Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-10-05
yUDGE HARRISON. ON TrrE cry
INJUNCTION BILL.

vile proposed bill for an injunction
against the new Board, which was pre-
scented to Judge Harrison about clock
on Monday evening. The matter received
the careful examination which its i'm.
portance demanded, and on Tuesday
evening the Chancellor announced the
result of his investigations to the solicit.
ors Of the complainant At their re,
quest, the decision was held up unit
the next morning, when the bill was re-
turned to the solicitor of the complain.
ant, with his refusal to grant an injunc
ton Endorsed upon it
At the request of Judge Harrison
friends, and as matter of general in
terest, we give below the opinion il
full:
An application is made to me at Cham,
beers, on bill filed by the Mayor and City
Council of Nashville, and the Records
and Treasurer of the city for themselves il
that capacity, and as individual property
holders of said city, and on behalf of other
property holders who may come in and
have themselves made parties to the pro-
ceedings, against the recently elected
Mayor, Councilmen and Aldermen, for an
injunction to prevent the latter from for
chilly taking possession Of the archives and
property of the city, until the questions
raised by the bill are determined by the
Chancery Court,
In applications for iniunctions in ordina-
~ cases, it is sufficient for the Chancellor
either to grant fat therefor, or to indorse
HE refusal without further explanation OF
his reasons for the grant or refusal to grant
the fat In this application it is due both
to the importance Of the questions raised
by this preliminary application, and to the
Chancellor to whom the application is made,
that the view taken of these questions
should accompany his action.
The granting Of the injunction asked for,
would practically decide the question in
favor of those officers of the corporation
who we're elected in September, 1866, and
who now seek by this proceeding to hold
over until such time as the court in the
course of litigation might order another
election az prayed for. For if prelimi-
nary writ was ordered the complainant
would delay action on a motion to dissolve
the injunction by exceptions to the answer
of defendants when filed, and by an appeal
to the Supreme Court, and would succeed
in holding over during most of the term for
which the defendants were elected.
This, therefore, is consideration which
shows the importance attached to the deei-
sion of the preliminary application.
The equitable rights of the parties liti-
CANT, cannot be ascertained without de-
Gliding the questions of law involved in the
case, and an injunction granted at this
stage of the proceedings might have the
effect of doing irreparable mischief to de-
PENDANTS, for if it turned out that upon a
final hearing after protracted litigation,
the questions of law were with them, they
will have been deprived in the meantime
of the positions TO which they had been
elected.
On the other hand, compliments allege
distinctly that they have right to the pro-
cess of injunction, and to call upon defend
ants to show by what warrant, valid in law,
the defendants pretend to be the lawful
Mayor and Council of the city, upon the
ground that there is no other court save the
Chancery Court, having jurisdiction, and
competent to give relief, and upon the
ground of the prevention of irreparable
mischief.
If / was sa tisfed that complainants' bill
made out case, calling for the prompt ex-
ercise of the high powers vested by law in
the Chancellor, to proceed to enjoin de-
PENDANTS from taking possession of the ar
chives, public buildings and assets of the
of Nashville, before the cause
was heard upon its merits, and that "irre-
parable mischief" would result from the
failure or refusal to grant the injunction,
should not hesitate to grant the injunction
asked for.
But after examining the question of the
control of the law-making power of the
State over public or municipal corpora
ton, existing only for public purposes, like
that of the "Mayor and City Council of
; and after examining the charter
Of the corporation and its powers with
reference to municipal election, and the re-
cent legislation, known as the franchise
law in relation to the question of how far
that legislation changes or moaifes the
former provisions of the city charter in re-
gard to elections in the city, and who may
appoint Judges of and who may vote at
such elections, without deciding or pre-
tending to decide the questions in this
cause in advance, except so far as the APP
plication for the injunction is concerned,
must say that do not see from the bill
IF the complainants that they present
Ease iustifying active and immediate inter-
7ention for the prevention of irreparable
or that irreparable mischief is
likely to ensue from the newly elected
Mayor and City Council taking charge of
The government of the city.
Very great inconvenience may result to
he complainants unless they are retained
n office by the extraordinary process of a
Court of Chancery, but it seems to me that
rreparable mischief to the city and pro-
,erty holders will not likely result from
ny refusal to grant the injunction.
1t is alleged in the bill that some of the
defendants are ineligible, as they do not
possess the qualifications required by the
,harter, 1t may be that upon final hear
ng this may constitute a ground for de-
,laring the election of the 18th September,
1867, void in toto but, as by the 10th Sec
ion of the act of 1853, it is provided that
zach branch of the City Council "shall have
to decide ultimately upon all
questions relative to the qualifications,
election and returns of members, it occurs
o me that, to say the least of it, it would
be doubtful whether / could safely take
way this franchise or power from the City
Council and assume to decide upon the
question of the election qualification of
members of that body.
Nor do think that the alleged coercive
of secret societies mentioned in
bill, or any threats which
nay have been made to influence voters at
he recent election, or any other political
appliances in conducting the election,
whatever weight these facts, if shown, may
nave on the hearing, can or does constitute
/ ground for the injunction asked for by
And it is equally difficult to see how the
question of vested rights and the effect of
he provisions of the franchise law upon
he corporate franchises as impairing the
obligation Of contracts, can be looked to
n this cause between the parties to this
1ill at this stage of the proceedings. Ger
ainly neither the compliments nor any one
IF them have vested right under the char
er to the offices to which they were elected
n 1866, any longer than their successors
ire elected and qualified, and if it turns
Il r al.