Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-09-19

tics or finance governed alone by tasir sell
fshness, and are enoeaYofing 70 conserve Der
own interests at the public expense. They are
not deceived but deceivers, and IN spite OF ali
their affected devotion 10 the common good. are
diligently engaged 10 feathsFing their own nests
A correspondents has just revealed 70 ass ssE a
profound secret the fac; that tle. propretors Of
certain newspaper. which for some time has We
hemently opposed any plan for rsdeening the
national bank issues. are large stock operators
whose plans were likely 90 be thsarted by any
judicious limitation OF The currency expansion
This Il no news 20 Us, although 10 may be 10 the
general public For. a long time past such
papers have been used By mere sDeculs-
tors 10 advance their own pecunisry int
rests. During the war they found q very cheap
style OF patriotism 10 serve them an excellent
purpose. Ibe most expensive system OF fnAn-
ciering which the world has ever witnessed was
thus inaGgurated in this country, aud the
whole nation was saved from bankruptcy only
because OF its intense vitality, and in spite of the
reckless profigscy Of those whose counsels gov
erned the administration Of the Treasury. And
all this iii me how tender these money loving pa
triots were OF the national credit With both oil
their own arms in the purse they allowed whole
sale plumber on every side, and denounced each
appeal for an honest. econo mical IN Ansgemeni Of
the public funds as an attempt TO enbarrass the
Government When tue war ceased, they were
opposed to any settlement OF the questions in
dispute, which should give the people respite
from excitement, and lead TO reckoning aAd
balancing of the public ledger. Any solicitation
to q pause in the grand imitation, the attempt to
fix a limit to the vast debt rolling upon US as an
appalling burden forrest heavily on the future,
the slightest susion to the fact that there might
De so much wholesale robbery and corruption
that The people would become FESTIVE under their
lee h,. nit cufGa IN n ont fraa
volley of abuse from these loyal spectators.
whose gains are never enough as long as there is
| anything more 10 seize.
The National Banking scheme was started to
minister to the same selfish interests Ii had in
| il something thAt was good, much that was ne
cessarily vicious. Ii was not seriously opposed
| at first, By many of those who saw its defects
because the projectors simply proposed TO offer
il to the people, and the shrewd sankers, who dis
like unnecessary trouble, know that if let to via
its way by its OVID merits, it would perish from
naniton and do 10 harm 10 any one Wesoun
ded the alarm because We saw that there was a
| determination to force IL upon the people By leg
slstive authority; but our warnings too lit
| tie Needed and few we're willing to admit the
| danger until they found il was too late TO avoid
| il. When they saw that for good or evil il must
| be tried, the most unseifsh men in the cOuntry
undertook to aid in the experiment with view
II OF mitigating the albSuUluS evils, anu C0GQucs
| ing the trial with the least possible damage 10
| the public interests
| We freely admit that many OF those who thus
took hold of the work, would have been glad il
/ the system had never been adopted But il il
| not true, as often asserted, that thew have en-
deavored TO limit its usefulness On the con.
i trary, but for those bankers who came reluct-
antly into the organization, it could never have
attained a respectable growth. Our own posi-
/ ton on this question we have heretofore stated
| with great distinctness, and wish now to repeat
| it. While at the outset we opposed upon prin
/ cple the establishment OF this system, We
are now in favor OF recognizing it al existing
| fact, and with co operating cordially with al
| who are disposed to perfect its working and
correct its manifest faults Our readers will Dear
| Us witness that almost from the FIRST publication
| of the plan, we have believed that it would be
established. We saw the mighty power that was
4 moving TO support it, and the apathy of those
| who could have resisted successfully If they had
| been true 10 the groat Interests cOnfded 70 their
| trust. When at first announced, the system was
advocated because il would lead to great de-
mand for Govern ment bonds while the nation
was 8 borrower, and would furnish the Treasury
| with fiscal agency for the negotiation of loans
| We exposed the hollowness OF these two pleas al
| the beginning, and our judgment has been vindi
Gated by the result Not dollar OF bonds was
| ever subscribed for, to be used for any such
banking purposes; and the Treasury in each OF
| its great loans appointed . private banker in
Philadelphia as its fiscal agent and gave him a
| commission allowed to no one else in the
/ country.
| IL was said, however, that the notes issued by
these banks would give TO the people uniform
currency of equal value in all parts of the coun
| try. This remained to be tested Respectable
institutions had been started under the law at
various points all over the land, aud numerous
| State banks had been changed to national or
| CARNATIONS They had obtained the engraved
| notes from Washington, signed them, aud paid
thom out That was the last they saw Of them.
| The majority of the notes followed the course OF
trade by an infslllble law TO the chief centres OF
| finance. There they began to pile up, adding to
| the vicious initiation. and threatening TO involve
all concerned in a common ruin In ordinary
| times, would have questioned the pro
| priety of sending these notes home for reiemD-
| ton. The issueing banks bad promised TO re
| deem them in legal tender on demand. and had
received all the advantages intended The notes
had run their course from the place Of issue to
| the centre; and clouds carry the water from
| the back TO the fountains, these should be
| gathered up and returned for a fresh circuit No
| good reason can be assigned why this should
| not be done The merchant, receiving them
| from the country as a remittance. would soou
/ End them deprecated on his hands, unless the
could be redeemed without material expense
| An ineonvertible paper currency cannot be kept
at par by the power of any law human CT di
vine. Those who oppose redemption as die
eliminating against the issues Of couRtry banks ,
only writing in tue interest of stock specula
tors who control their pens The city National
| Banks compelled TO redeem their issues be
| cause they within reach; not TO provide for q
| like redemption of outside issues is to discrimi-
nate against the latter for they would soon be q,
| a serious discount, and thus lose portion OF
their credit throughout the country.
Besides, the whole structure Of the National
| Banking Act is based the theory that these
notes are wanted as currency in the States where
they are issued. For instance, so many thou
sand dollars spportioned for Iowa. New
York bank cannot have that appropriation, and
they are only furnished to institutions actual v
| located ia Iowa, aud intended fer the use
and convenience of the people of that State
When any considerable portion OF the notes desig
mated for lows and issued there, fad their way
to Philadelphia or New York, they should be
gathered up and returned to that State for reds
| tributon And so throag hout the Union, the
| people Of each State should be secured by this
method the use Of that portion of the issue
awarded to them.
| The chief financial officers of tie Government
are acting on this theory, and are urging the
establish ment OF asserting houses, or some simi
lar plan, IN Boston. New York and Philadelphia
to facilitate the work Of redemption and thus
maintain, without disturbance, the uniform credit
4 0f the ma n issus. aud sacura tka a.. -