The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1866-06-30

whom duty alone had made his enemy.
Bcucdck may now be considered the
leading military genius of the Empire. IL
is said that he accepted the command ot
the Austrian army upon conditions, to wit :
that he should have at least three hun
drcd thousand men that no archdukc
should nc present with the army ; and that
he should choose all his own stall officers.
THE COMMANDER Chief OF THE FEDERAL
ARMY.
4 Frankfort dispatch says irincc
Charles, of Bavaria, will he appointed
commander in chief of the fcder"i "'''! :
PRINCE FREDERICK CHARLES. OF PRUSSIA.
, II the prussian armies are put forward
under the command o! frihce fr'u'',,N
Charles. they will have no very reiiia,hao'c
header. since the Prince Is many als.in-
rui>b,d N the son-in-law OF Queen VIC
/ Toria and is said to be afflicted with the
chronic stupidity which affects PruSsian
princes.
TUE ALLIES OF AUSTRIA AND OF PRUSSIA.
The eight votes excluding Austria given
in the Diet in favor of the mobilization oi
the Federal army represent population
OF lS.S5o,7n, and contingent OF 1878
men: while the five votes excluding Prussia
against the proposal represent population
OF 2.95I $50, and contingent ot 81, 800 men.
The EMPEROR NArcLEoN's LETTER on THE
SITUATION N EUROPE AND THE POSITION
OF FRANCE.
The following is the full text Of the
Emperor Eapolcon's letter to the Minister
of Foreign Affairs, of which portion has
already been given. 1t was read on the
18th instant before the Corps LcgiSlatlt:
PALACE OF THE TriLERIES, June ii.
NJ. lc Mini>,rc: At the moment when
the hopes of peace, which the meeting OF
tho Conference made us conceive, seem To
be vanishing, it is essential TO explain III
circular to the diplomatic agents abroad
the ideas which my Government contcm-
plated presenting in the councils OF Eu-
rope, and ,hc conduct IL means - follow
| in presence of the events which are pre-
pairing. This communication will place
| our policy in It's true light.
Had the Conference taken place, your
language, as you are aware, would have
been explicit. Iou were to declare in my
name that | rcpudatcd all idea Of terrific
rial ACKNOWLEDGEMENT so long rs the equlll-
hrium of Europe was not disturbed. In
effect, We could not think of an extension
Of our frontiers except lit case OF the map
of Europe being rcmodcllcd for the cHclu-
>ivc benefit of \ great Power, and OF the
coutcrmiuouS provinces demanding, 10y
votes freely expressed, their annexation to
France.
Outside these circumstances, think ii
more worthy of our country 10 prefer to
the acquisition of territory the precious
advantage of living on good terms with our
ncighhorS by respecting their independence
and their nationality.
Animated by these sentiments, and hay
ing only in view the preservation OF peace,
| appealed II England and 10 Russia to
address at the same time words OF con-
ciliatiun 10 the parties Interested.
The accord established between the
neutral Powers will OF itself bc pledge
of security Tor Europe. They showed
their imparriaity in resolving to limit the
discussion OF the Conference 10 the pend
inr questions. In order 10 resolve them, |
think il was necessary Ia address our
selves to them frankly, to di,cnga@e them
from the Diplomatic veil which covered
them, and To tax" into serious cou>l'lcra-
tiou the legitimate wishes OF >ovcTclgns
and Of nations.
The conflict which has arisen has three
cau>cS--thc geographical situation OF PruS-
Sia impcrtcctly limited; the wish OF Ger
many demanding political rccon>titu-
ton more couormahle 10 its general wants,
aud the necessity Of Italy 10 secure her
national independence.
The neutral Powers could not intcrpoSc
in the internal affairs OF foreign countries.
Nevertheless. the Courts that participated
in the constitutional acts Of the Gcrmanlc
Confederation had the right to examine
whether the changes demanded were not
of a kind 10 cndangcr the order established
in Europe. We should have desired, III
what concerns ourselves, for the secondary
States OF the Confederation, a closer union,
stronger organization, more important
position: for Prussia, more homogeneous
ness in the north for Austria, the malnte-
nance OF her great position III Germany.
We should have desired, moreover, that,
/ for an equitable compensation, Austria
should ccdc Ecnctia 10 Italy; for ii, III
concert with Prussia, and without regard
10 the treaty Of 1852, She made war III
Denmark on behalf Of German nationality,
il seemed To be just that she should recog-
nizc the same principle for Italy by COM
plotting the independence ofthc Peninsula
Such are the IDEAS which, for the lcpose
of Europe, we should have tried to carry
out. To-day there is reason 10 fear that
they can be decided only by arms. In
such an emergency what is the attitude 1t
becomes France to assume
Ought We to manifest our diSpleaSure
because Germany finds the treaties OF
ISIS Insufficient 10 satisfy her national
tendencies and preserve her tranquility
In the war which is about 10 break out we
have but two iutcrestS--thc maintenance
of the European equilibrium and the
maintenance of that which We have contrl-
butcd to constitute in Italy.
But to save these two interests, does not
the moral force Of France suffice In or
der that her voice shall be listened 10, Will
She he obliged to draw the sword? l do
not think so.
If, in spite Of our efforts, the hopes OF
peace are not realized, we are ncverthc-
less treasured by the declarations OF the
Courts engaged in the conflict, that what
ever be the results of the war, none OF the
questions which touch us shall be resolved
without the assent of France.
Let us, then, continue in n vlglIant
neutrality: and, strong in our dl>inter-
cstedncss, animated by sincere desire 10
see the nations of Europe forget their
auarrels, and unite in the cause OF civil
i lA~ .