Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1866-04-13
BUELL. AND GRANT.


To Lieut-Gen. Grant United States Army:
As long ago as last August / saw in
the New York Herald a paragraph pur-
porting to give some expressions of yours
/ concerning me, during your tour through
I the Northern States and Canada. II
was as follows:
"Gen. Grant, while in Springfield,
I Mass, cOnversed very freely on topics OF
/ general interest connected with the
army. He said that Gen. Buell. was
/ thoroughly versed in the theory Of war,
but knew nothing Of handling men in
I an emergency, and that his heart was
never in the war from the first He said
[ that Buell. might have reached Pittsburg
I Landing several days earlier than he did,
I in which case Gen. Grant would have
been the attacking party
I Immediately called your attention to
this paragraph. and requested you to
svow or disavow the remarks imputed
to you; and again on the 9th Of Decem-
Der / did the same thing. On the 4th Of
January received your reply, dated the
29th Of December. In that you say you
have no recollection Of the reported con
versati0n; and if any such occurred, you
know that your remarks could not have
been quoted correctly. For instance,
you say in regard to my "want Of ability
to command in the presence Of an ene-
my, or in battle,n you have always
thought and frequently expressed
yourself differently; and on the
subject Of my "heart never having been
in the cause,n you must, you say, GER
tainly have been misunderstood. You
supposed me TO be in earnest while was
in command, etc. You add, however,
that my letters published since have
rather given the idea that I wanted the
Union saved in a particular way, and
that way different from the one which
was being pursued Your impression
would have been more accurate if you
had understood that / desired that the
Union should be preserved or restored
not destroyed. But without going into
definitions, or drawing the line Of differ
ence, must say here, that the conclu-
sion which you have drawn from my eX-
Dressions is substantially correct.
In regard TO the battle of Shiloh, your
explanation, which I shall quote further
on, qualities somewhat the statement in
the newspaper report referred to; but al
lowing for the zeal of partisans, there is
enough in il 10 confirm the rumors ] have
heard, that the reflections which at vari-
Gus times have been actively and extern
sively circulated relative to my move
ments prior to the battle drew their in
spiration from your headquarters You
may, therefore, fairly be regarded as re-
spoDsible for them, and shall take them
mp in the form in which they have been
And frst, who ever asserted that l
could not have reaGhsd Pittsburg Land
ing earlier than did, Not /, nor any
one in my name Undoubtedly, I could
have moved by forced marches before
YOU were attacked on the 9TH of April,
as l did afterward, and so have reached
Savannah in time TO avert the disaster
Of that day; but in stating barely that |
could have done so, as in the paragraph
which / have quoted, the allegation is
implied that 1 was remiss in not doing
so. ] shall show that the facts do not
warrant any such imputston.
After giving q number of official dis |
patches, Gen. Buell. proceeds
From these facts it results that my
had for its object, not to rescue /
you from impending destruction, but to /
form junction with you for a deliberate /
under our common superior; |
and all statements 20 the effect that / /
knew yOa we're in peril, and yet failed to |
hasten TO your succOr, are without found /
alton. Had 1 acted on your dispatch to |
Gen. Nelson, OF on Gen. Halleck's au- |
thority 10 halt at WaynesbOro, the time |
you designated for me 10 commence |
crossing the river would have found the /
remnant Of your army prisoners ia the 1
casnBs of the enemy; though, in point Of 1
fact, as far as numbers We're concerned, /
you were in no need Of assistance, for /
you had several thousand more men than /
yOa. assailant, and the simplest DISPOSE |
ton Of your troops for battle ought to |
have secured to you the victory.
But the country has not only been I
made TO shuddeT at the narroWness of /
your escape, but TO grieve at the failure
Of ripe plans in consequence of my non /
arrival ana, therefore shall not close
this letter until have examined the de-
claration that, II had arrived earlier at
Savannah, you would have been the
party.
In the face Of all these facts-the lack
Of authority; the restraint of orders, as
you yourself interpreted them the alb
sence of means wherewith TO move. and
Of plan of preparation. or probability
Of mOving-it is impossible to sup
press incredulity at the statement that
Il had arrived earlier you would
have been the attacking party, And
f that theory could be divested Of the in
in which the more positive evi-
fence clothes t. the doubt would still
recur when men, sitting in
impartial Judgment on ali tha faois, and
your letter Of the 4th Of April
% Gen. Nelson with that Of the 9Th Of
pril to me, inquire with amazement, as
hey must 90, why il vas that, consider
ng yourself in ieoprady, and expecting |
IN attack on Monday, you made no prep
lration 20 avail yourself Of reinforce
ne1ts until Tuesday and why, whether
-our forcs was sufficient or Insufficient, |
'ou made no disposition of the troops
ilready on the ground TO meet the ex-
,ected danger.