The weekly North-Carolina standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 186?-1869, 1867-06-05

they may have been called, lam of the opin-
ion that their members are properly compre-
hended within this disqualifying clause, Ior
can imagine no official legislative posltlon
in which the duty of allegiance was more
distinctly violated.
The next and more difficult inquiry is who
is to be considered an officer OF the United
States or a judicial or executive ofhcer OF
any State within the meaning OF these clauses.
The various classes of officers are here IN
tended as State. Federal, executive or judi
cial officers. No legislative officer IS MEL
toned, except member of the State Legls-
lature or member of Congress. The des-
cription used as to other officers are as to
State officers, that they must be judicial or
executive, and as to a Federal omcer, the
terms executive or Judicial are not expressed.
He is described simply as an officer OF the
United States.
1t has been shown that the Federal officers
and State officers are classified separately IN
the clauses of the act under consideration.
(. I deem it profitable and conducive to clear
order to follow this classification. l shall
accordingly first consider what State offlcers
are included in the terms Executive or
judicial" This phrase is twice used in these
clauses, with the superadded description, lin
any State in the first clause, and OF ANY
State" in the second clause l think the
controlling term of description, If there is
any repugnancy in the terms, must be taken
to be the last, for that is used in the first
clause and to Others. Besides, it is the same
term of description used in the act of Con-
gress of 1889, declaring what State officers
are required to take the oath to support the
constitution of the United States, and in the
third section of the constitutional amendment
both use the same terms of description, "Ex-
ecutive and judicial officers of State" The
terms are so general and indefinite that they
fail to express with sufficient certainty a
designation of the persons intended to be
reached.
1t is ta be regretted in matter of so much
Importance that the rule of designation
adopted as to members of Congress and of q
State Legislature had not been followed up,
or if that were found impracticable, that
some more definite general rules had not been
declared. The uncertainty becomes manifest
in the application of the law, and this I'M
certainty necessitates construction. The ne
cessity for construction, which arises from
the generality of the law, cannot be better
stated than in the language of Plowden:
"Though the words be general, they are to be
| reduced to particularly by an exposition
| of the mode according to the intent of the
act of those statutes which comprehend all
things in the letter which the sages of the
law have expounded to extend but to the
same thing Those which generally prohibit
all people from doing such an act, they have
been Interpreted to permit some persons to
do it, and those which include every person
in the letter they have adjudged to reach
some persons only, are all founded upon the
intent, and collected by considering the cause
and the necessity of the act and comparing
one part with another, and sometimes by
foreign circumstances"
| deem it proper here to fix some clear
ideas of the general intent of the acts, and
by what rule of construction, strict or liber-
al that intent may best be arrived at The
intent as expressed is to enable the people
of each of these States to frame constitu-
ton for the State by the exercise of the
right of suffrage. There are clauses of the
act giving the right by general terms of de-
scriptiop to the people generally, and espe-
cially to those who have never enjoyed the
right before.
There are other clauses of the act, which
by general terms takes away this right CT
suffrage from those who havenjOyed it. The
rule of construction as to the clauses which
give the right must be liberal, and Gas to
them the general terms are not to be restrict
ed, but as to those clauses which derogate
from the existing right. the rule of construc.
ton must be strict that none should be ex-
cluded, who are not clearly within letter and
intent.
begin then with the inquiry whether the
officers of the militia of State, or those
embraced within these terms of description
and have no doubt that they are not, (ccr
tainly Congress, as to the officers of State
was not content to use the term at large and
without qualification, but as we see intend
ed to qualify the usual words to manifest
that intent,) would have been adopted, and
the terms would have been the judicial ant
executive, the civil or military officers of the
State. Accordingly we find when that wa!
the purpose as we see it was in the thirt
section of the Constitutional Amendment
known as article 14th Congress expressed
that purpose very clearly. That section pro
vides that no person shall be a Senator o.
Representative in Congress, or Elector o
President and Vice President, or hold an,
|
States, or as a member in any State Legisla
ture, or as Executive orjudicial officer Of tn
State to support the constitution of the Uni
ted States shall have engaged in insurrec
ton or rebellion against the same or giver
aid and comfort to the enemies thereof"
} This third section is expressly referred tt
more than once in these acts. 1t is made ii
fact part of these acts. Its language is fol
lowed word for word in these disqualifyins
clauses as far as was possible, excepting th
particular in which one is made to apply t,
, eligibility, and the other the right to vote
, When, therefore we find that Congress de
claring what persons shall be disfranchiset
! from holding any office, expressly include
the military as well as civil officers, as in tn
, third section of the amendment, and in pro
viding what persons shall be disfranchiset
from voting who held any office, and omit
to mention military officers, we cannot es
cape conclusion that the military officer
: were not here within their contemplation
1t is impossible to imagine case in whicl
the construction from laws in pari materi
: has a more cogent application, for it is evi
J dent here, that the law maker in framin.
J the disqualifcations of voters took specia
J cognizance of the third section of the amend
. ment and weighed it word by word, follow
ing it literally for the most part and reject
, ing deliberately the very word intended
embrace military officer.
j 1t must be borne in mind that we ar
J here considering the class of military Officer
who were such prior to the rebellion whe
the Office was lawful and who were know
as officers of the miiitia-not THAT class VIII
ifor IA q