The Bedford gazette. [volume] (Bedford, Pa.) 1805-current, 1867-08-30

/ IuQlclallV settled DN the SupTeIIS SOuIl
| of the United States in the leading case
of Mccullough VS.. the State OF Mary
! land a Wheat, 3l6.) The rule eStaD-
! lished in that case is well expressed by
! the reporter in the syllabus. If the
| end be legitimate, and within the scope
! of the Constitution all the means which
are appropriate, and which are plainly
adapted to that end, and which are not
prohibited, may cOnstitutiOnally be
employed to carry it into effect. Let
us recur, however, to the very words OF
the opinion, as delivered by &. j. Mar
shall "We think the sound cOnstruc-
tion of the Constitution must allow to
/ the National Legislature that dlScre-
/ ton, with respect to the means, by
which the powers it cOnfers are to be
carried into execution, which will ena-
BILE that body to perform the high du-
! ties assigned to it, in the manner most
beneficial to the people. Let the end
be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plain
| ly adapted to the end, and which are
not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution,
are constitutional" p. 421.
This is, certainly, very large char
! ter to the discretion of Congress, yet as
a rule for judicial cases, | am willing to
accept it. 1t is apparent however,
from the very terms in which the prin-
ciple is ennunciated, that this discre-
tiOn is not without limits.
1t is not Congress which is to be the
final Judge as to whether a measure is
necessary and proper for carrying into
effect any Of the delegated powers.
Were it so, the enumeration would
have been a vain and delusive mock
cry, and the fundamental principle
that the federal government is one
merely of limited authority, an un-
meaning formula ofwords.
The limits plainly set in this Ian
guage are these: l. The end must be
legitimate and within the scope of the
Constitution. =. The means must be
appropriate and adapted to the end. 3.
The means must not themselves be
prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit Of the Constitution.
There is, however, another limitation
upon the discretion of Congress in the
choice Unnecessary and proper means.
1t is clearly stated in Mccullough VS..
the State of Maryland, and indeed the
principle of it may be considered to
have ruled that case. l quote again
the very words of the opinion:
"The power Ofcreating corporation,
though appertaining to sovereignty, is
not like the powers of making war or
levying taxes, or Of regulating COM
nerce, great substantive and indepen-
dent power, 1CIich cannot be implied as
incidental to other powers, or used as a
means of executing them" t Wheat,
AL.
understand the Supreme Court in
this language to lay down the simple
and reasonable-I might, perhaps say,
the neutrality-suspicious. that no
one enumerated power can be inciden-
tai to another enumerated power
Three cases are stated as examples of
substantive powers, but clearly only as
examples. We have no right to say
that any of the express powers is more
substantive and Independent than an
other. Their very expression authOri-
tatively stamps their character. If,
therefore, power is delegated, but in
terms which import a limitation or
qualification, it cannot be exercised as
incidental to some other power, disre-
garding the limitation or qualification
annexed to the express grant. Indeed,
such limitation or qualification may be
considered as a prohibition against the
exercise of that power in any other
way, and therefore, within the limit
which the Supreme Court places upon
the discretion Of Congress in the enun-
citation of the general principle, viz:
That Congress cannot employ meas
ure, however necessary and proper it
Iy e. 1nI 10
express power, if that measure has
been prohibited.
| pass now to the consideration of
those grants, from which, by the aid
of the last paragraph of the enumera-
tiOn, it is cOntended that Congress have
authority to issue what this act calls
"United States Notes" and to make
them a legal tender in payment Of all
debts, public and private.
|. "TOregulate commerce with foreign
nations and among the several States
and with the Indian tribes" Art. |;
sec. s, par. 3.
1t must be admitted that standards of
value and of weights and measures are
means very appropriate and adapted in
the regulation of commerce. But then
we have in this enumeration a clause,
NhlCll GA l'ICSoly giants bllNi iCllHS7 NV
authority to create such standards. If it
directs of what they shall consist, Con-
gresS cannot make another kind as
incidental to the regulation of COM
merce.
With equal plausibility might it be
preten led that, for the regulation of
commerce, Congress could lay duties,
imposts and eXcises, and pass bankrupt
laws. Such measures might be very APP
propriate and adapted to that end. Yet
surely it will not be maintained that as
suming these powers as incidental, Con-
gre5S could disregard the rule Of uni
fOrmity, which limits and qualities the
express delegation Of them. This quail
icatiOn is, in fact, a prohibition Of any
lutieS, imports or eXcises, which shall
not be uniform throughout the United
5tates-of any laws on the subject Of
bankruptcies which shall not, in like
manner, be uniform throughout the u
nited States. Art. |, sec. 8, par. IA.
These cases present perfect illuStra-
ZION of the sOundnesS of the limit to
the discretion of Congress, prescribed
oy the Supreme Court, that substan
i've power shall not be exercised as in
| cidental. / do not, however, consider
| Them as any more perfect than the very
| case before us. If the power to create
4 standard of value and medium of eX
:hange is expressly delegated, but con-
| ined by its terms, as we will presently
| see, that is, to cOinS-fOreign or domes-
5ic-it is a prohibition of any other
lind of money. Congress cannot, un-
| Iar tho rNratnyt bf raUII la Il n o. pOn mprcq