Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1865-11-10

o'clock, midnight, on the ninth, l coun
termanded the order for the return OF thi
train, and directed preparations to b
made for theretmn of the army 70 Grant
Ecore. The dead were buried and tn,
wounded brought from the field anC
placed in the most comfortable hospitals
that could be provided, and Surgeons ano
supplies provided for them. a second
/ squadron ofcavalry wassent under diree-
/ ton of Mr.. Young, Of the engineer de-
! partment, to inform the fleet Of our ret
roaTadc movement and TO direct its re-
/ turn, if il had a5cended the river, and on
/ the morning of the tenth the army lels-
urelv returned 10 Grand EcOre. The
/ wounded were Immediately visited by
/ DR.. Sanger, who took with him clothing
rations, medicines. and other supplies,
and reported them in comfortable con-
dition
The report of Gen. T. Kilby Smith,
commanding the river forces, states that
the fleet did not arrive at Loggy Bayou
until two O'Clock +. NJ. on the sixteenth
of April two days after the battle at Sa-
bine Cross Roads.
lBy Telegraph
NEW York, Nov. 4.-The Tribune pub
fishes Gen. Banks reportOf the Red river
expedition. The document fills seven
and half pages. The Governments
plans, from the inception of the eXpedi-
ton. are fully detailed. The expedition
was ordered by the Secretary Of War
and by Gen. Halleck, then Commander
in-Chief
The failure Of the expedition is mainly
charged upon the naval force under COM
mand of Admiral Porter Gen. Banks
says the army was delayed sixteen days
at Alexandria by theinability Ofthe navy
TO pass the rapids, and three days at
Grand Ecore, giving the enemy time TO
concentrate, Admiral Porter meanwhile
employing his men and boats in collecting
cotton. In the course of the report, he
uses the following language:
% In view Of the published dispatches of
Admiral Porter, it is proper for me to say
that every position Of difficulty in which
the army was placed nthis campaign was
the immediate and direct consequence of
delayin the operations of thenavy. During
my term of service il has been my inyari-
able rule Of conduct, from which l have
never departed, to fOrbear the expression
of opinion or complaint upon the official
action Of others, but | feel it 10 be
solemn duty 10 say in this official and
formal manner that Admiral POTter's
published official statements relating TO
the campaign are at variance with truth,
of which there are many thousands of
living witnesses, and do foul injustice 70
the officers and solaiers of the army
living and dead Gen. Banks says
partial disintegration of commands was
the cause Of embarrassment, though not
Of failure.
He refers 10 the inability Of Gen. Steele |
to form a junction with the main column, /
the withdrawal of the marine brigade be- !
fore the movement was completed, and /
the fact that Gen. a. J. Smiths COM |
nand could remain with him but thirty 1
lays. He says even had the army /
reached Shreveport it could not have 1
its position there. The snly |
possible method of maintaining the posi- /
ion would have been TO concentrate a /
orce superior in numbers to the enemy, |
With sufficient time TO pursue him when |
sver he should move, even if it took US to .
This was suggested as the possible re-
;ult of the campaign, but was not en-
Jraced within the original plan, and was
pecially ypTecluded by rsreceived from
he Lieutenant-Generalc commanding the
Tmies He declares thatthe enemy was
defeated in every encounter except in
hat at Sabine Cross Road, on the eighth
# April. This defeat l attributed to the
O0se order of march and improper con-
iitiOu of cavalry trains