The aegis & intelligencer. [volume] (Bel Air, Md.) 1864-1923, 1864-08-05
After such repeated experience of the

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cess of impending operations against Rich
mend, it might have been supposed that
military directors, with as little perspicaci.
ty as ours have shown themselves to pos
sess, would not for the fourth time permit
Encouragement in this valley to lay
stone of stumbling and rock of otfense in
the way of the campaign. And yet the
illustration we have just had of the want
of forecast which has been signalized by
the conduct Of the war in this quarter sur
passes 10 its proportions anything We have
yet been called to witness. Let US analyzo
the elements of the invasion which. has
just ended in the raising of the "siege
of Washington"
1t is obvious to the most unmilitary
mind that in order to guard the side APP
proach to Washington via the Shenandoah
valley, post of observation should be Sc
selected at such u point in or near the
valley as shall enable the force which oc-
cupies it to discern the approach of danger
in time to guard against the descent of the
blow and to calculate its probable weight
wherever it may fall. Before starting ont
en- the campaign against Richmond in the
spring of 1862 General Mcclellan was
careful to take precautions on this score
Under date of March 16, in that year, he
wrote to General Banks (whq had been Sc
lected to watch the Valley as follows:
Your first care will be the rebuilding
of the railway from Washington to Manas,
ses and to Strasburg, in order to open
your communication with the valley Of
the Shenandoah. AS soon as the Manas-
sas Gap Railway is in running order in
trench a brigade of infantry, say four regi.
ments, with two batteries at or near the
point where the railway crosses the Shen-
andoah. Something like two regiments of
cavalry should be left in that vicinity OF
occupy Winchester, and thoroughly scour
the country south Of the railway and up
the Shenandoah valley, as we'll as through
Chester gap, which might perhaps be ad,
vautageously occupied by a detachment of
infantry, well iutrenched. Block houses
should he built at all the railway bridges.
Occupy 10y grand guards, War;, nton
junction and Warrenton itself, and also
some little more advanced points on the
Orange and Alexandria Railroad, as soon
as the railway bridge is repaired.
Great activity should be observed by
the cavalry. Besides the two regiments
at Manassas, another regiment of cavalry
will be at your disposal, to scout toward
the Occoquan, and probably fourth to-
ward Leesburg.
To recap;tulate the most important
points which should engage your attention
are as follows:
l. A strong force, well intrenched, in
the vicinity of Manassas, perhaps even
Centerville, and another force Ga brigade),
also we'll iutrenched, near Strasburg.
2. Block houses at the railway bridges.
8. Constant employment of the cavalry
we'll to the front.
4. Grand guards at Warrenton jung
tiob, and in advance as lar as the Kappa
ha"nooh, If possible.
5. Great care to be exercised to obtain
full and early information as to the enc
my.
6. The general object is to cover the
line of the Potomac and Washington.
We all know how these prudential ar
engagements Of General Mcclellan were
broken up by the military powers which
undertook the direction of the war after
he had been removed from his previous
control Of its operations. And since that
date these prudential measures, as respects
the Shenandoah Valley, have never beer
established, for no other reason, as far
as we can perceive, than that to re-estab-
lish them might be construed by some
body into a tribute TO General McClellan's
military sagacity in selecting a point
of observation like Chester Gap, midway
on the eastern border Of the valley, where
the approach of danger would be perceived
in tire to meet and check it at Harper's
Ferry, instead of some point on the Upper
Potomac, where, with such officers as the
military administration habtually stations
there, the approach Of danger is known to
the country only by stampede of our
forces from Winchester, Williamsport, or
Harper's Ferry, and by panic of the au-
thorities at Washington, who knowing
nothing with regard to the movements or
magnitude Of the invading forces, fall an
easy prey to every idle and vagrant rumor
which vexes the atmosphere in time of
alarm and uncertainty. The unknown is
always porteutous. In the absence of the
definite CONGREGATIONS revealed to tho
mind ly assured knowledge, the startled
imagination, while blindly cropping in the
dark, peoples all space wi "gorgons,
hydras, and chimeras dire" Even so
brave heart as that OF King Richard, in
the play of our great dramatist, was ap-
palled by shadows" as he exclaims:
''By the Apostle Paul, shadows tonight
Have struck more terror to the soul of Richard
Than can the substance Of ten thousand SOL
ders
Armed in proof"
And SO, during the last few days, we
have seen the administration starting at
spectres, usteriug panic cries of alarm, and
with its hands Dalsied nv imaginary ter