The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-06-02


build privatoers In French pOrz-
TAs War and the Currescy.
Our armies arc. beyond ell question, victo-
rious in the two great theatres In which tho war
RACES. Grant has given tho most substantial
evidence OF his ability to beat Lee, and il 10
hardly doxbtsd that he will take the rebel oapl
tai Sherman, In Georgia, has driven Johnston
from point to point, until II has become prob
fematical whether or no Johnston can make any
decided stand at oil; and there Is, finally, de-
Hnite confidence In tho popular mind that the
rebellion will soon and certainly bs put down.
Yet with all this, tho price Of gold continues TO
80 up This apparent vagary on the part Of
gold exoites . great deal Of surprise; for the
people think that, - our armies win battles,
gold must 20 down. But 1t shosld be considered
that other things affect tho price OF gold besides
the operations Of armies
In rejecting on the causes likely TO depre-
ciate the value Of our currency the people look
at once to the war ~ the main or only ono.
whereas il Is only just to consider that influence
after We have considered IL moro immediate
influences to be found in the administration OF
the national finances. Causes within the ma
tional sxchequer always affect the value Of
national currency much more directly and
forcibly than the successes or failures Ct war.
and It is Ia obedience to such causes that gold
now continues to advance in price, although
we are more decidedly victorious in the field
than we have ever before been. If the national
finances are administered on VIGOROUSLY un-
sound principles; if nation with . vast ex-
penditure makes only what every business man
can see ia m inadequate provision for the eX-
penditure, the people must inevitably lose faith
in its solvency; and as the people lose faith its
promises to pay must deprsciate in value
though il had all the victories of Alexander to
sustain it. This is now our case.
We are not the first people in whose history
this apparent contradiction has been seem Dur
ing the French Revolution the paper money of
the republic sounded all the depths and shoals
Of depreciation, though the republican armies
won against the enemies Of France tho most bril-
liant victories. But no victories could give
value to pieces Of paper that were multiplied
and multiplied with tho most prodigal profu-
sion, until their number was such that the peo-
pie could not conceive the possibility OF their
redemption. No provision was made for the
national expenses that inspired faith In the
national credit, and when that faith was gone
tho assignats, that under better financial sys-
tenn would have been expressions Of value, be-
came merely pieces Of dirty paper.
How different was the management Of the
British finances at period Of great difficulty.
England. it is true. was . great commercial
Of the finances alone explains the great difference
between the credit Of the two nations. Mr.
Pitt, under the advice Of the business mon Of
the country, adopted . simple, common sense
system. He borrowed money for half the ex-
penses Of the great wars that England then
entered upon, and provided by taxation for the
payment Of the interest. No government cur
rency was issued there was no undue extern
sion or imitation Of the regular currency, and,
though there was suspension of specie payment,
and the quantity of bullion in the Bank Of Eng
land went down to one million. the difference
between the price Of gold and Bank of England
notes scarcely exceeded twenty-five per cent
through the whole period covered by the bril-
liant victories Of Napoleon.
Here, on the one hand, was the most alarm
ing depreciation Of . national currency coinci-
dent with the success Of the nations arms, aud,
on the other hand, the steady maintenance Of
national finances in the face of continual dc.
feat And these facts show distinctly enough
that the operations Of armies are not the only
influence that,may affect national currency;
but they show that the good or bad manage
ment OF national finances 10 what ID really vital
to national credit
We have seen the history Of the finances Of
the French Revolution repeated in the Southern
confederacy, where almost unlimited issues and
continual imitation have destroyed every vcstige
Of national credit Memminger used up tho
credit Of his government with the people on
his first issues-analogous to tho French a..
signats; and in France the assignats were fol-
lowed by the manaats, which the people would
not take at ALL Memminger Is now likely to
suffer che same complete failure. II Is in vain
that he tries to wheedle tho Southern people
with the offer Of the most temptingly dscked
out securities. He cannot get . dollar. All
the time be has had cotton - . real basis Of
value for bis operations, and he has bad vic
tories enough; but his finances have proved an
utter failure.
We have initiated, not the system OF Piu, but
the bad one Of the French Revolution and of
Nemminger; and how far eur currency ID now
behind Memningsr's Ia downward tendency Il
is not we'll 70 consider; but IL b quito certain
that Il II on the same road in which Memmin-
gers a. well as the currency Of the French
Revolution wsss so far. Our people are daily
losing faith in the national credit They sec
the head Of the Treasury Department anxious
only over Presidential schemes and not over
provision for national expenses and they fear