Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1867-09-26

considered communication, in reply 10
one of our previous articles, signed
"Bapk Teller" The author thinks our
articles are calculated to have "a bad
effect ION whom, he does not parlieu-
larly say. If they should have any bad
effect on the interests Of the country at
large, we shall be sorry for, and disposed
10 avoid it. il they should have bad
effect on the interests of brokers, BANK
ers or others, whose interests clash with
those of the country, we shall be pleased
to see il SO; though we would not VIII
lingly ipjure any mans business, without
the existence of necessity winch
commands public journalist to speak
in the interests of the community at
large. And, since we are not forgetiul
of the fact that we are liable to err, we
welcome the arguments Of others to our
columns, whose opinions, by reason OF
superior information or experience in
financial matters, may be entitled to
more respect than our own. But let the
question be settled on the weight of the
argument, rather than by authority,
which is to be respected only for what 1t
is worth.
The argument with which " Bank Tel
Ter sets out, would itselfhave convinced
us that it came from behind bank coun-
ter. if il had not been indicated by the
signature. 1t smacks of that sort Of lit
erature precisely. We mean no disre-
spect TO the author-only what we say.
He says the amount Of Indebtedness "
Is not what causes fear in an individual
or q government, but rather the appre
hension THAT his resources may fail him
az debts msy mature" In other words
one worth fifty or sixty thousand dollars
would feel tolerably easy, being indebted
hundred thousand, with the interest
running on at the rate of six, eight or
ten thousand year, if his Indebtedness
had twenty years to run before maturity,
and he was enabled to meet his current
expenses and some small notes for inte-
rest falling due in the meantime. Such
reasoning may hold good with bankers,
who estimate men much more by their
punctualiiy than by the amount of prop
erty they possess, and who hold all men
good so long as they pay. Bnt we con-
fess we should be more alarmed at the
mountain of debt, than we should on &C.
count of the grounds of apprehension of
failure to pay the smaller and more i'm
mediately maturing liabilities. Nor
should we be mnch intinidated by re.
duction of Indebtedness amounting to
twenty per cent ,at the expense of making
all our debts due on demand, if the inte-
rest exceeded the means Of payment, if
our resources were being rapidly squan.
dered, and it was doubtful whether we
could pay the whole remaining indebted
ness of eighty per cent We should say
the sooner the debt was matured and the
collection enforced the better, if the debt
was augmenting, aud in such circum.
stances we were drifting to bankruptcy
at all events. Our correspondent seems
to have no fear of the future, so the
present can take care of itself We
envy him his happy temperament But
if we intend to pay off the Government
indebtedness, we think there must be
present provision which shall stop some
of the waste, and that anything which
will reduce our Indebtedness is all right
If we were paying specie, and when
the issues of notes by the banks was only
three for one of the specie in their vaults,
and this was a sufficient supply for the
purposes of commerce. we can see very
we'll how increasing those issues to ten
for one might depreciate by imitation.
But suppose the banks to be debtors, be.
sides the amount of their notes outstand
ing, to five times that amount in bonds,
can it be reasonably pretended that their
issues will not be deprecated to an
extent nearly approaching what would
be the case if they owed the same amount
in the form of notes Will not the known
fact Of ultimate insolvency diminish con-
fidouce in them to a great extent, even
though they are not presently called on
to make payment It is not true that
currency depreeiates in the proportion
the amount issued bears to the dem and
of the market when tho basis is not
specie, but rather in proportion to the
ability to make ultimate payment. So
long as the Confederate currency was
based on hope of success, it was in fair
credit, though the market was flooded
with it. When the result Of the war was
doubtful, and it was consequently
doubted whether the North would be able
to pay the public debt, greenbacks went
down to three for one Of specie, without
so great an amount of currency on the
market as we have now. If we had the
whole public debt paid of in greenbacks
to morrow, they would be retired, and
held, as the bonds are now, by capitalists
to q very large extent, and there would