The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-10-31

70 ne Ed,for Of Tie Ercniry rels5r4Jb-
Sin n:-SomC time after the return Of tho Prince
- 10 Europe, q statement Is said to have
appeared under his name TO the effect tina. no
inquired Of General Mcclellan Why he did not
lay down lis bridges and cross his whole army
over TO the right bank OF the Cniclabominy, and
that ilc General replied that his men were in
such conciiion that Il ordered tp 20 to work on
tbc bridges they would mutny. This is stated "
have occurred about the time OF the battle Of Pair
O.hs, IN ,he latter part ot May, 1852.
III. there ever been any explanation Of this
stat, t,uCut on the part o. the prinrci II posi-
tDr Hr tht hc01QU.rtgr, uf the Army ui the p0,y-
mgC, lis acquaintance with the science OF wtr,
ana Lis apparent good faith n what he states,
would seem 20 establish the fact cha. General
Mcclellan did thus speak of his army at tia
time.
The Prince evidently indicates that in his
opinion the BRIDGES ought 90 have been laid
down, ard the whole army assembled on the
right bgrl. lie saw that while only one corps
vGs on tia. luuk, and communication with the
rest Of the army dependent on the two slight
bridges (thc railroad bridge and Bottom bridget
q sudden rise iu tue stream might entirely Isolate
this corps from all help, and leave il u certain
prey TO the enemy. And even If thCse means
Of crossing remained, they were 50 made
quatc to allow of the passage Of a large
army, that the single corps on the right
bank might very we'll In all human probability,
he OYurpOWcrCd 10y o sudden attack of the Rebel
army, and cut of before an eff lent reinforce
ment could cross to its aid. In fact, on the 3ist
of May, We know that the enemy, prObs bly
Looping that the storm Of the previous night had
washed away the bridges, did fall on the exposed
corps and almost annhilated IL and but for the
stubborn fighting of our brave men, who con
tested every foot Of the ground, and Obliged
the enemy TO consume nc least two hours
In getting over q mile Of the road, aud thus gave
time for the troops on the lCtt banl, 70 come TO
their aid, We should have los an entire CORPS,
with all its material. Now, can il he that General
Mcclellan, to excuse his own waat OF skill or
enterprise from the Prince, deliberately sauderCd
his noble army, and caused the FrnChman 20
believe that the Army of the Potomac was In such
shameful state as to mutiny if ordered to perform
a duty involving IA few hours GbOri That after
toll and dangers unsurpassed in the history of war
II had tnally become mere rubblc. We know
that il was not mere rabble; We know that this
same army afterwards sustained during retreat of
seven days. the most obstinate assaults Of Il foe,
flushed with success and vastly superior in mum.
bcrs, and yet never failed when a fair field was
given of checking his advance and on the last
day Of that disastrous "chGnge of base" when
its commander is said 10 have abandoned
all hope, VIC know that this same army
of the Potomac turned on its pursucrs, and gave
them a blow at Malvern Hill, which sent them
reeling back towards Richmond, broken, routed
and trembling, lest they should be folio gcd and
whipped out of their stronghold of the Rebellion
We know then tha.the army ir0S not a mutiuou'
rabble, but the question i, Did its commander SC
represent 20 the French Prince, or did tho latter
misrcpresent the case ZZ.