The Norfolk post. [volume] (Norfolk, Va.) 1865-1866, 1865-07-01
THE BATTLE OF cHANoSIIopsy,,-n

| u,
them to dispose their lines for an attack
on the flank by Jackson, has been pub.
lished. Hooker, in this order, dated
May 2, $50 A. NJ, said:
1.-The right of your line does not ap-
pear to be strong enough. No artificial
defences, worth naming, have been
thrown up, and there appears to be a
scarcity of troops at that point, and not,
in the Generals opinion, as favorably
disposed as might be.
| We have good reason to suppose that
the enemy is moving to outright. Please
advance your pickets, for purposes ofob-
servation, as far as may be safe, in order
to obtain timely information of their APP
proach."
The inexplicable conduct of the
Eleventh corps is thus commented on by
Hooker:
The bad conductof the Eleventh CORPS
had cost me the key Of my position, and
very much embarrassed me by contract
ing my sphere of action. The position
which had been held by the left of that
corps was the most commanding one in
the vicinity. In the possession of the
enemy, it would enable him with his
artillery to enfilade the lines held by
the Twelfth and Second corps. He
could drive from plain in front Of Chan
cellorsville House all the artillery posted
to command the junction of the plank
road and the old pike, and he could
drive from the plain all the force that
might be upon it. To wrest this posi-
ton from the enemy after his batteries
were established upon it, would have re-
quired slender columns of infantry,
which he could have destroyed as fast as
thew were thrown llnOn IL
The Eleventh corps had been COM
pletely surprised and disgracefully rout-
ed. Despite my instructions to be in
readiness for the enemy, at the time the
attack was made upon it on the right
their arms were stacked, and the men
were away from them and scattered
about for the purpose of cooking their
suppers, and for otherpurposes. No dis
| position had been made to receive an at
tack, and there were no pickets on the
alert to advise of the approach of the en-
envy.
HooKER's WOUND AT CHANcELLoRs-
WILLIE. -.=-.
l may add here that soon after the ac-
ton commenced on the morning of the
Sd of May, / received severe confusion
| from the column of the building near
which was standing, being thrown
violently against me by cannon shot.
This rendered me insensible for half an
hour or more. AS soon as 1 had suffi-
GENTLY recovered to mount my horse, 1
did so, under the impression that I was
all right In the effort ofmounting, the
acute pain returned, and, after riding a
few steps, became faint, was taken
from my horse, and again placed in the
hands of the Medical Director. I may
have been disqualified for command, by
this accident an hour or an hour and a
half, during which time, Major General
Couch exercised my office. The enemy,
installing our movement, attempted to
follow it, and, in their confidence, adj
vanced on the new position we had ia
ken, and were quickly and severely
chastised. Iif"
Hooker complains of Gen. Sedgwick.
This brave officer, (who lost his life in
the defence of his country it will be re-
membered, did the same of Hooker, in
testifying before the Congressional Com
mittee. Gen. Hooker says:
1 have already stated what troops re-
manned in front of Gen. Sedgwick, and
| the length of line they occupied (be-
| tween five and six miles one entire
| brigade being stationed at the depot at
Hamilton Crossroads.
In order that there might be no failure
about the movement, 1 also despatched
Gen. Wagren to Gen. Sedgwick, as that
officer was familiar with the localities
about fredericksburg, and was inform
ed of my ownposition, and could explain
IL to him. pointed out to Gen. Warren
on the map where / wanted the Sixth
t5, tr11 hi hat
desired it to be there | also impressed
upoh him thenecessity of prompt com.
pliance with my orders on the part OF
Gen. Sedgwick.
l suppose, and am still of the opinion,
that if Gen. Sedwick's men had should
cred arms and advanced at the time
named, he would have encountered less
resistance and suffered less loss but, az
it was late when. he went into Fred
ericksburg, and before he was in readi-
ness to attack the heights, in rear OF the
town, which was about IL o'clock. a. M,
on the Sd, the enemy had observed MS
movements, and concentrated almost
| their entire force at that point to oppose
| him. The enemy's reinforcements OF
| infantry and artillery were observed az
they came up by several officers OF the
Sixth corps. When the attack was made
| it had to be upon the greatest part of
the enemy's force left ON his right; new
ertheless the troops advanced, carried
the heights without heavy loss, and
leisurely took up their line of march on
the plank road, advancing two or three
miles that day.
My object in ordering Gen. Sedgwick
forward at the time named, was to re-
lieve me from the position in which 1
found myself, at Charlottesville on the
night of the I'd of May. I was of the
opinion that if that portion of the army
advanced on Lees rear, sooner than
allow his troops to remain between me
and Sedgwick, Lee would take the road
that Jackson had marched over on the
morning Of the I'd, and thus open for me
a short road to Richmond, while the
enemy, severed from his depot, would
have to retire by the way Of Gordons-
vile.
In my judgment, General Sedgwick
did not obey the spirit of my order, and
made no sufficient effort to obey it. His
movement was delayed SO long that the
enemy discovered his intentions, and
when that was done, he was necessarily
delayed in the further execution of the
order.
This,it will be remembered, was while
the battle was being fought on the morn
ing of the 3rd, on the right, and WINE