Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-03-27
Correspondence sf TAe \. A. Word.
WAsHrNGToN. March

this city il would appear that the confederacy 10
doomed; that Lees defensive steps have proved
futile against Grants strategic combinations and
that Lee IS now forced to abandon points 70 hold
which he has heretofore employed all the lvails
bic troops OF bis command. Lee has been com
PEELED TO concentrate BY the very action Of Sher
msn's offensive and hitherto unopposed move
meats through South and North Carolina But
the art Of concentration has been, il We may
credit-the news rife to-day, fatal to the military
policy OF Lee, nssmuch as Johnston, bis ablest
lieutenant has been compelled TO make preci-
plate retreat from point 70 point as to disheart
en- the troops under his command, and render
their presence with the army of Lee, should they
reach the destined goal, highly detrimental 10
the discipline OF The army which has the final
destiny Of the confederacy in its keeping. In
short, Johnston's army is in full retreat; has
abandoned Goldsboro, with no attempt TO defend
Raleigh, ana has fallen back upon Virginia,
there to fight out the last battle Of the rebellion
or to ANONYMOUSLY surrender. The battle that
is now peDding-perhaps even now already be
gun-mu.t of necessity be the last action in
which the embattled hosts of either side will
meet. The grand success Of Sherman has driv-
en- the combined armies OF Hardee and Bragg
into the prepared By General Grant. and
junction Of Sherman with Grants great army in
front OF and TO the south of Richmond. will com
plete the investment, aud leave to victorious
host the task Of engaging crushed and dsheart
eaed band of insurgents
LEES SITUATION.
Ii was announced, early in the present month
that ho bad. in council of war. decided that
GoldsborO' and Raleigh must be held, to insure
the safety OF Richmond Then Sheridan had not
demonstrated upon the south and west of Rich
mond Subsequently mis- raid on the line of the
James river and its canal, and upon the line of
road leading to the great depot OF supplies.
Lynchburg, cut of all hope OF obtaining the nee
essary food fos HE army by that route and placed
him wholly dependent upon a single line OF road
by which to provide for his army. Lee may have
entertained the hope that he would not be mo
Tested in the direction of Lynchburg, and may
have even framed bis plans so az TO provide for
a retreat in that direction should the combinations
in his front and rear become too formidable. If
he entertained such views, however, they must
have been dispeled by the success with which
Sheridan met in not only defeating Early, but in
raiding all along the line Of the James river canal
cutting the railroad communications, and de
stroying all hope Of the rebel army being enable
ed TO reach any other PORT than one directly
south of Richmond. The operations OF Sheridan
therefore. necessitated change in the plan of
Lee, and instead OF eudeavcFing to hold Colds
boro' and Raleigh, he doubtless determined to
abandon North Carolina entirely, and concen
trate his troOpsin Virginia, with the hope that.
by accumulating an overwhelming force, be
would be enabled 10 achieve a success which
would in measure compensate for whatever
failure might ultimately befsll him IL must be
remembered, in this connection, that Gen Lee
is man of eminent military ability; that the
destinies OF the confederacy are in his hands
that be has been invested with pensry powers
for veal or woe: and that to him the people of
the south look tor deliverance in independence.
or release from their tolls and privations in
peace Gen Lee, viewing the situation with ar
eye unembarrassed bs political questions, doubt
less fully recognizes the impOssibity of achiev-
ing the independence of the confederacy by the
sword IL il made his duty, however, to do all
that he. as military commander. can TO render
the failure of the for which he is waging
war as little humiliating as possible. To &C
knowledge himself ysnquished now would be
in military sense. cowardy, for there is yet a
chance-remote though il msy be-of success
He must, then, adopt the only means left him,
collect his forces and give battle upon ground of
bis own choice. There he will have al advan-
tage over his adversary which no other course
can give him.
TuE EVACUATION or RICHMOND.
Assuming that Lee has chosen the battle
ground for the final conflict, and that the retro
gade movement of Johnston il in concord with
his plans, the conviction appears ncontrovertible
that Lee will not attempt 10 hold Richmond
many dave The demonstrations of Sheridan
brought forth evidence that Richmond was being
denuded OF its most valuable property, which
was being sent upon the line of the James river
toward Lynchburg This initiatory step toward
an evacuation had been in progress for some
time, and some Of the property was intercepted
in transtu The evidence of deserters aud refu-
gees-not always reliable when uncOrroborated
it is true, but in this point fully authenticated
represented that Petersburg at least was being
evacuated and some said that Richmond was.
likewise The papers of the latter city durin z
the latter part of SheFidan's raid, exhibited un-
mstakable evidences of "a defenseless state OF sf-
fairs in the rebel capital, even the editors and
compositors, with other exempt citizens, were
hurried into the trenches for the purpose of aid
ing in the defense OF the city. Ii the fOrt6cs
tons had been amply protected by the whole
army of Lee, such aid this would not have
been called into requisition. When Sheridan
reached Columbia he sent a force across the
river to reconnoiter. which returned with infor
nation. as reported By correspondents that no
enemy Vas to be seen. The party accordingly
retained. 1t appears probable however, that
the reasons General Sheridan did not cross the
James river and move upon Barksvlle junction
were that he had very strong force at that
point, and that it would have been positively dan
gerous to the safety of his command for General
Sheridan to have crossed the river even. by
this step be would have encountered a vastly SUI
perior force of the enemy and involved his com
mand in n snare from which be could not have
extFicsted IL.
LEI NEW LINE or DEFENSE
Ii Raleigh has been abandoned, and this seems
probable AZ the latest advices, Gen Sherman 2
and Gen Schofed's united armies are masters
Of the field in North Carolina The capital OF
the state will then be in Sherman's possession, a
fact which cannot but prove disastrous 20 the
success of the rebel cause in that state, from is
moral effect slone S,rategicslly considered
Raleigh is an important point. From this poin,
to Greensboro is but l62 miles by railroad At
the latter place is the termination of the new ex
tension of the road from Danville. which is the
southern terminus OF the Richmond aud Danvile
road, now Lees only available line of supply or
retreat IL is not probable that, with 90 short
distance intervening, Gen Lee will attempt 10
make Danyile position of defense ia il so
liable TO be fsnked bY Sherman's columns The
most reasonable theory. therefore, ia that the
Roanoke river will bs the " last ditch This is
considerable stream. having IFS rise in Virginia,
flowing in southeastery direction. and debOuch-
Jag into Albemsrle sound at Plymouth. CASTOR
and Weldon are .he Two principal points upon this
stream. and. as they the termini of railroad
lines, will probably De the places selected by Lee
for the fnal struggle. CASTOR and Weldon are
Twelve miles apart. The former is the terminus
of the Raleigh and CASTOR, and the latter OF the
Wilmington and Weldon, and SeaoOard and