Holmes County farmer. [volume] (Millersburg, Ohio) 1857-1926, 1864-04-28
Who Blocks the Advance of
General GrnntI

bCDdTtIlcHJ (WlJn WHICH nc Is unuerStOOu
to have been for the last two weeks at Log
gerhcads, or Gen. Lee forces a conflict by ta-
king the initiative, our armies in Virginia
will not make II spring campaign. Presi-
dent Lincoln cannot afford, and does not
want, vigorous advance previous TO the
Baltimore Convention. He has set his
heart upon reelection, and the turning
point OF his prospects is in IA nomination by
the Republican National Convention. For
an election he relies upon his overshadow
ing patronage, the use he can make of the
army as voting machine, and his bogus
States. But like Archimes of old, he must
have standing ground for his engines The
vast and mighty machinery which he con-
trols cannot be worked in his favor unless
he receives a regular nomination. To nom
mate himself as well as elect himself would
be little bareiaced; for he might as well
play the role of Cromwell at once, as to
put himself in nomination for a reelection,
and then use his patronage, the army, and
the rotten-boroughs to run himself in, But
in a regular nomination he can diguise, or
affect to disguise, his inordinate personal
ambition under the mask of fidelity to his
party. All his chances are, therefore, sus
pended upon the Baltimore Convention.
Should there be heavy fighting in Virgin
lii DItNlDuS W tilC HlcCtliIS VI tlltJ DOuN
Mr.. Lincoln cannot get the nomination. If
General Grant is successful, he will be borne
to the presidency on a resiatless tide of pop
ular enthusiasm The convention, seeing
this, would anticipate the action of other
parties, and try to establish IA right Of pre-
exemption by being the first to bring Gen.
Grant into the field. But if he fails his
chances and Mr. Lincoln will be alike bur
led in the common ruin. If, then, the
crafty parasites of Mr.. Lincoln can, without
too boldly showing their hand, prevent an
advance the month of May will be wasted
i'll puttcring preparation, and there will be
no great battles in Virginia until after the
7th of june. The administration brought
General Grant to Virginia merely to use him
as a pawn on the presidential chass- board.
Gen. Grant military abilities were as well
known to the President last autumn as
| they are at present. Why, then, since he
was to have the direction of the spring cam
paigns, was he not called to the cast five
months ago. and given the winter for pre-
paration? The truth is, he was made Gen
eral-in-chief when the spring was already
far advanced, only as screen of the admin
stYation. Had General lIalleck remained
in command until this day the country
would not have tolerated the inaction which
prevails in Virginia. With the whole au-
tumn, winter, and half the spring to pre-
Potomac since the battle of Gettysburg, il
is ,candalous that all was not ripe for an ad-
vance at the opening of the season. The
administration could not have stood up
against the storm that would have been rails
cd at this disgraccfu evidence of incapaci-
ty if General IIalleck had not been replaced
by more popular general -in-chief What
is the reason that the administration politi-
clans have not repeated the wild hullaballo
they raised in the beginning of 1862, be-
cause General Mcclellan did not advance
against the enemy in mid-winter The
president himself then issued Il peremptory
order, in January, for a simultaneous ad-
vanceof our armies on the 22d of February.
In point of fact, Gen. Mcclellan began his
advance in March, and in the beginning of
! April he was face to face with the ehemy on
the peninsula. But now, April is well nigh
spent, and nothing as yet done. The ground
is the same; the climate is the same; the
Army Of the Potomac from the body of un-
tried soldiers it then was, has become an
army Of veterans; there is no reason why,
after the lapse of three years, it should
| has, since the battle Of Gcttcysburg, had a
protracted breathing spell of nearly eight
months. Why, then, are the politicians
who were so impatient and clamorous two
years ago, 50 acqulescent now
But one reason can be assigned; Mr. Lin
coin parasites and personal supporters per
cciye that an advance would be fatal to his
4 prospects, and their ingenuity is exhausted
in contriving pretexts for delay No blame
can attach to Gen. Grant; it is no fault o
his that he was not called to the Fast il
time to make scasonablc preparations, ol
that he did not find these preparations made
to his hand by the foresight and energy OF
the War Department. Mr.. Lincoln and his
goneral-i in-chief lay all winter like dogs in
the mangcr, neither preparing for the spring
campaign themselves, nor suffering prcpar-
ations to be made by another When the
season for action had come, Gen. Grant had
II new command tumbled upon him, and was
compelled to rcorganize the Army of the
Potomac. Throughout the winter the
tales, representing that the rebellion was dy
ing of exhaustion and tottering to its fall
Had these tales been true they would have
afforded some excuse for the ieeblcncss anC
procrastination which have permitted tho
spring to open without any adequate pre-
paration for an early advance. But they
served their purpose which was, to credit
Mr.. Lincoln with having so nearly suppress
ed the rebellion that only finishing stroke
was needed to end it. This was the politi
cal capital on which he traded until he GOT
things in trim for his denomination at Bal
timore, when it became necessary for him tc
shift the blame of further delay upon then
shoulders.
At the eleventh hour therefore, General
Grant is called to the East and invested
with the chief command. BY this popular
appointment Mr. Lincoln supposed he had
drawn Il sponge over his military delinquen-
cies, as well as raised screen to mask his
agency in causing further delays. BY os-
tcntatiously affecting to turn over the whole
management of the war TO General Grant
he hoped delays would be acquiesced in by
the people from their great confidence in
that commander, and that they would also
| feel the Justice of allowing man suddenly
put in new position some time for prepar-
alton. Rut by retaining Gen. llalleck as
his chief military adviser, and keeping See
rctary Stanton at the head of the War De
partment, Mr.. Lincoln retained in his hands
the means of thwarting the new general-in-
chief whenever it should suit his purpose.
Already there is serious misunderstood
ing, amounting, it is said, to II quarrel, be
tween these two functionaries and Genera
Grant. The President petends to side with
Grant Che cannot afford to break with him,
and it is to be hoped, for the country sake
that Gen. Grants vigor and sclf-respec
will triumph over the craft Of the President
and that he will succeed in carrying out hi'