Western Reserve chronicle. [volume] (Warren, Ohio) 1855-1921, 1867-06-05

056 in 1878. The revenue rose, in both
years the amount paid on the nstional
debt was large-larger than 1t has ever
been since. The imports rose from
f27, 900, 900 in 1916, to S36, ,000, 600. A
second attempt was made to return to
specie. The history Of this effort at re-
sumption is thus narrated:
"In October, 1917, the directors Is
sued notice that they would pay spe-
Gle for notes of every description issued
prior to January lst Of that year. The
attempt was a failure. A great drain
of gold set in upon the bank, and the
sum paid in specie for these notes be-
fore the end Of the year amounted to
G2, 100000. The result of this expert
ment convinced the Government that
payments on July 5th, 1878, according
to the act then in force. They there
fore proposed to Parliament to grant
hesymbolic currency another reprieYe
for tWelVe-month, or until July 5th,
1919. The opposition passioately COM
batted and denounced this measure,
but they were beaten in the House of
Commons by 164 to 80, and in the House
of Lords by % to 9. 1t was during this
debate that Mr.. Hudson Gurney and
Alderman HeyGete declared against a
resumption on principle, ald the for
mer gentleman uttered the following
emphatic declaration and remarkable
warning; "But do what you viii, one
thing is certain; your pound of account
is not the pound Of account Of the days
of William I'LL; and under a debt of
ES40, ,000,00 you can no more force
back your prices to the prices of for
mer times, without ruin to all parties,
than you can make the shadow 60 back
on the dial"
Under the second "reprieve" the
country began to flourish again, prices
maintained high level, the Treasury
was full, imports increased and new
channels Of profit and enterprise were
opened, trade and commerce were in q
hourishing condition, and the Chancel-
lor Of the Exchequer boasted that in
three years he had paid offnearly thirty
millions of pounds of the national debt.
But this was not to last. A committed
of the House of Commons was appoint
ed to inquire into the question Of re,
suming specie payments. 1t reported
resolutions providing for q partial re
sumption ofspecie payments on Febru-
ary 1st, 1920, and proceeding by degrees
to a total resumption of specie pay
ments, which was to take place, at the
merit price of gold, on May lst, 1921
These resolutions were brought before
the House by Mr.. Peel in the month
of May, 1919. The government yielded
to the bullionists. and bill was drawn
up embodying the substance of the res
; olutions of the committee. Petitions
against the committees resolution and
bill poured into the House of Commons
from "the merchants, bankers and
manufacturers of BRISTOL" from ''the
principal merchants and manufactured
of Leeds" from "the merchants of Hal
ifax;" from "the merchants of Liver.
pool" and from FIVE hundred mer
chants of London. The bill, since
known as PEEL's act of 1919, passed
through both Houses.
The consequences are thus described
by the historian, Sir ARCHIBALD ALI
SON:
"The effects of this extraordinary
piece Of legislation were soon apparent
The industry of the nation was speedi-
ly CONCEALED as 8 flowing stream is by
the severity of an arctic winter. The
alarm became uniVersal-as widespread
as confidence and activity had recent
ly BEEN The country bankers, who had
advanced largely on the stock of goods
imported, refused to continue their sup
port to their customers, and they were
in consequence forced to bring back
their stock into market. Prices in con-
sequence rapidly fell that Of cotton in
particular sunk in the space of three
months to half its former level. The
country bankers circulation was con-
tracted by no less than FIVE millions
sterling; the entire circulation of Eng
land fell from e48, ,378, 900 in 1918, 70
S40. .928, 900 in 1920; and in the sue
ceeding year it sunk so low as s34,
I45, ,000."
Several tables of prices are given to
corroborate this picture, which we need
not publish. On May 1st, 1921, the
bank of England completely resumed.
One year afterward Mr.. Atwood, q
banker, of Birmingham, had occasion
to say: 1--WE have been thrown back
upon state of society in which all in
dustry and enterprise have been rem
dered pernieious or ruinous, and where
no property has been safe, unless hoard
ed in the shape of money, or lent to
others on a double security. That is a
state of things which in its results
leaves the landowner without rent, the
merchant without profit, the laborer
without employment or wages-which
revolutionizes property and deranges
and DISCREPANCIES all the different rela-
tions and interests of society"
We now append few of the deduc-
tions given at the end of the instruct
i've article from which we have collated
the foregoing facts, promising that we
do not accept them throughout, but at
the same time admitting that they con-
tain much that is true and valuable
The propositions are thusput. We be-
gin with the third in the series:
SO. That 9 forced and artificial con-
traction of the currency brings disaster
to every industrial, productive and COM
mercial class, and benefits only one
very small class, namely, the ''monisd
capitalist" as defined by Hudson
Gurney.
4. That the resumption of specie
payments fayors the national creditor
at the expense of the national debtor
and individual creditor at the expense
of the individual debtor.
5, That the resumption of specie pay
ments tends to render the payment of
national debt immensely difficult, if
not impossible.
8. That merchants, manufacturers
ana farmers, who give their mind to
this subject, are more likely to be right
on currency questions than bullionists,
pamphleteers and journalists.
.. That though nine out of every ten
bankers may be but poorly versed in
the theory of monetary science, yet
their practical good sense makes them
safer guides than cold blooded bullion
ist theorists, whose principle of action
is, perish the country rather than our
crochets."
8. That one of the bullionists' dodges
is to get up a Jacobinical outcry against
bankers, because bankers, with their
conservative bias, oppose an obstacle
to the rash empiricism of the former.
and that the producing classes should
point their suspicions not at the bank