Staunton vindicator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1860-1896, 1867-06-07


disqualification under the first clause would
arise in the case of member Of State leg
islature, or any executive Or judicial officer
of any State, who had not taken an oath to
support the Constitution of the United States.
| incline to the opinion that this oath is put
as an essential thing, the breach Of which by
instruction against the United States vlo-
lates the trust imposed by it upon the officer
But this clause, so far as the executive or
judicial officers of the State are concerned,
does not enlarge the class subject to disfran-
chisement The officer breaking the oath
which works disfranchisement must also be
judicial or executive officer of the State,
according to the rule hereinbefore estab-
lished. I do not apprehend any practical
question will arise here, for by the Consti-
tuition of the United States this oath is re-
quired to be taken by the members of the
several State Legislatures and all executive
and judicial officers, both Of the United
States and of the several States and in these
ten States the same oath was required as to
the members of the Legislature and the exc
cutive and judicial officers Of the State. This
brings me to the question, who is to be con-
sidered AN officer of the United States"
within the meaning of the clause under con-
sideration Here the term officer IS used IN
it's most general sense and without any quail
fcation, as legislative, or executive or judi
cial, and [ think, as here used, is intended
to comprehend military as well as civil OIL.
GERS of the United States who had taken the
prescribed oath, inasmuch as the violation OF
the official oath and the official trust has re-
lation to fealty to the United States, which
is broken by rebellion against the United
States. The reason is apparent for including
all officers of the United States and for ma
king the disfranchisement more general and
comprehensive as to them, standing as they
do in more direct relation of trust to the
United States than the officers of the State.
I now come to consider what is the mean
ing and scope of the disqualification arising
from that part of the oath which requires the
person to state that he has notengaged in in
surrection or rebellion against the United
States, or giving aid or comfort to the enc
mics thereof [ must here repeat what has
been said before, that in the work Of disqual-
ifcation two elements must concur-first,
holding the designated Office, State or FEEDER
al, accompanied by an official oath to support
the Constitution Of the United States; and
second, engaging in rebellion against the
United States, or giving aid or comfort to its
enemies Both Of these must not only con-
eur, but they must concur in the order of time
mentioned First, the office and the oath,
and afterwards engaging in rebellion or CIV
ing aid or.comfort. A person who has held
an Office withinsthe meaning Of this law, and
has taken the Official oath, and who has not
afterwards participated IN rebellion, may
very safely eske this oath /; and SO, too, the
person who has fully participated in the re-
bellion, but has not prior thereto held an Of
fee and taken official oath, may with equal
safety take this oath. My duty here is simply
one of construction. do not deem it prop
er to enter upon any question of the constitu~
tionality of this part Of the act.
Taking it as granted, for the purpose of
construction, that Congress has the right to
impose such an oath, it is not only allowable,
but imperative, that | keep in view its essen
tial characteristics It is something more
than a Legislative act in derogation Of an ex-
listing right. 1t is, in effect, law which
takes away an existing right as conse-
quence of acts done at prior time, and
which at the time they were done entailed
no such consequences In the late case be-
fore the Supreme Court of the United States
upon the test oath prescribed by an act Of
Congress to be taken by lawyers, by which
the exclusion from the right to practice their
profession was made to arise from prior par
ticipation in the rebellion, the court says ::
'sAs the oath prescribed cannot be taken by
these parties, the act as against them ope-
rates as Legislative decree of perpetual ex-
clusion, and exclusion from any of the pro-
LESSONS or any Of the ordinary avocations of
life for past conduct can be regarded in no
other light than as punishment for such
conduct The exaction Of the oath is the
mode provided for ascertaining the parties
upon whom the act is intended to operate,
and instead of lessening, increases its objec-
tionable character All enactments of this
kind partake of the nature of bills of pains
and penalties" The court further says the
deprivation of any right, civil Or political,
previously enjoyed may be punishment, the
circumstances attending and the causes Of
the deprivation determining this fact. The
characteristics of this clause of the acts are
therefore retrospective, penal, and primitive
Of course there can be no question as TO the
rule of construction which is here to be ap-
piled. Those who are expressly brought
within it's operations cannot be saved from
its operations Where, from the generality
of terms of description, Or for any other rea-
son, a reasonable doubt arises, that doubt is
to be resolved against the operation Of the
law and in favor Of the voter. What acts
then, within the meaning of the law, make
party guilty of engaging in insurrection
or rebellion against the United States, or
giving aid and comfort to the enemies there
of? The language here comprehends not
only the late rebellion, but every past rebel
lion or instruction which has happened in
the United States So too, it conlprehends
every foreign war in which the United States
has at any time been engaged. The first
part Of the sentence covers cases Of domes-
tic war existing in the form Of rebellion or
instruction, whilst Che last part applies to
foreign war. The words ''giving aid and
comfort to the enemies Of the United States"
,,o III oo,,o mood -, tho constitutional do