Litchfield enquirer., 1866-10-11

iatlon Of the country. But on the other hand
 he had to encounter this great dificultv ina
 he could not afford prolonged contest, |
 was necessary for him not only to win, but tt
 win rapidly. In a. country so rich and pros porous as Prussia has become of late years the calling out of the Landwehr reserves etc
 ates an amount of private loss and expense and inconvenience which is almost incredible I We c.n imagine pretty well what English feel ing would be if some three hundred thousand
 of our volunteers were summoned from the
 hcmes' and business, by a highly unpopula
 government to fight hundredaof miles away
 from En land in cause winch, at first sigh
 at any rate, was not one of national existence If the war was one succession of brilliant anG
 rapid victories, ,~the nation would bear the in fiction patiently enongh; but if the war Ian
 guished, no vefy evident progress were made
 towards it's end and the campaigns were at
 tended with heavy loss of life, there would be an irresistible outcry that enough had been
 done already for the honor of the country, and
 that it was folly to waste our strength on g
 needless struggle A similar outcry would certainly have been raised in Prussia if the
 war had gone on week after week month after
 month, without inflcting any decided blow up
 on Austria. Besides this, protracted war
 with varying fortunes, would have encouraged the governments of the petty states-all anti
 Prussian at heart-to use their power upon the side of Austria, while it would have led almost with certainty to foreign intervention. Under these circumstances, it was necessary for Count Bismarck to carry all before him and the courage with which he determined on stalking everything on one throw entities him
 to the same sort of repute as Sherman earned by his march through Georgia. As common rule, it is a mistake at whist to play out all your trumps at starting; but a great player knows when 1t is worth while to risk the trick for the chance of the game. @" l. 9,a@ ,l. 1 Accident plays a very important share In all wars and l suspect that many brilliant mill tary operations, held up to the youths of Sand hurst and Woolwich as examples of far-sight- ed calculation, were never anticipated before hand. But the campaign which has just end | ed can hardly have been much modified by ac
 cidental circumstances: The war proceeded
 all through with as much order and regularity as ifthe invasion of Austria had been a mere march from Potsdam to Berlin. There can be no doubt about the tactics of the Prussian generals; they consisted solely in the simple maxim to strike at once, to strike home and
 to strike hard. From the moment that the famous note ofthe French government, whi oh had given the cause--or, if you call it the pre- text-for war, not an hour was lost by the Prussians. As each corps is quasered habit
 ually in the province from which it is recruit ed, the army can be mobilized-or in other words, the men who have completed theirnor- mai time ofservice, but are still liable to be recalled to arms at any moment, can be brought back to the ranks with extreme expe- GIfl0n caI tO dad to
 with extreme alacrty; and the Prussian army was ready to take the field, while great ma iority of the Austrian regiments were osly half filled up. According to the whole theory ot war, the Prnssians ought tc have gathered a l large force to defend Berlin, and then adyanc- ed towards the Austrian frontiers, leaving gar isons behind them at every stage to keep open their communications with their basis of ope- rations. and dispersng any force. and captur- Ing any fortress, which lay in their way,
 It was on this theory that the Austrian plan
 of defense was based. Unfortunately the Prusslans neglected the established naxims of strategy. They left the capital undefended after removing the only danger which threat
 ened them in their rear by the dispersion of the Hanoverian army, and then they marched straight on for Vienna. via Saxony and Bohe-
 mia. The Austrians Were taken by surprise. They meant to occupy Dresden, and give fight
 in Saxony on the borders of their enemy s do- minions ; but, as usual, they were not ready when the decisive moment arrived. In the i same way the Austrlans reckoned on the Prus- slans not attempting to pass the gorges of the Bohemian mountains without extreme caution and circumspeetion. The calculation was uuim. peachable; but, as the Prussians simply push ed on as hard as possible, they again found the Austllans unprepared to resist their advance
 Even after the fatal and disastrous defeat of Koniggratz, the Austrians still repeated their l original 'blunder, and assumed that the enemy l wonld never leave the fortresses of Olmutz
 Josephstadt, and Kiniginstadt uncaptured in
 his rear; and the consequence was, that the Prussians did the very thing they were expect ed not to do, and actuarlly arrived within sight ot Vienna before the Austrians were prepared l to defend the capital of the empire. Nor can l there, l think, be any reasonable doubt that, 1t the Emperor had not consented to buy peace on terms which amounted to surrender at discretion, the successor of Frederick the Great could have entered Schonbrunn as con- queror. Had tbis not been known to be a matter of certainty, no Hapsburg sovereign could ever have submitted to abdicate his DO sitlon in Germany while an army remained in I the field -'~' '''''-' '%' i-'tr.-.
 r If you talk to Austrians, tas have done of
 late to many, about the causes of this success l sion of disasters, they always; tell yon that 1 ther defeat was due to the Incompetence and
 inefficiency of their generals: Ihave no donbt their generals were very indifferent ones; ras I indeed, they have been at most periods of their history. General Benedek had an immense l reputation before the war, that was passed on as small evidence as that of any commander l have ever heard of, not excepting General Nc Clellan or poor Lord Raglan. The ,Austrians chose to make up their minds that they would
 never have been defeated at Magenta or Sol ferine if somebody else had been in command :;
 and, as Renedek was considered dashing of- ticer. and was believed to have remonstrated against the tactics of Giulay, it was decided by popular exclamation that he was the militia ry genius who would have saved Austria, like Radetzky, if he had only had the opportunity. In spite of his blunders, the people still assert | thatsh is a brave and gallant soldier and such assertions are generally correct but it is clear that, whatever else he was, he, was not great general. Of the archdukes, counts, and high born nobles who held command under Rene. dek. not single one has given proof of militia Y ability. The stories which are popularly repeated by the Austrlans of the want of nerve and utter neglect of duty shown by some Of the hipheet nf .Ranodnks se ss ra,, a,rolo4 c,a