East Saginaw courier. (East Saginaw, Mich.) 1859-18??, 1864-05-04
The Campaign Against Richmond.
[Erom the U. S. Army and Navy Journal ]

The Campaign Against Richmond.
[Ercm the U. S. Army and Navy Journal
1t would be folly to assume to prog
nosticate success or failure as the res
ult of the summers campaigning in
Virginia. The press and the people
have learned to give over such bonn
bast. A thousand contingencies may
arise TO affect the solution of the prob
lem and spoil our fine theories. Yet
no intelligent military man can dare
to deny that there is a possibility OF
success. And the careful observer of
present conditions and circumstances
will see perhaps greater grounds for
confident expectation than ever before
existed. We have a veteran army !;
we move over ground thoroughly un..
derstood by our Generals; We have
tho lessons Of former campaigns for
our profting; we have learned by sad
experience the necessity of concentra-
ton; we have a tried and confident
commander. 1t is well known to
those who have had access to General
Grant that into his mind the likelihood
of defeat does not enter. He believes
that tho fortune which has followed
him hitherto will not now desert him.
The prospect of an encounter with
tho ablest General Of the enemy does
not in anydegree disturb his confident
assurance. And indeed, why may we
not say, instead of this, that Grant
now first encounters Lee, this, that
Lee is now first pitted against GrantY
And by General Grant we do not
mean merely the eminent and snccess-
full leader, but him the representative
Of certain correct military ideas-of
rorrcrrrtrrstivr,,,f fuss .,sssesss..~-A
thority, with which there shall be no
interference. If General Grant is not
impeded by political interforenue, he
may enter Richmond this summer. -
So far as we are able to interpret the
meaning Of the indications OF the
plans of the coming campaign, though
we frankly and freely confess that
these indications are few and mysteri-
Gus, they show full understanding OF
the situation, and have in them all the
promise of success. The exigencics
of the typographical features OF the
field of war in Virginia reduce the
possible lines of operation against
Richmond to q few which are at this
time well understood by all intelligent
military men. The knowledge OF this
fact will very much assist the interest
ed observer in calculating the chances
of success, and in determining the
routes by which General Grant Will
operate. These lines, or what we
conceive them 10 be, have already
been described in this journal, and
their relative advantages discussed
The first necessity is obviously to COW
or Washington, and IN such manner
that large force may DO loft to move
against Richmond, without the dis
traction which the duty of defending
the national capital would give to its
movements. The available line OF adj
vance for the enemy against Wash
ington is by way of Shenandoah VAL
lev !; our main defensive line is by the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad.--
These secured, Washington is eliectu-
ally covered. The passes of the She
nandoah guarded, strong force must
hold the defensive line Of the railroad.
Then in cooperation with this force,
an army may move by way Of the
Virginia Ccntrat, from Acquia Creek,
or from West Point, or from Harri-
sons Landing, or npon the South side
Of the James River.
For this, powerful armies will be
required. and each must be able to de-
fcnd itself against Lee. 1t is also to
be understood that in every sense
these armies should be cooperative,
and ultimately united, when Lee is
compelled to retire from his impreg-
nable position on the line of the Rapi-
dan, and to full back within tho de-
fonces of Richmond, whose communi-
cations to the South have been severed.
Then would follow regular siege oper-
ations, which would compel the enemy
to come out of his dcfcnces to attempt
to drive back the cncirling force
which lies across his communications.
and prevents tho subsistence of his
army III these conditions be sati; :
fed, we may expect fierce fighting in
front of the rebel capital. OF course,
Lee has the advantageof interior lines,
and lie will undoubtedly be able to
conccntratc against us an immense
force. He will fight for lie. In in
dicating thcsc manifest limos of opera
ton, we do not pretend 10 any knowl-
odge Of the plans and purposes ol
General Grant. We merely cxplain
conditions which must control any al.
vance on Richmond. The chances O,
success, as we have said, will depend
upon the vigor with which the move
mcnts are conducted upon the force
General grant Is able 10 concentrate
and upon the degree 10 which he il
left to pursue, undisturbcd, his plans
of campaign II would scem that
tho history Of Virginia campaigning
had taught a lesson in this respect
which could not fail TO be hecded.--
The victory or defeat Of tho army OF
General Grnnt will hang upon this.
Let us pray that wisdom may guide
nnd prevail, 81
\ ...T