Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-07-20

way that the Federal courts sit in court
houses owned or leased by the United States.
not in the courthouses of the States.
the United States pay each of the States
for the use OF its jails. Finally, the United
States levies its direct taxes and its inter-
nal revenue upon the property in these
States, including the productions of the
lands within their territorial limits, not by
way of contribution in the character of a
conquerer, but in the regular way of taxa
ton, under the same laws which apply to
all the other States Of the Union. During
the rebellion and since, the title of each Of
these States to the lands and public build
ings owned by them has never been dis
turbed, and not foot of it has ever been
acquired by the United States, even under
a title of eonGscation, and not foot has
ever been taxed under Federal law.
| In conclusion, / must respectfully call
the attention of Congress to the considera-
ton of one more question arising under
this bill. 1t vests in the military COM
manders, subject only to the approval of
the General of the army of the United
States, an unlimited power to remove from
office any civil or military officer in each
of these ten States; and further power,
subject to the same approval, to detail or
| appoint any military officer or soldier of
| the United States to perform the duties of
the officer so removed, aud fill all vacan-
cies occurring in these States by death,
resignation or otherwise The mill
tary appointee thus required to per
form the duties of a civil officer
according to the laws of the State,
and as such required to take the oath,
as for the time being civil officer. What
is his character? Is he a civil officer of
the State, or of the United States Where
Is the Federal power under our constitu-
ton which authorizes his appointment by
any Federal officer? If, however, he is to
be considered civil officer of the United
States, as his appointment and oath would
seem to indicate, where is the authority
for his appointment? By the constitution
the power of appointment of all officers of
the United States, civil or military, where
| not provided for in the constitution, is
vested in the President, by and with the
| advice and consent of the Senate, with this
exception, that Congress may, by law, vest
| the appointment of such inferior officers as
they may think proper, in the President
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads
of departments, but in this bill those who
are considered as officers within the mean
ing of the constitution are not provided for
by appointment by the President alone, by
the courts of law or by the heads of de-
partments, but vests the appointment in
subordinate officer. SO if we put this ques-
tion aud fix the character of the mill
tary appointee either way, this pro-
vision of the bill is equally opposed to
the constitution. Take the case of sol
der appointed to peform the office of Judge
in one of these States, and as such to adj
minister the proper laws Of the State
Where is the authority to be found in the
constitution for vesting in military or an
executive officer strict judicial functions to
be exercised under the State law? 1t has
been again decided by the Supreme Court
of the United States that acts of Congress
which have attempted to vest executive
powers in the judicial courts or Judges of
the United States are not warranted by the
constitution. If Congress cannot clothe a
judge with merely executive duties, how
can they clothe an officer or soldier of the
army with judicial powers over citizens of
the United States who are not in the mill
tary or naval service? So, too, it has been
repeatedly decided that Congress cannot
require a State officer, executive or Judi
cial, to perform any duty enjoined on him
by law of the United States, nor confer
power on an executive officer of the Uni
ted States to perform such duties in State.
If Congress could not vest in a Judge of
one of these States judicial authority under
the United States, by direct enactment, how
can it accomplish the same thing indirectly
by removing State Judge and putting an
officer Of the United States in his place
To me, these considerations are conclusive
of the unconstitutionality of this part of
the bill before me, and | earnestly COM
mend their consideration to the deliberate
judgment of Congress. Within a period
less than a year the legislation Of
Congress has attempted to strip the Execu-
tive Department of the government of
some of its essential powers. The consti-
tuition and the oath provided in it, deVolVes
IN the President the power and duty to see
that the laws are faithfully executed The
constitution, in order to carry out this
power, gives him choice of the agents, and
makes them subject to his control and
supervision, but in the execution Of these
laws, the constitutional obligation upon
the President remains, but power to exer-
else that constitutional duty is effectually
taken away. The military commander is,
as to the power of appointment, made to
take the place of the President, and the
General of the army the place of the Sem
ate, and any attempt on the part of the
President to assert his constitutional pow
er, may, under pretense.of law, bemet by Of
fetal INSTRUMENTATION, which is to be feared
These military officers looking to the au-
thority given by these laws, rather than to
the letter of the constitution, will recog-
nize no authority but by the Commander
of the district or the General Of the army.
If these men had no other objections than
this to the proposed legislation, it would
be sufficient. Whilst / hold the chief
executive authority of the United States
whilst the obligation rests on me to see
that all the laws are faithfully executed, /
can never willingly surrender that
trust or the powers given for its execution,
and 1 can never give my assent to
be made responsible for the faith
ful execution Of the law, and at
same time surrender that trust and powers
which accompany them to any other exec
utlVe officer, high or low, or any number
VI CACCuiAfC OAuNbks. II lhGSt Trusts, vested
by the constitution in the President, are TO
be taken from him and vested in a subor-
dinate officer, the responsibility will be
with Congress in clothing the suboFdinates
with unconstitutional power, and with the
officer who assumes its exercise. This in
reference with the constitutional authority
of she executive department is an evil that
will inevitably sap the foundations of our
Federal system, but it is not the worst evil
of this Legislation. 1t is a great public
wrong to take from the President powers
conferred on him alone by the constitution,
but the wrong is more fragrant and more
dangerous, when the powers so taken from
the President are conferred on subordinate |
executive officers, and especially upon |
military officers Over nearly one-shird |
Of the States Of the Union, military power,
regulated by no fixed law, rules supreme. |
Each Of the five district commanders,
though not chosen by the people, are re-
sponsibIe to them, and exercise at this |
hour more executive power, military and |
civil, than the-people have been willing to
confer on the head of the executive |
department. They cannot, according
to the forms Of the constitution repeal these |
laws; they cannot remove or control this 1
vile despotism. The remedy is neverthe-