Edgefield advertiser. [volume] (Edgefield, S.C.) 1836-current, 1864-07-20
GdgefelS :9b6ltrttiiser,.
From Johnston's Front.

Carottinian has gone to the front, ana writes
the following letterfeo his paper:
BEHIND THE CnArrAHoocHEE, July ls, 1864
"Gen. Sherman during this campaign may
have exhibited unauestionable ability ana
the highest qualities of the strategist, out
this army will whip him, if 1t is a,fofdeo an
opportunity, as certain as Heaven rules our
destinies.n. Such were the cheering words
Lieutenant Generals, and 1 daote them as an
illustration of the splendid spirit which, not
wisastanding fifty-two hard working days In
the trenches, fatiguing marches, broken rest,
and retroerade movements from an enemy
who only had to be fought to be beaten, still
peryades our army, and slumbers like spark
that requires but breath to fan it into flame.
The worst that can be said of our paen, is
that they are disappointeds Relying implic-
itly on the military judgment of Gen. John
ston, and daily amazed at his wonderful sue
cess.in checking or eluding the fanking col
umns of the enemy, they felt on arriving at
the banks OF the Chattaboochee that the crisis
of the campaign had arrived, and the work of
vengeance was about to commence. But the
hour is still delayed. The order was given to
*retire yet further to the rear. The evacuation
of Atlanta was commenced, and fear began to
possess the hearts of the spirited soldiery,
that the rich stake for which SO many valua-
BILE lives had been sacrificed from Ghttanoo-
CATO the Chattsheochee, was to be given up
without blow.
Whether their fears are 10 BE realized is
vet among the mysteries of the future. A
battle depends more on the choice of Gen.
Sherman than of Gen. Johnston. The policy
of the former from the moment he left Dalton
until to day has been, as far es practicable,
to avoid the issue of arms, and to accomplish
his end by continually turning our aanks.
There are vet no indications that his plans
hsve undergone change, and not until his
intentions are developed, will Gen. Johnston
take any step likely to decide the momentous
question of the hour
There arc several points. in this connection
to be considered, both By commander and
by the people. First, Atlanta is the ohjec-
tive point of the campaign. For two years,
the enemy have striven for. it in vain, until
finally massing his forces in tremendous ar
nv, he commenced the thus far successful
movement. Sitting down in our front, lie
entrenched heavily-loosened his wings, aud
started them on our ilanks. Johnston, una.
Bile to cope with his disadvantages, retired to
his next position. Again cntrenchr2ents-'
again flank; and thus from Datcn to the
Chattahoochee, there has been succession of
fights, manoeuvrcs and retreats. In word,
Sherman has achieved oneof the grand OBJ
iects of his campaign. He has forced his
antagonist back 10 the suburbs of Atlanta,
and is himself encamped within sight of its
spires.
Now, can the city be surrendered without
'iDHicting loss on our cause that%iil be al
most irremediable? Ought veto save Allan.
ia and risk the integrity of the army, and
part with valuable territory These are grave
questions, and they stare us too boldly i'll the
face to forbid discussion. The fact is evident
to every thoughtful mind that the fall OF this
city, with its important railroad connections
reaching into the heart of one Of the most
.productive States of the South, must create
influences at the North which will lend new
impetus to the war, additional strength to
the enemy in money, men and confidence,
and materially alter the complexion of tie
political party from which we have hoped so
much. Peace may be at the points of our
bayonets, but when these recede, VIC have lit
lie for which to hope. The effect at home
would likewise be demoralizing, and the army
itself might suffer from tie general Sep.es-
sion
Regard the dilemma, however, from anoth-
er-point of view, and suppose Gen. Sherman
to be in full and undisturbed possession of
Atlanta. Heis then three hundred miles
from his own cavalry, and in the heart OF on
eneinys territory. Does any ore imagine
that his lines would be secure and 'uninter-
rupted? The idea is preposterous. With
but single railroad at his back. our cavalry
at work upon its curves aud bridges, and.
others Of our forces ever threatening his rear,
the hour would speedily approach when utter
annihilation of the Federal army would be
his doom. The farther an enemy advances
from his base, the greater will be the disas-
fer whichis certain to follow his defeat. One
foe in the rear is more to be feared than ten
IN front. The game would be in our own
hands.
Ought Gen. Johnston to give battle here,
or surrender Atlanta without blow? If he
strikes and fails, ten or perhapstwenty thou
sand men will be added to the already fright
ful list of killed, wounded and missing"
Weeks, and it may be months, will be con-
sumed in recuperating, and meanwhile the
enemy may pursue his advantages still fur
ther into the interior. If, on the contrary
we retire prldcntially, we are still foot loose,
and in full force, ready at any moment to
turn upon the foe. HadeGen. Johnston de-
termiued to give battle any where: military
men contend that the event should have taxi
.en place beforesnow and many miles away
from Atlanta; because, if then defeated, the
twenty thousand militia subject to the call
Of Gov. Brown, could have rushed to bis res
cue, swellsd his decimated lines to, their orig
inal streDgeas and enabled him still TO con-
front his stubborn adversary and hold him in
check. That our commander has had OPP
portunities for turning on the Federal army
during his retreat and giving battle, with, the
probabilities of victory al on our side, am
assured by those intimately familiar with the
positions of the enemy and our own advan-
tayes; but for some reason, best known to
Gen. Johnston, he allowed these opportunities
tc'slip by unappropriated, and continued his
strategic move 10 the rear.
Gen. Johnston, however, is anxious to
fight, and to fight here. He cannot consis.
.a.root f,rthsr He must become ao-