The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-12-03

into the foreground as the apprehensions
which have been excited, and the activity
which will be stimulated, by Buffers bold
onset. The great banking interest and the
great bondholding interest would infinitely
prefer Chase to Grant. These powerful in
terests can derive little advantage from any
laws which this Congress may pass, inasmuch
as II can pass none which its successors may
not repeal. But If they can elect President
pledged by his antecedents, and his pride of
paternity, to the policy most favorable to
them, they will see their way clear for the
next five years, and will be content TO trust
to the chapter of accidents for the rest. Grant
has neither the motives nor the ability to
serve them which they rely upon in Chase,
Chase is so thoroughly versed in the
subject, he so well understands its wind
iDgs and intricacies, that he can aid the
moneyed interests under plausible and de-
ceitful shams; while Grant knows so little of
the channel to be navigated, that even with the
most strenuous intention to serve them, he
might carry the vessel straight ahead upon
sunken rocks, when a more skilful pilot, by
seeming to sail backwards, might take the
surest way out. In engineering policy which
runs counter to popular feeling, much must be
done by dexterity and craft. General Grant
has obviously no qualifications for the fnan-
cial man@uvres to which Mr.. Chase may be
presumed equal. The great monetary inte-
rests which have SO much at stake and can
afford lavish contributions to lobbying and
electioneering funds, will not permit the selec-
ton of any other Republican candidate than
Chief Justice Chase, if their exertiOns can
prevent it,
About the time that the financial questions
will have been hammered on the Congress
sional anvil to a white heat, the State Govern
ments constructing in the South will be knock
ing for admission. This will be the critical
juncture; the action taken on these applica-
tions will strike the balance in favor of Chase
If they succeed in favor of Grant if the sub
ject is postponed by sending back the Consti-
tutions for amendment. Grant, in the estima-
tion of his supporters, has good chances of
election without the Southern vote; Chase has
none. But this consideration would have
little weight if the nomination were not of
more immediate and decisive consequence than
the election. If Mr.. Chase is beaten in the
Republican National Convention, that defeat
is fatal, and there is no more to be said. If
the reconstructed States are represented in
that Convention, their delegates will be glow
ing radicals, and all their votes given to Chase.
From the day that their Constitutions are
sanctioned, they cannot be excluded;
so that if the States are admitted
previous to the Republican Convention, the
Chase faction will be reinforced by about
seventy votes and Grant be easily disposed of.
But il, when the Convention meets, the South
ern Constitutions have either not been acted
upon or remanded for revision, delegates from
those States will be excluded, and the compe-
tition more equal. The bank and bondholding
interests, with their strong preference for
Chase, will probably be powerful enough to
secure the prompt admission of the recon-
structed States, if they can meanwhile get
Congress deeply interested in the financial
questions, and majority of both Houses
committed to the leading features of the
Chase policy. This, therefore, will be the
chief business and effort of the first two
months of the session. Mr.. Chase has a clear
conception of the exigenoies of the situation,
and is eXerting all his influence in favor of
moderation in the reconstructed constitutions.
He has made a visit to Virginia with that OBJ
ject. 1t concerns him vitally that they shall
be so unObectionable to Republicans that
Grants friends in Congress cannot send them
back for revision.
These tactics would not naturally be ex-
pected to bring a further advantage to the
radicals in weakening the Democratic party. If
the Southern States are shut out of the Union,
it might be questionable whether they would
be represented in the Democratic National
Convention. If they could give no votes in
the election, why should they have any part
in the nomination But if the Southern States
are readmitted, their delegates would be ex-
cluded from neither Convention. The Repub-
lican delegates from the South would secure
the nomination of Chase, and it may be calou-
lated that the Democratic delegates from the
same section would turn the scale ia favor of
the Democratic candidate most acceptable to
the South, even against one certain of large
support in the North. But as the Southern
Democrats could give no effective aid to the
candidate after controlling the nomination. the
radical plan might be expected to weaken Mr..
Chase's enemies as well as supplant his rival.
We do not concern ourselves, at present, to
find the flaws and weak points in this plan
of operations, our purpose being merely to
reconnoitre Congress and get the key to its
probable action. The impeachment furry
will soon blow over Even the ultra-radicals
have nothing solid to gain by it, and the GER
tainty that, if brought to trial, it will end
in a damaging .fasCO will cause it to be
strangled in the cradle. If the House votes
to sustain the majority report of the Commit
tee, there can be no retreat afterwards. The
House will be committed. 1t will have to pre-
pare regular articles, appoint managers, and
do its best to secure a convictiOn. The
Senate could not decline the trial, nor could
they give their verdict without hearing the
evidence in all its unwieldy length. The
country would get thoroughly disgusted, and
the acquittal would be regarded as great
triumph of the President over the Republi-
can party. There is too much shrewdness in
Congress to play so losing game. We ac-
cordingly expect to see the impeachment pro-
ect squelched as soon as it can be brought to
vyofa