The tri-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1866-1868, 1867-05-30

| constitution or shall be eStaDnsheu ny Id"
and whose appointment are not herein there
with provided for" The Chief Justice says
eft has never been ascertained, nor is 1T easy
to ascertain to what offices this power of APP,
pointment extends" speak of offices ere
ated by law since the making of the consti-
ton. The word office is of very vague and
| indefinite import. Everything concerning
the administration of justice or the general
interests of society, may be supposed to be
within the meaning ofthe constitution, espe-
cially if fees or emoluments are annexed to
the office.
But there are matters of temporary and
local concern, which although comprehended
in the term of office, have not been thought
to be embraced by the Constitution, and
when offices of these kind have been created,
the legislature has sometimes made the ap-
pointment in the law which created them,
sometimes given the appointment to others
than the Governor, and sometimes given the
power of removal to Others, although the
appointment was left to the Governor The
officers of whom I am speaking are often
described in acts of assembly by the name OF
commissioners, such, for instance, as are EN-
ployed in the laying out of roads and canals
and other works of a public nature, yet all
these perform a duty, or in other words eXer-
L
employments under State authority, which,
in my opinion, work no disfranchisement.
I will name some by way of illustrating, viz:
Boards of commissioners of public works,
directors of State penitentiaries, State dlrec-
tors of banks or other corporations, special
commissioners or agents appointed by the
Governor or other State authority to perform
special duties, as examiners of banks, notaries
tn ia ya
edgments of deeds.
The rule laid down and these Illustrations
will, perhaps, be sufficient to determine who
come within its operations. The next dis
qualifying clause is founded on the oath OF
Office.
The oath, as incident to the office is not
mentioned in the first disqualifying clause,
but the office alone. But in the second clause
the oath is made to enter as a necessary ee-
ment in order to work disfranchisement, and
it is applied to the same classes of officers
named in the first clause, but the officers
alone; but in the second clause the oath is
made to enter as a necessary element in order
to work disfranchisement, audit is applied to
the same classes of officers named in the fifth
clause, and also to Others not named in the
first clause that is to officers of the United
States 1t is an oath to support the Consti-
tuition of the United States. and it is clearly
provided by this clause that if this oath has
been taken by member of State Legsla-
ture or by an executive or judicial officer of
any State then such person violating that
oath and engaging in Instruction shall be
dstranchised.
There is some obscurity in these clauses
and room for doubt whether disqualification
under the first clause would arise in the case
of member of State Legislature or on
any executive or judicial officer of any State
who had not taken an oath to support the
constitution of the United States.
1 incline to the opinion that this oath is
put as an essential thing, the breach Of
which by instruction against the United
States, violates the trust imposed by it upon
the officer. But this clause as far as the eX-
ecutive or judicial officers of State are con-
cerned, does not enlarge the class subject to
disfranchisement.
The officer breaking the oath which works
disfranchisement, must also be a judicial or
executive officer of State, according to the
rule hereinbefore established.
1 do not apprehend that any practical
question will arise here, for by the constitu-
ton of the United States this oath is requi-
red to be taken by the members of the
several State Legislatures and all executive
and judicial officers both of the United States
and of the several States" And in these ten
States the same oath was required as to
members of the Legislature and the eXecu-
tive and judicial officers of the State.
This brings me to the question, who is to
be considered an officer of the United
States" within the meaning of the clause
under consideration. Here the term officer
is used in its most general sense and without
any qualification as to legislative or eXecu-
tive or judicial; and l think, as here used,
it was intended to comprehend military as
well as civil officers of the United States
who had taken the prescribed OATH mas
much as the violation of the official oath
and the official trust has relation to fealty to
the United States, which is broken by re-
belion against the United States the rea-
son is apparent for including all officers of
the United States, and for making the dis
franchisement more general and comprehen-
sive as to their standing, as they do in more
direct relation and trust to the United States
than the officers of State
now come to consider what is the mean
ing and scope of the disqualification arising
upon that part of the oath which requires
the person to state that he has not engaged
in instruction or rebellion against the Unit
ed States, or given aid or comfort to the en-
emles thereof. L must here repeat what has
been said before that to work disqualifca-
ton, two elements must concur.
First. Holding the designated office, State
or Federal, accompanied by an official oath
to support the Constitution of the United
States.
Second. Engaging in the rebellion against
the United States, Or giving aid or comfort
to its enemies.
Both of these must not only concur, but
they must concur in the order of time men
toned. First, the officer and the oath, and
" afterwards" engaging in rebellion, or Civ
ing aid or comfort. A person who has held
an office within the meaning of the law, and
has taken official oath, and who has not af-
forwards participated in rebellion may
very safely take this oath, and so, too, the
person who has fully participated in the re-
bellion but has not, prior thereto, held an
Office and taken. the official oath, NAV with
equal safety take this oath.
My duty here is simply one of construc-
ton. I do not deem it proper to enter upon
any question of the constitutionality of this
part of the act. Taking it as granted for
the purpose of construction, that Congress
has the right to impose such an oath, it is
not only allowable, but imperative, that
keep in view its essential characteristic. 1t
is something more than a legislative act in
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