Urbana union. [volume] (Urbana, Ohio) 1862-1872, 1865-10-25
all gurts Of 6uoa gta0ing.
stonewall Jackson--His Success as
Leader--How He Looked in Battle.

IROM Jue COII6S 6SpOuuSuC0 VI ouO wv
York World we extract the following
t relative to the great rebel leader, Stone
wall jackson. We think it will bo reat
with interest
HIS CLOSE CALCULATION.
Jacksons military movements were al
ways based upon close calculation, and hC
was certainly not wanting in foresight
and caution. He seems to have known
perfectly we'll what It was in his power
to achieve, and as thoroughly what was
beyond his strength. He risked much
upon many occasions, but appears to have
been justified in his calculations of the
ultimate result.
1t will be objected to him by military
men, that he hazarded too much, at
times, and was only extricated by good
fortune. There appears to be some JUS
tice in this; but the resources of his
genius were enormous, and doubled his
numbers. Some of his ideas seem absurd,
when coolly looked at. When asked
what he would have done, if, after the
battle of Winchester, the conYerging
column of the enemy had cut him off at
Strasburg, be replaced "Iwould have
fallen back upon Maryland for reinforce
ments." Such a movement must, it
would appear, have terminated in his de-
struction; but it would be difficult to
find man in his old command who
would have doubted his ultimate triumph
even then.
His genius was for great movements
and decisive blows and his services be-
came more and more valuable as his
rank increased. He was better as Brig
adler than as Colonel better still as
Major General; and as Lieutenant Gen
eral was best of all. It is useless to ask
what he would have been as Commander
in-Chief without superior at Richmond.
But the brain which conceived and exc
cuted the campaign of the Valley must
have been equal to any position.
HIS LINE ALWAYS OPEN TO RETREAT.
He kept open, generally, his line of
retreat, and provided for deserters-
though it was hard to realize that failure
ever entered into his calculations He
had the soldiers eye for position, and
chose his ground both for infantry and
artillery with the exactness of genius !;
but if all his arrangements were made,
and his plans required battle, would fight
on any ground. He depended most upon
his infantry, but loved artillery from his
early association with that branch of the
service, never appearing so well pleased
as when directing in person the fire of
his cannon, amid a shower of shot and
shell. When once engaged, he seemed
to discard all idea of defeat. aud to re-
gard the issue as assured And, what
was more important, his men seemed to
share his conviction. Even at Keins-
town, he believed the Federal forces
would have retired in ten minutes if one
of his own brigades had not been or
dered to fall back A man less open to
the conviction that he was whipped could
not be imagined His indomitable com
bativeness, it might have been said, made
him set his teeth against fate, and en-
deavor to place his heel upon his destiny
itself.
HE NEVER TRUSTED To LUCK.
It may be said of him with truth, that
he deserved victory No man was more
careful in the use of every precaution to
insure success. The idea that he blum
dered on without prudence or system,
and achieved his success only by some
mysterious good fortune, is mere fancy.
No soldier was ever less indebted to
luck ;" no one ever proceeded in mill
tary matters upon profounder logic. He
knew his strength and his weakness, but
the difference between him and others
was this, that he made his estimates more
correctly. He did not lock to numbers
only, but to morale, the situation, the
spirits of his troops. With the three
hundred of Leonidas he would have at
tempted great things with the fifty
thousand survivors of Napoleon's Grande
Amaee, crushed in morale by Waterloo,
he would have attempted nothing. If
his men we're on FIRE with ardor, and the
enemy, though treble their number, we're
disorganized by surprise, or for other
reasons, he would advance to the assault
without fear of defeat.
HOW HE CONDUCTED A MARCH.
In every point of view, as we have said,
he deserved success. No General ever
made a greater use of mystery. He saw
from the first that he commanded men of
education, thought, speculation-the
most inquisitive of private soldiers
Without due precautiOn taken they were
certain to know what it was inexpedient
for the private soldier to know his de-