Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1864-12-06
9no s,tuasfOu In Tennessee,

Tne Situation in Tennessee,
The Cincinnati Commercial of yesterday
SAYS: That Hoods army forms line Of
battle within two miles of Nashville, is not
very pleasant reading, but if the facts are
calmly and intelligently considered, there
will be no imminent peril discovered in the
situation. There was great danger few
days ago. That portion of our army on |
the retreat from Pulaski to Nashville, was |
in most critical condition, and would
have been annihilated if the general man
agement had not been, on our side, that of
alert and capable officers, and on the side
Of the rebels that of slovenly confidence,
The safety of the 4th and 23d Corps with
the garrisons from Pulaski to Nashville,
and all the property, is In itself cause for
congratulAtion. And in addition, the
bloody check given Hood at Franklin has
materially weakened him. Then We have
concentrated our forces at Nashville in
good order and good morale. 4 sis Il
The explanation of the policy pursued
by General Thomas is his temporary in
feriority in cavalry. Hoods cavalry, un-
der Forrest, is nearly fifteen thousand
strong, and, as our cavalry is not so strong,
the enemy can, for the time, sweep the
country. a-...,-..
General Sherman took with him most Of
the well-mounted men OF his department.
of course it would be improper TO speak of
| this if the fact were not as well known to
| The rebels as ourselves. An additional
fact may be mentioned that is Of some mo
! nent. There has not been as energetic
and efficient work at Louisville in proVid-
ing dismounted cavalry with horses
snd equipments, as General Sherman had
reason to expect. .-.g.
| We have spoken of the advantage Of
the rebels in cavalry ss temporary. 1t is
se-s strictly. In very short time our
mouRte3 force will be made superior to
that of the enemy; and then if not before,
Hood must place himself south Of the Ten
nessee if he can. a1-
The rebels cannot take Nashville by
assault, and they have not siege train, OF
ammunition to besiege it. They will not
be able TO cut off communications with
that place; and, therefore, they eonnoi
starve US into evacuation ssl7
Evidences have appeared Of an inten.
tion of Hood to cross the Cumberland snc
move into Kentucky, but as long as tht
1 river remains at Its present stage he vii
find the enterprise of crossing it one at
= | tended with great difficulties. The rive
Is pstroled, both above and below Nash
vile, by gunboats that would soon rul
down q pontoon bridge. 1t is not hkel,
! Hood can cross the river unless he make
: the attempt as far up as Carthage, an
there he would have q rough and leal
n country to drag his army through.
Whether Hood can supply himself Il
Middle Tennessee with provisions an'
= ammunition, is question Of the creates
Importance. We hold firmly the rsilroGl
, to Chattanooga, so that nothing for tn
, rebel army can come from that direction
It The nearest point of rebel railway to Hoo
= is Florence, Alabama; and it is know
1t that he sent back his supply train to thi
% point the other day, especially, it ws
n thought, to bring up ammunition. In
], rapidity with which ammunition is cor
IS sumed in action, may be judged from Il
e fact that in the fight at Franklin, th
D. other day, we expended one hundre
IS wagon loads.
While Hood might bring up from Flo
-ence, suficiency Of ammunition, b
y transportation is not adequate to the tas
st of hauling provisions from that point
Is the neighborhood of Nashville. There is
d good deal of corn in Middle Tennesse
T though the crops in that region, owing
E. the unsettled state of the country and q
ID scarcity of labor, were short. Il is, hoI
al ever, the opinion of military men that,
y careful forsging, Hood can collect In tn
P country. friendly as It is to him, enoug col
70 to subsist his army for some time; and,
OF the mills have not been generally dest-ol
ed, ne could have his corn ground. ~
u TIE great ShelbyYille Mills, Thei
u Bragg had his meal ground while at Mu
al trees boro and Tullahoms, are still exts1
II and can be used Ey Hood. It Is not a
"a soluteiy certain, therefore, that he must I
y treat for want of proyisions--it will not {
n TO depend upon starving him out. B
u He must not forget that, owing his subsi!
1t enee to foraging exclusively, he cam
" live any longer than he can command t
country with his cavalry. AS soon as
Is is hard pressed he must stop foragin
and then very soon he will be out of !
he tions.
II Hood can not, or does not, cross {
ot Cumberland and lush into Kentucky, U
rul der the impression that he is doing SON
se. thing equivalent to Sherman's mar
Of through Georgia, the presumption is Il
he ne will demonstrate toward Murfreesbo
on which is formidsbly fortified, well suppl
en- and strongly garrisoned, and devote hi
ic, self, until our forces assume the ofensi'
ed to an effort TO thoroughly destroy
of Chattanooga railroad. The vital points
that road are however, well guarded, q
cd there is a large accumulation of supplies
CHATTANOOGA % ..