Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-10-27

our judgments, for Gen. Barnard shall furnish botl
the scales and the weights used in our inquiry.
The statements, then, which he here makes are
as follows: That the charge which was commonly
made al the opening of the gear 1863 to the effect
that the Administration was responsible for the
disasters that had befallen our arms in Virgini,
and elsewhere was charge audaciomly made
and impudemty persisted in }" that thus and then
to denounce the Administration for "incapacity at
the head Of affairs" was not only audacious" and
"impudent," but impoitic and unpatriotic, beside
being false, because the Administration was the
constituted organ through which the war was to
be carried on if at all, and to assail it on such
grounds was "to weaken the arm of the nations
sole war-making power" that it was under such
circumstances and with such impressions that he
wrote his "oficial report" differing SO essentially
from his professional opinions" given in the field
during the campaign; that the opinions written
down in his official report" though thus contra
ry to his professional opinions given" on the
field during the campaign, were no afterthoughts,"
but that he had formed and expressed the same
opinions six months before the date of that report
and that therefore, whatever may have been the
circumstance" under which the official report
was written, he had formed the opinions avowed in
it at period "when political questions had not
become involved with this subject"
We proceed to examine each of these averments,
and that we may do SO in way to which General
Barnard can interpose no objection, we beg to re.
mind our readers that IN the, month of December,
1862, only few oeehs before a0riting has official
report, Gen. Barnard addressed to Mr.. WILLIAM
HENRY HURLBERT, of New York city, the trans-
lator of the pamphlet Of the Prince de Joinville
(and then, we believe, connected with the New
York World letter in which he held the follow
ing emphatic language. The letter may be found
in the New York World Of January II, 1858:
Il The officers who have gone over to the South were
Souherners by birth While they have maintained their
at the Academy la the service and n the various
fields of warfare to which little army has been called
there not afforded by their reputation the
least ground for atrbutng to them military scientific
superiority.
'Their part in this war; considered in purely military
point of view, has been far the easiest Their Government
has been despotism over which popular will popular
caprice bad sway, and the head Of the Government
and Of the military forces have been essentially aud
identical.
" Their part in this warfare has been defensive one-a
part which has given them incaloulabe advantages Oc
cupyirg central position and possessing their railroads
(bu mainly by Northern capita great facilities for con-
centraoD they have had but to wait until plans were
developed and put in execution and then owing 30 the
enormous hindsnces arising from necessarily uper
feet organization and dscpne and the difficulties of the
country in which must operate, they have been able
deliberately to prepare their ground and to concentrate all
their means TO receive US.
/" 1t is probable that armies Of such magnitude were
before Gin modern tmes) opposed to each other in
xaA IF ~, L.
which been the atre of war and none but those
who experienced them well appreciate the enor
advantages which these circumstances confer upon
the defencethe difficulties thrown upon the offensive In
the recent campaign against Richmond may be said that
we never the army to which we we're opposed nor
could judge with any approach to accuracy where it
was and how disposed Hence the hesitation in attacking
enemy hose numbers and dispositions ankno,on
In place Of the unity Of purpose and iron will in execution
which have been the advantage Of the Confederate military
operations, haue been permitted to haze single R
rule unity OF plan purpose. Not only does this
apply the direction of military operations bnt The
objects Of the toar, TO the appointment Of the Generals to
command Political sectional influences hare disturbed
eounses frustrated plans The army Of General
Mcclellan pushed into the field than IL uos
dioded under fire different commanders each Independent
Of the other.
nIf we have no indication as yet of that command
ing ability and force Of will which would, If left untranu.
ciled unity of action and gius room for skill in
execution Qualities certainly possessed by head of the
rebel Gopernmen) we should at least remember Nspo-
Icons aphorsm that bad General s better than two
good independent Of each other and acting in the
same theatre OF war"
Thus wrote Gen. Barnard in the month of De-
cember, 1862, few weeks before he wrote his
official report, which bears date January q, 1863
Now, let us compare these statements with those
contained in that report, and still more particularly
with the averments made in his "review," which
is now circulating as campaign document.
The first averment, then, which he makes in
the preface Of the latter, is that the charge so
common at the opening of the year 1863, to the
effect that the Administration was responsible for
the disasters that had befaen our arms in Virginia
and elsewhere, was charge "audsciously made"
and "impudenty persisted in" The reader will
observe that in his letter to Mr.. Hurbert, written
at this very period, Gen. Barnard had the auda-
city to make this very charge. Political or
sectional iatauencss," he THEN said, "have dis.
turJed oar coumseSs or frustrated our plans"
The second ayerment, contained in the preface
to his review, is that those who complained Of the
for "incapacity at the head of
affairs" were criminal in their want of patriotism,
because they weakened the arm Of the nations sole
war-making power" Gen. Barnard, in his letter
to Mr.. Hurlbert, made thi, very complaint, and
actually had the impudence to institute compari-
son between Mr.. Lincoln and JEFF Davis, to the