The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1866-07-28
For the Free Trader.
The Italian Military Problem.

the Trader.
The Italian Military Problem.
The solici:ude fel. by Americans in regard
to the Italian contest with Austria will make
acceptable, perhaps, a statement of the mill
t,ry problem involved in that contest; and
there never was a military problem presente
to the intelligence Of either military adopts
or amateurs that admitted of a more perfect
and conclusive solution. and the reason is
at hanl. The country that must be the
theatre of the struggle is so clearly indicated
BY nature that ii it had not been the theatre
upon which the greatest captain III the world
taught mankind the highest principles of the
military art, the humblest disciple Of that
art, by little patient meditation, could
hardly have faileI III finding oIt the con,
trolling circumstances and principles to
which he should direct his attention for the
purpose OF securing the results proposed.
The object of the present contest between
Austria aui Italy > the Province Of Ee"s>
tia, including the city Of Venice, at present
and since 1915 under the dominion Of Aus
tra. Yenitia, hoTeTcr, IS part OF Italy :;
its people are Italians; and it is not doubt
full that they prefer the rule of an Italian
king TO that of the German Kaiser The
western frontier of Venc;ia opens upon Lom-
hardy, and it. southern upon the MIlanese,
both devoted to the cause Of Italy and her
king. and compreheIdng also the ta!re>t,
most populous. and richest portion OF the
peninsula.
The eastern frontier Of Vcnetia is the
Adriatic and its northern frontier Is nar>
row and opens upon the mountain region OF.
Erioul and the TyroI. which must be tr,
versed for some fifty or seventy FIVE milss
before reaching the substantial! resources of
the Austrian monarchy. A railroad, run
ming from Venice and Trieste to Vienna,
dimiuiShes this unflvorable cIrc-mstancc,
but does not ucutra!ze its Importance. In
al the foregoing circumstances therefore,
Italy has the advantage
About eighty miles west Of the city Of
Venice is the lake Of Garia aud issuing
from the southern extremity OF the lake l.
the river MncID, running scCth, and enter
ing the Po after 4 course of about twenty-five
miles. The Po, running east, enters III.
-Adriatic aboG; eighty miles east of the iuHc-
zion OF Tie Miuco. East o! the NinciO and
of Lake GarGil runs the river Adige- issuing
from the mountains of the Tyre! aud runs
ming south parallel will lake Ga, "a, and
but a short distance from i, till. passing the
parallel of the south end tf Lake Garja. i
turns Il little to the left. and runs nearly
parallel with the MinciD and the 20 to the
se.. The Lake of Garla itself peneratcs
2he E.uuutains for about thirty miles north.
ward from the Fortress of Peschiera, which
is situated at the debouch OF the Nincio from
the Lake. Fifteen miles below Pescbiera.
on the Mincio. * the CITY Of M.ntua, strong
- 4 =
The Citadel Of Porto and the Forts st. Ge0Tge
and La Favorite- Mantua itself is situated
in the miG.t Of marshes.
About twelve miles, a little nor.h Of east,
f-orfi Nantua is situated the town and fortiii-
cations OF Legnano, upon the Adige. and
from Legnaro. by the course of the AGiGe 10
Verona, also on the bank of the Adige, Is
about twelve miles, and it is abort nine miles
due west fro:r Verona to Peschiera. Both
Pcschiera ana Mantua, and the whole line of
the MIuciO between those points are strongly
fortified. The line Of the Adi.e from FerGua
to Legnano is still more strongly fortified.
The line from M.ntua to Lcgnano, passing
through Nevara and nguiunetto, and inter
sected by several small ma'shy streams and
traversing marshy region, IS strongly forth
fsd in It's whole length. The country this
line tIaverses is therefore very unfavorabc
for maueuvering against an enemy, even in
dependent of the Notifications. The line
from Peschiera to Verona Is favorable for
maneuvcring, and is also strongly fortified.
These four lines that have been described
enclose, ii will be observed. a nearly square
piece Of ground, twelve or fifteen miles long,
and ten or twelve broad ard as they are
strongly connected in every part, and power
fully Fashioned at the angles by the tortresses
of Peschiera, Mantua, Le-nanO and Verona,
Aha hol yt,ui
military works, called, from It's Ggure, the
Quad lateral; and its strength and position
Us a defence against the breach OF the vests
eru or southern frontiers Of Nenitia are such
rs to make it, | believe, IL the estimation OF
military connoisseurs, the most marvellous
work of the kind IN the world.
The principal obstacle that the fortiica,
tions on the line between Peschiera and the
Verona present TO an Italian army IS that
they would add to the difficulty of hank:nG
Verona, and taking it IN reverse by crossing
Adige above Verona, in case the Italians
should break through Peschiera. 1t would
also be powerful support TO the Austrans
in case they should choose to fight a general
battle between PeSchiera and Verona, which,
however, it Is not probable they would be
inclined to DO. 1t Is perhaps not necessary
10 add, because It will be understood, hat al
these lines, including the cities and fortifica
.ions of Peschiera and Mantua, are III the
hands of the AussrIans.
Upon this state of facts, it is perfect,
clear that in order TO secure their object. the
Italians must choose one Of three coarses
They must break The Ouadrilaieral they
must flank it; or, if neither Of these courses
IS feasible, they must cross the Alps, unite
Their forces with those of Prussia, and sseh
in Germany for those advantages over Aus
tria that will wiring frCm her Venetia at the
close of the war. The las. course needs nC
further EXPLANATION than 10 seY, that tbs
crossing of the Alps is entirely practicable
and the probability of Austria Eeimg able tC
interpose anv very serious obstacles to it i
not great: but it is not the course tha: tb
Italians viii choose, unless they are oblige,
to, because it does not conduct directly to tia
result they aim at
The attempt to flank the Quadrilatera
either by turning Mantua and Iegnano o
the south or the head of Lake Garda on tn
north. would be violation of almost ever
precept of the military art. twould be t
let in the enemy upon Tie flank and rear; ;
would be to allow him to close up and CT
off your Communications it would be to ru
yourself into 4 cHi de Sec where. even if yo
reached the bottom, yol could not get OF
again. Because, Il you reached Yenic'
with all your concentrations i'll the HAND
of the enemy, would you rot he as muc
troubled to get ont again you we're TO q
there :? And this last consideration is dec
slve against any maritime attempt, even
that were otherwise practicable, which