The Ashland union. [volume] (Ashland, Ashland County, Ohio) 1854-1868, 1865-08-23
or four miles ner day.

egraphed to Lieut.. Col. Swords, Assistant
Qurtermaster General
1--WE are in want Of everything. We
ara destitute Of forage"
That on the 2lst day Of July, 1862,
Chief Engineer ersigbill, acting on my
staff, telcgraphed to Brigadier General
Totten, at W Washington City
"Thc country in, our rear is exhausted.
That In our front soon willibc."
Tint on the23d Of July, / telegraph.
ed to the Secretary of War and to Gen.
eral Buell.
"My supplies are very short"
That on the 29th day Of July, in my
letter Of instructions to Chief Engineef
Craighill, about to proceed to General
Halleck's headquarters (see Exhibit NJ,
I stated..that y ..."fa3
"East Tennessee and Kentucky 10 the
Blue Grass region are exhausted" 'r
That on the 10th Of August tclc,
graphed to the Secretary Of War and
to General Buell. :.
~ have but three weeks supplies"
That on the 10th Of August, tels.
graphed to the Secretary Of Waf and to
General Buel.-- -
"Kirby Smith cannot possibly remain
three weeks in my immediate rear, while
l can hold this place Eve weeks with my
| present command" .a''o =
4 did hold the Gap four weeks and
Eve days from the date Of that dispatch. J
That on the 10Th Of August. telc-
graphed General Halleck that "One hun.
dred and fifty wagons looded with forage
and subsistence have arrived" 'ia. =
Those supplies were principally Of for.
age, which had been hauled over one
hundred miles, and as the teams had to
be fed, while on the road, from the wag.
0ns, the amount was greatly reduced.
Here, then, is the proof that General
Halleck was repeatedly informed of my
true condition as to supplies, and that il
he had the means to have given me re.
lief, as he says "be might have done," he
10 beyond all doubt responsible for the
loss of Cumberland Gap. H - b !!
General Halleck say that "the Gov,
.ernment believed that Cumberland Gar
would form serious obstacle to the re
treat Of the enemy"
II the Administration so believed, il
was the duty Of General Hallcck to have
, corrected so erroneous an imprt ssion.- -
He was aware that l had invaded Eas
! Tennessee in June, 1862, by two other
gaps, and that Kirby Smith had invaded
, kentucky by the same routes in Angus
of that pear. Hence, even had Genera
, Halleck furnished me with supplies, al
} he says he might have done, the force
of Smith and Bragg would have retreate,
D by two or three roads, instead Of by one.
+ In obedience to instructions from tn
, Secretary of War, l kept him advised o
my movements, and on the llth day.o
May, and twice afterwards, / suqgeste,
, the Importance Of protecting the. lines o
0 communication between Louisville On,
1 Nashville, aud between Lexington an,
Cumberland Ford and afterwards
!, strongly recommended the occupation o
!: Rogers and Big Greek gaps. But botl
lines were left unprotected the cavalr,
i | had repeatedly asked for was not furn
b ished, and the natural result Of the weak
Q eDed and exposed condition Of Kentucky
we're the raids of John Morgan and tn
Q invasion Of Smith and Bragg.
i. Regarding tho occupation Of East Ten
r nessee as Of vital importance, in vain
L made every effort to have rail or o,he
/" good military road constructed TO Cum
n terland Gap, and from thence to be el
% tended to intersect the great road fror
!. Richmond which connects East Tenucs
% see with Virginia, the Carolinas, Alabam
. and Mississippi. .rM
|, Three times | earnestly requested I
}. be allowed to advance against Knoxville
}. aud pledged myself to sweep East Ter
uessee from Bristol to Chattanooga.
d had supplies Of arms for six saditiont
n regiments Of East Tennesseeans, and q
n communication with Virginia could hav
boen cut of, until Buel could have az
10 vanced from the. Southwest. But I VI
p ordered not 10 assume the Offensive
8 Had not these plans been interfere
q with, the invasion Of Kentucky woul
Y not have taken place, and East Tsunesss
., and Cumberland Gap would be in OF
Is possession today. la blaA aigos5 iacr
d Gen. Halleck complains that I was "a
|. most boastful' in my @confidenece th,
l. ho ID could hold his (my) positiu
|, against any number Of troops Tho enem
y could bring against him (me)."
!. There was stern necessity for ton
Of confidence on my part, for | had re,
K son to know that there was panic frol
q Washington TO Louisville. Aud al,houe
10 cut of fiom supplies; without a sing
10 soldier wearing the Uuion uniform will
n in two hundred miles ofmy post; throa
+. ened by force vastly greater than N
10 own, my command maintained "a boas
!. ful confidence" and sought TO inspire
h least q moderate degree elsewhere.
IS In ansverto an Official telegram, r
It plicd: " a93t b q
a ~ am surprised 70 hear that there
. CONSERVATION at Louisville, or else,chcr
u Here Cumberland Gap) sll is quiet ar
b, orderly. We are prepared for the enen
= whenever be may show himselr."
T. The eneSy did show himself, and Il
It result proved tSaf We were ready to \
!, ceive him, During the thirty two do,
ID that We were invested We captured oy,
IL Eve hundred officers and soldiers, mskir
at on equivalent Of Eve hundred and fort
y, two Privatcs, and killed and wounded OF