The Valley Virginian. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1865-1895, 1868-01-15

was discovered by tho enemy; that the stall
Of the Army Of Northern Virginia was the'
made a Icomplete organization by itself; am
that the artillery Of the same army was con
solidated into one corps ut about the sam
time. The authors speak Of the discipline 9
their army at that time in higher terms thar
General Lee, according to some authorities
has sometimes used about it., sgiasj. .o3s ii
| It has been commonly, and we think truly
charged upon Southern officers and authors
that it has been their prartice to understat'
the nnmber of their; own troops and to over
state the number ofours.. No such chars'
can be brought against the authors ct thu
| book. On the contrary, they give 70 Gener
al Hooker's army total smaller by some ter
thousand than Mr.; Swinton assigns to II
while their estimate Of the effective Of; Lee
army seems 10 exceed Swiu,ou's BY abou
seven thousand. The Northern writer max
es the proportion Of the two armies to be 2:
CATO 10, the Southern as 20 to TO-, The
proportion is bad .enoughsfor us at best; but
the difference is material when We are count
ing men by ten thousands e4 a.ssis r:f
Tits well known that General Hooker con-
ccived plan of considerable merit for plac
| ing his army on General Lees left flank, and
forcing .,im to come out of his elaborate lines
about Fredericksburg, behind which lif We
may accept the somewhat. cxtrayagant asser-
ton Of Messrs Hotchkiss and Allan '''the
Confederate army was secure from attack ln
front as Wellingtoni at Torres s; edras. 4 Il .
His execution of this plan was good land even
L. ~ ,f. xvan fald in
| the book before us but this is familiar mat
ter, and we pass from it to the check which
our army met with near Tabernacle Church,
the Immediate cessation OF the advance, and
the Withdrawal to the lines constructed abous
Charlottesville. This event of the CAM
paign has always been matter. OF special woa,
der to those who have had any knowledge OF
the facts. Indeed, SO mysterious has it been
that Mr. Svihton seems to have. felt himself
reduced to the utterly unsatisfactory suggges
ton that Gen. Hooker's conduct was actuated
by an impulse of romantic generosity. It is
not easy to believe that the fabulous 'schival
rous courtesy" of the commander Of the
English troops at Fontenoy was initiated on
an enormous scale beyond the Rappahannock,
and we look with the liyeliest interest to this
book for an explanation Of the enigma. We
find in it enough to satisfy us that General
Hooker, though he committed one OF the
most Woful errors ever committed in war,
was not guiltyof snch fatuity IS is, common,
" supposed \ He made terrible. mistake !;
but it is not true, as we believe is generally
supposed, that his successful advance was
checked by what was. comparatively speak
ing, mere. handful Of men. s.,5 ao;osq II
On the morning Of Friday, May I, Gen,
Hoe,ler commenced his movement from
Charlottesville toward fredericksburg and
Lees lett flank. He moved a little less than
forty thousand men, on the river road, the
plank road, and the old turnpike, and he
held in reserve, beside his cavsry, a force
which could not have been much less than
thirty thousand men. the greater part of
which was disposed within radius Of one
mile from Charlottesville. Lis advance
met with but little opposition until it ap
preached the position taken up BY the Con
federates near the junction of the plank and
turnpike roads with the old Mine road, about
three miles east Of Charlottesville. s This
line, it appears from the book before US,
Anderson had ''busily fortified" and it also
appears that there were rife-pits on Smith
HiH-a, height TO the right and rear of the
Confederate position. These facts are not to
be lost sight 81 More than tais. Our aa-
thors tell us this-line was occupied by three
out of the four divisions Of, Jackson's corps,
by Anderson's division of Longstreet's corps
and by three Of the four brigades OF Laws
division of the same corps7--a force amount
| ing in the, whole to. about forty thousand
men, and all under the, general command Of
jackson. These are OF the utmost impor-
lance They amount to this: that about q
third of the. Federal army was advancing
through an unknown country, under nobody
| In particular, ,agaiust about an, equal mum
Der of Confederate troops established in, a
country perfectly familiar to them, and com
maaded BY the, most brilliant general that
the war had YET developed {. Il was the old,
lold story-7a. fraction, of the Union army, un-
der command Of subordiDates, advanced
against the bulk Of the. Southern army,
under the command OF. = man who was little
! short Of magician in his control of Els troops
q The first result was what might have been
expected. The active Jackson did not CON
tent himself with standing on the defensive,
but promptly took the offensive. * He did not
wait for the Development OF the Federal ad
vance, but took the iniatiyehimsefb before the
preliminary movements on, our side, were
completed The second result was natural
enough, but not what might have been ex
pected from, "Fishting Joe, Hooker, Such
of our troops sas were Erst engaged Tough,
bravely enough, but the great tanker pres
emily caused atbrigads Or SO to appear GU the
right Of our advance, and that was enough
melancholy as 1T may be to write the words
Instead at supporting his advance with the
great mass Of troops which be held in reserve
our fighting general ordered withdrawal. o.
his troops to the position they had occupied
in the morning. After gaining such an lad
vantage of position as would have given as
sured victory TO Frederick the Great, he caus
ed his troops to retire, and made every MAI
in his army feel that their forced marches hae
been made in vain, aud took from every sol
| der, the eliza of successful advance Th.
best criticism on the soendness Of his reason:
for this retrogade movement, namely, that h'
feared that his forces might be encountered
by the enemy while deDouchiag from th'
woods, and before they had time to deploy
may be found III the subsequent achievement,
OF the army of LEE salae9 5a8 Na;
4 al