New-York tribune., 1867-06-26
THE MUSTER ROLLS or THE CONFEDERATE
ADHTV


On another mage we give an abstract of the
returns of all the armies of the Confederacy
for nearly every month from the beginning of
1862 down to the beginning of 1S64-the entire
active period of the war, saving few weeks
mt the close. We are confident that all the
Rebel officers, from Lee downward, could not
furnish 80 complete an account OF the
strength of their armies. And we think
that no captured documents, as yet unar-
ranged, can add anything material to
this statement. Ii will be seen that the num-
Der of troops mt the East and the West was
throughout nearly equal. and that no con-
siderable body of soldiers was ever trans
fcrred from one army TO the other. The great
est number actually borne at any one time on
their muster-rols was 550,OOO and this was
only when, by "robbing the cradle and the grave"
every male from II to 30 was enrolled IN the
army Half n million is the utmost nominally
enrolled at any other period. The greatest
number present for duty ut any one time, and
that for only briof period, was 100000; to
which should probably be added few thou
sand rangers, partisans, and bushwackers.
There were not three periods of n month when
they had 10000. The Army of Northern Vir-
ginia. under Lee, was the great strength of the
Confederacy At only three periods did 1t
for n month number 100000 men present for
duty. A study of these reports, compared with
the known strength of the Union Army OF the
Potomac. will furnish materials for more
severe criticism on the conduct of the war in
this department, and the military merits OF the
different commanders, than any man has yet
4
dared to write. Thus in October, 1861, when
Mcclellan. with f47OO0 MEN " iit for duty"
feared TO advance toward Manassas, supposing
that the enemy had not less than 10000, their
actual force was less than 10000 and in De
ccmbcr they had only $4,000. Again, when at the
beginning of April, 1852 the Unready" reached
the Peninsula with not fewer than 100000 men,
lac was for "A fortnight held in check by Magruder
with barely 1900, who beside holding York
town, had 10 guard line of dozen miles.
when, after digging away at Yorktown for
fortnight. Mcclellan was ready TO assail that
fortihcation, held, as he supposed by mt least
100000 men--le having, as he says, s5!OOO-the
Confederates actually had on the whole PENN
sula less than $4,000. And when he finally
reached the Chickahominy with about 10000
effective men, the enemy had at Richmond but
1900 increased at the close of May TO $1,000,
sick and well, probably about G00O0 effective.
Meades success at Gettysburg was so decided,
and of such vital moment, that the feebleness
of his subsequent campaign in Virginia has
been overlooked. When, at the close of July.
he had reached the Rappahannock, he had fully
$4,000 men, The figures which we give show
that Lee had only 4l,0O0. Yet with this great
preponderance IIallcck would not allow Mead
10 attempt any offensive operations. But IN
October when Meade had 10000, and Lee but
5000, the Union general was actually driven
back almost within sight of Washington. This
retreat from Culpcpper to Centreville is utterly
inexplicabe, for Halleck had nothing to do
with the movement, and Meade knew that he
was much stronger than his enemy. THIS
abortiye campaign showed that Meade,
an excellent officer when backed up 10y
n stronger will than his own, was wholly
deficient in the moral courage requisite for
the conduct of campaign. When llalleck
WAS displaced from the chief command, and
Grants firm will directed Meade, the campaign
assumed wholly different aspect. Forward
"to Richmond" or wherever else the Rebel
strength might lie became the "war-cry" not
only of the Nation, but of the Commander
of the National Army. These are but few
of the points upon which the Confederate mus
ter rolls, which are now for the first time pub
lished furnish occasion TO remark.
The twelfth International Convention of the
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