The Norfolk post. [volume] (Norfolk, Va.) 1865-1866, 1865-12-09
np, The battles Of the Wilderness,

ing. The battles Of the Wilderness
SpOttsylvania, North Anna and Coli
Harbor, bloody and terrible as they wers
on our side, were even more dam aging
to the enemy, and so crippled him as t.
make him wary ever after of taking the
offensive His losses in men were prob
ably not so great. owing to the fact that
we were, save in the Wilderness, almost
invariably the attacking party; and
when he did attack it was in the open
field. The details Of these battles, which
for endurance and bravery on the part
of the soldiery have rarely been sur
passed, are given in the report of Major
General Meade, and the subordinate re-
ports accompanying it.
THE FAILURE TO CAPTURE PETERSBURG.
After the crossing had commenced, I
proceeded by steamer to Bermuda
| Hundreds to give the necessary orders
| for the immediate capture OF Peters
burg. aa. azA
were verbal, and we're for him TO send
Gen. Smith Immediately, that night,
with all the troops he could give HIN
without sacrificing the position he then
held. / told him would return at once
to the Army of the Potomac, hasten Its
crossing, and throw it forward to Peters
burg by divisions AS rapidly as 1t could
be done; that we could reinforce our
armies more rapidly there than the en-
envy could bring troops against US. Gen.
smith got off AZ directed, and confront
ed the enemy's pickets near Petersburg
before daylight next morning, but for
some reason, that / have never been able
to satisfactorily understand, did not get
ready to assault his main lines until near
shutdown. Then, with part of his COM
mand only, he made the assault, and
carried the lines northeast OF Peters,
burg from the AppOmattOx river, for
distance of over two and half miles,
capturing fifteen pieces of artillery and
three hundred prisoners. This was
about z p. M. Between the line thus
captured and Petersburg there were no
other works, and there was no evidence
that the enemy had reinforced Peters
burg with a single brigade from any
source, The night was clear--the moon
shining brghtIy--and favorable to fur
ther operations. General Hancock,
with two divisions Of the Secoud corps,
reached General Smith just after dark,
and offered the service of these troops as
he (Smith) might wish, waiving rank
to the named commander, who he na-
turally supposed knew best the position
of aifiiirs and what to do with the troops.
But instead of taking these troops, and
pushi ag at once into Petersburg. he re-
uuested General Hancock to relieve q
part of this line in the captured works,
which was done before midnight
BY the time arrived the next MORN
ing the enemy was In force.
ueniouA COMPLIMENT TO SHERIDAN.
The two armies Gin the Valley lay in
such a pOsition--the enemy on the west
bank OF the Opequan creek covering
Winchester, and our forces in front Of
Berrysville-that either could bring on
q battle atany time. Defeat to US would
lay open to the enemy the states Of
Maryland and Pennsylvania for long
distances before another army could be
interposed to check him. Under these
circumstances, hesitated about allow.
ing the initiative to BIZ taken. Finally,
the use of the Baltimore and Ohio rail-
road and the Chesapeake and Ohio canal,
which were both obstructed by the en-
envy, became SO Independently neces.
sary to us, and the importance of reliev-
ing Pennsylvania and Maryland from
continuously threatened invasion 40
great, that determined the risk should
be taken. But fearing to telegraph the
order for an attack without knowing
more than did of General Sheridan's
feeling as to what would be the probable
result, left City Point on the 18th OF
September to visit him at his headquar-
tiers, to decide, after conference with
him, what should be done. / met him
at Charleston, and he pointed out 80 dis
tinctly how each army lay; what he
could do the moment he was authorized,
and expressed such confidence Of sue.
cess, that saw there were but two words
OF instructions necessary-Go in! For
the convenience of forage, the teams for
supplying the army were kept at Har-
per's Ferry. / asked him IL he could
get out his teams and supplies in time to
make an attack on the ensuing Tuesday
morning. His reply was, that he could
before daylight on Monday. He was off
promptly tn time, and / may here add
that the result was such that 1 have
never since deemed it necessary to visit
General Sheridan before giving him Or
ders.
SHERMAN
General Sherman's movement from
Chattanooga to Atlanta was prompt.
skilful and brilliant. The history of his
flank movements and battles during
that memorable campaign will ever be
read with an interest unsurpassed by
anything in history.
His own report, and those of his SUI
coordinate commanders accompanying
it, give the details of that most success
full campaign. fsase
General Sherman, Immediately
after the fall of Atlanta, put his armies
in camp in and about the place, and
made all preparations for refitting and
supplying them for future service. Tho
great length of road from Atlanta to the
Cumberland river, however, which had
to be guarded, allowed the troops but
little rest.
During this time Jefferson Davis made
a speech in Macon, Georgia, which was
reported in the papers of the south, and
soon became known to the whole coun-
try, disclosing the plans OF the enemy,
thus enabling General Sherman to fully
meet them. He exhibited the weakness
of surprising that an army that had been
beaten and fearfully decimated in vain
attempt at the defensive could success
fully undertake the offensive against the
army that had SO often defeated it
*# Hood, instead of following
Sherman, continued his move north
ward, which seemed to me TO be leading
to his certain doom. At all events, had
had the power to command both
armies, ] should not have changed tho
orders under which he seemed to be act
ing. @ 91h