The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1868-08-01
Count Bismarcl's PoIicy-New Germany.

administration.
Count Bismarck's Policy-New Germany.
In the last number of the EdSn6urg Re
rSep (perhaps the purest representative of
conservative liberalism in England) there is an
able article on ''New Germany"-an article in
which the policy of Count Bismarck is rather
severely handled and which has already COM
manded considerable attention, both in Eng
land and on the Continent Since the battle of
Sadowa Count Bismarck has been the object of
general and almost unqualified praise. A few
months before that battle the Count was, per-
haps, the best hated man in Germany. He
was VIGOROUSLY opposed to the levelling views
of the German liberals and his imperial
tendencies were too Enthusiastically revealed in
the unconstitutional manner in which, without
the consent of Parliament, he forced through
successive budgets and increased the burdens of
the people. Sadowa was his success. 1t
was also his justification. The best hated be-
came at once the most popular man in Prus-
sia; and if the sentiments of the triumphant
Prussians were not echoed loudly in the other
German States they were echoed with suffi-
cient emphasis in Great Britain and through
out the United States. The vigor and ability
which he revealed in organizing the North
German Confederation crowned the victory of
Sadowa and made him for the time the most
prominent man in Europe. 1t cannot be said
that Count Bismarcks popularity has yet
waned for whatever he may be in Germany,
out of Germany men persist, rightly or wrongly,
in regarding him as Germany's hope and the
right arm of all her strength.
The Edinburg reviewer attempts to admire
Count Bismarcks genius. The question which
the reviewer raises is whether the policy
pursued since Sadowa has been the
ism or for German unity. The annexa-
ton policy of the Count is condemned. The
interests of Germany would have been better
served it, in place of annexing to Prussia all
the States he dared to annex and limiting the
League to the States north Of the Main, he had
followed the example of Cavour, making Prus
STA to Germany what Piedmont was to Italy
the centre and rallying point of the unionists-
and contented himself with looser but larger
Confederation, which should have embraced
the whole Of Germany, the Austrian States
alone excepted. In the opinion of the re-
viewer the present Confederation is clumsy
sham. The Count has created q reaction
against himself BY the smaller States the
domination of Prussia is felt to be an oppres-
sion. The experience Of the annexed and con-
federated States of the north has had most
discouraging effect on the minds of the people of
the SOUTH and South Germany is now more
opposed than ever to union with the north. It
is also the opinion Of the reviewer that Ger
many is weaker both for offensive and defen-
sive purposes than at the time of the Lux
emburg difficulty, while France is immea-
surably stronger.
II Is less our object to approve or disapprove
Of these views than to state them. It is unde-
niable that the reviewer states his case strong
ly, but 1t is just as undeniabe that there is
large amount Of truth il yha! he says: WheQ
be condemns Count Bismarck for not doing
otherwise than he did after Sadowa we think
he speaks with too much authority and does
not make sufficient allowance for the Difficult
ties and necessities Of the situation. When,
however, he treats Of the present condition Of
Germany, of the anti-Prussian feeljay which
is more or less strong in the different states of
the north, and which Is VIGOROUSLY strong in
all the States south of the Main, we
do not feel ourselves in a position to
combat his remarks. This, however, must be
admitted by all, that Count Bismarck has
made German unity not only possibility,
but In many important particulars potential
fact II Is Of all things the most improbable
that Germany will go back or in any sense
give up what she has won and IL may, we
think, be taken for granted that in the event of
any pressure being applied from without the
love Of Fatherland would overcome all sec
tional jealousies and make Germany q unit
| from the Rhine to the Baltic. Looked at from
certain points Of view there may be certain
visible and even disagreeable drawbacks to
German unity, but there is not the slightest
reason to believe that any section of the
Fatherland will prove untrue to itself The
time has not yet come when Napoleon may
stssok Germany With lppVsisy.