Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1868-09-23
sThe war.cloud in Europe.

|
al outbreak between France and Prussia:
Political ihteipretations'of various jEiads
are attached to the interview of the king of
Prussia with the Emperor of Russia Cat the
German watering place, Schwalbach), which
are believed to be directly connected with the
menacing attitude shown by France to Ger
mani rnasansgslatsly !.
Nobody believes in the imperial assurances
Of peace (given by the Emperor Napoleon in
speech ut TroyesC which be simply ex.
planned by the fact that Napoleon, after hav-
ing finished his military preparations, now
| only wants to fill his war treasury, and fer
that, purpose has thrown loan of five hun
dred million francs on the money markets of
London and Paris.
Ibelieve war between France and Germa-
ny is unavoidable. 1t may break, out this
year, or it may be delayed by diplomatic tricks
l'till next spring, or even for whole year
come it must as matter of necessity. AL
though there exists no cause for war yet, at
present, when warts wanted a cause, and u
Aaerant one, TOO, is easily found, as was seen
in 1866. In Prussia, as well as in France,
everything tends, ,to, war, which will become
moro and more necessity that. must be
.obeJed.
IN Prussia, Bismarck knows that a war
against France, especially. if France is the
asgressor, will effect perfect union of Ger
rhany at once, and put a rapid end to the de-
sire of German princes, with small terrific
ries, for separate confederacy. FIR that
reason preparations for war are made; for
that reason the national vanity of the French
is tickled, from time to time, and the Empe-
ror is placed more and more in false ;atti-
tude toward the French people,, SO that ne
cannot help commencing war, and then In
Berlin they will say that he is. the aggressor.
But.in France, Louis Napoleon, if he wants
to5be the founder oes.dynasty,is forced more
and more to that war. Heby no means likes
toandertake it, feeling that hehas grown old,
rather too old, but he, must 1t is certainly
significant that the ruler who. managed the
political affairs OF Europe, and by whose ar
;bitration all political questions were settled
but few years ago. is compelled now, in or
dereto secure his throne and the succession of
his son, to put at stake the fate of France in
the great game called war. That is sad af
fair for France, but still worse one for those
who will have to bear the burdens of that
war.s,5.. ,... .-.. 10.
1. AS things stand now, the breaking out Of
the war is expected as soon as the harvesting
is over and the new loan will be realized. H.
deed circumstances and causes Of different
kinds Especially the very cool attitude of
England to Napoleon III, or the stipulations
Between the King of Prussia'and the Empe-
ror4of Russia at their interview ,.may render
such q rapid commencement Of the:war not
advisable, and it is possible peace. will be pre-
s,.fyed vet for the winter bat that war must
and will eomesurely} and France will, certain.
SsS iseoi1he the aagressor-Ooupt Bismarck
will know how to 1ix that. And when France
is the aggressor and disturber of the peace,
preIext for European coalition against
France will be found aud even if Napoleon
should succeed In making Spain, Denmark,
Sweden, GUM and Holland more or less
his allies, Nnat could France do, together
with those allies, against an alliance Of all
Germany, England and Russia ?-while Aus
,tria, in respect to the German part of her
population, her disturbed finances, and her
dangerous Muscoyian neighbor, would be
Obliged to remain neutral. But not even those
small second-rate alliances arc secured yet to
France and that the favors Of the small pow
ers is sought so zealously is proof enough
that there is no prospect at all Of alliances
with great powers. And will those allies help
France any more than the South German al
lies helped Austria in 1866? They hardly
will. Spain will soon lave her bands full at
home. Belgium knows if. she abandons her
neutrality warranted By Europe, she will lose
her independence as State at the next trea-
ty of peace. In Sweden powerful party i
decidedly aycrse to French alliance, and to
interference in the quarrels of Central Eu.
rope. There would, therefore, be left only
Denmark, with about Is 600 men and some
old men-of. war, and Holland which could fur
nish still less. French papers, it is true, are
talking also of an alliance with Switzerland,
but consider the statesmen of Switzerland
too iudicous and patriotic to act thus against
the liberty and independence of their coun-
try. g. -.
to me to have ouly the design of encouraging
the French, and Of showing them that in the
war against Germany they will not have to
fight alone.
The London Spectator {not very kind to
France) compares the resources oil France and
Prussia in view of their possible hostile rela-
tions. It says:
Prussia has no reservoir Of energy like
Paris, so dangerous in peace, so valuable III
war that France contains forty five cities,
with more than 10000 people, and North
Germany only thirty; that old Prussia has
but al, ,l73,O 600 ceres under crop, and France
S2,66LO00; but we have stated enough to
show that in available resources, in the pow
er to fight on a great scale for long time.
the Hohenaolerna arc not yet tho equsls OF
the Bonspartes. Many things may remedy
this disparity--indvidual genius, organIza'
ton, or the national character-but on these
points observation can tell US little beyond q
few general facts. We English, moved, it may
be by an instructive sympathy wltha ofTeuto.
mic, blood are apt, especially since Sadowa,
to think the Germans the higher race, and no
doubt they are physically stronger than the
French. But they labor under gre;a!t. liza
bility to disease, citizen life not qualifying
them for the open field. Arms Of precision
are as fatal to physical power as gunpoWder
was to armor, and Frenchmen can march
when driven rather the quicker. In mental
power the Prussians may be superior on the
whole, but it must not be forgotten that the
very best qualities of the French character
its courage, ,inventiveness and elasticity-come
out most strongly in war; that in campaign
its main defect, vanity, ceases to be injurious,
while its creates. folble, febrile, impotence,
has all the effect of energy. A Frenchman
in spirits is very difficult soldier to beat,
and in this war he would begin with the con-
viction, inspired if not justified by history,
that he was the better soldier of the Two. lie
may not, of course, be equally well led, but
! the impression of Englishmen that he would
no. be is little moro than Q guess. PRUSSIA