Clearfield Republican. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1851-1937, 1865-02-08
P0RTER'S REPLY TO BUTLER.
Inc following is Commodore PORTER
iep'y 10 the Report Of Gen. BUTLER in re,
lation to the Wilmington failure.
NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.
u - EIJOeb,n N.J.

NORTH ATLANTIC SQUADRON.
, U. 3; Flagship Malvern.
60 Cape Fear Rirsr. jan 90, 1865.
Sr: have read the report of NJ;
General Butler in relation to the ,a,o %,
/, pedition TO Wilmington lin which h
/. bore part), and though late resnlis hh
, capture of Fort Fisher have comnletai
refuted the assertions of Gems. Bu,Ier on,
! Weilzel, deem it due 10 the naval ~, @
of the expedition that General ButIer, ~
lport should receive some notice Al ~,
hands. ~ ~.
10 use the mildest terms can pro
hounce the whole report tissue of mis-
!; statements from beginning to end, scarce
y equaled oy the misstatemefft made re
garulng the Lieutenant General.
Inc navy had been waiting two month,
10 start on this expedition, but for reason,
known TO the Lieutenant-General anG
myself, and which were perfectly salislac.
tory to me, the proper time was waited
Tor. We wanted a success. not a failure
Gen. Weiizel was selected, and General
Dutler's name was never connected with
the expedition, except to fit it out. When
lhe expedition did prepare to start, il was
gong 10 the attack on the supposition
that The powder vessel Originally prepar.
ed by Gen. Butler) would blow the forts
down, and the troops would have nothing
TO do but to walk 10.
was not opposed myself to the experi-
ment FOR think everything worth try-
ingl, and gave all my time and attention
TO the enterprise and fitting out the YES
sci. was hard at work getting ready, fill
ling her with powder, aud had placed her
IN the carpenters hands, the weather
looking very squally. Judge of my sur
prise, when Gen. Butler came on board
the flagship at Norfolk, and told
me he was enbarking the troops in
transports, and would be ready to start in
two days. | told him that was out of the
question, heavy southwest gale was COM
ing on that would last three days at least
and we could not 90 to sea at such a time,
neither could his transports move. Nv
advice was mot to embark the men until
the gale was over"
lie did embark the troops nevertheless.
The gale blew heavy for four days, and
the troops must have been very uncom-
Portable. AT the end of that gale the
fleet sailed. told General Butler that
my vesse ID were all SLOW the ulouIIUIs
would have to be towed would have 10
60 into Beaufort to fill up with ammuni-
tion and coal. as ! was afraid to venture
them at sea with too much in. ! advised
him to wait until we had got thirty-six
hours start of him, and also recommended
him to rendez yous at Beaufort, North
Carolina, where he would fiud good
harbor. Even up to this time no did not
tell me that he himself was going along,
but led me to believe Gen. Weitzel was to
be in command. He did not take my
opinion about sailing. His transports
and instead of rendezvousng at Beaufort,
where could find him he rendezvoused off
Masonboro inlet; showed his flagship deck
cd out with flags to the enemy at Ft. Fisher
and had one OF his transports fired on ey
guns near the fort. In the meantime
worked night and day at Beaufort TO get
the monitors ready and complete the ar
rangements for the powder boat, and
sailed when ready. There was no time
when any troops could have landed with
out danger up to the time the first attack
took place. was to be the judge of that,
not Gen. Butler, for ] had not that faith
in his generalship which would induce me
to follow him blndly, though determin-
ed to do all | could for him, and make
the expedition success if possible.
soon saw, though, that Gen. Butler
depended on the powder boat entirely,
and | said we would have no assault from
the beginning.
| will now proceed to notice Gen. But
ler's report in detail, and state where 1t is
incorrect.
lie first says he gave the navy thlrty-six
hours start. That is untrue; the trans
ports started before the navy, or dlsap-
peared. Gen. Butler himself left after
did. He speaks of the I" finest possible
weather" he had at sea, but says nothing
about the surf on the beach. No boat can
land on the beach unless the wind has
been blowing strong Off the land, and on
the DAYS in question, by looking at the
lor-book, YOU will find the wind blowing
southwest and south. On the 10Th the
monitors bad not arrived at Beaufort, and
on the 10th and l7th were coallng and
fllng with ammunition, and had to wait
a smooth time to get over the bar, the
wind blowing southwest on the 10th, llth
and 18th, and throwing in heavy surf on
tl6 bu llIOSh VI thO"N 10
Bradford, of the coast survey, came near
being capsized in the breakers, while ma
king reconuoiss 1t was zen. But
ler's duty to have rendezvoused at Beau,
fort, and wait until the monitor, and
powder boat, on which he so much depen-
ded, were ready. The movements OF the
light transports should have been suoor-
dlnate to the large and slow-moving. trig-
ates and iron-clads, and he should have
been where he could have arranged with
me all the details of the attack, but no,
he kept out of my way, and, think, did
it studiously.
When / arrived ON the ground of the !
naval rendezvous with the monitors, |
found Gen. Butler there.
| ordered the powder boat in, on the
night of the 18th (the smooihest beach
we had had), but at Gen. Buffers request,
through Gen. We!tzel, in
of the feet captain Lieutenant
X. II. Breesei, | postponed
tbe OK nlosion until General Butler should