Daily union and American. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1865-1866, 1865-12-14
NO. g..

talrs now existing IN my own State, | will
make a brief statement Of certain events that
preceded the commencement of the war. To
decide what weight should be given 10 the
opinions of an individual, we usually wish
to know what have been his opportunities Of
learning the truth, and also in what status or
position he has acquired his knowledged.
With this object, my own course. As well as
that of North Carolina, viii be advertesi
| to.
Though on sectional questions tsuch, l
! mean, as had reference TO slayery,)I usually
acted with the Southern Representatives ;
yet on several occasions, | was, by my
sense Of duty, thrown into collision with the
extreme men Of the South. For example,
/ opposed the twenty-first rule, forbidding
the reception of petitions, because believed
1t OF no advantage to us, and that, by in
creasing the irritation between the sections,
it was strengthening the Abolitionists.
Though opposed the so-called compromise
measures of 1850, and in public speeches ex-
pressed the opinion that the adoption would,
| in few years, endanger the existence of the
| government, yet, in view of the manner in
which they had been passed, / advised the
| people of the South to acquiesce in them, and
endeavor to accommodate themselves to the
| L
sively supported the elections of Pierce and
| Buchanan. As the arrangement between
| the two sections increased, and
! the extreme men on each side
were more violent it became more
and more difficult to pursue con-
sentative course, and, at the same time, re-
tain capacity for usefulness as public man.
voted, in 1858, for the Kansas Bill, which
then passed the House without repeating the
Missouri restriction, in opposition to most of
the Southern Representatives. At the sue
| ceeding session, when it was brought forward
with the repeating clause, | likewise sus-
tanned it. At the session which preceded the
Presidential election of 1860 | earnestly re-
sisted the policy of abandoning the Cincin-
natl platform. | saw and stated to many
that there was to be serious attempt, at
Charleston, to break up the Democratic party
not only to defeat Mr. Douglass, but to af-
ford an occasion for a collision between the
North and the South. In the Senatorial
caucuses and on the floor of the Senate, |
vehemently opposed the resolutions of Mr..
Davis, of Mississippi, declaring that the eff
feet of those resolutions would be to divide
and thus ensure the defeat of the Democratic
party and the consequent success OF the Re
publicans. | declared, further, that this
course would divide the Southern States,
while il would unite the Northern ones, and
thereby greatly increase probability Of a civil
war between the two sections. Even after
the partial rupture at Charleston, and the
passage of Mr.. Davis resolutions, attended
the convention at Baltimore, and labored
earnestly TO effect 4 reconciliation. | be-
heved that IL the Southern States were all
united. and even failed in the election, vet
such guarantees and assurances would be
given in that event by the majority, "A To
prevent serious collision between the North
and the South.
After the complete rupture Of the Demo
cratic party, yielding to the action Of the
North Carolina delegation l supported the
Breckenridge ticket | withheld this sup
port, however, for many weeks, while | ex-
erted myself to get up 4 State Convention in |
North Carolina to promote n Union or a |
single Electoral ticket to be pledged To vote
for any one Of the conservative candidates |
who might have the best chance of Success
| did not abandon my hope OF eliecting this
result until in the month of September |
met Mr.. Douglas at Raleigh, and pressed |
the matter on him, earnestly but unsuccess-
fully.
When Mr. Lincoln had been elected, sec |
ing that some of the cotton States would GER
tainlT secede and believing that war would |
probably occur between them and the Fed |
eral Government, and being convinced that |
in such a contingency North Carolina from |
her geographical and her political position, |
would be drawn into it, | advised the mem |
bers of the Legislature to call a con
vention Immediately in order that the State
might interpose between the parties then |
believed, and still think that if a convention |
of the State had been made a temperate |
demand, il might have obtained such guar
antees or assurances as would have preserved |
the Union without bloodshed. While | |
stated, both publicly and privately, that | |
believed war would be made if necessary, to
compel the Cotton States to remain in the
Union, | thought if before the war COM
menced, a majority Of the Southern States
would act, instead of war, the Administra-
ton of Mr.. Lincoln would give such terms
as would promote ageneral adjustment. Dur
ing the session Of Congress which followed |
sincerely exerted myself to promote the pas-
sage of Mr.. Crittenden's propositions, or any
similar arrangement. | did not abandon
such hopes at the Inauguration Of President
Lincoln, but remained in my place as Sena-
tor to the close Of the extra session.
Soon after the termination Of that session
the war commenced, and the State of North
Carolina, by unanimous vote of her con-
vention, passed an ordinance of secession.
In so voting think every member cor
tectly represented his constituents, and, as
far as | know, every man and woman in the
State subsequently sanctioned that act but
think, with regret. The Singh
lar unanimity then manifested resulted from
the previous position Of the two principal
parties in the State One Of these parties
was termed the secession party" No mem
Der of this party, as far AZ / knew, was in
favor Of seeding from the Union If assured
that the government would be carried on as
it had previously been conducted. They
believed, however from declarations Of Mr.
Lincoln and many Of his prominent sup
porters made prior to his election, that he
would use all the powers and advantages Of
his position to operate against the institution
of slavery, and that sooner or later the South
would be driven to resistance BY force, and
hence they thought it the better policy to sep
lrate at once.
The other party in the State was averse
60 this, and in favor Of awaiting for what
they called an covert act," or some direct
ly hostile demonstration. They insisted
however that the Government Of
the United States had no right to "coerce,"
or make war on a seeding State, and many
prominent men Of the party had taken the
ground that if any such attempt was made
they would resist il. Hence, on the break
ing out of hostilities and the call Of Prcsi-
dent Lincoln for men, this party, with re-
unanimity and alacrity, took |
ground with the Secessionists So great
was the zeal Of many prominent men among
them, that before the assembling Of the con
yention, perhaps AZ many volunteer com
panies had been raised from it, ranks "a
from the original secession party. A the
candidates for the convention that | knew
took ground before the people for secession
in fact though many preferred the term
revolution" When the convention, there
fore, assembled on the 10Th Of May, its ac-
ton was precisely what every one in the
State seemed 10 have anticipated. IL is
proper that / should say that ! had for
years previous condemned the policy Of se-
cession, and insisted that the South would
find il advantageous 70 remain in the Union,
even If force were &c be resorted TO- She
might then have acted in concert with her
friends in the Northern States. For SINH
lar reasons, thought that those who ~
5embled at Montgomery should have pro
posed no change in the constitution. excert |