The Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1855-1875, 1868-06-16

casual way, the working of our internal
revenue system without having been
forced to the conclusion that the great
est present evil under which we labor,
and that which contributes most to de-
feat the collection Of our taxes, is the
dishonest character of the officials en-
ploy ed; and when remedies for these
are sought the impossibility of finding
nybody responsible for the appointment
of such agents or for their conduct. In
short, there is no head to the establish
ment, or perhaps it would be more true
to say that, worse than that, it is trip
pie headed monster. We have the Pres
ident, Secretary of the Treasury and the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to
look to; all and each, in fact-neither
of them acknowledging full response
bility. What is the consequence? Tax
PAYERS commit frauds; officers connive
at them; often they even give actual as
sistance in the stealing that is going on;
complaints are made; the Commissioners
replies that he has no power over these
officers to remove the thieves and ap
point honest men, because selections are
made through the Secretary of the Trea
sury and the President. The Secretary,
if appealed to, explains that he can do
nothing but advise the President, and
shelters himself in that way. The Pres
ident interposes both the Secretary and
the Commissioner between himself and
the people, and the simple result of it
all is that the whole country is looking
on, the stealing is not stopped, but pro-
ceeds, growing worse and worse. and
the scoundrels bolde: and bolder from
day to day, until the whole aggregate of
evil is appalling, and it has become
question who rules the country-whether
its proper constitutional authorities or
gangs of tobacco thieves and whisky
ring p Mr.. Schenck went on to say
that a writer in the New York Evening
Post had charged that the Committee
on Ways and Means and its chairman
were assuming to be king makers in
giving such great powers to the Com
missioner OF Internal Revenue. The
writer illustrated his argument by refer,
ence to section ten. That was an un
fortunate illustration, for it SO happened
that that was one Of the sections copied
from the existing law. If the House
should refuse to confer this power on
the Commissioned. then he would ask
the House to confer it on the Secretary
OF the Treasury without the intervention
of tue Commissioner, or on the Presi
dent without the Intervention Of either
| the Secretary or the Commissioner, or
somebody who would be held to account
for what is done and for what is omitted
in matter SO vital as the raising of
revenue honestly, fairly and without
fraud and robbery. There was, in fact,
no head now; there was triple headed
monster-the President the Secretary of
/ A.
And another element of division of pow
er was the necessity of procuring con
firm atoms by the Senate of officers of
the revenue. Between the President,
the Secretary of tue Treasury and the
| Commissioner there was such division
, OF responsibility that nothing was done.
If the President, the Secretary and the
Commissioner were all right, then there
was another body in the Senate, where
| fault might exist or not, acting on the
/ recomme endation made through the pro.
per channels He did not say it was SO;
| but he said that from the divided re-
sponsibility and want of accord between
them there were no proper officers to
collect the revenue, and therefore steal
| ing went ON. These facts tended to il
lustrate the proposition that the country
had an establishment without respon-
siblc head, and that the law would never
/ be executed or the taxes collected until
| the system was reduced to a concentra-
| ted responsibility. The committee had
settled down on the conclusion that the
! true way to get the taxes collected was
to impose responsibility on one officer
strongly empowered and armed for the
purpose, and to hold him to the strictest
account for everything lie shall do under
such circumstances, that all public OBJ
servations and all watchfnlness Of the
law may be concentrated upon him. He
admitted that great power was conferred
| by the bill on the executive officer, not
much greater, however, IAN is now ex-
ercised by the Collector Of Customs at
New York. It was great power to be
conferred on any officer, and yet it would
be found that in the different provisions
of the bill the committee had taken
great care to hold the Commissioner to
closest accountability. Mr. Schenck
proceeded to show what effect the bill
would have on the cost of collection,
and stated that the bill proposed to abol-
ish the system of tobacco and whisky
inspectors. paid by the distillers and
manufacturers, and to have their duty
performed by storckeepers to be paid
by the Government. The saving in the
aggregate cost of collection he estima
| ted S6S9,970 The committee had
matured system of supervision In
! stead of special agents, the com mittee
proposed that in every Judicial district
there should be a supervisor of internal
revenue. But instead of being wan
dering officer he should be responsi
BILE man, properly paid by the Govern
ment. having fixed Office. and whose
duty it should be to supervise, look af
ter, attend to and report upon the con-
duct of all local revenue officers in the
district Even he, however, would have
to refer the case for final action to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and
thus the system of responsibility, from
tho hoaI nf tho 6ono RI m nf 6ov MI ri