Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-04-16
United states Supreme Court.

WASHINGTON, April 15.-In the United
States Supreme Court to-day, the Chief
Justice delivered the opinion of the court
in the case of the State of Mississippi as.
Andrew johnson and E. o. Ord. A mo-
ton of leave TO file bill is as follows:
A motion was made some days since in
behalf of Mississippi for leave to file bill
in behalf of the State, praying this court
perpetually to enjoin and RESTRAIN Andrew
johnson and Z. o. Ord, commanding the
district of Mississippi and Arkansas from
executing acts, or in any matter CARRYING
ferred to are those of March I'd and 22d,
1857, commonly known as reconstruction
acts.
The Attorney General to the leave asked
upon the ground that United States bill,
which makes the President a defendant
and seeks an injunction against him to
restain the performance of certain duties
should be allowed to be filed in the court.
This point has been fully argued and we
will now dispose of it. We shall limit an
inquiry TO the question presented to the
objection, without expressing an opinion
on the issues discussed in the argument.
In any case the President may be required
by process of this court to perform purely
ministerial acts required by law, or may
be held amenable in any case otherwise than
by impeachment for crimes. The single
point which requires your consideration
Is this: Can the President be restrained
from cerrying out an act of Congress which
is alleged to be unconstitutional?
1t is assumed by counsel for the State
that the President in the execution of the
reconstruction act, is required to perform
ton we think there is confounding of
the terms ministerial and executive, which
are by no means equivalent in import. A
ministerial duty, the performance of which
may in proper cases be required by the
head of department, through Judicial pro-
cess-and in respect to which nothing is
left to Discriminate a simple, definite
duty arising under conditions admitted, or
presumed to exist, or to be imposed by law.
The case of Marbury VS.. Madison, Sec
rotary of the State, 1st Crouch 1877 furn-
ishes an illustration. A citizen had been
nominated, confirmed and appointed q
justice of the peace for Kiston, Columbia,
and his commission had been made out
and sealed, nothing remained to be done,
except delivery and duty of delivery was
imposed by law on the Secretary of State.
1t was held that the performance of this
duty might be enforced by mandamus
issuing from the court, the court having
jurisdiction in the case. Kendell, Post
master General vs. Stockton and Stokes,
IL Peters 627. An act Of Congress
directed the Postmaster General to credit |
Stockton and Stokes with such sums as the |
Solicitor of the Treasury might find |
due them, and that officer refused to
credit them with sums so found due. 1t |
was held that crediting of money was a
mere ministerial duty, the performance of |
which might be enforced in each of these |
cases. Nothing was lefl to his discretion. |
and there was no room for the exercise of |
Judgment The law which required per- |
Torrance to this, was held might be re- |
quired by mandamus very different. Ii is the |
duty Of the President in the exercise of his |
power TO see that the laws are faithfully |
executed, and among these laws the act |
named in the bill. BY the first of these |
acts he is required to assign Generals to 4
the command of the several military dis
tricts, and detail a sufficient military force
10 enable such officers to discharge the dn- |
ties under the laws of the suppler entary
act. Other duties imposed on the sew
eral commanding Generals, land their
duties must necessarily be per-
formed under the President, as Com
mander-in-chief) The duty thus imposed
on the President is in no just sense minis
lerial, it is purely executive and political.
An attempt on the part of the judicial de-
partment of the government to enioin the
performance of such duties by the
President, might be justly character
zed, in the language of Chief Justice
Mashall, "a an absurd and excessive
IL is true that in the
Instance before us the interposition of the
curt is not sought to enforce action BY the
Executive under the control Of legislation.
,ut 10 restrain such action under legislation
alleged 10 be unconstitutional, but we are
Unable TO perceive how this circumstance
axes the case out Of general PRINCIPLES.
shich forbids judicial interference with
he exercise OF the Executive discretion,
I was admitting in the requirement that
pplieation nov made TO rs il with
az precedent, and this is of much
Teieht against it. Had it been sup
opposed BY the bar this court would arrest
xecution of an unconstitutional act of
loneress, il can hardly be doubted that an
pplicafion with that object would have
cen heretofore addressed to il. Such
ccasions have been frequent The con-