Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-03-23

ton, because they were deficient IN the quality
which Is most essential IN times Of revolution
The fscaIiy Of understanding the requirements Of
the moment end TIE problems OF The future In
stead Of seeking out what could be saved from
the wreck of the old regime which was going to
pieces on ths, most formidable OF rocks-corup-
ton ofpnblic moFsls-they refused 70 admit that
the Institutions 10 which the republic bad been
indebted for its grea'ness would prove the cause
Of its decline
Terrified at every innov stion, they coufounded
IN the sase prescription the seditlons OF few
iribunes and the just demands OF the people.
But their influence was so considerable, and the
IDEAS tha, we're hallosed By them held such an
empire over their minds, that they stll would
have obsiructed the triumph OF the popular
cause, bad not Caesar. by putting himself at its
head given il new lustre and irresistible force
party, ike 81 army. cannot conquer but under
A leader vorthv 10 command IL. and all who,
since the time of the Gracchi. had raised the flag
Of reform had sulIied Il with blood and degraded
with revolt Cesar raised II NJ gain and puri-
fed IL. In order 20 constitute his party he had.
IL IL true, sometimes recourse % agents far from
estimable The BEST architect can only build
with the materials he has n hand; but his con-
slant thought was 10 associate in his designs the
most respectable men. he spared no effort TO
gain over P0mDey, CTassus. Cicero. Seryilius,
Carlo, O. Fusius Calenus, ) Supcius, and
many others OF the same stamp In moments
Of transition, when the old sYs'em il in extre-
nifty. and the new one not yet in place, the
greatest difficulty does lot consist in overcoming
obstacles which sre opposed 10 the installation Of
a government called for by the wishes Of the
country. but 10 solidly establishing IT, in found
ing II on the co operation of honorable men pen
ctrsted with the rev ideas, and firm in their
principles (Liy III chap III
TONS or MOTIVES REFrTED
We have shown Cmsar acting only in accord
ance with his political convictions. whether as
the ardent promoter OF all popular measures, or
as the svowed partisan Of Pompey. We have
shown him aspiring, through noble ambition, 20
power and honors, but We know that historians
iD general suggest other motives for his conduct
He is represented having since 654 all his
plans arranged, his snares laid bis instruments
ready. They attribute TO him absolute kuorl-
edge Of the future. the faculty of directing men
and things at his pleasure, and of making each
man sn unconscious accomplish in his deep de-
signs. Ali his acts are moved by hidden agen-
cy, which historians boast OF discovering after
all is done If Caesar catch up the standard OF
Marus and becomes the defender of the Up-
pressed, and the prosecutor OF the hired assassns
of tyranny, it is in order to assistance
necessary 10 his ambition. Ii he struggle against
Cicero for the legality OF the proceedings against
| the sccompces of Catline, or support an agrari
~ law OF which be approves The political object;
it, in order to repair great injustice committed
oy Scylea. be support the reinstatement 10 their
rights of the children of the prescribed. il is with
a view TO abase the great orator in the ewes of
the popular party. II, on the contrary, he place
his influence at the service OF POmpey; il, on the
occasion of the against the pirates, he con
tribute to invest MIN with powers deemed eIor-
bitsnt: II he seeond the plebisoitum which con-
fers upon him the command Of the army against
| Mithrdates; If, subsequently, be move that ex-
tgaOrdinsry hon0rs should be conferred upon him
in his sbsence-all Ihis with the Machiavcllian
object Of turning the grealue-s Of Pompey 10 his
| own advantage. SO that II ne defend liberty il
is to ruin his sdverssries sni II he defend the
government il is 20 hatituste the Romans to
tyranny. Finally If Caesar pretend, like all
members OF the Roman nobility, to the honor Gf
the consulate. il is becau-e he secs through the
fasces aud the dust of the battle field the dicta
| torshp-nay, even the tbrone
Such interpretations proceed from the TOO
common fault of not estimating facts by them
selves. but rather FROM the cOloriug which sub
sequeni events impArt 10 them IL IL, indeed, 4
strange inconsistency 10 attribute to men of SUI
| perior mark AZ once the most paltry motives and
-uperhumaa foresight No; il was not the
thought OF keeping Cicero in check which
/ guided Caesar. He had not recource 10 tactics
| more or less skilful: he acted on his srm con
viction. and what places this beyond doubt is
that, once raised 20 power MS first acts were TO
carry out, "a consul or dictator what he had sd
vocstcd "a simple citizen; for instance the ag-
Rarian law and the reinstatement of the pTcscTib-
ei No; il he supported Pompey, il was not be-
cause he contemplated pulling him down after
setting him up. but because the illustrous captain
/ had emhraeed tho hipa-aiT To- ~
was given to no one to read the future so well
as to divine the use which the cODQueror of NTH
rldates would make OF MS trumphs and his pop
uarity. In fact. v hen be landed in Italy, Rome
was in state OF much anxiety Would he dis
band his army was the cry OF alarm heard on all
sides. Ii be came a master no one could re-
sist him. Contrary TO the general expectation.
Pompey disbanded his troops. How then could
Cesar foresee moderation so unusual in those
DAYS! ls il more correct TO say that Cesar on
becoming proconsu aspired TO supreme power
No; on setting out for Gsul be could have no
thought of reigDing at Rome, no more than Gen.
BIN parte, in setting out for Italy in 1896 ore IN
Ell of the empire.
Was il possible for Casar 70 foresee that dur
ing his ten years stay in Gaul he should always
be successful. and ST the end of that period the
minds OF the Romsn people would be favorable
10 hS schemes Gould ne guess thar the death
% his uduSuttE NoOiu snap tue INKS tnat nae
bound him to Pompey: that Crassus, instead OF
returning triumphant from the east. would be
conquered and slain BY the Parthians that the
murder OF Clodius would throw all Italy into
confusion: aud. finally that the anarchy which
he had s,riven to put down by mesps of the tri-
umvrate would lead 70 his elevation? Cesar
had before his eyes grest examples he marched
gloriousiy in the footsteps of men like SciIiO
and Psuus EmIlius The hatred OF his enemies
/ forced him TO seize the Dictatorship like Scylis
but for nObler cause. and BY conduct exempt
I from vengeance and cruelty. Let Us not be thus
anxious TO seek out petty passions in great souls
The success OF superior men-snd this is q con-
soling reflections owing more 10 The loltness
of their sentiments than 10 the calculations of
selhshness and astuteness. Their success de
pends much more on their ability in taking ad-
vantage Of circumstances than on the blind pre-
sumption OF believing themselves capable of
producing events which only in the hands of
God Certainly, Cesar had faith in his destiny
and confidence in bis genius: but faith il an in
siinct, and 10; calculation, and genqs fore
judges the future without divining It's mysterious
course (Liv III chap '
rHE UsE AND BENEFIT or STRONG GOVERNMENT
WHAT THE AUTHOR THINKS or rHE DICTATOR
suIF oF scYLLk
The history Of the last tfty years. and espe
oiAlly the dictatorship OF Scylla evidently show
ed thst Italy required master On al sides
the institutions gave way before the power OF one
Who NSs sustain cd not only hr his own partisans