Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1865-06-07

wishes Of those who administered the General
Government than upon Its own intrinsic merits
We notice that some Of the critics profess
themselves 70 be totally unable TO comprehend
how We could predict that the nav would super
sece the old systen, While opposed 10
some Of its distinguishing features The erpa
nation is very simple. The plan originally
designed for the ostensible purpose OF creating a
demand Tor Government bonds and the proyi
sioa OF uniform currency for the whole country
The chief objection 10 IL at the outset was not
that it would fail 10 realize these objects, al
though that was evident. but that II linked the
control OF capital With political power and pat
ronage, and thus open the way 20 an unholy ALI
anes. eorruptng in its influence and oppressive
aud degrading ia its character and relations We
always favored the use of paper currency TO
be OF uniform value throughout the country.
But would have that currency representa-
tive OF CON- and not a substitute for the precious
metals. The rapid changes in the quantity OF
the paper currency have always been prolific of
disaster Such issues should be based solely on
coin, and the latter would then never be dis
tsroed unless wanted TOR export. There will
come time when only such a currency will be
recognized. In the meantime, IL the General
Government had proposed to issue, for the use
of the people. a national currency. based on the
national credit, and to be redeemed oy itself at
the great commercial centres, IN coin, whenever
this WAS demanded. such currency TO supersede
all other Issues, there would have been little
popular objection. The preparation and issue OF
such a currency called for no creation of bank
ing system, and might have been realized with
out any organic change in a single financial in
stitution in the country.
The creation of thousands Of new banks, sub
ject TO the control of a central power at Wash
IngIon. TO be petted and fostered as they might
be facle and plant in the hands OF ambitious
politicians, oppressed and cornered if they
should prove FESTIVE and obstinate in the party
harness. We have regarded with the most serious
spprehensons. We pointed out the defects and
dangers Of the system, aud these we're 80 gen.
orally appreciated by thonghtfu capitalists that
they were almost unanimously averse TO the
radical change thus proposed. But free choice
between the new aud the old was no longer posi-
ole. The whole weight of successful political
power vas brought to bear in favor OF the new
system. Even this would hardly have suffced to
overcome the deep-rooted convictions of On Ose
who saw the evils to he encountered In the trial
OF the new policy, but for the added argument
drawn from popular prejudice Those who had
accepted without question the dogma that to
critcise any portion of the declared policy of the
Administration was 10 oppose the Government
and 10 afford aid and comfort Southern rebels.
were lett without any ground upon which to
COulC-t ILLS uSuFpdllOn, WHICH
thus sought, under the cover of national au-
thorty, TO overthrow the existing financial inst
tutions OF the country.
IL was evident TO all careful observers that the
new system, thus enforced, must supercede the
old and, Tor good or evil beco me- for "a time at
least. the established order Of the country In
view OF this result. there was natural division
OF opinion. even among those who were averse to
the change. Some entered zealously INTO the
cow erting process, and identified themselves at
once with the National Banks, IN the hope Of
directing them 10 a successful career. and thus
avoiding the dangers to be spprehend,d. In this
way, not few OF The new banks, including alike
those freshly organized and those remodeled
from State institutions, are found in the hands OF
thoughtful or experienced men, who will labor
faithfully to make them blessing TO the coun-
try. Others hesltated, and made the change re-
luctantly when they found that longer opposition
was likely to prove fruitless or to involve sacri
ices which they did not feel called upon to make.
And there some who still conscIentiously op-
pose the transfer and believe that the best in
terests OF the people require The preservation of
the old system at least until the new has been
more thoroughly tested They realize the dis
abilities under which they labor while thus re
fusing TO float with the current and they expect
to bear the abuse of fppant writers and malig-
Dant partisans, who always delight IN the safe
sport OF attacking an unpopular minority.
No Que can forecast the future; but it is safe
to say that, unless all former experience il to
stand without a parallel in subsequent history
the new system must be greatly modified or ulti-
mately abandoned. IL il is changed in time. the
greater dangers to be feared may be averted
The changes required to give it permanency
late TO its connection with the Government The
hand OF power must be lossened TO give the banks
greater freedom from political influences; and
the authority vested in the Secretary of the
Treasury to distribute the public funds indiscrm-
inately, without security. among favored il stitu
tons, must be carefully restricted. If this is
done. and central par redemption is energeti-
cally enforced. the other general features may be
successfully retained Thus much for the Ma
tional Banks
What shall be the future of banks which re-
tain the old organization? Plainly, if the new
system is permanently established they must re-
linquish all profit from circulation, and discon-
tinue, alter time, their own issues But must
/ they surrender their functions as bankers? We
think not, and believe that there is much
| popular misapprehenslon concerning their true
position after the lines between them and the
new banks shall be clearly drawn. What con-
stitutes the strength of bauk3 Its ability to
keep. safely. the money of depos;tors, and to &C
commodate dealers 10 such an extent az 10 at
tract a large amount OF custom. What is to pre-
vent bank now well established, with a good
reputation, and abundant capital. from contnu-
| ing such business a profitable scalel Will
all depostors prefer National Bank, with a
fourth of its capital locked up at Washington
aud treasury hrst-lien on the remsnderl Will
borrowers always find the most satisfactory &C
commOdatious at the new institutional IL is
true that while the funds Of the national treasury
are made available TOR individual loans the
needy may be attracted to the bank thus favor
! chant cautious about repeating the experiment
de will be apt 10 6nd that these funds plenty
when he needs them least, and growing scarce
as his necessities increase
There is reason TO believe that the initiation Of
the currency, now so long maintained, has
blinded many persons 10 the tact that the capital
is not likely 10 make fruitess appeals 10 Dor
rowers, when its normal relations TO labor are
once more restored. a lightheaded writer. more
remarkable for his prejudices than his intelligence
recently notified prominent city bank that by
cllnging to It's present organization il had lost the
opportunity OF placing itself at the head of the
national banks OF America. lie occurred TO w.
"a We read this oracular utteraDce, that il was
just possible that the thirteen gentlemen Who
direct the affairs OF that institution, and Who
stand among the fest business men in this city
had good opportunity for an estimate of their
future, as the writer in the Times who thus
bemoaned their tate. If baIks are needed IN
this city chiehs as places OF deposit aud discount
II would be difficult 10 show how 4 sound organ
lzation, With large capital. able officers and
directors. and select circle OF customers. could
I