New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1864-08-22
GRANT AND LEE.

Gen. Lee evidently lacks one Of the qual'6ca-
tons Of great communicable fails to profit
by experience and learn FROM his opponent.
Because he had found with successive Generals
Of the Army Of the Potomac that his plan of
striking heavy blow, at the outset of a
campaign, had succeeded in driving them
back, stunned by his furious onslaught,
he believed that he should check, by
similar tactics, the onward progress Of
Gen. Grant According to Lees calculations
Grant should have considered himself beaten,
and retired, after the two days fight when he
crossed the Rapidan, and ended the campaign, as
some of his predecessors had done, almost as
soon as it was begun. But that is Mt Grants
way Of fighting, as his Western campaigns might
have taught his rebel opponent. He was neither
beaten nor stunned but followed mp the terrible
blows which he dealt the enemy by fresh, I'M
firing attacks till he forced him to retire slowly
and sullenly from the Rapidsn to Richmond.
For time Lee seems TO have so far profted by
this new lesson as TO wisely and safely put him
self behind his earth-works, and with the eKcep.
ton of comparatively small detachment Of his
arrny,sent upon a raid into Maryland, whence
il should never been allowed to return-to
hold the whole of it strictly on the defensive.
But the unfortunate result OF the mining opera
tion or rather Of the subsequent attack, evident
" made him forget his newly learned caution,
and has led him to again underrgte his oppo-
nent aud TO fall back again upon his old tactics.
II d0es not seem TO have occurred to him that
our disaster in that attempt upon Petersburgh
was due to our own fault and not his Prov
esss; and that, though General Grant was
foiled az that moment he was still the same
Grant, persistent in purpose aud fertile in re-
source, with whom single defeat is only an
incident in a campaign, and not the end OF the
campaign itself. Lee should have known him
better by this time than to suppose that
Grant, because no had failed in one project,
would sit down in hopeless inactivity be.
hind his earthworks till something should
turn up that should compel him to embark his
army, as it was once embarked before, to steam
down the James and up the Potomac That
turning-up of something Lee endeavored TO
supply By sending a.considerable portion of his
army into the Shenandoah, trusting that Grant
would follow. But that, again, isn't Grants
way; be leads, not follows. 1t ID Lee. as the
sequel may show, who must act in
obedience to Grants movements, and send
for his army tc come back TO their earthworks,
if he means TO save Richmond. He must cor
rec. bis miscalculations, and learn to understand
that the present commander Of tho Army of the
Potomac is neither Of the men who was az the
head of it in the campaigns of 81, 'G2, '63.
He is convinced Of it by this time. Sheridan
is taking good care Of Early in the Valley, and
all Lees hopes Of diversion in that direction
have come TO naught. The object Of the move.
ment mp the Valley was probably two-fold, be
meant to save Early's command, of which, he
must have known, Sheridan had started in pur-
suit; and he doubtless hoped that movement
would be construed into new invasion Of the
North, and that Grant would move, at
least, 30 much Of his force northward
as to render all demonstrations upon
out Of the question. The latter cx-
has certainly failed him. Longstreet
NAV be able TO save Early and his plunder,-l
though that renal tc be seen when the retreat
commences. But it is hardly likely that he will
attempt new invasion for two reasons; first,
be will not venture with 10000 men, if he has
80 many, across the Potomac. with Sheridan.