The New Orleans crescent. [volume] (New Orleans, La.) 1866-1869, 1868-03-20

q small portion hold water will form by no
means importsnt.se set OF 10 the cams pressed
against us. (Hesr. hear.) But think If the mat
ter were fairly adjusted against rs, We should not
be dsposed 10 gludge the payment. Louo sno
general cheering.) The expense would be quite
worth mourning, II only in order to obtain an
authoritative decision as to the position OF neu-
trails in future war. Hear, hear.) II the Ala
hama claimants are kept ont OF what may De que
to them, they ought to understand-snd l think
they viii understandable Il u not by any act OF
this government; and though party politics may
run high In the United States, will not believe
that any party can be reckless or insensibie 10
the interests OF their own country as 70 engage IN
quarrel or possibly engage In great and costly
war. for the sake of enforcing In one particular
way claim which II was In their power to settle,
| and probably settle In their own sense, without
any recourse 70 violence. TO do so would be con-
trsry not only 10 the reasonable. sense .. .ne
| phrase, for which no English equivalent exists
| Enforcfr ane porte ottrete "-breaking open
a door that is not locked. (Hear, hear, and
cannot but think that in some way Indirectly,
If not directly, the United States government may
| Re induced to waive this point IL they decline
| 10 DO that, ii remains to be seen WHISTLER any
other solution Of the question in dispute can be
| found Mr. Seward has more than once thrown
| cut hints of general commission which should
| deal with all the outstanding questions OF all de-
| scriptions between the two countries. have
verbally and through Mr.. Adams, suggested that
| he should develop the idea, speaking a. an iso.
| lated individual and without prejudice to what
may be done in the future. should have thought
| that international questions were better settled
| one by one; but am not disposed 70 reject any
reasonable mode of settlement. and if we can
argue upon the substance, | do not think either
| the government, the House or the country would
1 be disposed to stand out on the matter Of form.
| (Cheers) - 10
| Mr.. W. r. Foster could not conceive snything
more calculated 90 appease the irritation between
the two countries than the concluding remarks Of
the noble lord, and although he objected, in some
| slight degree TO the course which the noble lord
had taken with regard to the negotiations he fully
| believed he had been-most anxious to bring them
| to a favorable conclusion, and that there was
| really less difference between himself and the
| American government than the noble lord per.
haps supposed. Originally, when Mr.. Seward
offered 10 arbitrate the war was still proceeding
| and il was for the interests OF the American gov
| eminent that the question should be referred
| but when, in 1867. the noble lord made similar
offer the war had ceased. and 1t was for our in
terest 10 terminate the controversy. But the
| position Of the American government had changed.
| They fell back from their position of advocates OF
| beligerent rights 10 their old standpoint OF the
| great neutral power, and advocated accordingly
the privilege of neuirals. Hence the noble lord
was now placed in the positicu of making an offer
| in accordance with our own interests, which the
British government had refused when made by
the Americans in accordance with their interests
at the moment. He did not for q moment
sympathize with the complaint of the
| American government m WHAT tley Caltcu our
premature recognition of the belligerent rights Of
the Confederates, but he did not think the ground
now taken by that government was the one stated
by the noble lord. He did not believe they ex-
pected anything so absurd as that. As 10 refer
irg the question 10 arbitration, while he thought
we had the clesrest case on the point itself be
could not see why we should object to make thst
case before an arbitration. There might be an
objection to such course, il arbitration was
merely meant 10 be mode Of making confess
sion where we knew we were wrong. But he be-
lieved that the parties to the treaty OF Paris
int nded that arbitration should in future be re-
gaIded as a means Of deciding disputes between
nations, by the intervention Of a third party, with
oui war or threat of war. In that line he trusted
arbitration would henceforth be regarded, and
therefore be could not see that the fact OF think
ing ourselves right was any reason why we should
decline arbitrsIion between ourselves and another
nsiion. Everybody in England wishes to have the
ficuly amieably arranged, as did every party
10 the United States, with the exception OF the
Fenians. The noble lord was himself most anx-
ous 10 settle, and. il his suppositions we're cor
xect. all the United States government wanted
was to make use Of certain arguments, and he
hoped the noble lord would not allow the nego-
tialion to break off on that ground, bat would re-
serve 10 himself The right of disappearing those
arguments. We are slso to consider whether this
matter could be settled otherwise than in arbitra-
ton. Hear, hesr.) He thought that II states
man OF high position were sent to America, with
power from the noble lord, the matter in dispute
might be arranged.
Mr.. Mil addressed the House. He said: We
are bound to make our municipal law sufficient
for the fullment Of our international obligations.
IL was rot sufficient and this was the only ground
| Of complaint which could be urged. The ques-
ton was whether we were bound By international
Law TO prevent certain things from being done
ard whether, If we were so bound, we did all
that We could TO fulfill tho obligation. He con-
graduated the House and the public that the issue
between the United States and this country was
an exceedingly small one, and that this small
fo1a tod Han ntnfo Ia
question:. He did not think there was much
room for blame in any quarter. This discussion
had brought out evidence that the tw0parties 10
the correspondence did not understand one sno-
Their. (Hesr, besr.) The noble lord, as 1t seemed
! had not thoroughly understood what the United
States demanded, and the United Ststss govern
ment had not understood what the noble lord re-
fused. He was confident that the United States
had never demanded that the question whether
we were premature in recognizing the belligereni
rights Of the Confederstes should be referred 70
arbitration. IL could not be maintained that our
recognition, even if premature, be violation
of international law. He had again and again
seen it admitted before Americans. and even IN
the writings of Mr.. Seward himself, that our re.
ccgnition of the belligerent rights of the South
was thing about the truth of which we had, by
international law right 10 decide for ourselves
II was. however, urged that what We did was IN
friendly precipitate, and that such precipitation
was unprecedented.
Mr. Mil said he, however, cordially welcomed
| tne Dlns tnrOWn out Dy the hOOle lOru lotantey)
as TO the probability of solving this question 10
some other way than by arbitration. Indeed, he
did not see for what arbitration was specially re-
| quTed In this country, az present, who were
disposed TO deny that we owed reparation in some
sort Of degree 10 the United States? 1t was quite
clear that the noble lord ives Of the opinior.
This, therefore, was not a case in which srbitra-
ton was wanted. II we owed anything we must
pay il, and what we wanted was some one to say,
not whether we ought to pay, bat how much ; ald
and this would he best declared, not by arbitr
ton, but by mixed commission. Hear, hear
he could not but think that there WAS great in-
crease Of good aud friendly feeling on both sides
| Of the wafer. There were few people In tn {
country who didn't believe an arbitrator woud
decide sgsinst us, and thatiE would be exceedingly
for The interest Of this country that it should be
(Hear, hear.) In such state Of affairs II some
| person-he would not say his honorable frienj
the member for Birmingham-not unacceptable to
| the Americans, were sent 10 them and il neg0ta-
lions we're opened on basis Of an admission that
Great Britain owed them reparation, aud the OBJ
| jeot WAS neTely 70 ascertain the amount, he
could not believe there would be any considerable
difficulty in arriving at settlement without going
| beyond The two dispatches. He hoped that some
| hing of this kind WAS intended ia the hint which