Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-11-24
THE SIEGE OF RICHMOND.
An 1ngl0.Rebe Statement Of The Sstndtton--
Lcc's Army Hard Pressed and Worn Out
Correspondence Of he London Times.
RICHMOND, SATURDAY, Der. 3, IS6

Correspondence of tho London Times.
RICHMOND, SATURDAY, Der. 8, 1884,
am happy TO report far more confident feeling in
Richmond than existed al the date OF my last letter IL
cannot be denied that when upon the 29h of September
was discovered in Richmond that Grant was advancing
upon the city with Two army corps (the Tenth and Ega
teenh and that Les had only handful OF troops 10 resist
the Fedsra feeling akin to panic possessed this commu
nifty II is the only instance of panic which in some expe
renee in Richmond can rscOlect Bur the city slowly
and sterny recovered ITSELF and 1t is nothing less han
justice to unpopular to say that no one IN Achmond
displayed such fmness and presence OF mind and deVe
oped such resources at the moment Of the greatest menace
as Gen. Bragg.
DIFFICULTIES OF GEN. Lee
In many of my previous letters have pointed out to
your readers the true disadvantages of Lees position as
compared with Grants As general illustration it may
be sand that Lee il the arc Grant on the chord OF
circle but this expression does not exactly define the
position of the two armies whose lines Extending each Of
them length of thirty mes) do not pursue any uni
form course inclination, will endeavor at the Iisk OF
repeating what have described many times before make
my meaning clearer. tt.
Your readers will understand that 10 such an attitude
occupied by the armies of Lee and Grant, the army
which takes the initiative and acts the aggressive has
immense advantage. Lee is like sklliu one-armed
prize fighter who fighting big bully with two arms
self The most tempting and prompting opportunities ofsr
themselves to him every day. he cannot AFFORD 70 hazard
twenty lives 10 tentative operation The fact OF his
great numerical interoriy to his enemy ald that nc Is
tethered down aud forced to keep always large portion
army before Petersburg are equivalent
to the loss OF ar arm by prizefghter.
Grant on the other hand has, 10 tho eyes Of those who
rightly survey the ground such advantages make it as
tOnshng that in the four months between the 18th OF june
when he crossed the James river and the present time he
should have made little of them In his centre lies
tbo rim tto of
monitors covering the Federal base OF operations and
making it unspproachabe by Gen Lee 1t is doubtless
with view to getting still out of these monitors that
Gen Butler IN attempting to cut canal through Dutch
Gap into which he hopes to tempt the James river 1t lie
not thought here may say par pdrenes that any sdvan
tage will result to Buffers comrades from this canal
it, contrary Federal experience at Vcksburg it proves
success BY means of the pontoon bridges which
meet Bermuda Hundred with Deep Bottom Grant can
throw any number of by night day to the north or
south Of the James Tt is almost impossible for Lee to
know if Grants demonstrations whether they threaten
Richmond on the extreme Federal right the Southde
railroad on the extreme Federal left fents realities
On the other hand from the conigaraton OF the ground
it is almost impossible for Lee to cut Grants extended
lines in any vital place. The most tempting place to assa
those lines would be somewhere not far from the spot
where Grants mine was sprung But the shape OF the
ground and the position OF the forces such that the lines
only be attacked at two three confined spots and
here naturally Grant has defended himself with triple ters
of and keeps always strong bodice OF men 10
position.
But the greatest of all advantages the following From
the 4h May up to the present hour Lees army has been
continuously in the trenches either actually under fire.
or any rate knowing at what moment it might not be
attacked by a savage and mutitudnous foe The Con.
ederates have been fighting the rack without inter
mission, for more than five months On the other hand,
the FederalGenera who knew from the beginning that
Lee was through the paucty Of his numbers restricted
acting the Defensive had in his power at any
ment to give four ths OF his army entire rest There
nothing to prevent Grants saying on the lst OF Au
gust shall want great efforts from you the goth Of
this month rect and recruit yourselves until that day
On the contrary for one hundred and sixty days Lees
troops have known rest either by night day We all
remember how the work in the trenches told upon
officers and privates 10 the Crimea 1t cannot be
dered that far uninterrupted pressure for more than
five months should have told earuy upon the poor Con-
federates exposed to of the fercest
known in Virginia scantily fed upon meat-mostly salt
meatand bread. without vegetables with only occasional
coffee, with other stmuant and threatened ceaseessy
by overwhelming numbers who have at their command all
that lavish prousion of expenditure and the scientific
experience of the whole civilized world cen contribute
cannot be blind to the fact Ell officers and prvAtes
from Gen. Lees army that they half worn out and
that though the spirit the ever they urgently
need rest in hopes that during the coming winter
this rest will not be denied to hem Lees army becomes
stronger but be that may, am convinced that when
the history of the Confederate campaign of 1864 in
Virginia is written it will record struggle unsurpassed
heroism and 10 the patience and sefdenyng endurance
of the troops since tbs time when blood first split
upon the earth and first lifted his hand anger against
his brother.
THE POSSIBLE EVACUATION OF PETERSBURG.
There is plan by which at the price of the bricks
and mortar Of Petersburg Gen. Lee might curta the en-
listing proloDgstion OF his lines, might assume much
stronger defensive position and considerably the
difficulties Of his opponent That this plan will be adopt
ed il occasion requires is by improbable but so
long Gen Lee feels himself strong enough to hold and
protect Petersburg well Richmond he will continue
to cling to both If he gave up the town Of Petersburg
and fell back upon the western and higher bank of the APP
pomatox, holding the heights of Pocahontas which grde
Petersburg the wet and NORTH his strength for defence
would be much greater; but he would have in
to give the little city to Its assaants much 10 the
fashion Fredericksburg given up to the Fede
rails while the Conederstes held Maryes Heights 1t has
often been argued by wise military heads that this would
be udcious STEP but experience has shown to what mis-
cry the inhabitants of towns surrendered to the enemy
reduced and TO this misery Gen. Lee will not consent that
Petersburg shall be exposed if he prevent it.
My own impression that the or failure which
may follow Hoods daring move in Georgia will govern the
operations Of Grant against Richmond. The reciprocity
and mutabiy which have always existed between the
rious Of the Federas the hand and OF the
Confederaes the other in the East and West were
apparent than at this moment II the Cenfed
crates maintain their present attitude before Richmond
and continue hold their enemy ut bay until az here
anticipated great disaster has overtaken Sherman in the
West, do not scrupe to say that in my opinion Rich.
moDd will laugh its asssants to If on The other
hand Sherman able to extrcate himself from his present
critical position, by either beating outwitting Hooi
there o be for apprehension about Richmond DIR
ing the coming toinier The like of hck has neper erssd
b.lore.
THE DARKEST HOUR OF GLOOM.
On the whole ii is impossible not 10 take more cheer
full view Of the Confenerate prospects Virginia than il
proper to entertain at the Of the last month At
this moment excluding from my mind all thought of
than in xuhi