The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1864-10-05
General Hood and His PolIer-

= From the Columbia q O. Caroinian, Sept 22I
People who find in the loss of Atlanta
an excuse for declaiming against Gen.
Hood and against the government for
originally appointing and for now re
tanning him in command, may applaud
themselves for their extraordinary sa.
! gacity, and demand immediate recog
milton Of their wonderful prescience .
but they certainly cannot claim credit
! for reason or fairness. The final loss of
Atlanta is not by any means the test in
this case. The ability to hold that city
depended upon many contingencies
which could not be controlled by Gen.
Hood or anybody else Could a general
absolutely command victory by con
trolling all the elements Of success. ii
would be a veryplessant thing for him,
no doubt; but such powers have not
yet been conferred on any human being.
nor were they ever, we believe, claimed
for Gen. Hood. The truth is that Gen.
Hood, when placed in command Of the
army, was required, no doubt, with his
own consent and approval, to carry cut
a predetermined, but newly adopted.
policy, and to maintain position which
he did not bring about and for which
he was in no wise responsible. Now,
the correct method of estimating the
merits of the two policies-the one pur-
sued by General Johnston and the one
adopted by General Hoods certainly
not to make either Of them depend on
the final preservation of Atlanta. But
if General Hood conduct is to be sui
jeeted to that test, General Johnston's
must be subjected to the same test. I'll
General Hood is to be coademnid be-
cause he lost Atlanta after a resistance
six weeks, why not condemn General
Johnston, who did not intend to fight
for il six days who retrsated all the /
way from the Tennessee line through I
deep deEles and over mountain crests. /
and across rapid rivers, and who brought
Sherman's army at last before the very
city the preservation of which the coun- |
try then supposed to be the object of (
our campaign, while its capture was oh I
viously that of the enemys The true 1
test in this case Is to be found il a Just I
and responsible estimate Of the pro- /
bable result of the two lines Of policy /
referred to Had the retreat Of our +
army been continued beyond Atlanta, /
and that place surrendered without a 1
struggle, sherman would have gained /
six weeks time for the prosecution of I
his campaign IN Georgia; and, with 4
troops comparatively fresh, and mum I
bers comparatively strong, lac conld 1
have continued the same movements 4
by which he had driven Johnston from 4
the Tennessee to the Chatsahoochie, I
and might easily, since Atlanta was the I
last strongly defended 10 Mt on his /
route have overrun and overwhelmed 4
the whole Of Northern and Central I
Georgia perhaps even capturing Ma /
con and Augusta. The six weeks re- 4
sistance at Atlanta has completely dis
concerted any such designs. With the /
capture of that place sherman finds I
himself TOO much exhausted to advance j
even another step, and sees his army 4
suffering a rapid depletion by the return
homo OF all his three years troops This
is what has been gained by the policy of
and, Is we did not lose our
army when we lost Atlanta, but are, on
the contrary, relatively far stronger
than when Sherman crossed the Chat
tahoochee, we may take it for granted
that General Hood has saved upper
Gecvgis from temporary conquest, and
has, by holding Sherman back, preser-
we'd TO US the important and valuable