Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-04-04

IroopS-I3O,OOO under Eee-Ehc
COmmandersO OF Departments, Their
Them-Southern Estimate of Gene-
raj Grant.
Correspondence Of the New York World.
BALTIMORE. March 23
WHAT THE SOUTH HAS LEARNED DURING THE WAR.
Now that the spring campaign is about to open
under auspices more favorable than in the past,
inasmuch the Federal armies will be under
one head, it is of the utmost consequence to as
certain definitely the military strength and the
plans of the Confederates for the campaign of
1864. / am fortunately in possession of the
facts which enable me to give you the exact COM
position and numerical strength of the Southern
armies, and the plans which the Southern leaders
have agreed upon for the spring and summer
campaigns.
Three years of have learned the South
many valuable lessons Many of these lessons
they have learned from their enemies; but thew
are none the less valuable to them on that ac-
count. They have never committed the error of
undertaking the power of the North. They have
from the first been convinced of the determine
ton on the part of the North TO conquer and
subdue them; and they have from the first deter
mined that they would not be conquered or sub
dued.
THE SOUTH DEPENDS UPON GENERALsHIP, DIsCI.
PLISE STRATEGY, AND NOT on NUMBERS.
The most useful of all lessons that they have
learned, and the one which they will put in prac-
tice the most during the campaign of this year.
is, that success III war does not depend upon
large armies, but upon good generalship and
strategy on the part of the officers and upon dis
cipline the part of their soldiers l have the
figures, and | will produce them in subsequent
letter. which show that at no period during the
war have the Southern armies exceeded one half
the numbers of the Federal troops During the
campaigns of 1864 the South will net have one
third of million of men in the field, while the
Northern armies will exceed million. But ev
cry man in the Confederate ranks will be Il we'll
disciplined soldier; and their armies will be led
by Generals of tried and proved ability.
SOUTHERN ESTIMATE OF GENERAL GRANT-rHEY
ARE PLEASED WITH HIS ELEVATION
The plans of the southern leaders for the
campaigns of 1864, are based in great measure.
but not entirely, upon what they have OWNED of
the plans and designs OF the Administration at
Washington 1t may strike your readers with
surprise. but it is nevertheless fact, that the
southern leaders at Richmond do not anticipate
any great change in the results of the war from
General Grants recent elevation They do not
dread his plans, they did (and would) the
plans of Mcclellan. They do not regard him
as possessing military genius O; high order
other Generals in the Union army who are far
more dreaded by them than General Grant. They
regard General Grant as being in the same class,
regards military ability, with Generals Meade,
W I. Sherman, Fitz John Porter, Wool, and
RoSecrans. The probabilities of his elevation
to the chief command have been Il subject of de-
bate at Richmond for some weeks. If such a
step was taken, it believed by the southern
leaders that it would be a political move on the
,,ft tbo A nd hat a,
be made as a military measure, or with the view
OF a more vigorous prosecution of the war on
the part of the North. They believe that II
General Grant had been left where he was and
if he had been furnished with troops enough and
supplies enough that he would have given them
considerable trouble in the " est during the year
tor they believe that his military abilities are
fully equal to the direction of vigorous cam
paien in that field. But they believe that hi.
elevation to the chief command will be a positive
advantage to them for three reasons First, be
cause his attention will be withdrawn from the
West, which will enable them TO carry out theil
plans there. Second, because they believe there
is only one man ia the North who is capable o
directing the operations of the wal as a whole
and of planning campaigns for the general con
duct of the war; and General Grant is not tha
And. third, because they believe (and th:
belief is founded Oh authentic intelligence which
they have received from a very high source il
Washngtpn) that it is the intention OF th,
President to plan the campaigns. and to direc
the movements and operations of the Union
armies himself, and to compel General Grant Il
divulge his plans to him The existence of th
state of things will. they believe enable them tC
carry out successfully their plans for the cam
paign of 1864.
The following is the organization, disposition
and numerical strength of the Confederate army
as it exists at present:
ORGANIZATION OF THE CONFEDERATE ARMY,
MARCH %.
Gen. Braxton Bragg. Commander-in-Chief
headquarters. Richmond, Va; Gen. S. Cooper
Adjutant General.
DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA.
Gen. Robert E Lee, commanding; headquar
ters with the army.
Troops
Seven divisions of infantry. 40, 900 men
250 pieces of artillery 5000 men
Fifteen regiments cavalry. Ii, ,000 men-90, 90
At Richmond and vicinity, under General
EiZey; at Petersburg, Weldon, Colds.
bOrO. Wilmington, and along the rail
road between Richmond and Whining
ton, under Gen Pickett and Gen.
Barclay. :. -. 3O,OO
Under Gen. ImbOden and Col. Mosby,
the line OF the Biltimore & Ohio
Railroad, and in Northern Virginia. 500
From Lynchburg to Arlington, in South
western Virginia, and guarding the line
of the Great Southern Railroad from
Lynchburg to Longstreet's pickets in
East Tennessee, under Major General
John C Breckinridge. .......... 500
Total under Gen Lees orders. ....,... $780, 90
DEPARTMENT The SOUTHWEST.
Gen Leonidas Polk, commanding, headquar
tiers, Demopolis. near Selma, Alabama
Forces under Gen. Joseph E Johnston
at Dalton, and oper 'ting against Gen
w I. Sherman (in Grants hte de-
partment. } Including The corps of Gen.