Litchfield enquirer., 1867-08-22
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 $8~ m1sdt ,sanor; it being tho object of the law to prevent tho commission of offences On h.i, ground zoe Miak Me indictment is sustaindbe.' Par ker, Ch J. Commonwealth vs. Harrington, 3 Pic 26.
 In State vs. Reyes, 8Vt. 67, Judge Redfield says
 "And we feel no hesitation in saying, that tho attempt to commit an offence, the soliciting an other to commit an offence, should (with few ex- captions not necessary to be enumerated here resting on peculiar grounds) be held indictabe as mlsdemeanors at common law"
 This is tho case, also with misdemeanors created by Statute, as we'll as misdemean- ors at common law.
 WhdteUer is ne,czy created bu statute t.a,cs 10 asef ue same qualities aud cidehts ds ifH had er- isted dt common la,c." 1 Bish. on Grim Law, sec 198.
 In Rex vs. Brodwick, ? Car. & Payne, 795, the Counsel for the prisoner claimed that 6 an attempt to commit & statutory misdemcanor was not a msdemeanor." Baron Parke, everything the ob- jection says
 "If this offence is made misdemoanor by stat ute 1t IS made 80 for all purposes. Thcro arc ma- ny cases in which an attempt to commit a misdo- meanor has been held to be amisdemeanor, whetll- CT the offence is created by statute or was an of fence at common law.'
 In Regina vs. Button, II Ad. $ FL, N. s, 9l7, Lord Denman, Oh. J., says:
 "The attempt on tho argument to mako dis tinction between misdemeanors by statute, and those by common law was not successful, the incidents to misdemoanor are not affected by tho origin ill law from which 1t was derived"
 In the case of Stato vs. Avery, Conn.,, 266, it it was held, also, that the solicitation to commit adultery, (which is statutory offonce not crime at common law,) was decided to bo indictable.
 While tho sale of liquor was Q legal traf- fic, regulated only by license laws, it was held that buyer would not have been lia- ble on Q sale without license and we do not see how the decision could have well been otherwise, since the buyer would then have right to presume that the law had been complied with. It is also true, ''that where we ascend into the lighter misdo- meanors, nearer approximation to the di- rect act is required to make one holden at all, than when we are among the heavier crimes" The sale of liquor is now, how ever, made crime per SC, and one of a very grave character. It seems to us, there fore, that whoever goes up to a public bar, and asks for spirituous liquor is guilty of a solicitation to commit the crime of liquor selling; and if sale is made on that soli- citation, we do not see why the buyer must not be considered an accomplice in the crime, and "iable to prosecution equally with the seller"
 In conclusion, we commend to the con- sideration of the 7emperance Journal the following late Tennessee decision under law making the selling of liquor by slave O crime:-
 we suppose it cannot be seriously controvert- eu 1nat upon general principles, the purchaser of sPtuous liquors, in violation of the statutes pass ea to suppress tipplng, is as much guilty of a vii oiStioh oi the law and as much amenabe to crmi- nal prosecution and punishment as the seller. They are Ill all respects pdriceps creinis they are alike wiiful violators of the law. The express nrohihi- ton to sell upon every just principle of construc ton, must be considered as implying prohibition to purchase. The purchaser-whether we regard his interest, or the effect and consequences of his act-s no less guilty, no less within the mischief intended to be suppressed, than the seller < He still stands guilty of wilfully participating in and aiding and encouraging, the commission of a ecimnal offence. Docs not this, upon the sound- sst principles of criminal law, constitute him a principle ill the offence? We think a does. M. Kinney, J. State vs. Bonner, 2 Head, l35.