The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-11-06
SPIRIT OF THE PRESS.
EDITORIAL OPINIONS OF THE LEADING JOURNALS
UPON OURRBFT TOPIos-CoMPILKD RvRRH
DAT FOR THE EVENING TELEGRAPH.
pha Pope's DlIemma-SOme Definite
FONTS I'm the Late News.

The POpe's DlIemmR-sOme Definite
Points I'm the Late News.
From the ~ y Times
Seeing that our dispatches concerning the
Roman business come from Florence, Paris,
London, and Berlin, with occasionally dis
iointed and mendacieus despatch from Rome
itself it is no wonder that there should be
considerable confusion both in regard to the
military and diplomatic aspect of affairs. There
are few broad features, however, that can be
discerned, even now, with some approach to
clearness.
l. That the people Of Rome itself and the
other subjects of the Pope have refused to
take any part in the Garibaldian movement.
Q. That the Pope himself is determined to
hold on to the temporal power, though it
drench Christendom in blood; that he Will
soruple at no means in his power to retain
possession of Rome; and that, if he be not
forced out by such an improbable circum-
stance as q successful war on the part Of Italy,
he will retain his grasp OF the sovereignty
until he is negotiated out OF power by means
that he finds 1t impossible to resist.
3. That the limit of Garibaldi's revolution
ary strength is the force of three to five thou
sand that have been encamped at Monte RO
tondo, and that, while he felt unable to assail
Rome, and could neither make a show Of re-
sisting the French troops on one hand or the
Italian troops on the other, he yet refused to
obey Victor Emanuel's summons to disband
his forces, hoping and expecting that some
complication would presently arise with
France by which his sword would be made
available, and his end would be gained.
4. That the French Intervention, originally
undertaken by Napoleon with reluctance and
with the apparent assent Of the Ratazzi Ad-
os,,,p 10 10 ha %
as far as possible, giving offense either to the
Italian Government or to the allies of Italy.
s. That Napoleon, as soon as he had guar
anteed the Pope against overthrow, attempted
to initiate negotiations for the pacific settle
ment of the Roman question-such negota-
tiOns to be carried on in Conference, and to
have, as their unavowed but unavoidable aim,
the contamination of Italian unity.
6. That Prussia, though ready to support
Italy in certain contingencies, is by no m sans
so anxious to get into war with France as to
lead her to find occasion for quarrel in the
mere fact of French Intervention in support OF
the Pope.
7. That the Italian Government by reason of
the financial and military condition of the
kingdom, feels that a rupture with France
would be ruinous to it, and that even though
allied with Prussia, it would almost certainly
be bankrupted and broken up in the event of
war.
s. That the feelings of the people of Italy
are very strongly aroused against Papal domi-
nation, and that thereby the Italian Govern
ment is weakened and confused, and placed at
a great disadvantage on all hands and in all
respects and that, though we need not give
much heed to the threats against Victor
Emanuel and the outcry for republic, yet the
attitude of the Government towards France
and its position towards its Prussian ally are
greatly weakened by the conflict between the
people and the authorities.
8. That though rupture between France
and Italy, involving also Prussia, Spain, and
Austria, may possibly be brought about by
occurred thus far that leads to consider such
rupture imminent.
10. That, though the English are strongly
opposed to the Papal power and to the French
intervention, and anxious that Italy should be
allowed at the present opportunity to settle
this disturbing question, there is not the first
sign that the English Government will, in any
event, lift finger in the matter, or do any
thing more than perhaps interchange some
diplomatic arguments with France.
IL. There is no doubt from what has already
been developed that, excepting the Garibal
dams, all parties, Italy, France, and Prussia
are exceedingly anxious to avoid war on the
Roman question. If it be said that France
could have evaded all difficulty about the mat
ter by simply refraining from sending he
troops to Rome, it must be remembered tha
the Garibaldians threatened such an onse
upon the Pope as the Catholic powers coul'
not be supposed to permit, and that Napoleon
had treaty engagements which his tender con
science and his regard for his dynasty coul
not permit MIN to see violated.
-On the whole, il is impossible to forecas
the end of this extraordinary bewildering an
threatening affair. All parties feel that som
IA, To aud off D1r1fip
of the Papal question must quickly be found
There can be no guarantee of a months peac
while things remain as they are and hav
been. Intervention is a wrong to Italy, dis
grace to the Pope, and a weakness for France
1t is war in itself, and the generator of wars
And we should think that all parties, even tn
Pope himself, must feel by this time that onl
by permitting Italy to obtain Rome can thi
lOng-standing and intolerable difficulty b
settled.
The Caucus SyEtem.