The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1868-05-01
MR.. BoUTwELL's ARGUMENT.

ldUOTNte anu eHeCllsc. IL CONCiS
he multiplicity of small points raised
" the Presidents counsel, and yet
clearly lifts into the foreground the
,ital issues in the case, to which all
.he others are collateral-the reno
val of Stanton and the appointment
Of Thomas. He opens with clear
statement of the relation which Con-
gress sustains to all other depart
ments of the Government. The Con-
stitution gives the National Legisla
ture inherit supremacy over the
courts and the President, by authori-
zing it "to make all laws which shall
be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution not merely its own
powers, but ''all other powers vested
by the Constitution in the Govern
ment of the United States, or any
department. or officer thereof Ihis
single clause ends all claims to equail
ty or rivalry between the three de
nartments or the Government, since
no department or officer can have
any constitutional function or power
which is net thereby placed under
the control of Congress. Whatever
powers of appointment or removal
might be given to the President by
other clauses of the Constitution, are
here brought under the legislative
control of Congress. Whether the
power of removals is an Executive
power, or is incidental to the power
10 appoint, in either case Congress
must decide by laws in what manner
the President should carry it into
execution. In pursuance of this
comprehensive grant OF power to
Congress. they have passed the Ten
ure-of- Office law. Having enacted
it, the President must obey it. His
functions are not Legislative. Though
his signature to an act is sought 10
the first instance, he is no essential
part of the law IN aking power. If a
bill pass by a two thirds vote over
his veto, il, becomes law. Hence,
while the legislative power in Great
Britain is vested in King, Lords, and
Commons, our Constitution declares
thrt call legislative powers are ves-
ted in Congress" alone, instead of in
Congress and the President. Still
less are his functions Judicial, for the
Constitution vests the whole judicial
power in a Supreme Court, and IN
such inferior courts as Congress
shall establish, and in the Senate sit.
ting for the trial of impeachments.--
The Presidents functions are neither
to make the laws or to adjudge their
constitutionality. but simply to obey
them. Since the President had no
authority to pass upon the constitu-
tionality of an act, the Senate is not
called on to decide whether he con-
strued it correctly, and hence is not
called on to consider the question of
its constitutionality. If it be true as
claimed that there is no way for the
President to test whether a law is
unconstitutional except by disobey-
ing it, it is equally true that if he
disebeys it there is 70 way to prove
and vlndicate its constitutionality
except to impeach and remove him
for his disobedience.
Since the President Intentionally
disobeyed the law, such intentional
disobedience involves all the crimi
nal intent of which the nature of the
case admits. He cannot eyade the
risk he assumed by pleading that he
thought the law ought to be broken.
This adds only insult to defiance. II
he can annul one law, he can annul
all. He can construe the Courts
and Congress to be unconstitutional
bodies. and SO defy all attempts to
curb bis despotic unsurpations -
This Is absoiute monarchy Surely
our fathers. fresh from their struggle
for liberty. and jealous against every
insidious approach of despotism, did
not intend to make the President the
absolute dictator which johnson
supposes him 10 be. Were there
any merit in the plea that the Presi-
dent violated the law in order to test
its constitutionality, this cannot avail.
He has shown no desire to bring the
question before the Courts. A quo
warranto can issue for this purpose
only on his application, and he has
not sought it. In the proceedings
against Gen. Thomas the question
might have been tested. But they
were dismissed on his own motion.
The Presidents sole aim, as indica.
ted by bis acts. has been to get pos
session of the War Department, moi
to test the constitutionality of the
law.
No power of removal is given to
the President by the Constitution. =
ne oniJ P0's'-SIS-.---.-----s-
ed therein is the power of Congress
to remove the President, and Others,
by impeachment. But as the reno
val of an officer has always been eff.
fected by the appointment of a sue
cessor, the appointment was regarded
as the official act, the removal as the
incidental consequence. The Senate
in consenting to the appointment OF
the nominee, taeitly assented to the
removal of the last incumbent. But
Andrew johnson, for the first time
in our history, claims to exercise an
independent power to remove, with
out appointing any successor, and of
course without asking the consent of
the Senate. The unsurpation is at
war with all precedent, as well as in
violation of law, without syllable to
warrant it in the Constitution.
/ attempting to remove Stanton,
the President was, therefore, guilty
of a high crime, by reason of his US
peration of a power not granted in
the Constitution. For this he would
deserve conviction had no tenure of
Office act been passed, and without
regard to its constitutionality, or
whether Secretary Stanton comes
within its provisions.
Nor can the President plead that
because Mr.. Stanton's resistance
foiled his plans, therefore he is not
guilty. AS well might a burglar
claim an acquiItal because compelled
to drop his plunder, and seek safety
ia flight. All the Presidents part of
he crime was finished. 1t lacked
,nly Stanton's participation. The
President if possessed of true and
manly pride, would not allow his
10 beg for his acquittal on a
)lea which wonld leave him indebted
or his escape to Seeeetay Stanton's