Prescott journal. [volume] (Prescott, Wis.) 1861-1871, 1865-01-28
THE WILMINGTON EXPEDITION.
Gsasral Buffers Report and Gran Endorsement,

Buffers report of the Wilminl ton expedi-
ton. The endorsement of Gel. GRANT on
the report makes one or two revelations
which throw considerable light on the cause of
Gen. BuTLER's removal from command. 1t
seems that be crowded himself into the Will
mington expedition without authority, when
it was not intended he should accompany it,
and disobeyed instructions by Ee-embarking
the troops after landing had been eff oted
GEN. BUTLER's REPORT.
The force composing the expedition amount
ed to about $500 men, consisting of Gen.
Orme's division Of the Gath corps and Gen.
Paine's division of the 25th corps, under CON-
mand of Maj. Gen. Weitzel.
Cens Butler states that after embarking his
forces on the transports they were detained
from the 9th 10 the 18th of December, wait
ing for Porter's feet. He joined the trans
port feet off Cape Henry on the 18th, arriv-
ing at the rendezvous off New Inlet on the
evening of the 18th, where they waited until
the evening of the 18th, having the fairest
weather possible. On the evening OF the 18th
Porter came from Beaufort, to rendezvous,
when the sea became rough, and on the 10th
the wind sprang up, making it impossible to
land the troops, and by the advice OF Admiral
Porter the troops were landed at Beaufort
This was necessary, as the transports were
coaled for ten days, and that time had been
then consumed.
For four days the wind blew gale, during
which time the transports were coaled and
watered. At 4 o'clock P. NJ, on the 25th,
Butler came in sight of Fort Fisher, and
found the naval feet bombarding it, the pow
der vessel having been exploded the morning
previous. Arrangements were made to land
the troops next morning, under cover OF the
gunboats. as soon as the fire of the Halfmoon
and Flag Pond Hill batteries had been silenc
ed, which were up the shore, two or three
miles above Fort Fisher.
Porter was sanguine that he had silenced
Fort Fisher. He was urged, if that were so,
to run by the fort into Cape Fear river, and
then the troops could land and hold the beach
without fear of being shelled by the rebel
gunboats, the tallahassee being seen in the
river. Gen. Butler argued that if Porter
would put his ships in the river, the army
could then be supplied across the beach, and
that at least the blockade of Wilmington
would be thus effectual, even if they did not
capture. the fort. Porter replied that he
should probably lose boat by torpedoes in
an attempt to run by, and was reminded that
the army might lose five hundred men by an
assault, and his boat would not weigh in the
balance, even in money point OF view, with
the lives of these men. Porter declined GO
ing by, and the expedition was deprived of
that essential element of success.
On the noon of the 25th the batteries were
reported silenced, and the transports success
fully landed their troops. Finding that the
accommodating party landing could hold the
shore, Butler determined that the land force
should attempt an assault. Curtis brigade
was pushed within a few hundred yards OF
Fort Fisher, capturing the half-mOon battery
and its men. This skirmish line advanced to
within seventy-fve yards of the fort, the gar
rison being kept in their bomb-proo by the
naval fire. When the fire of the navy ceas-
ed, the parapet was fully manned, and per-
sonal examination by Butler, within few
hundred feet of Fort Fisher, showed it to be
well protected by extensive stockade bas-
tions, fifteen feet high and fifteen wide near
the west ditch, and that no material damage
had been done to the fort by the navy
Seventeen heavy guns tore up breach. The
flag, which had been cut down by shell, was
captured on the edge of the ditch, and an Or
derly killed about a third of a mile from the
fort. The report that any soldiers entered is
mistake.
During this time, Ames' division had cap
tured 2lS men and 10 commissioned officers
of the North Carolina Reserves. Butler
learned from these prisoners that two brig
AIDES of Hoke's division were within two
miles of the rear of his force; their Skin
mishers were actually engaged, and the re-
mainder of Hoke's division had arrived the
night previous at Wilmington, and were on
the march, thus forming force outside the
works superior to Buffers.
81 had ha1 tbo
surf was rolling into the shore, so that land
ing had become difficult at this time Welt
eel reported to Butler that to assault the
works, in his judgment and that of expert
enced officers of his command, would be i'm
possible with any prospect of success. This
opinion conceded with Buffers, bnt as much
as he regretted the necessity of abandoning
the attempt, he yet considered his duty plain
No works as strong as Fort Fisher, had been
taken by assault during the war, and he re-
ferred to the slaughtered thousands in the as
slults ON Port Hudson and Wagner. Butler
says: | therefore ordered that no assault
should be made, and the troops to re-embark.
While preparations to re-embark were max
ing, the firing of the navy ceased. The guns
of the fort we're fully manned, and sharp
fire of musketry, and grape and canister
swept the plain over which our column must
have advanced. 1t was found impossible to
get Jour troops all aboard before the sea
ran so high as to render further embarkation
or even the sending of supplies ashore i'm
possible.
On the Goth, having made all proper dispo-
sitions for getting the troops on board, Gen.
eral Butler gave orders to transport the feet
as fast as ready to sail, to Fortress Monroe,
in obedience to orders from the Lieutenant
General
General Butler states he learned from de-
serters and prisoners that the supposition,
when the expedition was planned, that Viii
mington was denuded of troops to oppose
Sherman was correct, and so at the time of
the arrival of the army off Wilmington, there
were less than 400 men in Fort Fisher, and
less than 1000 within twenty miles; but the
delay of three days waiting the arrival of
the navy, and the further delay by the storm
of the 2lst, 22d and Esd, gave time for rein
forcements to arrive from Richmond. The
instructions of the Lieutenant General did
not contemplate a seige; we had neither
seige trains nor supplies for such contin-
gencies.
Gen. Butler here says: " The exigency
of possible delay for which the foresight of
the commander of the armies had provided,
had arisen, to-wit: Large reinforcement of
the garrison, with the fact that the navy had
exhausted their supply of ammunition in
bombardment, left me with no alternative
but to return with my army to the James,
The loss of Friday, Saturday and Sunday,
10th, 18th, and 18th, was the Immediate
cause of the failure of the expedition. 1t is
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