Vermont daily transcript. [volume] (St. Albans, Vt.) 1868-1870, 1868-08-12
GI0uf as u lSfIdteOisi.

of tfat excellent newspaper, the New
York San, has written IL life of General
Grant. in which he gives the following
estimate of that officers ability as IA
strategist Those who know Mr.. Dana
will not doubt the general correctness
of his judgment:
The attention of the reader II a. already
been called TO his recommendation of
united command in the Mississippi Val
| ley, and to the tardy action of the Gov
eminent in carrying this recommended
ton into effect. 1t is hardly necessary
now to say that this combination was
| the foundation of all our substantial
victories, not only III the West, but
throughout the entire theatre OF war.
Fort Donclson was won by CELEBRITY,
audacity, and heroic resolution shiloh
by stubborn fighting and unconquer-
able heroism; Nicksburg by the most
brilliant and original strategy, by rapid
marching, judicious combination and
sclf-rcliancc, which remind one of the
invasions of Russia ny Charles XII, or
i the Vigor displayed in Bonaparte ) cam
pagn OF 1886; but it must not be for
gotten that Charles los; his army at
Pultowa, and that Bonaparte did not
cut loose from his base and plunge head
long into the interior of the hostile cOun-
try but by judcious and well-forned
plan Of operations he broke through the
enemy's lines at such Il point as to re-
tain his communications with France
constantly uninterrupted, while by
rapid combinations and severe battles
he drove these lines before him. But
Grant, in The Nicksburg campaign,
boldly threw himself into the midst Of
hostile forces, leaving an army entirely
behind him, until he had seized the
most important point in the theatre OF
operations, and then turned upon and
defeated that army, and drove it into
the Notifications from which it was des-
tined never to emerge eXceptat the VIII
OF its conqueror. The closing victories
of the war were won by Il rare combina-
ton of military agencies. The CONSOLE
dation of four vast territorial depart
ments into one grand military division
enabled Grant to concentrate at Chatt-
anooga a splendid army, heavily out
, numbering the enemy, aud ii should be
remembered that Providence favors
strong battalions. BY a series of stra-
tegic and strong tactical combinations,
, these superior numbers were so directed
upon the field of battle as to take the
enemy at disadvantage, striking him in
the flank, and actually getting closer to
|
his own Headquarters.
The Atlanta campaign and the march
} to the sea; the selection of Sheridan and
, the formation OF the middle military di-
vision; the consolidation of the West
ern cavalry the establishment Of the
military division of The West Mississippi
, under Candy, followed by the campaign
6 of Mobile Sherman's grand holiday
, excursion and picnic party through the
: Carolinas, again severing the Southern
: territory, isolatiDg and scattering its
aimies, breaking its communications
and eating out the vitals Oft the Confcder
acy and lastly, but not least, the mag
e nificent campaign of the Army of the
G Potomac, from the Rapidan to the james
q and from Petersburg to AppomattON
Court House, bear ample testimony
, not only to the grandeur of Grants con.
: ceptions, but to the heroic and unshall
Y ale resolution with which he carried
, them into effect. There was no defea
: in all this, no hesitation, no doubling
: but the clear comprehension of the ends
: to be aimed at, the most careful prepare
V ton of materials, and the most perfec
confidence in the men and means by
= which they were to be attained. NJ
modern General except Bonaparte eve
s welded such vast and prolonged power
o. and not even that great conqueror dis
! played such remarkable sagacity in hi
organizations and selections of subordi
y mates. Massena and Soult were driver
= from Spain; Mcdonald was Overwhelm
If ed at Katzbach Marmont was defeated
at MOntmartre ; and Napoleon himsel
y was driven from Russia, beaten at Leip
x sic, and finally, after q series of unac
J. countable blunders, was hurled from hi
Is throne, recovering 1t again only to re
:, peat his plumbers and meet an ignOni
NOUS fate
s But Grant knew that no genius, how
Il ever remarkable, could sufficiently com
h mand the national armies in war G
II such magnitude without the assistance
= of lieutenants who could be trusted ST
l. make their own orders for the emer
is gencies that were sure to arise. III
t. therefore gave more thought to the prop
re er organization and direction of armie
upon the vital points of the enemy
L territory and lines, and to the selection
y of men competent to command them
a than to issuing the detailed orders O
- battle. Neither sherman, nOrSheridan
~ nor Thomas, nor Candy ever failed him
and had circumstances enabled him t
devote himself exclusively to the com
G. mand of the Army of the Potomac, h
ID would doubtless have displayed as mucl
skill in the tactics of battle as he did il
the strategy OF campaigns.
IL The quick Judgment by which he dis
l. covered the enemy's plan to evacuat
l. fort Donelson, and the sudden resolu
% ton which he based thereupon, to at
tack at once, are evidences of sOmethin,
more than aggressive temper or mer
brute courage The tactics of Looko
ID Mountain, Chattanooga Valley, an,
le Mission Ridge have never been surpass
v ed. The tactics, or more properly, til
y grand tactics displayed during the over
$ land campaign, are worthy of tn
IS highest commendation, and had the ex
d ecution of details been as faultless as tn
: conception of the movements, Their