New-York tribune., 1866-12-24
THE FRENCH ARMY.


One Of the greatest, though not one Of the imme.
date results of the late German war; is the impulse
which it has given throughout Europe to the question
Of military reorganization. II was commonly known,
even before the war, that Prussia had an excellent
military system but how far it exceled that Of the
other European countries was never fully understood
by the statesmen and soldiers Of Europe, until the
extraordinary brancy of the campaign Of 1866
filled all Of them with astonishmont and many with
dismay. Nothing, certainly, could be moro compli'
mentary % Prussia than the haste OF most OF the
other European States, after the close of the war, TO
initiate measures for thorough reform of their armies
In none Of the European countries has this sintaton
of military reforms attracted greater attention than in
France. Proud as the French Government and nation
have always boen Of their army and military renown
they did not hesitate in view Of the Prussian triumph
to admit and loudly proclaim the necessity Of creating
a more numerous and more effective army A few
statistical facts about the armies of the two countries
will show that the French had very weighty reasons
for taking this subject into serious consideration. The
population Of France in 1866 estimated at about
81 600, ,OOO For the same year, the effective force
Of the army, on peace footing was
fixed at 100000 while on the war footing
il would amount TO 757,727 men. Y Prussia,
in 1866, had population Of 100000, or just about
one.haf of the population Of France. In time OF
peace its standing army POS, ,57s about one-halt
Of the French army and therefore in the same pro-
portion to the total population; but whenever it
should become necessary to put the army on war
footing Prussia could within few weeks bring into
the field thoroughly disciplined army of 6O9,OOO or
if the reserve troops added, men, thus
equang France in the number Of her soldiers, not
whstanding the double number Of inhabitants in the
latter country.
In consequence Of the war, 10000, 900 Of other
Germans are to form, with Prussia the NorthGermsn
Confederation. The most important object Prussia
had in view in establishing this confederation was the
incorporation of the army of the minor States with
that of Prussia This point has been secured even
before tho meeting of the North.German Parliament
and Prussia as military power represents, therefore,
population Of %, 900 Of men. She is srsining
every nerve to complete the introduction OF her entire
military system into the minor States. This being
accomplished Prussia would have on the peace foot
ing an army Of over 300,0 ,0O0 and in time OF war an
effective force Of more than 100000 men, No
one, moreover doubts that the South. German States
which have population Of 100000, must very soon
drif. into union with the Northern Confederation
and in case of foreign war, they would even now be
almost sure TO go hand-in-hand with Northern
Germany. Their annexation would raise the PruSsian
Army to the grand total of 100000.
We can hardly be mistaken if we ascrbe the pacific
turn which was all at once given to the foreign policy
of France in great to consideration OF the
above figures Upon the establishment of the North
German Confederation, France became. as military
power, decidedly inferior to Prussia. To change this
humliating condition was the task imposed upon the
Military Commission. The report of the Commission
ia not yet before US. Rumors come by the Atlantic
cable that il was intended to raise the French Army
ncludng rsserves to 900 men, but that the dis
content with this measure was 30 general among oil
classes Of the population that It had to be abandoned
Thus on the one side is the military superiority OF
Prussia and on the other the universal dissatisfaction
of the French people with the proposed increase OF the
standing army. Beset BY these two difficulties, tho
Emperor has to adjust policy of military reform
which shall raise bis powet to level with iaat ol