Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1866-08-31
Hs PRrSsrA.
H. Secret Of Her Strength.

Il ne fono6ine xrticle from the London Tises
| &C crtsAns teae Interesting speculafions:
Eor,&sS the impressive Ie-ses OF she
war careful observer OF events
'So once eonclude that the mii'tsry
tds1R0 q Prussia must depend upon a secret
o what :. .,us us eoSa.ry which has in.. .nss.s
smitten down powerful monuchy with rhe
other lt ,s coontry with popuis'sca OF
ls.So.eo5 or less than the population Of Eag-
land and Wales alone. 1t has revenue OF
f2o,OtC,0Qo or less than one-third OF our own
revenue. Out of these resources IL maintaiued
an army on n peace footing OF two hundred
ard ten thousand men-as nearly the number
Of our own regular force as possible. Thus
far, then, we see that the military eetablIsh-
menus of Prussia were not larger than ours,
thoueh they were far cheaper; and we may
even proceed further in these esIea-
lafions and comparisons without finding
any material contrasts on the surface
Prussia had an enormous force IN reserve,
but perhaps every reader does not know that
the reserves OF our own army are At least
,aree: xne rrnsssan army, on war footing,
was reckooeo ~ 6pe.oQQ men, while there was
still availaole IN the last resort about 100000
more. These vaooO troops constitute, it must
De ewneo, . most formidable array; bat we
md IN an omcial publication issued from the
Statistical Department Of the War Once that
the war establishment of our ON N army mounts
TO no less than s6s.es0 men; so that In regular
forces and reserves together we have the a.
vantage even OF that Power which has lust
astounded Europe by the magnitude Of its
srmaments. But would our armamenis prove
ne efectivel We leave that question without
reply; but ~ lt is 10 be ans wered I'm the mega
tive. az NOBODY would consider British army
inferior 70 Prussian army, soldier for soldier,
II follows ef once that the difference betweeH
the two establishments must conkst IN the
quality of the reserves. Here, indeed, lice the
true secret Of Prussia's military strength, and
secret IN its origin IL was, though IL has been
employed so long, and with such nosorleus
e~peosk, that it ought 20 be neither q mystery
nor monopoly any LONGER
"Sixty years since, after the famous battle
OF jena Napoleon imposed on the defeated
Prusslans the obligation of limiting their mil
| i'ary establishments 10 q strength OF <aOco
men. 1t was impossible to contradict the En-
perer, and not easy, as might be thought, TO
deceive him; but the device was accom- pli.hed
by Scharnhorst, the War Minister OF the time,
who not only eyaded the decree Of Napoleon
but laid the foundations Of that militAry
strength which has just been displayed in a
career OF unexampled triumph. Scharnhorst
did restrict the actual or visible army of Prus-
sia 10 the specified numbers, but he kept this
army In state OF perpetual change. It's con-
sututlon never remained the same for twelve
months together, but resembled the waters
OF lake which receives a river at one end
and discharges it at the other. As soon as a
recruit was thoroughly drilled. and had be-
come an effective soldier, he was dismissed to
ms nome, and a fresh recruit was received in
his place, TO be again disciplined and aSaIn
dismissed. The result of this system was that
the standing army became out q specimen
corps OF nation ofsoldiers. For eyerv soldier
In the ranks there Were I've as good as be in the
body of the people, all ready, at the first caIl
OF the trumpet to re-enter the line OF the army
When, therefore, seven years after her great
defeat, Prussia once more rose, a force of two
hundred thousand men, admirably disciplined
appeared in the place Of an army which Napo-
leon believed ne had cut down TO a fifth of that
number. The Prussians Were not ungrateful
TO their beuefactor. To this day the statue OF
Scharnhorst in white marble stands by the side
ef the great guard house in the great thorough
fare OF Berlin-a record Of military sagacity,
as well as national fame.
"The secret, then, of the Prussian strength
consists In this, that the reserve force is prac-
tcaIly as good as the force in the field The
regular army merely represents q portion of
the entire army on duty for the time The re-
as competent for duty if their services were
required. BY this light let examine our
own reserves. We have already seen that as
far as numbers 60. they are not inferior 20 the
ment must be made on this score for the for
eign and coiored troops included in the I'm
isfactory. In British militia, British volun-
teers, British yeomanry and British reserves
generally, we have q foi ce OF between three
hundred thousand and four hundred thousand
men actually within the limits OF these
isles There is certainly, at first sight,
no reason why this force should not
be made as effective as the Landwehr or
Landsturm OF Prussia A Prussian soldier is
made by a service of five years. commencing
at the age of u. But Of tins short term of SER
Niee one-half only rs passed in the regular
o<N.y, INC "e..cA nail icing spent IN the army
OF ofteserve. No doubt, this ie more training,
or, At ary rate, more efectiv training, than is
gwen to our militia; but IL the Prussian Land
wehr could, at a few weeks notice, fight their
way from their own country TO the very walls
OF Vienna, the British militia should surely be-
as competent for the less trying work Of a
home campaign. 1t is, in short quite evident
from the German war, that q soldier can be
made in a much shorter time, and by a much
easier process than is generally supposed. Two
years and a half Of consecutive duty made the
men who won the battle of Sodowa against an
army which boasted with reason Of its pro-
fessional discipline and experience"