Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-07-19
Mr. Fe.sendsn aud the N. Y. Bank.
New YouK. July II, 1861.

NEw YoUK, July II, 1864.
The Committee of Ten, representing the
associated banks, were 10 session yester-
day, with view to consummating arrange.
mep,s with Secretary Fesseudeu for loan
of $50 600 600 The Secretary, who is
still here, adheres to his stIict construction
of the law relative 10 the proposals made
bv the banks, and the bauks are Chi,hy
employed iu devising an expedient fer re-
conciling the difficulty, which is clearly an
imbossibiliiy; and the failure of negotia-
tioos is considered a fIregoue conclusion.
That result would afford no occasion for
regret The banks, at present, are in no
position to undertake any large additional
obligations. They have aided produce
initiation far beyond the limits OF prudence,
and the result is showing itself IN general
panic iu Front street, 10 which the banks
may be serious sufferers. They have al
lowed their supply of greenoacks TO run
down to about $40 100000, at a period
when great excitement in the markets may
at any moment create heavy run upon
their deposits. AT such a critical crisis II
certainly appears bold measure for the
banks to iuumate TO the Treasury Depart
ment their readiness to take a loan OF $50,
600 OuO There is reason, however, for
this overture that does not appear on the
surface The banks were aware hat itaP
peal for a loan should be made to the peo
pie, the taking of it would creite heavy
drain upon their resources, and, coming
possibly ConCurreUtly with partial panic
IN the markets, might involve them 10 seri-
Gus difficulty. They, therefore, came for
ward aud propose to take The loan them
selves paying it not in greenoack",O OF which
they have not sutfi icienT supply, but 10
certified checks TO be GraEn 10y the credi
toss of the Government upon orders from
the Treasury Department. THIS would
certainly have Yoided The danger OF drain
of greeubacks; but il Involved many grave
considerations, aud, besides, Wa consid
cred By the Secretary OF the Treasury iIle-
gal.
This proposal of the banks involves more
rhau appears at 6rst sight. 1t constitutes
them practically the disbursng agents of
the Goverument-a function which forms
no part of their legitimate business. 1t
gives to the banks Il certain coutrol over
the Treasury, and TO the Treasury ce'-
tain control over the banks, which might
both ways operate burttully. 1t is no part
of the business of legitimate backlog to
specuIate in public loans. Toe moneys
entrusted to their care were deposi ed with
them for 20 such purpose, aud should, with
the least possible exception, be held Tor
uses contemplated by Legitimate banking
There is really no rational necessity for
the banks becoming systematically lenders
to the Government. The Secretary of the
Treasury can borrow from the people all be
REQUIRES. The banks bold but the peoples
that The people also are not able TO lend.
If it would pay the banks 10 take the loan.
it would also pay the people, and The Peo
pie would DOT be slow to perceive this aud
nc, upon it 1t is not supposable that the
backs would take auy uuPatriouc adVan
tage of the necessities of the Government
for putting dnwn the price OF loans; but
it is certain that they take the secnriles ut
the Government for the profit they can
make out of them, and that by combinn
;ious among themselves they can control
the price in their favor in a way not posi-
BILE when the loan is thrown open TOR pub
lie subscription at "a fixed rate.
For these, among various reasons ltaP
pears to be equally to the interest OF the
Government and the banks that Secretiry
Fessendeu should have as little negotta-
lion with the banks as possible. For
bridging over present necessities the Sec
rerary could negotiate "a temporary loan,
and for permanent reliance offer such a
loan as by its rate of Interest and period OF
redemption would attract public suoscriP
tions as freely as in the case of the FIVE
rweuties. We have already indicated what
class of securities are, in our opinion,
adapted for such purpose.
This policy would probably be for a
short time accompanied with tight mo-
ney market; but that is the very thing
that, in the present ir fl ,ted state of things,
is needed to bring affairs to normal leVel:
The stringency would EFFECT fall of
prices, money would flow iuto its reser
voirs, and would shortly abound seeking
investment in Government securities as al
fordiug, on the whole, the most remuner-
alive rates of interest.