Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-05-01


some for the worse, of the old one. II
retained the old plan Of election OF the
President; and Of course the sane
mod es OF nomination and election would
continued under it. The loss OF
ID e power Of removal from Office, WITH
out cause, except in a small number OF
cases. would have diminished by at least
ope.haIf. the evils OF the system and
the increased length of the Presidents
term OF service was also an improve
mept. But the President would stlli
even after these changes, have welded
an immense power OF patronage q
the war proved, by many examples, that
the system Of reward by profitable con-
tracts, that is, by agreeing, for q eonsid-
Grafton or share, to the robbery OF the
Treasury to a certain amount above fair
prices, had been transferred in full
vipeur from one Government to the
other. Meanwhile, q way was opened
for the increase Of the Executive infiu-
enee, by the permissible admission Of
the Secretaries to sit in both Houses
of Congress, without the adoption Of
that other feature Of the English Con-
stftution, by which the Ministry resigns
upon a vote Of want Of confidence by
the House Of Commons
1t would be better to have a President
selected by lot, taking ali the chances Of
ineompetency, with a responsible Caoi-
net. than one elected by the people with
= cabinet irresponsible. A system is
tested by its working and it is imPossi-
BILE for D to work worse than 7 has
To give the irresponsible ministry Of an
irresponsible President, who deems him
self the peculiar representative OF the
people. seats in the House and Senate,
would be to a~ggrayate all the evils.
The country will probably, for some
time hereafter, have successful Generals
for Presidents. These may or may not
be statesmen. It does not follow that
thew will not. General LEE would have
made a better P-residentthan MI. DAVIS;
any General taken at a venture, than
Mr.. LINCOLN. At least, owing little 20
the machinery o. party, they wOuldh have
been likely to. be upright and honest,
and weU-intentioned, if not able. But
| the time will soon come again when the
small politicians will combine and Gluten
at power. and then the day OF third-rate
Presidents, tools of party and Of party
| leaders, will recommends.
We NAV as well begin to u~ndecelVe
ourselves. We nave been long enough
in q state Of halIucination. We have
long enough hattered ourselves that we
had the best government In the world,
because we had abundant individual
license, and did plenty Of voting, and
enioyed the profits thst come for a time
from mismanagement Of affairs. The
iron hand of government was long
F. gloved with velvet. 1t has clutehed Us
at last, without the glove, and the blood
hiss flowed and the bones have cracked.
We have enjoyed the luxnries Of martial
law and Jettres de cGehet, merciless con-
scriptions, and unconstitutional acts Of
Congress to Iegalize the brutal usurps-
lions Of Despotism.
No superficial reform in relation to the
| Chief Magistracy will cure the disease.
It is organic-of the heart. If some
mode cannot be invented, by which he
! shall cease to be the representative Of
s party, better at ace have 8 King. Of
! all possible modes Of selecting him, that
by party-eaucus, packed and corrupt, is
infinitely the worst. The red Indians
and the bees do better than that. Apes
could not do worse.
No men of straw interposed, in the
/ shape of Electors, whose voting is mere
empty farce, can effect any good. No
system will answer, unless he is elected
by the States, each State having one
vote. Opinions may well differ as to the
/ manner in which that vote should be
/ cast. 1t should, at any rate, not be by
! the people for the excitement and sgi-
tation Of popular elections connected
with the Presidency should be wholly
avoided. Faction would still be king.
In our opinion, the wisest plan would be
| this that each State should nominate
two persons, one 8 citizen Of itself, and
! one a citizen Of some other State that
| this nomination should be made by the
| Governor, and c~0ncurred in by two
| thirds of the State Senate in secret SEES
| sion that the names Of all the persons
so nominated should be transmitted
| under seal, to the President of the Sen
ate Of the United States, the seals be
broken by him in the presence Of the
| Senate, in secret session, and a register
made of the nominations that each
name should then be written on 8 sepa.
rate ticket, or numbered, and the num-
bers placed on counters, and these
placed in an urn, from which two should
be drawn in succession by 8 child: thai
the person whose name was first drawn
shOald be the President, and he whose
name was drawn next, the Nice-Presi'
dent, unless he were a citizen Of the
same State as the former, in which case
another name should be drawn, unit.
one appeared, Of a citizen Of a different
State.
BY this mode, al the evils Of a popu,
lar election would be avoided theirs
could be no candidates, no pledges, nc
promises Of reward, no agitation and
the Independence OF the President on al
external influences would be as far a:
possible secured while at the same time
each State would have an equal chance
Of securing one Of the offices for s citizen
Of itself; the names presented would be
likely to be those of men worthy to be
President, especially those presented by
States whereof they were not citizens
and although a combination might be
formed for all the States except one to
present the same person as one Of their
candidates, yet, as his name should be
placed upon only one ticket. counter or
ballot, by however many States pre-
scented, the chances against him would
be too numerous for such a combination
to pay and it would therefore probably
be never resorted to, o if it were, it
would seldom, ifever, succeed, and would
not be often repeated.
It IS true that inferior men might
sometimes be selected under this sys-
TEN but this would not occur 50 fire.
quently as if political csbals nominated
and the populace elected. However di-
vided the country might be into parties,
men Of all parties would be nominated,
as the same party would never be in the
majority in all the States. And as it
would thus be uncertain 10 which party
the President would belong, the prospect
Of Presidential patronage would no
longer attract more recruits to the stand
ard Of the stronger party, than the ex-
celIence Of its principles.
The President thus becoming strictly
the representative of the States, and it
being wholly uncertain from what polit-
zeal party he would come, that feature Of
the English Constitution might be en-
bodied in ours, by which a vote Of want
Of confidence by the House Of Commons
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