The Evansville journal. [volume] (Evansville, Ind.) 1866-1870, 1867-01-10

is, that Legislative power is the great
and overruhng power in every free
Government. The representatives
of the people will watch with
jealousy every encroachment of
the Executive Magistrate, for it
i trenches upon their own authori-
y ty. But who shall watch the en-
! croachment Of these Representatives
themselves? Will they be as Jealous
i of the exercise Of, power by them
selves as by others? :" = :.
There are many reasons which may
| be. assigned for the engrossing infu-
ence Of the legislative department.
In the first place it's constitutional
powers are more extensive, and less
capable of being brought within the
! precise limits than those of either of
the other departments. The bounds
of Executive authority are easily
marked out and defined It reaches
few objects, and those are known. It
cannot transcend them without being
brought in contact with other depart
ments. Laws may check and restrain
and bound its exercise. The same
remarks apply with still greater force
to the judiciary It's jurisdiction is or
may be bounded to few objects or
persons; or however general and
unlimited, its operations are necessar-
| lily confined to the mere administra-
| ton of private and public justice, 1t
cannot punish without law 1t can
not create controversies to act upon.
1t can decide only upon rights, and
cases as they are brought by others
before it. 1t can do nothing for itself
1t must do everything for others. It
must obey laws, and if it corruptly
administers them, is subjected to the
power of impeachment Hla
+ On the other hand, the legislative
power, except in the few cases of con-
stitutional prohibition, is forever
varying its means, and its ends. It
governs the institutions, and law, and
public. policy of the country It
regulates allyits vast interests. 1t
dispeses of all its property. Look
but + at the exercise Of two
or three branches of its ordinary
powers 1t hle1ies all the taxes. It
directs oand appropriateso all supplies.
Il, gives rules for the descent and dis
tribution pfall property held by indi-
viduals Itcontrols sources and req
sources of wealth. 1t changes at lis
will the whole fabric Of laws. It
molds ut its pleasure almost all the
institutions which gives strength, and
comfort and dignity to society. In
the next place it is the direct, visible
representative of the will of the PEG
pie in all changes of time and circum-
stances. 1t has the pride as well as
power Of numbers 1t is easily
moved, and steadily moved, by the
strong impulse Of popular feeling and
popular odium.
1t obeys Ewithout reluctance the
wishes and will of the majority for the
time being. The path to public favor
lies open by such obedience, and it
finds not only support, but immunity,
in whatever measures the majority
advises, even though they transcend
the constitutional limits. 1t has no
motive, therefore, to be jealous or
scrupulous in it's own use of power,
and finds its ambition stimulated and
its arm strengthened by the counter
ance and courage of numbers.
These views are not alone those of
the men who look with apprehension
upon the fate of republics, but they
are also freely admitted by some of
the strongest advocates for popular
rights, and the permanency of repub-
lican Institutions. Each department
should have will of. its own. Each
should have its own independence Sc
cured beyond the power of being taken
away by either or both of the others !
But at the same time the relations
of each to the other should be so
strong that there should be a mutual |
interest to sustain and protect each |
other. There should not only be con
stitutional means, but personal mo-
tives to resist encroachments of one
or either of the others. Thus ambi- |
ton would be made to counteract am
bition; the desire of power to check
power; and the pressure of interest to
balance an opposing interest. The |
Judiciary is naturally and almost nee
essarily, as has been already said, the |
weakest department 1t can have no |
means Of influence by patronage Its
powers can never be welded for itself !
1t has no command over the purse or
sword of the nation.
After full deliberation upon this
measure, [ cannot bring myself to
approve it, even upon local considera-
tons, nor yet as the beginning of an
experiment on larger scale.
1t may be safely assumed that no
political truth is better established |
than that such indiscriminate and all
embracing extension of popular suf-
frage, must end at last in its destruc-
ton.