The Tiffin weekly tribune. (Tiffin, Ohio) 1859-1868, 1865-12-21

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Iwent, which we cX.rac, from the
text:
" My frs: object being to- break
,hc military power of tho rebellion
and capture the cncny's strong
holds, made me DESTROYS that Gen.
Butler should succeed in his move
Imcnt against Richmond, IA that
would tend moro than anythingl
else, unless it were the capture of
Lees army, to accomplish this dc.
lsircl result in the ,ast. Ii he fail
Jed, il was my determination, by
hard fighting, either to compel Ice
to retreat, or TO SO cripple him that
he could not detach a large force
to go north and still retain enough
for the defence of Richmond. 1t.
was wei understood. by b Dth Con.
erals Butler and Meade, before
starting on the campaign, that it
was NY intention to put both their
lurmics south of the Jumcs river in
case ofiailure to destroy Lee with
Iout It.
Before giving Gen. Butler his
instructions, | visit him ut For
trcss Monroe, and in conversation
pointed out thc apparent impor,
tancc of getting possession OF Pc
tcrsburg, and destroying Railroad
communication rs far south as pos.
Ijible.
e" Believing, however in the
lpracticabilify Of capturing Rich.
Imond unless il was reinforced. |
lmadc thatthc objective point Of his
Operations. AS the army of the
lpotom0c was 20 move stimuli unc.
ous'y with him, Lee colld not dc.
tach from his army with safety,
and the enemy did not have troops
elsewhere 10 bring to tho bcicncc
of the city in time to meet Il rapid
movement from the nvit th of James
river. col
"On the evening of tho 18th
and morning of the 18th he CARR
cd portion Of the encmy's first
line of dcicnccs at Drury's Bluff,
or Fort Darling, with Il small loss.
The time thus consumed from the
9th, lost to us the benefit OF the
surprise and capture of Richmond
and Petersburg, enabling, as it
did, Bcauregard to collect his loose
'orcos in North and South Carroll
ma, and bring them to the defence
of those places. On the 10th the
enemy attacked Gen. Butler in his
position in front ol Drury's Bluff
He was forced back, into his en-.
trcnchments between the forks OF
the James and AppomattoX rivers,
the enemy cntrcnching strongly in
his front, thus covering his rail
roads, the city and al that was val
liable to him. Ills army, there.
fore, though in position of great
security, was us completely shut
off from further operations directly
against Richmond rs ifit had been
in II bottle strongly corkcd. 1t re-.
.quired but u comparatively small
force Of the enemy to hold it there,
"The army
sen to operate AGAINST Richmond
having Theoretically scaled itscli
up mt Bermuda Hundred, the enc
my was enabled to bring the mos'
, il notall tic rciniorconcnts bIo'
/ from the south by Bcauregdrd,
against the army of tho Poto'
mac. In addition to this
reinforcement, Il very considerable
one, probably not less than 5000
, men, was obtained 10y calling il
the scattered troops under Brock
inridgc, from the western part o
, Virginia.
4" The position at Bermuda Hun
dred was as easy to defend as i
was difficult to operate from agains
the enemy. | determined, there
. fore, to bring from it ak available
forces, leaving enough only to sc
, cure what had been gained, and
f accordingly, on the 22d, | dircctod
that thy be sent forward, under
commanl ol Major General w +.
r Smith, to join the army Of the Po
tomdc.
OPERATIONS AGAINST RICHMOND.
, 4" My idea, from the start, nae
. been to beat Lees army north 0
, Richmond, or follow him south i
! he should retreat After the bat
e tic of the Wilderness it was ovi
/ dent that The enemy deemeo
, it OF the first importance to run n,
9 risks with the army he then had
4 lie acted purely on the defensive
c behind breast. works, or iccbly on
+. tho defensive Immediately in front
s OF them. and where, in case Of re-
t pulse, he could easily retire behind
G them. Without greater sacrifice
5 of life, than | was willing TO make
q all could not BE- accomplished tina
: | had designed north of Richmond
| therefore determined to continue
to hold substantially the groun,
we then occupied, taking advan
: tage of any favorable circumstan
$ ces that might present themselves
: until the cavalry could bo sent t.
i Charlottesville and Gordonsville
! to efectually break up the railroa,
connection between Richmond an,
? ? the Shenandoah Valley and Lynch
! burg; and when the cavalry go
,, well of, to move the army to tn
: south side Of the James river, b
the enemy's right flank, where
felt | could cut off all his source
| % Al