The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-04-08

however, map showing all the roads and
places named in this report. The country
between the roads Travelled by Gen. Ord's
command to some distance south of the
railroad is impossible for cavalry, and al
most so for infantry. 1t is impossible for
artillery to move southwark to the road
travelled by Gen. Rosecrans' command.
Soon after dispatching Gen. Ord, word
was brought by one of my staff, Col. Hill
yer, that the enemy were in full retreat
Immediately proceeded to Iuka and found
that the enemy had left during the night,
taking everything with them except their
wounded and the artillery captured by
them the evening before, going south by
the Fulton road. Generals Stanley and
Hamilton were in pursuit.
This was the first / knew of the Fulton
road. With it occupied, no route would
have been left them except east, with the
difficult bottom of Bear Greek to cross, or
northeast, with the Tennessee River in
their front, or to conquer their way ont
A partial examination of the country after
wards convinced me, however, that troops
moving in separate columns by the routes
suggested could not support each other I'M
til they arrived near Iuka. On the other
hand, an attempt to retreat would, accord
ing to programme, have brought General
Ord, with his force, on the rear of the re-
treating column.
For casualties and captures, see accom-
panyin reports.
The battle of Iuka fOots up as follows:
On the 10th of September we com
menced to collect our strength to move
upon Price at Iuka in two cOlumns-the
one to the right of the railroad, command
ed by Brigadier General (now Major Gen.
eraD W. S. Rosecrans; and the one to the
left commanded by Major General E o. G
Ord. On the night Of the 18th, the latter
was in position to bring on an engagement
in one hours march The former, from
having a greater distance to march, and
through the fault of guide, was twenty
miles back. On the 10th, by making a
rapid march, with hardy, well-disciplined
and tried troops, arrived within two miles
of the place to be attacked. Unexpectedly
the enemy took the initiative, and became
the attacking party. The ground chosen
was such that Il large force on our side
could not be brought into action. But the
bravery and enduran of those brought in
was such that with the skill and presence
of mind Of the officer commanding, they
were able to hold their ground till night
closed the conflict. During the night the
enemy fled, leaving our troops in possess
sion of the field, with their dead to
bury and wounded to care for. If it was
the object of Il enemy to make their way
into Kentucky, they were defeated in that.
Ii to hold their position until Van Dorm
could come up on the southwest of Corinth
and make simultaneous attack, they were
defeated in that also Our only defeat was
in not capturing their entire army, or in
destroying it, as | had hoped to do.
1t was part of Gen. Hamilton's COM
mand that did the fighting, directed en-
tirely by that cool and deserving officer. |
commend him to the President for ac-
acknowledgement of his services
During the absence OF these forces from
COrinth, tina. post was left in charge of
Brig. Gen. T. j. Mexican The southern
front from Jacinto to Riensi was under the
charge OF Col. Du Bois, with small in
fantry and cavalry force. The service was
'iooe cdIioitlClo!iiS pOl N' utSu, O'IUHCl Ou
Bots showing great vigilance and efficien-
cy. was kept constantly advised of the
movements of flying bodies of cavalry that
were lowering in that front.
The wounded, both friend and enemy,
are much indebted to Surgeon J. 6 F
Holsten, Medical Director, for his uDtiring
labors in organizing hospitals and provid-
ing for their every want.
| cannot close this r. port without paying
a tribute to all the officers aux. soldiers
composing this command. Their conduct
on the march was exemplary, and all were
/ eager to meet the enemy. The possibility
of defeat 60 not think entered the mind
OF single individual and ! believe this
same feeling how pervarles the entire army
which have TIC hence 10 command.
! neglected 10 melon ia the proper
connection that 10 cnvec our movement
from Corinth, and to attract the attention
of tie enemy in another direction, | or
dered q movement fr"pi Bolivar to Holly
Spring, This was conducted by Brig.
Gen. Lauman.
Before comp esing this report that OF
| Major General Ord Was received ana &C.
companies this.
! am. Colonel. very respectfully,
Your obedient servant
! L. s GRANT, Major General.