Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1864-09-01

The GleWRtAoE.
TIE tenaci.y with which GRANT holds TO his posi-
ton on The Kairoad South Of Petersburg something
FOR which confess ourselves unable to account mas
much d can expect to realize no great or immedi-
ate advantage from 80 doing. With she Virginia Gen
trsl Railroad bringing in supplies from ono dlrechon
and the Danville Road open in the other direchon'
neither the army nor the people st Richmond and Pe-
sersburg are at all dependent upon the Petersburg and
Weldon Road for their supplies.
Still, we suppose GRANT must have some object in
retaining large portion of bis force in the vicinity
Of Petersburg, unmoved By the Confederate operations
In the Valley, demonstrations, against Washington
City, or the States of Maryland and Pennsylvania
Evidently it is General LEES policy to transfer the
theatre o. the from the james to the Potomac TO
this bis movements would seem to point, especially the
operations under EARLY. But so far his maneuVres
have not resulted in dsodging the enemy from bis po
elton near the Confederate Capital and still GRANT
Keeps peggng away 70 the serious ncon venience OF
the people Of Richmond and Petersburg, especially the
latter.
Frmnegs of purpose amounting to obstinacy, is one
ofGRANrs characteristics and be may yet fatter him
sf with the hope of being able to carry out big plans
against the Confederate Capital but it would seem that
point had almost been reached where has obstina
cy would be forced to succumb tc the force of crcum-
stances and he like MCCLELLAN, find it convenient to
"chsnge bis base" We think that spite Of all that GRANT
can do, the Virginia campaign Of 1864 will close on
abe Potomac, and not on the James.
Il would that troops succeeded in capturing
Memphis but the whole affair, at least the accounts
Of the whole affair, confused in the extreme and
even contradictory. The question isdo We hold the
city and re fortfestions and hold them for any
LIZ LII
of Memphis be made available to enable our troops to
cross from the other side of the Mississippi any part
OF the1a2 OF course the mere capture of the city by
cavalry oIce without the ability to retain permanent
possession or secure Interior advantages, would be
matter of comparatively small importance. To know
CHAT vsIue to attach to the capture of Memphis we
must know the circumstances connected with that
event We may fairly ISSUING, however that the raid
ing expeditions which have hsen constantly Issuing
out OF Memphis have for the time being, been broken
mp, and that our TANKS in Georgia and Alabama will
be comparatively safe for some time to come.
We can make out no clear idea of the state Of things
In and e.ouud Atlanta Raids seem to be the order oil
the day. What progress General WHEELER is making
in SHsR1AN's rear we are unable to discover. JOHN
MORGAN who was last heard OF in East Tennessee,
may be able to DO something towards disarranging
SHRRMAN's plans, though how, does not yet appear
We hear little from Mobile, and lock for nothing very
stirring decisive in that quarter within the present
or next month. Fort Morgan is strong work, and
ought to hold out good while against the fleets If the
enemy has strong land force it may change the whole
aspect Of AFFAIR." but do not think he has such force
dsposabe for the purpose Of attacking Mobile or the
IoIts in its vicinity.
p. s.. It will be that telegram, received since
the above was In type, reports Fort Morgan in the
hande O. the enemy but without stating how it passet
into their hands Things mag be all right and honora
BILE about the mouth of Mobile Bay but again, the
may not 1t will take time to clear up the mystery tina
surrounds the whole affair.