The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-11-21
TIE ROAD TO PEACE.


THE ROAD TO PEACE.
No one can wish the war 20 continue one
hour beyond the point Of actual, imperative
public necessity. Though persons may differ
IN opinion as TO the conditions on which the
war should be allowed to cease, yet all must
desire TO see it speedily brought, If possible
to a satisfactory end. Those who fancy that
the war has been kept up, or is to be kept up,
for Its own sake do both parties to it great
injustice. The Rebels freely confess that they
are anxious for cessation of hostilites, aud
the national authorities at Washington have
repeatedly avowed Che same wish. Nor has
there been any period since the conflict began
when the Rebels could not have had peace by
simply LAYING down their arms, subject TO tn
mercy of that Government against which they
most unjustly revolted.
But they would not have peacel on tho5e
terms, while the National Government could
not grant It on any other JEFFERSON
DAVIS has insisted on the independence of the
Southern States as the sine qua non of pacid-
cation, and TO that ultimatum he has but re-
Gently reafiirmed his purpose to adhere.
Whether be will be able TO have his will in
army and the people who sustain It at home.
For JEFFERSON DAVIS, it should be remem-
bered, is, in fact, but one man among several
thousands in the rebellious States, and though
he wields, for the time being, as the so-called
President Of the Rebel Government, the col
lectiVe power Of the Southern people, he is
not absolute in his office, and may be forced
by popular pressure, and possibly the vote
even of his armies, to yield up his own ambi-
tious plans, and accept peace on more reason
able and therefore practicable conditions than
he has heretofore asserted his resolution to
insist upon to the last extremity.
In fact if peace is to be made with the
South on the only basis on which the nation
can possibly conclude it consistently with its
honor and future safety, it obviously must be
effected by and through controlling minority
Of the Southern people, including many of
those who are now in the army. 1t is quite
plain, also, that those persons in the South
who are still engaged in civil pursuits, and are
therefore scattered and unorganized, cannot
easily or safely initiate measures looking to a
peace on the condition of restoration of the
Union. They are not in a situation to act In
effective concert and if they were, their power,
to accomplish anything, without the concur
renee of the civil authorities and the military
would be but limited and uncertain indeed
Yet it is not to be taken for granted that the
way to peace, honorable and permanent, may
not be opened in spite of the Confederate Gov
eminent. The several States composing that
league In rebellion are, or claim to be, in so
far sovereign as to act for their independent
welfare whenever they may separately fancy
that the nee ssity or occasion for such action
has arisen. 1t was on this principle that they
all claimed the right to leave the Union and
form themselves into a new federation, based
on the same absurd idea, and therefore
just as loose in its conference, and sub
jeet to dissolution at the pleasure of its severa
members, as they held that Confederation to
be from which they capriciously seeded
Hence any one of the insurgent States may a
any moment, OF whenever it sees fit, reyol
against the first revolt and resolve itself bacl
Into that political association from which
withdrew nearly four years ago. 1t is to
presumed that whenever either one or moi
of the seeded States adopts that course,
would at once recall its soldiers from the Coz
federate service, and that that order would
promptly obeyed. The retirement Of the me
from the army of DAVIS might be, or probi
bly, would be, resisted; but that would be lilSel
to start a mutiny in the Rebel army, and wit
that wedge Of division once introduced di
affection among the troops would sprea
rapidly, the military power Of the Rebellio
would be speedily broken up, and the fate
the atrocious revolution would be completed
and finally sealed
In view, then, OF these facts, peace Jy neg
tiation may not be so impossible or 80 remo
as some people believe. IL could do no harm
at least, for the Administration to prOclai
lust now the conditions on which the secede
States win be severally readmitted into th
Union, and then leave them TO accept or reieC
the offer in their individual capacity, eithe
with or without the cooperation and sanctio
of the Rebel authorities at Richmond. In ou
judgment but little is TO be hoped for trol
direct negotiation with the Confederate Coz
ernment. We hold Mr.. DAVIS and h
associated leaders of the Rebellion TO be jud
ciaIly blinded by passion, and inaccessible
all rational arguments in favor OF the onl
sort of peace that it is practicable for this Co
eminent to make with the Rebels. 1t is tru
that, If terms were offered 10 DAVIS, and the
were rejected, IL would probably Increase tl
war feeling in the North, and infuse ne
Vigor into our arms And in that respect tt
measure would be 10 our advantage in an
event. But we predict that peace, on rigl
conditions, viii come at last, If it shall com
at all, short Of subjugation, only through tn
separate action of the several States now /
rebellion. To that end, therefore, all possi
BILE efforts should be directed
TREASON IN THE CAMP.
The Richmond Congress has its troubles