The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1866-07-06
The Military Situation in Germany.

FROM We 1tfeS.
We presume the future historian Will date the
opening of this great war from the entry Of the
Prussans into Holstein, and the consequent
retreat of the weak Austrian force before supe-
rior numbers. This at once consolidated Prus-
sian power in the north. 1t bound, for the
present the Elbe Duchies firmly to Prussia, and
1t left to the two Mecklenburgs, wedged in be-
sween Brandenburg and Holstein, no other
alternative but close alliance, if not actual in
corporation with Prussia. This was the easier,
as the feeling, both of the people and sovereigns
of Strelitz and Schwerin, favored such a course.
But it also isolated the three Hanseatic cities
Hamburg, Lubbock, and Bremen-irom any sup
port of the Bund; and though their quota in
men for the army is rather insignificant, the
maritime, commercial, and financial aid they
might have rendered would not have been in
considerable. Thus Prussia, with one quick
stroke OF sound military policy, fortified herself
in the north-an accomplishment that under
Jess skllful treatment could have been achieved
only at the cost of war.
In the west and south Prussia has acted with
equal vlgor, and so tar with equal success. The
Diet, on the l4th of June having voted the mo-
bilization OF the Federal army, Prussia at once
declared the Confederation dissoved made
known It's purpose to consider all the States that
voted in favor of the proposition. as enemies OF
Prussia unless they speedily refuse to arm and
would at once proclaim neutrality; and as none
Df the powers concerned acceded to this demand
Df Prussia, she began her movements, and on
the 10th Prussian armies entered Hanover,
Electorate Hesse, and SaXony. This was bold
move, but well conceived and well carried out
1t did for Prussia in the west what her occu-
patton OF Holstein had done for her in the
north-it consolidated her power in that di-
Tection. Looking at the map, 1t will be seen
That between the eastern half of Prussia and
Westphalia and the Rhine provinces, her
western dependencies, the Kingdom of Han
over, the Electorate OF Hesse, and Ducal Hesse
stretch north south
Sea down to near Frankfort -on-the-Main Their
1dhering 10 the Diet broke the continuity of
1he Prusslan line, Tor ohense as well as defense
would have completely isolated her possessions
on the Rhine, and exposed her to attack IRON
The armies OF the Bund on the lower El be thus
threatening to cut her off again from Holsten,
and nulity ali the benefits she had obtained
by its occupation. This was surely danger
enough to be ayerted by quick and bold action
Hence, without giving the Diet time 10 move
Its aTmles or even to concentrate them for the
present defense of these States and Interior
offensive purposes, Prussia occupied Hanover
also.
By this Prussia, as a result of but two davs,
campaign, has sole possession and control of
Northern Germany from the Belgian to the
atussian IrontleT, and as far south as her armies
Nave auVanceu-a result the Importance of
which, considering it in miIitary point Of view
can hardly De oVerestimated. Prussia now pre,
.a scents an a., un6rQken line to her adversarles
Towards the south, just as In the beoinning nj
Dur own war the South presented AN nnhroRon
line to the North from the Atlantic to tbe Ms.
sissippi. That there is a great ADVANTAGE in
Abs, no one can deny; but wherein some Of its
advantages lie we VIII presently see.
The simultaneous movement into savonv
sprang from different motives, and was InSaT.
taken for different object. The occupation Of
Hanover and the two Hesses though apparentSv ~
an offensive advance, was, in reality, a defensivs
Dne as we have shown, in order to protect the
western provinces and the northern frontier OF
Prussia from attack. The march to Dresden is
AIa N
though 1t may appear to be to some extent de.
fensYe one, that is, undertaken with view to
prevent the Austrlaus from holding Dresden and
1eipsic and thence threaten Magdeburg and
Berlin on one side, and Bresau and Posen on the
other. II Is undoubtedly intended TO attack the
Austrians on their line from Karlsback ID