Rutland weekly herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1859-1877, 1867-12-26
The Sor,hiisId Catastrophe.

builder OF the Vermont Central Railroad
10 reference to the Northaeld calamity.
Later testimony goes 20 show that the
urging of the engineer, Abbott, by Mr.
rcnney, in part made him responsible
for the accident: lama
|, Harvey Tenney OF st. Adams, de-
pose and say that am the master bridge
builder on the Vermont Central Rail.
road, and on the day of the accident rode
up from the depot to the Harlow Bridge
on the engine; | sat on the flremsns
seat; think there was i've in all on the
engine; l was the master mechanic In
reconstructing the bridge; | hire the
help on the bridges; l came 10 North.
field on Monday on the mail train Ia the
| forenoon | commenced work on that
day, Dec, 9th did not erect any hunt.
ers on the south end of the bridge on
| Monday. Mr.. Locklin came down on
the same train with me from st. Adams.
He and had no consultation about the
carrying past the trains; the first
knew OF bunter being erected on the
South side was on Thursday morning :;
heard nothing said about bunter be-
ing erected on the north side; we had
between 20 and 80 hands; might have
been so. Abbott was running the train
at the tire of the disaster; had not
noticed whether he had run it all the
time before; | have known him for years;
think he had had some trouble before
this in some way, but cannot say when
or how-some trouble shout his train or
engineering. The business OF this con-
struction train was to move material
and carry the men 10 their meals aud
work. Mr.. Locklin, supposed, had the
charge of the train, aud when wanted
anything done | called on him for the
train. Mr.. Lscklin is officially above
me, but he did not assume TO dictate to
me in this work. On Monday l only
cause down after my dinner, and on
Wednesday came down at noon
to be shaved, which is the
reason why was on the train.
boarded at Mr.. Smiths, near the work.
l did not think before Wednesday OF the
train running unusually fast before that
time; cannot tell how near the chasm
the trains ran before the accident, but
probably five or six rods heard moth.
ing suggested Of any danger before the
accident. When the men were getting
into the train passed along and got in.
to the engine; some OF the men got on
after | did The train started between
and o'clock; I said to Mr.. Abbott to
ring his bell and hurry the men up;
don's think | said any other thing he
said there was rail broken in the yard
and had got to go out on another track.
He ran out north to get on to this track
and | asked him WAY he went that way.
| did not discover as Abbott YVES cross,
| and | was not there were some men
left who could not all be seated at the
first table; the train was coming back
after these men; 1 might have said
something about his coming back after
them; don't know as I did; the under
standing was he should come back after
the men, but have no recollection OF
speaking to him about II. sat on the
fireman'S seat all the way up; the en-
ginePr was in his place, and another man
between the engineer and myself - |
think it was Bliss; between the depot
and Elbow bridge did not discover as
we were running unusually fast; about
half way between the Elbow bridge and
the Harlow bridge I thought we were
going too rapidly; did not look out to
form any conclusion as to the speed we
were running; I can't say what the
first warning was the first | thought
others had discovered the danger; they
were putting on the brakes rapidly l
don't recOlleCt as | spoke to the
engineer going up; don't think
did did not notice as others spoke :;
the first time looked out and saw the
danger was when | looked through the
window and saw Haskins. leave and I
thought the train would go into the
Chasm. cannot tell as Abbott shut
OFF steam. crossed on to his side and
jumped as soon as |. could see place 4;
did not notice Locklin until after the &C
cident; do not know as we looked 10
see where we were until after we jumped
of; think stood on my feet am not
certain. | was not 100 feet from the
Chasm when | jumped when | struck
the ground should think the passenger
car was going over and the timber fol-
lowed ; should think 1t was fifty feet
from the top OF the abutment to where
the men landed; l crossed over the
track forward of the engine and went
down where the men were | cannot de-
scribe the situation Of the men | could
not go to them, was so overcome l
should say there was between fifty and
sixty men went over; my opinion is
that the engineer forgot that the bridge
was gone and was absent-minded at the
time; | do not think l said anything
Of the danger; there was no time for
talking, we were so close TO the chasm :;
have not talked with Abbott about the
accident since it occurred | should
think it was safe without any bunter
for an ordinary prudent engineer, but
not such as Abbott has proven himself
to be; there has been a bunter put up
since; | do not know by whose order.
We don't consider it necessary to put
up bunter when bridge is burned or
carried away; it Is supposed engineers
know Of it. 1t is customary 10 back up
trains at such place so as to get near
TO unload. Since '-'s day they have
turned the tralne q think; have
talked with l. e. mt IT il vVss the