Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1867-01-12

: right OF determining upon the validity OF laws
: by the standard of the Constitution, The nb.
cessity of some such checks in the hands Of
the Executive is shown by reference to the
= most eminent writer's upon our system Of
Government, who seem to concur in the opin-
ion that encr0achments are most to be appre-
hended from the Department. in which, all
} legislative powers are vested by the COnsi-
tuition. Mr. Madison, in referring to theIdifii-
} Guilty of providing some practical secpritYfJr
each against the invasion Of the others, re-
Marks, that the Legislative department iB
everywhere extending the sphere Of its ac-
tivity, and drawing all power into its fnIpet-
! uous vortex. The founders of our Republic
seem never to have recollected the danger
from legislative usurpation which, by assem-
bling all power inthe Same hands, must leave
1T to tho same tyranny as Is threatened by exI
ecutive usurpations' III Representative re-
4 public, when the executive fIlagistracy lis
carefully limited, both in the extent and the
duration Of its power, and where the legisla.
tive power is exercised by an assembly which
is inspired by supposed influence over the
people, withan intrepid confidence in its own
strength, which is sufficiently numerous to
feel all the passions which aGtnatea q multi
tude, yet not so numerous as to 30 Incapable
of pursuing the object of its passions by
means which reason prescribes, it is against
the enterprising ambition Of this department
that the people ought to indulge all their
Jealousy and exhaust all their, PRECAUTIONS.
The legislative department. derives a sups-
Tiority in our government from other circ1n-
stances. Its constitutional powers being as
! once more extensive and less susceptible of
precise limits, it can with tie greater facili-
ty mask, under complicated and indirect
measures, the encroachments which it makes
on the coordinate departments On the 9th
er side, the executive power being restrained
within q and hpiun pln
simple in its nature, and the judiciary being
described by landmarks still less uncertain,
projects OF uSurpation by either Of these de-
paruments would Immediately betray and de,
feht themselves. Nor is this all. AS the leg
islative Department alone has access to the
pockets of the people, and has in some con-
stitutiOns, full discretion, and, in all, q pre-
yailing influence over the pecuniary rewards
of those composing other departments, a de-
| pendence is thus created in the latter which
gives still greater facility to encroaohments
of the former We have seen that the ten
-dency of republican governments is to ag.
| grandiZement of the legislative at the expense
of the other departments. -.
Mr.. Jefferson, in referring to the early Con-
stitution of Virginia, objected that by its
provisions all the powers of the Government,
Legislative, executive and judicial, resulted
to the legislative body, holding that the con-
centrating these in the same hands is precise
ly the definition of despOtic government. 1t
will be no alleviaton that these powers will
be exercised by plurality of hands, and not
by single one. One hundred aud seventy
1 three despots would surely be as oppressive
as one. And little will it avail us that they
| were chosen by ourselves. An elective des-
! potism was not the government we fought
for, but one which should not only be found.
ed ON free principles, but il, which the pow
ers of government should be SO divided and
balanced among the several bodies of magis-
tracy as that no one could transcend their le-
| gal limits without being Ctfectually checked
and restrained by the others. ....,.rr,1 IN
For tlis reason, that Convention which
| passed the ordinance of government laid its
! foundation on-this basis, that legislative, ex-
ecutive and judicial departments should be
| separate and distinct, so that no person should
exercise the powers of more than one of them
at the same time. But no barrier was pro-
Vided between these several powers. Theju-
| dietary and executive members were left de-
pendent on legislative for their subsistence
ipootice, and some of chem for their continu-
ance in it. If, therefore, the legislative as.
sumes the executive and judiciary powersgnO
opposition is likely to be made, nor, if made,
can be effectual, becanse, in that case, they
may put their proceedings into the formof
an act Of assembly, which will render them
obligatory on the other branches, They have
accordingly, in many instances, decided rights
| which should have been left to the judiciary.
| Controversy and the direction of the Execu-
tive. during the whole time of their session,
is becoming habitdal and familiar
Mr., JustlCe Story, in his commentaries ON
| the Constitution, reviews the same suljectJ
aud says g the truth is that legislative power
is the great. and oVerrnling power in every
| free government" ~ .f- ~ 7.'
Therepresentatiyes of the people will watch
| withliealousy every encroachment of the Ex-
ecutive Magistrate, for it trenches upon their
own authority. Bat who shall watch the en-
croaGhments of these representatives them
selves Will they be as Jealous of the exer-
else of power by themselves as by others
There are many reasons which may be assign
/ ed for the engrossing influence of the, ,Legis-
| lative Department. In the first place, its
constitutional powers are more extensive and
1 less capable of being brought within precise
limits than those of either of the other de-
partnients. The bounds of Executive au.
thority are easily matked ont and defined. 1t
reaches few objects, and those are known, 1t.
cannot transcend them without being brought
in contact with other departments Laws
may check and restrain and bound its exer-
else. The same remarks apply with still
greater force to the Judiciary. It's jarisdic-
tion is, or may be, bounded to few objects
or persons, or however general and unlimlt ted, !,
its operations are necessarily confined to the
mere administration of private and public
| Justice. 1t cannot punish without law. 1T
cannot create controversies to act upon. 1t
can decide only upon rights and cases asthey
are brought by others before it. 1t can do
inothing for itself. 1t must do everything for
others lIt'must obey the laws, and if it cor
rdptly administers them, is subjected to the
Epower of impeachment On the other hand
! the legislative power, except in the few cases
of constitutional prohibition, is unlimited
I It is forever varying its means and its ends
It governs the Institutions and law and puh-
4 lie policyjof the country; it regulates lifts
vast interests it disposes of all its property,
Look hut at the exercise of two ,or'three
branches ofits ordinary powers 1t, ,levies
all taxes; it directs and, appropriates- all,
4 supplies; it gives rules for the, descent and
| distribution and devises Of all property
held BY individuals; it controls the sources
and resources of wealth itchanges at itswilt
j tue whole fabric of laws; it molds at its,
pleasure almost all the institutions which
4 give strength and confort,, and Dignity to
Society Id the next place. it is the, direct,
ryisible Representatives of the Will of the peo-7
Pile in all chaugesof time and circpmstances
1t has the pride as well as power Of the num-
bers Itlis easily moved, and steadily moved,
blythe strong impulses of popular feeling and
j popular odl6fh 'ltobeys, without reluetapce,,
Chg Wishes apd VIII IF the the iAij0fity for the,
GTHe path 70 public favor He's open My BY such So 6R'
obedience, and it finds not only support butt
intntini ~ i ~ tafAvar Illa.aI REQ tha ma oritv