Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1866-01-12

! y
which large portion had been detached
to cut the railroad leading from Bati-
more north. General Grant says that
two divisions of the Sixth corps and the
advance of the Nineteenth corps arrived
at Washington before l did, and Mr..
Stanton says | was met there by the
Sixth corps, part of the Nineteenth
corps under General Emory, and part
of the Eighth corps under Gen Gilmore
Ny force had then marched over 500
miles, marching, at least, twenty miles
each day, except the day of the fight at
Monocacy, when it marched fourteen
miles, and fought and defeated Wallace
At the battle of Winchester, or the
Opequan, as it is called by General
Grant, my effective strength was about
eight thousand five hundred (S,500)
muskets, the three battalions of artillery
and less than three thousand $4,000
cavalry. Sheridan's infantry consisted
of the Sixth, Nineteenth and Cook s
corps, composed of one division of the
Eighth corps and what is called the
Army of West Virginia" Some idea
may be formed of the strength of the
Sixth corps when it is recollected that the
army of the Potomac was composed of
three corps on the LIST of May previous,
to wit the Second Fifth and Sixth,
and that its effective strength then was,
according to Mr. Stanton's statement,
40, 1856. The same statement shows
that the available strength ip the '' De-
partment of West Virginia" on the LIST
of May, was 30,782, and most of tile
troops in this department. wore concen-
trated in the Valley. Documents sub
sequently captured showed the strength
of the Nineteenth corps to have been at
the battle of Winchester, not less than
10000 effective men. Official reports
captured at Cedar Creek shows that
Sheridan's cavalry, on the 18th of Sep
TENDER, two days before the fight, num-
bered 10, 100 present for duty. His artil
lery was vastly superior to mine in men
and guns. The Sixth corps alone mot
have exceeded my entire strength, unless
it met with such tremendous losses as to
reduce its strength at least three -fourths
From all the information received and
from documents captured at Cedar
Creek, | am satisfied that Sheridan
effective infantry strength at Winchester
could not have been less than 35, 900
muskets. and it was probably more. The
odds against me, therefore, were fully
four to one, and probably more His
very great superiority in cavalry was
very disadvantageous to me, as the
country was very open and admirably
! adapted to cavalry operations, and only
cavalry, being mostly armed with En-.
field rifles without pistols or sabres, could
not fight his, whose equipment and arms
were complete. At the fight at Cedar
Creek had been reinforced by one di-
vision of infantry (Kershaw's) number
ing twenty-seven hundred (2,700) mus
kets, one small battalion Of artillery and
about six hundred cavalry (600) cavalry,
which about made up my losses at Win
chester and Fishers Hill. ] went into
this fight with eight thousand five hun
bred (8.500) muskets, about forty pieces
of artillery and about twelve hundred
q, 200) cavalry, as the rest Of my
cavalry, which was guarding the Luray
Valley, did not get up in time. though
ordered to move at the same time that
moved to the attack Sheridan's infantry
had been recruited fully up to its
strength at Winchester, and his cavalry
numbered 500, as shown by the Off
cial reports captured. The main cause
why the rout Of his army in the morn.
ing was not complete was the fact that
my cavalry could not compete with his,
/ and the latter, therefore, remained intact
He claimed all his own guns that had
been captured in the morning and after
ward recaptured, as SO many guns cap
tured from me, whereas | lost only
twenty three guns, and the loss of these
and the wagons which were taken was
mainly owing to the fact that bridge,
on the narrow part of the road between
Cedar Creek and Fishers Hill, broke
down, and the guns and wagons, which
latter we're not numerous, could not be
brought off. Pursuit was not made TO
! Mount Jackson, as stated by both Grant
and Stanton, but my troops were halted
for the night at Fishers Hill, three miles
from Cedar Creek, and next day moved
backward to New Market, six miles from
Mount jackson, without any pursuit at
all. So far from its being true. as stated
! by Mr.. Stanton, that no force appeared
in the valley after this, the fact is. that
I recognized my force at New Market,
and on the 10th Of November moved
down the Valley again and confronted
! Sheridan on the 18th and 18th in front
of his entertainments. between Newtown
and Kearnstown, and then retired back
to New Market because provisions and
forage could not be obtained in the lower
Valley. The expeditions by which the
posts Of New Creek and Beverly were
subsequently captured. were sent out also
from my force in the Valley. The strong
force which General Grant says was en-
trenched under me at Waynesboro, when
Sheridan advanced up the Valley in the
the latter part of February. 1865. with
two divisions Of cavalry 5000 each
nc, 900 10 alb, consisted Of about one