The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1864-03-08
Why all was not done that might have
been Done.
what has been EFected.
The Reason for His Return TO VIcks-
burg,

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burg,
The mystery which has so long
shrouded the designs of Gen. Sherman
are beginning to be dispelled by the
course Of events. That he is now re
firing leisurely to Vicksburg, without
the least apprehension of danger, APP
pears to be settled, if we are to believe
the statements Of rebel kilograms, bear
ing different dates, and sent from
diverse points, by various parties; and
their general concurrence is evidence of
their truthfulness.
The question, then, naturally arises:
what were his designs, and how far was
he enabled to accomplish his purposes ?
And preparatory to answering, it viii
be necessary to briefly refer to the stu
alton of affairs in Mississippi
The farmers of the northern, and
central portions of that State, relying
on federal advance, and feeling Sc
cure on account Of their isolation, from
rebel impressments, had planted large
ly, both of corn and potatoes; but not
withstanding the hoped for immunity,
no sooner had the crops matured, than
a heavy cavalry force, under Lee and
Forrest, was sent thither, to gather
them, and send them to railroad stations
for transportation to Georgia. The
subsistence thus obtained, was a mat
ter of the first importance to the rebels;
and well did the Richmond Wing de-
clare that to cut these off, would be to
damage them more than to win a vic
tory.
In the next place, the railroad from
Selma to the Big Black, was in running
order; and we have reason to believe
that it was meditated at Richmond, to
seize and hold some point on the Mis-
sissippi; at least to hold it long
enough to interrupt communication for
some time, and perhaps to draw rein
forcements from Arkansas, or Texas.
In the attempt, they must have failed;
but a large force would have been ne
cessary, in order to thwart their de
signs. Indeed, a few thousand rebel
troops, judiciously distributed, might
keep large army employed, in defend
ing the banks of the river
The expedition of Sherman has not
only cut off the rebel supplies, to which
we have referred, but it has also rem
dered an attack on any point on the
Mississippi untenable The destruction
Of the railroad to the TOmbigbee, is better
than defending. force Of 10000 men.
That road has been effectually de
stroyed Bridges, ties and culyerts
were burned, and rails bent so as to
render them worthless; and we are all
aware that there are not facilities in
Dixie to replace them; indeed, we
doubt if, under any circumstances, the
road could be put in running order in
four months.
But this was not all The extension
Of this road was destroyed as far as the
Tombigbee, and perhaps farther, though
we have no positive information upon
that point; and the Mobile and Ohio
road was rendered equally worthless,
as far South as Quitman, and to place
twenty miles north of Meridian
This viii effeetually cut off the corn
fields of North Mississippi, and win end
all apprehensions of rebel raid on the
Mississippi river.
1t is almost certain that Sherman
would have penetrated as far as Mont-
gomery, had not the expeditions of
Smith and Grierson failed, and render
ed communication with the Tennessee
river impossible Much has been lost
by that failure; but with this drawback,
Sherman's expedition has been produc-
tive of as many advantages as any
other since the war began.
We will also refer to one thing more
it effected 1t is not now out of place
to refer to the weakness of our army,
during the winter, on account of the
absence of two-thirds of the men on
veteran furlough; the return of the
greater portion of these troops, with
the arrival of large bodies of recruits,
has rendered it useless to hold the
secret longer The diversion created
by Sherman prevented Johnston from
attempting to take any advantage of
our weakness; and if nothing but this
had been accomplished, the expedition
would not only have been fully justified,