The Portland daily press. [volume] (Portland, Me.) 1862-1921, 1864-07-20
FOR GOVERNOR,
A Rebel Outlook.
For Members Of Congress.

A Rebel Outlook.
To those who are disirustful and despond-
ent regarding our military affairs we commend
the following clear and comforting summing
up OF the operations Of our two great Armies,
by the Georgia Constitutionast OF June 29th.
The aecouati is from rebel standpoint, and
shows clearly enough how matters viewed
81 Dixie. We presume the editor wrote out
his honest convictions
@The magnificent army of Sherman has
without loss and without battle, forced back
QUE of our best armies, under a iavolite Cen
era; and If he only had intended a raid, the
destruction OF the vast agricultural interest OF
the granery OF our Stale, is loss which
are III prepared TO endure, aud totally un-
prepared to retrieve. The evil is, first. the
withdrawal from market ofessential food; sec
Ond. the increase OF population caused by re-
fugees which makes an Increased demand on
the producing capacity OF the State; third, the
increased prices, which tend TO depreciate the
currency, which cannot bear another one. third
Reputation. Then IL IL be more than raid
aud Sherman holds his front by Notifications,
and mis- rear by guards, IL Is an actual loss oil
empire
therefore, with harm actually done, and
with Atlanta and the great railroad interests
involved in the fate OF a battle that Sherman
may may not risk, is it wise to tell our peo-
Pile that lhe Invasion of our State is but stu
pid blunder of the enemy.
just eight hours before the battle Of Bakers
Greek, General high Ia command told lady
in our hsaring, that The crossing OF the Mis-
sissippi by Gen. Grant placed him at
cy, and that the only thing fear was, that
he would take the alarm ana escape to his gun
boats before We could make the attack. Tween
- ty-four hours later, our broken columns were
hurrying along The same road in retreat, and
the lady who had believed the General could
not her wearing apparel. That
General was not named Pemberton.
Instance after instance OF this kind have we
har d1r U ma Wa and at IRA nanar trth
able editors, talk of the certainty that Sherman
never take his army back to Chattanooga
and congratulate the country that he has
marched Into trap. We once had some
perience with old rat that always sprang
~ rhe steel trap from the under side, and always
took oH the bait aud never got caught The
Yankees have peculiar faculty OF marching
into traps and staying there. Our only com
mentary upon such writing is, that such traps
as nalf State, and the best half at that, are SO
expensive as TO awaken smiles in the North
and 10 Europe when we boast OF them.
In like manner do we talk about Gen.
Grant, aud amuse ourselves over q set OF
facts which are lar from amusing
5 We are perfectly satisfied that the comman-
der OF the armies OF the United States might
have reached the result aimed for with
but small portion of the loss he has sustain
ed, and that with all allowance for the pecu-
liar Confederate arithmetic which kills Yankees
so rapidiy-on paperl
Lieut.. Gen. Grant was greatly mistaken In
his idea that, having turned The flank OF Gen.
Lee la crossing the Rapidan, there would sim
ply be loot for Richmond. But two
things have since been demonstrated, and
botn are serious. First, that the army of the
Union Is SO large and powerful that the usual
military axiom, Flanking is more dangerous
to the tanker than the fanked,' does not APP
ply. The strategy of Grant, which consists
IN simply Withdrawing one wing at a time be-
hind tue impregnable masses OF the center
and other wing. would be fraught with peril
We're that center aud remaining wing con-
enough
enough TO he broken, but Is perfectly safe
1t Is. Therefore he Is at liberty TO play
tricks Ia plain sight and without peril simply
because he Is TOO big 10 catch. Consequently,
In q succession OF tricks, even by one of the
only IN )derate ability OF Grant, there is dan
ger that one not seen or foiled at exactly
the rght time may catch Such result
would not be destruction 10 our army, for
Lse also is to big TO hold, but it might do
harm.
The second danger is Of the siege Of Rich
mond. Some OF our contemporaries and the
most of the correspondents, laugh at this !:
and yet Grant has 1t 10 his power to besiege the
capital or force an attack on himself, force
40 evacuation OF Richmond.
Not that he has his choice OF these three
things, but force that choice upon US.
Ia Grants moving up the south of Rich
mood aud threatening James river near the
city, Gen. Lee has choice Of two evils. If he
keeps ahead of Grant and holds the Peters
burg line inyiolated, that tanker necessarily
gets between him and Richmond, and walks
tween Richmond and Grant, the latter OF
conrse gets between him and the Southern
.s4 States communication, and GUS off the only
source Of supply now left as the valley Of
Virginia Is 10 the hands of the enemy. Ii
Lea wants to save Petersburg and Richmond
both, he will have 10 attack Gran. in one of
his craw-fish movements, and will have TO at
tack the positions and intreDchments which
the grand spade and pick army never exists
hour without.
Iu our judgment the plan of the campaign
Is at last developed Western Virginia, the
valley and its resources, is, by the movement
on Staunton and Lexington, to be rendered
unavailable for provisions. Grant is to throw
bus army into Qualifications the rail
roads from Richmond south, and so cut of
our army supplies. Thus the starvation OF a
sege will be as ef1ectnally secured as IL an
army could be found large en-, ugh 10 sur
round the legions OF Lee, as Grant did Gen.
Pemberton; provided, of course, that the
DanviIle road shares the same fate that the
Weldon road probably will.
II Gen. Lee chooses TO stop the game by a
fight, he has to put his finger on the slippery
Grant and stop his feake Rankings; and
having found him and stopped him for fight,
he will have TO charge the hills Grant will oc-
cupy and the trenches Grant will dig IL
President Davis concludes TO swap capitals.
and giving Grant Richmond, starts off ahead
OF him for Washington. will have the ar
my TO subsist In desert waste between the
two capitals; have to make time on foot that
will beat the transports on the Potomac and
on the Chesapeake; have the Notifications OF
Washington to storm, and seige to stand
should we get inside.
We lose Richmond II we hpfo the Weldon
and DanvIe railroads; we lose the railroads
500 II we save Richmond or we attack Grant In
nightly trenches IL we try TO save both. II
Is true that Gen. Beauregard could still keep
south Of Grant, and prevent raids into Caro-