Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1865-11-11
APPEAL.
From the london Army and Navy Gazette.
OUR LATE CIVIL WAR.
American Generals-Aa English Criti-
cfsm-

We're the great SUCCESSES Of the armies
Of the United States achieved by viola
ting many Of the rules and precepts of
thegreat European military authorities
II Is the opinion of a correspondent Of
our New York contemporary that they
The correspondent Of the ATHV
and NrgV.T Journal signsh himself Veteran
and as he uses hard names and talks Of
4" the strategy, grand and minor tactics
and loeisticsn Of the recent campaigns,
we mav.suppOse he understands some
thing about the matter. Butifhe IS very
profound, then we must confess our ignO-
rance and shallOwness. We have utterly
misunderstood the whole course Of the
war lift should prove, as he thinks il has
proved that anything new in principle
has been introduced, or fit should prove
any of the old and well-tried principles
Of strategy, and we might almost say Of
tactics, Is be unsOund. For our part, we
e only the considerable novelty, and
that is a novelty not of principles but OF
means, railways, irOnclads, telegraphsa and
troops who We're, many Of them, almost
born engineers. Gen. Sherman has adj
mitted that he profted more by thepages
Of Napier than by those of any other
writer; and We are not aware of any one
campaign which has shown us a military
principle reduced to practice which had
not been acted OF by some n or more
Of thcgreat commanders in all ages.
Wedonot suppose that even u Vet
erann would contend that the generals,
his countrymen, were more skilled in
warfare than Napoleon. But he certainly
writes rs il something totally novel had
been accomplished, as if success had
been won by breaking the old laws, which
Is equivalent 10 a claim that new law
have been established. But LET US bring
him 10 the test. His first position is thus
expressed: "Flank movements, for e.
ample he writes, have been regarded
as among the most dangerous that could
he employed, and always to be avoided,
If possible. Napoleon won the battle OF
Austerlitz by cutting tie forces Of the
ehemy i'm two while making a flank
movement: vet we find Sherman's vic
t6rious march TO Atlanta was fighting
and thanking, and Mead's tmeanmg
Grants. advance from the Rapidan q
the james was a grand flank movement,
fighting by day and thanking during the
night What real antithesis there Is
between the mastery movement of Ma.
pOleOn at Austerlitz and the series o.
movements which carried Sherman q
Atlanta, we do not see. One would hinB
that lighting and fianking'' was some
thing quite new, vet il was fighting and
thanking that carried Napoleon TO the
Mincio, and very dangerous fianking II
was.
The passage Of the Pc at Plaeenza was
q daring and hazardous achievement,
more daring and hazardous than any
thing Sherman attempted on the line
between Dalton and the ChattahoOchee.
Napoleon felt he could do it because ht
estimated Alright the character O
Bcauheu, and trusted to his own power.
Of deception. Sherman knew he could
not play such a trick with Joseph John
stOn, and his successes were due 70 tho
skill with which, while holding Johnston
AT bay in front, he at the same time
threatened most seriously his line OF
retreat The series Of movements which
brought Grant TO the James were, no
doubt, a series of flank movements. sue
cessful mainly because Grant handledhis
huge army with such skill that Lee never
had a chance but once Of touching him
on the line Of march. Every one OF
Grants movements 20 a flank was full OF
danger. His success shows, not that
flank movements are not dangerous, but
thaJhe knew how 10 parry the danger.
Lee routed Pope and Hooker by flank
aaaAaHAAAEH .AN AAH AAaAAA AeA NtAAuAE vi
such operations in front of Grant. At
Austerlitz, to recur to the first example,
Napoleon fell upon his enemies as they
were marching about under his nose.
Johnston never offered a like chance to
Sherman, and Sherman took care that
his flank marches should be wide enough
10 be out Of his opponents reach, yet near
enough To be effective.
Threaten your enemy's fanks. and
protect your own is a maxim as old as
the hills, and il Is also as true now as il
was before the American war, that flank
marches ia the face Of the enemy are
among the most dangerous evOlutions
that can be performed. The Veteran
thinRs that the success Of Gen. Grants
march 10 the James was owing TO this;
that the continual change of position de-
prived the enemy of the advantages of
infrenchments, by giving men no timeto
construct them. But surely Il ought not
10 require the eye Of "a veteran 20 see
that while intrenchments would and did
prevent Grant from forcing his way
straight 10 Richmond, no amount Of in
trenchmentS could have prevented him
from turning the line. If Lee had been
able TO mud himself in"-that elegant
phrase belongs to- Richmond editor-on
the north arena, that would not have
prevented Grant from moving upon
Hanover Court House. The reason Is a
foolish one. The marches were success
fUl, not because they gave Lee no time
10 construct field works, but because they
were ably planned, and unfalteringly
executed, out Of reach Of Lee, who had
70 conform, and who was also able 10 an
Icipate his opponent.
Another marvellous statement Of the
90 Veteran is This. "The instructions 1
by JOmiui and other distinguished
authors TO maintain the line Of retreat
and base Of suVplie-,n he writes, "were
often entirely disregarded.r Now this
is a question of fact. We remember 1
only % striking instance Of such disre-
gard without penalties, and that occurred
under very peculiar circumstances, which
a violation Of the rule-that Is 1
the great march of Sherman from GeOr-
gia % North Carolina. There was
another Instance In which the General
came so butterfly 30 griefthat he was never
employed again. Gen. Hunter advanced
lpOn L~ynchburg bv a movement SO &C.
that he lost his line Of retreat
md had 10 flee any how to the Ohio. But
N general, every officer was as Jealous of
his line Of retreat as JOmini could wish.
zee invariably took up positions, and es-
camps, covering his vital lines.
after Antietam, as after Gettysburg. he
Eli back before even feeble menaces di-
toward his rear. When ne at
lcked Meade, in the autumn Of eighteen
undred and siXty-three, that officer
romptly preserved his line Of retreat by
creating upon il. !
sherman ealoUsly guarded every
llle Of road in his rear toward Chatta-
O0ga, and the line Of supply thence 10 q
.ashvile was studded and banked BIZ in \
enched posts and guards. Nav, to pre- n
I'VE tnathne when threatened by Hood, Z
herman moved bodily back upOn it. Y
ms enemy of, and protected il o
ltu that enemy went away to strike at y
ashville, Yet our Veteran tells us Il
at "on many occasions the base was n
iandoned, the line Of retreat DESTROYED. I
III the entire army OF the Potomac Y
arched miles and days without either. q
surrounded by heenemy.v The n
wisely refrains from giving "A
If he had sought for them he
'uld not have found them. The base r
the army Of The Potomac was always ID
ashingtOn- That was never for a h
Dment abandoned. What the "Vete- s.
means, perhaps, il, that interme- a
We bases were abandoned, one after the OF
until City Point was reached. al
And this is true. But when did Grant on
itr0y his line Of retreat? In the viii m
mess he could still retreat over the 90
pidani at Spottsyivania he had Fred al.
,ksburg behind him, and he used il. tai
the march 70 the North Anna he had ee
re Than line Of retreat When he ia
! crossed the Pamunkey he was " di- oil
Z communication with Yorktown. and m
elved achievements from that side. IN.
the James, Of course, he had as GOOD az
inc Of retreat and supply as any us
.eral could desire. And as 10 marcbiug Y.
- and days without either line Of re- ml
II OF supply, entirely surrounded bv W.
my, the thing is nure fiction. He sef
q once surrounded 10y tho en- of
Grant, indeed, did quit his tenn saf
iry base al Grand Gulf. when he ~
red up the Big Black, but il was only
q permanent base on the Yazo6.
although he Tisked much, he knew FN
vas striking at a DISCOUNTED enemy, Ne
even If WOrsted he could have re-
ted again % Grand Gulf. {
len there is the great instance sup Mr.
4 by sherman. He did destroy his his
OF retreat. But he acted on a pro- pro
al knowledge ofthe facts, and a con- By
nee That he had power to deal with hin
u. he violated one maxim Of war, hin
~ observed q greater. He DESTROYED eye
my retreat, but he brought the was
= ms strength % bear upon the dog
paLt7 OF the enemy. So we see tam