New-York tribune., 1867-05-01
THE C0iFLICT BETWEEN FRANCE 1ND
PRUSSIA

Prussia
We regard it "a almOSt certain that the dan
ger OF European war has for tie present
been avcrted. 1t must have been weighty rea-
son, which prevailed upon both France and
Prussia to disregard the popular clamor for
war. and to consent, the one to the loss of the
coveted Grand Duchy. aud the other to the
dismanting of the Notifications. After these
mutual concessions have been made, it cannot be
expected that either France or Prussia should
be willing to go to war on any of the solutions
that may be proposed by the majority OF the
London Conference. Whether that body may
advise the annexation of Luxemburg TO Bel
gium. or its entire incorporation with Holland,
or the maintenance of its present condition
of scm-indcpendcnce, or Its entire mdepend-
cnce under sovereign prince, it is not likely
that popular feeling in either France or Ger
many can become greatly excited by the selec-
ton of one of these plans.
But it is highly probable that, whatever de-
cision may be arrived at at London, it will he
an adjournment, not final solution. Gs the DIS
Dutc bctwecn France and Prussia. Prussia IL
irrcsistiblyf "agglomcratng" the little States ot
the Teutonic world which are too small to
maintain their independence The fate
of Hanover and Frankfort forcshadows
that of Bavaria, Wurtcmburg, and Baden.
In the German provinces of Austria the
German tendencies are becoming more pow
crful every day, and will finally leave to the
Government only the choice OF either con
cludng the closest alliance with Prussia, aS
Joint representative of the interests OF the
German race, or of seeing the German PROV
inccS being rapidly converted INTO German
Vcnctia, drifting ircsiStibly toward union
with Prussia In either ease, Prussia Is on the
point of becoming the superior of Franco III
population and still more in powr. The
French Government, unless 1t should ac-
ccpt the inferior position which the natural
growth of Prussia would prepare for 1t, must
make il the chief aim of It's foreign pohcy
to arrest the natural expansion OF the Prlis-
sian power This aim of French politics
WILL on the other hand, spur Prussia to acccl-
crate the agglomcrationr of the minor Powers
with all the means within her reach, and 1t Is
obvious that tendencies so directly opposite
must at some time, and may at any time, pro-
ducc tremendous clash.
I'm the race of two such countries aS France
and Prussia for an increase of power, little
Kingdoms tlkc liollanU anu btleiuh dI' H''"-
tally alarmed ut the danger threatening their
independence. In fact. it may bc SAID
they have alrcady ceased to be indcpend-
cnt They feel a. much the necessity OF
leaning upon one of their powerful ncighborS
rs though they belonged to the new German
Confederation. Neither of them has vitality
enough to live much longer rs IN independent
nationality Holland and about four-sevcnths
of Belgium are inhabited 10y Tcutonic tribes;
while the other three -sevenths OF Belgium
are inhabited by the Walloons, who IN Ian
gilagc and habits fully agree with the
French The more imminent hostilitics between
France and Prussia, the more the ilollanders
and the Bclgians must become aware oi Their
political insgnfcancc, and the more they must
seck-not so much the alliance ~ the patron
are of one of their powerful neighbors. But
patronage l. only the iiIst step toward anneXa-
tiOn.
II may bc that the Peace Conference will get
rid of the Luxemburg question, hut IT will start
i'm the stead of it, the Belgian and Holland
question, which will prove much more serious
and not 80 easy of solution.