Litchfield enquirer., 1865-12-21
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WHOLE NO. o11o.

.4 s4sfds c g held that it might be part of the spring campaign to move against Mobile; that it cer. tainly would be if troops enough could be ob. tained to make 1t without embarrassing other movements; that New Orleans would be the point of departure for such an expedition; also that had directed General Steele to make . real move from Arkansas, as suggested hy him, 1 General Banks instead of demonstration, as Steele thought advisable. aoga 9 { On the 31st of March, in addition to the foregoing notification and directions, he was in. structed as follows: ,q 3asasW .lK 1 'Ist. If successful iu your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defence of the Red river to General Steele and the navys 2d. That you abandon Texas entirely with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Graude. This can be held with four thousand [ men, if they will turn their attention immedis, ately to fortifying their positions At least one half of tbe force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops. a.,,,.
 Sd. By properly fortifying on tue Mississip-i pl river, the force to guard it from Port Hud. son to New Orleans can be reduced to ten thousand men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active op- erations can again be resumed west of the river
 According to your last return this would give you force of over thousand effective men with which 10 move against Mobile. To this I ex- pect to add five thousand men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as neces- sary to hold possession of, would say, concen- trate at least twenty-five thousand men of your present command for operations against Mo , bile. With these and such additions as can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in nak- ing demonstration, to be followed by an at- | tack upon Mobile. Two or more iron clads | will be ordered to report to Admiral Faragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to cooperate. You can make your own ar engagements with the Admiral for his co-opera- ton, and select your own line of approach.- My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base, but, from your long ser vice in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter It isintended that your movements shall be co operative with move ments elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. All would now add is, that you com mence the concentration of your fsrces at once. Preserve q profound secrecy of what you in- tend doing. and start at the earliest possible moment
 us. GRANT, Lieutenant-G General
 Major General N. P. BANKS.
 Major General Meade was inMructsd that Lees army would be his objective point; thst wherever Lee went he would go also. For this movement two plans presented themselves One to cross the Rapidan below Lee, moving by the right Aapk the other above moving by the left. Each presented advantages over the other with corresponding objections. By crossing above, Lee would be cut of from all chance of ofignoripg Richmond or going north on raid. But if we took this route all we did would have to be doLe whilst the rations we started with held out besides 1t separated us from Butler, so that he could not be directed
 how to cooperate. If we took the other route
 Brandy Station could be used as base of sup plies until another was secured on the York or James rivers. Of these, however, it was decided to take the lower route.
 The following letter of instruction was ad- dressed to Major General B. F. Butler:
 FoRr MONROE, Va, April 2. 1874. "GENERAL In the spring campaign, which it is desirable shall commence at as early a , day as,practable, it is proposed to have coop. erative action of all the armies in the field, as
 far as this object can be accomplished. e,g "It will not be possible to unite our armies into two or three large ones to act as so many units, owing to the absolute necessity of hol. ding onto the territory already taken from the enemy. But, generally speaking, concentra. ton can be practically effected bv armies mos ving to the interior of the enemyis country
 from the territory they have to guard. By such movemen they interpose themselves be- tween the enemy and the country to be guard ed, thereby reducing the number necessary 10 guard important points, or at least occupy the attention of part of the enemy's force, if no
 greater object is gained. Lees army and Richmond being the greater objects towards which our attention must be directed in the next campaign, it is desirable to unite all the r force we can against them. The necessity ol covering Washington with the army of the Pc l tomac, and of covering your department witi
 your army, makes it impossible to unite these : forces at the beginning of any move. propos, therefore, what comes nearest this ofanythin, s that seems practicable; The army of the Pc l tomac will act from its present base, Lees af g my being the objective point. You will col e lect all the forces from your command the t can be spared from garrison duty, I should sa F not less than twenty thousand effective men- n to operate on the south side of James rive t Richmond being your objective point. Tot e force you already have will be added about te