The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1866-07-24
The Great Battle of sadowe.


The details of great hattie like that
OF honniggratL or SadoWa are not
quickly learnt Few have an opporfu-
nifty of seeing the general plan OF attack
and defence, and stiIl fewer can under-
stand IT, In the magnitude of the
armies engaged as well as in the impor-
lance Of the Interests at stake tb,. late
battle has seldom been surpassei
Nearly quarter of a million Of men
were arraYed on either side; thew ex-
tended over a great expanSe of country
and were led by royal generals who ex-
erciSed almost Independent commando
As military historians have disputed
for half a century about the incidents
of Ieipsic and Waterloo, il NAV be thai
this battle, which in nnaguitude eouaIs
LeiPsicY and far SURPRISES Waterloo.
Will for many year be the subject OF
controversy. But we are happy in
having at the seat of war CORRESPOND
ent who IS We'll qualified TO form judg-
ment on such operations, and who has
produced description which, consid-
ef1ng the circumstances under which il
was written, Is n marvel of accurate OBJ.
servauon. II is not too much to say
that we learn from his letter more than
was known OF the action by the great
majority of those who took part IN il.
The public is, indeed, well served by
those who narrate these wonderful
ENGuAs ia " 1T A4AlDSA DEAOIG the smoke
has cleared away from the battlefield.
We learn 50 speedily, and with such
comparative accuracy the general plan
ofan engagement that weare apt TO for
get how recent these advantages have
been, and TO undervalue the assistance
which the narrative OF a competent eye
witness, written on the very field, and
on the very day OF battle, gives, not on
" TO his contemporaries, but 10 future
historians. The Erandfathers of the
present generation were very different
" situated with respect to the battles
which distinguished the early part
of the present century. When Ma
poleou crushed the two Emperors at
Austerlitz, or broke the power OF Prus-
STA at Jena, there was no such clear
conception of what had been done. a
refercuce to the press Of the period will
confirm what most of US have
heard from our elders concerning the
suspense which prevailed during the
great campaigns. 4 deciSIUe UiciOTy
lras seldom announced as such, and ac-
copied By all the ioOTid lritlais tIceEltf-i four
hours. still less did people know the
number of men engaged, the DISPOSE
tons ofthe generals, the conduct Of the
soldiers, and the various details of the
action. News came struggling home
ward that the campaign was going
against the Austrians or the Prussians
great firm in the city had il
that BOnaparte had won anoth-
or victory, and that an armistice,
and then a peace was likely to be
the result. But somebody cOntFadicted
this, the public was warned not to be-
ieve sinister rumors. and it was shown
q PRIOR how impossible it was that the
combinations of the allies should have
failed. At last, after a week or ten
days suspense the worst intelligence
was fully confirmed; but even then the
m hrnE Il.
more trustworthy than Napoleon's bull
letins and scraps ofletteFs from officers
or soldiers which might find their way
into the French papers, and then after
time penetrnte into this country.
Even the subsequent victories of the
allies were very inadequately under
stood for long time. The campafcn
tremendous battles in and about Saxo-
ny, In which the French, sometimes
victorious and sometimes defeated.
were at length overpowered at Leipsic,
and compelled to fall back on the Rhine.
The telegraph and the military CORES
pendent have changed all this. We
probably know more of the battle of
KoniggratZ, which was fought this day
week, than the British public knew of
the battle of Ieipsic three months af-
forwards. The forces engaged, the
commanders, the stations of the differ
ent corps, the nature of the ground, the
manner of the attack, and the resist
ance il met with, are all described by
our correspondent with an exactness
which assures us that we have the main
incidents OF the battle. All that he saw
he tells, and his military EHolCEedgd ena-
bles him to form u correct Judgment OF
operations which were beyond his own
survey.
And what a battle it was as here de-
enFi0gan within = hOnPu eef
Austrians had been swept from the
field, and while the PrIisSiaus were
still pursuing their retreating legions!
There has been nothing like il in our
time, and only once ~ dtc great ICGT of
the French empire has there been sltch a
contest and such a carnage. The whole
PfussiRn and Austrian armies were en-
gagedi all that these two military mon
arches, fresh from the Fepose of u long
peace, could place in the field was there,
The delay of Benedek had enabled the
two main armies of the Prussians, each
one Of them national host in ITSELF to
combine, and, as Their losses had not
been largei the previous encounters,
thoy confronted the enemy $40, 600
strong. The Austrians are supposed
to have had an equal number. A sur
vey OF the field OF battle with a good
mapsWtlf show the extent of ground
over which these immense leVies of men
were spread. 1t is, indeed, wonderful
that such extensive operations should
have been begun and completed in a
single day. Where nearly half a mil
lion OF men and ], 500 guns are in the
field we might expect a conflict as long
as Leipsic. BHt The irresistible onset Of
The PTlLssidHs aud The SLtiLt of their 9sner-
ats decided de battle IN u single Lo5ty sum
ieT-s day. The narrative of its incl
dents given by our correepond-
emit does Justice TO the obsIi-
macy and courage of the Austrians,
but raises higher our estimate of their
opponents. II is evident that the Aus
TRANS were very strongly posted, and
that it was a work of daring and en-
duTance to dlslodge them. Only gem
erals having complete confidence in
themselves and their troops would have
Yentured ON such an enterprise, Gen. /
Benedek could have little hope of
achieving the objects of the war by |
taking up his partly intrenched po- |
sltlon." The Austrians conld not, by |
holding their ground in Bohemia, either |
denver Hanover and the Duchies or |
make those cOuqueSts of Prussian ter |
EitorY which were to enable them TO
cede Eenitia with grace. But If their |
design had been merely 70 protect their |
own territory, they, perhaps, could not |
have done better. They had position |
Wen protected by slope and wood, and |
tney made good use OF IL. Their ar |
ttttefy appears 10 hare been ereeHeRt |
1lteS HlOl0ed dotra tie adrdHcinq PruS- |
si1as, iI.llietiRg on them tefIi6Ee bsses /
while they themselves were almost nn- |
harmed From our corresp ondent's ac- |
count We must judge that the Prussiahs |
did not win the day merely by the posses
sion o. . superior arm Through great l
part OF their advance the needle gun I
gave them NO superiority. The Aus /
tElans were protected by the nature
of their position, and musketry ere 4
was useless against them The ss,Y,f1r5sI