The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-12-06
SPIRIT OF THE PRESS.
EDITORIAL OPINIONS or THE LEADING JOURNALS
UPON OURRKNT ToPTCs-ooMPuBD EVERY
DAT ron FHR BvENINa TKLE0RAPH.
The Pope,s Plan.

From the ~ T. Times.
despatch from Rome announces that This
Holiness the Pope has taken measures to ma
terially strengthen the Papal army" This
certainly is about the most preposterous thing
that even the Pope could do. His army,
which is some ten to twelve thousand strong,
has not only shown itself incapable Of defend
ing him against any organized force, but even
against such revolutionary bands as were led
by Garibaldi. Twice during his Pontifcate
has he been attacked, twice has his army
proved itself incompetent, and twice have
French troops come to his rescue. IL he had
any means of raising an army large enough
to defend his claims to sovereign power, there
might be some sense in his taking measures to
strengthen 1t. But as Italy is the only power
from which he is in any danger and as he can
not possibly raise in his limited dominions
military force one-twentieth as strong as that
which Victor Emanuel keeps under arms, his
plan of adding few thousand to his little
army, or even of doubling it, has no signif-
canoe whatever in relation to any adversary
he can encounter.
In his own territories the Pope can raise but
very few more soldiers than he has now got;
and the poor success he has always met with
In raising mercenaries in other countries, is
not such as to give him any encouragement.
Moreover, he has no money to pay troops, and
can in no way raise it. Every possible scheme
is constantly tried to raise means for the Pope
by loans, subscriptions, by begging, and by
Peters pence. But the result of all this
ceaseless scramble for money is that the Pope
cannot get out of debt, cannot fulfil his obli-
cations, and cannot raise enough to pay his
current expenses. Why, then, should the
Pope make a pretense to military power when
he could neither raise an army nor pay 1t,
when it is never of any service to him, and
when its increase would only add to his weak
ness
A thousand soldiers would be as useful to
the Pope as the ten thousand he now has; and
hundred would be as valuable as a thou
sand. The smallest number would serve as q
symbol OF his temporal authority, sign o.
his sovereign power-would bear aloft his flae
and indicate the basis of his rights. They
would be no less powerless against his eneria,
than his present army, and they would no les,
quickly attract the aid of France and the
sympathy of the Catholic world whenever the
Pope gets into difficulties. If he were to re-
duce his army to the size of that of the Duchess
of Gerolstein, it would subserve all his pur-
poses quite as we'll as his present expensive
and worthless force.
1t is probable, however, that in announcing
his purpose to materially strengthen his army,
r the Pope has another end to serve. He has
taken this means of indicating to the Catholic
world in view of the forthcoming Conference,
that he does not intend to weaken the tenn
poral power, but to maintain, strengthen, and
defend it. He does not intend to lower his
standard, to surrender his authority or to
decrease by one iota his claims, but, on the
contrary, to uphold and strengthen them. Il
he falls, he will fall asserting his sovereign
rights. If Napoleon tries to show that with a
speck for dominion and sham for an army,
it would be better for him to give up both,
he will point to his recent victories and to his
swelling hosts. The increase of the Papal
army is the Pope's defiance to Italy, and his
pltimatum to the assembled powers.