The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-11-23
TuE SITUATION.

From Ne Tr45RHc.
The movement of General Sherman is discussed
very generally rs if 70 were perfect inicpeuIent
operation, and a., &C. is lailnre or success y.re 70
bo determined wholly without reference 20 tho
conduct OF the war a. other points. Sherms. is
learredly compared 10 Napoean's marching ,r
Moscow, nud 10 Charles MI entering on Iu
mad ,arc'r, and 70 Ftod,d.s the Great renetrt-
trg bHh' Wa iui So, 90 pl1 SirsiHu war, AND 70
We know no iHN u"luN other general. t1 whose
schCmcs that whiDr b. hgs now uniertakon bps
no essential hLruu., what ytg. 10 Oupl.it on 90
all these vague and uumliturv vualorcs, 10 is
worth while TO remember that tlc army under
General ShctluHn is hut ono OF The many which
obey the duCC iUu o. LUutcu ut-OuuCral 9Gat;
and thai sherman i- certain TO receive the pow
eriul cooperation of other armies which like hi-
move ana acs as plr.s of ono machine guided 10y
one will.
Richmond papers r0port that lee has already
sen cuusldvrBb.e .e iulee 90 the defense of 5uudry
points thr. stDnJd hY sherman. We may safely
ass me That % bad duuc anything OF tue KIND
tht hiChnOud pGprs would have asserted the
drtct cen IGry. Jun army which Ice commands
is low holding iru of probably not less than
thuty M lc. 10 est NJ. To hold 10, hjs tOucO is
att, nuRtpd 10 t1U hast upprce Cons7tCut With
safety. Wn,n De decides To divide his army, he
H. TACT decides TO a'uuouu some pOruOu Of this
line and the position is such that the abandon
nCut e any part Cgs.itatc, the evacuation of
HtuTshUg, ard tho surrender OF al thls.
military advantages for the sake OF which that
othtTwiso worthless town he's Occu so obstiua'cly
dei0ndCd. Since. therefore, we have not yet
heard of the occupation Of Petersburg by our
tOices, We may conclude th o the whole Of Lees
uotps are still Iu tue trpuCucs near Richmond.
IL is stated again that L .riy has Hutlly a5au-
ooncd the Shenandoah 10 sheridan, aui that tine
latter, no longer nC.uiug large army, uas dos
patched two corps 90 tGC James. On the Latter
point we UAprcss no OJiuipu, hat we deem the
report about Early 20 FIR wrong as this that he
Cauuot AID will not Withdraw from the valley
"A q In al L
he bHs wholly gNcu over any purpose OF attack
ing SlcT Jan is Tro able enough. But the very
dilemma shows how even the inactive army Of
Sheridan is str uGthenipg the hands Of Shat-
man, IN his tar away march through Georgia
Early can 60 rti,hcr @ Richmond, nor tl oppose
Sherman.
As for Hood and Bcaurcgirl, th1y can hardly
be mentioned without aurh Never was an
army 30 luuiCrOuSly out Of place as that which
these maG.Cap lC ,dCr5 hurried OFF to the West,
while the scene of danger was with equal rapidty
sblited 10 be East. 10 IS limited that BcuIregarl
has sent his main body 10 COrntA, aud thence
down the railway ia order to get it once more
transported into Georgia and towards Macon;
but the plan Is 100 hopeless. A stern CHASE is a
long chase, and Il" remaining railway help could
bring these tSfCes within three days march of
SherDan's columns. On the other hand Beau
regard hrds his prUjec'cd invasion of Tennessee
impossible in tho iaCG Of uTgC unt watohfll
army under Thomas; and in fact can neither
fight nor run VI'h shte'y.
Three great armies, therefore, are seen to be
actively helping Shcrman-the armies under
Grant near Richmuud, under Sheridan in The
Shenandoah, and under ThOmas on the northern
bank of the Tennessee. hey together occupy
and control tbc tOai forces OF the Rebellion, and
they insure 10 Sherman an open country for his
advance, or rhcv stand waiting to seize the iirst
point which his movement shall cause to he
exposed. Tho ruth Is that the Rebellion at last
finds itself co.. iTOUtol by an enemy too s.rOng to
be met az all pOins, and the only question now is
at which point 1t shalt first surrender.