The Newberry herald. [volume] (Newberry, S.C.) 1865-1884, 1866-10-03

W3R0ng IN respect 70 CRSE trIDuNalS vi w
the distinguished gentlemen who constitute
it, when 7 say here that my Judgment does
not yield its assent to that decision 1t Is
not my purpose to attempt reVie# OF that
decision. As law-abiding citizen, I am
bound by it, so long as it stands unre7ersed,
But am in induced to refer to this decision,
because It may, in the minds of some, seem
to conflict with the principles Of these
resolutions, and particularly of the one now
under consideration, and also because I feel
it due to myself as an advocate of this law
from its first enactment to the present day.
The history of this law is somewhat curious
when we consider the end to which it has
come. It is most extraordinary circum-
stance that it remained so long On the
Statute book, and thus established itself as
law in the minds of our people and became
the rule of their conduct for years, without
being seriously questioned by any depart
ment Of the Government until within the
last twelve months.
It was first enacted in December, 1851.
I was then member of the other branch OF
the Legislature, and was member also OF
the committee which reported on the bill. l
remember that it wasobjected to in the COM
mittee on the ground that it was unconstitu-
tional, because it impaired the obligation OF
contracts. The distinguished chairman OF
the committee, now oRe of the Law Judges
of this State, if my memory serves me right,
expressed his doubts es to the policy of such
a law, but admitted it's constitutionaEty sand
on the passage of the bill when the same OBJ
lection was made, defended its constitution
atty in an able argument. 1t became a law
for one year, and with amendments, has
been re-enacted every succeeding year with
out opposition until the last session. But
before the Legislature met atits last stsession,
this law received the sanction Of another
body, the Convention of the people which
assembled in September, 1865. By an ordi-
nance of that body this Act was notincluded
amongst the laws of the State which were
declared imperative and void by reason OF
their expiring BY their own limitation, or
because Of the cessation of the causes
which induced their anactment. This Act
was considered of such Importance that the
Convention were unwilling to risk the chances
of the meeting Ct the Legislature before it
expired, and hence, gave it operation and
force beyond the time to which it was limited
by the Legislature. If the State had con-
tinued under strict military rule, and the
Legislature had not met till this day, this
Act would have continued of force on our
Statute book, unless the Court had set it
aside. Now, when it is considered that that
Convention was composed Of the most sub
stantial men Of the State, Of many of our
most distinguished lawyers and Judges that
seven of the Judges who sat on the case re-
ferred to were members of that body, it is
not strange that this decision of the Court
excited surprise. The Constitution Of the
State was the work of their hands, and con-
tains similar provision to that of the Con-
stitution of the United States, prohibiting
the enactment of laws impairing the obliga-
ton ofcontracts. Their action on this sub.
iect may, therefore, be fairly taken as aeon
temporaneous exposition Of the power of
the Legislature to pass such law as this
But the Judges have decided differently
and with singular unanimity. No ole i'm
pugns their motives. They had the right
to hear and decide the case made, and the
responsibility of their decision rests with
them. I have said that Notwithstanding
this decision. I still adhere to the opinion
which l have heretofore expressed. The
principle which had derived from my yread-
ing and reflection on this subject, and which
I believe to be the true one, is to, be found
laid down in the case of Sturgis vs.. Crownen
Shield, decided in the Supreme Court of the
United States, and which was approved by
our own courts in the cases Of Lowden vs..
Moses, and Alexander vs. Gibson. It is this:
+NFhe distinction betweeY the obligation ola
contract and the remedy given by the Legis~
lature to enforce that obligation has been
taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of
things. Without impairing the obligation
of the contract, the remedy may certainly
be modified as the wisdom of the nation
shall decide" If the distinction between
the obligation of a contract and the remedy
toeRforce that obligation exists in the nature
of things, the obligation of contract is one
thing and the remedy is another, not by
virtue of judicial decisions or legislative
enactments, bHs independent of both. The
mature of things" their relation, truth and
reason make it so, The human mind, by
no process of reasoning can make the things
one and the same. Hence, all those decisions
and dicta which destroy the distinction be-
tween the contract and the remedy, or make
the latter part of the former, are illogical
and unsound-they conflict with human
reason and "the nature of things" If the
laws as to the remedy enter into and form a
part of the contract, then all the laws as to
the remedy must be part of the contract.
We cannot separate one part of the remedy
from another part, and say this constitutes
part of the contract and that does not.