The Elk advocate. [volume] (Ridgway, Elk Co., Pa.) 186?-1868, 1867-08-01

officer of the state, where is the Federal
power under our Constitution which au-
thorizes his appointment by any Federal
officer If, however, he is to be CON
sidercd civil officer o. the United
States, as his appointment and oath
would seem to indicate, where is tho
authority for his appointment vested by
the Constitution The power of an
pointmcnt Of all officers Of the United
States, civil or military, where not pro-
vided for In the Constitution, is vested
in the President, by and with the ad
vice and consent of the Senate with
this exception : that Congress may, by
law, vest the appointment of such infe-
rior officers as they think proper in the
Presiden! alone, in the courts of law, or
in the heads Of departments. But this
bill, if these are to be considered infe.
rior officers within the meaning of the
Constitution, does not provide for their
appointment by the Presiden. alone, or
by the courts of law, or by the heads of
departments, but rests the appointment
in one subordinate executive Office, sub
ject to the approval of another subordi,
nate executive officer so that if we
put this question, and fix the character
OF this military appointee, either way
this provision of the bill is equally OPP
posed to the Constitution.
Take the case of a soldier or officer
appointed to perform the office of Judge
in one Of these states, and as such to
administer the proper laws of the state,
where is the authority to be found in the
Constitution for vesting in a military or
an executive officer strict judicial fupc-
tions to be exercised under state law it
has been again and again decided by the
supreme court of the United states that
acts Of Congress which have attempted
to vest executive power in the judicial
courts or judges of the United states are
not warranted by the Constitution
| If Congress cannot clothe Judge
with merely executive duties, how can
they clothe an officer or soldier of the
army with judicial duties over citizens of
the United states who are not in the
military or naval service.
50, TOO, it has been repeatedly decid.
ed that Congress cannot require state
officer, executive or judicial, to perform
any duty enjoined upon him by law of
the United states. How, then, can
Congress confer power upon an executive
officer of the United states to perform
such duties in state If Congress
could not vest in a judge of one OF these
state, by direct enactment, how can it
accomplish the same thing indirectly by
removing the state judge and putting an
officer of the United state in his place z
10 me these considerations are con-
elusive OF the unconstitutionality of the
part Of the bill now before me, and l
earnestly commend their consideration
to the deliberate judgment of Congress.
Within period less than year the
legislation Of Congress has attempted to
strip the executive department of the
Gov ernment of some of its essential
pow ers.
1t is to be feared that these military
officers, looking to the authority given
by these, rather than to the letter of the
Constitution, will recognize no authority
but the commander of the district and
the General of the army, II there were
no other objection than this to this pro.
posed legislation, it would be sufficient.
, Whilst hold the chief executive author.
ity ofthe United States; whilst the obli-
CATION rests upon me to see that all the
laws are faithfully executed, can never
willingly surrender that trust, or the
powers given for its execution I can
, never give my assent to be made respon.
sible for the faithful execution of laws,
ant at the same time surrender that
trust, and the powers which accompany
it, to any other executive officer, high
or low, or to any number of executive
officers
: If this executive trust, vested by the
, Constitution in the President, is to be
taken from him and vested in subordi-
nate officer, the responsibility will be
with Congress, in clothing the subordi-
, nate with unconstitutional power, and
with the officer who assumes its exer
} else. This interference with the con-
stitutional authority of the executive
: department. is an evil that will eventua-
, lily sap the foundations OF our federal
system, but is not the worst evil of this
) legislation. 1t is a great public wrong
to take from the President power con-
fered on him alone by the Constitution.
But the wrong is more fragrant and
| more dangerous wher the powers SO
taken from the President are conferred
upon subordinate executive officers, and
7 especially upon military officers Over
nearly one-third of the states of the
! Union military power, regulated by no
= fixed law, reigns supreme. Each one of
S the five district commanders, though
not chosen by the people Or responsible
D to them, exercises at this hour more
a executive power military and civil,
a than the people have ever been will