The evening Argus. [volume] (Rock Island, Ill.) 1861-1871, 1868-01-17

that it is law, or, at least, that it has that
color of law which loyal people are fain to
respect, even against their intelligent doubts
of constitutional warrant. Congress thus sue
cessfully constrained, by the influence OF
caucus control over political character, per-
sonal independence, and private interest,"
the Judiciary are not to be needlessly degra-
ded before the public gaze as deposed judg-
es, but may, ifthey choose, continue to ad.
minister Justice in all cases but such as the
Directory shall forbid through their peculiar
executive agents. The President, also.
since the attempt has failed to depose him,
is to be suffered to perfom executive duties,
and bear appropriate responsibilities, and to
be allowed the important advantage Of the
official title of president of the United
States, the Executive of the United States"
the "Chief Magistrate" etc. A large share
of power. too, is to be left in his hands, and
we do not doubt that under this scheme,
should he not provoke stern and stringent
measures, Mr.. johnson would be permitted
to hold the Office of President until, under
such @rganie changes and provisional regu-
lations as the Directory may by that time
have provided, a successor shall have been
chosen and formally installed, probably still
under the name of and with considerable re-
semblanee to the President, as the Chief Ex-
ecutive of the National Government under
the present Constitution.
This measure (supposing it already pass
ed is not, nor could become, except in ma
ked form, an act of congress. It is to be
regarded aside from all other bills framed in
this country. No act, however grossly I'M
constitutional, ever before contemplated its
execution wholly without the Executive, or
its validity directed against the Judiciary.
1t is, therefore, TO be treated on plane alto
gether different from that of measures IN
volving the question of constitutional power
There is no question here about the power.
l. 1t abotishes the National Legislature
No reasonable man can distinguish be-
tween an act abolishing congress and an act
vesting IN a military executive the admins
tratlon of the laws, and at the same time
completely exonerating him from judicial
authority, allowing him TO remain not sub
Ject to impeachment, and, in word, alto
gether irresponsible to any civil tribunal
whatever. 1t wonld be sufficient to most
persons believing in civil liberty that our
frame of government tolerates no power
whatever, even In the purest military mat
ter, in any military person, except what
may be controlled, absolutely and arbitrari-
ly, BY civil magistrate, at his own will
responsible, indeed, but responsible to all
except the military subordinate A soldier,
as such, has no will but what is directly or
mediately that of his superior; and the
commander highest of ALL centres in him.
self all the power and authority of all sthe
officers and soldiers of an army. We say
this should be enough to show that any
statute vestiag supreme powers in military
person, with no accountability but for the
personal appreciation of members of con-
gress, is statute abolishing congress, if it
could be statute at all because the exist
once of a law-making authority depends on
its power to punish the non-execution and
administration of valid laws. and not on
ITS power to pass them-a power freely en-
Joyed by any town meeting. But it is not to
people of settled, but of obscure apprehen-
sion of the principles of civil liberty, that we
address ourselves on this point. This bill is
altogether novelty, and we are too fully
sensible how sudden and great au innova-
ton it is to undertake to oppose its project
ors by mere lega! argument
The fifth section proposes;
"That any interference by any person, with
intent to prevent by force the execution of the
orders of the general of the army, made in pur-
suance of this act and the acts aforesaid shall be
held to be high nisdemeanor, etc.
Now, of course, as long as, Congress suffer
these acts to remain, and as long as the or
ders OF the General are, in the opinion of
Congress, in pursuance of them, however it
may be with the Supreme Court, the Presi-
dent, and the People, between Congress and
the General there viii be no conflict; they
passing acts to fit his orders, and he giving
orders to fit their acts. But is that law
making power, even while this accord would
exist7 IF General Grants orders should 90
beyond the acts in question in the opinion of
Congress- but not in his opinion. can Con-
gress decide? They have no judicial power.
The legal effect of their acts is no more to
be judged by themselves than by General
Grant. 1T he should think he was right.
ought he to submit to them, who he should
think were wrong? The Judiciary could
not help the matter, because the bill casts
them altogether out; and the President
could not, because either party would have
equal right to declare his action an "inter-
ference" and one or the other would punish
him for high misdeneanor." That any
great public measure should depend upon
of opinion between men, and
least OF all, between a legislature and mill
tary commander, is preposterous to common
experience. Difference of opinion is in all
cases, and in this case necessarily, contem-
plated. Yet, in case of a difference between
the General and Congress. each acting from
a sense of duty, (which would but insure a
contiict) there would be no power on earth |
to decide, and it would become the duty of
each party to coerce the other to submiss-
sion. When the head of an army thinks it !
is his duty to disperse legislature, he does
it. unless he is recreant. Now all comes to |
this, viz: That under such O. statute. eren |
# 1T scas accepted and obeyed an good faith |
by all, Congress, by its osrn terms, could be |
The National Legislature so long as the Gen |
erot should not change has opinion, and no |
longer. This, of course, is the same thing |
IS passing an act declaring, in terms, that
The Congress shall cease to exist upon a stat
ID and very Probable contingency. s-
We trust i is sufficiently clear that an at.
empt is made to betray the sovereign Iegis-
ative power OF the peoplesin into the hands of
'ne man, and that man military cheftain,
With his sword at his side. But If any doubt
'emains, the other provisions prove it. and
'how that the attempt is also to betray. in
ike manner, the sovereignty of the people
n the two other coordinate branches oil
@ az 10
z The Judicial po,cer as to be abolished.
Section first of this astonishing draft of a /
I'LL proposes. Sthat the civil State govern. 4
nents IN said States respectively shall not
'e recognized as valid or legal State govern.
nents by judicial power of
ne United States" Section four propos.s
.nat 1t shall be unlawful for the President ,
i the United States tn order an, .n