The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1868-08-12
EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.
PRUSSIA AND ITALY.
general La Marmora and ths PEussian
Alliance.

mentarv episode in reference to the relations
between Prussia and Italy, tor which we are
indebted TO General La Marmora. If that episode
possessed mere historical interest 1t might be
passed over in silence. But the statements to
which General La Marmora's speech would lend
currency are calculated to embtter the future
even more than to excite regret respecting the
past political aud military relations of two great
countries; and therefore, as General La Mar.
mora, perhaps with the very pardonable view of
retaining his own personal prestige, diminished
since the campaign of 1866, has felt himself at
liberty to communicate TO the Italian Parliament
a document which, being one affecting the rela-
tons between two governments, he now possess.
ing simply private capacity had no right to
publish, and which would lead all Europe to
suppose that the of affairs at the outbreak
OF the campaign of 1866 was very different from
what it really was, it is desirable to exhibit the
facts of the case in their real character, order,
and proportions.
Three weeks before the breaking out Of the
war for the liberation of Venice, Count DUse.
dom, the Prussian Minister al the Court of
FLORENCE, had repeated Gonversauons with Gene.
to impress on the general how desirable 1t was
that the Italians should not throw themselves
inConsiderately upon the Quadraliteral, but
should act in perfect agreement with their
Prussian allies, in order to secure the great aim
of their league, the breaking up OF the Austrian
monarchy. Count d'Usedom was not alone in
those conversations with General La MaCmora;
his views were repeated and enforced by an
elderly officer, General Bernhard, the military
representative attached to the Prussian en-
Instructions of their Government, Count d'Use-
dom and General Bernhard set forth with the
most perfect confidence the entire strategetcal
plan proposed by Prussia tor the common action
OF the Prussian and Italian armies. Prussia
would not have stopped short before 0lmutz,
Koenigratz, or Theresens stadt, but would have
pushed straight on to Vienna. And what was
the plan in favor with General La Marmora?
He was not prepared to announce one. 1t did
not appear that be had formed one. Count
DUsedOm and General Bernhard laid before
General MarmOra all the DlanS Prussia.
but they were kept in ignorance of those OF
Italy. In this state of imperfect confidence
they could only suggest, but did not pretend to
dictate. that the best course would be to leave
strong corps tor the defense of Turin and
Milan and, traverslng the Pc, TO leave the for
tresses TO the left, and push on towards Ley
bach, Trieste, and Vienna - not stopping at
the Isonzo. The Quadriateral is far more
strongly fortified on its western side IN con-
sequence OF that front being turned to Piedmont
and France, and any attempt to pass would be
fatal. On the contrary, the Quadrlateral to the
south, on the side OF FerraIa and Bologna,
where no apprehenSiOns were entertained from
the hostility OF the Pope, was comparatively
weak, and as, moreover, the natural difficulties
were diminished at that season of the year.
from the rivers being low and the mountain
torrents almost dried up, march in that
direction would not have presented very alarm.
ing obstacles. To these considerations of the
Ptussian Minister-n- General, General La Mar
mora never made any reply. Aud yet the
dominant idea OF the Italian Government had
been clearly that OF declaring and carrying on
great national war; BY what causes was Italy
prevented from giving effect to this idea? BY
the desire o France to keep in check both
Italy and Prussia, a desire prompting the
French efforts to localize the war as much as
possible. In Germany the efforts of France did
not meet with the desired success. 1t
otherwise in Italy, where assurances were OBJ
tanned That the war should De reduced as much
as possible TO the proportions of series OF mere
skirmlshes, and where a pledge was given by
Austria that IN the event of her beIng victo-
rious she would not pass the Mincio. The efforts
ErQnnp EpcpnHp6 EnOlQp6
dpomatists having received instructions to do
all in their power after the war appeared ineVi-
table to locallze 1t as much as possible. Now 1t
is evident that such plan was wholly at variance
with the plans and interests OF Prussia, which
had in view, not the securing OF this or piece
OF territory, but the breaking up OF the Austrian
Empire; for if Austria possessed the certainty Of
the war on the Italian side being thus localized
she would have lett just troops enough to hold
the, tortresses in the Venittan - territory,
weight of her armies on her German
foes. The other Italian Generals CON-
pletely shared the views OF Prussia, foresaw the
incOnyenlences and dangers OF a localized war,
and attempted to fuse their own convictions
into the mind of General La Marmora. But was
it to be expected that he would accept the ad-
vice of his brother generals? Such was the
state of matters-the war was on the point of
breaking out; within two or three days was TO
be held the final council OF war, deciding on the
plan of the campaign, and the Prussian minister
apprehensive OF the consequences to both Italy
and Prussia should the former determine ON
carrying on a localized war and still more,
should an attack be made on the Quadrllateral,
a point certain to entail failure. determined, at
least, to relieve both his Government and him.
self from the responsibility OF a wrong de-
cision. Accordingly Count d'Usedom summed
up in a despatch the precise points which
for several weeks had been the subject
of daily discussion between General La
MarmoTa, General Bernhard and himself 1t
must not be forgotten that General La Marmora
had all this time been holding, and at the very
moment was still holding the portfolio Of
Foreign Affairs, and that Count D'Usedom, rs
representative OF Prussia at the Court OF
Florence, had been under the daily necessity of
conierrlpg with him on the political questions
from which the military questions were, at such
crisis, absolutely inseparable. When General
La MarmOra complains that he, commander
in.chef, received such military communtca-
tion from diplomatist, he strangely overlooks
the tact of his being at that time diplomatist
himself, and required in his diplomatic
capacity to treat with his brother minister
on the great Interests affecting the two
countries. AS 10 the form OF the despatch, 1t
was Straightforward, busness-like paper,
with no beating about the bush which
called spade a spade, and sought to impress
matters OF the most vital importance to the
State which the writer represented as well as to
the State Of which General La Marmora COM
manded the forces. Well, what did General La
Marmora do with this document? He shelVed
lt-snch is his own admission-his Justification
Depg that he took alarm at document of such
importance being transmitted through two
dlplOmauc chanCelleIies. ! am informed that
count DUsedom has expressed himself IN very
strong terms about this complaint of General
La Marmora, and has observed that, having
perfect confluence in the gentleman attached
10 the PrusslaN Chancellery, he had taken for
granted an equal confidence by General La
Marmora IN the Commentators Cerruti, the