, 1864-02-27
WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENCE.

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From Our Regular Correspondent
- WAsnsa7oa, Feb. g, 1861.
1As AltAx of THE POTOMAC, &C.
IN my iast 1ettel upon this subject, / spok
Of many o1ncefs OF the Potomac army bcin!
impressed Win the belief that they and tn
army were neing sacrificed to ., theory o
Gen. Hnheck, formed at the commencement
Of Inc campaign, and still doggedly adhere'
10 Dy him, notwithstanding that repeater
and disastrous failures have proved It to b
an erroneous one. Cen Ha1lcrk,s or;rfna
| ,fhenrv for rnther that ~ ell a,,,1i= :,
wha,s ~ s',a1 :. " htu1 eenu!A, " -
"aont lae nonor o1 II really beiongs,) u U
the right Of the army protected by the Blu,
Ridge mountain chain. leaving the left on1,
nv,ozad - ~ t,,sss - ~
pu t11s.. ~ w .a4Heu ps eae enenDy' III c'0'
ue 1a!ter event could not by any menus b'
presen1ea' pre- t nave heard officers Of the Poto
souuo round and IL ornu I'm ,r-s-,t - f,1
f4ons - H.. -.,,,,. - ''.s 1.,-,,
!.oN' % "e e.!e'"y, "mle ooth HANKS could resi-
| uFon LUZ 1lounla1u cnalns but sueu cnanee
of base as this, while under the fire of the
enemy, involved great danger of the route
and f1cst ruct;on NJ t7,e entfro or,uv ana t1,a
,ass - ~ sas1.na 49, 49,, sa.ns a..,9 m ~ -.
Aoes " no oaseage @na am1nunltlon tra1ns
anu also, naVlng- been thus thrown back upon
mountain chain over which there Is
| no Way Of escape, and from and to
1,,,;a,, tta.. 49, - a - w w
|
| 1nonlca.1oo' Inc loss ol INC army 10 ons
| question Of hours, unless It can be reliyed
| by euccoring force of sufficient number to
| encapc and dive boc1- the oncnnv Rnt tb,o
3cscTintion of toc,;cs1 ar.,nan.s l. =, arna '
on y! eastleai mo'cinents ~ Ii oppo-
sltlon 10 one OF the: leading maxims Of war,
which reads: "In giving battle endcayor
| TO fight so that the enemy shall bo driven to-
| wards and on some great natural obstacle, as
river, q luke, a chain Of mountains, marsh,
Sc, in case he is defeated; for being driven
on "a obstacle lle cannot pass BY superior
all communications By which to retrcat, hc
/ will be entirely ruined; or, at least, I'M
| menscly greater fruits mny be expected from
the victory tlan II the enemy had lines Of re-
| treat open. And On the othcf hand, take earc
rot to s'goge % a. ., eaeef 9ffeqe, to DC drise"
o. s'ieh grtat natural obstacle" In case of de-
feat, however, IN the present line Of march,
| General Halleck lays himself open to all tho
disadvantages and gives the enemy all tho al-
| vanfaEes above enumerated
! Besldes, the ground contains natural OBJ
STAGES htelSecl1ng me line OF 9attle ut vari~
pns points, t9cre Is danger that the army may
oe, cut up IN ~ oelaii ana that portions Of It may
proposed line or new base. It was such mt
| n1al eostacles-sWnmPs, and narrow but
| deeP ara slnge1sh stfeams-Wh1ch were
nearly fatal to Mcclellan and his entire army
On on INC occasion o. MS memorable change Of
this c1onne NJ i,asc rsnscl h. ~ 4,,r,;,,s+ -
his tl$ht wing, Mcclellan held the advantage
OF ~ taking up LIS new position, not IN front Of
na.naa', nAgassso4e bal51e,, bnt N front OF
naV1saole f1Fer, on Which foated naval
funT11lun 191Ge, g wn,eh wns that which
nnali5 a:15 leseued nc entire army from annihi-
1sion, or suIGnoGf 70 inc enomy. The he
5olsm Of McCalls Division IS said By General
aleaGe, and even titz John Porter, to have
saved the whole army from inevitable de-
struetlon. Thus the mere protection Of the
right wing OF our advancing army is not Of
60 great benefit as to neutralize the many dis
advantages Of the present ROUTE. Among
these disadvantages are the natural obstacles
heretofore spoken Of, and now thoroughly
improved by art the great length
! of time lren1cr1ng necessary the
keeping open Of communications, and also Of
maintaining an immense supply train at
great expense, risk Of captnre bv p1,lr;il,s.
Cavalry, &c. fhis item of Tie account Is 30
important, that NAV be excused for giyinr
| Il few figures thereon. Thus every Infantry
regiment requires six wagons, with six
forty regiments to IN army corns. and FIVE
army rnrns IL oivee oTG 1rn1ona r on
mules. aud 3CO6 t3rirers and e7,orJs Int
there arc also say thirty Regiments m nf cava1rV
wagons, a.1Cl mules. and 1'oSn dr;verss ma M
cnar5s. 81 for the 1yho1e o-1nr. o 34'e4' "'4'4
T"ners 4o- @1s "aot' !"
Mnics. a'ss1 e.
Drivers and cuard. :s.ss..' iSS1
Imap1nc thc 1cnrth ~ th;s linz ~ 1.o1ops
IT is Estimated tha} 1{o we1ona vii oecG
mile in sinrle file: AZ thai tI,is line 1iif a..
cupy SPACE Of e1crcn miles in 1enoth thrnnch
n Tear1IT 1imhcred connt- cornr1d 1t.;tf g.,
uuderrroWfh Of bTr,shs With makes the verr ~
best kind Of ambuscade for frnaTilIos' nm
credibIy informed that in Ge5s Mcade,s ilast at
posItion On fie other Ida ri tbe RnnIaonf f ba
fost a larrc wnron fre;n. wh,ch 1raa cnt out n9
If fhe linz and cantnrad hv In ann,nu 9v;ti,A
ont The ioss Ia ffen of = man an1 }bot %'ia ~
deed the whole Of The bageore Of t1,e army
fsof e. a. +ha Ky .o ~ ii "a aanseI lae
nrn,anti. ~ g., ra1n 49,. ~ t.is ksas
Ha11it,sr 80 U1uSt ~ e4ss iessm lIum tnosc
nrored ~ tar;hfE ssas+-1s ~ ~ ~ nlSn usG
4he poteq,oo .e.1iots u'''s1ioun ~ 1ne 4t"y ol
he / .&.,,..e 43... ~
ofnn ~ 49," h.+ea,aa ea,a tsn, ~ tae lase
All. ~ o,n,-,.$a.3 49, ~ I'LL LII ~ ~
sist,n i'is 1is,, r. a5renaa 7,hn ~ VII ESi
send lis a1fny down thc Potonnac nnd m fhe
1amcs River to within few miles or Rich
mond, amt then establish base, with plenty
Of supplies always at hand. WHY, from that
point, ne might dig Ills way into Richmond,
as nG d1d from Pittsburg to Corintl, invest
ing foft Uarltng on TIE. left oy:land and water,
capturing 1t, II need be, and paseing the gun
ooals up beyond II, TO protect tue left flank
Of Ms army, while he eftectually covered the
rght " deid WORKS sncl1 as the British and
French used from BalaklnFa to SebastOpo1,
Which is q greater distance than HauccE;
would have to proceed. i great naval pow
er, such as ours, should nlways use that arm
Of the service ns far as possible. Wotcr com.
munfcation Is always cheaper than land, and
It is not liable to be broken up or cut off If
it is necessary to cover Washington, let an
army be raised for that purpose, or let volun-
teer militia gnrrison the forts. The present
route to Richmond may be very: well Us a
teint, to engage the attention Of the enemy
to cover Washington, DC. 1t may answer;
ior one or al OF these purposes; but there.
are milltaIy men IN and out OF the army
Nnose oplnion Is entlIied 70 respect, ahd VINO
nave from the commencement pronounced IT
ampracticablo go far as the ayoWcd object is
concerned. II is TO be hoped that different
disposition Will be made OF the Potomac ar-
my ID the spring; and above all that 1t Will
not be use1eEsly and maQly hurled agnfnst
the natural and artificial obstacles which
form the present line Of march to Richmond.
rur Ea,aFrrnr c1urr14n