The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1865-02-15


you, as the trusted Chief Magistrate of
the Confcderacy, and to our great cause,
whatever assistance may be able togive.
Very truly yours, .a
[Signed] JAMES A. seldom,
Secretary of War.
RICHMOND, 1st February, 1866.
My Dear Sir: You are too we'll ac-
quainted with the reasons which have
delayed my answer to your letter of the
18th ultimo to need any explanation on
the subject, and must be too we'll assured
of my warm personal regard and Official
confidence to render necessary any OK
preston of the regret / feel at being de-
privcd of your aid and counsel at this
critical ijuncture in our affairs.
( had hoped that further reflection
would induce change in your views,
but as this has not been the case, am
not at liberty to question the reasons for
your decision. 1t is matter exclusively
for your private judgment whether you
should be controlled by an expression of
opinion on the part of the Virginia dele
ga,ion in Congress that it would be ad-
visable ITO 1c-organize my Cabinet by
relieving all the present heads of de-
partmcnts." / have no choice but to
acquicsce in your conclusion, that you
cannot longer I'LL your present position
without impaired usefulness, nor with
out doing violence to your feelings.
! cannot, however, recognize the pro-
pricty of your decision, because cannot
admit the existence of power or right
in the legislative department of the Go
yernment, or in any part or branch of
it, to control the continuance in Office of
those "principal officers in each of the
executive departments" whose choice
the Constitution has vested in the Chief
Magistrate; whose advice in writing he
is empowered "to require" and whose
tenure Of Office is exceptional, being
made to depend expressly on 1.-The plea
sure Of the President" The relations
between the President and the heads of
the executive departments are from their
nature of the closest and most intimate
character they imply mutual confidence
and esteem, and general concurrence of
opinioQ on administrative policy; and it
is nota constitutional function of the le-
gislativc department to interfere with
these relations, nor can it be assumed
that change of the heads of depart
ments would aker the administrative
policy of the Government, without also
assuming as true the injurious suppose.
ton that the President has permitted
them to pursue policy at variance with
his own, aud has thus failed 10 do his own
duty as chief of the executive depart
ment. -.
The notion that, under our form of 90
vernment, an expression by the legisla-
tive of want Of confidence in the execu-
tive department is an appropriate exer-
else of constitutional power, and should
cause q change in the Cabinet, is quite
.unfounded f; and it is not difficult to see
that it arises from false analogy, that
most fertile source of error. In Great
Britain, vote of the House of Commons
expressing . want of confidence in the
ministry has controlling influence, be-
cause the Parliament governs. With us
it is the reverse. The two cases are so
distinct as to be opposite, rather than
parallel, to each other. =.
In Great Britain, the ministry are thc1
executive government. The sovereign
rules, but docs not govern. In tho Com
federacy the heads of departments
neither rule nor govern.
In Great Britain, The sovereign is ire
sponsible, and "can do no wrong" and
the ministry alone, are responsible. In
the Confcderacy, the President may do
wrong, and is responsible for 80 doing.
The remedy for biz wrong doing Is i'm.
parchment by the House Of Represents
tives. .f3
The Senate is without power even to /
impeach, and can only act IS judges when
the House impcachcs.
In Great Britain, the crown being no
reditary IS we'll as irresponsible, Tho con- !