Keowee courier. [volume] (Pickens Court House, S.C.) 1849-current, 1867-06-08
PlCKENS COURT HOUSE, S. G., SATURDAY, JUNE s. 1867,

decarcu. nc uncertainty becomes manifest
in the application Of the law, and this unccr-
tainty necessitatcs construction The ncccs-
sty for, construction, which arises from the
generality Of the law cannot be better stated
than in the language Of Plowdcn: "Though
tho ~o.1is bc general, they arc TO DO reduced
to pasticularity by exposition ulado accord
whisl comprehend all things in tho letter, the
sk tsgs hAva ahosspo 9hISssd II s eftsna
orally ~ s.Ai,iIed ali people ;sui. lois;s gach
nh act, Slley have interpreted to permit somo
persons TO do; and those which include every
person in the letter, they have adudccd to
reach some persons on yal} founded upon
the intent, which is collected by considering
the cause and necessity of the act, and com.
| pairing one part with another, and sometimes
| by foreign circumstances. deem it proper
hero to fix somo clear ideas of the general in
tent Of these Acts, and by whit ri isht of con
struction strict or liberal, shat intent may
best be arrived at. The iutent, as expressed,
is to enable the people Of each of these States
to frame constitution for the State BY the
exercise Of the right of suffrage. There are
clauses of the Act giving the right, by gcncr.
al terms OF description, to the people generally,
| and especially to those whoh C never cnioycd
| VIC iiS'le ptIblC. IHcIc are Quiet Cl3uScS OF
the Act, which, by general terms, take away
this right oc suffrage from those Who have al
| ways enjoyed it, The rule of construction as
to the clauses which give the right must be
| liberal, and as to them the general terms arc
not to be restricted. But MS to those clauses
which dcrogatc from the existing right, the
rufe of construction must be strict, that none
should be excluded VIII are not clearly within
the letter and intent.
| begin, then, with tic inquiry, whether
officers of the military Of the State are en-
braccl within these terms Of description p
| And have no doubt they arc not. Certainly
| Congress, as to the officers of State, was
not content to use the terms at large and with
out qualification. If Congress had intended
to qualify. the usual words to manifest that
intent would Eavc been adopted, and the
terms would have been " the judicial and cx
ccutivc, the civil or military, officers Of the
Smto." Accordingly, we find that whom that
was purposcd, rs we see it was in the third
section Of the constitutional amendment, in
article fohrth, Congress expresses that pur-
pose very clearly. That section provides that
no person shall be Senator or Representa-
tive in Congress, or ccctor of President or
Vice. President, or hold any Office civil or mil
itnry, under the United States, who, as a
member of any State Legislature. or as an OK
ccutive or iadical officer of any State, took
an oath to support The Constitution of the
United States, and shall have engaged in in
surracton or rebellion against the same, or
given aid and comfort to the enemies thereof.
This third section is expressly referred to
more than once in these Acts. 1t is made,
in fact, par. uf these Acts Its language
is followed word for word in those di>qual-
| flying clauses as far as was practicable, cX-
cept in the particular in which one is made
to apply to eligibility, and the other to the
right to vote. When therefore, VIC find that
| Congress in declaring what persons shall be
distranchiscd from holding any Office. express.
ly include military as we'll as civil officers, MS
in the third section of the amendment, and in
providing what persons shall be tlisfranchiscd
from voting who held any Office omit to men
tion military officers we cannot escape the
conclusion that military officers were not here
within their contemplation. 1t is impossible
to imagine case in which tho construction
from laws in pnri maierio has more eongcnt
application for it is cvidcnt here that the law.
maker, in framing disqualification for voters,
| took special cognizance Of the third section
of the amendment, and weighed it word by
word following it literally for the most part,
and rejecting deliberately the very word in
tended to embrace military officer. 1t must
be borne in mind that we arc here consider.
ing the class ef military officers who were
such prior to the rebellion, when the Office
was lawful, and who were officers of the mill.
tia /; not that class who became military Off.
oers daring the rebellion. As to this last
c'ass, they all come under tha, other clause
of disqualification which applies to participn.
tion in rebellion.
Having tho inquiry thus circumscribcd to
civil o!Eccrs, the question rccnrs. what civil
officers are to be brought within the terms
"cxecutivc or judicial officers of IL State ?''.,,.
They clearly include, so far as executive Off
GERS arc concerned, all such officers ~ are
generally known by the proper description of
State officers, or officers of State. In one
sense, and i'll a popular sense, description of
the executive officers OF State is applicable
to a wrll-known class--thc Governor, Lieut..
Governor, Auditor, Treasurer, Secretary and
State officials proper, who exercise executive
functions at the seat Of Government
ain not prepared to say that only these
proper State officials come within this term
of description, nor am prepared, as to the
judicial officers of the State, to limit the dc.
scripton to judges of courts whose jnrisfic-
tion extends over the entire State must
content. myself in saying of these officers, ex-
ecutivc or judicial, that they arc clearly with
i