New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1865-11-04

I'm. M Communication with him was necessarily by
specal Messenger and occupied from Is TO 20 days IN
each communication, II was possible ior ether OF US
fully 10 comp ehend the relative position Of the Two
armies OF TO assist or TO support each other. Inc
column of Gen. A. j. Smith was q partially indls'
pensable command. Gen. Sherman, in his dispatch
Of tie 10th Of April received the l6th Informed me
that the thirty days for which he had loaned me
Gen Smiths command, woud expire on the 10Th OF
April the day after the battle OF Pleasant Ill., Gen.
Smiths st uctions. which he showed me, required
him TO confer constantly with Admiral Porter the ap-
proved friend of the Army the Tennessee MS ofues
were dated headquarters Red River Expeultion'
steamer Clara Belle" lie never declined co9Pe'ali11l
With me, did lie receive orders fom ne. lie mdge
official reports bis forces or then oreratOhs ne
wise responsible for the results OF tue eApeo
tion and may perhaps be said to rave gaheu 81 nJC
by its failure as lie would from its success. When his
thirty days up he claimed the night at GfaDd Ecoe
to retmn to Vicksburg irrespective OF the eondtoh ~
the army the feet AND aid not CONSIDER hiSen AZ az
responsible for the inevitable consequences Vi NE
draw to the army the navy, nor iof that deenon
which their preservation demanded. lhat iesPo"S
biity called upon 10 assume ID written
entertain no doubt that his official course was entirely
consistent with bis orders and cheeIfuly acknow
Ice the generous and earnest Efforts oi Cen mower %
the Sixteenth, and Gen. l. knhy Snlh oi ,ne oe,gn
eenth COrps to infuse into the different corps tna
uniy OF spirit which is essential TO victory as ,ne
yalor Of the soldiers in actual battle gladly aceoru 70
the men Of these commands the honor OIL na.ne
desperate enemy superior In numbers wllD Us nuSn
pallarry and success that which distinguished Tue
| ioops OF my immediate command no hither piaho
than this can be given to any solGliS' AieA"iuei
troops never fought better. 80
The result of the position of the cavalry train and the
loose order of march by the column OF troops unoeI
Maor.Gen. Franklin on the Ssh oil AprlL Deioie "a.
battle of Sabine Cross Roads, have been slatGu. u
recommending officer is of course responsive LOT al 'al
occurs in his command, whatever may nave oeeh ne
cause But while il was both proper ana neeSss"! io
TO give personal attention 10 the prompt advance Vi
all the FOODS ana fleet from Grand Lcorc on lhe MOI
ing Of the 7h ii supposed that The movement VI
single column of l3C0O men. moving IN advance Oh quo
oof1 "a
ncr as to be abe to encounter the enemy II lie OHe
resistance might safely be intIusted 10 an oiGer o. me
reputation and experience OF MAJOR zen snneTor TO-
that of any officer Of the expedition OF Vi the oep'
make no complaints of the navy; but in view oil lis
prolio dispatches long since published ON ms cam
nagn may properly repeat few facts already stlttu.
The success OF the expedition depended s0ey oh ie
CELEBRITY OF the movement lie nav! ueu!Sfo -
Tcore three DAYS. 1t occupied four DAYS III no'lnS
Ifromt Grand Ecoe 10 Springfield Landing eislnhN VI
O4 mics upon what the dispatches cal llSlns NeI
i,b GOOD water where ii arrived two days after Inc
first battle and day after the decisive pa'o VI VIZ
campaign at Pleasant Hill 1T det"neu .nS a'n! ~, ~
DAYS at Grand Ecore and Il days al AtAahu "a VA
return. These not opinions; they are events AZ
the army they were pregnant and bloody events,
The difficulties Of navigation the lmpelcc. conIon
traton of forces the incauilous march OF INC oln VI
Anil and the limited time allotted 10 the eXpedlloh'
were the causes oil tLis failure. owe uo'he 70 lne
enemy-pot even our defeat. Could any one 81 tn,se
difficulties have been avoided, The OBJECT OF lne ci
paign would have been accomplished But Inc o'GuI1i
Ton Of Shreveport could not have been nallaihsu U.
TIE presence of the enemy woud have required sueh
force for its defense could not have en- snppea
Tho river end for which other arrangement Lao Dc
made as suggested in MY dispatch of the 3Oh oil March
Tbe only possible method OF maintaining THIS position
would ave been 70 concentrate al tbs point force
superior in numbers 20 the enemy. Win huhcchl Ihe
IN nurse him wherever lie should move, even II HOOK
rs 10 galveston on the Calf coast This was suggested
as possible result of tie campaign but 1t was not EN-
braced within the original PLAN ana was specla,! pe
in6d nv orders received fIom the Lieutenant
commanding the armies
! N Y. BANKS. NJ. G. "