Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1867-07-24

es and its internal revenue uyon the proper
ty of these states, including the productions
of the lands within their territorial limits,
net by way Of levy and contribution in the
character of a conquerOr, but in the regular
way of taxation under the same laws which
apply to all other states of the Union. From
first to last, during the rebellion and since,
the title of each of these states to the lands
and public buildings owned by them has new
er been disturbed and not a foot of it has ever
been acqired by the Uaited States, even I'M
der right of cOnfiscation, and not a foot of
it has ever been taxed under Federal law.
In conclusion, l must respectfully ask the at
tention of Congress to the consideration of
one more question arising under this bill. 1t
vests in the military commander, subject
only to the approval of the general of the
army of the United States, an unlimited
power to remove from Office any civil mill
tary officer in each of these ten states, and
the further power, subject to the same APP
proval, to detail or appoint any military Of
fcer or soldier of the United States to per-
form the duties of the officer removed and to
fill all the vacancies occurring in those states
by death, resignation or otherwise. The
military appointee is thus required to per-
form the duties of civil Office according to
the laws of the states, such is required to
take an oath and is for the time being civil
officer. What is this character? Is he
civil officer of the state or a civil officer of the
United States? If he is civil officer of the
state where is the Federal power under our
constitution which authorizes his appoint
ment by any Federal officer? If he is to be
considered a civil officer of the United States,
as his appointment and oath would seem to
indicate, where is the authority for the APP
pointment vested by the Constitution? The
power of appointment of all officers of the
United States, civil or military, when not
provided for in the Constitution, is vested in
the President and with the advise and con-
sent of the Senate, with this exception, that
Congress may by law vest the appointment
OF such inferior officers they think proper
In the President alone, in the courts of law
or in the heads of departments But this bill,
IT these are to be considered inferior officers
within the meaning of the Constitution. does
not provide for their appointment by the
President alone or by the courts of law, or
by the heads of departments, but vest the APP
pointment in one subordinate executive Off
Ger so that, If we put this question and fix
the character of his military appointee, eth
er way this provision of the bill is equally
opposed to the Constitution. Take the case
of soldier officer appointed to perform
the office of judge in one of these states, and
as such to administer the proper laws of the
state, where Is the authority to be found in
the Constitution for vcsting in military
an executive officer strict judicial functions
to be exercised under the state laws. 1t has
been again decided by the Supreme Court of
the United States that acts of Congress which
have attempted to vest executive powers in
the Judicial courts or judges of the United
States are not warranted by the Constitution.
If Congress cannot clothe a judge with mere
v Init hoy al ho
officer or soldier of the army with judicial
duties over citizens of the United States who
are not IN the military or naval service? So,
too, 1t has been repeatedly decided that Con-
gress cannot require state officer, executive
or Judicial, to perform any duty enjoined up
on him by a law of the United States. How
then, can Congress confer power upon ex-
ecutive officer of the United States To perform
such duties in state? If Congress could
not vest In judge of one of these states any
Judicial authority under the United States by
direct enactment how can it accomplish the
same thing indirectly by removing state
Judge and putting officer of the United
States III his place. To me these cOnsidera-
tions are conclusive of the unconsttutionalitv
OF this part of the bill now before me, and
earnestly commend their consideration to the
deliberate judgment of Congress.
Within period of less than year the
legislation of Congress has attempted t.
strip the Executive department of the Govern
mcnt of some of its essential powers. The
Constitution and the oath provided in it. de-
volvc upon the President the power and duty
to that the laws faithfully executed
The ConstItut ton, in order to carry out this
power, gives him the choice of agents and
makes them subject to his control and super
vision, but IN the execution of these laws
the Constitutional obligation upon the Prcsi-
dent remains, but the power to exercise that
Constitutional duty is cffectually taken away.
The military commander is az 70 the power
of appointment made to take the place of the
President and the general of the army the
place of the Senate, and any attempt the
part of the President TO assert his own Con
stitutlonal power may, under prctencc OF
law, be met by official insubordination Ii
is to be feared that these military officers
looking to the authority given by these laws
rather than to the letter of the constitution,
will recognize no authority but the command
er of the district and the general of the
army. If there were other objections
than this to this proposed legislation it would
be sufficient. W hilst hold the chief execu-
tive authority of the United States whilst
the obligation rests on me To see that all the
laws are faithfully executed. | can never
willingly surrender that trust the powers
given for its execution. | can never give my
assent to be made responsible for the faithful
execution of the laws, and at the same time
surrender that trust and the powers which
accompany 1t to any other executive officer.
If this executive trust, vested by the Consti
tuition in the President, is to he taken from
him and vested in subordinate officer, the
responsibility will be with Congress in cloth
ing the subordnates with unconstitutional
power and with the officer who assumes it's
exercise. This interference with the constitu-
tional authority of the executive department
is an evil that will inevitably sap the founda-
ton of our Federal system, but it is not the
worst evil of this legislation 1t is great
public wrong to take from the President
powers conferred on him by the Constitution,
but the wrong is more fragrant and more
dangerous when the powers so taken from
the President conferred upon subordin-
ate executive officers, and especially upon
military officers, over nearly one third of the
states of Union. The military power is regu-
lated by fixed law it rules supreme in
each of the five districts The commander
though not chosen by the people or respons-
ibe to them for the exercise of this power
has more executive power, military and
civil, than the people have ever been willing
| to confer upon the head of the executive
department though chosen by and responsible
to themselves The remedy must come from
the people themselves they know what it
is and how it must be applied.
| At the present time they cannot, according
to the forms of the Constitution, repeal these
laws. They cannot remove or control this
military despotism. The remedy is never
theless in their hands. 1t is to be found in
the ballot, and is a one, if not controlled
by fraud and awed by arbitrary power, or
| from apathy on their part too long delayed.
With ahi1iup copfdence in thor pa friot-