The weekly sun. (New York [N.Y.]) 1851-1869, 1865-02-11
THE WEEKLY Sun.
Tbe Military situation.
sArrNDAY MoRNING. DID u. IL

The Military situation.
Trr sreat.s, and u,oet important combinations
ofue var are nov in progress, and both sices ire
rr.rarins Er . campaign ths, will probably Jr,'c
dscl.ve n the fate Of The Confed.rsoy. A. the
thsair- 4 var is nov oompr.ssed within cor par
svey narrow cornp.ss IT'S probable hat The
various operations Of Ueners uRASr vii be srnuI'
tsn~ou[ O order W compel the enemy to cover al
no ohisi points Of attack At the same time. large
portion Of the powerful army Of General THOMAS
bas hen u,nherred from the s1uih ven 10 lie
EAs, The whole of the 23I Army Corps, under
sBovIsLp has by This ums reached The Atlantic
otAs, AMI General bE,oHEs with several thou
.and mon from Chs,tsnooga. has already joined
The Army Il the Potomac Re-enf9rcenents from
oiher quarter. are slso said W be 90 their way.
The kno-n position o. our forces indicates tie
losding features Of tho campaign. without revesl-
Ing ne .ira,egic. combinations Which Ar. n
trl,r only known W The Lisuv
Conmencing In virgins, ". aud hist
G-reral snFsrnIS still occupies the loeor
valley Of the Shenandoah, and guards
he N1rth against sudden invasIuu, Al
the sarne SINE threatening LJuchturg and Oar.
vile and the Communications between RcNinont
and thS Southeast. Farther South fnd X co..
rnond threatened by. more formidable force and
and In MOI. real danger thsn Al any former p''od
General GaASr s daily pushing slowly, indeed,
tui nois,lss.y and irrcssthly. his cham n 'oru.
sc,sons nearer h N. doomed city In S1r,h Caro-
ms the operations Of h gh strategic Importance.
Gon TrEtr has rcceivci large roiutorccmontI, and
his movements all p1iat 10 q cooperation With The
two linton armies nth sni South under Generals
GF.yr sud snEsu.S, respectively Ahc.vy force
IL ssd 70 be ascending the Ch'-au River In
he direction ~ Weldon. Whether this mogemcnt
tnvoIg', the postponement Of the expedition
sg,inI Wilmington rernsins to.bc soou. weldon
ard LyU0hhgrg are the hack doors w &C.. mond,
snd me g. secession II cither of these raocs would
compel tho cy.oIauon ~ that city within \ very
tref pcr ID. The advAncc on Wilmington would
plsoe General Tr1RT's forces within more
direct supporting distance Il General Sum
Man, upon whose movements the complexion
~ the whole campaign chiefly turns. lie Is the
hsmm-r that Ia ~ brosk the ConiederAcy against
the GRA,T anvil Al Petersburg. on his movement.
itis almost useless W speculate, As his strategy
10 character that battles tho skill q tho shreWi-
eet reh>l generals All that IL known of him pou.
lively, IL that he 10 now operating In South Ctro-
"a II Ia stated that he "a throstoning Augusta,
but the probability that his movements In that
direction arc intended " cover attack
Drsnctvue, situate midway between that city and
Charleston, and the centre Of railroad communic,
tionsiu south Carolina aud ibc AIsnnc tier Of states.
The rcbcls are evidently putting forth their utmor,
powers to avert the blows which are sbou, 10 fall
upon them. II u not improbable tina, SHmxAr
mag oxpcrienco a more formidable opposition In
~
capturc OF Atlanta Its sll important 10 the rehos
to chek him, his success would he no less fatal
to the Coniolerscy than he defeat Of Lass army.
BrArREGAED snd HAspUs forcos may roach, 4
they no, exceed twenty Ave thousand men
An army Of this size, properly organized and ed.
and acting strictly on the defensive, is capable Of
opposing serious obstacles, 10 the success Of Gen
eral snnsAS's plans. But the rebel general,hip,
though not Of high order, Is vastly superior 10
The morale Of the troops who have boen r,pestoily
tcston, and who mus feel . conscious infcrioriiy
~ General SBERNA''s irresistible leg.iops The
presige Of snEEsAr's army ia equal to a reinforce.
men, Of twenty thousand veterans IN sny pitched
battle that usy he fought
lhs REVIEW n the situation necessarily over
looks many points Of interest which cannot he
revealed Al the present time without prejudice 10
he pubic Seryice. But IL Is sufficiently apparent
hat there arc reasonable grounds for snnci psuug
he mos' decisive Idysntagoa We may no, during
the winter and spring campaigns schiove the final
suppression OF he rebellion, In the rebels are
determined to hold ont 10 tho bitter end bu, We
can, and probably ~il occupy all the Atlantic
Satoe as eieetuAlly and surely as We hold tho
South wes, and thus narrow tho war between ,he
ocean snd the Aisslrsippi W mere petty guorrill,
operations. For ths Trans ississppi region. I.
summer and fall campaign may ho necessary. The
sctusl military condition Of the souihern ,nsur-
scns would alone invest the poaeo movement,
with orediblhy. Bus even tho obduracy and false
pride of the retel leaders only postpone, with
out sv'rtng,iher hnAl doom IN ease Of continued
tesiHtBuco.