The Goodhue volunteer., 1864-04-13
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Why has the Army Of the Potomac made
such Small progress--A Very able Re-
view and Retrospect. .. s.. -
| [From the Army and Navy Journel:l
The question is constantly asked in pri
vate circles-"Why IS it that the Army o
the Potomac makes such small progress ?
In Congress. also, the movements Of this
Army have excited severe comments. The
general opinion seems to be that some re-
markable de ficiency has existed in the man
age ent;at Washington, or equnl remarka
ble incapacity for command at the headqnar
tei Of the Army itself. Un.ayo rahlsoom
parisons are frequedtly instituted k6tKeen
its achievements and those OF the Western
armies. In fact, its career seems to be al
most universally regarded as failure
Even at the first view it would seem in.
credible that the want of success-so far as
relates to the conquest Of Virgins. the
Army If the Potomac, so well organized as
it is, composing so many thousands Of trp; ps
as brave as any others in the country, and
numbering among its officers so many whose
abilities a'e indisputa lie, it would seem in
credible that the failure Of this army should
be attributable to causes existing within it.
self. 1t is even questionable if the word
"fa'lure'' can be properly applied to its ca
reer. Although it has not captured Rich
mond, and thus realized the sangulne hopes
of the country, it has been the bulwark o.
the North against aggression; it has kept
large rebel armies afoot in districts where
the resources Of the South were over
whelmingly taxed to sustain them it has
really kept Richmond in the condition Of q
partially be c.saered city and it has fought
battles equal to tho greatest and mos.
fierce|y contested Of any recorded in histo
|ry-makiny the most terrf1i la :oc in the
ranks o: the enc my.
We do not intend, however, in this arti.
c:e to discuss the past history Of the Poto-
mac army, or to attempt tie settlement OF
the causes Of the failure of the Peninsula
campaign, and Of the repulscs at Freder
!cksburg and Charlottesville. Nor VII
we attemp, to investigate the reasons why
more positive results were not rcaped from
the victories Of Antivtam and Gettysburg.
Nor yet Is it necessary for US to defend the
ior
Gettysburg, an a hundred s:outly con,cs,e /
battles and skirmishcs. We desire Simply
toSve some military reasons why the Ar
H." OF the Potomac, in the position it has
occupied since last summer, apon the Rap
pahannock, finds it's progress toward Rick
mond impeded. Indeed, many officers OF
high standing believe that beyond the Rap
pahannovk, or at farth.St the Rapidan, pro
gress is impossible. That it will bccume
possible, with and adequate force. is. how
ever, to qe expected. AMI al appearances
now indicate that the Government intends
during the coming season, with increased
resources at its command, and proftiting
by the sad experiences of the past. to max
such provision as will ensure final sue
cess.
Two armies Of equal numbers and com
manded with equal ability, being opposed to
each other, their movements and achieve.
ments must be entirely determined by the
nature Of the nature of the theatre Of ope-
rations, Perhaps never in the history Of
warfare has the character Of the ground ex
lerted more Influence on the campaigns than
tha. Of the portion Of Virginia which lies
between Washington and Richmond. On
the right Of our army are chains Of noun
tains that enable the rebels to conceal any
- %an."s ., movement :. :,'sy ;a:; undert:::s;::,
while the valleys afford to them the means
for an easy and uninterrupted passage to
the Potomac above Washington and one
almost entirely secure from attacks in their
rear. On our front is , succession OF riv>
|ers, presenting great natural obstacles to
our advance. and at the same time easily
|defensible; to make f.nking movements by
ascending them IS to open our rear to at
tacks from Fredericksburg. and to cross
below the rebel army leaves the railroad !.
prey to guerrillas. The country il more
over. masked in every direction by dense
forests, rendering any ything like surprise
in force impracticable. Afew rebel scouts
may 1t a'I times easily detect and thwart
such movement. Such are the natural
features Of the country.
| It is ; well known rule Of military opo-
Iration shat base should neither b too
extended nor too limited, and that il should
Be accessible BY several routes The base
Iof The Army Of the Potomac Is inst the
width Of > railroad track, and that railroad
furnishes really ths only practicable rDats
lof communications With limited base, N
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