Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1868-01-15

Grant anticipated no attack; was project.
ing an advance; and yet was not sur
| prisedp
| Grant ras surprised. Websters admi.
rable arrangement OF siege guns and the
gunboats only saved him from annihilafion
on Sunday, the 9th. The arrival of Buell.
enabled him to oppose the Rebels with
fresh forces on the morning of the 18th. If
the result was victory, as Badeau claims.
why were not the Rebels pursued? II was
heavy, and dark, and wet, and the troops
we're fatigned, are the reasons given by
Badeau for the lack of pursuit. Was ii
any darker or wetter for the pursuers than
the pnrsued2 Were the men of BueIPs
command, who had fonght one day, any
more fatigned than the Rebels. who had
fought two days? IL a victory, where were
the fruits? Were they in our loss of some
l5OOo men in The panic which the battle
carried through the North; in the uniyer-
sal condemnation that fell upon Grant in
theremoVals; in the rejoieings Of the SoEth;
over the result; in the undisturbed retreat
OF the Rehels--or in what p II victory,
4 was OF kind whose limited repetition
would have swept the Federal armies from
existence, and secured the Independence Of
the Confederacy. . arE 4Ee
From this review Of the battle of Shi-
loh, we get another general conclusion, as
| follows:
| Ill The inattention of Grant al Shiloh
led to surprise which involved an enor-
nous sacrifice of life, and which only es,
capped complete annihilation by the timely
arrival Of reinforcements.
Badeau concludes his notice of Shiloh by
stating that the Rebels abandoned Corinth
because they had fought and lost at Shiloh
two months before. This is all bosh. Hal
leek was advancing on Corinth, slowly, and
entrenching at every step, with an army of
one hundred and taoenty thousand men. The
Rebels had only some fifty thousand. The
disparity in numbers accounts amply for
the abandonment of the position. There
were not enough armed Rebels in the Con.
iederacy to resist the plan and force used by
Halleck in his advance over the fifteen
miles that separated him from Corinth.
DOWN THE MISSISSIPPI TO yIcKsBURe.
The writer enters into a lengthy review
Of the various plans to capture Yicksburg.
Noting his first movement down the Mis-
slsslppi Central railroad, and its failure
anu Grants hasiy retreat, he holds him re.
sponsible for Sherman's bloody repulse AT
Chickasaw Bayou, December, l862-the
arrangement being that Grant should at.
tack at the same time from the rear. CO.
ing down the river then to Milliken's Bend
his successive moves are thus sketched:
Badeau says: Grants problem war now
to obtain footing on the highlands of the |
Eastern bank, and base from which to
operate against the city and its communica- !
ho EF,f
ioothold on the highlands of The Eastern |
6ankT was TO commence digging ditch on
lhe Western bank Of the riper, andsome three |
miles distant from the city. The ditch
lalied, the next move to gain foothold on /
the Eastern bank was to break the leyee /
on the western hank of the Mississippi, |
sixty miles above Vieksburg, and then |
widen bayoqs and dig canals through the |
interior OF Louisiana, for distance of |
nearly iour hundred miles, into the Missis. |
sipPl below. This masterly plan of getting
on one bank OF wide river by digging
canals on the other side of the same river
was likewise failure.
Inc next move TO gain footing on the
I,as'erh oank was to open route into the I
: a l,.,.oS 400 FasS from the Mississippi. From
MIiillien'# Bend to Kicksbutg, uid Yazoo
fass,Wss only some nins hundred miles All |
q at ever prevented the capture of Vicks.
burg by this plan was a little battery of |
Two heaYy guns which theRebels erected at |
GREENWOOD: The lronclads attacked the |
baiiery, and were repulsed levees were cut |
10 drown out the battery, but the operation
ialled; and the nine hundred mile route to |
the rear OF Nicksburg was reluctantly aban.
doned.
The next move on Vicisburs was to send |
a iorce mp 1azoo river, etc, etc, hanking |
Halnes Bluff, relieving the. .forces held by /
the little battery at Greenwood, and flank |
ing Nicksburg. How Porter's gmboats |
went up; and how Sherman followed |
after and saved the gunboats; and how
there never was a broader farce than |
this move up through the Yazoo swamps-
are all facts well known 10 the public.
Grants next plan was TO open some |
bayous which ran from the Mississippi at |
Milliken's Bend TO the Mississippi below |
Nicksburg Along there he could send |
transports with troops and supplies; and |
these, he intended, should go down to CO.
operate with Banks against Port Hudson. |
THE MoVEoN JACKSON.
On the Sd of April, Grant found himself |
in possession of Grand Gulf Transports
had run the Vicksburg batteries: Grand |
Hnlf had been fanked and evacuated. Up
TO this moment, let it be understood.
Grant had been operating to effect a lodge- |
ment with view TO the support of Banks. |
ltwas when in possession of Grand Gulf !
that he first conceived the idea of march |
ing against the rear of Yieksburg, via
jackson. He was induced to take this |
course from receiving letter from Banks, |
which stated that he (Banks) could not |
reach Port Hudson before the 10Th of Nav |
"a period of near six weeks. In other |
words, circumstances obliged Grant 10 give |
up the idea of operating against Port Hud- |
son. ~
Is there anything strange that, placed in |
this position, he should resolve 10 move |
against Jackson? The idea of eaptnriug |
jackson, and thereby isolsting Yicksburg, |
was patent even 20 unmilitary minds. |
Granps move upon Jackson was in no re- |
spect the suggestion OF daring military |
genius, but a something which was one |
hall g necessity, and one-half pateat adj |
vantage. There was not a soldier in
Grants army that failed 10 cry, "On to |
Jackson r. the moment Grant had estab- |
lished himself on the eastern bank. Had |
the commander failed TO see tie benefit of |
the movement, he would have, been blind |
beyond description.
What offered palpable advantages; /; what |
was patent as being al once a sure success |
and an inevitable necessity-took place. !
and the Federaiarmy marched upon Jack
son, and then closed in on YicksbHre, ont
numbering the opposing Rebels five TO one |
at every step Of the movement
Let us here note this important fact |
Upon the day that Grant occupied Grand
Gulf he stood strategically, with reference
to Jackson and Yicksburg, precisely where
he stood, the November before, az Coffee |
Vile, just above Grenada, on the Missis- |
sippi Central. In the latter case, he was
less than $50 miles from jackson.
In plain English, Grant spent from No.
vember to April in moving from one stra-
tegic position 20 another, each Of which |
bore alike upon the coveted objective point. |
During this change of positions, thousands !
Of our gallant soldiers died in the mud of |
Louisiana; millions were spent in making |
the transfer; the Notifications of Vioks- |