The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1865-06-16
The Battles Before Richmond.
The Pursuit Of Lee.
Reports Of Meade and Sheridan.
Special Dispatch to the Cinennaii Gszeits.,
WAaHSGroN, June IS.
GEN. MEApEs REPORT.

4 RA4A5G " GAG Otn OOA 20 AOA VIZ SA~-AC
had in the campaign. The following
the concluding paragraph OF the II
port:
i 81 would call special attention to tn
handsome repulse of the enemy b
Grifin's Division of the 5th Corps ol
the 29th ultimo; to the important par
taken by the 5th Corps in the battle o
Five Forks; to the gallant assault on th'
ID lust, by the 9th Corps-in my judg
nent the decisive movement ofthe cam
paign; to the successful attack of thu
9th Corps in the battle Of Sailor Creek
to the gallant assault on the I'd inst, o
Of the 9th Corps, and the frmness anC
tenacity with which the advantages
then gained were held against all as
saults of the enemy; to the brilliant at
tack of Miles division and corps al
Sutherland's Station; to the energetic
pursuit and attack of the enemy by
the I'd Corps on the 9th inst, termina-
ting in the battle of Sailors Creek, and
to the prompt pursuit the next day
with BarloW's and Miles attacks, as all
evincing the fact that this army, Off
GERS and men, all nobly did their duty,
and deserve the thanks of the country.
Nothing could exceed the cheerfuiness
with which all submitted to fatigue
and privstions to secure the coveted
prize, the capture of the Army Of North
ern Virginia"
sHERIDAS's REPORT.
Gen. Sheridan has also made his re-
port of the operations of the cavalry,
and such other forces as were under his
command in the closing campaign in
Virginia It bears date May 10Th, and
would make about three and half col.
umns of your paper. 1t is written In
his spirited style. he says the effect
i've cavalry force was 9 thousand men
His FIRST orders were to make 8 raid on
the Southside railroad, and thence join
Gen. Sherman, or return to Petersburg,
as circumstances might dictate; but ST
ter he had started, and during the
night of March oath, Gen. Grant sent
him instructions TO abandon the con-
templated raid, and act with the in
fantry under bis immediate command,
and if possible turn the right flank of
Lees army.
Gen. Sheridan then details the op-
CREATIONS of the Both ult, which resulted
in the forcing back and partial discom-
'6ture Of our forces He then contin-
ues:
During the night of the 3lst of
March, my headquarters were at Din.
widdio Court House, and the Lieuten-
ant General notified me that the 5th
corps would report to me, and should
reach me by midnight This corps had
been offered to me on the 30th inst
but very much desiring the 9th corps,
which had been with mein the Shepan-
doah, asked for it, but on account of
the delay which occurred in moving
that corps from its position on the line
in front of Petersburg, it could not be
sent to me-" alls Il'
At3 q m. on April LIST Gen. Sheridan
issued his orders to Gen Warren. They
were to attack vigorously at daylight;
and he adds that had Gen Warren
moved according to the expectations of
the Lieut. enant- General, there would
appear to have been but little chance
for the escape of the enemy infantry
in front of Dinwiddie Court House.
General Sheridsn's report Of this
days pefations-known as the battle
of Five Forks-is written in his best
style, and is a most graphic picture
His plan is best told in his own words:
81 determined that I would drive the
enemy with the cavalry to the Five
Forks; press them into their works,
and make an effort to turn their flank, !
and meanwhile quietly move up the
4th corps, with view to attacking
their LETT. flank, crush the whole force
if possible, and drive westward those
who might escape, thus isolating them
from their army at Petersburg Hap
PLY this operation was successfully ex-
ecuted" - .,5f s...a %
After speaking Of the cavalry, he
continues: 81 then rode over TO where
the 5th corps was going into position,
and found them coming up very slowly,
/ was exceedingly anxious so attack at
once, for the sun was getting low and
we had to fight or go back, 1t was no
place to intrench, and it would have
been shameful to have gone back with
no results to compensate for the loss of
the brave men who had fallen during g
the day. -
ain this connection l will say that
Gen. Warren did not exert himself to
get up his corps as rapidly SIS he might
have done, and his manner gave me the
impression that he wished the sun to
60 down before the dispositions for the
attack could be completed As soon as
the corps was in position ! ordered an
advance. The 5th Corps, on reaching
the White Oak Road, made q left wheel
and burst on the enemy's left flank and
rear like tornado, and pushed rapid
ly on, orders hsying been given that if
the enemy was routed, there should be
no halt to reform the broken lines. As
stated before, the firing of the 5th
Corps was the signal to General Merritt
10 assault which was promptly respond
ed TO, and the works of the enemy were
soon carried at sword points by our
brave caEalrymen, The enemy we're
driven from their strong line Of works,
and completely routed The 5th Corps
doubling up their flank in confusion,
end the cavalry Of Gen. Merritt dashing
on the White Oak road, capturing their
artillery and turning it upon their bro
ken ranks, 20 demorSlizsd them that
they made no serious stand after their
line was carried, but took to flight in
disorder. Between Eve thousand and
six thousand prisoners fell into our
hands, and the fugitives were driven
westward, and were pursued until long
after dark by Mefritts and McKinsie's
cavalry, for a distance Of six miles
During this attack l again became dis
satisfied with Gen Warren. Daring
the Eergagement portions OF his line
gave way when not exposed 70 3 heavy
FIRE. and simply from wantofconhdence
on shs part of the troops, which Gen
eral Warren did not exert himself 70
inspire Therefore relieved him Of the
command of the 5tb Corps, authority
for this action having been sent to me
before the battle, unsolicited
In these extrscts General Wsrren
viii find the answer to his late letter
in the newspapers, in which he profess
ed ignorance to the cause Of his super
ced1re General Sheridan speaks in
the warmest terms of the 9th Corps, as
well as Of his own cavalry force, ssying
they all seemed to realize that the sue
cess of the campaign and the fate of
Lees army depended on the result Of
that days fighting The report then
details at considerable length the pur-
suit of Lees army. The opening para
graph of his account Of the operstions
of April Sd. is as follows; "on arriving
at JettersEille, learned that without
doubt Lee and his whole army were at
Amelia Court House. The 5th Corps
was at once ordered to intrench, with q
view Of holding Jettersgills until the
main army could come up. Il seems
to me that this was the only chance
the Army Of Northern Virginia had 70
save itself, which might have besn done
had General Lee promptly attacked
and driven back the comparatively
small force opposed 70 him, ard pufsu'
ed his march 70 BurksYille Junction. !.
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