The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-09-07
TUT UTsrORy Or Ap,yIsTrcrs

THE HISTORY OF ARMISTICES
Z A writer in the Army and Nary Journal dis
cusses at some length the effect of armistcos or
suspensions of arms, as shown by the testimony
of the past in history. In nine cases out of ton
rs this writer interprets history, an armistice is
ruse to cover some trick or manuuvre, from
which the winning party has everything to lose
by letting up an antagonist at the crisis of the
struggle. During the last three centuries an arms-
fice has never been resorted 10 by victor, as it
is now proposed that our Government shall do
During the civil wars of France, every armistice
proposed or conceded to the Reformed party.
was a confession OF weakness on the part of the
Government, to be violated as soon as circum-
stances were favorable. Each renewed suspen-
sion Of arms gave a breathing spell to tho reyo-
lntionary party, and enabled them to protract the
struggle Until the concentrated and augmented
TigOr of Louis XIV afforded an opportunity and
energy TO the Court and priesthood to strike a
decisive blow. Other instances illustrating the
effect Of armistces, are mentioned by this writer
as follows -
"The proposals fora truce or armistice between
Spain aud the revolted Netherlands or United
Provinces, In 1907, by the archdukes, was con-
sidered to manifest so great a desire for peace
- On he part of the Spanish NEUTRALITY-SUSPICIOUS.
seS ed by the Northern Executive in our CaseJas
t0'conyince the world that they were destitute Of
the means for sustaining the war. This truce
concluded III 1909, was tantamount 10 Declara-
tion of the Independence of the Seeded States of
Holland, and was ratified by the Peace of West
phalia in l64S. The interval between 1909 and
164S thirty mine years, was period of renewed
continual war between Spain and her reyoted
provinces, in which the Border States of the
Spanish Netherlands and the ocean were the
theatre of furious hostilities. BY this truce or
arnistice, the Netherlands, or Seeded States,
gained almost every advantage, except actual
recognition, they could have won by successful
military operations. This case is very opposite
70 the relative condition Of North and South at
this moment.
''Nsrn3ieon acknowledged that the armistce of
Cheraseo, in 1876, was perfect stroke of for
tune for him. 1t was proposed by the Court Of
Turin, when the slightest check he said, 'one
caprice of fortune. would have undone every
thing Here we have a military power, the
South, represented by Napoleon, saved by the
moral weakness of the Allies opposed TO it, whose
armies were superior in numbers especially IN
carolry and artillery (our own case eXactly,) well
supplied with everything, and in possession of
f0rtresses the French were not in condition to
reduce. The result was the complete humilia-
tion of Sardinia.
"When the French Directory sent General
d Clarke to propose amistice in 1877, after Ar
COLA Napoleon would not permit him to enter
into negotiations, because the future master of
Europe saw that unfaltering audacity and fiery
energy were the keys TO ultimate triumph, not
cessation of hostihues, or an armistlce.
Napoleon confessed that his consent 70 the
perhaps the greatest blunder of his career pre-
gious thereto. Wavering fortune seemed about
to relent and smile on him again. That armistice
added Austria to the coalition against him, and
brought the Allies to Paris in the succeeding
year. He also proposed an armistce at Leipsic
but the Allies, who had accepted that of PleswitL
70 perfect their plans, cover the junction Of the
Ausrians, apd get ready for a crushing concen-
tratiye advance, had too much sense 70 accord a
''let up" TO an adversary who knew how TO profit
by such a "slip' on the part of his enemies.
l "Finally, take as lesson our Tacubaya armis-
tice in 1877. Victorious at Contrerns and Chu-
rubuseo, Scott was deeply impressed through
interested representations of others. with the
danger of Selling the capital of Mexico Al
though he knew from what they had done what
his troops could do, he halted and offered nego-
tiations. That pause cost us two bloody con.
fiicts, Molino del Rcy, and the storming of Cha
lpultepec"
These are significant facts, and should bC
considered by all who are inclined 20 regard al
armistce as sovereign pauacea for all ouI
woes as nation. What has been true in othel
countries and times, would undoubtedly bC
true in our own. An Rrmistice would enable
the Rebels 10 regain their strength, repair dam
ages and prepare for another struggle, thereby
inevitably proonging the war, since Il is simply
impossible that any negotiations could resul
in an acceptable peace, unless the Rebel leader
should abandon at the outset all their presen
pretensions, in which case no negotiations wOul,
be necessary. To ask the Government, unde
these circumstances, to propose concessions o.
request suspensions of hOstilitieS, ig 10 ask il h
confess itself conscious of defects which max
snccess impossible; is, indeed to encourage tn
enemy by admissions of weakness which woul'
only add 70 bis desperation and yigor on the re
sumption Of hOsiilites
The Rebel leaders understand this question
thoroughly, and see clearly the advantages whcl
wOuld result TO them from an armistice. Tn
Richmond Examiner, discussing this subject
says :-"An armistice, in any ineligible sens
whatever, could mean nOthug less than a cessa
tion Of every act Of war for the time agreed upon
both naval and military nothing less than
withdrawal of the invading troops from every
part of the Confederate States, and a suspension
of the blockade Of the coast The occupation o
Grants camp at Petersburg, and Of Sherman'
before Atlanta, the occupation of Chattanooga
Knoxville, and HarpeT's Ferry, are all acts OF war
The presence Of blOckading squadron oGWil
mingtOn, 70 stop and destroy our merchant YES
sells, is an act Of war. An armistice intended tC
be real, and not illusory, would be the stoppagJ
of all these operations aud occupations; and suel
an armistice the Confederate Government coulC
not have the folly TO reject"
This, from Rebel source, Is true statemen
ofthe effect of an armstice and Il is 70 lust thi
abandonment of everything we have gained il
three years of war that the country is invited By
the CbicoOo COnyeutionists - Aelpark Adu