Brownlow's Knoxville Whig. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1866-1869, 1868-09-16

with her husband and wife, and in every respect
treated her free woman. ss
The Chanceller deereed for the complainant from
which there il an appeal 10 this court
The principal question relied under this state Of facts
that By tns laws Of this State as they existed prior n
the abolition Of say3 persoAs held to services OF abo
such articles AZ were allowed By statute and
y they equally incapable Of taking benefciaries
under deed Of truss
The question raised in argument is not prouerlz ,,a
seated in the pleadiDg II Is nowhere alleged either IN
tbs bill answer, that either The colored psman Ti
or her daughter, Emily, at any time slaves ~ ~
intestate, any else. The fact appears ia the
and not otherwise II the entire record and as general
rule Of Chaneery practice court Of equity can make mo
decree on the proof alone the facts constituting tbe
upon which the decree is sought not having been set r
either in the bill or answer.
Every decree must be founded on and be in eopfori
ty 70 the anegationt, and proof, and cannot be based
upon fact rot put 10 issue By the peadings But as :
rule Of Chaneery pletdfngs the same stfictnoss i NOT r.
CURED in courts Of equity at law Cooke vs. Trotte
70 Yer 2l3, 2I7; 10 Wheaton ISL BARRIER nrar sso
Cunningham vs.. Wood, 3 Hume All, 400
But independent Of this defect IN pleading the pes
ton assumed in argument as applied 10 this case can
not be sustained Il Is true as general proposition,
slave, the Institution existed IN Tennessee r- -
the late war, could not bold pYopertv He and ev.r,
thing Of his earnings, belonged to his master and he
could not therefore make contracts which were ohliga
tory on himself or the person contracted with UniYer
sy vs.. Cambrseling, Yer 81 Fletcher vs. the Sfate a
Hum. 256 Jenkins W. Brown, Hum 200 Hiie va the
State, Yer. 207. law - ''0
Admitting the principles as recognized IN the above
feoited cases very different question pretended in
the facts and circumstance Of this case Bv he enro
mon law there Is no question but the master might man
unit his own slave by parole or even by from
acts IN pas Black Com. 90. Judge Green, while
commenting on this common Jaw principle in the case of
Geeenlaw vs.. Rawlings, Hum. 90, says ~And in this
country ndep ndent of statutory prohibitions the same
principle exist No deed writing of any kind is ne
eessaTy for the purpose Of parting with the masters
rfs.f II, raaf p,
be implied, have been held sufficient" Citing John
~ John, 53I see also Lewis vs. Simonton, 1856
But the State has interest in the character of It's CT
ITEMS and therefore has undoubted right to regu
late by law the of introducing members into
It's free community Hence the Legislature, to guard
against such persons becoming charge upon the pub
lie has repeatedly provided by law that before manumis
sion can become complete the assent Of the State must
be obtained But after the master or owner has parted
with the right Of property the slave, either upon terms
Of the common law, by viii, contract written, or in
parole entered into directly between the and bis
slave upon consideration moving from the slave the
master or stranger behalf Of the slaYe what was
the status Of such slave before the assent of the State
obtancd It well settled by courts that his
relations TO his former MASTER owner well to the
community, wholly changgl He owes no service or
labor to his former % any else And if he
voluntarily goes TO another State in this condition
where slavery is net recognized he violates no law of
this State or Of the United States and thereby to all in
tents and purposes becomes free In this intermediate
state between freedom and slavery rather the law
formerly existed, qualified citizenship and bondage he
has nch0ate right to freedom, and no one can inter-
pose any objection to its assertion but the State He ia
free TO enjoy the fruits of his labor and after the
assent Of the State is given his manumssio he may
sue for and collect note given him in the interval be-
tween the time at which bis former master vested him
with the right Of freedom and its final contamination
And Why should he not have capacity to support trust
made in his faYor during this period? We think, es
pecaly IN court Of equity, there * no reason or au
thorty to the contrary. Lewis vs. Simonton, g Hum
loJ IL Is clear IN such his freedom BY relation
must be held 10 extend to the time when the right FIRST
aecured and upon this principle this court has held he
could after the contamination Of his freedom take both
real and personal property, devised to him by his for
mer owner, much he support trust in bis IA
yor the trustee asserting thereto after he has obtained
the consent of the sovereign to bis manunssion Lewis
vs. Simonton, Hume, 1876; Laura JGne Hogan, 10
Hume, 1872 McCoud Karne's extr's Childs ct all
Coldwen, 248 Rose Porter by next friend vs.. Black
more admir- ct al COdwell, IS s. Nelson and Smith
1eer extrs William and Horace Smithpeter Cold
veil, ID; Banks VS.. Banks, Coldwell, 546.
Applying these principles to the under considera
on there can be no doubt at common law, the acts and
conduct of the intestae towards tho woman Letta and
Emily would have been sufficient to have wasted them
With inohoat right to freedom and if so under the
authorities aforesaid cited well the Of Abram
man of color, VS.. johnson ct al | Head 120 IL is
lear that the acts and candue of the neatate Parsons
" implication of law vested them with right manu-
mission and thereby conferred upon them the legal ca
'aaiy to support the trust IN question, which their for
ner oHneT had freely and voluntarily cOnferred upon
hem and had tho Institution Is slavery Eeased in the
State 1t would probably have been the duty of the ad
Illustrator 60 have applied for their emancipation But
by the rat6eation by tina people, of the amendments to
he constitution Of the State abolishing slavery tho
lent of the sovereign given in its most solemn and
IMPOSING form, and The complainant, Emily, is fully
with privilege of remaining in the State
md she may now in court of equity, by relation,
the rights which accrued to her under that trust
While in quasi state of freedom,
Affirm the decree of the Chancellor.
MILLIGAN, Judge.
Attest: J. G. FRAZER, Clerk