The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-10-21

unreasoning contempt of the advice of supe-
rior men. These are the very qualities which
make him strOng. A sledge-hammer is a rude
and simple instrument; but if its vigorous
blows be delivered upon a single point, it will
break the hardest stones. Garibaldi is in
some respects political force of the highest
order. In the first place, as q chief attribute
OF MS ascendency over other minds he has
that perfectly clear and settled perception of
his aims which excludes doubt or vaoiilation.
This firm grasp ofhis purposes cause vaguer
and less inileXible minds to lean on him with
confidence. This strenuous steadiness of aim
belongs to all men born for influences; but in
Garbaldi it is the rudder of a small ship,
With a mind of more breadth and penetration
it would make him a great man. Another
source of his influence is the simplicity of his
life, which gains for him the credit of single
hearted devotion to a cause. He covets and
enjoys reputation, but neither friend nor foe
suspects him of sOrdid ambition. With these
qualities, which are potent elements of leader
ship in all epochs, Garibaldi joins the advan-
tage OF moving with the most modern current
of his time, and of being fitted by his intre-
pidity to strike when other men would only
think. His ungovernable impulsiveness may
lead him to strike before the time is ripe, but
the electric effect even of premature blows
strengthens growing cause.
Millions Of hearts beat quicker at the fame
of Garibaldi's attempts. 1t signifies little
that intelligent men contemn his lack of iudg-
ment; the multitudes who admire are still mar
rover than himself and have therefore no
sense of his deficiencies. The glowing admira-
ton he elicits is popular offset to reverence
for the Holy Father which is rooted in many
hearts. Perhaps both sentiments are equally
unrefecting Each, however, having the
merit of hearty sincerity, is potent political
force, and each will be utilized to the utmost
by the stronger hands into which the contest
is about to pass. Garibaldi and the Pope, the
ancient and the modern spirit, are merely the
pieces on the chess-board with which the game
of European politics will be played, by men
who care little for one cause or the other
except so far as they can make it serve their
lust of power.
Napoleon makes the first move, and opens
the game with his customary duplicity and
skill. He Pretends that the Pope is in peril,
not from insurrection but invasion, and that
he intervenes against the invaders. When
he interposed to save and restore the Pope in
lS49, he pretended that he sent an army to
Rome out of friendship to the new republic,
although the Roman republicans had never
invited him. The use made of his troops dis
closed his real intentions. The purpose and
the motives are much the same now as then.
1t is an appeal to the sympathies of Catholic
Europe, and especially of Catholic France In
the rural districts, where there remains much
of the simple piety of the olden time, the
clergy have great influence, and the people
are not infected with the spirit of the clubs
and cOteries of Paris. While Napoleon is
strong among his Catholic subjects his throne
rests on a pretty secure basis, the
troops about the capital being a tolerable
safeguard against sedition so long as the rest
of the empire is tranquil. By strengthening
his reliance on his Catholic subjects he gains
heir support in the war for which he desires
preteXt, and weakens his possible enemies
by the same kind of appeal to their Catholic
subjects. A war undertaken to maintain the
rights of the Holy Father would begin on
plausible grounds, and if Prussia should in
teryenee France would easily place her in the
light OF an aggressor. Napoleon's industrious
preparation since the beginning of the year.
and the counter-preparation of Prussia,
equaly formidable, are perhaps the best in
deXes to what is coming.
If great war grows out of these troubles. it
will begin between France and Italy. If
Prussia shall come to the aid of her late allv
Austria will support Napoleon, and the war
grow to colossal magnitude 1t was by the
d combined arms of Austria and France that the
Pope was restored in lS49, and the Catholics
Of both countries would readily support their
rulers in a similar joint attempt. IT, as the
result of the contest Prussia should be hum
bled, weakened, and reduced to her former
relative rank, Napoleon would have accom-
plished his wishes, and Austria might be COM
pensated by the restoration of some of her
osses in the late war. These are probably the
aims in contemplation; but their accomplish
ment depends upon the uncertain fortunes of
var.
A London telegram states that the Times
ldvises the King of Italy to get beforehand
with Napoleon by promptly marching To
Rome, and occupying the holy city himself,
This would be a weapon with double edge.
Napoleon might thereupOn charge that Victor
Emanuel had thrown off the mask by open
participation in an invasion which he had
before secretly abetted. So far as Napoleon
3ould make this appear plausible, he would
have ground for accusing Victor Emanuel of a
breach of treaty, and would thus find legiti
mate caSus JeLf. The advice of the London
Times may, after all, be good; but it would
need to be followed with great skill in the
treatment of the Pope to prevent Napoleon
turning it to his advantage.