The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1866-05-29
PRUSSIA AND the MINOR GERMAN
STATES.

STATES.
An rz-pOrtant Letter from Count Bis
mArk-The Key 10 His Policy ia Ger.
many.
The following letter, written by Count Bis.
mark TO friend during the Italian war, while
he was PIussian Minister to Russia, and shortly
alter he had ceased to be the Prussian repre-
sentative at the Federal Diet in Frankfort was
Tor the first time published in the Reform at
Hamburg, on the 18th instant. From that paper
We translate it Tor the EVENING TELEGRAPH:-
ST. PETERsBURGH, May IL, 18j9-From the eight
yeais OF my offc al activity al Frankfort have be.
come convinced, as the result OF my experience, that
for Prussia tue present institutions OF tue Contedera
ton ao, in peace an oppressive, and IN critical
periods dangerous yoke, without atfOrding us
those equivalents which Austria receives from them
while retaining much arser share OF her own
freedom Bo h these great powers are not treated
with the same measure by the Princes and Govern
ments OF the sma Ter States; the construction of the
objects and laws OF the ouIederaton modified ac
cOrdng 10 the necessities OF Austriau policy With
your perfect knoTlenRo of the subject l need not
enter into details of the history of Federal poucs
since 1850, and contine myself to refer merely to
the re-estab bllshment OF the Diet the customs diff
cult1es, the commercial Iress, and constitutional
legislation. the Federal fortresses, Rastad and May
ence, the Neuichatel and Oriental questions
Always have we been oppo'ed by the same compact
majority, by the same demand tor concessions oy
Prussia. In the Oriental question the influence of
Austria was so much superior to our own, that not
even the harmony of the wishes and desires of the
FeGeial Govelnme with the pOlicy OF Prussia
Almost without exception our con1ederates have
intimated to us, and even SAID, hat 1t was
impossible ior them TO keep up the confedera
tion with u.s. should Austria go her own way;
although IT was not doubted that the right as Well as
the true interests OF Germany were IN the side Of
nearly all the contedera Princes. Would they
ever, in similar manner, sacrifice their yn wishes
and desires to the necessities the security of
frussa3 Certainly not. tor their adhesion to
Austria rests upon false interests. which TO both
command thfir union against Prussia, and their
restncuon OF the development of the power and IN
huence OF Prussia as permanent basis of their
joint policy.
To develop the confederation with Austria at its
head l. the natural object Of the policy the Ger
man Princes and their Nlni ters this their view,
can be achieved only at the cost Prussia and is
necessarily AIMED against Prussia, so long aS Prus-
sia Will not confne herself TO the useful task of
curing her contederates against too great an extern
SION OF Austra's influence and 20 bear, with
firing pleasantness and submission to the majority
the disproportion OF her duties to her rights the
confederation. lhs tendency. of tue policy of tn
middle States Will recur with the activity oil tne
magnetic needle after every temporary disturbance,
because it Is not the wiu product of single circum
stances or persons, but the natural and necessary
result of the Federal relations of the smaller States
We have no means within the given Federal com
pacts to arrange ourselves with it permanently and
satst actOrily.
Since the Confederates, nine years ago, under the
lead of Austria began from the hitherto unregarded
arseual OF The Federal ganlc avs to produce
principles which coud ard their system, and since
regulations whose proper construction in the sense
OF their founders was only available by the united
action OF Prussia and Austria, were attempted to be
used onesldedly for guardianship over Prusslan
policy we have had constantly to feel the weight OF
the situation in which we have been placed by the
Confederation, and Its ultimate hIstollc develop.
ment. We had to confess however, that In quiet
and normal tunes we could do much by proper con-
duct 10 weaken the evil its consequences but
nothing to cure it; but IN dangero1s times as the
present. 1t IS too natural that the other sde in pos
session OF all the advantages of the Confederation,
should willingly admit that things improper have
occurred but declare, in the interest OF ALL the time
inexpe to bring past events and home difficult
ties into discussion. For us opportunity, if the
present Is iet pass unused WI perhaps NOT so soon
the declarations that in normal times no changes
can be made.
sent King of Prussial has taken position which
meets with the undivided approval oil all those who
have any Judgment at all upon PTussian policy, and
have not allowed il to be dimmei by partisanshTp
portion Of our c0nederates seek by thoughtless
and 1anatcal efforts TO disturb this position.
If the statesmen at Bamberg are so quickly ready
TO follow the first cry for war OF an uDthlnking
and variable public opinion, they do 1t probably
with the cOnsoling reservation of how easy it Is
for small State TO change colors in case Of need.
But If they would make use OF the Federa organi-
Zaton TO send power like Prussia into the fire;
If be asked of us to risk blood and treasure for the
political wisdom and the thirst for action OF Govern
ments whose very existence depends on our protec-
ton il these States wish TO lead on, and if "a
means they propose to start theory of confederate
liability, with the recognition of which all autonomy
of PIussian policy won cease then it IS time IN my
opinion to remember tha tne leaders who ask us to
follow them serve other than Prussan interest,", and
that they understand the cause OF Germany which
same time be the cause OF Prussia, unless surren-
der curse yes
may, perhaps, go too far if l expres the opinion
that we ought 10 use eVer legitimate opportunity
offered by our coniedeiates, to obtain such
VISION of our mutual relations as Prussia eds, that
she may permanently live in regular inJercOurse with
the small eI German States. We should take up the
glove at once and not view 1t misfortune, but as
the progress 10 the crisis of improvement, II
majority at Frankfort adopts q resolve which we
consider unauthorized, wItul change OF the object
OF confederation, and breach OF the compacts.
The more marked this breach would be the better,
In Austria France, Russia we may not again
me OF with conditions so favorable to allow us an
ameiOIation OF our cOnd Ition IN Germany; and
our confederates the best way 10 give us
Just eau for IT, without our helping them on.
Even the Kreuz ZeitiHg Ia Government paper
at Berlin) is amazed that majority at Frankfort
could dispose OF the PTusslan army Not only as to
this journal have soHowiully observed what DOVE
Austria wieds IN the German press bY Its sGIlfullY
woven net, and how 1t knows 10 use this weapon.
Without it, sO-caled public Opinion won d never
have advanced high. l say so-cdHed, for the
masses OF population are never tor war unless irr-
tated by the &C ua suffering Of heavy burdens II
has come TO this, that under the cloak OF general
German feeling, Prussian paper hardly dares to
profess Prussian patriotism. Sentimental whining