Holmes County farmer. [volume] (Millersburg, Ohio) 1857-1926, 1865-03-23
Pence and the Price Of cold.


ton as to the effect ofpeace on the monetary
concerns OF the country. 1t is supposed
that, should the pending campaigns in Vir-
ginio and the Carolinas be successful. the
war would be substantially ended. The
first expected consequence Of this success is
great and immediate reduction in the ex-
penses of the government. Thisanticipated
reduction begins already TO be discounted in
advance. Gold falls under its influence
IN important victory by Sherman, or by
Grant, would cause prices TO dip, for
moment, like a boy Kite in a sudden gust
of wind
But let us not deceive ourselves
Peace with the South will come in no such
shape, nor be followed by any such immedi-
ate consequences, as are implied in the idea
| Of peace at the close Of a foreign war. A
peace made by us with foreign nation does
not include, but precludes, our military oc-
cupation of their country. Who believes
that we can safely withdraw our armies after
the subjugation Of the South? When we
make peace with foreign nation we depend
upon the faith of its still subsisting gouer,t-
me,t to control its own population by its
own military force, alike for the preserva-
ton of domestic order, and the protection
Of ourselves against aggression. But the
South will be left neither with a selfsus-
tanning government nor military force
Elements of turbulence and disorder, result
ing, in the main, from unextinguished hos
tility to the Union, will keep that section in
commotion, as the waves Of the ocean con-
tinue TO roll after the storm has spent its
force.
/ Now, how are these turbulent elements,
scattered over 50 vast an area, to be con-
trollcd? The emancipation experiment
alone may heave southern society like an
l HIo -
of the southern armies is sufficient alone to
leopard the tranquility Of the South for
years. The southern whites never had any
regular habits Of industry into which they
will easily fall back when their soldering is
over They are far more likely to break up
/ into bands Of desperadoes than to deport
| themselves as quiet citizens. They will lurk
| in the mountains and forests of that extern
| sive region, prowling about the settlements,
and indemnitying themselves for the loss of
| their slaves by marauding on the crops of
! the freedmen. If we leave the South with
arms and military organization efficient
enough to suppress such disorders, what
warrant have we thatit will not, on the first
! favorable occasion, be turned against our
selves? Quis cuSt0des custodiet7 A south
ern military force, permitted for the purpose
of preserving internal order, would need a
northern army of observation to keep it in
subjection.
4 1t is apparent, from the Sc considerations,
that whatever may be the success OF our
arms in the spring campaign we cannot, in
long time, safely disband our armies. If
the southern forces break up into guerrilla
b bands, it will require more troops to occupy
and hold the country than it did to subdue
: it: just as we could have fought southern
navy to reateradvantage than we have kept
IN, ol,a 4tor alr,
, privateers. When southern troops are col
lected in a body we know whittier to direct
, our march, and can make a tOlerable estimate
of the force we are likely to encounter But
in giving chase, over a wide eXpanse of
broken and wooded country, to guerrilla
parties that can suddenly unite for an onset,
and as suddenly scatter for safety, we shall
be liable to be always out in our reckoning.
1t will be a transfer to land with new actors
and scenery. Of the old play Of 'hide-and-
go-seek" on the ocean, where great navy
was so long bafled by a few buccaneers.
But if our armies are no disbanded, how
are our expenses 10 be lightened. This
question flies like an arrow, straight to the
heart Of the subject The cost of an army
is not in proportion to its liability to pitched
battles, but in proportion to its numbers
and its mobility. Whether soldiers fight or
merely march and bivouac, they must, in
either case, equally eat and be paid. Until
somebody shows us that we can prudently
/ disLand our armies after one more success
full campaign, it is not safe to look upon the
close of such campaign as the termination
Of our military burdens. In our reasonings
about peace we are unconsciously misled by
false analogy between Il civil and foreign
war. The treaty Of peace by which foreign
war is ended, closes the whole thing up at
once. The government with which We treat
becomes responsible for the hostile popula-
ton whose conduct it can bind. But in the
present case, we overthrow the government,
and substitute for it our own rule, to which
no submission will be rendered as Of right,
but only such as We can eXtort by compul-
.sion.
1t hence follows that any fall in gold based
upon the expectation Of an early reduction
: Of our military expenses will be but tenn
porary prelude to a new disappointment.-
e The hope for better currency must for
e the present rest mainly on the financial
/ wisdom of the new Secretary Of the Treas
! ury. But Mr. McCulloch is so new to the
e Office that this ground of confidence requires
D the confirmation Of some further taste ofhls
I quality.-Ner York World.