The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-02-27

sent, unless the soatb can and redress by
political machinery which they oould have
controlled in 1861, resort to force would be
unJustinabe, even under such outraoes on
Their rights as are now ripe for execution. But
their political efficiency and their military re-
sources are at an equally low ebb, at time
when they have the sorest need of both.
We suppose that such Sontherners as can
suihciently control their honest indignation to
make an estimate of the situation, will neroeve
that the only cheioe which remains omen TO
them lies between dogged, sullen submission.
and reorganization under the new gospel OF
negro suffrage. In such a pitiable choice of
alternatives we do not offer advice: but we
can perhaps explain the actual situation more
dispassonately than those who are stunp intb |
justiiabIe rage by this fresh aggression.
we advised and approved of the rejection by |
the South of the Constitutional amendment. |
If we hesitate, as yet, to give similar advice |
respecting the reorganization proposed in Sher- |
mans bill, 1t is because circumstances have,
in essential respects, so totally changed, that
new and comprehensive survey of the situation
is a necessary prerequisite to intelligent action
The two chief features of Sherman's bill are
outrages which baffled political foresight, be-
cause it was not supposed or supposable that
such stretch of perfdy and inconsistency
could be ventured upon. Sherman's bill pro-
vides for the overthrow of the Southern State
Governments, and for putting the whole sec
ton under the rgors of martial law. We had
what seemed to be solid reasons for supposing
that neither of these outrages would be per-
petrated. In relation to the State Govern
ments. we supposed that the Republican
party would be bound by its own recogni-
ton of those Governments. The Importance
which they attached to the Emancipa-
ton amendment, and the fact that they
recognized the Southern ratifications of it as
valid, precluded them, in logic and consist
ency, from afterwards calling in question the
competency of the ratifying State Govern
ments. Congress has acknowledged the
validity of the Southern ratifcations of that
amendment in a dozen different ways. 1t has
repeatedly made it the basis of legislation, and
| even in proposing the amendment now pend
| ing, it recognized its validity by numbering
| the proposed amendment as the fourteenth,
| which it could not be unless there was hir-
teenth, and the thirteenth is precisely the
| Emancipation Amendment 1t seemed against
| all antecedent probability that a Republican
| Congress would displace this amendment from
the Constitution, by declaring that the ratify
| ing States which made up the three-tourths
were not competent to act upon it. Even the
| pending amendment was submitted to the
| Southern States and their ratifcatiOns asked.
| Was it to be expected that Congress would so
stultify itself as to declare illegal the very
|
Putting the South under martial law was as
| little to have been expected, in any reasonable
calculation. Martial law, by its very nature
and definition, is a suspension of the habeaS
corpus; and the Constitution declares, with as
much emphasis as it says anything, that the
habeas corpus shall not be suspended except
in times of rebellion or invasion. There being
no rebellion, it was not to have been expected
that the South would be again put under mar
tial law
If these two outrageous and unexpected
measures had not been resorted to, the South
| would stand on strong vantage-ground for
battling the radicals. The worst that could
be done was to exclude the Southern members
| of Congress-an evil that might be borne with
! composure so long as the South held control
of its internal affairs through the State Gov
ernments, freely chosen by its white citizens.
The extent of the evil was payment of Federal
/ taxes without Federal representation. But
with the State Governments abolished, or ex-
| listing on mere sutferance, and the whole peo-
pie subject to martial law, the situation is so
| changed, and the consequences of resistance
so stupendously magnifed, that it is impor-
tant to take new observations and bearings
before deciding on the future direction of the
voyage.
We suppose it will be found, when the South
can abate its just indignation sufficiently for a
careful survey, that it possesses no machinery
| OF resources, eltnef pOltlCal or military, Tor
tending off this atrocious oppression. If no
| such machinery or resources shall be Disco
/ verable, the practical question will then be
| whether the South shall accept the situation
under protest or disdainfully submit to it.
| Were it not for the negro element of the pro-
! blem, the latter would undoubtedly be the true
course, as alike consistent with safety and
| self-respect. But the negro element compli-
| Gates the question, and renders the solution
| 4 iS hat tha H.
licans may, through Government patronage
\ and appeals to ambition, bribe and demoralize
Southern whites enough to make, with the nee
| groes a majority of the inhabitants. If they
can succeed in this they win reorganize and
| admit the States, and the South will there
after be under negro rule, and will become in
| tolerable as the residence of white men. Ad-
mitting Cat least by hypothesis) that this
danger is not fanciful, the question arises
(and very grave one it is) whether it is not
better to fight the devil with fire." by
accepting the negro suffrage which is inevi-
| table, and controlling the negro vote, instead
| of allowing it to be alienated to the Republi-
cans, as it would pretty certainly be by resist
ance Whether the negro vote could be
managed by the planters, and whether whites
enough could be seduced to make the radical
plan work, are questions that cannot be
answered without more local knowledge than
we possess; but we suppose all intelligent
Southerners must allow that these questions
| ought to be well considered before taking an
irreversible resolution.