The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1867-10-30
war in Europe.

.,.,,onon of affairs in Italy hourly becomes
more serious. The insurgents under Carl
baldi are probably now in Rome. The Italian
Government is still inactive, no further mea-
suras having been taken to check the progress
oftbo revolutionists. Meanwhile, the French
Kmperor has put his threat into executions
and the French fleet so long in readiness at
Tonlon has sailed, with the expeditionary
force on board, for Civita Vecchia. 1t is mani
fest that Victor Emanuel and his advisers are
at their Wits end. They know not what to
do. With the September Convention on the
one hand, and the national will on the other,
they sta nd like the philosophers ass between
tbe two bundles of straw. Their position, we
init is difficult, but great statesmen are
ual to great emergencies, and the ''inac-
ity'' in this case can scarcely be said to be
uasterly."
m few hours. however, French troops will
in collision with the Garibaldians, and 1t
W be difficult for the Italian Government
On. er to hesitate. The Garibaldians alone
not a match for the troops of imperial
nee. But will the Garibaldians be left
neP Rather will not the Garibaldians null
until they cover the peninsula, and until
sounds are heard in any part OF Italy but
iribaldi" and "Rome !'' Even now, so
tn, roughly at one are the Italian people in
ogard to this Roman question, that in an
, lti- -Garibaldi movement the troops cannot be
trusted. It requires but the presence of
French soldiers on Italian soil to fan the spirit,
already wild, into uncomfortable fury, and
10 preoipitate upon the invader the entire
strength of the peninsula. In such a case
Victor Emanuel and his Cabinet must ad-
vance with the popular torrent or perish be-
meath it,
1t is a belief which is entertained by many
that Italy will not, under any provocatiOn,
allow herselfto come into collision with France.
We do not share this belief. Italy, we admit,
is not in present circumstances a match for
France. We do not say this because 10000 900
are not a match for 1900 600, but because the
Italian kingdom is too young, too poor, too
mperfectly consolidated, even though its
population were larger, to meet on equal terms
with one of the best organized and most power
ful military monarchies in the world. But the
blood of the nation is up; it feels itself him
dered from obtaining its own, and insulted
before the world and nations in such circum-
stances are but little in the habit of calculating
possibilities. Nor, in the event of war
breaking out between the two powers, would
the cause of Italy be altogether desperate.
Italy is not now what she long has been.
Since the breaking up of the Roman empire
almost to the present time she has been so
weak as to be at the mercy of every powerful
neighbor; but this weakness was the result of
disunion. Disunion is now no more. The
peninsula is no longer cut up into number
less petty principalities or dominated by
neighboring monarchies. For the first time
during many centuries Italy is unit and the
Italians have national existence. 1t is to
complete and perfect this unity to round off
into perfect whole this national life, that they
demand Rome. 1t is to hinder this unity, to
stunt this national life, that France now invades
the Roman territory. In contest with
France, Italians, whatever might be their
drawbacks, would have the incalculable ad-
vantage of fighting on their own soil for the
integrity of their territory for the unity their
national life, for the realization Of everything,
in fact, which is most righteous and most
noble in human aspiration. Not soldier but
would feel encouraged by the thought that he
was backed up by the sympathy OF his entire
people, and that wherever in any part OF the
world liberal sentiment had found a home,
prayers were breathed for his success. The
French might feel that they were graphing
not with the weak arms which their fathers
despised in the wars of the revolution, but
with somewhat of the sinewy strength of the
ancient Romans. The Italians might not be
able to drive Frenchmen from their soil, but
they might be able, as long at least as was
necessary, to hold them at bay.
The success of the Italian cause, in truth, is
largely dependent on the influences which
may be brought to bear upon it from without.
The civilized world is watching the movement,
and watching it most intently. Public opinion
is already excited and if war break out will
be excited more and more. 1t is not for a
moment to be doubted that sympathy will go
with Italy and against France. The effects
will be manifold Prussia may or may not join
actively with her former ally against France,
but Prussia will not fail to prosecute her de-
signs, meanwhile upon South Germany, and
ere France is aware OF it the German nation
may be unit on her northern border anC
the triumph of Prussia complete. Austris
can do nothing, even if she were willing, anC
she is but little likely to make the attempt
Russia, however, will not lose this opportu
nifty. She has long been waiting for it.
will have come at last, and we may rest as
sured she will turn it to her own advantage
Turkey will be compelled to cede Cret
to Greece, and it is even doubtful whethe
such sacrifice will satisfy Russian demands
The Christian provinces of Turkey are ripe fo
revolt If Russia but applies the match tn,
explosion will take place, and Turkey il
Europe will be shattered to pieces. England
meanwhile will look on anxiously no doubt
put with calmness and dignity, sympathizinI
heartily with progress and liberalism whereve
tney manifest themselves, but refusing to un
sheathe the sword except in defense of her in
terests IN the Mediterranean and the East
Egypt must not be touched and will not
worse than all this France herself NAV Well
10 the influence OF universal public oninion
and Napoleon, when too late. NAV fnd that
by the war he has very unnecessariIv COW
menced, he has sapped the foundation ~ hi
throne and ruined the hopes of his dyoa.t