The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1864-06-25

From fites of Philadelphia and New York
papers OF the 2Jih we extract some add
tional news from the United SfaaEs


aRAsr's LAST MovsMMr-fHE Military ASPECT
AND or xCrs -Ir3 PROBABLE EFFgcTs UPON fHi
CAMPAIGN.
A correspondent Of the New York 7inses (th
same who wrote the account Of the battle OF Col
Ilatbor. which e,icited the denn ictat!cns Of th
Heras.l) furnishes from Washington, nnder date .
JHae i6. the following
In nv letter on the battle Of the Chick kahominy
eudeavored to recognize the true military charac
ter and bearings of that battle. put On recon-
then the opinion that Gen Grant would make IA
further effort to pass the Chickahoininy and hialc
thai his eyes were even then ,tu.ue" sway !" hhe
and com mbinatiOus more bold than any Yet Ss
sayei."
We'll. what could then only be thus ohscurel!
(0resh adowe, Is too day a realized fact. ladecd,
may now 20 further and state tHat if"M tue scf
start the transfer OF the army To tue seutiisie u
Richmond has fosused an integra' part Of Gei
Grants plan of campaign. aud hie the battie q
the Chic ekahon,iny was still IN pfosTe tue whot
question OF forthcoming the jaime 'F'vef was tiabo
rateIy discussed.
Aud now, recognizing the rela ions which hi
action holds to the general plan OF opsrat'0ns-n0v
that 1t stands defined as the pivOtas point OF tn
whole campaign-wOuid II DC 100 macn 'or me 4
ask those presses that abused me Tor having 81
recognized 1t fortnight ago, 10 take BACK tha
abuse.
The battle OF the ChickahOniay Was An expert
meht majc for specific purpose = 10 test the p 10
sibiiiy Of an assault on Richmond tom the north
era side. Ii was AN experiment perfectly pf0pc
to be made, and il was satisfactory. II cOavinces
every hecttng mind that nothing was 10 be gatne,
In that direction.
This was obvious TO every one, aad every ont
waited 10 see what card Gen Graat would ;iaJ
next. But II was only those who knew something
o. the bOldness ofhis military conceptions that coui'
have yeniured TO anticipate Il repetition Of th'
Vicksburg strategy, the same strategy, The SAINT
audac ty, only On tar grander scale.
.f.iA ctr plt, t,ta
reaus passage OF the Rhine and Aank march Oh
Ulm, stands to-day an accomplished fact tis
Army Of the Potomac, taken up as In the arms
giant, was transported from the ChiekahOminJ
and planted south Of The James riveE ana south o.
Richmond
Now begins new act In the grand war drama
We shall operate on new and uninterrupted lines
looking to new and hitherto unattainable results
and we think there are few military men who d.
not now feel that the present position of the Army
of The Potomac gives rs reason 10 indulge brighter
hopes OF ultimate success Than has been possible
any tine since the war began.
The Ssuthside Is the true line OF operation
against Richmond, looking to great uteri0r re
suits. OF the three cardinal maxims OF strategy
ihl most important of all prescribes ''to operate
on the enemy'S communications without endan
gefing your own" Now, the operations of tht
Virginia campaign have been conducted under cir
cuustances THAI made it impossible to apply this
principle.
Geu Grant has aimed assidu0usiy to bflng OH &
great decisive field fight, with the hope OF crushing
the rebel army but ;fo:n The nature Of the coun
try, its piOdigi0us facilities for defence, and III,
skill Of the opposing General, this has been I'M ,0s
s!bIe. We gained victories, We steadily pusiie.
the enemy back and in an unparalleled campaigs
of twenty nine days, forced Lee from the Rapidar
to the trout Of Richmond but no decisive result
We're accomplished.
Lees army Is an army Of veterans II is an In
Stiument shaipeHet 10 4 perfect edge. You turt
its tanks; well, Its f'anks are NIKE TO be TUNED
this effects iiitlc or nothing All that We ca,
reckon gained therefore, is the loss OF life In
dicted on the enemy, and of having reached I
point Thus near the objective, but no brilliant mill
tary results. In loss of life, we wee undoubtedly
Suffering more severely than the rebels. thins
W. may laisiy say in the pfopoiti tion OF five 10 thei
III ee.
Now 1t is obvious that we could not have long
stood thus. Whatever prcp0nderance OF uuMbeIs
We might have would soon dis1ppear--W0uid sOot
become an inequality, ana presently an infeiioity
The rebel army might have been worn away by at
triton, but we should ourselves have been ex
hausted In the process. The hammer would have
been broken by the anvil.
BY The present move q new order of operations
beeus. We not only threaten the communica- A.
iions OF The enemy, we plant ourselves across his
C communic atiOns. The communications Of tht
rebel army are the grea; lines OF railroad by Pc
Iershurg and Danville and their CONNECTIONS.
Richmond, as ty-k!ehmond, as military
cen!re-it Is strictly dependent on these lines to
its supplies. Cut II eff from these and you have a
around It's throat. Ii may have months
supplies, OF three months, or six months, bu
these exhausted, II must succumb. Ii Lee allow.
hinseif 10 be shut up within Richmond, therefore
the problem reduces itscif to repetition OF Vicks
burg over again VIII he do so: That Is ques-
tion
nut this is the pitiess alternative to which Lee
is now rednced-to stay in Richmond and suf lie
the fatal lines Of circumva IatIOn TO be draws
around him, or TO come out of his works and give
battle. Now fair field fight Is precisely what tht
Army of the Potomac invites and welcomes; IL vii
gladly give the rebels man for man, and engage Il
defeat them wi,ial.
Ii Lee Is unwilling to run this risk, he retire:
within the defeaces OF Richmond, and we then
hold precisely thr relations held by the Allies o
Napoleon defending tafii ia 1874. IL was la vain
then that that that coasumnIats master put forth
thai recalled the serdaTs OF the f: 81
eat Italian campaign; Ia vain he threw his mass
ea on different points Oi the investing line If Lee
IL not IA better General taaH Napoleon, he eau hard
iV hope for a much better fate
f1sVith the Army OF the Potomac planted at or
nor,h OF Petersburg, We there tap the great rail-
road line connecting Richmond with the Atlantic
seaboard aud Gulf States. When there Graz,
may be able 10 throw his left across the Danvilit
road, and In this case Richmond Is isolated. Il
his plan does not contemplate 90 great develop
ment 0f font, he Will al least provide for the Ell
ectual destruction OF the latter raIroad aud this
as well as the destruction of the Western lLyneh
burg) rUad and the James River Canal, viii be au
easy prey To our cavalry, which, under the hands
of Sheridan, has almost put the rebel cavalry Gut
CT existence. The reduction Of Fort Darling Is m
incidental piece of work, which will be gladly
cQatended for by some Of the able engineering
heads OF she Army OF the Potomac In the mean
time We have perfectly secure and convenienl
base the james river, 10 which all the transp0rta
lion lately at the White House has been forwarded
There is another aspect of the move to the south
side OF the James which, from the point of view o
its relations to the whole theatre Of war Is not less
important than Its bearing on the problem imme-
,saI., kpta~ IL gx.
rebel armies, and give US an Interior position rea
tive 10 the army of Lee In Virginia and the army 0
Johnston In Georgia.
II has been reported that large detachments o
!ohnston's army are already en- route to reinforce
Lee, and II not actually under way. we may do
pend upon 1t tina, the able military heads that rul,
the war Councils of Richmond, thoroughly imbuec
with the cOnce pii0n OF concentration and wilIii.
to risk everything to save kichmond, would vii
liney have sacrificed western territory 10 se
cuts The great point in Virginia
But how does II stand now JohnSton coming
10 reinforce Lee would lind his progress to Rich
,nOnd barred by the same opponent whe s,oppe.
his junction with fembetton In vicksburg. w,
secure this therefore, first, that the enemy shat
receive no addition 10 his strength, while our Do
siti0n effects concentration OF both the force
Of Butler and Haater with the main Operatin,
forces.
to great aud impOrtn at results coming from th,
new position Of the army, am very far from look
Ing on our success as tOregone conclusion W,
have opposed 10 US an enemy Of the highest skin
handling an army Of sufficient strength stu to at
tempt great thisgs, aad animated by a spirit o
desperation.
fully expect some bold, audacious Initiative OIL
the part Of Tee, aud the greater the straits 1,
which he inds himself. the more energeticaIly vii
he attempt 10 retrieve himself and The fortunes Q
the C0nledcracy bouad up with hind.
YANKEE ACCOUNT or rae RECENT pf0HrINa ARouS
PgrwRsBuR0--THI RxGgLLGNC4 OF THg NsaRs
TROOPS AZ cOAfARED With TafIs WRITE cox
RApHs, &C.
The Philadelphia Inqairer, OF the aO:h, has le,
ters from Its correspondent near Petersburg as lat