Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1867-02-15
SOME OF The RIGHTS OF MARRIED
WOmEN DETEKMINED.
What Isl Reasonable Amount OfBaEgase
Cor a travelling FemaIes

Reported in \. y. Times, Feb. 81
supreme Court, General Term, February 4
Before Presiding Justice Leonard, justices
Ingraham and Clerke. itawson vs., ~ Penn
k~iIgania railroad company. The court IN
this action gave a d cision on n case made by
the defendants and argued at the January
Plaintiff was q married woman, and
/ while on a trip from Ohio TO this city,
and passing over defendants road and
through New Jersey, she lost e quantity
of valuable baggage. She brought an &C
1 ton inner 0wn name Z recover It's Value.
The case was tried q short time since at
the circuit, when the jury rendered a
verdict for plaintiff for the full amount
claimed. The railroad company there
| upon took their appeal to he general
term, with the following result:
ABSTRACT OF Mr.. JUSTICE cLERKE's
OPINION.
The common law rule which vests the
/ property Of the wife in the husband, and
| gives him disposal OF her apparel, jewelFy,
etc, during his lifetime, is held 70 be
changed in this state by the various in-
I djctments since IS4S in relation to the
Z Property OF married women The act OF
1915 merely provided that the property OF
any woman who should thereafter marry
should not be subject to the dipOsal Of her
husband, or liable for his debts, and that
the property of any woman then married
should likewise be exempted from the
disposal Of her husband, except so far as
il may be liable for the debts Heretofore
contracted. In both cases it was de-
clared that her property should be sole
and separate, like thatof a single woman,
with the exception Just mentioned. The
act OF 1919 extended this privilege by pro-
viding that any married woman may
take by inheritance, gift, grant, devise
or bequest, from any person other imam
her husband, to her sole and separate
use, aGd dispose of the property thus OBJ
TAXED in the same name and TO the
like effect as any unmarried woman
could dispose of her property and 1t was
to be free from the disposal of her hus-
band and from liability for his debts.
The act Of 1865 still further extended the
urivileges- Of married women, and in the
seventh section il allows a married wo-
man TO a and be sued In the same a
ner as q single woman in all matters re-
lsting to her property, or which may
thereafter come tOher by descent devise,
beauest or gift Of any person except her
husband. We see that these several
acts were all progressive, each sue
cessively Increasing the privileges
of married women with regard TO
property but they contain nothing
which warrants supposition that a u
band could make any gift 10 his wife that
he could not have made previous TO 1913.
The act Of 1852, which is chiefly amend
atory, amends the seventh section refer
red to Of the act Of 1850 by emitting D
words except her husband after the
- NE------ q % 60 Nhuf Ehn NAV gTrn
and be sued in all matters having rela-
ton to any property obtained from her
husband as well as from any other per
son. The Judge thinks that, considering
the spirit by which this legislation WAS
set ON foot and the progressive character
Of these several ensctments, We might
safely infer that the legislature intended,
by the act OF 1852, to repeal the rule Of
the cOmmOn law, providing that a gift
from a husband to a wife could not invest
the property in her. She has plainly a
right to sustain an action for any property
which has been given to her by her hus-
band, whatever claims be or his credit
ors might have to it after it had been re-
cOyeled.
Hence the court held that the wife
could maintain an action in her own
for the loss Of that portion Of her
apparel and jewelry which was the gift
of her husband, as well rs that which
was the gift of the son.
ON the second question argued before
the court, the latter held that the railroad
company were liable, notwithstanding
the notice OH the ticket which they sold
to the plaintiff, that they would not
be responsible for an amount of bag
gage exceeding in value 500. The judge
saws the liability of common carriers
is well settled. They are liable except
for accidents which no human prudence
or foresight can control or avoid. That
common carriers may limit their liability
by notice, which is brought home to the
passenCer-that Is, by a special agree
ment-is well settled. But there must
be a positive contract. The passenger or
owner OF the goods must voluntarily
waive his or their rights. The railroad
company cannot rely upon the printed
notice upon the tickets.
rs TO the third question argued-that
is, the extent of ~defendants' liability-the
court said that quest ion was left solely to
the Jury, and very properly. What was
a proper amOuntOf baggage for a mar
ried lady or any other person on a jour
ney was purely one Of fact. It must nee
essarily depend upon the circumstances
Of the passenger, condition in life, the
nature and length Of the journey under
taken, etc.
The entire opinion written by Justice
would well be worth a perussl by
all our readers. We have only been
permitted to give a brief abstract. The
court came TO the conclusion that the
judgment should be affirmed, with costs.