The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1866-04-20

FEsT o, "RAPoLEON LA PRUssE"-AN AL.
LANCE BETWEEN FRANCE AND PRUSSIA "IN
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS THEY MAY DEFY THE
HOSTILITY OF THE OTHER GOVERNMENT" AND
HAVE NOTHING TO HOPE FROM THEIR FRIEND
ebIP"-AUsTRIA TO BE HUMBLED, AND RUSSIA
ITALY, AND ENGLAND NOWHERE.
TGrS (AprH 4, COrre 7poRdence or the London Times
One of those pamphlets which ere usually thrown
the OF some great event as feeers, to tes
the state of pub cloDniOD, has just appeared. lGI
headed Napoleon III ct Ia PrusSe, and Is anonymous
W neither the writer has taken ms Inspiration from
French or a Prussian source 1t is difficult TO say
but from lhe aIdOr with which he advocates tn
alliance Of Prussia with France, in preference to any
other 1t probable that he not an unfalthtul
ponent OF M Blsmark's policy, however correct or
otherwise he may interpret that of the sovereign
whose name he places at the head of his production.
Alter a marked allus0n to the courteous reception
given to the Prussian Minister last autumn at St
Cloud he hastens prove that the alliance of France
and Prussia not merely possible but that it Is IN
dspensable; that their relations with the other Gov
ernmen of Europe are of little advantage to either
Of them, as they have nothing to hope from their
friendship, and may deiy their hostility. The part
two.fold character. She has to consolidate her
supremacy In Cormanv, to the detriment OF Austria,
she has to take her place among the maritime
powers of the first order. The port OF Kiel is
Indispensable to her IN the latter case; and ter.
rltoIial agRrandiZcment is urgent in the forum.
NJ. Bsmark, with that lofty conception which
has made hun the foremost sta esman OF the age-in
fact, the ''Richeieu OF Prussa"-5aw al this at a
glance. 10 attain his object he Tevivod, "wIth ad-
mirable ability" the Schle wig II ostein gu Stion
and, having neutraZ0d the gIeat powers OF Europe,
undertook in conC;rt with Austria, the war which
covered with laures the PIussian troops a. Duppel
signed the treaty at eastern, which gave him tine
port OF ei, and threw the opulation The duches
into his arms Throughout this contest Austria
played but a secondary part; a even the material
advan ages she hoped 10 reap from it are eSclping
her. The annexation OF the duchies 20 Prussia rs inn
minent 1t Is imperouslv commanded Dy the Iorce of
circumstances, nomattor uLder what form or name
OH ect annexation or personal union happy eXpros-
siOn by-the-way, invented by the ingenious states
man 10 satisfy the ephemeral susceptDilities of
genei alton mOrbldly deslrous of self government
and independence. Pubic op'mon calls tor the
territorial a% randIzement which Is to make in the
history of Prussia fresh sartng point tor her real
grandeur. 1t cannot be lett uLeheced without peril
to her internal tranquility There is danger IN
respect OF Aus ma; for were Prussia batfied in her
scheme Of annexation, austria, now thoroughly
humb ed, wou again lift her head, regain her in
fuence IN Germany, and make her adversary pay
dearly for her momentarY superiority. There
is danger, too, IN respect of the smaller
would again put for h pretenaons to pohtl-
cal Independence, and refuse to follow in the wake
of M. Bismark But by whose and can all this oe
accOInp lsheo2 Assu cdly not with that OF his own
Government ana his own people only; for, enter
prsng as he is, he IS not so rash as to stake the
out s0Iid faithful, duIa ,le alliance which will
enable him to carry out his Object without drawing
da lie in OF war, invIncible in Congress or in
conference; and the only power to which Pr ussia
can hold out her hand is France
An alliance of Prussia with Austria Is simply inn
possible. The difference OF races, aud the dlversties
OF religion place an impossible gulf between them.
The weakness OF Austria was abundantly proved in
the italan war; ana 1t Is proved every day. when
that an attack on her territory shall be considered
as an attack on the Contedt ration itself, and q
danger to- it No efficaclods cooperation can be-
hoped Tor from power that is scarcely able to keep
the Italian people III check TO restore cain to Hun
gary, BOhem a, and ualIica. For these and many
O,her reasons IA lussia would cain nothing by an
Austrian alliance, and has hing whatever 10 fear
from her enmiV. OF lta it is unnecessary to SPEAK.
Italy is still occupied with her H. terna Organization;
and, embarrassed she at home she can be seri-
Ously useful to nobody.
WI'h regard to RUSSIA and England it is manifest
I'm RI I'M
olzement OF Prussia as mari ime power. England
is TOO jealous OF her supremacy at sea to permit the
growth OF lVal, least of all to contribute towards
III Russla would no longer be stress of the Baltic,
and in case OF rupture, the Prussan feet could,
the fret day hosttie- commenced, seriously menace
CIOBstadt and ST. Petersburg
but even though Russia might IN certain crGum'
land has completely lost her influence, and John
Bull, by his miserable abandonment of Denmark
during The war With Prussia, has renounced his pre-
tensions 10 an European protectorate. He has lost
the tase Tor hazardous enierprls9s his sword no
longer quits ITS scabbard; and his will no longer
turns the scale on his side Wnen his material inte-
tests are at stake he may shake off his tOrpor
for a moment, and prepa Q TO fight, but to fight
with diplomatic notes ana circulars. Then Fenian.
Ism IN Ireland and mutinit i'll India are phantoms
periodically recurring 10 paraYze his forces, just
Poland, even when stirring under her shroud
shakes the MuscovIte colossus that has one foot in
Europe and the other in Asia. Prussia has only to
exh bit those two sca ccrows, an that of Hungary
btfo Austria to counterbalsnce the hostility of the
three powers, since she can draw no advantage from
Their alliance The Austrian alliance, the English
one woTd-impossible or useless.
France, then, is the Ony power whose alliance
Prussia should seek. II is not that France has any
views on the Rhine on the principle OF natural from
tiers. Indeed, France should Dut an end, once for
all, 10 the unjust prejudces which Germany has
ceiVed against her, and the bugbear of the left
bank q" always held up az obs lcle between Ger
many ana her, should vanish forever. AT what
price, then could Prussia obtain this alliance? And
what would she Ocr 10 the Cabinet of the Tuileries
to remove all scIupleY Though France has no need
of the Rhine for her greatness there is, In the d-
fectlOn OF certain reCtfcatiOQ of from
ti6r' which woud be very useful 10 her and would
scarcely be Ielt by Prussia, That concession, the
limits of which might ne easily determ ned by geo
Rraphers and aiplOmatsts, would remove every OBJ
stacle
For France it would be a serious benefit; for the
bruck. Political advantage 1t would have none
whatever. The PIusslan Government could make
the concession without derogatlng from its dignity
without incurring blame from The Chamber of Ro-
preBentatVes, who en- this point, and perhaps for
the first time, would agree wit0 1T. BY 1t Prussia
no enemy to fear, however formidable he might be
Austria would be paraYzod, Russia anxious, Eng.
land digQuicted; but all three conscious OF their
weakness IN precence of this formidable league OF
two homogeneous peoples, would not dream OF dis
turbng the peace of Europe. The future OF political
Europe is in two WOrds--PTussia and France.
An alliance between France and Russia is out Of
the question. 1t would at once provoke European
war The old antagOnism of France and Austria
the humblDg OF the house of Hapsburg contem plated
by Henry " and by nearly all the kings of France
make II unnecessary for the author to enter into
tween these two States All the attempts made TC
draw them closer TO eash other, whether on the