The Goodhue volunteer., 1864-04-13
M1istellAueu11s 3eadiug.

Why has the Army Of the Potomac made
such Small progress-A Very able Re-
view and Retrospect.
| From the Army and Navy Journal
The question is constantly asked in pri-
vate circles-"Why IS it that the Army Of
the Potomac makes such small progress p
In Congress, also, the movements of this
Army have excited severe comments. The
general opinion seems to be that some re.
markable de fciency has existed in the man
age ent at Washington, or equnl remarka-
bic incapacity for command at the headquar.
te4 S Of the Army itself. Un.ayo rablesoom
parisons are frequedtly instituted AeIWeen
its achievements and those Of the Western
armies. In fact, its career seems to be al
most universally regarded as failure.
Even at the first view it would seem in
credible that the want of success-so far as
relates to the conquest Of Virginia. the
Army IF the Potomac, so we'll organized as
it is, composing so many thousands Of tro: ps
las brave as any others in the country, and
numbering among its officers so many whose
abilities ale indisputa le, it would seem in
credible that the failure Of this army should
be attributable to causes existing within it.
self 1t is even questionable if the word
"fa'lure' can be properly applied to its ca
reer. Although it has not captured Rich
mond, and thus realized the sangulne hopes
jof the country, it has been the bulwark Of
the North against aggression it has kept
large rebel armies afoot in districts whe,e
the resources of the South were over
whelmingly taxed to sustain them it has
really kept Richmond iu the condition Of a
Ipartial!y b:e'saercd city and it has fought
battles equal to the greatest anl most
fierce|y contested OF any recorded in histo
'ry-mlkiny the most territfi la :oc in the
ranks 0: the enc my.
We DO not intend, however, in this arti
&C to discuss thc past history Of the Poto-
mac army, or to attempt t le settlement Of
the causes Of the failure Of the Peninsula
)compai5n, AMI Of the repuscs at Freder-
!chsbarg and Charlottesville. Nor " III
we attcmp, to investigate the reasons why
moro positive results were not rcaped from
the victories Of .AHtivtam and Gettysburg.
Nor yet Is it necessary for US to defend the
heroes .. Fair OAkeS, and Antietam and
Gettysburg an a hundred s:outy con,estc
battles and skirnishcs. We desire Simply
to give some military reasons why the Ar
m OF the Potomac. in the position it has
occupied since last summer, apon the Rap
pahannock, finds it's progress toward Rici.
mo0d impedcd. Indeed, many officers OF
high standing believe that beyond the Rap.
pahannock, or at farth. st the Rapidan, pro
gress is impos- ible. That it will become
possible, with and adequate force. is,. how
ever, to qe exuected. AMI al appearances
now indicate that The Government intends
during the coming season, with increased
resources at its command, and profi,ing
by the sad experiences Of the past, to max
| such provision as will ensure final sue
cess
Two armies Of equal numbers and com
minded with equal ability, being opposed to
each other, their movements and achieve.
ments must be entirely determined by the
nature Of the nature Of the theatre Of opc-
rations, Perhaps never in the history Of
warfare has the character o. the ground ex
crted more influence on the campaigns than
that Of the portion Of Virginia which lies
between Washington and Richmond. On
the right Of our army are chains Of noun
tains that enable the rebels to conceal any
as"a'"s as movement :',5;; :"1y 'a:; undertcc:.;::,
while the valleys afford to them the means
for an easy and uninterrupted passage to
the Potomac above Washington, and one
almost entirely secure from attacks in their
rear. On our front is succession OF riv>
ers, presenting great natural obstacles to
our advance, aud at the same time easily
!defensible; to make fsnking movements by
ascending them is to open our rear to at
tacks from Fredericksburg. and to cross
below the rebel army leaves the railroad q
prey to guerrillas. The country is more
over, masked in every direction by dense
forests, rendering nything like surprise
in force impracticable. A few rebel scouts
may at all times easily detec. and thwart
such movement. Such are the natural
features Of the country.
1t is we'll known rule Of military ope~
ration that base should neither be too
Extended nor too limited, and that il should
Be accessible by several routes. The base
Iof the Army Of the Potomac Is just the
width Of railroad track, and that railroad
furnishes really the only practicable route
fof communication With 4 lIrnife1 haSe m