, 1866-07-24

which of all others is the hardest to be
dealt WIth-the feeling of self-interest.
If there was anger or i'll blood on the
part Of the Americans, it was not express
ed in the negotiations. Their argument
was simply the argument so familiar in
this country-that freedom of trade was
incompatible with difference of fiscal con-
ditions. The burdens e"ntailed by the
Civil War had produced heavy taxation,
and the Americans, being heavily taxed,
deemed themselves unable TO compete
with the comparatively unencumbered
Canadian. The colonial producer, it was
said, would now enjoy so great an advan-
tage over the American producer that
the superiority would be ~overpowering,
and the profits of Industry would pass
away from the United States to the Bri-
fish dependency. We have learnt how
these arguments are to be answered but
if the Americans have not yet made the
discovery, we are bound to excuse them.
AS it was, the whole course of the nego-
%tlations revealed the uniformity of the
convictions at work. MIR. Seward made
no attempt to diSsembIe the mutual ad:
yantages which the Reciprocity Treaty
had produced, and which would be lost
by It's termination !; but he represented
that, according 10 the practice of the
United States, the question was one for
legislation rather than diplomacy, and
that application should be made to Con-
gresS. The application was made ac-
cordingly, and, as the whole matter was
now regarded as a matter of finance, ne
gotiatiOns were opened with what we
may call the Financial Department of
Congress-that is, the Committee of
Ways and Means. To this Committee
the Colonial Commissioners submitted a
scheme for a species of Commercial
Treaty In place of the Reciprocity Trea-
ty, and the Committees, inSite turn, pro
posed a counter scheme but the differ
encc was so great, and the benefit to the
colony SO doubtful, hat the Commission
ers retired from the negotiation. AT a
lateF period Mr.. Morrill, himself, the
Chairman of the Committees, brought in
a Bill for granting certain exceptional
advantages to Canadian exports in return
for a continuance of the privileges ac-
corded by the old Treaty but even the
proposals ofthis leading Protectionist were
too liberal for his party in Congress, and
the Bill was lost. Congress was IN favour
Of efectual protection for every branch of
production, aud would haXe free trade
with its neighbours no lopg&r.
Such is the history, as row authenti-
cally told, of the negotiations over which
Lord Clarendon, as Foreign Secretary,
presided for four anxious months, and the
correspondence now published proves to
demonstration that the inactivity imputed
as a default 10 the British Government
was in reality a policy of judicious and
successful forbearance. Lord Clarendon
did all that could be done with any pros
pect of utility; to have attempted more
would have been t. provoke not only
failure, but embarrassment. He placed
the reciprocal Dement'S or Gne treaty PIatu-
" before the American Government, and
he did not disguise the intention of our
own Government to withdraw privileges
from the United States if the United
States should withdraw privileges from
us. He then admitted without reserve
the desire of this country to see the
Treaty continued, and the willingness of
our Government to enter into negotiations
for prolongng it, or modifying it, or
substituting for it any other Convention