Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-11-17

the Valley-CoaseQuences Of the Refusal Of TIE
Administration TO Carry out tke Instructions Of
General MeClelan- Why .Strasburs has NOT
bern Fortifed-7R, Administration Determin-
ed TO ErpOs, Pennsylrania 10 Insasion. and
Washington 10 the Danger Of Capture. Rather
than Follou MeClellan's Adriee.
Especial Correspondence Of The Chicago Tines
WASHINGTON, November IL.
II Sheridans army experiences another defeat
sithin few days, and il compelled 20 retreat 10
the north side of the Potomac land there are
indications that something of this kind will take
place. IL will be the direct result of the wilful
Obstnacy Of the administration in refusing TO
take certain measures 20 prevent such disaster,
simply because the measures were recommended,
and indeed. ordered BY General Mcclellan, while
he was in command of the army. IL will be re-
membered by your readers that, before the de-
feat of Sheridsn's army on the 18th ult, our
forces in the Valley having retreated from
Browns Gap and HarrisOnburg. occupied posi-
ton on the east side Of Cedar Greek and on the
north side of the north fork Of the Shenandoah
river, about FIVE miles northeast Of Strasburg
and fifteen miles southwest of Winchester
Strasburg was not occupied BY either army: but
Early's forces were at Fishers Hill, FIVE miles
southwest Of Strasburg The Manassas Gap
railroad had been rebuilt at great expense, and
Sheridan's army was supplied by it directly from
Washington, the trains running from Manassas
junction re Front Royal.
Why not to Suasburgg Because, although
that place had been in full and undsturbed pos
session of garrison of Federal troops for twenty
days, from the Goth of September to the 10th of
October. yet no steps whatever were taken to
fortity il. The consequence was, that, when
Sheridan retreated from Browns Gap, between
the 9th and 10th ults., be did not deem il pru-
dent to halt at Strasburg, but crossed Cedar
creek, and encamped in the position indicated
above near Middletown. where his army re
NAMED from the 18th TO the 18th OF October
And yet Strasburg is susceptible of being
strongly fortified. If SIasburg had been suta-
| ably fortified, as IT could easily have been. Sher
idsn's army could have stopped there, and if
Sheridans army had been there on the 18th of
October. properly fortified, the defeat of the
morning of that day would not have occurred
Eary would not have dared to make the attack,
! because he would have known that he would
| certainly have been reDulsed
| The result of the neglect TO fortify Strasburg
has been, first. that Sheridan's army was so
crippled the 18th ult that he has been unable
70 resume the offensive since; and second, that
the administration has been compelled to destroy
| III
| great expense. The destruction of the Manas-
sas Gap railroad was begun about the 25th OF
October aud was finished in the early part of
this month. Sheridans army, now broken up
into different detachments and holding the line
! of the Potomac, II now supplied from the gen
eral depots of Baltimore and Harper's Ferry.
But why has the Manassas Gap railroad
been destroyedg And why was not Strasburg
fortified? The answer will be in Gen. McClel-
| lan's official report of the campaign of the army
OF the Potomac; in his letters OF Instructions of
March 10th to Gen. Banks and Gen Wadsworth
in his letters of April LIST to Adj. Gen. Thomas
and in the letters of Col. Alexander to Capt
Munther. OF the engineer corps, OF April %
| 1862. Gen Mcclellan was then about To set out
on the Penlnsuar campaign: and in these letter.
he left full aud minute institutions for the de
Tense OF Washington. These instructions, if Car
red out and observed. would have prevented
every advance which the COniederates have since
made through the Shenandoah valley. But
they never have been carried out obeyed, from
that time to this.
The main point OF these instructions were, first
| the intrenchment of a stray force at Manassas
Junction; second. the rebuilding OF the Manas-
sas Gap railroad from that point, not only to
Front Royal. but TO Strasburg. Strasburg be
ing then held by General Shields, with l9 6ol
troops third, the fertilization of Strasburg
| fourth great activity and constant employment
of four regiments of cavalry in accommodating
from Manassas Junction, Front Royal, AND
Strasburg, far up the valley, and beyond War
renton There were IS .467 troops left for these
services in the valley besides 81 9s9 at and near
Washington, making 70 456 men in all left fol
the defense of the Capita, But these instruc
tions have been stsdiously disregarded ever
since.
At the time that Early. with his little force OF
5000 troops, was falling back before Sheridan {:
army of 80. 900 men, after the battle of Sept
18th. it hoped by the administration that
the latter would take Lynchburg. But on the
9Th or Sth of October. il became known at the
War Department that Sheridan had been de
feated in several engagements near Browns
Gap, and was then retreating towards Stras
burg. His orders were, that, in case he failed
to reach Lynchburg, and was compelled to fall
back TO Srasburg, he was TO make of the
whole valley "a barren waste" and the ad
ministration well knew that that was what he
was doing. They hoped, however. that he
would vet be able TO maintain himself At some
good position near Strasburg. and sent him Or
ders to that effect which orders reached him
at Strasburg on the 10th OF October la the
concluding paragraph of these orders he wa;
informed that the administration was then en-
gagged in rebuilding the Manassas Gap railroad
and he was directed TO send a strong detach
ment to Front Royal protection thereto
lie sent the 9th corps there accordingly, and
moved bis main body across Cedar Creek as
has been stated above.
The Manassas Gap railroad has been de
stroyed again, because it would be a confession
of the wisdom of Gen. Mcclellan to allow il
to be kept in operation IL can never be KEEP
in operation, however, until Strasourg Is prop
ery fortified: and the administration neglected
to iortify Strasburg in September and October
last. because TO do so would have been vim
dication of the wisdom of Gen Mcclellan in di
recting il To be done. But until Gen. McCle
lan's Instructions are carried out and obeyed
the Confederates will remain. as they are now
the real masters OF the valley: and will always
be able make it, il is now, available for
their military purposes y.
Che Liberty Of the Press.
"Give me-" said the eloquent SHERIDAN. "bui
ltha Of he. and | will INV mil