The mountain Democrat., 1864-10-08
WAx 0sa. nuoal as.lkn.G.
We 6nd the following letter from Gen.
D." Carlos BuGIl to friend, 10 the Phil.
sAel~ki% A9nl ... .....


We And the following letter from Gen.
D." Carlos BuGll to q friend, 10 the Phil.
~adsl~kiA A4i .., .. ...
HEDsoED SPkrNos, PA.,(
July 10Th, 1864.
DEAR SIR The public have seen no
Official announcement Of the fact - though
II L. by this time very generally knOwH
-thSt ] have resigned my command In
the army. / have several times since
been assured that my personal friends,
and many who without the Claim Of per.
sonal acquaintance, have taken an inter
eat in my official career, feel that some
explanation Of the circumstances and mo-
tiveE Of my action is due TO them. Ac
cepting this claim upon me, i have already
answered ""ne Of my friends in substance
IS ] do you now.
1t 10 perhaps unnecessary to enter into
an exposition Of the circumstances Of my
Supercedure in Tennessee, in the Fall Of
1869. since the particulars, though not
without . certain value, involve interests
Of my own with which il is not my wish
to weary you. As far as the facts are
concerned, it will suffice for the present
to say that, after the adjt urnment, about
the first Of May, 1858, Of the "CommiS.
AiOn" which investigated my campaign,
my correspondence ~ith the Department
was confined to q monthly report made to
the Adjutant General that was waiting
the action Of the War Department on the
proceedings Of the Commission; that
about the first week in April last was
offered command under Gen. Sherman,
uny junior, w hich I declined; that monii:
lat'r ] was again offered command under
Gen. Canby, also my junior, which ! de.
clIned that about three weeks later re.
crived notification that was mustered
cut Of my rA"k a. Major General Of Vol
unteerS, and that On the same day sent
in my resignation as ColOnel in thr Adju-
Iant Generals Department Of the Regular
Army.
The impulses Of most men would ap-
PrOvs MY caIurSe in thus matter. il it even
rested TN no other ground than deter.
uiinatiOn mot t0 acQuiesce in any measure
Inat would degrade me; but ! had high
er motive than that. believed that the
policy and means with which the war was
beng prosecuted we're diScreditable to the
natiOn.a stain Wp,'n civilization and that
they wOulI not only fail 10 restore the
Union, If indeed they had not already
rendered restoration impossible. but thai
their tendency was to subvert the inSti
tutiOns undcr which the country had real
ICED une xaMplcd prosperity and happl
ncsS, aud TO such work could not coulL
lend nav hand.
While there may have been more Of
less Of persunAl ambition mixed up in The
mOveMent Of secession-as there must
generally be In the management of p"liti
cal atfairs-yet do not doubt that Il wa
mainly Determined by an honest convic
non in the minds M those who engager
in il that the control Uf the Cover nmen
had passed permanently intu the hands d
. SECTIONAL party, which would sOOT
trample uE"'n the political rights Of the
South. This apprehension was shared ia
by very large portion Of the pe"pie who
did not favor secession, and who were ~
anxious for the preservation Of the Union
that even coercive measures, If tempered
py J0oSt(S ouN t1VINNS 0Oub bVb heNN Co
uanged them. Under these circum
stances, the use Of military fnrce tn put
down armed resistance was not incOmpat
hle with . reStUratiOn Of the Union with
it's turner glorieS and affections. provided
the means were employed in such man
ner a. TO convince the people that theIT
constitutional rights would be respected
Such policy, therefore, in the use OI
force. il force Dust be reSorted had the
manifest advantage Of weakening the
power Of the rebellion and strengthening
the Government, independently Of the
moral force which dignity and justice al.
ways lend to authority.
A policy which recognized these prin'
cipl,s waS wisely declared by Congress
in the beginning Of the war; and from a
frrvent desire for the preservation Of the
Union. in which pride Of conntrv and al
my interests ~ citizen crntcred, mot less
than from \ natural Impulse, gave thai
policy my earnest support Unfortunate
ly it Was too often cheated If its due ef
feet by the infusion Of sectional raIIcor
and the i'jUdiciOus or HRGaitlffal acts oil
agents Of the Government; and when, al
the. expiI ati"n "f year. system ofspoil
alton aud Acknowledgement was inSgurat
ed, the cause was robbed nf its sanctily,
and success rendered more difficult Of at.
tainment.
YOu have. in these few lines, an explA
nation Of the motives of my conduct while
| was in command, a. well Ak the step,
which. about twenty three years of SER
vice, has closed my career ~ soldier
and br"ken up the professional habits and
associations to which was educated, and
in which I have passed the larger portion
Of my 'ife. lam very far from casting
UnfavOrable reflections upon the thou
sands in the service, who. perhaps, with
views similar to my own. have not ChOs
en- my course. Few Of them have beeu
similarly situated; and rather commend
the patience with which they have slruG
gled in poSitiOns which must otherwise
have been Allied by less scrupulons men,
and in which they might mitigate some
Of the calamitieS which they yet could
not wholly prevent.
Very truly yours. D. G. BUELL.
AN TMPROPER PRPsENr. negrocI