Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-05-30

systems, finds / tdificult to decide which
Is the greater a~bomination. The feebIest
Supreme Bench that ever sat on earth,
was elected in Arkansas by the Legisla-
ture. In Mississippi, candidates for the
Supreme Judgeships had to make It
known how they would decide, If elected,
in regard to the validity Of the State
bonds issued for the benefit of the Plan
ters' Bank. In California, the decision
OF the Court in certain great land claims
was openly alleged to have been bought
with money. In New York, the party )
nominated Judges as 1t did inferior off,
GERS Of the State and the decisions of
the Supreme Court sunk rapidly in the
estimation OF the Courts and bar Of other
States.
Wherever the judges are elected by the
People, for short terms Of service, the
temptation OF an incumbent of the
Bench, to electioneer, with the public
and individuals, for reelection, is too
great to be successfully resisted, save in
very rare instances. Independence In
lhe judiciary is uttslry impossible, where
the judge must 1--WE his place to an cleo
ton by the populaos, which means his
selection and nomination by the party
leaders. It is, indeed, the very thing
which popular elections are intended to
prevent and if the Devil had been in
vited to invent q mode by which the
judiciary should become a curse inflicted
upon a State, a shame and reproach to
Republicanism, and q standing manu-
ment Of human folly, he would have
produced the very system by which, in
New York, blacBguardism is enabled to
set its representatives on the Bench, and
thieves and burglars elect the judges be-
fore whom they are to be tried. There
can be 60 conservatism in regard to the
national Constitution, when the domi-
nant party sets so little value on judicial
independence and u~prightness in a State.
1t is 4 true that if the Governor appoints
the Judges, he also, being alwaysa psrti-
zan, and too often q person ofthe smallest
calibre, will select none but ~partizans,
and givinkdhhe eFmine as a reward for
services often little worthy, will fill the
bench with men no better than those
whom the people or the Legislature
would select. Then why not try another
mode? The people want only learning,
capacity, integrity and independence on
the bench or, if they want anything
the opposite of any of these, they ought
not to be allowed to have it. The ma
jority has NJ right TO a choice, unless it
will choose these. They have no right
to impose on single sutton a corrupt or
an incompetent Judge. 1t is not a mat
ter in which the majority ought to gov
ern; and if popular election is adopted
as a mode of securing competency, learn
ing and integrity, it is the worst of all
possible modes, because the people at
large are not competent to judge Of the
professional qualifications that a judge
should have; and q good Judge, or a
lawyer who.wi1make a good one, is the
least likely Of all men to be popular.
Create a board of lawyers in each
State, composed Of nine, eleven, thirteen
or fifteen lawyers, admitted to practice
in the Supreme Court. Let these select
the judges. Let the office be for life, and
forbid by law the return to the bar of a
judge resigning his office. Then you
will have good judges for the bar will
select the best Of the profession, for the
reason, if for no other, that they will
thus be removed out of the way of the
less distinguished members Of the bar.
Then t@ere will be no judges going upon
the Supreme Bench, to have leisure
and opportunity to study their profes-
sionp or in order to override certain
cases, dNided against them by their pre-
decessors, and which they wish should
lease to be authority before they return
to the bar.