, 1865-03-28

ala PreSluent Davis make any aIluSIOn to
this principal topic Of discussion. Except
for the timely despatch from Mr.. Seward
to MIR. Adams, we should never have
heard a syllable of the proposition which
was SO deliberately considered, and, not
on It's own merits, rejected. There is
nothing, however, in Mr.. Davls's speech
to make US lncredulous on the point, and,
indeed, a little confirmation is derived
from the comments of some of the Rich
mond journals. One of these prints states
that Mr.. Lincoln and Mr.. Seward did in
the course Of the interview recognize the
prospect of foreign complications and the
probability that England rather than
France would be the country involved.
We must admit, too, that the "schemc,"
If it was thus recommended by the South,
had been conceived with considerable in
gcnulty in the interest ofthe Secedes. BY
these suggestions they cvaded the insur-
mountabIe difficulty in the way OF direct
agreement, and offered the present peace,
of which they knew the North to be de-
sirOuS, with the addition of an attractive
enterprise, aud yet without any rejection
of their opponents principal claim. IF
'bi4 COi.ibttIhILS NCQIA tib CUilSCslO w
he allies instead 0fCnomi2s 'lor aScason,'
they might afterwards return to the dis
cuSsjon Of their own differences with a
chance Of agreement which could not
have been injured and might, very pos
sibIy, be found improved. That would
be the aspect of the case presented to the
North. To the South the scheme would
promise still more. If the North could
be induced by the combined a]IIuremeuts
Of the prospect to put up with a temporary
separation from The South, and make even
that provisional recognition Of its indie
pendencc which would be involved in the
fact of an alliance, half the battle would
be gained. By the time the "eXtrinsic
policy" had been carried into execution
and brought to an end the FederaIs would
have become accustomed to live without
the Confederatcs, and to see in the South
ern Republic only a kindred State and
natural ally. After habits Of internal
peace and intercourse had been once re-
sumcd it would have been hard to revive
the trials Of civil war for the sake of q
Union which had already been dispensed
with for some time with more profit than
loss; while if the scheme ofdiversi0n had
but ended in the acquisition, say, of such
a country as Canada, the accession of
territory on one frontier might well dis
pose the gamers 10 resign themselves to
some sacrifice on another. Nothing could
be more ingenious than these conceptions.
The proposition would not Immediately
offend the pride or ambition of the North,
because it left the question Of the Union
Just where it stood. 1t would crafty the
presumed feeling of the North by the as
sertion Of the Monroe Doctrine, and the
temporary concentration of American
strength. 1t would yield that immediate
relief from civil war which all alike
would welcome, and yet, with all this, it
would do more for the South than the
North by producing an armistico on the
instant and the best conceivable prospect
Of Independence at a later day. We
think the idea an uncommonly smart one
and creditable to the acutest intellects of
America. In fact, as far as we can see, it
would have been entirely successful had
the actual fortune Of war at the moment
been so nearly balanced as to render an
armistice as desirable to one b%elligerent
- ,rcLL,. H. Al. u.ao,A x.io4or1oo Of