Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-03-14
ANoTHEE vETO MESSAGE.
Tenure Of once BIZ.

EeMlEt OF GLlEe hAAAs
To the Senate Of the United States
have carefully examined the bill to
regulate the tenure Of certain civil
Offices. The material portion Of the bill
is contained in the first section, and is
of the following effect THAT every
person holding any civil Office to which
he has been appointed by and with the
advice and consent Of the senate, and
every person who shall hereafter be APP
pointed to any such office and shall
become duly qualified to act therein, is
and shall be elected to hold such office
until a successor shall have been sp-
pointed by the president with the advice
and consent of the senate and is duly
qualitiedAnd that the secretaries Ofstate,
Of the Ekasury, Of war, Of the navy and
of th 1nterior, the postmaster general
and She encouragement, shall hold
their offices respectively for and during
the term Of the president, by whom they
may have been appointed, and for one
month thereafter, subject to removal by
and with the consent and advice of the
senate"
These provisions are qualified by a res
ervatiOn in the fourth section that no.
thing contained in the bill shall be cou-
strUed to extend the term of any Office
the duration of which is limited by law.
In effect the bill provides that the presi-
dent shall not remove from their places
any OF the civil officers whose terms of
Office are not limited by law, without the
advice and consent OF the senate of the
United States. The bill in this respect
conflicts, in nv judgment, with the con-
stitutioR of the United States. The
question, as congress is fully aware, is by
no means a new one That the power of
removal is constitUtiOnaliy vested in the
president Of the United States is a pre-
requisite which has been not more dis
tInctly declared by the judicial au-
thority and Judicial commentaries
than it has been uniformly prac-
ticed upon by the legislative and ex-
ecUtive departments of the government.
The question arose in the house Of repre-
sentatives as early as the 10th Of June,
1883, on the bill for establishing an
executive department denominsted the
department OF foreign affairs. The first
clau-e Of the bill, after recapitulating
the function Of the officer and defining
his abilities, had these words "TO be
removable from Office by the president
OF the United States" 1t was moved to
strike out these words, and the motion
was sustained with great ability and
vigOr. 1t was insisted that the president
could not constitutiOnally exercise the
power of removal exclusively of the SEN
ate; that the F6derd{ist so interpreted
the constitution when argued for its
adoption by the several states, that the
constitution had no where given the
president the power Of removal, either
expressly or by strong implication, but
on the contrary, had distinctly provided
for the removal from Ofic- by impeach-
ment only. A construction which
deBied the power of removal by the
arguments given, from the danger Of the
abuse of the power, from the supposed
tendency Of an exposure of public officers
to capriciOus removal, to impair the
efficiency Of the civil service, from the
Illegal injustice and hardship OF dis
placing incumbents dependent upon
their official stations, without snf1i-
cient consideration, from a sup
posed want Of responsibility on the part
Of the president, and from an imagined
defect of the guarantees against which a
vicious president might incline TO abuse
the power. On the other hand on x
elusive power Of removal by the presi-
DEBT was defended as a true exposition
Of the test of the constitution. II was
LAAlLlAdlAfCu Nh1A AAAEAE hAU GtlAAA4 -FAFC1
for which persons about TO be relieved
from office without being guilty of trea-
son, bribery or malfeasance, and that
the nature of the thing demands that it
should he so supported. 1t was said II a
man becomes insane by the visitation Of
God, and is likely to ruin our affairs,
are the hands Of government 70 be de-
Tended from wardiug off the evil -?
Supposing a person IN Office as not pos
sessing the taientsi e was judged to have
at the time Of the appointments Is the
error not to be CoTrected2 Suppose he
acquires vicious habits and Incredible in
dolence, or total neglect Of the duties OF
his office which shall work mischief 10
the public welfare? Is there no way to
arrest the threatened danger? Suppose
he becomes Odi0us and unpopular by rea-
son OF the measures he pursues, and this
he may do without committing any posi-
tive evil againstthe law, must he preserve
his office, despite Of the popular will?
suppose him grasping for his
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT and the elevation
Of his connections by every means
short of the treason dehrei by the
constitution, hurrying yOur affairs TO the
precipice of destruction, endangering
your domestic tranquility, ~plunderiag
you of the means Of defense, alternating
the affections of your allies, and promo
ting the spirit Of discOrd ? must not the
tardy, tedious, desultOFy road by way of
impeachment be Travelled to overfake
the man who basely c%onfdiDg himself
within the letter of the law is employed
in drawing off the vital principle Of the
government? The nature OF things, the
great object of society, the express object
Of the constitution itself requires that
this thing should subserve 70 unite the
senate with the president. The exercise
of the power, it was said, would involve
US in the most serious difficulties. Sup
pose a discovery OF any Of these events
should take place when the senate is@nOt
in session. How Is the remedy to be
applied7 The evil could be avoided in
no other way than by the seBate set
ting always, in regard TO the danger of
the power being abused, if exercised by
one man 1t was said that the danger Is
as great With respect to the senate who
are assembled from various parts Of the