Brownlow's Knoxville Whig, and rebel ventilator. [volume] (Knoxville, Tenn.) 1863-1866, 1866-01-10
H. L. CARRICK ct al, rs. P. N ARMSTRONG,


This is one of those peculiar cases which are some
times met with in which neither party stands in an
attitude 20 claim the protection of court Of equity
Both parties in the cause appear in the original
cause, out of which this proceeding grew, to have
tainted with an illegal and champertors agreement,
for which the original bill was dismissed, and the
judgment here complained of pronounced.
The facts necessary to be noticed are briefly as
follows Many wears ago the firm of d" Leftwick &
Carrick,' which was composed Of the complainant
and Samuel V. Carrick who is dead obtained
q large Judgment" against William NJ. Bates, from
which as Is alleged in this BILL they despaired OF
realizing anything and authorized their attorney to
transfer the judgment to the defendant Armstrong,
but as is stated in this bill, without liability for
costs. Under this transfer and agreement, Arm
strong TO have one half of the amount collected
and he afterwards to secure the debt filed bill, in
the name Of compliments against Bates, which, af-
ter several years litigation dismissed for cham
perty, and the judgments now sought to be perpetu-
ally eniOHed, pronounced against complainant and
defendant Armstrong as their security for costs
From this judgment an appeal was prosecuted to
this court and the decree of the chancellor affirmed
at its December term, 1856.
1t is further alleged in the BILL As the ground Of
equity, that Armstrong used compliments name in
the original bin without their knowledge or consent
and that be alone was interested in the recovery
and as they derived no benefit from the litigation,
they should not be held responsible for any part Of
the judgment.
The answer admits the champertors' agreement
and denies that the judgment transferred to de-
PENDANT in any other way than the agent OF conf
plainant, and that he was responsible to them for
one-half the recovery, and that they had full lnow
edge Of the of their names in the original BILL
and That there was no agreement bv which COM
plainants were not to be held liable for costs.
The proof is very meager and unsatis factory. 1t
consists of only one deposition, and statement of
John L. GOOdal made in the former causes and con-
situted part Of the record in that cause. Excep-
tons were taken 10 the reading of this paper, but
the record fails 10 show any action of the court upon
them, and the papers is here part of the record
Under this state of facts the chancellor sustained
the bill; and as 10 the compliments, perpetuslly
Joined the execution issued from this court and de-
clsred the judgment as 70 compliments null and
void.
In this we think there is error and the decree of
the chancellor must be reversed To say nothing Of
the power of q court of equity 10 declare void q
Judgment ofths court or TO stay by lnjunctlons, It's
process there IS abundant reason in the record for
reversing the decree. The Statement. of Go0dall
taken from the record Of the former case, was i'm
properly admitted as evidence by the chancellor
without the production of the entire record This
court has repeatedly held that record one whole
and when produced as evidence it can not be gar
bled.
But it is insisted that if Goodalls statement should
be excluded, the testimony of Gordenhire is sufi-
cient TO sustain the allegations in the BILL He stated
that the defendant Armstrong, mora than once told
him "that,he had bought Leftwick and Carrick's
interest in the claim" This may all be true but in
our view Of this case il cannot weigh against the
solemn Judgment Of this court which is substantially
admitted IN the bill and answer to have been predi
Gated upon the champertors agreement made by
complalhants attorney and defendant Armstrong
about the identical judgment of which the witness
speaks. The verify of record Is not to be rnDeach-
ed BY testimony al I71ds The Bank of Tennessee
vs. Patterson, ct AL Hum, 363. Superadded to
this the bill itself contains the evidence that COM
plainants did not regard the judgment as absolutely
transferred to the defendant. No consideration IS
alleged as having been given for them, and more
than once it is repeated that large amount might
have been collected on the judgment had it not been
for the bad management of the defendant. The
whole case presents so many Objectionable features
in both parties, that constrained to dismiss
the bill and each party will pay one half the costs
in this court and the court below.
MILLIGAN, Judge. e
Attest: J. G. FRAZER, Clerk.
OTTrE CLERK or THE SUPREME CoURr ToE THE NM
DIE DIVISION or TIE STATE OF TENNESSEE, NASHVILLE
!, Jesse G. Frazer, Clerk of said Court do hereby
certify that the foregoing is true, perfect and
plete copy of the opinion of the Court delivered at
It's December Term, 1865, in the case of II. L.