The Union and journal., 1864-10-28

rebellion. who had for years marked his men to
be of use to him when his great conspiracy
should culminate. knew his protege rs an inof-
fensive man, thoroughly imbued with southern
aristocratic notions Of slavery and "chivalry,
and rs loyal to the South as he was to the North
and South.
What more natural than that on his return
from Europe the entente eoraidie shouiu oe
kept up by Jetf.'s granting him another COM
mission! And what 50 natural as 10 nhd MIN
in 1850 united with the breckenridge pemoo-
racy." which, rs il has since proved, divided
the Democratic party that they might have a
pre,ext in the election OF Lincoln to divide the
country and which wing advocated the belief
that slavery was the normal condition OF the
territories!
And so, with these antecedents, We find him
one year later commanding our armies, whose
mission could never be fulfilled until his ''south-
ern friends" including JEFF. himself, should be
subjugated and banished the country. Can 1t
be possible that the remembrance Of the many
favors he received from his eoUfrerss ut the
South. and the gratitude which he felt to Da.
Wis. fingered on his memory and in his heart to
poison his brain that il could not plan, and
paralyze his arm that II could not win. victo-
ry for the Union, Bear in. mind, We do not
claim that the circumstances narrated by US al
low no other conclusion than that suggested
above. But we do claim that, looking at the
consistent failure Of Mcclellan to ogain any van
tage over the rebels. a conclusion affecting his
loyalty is not altogether unwarranted, and the
fact of his being the candidate Of the copper
heads by no means wcakens the inference.
Perhaps with this light we may more readily
solve the deep mystery OF his conduct in the
war. We first dud him making gratuitous of
fers to the rebels to catch their runaway slaves,
and to use the whole army to suppress any
slave insurrec,ion in their midst, so that all
their energies might he girded up wherewith to
war for their peculiar institution. There was
another" breckenridge Democrat, "rare,' y not
"Ben Jonsou," hut Ben. Butler. who gave n
different keynote to the management Of slaves
who fled to our lines, not because OF his SYM
pathy with the blacks, bit because his theory
OF making war meant the destruction Of that
power warning upon the Union. not by
strategy" not by "exhaus,ng all the resour.
ces OF craftsmanship" but by staggering, crush
ing blows. McClellan's theory was far differ.
ent. He was to gain "boodless" victories that
should leave the war power Of the South intact,
That could easily be done. The war could be
prolonged until people, disheartencd by debt
and taxes aud by seeing nothing accomplished,
should throw the blame upon the Almiuistra-
ton where our hero tried to place all blame,
and overthrow the Administration by substitute
ing the Democratic party whose Presidential
candidate he was sure to be, since through him
alone such state of things was to be brought
about.
In whata position our young Napoleon would
then be to treat with his whilom friends and as
sociates What influence he would have with
those men in whose plans he hal figured, in
that delightful campaign TO an island in the
sea How he could then administer the "Con-
stitu,ion IA It is" interpreted by JEFF Dayis)
aud the "Union rs il was" with Davis and
Thompson and Floyd in the Cabinet) Apret-
Is picture surely, but the people would nothaye
il 50.
But here we dismiss the individual, thinking
that by better understanding Of the Man and
fathoming his motives. we can more readily APP
precia,e the method of his failures.