The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1865-03-04
PLAN OF GRANT AND SHERMAN FOR DE
STROYING LEES ARMY.

STROYING LEES ARMY.
The United States Army and Nary
Gozette has long article upon the pro-
liability Of the destruction of General
Lees army by the forces of Grant and
Sherman. We copy some paragraphs ::
The contending forces upon the field
of operations on the plains east OF the
Alleghanics are the army of Lee, with
the scattered commands Of Bragg and
Hoke, lately at Wilmington, iIardee from
! Charleston, Beauregard in front Of Sher-
man, Hood striving to get into the East
| ern Zone, and Hill cut off at Augusta !;
and on our side, Grant facing Lee at
Richmond, Scholicld in North Carolina
left by the evacuation Of Wilmington
| free either to march twenty thousand
men to Sherman's reinforcement, or 10
join Grant by water with all but the
small force necessary for garrisoning
Wilmington; finally, Sherman's victo-
] rious columns are pressing their relent-
less way direct to victory.
The destruction of the armed force Of
the Confederacy being now the great spe-
cifc object of the combinations of our
generals, it necessarily involves the
forcing Of its main army into central
position, from which escape, in case Of
defeat, is impossible. The direction Of
Shcvman's march promises to secure this
specific object. At the same time, it is,
Of course, desirable for him to cut Oft
from the enemy's main force as many az
possible of the small detachments which
he has left in garrison at different points
His advance upon Branchvi!le cut off
Hill and Hood. His movement upon
kingsville, before threatening Columbia,
forced Hardee and Beauregard upon di-
verging lines of retreat; and, if our
cavalry were fortunate enough to strike
| Florence, or Schotield to seize Whining
| ton before Iiardee's arrival at these
places, the latter general will be thrown
entirely out of the immediate sphere Of
| operations. These mastery com blna
tons are inestimably efficient in prevent
ing accessions to Lees forces.
The limited resources of the South,
and the combination Of its military forces
under Lee as Gcneral~in-Chief-a change
| of organization which must Of necessity
lead to q union Of the outlying forces of
| the Conlederacy in the execution Of some
| one wcll-conccivcd schcmc-c0mpel Lee
| to the same concentration which our
combinations arc forcing upon him.
1t is, of course, impossible for us to
| entirely surround Lee with armies, each
equal to his own force; and armies of
less strength might, by an active and
| skillful opponent, be attacked and de-
stroycd in detail. Hence, our concentra-
| ton against Lee can consist OF only two
armies, that Of Grant and that of Sher-
| man. The forces of Schofeld will ne
cessarily join one or the other of these
as soon as relieved from their immediate
duty by the fall of Wilmington. Which
army Schotield will join will depend upon
| the relative force Of our two main CO.
lumns, counting, Of course, Grants in.
| trenchments and defensive attitude as so
much force on his side. We incline to
believe that he will join Sherman, who
is most exposed to the assaults of Lee,
and to whom defeat, from his exposed
position, would be the more disastrous.
Concentrated between our columns,
with forces probably equal to the
stronger, Lee would occupy much the
position of Napoleon in his celebrated
campaign of 1911. In that, interposing
between the columns Of the Allies adj
vancing upon Paris, striking powerful
blows which his genius alone could con-
ccivc, and execute victory from almost
every encounter-irom Champ Aubert,
Chateau Thierry and Montmirail, to
Manages and Montereau. But he was
doomed to fall before tho combinations
Of the enemy, their superiority in mum
bers, the impcssibility Of his obtaining