Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-07-21
from the National Intelligsncsr.

the ignorance aud shiftlessness Of that admin.
istration. has learned 10 practice IN this quarter
wearisome monotony OF movement, which only
serves to show thst be deems IL safe at any time
70 hope for saccess by counting on our official
stoldity standing substitute for his poverty
of invention
Talleyrand wont To lay that il Is always
better 70 rely on the folly Of you. antagonist
than OH your own sagscity, ana il is certain
that the enemy. in the use he periodically makes
of the Valley OF the Shenandoah. has shown
his own sagscity only ia presuming always on our
official want Of that quality in the conduct Of the
war. Physical geography has ordained that the
occlusion. at least the vigilant observation. OF
this side approach the city Of W ashington shall
be prime element in any campaign which, start
ing from Washington, has the city of Richmond
for IT. objective point And yet, with a want of
foresight which, in the absence of all conceivable
motive for the wilful betrayal Of a grave public
trust, coniounds the reason Of ordinary mortas
byIts magnitude and By its inyeterscy our military
authorities have for four successive summers per
mitted this valley TO be used by the enemy at his
pleasure for the purpose OF bringing confusion on
the well-laid plans of all our Generals operating
against Richmond. Whether il be at Que time
from failing TO station in this valley capable
commanding officer; or at another from not re-
tanning sufficient force under his command; or
points of observation to descry the approach of
danger in time to guard against positive mischief
whether. at some times, it be from commit
ting all these blunders at once, certain il is that
the military administration, IN giving the country
much sad ex perience of ineficiency has no where
made that inefiicieucy more egregious and de
plorable than in this quarter.
The first battle of Bull Run was turned from
victory into disaster by the failure of General
Patterson to prevent the junction of General
Joseph K. Johnston. through this valley. with
General Beauregard in the very crisis of that con
hct-a failure which, whether resulting from the
incompetency of Gen. Patterson, as some charge,
from the inadequacy of his aggressive force,
az others represent, is one of which the response
billy must equally rest on the central power
which appoints our commanders and directs the
operations of the
The campaign of Gen Mcclellan was arrested
and frustrated by the incursion of Gen. jackson
into this valley in the latter part of May. 1862,
compelling the abrupt retreat of General Banks,
throwing our military authorities here in most
s.sject panic, and preventing the contemplated
junction Of General Mcdowell with General Nc
Clellan by the Fredericksburg railroad-he being
diverted from this line OF march to engage in
what he knew to be the impossible chase of J ack
son: and jackson, in the meantime, after dis
tracing all.our combinations succeeded in hurl
ing his whole coumAaganst McClellan's forces
around Richmond at the very moment when our
military authorities, relying on the reports of
General Fremont after the battle of Cross Keys
on the Sth of June, supposed him still to be de-
tanned in the valley by the threatening presence
of that officer.
Then came the brief campaign of Gen. Pope,
in which, after having his flank repeatedly turned
and his communications with Washington broken
by an attack in his rear, he was badly repulsed
and driven into the defenses of Washington,
while the enemy, with liesurely composure,
turned from the pursuit of his broken and mis-
handled forces to proceed through this same val
ley, and make the formidable Eruption into Mary
land. which repealed BY Mcclellan in the
battle of ADtietam on the 18th of September,
1862
We need not pause to describe the dsgraceful
events which preceded the occupation of Win
chester by the enemy at this time, or which at
tended the surrender of Harper's Ferry-results
all due to the incapacity which placed incompe-
tent officers in import AM positions; and which,
in the case Of Harpers Ferry, was made doubly
conspicuous on this occasion by the retention of
Col. Miles at that post under orders from Gen.
Halleck, after the military availability of the po-
stlon was entirely neuiraZed by the turn which
events had taken. Official incapacity in Washing
ton thus combined with military incompetency at
the post to erect the entrance of this valley
the Caudine forks of an unspeakable humilia-
ton, which largely modified the exultation Justly
produced by the victory of Antietsm. and which.
IN all generous minds. intensified by the at
tempt to throw OH Gen. Mcclellan the response
bility for the untoward events which he had the
sagacity to foresee, but not the power to prevent
alter bis advice in the premises had been con
temned By the General-in-C Chief
And next, in the summer of 1863, more than
a month after the disaster of Charlottesville un
der Gen. Hooker. the Confederate commander
proceeded to project new invasion of the n orth
via this same valley of the Senandoah From a
failure on the part of our military authorities to
occupy in this quarter the proper points OF obser-
walton, and from their failure to place in the DO
stions actually occupied the requisite military
talent and skill. the country was again called to
blush at the disgraceful stampede of Milroy
which preceded the Eruption of the enemy into
Msrylan Winchester evacuated with John
Gilpin speed; and eighteen field pieces, $500
muskets, and large quantity of ammunition
were left behind by the fugitives-a valuable
gift to the invading enemy
After such repeated experience of the military
relations held by this valley TO the safety of
Washington and to the success of impending
operations against Richmond. il might have been
supposed that military directors with little
perspicacty as ours have shown themselves to
possess would not for the fourth time permit
mismanagement in this valley to lay a stone of
stumbling and rock of offence in the way Of the
campaign Aud vet the illustration have just
had of the want of forecast which has been sigma
lized by the conduct of the war ia this quarter
surpasses in its proportions anything we have yet
been called TO witness Let US analyze the ele-
ments ofthe invasion which has Just ended in the
raising of "the siege of Washington
liz obvious the unmilltary mind that
in order to guard the side approach to Washing
ton win the Shenandoah Valley. 4 post of obser-
near the valley a. shall enable the force which
occupies il to discern the approach of danger iD
time 10 guard against the descent of the blow and
to calculate its probable weight wherever il may
fall. Before starting out on the campaign against
Richmond, in the spring of 1862, Gen. Mcclellan
was careful To take precautions or this score
/ Under date Of March 10TH in that wear. he wrote
! to Gen Banks who had been selected to watch
the valley follows:
~ our first care will be the rebuilding of the
railway from Washington to Manassas and to
+ Strasburg, in order TO open your communications
I with the valley OF the Shenandoah. As soon as
the Manassas Gap railway is IN running order en-
Z trench brigade Of infantry. say four regiments
with two batteries, at near the point where the
railway crosses the Shenandoah. Something
! like two regiments of cavalry should be left IL
1 that vicinity TO occupy Winchester, and thor
oughly sc0ur the country south of the railway
and up the Shenandoah Valley, as well rs
through Chester Gap, which might, perhaps, be
advantageously occupied by a detachment of in
/ fantry, we'll entrenehed. Block houses should