Dallas herald. [volume] (Dallas, Tex.) 1849-1873, 1867-01-19

son prescribed II Is against the enierpris'
ing ambition OF the department that the
people ought TO indulge all their Jealousy
and exhaust all their precautions, The
Legislative Department deserves superb
oriiy in our GGyernmcnt from other circup'
stances. Its constitutional power being AZ
once more extensive and less susceptible of
precise limits, II can, with the greater IA
cility, mask under complicated aud indi-
rect measures the cncronehments which II
makes on the co ordinate departments.
On the other side, the Executive power
being restrained within narrower com
pass, and being mere simple in ils nature,
and tho hcJudiciary being described by land,
marks still less uncertain, intentions OF
usurpaiion by either Of the Departments
would Immediately betray and defeat them
selves. Nor IL this NIL, As the Lcgisla.
| tive Department alone has access to the
pockets of the people, and has, In some
/ Constitutions full discretion, and in all n
prevailing influence over the pecuniary re-
wards of those who fiji other Depar,mer 8,
n dependence is thus created in the latter,
| which gives still greater facility to en-
/ cronchments on their former We have
seen that the tendency Of republican Gov
eruments is 10 the nggrandisement of the
/ legislative at the expense Of other depart
| ments. Mr. Jefferson in referring to the
early Constitution Of Virginia, objected
that by its provisions all powers Of Gov
ernmcnt, legislative, executive and judicial,
resulted to the legislative body, holding
that the concentration there in the same
| hands is specially the definition of dcspotic
/ Government. II will be no alienation that
Z a. ba arcicol ne n plnra l.
/ ity of hands and not by a single one. One
hundred and seventy-three despots would
surely be as oppressive as one. Aslittle will
| il avail us that they are chosen by our
! selves. An elective despotism is not the
! Government we fought for, but one which
should not only be founded on free princi-
| ples but in which the powers Of Govern
| ment should be so divided and balanced
! amotig general bodies Of magistracy that
| no one could transcend their legal limits
without being effectually checked and re-
strained by the others. For this reason
that convention which passed the ordinance
of p6uernmen mt, laid its foundation on this
hos;o--tl,at he legislative executive and
judiciary departments ""hou'd be separate
and distinct so that tne person s"'''a eN'
ercise the powers Of but one OF them at the
same time. But no barriers were provided
between these several powers. The ju l.
ciary and executive members were left de-
pendent on the legislative for their subsis-
tence in Office and of them for their con-
tinuance.
If, therefore, the legislature assumes o1-
ecutive AMI judiciary powers, no opposi-
tion is likely to be made, nor if made can
be effective, because in that case they may
put their proceedings into the form of an
act of assembly, which will render them
obligatory on other branches. They have
accordingly in many instances decided
rights which should have been left TO the
Judiciary and the direction of the Execu-
tive during the whole time of their session
as becoming hnbitual and familiar. Mr..
Justice Story, in his Commentaries on the
Consultation, reviews the same subject, and
says the truth is that the Legislative power
is the great and over wiling power in every
free Government. The representative OF
the people will watch with Jealousy every
encroachment of the Executive magistrate,
for it trenches upon their own authority,
but who shall watch the encroachment of
these representatives themselves Will
they be as Jealous of the exercise of power
by themselves as by others? There are ma
ny reasons which may be assigned for the
engrossing influence of the legislative de-
partment. In the first place its constitn-
iiopal powers are more extensive and less
capable of being brought within precise
limits than those of either of the other de-
partments. The bounds of the Executive
authority are easily marked out and detin-
ed 1t reaches but few objects and those
II
thout being brought in contact with the
other departments. Laws may check, ana
restraip, and bound its exercise.
The same remarks apply with still more
force to the Judiciary. The jurisdiction is
or may be bounded TO II few objects or per-
sons, or however general and unlimited, ITS
operations are necessarily confined to The
mere administration of private and public
Justice. 1t cannot punish without law; 1t
cannot create controversies to act upon; 1t
can decide only upon rights and cases as
they are brought by others before il. 1t
can do nothing for itself 1t must do cve-
rything for others. 1t must obey laws,
aud, If il corruplly administers thcmi 1t is
subjected to the power of impeachment.
On the other hand, the legislative power,
except in few cases of constitutional pro-
hibition, is unlimited. 1t is forever vary
ing It's means and its ends. 1t governs the
institutions and laws and public policy Of
the country; it regulates all its vast inter-
ests; it disposes of all its property. Look
nt the exercise of two or three branches OF
its ordinary powers 1t levies all taxes
it describes and appropriates all supplies:
II gives rules for discreet distribution and
devises of all property held by individuals:
Ii controls the sources and resources OF
wealth. 1t changes at its will the whole
fabric of the laws. 1t moulds at its pleas
ure almost the institutions which give
strength, and comfort, and dignity 10 soci-
ETY.. In he next place, it is the direct,
visible representative of the will Of the
people in all changes of times and circum-
stances. 1t has the pride as well as power
of numbers. 1t is easily movadl ...1 =. {. 5tcaG-
lily moved by strong impulses of cr@- ncr"'"r
feeling and popular odium. 1t obeys with
out reluctance the wishes sand will Of the
majority fortbe time being. The path to pub
lie favor lies open by such obedience, and 1t
finds not only support but impunity in
whatever measures the majority advises,
even though they transcend the constitu-
tional Units. 1t has no motive, therefore,
to be Jealous or scrhpulous in its own use
of power, nd it finds its ambition stimu-
lated and its arm strengthened by the
countenance and courage Of numbers.
These views are not alone those Of men
who look with apprehension upon the fate
of Republics, but they are'also freely adj
mitted by some Of the strongest advocates
for popular rights and the permanency Of
Renublican institutions. Each DEP artment
sbould have a will Of it own; each should
have its own independence secured beyond
the power of being taken away by either
or both Of the-others; but at ihe same time
the relations Of each TO the ofher should be
90 strong that there should be a mutual
interest TO sustain and protect each other.
There should not only be constitutional
means but personal motives TO resist en-
croael ments Of the one or the other upon
each Of the other. This ambition should
be made to eounteraet ambition; the desire
Of power to cheek porer, and the pressure
Of interest," to balance an opposing interest,".
The Judiciary is naturally and almost nee |
.-..~;lv n has hreu already sai0, the |