The Portland daily press., 1868-06-01

of the unavoidable meaning of language,
must be conceded, embrace the case of MI
Stanton, then holding the Office of Secretar
of War.
But leaving this discrepancy of deduction
L turn to the construction of the act by Judg
Curtis, which seems to be the generally re
ceived Interpretation OF those who hold tha
Mr. StantOn's case is not provided for in tn,
act.
He comedies that the words 'every person
holding any ciYil Office" &C., include MI
Stanton, but insists that the words "except a
herein otherwise provided" taken in connec
tion with the proviso that follows, operate t
exclude him from this general description o
persons.
The. words "except as herein otherwis,
provided" it is plain, either standing alone o.
taken in connection with the proyiso are no
entitled to the force of terms OF absolute ex
cluslon, but rather are used in the sense o
qualifying some antecedent provision in the
body OF the section. Now what are these
antecedent words or provision to which these
qualifying words relate, and which they are
supposed to modify? Do they quality the
provision "every person holding any civil Of
flee" &c, "except as herein otherwise Lrovid-
ed" or the words sis and shall be entitled to
hold his said office until his successor shall in
like manner be appointed and qualified, "
Except as herein otherwise provided?"
DO the qualifying words operate to erctude
portion of the persons from holding office
under this act altogether, OF do they operate
to qualify the condition of holding? The
former construction, it is submitted, does vic
lence to the intent OF the act; besides, it is
an obvious misapplicatiOn Of the qualifying
words TO portion Of the section to which
| they do not relate. l. is clear that it was the
intent OF the act to regulate a tenure of office
OF some sort, of all the persons described in
| the body OF the section, that is, "every per-
son holding any civil office" &c. !; but by this
construction portion OF those persons fail
to be provided Tor altogether; while the adop-
ton of the other view provides for them a
tenure OF office, but different in its condi-
tions, and is thus in harmony with the OBJ
jects of the law.
Ii it be accepted that the Secretaries are
not excepted out of the body of the section,
and that the effect of the proviso is simply to
provide and determine what their tenure of
office shall be, the only remaining question is
whether the provision does make such ten
ure Tor Mr.. Stanton. 1t is cOntended that it
does not, as he was not the appointee of Mr.
johnson, and that the term Of Mr.. Lincoln,
whose appointee he was, was determined by
death. 1t is conceded that Mr.. Stanton was
appointed by Mr.. Lincoln in his first term of
office, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to hold during the pleasure ofthe
President for the time being; that he was du-
ly holding Office under that appointment in
the second term OF Mr.. Lincoln and up to his
death, He was, therefore, the appo ntee of
Mr.. Lincoln, by original appointment in his
first term, and not less so in his second term,
in effect, by adoption and continuance in Of
ice under the first appointment the person
and the office being identical, and there being
no limitation in the tenure of the office, ex-
cept the pleasure of the President for the
time being. Mr.. Stanton was, therefore,
properly holding office by appointment of Mr..
Lincoln in his second term at his death. He
continued to hold under such appointment
and commission from Mr.. Lincoln after the
succession of Mr.. johnson, and, by his adop-
ton and continuance in Office, and was so
holding at the passage of the 1enure-of-office
act.
But it is said that if he is to be regarded as
the appointee of Mr.. Lincoln in his second
term, he is still not embraced in the terms of
this act, as that term closed with the death
of Mr.. Lincoln, and that since that event he
has been holding in the term of Mr.. John
son. 1t therefore becomes necessary to de-
termine what was the Eterm" of President
Lincoln. Was it an absolute period of four
years, or was it that period during which he
served in his office; the period tor which he
was elected, or the period he held and occu-
pied his office? Was the term of his office
subject, in the language of the counsel for the
President, to a conditional limitation ?''
The term of the presidential office, by the
Constitution, is four years, and that without
regard to the contingency of holding or peri
cd of actual service. 1t describes the period
for which the office lasts, and is without lin
itation. The tenure OF his office is subject to
the pnntn nUpnpiQS of 6Qath racion of or M
moval; but that relates 10 the condition of
actual holding or period of service, and in no
way affects the term or period for which he
was elected. Now, the language of the pro-
viso is, "shall hold TOR the term of the Presi-
dent by whom appointed" Mr.. Stanton was
appointed by Mr.. Lincoln, whose term of Of
fce was absolutely t6uT gears, under the
Constitution. The statute adopts the same
word term, and this makes the period OF
holding identical with the period of the Pres
idential office, and does not subject it to the
contingencies ofthe tenure of his office or the
period of his service.
pass the question whether Mr.. johnson
is or not serving out his own or the term OF
Mr.. Lincoln as unimportant in the view taken
OF the question. Their terms of office as a
period of time, were identical, and whether
he is serving out Mr.. Lincoln's term of office,
as Vice-President, upon whom devolve the
duties of the Office of President by death,
can have no influence upon the general fact
of what was Mr.. Stanton's term of office. In
| either case his term would be the same.
But If, as is contended by counsel for the
| President and those who adopt his views, the
| proviso failed to provide tenure for Mr..
| Stanton, he being conceded to be in the body
| OF the section, then as to him the words, eek
| cept as herein otherwise provided" fail to
have any effect, and leave his tenure unafect-
| ed, and the same as that provided in the
body of the section for the description OF
| persons mentioned. / conclude, therefore,
that the act did not fail of its object, namely,
to regulate the tenure of Office OF "every per-
| son holding any civil Office to which he has
been appointed by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate;" that Mr.. Stanton's
case was not excepted out of its provisions
that the proviso does regulate for him ten
ure of office but if it do not, then it is clear
that it is regulated as is provided in the body
of the section for "every person holding any
civil Office" &C., and that his removal was a
clear violation of this act.
But it is said that it is at least doubtful il
| the act did affect Mr.. Stanton's case, and thai
the effort to remove him from his office ON the
| 21st February last was an attempt on the part
of the President which he might well believe
he had right to make; that the attempt die
not succeed, and that it would be an abuse o
/
grounds so slight.
But did the President truly believe that h
had the right, that it was clear, and that tn,
| public welfare justified and demanded its exer
| else? He had refused his assent to the tenure
| of-office act, stating in his message, among hi
reasons expressed for refusal SO to do, that it
provisions deprived him of control over hi
cabinet.
He had suspended Mr.. Stanton under it
provsions-so stated to the Secretary of tn
| Treasury. as rpuurad bV ifs nrOviSiOps III,
had communicated his reasons for this suspen
sion, agreeably to the terms OF the act, to the
Senate. He had been advised of the action O
tn. Senate upon that suspension and of tn
acquiescence ofGeneral Grant in its determin
alton of the case, and had witnessed the return
of Mr.. Stanton to his office and its duties il
accordance with the imperative provisions o
| this act With these acts and this knOwledg
upon the record, it is difficult to believe tina
the President was acting in that measure o
good faith and in the presence and under tn
| pressure OF public necessity which would Jus
tify the defiance of a law of even doubtful i'm
port; and in this attempt to put aside hig
| officer of the government without charge {
misconduct in office, and after his purpose ha
been overruled by the Senate, it is submitte
there is apparent less of desire to consult tn
| public interests and faithfully to execute tn
laws, than to execute his own purposes upo
public officer who had incurred his persona
displeasure. Nor is it easy to adopt the opiI
ion that the charges and proof in support
them may properly be regarded as slight @
unimportant.
The President may not arbitrarily and with
out cause depose high public officer with in
, punity independently of the act under consider
alton. Wantonly to do it would constitut
the essence of arbitrary and unbridled powe
and tend to establish that irresponsible iicens
over the laws fatal to republican government
the first appearance OF which demands to be r.
buked and resisted. The officer and the offic