The Wheeling daily register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1864-1878, 1866-01-04

WQeu III Is TSCUll0ClCu piAop-eAsS ~AAN
the Potomac was composed OF three
corps on the lst of May previous, to wit;
the Second, Filth and Sixth, and that
its effective strength then was, accord
ing to Mr.. Stanton's statement, i20,5oo.
The same statement shows that the
available strength of the forces in the
"Department of West Virginia" on the
LIST of May, 30,752, and most of the troops
in this department were concentrated
in the Valley. Documents subsequent
" captured showed the strength OF the
Nineteenth Corps to have been, at the
battle of Winchester, not less than IS,'
100 effective men. Official reports cap
tured at Cedar Creek showed that Sherl'
dams Cavalry, on the 18th OF september
two days before the fight. numbered H.
100 present for duty. His artillery was
vastly superior to mine in number OF
men and guns. The Sixth Corps alone
must have exceeded my entire strength,
unless it had met With such tremendous
losses as to reduce its strength at least
three fourths From all the information
received, and from documents captured
at Cedar Creek, | am satisfied that Sher-
idans effective infantry strength at
Winchester could not have been less
than IS 900 muskets, and it was probably
more The odds against me, therefore
were fully four to one, and probably
more His very great superiority III
cavalry was very disadvantageous 10 Me'
as the country was very open ana aani,
rably adapted to cavalry operations, anu
my cavalry, being mostly armeu wlIh
Enfield rifles without pistols OF saores'
could not fight his, whose equipments
and arms were complete. AT the hight
at Cedar Creek had been reinforced By
one division of infantry (Kershaw's)
numbering twenty-seven hundred (2,7OO)
mnsl ats one small battalion of artillery
and about six hundred (60O) cavalry,
which about made up my losses at Win
| chester and Fishers Hill. / went into
This fight with eight thousand FIVE hun
| dred (s,5O0) muskets, about forty pieces
of artillery and about twelve hundred
| q 2OO) cavalry, as the rest of my cavalry,
which was guarding the Lurray Valley,
did not get W in time, though ordered to
move at the same time | moved to the
attack. Sheridan's infantry had been
recruited fully up to its strength at Win
| chester, anu Ills y WV
as shown by the official reports captured
| The main cause why the ront OF bis army
in the morning was not complete, was
the fact that my cavalry could not com
pete with his, and the latter, therefore,
remained intact. He claimed all his
own guns that had been captured in the
morning, and atterward recaptured, as
so many guns captured from me, whereas
I lost only twenty-three guns, and the
loss Of these and the wagons which were
taken was mainly owing to the fact that
bridge, on a narrow part of the road
between Cedar Creek and Fishers Hill,
broke down, and the guns and wagons,
which latter were not nnmer-
GUS could not be brought Off
Pursuit was not prosecuted to
Mount Jackson, as stated by both Grant
and Stanton, but my troops were halted
for the night at Fishers Hill, three miles
from Ceder Creek, and next day moved
back to New Market, six miles from
Mount Jackson, without any pursuit.
So far from its being true, as stated by
Mr.. Stanton, that no force appeared in
the Valley after this, the fact that | re-
organized my force at New Market, and
on the 10th of November moved down
the Valley again, and confronted Sheri.
dan oh the 18th and 18th in front of his
intrenchments between Newtown and
KernstOwn, and then returned back to
New Market because provisions and for
age could not be obtained in the lower
Va ley The expeditions by which the
posts of New Creek and Beverly Station
were subsequently captured, were sent
out also from my forces in the Valley
The strong force which General Grant
says was intrenched under me at
Waynesboro when Sheridan advanced
up the Valley in the latter part of Febru,
airy, 1865, with two divisions Of cavalry
5000 each, 10000 men in all } consisted
of about 900 infantry and few pieces
of artillery, most fmy infantry having
been returned to General Lee TO meet
corresponding detachmeDts from Sheri-
dan to Grant, my cavalry and most OF my
artillery having been sent OIL on account
of the impossibility offOraging the hor'
SEES in the Valley. Obvious reasons of
policy prevented the publication of these
facts during the war, and it will now be
seen that was leading forlorn hope all
the time. and the public can appreciate
JnG GudIdClCl VI thc NlItollco Noi ny
Sheridan over me-.
The statements have made are from
facts coming within my own knowledge,
and they are made to show the disparity
between the Confederate armies and
those of the United States These state.
ments will serve to give some idea of the
disparities existing in other lines. | now
ask which has retired from the contest
with more true glory, that heroic band
of Confederat,s who 80 long withstood
the tremendous armies and resources of
the United States, or that Grand Army
of the Union" which, while being re-
cruited from all the world, was enabled
by continuous hammering" to so ex-
haust its opponents by mere attrition,"
as to compel a surrender The world has
never witnessed so great a political
crime as that committed in the destruc-
ton of the Confederate Govern
eminent by armed force. Other nations,
III ancient as well as modern times have
fallen under the yoke of the conqueror
or usurper, because their own follies
vices or crimes had prepared the way for
their subjugation. Mary tears have been
shed over the fate of unhappy Poland,
but We cannot shut our eyes to the fact
that the Poles had shown their incspaci-
ty to manage their OWE Government ere
they were consigned to foreign rule In