The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1865-06-30

one piece of artillery, I think five or six
wagons, and one ambulance. Of course,
many OF the 11th corps lost their arms and
knapsacks.
In my opinion there is nothing to regret in
regard to Charlottesville except the failure to
accomplish all moved to accomplish. The
troops lost no honor, except in one corps, and
we lost no more men than the enemy; but
expectation was high, the army in splendid
condition, and great results were expected
from 1t. 1t was time, too, when the nation
required victory.
Concerning the subsequent history of
the Army of the Potomac, under General
Hooker, this record is not less instruc-
tive and entertaining. Movements in
the enemys camps soon began to indicate
that a hostile movement of some kind
was in preparation. What that move
ment was to be, Gen. Hooker could not
satisfactorily make out, but it seems to
have excited in bis ardent bosom bis old
disposition to "pitch into" somebody.
He wrote to the Secretary of War:
II Stoneman had not almost destroyed one.
half OF my serviceable cavalry force I would
pitch into him the enemy In his camps, and
me for few days.
Stahls cavalry were scouting about Bull
Run, and Halleck would not allow them
to be transferred; wherefore, Gen. Hooker
was constrained to "pitch into - Halleck.
He wrote to the President, June 5th, to
know "the views of the government con-
cerning this army" Halleck had in
structed him to "keep always in view the
importance Of covering Washington and
Harper's Ferry and yet Haileck refused
to give him the troops he needed. In case
the enemy should move northward, as was
anticipated, says Hooker:
am of opinion that it is my duty to pitch
into his rear, although in so doing the head of
return. Will it be within the spirit of my in
structions to do 80. Ia
Again Halleck interposed, objecting that
to pitch into the enemy's rear across the
Rappahannock, would be contrary to the
rules laid down in his book on strategy.
The President concurred with Halleck,
and wrote postscript letter, giving Gen.
Hooker this graphic, and also strategic
advice:
In one word, would not take any risk of
being entangled upon the river. like an OK
jumped half over fence, and liable to be torn
by dogs front aHd rear, without o fair chance
to gore one way or to kick the other.
General Hooker could only act upon this
advice and keep on the side of the river
toward Washington and Halleck. The
enemy continued bis movement toward the
valley, soon rendering it necessary for
Hooker to withdraw from the line of the
Rappahannock toward Washington. As
soon as he did 80, the result he had FORE
seen came to pass. That portion of the
enemy which had remained opposite to
watch his movements, and which he had
vainly asked authority to "pitch into, "
Immediately broke camp and moved up
the river to join the main force now
marching to invade Maryland and Penn
sylvania
With the history of that invasion, which
eliminated in the great battle of Gettys-
burg, the public are familiar. To have
prevented it after the abandonment of the
Rappahannock line, General Hooker shows
would have been impossible; but to have
checked the enemy, to have thwarted in a
measure his designs, to have saved millions
of property both to the government and to
the people of Pennsylvania, would not
have been impracticable but for the con-
slant interference and unreasonable hostil-
ity of the General-in Chief. How General
Hooker was at last badgered into giving up
the command, he thus relates:
On finding that was not allowed to maneu.
yre my own army in the presence of the enc
nv. and conscious that l was standing in the
way of the accomplishment of its mission, on
the same day, the 9th day of June, I sent
Gen. Halleck the following telegram:
June II, 1S63-1P.M.
"Maj.-G Hal9eck:
INV original instructions were to cover
Harper's Ferry and Washington. l have now
imposed upon me in addition, an enemy In my
front of more than my numbers. beg to be
understood, respectfully but firmly, that am
unable to comply with those conditions with
the means at my disposal and 1 earnestly re-
quest that may be at once relieved from the
f>'''' JOSEPH HOOKER.
"Major General Commanding"
NAV add, as my conviction, that if the gen.
eral.in-chief had been in the rebel interest," it
would have been impossible for him, restrained
as he was by the influence of his Excellency
the President. and that of the Honorable the
Secretary of War, to have added to the embar-
rassment he caused me from the moment
took command of the Army of the Potomac
to the time surrendered it.
After receiving instructions not to withdraw
the troops from Maryland Heights, proceed
ed to Frederick and directed the 18th corps to
march to that place. The following morning
Col. Hardie arrived with an order from Gen
Halleck relieving me from the command, and
directing me to turn it over to Gen. Meade
The same messenger brought letter OF in
structions to Gen. Meade, which l heard read
but did not read myself, and was to the effect
that he could make such disposition of the
troops at Harper's Ferry as he thought proper.
And it also added to his command the troops
under Mai. Gen. Couch, which was informed
numbered 10000 men. / may state further,
that though had asked for only IL, 900 men,
and had been refused them. large reinforce.