Staunton spectator. [volume] (Staunton, Va.) 1849-1896, 1865-07-11

power is exclusive in its character, and it is MOI
competent for. the State Legi slatures to assum.
jurisdiction over the same subjects. The Suprem,
Court so held in regard to the subject of naturali
zation, Whea ton, 2O9, and in egard to the reg
uation of commerce betw cen the States, in Glib
bons, Us. Ogden, 8; Wheaton l, and so of tn,
Bankrupt laws
It was maintained in regard to those subjects
that unless the power Of Congress to legslate was
exclusive endless confusion must ensue from con
1icting legsla ton between the States and the U
S. and among the States themselves.
The clause which have quoted shows tina tCon
gress has sspower to deduce the punishment O.
tres son. Following the doctrine settled in thu
analogous cases Of naturalization. and the regula
ton Of inter States commerce, am warranted il
assuming that the power to declare the punish
ment of treason is vested exclusively in Congress
fit were not So there would be no uniformity il
the system of penalties. An offender would bt
punished in Virginia by one set of penalties, ant
in other States by others, which would be sub
versive of all our ideas Of justice and right.
/ The subject Of treason against the government
of the U. S. properly belongs to. that government
and I submit that when in the exercise of its lie
gitimate functions. Congress declares what the
punishment of the offence shall be, it is not com
petent for any State constitution law to add te
or take from the penalties prescribed by Congress
would also here suggest flor it would extent
this letter too CHI to discuss the question: wheth
err the penal provision of the constitution of Vlr
ginia, is not of questionable validity, under thu
clause of the constitution of the U. s. which pro
hibits tate from passing any e1 post tacto law
An Ell post facto law is defined to be one (which
renders an act punishable in a manner n which i
was not punishable when it Was committed" 3
Cranch, 1873.
The constitution of Va, was adopted on 18th
Feb. 1864, and when it denounces the penalty o
dis franchisement against all who held Office
anytime under the Confederate government, ever
as e2rly as 1861, it. seems to me it comes In con
fiji ct W it'll the prohibition above alluded to.
| come now to the consideration OF the SECOND
| question above stated.
The constitution gives to the President, Art. III
Sec 2, clause l, the power to grant reprieves ant
pardons for offences against the U. s., except IL
eases of imp eachment.
take it this power is plenary as well as exclu
sive The President is the only person who cal
grant the pardons and when he exercises his pow
er, the pardon embraces the whole ole nee, ant
all it's incidents and consequences. Bacon says
in his abridgment, VOL 3, page 29o, that 81
seems agreed that pardon of treason or felony
even after an attainder, so far clears the party
from the infamy and all other Consequences there
Of that he may have an action against any on
who shall thereafter call him traitor or telon TO
the pardon makes him, as it were. a new man."
In Denning's case, 10, John. s, 403, it was he'll
that person sentenced to the State prison 70
life, and afterwar ds pardoned, is restored to hi
rights and duties as parent and becomes entl
tied to the custody Of his infant children who ha
| been on account Of his civil death, placed unde
care of guardians.
Now it seems to me that where case is clearl
embraced. by the terms of the Presidents proc
lamaton Of amnesty, the guilt of the party wit
all it's penalties and consequences is removed
He is made, as it were, a new man, and is restor
ed every right that he would have possess ed j
| he had never been guilty of that offence. So Ia
as he is concerned, all laws imposing penalties ar
| imperative. lie is taken out of the sphere 0
| their influence. 4 pardon is an entire thing. l
reaches through the whole subject to which 1t L
/ applied 1t sweeps away, and blots out ever.
| consequence of the commits sion of the offence. L
regenerates and makes new man OF this offence
10 maintain the competency OF Il tate Constr
tuition, to impose di sfranchisemenfs or other pen
altes for the offence of treason, wh ich the pardon
of the President cannot remove, you must hold
! that State can abrldge tue constitutional pow
| ers OF the President. The Constitution OF the
U. S. gives the President pie nary power to par
don. There is but oae limitation to it, and tina
Is in cases of impeachment, Now, can it be pos
sible, that while the President, by pardon, h as
| power to relieve from the penalty of coniiscaton
| Imprisonment, or DEATH he cannot absolve from
the minor penalties sought to be imposed by State
! authority !? Does not this involve the right Of
State to trench on the prerogatiye of the Presi
dent Of U. S., and reverse the fundamental prin-
cpe that the Constitution and laws of U. S. are
the supreme law of the land9 10 allow q State
to curtail the power of the President opardon
to absolye from Gu the consequences cf the c9cnce, il
| practically to assert the supremacy OF State
/ over the u S. authorities !? The consequences
might be most disastrous. Each State might pre-
| scribe its own limitations to the power OF the Ex-
ecutiye, an the whole policy Of the Federal Gov
.ernme mt might be frustrated. There would be nc
nm forrnitu in the MINI hmcnt in different States