East Saginaw courier. (East Saginaw, Mich.) 1859-18??, 1865-12-13

alter the Cotton States had all seeded.
(Appleton's Annual Cyclopedia for
1861, p. 1907 This showed that
very large majority of the delegates
elected were in favor Of remaining in
the Union.
CONDUCT TOWARD THEM AND REASONS
! FOR 1T.
Under these circumstances il iseasy
to imagine what would have been the
effect on the. other Southern States of
sending feeble force of United States
troops to Fort Moultrie at this critical
coniuncture. Had collision been the
consequence, and blood been shed i'm
mediately before the meeting of Con-
gress, the other Cotton States, from
their well-known afiinities, would have
rushed to the support of South Caro-
lima. She would thus have accom-
plished her long-sought object. In
deed, it was the current report of the
day mat her ivadins disanianists had
declared the spilling of a little blood
would be necessary to secure the CO.
operation Of other Southern States.-
Besides, in the Presidents opinion
there was no necessity, at the time,
for any reinforcement to secure the
forts in the harbor Of Charleston
He was convinced that while the other
slaveholding States were ready and
willing to compromise with the North,
South Carolina would not dare to at
tack Fort Moultrie. This conviction
did not spring from any confidence in
her spirit of forbearance; it arose from
a certain knowledge that such an out
rage would be condemned not only by
the Border but by the Cotton States.
1t would estrange and separate them
from her, at the very moment she was
most solicitous to conciliate them
Whoever was in Washington at the
time cannot fail to recollect the de-
nnnciations in advance of leading
Southern men against such an unpro-
voked attack. The public property
stood within her limits-three forts, q
custom-house, an arsenal, and post
office, covered by the flag Of the coun-
try. From these she knew she had
nothing to fear unless she should first
make the attack. Such an outrage as
the seizure Of fort of the United
States by any State had never before
been imagined There must be a
fearful suspense between the concep-
ton and the commission of such an
act 1t was the supreme object of the
President to promote, by all the means
in his power, such fair and honora-
BILE adjustment between the North and
South as would save the country from
the scourge of civil war. 1t was,
therefore, his evident policy to isolate
South Carolina, as far as possible,
from the other Southern States; and
for this purpose to refrain from any
act which might enable her to enlist
them in her cause. If, after all, she
should attack Fort Moultrie, this act
would have met their universal con-
domination. Besides, nothing short OF
such an attack could have united the
people of the North in suppressing her
revolt. They were then far from being
prepared for civil war On the con-
trary, they were intent on a peaceful
solution of our difficulties, and would
have censured any act of the a!minis-
tration which might have defeated
this purpose and procipitated them
into hostilities. The true policy was
that expressed by President Lincoln
TO the seeded Cotton States in his
inaugural months afterward, in which
he informs them, "You can have no
conflict without being yourselves the
aggressors." Although the President
believed (and this with good cause, as
the event has shown that under the
existing circumstances, South Carolina
would not attack any of the forts in
the harbGr of Charleston whilst he
suffered their status quo to remain yet
in this it was possible he might be
mistaken. To guard against surprise
after the secession of the State, which
was then imminent, he had prepared
an expedition as powerful as his lin.
tied means would afford, to send rein.
forcements to Major Anderson, at the
first moment of danger. For tbs par.
pose the Secretary Of tie Nary had station.
ed the brooklyn, a powe,Jm war steamer
then completely ready for sea, an Hampto,
Roads, 10 take on hoard for Charleston
three hundred disciplined troops, trith pro.
riSions and munitions Of ww, fran M'
ne,yhJoring garrison Of Fortress Monroe.
INSTRUCTIONS TO MAJOR ANDERSON.
Having thus provided for the rein.
} forcement of the forts, in case of need
the Secretary of War dispatched AS.
: sistant Adjutant-G General Buell. tc
} Major Anderson, at Fort Moultrie
, with instruction how he should act in
his present position. These were com.
! municated TO him on the 18th of De
r cember, 1860. Whilst they instructed
, the Major to avoid every act of aggres
sion, they directed him, in case of al
| attack upon, or attempt to take pos
, session of, any of the three forts under
his command, to defend them to the
, last extremity. Furthermore, ne wa:
: authorized. as a precautionary meas
ure, should he believe his force insufh
| cient for the defcnse of all three, t,
! remove it at his discretion from Fort
; Moultrie TO Fort Sumpter, whenever
he should have tangible evidence of q
design, on the part of South Carolina
} to proceed to hostile act. We say
to Fort Sumpter, because the third
fort, Castle Pinckney, was wholly in.
: defensible. From the important bear
ing of these instructions upon subse-
quent events, they are entitled to
textual insertion. They arc as follows
"You are aware OF The great anxiety
of the Secretary of War that collision
of the troops with the people of the
} State shall bo avoided, and of his
studied determination to pursue a
course with reference to the military
force and forts in this harbor, which