The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-05-06
GENERAL Grants Work.
n the Cincinnati Commercial

From the Cincinnati Commercial
Reports from the Eastern armies are highly
favorable in all respects. The winter has been
we'll employed in recruiting and reorganization.
Since General Grant took the command in chief
his attention has been constantly given to the
Army OF the Potomac, and he has relieved it
of 4 horde of civilian followers and vast
quantity of supcriuons baggage. The object
is to give the army of the East the mobility
that has specially distinguished Western troops.
The business of covering Washington. which
has been so fatal an embarrassment to the com
manders of the Potomac army, is likely to be
made incidental rather than primary in the
coming campaign. and if the old rebel strategy
of rushing down the Shenandoah Valley should
be repeated, it is tolerably safe to predict that
an old-fshioned alarm will not come of it
1t is matter of public notoriety that Gen.
front of Lees position on the Rapidan. but that
an -On to Richmond advance, having its base
somewhere in General Buffers department. and
probably south of James River, is part of the
programme.
The rebel efforts to repossess the positions
we hold on the coast OF North Carolina, indi-
cate that they perceive serious danger in that
quarter. Lee would not spare some heavy
divisions OF his troops in that district ut this
critical time, if he were not apprehensiye that
the railroad communications of Richmond with
the South were threatened.
Since we have had control of the waters of
Virginia, it has seemed to us clear enough that
the most feasible plan for taking Richmond
was to make our base of operations against that
city on the nearest navigable water that we
hold to that place. The most pOpulOus and
best cultivated district of Virginia is south OF
the James River and this region is intersected
bykexcellent turnpike roads. An advance of a
competent force south of the James, would
take Richmond in the rear, and if the enemy
were driven from their Capital by such move
ment, with others in cooperation, they could
not use their main railroad in the removal of
their stores, but would be compelled to retreat
westward, and the value of the prize would be
increased.
There is reason to believe that Gen. Grant is
not insensible of the importance of these con-
siderations, and that he has made his plans ac-
cordingly. The public are keenly alive TO
the weight of the concentration of troops, and
look with deep distrust upon any thing that
resembles the scatteration policy. So the gen.
eral diffusion of the information that General
Grant is dividing his forces, has shaken the
faith of some people in his success. But if we
understand it, he presumes that his force is
nearly or quite twice as large as that of the
the enemy, and he can SO time his movements
as to constrain Lee to divide his forces also.
The line of the Rapidan has been fortified by
Gen. Lee with great assiduity, and is of i'm
mense strength The country is full of swamps
and thickets, and is broken and wooded, SO as
to givsn small force. acting on the defensive,
decided advantages. Then Lee has unques-
tionably very powerful army, and would,
therefore, be justified in assuming, with some
confidence. his ability to hold his line against
the assaults of superior numbers. if they were
made directly in front. 1t seems necessary,
therefore, to turn his position, and if the main
body of the army, under Grant, can be so dis
nosed as to give Lee employment in watching
the Rapidan, and we haYe an additional force