The Evansville journal. [volume] (Evansville, Ind.) 1866-1870, 1867-01-10

Of the people. there is danger Of it
pressing with destructive weight upOI
all other parts of the machinery o
government. It has, therefore, beer
thought necessary by the most skillfu
and most experienced artists in the
science of civil policy that strong bar
riers should be erected for the pro,
lection and security of the other
necessary powers of government
Nothing has been deemed more fl
and expedient for the purpose than
the provision that the heal. of the
Executive Department should be sc
constituted as to secure a requisite
share of independence, and that he
should have negative upon the pass
ing of laws, and that the Judiciary
power, resting on still more perma
nent basis, should have the right Of
determining upon the validity Of laws
by the standard of the Constitution.
The necessity of some such checks IN
the hands of the Executive is shown
by reference to the most emlnen t
writer's upon our system of Gov
eminent, who seem to concur IN the
opinion that encroachments are most
to be apprehended from the depart
ment in which all legislative powers
are vested by the Constitution.
Mr.. Madison, in referring to the
difficulty of providing some practical
security for each against the invasion
of the other, remarks: The legisla-
tive department is every where extend
ing the sphere of it's activity, and
drawing all power into its impetuous
vortex. The founders Of our Repub-
lie seem to have recollected the dang,
er from legislative usurpation, which,
by assembling all the power in the
same hands, must lead to the same
tyranny as is threatened by the Elk
ecutive usurpations. In a represen-
.tatiye republic, where the executive
magistracy iso carefully limited, both
In the extent and the duration of its
power, and where the legislative pow
er is exercised byan assembly which
is Inspired by Supposed influence
over the people, with anintrepid con-
-fdence in its own Strength. which is
sufficiently numerous to feel all the
passions which actuate a multitude,
yet not so numerous as to be In
capable of pursuing the objects of its
passions by the means which reason
pr cribes. a eiataor-.stH
1t is against the enterprising ambis
ton of this department that the peo-
pie ought to indulge all their jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions.
The legislative department derives a
in our Government from
other circumstances. Its constitu-.
tional powers being at once more ex-
tensive and less susceptible of pre-
else limits, it can, with the greater
facility, mask, under complicated and
indirect measures, the encroachments
which it makes on the coordinate
On the other side, the
Executive power being restrained
within a narrower compass, and being
more simple in its nature, and the
Judiciary being described by land
marks still less uncertain, projects by
either of these departments would
Immediately betray and defeat them
selves. Nor is this all. As the legis-
lative department alone has access to
the pockets of the people, and has, in
some Constitutions, full discretion,
and in all, prevailing influence over
the pecuniary rewards Of those who
are joined with the other depart
ments; dependence is thus created
in the latter, which gives still greater
facility to entertainments of the for
mer
We have seen that the tendency of
Governments is to an ag-
grandizement of the legislative at the
expense of the other departments.
Mr.. Jefferson. in referring to the early
Constitution, of Virginia, objected
that by its provisions all the powers
of government, legislative, executive,
and judicial ,,resulted to the legislative
body. Z"
Holding that the concentrating of
these in the same hands is precisely
the definition Of despotic government,
it will be no alienation that these
powers will be exercised by plurali-
ty Of hands, and not by single one.
One hundred and seventy-three des-
pots would surel y be as oppressive as
one.
AS little as it will avail us that they
are chosen by ourselves, an elective
despotism was not the Government
we fought for, but one which should
not only be founded on free principles,
but in which powers of Government
should be so divided and balanced
among the several bodies of the mag
istracy as no one could transcend
their legal limits without being effect
ually checked and restrained by the
others.
For this reason that convention
which passed the ordinance of gov
eminent, laid its foundations on this
basis, that the legislative, executive,
and judiciary departments should be
and distinct, so that no
narsnn shnnld exercisa the nnwnrs nf