Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1867-06-21

Il The POWERS AND DUTIES OF MILITARY
COMMANDERS IN THE Souri, The Attorney
General has given his opinion on the powers
and duties of Military Commanders, which
is lucid and cogent document, determining
very satisfactorily the relations of the civil
and Military authorities in the Southern
States, and shows that the latter have in
many cases exceeded their powers under the
reconstruction law. It sets forth that the act
conten1plates two distinct governments, the
one military, the other civil, in each of the
ten States comprised in the military districts:
the civil recognized as existing at the date of
the act, and the military created by the act,
both being provisional, and both to cease
and accepted by Congress- The civil govern
lnent, having all the characteristics and
powers of a State government, legislative,
judicial and executive, is recognized more
than once by the act, and is not in any re-
spect changed by it, save only in the matter
Of the qualifications Of voters, and Of persons
eligible to office, the manner of holding cleo
tons, and the mode Of framing the State
constitutions. The power of making any
further change is reserved to Congress- not
delegated to the military commander. What
ever power is not given to the military by the
act, remains with the civil Government The
only question is upon the powers conferred
on the military authority Each of the ten
States is made subject to the military au-
thority of the United States" not to the
military authority altogether, but with this
express limitation, ssas hereinafter prescrib-
ed" What is hereinafter prescribed" is a
general clause, making it the duty of the
military commander to give protection to all
in their rights Of person and property. The
Attorney General then proceeds to. inquire
what sort Of protection is here meant, and in
what manner the protection is to be given
He answers that the power to protect is not
power to create new rights, but to protect
those which are established by existing laws;
in effect, police power, given to meet the
contingency recited in the preamble of the
act, of a want Of adequate protection for
life and property" and the necessity also re-
cited ''that peace and good order should be
enforced" This construction is made more
apparent by the immediate context, which
sets forth that this protection is to be done
by the suppression of insurrection and disor-
der, and by the punishment, either by the
State courts or by military commissioners
when necessary, of all offenders None of
the special clauses have reference to any de-
partment of the civil administration, save
only it's criminal jurisdiction. There is no
provision whatever to establish courts or
tribunals for the trial Of civil cases. There
is no authority for the removal by the mill
tary commander of the proper officers of a
State, either executive or judicial, Or the APP
pointment Of persons to their places. No such
grant of power is either expressed or implied
in the act The concluding clause of the
sixth section not only recognize all the Off
GERS Of the provisional governments, bit, in
case of vacancies, directs that they shall be
filled by the people, not by any other power,
civil or military. A governor appointed to
Office by military commander is neither
recognized by the laws of the State nor is he
appointed as military governor for State
which has no lawful governor. If the mill
tary commander GUST the governor, he can
GUST all the other officials of the State, where
as the act leaves the right Of electing their
officers to the people. In the suppression Of
instruction the military commander is indie
pendent Of the civil authority, and in the
trial of criminals he may supersede the civil
jurisdiction, but, if these contingencies do
not happen, the military power remains pas
sive. The military commander is made by
the act conservator Of the peace, not leg
islator. The act expressly declares that as to
such future changes of laws as might be ex-
pedent, the question of expediency, and the
power to alter, amend or abolish, was re-
served for ssthe paramount authority of the
| United States at any time to abolish, modi-
fly, control, or supersede the same Where,
then does a military commander find has
authority to set side any of these laws?
The Attorney General then proceeds to give
some instances of the extraordinary powers
exercised by military communicable de-
posing Of a Governor and the appointment Of
another in his place, and the ejectment of a
Judge of one of the criminal courts and the APP
pointment in his stead of a private citizen, in
spite of the fact that the commander has au-
thority only in cases Of necessity to transfer
the jurisdiction to military tribunal. This
is the specific authority, and no other can be
lawfully exercised This new judicial ap-
pointee has the power to inAict the death
penalty, whereas the only judges having this
power whom the act authorizes the military
commander to appoint is a military commits
sion" Other examples are cited Of interfer-
ence with civil authority in North and South
Carolina, in which the military commander
assumes that the paramount authority" is
vested in himself as fully as in Congress.
The military commanders are responsible to
the President, and the decision Of Chief JUS
tice Chase in the case of the State Of Missis-
sippi, under this very act, is cited to prove
this position.
The concluding portion of the opinion is
summary Of who are entitled to registration
The oath prescribed in the supplemental act
defines all the qualifications required. Two
elements must concur in order to disqualify
a person under the oath first, the office and
official oath to support the constitution of the
United States; second, engaging afterwards
in rebellion. Both must exist to work dis
qualification, and must happen in the order
of time mentioned. -B0ltimore Sum-
GrppIT SuyrIT ON CoNprcc .rroN -Wo ro