Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1864-07-28
REBEL VIEW or TRE SITUATION.
Correspondents New York Worldl
4 BALTIMORE, July "a
LATE NEWS FROM RICHMOND.

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THE CRISIS OF sHERMAN's CAMPAIGN.
The progress of General Sherman toward
| Atlanta has been so steady; his movements
have been made with such uniform good
Judgment, and have been attended hitherto
with such success, and the difficulties that
he has overcome have been so many and so
great that it is hard to believe that heis to
| be balked at last of the fruits of his hard
campaign. Whatever may be the result OF
| the operations of the next few days, history
will record that General Sherman deserved
| success 4 The march of his army nom
| Nashville to Atlanta is Of itself a triumph
| of which no future adverse circumstances
can rob him. His great merits as a com
mander are not overlooked or undervalued
by the Confederates, by whom he is re-
garded as infinitely superior to Grant; and,
indeed, as General of true genius.
CONNECTION BETWEEN THE OPERATIONS OF
LEE AND JOHNSTON.
But General Sherman can not overcome
impossibilities. The Confederates placed
so high value upon Atlanta at the begin
ming of this campaign that no means were
thought too great to secure its safety. The
movements of General Johnston, inexplica-
BILE as they have seemed, and disheartening
as they have been to the mass OF the South
ern people, have been made In pursuance Of
the original plan agreed upon between him
and General Lee at the beginning of the
campaign. This plan required the large
and well-disciplined army of General Sher-
man to be kept at bay, and employed in
fighting its way toward Atlanta, until the
campaign in Virginia should have assumed
such a phase that portion of General Lees
troops could be sent to Atlanta to reinforce
Johnston. In consequence of the interfer-
ence of Mr.. Lincoln with General Grants
plans at the commencement OF the campaign
(the particulars of which interference L
have heretofore mentioned); and lin conse-
quence of the forced adoption by General
Grant of the overland route, and its neces-
sary results-which were clearly f0reseen
by General Lee-it was expected by the
rebel leaders that the campaign in Virginia
would have assumed its present aspects
some weeks ago. That it did not do so, the
rebel leaders are candid enough to acknowl-
edge, Is due solely to the unconquerable
and inflexible purpose of General Grant,
and to the superb discipline OF the veteran
troops of the Army of the Potomac.
CONFEDERATE OPINION OF GRANTS POSITION.
But, if the rebel theory of General
Grants position is correct, that period has
now arrived. What they believe about his
army is this: that it has now done all that
it will be able to accomplish; that it may
maintain its present position for weeks to
come, but that any further offensive opera
tions, beyond the shelling and destruction
of Petersburg, is out of the question; and
as no military object can be accomplished
by the destruction of that place, they are
prepared to see it destroyed. The position
of Beauregard's army, in their works at
Dafarchnror thoty rana rd ohcOlutplV i'm
pregnable, and they regard the recent con-
traction of General Grants lines, and his
abandonment to them of the Weldon Rail-
road, as n virtual confession even of his
numerical weakness. | may add that they
know precisely, not only that the effi-
cheney of Grants army is greatly impaired
by the loss of so many of the most valuable
of our officers, but also that they know the
very names of many of those officers, the
dates when they were killed and disabled,
and the actual condition of the divisions,
brigades, and regiments which they COM
manded. ii-
ADHERENCE OF THE REBEL LEADERS TO THEIR
ORIGINAL PLAN OF CAMPAIGN. q
Ever since the 1st of July, therefore, the
energies of General Lee and jeff. Davis
have been bent to the task of carrying out
the main features of the original plan of the
summer campaign, which l described be-
fore it had been opened. 1t is remarkable
how accurately their calculations about it
have been fulfilled up to this time. It's on I
record, and therefore cannot be denied, that
they expected General Grant to do exactly
what he has done at every step OF his cam
paign, and that they were prepared for him
at every point. 1t is on record that even
in the midst of the overland campaign, they
knew that he must eventually abandon it
and adopt the route of General Mcclellan,
and the despised and rejected plans of that
General. But it was the delays that were
forced upon him by the conduct of the ad-
ministration which gave the rebel leaders
time to Illustrate even those plans. 1t is on
record that they expected, and even desired,
his operations against Petersburg, knowing
we'll that he would be delayed there, as he
has been, and that thus they would be en-
abled to carry out their plans in the West. D
REINFoRCEMENTs TO BE SENT TO GENERAL
~ JOHNSTON. .srr
These plans, as stated in my last letter, A
embrace the reinforcement of Gen. john A
ston at Atlanta by that portion of Gen. (,
Lees army not required at Petersburg, and
also by the twenty-five thousand veteran l
troops under Gen. Kirby Smith, recently in
the Mississippi valley. This reinforcement,
according to their calculations, will put it
in General Johnston's power to assume the !
offensive. to attack and defeat Gen. Sher- I
man, and to follow up that defeat in such
manner as will render the army of the lat
ter practically useless during the remain
der of the war. But that Is not all.
CONSEQUENCES OF THE LATE EXPEDITION
INTO MARYLAND.
The moral results that attended the late
expedition of General Early into Maryland
have somewhat modified the plans of the
rebel leaders, but that modification has only
made them more audaciOus. They willn
longer be contented with the defeat of Gen.
Grants army, and his forced retreat from
their capital. This result they expect to
bring about by concentration of their
forces at Richmond after Atlanta has been
relieved. But they will not be satisfied
with that. They know now, that Washing
ton was in their power on the 11th and 18th
of July. They know now, that Confed-
crate army can he brought without difficult
ty from Richmond to Maryland, and that it
Is in the power Of such an army either to
invade Pennsylvania or to threaten Wash
ington. And this they are determined to
do either this summer or early in the fall.
TRUE SOURCE OF THE STRENGTH OF THE
.ru SOUTHERN ARMY. 7t
It may be said that it will require large
armies to carry these plans into effect. 1t
will require strong armies; but military
success depends upon discipline and good
peneralship, and not upon numbers, as we
have learned to our bitter cost. suppose
the readers OF The World were never delud-
ed by the oft-repeated fable that the rebels,
long ago, had cOnscripted every man, and
that when the armies now in the field were