New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1866-05-22
EUROPEAN AEEA1Rs.

affected by collision between the two great yer
man powers are 50 important that they may COM
| pei, or impel the other members Of the EuroPean
system 30 take part in the impending suusA'et
The present arrangements of the EuFopeaii i"F a'0
| arbitrary and artfoisl. Their maintenance ue'
pends on the equilibrium of power ana tae pre-
vang fesr Of the revolutions which inlgas 90 pro-
voked by wars for dynasticai or territorial aggfs
5;sapent. When the partitions and adjustments Of
Is1s we're made, they were supposed to be perma
nent and were declared to be unaterahle. But
4 tbs very powers which then exercised unlimited
authority in Europe were forced, within very
i short perioa to submit to certain notifications of
their arrangements The Congresses of Loybach
ana yereua, which ostehsibly confirmed the
adjustments of 1916, illustrated to certain extent
| the inevitable law of mutation, and set an exam
pie Of deviation, in direction, which was sure
| to be followed, subsequently, by deviation in
another direction.
| Finally, il 1880, the expulsion from France of
the Bourbon line, the establishment of the Orleans
dynasty BY the will Of the French people, and the
revolutions in other parts of Europe, which fol-
flowed these events, gave mortal blow to the
doctrine Of Legitimacy, snd to the pretensions of
hereditary dynasties to fix the destlries of nation
alities either by compulsory combinations, or
foreible severanees After that time the treaties of
llsI5 ceased to influence the course of European
politics and the character of European adjust
Ilmeuts. The subsequentreyo of 1850, and
the conflicts springing ont of them involved alter
l-nate changes which would have been quite impos-
sible under the authoritative domination of the ideas
Of the holy alliance. The conservation Of the
suffrage principle in France by the elevation Of
Louis Napoleon to the Imperial throne ana the
effective extension Of that principle TO Itsiy, as
exhibited IA the construction Of the Italian king
dom under Victor Emmanuel, introduced new
element into European politics-an element which
threatens to assert its predomnance in many ways
involving peril to existing dynasties, ana distur-
Dances Of existing territorial relations.
Hence the careful watchfalness with which Eu-
Iropean governments strive to avoid all outbreaks
of the war spirit Whereas their aim formerly was
to avail themselves Of every Opportunity for ag-
Igrandizenent, the only restraint being the fear Of
encountering hostile combinations formed to main
tain the balance of power, their greatest care now
"A is to avoid wars which might endanger their
4 safety, BY giving On alarming Importance to the
i new and dangerous doctrine of popular SOW
ereignty. These remarks apply with peculiar
! force to the German States. AS to France anG
j Italy and England, and even Spain, the operation
Of this principle referred to is materially modified
il
4 another on the popular consent declared, in the
= respective cases. in more or less authoritative
i manner. When. therefore, we see the two great
German powers willing to risk all the peTils of an
\. uncertain future, by resort to arms we can
n readily believe that other powers. which are re.
n strained by no such terFors will readily be drawn
i into the contest.
r France, thus far has expressed no opinion as to
Il the merits of the controversy between Prussia
il and Austria. But we know that the French PEG.
q pie have always been troubled with an intense
longing to extend their frontier to the Rhine which
they consider their natural boundary, and the EN-
u peror would, probably, not reject tempting OPP
a portunity to add the Rhinsh provinces of Prussia
il tohis dominions, The acquisition Of these pro
vinces and the annexation Of Belgium, seem to be
the reconcile springs of French diplomacy. Yet
es tls motive has been carefully concealed and the
"a NV open indications of policy which the French
0, Emperor has given to the world have seemed to
III favor the idea Of Prussian alliance Perhaps il
y, may be that he stimulated Bismar up to the fight
TO ing point, without compromising himself as to the
H. future action of France just as it is now stated
~ that he is urging the italian government to the
es adoption of warllke measures.
mi Indeed it seems to be very certain that Italy
p viii take advantage of the opportunity offered by
10 "a German war, to eensummate the darling wish OF
the Italian heart-the reunion of all of Italy under
If exclusively Italian governments, The possession
r LOT Yeneta by Austria is perpetual source firr
tation in Italy and, sooner or later Disbursements
II and collisions must have come of it, Victor En-
9 manuel might not be willing to risk contest for
e its possession with the mighty military power Of
, Austria; but he would scarcely dare to disregard
so tempting chance as would be offered by a
war between that empire aud Prussia. He may
have 70 choose between his throne and war, and
the choice between such alternatives is quickly
. made. Hence, as soon as the Austro. Prussian
controversy approached eliminating point, italy
commenced TO arm and to assume menacing at.
titude towards the Venetian frontier Military and
diplomatic necessities compelled Austria to respond
in the same way and then each power called on
The other to disarm. Both refused and at last
accounts the military preparations were pressed
with undated yigor. The frontier fortresses are
IN course of repair and reinforcement. The
Italian feet has beer concentrated in the Adriatlc;
The reserves have been called in; furlougha have
heen revoked and the press is occupied in excl
ting the war spirit. Under such circumstances
there Is no telling at what moment the storm Of
war may not break over Europe.
| 4,