Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1864-01-15
Probabilities of the Spring Cam
paign.

be little doubt as to the defeat OF lheli
armies and the closing up of the war a
an early date. With the projected move
ments of the enemy before us, our troop:
could be massed where they are needed
and we could make sure Of always meet
ing the enemy with equal or superior
numbers. 1t is to be hoped that the ex'
ecutive branch of the government viii
not be SO pre-occupied with politics, moi
our commanders so self-confdent, that the
enemy will no, be closely watched and
his plans discovered in time to checkmate
them. Otherwise we may have the hu-
initiation of seeing our lines crowded
back again, and the final victory defer
red,
1t is obvious that the great effort Of the
rebels will be to defeat and drive back
Gen. Grant. This is essential to them
If they cannot prevent his remaining
firmly fixed at Chattanooga, and making
that base Of operations against Atlanta
and afterwards against Savannah and
Charleston, they may as well give up
without any more fighting. But they are
not ready for that yet, and it is reasona-
BILE to expect that they will mass their
armies in the central department, and
make it their FIRST and great effort to re-
cover the ground they have lost there
And they will move early. They know
the importance Of taking the initiative,
and they have the advantage of mild
winter and an earlier spring for prePar-
atoms, and they also know that the chan
ces are that we shall be so slow and de-
iberate in our preparations that they can
surprise and take US at disadvantage By
an early spring campaign.
The rebels do not intend 10 abandon
Richmond and Virginia, but they will de-
it rather than risk failure in Georgia and
Tennessee by attempting to hold BOTH
The remoral of their government works
from Richmond to Columbia, S. c., is in
anticipation Of the necessity for abandon
ing Virginia, n, least temporarily
There are other indications pointing in
the same direction, and showing 4 deterN
mination 10 concentrate all their ayalla.
BILE forces for an attack upon Gen. Grants
army. The rebel troops in Arkansas are
reported to have received orders that
caused great excitement among them
They may have been ordered to cross the
Mississippi and make their way to Geor-
gia; and the advance upon Little Rock
lis in that case mere feint TO conceal
their real purpose. So also the reported
march Of Magruder'5 forces in Texas TO
attack our troops along The coast of that
state is quite likely to cover design to
move through northern Louisiana and
cross into Mississippi for the same desti-
nation. TIE raid of Forrest and Chal-
mers into western Kentucky and Tcnnes-
see may also cover a similar movement
of the troops in that state. And ihe adj
vance of rebel force down the Shenan-
doah valley probably conceals the move
ment of a part OF Lees army to reinforce
Longstreet, a process which appears to
be going on. A Richmond correspond
ent of the Mobile Advertiser states that
the confederate cabinet were lately in Sc.
cret consultation for several days, and al
though their decision is not made known
he says
81 trust ere this letter reaches its des.
tination, the people of the gulf states viii
receive tidings that the whole power Of
the government is to be welded in their
behalf, and that its whole energy is to be
concentrated against the invader. Al.
ready we hear of troops passing through
Atlanta. and we have Bragg's official an.
nouncement Of the retreat Of the enemy
back TO his fortress at Chattanooga. II
weather, roads, and a badly punished ar.
my compel him to delay bis advance till
the spring, h- will then find an obstacle
in his path which will make him trem.
be"
The tenacity with which Longstreet
holds his position in East Tennessee is
significant, and the limitations that he
will attempt a winter campaign against
Knoxville are not wholly Incredible
Possession of that point is worth every
thing to the rebels. If they can gain it
before Gen. Grant begins his spring cam
paign, and can plant a considerable force
there, they may break up all his plans
and make Chattanooga untenable; for
Gen. Grant could hardly remain there
with the enemy virtually in possession OF
his immense base line of three hundred
miles. This is an advantage that would
repay great struggle and great sac
riice to the enemy, and Gen. Lee can
now safely send half his Virginia army
to Long,treet, provided a winter cam
paigu is possible in East Tennessee
Indeed, if their transportation is sulli-
cient, they may hope to make a quick
and successful winter campaign, or an
early spring campaign against Knoxville,
lcomnel the pvacuntion of ChattanoOoa