Cleveland daily leader. [volume] ([Cleveland, Ohio]) 1865-1873, 1865-10-19
SCRAPS OF HISTORY.
shermau's Vicksburg PrOtest-HOw
Inc Grand March was Planned.

Col. Bowman, in his forthcoming life Of
Gen. Sherman, gives the following inter
esting items of history;
THE STORY OF THE vtcksBURG PROTEST.
1t has been alleged in some of the news
naners of the dav. that while the army
was encatnped at Youngs Point, General
Sherman handed to Gefieral Grant a writ
ten protest against the proposed movement
on Grand Gulf, and the statement has been
coupled with such a show OF circumstances
| as to obtain ready credence IN many quar-
tiers. In fact, General Sherman never
protested, either in writing or verbally,
against any movement ever proposed or
adopted by General Grant and through
out the entire campaign these two COM
manders acted together in perfect harmOhy
and e~Ordiality; the commander-in-chief
freely and constantly availing himself of
Sherman's advice, the subordinate prompt
lily and faithfully carrying out the orders
of his superior. But the movement on
Grand Gulf was not Sherman's plan. 1t
was the conception of General Grants own
mind, and was adopted by him, against the
opinion, though with the full consent and
support of the Executive. Sheridan CON
sidered the north front of Vicksburg the
true point of attack, and the line of the
Yallabusha the best base of operations.
On the Sth of April he freely expressed
this opinion to General Grant lii the fol-
lowing communication:
Il would most respectfully suggest that
General Grant call OIL his corps command
ers for their opinions, concise and positive,
on the best general plan of campaign.
"My opinions are:
HFirst-That the army of the Tennes-
see is far in advance of the other grand
armies.
"Second-That a corps from Missouri
should forthwith be moved from st. Louis
to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas,
supplies collected while the river is full,
and land communication with Memphis
opened by way of Des Ark, on the White
and Madison, ON the st. Francis rivers.
"Third-That as much of Yazoo Pass,
Coldwater and Tallahatchie rivers as can
be regained and fortified be held, and the
main army be transported thithar by land
or water; that the road back to Memphis
be secured and reopened, and as soon us
the waters subside, Grenada be attacked;
and the swamp road across to Helena be
p%atroled by cavalry.
oFourth-That the line of the Yalla-
busha be the base from which to operate
against the points where the Mississippi
Central crosses Big Black above Canton,
and, lastly, where the Vicksburg and
jackson Railroad crosses the same river.
The capture of Vicksburg would result.
"Fifth-That a force be left in this vi
cinity not to exceed ten thousand men,
with only enough steamboats, to foat and
transport them to any desired point. This
force to be held always near enough to act
with the ~gunboats, when the main army is
known to be near Vicksburg, Haines Bluff
or Yazoo City.
"The chiefreason foroperating solely by
water was the season fthe year, and high
water the in T~allahatchee and Y~allabusha.
The spring is now here, and soon these
streams will be no serious obstacles, save
the ambuscades of forest and whatever
works the enemy may have erected at or
near Grenada. North Mississippi is too
valuable to allow them to hold and make
crops.
81 make these suggestions with the re-
quest that General Grant simply readthem,
and simply give them, as l know he will,
a share of his thoughts. l would prefer
he should not answer them, but merely
give them as much or us little weight as
they deserve"
And he added in conclusion:
Whatever plan of action he may
adopt will receive from me the same zeal
Gus cooperation and energetic support as
though conceived by myself"
SHERMAN PROPOSES HIS GREAT MARCH.
Sherman had previously proposed to
General Grant, in the early stages of the
pursuit, to break up the railway from
Chattanooga to Atlanta, and strike out for
Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah,
"Until we can r%epopulate Georgia" he
wrote, ait is useless to occupy it; but the
utter destruction of its roads, houses and
people will cripple their military resources.
By attempting to hold the roads we will
lose a thousand men monthly, and will
gain no result. l can make the march,
and make Georgia howl" And, again,
Hood may turn into Tennessee and Ken
lucky, but l believe he will be forced to
me. Instead of being on the de-
1 will be ON the offensive. Instead
of guessing at what he means, he would
nave to guess at my plans. The differ
Ill WIZ Is luAl INShLl-HNO Pol SSA1-
l can make Savannah, Charleston, or the
of the Chattahoochee. 1 prefer to
march through Georgia, smashing things,
to the sea-" He now proposed to the
Lieutenant General to modify these plans,
SO far as to give him the chance of either
Of the three alternatives just named.
al must have alternatives, ;" he said, ''else
being confined to one route the enemy
might so oppose that delay and want
would trouble me, but having alternatives
l can take so eccentric a course that no
General ear guess at my objective. There
fore, when you hear l am off have look
outs at Morris Island, S. c.; Ossebaw
Georgia; Pensacola and Mobile
bays. l will turn up somewhere, and be-
lieve me l can take Macon, Milledgeville, |
Augusta and Savannah, Georgia, and wind
up with closing the neck back of Charles
ton, SO that they will starve out. This
is not purely military or STRAIT
egic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability
Of the South"
General Grant promptly authorized the
proposed movement, indicating, however,
his preference for Savannah as the object
i've, and fixing Dalton as the northern
limit for the destruction Of the railway.
Preparations were instantly undertaken
md pressed forward for the consumma-
ton Of these plans.