Daily Davenport Democrat. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1864-1874, 1867-01-11

lives Of the people will watch with Jealousy
avery cncroachment Of the Executive NaR-
istrate, for IL trenches upon their own ana
lhority. But whe shall watch the eneroach.
rnents Of these Representatives themselves!
will they be No jealous Of the exercise Of
power BY themselves ~ by others! There
are many reasons which my be assigned
for the cngrcssing influence Of the legisla>
tive department. In the first place, its con-
stitutonal powers are more extensive and
less capable Of being brought within the
precise. limits than those Of either OF the
other departments. The bounds Of execu~
tive authority are easily made out and de-
fined; it has few objects and these ere
drawn; can not transcend them without be.
ing brought in contact With other depart.
ments OF law that check and restrain in
bounds ito exercise; the same lcmashs ap-
ply with still greater foscs to judiciAry-the
Jurisdiction u, Or may b confined 70 .
few objects q psseons, o. however unlinit.
ID, Its operations ere necessarily
eonfined 10 The mere administration Of priv
vate and public justice; It cannot punssh
without Lao /; u cannot create cenerovofaies
70 act upon il can decide only upoa he
rights Of sasss brought BY others bsSors Il
Il can do nothing fer itself-its 0uso Do
svssythioe for Others Il mus Soey Laws,
end Il cos5uptly administered, u subject TO
o. the other hand, legisla.
tive power. except 10 the few cases the Con.
stitution prohibited, u 10 forever varying its
means and its ends It governs the institu.
tone and Law, and public policy Of the Con-
stitution it regulates all IL past interests;
It disposcs Of al it, property. Look but q
the exercise Of two OF three branches Of it,
ordinary powers il lsvies oil taxes il di.
reefs and appropriates all supplies, Il gives
rules for the distribution Of oil property held
BY Individuals it controls the sources and
resources Of wealth it changes, ct its will,
the whole fabric Of laws it molds at ito
pleasure almost al the institutions which
give strength, and comfort, and dignity to
society. In The next place, i 10 the direct
visible representative Of the will of the peos
pie, in oil changes Of time and circumstances
It has the pride - well - power Of numbers.
end L 10 easily moved By the strong in.
pulse Of popular issling and popular odium;
il obeys without reluctance the wish and
will Of the majority for the time being, with
public favor lets open BY such obsdsenes,
and Il 6nds not only support. but impunity
in whatever measures the majority advises.
even though they Transcend the eonstitu.
tional limits. II has no motive, thesefere,
70 b jealous end scsupuloue in its own use
Of power, and Il finds its ambition stimula.
I'd and IL arm strengthened By the counts.
nance and courage Of ito members. These
views ere not alone those of men who look
with apprshension upon The fate Of rspublics.
but they ore also freely admitted BY some Of
the strongest advocates fof popular money,
nor men that command armies or ap<
pointed 70 Office. Il 10 never brought into
contact with the people BY constant appeals
and solicitations, and private intercourse,
which belong to oil other departments Of
Government, IL 10 ssen only in controversies
or in trials anu punishments; it, rigid JUS
tice and impastiality give Il no claims 70 fa>
v0s, however they may to respect 1t stands
solitary and unsupported, except BY that
portion Of pablo opinion which 10 interest.
ed only in The Strict adm,nistration Of jus.
tics. Il ca scarcely secure the sympathy OF
Jealous support either Of the Executive OF
the legislative. II they are not - Is not
unfrsq isntly the case, jealous Of it, prefoe>
atives, the constitutional necessity Of scrus
timing the acts Of each upon the applica.
ton Of any private person. and the painful
duty Of pronouncing judgment /; that these
acts are departure from the law or Consti
tuition, can have no tendency to c0nciliate
kindness or nourish influence, il would
seem, therefore, that some additional guards
would under such circumstances be right,
and tho pronouncing Of republican institu>
tons, each department should have . will Of
its own. II can neither levy taxes, nor ap-
preparations necessary to protect its own.
Each should have its own dependence So
cured beyond the power Of being taken
away BY either Or both Of the others, but
At tho same time the relations Of each to the
other should lie 90 strong that there should
be mutual interest to sustain and protect
each other. There should not only be con-
stitutional means but personal motives to
resist the encroachment Of ono or both Of
tho others.
Thus ambition would 10 made TO coun>
teract ambition, the desire Of others to
check power, and the pressure Of interest
to balance an opposing interest. The judi
ciary 10 naturally and almost necessary
~, 20 has been already said, the weak
cot department. It can have no means Of
influence BY patronage; its powers can
never be welded for itself; it has no CON-
mand over the purse or sword Of the nation;
II would seem, therefore, that some additional
guards would uGder such circumstances be
necessary to protect this department from
the absolute dominion Of the others, yet
rarely have any such guards been applied
snd every attempt 10 introduce them has
been resisted with vigor which demon.
stratcs how slow popular leaders are to inc
trodace any checks upon their power and
how slow the people are to believe that the
Judiciary is the real bulwark Of their liber-
ties. II any department Of the Government
has undue influence or absorbing power, it
certainly has not been either the Executive
or judiciary. In addition to what has been
said by these distinguished writer's, it may
also be urged that the dominant party. may
by the expulsion Of sufficient members, or
by the exclusion from representation Of .
requisite number Of States, and reduce the
minority to less than one-third. Congress. by
these means might be enabled to pass law
that, objections Of the prees to the contrary
Notwithstanding, which would render ims
potent the other departments Of the Govern.
Wcut, auu maAc suVpcIuuv0 WuVScUOmo o0u
restraining power which it was intcodsd
BY the forms Of the Constitution
should Be sxerted by them This
would be . practical concentration Of oil
power in the Congress Of the Units0 States.
This, 10 the language Of another, Of the
Declaration Of Independence. would b pro.
.cisely the definition Of dsspotic. Ihavs pro-
cesded to produce the tsachings Of great
statesmen and constitutional lawyers, q the
early and latter days Of the Rspublic rather
than to rely upon % expression Of my own
opinions; 10 can not toe often fecur to
them. especially ct . ccjuncturs like the
present; their Application 70 our actual con-
dition is % apparent that they now come 70
rs q warning voice to bs listened to With
more attention than any previous period Of
our history. We have been cad are yet 10
the midst ofa popular commotion. The pas
sions aroused BY great civil war are stin