The Newberry herald. [volume] (Newberry, S.C.) 1865-1884, 1865-10-18


of his troops but after their exhausting
march, the men finished the work without
bloodshed almost, and soon forgot their wear
mess in the sweet sleep wtlich follows toll
and victory Aggressive warfare Sas tho
fundamental principal of his military system.
He preserved the pnvarying conviction,
throughout his whole career, that the trne
policy Of the South was one of invasion. So
far did he carry this, that after Port Rcpnb-
lie, he was passionately bent on advancing
into Pennsylvania, though General McCic)-
Ian was knocking at the doors Of Richmond
with an army of $50, 600 men. After the bat
ties Of The Cbickahominy, he rose from his
camp-couch, one night, where he was lying,
talking with a friend, and violently striking the
pillow with his clcnchcd hand, exclaimed &:
"Nhy don't we 80 to. Pennsylvania no4 :?
The Scipio Africanus policy S the best ! J"
To march, to maroeuvre, to flank, to strike
to advance, retreat, keep his enemy IN con-
slant fear-such was bis system. lie never
rested, and took no account of hours or sea-
sons. lie seems to have considered all wea-
thtr good to fight in, and to have discarded
the general conviction of military men that
night attacks arc hazardous. The Bath en-
pedition was undertaken in the dead of win
ter and, at Fredericksburg he projected and
attempted to execute a final assault upon the
federal araiy, which was to begin 'r"cciscfy
at sunset" At charlottesville, at rinc
o'cleek at night, swhen he fell, he was .prepar-
ing for that movement of his left wing, which
was to envelope General Hooker, and decide
the fate Of the federal army. No other gen
cral living would have venturcd upon so dan
gerous an undertaking but Jackson had de-
cided upon it without hesitation.
1t is not to be wondered IL that unwcary
or in1olvnt opponents became the victms ola
strategy SO bold and aggressive. Genera!
Banks is an example. a more unfortunate
appointment could not have been made by
the federal government. Banks secass to
have been without enterprise, and greatly
wanting in that watchlui Gaze which his posi-
tion, in front OF so dangerous foe, required.
Jackson surprised him at Strasburg, and
drove him from tue valley, almost Without
rcsistcncc The manoeuvcring around Port
Rcrublic was another example Of MS superlo-
rity to General Fremont. whose Flal!, of ad-
vancing with one column, upon 5ack$on's S
rear, while another was scrt u intercept him,
was tarncd against him and BECAME TIC Occa-
sion of lis ruin. The raHidity of Jackson's 5
marches in the valley campaign, and cHpedI-
ton to the rear of General Pope was marvel
ous but there was something still more Strik-
ing in the enterprise which suggested these
movements. To soldier so f.rt;!e in resources
so rapid, daring, and unhcsitating, victor.E
was almost foragonc conclusion.
The difference betwcGn enterprise and fool
hardness is that between ca}culati'n and
chance. Jsekson's military movements, were
always based upon close calculation, and he
was certainly not wanting in foresight and
caution He seems have known perfectly
weffwhat it was in his power to achieve, and
as thoroughly what was beyond lis strength.
He risked much, upon many occasions, but
appears to have been justified in his calcula-
tions of the ultimate result. II will be objecs
ted to hin by military men, that be hazardel
too much, at times, and was only extrlcatcd
by good fortune. There appears TO be some
Justice in thiS but the resources ofhis genius
were enormous, and doubled his numbers.
Some OF his ideas seem absurd, when cooily
looked ct When asked what lie would have
done, if after the battle of Winchester, the
conyerging columns of the enemy bad cut
him off at Strasbarg, he replied he would
have fallen back upon Maryland for reinforce
mcnts." Such movement must, it woukl
appear, have terminated in his destruction :;
but it would be di!bcuIt to find a=1nah Of his
old command, who would Ravc 'doubted his
ultimate triumph even then.
His genius was for great movements, and
decisive blows and. thus, his services. be-
came more and more valuable. as his rank in
creased. lie was better as Jrigadier than as
colonel better still as rnajor general and as
lieutenant general was best Of all. 1t Is use
less to ask what he would have been as COM
mander-in- without q superior at Rich
mond. But the brain which conceived and
cxscptcd the campaign Of the valley must
have been equal to any position.
Jackson's other merits as a general were
great: lie was a bad organizer and discir'i-
marian, but admirable in his selection of Ecn
for important ccUmand. lie conducted his
campaigns upon ehe soundest rules of military
science, and where he diVerged from the bca;
ten track of precedent, did 50 from coOsidera'
tions connected with the nature Of the coun-
try in which he operated, the pccularities of
his adversary, or the character Of tic troops
upon wfffch IIo depended.
He kept open, generally, his line Of re-
treat, and provi led for diSastcr-though it
was hard to realize that failure ever entercd
into his calculations lie had the soldiers
1>otl !,