The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1866-04-11
General BueII's Defense.
Important Letter to Gen. Grant.


Important Letter to Gen. Grant.
To Lieut. Sen. o. 5. Grant, u 5. Army:
As long ago as last August 1 saw in The
New YORK Herald a paragraph purporting
10 give some expressions Of yours concern
ing me, during your tour through the North
ern States and Canada. 1t was as follows
"Gen. Grant, while in Springfield, Mass
conyersed very freely upon topics of gen
eral interest connected with the army. He
said that Gen. Buell. was thoroughly versed
in the theory Of war, but knew nothing OF
handling men in an emergency, and that
his heart was never in the war from the
first. He said that Buell. might have reach
ed Pittsburg Landing several days earlier
than be did, in which case Gen. Grant would
have been the attacking party"
! Immediately called your attention to
this paragraph, and requested you to aYow
or disavow the remarks imputed TO you; and
again on the 27th Of December l did the
same thing. On the 4th of January I re-
ceived your reply, dated the 29th of De-
cember. In that you say you have no re-
collection Of the reported conversation; and
if any such occurred, you know that your
remarks could not have been quo'ed
correctly. For instance, you say in regard
TO my "want Of ability to command in the
presence of an enemy, or in battle" you
have always thought and frequently ex-
pressed yourself differently; and on the
subject Of my heart never having been
in the cause" you must, you say, certainly
have been misunderstood. You supposed
me TO have been earnest whilst | was in
command, &C. You add, however, that my
'letters published since have rather given
the idea that l wanted the Union saved in
particular way, and that way differed from
the one which was being pursued" Your
| impression would have been more accurate
If you had understood that desired that
the Union should be preserved or restored
not destroyed. But without going into def
ntions, CT drawing she line of difference,
may say here, that the conclusion which
you have drawn from my expressions is sub
stantially correct.
In regard to the battle Of Shiloh, your ex-
| planation, which I shall quote further on,
| qualities somewhat the statement in the
| newspaper report referred TO but allowing
for the zeal Of partsans, there is enough in
| IL 10 confirm the rumors have heard, that
the reflections which at various times have
been actively and extensively circulated re-
lative 10 my movements prior to the battle,
drew their inspiration from your headquar
ters. You may, therefore, fairly be regard
ed rs responsible for them, and l shall take
them up in the form in which they have
been circulated.
And first, who ever asserted that l could
not have reached Pittsburg Landing earlier
| than | did? Not l, nor any one in my
| name. Undoubtedly, | could have moved
| by forced marches before you were attacked
on the 9th Of April, as l did afterward, aud
so have reached Savannah IN time to avert
the disaster of that day but in stating
barely that I could have done so, as in the
| paragraph which have quoted, the all9ga-
] -, 1 hot Tvuoa VI do
ing 60. shall show that the facts do not
warrant any such imputation.
! 1t may be unnecessary TO say that the
| rate Of march of armies is regulated TO SUIT
the object in view. When there is no press
| ing emergency the health and discipline of
| the troops are the controlling consideration.
! Under auch circumstances, when no serious
obstacles have to be overcome, twelve miles
| a day for many days in succession Is very
GOOD average Tor large bodies of troops. But
| when some vital object is to be attained,
! such as TO succor other troops that are in
| peril, an army moves by "foreed marches"
and marches may be forced in different de-
| grees-either according to the average
| ability of men, or according to the ability
Of only the most enduring. If the term Is
definite at ell, it is only so in regard to the
| effort exerted, and not as TO the distance
| overcome f.r marches may be forced IN
| eqnal degrees, and yet in one instance no
more than ten miles day may be accom-
plished, while in another thirty may be
! reached, the difference being due to the
physical condition of the troops, or the diff
| 6culties encountered on the road. In all
cases where it is not definitely prescribed
by higher authority, the rate OF march de-
pends upon the Judgment Of the immediate
commander, and only the knowledge of
some vital emergency would justify him in
taxing his troops to the extent OF their en-
durance: for, besides the hardships to
which they subject the soldiers, forced
marches are always attended with more or
less struggling and injury TO discipline.
Such forms Of expression as more as rGp-
idlt as possible, frequently used in orders
are 10 be understood as meaning merely
that the movement is to be made with dis
patch and energy, but not by 'ioreed
marches" unless the circumstances are
known TO require extraordinary eXertioni
and especially is this the case when the
march is to be long one, and when the
obstacles which may delay 1t are unknown.
The following official dispatches, when
shall quote without any tedious explana-
/ lions. will show the circumstances under
which l moved from Nashville to form q
junction with General Halleck's forces, OF
which you were, for the Time IN immediate
command on the Tennessee river.
'TGeneral Buell. then gives large number
of official dispatches exchanged between
himself. General Halleck and General Grant,
which We omit, as he has appended the fol-
low summary Of the evidence which they
afford
Gen. Buell. continues:
First. You were ordered up the Tennessee
river for a specific object, and without refer
once 10 auy support from mei that IS, ac-
coTding 70 General Hslleck's dispatch on the
| sb of March, you bad "gOHe up the Ten
uessec TO destroy connection rallrCad con-
nectionl at Corinth, Jackson and Hum
second. On the 10th, six days later &C
| Tive, 10 the same authority, you were
s,,,oyiSg m the Tennessee riV6r as rapiuIy
| os vop could obtain transportation IRON
| which IL would appear that you hao hlore
| troops than transportation, notwithst tahuins :
l was sending you all the boats could pare
! from the Cumberland. in the IneahIline
the plan Of operation had been arrange
Quoting again from General Hallecks as
,,atebos of the 10th "On account OF the
aUetnv's forces at Corinth and Hunboldtl
/ Il ,raS deemed best to land at Savannah and
cstoblish a depot. The transportation
would serve as ferries" That Is, your
cb;af General Hnlleck, had concluded to
nrocSed with deliberate preparation, under
tbe shelter of the Tennessee river, for an
attack on the enemy's position al Oorlnthi
or elsewhere in that vicinity.
Third. On the 10th, 6eu. Haileck rep
YOU still "c0HcCnfratiHg al savannah, oy
yyL;ch il a9pears that he lid not consider
YOU yet concentrated.
Fourth. On the 2Sth be reports that
sqarre rein iOrcements are being sent 70
Won. that is, the force which he though
Necessary was still not coSceHtrdtca. "M6
r ,,,st " he saws, "be ready to attack IS soon
r as tbe roads sre passable;" from which j.
{ :, ~ understood that Gen. Uslleck had
| -, ;pf,rmed-for he was not present e
= - bir,selc-th at the time the roads
90, savsanah TO Corinth were not in q
con5itiop 10 admit Of - ettack,
Finb. The invitation 10 po-operete came
4 from, me 70 Gen. Halleck5 IS independent
communicable commanding the bePaf1-
mert Of Missouri, and the pePaFlu,len,' q
the Ohio; snd our CONSULTATIONS LesIl'Su ~ -
! he desirnstiop Of Savannah, which Is on
the east bank OF the Tennessee, and was wa
therefore a secure place for you a. th'
| point at which we were 10 form jQn-slot
for our ulterior object. As late as tbe S1l
! dag Of April-the day Of my srTiVai at ga
: yanuah, sa3 the day before yeu were az
| tacked--''futurs Eovemcnts" were not ae'
| termiped upon BY Gen. Hs!lscky your com
| mander, aud at that time mine also.
, sixth. Gen. Halleck and yourself were
informed from time 10 time Of the progress
Of nv movement, and the obstacles whlef
d retarded it. ..,
IS seventh. was in communication viii
e Won bv couriers, and with Gen. Halieck b.
. telegram, and neither you nor he informel
me Of YOUR actusl position, though I tele
grapkci him distinctly on that point; IA
- iess aid gou advise me that you eOnsidereC
Yourself in peril. On the contrary, on th'
3 an Of Aprii YOU sent disPatsh 10 Gen
Nelson, who commanded the advance OF IA
column, telling him not 70 hssten his march
as he could not at any rate commence cross
ipr The river until the following Tuesday
! tbTee davs after tie tine which had az
!, rointsd ior him 70 STRIVE atSsvaInah.
y From these facts it results that my move
ment had for its object, not 70 rescue yo'
ron Impending destruction, but 10 form
uuction with you for deliberate cam
- 1aign under our common SUPERIOR and a.
ststementa 10 that eilect thai ] knew 70
v-ere in peril, and yet failed 10 basten
N ,.o,,r s,,c,-or, are without foundation. ha'
:, s.te8 on your Dispatch 10 Gen. NeisoI
., - an Gen. Hallecks authority TO halt
W.yneshoro. the time you deslgnatea "