Daily Davenport Democrat. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1864-1874, 1866-01-30

go .0eaHovalf re0 1ea3e
CO4ro6 0ube061e1.
In the hited stlles Circu;: co1fs ~
terday aflqlnoon, J6dgs 1owes senos s 80 -
imnortone 3ec;s;c1 Us(h sogatd 10 The hquos
CASES. The Judgs expressed no opinion ON
Monday, 1t which time there Was partial
hearing, but held the question under i'd
visemcnt. The decision Was ~ follows:
| Circuit Cc~rt of the United States, Aasse-
chusstts D3strict-In the case Of Fr0neis
Jones, Losesll. j.
This IL . petition for tho removal Of an
indictment pending in the Superior Court
| for the county Of Suffolk against the peti-
tioner, charging him with selling intoxica-
| ting liquors contrary to the law ef Masss-
chusctts. The petitioner holds license,
duly issued By the proper collector ofinter-
nal revenue Of the United States, for carry
ing on the business Of retail dealer in liz
uors, and he alleges that in 20 selling he did
| an act under . revenue law OF the United
States, within the meaning Of st. 1888, Ssas.
2, en-. 81. So, commonly known ~ the force
bill.
The words of that section 90 far now ma
tcrial. are rs follows: "That in any case
where suit or prosecution shall be commence
| cu III court VI otoeVs Sko'oSs ny ~sAA7
Ger Of ths United States, or other person,
for cor on accounto any act done under the
revenue laws ofthe United States, or under
color thereof, or for or on account Of any
| right, authority or title, set up or claimed
ny such officer, or other person under any
such law" etc. tit shall be lawful for the
defendant to remove the suit or prosecu
| tion," &c.
The Gully question now mooted is whether
the petitioner brings himself within the
meaning Of this section. His position Is
that the license gives him an absolute right
to sell, notwithstanding the legislation "f
this Commonwealth prohibiting it.
1t was agreed that the question, whether
the license confcrs such = right, question
now pending before the Supreme Court Of
the United States, ought not to be decided
in summary manner on this motion to
allow the petition and accordingly it has
not been argued, and am to assume, for
the purpose OF this discussion, and only for
that purpose, that the license should be
construed as permission to sell, anything
in the laws Of the Commonwealth to the
contrary Notwithstanding
The only question now is, whether, grant
ing that the act Of selling was duly author
lied and was legal, it was an act done under
the revenue laws of the United States or
under color thereof.
The argument Of the learned Attorney Of
the Commonwealth, and which he enforced
with much ability, is, that the statue only
applies to officers Of the revenue, and such
other persons as they may be lawfully call
ed to their aid in enforcing the laws. The
language, however, appears to be too broad
to admit Of this construction. 1t applies in
terms to all persons who do any act under
the law, and this means, | suppose, by
authority OF the law. The act in this case,
| no doubt, was under the license; bu the
license derives its whole validity FROM the
law. and the act therefore, may properly be
said to be done under the law The intent
Of the statute is said to DC to protect tn.
officers Of the Government engaged in col
lecting the revenue, from ur friendly iegisla
ton by the States This is true, but the
object is little broader; namely, to enable
the revenue to be collected an object which
it would be the aim Of the supposed legisla
ton to obstruct and interfere with.
Such legislation would be likely to take
the form Of prohibition to the citizens Of I
State from paying duties, taking license!
, and the like; and the force bill appears t
be aptly framed 20 meet such a contingent
cy If a merchant should choose to pay
duties to the collector, Notwithstanding sucl
, payment were made punishable bya Stat
law, he might well DC said to have don. al
:, act under a revenue law, though 1t ~a
done with no intent and no official right L
aid in the enforcement Of that law, but Oh
n in the ordinary prosecution of his ow
q business. lnlced, it was conceded, as
=. understand, tn the language itself OF tn
~ act would fully justify broader construct
=. ion. do not find in any part OF the statut
~ the enforcement Of the law though the
\ are the persons to whom it has in fact bee
Is found generally to apply.
The great inconvenlenccs which may 70
low the removal fthe very numerous case
IN OF this kind to the Circuit Court iinpres
IS my inind very strongly, and would lead III
q to decline the jurisdiction, if could Sc
the way clear to do SO; but they can hay
n no weight in the present discussion, be
d cause they apply with precisely equal fo.c
: to all prosecutions which may be removes
here, as we'll as those within the aimittc
province Of the statute, as those now il
{ question.
Again, the statute seems to give but
limited discretion to the Court on the mer,
II question Of granting the petition. 1t dc
wolves upon the Court, or, in vacation, up
;, on the Clerk, the duty Of granting it, wher
e certain sort Of application is made. 1t il
c not necessary 10 examine the matter o
discretion iufther than to say, that juiis
c dictioa could hardly be disclained unles.
IN a very clear case against its exercise. |
on iuller discussion, the suit If prosccu
ton should Dc dismissed for want of iurls
. dlction, do not see why il should not a
d once resume its vitality in the State Court
:, That Court has merely stayed it's hand. -
The cause is still upon its docket, the re
!, cognizance is still in force and Of record
{ there
The tiftieth section Of the Internal Rev
enue Act Of 1864, adopts the force bill in
| terms and applies it to all cases arising un-
! der the laws for thel collection of internal
9 cutics. A case in which the authority Of
, such a law is set up in answer to q prose
, cution is case arising under the law jus,
as the act is an act done under the law. II
not, acollector who is sued in trespass and
! defends under the law, might be excluded
because the plaintiff would be merely rely.
: ing upon his right to his own property un.
til some good cause could be shown fol
seizing it. 1t is not necessary that the
plaintiffs Gaze should depend,upon the law
but that the rights Of one party should
N. Richardson for the petitioners; q. p.
q Sanger, Commemorative Attorney, contra
Rhode 1. Argus.
~. Louis w.. Memphis.
9 The Memphis Pos, has the following: