The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1868-11-02

Of supply and retreat laid through the Chaoo, and
was kept up through swampy road extending from
limbo to the mouth OF Rio Bermejo lying three
between both the mouths Of the rivers Bsrmeio and
Teblcuari several Paraguayan steam transports
constantly plying At Tebicuari Lopez had made q
redoubt, to serve general depot FOR provisioning
his fortress. With the six iron-cads above Humaita
the allies hold now or could hold undisputed and
Complete OF the river Paraguay They
with blockade the mouth OF the river Tebicuar in
terrupt the passage across the river Bermeo, which
runs perpendicularly through the Chaco. and, by
protecting an immediate landing OF an allied force
on the peninsula in front OF Humaa, completely cut
of his sole line OF retreat
Lopez's situation had thereby become one OF ex-
IRENE peril. and had Grant Napier been at this
juncture at the head OF the allies his fate would
the generalissimo OF all the allied land and water
forces was Marquis de Caxias, who did, at the right
time, nothing OF the kind. STILL as Lopez could not
expect that the Brazilian irOn-cad5 would have been
suffered to remain two months and half above
Humatd. iding their time away, the abandonment
OF this fortress, as his primary base OF defence
instantly resolved upon and the mouth OF the river
Tebicuarl was chosen In its stead. But Tebicuart
sun required 70 be made what II has since become
four months al least were thought requisite for that
purpose. The whole Of the contents Of Humaita was
to be transferred to Tebcuari, and how to effect so
stupendous feat under such extraordinarily diff
cult circumstances was not easily conceived. Yet
the enterprise was not only attempted, but success
fully carried out with matchless address, bOldness,
resolution and CELEBRITY. The execution OF this plan
was facilitated by means Of the cleverest ruSe de
some pecaIiartes Of mind both OF caxias and
Lopez 1t Is well deserving OF notice. apart from the
great intrinsic merit OF the adroit perform
insinuated that Lopez intended to make an
forces The revelations OF this sdeserter'' seemed
to be borne out by the fact that then being OBJ
served of unusually large bodies Of Paraguay troops
being seen concentrating themselves at Curupaity.
These forces were seen at other days steathiy and
noiselessly moving towards the CENTRE towards the
right and 80 on. These masses seemed daily to In
crease in number.
Meanwhile an extraordinarily noisy movement
TO and fro was remarked within their lines,
their forces were perceived compactly massed, APP
parently to draw Caxias' attention to that point,
days and nights the allies were Kept distracagy on
the Q UtUe uncertain as to the real point where the
dreaded onset was to be made. All at once the noise
less moving masses were to be seen no longer The
noisy hubbub altogether ceased. It was apparent
the Paragraphs had been afraid to attack the allies
their That they were there the Brazilian
commander could entertain no doubt, for Lopez had
enormously increased the heavy artillery along
and, besides, q great number Of armed men
were now constantly seen standing by their pieces
The reader has already guessed the riddle.
While the Marquis de Caxias was hourly ex-
pecting to be attacked. the dexterous and
moving from Curlpaty, Passo-poc1 and Epinillo,
and had actually transferred to Tebicuari all the
al al pon aSos
thousand soldiers prodigious quantity OF ammuni-
tons and oil the living impediments lying In that
fortress. To make the illusion still more complete
the smart Paraguayan chief had caused the real six
ty-eghtpOunders to be substituted for wooden guns
and the real soldiers for soldiers looking scarecrows
ing against their arms. few companies OF men
were left to keep these lines and fire daily volIeys
OF musketry at the allies who did not find out the
trck Till UPWARDS OF month after everything
already been removed. At last Marquis de CaXias
became aware that the dreaded lines were feebly
guarded. A reconnaissance was ordered. The Para
guayan guard made show 0frcsstance and retired
to Humaita. The allies then CALAMITY mounted the
parapets and took possession Of the wooden guns
and Paraguayan scarecrows.
And now the most contemptibly ridiculous
part OF this affair remains to be told. In
communicating this 'vtctory" to his govern
ment Marquis de Caxias actually wrote, and
had published by all newspapers here, that no
success Of this attack, soano Lopez was shamefaly
dying he did not know exactly whther-towards
Bolivia, as he thought-and had finally abandoned
and childish infatuatlon no less extraordinary he
further wrote that at most three days later his next
aespafs woala 6e written rom wtn,n Tue walls OF
here related-as to the wooden guns and scare
crows found within the Paraguayan lines-had been
authenticated and become known at the very time
that he wrote his famous DESPATCH Marquis de
Caxias gave 10 the world at least signal proof OF
his uncommon fortiude and strength OF mind, for
any other commander-in-chief. unucr similar crcum.
stances, would have died OF shame. And yet he
was destined to be still more egregiously
deceived by second stratagem which, according 70
reliable accounts cost the Brazilian army on the
18th ultimo upwards OF 1000 OF It's best men. But
abandonment Of Humsita being resolved upon Colo
mel Allen was entrusted with Its defence. He was
to hold il 4. all hazards and against all odds until he
should be ordered by Lopez 70 rot e from It. HUI
malta might contain at that time about 1000 souls,
Of whom 1000 were veteran troops.
Finally, at the beginning OF July last, the
new works erected on the Teblcuari were thought
OF sufficient strength TO defy all the power
the allies could bring to bear against them;
In fact, as impregnabie s TO me allies. both by
being now invested on the side OF the Chac0, at
last efectualy besieged and had no other communi-
night through the .'Guaicuru, lake. Meantime the
fortress was running short OF provisions and there
chance ofsuccessfully attacking Rivas forces,
so long Us his TANKS protected by the rifed one
hundred and fifty Founders from the Brazilian IRON
clads. Still. by bold coup de main, large amount Of
provisions might have been introduced through
GuaIrcurG before the allies could have prevented
It. Nevertheless, the definittve evacuation OF tins
fortress was thought preferable, inasmuch as sure
means had been found to transfer with safety, to
Tebicuari at least, its Incompatible artierymen,
who were now needed to man the river batteries Of
this new stronghold. And SO indeed 1t happened,
OF picked men, had arrived ct limbo In safety and
unperceved by the allies.
Colonel Martinez, o stern intrepid officer greatly
esteemed BY Lopez. He was instructed first
and above all, TO leave the fortress absolutely
bare OF every living thing and, next to en-
deavor to transfer to limbo the sick, wounded,
crippled and convalescents the women and children
that had been suffered TO remain with the garrison,
the prisoners, and last OF Oil, the remainder OF the
garrison. NY Informant set down ut about
three thousand the NUMBER OF living fmpedi-
neata, without counting the prisoners, and
at about two thousand the number of troops
still lett In charge Of Martinez and adds
that the fortress was to be blown up al q given
moment by means Of voltaic battery and wires
kept In the Chaco fort lying right in front Of Hu.
maiti. On the 18th great deal OF warlike material
had already been collected the lake redoubt and
on the l4th the contents OF the hospitals and mfr
ares had been transferred there and left In charge
of women.
And now must relate the second "trick"
played by Colonel Martinez on the Brazilian
Commander-ln-Chef to facilitate this evacuation.
The canoes which ferried the sick and wounded on
the Iith were left there to be observed by the iron
clads stationed below and above Humata, while o
noisy movement was kept up In the swampy woods
fronting Rivas' position. Meanwhile the pckets
and guards doing duty outside the ramparts had
been greatly diminished, and on the 10th none
were sent outside the fortress, wherein no sign OF
life was observable. A general bonbardment had
NV al IN fror