The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1865-07-15

chesler. rms army Will be Suthct Tlf
to t4ke Gordonsy,ille, and compel be
enenIy to detach u large army Of o-l
servitiOn to watch your moyements nd
fight you, or to lose the line-tht e.
tenstye line-of the James river d
his CONNECTION with Lyuchburg. ny
detach nm ARMY of observation, wei we
accomplished our purpose, and Gen
Mcclellan can beat the REMAND o
his forces and occupy Richmon II
he does not, you will compel III to
ev1cuate Richmonds If he attenf o
fall upon. you with his entire fore la
could not reach Gordonsville 3Il
thnn four days, which would give l-
pie time to prepare for him; and
will haYel control of the SJIloh Ia
passes, and of the great valley or
army could be dis1odged from u
by q long campaign. Thus all
troops, Which at present weigh
ather the great contest, ~ bq
brought aid IN bTils.ing it q az
cesSful5 conc clusibn..1
3enefl 4 ii9ptoSS 3ti1lss
| plan, wlliehiit was Thought proper TO
lay before his division Commanders, /
left the next morning for StraSburg,
whence / telegraphed in cipher to the
Secretary of War, stating that General
Banks had request me to say that it
met his entire abpfObation. 10 carry
II out ttAwns necessary that Blencker'S
orders to cross the Shenandoah should
be promptly revoked. ReceiVingao or
der from the Secretary of WaT,SBlenc-
ker's movement t9us continued across
the Shenandoah. This command was
found in the mOstJwretched condition
unfed, unclothed, unshod and unpaid
between 500 and 1000 men. barefooted.
the cavalry and artillery horses unshod,
and the whole command requiring new
outfit to prepare it for u campaign, It's
condition wns promptly reported to the
War Department and orders were given
to forward the supplies, but terrible
Hood in the Potomac, which swept away
the Harper's Ferry bridge and prevent
ed the crossing of the river for eight
days, delayed their arrival. When f.
nally prepared, 1 conducted them to
General Fremont, and forthwith re-
turned to Washington, about the 10th
of May, where I received orders to Join
General lHalleck, to whom / hastened.
hoping to arrive in time for the great
battle then thought to be impending in
front of Corinth.
(The following letter from General
Mcclellan, which we find among the
papers accompanying the testimony of
General Rosecrans, we think has not,
until now, been published y
HHEADQUARTERsD Dept OF THE OHIO.
BUCKHANNoN, VA, July 3, 1851.
GENERAL: Yours of the ID has
reached lne5 AFTER Questioning your
messenger and hearing his full story, /
confess I do not share your apprelien-
sions; and that am not II little sur
prised that you feel the defense of Phil
lppi SO hazardous and dangerous an
operation.
''If four thousand (nearly) of our.
men, in position selected and fortified
in advance, with ample time to exam
inc the ground carefully and provide,
against any possible plan of attack, are
not enough to hold the place against
any any torce these people can bring against
it, i thinlSsNve had better all go home at
once. If we can; not fight in. liJoSftiOn Z
am much mistaken as to ouf me
II have, however, in defererice to
Eyour views, ordered the 9th Ohio on
temporary duty with you, until the.
crisis is past, although I believe they
can be employed to more advantage ut
other points.
"This is is all the reinforcement I can
now spare. AS to the oneor two squad
rons of efficient cavalry asked for by
Captain Benham, it seems hardly nee
cssary for me to repeat that / have only
one and n half companies, such as they
are, and that more important duty is
for them here.
Z. "You have only to defend n strong
position, or, ut most, to follow u re-
treating enemy. 1 fear you do not
share the confidence feel in our men,
more dangerous than l do.
81 feel TINT these men of ours can be
worked up TO any deed of daring; that
their leaders can make them cool under
fire, and that n couple of good compa-
nics of inthntry can drive off all their
cavalry i'll this mountainous country.
propose taking the really difficult and
dangerous part of this work on my own
hands. will not asSy to do any
thing that / would not be willing to do
myself. But let us understand each
other; 1 can giycyou nomore reinforce
ments. | can not consent to weaken.
any further the really active and i'm
portant column whichis to decide the
fate of the campaign. If you can not
undertake the defense of Phillippi with
the force now under your control, /
must find some one who will. have
lordered up Latham's company, all of
| 'tKeyS' cavalry that are fit to take the
field and the 9Th Ohio. Do not ask for
further reinforcements if you do, /
shall take it as n request to be relieved
from your command, and to return to
Indiana, 4
81 have spoken plainly; / speak Off
chilly. The crisis Is a grave one, and 1
must have. Generals under me who are
willing to risk as much as am, and be
content to risk their lives and reputa-
! tlonS with such means as can give
them. Let this be the last of it. Give
me full details as to the information you
obtained-not mere rumors, but fncts,
and leave it to my Judgment to deter
mine what force you need. wish ac-
/ Ttion now, and determination.
Il am, sir, very respectfully, your
ob't. sery't, G. b. MCCLELLAN.
"Major General, Commanding.
General Il. A. MoRRIs, Phillippi.
HEAD'QRs Dept. OF THE OHIO,
"Beverly, Va, July 10, 1861.
I i y
Assistant Adjutant General .
One way to Punish Jen. Davis.