Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1868-05-16
FRANCE AND GERMANY.
WarIIke Attitude Of Prussia N Hillary
Movements ON the FrOntiers-Tlie
work Of Fertilization Progressing

Movements ON the FrOutiers-THe
work Of Fertilization Progressing
Form the Paris Prose-. April g.
The Prussians are certifying Treves
visit of General Molter TO that city has
been recently mentioned-people fancied
that he went down there TO mark the
ground and commence new fortress. No
such thing. In reality, the work was com
menced a year ago, on the day when in
virtue of a decision of Europe the Prus-
SLAMS had to clear out of Luxembourg.
The Prussians have two objects in iortify-
ing Treves. In the first place, they want
to replace Luxembourg; next, they want
TO keep their eye on that stronghold, and
keep up at Treves a body of troops large
enough to pounce upon it at the first symp-
tom of disturbance. 1t should be borne
in mind that, instead of being dismantled,
as specified by the protocols of the Treaty
of London, merely the crest of the RAM
parts has been preached here and
there. What Prussia wants is to COM
plete her system of Qualifications be-
tween the Rhine, the Moselle and
the Sarre, a system which forms
what may be described as the German
Quadfilateral. The extremities of that
quadrilateral are Mayence, Coblentz, Lam
dau and Luxembourg or Treves. The import
ance Of Mayence is too well known to re-
quire demonstration. 1t has changed
hands about twenty times. 1t formed
the basis of operations of every
campaign of the first Empire against
Germany and later, formed the point
where the allied army swooped down
(Eobla,,fo Mt tho aNso oc
the Moselle and the Rhine, is almost as
formidable stronghold as Mayence; and,
indeed, the possession of Mayence without
Coblentz would be immaterial. Landau is
Of less moment; but it does not stand
alone. 1t is girdled round by chain Of
small fortresses, which, like itself, Saar-
bruck and Saarlouis, were taken from
France by the treaty of the 10Th of Sep |
TENDER, 1915. Such, in a word, is the !
Prussian Quadrilateral, of which, with the |
secondary fortresses, are able, if necessary,
to shelter an army of more than 10000 |
men,. Already, at the present moment,
they are occupied with a force equal |
to an army. At Mayence there |
are 10000 men, at Coblehtz Is, 900, at |
Landau 5000, at TreYes 5000, at Saarlouis |
1000, .and at Saarbruck 1000. The total, |
81 900 men, is very respectable little i
army. The material Is that of an army,
and the necessary provisions are known /
to be immense. In fact, for the last two /
years Prussia has done everything in her
power 10 render this position impregnable. |
This is easy TO understand; il is the ram
part of Germany for the defense, and the
key of France for the attack. This quad
riiaforol h,inr, IN tn, banI, ,f L
c0uld not, WithOutimmense precaution and
risk, make war in Germany. If
we passed above Treves or below Landau,
if we advanced on the enemy's territory,
we should have behind Us an immense
cluster of fortresses, an intrenched camp
Of 400 square leagues and complete army,
almost unattackable, unless by long and
sieges, which wonld be ready
to profit of our slightest check, and to cut |
off our communications or retreat either
to the North or South. We do not pre-
tend to trace out plans for campaign or
lines Of defense, and If we explain as we'll
as we can the importance of these posi-
lions, il is to point out the serions
of the policy which
has permitted such a force TO
become, to the deiriment of our
and our security, q terrible
arm at the disposition of Prussia. We
have gone along quietly, and, notwithstand-
ing what may be said to the contrary,
greatly respected for fifty years, while,
Turing the same time, the German Confed-
eration occupied Luxemburg, in concert
with the Grand Duke; Mayence, in con-
,ert with the Duke of Hesse; and Landau,
in common with the King of Bavaria. So
many hostile wills were necessary to attack
ls, that in reality their concert gave us
little to fear. But to-day there is but one
will in Germany, and tomorrow, perhaps,
here will be but one army. 1t is, there
fore, time to see TO our frontiers. What
have we TO oppose TO the threatening posi-
ion? A line Of fortresses no doubt very
powerful, but devoid of natural delenses.
That ia not sufficient. 1t might be enough
TOr a rapid war but, hostilities over, if the
state of things be not changed, the danger
will reappear, and with equal gravity
here will still be the same difficulty to
attack, to profit of victory, or to defend
ourselves.