The weekly union record., 1865-02-11
Formation of q Line of Battle.

following article on The Formation of Line
of Battle from Coiburns United Service
Magazine:
At the end of the year 1851, the present
/ Emperor of the French-a profound military
| lstudeut-consulted Jomini as to whether The
improvements of firearms would 3ecessitate
great notifications 10 the method of war
/ Jomiui's reply was trsnotanf 1t might.
probably" be said exert a certain influence
on the details of tactics; but 10 Ibe great
strategieal operations of the war, aid the
grand combinations Of battle, victory will al
ways be secured BY the same principles which
gave it to the great captains OF all ageS-Al
exander, Cesar. Frederick the Great and Ma
poleon." The Emperor was decidedly of the
same opinion. The heroic events of the Siege
1 OF Sebastopol did not induce Jomini TO alter
( his opinion; the gigantic contest between the
two vast eutrenched camps, occupied by entire
armies, and furnished with two thousand pieces
of cannon of the largest ealiber, will ever be an
unprecedented event 10 past ages, and not likely
to be equaled in the future, because the cir
cumstances which produced it can scarcely
occur again; but these contests Of artillery
against ramparts bear no analogy to pitched
battles, and cannot influence the grand combl
nations of war, or even the tactics of battle.
Nevertheless the conflicts of Alma and H.
hermann, several occasions in the present
American struggle, and tie decisive effects Of
the Prussian breect loader in the war of Den
mark, emphai,cally point 10 the necessity for
certain notifications in the tactics of Infantry
to meet the difficulty.
The great question of the Influence Of mus
kerry fire iu battle is not new. 1t dates from
the reign of Frederick the Great, and especially
from the battle of Molwitz. which he won. ii
Is said, because his infantry, being provided
with iron ramrods, could fire three shots
minute more than the enemy. Hence the well
known discussion raised at that epoch between
the partisans OF the thin order OF battle and
those who upheld the efficacy of the deep form
alton. The result was hat the system of lines
deployed 10 three ranks was adopted for the
Infantry; the cavalry was formed in two ranks,
and in the order of battle il was deployed
either on the wings. or a portion of it was
posted in reserve The double column on the
center OF each battalion was. in l19l. permitted
in partial conflicts, the attacks Of isolated posi-
ti0nS, village, wood or small intreDcbment.
The imperfect training of the Republican forces
of France. and the maneuvering deficiencies of
their generals, enforced the adoption in battle
of columns appuyed by numerous skirmlsbers.
But, without laying undue stress on this fact,
it is obvious that the nature of the country in
which the wat is waged-the Vosges, the Alps,
the Pyreuees and the broken country of the
Vendee- excluded every other system of battle;
the camps of Saorgio, Figuieres and Mount
CeDis could not have been attacked with reg
ments deployed
Under Napoleon, as is well known, the col
uu'n was generally adopted, because his opera
tions were almost always on the offensive.
In 1907, Jomini proposed for the attack the
system of lines formed by columns of battalions,
by divisions of two companies extent; that is,
to march against the enemy in lines formed by
battalions in close column or at company dis
lance, the line being preceded by numerous
skirmishers, and the coSumns preserving be
tween them intervals, the maximum of which
should be that of deployment, andthe minimum
that Of the part of column. This method
was suggested by the events of the celebrated
campaigns of Ulm, Austeri,z, Jena and Eyau,
in which was made emphatically apparent the
difficulty, if not impossibIlity, of tiinging an
army against an enemy in position, with the
march of lines depoyed in two or three deep
formation.
Wellington's success in Spain and Waterloo,
achieved with troops deployed in two ranks,
and generally attributed to the murderous fire
of his excellent infantry, inspired doubts as 10
the utility of small columns. Ou the other
hands the Archduke Charles in the battle of
Essug, adopted Jomni's suggestion, and, in
the restricted space of the field, formed por.
tion of bis army in columns of battalions which
admirably resisted the furious charges of the
enemys cuirassiers, result that would have
been impossible, had the troops been deployed
Again, at the battle of Wagram. the greater
part of the Austrian line was formed as at Ess
ling; and after two days of terrible conflict,
which cost twenty thousand men, the Archduke
retired from the Geld-not because his army
was seriously punished, but because, his left
being oyerlapped and repulsed, his retreat into
Hungary was threatened.
At the Congress of Verona, 10 1923, con-
versation took place between the Duke of
Wellington aud Jomini on this subject Jomini
referred to Weliugton's system OF formation for
battle, to which much of his success was as
cribed. The Duke declared himself convinced
that the French method OF attack 10 columns
more or less deep, against solid infantry,
armed with excellent muskets, con6ding iD
their FIRE, and well supported by artillery and
cavalry, was very hazardous J0mini observed /
that the deep columns alluded to were very
different to the columns which he Suggested /
q formation which offered for the attack great
consistence, considerable impulse or momentum,
and great mobility; whereas, the great masses
in question did not admit of greater mobility
and impulse than a deployed line and were,
moreover, exposed TO the rasages of artillery. I
And, coming still closer TO the point, be asked
the Duke if he did not form bis Hanoverian |
Brunswicker and Belgian troops in columns Of
battalons? Yes, replied the Duke, because
was not so sure of those soldiers as OF my
Englishmen." Tbereupon. Jomni contended
that this very admission suficed TO demonstrate
that line formed of columns of battalioDs was
evidently more solid than long lines deployed
and the Duke emphatically said Certainly
they are also good-but that always depends
upon the localities and the pluck of the troops. /
We cannot always act in the same way on all
occasions"
Wellington also admitted that the French .
columns at Waterloo, especially those OF the +
right wing, were not small columns of a single /
battalion, but enormous masses, much heavier 7
and deeper Indeed, it appears that Ney's