New-York tribune. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1866-1924, 1866-05-15
NEW PUBLICATIONS.
swINTON'S CAMPAIGNS OF THE ARMY OF
TIE POTOMAC.

CAMPAIGNs or TIE ARhY OF the IOToMAO. a ChIi
PssSsTtyASI PROM ynE eo 10 90 Sss,
b. Richardson.
MI Swinton has enjoyed very remarkable advantages
Tor the performance Of the arduous task Of historian of
the Army Of the Potomac AS correspondent OF "Ihe
Now Yok Times" he witnessed great part Of the opera
tons lie has had 10 describe and through his personal
acquaintance with leading officers obtained access TO
sources Of information which have not been open to the
public at large. Voumnous reports and memoranda
many Of which have been published have been put
ct his disposal lie has had all the reports and conso
dated monthly returns of tho Confederate Army and be
haa conversed freely with most Of the principal Rebel
Commsndcrs In his elaborate critical remarks upon the
operations of the opposing forces lie processes rather TO
IoAect the opinions of the majority Of the most dstin
euished officers than to forth his independent
Judgment holding the "amyyerdcts on men and things
DO sounaer than any that hereafter likely 70 De
rendered"
10 good many respects his qualifications are as great as
his opportunities. lie has the broadness of Wow whoh
enables him TO take in the whole OF battlefield OF once
and the exact relation OF each separate movemen 10
tho complete result He has tie resolution TO disregard
unimporant details and TO avoid encumbenng his nara
tive with minute particulars which, though interesting IN
themselves would serve distract the readers attention
from the main point. He has sufficient knowledge of mil
ay science 10 understand the complicated maneuvers Of
q great campaign He writes with marvellous olearness
aud great deal of animation carrying us along at asharp
pace though he stumbles and then over crooked
phrase, aud trips us up pretty often with an obso-
loie or aniiquated word. and sometimes with a
word-like "devisement," "disillusioni2e, "poSi-
Ioned"-which is not English at al. He can write
so well that unwilling 10 let these and few other
blomshes pass without notice. He has an inordinato
fondnc8s for the of wiha where with would be
pesssner and better We find the expressions, those
who knew it not nor would not know it," which is proba
bly, An oversight; "su morning" all forenoon;" the
yorde, side of Bull Rum; and, "a long and fruitlesa
Chevy Chase" the last Of which Is unmeanng, because
Chevy Chase is not as Mr. Swinon to suppose the
name ola hunt or pursuit. but the of locality
These however trifing defects which the undoubteo
ments Of his history may wei induce us TO excuse HIS
narrative of each battle and campaign is illustrated by
critical commentary in which he fearlesy exposes blum
doris and shortcomings and warmly commends whatever
The deems worthy Of commentator. His book VIII pro-
woke greatdea of hostility; first because he has no
respect for popular idols and severe in his judgment OF
oil the successive commanders OF the Army Of the Poo-
mac from Mcclellan to Grant and secondly because his
narrative which concerns itself rather with the salient
festaros Of general than with instances of per
sons gallantry will the hasiy reader to overlook
the claims Of many subordinate officers to popular graft
tude But whoever reads his book with attention must
admit that its plan is good one and that has been exc
cuted with remarkable ability.
From his observations Oh Mcclellan select the fol
lowing passages:
TIE military character OF Mcclellan viii not be difficult to
settle much + yet D On s oser He
asnredy great General for be bad the pedany OF
emily that ofsbe Cabnet end his place was in Wash
ingtoa where he should have remeined as GeneranChe
Hero BIS ability plan campaigns aud form large strategic
which
scope and he would have been eonsderate and helpful TO
those in the field But his power taecan was much IN
his talent r6tegist and he executed less boldly
than be conceived not appearing 70 know well those counters
stance Yet be was improving N ms regard aha was me
OF a General who grew holder as he grew older.
To General Mcclellan personally misfortune that he
oonest for was inevitable that the FIRST leaders should be
sacrificed to the nations ignorance c war Iakng TINS INTO
tailed to accomplish in the actual circumstances OF has per
Torrance Ihaye endeavoreo in ne eae OF his oampesn
him be said tia, he does not belong to that foremost
been saccessfu and including bat lustrous names
neither does rank with that class who have ruined
their without fighting lie ranges with that middle
category Of meroriOus commanders who like sertorous
waenstein and William Of Orange, generally unfortunate in
war yot IN the words Of haT1ont never DESTROYED
nor discouraged but always able oppose nenacng
front and make the enemy deaI for what he gained
Upon Burnside and Hooker lie is particularly severe
though he accords to the latter General great praise for
the preliminary movements 6. Charlottesville, asserting,
80 feoblo and faulty be almost beneath criticism"
He is more tender with General Meade, though he finds
him tdy in realizing the severity of the damage he had
Inflicted on his opponent" in the battle Of Gettysburg.
and SLOW IN the subsequent pursuit. Grants overland
campaign he evidently regards as a costly mistakes
Gen Gran. summed up lis theory Of action in single
campaign ranks him with that class Of generals who have been
named 1horsrkers Bot the mind Of great commander
never moved that principle alone though the greatest have
ondnes. for tie employment Of brute masses
In direct attacks the with Napoleon IN 1872 IN
partial ecp genius The result Of such assaults that
o. Spottsy Courthouse and at Cod Habor In the latter
OF which the Army OF the Potomac ost ~ men 70 Lees
one presents redofo al o1syd Of the theory OF ham,
meriag" And besides Gen Grsnt best successes were &C.
oo,npshed only when departing from Lis own principle he
paneuvered O well as attacked
may indeed be ssd that the resources OF the Con
fdetsoy wen nigh exhausted While those OF the North
s ample continuance Of even such unequal exchange
Of life made in this oauBagn wood finally result IN
the destruction Of the enemy Bat th. assertion oms the
important consideration that war sustained quite as much
by the moral energy Of people BY lite material resources
the former must be active TO bring ont and make
available tho latter has Lot unireeuenty occurred that
with abundant nation has failed In war by the
ssppng the anmang principle in tie minds Of citizens
FOR armies are things visible ard formal crcumscribd by
time and space bat sol Of war unseen bou nd
up with the interests convictions passions Of men, Now 50
gloomy was tie military outlook after the action the Cbieka
RoDny and 70 such degree BY eoteqOence bad the moral
spring the public mind become relaxed that there was OF
this time great danger Of collapse q the The history
Of this CONFLICT truhfny written will show this Had not sue
sss c Saye Taes peW & to recruit the army
the Potomac which shaken structure SIS vaor quenched
wounded. was the Army Of tbe Potomac no more
IL would be interesting 10 institute 20 detelec comparison
between the overland campaign toward Richmond and the
campaign Of Sherman toward Atlanta These operations were
parallel the conduct Of tie commanders very differ
ent Gen. sherman rarely assauug treated each position
taken up By Johnston fortress by ntrenchng front
OF opponents works lie able both TO cover his own lines
ssd gradually accumulate fahk force 50 menacng to bis
antagonists communications compel him TO abandon each
successive stronghold Thus by repeated eeps 10 advance
asd With comparatively little loss he reached his goal At