Prescott journal. [volume] (Prescott, Wis.) 1861-1871, 1867-12-14

rum and disgrace. Pablo creditors
and taxpayers are alike interested in
an honest administration of the finan.
ces, and neither class will long endure
the large handed robberies OF the re-
cent past. For this disereditable state
of things there are several causes. -
Some of the taxes are so laid as TO pre-
sent an irresistible temptation to evade.
by the payment of the great sums,
which officers way well receive by con
nivance at fraud, aud create a pressure
which is more than the virtue OF many
can withstand, and there eau he NO
doubt that the open disregard aud con
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS aroused by some
of the highest aud most infiuantiaT men
IN the country, has greatly weakened
the moral sense Of those wha serve in
places, The expenses of
the United States, including interest
on the public debt, are more than SIX
times as much as they were seven years
ago. To collect aud. disburse this vast
amount requires careful supervision
as well as systematic vigilance.
THE TENURE OF OFFICE BILL.
The system, never perfected, was
much dlsorgnnizsd by the Tenure az
Office bill, which has almost destroyed
official accountability. The president
may be thoroughly convinced that 40
officer is incapable. dishonest or ia
faithful to tho constitution, but under
the law which | have named, his ut
most endeav0r Is to complain to the
Senate, aud ask the privilege of sup
plying his place with better man. III
the senate be regarded as personally or
politically hostile to the president, 1t is
natural aud not altogether unreasona
BILE for the officer to expect that 1t will
take his part as far as possible; restore
him to his place, and give him tri-
umph over his executive superior Off
Ger. He has other chances of impunity
arising from accidental defects OF
evidence made in investigating it,,
and the secrecy of the hearing 1t is
not wonderful that official maifeasance
should become bold in proportion as
delinquents learn to think themselves
safe. / am entirely persuaded that un-
der such rule the President cannot
perform the great duty assigned to him
of seeing the laws faithfully executed
and that it dsables him most espsci tiIv
from enforcing that rigid accountability
which Is necessary to the due execu
ton of the revenue. The constitution
invests the President with authority to
decide whether "a removal shall bs made
in any given case. The act of Congress
declares in substance, that he shall only
accuse such as he supposes to he un-
-
makes him sole judge IN the premises,
but the statute takes away his jdrisdic-
ton and transfers it to the Senate, and
leaves him nothing bat the odIous and
sometimes impTacticable duty OF be
coming prosecutor. The prose-
cutiOn is To be conducted before
a tribunal whose members SFe not, like
him, responsible to the whole people,
but to separate constituent bodies, aud
who may hear his accusation with
great disfavor. The senate is ALSO.
lntely without any known standard of
decision applicable To such 8 case. It's
Judgment cannot he anticipate 4, for it
IS not governed by any rule. The law
does not define what shall he deemed
good cause for removal. Ii is ImpOs-
sibie even to conjecture what may or
may not be so cousided by the senate.
The nature of the subject forbids clear
proof ii the charge be lncapacity. What
will support itf Fidelity to
the constitution may be understood or
Ia thousand different
ways, and by violent party men ia
violent party times, unfaithfulness
to the constitution may even
come TO be considered meritorious.
Ii an officer be accused Of dishonesty.
now shall it be made out9 Will it be
from acts unconnectei with
public duties from private history, or
from general reput ltlOn? or must the
President await the commission of an
actual misdemeaaor in office? Shall he
in the meantime risk the character aud
OF the nation in the hands OF
men to whom ne cannot give his conf
denceP Must he for6ear his complaint
II ntil the mischief is done and cannot
be prevented? LII his zeal IN the pub
lie service should impel him to antici-
pate an overt act, must he move at 10
peril OF being tried himself for the
otfense OF slandering his subordinate?
In the present circumstances of the
some one must be held respon-
sible for official delinquencies of every
kind. 1t is extremely difficult ID say
where that responsibility should be
thrown, il 1t be not left where it has
been placed by the Constitution;
but all just men will admit that the
President ought to be entirely relieved
from such sponsibility, ii he cannot
meet it by reason of restrictions placed
by law upon his actions. Unrestricted
power of removal from office Is very
great one to be trusted even to a mag
lstrate chosen by the general suffrage
of the whole people, and accountable
directly to them for has acts. 1t is IN
doubtedly liable to abuse, and at some
periods of our history, perhaps, has
been abused. Ii it be thought desirable
and constitutional that it should be so
limited as to make the President mere
ly a common informer against other
public agents, he should at least be
permitted TO act in that capacity before
some open tribunal, independent of
party politics, ready to investigate
the merits of every case, furnished with
means of taking evidence, and bound
to decide according to an established
rule. This would guarantee the safety
of the acCuser when he acts in good
faith, and at the same time secure the
rights of the other party. / speak, of
course, with all proper respect for the
present senate, bat it does not seem to
me that any legislative body can be so
as to insure its fitness for
these functions. It is not the theory
of this government that the public Off
ces are the property OF those who hold
them. They are given merely as a
trust for the public benefit; sometimes
for fixed period, sometimes during