The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1866-07-06
The War I'm Germany-supcrior Strategy
or the Prussians.

or the Prussians.
However much men may differ as to whom
belongs the diplomatic victory in the quarrel
between Prussia and Austria, no one can doubt
that the strategic advantage is with the former.
The diplomacy which secured the vote and the
alliance OF Saxony Hanover, Nassau, Wtrtem-
berg, ElectoralHesse and Hesse- Darmstadt to
Austria undoubtedly gave to that Power a
large territory and great numerical strength
in population and contingents; but neverthe-
less it gave TO Prussia great strategic advan-
tage, since II forced Austria to so dispose her
troops as to protect and hold an isolated coun-
try whose inhabitants were not competent to
protect themselves. The situation Of the two
Hesses and Hanover are not unlike that Of
Maryland during the late war in this country;
and they must remain in great measure as
isolated from Austria as Maryland was from
the rebel States, and as content to be occu-
pied by the Prussians as Maryland was by
the Union forces, until the end Of the contest
The Prussian commander, Prince Frederick
Charles, has not been slow to perceive this,
and has been equally prompt in acting. No
sooner was the vote Of June IA on the mobili-
zation of the army of the confederated Ger
man States announced than Prussia pronounced
the Federal compact dissolved and thus de-
clared war against Austria and the confeder-
ated States which voted with her. No sooner
was war declared on June Is than Prince
Frederick Charles began to move, and on the
10th advanced into Saxony, occupying Ores
den and Lobau. At the same time General
Manteuffel occupied the isolated State of Han
over, and General Won Boyer, advancing upon
Frankforton-the-Main, cut off the retreat of
the Hanoverian army upon that point.
There have been no operations in European
warfare for many years displaying greater
vigor than these initiatory movements of
Prince Frederick Charles, and they must
Immediately produce important results. The
occupation of the mountain region of
Saxony, and the holding of its numerous
passes, is triumph equal to victory won,
since it not only protects Prussia from flank
movement, but what is more important it
threatens communication between Vienna and
Frankfort, between the Austrian army and it's al
lies, the forces Of Wdrtemberg, Bavaria and the
Hesses at Mayence and Frankfort From these
mountain passes Of Saxony the troops of Prus-
STA can debouch upon the lines of communica-
ton of the Austrians and Of retreat of the
Federals, and force them to battle or retreat.
One of these results must ensue from these
movements-perhaps both may, and doubtless
the next news will bring us the intelligence of
the retirement OF The Federals from Frankfort
into Bavaria, and perhaps even into Bohemia.
The immediate concentration Of the Federals
pears to have become a necessity, and conse-
quently the Federal abandonment of Hanover
and the two Hesses. The occupation of Saxony,
the seizure of the railroad communications ber
tween Bavaria, Ssxony and Austria, the pos
session Of the fortified line Of Magdeburg,
Berlin, and the possession also of the mountain
detlles which separate Saxony and Bohemia, are
points gained by Prussia which will cost Aus
tria much bloodshed TO recover The vigor and
strategy of Prince Frederick Charles are admira-
BILE, and in this instance highly effective, and
equal to anything which We had illustrative Of
the art during our late war. We suggested yes
terday that the Prusaians, while adopting our
ideas Of organization, might probably employ
some Of the varied qualities Of oui generals,
but doubtless Sheridan and Sherman will be
prompt 70 recognize in the action Of Prince
Frederick Charles the spirit and afdor of the
true soldier and strategist.