The Union and journal. [volume] (Biddeford, Me.) 1858-1882, 1864-11-04

W Suuner VINO, WIKI oV,vvV meu, wa wa"
in mile Of him, begging raiuforcemen''
but Sumner told him according 70 lis orders
he could not ssnd him any. In the night
the rebels evacuated their line Of carthworks
before a fighting general with $500 men, "
line Of defence as strong as that across tue
Yorktown peninsula which held Mcclellan
a, bay thirty days with his vast army! Our
hero had no more to do with the victory AZ
Williamsburg than we had. lie was at
Yorktown during the entire engagement
and did not come upon the field until T.
NJ, after three couriers had been dispatched
to urge him to the front. II is in evidence
to show that had the capture Of Richmond
been an object Of Mcclellan, he could have
marched his army directly into that city.
He could have done the same after the battle
Of Fair Oaks. But instead, no marched it
into those deadly swamps, and staid there
until he los, &C, 900 men by disease contract
ed by the poison malaria, and until the enc
my drove him out Of IL. and sent him whirl-
ing on board the gunboat at Harrison's
Landing.
The battle of Gaines Mill on the 2Sth Of
June was the decisive blow which routed our
army. and thence commenced its fight like q
flock of sheep, as Hooker described it, be-
cause there was no leader. The army fought
by day and rctrcated by night, while Nc
Clcllan lead his army for the FIRST time in his
life, by Fastening to a safe retreat for himself.
Gen. Heintz- Imam testi6es as follows:
Quesiion.-Was the seven days battle
fought under the direction Of Mcclellan, or
did each corps commander fight his own
troops rs best he could?
Anacer. The corps commanders fought
their troops according to their own ideas.
We helped each other. II anybody asked
re-eniorcements, sent them. II wanted
re.enfnrccments, | sent to others. General
Mcclellan posted the troops in the morning.
and then pent of 10 his headquarters. and zoe
sar no more Of him. That was at Malvern
Hill. ...
Crcuching on board gunboat like a
whipped spaniel, this man. who by his treach-
cry or inability as u military chieftan, had
sacrificed more than one.half Of his entire
army which he took with him to Yorktown,
had the insolence to write n the War De-
partmcnt: ...
"You have done your best to sacrifice thi:
army" III save this army now, tell
you plainly that owe no thanks to you, OF
to any other persons in Washington" 1.-The
Government has not sustained this army. II
you do not do 50 now the game is lost. y
"You must send me very large re-enforce
ments. and send them at once"
The enemy now mado Immediately for the
capital. With a full knowledge that all the
force OF the rebels would now be concentrat
ed to overwhelm Pope. he so delayed eIecut'
Ing tho order Of Ialleck to bring his army
to Washington, flat llalleck severely repri
manded him, and again urged It's execution
Banks fought the enemy fourteen days, and
reiterated, while the army Of the Potomac al
last arrived a, Alexandria four days belor,
the battle Of Centreville where Mcclellan
heard the guns which wiped FROM the face o.
the earth 10000 OF his "tellow soldiers" iol
whom he Processes such love, disobeyed thu
numerousordcrs given him to re enforce Pope
and left them to sink into the earth without
aid from him.
We have no hear, to follow this Napoleon
TO Antietam, to note his sacrificing IL ,00t
men at Ilarpsr's Ferry, or his refusal to f'l
low Lee after Hooker and Burnside had fought
that battle, and won victory, had it beer
followed up.
The limits Of newspaper article compel
Ia to leave the subject here, which we dc
with answering one question. 1t is Otter
we'll asked. why, il McClellan's course wa'
such as to convict him OF trcachcry or inabil
ity. did the Administration retain him s.
long in command? because, The Adminisira
fion did not dare do other,risc, Ii is not zen
orally known how near ruin we came Will,
Mcclellan held his supremacy at Washing
ton. His par,isans filed public and respon'
sible places in tho Government, overawing
public sentiment. McClellan's officers wrote
threatening and insulting letters to members
OF Congress who dared to comment on Nc
Clellan's management. and so prevalent ant
alarming was this evil that the President wal
obliged to order Mcclellan to stop this inso
lence. McClellan's design was to gctan i'm
,peuse army with himself as the only com
mander. For this purpose he bitterly op
posed dividing the army into corps and hav
ing separate commanders for each, ant
the President forcseeing that trouble nigh
arise, perenp,orily ordered the army int
corps. aud appointed commanders for them
who were no, the blind followers Of Napo
leon, the Little: aud from that time forth h,
evinced the utmost hatred to them, although
they. Sumner. Heintzelman, Reyes aud Hook
or. were the only generals who fought tosav'
our army in the seven days. battle. And FOL
fear that no would surrender bis whole army
he was retained in command until such meas
ures could be brought about as would ensur,
the obedience Of orders. When his partizar
officers had demoraliIcd their troops within
Al A AZ d.