The Tiffin weekly tribune. (Tiffin, Ohio) 1859-1868, 1864-09-29
MoClellan---Hooker,


. duct of the war, in March, 1889. We
piyo below few extracts from this testi.
inony, for the cd fication of"whom II may
concern
QUESTION. To what do you attribute
the failure Of the peninsula campaign!
} ARsDer. Il do mol not hesitate 10 say
that Il is 10 be aiiribufedto 10 The rant Of gen.
, erd,ship on the part Of our commander.
Question Were you consulted upon
the subject Of the line Of the peninsula
IN preference to tho one direct TO Rich.
mondi
, Anspcr.--I nevc wasr consulted on the
} subject. 49,. i
/ Question What was the condition OF
, things at Yorktown when our troops hrst
landed on the peninsula, us regards the
, sticnaih Of the place and the relative
. strength OF the opposing forces!
4 Ansper.-I did not go down Tor some
/, .hrcc weeks after Gen. Mcclellan went
down. He went with tho army rom
Alexandra, and the return vessels stop.
, ped at Budd's Ferry, where ! was ana
= took my division down. Gen. McClellon
took down about so 900 men, aud when J
ioined him took 1000 down to him.
/ did not sec the returns; but that was
the und r.tnnjing there. Franklin alter.
: ards IJincd with his DIVISION. AZ inc
: tiino that General Mcclellan landed with
this lnrno army therc were somewhere
between 8 1000 aud 10000 ut Yorktown.
have heard il estimated as low as 81
900 and as high Us 10 900.
Question What course would you
, have advised at III time Of landing on
the peninsula under the circumstance!
A nswer. What subsequently, did
will, | think, convey an answer to that
question. attacked, with my single
} division, n line oI works OF Williamsburg
stronger than the line across the pcnn'
, suIa Mt Yorktown. At Yorktown, long
, after ilincd, never could understand
, why | was required to send ono half OF
my number on duty, day aud night, to
, dig, 80 as to invest that place. could
] only conclude that u siege had been de-
: tcrmincd upon somewhere IN tho pro-
. grammc before ever having felt to see
, whether we hud an enemy 10 front or
, not. Aud great many others felt so
too. From my examination of the works
y at Yorktown, aud reaching away beyond
b the position that occupied, felt that
I tNtW liNth Coulu ut pltlCfu WlbhVuh ny
considerable loss by the corps with which
' was on duty---lirintzolmans corps
> We could have gone right through, and
D gone 10 the rcur Of the enemy. They
= would run the moment we got to Their
4 rcut, aud we could have picked up the
/, prisoners. Right there at Yorktown the
enemy had cxpcndcd.u great deal OF labor.
But | would have marched right through
the rcdoubts, which were u part OF the cor
= don they had, aud got on the road be.
S tween Yorktown aud Richmond, and thus
compelled tho enemy to fight me on my
=, ground, and not have fought them on
;. theirs.
" Question .--Suppolc that Gen. Nc
}. Clclon had thrown his army between
Il Yorktown aud Williamsburg with us
q much rnpidity as he could, what wOult
, have probably been the effect!
: A Rspcr.--It would havo resulted il
the capture aud destruction OF the cnc'
u my's army.
Q Question. you know any reason
o why that could not have been done!
q A Aaswsr.--I do not.
n Question. II your Judgment thn'
. you could have gone into Richmond
l then!
A Answer.-IihiRk pe could haze mOed
= right on, and got into Richmond he
Y second day after that battle without another
; gun being fired.
Question. Suppose that the next day
n after this repulse of the enemy at Fair
= Oaks, General Mcclellan had brought
. his whole army across the .Chicknhomeny
and made a vigorous movement upon
Richmond, in your judgment; MS militia
ry man, what would have been the effect
OF that movement!
nSuer.--ln answer to that | would
say, that at no time during the whole OF
/. that campaign did feel that we could
|, n It 20 to Richmond. And | will say,
;. further, that after General Mcclellan
received his orders to abandon IIarrison's
Landing, wen, to him voluntarily and
7 suggested that with tho lorce wc had
\ there wo could take Richmond, aud
7 pressed him to do il. So confident was
that We could be successful that | was
willing to tallo the advance, and so u.s.
sured him. This interview took place
about ~ o'clock on Sunday. From that
interview returned to my camp stopping
on the way about two hours. On reach.
3 ing my camp found on my table an
order from General Mcclellan to prepare
f. myself with three days rations and the
=, usual amount OF ammunition, aud 10 be
ready 10 march at , o'clock ON Monday
This order was eommun icated to tho
whole army, and | firmly believe that
der meant Richmond | had said to
RI General Mcclellan that IL we were un-
successful il would probably cost him
his head, but that hp might us well die
Tor an old sheep as for lamb. told
him that knew of no better place to put
p; an army than between JOhnson-who
was at that time in Pope's itont--and
4 the deiences Of Richmond, that the troops
holding these defences would have To
mach to tho succor of jackson, and
would be compelled TO come out and givc
battle outside OF their delonces, when ]
} knew we were always stronger than tho
0 enemy, But before the time arrived lor
IeSecuting that order il was counter
I, manded, aud hence the results OF Pope s
campaign. AT ilarrison.s Landing felt
that we were in no place to come back
by water up the Potomac river, but il we
were wanted. at Fredericksburg we should
march there. But we afterwards cam Q
up by water.
/. Quesiioa,-Wcre you in the baltic Of
= MuRernl
!. Aas'osr.--ios, sir, aud at thOt place
h we won a great battle.
" QuestioR.--Could you have gone into
Richmond after that fightl
A AaNosr.-I have no doubt re could.
"a The day before, had fight at Glendale
n end under tho orders, had TO leave my
A wounded behind me, aud lelt two sur.
!, goens TO take care OF them. Tho enc.
4 my in coming to Malvern had 10 march
. right by my hospital. My surgeons af-
!, terwOrds reported TO me that about 3
y o'clock on the day Of the battle or Nal.
varn tha ananlv cnm n,Nu,al r.ll,... 4. "A.