The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-03-29
Operations on Charleston.
TO TIE EDITOR OF THE HERALD.

WASHINGTON, ID. G., March 20, 1864
Fer the last seven months nothing has so completely
epgrosed the attention Of the public as the operations
Charleston The success which has attended these
operations has induced the public TO imagine that
Charleston would be taken Immediately. When, there
fore, all attained there that was expected Of both
army and navy the people clamored for the navy 10 90
on, and system Of abuse WAS Ievelled at Admiral
Dahlgren and the navy, which was Known BY
the writer's 10 be false. This ablse was wnked
at by persons whose time could have been bet
ter spent than in trying TO break down those
whose entire attention devoted 10 the interests
Of the country. rne cry raised Why does not the
navy 40 something when II well known that the
navy had noby done s share Of tho work, and would
Willingly do more we're u possible aud that without the
aid or the navy Morris Island could neither have been
taken at first held now. Equally as well might the
cry been raised, Why does not the army do some
thing? The same answer would apply as well for the
navy as for the army The answer Is that they had
done al that was expected and all that was possible
BY referring 10 the report Of the secreary Of theNavy
with The appendix, We viii that when Admiral y all.
gren relieved Admiral Dupont he was requested by
General Gilmore 80 operate in the taking OF Morris
leland but no mention made Of taking Charleston.
Although II opportunity offered, IL would be
eonabe suppose advantage would be taken Q!
IT, That report viii snow how well and CALAMITY Co
operation was given.
Bus even supposirg Charleston 20 have been The 'mme
date object OF ata et Us look back at the condition
or affairs before the movements commenced The de
fences Charleston consisted OF line OF works, OBJ
sructons and torpeioes from Norris Island to Suvans
Island which, once passed, the city would be at the
mercy Of the feet was known az that time that there
formidable works beyond. When, therefore.
we moved upon Morris Island, had we been able
70 gain the entire possession Of the ,. island I'm,
city with the vessels. But the operations
were delayed az Wagner so long that the enemy
had time To remove their heavy guns back, and form
q new line OF works. distractions and toTpedoes from
Fort johnson 20 Fort Moutrie so that when finally
did gain possession OF Morris Island stood the
relative position and with the obstacles, fur
thor removed, 20 surmount. that existed at first
army 90 s o nv S
navy Tbe relation which an advance by land bears TO
an advance by water s very Important for supposng
and left inside for IL is absurd to suppose that crippled
cond be saved from sinking under the heavy e OF
Moutrie Johnson and Ripley Aud such an advance being
unsupported corresponding advance Of the land force
these wpn remain for the rebels 10 raise when
the iron clads withdrew FOR outat some time
they mns, for fresh supplies. But could the army ad
At the time with the navy, the vessels lost
inside would stil be at our command 10 be raised at
our pleasure.
Under these circumstances it seems that operations
before Charleston must for some time. They
even now az an end; for General Gilmore has already
moved his headquarters to Hilton Head from Folly Island
which means that nothing more Is to be done in that
quarter
The army now resting without any particular
trouble them. Bnt with the navy. They must
watch and see that the rebels DO not get out with their
an effective blockade, and must battle day and night
with the elements aud keep safe what we have gained
There Is rest for the sailor.
should the navy go up the city they have aNto lose
and nothing 70 gain They can give and receive blows
w sand 1 he.
are injured and 10 the end they must come gu, perhaps
cads and drive them or and raise the blockade
The must at the same time tight batteries, orpe
Anooa nd nbu annx
The purpose OF the navy is TO maintain an effective
blockade and 10 cooperate with the army and 10 this
We must conder the consequences OF defeat with the
probability and that the advantages 10 be
gained will warrant the risk OF defeat Let 10 then
imagine our ironclads have been disabled In that
tho rebel .cads would sally ont, break The
blockade. which would enable them 20 obtain the sup
Plies which they much 10 need OF. of army
on the coast and by starving them out compel SUR
render Northern cities would be threatened;
for these vesselsof which tho Atlanta onscan
dure tho sos With all this stake, would II be proper
to risk nsh where there is nothing TO gain should
ray not.
The excitement caused by the that the Alabama
was approaching New York last summer IL still fresh In
the minds OF the people and the reported loss OF the
Ironsdes and Monitors lately caused painful sensa-
tons
by some ignorant aud malicious scrbbers IL has even
been said that he wanted pluck when every knows
that in every nght his hg always ahead and at the
post o honor and danger When the army first landed
and were moving Wagner, and the Monitors we're
clearing before them, the lag Monitor, which
IN the advance was struck sixty times with heavy
shot which IL more than any Monitor has ever received
in any battle And yet with the record in Official shape
now before the public Of the almost daily actions in
which the Monitors engaged last summer, he Is
attacked for not "doing something
As what viii be done would not be proper TO discuss
n were known. only reasonable 10 suppose that
all will be done that Is possible.
The impress that the distractions have been removed
and washed during the late gales 10 Incorrect with
the exception OF three hundred feet o chain and
some rope work the distractions have not been injured
and are formidable a. Rats occasionally
sent down with tide TO inuro the but
slant vigilance Of the navy has always prevented any ia
jury being done. TRUTH