The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-07-01
AcEaoR cAa.
More than One Great Battle to be
ng Avoided.
How the Campaigns Before Rich
mOnd and Before Atlanta
Affect Each other.
Correspondence of the World.

Among the letters in the rebel mail that was
recently intercepted here, were some that re-
ferred to that pa of the plan of the campaign
which has been intrusted to Gen Johnston.
These letters were written by persons whose
official position in two instances, and whose
relationship in another, gives great weight and
authenticity TO what they say. From these and
other more remote sources, have derived the
following facts in relation to the present
movements of Gen. Johnston in Georgia:
The successive retreats of the rebel army
under Gen. Johnston from Dalton to Resaca,
from Resaca to the line of the Etowah River,
and from the Etowah to Marietta and the line
of the Chattahoochee River, Cor it has been
determined that he shall eventually take that
last step), gives great discomfort to the people
in tie South: but it IS really what the South
ern leaders had determined on before the cam
paign began, The Rebellion is not on its last
legs yet, nor have the rebels got in their armies
now all their fighting men. Still their armies
have cost them TOO mach and are raised with
too much difficulty, to allow the life of sin
gle soldier to pc thrown away usclessly, and
their generals, therefore, in this campaign
avoid all engagements the results of which
would only be the fruitless sacrifice of their
men. SIG. Doc f3ril Tf 'tl .
THE REBELS AvERsE TO FIGHTING MORE THAN
ONE GREAT BATTLE IN GEORGIA.
In arranging the details of the campaign in
Georgia, it was seen that at least one great
battle must be fought between Chattan ooga
and Atlanta, but they hoped to fight that battle
at such time and under such circumstances
of position, &C.. that it should not only be de-
cisive of the campaign in that it would deliver
Atlanta from all fears of subsequent attack, but
that 1t would have these two further results:
LIST That Shermans army would be entirely
destroyed, or at least SO severely crippled that
to retreat north of the Ohio river would be all
that it could do. And I'd. That Johnstons ar
my, after securing the permanent safety of At
lanta, would be in a condition to move rapidly
to the east and TO join Gen. Lee in defeating
the forces operating against Richmond. And
they hoped that one battle would be sufficient
to enable them to gain these ends. The only
question then was, where and when should
this battle he fought? Evidently where the
rebels would be the strongest and the federals
the weakest: where the rebels would be near
est to their base and the federals farthest from
their base; at point whence the rebel army,
after the battle. could be most speedily trans
ported to Virginia, and at point whence the
federal army, after being defeated or repulsed,
would have the greatest difficulty and the long,
est route to traverse in retreating to Nashville
All these conditions, it is claimed. meet and are
found in the rebel position On the left bank of
the ehattahoochee river, six miles northwest
of Atlanta: and in no other position which
General Johnston has abandoned.
JoHNsToN's MOVEMENTS DEPENDENT ON GEN.
GRANTS. -'..'
The execution of this plan in the manner
proposed depended greatly upon the progress
OF the campaign against Richmond. And the
rebel leaders claim that the results which have
followed the adoption of the overland route by
General Grant, his frequent changes of base,
and his final abandonment of that line " and
the adoption of the Peninsula route; and then
abandoning that route, and seeking to estab-
fs,t hasa t. 4
ly facilitated their operations in the West
Nothing decisive, they say, has yet taken place
in Virginia, unless it he fresh demonstrations
OF the impractibility of operations against Rich
mond by the overland route. The obstacles to
the capture of Richmond, which lay before
General Grant when he set out on his cam
paign, lie before him now just the same He
has only lost in getting to them, $4,000 men,
whom he might just as we'll have had with him
to day; but for this very prominent trait in
General Grants character, they rather like him
than not. Their losses in this overland cam
paign have not been one quarter as large as
ours. The South could not stand the same
drain upon her population that the war has
made upon ours. If General Lees army had
lost half as many men as we have in the last
six weeks, it would to day be completely cut
up, and utterly incapable even of respectable
resistance. If the accounts of rebel losses that
are published in administration papers were
correct, they would snow that the rebels have
lost more men in battle than they ever had in
their armies.
JOHNSTON TAXES HIS CUE FROM LEE.
The rebel leaders claim that General Lees
inaneuvers have been successful. in that, with
a smalklOes to their army, and very large one
to ours, they have drawn the Federal army far
away from its capital. and brought it to where
it must spend months after months in profit
less siege operations. Their confidence in the
absolute impregnabilty of their capital is un-
shaken and il must be admitted by those who
know the facts that it is well founded. The
time has now come, therefore, they say, when
the part of the campaign which has been in-
trusted to General Johnston viii he developed.
WHAT THE REBELS THINK OF SHERIDAN.
They understand the recent hesitation OF
Sherman, at Allatoona Pass to mean that that
officer comprehends their plans now, if he has
not done so before, and is striving to counter
act them by new combinations. Singular as
NAV seem. the rebel leaders have q much
greater respect for, and a far deeper dread of
Cen Sherman than for Gen Grant, They be-
Heve that he is soldier of real genius, while
Grant, they say, is distinguished only for bull
dog tenacity, and utter disregard for the life
OF his soldiers. Whatever respect they may
have had for Grant TWO months ago is now en-
tirely obliterated bv his giving up hisown plan
for marching on Richmond and adopting that
of the President "a fact which was as well, an,
as soon, known at the latter city as 1t was in
Washington); and then being compelled in the
end to adopt the despised plan of Gen. McClel-
Ian. They believe that Gen Sherman Is SO
deeply impressed with the gravity of his posi-
ton (and It needs the study of good map; to
see 1t in all its bearings) that he will pause for
while and wait for further developments at
the east, while he fortifes bis present position,
which happens TO be an admirable one for the
purpose. a'c'7fo' -no9 ni'9 5dAlIoi '''7
r. GEN. JoHSsTON's PLAN OF oPERAT1oNs.oJ 9a
Gen. Johnston's plan il believed at Rich,
mona 20 % 70 pursue the same course at Ma
netta wnicn he did ct Resaca, and then to re-
tire behind the Chattaho0che. In order to a.
tack him and advance on Atlanta, Gen. Sher-
d map must. cross that stream, which is one Of
bank of the river Is hilly and sfscp and ia
decisive battle in Georgia win eitRsf take nlScs,
when Generaa Sherman attempts t0 c1rt,ss r., -.
at some point between It and Atlauta, tisnta
itself is very strongly fortified. Even If the
rebel army should be worsted in the encounter
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