The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1864-02-22
Monday Morning, February ~, 1864.
From the Paiia ieiptia Press.
Gen. McCleIIan,s Report.

public-a document necessarily long, consid-
ering the wide field over which it traverses.
but extended for purposes OF personal defence.
We are not about TO enter upon its review,
which would of course, be tedious, but we
venture TO say that the public will be as much
dissatisfied with Gen. McClellan's report as
with his action. We suggest, also, that this
report might be still further extended if Gen.
Mcclellan would only write defence of Fitz
John Porter, or give US a fuller chapter ex-
planning his relations with Gen. Pope. II am
sure" said Gen. Mcclellan, in an interview
with the President, September, 1862, 'that
whatever estimate the army might entertain
of Gen. Pope, they will obey his orders, sup
port him to the fullest extent, and DO their
whole duty" The President, at this inter-
view, asked General McCllan to telegraph TO
"Fitz John Porter or some other of his friends"
and try to do away with any feeling that
might exist
To what a condition had General Mcclellan
brought the army that so honest man as the
President found it necessary to ask him TO
write a letter urging his generals to do their
simple duty! His own disparaging words
with regard to General Pope, aud many WELL
known incidents OF the second Bull Run cam
paign, show clearly that the Mcclellan fac
tion in the army p7emeditatedly failed to give
that officer cordial support, and history will
approve the dismissal of Mr.. John Fitz Porter
as one of the most righteous acts of the war.
Certainly one of its greatest wrongs was the
treatment which General Pope, whatever be
his merits as an officer land his claims to con-
sideration were then equal TO those of any
other general, where all had risen from OBJ
scurity), received from those whose business
and duty it was to aid him.
The one great fault of Gen. Mcclellan ap-
pears TO have been his over-estimation of his
own importance to the country and to the
oh r.lau oil t...
subordinate, dictatorial, and, at the same time
meretricious. He had the greatest army of
the country entrusted to him, and for time
had no critic or chief but the President. All
his troubles seem to have commenced when
he found commander-in- chief, and yet GEN
eral Halleck was and is still the military supe-
rior Of General Grant,who ''has always obeyed
orders" General Mcclellan seems to have al
ways considered himself a success, whereas
the country regarded him as an experiment,
and to-day the young Napoleon is not disen-
chanted. Suffice it to say that two represen-
tatiye generals have gone out of date for par
allel reasons--we mean Generals Mcclellan
and Fremont. If there is choice between
them, we think time has proved that the lat
ter was the most Indispensable. Certainly he
has best preserved his self respect, albeit he
never knew how TO obey events, and claimed
the peculiar privilege OF making his own es-
innate of his personal services.
1t is not a little amusing to read the follow
ing in the concluding pages OF Gen. McClel-
lan's report:
"In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns,
the direction should be left TO professional soldiers
stat sman may, perhaps, be more competent than
soldier TO determine the political objects and direc-
ton of campaign: but these once decided upoa,
everything should be left to the responsible military
head. without interference from civilians In no
other manner is success probable. The meddng of
individual members of Committees of Coprfess With
subjects which, non lack of experience they are of
course incapable of comprehendng. and which they
are apt to view through the distorted medium Of
partizau or personal preudices can do no good and
Is certain TO produce incslcuable mischief
The greater portion OF this statement is
true, though its general spirit is too absolute,
and its author means to imply that he was
sacrificed to the interference of civilians. But
we shall measure Gen. Mcclellan by his own
rule-a rule that should work both ways
Further, he says, with what profundty may
be observed:
II believe that necessary preliminary to the re-
establishment OF tho Union is the entire defeat or
virtual destruction Of the organized military power
of the conede rates and that such result should be
accompanied and followed by coneiliatory measures;
and that 6y pnrsuing the Eotsticot course Ihdre al
scdgg adcised is is possible TO bring about perma-
neat restoration ofths Uaioz,' SC.
What business, we may ask, had General
Mcclellan to dictate the policy of the nation?
The public is not aware that his advice upon
the subject was ever asked. If the civil Gov
ernment has little right to interfere with mill
itary matters, the military has still less au-
thority to Interfere with affairs OF policy. We
commend TO recollection the irrelevant letter
which Gen. Mcclellan wrote to the President
on the heels Of his defeat on the Peninsula. n
letter in which not single word occurs ap-
plying TO his own martyred army or TO any
army whatever, but which is engrossed with
schedule of policy marked out for a Coy
ernment which he apparently supposes not
wise enough either to direct him or to control
the war; On the strength of this vanity.
Gen. Mcclellan presumes TO instruct the Gov
ernment, not only as to how it should prose-
cute the war, bnt as to what its politics should
be. Egotsm and presumption should go no
further. At this period be found ii easy to do
two things, which his few admirers will find
it hard to reconcile to military ethics; first, TO
throw the blame of his disasters upon the Sec
retary of War; second, to dictate the policy
of the President.
II General Mcclellan failed at the most crit
cal hour, it was not for want of repeated
warning, aud it rds chiefly through his own
fault. He placed his army Ia position where
according to his own showing, it could barely
succeed, and where, If failed its failure would
be stupendous. 1t was the characteristic of
his military career that he could never have
enough. He placed the Administration in
such a.delemma that he could demand where
they could not give In brief he never work.
ed for the Government, but required, for the
success of his operation, that Government
nation, time, tide events, men, and armies
should wait for him. Though he required
'more men" than any general Of history. his
greatest want was want of "time" Men and
time, however, were not enough, without a
certain policy. His folly has become monu-
mental, and as folly, it is certainly great so
great that it is imposing. When we consider
this, we hardly wonder that he is not silent,
or that his partizans do not cease to claim
that he was great general or anything else
but a small man with large ambition.
On the whole, General McClellan's report
will impress the readers with three grand
things, as necessary to war as war ITSELF First
General Mcclellan; second General McCel-
lan's policy: third General McClellan's strate-
gy.