The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1865-01-06

, -.b9qxa nofgn!mA ID 9''i hiosi SFe'i ~ \
!. ai tsqa oar saiioiifdo9 taGFeia6a 81 =
!, t s5TE7s 4T0T.Y -75'.t
tAedwnit6A tiil ilnedsnoou sos BaSlps troops TO-
get mp abreast, when the, entire line advanced,
and recovered all the ground We bad ever held.
know that with the exc6ption Of oux aofi Two
snSsss v as tSsf aSat1pg af Ept Gf Ap
lneyee Was disposed nor am InOw, to que6.
ton any thing d0neby Gen. Buell. and bis ax-
my; and know that approaching our field of
battle from the rear, he eucDuntdred that a1k-s
ening crowd Of laggards and fngitiyes that exr
cited AIS contempt and that Of bis army, Who
never gave full credit to those in the front line,
VINO did hight hard, and who had at Az: NJ,
checked the enemy, and were preparing the
next day to assume thee Offensive Ifefdeinb9r
thefact the better FROM General Grants auec.
,d0te 0fthe D0nnelsOn ihata1e witch IA tbM ifIe;
then for the first timo-that at, a. pedftain Ueri.
lod Of the battle, he saw that ether side was
ready t0giveo way II the other showed 4 bold
'front.' and he determined to dothat very thing.
TO advance on the enemy when, as he prog-
nosficated, the enemy surrendered AT r
the same, and he judged with Law. Wal
Ilaces fresh division, and such Of our startled
troops as had recovered their equilibrium. !.
he would be- justified in dropping. the de.
fdhsive, and assuming the offensive II, the
morning. And, i repeat. / received such or.
fders before knew Gen. Buell. 3 troops were at
the river. 1 admit that I was glad Buell. was
than ours and better systematized and drilled.
and his arrival made that certain which was
before uncertain j! have heard this question
much discussed, and must say that the officers
Of BuelPs army dwelt too much on the STAN.
pedo ofI come OF our raw troops, and gave us
little credit for the fact that for one whole day,
weakened as we were by the absence of Buell's
army long expected, Of Lew. Wallaces diyis.
lon, only four miles Of, and of the fugitives
fromour ranks, we had beaten or our assail.
ants for the time. At the same time our Afiiy
Of the Tennesse have indulged in severe crftf.
cism at the slow approach Of that army which
knew the danger that threatened us from the
concentrated armies Of Johnston, aBeauresard
and Bragg, that lay at Corinth. In q war like
this, where opportunities for personal prowess
are as plenty as blackberries, to those whoseek
them at the front, all such ordinations should
be frowned down; and were 1t not for the milf
tary character of your journal, would not
venture to offer correction to q very popular
error.
d l will also avail myself of this occasion to
correct another very common mistake in attrib.
uting to Gen. Grant the selection of that bat
tle-feldg 1t was chosen by that veteran soldier.
Maj Gen. Charles r. Smith, who ordered nv
division to disembark there, and strike for the
Charleston Railroad. This order was subsG-
quently modified by his ordering Hurlbut's di-
vision TO disembark there, and mine higher up
the Tennessee to the mouth of Yellow Greek,
to strike the railroad at Burnsville. But floods
prevented our reaching the railroad, when Gen,
Smith ordered me In person also to disembark
at Pittsburg Landing, and take post we'll out,
90 a. to make plenty of room, with Snake and
Lake creeks the tanks of camp for the grand
army Of invasion. .. ..-.sz.' =,
Itwas Gen. Smith who selected that field of
battle, and it was well chosen. On any other
we surely would have been overwhelmed, as
both Lake and Snake creeks forced the enemy
to confine bis movements to q direct front at
tack, which new troops are better qualified 70
resist than where fanlks are exposed to real or
chimerical danger. Even the divisions of that
army were arranged in that camp by General
Smiths orders, my division forming, as II
were. the outlying pickets, whilst Met Clernand's g
and Prentiss' were the real line of battle, with
w. d. Z. Wallace in support Of the right
wing, and Hurlbut of the left Lew. Wallace's
division being detached. All these subordinate
dispositions were made by the order of Gen.
Smith, before General Grant succeeded him
TO the command of all the forces up the
Tennessee headquarters OF Savannah. If
there were any error tn putting that army
on the west side Of the Tennessee, exposed
70 the superior force OF the enemy also assem-
bling at Corinth, the mistake was not Gen.
Grant's-but there was no mistake. Il was
necessary that q combat, fierce and bitter, 70
test the manhood of the two armies. should
come of, and that was as good as any. Il was
not then question of military skill and strat.
egy, but of courage and pluck, and I am con-
viheed that every life lost that day to Us was
Necessary; for otherwise at Corinth, at Mem.
phis, at Vicksburg, we would have found
harder resistance had we not shown our ene-
mics that, rude and untutored as we then were
we could fight as well as they. ;I.r. rlis =,
Excuse 60 long letter, which Is very un-
usual for me; but of course my life Is liable to
cease at any moment and I happen to be a
witness to certain truths which are now be-
ginning to pass out Of memory, and form what
is called history. - ll'is Gar 49,
l also take great pleasure in addin8 that
nearly all the new troops that at Shiloh drew
from me official censure have more than re.
deemed their good name; among them, that
very regiment which first broke, the Fifty
Third Ohio, Colonel Appen. Under another
leader, Col. Jones, it has shared every cam.
paign and expedition of mine since is with
me now, and can march, and biyouac and fight
as well as the best regiment in this or any
army. Its repatution now is equal to that of
any from the State Of Ohio. / am, with re-
spect, yours truly, tsi,,ofr.. Z, u.
w. T. SHERMAN, Maj. Gen.
TlX ON MArCuuo The 6ouornunent