, 1866-06-05

of them on the Auxerre oracle. What
that oracle really teaches is that the
Emperor intends to take any advantage
the struggle, or the fear of the struggle,
may give him, to advance his own end Of
breaking up the settlement of 1918, with
the greatest glory TO France, and with
the fullest satisfaction to carefully res
trained democratic tendencies, which he
can squeeze out Of the crisis. But first,
every iDdignity he can put upon the set
Element of 1915 we may be sure he Will
put. Next, it will be his aim 10 win for
France as much Of her old territorial
limits as he thinks safe, and not likely
to provoke o coalition against him, GER
tainIy not Tess than she had IN 1870.
Lastly, all his policy will aim, In strict
subservience to these two ends, as salts
fying as much as possible all national
and democratic aspirations short of stlmu-
lating any people into revolutionary en-
thusiasm.
Whether, therefore, the Emperor in
tends to aid Austria, or Prussia, or Que
and the other alternately, we take to
DEPEND entirely on which of the two
powers he finds most inclined to co-ope-
rate with him for these ends. If Austria,
as was rumoured yesterday, is willing to
meet his views about ItaIy,-that IS, we
take it, to give up Venetia, but at the
same time impose some new condition
about Rome which may help to sober
the Italian enthusiasm and to weaken
the Italian power, we have no doubt ina
the Emperor's first move would be ia
vourable to Austria, especially as this
concession to Italy would give HIM a
fair excuse for demanding somewhere an
equivalent to France on the Rhine, and
nfrhons also for Austria on the Danube,
both deadly blows at the treaty Of 1918.
If. on the contrary, as is more probable,
Austria is quite deaf to argument about
Venetia, in all probability Count Bis
marck will have the advantage Of the
first French move. Perhaps he is scarce
" a sufficiently democratic instrument
for the Emperor's views, but alter all
Louis Napoleon cares at least as much
TO strengthen the hand which curOs de-
mocracy, as to find for democratic cray
ings from time to time some legitimate
satisfaction. He was even more anxious
to strengthen Victor Emanuel ard Ca
YOUR against Mazzini and Garibaldi, than
to procure Italyfher first step in freedom
He was quite as eager to put the drag on
to Italy in the autumn of 1859 by insist
ing on Confederation, as he had been
eager to break the Austrian yoke in the
spring. Hence Count Bismark, who is
not i~ndisposed to crafty the national
cravings of Germany, though he is alb
s%olutely opposed to its democratic bias
NAV seem even a better instrument to
the Emperor than the Austrian states
men who are hampered with constitution
al crotchets which might, in a time of
crisis, render them unwilling to apply
the curb promptly, and moreover, IN
bargaining with Prussia the Emperor
will have the advantage, which he would
not have with Austria, Of pleading that
Prussia as a homogeneous German pow
err might become far more dangerous to
France than a composite and federated
Austria can ever become. Besides 1t
may but too probably be the Emperor's
Interior view to strengthen France at the
cost of Belgium, for it is contrary to his
democratic leanings to take into Ffatee
a territor1 really alien in language and