The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-08-05
SPIRIT OF THE NEW YORK PRESS
Leading Editorials from the New York
Papers This Morning.
ETERsBURe-CAUsE AND RESULTS.


PETERsBURG-CAUsEs AND RESULTS.
From Ne Tr4Bsns
The general belief which has existed from the
hrst, that the failure at Petersburg WAS due pri-
marily 70 blunders, finds ample confirmation In
the concurrent testimony of correspondents. Re-
luctant to criticize, we have withheld cepsure Till
1t seems essential to delay no longer. We have
to say, therefore -
1. General Grants plan was we'll matured
feasible, and ought 10 have succeeded. Had h
succeeded, Petersburg Woud have fallen
y Dethils or its execution were left 70 General
bieane, VINO Is the executive officer Of the Army
Oi the fotOmac. He IS responsible for the choice
OF troops composing the assaultng column, and
ioI All such arrangements did not fall specially
"ahin tue province Of corps commander.
8 General Burnside's Corps having been desig-
4 mated TO carry the Cemetery HILL that General
becomes responsible for the handling of his troops
upon the teld, unless relieved OF Il by specific
orders Upon him, therefore, or upon General
Meade, seems TO be the blame Of the DELAY which
intervened between the springing of the mine
ana the forward movement Of tho column OF
assault, which was the first and probably fatal
error on the actual field. II is plain that the ex
Ploson should have been instantly followed by
the ASSAULT yet there was a delay of from half
an hour 20 an hour, giving time for the enemy to
recover from his surprise and concentrate his
forces on the point indicated for assault
a. Still worse was the conduct of the division
20 which the attack was intrusted. Starting late
there was just one hope for ito attack with i'm
petuosity. Instead of which General Iedlie
halted his column within the crater formed by,
the explosion, and wasted invaluable time In
digging out two guns-a hesitation utterly ineX.
pllcaole. The two guns were as nothing TO cover
the movement Of hs column. To have hurIaJ
his men forward-that was the chance of success
and was thrown away.
SO far as geAeralship goes, our criticism stops
1 with the first advance of the troops When
4 Ledlle actually moved the best hope of victory
4 had departed, but his men went forward with a
certain degree OF resolution. Their officers tried
nard 70 carry them up the hill but the fire which
delay had permitted the enemy TO direct upon
them was terrific, and they came back again.
The assault was neither heroic in its steadiness
nor disgraceful by preclptate retreat Consider
ing 70 what needless peril the men were exposed
and that the service on which they were sent is
the most difficult IN war, they behaved we'll Tho
second assault, by the division of cOlored troops
was as resolute as the hrst-appareutly neither
more nor less so. But thew were put TO do an
impossible thing. When the first column had
been repulsed there was no longer any hooe
except in superhuman Valor.
SO much for the causes Of this repulse, now as
70 its military results.
IL General Grant had succeeded-as he had A
right to expect-he would, as we said above have
taken Petersburg. Cemetery Hill is the key to
the whole system of Rebel defenses Bat the
failure is the failure of one effort-by no means
Iof the siege, or of the operations against Rich
mond. The losses are not heavy-are, in fact,
less than in any previous engagement of import
IL
siye while 1t Is not even serious.
There Is talk OF Lees sending his main army |
TO reinforce Early; to reinforce Hood; rs If ope-
rations near Petersburg were at an end. We |
should Ike TO believe he has done either When |
Hancock crossed the James before the explosion |
OF Saturday, and ht- icint compelled the detlch-
ment of o portion OF Lees force to meet him, |
Lee was nearer to destruction than ever before; |
and well knows it. We cannot believe he will |
cisk the permanent separation of u corps from |
his Petersburg garrison taught as he has been, |
with what indomitabe resolution his adversary |
clngs 10 his purpose
But Ii he has If Hill has gone TO Early, by !
the Shenandoah or upon the Rapahannock tho !
initiative which Grant has maintained from the |
beginning OF this campaign is mono the less his
at this moment. Nothing can relax his hold |
upon Richmond, which the position south of the I
james secures him, nor will the position ever be
relinquished: II Hill goes to Early, General |
Grant may gladly send force enough 10 the POtO-
mac TO destroy the combination, but he will not |
be content with that achievement alone. 1t is
likely he does contemplate settling this Shenau-
doah business decsively-he the enemys force
what 1t may-but should it prove that Lee Is
cajoled by the show Of success at Petersburg into
sending heavy detachments away from that point,
1t may prove the cause of his destruction and the
prelude 10 the fall of Richmond
At all events we can ak nothing better in n
military point Of view than such suicidal diyi-
sion OF the army of the Rebellion. An invasion
OF PennsS lvania or attack on Washington is no
militarily consistent with the security of Rich.
mond. Lees army Is an army of defense-no o.
riOusly inferior in numbers TO that of General
Grants, and able to resist it solely by acting on
the defensive, When 1t attempts 10 reverse the
conditions OF its successful operation, its infe-
-Tiority of numbers will insure its defeat
From which 1t follows that ths event of last
Saturday has by no means changed the situation
or the relations between General Grant and his
antagonist. The siege of Richmond continues
and the effort which will most accelerate It's fall
Is such movement into the Shenandoah as Lee
Is supposed 10 be making.