The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-07-29
The Strategy of Sherm au's Cam.
paign.

An able military writer in the Philadelphia
Press. reviews at considerable length the
situation, which he deems quite favorable
to the Union cause, excepting the advance of
SHERMAN on Atlanta. Of this he says:
There is one aspect of the campaign we
must confess gives Us uneasinesS when we con-
template it, that Is the advav ce of Gen. Sher-
man on Atlanta. 1t is laid down by ali writers
on the military art. and all history attests the
soundnesS of the maxim that YOU should new
er act by double or exterior lines of Operat on
Every mile that Johnston falls back brings his
aud Lees army nearer together; and it must
be borne in mind, that when we speak of the
dis ance betwe two armies, We mean the
length OF time that it will take them to unite
Were Johnston 20. day at Augusta, and Sher
man before that place, we should consider that
our position was really less favorable than it is
at present. We look upon every foot of ad-
advance that Sherman az made beyond Chat
tanOOga as q serious military error. If we fail
in the present campaign, we believe that his
tory will trace the failure to that advance.
None of the movements made in the present
campaign have been unforeseen by the enemy.
The fact that General Grant would LOSS the
James was anticipated at Richmond before it
was known at the North. Whether they had
positive information We knew not, but that in
telligent persons in Richmond anticipated it
there is not the slightest doubt None of
our success es have been The result of surprises;
each and all have been the necessary result of
our adherence to sound military rules. the zeal
of our officers. and the sterling capacity of our
troops to receive and give hard knocks. Ad-
herring to these princil les, We doubt not but
the energy and determina ion of Grant will
ultimately lead us to a favorable result The
great point of the rebels, the indispensable
point to them is to unite their two armies un-
der Johnston and Lee. without our being able
to unite those of Meade and Sherman. We
think that General Grant is maneuvring to pre-
vent this. Should the rebels resolve 20 make
one OF those great sacrifices which have, when
successful, stamped the names of their authors
with immortality it is possible that an oppor
tuniy m ~ occur for them to prolong the war:
but to do SO the sacrifice must be real and com
plete not half way, Should General Lee de-
termipe to abandon Richmond to its fate. re
store the Danville road, move all OF his
forces Or The m in body of them on At
linta, the position Of General Sherman would
be critical in the extreme. We deem it pos
sbe to reinforce Johnston's army by thirty
thousand or for y thousand men from Rich
mond wan that force that able General (fOr
we giru him us the first among the rebeis)
might lhf1ict disaster upon Sherman. TO re-
cover East Tennessee and Nashville with the
command OF the Knoxville road, with Lyncn-
burg and Burkesvile as advanced posts, might
Well compensate the rebels tor the loss Vi n'cu-
mOnd. We deem su> h result pOsslDie put VIC
doubt whether the men at Richmond nave TUG
nerve 10 withstand the clamor tnSs WIZ pe
raised as soou as that city is abindoned. 1--we
are not mistaken both DAVIS aud Lee are of
that type OF men that are bold IN success dar-
lug whsn srtune sInileS, ~ 'un nav h"v ~ rs
perate circumstances. Ihey nay nave the
capacitv nf uanIon or OF Cromwell. but lack
tnt. IRON will which gave those men the name
they will always bear in history.