, 1866-07-30

the phrase winch mas gwen rise 10 SO
much speculation might have been more
precise, it is contended that the contin-
gency alluded to is the most extreme, and
consequently the most unlikely that
could happen.
The Journal deS D6batS takes this view
of the matter. 1t urges that, as between
Prussia and Austria, tire war is not ma
tiOnal in the sense it is between this lat
ter Power and IlaIy-that is, without
compromise of any kind - but rather
political. 1t is q war about influence,
where the pretensions of the belligerents
may be settled by the fortune Of war in
various ways, more particularly as the
respective forces are nearly equal. To
Justify these apprehensiOns it must be
supposed that one of the Powers will
reduce the other to such extremity that
nothing can prevent the former from reno
deHing Europe for ats erclusive advantage;
for to obtain such a superiority over IL
formidable enemy it would not suffice TO
be constantly victorious, and that all the
battles it gained should be decisive ; it
must also have time to be in such a stu
alton as to impose on the defeated
party a plan from which it could obtain
the most eXorbitant advantages. Long
WarS are not possible an modern times, for
the exhaustion of resources is most rapid
with armies so colossal. Moreover, in
the hypothesis indicated by the Emperor,
the territorial changes occasioned by the
wan must be for the "ercIuSiUe'' advantage
Of the victor. If the ACKNOWLEDGEMENT of
Prussia or of Austria he accompanied by
the deIiverance Of Venice, obtained by
arms or otherwise by Italy, the advantage
would not be exclusive" But even
were it exclusive, there is a second
consideration which, even in this case,
j~uStiies the doubt of France having re-
course to arms, and that is the assent of
the populations 10 be annexed. The
victorious. Power, having acquired consi-
derable increase of territory, wouzd be in
vited by France to cede certain contermi-
nous districts. It is probable that it
would consent to do so, for The simple
reason that France binds herself to con-
suit the populations and it is equally
probable that the annexation would be
renounced should it. be ascertained be-
forehand that those populations would
refuse to belong to France. 1t is certain
that the true interest of France is to gain
nothing by violence. Violence would
weaken the Imperial government, for the
pishes IF the people are the gredt means by
which the destruction of the treaties of 1916,
which is is great ambition, shouM be effect
ed. In point of fact, there are four
chances to one that France will not be
drawn into this sanguinary conflict. It
would, then, be premature to be moved
too much by it; it would be, so to speak,
TO initiate the man who threw himself
into the water for fear of getting wet.
If the Imperial letter be taken in its
obvious sense, France has more reason
to hope for peace than to apprehend war.
The maintenance of what has. been
founded in Italy, and the preservation of
the equilibrium Of Europe, are the two
causes for which France would draw the
sword and for her 10 draw the sword
what has been founded in Italy must be
destroyed, which would involve the dis
turbance of that equilibrium. But would
Austria, if victorious, destroy the king
dom of Italy? People do not attempt TO
conquer their neighbors when they have
as much as they can do to hold their own.
With Prussia face to face in the north,