, 1864-04-13
Gblfeao Qribuue.,
WEDNESDAY, APRIL Is, 1854.
SHALL WE POSTPONE TEE cox.
VEN TEOEY

The effort which those who oppose th
nomination Of Mr. Lincoln are making u
postpone the Baltimore Convention, Is attend
ed with great and imminent danger to the
Union cauee. The reasons by which theAe
men attempt to Justify their action, arc
such as may we'll alarm all loyal mcn, ana II
regarded In their true light, and certain con-
secuene,s shou1d be conclusive with every
eagncious and patriotic man asalnst INC post"
poucmcnt OF TINT Convention.
The New York Exening Rssf, referring to the
favor with which the proposal OF Mr.. Lin
coins name secms to have been received; 70
marks that should our affairs, by the cam
paigne OF this spring, be crswned with bril-
liant SUCCESS, that favor will become unani~
nous. "But," it adds, 4'if they should not
be well conducted; il, instead Of mcetincsuc-
ccsses this spring, We shall encounter only re-
vcrees and calsmitiee, would Mr.. Lincoln
then be the proper standard-besrer of tue
loyal party" .>
From thie It Is evident that one of the surest
waysto defeat Mr.. Lincoln ie thought 10 be,
first, 10 postpone The convention; ard next
to complete the work by seeing to It that our
armies cncouAter only reycrses and ca1amitics
during the summer campaigns. These two
things are essential, and tho ono just as much
so rs the other. lyon delay the nomination
and In the meantime the army achieves sue
ceseess and victories, you by no means &C.
complsh the desired result; for if the army
should prove successful, then Mr. Lincoln is
sure to be nominated in the fall. The most
important thing, the only sure way to defeat
Lincoln is to manage to get 6 few months Of
ND 6ytV3v l1vS Irrn
and disaster to the army. The Indispensable
condition to LncolR'e defeat is to defeat the
army; and this being clearly seen and admit
ted BY those who have made mp their minds
that Lincoln must be defeated, It is reasona-
bic 10 suppose that they will do I'LL thcy
can TO have The army defeated? To pnt off
the nomination only is to leave the work half
done, and is sure to cnd in utter failure, uu-
less 1t be also accompanied by. revctses and
calamities to. our forces, Will these men
botch and bunEle their work in this manners
When defeat and disasters in the field are
thus indispensable TO political success, arc
not politicians the men TO do all they can, to
move ieavea II they possibly may, and earth
as they surely will, to bring them about.-
II il plain that no better method could be
devised than this to organize and set in mo-
lion in the very heart Of the loyal and Union
party, @ visiIant. active, and determined op-
position to the success or triumph of our
:trms, Cepperheads cor1d not devise aay
scheme better calculated to help their pur.
poses and play into their hands. So clear Is
this result, that We should be convinced the
movement had Its origin in their ranks, were
II not put forth and advocated by those who
have always been held to be good Union men.
But *haterer it, origin, and however plausl-
bic or loyal the assertions apd professions Of
those who hnvc proposed it, it locks very
Ike m invention Of the enemy; and is 60
manifestly traught with danger to the Union
cause, ind disaster to The army, that nil true
loyal men cannot full to regard it with great
suspicion and distrust--lt is easy to snv that
those who think this course OF actisu wise
and patriotic are actuatcd only by pure mo.
tiHcs and arc looking only to patriotic ends;
but no man who considers what must be the
sure working Of the measure wsuld willingly
bring on the Union cause the new and
great rcrais which are thus prepared for it.
10 make revcrscs and cAlamitIes to the army
essential to The success Of political move
mtnt, is to unite all Who favor tnat move
mcnt In ono purpose and effort to have those
reverscs and disasters made sure, It is the
idlest of all hopes to suppose that such po-
Itical party viii have too much patriotism
and loo pure loyalty to attempt such thing.
No men, and no political party, can be trust
ed impelled by such passions, aud surround.
cd by such temptations. II this measure to
postpone the nomination until fall, because
II the army met with calamities and rererscs
in the meantime, Mr.. Lincoln could not eet
it, were proposed by the Copperheads or the
rebels NC could understand it We can see why
they should propose measure 80 admirably
devised to place large portion Of the Union
party in opposition te the Administration,
and furnish them with reasons and surround
them with strong temptations to hold back or
oppose the Government; to thwart, cmbar-
rass, and defeat fts measures; and to bring
rcverscs and disasters oaly to the army. But |
why such proposition should come from
any Int Ccpperheads or rebels we cannot
understand