Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-06-17

| LAVOrAOl6 10 MS EsputAIOo, D0Qotle68 the
account given by OUT correspondent is the
best that can be said on that side of the
subject, and 1t is not necessary to go any
further than this account to entirely con-
denim General SigeI and to find plentiful
justification for his removal. tt.
1t is asserted, 10 ektenuAtion Of the loss
Of the battle, that the orders to march
were not complied with; that the presence
of the cavalry In 'he road delayed the
movement of the infantry more than an
hour; that General Sigel could not get his
whole fierce into battle; that his officers did
not know their duty, and that the artillery
could not be used on account Of the rain.
These circumstances indicate badly man
aged battle, and the want Of right kind
of commander; but these were not what
lost us the battle. We were beaten BY hay-
ing our line of battle formed with the cav
airy Ia the centre, Our line Was broken
where the cavalry was posted, and that
determined the battle. It is explained that
the absence from the field of two regiments
Of infGntry made q itgap" in the line, and
that this was filled with cavalry and ar
tillery. l...
g We cannot understand why the failure Of
two regiments to come up should make .
gap, in line in which they had never yet
taken their places, and still less why such
gap, when made, should be filled with
cavalry. 1t is to be supposed that gen.
eral suddenly encountering the enemy
forms his line Of battle with the troops he
has at hand, and not with gaps in view of
troops that are to come up; and it is not to
be supposed that general in these days
shall put cavalry where he knows he ought
TO have infantry. No line of battle so
t0fmP6 ~
ous assault; and If in the nineteenth cen.
tury We are to lose battle by having cav
airy posted on or near the centre Of the
line 1t 10 hard to sec what advantage the
assidaous study of grand tactics for many
hundred years past hast been to the art Of
war. 1t is q bad formation, and when a
general loses battle by a bad formation,
and by the failure to offer to the enemy the
whole resistance o. which the force under
his command is capable, he alone is respou.
sible for the loss Of that battle and il re-
moved for it the removal is pre.eminently
just.
Another, therefore, of our prominent
geperals, kept in place by the power of q
party, has been put out of the way by the
hard logic of events. 1t would not be an
agreeable pastime TO estimate the harm
that has been dons to our cause through
the whole war by our having had iueffl-
cient men in the 7ery places that efficient
men were very eager to get. Unquestion-
ably that harm has been very great. Even
In this campaign,i If we had a man TO go
up the valley with Sigels force as Stone
wall jackson has two or three times come
down the valley, our definite success
would have been certain ere this.
But, now that the whole control Of our
armies is apparently 10 the hands of Cen
eral Grant, it is likely that we shall not
have to Vex our souls with many more re-
grets for the shortcomings of political
generals. Our government has seen that
IL must necessarily leave Grant alone as
Ihe supreme Commander, and Grant be-
ItoVeotni ootdioEl- 4lfnnI6P,U GeUOR'S aud
AVerilPs recent successes show this clearly
enough.