Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1867-11-05

debt by another. L propose the pay
ment of the demand obligation by q
time obligation producing specie.
Again: The policy of the Government
should not wholly look to assuring
present comfort in brief respite, but to
the interests of posterity," you say.
True. 1t is doing so in the best pos
sible way-when it (Government) so
arranges the debt that it will bear
only equally as heavily, TO say the
least, on posterity as on us. / have
read much about leaving the debt
to posterity-a debt skillfully placed,
and maturing at long terms, at a
comparatively low interest. But l do
not read much as to the enormity Of
leaving posterity damaged, broken
down, bankrupt country, bereft of its
energy, enterprise, and of its values. /
do not desire particularly that posterity
shall inherit from US currency similar
to that of the Confederate States at the
close of the war. 1t surely would not be
grateful.
Again: The Bank of England has but
little to do with sustaining the govern
ment credit of England. English secu-
rites are wholly beyond its control, and
Auctuate with the workings of the money
market. The Lank holds seventy mill
lions of government securities, on which
it can issue an equal amount of cur
rency. Its issue over that sum must be
only upon specie actually within its
vaults. That bank is depository of the
government, and makes advances as re-
quired in advance of the collection Of
the taxes. In many respects it is far
preferable to our national banking sys-
tenn. But such bank could never have
answered the purpose which the national
banks have--the sustaining of the credit
of the government in time of need.
English securities depend, like our own,
upon the confidence in them existing
among capitalists-not as to the GER
tainty of final payment, but the certainty
of the punctual payment of the interest
thereon. And this confidence the bank
cannot control. The magnificent bank
which you think would bring such pros
perity would be unwieldy, and could not
accomplish the desired end,
The government ought to furnish
currency for its people, but only to the
extent of the wants of the people and the
ability of the government to redeem in
coin promptly. But the people should
not be denied the same privilege-the
privilege of banking upon government
securities-which is all really the
national banks do. If national banks
did not own the three hundred and fifty
millions securities held by the Treasurer,
others would own them; and the govern
ment cannot escape its solemn obligation
to pay interest thereon in coin. Nothing
is gained by tearing down the national
banking system.
But everything is sometimes gained
by good party cry, and down with
national banks is as good as anything
else. 1t will be found, however, in the end
that national banks are good or bad,
not because of the system, but because
of inherent soundness or badness; and
each will stand or fall as it may be
sound or otherwise. The destruction Of
the system would result in adding to the
burdens of the Treasury the redemption
of three hundred millions of demand
now scattered among sixteen
hundred banks excepting the issues of
banks that might stand the trial., aud
to that extent put off what we all SO
anxiously want - the resumption oil
specie payments-which, pray, may
speedily come, with its necessary ulti.
mate result-prosperiy.
BANK TELLER.