The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1864-06-18


this hope also was doomed to disapHnt-
papt.-Cbr. N. Y. Times.
The Victory 1t Dallas-.SpIe1ia
Calamity Of LOgon's C0fpst
In THE FIELD WITH ARMY OF Tenn 20
- NEAR DALLAS, Ga, May 29th. =
When my despatch Of the 9th was VT
ten it was comparatively quiet alongur
lines. 1t was very warm day, on OF
your warmest midsummer afternlns
would have been no more uncOm1Ortsle.
The sky was clear, and q burning nn
shone fiercely through an atmosrre
alive with dust and almost motio1ss.
The day was uncomfortable, and the dnd
army lay almost motionlsss and heat TO
the indole4t point. In ffQ3t 4 lohg Of
skirmishers kept loyal Watch and ard
over ''our misguided BRETHREN" thatere
even then preparing an assault with trce
and arms and q genuine intent TO kill
That you may understand the objeend
character Of the fierce struggle nich
closed the day, an explanation Of II po-
sltlOn OF the cOntendinS armies is n(ssa-
ry. BY series of flank movementssher-
man had forced johnson to retirarom
two strong military ypositions-Daltd and
Resaca-where he had received httle.
BY rapid marches and excellent gerai-
ship, he had concentrated mis- whol&rmy
upon two points. Adairsvi,fe and FingsS
ton, where Johnson had hoped to4.tacA.
one Of the three columns unsuppofd ~
either OF the others, and compeH tEs
rebel general to retire from these.
Johnson s. strategy was so far <ceeG-
ingly cautious. 1t was evident Tbs with
out great advantage Of positions an Lurn-
bers he would not fight. After leaslg Re-
SAGA II also seemed that he deenE II q
some importance to withdraw oj army
from its base Of supplies: His deTucsson
of the railroad was, with the exct;isn 6 I
Resaca bridge quite inconsideS.e. Il
should be borne in mind, hover, that
Sherman's pursuit was as rapid nd Wig
orous as possible, his advance coinnaly
skirmishing with the enemy's Jar, and
that there was with the Army ofle Cunn-.
berland and had attached to itt Only a
large and well appointed corps traiiroad
builders, under the command Of Col.
Wright, but Sherman carriedvith his
army bridges all ready for all le ilnpor.
tant streams. There are, thereto, in ex.-
listing facts quite as good reasS for be-
lieving that so much Of JohnYs move
ments as brought us SO far so1 was the
result of Sherman, as his own Sategy. f,
From Kingston, Johnston treated TO-
the Altoona Mountains and hted. This
R0SoSS A
rect road to Atlanta, furnishedim posi-
tion equally as strong and densihle by
nature as any he had occupied :
Leaving Jonston 10 enjoy Ils splendid
position, Sherman replenishedis commits.
sariat, filled up his ordnaneand forage
trains, and at daylight on it25d was oftN
again on the war path. Marling in three
columns, rs heretofore, the any moved %
the left by the rebel position Johnston,
being apprised Of the directij which Sher-
man was taking, at once 1ved towards
night of the oath. From aoint south Of
Dallas some two miles, a Ege or success
sion of hills extends nearlyorthward, the
highest point being knon as the Lost
Mountain. In its front, It at some dis
tance from the ridge, Pumiin Vine Creek
runs, following the same gleral course as
the ridge. Along and on tk range of hills
Is the position of the rebel imy. Its front
is covered by strong rifle It's, and on the
sides of the hills, at difiertt points along
the line, are substantial prks IN which
are placed his batteries. lhnston, having
selected and taken his potion, ours con-
derstOOd that our positn is on Level
ground. Along the enen 8 front are nu-.
merous elevations, bills al rayipes, (which
we occupy. The face tly6cou1try il
rough and heavily wooded sol a tie 'tnaka
of both armies is concead IN the dense
forest. The hills on th rebel right and
centre are higher than thle gN haA les. -
So much for the positionj
The 18th army corps oc5pies the extN ne
right, the left wing of th1Gth being On It's
left, in the front and to Il south Of Dallas,
and covering the MariGa road and the
road to Villa Rica.
During the night Of thE6th the trains Of
the army of Tennessee we're moved from
an exposed position. i. which they had
been packed to one fuiher in the rear
This movement was nun on road which
at several points was n full view Of the
rebels on Lost MoIntail During the day
our wounded and sick ere removed from
the buildings in the Eillage of Dallas,
which had been used q q temporary hos.
pital, back to the Pumkin Vine Creek
These movements were}f course, observed
by the enemy.
About FIVE in the aftroon the rebels ad-
vanced their skirmishes along the whole
front of the army of ne Tennessee. Our
front was covered with rifle pitextending
along its whole length distance Of some
two miles. and the righ flank by Wilder's
brigade Of the I'd cavsry division. Har-
rows 4th division Of th 18th corps had the
right of the LIE, and Veatch's. the
4th division of the 16tlcorps, the extreme
centre, cOnkting of Sweeney's
division of the 10th an Morgan L. Smiths
and Osterhaus' divisio of the 18th corps.
Advancing heavy inc Of skirmishers
with great rapidity, ar skirmishers in q
short time fell back tothe ritle-pits. Our
the main arly, who were quietly
observing the movemnts Of the enemy, at
the first volley of theskirmishers, fell in
stantly into their plaes behind the breast
General an. field and line and
staff officers sprang their posts, and in
less time than occpy in narrating, the
army Of the Tennessee was in line to re-
ceive assault Two ailes of as good men
as ever stood in line If battle, al Western
regiments but one, confronted Hardee's
and Polk's corps. FIR the first time IN the
war, with nearly al the regiments, opr
men were behind brsastworks and being
attacked. 1t had carried many one such
rs the rude work OF .ogs before them. 1t
lad also charged up 10 the stronger works
we're to be charged, and some wondered #
IS they had always driven she rebels from
similar works, they could h held BY Yoar
Western men. eaM sal -
Although it was well understood tha.the
movement of the trains hal attracted she
notice of the rebels, and W(uld very proba-
ny induce the belief tina. our positions
we're being changed, and. HAT an attack
vas very probable, yettth attack was 80
{ M 3sS