The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1868-09-29
The Spanish Insurrection and the Popular
CQuse In EurOuc.

The Spanish Instruction and the Popular
Cause In Europe.
The Spanish uprising continues to make
progress, but it does not appear to gain in
defnteness of aim and purpose. The one
thing which stands out with distinctness is
that it is already creating certain amount of
alarm in France. All the accounts of the
situation that come to us through France have
q coloring the meaning of which is unmistak-
able. 1t must not be thought in France that
the people are powerful enough in Spain to
effect change of government. At least such
a thought must not be encouraged.
The only interest which we on this Cont
nent can have in this Spanish affair arises
from its relation to the peoples cause all over
Europe. If Spain is successful in cmanci-
pating herself from the present tyrannous yoke
and successful in establishing wise and pow
erful government, there can be no manner of
doubt that her example will prove contagious
in the case Of most of her immediate neigh
bors. Italy is not quite contcnted, and Italy
will be induced by the success of Spain not
only to express her wants, but to enforce her
would be directed more against Rome than
against Florence. But Rome in danger would
lead to French invasion of the Italian penin-
sula. If liberals were successful in Spain the
sympathy Of Spain might reveal itself
in the shape of actual assistance to
one result. Napoleon would be compelled to
march his armies across the Pyrcnees and
send a portion of his feet round to Cadiz. A
French occupation Of Spain and French occu-
patton of Italy, or rather q war in both penn-
sulas, might prove too much even for Napo-
leon. With the armies of France 80 engaged
It is not conceivable that republicans or Or
leanists or legtimists would remain inactive.
A French occupation Of Spain and French
occupation of Italy would be certain to be fol-
lowed by a general insurrection in France.
Napoleon so crippled what would Prussia,
what would Austria, what would Russia do9
If the German populations did not rise and seek
10 establish German unity on a broad and
popular basis, Germany would have no choice,
but become unit under Prussian supremacy.
Nothing but general uprising Of the people
would hinder Bismarck from Selling the oppor-
tunity to complete the work which he has sue
cessfully begun and which he hopefully con-
tinues. A great German republic or great
German empire would be the certain result.
In such circumstances as those we have ina
gined Austria, in the first instance, would be
in great peril. The empire as II now Is hangs
but loosely together. II is at best but a hetero-
gencous mass, and the mass is singularly COM
bustible Gallicia, Bohemia and some of the
Southern provinces are even now with difficulty
held in subordination. A little spark would
set them on fire. IT. however, Austria and
Russia could agree there would be no great
difficulty in changing the map of Europe to the
advantage Of both. BY giving Austria Servia,
Bulgaria and Wallacha and so much of Mol
davia as would make her mistress Of The
Danube, Russia might enthrone herself in Con-
stantinople and convert the Erzine into Rus
sian lake. Turkey il toe weak to resist with
| any prospect of success, and Greece might be
/ gratfed by receiving an addition of territory
| commensurate with her ambition. These may