Cleveland daily leader. [volume] ([Cleveland, Ohio]) 1865-1873, 1865-12-07

delighted; all fears and apprehensions
were dispelled. am not yet satisfied but
Thomas Immediately upon the appearance
of Hood before Nashville, andbefore he had
time to fortIfy, Should have moved out
with-his whole force and given him battle,
instead of waiting to remOunt his cavalry,
which delayed him until the inclemency
of the weather made it impracticable to
attack e%arliear than he did but his final
defeat of Hood was so complete that it
will be accepted as a vindication Of that
distinguished officers judgment u III
FORT FISHER AND GEN. BUTLER.
The report then describes the two expe-
ditions against Fort Fisher and Whining
ton. Concerning the first one it says:
Gen. Butler, commanding the army
from which the troops were taken for this
enterprise, and the territory within which
they were to operate, military courtesy
required that all orders and instructions
should go through him. They were so
sent, but Gen. Weitzel has since officially
informed me that he never received the
Instructions, nor was he aware of their
existence until he read Gen. Buffers pub
lished official report of the Fort Fisher
failure, with my Endorsement and papers
accompanying it. l had no idea of Gen.
Buffers accompanying theexpedition until
the evening before it got off from Bermuda
Hundreds, and then did not dream but
that Gen. Weitzel had received all the in
structions' and would be in command. 1
rather formed the idea that Gen. Butler
was actuated by a desire to witness the
explosion of the powder boat. The expe-
dition was detained several days at Hamp-
ton Roads, awaiting the loading of the
powder boat. The Importance Of getting
the Wilmington expedition off without
any delay, with or without the powder
boat, had been urged upon Gen Butler,
n ne was advised to so notify Admiral
Porter. a9 rs trHof :
The powder boat was exploded on the
morning of the oath, before the return of
General Butler from Beaufort, but it
would seem from the notice taken of it in
the Southern newspapers that the enemy
were enlightened as to the object Of
the explosion until they were informed by
the Northern press,
Concerning General Terry's expedition,
the report says;
1t consisted of the same troops who
went with General Butler, with the addi-
ton of one brigade of 1900, and a small
siege train, which it was found not neces-
sary to land. In his Instructions to Gen
Terry, General Grant says l have served
with Admiral Porter, and know you can
rely on his judgment and nerve to under
take what he proposes.
The report then mentions the transfer
ring of General Schofield's army TO North
Carolina, General Sherman's march FRI
Savannah to Goldsboro, and General
Sheridan's raid against the James River
Canal. 1t appears that Gen. Sheridan's
instructions contemplated that he should
cross the danes river, pass down to the
west of Richmond, and Join Gen. Sher-
man in North Carolina. This enterprise
was defeated by the enemy burning all the
James River bridges, cur pontoons being
too short to reach across. Sheridan &C
cordipgly, after demolishing the remnants
of Early's army, destroyed the canal and
marched to White House, where be Joined
the army of the Potomac for the first
movement on Richmond.
THE FINAL ATTACK ON RICHMOND.
The report next gives the full i~nstrue-
tions, dated March "A, 1855, TO Generals
Meade, Ord and Sheridan for the opera
tons which led to the capture of Rich
mond, which were in substance that Gen.
Sheridan should move on the 18th, with
all the cavalry and one division Of iufan-
try, against the South Side and 'DanvilIe
Railroads, the whole army following to
the left for the double purpose of turning
the enemy out of his defenses in front Of
Petersburg, and of supporting General
Sheridan in his attack on the railroad.
The instructions conclude as follows:
Nh annran wnar- 90
strip his lines to a mere skeleton in the
hope of advantage rot being taken of it,
whilst they hurl everything against the
moving column and return. 1t cannot be
impressed too strongly upon commanders
of troops left in the trenches not to allow
this to occur without taking advantage of
it. The very fact of the enemy coming
out to attack, if he does so, mayb e regard
ed as almost conclusive EVIDENCE of such a
weakening of his lines. l would have it
particularly e%njoined upon corps COM
manders that in case of an attack from
the enemy, those not attacked are not to
wait for orders from the commanding !
officer of the army to which they belong,
but that they will move promptly, and in
form the commander of their action. l
would also enjoin the same action on the
part of division commanders when other
parts of their corps are engaged In like
manner, l would urge the importance of
following up a repulse of the enemy.
CSigned US. GRANT, Lieut.. Gen.
The report continues / had spent DAYS
of anxiety lest each morning shonld bring
the report that the enemy had retreated
the night before. 1 was firmly convinced
that Sherman's crossing the Roanoke
would be the signal for Lee to leave.
With Johnston and him combined, a long
tedious and expensive campaign, eonsum-
ing most of the summer, might become
necessary. By moving out, l would put
the army in better condition. for pursuit,
and would at least by the destruction of the
DsRYille road, retard the concentration of
the two armies of Lee and Johnston, and
cause the enemy to abandon much mate
rial that he might otherwise save. l
therefore determined not to delay the
movement ordered, Further instructions
were issued to General Sheridan, on the
18th, instruGting him, in case the enemy
should come out of his intrenchments, to
fall upon him with full confidence, that
the army would engage him as eircum-
stances should dictate; but if he did not
come out, then Sheridan should destroy
the railroads effectuallY, and return and
join Sherman in North Carolina accord
ing to circumstances.
On the following day, General Sheri-
dams instructions were changed. He was
directed to abandon the raid on the rail
roads, and get on the rear of the enemy's
right flank, General Grant saying l now
feel like ending the matter, if possible.
s,,-rrroT FIVE EORVG
A detailed account oftbe action at Five
Forks and the breaking of the enemy's
lines in front of Petersburg follows.
Concerning the affair at Five Forks the
report says:
General Sheridan, when Unexpectedly |
attacked by the enemy's infantry, dis
played great generalship. Instead of re-
treating with his whole command to tell
the~story of superior forces encountered,
he deployed his cavalry on foot, leaving
Only enough men mounted to take charge
of the horses. By this means he delayed
the enemy's advance until our own in
fantry got up, when he drove him back to
Five Forks, assaulted and carried his |
strongly fortified position, capturing all
his artillery and between 5000 and 5000
prisoners. Generals Ord, Wright and
Parke, MEANWHILE, had made exam
nations in their font with a
view to a general assault. The two
latter reported faVorably. A lombard
ment was accordingly commenced on the
nipbt of the Ist of AnriI. and Eanf nm nm |