The tri-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1866-1868, 1867-07-30

Alex. HI. stephens on DAVIS and the
Confederacy-.-Remin OF the
Rebellion.
A correspondent of the New York Times
recently visited Alex. H. Stephens at his
home at Charlottesville, Georgia. We ex-
tract the following from an interesting letter
published by him.
HOW A RAIN-sToRM TOOK GEORGIA OUT OF
THE UNION.
Mr.. Stephens had wanted a convention of
the people to be held about the 18th of De-
cember. He knew that Georgia would not
secede, and he was also sure that South
Carolina, which had not yet seeded, would
not, hot though she was, go out alone But
he could not effect this purpose. the cleo,
ton for delegates was ordered for the lst OF
Jannary. which was after South Carolina
had taken the leap "Well," he went on to
say, "on the 1st of January, there was
.rain-storm more violent than the oldest In
habitant remembered-not since the flood In
the Yazoo had there been such storm. The
result was that the country people could not
get out to vote, and this gave prepondera-
ting influence in the election of delegates to
the towns and villages, where, you know,
political epidemics are always stronger than
elsewhere We lost at least twenty Union
members by this Even Rome, up in the
Cherokee country, where the Union senti-
ment was vastly in the ascendant, sent Sc
cession delegate. went over myself to the
Courthouse yonder to vote, and the room
was filled with dripping people, with wet
saddles in their hands, who had come
through the flood and mire with immense
difficulty. 1 made them little speech there,
and 1 said then that feared the rain would
lose us the election. And so indeed 1t did,"
GL1MPsEs OF THE EARLY wAR-DAYs.
The day before the adjournment of the
Montgomery Convention the different dele
cations had meetings at their rooms to con-
suit in regard to the important question of
choice of Executive. Stephens was pres
ent with the Georgia delegation. 1t was
there stated that South-Carolina did not
wish to bring forward any name, and thought
Georgia should have it. Mr.. Stephens per-
sonal choice was Toombs, whom he regarded
as the most powerful intellect of the South.
There was, however, some mention made of
Stephens himself for the office; but he then
stated that he 3" wished to be counted out
that even should he be chosen unanimously,
he would not accept, unless he saw that he
could form cabinet that would agree upon
the line of policy on which he thought the
war should be conducted. Hitherto the
name of Davis had hardly been mooted; but
at this point some member came in and said
he understood that four States had agreed
to present Mr. Davis. This was something
new; for Davis aspiration had been to be at
the head of the army rather than in the
Presidential chair. 1t was proposed to send
out and ascertain if the report were true
The case was found to be as stated. The
delegation then said they would wish Mr..
Stephens for the second office, and to this he
(being absent from the halI was unanimous
ly elected "The Office" he observed, "was
not unpleasing to me; it was free from re-
sponslbility, and I thought might afford me
the means of doing good"
In speaking of Davis he remarked that
there was great popular misrepresentation in
regard to his character He was" said
he, mot at all what people suppose-not at
all fire-eater; and though he was OF course
a State-Rights man, he could hardly be call
ed secessionist."
Then he does not deserve to be counted
with the conspirators- with the Cobbs and
Yanceys and Wigfalls."
Certainly not. He was opposed to Sc
cession, but did not have the courage to
come out against it. His course was simply
the result of timidity, of the desire to keep
the inside track and step into the shoes of
Calhoun"
Then among other points Mr.. Stephens
mentioned that Davis was very averse to
having Fort Sumpter fired on, and only yield !
ed after it was known that fleet with
reinforcements and supplies was off the har-
Dor. "That we regarded after the promise |
made, as the beginning of hostilities, and |
held, therefore, that it was not we that COM
menced the war;"
1t was universally thought that the war
would be brief holiday affair. "Most of |
the prominent politicians, when we got |
through the work of the convention hasten
ed to enter the army, fearing that if they did
not get in quick they would lose the oppor-
tunity of making some capital for the future !"
Mr.. Davis, he went on to say, observed
to me soon after we got established at Mont
gomery, that it would now be a question of
brains who should win, and the remark was
so just that I thought there must be great
deal where that came from. But there was
manifested from the start wonderful lack
OF craftsmanship, and even of mere ordinary
good sense"
1 asked him to give me some illustrations
of this.
"Well," said he, "there is the subject of |
fnance-the sinews of war. Never was |
people in position to start with so magnif-
cent basis of credit as we. They said cot |
ton was king. Nonsense! 1t was indeed a
commercial king, but no political king. |
always regarded the prevalent notion that !
England would intervene in our behalf on
account of cotton as the most chimerical of |
fancies and I told them at the time that the |
only effect of locking up our cotton would
be to stimulate its production elsewhere
Now observe" he continued, "what foun-
dation we had for credit, which Chatham
calls the 'plumage of the bird proposed
to take all the cotton-say four million bales
at ten cents, paying for it with eight per
cent. gold interest bearing bonds By ship
ping it to Liverpool, (Which we might readi-
ly have done, for there was no blockade to
speak of during the first year, and holding
it there till it rose to fifty cents, we would
have had $sOO,OOO,OOO. Well, early called
MIR. Davis attention to it, but he told me he
knew nothing of finance, and said go to
Meminger.' Meminger and talked it all
over one day, and we were to have another
meeting two days afterwards, but in the
he came out in the newspapers