The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-04-10

days march--making two marches of this
distance twenty-three miles. At that rate,
the thirty-four miles remaining would have
consumed nearly three days, and the troops,
if they had marched on with the least practi-
cable delay, would have arrived at the scene
of action the day after the battle. JacksOn's
might have reached it ON Sunday night. The
author said his army amounted to IL 900 men.
More than 5000 of them were in the battle,
conveyed on trains, the first of which arrived
at Manassas on Friday evening" and the last
about noon on Sunday. The detention of the
remainder was due to the wretched misman-
agement of the railroad trains. The only col
lision occurred on Saturday night, of a train
bearing the 9th North Carolina Regiment and
an empty one returning The regiment was
carried on, reached Manassas Station on
Sunday morning, and took part in the
battle. Elzey's Brigade, on another train
passed over the place of collision soon
after the occurrence, and reached Manassas
Station soon after noon on Sunday. The facts
prove that the track was not obstructed, at
least not seriously. None of the troops were
lett without any provisions for their subsist-
ence. If any of them suffered for want of
tood, 1t was in consequence of throwing away
their rations, then not unusual on a march.
We left Winchester with as much provisions
as we had the means of Transporting, and
had enough for two days after the arrival of
the troops at Manassas, on Monday. The
author asserts that all the remaining troops
(Jackson's infantry being placed on trains)
Were detained at Piedmont two days without
food. These troops got to Piedmont ON Fri
day afternoon, and the battle began on Sunday
morning, not much more than one marching
day after the arrival at Piedmont. About
$500 of the II 600 at which he estimates the
Army of the Shenandoah, were engaged in
the battle; therefore but 2700 could have
been detained at Piedmont. The fact that
these troops were two days in marching
twenty-three miles from Winchester to Pied
mont, shows that they could not have marched
thirty-four miles from Piedmont to the scene
of action in less than two days, and that the
only hope of getting them into the battle was
by the railroad.
Pages 215-16:-'The plan OF battle which was
adopted. after the designs of the enemy were
fully disclosed, was worthy of the genius of
Beauregard who suggested and of johnson,
who accepted it. This was to send the two
reserve brigades which were at hand to sustain
the shock upon the lett and to enable that wing
of the army to hold its ground for q time, while
the centre and right were advanced across Bull
Run, and swung around into position parallel
to the enemy's line of march towards the Stone
Bridge, with the view of assailing their rear
guard and their line of communication at Cen.
trcVille.r
"The plan of battle,' so extolled by the
author, was made impracticable by McDOw-
ellis turning movement, and, therefore, was
abandoned when the 'designs of the enemy
We're fully disclosed" The movements of
Bee and Jackson to the left, so far from being
the consequence of the disclosure of the
enemy's plans, preceded that discovery;
indeed it was Bees encounter with the
Federal army which revealed to me its designs,
and ''such reinforcements as could be spared
from the centre and right were then ordered
to hasten to the firing. The plan the author
supposes and admires would have kept our
centre and right (six brigades) out of action,
and enabled the Federal army to crush the
other three. Centreville was three and half
miles north of our centre on Bull Run, and
the field of battle was mile and half south
of our original left on Bull Run: so that it is
clear that the troops which might have moved
to Centreville in the beginning of the action
could by no possibility have reached the field
in time to take part in it, but would have
assisted Mcdowell in his turning operation,
and made it impossible to prevent his seizure
of our depot at Manassas.
Page 2l6-17:-''The two generals despatched
the order for this movement to the commanders
OF the right and centre, and then galloped for
the scene OF action"
Not orders for the movement supposed but
countermanding it, and directing troops from
the centre and right to march rapidly to the
fight
Page 2l7:-" and Beauregard after
listening in anxious suspense to hear his guns
open upon the heights of Centreyiile, until the
day and the battle we're too far advanced for
any other resort, 1elinquished the movement
The only tactics which remained for the
Confederate Generals were to bring up such rein.
forcements as could be spared from the centre
and right successively.h
General Beauregard could not have listened
for the opening Of guns on the heights of Cen
treville, for none had been sent there.
McDowell's turning movement was revealed
by Bee not earlier than l05. If the centre and
right had then been ordered to Centreville. as
the author states, they could not have reached
it much, if at all, before 2 p. M. If those
troops had been ordered into the action,
they could not have Joined in it, it would
have been too late. As it was, with the three
and a half brgades ordered up, two were too
late, although those orders were despatched
at least as early rs IL o'clock A. Nj.
This account of the battle does great injus-
tice to General Beauregard and to Bees and
Early's brigades and their commanders.
General Jackson's great fame is in no degree
enhanced by such disparagement of his asso-
ciates.
Pace 33O.-"Tle pursuit OF the enemy was not
continued beyond Oentreylle, and this was the
first error which made tue lauTels ofthe Con-
tedeTate army, so tar, to the eye barren of sub
stantial truit Il was accounted for, in part,
by the paucity OF cavalry; but this excuse was
no justification, because the cavalry in hand
of which only two companies had been engaged
in the actual combat, was not pertinaciousy
pressed after the tugItives, but paused even be.
| them.n
! The Substantial fruit" of this victory was
the preservation of the Confederacy. No
more could have been hoped for. The pursuit
OF the enemy was not continued, because our
cavalry Ga very small force) was driven back