Weekly national intelligencer., 1864-03-17

4 s. /. . II .
or retard his march, and because the treasures of
the city would procure in the greatest plenty such
supplies as were necessary for the war" [Poly-0
bius book 3, oh. 81 During this period of the
campaign he bestowed the greatest attention on
keeping his communications open with Carthage,
and it was not until this point was well secured,
says Polybius, that he set about "informing him
SELF with all the exactness that was possible,
speoting the fertility and resources Of the country
that lay beneath the Alps and along the Po." For
provisioning his army in this part Of its march he
relied mainly on conciliating the favor and aid Of
the GaulS, while his troops were stimulated to
follow him in the expedition by glowing pictures
of the richness Of the country through which they
were destined pass. But he did not entirely cut
loose from his base at any period Of his expedition,
though his communications with Carthage and
Spain were sometimes broken. When he passed
| the Iberus with ninety thousand foot and twelve
thousand horse he left Hanno behind with eleven
thousand men to take care Of the conquered coun-
| try in his rear. Hasdrubal was the chief of his
commissary department., and SO skilfully did he
perform the duties of the Office that Hannibal was
able to sustain himself for years in his invasion
of Italy. When it was necessary his powerful
cavalry enabled him to keep his communications
open with the base Of supplies. When supplies
not furnished by the Gauls others, this sans
cavalry were dispatched on foraging expeditions.
Depos Of supplies looated by the Romans at different
points for the subsistence Of their army Of defer ce
were attacked and captured as at Clastidium, for
instance, (now Castiggio,) small town on the
banks of the Po 1t was in these various ways ii at
he contrived to keep his army supplied, notwith-
standing the difficulties of the country throug gh
which portion Of his march was made But
these difficulties Of the war told with terrible eff ct
on his forces. When he entered Italy and first
encamped at the bottom of The Alps be paused to
give his troops needed rest and refresbment. The
condition Of his army at this stage of it, progress
is thus described by Polybius;
]" Indeed the present condition of his army msera
bic almost beyond expression For besides the hardsh p
which they had sustained from the difficulties of the WY
both in ascending and descending the mountains the
OF such provisions as necessary and the dseas
aso which their bodies had contracted from neglect aud
hthness had changed them into spectacles Of horror
while the greater part seemed voluntarily sink beneath
their suerngs and tn reject all thoughts both Of lie
aud safety For in march so long and difficult, il
might fully satisfy the wants of army
and those which they had brought almost al
lost among the precpices with the beasts that carried
them This army, therefore, which, when passed the
Rhone consisted Of thirty eight thousand foot and eight
thousand borss reduced to less than half that
number. Ths rest hsd penshed among the mountains
And those that left alive were 30 much worn and
altered by continued suerngs that appearance as
scarcely human The first therefore, to which An
nba gave his whole attention to raise droOp
ing spirits o the troops and by proper rereshment to O.
store both the aud horses to their former state.
1t may he proper for us to add that the army of
Hannibal made its march across the Alps with
out being encumbered with any baggage save
supplies of food borne by beasts of burthen. The
baggage was all left behind, as Polybius elsewhere
states, at Ci.ss, in Spain, under the charge of
Hanno, where it was subsequently captured by
Cneus Cornelius, with an expeditionary force
| landed by the Roman fleet near Emporium, an
which penetrated inland to this place. Ha.dru-
BAL when informed of this transaction, made has
to cross the Iberus and drove the Romans back to
their ships; after which he recrossed the Iberus
and fixed his winter quarters at New Carthage,
where, says Polybus, " he employed all his care to
the posts that we're oa that side of the river
and to complete all the necessary preparations for
the war; Book iii, ch. u
We have not time to follow the march of Han
nibal at each stage of his advance, in order to
point out the different methods to which he resort
ed for subsistng his army at different places and
epochs, though the sources Of information are
ample in the pages of Polybius and Livy, particu-
larly the former. The length of his march frc m
New Carthage, in Spain, where he started on his
expedition, to the point where he debouched II to
Italy, was, by the route he took, about nine tho u
sand stadia, Cor more than thousand niles,) ac-
cordng to the statement of the historian.
The vicissitudes of the march in the matter Of
supplies were great, as might be xpected And
that they were clearly foreseen by Hannibal is
attested by popular rumor, to which ausion is
found in the pages of Livy and elsewhere, to the
effect that "while celebrating on the means Of
supplying his forces in their long march from
| Spain into Italy, he was advised by one Of his
generals to accustom his men to feed on human
| lesh"-a trait Of barbarism, from which, however
Polybius vindicates the Of Hannibal, il indeed
such advice was ever given to him, andif the whole
story was ever any thing more than Roman fab
rication by which to stimulate the passion Of the
Roman people against their formidable enemy. At
times the army Of the Carthagnians was ia the