Lewistown gazette. [volume] (Lewistown, Pa.) 1843-1944, 1864-05-04
MISCELLANEOUS,
THE MCCLELLAN REPORT.

report, in the n. Y Times, are still con-
tiuued We make an extract from last
Saturdays article:
Two decisive battles had now been
fought on the Chick ickahominy-Fair Oaks
and Gaines Mill They were rot battles
of McClellan's seeking-tbey were brought
on by the rebes, and we are thus presented
with the odd spectacle of General seek
ing special theatre of war for the pur.
pose of making not only an offensive, but
rapid and brilliant movement, com
PEELED each time he met the enemy to fight
on the detensiUe. We have the further
spectacle of the man who was constantly
clamoring tor reinforcements, and con.
stantly putting the blame of his failures
to the lack of renforcements, FIGHTING his
tao CHIEF toHles, the first uith one hoU,
t0rce!
To the last we find him persistine in the
demand for more troops-to the last we
fnd the man who was ready to
"Drnk up Esile, eat a crocodile"
doing nothing with what he had IF at
this instant, says he, the day after the
battle OF Gaines Mill. Il could dispose of
tn Thousand resh men, | could gain the
victory tomorrow "a statement to which
we might reply that had he not allowed
Porters corps to bc slaughtered the day
before. he would have had the ten thous-
a.d be there lost But it is very remark
ab:e that, W,th al enemy 'two hundred
thou-aud' strong, and behind strong in.
lreuchments. be should have deemed him
self capabie OF gaining the victory with
feeble reinforcement Of ten thousand
men, which would have been no more than
he had during all the time he did not
gain victory In fact, his victories on
paper and in hypothesis, are part of the
wonderful phenomena OF Gen. Mcclellan S
character.
Having lost his base, and the enemy be-
ing planted across his communications, it
only remained for Mcclellan to beat a re-
treat to the James River. This act he
dignifed at the time by the euphomism
Of change OF tase'-a phrase which has
since then acquired a ludicrous meaning it
will be long TO lose.
The retreat to the James, considering
the bulk of the enemy was on the left bank
OF the Chlckahominy and long march off,
was not difficult But, Notwithstanding
this fact, and that the troops were put in
the most obvious positions, and that in no
case was Gen. Mcclellan present at any of
the engagements TIE seven days fight
this movement has been claimed as mas
terly piece of strategy-cOmparable say
his admirers, only to Moreau's retreat
through the Black Forrest And we dare
say that the credit in the one case is about
as just as in the other; for Napoleon pro-
claims that Moreau's retreat was ithe
greatest bunder he ever committed As
the Directory, adds he, could not give
Moreau credit for victory, fhey did for
a retreat, ,achich they erased to be ertoNed
IN the highest terms; but instead of credit.
Moreau merited the greatest censure and
disgrace for it, We leave the parallel to
the readers own apprehension
In all the battles during this retrogade
movement, we have the same utter want
of head-Gen. Mcclellan in each case be
ing absent getting fresh position to fall
back upon. This is the first time that we
had known that it is the first and highest
duty of Commanding General to recon.
noitre positions for retreat The Corps
Commanders, says Gen. Sumner, in his
testimony before the Committee on the
conduct of the War, fought their troops
according to their ocn ideas We helped
each other. If anybody asked for rein
forcements, | sent them; if | wanted rein.
forcements, | sent to others He (Mc
Clellan) was the most extraordinary man
| ever saw. do not see how any man
could ieaUe so much to others, and be so
confident that everything toould go just
right Even at the last of the series of
b,ttles, when defeat would have thrown
his army into the James river, at Malvern,
we find bin, with the exception of brief
period previous to and at the end of the
fight, away 'on b ard gunboat.' and this,
Notwithstanding the admitted fact that the
innate valor oi our troops gave the enemy
50 decided a repulse that, # vigc rously
followed up, they might even then have
been followed up In to Richmond.
So ends the story of the strange event
full campaign on the Peninsula-a cam.
paign which, though ill-planued, was worse
executed, and in which the utter incapacl
ty OF the Commanding General to take ad
vantage of even such opportunities as for
tune threw in bis way, was most signally
demonstrated. Gen. Mcclellan did not
bring back with him such an army as he
had taken away, He brought back an
army demoralized, worn down by useless