Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1865-02-13

intimacy between the Executive and H,:
Legislature. III even the rights of the
States were safe, and even If this were a
time of peace, still would, as Democrat,
as Republican, never allow the Executive
to approach any nearer the Legislature than
Is entirely consistent with the movement of
each in their own well defined circuit. AS
with nature, so with institutions. OF two
plants in the vicinity of each other the
fruit of one will lose its peculiar flavor and
be assimilated to the taste of the other, if
that other have the stronger fiber, the rich
er nutrlment, and happens to be near by.
SO in the stellar world the lesser luminary
will, unless restrained, fly toward the great
er, to be by 1t absorbed.
The committee truly say that the trainers
of the Constitution did not intend to estab-
lislI an absolute separation Of the legislative
and executive departments. This is true.
The separation isxnot absolute; if it were,
they cuiildriiot stf3sist.fn the same system:
but affirm that they endeavored by every
guard to allow just as little connection be-
tween the parts as would enable the Gov
ernment in its entirety to perform its func-
tions.
The committee instance the veto power,
to show that there is q connection between
the law-making and law-executing depart
ments. The argument proves too much.
The veto of the President is the limit of the
presidential interference, and its exercise is
allowed only after the law is passed; ana
even then, after the Executive has exhaust
ed his reasons tor the veto, he may be over
ruled by vote of twO-thrds. If the EX-
ecutive, by his agents of the Cabinet, exert
his influence in the making of laws, where
is the necessity for the veto? His veto is
then an absurdity. So Judge Story regards
it. The veto is the Executive arm for the
defense of its own powers. The Legislature
is presumed to have no desire to favor them.
When laws are passed by a Legislature mis-
led by love of power, a spirit of faction,
political impulse. or a persuasive influ-
ence, local or. sectional, which may not
reach the Executive, he being the repre-
sentative of the whole nation in the aggre-
gate, then the veto has its use. See Story,
page 32:
He will have an opportunity soberly to examine
the acts and resolutions passed by the Legislature,
not hurting partaksn ofthe Teeings or combinations
which haze procured their pdsSa0e and thus to cor
rec what will sometimes be wrong, from interfer-
ence as well as design"
His responsibility is independent of Con-
gress. To join his duties with law-making
is to destroy his responsibility and derange
the proper distribution of powers Go one
step further. Suppose a law of great value
passed, then vetoed; nevertheless two-thirds
of Congress favor it; but in come the Cabi-
net, and by threat bribery, promises OF
patronage and gifts of honor, the legislative
will is subordained: are not the people
robbed of their fair right in the Legisla-
turc? Voting is not the only way of max
ing laws. Voting presupposes influences.
Voting is but the sign of what has been
done. If these influences are reached by
Cabinet cajolery or honeyed Establishments
from the masters of patronage and fountains
OF honor, the influence is not less, but rath-
er greater, than if the Cabinet had right
to vote. Indeed, some Governments which
allow the ministry to have the eRtree to the
Legislature, expressly and strangely forbid
their presence when the vote comes off.
This is the case in Brazil, Costa Rica. Por-
tugal, and Spain. But what guard is there
in such cases-for the influence is eXerted
generally before and not at the vote? Still,
even these guards show the jealousy of the
Legislature against the dominating influen-
ces of the Executive even In such mon
archical countries.
What, then, are the relations which the
three departments Of our Government Sus-
tain to each other? How are they intended
to act in harmony? Mr.. Madison has con-
sidered this matter in Nos. AZ and 4S of the
Federalist. The distinctness and separa-
tion of the three departments is by him. as
it was by Montesquieu, regarded as an es-
sential precaution in favor of liberty. He
was careful to show that the several depart
mentS of power were so distributed and
blended in our system as at once to pre-
serve symmetry and beauty of form, and to
prevent any part of it from being exposed
to the danger OF being crushed by the dis
proportiOnate weight OF other parts. He re-
garded the accumulation of powers, legis-
lative, executive, and judicial, in the same
hands, as the very essence of tyranny.
Hence, if there is any approach toward such
accumulation, my argument is that there is
an approach toward tyranny. If there can
be no liberty where the Legislature and
Executive are one, is not liberty endanger-
ed when you absorb an essential function
or feature of one by the other? Says Mon
tesquieu:
"Therc can be no liberty when the legislative and
executive powers are united in the same body or
person, because apprehe nsions may arise lest the
same monarch or Senate may enact tyrannical laws
to execute them in tyrannlca manner; or were the
power of judging joined with the legislative, the life
aud liberty of the subjects would be exposed to ar
biary control, for the judge would then be egisla-
tor. Were il joined to the executive, the judge
might have all the violence of the oppressor."
Mr.. Madison'draws from the several Con-
sttutiOns of the States as then existing,
New Hampshire, Massachusetts,, New York,
Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, and others, to show that the several
departments are inhibited from exercising
the powers of either of the other depart
ments. The language of these early Con-
stitutiOns yet remain IN our present Consti-
tutions. Not single State OF. this large
Confederacy has ever in its Constitution so
departed from the model of the Federal
Legislature as to allow the membership of
the Executive, Gushing, page 6l0,) or of
hic aids IN administrations or even their