The western Democrat. [volume] (Charlotte, N.C.) 1852-1870, 1865-09-26
STONEWALL JACKSON.

A late correspondent of the N Y. World ha
furnished the readers Of that journal with some
graphic remarks upon the genius in strategy
aud military resources, of Stonewall jackson
We make few interesting extracts:
His close Calculation.
Jacksons military movements were always
based upon close calculation, and he was certain
rJy not wanting in foresight and caution He
seems TO have known perfectly well whet it SsS
IN his power to achieve, and as thoroughly
what Was beyond his strength. lie risked
much, upon many occasions, but appears to have
been justified 10 his calculations of the ultimate
result.
| 1t will be objected to him by military men,
that he haZardec too much, at times, and was
only extricated by good fortune. There appears
to be some justice in this; but the resources of
his genius were enormous, and doubled his
numbers Some of his ideas seem absurd when
coolly looked at. When asked what he would
have done il, after the battle of Winchester, the
| conVergiDg columns Of the enemy had cut him
off at Strasburg, he replied, 81 would have tal-
len back upon Maryla for reinforccments"
| Such movement must, it would appear, have
terminated in bis destruction; but it would be
difficult to fad man in his old command who
would have doubted his ultimate triumph even
then.
His genius was for great movements and de-
clslve blows; and thus his services became more
anG more valuable his rank increased He
was better as brigadier than as colonel better
still as major general, and as Lieutenant gen.
eral was best of all. 1t is useless to ask what
he would have been as commander-iu chief
| without superior at Richmond. But the brain
which conceived and executed the campaign, of
the valley must have been equal to any posi-
ton.
His Line olpays Open to Retreat.
He kept open, generally, his line OF retreat
and provided for disasters-though it was hard
to realize that failure ever entered into his cal
culatons. He had the soldiers eye for posi-
ton, aud chose his ground both for infantry
and artillery with the exactness of genius; but
If all his arrangements were made and his plans
required battle, would give it on any ground
He depended most upon bis infantry from
his early association with that branch of the SER
vice, never appearing SO well pleased as when
directing in person the fire of his cannon. amid
shower of shot and she'll When once engag-
ed, he seemed to disregard all idea Of defeat,
and to regard the issue as assured. And, what
was more important, his men seemed to share
his conviction A man less open to the con-
vicson that he was whipped, could not be i'm
agined. His indomltabIe combativeness, it
might have been said made him set his teeth
against fate, and cndeavor to place his heel up
on destiny itself
lie never Trusted to Luck.
1t may be said of him with truth, that he de-
served victory. No man was more careful in
the use of every precauton to insure success
The idea that be blundered on without prudence
or system, and achieved his success ouly by
some mysterious good fortune, is a mere fancy.
No soldier was ever less indebted to 'sluck'; no
ono ever proceeded in military matters upon
profoundcr logic. He knew his strength and
his weakness, but the difference between him
and others was this, that he mado his estimates
more correctly. He did not look to numbers
only, but to morale, the situation, the spirit OF
his troops. With three hundred o. Leonidas
he would have attempted great things; with
the fifty thousand survivors of Napoleon's
Grand Arn.ie, crushed in morale by Waterloo,
he would have attempted nothing.
Ho,o he Conducted a March.
In every point of view, as we have said, he
deserved success. No General ever made
greater use OF mystery. He saw from the first
that he commanded men of education, thought.
speculation-the most inguisitive Of private sol
diers. Without due precauion taken they were
certain to know what it was nexpedient for the
private soldier to know; his dangers would be
penetrated, and be nosed abroad. Hence his
inscrutable mystery. He would not permit his
men to inquire the names Of the towns through
which they passed, and on the march against
General Mcclellan, at Richmond, issued gen.
ersl order directing the troops to reply II don't
know" to every question.
Meeting a nan struggling toward cherry
tree, be said:
''W here are you going2"
x don't know" was the reply
"To what regiment do you belOngl"
81 don't know"
"What do you mean?"'
81 don't know"
jackson laughed quietly and passed on He
said that if his coat knew what he designed be
would take it off and burn it. He would en-
camp for the night at cross roads, and the auid-
nuHcs in despair at their inability to deter
mine. toward what point of the compass he
weuld march on the morrow. About to abandon
the valley, he publicly directed careful maps to
be made Of the region, as though intending q
campaign therein. When one of his staff en-
gagged dinner few miles ahead OF bis advanc-
ing column, be adlnonished him Of error. How
did he know that the column would pass that
point?
"Old lStonerdW' on the Field.
There were few who failed him at such mo-
ments. The sight of Jackson upon these occa-
sions seemed to turn the heads of the troops
They forgot all else and grew reckless; aud
when uien become reckless they 60 far Cedar
Run furnished an Instance Of this. The left
wing, formed of Jacksons veterans, was broken,