Ellsworth American. [volume] (Ellsworth, Me.) 1855-current, 1865-03-10
The Monitors.

tne last Two or turce years 10 Tue Aiuerl-
can Navy and the radical changes which
have taken place in thes construction ol
naval vessels. The monitor principle has
its admirers and its Utter opponents. 1t
is pretty certaifthat time and practical
tests will have to decide who is right and
who is wrong in this matter. The recent
discussion in Congress to establish a
Board Of Admiralty to look after the
business of constructing our navy, gives
the public about all the facts on both
sides Of the question that there are to be
had now. The following letter, written
by an English naval officer, and addressed
to the London Iimeseproves how much
interest is taken on the other side of the
Atlantic in these important matters
This etter, we should judge is favorable
to the monster principle:
TO the Editor Of The Times: +.
S1R-The fall of Fort Fisher, as you
truly remark, presents points Of deep in-
terest to the country and to those who
study the art of war. l am convinced
to very great extent of the soundness
of Admiral Porter's conclusions, for
there can be no doubt that Fort Fisher
was'a much more formidable work than
the Malakhoff, with the advantage. of
modern ordnance and science. But when
he draws an exuIting comparison between
the prolonged and honorable resistance of
the Malakhoff against the allied forces Of
Great Britain and FRANCE, and the rapid
capture of Fort Fisher BY the federals, |
must beg to differ, as there is no analogy
in the events for, while Fort Fisher
twas captured by handful of men, un.
der the fire of the guns of the feet" and
in "seven hours after the attack COM
menced in earnest" the Malakhoff Tow.
er was free from the fire of the guns of
the allied fleets. We once went in at
the sea faces Of Sebastopol with an enor-
nous force of wooden ships, unaidcd by
iron-clads, and we never tried it again.
All who saw these magnificent fleets Of
wooden ships detied by a lesser number of
guns i'll a fortress deplored this waste Of
power, booming thousands Of fine fellows
to bs comparatively inactive spectators OF
a great struggle. Tais first suggeste to
me the necessity Of having some machines
better adapted for the offensive purposes
Of warfare than wooden three-deckers
like the Victoria, and | then proposed
monitors, or rather Lady Nancy" RATS,
for this purpose. How far my views
were right has heen answered by the fall
Fort Fisher, although it may be said the
monitors did not succeed at Charleston.
But an attack by sea to- be successful
must always depend upon being able to
concentrate a numerical superiority oil
guns against any portion Of stronghold,
so as to silence its offensive powers, when
the other contingent and outlying works
must fall in detail, if not evacuated, as
liz the case of Fort L sher. But in the
Charleston affair there were only 23'guns
aaoat brought to bear against some lO0
guns, besides the difficulties Of an intri.
cate channel and confined waters. Al
present | will leave the question Of forts
and ships, as now the great interest oi
this country is ship against ship, for it is
in the open sea we shall have to test oul
supremacy, and it is as well in the great
race of reconstruction now going on to
weigh carefully Admiral Porters and
others remarks, ELECTED as they have
been by actual warfare.
In your leading article Of the 9Th, you
point out the tonnage Of the monitors
First, let me call attention to the small.
ness Of these vessels compared with any
wehave that could attempt to cope witt
them. The smaller monitors are l,03l
tons, and the Monadnock, although only
1868 tons, Admiral Porter says would
destroy any vessel We have in the British
navy. la this | caunot agree with thu
gallant Admiral. for | believe the Roya
Sovereign-though but conversion-i
she had proper guns supplied her, to be .
coed match for the Monadnock. How
ever, on both sides of the water it now
appears to be admitted that in actua
tight of ship against ship the turret ship
must have great superiority. Our larger
ships run up to 6,O00 tons, and we have
no iron-clad approaching so small ton
naye as these monitors, except the r.
search and Enterarise, which have not Il:
yet been tried in a gale Of wind, and Cal
not even attempt to carry these heavy
guns.
Admiral Porter says, for all service
he would prefer the lronsides to the No
nadnoek, but that the latter would b.
more than than a match for her.
| have not the list of the Federal ma
Wy before me, bu: believe the Ironside
is 3,400 tons, and consequently twice a
large as the Monadnock. Therefore tn
question is now reduced to the respective
saa.going qualities of these vessels anl
general comforts of the crew while OF
service. This, however, must be mat
ter of comparison, as we find from tn
little experience gained at sea with ou
iron n-elads that they are all condemned a
sea going vessels, except the four frs
constructed Warrior, Black Prince, DE
fence and Resistance, which leads us t.
the unpalatable copcusion that the bull
of our iron-clads are little better thai
floating batteries, but could all be knock
ed to pieces BY. the Royal Sovereign o
Monadnock: The experienc, of tn
monitors in gales OF wind (Which none o
ours have been in except the Warrio