The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1865-06-30
GEN. snERMANS REPORT.
Interesting Details Of the Georgia
Campaign.

Interesting DetallS OF the georgia
Campaign.
Special Dispatch to the Chicago Times.
WASHINGTON, June 21.-Gen. Sherman's re-
port of his campaign in Georgia has been re-
cceived at the War Department. 1t is dated
Savannah, Jan. 1. 1t is a very elaborate argu-
ment and opens with the occupation OF At
lanta, and traces the campaign infinitely till
Savannah was occupied. Gen. Sherman says
he became aware ia September last, that the
enemy intended to resume offensive operations
under Hood, and he sent Major General Thomas
to Nashville to organize the new troops ex-
pected to arrive there, and to make prepare
lions to meet such an event. He then de-
scribed the movements he made with Slocum
and Howard to intercept Hood, and made all
arrangements to give the latter battle in Snake
Creek Gap, on the 14th of October, but the
enemy gave way and escaped He was little
encountered with army trains, and moved with
great rapidity, and succeeded in getting into
the gorge formed by the Lookout Range within
the neighborhood Of Gadsdia. Hood, he says,
evidently wanted to avoid fight. Gen: Sher-
man then says: Hoods movement and STRAIT
eey had demonstrated that he had an army
capable of endangering at all times my COM
munications, but unable to meet me in open
fight. To follow him would simply amount to
being decoyed away from Georgia with little
prospect of overtaking and overwhelming him.
To remain on the defensive would have been
bad policy for an army OF SO great value as the
one then commanded, and was compelled
to accept course more fruitful in resources
than the naked one of following him to the
Southwest had previously submitted to the
commander-in-chief a general plan, which
amounted substantially to the destruction of
the Atlanta Railroad back to Chattanooga,
and sailing forth from Atlanta through the
heart of Georgia to capture one or more OF
great Atlantic seaports." Gen. Sherman de-
tails the organization of the troops which he
furnished Thomas to protect the route from
Chattanooga to Nashville, and to look after
Hood He then says he commenced on the
14th of November bis grand march, having re,
ceived the sanction OF the commander-in.chief
for carrying into effect his plans, the details of
which were explained to all his corps COM
manders and heads of staff.
With strict Injunction of secrecy, General
Sherman then details the line of march of the
three armies of Georgia, Tennessee and Ohio,
the abandonment of Atlanta and the advance
of his command at that time: "On the 14th
of November my army stood detached and cut
from all communication with the rear, and
was composed of the 4th, 18th and 18th corps,
constituting the right wing, under Major Gen.
o. o. Howard !; the 18th and Goth corps, con.
shutting the left wing, under Major Gen. Slo-
cum, of an average strength of 10000 infantry;
of s., 900 under Brigadier General Fitzpatrick;
and artillery reduced to minimum of one gur
to 1000 men. My first object, oc course, was
to place my army in the very heart of Georgia,
interposing between Macon and Augusta and
obliging the enemy to divide his forces to de-
fend not only those points but Millen, Savan-
nan and Charleston. All my calculations were
T..11v .snl
to that place, Sherman saws: As We ap-
preached Savannah, the country became more
marshy and difficult and more distractions
were met, in the way of felied trees, where
roads crossed through swamps or mar
row crossways, but our companies were
well organized and removed all obstruc-
tons in an incredibly short time. No
opposition from the enemy worth speaking of
was encountered until the heads of the columns
were within fifteen miles of Savannah, where
the roads leading to the city are obstructed,
more or less, by felled trees, and with earth
works and artillery; but these were easily
burned and the enemy driven away. so that by
the 10th of December, the enemy were driven
within his lines at Savannah. The only ap-
breaches to the city were by five narrow cause
ways, and two railroads, and the Augusta, and
Louisville and Ogeechee direct roads, all of
which were commanded by heavy ordnance,
too strong for us to fight with our light field
guns. To assault an enemy of unknown strength
at such disadvantage, appeared to me un-
wise, especially as had so successfully brought
my army almost unscathed so great distance,
and could surely attain the same result by the
operation of time. / therefore instructed my
army commanders to closely invest the city
from the north and west, and to reconnoitre
around in their fronts respectively, while
gave my personal attention to opening COM
munication with our fleet. which knew was
waiting for US ia Tybee, Wasachee and ASA
bar sounds
Gen. s. then details his success in opening
communication with Dahlgren and Porter, and
adds, 81 was very much disappointed that
Hardee had escaped with his garrison, and had
to content myself with the matured fruits of
victory, without the cost of life which would
have attended q general assault. Substantial
results viii be more clearly set forth in the
statements of heavy ordnance and other public
property acquired, and it will suffice here to
state that the important city of Savannah, with
its valuable harbor and river, was the chief Oh
ject of the campaign"
Gen. Sherman then refers to his results as
follows: Our former labors in North Georgia
had demonstrated the truth that no large army
carrying with it the necessary stores and bag
gage can Overtake and capture an inferior force
OF the enemy in his own country, therefore no
alternative was left me but the one adopted,
uducly, W OiNluc LILY lOlctS, auQ VIII one part
act Extensively against the enemys reserve.
With the other, shall act defensively and in.
vite the enemy to attack, asking the chances
of battle. In this conclusion have been sin
gularly sustained by the results.
/ estimate the damage done to the State and
its military resources at 800, 600 600, at least
$50 900, 600 of which has been to our advan
tage, and the remainder is simply waste and
destruction. This may seem hard species of
war, but it brings the sad realities CT war home
to those who have been directly or indirectly
instrumental in involving us in its attendant
calamities.
The report concludes as follows: In the body
of my army feel q just pride. Gems Howard
and Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity
and intelligence, thorough soldiers and pa
triots, working day and night, not for them
selves, but for their country and their men.
Gen. Fitzpatrick, who commanded the caval-
~ Of this army, has handled it wi b spirit and
dash, to my entire satisfaction, and kept SUI
perior force of the enemy's cavalry from even
approaching our infantry columns or wagon