Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-07-11
REREL VIEW OF THE RAID.
Plan Oh EnyasiOn-Ehe isebei Army
I'm Maryland 90 be Reinforced from
Iee,s Main BOdy.
BALTIMORE, July g, 1864.
REAL CHARACTER or THE REBEL MOVEMENT To-

BALTIMORE. July g. 1864
REAL CHARACTER or THE REBEL MOVEMENT To-
WARD BALTIMORE.
present below all the facts have been able
to ascertain, uD to this time, in relation to the
daring movement now being made by the rebels
in this direction. They all go to show that il is
not mere objectless raid, or triflng and spas
modic movement which will quickly subside; but
that il is, on the other hand, part OF deliberate
and we'll considered plan. on the part of General
Lee. for che defense of Richmond and the defeat
of Grant-a plan which was formed as soon as
the designs OF the latter had become apparent
namely early in May, and to which have since
alluded more than once That plan was, in brief,
as follows:
To take up such positions, and to maneuver
his army in such manner, upon the overland
route, "a to inflict as heavy a loss as possible
upon the Union army before the latter reached
the vicinity of Richmond. to make such DISPOSE
ton of his forces. the north and east of Rich
mOnd. a would prevent General Grant from
crossing the Chickahominy at any point above
Bottoms bridge, or from attacking the city from
the east: but to throw no obstruction in his
march from the Lower Chickahominy to the
James river The object of the plan thus far
was to induce Grant to make the inal attack on
Richmond from the south side of the James
to resort to the tedious operations of a siege
ALL or GRANTS MOVEMENTS FoEEsEES By rHE
RIBEL LEADERS.
The great advantage. which a Union army
would derive from the use of that river was not
overlooked nor moderated by the rebel lenders
But they knew from the outset. as | stated on
the lith OF April, that on whatever route Gen
Grant might begin his campaign. he would be
driven in the end To- ADOPT the James river route
That route they feared might be fatal to their
capitol IL our operations wese conducted from the
north side, but il Gen Grant decided on onera-
tons ON the south side they believed in the ETH.
cacy OF their means for successfully defending
the city, particularly the latter cannot be
reached by water. And whether Gen Grant be-
gan his operations from bermuda Hundred III
rectly against Richmond, or from City Point
against Petersburg first, would make differ
ence in their plans. except this that by making
Bermuda Hundred bis base. General Grant would
be able To begin he great siege sooner. That
event would only be delayed by any operations
that he might make against Petersburg That
DELAY however. would be OF advantage to them,
both in the time il would afford them, and in the
great loss " hich il would be ia their power TO
iufct upon the Union army While operating be-
fore Petersburg | have recently explained,
June - and %. why Gen. Grant can gain no pos
sHpte advantage ON Tue capture oi ietetSoufSf ahu
how, according to the rebel ideas. he could have
gained al first aud without loss. by the estsb-
lishmeni OF his base az Bermuda hundred. all the
advantages resulting from the destruction Of the
Southern railroads. Which has cost him dear,
aud taken Up so much time at Petersburg.
CONFEDERATE vIKw or GRANTS PRESENT POSITION.
The rebels claim that their plan thus far has
succeeded even better than they expected or
hoped The immense force with which General
Grant began the campaign. and the fact that they
were obliged to operate against three different
armies az once. rendered the task of the Confed-