The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1865-11-12

IL is customary with our cOuutrymen in
speaking Of the possibility Of foreign war
70 assume as mntter Of cOuTse that we
should come of victorious, snd that right
speedily. The extraordinary trouble We
had 10 subduing a rebellion backed by no
fnancisl resOurces Whatever ought to in
duce as 10 BE- less eonfideut IN this assump-
tion, since the nnaueial, naval aud military
power OF nations like England and France
lar transcend what we encountered in the
late southern war. But il must not De for
gotten that the European Powers are fully
depressed with the magnitude Of our re-
sources aud the warlikc character Of our
population, and that as, IN the case . fthe war
with Russia, great combustion was re
sorted TO for the purpose Of rendering sue
cess certain, and as the intervention IN
Mexico was begun under similar auspice,
aud the conduct OF England snd France 10
ward as during our late civil war regulated
by agroenen and was in point OF fact sn
alliance against us, We must, IN case we I'M
dertake foreign war, expect a great and
p ,werful alliance against US, over which IL
might tax our powers 10 the very utmost 10
prove successful.
Then The question arises. should we come
od victorious in such contest, would we
not be ruined for all subsequent efforts by
the vast mountains Of debt IL would leave
manage 10 provide for our existing obliga-
lions, and il remains 20 be seen whether, In
an eia of peace, without the patriotic excite
mont OF the war 10 buoy them up, our poo
pie viii patiently bear the load of taxation
fsnde,od essential by the war dcb:. IL Is
true that in q great foreign war the ratri-
otto leryor 60 which We have alluded would
be leuiold greater, but the ioads OF debt
would b. Jar beyond all our present ideas,
d a.. v.ssH . "a.
pie % deliberaie as 20 our ability 90 bear
such burdens.
IL we assume that we could solve the fis-
cal problem, let Us ask whether the condition
OF our empire at the present time Is enc 10
be risked ln a grsas war against powsriul
European alliance? There can be no reason
able uoubt that all toe Indian vars ui the
lat four y. ars have been iomenied by rebel
emiszarias ON the one hand aud agents Of
the British iuf companies IN the other.
With the French IN full possession Of Mex
e. they would be much more vigorous then
the he bells Ia iolnentng wars smong all the
central aad southern tribe, while Ina the north
the British fur traders would work with
hearty good viii, because q is 10 their inter
est IA discourage the progress OF our settle
menls un the border. Oar Pacific colo
Do as are fully three srousapd miles distant
from the military snd naval fesources which
would have 10 defend Them, and although
We are aule 90 make ourselyes felt at sea,
it Is doubtful ii we could contend there
sue, Is fully against England and France
combined Within ten years We shall have
a railroad buiit TO the Pacific, supported by
q chain % settlements al along the roue.
Vita shreWd forecast, JET. DAVIS, when he
was President pitrce's Secretary Of War,
saw ihe,e things, and urged The Pacific
Railroad rs military necessity.
lyen with the Pacific railroad built aud
in operation, we should have had hard work
10 contend against an Anglo-FTench ALI
ance, with France operating from Mexico
81 a base, and England drawing her re-
sources from lndia and Au.traliH, ard using
British Columbia ms base. What we need
Is time % enable as Go Populete and organize
cur immense western domain. ID Is not
merely railroads and stage roads and mining
settlements that We want there. We must
have a population with resources 10 draw
] upon 10 case Of war. We must have agri-
| culture. eommerce and the mechanic arts
established in those remote Wilderness.
We must have society permanently orgsn-
ized there, with all The institutions which
aftach man % bis home aud render him viii
ling % light for IL.
Locking 10 the northwestern border, We
I find our colonies weak in number, deficient
/ in an RESPECTS and standing In great need
| 81 all that We can do fer them while ON the
| Southwestern border we are FAR worse or
] We have been much more engfossed by the
/ cllort 10 bui,d up strorg cbuiu Of settle
mcnts along the central overland route,
/ which, as q must be The strongest military
/ position. from being The m 81 distant from
| the irrutiers, was wisely thus stt-nded 10
I first. But in case OF war ere would be Sc
| riou. danger Of the French taking southern
/ California, Arisoua, and New Mexico. and
oi the English taking Warrington, Idaho
| Hni Maatano.
Thore VIII doudt this do not know the enor-
| NOUS cost OF transporting troops such vast
| distances overland rs we would have 70 do,
/ snd the losses Incurred in those enterprises.
] 10 has been truly observed thas this was the
4 gfeatct drawback under which Russia la
bored IN the last war, and thar she lost more
/ men BY The way than she did IN actual con-
1 d.ct. In case &C great war our Pacific
| coat might be lost o. ms by combined Enc
| glsh I'd French attack. ia consequence OF
/ their vast naval power, before We could
/ send thither. around Cape Horn, q feet
strong enough 90 prevent Il. We have be-
| lore us, therefore. she task OF building up
on the Pacific navy yards, mon works, and
everything clse requisite 20 enable us 20
meet any such emergency We must have
| there navy which can be put ia she ser-
wee az short notice, and the mesns Of To-
eicasing ID with great rapiaitv. We must
stto De able 10 draw from the Pacific Statos
All me men requisite fe7 their defencc. ami
th's we could hot now % ii tho allies m ade
| q iOrmioahle attack ~ liI,i.lrl-,i5 "a Arsr-