Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1866-07-13
|OkllJo). Statfsrrarr., |.
THE QUADRULATERAL.

The FOrtresses and Situation i'm
1859 and 1866. aA'.'Ih -i'. 'a.i
Before the Franco-Austrian war In Italy
and up to that period It, was, only possible
to approach the, QuadriIateral from the
west, and it was against attacks from the
west that the Austrians up to 1860 lavish
ed all their preparations. But owing to
the acquisition of Lombardy by Italy,, and
the change Of frontier, the Quadrilateral of
| 1859 is not the Quadrilateral of 1866, 5.-
+ Awriter in, .he Etlipbiugh Scotsman thus
describes its present position, and Indicates
1.-the probable campaign of the italian gen
erals On the upper lines of the Adige and
| the Mineio, just in the narrow part of the
plain formed by the Tyrol mountains on the
one hand and the Po on the other, the Quad
4 rilateral Is seated. r.s...tst. aI.ll. .r.i.s.,
l. Peschiera, in itself little, weak, easily
isolated place, forms the northwest angle.
THE line of the MiGcio, a stream too small
and with tue banks too favorable to an
army seeking a passage from the west to be-
worth permanent fertilization or capable
of serious defense, is supported twenty
miles below Peschiera by Mantua, a for
tress peculiarly adapted for defense, by the
| "lakes" of the Minci0, which cover it to
the north, and by the facility with which
great tract of country to the south of it can
| be laid under eight or ten feet of water,
4 Six or seven miles south of Mantua the
tete-de-pOnt of Borgofrte forms not very
important outwOrk of the Quadrilateral.- .-
\ Fully twenty miles due east of Mantua, on
the Adige, Is the double tete-de-poRtot Leg
nago--7a small place, with garrison of
some two thousand men, but not to be held
in presence of a large army or against O.
vigorous assault. Through 1t runs the
great Southern road from Cremona and the
cities of the Po to Padua and Venice.
/ Verona, twenty-five miles northwest from
LegnagO, and sixteen miles east from Pes
| ehiera, completes the square, and forms the
! point d'appui of the entire system. Placed
| astride on the Adige, it commands at once
| the roads; and railroads from Austria
through the Tyrol; from Turin and Milan
| through BreScia and Peschiera, aud from
! Vienna, through Vicenza,t by the Valley of
the Upper PiaVe on the one hand and Ve-
nice and the passes of the Carnic Alps on
the other. At Verona, further, the railroad
from Vienna by Udine, Mestre (Venice),
Padua and VicenZa, into Lombardy, and
the branch line to Mantua, are held; and
this command of communications, and the
extent and nature of its defenses-Which
are exceedingly strong on the side of the
west, as we have said--sXcellently adapt it
for the place of refuge or support OF large
/
4 operations.
| Close behind the Adige the great TyrOl
road and the railroad run down on Verona,
and beyond the Adige, close to the famous
4 plateau of Rivoli. the forts of PastrengO,
erected since 1859, shut the defile against
4 the march of light columns, which through
the Stelvio or Tonale passes, or round the
| head or across the waters of the Lake Of
4 Garda, might seek to descend on the right
| flank of the Quadrilateral through the Ital-
| lad TyrUl. Mantua and Verona, therefore;
at the extremities of one diagonal, form the
chief strength of the Quadrllateral-the
! one covering the line of Mincio, the other
that of the Adlge. But Peschfera and Leg
naSo, at the extemities of the other diagone
| all are easily surrounded or easily taken;
and Mantua may be blockaded with force
not much outnumbeTing its garrison.
In reality, therefore, Verona is the one
angle of the Quadrilateral which gives to
the other sides and angles what value they
have; and thus it must be the prime OBJ
4 jective point of any operations undertaken
j for the deliverance of Venetla from the
! presence OF the Austrians.
| In 1859 the allies had blockaded Peschiera,
and were, at some peril, confronting the
Austrians in indVeronalrashen the inter0ieao7 at
Villafranca ended the war. They could
only advance on Verona from the west,
With their left flank in risk of being cut off
and driven up the Adige, and with their
right flank, refused, covering their passages
over the Minelo and menacing Mantua.
| Precisely what influence the military diff
culties of his position had on the decisions
of Napoleon at Villatranca, we do not now
ask. They had an inhunce We do not
doubt; for then the Quadrilateral was
serving the purpose for which it was de-
signed and best adapted-defense against
attack from the'West. W. .'
but that turning of the Quadrilateral
which, we have said, was one Of the effects
of the Convention of September, has altered
eUerything. The allies, in 1859, had but one
base OF operatioris-Turin and the Ticino; |;
and the Austrian front was solidly planted
on the short strong linestretchng from the
Lake of Garda TO the Po,, Nov, the ltal-
| ians haze too bases OF operati0ns--Tmln,
the Ticino, Milan, against the familiar and
formidable west face 0fcthe Quadrilateral; !;
Florence, Bologna, Ferrara, against the
Southern flank and rear, now completely
opened by the expulsion of the Grand
Dukes. These two lines of offensive. opera
tion are connected by the great lateral COM
munication Of tile Emilian way, passing
| from Milan byoPaVia, Piacenza, Parma,
Modena, Bologna, TO Ancona (the maritime
support on the Adriatic side, as Leghorn
and Spezzia are on the Mediterranean, of
the new base at Florence), and BY the rail-
| way which runs parallel with it. 1tis not
known that the Austria have taken the
preeautions which the courseof events die
| tated--by fortifying the lower, Pc, and
siren Sthehing the line Of the lower Adige
2gagafhst the enterprises of the enemy on
the southern, frontier of fVenitia. ui7e,l aba
i PoesihlU their consciousness that their