Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1864-03-15
WHAT SHALL WE nOf

Il is very evident that the Republican party
| OF the North will, as long as they continue in
power, prosecute their unholy crusade against
US, their aim being not to restore the Union,
but to subjugste our people, coufscate their en-
tire property, and give to the hAngmsn eli our
leaders. The best method Of preventing this,
and securing peace, is to drive back their ar
mics when we can, and hold others in check,
and thus convince 9 majority Of the voters Of
the North that our suRiugation is impossible,
thereby securing the success of the Democratic
party in the pending Presidential election, with
whom We can, if we can with anybody, ne
gotiAte.
What, then, should be ouT policy and plan of
campaign
We hsve at least two armies Of sufficient
strength to attempt Almost any important move,
LEES and JoHEsIoE's; and to these, with
such additions as csn be made to them, we may
look for the 8ehie7elnent Of our aims. In their
proper employment, and IN their victories, is our
gTestest trust. But TO reinforce both of thsse
armies, and place ttem on the Offensive, we be-
Ieve to BE- imPolitic and unnecessary, and hence
we should operate iggrassively with bat one Of
them. Which
That the great and skillful LEE and bis victO-
nous veterans are qualified for the task is sd-
mitsed. Bat can be successfully invade Penn
sylvsnia, hold portion Of her territory, and
th1s transfer the SaT TO tie enemy's own coun-
Try We have the results Of two efforts in that
7.-.,f.--, tl.-t -lo-t1 .5,,-,i-b ~ to tba cov-
trary; besides which there are grave reAsons
against another attempt in that quarter, and in
favor Of an advance into Middle Tennessee and
Kentucky by JoHSsTOE's army.
Ist- Our forces can as surely and we'll subsst
in Middle Tennessse as they can in Pennsylva-
MIA, and upon supplies IS much the enemy's,
antl we reposssa3 that section, as is the meat
and corn Of Ohio.
81 With cur forces occupying Middle Ten
nossee, the enemy would have but one line Of
communication, ard this would be at al times
open 20 an enleTprEirg and efficient cavalry
while, on the contrary, in Pennsylvania his ia
clities for concentrating troops could not be Sc
riously interrupted even should we be sble TO
hold the country to the susqushanna.
81 To move into Middle Tennessee would
not thrssien Lis territory, nor would It tend to
infame the public mind in the North, thereby
swelling bis ranks; while 70 invade Pennsylva-
MIA would entail 10th Of these results, besides
bringing 20 the support Of their regular forces,
large numbers Of already organised militia, as
was the case al Gettysburg.
Ash For the frsi time since the beginning Of
the war, have We the prospect of deriving an
sIvantsgs BY sbstiining from any unnecessary
irriistion Of The people Of the North. That there
is a growing tendency among them TO "let us
slide" is evident, and This can be grestly
strengthened BY BEATING their armies on our own
soil in = woId, ~ destroying their hopes Of
subjugstiDg Us, without sTousing them to q
sense Of danger to their own homes.
Let, then, ell our dispossbls forces, or IS
many Of them IS may be dssmed necessary, be
sent to Gen. JOHNSTON, that be may move fer
ward witb abundant strength 10 turn GRAM
out Of Chst;snoogs and crush him which done,
and Tennessee rePosSsssed by Us, LIEeoLN
would have beggsrly account to show for his
four years Of stewardship, or to offer for new
lease Of power to his party.