian. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1866-1910, 1868-06-05

| pleasure, assign him an additional tern
: of years or give him q life estate in hi,
5 office. In either case what have we bu
, a new appointment to Office by Congress
BY the express words of the Constitu
tion the principal officers ofthe Govern
ment Including, think, the heads o
the Executive Departments must hC
appointed by the President by and
with the advice and consent of the Sen.
ate, and the appointment of inferior
: officers may he vested by law in the
President alone, in the courts of law,
or in tire heads of Departments. Each
House of Congress may choose their
own officers, but in no case whatever
can Congress appoint an officer of the
United States. Being clearly incapable
Of making an appointment, they can
not change one after it is made, givi ng
1t character and duration which wero
not within the contemplation or inten-
tion of the appointing power when the
Office was conferred.
l conclude, then, that if the tenure
ot-ofiice act be construed to place the
cases of Mr.. Stanton and of the other
Lincoln Secretaries within new ten
ure-of-olfice rule, il is so far forth un-
constitutional and void, and can afford
no support to the first eight and to the
eleventh articles sofimpeachment.
q 1t is important to observe that no
objection upon constitutional grounds is
made or can be made, to some parts Of
the tenure-of-ofiice act. The sixth Sec
tion, for instance, is entirely unexcep-
tionable, and was very properly acted
upon by the President in giving notice
to the Secretary of the Treasury of Mr..
Stanton's suspension in August, 1867.
And so the second section of the act, in
authorizing the suspension of officers
between sessions of the Senate, violates
no provision of the Constitution. and
denies no just claim of executive power.
1t was quite competent for the Presi-
dent to suspend Mr.. Stanton under that
section, Notwithstanding his denial of
the validity of the first section, and if
he had done so In express terms he
Nouiu iiot iiaNt tApOSCu hlu-cll 10 IL
charge of Inconsistency. 1t is true he
puts his suspension of Mr.. Stanton up
on the executive power to remove him
under the Constitution, holding that
the power to remove includes the
power to suspend, but still the act of
suspension fell within the letter of the
law and was in all respects conformcd
to it. While il was from the Presidents
point of view good exercise Of power
under the Constitution, it was also un-
deniably good exercise Of power
within the terms Of the law: and if
placed upon the latter ground alone il
would not be an admission of the con-
stitutionality of the whole law but only
of so much of the second section as au-
thorizes suspensions from office. 1t is
only necessary to add here, by way OF
explanation, that while Mr.. Stanton's
case is believed not to come within the
operation of the first sccti on, the power
to suspend him is clearly conferred by
| the second.
! .. / hold that the violation of law by
a President which will constitute an
imreachablc high crime or miSdemean.
/ or must be Wilful and intentional
| violation, and in its nature calculated
to produce serious injury to the public
service. Mistake and error OF judgment
merely are not To be punished by i'm
/ pcachmcnt, but only grievous and will.
lul crime which cndangers the public
safety or welfare. Therefore, if there
was nm honest miscOnstructiun of the
tenurc-of- office act by the President, in
holding that Mr.. s'tanlon's case was
not within it, he cannot he convicted.
The removal of Mr.. stanton was not an
act calculated 10 iniure the public SER
vice or shock the moral sense OF the
people. And the construction oi the
tenurc-of-ofice act adopted by the Pre-.
sident, whether right or wrong. wa.
not an unreasonable or rash one. but
was precisely that cons lruction which
had been assigned to it H. the Senate at
the time OF its passage, and which ap-
pears to he most consistent with it,
tnrm-.
!, Assuming That the first section Of
the tenure-of-o office net was one Of
doubtful cOnstitutionulitya and con true
ton, | hold that the President wa, ful.
ly justified in challenging it applica.
ton to his Secretaric~, and ia taking
necessary step, to have its validity and
construction determined in tn" court,
of law. But his position as to his right
and duty in this respect has boon gross
/ ly misrepresented and, perhaps, great
/ ly misunderstood. Ii was stated, how
ever, by Judge Curtis, in his opening
/ for the defense, with Il clearnesS and
completeness which leave nothing to
be desired, and remove all excuse for
misconceptlon or complaint. He said: ::
{ ~ am not intending to advance upon
! or occupy any extreme ground, because
/ no such ground has been advanced mp
on or occupied by the President of the
! United States. lie il To take care that
! the laws be faithfully executed. When
a law has been passed through the
forms Of legislation, either with his as
sent, or without his ascent, ii il
his duty to see that that law is
! iallHi'llN tAtCulCu 50 lollg aS nOlhlnE
Is required of him but ministerial ac-
tion. He is not To erect himself into a
judicial court and decide that the law
is unconstitutional, and that therefore
he will not execute it,"
| lie asserts no such power He has 90
such idea of his duty, His idea of his
duty Is, that ita law is passed over his
veto which he believes To be unconsti-
tutional, and that law affects the inter.
ests of third persons, those whose inter
ests are affected must take care of them,
Nindlcate them, raise questions concern.
ing them If they should he so advised
If such law affects the general and
public interests Of the people, the peopl,
must take care at the polls thai it /,
remedied in constitutional way.