Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-02-02

pOrtunity TO be heard has been aI'oEded
Their admission and their exclusion ar
not the exercise of q mere minister's
power. The court Is not in this respec
The register of the edicts OF any Othe
body. 1t is the exercise of judicial pOwei
and has been so1leld in numerous cases
1t was so held BY the court Of spleeals
New York in the matter Of the spplica
tion of Cooper for admission, Attoi
neys and counsellors," said that couri
"are not only officers of the colTt, bu
officers whose duties relate almost exclu
sively to proceedings of Judicial nature
and hence their appointment may, VIII
proprietv, be entrusted to the courts; an'
the latter, in performing this duty, ma
very Justly be considered as engaged il
the exercise of their appropriate jadieia
| f1nctions.n In lsx parte secomb, a man
damus to the suIreme court of the terri
tory of Minnesota 10 Vacate an order re
moving an attorney and counsellor wa'
| denied by tAis court on the ground thai
the removal was judicial act.
We are not aware Of any case says
the court, "where a mandamus was
| issued to an inferior tribunal command
| ing it to reverse or annul its decision,
where the decision was in its nature a
judicial act, and within the scope of its
Jurisdiction and diss,retion." And in the
same case the court observed that II
has been well settled by the rules and
practice of ccmmon-law courts that 1t
rests exclusively with the court to de-
termine who is qualified to become one
of its officers. as an attorney and coun-
sellor, and for what cause he ought to be
removed.u The attorney and COUNSEL
lor, being by the solemn Judicial act OF
the court clothed with his office, does not
hold il as mater of grace and favor /;
the right which il confers upon aim to
appear for suitors, and TO argue cases, is
something more than mere indul-
gence, revokable at the pleasure of the
court or at the command of the legisla-
ture it is right of which be can only
be deprived by the Judgment OF
the court for moral or profes-
siOnal delinquency. The legislature
may undoubtedly prescribe qualifications
for the office, with which he must con-
form, as it may, where it has exclusive
Jurisdiction, prescribe qualifications for
the pursuit of any Of the ordinary avo-
cations of life but to constitute a quail
fication, the condition or thing prescribed
must be attainable, in theory at east, by
every one. That which from the nature
of things, or the past condition or con-
duct of the party, cannot be attained Dy
every citizen, does not fall within the
definition Of the term. To all those by
whom it is unattainable it is a dsqualifi-
cation which operates as perpetual bar
to the office. The question in this case
is not as to the power of congress to pre-
scribe qualifications, but whether that
power has been exercised as a means for
the infiiction Of punishment against the
prohibition of the constitution. That
this result cannot be effected Indirectly
by a state under the form Of creating
qualifications, we have held in the case
of Cummings VS.. the State of Missouri,
and the reasoning upon which that con-
clusion was reached applies equally to
similar action on the part of congress,
These views are further strengthened
by a consideration Of the effect of the
pardon produced by the petitioner and
the nature of the pardOning power OF the
president. The constitution provides
that the president shall have power to
grant reprieves and pardOns for Oftenses
against the United States, except in cases
of impeachment.n The power thus con-
ferred is unlimited, with the exception
stated; it extends to every otfense known
TO the law, and may be exercised at any
time after its commission, either before
legal proceedings are taken, or during
their tendency, or after conviction and
Judgment. This power of the president
is not subject to legislative control. Con-
gress can neither limit the effect of his
pardon nor exclude from its exercise any
class of offenders. The benign prerOga-
tive of mercy reposed in him cannot be
fettered by any legislative restriction.
Such being the case, the inquiry arises
as to the effect and operation Of a pardon.
On this point all the authorities concur
pardon reaches both REIMBURSEMENT
prescribed for the offense and the guilt OF
the offender, and when the pardon Is full
it releases the punishment and olots out
of existence his guilt, so thai in the eye
Of the law the offender is as innocent as
if he had never committed the Otfense. II
granted before conviction, 1T prevents any
of the penalties and disabilities consequent
upon conviction from attaching. lfgrant-
ed after conviction, it removes the penal
ties and disabilities, and restores him tC
all his civil rights. 1t makes him, as il
were, new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity. There is only thi:
Limitation to its operation 1t does moi
restore offices forfeited, or property OF
/
of the conviction and Judgment The
pardon produced by the petitioner is &
| full pardon for all offenses 10y him com
mitted arising from participation direp
or implied in the rebellion, and ia subJee
! 10 certain conditions which have beeI
complied with. The effect Of this pardon
Is to relieSe the petitioner from al pen
| alties an n disabilities attached to The
offense fnmitted by his participationiI
the reh.fion. So far as that offense i
concerned he is thus placed beyond th'
reach of punishment of any kind; but L
exclude him by reason Of that ofiens'
from continuing in the enjoyment q
previously acquired rights Is to enforce
punishment for that Ottense, nQtWlth
standing the pardon, If such eKelusl@l
can be effected by the execution OF al
expurgatory oath covering the offense
the pardon may be avoided, and that &C
complished indirectly which cannot b
reached by direct legislation. II is no
within the constitutional power of con
gress thus to infliet punishment Geyon'
the reach of executive olelnency.
From the petitioner, therefore, the oau
! required by the act of January "a, 1865
cannot be exacted, even were that ac
not subject to any other objection, thai
the one just stated. 1t follows, from tn
views expressed, that the prayer Of tn
petitioner must be granted,
The case of r. H. Mari ia similar In it
main features TO that Of the petitioner
and his must be granted; and tn
amendment TO the second rule OF tn
ceurt, which requires the oath prescribe
by the act of January "a, 1863, 10 b
taken by attorneys and caunsellors haV
ing been Gnadvisedly adopted, must b
rescinded, and it is so ordered.