The daily phoenix. [volume] (Columbia, S.C.) 1865-1878, 1865-11-19
[Contin,1ed from Third Paae.l

North Tor the capture of Richmond,
made after ample preparation and in
enormous force, ended in utter failure.
Unquestionably at that time the South
possessed all the attributes of an inde-
pendent State-: State at war with
its neighbor, and blockaded by its
heets, as other independent powers
have been before. Recognition would
have been warranted by the facts and
by the precedent most closely in point,
the separation from Belgium from its
union with Holland. The step was
dictated, so far as this country is con-
cerned, by the most obvious consider
atlons of self-interest. But it was
thought by those with whom the de-
clslon rested-we do not here inquire
whether they thought rightly
until forced to it by circumstances,
our Government ought on principle
to abstain from action. It was not
permitted to weigh political advan-
tage against what seemed to be
moral obligation. Few in America
are likely to understand this In the
Northern literature of the war there
may be found appeals to glory, to
nationality, to the flag, to self-interest,
to future safety, but never ac appeal
to any such thing as duty. In coun-
try where the doctrine is accepted
that anything is fair in politics, and
where popular phrase is 'sour coun-
try, right or wrong" it may be diff
cult to realize the belief that a great
political decision could be formed,
not by considering whether the step
RI t,o 4. 4
it would be right.
Another cause of the failure of the
South was excess of confidence. This
occasioned the loss of New Orleans,
and other early disasters. It may
fairly be said that the men were over
brave. Although the life of each
'ooutilein soldier was clearly worth
more to his county than those of three
men to the North though it was
plainly the true policy to husband
every drop of blood, to use as weapons
the difficulties of the country, and
never to fight battle in the open
held except from necessity, the re-
verse of this was always the rule.
Throughout the war there was an in
cessant thirst for battle. Lives of
Southern soldiers were expended, not
as If they were precious, but as if the
supply were ineNhaustible. A General
like Johnston, who adopted the true
line of strategy, was discarded for a
lighting man. From this fiery valor
sprung those aggressive movements
across the Potomac, into Kentucky
and Missouri, which lost more men
than would have saved Richmond.
The last and most fatal of these move
ments, that Of Hood into Tennessee,
appears to have been based on calcu-
latlons wholly lnexpicabie in the light
of the facts before us, except as an
act OF despair. If such it was, then
peace should have followed the failure
without loss of time. And it was a
fatal error to permit the mountain
region to fall into the enemy IS hands,
almost without an effort to preserve
it. The great range running from
Chattanooga to Lynchburg, the back
bone of the country, was the true line
of Southern defence; and the sea-
ports should have been held only as
outlying posts. Under the system of
strategy pursued, when the storm
burst through the coast-line, there
was nothing within to rally upon.
But it is easy now to criticise. Ac-
cording to the great master of the art
of war, the difference between Generals
is in the comparative number of their
mistakes. If we consider rather what
was accomplished, and with what
scanty means, then, without any dis
paragement of the energy of the
Northern people, or the courage of
their soldiers, we shall be forced to
say that throughout the history OF
modern times no efforts more amazing,
no sacrifices more unbounded, no
achievements more glorious are on
record, than those of the people and
armies of the South.