New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1866-03-19
souvenir. of the war.


siege Of Mobile.
They are intended as a simple, truthful chronicle
/ ~ aventss Invested If any comments whatever
i and written with view to help future historians
W. s mist be permitted to add that distinguished
Federal oissr Mhe TOOK an t aohSe part IN the re
character of the writer of these notes, has applied
directly to him for his own relation of events ans
intends to base that relation impartial histor,
of the war,
III our next issue, and in order to complete tn,
history of the siege, we will re- produce the &C
count OF the passage of the feet into the hay
which was published in one of the city papers fou
days after its occurrence.
That report was at the time Reproduced in nj
the Southern and Northern papers, and, although
written with all the bitterness we then felt agans
our opponents, it has been admitted by all 10 be
truthful account of the momentous scene of Au
gust 9th, 1865:
THE SIEGE OF MOBILE.
In May, 1868, the line of the city defenses abou
Mobile was not nearly completed. The fall oI
yicksburg, and the preparation made immediately
thereafter by Gen. Grant to attack Mobile with 8
large army. enabled the engineers by arousng the
anXlehes OF our people, to procure sufficient negro
labor to complete the line of Notifications projected
by Gen. Buckner. They also commenced to rem
edy certain defects supposed to exist in that line,
and by the winter of 1868 the works of Mobile
were pronounced so strong that garrison of ten
Thousand effective troops in them would compel
tlU tutuuy W uGNOte forty tllOusduu tloVPS anu
ninety days to the reduction of the place. N
The works of defense were, however, continually
strengthened up to the movement Of Canby's at
tack in March, 1865.
At that time, the effective troops available for
active defense Excluding the cavalry, which were
ordered, in the event of SIEGE to take the open
field and the local city troops, which, being made
up chiefly of householders and heads of families in
the city, and of other persons not liable to active
military service, could not be fairly accounted part
of the effective garrison) amounted to less than
eight thousand artillery and infantry. The attack
| ing army was made up of a large force of siege
and field artillery, one or two divisions of cavalry
and three corps of infantry, besides naval force
of more than twenty steamers.
The preparation for this campaign commenced
Immediately after Hoods battle at Nashville.
The campaign terminated on the 18th Of April,
1865.
When Sherman moved out from yicksburr in
the winter OF 1864 it is not probable he could have
taken Mobile. Eight OF nine brgades of veteran
troops were thrown into it so soon as General
Polk became convinced that Mobile was the object
Of his expedition.
When the army of General Granger commenced
its attack upon the defenses Of the lower bay,
there were actually no troops in Mobile or the de-
lenses Of it upon the land side. Even the artillery
garrsons, consisting of the LIST Louisiana artillery
and the LIST Mississippi light artillery, had been
called away by General Stephen D. Lee to aid in
repulsng the column which, under General A. j.
Smith, had advanced from Memphis as far as Har-
risbnrg. After the battle of Harrisburg, and the re-
treat of the enemy back to Memphis, General Lee
ordered these troops across to West Point Georgia
to support or join General Hood. Therefore when
the garrison Of Fort Powell blew up that work, it
became practicable for the army of General
Granger TO pass through Grants Pass in light
draft steamers ascend to Dog River Factory disen-
bark there, and move at once into the city Such
movement, aided by q demonstration by the
fieet upon the batteries in front of the city,
would have been certain of success, and would
10 IN hov hoo I}aIh
Fort Morgan would have then been isolated and
must have capitulated when its supplies became
exhausted.
Fort Morgan was well defended, and served us
well. for the time consumed before it by Granger
and Farragut snfficed to prepare Mobile to receive
their attack. The artilerists returned to their
posts, other troops were rapidly brought in, Dog
river was closed against transports and gunhoats
and It would have required beseging army larger
than Changers to attack Mobile with hope of sue
cess.
The loss of the fort at the entrance of Mobile
Bay, and the passage into the bay of the Federal
deet efeetually stopped blockade running from
Mobile. Indeed, it was at any time practicable
for Q feet OF light draft steamers to run by night
into Mobile Bay. This war has taught US that bat
teries alone cannot close wide channels against
steamships. illustrations Of this will be found in
the running of the Transport batteries on tile Po-
tomac; the passage of the forts below New Or
leans; the passage of Farragut by Port Hudson
and Grand Gulf the passage of Porter's feet by
Nieksburg; the passage Of Farragut's fleet by
Fort Morgan and finally, the impunity with which
our daring blockade runners almost nightly re-
ceiycd the fire of some Federal cruisers as they
ran through their fleets into our ports If steam
ship is boldly commanded and can keep up her
speed, she has but little to fear from guns half
mile from her especially at night; but if she can
De detained stationary under the fire of shore bat
cries long enough for the gunners to get her
ange, she may soon be destroyed.
The channel before Fort Morgan was rather more
"a q Ia ida = IL
# the water in and out of the bay with the ebb
md flow of the tide was very strong. These facts
made it impractcable for the engineers with the
means at their CONTROL to fix any distractions that
ould detain ships. Their reports showed that
bout four hundred torpedoes were in the course /
i three years planted within one mile Of Fort
iorgan. Of all this number but one is known to |
ave remained serviceable. Farragut led his feet |
yer the thckest line Of the submarine mines.
For many months before Canby's attack on
lobile,. fleet of from five to seven steamers
uarded the outlets from the city effectualy against
II blockade running vessels.
Several experienced and enterprising blockade
aptains pressed SO earnestly for permission to run
ut through this feet, and were so strongly backed
y instructions from the Confederate States War
department., that gaps were repeatedly made
the DISTINCTIONS, and every other opportunity
Horded them to run out to sea. But not one of
hem ever got out. @
The position known as g Spanish Fort, y was first
coupled soon after Fort Morgan FELL The rea-
ons for occupying it were to aid in defending
ppalachie river against feet which might at.
smpt Its passage, and to prevent the enemy from
occupying 1t and planting batteries there which
light silence Hnger and Tracy, so as to leave
ppalachie river open.
A heavy six gun battery was first constructed on
10 buf which tradition marks as the site of an old
parish fort. Subsequently, this battery was de-
nded In rear and became part of an enclosed
I'D work. Then redoubts McDermttand " Num-
y 3" were overwhelmingly, as the views
successive commanders and engineers had oper-
ion, the line of works was extended until it sWept
semicircle 300 yards long about old Spanish
rt as centre.
Except at three or four prominent points where
tteries or redoubts were constructed this line
IS not stronger than those behind which our ar
es of Tennessee and Virginia were accustomed
entrench themselves for battle. 1t was held for
IRE than two weeks by force of about seventeen
ndred muskets, and less than three hundred artil-
lists. rs pH= y sf
General Gibson, the commander of Spanish fort
IS ordered not to hold it to extremity but to
andon the position and save his garrison when it
ould become evident that lie could no longer ,
aleiously protract the defense. A plank road (
rs made on trestles across the marsh to enable
Y 70 secure the retreat of his troops, and boats
lie river -'- 1890, 49, PP Z
~ considerable portions of the line the files of
!, 49,, 2anisn Fort were several feet apart and a
Z shV ManK There was marsh several hundred p
~ o;aMe reaching to the waters edge guarded
Under such circumstancas sort;o 49, s
icions nor Practicable 49, NY Ju O
Ihe besegers having at a, ao.,,, =,
shea themselves under the brow of an e,;nanno Il
lose 70 feuoubt No. s, Can't Clama,ts 49, | h