The evening Argus. [volume] (Rock Island, Ill.) 1861-1871, 1867-01-21

years preceding their application, is regarded
as sufficient evidence of the possession of the
requisite legal learning, and sufficient evi
dence that their private and professional
character is fair. The order of admission is
the judgement of the court that the parties
possess the requisite qualification as attor-
neys and counselors, and are entitled to APP
pear as such and conduct causes therein
From its entry the parties become officers of
the court, and are responsible to it for pro-
fessional misconduct. They hold their of
fees during good behavior, and can only be
deprived Oft for misconduct, ascertained and
declared by the judgement OF the court after
opportunity to be heard has been afforded
Their admission and their exclusion are not
the exercise of a mere ministerial power
The court is not in this respect the register
of the edicts of any other body. 1t is the ex-
ercise of judicial power, and has been so held
in numerous cases. 1t was so held by court OF
appeals of New York in the matter of the APP
plication of Cooper for admission. Attor-
neys and counselors said that court, are not
only officers of the court, but officers whose
duties relate almost exclusively to proceed
inps of a judicial nature, and hence their ap-
pointments may with propriety be entrusted
to the courts. And the latter, in performing
"
engaged in the exercise of their appropriate
judicial functions. In er parte Secolnh a
mandamus to the supreme court of the state
of Minnesota to vacate an order removing an
attorney and counselor was denied BY this
court on the ground that the removal was a
judicial act. We are not aware OF any case,
said the court, where mandamus was ISSUED
to an inferior tribunal. commanding 1t to re-
verse or annul It's decision where the dccis-
ion was in its nature a judicial act, and with
in the scope of its jurisdiction and discretion.
And in the same case the court observed
that ii has been well settled by the rules and
practice of common law courts that 1t rests
exclusively with the courts TO determine who
Is qualified to become one of It's officers as
an attorney and counselor. and for what causes
he may be removed. The attorney and conn
selor. being by the solemn judicial act of the
court clothed with his office. does not hold 1t
as matter of grace and favor; the right
which it confers upon him to appear tor suit
ors and to argue causes is something more
than n mere Indulgence, revocahle at the
pleasure of the court or at the command Of
the legislature. 1t is y right of which he can
only be deprived by the judgement Of the
court for immoral or professional delinquen-
CIV. The legislature may undoubtedly pre-
scribe qualifications for the Office with which
he must conform as it may, where 1t has
exclusive Jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications
for the pursuit of any of the ordinary avoca-
tons of life. But 70 constitute quahtica
ton, the condition or thing prescribed must
be attainable, in theory at least, By every one.
That which. from the nature Of things, the
past condition or conduct OF the party, can
not be attained by every citizen, does not
= IL l., JoE,, 20 +fa To oil
those BY whom it is unattainahle it is a dis
qualification which operates as perpetual
bar to the office. The question in this case
is not as to the power OF congress to pre-
scribe qualifications, but whether that power
has been exercised as a means for the lntic-
ton of punishment against the prohibition
of the constitution. That this result cannot
be effected indirectly by state, under the
form of creating qualifications, We have held
in the case of Cummins VS.. the state OF Mis-
souri,and the reasoning upon which that CON
clusion was reached applies equally to SINH
lar action on the part OF congress. These
views are further strengthened by consd-
Grafton of the effect Of the pardon produced
by the petitioner and the nature of the par
doning power of the President. The consti-
tuition provides that the President shall have
power to grant reprieves and pardons for Of
fences against the United States except IN
cases of Impeachment. The power thus con-
ferred is unlimited. With the exception
stated, it extends to every offence known TO
the law, and may be exercised at any time
after its commission, either before legal pro-
ceedings are taken, or during their tendency,
Or after conviction and Judgment This
power of the President is not subject to leg
islative control Congress can neither limit
the effect of his pardon, nor exclude from its
exercise any class of offenders The benign
prerogative of mercy reposed in him cannot
be fettered by any legislative restriction.-
Such being the case, the inquiry arises as to
the effect and operation of pardon. On
this point all the authorities concur. A par
don reaches both the punishment prescribed
for the offence and the guilt OF the offender
and when the pardon is full it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the
guilt, so that in the eye of the law the often
der is as innocent as if he never committed
the offence. If granted before conviction. it
| prevents any of the penalties and disabilities
consequent upon conviction from attaching,
! If granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities, and restores him
| to all his civil rights. 1t makes him, as it
| were new man, and gives him a new credit
| and capacity. There is only this limitation
TO its operation-it does not restore the offices
| forfeited or property or interests vested in
| others in consequence of the conviction and
| judgment. The pardon produced by the pc
| titioner is full pardon for all offences by
hiEs committed arising from participation, di-
rect or implied, in the rebellion, and is sub
ject to certain conditions which have been
| complied with. The effect of this pardon is
to relieve the petitioner from all penalties and
disabilities attached to the offence committed
by his participation in the rebellion, so far as
that offence is concerned. He is thus placed
beyond the reach of punishment of any kind.
But to exclude him by reason of that offence
from continuing in the employment, OF pre-
yiously acquired right is to enforce punish
ment for that offence, Notwithstanding the
pardon. Ii such exclusion be effected by
the execution of an expurgatory oath, cover
ing the offence, the pardon may be avoided,
and that accomplished indirectly which can
not be reached by direct legislation. 1t is
not within the constitutional power con-
gress thus to infict punishment beyond the
reach of executive clemeney. From the pc
toner, therefore, the oath required by the
act of Jan'y "a, 1865, cannot be exacted,
even were that act not subject to any other
objection than the one Just stated. 1t fol
| lows, from the views expressed, that the pray
er of the petitioner must be granted, and
the amendment to the second rule of the
| court, which requires the oath prescribed by
! the act of Jan'y "a, 1865, to be taken BY at
torneys and counselors, having been unadvis
eddy adopted, must be rescinded, and it is SC
ordered.