The Norfolk post. [volume] (Norfolk, Va.) 1865-1866, 1865-10-17

Others monthly :. - 49,, - b,
yours and McPhersons in opening the
Mississippi, an achievement the import j
ance of which cannot he over-estlmatea.
81 beg to assure you of my deep per-
sonal attachment, and to express tho
hope that the chances of war will leave
me to serve near and under you till the
dawn of that peace for which we are
contending, with the only purpose that
1t shall be honorable and lasting. buff
THE STORY OF THE vICKsBURG PROTEST. H
Col. Bowman thus tells the true story
of the "protest said to have been
written by Sherman against Grants
plan for the capture of Vicksburg:
1t has been alleged in some of the
newspapers of the day, that while the
army was encamped at Young's Point,
Gen. sherman handed to Gen. Grant q
written protest against the proposed
movement on Grand Gulf, and the state-
ment has been coupled with such ashow-
| of circumstances as to obtain ready Gre
dence in many quarters. In fact, Gen.
Sherman never protested, either in writ
ing or verbally, against any movement
ever proposed or adopted by Gen. Grant;
and throughout the entire campaign
these two commanders acted together in
perfect harmony and cordiality; the
COMMUNICATIVE freely and con-
stantly availing himself of Sherman's
advice, the subordinate promptly ana
faithfully carrying out the orders OF his
superior. But the movement on Grand
j Gulf was not Gen. Sherman's plan. 1t
was the conception of Gen. Grants own
mind, and was adopted by him, against
the opinion, though with the full con-
sent and support of the Executive
Sherman considered the north front OF
Vicksburg the true point of attack, and
the line of the Yallabusha the best base
of operation. On the Sth Of April he
frankly expressed this opinion to Cen
eral Grant in the following commune
cation: #4s5 E.. .-.... .. -
! ~ would most respectfully suggest
that General Grant call on his corps
commanders for their opinions, concise.
and positive, on the best general plan OF
campaign. ... r,-.. .g.
my own opinions are: ....I ill.,.
THAT the Army of the Tennessee IS
, far in advance of the other grand armies.
: Second--That corps from Missouri
. should forthwith be moved from st.
J Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Ar
kansas, supplies collected while the river
il full, and land communication with
| OpOhCu opCISu W V"y " A0|
: Ark, on the White and Madison, on the
st. Francis rivers. g..-,..l.r =
= Third-That as much OF Yazoo Pass,
O Coldwater and Tallahatchee rivers as can
h be regained and fortified be held, and
!. tho main army he transported thither by
. land or water that the road back to
!, | Memphis be secured and reopened, and
r as soon as the waters subside, Grenada
= be attacked, and the swamp road across
Is to Helena be patroled by cavalry.
h Fourtl-'rhat the line of the YaIla'
a busha be the base from which to operate
II against the points where the Mississippi
,o Central crosses Big Black above Canton,
ia and, lastly, where the Nicksburg aud
vi jackson railroad crosses the same river.
nt The capture of Vicksburg would result.
va Fifth-That force be left III this
r. vicinity not to exceed ten thousand men,
NO with only enough steamboats, to float
vi and transport them to any desired point.
20 This force to be held always nearenough
~ TO act with the gunboats, when The main
,t army is known to be near Vicksburg,
"a Haines Bluff or Yazoo City.
N "The chief reason for operating solely
" " by water was the season of the year and
= high-water in Tallahatchee and Yalla-
a busha. The spring is now here, and
= soon these streams will be no serious Oh
= stacle, save the ambuscades of forest and
# whatever works the enemy may have
- erected at or near Grenada. North Mis-
II sissippi is too valuable TO allow them to
n hold and make crops. ...
+. 81 make these suggestions with the
l. request that General Grant simply read
70 them, and simply give them, as know
al he will, a share of his thoughts. ! would
prefer he should not answer them, but
"a merely give them as much or rs little
q. weight as they deserve" ..,.-
- And he added in conclusion
m "Whatever plan OF action he may
. adopt will receive from me the same
y Jealous CO. operation and energetic SUPP
,e port as though conceived by myself"
of SHERMAN PROPOSES HIS GREAT MARCH ''
Sherman had previously proposed to
General Grant, in the early stages OF the
4 pursuit, to break up the railway from
- Chattanooga to Atlanta, and strike Out
% for Milledgeville, Millen and Savannah.
e Until we can repopulate Georgia." he
n wrote. sit is useless to occupy 1t but
the utter destruction of its roads, houses
. an people will cripple their military
D resources. By attempting to bold the
r roads we will lose q thousand men
e monthly, and will gain no result. can
e make the march,. and make Georgis
!, how'll And, again: Hood may turl,
6 l1LO tennessee anu heutuSnyi p"e
o believe he will be foi ced to follow me
Instead of being on the defensive VIII
e be ON the offensive. Ins,tea OF guess
d ing at what he means, he would nave U
), guess at my plans. The difference N
e war is fully twenty-five per cent. car
d make Savannah, Charleston, or tht
10 mouth of the Chattahooche. prefer u
d march through Georgia, smashing
is things, to the sea-" He now proposed
lr to the Lieutenant-G eneral to modify
ct these plans, so far as to give him the
of choice of either of the three alternatives
v, just named. '
al ~ must have alternatives" he said,
I'd :" else being confined to one route the
lis enemy might so oppose that delay and
10 want would trouble me, but having ai-
~ ternatives / can take so eccentric
re course that no general can guess at my
Id objective. Therefore, when you near L
90 am off have lookouts at Morris lsIans,
p S. c.. Ossabaw Sound, Georgia; Fensa-
re cola and Mobile bays. l will tnn up
.o somewhere. and believe me l cai take
I'M Macon, Milledgeville, Augusta ard Sa-
,r vannah Georgia, and wind up with
:" closing the neck back Of Charleston, 80