The Wheeling daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1865-1903, 1865-07-15


ment, and prefaced by the remark that
he had not, until recently, had in his
possession the necessary papers to ena-
Die him to write n report of the CAM
paign OF Western Virginia, In that re-
port he says:
"About half past two the firing which
we had heaTS1inthe direction Of the zap,
and which apparently receded, ceased.
shortly atterward an officer appeared in
the rebel camp and made II speech, We
could not hear the words, but, from the
cheers which followed, many supposed
It had Jared badly with our detachment.
Immediately ordered roads to be cut
and guns got into position, intending to
open the next morning, in order to re-
lieve RoseOrans.n y q
: am quoting from memory, and may
not give the words exactly, but give
thesubstallee. General Mcclellan adds
that he wns delayed by accidents, the
next morning, in opening, until the mr.
rival OF 9 messenger Announcing no the
have ever seen or heard from him in
reference to the matter.
@. Ifhe had supposed that the enemy
was getting the, better ofyou why should
he have delayed until the next morning
before commencing the nttack2r
b a. Such mode of relieving me was
the surest way, toyenable the enemy to
destroy me. Tho only sure relief he
could have given would have been to at
tack the enemy theinstant he heard the
first firing.
Q. I understand you to say YOU ex-
pected to reach the top of the mountain
by 10 o'clock in the morning. In reali-
ty you did not arrive there until half
past two o'clock III the afternoon. Why
was that?
A. In reply to General McOlellan's
question about what time thought I
could reach the top of the mountain,
stated that thought 10 o'clock would
be the latest. That was on the suppo-
sition that L should as soon us pos
sible after our then conversation. But,
as nave already stated, it was, on the
suggestion of General Mcclellan, de-
termined that the head of the column
should not quit the main road and en-
ter the forest mt our front picket line
until daylight. A further cause of de-
lay, which has been stated, was this (:
that, owing to the ftct that we were tin-
dertaking this march mainly in the
daytime, General Lander thought, on
CONSULTATION with the guide, and l de-
ctded, that it would be wiser to take a
more circuitous route, passing further
from the enemy. This lengthened our
march, making it over ten hours.
2 O. How far distant from you were
General Mcclellan and the main body
of our army Mt the time you were en-
gagged with the enemy?
"A. In Straight line it was probably
two miles; by the road it was two and
three=qunrter miles to the rebel lines,
and our troops were formed in line of
battle in front of the rebel lines lust
out of the range of their fire.
q. Then he must have known from
the sound of your guns, if in no other
way, whom you commenced your attack
upon the enemy and the continuance
of the fight?
9 "A. Certainly.
Clellan -nnder his command, incIuding
the force which accompanied you ?a
A. do not know exactly, but be-
lieve ut least between 5000 and Z, 900
effective men.
@. How many men did you take
with you when you made your move
ment to the top of the mountain?
which. My official report shows the
number, and is made IL part of my test
imOny. i-
SIAN4AoEArENT OF EASTERN CAMPAIGNS.
CAfter he was relieved of the com
mand of the Department. of West Vir-
ginia, General r. says:
Having turned over the command of
the department to General Fremont,
i'll obedience to orders, 1 repaired to
Washington and reported to the Secre-
tary of War, who reiterated his cOmpli-
ments OH the plan of campaiGnI had
proposed, and expressed his regret Mt
not being able to cOnIides to me its exc
cution. On the evening after my arri-
rival the Secretary sent for me to come
to his office, and informedime that he
desired to send me in search of Blenclx-
er's division, wrote a letter of instruc-
tions to that effect, and also directed me
to visit the headquarters of General
Banks, and confer with him, reporting
progress from each telegraph station to
the War Department L mention this
as n circumstance of Significance in
what follows. left the next morning
for Harper's Ferry, and reached Win
chester the same evening, dispntching
messengers from two or three points on
my route in search of General BlencI-
er's division. AT Winchester Iedfned
that General Blencker, having arrived
ut Berryls Ferry, in attempting to cross
his men bv means of the old ferry boat,
had, unfortunately, by its careening and
sinking, lost some thirty-tive men. /
Immediately wrote, informing him of
my orders, and directing him to march
to Smokers Ferry, lower down on the
Shenandoah, where we had n flying
bridge, and cross there. arrived ut
Woodstock tie evening of the 18th A pFil,
and informed General Banks of my
mission. AS my Instructions did not
indicate any subject for conference, the
General and myself concluded that it
was to be, dd Ei6ituD', and therefore took
upthe military situation.
After considering the position and
numbers. Of McDowelPs, Banks and
Fremont's forces, / said to General
Banks, tsWhat force has, the enemy in
front of you 2" He replied, "Between
/ s, 900 and IL, ,OOO." then said, "Our en-
tire forces under yourself, Gen. Nc
Dowell and Gen. Fremont, are mt pre-
sent having no decided influence on the
contest between Gen. NIcClellan's 8
forces and the rebels on the Peninsula.
You are in the great valley which has
ALWAYS been an abundant source of
rebel supplies. Your line of commu-
nication is covered by the Blue Ridge
and the Shenandoah, and therefore
icnIn m nr.ntiNelY safe IT seenns to me