New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1868-06-19

or more pieces az the pleasure OF the RUSSIAN Com
mander."
The arguments which might have been urged
against this march are stated with great clearness
and force:
"The invaders had acquaintance with the country
into which they going, except what they got from
their map and although, far it ent this guide was
not an unfathful one the language Of the engaver who
represented with lines and shading the southwark decv
tiles of the Mackenzie range did not have the effect of
warning the Allies that there there impregnabe
position and that il they should leave it to the enemy
they would cOncede to him rrevOcaby an advantage Of
the greatest worth by giving up their power TO attack
him the open field, and compelling themselves to assai
him if ever they should assa him at ALL in his lines of
defense at SebastOl Ol.
And last It he observed that for the Allies TO
avoid the attack of the star Fort which stood within
gunshot before them, and to away TO the south
coast to fly from task measured out understood,
we'll defined, and 90 off to confront things unknown.
The weakness of the Fort itself aid to defense had
been perceived by the Allies and although they did not
that had been abandoned by the Russian army
the care the seamen they that it would be
defended. if defended ALL by force suffering under
the depression of lost battle and having to attempt
stand with Of the IN its immediate Yet 10
the task of seiznc this fort and gaining the
north side Of SebastOpO and the means OF destroying the
enemys Feet and dockyards they were going to prefer
the poIed forest and the mountain roads, with the
necessity of having to debOuch into plain where the
presence Of Russian army might be expected and Of
aferward being forced conquer for themselves new
Of communication with the ON that of course,
their very to depend and them again, In
the distance there would still lie before them the prospect
Of having TO force the immensely strong position Of the
Sapouue ridge; and not until that should be carried
would they he able to begin attacking tho southern de-
lenses sebasopoldeienscs Of which, at this time.
they knew very little. They had learnt indeed, that on
its land side years before the place open
but knowledge of what might since have been done for
its defense their minds almost blank"
1t is difficult to comprehend the motives which
could have swayed the mind of ST. Arnaud to the
adoption of such enterprise this, unless on the
theory OF his unftness for command from i'll health
1t is still moro remarkable that Lord Raglan, al
though adopting it as an expedient to prevent the
campaign from coming to an absolute stand-st,
should have thought well of the measure i'll itself.
Bat Mr. Kinglake allows us to see that Lord Raglan
fell back this perilOus and desperate plan with
cheerful cOntentment apparently he not
much impressed with the hazardous character of the
flank march, and on the other hand, he certainly
thought that if once the allies should be established
on the south coast they would there be on the best
ground for attacking Sebastopol" But the real iust
fcation of Lord Raglan lies in the fnct that the
willingness of the French TO attack the north side of
Sebastopol, had brought the Allies into straits
round the east of Sebastopol might be regarded as
the least of the evils from which a choice could be
made
Lord Raglan had also for this, as for many subse-
quent errors into which he was led. the encourage
ment of professional opinion from the chief of the
English Engineers Sir John Burgoyne. The opinion
of this officer in favor of the flank march put in
writing and then he was directed by Lord Raglan 10
present IT TO the French Headquarters. After brief
discussion it was adopted by Marshal st. Armand.
Before this had been done tie armies had moved
forward from the Alma the morning of the 23d of
September. They biyouacked that night on the
Katcha On the 9th there was no movement till 10
in the morning On the evening of that day, when
the troops had reached position on the Belbec some
what inland the final resolve was taken:
lord Raglan with of hs staf, went to the cam
OF the French Headquarters. The interview was nOl
long Lord Raglan. in few words, and for the us
time submitted that tine Allies should go with their
original plan of campaign and assault the works on the
north OF sebdstopol Marshal st. Arnaud more de
clned agree this He aid the defenses the Star
Fort had reyetments in masonry and that he would
undertake TO attack such work without laying formal
siege to it. This treated ncgativing all
further idea Of attacking SebastopO from the north As
regards the which. in these circumstances to
be resOrted to- Lord glaI had himself pro
posed the alternative phn and Marshal ST. Arnaud. it
seems though not without some hesitation. had already
made up his mind to accept IT, On this subject. there.
fore, neither the other OF the TWO commanders
had need words of persuasion They agreed to at
tempt the flank march,
during the conversation, Marshal St. Arnaud sat rgdly
up IN an armed chair, and who observed 1t his
bearing conveyed impression that he wished TO give
the interview appearance Of formaity; bat Lord
Raglan perceived the truth. lie had left the
French camp than he said 10 one Of his STAFF Did you
observe ST. Araudl-he is dying
This the last time that the two chiefs conferred
upon the business OF the campaign. When Lord Raglan
visited the French Headquarters the following
ing he found that the Marshal was no longer Ia con
dition TO be able to take part IN affairs"
The decision come to was this: That unless a
reconnaissance shoud disclose good reason for chang
ing the plan. the English army, followed by the
French, should endeavor to push round the head Of
the Sebastopol Toadsead by gaining the Mackenzie
flights. with intention to descend thence into the
valley of the Tchernaya and recover communication
with the sea by selling the harbor of Baaclava
If" says Mr.. Kinglake this final determination to
turn aside from the Star Fort was in mere
continuance of ST. Anaud's former refusal to march
on and attack the work, still it took place under diff
ferent conditions, and in circumstances which gave
it the character of distinct resolve. Thus regarded
it has TO be ranged the second of the lost occasions
which followed the battle of the Alma"
Mr.. Kinglake does not conceal his opinion that the
Allies were now in ght which threatened them
with not mere discontinue. but ruin. They were,
moreover in blank ignorance OF the enemys position
and plans. The cavalry under Lord Lucan were Or
dered to undertake reconnaissance next morning,
but missed their way. In point of fact the 25th,
the English infantry plunged into an unknown for
est, through which they directed TO steer by
compass south-sonth-east. The single narrow lane
OF woodland road was reserved for cavalry and aTtil
lery, and the wood was so dense that the infantry
could not preserve any kind of military formation,
and often had to make their way in Indian file. Dis