Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1865-11-10

al in front right and rear. BY skiilf
he movements of Gen. Emory, the tianks
the two brigades, now bearing the brui
u Of the battle, were covered. The euem
n pursued the brigades, passing the left an
b. center. until he approached The reserve
ne under Gen. Smith, when he was met b
es n charge led by Gen. Mower, and checke,
n The whole Of the reserves were no.
a ordered up, and in turn we drove III
le enemy, continuing the pursuit until nigh
es compelled us 10 halt.
Of REASONS FOR BETURNNG TO THE sus
r SIsSIPPI NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS. FROM
ID LIEUT.-GEN. GRANT.
.e The battle OF the ninth was dCsper8t
5 and sanguinary. The defeat ofthe enem
n was complete and his loss OF officers an
l. men more than double than that sUs
' tanned by our forces. There wasnothin
j, in the immediate position or condition G
y the two armies to prevent a fOrwau
q movement next morning, and order
Vt were given Tor an advance. The train
e which had been turned 10 the rear on th
e day of battle, was ordered TO reform an,
u advance at dayhreak. ] communicate,
o this purpose at the close OF the day &
Gen. \. J. Smith, who expressed hiscon
o currence therein. But representations
h subsequently received from Gen. Frank
r. lin and all the general officers of the nine
. teenth corps, as 70 the condition of theil
{ respective commands for immediate
2 active operations against the enemy
b caused a suspension Of this order, and &
70 conference of thegeneral officers was held
{ I'm the evening, I'm which it was deter
r mined, 6pon the earnest recOnlmenda.
70 ton of all the general officers above
D named, and with the acquiescence o
E Gen. Smith to retire upon Grand EcOrJ
, the following day.
The reasons urged for this course by the
o officers commanding the nineteenth and
? thirteenth corps, We're: First, that the alb
+ sence Of water made ii absolutely nCces-
{ sary TO advance or retire without delay.
) Gen. Emory's command had been with
) ont ratiOns for two days, and the train
which had been turned 10 the rear during
3 the battle could not be put in condition to
move forward upon the single road,
through dense woods in which ii stood,
, without difficulty and-loss Of time. 1t
was for the purpose Of communicating
with the feet at Springfield Landing from
e-Sabine Cross Roads 10 the river, as
well as 10 prevent the concentration OF
the Texas troops with the enemy at
Mansfield, that we had pushed for the
early occupation Of that point. COnsid-
cring the difficulty with which the gum
boats passed Alexandria and Grand
Ecore, there was every reason to believe
that the navigation Of the river would be
found impracticable.
4 squadron of cavalry under direction
Of Mr.. Young, who had formerly been
employed IN the surveys of this country,
and was now connected with the engineer
department, which had been sent on q
+ reconnaissance 10 the river, returned to
Pleasant Hill, on the day Of the battle,
with the report that they had not been
able 10 discern the fleet, nor learn from
the people It's passage up the river. This
led to the belief that the low water had
. prevented the advance Of the fleet The
. condition Of the river, which had been
steadily falling since our march from
+ Alexandria, rendered it very doubtful, if
. the fleet asCended the river, whether il
could return from any intermediate point;
and probably, if not certain, that if il
reach Shreveport it would never escape
without a rise Of the river, of which all
hopes began TO fail. The forces designated
for this campaign numbered forty
two thousand men. Less than that
number was actually available for
service against the enemy during Its
. progress. The distance which separated
Gen. Steele's command from the line Of
our operations nearly two hundred miles
TO Us or 10 the enemy, and reduced the
strength of the fighting column to the
extent Of his force, which was expected
to be from ten thousand tofifteen thousand
men. The depot at Alexandria, made
necessary 10y the imprIcticable naviga-
ton withdrew from our forces three
thousand men, under Gen. Grover. The
return Of the Marine Brigade to the de
. fense of the Mississippi, upon the demand
of Aiai.-Gen. McphersOn, and which
could not pass Alexandria without its
steamers, nor move 10y land for want Of
land transportation, made a further re-
duction Of three thousand men. The pro-
lection Of the fleet OF transports against
the enemy on both sides of the river
made it necessary for Gen. a. j. Smith
TO detach Gen. 7. kilby smiths division
Of two thousand five hundred men from
the main body for that duty. The CONF
missary train required guard OF five
hundred men, These several Haatacl-
ruent-. WmCn lt Na- lUlDossitItca- cid.
and the distance of Gen. Steeles COM
mand was not in my pOwef,to correct,
reduced the number Of troops that we
were able at any point TO bring into
action, from fOrty-twO thousand men to
about twenty thousand. The losses sus-
tanned in thesevere battles Of the seventh,
eighth and ninth of April amounted to
three thousand nine hundred and sixty
nine men, and necessarily reduced our
active forces to that extent. The enemy,
superior 10 Us in numbers in the outset
by falling back was able to recover from
f his great losses by means of reinforce
mcuts which We're within his reach as
. he approached his base of operations,
while we were growing weaker rs We
departed from ours. We had fought the
+ battle Of Pleasant Hill with about fifteen
/ thousand men against twenty-five thou
sand men and won a victory which for
/ these reasons We were unable 10 follow
up. Otherconsidoraions connected with
the actual military condition OF affairs
afforded additional reasons for the course
. recommended.
Between the commencement of the
expedition and the battle Of Pleasant Hill,
a change had occurred in tho general
command Of the army, which caused
modification Of my instructions in regard
to this expedition.
Lieut.. Gen. Grant, iD a dispatch dated
the fifteenth of March, which ] received
on the twenty-seventh of March at
Alexandra, eight days before Uv reached
Grand EcoTe, by special messenger, gave
me tie following Instructions: Should
you find that the taking Of Shreveport
viii occupy ten or fifteen days more time
than Gen. sherman gave his troops who
are absent from their command, YOU
, will send them back at the time specified
, in his note of blank date Ng-sa. era,
) II II should lead to TIC a5vEd0uacBf Of
the U,cis osteer " the eJpedti0R Should
{ It prove successful, hold Shreveport and
Red River with such force as YOU deem
necessary, and rftWu the balance oil
ycuv tf8Qlts 70 the ueighb0rhood Of New
Orleans These instructions, / was in
formed, were given for the purpose OF
s having all parts of to army, or,
: rather, all ar,--.ss, act as much in concert
s as possible" and with the view 10 q
{ movement in the spri.sg campaign
s against Mobile, which was certain to b,
made "if U2ops enough could be oh
- tanned without embarrassing othc
e movements, in which event New Or
4 leans would be the point Of dcnor;lre fo
5 such an expedition
T 4 sUass4uent dispatch, though il die
d not control, fully justified my action, re
c peated these general views, and statet
o that the commanding General - NOUb
!. much r,,,55r zbe Red Rircr CrDeditioi
Y had UcrCr begun, than hat yoV should b.
{ detained one dag beyond The irgt u Nu5
t. ia commencing TIE Increment east Qt n,
= A2sstssFph
e The limitation Of time referred to Fl
q these dispatches was based upon the Opin
If ion, which I had verbally expressed T.
Il Gen. Sherman at New Orleans, that Gen
S, Smith could be spared in thirty day
e after we reached Alexandria; but IL wa
g predicated UpOn the expectation that tn
.e navigation Of the river would be unob
e structed: that We should advance with
v out delay at Alexandra, Grand Ecore @
.e elsewhere, on account Of low water; an
u that the forces Of Gen. Steele were to GO
1t operate with US eflaltgaiiy at some poin
Ie on Ited River, near Natchitochcs @
81 Monroe.
~ Il was never understood that an gXpe
~ ditioD, that involved on the part Of m.
command a land march Of nearly fOJ
e hundred miles into the enemv's cCUatry
is and which terminated at point whic
.e We might not be able to hold, either o.
l- account of the strength Of the enemy G
n the difficulties Of obtaining supplies, Wa
n 20 be limited 20 thirty days. The c0nd
h ton of our forces, and the distance an
n difficulties sattendingfurther advance I'M
y the enemy's country, after the battle /
& the eighth and ninth, against an enem
v superior in numbers TO ouroWn, rendere
4, II probable that we could NOS oocup
le Shreveport within the time specified, AN