The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1868-02-10
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vienna, January IS, 1868.
The organisation Of the army Is th,
only question which is sslllwIlting fo
solution In the reorganization Of thl
Austrian Empire. There is still I
striking contrast between the principle
represented in Vienna and the WiShei
Of the Hungarian nation. II Wsare Il
believe the accounts from Pesth, thu
Hungarlaua have already succeeded IL
forming schism on the question ant
the latter body SeemB to have by nj
means abandoned the idea Of the for
nation OF a Hungarian army. It Il
hIhtsd that HunsGry would in tha
case dsfray the expenses Of It's army
corpB and that 1t bad consequently
urged the lowest figure possible for tht
army expenses OF the empire. 1t Il
also rumored that the military system
as Inaugurated By the present minister
Of war soon after the termination o.
tie last campaign will bo dropped
again and the substitute system
introduced, z the IL ArmyO reduced
TO minimum and natlona
guard organized, composed OF the re,
serve, for service in the Interior. Il
this plan sbopld bs executed Austria
will prove that bitter experience has
not been able to teach any lessons to
this unhappy country, and the Aban-
doning Of the principle Of general mill.
tary duty will be q great step back.
ward for Austria. According TO the
principles Of the State the rich man
ought no longer 10 be allowed 10 With
draw himself by payment Of a certain
sum Of money from the most sacred
duties towards the community Of the
poor. Another point which renders
the adoption Of the system Of general
armament necessary, Is the acquisition
Of men Of intelligence TO the military
service. The reasons for our last de-
feats have been sufficiently explained,
and 1t lB apparent that want OF intelli.
gencs has been one Of them; 1t would
therefore appear impossible TO endeav-
or to reject to-day the measure Of re.
form, the adoption Of which was
received with 80 much applause last
year. But a still more absurd
Idea is the formation OF 4 national
guard out OF the men Of the reserve
who, would thus be almost entirely Sc.
parAted from the general movements
and operations ofthe army. The first
question which arises In regard to the
future organization Of the army Is to
know the number of men necessary to
Austria for maintaining It's position as
a great power, and for Its defence In the
event OF an attack from abroad. This
question 10 solved by look into the
military organization Of the States
which might possibly endanRer The In.
tegTIty of Austria. The North German
Confederation possesses ut present an
army OF ioperatIon OF 500, 900 men, which
by virtue OF Its excellent organization,
can be sent into the field within very
short notice. It has, besides this field
army, an imposing and compact ma
tlonal guard for the defence Of the
country In case OF an invasion. The
armies OF the South German States,
which Russia has more or less In tow,
are not comprised in that estimate.
The figure OF French and Russian field.
armies M equally high, and even Italy
is superior 10 rs II we add the national
guard Organised for field duty France
has been compelled by the development
Of the North German Confederation 10
re.orRanlze Its army without warllke
or offensive movement being thereby
Intended, and much less can Austria be
accused OF such Intentions for the re-
construction Of It's army, for we are,
through our geographical situation
more exposed to foreign invaslons than
most other countries. We may be
forced TO a war In spite OF our sincerest
desire for peace, and must therefore be
prepared for any eventually. Bat, II
the men Of the reserve are to be organ
lied into a national guard, which would
not assist the army ofoperation ut all
In case OF an action outside OF the en-
pire and only condltIonally In con-
dict within the borders of the State, a
term Of service OF ten or eleven years
In the line would be necessary In order
TO raise an army OF operation Of 500, 900
men. The adoption Of such a system
would expose US more or less TO the
changes Of the impending crisis, or
compel US to abandon Austrian and
limit ourselves to Hungarian policy.
The next question which arises Is TO
consider the manner In which the
army must be organized In order TO
raise such large number Of troops
without the treasury OF the State and
the interest Of the peoplein a national
political point OF view becoming too
much affected. Everybody agrees TO
the fact that this problem can only be
solved by the Introduction OF general
military duty and skillful combination
Of the operating army with the nation.
al guard But It Ia evident that II the
young men from the l7th TO the SD
year are withdrawn for the formation
Of u national guard, not more than Il
series OF six years would be left for the
formation Of the regular army, which,
with yearly cOnscripliOn Of l00,0
men and the deduction OF usual pre-
CenIage would only yield 100000 men,
too EmRll AN army for the present re.
quirement, and, what Is worse, that
army would be too expensive. The
last war, during which our army Of
operations only reached the figure OF
400, 0O0men Notwithstanding all The men
OF the reserve were called In, has sufli.
uiently shown the grave defects OF our
present army system.
The unity Of the army must be pre-
served under any circumstances and In
our debates with Hungary about the
future organization Of the army we
must not make any more concasSIons
rs we would otherwise lOBse all power
to preserve the integrity Of the empire
AS whole. The proposition Of Hum
gary TO pay ilH own national guard,
and 10 reduce the war expenses OF the
empire In proportion, would In case
of It's adoption, result In nothing loss
than the creation Of II Hungarian army
and The transfer Of tho defense not
only OF hereditary States but In certain
cases even Of the whole Monarchy,
with all its expenses on the CiSlithnnian
countries, which are already bur too
highly taxed. There IL no question
but that tue budget Of war has TO be
grsatly reduced, but la minimum can
only he arrived at after minimum fiR.
ure Of the army of operation haS been
agreed upon aud the above argument
would 20 to show that this figure Ia al
ready prescribed to us by force Of cir.
GumSlAnces. PreCAutlon and nrmneSs
N more necessary than ever, In order
not to create division In the army
through the Vaccinations OF the Hun.
RarlRu Diet,
ITIBRAll To bp a mnttpr Of gelE.cOn.