Green-Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1844-1884, 1867-04-24
The Opinion of the Court in the
Mississippi Case.

In the | nlted States Supreme Court last
Monday the Chief Justice delivered the opin-
ion of the Court in the of the State of
Mississippi agt. Andrew johnson, President
of the United States, and f. o. c. Ord, on
the motion for leave to file bill, as follows:
\ motion was made some days since, on
on behalf of the State of Mississippi, for
leave to file bill in the name Of the State
I praying this Court perpctually to enioin and
restrain Andrew Johnson. President of the
/ United States. and +. D. c. Ord. General
commanding III the District of Mississippi
and Arkansas from executing, or in any man
ner carving out certain acts of Congress
| therein named. The acts referred to are
those of March > and March %, 1867, com
monty known as the Reconstruction acts
The attorney-Gcneral objected to the leave
/ asked for upon the grounds that no bill which
makes the President a defendant and seeks an
! Injunction against him to restrain the per
/ Torrance of his duties as President, should
be allowed to be filed in this Court. This
point has been fully argued, and Will
now dispose of it. We shall limit our in
quiry to the question presented by the objec-
ton, without expressing any opinion on the
broader issues discussed in argument wheth-
err in any case the President of the United
States may be required by the process of this
Court TO perform purely ministerial act re-
quired by law, may be held amenable, in
any case otherwise than by impeachment for
crime. The single point which requires
consideration Is this, can the President be
restrained from carrying into effect act of
Congress alleged to be unconstitutional? 1t
is assumed by the late Counsel for the State
of Mississippi that the President in the
execution of the Reconstruction acts, is re-
quired to perform mere ministerial duty.
: In, ~ 1,IrE
compounding of the terms :. ministerial -
and - executive" which are by no means
equivalent i'll import. \ ministerial duty,
the performance of which may. in proper
cases. be required of the head of depart
ment by judicial process, is one in respect to
which nothing is left to discretion it is
simple, definite duty, arising under condi-
tions admitted or proved to exist, or imposed
by law. The case of Marbury agt. Madi-
son, Secretary of the Treasury Il Cranch,
1917. furnishes an illustration. A citizen
has been nominated, conformed and APP
pointed a Justice of the Peace for the Dis
trict of Columbia, and his commission has
has been made out, signed and scaled. Moth
ing remained to be done except delivery. and
the duty of delivery imposed, by law,
on the Secretary Of State 1t was held that
the performance Of this duty might be en-
forced by mandamus issuing from Court
dali, Postmaster-General, agt. Stockton and
Stokes (12 Peters. 527), an act of Congress
had directed the PostmasterGeneral to credit
Stockton and Stokes with such sums as the
Solicitor of the Treasury should find due
them, and that officer refused to credit them
with certain sums SO found due 1t
held that the crediting of this money was
mere ministerial duty, the performance of
which might be infOrced in each of these
cases. Nothing left to discretion
There was no room for the exercise of judg
ment. The law required the performance of
a single specific act, and that performance,
it was held, might be required by manda-
mus Very different is the duty of the
President in the exercise of the power to see
that the laws faithfully executed, and
among those laws, the acts named in the bill.
Bv the first of these acts he is required to
assign Generals TO command in the several
military districts, and to detail sufficient
military force to enable such officers to dis
charge their duties under the law. BY the
supplementary act, other duties are imposed
on the several commanding Generals, and
their duties must necessarily be performed
under the supervision of the President, as
COMMANDMENT Chief
The duty thus imposed on the President is,
in no lust sense, ministerial it is purely ex-
ecutive and political. An attempt on the
part of the Judicial Department of the Gov
ernment to enioin the performance of such
duties by the President might be justly char
in 50 an absurd and excessive e1-
travaganc 1t is true that in the instance
before us the interposition of the Court is not
sought to enforce action by the Executive
under Constitutional legislation, but to re-
strain such action under legislation alleged to
be unconstitutional. But we are unable to
that this circumstance takes the case
out of the general principle which forbids
judicial interference with the exercise OF Ex-
ecutive discretion. 1t was admitted in the
argument that the application now made to
as is without precedent. and that is ofmuch
weight against it. Had it been supposed at