Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-08-08

lind BOuShsin, plStesd IL ana rolled up his
Adversary. ~. Ai ."' 'aAl'"'p .57liG
Now, Il 90 hRppened that such "a point
had been found In the defences Of Peters
i burg-A point which, II not weak In Itself,
'HW6dld Rt least give such enormougy ed.
vantage to ab, could II once be secured,
that the foFtdns Of the day might be said
4 70 turn upon itsn possession. Elaborate
4 Observation Of the tirrdtG lad revealed one
'bof those Ukey- points" which Napoleon,
Ftedefick and Cesar never failed toiseek
i on ALI their battle. fields! This position is
q domil sting ridge or hill (oemeteFy Hllll
4 on the eSst side 6f the city, which, If carr
rfsd BY the agSaglting column, would bring
| 1t on the rear Of the whole rebel line, per-
init bur artillery 10 sweep its entire pro-
ElchSati6ni and at the same time give us
4 fHbinmAnd Of the AppomsttoE and its cross;
IingB!aii A Victory under such DiroumstahcbG
conld hEfdly fail to be q decibive 0ns-Ait
must sever the rebel army ID tWaing -Andi
bring about most Important captures Of
men and material. These results were
lfHIiy icounted upon BY Cthe head Of the ara
/ NY as the seaGentS Of suceess!i That We
IBhoGid have failed TO carry q point inVolT-
ling In itself 90 much, especially after 90
Successful an Execution Of allEhs prelims
tihaty operations, is certainly alegitimate
cause Of public m0rti6eation. This how
svrt, far from dispensing with, 2FatheI
prompts investigations Of the causes Of &
| failure 30 lamentable.p D51nGnd hThaD
/ li am .fttlly aware Of the delieacy Of such
an inquisition, And 'apPfeGi6te the perfect
knoWfedge' 6f all the facts of the case needp
ed 70 authorize Q JGdgm6nt yet there aps.
pear TO be certain facts quite on the sur
face which may help 70 furnish forth an
ladeqhate explanation. ''.7si 4'' ''''
-'.- 80" 80. ~ III. -.l nor /
% At the threshbold of this Examination,
however, . word should he promised toueh7
ing the plan of attack determined upon for
the operations off Saturday. Although
PetersbnFgh cannot be said to- be under
Biege7 the action of Saturday partook large
~ Of the nature offs siege operation, and
may come under tho category of what mil
itAry mem call gan 'irregulaS, sieRe." It
embraced the elimination fgAm the prob
lem Of q fort, by the explOsiol. Of q mine
which had been In course Of construction
for several Eteeks--R task belonging purely
20 engineering or siege operations. Hne1t
required that through the breach fofmed
In the euemy's line, lby the destruction Of
the fort, an assembling, column should
storm the commanding position held by
4 =
masBing of troops Rt, this point, % that the
plan Of action does NOT contemplate the
advance ofthe general line Of battle, butte
powerful CONCENTRATION Of force on an In
dtViduAl point-tha line Of battle proper,
cooperating only 80 far aB 20 divert atten9
tionl and employ the enemy BY, , general
artillery firing. We thua sec the whole
momentum oE,the action, and the whole
hazard of the. result .indiyiduatSd IN the
corps torWhich the duty of assault ig a..
signed. .li3LJ .i.a1 a3i14uaa 9s8EI ~ ~ 4
In this state of facts IL would seem to
be the dictate Of prudencet and certainly
has been the inVaFiable practice Of the
great commanders, 70 select for the storm
ing column the elits Of the army, Rnd 70
take the supporting forces, as we'll as those
destined for special service sfter the main
action, from those equal 20 the best in the
army The action of Saturday does not
seem TO have been planned In conformity
with this principle. The portion Of our
line fronting the key point of the enemy 9
position has been for some time held By
the Ninth Army Corps It was, therefore,
Cen Burnside who conducted the mining
operations for the destruction Of the fort
in his front, aud his troops would natu-
rally. form the Assaulting column unless
other dispositions should be made. -
--Now,.y1ith-nO. desire tO=undertake the
-ungrasious t0klD6 oompaEiao9, bat with
the simple PufPoss Of stating 9 matter Of
fact essential To- the correct appreciation
of all the elementa that enter into the
question, il il due to say that the Ninth
Cotps can not only y. not DE, cont sidered the
elite corpsJof the army, bat fS really CON
sidefed far from equal 70 Others that might
De msntionsd-dnequRi, for Instance, to
the Second, or the Fifth, or the Sixth.&
Thla3 again iBEhot id dhd aedst Intended 70
convey Auyi impression of blamei but 90 u
lhappSI1 60ibea ThH oldoNinth Corps, than
which there never was better, has been re-
duced by hard work 10 mere nucleus,
With which hAE, been agRIpherated mot
IIIed) . mass OF new heterogeneo1s aud
Inferior mAteriaH The First Division Is
largely composed ,.of hegyy ARTILLERY, dis
monntedi cavalry &p.YI the Fourth IL com
posed exclusively Of blACkBi nI But Whist fS
even more eStrS0 fdfnarY then the Beiec-S
tion itself, i5E the mode in6Whict the selee-
ton was, made, for itsiHppeafs that the
choice OF the post Of honor OdS fred 6y
edslih3 Eoti. t,Oh the evening before" says
4 correspondent, 1.-THE division cpmmanders
of aheacorPs had. drawn lots for position IN
the attacking eolumusi The First Division
'tEsdlia1s1 Won, ,thsieed, aud 80 headed ths
thiB morningVto When such . mode
of Determining such question is adopted, |
heed SoHdsted that ffaetiodS chance
aheqld turn mp the poorest division Of .
poor eorpsra divisiol lifted neither IN 10.
'spscfi Of its5eomPo5iti6n OF its commander
for such q duty IS was Assigned III t'Sls
|, If then, IN view of1 thf4 circumstances, Il
be asked bWhy snotheF selection was not
made, an answer does5uot readily present 4
itself There Is, however, IN CaInots re-
maEkable work Ps Ia pOesess De- Place.
eloaely The mRttsr Id hand. tiTfs reason
Pahy orr as6allts occasionally fail, |" says
he, i'are, in nay opinionF Tariou8. Ia the
ff6t plaee, II d 81 fuie that the troops ims