The state rights democrat. [volume] (Albany, Linn County, Oregon) 1865-1900, 1867-12-28
THE TENURE OF OFFICE LAW.

placed.
THE TENURE OF OFFICE LAW.
1t is we'll and publicly known that
enormous frauds have been perpetratcd
on the treasury, and colossal fortunes
have been made at the public expense.
This species Of corruption has increased,
is increasing, aud if not diminished will
soon bring US into ruin and disgrace.-
The public creditors and tax payers arc
alike interested in an honest administra-
ton Of the finances, and neither class
will long endure the highhanded robber-
les Of the recent past. For this dis
crcditaDle state Of things there are sey.
cral causes. Some Of the taxes arc so
laid as to present an irresistible tempta-
ton TO evade payment The great sums
which officers may win by connivaDce at
fraud create pressure which is more
than the virtue Of many can Withstand,
and there can be no doubt that the open
disregard Of constitutional obligations
avowcd by some Of the highest and most
influential men in the country has great
ly weakened tho moral sense Of those
who serve in subordinate places. The
expenses Of the United States, including
interest on the public debt ore more than
years ago 10 collect aud disbur8c this
vast amount requires careful supervision
as we'll as systematic vigilance. This sys-
tcm. never perfected, was much disorgan.
lied by the Tenure Of Office bill. which
has almost entirely destroyed official nc.
countability. The President may be
thoroughly convinced That an officer may
be incapable, dishonest or uDfaithful to
the Constitution. but under the law
which | have named the utmost he can
do il to complain to the Senate and ask
the privilege Of supplying his place with
better man IF the Senate be regarded
MS personally or politically hostile TO the
President. il IN natural and not altogcth.
or unreasonable for the officer 10 expect
that it will take his part as far as posi-
BILE. restore him to his place and give
him triumph over the Executive superior
The officer has other chances of irupunity
arising from accidental defeat of evidence.
the mode Of investigating it, and the
secrecy Of the hearing.
II is not wonderful that official malfca-
sance should become bold in proportion
as the delinqucuts learn to think them.
selves safe. am entirely persuaded that
under such 4 rule the President cannot
perform the great duty assigned to him
Of secing the laws bc faithfully executed.
and that 1T disables him most especially
from enforcing that rigid accountability
which is necessary 10 the due execution
Of the revenue laws The Constitution
invests the President with authority ia
decide whether removal should be made
in any given ease; the Act of Congress
declares in scjs'ancc that he shall only
accuse such As he sapToscs TO be unwo.:h '
Of their trust The Constitution rnakes
him sole JUDGE ia the premises. bnt tho
statute iakcs away his Jurisdiction, trans
fcrs ii to tic Senate, and leaves hin
nothing bu; the oiious aud sometime,
impract;cable duty Of becoming 4 prose
cntor--ihe prosecution TO be conducted
before a tribunal whose members are not
like him. responsible to the whole people
but 10 separate constituent bodies. anl
who may hear his accuzatiou with grea
disiavor The Senate il absolutely with
out any known standard Of decision appli
cable TO such case. Its Judgment
cannot be anticipated. for il i not govern
cd by any rule The Law does not define
what shall be deemed good cause fol
removal II is impossible to conjecture
what may or may not be so considered By
the Senate. The nature Of the suhiec
forbids clenr proofs. IF the charge b.
incapacity. what evidence shall support
it2 Fidelity 10 the Constitution may b,
understood in a thousand different ways
and by violent party men in violent party
times. uniaithfulness 10 the Constitution
may even come To be considered meriso
rious IF the officer bc accused Of dis
honesty how shall il be made oat? vii
it be inferred from acts unconncctcd witt
public duty. from private history. or from
general reputation or mustthe Presden
await the commission of an actual misde
mcanor in Office Shall he in the mean
time risk the character and interest o.
the nation in the hands Of men to whom
he cannot give his confidence Must h,
forbear the complaint until the mischief
is done and cannot be prevented ? If hi.
zeal in the public service should impe
him to anticipate the overt act. must hC
move at the point of being tried himsel
for tho offense Of slandering his subordin
ate ! In the present circumstances o.
the country, some one must be held re
sponsible for official delinquency of over,
kind. 1t is extremely difficult to say
where thatresponsibility should be thrown
If it be not left where it has been placed
by the Constitution. But all Just mer
will admit that the President ought tt
be entirely relieved from such RESPONSE
bility, if he cannot meet it, by reason o.
restrictions placed by law upon his action
The unrestricted power of remova
from Office is a very great one to be trust
ed even to magistrate chosen by til,
general suffrage Of the whole people, anC
accountable directly to them for his acts
1t is undoubtedly liable to abuse and a
some period Of our history, perhaps, ha
been abused. If it be thought desirabl,
and constitutional that it should be 81
treated as to make the President merely
common intormer against other publ;
agents, he should at least be permitted t
act in that capacity before some open tri
bunal, independent Of party politics
ready to investigate the merits of ever,
case, furnished with the means of takin,
evidence, and bound to decide accordin,
| to established rules. This would puaran