The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1864-12-24
SATURDAY. Aoaslso. pEoraBra il. Isss

SATURDAY MORNING. DEUEMBER24. 1854
THE ARTAsND SCIENCE or WAR
WIInNaros, N. G., December 20, 1854
10 ne Editor Of the Richmond Dispafch
Notwithstanding we hare nov beer
engaged in this great contest for nearl,
four years, and have had experience I'M
rivalled in history, there Is no subject se
little or SO imperfectly understood Ii
that OF war; The struggle was com.
nnenced with the mistaken and unfort,.
nate idea that generals were born and moi
made-m military knowledge unnecessary
that Bowie-kniyes, pixies, reyolyers and
brave men would alone gain battles and
give us liberty and independence. The
absurdity of such ideas has been proved
by terrible and sad experience An
army not in good discipline, well drilled,
ana commanded by competent officers. is
sun but the shadow Of an army, incapa-
Die OF executing great enterprises OF Of
gaming permanentresults. or this the
history OF war contains abundant proof:
ana yet, IN our own army, we see the ele.
mentary branches of the profession
grossly neglected.. Even the school of
the soldier, company and battalion, eyolu-
tons OF the line, as well as the duties of
guards and sentinels, are but imperfectly
understood, and are considered by far too
many as useless knowledge, because they
do not understand them, and do not care
to take the trouble of learning.
That the people should be taught that
war is simple matter, requiring no spe
cial information or study, was under
The circumstances, to be expected, as It
aocords with human experience. The
country was full of gentlemen of edu-
soation and those distinguished in civil
life, but without military information. -
4 few ideas gained from reading the
campaigns of Wellington, Napoleon or
Marlborough, was, perhaps, its greatest
extent. Whe.r the time came for the |
people to arise, these gentlemen must be
officers; and, acting upon the popular
but dangerous dogma that generals are |
born and not made Memo cir nsagnus
sine atRutu aliquo dioiao anquaaa fuit-l
and the army was soon filled with gene
raj and other officers incapable Of per-
forming the solemn and important duties
that devolved upon them. Thus the
good of the nation was sacrificed to ambi-
ton, personal selfishness and nepotism;
and disaster upon disaster has been the |
result. Many generals now in the field |
holding responsible commands are igno-
rant of the evolutions of the line, and, to
a great majority, grand tactics, strategy,
and the other branches of the art, is a |
perfect mystery. 1t is in consequence
of this want OF professional information
that SO many battles have been fought |
without any great results.
BY the impossibility of manoeuvring
our army, our battles are fought in paral-
lei lines-decidedly the worst order OF
battle, since there is no skill in causing
armies to fight, where the chances are
equal, regiment against regiment, in the
absence Of all tactics. A battle thus
gained is merely the shifting of positions.
without any substantial advantages, as
experience IN this war has shown. The
best combinations of a general-in-chief
will fail with Incompetent generals and
badly-iDstructed army. The great ad-
vantages Of grand tactical combinations
and man0uvres are lost to us on the
day Of battle because our generals dare
not attempt misunderstanding their own
abilities--as they would most probably
result in disaster and our probable ruin.
The fundamental principles Of war
consist mainly in carrying, by strategic
the mass of an army upon
the decisive point of the theatre of ope-
and as much as possible upon
the communications of the enemy, with
out endangering your own; then ma,
nmuyring so as to engage with the
weight OF your forces fractions only Of /
the hostile army. Then strategy pre-
pares the chances of victory and infiu-
ences in advance its results. +
The directing principle Of the combi-
nations of grand tactics is the same as
hat of strategy. 1t in well combining
md carrying the mass Of your forces
lpon part only of that of the enemy,
md upon that point it is most important
% oyerwhelm, and promises the great
,st advantages. When the numerical
strength aud discipline Of opposing
armies are nearly equal, the result OF bat
les depends mainly upon the order OF
,attle adopted, the abilities Of the gene
ais, the cause Of the struggle, and the
moral condition of the troops. These
ender victories more or less decisive
nd determine their results and impor-
ance. sThe formation and cultivation Of ,
he morale Of an army is the peculiar |
OF general-in.chief; and none
ut great general and just man can q
ally succeed in inspiring the troops with