Litchfield enquirer., 1866-02-22

| @1-< -s= r X FIFE. 00, I868.
 - IREPoRr oF LinUr aENERAL U. s,
 GRANT. &s'1 M e6bzIiAusa.j a s sse.
 All nsesssxty preparations for carrying these IdIsecli6ns into 0psistIoh may De commenced | Iss|Socs. fA9 idsefves u the stl corps should I u nizsssd sm6tA II possible. Whilst would aet isu order III Ilbacobditional sstack on ths sbsnyss iihs bt tisn, thsy should bs ready, Es6d sAoalis smske 4bs attack fl the enemy weak. Iens hieliaes inahsirf frsut, without waiting for ordere h case they carry the line. then the vhnls oi the sth. corps should follow up, 10 sas |to join IT co Eoperste with the balance of the asuy.s To prspare for this the 9th corps will hsvs rations isshsd to them, same as the bal. ance of the asuy General Weitxel will keep |vixilsnt wktoh upon bis front, and if found tt |alfp practicable to break through at any rcint he will do sos A success north of the James shonld be followed up with great prompsness Anattsck nillnot be feasible unless 1t is fognd that theI enemy has detached largely. In that case 1t may Sc regarded asssvident that the ell. am5 are relying upon their local reserves, principally. for the defence of Richmond. Pre- pssations may besmads for abandoning all the line north of the 5James, except enclosed Tout Wofks -only te be .abandonsd. however. after 1 bfsak ismade in ths lines Of the enemy. sssis ,
 By these instructions large part of the ar mics operating against Richmond is left be- hind. The enemy knowing this, may, as an only chance, strip their lines to the merest skeleton, in the hope of advantage not being taken of it, whilst they shurl everything against the moving column, and return. It cannot be impressed too strongly upon commanders of troops left in the trenches not to allow this to occur without taking advantage of it. The very fact the enemy coming cut to attack, if he does 30, might be regarded as almost con elusive evidence of such weakening of his lines. Iwould have it particularly enioined npon corps commanders that, in case of an at tack from the enemy, those not attacked are not to wait for orders from the commanding officer of the army to which they belong, but that they will move promptly. and notify the commander of their; action. I would also en- join the same action on the part of division commanders when other parts of their corps are engagsh In like manner would urge tke importance of following up repulse of the en- |emy.
 U s GRANT, lieutenant General
 Major Gsnerals MkADE, ORD, and SHRafl par.u8 zzs 5 zs as
 Early sonsbe morning Of the 25tb, the enc my assaulted our lines in front of the sth corps (which held from the Appomattox river to- wards our left,) and carried Fort Steadman, and part of the line to the right and left of it, established themselves and turned the guns of the fort against us. but our troops on either flank held their ground until the reserves were brought up. wh en the enemy was driven back with heavy loss in killed and wounded and 1900 prisoners. Our loss. was 6S killed, s37 wounded. and 506 missing. General Meade at once ordered the other corps to advance and feel the CT emy in their respective fronts =rush- ing forward they captured and keld the enemy's strongly intrenched picket line in front of the 2d and 9th corps. and 834 prisoners. The en- emy made desperate attempts to re:ake this line, but without success. Our loss in front of these was 52 killed. s64 wounded, and POT missing. The enemy's lossin killed and wound ed was far greatar
 General sherman having got his troops all quietly into camp about Goldsboro,. and his preparations for furnishing supplies to them perfected, visited me at City Point on the 27th of March, and stated that he would be ready to move, as he had previously written me, by the 10th of April. fully equipped and ratio6ed for twenty days. fit should become necessary to bring his command to bearaagainst Lees army, in co ooperation with our main forces in front of Richmond and Petersburg.s General Sher- man proposed in this, movement to threaten Raleigh, and then by turning suddenly to the right. reach the Roanoke at Gaston or there abouts, whence he could move on to the Rich mond and Danville railroad, striking it in the vicinity of Gainesville, or join the armies ope- rating against Richmond, as might be deemed best This plan he was directed to carry into execntie0, if be received no further direction in the mean time. explained to him the movement I had ordered to commence on the 2sth of March. That if it should not prove as entirely successful as hoped, I would cut the cavalry loose to destroy the Danyille and South aide railroads. and thus deprive the enemy of further supplies. and also prevent the rapid concentration of Lees and Johnston's armies.
 I had spent days of anxiety lest each ,morn- ing should bring the report that the enemy had retreated the night before. was firmly con. vinced that Sherman's crossing the Roareke would be, the signal for Lee to leave.g With Johnston and him combined, a long, tedious, and expensive campaign, consuming most of the summer, might become necessary. By moving out I would put the army in better condition for pursuit, and would at least, by the destruction of the Danville road retard the A As l