New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1865-02-03
suERMAN,s CAMPAIGN.

What is called the --latest intelligence from
Gen. Sherman's army represents his forces al
less than forty miles from Charleston. The date
is the 2Sth Of January. But the statement is so
vague that we may infer the advanced corps OF
the army have made no movement since the
occupation of the line Of the Salkehatchie, n
few miles beyond Pocoteligo Bridge. Our
letters of some days since show that the LETT
wing of Sherman's army, which left Savannah
about the 10Th, had been delayed in its advance
by the ;nundation of the country, and was
quite unable TO get forward. 1t is, there
fore, very unlikely that the right wing
which was already so far to the north
as not to be in communication with its sup
ports, should have moved decsiye!y in any d.
recton or should have gone far from its base
on Broad River. Late Rebel reports speak Of
three columns of Sherman's army as in motion,
whereof the main was marching straight upon
Charleston. But it is quite clear no such
movement can yet be making. The inability
Of Sherman to move by land in the neighbor-
hood of the coast must stop all extended opera
tions to the North. His army may move, when
il moves, in two or three columns, but they
will surely be cooperating columns. Their di-
rection, moreover, may be guessed at by the
Rebels, but will hardly be indicated in advance
by any crude efforts toward either of the points
Sherman may be supposed to intend to approach.
Therefore, the present statement about an
advance to within forty miles of Charleston
means little or nothing. The Salkehatchie
River. where it would naturally be struck by
the head of Towards column, is but little over
fifty miles from Charleston. On or near that
stream Shcrmans outposts are undoubtedly to
be found The Combahee is about twelve miles
distant and is understood to afford line capa-
bic of defense for some distance from the coast
The fact that Sherman is not even reported to
have crossed that river is conclusive that he has
not attempted any further advance. When he is
over 1.-THE still has the Ashepoo and Edsto Rivers
to cross before approaching Charleston. The
country is a swamp. The roads are causeways
Were there troops enough to make a serious
stand against Sherman, they could make his
campaign through these districts difficult one.
IL is probable however, that no real opposition
is to be attempted Shcrman's force is too over
whclming. All his columns cannot be met. If
he moves upon Branchyillc ho gets upon high
land and out of the swamps, and may fight a
battle anywhere on equal terms with any army
he can Gnd. Nor is there any reason to think
a column moving in that direction could be pre-
vented from extricating itself out of the mire Of
the coast swamps. Sherman, therefore, being
strong enough to divide his army, and the
Rebels not being strong enough to meet him at
every point, he will get steadily forward, ex-
tending now one wing and now the other, and
so approach Branchvillc and Charleston, and
perhaps even Augusta, with equal steps, aud III
scrutable purpose.
People who are getting impatient at Sher-
mans delay may console themselves with the re-
Election that he knows nearly as well as they
what can be done and what cannot. So long as
there are rains and inundations there will be de-
laws, but with the return of decent weather the
campaign will progress. Nor need we speculate
anxiously whether the first point aimed at be
Charleston, or Branchyille, or Augusta; whether
this plan or the other be uppcrmostin Sherman's
mind. 1t is enough to know that his campaign
is directed ultimately against no less city than
Richmond ITSELF and that without drawing
higher to it than hundred or two hundred
miles away he may, by the mere stress Of his
approach. compel its evacuation.