The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1864-12-02

by the muzzles of his guns; that is. en-
forcing supplies by bombardment, and 10y
bringing to merchant vessels, helping him
self (glving orders for payment), or finally
be allowed to evacuate the fort, which, il
in that case, would be inevitable Bu
before any resolution was taken-the lat,
secretary of the navy making ditfcultie.
about the want of suitable war vessels
another commissioner from South Carolinf
arrived causing further delay Wher
this had passed away. Secretaries Hol
and Toucey, Captain Ward of the navy
and myself-with the knowledge of the
President buchanan )-settled upon tn,
employment, under the captain (who wa:
eager for the expedition, of three or four
small steamers, belonging to the coast sur
vey. AT that time Qate in january
| have but little doubt, Capt. Ward
would have reached Fort Sumter with all
his vessels. But he was kept back by
something like truce or armistice made
(here) embracing Charleston and Pensaco-
la harbors, agreed upon between the late
President and certain principal seceders OF
South Carolina, Florida. Louisiana. etc.
and this truce lasted to the end of that adj
miniStration
There is a similar history connected
with the Pensacola navy yards and forts,
and the other Notifications ON the coast,
all of which might have been secured if
Gen. Scott had been permitted to act
This is what was done.
Early in January ! renewed (as has
been SEEM my solicitations to be allowed
to reinforce Fort Pickens; but a good
deal of time was lost in vacillations.
First, the President ''thought if no move
ment be made on the part of the United
States, Fort McRae will probably not be
occupied, nor Fort Pickens attacked. In
case of movement by the United States,
which would doubtless be made known
by the wires, there will be corresponding
local movements. and the attempts TO re-
intorce will he useless" Quotation from
a note made by Aide-de-C Camp Law. about
January II. of the Presidents reply TO a
m><age from me) Next it was doubted
whether it would be safe TO send reinforce
ments in an unarmed steamer, and the
,,c,,al .-,,,..,ll., ,,.,,-,1
the Brooklyn having long been held in
reserve AT Norfolk for some purpose m-
known 10 me. Finally, after | had kept
three hundred recruits III New York har-
Dor ready for some time-(a and they would
have been sufficient 10 reinforce. temporal
rllv. Fort Pickcn>. and 10 occupy Fort
McRae. alSo)-thc President. about JAN
uarv 18th. directed that the sloop-ot-war
Brooklyn should take Il single company
(ninety men from Fortress Monroe. IIamp-
Ton Roads,, AMI reinforce Ii. S,cmmcr al
Fort PickcnS. but without surplus man
for the neighboring fort. McRac, The
Brooklyn. with Capt. Eodge's company
alone, left the Chesapeake. for Fort Pick
ems, about January 22d. and on the Doth.
President Buchanan. having entered into
a quasi armiStice with certain leading Sc
ce,lers at Pensacola, and elsewhere, caused
Secretaries Holt and Toucev 10 instruct. in
a Joint note, the commanders of the war
vessels off Pensacola and Lieut. Slemmer,
commanding Fort Pickens. TO commit no
act OF hostility, and not 10 land Capt
Vodge'S company unless that fort should
be attacked. 1t was
known at the navy department that the
Brooklyn, with Capt Vodge's company
on board, would he obliged in open sea TO
stand off and on Fort PickenS. and. in
rough weather, might sometimes be fifty
miles off. Indeed. if 50 at sea. the fort
might have been attacked and easily car
ried before the reinforcement could have
reached the beach Tin open seal. where
alone it could land
To show how fully the rebels appreci-
ated Gen. SCOTS efforts. this passage is
gwen from an eulogy pronounced by the
Richmond Examiner on Secretary of War
Floyd when he returned to Richmond:
"The plan invented by Gen. Scott to
stop secession was, like all campaigns de-
vised by him, very able in IFS details and
nearly certain of general success. The
southern states are full of arSenalS and
forts, commanding their rivers and strate-
gic points. Gen. Scott desired TO transfer
the army of the United States TO these
forts rs speedily and quietly as possible,
| The southern states could not cut off COM
munication between the government and
the fortresses without a great fleet. which
they cannot build for vears-or take them
bv land without one hundred thousand
men, many hundred millions of dollars
several campaigns, and many a bloody
siege. Had Scott been able to have GOT
these forts in the condition he desired them
to be, the southern confederacy would not
now exist"
Sceptical Sailor Convinced.