The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1867-01-23
BATE or SUBSCRIPTIONS.
THE BUSINESS OF THE COUNTRY

THE BUSINESS OF THE COUNTRY.
Secretary srCuIIOeh's RuInous Poll
| cy----The Peril of the Public FL
nanees and all industrial Enter
| pFises under His ManaSement---The
Scheme by which He Proposes TO
Add S56O,OOO,0O0 10 Staggering
Public Debt----PraefIcaI Common
Sense Needed in Congress.
| From the Cincinnati Gazette
When the rebel armies surrendered
the nation had debt payable, prfnci-
pal and interest, in coin, amounting to
81 ,167, ,169, ,94l so, on which the annual
interest was about 6S millions; and it
had a debt payable, principal and in
terest, in lawful money QegaI tender
notes,) amounting to SLIT, ,53l ,149 10,
on which the annual interest was S7O,-
s64, ,679 n; and a debt bearing no inter-
est, consisting of circulating notes,
gold certificates, &C., of S46O, ,556, ,264 20.
Thus its debt payable in currency was
81, ,63S, ,OS7, Alb 80. The whole amount.
payable both in coin and currency was
S2,7l4. .6SS, ,3l4 IS; on which the annual
interest was Sl3S, ,S96, ,955 20.
| Our borrowing had all been done ;
the evidences of debt were all issued.
The matter of the public credit was
| fixed, so far as the Government could
gain anything by it : and any improve
ment in it would accrue only to the
| holders OF the debt.
Taking the average premium on gold
! during the time the currency-interest
| debt was being issued, as the standard
| (fOr which we are indebted to the valu-
able report on the public debt, made
last winter by s. S. Hayes, one of the
| Revenue Commission,) the Govern
ment received for the currency obliga-
tions about 65 cents on the dollar.
/ In other words, we had borrowed
money that was then deprecated, ac-
cording to the coin standard 10 65 cents
on the dollar, and we had bound our
selves to pay in the same currency.
| We then had outstanding nearly GIL
millions OF legal tender notes, all of
which servee in some form the uses of
| currency; and we had u bank circula-
tion, authorized and rapidly being
| issued, of 300 millions, making an ag-
| gregate of 94I millions of currency, be-
| sides enough of the circulation of other
| banks to raise the total to ], 900 millions
This furnished an abundant currency
! to pay off our paper obligations, in
| money as cheap as that which we bor-
| rowed, so long as its volume should not
| be materially reduced. The general
! prices of commodities had adjusted
| themselves to the depreciation of this
| currency, and our revenues were in
| creased in proportion, so that they
reached the enormous sum of 55S mil
| lions; of which, after the end of the ex-
| traordinary expenses of the war, about
half could he applied to the redemption
| of the principal of the debt And while
| this abundance of currency continued,
this enormous amount of revenue was
borne without any extraordinary hard
ship.
This was the financial situation pre-
/ Il . II II
tions of the war. Was it not well
| enough to remain undisturbed ? We
had deliberately deprecated the cur
rency by additional issues, in order to
| facilitate the borrowing of it. We had
the same cheap currency to pay-at
least so far as the currency obligations
were concerned. What would be
thought of u public financier who in
this situation should propose to add 54
| per cent. to the real amount of our cur
reucy debt, by turning it into gold
| bonds, and by withdrawing the cur
rency to such an extent as to raise the
remnant to the value of coin? For it
will be seen that 35 is within a very
small fraction of 81 per cent. of 65.
Our nominal currency debt was 1000
millions. Its real value, by the coin
| standard, was 1,040 millions. What
| which would add this $50 millions 10
our already fearful burden and this
without any equivalent, without any
gain to anybody save the holders of the
| obligations. Our non-interest currency
| debt was nominally 45O millions. The
| real value OF the coin standard was 2Q3
millions. What shall be thought of a
| financial policy which would add to
| our enormous debt by turning these $50
millions of circulating notes, which
bear no interest, into specie bonds,
| bearing interest in specie, thereby add
ing 157 millions to the real amount of
the principal, and adding % millions in
| gold to the annual interest?
| If the addition, without considera-
| ton, of $50 millions to staggering
public debt is a good preparation for
! paying 1t, then we are in the way of be-
ing we'll prepared. If to depreciate the
currency IS Fer cent by Initiating it with
| irredeemable paper, when we have to
borrow and spend it; and to appreciate
it to par when we want it to pay the
debt, is financial wisdom, then it will
| die with us, for we have it all. II to
turn 450 millions of currency notes
bearing no interest, and which we paid
out at 65 cents on the dollar, at par into
gold interest bonds be an approach to
financial soundness, then how much
must we add to our burdens to reach
| the bOttom2
We suppose that to the kind OF peo.
pie we write for it is not necessary to
prove that when the dollar of currency
is deprecated to 65 cents, it is as easy
J procured to pay debts with, ,as 65 cents
would be in par money; or that If the
dollar in currency which is depreciated
to IS cents shall be appreciated to par,
it will be as hard to procure as dollar
of par money is now; or, that IL we bor-
| row currency when 1t is worth but 90
cents, and then raise it to par before We
pay it, we add about "a cents to the real
debt. And yet we mention this be-
cause we have public hnanciers who
admit that the currency is deprecated,
but who seem not to realize that the
currency debt is deprecated with it;
and who appear incapable of compre-
hending that by changing deprecated
currency debt Into gold bonds. they are
increasing the amount we have actual
Iy to pay, by just so much as the diff
ference between the present value OF
the currency and of coin.
When this war ran up debt which
the Government believed would reach
3. 900 millions, there were very general
doubts as to the ability of the country
to pay it. But there was this abate-
ment: this sum was a nominal one, so
, far as the currency debt was concerned;
the real amount of that was more than
a third less than the actual figures,
and at least $50 millions OF 1t was in
currency notes, drawing no interest,
and which we could take our time 10
: pay, and which themselves increased
the facilities for paying by cheapening
money.
While the currency OF the country
continued at about the same value and
: volume as when we incurred the cur
, rency debt, We should have to pay nc
more than We actually received. The
l j, 600 millions would be as easy to pay
% O4O millions yyould be in mar mon