, 1868-10-30

600 but this advantage, though an euor.
nous one In the long run, will not tell At
once. France might be exhausted before
Prussia, but France, as NJ. Magne has shown.
can for the present obtain any money she
wants, and the wars of to-day are rarely
carried up to the point at which national ex
haustlon is apt to be felt, least of all wars
for reputation and territory. Each nation
strikes hard and streight, the masses employ.
ed are too vast for delay, and armies are too
nearly conterminOus with nations to admit
OF many, or indeed of protracted campaigns.
with statistics, or II Ne eN&6fERArasa our columns
has no reservoir of energy like Paris, so dam
yerous in peace, SO valuable in war that
France contains As cities with more than
$4,000 people, and North Germany only 80 !;
that old Prussia has hut Al, $4,000 acres
under crop, and France 81 ,66l 600; but We
have stated enough to show that in available
resources, in the power to fight on a great
scale for long time, the Hohenzolerns are
not yet the equals of the Bonapartes. Many
things may remedy this disparity, individual
genius, organization, or the national charac-
ter but on these points observation can tell
us but little beyond few general facts. We
English, moved, it may be, by an instructive
sympathy with all of Teutonc blood, are apt,
especially since Sadowa, to think the Ger
mans the higher race, and no doubt they are
physically stronger than the French But
they labor under great liability to disease,
citizen life not qualifying them for the open
FLED arms of precision are as fatal to phys
cal power as gunpowder was to armor, and
Frebchmen can march, when driven, rather
the quicker. In mental power the Prussians
may be superior, on the whole, but it must
not be forgotten that the very best qualities
of the French chara cter, its courage, invenS
tiveness, aud elasticity, comes out most
strongly in war; that in campaign its
main defect, vanity, ceases to be injurious,
while its greatest foible, febrile impatence,
has all the effect of energy. A Frenchman
in spirits is a difficult soldier to beat, and
in this war he would begin with the convic.
tion, inspired if not justified by history, that
be was the better soldier of the two. He
may not, of course, be equally well led, but
the impression of Euglishmen that he would
not be is little more than a guess. Prussia
possesses in Count Won Moltke a very great
strategist, strong alike in his genius and in
the full conviction that it is the first in the
world, but the Seven Weeks War did not
develop Generals of unexceptionable ability,
aud ttU Prussiau Oou-s hoo tendenoy to
put its trust in princes. Napoleon Is en-
barrassed in that way also, being unwilling
to trust armies to men who hates his dynasty;
but between princess and political marshals
there is not much to choose, and the French
Chieftain can stoop for General among the
masses of the people, while the Prussian is
limited in his choice to the caste of the we'll
born. Either map turn up man worth
armies, but the process of turning him up
will be quicker in democratic France than
in aristocratic Prussia. The single point
which in this respect is unfaVorable to
France is her autocratic regime, which in
eighteen years may have exhauoted her stock
of genius, but it must not be forgotten that
this regime has been less aotocratic in the
armv than in any great department Of French
life. The Empire has but few ministers Of
genius, cynics say but one, but the army
must have many an original General in its
ranks. We are far from the folly of attempt
ing to predict, should the great fight come
off, to which side victory will incline; but
we eau venture to say with confidence that
North Germany has reason, serious reason,
to think deeply before she abandOns the
hope of peace with France.-LOn. spectator.