The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1868-12-09


tory On the first day of September it consisted
of the following items -
Fnndeddeht 81, lOp sos el'SO
mhIureu ueCt' '''''.'..''.''''''''.''' IoO3OsOVy
Temporary loln Observation-Disclosures. 107 l4S 713 16
Certificates of ndeltedness.......... 50 O93 100000
Five per cent. legal tender notes 900. SO 954 23nO0
Compound interest legal tender notes 2l7o24 10000
United States notes, legal tendets... 438 l6O569OO
Fraction al currency. ................ 263A 742'5t
Suspended requsitions uncaed for... 2lll 100000
Total. so s45 9O7 62O.56
Deduct cash in Treasury. ........... ss,2lS055 10
Balance. 2,757 6s9,b7l'48
From this statement it will be perceived that
81, ,276 S34 1926 Of the public debt consisted of
various forms temporary securities $433, 100, 300
of United States notes.-the excess. of which
over $400, 600 having been put into circuIa-
tion in payment of temporary loans-and $780,
344, ,742 of fractional currency. Portions of this
temporary debt were maturing daily, and all of
il, including SIS, ,4150 900 of the funded debt, was
to be provided for within period of three years
The 7-30 notes were, by law and the terms of the
loan, convertible at maturity, at the will of the
holder, into 520 bonds, or payable like the rest of
these temporary obligations, in lawful money.
1t was of course necessary to make provision
for the daily maturing debt and also for taking
up, from time to time, such portions of it as
could be advantageously converted into bonds or
paid in currency before maturity, for the purpose
of avoiding the necessity of accumulating large
sums of money and of relieving the Treasury
from the danger it would be exposed to if a very
considerable portion of the debt were permitted
to mature, with no other means of paying it
than that afforded by sales of bonds in q market
too uncertain to be confidently relied upon in an
emergency. In addition to the temporary loan,
payment of which could be demanded on so short
II notice as to make it virtually debt payable on
dcmand-the certificates of Indebtedness which
were maturing at the rate of from fifteen to
twenty millions per month-thc five per cent
notes, which matured in January following, and
the compound interest notes, which were PAYABLE
at various times within period of three years
there were $3.50, 900, 900 of 7-80 notes which
would become due as follows, viz -
August IS, 1861 $500 900, 900
June Is, 1868. 300 900 900
ouig TO- 1903, 21OOUU,OOU
As the option of conversion was with the
holders of these no tes, it depended upon the con-
dtion of the market whether they would be pre-
sented for payment in lawful money or to be GA rya
chanGed for bonds. No prudent man, InFuS.eu
with The of the nations interest and credit,
would permit two or three hundred, n'""GA' 20
debt to mature NituVut making provision Tor It's
payment; nor would he, If could be avoided, ac-
cumulate large sums of money in the Treasury
which would not be called for, If the price of
bonds should be such as TO make the conversion
of the notes prele able to their payment in lawful
money. The policy of the Secretary was, there
fore rs he remarked in n former report, deter
mined by the condition of the Treasury and the
country and by the character of the debt 1t was
simply, first to put and keep the Treasury in such
condition as not only to be prepared TO pay all
claims upon presentation, but also to be strong
enough to prevent the success of any comblna-
tions that might be formed to control its manage
ment; and. second, to take up quietly in advance
of their maturity, by payment or conversion,
such portions of the temporary debt as would
obviate the necessity of accumulating large cur
rency balances in the Treasury and at the same
time relieve it from the danger Of being forced to
further issue of legal tender notes, or to sale
OF bonds at whatever price they might command.
In carrying out this policy, it seemed also to be
the duty of the Secretary to have due regard to
the interests of the people, and to prevent as far
as possible, the work of funding from disturbing
legitimate business. As financial trouble has
almost inv; riably followed closely upon the ter
mination of prOtracted wars, it was generally
feared, as las been already remarked, that such
trouble would be unavoidable at the close of the
great and expensive war in which the United
States had been for four years engaged. This, of
course, it was important to avoid, as its occur
renee might not only render funding difficult, but
might PROSTATE those great interests upon which
the government depended for its revenues. 1t
was, and constantly has been, therefore, the aim
of the Secretary so to administer the Treasury
while borrowing money aud funding the tenn
IOraTy obligations, as to prevent n commercial
crisis, and to keep the business of the country as
STEADY as was possible on the basis of an ire
deemCble and constantly huctuatiDg currency.
| Whether his efforts have contributed to this end
not, he does not undertake to say but the fact
| is unquestoned, that great war has been closed
| large loans have been effected-heavy revenues
! have been collected and some thirteen hundred
millions of dollars of temporary obligations have
| been paid or funded, and great debt brought
| into manageable shape not only without finan-
| cial crisis, but without any disturbance to the
| ordinary business of the country
To accomplish these things successfully, the
Secretary deemed il necessary, as has been before
| stated, that the Treasury should be kept con-
| stanty in strong condition, with power to pre-
| vent the credit of the government and the great
| interests of the people from being placed at the
| mercy of adverse influences. Notwithstanding
| the magnitude and character of the debt this
power the Treasury has, for the last three years,
| possessed; and it has been the well-known exist
ence, rather than the exercise of it, which has, in
repeated instances, saved the country from panic
and disaster. The gold reserve, the maintenance
of which has subjected the Secretary to constant
bitter criticism, has given a confidence to the
holders of our securities, at home and abroad by
the constant evidence which it exhibited of the
| ability of the government, without depending
upon purchases in the market, to pay the interest
| upon the public debt, and steadiness to trade,
| by preventing violent fluctuations in the con-
vertible value of the currency, which have been
| more than ample compensation to the country
for any loss of interest that may have been sus-
tanned thereby. If the gold in the Treasury had
been sold down to what was absolutely needed
for the payment of the interest on the public
debt, not only would the public credit have been
endangered, but the currency and, consequently
the entire business of the country would have
been constantly subject to the dangerous power
of speculative combinations.
| OF the unavailing effort that was made by the
Secretary TO contract the currency, with the
view of appreciatng il to the specie standard, he
iol bears to speak. His action IN respect to con
traction, although authorized, and for time sus-
tanCd, was subsequently disapproved Gas he
| thinks unwisely) by Congress. This is u ques-
| tion, however, that can be better determined