The Bedford gazette. [volume] (Bedford, Pa.) 1805-current, 1867-12-13

! their own constitution. 1t gives me
pleasure to add that the appeal to our
! common constituencies was not taken
in vain, and that my confidence in their
wisdom and virtue seems not to have
beeI misplaced.
Receaue Fauds-Tenure Of Office Bill.
| 1t is well and publicly known that enOr
nous frauds have been Lerpetrated on the
! Treasury and that colossal fortunes have
been made at the public expense. This Spe
cies Of corruption has increased, is increas
ing. and if not diminished, will soon bring
Us into total ruin and disgrace. The public
creditors and tax payers are alike interested
in an honest administration Of the finances,
and neither class will long endure the large
handed rObberies OF the recent past. For
this discreditable state Of things there are
several causes Some Of the taxes are so
laid as to present an irresistible temptation
to evade payment; the great sums which
officers may win bv connivance attraud, Gre
ate a pressure which is more than the viz
tue of many can withstand, and there can
be no doubt that the open di regard OF con
StitutiOnal Obliga ti0ns, assumed by some OF
the hig hest and most influential men in the
country, has greatly weakened the moral
sense of those who serve in subordinate pla
ces The expenses of the United States,
including interest on the public debt are
more than six times as much as they were
seven years ago. To collect and disburse
this vast amount requires careful superviS
ion well as systematic vigilance The
system, never perfected, was much diSor
ganized by the Tenure of Office bill, which
has almost destroyed official accountability.
The President may be thoroughly convinced
that an officer is incapable, dishonest or un
faithful to the Constitution, but under the
law which | have named, the utmost he can
do is to complain to the Senate and ask the
privilege of supplying his place witha better
man. If the Senate be regarded as person
ally or politically hostile 70 the President, it
is natural, and not altogether unreasonable,
for the officer to expect that it will take his
part as far as possible restore him to his
place, and give him triumph over his Tx
ecutive superior The officer has other
chances of impunity, arising from accidental
defects of evidence the mode Of invest
eating it, and the secrecy of the hearing
1t is not wonderful that official malfeasance
should become bold in proportion as the
delinuuentS learn to think themselves safe
[ am entirely persuaded that under such
rule the President cannot perform the great
duty assigned to him Of seeing thelaws faith
fully executed, and that it disables him most
especially from enforcing that rigid accounta
bility which is necessary to the due eXecu
ton of the revenue laws. The Constitution
invests the President with authority to de-
eide whether a removal should be made In
any given case ; the act of Congress declares
in substance that he shall only accuse such aS
he suppOSeS to be unwor by of their trust.
The Constitution makes him sole Judge IN
the premises, but the statute takes away
his Jurisdiction, transfers 1t to the Senate
and leaves him nothing but the odious and
sometimes impracticable duty OF becoming
| a prosecutor The prosecution Is to be con
| Quoted before a tribunal whose members are
not like hm-responsible 10 the whole peo
pie, but TO separate constituent bodies, and
who may hear his accusation with great dis
| favor The Senate is absolutely without
any known standard of decision applicable to
such case. Its judgment cannot be an
| ticipated, for 1t is not governed by any rule
| The law does not define what shall be
| deemed good cause for removal, and 1t Is
| impossible even to conjecture what may or
may not be so considered by the Senate
The nature of the subject forbdS clear proof.
| If the charge be incapaclty, what will sup
port it? Fidelity to the Constitution may
be understood or misunderstood IN thous-
and different ways, and by violent party
men in violent party times, unfalthfuness
TO the Constitution may even come to be
considered merltOrlOuS. Ii the officer be
accused of dishonesty, how shall 1t be made
out? Will it be inferred from acts unron-
nected with pulic duty, from private history,
or from general reputation or must the
| President await the commission of an actu
] n. hall hn Z hl
mean time risk the character and interest of
the nation in the hands Of men to whom he
| cannot give his confidence? Must he for
| bear his complaint until the mischiefis done
and cannot he prevented? If his Zeal in
| the public service should impei him to an
ticipate the overt act, must he move at the
peril Of being tIied himself for the offence
| Of slanderng his sub0i dinateS In the
present circumstances Of the country some
one must be held responsible for official de-
| linqurncy Of every kind. 1t Is extremely
difficult TO say where that responsibility
| should be thrown, if 1t be not left where 1t
| has been placed by the Constitution. Buf
/ all lust men will admit that the President
ought to he entirely relieved from such re
| ,ponsbiiity, if he cannot meet 1t. by reason
! Of restrictions placed by law upon his action
| The unrestricted power OF removal from OF
! flee i very great one to be trusted, even
| TO d magistrate chosen by the general sui
/ trage Of the whole people, and accountable
! directly to them for his acts; 1t Is und0ubt
! edly liable to abuse and at some periods OF
our history perhaps has been abused. II 1t
be thought desirab Bile and Con.tituuonal that
i should be so limited as to make the Pres
ldeut merely a comm6n lnlUriner against
other public agents, he should at least be
permitted to act in that capacity before
some open tribunal, independent OF party
/ politics, ready to investigate the merits OF
| every case, furnished with the means OF
! taking evidence, and bound to decide accord
! ing to established rules. This would guar
| antee the safety Of the accuser when he acts
in got q faith, and the same tune secure the
! rights of the other party. | speak, OF
| course, with all proper respect for the pres
ent Senate but it does not seem to me that
any legislative body can be so constituted as
to insure It's fitness for these functions 1t
is not the theory of this Government that
public offices are the property OF those VINO
! hold them. They are given merely as "a
! trust for the public benefit, sometimes tor a
fixed period, sometimes during good Deha
vior. but generally they are llabe to be ter
minated at the pleasure OF the appointing
power which represents the coi!actlVe males
tv and speaks the will OF the people. Inc
forced retention in office Of single ,dlshOn-
est person may work great injury to the
| public interests The danger to the public
service comes not from the power TO remove
but from the power to appoint; therefore