, 1865-10-19

la. ished for the prosecution Of tho war at the
call Of the Federal President and General, ne
lind still Jefferson Davis comparatively dumb
making no recommendations to Congress
which indicate the least appreciation Of the
impending scale Of attack, the least concep-
ton Of measures requisite 10 meet and foil it.
Such, for example, Is q conscfiption law.
Unadyiscd On this point, Congress indulgcd
In The dream that great war could be pro-
longed by voluntary contributions Of bravo
; and muscle volunteers exclusively! Alr.
Davis had at that timc the influence to have
corrected this fatal delnsion, hut be shared It
equally with Congressi and hero again fell
Infinitely short Of the height Of his position.
BLrSDEn1SG IN THE WEST.
AGa1rs meantime grow troublesome In The
West Ctittenden had been routed, and by
the end Of january, 1SGo, there were porteuts
Of the loss Of the Mississippi river. General
.Beaurcgnrd. ut tba instance Of congressman,
lnmbus, Kentucky, with the implied promise
thai. hc should be supported by the regulate
eendfnl officers TO enable him to organize his
new. command into hr1gades nnd divisions.
Ccrtnin Co1oncls were named for promotion;
but he was assured through his Adjutant Gen
eral, BY Mr. Benjamin, that there was no need
:" admirably organizcd." This was not the
TACT, for he Organization 1t had was alto
getller irregular and Insufficient for the field
Corrected as far as practicable just before the
battle Of Shiloh, for the ,vnnt Of PROPER Brig
adiets their duties had to be trusted to
senior Co1onels OF brigades who wore ut
some cases by no means the best Of their
grade present. Gen. Bcauresard had taken
the responsibility of carrying With him cnpa-
bic engineer on Ills staff, whom he was able,
therefore, to employ at once upon works
which made the obstinate defense Of Island
M o1Fi4 and at7riT r ~ Dat
other engineer officers promised we're not
available until attcr the battle Of Shiloh. and
consequently il had been Impossible to acquire
nccurate information Of tle terrain In the
Ticlnity ot the battle ZELDA circumstance Of
much greater disadvantage to the ConGeder-
ate General than may be apparent to the gcn'
cral reader. Those applied for were line OIL
GERS, and might as wel have been appointed
In the first week Of February as ultimately In
April and May; but Alr. Benjamin, when
urged to act at once and give the orders By
telegraph, replied that he could not do so.
without ttrst obtaining The permission Of tic
President. :
Tint is, rot cvcn Captain Of Engineers
could be appointed, though reported to be
capable mud absolutely needed bY m army
commander, until tho head Of tho Govern
mont had consented. The. fact IL, affairs Of
this Sort engrossed his time, his thoughts,
and left little for matters that legitimately
QeiGuEcN u AaS nNu luutl10lS.
Finding lis command yift uGlly unorrapizcd
Beauregard, BY telegraph, applied again for
the officers be had specified In February The
reply was that, belonging tas Colonels) TO
JCllnstbn's army, they could not be spared,
and officers attacked to lis own forces must
be recommended for promotion instead.
1imc was pressing, and certain officers wero
mendation Of Generals FoI aud Bragg TIC
nnswcr then was That he must wait until be
could nominate officers as deserving and ca
pahle fEetn his own knowledge. Ono or tWo
promotions we're made, however, Int when
Recommendations we're again made tho reply
promotion in battle. Under oil tho circum-
stances this ~as downright triilfcr; and the
want Of these officers was one Of ti,e ciicf
rcaeons why the battle Of Si,iloh was not
brought to dcciEiyo close by MONDAY on the
9Th Of April, 1850, which must hare made the
arrival of Buel1 too latc to be Of the least
I use ii res.ulng Gen. Grants army
BEAUREGAED SUPERSEDED.
Gen. Beaurcrard, for some time in bad
health, thought it best for the service to take
advantage Of the lnll in operations incident to
the position Of his army al .Tupclo alter the
successful evacuation Of Cotinth, and by
short respite from duty seek to rccupeTntc.
He therefore retired to Biadon Springs, some
twelve hours distant By railroad, turning over
|. the command to Gen. Bragg, with In5truc-
tions looking to the preparation Of the army
for the field at once on bis return, which he
anticipated would te tn three weeks. But 10
SOONER had At. Davis heard Of this step than
he te1egrapled Gen. Bragg to assume I>erman-
ent command. Gen. Beauregard was thus
laid on the shell, not to be reinstated, as Mr.
Davis passionately declared, though the
whole world should urge him to the measure.
l. What General Bragg achieved In the cam
! paign which he Eoon under took las passed into
history; what General Beauregartl, IN his
place, might hare accomplished; may only be
subIpltted at the time to General Cooper. 4
copy Of which las been Published. The mill
taTy reader, It is believed, will approve the.
.leT: and Will dud It dIticnlt to understand
WHY. General Bue.i was not Obliged to ac-
cent battle at Munfordeyil]c, Kentucky, and
| why; 1t was that Briggs md Kirby Smiths
forces operated on separate lines In that CAM
paign. .
Tasstng now to the campaign Of 1865, 50
filled with heavy disasters to Confederate
anna, We witness On all sides nFidenecs Of
| the hand that Was surely guiding tho South
| e.D cause to utter ruin.
The extent Of the defeat inflicted by Gen.
Lee at Charlottesville in May, is admitted;
Lopgstreet's cozps was absent from that field,
having tcen detached under distractions or
nt least pressure from Richmond, due to
that evil genius OF the Contederalcs, Sorth-
rop, though Gen. Leo believed an attack i'm
mincnt--
liant Confederate success never did atlatss
lock 20 propftl0us for the Confcdcratcs. The
Federal n my, stunned nnd -disorEanized, lay
tael.lnd the Nappal,annock. Bragg eonttout-
cd Rosccrons NJ Duck lsiyer with force
strong enough to hold hin, at bay, one corps
Hcr.d hayc enabled him 10 take the offensive
! nader conditions SO Enfarorable to Ro5ccFans
/ ns Almost to- Eccure decisive dc1eat !,
defeat with the Cumberland River behind his
back to einbarrass re!rrat, and with:no sup
| porting force available, willie without such a
sleek Of snbsi ,tence as would have
enabled him to decline battle behind i'm
preEnable fntrenchments. Gen. Lee might
| have commanded tho transfer OF the corps
could haye been made IN :; ten days: at
| most, tor two lines Of 1nflroad as lar as Chat-
| tanoosya, were tten open to the Confederatcs;
tie time was far more favorable than when,
| afler Tho defeat at Gettysburg, Lonrstrcet
Nes uItually sent. Such m operation was In
| strict accordance with the cardinal principles
! Of tic art Of war. The Confederatcs occu-
pied ;thc interior lines, and should have
sclxed q patent opportunity to concentrate
| their masses In superior .ofca upon this army,
which the blunders Of theit adversary had
| Iso1nted and exposed.
T. Had this been done the corollary was equa1-
ly apparent, md equally important too for
the Conicderates. Gen. Grant had Just en-
tered upon lis campaign against V1eksbnrg.
The confcdelates held Port Hudson, so that
I neither supplies nor feinforce1nents could
| rench ll1n from the South. We're RoEccrnns
defeated, one Confederate corps at least could
| then have been dEposalie for q iucti0n with
johnson ; q dct1chment from it takinE Fort
Pillow at the same time, and thus cutting of
| reinforccmcuts und subsistence from the
1 Tn Mt ppr% nd s0n
frcm the Southern quarter. THIS the military
| reader will readily perceive, as also that
johnson would then lave been superior In
force to Gen. Grant, Who, for lack Of suhslst-
cncc; must soon have been Obliged to fight
under all possible disadvantages, with nearly
| certain disaster.
Ucaft,s m adder rcrc the Richmond authori.
| ties to ell tho promises Of tho situation. Their
tat went forth; tho Gettysburg campaign
was 'inaueurated-tl TINT Is, the old policy was
continued of keeping the Confederate forces
divided and. dpefating on widely divergent
lines. Gcu-Lcc is too great soldier not to
! bare read cright ut that tinne tie clear lessons
Of his art, not to have seen at a glance what
w'as to he gained by the blow at Rosecraul
with crushing force, and what the continued
dispersion Of forces In Nar inevitably In
yolved. We hnrc ncrer heard the Gettys.
burg campaign defended except as commis
ea,iat device, and This gives, the clcw TO the
Commissary- General.
From It q woes ,u,uumbercd >, followed FOL
: The Confederate n11ns. The campaign itscl
ended in disaster md tle loss oEovcr thirty
ttoueard men at Gettysburg, where also WI:
buried much Of the prestige which had hlth
crto wontrously strengthened the da1ntles:
aAr1ny Of North Virginia." Bragg was
forced first Out ut: Middle Tennessee, and ther
from Chattanooga. East Tennessee was losl
in turn. viclts6ufg and Port Hudson, with
demltaSle Gfnnt:; The Mississippi Ri7el
passed into Federal possession, aud communi
cation with the trans Mississippi portion O.
tho Confederacy was cut off. In brief, {
long .irain OF almost mortal disasters va:
only: interrupted by o transient .succes:
at Chic1.smauga. the va1ue Of which was soor
;t;n1 the f,.1a dcfscIeI Tonrstncot tn h. hi