Daily union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1865-1866, 1866-11-21
EFFECT OF THE WAR ON THE STA
TUTE OF PLANTATIONS.

In the Circuit Court of the United States
for Maryland, on the 18th inst, a decision
was rendered by Judge GILES, which in
wolves point Of considerable interest We
extract from the Baltimore Sun, the follow
ing in regard to the case
! This was an action on a bill of exchange
| drawn on Memphis by the jackson Insu-
rance Company, in February, 1861, at sixty
! days, on JAMES A STEWART, PAYABLE at the
| Farmers and Planters Bank in Baltimore. and
accepted by STEWART, but protested for
Don-payment, April %, 1861.
Plea, statute Of limitations.
Replications.-lst That war existed when
the cause Of action accrued, and that three
years had not elapsed between the close Of
the war and the commencement of the suit.
End. That the President of the United
States declared war against Tennessee by his
proclamation of August l6, 1861, which war
continued until, by the proclamation of the
President, of June 49, 1866, Tennessee was
restored to the Union, and that the inter-
walls of time which elapsed from the maturi-
ty Of the bill to the beginning Of the war,
and from the close of the war to the COM
mencement Of this suit, did not together
amount to three years.
10 these replications a general demurrer
was filed by the defendant.
The Judge held that the case was within
the local law of Maryland, which required
suit to be brought within three years, and
proceeded to say that on the 7th of Septem-
Der, 1861, this court decided that the Presi-
dent of the United States had the right by
proclamation to recognize the existence of a
state OF war; and that the war, from and
after the date of such proclamation, existed
bafx tho GtoAoa Al
nation and the rest of the United States.
Also, that the late war, when so declared
and recognized by the Presidents proclama-
tlon, became a ciga ludr, and imposed upon
both belligerents all the rights and conse-
quences of such war. This was one of the
earliest decisions in regard to our late civil
war, and the principles then enunciated
have since been fully confirmed by the Su-
preme Court of the United States in the
prize cases, 2 Black, 635.
As regards the State of Tennessee, there
can be no doubt that war existed in conse-
quence of the proclamation of the President |
of August 10th, 1861, and not before, as that |
State was not included il the previous proc
lamations.
1t is a well settled principle that contracts |
made before war are only suspended by the |
war, whereas contracts made during the war |
are void. This principle is fully recognized |
by the Supreme Court in regard to our late |
civil war.
In ancient times private property of alien |
enemies, and debts of every kind, were con-
fiscated to the State.
Happily all this has been changed in mo-
dern times, ana now, while contracts made |
during war between alien enemies are abso-
lutely void, being against public. policy,
private interests ar rOtected and bona tide
contracts made beh othe breaking out of
war are suspended during its existence, but
revive at its termination.
1t has been repeatedly decided by both |
State and Federal courts that where by
legislative enactment parties are prevented
from prosecuting their claims, the interval
during which such prevention lasts is not to
be counted as part of the time allowed by
the statute of limitations. Now the power
TO make war and peace is, by the Constitu-
tion of the United States, delegated exclu-
sively to the Federal Government; and as,
during the war, the plaintiff, being a eorpo-
ration of the State of Tennessee, had no
right to bring suit against the defendant,
who was a citizen OF Maryland, the Mary
land statute of limitations was suspended
during such period. The general rule un-
questionably is, that where the statute of
Limitation has once begun to run, no subse-
quent disability will arrest it.
But we have already seen that a legisla-
tive enactment suspends the running of the
statute, and the same result follows from the
declaration of war by the supreme power of
the land. For it is a well-recognized prin-
ciple of the law of nations that the right of
a creditor to sue for the recovery of his debt
is not extingaished by the war it is only
suspended during the war, and revives in
full force on the restoration of peace. A
war, then, having certainly existed between
Tennessee and the Federal Government,
from the Presidents proclamation of August
10Th, 1861, and which, although civil war;
yet, according to the decision of the Supreme
Court in the prize cases, carried with it all
he consequences and disabilities of public
war; it follows, therefore, that the plaintiff
n this case could have instituted no pro-
,eedngs in this court until peace was pro-
claimed by the Presidents procamations Of
June 18th, 1865.
This suspension, being by the exercise Of
he paramount authority of the Government,
,annot be held TO work forfeiture of the
Plaintiffs cause of action, but that his right
0 sue, suspended by the war, revived when
[ ceased. And as it has not been three
ears from the maturity of the cause Of
ction to the commencement of the war, and
rom the termination OF the war to the COM
nencement Of the suit, this suit is not barred I
y limitations, and the demurrer is there
,ra ovorrt,lo1