Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-01-08

| not create controversies 10 htI lDDH.
s. It can decide only upon rights and
)t eases as they are brought by Others be-
/ fore It; can do nothing for itself; II must
re do every thing for Others it must obey
II tho laws, and if it corTuptly administers
ar them, il is subjected TO the power Of inn
is parchment. On the other hand the
sr legislative powers, except in the few
J. cases of constitutional prohibition, is un-
$ limited. Ii is forever varying its means
.e and lis end. It governs the institutions,
n and laws and public policy Of the coun-
,. try. Il regulates all its vast interests.
Al 1t disposes of all its property-look but
e at the exercise of two or three branches
i. of its ordinary powers: Il ievies all taxes;
8 ii directs and appropriates all supplies
il gives the rules for the descent, distTi-
n button and devices Of all property held
r by individuals; it controls the sources
q and resources of wealth it changes at
4 its will the whole fabric Of the laws; ;
: i. moulds at its pleasure almost ali the
= institutions which gave strength, and
r comfort, and dignity to society. In the
next place, it is the direct visible repre-
Z sentative Of the will Of the people in all
: the changes of times and circumstances.
Z 1t has the pride as well as the power Of
= numbers; it is easily moved, and steadily
moved by the strong impulses Of popular
feeling and popular odium, it O6eys with
! out reluctance the will Of the majority
-flfOT the time being. The path to public
N-avor lies open by such obedience, and il
finds not only support but impUIIity In
whatever measures the majority advise,
, even though they tTansc end the cOnstitu-
T tiOnal limits Ii has no motive, there
fore, to be Jealous or scrupulous in its
use of power and it finds its ambition
stimulated and its arm strengthened by
. l the 0OUu fanRnpa and anIIrgUp pf nuFft-
bers. These views are not alone those
Of men who look with apprehension upon
the fate Of republics, but they are also
freely admitted by some of the strongest
advocates for popular rights and the
permanency of republican institutions.
Each department should haye a will
Of its own each should have its OwR in
dependence secured beyond the power of
being taken away by either or both Of
the others, but at the same time the rela-
tiOls Of each to the other should be so
strong that there should be a mutual in
terest 20 sustain and protect each other.
There should not only be constitutional
means but personal motives 10 resist en-
croachmentsO of one or either Of the others
Thus ambition would be made to control
ambition, the desire Of power to check
power, and the pressure OF interest to
balance an opposing interest The iud-
ciary department is naturally and dmost
/ necessarily, rs has been already said. the 1
weakest department it c.N have no
means ofBiDfuence by S.ttrOnage its |
/ powers csI never be Y.fdgd for itself; |
il has DGNUmmGud o er the purse or the
sword y the natiOdE it can neither lay
I taxes - ssIsEA',- money, nor com
mans o% or appoint to office; it is /
nevftSP asht into contact with the peo-
/ pleEF constant appeals and sOliCita-
/ IA ~ and private intercOurses which |
/ 5Fa1hg 70 all the other departments Of
N 9 government. It is sure only in con- |
floversies, or in trials and punishments (;
>, Is rigid justice ami impartiality give il /
e5O claims to favor, however they may I
I U5respected. It stands solitary and un- |
supported, except by that portion Of pub |
! lie opinion which is interested only in /
/ The strict administration of justice, il /
/ can rarely secure the sympathy or zeal /
1 Gus support either Of the executive or the /
I legislative; if they are not, as is not I'M /
/ frequently the case, Jealous Of its prerog- /
/ 9tives, the constant necessity Of scruti- |
/ uizing the acts of each upon the appica- /
4 ton Of any private person, and the pain /
/ ful duty OF pron0uncing Judgment that |
these acts are a departure from the law |
and constitution, can have no tendency /
I to cOnCiliate kindness or nCuri5h iuflu- |
euce II would Sc en- therefore that some |
additional guards would under such cir |
Cumstanccs be necessary 10 protect /
this department from the absolute do |
miniOn of the others yet rarely have /
any such guards been applied, and every /
attempt TO introduce them has been re- /
sisted with a pertinaciiy which demon |
strates how slow popular leaders are to .
Introduce checks upon their own power |
and how slow the people are to believe |
q :. 81
their liberties. II any department Of the /
government has undue influence or abb
s0rbing power, il certainly has not been /
either the executive or the judiciary. II /
addition to what has been said by these
distinguished writer's, it may also be urged /
by the dominant party In each house,
that they may, by the expulsion % a suf- /
Ticent uumb=. Of members, or by the /
exclusion from representation Of requi-
site number Of states, reduce the minor
ity to less than one third. Congress by
these means might be enabled to mass u
law, the objections OF the pcesi fSnt to
the contrary notwithstanding, which
w0Gld render impJtent the other two
departments OF the governor and make
imperative the wholesome and restrain
ing power wlichft was intended by the
trainers OF thef fconstitution should be
extended by ITEM. This would be a
practical concE EtTatiun of all power in
the United Sitks es; this, in the language
Of the authol IS tie declaration Of iude-
pendenee EisSs>> ~. y Sisely the defni-
- vYleffS b } Isssasai itii5 ,aso,,i,ls ilaEt ot
M Md dn4llRRssffi crest 5eEtth9iG1 feEt tbs eomgl mp! onai
!a5|yeIs ,,'i;. %i 4ss carry amy Wds - nth
upon an expression Of my u
We cannot too often recy
especially at coHjuucti--...sa the
present. Their applications to our actual
condition is so apparent that they now
come 10 Us as q living voice, to be lis
tened TO with more attention than at
any previous period of our history. We
have been, snd are yet, in the midst of
popular commOtiOns. The passions
aroused by a great civil war are still
dominant. II is not time favorable to 1
that calm and deliberate Judgment
which Is the only sale guide when radi-
cal changes in our institutions are TO be
made. The measure now before me is
one of those changes. Ii initiates all
untried experiments for a people who
have said with one voice that it is not
for their good. This alone should make
us pause. But it is not all-the exneri-
ment has not been tried, or so much a
demanded by the people of the several
states for tLemselyes-in but few of the
states has such an Innovation been
allowed as giving the ballot to the cOlored
population without any other qualifca-
tion than a residence of one year, aud in
most of thera the denial Of the ballot to
this race is absolute and by fundamental
law placed beyond the d.main of ordi-
nary legisia ion. In most of those states
the evil of such suffrage would be partial,
but small a. it would be, it is guarded by
constitutional barriers Here the inno- !
vatiOn assumes formidable proportions
which may easily grow to such an extent
as to make the white population a su6or-
diBate elem ent in the body polite AT
ter full del beration on this measure, l
cannot bring myself to approve it, even
upon local considerations, nor yet as the
beginning Of an experiment on larger
scale. yield to no one in attachment
to that ru.e of general suffrage which
distinguishes our policy as q nation but
there is limit, wisely observed hitherto, |
which makes the ballot & privilege and a
trGst, and which requires of some classes
q time suitable for probation and prepar-
alton. To give it Unfortunately to a
new class, wholly gnprepared by pre-
vious habits and opportunities to perform
the trust which it demands, is TO degrade
It and finally to destroy its powers; for |
il may be safely assumed that 10 politi-
cal truth is better established than that |
such indis,sriminats and all-embracing
extension CT popular suffrage must end
at last in lis destruction.
ANDREW JOHNSON.
wAsHINGToS, JRuary > 1857.
s-~s-za<-.-ss
EsRY GOODS
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