Virginia free press. (Charlestown, Va. [W. Va.]) 1832-1916, 1865-08-24
where TO Go This Summer.

Now that - TINS cFuei Wal - NfNAs AA-S-N '---
doubt be among our readers hundreds OF persons
who viii desire to visit those scenes in the East par
itcularlv in Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania
which have been rendered historic on account ofthe
momentous events Of which they were the theatre
We propose in this article to Indicate few ofthese
placs and to point out the best manner Of reaching
them. 1t will be borne in mind by our readers that,
from the commencement Of the war till its close the
eap,ure Of Richmond was deemed an object OF para
mount importance BIZ the Government and that the
war did, in fact come to termination Immediately
after the occupation Of that city by the Federal Tor
ces On the other hand, the defence of their eapi-
tai was made primary object on the part OF the
Confederates. 1t was defended by admirable
system Of Notifications, but, above all, by its being
rendered inaccessible BY water. Around It's walls
were gathered the flower Of the Confederate army,
and in the various operations directly and indirectly
connected with the defence Of the city, Gen. Joseph
I f. Johnston, Gen. Stonewall" Jackson, and Gen.
Lee himself, displayed those remarkable powers oil
/ peneralship, and that profound knowledge OF the
/ art of war; which enabled them, for the space OF
years, with comparatively small armies at their com
nland, to battle and keep at bay the vastly superior
/ forces of the Federal army. Among these opera
tions. the most prominent took the form of nyasons
into the States Of Pennsylvania and Maryland; and
maneuyres either real or feigned, directed against
the cities of Baltimore and Washington. Thegene-
raj object Of these operations to relieve Rich
mond, BY making it necessary on the part OF the
/ Federal commanders to employ the whole force at
their disposal for the defence Of Washington, or at
\ least for movements against the Confederate army
| in MARYLAND and Pennsylvania. These operations
too we're carried on in every of the four years
| Of the war; Thus, in 1861, both before and after
the battle of Manassas, the Conederates maintained
/ a strong force on the Upper and Lower Potomac,
! and even in sight Of the dome Of the Capitol. In
1862, they defeated Popes army near Culpeper,
drove it to the shelter of the Washington forts and
captured Harpers-Ferry. In 1868 their operations
against Gen Hooker, after the battle Of The Wild
erness, were carried on quite near Washington
| They captured Winchester, Martinsburg, Williams
port and Hagerstown, on the Upper Potomac, inva-
ded Maryland and Pennsylvania, captured Cham
bersburg, and made strong demonstrations towards
| both Baltimore and Harrisburg, but were defeated
\ by Gen. Meade, at Gettysburg in Pennsylvania
\ In 1864, even while Grants army was engaged in
I the siege Of Richmond the Confederates, with a
small but well-appointed army, laid siege to Wash
ington took possession Of point on the Baltimore
aud Ohio Railroad between that city and Baltimore;
actually attacked one Of the forts defending Wash
nston; tore up and destroyed several miles of the
I track Of the Baltimore anu Ohio Railroad between
| Harpers-Ferry and Baltimore; moved towards the
latter place, and burned the house Of the Governor
Of Maryland, within sight Of the Monumental City.
In all these operations, there was a frontier line
defended by the Federal troops and which it was
the continued object of the Confederacs to force
/ The Baltimore and Ohio Railroad constituted this
frontier line. 1t extends entirely the State
Of Virginia, from Baltimore and Washington, on
the east, to Parkersburg and Wheeling on the
west distance Of about 400 miles. As long this
frontier line was held and successfully defended, in
vasions Of either Maryland Penns lyania, OF OPP
/ erations against Baltimore or Washington, became
impracticable. But whenever the Confederates
succeeded in forcing this line, and in capturing a
few of the military posts upon it. the whole of Ma
ryland and Pennsylvania became open to their in
/ cursiOns, and there was nothing to prevent them
from marching either on Baltimore or Washington.
The defence Of this road therefore, became, practi-
cally and really the defence Of the frontier large
bodies of troops were stationed upon it, and battles
and kirmishes took place at many points along the
line; and, owing to causes which it is the province
of the historian to relate parts Of the road were
frequently in the hands Of the Confederates.
As military road, the Importance of this railroad
70 the Government was very great. Its proximity
to the seat Of war, andit peculiar geographical po-
siton, rendered it particularly valuable. During
the war the enormous number Of nearly two-and-a-
half millions Of troops have been transported upon
it. It's destruction, therefore, greatly desired
by the Confederate Government, and the latter put
forth many strong efforts 20 accomplish this end.
These efforts wore often attended with success. In
June and July 1851, large portion of the track
was destroyed between Harpers- Ferry and Cumber-
land and number Of valuable bridges burned
The road and bridges were rebuilt in the fall of that
wear, and it was used that winter, and greater
| part Of the year lS62. In September 1862, after
the defeat of Pope and the capture Of HarpersFer-
rs, q considerable portion of the track near Mar
/ tiusbarg west Of Harpers-Ferry, was Destroyed
In May and June 1868, after the battle Of The Viii
darness, the Conlederates again had possession of
the ROAD, ana destroyer many mites o the ttdch-
Finally in the latter part of June and early part
Of July, lsGi, the Contederates under Gen. Early
bad possession Of part of the road between Bati-
more and Harpers-Ferry, and destroyed the track
for a space Of several miles. But, no matter how
/ much damage was done TO the track, or how many
cars and locomotives were destroyed, or how many
bridges burned or blown up the Confederates found
t0 their modification and chagrin that the road was
always rebuilt and placed in running order in an
incredibly short space of time, as as and in
deed in some cases before, military protection was
afforded to the railroad company. Therefore, when
in July, 1854, the Contederates made their attack
on Washington, they refrained from damaging the
double track between Washington and Baltimore,
because, as Gen. Early afterwards stated, their
perience had demonstrated that the railroad cOmpa-
nv could rebuild their track less time than would
take them to destroy it. And indeed, at that very
moment when they were laundering away at the
gates Of the capital, the railroad company, with a
2 L IL