Brownlow's Knoxville Whig. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1866-1869, 1867-05-08
!, g.. oeneraIsbIu at ChanceIIOrsViIIe.

I.oos Generalship at Charlottesville is thus crit.
;cised by A. Il. Guernsey, in the New York
Times;
! The real merits of commander are not always
20 be measured by his success or failure The
veteran Observer remarks very Justly that "the
campaigns Of Lee presents points as open to criti-
cism as those OF our commanders" This is espe-
ciAlly true OF Chancellorsville and we need not
wait Tor the future historian to point them out
his nrst movement, marching with the bulk Of his
army to confront Hooker at Charlottesville was
justifakle for he had every to suppose that
Rockers force there, and inferior to his own
he was not aware that on Friday morning Sickle's
corps had come TO that point and in case he found
himself overmatched he could still return to his po
stion retreat by the railway, making q stand
wherever he should find it advisable. After that
every movement was one which, upon any reason
able calculation Of probabilities a comman-
der has no right except in TN extreme emergency
TO reckon upon the chapter Of accdents-must have
been disastrous. When he first divided his army,
sending jackson days march away, he had no
right TO assume that he would surprise the Union
right or that Hooker would fail to attack his re-
manning force
On Sunday morning he had no reasonable ground
TO presume that divided assault made with an in
fcrior force upon an ntrenched line could succeed
1t succeeded only from Hookers having csuselessly
abandoned the position at Hazel Groye-a position
Of WHICH u6ltner party knew the value. lie naQ
no right to imagine that the Union commander,
whoever be might be, would fight him with any
thing less than his whole army. If he barely sue
ceeded against half of it. it is easy to what
would have been the result had the whole been
brought against him. When again Sunday
afternoon, and especially on Monday morning he
once more divided his greatly diminished army be
could have no reason to suppose that Hooker would
allow him TO beat of Sedgwick without making an
attempt to aid him, either directly by assailing
Stuarts small force in his front. The only cause
for which a sound military judgment can find any
good reason-looking at the circumstances as we
now know them to have been, or as Lee must have
supposed them to be-was to put in practice the
tactics with which fifteen months later he long
foiled Grant-to fall back toward Richmond, by
successive steps, contesting the ground whenever
goo position presented ITSELF all the time approach
ing AIS own base of supplies, and drawing the enc
nv further from his. He would have been grow
ing stronger while the enemy were growing weak
or at every mile. The possession of Fredricks-
burgh was in itself of not the slightest importance
TO eft her side. Its only value to either lay in the
fact that if held, it was obstacle in the way to
Richmond. Any other position on the line would
have been of equal value. The fact that, by a Sc
ries of chances upon no one which he could rea-
sonably rely, Lee won success at Charlottesville,
in no wise initiates against the inherent and essen
tial faults in his operations. With every probable
ity against him, he undertook enterprise the ex-
ecution of which was in no way essential to his
safety, and the failure of which would have been
absolute ruin