Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-03-30

Il The misfortune OF Bis posiloo- Publicly he
must assume an absolute confidence in bis power
Of promptly crushing the south; II he doubted Il
he would be crushed himself But privately.
nothing prevents him from giving vent to bis
own thoughts and from regretting more than once
that be accepted the nomination Of the Chicago
Convention IN lobO
. MILITARY CRITIC UPON SOUTHERN RESOURCES.
Asa contrast to the fiattering, and fear de-
ceitful, picture we form Of our own resources,
and OF the weakness of the south, / will men
ton few passages Of a conversation bad, this
week. with q military critic OF some experience,
who Was with Gen. Sherman when he entered
Savannah. and who had IN consequence ample
opportunity 10 study the question on both sides.
As that gentleman Is foreigner he could not,
Of course spouse all our ideas and sentiments,
neither has he those Of the south. he thinks
the south has always been weak, and that the
reason Of is apparent strength is to be found in
the inefic cheney of our military organization more
than in anything else.
IL was struck" said ne, ito find in our maj CD
through Georgia the cities and villages more
than half depopulated, the farms abandoned ev
erywhere an overlooking population Of blacks,
in the mids: Of which few Caucasians were to
be seen, too old or too youug for the rude ser
vice of the camp, AID here and there few wo-
men crying over their departed husbands, or re-
questing me TO carry to those who were still alive
in the ranks few lines written with trem-
bling hand and half defaced with tears. Inquir-
ing of one Of these women If she wanted me 10
say anything TO her husband in case j should
meet him on the battle field or in the hospital,
or in prison, Nothing, replied she, except TO
follow his flag. The spectacle impressed me
in two different ways-in the depopulation of
Georgia l saw the proof of great material weak
ness; but in the answer of the woman an evil
dence OF great moral strength. The south is
precisely il the condition represented by these
two fscts-poOr in resources, but strong in cour
age and strength.
THE kEsELLIoS FROM a HIsroRIoAL FONT OF
VIEW.
81 know that moral strength is q poweress
weapon unless it has a sufficient number Of bay
onets to back it, and | know, also, this is hardly
the case with the south. Three to one is now
about the proportion OF our forces in relation TO
those Of the south, and if the contest was to be
decided all at once, in open field, the result would
not be moment doubtful; the south would be
crushed and annihilated at once. But things, l
am afraid, are not TO be carried on in that style.
And here call your attention to that moral
courage to which have alluded, and which, il
il means anything, means endurance, resigna-
ton TO sufeTings, fortitude in adversely, and
faith Ia Providence. If the cOnfederates really
possess those virtues, do not see why they
would not stand four years of war yet, Just as
the Romans stood, the same length of time, the
four hundred thousand men brought by Hsnni-
bal into Italy, the capture of nearly all their cit
les, the siege of Rome. the destruction OF all
their communications, aud the enslaving of three
fourths of their population Numerous illustra-
tons could be brought forward to show that ma
tons far more reduced than the south have by
the strength alone OF their uucoDquerable spirit,
finally reached their object. aud accomplished
their Independence.
THE TACTICS Of THE WAR TO BE CHANGED
IF you ask me whether the abandon ment of
their capital and of their shore cities; if the
tearing up of their interior line of communica
tons, and their sequestraton from the world, is
not a mortal blow to the confederates will say
that, considering the extent OF country in which
they can move, retreat and establish lines of de-
tense, these three things, however weakening
they may appear, are by 10 means weakening
20 their cause. For you must not lose sight of
this most important fact, that whenever the con
iederates abandon the sea shore aud withdraw to
the interior OF Western Virginia, Tennessee, or
South Carolina, We lose. at the same time the
assistance of our navy. so advantageous to US
hitherto, and are compelled to strike upon a new
strategy longer aud more difficult to carry out
than any one we have yet pursued Our present
bases of supplies are lost and new ones have to
be established. All this requires a great deal OF
time and money, and may lead to great sacri-
fee of men. Suppose Gen. Lee adopts the Fa-
ban policy-divides bis army into three; which
can easily be fed on account Of its division;
throw one into East Tennessee, one into Ken
lucky, and the other one into North Carolina
execute large raids upon our borders; combine
his movements so as to be always in our rear
and flank. avoiding battle so long as he is not
sure of success, .ssd attacking US only when
there is an opportunity TO do so? Don't you
think he can protract the war several years Ion
ger by such policy and by having, as he will
have, the distance, the heat, the malaria fight
ing on his side, much as | wish to see this war
end by the overthrow Of the rebellion. cannot
help thinking that as long as these rebels have
one hundred thousand men in the field, and q
population Of blacks to fill up its depleted ranks
as long as they posses that indomitable spirit
which they show, there is no chance for US OF e
speedy solution of the contest.
WHY TIKI REBELS ARE OPPOSED TO REcoNsrRuc-
You will no doubt say, and Justly too, that
with their railroad lines destroyed, the confeder
stes are deprived of several advantages they had
hitherto enjoyed. such as the rapid transportation
of provisions and ammunitons from one point
to another, the power of contracting rapidly upon
certain threatened positions the facility of com
munication between the various armies they
have now in the field, &c. All this is very true,
and | agree with you that the position of the con-
federates is more precarious on that account than
ii would be otherwise You must not forget,
however, that the difficulties they are laboring
under at present are common to both peoples; |
that pursuing them into the interior, as we will |
have to DO. when they have left Richmond, pls- |
ees US on exactly the same footing; no railroad
on either side, but long and difficult marching |
through roads, forests, swsmps, and morasse s |
i his Is the new aspect the will assume per- |
haps next summer and fall, when the country is |
pregnant with deadly exhalaton and the very
air we breathe carry poison into our veins / am |
aware that great many Of u.s. here in the north, |
Go not believe that the confederates will 90 |
through such hardships, but that, tired of a long
and proftless war, they will prefer to Law down
their arms and come back into the union
This hight have been possible with Gen. Nc |
Clellan as president, for the general would have
heen careful TO put out of the way eyerythin 2 |
which might have offended the susceptibilities or
wounded the pride Of the eonfederates. With |
Mr.. Lincoln. the thing is utterly impossible His
terms OF reconstruction are such that no Ameri- |
can can accept them without giving up at once
all that has made him what he is free and indie !
pendent; all that the Saxon race holds as the /
dearest of It's rights, the right of keeping its
honor unsullied, and of holding I'd its flag high
among the nations of the earth. Do notexpect,
then, 10 see the confederates come back upon
such terms. They will fight and die 10 the last
rka- So