Civilian & telegraph. [volume] (Cumberland, Md.) 1859-1875, 1865-12-28

present themselves, until the cavalry coulC
be sent to Charlottesville to effectually
break up the railroad communication between
Richmond and the Shenandoah Valley and
Lynchburg; ard, when the cavalry got vel
off, to move tho army to the south side o
the James river, by the enemy S fank, where
| felt could cut Off all hiE sources of supply
except by the canal"
How this was effected is next explain ed
the operations Of Sfgel (who was relieved al
Gen Grants requcs) and of Hunter in the
Valley, are alluded to, and the narrative
brought down to tie
SIEGE or PETERSBURG.
Operations in front of this place are de-
tailed at some length, but no material facts,
so far as we observe, are added to our history
of that campaign. OF the unfortunate explo-
sion Of the mine, the report says:
On the morning of the 30,h of July. be-
tween and 3 o'clock, the mine was sprung,
blowing up battery and most of eglhent,
and the advance of the assauting column.
formed of the 9th corpse, Immediately took
possession of the crater made by the explosion
ard the line for some distance to the right
and left of it, and detached line IL front of
it, but for some cause failed to advance prompt
ly to the ridge beyond. Had they done this,
| have reason to believe that Petersburg would
have fallen. Other troops were Immediately
pushed forward, but tho time consumed in
getting them up enabled the enemy to rally
from his surprise, which had beer complete,
and yet forces 70 this point for its defense.
The captured lire thus held being untenable,
and OF no advantage to us, the troops were
withdrawn, but not without heavy loss. Thus
terminated in disaster what promised to be
the most successful assault of the campaign u
TIE EEBEE ADVANCE on WASHINGTON.
IN account Of the rebel invasion of Mary
land, under EARLY. and the subsequent ad-
vance upon Washington, is next given.
| Sheridan was ordered to the command of the
forces operating against Early, with orders to
seize forage, provisions, and stores necessary
for the use of his army in the Shenandoah
Valley, and to consume or destroy such as
could not be used, but to spare the houses of
the people. An account of Shcridans opera-
tiona in the Valley, highly complimentary to
that officer, is then given. OF Sheridan,
Grant says:
Fearing to telegraph the order for DR. at
tack without knowing more than | did of
.
be the probable result, left CITY Point on
the 18th Of Septcmbcr, to visit him at his
headquarters, to decide after conference with
him what should be done. met him at
Charlcston, he pointed out so distinctly how
each army lay, what he could d6 the mGn'ent
he was authorized. and expressed such conf
dence of success, that | saw there were but
two words of instruction necessary, ego in"
For the convenience of forage, the teams for
supplying the armies were kept at Harpcrs'
Ferry. [ asked him if he could get out his
teams and supplies in time to make an attack
on the ensuing Tuesday morning, his time ;
and | may here add that the result was such
that Faec meyer since deemed it necessary
10 visit General Sheridan before giving him
orders"
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST, so5fh, AND SQUIRT
WEST
Interesting accounts are given of General
Shcrmans operations against Atlanta, of Gen.
Sturgis's unfortunate Guntown expedition,
which had, however, the effect of Keeping For
rest out OF Middle Tennessee, Of Shermans
march from Atlanta to Savannah, of Hoods
brief but bloody campaign i'll Tennessee, and
Of the tro assaults on Fort Fisher. How
SchOields army was transferred to North
Carolina, and Shcrman's march to Goldsboro'
each Important moves i'll the great strategic
game of war the Licutcliar,-General Wa9
then playing, ars fully described This
brings the narrative down to the preparations
for
TIIP corr DE CRAZE OF TIE REBELLION
Ga The 24th of March, 1865, instructions
lInn,r,l, M,,1n - ,,I
Sheridan for the operations which led to the
capture OF Richmond, which were in sub
stance that General Sheridan should move
On tie 29th with all the catalry and
one division of Infantry, against tie South
side and Danvillc railroads, tile whole
army following to the left for the double
purpose of turning the enemy out of his
dcfcnses in front of Petersburg, and of
supporting General Sheridan in his attack on
the railroad. The Instructions conclude as
follows:
Tie enemy may, as an only clance, strip
his lines to the n,ercst skeleton, in the hope
of advantage not being taken of it, whilst
they hurl everything against the moving
column, and return. 1t cannot be impressed
too strongly upon commanders of troops left
in the trenches not to allow this to occur
without taking advantage of it. The very
fact of the enemy coming out to attack, if he
does so, may be regarded as almost conclusive
evidence of such weakening of his lines.
| would have it particularly enjoncd upon
corps commanders that, in case of an attack
from the enemy, those not attacked are not to
wait for orders front the commanding officer
of the army to which they belong but that
they Will move promptly, and inform the
commander of their action. | would also en-
join the same action on the parts of their
corps engaged. In like manner, l would
urge the Importance Of following up repulsc
OF the enemy.
(Signed) U. S. GRANT,
Licutcnant-General."
The enemy's disastrous attack on Fort Stead
mar. took place on the 25th. The situation
was then as follows: .
General Sherman having got his ttoops
all quietly 10 camp about Goldsboro, and his
preparations FIR furnishing supplies to them
perfected visited me Mt City Point on the21tli
of March, and stated that he would be ready
to move, as he had previously written me, by
the 10th of April, fully equipped and rationed
for ten days, if it should become necessary to
brfY,p his command to hear aparrst Ice army