Nashville union and dispatch. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1866-1868, 1867-02-19
WHY WASHINGTON WAS NOT TIA
KEN IN 1864.
From Gen Early's Memoir Of the Last Year Of

~ AHuE-
From Gen. Early's Memoir Of the Last Year Of
the War.
The rapid marching, which had broken
down a number OF men who werebareiooted
OF weakened by previous exposure, and had
been left in the Valley and directed to be
collected at Winchester, and the losses in
killed and wounded At Harper's Ferry
MARYLAND Heights, and Monocscy, had re
duced nav infantry 70 about 6OOO mnskeis.
OF tbose remaining, very large number
were greatly exhausted BY the last two days
marcbing. some having fallen BY sunstroke,
and / was satisfied, when We arrived in
front of the Publications, HAT not more
than one-third OF my force could have been
carried into action. ] had about forty
pieces Of Geld artillery, Of which the lar
gest we're twelve FOUNDER Napoleons, be-
sides few pieces Of horse artillery with
the cavalry. McCauseland reported the
works on the Georgetown pike too stfongly
manned for him 10 assault. We could not
move 10 the right or the left without its be-
ing discovered from the signal station on
TIE top Of the "Soldiers Home which
overlooked the country, aud the enemy
would have been enabled TO move in his
works 10 meet us. Under The circumstan-
ces, TO have rushed my men blindly against
the Notifications, without understanding
the state Of things, would have been worse
than folly II We had any friends in Wash
ineton. none Of them came ont 90 give us
information. and this satisfied me that the
place was not undefeuded. ! knew that
froops had arrived from Grants army, for
prisoners had been captured from Ricketts,
dirieiaa of che Sixth corps, az Alonocacy.
From Shapsburg / had sent message
to Moshy, by one Of his men, resquest-
ing him 10 cross the Potomac below
Harper's Ferry, cut the railroad and
telegraph, and endeayor 70 find ont the
condition Of things in Washington; bat he
had not crossed the river, and ! had re-
ceiyed no information from him. A North
err paper, which was obtained, gave the
information that Hunter, after moving mp
the Ohio river in steamboats, was passing
over the Baltimore aud Ohio railroad and
! knew that be would be at HarpeT's Ferry
sooa, as Imboden had done very little dam
age 20 the road west Of Martinsburg. After
dark on the lth / held a consultation with
Major Generals Breckenridge, Rodes, Cor
don and Ramseur, in which / stated to
them the danger of remaining where we
were, aud the necessity Of doing something
Immediately, as the probability was that
the passes Of the South mountain and the
f3rds Of the upper Potomac would soon be
closed against us After interchanging
views with them, being very reluctant 10
abandon the project Of capturing Washing
ton, ] determined to make an assault on
the enemy's works at daylight next morn
ing, unless some information should be re-
a.. IA
tieability. and 30 informed those officers
During the night dispatch was received
from General Bradley johnson, from near
Baltimore, informing me that he had re-
oeived information from a reliable source
that two corps had arrived from General
Grants army, and that his whole army was
probably in motion. This caused me to
delay the attack until ] could examine the
works again, and rs soon as 1t was light
enough 10 see, ] rode 10 the front and found
the psrapets lined with troops / had,
therefore, reluctantly TO give up all hopes
Of capturing Washington, after had ar
rived in sight Of the dome Of the capitol,
and given the Federal authorities a terrible
fright
Grant in his report says, in regard to
this condition Of things when / moved to.
wards Washington: The garrisons of
Baltimore and Washington were at this
time made mp Of heavy artillery regiments,
hundred days men, and detachments from
theinyalid corps" And in regard 10 the force
Of Wallace AT Monocacy, he says His
force was not sufficient 20 insure success,
hut he fought the enemy nevertheless; and
although it resulted in a defeat 10 our arms,
vet it detained the enemy and thereby
served TO enable General Wright 10 reach
Washington with two divisions of the sixth
corps and the advance of the nineteenth
corps before him" Stanton says in his
report: Here TAT Washington they (we)
were met by troops from the Army of the
Potomac, consisting Of the sixth corps, I'M
der General Gilmore, and a part of the
nineteenth corps, Just arrived from New
Orleans, under General Emory Taking
Grants statement of the troops which had
arrived from his army "a the most reliable,
they were sufficient 90 hold the works
against my troops, at least until Otherscould
arrive But, in addition 10 those which
had alrcady arrived. there were the detach-
menIs from the invalid corps, called, ! be-
lieye the " Veteran Reserve" TOT which
/ was informed there were about five thou
sand,) the heavy artillery regiments, the
hundred days men, and, ! suppose. the
part Of the eighth corpse mentioned by
Stanton. To al these may be added the
local troops or militia, and the government
employees. Some Of the Northern papers
stated Chat between Saturday and Monday
] could have entered the city but on Sat
urday ! was fighting at Monocacy,- thirty
live miles from Washington, a force which !
could not leave in my rear; and, after dispos-
ngof that force and moving IA rapidly as
% was possible for me 10 move | did not
arrive ia front of the Notifications until ai-
tcrnoon on Monday, and then my troops
were exhausted, and il required time to
bring them into line. | had then made a
march over the ClrCuitous route by Char
louisville, Lynchburg and Salem, down the
valley, and through the passes of the South
Mountain, which, notwithstanding the de-
LAYS in dealing with Hunters, Sgels and
WallaCc's forces is, Tor its length and
rapidity i believe, without parallel inthis
OF any other modern War-the unoppOsed
marauding excursion Of Sherman, through
Georgia not excepted My small force
had been thrown mp 90 the very walls of
the Federal capital, north OF a river which
could not be iorded 3t any point within
forty miles; and with a heavy force and
the SOnth Mountain in my rear, the passes
through which mountain could be held by
small number Of troops. A glance at the
map when il is recollectd that the Po-
tomac Is a wide river and navigable 60
Washington for the largest vessels, viii
cause the intelligent reader TO wonder, not
why I failed 10 take Washington, but why
had the audacity 70 approach IT as ] did,
with the small force under my command. Il
was supposed 10y some, who were not in
formed Of the facts that J delayed in the
lower valley longer than was necessary
hut an examination OF the ioUegoing nara.
tive will show that not one momeRt was
spent in idlcness hut that every one was
employed in making some arrangements,
or removing some difficulty IN my way
which il was necessary 90 make OF remove
80 az 20 enable nae 90 advance with pros
pect of Success could not move scroS.
the Potomac and through the passes OF the
South Mountain with any safety until
Seigel was driven from, or safely housed N
the fortihcations az MARYLAND Heights
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LNCTTING THE PERSECUTION OF
CHRISTIAN MINISTER'S
The Jonesboro Fiao Of the 18th, pub
4 ~