The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-12-03

public will bo content to let General Sherman
conduct his campaign after his own method, trust
ing its plan 20 be justified by its results.
10 needs but q slight appreciation Of the nature
Of General Shermans task 10 justify his wisdom
in not staying his march for the capture Of places
that must fall into his hands as ripe fruit on the
accomplishment Of his design. Such procedure
would only serve 90 exhaust his supplies and use
up bis ammunition, in the execution Of minor
results that are the necessary corollaries 10 the
successful execution Of his general plan.
Sherman aims az great Interior results when
he shall have achieved his end, he will have per-
manently severed the Gulf States from those OF
the Atlantic seaboard. We shall hold she line OF
the Savannah river, and confue the main rVly
Of the Rebellion within the limits Of Virginia anu
the CurOlnas.
What thep. has been the actual progress Of
General Sherman thus far in the execution OF ms
purpose FIRST, we know from me 'esum9ny OF
the Richmond journals OF yesterday, lhat nc mas
successfully transferred his wholc army over the
Orouse tbS only river he had TO cross ere reach
ing an outlet on the sea. we know, secondly,
tbS, be is moving far south OF Augusta, on the
line connecting that city with saVannan; and on
which they both depend.
I'VE know, thirdly, that he had, at last advices,
pusbed forward 20 far that he was able to throw
out a cavalry co umn 70 communicate with the
fleet. We know, fOurthly, both through the con-
fessions ofthe Richmond and Georgia press and
through The declarations OF General Grant, that
the Rebels have no hope Of being able TO thwart
sherman.
This despair is s;rikingly manifested 10 the
tone of angry comment which the Richmond
press heap on JetI. Davis for his policy in send
ing IOod's army on fruitless raid into Ten.
nCssee instead OF retaining II where IL could check
the advance Of Sherman.
Says the Enquirer of Wednesday -
"Witbout sustaining any ply sical injury from
Shermgn's successful march TO the coast our
cause cannot escape a great moral defeat by a
triumphant raid through the heart Of the Con
fcGeraCy. II is neither proper nor profitable 10
inquire into the wisdom Of the slde-trdck strategy
but at future day, IL will be well, if for nothing
else, at least for curiosity TO find out who Il
that so entirely succeeded in rendering absolutely
useless the Army of Tennessee"
In like strain writes the Whigof the Both ult. -
"ln the meantime, while we do noe affect to be
a Judge of military matters, we can but regret the
absence of Hood. When he cut of Shermau's
communications above Atlanta, we supposed he
intended TO iortiiy himself upon the railroad, and
fight him when he came out TO restore them. If
he should choose a bOlder game, the game he is
now pursuing, we thought, Of course, Hood was
10 follow in his rear, and cut or all communca-
tion i'd that direction, while all Georgia was 20
rise in his front; we could see nothing better for
SheTman's army than absolute annihilatiOn.
But, it seems, that our calculations were
oil wrong. Hood plays no part in this
interesting drama; his army has been
sent entirely Off away across the Tenues-
see river, and at the last accounts was doing
nothing most vigorously. We do not know who
planned this campaign, nor are we competent to
pronounce judgment on military matters. But II
does appear 10 us tnat the pOlCy pursued IN THIS
case maTvelously resembles that pursuedln several
others ofnot very ancient occurrence, which senta
portion of Bragg's forces to ViCisburg, before he
was attacked by Rosccrans, and which despatched
Longstreet To Tennessee at the critical moment
when Grant had assembled all his forces, from
all quarters, and was about 30 make his attack at
Missionary Ridge. IL may be policy strictly
military, but it is very much in opposition
10 common sense, which tells us that, CatcriS
parbUS,1 two men are stronger than one,
and that il 1t be object 10 defeat enemy, it
is certainly best to have large force as possi-
bic TO do 1t with. Hoods men have been for
weeks without an enemy before them. In that
| time they might have been at Macon, in Sher-
mans rear, and were they there, Sherman's
destruction would be inevitable; at least so it
| seems TO us.
"Let us, however, hope for the hest, and among
| other good things, that the President JEFF
| DaVis) will stay at home when the Southern
| armies meet with any more bad luck. let the
| men who have TO fight the campaign plan it
| Even Napoleon declined to make general unde
his orders follow plan he lhad sketched for hin
| when he found he had one of his own. "Miue i
the best" he said, but it is better to let hin
follow his own" Let our generals follow thei
| own plans. II they are not fit to be trusted thu
far, they are not fit to command the armies"
Such are the chief points in regard to Shev
mans progress we are allowed to gather from tn
reluc ant confessions of the Richmond press.
| our mind they ore cheering, and we think the
| will be so to the public generally. They have r
moved a load of anXietye ngendered by the dou
and ignorance in which we have been kept I
gaHding the situation in Georgia, and by the CO.
temptation of the inherent difficulties Of the C
terprise. Though they do not now show us 81
| end, they give assurance of its speedy realiz
ton and inspire the same confidence expresSe
by Lieutenant General Grant in his despatch
| President LincOln.-Neio York Tunes.