Vermont phÅ“nix. [volume] (Brattleboro, Vt.) 1834-1955, 1865-12-22

Hancock. with two divisions OF the I'd corps.
reached Gen. Smith Just after dark, and offered
the service of these troops as he (Smith) might
wish, waving rank TO the named commander,
who he naturally supposed knew best the po.
siton of affairs. and what to do with the troops,
and pushing at once into Petersburg, he re-
quested Gen. lIancock to relieve part Of his |
line in the captured works, which was done be-
fore midnight"
When Gen. Grant arrived the next morning, |
the enemy was in force, and the subsequent at
tacks, though partially successful, resulted only
in forcing him back TO an interior line, from
which he could not be dislodged.
The enemy having withdrawn his troops from
q portion of his line in front OF Bermuda Humid |
red, to reinforce Petersburg, Gen. Butler at
once advanced force to the railroad between
Richmond and Petersburg, but failing to avail
himself judiciousy of the aid sent to him by
Gen. Grant, the advantage thus gained was
lost.
The cavalry raids of Generals Sheridan Will
son and kauz are referred to, and an account
is given of the euemy's raids into Maryland and
Pennsylvania under Gen. Early, which follow
ed the retreat of Hunter from Lynchburg.
In consequence of the frequent interruption
Of telegraph communication, with Washington,
and the consequent difficulty of transmitting
orders, 1t became necessary to appoint some
person to the supreme command Of all the
forces which might be called upon to check an
advance of the enemy by way of the Shenando.
ah valley and Gen. Sheridan was appointed to
that post. Gen Grant had an interview with him
at Charlestown, about the middle Of Septem-
Der, when Sherman expressed such confidence
OF success if he were authorized to make an at
tack upon the enemy's lines on Opequan Creek,
that says the Lient. General, 81 saw there were
hut t,vn IF { 10
in" What followed is familiar story. Sher-
idan did "go in," and Early went out of the
Shenandoah Valley with mere wreck of an
army losing nearly all of his artillery and
many prisoners
1t was ali object of primary importance to
prevent il possible, any future attempt to in
wade the North by hostile expedition march
ing through the Shenandoah valley. With
this object Gen. Grants orders to the officer in
command, contained the following Instructions
ain pushing up the Shenandoah Valley,
where 1t is expected you will have to go first or
last, 1t is desirable that nothing shall he left to
induce the enemy to return. Take all provis-
ions, forage and stock wanted for the use of
your command; such as cannot be consumed
destroy. 1t is not desirable that the buildings
should be destroyed-th SHOULD rather be
protected-but the people should be informed
that so long as an army can subsist among
them occurrences these raids must be expect.
ed, and we are determined to stop them at all
hazards"
How fully these instructions were ubeyed
cannot yet be forgotten by readers of the wars
history still less by the unfortunate inhabitants
of the fertile valleys of Virginia.
After describing some of the incidents of the
siege of Petersburg, and various attempts to
gain possession of the railroads leading north
wards from Richmond, Gen. Grant turns hi,
attention to the brilliant campaign of Gen
Sherman.
On the 9th of May, 1864, two davs after the
passage OF the Rapidan by the Army of the Po
} tomac, Gen. Sherman commenced his marct
from Chattanooga. We have not space, nor is
it necessary to follow the report in detail o.
) the skilful manguvring and hard fighting b,
which the army of Joanson was pressed back tc
Atlanta, aud the final capture Of the city, aite
Heard's desperate eXertions had failed TO raise
the siege. In describing these events Gen
Grant pays passing tribute to "the brave, ac
complished and noble-hearted Mcpherson,
, who was killed on the 22d of July, in one of tn
= most determined of the enemy's attacks OIL
Sherman's lines.
Having captured Atlanta, Gen. Sherman pu
his army in camp in and about the place, ant
made all preparations for reftting and supply
, 10 '"'i W. wv sS' N'.S' iHC Si'uI lelb u
; OF ROAD rom Atlanta TO the Cumberland River
/ however, which had to be guarded, allowed tn
troops out niue rest,
Y DuflnS thlS time, says the report, "Jeher
: son DAVIS made speech IN Macon, Georgia
which was reported IN the papers OF the South
ana soon became known to the whole country
disclosing the plans OF the enemy thus enabln
Gen. Sherman to fully meet them. He exhib
tied the weakness of supposng that an arm
,f that mad been beaten and fearully decimated /
s vain attempt at the defensive could success
t tu'Iy undertake the offensive against the arm
l. that mad so often defeated it,
e In extension OF the plan exposed by Davis
= Gen Hood soon after made his way by Gil
is cuIIous route to Sherman's rear, compelling III
Il ia'ter 70 fohow ana drive the enemy from III
n llnes OF communication by which the enemy
S Atlanta must receive its supplies. 1t soon bC
IS came evident that these lines could not h
n securely held against an active and enterpri'
y ing enemy, possessing large cavalry force
/, Gen. Sherman proposed the plan which aftei
It wards he executed with so much success, OF
>, march through Georgia TO the sea coast, lea'
Is ing Gen. Thomas TO take care of Hood. Ger
i Grant was not at first disposed to agree to th
a plan, but finally, after considerable d;scuSsio
! of the matter, gave his consent, on the llth {
it October, IN the following reply TO dispatc
from Gen. Sherman "lt yOn are satisfied tn
1t trip to the sea coast can be made, holding th
o line of the Tennessee River firmly you ma
1t make it, destroying all the railroad south
= Dalton or Chattanooga, as you think best