Evansville daily journal. (Evansville, Ind.) 1863-1866, 1864-02-24
that the enemy was superior and would

hat the enemy was superior anu "oulu
light WE'LL
BlvoUAC IN FRoxT OF WILLIAMS
BURG, MAY ), 1920 P. NJ.
Hon. E. NJ Stanton, Secretary Of Var:
After arranging for movements up
Y ork river, was urgently sent for here.
I find 10. Johnston in front of me in
strong force, probably greater good deal
than my own. General Hancock has ia
ken two redoubts, and repulsed Early's
rebel brigade by real charge with the
bayonet, taking one Colonel and $50 !
prisoners and killed at least two Colo
nels and many privates. His conduct |
was brilliant in the extreme.
| do not know our exact loss, but fear
that General Hooker has lost considera-
Bile on our left
Iledrn from prisoners that the rebels
intend disputing ecery step to Rich
mond.
shall run the risk of at least hold
ing them IN check here arhile l resume
the original plan
My entire force is undoubtedly con-
siderGbly inferior 10 that of the rebels,
t0ho tciU fight ,OelL; but I ioiU do all l
can NTH the force at my disposal.
GEO. B. MCCLELLAN,
Major General Commanding.
A narrative consisting of orders and
dispatches, is incomplete if it omits those
which show the condition of the COM
manders mind during the events Plaus-
IDLY constructed afterthoughts, written
out in retirement, may be more satisfac-
tory to the general, but they do not give
what he proposes to give, q picture Of
events by the dispatches and orders of
the times.
At one moment in victorious pursuit
of the flying enemy; announcing his
resolution to push them to the wall, and
that his force was enough; magnifying
the result of his victory, and its effect
upon the country, and commencing all
as proving the wisdom of his plan; and
then as soon as he found that the enemy
had stopped running, and that Jo John
ston was actually in front of him, his
heart sank within him. The enemy s
force became greatly superior. He was
confident they would fight well. He con-
suited prisoners and was told that the
rebels were actually going to dispute the
way to Richmond. OF course if they
intended to fight he did not. He con-
cluded not to push them to the wall, but
to take to the wall himself. 1t was not
his plan at all, that had drawn him into
this trouble. 1t was Washington inter
ference. His force was entirely made
quate. He would "run the risk of try
ing to hold the enemy in check, while he
resumed the original plan.
1t was General McClellan's fate never
to be near enough to an engagement Of
his army to understand the nature Of it,
and. uniformly to give an incorrect and
unjust account Of it in his early dis
patches. Thus in the battle of Fair
Oaks, in a dispatch dated at night, "On
the Battle Field" which he never came
near, and which the enemy then held
he DETAINED Gen. Casey's Division, which
for two hours had borne the brunt of the
enemy's attack. He was compelled to
retract this the next day, but the credit
and spirit of the Division were irrepara
bly, injured
So in this case he gave the entire ere
dit to Gen. Hancock, who had, by com
mand of Gen. Sumner, taken possession
of some abandoned redoubts, and who
had done but little of the fighting. H,
omitted all mention of Sumner, Hooker
and Kearney, who did the chief fighting
in this battle, which cost US 2,22S men
of whom 456 were killed and 1,40C
wounded.
His report now shows the total igno
rance and injustice of his dispatches a
the time. Gen. Kearney's private let
tiers, which were afterwards published
showed how the soul of that gallant sol
dier was stung by this injustice art
i charlatanism. But it is evident from the
. dispatches that charitable allowances
should be made for the demoralizet
state of Gen. McClellans mind, whel
be found that the enemy had stopped
! running.
: It will be seen that while he was tele
, graphing his brave pursuit and invinci
BILE determination, and while his arm
was fighting this battle, he remained be
hind at Yorktown, TO superintend tn,
} starting of Franklin's division by water
and to send dispatches to the country t.
have future victories discounted, in tota
ignorance of what was going on.
The fact that these dispatches wer,
McClellan's own, makes the omission thu
more to be regretted. There are man,
dispatches, letters and orders in his re
port which do not give an accurate view
of his own feelings at the time, nor O
his own style. But these are undoubt
edly his They enable us to sympathizt
with the young Napoleon's triumphan
soul when the enemy ran without fight
ing, and to admire his heroic determine
: ton in the pursuit, while be thought tn
enemy afar; and to eommiserate his de
moralization, when the enemy stopped
J and showed fight In their clear igh
we can see the invincible resolution o
the young hero, that if the enemy die
not run he would.
: If the play would pay for the candle
a we might give some other omissions a
strikingly illustrative of the military ge
NOUS of the pride of our country, an
this =" most senseless and fit man" 70
/, the candidate of the peace and surren
) der Democracy.