Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-01-08

se the principles of the constitution 10
al herited from our fathers. It follow;
,le therefore, that in admitting to the balio
- box a new class of voters not quaiihe'
he for the elective franchise, We weaker
be our system of government instead o
IS. adding 10 its strength and durability
u. In returning this bill to the sen
nj ate, l deeply regret that there shoul'
IT, he anv conflict of opinion between
r the legislative and executive depart
n ments Of the government 10 regard I,
& measures that vitally affect the prosper
e. ity and peace OF the country, slncerely
~ desiring to reconcile the states with on
Ut another, and the whole people TO tb'
ia government of the United states. Il
al hiss been my earnest wish to cooperate
ot with congress in AL measures, having
lt for their object a proper and complete
n adjustment of the questions resulting
.t from our late civil war. Harmony be
s, tween the coordinate branches Of thi
(; government always necessary for the
D. public welfare, was never more De
L maudel than at the present time, ana II
1t will, therefore. be my seonstant aim tC
b. promote, as far as possible, concert 0,
> action between them. The differences
a. Of opinion lhat have already oc-
Y Cured have rendered me only the
s more cautious, lest the executive
B
) prerorativas of congress, or by exceeding
Z In any manner the constitutional limit
o Of his duties, destroy the equilibrium
= which should exist between the several
}. coordinate departments, and which Is 50
Is essential to the harmonious working oi
G the government. l know it has been
t urged that the executive department Is
e more likely 10 enlarge the sphere OF its
Y action than either Of the other branches
/ Of the government and especially in the
t exercise of the veto power cOnferredupOn
e it by the constitution. 1t should be ret
v memberei, however, that the poWeEES
+ wholly negative and Conservative @pl
e character, and was intended to opfF .as3s
?, a check upon unconstitutional, A5s JNAnd
II improvidsnt legislation, and n pplesns
L Of protectiOu against invasi0E ", 9he just
F. powers Of the executive ~ t1SSssEcial de-
, partments. 1t is remaY q by Chancel-
s ior Kent that to e9SzRr Is a transcend
ses-as it to bs;SIi Ii'GIR7f :9I7df y 6ks9AIIssSpre5cn-
p ad1u of[-oy4sople there is dangNF> OF
e lis presZ 52with destructive weight IN
e al i5ther parts Of the machinery OF
e. goVs.Smeut. 1t has, therefore, been
e Ldsfsyht necessary by the most s&illful
GF4F most experienced artists in the
~ fhcs Of civil policy that strong barriers
r, Sid be erected for the protection and
p security OF the other necessary powers
! of the government, nothing has been
, deemed more fit aud expedienL for the
b purpose than the provision that the
2 head Of the executive department
- should be 50 constituted as to secure q
S requisite share of Independence, and that
I he should have a negative upon the
8 passage of laws, and that the judiciary
2 power, resting on Stiil more
Ghgrrfd faavn fsa
. right OF determining upon the
! validity of laws by the standard Of
Ahe constitution. a necessity Of some
arch check in the hands Of the executive
e ~ shown by reference to the most emil
ifslt writers upon our system Of govern
R4alt, who seem TO concur in the opinion
o. Tina eucroaehment5 are most to be ap-
pretended from the department in which
/ all legislative powers are vested 10y the
constitution. Mr.. Madison, in referring
{ to the difficulty of providing some prac-
: teal security for each against the
{ invasion Of the other, remarks that
, the legislative department is every
where extending the sphere OF its
) activity and drawing all power into
z its vortex. The founders Of our Tepub-
{ lies seem never 70 have recOllected the
danger from legislative usurpatioas
. which, hy assembling all power in the
: same bands must lead TO the same tyran-
r ny as y threatened by executive usur-
= pations, In representa4ssEe republic
wheFS61-r55- 900 IN .gistSey IS eaSzss
lu'Iy f Zen ~, ~, -, 49,
Iegsistive l.i,iR % Ree Jy rs an as as.
sembly which IS fnspSt supposed
influence over the PeSs Il with amin
trepid confidence in kNtSn strength,
which is sufficiently nub H. us 10 be in
capable of pursuing IN affects of its
passions by means VIZ y Areason pre-
-cribes. Il is against tnterprising
ambition of this depardaent that the
people ought to indulGi all their jeal
ousir7 aud exhaust all tibtir prosecutions.
The legislative Gepartm Int derives su-
peri0Tity la our government from other
circumstances. The CONSTITUTIONAL powers
being Gt once more extensive and less
susceptible of precise limits it can
with the greater facility make
under complicated and direct meas
HTes the encroachments which il
makes on the coordinate departments.
On the Other side, the executive power
being restrained within narrower
compass, and being more simple in
Its nature and the judiciary being de-
= scribed by landmarks slill less un-
} certain, projects Of usurpRton by these
departments would immediately be-
tray and defeat themselves nor is this
/. all, as the legislative department alone
has access to the pockets of the peo-
pie, and has in some constitutions full
discretion, and in all prevailing in
liu=nce over the peCuniary rewards OF
those who fill the other Departments, q
dependence is thus created in the latter
which gives still greater facilities to en-
cTOachments Of the former. We have
seen that the tendency Of republican
governments is 10 an aggrandiZement of
the Legislative at the expense Of the
other departments. Mr. jefferson, in
referring to the early constitution Of
Virginia, objected that by its provisions
all the powers Of the gavernment-legis-
lative, executive a8d iudicial-re suited
to The legislative body, holding that the
concentrating these in the same hands
is precisely the definition of despotic
governments. 1t will be no alleviatiOn
thet these powers will be exercised by q
plurality OF hands, and not by a single
one hundred and seventy-three dssp0ts
would surely be as oppressive as one As
little will il avail Us that they are chosen
by ourselves an elective despOtism, was
not the government we fought for, but
one which should not only be founded
on free principles, but in which the
divided and balanced among several
bodies Of magistracy as that no one
could not transcend their legal limits
without being Cffectually checked and re-
strained by the others For this reason
that convention which passed The ordi-
nance OF government laid its foundation
on this basis That the legislative, ex-
scutive and Judiciary departments should
be separate and distinct, so that no per-
) son should exercise the powers of more
than one OF them at the same time, but
no barrier was provided between these
several powers the Judiciary and exec
utive members were left dependent on
/, the legislative for their subsistence in
office, and some Of them for their contin-
uauce in it. II, therefore, the legislature
assumes executive and Judiciary powers
no opposition Is likely 70 be made, nor if
/ made, C@u be efiectusl, because in that
case they may put their proceedings into
the form of an act OF assembly, which
viii render them obligatory on the other
branches. They have, accordingly, In
many instances decided rights which
should have been left to judiciary con-
troversy, and the direction Of the execu-
tive during the whole time Of their ses-
sion is becoming habitual and familiar.
Mr. Justice Story, in his commentaries
on the constitution, reviews the same
subject and says The truth is that the
legislative n0wer is the great and over
ruling power in every free government"
The representatives of the people will
watch with Jealousy every encroachment
Of the executive magistrate, for it trenches
upon their own authority, but who shall
watch the encrOaehmeut Of these repre-
sentatives? viii they be as Jealous of
the exercise Of power by themselves as
by others There are many reasons
which may be assigned for the engross-
ing influence Of the legislative depart
ment In the first place. Its constitu-
tional powers are more extensive and
less capable Of being brought within
precise limits than these of either of the
other departments; the bonds of the
executive authority are easily marked
out and defined. 1t reaches few objects
and those are known, it cannot transcend
them without being brought in contact
with the other departments, however it
may check and restrain and bind its
I exercise The same remarks anpiv with