The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1866-07-21

of this law is, that it affects "private
rights retrospectively."
1t is, therefore, not an er post fdcto law
according to Kent's definition.
The cases of Calder Us. Bull, 8 Dallas,
and Fletcher Us. Peck, Cranch, are
also referred to in support of the promo
sition that this is an eE post Eacto law.
The case OF Calder Us. Bull was this
The Will of Norman Morrison was Of
fered for probate before the Probate
Court of Hartford county, Connecticut,
and was rejected on trial. The deviseeS
failed to perfect their appeal from the
judgment of the Probate Court within
the time prescribed by law. 1t was
therefore claimed by the heirs at law
that the judgment of the Probate Court
had become final and 1rrevocable, and
that the title to the property denied by
the will had irrevocably vested i'll them.
On the application of the devisees, the
Legislature of the State of Connecticut
set aside the Judgment of the Probate
Court and granted new trial to the
devisees, with liberty to appeal from
the judgment that might be rendered
ON the new trial, within six months.
On the new trial the will was estab-
lished and admitted to probate. The
contestants appealed and the Supreme
Court affirmed the Judgment of the
Probate Court, in admitting the will to
probate: The heirs at law claimed
that the law setting aside the
first Judgment of the Probate Court and
granting new trial was er post Tdcto
and unconstitutional because it divest-
ed them of the title which they ac-
CURED by the first judgment of the
Probate Court, which was not appealed
from in pursuance of the law then in
force. The Court held that the law was
not unconstitutional or er post Eacto.
And there is not a word in the opinion
ofthe Court that gives any color to the
claim that law affecting rights of pro-
perty, or civil rights is an eE post Jacto
faw.
The case of Fletcher VS.. Peck s.
Cranch was this: The Legislature of
the State of Georgia passed a law au-
thortzing the Governor to sell and con-
vey 100000 acres of wild land in that
State. In pursuance of this law the
Governor sold and conveyed $4,000
acres of the land to Fletcher for So, 900.
A subsequent legislature repealed the
law authorizing the Governor to sell
the land, and declared the law void, be-
cause its passage had been procured Ly
bribery and corruption, and revoked
all sales and grants made by the Gov
ernor under it. The Court held that so
much of the repeating law as attempted
nor before its passage, was nnconstitu-
tional-not because it was er post jdcto-
but because it was a law impairing the
obligation of contracts.
In other words the Court would not
permit the State of Georgia to stultifv
herself by repudiating her own con-
tracts.
But what contract did the Legisla-
ture of West Virginia make with Mr..
Hunter that she seeks to repudiate by
the law of February, 1866?
am not able to see the analogy be-
tween that case and the case at bar.
The case of Dartmouth College VS..
Woodward, Wheaton, referred to by
the aPPlicant-simply decides that the
Legislature of a State cannot repeal the
charter of private corporation upon
the faith of which capital has been in
vested, aud thereby for all practical
purposes, contiscate the capital so in
vested. 1t has ever since been
recognized as a leading case, and
Is undoubtedly sound law, though
it has recently been gravely
questioned. In the cases which came
up from Ohio under the State Constitu-
tion of 1850, and the laws passed in
pursuance of it, increasing the tax on
banks previously chartered, the au-
thOrity of that case was called in ques-
tion, and denied by minority OF the
Supreme Court of the United States.
In the case of Dodge Us. Wooley, lS
Howard 36I, involving this question,
j Judges Catron, Daniel and Campbell
dissented. In the case of the State
Bank of Ohio Us. ThrOop 16, Howard
1893, the same Judges dissented. In the
case of Butler as. Pennsy ylvaniu 10,
Howard 4O2, it was held that law re-
ducing the salary of an officer from
81 to So per day, and changing the mode
OF appointment so US to oust an ircum-
bent before the expiration of his term,
was not a violation of contracts, but
was valid, constitutional law.
In the case OF Satterlee as. Matthew
son 2, Peters $50, it was held that:
Retrospective laws which do not i'm
"pair the obligation of contract, or
"partake of the character Of er post
ntucto laws are not forbidden by the
CONSTITUTION of the United States"
In delivering the opinion of the
Court, Justice Washington says: "The
objection however which is most press
"ed upon the Court is, that the effect of
this act was to divest vested rights.
''There is certainly no part of the Con-
'stitution of the United States which
"applies to State law of this descrip-
"tion, nor are we aware ofany decision
'of this, or of any Circuit Court which
"has condemned such law upon this
"ground, provided its effect be not to
impair the obligation of contract"
In 1929 the Legislature of Virginia
passed law authorizing a turnpike
corporation to raise money by lottery
TO repair its road. In 1884 law was
passed limiting the operation of the act
to six years. Held, that this Limitation
did not impair the obligation OF a con-
tract. Phalen Us. Virginia s. Howard
1853.
In the case of the Charles river Bridge
Us. Warren Bridge II. Peters 42O, the
first point decided in the case is that:
"a State law may be retrospective
''and divest vested rights, and yet not
violate the constitution of the United
"States."
Chief Justice Taney in delivering the
opinion OF the Court says: at is well
settled by the decisions of this Court
that State law may be retrospective
"in its character, and may divest vested
rights, and yet not violate the cunsti-
tuition of the United States, unless it
"also impaires the obligation of a con-
"tract."