The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1866-10-06


| ment by Mr. Randolph that he was convinced of
the existence Of grounds of impeachment led TO che
| appointment of a committee of inquiry. The first
committee was directed ''to inquire INTO the official
| cOnduct Of Samuel Chase, one of the associate
justices Oft supreme Conrt = and report whether
quire the interpostion OF the constitutional power
Of this House, This was the 9TH Of January, 1904
On the 9th of MARCH they reported that they are of
opinion that Mr. Chase be impeachod Of hieh
| crimes and misdemeanors" Mr.. Randolph and
| Mr. Early were appointed ITO 90 to the Senate, and
| at the bar thereof, IN the name of the House of
Representatives and of all the people of the United
| States, impeach Samuel Chase" etc and to state
that the House would, I'm due time exhibit particu
| lar articles OF impeachment
On the 13tn Committee, of which John Ran.
dOph was chairman, was appointed to prepare art-
ces, which were lei Ored on the 26th, but not voted
| on until the next session. In December the five
| distinct articles OF impeachment were severallY
adopted by the House; and the seven managers
| were chosen by ballot to conouct the trial The
| Senate also adopted code OF rules OF proceeding
in case OF impeachment and so the trial went on,
lasting from February l, 1906 to the LIST of March
ioneWmg The result was complete acquttal
there not being two-thrds vote of guilty on any
one article.
The regulations and restrictions as to impeach-
mept established by the Constitution only these
The Senate IS TO be under specla oath in trying
an impeachmentj no convection can take place
without vote of "two.thirds of the members pre-
sent;" and judgment shall not extend further than
removal from office and permanent disqualification
for office. All other details of form ana manner O
procedure are left by the Constitution to be deter
mined from time to time by custom, common sense,
the nature OF the case and public justice, as the
whatever justice and the public good may require,
under the general principles OF our Government.
The completeness and finaltY OF tins discretion is
seen IN the fact that the judgment of the senate
red by twothrds vote is absolutely final and ire
versible so that there IS no longer any human
thonty which can revise the judgment, or set aside
the decree.
1his prerogative of impeachment is in fact, the
only absolute power known IN our form of govern
ment. The judgment OF the Supreme Court is final
only as decision Of the case in hand, and Tor
giving that very decision the Judges may be I'm.
peached and removed The President welded "the
executive power of the Government without APP
peal or control, except as the 'advIce and counsel
OF the senate" is required in certain matters but
Tor any one of his acts he be mpeached by the
House, and adJudged guilty by the Senate of a mis-
demeanor, ana removed from office by two.thirds
vote,
In addition, as things now are, while we are with.
out any Vlce-PIesident, the Senate would fill the
vacancy which 1t had made the president of the
Senate being by law the next in the order of sue
cession An act OF Congress- passed by both Houses
concurrence, may be vetoed by the President; or,
if passed by twO.thiros vote over the Presidents
veto, may he virtually annulled by the Supreme
Count tor unconsttutlonallty. And then, again
for that decree the Judges may be mpeached aud
removed. But Judgment by two.thirds of the
Senate on an impeachment by vote of the House.
| has no remedy under heaven.
The two Houses are brought together by the terms
of the Constitution on the first Monday in December
of every year, without any call from the Executive
When together, each House organizes itself by the
choice of Its officers without asking or requiring
| executive approval. And each House JUDGES, with
out appeal, of the qualifications of its members and
can eXpel the obnoxious by two.thlrds vote, with
| no possible appeal reversal And when once
| assembled and organized, the two Houses 20 on
| with their work as long as they see fit with no
power or the Executive the judiciary to interfere
| o prorogue or to dissolve either House. Congress
can one exercise the power of Legislation. Neither
President nor supreme Court can give to any rule
the force OF law except by authority of Congress
| The Constitution, by requiring two-thlrds vote
TO convict after an impeachment. shows the by
which this supreme and final arbltrament is secured
IRON oemg made tL Lpaythng IL tools OF danger;
| men. And the absence of all other rules of proce
dure shows that 1t was intended to mako this the
ultima ratio the last resort OF the Government the
repository of that paramount and irreversibe pre-
| rogatlve which human lmperiecton renders neces-
sary in the last resort to avert the necessity of
| volutlon a. the only remedy for evils that no
| longer possible to De borne.
| Such power needs to be as unrestricted 1t is
final, because 1t is designed to be put forth in all
| possible and all conceivable emergencies, and must
therefore make its own rules from time to time, as
| the eXigencY OF the time may require If it were
bound by pTeceGents, or limited by forms, the only
study of hostile agents would be to keep their mis-
Chief outside OF those lines, and the country would
The limitation OF the penalty to be imposed by
impeachment to the bare removal from Office and
disqualification for future trusts shows the care with
which this terrible weapon was guarded against the
possibility of being used as the instrument of ven-
| geance or the means OF usurpadon. Its leading
object not punishment, but to put instant stop
10 to-, abuses , OF admn,stiSti0n The removal from
| ishment, because the people never look upon the
possession of Office as in any sense a personal
| right. If remoYaI were looked upon in tine nature
| OF a penalty, or as implying q charge conyc-
tion of misconduct, it would be impossible for
| the people TO take so quietly the present whole
| sale removals made by the President of men above
| the Suspicion of wrong, and ior no possible cause
except hat they continue to agree in opinion with
the people, while the President has turned AGAINST
| them. A case IS supposable in which any reason
| which serves for removals by the President won d
| be equally valid to warrant removals by impeach-
| ment-the penalty IN either, case being the same
The use of constitutional power in case to cut
| short the abuse of similar power in the other
| would be neither anomalous or dangerous. The
penalty OF disqualification inflicted by TWO thirds
| vote OF the Senate would be more serious matter,
| and not hkeIy to be lightly applied
That prerogatiye so potent and easily applied
has so rarely 1Ound or made occasions its exer
clse proves only the perfection OF the machine and
| bnngs into action the unction of the governor
and the safeIy-vave. Its existence needs to be re-
called to mind, and its capabilities should be
sionally contemplated, that needless officials may
| learn 10 beware of bringing themselves under ITS
| operation. Before they know 1T, they may find
themselves hurled from the office they abused, and
forever cut off from the highest privileges OF cit
zenship and that without remedy.