The Norfolk post. [volume] (Norfolk, Va.) 1865-1866, 1865-12-09

follow him up to The full extent of hi
! ability, while | prevent the concentra
ton of Lee upon him il it was in tn
power OF the army of the Potomac 1
do so. More specific written instruction
were not given, for the reason that ha,
talked over with him the plans of th
campaign, and was satisfied that he nj,
derstood them and would execute then
TO the fullest extent possible
Eewhere he adds: ,I aE
II may state that, commanding a
| the armies as did, tried as far as pos
sible. to leave General Meade i'm indt
pendent command of the army of th
Potomac. My instructions for that arm
We're all Through him, and were genera
in their nature, leaving all the detail
and the execution to him. The cam
paigns that followed proved him to b.
the right man in the right place. Hi
commanding always in the presence o
an officer superior 10 him in rank, ha'
drawn from him much of that public
attention that his zeal and ability entitlt
him to, and which he would otherwise
have received e Lna ntaa
BuTLERs MOVEMENT AGAINST RICHMOND.
General Grant does not commend
General Buffers military operations.
OF the early movement against Rich
mond he gives the history, and the fol-
lowing comment, which we extract
from the text: .tfl
MY first object being to break the
military power of the rebellion and cap.
ture the enemy's strongholds, made me
DESTROYS that General Butler should sue
ceed in his movements against Rich
mOnd, as that would tend more than
anything else, unless IL were the capture
of Lees army, to accomplish thisdesired
result in the East. If he fniled, it was
my determination, by hard fighting.
either TO compel Lee to retreat, or to 50
cripple him that he could not detach d
large force to go north and still retain
enough for the defence of Richmond.
II was well understood, by both Generals
Butler and Meade, before starting OIsthe
campaign. that it was my intention to
put both theirarmies south Of the James
river in case of failure to destroy Lee
without it, e.f.'-. Is,..,,i' -.isi
Before giving General Rntler his ie,-
structions, ! visited him at Fortress
Monroe, and in conversation pointed out
the apparent Importance of getting pos
session or Petersburg and destroying
railroad communication rs far south as
possible. N.Ha
believing, however, In the practical
bility of capturing Richmond unless il
was reinforced, | made that the objec-
tive point of his operations. AS the
Army of the Potomac was to move ST.
multaneousiy with him, Lee coulp not
detach from his army with safety, and
al nj IA a,,I. L.,
to bring to the defence of the city in time
to meet n rapid movement from the
north of James river.
"On the evening of the 18th and norm
ing of the 14th he carried a portion of the
enemy's first line OF defences at Drury,s
Bluff, or Fort Darling. with small loss
The time thus consumed from the 9th
lost to us the benefit of the surprise and
capture of Richmond and Petersburg,
enabling, as it did, Beauregard to col
lect his loose forces in North and South
Carolina and bring them to the defence
of those places. On the 10th the enemy
attacked General Butler ia his position
in front of Drury's Bluff. He was forced
back, or drew back, into his intrench-
ments between the forts OF the james
and Appomattox rivers, the enemy in
trenching strongly i'm his front, thus
covering his railroads, the city, and all
that was valuable to him. His army,
therefore, though in position of great
security, was as completely shut off
from further operations directly against
Richmond as IL 1t had been in bottle
strongly corked. tt required but Z com
parativcly small force of the enemy to
hold it there.
"The army sent to operate
against Richmond having Theoretically
sealed itselfup at Bermuda Hundreds,
the enemy was enabled to bring the
most if not all the endorsements
brought from the south by Beauregard
against the army of the Potomac. In ad
dition to this reinforcement, very
considerable one, probably not less than
fifteen thousand men, was obtained iiy
calling in the scattered troops under
Breckinridge from the western part of
Virginia.
1.-The position at Bermuda Hundred
was as easy to defend as it was difficult
to operate from against the enemy. /
determined, therefore, to bring from it
all available forces, leaving enough only
to secure what had been gained, and de-
cordingly, on the 22nd, | directed that
they be sent forward, under command
of Major General w. T.. Smith, to join
the army of the Potomac. ~
OPERATIONS AGAINST RICHMOND.
"My idea, from the start, had been to
beat Lees army north of Richmond if
possible. Then, after destroying his
lines of communication north Of the
James river, to transfer the army to the
south side aud besiege Lee i'm Richmond.
or follow him south ii he should retreat.
A fter the battle of the Wilderness 10 was
evident that the enemy deemed it of the
first importance to run no risks with the
army he then had. He acted purely on
the defensive behind brcastworks. OF
feebly on the offensive immediately i'm
front of them, and where, in case of re.
pulse, he could easily retire behind
them. Without greater sacrifice of If.
than was willing to make, all could
not be accomplished that | had designed
north of Richmond. l therefore deter.
mined to continue to hold substantially
the ground We then occupied, taking nd
vantage of any favorable circumstances
that mightpresent themselves until the
cavalry could he sent to Charlottesville
and Gordonsville, to effactually break ur
railroad connection between Richmond
and the Shenandoah Valley and Lynch
burg; and, when the cavaly got well off,
to move the army to the south side OF
the James river, by the enemy's right
flank, where ! felt could cut off his
eonrces of supply except by the canal,
During three long years the
armies of the Potomac and Northern
Virginia had been confronting each