Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-01-10

, billions, and must eventually end in tn,
. complete destruction Of tha; liberty o
which il should be the most powerful con
seryator.
Great danger is therefore to be appre
hended from an unlimited extension of the
elective franchise to any new class In
our country, especially when large ma.
jority of that class in welding the power
that Is placed in their hands, cannot be ex-
pected correctly to comprehend the duties
and responsibilities which pertain to suf-
frage. Yesterday, as il were, four millions
Of persons were held in a condition OF
slavery that had existed for generations
to-day they are freedmen, and are assumed
by law to be citizens. II cannot be pre-
snmed from their previous. condition Of ser
yitude that, as a class, they are as well in
formed as 70 the nature Of our government
as the intelligent foreigner, who makes our
land the home Of his choice In the case
OF the latter neither a residence of
five years and the knowledge of our
institutions which it gives, nor attach
nent to the principles o. the constitution,
are the only conditions upon which he can
be admitted to citizenship. Hemust prove
in addition a good moral character, and
thus give reasonable ground for the belief
that he viii be faithful TO the obligations
which he assumes as a citizen Of the repub-
! lie, Where a people-the source of all
\ Poli.ieal p0wer-speak BY their suffragea
through the instrumentality of the ballot
box, it must be carefully guarded against
| the control Of those who are corrupt in
! principle and the enemies of free institu-
tions, for it can only become to our politi-
| cal and social system safe conductor Of
healthy popular sentiment when kept free
from demoralizing influences. III the
hands Of the patriotic and worthy our
government will be preserved upon the
| principlesof the constitution inherited from
our fathers.
II follows, therefore, that in admitting to
| the ballot-boK a new class Of voters, not
| qualified for the exercise of the elective
franchise, We weaken our system Of govern
ment instead Of adding to its strength and
durability. In returning this bill to the
Senate, deeply regret that there should be
any conflict of opinion between the Legis-
latiVe and Executive Departments of the
| government, in regard to the measures that
virtually affect the prosperity and peace of
the country, and sincerely desire to recon-
cile the States, with one and the whole
people, to the government of the United
States
1t has been my earnest wish to COOP
crate with Congress in all measures having
for their object proper and complete ad-
justment of questions resulting from our
late civil war Harmony between the CO.
ordinate branches of the government ,which
Is always necessary for the public welfare,
I al ~
present fine, and II will therefore be nv
constant aim 70 promote, as far as possible,
concert ofaciiOn between them. The differ
ence of opinion that have already occurred,
have rendered me only the more cautious
lest the Executive should eneroach upon
any OF the perOgatiVes Of Congress, or by
exceeding in any manner the constitutional
limit of his duties destroying the equilib-
rum which should exist between the sew
eral coordinate departments, and which is
so essential to harmonic the working Of
the government. | know it has been urged
that the Executive department is more
likely to enlarge the sphere of its action
than either of the other two branches Of
the government, and especially in the eK-
ercise Of the veto power conferred upon it
by the constitution.
Itshould be remembered, however, that |
this power is whGly negative and con
servatiPe in its character, and was in |
tended to operate as a check upon uncon-
stitutional hasty or imprudent legislation,
and as a means of protection against the |
invasion Of the just powers of the Execu- |
tive and judicial departments
II is remarked BY Chancellor Kent that
to enact laws is a transcendent power and |
if the body that possesses it be a full and i
equal representation of the people, there is |
danger of its pressing with destructive |
weight upon all the other pa-ts of the ma
chinery of the government.
Ii has, therefore, been thought necessary
by the most influential and most expe- |
fenced jurists, that strong barriers should |
be erected for the protection and security |
Of the other necessary powers of the gov
enment.
Nothing has been deemed more fit and |
expedient for the purpose than the provi- |
sion that the head of the Executive De- |
partment should be so constituted as TO |
secure the requisite share of independence, |
and that he should have a negative upon /
the passing of laws, and that the Judiciary |
powers, resting on a still more permanent |
basis, should have the right of determining |
upon the validity of the laws by the stand |
ard of the constitution. The necessity Of |
some such works in the handso of the Execu- |
tive is shown by reference to the most emil /
nent writers upon our system Of govern |
ment, who seem to concur in the opinion |
that encroachments are most to be appre- |
hended from the department in which all |
legislative powers are vested by the consti-
tuition
Mr.. Madison, in referring to the diff |
Guilty Of providing some practical security
for each, against the invasion of the 9th
ers, remarks that the Legislative depart
ment is everywhere extending the sphere
Of its activity, and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex. The founders of our
republic seem never to have recollected /
the danger from legislative usurpation, or
that the assembling of all power in some
hands must lead TO the same tyranny az is
threatened by Executive usurpations.
In a representative republic, where the
executive magistracy is carefully limited,
both in the extent and duration of its |
powers, and where the legislative power is
exercised by an assembly which is inspired
by a supposed influence over the people,
and with confidence in its own strength,
which is sufficiently Numerous to feel the
passions that aetuste multitude, yet not so
numerous as TO be incapable of pursuing
the objects Of its passions Reason sug-
gests that it is against the enterprising
ambition Of this department that the peo-
pie ought to indulge all their jealousy and 1
exhaust all their precaution.
The legislative department derives a su-
periOrity in our government from other cir
Cumstances. Its constitutional powers be- 4
ing al once more extensive and less suscep-
tible Of precise hmits, it can with the /
greater facility mask, under complicated /
and indirect measures, the encroachments
which it makes on the coordinate depart |
ments. On the other side the executive
power being restrained within narrower 1
compass and being more simple in its ma
ture, and the Judiciary being described by |
landmarks still less uncertain, projects of /
usurpation by either Of these departments |
would Immediately betray and defeat them
selves. Nor is this all As the legislative /
department alone has access TO the pockets
Of the people, and has, in some coustitu-
tions, full discretion, and, in all, a prevail |
ing influence over the pecuniary rewards Of |
those composing other departments. de-
pendence il thus created in the latter which |
gives sill greater facility 10 encroachnents
of the former. We have seen that the
tendency Of republican governments is To
aggrandizement Of the legislative at the
expense Of the other departments.
Mr.. Jefferson, in referring 70 the early
constitution Of Virginia. objected that by |
its provisions all the powers Of the govern
ment legislative, executive and Judicial
rasultai 10 the lpOislatiya l,ndv hclaiu,r ]