Western sentinel. [volume] (Winston [i.e. Winston-Salem], N.C.) 1856-1886, 1864-06-30
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eAsSEESIBL.E CONCLUSION.

| eAsSENSIBLE CONCLUSION. 4
| The New York Times has u, last found
. out that even if tRichnoud were taken, IL
would, not end the war. This a,nazing
/ discovery is the result OF three years study
and observation. The rebellion is no lon.
ger tc be 'speedi.y crushed 1t is only
this year. quoth iAe Times, that very
considerable portion OF the public has
thoroughly wakened up to the fact tnat,s
owing to The enormous extent OF. the terri
tory We seek to conquer, the occupation of.
places is OF comparatively little valuc.g
vi course, SOME places, such as the Capt.
tol of the Contederacy, nave more value
than others. The loss oi Richmond would
oe heavy blow and great discourage
ncnt to the enelny but il would be sim
ply moral blow. It would be a mortifi-
catlon, but unless it was an indication of
weakness, il would be nothing smores
HE Isn1es taeu concludes that oar people
have suffers is'oo ,au:h to be appalled, by
! F'a2ral blows, auu iaat if Richmond we're
-akln. and Lees army allowed to retire
oo.thwatd without much damage, there
is no question whatever we should not
. nave s'1ade much progress. He@w would
hold GU. n North Carolina, or Georgia,
consciipt and impress supplies, anG tight
on AS before, anu We should have 10 follow
him for hundreds et aniles, sto WY, contin.
uousty, and with o.thcllties OF all kinds
steadily increasing The turther we peuetra-
ted into the interior and away from our
base ga
This is sage conclrsion, though wheth-
er 1t is announced in consequence Of an
apprehension that Richmond cannot be
taken, and that something must be said to
console the Northern fox for the loes Of
tie grapes, we cannot pretend to guess.
But wha ever the motive Of the announce
n,ent, it Is none the less true. Supposiny
Grant to take Richmond, and not to take
Lees army, how long would it take to
conquer the South !-After Grant had ta-
ken Pemberton, he was unable to follow
Johnston's little force more than forty
miles. After lie had overwhelmed Braggs
interior forces, he was driven back in tlis
very first attempt to follow u2 his success.
Gen. Lee would fall back and fight, and
come ronnd and fight, whilst gncrillas
would swarm in mal1itndes upon Grants
whole line ot supplies. It is, therefore, Of
the last Importance TO Grant that he shonld
capture Lees army. and we may calculate
with confidence that nothing less than this
has been and is his design and that no eff
fort of stratagem will be lett untried for
that purpose.
We have no fears for Richmod, not the
slightest, nor any reverence for Grant -
a great General. His Object being the cap
ture OF Richlnod and Gen. Lees army,
what evidence of generalshipe was there
In permit ing Lee to strip him of seventy
t:sre thousand men Gu his way TO Richmond
h. the Rapidan, when by adopting at once
McCle!l,s : s.nvement on the Peninsula
lie could have saved that Immense force
and thrown it between Lee and the South.
Would not the seventy FIVE thousand
men he has lost by coming ON that famous
line which he vowed he would stick to 1T
il took al summer, be very convenient now
to move upon the rear of Petersburg, q
movement which he may Intend still to
make, and which, if he were a great Gen
erai, he would have provided for by plac-
ing there that immense host which he has
made food for Confederate rifles. The
Times may make itself easy. We do not
think that either Ii ehmond or Gen. Lees
army is ever destined to become the prey
of Yankees.--RicA., Dispatch. a.
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