The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1864-03-05
sstRmsns MISSISSIPPI EXPEDITION
frnoE GER OWN CORRESPONDENCE ]
MONTGOMERY, Ala.

The Vital part of the great combined movement
by the Federal armies against our defensive PEST
stons has failed, and with 1t the whole plan mast
come 10 naught. The advance Of 9herman's army
was full Of danger, as in the event Of success he
would have been in position to derange all on,
plans and render the fall of Atlanta only ques.
ton OF lime; but this, like many previous combl-
nations Of the enemy, failed because too much
was attempted. The objective point at which the
enemy aimed was, beyond all doubt, the grea,
railway centre o the C0nfederacy; and the naval
attack upon Mobile, the aavanoe Of Sherman upon
Meridian, and the forward movement upon Dalton,
were all parts of the plan by which that poiut was
% be reached. The scheme was q bold one, and
showed great originality II net soundnsss Of juds.
sssmss <ssn. 0ran: il a hOla-Haap.-a if he had
succeeded in his combinations the North might
well have claimed that be was really great zap.
tain. In all this we have fresh illustration Of
the poetical truth that
The best laid schemes Of mice and men
Aft gang aghey!
There is reason 10 believe that Gen. Sherman
expected when he marched out Of Vickehurg to
reach Selma, in Alabama. The heavy column 0f
cavalry that started from Memphis, and constituted
an important part Of his forces, was to move rap
Idly across MisSissppi aud Alabama cut the inte-
TOR railway lines, destroy the bridges and Govern
ment workshops, lay waste the country, and gain
the Of Gen Polk, harase and delay bis retreat,
and. II possible, forca him down towards Mobile,
while Shsmau rushed upon him in front Had
Gen. Polk retrcated upon Mobile, the attack upon
which by tho Federal Eeets was calculated II not
designed to draw him tn that direction, Sherman
would have occupied Meridian, Dem0p0lis, and
Selma, and thus have rendered his escape inpOs-
sibe and the fall of Mobile, from lack of provis-
ions and without blow, matter Of absolute cer-
taintv The possession of Mobile and selma
would have given the Federal commander two i'm
portant water bases, the one on the Mississippi at
Vicksburg the other at Mobile on the Gulf two navf
gable rivers communicating with the latter
the Alabama and T0mbigbee, and Two railways
ready to hand, viz the Mobile and Ohio ana the
V:cksburg and Jackson roads. Once In possession
Of these important points, aud bis army nrmly 60
tabllshed IN The triangle forined BY the Alabsma
aud Tombigbee rivers and the railroad leading from
Selma to Demopais and Meridian, and We should
no more have been ab'e to disIodge him from his
position than we have been to drive the enemy
from he Virginia Peninsula and Fortress Monroe.
Indeed successful lodgment In this fertile region
Of Alabama would not oaiy have carried with It the
fall If Mobile aad Montgomery, and seeured to the
enemy points ofsreat material and strategic import
auce but II would have been equivalent to the re-
moval Of the Mississippi river, snch thing were
physically possible, from Vicksburg and New Or
leans 10 Montgomery and Mobile. Nay, more-it
would have been grand hank movement, AZ II
was designed 10 be, against Gen. Johpston, which,
II successful, would have resulted, ~ has already
been intmated, in the fall Of Atlanta and the occu-
paney by the legions of the enemy OF the Northern
half Of the great State of Georgia. Every man we
might have sent to Mobile would only have
enhanced the victory of our foes AZ it did At Vtcks
burg. Had Gen. Polk retired upon Mobile, SheF-
man would have thrown himself In his rear and
cut or his supplies, al Grant did at Vicksburg
when he threw bimself between Pemberton and all
hope OF succor There could have been no sscape
by water; for there was Farraguts dset already
hurting its thunders At Fort eowelfi nor through
tho Mississippi, for there was Banks and hts col
ua,n marching up from New Osleans II Johnston
should send endorsements TO the scene Of action,
as II was doubtless expected he would do, then
Grant would fall upon him at Dalton and force him
back upon Atlanta, asainr which II was finaiy
hopcd 5herman would be abie to advance from the
west while Grant pressed down from the north =
the m ~ sss ana
battle 10 imminent AZ Dalton; but when tie hears,
as he must In the course Of few hours tnat ohef-
man has been foled, and thar hts pan Of the CON-
bined movement has taiied, he WIN Prooaoty reure
| 10 Chattanooga, ~ The latler has to Vickseurg
But how was this formidable combination de-
fsased Il failed because too much WIN attempted
| consummate akiii and e0uTage. The co-epesatlsl
| columns were too widely separated, usae'expaeed
% masy chances Of tatluse, and were eutsusted
| 70 too many different hAads. The column Of cav
hosos, ma With more lhan inssch IA Ibose @.
peEb soldiers, Lse. fouess, aa1 Roddys and thei!
brave foliowsFs. The COMMANDER e III Fedesa
cavalry not oesy failed n bic pan e Ae pro-
back with heavy loss. The retreat of 0en. Poll
| was maseeriy SntnG. He showed oFeat J1dBnea
she's Ne declined - seeeps haaals aed retired -
Hasiae taksn bis roslsloe g The east hask - sha
stream. u was iapoesihae ebs ohesaan y 9evS
] upon Mobile vttbout eSposlag ~ 0aaks en1 sea
/ 4 Sm"us.sy. % % sssess s;sss ssiaS "a sssiss
oneaeomcufi - the Tombishse and Aleea0a
i witch Woald have heen equally fstai - hse -
sl.ns. Nor shos,d we - e rake sssssastsl sa = e