The Plymouth weekly Democrat. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1860-1869, 1864-06-23
VOLUME 9.
Amos Kendall on tho Crisis
second Series -Eettcr seventh.

MCCLELLAN AND GRANT-WHY CLEL-
Ian DID NOT TAKE RICHMOND IN 1862
THE CONSEQUENCES.
To every American Citizen who longs for
speedy restoration of peace, liberty,
and the Union:
The writer Of these letters has been to
nuch Interested in the tragic scenes which
have illustrated the last two weeks TO pur-
sue his ;lnwelcome theme, and doubtless
his readers have been as little inclined to
read as he TO write. Instead Of at present
following hi7 proposed order Of discussion,
let US consider passing scenes in their re-
lation TO the past.
In 1862 when Gen Mcclellan was be-
fore Richmond with the army of the Po-
tomac, there were ivc Major-Generals in
the State of Virginia with separate COM
mands viz: Mcclellan before Richmond
Wool at Fortress Monroe, Mcdowell at
Fredericksburg, Banks in the Shenando.
Nh Valley, and Fremont in Western Viz
GINA. The President himself and Secre-
tary of War gave orders direct to each Of
these Generals, constantly interfering with
their plans, and especially those of Gen.
Mcclellan.
The number and description of troops
necessary, in that Generals opinion, for
the capture Of Richmond, had been def
nitcly fixed upon apparently with their
approval. But when he was about to start,
tie President took from him 10000 men
Of these troops. Bankers division, for the
purpose of increasing the command of
Gen. Fremont. Before he left Washing
ton he had been authorized to draw TO-
coo men from Fortress Monroe to aid him
in his enterprise. The day after his arri-
val there that authority was withdrawn
from him. Thus, before he advanced upon
Richmond, he was deprived Of 20, 900 men
of his contemplated force.
Gen. Mcclellan believed that with the
aid of NcDowell's corps Of $4,000 men, he
vas still strong enough to take the rebel
capital Il fought his way to its very
gates, aad Mcdowell was On the point of
joining him, when he too was ordered up
on other service and The rebel capital was
saved
Now, who caa doubt tha. if Mcclellan
had been allowed to retain these $4,000
men, and to manage the campaign in his
own waT, even without the power to order
reinforcemen.s which Gran. now posses
ses, Richmond rc2u,d then haze been taken
and the rebellion driven further South,
perhaps entirely suppressed? Who then
is responsible Cor the subsequent calami-
ties and the indefinite prolongation of tn,
war? Who is responsible for the awful
consequences Of thus depriviag Mcclellan
of the force deemed by him necessary for
the carture Of Richmond Who is re-
sponsi6ie-
For the blood Of Malvern Hill and 9TH
er fields during McClellan's retirement to
Harrison'5 Landing?
For the blood Of the second defeat at
Bull Run?
For the Blood Of An.ictam
For the blood Of Fredericksburg
For the blood of Charlottesville
For the blood cf Gettysburg?
Fo. the blood that is aow flowing in riy-
crs between Fredericksburg and Rich
mond?
Yes, who shall answer for all this car
mage when God ''maketh incuisition for
blood ?" Not, surely, Gen Mcclellan,
who would have prevented it, had he been
lc, alone. And the Joy that now animates
every loyal heart on hearing the sounds
ofvictory from the Army OF the Potomac,
IS saddened by the reflection that the
blood which it costs is a sacrifice made
necessary by military and political jeal-
ousy, now intensified into personal hatred,
which apparently would rather see the
Union perish than that Gen. Mcclellan
should, in subordinate command, aid
Ger. Grant in saving It.
AMOS KENDALL.
Nav 20. 1861.