The Norfolk post. [volume] (Norfolk, Va.) 1865-1866, 1865-07-24
Col. Comstock, of Gen. Grants staff.

reported to Gen. Butler that in his opnian nv, pn
upon Fort Fisher would be impracteable
Questionable you accompany Gen. Weitzel on that
| examination ? H5t
"Answer-I not with General weitzel at that
| examination "
aQueston-To what conclusion did you come in regard
to the practcabilty of an assault upon the work that
| timer
| "Answer-I cannot say that formed definite opn.
ion at the time as the question of ASSEMBLING had areay
been decided upon the report of Gen Weitzel cannot
perhaps give definite to that question: because
allow my subsequent knowledge of the work to affect
my opinion somewhat.
''Question-Was it a strong work
"Answer--It was. will endeavor to answer the qies
ton somewhat in detail / the work the first time
about the same time that General Weitzel did, and at
about the distance AT that time of our men
had been in the work. L counted think Ii guns not
injured, far we could see thought the work at
that time very difficult of ASSAULT thought then the
chances otsuccess were more than Later, howey-
perhaps half or three quarters of hour aferwar
l Gen. Curtis, and he told me that some ofhis men
had been in the work. that horse had been taken out
of he fcrt and that the flag had been taken off the pal
pet by one Of his men, and that there not more
than 20 Rebels inside ofte work, and that he beevedhe
could take it with so men, asked questions about
his sources OF information and he then said he edud
take it with brigade If had been in command of the
forces that point, should have made the trial take
the fort simply because his men felt or thought they
could go into the fort My opinion to the practicable
tyof assault when first saw the work. was changed
subsequently by the statement of Gen. Curtis aud the
men who had been in the work. Is
"Queson-0n the slppostion that the work was really
not properly manned by the enemy?
"Answer-That was Gen. Curtiss idea l did not think
supposed tho all in the boomproos and
thought that if the enemy would let the get up
close as Cen Cutiss men did thought it possible that
confident could rush in in time to shut the rebels up
in their bombproos. II the men had not had strong
belief that they could get ill., should have thought the
chances Of success were small But with such belieas
that, 500 men could have done anything sH5z
"Question-Wth the information that Gen. Weitzel
had would you have agreed with him, independent Of
what Gen. Curtis said to you.
.Answer-I should from the information had at that
time.' =a.
In relation to the strength of the gar
rison of Fort Fisher and the effect of the
bombardment, the Rebel Gen. Whiting
(while wounded and prisoner), just be-
fore his death, stated, in answer to ques-
ton sent him by Gen. Butler, that
"Eive (5) companies Of the Both Regiment North Caro-
lima troops, and Adamss light battery, amounting to six
hundred and sixty GOD aggregate, the number
the garrison at Fort Fisher the leth 18th and 18th
ION the 23d 10 men, veteran artillery OF the 10th
Regiment North Carolina troops, so sailors and tho 18th
Battalion Junior Reserves about $50 strong were thrown
Question lsPcase whether part and if So how
much Of the damage done to the fort by the tire Of h
| navy repaired during the nighty
| "Auswcr-Casualties first day: Killed none wounded
a. mortally, three % severely, and nineteen 90
slightly; total %. Five (5) gun-cai1iagcs disabled
"Second day Killcd three (3): wounded nine (9) NOR
tally, six (6 severely, and wcntyeigh (2) slightly to
tai 40. Damage but very slight; one O. 1oncl, two e
~ 10-inch gun disabled Damage repaired at night
Encmys fire formidable and difusc uncon
contracted Apparent design OF the fleet to silence the
channel batteries in order to force entrance with his
vessels and not to attack by land The garrison
no instance driven from its guns, and fired in retnrn
cofdns to orders, slowly and deliberately six hundred
| and sxty-two (662) shot and shells.
"Quostion 1iBy of the cessation of the bonn
bardment at night you not able to rest and recruit
| your garrison?
"Answer-We were able to do both
"Queson 15At the time of the landing where the
I .t.,...f fI,. f.,k2
"Answer-Assembling at Sugar Loaf as fast Hoke's
pcoplearriyed
'Qucstion 17-At the time our skirmish line was de-
ployed before the fort what the condition the guns
and defences upon the land side to efficiency for
| fensiye purposeY
"Answer-The guns and defeinces on the land from,
in perfect order at the time referred to- except two
(2 disabled gus the left nineteen guns in position
palisade in perfect order, and the mines the same the
| wires not having been cut.
Question 1sIn view of the condition of the fort and its
garrison would it have been possible. with either three
t3) or SIX 6 thousand men to have taken the work by
assault? (No-1n answering this question please give
as many OF the details for the you may give
possble)
Enthusiastically yes. Probably. no. The work was
very strong, the garrison in good spirits and ready
the fire the approaches 1.-THE assautng column having
cover would have been extraordinarily heavy. In
addition to the heavy guns, had battery Of Napoleons,
which placed great reliance. the paisade alone
would have been most formidable obstacle"
Upon the report of Gen. Weitzel and
that it was not advisable to make an as
sault. 1t will be remembered that Gen.
Weitzel was the officer whom General
Grant says he intended should command
the land forces accompanying the expe-
dtion, and Col. Comstoclz was an officer
upon Gen. Grants staff. Both the Of
fcers were engineer officers of skill and
ability, competent to judge of defensive
works.
1t will be observed, upon examination
of the testimony, that the naval officers
who testified before your Committee
were of the opinion that Fort Fisher
was much more injured by the bonn
bardment, and therefore could be more
easily carried by assault, than it was in
the opinion of the army officers.
Gen. Butler also determined to with
draw the troops he had landed and to re-
turn to Fortress Monroe. In this he |
may not have complied strictly with the
letter of his instructions from General
Grant.
Gen. Butler states in his testimony: |
II will state what determined my mind against remain
ing on the beach near Fort Fisher was by no means
unmndfui of the instructions of the Lieutenant General
He had directed remain if had ELECTED landing
If had effected landing should have renamed But
landing REQUIRES something than to land 500
men out of $500 beach, with nothing but 40 rounds
in their cartridge boxes and where their supplies would
he driven off the first storm. did not think that
landing within my instructions, therefore deemed it
much better for the country to withdraw, did that it
was much less risk and much better for the future for
if il was necessary, sufficient number of men could hold
the line of communication from Masonborough inlet
down TO Fort Fsher and ifthey could be spared from
tho armies around Richmond could be sent down there
where they could 60 in with six feet of water and from
thence operate against Fort Fisher they could come pr
pared for a siege and remain there.
}y going away would draw off the enemy's atten-
ton If remained there it would keep his forces con
cenated that point; and if driven away by the
that was coming up, then should lose the men
had landed. acted for the best according to tho fight
hain l--
General Weitzel testifies:
"Queson-pd you and General Butler fully concur in
everything relating to the expedition and execution oft
what was done after the expedition sailed from
Fortress Monroe?
"AnsUer-fes, sir; that is so far as had iuforma-
ton.
Question-Was there anything done, or omitted to be
done which You would have DONE or omitted If YOU
had had full command OF the expedition.
=" Answer-Ycs, sir. Ii had the instructions that
General Grant gave General Butler would have done
one thing that General Butler did do; would have
enreIehed and remained there should certainly have
done that: and have written to General Butler that
was sorry he did not show that letter of instructions
that could have advised him about that There is
where General Butler clearly made mistake The order
seems to be explicit that he should remain there No
matter what the difficulties were that order would have
covered him from any consequences.
"Question-Did the condition OF things exist tne4e
which that order contemplated
'Answer-I think 49, A.,
"QuestionIn relation to the landing OF Troops, a. 4,