Natchitoches spectator. [volume] (Natchitoches, La.) 1867-18??, 1867-12-19

Ger to expect that it will take his part
as far as. possible, lestore him to his
place ahd give him a triumph over his
executive superior. The officer has
ether chances of impunity, arising
from the accidental defects of the evil
1ence; the mode of Investigating it and
the secresy of hearing. It is not won
derful that official malfeasance should
become bold in promotion as the delin-
quents learn to think themselves safe.
am entirely persuaded that, under
such rule, tn 9 president cannot perform
the great duty assigned to him of seeing
the laws faithfully executed, and that 1T
disables him most especially from en-
forcing that rigid accountability which
is necessary to the execution of the rev.
enue laws. The Constitution invests the
President with authority to decide
whe her a removal shall be made in any
given case. The act of Congress de-
clares, in substance, that he shall only
accuse such as he supposes to be un-
worthy of their trust. The Constitution
makes him the sole judge in the premis-
es, but the statute takes away his juris-
diction, transfers it to the Senate, and
leaves him nothing but the OdiOuS and
sometimes impracticable duty of becom-
ing prosecutor. The prosecution is to
be conducted before a tribunal whose
members are not. like him, responsible
to the whole people, but to separate
constituent bodies, and who may hear his
accusation with great disfavOr. The
Senate is absolutely without any known
standard of decision applicable to such
case. It's Judgment cannot be antici-
pated. for it is not governed by any rule.
The law does not define what shall be
deemed good cause for removal. 1t is
impossible even to conjecture what may
or may not be SO considered by the Sen
ate. The nature of the subject forbids
clear proof. If the charge be incapaci-
ty, what evidence will support it! FL
deity to the Constitution may be under
stood or misunderstood in thousand
different ways, and by violent party men
IN violent party times, unfaithfulneSs to
the Constitution may even come to be
considered meritorious. If all officer be
accused of dishonesty. how shall it be
made out2 Will il be inferred from acts
unconnected with public duty, from pri
vate history, OF from general reputation,
or must the president await the com
sion of an actual misdemeanor in office!
Shall he in the meantime risk the char
acter and interest of the nation in the
hands of men to whom he cannot give
his confidence? Must he forbear his
complaint until the mischief is done,
and cannot be prevented! If his zeal in
the public service should compel him to
anticipate an overt act, must he move
at the peril of being tried himself for the
offense of slandering his subordinate!
In the present circumstances of the coun-
try, some one one must be held respon-
sible for official delinquency of every
kind. It is extremely difficult to say
where that responsibility should be
thrown if it be not left where it has been
| xNlo Il IN mt oil OF
men will admit that the president ought
to be entirely relieved from such respon-
sibility if he cannot meet it by reason
restrictions placed by law upon his ac-
tions. Unrestricted power of removal
from Office is a very great one to be
trusted even to magistrate chosen by
general suffrage of the whole people,
and accountable directly to them for his
acts. 1t is undoubtedly liable to abuse.
and at some periods of our history, per-
haps, has been abused. "
If it be thought desirable and consti-
tutional that it should be so limited as
to make the president merely common
informer against other public agents, he
should, at least, be permitted to act in
that capacity before some open tribunal,
independent of party politics, ready to
investigate the merits of every case fur
niShed, with the means of taking the
evidence, and bound to decide according
to an established rule. This would
guarantee the safety of the accuser,
when he acts in good faith. and at the
same time secure the rights of the other
party. l speak, of course, with all pro-
per respect for the present Senate; but
it does not seem to me that any legisla-
tive body can be so constructed as to
insure it's fitness for these functions.
1t is the theory of this government
that public offices are tho property of
those who hold them. They are given
merely as trust for the public benefit,
sometimes for fixed period, sometimes
during good behavior, but generally
they are liable to be terminated at the
pleasure of the appointing power, which
represents the collective will and speaks
for the people. Forced retention in of
flee of a single dishonest person may
work great injury to public interests.
Danger to public services come not from
power to remove, but from power to APP
point Therefore it was that the trainers
of the Constitution left the power of re-
moval unrestricted, while they gave the
Senate the right TO reject all appoint
mpntS which in tic o1NiY.inr x-o,,o ,,o+ a =