The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1866-07-26

forever 10 private life. Could there be any
doubt as TO which of the two he would choose
The wisest course for the Austrians would
have been to have made peace with Italy, yield
ing Venetia for a comcensatiOn, ana to have
concentrated all OF her available forces in Bo-
hemia. This, however, could hardly be eX-
pected of an aristocracy like that of Vienna.
Failing to do this, the army in Italy should Lave
been reduced TO the lowest possible strensth,
say 200. This force would have been sufli-
cent to have held the famous QuaiIiateral
against the attacks OF Victor Emanuel The
rest OF the Italian army should have been held
in reserve along the read to Vienna so as to
have been throE either into Ita'y or Bohemia,
as circumstances might require. Modern armies
are so huge, and the amount of materials
required for their supply so great that 1t is
impossible to supply their daily consumption of
materials except by water or railroad communi-
cation. Now, the only considerable streams in
Rohemia are the Modau and the noted river
Elbe; consequently, Benedek had to rely on
railroads for his Supplies. All OF his movements
had to be subordinate TO hlg holding command
OF them; these once lost, his army was de-
stroyed.
There are two lines of railroad from Prague,
the capital of Bohemia, to Vienna; first that via
PaTdubitZ and LandskrOn, where it branches
into two-one at Brunn, the other via Omutz,
uniting with the first at Lundenburg from thence
10 Vienna. The command OF this road was in
dispensabe iCr the safety of Benedek's army.
branch of this road leads from Pardubitz to
Koniggratz, Josephstadt, and Nacho1, de-
bouching upon the theatre of the late battles.
The second line goes first to Ratshino on the
Danube, thence by the south bank of that river
TO Vienna. BY ascending tue Moldau to Bud
weis will be found a road that Joins this last at
Linz on the Danube. AT Prague these unite
and proceed along the banks OF the Elbe to
Dresden. This last point is connected by road
via Bautzen and GoIlltz, with Breslau, where it
Joins the great road from Berlin to Silesa.
careful study OF the position shows that
Dresden was the objective both for the Austrians
and the Prussians; whichever first occupied 1t
would acquire great advantage over his ad-
versary. 1t was in the hands of the Saxons,
allies of the Austrians, who should have strained
every nerve to have held it. Why Benedek did
not do so cannot at present be known. If he
felt strong enough to invade Silesla he certainly
could defend Dresden 1t may be that he feared
The army of Slesia advancing and sezing the
railroad 10 Vienna; and if this be true his army
must have been too weak, and should have been
reinforced from Italy. Until the occupation OF
Dresden. the Two Prussian armies were acting
on double exterior lines; that point secured
they could unite via the Dresden and Breslau
road. By holding Z,ttau, the Austrians stll
threatened 10 intercept that route at Gorlitz;
but the Prusslan victory at Zittau rendered their
communications henceiorth secure.
The PrusSian advance into Bohemia from
both SaXony and Silesia was bold, we'll CON
Ceyed, and sklllully executed, though at the
first glance il would appear 10 be violation OF
the maxim OF war. Never to act by double ex-
terror line, your adversary having the interior
line" This, however, was not the case By
means'of the field telegraph, the armies were in
constant communicau IN with each other, so
that it was impossible for Benedek to move IN
mass against either, without the other being in
formed OF the movement; and careful eXamlna-
ton OF the position shows he could not follow
the retreat OF one without exposing his line OF
communication TO be seized by the other. The
advances of the army OF SaXonY, by way OF
ReichCn6eTg upon Wurnau and Munchengratz,
and that of Slesia from Schweldnltz upon
TTautenau, were well combined and strictly in
conformity with the laws OF strategy. 1t is true
that GitS chin the DOint Ot iuncCOu IN the
hands OF their adversary, but the constant com
munication by means Of the field telegraph
made the armies one. 1t was the advance OF
the army OF Silesa upon the right flank and rear
OF the AustrIans that secured the Prussians the
victory at Sudowa. That much was expected
from the Austrians is certain; that these eX-
pectations have been disappointed cannot be
denied.
Before condemning Benedek, however, all the
circumstances should he known. Austra's
resources are not yet eXhausted; the yielding o
Venetia renders disposabe her best army.
Prussia will hardly dare to advance Immediately
upon Vienna. Her next objective will be the
army of the Contederates at Frankfort. Thai
army, it seems to us, should at once fall back on
WurZburg, and, If necessary, abandon all OF the
territory OF the Coniederacy to unite with the
Austrians in the strongly fortified positions o.
Passau and Linz on the Danube. What Austria
requires is time to concentrate her resources
| decisively 50 as to defeat the army OF the Con
! tederates at Frankfort, for upon the defeat o
that army will depend the permanent triumph
| OF Prussia.
]