Daily union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1865-1866, 1866-01-02

| der General Gilmore. Ny force had then
| marched over five hundred. miles, marching,
| at least, twenty miles each day, except the
day of the fight at Monoeacy, when it march
ed fourteen miles, and fought and defeated
/ Wallace.
| At the battle of Winchester, or Opequan,
as it is called by General Grant, my effective
strength was about eight thousand FIVE hun
! dred muskets, the three battalions of artillery
and less than three thousand cavalry.
Sheridan's infantry consisted of the Sixth,
Nineteenth and Cooks Corps, composed one
division of the Eighth Corps and what was
called the "AImy of West Virginia" Some
idea may be formed of the strength of the
Sixth Corps, when it is recollected that the
| Army of the Potomac was composed of three
| corps on the lst of May previous, TO wit !:
| the Second, Fifth and Sixth, and that its
| efectiTe strength then was, according to Mr..
| Stanton's statement, 120,3S6. The same state
ment shows eavailables of the forces
in the Department of West Virginia" on
the first of May, 30,7S2, and most of the
| troops in this department We're concentrated
in the Valley. Documents subsequently
| captured showed the strength of the Nine
teenth Corps to have been at the battle of
| Winchester, not less than $4,000 effective
men. Official reports captured at Cedar
| Creek showed that Sheridan's Cavalry, on
the 18th of September, two days before the
| fight, numbered 10000 present for duty. His
| artillery was vastly superior to mine in
number of men and guns. The Sixth Corps
alone must have exceeded my yentirestrength,
| unless it had met with such tremendous
losses as to reduce its strength at least three
| fourths. From all the information received
and from documents captured at Cedar Greek,
| / am satisfied that Sheridan's effective in
| fantry strength at Winchester could not
have been less than $4,000 muskets, and it
was probably more. The odds against me,
therefore, were fully four to one, and proba-
bly, more. His very great superiority in
| cavalry was very disadvantageous to me, as
the country was very open, and admirably
adapted to cavalry movements, and my
cavalry, being mostly armed with Enfield
rifles without pistols or sabres, could not
| fight his, whose equipment and arms were
complete. At the fight at Cedar Greek had
been reinforced by one division of infantry
| (Kershaw's) numbering 200 muskets, one
small battalion of artillery, and about 600
cavalry, which made up my losses at Win
| fight with $500 muskets, about forty pieces
Vi dIIlucIy, diiu du0ub iy-OV Sbfdlv tbo Vic
rest of my cavalry, which was guarding the
Luray Valley, did not get up in time, al
though ordered to move at the same time
moved to make the attack. Sheridan's in
fantry had been recruited fully up to its
strength at Winchester, and his cavalry
numbered $500, as shown by the official re-
port captured The main cause why the
route of his army in the morning was Rot
complete was the fact fhsf nay eayalry
could not compete with his, and the
latter, therefore, remained intact He
claimed all his own guns that had been cap
tured in the morning afferward recaptured,
as so many captured from me, whereas lost
only twenty-three guns, and the loss of these
and the wagons which were taken was mainly
owing to the fact that bridge, on narrow,
part of the road between Cedar Creek aud
Fishers Hill, broke down, and the guns and
wagons, which latter were not numerSuS,
could net be brought off Pursuit was not
made to Mount Jeckson, as stated by both
Grant and Stanton, but my troops were
halted for the night at Fishers Hill, three
miles from Cedar Greek, and next day moved
back to New Market, six miles from Mount
jackson, without any pursuit at all. So far
from its being true, as stated by Mr.. Stanton,
that no force appeared in the Valley after
this the fact is that l reorganized my force
at New Market, and on the 10th of Novem-
Der moved down the Valley again, and con-
fronted Sheridan on the 11th and 18th In
front of his intrenchments between Newtown
and Kearnstown, and then retired back to
New Market, because provisions and forage
could not be obtained in the lower Valley.
The expeditions by which the posts of New
Greek and Beverly were subsequently cap
tured, were sent out also from my force in
the Valley. The strong force which General
Grant saws was intrenched under me at
Waynesboro, when Sheridan advanced up
the Valley in the latter part of February,
1865, with two divisions of cavalry of 5000
each 10000 in all, consisted of about one
thousand 4 ,000) infantry and a few pieces OF
artillery, most of my infantry haTing been
returned to General Lee to meet correspond
ing detachments from Sheridan to Grant,
and all my cavalry and most of the artaiJery
having been sent of on account OF the lmpos-
sibility of foraging the horses in the Valley.
Obvious reasons of policyr prevented my pub
lication of these facts during the war, and it
will now be seen that was leading forlorn
hope all the time, and the public can appre-
ciate the character of the Victories won by
Sheridan over me-
The statements l have made are from facts
coming within my own knowledge, and they
are made to show the disparity between the
Confederate armies and those of the United
States. These statements will serve to give
some idea of the disparities existing in ether
Inca | now ask which has retired from the
contest with more true glory, that hersic
band of Confederates who so long wlthstood
the tremendous armies and resources of the
hat 0 0Eropd Of the
Union" which, while being recruited from
all the world, was enabled by continuous
hammering" to so exhaust tts opponent "by
mere attritionD as to compel a surrender
The world has never witnessed SO great
political crime as that committed in the de-
struction of tbs Confederate Government by
armed force. Other nations, in ancient as
well "A modern times, have fallen under the
yoke of the conqueror or usurper, because
their own follies vices or crimes had pre-
pared the way for their subjugation. Many
tears have been shed over the fate of r1nhap-
nv Poland, but we cannot shut our eyes to
| the fact that the Poles had shown their inca
pacity to manage their own Government ere
they were consigned to foreign rule. In our
case, however, the civilized nations of the
ea-th have stood aloof and seen brave and
patriotic people politically murdered. While
maintaining an unprecedented struggle for
| the right of self-government, and manifestlng
at every step their capacity for it, and this,
too. when under an assumed neutrality, the
resources of men, money and munitions OF
war of those very nations were being freely
used to consrImmate the monstrous deed, and
thereby give the final blow to genuine re-
publican government even in the United
/ States.
On behalf of my down-trodden country, L
| make the appeal to those nations that they
will not commit the further injustice of re-
ceiving the history of this struggle from the
mouths and pens of our enemies, but that
| thew shall wait until the time shall come
| for placing a true history before them. In
| the meantime, let all my countrymen who
were in A condition to know the character oil
the contest, put in a tangible form to be pre-
| served for the use of the future historian,
such facts and materials for that history as
are in their knowledge or possession.
]. A EARLY, Lieut.. Gen. {. ;. A,
| Insanity of Communities
We find the following reminiscence OF