Daily Davenport Democrat. [volume] (Davenport, Iowa) 1864-1874, 1865-02-17
~ le1o Psess uegetlstlsss'
The V1Nolo AMAls N Aesso'
61on0>svro % oeo0dWJnk
49, DECISIVE toso
Country.


G000Ssys
-. vv,.aem sr the Policy sf HE
0~Hecrasac Rarsy vlnaacasea.
~. a. New York wsrld, Feb. ILL.,
Iiapeln has 4 last satisfied public
.~c.ctstion and sent to Congress his defer.
r.d message giving he version Of the histo.
- Of the Hampton Roads conference. with
- Of he tsttss end tslsgrsms inter.
changed among the various psfties to that
proceeding.
There Is nothing In the basratien and let
tara thus communicated Inconsistent with
the superstition that the whele affair was IN
srtful man0uvre BY the friends Of the Pres.
ident to hoodwink and deceive tho country
for his benefit Its purpose vs. not peace,
but to silence hostile criticism on his I'd
ministEation.
The Democratic party asserted their b.
lief, In the Presidential canvass that, II they
elected their candidate, peace on the basis
Of r. unisa would Be possible soon aCer his
inauguratiea. The PARTY that nominated
Mr.. Lincela put him on the platform Of war;
war = - ceatinusd (sse the Baltimore re-
solves) without relaxation until slavery 10
destroyed, rooe and branch. Before Mr..
Lincoln vas formally declared elected, It
had become appasent that time was vindi-
eating the Democratic position. Evidences
Of wavering and dissensions came to us with
every batch Of Southern journals. Events
seemed ripening for peace with such rapid
" that nothing vas necessary but states
manship 70 put an honorable termination
TO the war previous to the fourth Of
March.
The friends Of the reelected President
felt it necessary to meet, and by some means
gainsay, these accommodating proofs that the
Democratic party had formed . sagacious
and f0rccasting judgment Of the possibilities
Of the situation. lfpeace should be male
this spring, the abolition amendm Mt TO the
Constitution would not be ratified, and the
war would end leaving slavery unextin-
guished, contrary 70 the demand of the Bal
timore platform. But if no steps toward
peace we're taken, il no pr0ffers were made,
IL nothing Was done, the Democratic party
would stand before the country fully vindi-
Gated; Mr.. Lincoln's influence would stead
lily decline from the day Of his second inau-
guration. It was political necessity that
no should be rescued; and the task was
undertaken by the same experienced and
long headed, not to say crafty, politician
who undertook, last autumn, to demoralize
the Democratic party by trying to induce
General Mcclellan to decline its nomina.
ton.
All the preliminaries up to the arrival and
detention Of the Confederate Commissioners
1t our lines are consistent with the SUPPOSE
ton that the President desired peace; but
they are also and equally consistent with the
idea that be wAs playing political game tor
his own advantage. But in all the subse.
Quent proceedings, . determination that no
conditions should be allowed which the reb
els were not certain to reject, is painfully ap-
parent. Il is too clear for successful con
tradiction that the President dealt deceit
fully with the rebel authorities, and has
been practicing on the country.
Mr.. Lincoln euticcd tho rebel government
70 send commissioners by holding out to
them the Idea that simple re union was II g
sole condition on which he would insist
That letter Of his to Mr.. Blair, which makes
such figure in his narrative, is again and
again put forward bv him as the basis on
which he insisted. The whole emphasis oil
that letter lies in the words ''our common
country" used to describe the purpose Of q
permissible mission. Those words are rem.
dered still more emphatic by the ndorse
ment, in the Presidents own hand, on the
back Of his copy Of the letter. He said, in
the letter, that he would receive any agents
who came with the view of securing peace
to the people Of our common country"
We put il to any man Of cand0r and in
telligencc, If this letter, considering all the
circumstances, did not fully authorize the
expectation that the re union Of the States
was the only condition Of peace which the
President intended to insist on as indispen-
sable. Tho emphatic words were intended,
~ the President took pains to record in the
aforesaid Endorsement, rs IN offset and an
swer to the expression in Davis letter to
Mr.. Blair about securing peace between the
1.-TWO Countries
Mr.. Lincoln seems to have been surprised
and embarrassed at the prompt acceptance
Of his proposition. Had it been refused, as
he expected and counted on, his letter to
Mr.. BLAIR, and the Endorsement he wrote
upon it, would have been damaging bomb
to explode, at some fit opportunity, against
the democratic party. Its publication would
have been regarded as conclusive documen
tary evidence that the Democrat. party was
wrong in claiming that peace was possible
on thu basis Of reunion Every thing seem.
to have been cut and dried with reference te
this expected failure. and this use to b.
made Of il.
The + President was accordingly takcr
aback and disconnected, when the rebel com
missioncrs, made their appearance at ou1
lines, with IN application for safe conduc
to Washington. Shrcwd as he is, he knew
not what to do; he was 1t his wits end
His political bomb seemed about to explod,
in his own camp. He first did all he could
and moro than manly dealing would war
rant, to repulse the mission he had virtually
invited. He kept the commissions knockin,
At our lines, and plainly would have sen
them back unadm,tted, If Gen. Grant hat
not derenged his plans by admitting then
before the arrival Of MAJ. Eckert, the agen
sent BY the President to interpose obstacles
Even then this agent seems so well to have
understood the wishes Of the President. tina,
he accomplished the object for which he wa,
sent, and the commissioners would hav,
been immediately remanded across the line,
had it not been for the interposition Of Gen
Grant. ~ am ccnciaced." telegraphcd Gen
Grant, to the President ''ttat their inten
tom are good, and THEM DESIRE SINCERE T,