Semi-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1853-18??, 1864-02-12
For the Standard.
In the Matter of Bradshaw.

I In the Matter Of Bradshaw.
IN March, 1863 the petitioner, being elected 9
constable was duly qualified and entered upon the
discharge OF the duties of his Office In ApriI 1853
ne was sent to the camp of instruction as q con.
SCRIPT; on the 9th of May, 1868, he was sent to the
| army where he served about six weeks On ioin-
ing the army, he received bounty but has never re.
eeiVeo any pay; he came home on furlough until
his case could be decided A correspoudence was
had between Gov. Vance and the Confederate au.
thorltles which need not be set forth On the 10Th
January, 1864 he sued out q writ of hdbeas corpuS
May l, 1858, Congress enacted, In addition to
the State officers exempted by the act lst October
1862, there shall be exempted all State officers
whom the Governor of any State may claim to have
exempted for the due administration OF the govern
ment and the laws thereof" &c.
May ., 1868, Gov. Vance claimed to have exempt
ea all justices OF the peace" &c, "constahes who
entered into bond previous to the 1lth May, 1863,
and their successors 10 Office" &C
December a. 1868, the Legislature adopted and
made permanent the claim which had been made by
Gov. Vance.
= ]! The receipt of bounty by the petitioner was q
waiver TO any claim to exemption under the act 0c-
tober II, 1862; but, of course; 1t could not have
the legal effect Of being waiver of any exemption
to which ne might afterwards become entitled It's
effect is to put him in the condition of hav
ing at that time no right to exemption.
2 The next question is did his being placed in
the military service as conscript vacate his Office
OF constable or did he continue to hold that Cce
while he was in the condition of q soldier2 Alb
sence from the country non user does not per Sc
deprive one of public Office; it may because of for
felture, but the office continues un I'll there be prop
er legal proceedings to put him out of it. This is,
we'll settled; Q b. Com. 15S
8. The question then is narrowed to this: Does
tue act Of Congress, and the claim that Gov. Vance
made in pursuance thereof and the act of the Leg.
a0nhr he anfo kohl -bo
at the date of the claim of the Governor in the mill
tary service Of the Confederate States or is the ex
emption confined to constableS who were not in
military service? The words of the act of Congress
are general: "There shall be exempted all State
o1EcerS whom the Governor Of any State may claim"
DC. The words of the Governors claim and of the
act OF the Legislature are also general" All justices
of the peace, &c, constables who gave bonds pre-
vipus to the 11th May 1863" &C.
l can see no ground TO except, from the opera
tion of these general words State officers who we're
in the military service. If such was the intention
proviso to that effect would have been made
and there is no rule of law under which it can be
made by construction. | am, therefore, of opinion
that the petitioner is exempted
1t was suggested in the argument that the ex-
ception should lie made by implication from the
use Of the words "shall be exempted :" and it was
said that the word "exem pted" is restricted in its
meaning to persons who not in the military
service, and "diseharged" is the proper word,
when referring to persons who are in the military
service. This distinction may obtain in military
circles, but the word ITO exempt" is not 4 tech
nical term it is a plain English word, and means
literally to take out Of FROM" and its ordinary
Specification is "to free from, not be subject to"
any service or burthen to which others are made
liable; as to exempt from military service to ex.
emptfrom taxation; and it is = settled rule Of con-
Struction, words in statute are to be construed
accordin Dto their ordinary meaning unless there
is something to show they are used in q different
sense The Courts cannot expect Congress to take
notice Of the military parlance and require, in or
der to express the intention that all the State off
GERS whom the Governor may claim as necessary,
&c, shall be free from military service, that this
particular mode of expression shall be adopted, to
wit "hll State officers not in the military service
shall be erenptc1, uu ali no are'in the military
service shall be discharged whom the Governor
may claim as necessary" &c. The meaning as ex
pressed by the act of Congress to exempt all State
officers, is clear; and the words used to express
the intention are appropriate according to their
we'll known Specification. ..
It was further suggested that from the nature of
the subject the act should be construed not to
embrace State officers who are in the military ser
vice; and it is assumed that Congress did not in
tend to take any one out of the army. There is
the same reason to assume that Congress did not
intend to keep any one out of the army! 1t may
conscript was seriously questioned, and especially
its power to conscrpt State officers who were neces
sary for the due administration of the government
and the laws thereof and this extended exemption
was concession deSi sned 10 avoid ali conflict with
the States and the Of the peculiar words "whom
the Governor of any State may claim to have ex-
empted" countenanccs this idea But these are
conjectures on political questions into which the
Courts are not at liberty to enter.
The cases of Irwin, Marony and Bryan, in which
it is held that the conscripton acts do not embrace
persons already in service, and the cases Of Guyer
and others in which il is said that the exemption
act Of the 11th of October 1862, did not embrace
mechanics between 19 aud 50 who were already in
service may seem at first blush to oppose the con-
clusion to which have arrived; but upon examin-
ation these cases will be found negatively to sup
port it The general words Of the CONSUMPTION acts
embrace all white males between l8 and 35 and be-
tween 35 and As, and tits only by a reference to
the nature of the subject and the context that per
sons already in service were excluded The nature
of The subject; for there was no occasion to con-
scrpt persons in service for three years the war;
they were soldiers already. The cOntert;; for the
provision as to camps of instruction. calling the
men into service at different times, &c, were not
applicable to persons already in service.
So the general words of the exemption act OF l1th
October. 1862 embraced all sHoemakers, black
smiths, &c, and it is only from the context that
shoemakers, blacksmiths, &c, already in service
we're excluded They were required to be actually
e,nDloysi in their respective trades at the time,
which in reference to those between l6 and 3d. was
held to be at the passage of the act in order to ut
it to the conscription act of April, 1859; and IN
reference to those between 35 and 45 or who alter
wards come to the age Of Is, "at the time is
taLon N mean when called into service; and this
actual ernplovmeut in their respective trades could
bo,o no onnlIcat,on to men who were in the militia