The New York herald., 1864-12-11
sHEsMAs's ROUTE FRon MILLws.
rFrnm the Rgchsnoud Enuuirer. Dec. A.

per mako 1t known. The accounts rpresend him
Nen Ceoysto. FROM that point three harbors pre-
sent about equal disancss-Bea afort, savannah and
Darien. To which OF these the "srand column" was
dragging It's dsprted not known psitlvsiy
Some believed that Sherman would yet endsavor TO
force junction with Foster at Grahamsvie and failing
In that try TO upon Savannah and by
numbers seek 70 force the lines and capture the city
Others think that having avoided Macon aud Augusta
will not attempt to Garry fortified city like Savannah
but will turn to the rgh. find supplies at Darien
80 far sherman has done hay~s ercept indirdtsa
ard sAs rairoads, The Augusta and Atlanta road viii
be 10 running order within forty days-by February l.
Tho Georgia Central will also be mads ready for trans
pcrtafion Ia few weeks. largo force has already
been set to work upon both roads, IL will not be
months before the injury inflicted by sherman will be
fully repaired. Having taken places OF Importance,
and released no prisoaer will the damage to the railroad
compensate tho enemy for tner oss of and tho
practical destruction OF the army under sherman viii
the march 10 the coast compensate for Hoods equally
victorious march into Teuuessses The enemy newspapers
arc seeking 70 quiet the public apprehension by claiming
that sherman "has again bscced the ccnederscy" and
separated the Gulf States from tho Atlantic States
efsctusly as the Mississippi divides Trans Mississippi
from the States east OF that river. 1hls, know, is
simply boasting TO up anticipated dsaser and this
viii soon be uudestood by the people Of that country
but further deception All tho pub opinion
that coe to rs from the United States indicate
great uueasness on account OF sherman. He Ia now
over dce. and his signal lights no along
coast What has caused this delay the enemy do
know they are unwilling believe that tho Confederate
reserves and Georgia militia have impeded hts march,
and hence their newspapers pretend that delayed
to destroy more eectuay the provision Of
tho country.
THE REBEL THEORY or sHHaMAN's MARCH.
From the Richmond whig, Dec s.
II Sherman gets through Georgia seacoast Il viii
certainly bc great humt,ton 10 s consracp; but 10
WILL not be more than q humiliation. We showed, we
think, when his march FIRST undertaken Why il was
TO be considered not military ~ political
movement aud why il should be regarded ratbor asa
defensive than aggressive The evacuation
OF Atlanta was compulsory When Hood bad established
himself on the Tennessee river, looking towards Nash
vile and the limo by which Sherman kept open his
muncatons with that city, Atlanta ceased to it's
purpose base for further operations and
y lost its value 70 the enemy. II sherman should stay
in Il with his army he would be wasting hs strength
nothing, while Hood could operate against his communI.
cations, and. ny cutting him oFrom his base Of supplies
compel him either TO fall back and fight battle re
svo himself, or to push forward for now base on the
coast One Of these things he absolutely compelled
to DO
True military policy would have instructed him to fall
back ees in Hoods 'front.' and by the concentration Of
OF the field. But this before have stated,
would have been 10 confess his whole campaign failure
and 10 begin over again the which the Yankee
armies have been 80 long and weariy prosecuting
since tho all Of Fort DonssoD. II would demon
strated the impractcabity OF the Yankee scheme Of
cnnquests would have rendered the Northern people
contented. and might have made impossible Tin
c0n 70 raise another army. To push forward to the
ocean was the only slternative. And this even while
pav in all IN h afru
and BY so vast au expenditure Of means, ap.
peared TO offer some compensating advantages. n
looked Ike an advance IL could be called q
grand canpaign, brilliant movement; II sue
cessfuly carried through It might be claimed mag
nfcent triumph, not opposing Confederate srmies
for these pcrsstently out OF tho way,
leas, the obvious difficulties OF long and tedious
march through hostile country, and tbs obstacles
which always Impede and the pcrs which alwsys besss
this kind Of invasions.
IL could likewise. then be said that the Yan autho
rifles had determined TO change ther whole system OF
INVASION, ana aao coast ne ~ base operation
against the refractory Atlantic sope, rather than 20
attempt the slow and dncu transit Of the mount,in
ranges which, years, has produced very iste
more than was gained within the rst six months atter
the fall Of Nashville. And perhaps this. combined With
some general theory OF concerted action With Grant
against Lees communications, "a the pricr military
hypothesis which Sherman's movement ,s based.
But We contend that successful 10 s immediate
oh ectiba setiag through to the cossthe Ccofede
rate cause will be vastly gamer and the Yankee cause
vastly tho in general resris OF the campaign
IL restores to us Of communication We held
st the opening year, yields 70 us vast nnd
important section which had been wresed from us frees
large portion people from the domination OF their
eeies and Just that extent increases the strength
aud the resources Of the conederscy In effect puts
tho Yankees back Instead OF putting theru forward and
forces them try experiment-thas OF operating
from tne coast to the interiors; system which shsy
have heretofore refused to adopt, and shows that they
abandon hopeless their former plsn perrsseusy sd
hcrea TO during years cosqerug the country bya
gradual descent from mountains. f he do not re-
cover that line, shall not he worse on than We were
last year. aud tho Yankees will have cxperded nearly
,housand million dollars. sacrificed thousands or lives
and tbrown away fruits Of fifty Imaginary victories,
and half dozen real ones. ouy for the sake d trying
their luck Ut different point. And, alter all there Is no
| oertaiuty that shermaa will get through
SHERMAN QUIET on TIN oGRRouxs mvEs--xtrA-
TRICKS IRoCBLus.
/ from the Richmond sentinel, Dec. al
The Information from Georgia indicates verj ufte pro
ersss for sherman. He be comparatively quiet
where near the banks OF the Ogeechse shile hs
cavalry sent out 10 explore way OF exit in this,
Fitzpatrick has met with very Indifferent success Instead
6ndg the desired outlet OF which hs was 10 quest on
recent OCCASION he nrss lost his road and then found
Wheeler and next found whipping. and next lost his
hat. Hts account o, "found and lost" was against
him In all the Items More recently, having fortified
himself with heavy infantry force, he found wheeler
again. but had hts usual ucx In the fight; whselers
mon having heavily rcpulsed both cavalry and infantry
Fitzpatrick has since pursuing his explorations Ike
swamp ghost under difficulties, anxious at " ncd
clue to the labyrinth and TO avoid wheeler
Under such circumstances Il u nos TO be wondered
that sherman slowly, obviously and caprciously
His original plan has only failed 40 fAr ~ concerns
the objects accomplished mis- way, but the point
Of coming been made 10 depend on circumstances
~ they develop. u stii uncertain what particular
destination no will attempt Tue opinion Of lcokerscs y
yet divided whether Darcn Savannah or Beaufort the
| point aimed n. We should suppose Savannah u the