Gallipolis journal. [volume] (Gallipolis, Ohio) 1837-1919, 1864-07-14
fVThe eorrsspondent Of the Ci

~f'~sf~f'naCueOA VI w OaA-
cinnad Gazette, furnishes the follow
ing relative to the failure Of Gen.
Hunter to capture Lynchburg.
The main facts agree precisely
with statements made to US by of.
ficers connected with the leNpedition,
and are no doubt reliable.
Had Gen. Crook been in command,
the result of that stupendous raid
might have been very different It
is to be regretted that matters turned
out as they did, but highly gratifying
to the numerous friends Of General
Crook, to know that be is in no way
responsible for it:
GEN. HUNTER RESPONSIBLE.
But we didn't take Lynchburg, and
whyf Simply because Major General
Hunter allowed q failure. in the first
most important element Of raid,
eeferity of movement A raid is an
advance far into an enemy's country,
where at very short notice vastly
superior forces can be hurled against
the invading party. The only hope
for success in such a movement de-
peDds upon the surprise of the in
vaded, the suddeness of the blow,
and ere he has time to recover and
collect his forces the rapidity of re-
turn to the original base where the
parties are OF q nearly equal foot
ing. Vow did Gen Hunter move in
accordance with this requisite? Gen.
Crock wish bis command joined him
at Staunton, Wednesday noon, June
Sth. were he had been resting his men
two davs Already among the rebels
It was believed that Lynchburg was
the point at which we we're aiming
Yet we Law at Staunton until Friday
morning. the 10th, end by short, easy
marches entered Lexington on the
evening ofthe 11th, and rested here
until Tuesday morning, the 14tlA By
this time, belief in the rebel mind had
become certainty and we heard that
they were taking the Lvnchburg
stores to Danville, and making pre-
paratiens to resist us at Lynchburg.
Lexington is only forty-one miles dis
tant from Lynchburg by the direct
route. Gen. Crook here Fmpiored
permission to march his own gallant
Kanawha division, by this road and
surprise and take Lynchburg. In
accordance with his own Paid- like
custom; but he was refused, and
compelled TO march with what he
knew was almost fatal slowness.
/ Instead Of taking the direct route,
General Hunter leads us off to Liber
ty, by way of Buchanan-both tri-
fling places, in neither of which did
we gain any peculiar advantage
taking us by two sides Of a triangle,
instead of the shortest line.
Now notice the result of all this
delay of four days, and how it defeat
ed our design against Lynchburg -
We arrived at Lynchburg Friday
afternoon, attacked and drove the
rebels two miles, and only halted
with the coming night. During the
night the heavy endorsements
from Richmond, a division under
Early, arrived in Lynch6mrg, having
been just FIVE days on the way
This latter fact we have ascertained
from undoubted testimony. With
these re endorsements, the army in
LyRshburg far out-Bumbered ours,
and that, too. with the addition Of
strong breastworks, rife pits and
forts In such a situation but one
course is left, aud that is,. speedy and
cautions retreat.
Well, the retreat is begun-and
certainly no complaint can be made
of delay or idling in this part of the
march.
Then, furthermore. look at the
disgEaeeful loss OF Artillery, to a
paltry pack of guerilIas not quite 200
in all. What more, or rather less could
be expected than that such loss
would Of necessity follow from the
disposition made of the batteries, in
what seemed to he more especially
Hunters command, of the lst Divis-
ion. They were made a separate
train. just as our wagons. Attempts
had been made to induce Gen.
Crook. to run the same risk with his
batteries, but in the absence of any
positive orders, he managed to avoid
it. inr- vrH-e
Such, then, seems to me to he the
cause of our failure to take Lynch
burg Gen. Hunter although q
good officer OF high education is not
the man to -.go on raid"