Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-02-01


tempt as we have read it, history, TO overthrow /
the Government Of the United States, and Is not /
now ostensibly prosecuted for that purpose Inc /
rebellion consists In an attempt, if We have read /
Alright, TO withdraw a certain portion of people /
and territory from under the Jurisdiction Of the
Government of the United States-to dEride the |
JRiOa, leaving the North under the existing gov |
ernment and placing the South under a newly
created government II is true that the rebel !
armies would if they could, invade the territory
of the Northern States, in order TO relieve the
rebel States from the deSolation Of war without
changing the object for which the war is prose-
cuted on their side, viz: their Independence of
the Union, or. perhaps, guarantees for rights in
il. And, il our army was withdrawn. or greatly
weakened before terms of peace were agreed on,
the rebels would seize upon their independence,
if they did not invade US. Hence, the imperative
necessity felt By all of continuing To keep up
the army, prevent this greatest of evils, what
ever ultimate purpose the administration NAV
indirectly seek to accomplish By it, which could
not be approved.
No one of the Northern States constituting as
they together do decided majority of all the
States desires to overthrow the Constitution Of
the United States, or to withdraw from ander It's
operation; nor do any considerable portion,
perhaps not any, of the people of such States
manifest anv desire TO resist the legal execution
of the Constitution and laws. Resistance 20
illegal and mob violence is not necessarily
resistance to the government. The courts, in all
the Northern States, and have been open.
But the Southern States are attempting, by yiO-
lence, tokever the Union, andthe Government of
the United States and the people of the Northern
States are attempting, rs they assert, to prevent
the severance of the Union of these heretofore
united States. Such is the object, on both sides,
| of the war; not 10 maintain or overthrow the old
legal Government of the United States, but, on
one side to continue the existence of, and on the
other 10 sever the territorial unfg of The nation.
/ And the opposition to the Administration, mot
the Government in the quiet law-abiding States
of the North is not forcibe, but peaceful differ
ence and conflict of opinion and argument a. to
! the cause of the rebellion, and the measures
which should be pursued best calculated 10
restore territorial unity, under the government
of our fathers with the least destruction
of property the least sacrifice of life and consti
tutional liberty and in the shortest possible time
! And the question now is, does such peaceful
conflict of opinion and argument justify the Adj
ministraiiOn in subecting those who differ with
! il 10 the military power! For the case 1T BAR
though perhaps not of that description in Its facts
vet rests entirely upon the principle, we re-
marked at the outset, of governing by martial
law; it would not be pretended that the mill
tarv could make such arrest of the citizen as that
involved in this case, in time of peace. We have
a
course We kao1c al no prece dent for such
ecse the Po,ceras that aJore proPomded, viz:
of subicctng opponents, simply inpoliiical opin-
ions TO martial law for expressing those opinions;
for such opinions arc not force is the express
Ing of them force, nor is ii a crime by any law of
| the land
There is one precedent upon this question to
which we think ii instructive to refer When, in
1916, the American Colonies Iebellcd against
Great Britain, not to overthrow the British Gov
ernment-that still stands-but to sever the
British Union TO take the colonies ont from un-
der the jurisdiction of the British Government,
King George the Third determined to 60 TO
great lengths in attempting to consolidate British
public sentiment in support of his particular
policy against the colonies He laid down the
two propo sitions that the British Union should
never be dissolved, and that the colonies should
be subugated by the sword to the sovereign will,
unnhuenced by anv reasonable or fair terms TO be
! offered TO invite submission He wentgreatlengths
in attempting to unite the English people at home
upon the idea of enforcing his platform by war
alone. H. used the patronage of the govern
ment in the shape of contracts andappoiniments,
10 corrupt; he spent enormous amounts in actual
I bribery and re-crtcd to various means of intimi-
dalton TO produce united English sentiment
corresponding with his own. Mays Const.
Hist vol l, PIP. 80 rs; , b 81. On page 50 of
volume one are extracts of letters from the
King TO Lord North. On the 4tl of February,
!, 1879, he wrote: "YOu may sound Lord Howe;
but before | name him 20 preside at the Admiral
ty Board, must expect an explicit declaration
that he will zealou~ly concur in prosecuting the
war in all CHARTERS Of the globe" Again, on the
22d of June 1879, he wrote: Before L will hear
Of any mans readiness 10 come into office, /
will expect 70 see il signed under his own hand
and seal that he has resolved 10 keep the empire
entire, and that no troops shall consequently be
drawn from thence, H. e. America nor indie
pendencc ever allowed
But tie King could not produce unity of sem
J; timent in his exclusive war policy. Chatham,
Fox Burke, Barre and other Britons, far
t seeing statesmen and iliusirious patriots, were
for compromise, concia ION along with war;
they warned the King that s policy was less
humane, less Christian than theirs and was cal
cuated to prolong and increase the expenses OF
the war that il involved the overthrow OF liberty
in England itself, and might even subject him
az last, in the dispensations of Providence, to
the loss of the brightest jewel of his crown.
These sentiments were boldly and earnestly Ut
tered: thev were read By the army and the rebel
coloniSts; and though il attempted by few
narrow minded bigOtS to throw discredit uDOn
the patriotism of those great statesmen, we have
never leaIn d that the King, even claimed that
+ their course gave him right to arrest them by
virtue of martial law. See Buckles Hist. Civ,
p. 355. III the speakers thought hlng Ueorgt
and his ministers advocated erroneous doctrines
the intelligence of the soldiers rendered the army
capable Of discerning it and avoiding being infu
onced by them: or a all events, the fact didnot jus
tfy the violation of the constitutional rights of the
e citizen TO suppress them. And the proposition
4 would certainly be mOnstrouS one, that all ut
n terances of opinion may be prohibited for fear al
c erroneous one might be expressed and we have
in thi, country no legal censor, outside of thu
= law, who ha, iyht To set M his own opinions
ties, by which the correctness of all Others i
1 to be determined The foregoing is the precc
! dent from Great Britain. We should be reluctant
10 seek Others in Spain, Austria. Russia, Turkey
= Naples. Mexico. or the So-called Confederate
: States.
c We feel constrained, then. TO come 10 the con
. clusion that the war power of the President i
limited to the simple right of exercising MARTA
b law, simply as military chief locally and tenn
1 porarily. where actual or Immediately impending
5 force renders it military necessity. No othe
doctrine can be reconcilcd with the Constitution
: of the United States, or is compatible with tn
c liberties OF the people.
n The next question that arises Is, how i IN,
existence of the fact that the civil power is ~
;, perseded by illegal, forcible resistance. to b
5 aSccrtaned j. il fact 10 he proved on tn
h trial. or decided by the Court upon iudicia
r knowledge If the former. there is no ayermen
o in the answer of the existence of such fact an,
t it bad for that reason. Ii the latter. We ar
n able TO state, with a feeling Of complete assur