Delaware tribune. [volume] (Wilmington, Del.) 1867-1877, 1867-12-19

10 the Court until after it had pronounced
the opinion adverse to the Civil Rights Act
g That there was what may be properly
termed, in view of the vast importance of
the question, an argument as to the con
of the Civil Rights Act
Judge Gilpin must be pained to observe
the intimate manner in which these erro-
neous statements are connected with his
Opinion. We had rsther anticipated indeed,
that upon observing this intimacy, which
has evidently been intended by the printers
to create the impression that these irrcs-
ponsible statements are part OF Judge
Gilpln's own work, that he might have
thought it desirable to request the news
papers to signify the fact that they were
not The obscure manner of publication,
however, has not perhaps attracted his at
tention.
But whatever may be the fact in respect |
to this, it is true that these prefxed and APP
pended statements are incorrect in the two
points specified. That Berry was the pros
ecuting witness was fact known to all the
Court, before the pronouncing of the Opin
ion, an6 it is evident that it was so, because
the Judge, after concluding upon the I'M
constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act,
proceeded at once to decide the admission
of Bcrry's evidence, on the ground of his
being the prosecuting witness. Nor was
there any argument previous to the Opln-
ion, Mr.. Diapers defense of the Act being
of the bricfcst possible character, not cab-
crate, moi exhaustive, and not intended 50
to be- To term the brief consideration Civ
en- to il an argument is a plain misuse
of language.
To come, then, to the chief point in Judge
Gilpin's opinion. He does not deny, it
must be distinctly noticed, that the Civil.
Rights Act may be Constitutional, for the
main part. But the argument is that though
the National Authority may set aside State
Law, in reference to inequality of punish
meni, or in other respects, it cannot assume
to control or regulate " The admission of cy-
idencc in State Courts" 1t would almost
appear indeed, from the opening portions of
his argument, that Judge Gilpin cntcrtains
t the impression that the admission Of wit
ness TO testify depends upon the uncontrolled
will of the Court, and that he may be re-
jected or heard, just as the Judges prefer
ence may suggest. Of course this is MOI
true. Witnesses are heard, according l.
Tar, or if they he incompetent, aHlfr tn
j laW, they must be rejected The Judg,
= has no discretion. lie is bound by the Law
: in this as in every other procedure.
" Whether the witness be incompetent or moi
We according TO the rules Of law, is the onl
: point for his judgment.
To come, then, to the law, in respect 1
the admission of colored Witnesses, in prose
BUTTONS against white man. The act Of thi
= State requires their rejection, except wher
no competent white witness was present
= The Civil Rights Act, in pursuance Of III
: second clause of the 18th amendment to III
National Constitution, abnuis the Stat
. Law, sets it aside, repeats it. In this re
= spect the latter no longer exists, and til
:, rule binding the Court TO admit or reject
: witness is the ordinary common law rul,
. in which color is no disqualification.
ing el'ci '"e'ioe ii'a.eiiahs eiis a. " u
+ s1ofe u 'he aoiis'itolson'' Aiiiciu'heht-
I'd iio says ne his' sco'ioii ,'iaArs 'he y
he gro iace iiec' ~ uocs ho'hihs hiore.
On ms win aii uue aeieiehee' Is SAD,
it. tal mistake. The language Of the claus
ut ny us Simple citation SHOWS 'he erfof'-
'ir Neither slavery nor involuntary ser
We ihue' except us punishment Tor crii
G; WHEREOF tae parry shail nave ncch cohVi
We :, co. SHee" efsse S'th'h tne .hllea states
er- any pace s,iplcci 70 'le'f jutlsu'c.lon'
MARX inc iahguage--sliaii eAls''
~ ehos hesr" slavery Oh course. lhat Is
=, hrst eilect. out hot maj alohe-H 90d'