The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1864-06-22
The Campaign ON the Chicka=
! hominy.
washington, June IL, 1864.


this morning puts very different COM
plexien upon the real aspect of the mill |
tary situation in Virginia, from what the
public get from the official dispatches
rom the War Department ] believe
''the government" has reliable news from
the South quot from General Grant, to the
Tth inst. have news myself, direct from
the rebel capital, up to fhe Sth. 1t Is
evident from this news that the results
of the battle of the Sd of June were not
only disastrous in the extreme to Gen.
Grants army, but also that in conse
Juence of the loss he sustained then, and
'he Information that he then acquired as
to the strength of the Confederate works
ION that line, the extent and formidable
character of the immediate defenses of
Richmond, and the vast number of troops
which are at the disposal of Gen. Lee,
that his operations have come to sudden
stand still, and that he is preparing to
bandon' the attempt to capture Rich
mond by operations Ion that line,' and
to transfer his army to point from which
he can approach the Confederate capital
from a different direction.
1t is we'll known at Richmond that Gen.
Graut is digging anG intrehching on
pretty large scale. But the Contederates
do not regard this rs an indication of the
commencement Of siege operations: 1t
may bc General Grants intention to in
duce them to believe so. But they do
not believe it. If Gen. Grant really in
tends to approach Richmond from the
herth or the cast, and to bcsiegc it from
either OF those directions, tie Confeder-
ate leaders know that the best and most
available manner in which he can do so,
| is to cross to Bottom Bridge and ap
proach it from the east; and they know
| that Gen. Grant knows this also. For
ltunately for him, he has with him some,
although not all, of the hest engineer Off
GERS of Gen. McClellan's old army. This
| is no new business to them. They know
every step OF the way. They know the
| features. favorable aud unfavorable, OF
all the different approaches to Richmond.
They know that by crossing at Bot, In S
| Bridge the army can be brought to the
outer line of the Richmond defenses with
out the loss of man; and that the army
can be brought to The same point 10y way
of Cold Arbcp, Gainesvisle, New Bridge
and Mechanicsville Bridge, if Gen. Gran,
is willing to sacrifice twenty thousand men
in order to bring the army there by thai
route. M E
The Confederate leaders believe, there
fire, that by this time Gen. Grant thinks
he has lost about AS many men as he Cab
]well spare. ard that sooner than fore,
their lInc ul works Oh the Upper Chicka
lon.iny at the enormous expendi. ure OF
nc that that weuld cost him, he will mo, c
lis army to Bottoms Bridge, aud cross
there. Indeed they believe that his move
ments are directed to that end now.
The Confederate leaders are impressed
with the belief that Grant will be obliged
to follow Gen. McClellan's plans in every
respect. They say that be has done SC
hitherto, aud that he must continue to dc
so, because by those plans alcne can Rich
mond ever be approached. 4 hey expect
TO see his army next, then, Ihdearofins
to reach Richmond by way of the Seven
Pines, and failing to make any impression
on their strong works from that direction
they expect to see the srmy striking toi
the James river. If he attempts the lat
ter movement their determination is tt
attack him in the hink and rear, and (,
i hurl the whole strength of their army OIL
\ the Union forces while the latter are eros
sing the White Oak Swamp. Ii they
can once get Grants whole army engaged
in real siege operations East of ltichmonc
they will be we'll content. That it is saiC
will at once relieve Gen Lees main army
, from the necessity of taking any further
/ part in the defense of the city, and Wi.
4 enable them to make an offensive move
ment toward the North.
There is one idea Of which the popula
mind must lie disabused it is that th
works around Richmond can be taken b,
assault, at great sacrifice of life per
haps, but still that they can be carried
Never was there greater error. know
the valor of our troops, for have seer
it at williamsburg, at the Seven Pines
ut Savage Station, at Malvern Hills, a
South Mountain, at Antietani. | know
the salantry Of our officers and the skill
of our Generals. | know from the fear
tul loss es that have attended this cam
paign, thst Gen. Grant does not regart
the lives of his soldiers if any atlvantag'
J is to be gained. and that he speaks of th'
loss of 1000 soldiers III an engagement
/. including 6 Colonels. as mot serious.
But know something of the strength
land extent of the Notifications arount
Richmond, and | know that no troops il
the world could carry them by assault
Look at Fredericksburg. Look even a
the attempt on the Sd of June to carr,
the enemy's POSITION. Look, on the 9th
er Land, at Gettysburg, and see how isuit
} less was the attempt of the. rebels there
to, carry orr position. Yet at Fredcr
icksburg, the " huI'' strength of the army
} of the Potomac failed 10 carry the posi-
on ly rs, s,aut At Cold Arb 7, o IL,
i Sd, the whole strength of Mcanr my
was unavaiing 10 carry the enemys .
I sition by ASSAULT: Even The first line r
outer works could not he held beeausc
from second and stronger line, the enc
nv concentrated their fire, upon ns. Yc
the rebel works at FREDERICK sburg an,
4 Cold Arbor, and orr works at Gettysburg
were only impromtu affairs. The works
around Richmond have been constructed
for TWO years All the engineering tai