The Pacific commercial advertiser. [volume] (Honolulu, Hawaiian Islands) 1856-1888, 1868-01-18

end which was the most nearly crowned with
success, was q reciprocity treaty adopted by the
Island Government through the influence of the
Hon. Mr.. Allen, in 1854, which failed in the
American Senate through the votes OF Messrs.
Benjamin and Siidell-
The prescn; proposed treaty. though upon its
face Offering very large benefits to the Islands
immediate and direct pecuniary emOluments-was
strongly opposed by the native and foreign Popu-
lation. (other than American,) and, though urged
by the King. seems 10 have been consented 10 &c
a kind of last choice between utter agricultural
and commercial prostitution, and 4 reciprocity
which they felt tends 10 their ultimate absorption
liz Is supposed any attempt 1T purchase would
have been thwarted by other Powers. They
could offer nlOney-as much rs the United States.
50 far they stood with Us on equal ground, and
could with our bids have bid higher; hut they
could not offer reciprocity. \ reciprocity between
England or France and the Sandwich Islands
would have been of less benefit to the Islands
than a similar interchange with the United States,
by the entire difference of the cost of transporting
their raw material 10 Europe instead of TO San
Francisco. The Islands gain by reciprocity with
the United States $50 per ton on their raw ma
terial more than they could gain by reciprocity
with England or France
Mr.. Seward knew where he had the advantage,
and has taken this course.
VII.
How far will this treaty tend Immediately TO
convert the Islands into a defence, and assurance
of American commerce on the Pacific 1t will
naturally promote our intercourse with their
population, and from that intimacy, combined
with identity of interests, pursuits and profit,
American influence must increase In the native
mind. The spirit of enterprise in our people and
their close proximity viii induce American citi-
zens promptly to move on 10 the fields of COM
mercial profit on the Islands which the treaty
opens. Other natiOnalities move more slowly,
are more distant, and viii have less faith in the
permaneuce of the union between the Islands and
main-will, in fact, be behind-hand in occupying
the ground. The treaty practically will give a
monopoly of the Increased commerce and agricul-
ture of the Islands To American citizens. Its
operation Will be that by degrees, the native
chiefs will sell their lands 10 the newcomers, and
the real property of the Islands pass by purchase,
piecemeal, into American hands So that. in all
probability, at the expiration of this treaty 1t
viii be difficult 10 say whether the people VIII be
Americans in Hawaii, or Hawaiians in America.
Immediately, the mere presence of so many
Americans in the Islauds would cause a hostile
power to pause before attempting 10 make them a
naval rendezvous, while the treaty itself will con-
fer upon this Government almost the right-at
least a very strong pretext-to arrest by force
such occupation should it any time be attempted.
VIII.
But, ultimately, at the expiration of the treaty,
what probably will be its effect? 1t is not un-
likely that from twenty to thirty thousand Amer
leans viii be found busy on the Islands, digging,
planting, building, trading, fishing, thriving them
' anu Causing ITu 4l II Oui1l 1lEt<luN
eight-tenths of the skilled industry of the capital
of these Islands belong to Americans. and of the
twenty-six plantations producing over one hun
dred tons OF sugar yearly, twenty are now in
American hands. OF one hundred and four COM
mercial firms in the Islands (Which includes ali of
note) ninety are either wholly or partly Ameri-
can. The material interests, the fortunes, the
daily bread. the accumulated saving of this push
ing, working, intelligent crowd will, at the expi-
ration of the treaty, be absolutely dependent on
- L. -l-.-@ 49, ~Ia~ - 49,.
procity, will be to turn their property from a
benefit to n burden, their profits to losses, their
industry to waste, themselves TO bankrupts. And
more than this. The revenues of the Government
from internal taxation, which by that time will
have increased, and with that increase its expen-
ditures also, will be imperilled. 1t Is more than
probable that the active influence of the resident
Americans, and the danger of exasperating them
on the one hand, with the prospective derange-
ment of the island revenue on the other, will be
TO induce the royal family and its adher-
ents to yield 10 the logic of events and resign
gracefully a position which they cannot maintain
with comfort and honor.
The natural finish will be the peaceful incorpo-
ration of the Islands into the american Republic,
in order to secure in perpetuity the profits and
property created by reciprocity.
IN.
Let us next consider the probable profit and
loss To this Coast and the rest of the United
States in n pecuaiary sense, resulting from this
treaty.
So far as this Coast is concerned, it is impossi-
bic To find any item of loss which will accrue to
its States or Territories. The Reciprocity Treaty
admits into the Sandwich Islands, free of duty,
our lumber, our manufacture of almost every
kind, our food crOps-ln fact. everything that we
can, proftably To ourselves, export. Its effect is
to make US their bankers, their manufacturers,
their carriers, and, generally, their agents and
these, not only for the present population and its
but TOR the prospective increase under
the treaty For instance, suppose a sugar plan
should be started at the Islands. Nearly
t. o-thirds of the total investment will be for ma
chInery, buildings, fences, agricultural implements
and supplies of breadstuffs and clothing. These
come from here almost wholly. The los 10
the United States revenue is only in a very small
perhaps one-torty-hith of the whole,
by Us. 30 far as we on this Coast are
concerned, We can but modestly concur, happy
that our position here enables us 10 catch without
or effort the lions share of the benefits of a
measure of national policy.
The profit and loss to the United States is an
entirely different question, and no doubt il has
been, and will be, well counted by the Cabinet
and the Senate. Immediately the treaty looks
enough. The Hawaiians abolish duties
on American products which last year yielded To
them some S6i 900, while our Government adj
duty free Hawaiian raw staples on which
year it collected about S450,000.
During the seven years of the treaty, in all
probability, this difference of apparent loss viii
DC largely increased. The main Item from which
the revenue loss will arise II sugar. The Hawai-
ian Commercial AGrerhser- in Its yearly resume,
in the spring of 1906, places the entire amount
Of grazing and tillable land in all the islands at
500. 900 acres, and the amount of land suitable
for sugar cane culture at 100 600 acres. This
may be taken as an extr,me statement, as the
object evidently was to make The show
Ing as imposing as possible.
There are at present twenty-six sugar planta-
tons estimated TO produce from 100 to 200 tons