Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-03-13
THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION LAW.

THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
RECONSTRUCTION LAW.
The extraordinary assumption ofpower
by Congress which lies at the root Of the
m ;litary reeonstrnction law enacted over
the veto Of the President-the despotic
character of the military governments
which it sets up in ten Of the States Of
the Union-the onerous conditions which
are imposed upon the work Of reconstruc-
tion-the disabilities that are to be en-
forced in all preliminary proceedings, are
features which have induced a number Of
Southern exchanges to recommend that the
constitutionality Of this measure be tested
before the Supreme Court Of the United
States How can an issue be made by
which the Supreme Court may examine
into the constitutional right of Congress
to enact such law2 This law assumes
the ground that in certain States there
exists "no legal State governments or
adequate protection for life and property"
therein 1t does not assume that these
States have ceased 10 exist as States; on
the contrary they are distinctly recognized
by the law to be States The ussrped
power attempted to be exercised by Con-
gress over these States is claimed upon
the ground that they now have no legal
governments Here is the point upon
which case may be submitted to the
Supreme Court for its adjudication Of
the power and authority of Congress to
exercise any control whatever over the
internal affairs Of these States The New
Orleans Picqyure in discussing this view
Of the case, says; " If the State govern
ments were formally abolished by act Of
Congress, and territorial governments put
in operation, itmight be pleaded chat this
was the act of the political department
Of the government; the legislative power
invested with functions equivalent to the
Executive, having oyerruled the veto The
courts might take the ground that the
Judiciary will not take up questions which
are merely political, and continues
"Such a plea cannot now be interposed
If any Of the acts directed TO be done by
Congress are arrested by Judicial process on
the ground that they are in conflict with
the constitutional powers Of States, or in
fringe on rights and Liberties of citizens Of
States which they derive from the constitu-
ton of the United States. These are
judicial questions purely, and they may be
raised in various ways, and will doubtless
be made in some well-considered case TO 90
before the Supreme Court. The amended
bill does not contain the provision which
was in the original bill of Stevens, taking
away the privilege Of the writ of Aabeas
corpus. Every arrest by military authority
will be subject to the revision Of court Of
the United States, on the return Of a writ
Of hdbeas corpus The proviso which makes
null and void all interference of State
authority, may be subjected 10 the same
tests; and the authority to create military
commissions in time of peace be subiect TO
the same scrutiny as that which was be-
slowed on the Milligan case, in which
the action Of military commission, in the
state Of facts then existing in Indiana, was
unconstitutional" The state of facts ia now
somewhat different, bat the general prin-
ciples enunciated by the Supreme Court are
fully applicable TO cases arising under this
law; for the conrt decided in the most dis
tinct terms that "neitherthe President, nor
Congress, nor the Judiciary" can disturb
any of the safeguards of personal liberty
incorporated into the Federal constitution;
enumerating the provision that no person
shall be deprived of life, liberty and pro-
peTty except by due process of law, and that
every accused shall be entitled to a speedy
trial by an impartial Jury Of the vicinage
The only exemption allowed was that in
time of fragrant war, when instruction or
invasion puts the country in peril from
force, the privilege of the writ of haJeas cor
pas may be suspended, within military
lines, on the theatre of actual hostilities.
The doctrine of the Supreme Court pro-
bibits military commissions, even in time
Of actual war, except within the range of
peril from insurgent force. 1t is perfectly
plain that the court on its own principles
would decide, that the military commits
sions under this bill are against the consti-
'"hoh anu that ~ olilg httuS case 70 ne
carried mp to have that point ruled by the
same majoriiy which decided the Milligan
case"
1t is highly important that in some way
the provisions of the constitution should |
be made available on the side of liberty
against Radical rule and military despo
tism, and the Supreme Court of the
United States is the only channel through
which such relief can now come.