Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-08-23

q clog upon his good intentions are often
the instruments and accomplices of his
band and are almost always 3 cloak to
his faults"
These were authoritative expositions
Of the intention of the Constitution, be-
Cause they we're written by one Of those
who had the largest share in making it,
to induce the people Of New York to
ratify it. And 1t must certainly be plain
that it is utterly contrary to its spirit
and purposes, for the legislature TO enact
a law, Notwithstanding the Presidents
objections, by which he is rendered in
capable TO dismiss from place a Secre-
tary Of q Department. The Constitu-
ton does not require the assent or advice
of the Senate to his removal of any
officer; and therefore the legislature
usurped upon the Executive when they
undertook by a law to make that neces-
sary. The law is q mere nullity.
When the Constitution was under con-
siderstion, one chief objection to it was,
that it gave the President too much
power; and that he would encroach upon
the other departments. To this the
Authors OF the FedeTnList replied that
the real danger lay in another direction.
The partition of power, MI. HAMILTON
said, in No. LXXI, ought to be 30 con-
trived as to render one department
Independent Of the other.
at is one thing" he said, "to
be subordinate to the laws, an
other to be dependent on the
legislative body. The first COMFORTS
with, the last violates, the fundamental
principles Of good government, and
whatever may be the forms Of the Con-
stitution, unites sIl power in the same
hands. The tendency Of the legislative
authority to absorb every other, has been
fully displayed and illustrated by exam
pies in some preceding numbers. In
Governments purely republican, this
tendency Is purely irresistible. The rep
resentatiVes Of the people, in q popular
assembly, seem sometimes to Jdncy that
they are the people themselves, and be
tray strong symptoms Of impotence and
disgust at the least sign of opposition
IFlLu aHN JULIET AuhI NEA . 10 u tftg t%Efg hoG
Of its RIGHTS, BIZ either the Executive or
Judiciary, 5UeTe a breach Of their privi
leCe. and an outrage to their dignity.
They often appear disposed to exert an
imperfOus control over the other depart
ments and as they commonly have the
people on their side, they always act
with such momentum, as to make it very
difficult for the other member OF the
Government to maintain the balance Of
the Constitution"
that "neither Department ought to pos
sess, directly or indirectly, an everything
influence over the others, in the admin
istration OF their respective powers.
1t will not be denied" be
said "that power is Of In ~encroaehiDg
nature, and that it ought to be eFsctuGly
restrained from passing the limits as
signed to it. Will it be sufficient to mark
with precision the boundaries Of these
departments, in the Constitution Of the
Government, and to trust to these psrch-
ment barriers against the ~encroaching
spirit Of power. Experience as
sures US that the efficacy of the
provision has been greatly ~overrated
and that some more adequate defence is
Indispenssbly necessary for the more
feeble, against the more powerful men,
bers Of the Government, The Legislative
department Is every uhere extending the
sphere Of its activity, and dras0tng all
pOl0er into its impetuOus Uorter." LEG
islative usurpstions," he said, "by as
sembllng all power in the same hands,
must lead to the same tyranny as is
threatened by executive usurpstions."
In No. LXIX, MADISON said: 1.-THE
several departmets being perfectly CO.
ordinate, by the terms of their common
Commission, neither Of them, it is evil
dent, can pretend to an exclusive or sE-
perior right Of settling the boundaries
between their respective PODers.
The tendency Of republican government
is, to an sggrandizement Of the legisla-
ture, at the expense of the other Depart.
ments.n
In No. Ii, MADISON said
/" In order to lay q due
foundation for that separate and
distinct exercise Of the different
pOwers Of Government, which to s. Ger.
tain extent is admitted on all hands TO
be essential to the preservation Of lib.
erty, IL Is evident that each department
should hare q WW Of its OJ0H, and con-
SequeHtly should be so constructed, that
the members Of each should hare as little
agency as possible in the appointment Of
the members Of the others. But
the great security against 8 gradual CON
centratiOn Of the several powers in the
same department, consists In giving to
those who administer each department
the necessary constitutional means, and
personal motives, TO resist encrOach-
ments Of the others. The provision for
the defense must in this, as IN all other
cases, be made commemorate to the dan
geT Of attack. Ambition must be made
10 cOuBtsract ambition. The interests
Of the man must be connected with the
Constitutional rights Of the place. e.
In republican government, the legisla-
tive authority necessarily predominates.
The remedy for this inconveniency is,
to divide the legislature into different
branches; and TO render them by diff
NEEEnL hlDNiE6 VI EAEtNlODs hlU ukueEE0Ll
principles Of action, as little connected
with each other, as the nature of their
common functions, and their common
dependence on the Society, will admit.
II may even be necessary to guard
against dangerous encroachments by
still further precautions. AS the weight
of the legislative authority requires that
il should be thus divided, the weakness
of the Executive may require, on the
other hand, that il should be fortified"
One Of the means relied on to iortify
the Executive, was the Veto power;
without which, HAMILTON said, in No.
LXXIII, the Executive would be ab-
s~olutely unable to defend himself against
the depredations" of the Legislature.
=" He might gradually be stripped Of his
by successive resolutions, or
annihilsted by a single vote and Ia the
one mode or the other, the legislative
and executive powers might speedily
10 be blended In the same hands"
The Veto power has been found utterly
unavailing to prevent this. We have
the President stripped Of his Consti-
tutionsl powers by successive depreds-
tions, and q Of his Secretaries the
creature and instrument of the Legisla-
ture, executing its will, In opposition TO
that Of the President, and the General
indeeently commenting on the motives
Of action OF his CommAnder-in In Chief.
We now see, iu the words Of HAMILTON,
8 the superior weight and influence of
he legislative body in 3 free Govern
.ent, and the hazard of the Executive
o a trial Of strength with that body"
We have thus seen that, according to
be authoritative judgment of the judi
,iRl Department Of the Government, the
congress can exercise no p0aOers Of le9ts-
ajoH at al, even over a conquered ter
itory, except in conformity TO, and by
rirtue Of the power derived from the
constitution, and cannot, IN any odss,
.isregard the prohibitions contained in
be Constitution and the amendments
which have become parts Of it, How
bis connects itself with the other points
o which we have directed the readers
ttention, we will show hereafter. +.
VS. have seen that uYPht The nusncse !