The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1866-07-21
The Causes of BenedeIs,s Defeat.


From the Times.
A French paper assigns as the three principal
causes OF Benedek's defeat, that the Bavarians
were too slow, that the Austrians were numeri-
cally inferior, and that the Prussians with their
needle-guns and rihed cannon, had the best
arms. Though all these circumstances NAV have
largely contributed to the loss by the Austrians
OF the great day of Sudowa, yet we think that
there were anterior causes at work in favor of
the Prusslans and against the Austrians, and
the almost sole result of the waitand-be blessed
strategy, or rather no strategy, OF Benedek.
We have before us for review all the successive
events OF the campaign in Bohemia, beginning
with the first ADVANCE OF the PrussiaDs into
SaXony on the 10th of June, and ending with
SudoNa on the Sd OF July. We eau now form a
comparatively correct estimate OF the strategy
OF both combatants. Without encum bering our
remarks by any extended reference to details,
and endeavoring to be bref, we ask the readers
attention Tor few moments to the position i'm
winch the 10TH of June, the day OF the declara-
tion OF war, found both bellieeren's. Prussia
had an army OF l44,000 men un Ter the Crown
Prince IN Slesia, extending along the entire
Austrian frontier to near OsWlecZin. She
had another army of 10000 men under
Prince Frederick Charles in PrGssian
saxony, on the western and along the
northern and northeastern frontier of the
Kingdom OF SaXony. Austria, on the other
hand, had large army, estimated to consist of
ABOUT 25O, 900 men for active operations in the
beld, exclusive of post garrisCns and other
detached service, under Benedek, his line
stretching Ike the two sides Of triangle from
the valley oil the Eyer up into the salient angle
which Bohemia makes into Royal Saxony, and
down again along rhe line of the GlatZ country
and Prusslan Sllesla to the boIoers OF Galrcia.
FROM MS extreme northern outpost, near
Aussig on the Elbe, Benejek was only about
fourteen miles from Dresden, while the Prus-
slans, from their nearest point anywhere on
the Saxon frontier, had more than thirty.
HAD there been that VIM, and nerve,
and resoluteness of action which the
Prussians have shown, in the Austrian com
mander, the night OF the 10th of June would
nave seen him In Dresden, and on the 18th he
could have confronted with his whole army
ihe three corps d'armee OF Prince Frederick
Charles on the memorable field before Ieipsc
Two hundred thousand against one hundred and
twenty thousand would, ia spite of the Prussian
needle-gun, have given Benedek all the chances
OF victory. On his right the bulk OF the Prus-
sian army OF SlesIa, consisting of four corps
daImee, was concentrated between Franken-
stem, Glatz, and Neisse, and between them and
the AustIians lay the Riesen-geblrge, with easily
qelehslDie passes. An Austrian victory over the
Prussians at Liepsic, however, would have at
once prevt tnted any offensive movement of the
russians IN Sllesa, Tor then Berlin would have
DeS much more in danger than Vienna now is.
With all these advantages PROMISING WHY did
Benedek delay and remain quietly cooped Iip as
II were, behind his mountains. while the Prus-
SLAMS oVerran SaXony from two directions? In
aodluon to these strategical reasons, so obvious
that even an unmilltary eye can comprehend
them by carefully studying good typographical
map OF tine country he ought to have been
prompted TO an instantaneous advance in force,
by the political reason that tine Saxon allies of
his sovereign should have been encouraged by
the presence OF their Austrian protectors against
Prussian invasion, and that the minor German
States yet waVering might, by the resolute action
OF Austria, have determined to take her side
Certainly these were reasons enough to have
counseled action instead of delay Benedek
chose the latter, and il this lies the principal
cause OF his ultimate defeat. The Prussians,
however, acted as Benedek ought to have done,
and IN this lies the principal cause of their
present success
1t may he thar in his mountain fastuesses north
OF the line OF Prague and Pardubitz, Benedek
considered himself secure against attack, and
able to repuse anv concerted movements OF the
enemy; that he felt himself compelled to commit
the same strategIcal fault as did the Prussiaps
by dividing his army into two columns, one
operating north opposing Prince Frederick
Charles, the other 10 the east against the Grown
Prince 1t may be that he expected the sDeedV
arrival of corps OF ffty thousand Bavarians to
ioin the twenty-siX thousand Saxons who were
70 retire, or had retired into Bohemia. and with
them to constitute the lett wing of mis- army
covering Prague and his own flank and rear
and il may also be that the Bayarians were too
slow III coming. All this may be true. asd vet
be no cause Tor his defeat; since he allowed the
Prussians TO enter SaXony unopposed and make
IL their new base OF operations, thus hemming
in the northern portion of Bohemia, as il in a
wee, anu a9vanclng thence against his position
Even then, rapidty of movement could have
'aVeu MN. Though military parallels are not
fha oAva =