Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1865-03-13
Inequalities OF tho Contest.
From the Philadelphia Press.

How any rational Southern man can in
dulge hope of achieving independence, in
view of the present situation of affairs, is
something we are utterly unable to under
stand; and in spite of asseverations to the
contrary, we cannot believe that such hope
| exists. The contest, from the first. was a
most unequal one, and if the rebellion was
not squelched in the first year of the war,
it was because the Government and people
of the loyal States could not believe that
the rebel chiefs would be able to bring out
every energy of the Southern States, and
convert their vast territory into military
encampmeut. In fact, both parties were
Ignorant of their respective resources for
war, and the consequence was that the
struggle went on after the plan of the
game OF "brag." The rebels seized the
arsenals secured some forts by treachsry,
aud at length fred on Fort Sumter. The
President called out seventy-fve Thousand
men for three months. The rebels
called out twice the number for a year.
The President called out three hundred
thousand for three years, aud so on.-
If the struggle in all its grand and far
reaching proportions could have been
foreseen from the start, and if the Govern
ment had at once called into the field
force superior to any possible force of the
enemy, be might have been overwhelmed
by numbers in the first year of the war,
and with little loss of life But no human
wisdom could anticipate, four years ago.
the magnitude of the contest upon which
the country was entering 1t was known
that the Southern dig rchy was animated
by Satanic pride, maleVolence and ambi
ton, but that those demoniac passions
would sustain them throughout war un
paraileled in history for the power and
capacity displayed on each side, could not
be foreseen BY the ken of man; and hence,
the Government reserved its gigantic, we
might cay its Titanic, power of offence and
defence to be drawn forth by emergencies
as they have arisen. But the rebels have
at last goue the length of their tevher.
They can no longer respond to President
Linooln's call for three hundred thousand
men by calling out an equal or greater
number. They canoot keep their existirg
ranks filled. They have lost the control
of three fourths of their territory, and
every day the limits within which their
only remaining effective army can forage,
umns of Sherman, and the tightening
Gordon of Grant.
At the beginning of the contest it must
be owned that the rebels were greatly our
superior in officers. They had long been
anticipating rebellion, and preparing for
war, and they knew their best men That
this is true is shown in the fact that the
same men are still relied on to lead their
armies. Lee, Johnston Beauregsrd, Bragg,
aud Hardee, were at the beginning OF the
contest. as at the present day, the cher
ished military idols of the rebels. This
sagaciou5 selection of military leaders has
been of vast importance in protracting the
contest. If in the 6rst year Of the war the
merits of Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheri
dan, Terry, had been equally understood on
our side, who can believe that the war
would have lasted to the present day?
The rebels in the first year of the war
possessed this great advantage over the
Government with fVe fold their present re-
sources in men and munitions. 10 the be-
ginning of the fifth year of the war, the
Government has superior resources and
advantages to those possessed by it in
every respect, except in the facility of get
ting men. 1t has as many men upon whom
to draw, but the novelty of volunteering
has worn off, and it is more difficult to
bring them into the field. In officers ne
are now the superior of the enemy; and
the contest, very unequal at the outset,
has become immeasurably so. The final
result is no longer doubted, and can no
longer be regarded as distant. II is OnlyEn
question of a few mooths; and men Sbegin
to puzzle their brains rathec in regard to-
the terms of settlement, and about the
ways and means OF paying the interest and
principal of the dational debt, than with
misgivings of success in the suppression
of the rebellion.