The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-10-26
France and the Pope.

In spite Of the paclnc news HOh ais, ~ 40
unite evident the Roman question is not set
lied. We predicted fortnight ago that
France would certainly not allow the move
ment against Rome to be consummated with
ont Interfering. This has been already con-
6rmed. We also predicted the Italian Govern
,pentwould be unable to enforce the September
convention and put down Garibaldians, even
II Il were desirous of doing so; and whether
we were right in this anticipation still remains
to be proved, but all appearances thus far are
in its favor. The story that the Pope intends
to ay to Bavaria or England in case the insur-
gents reach Rome, is probably not true. The
experiment would perhaps have been safe
one in l849 but it would be in the highest
degree dangerous Just now. In 1849 there
was a strong chance of his being brought back
from exile; to-day there would be almost none.
His greatest friend, Austria, has since then
received mortal blow, and is 80 little able to
befIiend him that she is at this moment un-
successfully endeavoring to defend the last
conCOrdat against her own subjects.
Spain, the only other great Catholic power
in Europe is not able to help or harm any
body and perhaps the last thing in the Roman
imbroglio which concerns France is the Pope's
personal comfort or local habitation. So
foolish as to leave Rome now, he could only
come back again in virtue of an arrangement
with Victor Emanuel, ''the subalpine king"
whom he cursed handsomely only two or three
weeks ago. and this would be greater humilia-
ton than his Holiness could possibly bear.
The report that, come what will, he will not
quit Rome, is therefore probably the true one,
and there is enough of the melodramatic even
In Pho Nono's composition to make it not un-
he lnbr hp Of
the Garibaldians into Rome by taking refuge
in the catacombs from which "Christianity
first issued eighteen hundred years ago."
AS long as he stays in Rome, too, he fur
nishes France, which is the only power likely
to interfere, with an excuse for interfering,
and France is likely to interfere-in fact, by
the last accounts, is interfering, but not fol-
ecclesiastical reasons. France is not Catho
lie power in the proper sense of the term
There is in France no State religion. All de-
nominations occupy the same position before
the law, and whatever appearance of honor OF
consideration the Catholic Church may enjoy
is due to the fact that the 'chief of the State'i
and the majority of the people belong to it.
The title of ''the eldest son of the Church, -
which the Emperor loves to claim and the
Pope is not unwilling to bestow, is a relic of
the feudal time which, since the Revolution,
has been simply absurd.
The 'eldest SOM in France is no longer a
pIlNlleSeu peTSOu, duu ln6 OQurCn, OF course,
knows no distinctions of her own making be-
tween her children. The original interference
on behalf of the Pope, in 1849, was in reality
not due to any particular solicitude about the
Papacy on the part of any portion of the
French public. Those of the peasantry who
are still strongly influenced by the priests are
not very powerful body, and the religious
fervor is not strong enough to fill their heads
with any very marked ideas on foreign policy,
much less to cause them to press a particular
foreign policy ON the Government. In
the French army there is probably
no potentate held in less respect than his
Holiness, nor any one who adorns a greater
number OF barrack-room jokes, and few SER
vices could have been more distasteful to the
troops than the Roman expedition. 1t was
undertaken avowedly not in the interest of re
ligion, but of French influence in Italy
Austria had under the leadership of Radetski
recovered from her reverses, and, after Novara
there was no question of her driving out GAR
baldi and occupying Rome as we'll as tn
Marches. The French expedition was, there
fore, simply the first French protest agains
the treaties of 1915, which gave Italy int
Austrian hands, aVowedly as a check OF
French influence at the South.
When Napoleon drove Austria out of Italy
he really removed the cause which first tool
the French army to Rome, and he was thus
enabled to prepare the way for a total with
drawal as well as what it was that led him t
intervene on behalf of Italian independence
will probably remain forever a mystery. Nc
analysis of his character or of his aims ha
ever explained them. His Carbonaro reminis
cenCes, and the fear of assassination inspired
by the Orsini attempt, have done duty as tn
real cause, in hundred articles and brochures
but they have probably never satisfied dozel
intelligent readers. The theory that he wen
to Italy because his dynasty needed to b
Cemented by the blood of successful war, ant
Austria was easier to beat than any othe
enemy that offered, is probably the neares
approach that has been made to the soluuo
OF the problem. But whatever the cause til
logical result of his success was the evacuatio
OF Rome, and the evacuation of Rome was,
lar as his relations with France were COZ
cerned, the crowning error of long series.
In the hrst place, there is no people
Europe for whom Frenchmen have less syn
pathy or esteem than for the Italians. The
hate the English, and they do not like Il
Germans and Russians, but the Italians tn,
both hate and despise. They do not belle
in their capacity for selfgovernment, or
their military prowess, or in anything belon
ing to them but their music; and their dislil
OF seeing Austria lording it in Italy was tw
thirds due to the fact that Austria was doil
what all Frenchmen felt France, if anybod
was entitled to do. The other third was d.
we are bound to say ito the hearty dete
tation which every Frenchman feels in
very bones for the spectacle of dishonest, i
capable, badly organized, and oppressive go
ernment.
In the second place, the occupation of Ron
was not by any means disagreeable to any b
II