Holmes County farmer. [volume] (Millersburg, Ohio) 1857-1926, 1864-09-15

and oncrous duties to be performed, there
are people who find fault because Mcclellan
did not at once advance and annihiate
victorious rebel army of l0O,OO men that
occupied a strong position not far from
Washington.
1t is scarcely necessary to write in detail
Of this portion Of Mcclellan career, so
well are its details known TO the public. A
vast and comprehensive plan for operating
against the rebellion was devised by the
new commander. He indicated in this plan
points in every portion Of the southern
States whose possession was vital to the
existence of the Confedracy, and which,
once wrested from the Confederates, would
give the dcath-plow to their cause Suf
flee it that dear experience has since taught
how supreme was the wisdom which thus
early pointed out the weak links in the
Confederate Gordon Of defence. Ever
since, the Federal armies, with more or
less success, but without unanimity as to
time, have been fighting for the possession
Of these very points and no others.
Gen. McClelan's logical idea Of organi-
zing an army large enough to assail in force
all these various points, and also to weaken
the then inconsiderable Confederate armies
? by forcing them to defend all these posi-
items from a simultaneous attack, was de-
feated through the impatience of the pco-
pie for an onward movement, and the inju-
dicious interference of President Lincoln
and the jealousy of Secretary Stanton and
other aspiring officials. Long before Gen.
Mcclellan had raised his armies to the
size required for the simultaneous move
ment; long even before those he did have
were more than half disciplined, or their
/ various military departments had been more
t than half resurrected from chaos, Mr.. Lin-
coin assumed command of the armies, and
! on the 9th day of January, 1862, he or
e dered that a forward move of all the land
/ and naval forces in the federal service should
$ take place on the 22d day of February
: AT the same time the new Commander-in-
/. Chief also laid his plan for the capture of
s Richmond before his subordinate, Gen. Nc
!, Clellan.
0 1t is sufficient to say that Mcclellan saw
the fatal errors involved in this plan, and
: that he finally induced the President to al
e affording water as line of transportation
/ and base of supplies. That the former
c plan was fatal one has since been amply
IS demonstrated by Burnside, Pope, Meade
s and Hooker all of whom attempted it and
# was driven back with tremendousloss Grant
S has been endeavoring to affect it during
. the past summer, and, owing to his uncon-
querable perseverance, he succeeded to a
c greater extent than all others, but at the
r expense of the most enormous sacrifices on
Is record, and without having gained single
,s point in the capture of the rebel capital.
e Not only was Gen. Mcclellan driven tC
II move before his armies had reached thei
proper size, but that essential portion o
id his plan which contemplated striking al
at around the Confederacy at the same mo
oy ment was defeated. He did not wish t
i'd move before April; yet, in February, Grar
in had captured Henry and Donelson, an
on without any concert as to time under the d
nv rection of Lincoln, blows were being struc
at various portions of the Contederacy. b.
to ing without unity as to time, these blow
were availless for the reason that the Cor
ur federates moving upon inner lines, wei
r. enabled with ease to concentrate their wea
r armies at the threatened points, and in th
le manner to offer effective resistance.
ne The movement, of General Mcclellan
of from the time that he left Washington ii
he had placed his army nearer Richmon
I'd than any Federal army has ever been since
e. are well understood. We will only allude
lr one thing in this connection that is univel
Nv sally misunderstood. 1t has been custom
lr ary among all classes to regard the week {
battles which succeeded the change of bas
te to the James River as one Of defeat an
b. disgrace to the Federal arms. Never wa
H. there a greater error than this; and never i
IS, the history of battles, in this or any country
40 have there been, than in these greater eXh
to bitions of heroism on the part Of soldiers
a generalship on the part of commander, an
ay success in the endeavor to accomplish q ce
ld tain end There is not to-day, in all til
glorious occurrences of this war; an ever
D., which reflects so much credit upon the mi
lC g olcbi tho,
=: is no success in our career which CLEAN
~ with as bright light as the movement b
~ the army Of the Potomac from the Chick;
e. hominy to the James Rives And yet it
eIe almost universally misunderstood save
y, ta those who rise above partisan prejudice an
", " view this thing with dispassionate eye.
,'ssvu 1t is very easily understood: Owing
OF the jealousy of Stanton and Lincoln and Il
a' impertinent and constant interference of Il
if- !i latter, Mcclellan found himself wit
W, out sufficient force to sustain his position
laI front of Richmond Reintorcements ht
lai i,'i been constantly promised him and as co
"a "a stantly not sent. He was receiving his su
AZ As plies from White House on the Pamunl
" River, and to retain this base he dependt
;ef upon the troops under Mcdowell, who qua
" w ded his right flank, and thus prevented Il
t. rebels from striking his rear. The Pres
81 utul db lulS NllhN'iCh
m VI in the direction of Washington. and tn
ms left McClelan's rear exposed. He had !
WI ITh troops to replace those under M
ih- Dowel; Lincoln could not or would n
,nn send him any reinforcements. VIII
ian should he do? Remain where he was al
;;nnE allow his right to be turned and the safe
m lmch of his entire army endangered, or chan
w, his base to some point whore his line
WI supplies could be secure, and Richmond
Is menaced the same as ever OF course Il
latter alternative had to be chosen.
On, Everybody knows that change Of ba
re- with an enemy in front is one of the mo
vas difficult problems in in military science
ose Where one force will succeed in doing
nd, there will be dozen cases of failure. SU
nd fee it that Mcclellan executed this name
ver-that he transferred his entire army
zen new base on James River without the 10
ce. of a wagon or a gun-that he did this
my the face of the most tremendous attacks
nj a superior force continued from day to d
en-. and that finally, after having repulsed e
ion cry attack, he reached his new base wi
te- his army and material, having inflicted u
ing on the the enemy twice or thrice the loss
ted men experienced by himself. And y
m, there are men bigoted enough to pronoun'
cal this unequaled feat disgrace, a disaster.
lld 1t is unnecessary fellow Mcclellan sea
md eer in detail much further. The pub
tn knows it all. 1t is known how he was l
moved from command; how he took Il
sh. disordered and defeated fragments of Pope
in army, placed them in the pathway Of t