Evansville daily journal. (Evansville, Ind.) 1863-1866, 1864-04-30

+ Mcclellan, and a certain aim at effect
for uIterior aud uHmilitsry purpose,
show themselves early. In October, 1851,
addressing a memorial TO Mr. Cameron,
tLen Secretary Of War, he does not for
get the important constituency Of Bun
KUN. The unity Of the nation, be says,
f The preservation Of our institutions, are
90 dear to me, that have willingly sac
rifced my private happiness with the
single object Of doing my duty to the
country. When the task Is accomplished,
| desire 70 retire TO the obscurity from
/ which events have drawn me. Whatever
the determination Of the Government
may be, | will do the best can with the
/ Army Of the Potomac, aud viii share its
/ fate, whatever may be the task imposed
/ upon me-. Not TO speak Of taste, the
utter blindness 10 the true relation Of
/ things shown IN such language is start
/ ling What sacrifice had General Me
/ ClelIan made whieh had not been equally
/ made by every ore of the one hundred
ard fifty thousand men Of bis army
Educated at the expense Of the country,
/ bis services were debt due on demand
Aud what was the sacrifice Of which
+ soldier speaks 50 pathetieally? To be
+ raised from The management Of 8 rail-
way 10 one Of the most conspicuous and
I inspiring positions OF modern times, 10
50 opportunity such as comes rarely 20
any man, and then only IS the reward Of
transcendeus ability tsanscendently dis
/ played To step from esptsiney Of en-.
gineers 10 the command Ia chief great
+ nation on FIRE with angry enthusiasm,
/ spendthrit Of men, money, devotion, 10
be the champion of order, freedom, and
I eivilizaiion--this is indeed sacrifice
such as few men have been called upon
I to make by their native land And of
what ls General Mcclellan thinking when
be TALKS o. returning to obseurity2 OF
what are men commonly thinking when
they talk thnsy The newspapers you'd
soon grow rich If everybody should take
TO advertising what he did not want
Aud, moreover, 70 what kind Of obseuri
| ~ can successful general Feturng An
obscurisy made up Of the gratitude and
/ admiration of bis c0untFyNen, a strange
obscuriiy Of glory Nor IS this the only
occasion on which the general speaks Of
his willingness 10 share the fate Of Bis
army. What corporal could do less
No mao thoroughly in earnest, and With
the fate Of bis country in his hands, and
no thought bat that, could have any
place in his mind for knch fooslight
| phrases ~ these.
| The MiscoHesptioas Of The PeHinsgIar
Campaign
A man vague Ia bis conceptions is apt
to be timid in action, for the same hazi-
/ ness Of mind may, according 10 circum-
stances, either sofsen and obscure the
objects Of thought, or make them loom
with purely fantastic exaggerAtion =
There Is vast difference between clear
ness Of head On demand, and the power
Of framing abstract schemes Of action,
beautiful ia their correctness Of outline
and apparent simplicity. II is a percep-
ton OF this truth, sc believe, which leads
practical men always to suspect plans
Supported By statistics too exclusively
conclusive Ii vas precisely such a spe
| eious basis OF dehuile misinformation
that Gen. Mcciellan's next proposal for
the campaign BY war of the Peninsula
resied--pFecise facts before be sets out
turning 10 something like precise no-facts
when he gets there--beautiiul complete
ness Of conception ending ia hesitation,
confusion and failure Before starting,
''ths roads are passable az all seasons Of
the year, the county much more favor
able tor oiiensive operations than IN front
Of Washington, much more level, the
woods less dense, the soil more sandy
| lp 4T.) After arriving, We end "the
roads impassable,, very dense aud ex-
tensive FORESTS. the eleariugs being ie~
aad small; aud "the comparative Hat
ness Of the country and the alertness of
the enemy, everywhere ia force, render
ed thorough seeonnoiesnes slow, danger
Gus and diificalt' (p 7g) Gea. McClsl.
Isns mental constitution would seem to
be one Of those easily elated aud easily
depressed, that exaggerates distant adj
vantAges and danger near at hand
I minds stronger in conception than per
ception, aud accordingly, as such always
are. wanting that faculty OF swift decis
ION which, catching inspiration from
| danger, makes opportunity success Add
10 lhis kind Of adhesivensss 1--WE can
hardly call il obssinaey or pertinacity,)
of temper, which can make no allowance
for change of circumstances, and we
think We have tolerably clear notion Of
the causes of Gen. McClellan's disasters
/ de can compose a good campaign BE
/ fotehand but be cann0, improtise one out
Of the events Of the moment, as is the
wont Of great generals Occasion sci.
/ dom offers heE forelock twice to the grasp
/ of the same man, aud yet Gen. McClel-
| Ian, by the admission of the rebels them
selves, had Richmond at his msEey more
f than once.
i O. Hoss fhs Caaefniga sras lost,
Hs seems to attribute his misforiunes
i mainly 10 the withdrawal Of General Nc
Dowells division, and its consequent
/ failure to cooperate with bis own forces
/ But the fact Is patent that the campaign
wss lost BY bis sitting down in front Of
Yorktown, and wasting whole month
in a series of approaches whose scien-
I tic propriety would have delighted Uncle
Toby, to reduce garrison OF eight thous-
and men. Without that delay, which
gave the rebels time 10 send jackson IN
70 the Shenandoah Valley. General Me-
Dowelfs army would have been enabled
20 COME 20 ntS asStstAuCt. gcutfat Me-
Clellan, it Is true, complains that it was
not sent round BY water, as he wished:
but even II il bad been, It could only have
been an addition OF helpIessness to an
army already too unwieldy for its con-
mander; for be really made the rebel
force double his own (as be always fan
eied il did, BIZ never bringing more than
. quarter Of his army into action at
. ones. Yet during the whole campaign
be was calling for more men, and get
, ting them, till bis force reached the hign-
. est limit he himself had ever set. When
every available man, and more, had been
D