Evansville daily journal. (Evansville, Ind.) 1863-1866, 1864-05-30
Concerning Grant,s Movement.

Concerning Grants Movement.
Especial csrresposdsnss Of CiHelanatE Gazette
WAsHixGros, May 10
have written nothing, for a week or
two, concerning the operations Of the
army, except the telegraphie dispatches,
(in which / fattsr myself that the Ga
Estls has not been behind any Of its
Western neighbors, because il seemed
too early to attempt 10 form connected
opinions OF the campaign while its plan
vas as ret undiselosed
There 10 q lull, howaver--a pause be-
tween the scenes in this latest act Of our
great national tragedy-which may ena-
Bic us TO gather up our fragmentAry
ideas Of the contest into consistent
whole.
1t has been simply bulldog fgh' that
has been progressing in the Wilderness
They grappled, tugged aud worried;
now one on top, now the other, ihe big
ger dog having, in the main, the best Of
IL; but for no other reason than because
he Vds the bigger. In other words, /
mean that the contest has been noted.
not more for the unparalleled ohstinaey
with which il has been continued, than
for the lack Of important advantages on
either side, except those which mere sa-
peFior numbers have given.
General CANT is understood 10 have
estimated Lees entire strength, inetg.
ding the garrison Of Richmond, at one
hundred and ten Thousand men. Count.
ing ten thousand ~ required for the de-
fsnses Of Richmend, outposts, guards 10
trains and the like, We may fairly reckon
the force with which Lee met as IN the
Wilderness, at one hundred thousand
At the outset, Grant was At least one
fourth stronger; and be lost no men 10
guarding railroads or protecting his
rear.
The boldest feature in General Grants
movement was the first. What General
Pope promised TO do, in his famous ad-
dress to the army before Cedar Noun.
tain, General Grant did lie cut loose
Fl N his base Of supplies, aad allowed
the line Of bis communications to take
care Of itself At the time Of his move
msnt, Brandy Station was bis base, with
Communication thence by the Orange /
AstAAit1AsA A&tttRA4s va AAAHA1A8 IA
Washington. Abandoning this, and
plunging across the Rapidan into the
eHemy's country, be was without base,
and no foot Of ground TO guard save tAat
on which his army stood. For FIVE days
| he fought his way, then swung his army
half around and sent his trains, not
northwest again 10 Brandy Station, bet
northeast TO Fredericksburg, which point
isolated by his movement from The enc
my's main body, easily fell into his
hands, End thus gave him the line Of the
Potomac up to Washington IL was Just
sneh movement, though on a far
broader scale. that placed our army IN
/ the rear Of Vieksburg.
In another respect il strikitgly resem-
bled the opening of the Eastern cam
| paign Of 1868 Gen Hooker refused to
attack the enemy then in his iutrench-
ments at Fredericksburg, bat turned his
left flank, and forced him to come out
4 Of his works TO save his communications
with Richmond Precisely the same
thing Gen Grant did, crossing even at
the same fords, and taking for part Of
the way the same roads. The enemy
this time, however, vas farther up the
river, and so We turned his right instead
OF bis left flank.
In doing this our army was compelled
to march by the left flank in Che face OF
the enemy Whoever remembers the ex-
travagant puffery Of Mcclellan for the
Peninsular campaign, viii not forget how
his organs teemed with praises of the
almoss miraculous skill with which he
brought of his army from the seven
days battle By the same movement,
They declared it TO be the most hazard
ous movement of war If il was so dam
gerous then, il could scarcely be less so
when GeR Grant attempted IT. The one
vas forced TO use it to rescue his army
from snnihilation; the other boldly chose
It as a means of forcing the enemy 10
5 fight on open ground
The criticism on Hooker's Chaneel.
lorsville operations is equally applicable
10 Gen. Grants movement Strategi-
cally offensive, it was, nevertheless, tac
itly defensive. That is 70 say, It vas in
its very nature aggressive; yet We waited
for the enemy to attack US Il may b
that this was not Gen. Grants intention
but if il was not, then his movement
By The left flank was not wholly success
fal Il w2s while our army was hasten.
ing along in this extended line that Lee
struck ii near the middle, and the battles
OF Thursday and Friday, in the wilder
ness ensued.
The fairest statement We can make o
those battles is, that they were successes
brt not victories Lee attacked Us
masssd bis troops aad made terrible ef
forts to break oar lines. Each day b,
was rspalsed, and We nearly held oul
} ground had he continued TO hold bis
, and to maintain the slight advantage b
had gaiaed over the right of sedgewiek
. Corps, Il might have been called draw
! battle, bnt he hurried of in the night Il
} Spottsyvinia Court House, twelve or fif
= teen miles further South We gained n
t victory, for we took fewer prisoners thai
E We los., and did not drive the enem
/ from his ground; but our success va
; substantial, for We defeated the effort Q
4 the enemy to break our lines
) We crossed the river on Tuesday sn,