Daily union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1865-1866, 1866-08-03
JUDGE HRIENs DECISION ON THE
FRANCHLsE-THE TRUE ISSUE,

ASOta5ltg dh1uLIto tht toHslllullOHdluy o
the law, the petition presents no sufficient
ground for writ Of mol,ddnus to the Regis
ter and Commissioner to register the peti
tionorand to issue to him certificate of sucI
registration. 1t ignores the important cir
cumstance that some part Of a law may b,
constitutional and other parts Of it unconsti
tutionaI, and that as to the parts Of an ac
which are in accordance with and authorized
by the Constitution, it must be held valid
and enforced, and as to other parts Of i
which do ROT accord with and are not au
thorized by the Constitution, it must be re
garded as void and be by the courts so de
clared. The power Of the Legislature Il
pass a law appointing a Registera nd Com
missioner Of voters, and requiring all voters
to register their names and obtain certif-
Gates of such registration as a condition upor
which they shall exercise the right to vote
can not be successfully questioned The
parts Of the Franchise Law, therefore, pro-
viding for the appointment of Registers and
Commissioners Of voters, and prescribing that
allvOtersshall register their names and obtain
certificates Of registration are constitutional
and valid. But if the other parts of the
law prescribing particular qualifications for
all voters, and depriving all who do not pos
sess the prescribed qualifications Of their pre-
cedent and existing right to vote, be not, as
the opponents Of the law think they are not,
in accordance with the Constitution of the
State, they are invalid and must by the
courts be 50 declared. The case made by
the petition presented this question. 1t as
sumed, Of course, that the parts of the law
as to the appointment of Register and Com
missioner, the registration of voters and the
issuance Of certificates we're in accordance
with and authorized by the Constitution, and
therefore were valid and obligatory But it
equally assumed that the other parts Of the
law were not in accordance with the Consti-
tuition, and were therefore invalid and void.
Upon the former assumption it predicates
and asserts theduty Of the petitioner TO have
his name registered and obtain certificate
Of registration. Upon the latter assumption
it predicates and asserts his right to require
the Register and Commissioner to register
him as a voter and issue to him certificate
of such registration. For if the former
parts of the law be constitutional, the petit
toner was, in common with all the citizens
of the State, bound to have his name regis
tered as a voter and to obtain a certificate of
such registration as the the condition upon
which he was to exercise his right to vote;
and if the latter parts of it were unconstitu-
tional and void, he had the right to
require the Register and Commissioner
and to issue to him a certificate, notwith-
standing such void provisions, and upon the
refusal Of the Register and Commissioner so
to do, under the pretense of the void pro-
visions, the court was bound to declare the
provisions void and unconstitutional, and to
compel the Register and Commissioner to
register the petitioner and give him the ne
cessary certificate. But the able and ingeni-
BUS opinion of his Honor fails to meet the
,ase made in the petition, and to decide the
or unconstitutionality of
he latter parts of the law, as the bare state
nent of case shows. He, no doubt has
passed upon the case as he understood it, and
lecided the question he thought the case
but yet he clearly misappre-
lended the case made in the petition, though |
he did so honestly and candidly. TO dis
,ose of the case properly, his Honor |
,ught to have passed upon the whole case
made by the petition, and either to have |
Iecided that parts of the provisions of the
aw could not be held constitutional and |
ARTS of them unconstitutional, if such was
is opinion; or if such was not his opinion,
hat different parts Of them could be so held
nd declaring the provisions as to the APP
ointment of Register and Commissioner of
oters, and as to the registration and the issu-
Gates were constitutional; ifsuch
ere his opinion he ought TO have gone on
nd decided that the other provisions Of the
Nv, prescribing new qualifications for all
oters, ard depriving all citizens, except
lch as could bring themselves within the
swly prescribed category of qualification, of
ieir existing rightto vote were constitutional
such was his opinion, unconstitutional if
at was his opinion. If the former was his
,inion, he ought to have dismissed the pc
lion, but if the latter was his opinion he
as bound to grant the writ of mandamus;
cause as a component part of the depart
ent of our government, to which is con-
led the duty Of guarding the Constitution
,ainst infractions, and Of protecting the
ghts of the citizen under it, his duty was
see that the citizen vas not deprived of
S inherent right of suffrage under the cover
I'd pretence ofthe void and demonstrations
provisions Of the law. But his Honor did !
ither Of these things. In this respect we
e thoroughly convinced that he ncon-
iously committed a grave error.
The object Of this article is simply to
int out what the case made in the petition
d the question thereby presented actually
IRE, and not 10 enter into discussion as to
e constitutionaliIy Of the questioned pro- !
sions of the Franchise law. In doing so {
, have deemed tia sacred duty to speak of
e decision Of his Honor with candor and
inlness, giving him full credit for recti- c
de Of intention, to which all who are called q
.on to al minister the law are at all times
titled, and carefully abstaining from all
Of his Honor's decision and '
Union. Such denunciations are at all
nes as unwise as they are unjust They !
yer aid the cause of truth. In the pres .
instance they could haveno tendency TO
.nce the error into which we think his :
,nor fell. Il our view Of the matter be
correct one, the statement of the case 7
the error Of his Honor, and if
be an erroneous one, our error must in the
ne way be made apparent. The question
= been taken TO the Supreme Court which
5unal will unquestionably decide it fairly
I justly by the light Of principle and au-
'rity. What that decision is compelled
be we entertain no doubt f. Mr.. v