Cleveland daily leader. [volume] ([Cleveland, Ohio]) 1865-1873, 1865-12-07
The Report OF lieutenant General
Grnnf

We publish to-day an extended syn
opsis of the official Report of Lieutenant
General Grant, which will be found of
surprising interest. The Lieutenant Gen
eral is not so careful of the feelings of
others as Secretary Stanton seemed to be,
and many items of history hitherto only
vaguely intimated are now made clear.
The only object seems to have been the
chronieling of the truth, which has evil
IDENTIFY been given regardless of whose rep
utation might suffer.
The Fort Fisher expedition under Gen.
Butler is thoroughly ventilated, and is
anything but ereditable to that officer.
General Grant designated General
Weitzel to command that expedition,
but, as the order,was as a matter of courtesy
sent through Butler as the superior in
rank of Weitzel, Butler suppressed it and
assumed the command himself. General
Grant says he had no knowledge of Gen.
Buffers intention to accompany the expe-
djtion until the evening before its depart
ure, and then supposed he was merely
going along to witness the explosion of
the powder-ship, which was one of But
ler's pet projects, and which Gen. Grant
disposes of in a very humorous manner.
The subsequent expedition under Gen.
Terry differed from the first only in the
addition of fifteen hundred troops. The
Lieutenant General took occasion to say to
Gen. Terry: az have served with
Admiral Porter, and know that you
can rely on his judgment and
his nerve to undertake what he
proposes This looks very much like
placing the blame for previous difficulties
upon Butler. 1t will be observed that
Gen. Buffers management during the
Richmond campaign is at different times
condemned.
The management of Gen. Hunter in his
expedition against Lynchburg is not APP
proved, but is excused on the ground that
Gen. Hunter evidently thought he was
obeying orders.
The most damaging blow is aimed at
Gen. Rosecrans. After r~ecounting the
main points in the Missouri campaign at
the time of Prices last invasion, the Re
port states that the impunity with which
the enemy moved through theState "shows
to how little purpose a superior force may
be used" adding hat there was 'no reason
why Gen. osecrans should not have beaten
and driven Price F" long before the latter
ceased to advance. This sentence is as
severe as that wherein the Lieutenant
General says of the rebel General Hoods
strategy in the Nashville campaign: Glad
1 had the power to command both armies,
[ should not have changed the orders I'M
der which he seemed to be acting
Some light is thrown upon the vexed
question as to who originated the idea of
"Sherman's march to the sea" Gen. Sher-
man, when Hood threatened his commu-
nieations at Atlanta, proposed to destroy
all in his rear, cut loose from his base, and
strike out across Georgia to the coast.
Grant gave him permission to do so, pro
vided he could leaVea sufficient force behind
to " hold the line of the Tennessee river
firmly" But it must not be concluded
that this was an entirely new idea
with Sherman. Grants original design
was that sherman's army should go
through Georgia to the coast, but he pro-
posed to hold Atlanta and keep open com
munications while doing 50. The latter
part of the plan was changed at Sherman's
solicitation. Thus it will be seen that
these two great minds worked together for
the success of our arms.
In reviewing movements in the Shenan-
doah Valley, Grant says; "Not regarding
the operations of General Siegel as salts
factory, L asked his removal from com
mand, and. Major General Hunter was
appointed to supersede him."