Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-07-21

considered as ofIleers, within The msanlpi
Of the constitution, which does not pru
vide for their appointment by the presi
dent alone, or by courts Of law, or b,
heads OF departments, but vests appoint
ments in q subordinate officer. So,
we put this question and fix the ehaFsc
ter Of this military appointee, eithe
way, this provision Of the bih Is equally
opposed to the constitution. Take thl
case Of soldier appointed to perform
the Office OF Judge in one of these states
and as such TO administer the propel
laws Of the state, where is the authority
TO be found In the constitution vesting Il
q military or in an executive officer
strictly judicial functions to be exercised
under the state law? It has been again
decided by the supreme court Of the
United States that the acts of congress
which have attempted to vest executive
pswers in the judicial courts or judges Of
4 the United States, are not warranted BY
the constitution. If congress cannot
/ clOthe Judge with executive duties how
can they cloths an officer or soldier Of the
army with judicial duties of the United
| States, who are not In the military OF
navsl-serviee? So, too, It has been re-
/ peatedly decided that congress cannot
/ require a state officer, executive or Judi.
cial, to perform any duty enjoined on
| him by law Of the United States. How
can congress confer power upon an
| executive officer of the United States TO
perform such duties in q state II
congress could not vest in Judge OF
one OF these states any judicial authority
under the United States by direct en-
aetment, how can it accomplish the
same thing indirectly by removing a
judge and putting an officer Of the United
states in his place, to me these con-
siderations are conclusive Of the uncon-
stitntionality Of the part Of the bill be-
fore me; and | earnestly commend this
consideration to the deliberate judgment
Of congress. Within a period Of less
than a year, the legislation Of congress
has attempted to strip the executive
department Of the government of some
of its executive powers The csnstitu-
ton and the oath provided in il
devOlved on the president the power and
duty to see that the laws are faithfully
executed. The constitution, in order to
carry out this power, gives him choice Of
the agents, and makes them subject to
his control and supervision but in the
execution of these laws the constitu-
tiOnal obligation upon the president
remains, but the power to exercise that
constitutional duty is etfectually taken
away. The military commander IS, as
70 the power Of appointment made To
take the place of the president, and gen.
erals OF the army the place Of the senate,
and any attempt on the part Of the
president to assert his own constitutional
power, may, under pretense of law, be
met by official insubOrdinatiOn. It is to
be feared these military officers, looking
to the authority given by these laws,
other than to the constitution, will re-
cOgnize no authority but the command
ers of districts, and to the general of the
army. II there were no other objections
than this to the proposed legislation, it
would be sufficient. Whilst l hold the
chief executive authority of the United
States, and whilst the obligation rests on
me to see that all laws are faithfully eX-
ecuted, cannot ever willingly surrender
that Il ust or the powers given for its execU-
tiOn;I can never give my assentto be made
responsible for the faithful enforcement
of laws, and, at the same time, surrender
that trust and power which accompany
any other executive officer, high or low,
or any numbe"--f his executive officers.
If these executive trusts, vested by the
constitution in the president, are to be
taken from him and vested in a subor-
diDate officer, the responsibility will be
with congress in clothing the subOrdi-
mates with unconstitutional power, and
WITH the officer who assumes its eXer-
cises. This interference with the con-
stitutional authority of the executive de-
partment is an evil that will inevitably
sap the foundations of our federal sys-
TEN. But it is not the worst evil of
this legislation; it is great public wrong
20 take from the president the power con-
ferred on him alone by the constitution.
But the wrong is more fiagrant and more
dangerous when the pOwerssO taken from
the president are conferred on subOrdi-
mates, executive officers, and especially
upon military officers. over nearly one
third Of the states Of this union, where
military power, regulated by no fixed
laws, rules supreme. bach OF the dis
trict commanders, though not chosen by
the people, or responsible to them, eX-
ercises at this hour more executive
power, military and civil, than the people
have been willing to confer upon the
head the executive department, though
chosen by, and responsible to, them
selves, the remedy must come from the
people themselves. They know what il
is. and how il is to be applied. At the
present TINS they cannot, according TO
the forms of the consultation, repeal
these laws. They cannot remove or con-
troll this military despOtism. The remedy
is, nevertheless, in their hands. 1t is to
be found in the ballot, and is a sure one,
if not controlled by fraud, and aWed by
arbitrary power, or from apathy on their
part too long delayed with an abiding
in their patriotism, wisdom
and integrity, am still hopeful Of the
future and that in the end the rod Of
despOtism will be broken, the armed heel
Of power be lifted from the neeks of the
people, and the principles OF violated
preserved.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
WAsHINGToS, D. c. July 10, 1867.