Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-10-27

self professions lily on the subject against the Gre
Prospective Col dence" he then entertained to use
the phrase Of Jo Leoomte as keen in the satire it
conveys as it i 4, fine in point of expression.
Nor is thil, the only specimen of Gen. Bar
nard's "retro spective" ssgaoity. In his official
report writer in the year 1868, after Gen. Mo
Clellan's reno val from command, he designates as
great blund the omission to open our batteries
at Yorktown IS fast as they were completed. He
says:
:" The siege having been determined upon, we should
have opened batteries the place they
completed tt effect the troops would have been in.
lad the
driving the en- emy from Yorktown by force Of arms
whereas as it only induced him to evacuae for
prudential reas ,ns."
When he rss under examination by the " War
Committee" on the 25th of February, 1893
month after he date of his official report-Gen.
Barnard expl aimed the origin of this blunder as
follows. We quote from Vol. l. of the War Com
mittee's repol t, P. 393:
as completed2
"Gen. BARN ARD The idea was to produce more com.
plete effect whe n they were opened.
Question. Whose idea that2
Gen. BARN ARD cannot say. suppose the error Of
not doing il bell gs much TO me as 10 ann bodu else
The idea was t get the batteries all ready and produce
decisive effect at once when they should be opened
The reader is now prepared to appreciate how
much weight should be given to the accusations of
this military engineer turned political reviewer.
If the Comm anding General erred in the course he
pursued on certain occasions, it was perhaps be-
cause he gave too much weight to the counsels of
his chief engineer at the only time when those
counsels could possibly be of any use to him in
determining his military conduct. It may be that
Gen. Mcclellan overrated the capacity of Gen.
Barnard. It is certain that Gen. Barnard thinks
SO, for he blames Gen. Mcclellan most vehemently
for taking his advicewhen he should have known bet
ter than to do SO. 1t undoubtedly was grievous
misfortune to Gen. Mcclellan that in the conduct
of his military operations on the Peninsula, during
the spring and summer of 1852, he was compelled
to follow the advice of Gen. Barnard IS given at
the time from day to day, rather than the puperect
wisdom contained in his report written in the year
1868, after Gen. Mcclellan had gone into retire
ment under the dsfavor Of our military authorities
We have thus sufficiently exposed the palpable
contradictions which exist between the "profes-
sionsl opinions of Gen. Barnard as compared with
his official report" published in January, 1868,
after Gen. Mcclellan had been removed from COM
mand, with no probability of his restoration to fa-
vor under the present Administration, and still
more as compared with his " campaign document
disseminated by the Republican Executive Com
mittee in this city The exhibition we have made
is sad one, but it was necessary to the vindica-
ton Of truth and to the defence of our recent mill
tary history from perversons having their origin
in political rancor, and obviously inspired by COM
plasanco towards official superiors who have favors
to grant and promotions to bestow. How far such
political rancor and such complaisance have given
color and complexion to the views of Gen. Barnard
the reader shall Judge for himself from the evil
dence we have already advanced and from that
which we next proceed to adduce.
In the preface of the "review" containing this
gross personal attack on the private well as the
Barnard writes as follows, after alluding to the
disheartened condition of our affairs on the 1st
Of January, 1863, when the Army Of the Potomac
had just been led by Gen. Burnside to unavailing
slaughter at Fredericksburg:
"Men did not feel dsmayed because they doubted the
ability of the nation to carry the struggle to q
fu ISSUE but BECAUSE for the time the power of the nation
was partially paralyzed. Yet there a moment
when the public safety and the safety of the cause
more urgently demanded the exeron of ell the nations
strength Why, then, did men doubt7 Where was the
origin of this paralyss in the charge audaci0nsv
made ipndeny persisted IN that to the Uunders and in
capacity of the Administration all disasters due
that ,oi such ineapdciy at the head Of Affairs
ces though they poured forth like ,oater, aoould like
,oater be split the ground Men will sacrifice much
great emergencies but they ,oH give their lives
their money merely that such treasures may be gno
rantly waDtonly wasted.
Had Mcclellan but had his way had he not been in
terered with had not his been reduced and taken
away from him. and his movements in a thousand ,oaus
hampered and baked had s in short had sole control
Of military affairs, all ioouid h.pe been different Rich-
mond would have been tho rebellion would have been
subdusd, and, instead OF disaster and prolonged war
triumphant pence might have been our happier lot
"The Administration thus denounced was, for better or
the consuted agency through which the war, If
it to be carried at ALL must be conducted That
fact cannot be altered The toho tocakened the arm
the natons sole making poioer just TO that degree
Cen McCleans responsibility for the disasters ceased to
be mere abstract question about which men might differ
without prejudice to the public interests; IL became
national question, and one Of vast import.
under such circumstances that 10 writing an Off
cial report at the request Of Gen. Mcclellan himself
the engineering operations Of the Army Of the Potomac
deemed it my duty to state what believed to be the
Of failure Of the campaign Of the Peninsula The
opinions therein orfen dopn aferthonghfs Sir
months before had formed em and tohcn spoke at aH
(,rheh did not do openy expressed them had formed