The Vermont transcript. [volume] (St. Albans, Vt.) 1864-1870, 1864-08-12
The Present Crisis.

1t is too evident from the speech of
people and from the tone of the pub
lie press that feeling of disappoint-
ment, not to say dependency, in re-
gard to our military matters, has seized
hold of the popular mind Our peo-
pie have expected too much in too
limited space of time-have been over
sanguine of immediate success. They
have not been content to "hasten
slowly" according to the Latin prov
erb. They have raised their expect
atoms too high and with every new
reverse they have been gradually grow
ing more and more depressed and dis
heartened.
This ought not SO to be. We should
"learn to labor and to wait" AS one
of our exchanges very properly re-
marks, "the people of the North have
been very frankly told that they would
have to meet the rebels fighting with
the energy of desperation. The insur-
gent leaders understand very well their
position-which is the defence of the
edge of their last ditch, if we choose
to make it such. They are fierce and
frantic of course; for with them every
thing is at stake. Are the loyal peo-
pie ready to accept the opportunity
offered them, and the task it imposes
upon them? That is the question for
them to settle; and they ought to set
tie it by the sternest determination, to
allow no partial reverses to disheart-
en- them, and to push forward the re-
Inducements so that the fearful strug-
gle shall be the last This is no hour
for dependency or relaxation of eff
fort. 1t is just the hour for vigilance,
resoluteness, and uncomfortable vigor
and activity. The enemies of the
country are full of the courage of mer
who have nothing to lose but every
thing to gain. 1t becomes the friends
of the country to understand this, ant
be equal to the crisis. If they are so
the conflict, however fearful, can b,
ended, and the triumph Of the RICH
be the winning of secure peace.
The repulse at Petersburg was on
of those Notifying incidents which
illustrate almost every successful cam
paign from the time of Hannibal t,
that of Napoleon and Wellington
Though probably not SO severe n
Sherman's reverse at Kenesaw Noun
tain, it will excite for the moment
large measure of Copperhead clamoi
Sherman's reverse did not long stol
Sherman's advance, and the invest
ment of Atlanta has already dimme,
the memory of Kenesaw. So wit
Grants failure in his assault on Pc
tersburg. 1t is bad in itself, but
will have little effect on the decisio
of the campaign, and will only stimr
late the Commanding General to ne'
efforts of skill and intrepidity. Tf
nacity in holding on to his main oil
ject in spite of disappointments an
reverses, gave Grant Vicksburg in tn
end. The same iron determinatio
will. in the end, give him Richmond.
Perhaps our readers would like
have their recollections refreshed wit
what occurred nine days before til
surrender of Vicksburg. On the 25t
of June, fort, which had been mine
by Gen. Grant, was blown up, and
strong Federal column advanced I
the assault. but after bloody contef
with the enemy was compelled to r.
tire. On the Goth of June. anothe
mine was sprung, but vas followed /
no assault On the 4th Of July Wick
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