New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1866-06-13

by proving, from the Confederate official re
ports, that General Porter's allegations were pc,
feotly correct, and that General POpe's charge
were utterly untenable and unfounded.
OF General Burnside Mr., Swinton says tina
there is much in the circumstances Of his career
f "and nhis character, to inspire lehent judgment
+ His elevation TO the command was unsought b.
him; for with good sense that was creditable t
him, he knew and proclaimed his unfness TO
the t1ustn At the time he was relieved deser
tons were going on at the rate of ECO day, ant
4 there were $4,000 men absent from the army, fo
t causes unknown
. Dismissing for time the crushing criticisms o
+ the author on General Hooker's operations, ant
his mild approval of General Meade's, we come t
part of the work which perhaps, more than any
other, comedies with what is sure to be the iudg
ment of impartial history, while it will shock the
preiudiees and dspe the Illusions of the people
/, of the North OF General Grant Mr.. Swintor
seems to have no very exalted opinion. His mer
consisted mainly in the immense advantages which
he enjoyed over his predecessors in possessing
unlimited control over his army, Added to this he
was characterized by an infexible determination
which sure to tell in his favor in the long run
if his forces should not be, in the meantime an
initiated, or reduced to the point of ineffciency
| by the heavy blows to which he so often exposed
them. He was rescued from this fate by having
immense reservoirs from which to draw reinforce
ments, and by the recuperating operation of sue,
| cesses gained in other parts of the country. Gen
Grants first essay on his new theater of action
was bitter disappointment to his hopes and his
expectations. The battle of the Wilderness, the
most tremendous collision of arms ever witnessed
on the American continent, and the most extraor
binary action of the most extraordinary of wars
was intended by the Federal commander to be the
one blow which should effect the destruction Of
the Army of Northern Virginia. During the two
days of that bitter struggle one hundred and
thirty thousand Federal soldiers were launched
| against the forty thousand Confederates com.
manded by General Lee, and at the end of that
time, the Union host, discounted and defeated
withdrew in sullen amazement towards Fredercks
burg, leaving their dead and wounded on the field
| Mi. Swinton says that, in this battle the Federal
loss exceeded fifteen thousand The official report:
show that it was only triae short of thirty thou
sand. The subsequent battles fought by Grant, up
to the time when his forces were transferred to the
south side of the James river, were series of de-
feats, amounting in the aggregate to melancholy
disaster The battle Of Cold Harbor, reported al
the time, even by General Grant himself, as mere
reconnaissance, inflicted a loss on his army Of
| thirteen thousand men.
The method adopted By the Federal comman-
| der was soon made so conspicuously evident to
the world that it was little likely to be misunder-
stood. The following, however shows the esti-
mate in which it is held by an impartial critic:
Sharing this view, Gen. Grant hoped at one
blow to finish the troublesome, and seemingly in
| vulnerable, adversary. And to achieve this end,
| ne made little account OF those arts that accom-
plish results by the direction and combination OF
| forces for at this period he avowedIv despised
\ maneuverng. His reliance was exclusively on
the application OF brute masses, in rapid and re-
| morseess blows, Or as he himself phrased it, in
hammering continuously" 1t soon appeared
| however, that the hamSBer would itself break on
the anvil; and taught b lesson by this he was
thereafter more disposed to accept whatever aid
| the resources Of strategy afford.
That Gen. Grant himself lost faith in his method,
and confessed it to be false is proved by the fact
that, after crossing the James river lie adopted
precisely the opposite system-a system which
adjourned for year the result which was to have
been achieved in a week.
After summing up the results of the campaign
which, on the whole was eminently disastrous to
the Federal army, our author declares that the
s Contederates, elated at the skillful manner in
which they had constantly been thrust between
Richmond and the Union army, and conscious of
the terrible price ip blood they had exaeted from
| the latter, were in high spirit, and the morale of
Lee army was never better than after the battle
of Gold Harbor."
In connection with this statement we have a con.
fession which is very well calculated to modify the
arrogance which declares victory to have been
assured from the commencement, and to rebuke
the presumption of those who can see nothing but
madness in the conduct of their adversaries. Mr.
Swinton admits that at the close of the campaign
the military affairs of the North, as a consequence
of Gen. Grants failures, were in well-nigh des
perate condition; and that they were only, resus-
citated by successes elsewhere, due in great
measure to what the author considers the plumbers
of the Confederate government. Mr. Swinton,s
own words will be found suggestive and instruetive
1t may indeed be said, that as the resources of
the Confederacy were Well-nigh exhausted, while
those of the North were still ample, continuance
of even such unequal exchange of life as was
made in this campaign would finally result in the
destruction of the enemy. But this assertion Omits
the important consideration that war is sustained
quite as much by the moral energy of a people as
by its material resources and that the former must
be active to bring out and make available the lat
ter. 1t has not unfrequently occurred that, with
abundant resources, nation has failed in war by
the sappng of the animating principle in the minds
of its citizens. For armies are things visible and
formal, crcumseribed by time and space but the
soul of war is power unseen, bound up with the
interests, convictions, passions of men. Now SO
gloomy waslthe military outlook after the action of
the Chickahominy, and to such a degree by conse-
quence had the moral spring of the public mind
become relaxed, that there was at this time great
danger of collapse of the war. The history of
this conflict truthfully written will show this Had
not success elsewhere come to brighten the hori-
zon, it would have been difficult to have raised
new forces to recruit the Army of the Potomac
which, shaken in its structure its valor duenched
in blood, and thousands of its ablest officers killed
and wounded, was the Army of the Potomac no
more.
This statement, the truth ofwhich, says the New
York World, it would PROBABLY be useless to dis
cuss with any one who is disposed to call it in
question, Mr. swinton reinforces by the following
brief but significant note, note which will be felt
to be particularly significant when we recall the
relations existing between the New York Times,
on the one side, and the late President Lincoln and
Mr.. Seward on the other:
The archives of the state department, when one |
day made public, will show how deeply the gov
eminent was affected by the want of military sue |
cess and to what resolutions the executive had in
come.
sAn1aG OF THE EVENING sTAR.--The steamship
Evening Star, Capt. Delaney, sailed from her
wharf, foot of Jackson square, last evening at Z |