New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1868-06-23


Toward the sea. the ncurson of the allied fleet was
sufficiently obstructed by the sunken ships. More
over the IMPRISONMENT of the Russian fleet released
all its crews and all its for the defense of
the place by land Since the Allies had established
themselves at Balaclava and on the plateau called
the Chers0nese the south of the place. 1t was the
south side aloue which was now menaced, and Tor
the defense of which the Russians called upon
TO provide
IL is the opinion of Todleben that on the 26th of
September the day when the Allies seized upon
Baaclava, the south side of SebastOpo was no more
defensible than the north Prince Mentschlkoh
having stolen away with his army, there remained
no sufficient force to man the weak Entertainments
much less to repel resolute assault by an enemy
GO COO strong BY the zeal with which Korniloif had
inspired them and by the impressive soemnities OF
a religious service the supplemented Russians had
been brought into great readiness for battle. Yet"
saws Todeben "neither the exaltatiO of the troops
nor their resolve to fight to the last extremity could
have saved Sebastopo if the enemy had attacked 1T
Immediately after the passage of the Tchernaya'
Here again. therefore fortune stretched out herhand
TO the Allies inviting them to lay hold OF the prize,
in quest of which they had undergone such ton ana
loss Why did they hesitate and finally refuse
Once more it is the French aided by the counsels OF
Sir John Burgoyne who for delay, and once more
il il Lord Raglan and Sir Edmund Lyons whose
minds appear 10 be bent upon immediate action.
Once more it is Lord CLAN who yields and 1t IS the
French who impose upon the allied armies That kihd
of policy in which discretion has greater part than
valor Mr.. Kinglake now. before, finds tho neces-
3ity of preserving the alliance so weighing upon
Lord RagIans mind rs TO excuse him for submitting
to the control of the French commander. 1t may be
doubted whether Raglan's c0mplasance not
tl,n hali af lie
French Headquarters that the real leadership of the
allied forces was properly in their hands few
weeks later Admiral Dundas found giving way
before the pressure put upon him by Admiral Ham
elm and he Justly incurs the historians censure Tor
his concession 10 an unreasonable demand. If the
arguments which Mr.. Kinglake has brought to bear
against Dundas should be applied to Lord Raglah II
difficult to how the latter could stand excused
any more than the Admiral Over both of these the
French commanders at certain times had an ex-
cessve ascendancy
The real question presented to the Allies on the
9th If September and succeeding days was whether
they would hazard immediate assault, or resort to
a siege. Sir John Burgoyne estimated that an as
sault would cost 800 lives; and Canrobert declared
that to deliver an attack before attempting TO get
down the enemy's FIRE would he nothing less than
crime. Against these energetic opinions Lord Rag
Ian was so far from protesting that he took pains not
even 10 appear 10 dissent lest the appearance OF dis
sent should prove fatal to that good understanding be-
tween the English and French which 1t was his first
object to cultivate. Mr. Knglake sums mp ut length
and with his usual cleaneSs the arguments on both
sides. They are conclusive IN favor of the assault
They arc so conclusive that they would seem to be
stated at superuous length it not that Sir John
Burgoyne. untaught by experience is understood
still to maintain his original opinion.
There were men in tho English camp who saw
clearly what was coming upon them by reason of this
timidity which prevailed in the councils at Head
quarters. One of them was Cen Aircy, who wrote
home: My own opinion is that we are here for the
Winter. maintaining only a strong position until
we can bo reinforced" Sir Edmund Lyons spoke
still more publicly, expressing his conviction that
unless the place at once assaulted 1t would not
be taken at all except after grievous loss and that
the men then composing the army would not live
TO do it," The result may best be stated in the con-
GLIDING words of Mr. Kingakes twelfth chapter:
In adopting a measure which only the first and
the easiest OF long. arduous and bloody undertaking,
the who got the sway Of the question were blind or
half blind, it would SEEM not merely 20 the probable
effect but 10 the then present import OF what they were
doing They cOnscieDtOusy no doubt, resolved that,
before attempting an assault they would make good
of their segeguns but then they were not really
going 20 put all this ordnance in battery without first
getting for n that what they In truth I'M
derook was 10 open trenchwork in which to plant
their great guns and with those to cannonade the for
tress In other words. they determning-they
hardly knew what they ddto upon the siege OF
srbastopOl.
1T was with hope OF inducing the Allies to come to
this very that the defenders OF Sebasopcl had
been tong
"The great Engineer who directed the labors OF the
garrison declared saw that the place at this
time could not have been held against such attack
the Allies had the power To make and this Is the judg
men Of one who, compared with all other men, had the
fullest understanding and knowledge OF the question on
which ne was writing Gen. de Todleben Is fable; but
unless he has underraod the defensive of Sc
bastopol which he himself preparing In the four last
days Of September the determination OF the Allies to
give the garrison respite will have TO be ranged the
third OF the lost occasions which followed the battle OF
the Alma"
At the very outset the English had foretaste of
that difficulty in the transport of material which
afterward made the word Balacaya hideous sound
10 them.
The French had spaclons landing ground in their Bay
Kamesch with easy approach to the ground where
their siege corps was camped and IL does not appear
that they encountered any great difficulty In bringing to
the their stores and their batterng trains II was
otherwise with the English; for there TO be
felt the OF that want which destined TO be
the OF cruel suorngs 10 their army, and TO wiring
the hearts OF their brethren az homo with grief which
soon turned into anger Our forces, encanped on the
Chersonese near is tro TO their port of supply
but contact with IT, There was distance OF SIX or
seven miles which had TO be conquered. And howl The
means OF land transport slight In proportion %
the need that the mere counting OF the carts
that they had and OF the beasts lit for draught might
we'll have induced the Allies TO go back once more into
conncl, and ask themselves yet again whether 1t was
commonly prudent for them TO forego postpone their
assault OF the place for tho sake OF undertaking mighty
siege business without sullicing resources.
cit would seem that the only Of transport avail
able TO our engineers light buockcarts OF the