The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1867-07-26

Since Tue title Oh each Oh tneSe SIu[eS
| to the lands and public building own
ed by them has never been disturb
ed, and not foot of it has ever been
acquired by the United States, even
under title OF confiscation, and not
a foot has ever been taxed under the
Federal law.
In conclusion, / must respectfully
call the attention of Congress to the
consideration of one more question
arising under this bill. Invests In the
military commander subject only to
the approval OF the army OF the
United States, an unlimited power
to remove from office any civil or
military officer in each of these ten
States, and the further power, sub
ject to the same approval, to detail
or appoint any military officer or SOL
dier of the United States to perform
the duties OF the officer so removed
and fill all vacancies occurring in
these States by death, resignation or
otherwise. Tie military appointeeI
must be required to perform the du-
ties Of civil Office according to the
laws of the State, and as such re-
quired to take an oath. He is, for
the time being, a civil officer. What
is his character? Is he civil officer
of the State, or a civil officer of the
United States? Where is the Federal
ipower under our Constitution which
authorizes his appointment by any
Federal officer? II, however, he is
to be considered civil officer of the
United States, as his appointment
and oath would seem to indicate,
where is the authority for his appoint
ment by the Constitution?
The power of appointment Of all
officers of the United States, civil or
military, where not provided for in
the Constitution, is vested IN the
President by and with the advice and
consent Of the Senate, with this ex-l
ception, that Congress by law may
vest the appointment of such infer
Tor officers as it thinks proper in the
President alone, in the courts of law,
or By heads OF departments. But
this bill, if these are to be consider,
ed inferior officers within the mean
ing of the Constitution, does not pro
vide for their appointment by the
President alone, or by courts of law
or by heads of departments, but vests
their appointment in q subordinate
officer. So if we put this question,
and fix the character of this military
appointee either way, this provision
OF the bill is equally opposed to the
Constitution. Take the case of q
soldier to appointed to perform the
office of Judge in one of these
States, and as such to administer the
proper laws OF the State. Where is
the authority to be found in the Con-
stitution for resting in military or
an executive office strict judicial
functions to be exercised under State
law 1t has been again and again
decided by the Supreme Court of the
United States that Dts of Congress
which have attempted to vest execu-
tive powers in the judicial courts or
ia Judses NJ the United States, are
not warranted by the Constitution.
If Congress cannot clothe a Judge
with merely executive duties, how
can 1t clothe an officer or soldier of
the army with judicial duties over
citizens OF the United States who
are not In the military or naval SER
vice? So, too. it has repeatedly de-
c:ded that Congress cannot require
State officer, executive or judicial, to
perform any duty not enjoined on
him by law of the United States
How can Congress then confer pow
er upon an Executive officer of the
United States to perform such duties
in State? If Congress could not
vest in judge of one of these States
any judicial authority under the
United States. by direct enactments,
how can it accomplish the same thing
indirectly by removing the State
Judge and putting an officer of the
United States in his place?
I To me these considerations are
conclusive of the unconstitutionality
of this part of the bill before me,
and 1 earnestly commend their con-
sideration to the deliberate judgment
of Congress.
/ Within a period of less than a
year the legislation Of Congress has
attempted to strip the Executive de-
apartment Of the government of some
of Its essential powers. The Con,
stitution, and the oath provided in
lt, devolved on the President the
power and the duty TO see that the
laws are faithfully executed. The
Constitution, in order to carry out
this power. gives him choice of the
agents, and makes them subject to-
his control and supervision. But I'M
the execution of these laws the con-
stitutio1al obligation on the Presi-
dent remains, but the power to exer-
else that constitutional duty is effec-
tually taken away. The military
commander is, as to the power of
appointment, made to take the place
OF the President, and the general of
the army to take the place of the SEN
ate; and any attempt on the part of
the President to assert his own Con
stitutlonal power may under pre-
tense of the law be met by official in
subordination.
1t is to be feared these military Of
ficers, looking to the authority given
by these laws rather than to the let
ter of the Constitution will recognize
no authority but the commander of
the district and the General of the
army. Ifthere were no other osjec-
tions than this to the proposed legis-
lation, it would be sufficient. Whilst
l hold the chief executive authority
of the United States, whilst the obli-
CATION rests on me to see that all laws
are faithfully executed, l can never
willingly surrender that trust or
the powers given for its execution.
l can never give may assent to be
made responsible for the faithful ex-
ecution of laws, and at the same
time surrender that trust, and the
powers which accompany it, to any
other executive officer, high or low
or ary number Of executive officers.
If the executive trusts, vested BY
the constitution in the President, are
to be taken away from him and vest
ed in q subordinate officer, the re-
sponsibility will be with Congress I'M