The aegis & intelligencer. [volume] (Bel Air, Md.) 1864-1923, 1866-06-15

ligerent, or man of war sThe head is
compact, not large, but we'll put together
and his eyes are fine and gentle. In con.
versatlon, he has slight but quite per-
ceptIble French accent. 1t it be added
that he dresses with simple elegance, this
hasty outline of his personnel will be COM
plete.
The qualities of Beauregard's mind, so
tar as they reveal themselves III CONVEX.
sation, appear to justify the estimate of
those who hold him to have been among
the foremost of our enemies. If his Ca
reer did not prove his title to take rank
as 6rstclass military man, it showed him
to be at least frstra second. class man.
One readily sees in him a wonderful,
clear, swift, far glanoing mind--a man
who on the field of battle would be splen-
did in emergencies, master in most per-
feet degree of his faculties, and of the
elements with which he has to deal. In
strategic grasp he had, perhaps, no supe-
rlor in tie field and the clearness, pre-
cision and comprehensive synthesis with
which, In conversation with us, ho ran
over the salient features of his campaigns,
showed an intellect tempered to a fine
edge.
That he has the qualities to make
really great commander was not made
manifest by the war. And, indeed, in the
composition of this type of man the NOR
al are quite as requisite as the intelectu-
al parts. To his fashioning there must
60 that breadth and calm and equipoise
which Grant showed and which Grants
adversary, Lee, showed. If Beauregard
does not range with this category, be at
least must take high place among what
We may call the professionalism in war.
Perhaps he would shine with most ustre
on a special field or in performance of
special piece of work-as in the defence
Of Charleston.
But it has resulted from the fact that
some of Beauregard's most brilliant ex-
ploits were of the latter order that it has
passed into current verdict that be was
greater in defence than in offence. This
we think hasty judgment. Mr.. Swim
ton, in the Campaigns of the army of the
Potomac,," reviewing that officers cnndnct
at Bull Run, says: "Beauregard's inspi-
rations we're essentially aggressive. =
This was found most truly justified by all
that we heard from the man himself
1t is we'll known that at Bull Run be was
actually in the act of an offensive maneu-
vre when Mcdowell turned his right, and
at the close of the action be was eager to
press on, but was restrained by Mr.. Davis,
who was upon the field. The bitter ex-
pressions of disgust at this policy which
he threw into his report were the first
cause of that hostility towards him which
gradually grew up in the minds Of the au-
thorities at Richmond.
Of this same aggressive tendency, we
had from him several other instances
When, in February, 1862, he left the
Army of Northern Virginia to take charge
of the defence of the Valley of the Mis-
sissippi, under Albert Sydney Johnston,
who was then in command of the entire
Western Department, he found that off
GERS force divided into two armies, each
of which was too small either for often
sive or defensive action. Under john
ston's immediate command were $4,000
men at Bowling Green, confronting
Buelfs Army, and at Columbus, on the
Mississippi, were $4,000 men under Polk,
who was watching the motions of Grant,
who from Cairo was about to initiate the
campaign that eliminated at Donel-
son.
Seeing the iuutilty of this Austrian poll
cy of attempting to cover everything, by
which one really covers nothing, Beaure-
gard proposed that he should reduce the
garrison at Columbus to a minimum of
1000 men, and with the remaining H.
600 move to join the force at Bowling
Green, when johnson and he together,
would, he thought, be strong enough to
give crushing defeat to the Army of
Buell., which was then regarded as the
most Immediately menacing. With one
army thus eliminated from the problem,
he proposed to concentrate against Grant.
Scarcely, however, had Beauregard reach
ed his field of operations, than Grant,
early in February, began his operations
against Forts Henry and Donelson, and
Johnston was compelled to fall back
through Nashville and Murfreesboro.
AS it was thus impossible for Beauregard
to join Johnston, he persuaded Johnston
to move TO Corinth and make a junction
with him.
With the united force he advanced
secretly away toward Grant, who had
meanwhile moved to Pittsburg Landing,
on the left bank of the Tennessee River.
The result of which was the battle of Shi-
lob, the history of which is known to the
whole world The conception of this
movement on the part of Beauregard was
brilliant and in accordance with the high
est principles of war. 1t eliminated in a
crushing defeat to Grant on the 9th, and
there is every human likelihood that it
would have ended in the humiliation of
Grants Army bad it not been that the
rawness of the Southern troops caused the
march to Shiloh to be one day longer
Al D. L. -. L.