Spirit of Jefferson. [volume] (Charles Town, Va. [W. Va.]) 1844-1948, 1867-07-16
[From the West and sOuth.I
The Confederate Cause,

during the war; be makes long statement
in that paper, from which it appears that the
Southern armies were much smaller than has
been supposed.
The Army of the East comprised all the
troops in Virginia and in the States border
ing the Gulf and the Atlantic. The Army
OF the West comprised the troops operating
anywhere in the Valley of the Mississippi.
There was only single instance against many
on our side, where these armies ever rein
forced each other. That was in September,
1868, when Gen. LOngstreet went to Tennes.
see and fought the battle of Chickamauga.
where the barren victOrp was not followed up.
The remnants of LOngstreet's corps went back
home to Virginia in the spring of 1864.
1t IS probable that during the Whole war
6UO.OOO different men were in the Confed>
crate ranks, of whom half are dead, and a
large proportion of the remainder are disa-
bled by wounds and disease. It is probable
that the South lost one third of its able
bodied white male population during the war;
The Tribune correspondent thinks that much
more than that proportion of the wealth of
that section was acriiced-indeei, annihila-
ted-and with it, the means of accumulation
themselves were destroyed He says that
any man who reads his account of the slen-
der array of the Southern armies, and COM
pares it with their heroic struggles and sacri-
hces, must be willing to raise hand and voice
to aid aud console the Southern people.
The Confederate armies reached their high
est numbers and efficiency in the spring of
1868, when Lee prepared to move into Penn
sylvania. by June there were 100000 ON
the muster rolls, apd 800, 900 fit for duty
Recent victories had inspired them with con-
tdcnce. Half the able-bodied whites we're
enrolled, seven out of ten were present, and
six out of ten were fit for duty. Gen. Lee
set out in May with 100000 men, but by the
end of July he had only Al 600 avilable men.
Gen. Meade had twice as many troops. aud If
he had pressed forward ne could have finished
the war. In the spring Of 1864 Grant Opeu-
ed the Virginia campaign. Lee had but So.
700 men; aud in August, when the strife
had reached Richmond, had but 6O.OOO.-
De>ertions had so thinned the Southern ar.
mics. both East and West, that, of $500
on the rolls, not over two hundred thousand
were present for duty. In February, 1865,
Lee had only 10000 men fit for duty. out of
nominal force of 100000; aud when he
retrearcd from Richmond, he had not over
10000. When lie surrendered to Grant, in
.ipril, he had less than 10000. In July,
1852, in both armies of the East and West,
there were 2l7 900 availables; in September.
1862, 2l9,900; in March, 1868, Isl 600;
in July, 1868, l9S.OOO; in April, 1864,
100000; in August 1864, 1877, 900; in No.
vember, 1864, 10000.
1t is worth while for the curious in the
items of the physical struggle of the South.
to examine the details Of the Tribune CORES
pondent; likewise to contrast them with the
record of the Federal forces There is u
|. u
wonder at the continuance of that struggle.
The great overruling consideration, how
ever, is that the Confederate Government was
not at all equal to the emergency. They de-
pended too much on strategy and diplomacy
They thought the internal obstacles presen-
ted by the extent and nature of their country
were insurmountable and that, if unassisted.
they could prOtract the struggle till the North
deslSted-twcnty years, Mr.. Davis thought,
aud he purported to be high military authori
ty. His reliance was delusive upon his own
resources; equally So were his expectations
from abroad. Both these great means of re-
slstance were mismanaged. He did have the
North ut disadvantage. and he could have
come out victorious if he had been equal
to the occasion. 1t was u Stupendous crisis,
to which few men could by any possibility
match themselves. He was too highly lifted
up into the abstract to realize the situation.
lie did not face the revolution he did not
consider 1t one. He thought it was a war
between adverse armies: to be decided by the
relative strength of troops and positions 1t
was social and political upheaval of the very
foundations Of our civilization. The South
ern people, to some extent, felt the truth of
the matter: the Southern armies knew what
was at stake. Both civilians and soldiers
were aIienated, instead of being inspired bv
their civil chiefs, who not only had none Of
the spirit OF the occasion, but repressed it in
their armies. Disaster aud demorilzation
spread every where. Opposition grew and
strengthened, distraction came, aud the inner
strength Of resistance fell away
Outwardly the case was no better. The
diplomacy of the South was terrible. The
great means of external assistance was the
very cotton which they burned up on the
plantations. The quarter to give aid was the
French Emperor, who had his own great
scheme for the Latin races, which has failed
so ignominously, hut who should have been
inspired with the infinitely grandcr idea of
becoming the pacific master of the world
Mr.. Davis and his cabinet had no comprehen
sion Of the true diplomacy. Their plan was
to burn their cotton aud then appeal to Eng
land aud France together. Their foolish
agents set down in Half Moon street. Picca-
dIily, batch of lunatics. to convince England
out OF her books of precedents that she must
bury her distrust of France in coalition to
benefit the South, without other cousdera-
ton than her logical consistency Since
when has England recognized any de tncfo
State. unless it Was her interest? The Em>
peror ut France after the Southern agents
had failed in England, gave them cold re-
ceptlon. and no promise of support. And yet
the South could have succeeded, and he be-
come the worlds master, if Mr.. Davis had
known the simple truth that dime cotton was
more irresistible in diplomacy than gun cot.