Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1867-04-30
germany Perfecting Her Field
Strategy-ImPorfanceO of Luxem-
q esb6rg-HOw Francs May be In

sbdrg@HOw Francs May be In
rfaris tApril I'D Correspondence of London Times.]
It's remarked as significant that some of
the. German papers have already begun TO
discuss military operations as II war were ere
actually on the point OF. being declared De-
: tween France and Prussia. J.
7gfb What has attracted most attention In
{, Paris is an article in the Gazette of North
Germany, Prussian, ministerial paper lt
3 saws: In war with France the German
armies viii have to operate on two princi-
: s. nal noints-AIsace and Lorraine, Belgium
is and the lower Rhine, separated by the.
hillv country between the Moselfe and the
Mense. In case of an offensive attack
against the west or the upper and middle
&c Rhine, it would be necessary to secure the
/, important; line Of operations, Mayence,
Kaiserslautern and Metz, which leads into
the valley of the Marne. This line passes
through network of numerous French
fortresses, of which the most important Is.
Metz a place of the first rank, aid yet of
slight Importance, II Luxemourg, alsean5
+ seven miles from it, is in our hands and
keeps ft in check. The holder of Luxem-
burg is master of the valley of the SarTe.
which is only closed by Sarrelouis but
sstllis valley cuts at right angles the line of
operations already mentioned OF an army
entering from the miodle hlIne e INTO Cnam-
pagne. If on the other hand, Luxemburg,
Is q French fortress, it is, especially in con-
cert with Metz. a danger for the lines of
Communication of that army, and, more
over, it would force it to weaken itself con-
siderably. by detachments for Investing
A Prussian LuxemDuTg Wouio snen oe IoI
3 us necessity; a French Luxemburg would
menace our lines of communication on the
right flank. The possession of Luxembourg
3 bY the French would also be danger for
thelPft flank ola German army advancing
from the lower Rhine into Belgium.
1frfT 1fah hoT nfF1fl
ofajHncture is Luxembourg, give TO That
fortress special Importance by reason OF
the facilities afforded by railroads In actual
warfare. These lines are-1. Nancy, Metz,
Lnxemburg; 2. Luxembourg, Namur, Brus-
sells; 8. Luxemburg, Spa, Liege; 4. May
ence, Sarrebruck, Sarrelouis, Treyes. Lux
emburg. The firstitwo run parallel to the
French frontier, touch several fortified
places. and are in direct communication
. with The central point, Paris, as we'll as
with the south and north OF the country
The strategy of the French army would be
greatly favored by this railroad parallel to
the frontier, and its displacement at Will,
g from the south to the north. and Utce cersd,
would be easy. The Luxemburg-Lieg
= line runs parallel to the Prussian frontier.
onthe Belgo-L o-Luxemburg line, connects tile
valleys of the Moseile and Meuse by the
shortest way, and cuts the Col0gne-ltege-
Brussels line near VeEyiers. To Luxem-
burg and the junction point of these three
:. lines must be Attached, in a French point
of view, great importance. Fourthly, the
important network connecting the valleys
of the Rhine, the Nahe, the Sarre and the
r ,Moselle debouches on Luxemburg, and on
it is the only line of communication by rail
Of the theatre of war In Lorraine and Bel
gium. It is of capital importance for the
Germans The great Importance Of that
place for as would be increased by the COM
!. pletion Of the projected line, Treyes-Co-
fonge and Treves- Coblentz, by which Lux
em6urg couldrbe put in direct communica-
Z fion with the strongest places on the banks
sgof the Rhine, and serve as advanced post.
: Thus. the equestion relative to a fortress, SO
81 we'll suited both for attack and defense
Z should be the object of serious examina1