The New York herald., 1864-09-26
SherIdan's Victo tes--The Campaign In
the Valley.

Sheridan continues his pursuit Of Early Z
routed forces with his glorious vigor Only
the most meagre accounts Of his progress now
come to hand, for the reason that he has gotten
so far from his base that the communication
with his army is not free In fact no commu
nication is safe or even possible, except under
! strong escort, as the country is infested with
! euerllas. He may, perhaps next be heard
| from-as Hunter was in the same neigkbor
! hood-through the Richmond papers.
In order thai the full value of Sheridan 8
victories in the valley may be properly under
stood ii is necessary to glance over the move
ments lately made by Early. He was sent
down the valley. it will be remem-
hcred, very soon after Grant had crossed the
James river, and when the Army Of the Potomac
no longer literally covered" our capital. In
1862 General Lee had been very fortunate
with similar man1uyre. No sooner had the
Army of the Potomac, by its movement to
Harrison's Landing in that year, gotten of the
direct line between Richmond and Washington
than Lee pushed part of his army mp to the
Rapidan. This frightened General Halleck,
and caused the withdrawal of our army from
the James. Lee then Immediately pushed his
whole army on after the body with which he
had made his first venture, and thus, at single
stroke, transferred the war from the neighbor-
hood Of his own capital into Northern State.
He counted upon similar result in the pre-
sent year, but ought to have remembered that
he had not General Halleck to deal with any
longer His tentative was failure. Grant
understood it fully and clearly from the
FIRST, detached just enough force to nullify
Early, and that valiant rebel, though he made
a great noise, did no damage.
Lee, to the best of any ordinary judgment, at
the time he made this movement made it in
perfect safety. There appeared to be no doubt
that he could spare twenty thousand men for
this attempt, and no doubt but that he, with the
remainder Of his army well posted in immense
Notifications, could keep our force at bay.
Moreover he, in common with all Rebellion,
confidently expected that our army was to sit
down and die with fever. But Grant disap-
pointed him in all respects. His watchfulness
his energy, his immense activity, soon con-
vnced Lee that be had played a hazardous
game in the detachment of Early. Stretching
his line to an immense length, he compelled
Lee to attenuate his line, and then, through
that very weakness in Lee that was caused by
the absence Of Early, Grant was able to seize
the Weldon road. The rebel papers pretend
that this was a matter OF no consequence;
but this seizure OF the Weldon road
added one hundred dollars to the price Of
every barrel Of -four sold in Richmond after it
was made. Had Lee had present the force
with Early he might have prevented that
seizure; but since he could not prevent, be
had to make the best Of it.
Grants movement on the Weldon road gave
an entirely new character to Early's occupa-
tion Of the valley He was now no longer
there to threaten Washington or divert men
from Grants army. By the lose Of the Weldon
road Lynchburg had become a place Of the
most vital Importance to Lee, and Early
business was now to cover that place. and, II
possible, gain a victory for moral effect He
was even reinforced, in the hope that be might
do this last; but it soon became obvious tina;
he was a no onentity. He could 'offer battle,
and did il every other day; but he could not
force battle Lee saw that, having spared so
many men to accomplish certain purpose,
and having failed in that purpose, the absence
Of those men from the circle around
Richmond was to our advantage. and
not to his. Lynchburg could be. as
we'll defended by troops within that
circle, and within that circle also they would
be handy as supports in case Of emergency. Il
was imperative that he should cover Lynch
burg; but il was also imperative that he should
have the occasional use OF the troops that
covered that place for other purposes for men
were getting scarcer every day by the drain
OF desertion and large losses in battle.
Early was, therefore, ordered to retire three
weeks ago; but be found tha. il was an easier
matter to come to the Potomac than TO gel
away from IT, Sheridan's vigilance and bis
force in cavalry rendered il impossible for Early
20 retreat without the danger OF most desiruc.
tive battle, and thus be was compelled 10 stand
still
There was through these three weeks more ad.
vantage to us in that than there could have been
In victory; but Lee wanted men, and urged
Early 70 send 4 detachment. II be could moi
bring all. lie accordingly, on the 18th IN
siant. sent away General Anderson with al
least one division, perhaps With more. He
had kept this force from Lee through oil the
time when Lee most wanted IL, and he sent j
10 Lee lust Of the time when he more than eveI
wanted II himself. That detachment left hin
at sheridans mercy, and the destructive blow
at Winchester was given when Anderson had
gotten no further than Cordonsville. BY tlt
battle at Winchester, then. and the battle al
| Fishers Hill, Sheridan has destroyed the force
that covered Lynchburg and the force thai
Lee counted upon TO relieve bis overworket
meu at Petersburg. Lee hss lost his rein
forcsments, and Lynchburg is q. our mercy; or
II he detacbes . force to Lynchburg, Grant cal