The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1868-12-21
RUSSIA IN ASIA.
The Advancing Russian POwer-Anairs
Hin British IndiR-The Prospect Any
thing but Bright.

diBintegrati0n," Tor What We know, JnOuXn we
are habituslly incredulous of all such state
ments but pending that social change, it is
quite certain that the Government of India has
received an alarm from new quarter severe
enough to startle II into modification OF its
foreign policy. Sir John Lawrence, 1t is well
known, has been throughout his vioeroyslty
the advocate of policy in our dealings with
Russia which his critics satirize as one of
''masterly inaotion," and his advocates, th,,
ablest Of whom mas Jus's h%%1vn elected member
for Hereford, describe more correctly
as one of "watchful expectatic,n.n
He has persistently refused to Invade
Afghanistan, or seize Candahar, or Garrison
Herat, or do anything else oaloula'ee 'eed need
lessly to accelerate q conflict with the advano-
ing Russian power. He has been, in fact, the
most determined, though the ydost moderate,
of all the opponents OF The Russophobia
chronic among Anglo-Indi ans An incident,
however, has recently Occurred which has
compelled the Viceroy TO review bis policy,
and has determined h,m, if we are rightly in
formed, to press new one upon the India
House and the Foreign Office. This is nothing
less than the receipt of information, appa-
rently authentio, certainly most grave, that
Russia had discovered 6 forgotten weak point
in our fro1tier, and is pressing towards that.
The Government possesses in Mr.. J.. ID. For
syth, the Commissioner of the Jullundur Divi-
sion, a man in whom it has for many years
reposed an exceptional confidence, especially
with regard to Himalayan affairs. This
gentleman, an acute man of the world, much
experienced in Indian diplomacy, is in foreign
policy what may be called an Anglo-lndian
Whig, not much influenced by extreme views
on one side or the other, and inclined to
think that his first duty is to carry out not
only the orders, but the policy Of the Govern
ment he represents. lie has, however,
arrived, during hill tour in Ladakh at three
very disagreeable conclusions, which, with
their grounds, he has impressed on the gov
ernment of India. First, the Eastern Tur-
kestan, or, to put it more plainly to English
readers, the region between Thibet and
Afghanistan, through which Russia must ap-
proach if she designed TO invade us through
Cashmere instead of Afghani5tan, is rich
enough to support a largo army with ease,
is, in fact, judging from its trade, very fer
tile region; secondly that the notion
of the impassability of the Hmalayas
on the northeast is pure delusiOn.
This is stated ON the authority of
actual journeys made by Er. Forsyth and
others, who declare that the physical difficult
ties IRE so few that, ''instead OF wall II 900
feet high rising up as IS supposed, the
gradients are sufficiently easy to admit of
railroad being made, apd there are no insuper-
able objections to our constructing q road for
csmels the whole way across the Hjmalaya
A casual observer might suppose such thing
impossible, but We have the facts to 60 upon,
and camels have on several occasions been
brought even over the difficult Ksrak0rum
route; joTtiori they could be brought by the
ChangchenmOo and along made road into
LahOul." The cold is severe, bat the fall of
snow is slight, and without entering into geo.
graphical controversy, it may be assumed that
competent local officers are convinced that
European army, with guns, could enter India
by this route. That is, TO use a European au-
alogy, they are convinced that the Branner,
which was supposed impossible, is more easily
passable than the st. GOthard. There is hole
in the north-northsast corner OF the ssmi-cir-
oular wall which shuts out India from the rest
OF Asia. Thirdly 1t is the conviction OF these
officers, derived from cOllated native and Chi
nese accounts, that Russia has obtained per-
mission to establish a cantonmant at Gumab,
point which commands the chief passes on
this route; and that the ruler of Yarkund the
only strong State between Russia and Cash
mere has entered into negotiations with the
Gar in the attitude of a suppliant; in other
words, that direct Russian influence will shortly
be extended as far as the Happy Valley; or, to
put it in a form more closely within the range
OF English thought, that Germany, if inclined
TO threaten Italy, can march uuoppOsed
through the Tyrol, and is in possession of the
Brenner. We do not we repeat, assert that
these statements are exact. For anything We
could contribute to the discussion, East Tur-
kestan may be a Sahara, and the Himalaya
Gumah an invention of the Chinese. Ali we
affirm is that officers of remarkable capacity
and coolness, personally acquainted with part
of the route and officially responsible for
their Investigations as TO the remainder, hold
these views that the Viceroy believes them
sound, and that a change of policy will
probably be the consequence of his belief.
We must confess We do not like the
intelligence at all. AS our readers are
aware, we have steadily opposed the
Indian demand for an ''active'' policy in
Central Asia, but that was because we believed
the PuDjaub by far the best place for the
battle, should it ever arrive. We believe
that still, but with this modification. If the
northeastern passes are really as easy as is
represented, and ii the Russian Government
had really formed a cantonment at Gumah,
the British Government would be in this
almost unendurable position, that in the event
OF any quarrel, however serious, for Constan-
tinOple or Egypt, the Car could at any mo-
ment, without expense or great effort, paralyze
the power of our greatest ally, the military
Indian empire. With Russian troops collect.
ing at Gumsh we could not take white sol
der from India, or leave the Pupiaub without
an irresistible garrison. 1t would be madness
to do either. India, without occupying
Russian army, would be fully occupied hersel
by it's possible arrival, while her treasury
would even in time OF peace be loaded with
expenditure. II would be necessary to annex
the valley of Cashmere, a most annoying
step, for more reasons than one, and turn that
small but beautiful territory into q grea
camp, at endless expenditure both of troops
and money; and, moreover, to do all thi!
without reducing the old Afghan difficulty one