The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1864-12-02
. Buchanan's Failure to Save the
Union
GEN. SCOTS DISCLOSURES.

GEN. SCOTS DISCLOSURES
The most interesting portion of Gen.
SCOTS autobiography, just published. is
that which relates TO the rebellion. The
disclosures he makes leave no doubt that
If President Buchanan had taken his ad-
vice all the southern forts and arsenals
might have been saved and the rebellion
; crushed out in its inception; and no one
can read Gen. SCOTS account without
feeling that Buchanan was either in guilty
completely with the southern conspirators.
or was their weak dupe and tool
A. early as October, 1860. Gen. Scott
; warned Mr.. Buchanan of the exposed
condition of the southern forts and navy
yards, and urged their Reinforcement
They might then have been made perfect
ly secure, and, as Gen. Scott saws. the
danger OF secession would thus probably
have been averted altogether. But the
President doubted and hesitated. and mat
tiers drifted on, and conspirators mean
while pertecting their preparations for war.
How faithfully and persistently Gen.
Scott afterwards urged upon Buchanan
the performance of his duty as President,
to take measures to save the forts. arsenals
and navy yards in the South. these pas
sages from his autobiography will show
! October 3l.-I suggested to the secre-
tary OF war that a circular should be sent
at once to such of these forts as had gar
rlSonS, to be on the alert against surprises
and sudden assaults. After long con-
fnement to my bed, in New York. came
to this city (Washingtou). December II.
Next day | personally urged upon the sec
retarv OF war the same views, viz {: strong
garri~onS in the southern torts-thoSe of
| Charleston and Pensacola harbors, AT
once: those on Mobile Bay and the Miss
i>>ippi. below New Orleans. next, etc.
etc. again pointed out the organized
companies and the recruits at the princi-
pal dcpot> available for the purpose. The
secretary did not concur in one of INV
views. when | begged him to procure for
me an interview with the President. that |
might make one effort more TO save the
forts and the Union. BY appointment
the secretary accompanied me to the Pres
ilrnt. December IL. when the same top
Ic>. scce>>iOni>m. etc, were pretty fully
discussed. There being al the moment, in
the opinion of the President. no danger of
an carly secession. bcvond South Carolina.
the President. in reply to my arguments
for Immediately reinforcing Fort Moultrie
and sending Il garrison TO Fort Sumter.
>:lld. i'll substance. the time had not arriv-
ed for doing 50: that he would wait the
action of the convention of South Carroll
na. III the expectation that a commission
would be appointed and sent to negotiate
with him and Congress respecting the Sc
ce>>lon OF the state and the property the
! United States held within It's limits; and
that if Congress should decide against the
secession. then he would send a reinforce
mcnt, and telegraph the commanding Off
Ger MAJOR Ander>on) of Fort Moultrie. TO
hold the forts (Moultrie and Sumtcr)
against attack. And the secretary with
animation, added: :. We have a vessel of
war (the Brooklyn in readiness at Nor
! folk, and he would send three hundred
men in her. from Fortress Monroe to
Charleston. To which | replied, first,
that 50 many men could not be Withdrawn
from that garrison, but could be taken
from New York Next, that it would
then be too late, as the South Carolina
commissioners would have the game in
their hands-bv first using and then cut
ting the wires, that. Us there was not Il
soldier i'll Fort Sumter, any handful Of
arm ed sec esSionists might seize and occu-
py it. Here the remark may be permit
ted, that, if the Secretary'S three hundred
men had then (or some time later) been
sent to Forts Moultric and Sumter both
would now have been in in the possession
of the nited States. and not a battery be-
low them could have been erected 'by the
seceSSionists. Consequently the access TO
those forts from the sea would now the
end of March, 1861 be unobstructed and
free.
The veteran general-in-chief continued
to press the matter frequently upon the
President, but without avail. He closes
his narrative of the effort he made to get
Fort Sumter reinforced with this sum-
ming up:
1t would have been easy to reinforce
| this fort down to about the 18th of Feb
ruary In this long delay Fort MouItrie
had been rearmed and greatly strengthen
ed, in every way. by the rebels. Many
, powerful new land batteries (besides for
midable raft) had been constructed -
: HulkS. too. were sunk in the principal
channel. so as to render access to Fort
Sumter from the sea impracticable, with
out first carrying all the lower batteries OF
the seceSsionists, The difficulty of rein,
forcing had thus been increased ten OF
Y twelve fold First, the late President re.
| fused to allow any attempt to be made
t because he was holding negotiations with
t the South Carolina commissioners after
: ward. Secretary Holt and myself endeav
: ored in vain, to obtain ship of war fol