The aegis & intelligencer. [volume] (Bel Air, Md.) 1864-1923, 1866-04-20

equally outuumbcred by the superior for
ces of Foster, and had only 5000 men
to cover tie line of the Black Riv r, and
at the same time protect Lees right flank
and rear These were fully equal, never.
theless, for the purpose, but their num-
bes were too small for field operations,
and they were always obliged to remain
on the defensive at a time when opera
tons of that nature we're dscouraging in
the extreme, and merely served to drag
out doOUed existence Still furth r
South were the armies of Hardee and
Beaurrgard, opposed to Gen. Weitzel in and
about Charleston on yne flank and Sher-
mans advance, with his entire army Of
the West, in front. They had to cover
Savannah and Charleston, and the rail.
roads thereto, to maueuvre so as to pro-
tect both cities, and at the same time
keep open their communications with
Richmond and Lee, and yet had only o.
900, while there were at least 10000
against them, 10000 in Sherman's army,
and 10000 in Port Royal, Falls Island
and the neighboring coast. Still further
South again were Taylor's, Hills and
Cobb's commands, distributed over the
States of Georgia, Alabama and Misissip-
pi, and SO far as weight in contest went,
of no earthly use whatever. In the same
category may also be placed the forces
under Kirby Smith, Magruder and Price,
which were needlessly allowed to remain
west of the Mississippi. They might
probably have changed the aspect of the
war, for considerable time at least, if
placed under the control of an able lead
err like jackson or Lee. This, too, was
the only point the South all through
maintained, and the only one, which for
strategical reasons the Federals did not
seriously assail, although by means of the
Mississippi and their gunboats they could
have concentrated all the forces in the
West upon almost any point in it. But
to return to the comparison, Lee was
fearfully outnumbered in the east, Hardee
and Beauregard were equally so in the
South, Bragg and Hoke so far as prepon-
derance or diversion could 60 being ut
terly out of the contest. Combats in
tue open uelu uuuer sucu circumstances
resolved themselves into mere butcheries,
and further continuance of the contest
would have been worse than foolish
The South, nevertheless, has no reason to
be ashamed of the prowess and the en-
durance it displayed. In every battle in
which the numbers were in any way
proportioned, victory unswervingly perch
ed upon its banners. The greatest cap
tain of modern times was twice placed in
the same predicament, and although in
his desperate straits he surpassed himself
in ability and genius, mere brute strength
outweighed all his combinations and the
valor of his battallions. A victory had
become almost as dangerous as defeat,
owing to the sacrifices it necessarily en-
tailed, and the blacks being out of the
question. surrender and submission loom.
ed into sight. One now only wonders
why Mr.. Jefferson Davis did not make
terms with Mr.. Lincoln in Hampton
Roads. 1t must have been strange in
fatuatiou which prevented him. There
is yet further moral. 1t is wonderful
with, the slim force the Confederates are
now shown to have possessed, that they
shonld have resisted so long the great
armies moved against them.