The Louisiana Democrat. [volume] (Alexandria, La.) 1845-1918, 1866-01-17
GENERAL EARLY ON GRANTS
AND STANT0N'S REPORTS.
The Campaigns of 1854 g5 The
Other Side Of the Question.

The Campaigns Of l84-B5 -Eht
Other Side Of the Question
The New York News has received TIN
following interesting letter from Genera
EARLY, late Lieutenant General G. s. A.:
Havana, DECEMBER l8, 1665.-The re
ports of the campaigns Of 1864 and 1865 BY
Secretary Stanton and ldeutenant-G Genera
Grant, recently published, contain many
erroneous statements which do great injus
tice to the Confederate armies. The press
in the Southern States is at present effec
tuaIly muzzled by military rule, and thu
| Confederate cause hasaoappropriate
by which the ears of the world can b,
reached The tune will arrive, however
when true history Of the warfare can b
written SOFAS to enable foreign nations ant
lposterity to do justice to the character Q
those who have sustained SO unequal !;
Istruggle,fer all thatsiS dear to man. In an
ticipation of that time, Twill call attention
to some facts which will show the tremen
dous odds the Confederate armies had tt
encounter.
Mr. Secretary Stanton's report shows
'that the available strength present for duty
in the army with which General Grant com
meme. I'd the campaign of 1864 was, On Is
of May, 1854, as follows:
The Army Of the Potomac funde
40.
General Meale ..........-... 1854
The Ninth Army Corps (under Gen
eral Burnside. ................ ZO,ISt
Aggregate ...... Ia %
Besides this, he says the CHEZ part OF tn
force designed to guard the Middle depart
ment and the Department of Washington
was called to the front to repair thu, ,'osse
in the Army of the Potomac, which doubt
less was done before that army left tat
vicinity Of Spottsylvania Courthouse, as
General Grant says: ..'The 18th, l4th, 18th
10th, 18th and 18th (df May, 1854 were
consumed in maneuvring and waiting forre
Inducements from Washington" and Mr.
Stanton says the sending Of these troops to
the front caused the detachingfrorH General
Lees army of the force under me to threaten
Baltimore and Washington. The available
strength of the forces in those departments
on the LIST May, according to MIR. Stanton
report, was as follows:
IN the Department Of Washington. : az, l25
la the Middie Department. -. ... .5!62i
Of which it may be safely assumed that 'at
least 10000 men were sent to tie front, sa>
General Grant says that when | approached
Washington the garrison of that place and
Baltimore were "hlade up of heavy artillery
regiments, hundred days men, and detach.
ments from the Invalid Corps" aud hence
it became Necessary 70 send troops from his
army to meet me. This, therefore, made an
army Of 10000 men which General Lee
army had to meet before, ss l will snow, it
had received any treitforcements whatever
This estimate does not include the rein.
forcsments received in the way ofrecruits
from voluntary enlistment and the draft
which was constantly going on, nor does it
include reinforccments from the Northern
Department and the Departments Of the
East and the Susquehanna, where there
were, by Mr.. Stanton's showing, l5,347
available men for duty, the greater part OIL
which, it is presumed, were sent to Grant
as otherwise they might have been brought
to Washington to meet my force with more
ease than from his army.
General Lees army, at the beginning ci
the campaign, consisted of two divisions Of
.Longstreets corps, Ewell's corps, a. z.
Hills corps, three divisions Of cavalry and
the artillery. | commanded, at different
times during the campaign, Hills and
Ewells corps, and am, therefore, able to
state very nearly the entire strength Of the
army. Ewclfs corps, to which os -. cad
did not exceed fourteen thousand (l4,0dU)
maskets at the beginning of the campaign.
When | was placed in command OF Hill
corps on the oth Of May, by reason Of Gen,
eral Hills sickness, its effective strength
was less than thirteen thousand (I3,0O0)
muskets, and it cou:!d not have exceeded
eighteen thousand $4,000 in the begin
aing General Longstreet's Cops was the
weakest 6fYhe three when all the divisions
were present, and twowith him had Just re.
turned from an arduous and exhuusting
winter campaign in East Tennessee. His
effective strength could not have exceeded
5000 muskets. General Lees whole effec-
tive infantry, therefore, did not exceed 49,
900 muskets, if it reached that number
The cavalry divisions were all weak, neither
of them exceeding the strength of a good
brigade. The artillery was in proportion to
the other arms, and was far exceeded by
Grant $, not only in the n ..a...,,r 0, men and
eo'..ils, but in welsllt Of metal, and especially
in quality of the ammunition. General
Lees whole effective strength ut the open
ing of the campaign was not oyerfifty thou.
sand (5O,O0U) men Of all arms. There were
no means Of recruiting the ranks of his
army, and no achievements were received
until it reached Hanover junction, On the
23d Of May. 1t was this force, therefore,
which compelled Grant, after the fighting Of
the Wilderness and around Spottsylvania
Courthouse, including the memorable 9th
of May, to wait six days for reinforcements
from Washington before he could move
and bafled his favorite plan of reaching
Richmond. At Hanover junction Lee was
Joined by Pickett division Of Longstreet s
corps, Que small brigade of my division OIL
IL Il ~