The New York herald., 1868-03-31


ofiice, and he did not see how Grant could refuse
IT, Article eight charges that the appointment OF
made M the for as tss S
moneys appropriated for the military service
and Department OF War. In addition to the proof
pontment OF Thomas, which must have been known
to the members Of his Cabinet the President caused
formal notice to be served on the etary Of the
Treasury to the end that the Se0rsafy .sGht answer
the requisitons for money of Thomas, and this was
only prevented by the 1rmness with which Stanton
retained possession OF the books and papers OF the
War ONCE. 1t will be seen that every fact charged
In article one s admitted by the answer Of the respon
dent. The intent Is also admitted as charged-that
once act and to remove Mr.. stanton from
the office OF the Secretary for the Department
ate and NO" nsted conrarv to the nrcvisons
OF the constitution itself. The only question remain
ing Is, does the respondent justify himself by the
the constitution there is conferred on the Pres-
dent as part Of the executive power the power ut
any and all times of removing from ONCE ell eXecu
tive officers for cause to be judged OF by the Pres
dent alone and that he verify believes that the ex
scutiye power OF removal from % Office cCnfidsd to to
power OF suspension from Offce indefinite
ly." Now, these offices, SO vacated, must be
because government must go on; there can be no
interregnum IN the execution Of the laws IN an or
necessity, the right to n their places with appoint
ments OF his choice, and that this power cannot be
restrained or limited In any degree by any law OF
conferred and the duty OF exercising 1t In fit
imposed ON the President by the constitution Of
the United States, and that the President could not
be deprived OF this power relieved OF this duty nor
could the be vested by law In the President and
the Senate Jointly either part or whole" This then
and the American peOpe:-Has the President, under
the constitution, the more than kngly prerogatve at
viii to remove from office, and suspend from o1ice
Indefinitely, all executive officers Of the United
States, either CIVIL military naval, at any and all
times, and f the vacancies with creatures OF his
restraint whatever or possibility OF restraint by the
Senate or by Congress through laws duly enactedG
The House OF Representatives. In behalf OF the peO
pie, join this issue by affirming that the exercise
OF such powers Is high misdemeanor in
Office. If the affirmative is maintained by the
articles are concerned-unless such corrupt purposes
are shown as will OF themselves make the exercise
and ought to CO. quit and free. Therefore, by these
articles and the answers thereto, the momentous
question, here and now is raised whether the Presi
dental Office itself III 1t has the prer0gatives and
power claimed for ip ought in fact, to exist as
part OF the constitutional government Of free
and less important inquiry Is to be determined,
whether Andrew Johnson has so conducted himself
that he ought longer to hold any constitutional
office whatever The latter sinks to merited
insignificance compared with the grandeur OF the
and power hitherto unclaimed and unknown to the
people OF the country Is engrafted on the constitu
ton, most alarming In its extent most corruptng In
its influence, most dangerous In its tendencies and
most yrannica IN its exercise. Whoever therefore,
votes mot guilty. these articles votes to enchain
@ feet Of 'a any man. %nc % being resident may choose
to control them. For this most stupendous and un-
limited prerogatiye the respondent cites no
tonal enactment--indeed he could not. for
the only mention of removal from Office in the con-
stitution IL as a part OF the judgment in case OF
impeachment, and the only power Of appointment Is
by nomination to the Senate OF officers to be ar-
lied and limited appointment by the Fr ,sident
when the Senate is not in session. Whence, then
does the respondent by his answer claim to have de-
rived this pOwer2 give him the benefit Of his
words, that II was practically settled by the first
Congress OF the United states.' Again, / give him
the benefit OF his own phrases as set forth In his mes
sage to the Senate on the 81 OF March, 1867 made
part Of his answer-"This was decided by
to twenty, Din this, however he is mistakenly
and in the Senate by the casting vote OF the Vice
President" In the same answer he admits that
before he undertook the exercise OF the most danger
ous and stupendous power after seventy-hve years
OF study and examination OF the constitution by the
that there was no such unlimited power. SO that he
admits that his tremendous power which he claims
from the legislative construction Of one Congress by
vote OF "a to 20 in the House and tie vote In the
Senate, has been denied by another House OF more
than three times the number Of members by
sSsn double the nj humber % q BY ~oe
OF as to 10, and this, too after he had
that he could lind to sustain his claim Of power.
II he derives this power from the practical settlement
constitutional provisions why may not such con-
structiOn be as practically settled more authorayely
by the nnanmiy ofanother Congress, yea as we shal
see OF many other Congresses2 The great question:
however still returns upon US, Whence comes this
p0wers how derived or conferredf Is 1t unlimited
and unrestrained-illimitable and unrestrainable-
"a the President claims 1t to beY In present
ing this topic 1t will be my duty-and shall
to o % % nothing aSa sns sae the
support them so far a. they may come
to my knowledge, leaving the argument and illusra-
tOns Of the question to be extended i'm the close by
ADLER and better hands. II power OF removal in the
Executive is found at all In the constitution II l. ad
mitted to be an implied one, either from the power
vested in the PresdentY" Has the executive power
granted by the constitution by these words any iimi
tationsf Does the constitution invest the President
with all executive power, prerogatives privileges
and mnunites enjoyed by executive officers OF other
ton, II so, then the constitution has been
much more liberal in granting powers TO
of the government az that has onl, .aIl Legislative
powers herein granted (which shall be vested IN the
Congress OF the United States not all uncomfortable
legislative powers, there many limitations
upon that power as exercised by the Parliament Of
England for example 80 there are many executive
powers expressly limited In the constitution, such
declaring war. making rules and regulations for the
government OF the army and navy. and coming
money. AZ some executive powers are limited by
the constitution ITSELF 1t Is not clear that the words
'.the executive power Is vested In the President"
do not confer on him all executive powers, but
tional provisions granting regulating specific
powcrsy The executive power Of appointment is
clearly limited by the words "he shall nominate and
10y and with the advice and consent OF the Senate
shall appoint ambassadors y and all other
officers Of the United States whose appointments are
not herein otherwise provided for and which shall
be established by law" Is MT more In accordance
with the theory OF the constitution TO imply the
power OF removal from the power Of appointment,
restrained by like limitations, than to in-
ply 1t solely as prerogative OF executive
power and therefore illimitable and uncontroablcY
Have the people anywhere else In the constitution
granted iimitable and uncomfortable powers either
to the executive any other branch OF the govern
mentS Is not the whole frame OF government one Of
checks, balances and lmtatonS Is IL to be believed
that fathers, just escaping from the expressions
Of monarchical power and 50 drcading 1t that they
feared the very name Of king, gave this more than
kingly power to the Executive, illimitable and un
controllable and that, too, by implication mcrelys
Upon this point our proposition is that the Senate,
being In session, and Office, not inferior onc
within the terms OF the constitution being
filed, the President has the implied power OF
inauguratiGs the removal only by nomination OF u
successor TO The Senate which, when consented to,
works the full removal and supersedes the In