The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-08-08


officers were excepted from its operation.
When il was sent down to the House. an
amendment was offered striking out the ex-
oeption.
This was voted down by what would have |
been tie vote, if Mr.. Alley had not changed |
his vote from aye to nay and saved Speaker |
Colfax the embarrassment of a casting vote. |
The next day this vote was reconsidered and |
the amendment adopted by 50 ayes against 62 |
nays. When the bill, as amended, was re-
turned to the Senate for its concurrence, that |
body, after debate, rejected the House amend
ment by 2S nays against IL ayes. II then
went back to the House, which adhered to its
amendment and called for committee of con-
ference. The result of the conference was the
following provisO, which now stands as part
of the law
Provided: That the Secretary OF state. of the
treasury, OF War, of the Navy, of the Interior,
General shall hold their offices respectively
during the term Of the President by whom
thereafter, subject to removal by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate.
President Johnson is understood to hold
that this does not apply to the members OF
his Cabinet who were appointed by his pre-
decessor. 1t will not be difficult to demon
st1ate that this is the correct Interpretation.
II is evident from the circumstances that
put upon a different footing from other Off
GERS in respect to their removability. Had it
been the design of the law to subject them
all to the same rule, it would have suthced to
strike out the exception in the original BILL
as the House proposed and the Senate by
strong majority, after a full discussion, refused
to do. 1t was argued in the Senate that, if
the exception were simply struck out, the
consequence would be that new President
would be compelled to retain the Cabinet OF
his predecessor whenever the Senate happened
to disagree with him in politics, whereas fair
ness requires that every new President shall
be permitted to select his confidential advi-
sers. The proviso agreed upon in the Con-
ference Committee was intended to meet this
objection, and must be interpreted with refer
ence to it. The proviso was a compromise.
The House yielded to the views of the Senate
as far as to allow every President to select
his own Cabinet and not compel him to keep
that of his predecessor; and the Senate
| yielded to the views of the House so far as to
make Cabinet officers, once appointed by a
| President, irremovable till one month after
\ the close of his:term, without the consent of
the Senate.
! But question may arise (and here, it seems
! to us, the controversy hinges) whether the
mere continuance in Office of a predecessors
| Cabinet operates as an appointment, and
! renders the officers irremovable. If it does,
| Cabinet; if it does not, he is prohibited from
removing only those whom he himself ap-
| pointed. Now the law enables us to decide
| this question with absolute certainty and pre-
| cision. 1t sweeps away all possibility of a
| President inheriting the Cabinet of his prede-
cessor without fresh appointment by himself
and new confirmation by the Senate. 1t
makes the term of every Cabinet officer expire
| by law on the 4th of April after the President
| goes out the 4th of March. They can no more
serve another day without a fresh appointment
| than the President can serve beyond the 4th of
March without a reelection. The law does
not contemplate any such thing as the con-
tinuance of a predecessors Cabinet by acqui-
escence. The law cannot, of course be retro
| active, and therefore Mr. Lincoln's appointees
continue until Mr. Johnson removes them
But when he has made an appointment himself
the officer is irremovable without the consent
Of the Senate until one month after the expi-
ration of his term of Office.
If Mr.. Stanton should refuse to resign, and
should dispute the Presidents right to remove
him, what would be the remedy We sup
pose the President would apply to a United
| States Judge for mGndamtS commanding Mr..
Stanton, by the authority of the Court, to sur
render the office and its archives. Ifhe should
refuse to obey the mandamuS, the President
would support the authority of the Court and
oust him by force.
we commend Ihe prudence ana good Judg-
ment of the President in making an example
of Stanton before meddling with Sheridan. AS
we remarked on former occasion, it would
be absurd to show extreme resentment at in
subordinatiOn in distant Louisiana and Texas,
while tamely putting up with insolent contu-
macy in his own Cabinet under his very nose.
On grounds of policy, as well as dignity, it is
better to make an example of Stanton rather
than of Sheridan. The radicals would pro-
badly take up Sheridan and run him for Pre-
sident. He courts removal as the greatest
stroke of luck that could befall him. 1t would
be no punishment to aid him in his aspirations
for the Presidency. But Stanton clings to
Office as a coward clings to life. He dies with
out any hope of resurrection. The Republi-
cans might as well think of digging up rotten
carcass and running it for the Presidency; as
of running Stanton to compensate him for his
loss of office.