The New York herald., 1864-12-03

The victory In Tennessee proves to have
been very severe blow to Hoods Advancing
army. Thomas only held the position at
Franklin for the opportunity OF delivering o
hard hit, and therefore it could scarcely have
been hoped that he would be able to put so
uuch punishment in it as he appears to have
done. Nor is it probable that he could have
punished so severely, under the circumstances
any other rebel general but the rash and pre-
cipitate Hood. This battle was even worse
on Hoods part than the attempts OF the same
general to force Sherman's lines In front Of
Atlanta. The rebel infantry was forced in
masses against position that the enemy had
not examined at all, and persistent attempt
was made to carry Notifications that had not
been reconnoitred even from behind line of
skirmisbers. AS consequence, this infantry
was cut down by grape and canister from
guns OF whose position and existence the
enemy had no knowledge till they received
thoir fire. Hoods loss is stated, not unreason-
ably, at the large figure of six thousand, and
ours at seven hundred. Hoods army thus
lessons as he advances, while that under
Thomas increases by the continual arrival of re.
Inducements. Hood will have another oppor-
tunity to repeat this battle nearer Nashville.
Sherman still makes a tolerahle noise in the
Richmond papers despite their determination
to keep silent as to his movements. The
Southern people must be q sorely bewildered
generation if they attempt to get any satisfac-
tory view of Sherman's progress and prospects
from the Richmond papers. Such comicsl in
CO nsistencies as those papers heap one on the
other were never before seen in print. By
universal consent they agree that Shermans
advance is only a raid-a movement of no
great Importance; and yet they hardly give
thought to any other subject. They say that
the movement can have no military result.
This idea they put forth with what Falstaff was
wont to call "damnable iteration" and en-
bellish it with every trope described in the
rhetorics. He may occupy Macon, they say;
but he cannot hold it. He may march across the
country; but cannot stay in it. He may burn
houses; but what Of that And 50 they go on
through all the particulars. Well, then, if
Sherman's operation can have no military re-
suit, it is only so much effort wasted and
Sherman is just where the rebels ought to de
sire him to be-tbat is, in place where he can
do the rebel cause no harm. Yet the bolder ones
Of these same papers pitch into the rebel gov
ernment for having sent Hood to Tennessee
Hood had taken off Shermans shoulders,
"to carry it through tho mountains and
stick it in the mud between Tuscumba and
Florence" They speak Of it as switched
eff" army, aud wonder who 1t is
that has $50 entirely succeeded in rendering
Hoods army absolutely useless" Now if their
own theory Of Shermsn's harmlessness be true,
his is the army that has been switched off; he
is the general who has been gotten out Of the
way, that Hood may go forward to Tennessee,
and thus Sherman's presence in Georgia is the
triumph Of the Riehmond strategy, as also is
Hoods in Tennessee. When the Richmond
papers come to their arguments. they ought to
the colsr they have given to the
facts and il they really fear Sherman's pres
eoce in Georgia, they ought not to forget that
they are all the time telling the people there is
no danger in It.
Augusta, we are told, is quite safe. Savan-
nah is 'girding up her loins," and there is great
activity everywhere We are told Of the arri-
val OF veteran troops from Virginia. and we are
furnished with the names of the cities that Sher-
man has not threatened, and with the uames OF
those be cannot take. OF course the list in
c!udes all the cities in the Southern States.
Now suppose that Sherman does not want all
these places that the enemy say he cannot take
aud does not threaten. Suppose that he is in
different who holds Macon, Milledgeville, Au-
gusta, Charleston or Savannah, and has another
purpose in the movement of his army besides
the capture of those cities. Indeed, it would
not be without parallel if Sherman's operation,
so grand one on its face, had another object be
side any that it can carry out against Georgia
if it were, in short, already part OF the ope
ratjons against Richmond. Let US give a sop
to Southern vanity aud say that it is another
application, though on a far grander scale, OF o
movement attempted by General Lee last
summer-and we can still see some good in
it-while every rebel must, of course admit
that every idea is grand that comes from Lee.
In the summer Lee saw that Grant had our
whole Ea tern force concentrated on the
James, that Washington, Maryland, Penusyl-
vanis, all were exposed, and he moved Early
down the valley-whlc alarm spread through
out every Northern city. lie hoped to draw
part OF Grants force away from the James.
and so weaken that leader and get the advan-
tage of final victory. Now all this is the
other way. Hood is out OF reach, and Lee has
concentrated at Richmond all available force,
having stripped every point south of It. Sher-
man, therefore, becomes farsighted and hard
hitting Early, and marches grandly forward
into the Maryland and Pennsylvania, the
Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia and New
York of the so-called Southern confederacy.
viii he not weaken Lee Will he not en-
able Grant to strike More than q month