Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1867-12-11

urcs Or such as might lead to force, Us long
as those which are peaceable remain open to
him to his constituents. 1t is true that
cases may occur in which the executive would
be compelled to stand on its rights and main
tain them, regardless Of all consequences
Ii Congress should pass an act which is not
only in palpabie conflict with the Constitu-
ton, but will certainly, if carried out, pro-
duce Immediate and irreparable injury to the
organic structure of the government and if
there be neither judicial remedy for the
wrongs it iniiicts, nor power in the people to
protect themselves without the official aid OF
their elected defender if, fer instance, the
legislative department should pass an act,
even through all the forms of law, to abolish
a coordinate department of the government
in such case the President must take the
high responsibilities of his office, and save
the life of the nation at all hazards. The
so-called reconstruction acts, though as plain
ly unconstitutional as any that can he i'm
agine1, were not believed to be within the
class last mentioned. The people were not
wholly disarmed of the power of selfdefense.
In all the northern states they still held in
their hands the sacred right Of the ballot,
and it was safe to believe that in due time
they would come to the rescue of their own
Institutions 1t gives me pleasure to add
that appeal to our common constituents was
not taken in vain, and that my confidence n
their wisdom and virtue seems not to have
been isplaced.
FRAUDS ON THE TREASURY.
1t is well and publicly known that cnor-
nous frauds have been perpetrated on the
treasury, and that colossal fortunes have
been made Mt the public expense. This sre-
cics OF corruption has increased, is Increas
inr. and if not diminished will soon bring us
Il Il ptlh hlI.,,
ors and tlx-plyers are alike interested in an
honest administration of the finances, and
neither class will long endure the large hand
cd robbcries of the recent past. For this
discrcditablc state of things there are several
causes. Some Of the taxes are - laid as to
present an irresistible temptati m to evade
pavment The great sums which ofiicers ma
win hy connivancc at fraud crea te Il pressure
which is more than the virtue of many can
withstand, and there can be no doubt that
the open disregard Of constitutional obliga-
tons avowed by some of the highest and
most Influential men in the country has
greatly we kened the moral sense of those
who serve in subordinate places. The ex-
peuses of the United States, including inter
est N the public debt, are more than six
times rs much as they were seven years ago.
II collect and disburse this vast amount re
qnircs careful supervision as well as system
atic vigilance. \ system never perfected
was much disorganizcd by the " Tenure OF
Odicc bill . which has almost destroyed Off
ciIl accountability. The President may be
thoroughly convinced that an officer is inca
pablo dishonest or unfaithiul to the Consti-
tutl)n but, under the law which | have
name |. the utmost he can do Is to complain
t. the senate, and ask the privilege OF sup
p' wing his place with better man. If the
senate TIC regarded as personally political
lv hostile u the President, it is natural and
t1t altogether unreasonable for the officer to
expect that it will take his part as far as
p,ssi lc restore him to his place, and give
hln Il triumph over his executive superior.
fhc 1aj-er las other chances of impunity.
arising from accidental defects of evidence.
mode OF investigating it, and the secrecy OF
herring. 1t IS not wonderful that official
malleasancc should become bold in proper
ton rs dclinquents learn TO think themselves
safe.
| am entirely persuaded that under such
rule the President cannot perform the great
duty assigned TO him Of seeing the laws faith
fully executed, and that it disables him most
especially from enforcing that rigid account
ahIlitv which is necessary 70 the due execu-
ton Of the revenue laws. The Constitution
invests the President with authority to de-
eide whether = removal should be made in
any gwen case Inc tICl Oh Congress ucCldTco
in substance that he shall only accuse such
IS he surposes 10 be unworthy of their trust.
The Constitution makes him sole Judge in
tie premises hut the statute takes away
his jurisdiction, transfers it TO the Senate and
leaves him nothing but the odious and some
times impracticable duty of becoming pros
ecutor. Prosecution is TO be conducted be-
fore a tribunal whose members are not, like
him, responsible to the whole people, but to
Separ.t te constituent bodies, and who NAV
hear his accusation with great disfavor. The
Senate is absolutely without any known
standard of decision applicable to such a case
Its Judgment cannot be anticipated, for it is
not governed by anv rule. Law does not de-
line what shall oe deemed good cause for re-
m0yal. 1t is impossible even to conjecture
what may or may not be SO considered by the
Senate. The nature of the subject forbids
clear proof. If the charge be incapacity.
what evidence will support it
Fidelity to the Constitution may be under
stood or misunderstood in a thousand differ
ent ways, and by violent party men, in violent
party times. unfaithfulncss TO the Constitu-
tion NAV even come to be considered merito-
riOus. 1t an officer be accused of dishonesty,
how shall it be made out? Will it be in
fcrred from acts unconnected with pubic
duty, from private history, OF from general
the commission of an actual misdemeanor in
Office? Shall he in the meantime risk the
character and interest of the nation in the
hands of men to whom he cannot give his
confidence? Must he forbear his complaint
until the mischief is done and cannot be pre-
vented If his zeal in the public service
should impel him to anticipate an overt act,
must he move at the peril of being tried him
self for the offense of slandering his suhor-
dnate? In the present circumstances of the
country, some one must be held responsible
for official delinquency of every kind. 1t is
extremely difficult to say where that respon-
sibility should be thrown, if it be not left
where it has been placed by the Constitution.
But all Just men will admit that the Presi-
dent ought to be entirely relieved from such
responsibility, If he cannot meet 1t by reason
of restriction placed by law upon his action.
TENURE OF OFFICE.
Unrestricted power of removal from Office
is a very great one to be trusted even to a
magistrate chosen by the general suffrage of
the whole people, and accountable directly
to them for his acts. 1t is undoubtedly liza
bic to abuse, and at some periods of our his
tory perhaps has been abused. If it be
thought desirable and constitutional that it
should bo SO limited as to make the President
merely a common informer against other
public agents, he should at least be permitted
to act in that capacity before some open tri-
hunal independent of party politics, ready to
investigate the merits of every case, furnished
with the means of taking evidence. and
bound to decide according to established
rules. This would guarantee the safety of
the accuser when he acts in good faith, and
at the same time secure the rights of the
other party. l speak of course with all
proper respect for the present Senate, but it
does not seem to me that any Legislative body
can be so constituted as to insure its fitness