, 1866-01-16
GE. CRAMPS REPORT.
It's Intercat ind In-.-. j. >,
pean FoVerA-A New System. Intro-
duccd into the Art Of War.
~

| etcsS -t--sFtance to Euro
Pean foVe!h-A New System Intro.
ouccd INTO the Art OF War.
1From tho Lonlon Times, Dec, s91
Gcn- Grant has addressed To Mr, Sccrcto-v
Stanton report whlcl Is eouiyn,ent II !
complete history OF thu civil war in its,afest
period. In this country ne ret no such
cinoorate description OF events as American
CON @eommandeIs arc IN thc lablt Of compiling.
oIr Generals address themselves to the War
uihee in dispatches which may be published
at future time, and ultimately, perhaps,
reduced to the form Of history but In The
| United States both military and nayal COM
lnanlers describe, explain and Justify their
shape Of connected and amusing narratives.
| In the present Instance the interest C oncentra-
| ted in hedocument before us Is extraordinary.
| Gen. Grant was Commander IN Chief Of alI the
armies Of the United States during
the 1ast aud decisive year Of the
wsr: We hare been accustomed to
regard him merely rs commander of
the Army Of the Potomac because he selected
Virgtnia as the scene OF his personal e1ertfons,
but the fact la that the Army Of Vlrginia WIS
actually under the command Of Meade, Just
as the Army OF Tennessee was under the COM
maud Of Sherman, while Grant himself not
only dictated the plan Of the cnmpaign, but
exercised direct supervision over ill tho ar-
mics at once. What renders this report, too,
the more remarkable Is that 1t explains u
new, md, US the event, proved, successful
system Of tactics devised for the occasion.
When Grnnt assumed the chief command the
Federal forces were making little progress,
uor could anybody anticipate speedy fermi-
nauon OF the war; but the new commander
adopted new method Of warinre, and the
result wns that In twelve months time the
wRr was at an end. What this method was,
On What principle 1t wns based, aud how 1t
was carried into execution is very intelligibly
told.
At m "ear1y period of the rebellion ,, Gen.
er1l Grant had OWNED the secret Of Southern
strength and Northern weakness. The Fed
erals were three to one, at least, In numbers,
and immeasurably superior in material, re-
sources, md yet tue Confederates maintained
against nh attacks. This, says Grant, wns be-
cause the strength Of the North was never ex-
ertea on good system or with sufficient res
olutlon. The Southern generals held a posi-
lion like the ontline Of q fun, extending from
east to west, and covering the country behind
them: By means Of the railroads itterscct-
Ing the interior. they could bring up their
50 long as 1t was necessary for them to be
strong at one point only, they could always
contrfye to be stronger ut that point than
thcic adycrsaries. The first and most indis-
pensihle step, therefore, was to deprive them
ot this favorable condition by attacking
as to retain every Southern army In its
Own position and prevent It from rein
forcing another. Hitherto the two main armies
Of the Federnls-one tn Tennessee and the
Sa.s.ip 49,. ip virginia-had been acting, rs the
Wee one 1as palg IL ke Tx atnba ba'ky T., tfam an
ing, and 60 the able Generals or tha Con-
iedetacy could shit or concentrate or re-
ifcvc their forces in such way as either to
economize their strength or employ it to the
greatest advantage: If Lee was hard pressed
4c could be IcinioEccd BY Beauregard; il
ported from Richmond or Petersburg. 1ttack
on both sides at once md these tactics would
he imptacticable. But, besides all this, Gen,
Grant took harder and more terrible view
Of affairs. Man for man the southerners
% we're tne 9 9est troops, partly, perhaps, from
the great military ability Of their command.
one Battle, tie M Feat1,ls FFets and aou1S q 4n n9{
pretend to reckon confidently on winning |
but there was one thing on which they could /
reckon, and that was on killing certain num-
per & Q. ax Ionlederates. or course they must
suicr equal or cTcn greater losses themselves,
but that they could Well afford, II every bat.
tie cost the South certatn proportion Of |
men. given number Of battles mnst DESTROY
the southern power. even IL no battle was q
decisive FtctorT: So Grant determined not
oAAj " nEAb1 uut 10 ugQt on. Without stint or
stay, come what might. Ha.u 1nvvs-- and
lncessant blows constituted bis strategy asd
tactics. II ho we we're to fare as Mcclellan
md Hooker had Jared, he would not do as
Mcclellan and Hooker had done. &c opened
The new campaign resolved to 70 on fighting
ne won or LOST, md, as he himself
says, Ito hammer continuously against the
armed -, lorce Of the enemy and his resources
there, should be nothing left to him but
The literal execution OF this
While rccounting the events Of Il the VI Virenian @
campaign, the General represents one engage
mtnt as virtually failure IN these words @It
was the only general attack made from the
Rapidan to the james which did not in.!Ict
upon the enemy losses 10 compensate for our
own losses. wonld not be understood as
saying that all previous ATTACKS resulted u
victories to our arms, or accomplished as |
much as had hoped from them but they
inflicted upon the enemy scrcre losses. which
tended In the end to tho overthrow Of the re.
bellion." How much these tactics cost the
North Ee need not say. It u said that Grant
winccs to this hour whenever the figures