Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1867-05-31

ing certain officers, and afterwards partlcl-
pating in rebellion against the United States.
The consideration of these two clauses leads
to two distinct subject matters of inquiry |:
First. What Offices or officers are compre-
hended? Second What acts amount to en-
gagement in instruction or rebellion against
the United Htates, or giving aid and comfort
to the enemies thereof? will first consider
what Office or Offices are comprehended. AS
to some Offices, there is no room for doubt
Members Of State Legislatures and members
Of Congress are clearly enough designated.
The question might, however, arise, wheth-
er convention held in State for the franz
ing OR amendment Of its constitution would
answer the description of State legislature
within the meaning of the act? Such con
vention, although it is clothed with legisla-
tive power, cannot properly be denominated
State legislature; and in the acts now under
consideration, a convention and a legislature
are expressly distinguished, for they require
constitution to be framed by a convention,
and they require the Legislature Of the same
State to adopt the constitutional amendment
When, then, in the same acts they again use
the phrase Legislature Of the State" they
must be understood to use it in the same
sense and as distinguished from a constitu-
tional convention. But as to those legislative
bodies which passed what are called ordi-
nances of secession, by whatever name they
may have been called, am of the opinion
that their members are properly comprehen-
ded within this disqualifying clause, for |
can imagine no official Legislative position in
which the duty Of allegiance was more dis
tinctly violated.
The next, the more difficult, inquiry is,
who is to be considered an officer of the Uni
ted States, Or an executive or judicial officer
of any State, within the meaning of these
clauses? Various classes of officers are here
intended. State officers and Federal officers,
and executive or judicial officers. No legis-
lative officer is mentioned except member
of State legislature or pember of Congress.
Descriptions used as to other officers are as
to State officers, that they must be judicial
or executive, and as to Federal officer the
terms '.judiciap' or executive are not ex-
press. He is described simply as an officer
Of the United States, 1t has been shown that
Federal officers and State officers are CLASH
fed separately in the clauses Of the act under
consideration. deem it profitable ond con-
ducive to clear order to follow this classi6-
cation. I shall accordingly first consider
what State officers are included in the terms
executive or judicial. This phrase is twice
used in these clauses with the superadded
description, Sin any State" ''ln any State, :"
in the first clause, and q any State in the
second clause think the controlling term Of
description, if there is any repugnancy in
the terms, must be taken to be the last, for
that is used in the first clause and others
besides. It is the same term Of description
used in the act Of Congress of 1899, declar-
ing what State officers are required to take
the oath to support the Constitution of the
United States, and in the third section Of
the constitutional amendment Both use the
same terms of description-s'executive and
judicial officers Of the State" The terms are
SO general and indefinite that they fail to ex-
press with sufficient certainty designation
Of the persons intended to be reached. It is
to be regretted, in matter Of SO much i'm
portance, that the rule Of designation adopted
as to members of Congress and Of State
legislature had not been followed up. IF that
were impracticable, that some more definite
general rules had not been declared. The
uncertainty becomes manifest in the applica-
ton of the law, and this uncertainty neces-
states construction. The necessity for con-
struction, which arises from the generality
of the law, cannot be better stated than in
the language of Plowden: "Though the
words be general, they are to be reduced to
a particularly by exposition made according
to the intent of the act. Those statutes
which comprehend all things in the letter,
the sages of the law have expounded to ex-
tend to but some things. Those which gen.
orally prohibited all people from doing such
an act, they have interpreted to permit some
persons to do; and those which include every
person in the letter, they have adjudged to
reach some persons only-all founded upon
the intent, which is collected by considering
the cause and necessity Of the act, and COM
pairing one part with another, and sometimes
by foreign circumstances" | deem it proper
here to fix some clear ideas of the general
intent Of these acts, and by what right OF
construction, strict or liberal, that intent
may best be arrived at. The intent, as ex-
pressed, is to enable the people Of each Of
these States to frame a constitution for the
State by the exercise Of the right Of suffrage.
There are clauses of the act giving the right
by general terms Of description, to the peo-
pie generally, and especially to those who
have never enjoyed the right before. There
are other clauses of the act which, by gener-
al terms, take away this right of suffrage
from those who have always enjoyed it.
The rule of construction as to the clauses
which give the right must be liberal, and as
to them the general terms are not to be re-
stricted But as to those clauses which dero-
gate from the existing right, the rule Of
construction must be strict, that none should
be excluded who are not clearly within the
letter and intent.
CONCLUDED NEXT WEEK.