Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1866-11-22

sages, seems to have exhausted the Legal
limits upon that line of operations, and il
was abandoned for another, by means OF
constitutional amendment. But as this
line of attack forces the South into the en-.
gagement, it is not likely to prove so sue
cessful to the Radicals. The ten excluded
States, with Maryland, Delaware and Ken
lucky, are able to control amendments to
the Constitution until the number of States
are increased to ffty-two, which is not pro-
bable during the present generation.
The New York World, in discussing this
question, very forcibly says that the South,
then, has nothing worse to fear, as conse-
uuence of the late elections than pro-
tracted exclusion from Congress. Negro
suffrage cannot be forced upon them ex-
cept by an amendment to the Constitution,
which they can checkmate. New penalties
for treason are equally impossible, by the
prohibition to pass er post facto laws. The
old penalties have been RENTED by the
Presidents proclamation of amnesty and
his individual pardons. The State govern
|
cannot be upset, because Congress never
comes in contact with them except in judg-
ing of their competency to furnish creden-
tials to members of that body. Congress
having already done its utmost against the
South, that section has nothing to fear in
consequence of these elections beyond what
| it already suffers.
Congress being powerless to wreak adj
ditional vengeance on the South will pro-
badly concentrate their hostility upon the
President If they could replace him by
Radical they might admit the Southern
Representatives without endangering their
power, and thus escape the odium-an
odium which will grow-of preventing a
restoration of the Union. With every
Southern Senator and Representative in
his seat, the Radicals would still have ma
jority both with this Congress and the next.
But so long as we have a President dis
posed to veto their bills, they would sur
render their power by admitting the South.
With the South excluded, the Radicals are
too strong for the veto with the South
admitted, the veto would be too strong for
them. If they could depose President
johnson, their chief objection to the imme-
date restoration of the South would be
the Southern vote in the Presidential cleo
ton.
On account of this inability of Congress
to inf1ict further punishment upon the
South, having exhausted legislation and
being unable to amend the Constitution,
we are prepared to see them attempt the
more bold and less prudent plan of direct
attack upon the President, Ill which entire
success OF utter defeat and destruction at
tends them. A powerful organization, in
toxicated with uninterrupted and brilliant
victories are not easily checked by obstruc-
tons of an ordinary character, and Will
hardly be curbed by the moro prudent,
when the objects of their desires are nearly
attained, and between them and the goal
of their aspirations stands but one man,
even though he be panoplied in the robes
of law and order and peace.
It has been proposed, by papers in the
interests of the dominant party, that their
object could be attained by laws cur
failing the Presidents patronage, and
thus render him utterly powerless to in
terfere with them. They pretend to
allege that the victories of their party
have defeated plot OF his to set up
bogus Congress. and as the complexion of
that body is now settled for the remainder
of his term of office, that he will, by fair
seeming professions, so as to induce hope
for his return to the embrace of the Re-
publicans, attempt by diplomacy and in
trigue to accomplish what he has failed by
open opposition. Members are therefore
warned not to regard any professions the
President may make, and Congress urged
to use the power lodged in their hands by
the Constitution, to take from the Presi-
dent the power he has abused, and to es-
tablish some permanent system of appoint
ments to Office. The general sentiment of
the country they declare to be that the au-
tocratic power of the national Executive is
fraught with peril to our liberties and free
institutions, and ought to be reduced.
This mode of attack is subject to two
drawbacks, one of power, and the other of
policy In the first place. to change the
mode of appointments to Office, will require
change of the Constitution; and if it did
not, in view of the probable certainty of
Radical President and the uncertainty of
Radical Congress in 1869, such change
might crush it's own authors.
We, therefore, rather expect an attempt
to impeach the President, and by his ex-
pulsion fill the Executive chair with one of
their own partizans Unless they do some
thing of this kind, we see no practical re-
suits attained by Radical successes at the
late elections, except the power to exclude
the electoral votes of the Southern States
in the next Presidential election; and in
the event of their being necessary, with the
Conservative vote of the North, to elect the
Conservative candidate, resolution de-
claring they shall not be counted will pro-
badly be more easily and safely passed by
both Houses of Congress, than carried into