The Black Republican., 1865-04-15
A MEXICAN WAR.
After Our Rebellion. Shall Maximilian
be Driven Outa
THE QUESTIONS OF EXPEDIENCY AND THE
DRIFT OF EVENTS.
rz~,,r the New York Times March 81


to close-to be followed by another against !
Macmillan in Mexico? The time is not dis |
tant when this will be forced upon us a |
practical question.
Were the answer to depend simply upon |
our National right, it would be easily de- |
cided. We have u right to protect neigh |
Dor from the subyersion OF its government |
bv foreign usurpations. That is d principle
Of international law, sustained by countless
European precedents. 1t falls within the
most limited construction of the Monroe
doctrine, established by our fathers. 1t is
not necessary to inquire whether this right
cannot be taken away by the acquIescenee
of the Mexican people in this change.
It Is enough to say that there is no
proof that the majority of the Mexi-
can people would prefer that MaXimlllan
should reign over them. The fact that
large French army is still kept upon Mexi-
can soil, to put down all resistance, is evil
denCe to the contrary. There can be no
reason why the Mexican troops, regular and
militia should not be trusted to keep order,
If the Government of Maximilian has real
strength in the confidence and affections of
the people. Until the last French soldier,
and every other foreign mercenary, quits
Mexico and the defense of Maximilian's
throne is left entirely to the voluntary
action of the MeXicanS themselves, it must
be assumed that his Government is imposed
there is no help for it. If our own Govern
ment shall choose to furnish that help, it's
right to do so cannot be cOntrOverted.
But these are questions of eXpediency
| that suggest themselves. Are the MeXicans
sufficiently capable of selfgovernment to
| make 1t worth our While to help them re-
I cover it? Would not an orderly v government
under Maximilian be better for them than
| the anarchy which had reigned previously
| for a generation? Are we prepared to fol-
| low uD an expulsion of Macmillan by the
annexation of Mexico to our own nationally,
| or bv other means of securing for 1t good
and stable government? Again, suppOsing
| the expediency to be established, there
| might be questions respecting the best time
| for making the intervention viii not our
| country so need rest after the rebellion that
| It would be better to take time to recupe-
rate before exposing ourselves to fresh war?
| Would not the mighty questions which must
| arise concerning the reorganization OF the
| South, sufficiently engross our attention,
| without engaging ourselves in external
complications? Would not a certain delay
be advantageous for Mexico herself, by its
securing for her the completion of the rail
roads and other great internal improve
ments which Macmillan now thinks it to
be his policy to push torward
1t would be easy to multiply these ques
tions of expedienCy But after all it is
probable that they will not effect the actual
result. It would be far better could the
action of our Government depend upon tht
conclusion reached through a thorough dis
cussion of the subject in all its bearings
This cannot be anticipated. In all proDa
bility our future relations with Mexico vii
be determined mainly by circumstance
quite beyond our control. Whatever th'
policy of our Government, sixty days vii
not elapse after the ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF OIL
armies, before Maximilan will see the CLEAN
OF American bayonets. Thousands of vet
. eran soldiers in both the National and Con
federate armies have contracted q taste 70
war that would of itself draw them into an
military field within their reach. Othe
thousands who would be willing enough
under ordinary circumstances, to return tt
peaceful pursuits, would yet yield to thell
love for popular rights and republican prin
cipIes, and be eager to join in clearing the
continent from imperial usurpation. Ou
Government has no power to prevent an,
such soldier after his discharge from goins
to Mexico, and enlisting, when he gets there
under the republican flag. Even had it re
cognized the rule of Maximilian, as it hat
not, and even were it disposed to exercise
toward him every obligation due a friendly
power. it could not prevent the departure
of any discharged soldier to Mexico
| There is no law, either municipal oil
international. which either imposes the
duty or bestows the right. We may
as well take it for granted that the Jua
| reg government will be heavily reinforced
by American soldiers in short time after
the termination of our war with the rebels
and that if Maximilian persists in holding
on to his rule, he viii at any rate, have to
fight for it harder than ever before But
| could the combat go on without drawing
our Government into it? Could those who
who had been American soldiers fight for
eign mercenaries for any length of time in
behalf of republicanism, without SO firing
the American heart at home that the Gov
ernment would have no alternative but to
launch into the conflict? That we consider
| the real practical question. 1t is question
which will almost certainly be forced upon
us by events, and which will be quite lnde-
pendent of any policy predetermined either
In Congress or Cabinet councils. 1850
| If Maximilian were wise man he would
| fOresee this sequel, and would at once take
action to save himself from it. He would
lose no time in breaking up his foreign
legions, and putting himself entirely at the
disposition Of the Mexican people. If he
thinks he could not safely do that, then let
himyabdicate forthwith. There is no earth
ly chance for his retaining the throne
against the will of the Mexican people. No
foreign force can avail him in repressing
that will, after the close OF this present war
shall leave American bayOnets free. The
strongest foreign protectorate would prove
to him but a Dashboard shield. Possibly,
having given sympathy as he has to the
Confederate cause, he may count upon the
help of the disbanded Confederate armies.
He will get no such help. The Southern peo-
pie are as strongly against foreign DONNA
ton on this continent as are the Northern. A
few venal officers of the rebel armies might
be seduced to the imperial standard, but
the rank and file never. The old American
sentiment would assert ttsef. Those who
are now antagonists, wo1ld be found fight
+ ing on that ground. shoulder to shoulder.
| 1t will be fatal mistake for Macmillan to
| tr1st anv other calculation