The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1866-01-18
sflasigrille slniua.
wx. CAMERON q CO., Publishers.
GEN. GRANTS REPORT.
How Received in Europe.
General Grants RepOrt---HIis The
Ory OF War.


General Grants theory Of war is sim
ply this have 250,000 men to the
/ $50 900 of the enemy. ! shall not at
tempt any strategiesl movements.
shall not try myself in the open field OF
rass canlpogas against Lee; but I viii
| fight the enemy whenever l can, in the
conviction that will make him lose as
many men ss l do, and that at last,
when | have reduced my army 10 l50,-
600, he will only have $1,000, and that
must then win He saw no posi-
ton, praeticed no grand mEneuver, but
kept on pressing his enemy eontinu-
ously on an outer circumference, and
eventually moving round froa right 70
left, till his line wheeled round and
stood facing the point from which il
had started. He saw that it was not
| Richmond but Lees army which was
the heart and soul Of the Confederacy ;
and he hammered away till the head OF
his hammer was nearly hattened and
destroyed; but at the same time other
| tremendous armies we're hammering
away ct the Confederates on similar
principles, and the terrible rule in
| arithmetic was worked out But who,
seriously aad candidly speaking, will
pronounce that such a system IS enti-
| tied to the praise reserved for high
efforts of military genius Not General
Grant, for he appeals to the great end
in view es the justification OF his prac-
tice. He car, certainly say that, where
as his predecessors filed every ditch
with dead, and marched forward or
backward over slaughtered thousands
OF their men, he alone plucked victory
from the holocaust, and that the slain
Of Spottsylvanis and Petersburg were
the ramps over which he strobe to sue
cess. On 2 future occasion we shall ex
anime the report, which is worthy Of a
most attentive examination, and is en-
titled 10 very high praise, although it
does not. we think, deserve all which
has been said of it in America Of
Grants genius for the work to be done,
there can be no doubt appreciated
the situation and the forces OF the com
batants in the cleaFest manner; and if
the American Congress reyives the rank
of General, as is proposed, in his favor,
be can take it with the consciousness
that no one on the continent IS 50 wor-
thy Of the position.
CES. GRANT AND HIS sCBORDiNATEs.
From The London . .ay NeSs. Dec. %.
But able as the plan sketched out BY
General Grant was, and based as it was
upon established military principles,
its execution would have been impOssi-
bic if those who acted under the Com
mander-in- Chief had been different
men. In field Of war so extensive as
that of the United States, it IS simply
impossible for the Commander inChief
to give detailed instructions to each of
his subordinates. And so it was with
General Grant When he is explaining
MS views to such men as Butler ana
Banks, he certainly deseends into de-
tails, because it is Obvious that he had
no confidence in their military capaci-
ty. But in dealing with Shermsn,
Meade or Sheridan, ne contents lam
self with the most general instructions.
He sees them, talks to them, satisfies
himself that they comprehend the
principles upon which he Is acting, and
then leaves them, in the confident ex-
pectation that they will execute them
10 the fullest extent possible. But
observe, two conditions are needed be
fore the plan can be followed. The irst
l., that the Commsnder-in-Chief and
his Lieutenants shall act on the same
general theory. The same principles Of
war must be assumed to be true by the
chief and by his subOrdinstes, and this
condition cannot be secured unless both
parties have received "a military educa-
iion, and have given in their adhesion
TO the same military principles. The
time lost in explaining TO a subOrdi-
nate the principles and the mode OF
carving them into effect would have
made il impossible for Grant to have
begun or completed the necessary
movements within the time at his dis
posal.
Fortunately, however, the officers
under Grant had been educated in the
same school ss himself, and thoroughly
understood the theory of war which
they were called upon 10 put into prae-
tice. But something more than
knowledge Of principles Is required in
an effective GeneFsl. He must be able
to put his theory into practice This
result can only be secured by the Com
msnder-in Chief exercising sound judg-
ment With him rests the selection of
/ those who are to execute his commands.
If he fails in selecting the fttest men,
be must himself fail, however admirs-
ble may be his plans. The power Of
selecting the right man IS essential to
military success. Accordingly, this is g
power which has teen possessed by
every great commsnder--by none more
than by Napoleon, Wellington and
Marlborough. And it is q power which
was surely possessed by the man who
selected Sherman, Meade and Sheridan
ANsH sYsrEa 1srRopUcEp Iyro TEE AIT or