The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1865-01-16
What viii Sherman do next 2


ry won, we are anxious for another briliiai
achievement. Now we think Gen. Sherman
takes time by the forelock, so far as it is poss
BILE to do so. 1t must be remembered that ne
is at the head of large army which cAnn''
be quite SO easily and quickly moved as man
can drive bis team to his door. That Sher-
man will move. and in the right direction too,
we have no doubt
Concentration of our forces upon important
points seems now to be the policy of Gen.
Grant And if such policy had been pur-
sued in the earlier stages of the war, our sue
cess would have been greater. We evidently
lost ground in scattering our forces over too
much territory, and in ende lvoring to occupy
too many points. Our fields of operation EN-
braced too large territory; but better poll
cy Is now adopted, and the rebels feel our
blows, and reel under them, wherever we
strike.
1t is not surprising that some time should
elapse before our Government and its officer
fully comprehended the nature of the strug-
gle in all its bearings. 1t was hard to believe
that the rebels, 10 the commencement of the
conflict would show so much fight, and pu
forth so much power as they have; especially
when there were no grievances oil which they
could reasonably complain. Never in the an.
mails of the world have a people risen against
SO good government, and shown so much
fight without sufficient cause as these South
ern shareholders. When the future historian
shall sit down and calmly and candidly write
the history of this rebellion, he will be much
astonished that he finds SO few grievances Ct
which ths rebels could complain, and so few
causes for such a tremendous war on their
part.
But the war is upon US and we must fight
tout unless the rebels lay down their arms
and sue for peace. The concentration of our
army has been the means of giving us veto
ries during the past year that have shaken the
rebellion to its centre. We believe Sherman
will keep his forces together and spare no
more than is absolutely necessary to garrison
Savannah. When Atlanta was captured, Sher-
man had force enough to divide his army and
give Gen. Thomas strength sufficient to take
care of Hood, which he has successfully done.
In the southwest, the rebel power has been
severely handled, and its prestige gone. 1t
will not be necessary for Sherman to send any
assistance to that section. The rebels cannot
raise force sufficient to confront Thomas
who can march,, if SO disposed, into the cotton
states, and probably he may do SO at proper
time. -
Gen. Fosters army has not been strong
enough to make a formidable attack on
Charleston, and yet his power is by no means
small In capturing Savannah, Sherman has
enabled Fosters army to join his if found ex-
pedent. But Sherman's force is larger than
we dream Of Before this capture, these two
armies were separated, but they can unite
their powers for future operations. The pres
ence of Fosters army on the enemy's flank,
will be great help to Sherman in marching
northward. So much for these two federal
forces. There is concentration, or may be
when exigencies demand it.
Gen. Lee is exceedingly anxious, no doubt,
to be after Sherman, who has been feeding his
army on the luxuries of rebeldom, and ex-
ploring the high sounding "shel" But how
can he leave on such an excursion without ex-
posing the rebel capital to danger? There is
the indomitable, "Ihe unconditional surrender"
Grant, and there he will remain. Lee knows
what Grant is, and fears him, and dares not
come out of his entertainments te fight him.
We have evidence enough of such fact.
1t is hard case for Lee to be thus cooped
up and confined, when Sherman, Thomas and
Sheridan are at liberty to strike wherever
they think their blows will be the most efec-
tive, and be felt the most severely Lee and
JEFF Davis are in trouble. There can be no
reasonable doubt of that. II Grant would only
leave for some other locality, Lee and Davis
would breath more freely; but Grant is there
by design and not through chance. No rebel
force drove him there, but on the contrary he
drove the rebels, and planted himself before
Richmond for wise and strategic purposes.
Aud there he is cody and calmly giving his
orders, saying TO Sherman "march through
the heart of rebeldom, feed your army on the
fat Of the land, take Savannah, make Georgia
feel that her true place is in the Union; march
north and make South Carolina tremble,
while will keep Lee and his army in close
quarters"
We can imagine we hear him say to Gen.
Thomas, stake care of the southwest, follow
Hood, and render his army more powerless
than it is now" And to Phil. Sheridan, Hkeep
the Shenandoah valley free from the rebels,
and will see that the Lee is kept within my
grasp" 1t does not require great stretch
Of the imagination to shadow forth such
things, and surely the close observer of pass
ing events will not be at loss to find some
truth in them. The present aspect of affairs
warrants us in putting such words into the
mouth Of our brave and persevering General,
at least, such is the impression we receive
from survey Of our army operations.
But the question returns, what will Sher-
man DO next? He may make an attack on
Charleston, and il SO, we are inclined to the
Oeiiei that the citizens of that hotbed of trail
TORS would otreeeive quite so much gentle !
treatment at the hands of 8 herman, as those |
OF Savannah have. We are told the feelings |
OF our army are somewhat hitter towards !
Charleston. And it is not Surprising that our
soldiers would like to wreak little ysnooance
on such traitors, who began this uurio1taons
war which has called upon the country for s,oh
asacrifice OF blood and treasure. 1t would NJ
severe blow to the rebels to lose either |
Charleston or Richmond, but to that complex 4
Ion 1t must come at last.
From survey of all the ground we think
Sherman's forces will join Grants, but whar
Sherman viii do, what roads he will travel
what demonstrations he will make ere a
junction of these armies is formed. is more
than we know, and perhaps it may be more
than Sherman himself now knows; for much |
may depend on the movements of the rebels.
Its possible that Richmond may be evacuat-
ed, Lee break away from Grant, and confront
sherman, II that movement should be made,
Grant would occupy Richmond and follow
close IN the wake of Lee We must wait pa