Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-09-08

battle of Shiloh If it had come frou any competent
source there would have been lack Of official evidences
10 show that not until the day oil the battle did either
General Grant General HAleck supp0se that General
Grants army "imperilled.p Ia alusi0n to II 10 an
official statement more than year ago, General Bael
merely The movement which preceded The battle
| was prompt and even rapid. marched from Nashville
not TO those forces but TO form junction with
them to operate against the enemys position at Cornth
was informed that should find Gen Grants army at
Savanna the east side of the river and surprised
and concerned, whn heard during the march that
it on the west bank but was relieved from anxiety
by the information that it protected by high water
the streams which interpossd between 1T and the enemy
and nearly surrounded it, as to bs perfectly secure"
We next find Gen Buels army occupying the centre in
the advance upon COrinth under Gen Haeck and rein
forcing Gen Pope in the pursuit. until it was discontinued
by Gen Haecks order after the evacuation by the enc
my About the 10th of June by Gen. Hslecks order ne
commenced moving eastward to advance into East
but being required to repair the Memphis and Charles
ton railroad he proceeded and to guard it until his
troops were relieved he ouy arrived at Huntsville up
wards of hundred miles from COrnth about tho lst oil
july with less than 25 900 and his last division was
only relieved from guarding the road in time to join him
the 3lst of July Foreseeng from the first that the
road from Cornth could not be kept open and that 1t
would be useless to him for supplying his army no had
been busy in opening the roads through Nashville, which
the enemy had destroyed in retreang from Middle Ten
in March, In the time the enemy was also
active The bulk Of the army of Bsauregard, which had
opposed the three combined armies that had advanced
upon Corntb under Gen Haleck transferred mainly
by railroad to Chattanooga before the last OF July AT
least 900 men, with what already there thus
placed 10 East Tennessee under Bragg and KIRBY Smith
and large cavalry force which Buelrs cavalry
rey insufficient to cope with, thrown upon the three
hundred and miles of railroad upon which he de-
pending for supplies and when the road far back
Nashville at length repaired and rendered secures the
road north Of Nashville eectualy broken, and its
establishment rendered impossible without the withdrawal
of considerable force from the 'front.' already too weak
Although the experiment f supplying large army at such
distance by snge railroad through hostile territory,
until then unred in war, and although the power Of
the enemy to operate against such line undeveloped
yet Gen Buell. had oreseen the advantage which the
my could derive from the elements and had applied,
successfully for larger force of cavalry to counterfeit
them. 1t will be remembered that such advantages
poyed by the enemy against Gen. Grant when he not
than eighty miles from his base compelled him TO
abandon the land movement against Vicksbug and return
i to Memphis. N .r,-t (.
The enemy commenced moving north from East Tennes
about the lSh Of August with than 60 900
Without undertaking state exactly what number Of
troops Gen. Buell. had it will suffice to say that the enemy
outnumbered him whereas and the experience of
his the field for the last two years,
chow that the odd ought to have been reversed AS it
he not able to concentrate far n advance
McMinnvlle more Than 81 900 At length, after
maneuvriDg to bring the enemy to battle on the route
which he expected to take and finding his supplies
rapidly diminishing, he concentrated his army promptly at
Murreesboro about the 9Th of September but instead
of advancing that direction expected the enemy
proceeded due north towards Kentucky-the main army
under Bragg moving in direct ne sixty miles east OF
Nashvile and the lesser under Kirby Smith passing west
of Cumberland Gap and defeating Mt Richmond the fol
in Kentucky longer under Gen Buels comm snd hch
attempted to oppose the invasion Leaving 900 men to
hold Nahvile, which he had previously ordered be for
tfd Gen Buell. moved rapidly with the remainder of bic
force to counterfeit the design of the enemy He did not
as The Tribune says move route parallel to that
the enemy but nearly at right angles to it, and
striking it at Glasgow Mumfordsvie but the enemy
having shorter distance to march, reached Mumfordsve
before him captured the garrison that place.
exposed, and continued his march Gen Buell. drove
Briggs guard ont of Mumfordsvie and followed hin
closely until be turned off to form junction with the 90
lumn under Kirby Smith. Buell. then moved directly OF
Louisville to anticipate any design of the enemy tina
place. and form Junction with the raw troops that had
been hurriedly assembled there.
The Tribune rightly describes his Of the onges
and most rapid marches Of the but that paper ant
the Post, more gDorany perhaps than malciously call
retreat IL was no more retreat than was the
ment Of The Army of the Potomac from the
to meet Lees army in Pennsylvania An army in rerea
when suitable opportunity offers
The Tribuns absurdly says that Gen Buell. in marchn.
north after Bragg ordered Andrew johnson evacuate
Nashville aud so abandon all Tennessee-which johnson
refused to do" johnson had command in Tennessee
aud no authority power to dsobey order of Gen
Buell. Nor has It before been asserted that any such
was ever gVen but 1T has been said that Johnsous
tulatons prevented Buell. from giving the order Gen
Buell., IN the official statement heretofore alluded to- treats
this story 10 these words:
Some months ago statement appeared in the newspa
per the reported authority Governor ndrew johnson
that had only been prevented by his resolue
from abandoning Nashville when moved north with my
army in September last lie snce made the same
ton in deposition Whenever have spoken this sub
lec' have denounced the statement fslse and ncw
repeat thai dennncstion very willing bear tho
responsibility oil my inonons; and IL gives
sincere pleasure Al all times to acknowledge any assistance
may recei otkers either in counsel or action If
Ia determined to abandon Nashville 1t would have been
upon best Judgment and should cheeruly have sub
med 10 verdict on the wisdem of my / assert
that minated to Governor johnson intention
wh to leave Nashville without garrison that there
DO discussion between pro the subject
the determination to hold the place my own unindu
enced by him any had that confidence In
his uegmen that dstrus OF my own (which would have
induced to seek bis counsel On account of hs Official
position called on him irst inform him what meant 10
do and last To tell him what garrison had concluded 10
leave On both occasions far my plans concerned
the speaker aud he the listener MY officers were far
more hkey 10 know my views than he and they hav e
stated that said always that the poll cs Importance the
occupation far ont eighed purely military bearing
| the question, and that should hold the city,"
by the time of the arrival of Buels rear division at
Louisville after the march above described find the
troops that he found there moi merely added TO but
Incorporated nt his old army and prepared to march the
next morning against the enemy The campaign which
ensued is matter OF official record march Of seventy.
five miles from Louisville brought Con Buell. into collision
with Bagg's army at Perryvle The Tribune says truly
rendered it necessary to make suitable
Tor the decisive battle that TO be expected but the
Tribune not justified in saying that Bue's army was
wosted, in blaming him because the whole of his force
not engaged or 10 sayng that the enemy retreated
because he greatly outnumbered He reiterated
doubtless because he believed il safest and his loss in
killed. wounded and prisoners in Kentucky did not prob
ably tall short Of 8 900 The examples are not rare
10 the history 96bis and other VIII army has
effected re under less favorable circumstance
Gen. Bael continued the pursuit long it promised