Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1864-12-03

As to communications he has none. His
government does not expect his news till
he reaches the seacoast. In short this ex-
pedition is a gigantic raid, flying column,
q march, not an occupation or conquest
This it is, on its Acknowledgements
lily. What is the nse or the sense Of talk
inf about its effects on the confederacy, or
on Lees army, or any other army, e
If Sherman could destroy Macon and
Augusta as he has done Canton, he might
have additional acts of unsoldierlike bar
barism to boast of; but if he does not sue
ceed in damaging orcapturing either-and
we believe the time has gone by when he
had q chance to touch them-he hiss moth
ing before him but q race to the seacoast.
This he may be expected to commence so
soon as he has made trial on either Of
those towns and failed, or as soon as he
discovers by the careful reconnaissance he
is now making, that he will fail If heat
tempts either. He will make good time
when he starts, because ruin will be the
certain result of delay He may reach the
sea in safety, and by so doing inhict dis
appointment on the country and disgrace
on the official persons who should have
rendered his escape impossible in that di-
rection, or in any direction, after he burn
ed Atlanta aud "busted the railroads"
But let us suppose the worst. Let us sup
pose that he takes one or the other OF
those towns. He will inhict some loss on
the citizens and some on the government
but he cannot stay there, as he could have
stayed at Atlanta, for he would have no
supply or communication. Still less will
he be able to leave garrison: for that
would be delivering the men who should
compose its prisoners into our hands. he
can do absolutely nothing after destroying
q certain number of buildings but con-
tinue his march to the coast.
If he should reach the coast, what would
be the consequence The country from
Chattanooea- to Savannah would then be
clear of all enemy, and, except the moral
effect, and the blunders which psnics never
fail to breed, we profess ourselves unable
to see the mighty results which will have
been obtained If the fear of this flying
column, and the political influences which
the outcries of population not hardened
by the contact OF war may bring to bear
on military councils, should cause the Con-
federate generals to disorgsnize their ar
mics and abandon their plans, its effects
will indeed be great and disastrous to US.
But if no such panic is created, and no
such blunders are made-if no time is lost
in locking the doors of stables from which
the steeds were all stolen when Johnston
was taken away from his army, and Davis,
under the name of Hood, assumed com
mand of it-this march 1--WE speak OF the
progress, through the land slone) will have
no more real significance in the history of
the war than the feats Of tightirope
dancers on the destinies of empires.
That one part of Sherman's design was
the production OF this moral effect-to re-
ioice the sovereign mob of the United
States, and to frighten into fits all
the fools in the Southern Confederacy, is
highly probable. But separation of the
confederacy never was part of the design,
because that was plainly impossible. Be
yond the moral effects, he had undoubted-
ly great aim. The extraordinary disap-
pesranee of the only army opposed to him
in front of Atlanta, and its disposition in q
remote corner of Tennessee, LETT him moth
ing to do in the interior of the country,
except perhaps to occupy it and garrison
towns This he is inno condition to attempt,
| for his army was diminished to half Its
number after the fall of Atlanta. It was
organized for three years in 1861, and the
enlistment of most of the regiments ex-
pired in June. He kept them together for
some time by the promise that they
would be sent home as soon as the
/ town was taken. When the Jonesboro
movement proved a success disgrace
to our arms not less indellible than Mis-
sionary Ridge-he kept his promise, and
his army was rednced to what it is now,
1t was sufficient to garrison and occupy a
wide extent of country; but it might be
used against Charleston or Savannah, OF
at least it might be employed, after a
junction with Grant, against Richmond -
| Now, the nearest way to Richmond, to
Charleston Cor Savannah, is precisely the
road he has taken. By direct march tC
Beaufort he reaches the feet which can
land him, without obstacle or danger, on
the bank of the james. In any event
work for his army could only be found by
directing his steps to the sea. His blow:
are not aimed at inland villages, nor is the
object of his march the separation of the
confederscy, or of those railroads which
unite more rapidly than he can cut them.
|