Urbana union. [volume] (Urbana, Ohio) 1862-1872, 1864-04-13

in the first instance the authority Of the gov
erument must be supported by Overwhelming
! physical Iorce.
Our foreign relations and financial credit
also impeia;iyely demand that the military
action Of the government should be prompt
and irresistible.
| The rebels have chosen Virginia "a their
battlefield, and il seems proper FOR Us to make
the first great struggle there. But while thus
directing our main efforts, 1t is necessary to
diminish the resistance there offered Us, By
movements on other points both by land and
water.
Without entering at present into details, l
would advise that strong movement be made
on the Mississippi, and that the rebels be dd-
ven out of Missouri.
As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that
Kentucky is cordiolly united with Us, would
advise movement through that State into
Tennessee, for the purpose Of assisting the
Union men Of that region and Of seizing the
railroads leading from Memphis to the east.
The possession Of those roads by US. in con-
fnexion with the movement on the Mississippi,
would go far towards determining the evaeu-
alton of Virginia 6y iherebels In the mean
time, all the passes into Western Virginia
from the east should be securely guarded, but
I would advise no movement from that quar-
ter towards Richmond, unless the political
condition of Kentucky renders it impossible
or iaexpedient for US to make the movement
upon Eastern Tennessee through that State.
Every effort should, however, 6e made to or
ganize, arm and equip as many tgops as pos
sible in Western Virginia, in order to render
the Ohio and Indiana regiments available for
other operations.
At as early a day as practicable, it would
be well to protect and reopen the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad. Baltimore and fort Mon
roe should be occupied BY garrisons sufficient
to retain them in our possession.
Tie Importance Of Harper's Ferry and tie
line OF the Potomac in the direction Of Lees
burg viii be very materially diminished as
soon as our force in this vicinity becomes or
ganized, strong and efficient, because no cspa-
bic general win cross the river north Of this
city, when we have strong army here ready
to cut Of his retreat
To revert to the west 1t is probable that
no very large additions to the troops now III
Missouri viii be necessary to secure that
State.
I presume that the force required for the
movement down the Mississippi viii be de-
termined by its commander and the Presi-
dent IF Kontucky assumes the right posi-
ton, not more than 10000 will be needed,
together with those that can be raised in that
State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the
latter region and its railroads, as well as ulti-
mately to occupy Nashville.
The Western Virginia troops with not more
! than five to ten thousand from Ohio and Ind
ana, should, under proper management SUI
fee for its protection.
When NE have re-orgnnized our main ar
my here, 10000 men ought to be enough to
protect the Baltimore and Ohio railroad and
the Potomac 5000 will garrison Baltimore,
1000 Fort Monroe, and not more than 10000
will be necessary al the utmost for the deien-
ce Of Washington.
For the main army el operations I urge the
following composition:
$50 regiments of infantry, say. s25o00 men