The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1865-02-22

IN their rifepits. whsther they succeeded in dis.
lodging our skirmishers OF not, their loss Vas hss
and ours almost nothing.
At Dalton. the great numerical superiority Of n.
enemy made the chances OF battle much apains. w.
and, even il beaten, they had a safe refuge he;r;
the fortified pass of Ringgod and in the fortrsss ~
Chattanooga. Our refuge, in case Of defeat vas ~
Atlanta, one hundred miles oil, with three rverz
Intervening Therefore victory for could not bavs
been decisive, while defeat would have been ,,tter,y
disastrous. Between Dalton and the Chattahoorbs,,
We could have given battle only by attacking tho
enemy intrenched or so near intrenchrnen TIA.
the only result Of success TO would have been he
falling back into them, while defeat would hara
been our ruin. In the course pursued our troors
always lighting under cover, had very trtng losses
compared with those they inflicted so tina. the ere
my's numerical superiority was reduced daily and
rapidly, and we could reasonably have expected ~
cope with the Federal army on equal ground by Ii.
time the ChattahooChce passed. Defea. an r.
side of the river would have been its destr,ctior
We, If beaten, had place Of refuge in Atlanta e.,
strong to be assaulted and too extensive To La m
vested had hoped also, that by the breaking Of the
railroad IN its rear, the Federal army might be con-
pei led to attack position Of our own choosing
or to retreat, easily converted into a rout After W.
crossed the Etowah, five detachments Of savalr7
were successfully sent, with instructions to dezroJ
much as they could of the railroad between D,i
ton and tho Etowah. All failed because too ve3k
We could never spare a sufficient body Of cavalry
for this service, lis assistance absolutely ne
cessary III the defence OF every position occupied
captain Harvey, an officer of great courage ami
sagacity, was detached this service, With OH.
hundred men, on the lth OF jane, and remained
for everal weeks near the railroad, frequently IN
terIuptlng, although not strong enough to prevent
It's use. Early in the campa gn the statements Of
the strength of the cavalry III the Depa.tlner. Of
Mississippi and East Louisiana, given me hy Lou
tenant-General Polk, just ftoin the command II
that department., and my telegraphic correspond
cuce with his successor, Lieut.nantCienerai s. d
Lee, gave reason to hopo that competent fore
could be sent from Mississippi! and Alabama to
nft fo rl-r.,l
army. 1 therefore suggested it to the Presii.us
ii ec:y on the 18th Of June and 10th Of July ami
through General Bragg on the 30.h, l2th 18th l6l
and 10Th Of June and also TO observation-disclosures!
Lee on the 10th OF May, and 3D., nth and 18th of
June did i'll the belief that this cavalry would
the Confederacy better by causing the defeat
OF Maj or- General Sherman's army than by ItY,.-
ling rad in Mississippi.
Besides tire OF my removal, alleged ~ tbs
telegram announcing it, various other accusation.
have been made against me-somc published IN
newspapers III such manner ~ To appear 10 have
official authority, and others circulated 0rally!n
Georgia and Alabama, and imputed TO General
| Bragg.
The principal are that rcrsistently iisregirlel
the instructions Of the President; that would not
| fight the enemy that te'used TO defend Atlanta
that refused 10 communicate with General Bragg
III relation 10 the operations OF the army; that
disreearted his cntreatics to change my and
attack the enemy; ana gross cXagctIatoEe Of the
losses of the army.
had not the advantage of receiving the Pre.-
dents instruction. i'll relation to- the marn.r Of
conducting the campaign But as The condGc Of
my predecessor, IN rctreaing before ODDS less than
| those confronting me, has apparently been az
proved and as General Lee III Keeping Oh the de-
| !ensiee and Ietroatipg towards Grants objective
! point under circumstances Ike mine, was adding
to his great fame, both III the estimation OF the Adj
minIstration and reop'~, supposed that my course
| would not be censured. I believed then, a8 | 10
now, that it was the only az my command
which promised sltcCesS
| think that the foregoing narrative shows tina.
| the Army OF Tennessee did fight, and with at let.
| as much effect a, ii las ever done before.
The proofs that [ intended 10 hold Atlanta are
the fact that under my orders the work OF strength
| enlng It's dofenCeS Was gong on vigorously, the
| communication the subject made by me to Gene
rtl II god, and the fact thai my family was III tie
town. That the public workshops We're removed
and no large supplies deposited in the town, as al
legged by General Bragg, were rncastres Of common
prudence, and 10 more Indicated the intention -
| abandon the place than the sending the wagons ri
| army to the rear on a day OF battle proves
| foregore determination to abandon the field.
While General Bragg At Atlanta, about The
middle Of July, We had no other conversation con
corning the army there than such Us INTRODUCED
lie asked questions regarding Its operations,
past or future; made no comments upon tAcm, nor
TONS and had not the slightest reason 70 sup
pose that Atlanta would not be defended He toni
me that the object OF his journey was to confer Wiz
Northumberland Lee, and communicate WIZ
General T. X Smith III relation 10 relnt0IcemeGtS
for me- lie talked much more Of affairs in Virginia
than i'll Georgia, asserting, what | believed. that
ShcrInan's army outnuUtered Grants AAd III
pressed me with the belief that his y~I = at ware
unofficial.
4 copy of brief report by General Hood az -
rttnies this
Most respectfully,
Your ob,dient servant,
J. +. Jnf-sroS, General