Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1867-09-06

that an act of Congress of the United SfaIes L.u
been repealed by circumstances If ever Congroas
mas impaired constitutional judicature, once cs
taDllshed for the people, it was not by an mplioI
repeal; nor could it be done by any implcafion
but such as could be reconced with no other REQ
sonable interpretation of the statute supposed ~
work such appeal. In the present matter hove
er, the opposite implication, from al act viii
took effect on the same day with the first Of t}
Reconstruction s acts amounts almost to express
IA District IN common with all the Others ~ fni
lows: 'o lol
That the Chief Justice of the United STATE o,,,
the associate justices Of the Supreme Court shall
be allotted among the circuits nom CHRISTINA br
der or the court, and whenever q new aiioIII,elt
shall be required or found expedent by reasor
OF alteration OF one or more circuits, or Of the new
appointment OF Chief Justice or associate So,
tice, or otherwise, it shall be the dufv ~ H. -
to make the same, etc. (Act of I'd March, 1897
The circuits land consequently the districts
composing them) "now existinp'n 10 n o;.i
the day the first of the reconstrnct;,on ,S
ures took effect were the express basis of the 81
lotment, to authorize which was the object Of flo
above quoted provision. The possible "altera.
tion" of said circuits was anticipated shown
that until one or more circuits should be altered
by law, they were not to be otherwise reco0ni1aJ
than as heretofore: Accordingly the following il
Monday, April S, 1867 "
" Ordered, That the following allotment is made
of the Chief Justice and associate justices of the
Supreme Court of the UnitedStates amonr tbn
~
case made and provided"
The assignment of the several justices is suh.
joined, among which the following appears
"For the Fourth Circuit, Salmon p Chase
Chief Justice"
The first section of the act of Congress Of 18th
July, 1862, that the interruption OF the sessions
by rebel violence WAS the only change which Con-
gress was willing to recognize in the judicial bus
mess provides:
Hereafter the districts of Maryland, Delaware.
Virginia and North Carolina shall constitute tho
Fourth Circuit. az Stat, 576.)
1t Is thus made apparent, not only By earlier
but py eXtemporaDeous legislation, of the same
session. by the same individual! members and al
most on the same day, that whatever under the
Constitution of the United States, either of an
thorlty or Jurisdiction attaches to the districts
ana circuits as they stand in the statute book
intended to be, and must be deemed a.; d held to
be, of full force and virtue now as heretofore But
we have seen that a tract of country, composed Of
MATES or parts Of States, once brought under the
operation Of the judicial power, cannot, without
revolutionary violence, be deprived of or exon
Grated from it. Violence is the only recognized
exception, and that, by Congress- as we shall here
after see, Is recognized only while the violence
lasts, and then as unlawful derogation from
the judicial power.
If it be admitted that the judicial power is in
tact in the district of North Carolina, though the
subject matters of its authority are limited TO
category, it Is certain that upon those subject
matters the courts Of the United States for that
district are the supreme authority of the United
States.
The high prerogative of the independent iu-
dietary may be well illustrated i'll closing sketch
OF the Department of Justice, by word respecting
the conclusive and binding character OF a iudg-
ment at law 1t may be rendered even by an INFER
court but, if the court is competent the iudg-
ment may be defined to be the very law OF the
land for the particular matter adiudged a
Rawle, 289.) To suspend" a Judgment in a
manner not pointed out by the law is therefore
to suspend the law The Supreme Court says
There is no principle of law better settled than
that every act of a court of a competent iursdic-
ton shall be presumed to have been rightly done
TIL the contrary appears. So long as II
Judgment remains in force it is in itself evidence
of the right CT the plaintiff to the thing adiudged
and gives him right to process to execute the
judgment. The errors of the court, however al.
parent, can be examined only by an appellate
power" (VoOrhees Vs. Blk. l. S. 10Peters. i72,
473.)
Surely we need not inquire whether the Logis-
lature Of the Union has attempted to vest partc-
ular executive or military officers an "appellato
power over judgments, however erroneous,
which have been pronounced in court of the
United States. Let the inquiry rather be whether
the right of executing process which has issued
upon such judgment is anything else but one OF
the very rights OF person and property" which
II the plaintiff seeks to execute IL within Of
the reconstruction districts, the commanding Off
Ger is charged to "prOtect" by the express terms
of the reconstruction laws? (Act of "a March,
1867 sec. - 1t must be beyond dispute if the
authorities and the statutes which have been III
troduced are accepted, that the right of itigatng
in the Federal courts, and the right Of being tried
in them for violations Of the criminal code of tho
United States, and, of course, the due conserve
ton Of their authority in every form, are a part
Of the rights to be protected and the duties 10 be
performed 6g the TeSpectlUe commanders Of the r.
construction districts. In this view the error of
General Sickles reaches the full stature of per
version of authority, which if persisted in, must
Immediately acquire the character of the crime of
levving war against the United States, an under
taking which would not for moment be imputed
to the deliberate intention Of an officer honorably
distinguished for his gallantry in defence Of the
Constitution.
But, it might be said, may there not have been
doubt as to Jurisdiction Certainly in this,
in any other matter, there may have been doubt
But it would insult the intelligence of the com
mander Of the Second Reconstruction District to
inquire whether or not he supposed himself
thorized by law to forbid the Supreme Court of
the United States from hearing causes affecting
persons phabiting the States of North and South
Carolina, without his consent. Naturally
person could hesitate whether he had such
power, without considering whether it was not his
duty to cOerce the court by arms if it should re-
sist him 3D.! We must take it to be certain that L.
could net have been in tho contemplation OF Gen
eral Sickles, when issuing his order No. TO- to dls
pute with his sword the authority of the Supreme
Bench. Yet, it is equally certain, that if he had
been disposed to ascertain his authority, through
an adjudication by competent court decision
might have been procured with the greatest ia
cility. defendant could have raised the quCs-
ton of jurisdiction in nearly any at the term
If the judgment was then adverse to the power
of General SiCkles, 1t must have appeared easy to
procure final and conclusive decision in the SUI
prenie Court writ Of error. If that officer
had doubt on this subject then, he must have
known the only lawful course for its solution
Where q difference arises between a military
agent and court to the jurisdiction Of the
latter, and t1e former presulnes to decide it for
himself in his favor, the act can bear no other
name than usurpation. But it may be thought
he did so only to the inferior court and not as
to the Supreme Court. Now, though he may not
have suspected the fact, a moments reflection
must show that the interference which is under
consideration an interference by General
Sickles with the judiciary, including the Supreme
Court of the United States as whole and theforce
which, through his subordinate, Colonel Frank,
was threatened against the process of the Circuit
Court, cannot, l think, be distinguished in law
from a similar threat, rudey directed, to the
Judges of the Supreme Court at Washiugton.-
The process, which in Marshal G0odloe's
hands might, and, indeed, for aught that appears
here, may have been process issued in pursuance
of mandate from the Supreme Court, remandng
Il cause with directions for further proceedings in
conformity to the decision of that court. control
over such process, before remarked of any
final process, would be a control over the whole
proceedings, and the court ITSELF its august judges
of their judicial will. Moreover, if final process
may be controlled by the order in question,
may mesne process, or any step in litigation for
the order expressly commands that certain suits
be stayed, and that like suits, not yet initiated,
shall not be instituted. If the interference OF
process which is now in hand could be justified
so could an effectual interference, at any stage,
49, W al Inn