Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1866-03-15
The President and Congress.

70 is a matter OF the gravest regret that the
President and Congress slonid differ decidedly
at this most important moment. 10 was clear,
however, from the day that reorganization became
practical question that great forbearan"e would
be necessary in each branch OF the Government,
| and il ia painfully evident that neither has ever
cised il. But inclined TO believe that the
events Of the past fortnight have taught both the
President and Congress, as they have Hught The
country, that different spirit must prevail upon
both sides at Washington, or very serious couse
quences will follow. Thus, upon the cardinal
point of the admission of members from the late
rebel States, the President is powerless il Congress
! persists; and, on the other hand, measures which
Congress deems absolutely essential may he baf-
fled by the Pr osident's'vefO.
| When the last rebel sur endered. aad the State
whose secession had been prevented by the nation
al arms left without other government than
the military authority of the United States, il was
necessary tlst steps toward the civil reorganiza-
1 ton of those States should be taken by the Com
msnder in Chief. The President, therefore, act
| ing under no special verbal warrant OF the C0nSt
tuition but by its undoubtedlv implied authority
and from the necessity OF the case, appointed Pro-
yisional Governors and authorized them TO call
primary elections OF delegates to Conventions, in
dicating at the same tine who should vote. In
this last point OF his instructions tie President was
governed by the view which had been kept steadily
prominent through the war, that no State could
4
ceded that, under The Constitution, the suffrage
should De conferred 10y the State alone, he refrain
ed from disturbing that understanding, naturally
anxious TO follow as far as practicable the normal
traditions of the Government lie excepted, how
ever, certain classes of those who by the old State
laws were eatited to vote, while ne retrancd from
creating new voters.
Undoubtedly this whole preceding vas cxcep-
tional. He acted an absolut: military com
ed other conditions and adopted different syS-
TEN. he forbade voting to any whom the local
law hsd formerly empowered to vote, the local
law was really repudiated His will the only
law in the case, and he had the same right to au-
thorize Wade IIampton's late slave TO vote rs he
had to prohibit Made Hampton from voting
Wade Hampton more traitor, according
to the Constitution. although he was more cen
spicuous one, than any of his soldiers; and if the
Commander-in- Chief could authorize a traitor ia
ken in.arms to vote because he had been formerly
a voter. he coud certainly permit loyal soldier
of the Government to vote who had not hitherto
enjoyed that right. But in this matter the Presi
dent Was guided b Y the plain consideration that it
WAS desirable to make no Fundamental changes
which he could avoid; and although the true
q ounds and limits Of hi. authority in the case DO
not seem TO US to have been clear to the
President himself, he proceeded upon his convic
lion of the indesn uctibiity OF o State in the Unon
and his action was perfectly ineligible.
The Conventions having met, lie stated certain
conditions which he, at least, deemed essential
prcocdsuts TO resumption OF the relations OF the
States to the Union. These were substantially the
revocation Of the acts Of Secession; the repuda
tion Of tie rebel debt; the formal adoption OF the
Emancipation amendment; the guarantee o! all
civil rights to the freedmen; and the election OF
truly loyal representatives 20 Congress. All OF
these but the two last were generally accepted b.
tie States in question. But none, We believe,
have fully guaranteed an equality Of civil right be-
fore the law although l.: one Of the Southwestern
St.tes it has been held by Court that the over
throw of Slavery carries with It all the legal dis
tinctions based upon color. One or two loyal rep
rcsentatives we're also elected from the laie rebel
States
! This was the condition of the case when Con
/ gress assembled. The point TO decide exactly
that stated by the President ia his late unfortunate
speech When those who rcbellcd comply with
the Constitution, when they give sufficient evil
denes OF loyalty, when they show that they can be
trusted, when they WELD obedience the law that
you and acknowledge, say extend to them tiie
right hasd OF fellowship, and let peace aud union
be restored" Congress met and found reprcsen-
tatves ofthe rebel States awaiting admissi ion
Congress said al Orce, Let us * mine and see If
these States can be trusted aud whether they iGce
given sufficient evidence of loyalty" Surely Con
| eress not bound to take the Presidents opin-
ion upon these points. Il would doubles give 1t
great weight; but the power already exercised by
the President in the reor-,anizI tioE was SO enor-
nous that il desirable another authority should
intervene. The President had certainly no reason
TO be angry with Congress for exercising the very
discretion which he claimed for himself; and il
seems 10 us if the President had been more pa
tient. if he had reflected tina, it not for him
a,one to decide without appeal the conditions OF
Reorganization Of the Union, the collision might
have been avoided.
! IL was the evident determination OF the Pres-
dent that his view should prevail which excited
the jealousy ot Congress. How could he expect
that General Grants report OF a few days excur-
sion TO Charleston would be accepted as conclu-
.ve statement Of the actual condition of public
sentiment as against the evidence Of prolonged
and faithful observation presented by Carl Schurz
| Mutual defiance was exchanged almost at the very
opening of the session. The House insanely al
lowed its most unfit member for the office 20 be
its leader, while the unfortunate expression of
Senator Sumner indicated hostility and impa
tence whit h could only lead to mischief. With an
equally unfortunate want Of reticeDce the Presi
dent talked freely and warmly Of the action of the
! House; and the House had not dignity enough to
rebuke Thaddeus Stevens when, i'm return, he
grossly insulted the President bs comparing him,
for expressing opinion, to Charles l. subverting
the fundamental law. The heat grew. The Pres.
|
gcd in untimely exposition of his views OF gener-
al policy. The Senate failed TO sustain its own
bill by the necessary two-thirds. The House,
stung with disappointment at the defeat OF its fa-
vorite measure, and incensed by the untimely re-
marks OF the President, needlessly declared that
whatever his opinion might be. no rebel State
should resume its relations in the Union except by
permission of Congress- AgSin Thaddcus Stevens
talked wildly about u-urnvtion at the very moment
the President refusing enormous power, and
as il the Presidents opinion could admit repre-
sentative to Congress, and then followed the mel
ancholy scene in the White House grounds.
If his hostility continues. practical reorganiza-
| ton OF the Union will be DELAYED for two years
certainly. A political revolution will inevitably
arise which will return the late rebel States to
Congress without the oath Of loyalty, and transfer
the Government TO the present Opposition. Now
Congress, it seems to us, for reasons which must
he apparent to every thoughtful man, must take
the initiative in returning Ia cooperation with the
President. 1t must consider what is called his
policy totally irrespective of his personality. The
central idea of that policy s, that change Of feel
ing can not be wrought by law. We must remen-
ber that are to live with the people of the reb-
el States as fellow citizens, not as subjects; and
wise men will see many reasons why it is better to
leave many things that we might now wish to eff
feet directly to the surer accomplishment Of indl-
rect methods. Congress is undoubtedly the Judge
when the unrepresented States may safely resume
their relations in the Union. But the decision
should be b2s, d upon common-sense and a gener