The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-08-26
PIRIT OF TIE NEW YORK PRESS.
Leading Editorials from the New York
Papers This Morning.
GRANTS CAMPAIGN AND COPPER
HEAD PEHyERSIONs.

HEAD PEHVERSIONs.
FFcw ne Tms.
IL has been said that the wolf when lcsrutug TO
read could mako nothing Ont Of the lettors but
Iap,5, Whatever o,he, word, they might foru.
Copperheads have 6 similar iuarttudc. VIVA
ever the military situation, they cau never make
any thing Of it but failure. Il would seem ts II
failure were thoir very ocet and drink. aud as Il
their whole he ,rt were constantly vet upon Il.
Here, ior instsuoe is tie campaign of General
Grsut against Foersburg. it istwU months since
he iTst moved across tie imCs river, aud matc
that city bis objective point From tue begin
ming the CopPerhest juuinHs have Lad N good
WORD for i, and tho last month they have vtru-
leutly deciicd It. ht last, fortnight agl, In
sight OF certain new movements Of General Grant,
they On the instant converted them into proofs
that Oener l Gtaut hin-eu had given up the
CamrRign, and thdt hc was going 70 withdrIw
bis tto' ps 10 the Potomac For dHys they reyclod
IN aibts and sueyrs.
q OF course, thy could not venture Cxultation
outright, but they made il plain to ever, b ,dy
shat they had neither heart 10 wish nor eyes to
SEQ anything but failure. The pu JliC nov pretty
. welt uDdgIst, nd what the Failure Is. The
great object Of the campaign is secured com
pCtCly. Petersburg In itSel has not tue slightest
was the great southern railroad, V1icb passes
through It, and -hr5h is the great cardiac artery
a to,hc heart OF the Rebellion.
The successful seizure Of that railroad just
movements which were interpreted by the Cos.
perheEds into an abandonment of tue campaign
u has spendidly crowned all of General Grants
4 work for the last two months. By preventing
that transit by which General Lees army az
3 RichmOnd has hitherto been onablod 70 throw
q itsan uVOn any threatened point SO quickly it
~ puts the country FROM the James river tar down
n into North Carolina completely within Goncrsl
Grants future coGtfol. The great circuit involved
Il in the transfer of troops by the Duyillo 70 vi
10 the West, fOrbids all such rapid transfers OF
troops H. and fro Is have hitherto given General
n Ice his chief defensive strength.
n Butthe grand advantage which will result from
the gain Of this railroad will be the direct pros
sure produced by 1t upon Richmond Itself. IL
depriYes the Rebel capital Of all connection With
u the body Of the "COnfederacy," except By 8 siu-
a gle line Of railroad and that notoriously one Of
poor construction, and upon which General War
rem, VIC learn, is already making demonstrations.
Even were Grant not 10 iualIe another aggressive
movement, but simply hold his present position,
10 Is duubtfulw whether Lee would be able to ain
tain his army III Virginia through another winter
with no other means Of external supply than
what this slender Danviile railroad can afford. It
Is difficult TO Oyeres,iInate the importance Of
General Grants last success.
From the commencement Of the campaigns
4 this summer, the Rebels at home, amt the Rebel
sympathzers abroad, have systematically Gouted
Ht them IS simply 30 many mad marches to
slaughter. This peryersity was malicious enough
doubtless, but there was good deal of hum VI
nature in IL. The campaigns being directed
against the Rebellion. of course would get plenty
of contumey from the friends OF the Rebellion
Buthe for these Northern CoppCrhcads, ,thCy do not
ADMIT that they are the friends of the ReOel ion.
They profess tn be for the national cause. In a
certain sense they doubtless arc. We would not
willingly believe that there is man in the broad
North who would not prefer the preservation OF
the nation TO its destruction. How is it, then,
A that Wo see this propensity In the Copporheads
always to misstate the present and misc Ilcula Q
the future, when treating Of our military opera
| tons How happens IL that, though they will
not consort with the Rebels, they yet 30 closely
assinila'e with them IN this spirit
There is no way or explaining this, but 10 tho
fact that the Copperheads are full Of the worst
spirit OF faction. They feel that the failure Of
our arms would tend 70 bring tho Administra-
tion into discredt, and thus they do their best TO
give the aspect of failure 70 every movement Of
our arms. In matters not that tho national cause
itself suffers by thus darkeLng its prospects. IL
matters not that the skill Of our generals aud the
prowess Of our soldiers are not only Ignored,
i but positively belied. Care is had for only tho
/. one object Of making the Administration unpopu-
lar. IL is difficult 10 say what public dshonor o
disaster would not be welcomed if it made, in
any measure, against the Administration. IL il
not too much TO say that some, at least, Of the
Coppeiheads would be glad to sec every natonaI
soldier driven hack TO the Susquehanna aud the
Ohio If the defeat Of President Lincoln at the
next election could thereby be secured.
IL is rot necessary to give this spirit the name
Of positive treason. We don't call 1t so, for it
may co-eXist with certain sort Of good
will 70 the nation. Its crime is not that IL Dc
iiberately seeks to ruin the national cause, but
that itmdkes the success Of the cause subordinate
to party So far Ss this Ills short of trea
son, We freely give the COpperhcads that extent
Of credit. But whatever difference there is be-
tween such faction and treason is simply che
4 difference of nanslGughter from murder-the
absence OF malice prepense and atorethoughi
against the victim. But no difference in motive
4 can make any difference In the result. In ehet
II unchecked, the nation will alike find It's death