New Orleans daily crescent. [volume] ([New Orleans, La.]) 1851-1866, 1866-03-19
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| which had become SO popular with our marching
and fighting armies They were found to be al
1 excellent continuance.
Screens of steel plates, about half an inch thick
| were arranged so as to close the embrasures o.
| the held works against the enemy's sharpshooters
| they were quickly raised or lowered as the gun
recoied from the port, or was run into battery
| aud ehectually covered the cannoneers.
oohofn mortars were very useful, especially to
| US, because of the great scarcity of ammunition
/ wooden mortars were in process of construction
An excellent invention of Col Burnett obviated
the use of eccentrics in our carriages for siege
guns, and greatly facilitated the manouvering OF
those guns and smplfied the construction of their
carriages.
| Some 24.pounder Dahgren howitzers had been
captured on a Federal gunboat in Iazoo river.
| Two or three of those We're mounted on old pro-
visionai iron 12-pounder carriages, and were re.
/ markably effective.
The marshes about Mobile, as marshes almost
everywhere else produced a greater moral effect
upon beseigers and beseiged than facts justified.
I During ordinary stages of water those marshes
were everywhere traversible by footmen with but
| little difficulty. The garrison of Spanish Fort
marched over to Blakeiy five miles distant rather
than wait at the terminus of the plank road for the
slow process of ferriage provided for them.
| No commander should everrely upon the reports
1 of country people about marshes, nor even of en-
/ gineer officers But if the movements or safety of
| his command may depend on the practcability OF
| a marsh, sharpshooters should be deployed over
it. In many cases they will find their way over
swamps and marshes which have been before CON
sidered impenetrable. This was certainly, to some
extent, true of the marshes covering the TANKS of
the works of Spanish Fort and Bakely, as well as
those surrounding Huger and Tracey.
The Federal fleet might have landed by means
OF their launches, a force near Huger and Tracey,
and have carried those works by assault. The gar
risons were in constant expectation of such an
assault and were prepared to repulse it.
But after the sinking of the monitors near APP
palachie bar by torpedoes, the fleet took no APP
parently active part in the attack. Now and then
a few shots were fred at ranges of about three
miles. But no casualties or other inconvenience
resulted from these demonstrations.
Indeed it would have been utterly impossible for
any vessels to have passed from Appalachie bar
above the batteries defending that river. All of
the approaches were guarded by torpedoes, which
in those quiet shallow, fresh waters, preserve
their destructive power for very long time.
Besides which the distractions and batteries were
such as no ships yet built could stand
1t was, perhaps, an error to fortify or occupy
the position of Spanish Fort. No batteries from
these bluffs could seriously harm batteries Huger
and Tracey. The battery near Bayou Minette
bridge was in as good position as could have
from battery Huger, and bombarded Huger and
Tracey for twelve days without causing serious
loss or any damage. Three men were wounded
early in the bombardment. But because of the
great want of ammunition, Colonel Patton was
ordered not to reply to the enemy's fire, but to
hold his ammunition to use against the enemy's
feet in any attempt it might make to force a pas
sage OF the river. There ere not 200 rounds per
gun ior the Brooke guns, and something over 300
for the ten inch guns. There was no more to be
had in the Confederacy. Therefore, the garrisous
OF Huger and Tracey held their fire. covered their
guns with merlons against the batteries on the
Eastern shore, and built bombproofs for them
selves.
Were the question to be again presented of de-
Tending that river it would perhaps be decided to
render Huger and Tracey very strong self.sustaiu-
ing works. If the Eastern Shore were to be oc-
cupied at all, a strong work on the redoubt Nc
Dermitt would accomplish the object sought
The expenditure OF small arm ammunition in
Spanish fort was very great AT first it was about
49, 900 rounds per day. The minimum daily ex-
penditure was $4,000 rounds.
The amount of field gun ammunition was also
greatly diminished during the siege of Blakely and
Spanish Fort When Bakely fell, there was so
little ammunition left that an attempt to Withstand
siege in Mobile would have been entirely uDiusti-
fable.
The position of Blakely was first occupied by Il
small force soon after the fall of Fort Morgan
The chief object in occupying and defending it
was to prevent an enemy from establishing him
self there, who could entirely cut off communica
ton between Mobile and the batteries Huger and
Tracey, and thus open Appalachie river to the
fleet. u-
The works of Blakely consisted of nine lunettes
with four or i've embrasures each, connected by
a continuous line of rife pits, covered in front by
two lines of abattis etc. The works were better
constructed than those of Spanish Fort. They
covered the ground in front of them better
covered the ground in the rear better, and were
not so much exposed to enfilade fire as those of
Spanish Fort were in many parts.
The garrison consisted of about 1900 muskets
and about 300 artillerists.
The casualties during the sege were about |
twenty to twenty-five daily The garrison was an |
excellent one and full of confidence. 1t was not
believed that an assault wonld be made for some |
days, and the beseiged believed they could repulse
any assault.
1t seems to have been an error not to remove the.
garrison of Blakely to Mobile as soon as Spanish
Fort was abandoned. 1t would have been difficult
y do this after day dawned, and up to that time
III of Spanish Fort garrison had not been trans
erred from Blakely to Mobile.
Perhaps the circnmspection observed by the
oesiegers in their operations about Spanish Fort
ustllled the commander, in calculating upon the
same system being used against Bakely.
As soon as Blakely fell, orders were given to
prepare to eyacuate Mobile.
Col. Isaac Patton remained in the immediate
presence Of the enemy, commanding the little gar
1sons at Huger and Tracey. These troops, in all
ibout 800 Louisianians, remained in the presence
If the enemy's army and fleet, ten miles distant
rom Mobile, whence they knew no succor could
each them, and continued to receive and return the
ire of theconstantly increasing batteries planted
lganst them, until after dark Of the llth when in
obedience to orders of the General commanding,
hey dsmantled and abandoned their works and
etired upon the city, reaching Mobile after day
lSnL OF the lztn. Ihey nred the last Confederate
hots of the last great battle of the war.
On the same day upon which Spanish Fort was
invested and besieged Bakely was invested.
Gen. St. John Lddell, an officer of excellent
experience and Of high traits, had been in com
nand of all the forces on the Eastern Shore. On
he 18th and 18th March, he moved out to offer
'attle with about $500 men to the army advancing
rom Fish river. But finding that army marching
heavier force than he had supposed it to be.
pon road to his left, he retired with his troops
ltQ the works of SDanish Fort and RfnknIy
S the enemy threw himself around Spanish Fort.
nd between it and Bakely.
This rendered it necessary to make the com
handler of Spanish Fort independent of Gen
,ddell, who could no longer properly control and
,lstain his operations
ThencefOrWard, the two commanders reported
irect to the Commanding General of the Depart
tent of the Gulf, who was daily with one or the
Their, or both. ....
Blakely, having been cautiously invested on the
9th of March, was besieged on the LIST of April.
he approaches were very slow. The first paral-
3ls were established at greater distance than
hose of Spanish Fort; and the progress of the
lege seemed less active and effective until the {
yening after the evacuation of Spanish Fort |
'hen the whole army seems to have been brought
p to Bakely, and under the inspriting Influence {
the occupation of Spanish Fort an immense
oumn Of attack was formed OF more than twenty :
lotlsand men, who were marched upon the cen.
r of our line of Blakely, where the ground was I
lyorable to an assault, and the line of defenses
as very weak. The mass moved on SUCCESSFULLY
he line of the defenders was too long and thin to
Init of achievements being drawn from any l
lrt Of it or ola heavy tire. The troops behaved a