Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-03-27
-oorr.spsnasncs Of The Ne. York Ness


lis not unlikely that the telegraph will fash
important intelligence from Virgins before this
letter passes through the hands Of the printers.
The storm that has been brewing ever since the
roads began 70 dry will burst with terrible fury
before three days have passed. unless some great
and unforeseen obstacle shall interpose 10 parsiyzs
its power. Grant 10 A. last ready 10 strike the
blow for which he has been gathering strength
during bis tedious inactivity before Petersburg
His army Is stripped for the battle, and may be
moving toward, but not TO, North Carolina while
| am writing this. An officer OF the I'd corps
writes 10 friend 10 Washington: We are
under marching orders All tents and surplus
baggage have been ordered 10 the quartermsster
At City Point We ready TO move at an
hours notice RstiOns for a four days march
have beer issued 10 all the men. One order that
We have received ia remarkable and suggestive
We mus. wear government shoes. Boots and
fancy shoes must be discarded. Men can march
for days in those easy, broad-soied shoes issued
by the government. and We must wear no others.
We do not know where We are to go; but We feel
that there Is terrible work before US, and We are
ready for it The campaign on which We are
about to enter will be the most sanguinary yet
Witnessed in Virginia; bur il will also be the
shortest The enemy will fight desperately, but
their strength il waning, and before the ist OF
MAY we expect to be in Richmond. With Rich
mond in our possession the confederate army will
become disheartcned and demoralized, and its
overthrow will then be an easy task. But Lee
will fight one desperate battle before be aban-
dons Richmond, and then the heavy fighting will
be over"
that time the weather has been all that could be
desired--clesr, bright and wsrm-A day, per-
haps a few hours. may bring the important news
| that all await so eagerly.
There is no need Of telling you that Grant will
not "move on the enemy's works. he has
had quite enough of that. De found it very e1
pensive at Spottsylvsnis and paid dearly for it
at Coal HArbor. The plan will beIto plant a
heavy force on the SOuihside railroad That is
the only line of communication now open to
| Gen. Lee. If that is lost, Richmond will be in
greater danger than ever before. On the 18th
| inst, President Davis said 1.-THE capital OF the
| confederate states IL new threatened, and is in
greater danger than it has been heretofore during
| the war" That danger has been augmented
rather than decreased since President DAVIS :
message was written. Sehofeld has advanced
to Kinston since that time Sherman has crossed
| the Cape Fear and moved tow ards Goldsboro aid
Raleigh Sheridan has inflicted greater damage
| on Gen. Lees northern communications. In
whatever light we regard the situation at Rich
mOnd We are forced irresistby to the conclu
| sion that the danger 10 the confederate capital
| increases dsy by day, and that nothing but the
genius Of Gen. Lee and the lndomitable spirit OF
| his army can ward off the blow that is impend-
| ing for the destruction of the confederate power
Will this genius and the indomitable spirit prove
| equal TO the task to which they must be setg
| Generals Grant and Lee are equal in one re
spect--each Yields the military power of the sec
ton which he represents. Grant can detsch one
third of his army to cooperate with Sherman, II
be should deem II prudent OF necessary to do so;
| or he can call on Sherman for one-third OF his
| army 10 assist Meade in Virginia. Lee can order
| Johnston to bring his army within supporting
| distance of Richmond: or he can break up bis
| own immediate command, and send one third or
one-haf of il to Johnston. He can do either
| but will not do the latter. And whyf Because
il would be the signal for Grant to swing his army
around towards Burksville, at present the mos,
important railroad point confederate territory
| This is undoubtedly General Grants object
This is the very point that has been in his mind
| eye during the iast SIX months--the pivot or
| which all his plans revoye--and TO the attain
ment OF this object he will bend all his energies
and WELD all bis power, when the oppoTtune mo
/ ment comes.
Ii is doubtful, very doubtful, if Lee will weak
| en- his own army 10 strengthen Johnstons. Such
| q measure would be equivalent to opening the
| gates or Richmond and inviting Grant to enter
And yet, il is almost as important to keep Sher.
| man in North Carolina as TO keep Grant out OF
/ Richmond. Johnston must check Sherman or
| Richmond will become almost yaueless, If not
untenable. Sherman must be stopped south OF
| Goldsboro or Raleigh, or he will not be stopped
al all Ii he is allowed to advance east OF n euse
river he will make bis way to the Roanoke, and
then II will be almost impossible to keep him on,
OF Virginia. Ii Sherman's movements were
subject to such considerations have controlled
Grants operations in Firginia-such for instance
40 operating from regular base-it would not
be difficult 20 check him, just Grant has often
been checked; but be carries bis base in his
| wagon trains, and. therefore, can move in what
| ever direction promises to be most advanta geous
to the attainment of his purpose. If Goldsboro
is fortified and held BY heavy force. or if John
| ston's army is concentrated ~ Raleigh, Sherman
will no. attack either. In that event he will be
| more likely to aim at Smithvle thirty miles
north Of Goldsboro, or at Kinston, thirty miles
south of Goldsboro; and by continuing bis march
| toward the Roanoke, flank Johnston's position
| at Goldsboro or Raleigh. Johnston's army is
| not large enough to cover the whole line of the
keuse. and Sherman moves under such peculiar
circumstances that he can, at bis leisure, pick out
the weakest part OF the line and pass through
there. He will not fight if he can avoid it; and
| unless Johnston makes him fght and whips him,
he will march to Virginia Just es he marched
| from Georgia to North Carolina
1t is now in the highest degree probable that
ali the confederate forces in North Carolina are
| concentrated in one body. Gen. Howard says
| Hardee retired before Sherman to the Cape
Fear, and crossed that river on the 9th en- route
| for Raleigh. This shows that Johnston's for
ces were not concentrated during sherman 8
march from Columbia TO Fayetteville They
sro concentrated now. for both Hardee and
Beauregard (if the latter still commands the col.
| umn that moved from Charlotte have formed
| junction either az Raleigh or Goldsboro; and
| Braggs forces. withdrawn from kinston, have
joined the main army g; or north Of Goldsooro
| Therefore, Johnston hiss all his forces well in
hand, no longer scattered far apart, but so near
each other that the strength of sll can be used
AZ one time, and TO effect one purpose But, on
| the other hand, Sherman's forces are also sub
jecs to one will, IT, s, is believed. he has reached
| the Neuse either al kinsioa or Goldsboro His
strength has been increased by the addition Of
SchOheld's twenty thousand men and, therefore,
whatever advantages Johnston NAV appear TO
| reap from the concentration OF all his forces il
coun,erbslancsd by Shsrmlr's conjunction with
| Schofeld
III the two armies are brough; face TO face. and
Shermsns progress efec.ually checked, Lee will
hold Richmond despite the portentious clouds
that nov lower upon that devoted citadel of con-
tolerate power. If Sherman crosses the Neuse
and brings bis army to the banks of the Roanoke
then the retention Of Richmond viii be a task
that will try all the feith and genius snd p0yer