The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-02-13
How to Purify the Corruption at Har-
riSburQ.


during a session of the Legislature, they will
well remember the mysterious beclzonings into
corners, the whispered questions as to, what
he wants ''put through" and the assurance
that it can be done ''if he will only make it
all right" If there is anything calculated to
disgust our honest men with elective govern
ment, it is visit to that centre of small cor
ruption, and an interview with the iobbers and
lobbyists who throng the halls of legislation.
There is no use of pretending virtuous indig-
nation, nor yet of shutting our eyes against
that which, however much to be regretted,
exists. What we now need is a remedy, and
remedy which will be effective and perma-
nent is difficult matter to secure.
There seems, however, to be a way of
escaping from the power of these corrupt
Representatives. The class who indulge in
this sort of business-for there are many who
make it business-is divided into the lobbyists
or outsiders, and the Legislators or officials.
The size of our Legislature is such as to hold
forth a powerful inducement to bribery. The
House consists of one hundred members and
the Senate of thirty-three. On every question
on which there is any difference of opinion, the
Senate must be tolerably equally divided, so
that three or four votes will either pass or de-
feat any public or private bill. The con-
sequences are, that if there be two corrupt
members of the Senate, they have a full oppor-
tunity of plying their trade of black mail
utterly regardless of truth or decency
and almost certainly escape detection.
In the House of Representatives the same
is true to a greater extent, and as the
price of vote is lower, it is easy to purchase
a greater number. The result is that to be
a member of the State Legislature is to expose
yourself to unjust suspicious, and to be
brought in contact with the lowest and vilest
kind of political chicanery. The corruption at
Harrisburg is seldom sufi ciently large in any
one instance to reach any show of respect
ability, but is so petty, so small, as to be only
denominated thieving Wethink that all this evI
can be remedied By increasing the number ofmembers
ofthe Legislature. If, instead ofhaving one hun
dred and thirty three, we were to have five or
six hundred, there would be no chance for cor
ruption, or, at least, the reward for the pur-
chase of one vote would be so small as to re-
move all inducements to bribery.
This idea is acted upon in nearly all the
New England States. The Legislature of New
Hampshire numbers over five hundred, and
that of Vermont and Maine almost as large a
number. In Massachusetts, every town is en-
titled to delegate, and we never hear of cor
ruption to any extent being practised. If for
every county there were to be five or six, in
stead of one or two members, we would hold
out the strongest inducement to honesty by
removing all hoped-for benefits from crime. 1t
may be answered that the expense of such a
cumbersome body would be enormous; but let
it be considered whether it does not cost the
people more to engineer all the bills through
the present corrupt organization, than it would
TO honestly pay larger number for doing
46h,~ legitimate duty. We are strongly in
favor OF this reform, SIN the multitude of
-oounselors there is safety, " and we hope to see
the day when our Legislature will be of such
size as to render all purchasing of votes futile.
We have proposed a remedy, so far as the
prevention of bribery is concerned; let us now
aim at its detection. AS our laws now read,
both he who offers and he who receives a bribe
are amenable to punishment. The conse-
quence is that league is established between
them, and an inducement held out to both to
profess ignorance. If pressed to the WALL
,either can refuse to testify for fear OF crimi-
mating himself, and the matter is forever
hushed up We propose that the law be so
amended as to make it criminal for man to
receive a bribe, but not for man to offer one
We grant that any one who would attempt to
influence public servant by such means de-
serves punishment; but if the punishment was
reserved for one party, it would make him
suspicious, and enable the public to de-
tect the guilty representative, either by in
ducing the briber to turn States evidence or
by securing proof of completely by means oil
such deooy as is used in the Post Once 10
detect thieves. Under any circumstances, we
think that the result would be beneficial.
the proposed reform were to be adopted, we
cannot but believe that much of the corrup-
ton which now disgraces our State capital
would be remedied, and an honest man not be
Obliged to hesitate before he takes a seat in
body with an almost disreputable reputation.
A Test Measure.