The Iowa transcript. (Toledo, Tama County, Iowa) 1858-1866, 1864-09-15

contingencies is not fit TO command q

contingencies IS not mt TO command 3
company.
:. It's difficult TO say whether McClel.
lan's faults Of commission or those Of
omission we're the most glazing. I'm.
mediately after this brilliant move, he
thre away one Of those chances which
Fortune sometimes offers man once,
and seldom more than once in lifetime
The battle was resumed by the arrival
OF Heintxelman, and night found our
men holding their ground. At daylight
the enemy attacked and we're repulsed
with fearful slaughter. Johnston was
badly wounded, and no one seemed
able to take his place, The repulse ter.
inmates; in roui. Richmond was in
state of panic but Mcclellan, instead
Of following the fug,tives. sat down to
congratulate himself that the energy Of
Heintzelman and Sumner had averted
the terrible consequences Of his blum.
iers.
One would suppose he had by this
time learned the danger Of disregardlne
first principals but We find him again
pursuing the same strategy Four
corps of his army were on the left bank
Of the rlvar--Portcr, with the fif,h, on
the Ugh, bank. II has been SAID by
military writers that tic rebels have
generally followed Napoleon's tactics.
Mcclellan SCENE 4 desirous of c,nnlatinc
Ma mont, who at Salamanca when he
had gained such position that Wei.
iing'on must retreat, fearful Of having
hi ianrels snatched away BY Joseph
Bonaparte, fent his right wing TO
The only road by which Wellington
could retreat. TIE latter could scarce
~ believe that q man who had shown
such tactical ability, SO cgregious q
blundcr. Wellington moved upon this
wing and c,nshed it before Marin on.
could come 10 the resrne. In ike man.
ner, Porter was to threaten Richmond,
while Mcclellan held the enemy ia
check OH the lef, bank. The result ,s
VEL known. Granting that Jackson =
arrival was unexpected, if McC,elar
had hal his arny we'll in hand, these
additional! troops woul.l no, have mater.
tally affected the result. But Lee lef,
a liue of pickcts with al few reserves to
amuse Mcclellan. while he threw the
bulk Of tis army against Porter. Moth
ing bu, the timely arrival Of nigh, saved
Porter. As it was, he Loaf between
thirty and forty guns and and his ranks
were terribly decimated.
What was Mcclellan doing in the
three weeks between Fair Oaks and
Gaines Mills ? Waiting for Mcdowell
say his admirers. Bat lie made snch
disposition ofhis forces az 70 insure his
defeat even it Nc Dowe!l brought up the
expected ,reinE?rce,nents. SO that
granting, for the sake OF argument, that
the administration withheld Mellow
el, that docs not pallia,o tisese gross and
repeated blundcrs. Did the Admins.
tration make him sit down for q month
at Yorktown? Did they prevent him
from following the enemy with decent
energy? Did they suggest that "Io-
cuiar" strategy, which exposed
Caycc TO destruction at Fair Oaks
and Porter At Gaines Mile ?.
When these questions are answered
satisfactorily, il will be time to charge
upon the Administrations his failure. He
certainly knew that Jackson was absent
in the valley with $4,000 men-why
didn't he strike blow, then, in those
three weeks that elaspei ? Bat he
waits until Jackson returns, is attacked.
and owing to the defective disposition
of his troops, il beatel aud his friends
cry ''iMerserenee."
At some future time propose to f,l
low this campaign to its disastrous
close, and to glauce at the Campaign Of
Antietam.
AN OFFICER OF THE ARMY.