The Cambria freeman. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1867-1938, 1868-02-06

sufficient for that purpose.
Fourth, That if they are satisfied there
was negligence on the part of the defend
ant, the question of concurring negligence
on the part of David ellis is entirely for
the Jury and that there is no evidence
of concurring negligence on his part before
them.
We refuse to answer this point as a
proposition bearing on this case.
Fifth, That it is the duty of the defend
ant TO know tho capacity and condition
of its own structures, and lis ignorance
upon this subject would not relieve it from
liability to party injured upon the
grounds of negligence.
We say to that, gentlemen, that if the
party is liable for negligence, their igno>
rance would not excuse Them where there
is liability.
Sixth, That the duty Of the defendants
to provide safe and sufficient platforms is
not limited to the ordinary business of the
road, but must be equal TO any occasions
that may occur.
We refuse 10 answer that point as re-
quested.
Seventh, That if the Company gave
either an express or implied invitation TO
the public to meet the President at their
Station at Johnstown, 1t was their duty
10 make the platform sufficiently strong
to support and protect them from any ac-
cident over which they had control, whilst
on its platform at said Station.
We refuse, gentlemen, to answer this
point as requested. There is no evidence
FL, IL,
to speak Of an implied invitation has put
the question just waere we have dealt
with II already.
Eighth, That if large crowds of people
were permitted for several years to assem-
bic on that platform, and it was suffered
TO remain exposed TO the weather for over
six years without repairs, although the
Chief Engineer Of the Company had been
notified as far back as the year 1862 of
its insecure and unsafe condition at that
time, it was gross negligence to permit =
multitude of people TO assemble on it af-
forwards, and especially on the occasion
of the Presidents visit.
We refuse TO answer this point rs re-
quested, as the controlling propositions in
the disposition of the case.
Ninth, That Il evidence satisfies the
jury that an inexperienced and incompe>
tent carpenter was instructed with the duty
of examining this platform as 10 the re-
pairs required, and that this examination
was made carelessly and negligcntly, it
was gross negligence if the Company had
notice of the purpose for which the Presi-
dent stopped at Johnstown.
We refuse, also, to answer this point as
requested, as proposition bearing in the
case.
Tenth, That if the Jury believe that
the carpenter entrusted with the repairs of
the platform, could, by careful examina>
lions Of the structure Of such platform,
have had knowledge of its insecure, rot
ten and unsafe condition, notwithstanding,
in place Of endeavoring to strengthen it by
replacing the old and rotten timbers with
new ones, he laid new two inch plank
over the rotten timber, thereby weakening
it, and making it as it were trap or pit
fail for The public, by leading them to be-
lieve il had a strength that no multitude
of people could break down, the defend
,ant is guilty of gross negligence.
We refuse, gentlemen, 10 answer this
point as requested, as proposition appli-
cable to the present inquiry at issue.
Eleventh, That if the Jury believe that
the running Of the train as far Eastward
was calculated 10 bring the crowd on that
part of the rotten structure that covered
the chasm or vacuum over the bed eff the
old canal, it was gross negligence if they
believe that portion of the platform was
rotten and dangerous.
We refuse, also, to affirm this point.
Twelfth, That if the Jury believe the
defendant was party TO the arrangement
for the President and suite to stop at
Johnstown, to see and converse with the
people at that place, and that they had
reason 10 anticipate n large multitude Of
people to meet him there on that occasion,
it was their duty TO stop their train at the
most secure and safe place, adjacent 10
said Station for such purpose, and if they
did not do SO they were guilty of gross
negligence.
We refuse to affirm this point as a prop
osition applicable to this case, or control
ing its result.
Thirteenth, The Court is requested to
instruct the Jury that negligence on the
part of the defendant is purely matter of
fact, and exclusively for them
What is negligence may often be, and
most generally is, question of law,
Whether the facts in any given case prove
negligence, is generally, but not always,
a question of facts for the Jury. When
the facts are admitted, or SO clearly pro-
ven that there is no conflict upon the sub
ject, then there is no question of fact to
be submitted to the Jury upon tho ques>
ton of negligence, any more than any
other question. We refuse, therefore, to
affirm this proposition.
Fourteenth, That if they believe the
injuries complained of by the plaintiff
were the result of the negligence of the de-
fendant, TO which the plaintiff did not con-
tribute, then they should find for the
plaintiff.