North Iowa times. [volume] (McGregor, Iowa) 1867-current, 1867-07-31

a supplemental bill on Reconstruction.
President Johson vetoed it. Thus far his
bittcrest and most talented opponents have
answered the arguments of the Executive
with invective only: Whatever may be
said of candy" it will be conceded by
fair minds that his messages, whether in
troductory or veto-ical, are among the
soundest Constitutional State Papers that
were ever issued. The Jelo,c is the con-
clusion of his late Veto Message Of the
Supplement Bill "
SIN conclusion must respectfully ask
the attention of Congress to the consiera-
ton Of one more question arising tnder
this bill. It vests in the military COM
mander, subject only to the approval of
the General of the armies of the United
States, an unlimited power to removdfrom
Office any civil or military officer in each
Of these ten States, and the further pwer,
subject to the same approval, to detail or
appoint any military officer or solder of
the United States to perform the duties of
the officer so removed, and to fill III va
cancies occurring in these States by Death,
resignation or otherwise. The military
appointee thus required to perform the
duties Of civil Office, according 10 tie
laws of the State, and, az such, rei uired
to take an oath, is for the time bling
civil officer. What is his charactef7 Is
he d civil officer of the State, or civil Of
ficer of the United States? If he is civil
officer of the State, where is the Federal
power under our Constitution whichsu-.
thorizes his appointment by. any Fede'al
officer? If, however, he is to be consid,r-
ed civil officer of the United States, as
his appointment and oath would seemto
indicate where is the authority for. lis
appointment vested by the constitutidf?s
The power of appointment Of all officers
of the Uuitod States, civil or military,
when not provided for in the constitution
is vested in the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, with
this exception that Congress may by law
vest the appointment of such inferior off,
GERS as they think proper in the President
alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads
of departments. But this bill, if these are
to be considered inferior. officers within the
meaning of the constitution, does not pro-
vide for their appointment by the Presi-
dent alone, nor by the courts of law, nor
by the heads of the departments but vests
the appointment in one subordinate execu-
tie officer so that if we put this question
and fix the character Of this military ap-
pointec either way, this provision Of the
bill is equally opposed to the constitution.
Take the cause of soldier or officer APP
pointed toperform the Office of judge in one
Of these States, and as such to administer
the proper laws of the State, where is the
authority to be found in the constitution
for vesting in military or executive Off
Ger strict judicial functions to be exercised
under the State laws? 1t has been again
decided by the Supreme Court of the Uni
tsd States that acts of Congress which
have attempted to vest executive powers in
the judicial courts or judges of the United
States are not warranted by the constitu-
ton. If Congress cannot clothe judge
with merely executive duties, how can
they clothe an officer or soldier of the
army with judicial duties over citizens of
the United States who are not in military
or naval service? So, too, it has been re-
peatsdly decided that Congress cannot re-
quire State officer, executive or judicial,
to perform any duty enjoined upon him
by law of the United States. How,
then, can Congress confer power upon an
executive officer of the United States to
perform such duties in a State If Con-
gress could not vest in Judge Of one Of
these States any judicial authority under
the United States by direct enactment, how
can it accomplish the same thing Indirect
ly by removing the State judge and put
ting an officer of the United States in his
place? 10 me these considerations nre
conclusive of the unconstitutionality ofthis
part of the bill now before me, and ear
nestly commend their consideration to the
deliberatiye judgments OF Congress-.
Within period Of less than year the
legislation of Congress has attempted to
strip the executive department of the gov
eminent of some of its essential powers.
The Constitution and the oath provided in
it devolve upon the President the power
and duty to see thatithe laws are faithfully
executed. The Constitution, in order to
carry out this power, gives him the choice
of the agents, and makes them subject to
his control and supervision; but in the
execution of these laws the Constitut onal
obligation upon the President remains, but
the power to execute chat Constitutional
duty is effectually taken away. The mill
tary commander is, as to the power of APP
pointment, made to take the place of the
President and the General Of the army
the place Of the Senate, and any attempt
on the part of the President to assert his
own Constitutional power may under pre-
tense of law, be met by official insubordi-
nation. 1t is to be feared that these mill
tary officers, looking to the authority CIV
en- by these laws rather than the letter of
the Constitution, recognize no authority
but the commander of the district and the
General Of the Army. If there were no
other objections than this to this proposed
legislation it would be sufficient.
While / hold the Chief Executive author
ity Of the United States, while the obli,a-
ton rests upon me to see that all the laws
are faithfully executed, can never vii
lingly surrender that trust or the powers
given for its execution. can never give
my assent to be made responsible for the
faithful execution of laws and at the same
time surrender that trust and the powers
which accompany it to any other executive
officer, high or low. If this executive
trust, vested by the Constitution in the
President, is to be taken from him and
vested in subordinate officer, the respon-
sibility will be with Congi ess, in clothing
the subOrdinutes with unconstitutional
power, and with the officer who assumes
its exercise. - 0 ~
This interference with the Constitutional
authority of the executive department is
an evil that will inevitably sap the found
alton of our Federal system; but it is rot
the worst evil of this Legislation. tits a
great public wrong to take fromthe Ptesi-
dent powers conferred on him alone BY the
Constitution; but the wrong is more fla
grant and more dangerous when the pow
ers so taken from the President are con-
ferred upon subordinate executive officers,
and especially upon military officers. Over
nearly one third of the States of the Union
military power, regulated by no fixed law,
rules supreme. Each of the five district
commanders, though not chosen by the