Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1865-06-16
ABSTRACT OF MEADE'S AND SHkhis
DAMS REPORTS OF THE
LAST CAMPAIGN.
Difficulties Between Sheridan and war.

From the New York Commsrcial.l

from the New York Commercial
We give elsewhere condensed reports OF
Generals Meade and Sheridan as 70 tne pa,s
borne by them in the grand campaign Wniea
closed the war The heroes Of Gettysburg and
Five Forks write as they fight, going al tneir
TASK IN straightforward, business.lfke mAn-
skiIlfuI and brave, thew do not aim TO give
prominence TO their own in dividual merits, but
award credit 70 their subordinates wherever ie
When the movement commenced from near
Petersburg, Meades personal command con-
sisted of the ID corps (HunphreysN 5th WAR
ren's) 9th (Wnsht'se and 9TH (Parke's), Gen.
erai Grant exercising personal supervision
over the entire army, embracing, IN addition
to those enumerated, portions o: the I'D and
and 9th corps and tAe cavalry AFTER Sneri-
dams advance and attack upon Five Forks
the 5th corps was sent to him, and renamed
subject TO his command during the IemAihuer
Of the campaign. When the impetuous on
slaughts of the cavalry, supported by the 5tn
corps infantry, had SO diverted the enemy
attention as to weaken their left and center IN
front OF Petersburg, Meade, who had remained
back with his three corps, suddenly, on inc
morning of April 2, hurled them upon tno
weakened lines, which they broke through IN
every direction. General Wright inaugurated
this movement at four o'clock, and 70 MS corps
General Meade ascrbes the credit Of Its entire
success. He says: The gallant assault on the
I'd instant by the 9Th corps was, in my Judg.
ment, the decisive movement Of the campaign.
He again praises this command for their sub
sequent successful attack at Sailors Creek
and also speaks in the highest terms OF his re-
manning corps, and OF the "chesrfulness with
which all submitted TO fatigue ahd privatlons
TO secure the coveted prize"
Gen, Sheridan's effective force Of cavalry
numbered nine thousand. On the 2stn Oh
March he left his encampment near Peters
burg, to make, as he says, cavalry rag on
the Southside railroad, and thence JOIN Gen.
Sherman, or return to Petersburg, as circum-
stances might dictate After he had proceeded
we'll on the expedition, he, however, received,
| during the night, instructions from Ger; Grant
to abandon it, and, acting IN concert WIN tne
| infantry supporting hm-Warrens b 5th corps
turn the right Of Lees army. de accoroingiy,
at an early hour on the following morning, dl-
rected his course for the Five FORKS. the pos
| session of which he knew would enectually
turn the enemy's works. The reader is already
| familiar with the brilliant success of his move
| ment; how, after a desperate conflict, ne cap
| tured and dispersed the whole force CONFRONT
ing him, and compelled the enemy TO send a
| heavy force from their Petersburg line or
| works in order to stay his victorious progress.
While the engagement was going on, ne re-
lieved Gen. Warren from the command OF the
| 5th corps, and directed its movements himself,
| until Gen Griffin was subsequently assigned
| to it. Some days since Gen Warren published
| letter, in which he stated that he had been
| unable to ascertain why he was thus perernp-
| torily relieved. Sheridan assigns the cause In
| his report As we have hitherto learned from
| another official source, Gen. Grant was fear
| full lest Warren might not be up to time, and
| he accordingly, as Sheridan says, unsolicited
| by himself" clothed him with authority TO re-
| move Warren should he deem it best to do SO.
| He adds: Gen. w arren did not exert himself
| to get up his corps as rapidly as he might havo
! done. and his manner gave me the impression
| that he wished the sun to 60 down before DIS
| positions for the attack could be completed"
| Again. he says he was dissatisfied with him
during the engagement, adding: Portions OF
| his line gave way when not posed to aheayy
| fire, and simply for want Of confidence on the
| part of the troops, which Gen. Warren did
not exert himself to inspire. therefore re-
The reason for this misunderstanding was
| obvious. Warren was the personal friend an d
companion of Meade, the commander nomi-
nally OF the whole army, and did not relish
being subordinated to Sheridan, who had just
| 1oined that army.
| Sheridan's report, furthermore, shows that
this i'll feeling did not stop with Warren, and
corroborates dispatch to the Commercial
while the pursuit was In progress, which
affirmed that there was considerable jealousy
among the subordinate commanders: Sheridan
says after the battle OF Sailors Creek:
tMajor Mcclellan and Lieutenant Colonel
Franklin, of General Wrights staff, had sue
cessiyely been sent forward to report the pro-
gress of the 9th corps in coming mp, and on
the arrival OF Major General Wright he re-
ported his corps to me, and from tnat time un-
til after the bate received my orders and
obeyed them; but after the engagement was
over, and General Meade had communicated
with General Wright, the latter declined to
make his report to me until ordered to do so by
the Lieutenant General"
| Happily for the country, however, Generals
Meade and Wright did OF permit their feelings
| to interfere with their duty, and all working
together, the pursuit was brought to glorieus
| termination.
| We have thus dweIt at some length Oh these
| reports. clearing up certain points, as they do,
hereafter be regarded and looked back to with
| more interest than apy other