East Saginaw courier. (East Saginaw, Mich.) 1859-18??, 1864-09-14
EAST SAGINAW MICHIGAN WEDNESDAY SEPTEMBER H. 1861

ton was about 0U,OOO men: IL was
the same mob that had just been rout-
cd at Manassas, and was without arms,
discipline, or spirit. TO increase this
force, discipline it, and to produce uni
formity in the guns, artillery, amupi-
ton, and equipment were the first
steps taken by the now commander,
Departments, embracing Engineers,
Quartermasters, ordinance, medical
subsistence telegraphic, &c, were
either entirely lacking or in a state of
inefIiciency that rendered them worse
than useless. All these had to be
created; and yet, with an army Of on
ly $4,000 men in this condition, and
with these multifarious and onerous
duties to be performed, there are peo-
pie who find fault because Mcclellan
did not at once advance and annihilate
victorious rebel army of 100000
men that occupied a strong position
not far from Washington.
1t is scarcely necessary to write in
detail of this portion Of Gen. McCl-
ellan's career, so well are its details
known to the public. A vast and
comprehensive plan for operating
against the rebellion was devised by
the new commander He indicated in
this plan points in every portion of
the southern States whose possession
was vital to tho existence Of the Con-
federacy, and which, once wrested
from the Confederaies, would give the
death blow to their cause. Suffice it
that dear experience has since taught
how supreme was the wisdom which
thus early pointed out the weak links
in the Confederate Gordon Of defence.
Ever since, the Federal armies, with
more or less success, but without una
nimity as to time, have been fighting
for tho possession Of these very points
ana no OtlvIe.
Gen. McClellan's logical idea of or
ganizing an army large enough to u.s.
sail in force all these various points,
and also to weaken the then inconsid-
erable Confederate armies by forcing
them ~ defend all these positions
from simultaneous attack, was de-
feated through the impatience of the
people for an onward movement, aud
the injudicious interference of Presi-
dent Lincoln and the jealousy of Sec
retary Stanton and other aspiring Off
cials. Long before General Mcclellan
had raised his armies to the size re-
quired for the simultaneous move
ment; long even before those he did
have were more than half disciplined
or their various military departments
had been more than half resurrected
from chaos, Mr.. Lincoln assumed
coidnfa8 Of the armies, and on the
9th Of January, 1862, he order.
ed A)M forward move of all the land
and naval forces in the Federal SER
plan for the capture of Richmond be-
fore his subordinate Gen. Mcclellan
It is sufficient to say that Mcclellan
saw the fatal errors involved in this
plan, and that he finally induced the
President to allow him to approach
Richmond by route ahording water
as a line of transportation and base
of supplies. That the former plaI
was fatal one has since been ampl,
demonstrated by Burnside, Pope
Meade, and Hooker, all of whom at
tempted it and were driven back will
tremendous loss. Grant has been en-
deavoring to effect it during the pas
summer, and, owing to his unconquer
able perseverance, he succeeded to
greater extent than all others, but a
the expense of the most enormous sac
rifices on record, and without havin
aa;nod q ai., sio point IN tha capture @
4 the rebel capital.
Not only was Gen. Mcclellan dri'
Y ON TO move before his armies ha
Q reached their proper size, but that 81
4 sential portion of his plan which COZ
4 templated striking ali around the Cor
d federacy at the same moment was d'
It feated. He did not wish to move b'
;. fore April; yet, in February, Gral
/ had captured Henry and Donelso
a and without any concert as TO TN
d under the direction of Lincoln, bloy
a were being struck at various portion
6 of the Confederacy. Being witho
70 unity as to time, these blows we
l. availless, for the reason that The 20
al federates, moving upon inner line
l. were enabled with ease to concentra
A. their weak armies at the threaten
s. points. and in this manner to otier
III fective resistance. :,
nc The movements, of Gen. McClella
ne from the time that he left Washin
G. ton till he had placed his army near
"a, Richmond than any Federal army !
to ever been since, are well understot
re We will only allude to one thing
n this connection that is universally III
as understood. II has been customs
re among all classes to regard the we
OF of battles which succeeded the chan
N. of base to the James River as one
IA defeat and disgrace to the fede
he arms. Never was there greater
on ror than this; and never IN the hist'
lth of battles, in this or any country, III
wn there been, than in these greater
lu- b;bitions of heroism on the part
soldiers, generalship on the par
sh- commander, and success in the
ro- deayor to accomplish certain end
tho There is not to-day, in oil the giori
all occurrences of this war, an e'
nst which reflects so much credit upon
to military genius of American gene
md ship; there is no success III our ca, y
at which CLEANS with as bright a II
Il a as tho movement by the Army OF
ush Potomac from the Chickahomln
ain the James River. And yet It Is
,as; most, universally misunderstood {
2 in by those who rise above partisan |
ans udice and view this thing with
n at passionate eye.
om- 1t is very easily understood.
, of ing TO the jealousy OF Stanton