The New era. [volume] (Martinsburg, W. Va.) 1865-1871, 1865-10-12


the Constitution of West Virginia, by
imposing disqualification upon voters
which that instrument does not author
ize, but it is further nugatory and void,
because in conflict with the Constitution
Of the United States, and with another
provision of the Constitution of this
State.
The Constitution of the United States.
Article l, Section 10, declares:
No State shall pass any er post tfacto
law.'
The Constitution of West Virginia,
Article ,, Section ], declares:
No CO post .facto law shall be passed."
1t is only necessary to read the oath
prescribed by that act, and to know what
an &c post toeto law is, to satisfy any
candid mind that this law is Justly
subject to that condemnation.
What is this oath? Is it like the oath
of allegiance, Or the oath of amnesty,
which bears upon the future conduct of
the person taking it? Is it intended to
exact of the party any assurance of pro-
spective or future good behavior. Not
at all. 1t requires him to swear that
he has not for the four years preceding
the enactment of the law, given any aid
or assistance to the rebellion. All will
admit this then to be retrospective law,
and the simple enquiry is, does it belong
to that class of retrospective laws, which
are termed er post .foctos
This question is easily answered. 1t
was announced by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the case of Fletcher
VS.. Peck, "that an er post .facto law
was one which rendered an act punish
able ia q manner in which it was not
punishable, when it was committed"
This definition, says Chancellor Kent,
is distinguished for its comprehensive
brevity and precision, and it extends
equally to laws inflicting personal or
pecuniary penalties, and to laws passed
after the act, and affecting person by
acoy Of punishment, either in his person
or estate. LIT col. Com. p 3s2.
So Judge Story says, every law is an
er post .facto law, whereby an act is
declared a crime, when it was not
crime when committed, or whereby the
act, if crime, is aggravated in enor-
nifty, or punishment; or whereby differ
e,1t or less ecidence is required to convict
an offender, than was required when the
act was committed. Conn. on C0usti-
tuition, Section 1915.
All will concede these to be fair and
even judicial eXpositions by the Supreme
Court of the United States, of what are
termed er post .tacto laws.
Now, take the case of a man who in
June, 1861, had given aid and assistance
to the rebellion, who subsequently made
his peace with the Government, and
since that time has been a loyal citizen.
He offers to vote. The test oath is pre-
scented to him, undert the act of February,
1865, law passed nearly four gears after
the act upon which it is to operate He
is required to swear that he never has
at any time since the commencement OF
the war given any aid or assistance to
the rebellion, and inasmuch as he cannot
purge himself of an act done nearly four
years before the passage of the law, he
is deprived of the right of suffrage.
1t is easy to bring these facts to the
test of the definitions given Of an e.r pos
.tdcto low. Is the act done by him in
June, 1861, punishable in a manner il
which it was not punishable when it wa:
committed? Is there different an(
less evidence required under the act O
February, 1865, than there was in June
1861?
BY the Constitution and Laws as they
existed prior to February, 1860, no mar
could be deprived of his vote unless
regularly concicted Of treason by tho
verdict of jury, and the Judgment O.
the court. Before that law no one coul(
be convicted except upon the testimon,
of tloo toitleesses to such overt act O
treason. Under the law of February
1865, man stands substantially convict
ed of treason, and deprived of his vot