New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1866-07-21
sr. base Nj. operation. on speculation Wills hi, s..u.

fore base his operations on speculation Wills his ssaaus
s defect Of communication wa 10 the case Of the Pms.
SLAMS rmeded BY their field teeer ph. Etch commander
caru-s coumns On the evening Of 2eh Pace Frede.
uck Charles knew that the Grown Prince held Skas ard
rruenru and the Grown knew that coasig h4d
mastered iurnan and Nh chenglaA Tho Giant Mountains
had become srntegicely geographical EXPRESSION. Very
different operations hese from the speculative r
ue Zines II Frederick or Napoleon
Your Prusssa Military Correspondents excellent letter
tells to-day ttat the First Prussian Army pushed The
cut Of successive positions. and mastered the essential point
Ctsc through which the junction q the separated armies
preIlde to NOR important exhibition u gonerOi,hip
Discussing yesterday with over the best map 10 DO OBJ
tanned probal, this oOuniry tho Austrian Sa
dows friend considered ito pointed the
no Of the Bistrs each sids OF that vllse From this
view dissenied tho ground that to occupy such front
would be offer r h flank TO the Crown PriDoes attack
For though be and bis cousin vero communication through
Csch b. supposed that they had concentrated
there since faux march from the Elbe that place would
exposed the line of communication with Gas TO the
white wing behind the Bstits fom sadowa south
ward the est OF the line was thrown back eastward toward
tho Lbe aiorg range Of Nights which are placed there on
the map
e,crtIss to judge irOm Benedeks Geographic report Of
the bsitle which ppeared this morning tho Austrian hns
absolutely invited the attack Of the Crown princes army
That army had orcnped Arnau and h9aesh pnd 's aee
march field where Prince Frederick was engaged
bros b IL to Clum about three mics cast Of sadows when
ne % ran and AN he on ms a al in the Mar
sha dpstch the only excuses be has Tor per
hitting tds movement ~ b, accomplished one Of two
Conclusions ircvtabother that he SO disposed Ms ioices
uskc his edycreaes present oil the NcOry OF tha ne
Was fnry outscLeratuin tue movements on'' ''
battle.
Therefore beside the needegen and tho field telegraph
military ability (which. perh sr We might naturally enough
CHIEF Of the Prsisn Sttl hst lad It's share IN
tho decision Il days Moreover this ability was
not the result Of experience |. war; but Of Ohr preparation
The drawn that mecani science Is not yet
omnipoeni that while cannot too promptly provide our
seyes with still generals whose strength ies
in their brains oauno wi ard hat we mus,
not fancy whom Enfield hHs done s bst tst We nave
thereby secured all toe conditions Of success.
searcey be premature TO pronounce BeneneE o'al
fure NJ reputation cou survive such rude assaults sS
Manoherg,k E Gschin. 1fautcnau, Skntz and csdowr.
even though gun be dreaded in mitigation OF dcent
All the resources OF great monarchy which not military
Posor was nCtbng. placed with unprecedented con
Gdenoe hands aud be must bear alone The responsibility
of disaster Han O lie not yet revealed which prove
naeqasey to resist the stre OF events nst Lave bn
as insub.tantiai The Nisos Of Don QGnoos helmet II
vcud st injustice perhaps " the adcr ~ th' Eiehh
Cons II Solierino pair HIN on with la Mafmorn Iu1
soul. tid Su William Napier that there wore 6e Who
could command go0D oilers 1000 Tower t10)O very
few 100 GO II vii co'denic toward the defeated vet
Gran 20 say that could 5oOJ 1u but had
not tie Atantesn shoulders ~ 10 bear tho weight o l@
sr. SIR. your obediont servant
LIZ