The New Orleans crescent., 1868-08-28
The ELEMEKis OF A MILITARY EMPIRE.

1t is the silent thought even Of some o
these who most bitterly execrate the revolu
tionary schemes Of the dominant faction tha
the present current Of change will have Nc
rest until it loses itself in the tideless sea O
military empire. Historical analogies, il
must be admitted, are rather favorable to such
view But historical analogies are FIRE.
quently deceptive. The political situation in
this country presents, TO be sure, points oi
resemblance to such scenes as preceded the
C@sarian empire OF Rome and the Napoleonic
empire Of France. The country seems dread
fully near to that pass when the popular
masses would welcome the appearance of an
armed arbiter between Unsuitable revolution
and corruption on the one hand, and
unconpromising reaction and reform on the
other. But along with some obvious SINH
larities to the historical cases referred to,
there are also some conspicuous dissimi-
I larities.
Upon thorough examination the basis of
great and permanent military despotism,
of the one man power, will be found much
more complex than common opinion sup
poses it to be. A large aud effective army,
obedient to central head, is of course an
essential element of such basis. But some-
thing more than the argument Of domestic
necessity, the tyrants plea, is demanded to
give durability to the existence of this ele.
ment Foreign antagonism is the REQUIRED
complement Foreign war was the normal
condition of Rome. All the world was the
enemy OF Rome, except that which was Ro-
man. So it may be said of the great military
powers OF Europe, that for them foreign war
is always present fact or an impending
eventuality, and that every country on the
continent which is not submissive To French
Frusslan or Russian policy, is the enemy of
Russia, Prussia or France. Herein is the
perpetual argument for those immense mill
tary establishments which make modern
Casars of the sovereigns of those three
powers. The people feel the need Of a strong |
centralized government for the sake of ma |
uonal security or national aggrandizement; |
but jealous of aristocracy, abhorring the idea
OF ruling class, of having many masters
over them, they will only consent that such
a government shall be confided to single
hand. 1t would be quite erroneous, however.
to suppose that they are insensible to the
many and great evils of the system which is
called, In Napoleonic phrase, the rule of one
by the will of all; system which is apt to
prove In effect, by dint of organized coercion
within under pretext of providing against
dangers without, the equal slavery of all 10
The common despotism of one. Nothing but
the present sense of its national necessity
could induce the French to tolerate it q dav
onger.
now, in respect to the United States, we
nay look In vain for the same argument in
'ehalf OF military empire. This country. in
Ter continental relations, is practically without
my foreign antagonism. There is no enemy
IN any OF her borders, and she is liable to no
ontingency Of foreign attack from any quar- {
er which would justify, in the popular judg-
nent the maintenance of large standing
rmy to be used at the arbitrary discretion of |
single man. I
II is seen, then, that arguing from historical s
nalogies, the United States lacks one of the /
itherto essential conditions for conversion t
lto military empire. t
Admit, however, that the case Of the United S
tates is exceptional, and that it may result in a
ie establishment Of a military empire
'unded IN domestic conditions alone. Ac-
'rdIng to historical examples, we must con.
nde that this part of the basis of such an o.
npire must be arrived at by the suppression !.
partisan cliques and factions. and the | b.
'rogation of all odious and unpopular
onoPolies Then would come the union of n, ~
% demos, or the democratic mass, drawn III
gether by common instincts and common d'
terests, and above all by the sentiment of D.
uaiity, about single representative, cham 50
on and ruler. This is the Napoleonic and r.
esarlan theory of the imperial Office, what L,
er that office may have been in practice. y.
IL is clear that no such basis as this can be ga
yically developed from the policy of the Of
dlcal faction now in power. This faction ,e 20
hiled with the spirit of exclusiveness
'nopoly and Prescription. 1t has appealed Lc
the sentiment of equality in but one Sec W
OF the population, and that the smallest: ms
Dlacks, namely, who do not number ona r.
slfth of the whole. 1t has appealed to the
ord, and exhausted the instrumentalitv of re'
sword in efecting its usurpations; and, in be
failure OF other remedies in behalf of sec
people, 1t will assuredly perish by the ne ne
lrd And should a permanent military yei
pire ensue, it is not Grant, who has been r.
ready to enforce the execrable misrule of ths
faction, whom the people would deliber- did
ly call on to be their Caesar. dt li'
=, ow
he Pendleton Guards, strong in number. Pc
niger still in the old names they bear. and 'sn