Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-10-06


ry cases, ii is sufficient for the Chancellor
either to grant fat therefor, or to indorse
his refusal without further explanation Of
his reasons for the grant or refusal to grant
the fiat. In this application il IL due both
TO the importance Of the questions raised
by this preliminary application, and to the
Chaneellorto whom the application is made,
that the view taken of these questions
shoald accompany his action.
The granting Of the Injunction asked for,
would practically decide the question in
favor of those officers Of the corporation
who were elected in September, 1866, and
who now seek by this proceeding to hold
over until such time as the court in the
course of litigation might order another
election az prayed for. For If prelimi-
nary writ was ordered the complainant
would delay action on a motion to dissolve
The injunction by exceptions to the answer
of defendants when filed, and BY an appeal
to the Supreme Court, and would succeed
in holding over during most of the term for
whiqiathe defendants were elected.
This, therefore, is consideration which
shows the importance attached.to the deci-
sion of the preliminary application.
The equitable rights of the parties liti-
CANT, cannot be ascertained without de-
Gliding the questions of law involved in the
case, and an injunction granted at this
stage of the proceedings might have the
effect of doing irreparable mischief to de-
PENDANTS, for if it turned out that upon
final hearing after protraeted litigation,
the questions of law were with them, they
will have been deprived in the meantime
of the positions to which they had been
elected.
On the other hand, compliments allege
distinctly that they have right to the pro-
cess of injunction, and to call upon defend
ants to show by what warrant, valid in law,
the defendants pretend to be the lawful
Mayor and Council of the city, upon the
ground that there is no other court save the
Chancery Court, having jurisdiction, and
competent to give relief, and upon the
ground of the prevention of irreparable
mischief. .1.If-.l.- ~ a
If / was satisfied that compIainants bill
made out case, calling for the prompt ex
ercise Of the high powers vested by law in
the Chancellor, to proceed to enjoin de-
PENDANTS from taking possession of the ar
chiyes, public buildings and assets of the
corporation of Nashville, before the cause
was heard upon its merits, and that FIRE
parable mischief" would result from the
failure or refusal to grant the injunction, l
should not hesitate to grant the injunction
asked for.
But after examining the question of the
control of the law-making power of the
State over public or municipal corpora
ton, existing only for public purposes, like
that of the "Mayor and City Council of
Nashville and after examining the charter
of the corporation and its powers with
reference to municipal election, and the re-
cent legislation, known as the franchise
law in relation to the question of how far
that legislation changes or mobiles the
former provisions oft the city charter in re-
gard to elections in the city, and who may
appoint Judges Of and who may vote at
such elections, without deciding or pre-
tending to decide the questions in this
cause in advance, except SO far as the APP
plication for the injunction is concerned,
must say that do not see from the bill
of the compliments that they present a
case iustifying active and immediate inter-
vention for the prevention of irreparable
mischief, or that irreparable mischief is
likely to ensue from the newly elected
Mayor and City Council taking charge of
the government of the city.
Very great inconvenience may result to
the complainants unless they are retained
in office by the extraordinary process of a
Court of Chancery, but it seems to me that
irreparabIe mischief to the city and pro-
perry holders will not likely result from
nv refusal to grant the injunction.
1t is alleged in the bill that some of the
defendants are ineligible, as they do not
possess the qualifications required by the
charter. 1t may be that upon final hear
ing this may constitute a ground for de
claring the election of the 18th September,
1867, void in toto, but, as by the 10th sec
ton of the act of 1858, it is provided that
each branch ofthe City Council SHALL have
authority to decide ultimately upon all
questions relative to the qualifications,
election and returns of members, it occurs
to me that, to say the least of it, it would
be doubtful whether | could safely take
away this franchise or power from the City
Council and assume to decide upon the
question of the election qualification Of
members of that body.
Nor do l think that the alleged coercive
machinery of secret societies mentioned in
complainants' bill, or any threats which
| may have been made to influence voters al
the recent election, or any other politica
appliances in conducting the election
| whatever weight these facts, if shown, may
have on the hearing, can or does constitut,
a ground for the injunction asked for b.
compliments.
And it is equally difficult to see how thu
question of vested rights and the effect Q
| the provisions of the franchise law upol
| the corporate franchises as impairing tn
| obligation of contracts, can be looked Il
| in this cause between the parties to thi
| bill at this stage of the proceedings. Ger
tsinly neither the compliments nor any on
Of them have a vested right under the char
ter to the offices to which they were electe'
in 1866, any longer than their successor
are elected and qualified, and if it turn
ont upon the final hearing of this cause
that no valid election has been held, an
| that defendants were not entitled to tax
| charge of the government of the city undo
the charter and laws Of the land; thei
remedy and the remedy of any person VIII
has vested rights affected by the ALLEGES
illegal proceedings, or the obligation {
| whose contract with the State or city 10 i'm
paired, will be adequate and complete.
| the State of Tennessee has passed a law IN
pairing the obligation of contracts betwee
the State and the corporation of Nashville
or between the corporation and third pal
ties, il is unconstitutional, and any part
aggrieved can, upon proper proceeding
have the law so declared
L am not prepared at this time to decid
that the act of 25th of February, 1867, er
titled an act to alter and amend an a.
passed May Sd, 1866" usually known Z
the amended franchise law, is unconstitr
tional and void, but for the purpose Of II
, present application so far as it is Decessar
to consider its provisions, will regard 1t
the law of the land, more especially as OF
Supreme Court, when it had the questio
of the constitutionality and validity of II
, franchise laws before them, decided II
main question raised in relation to sal
acts, including the question as to wheth'
s the General Assembly, in passing the hr
of these acts, had exhausted the pow
granted in the amended constitution.
The said act Of 18th February, 1s6
section /, provides that every male II
habitant of this State, Of the age Of twent,
; one years, a citizen Of the United Stat
and resident of the county wherein
may offer his vote six months precediT
! the day of election, shall be entitled TO Il