Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-05-02

the fre6t0ent-Ll On u
Defensive PoIicy-Impossibili of a
Present Advance on fxfchmond-OId
Abea Juggiery for the next Presi-
dency.
s. Especial Correspondents OF the Chicago Tmes] =
WASHINGTON, April p.
Ii is understood here, in the best informed
military circles that the disasters which our fore
es have suffered on the Red River, in Louisiana,
is of the most serious Notwithstanding. in J.
deed, to the total route of the Union troops; and
that the result must be the entire abandonment
of the expedition. An attempt will be made TO
| lay the blame of the defeat upon Gen Stone;
aud il is said that orders for his arrest have all
ready been telegraphed. The latter assertion
may be true enough. The Administration has
never been SLOW to find scapegoat for its own
delinauences, and Gen. Stone has been com
PEELED once before to suffer in that capacity
In this case when the facts come TO be known,
it will be seen that the blame for this shameful
defeat of forces, and for the entire expedition
indeed, rests upon Abraham Lincoln. The ex-
petition planned and the orders for il were
given without consultation with Gen. Grant, and
in opposition to his well known wishes. No mil
i:ary object could be accomplished, even if the
expedition succeeded-and Gen. Grant knew
that the expedition could not succeed-while. at
the same time, the withdrawal of so many troops
for service IN Louisiana (about so 900 in ally
weakens the other armies to such an extent that
Gen. Grant finds himself paralyzed in conse-
quence. - ft-t
But this is only one point on which there is
diversity of views between Gen. Grant and the
President There less than dozen i'm
pOrtant subjects. relating 10 the campaigns OF
this spring aud summer, in regard 10 which Mr..
Lincoln and the General in Chief are at variance;
and to such an extent. too, that harmonious
ton between them is impossible. Among these
subjects are-frst, movement on the part oil the
| Army of the Potomac; second, the route or routes
to be taken by that army in its march 10 Rich
moud; third, what Geaeral shall lead that army
when it does march to Richmond; fourth, wheth
er the campaign on our part, during this year, is
to be offensive defensive: fifth the concenira-
ton of our forces for great Efforts sixth, the
tention in office OF Stanton and Halleck; seventh,
the status OF Gen Butler; and eighth, the con-
tinual appointment of unworthy men TO be Brig
adler ppointments made from politi
cal Considerations alOne-while many worthy
and deserving Colonies, who have been acting
Brigadier Generals for months, and who are in
every way worthy OF the position, are passed
over With silence and contempt Htf1
On every one of these points the diversity of
views on the part of Old Abe and Gen Grant is
so wide as TO amount to an open rupture. In re-
gard to every one of these subjecIs Gen. Grant
insists upon the adoption of certain line OF con
duct, which the President positively refuses to
accede to; announcing, on the other hand, his
firm deter mnation to- pursue another and
trely different course. Thus all harmony and
concert of action is at end, and nothing
but defeat and continued disaster can be looked
for.
1t is impossible to say whether or not Mr. Lin
coin really believes that the Confederates intend
to invade the North a large scale this sum
mer. ID lie does believe it, common sense would
dictate that he should prevent that invasion by
attacking and Defeating the rebel armies. He
pretends to believe it. however. But instead of
adopting the measures which would prevent
invasion, he is actually pursuing measures which
will invite and render easy such an invasion. In
other words, while Gen. Grant is striving with
might aud main TO concentrate the armies, and
to get them in motion. in order to strike blow
al the rebel power which shall render invasion on
their part impossible, Old Abe is insisting upon
il that the true policy is for to lie still, to act
on the defensive, and To annoy the eueury ana
distract their attention by number of detached
expeditions TO different parts of the South. Gen.
Grant wishes to concentrate 200, 900 troops and
with them, and an adequate naval force, to ad-
vance on Richmond at once. The President has
so arranged matters that Gen. Grant finds that
he cannot get even 100 900 men; that these are
separated in three widely different localities, aud
that he is not allowed to combine them in one
column; and that he cannot get the positive
surance of any adequate aid from the navy. All
this is done in order to prevent Gen Grant from
moving on Richmond at all Mr.. Lincoln knows
that Gen. Grant will not begin TO move toward
Richmond until he has an adequate force for
that purpose. and the crafty Rail Splitter has
been careful that he should not have such a
force
Ii Gen. Grant had been willing to make an
overland campaign against Richmond, there
would have been no objection on the par, of the
/ Executive and indeed, in that case. all the Ad-
ministration organs, having their sent them
from the White House, would have been bawling
"On to Richmond" long ago. WhyY Simply
because among the few things that Mr.. Lincoln
knows is this: He knows that an overland cam
paign against Richmond would result in defeat
of army. He desires such defeat. for he
hates that army, and has done his best DESTROY
it, Therefore he would have consented to an
overland campaign.
But Gen. Grant will not consent to make such
a campaign. He knows, too, that it would result
in defeat He understands that there is only one
J route TO Richmond and he is determined to TAX e
that route, with all the forces under his control
I or none.
Events have nov proved that 1 right in
my conjecture that the proposed expedition to
e Richmond in three columns, moving oy three
different rontes was no plan of Gen. Grants, aud
. that he would never sanction the adoption of
. such plan. That amazing piece of strategy is
q now known TO have originated with Stanton aud
the army does move on Richmond, IL shall be so
divided. and shall so move Aud Badly Smith
n (Gen. W. F. Smith) IS been sent down to Fort
r RES Monroe, with the remnants of two army
y corps, probably Is. 900 men in all. and Butler
forces i'm North Carolina have been considerably
r strengthened, with this end ia view. Gen.
v Grant has not objected to this disposition of
4 troops, because the troops sent to those points
e will be just where he wants them when he begins
S TO move. But he wants the whole army TO 90 to
the Peninsula. aud to use the James river as a
J. base And he will not move against Richmond
n from any other base than the waters of the PEN
e nsula.
J. Why does the President throw these obstacles
= in the way of Gen. Grants movements? Be
. cause he is jealous of him. as he of McClel-
1 Ian. Because he is determined to prevent the
: accomplishment OF the plans Of Gen. Grant, as
: he prevented the accomplishment of the plans OF
4 Gen. Mcclellan. Because he fears the rivalry OF
!, Gen. Grant as a candidate for the next Presiden
: convention to be held i'm June, Mt which he ex
e poets to be nominated for President And be
!, cause the result OF any movement of the Army
. of the Potomac would he fatal To his chances oil
e nomination. If the movement should result in
defeat, that defeat would be upon his shoulders
and would kill him politically If h result in
success, the glory will so evidently be General
Grants that il will be in vain for Lincoln to seek
to deprive him of il, and he will loom up in the
!, political sky at once. so formidable candidate
that Lncoln's chances will dwindle down to no
IL. q a