Public ledger. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1865-1893, 1867-03-14
MORGAN'S RAID AROUND GIN
CINNATI.
The Pillaging of the Confederate
Soldiers.
The Hospitality of the Citizens of
Ohio.

From Gen. Basil Dukes History of
Morgan's Cavalry, we make the follow
ing extracts relating to the raid around
Cincinnati and the pillaging of the Con.
federate troopers. Gen. Duke, it will
be remembered, was the officer second in
command to Morgan on this memorable
raid, aud the one is generally credited
with furnishing the brains to plan the
campaign that Morgan executed or at
tempted to execute. Gen. Duke, we
believe, is now q resident of Cincinnati: !:
Moving at 5 o'clock a. M, from bivouac
at Summansville, Indiana, the command
reached Harrison by l o'clock of the 18th
of July. Here Gen. Morgan began to
maneuver for the benefit of the com
manding officer at Cincinnati He took
it for granted (for it was utterly impos-
sible, moving as rapidly as we were
forced to do, and in the midst of strange
and hostile population, to get positive
information regarding any matter) that
there was a strong force of regular troops
ia Cincinnati Burnside had them not
far of, and Gen. Morgan. supposed
that they would of course be brought
there. If he could get past Cincinnati
safely, the danger of the expedition he
thought, would be more than half over.
Here he expected to be confronted by
the concentrated forces of Judah and
Burnside, and he anticipated great diff
fculty in eluding or cutting his way
through them. Once safely through
this peril, hi, escape would be certain,
unless the river remain so high that the
transports could carry troops to inter.
cept him at the upper crossings. The
cavalry following in his rear could not
overtake him as long as he kept in mo-
fion, and the infantry could not be trans
ported so rapidly by rail to the eastern
part of the State that it could be con-
,centrated in sufficient strength to stop
him. His object, therefore, entertain
ing these views and believing that the
great effort to capture him would be
made as he crossed the Hamilton and
DAYTON railroad, was to deceive the enc
nv as to the exact point where he would
cross this road, and denude that point as
much as possible of troops. He sent
detaehments in various directions, seek
ing, however, to create the impression
that he was marching to Hamilton.
After two or three hours halt at Har-
rison, the division moved directly to.
wards Cincinnati, the detachmen mt coming
in in the course of that afternoon
Hoping that his previous demonstration
would induce the sending of the bulk OF
the troops up the road, and that it any
were left at Cincinnati his subsequent
threatening movements would cause them
To draw into the city, remain on the de-
fensive and permit him to pass around 1t
without attacking him, he sought to .ap-
proach the city as nearly as possible
without actually entering it and involv-
ing his command in a fight with any gar.
rison which might be there. He has
been sometimes accused of lack of en-
terprise in not capturing Cincinnati. 1t
must be remembered that Cincinnati was
not the objective point of this raid 1t
was not undertaken to capture that city.
Gen. Morgan knew nothing, and, IN the
nature of things, could know nothing OF
the condition of affairs in the city, or
whether it was weakly or strongly gar
Pisoned.
Starting that morning from point
ffty miles distant from Cincinnati, and
reaching the vicinity Of the city after
nigbtfall, lie must have possessed more
than human means of obtaining informa-
tion. had lie known these things then,
and be did not have o rapping medium
ON his staff. Moreover, OF the 246O eifec.
tiyes with which he had started, be had
not 2OOO left. He could get fights enough
TO employ this force handsomely, without
running into labyrinth of streets, and
among houses leach Que Of which might
be made q fsrti6oation), with the hope
that the town might be gnoccupied with
troops. or that Il might be snrFendered.
Our " copperhead friends, who could
have given us the necessary information,
were too loyal, or too busy dodging
Burnside's Dutch corporals to come out
The men in our ranks were worn down
and demoraliEed With the tremendous
fatigue. which no mas can realize or
form the faiutest conception OF nnnl pc
~ experienced it. 1t is as different
from tEa fatigue Of an ordinary long
march. followed BIZ some rest, as the
main given By an bonFs deprivation OF
water i unlike the burning, Fabid shirst
az fever. Had the city been given up to
US. aua had the least delay occurred IN
getting bosls With which to cross the
river. the men would ksFs scattered to
All quarters Of the city, and tNsniTfour
e. =.