Keowee courier. [volume] (Pickens Court House, S.C.) 1849-current, 1866-02-10
M1SCEI.LA "A NY.
The English Press on Gen. Grants Report.


ations is attracting a large share Of attention
abroad. The English journals comment on it
very favorably, and make the Lieutenant
General the subject of many high conipli-
ments. The London "Times" says: What
renders this report too, the more remarkable,
Is that it explains new, and as the event
proved, successful system Of tactics devised
for the occasion. This system was that Of
availing himself of his great superiority of
numbers, attacking a variety Of points at once,
and preventing the concentration of the South
ern troops. Says the "Times ~
Man for mansthe Southerners we're the best
troops, partly, perhaps, from natural aptitudes,
but mainly, no doubt, from the great military
ability Of their commanders. On fair field,
and in any one battle, the Federals could not
pretend to reckon confidently on winning;
but there was one thing on which they could
reckon, aud that was on killing certain num-
Der of Confederates Of course they must
suffer equal or even greater losses themselves,
hut that they could we'll afford If every bat
tie cost the South certain proportion Of men,
given number of battles must destroy the
Southern power even if no battle was dcci-
sive victory. So Grant determined not only
to fight but to fight on without stint or stay
come what might. Hard knocks and inces-
SAINT blows constituted his strategy and tactics
If he were to fare as Mcclellan and Hooker
had Jared, he would not do as Mcclellan and
Hooker had done. He opened the new cam
paign resolved to go on fighting whether he
won or lost, and, as he himself says, I" to ham
,ner contin dously against the armed force Of
the enemy and his resources until by mere at
triton, if no other way, there should be
nothing left to him but submission" The
literal execution Of this policy is expressed in
every line of the report. While recouuting
the events of the Virginia campaign the Gen
failure in these words I" 1t was the only
James which did not infict upon the enemy
would not be understood as saying that all
previous attacks resulted in victories to our
arms, or accomplish as much as had hoped
my severe losses, which tended in the end to
these tactics cost the North we need not say
AS far as plans can be justified by events
that justification belongs certainly to Grant
system had failed. His campaign brought
pHo ""t " t]H Ctlh, "pCtCoo C'CiS lolmSt Canl-
: paign had left the contest pretty nearly as it
stood before. 1t must be understood, too,
that wherever military science appears more
conspicuous than brute force, that merit is
Grants also. The scheme Of Sherman S cam
paign was dictated by Grant, as were others
less important and less fortunate. The grand
principle of the whole system was co operation.
Besides the two great armies of the East and
West, which, on this occasion, were to pull
together, Grant set half dozen other armies
in motion, to distract occupy and punish the
enemy at all points together *
That result is undoubtedly due to the Chill
cary arithmetic Of General Grant. ! He is
not the first conqueror who has adopted the
principle, though he was the first 70 apply it
to the resources of a whole people instead Of
the divisions Of single army. lIeis entitled
therefore, to the credit which complete success
confers; and, indeed, terrible though the cost
was, it may we'll be questioned whether an in.
definite prolongation of the war would not have
cost both parties still more.
The Liverpool " Post says:
General Grants report is about to become
as famous as Caesars Commentaries. It is
infinitely more important, for in the recent
eiyil war in America Greek met. Greek, and
Grant encountered more formidable foe than
Caesar. at first the report escaped attention.
It came in bundle Of official documents, all
figures and few arguments but when the
story Of the campaign of 1864 was looked into,
matter was found in it calculated to interest