The Iowa plain dealer. [volume] (New Oregon, Howard County, Iowa) 1867-1895, 1868-03-27

With an intrepid confidence in its
own strength, which 10 sufficiently
numerous to feel all the passions
by means which reason prescribes.
Il is asuinst the eaterpyising ambition Of
this dspoyimnet that tAs people ongAt to
indulge all their jealousy and srAasst al
hheir preeaut,7ns.
The legislative department derives
its superiority in our governments
from other circumstances. Its
constitutional ps~ers being al once more
srtensive and less susceptible Of preeise
limits, 1t can pitk greater facility ma sk
under complicated and indirect measures
the eneroachments .rhieh II makes on the
CO ordinate departments. II Is net
unfrequently a question Of real NICE
| ty in legislative bodies, whether the
operation of particular measure
will n, 1t extend beyond the lcgisla-
tive sphere. On the other sid:, the
executive power being restrained
within . narrower compass, AID
being more simple in its nature, and
the judiciary being described BY
landmarks still less uncertain, pro-
jects of usurpation by either of these
departments would Immediately be-
tray and defeat themselves. Nor 10
this oil. As the legislative depart
mcnt alone has access to the pock-
cts Of the people, and has in some
constitutions full discretion, and
in all prevailing influence over tho
pecuniary rewards Of those who gil
the other departments, . dependence
is thus created in the latter which
gives still greater facility to en-
croachments of the former.
I have appealed to ou. own expo
rience for the truth of what l ad-
| vance on this subject. We're it ncc-
essary to verify this experience by
particular proofs, they might be
multiplied, without end. l might
collect vouchers in abundance from
the records and archives Of every
State in the Union. But as more
concise and at the same time equal
ly satisfactory evidence, l will refer
to the example Of two States, at
tested by two uncxceptionablc au-
thorities.
The first example is that of Vir-
ginia, a State, which. as We have
seen, has expressly declared in its
Constitution that the three great
departments ought not to be inter-
mixed. The authority in support Of
it is Mr.. Jefferson who besides his
other advantages for remarking the
operations Of the Government, was
himself the chief magistrate Of the
State. In order to convey fully the
IDEAS with which his experience had
impressed him on this subject it will
be necessary to quote a passage Of
some length from his very interesting
"Notcs on the State of Virginia.
(Pagc 1859.
IAN the power Of government
legislative, executive, and judiciary.
result to the legislative body.
The concentration Of these in tie sane
hands is precisely the definition cf dtsrosie
government 1t UtN be no allsriatioss
that these po,rers ar,N be exercised by a
plurality o. hands and not bya single one.
One hundred and ssventy-tkyss dtsp0ts
zoo" III surely BE- as oppressive Gs one
Let those who doubt it turn their
eyes on the republic Of Venice. AS
little will it avail us that they are
chosen by ourselves. An elective
despo:islm is not tho government We
fought for; but one which should not
only bo founded on free principles
but in which the powers Of govern
mcnt should be SO divided and bal
anced among several bodies Of the
ma gistracy as that no one could
transcend their legal limits without
being cffectually checked and re-
strained by the others. For this
reason that convention w..ich passed
the ordinance Of government laid its
foundation on this basis, that tho
legislative, executive, and judiciary
departments should be separate and
distinct, so that no person should
exercise the powers Of more than
one of them at the same time. Bat
no barrier was provided between
these several powers The judiciary
and the executive members were left
dependent on the legislative for
thcir subsistence in Office, and somo
Of them for continuance in it. II,
therefore, the legislature assumes
executive and judiciary powers, no
opposition is likely to be made. nor
! if made can be effectual, because in
that case they may put their pro,
cccdings into the form Of an act Of
Assembly, which will render them
obligatory on the other branches.
They hayvc, accordingly, in many
instances decided rights which
should have been left to judiciary
controversy, and direction Of the
executive during tho whole time Of
their session is becoming habitual
and familiar.
The other State which I shall tako
for an example is Pennsylvania, and
tho othor authority the Council OF
Censors, which assembled in tho
years 1853 and 1884. A part Of tho
duty Of this body, as marked out BY
the constitution, was '.to inquire
whether the constitution had been
preserved inviolate in every part,
and whothcr the legislative and OK