Ellsworth American. [volume] (Ellsworth, Me.) 1855-current, 1864-12-02

communication, explain the perplexing OBJ
security, in which the maneuvcrs of Hood
and Sherman are shrouded. We know, in
our midst, tolerably well what the inten-
tons of our own General are. Brave and
bold in execution. experienced, and guided
by the master mind of Beaurcgard. in his
general plans, his westward move may
puzzle us. but cannot cause any apprehen-
sion. What he has so successfully con-
ccaled from his willy adversary, we shall
of course. not make known through our
columns. especially as nothing but change
in the weather, with the hoped for i'm
provement in the roads, is wanting to de-
velop his plans, and, we trust, bring them
to "a happy issue.
| 1t ia different with Sherman's purpose in
marching out of Atlanta, which seems tc
be unknown to the North, and probably in
its general outlines alone dictated by Grant
and the powers above him. Its general
character, however, is not difficult to guess
from military point of war; for, after
all, war is not mere game OF contingent
cies, but a science. and as such subjected
to fixed rules. which no good General will
violate, as he knows but too well how sure
" the penalty follows the neglect of Ger
tain fixed principles. Thus it is evident
enough that Sherman has tried for the last
few months, and tried under most agra
waiting difficulties, to hold by the railroad,
which forms his main line of communica-
ton with his base at Nashville. In doing
this he had to contend with the dashng
attacks of Forrest, the steady pressure OF
Hood. and the hostility of the inhabitants
all around him; his own army was ex-
hausted by incessant marches and counter
marches, decmated by continued fighting
and wasting disease, and finally reduced to
one-half by the political exigencics of the
Presidential election. Still he has held on
to the last extremity, without resuming the
offensive at any one point, but waiting pa
tiently to take advantage of any errors
which the young, jealous General on his
flank might commit in his operations on an
immense circumference around it. He has
either been disappointed in this e1pecta-
ton. or he has been unable, from want of
men or skill, to take advantage of them.
This only he has gaincd, and il is no small
gain TO him. nth his plans for the 'cinter,
that Hood is far off to the Vest, oRiy ttebiy
threatening has rear and has fank, and ruth
the hostile army under Thomas bet,ceen him
and atlanta. 1t may Be that this is the po-
sition wLich Sherman had in rieu uhcn he
boosted Math 1eoutd soon hare Hood ,cherc
he ,cdntcd him. II is certain that has pur-
suit has been but series Of ttin.s. and that
the door 10 The Vest Tennessee lcas pUr-
poseiy LEFT open 10 allure the eager looks Of
our gallant men in that direction.
In the meantime, Sherman has found out
~, -, l..
that Atlanta could no longer be considered
as the pivot of an army, whiehis unable to
find subsistence in that exhausted country.
1t can never be made n strong place. be-
cause it is so commanded by surrounding
nights; it could easily have been taken
during the three days when our troops were
before it. if they had been in stronger
force. Besides. to make it valuable
point dappui, it would require to be re-
stored with ammunition and provisions,
which it is now impossible to introduce =
Nor could it be any longer considered as a
great depot. for the railroad being destroy
ed. or seriously threatened with constant
attacks, it became valuelcss as sGch. IIav-
ing. therefore, recraited and recognized
his army, and having drawn ample sup
plies from his base of operations as well IA
from the scanty remnants of the country
around him. he resumes his march south
ward What may be the ultimate end of
this hazardous but brilliant enterprise. is.
of course, not known to the public: it il
most likely, we think. not finally deter
mined upon by Sherman himself.
This much only is certain. that he will
try TO possess himself first of Macon. Sue
cess in the maueuvcr would bring him two
valuable advantages. besides the mere
prestige of occupying the town and de-
stroyius whatever may be valuable there
to our Government. He could thus obtain
immand of the railroads. which lead from
Macon eastward to Augusta and the seat
of Government, and westward to the Miss
issippi, thus effcctualiv destroying our
communications with the Trans Mississip-
pi Department. He ,rouid, moreover, cut
Of Hood and his army from has base Of
operations, his supplies and has means Of
comforting ,eith the seat Of Government. In
these aspects the more is a formidable one.
and IL is no use to shut our eyes wIltMiy
TO danger far better 10 took IL IN the fare
and prepare for resistance ruth rigor and
despatch. 1t is not unlikely that Sherman
may hope even more from the moral effect
of such a success on the mind Sof the pco-
Pile of Georgia. In this, we are assured
he will be utterly disappointed, and soon
discover how tar he has been misled by
we'll meant but incautous expressions Of
certain high officials