The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-08-29
Fort Norge tion OF tho she.
AsndoRh valley.

Fort Morgan is ours. This glorious piece or
news comes to US by way of the Richmond pa
pers, in which it would never have appeared
if there were possible doubt Of its truth.
For the particulars OF the capture we must await
the accounts Of our correspondents; but the fort
doubtless surrendered, rs it was expected it
would, 10 the joint efforts OF the army and
navy. 1t was bombarded by the fleet aud land
batteries probably until it was SO hot that its
occupants gave it up, glad to get rid of it..
Like Fort Gaines, it was another of the last
bitches that the chivalry is determined not to
die in. We give elsewhere an excellent map
aud description Of the fort and its defences
AS our readers may already know, it is the last
OF the rebel defences at the entrance of the
harbor, which is thus left entirely in our pos
session. Farragut may now go on in his glorious
career, and give his attention to the deiences
proper Of Mobile city
| 1t is reported that still another reinforce
ment from Richmond is on its way to EARLY,
and it is reported on better authority that Early
! is in retreat, and likely to leave the valley.
| In our remarks Of yesterday on the operations
on the Weldon Railroad we indicated the pro-
liability that Early would be ordered to Rich
| mond at once. 1t seems to be the impress
sion in some quarters that Sheridan
ought to have forced . battle with
Early fifteen or twenty days ago.
But we are not of this opinion.
| For both Lee and Grant there was a possible
| advantage In operations in the Shenandoah
valley. Lee, in Early's second advance, did
| not threaten an invasion to divert additional
force from Grant. He knew that our force in
the valley equalled his own His advantage
lay in his chance to gather the harvest, and the
! harvest was all that he hoped for from the val
! ley 1t would be great point gained for his
cause if he could have gotten it. 1t would
| seem, then, on the surface as if Grant ought to
have driven him out Immediately, at whatever
cost: but this is not quite true. Such conclu-
sion would be the result OF narrow view q
view that regarded no other part Of the strug-
gle than that in progress in the valley. TAX
ing larger view, it is worth while to inquire
whether driving Early out Of the valley was
the very best thing that could be done, or
whether, by letting Lee gain the apparent ad-
vantage of the valley harvest, Grant could not
through that very means gain greater, more
immediate and more real advantage elsewhere.
We consider that the event has proved that he
could.
Sheridan could doubtless have fought EARLY
at any one Of dozen places within the last fif-
teen days. He could in all probability have
beaten Early before the arrival of the reinforce.
ments received near Strasburg. We are not
hot ho of hovo hur frov Eor
ly's front at Strasburg, overwhelmed the rein
forcements near Front Royal, and then had
time to fight Early as the latter hurried forward
to assist bis auxiiaries. But what then Early,
beaten, with thirty thousand men, might at most
have lost ten thousand, and would have had
twenty thousand left. Without any further
hope to hold the valley, he would have hurried
to Richmond with these. He could have gotten
there at least five days before Sheridan could
have gotten into Grants lines, and he could
| have taken part in the battles of the 2lst or
! 25th instant on the Weldon road. Let us sup
pose that Earlys twenty thousand had been at
Reams station on Thursday last, at that dan
gerous hour when the lines Of the Second corps
were broken and the dismounted cavalry did
such effective service. In all probability we
should have lost the immensely important posi-
ton that the enemy has already made three
desperate, but happily vain, attempts to drive
US from.
Sheridan doubtless acted under orders. and
the orders have proved to be good ones. If
Lee could be tempted by the hope of possible
gain in the valley to make movements that will
likely lead to his ruin on the James, SO much
the better for u.s. and it was wise to let him 60
there and stay there. He now calls in his val
ley force. Since Early has been absent Lee has
lost about half as many men as Early has with
him, and Early, on the way to Richmond, will
lose immensely by desertion. Lee has also in that
same time lost great opportunities, and 1t is to
be hoped that the position at Ream's station is
SO well strengthened this that its capture is
impossible. Thus we have for once done what
| the rebels have done many times-we have pro-
| fitted grealy by our enemy's blunder. Lee
| has gained no substantial point by Early's
movement down the valley, and it has been Of
| very great advantage to us.
PREPARATION FOR THE DRAFT-How THE
| PEACE OF THE CRY Can BE BEST PRESERVED
1t is quite evident now that there is not the
| rap,o,aat nrosnant either of tho abandonment