Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-06-16
RECENT HISTORY INDICATED.

BARNARD has been appointed Engineer-ln-Chief
TO the ARMY of the Potomac, the New York Even
ing Post truly observes that he is one OF the abes
engineer officers of the regular army, and has the
advantage Of knowing thoroughly the country about
Richmond, in which the army is now operating.
He was, it will be remembered, the Chief Engineer
of the Army Of the Potomac while it was under
the command of Gen Mcclellan, during the whole
of the Peninsuar campaign. In the selection of
Gen. Barnard our New York contemporary finds
another evidence that the important talentof know
ing how to make the best use of mems knowledge
has not deserted Gen. Grant But the Post is not
happy in its historical memoranda whenit proceeds
to say:
an Gen Barnards advice had been needed in the fret
year Of the war, the campaign against Richmond would
probably have resulted very differently Some remarks at
the close OF his official report the engineer operations
in the Peninsuar campaign show what his Ideas were OF
the proper line Of operations and OF the elective metnod
He gives his opinion that one OF the prominent causes
of ultimate failure that compagn was the nacton OF
eight months from August 1861 to April IS63 declares
that the army complete IN November as ~ ever
became that Norfolk could have been taken during the
winter condemns the plan OF moving by way OF the Pc
nnsua perfectly certain to invite nay to compel inter-
and ASSERTS that the line OF YORKTOWN should
have been assaulted and that the battle of Williamsburg
ought to have been fought with the whole army instead OF
detached portions under single head de points OUT
that after leaving Williamsburg should have crossed
thu ChickahomiDy and connected with the navy on tho
James, and adds 10 taking the route which was cho
sen we lost essentially all that worth going 30 Tar to
GAIN viz the James river approach and the cooperation
of the navy
"Takina notice that two weeks ought not to have
been spen. in traversnR the forty miles from Williams
burg to Bottoms and New Bridge, that the repulse OF
the rebels at Fair Oaks would have carried Tie into Rich
mond if it had been taken advantage Of and that this was
one of those occasions which if not seized do not repeat
shows that when ut last the rebels mad mad
time through delay, to accumulate large 10 &C. our
army was 40 badly handled that tho battle of Ganes's
Mills while the enemy fought with his whole force, except
enough left before lines to keep an appearance we
fought with twenty thousand and lost the battle
and nipe thousand and be shows further that our
whole srmy had been concentrated either side OF the
Chickshominy, in either case we might have teureo
victory and the possession OF Richmond
1--WE quote these opinions Of Gen Barnard 10 show mat
he s and always Of opposed to the delays
which brought disaster in 1862; and that therefore,
while his knowledge of the ground ON which the army
now fighting the geasest value bis spirit in concert
with that Of Gen Grant"
These statements are very far from being accu-
rate. If the Post had taken the pains to read tie
record of Gen. Barnaru opinions made accessible
to the public, it would have found that Gen. MoClel-
Ian, while in command of the Army Of the Poto-
mac, was fully sustained in the course he pursued
by the contemporancous advice of Gen. Barnard.
If the Commanding General erred in that course
it was perhaps because he gave too much weight
to the counsels Of his Chief Engineer at the only
time when those counsels could possibly be OF any
use to him in determining his military conduct.
It was the misfortune of Geu. Barnard not to
know, in the midst of the events in which he was
an actor, all that he conceived himself to know
after those events had passed into history, and 1t
was the misfortune of Gen. Mcclellan that in the
conduct of his military operations on the PENN
suls, during the spring and summer Of 1867, ne
wa, compelled to follow the advice of Gen. Bar
nard, as given at that time from day to day, rather
than the advice contained in his report written in
the year 1863, after Gen. Mcclellan had gone into
retirement under the disiavor Of our military au-
thorities.
In reviewing the operations of the Army of
the Potomac, some months after the Withdrawal
of that army from the Peninsula to which it
has once more won its way at cost SO terri
BILE. Gen. Barnard attributed the failure Of the
Peninsula campaign of 1862 to the precipitance
with which the army was pushed" into the field
in the sprng of that year, and to the imperfect
support it received from the civil authorities in
this CITY from the want of military head. In a
letter addressed to Mr. William Henry Hubert
the translator of the monograph of the Prince de
Joinvillc on the Peninsula Campaign, among other
iudicious reflections, General Barnard wrote a,
follows:
"Itis probable that armies Of such magnitude were
never before n modern tmes opposed to each other 10
country 90 wooded and Of .uch impossible roads that in
which has been theatre of and but those who
have experete ed them well appreciate the enormous
advantages which these circumstances couer upon the de-
f.uce-the dificulties thrown upon the offensive.
In the recent campaign against Richmond 1t may be
said that we never the army to which we were OPP
posed nor could dge with any approach IT, accsracy
where it was aud how it was disposed Hence the hesha
tio~ attacking enemy rhose Numbers and d'posn'ons
are snkaopa.
In place Of the unity Of purpose and iron will IN eIecu
ton whch have been the advantage OF the Confederate
military operations, ne haye been permitted 10 haue no
snQls soil rneno snip If plan or purpose Not only
does this apply the direction II military operations out
epem the OBJ of e mario the appointment OF he
Generals to command Political seiionat influences
hare dstted eonnsss Jrultrated our plans The
army Gen Mcclellan pushed INTO the h-ld
than divided under FIVE different commanders each
independent Of the Other
IL" we have seen indication yet of that command
ing ability and force Of will which would If left pDtam
melted create unity Of action and give room for skill in
execution (qustes certainly by the head OF tbs
rebel should at least mbrr NapO
locus aphorsm that bad General 10 b. tier than tAo
good independent Of each other and ac 10 the
thcatre Of war"