The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-12-31
TnE wILmINsToN EXPEDITION.


ample testimony. AT the best, we are all so
liable TO be mistaken, that he who prcsumes 20
judge, should at least avoid obvious causes Of
error without this predatory qualification,
we should not consider ourselves Justified in
discussing the failure of TIE Wilmington cxpe-
Cition. We consider the evidence in the case
to be so insufficient, that it would SAVIOR Of pre-
sumption to attempt to render precise YER
dict On the other hand, If the subject be
entirely ignored, there is danger Of misapprc-
sion arising in the public Mid.
The first thing that strikes us is Admiral
PcETrE's admission that he did not consider
it eSTedient TO await the arrival Of General
EUTLER. His words are AFTER the SOU
wester, the wind chopped around to the vest
ward and gave us a beautiful spell Of weather
which i could not afford to lose; and the
transports with the troops not making their
appearance, / determined to take ADVANTAGE
OF it and attack Fort Fisher and its outworls.'
II Admiral PORTER was acting in concert
with General BUTLER, no attack should have
been made without consultation with General
BUTLER. If the chief command BELONGED TO
the Admiral, he had the right to do what he
pleased; but if the chief command belonged
TO General BUTLER, the Admiral had no right
TO take the initiative against the enemy. II
the chief command belonged to neither, the
expedition was faulty in its very nature.
Dependent upon whether an expcditlonary
force consists chiefly Of an army or of a navy
the chief command should dcvolve upon the
highest officer Of that service which is to un-
dertake the greater task in the proposed scheme
OF operations. To order this otherwise, may
be fatal to the success of any plan.
In this particular case, no bad consequence
resulted from the action OF Admiral PORTER.
If he had squandered his ammunition, so that
upon the arrival Of General BUTLER. no !
assault could be made under cover of the fire !
of the fleet, then, indeed, would the attack
have proved most premature and unfortunate.
But it seems that upon General BUTLER's !
arrival, the feet was still in condition to bonn
bard the enemy's works, but that General |
BUTLER declined to assault them. That no
untOward event resulted from the early bonn |
bardment, affords no satisfactory reply to CEN !
sure of violation of the principle of con- |
certed action, wthout which any operation
is not only liable but likely to fail.
In regard to the explosion of the torpedo
boat, the unfortunate results that might have
ensued from the action of Admiral PORTER
are almost too obvious to mention. The tor
pedo boat was exploded before the lombard
ment OF Fort Fisher. As General BUTLER
had not arrived when the bombardment took
place, he must have been absent at the time
OF the explosion. Now, the theory favorable
to the success Of 'the torpedo boat flor there
were two theories even among engneers) was
that it would so demolish the fort that the
work would be untenable. Is Il not clear that
it behooved the troops to assault Immediately
after the explosion. Yet, if the torpedo boat
had succeeded, the troops would not have
been present, for the torpedo boat was ex-
ploded on the morning Of the oath instant, at
iorty-tlve minutes past one o'clock.
Suppose that the fort had been seriously
damaged, would it not have been somewhat
repaired by the evening of the cath instant
when General BUTLER arrived? Admiral
PORTER says SAT sunset, General BUTLER
came in, in his flagship, with few transports
the rest not having arrived from Beaufort"
Would the fort not have been in still better re-
pair on the 25th instant, at the time OF day when
General BUTLER was prepared to land? Admi-
raj PORTER says that the army commenced
landing about two o'clock" So, if the fort
had been seriously injured at forty-fve minutes
past l o'clock on the morning Of the 24th
instant, the Rebels would have had tAirty-six
hours and quarter before General BUrLER's
forces ever touched the beach to prepare for
the assault.
As the torpedo boat did not effect the desired
damage, here again, the action of Admiral
PORTER was followed by no bad results; but
II the torpedo had answered the expectations
formed, the haste OF the Admiral might have
implicated the success of the whole expedi-
tion. This case affords still better proof than
the first, that expeditions requiring concerted
measures should never be entrusted TO COM
manders independent OF each other.
We now turn to the operations of the troops
The accounts which we possess relative to
their performance are not 60 full as those
relative to the other part or the expedition.
Undoubtedly it was expected that the tor
pedO boat would effect so much damage that
the troops would be certain to occupy the po,i-
ton Of Fort Fisher But the torpedo failed.
Yet it is plain that its failure was not con-
sideTed tantamount to a failure OF the
expedition. Otherwise, why were the troops
landed? But when they were landed and
captured some of the outworIls Of Fort Fishsr.
and the skirmsh line, as General BUTLER re-