The evening Argus. [volume] (Rock Island, Ill.) 1861-1871, 1865-06-29
General Hooker's Report Of the Battle OF
Chancelloryfle.

That portion of time included between May
LIST and 18th, 1868, has been, to the public.
one of the most exciting, mysterious and
bloody intervals of the war. Ii was during
this time that the celebrated battle of Cham
cellorville occurred; battle which at first
assumed the proportions of victory but sub
sequently resolved itself into one of the most
bloody, shameful and inexplicsble defeats of
the entire war. It was during the progress
OF this battle that the entire north became al
most insane with JOY over the news of the
capture of Rich aond and JEFF. Davis by Stone.
man; and it will not be forgotten by those
who were with Grant on the march to the
rear of Vicksburg, how the spirit of the ar
my was aroused by the intelligence of victor
les won by Hooker and Stoneman before
Charlottesville and Richmond. te
This advance, heralded as glorious victo-
nv, and followed closely by retreat that
greatly resembled a rout, has never been un-
derstood by the public. Two years after the
occurrence of this mysterious battle the fed
eral commanders report is given to the world.
1t is very lengthy, and yet we venture the
assertion that he who gives it an examination,
no matter how careful one, will find that he
knows less about Observation-Disclosures il has
become more mysterious and inexplicable
than ever. He will be astonished to learn
that there was no battle fought at all at
Chancellorville; at least such is the report of
Gen. Hooker. He says:
ssIt has been the desire and aim of some of Gen.
McClellan's admirers, and do not know but of
others, to circulate erroneous pressions in
gard to Charlottesville. When returned from
Chan cellorville, feltthat had fought battle.
In fact l had more men than l could use, and
fought general battle, for the reason could
not get my men in position to do SOD
The admirers of General Mcclellan "who
.a.lo L.
isfed that if there was not BATTLE" there
was something at Charlottesville not unlike
battle" for Hooker says his losses in this
affair, or whatever it was which was no ''bat-
tie" were IL, 1877 men. We will have TO con-
clude. In Difference TO the opinion of Fight
ing Joe, +" that Charlottesville, in being mo
battle and emo defeat" comes witbin the
category of g deeds without name"
General Hooker does concede that he
crossed the Rappabannock, attacked Lee. and
that he very soon after recrossed the Kappa
hammock to his old position. The reasons
that induced this retrogade movement, 40
cording to Hooker, seem 20 have been not the
want of men, for he had more than he could
USE" (cide supra; but through inefficient
corps commanders. He says that Sedgewick
did not obey orders ; that Howard disgrace
fully ran away; while Averill so far dsvia-
| ted from positive instructions in his cavalry
movement that he (Hooker) was obliged to
remove him and substitute Pleasanton.-
Stoneman is described as follows: mo Off
Ger ever ma lie greater mistake in constru-
ing his orders, and no one ever accomplished
less In so doing"
The following upon corps commanders and
other officers shows that it il was completely
their fault that the I" no battle of Chancel-
| lorville resulted as it did
=
in corps commanders and that It is the comms nd
that gives tone and character Ia has corps some
of corps commanders and also officers of other
rank, appear TO be unwilling TO go into a hight IN
my judgement, there are not many Dho really like
| to fight. In the campaign in the west never
ventured to engage a force that could not whip
myself, / not confident that | would be
promptly and vigorously supported in case re-
| qured It.n
From this we acquire three important
| points: LIST. That the action of corps com.
manders and other officers lose the fight at
Charlottesville I'd. That corps commanders
and other officers, as a general thing, do not
like to fight and Sd. That General Hooker
had no confidence in western troops In re-
latIon to the last, it may be said that the feel
ing between General Hooker and the western
troops is reciprocal one tn,y having quite as
little confidence IN him he can by any pos
sibiity have In them. With reference to the
other points, little need be said for the ans
wer to them is found in the gallant conduct
of men like Logan, Mcpherson. Blair. Slocum
and Howard and in the subsequent career of
the very men whom the first point villifes.-
| We may say here that the most noticeable
case on record of a corps commander showing
an unwillingness to fight Is that of certain
corps commander named Joseph Hooker, who
marched TO the rear when Sherman was NOV
! ing on Atlsnta
| The very most that can be deduced from
this report of Gen. Hooker is, that he under
| took affair greater than his ability. He
| had no confidence in any of his corps com
manders or other officers and, judging by
the small attention they paid to his orders
they had not the slightest confidence in him
| Ii we may believe his report,-which, by the
| way, is contradicted in many essential points
| by that of the gallant Sedgwick his corps
| commanders occupied themselves mainly in
advancing when he ordered them to fall back
and in running away when he ordered them
| TO 90 ahead. The only officer he gives any
| credit to is Warren, and he was removed by
| Sheridan for misconduct disobedienca at
Five Forks, besides having been severely
censured for his conduct at the explosion of
the Petersburg NINE
The report of Hooker adds nothing to his
reputation a. a soldier. 1t is a miserable
lame attempt 10 hasten upon subordlnates a
result for which he alone responsible.
Hooker was created by the New York Fri
bune, and the battle of Charlottesville is
quite much the result of Greeley's offoi
Gus intermeddling with military affairs as
was the miserable and shameful rout of our
forces at Bull Run. Mr.. Lincoln would new.
er have appointed Hooker to the command of
the army of the Potomac had it not been for
the persistent clamors of the New York
Tribune. commenced soon after Pope's defeat,