The Norfolk post. [volume] (Norfolk, Va.) 1865-1866, 1865-07-01

raised i'll movements, from fear his COM
munications would be interrupted; that
they We're liable to be cut off. This in
dicates that was striking him at Vi
tai point when / was moving to under
mine him. AS it was, by not giving me
this force at Harper's Ferry, did not
feel safe in making the movement, and
was made to appear in ridiculous attl-
tude, by marching the Twelfth corps
thirty miles out of its way, in order to
Join the troops at Harper's Ferry, and
then requiring them to march BACK
again, without an object.
L said further to General Meade, that
the enemy had made the invasion WITH
out any pOntoon bridges, and, OF course,
in my Judgment, die not intend 10 eros,
the Susquehanna RIVER; lndeed, l told
nortance TO him I'M tie position which he
held. I told him had already directed
INV cavalry to advance on the Emmetts-
burg and Gettysburg line, and to extend
their wings to the light as far as the
Susouehanna, and to the left as far as
South Mountain--thi in order to get in
formation of the movement of theenemy.
IL was, perhaps, 10 o'clock in the day
that General Meade vasinfOrmed of this.
This was the day on which l was reliev-
ed. In the evening General Butterfield
came to me, saying that he had been di-
rected by General Meade to see in what
order thought the troops should march,
on what routes, ard with what object.
I gave him my ideas, while he TRANSCRIPT
ed them, and which, presume, was the
order in which the troops did march.
The main column was to march due
north, with column within supporting
distance, in the direction of the railroad
from Baltimore to Harrisburg, keeping
it in mind to make that line of supply
as well as the one that we were on. !
stated that my sole object would be to
cover Washington and Baltimore, and
should endeavor to keep the troops
nearer to either one of these places than
the enemy. The order of march, sup
pose, was the order gave. I do not
know anything to the contrary.
@. Had you been permitted to take
the 10000 troops at Harper's Ferry,
what, in your Judgment, would have
been the result of that campaign?,
A. had great deal Of confidence
whipped, I could not say destroyed
Had anticipated the rise in the river,
I would say that the army was in great
danger of being destroyed.
@. Can you assign any reason why
General Halleck refused those troops to
you, and Immediately afterward, trans
ferring them over to the command of
Gen. Meade, permitted him to have
them?
A. L know of no reason.
By Mr.. Gooch. q. General Meade,
coming into command,
caused Maryland Heights to be aban-
doned.
A. He ordered it to be abandoned
the following day. When L came to
Washington, the Secretary of War in
formed me that he regretted very much
the step had taken; that it was the in
tention of the President to give me the
command of all the troops had asked
for; but that fact had never been COM
municated to me, nor had / any intima-
ton of it before. 1 inquired of the
President why he had not given me a
corps in that army after he had relieved
me, and he said that it was for the rea-
son that he thought that it would not be
agreeable to me or to General Meade
Subsequently he communicated his de-
sire to this effect, by letter, to General
Meade, which was acceded to by the lat
ter first, and afterward objected to by
General Meade.