The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-04-10

poweffuI Federal force was about to attack
the lines of Bull Run near Union Mill, where
tbty we're now denuded OF defenders. This
caused them to recall the fresher regiments
from the chase and send them upon a forced
march of seven or eight miles, to meet an
IMAGINARY enemy, and to return next morning
to the field Of battle"
We had, of course, but one commanding
general-myself The story of the ''alarmed
scout" and "bewildered picket" is doubtless
intended for sarcastic surmise, not fact. 1t
is out of place in a biography of Jackson. No
troops "were recalled from the chase and sent
seven or eight miles by night" or day "to
meet an imaginary enemy" Holmes brigade,
which arrived too late to join in the battle or
pursuit, and Ewelps, reported by its comman-
der to be four miles Off after the fight was
over, were ordered to return to their camps,
for the comfort of the men, and to spare
Ewell's a needless march. The latter, in his
conversation with me, said that the Federal
troops, which had been facing our centre and
right during the day, were reported to be ad.
vancing. He agreed with me, however, that
If this was true, they would soon be recalled
to serve as rear guard. Still, he and Holmes
were cautioned to be on their guard. No sol
dier was ordered by me to march, in conse-
quence of this report, or exposed to discom-
fort or fatigue. No troops were ordered to the
'field of battle' next day, except those de-
tailed to collect the arms, etc. Our infantry
which pursued the enemy from the field, find
ing their pursuit Intellectual soon aban-
doned it..
Page 23l:-'It was expected that the Coufede-
rate commanders would at least pursue the
enemy 10 the gates of their lntrenchments
before Alexandra and Washington; and 1t was
hoped that 1t might not be impracticable, in the
agony of their confusion, to recover the Vr-
ginian city, to conquer the hostile capital with
its immense spoils, and to emancipate oppressed
Maryland by one happy blow"
These expectations and hopes were ex-
pressed at the time, not by military men who
understood the state of affairs, but by the
same military critics of the press who had but
little while before heaped denunciation on
me for the measure which averted the capture
of our army in the valley, and enabled it to
preserve the Confederacy at Manassas-the
abandonment of Harper's Ferry. Such pur-
suit would have been frutless. We could not
have carried the intrenchments named by
assault, and had none of the means to besiege
them. Our assault would have been repulsed,
and the enemy, then become the victorious
party, would have resumed their march to
Richmond. But if we had captured the
intrenchments, river mile wide lay between
them and Washington, commanded by the
heavy guns of a Federal fleet. If we had
taken Alexandria, which stands on low and
level ground, those guns would have driven
us out of it in few hours, at the same time
killing our friends the inhabitants. We could
not cross the Potomac, and, therefore, it was
impracticable to conquer the hostile capital''
or ''emancipate oppressed Maryland" The
failure of our invasions in 1862 and 1863
with far greater means, might convince the
Southern people, | think, that the authors
expectations were eXtravagant.
Page 231:-"The toiling army, which had
marched and fought all along the hills of Bull
Run through the long July day, demanded, with
o,,Nl 4, Hn l,l ,EEn n,s.. e
declared they would march the soles off their
feet in so glorious an errand without mur-
mur.n
My information of the disposition of the
army was very different. According to it.,
! the troops believed that their victory
had established the independence of the South
that all their country required of them had
| been ccomplished-the war ended, and their
military obligations fulfilled. They therefore
| left the army in crowds, to return to their
homes. Such was the report of the generals,
colonels, staff officers, and railroad officials.
The exultatiOn of victory cost US more than
the Federal army lost by defeat.
Page 29l:-" But more than this the morn
| ing after the battle saw an aggregate of ten
thousand fresh men, composed of the remainder
OF the Army of the Valley, who had at length
! reached the scene, and of reinforCements from
Richmond, arrive within the intrenchments at
Richmond from Manassas Junction, who were
! burning with enthusiasm, and expected nothing
else than to be led against the enemy at once"
| l have no records; but, according to my
| recollection, the Sixth South Carolina Regi-
ment constituted the only reinforcement from
Richmond at the time referred to. On page
2ll the Army of the Valley is estimated at
| IL ,000. So that less than 2700 men of that
army must have arrived the day after the
battle, as more than $500 were engaged in it.
| am confident that if we had marched a few
days after the battle to "cOnOuer WaShinp-
TOM and 'emancipate Maryland" !" we should
not have brought 10000 men to the banks OF
| the Potomac. Our men, as has been already
| said, believed the contest decided-their OBJ
| jects achieved-and were more disposed to 60
home to enjoy the independence and glory
| they had won than to renew the war on
| Northern soil.
Pages 23l-232:-"In few days .the patriotic
| citizens OF Alexandria sent authentic intelli-
there and in Washington, which true military
| sagacity would have anticipated as Jackson
| did, without actual testimony"
No such intelligence was sent to me. Nor
| were the Federal troops south of the Potomac
a rabble. Mansfelds, Miles, and Runyan 5
| divisions, a larger force than we could have
| brought against them, had not been beaten or
| engaged, and the reports of the commanders
| of the brigades engaged show that they en-
tered the intrenchments organized, except
| those who fled individually from the field.
These latter undoubtedly gave an exaggerated
| idea of the rout to the people of Washington;
| as those from our ranks met by the President
| before he reached Manassas on his way to the
| field, convinced him that our army had been
| defeated.
Page 232:-"For days there was neither orga.
nlzation or obedience nor thought OF resistance
ON the South side OF the Potomac"