The Jeffersonian. [volume] (Stroudsburg, Pa.) 1853-1911, 1865-12-21
Report of Lieut.. General Grant.


"From an early period in the rebel
lion | had been impressed with the idea
that active and continuous operations of
all the troops that could be brought into
the field, regardless of season and wealth
er, were necessary to speedy termna-
tion of the war. The resources Of the
enemy and his numerical strength were
far inferior to ours but as an offset to this
we had vast territory, with apopula a
ton hostile to the government, to garri
son and long lines of river and railroad
communications to protect, to enable US
to supply the operating armies.
The armies in the east and west acted
independently and without concert, like
baulky team, 10 two ever pulling to
gether, enabling the enemy to use to great
Advantage his interior lines of communi
cation for transporting troops from east
to west reinforcing the army most vigor
ously pressed, and to furlough large mum
bers during seasons of inactivity on our
part, to 90 to their homes and do the
work producing for the support of their
armies. 1t was question whether our
numerical strength and resources were
not more than balanced by three dsad
vantages and the euemys superior posi-
ton.
'From the first was firm in the cou
viction that no peace could be had that
would be stable and conductive to that
happiness of the people, both north and
SOUTH until the military power of the re-
belIion was entirely broken.
Il therefore determined, first, to use
the greatest number of troops practical
against the armed force of the enemy /;
preventing him from using the same force
at fferent seasons against first one and
then another of our armies, and the pos
sibility of repose for re6tting and pro
duciug necessary supplies for carrying on
resistance. Second to hammer coutinu
ously against the armed force of the enemy
and his resources, until by mere attrition
if in no other way, there should be moth
ing left to him but an equal submission
with the loyal section of our common
country to the Constitution and laws Of
the land.
These views have been kept constan
tly in mind, and orders given and cam
paigns made to carry them out. Wheth
er they might have been better in con-
ception and execution is for the people,
who mourn the loss of friends fallen, and
WHO have to pay the pccuniary costs, to
say. All | can say is, that what l
have done has been done conscientiously,
to the best of my ability, and in what |
conceived to be for the best interests Of
the whole country.
His ceusures fall freely on nearly all
Of General Buffers movements, and it is
manifest that he considers Butler res
ponsble for a great amount of unnecess-
AIRY loss of time, life and money. He
remarks, "my idea from the start had
been to beat Lees arms north of Rich
mond, if possible then, after destroying
his lines Of communication north Of the
James river to transfer the army to the
south side and besiege Lee in Richmond
OR follow him south if he should retreat. ;"
cater the battle of the Wilderness it
was evident that the enemy deemed it Of
the first Importance to run no risk with ar
my he then had. He acted purely on
the defensive behind breastworks, or
feebl ly on the offensive Immediately in
front Of them and where, in case of re
pulse, be could easily retire behind them.
Without greater sacrifice of life than |
was willing to make, all could not be ac-
complished that | had designed north Of
Richmond
During three long years the armies
of the Potomac and Northern Virgiua'
had been confronting each other In
that time they had fought more desper
ate battles than it probably ever before
fell to the lot of two armies to fight, with
out materially changing the vantage
ground of either The southern press
and people, with more shrewdness than
was displayed in the north. finding that
they had failed to capture Washington
and march on to New York, as they had
boasted they would do, assumed that they
only defended their capital and southern
territory. Hence, Antetam, Gettysburg
aud all the other battles that had been
fought were by them set down as failures
on onr part, and victories for them
Their army believed this. 1t produced a
moral which could only be overcome by
desperate and continuous hard fighting.
''The battles of the Wilderness. Spot
syiyania, North Anna and Cold Harbor.
bloody and terrible as they were on our
side, were even more dam gng to the
enemy, aud SO crippled him as to make
him wary ever after taking the offensive.
His losses in men were, probably, not SO
great, owing to the fact we were, save in
tile Wilderness almost invariably the at
tacking party, and when he did attack it
was in the open field. The details Of
these battles, which, for endurance and
bravery on the part of the soldiery, have
rarely been surpassed, are given in the
report of Major General Meade, and the
subordinate reports accompanying it,"
The report closes thus:
at has been my fortune to see the arr.
rn1 Of hafI L.. al