The daily clarion. [volume] (Meridian, Miss.) 1863-1866, 1866-02-23

1 Whatever belongs merely to the remedy
may be altered according to the will of the
State, provided the alteration does not i'm
pair the obligation of the contract. But i
that effect is produced, it is immaterial
whether it is done by acting OF
contract itself In either case it is prohih-
| tied by the Constitution" cit il
manifest that the obligation of the contract
and the rights of a party under it, may in
effect be destroyed by denying remedy al.
together, or may be seriously impaired by
burdening the proceedings with new con.
ditions and restrictions, SO as to make the
remedy hardly worth pursuing
In McCracken VS. Hayward, Howard
6l2-6I3, the same court says:
Amy law which in its operation amounts
to denial or obstruction of the rights ac-
cruing by the contract, though protesting to
act only on the remedy, is directly obnoxious
to the prohibition of the Constitution" =
The obligation of the contract between the
parties in this case was to perform the
promises and undertakings contained there
in; the right of the plaintiff was, to dam
ages for the breach thereof to bring suit and
obtain Judgment, to take out and prosecute
an execution against the defendant till the
Judgment was satisfied, pursuant to the ex-
listing laws of Illinois. These laws giving
these rights, were as perfectly binding on
contract as if they had been set forth in its
stlpulations in the very words of the law
relating to judgments and executionsr
And this Court after citing the above
passages from the last Two. cases. says:
These decisions certainly establish the
principle that all legislation which ma
terlally affects the laws for the enforcement
of contract existing at the time it is
made, impairs the obligation of the con-
tract. To this extent the influence
OF these decisions meets with unqualified
acknowledgements Newt VS. Bank of
Port Gibson, G. S & NJ 623.
Chief Justice Parsons says, in Call VS.
Haggin, 8 Mass. 430. fE
eff the Legislature of any State were
to undertake to make a law prere,ating the
legal remedy upon contract lawfully
made and binding on the party to it. there
Is no question that such Legislature would
by such act, exceed its legitimate powers"
In Tarpley VS. Hamar, 8 S and NJ. 314, this
Court says, that any legislation thatmight
lessen the extent or efficiency of the remedy
on existing contracts, or which changes or
diminishes the force of existing liens,
might be Objectionable
And these principles have been affirmed
in this court in more recent case, as fol-
lows:
1T is too well settled to admit of ques-
ton at the present day, that it is
" lblllIl IllC pONCI vi lllt OJiIt
to regulate the remedy and modes of pro-
ceeding in relation to past as well as to
future contracts. This power is subject
only to the restriction, that it cannot be
exercised so as to take away all remedy
upon the contract, or to impose upon its
enforcement new burdens and restrictions
which materially impair the value and
benefit of the contract" BriscOe VS. Ank-
etell % Miss. 81.
Let us now consider the character of the
legislation now before us.
1t is urged that it is within the legiti-
mate powers of the Legislature, because it
pertains to the remedy. But is that its
true character?
1t contains no provision whatever in re-
lation to the process or course of judicial
procedure or suit which might have been
instituted, on the causes of action enume-
rated,-but 1t interposes positive inter
dict against the institution of any such
suits. 1t does not attempt to make any
new regulations in relation to the prose-
cution of suits then pending or any pro-
ceedings to be had therein, but absolutely
prevents all proceedings in such suits for
more than two years. Instead of modify
ing the remedies existing for the causes
of action specified, or providing new
remedies thereon, ititakes away all rene
dies upon them with few exceptions, and
closes the Courts as to all remedies upon
them for period exceeding two years
This can with no propriety, be classed or
justified as legislation regulating remedies,
but is in ettecG a deRl0t Of all remedy upon
the causes of action enumerated, for the
time specified. 1t is, therefore, clearly
within the principles above stated, and
comes within the prohibition of the Con-
stitution of the United States, and of the
18th Section of our Declaration of Rights.
We will now consider the objection
to the cOnstitutionality of this act, based
on the 14th Section of the Declaration of
Rights, which requires shat all Courts shall
be open, and eUe1y person, for an injury done
HIM, an has lands, goods, person or reputation,
shall haze remedy By die course Of lar, and
right and justice administered agith0ut sale,
denial or delay
What is due course of law in this re-
spect, is not left in uncertainty, but can be
ascertained by other provisions of the Con-
stitution; and, accordingly, the 18th Sec
ton of Article of the Constitution re-
quires that "a Circuit Court shall be held
in each county of this State, at least twice
in each year." and the 18th Section of the
same Article requires that ''the High
Court of Errors and Appeals shall be held
twice in each year, at such place as the
Legislature shall direct" &c. These re-
quirements are positive and imperative,
and are in furtherance of the provisions of
the Declaration of Rights, that ''right and
justice SuOuIu Ue dulllnlSIeTeu ''tctutOuk u6-
NAL or delay" The plain intention was that
these Courts should be open at least twice in
each year, in order that every person should
have tull and free remedy, in the ordinary
forms of law, for all injuries done him in
any of his rights of person or of property.
If this privilege is denied or prohibited by
act of the Legislature, as to any of the
rights of the citizen, it is as effectuallya
violation of the Constitutional right as II
the Legislature had enacted that these
Courts should be entirely closed; for the
denial of the remedy at the prescribed
terms of these Courts, is, in effect, the
same, as to these rights and remedies, as
if the Courts had been directed to be en-
tirely closed. There cannot be a doubt
that, if the Legislature had passed an act
requiring these Courts to be entirely closed,
until the first day of January, 1868, itwould
have been violation of the provisions of
the Declaration of Rights, and of the Con-
stitution referred to; and it is equally clear
that an act requiring them to be closed as
to certain specified rights and remedies of
the citizen, is of the same character. For
the citizen is thereby deprived of remedies
positively guaranteed to him by the organ
ic law, the courts are not open to him for
redress of his injuries, and right and JUS
tice are denied and delayed.
1t appears, therefore, to be clear beyond
doubt, that the act of the Legislature in
of the Declaration of Rights, and of the
Constitution of this State, anu must De held
imperative and void, for that reason.
But 1t is urged in support of the validity
of the act, that the Legislature is clothed
with power to suspend the laws of the
State, by the 18th section of the Declare
ton of Rights, which provides, that no
power of suspending laws shall be exer-
cised except BY the Legislature or It's authori-
ty;;' and that the act in question is but an
exercise of the power thus granted.
1t must be conceded that this recognizes
in the Legislature the power to suspend
the laacs in general. But this recognition
of power must be so construed as
to harmonic with other provisions
of the Constitution, and will not
admit of construction which
would defeat other specific provisions of
the instrument and violate individual
rights therein positively guaranteed. The
act in question does not suspend merely
the ldecs of the State for the collection of
debts; but in our view, it contravenes the
v,,.ov;s;orS IF fhn Dne1arati0n of RiU'htS