The Iowa transcript. (Toledo, Tama County, Iowa) 1858-1866, 1864-09-15
M'CLELLAN'S :ENERALSTHIP
REVIEWED
Ills PeninsuiMr Cam palgn and
Its Appalling Dlunders.
By AN OFFICER OF HIS Army.
Chica 90, September 5.

Chica 60, September 5.
To the Editor Of the Chicago Eve. Journal
have noticed lately articles in the
"Times" speaking Of General Mcclellan
as the first military man Ct the day,
and dwelling upon the interference on
the part of the Administration with his
plans. You may perhaps find room in
your columns for few remarks from
one who has served under his command
! from Yorktown 10 Atielam.
do not propose to enter into de.
tailed criticism on the memorable PEN
insul,r ampaign. The Review OF
Emil Schalk, pupil Of J,mini, and
probably the frs, military writer liy.
ing, has exhausted the subject but il
has occurred TO me that, by pointing
nut the more glaring blunders, some OF
The extreme opinions prevalent III re.
gard to the incipien, Napoleon may be
corrected
To begin with Yorktown: When the
splendid army Of the Potomac arrived
in frcn, e Tie G,fenscs, tie place was
held 10y Magrnder, with to,ce not ex
eceding l5,GOo men, probably much
less. thder these circumstances an
assault Nigh. have cost many lives-,;
NIGH, have failed--it should, d, All
eveniS, have been attempted. An AK.
!om II the conduct II military affairs is
tlat the prospect Of great results justify
asks, and vi hen one party has SO great
= preponierance Of force that failure
ean only involve a repulse nothing can
txcilse neglect Of this rule. This was
exactly sirClellan's case. With an
army 4: s., 900 men, the wors. thing he
could have anticipated would have
been ,erulse. Ard when, after a
month Of labor, everything vas com
pleted for bringing against the works
81 weight Of IN -tal sunisien, to render
them sutenable. the willy enemy cvacu
atct the pace. He had gained inpor
tam atlsantages-d delayed Us 4 MONTH
aia colitcte.l an army nearly, il no;
quite, tgaa' 10 cur own. The enemy
vacated a5ou. ; o'clock ia tin. moIn
ing. Il was / o'clock tie next day
before the cavalry and lose artillery
started in pursuit, and the main bcdy
Il the army did not make Is miles up
to that night. Evidences were abun
dant that considerable decentralization
prevailed in the rebel ranks. The road
VAS strewn with knapsacks, demolished
wagons and abandoned guns.
If the pursuit had been conducted
with linary yigo,, the enemy would
have been forced to fight before his de.
moralizel ranks could reach the next
strong posi,iGn-Williamsburg. That
an attack was made there, and that the
esemy did not escape in fact, was ow-
ing 70 the fact that the advance was
led by mar who never lost Al oppM
tnni'y Of attacking, with any prospect
Of success the gallant Sumner. With
hat battle the pursuit virtually eeaaed,
although the larmy Of Mcclellan moved
IN me same direction with the enemy.
When the army arrived \, Tyler's Farm
on the banks Of the Chickahominv, the
following disposition was made Keyes'
corps (4th) was thrown across the rivor
thus violating one Of the Gss, principles
Of thu military art, viz, that portions OF
an arms should never be separated in
the presence OF An enemy b.. any obsta.
Gle which is impassablc. or whose pas.
sage occupies much time unless each
portion thus detached is strong enough
to act independently Of the other. The
result was exactly what might have
been expected. The enemy were led
by = man Of too much ability to allow
such blundeIs to be committed with i'm
puni,y. Joseph Johnston, taking al.
vantage Of rise in the river, which
carried away the briggs, threw his
whole force npon Cayce's Division of
keyes' corps. This division was 1riy-
en- several miles, losing four batteries
and many prisoners. It would have
been annihilated. had not Heintzcl,nan
and Sumner, by superhuman cxertions,
and by constructing a rude corduroy
bridge, brought up their corps, and saw
Cd the 4th from destruction. It is no
excuse to say that Mcclellan did no,
foresec tho rise Of the river. A nan
who does not guard against ordinary