Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1864-03-27
The Csmiss Campaign Fersslsaaowed.

- a
AZ Ihe risk Of being somewhat tedious, but
Win the hope Of presenting a more distinct i'm
preston upon the minds OF. cur readers. We will
en1merate the most important fractions into
which our forces east of the BfissisVipni sre d.
vided. Commanding with Florida they sppeaF
| to be about IS follows;
1. The Notifications at Key West and the
Tort1gas are held By sufficient gErrisons
/ 2 The remains Of Gen. Ssymour's command
at Jacksonville.
3. The immediate command Of Gen. Gilmore
at Port Roysl, Pulaski, Folly island, etc
4 The troops under Gsn Peek at Beaufort.
! NswbeEn, and other places in North Carolina
5. The command under Gen. Butler at Nor
folk and on the lower peninsula.
8. The army Of the Potomac on the Rspidan.
| z. The garrisOns Of Washington and Balti-
mere.
s. The troops in the lower Shenandoah val
ley, and thsnce TO Cumberland, Grafton, Bsv-
eTiey, etc.
| 8 The troops In the Ksnswhs valley.
10. Tha army of ths Ohio in East TenRsssee.
| II. The army undsr tho immediate command
of Gen Grant ct chattanooga, Huntsville, etc
10 The troops At Memphis and it's vicinity.
I3. The command of Gen. Sherman, between
Vieksburg and Selma.
IL. The garrison Of Vicksburg and its vicini-
ty.
Is. The sarrisOns of New orlesus, Baton
Rouge, etc.
'16. Tho troops sent by General Banks 10 CO.
operate with Admiral FaTTagut sgAinst Mobile.
To complete the picture ws may add to these.
Il. The troops on the Rio Grande.
10. Those at Indisnola, etc.
IS General Ffauklin's command in the
Tsche region.
20. General Steele at Little Rock.
81. The command in vicinity OF Fort Smith.
% The troops IN Missouri.
%. The command in Now Mexico.
h shus appears that to tho east Of the Missis-
| sippi, as well Es on the west Of it, we OCCUPY
the ciTcumforenes of q vast circle, in this case
more than thIes thousand miles in extent, the
enemy, IS before, holding tho csnIer, snd POS
his different armies. What is It proposed 70 ef-
feet with the numerous fractions we have men
| toned We will endeayor to answer this auss--
| ton IS we bes. can with the aid Of the seAntY
| information We possess in common with the
rest Of the public. The fr5t subdivision re-
quiIes no comment its purpose is simply TO
hold the very important points nsmed against
either foreign or domestic enemies.
Il ia impossible for the unintiated to account
| for the second Tscton,or for the mevsment which
| brought about the disastrous affair Of Oinstee
AS we are now situAted, the possession of North
ern FLORIDA can be Of no military advantage 10
our cause, eommsnsurate with the cost of gain
| ing and holding il. If Tallahassee Wers the
objective point, it was an acs Of folly 70 move
upon It from the east, over land Tonte Of about
one hundred and eighty miles, instead Of START
| ing from st Marks, ApRscaic9la, OF st. Joseph,
as bEse. To retain the command of Seymour
at Jacksonville or elsewhere in Northern Fisrida,
would be merely to weaken 0nT active forces by
| that number of troops thew are useless there,
/ and can be well employed where. We can
not look in that direction RY results at all
| likely to expedite ths close Of 'ebsllion.
| The third fraction, that of Gilmore, is
| either too great or too small. Itk weak to
accomplish the capture of Charleston, larger
than is necessary to hold our posts on the shore.
| Unless the Davy should achieve unexpected re-
suits, we cannot aahepats tas reduction Of
| ChaIleston this summer The shelling Of the
city, which appears to be shs only occupation
/ of the batteries, does not At all affect the de-
/ fenses, and can produce no better result than
| The expenditure of g vREt amount OF costly am-
mnnition, and an increased bitterness of feeling
on both sides. Gen. GilInors5 snpeIdaous forcs
would be far better employed in the capture of
Wilmington than in useless advances IN Florida
or upon Johns Island. IF he had not men
enough to insure success at Wilmington, in
connection with such troops % could be spared
from North Carolina, his available surplus could
be well used with some Of the large armies
whose operations must, in the end, decide the
| contest.
What may be the strength of the fourth frac-
ton we have no means Of knowingi. but il is
clear that wisdom presents but two alternatives
| for our guidance in North CsroIina, VIZ: either
| to operate in sufficient fores to gain and hold
Goldsboro', Raleigh and Greensboro, or else to
| retain only troops enough to hold our own with
/ the aid of the gunbOats aud strong defensive
works. As it is clear that we hEve not force
e1oRgh in North Carolina to move on Raleigh,
we cannot expect anything IN the way OF de-
cidsd advantages there unless the surplus troops
should coopersts with Gilmore in the reduction
of WiiMington Should this not be done, sBy
surplus troops there ElAY be there, after provid-
| ing for strict defensive, ought to he sent 20
some one of the active armies in the field.
Gen RutleE's immediate command is liable to
| the sams objections as the others. L IS too
weak to move on Richmond with any hsps Of
SUCCESS, and is larger thsn-is necessary to hold
bis present line. Unless Gen. Butler be largely
reinforced, We are NOS 10 e1peas any good re-
suits there.
Next comes the army OF thu Potomse, which
| Ii no doubt destined this Summer again to sig
nAlizs its courage and endurance in sanguinary
battles, which will, We fear, DO less decisive
| than they should be, for reason that its line Of
operations is not vel selected. For the direct
defsnes Of Washing ION and the upper Potomac
| IT'S present position near CuipspeT Court House
I Is eEcGlieLk 6Vely tDli5 II AlFAucs1 VIII aul
ysyy much TO its difficulties, and long before
reaching Richmond it will have lost whatever
| superiority of numbers it msy now possess, un-
] less il abAndOns altogether its communication
| with Washington and bases itself ON the James
river; bat this is not Ia accordance with the
theories of the Washington strategisis, and we
have only to anticipate another fruiiless attempt
| to roach Richmond overland ''oa wooden legs
Tho sad experience of the pssl is fresh enough
in the minds of all to enable our readers to draw
their OWN conclusion ss TO the probsble result
| of renewed efforts Ia the game direction. Init
nations have been held cut that it Was designed
to moVs on Richmond ia two columns, the
army of the Potomac, overland, and = second
column along the James river. Unless each Of
these columns is capable of contending sue
cessfally with Lee by itself, the probabilities
are against the success Of such . movement, for
| Lee, being between them, may attack and over
whelm each separately before the other can
aid it.
The Ninth Texas Defy ASe's Threafs.
HEADQUARTERS orb TKxAs INFASTRY,
| Near Demopo.is Ala, March Is, 1904.
MR. EDITOR: To-day The subjoined resolu-
| tons were submitted to the 9th Texas infantry.
| While drawn up in line, the col0Ts were ad
/ vsnesd, and sll whose sentiments they reflected
were ssked to dress forward upon them, where
upon they we're adopted without dissenting
voice. Il may cheer some hearts to know that
these veteran Texans, though effseluRlly cut ca
~