, 1865-03-01
Qtllfdap Gribn11e,
THE MILITARY SITUATION.

WEuNESUAI i, MARCH I, 1865.
THE MILITARY SITUATION.
In the absence of any information oS III,
movements OF General Sherman, other thar
the meager 1acts which escape to us through
rebel channels, deep sollcitude and a suspen
sion Of 5udgment'as tc their success nAturall,
prevail throughout the North. At present
we only know that his movement into sontt
Carolina has resulted In the capture o
Bsanchy1le, Columbia and Charleston. com
paratiyely without rcaistance, and that be h.,
thus far occupied, either permanently or tenn.
pora1ily, whatever point be pleased. and al
last accounts was pointing towards Charlotte
North carolfna, with an apparent intention
Of proceeding cia Salisbury, Greensborouch,
and Danvine, into Virginia.
This route, avoiding the svamps of The
coast region, lies through an elevated and dry
country, favorable to the health Of his army.
and to military operations, and abundant in
supplies. It Is his shortest ronte Into Vlr-
ginia. It makes communication with, and
reinforcement from East Tennessee possible.
and renders similar aid from Wilmington and
Rewbern difficult His route is about equI-
distant from our lines in Tennessee and on
the coast, and through the very heart Of, The
remaining rebel territory.
The advance Of his cayal.y to Florence, re-
ported several days ago, may have indicated
desire to open communication with our
forces ut Wilmington, TO intercept the forces
which retreaaed from Cha{1eston, or mere.
" to destroy the raflroads which
center at Florence. Rebel papers give no
information what Sherman Is doing oiler
tlnn TO note the casual fighting and re-
suits in the occupation Of this or that town.
These however are the 1east of General sher-
mans labors or achievements. His cavalry
columns perform whatever little fighting
may be necessary to protect his army, which
Is gigantic working party engaged In de-
etroying railroads and military supplies. Til.
fighting is ol 1ittlo consequence compared
with the yast amount Of labor performed In
the work Of destroying the rebel means Of
sustaining their armies,
While so engaged the slaves who will nock
TO his standard, as II Georgia, By thousands,
will supply him With every NEEDED inforina
ton relative 10 tlle movements and p.cpara
tions Of the rebels to resist him. This Kind
Of information has ncrer yet deceived our
officers, and has been Of tncalculable service
to them. The slaves look upon General Shcr-
man as diyincly commissioned to bring them
liberty In the name of the United States Gov
crnmcnt, or rather Of Abraham Lincoln, who,
u them, tmpersonates their freedom. They
deal In no abstract theories, but love and
will serVc with their lives the man who
brings them freedom. As rebel member OF
Congress recently stated that In South and
North Carolina there were ten able bodied
negroes to one white man, 1t follows that
Sherman has the sympathies Of ten ont OF
eltVen Of the people on his march. Without
this clement Of strength his march would
have been fatal blundcr.
While these facts make up the extent OF
our knowledge Of Shermnn's condition, we
have ha dly more data by which to estimate
the resistance which the rebels can couccn-
trate against him. Fcars are felt by some
Tint what the rebci papers style the
"litte army" OF: BeauEesard, may be rein
forced by Bragg from Wilmington, Hardee
from Charleston, bv Hood from Aiabama, and
by Ice from Richmond, so Us to out number
Sherman. Some would assert that Lee has
ordered IN evacuation Of the coast, and
concentration in the interior. We have no
evidence Of any such pretended order. The
rebels were driven out Of Savannah, Branch
vile, Columbia, Otaugeburgh and Winnsbo-
rough by 6herman's superior numbers. They
were Hankcd out Of Charleston and compelled
to run not by any order of Lee, bnt by the
certainty Of capture by Sherman It they r.
maired. They were stor1ned out Of Fort
Fishe. after the most obstinate resistance,
and step by step were mancuyered and driven
out Of every fort On the Cape Fear river, and
finally out Of Wilmington. The abandon
ment Of these posts results not from any
plans Of Lee, but in spite of all his plans.
If we suppose Shevmao's army to number
from 10000 10 5000 men, it-is difficult 10
conceive that the rebels can BY their utmost
skill In concentration outnumbes him. At
every point from which they eau withdrnw
troops for the purpose, those troops have
heretofore been outnrmbercd aud outdankcd
by our own forces. Any rebel force which
may concentrate With Beaurcgard, Therefore,
will relieve still lnrgcr Union force to unite
with Sherman The cyacuation by Hardee
Of Charleston set at liberty sha 1"sE1 uass or
our tloops heretofore operating there under
Gilmore and Foster. So wish the eyacua,iou
Of Wilmington. Any reinforcement OF Beau
rsgald by Eocd would seem to be impossible,
and Shr.man's army end hundreds OF mtles
Of mountainous country ARE between them
While We do not ser ttat Bcauregard can
out, reinforce Sherman, unless Lee bring to his
aid the army now at Richmond, this last
movement would be equally fatal to rebel
hopes, as it would make 6herman'a move
ment result in the capture Of Richmond,
which is its highest object
Much Is said Of the fact TINT the rebels will
operate on interior lines, but this depends
somewhat upon the strategy Of General
Sherman. In his late movement
into South Carolina, the rebels
found their invader operating. on
interior lines, while they knew not whether
10 concentrate their strength at Augusta,
Columbia or Charleston, md 60 lost the two
latter. He may equally disconcert them by
his movement into North Carolina. Great
6olcitude will natu1 ally be felt until the re-
suits Of the counter. movements against Sher-
man arc known. The rebels, by riskiug
much, may still deliver q heavy battle.
Whether they will do so, and end the contest
in Wa,c' loo, or IN n general collapse, few
weeks will determine.
If the rcbcls are now gathering the shattes-
cd remnants Of thcir former strength for a
final conflict, it is specially important that
the 800, 900 men called for by the late daft be
s.nt 10 the front Us speedily as possible. Their
presence tbele now, would render further IF.
fort on :hc part Of the rebels so manhcstly
hopeless, Us to render bloodless terlnin lion
Of thc wur far more probable. The rebel
armies ART nuw bviug strcug hcned By the re-