The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1864-12-22
SaniOr..
Hood aud his Performances.

Hood aud bis Performances.
Now that Hoods army has been 80
reduced, that, like the command Of
PembertoD, it is Of the things that were,
it may not be inappropriate to give our
readers a summary OF what the rebel
leader has done, since assuming com
mand Of the department of the Ten
nessoeg .fh@
Daring the whole Of Johnston's ret
rograde movement, Hood protested
against theopolicy adopted byohis 50,
perior, and declared that all that was
needed to bear sherman, was to fight
him ofhis own personal courage, snd
readiness to incur al the dangersof
battle, there was no question; but Of
his aJiaty to successfully lead an army,
many grave doubts were entertained,
by rebels themselves, aud these have,
doubtless, now become Fixed convic-
tons.
When JOHNSON had reached Atlantis,
IN his backward march, the contest be-
tween the two policies eliminated.
JEFF Davis visited the place, and heard
t1e stories, suggestions, and complaints,
Of all parties; and finally superseded
johnson with Hood, who had been the
leader in the bold policy, and who had
declared that Atlanta could be readily
held
Within three days after assuming
command, he fought his first battle, By
taking the offensive. Johnston had not
dared 70 resist his advance: Hood
hurled his columns upon our lines, de
tsrmined, il possible, TO break them
and in this assault he was most terri
bly, beaten. Not discouraged, he re-
newed the assault on the 22d, and suf-
fered another terrible defeat; and f.
nally satisfied himself of the fruitless-
ness Of the attempt to drive Sherman,
on the 18th, after losing some 5000
more Of his men. A moderate estimate
Of his losses, in these three engage
ments, was 10000, and they probably
far exceeded these fgures
These assaults upon cur lines were
just what Sherman wanted. The rebel
army was SO weakened that it would
require but one bold stroke to take At
lanta; and though the time could not
have been long delayed, Hood, by his
foolish policy, fastened it fsAa.l
Determined to cut Shernan's com
munications, he sent his cavalry, un
der Wheeler, to the railroad between
here and Chattanooga, thereby leaving
the coast clear for Sherman. who at
once cut loose and captured Atlanta
here, again, his policy served our cause
Next, IS a precursor Of his "grand in
vasion," be sent Forrest into Tonnes
see, which caused Sherman to send
ssversl divisions Of infantry TO the
north. to protect his communications.
and these just got here, and into posi-
tion in time. to prevent Hood from
moving into Tennessee himself, and he
was compelled to take up his quarters
Ia Alabama, for time. But for the
warning given by Forrest, these men
would not have been here to resist, and !
Hood might have doue some serious
damage, by sudden dash.
In going into camps, preparatory to
his projected invasion, too, he showed |
an unusual want of discretion He
left hundreds Of miles between himself
snd Sherman; and the latter moved |
quietly off to Savannah, while the |
threatening attitude of Hood was such
as TO give Thomas full warning TO be on
his guard, and collect in scattered gar
risons, or make the necessary prepare
tions to collect them, when it became
necessary to do so.
When the rebel army commsncedi its
last northern march, Hood could not
zee that Thomas'Nwas falling back to
draw his adversary on; and he there
fore rushed after the retreating army,
es if 40 resistance was possible; yet
while he vigorously pressed US, he al
ways failed to see the appropriate time
70 strike. At Spring Hill, our forces
were not fully concentrate ted, and Hood
failed to take advantage of it, at Fran
kiln, our men were prepared for resist
Rnoe, and the rebel commander at
tackled Scho6eld, and was badly beaten
1t is impossible that Hood could have
taken Nashville under any circumstan-
ces; but if it was his intention 20 try
and it was-the time for the assault was
when our troops, wearied with marches,
had just arrived, and before they had
fairly got into positions but Hood did
not attack them
Hood. despairing Of taking the city,
ordered retreat but when? Not till
Thursday morning, when it was inn
possible for him TO get away, as Thomas
was pressing him closely. he might
have escaped on Thursday night, but
did not, and & loss of COCO more men
followed.
Such are the main features Of Hoods
campaign, upon which the rebels, and
particularly jeff Davis, based sneh high
hopes he has lost 10000 men, at the
least, since assuming command and
has not, TO day, Of al arms, 10000 left.
We heard brave officer, On going in.
70 battle, the other day, remark that be
hoped Hood would not get killed, as he
was the very man TO use up the rebel
army and no close observer bat will
agree with him on that subject. II
LATEST FR0N fHs FRONT.