The Potter journal. [volume] (Coudersport, Pa.) 1857-1872, 1864-10-05

entire, its disgraceful truth.
And first, in evidence Of its truth, we
have the declaration, informal, but not
tie less weighty, (because reiterated and
unvarying,) of the rebel chiefs, that the
South will not treat for peace save upon
the basis of recognition of its indepen-
dence. The press of the South omits no
opportunity to impress upon US, and upon
the world, that peace can only come thro'
recognition. Recognition is but another
name for separation. And finally, every
European nation has come to regard the
result of this war as certain to be one of
two things-either subjugation or dis
union. 1t is the clear conviction which
truth brings to every rational, enlightened
mind. 1t is, therefore, entitled 10 great
weight, second only to the resultant fact.
1t is due to the opponents of Mr.. Lin
coin to state teat they pretend to believe
in the probability of peace and union
through some compromise, the terms of
which are not clearly stated
1t will he easy to show the futilitY of
such hopes, if it has not already been
done. 1t will not be difficult task to
show that such belief does not take root
in conviction. The. leaders of the opDo-
sition are men Of great ability, and more
than ordinary sagacity. They cannot,
therefore, be ignorant of the facts which
are of public record. Those facts effect
ually preclude the possibility Of peace and
Uuion through any compromise, unless
the terms involve recognition, and that
would be disunion.
But let US thoroughly consider this
question of peace through compromise.
1t Is reasonable to suppose that the chiefs
| Of the rebellion would have accepted
terms in the outset, if at all It is al
legged by our opponents that Mr.. Lincoln
hurried the nation into war, not only
without constitutional warrant, but even
against the wishes Of the rebel chiefs
themselves. They reproach the Congress
then IL session with having refused to
adopt the Crittenden compromise meas,
ure, and thus forced the South into rebol-
lion IN exercise Of the right Of self defence
and self preservation. It is unnecessary
to pause to show that all this transpired
while the reias Of power were held by
| Southern men, most of whom are now in
arms against the Government. Let that
pass. The question hinges upon the re.
spOnsibiity Of the rejection Of the Crit
tenden compromise. It was rejected
By whom? Reference to page 199, part
first, of tAe CongrcssivaaL Globe Of the
second session of the thirty sixth Congress
will place the responsibility for the reiec-
ton of that compromise where it properly
belongs. 1t will be seen that the Crit.
tenden compromise was defeated by the
substitution Gin efect) of what is known
as the "Clark amendment" The record
shows that the vote on the motion to
substitute was-yeas %, hayes 80. The
vote on the adoption of the Clark propo-
sition, taken directly afterwards, was
yeas 55, nays, %. The presumption
would be, naturally, that if the South had
votes enough to reject the substitute, it
would also have had enough to reject the
proposition when offered Independently.
There was falling off in the negative
vote on The proposition, as compared with
that on the first motion to substitute, of
seyen votes. This is accounted for by the
fact that Senators Benjamin and Slidell,
of Louisiana; Wigfall and Hemphill, of
Texas Iverson, of Georgia, and johnson,
of Arkansas-Sir ,Soathern Senator's
sat IN their seats Gnd refused to cote. |
Had these six Southern men voted "no,"
the Clark proposition would have been
defeated by majority of four votes, and
the Crittenden compromise could have
been AIKEN up and carried by the same
majority. 1t appears of record, then, that
the Crlttenden compromise was rejected .
because six Of the leading Senators from
the South virtually refused to vote for it.
a motion to reconsider was carried some
months later, and direct vote upon the
compromise was taken. The proposition
was lost by q single vote. But one of the
six Senators referred to voted on that
occasion, nearly all of them having with
drawn on the secession of their respective
States. Had they remained to vote for
the compromise, it would have been
adopted.
The chief object in alluding to this
matter is to show that when, before the
overt act of war was committed, the South
had the election Of compromise or war,
she, through her highest dignitaries,
deliberately chose war
The South would not have compromise
then. Is it reasonable to suppose that it
would accept such an accommodation
now? Her rulers have the Southern
masses by the throat, and caa mould
them to their imperious will. They are
r,ln e. N. I