Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1865-11-08
WHY THE SOUTH FAILED.

The London Quarterly ReUieg has
a long and interesting article on the
causes Of the failure Of the south in the
late war for sectional independence, from
which we make copious extracts. The
question naturally arises says the
Reriew. what caused the f~ailure-0f this
great effort Of the south TO possess a gov
eminent Of its owne The principal cause
is indeed obvious enough: the great
srperioritv Of the North in numbers and
resources five add % the free States
the four slave states that followed their
lead. under more OF less cOmpulsi0n-
Delaware, Maryland, Missouri and Ken
tucky-and 10 these the districts al Fed
eral command from an early period Of
the war. saw half of Tennessee and
Louisiana, and a third Of Virginia, we
have a population, by the census Of
eighteen hundred and sixty, Of twenty
three million four hundred and eighty
five thousand seven hundred and twenty
two on the Federal side. This leaves
under the rule Of the C~onfederacy seven
million six hundred and sixty-two thou
sand three hundred and twenty-five.
Here the disparity Of strength is enor-
NOUS. On examination 10 viii be found
even greater taan il appears; for these
are the numbers of the entire populations,
and that Of the South included rather
more thar three million out Of the four
millions Of negroes who appear in the
census. Vow although these displayed
remarkable fidelity and maintained the
whole southern people IN food by their
labor. sclJ 10 Is clear that the ranks Of
the Southern army would have been bet
ter filed if the whole population had sup
piled recruits. And the Federals had
great advantages ia addition 70 superior
1ty in numbers. Their command Of naval
force, practically exclusive, was soon felt
10 q country Interested by great rivers.
Looking back 10 the early stages Of the
war. it seems doubtful whether they
could have made any progress without
this advantage. The feet was Of invalua-
be service al q means OF movement, and
On two occasions saved an army from
uin-t1ar n GRANT at shiloh, and that
Of MCCLELIAN on the James River.
There was too, tHt special weapon, the
blockade, which cassed the disorganiza-
aUn Of the Confederate finances, and
prevented the importation Of munitions
Of war, except at so much cost and with /
30 much irregIlarity a. 10 compel manu-
fact1res b be established when every
man was required 10 meet the superior
numbers of the enemy. And while a
great immigration from Europe into the
North recruited its armies 0r flied the
place ofnecruits, the South was entirely
Of nom this resource. nthe attempt
be made 70 estimate the valueofall these
elements it win appear that the odds
against which the South has maintained
This contest were in effect not less
than five 20 oac. There was also a
crest contrast An the effects Of the I
war on the two people. The North with
lie ports open, vita California supplying
roId. and petroleum stimulating sDecula- !
lion, soon discovered i'm the war a mine
III sudden wealth. Those who guided the
current Of public opinion grew rapidly
,ica. Tor patriotism and profit went To-
soetber. The vast expenditure Of the Gov
rrnment created q lucrative market: the
railroads aourished with the transport Of
roons and stores; the creation Of cur
,ai.cy had the effect for the time Of the
creation Of SO much wealth; and never
VAS known a period Of such prosperity
nd e~xhneraHon. PA any country a war
,gaI be maintained with vigor by which
overv ouebelieyes he il making a fortune.
In the south there was the reverse Of all
flia With its commerce sealed up; al
/ mes in dreaded aehnl famine by which
indeed il was intimately reduOed) with
s~istricts "a affer tie other devastated by
the enemy; cut OF nom al the comforts,
81 which, ia such a climate, some are ne
ossiies Of ufe-the whole history IL a
J eeord Of suffering and endurance, Of ruin
10 many, p~rivation oaH
sit was expected generally that
when the day Of need drew nigh,
the Confederate Government woaid
SRA tbs negroes and thus re-