Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-12-20

v
given him proper instructions, the riot
which arose on the assembling of the con.
veniion would have been averted.
There NAV be those ready 10 say that
would have given no instructions even il
thedispatch had reached me in time; but
all must admit that ought to have had
the opportunity.
The following is the testimony given by
Mr.. Stanton before the Impeachment In
vestigation Committee "a to the dispatch ::
"Q.-Referring to the dispatch of the 18th Of
July by, Gen Baird, | ask you WHISTLER that dis
patch, on its receipt. was communicated
Al received that dispatch on Sunday fore
the question presented did not see that I
could give any Instructions different from the
line of action which Gen. Baird proposed, and
made no answer TO the dispatch.
'Q.-I see it stated this was received at 1920
PM. Was that the hour at which it was received
"a That is the date Of its reception at the
telegraph office Saturday night; received il
on Sunday forenoon, at my residence; q copy Of
the dispatch was furnished to the President
several days aftervard. along with all the other
dispatches and communications on that subject.
but it was not furnished by me before that time
Isuppose it may have been ten or fifteen days
afterward.
''Q-The President himself being in CORES
pOhAcuIc Win blu1c pdIbfcc HYOl lut Slfuc cAln-
jet, would it not have been proper to have ad-
vised him of the reception of that dispatch?
AL know nothing about his correspond
sngT 0s3g ssSSt any
gence of the riot on Thursday morning. The
riot had taken place on Monday"
It is a difficult matter to define all the
relations which exist between the heads of
departments and the President. The legal
relations are well enough defined. The
constitution places these officers in the re-
lation of his advisers when be calls upon
them for advice. The acts of Congress 90
further; take for example the act of 1879,
creating the War Department. H {
1t provides that "there shall be a prinS
cipal officer therein, 10 be called the Secre-
tary for the Department of War, who shall
perform and execute such duties as shall
from time to time be enjoined on or in
trusted to him by the President of the
United States" and furthermore, the said
principal officer shall conduct the business
of the said department in such manner as
the President of the United States shall,
from time to time, order and instruct"
Provision is also made for the appoint.
ment of an inferior officer by the head of
the department, to be called the Chief
Clerk, "who, whenever said principal off,
Ger shall be removed by the President of
the United States" shall have the charge
and custody of the books, records and
papers of the department.
The legal relation is analogous to that
of principal and agent. 1t is the Presi-
dentupon whom the constitution devolves,
as head Of the Executive Department, the
duty to see that the laws are faithfully
executed; but as he cannot execute them
in person, he is allowed TO select his agents,
and is made responsible for their acts with
in just limits. So complete is this pre-
sumed delegation of authority in the rela-
zion of head of department to the Presi-
dent, that the Supreme Court of the United
States have decided that an order made by
head of department is presumed to be
made by the President himself
The principal upon whom such respon-
sibility is placed for the acts of a subordi-
nate, ought to be left as free as possible in
the matter of selection and of dismissal.
To hold him to responsibility for an officer
beyond his control to leave the question
of the fitness of such an agent to be de-
eided for him and not by him to allow
such a subordinate when the President,
moved by public considerations of high
character" requests his resignation; to as
sumo for himself an equal right to act up
on his own views of ''public consideration"
and to make his own conclusions para
mount to those of the President-to allow
all this is to reverse the just order of adj
ministration, and to place the subordinates
above the superior.
Ill., ~4Ao. roI,A31-,, L.
tween the President and head of depart
ment beyond these defined legal relations
which necessarily attend them, though not
expressed. Chief among these ismutual con-
fidence This relation is so delicate that it
is sometimes hard to say when or how it
ceases A single fragrant act may aid it at
once, and then there is no difficulty. But
confidence may be Just as effectually de-
| stroyed by a series of causes too subtle for
demonstration. As it is a plant of slow
| growth, so too, it may he slow in decay.
| Such has been the process here.
| will not pretend to say what acts or
| omissions have broken up this relation.
| They are hardly susceptible of statement,
and still less of formal proof Neverthe-
| less, no one can read the correspondence oi
| the 9th Of August without being convinced
| that this relation was effeetually gone on
both sides, and that, while the President
/ was unwilling to allow Mr.. Stanton to re-
man in his administration, Mr. Stanton
was equally unwilling to allow the Presi'
dent to carry on his administration without
his presence.
In the great debate which took place IL
the House of Representatives in 1889, il
the first organization of the principal de-
partments, Mr.. Madison spoke as follows
1T is evidently the intention Of the eonstitu
| ton that the first Magistrate should be respon
| sble for the Executive Department. So far
therefore. as we do not make the officers WhG
| are to aid him in the duties of that department
| responsible 20 him, he is hot responsible to tn
country. Again, is there no danger that al
| of the Senate and has friends in that body, ma
choose rather to risk his establishment on tn
favor Of that branch than rest il upon the dis
| charge of his duties to the satisfaction of tn
| Executive branch, which is constitutional
| authorized to inspect and control his conduct
And il it should happen that the officers connec
| themselves with the Senate, they may mutual
| support each other, and for want of efficacy, re
| duee the power of the President to mere vapol
| in which case his responsibility would be ami
| hilated and the expectation of il is unjust. Th
| high Executive officers Joined in cabal with tn
| Senate would lay the foundation of discOFd an
| end in an assumption OF the Executive pOWe
1 only to be removed by rsvoluuo IN the gov
l eminent"
| Mr.. Sedgwick, in the same debate, re
| ferring to the proposition that a head 0
department should only be removed o
suspended by the concurrence ofthe Senate
uses this language:
| but il proof be necessary, what is then tn
| consequence Why, in nine cases out of tea
| where the case is very clear 10 the mind of tn
| President that the man ought to be removed
al k4- .t.a
| lutely impossible TO produce the necessary evi
Il denee- Is the Senate to proceed without evi
dence? Some gentlemen contend not The
| the object will be lost Shall q man, under thes
| circumstances, be saddled upon the President
| who has been appointed for no other pUrpOs
but To aid the PreSdedt in performing certai
duties Shall he be continued, L ask agar
| against the win Of the President If he i
where is the responsibility Are you to loo
| for il in the President, Wh0 has no control owe
| the officer. no power 10 remove him If he aei
unfeeIingiy OF pnfaithfdily? Without you max
| him responsible, ySo weaken aud destroy th
be done in eases which can only be known frOl
a long acquaintance with the conduct of a
| officer 2" H
| had INDUCED the hope that upon tn
assembling of Congress, Mr. Stanton Woul
have ended this unpleasant complication
according to the intimation given in hi
note of August IL. The duty which hav
felt myself called upon to perform was b
no means agreeable; but feel that / an
not responsible for the controversy or 70
| the cOneeuuences. ar. rHrE.r