Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-03-18
The Rebel Force Opposing sherman
The March OF sherman - ade
Hsmpton's victory Doubtfui->far-
walton IN fichmond.
LII LII toRen orrosLNe snEnNAN.
rCgrresp0ndence % tbs World.
WILMINGTON, March IL.

rCSrresp0ndence o. Tie Word.
wisnISoToN, March ~.
rHE KKREL FoRcE OPPOSING SHERMAN.
It's stated that in the last interview JEFF.
Davis had With Joe johnson, on the eve OF his
departure for South Carolina, the rebel president
said 10 him: " General regret to have no army
to give you; / hope, however. that the people of
South Carolina. by whom you are nov called,
will furnish you one larger. IL Bet better, than
the one you had before =" These words have a
higher significance than at FIRST appears They
show that Joe Johnston did not carry any rein
forcements to Beauregard. save the prestige Of
his name. very popular in Carolins aud Georgia,
and the doubt expressed in the word al hope
used by the president, that IL was al least ques
tionable whether or not be would be enabled 70
fnd an army in the raw recruits and the scattered
fragments of defeated troops Struggling about ia
these two states The fact that General Lee did
not send any of his forces to the Carolinas. is
now beyond doubt. General Johnston, when
taking command OF the few soldiers gathered at
Charlotte bv the eIerfions OF Beauregard, did not
bring from Richmond a single man. except a few
officers of his staff devoted to his fortunes. The
forces he me. were those brought up from Char
lesion by Beauregard by Hardee, who at first
operated in another direction. but who, fe~
DAYS after. made bis junction with the main
army; by Cheatham, whose corps was divided In
two, one remaining with johnson, the other oper-
ating against the renforcements sent from New
bern aud VI ilmingtcn to the assistance of Sher-
man
All these forces combined did not exceed thirty
FIVE To forty thousand men. and could not. con
sequently by reason Of the hurry in which they
we're gathered. and Of their imperfect organiza
ton as well as of their numerical nferiorty
present any serious obstacles to Gen. Sherman.
All the stories you hear about Johnston's great
strength and the repUlse OF Sherman are no
doubt very ingeniously worded, but 8 slight &C
quaintance with the efficiency and size of the fed
eral army, and with the extemporized and shaky
elements OF which General JohnstOn's forces are
compoeed. will satisfy any one that there can be
no foundation in any OF these reports
TIE MARCH or SHERMAN
According to the rumors current this evening.
General Shermans whole route from Columbia
to Florence, aud Laurel Hill was nearly clear Of
any impediments The army OF Johnston, which
was TO impede his march, remained prudently on
the railroad south OF Charlotte. in order to de
tend a Inc which il was not the intention of our
forces 10 follow. Thus. while the rebels were
closely watching the north of Columbia, OF
which the safety of Richmond was said to de
pend, General Sherman was striking the vii
mington and Manchester railroad and making
up for the Atlantic shore. TO which ne must look
:or fresh supplies.
Although the details OF that march have 10,
yet been made public. enough OF them have
transpired to show that be vas not in a position
recurring him 20 accep, or refuse battle, for
none was offered 10 him. and that except Skin
mishing on his rear and flank. he had no fighting
Of any amount with the enemy; in such cOndi
ton Of affairs Sherman could not. of course, fal!
back: the only formidable enemy on his path
was starvation, but that enemy he could conquer
by leaning on hi, right toward the feet of Dahl
gren and Porter, who were watching and follow
ing with anxiety all his movements. This is
Whist he has done with the success which his Last
dispatch from Laurel Hill ioFeshadows.
rux WADE HAMPTON VICTORY DOUBTFUL.
A regards the fight and repuse of fitzpatrick
with W de H mpton. mentioned in the Rich
mond papers as q confederate success. ] have
reason to believe that the rebel accounts we have
are partial statement. giving only distorted
or incomplete view of the engagement, | base
this opinion upon the fact that when Wade Hamp.
ton left Richmond for South Carolina. about siI
weeks ago, all his cavalry was then scattered in
various states on furlough, the winter being con
sidered time Of rest during which neither horse
men nor horses are wanted. Besides there was
no forage in the capital for the horses, and very
little provisions for the men.
hence, W aOe Hampton, WpeD ne started 10 re-
sumo his command. was in the position of John
ston when he took his Hew general with
out an army, or. rather. cavalry officer without
cavalry. In this position what could he do but
rely upon the prestige Of his name-great. | con
fess in the south a. well on his account as on
account of bis iustrious predecessors-and gath
er his men. as the ieudal barons used TO gather
their y4ssais, at the opening of each campaign
This. of course, ne did TO a certain extent. But
such a system of warfare, especially in front OF
enemy dispOsing Of a complete and vigorous
organization. is naturally very slow All Wsde
Hampton could muster did not exceed, under
stand. .wo or three thousand men. who were in
no position 10 match kilpatrick's force This il
why distrns, the story published in the Rich
mond papers. and think it wise TO wait for fur
Their Information before crediting it.
STARVATION N RICHMOND
Starvation i.. at the moment write. as for
midsble foe TO Gen Lee as the massive army
of Gen. Grant All the news | receive from
Richmond confirms in this opinion Two
weeks a 20 the rebel soldiers were already suffer
ing for want OF bacon an1 were put upon half
rstions. The recent expedition OF Sheridan has
not certainly improved their condition. Unless
they are promptly relieved by invoices from
North Carolina aud southern Virginia. the rebel
army will be compelled 10 abandon lis present
quarters. and withdraw into the interior of the
country where provisions are more abundant than
they are in Richmond How long the soldiers
will stand the privsiions 10 which they sre now
submitting depends much on their spirit cf en-
durAnce and Of their discipline, symptoms of
discomfort are visible. it = said. in their ranks
20 that Gen. Lee NAV be Il any moment CON
PEELED. in order TO prevent the spreading OF fac
tious spirit amo,g his men, s,her 10 give battle
or 10 evacuate Richmond This last alternative
Is certainly now very prooaolc snd should nos
be SURPRISED b ne hrs. sps.. Q ssr-n. xeAther