, 1866-08-24
FROM EUROPE.
Our Italinn Letters.
The War UnAnishcd-obJcct OF Franco
.-lta1yss Wunts ana Intentions.
From Our Own Correspondent

From Our Own Correspondent
FLORENCE, August !, 1865.
This war was virtually ended by those I'M
peria1 tclcgnpl,ic messages By which Fran
els Joseph aud Napoleon celebrated tho 4tl
Of July. The question was too large to be
settled In day, the plan proposed could
not succeed; but 1t was evident from the
moment that France avowcd her alarm at
new Villafianca. All the power Of France
was pledged to put stop to successes which
were constantly demonstrating the 1ittleness
Of the Nspo1eonic mind, and removing far~
ther away the coveted possessions On the
Rhine and In the Mediterranean.
But 1t Is evident enough that an unfinished
war Is like IN unfinished batt1e-lt renders
other wars necessary, The incomplete war
Of 1859 left for us the war Of 1856. The un~
finished war Of 1865 leaves the seeds OF new
war within few years. 1t was bitterly
complained that the Crimenn war lasted be-
yond all reason. It Is easy to show that by
sighting It through and finishing II, you
saved money and suffering, The comparison
shows It very clearly. The campaign Of
1850 left all the powers Of Europe busy with
armaments which have, In the aggregate,
cost in seven years ten times Us much as
your war. The peace sou have now left you
free to d1sband your armies. Every new
peace In Europe Ia the slgual for new arna-
mente.
The object Of France Is transparent: to se-
cure some sort of peace, and then to defeat
by intrigue or force the objects Of Prussia,
the unity Of Germany. It Is evident that all
| nations who have unsatisfed ambitions, or
| reasonable fears, will arm to realize their as
1 41rAf- E.<x1 not1
| Napoleon will see the desitableness Of satis-
| flying Italy. so as to Isolate her in the next
| struggle. To this end, he Is willing to secure
her part ofthe Italian Tyrol, and to remove
Nil needless causes Of irritation on the part ol
Italy. But though Italy may get more than
that can be done will be done to save her
pride, there remain here the seeds Of q new
| 1Fnr or new wars.
As to territory, Trieste and DalmatIa hr,
claimca by the Italians and are more 1talia1
than anything else. Above all, they arc no
to be LETT in the hands Of Austria. The Ro
man question Is proposed to be settled by q,
unsatisfactory compromise. SWitzerlnnt
hold. the Ticino, Including the Aeara Of Lax
-NoG9iore. France possesses Nice, Savoy au
Corsica on eacl, Of which 1taly has Tali
clalnl.
It docs not much matter now whether tn
ambition to possess these territories is sea
sonable or not. merely note that 1t cxlstt
and Inns become n aevourtng passion Of tn
} nation. In any wnr, any nation that fight
/ with reasonable prospect Of success can i'm
fies arc rs much due to til
J good geperniship, Without this ailiane
, the battle Of koniggratz could not have bee
fought at all. Onc-third OF the Austria
troops were by tlat 1yaguc confined in III
| ffrrf+r rf I'm t1rf1uf Ef,r
| matter that no victories have been ,von hcl
that influence the result. The valor Of Il
: troops has been proved, the wnrl1ke spirit
, the people Is known now to all Europe, an
!. ! no one can doubt tllat next time the iul
. will flaye lions for leaders. Tie very III
:. fcred, Is q pledge to tho world that asses wi
$ no longer be assigned to supreme command
!. On the other side, this fatal inct11clcn'
{ OF our commanders and the nlcagrc militia
!. results Of the war arc Incentives to anoth
= h and more successful war; # Europe cam
d Italy will lind her account in p.
T. fecting 1cr army for new struggl.
, for nothing but victory will co,itc
: her. A period Of active diplomatic stru
= giles approaches and III Italy the first qas
our A1sn1strics:'' At present 1slcasoIl is
power, and Is an independent Minister, Y,
governs Italy On Italian ideas. There "
be struggle to supplant him by more p1ia
men. Tie French influence Is very stron
but the italian people aru stronger, and
casoli has their confidence. Tic Chief d:
ger to his power 1ius in the necessity OF
). commodating the Roman question. II sol
II yielding to French opinions Is needed At IL
o point Of our foreign relations, 1t is eyldg
le That Ricasoli Will 10 nt a disadvantage.
remains to be sccn, too, whether Ricas
10 cau organize national party. 1t docs
! vet exist: we hope to find In hin this SiE1
y proof CT political sasar1ty- srEMo