The Louisiana Democrat. [volume] (Alexandria, La.) 1845-1918, 1866-01-17

thHisSfsQ u tile eAoIt vi UTdlt, by tile use u
10 few flash phrases, to make Butler the
scapegoat Of all his failures.
The disparity between the forces oil
Sheridan andAgscf IN the Valley cam
paign was even greater than that between
Lee and Grant. My force, when I arrived
lin front of the fortifcations Of Washington
on the llth Of July, 1864, was eight 'fii8h
sand 5000 muskets, three small battalions
of artillery with about forty (4O) field
lpieces, Of which the largest were IL pound
Ut Napo!eons, and about two tAoasaad
10000 badly mounted and equipped caval-
Try. of which large portion had been de-
tachedsto eut the railroads leading from
Baltimore north. Gen. Grant saws that
1.-TWO divisions Of the Sixth Corps and the
advance ofthe Nineteenth Corps arrived
at Washington, beforeiI did, ana Mr.. Stan
ton says | was met there by the Sixth
Corps, part Of the Nineteenth Corps, ,ln-
der Gen. Emory, and a part Of the Eighth
Corps, under Gen. Gilmore. Ny force had
then marched oversfvc hundred miles,
marching ut least twenty miles each day,
except the day of the tight at Monocacy,
when it marched fourteen miles, and fought
land defeated Wallace.
At the battle Of Winchester, Or Opeqs,an
las it is called by General Grant, my effac-
tive strength was about eight thou. and five
Hundred $500 muskets, The three battal-
lions Of artillery, and less than three thou
sand 5000 cavalry. Sheridans infantry
consisted of the Sixth, Nineteenth, aud
Cooks Corps, composed Of one division OF
the Eighth Corps and what was called tie
I" Army Of West Virginia. y Some idea
may be formed Of the strength Of the Sixth
/ corps, when 1t is recoiiected that the Ar
my 1T the Potomac was composed of three
corps on the LIST Of May previous, to-wit !:
the Second, Fifth ana Sixth, and that its
effective strength then vas, according to
MIR. Stantoa's statement, l20,3S6. The
same statement shows tllattthe available
strength Of the force in the department
of West Virginia" on the lst Of May
3O,7S2, and most of the troops in this de
partment were concentrated in the Valley.
Documents subsequently captured showed
the strength Of the 18th Corps to have
been. at the battle Of Winchester. not less
than 10000 effective men, Official reports,
captured at Cedar Creek, showed that
Sheritlan's cavalry on the 18th of Septem-
Der, two days before the fight. numbered
lO,l0O present for duty. His artillery was
vastly superior to mine in number of men
aud guns. The 9th Corps alone must have
exceeded my entire strength, unless it had
met with such tremendous losses as to re-
duce its strength ut least three-fourths.
From all the information received, and from
documents captured at Cedar Creek, am
satisfied that Sheridan's effective infantry
strength at Winchester could not have been
less than thirty five thousand maskets, and
Fit was probably more. The odds against
me, therefore, were fully four to one. and
probably more. His very great superiority
in cavalry was very Acknowledgements to me,
as the country was very open and 'admira
bly, adapted to cavalry operations, and my
cavalry, being mostly armed with Enfield
rifles, without pistols or sabrss, could not
fight his, whose equipment and arms were
c9mplet,. At the fight at Cedar Creek
had been reinforced by one division Of in
fanty kcrshaw's numbering twenty seven
hundred (270D) muskets. enc small battal-
ion Of artillery and about six hundred l6OO)
cavalry, which about made up my loss at
Winchester and Fishers Hill. | went in
to this fight with eight thousand Ave haa.
dred (S5OO) muskets, abont forty pieces Of
artillery and abo*s twelve hundred (l2OO}
cavalry, as the rest If my cavalry, which
was guarding the Luray Valley, did not get
up up in time, though ordered to move at the
same time / moved to the attack Sheri-
dams infantry had been recruited fully up
to its strength at Winchester, and his cav
airy numbered 1900, as shown by the Off
cial reports captured. The main cause Why
the ruut OF his army in the morning was
not complete was the fact that my cavalry
could not complete with his, and the latter,
therefore, remained intact. He claimed
all his own guns that had been captured in
the morning, and afterward recaptured, as
so many guns captured from me, whereas,
| lost only 70 guns, and the loss of these
and the wagons which were taken was MAIN
y citing to the fact that a bridge, on a mar
row part CT the road between Cedar Creek
and tishtf's hfa, broke down, and the
guns and wagons, which latter were not
numerous, could not be bron.n..,. off. Pur.
suit was not made to MONT Jackson. as
stated b.. .o.n Grant and Stanton, but my
troops were halted for the night at Fishers
Hill, three miles from Cedar Creek, and
next day moved back to New Market, six
miles from Mount Jackson, without any
pursuit at alL SO far from its being true,
I us stated by Mfr. Stanton, that no force ap-
peared in the Valley after this, the fact is
that reorganized my force at New Mar
ket, and on the 10th Of November moved
down the Valley again mad confronted
Sheridan Oil the II th and 18th III front of
his intrenchments, between Newtown and
kearnstown, and then retired back to New
Market beca,lse provisions and forage could
not be obtained IN the lower Valley. The
expeditions by which the posts Of New
Creek and Beverly were subsequently cap-
tured. were sent out from my force III the
Valley. The strong force which Gen.
Grant says Vas intrenehed under me at
Waynesboro when Sheridan, advanced up
the Valley in the latter part of February.
1865, with two divisions Of cavalry Of 5000
each, 10000 in ally consisted Of about
1900 infantry aud q few pieces of artillery.
most OF my infantry having been returned