Cleveland daily leader. [volume] ([Cleveland, Ohio]) 1865-1873, 1866-06-29

DIV the pEOOIs Auu / the OIdbc ldllS v BIONO |
any one thing necessary to sustain the charge
they fail to make out a case, for every man
is presented to be innocent of an offence I'M
til the contrary is shown. If that were not
the case then every mar would be presumed
to be criminal till the opposite were shown,
which would render society Q strange thing
indeed. You must, therefore, assume the
defendant innocent till the contrary is
proven, and this proof must come up to the
point of establishing his guilt beyond area-
sonable doubt, and if any one fact necessary
to constitute the offence is left by the evil
dence with a reasonable doubt as to its ex-
istence in this case, that would be fatal to
the prosecution, because our law does not
allow any man to be convicted of an offence
till every fact necessary to constitute the
offence is shown to nave existed bayoDd a
reasonable doubt. And these rules the pris-
oner is entitled to have applied to the case,
and they should not be lost sight of.
Now, in the investigation of q case of this
sort, it must be made to appear, in the first
place, that sueh q person as is claimed to
have been killed was a living being at the
time. Was Rosa COlvin, then, on the oath
of March last, q living woman ? and for the
satisfaction of that you must look to the evil
dence. Does the evidence show it? Does
it show it beyond a reasonable doubt?
His Honor the Judge here went into a
detailed review of particular acts in the
case, which our limited space compels us to
omit, and in the course of his very lucid,
comprehensive and mastery application of
the foregoing principles to the particular
facts, made some points which cannot fail
to be of general interest, som of which we
here cOndense:
The difference between what is called di-
rect and what is called circumstantial evil
dence is, that while the former is testimony
of the immediate fact by an eyewitness,
the latter is testimony of such facts sur
rounding the main fact, and compels the
Inference in the reasoning mind of the exist
ence of the main fact to be proved. And
this inference must be the only inference
reasonably dedueible from the facts proved.
and the facts relied upon as supporting the
inference must not be reasonably reconcila-
BILE with any contrary or different infer
ence and the inference must not only be
established in the mind beyond a reason
able doubt, bat each and every fact going
to sustain the inference and making it GER
tain beyond q reasonable doubt must be es-
tablished by correct and positive testimony
establishing them beyond q reasonable
| doubt for the law will permit an inference
to be based upon an inference. Therefore,
in this case, every particular circumstance
or fact depended upon by the prosecution
to support the inference of generalization
aud deliberation must be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt-must be shown with the
same degree of certainty as any of the main
facts before alluded to, as, for example, the
fact of such q woman as Rosa COlvin living
on the day specified. Further, the facts
proved must exclude every ether inference
for a set Of facts consistent with another in
ference than the one claimed cannot be
said 10 support that inference beyond q rea.
sonable doubt. Any fact which is consistent
with the suppOsitiOn that there was not any
d liberation and generalization canuOt be
rightfully claimed to establish the inference
OF elaboration and generalization, for if the
facts are consistent with either proposition
they cannot be said to establish anything.
The Jury may go beyond the evidence of
particular facts alledged to have existed be-
fore and after the killing for the purpose of
finding support to the reference of premedi-
tation and elaboration. They may find it
IN the transaction itself, and have no doubt
that may look at any facts they may find
in the case for the purpose of inferring de-
liberation and generalization, for / think a
state of things might easily be conceived TO
exist when a death had been caused-a
state of facts from which one conclusion,
and only one, could be drawn, as to
whether the killing had been done on a
sudden quarrel or on q second thought; and
whether there was a thought and design
formed before and then deliberated on and
carried out, is for She Jury to determine
from all the facts in the case. Il is not for
the Court to give any opinion as to the
facts. That Is for the Jury entirely; both
the facts proved directly and what refer
ences can be drawn with reasonable cor
talnty from those facts. The same re-
mark is applicable to all of the
other evidence relied upon so far
as they rely upon the conversation
hal with Mcconnell himself.
Look at all the whole testimony in the
case, ascertain all the facts and draw from
these facts the conclusion which to your
minds seems proper, and draw snch only
as you can entertain beyond a reasonable
doubt, in the first place whether this was a
case of murder, and if so whether Alexan-
der Mcconnell did it on the 25th of March,
1866, and whether if he committed the
murder he committed it with deliberate
and premeditated malice. This deliberate
and premeditated malice as I have already
stated, must be established lust as fully as
any other material fact in the case
by evidence going beyond the fact of
malice and intentional killing. If you
ind all these elements to exist, that he
killed this woman, that he intended to do
wrong, that he maliciously, purpOsely, and
of premeditated malice killed her, it will
be your duty to find him guilty of murder
IN the first degree, and in that case it would
be your duty to return in your verdict not
simply that he is guilty Ofmurder, but that
he is guilty of murder in the first degree.
If you find that he committed this murder,
but that there was no elaboration and pre-
meditation, but that no purposely and ma
liciOusly killed her without reconciliation
and deiberstion, then it will be your duty
to find him guilty of murder in the second
degree only. IF you nnd-but it is hardly
necessary to state the proposition because
the presumption as before stated, in this
State, is where a killing is found, the pre-
sumption is that it was done purposely and
maliciously, and it is for the slayer to dis
prove those Prescriptions of the law, and in
no case to reduce the offence below murder
in the first degree. the defendant must show
that it was done unintentionally. If it was
upon 3 sudden quarrel, and that appeared
then the offence might be reduced to man
slaughter, but in the absence of evidence as
TO how 1t was done, the law will presume it
TO have been done malieiously and purpose
ly. II there was simply an assault and
battery and the death came from some other
cause or accident you will find him guilty
Of simply an assault and battery.
The case was then submitted to the jury,
who retired to agree upon a verdict. Sup
per was served them by the Sheriff at eight
o'clock. Up to eleven o'clock last evening
our reporter waited for the verdict" but
in vain. a verdict will doubtless be agreed
upon this morning, which in the meantime
tits idle to attempt to anticipate
We have closely watched the case through
out and cannot but commend the manner
and spirit in which it was conducted, both
by the prosecution and the defence. Mr..
A. T. Shades opening argument fer the State
was pointed and finely made Mr.. Knights
argument was searching and replete with
logic, method and pathos, and was listened
to with great attention. Of the arguments
of Mr.. Palmer and Mr.. Castle we have
already expressed a very favorable opinion.
REAL ESTATE SALEs.-The following trans-
fers of real estate have been placed on re-
cord within the past few days:
Maria J. Brown to Purdy & Mcneil, un-
divided one-half of sub-lots 20 and "a, and
east half of sub-lot 10, Peach orchard al
lotment, city of Cleveland. Consideration
$50.
Thomas B. Forbs to Marcus A. Brown,
100 acres of land in lots Nos. 81 and Il,
township of Parma. Consideration 5000.