Washington telegraph., 1865-03-22

tcipaiing any serieus resistance till near Shrevc-
port, he expected to communicate with tho f1et
froH, Mansfield; distant from the river about tif-
teen or twenty miles. He doubtless hoped to
hear from St.@ls, and would then direct his ar-
my upon Shreveport or Marshall as to intrli-
genca received might determine him
General Smith now instructed General Tay-
lor to choose position suitable for . crcisive
battle. to compel the eneny TO dsvelopc liz
Intentions" and when Convinced that gen
eral advance was being made /" to notify him
and he would "core 10 the front"
General Taylor, who WAS then ia the rear of
Mansfield, moved with his ~h0ls forc- lrO Or
,hrss miles to the front Of that place, and ssUn
became engaged with ths enemys iEiantry.-
The Reconnaissance was converted into battle.
An impstuens charge If Mouson's Division On
the left broke the cneny's liEn Of battle, walk
or advancing o. .he .ht. completed their rout
The road running through bIshy country,
was encum5ered by a TAIN OF two HUNDRED
wagons, ali Of which, with twenty odd ,i-ces
OF artillery, were captured. General Taylor
pressing Oh about six miles, came upon another
army corps, which Lie engaged unliI darkness
terminated the fighting for The day.
Fortune had favored tie vaTor Of our troops
and justified the dissemination Of General Tav-
lor to engage in : battle. Two divisions Of the
18th army corps, with three or four thousand
cavalry, had been caught out vi supporting dis
tance Of other corps, and had been completely
GFLIlhIOWh A A1 AAAu DEcn desperate,
and the loss severe Oh bOtl sides The enemy
had however the 18th army corps intact, and
A. j. Smiths command, amounting to aEcthsr
cerps untouched.
being snort of supplies, with large train
captured, Banks Was obliged to fall back to
Grand Ecore. His trains were reversed, and no
took position at Pleasant Hill to cover the re-
treat There General Tay lo--pow reinforced
by the Missouri and Arkansas trsops--found
him on tho evening OF the next day, and At
once attacked him. Our left was again success
ful ia driving him from his position; but cur
right was repulsed and routed Many erplana-
tions have been offered OF this failure but il a.
doubtless owing 70 shs good quality and over
poweTing numbers IT the enrmy's troops.
This j. the key ID the great ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS =
of .hs campaign By you Pleasant Hill II claim
ed as a victory. whereas i was a dcfsa. for Is
Our army fell back % Mansfield. twenty
miles. TIE enemy also continued III. retreat
! 10 Grand Ecors.
Possibly Il fresh cavalry rad been at hand TO
puI sue, thl decentralization ct the eL~my might
raYe Lecn effected; Tut all Of ours WAS exhaust
ed 1T was just up from long marches through
Texas. and had been constantly engaged tor
tnrer or four days, Hi.h little or no forage
Before o4T army w1s i'll condition To move from
Mansfield. the enemy was entrrleh- AZ Grand
Ecore, snd supported by gun boats. The river
was low and continually falling. The Acct
AIEE 4LAI ESrtHlrQ w LLt HOlAA 81 Commune
cation agreed upon, found itself in . very pre-
cariou. situation. 1t had to be lost or retu rn;
which j. did, being necessarily annoyed by our
cavalry and light artillery.
when The battle ofPlessant Hill was fought,
Stuels wss still advancing He had cIossrd the
Liiti. Missouri with excellent army Of IL, 900
Izen; having beenj Joined Dy ThaycT FROM Fort
Smith.
This i the time when il is alleged General
Smith made his great mistake ia not pursuing
tsanEs.
Let Us examine the reasons which determined
him.
III Is very natural thst the people both of Lou
isianA ana Arkansas should lhink that their re-
spactive STATES were thc most important. His
tnry teaches VI Also, that unfortunate command
ers Of armies and districts with thlir eyes fxed
upon their own lcc4iities ard the enemy oppos-
ael ~ them, and with ihe natural desire ot dis
tincfioh ana suecrAs, are Pronc 70 magnify the
importance Of their position. and tC think that
they should Ne especially reinforced But the
GeI-rssl commanding department, dependent
uyau Itself for its means oi defence and offence,
tuust TAX, y survey d the whole Gold Of action,
and n,ust q, aide upon lis owa responsibility
v hat Is best iOF III whole cause. H is not 80
look 10 the wiuAicg ot battle alone; he must
win campaigns he subordinate Cfi.er il Civ
IN an army and dire, tel " operate with il for
specific objects. III 1t i .9st, he higher author
ity is expected to supply u. a!ace a command
~ in General Smiths position, charged with Inc
defence of an immense t-rritery, Stl lnsuff-
cient lI-ans and isolated from all support cam
not lightly jropRrdizc al army whose loss h
cannot repair; nor allow one column OF an eng
"a to seize upon arsenals, cvpots, wOrkshorsi
etc. although by permitting it Ar might win
rcnown. OF possibly iatict great loss upon him
in another quarter
On the one hand, Banks with force, double
.I 4. ~ a
EcoEe. supporte- by gun boats. He hA1 TWO
pontvoR bridges established, - that it ae desired
~ avoid, oT was ~orsttl il an engagement, lie
could cross the river, md Dy marching down its
left baRk or over the country 70 the Ouachi.a
At HarTisOnbuIg-TrleYe Himself from molcsta-
ton by OH army
The country being destitute Of supplies, It
was impossible 70 diHlodge him by undertaking
A sustained operation upon LIS communication.
4. would have been simple madnss, to march
up aud assault in it, then position .ho army
which We had failed to whip in fair 6eid at
Pleasant Hill. Finally, Lad Banks b. en- driven
to the AtchafalAya, tho caIupaigH would have
terminated, AS tie gHnUoaIs controlled that
stream.
On The other hand, Sts-le ith a force not
larger than Gen. Smith could bring against
HIM. h a come oat Of his fsrtihcations, and was
now distant from them over one hundred miles.
Ii LIS could b. reached and his Infantry disor-
ucr6d-his army would come tEs prey Of our
cavalry. with lis army. ~oaId fall tile ioriifca-
cations Of Little Rock, Pine Blud and Duvslls
Bluff, giving us control Of Northern Arkansas,
where II was known ne could obtain ten shsu-
sand recruits. The political organizations
which The nemy were ildxstrioasly establish
ing. would b. broken up, and the way would
bo opened to Missouri tor cur infantry.
Again uith Banks ~ Grand Ecore-siUnn-d
it is true, bu. not seriously hurt-a renewal Of
the advance was not a. Ill improbable, either
upen the original plan. Or upsn the north side
Ut the BED river; locking 10 a junction with
Sterile il this ueiE hborh0od Of AiadeR. This
would have made their combined armies irrr-
sistible In this position OF affairs Gen. Smith
did not feel himself at liberty 10 allow Steele
either 10 advance upon hi- dcpets, Or to estab-
lish himself in the valley Of tie Ouachita- Is
wa4 known that the President hsd almost de-
rianded that an effort to re-occGpy the vaily OF
the Arkansas be made. Finally, ths Arkansas
troops had marched without hesitation or Inur-
mur 10 relieve LouisiRnA, and both they and
the citizens confidently relied on tine command
ing General for succor soon a. it was in his
power 10 afford II.
The Arkansas and Missouri troops, and
Walkers oIvisicn Of Texans were brought
back 10 Sin vvepsrt. with G1a- Taylor in com
mand; Gen. P0lignac being lett 10 observe Cen.
banks.
When they reached Shreveport, Steele. whs
had hcsitatrd af Prairie Dan, moved by bis