The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1868-12-19

dred yards when the enemy's artillery re-
opened, and so completely swept cur front
as to satisfy me that the proposed move
ment should be abandoned" Ii was ret
ting dark when this movement was aban-
doned; and it was we'll that it was given
up, for the enemy had an immense
force Of infantry. that had not been en-
gagged, massed in the road which ran
through the middle of the river bottoms,
behind the high, thick, and solid embank-
ment of earth which served as an enclo-
sure for the adjacent fields, and furnished
breastwork coextensive with our whole
front on this part Of the line, and much
stronger than the famous stone wall at the
base Of Marye's Hill. There was q similar
embankment on the other side of the road.
forming second line, and the front one
had been pierced in numerous places for
artillery, 81 that from behind it storm of
canister and rife balls would have belch-
ed forth that would have rendered it utterly
impossible for anything to live while pass
ing over the open plain Of about q mile in
width between us and the,road. However
ready they were to obey the orders Of their
General to advance, there was not a man
Of all the force ordered forward, whether
in the front or in support, that did not
| breathe freer when the countermand came.
Much has been said in unofficial quarters
about General Jackson's supposed PROPOSE
ton to drive the enemy into the river, but
| twill be seen from the FOREGOING statement
that he did make the atten : and was COM
PEELED to abandon it. I did not hear of any
other proposition to attack the enemy on
| that occasion. -.er
A little after dark on that day received
an order from General Jackson to take nv
brigades to the rear to enable them to get
rations and rest, preparatory to their taking
position on the front line for the next day,
which was not able to do because no troops
came to my relief. About midnight another
order came for Jeckson's old division, then
under Brigadier- General Taliaferro, and
since, to relieve A. P. Hills division, on the
front line, at moonrise, which was then af-
ter middle Of the night, as the moon was in
its last quarter. Taliaferro did move up-my
brigades being already in front-and our
| former position OF the second line was taken
| by D. H. Hill, while A. P. Hill retired to the
rear to rest and recruit his men. There
was no order to make the men strip to the
waist for an attack, or for any attack, but
our orders were to await the renewal of the
enemy's attack next day. The first heve
ever heard of the proposal your correspond
ent mentions is his statement of it,
think that if there had been any order for
the men to strip would certainly have
heard of that. There was silly story pub
lished in some of the papers that at q
council of war held that night General
Jackson fell into doze, and when walked
up and asked what his opinion was, he re-
piled, "Drive 'em in the river drive 'em
in the river" But no one who knew the
Generals exemplary piety and very tempe
rate habits, it is to be presumed, gave q
particle of credenee to that story. l heard
of no council Of war at all, either then or
afterwards, except from the foolish report
alluded to.
1t is morally impossible that the state
ment Of your correspondent can be correct,
for these reasons Burnside's army con-
sisted of three grand divisions, each an
army of itself, under Sumner, Franklin,
and Hooker, respectively. Franklin's grand
division had attacked our right, and Sum
ner's our left, while Hooker's remained
comparatively inactive. After Summers
repulse the whole Of Hooker's grand divi-
sion crossed over to the support, and though
q small part of it made another advance
against Marye's Hill the greater part re-
manned intact to cover the reformation of
the troops that had been engaged. Frank
lin still remained confronting our right,
and in such strong force and position
as to have compelled General Jackson
to desist from his attempted attack
from that flank. The Second corps
would have had to march more
than five miles to get to Fredericks-
burg, by any route open to it, and
there was not the first preparation made
for such march. To have moved that
corps from the right would have been the
abandonment to the enemy Of all that part
! of the line to stake everything on the pro-
posed attack, for if that failed the left was
| untenable with the enemy in possession of
the right. The difficulties of advancing
upon the enemy III Fredericksburg from the
hills in rear were even greater than on the
ter Of the ground. There was no such evil
dence of the decentralization Of the enemy
as that mentioned for though his assault
ing columns were repulsed with great
slaughter they always had many reserves
to fall back on. The expedient of stripping
to the waist would have been very shallow
one, as the night was very dark in the
fore part, and in the latter part, when the
moon rose, heavy fog overhung the river
bottoms, including the town, while our
men did not wear white shirts, and in the
dark, at little distance, it would have
been impossible to tell man without o
Jacket from one with jacket. If this had
furnished the means of telling the men
apart, the advantage would have been all
with the enemy, who would have awaited
the attack in compact form, while our men
would have had to separate into innumera-
BILE parties to get through the streets. In
an attack of this sort it would have been
impossible to preserve any control OF our
men, and they would have gotten into mex
tricable confusion. A large portion Of our
men (more than third) had no bayonets,
rs the greater part of their arms had been
picked up on previous battle-felds without
bayonets. Our men always dreaded night
attacks from the fear of encountering each
other, and none knew this better than Gene
raj Jackson.
I do not believe that General Jackson
made the proposal, and am perfectly sat
isfied that the attack, if attempted, would
have resulted in 8 terrible disaster to US
greater, perhaps, than would have attended
an attack from our right. General Jack
sons staff at that time, with the exception
of his two aids, was afterwards my o|n
staff for considerable period, and neTe.