Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1867-01-18
JANUARY 49, 1861

parties upon whom the act Is intended 10
iOperate and instead of lessening, increases
its Objectionable character. A il enactments
7 of this kind partake of the nature fbills
eof pains and penalties, and are subject to
the constitutional inhibition against the
q passage Of bills of attainder under which
) general designation they are included In
/ the exclusion which tile statute adjudges,
} it imposes a punishment for some of the
Z acts specified Which were not punishable,
{ or may not have been punishable at the
time they were committed; and for all the
z acts itadds new punishment to that then
prescribed, and ii Is thus brought within
! the further inhibition of the Constitution
Z against the passage of an er post Jdct0 law.
In the case of Cummings D. the State of
Missouri, just decided we had occasion to
consider at length the meaning of abill of
, attainder and an ec post tdeto lawn. the
clause of the Constitution forbidding their
G passage by the States and 10 tisuHnecessafy
; to repeat here what we then said. "A like
prohibition is containedintheC Constitution
againstenactments ofthis kind by Congress,
and the argument presented in that case
against certain clauses of the Constitution
OF Missouri is equally applicable to the act
of Congress under consideration in this
case. The profession Of an attorney and
, counselor is not like an office created by an
act of Congress, which depends for its con-
tinuance, its powers, and Its emolumefits
r on the will of its creator, and the possession
of which may be burdened with any con-
ditions not prohibited by the Constitution.
Attorneys and cOunselors are not officers
of the United States. They are not elected
or appointed in the manner prescribed by
the Constitution for the election orappoiht-
ment of such officers. They are officers of
the Court, admitted as such by. its order
upon evidence of their possessing sufficient
legal learning and fair private char
acter. Since the statute Of Henry ~, it
has been the practice In England, and it
has always been the practice in this coun-
try, TO obtain this evidence by an eXam
nation of the parties. In this Court the
fact of the admission Of such officers in the
highest Court OF the States to which they
respectively belong for three years preced
ing their application, is regarded as suffi-
cient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and the statement
OF counsel moving their admission is suffi-
cient evidence that their private and profess
sional character is fair. The order of admis-
sion is the Judgment of the Court that the
parties possess the requisite qualifications
as attorneys and counselors, and are enti-
tied to appear as such and conduct causes
thereon. FROM its entry, the parties be-
come officers of the Court, and are respon-
sible to it for professional misconduct.--
They hold their Office during good be-
havior, and can only be deprived of it
for misconduct, ascertained and declared
by the Judgment of the Court after oppor-
tunity to be heard has been afforded. Their
admission and their exclusion are not the
exercise of a mere ministerial power. The
Court is not in this respect the register of
the edicts of any other,body. Itis the eX-
ercise OF judicial power, aud has been SO
held in numerous cases. 1t was so held by
the Court of Appeals of New York in the
matter of the application OF Cooper for ad
mission. Attorneys and counselors, said
that Court, are not only officers of the
Court, but officers whose duties relate al
most exclusively to proceedings of Judi
cial nature, and hence their appointment
may with propriety be iutrusted to the
Courts. And the latter, in performing this
duty, may very justly be considered us en-
gagged in the exercise Of their appropriate
judicial functions. In CO Ddrte Secomb, a
mapddnutS the Supreme Court of the Ter
ritory of Minnesota, TO vacate an order re-
moving an attorney and counselor, was de-
MED by this Court on the ground that the
removal was judicial act. We are not
~
nlallddrpds was issued to an inferior tribunal,
commanding it to reverse or annul its de-
cisiOn where the decision was in its nature
judicial act and within the scope of its
Jurisdiction and discretion. And in the
same case the. Court observed that it has
been well settled by the rules and practice
of common law courts, that it rests eXclu-,
sively with the Court to determine who is
qualified to become one of its officers as an
attorney and counselor, and for what
causes he ought to be removed. The
attorney and counselor being by the sol
emn judicial act of the Court clothed with
his office, does not hold it as matter of
grace and favor the right which it confers
upon him to appear for suitors and to argue
causes, is something more than mere in-
diligence, revocable at the pleasure of the
Court or at the command of the Legisla-
tilre; it is right OF which he can only be
deprived by the judgment of the Court for.
immora! or professional delinquency. The.
Legislature may undoubtedly prescribe
qualifications for the office, with which he
must conform; as it may, where it has eX-
elusive Jurisdiction, prescribe qualifica-
tions for the pursuit of any of the ordinary
avocations of life. But to constitute a.
qualification, the condition or thing pre-
scribed must be attaiuable, in theory at
least, by every one. That which, from the
nature of things or the past condition or
conduct of the party, cannot be attained by
every citizen, does not fall within the
definition of the term. To all those by
whom tits unattainable, tbs adsqualifca-
ton which operates as perpetual bar to-
the Office. The question in this case is not
ds to. the power OF Congress to prescribe
qualifications, butjwhether that power has