Prescott journal. [volume] (Prescott, Wis.) 1861-1871, 1864-10-22

infamous declaration, invite them 10 DO SO!
will prove to you that this is no mere off
/ spring of my imagination. Some time ago,
| Lord Lyons wrote to his government an Off
cial dispatch, in which the following passage
occurred:
Sc Several of the leaders Of Lie Democratic party
sought intervieacs auth me- both before and after the
arrival Of the intelligence of Gen McCellans dis
missal. Tire object uppermost in their minds,
while they speaking 70 me. acas naturally that
i Of foreign mediation 6etaceen North and South -
Many OF them seemed to think that this mediation
must come at lasti but they appeared to be afraid
| of its coming too soon. it evident that they
| opprehended that a premature proposal of foreign
4 Intervention would afford the Radical party
means of reviving the violent spirit, and thus
of defeating the powerful plans OF the Conserys-
tiyes They appeared to regard the present mo-
1 ment Al peculiarly unfavorabe for such offer,
and indeed, to hold that it would be essential to
the success of any proposal from abroad that 1t
should be de, red until the control Of the EzectfUe
Government should be in the hands Of the COnserra-
| tire party"
So far Lord Lyons.
Foreign powers having at last found and
| seized upon a pretext for officially meddling
with our difficulties, such as your invitation
would give them-and indeed, remembering
Lord Lyons significant dispatch, this seems
| to be part of the Chicago programme-we
shall see the working of new agency in the
affairs of this continent; an agency which,
fortunately, was unknown to US as long as
the country was one and that agency is for
eigt influence.
The same reasons for which England and
France desired the breaking up of this Union,
the same reasons will also impel them to do
all they can to make separation permanent,
and the whole of their influence, powerful as
it will be-for the Confederacy will necessa-
rily lean upon her European friends-will be
thrown against reunion. That influence will
indeed be powerful, for it will not only ex-
tend to the Government, but 1T will at once
run through all the channels of trade. And
now is there anybody credulous enough to
believe that against such fearful odds you can
carry out the timid scheme with view 10
which you mean to stop the war? Foreign
influence, once admitted, as it will be by this
policy, will have the casting vote in all that
ponds between US and the South. We shall
not have two great powers on this continent,
but four, and all but one bitterly against re-
union. Divide and rule, is the old saying
but not those will rule that are divided
(Applause.) Whatever our ultimate decision
may be after such developments, whether to
resume the war at once, or to acqulesce IN
separation; and then, after a short breathing
spell, launch into the confusion of new con-
flict, there is one thing certain We shall find
the South SO immensely strengthened, that il
for people like ours any task could be hope
less, this would be hopeless indeed
And in the same measure as the South will
be strengthened by this Chicago policy, SO
we shall be weakened. / have already al
luded to the Generalization and disintegra-
ton of our military strength by its effect
But that is not all.
At present the enlightened opinion of the
liberal masses of Europe is on our side. That
opinion may IN "A crisis prove strong enough
j to bride the action of governments. How
can we expect that opinion to be true to US,
, if we are treacherous to ourselves! With
what face can we demand its generous sup
port if we confess failure and throw doubt
: upon the justice and humanity of our cause
+ You have heard of the people of Germany
pouring their gold lavishly into the treasury
of the United States (Applause.) You
have heard of loan ola thousand millions
having been offered, and now in progress oil
: negotiation. Would those people who are
standing by us SO generously i'll our embar
easements, would they have done so, if they
{ did not trust in our ability and determination
to carry through the war? And now they
are told by party who boast of being able
TO grasp the reins of government, that the
war is failure, and being failure, and be
! ing unjust, inhumane and ruinous, must be
/, given up. You, who are so clamorous about
the condition of our treasury, do you cal
; that raising our credit abroad do you cal
that helping our finances out of a distressed
condition? Truly, if it were your avowed
object to reduce the Government to total i'm.
potency for want of means, to render the ma.
ton incapable of vigorous movement, to lay
it PROSTATE in utter helplessness at the feet
of its enemies your means could not be more
, judiciously chosen, you could not operate
with more internal acutencss. Great ap.
pause.
We may ask ourselves How is it possible
that policy so utterly absurd, reckless and
pernicious, should find any supporters among
men whose sound sense and patriotism are
not completely extinguished? l find the
reason in a vague impI here and there
prevailing, that the Union and universal good
feeling may be restored by policy of concil.
iation and compromise. l find it in the gen.
erous impulses of magnanimous hearts, which
|, insist that those who are conquered and
brought to terms, should be attached to us by
a kind and forbearing treatment. There is
no man in this country who would be less in
clined than | to listen to the prOmptings of
vengeance and resentment But while we
{ are willing to act with a sincere desire to
heal all wounds by generous accommodation,
do you not see, that before we find a field for
that magnanimity in offering terms to the
conquered, the rebels must first be conquer
Gu anu DIOuSuG W eciiHS. NApplduocsJ anu
do you not further see, that if we follow the
Chicago policy, the chance is rather, the reb-
els will be masters of the situation and bring
us to terms? Still, as the feeling / speak of
is vague and indefinite, and may make itself
heard independently of the Chicago platform,
/ viii say word on compromise in its gen.
eral aspect.
CONSEQUENCES OF OFFERING A COMPROMISE.
compromise with the rebellion offered
on our part, would necessarily contain two
conditions: first, an abandonment of some es-
sential point determined by the national
election of 1860, for that was the occasion
on which the rebels seeded; and secondly,
the stipulation that the rebels shall give up
the struggle and return to their allegiance
Every sensible man who has his eyes open,
knows that the rebels will certainly reject
compromise containing the second stipula-
ton, as long as they entertain any hope of
achieving their independence. The question
arises, Would it be good policy to offer the
first, even by way of experiment?
1 have already said enough to make it evil
dent that as long as the rebels have conf
dence in their ability to win ultimate success,
they will insist on their terms and not think
of accepting ours. We must therefore shake
that confidence. How shake it BY dis
n II \