Dallas herald. [volume] (Dallas, Tex.) 1849-1873, 1867-06-15

iuI tn rtprDH rIiIi Fun.UIHui rrf.
tUniy tho description ~ persons
which nru lnlurdWl lU bt rrnNhtd
llis Go bc regretted. inu prltcr
ut 40 much Importance chat tho
rate ur designation adopted ~ io
mruhUra ui t'Wgrcst rnl State iog
lduvs had unt boon tUl'lyc1 an 4,
ur. irlhui were Gmpd impmrliWblp,
rpug moro l.iuilG general mlcs
had not hnyu declared. Tho unrcr.
laIul} becomes manifest In Upplicn
i,uH Of INV, aud this uncertainty
ruoc5,ilics construction, Tho ne
crssity for constructions, which ari-
ecs from the generality ul the law,
could not be- buDtor stated than in
tao language Of plnwdcn; Though
sac words be- general they are TO be
reduced To II particularly by expo
elion, made according To the intent
"r the net. Those statutes which
comprehend all things in tho lattcr,
7hc UsagcS of law have cNpoundcd
Nv cNlcnd but to some things those
which generally prohibit all people
from doing such an net, they have
interpreted to permit some persons
40 do IL, and those which include
every person in the letter, they
q have Udjudgcd to reach some per-
sons only al! being founded on tho
intent, collected by considering the
cause and necessity Of the act, and
, comparing ouo part with another,
% sometimes by foreign circumstan-
ccs,) | deem it proper place to fix
some clear ideas of the general in
tent Of these acts, and by what rule
ofcOnclusion.-strict OF liberal-that
intent may best be arrived at. The
intent, as expressed, is TO enable the
people Of each of the States to frame
II consultation for the State, by the
exercise Of the right of suffrage.
These are clauses of the act Civ
ing the right by general terms of
description to the people generally,
and especially to those who have
never enjoyed tho right before.
There are other clauses of the act
which, by general terms, take away
this right of suffrage from those
who have always enjoyed it. The
rule Of construction as to clauses
which give right must be liberal,
and its general terms must not be
restricted; but clauses which der
ogate from existing right, the rule
of construction must be strict, that
none should be excluded who arc
not clearly within the letter and in
tent. begin, then, with the in
quiry whether officers of militia of
State are within these terms of des-
cription, and | have no doubt that
they are not. Certainly, Congress,
as to the officers Of II State was not
intent to use the term at large and
without qualification, but, as we see,
intended to qualify the general
term. If the purpose was to desig-
nate military officers the usual
words to manifest that intent would
have been adopted and the terms
would have been the judicial and
executive, the civil or military Off
GERS Of the State. Accordingly we
find when that was the purpose, as
we see it was in the third section
Of the constitutional amendment,
known rs article fourteen, Congress
expressed that purpose very clearly.
That section provides that no
person Shall be Senator or Repro
sentative in Congress, or clcctor of
President or Vice President, or hold
any Office, civil OF military, under
the United States, or under any
State government, who, having pre-
Siously taken an oath as q member
of Congress, or as an officer Of the
United States, or as q member OF
any State Legislature, or as eXocu-
tive or judicial officer of State, to
support the Constitution Of the Uni
ted States, shall have engaged in
insurrection or rebellion against
= the same, or given aid or comfort to
encmies thereof. This third sec
ton is expressly referred to moro
than once in these acts it is made,
in fact, part of these acts; its Ian
guage was followed word for word
in these disqualifying clauses as far
as was possible, except in the par
ticular in which one is made to APP
ply to eligibility and the other to
right to vote. When, therefore, we
find that Cong tess, in declaring
what persons shall be disfranchiscd
from holding any Office, expressly
includes military as well as civil
officers, rs in the third section of the
amendment; and in providing what
persons shall be DISTINGUISHED from
voting and who held any Office, and
emitting to mention military Off
GERS, we cannot escape the conclu-
sion that military officers were not
here within their contemplation.
1t is impossible to imagine case
in which the construction from laws
in pGru mdteria has n more cogent
application, for it is evident here
that the lawmakers in framing
.disqualificatiens took special cogni-
zance of the third section of the
amendment and weighed it word
by word, following it materially
for exact language, and rejecting
every word intended to embrace a
military officer 1t must be borne
in mind that we arc here consider
ing the class of military officers who
were such prior to the. rebellion,
when the Office was lawful, and who
were known as officers of the mill
tia, not that class who became mil
itary officers during the rebellion.
AS to this last class, thcy.all come
on that other clause ON disqualified
ton which applies to participation
in the rebellion
r, Second, having the inquiry thus
circumscribed TO civil officers the