The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1867-05-20

But we refrain from further comment; tho ques-
ton now to be decided is one Of that class whlqh
emphatcally belongs to the courts to adJudge-at
is not o question Of privilege but OF right. But
having noticed some remarks OF the press, which,
perhaps unintentionaly did injustice to the mo-
tives Of the South Carolina Railroad Company, we
have been at some pains to have prepared the
leading points in the argument of our distinguish
ed townsman, General JAMES CONNER, which we
append.
AS Solicitor of tho South Carolina Railroad Com
pany. LIE has brought to tho view of the court, In
a very able manner the whole question at issue,
and we commend it to the careful perusal OF our
readers, satisfied that they will find, that in this as
in all other trusts committed to him, he has dis
charged his duty with marked ability.
The South Carolina Railroad Company rs Tho Colum.
bia and Augusta Railroad Company. PORTER Con-
NER for Complainants ARTHUR, MELTON q MELTON,
for DEPENDENTS.
ARGUMENT OF GENERAL CONNER.
The pleadings in the cause indicate the issues
submitted to the Court for decision.
The essential allegations in the bill of Complain
ants are that the action of the Defendants is des-
tructive Of the chartered rights OF the Complain
anus, anu GndG bIt VI eLo 1SNSeA>>s~ 49,
pairs the obligation of the contract previously
made between the State and Compainants, and ls
therefore void.
The rights Of the Complainants are derived
from and must depend upon the terms OF their char
ter. What that charter is will hereafter be shown.
The question now to be considered, is how that
charter is to be construed.
1t is contended by the Defendants that the con-
struction shall be most literally for the grantm
and most strictly against the grantee and that the
rules of construction applicable to monopolies
shall apply.
But this is not monopoly. A monopoly is de-
fined to be "an exclusive right granted to o lew
of something which was before OF common right:
It cannot be said that the right to construct Ral
of this privilege to the Complanants, dvested any
citizen Of rig int previously enjoyed by him. Even
IL q monopoly, the question is not between the
monopoly and the citizens, but between one mo-
nopoly and another, for both these corporations
exist by virtue of the same power.
In cases Of Royal Grants, where confessedly the
construction was always most strict against the
grantee, the intent prevailed, and the grant was
not limited simply to what was specifically grant
ed, but included all that necessary to the en-
| joyment Of the thing granted. lWhistlers case, as
| Id Coke. Is Sir John Molin's case, 6 Coke The
Church Wardens OF st. Saviour, 10 Coke, 81; Be-
cons Abr1dgment, Prerogatlve F.; sutton Hospl-
| tai 10 Coke, "a b.
| 4 distinction has also been drawn by eminent
;urists between ROYAL and Legislative grants
End more liberal rule Of construction applied 70
! the latter.
diual principal Of Interpretation is the intent OF
| the Legislature Tho charter is the contract be-
tween the State and the corporation, and Ike any
other contract "ls to be construed to accomplish
tho intention of the parties, and in determining It's
| opl foir oODafrupfiOn
ton with tho subject matter" (Charles River
Bridge case, II Peters, 400; Boulton Us. Bull, Q
Henfy Blackstone 4s9; Binghampton Bridge
oAf The fiji Strength of the Defendants case can
hardly be better expressed than IN the language
of C. j. Taney, in Tho Cha: lies River Bridge case
and as it is the leading case on thls 2rancn 4 on
the Defendants it may be well TO ascertain exactly
| what that case was.
The Charles River Bridge Company, and the War
rem Bridge Company, were rival corporations, each
| owning bridge connecting Boston and Charles
town. The Charles Riyer. Bridge as the elder,
endeavored to enjoin the Warron Bridge COM
pany.
tanned no grant Of exclusive privileges III Peters,
548 549.l The effort was to imply exclusive priv.
ieges, III Peters, $50, and to imply them against
the expressed intention Of the Legislature, III
Peters, 551.l It was not CASE OF construction
| Dut an 0QOTT 10 lUlpOEI hVtAo iut& P*tO
Tie court divided. The case was tgics argued
and finally decided by 3 majority OF one, HAD
| there been words from which the intent to grant
exclusive privileges could have been inferred, 1t II
/ manifest that the court would have unanimously
granted the injunction.
We shall proceed 10 show what was granted,
and that every grant OF power to the compalnants
was accompanied with an express grant OF exclu-
sive privileges.
pressed in the act of 1927 incorporating the Canal
\ and Railroad Company, was for the construction
\ OF Railroad OF Canal or Railroad and Canal
from the city of Charleston on the most
routes to each of the towns Of Columbia, Camden
and Hamburg" This waa modified by tho act OF
1928. which directed the construction Of Railroad
| to Hamburg, with ''branches thereof to Colnm-
bia and Camden" The act Of 1923 did not pro-
hibit independent and direct roads nom Charles
ton to Columbia and Camden. On the contrary,
it authorized them, but the preference evidently
was for main stem and branches, and after Civ
ing to the corporation the right to construct such
main stem and branches, the act provides that
Railroads air. % shall be vested IN tie company, herein
and hereby incorporated exclusively"
By yirture Of this act, the connection OF Colum-
bia and Hamburg by Railroad, WAS authorized.
Not any implied authority but positive, express IS IS
be completed, and then branch thereof to
Columbia. The "branch" necessarily connected
Columbia and Hamburg. 1t was physinally I'M,
possible to construct the branch" contemplated
by the act, without connecting Columbia and Ham,
burg. and all the railroads authorized by the act,
were by the terms Of it exclusive in the company.
To show this still more clearly, let us refer TO the
act Of 1888, entitled IAN act concerning the South
Carolina Canal and Railroad Company" " the pream-
benefit the South Carolina Canal and Railroad
Company have constructed under their charter, q
Railroad from Charleston to Hamburg, and may
construct branches thereof" BE it enacted &C..
that all lands uIappropriated within one mile Of
the centre Of the main tract OF the said road and
it's branches, be vested in the said Company.
This act gives no powers or authority, but it
recognizes the right Of the Company to construct
TO ascertain what branches it refers to, We must
turn to the charter, and the only branches thero
mentioned are branches to Columbia and Camden,
| and over every foot of track authorized by that
act, the exclusive privilege extends;
in the position Of granting to the Company the e1-
elusive right to make keep up and employ such
Railroads, and yet al the same time reserving to
| itself the right to grant the same privileges to
another,
No point is indicated at which the branch is to
diverge hom the main stsm that is left to the
Company. It might have brapohed at Aiken
or few miles from Hamburg. Suppose this bad
been done and the branch continued thence 70
Columbia and on to Camden would not such road
have been clearly within the power given by the
act, and would not the right to make, keep up,
and employ such roads have been vested exclu-
sively in the Company? The charter is too clear
and explicit in its terms to justify doubt. =:
Now, suppose this to have been done, and the
road built, and Columbia and Hamburg thus con-
nected, and the year after ts completion the Leg
islature had charted Railroad nom Columbia to
Hamburg. lust such road as the Columbia and
Augusta Company now contemplate, would not tho
latter charter have been set aside as violating the
prior, as impairing the obligation Of the contract
made between tho State and the Canal and Railroad
Companyp So long as the Dartmouth College
case stands as law, the answer must be in the
affirmative and why and how would such o char
ter impair the obligation Of the previous contract
Bccause the road constructed under it would con-
meet places already connected BY railroad, the
which was vested in the Canal and Railroad Com