Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-05-09


tf-ttf - E-f4L VIRGINIA. r 49," ~ ,
The following 10 the Southern view OF the pres
ent military situation in Virginia. i mean il is
the view that comes here from Southern authori-
"; and | state this with particularly. because
not a single item OF the following information
comes from Union sources What is said about
the strength and movements of the UuiOn forces
may or may not be true. but il Is what Is believed
TO be true at Richmond. and the rebel morements
are based upon it. vrr
Longstreet's whole corps has Joined General
Lee ON the Rapidan, and Gen. Lees army is now
nearer one hundred thousand than eighty thou
sand strong. His main body is on the Rapidan,
near Mine run, with Longstreet on the extreme
left, and Ewells corps on the right The old
corps of A. P. Hill holds The center. ~
THE REBEL. CAVALRY. IKE alI gTF
Gen. Stuart's cavalry. fully eighteen thousand
strong, are now massed altogether. both men aud
horses being in the best possible condition for
making a campaign. The horses have been
feeding partly upon grass for more than a week,
and for this purpose the cavalry have been kept
a little distance in the rear, and TO the south aud
west of the main army. ALI along the eastern
slope of the Blue ridge. and in the country around
GOrdonsville and Charlottesville, and down to the
James river, the pasturage has been abundant for
ten days past. Even on the Rapidan, where the
rebel cavalry now are assembled, the grass is
high enough to afford the horses a part of their
food. Among the men. the general impression is
that they are to move Immediately, and that their
route will be up the Shenandoah valleys 7sg
GEN. LEES ESTIMATE OF GEN. GRANT.
Gen. Lee is playing a very deep strategic game.
Whatever may be the estimate in which Gen.
Grant is held by the magnates ut Richmond, Gen.
Lee is 100 good a soldier TO 5eSpise him He is
aware of the exact number Of troops under Gen.
Grants orders. and he knows he will have to
fight with 4 much larger Union army than he
ever before encountered. All of his movements
for a week past have been made with a view of
deceiving Gen. Grant in regard to bis real inten-
tons. and of leading the latter TO believe that
hisobject is the very reverse of what il really is.
All OF his maneuvers during the last six or seven
days give color TO the impression that be is mass
ing the whole Of his available strength on the
south side of the Rapidan; that he has selecied
that spot as the battle ground, and that he IN
tends the battle to be fought there which is TO
decide the fate of Richmond.
eES. LEES STRATEGIC GAME.
But such is not Gen. Lees intention. He is
ready to make a certain movement, and has been
ready for two weeks past. He only walls to
make it until Gen. Grants plan of operations is
fully developed; until his line Of march has been
made plainly manifest; until Gen. Grant shall
have committed himself to a certain line of one
ratious from which he cannot readily withdraw.
Then Gen. Lee will make his real NOV
ADVANTAGES OF THE OVERLAND ROUTE TO THE
REBELS ~
Lee is satisfied by this time that Gen. Grant
has been compelled to adopt the overl md route
as the line of his advance on Richmond, and that
any movements on Richmond made by way of
the Peninsula or the James river, or from the
south. will be mere feiuts, and that they will be
made, too, with such ineonsiderable bodies of
troops that they need give him no concern He
Is surprised that Grant should have taken this
overland route. and the fact that he has done so
is a piece of good fortune that Lee did not ex-
pect. Ii Grant had made a peninsula campaign
against Richmond III earnest, il would have nc.
c~essitated the retention of Lees whole army
there. or near there, for the defense Of the rebel
capital. The adoption of the overland route,
however, leaves Lee free to carry out the plan
which he has formed for operations ia another
direction.
Gen. Lee estimates the Union troops advancing
toward the Rapidan, under Gen. Grant. at IS 900
strong, including Burnside's corps. The ultimate
destination of Burnside's corps gave Lee consid-
cradle uneasiness until recently. but he kept him
self advised of its movements from day TO day.
Whatever might have been thought or feared at
Richmond, Lee never believed that it was Burn
sides corps, or any part of it, that was sailing up
the R,ppahannOck. 1t is a reliefto him TO know,
however. that Burnside's corps has joined Meade's
army, and that it will take part in the overland
movement. ss
WILL THERE BE A BATTLE ON THE RAPfDAN2
There will be a battle on the Rapidan, but il
will not be the great battle. Gen Lees position
there is so strong, and he is so well intrenched,
that with One-third Of his army he expects to
hold it for some. time against the advance Of the
Union troops. Ii is probable, however. that if
this advance is made in great force, the position
m tho DaDi1ap uHll mot ho ,natusatroJ b,,f 49,
rebel forces will fall back either TO Mine run or
to a position on theright bank oftbe N orth Anna
river, and between that stream and the Virginia
Central Railroad. between Gordonsville and
Hanover Junction Both of these positions are
strongly fortified, toe inl~renehments being very
extensive res,
THE BATTLE MUST BE on GROUND OF LEES
CHOOSING.
And to whichever of these positions the enemy
retires there General. Grant will have to follow.
1t must not be forgotten that in this overland
campaign, as in all that have preceded il, the
battle, when 1t takes place, will have to be fought
at the time that General Lee chooses, and ON
ground that he has selected for that purpose. IL
may be in General Grants power to defeat the
rebel army after the battle has been Joined But
il is not in his power TO compel General Lee to
fight until he wishes To. or in any other position
than that which he himself has chosen. This is
a disagreeable fact But it is a fact nevertheless,
and it may be well to remember il.
FoRTIFioATIoSs AT GORDoSsvILLE.
Gordonsville Junction is another point that has
been strongly fortified by the rebels This point
resembles Manassas Junction in its defensive
features. and IL would seem 10 be the design of
the rebels to hold il with the same per,inacity
There Is a range Of low hills that rui from that
point to Hanover. and as the engineer officers Of
the rebel army spent several DAYS of March in
examining them and in surveying the adjacent
country. it is probable that the advantage which
they afford viii not be overlooked.
THE STRONG POSITION or THE REBELS cAsNoT DE
TURNED.
General Lee knows. too, and his calculations
are based upon this fact, that, although General
Grants objective point is Richmond. yet sill he
will have to attack and defeat the Confederate
army, before he can get there; and General
Grant himself. of course. Is fully aware Of this
fact. Many people at the North who remember
Run, as demonstrated by General Meade in No
vember or December of last year, and the terri
BILE slaughter of our troops under Burnside in the
attempt to take fredericksburg in December of
the year before. no doubt faBcy that Genera
Grant, IN bis advance, will try rather to turn any
such strong position as he may encounter. AMI
push on 70 Richmond BY passing 30 one side of
them. But that cannot be done. To DO so,
would be to leave the rebel army In his rear, and
il is to gain precisely that positiou3 fr the main
body OF bis army, in other words, to get between
General Grant and Washington, that General
Lees maneuvres will be directed. ir1sl 80 rsd@
GEN. LEE DESIGNS TO THROW MS MAIN BODY Be
TWEEN GRANT AND WASHINGTON.
In a word. depending on tbe vast advantage
which bis army enjoys In position; on the various
4 defensive lines 10 which thew can snccessfnllv