, 1864-11-21
AnAnglo-Rebel Statement Of the
Situatioa---The Desperate
Straits of. the Con-
federacy.
Lees Army Hard Pressed
and Worn Out.
A Hint at the Probabie;Evacs
uatlou Of Petersburg.
Correspondence Of the London Times.1
A PANIC IN RICHMOND.
a. q

slowly and steEnly recovered Itself, and It ia
nothing less than Justice to an unpopular man
to say that no one In Richmond displayed
such fismncss and presence Of mind, and de-
veloped such resources at the moment Of
greatest menace, as Gen. Bragg.
i LEES DIFFICULTIES.
In many of my previous letters I have
pointed out to your readers the true disadvan-
tages of Lees: position as compared with
Grants. As q general illustration 1t may be
said that Lee is on the arc, Grant on The
chord, Of a circlo; but as this expression does
armies, whose lines (extending each Of them
over length OF 50 miles, do not pursue any
uniform course or inclination I will endeayor
at the risk Of repeating what have described
many times before, 10 make my meaning
clearer Your readers will understand that, In
such an attitude as is occupied By tue armies
of Lee and Grant, the army which. takes the
immense advantage. Lee is like q skillful ono
armed prize fighter, who is fighting q big bull
ly with two arms, stronger, taller, more nc-
tive, and keencrsighted than him. The most
tempting and prompting opportunities offer
themselves to him every day. He cannot
tive operation. The factof his great numerical
inferiOrity to bis enemy, and TINT be is teth-
cred down, and forced to keep always largo
portion Of his army before PetershurCh, are
disadvantages equivalent to the loss Of an
arm BY q prize fighter: Grant on
the other hand, has In the eyes
Of those - who l! g rightly y,,,., survey 'l3 the
Ing TINT, in the four months between the 18th
of June, when he crossed the James River,
and the present time, he should have made SO
little use Of them. In his centre lies the
James River, with its dozens OF Yankee gun
boats and monitors, covering the Federal base
Of operations, and max ing 1t unapproachable
By Gen. Lee: 1t is doubtless with view, to
getting still more ont Of these monitors that
Gen. Butler Is attempting to cut canal
through Dutch Gap, into which he hopes to
tempt the James River. It is not thought
here, lmay say par pdrenttese, that any ad-
vantage will result to Buffers comrades from
this canal, even II, contrary to Federal axpe-
rience at Vfck6burgh, It proves success. By
means Of the pontoon bridges which connects
Bermuda Hundred with Deep Bottom, Grant
can throw any number of men by night or
day TO the north OF south of the james. 1tis
almost impossible for Lee to know if Grants
demonstrations, whether they threaten Rich
South Side Railroad On the extreme Federal
left, are fcints or realities. On the other hand,
from the conHgusatiop Of the ground, it is al
most impossible for Lee to cut Grants ex-
tended lines in any vital place. The most
tempting place to assail those lines
would be somewhere not far from the spot
where Grants mine was sprung. But the
forces Is such That the lines can only be at
tucked nt two or three confined spots, and
here naturally Grant has defended himself
with triple tiers Of Notifications, and keeps
always strong bodies Of men in position. But
the greatest Of all advantages Il the follow
ing From the 4th of May up to the present
hour Lees army has been continuously IN the
trenches, either actually under fire OF ct any
rate knowing at what moment 1t might not
be attacked By q savage and mulutud1nous
foe. The Cunfederates have been fighting or
on the rack without fntermission for more
than FIVE months, On the other hand, the
Federal General, who knew from the begin
ming that Lee WAS, through the paucity of
his numbers, restricted to acting on the de-
fenEive, had 1t in bis power at any moment to
give four-Hfths Of his army an entire rest.
There WAS nothing TO prevent Grants saying
on the 1st OF August, ~ shall want great ef-
forts from youu yu On the 2oth Of this t. month;
On the contrary, for 1s0 days Lees troops
have known no rest, either by night or day.
We all rememberbow the work in the trenches
told upon our officers and priyates in the Cri-
inca; It cannot be wondered that
mole than five mouths should have told
fearfl1ly upon the poor Confdcrntes, exposed
to one Of the fiercest Summers ever known in
Virginia, scantfly fed upon mcat-mostly salt
meat-and bread, without vegetables, with
only occasional coffee, With no other stimu-
lant, and threatened ceasclessly BY over
whelming numbers, who have at their com
mand all that lavish profusion OF expeudi-
tu1e and the scientific experience Of the whole
civilized world can contribute. Icannot be blind
to the fact, Us inject officers and priyates from
Gen. Lees army, that they are half worn out,
and that, though the spirit is the same as
%]1or-7 ,na6 INT
that during The coming winter this rest viii
not be denied to them, as Lees army becomes
stronger : but be that as 1t may, am con-
WINGED that when the true history of the Con-
federate campaign Of 1854 In Virginia is writ
ten, it will record struggle unsurpassed in
heroism and in the patience and selfdenying
endurance Of the troops since the time when
blood WIS first split upon the earth, and man
first lifted his hand in anger against lis brother
TIE POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF PETERSBURG
There is one plan by which, ut the price Of
the bricks and mortar Of Petersburg, Gen.
Lee might curtail the existing prolongauon
of his lines, might assume much stronger
defensive position, and considerably increase
the difficulties Of his opponent. That this
plan will be. adopted, If occasion requires, is
BY no means Improbable, but so long as Gen.
protect Petersburg as Wellas Richmond, he
will continue TO cling to both. If he gave up
the town Of Petersburg, and fell back upon
the western and higher bank Of the Appon'a-
tto1, holding the heights Of Pocahontas, which
gird1e Petersburg on the west and north, his
strength for defence would be much greater;
but he would have in some measure to give
the little city up to Its assailant6, much in
the same fashion as Fredericksburg WIS given
up to the Fcderals while the Confcderates
held Marye's Heights. It has often been ar-
gued By wise military heads that this would
be a judicious step, but experiments
has shown to what misery the inhabitants OF,
towns surrendered to the enemy are reduced,
and to this misery Gen. Lee will not consent
that Petersburg shall be exposed, if be can
prevent 1t. Ny Own impression is that, the
success or failure that may follow Hoods dar-
ing move in Georgia {of which spoke in my
last 1etter,} will govern the operatious Of
Grant against Richmond. The reciprocity and
which have alwnyB existed between
the various armies of the Federnls On the one
hand and Of the Confederates On the other, In
the East and West, were never moro apparent
than ut present. The Confederates maintain
their present attitude before Richmond, and
s Se1 t hea thsT enemy At by until as
taken Sherman in the West. I do not scrnpie
to say that, in my opinion, Richmond Will
laugh It's hssailants to scorn. If, on the other
hand, Sherman is able to extricate himself
from his present critical position, by either
beating or outwitting Hood, there Will be
reason for apprehension about Richmond dur
ing the coming winter, the like Of which has
never existed before. -"
- The Copperhead organ of this city