The Camden journal. [volume] (Camden, S.C.) 1866-1891, 1866-11-07
After full argument, the Court,
Judge Giles, decided as follows:

JuuSc VllCS, uecldcu as 1OllOWS:
Unquestionably in this case zer
,ffori prevails, and not lee loci contra
tus: hence the Court will apply the
law of. Maryland, which requires
suits to be brought within three
years. Nd. Cons, art. ST, sec. 1
and 2.
In this law there arc certain speci-
fed exceptions provided for; but it is
mistake to suppose that exceptions
may not arise other than those men
toned in the statute. The law al
ways supposes the existence of a
party in being capable of suing; and
if, when the cause of action accrues,
there is no such party capable Of SUI
ing, limitations do not begin to run
until such party comes into being.
Hence, if war had existed at the time
this cause Of action accrued, limita-
tions would not have begun to run
against plaintiffs claim until the war
ended.
On the 7th of September, 1861,
this Court decided that the President
of the United States had the right by
proclamation to recognize the exist
ence of state of war; and that the
war, from and after the date of such
proclamation, existed between. the
States mentioned in the proclamation
and the rest of the United States
Also, that the late war when so de-
clared and recognized by the Presi-
dents proclamation, became IL cluil
'cer, andimposed upon both bclligcr-
cnts all the rights and consequences
Of such war. This was one of the
earliest decisions in regard to our
late civil war, and the principles then
enunciated have since been fully con-
frmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the Prize Cases, 2
Black, 635.
The justices of that Court were
unanimous as to all the consequences
which resulted from state of civil
war; but the three dissenting Judges
were of opinion that the war began
only after the proclamation of the
President, Of August 10th, 1861,
passed in pursuance of power con-
fencd upon him by the act of July
18th, 1861.
As regards the State of Tennessee,
there can be no doubt that war en-
listed in consequence of the proclaim
alton of the President of August Is,
1861, and not before, as that State
was not included in the previous pro-
clamation.
1t is we'll settled principle that
contracts made before the ewar arc only
suspended by the war, whereas con-
tracts made duringthc war are void.
This principle is fully recognized by
the Supreme Court in regard to our
late civil war,
In ancient times private property
Of alien enemies, and debts of every
kind, were confscated to the State.
Happily all this has been changed
in modern times, and now, while con-
tracts made during var between alien
enemies arc absolutely void, being
against public policy, private inter
csts arc protected, and bona fde con-
tracts made before the breaking out
of IL war arc suspended during its
existence, but reripe at its teimina-
ton. 70 the honor Of the United
States and Great Britain be it said
that these. rights have always been
respected BY them.
1t has been repeatedly decided by
both State and Federal Courts that
where, by Il legislative enactment,
parties arc prevented from prosccu-
ting their claims, the interval during
which such prevention lasts is not to
beseountcd a. part of the time allow
ed by the statute of limitations. Now
the power to make war and peace is,
by the Constitution of the United
States, delegated exclusively to the
Federal Government; and rs during
the wal the plaintiff, being Il corpor-
alton Of the State Of Tennessee, had
no right to bring suit against the dc
fendant, who was citizen of Mary
land, the Maryland statute Of limita-
tions was suspended during such pc
riod. The general rule unqucstlon-
ably is, that where the statute Of lin
itation has once begun to run, no
subsequent disability will arrest it.
But We have already seen that q
legislative enactment suspcnds the
running of the statute, and the same
result follows from the declaration of
l. L.