, 1864-06-22

Grant has at last arrived within one remove
Of the grand object Of all bis battles, marches,
counter-marches and changes of base-with-
in one move Of the .tking row." He has got
behind Richmond in the line of-rehel sup-
plies and retreat, but at too great distance
to place the rebel "capital' effectively under
siege. Doubtless the "king roW'' to which
Grant is directing his movements lies be-
tween Petersburg aud Richmond, nearer the
latter, and crossing the line Of the Richmond
and Petersburg and Richmond and Danvule
Railroads. Prior to Grants last movement
and while he rested on the Chickahom1ny,
we expressed our views Of hts plans, which
we now reIterate: "There can be no doubt
that Grant will direct his attention to TWO
leading objects, cutting of the rebel line Of
eupplIcs, and getting around between the
rebels and their line Of retreat. Grants Oh
ject will be to compel Lee as fur as possible
to do the desperate fighting, and 80 to hem
him In that be must overcome Grant or sue
cumb To the difficulties with which Grant
will surround him. Whether Grant VIII be
obliged, In carrying out this programme, to
first capture Petersburg, or whether be Will
pass it, by flank movement for the position
etill nearer Richmond, which he doubtless
covets, remains to be seen.
Grant, In seeking his present position,
from his old one on the Chickahominy, had
the choice Of two cou1ses, either the direct
march to the James River at Fort Darling,
involving terrific struggle In the s"amps
Of the Chiekahominy, or such clrcuitous
movement IS, while enabling him to cross
the James without general conflict on dis
| advantageous ground, would still give Lee
the short interior line on which to operate
! He chose the latter. Our later advices show
that the rebels had fully anticipated the for
mer, and had entrenched against it, from
Gaines Mill to Malvern Hills. Great as wa
| the celebrity with which Grants movemen
| was conducted, and whether OF not it was a
euccesstu1 as was anticipated, 1t is easy t.
see thst the intervening of the lew hour
which enabled Lee to reinforce Wlse's BRIG
ade in the occupation of Petersburg, befor
hancock's corps had made any cIecttv
demonstration against 1t, may have seriousi
affected Grants subsequent operations.
s1arce at the map will suffice to show tha
the present position Of the army will prot
ably be speedily changed. At prcsen
three Of his corps are south Of the Appo
mattoI, while Buffers command is mort
of 1t and operating from Bermuda Hundred
az base. Possibly the protection afforde
BY the gunboats in case Of general engage
meut Of the whole of Lees army with eithe
Of these sections Of ours, may justify this
a permanent position for the army.
1t is safe to assume for Grant that In tn
event Of general engagement, whethe
upon the North or the South Of the Appe
nnttox, his whole army will be capable OF be
Ing united. The whole country Is lookin
with deep anxiety to.the great strategic gam
Of skill and conflict Of force impending b
tween Leo and Grant Our latest advices +
mind Us painfully Of the fact that Grant
strategy cannot be expected to protect the a
my fron severe losses. Every forward ste
involves serious loss Of the most precior
element we can bring into any contest-tt
lives Of men God grant that the price pal
| may be rewarded with the purchasa-Vi
1ory-Un1on, the salvation Of the Nation