Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1864-10-14
AnothSr Rebel view ofs sherman's Di-
Taumass

|
| Iemma.''
The rebel press, from one end Of the
South to the other, are in ecstasies of hope
over the prospective schievementsof Hood.
They announce that he is in Sherman's
rear, and that he must be used up in few
weeks. The Richmond Whig confesses
that Hoods army is sin very critical
position" but thinks Sherman's destruction
certain.
The Whig indulges in the following tic-
ton:
He is at and around Atlanta at the pres
ent moment. He is supplied from Chat
tanooga, considerably more than one hun
dred miles of. The supplies come by
single railroad track which crosses the
Chatahoochee considerably to the north of
Atlanta. The intermediate country be-
tween Atlanta and Chattanooga is desc
late, rendered so by Shermsn's own bar
barous policy. He must get everything he
consumes, then, from Chattanooga. His
army is certainly not more than fifty thou
sand strong. We doubt, indeed, whether
it numbers so many, but that is the out
side. He has large stores at Atlantis, but
fifty thousand troops will soon consume
everything there. Hood, with an army
fully able TO meet him in a pitched battle
with every hope snd success, is on this
railroad line he is thus completely cut
of from his base Of supply. He must clear
his rear, or advance farther into Georgia.
In the first case he must beat Hood. In
the second he must march with Hood in
bis rear. In either his position is very
critical. In either 1t would take but avery
partial success on our part to render it ia
tai. He must attack Hood in his intrench-
ments, and he must beat him badly and
decidedly.
If Hood were in Sherman's resr, on the
line of railroad to Chattanooga, and in a
desolated country, it is question which
every Yankee naturally asks, Where are
his supplies to come from while ne is
squatting in the rear of Atlanta VIII he
feed on unsubstantial air? Such iriveling
nonsense are the rebels in Georgia now
fed upon.
But ths Dispatch carries the dilemma
into other details. If Sherman cannot get
rid of Hood in his rear, what then can he
do2 asks the Dispatch. Two things re-
main for him to do-either to march on
Montgomery and Mobile, or upon Au-
gusta and Savannah. In either event, the
Dispatch thus predicts his 'sad fortunes" 4
An advance in the direction of either
Mobile or Augusta would be the signal for
all the country over which he has passed
to rise in his rear, The army of Hood in
that case, would serve as q nucleus around
which the whole strength of northern
Georgia would rally. Followed closely in
the rear by Hood, be would be assaiIed in
flank and front by every man or boy who
could carry a gun or mount a horse. Ar
rived before Augusta or Mobile, he would
find force in his front prepared TO resist
him, and he would find Hood and his other
friends still in his rear. To fall back, on
the other hand, in the direction of his sup
plies, would be equally hazardous. He
would, in that case, be compelled to fight
Hood intrenched up to his chin, or to get
around him by fanking. In the meantime
Forrest is between Hood and Nashville
breaking up the railroads and destroying
the communications of every kind. Should
he pass Hood by thanking, he will still find
it difficult to subsist an army in country
rendered so desolate as that of North
Georgia. His only hope, it seems to us,
would lie in reinfUrcements to come through
Nashville from beyound the Ohio and
they would have to run the gauntlet of
Forrest and the guerillas. In fine, we can
hardly conceive a case in which Sherman
will not be reduced to extreme difficulty,
if the proper vigilance be used and the
proper men hold the command.
All this, no doubt, sounds very comfort
ing to the desponding rebels in Georgia.
But it is all based upon several delusions.
The first is that the rebel armies are in the
rear of Sherman; the second, that he has
but A, 900 men; the third, that if Hood
could get into his rear, he could support
his army; the fourth is that the Union
army is not in Tennessee; the fifth is,
that Hoods ragamufins could meet Sher-
mans legiOns in the open field.
We opine that Sherman is anxious for
nothing so much as to have the rebel army
in his rear. Once there, he would soon
use them up as he did at Altoona.
| 9Dnn1as