The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1867-04-04

anshor s,id his army amounted to ii ,OOo
,om More than 5000 of them were IN
Hattie conveyed on trains, the first OF
,nh;cb arrived at Manassas Friday evening
ad tho last about noon on Sunday. nc
Ja,antion of the remainder was due 10 VI,
uretcbed mismanagemcnt of the ra,lioau
tins The only collision occurred o ss..,
Sor n;obt of n train bearing the oiA.h
N:r,h carolina regiment ana an Empty
ono returning. The regincn. was s".i w
ono naacbed Manassas station sunday
ou, and took part IN the battle.
III brigade, on another train, passed
L" The place of collision soon after the
oocnrreuce, and reached Manassas station
coon after noon on Sunday. The facts prove
that the track was not INSTRUCTED, at least
not seriously. None of the troops were left
without any provision for their suoslst-
encc. If any of them suffered for want oil
| food, it was in consequence OF throwing
| away their rations-then not unusnal OH
march. We left Winchester with as huch
nrov;sions as we had the means OF trans
| nortino and had enough for two DAYS aitef
| The arrival of the troops at Manassas on
| Monday. The author asserts that all thc
remaining troops (JackSon's infantry Deing
nlaced on trains) were retained at RED
mont two days without food. These troops
cot TO Piedmont Friday afternoon, and the
battle BEGAN Sunday morning, not much
more than one marching day after the ar
rival at Piedmont. About $500 OF the
II 600 at which he estimates the Army oil
the Shenandoah, were engaged IN the pat
tic therefore but Zoo could have been
detained al Piedmont. The fact that these
troone were two days in marching twenty
ttrpe miles, from Winchester to Piedmont,
shows that they could not have marchsu
thirtv-faur niles from Piedmont 10 inc
scene of action in less than two days, anu
that the only hope of getting them il'o 'ho
battle was by the railroad.
Pages 2ls-l6: "The plan of battle when WIS
adoptcd, after the designs OF Inc enemy MeIs
fnIly disclosed, was worthy OF the genius Oh
Raanregard. who suggested, and OF Johnston,
| who accepted it. This was TO seha the tWoie-
| serve brigades which We're al hand 10 sustali,
| the shock upon the left, and to enaoie th''
| wing of the army TO hold its ground Tor 4 'iihe,
w,hiIa Tho centre and right were advanced
| across Bull run, and swung around INTO Il Pc
| sition parallel 10 the enemys nneOi Hhsi Ili'
| toward the Stone bridge, with the view Oh as
sailing their rear guard ana theil i''Ie u '0'"
muncation al Centreyille.
"The plan of battle so eXtolled by tne
author was made impractlcable by NC
Dowell's turning movement, ana therefore
was abandoned, when the "designs OF the
enemy were fully disclosed" The move
mentS Of Bee and Jackson to the LETT, so
far from being the consequence OF the ais,
closure of the enemy'S plans, preceded
that discovery indeed, it was Bees en-
counter with the Federal army which re-
vealed TO me its designs, and "such re-
Inducements as could be spared from the
centre and right" were then ordered 10
hasten to the firing. The plan the author
srpposcs and admires would have kept our
centre and right (Six brigades) out OF ac-
ton. and enabled the Federal army to
crush the other three. Centrevllle was
| three and half miles north of our centre
ON Bull run, and the field of battle was a
| mile and half south of our original lett
ON Bull run: so that il is clear that the
troops which might have moved to Centre,
Vile in the beginning Of the action could
| by no possibility have reached the held IN
time TO take part in it, but would have as
sisted Mcdowell in his turning operation,
and made it impossible to prevent DIS
seizure OF our depot at Manassas.
Pages 2l6-l-: THE two generals dispatched
the order for this movements w Nit NO'''t'''''
ers of the right and centre, and then sailopea
for the scene OF action.
Not orders for the movement supposed,
but countermanding it, and directing
troops from the centre and right TO march
rapidly to the fight.
pooa 2l7: as and Beauregard aftcl
nstsuing in anxious suspense 10 hear ms guns
omen upon the heights of Centrevllle, until the
| day and the battle were too far advanced loi
any other resort, relinqulshed the hoNeinen II =
| y + The only tactics which remained IoT NV
| Confederate generals We're 10 bring up Snci
| achievements rs could be spared from ths
| centre and right, successiVely.
General Bcauregard could not have listen
ed for the opening OF guns on the heights
Of Ccntreville, for none had been sent
there. McDowell's turning movement was
revealed by Bee not earlier than lOl2. l.
the centre and right had then been ordered
10 Centreville, as the author states, they
could not have reached it much ut at all
before 2 p. NJ. If those troops had then
been ordered into the action, they could not
have Joined in it it would have been toe
late. AS it was, of the three and hal
brigadeS ordered up, two were too late
although those orders were dispatched a
least as early as i o'clock A. NJ.
This account of the battle does great In
Justice to General Beauregar'i and to Bee
and Early's brigades and their command
ers. General Jackson's great fame is II
no degree enhanced by such disparage
ment of his associates.
Page $50: "The pursuit of the enemy wa
. not continued beyond CentreSille, ana TN
was the first error which made the laurels o
! the Confederate army, so fair 10 the eye, OAR
rem of substantial fruit 1t was accounted 10
in part by the paucity of cavalry but TIN
! excuse was no Justification, because the cav
airy in hand OF which only two compahle
had been engaged in the actual combat, wa
not pertinacously pressed after the fugitiVes
but paused even before it met with any soli'
resistance upon them"
The substantial fruit" of this victory
was the preservation of the Confederacy
No more could have been hoped for. The
pursuit of the enemy was not continued
because our cavalry "a very small force
) was driven back by the solid resistance
of the United States infantry. Its rea
guard was an entire division, which hat
not been engaged, and was twelve o
fifteen times more numerous than our tw'
little bodies of cavalry. The infantry wa
not required to continue the pursuit, be
cause ii would have been haraSSing 1t t
: no purpose. 1t is well known that in
fantry unencumbered by baggage trains cal
easily escape pursuing cavalry. Ma
poleon's victories of LutZen and BautZel
are strong instances. l maintain that
considering the relative strength of the
belligerents, the southern people could no
have hoped for more substantial fruits
of this victory. The defeat of the Con
| r. lano.o ,r,,, u,nrl5 baya involved thI