The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Stroudsburg, Pa.) 1853-1911, 1867-01-17
pa- The Supreme Court, by a majori-

ES ne supreme court, Dy maJoIl-
ty Of one (Judges Field, of California,
Davis, of Indiana, Clifford, of Maine,
Nelson, of New York, and Grer, of Penn
sylvauia, asserting, and Chief-J ustice
Chase. of the.District Of Columbia, judy
es Miller, of Iowa, Swayne, Of Ohio, and
Wayne, of Georgia, disscnting), annuled
so much of the Constitution of Missouri,
as rrecludes those who participated in or
sympathized with the late Rebellion,
from officiating as ministers of religion,
as teachers in schools, or as legal advo
Gates in courts. Judges Field, Davis,
Chase, Miller and Swayne were appointed
by President Lincoln.
The grounds upon which this decision
is made may be briefly stated. 1t is ar
gued that the test-oath is directed against
acts not defined in any code as criminal;
for instance, the mere expression Of sym
pathy with rebellion; that such acts had
10 possible relation to the lawful pursuits
of the persons committing them; that the
oath contravcues the clause of the Con,
stitution forbidding any State to pass a
bill of attainder or e1 post .fdcto law; that
the oath is in effect both of these, be-
cause, by an evasion of the Constitution,
it imposes the penalties Of a bill Of attain
der, and an e1 post .tdcto law, and that
the Constitution deals with things, not
names; that the oath is &C post .facto be
cause some of the acts for which it impos-
es The punishment Of deprivation from
Office, ETC., were not kown as ofenses
when the acts were committed; that 1t
subverts the presumption of innocence,
and perverts the rules Of evidence, pre-
suming the party to lie guilty, without
trial; that it imposes penalties without
the form .f judicial proceedings; that if
the oath is legal the Constitution may be
evaded at pleasure, and individuals depriv-
ed of their civil rights.
The opinion of the Court upon the con
stitutionality of the test-oath imposed by
Congress upon attorneys and counselors
is based on similar grounds, it holding
additionally that attorneys are not officers
Of the United States, and that the Court
is not the registrar-.of the edicts of any
other power, i. e. Congress, and that Con
gress cannot impose qualifications as a
means of punishment. 1t further holds
that, the case considered the petitioners
had received full pardons from the Presi-
dent for taking part in the Rebellion, and
that Congress cannot limit the effect of a
pardon which constitutionally restores to
full citizenship.
The dissenting opinion of Justice Mil
Ter holds that practice in the Courts is
privilege witch Congress may limit, and
not an exclusive right; that attorneys are
subject to legislation, equally as judges
that Congress had the power to prescribe
their qualifications, and that the oath i'm
posed is not an unjust discrimination
that the oath justly makes loyalty in the
past, and the pledge of it in the future, a
qualification. 1t denies that the test-oaths
are in substance bills of attainder or &c
post tactO, and argues that they simply
require the proof of loyalty as a condition
Of practice, and not as punishment for
past ofenses. 1t holds that the Presi- |
dents power to pardon does not dispense
with the laws; that /" he may save Grim
inal from the gallows, but a lawyer can
not by him be re-admitted to the bar. -
We place the substance of the two opin-
ions before our readers, with the belief
that if that of Judge Miller be not the
law, we have the monstrous anomaly Of
Constitution which gives treason the le-
gal power to evade the consequences Of
treason. and prevents Congress or the
States from making loyalty qualification
Of Office.
nSF~ We have been reading, at odd mo-