The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1865-01-13
the Military Prospect..A lwarning
against too Sanguine Kxpeetaiions.

against too Sangufne Expectations.
From the New York Times. i}o1id3T2 - 10 .
It may easily happen that our people
may be too sanguine with reference to the
mediate results of Gen. Sherman's march;
and his capture of Savannah. Jeff. Davis
said, in his late message, with some truth,
that the existence of the confederacy, and
the success of their cause, does not at all
depend on their possession of cities. In
our struggle with Great Britain during
the war Of independence, that power held
for years many of our largest cities, and
marched her armies from one end of the
country to the other, without perceptibly
affecting the weakness of the contest. A
vast agricultural country as this was then,
and as the South is now, does not depend
at all on cities; In fact the population of
towns in severe blockade becomes often
burden on the producing classes. We
might now, jeff. Davis has said, hold Mo-
bile, Wilmington, Charleston and Rich
mond, and the essential resources of the
confederacy remain much as they have
been. ..., .... ,...-f.
But it must be remembered that the
essential resources, the material forces of
country, are by no means its only or
principal strength. 1t has been said of a
Commandment that its principal effect is
metaphysical, or mental. 1t is so with
the power of q community to resist or to
fight. 1t is mainly in the mysterious and
utterly immeasurable force of the human
will These are affected by, moral as well
as.material causes The capture of Rich
mOnd would in fact relieve the confeder-
acy of real burden; but in its moral
effect, it could not be measured by what
ever loss of guns or stores To less de-. +.
gree the loss of Savannah tells on the
prestige, the spirits of the rebel popula-
ton. Still, it is not to be denied, that
the escape of Hardee's army lost us the
greatest prize of victory. What We mainly
want. now is the destruction of armies.
Had the only outlet from Savannah been
shut up us, and Hardee's fifteen thousand
been captured, we should have been far
nearer the close of the war than we are
now. --..'......-r, -.t.fr. .-r..., .- s.... ,..-
General Thomas victory is, in fact,
much more Immediately decisive stroke
than General Sherman's brilliant capture,
though we have no doubt that this last
will be followed by important operations,
influencing greatly the campaign of Vir-
ginia. Had one of our great armies, in
the last year of the revolutionary war,
suffered such an overwhelming deafeat as
has Hoods, the issue of the whole struggle
might have been very different. H., =, i,
The ultimate effect Of Gen. Shermanis
splendid march and his future occupation
of the line of the Savannah River, we be-
Geve will. be most decisive but it is :,
somewhat distant effect, and dependent on
strategical combination. This march dis
appointed the old popular illusion of
" starving out" the Confederacy. We
have found the vast cotton-felds Of Geor-
gia thick sown with the crops Of cereals
the land abounded with potatoes, corn.
wheat, poultry and stock there was no
approach even to scarcity. As we adj
vance into eastern Georgia and South Car
DINA we shall undoubtedly find the same. |
condition. Even the worthless currency |
does not seem much to affect the people
or hamper the officials, as commerce has
become barter, and the government raises
all its supplies by forced levies. Our de-
struction of railroads and the crops lying
near them, will undoubtedly cramp Gen.
Lee in Richmond but the worst effect
they could produce, would probably only
be the evacuation of that city and the oc-
cupatiOn of new line further south.