Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-07-02
A SOUTHERN VIEW or THE sITUA-
TfON.



result O. e.. the capture Of Richmond in the
lesst; while the longer he remains there. or at
Any point south Of Petersburg. the greater will
hl, losses be- aud the les able will he be to at
tack Richmond With vigor. This last attempted
hink movement OF General Grant affords strk-
ing illustration Of this fact The destruction OF
the " eidou and Petersburg railroad and the
Lynchbgrg aud Petersburg railroad, (iOr this was
the object OF the moyement.) would not. even il
successful, advance the capture Of Petersburg a
single day. II the object Of the movement was
to prevent supplies from reaching Petersburg
over those roads. thar object could have been at
tanned by closely investing the place on he south
side of the AppomattOx, instead of dividing the
army and sending one half OF il 10 point ten
miles to tie south. and thus exposing them to be
cut of
GLNERAL LEI EXPECTED RICHMOND TO BE ATTACKED
PROM BERMUDA HUNDRED.
Th- attempted flank movement OF General
Grant IA. not 1t al what General Lee expected
He expected that after General Grant had be
come convinced OF the impresnibility OF Peters
burg he would abandon his attempt 20 take it.
AMI would move his army 20 Bermuda Hundred.
and begin his operations against Richmond from
tbai point. in this case arrangements had been
made 70 transfer the reDei army from Petersburg
to that city, and Petersburg would have been
abandoned. as an Outwork that had served its
purpose and that could De useful 20 longer.
And this viii be done now, if nv information is
correct The rebels only defend Petersburg be-
cause Richmond is safe az long as they can keep
tho Union army there
now PETERSBURG cAN BE TAKEN.
Does General Grant wish 10 take Petersburg!
can tell him. on rebel authority how il can be
taken with single division, and without the loss
ID T.. g
tions 70 Bermuda Hundred. and commence ope
ratious agaius, Richmond from that point. On
the very day thar he Hoes 20. the rebel army at
Petersburg viii be Withdrawn tberefrom and sent
TO Richmond; and then, il he wishes 10 do so
General Grant can take possession Of Petersburg
But it, possession will not be Of the slightest ad
vantage TO him.
WHY GENERAL LEE FEARED THAT THIS WOULD BIZ
DONE
II i said that Gen. Lee is amazed that Gen
Grant has not done this before and that he looks
for il to be done vet Il is common thing
among the officers Of Gen Lees staff to say of
Gen Grant that he always selects the most indi
rect way OF getting 10 object. and the way
that will cost the lives of the most soldiers and
that when that has failed then he will ADOPT some
more feasible plan. ana one involving not so
much bloOdshed. In the present instance they
say that he will abandon Petersburg and change
his base TO Bermuda Hundred, now that his flank
movement To the south OF Petersburg has failed
Bot Gen Lee himself. it is said, expected him TO
DO So instead of attempting to make this last
flank movement 1t it Is done in the manner in
dicaed in my last letter. It will give to Gen
Grant all the advantages which the capture of
Petersburg by coup de main would have Sc
cured to him. and il would enable him. too. TO
obtain possession of the Richmond md Dtnville
Railroad and thus TO cut off all communication
not only with Petersburg and Lynchburg bu;
also with South Carolina and Atlanta Gen
Lee believed that these considerations would
present themselves to the mind OF Gen. Grant,
and this il the reason why he thought that the
latter, as a good soldier. would make Bermuda
Hundred his base: because from that point he
could secure. without iuss. all the advantages
that the capture of Petersburg would give him
and many Others which would not have resulted
had Petersburg been taken by bombardment or
assault
WHAT THE REBELS THINK ABOUT FORT DARLING
AND GEN FOSTER
Speculation Is rife at Richmond in regard to
the recent mysterious movements of our iron.
clad fee in James river and also in respect TO
the landing the north side of that river above
Newmarket, OF Fosters division. So lar as Fort
Darling itself Is concerned. no apprehensions as
20 is safety are entertained; for it i believed to
be mpreguable TO attacks bo.h by land and
water II constitutes the let of the outer line
Of the southern defenses Of Richmond. There
are weak points IN that line but Fort Darling is
not one of them Nor Is there any more proba
/ bity that the distractions in the james river
will be removed now than there was six months
ago.
RICHMOND ABSOLUTELY INACCESSIBLE BY WATER.
The fact IS simply this: The rebels has sagac.
/ ,y enough 10 be sensible of the fact two wears
ago, that their capital was at eur mercy any time
We chose 90 take il, unless they could prevent
our sunboats from reaching e. The measures
which they adopted % effect this purpose they
believe ~ Oe such viii prevent any hostile
vessel from passing Fort Darling The efficacy
OF these measures of course remains 10 DE tested
But such absolute confidence would not be re-
nosed in them If there were not good reasons for
IT, They have bad two whole wears 70 perfect
their plans for this purpose
AZ ATTACK ~ RICHMOND FROM rHE EAST STILL
DREADED.
What they fear from our iron-cad feet IS that
il MAY be used 10 cover movement of our army
on Richmond from the southeast The landing
ot the .j,tle force of General Foster az New Mar
ket CD the 2ist inspired more real terror at
Richmond than had been felt there at anv time
since the battle Of Malvern Hill. in 1862 If
twenty-fve thousand men instead % General
Fosters little command, had been landed there,
thew might have marched into Richmond The
only TROOPS between them and the rebel capital
we're "a single division Of Hills corps The posi-
ton which General Foster uON holds affords a
better base Tor operations asiiust Richmond than
even bermuda Hundred II is ouly twelve miles
from the city The movements of Gen. Grant
I'm thar direction Will be watched by the rebels
With anxious ,o.ictude; for ON that field. they
believe the great contest for their capital will
Terminate DRUIp