Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1866-01-12


at least 40, 200 men were sent to the
front. as General Grant says that. when
[ approached Washington, the garrisons
of that place and Baltimore were a made
up of heavy artillery regiments, hundred
days men, and detachments from the
Invalid Corps" and hence it became
necessary to send troops from bis army
to meet us. This, therefore, made an
army of over $50, 900 men which Gen.
Lees army had to meet before, as | will
show, it had received any reinforcemenis
whatever This estimate does not in
clude the reinforcements received in the
way of recruits from voluntary enlist
ments and the draft, which we're entirely
going on. nor does it include reinforce
ments from the Northern Department
and the Departments of the East and
the Susquehanna, where there were, by
Mr.. Stanton's showing, Is, 344 available
men for duty, the greater part of which,
1t is presumed, were sent to Grant, as,
otherwise, they might have been brought
to Washington to meet my force with
more case than troops from his army.
General Lees army, at the beginning
of the campaign, consisted of two divi-
sions of Longstreets corps, Ewell's corps.
A. P. Hills corps, three divisions of
cavalry and the artillery. I commanded,
at different times during the campaign,
Hills and Ewelrs corps, and am, there
fore, able to state very nearly the entire
strength Of the army. Ewell's corps, to
which l belonged, did not exceed four
teen thousand "a, 00O) muskets at the
beginning of the campaign. When
was placed in command of Hills corps
on the Sth of May, by reason Of General
Hills sickness, its effective strength was
less than thirteen thousand Q3, 000)
muskets, and it could not have exceeded
eighteen thousand $4,000 in the be-
ginning. Longstreets corps was the
weakest of the three when all the divi-
sions were present. and the two with him
had just returned from an arduous and
exhausting winter campaign in East
Tennessee. His effective strength could
not have exceeded eight thousand g.
000) muskets. General Lees whole ef-
fective infantry, therefore, did not ex-
coed forty thousand 100000 muskets,
if it reached that number. The cavalry
divisions were all weak, neither of them
exceeding the strength ofa good brigade.
The artillery was in proportion to the
other arms, and was far exceeded by
Grants. not only in the number of men
and guns, but in the weight of metal,
and especially in the quality of ammuni-
ton General Lees whole effective
strength at the opening of the campaign
was not over fifty thousand $50, 000)
men IF all arms. There were no means
of recruiting the ranks of his army, and
no achievements were received until it
reached Hanover Junction, on the 23rd
of May. Ii was this force, therefore,
which compelled Grant, after the fight
| ing at the Wilderness and around Spott-
! sylvania Court House, including the
memorable 18th of May, to wait six
days for reiDforcements from Washing
ton before be could move, and baflled his
favorite plan of reaching Richmond. At
Hanover Junction General Lee was
joined by Pickett's division of Long
streets corps, one small brigade of my
division of Ewell's corps, which had been
in North Carolina with Hoke, and two
small brigades. with battalion of artil
!ery under Breckenridge. This force
under Breckenridge, which General
Grant estimates at 5000, and which
was subsequently united to mine at
hynchburg, did not exceed two thousand
/ (2,00( muskets. At Coal Harbor, about
the LIST Of June, Hoke's division from
Petersburg joined General Lee, bu:
Breckinridge's force was sent back i'm
apediately after its arrival near that place,
on account Of the defeat and death Of
General Vim. Z Jones at Piedmont, in
the Shenandoah Valley, and Ewells
corps, with two battaions Of artillery,
was detached under my command on the
morning of the 18th Of June to meet
| Hunter. This counterbalanced all rein
! forcements The foregoing statement,
which fully covers Gen. Lees strength.
shows the disparity of forces between the
two armies at the beginning, and it was
never lessened after it reached the vicin-
| ity of Richmond and Petersburg, but
was greatly increased. The curious may
speculate as to what would have been
the result if the resources of men and
munitions of war ofthe two commanders
had been reversed. or if Lees strength
had approximate Grants. Occupying
neutral position, as between the two
Federal commanders, Grant and Butler,
and certainly having no reason to admire
the latter, | cannot but be amused at
the effort of Grant. by the use Of few
fash phrases, to make Butler the scape-
goat Of all bis failures.
The disparity between the forces of
Sheridan and myself in the Valley cam
paign was even greater than that be-
tween Lee and Grant My force. when
I arrived in front of the Notifications of
Washington on the 18th of July, 1864.
was eight thousand $4,000 muskets,
three small battalions of artillery with
about forty (40l field pieces, Of which
the largest were twelve-pounder Napo-
Icons, and about tive thousspd "a, 00O)