The Tiffin weekly tribune. (Tiffin, Ohio) 1859-1868, 1867-12-12

long endure tho large. handed rob.
berries Of the recent past.
For this discrcditable state Of |
things there are several causes. Some |
Of the taxes are so laid as to present |
an irresistible temptation to evado |
payment The great sums which Of. |
hcers may win by connivanee at fraud, |
create a pressure Which is more than |
the virtue Of many eau Withstand
aud there can be no doubt that the
open disgrace, Of constitutional obli.
gatious avowod by some Of the high.
est aud most influential meu in the
country, has greatly awakened the
moral sense Of those who serve iu
subordinate place.
TnE TENURE OF OFFICE Law.
The expenses Of the United States,
including the interest on public debt.
are more than six times as much as
they wero seven years ago. To col.
lect and dislurse this vast amount,
require careful supervision as we'll as
systematic vigilance. The system,
never perfected, was much disorgariE.
cd 10y the Tenure Of Office law, which
has almost destroyed official accounta.
bility.
The President may be thoroughly
convinced that an officer is incapable,
dishonest, or uufaithful to Sthe Con-
stitution, but under the law which |
have named, the utmost he can do is
to complain to the Senate aud ask the
privilege Of supplying his place with
better man. II the Senate be re-
garded as personally or practically
hostile, to the President, it is natural,
and not altogether unreasonable, for
an officer to expect that it will take
his part as far as possible, restore him
to his place, aud give him a triumph
over his executive superior
The officer has other chances ofim.
puuity arising from accidental defects
of evidence, the mode of investigating
it, aud the secrecy of hearing IL. 1t
is not woderful that official malfea-
sance should become bold in proper
ton as delinquents learn to think
themselves safe.
l am entirely persuaded that, under
such rule, the President cannot per
form the great duty assigned to him
of seeing the laws faithfully executed,
and that it disables him most especial.
ly from enforcing that rigid accounta.
bility which is necessary TO q due ex-
ecution Of the revenue laws.
The Constitution invests the Presi.
dent with authority to decide whether
a removal shall bo made in any given
case. The act Of Congress declares,
in substance, that ho shall only accuse
such as he supposes to be unworthy
Of their trust. Tho Constitution
makes him the sole Judge in the
premises but tho statute takes away
his jurisdiction, transfers it to the
Senate, aud leaves him nothing but
the odious and sometimes impractica-
BILE duty Of becoming prosecutor,
The prosecution, too, is to be con.
Quoted before n tribunal whose mem
bcrs are not like him, responsible to
the whole people, but to separate con.
stituent bodies, aud who may hear his
accusation with great disfayor.
The Senate is absolutely without
any known standard Of decision apph.
cable to such n case. Its judgment
cannot bo anticipated, for it is moi
governed by any rule. This law does
not define what shall be deemed good
cause for removal. 1t is impossible
even to conjecture what may or may
not be so considered by the Senate
The nature Of the subject forbids
clear proof. If tho charge be inca
pacity, what evidence will support it ?
Fidelity to the Constitution may be
understood or misunderstood in a
thousand different ways; aud by yio-
lent party times, unfaithfulness to the
Constitution may even como to be
considered meritorious.
If an officer be accused of dishon
esty, how shall it be made out? VIII
it be inferred from acts unconnected
T from public duty-from private his.
tory, or from general reputation OF
must the President await the commis-
sion of au actual misdemeanor in Of.
fee ? Shall he in the meantime risk
the character and interest of the ma
ton IN the hands of men to whom he
cannot give his conGdenoe2 Must he
forbear his complaint until the mis-
chief is done and cannot be prevent
6d2 If his zeal in the public service
should compel him to anticipate the
overt act, must he move at the poril
Of being tried himself for tho offence
Of slanderiug his subordinates ?
In the present circumstances Of the
country, some ono must be held re-,
sponsible for Official delinquency Of
every kind. II is extremely difficult
to say where that responsibility should
be thrown, if it be not left where il
has been placed by the Constitution
But all Just men will admit that the
President ought to be entirely relieved
from such responsibility. if he cannot
meet by reason of restrictions placed
Dy law upon MS acliohs'
| Unrestricted power Of removal frouI
Office is very great one to be trusted
even to a magistrate chosen by the
general suffrage of the whole people,
and accountable directly to them for
his Aets. 1t is undoubtedly liable to
abuse, and at somc periods Of our his
tory, perhaps, has been abused.
If il be thought desirable aud con.
stitutional that il should DO so limited
as TO make the President merely 4
common in former against othor pub
lio agents, he should at least be per-
rnitted to act in that capacity before
some opsn tribunal, independents Of
party politics, ready to investigate The
merits Of every case, furnished with
means OF taking evidence, aud bound