The Hancock Jeffersonian. [volume] (Findlay, Ohio) 1857-1870, 1867-12-06
TConclatded from Second Page.

L he SO-calleu hecOnSIrucClOn acI
though as plainly unconstitutional s
any that can be imagined, were nc
believed to be within the class las
mentioned. Tie people were nc
wholly disarmed of the power of sell
defense. In all the Northern State
they still hold in their hands the So
cred right of the ballot, and it wa
safe to believe that in due time the,
could come to the rescue of their owl
institutions.
1t gives me pleasure to add tha
the appeal to our common constitu
ents was not taken in vain, and tina
my confidence in their wisdom ant
virtue seems not to have been mis-
Iplaced.
1t is well and publicly known tha
enormous frauds have been perpe
trated on the Treasury, and tina
colossal fortunes have been made a
the public expense. This species o
corruption has increased, and is In
creasing, and if not diminished vii
soon bring US into total ruin and dis
grace. The public creditors and tax
payers are alike interested in ar
honest administration of the finances
and neither class will long endure the
large handed robberies of the recent
past. For this discreditable state oi
things there are several causes
Some of the taxes are So laid as to
present an irresistible temptation to
evade the payment. The great sums
which officers may receive by con-
.nivance at fraud create pressure
which is more than the virtue of many
can withstand; and there can be no
doubt that the open disregard OF
constitutional obligations avowed by
some of the highest and most influ
ential men in the country, has greatly
weakened the moral sense of those
who serve in subordinate places.
The expenses of the United States,
including the interest on the public
debt, are more than six times as
much as they were seven years ago.
To collect and disburse this vast
amount requires careful supervision
asswell as systematic vigilance. The
system, never perfected, was much
disorganized by the Tenure of Office
bill, which has, almost destroyed Of
fetal accountability. The President
may be thoroughly convinced that
an officer is incapable, dishonest, or
unfaithful to the Constitution, but
under the law, which / have named,
his utmost ability is to complain to
the Senate and ask the privilege of
supplying his place with better man.
Ifthe Senate be regarded as person
ally or particularly hostile to the
President, it is natural, or not alto
ge.her unreasonable for the officer
to expect that it will take his part as
far as possible, restore him to his
place and give him triumph over
his executive superior. The officer
has other chances Of impunity, aris-
ing from the accidental defects of
the evidence, the mode of investigat-
ing it, and the secrecy of hearing. 1t
is not wonderful that the official
should become bold in
proportion as the delinquents learn
to think themselves safe. 81 aEzEE-.
/ am entirely persuaded that, un-
der such q rule, the President cannot
perform the great duty assigned to
him of seeing the laws faithfully ex-
ecuted, and that 4 disables him most
from enforcing that rigid
which is necessary to
he due execution of the revenue laws.
The Constitution invests the Presi
lent with authority to decide whether
4 removal shall be made in any
given case. The act of Congress
ieclares, in SUBSTANCE, that he shall
,nly accuse such as he supposes to
be unworthy of their trust The
makes him the sole
udge in the premises, but the statute
axes away his jurisdiction, transfers
{ to the Senate, and leaves him
nothing but the odious and some
lines impracticable duty of becoming
/ prosecutor. The prosecution is to
De conducted for a tribunal whose
members are not, like him, response
Die to the whole people, but-to sep |
.rate constituent bodies, and who
nay hear his accusation with great
lisfavor. The Senate is absolutely |
Without any known standard of de- |
.ision applicable to such a case. Its
Judgment cannot be anticipated, for
t is not governed by any rule. The
aw does not define what shall be
Ieemed good cause for removal.
t is impossible even to conjecture
Ehat may or may not be so consider
d by the Senate. The nature of the
ubject forbids clear proof. If the
barge be incapacity, what evidence
7ill support it? Fidelity to the Con-
titutlo1 may be understood or mis-
nderstood in a thousand different
rays, end by violent party men in vio-
ent party times, unfaithfulness Of the
may even come to be con-
idered meritorious. If an officer be
ccused of dishonesty, how shall it
e made out? Will it be inferred
.om acts unconnected with public
uty, from private history, or from
eneral reputation, Or must the Pres
lent await the commission of an
CT of misdemeanor in officeP Shall
e in.the meantime risk the character
nd interest of the nation in the
ands of men to whom he cannot
i've his confidence Must he for
ear his complaint until the mischief
done, and cannot be prevented +?
f his zeal in the public service
lould compel him to anticipate an
vert act, must he move at the peril {
f being tried himself for the offense
slandering his subordinate 7 In
le present circumstances of the I
ountry, some one must be held re-
Donsible for official delinquency of
very kind. 1t is extremely difficult
D say where that responsibility
hould be thrown if it be not left
here it has been placed by theil
But all just men will
dmit, that the President ought to
e entirely relieved from such re-
if he cannot meet it by
eason OF restrictions placed by law
pom his actions. Unrestricted pow
{ of removal from office is a very
cat one to be trusted even to
Magistrate chosen by general suffrage
the whole people, and accountable
irectly to them for his acts 1t is