Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-03-05
THE SBPREaEE. C0URT-IT RELA-


The strength of the Conservative posi-
ton, for immediate operations, lies in the
/ President and the Supreme Court But
/ these advantages are defensive and tempo
rarv. They are of little use except as a
means of gaining time to rally and recruit
our forces. Unless we can elect President
/ Johnson's successor, his fidelity TO the con-
stit1tion is but a transient advantage. So
long as there was reason TO hope for the
! final closing up Of this controversy during
his term, It was not necessary TO look 70 the
Presidential election as the key of the po-
Iitical situation. But, since the recent ac-
ton of Congress cuts of expectations Of relief
previous to that event, it is necessary to ex-
tend the scope of our calculations We
must estimate the possibilities that lie be-
yond the Presidential election, in order to
act intelligently in the preliminaries of the
election Itself If any portion Of the Con-
servatives, North or South, think that we
shall be as we'd of without the next Presi-
dent as with, they will Of course oppose any
tactics to improve our chances OF electing
him. For our part, we do not wish to see
| this point decided without discussion, but
after discussion and if, on a fair COMPARE
son and balance Of advantages, the South
think It best to let the Presidential election
go by default, it is not for us to question
their right Of abstention. ..
In the actual position Of affairs, the Su-
preme Court is Of more value TO the South
! than the President. In the absence of the
South from Congress, the adverse majority
being sufficient to Oyerrule the Presidents
veto, he is practically powerless, except to
stand as sentinel at the door of the Supreme
! Court two-thirds majority of Congress
ayails nothing against a decision of the
| Court: and the appointment Of the judges
| being vested in the President, Congress can
| accomplish nothing by increasing their
number. But If the Republicans elect
| President Johnson's successor they will
thereby gain control Of the Supreme Court
| and thus remove the only barrier that stands
between their absolute will and the unpro-
| tected South. If the Conservatives do not
carry the next Presidential election, the
| Sonth is delivered over to six years more
| (six, counting from this date of unfelieved
oppression. A Radical President could
veto every bill repeating the acts of this
and the succeeding Congress, and whatever
revolutions might take place in the popular
sentiment during the four years ending
March 4th, 1879, the long term of the Sen
! ators will prevent our getting two-thrds OF
the Senate, and passing repeal laws over
| the veto. There is accordingly no visible
hope of early Justice to the South, except
| through the Presidential election. Mean
while, the Conservative majority of the Su-
preme Court is a valuable temporary adj
| vantage.
But this advantage is too limited, and is
| held by too frail tenure, to be an impor-
tant element in any long-sighted political
calculation. The tenure of the Judges is,
to be sure stable in one respect, since they
keep their Offices during good behavior.
But the Conservative advantage in that
Court is held by the slender thread of a sim
gle life. There are five Conservative and
four Radical Judges; the Oldest men, APP
pointees of former Democratic Presidents,
being among the Conservatives, and, in
the usual course of nature, most likely to
die. The loss of one Conservative Judge
would make tie, and no law can be declared
unconstitutional but by clear majority.
President johnson could not replace a Con-
sentative Judge by a new appointment, be-
| cause Congress, at its last session, passed a
law reducing thenumber Of Judges TO seven,
forbidding any new appointments until. by
reached. The consequence is, that if a case
testing the constitutionality Of the Sherman
Law should be made up by the South during
the coming season, ii would depend upon
the life of every one of five men, some of
them far advanced, whether the decision,
year hence, would be favorable. The chance
is certainly worth the trial, but Is subject
to this contingency. Whatever may be the
immediate prospect of life, 1t would be
against the ordinary course of nature for the
Conservative majority to remain till the
close of a new Presidential term, or even
far into it. The Supreme Court is, at best,
but a temporary dyke to help stay the
floods while we are building a more per-
manent embankment. If we do not carry
the Presidential election, the Supreme
Court will at once cease to afford any pro-
lection. In the meantime, the death Of one
venerable old man may, at any day in the
year, take away all its restraining power.
Practically, the question is no longer
what may be done this side of the Presi-
Dental election, but what may be done by
means of It. Under the most favorable
circumstances, a decision of the Supreme
Court cannot be obtained before neS win
ter; and by that time we are on the very eve
of the Presidential election. If the Su-
preme Court, in setting aside the new law,
could also restore the Southern States to
Congress, or insure the counting of their |
electoral votes, decision next winter would |
be in ample season. But the sole effect of |
their decision would be to remand things |
back to the condition in which Shermans |
bill found them. The admission or eXclG- |
sion of members is business over which |
the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction nor |
control. The electoral votes will be counted |
in the presence Og both Houses and under |
their superintendent, and when the result |
is declared by the President of the Senate |
there is no tribunal that can review it. IL |
the new law should be declared unconstitu-
tional by the Supreme Court next winter, |
Congress would pass a new act, prescribing |
other terms of restoration; and az the COM |
pliance of the Southern States with the new /
conditions could not be submitted for APP
prevail until the following session, the South /
would be excluded from the Presidential |
election, without remedy or redress. This |
is the chief result at which Radicals aim.
They would as willingly see it accom-
plisned by an adverse decision Of the Su-
preme Court as By Southern non-acceptance
Of a plan which the Court sustained.
Any means of defeating Southern paTtici
patton in the election, establishes their /
domination for six years from the 4th of
March now at hand. 1t is all one TO them
whether the new law is set aside or sus-
tanned. A decision either way is equally
favorable to their wishes, provided the
South does not meanwhile reorganize I'M
der the new law. If the South waits to
test it, and get decision on it, the South
ern States are excluded from the Presiden-
tial election any way. IT, by the death Of (
a Conservative Judge, the law should he
sustained and the South should aoquiesce,
ii would be too late to take part in the
Presidential election, since the new consti-
tuition eouid not be presented for approval 1
until the winter following.
Sherman's bill varies the situation, by an
uneqaivocal Congressional pledge thai the
States shall be restored on their compliance
with certain clearly defined conditions. No
such pledge was made in connection with
the constitutional amendment passed at the
las. session. The Southern States might
have ratified that, and yet Congress might
have excluded them without violating any
explicit promise. Both schemes we're art
r.