The Anderson intelligencer. [volume] (Anderson Court House, S.C.) 1860-1914, 1866-02-08
The English Press on General
Grants Report.

operations is attracting a large share Of
attention abroad. The English journals
comment on it very favorably, and make
the Lieutenant-General the subject Of
many high compliments. The London
Times says: What renders this report,
too, the more remarkable, is that it ex-
plains new, and as the event proved, a
successful system of tactics devised for
the occasion. The system was that of
availing himself of his great superiority
of numbers, attacking variety of points
at once, and preventing the concentra-
ton of the Southern troops. Says the
Times:
| Man for man the Southerners were the
best troops, partly, perhaps, from natural
aptitudes, but mainly, no doubt, from the
great military ability of their command
ers. On fair field, and in any one bat
tle, tho Federals could not pretend to
reckon confidently on winning; but there
was one thing on which they could reck-
on, and that was on killing q certain num-
Der of Confederates. OF course they
must suffer equal or even greater losses
themselves, but that they could we'll af-
ford. If every battle cost the South o
certain proportion of men, a given num-
Der of battles must destroy the Southern
power, even if no battle was decisive
victory. So Grant determined not only
to fight, but to fight on without stint or
stay, come what might. Hard knocks
and inccssant blows constituted his STRAIT
egy and tactics. If he were to fare as
Mcclellan and Hooker had, he would not
do as Mcclellan and Hooker had done.
He opened the new campaign resolved to
go on fighting whether he won or lost,
and, as he himself says, "to hammer
continuously against the armed force Of
the enemy and his resources until by
mere attrition, if no other way, there
should be nothing left to him but submis-
sion." The literal execution of this pol
icy is expressed in every line of the re-
port. While recounting the events of
the Virginia campaign the General rep
resents one engagement as virtually a
failure in these words: at was the on
ly general attack made from the Rapi-
dan to the James which did not infict
upon the enemy losses to compensate for
our own losses. I would not be under
stood as saying that all previous attacks
resulted in victories to our arms, OF ac-
complshcd as much as had hoped from
them but they inflicted upon the enemy
severe losses, which tended in the end to
the overthrow of the rebellion" How
much these tactics cost the North we
need not say.
AS far as plans can be justified by
events, that justification belongs certainly
to Grant. His system was successful
where every other systemehad failed.
His campaign brought the war to an end,
whereas every former campaign had left
the contest pretty nearly as it stood be-
fore. 1t must be understood, too, that
wherever military science appears more
conspicuous than brute force, that merit
| is Grants also. Tho scheme of Sher
mans campaign was dictated by Grant
as were others less important and less
fortunate The grand principle of the
whole system was cooperation. Besides
the two great armies of the East and
West. which, en- this occasion, were te
pull together, Grant set half a dozen 9th
er armies in motion, to distract, occupy
and punish the enemy at all points to
cether. Z That result is undoubt
edly due to the "military arithmetic" O
General Grant. He is not the first con
queror who has adopted the principle
though he was the first to apply it to the
resources of whole people instead o
tho divisions of single army. Heis en-
titled, therefore, to the credit which com
pleto success confers; and, indeed, terri
Bile though the cost was, it may well b.
questioned whether an indefinite prolen
CATION of the war would not have cos
both parties more.
The Liverpool POst~says;
General Grants report is about to be
come as famous as Caesars Commenta
ries. It is infinitely more important, fol
in the recent civil war in America Greel
met Greek, and Grant encountered amorf
formidable foe than Cesar. At first the
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