Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-09-08

loh and very occupied the Memphis and Charleston
railroad from Docatur to Bridgeport passing through
that place He had division Of about 900 under
his Immediate command, and, c0ntngently as many more
Not than 1000 of the enemy appeared within
many captured fifty armed during the whole
| time, and never killed twenty Yet his services
valuable What he did, he did with iLtsllgenc zeal and
energy, and Gen. Buell. has given him liberal credit Gen
Buell. lost single brigade much less division by
capture. His whole loss by capture within the year did
probably exceed the strength OF full brigade and 10
instance such loss ascbable 70 any fault OF his
Mumfordsyie not under his command and he was 10
no responsible for the capture of its garrison
The Post imputes to Gen. Buell. that :" he permitted
Braggs army to get away in Kentucky, while another
General Gin command of Bues army who did not hold to
Gen. Busls policy, but who carrying on war in way
which it peases Gen. Buell. to call stain on civilization
fought and the battle of Murfreesboro The army
of Bragg which "got away" in Kentucky the same
army that subsequently attacked its adversary at Murees
boro with this difference that it had been diminished by
the detachment Of veteran troops and reinforced in less
degree it is believed, by conscrps The Federal
army which fought at Murfreesboro uuder Buells
was the same army that Buell. commanded in Ken
lucky against Bragg, with the difference that in the two
months that it had been under its commander it had
been very considerably reinforced The dimnuton in the
strength of the two opposing armies from ordinary
since the campaign in Kentucky had probably been pro-
poronatey equal The Post says that Bues successor
battle that occasion. If, then, under the err
cumstances described Braggs army able to off
at it's leisure after that battle and halt for nearly
months within thirty miles of victorious adversary, what
wonder that it should have been able to get away" in
Kentucky?
army defensive line for whole summer" The truth
49, that from the time of his arrival in North Alabama
with less than twenty-five thousand men, to the time of
his concentration at MurreesbOrO two months and
from the time when his last division Joined him, makag
about thirty-one thousand men, month. How he
employed during that period has been briefly stated in
this article and may be particularly ascertained by
reference to official records. In fact it line of
active and incessant preparation for campaign with
force now known to have been absurdy insucent but
admitting that it was defensive lne the Post in the
paragraph applauds BuePs successor way Of
ras for having successfully made the glorious aud ardu
Gus mountain campaign which gained US Chattanooga
Grant this ALSO but fairly slate the fact that after the bat
tie of Murfreesboro Buells remained nearly
months in his enreached camp at that place. within
thirty miles of his adversary and with this further differ
the two cases. that Buell. had thirty thousand men,
and three hundred and forty miles of made quaey pro.
teced railroad communication, with which to advance
against adversary sixtyfv thousand strong while
with seventy thousand under his immediate command
and say twenty thousand more under Burnside and with
well stored magazines at Nashville, which reduced his line
of communications to hundred and fifty miles, we'll
guarded Buers successor nndertok the campaign
against adversary probably not than forty thou
sand strong and although his adversary retired from Chat
tauooga al his approach yet twelve miles further south
that adversary reinforced by probably twenty thousand
men, attacked and drove HIM back and for months
eaguered him his army in Chattanooga IF Buell. ought
to have been successful with inferior against superior
force why did his require great preponder
Of force to win such precarous the
field liz it because the policy had united and nerved
| the armies and people of the South
1t is necessary this article to multiply details
the com parson which the Post has instituted Whoever
anxious for the truth may upon certain general facts
that the minds of most who have inteligeny
observed this contest, himself examine the comparison
which that paper has between the general results
before aud since the country saped by the policy
He will estimate the difference between creating armies
out Of perfectly materials and operating them upon an
unknown field the hand and other entering
on the field with veteran armies and with all the adj
vantage of the experience of former campagns and he
will judge whether the of the frat year were
greater than those of the two whether the
scheme Of subugation and spolaton has contributed
the triumph OF the Federal arms much less promoted the
cause Of Union aud peace For the last year and hall
the Government has poured renfocements and
vishy into the hands of its Generals but has gained
important victory where the odds not greatly its
favor It's effective force has been large the
beginning of the present campaign and it has thus far
gained decisive advantage 1t point to than
mortyinn dssster-the lsgtmste fruit of policy which
lends inevitably to ruin and disgrace The condition OF
Kentucky in beginning of this struggle was critical
as that of Maryland and Missouri An administration OF
affairs which respected the Constitution, and made
upon armed enemies, not upon unarmed and women
aud which soothed the excitement and apprehension the
contest naturally gave rise to- restored Kentucky to quiet
and made her of the most loyal and valuable supporters
of the Government contrary course has, it is true
restrained Maryland by mailed hand her throat and
a sword at her breast while in Missouri it has inaugu-
aud kept state of rapne and brgandage which
has ruined the State and at whose details the hear
sickeDs Kentucky entering upon the doom
Will the fell work stop the south bank of the Ohio7
Its votares exult over its victims but late
voice OF every honest man will cry aloud against it,
The assertion Of the Post that Gen Bues policy and
system demorazed his army that had to be
cd before it could again take the ed untrue 10 three
respects Fret, in alleging that the army dsmoraz.
ed second, in averrng by implication that it required
organization for any and third in implying that it
was actually reorganized in any fundamental particular.
Every resde OF the newspapers OF the day will remember
with what torrents of condemnation the Republican
teemed against Gen Buell. for the dismissal OF Turchn
other Offenders and for his general in repress ng
marsudng and corruption That these att lchs seeming
express the sentiments Of the people, well calcu
lated to impair the discipline OF army recently formed
from the ranks of the people, must be admitted and that
some individuals actually demoraLzed by that
and by the bad influence Of high State officials most
likely rue but the OF the army remained to the
high tone which characterized il from the FIRST when the
effect Of discipline began to be felt upon it.
single ausion which does not within the scope
to which it intended TO confne this article shall close
it. The Tribune pretends TO knowledge of the pro-
ceediogs Of the commission" which investigated Gen.
Buelrs campaign Does that paper to say that an
oath of allegiance was required condition of the sdms-
sbly reliability Of Gen BuelIs Witnessed We shsll
know OF that commission and of the facts which
it developed when the Government shall have given it's
] proceedings to the public