The Charleston daily news. [volume] (Charleston, S.C.) 1865-1873, 1867-01-08


latiye powers are vested by the Constitution.
Mr. Madison, in referring to the difficulty Of pro-
dlny some practical security for each against the
invasion OF the others, remarked that the leg1s;a
tive department is everywhere extending the
sphere Of its activity, and drawing all power into
its impetuous vortex. The Founders Of our Rcpub
Legislative usurpation, which, by assembling all
power in the same hands, must lead to the Same
In representative republic, where the executive
magistracy is carefully limited, both in tho extent
ana the duration Of its p2wer and where the legis
inspired by supposed influence over the people,
with m intreI;d confidence in its own strength,
viii III is sufficiently numerous to feel all the pas
sions which actuate q multitude, yet not so nume-
rous Us to be incapable Of pursuing the objects Of
IT'S t passions, by means which reason prescribes-
paltment that the people ought to indulge their
jealousy als, and e1ha 1st all their precautions:
in our Government from other circumstances. @ . IL
constltutlonl powers being at once more extensive
and less susceptble OF precise limits, it oan, with
irdirect measures the encroa hmenfs which it
makes on the coordinate departments. On the other
SIDE the exclusive power being restrained within
nature, and the Judiciary being prescribed by land
marks still less uncertain, projects Of usurpation
betray and defeat themselves. Nor is this all AS
the Legislative department alone has access to the
pockets S q the people, and has, in some consttu
ence over the Pecuniary awards Of those connected
with the other departments dependence ia
thus created in the latter which gives still greater
faclty to the encroachments Of tie former
We have seen that the tendency OF republican
4 is to an Of Che les
Of virginia objected that BY it's provisions ali the
to tho and
that the concentrating these in the same hands
Is precisely the definition OF despotic government
1t will be no aueviation that there is plurality Of
q hnn ou1
sevonty-three despots would surely be rs oppres-r
sivo as As 1itle VIII it avail US that they are
not the government we fought for, but one which
should not only be founded on FREQ principles but
avS n wh,sh the the powers Of government should be SO
magistracy, as TINT no one could transcend their
localities without being eectually checked and re-
vention which passed the ordinance of covcrnment
laid its foundation this bnsis that the legisa-
be separate and distinct SO that no person should
exercise the powers of moro than one of them at
tho same time. U"1 I0 0-T
But no barrier was provided between these seya.
raj powers. The Judiciary and Executive mem-
bers were left dependent on the Legislative Tor
their subsistence in Office, and some Of them for
their continuance in it. It, therefore, the legisla-
ture assumes executive and judiciary powers, no
opposition is likely to be made, nor, if made, can
thoI o N 5e 5e1 they
sembly which viii render them obligatory on the
other branches, They have accordingly, in many
left to Judiciary controversy and the direction Of
the Executive, during the whole time Of their ses-
son, H IS 1tss becoming IN ha6itqal and familiar.
GO CONSTITUTION, reviews the same subject and says
Il
jealousy every ,encrcachment Of the Executive
Magistrate for it trenches upon their own author-
these representatives themselves? win they be
as jealous OF the exercise Of power by themselves
as by others There are many reasons which may
department. In the first place, it's
constitutional powers are more extensive and less
eapselo e OF being brought within precise bounds
than those OF either Of the other Departments The
bounds OF the Executive authority are easily |
marked out and defined. It reaches few objects,
without being brough, in contact with the other
GeRartments 1aR1I Laws may check and restrain and
stin greater force to the Judiciary The juF;sdie-
ton is or may be bounded to q few objects or per-
erations necessarily confined to the mere ad-
ministration Of public and privnte justice. It can
not punish without law, it cannot create contro-
versiea to actnpon. It can decide only upon rights
and cases, they are brought by others before it.
It do nothing for ITSELF 1t must do everything
for others. It must obey the laws, and il It cor
ruptly administers them it is subject to the power
OF Impeachment. I"N-.4 N
On the otaer hand, tho Legislative power, ex-
is unlimited it IS forever varying its means and
its ends it governs the institu lions and laws and
public policy Of the country it regulates all its
Look but at the exercise Of two or three branches
Of its ordinary powers. IT levies all taxes md it
aaes and 81 i gss the
all property held BY individuals it changes at it's
will the whole fabric Of the laws it mou1ds at its
strength and comfort, and dignity to society In
the next place. it is the direct visible representa-
tive Of the VII Of the people in all the changes Of
as the power Of numbers; it is easily moved and
sen and Re i Of ffGsys Sye
By such Obedience, ana it aads not only support
the
tional limits. 1t has no motive, therefore, to be
jealous or scrnp1aons in its own use Of power and
strengthened by the countenance and the courage
ofnumbers.
These views are not alone those Of men who
but they are also freely admitted by some Of the
strongest advocates for popular rights and the
y Of republican inst % i Each de-
should have its own independence secured beyond
the power Of being taken away by either or both
Of each to the other should be SO strong that there
should be mutual interest to sustain and protect
each other There should not only be constitutional
croachments Of one or either Of The others Am
bltion would thus be made to counteract ambl- 4
tiou,-the desire of power to check power, md
tho pressure Of interest to balance opposing in
terest. s45 .... l&.5t. .s. .5 8oz
The Judiciary is naturally, and almost neces-
sarily, as has been already said, the weakest de-
partment. It can have no means Of influence by
patronage. Its powers can never be welded for j
ITSELF It has no command over the purse or the 4
sword Of the nation. It can neither Lay taxes, nor
appropriate % money, por aesnmand ar1nies or ap.
with the people by constant appeals and solicitations
and private intercourse, witch belong to all the
other departments of government. It is seen only
IN controversies, or IN trials and punshments Its
rigid Justice and impartialty give it no claims to
favor, however they may to respect Il stands
solitary and unsupported, except by that portion
Of public opinion which is intereated only In the
strict administration OF Justice. It can rarely
secure the sympathy or jealous support either Of
the Executive or Of the Legislature. II they are
not ns is not unfreguently the case, jealous Of it's
prerogatves, the constant necessity Of scrutiniz-
ing the acts OF each, upon the application Of any
private person, and tho painful duty Of pronounc.
ing judgment, that these scts are departure
from the law or Constitution, can hsye no tendency
to concliate kindness or nourish influence.
It must seem, therefore, that some additional
guards would under such circumstances, be ne
csssary to protect this department. from the a5so-
lutte domination of the others. Yet rarely have
to introduce them has BEEN resisted with q park1
nacity which demonstrates how slow popular lead
ers are to introduce checks upon their own power,
and how sow the people to believe that the Ju-
dietary is the real bulwark OF their liberties. II
any department. Of the Government has undue In
huence or absorbing power, it certainly has not
baen either thy3 Executive or Ghf5 Judcis1g -