Cleveland daily leader. [volume] ([Cleveland, Ohio]) 1865-1873, 1865-12-14
"The Dogs Of war Let Loose" on Gen

titled Lieutenant General Grants Re
port accuses the Lieutenant General of
writing under the "~inHuence of p%artiali-
ties and prsjudices." 1t says:
aIieutenant General Grant, in his re-
port, finds nothing c~ommendable in But
Ter. but in his statement of everything
done by Butler, either directly censures
him, or indirectly condemns him. While,
although almost every move, blythe Army
Of the Potomac, so called, under Meade,
was a defeat, until the final closing scene,
when Sherman's march drew Lee from
Richmond, yet the bare recital of the facts
are given by Grant, withoutone word of
comment or one syllable of eensure, but
the highest possible compliment paid to
General Meade, its commander.
Buffers falling back from Drury's
Bluff on the 10th of May, and intrenching
himself Grant speaks Of as being lin a
bottle strongly eorked, not even giving
Butler any credit for gaining a safe posi-
tien. On the other hand, when Hunter
made his march from the Kanawha to
Lynchburg, in the same month, that Off
Ger was ordered to march by the way of
Charlottesvllle;ye yet he saw ftto go by way
Or UeXIngton, ana Jnls was met aC Lynch
burg by the rebels, and obliged, from want
Of ammunition, to retreatto the Ksnawha."
All of which is as far from the truth as
ignorance or malice could make it. Gen.
Grants career has been marked by an en-
tire absence of the traits of character here
attributed to him. In order to sustain its
assertion, the Herald assails Generals
Meade and Hunter, whilst it enters into
a glowing ~panegyric of Gen. Butler. Let
Us look at the facts, for it is in the light of
truth alone that these questions can be
finally settled. At the opening of the
spring campaign of 1864, Gen. Meade's
army occupied a position on the north
bank of the Rapidan, confronted by Lee
on the south side, whilst Butler held For
tress Monroe with the Army of the James.
Meade's collective point" was Lees army.
Buffers collective point7lwas Richmond.
So directed the Lieutenant General. Both
Armies were to move on the 4th day of
May. Meade was to attack Lee and
press him closely. Butler was to move
up the south side of the james river and
demonstrate directly against Richmond.
Buffers movement would necessitate the
weakening of Lee 5 army to defend the rebel
capital, else the surrender of it into our
hands. The former would enable Meade
TO whip and drive Lee; the latter would
place Buffers army in the intrenchments
Of Richmond and in the rear of Lee, who
could then be crushed between the two
armies. The movement was begun BY
both armies on the 4th, as appointed. On
The 9TH Butler occupied City Point with
out opposition, and on the 9th had his en-
tire command in position there. This was
he point Gen. Grant had directed him to
secure as a base, and so far all had gone
well. The rebel force had been in the
main concentrated in Meade's front, leav-
ing Buffers line of advance comparative
Iy unobstructed. Instead of pushing for
ward Immediately toward Richmond, But
Ter seemed to forget that the movement of
bic army wee designed 10 be Of on-oEen-
sive character, and took up and fortified a
defensive position betwee the James and
The Appomattox rivers at their confluence.
The time, frem his arrival at City Point
IN the 9Th, to his partially successful at
tack on Drury's Bluff on the 18th, seems to
have been occupied in araid on the Pc
sersburgh and Richmond railroad, and
in Preparations for defense. This delay
enabled the enemy TO collect their scat
sere4 forces in the Carolinas and bring
themup to checkmate Butler. On the 9Th
they attacked and drove him back into his
intrenchments. This enabled them to for
tify and hold a line in his front, covering
Petersburg, Richmond and their lines of
communication. Buffers position here
Is thus described by the Lieutenant Gen
eral; His army, though in a position of
great security, was as completely shut of
from further operations directly against
Richmond as if it had been in a bottle
strongly corked."
During the week that Butler delayed,
.hils leaving Lees whole army to oppose
the Army Of the Potomac was en-
lbled to advance only by the most deter
mined bravery and the most obstinate
perseverance,. Had Butler advanced as
as his instructions contemplated,
would have been compelled to lose
Richmond or detach troops for its defence.
Either would have secured a brilliant sue
to our arms. In the face Of these
how presumptuous for Buffers
to assert, as the Herald does, that
I almost every move by the Army of the
Potomac, so called, under Meade, was a
1t is a perversion of the truth !
md a base SANDER upon the heroes of the {
Wilderness, Spottsylvania, Cold Harbor, /
md other well-fought fields. Notwith- :
the failure Of Butler to create a :
INVERSION in Meade's favor, the Army of j
he Potomac whipped Lee and drove him :
hiszintSsnehReRts 4 Wilder 5
ness on the 5th and 9Th of May, and then
his position on the 18th. Although
column failed to be cooperative,
the Army of the Potomac drove Lee from
the Rapidan TO the North Anna during
The time occupied by Butler in taking up
a asafe position" I'll
Butler S u~naccountable delay dcranged
the whole plan of the movement and pro-
the campaign from a few days or
weeks to eleven months. For this he de-
to be written down a strategist. But
this was not his only blunder. His mill
tary career was conspicuous only as one
of failure, so far as military strategy was
concerned. His single strategic achieve
ment5 was the opening of the Annapolis
to Washington early in the war.
For this let him have proper crediti but
unless he desires a full ventilation of his
of folly as a commander in the
field, let him call of his dogs now snap-
ping and s%narling at the heels of one who
IS his superior not only in rank, but
in military skill and moral worth.
The kindly manner in which General
Grant alludes to.the Shortcomings ofGen.
is illustrative of his disposition to
be lenient with subordinates who did
passably WE'LL General Hunter did
" 3