Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-11-08
Correspondents Of III. New rorl New.

The proof Of the complete failure of General
Grants last movement against Richmond is now
20 conclusive that il Is not probable any reason
able man will presume to doubt it. To reiterate
the statement that il was merely designed A. a
reconnaissance, j. TO insult even non military
minds. All the adYces from the front concur in
stating that the object of the operations the
south side of the James was to turn Lees right
flank and get possession of the Southside rail
road. This once accomplished, and the army
entrenched on the line thus obtained, the gradual
extension'Ot Grants left would eventually bring
it to the junction of the Danville and Southside
railroads; aud that point in our possession, il was
supposed that Lee would be compelled to eyacu-
ate both Petersburg and Richmond. Three or
four days would DC required 60 establish the
Amy on this new line. and from the fact that
several days ratioDs were issued to the troops it
IS evident that the design here outlined was really
contemplated
Buffers movement on the north side of the
james was not merely fent, as has been repre-
sented His object to turn the left CO the
Richmond defenses, and 10 accomplish this he
made detour of some fifteen miles, thinking he
could by that means get in rear of the enemy's
flank aud force the troops at that point to retire
towards Richmond, or risk being cut of from
the main army His persistent efforts TO take
the works on the Williamsburg road by assault
il another proof of his design to force the Con
federstes to fall back on the capital Holman
on the extreme right had actually carried some
OF the works the enemy's left flank, ard
would undoubtedly have pressed his success had
he been able TO DO So But the Confederates
active and vigilant. and when Holman
penetrated their left they rapidly concentrated
troops from other pan = OF the line and compelled
him to relinquish the advantage he had gained
So brief was his possession of the works IA small
redoubt) that he was unable to secure two guns
which were abandoned BY the enemy when Hol
man threw forward his division, and he retired
with n loss at least three times as great "a that
inflicted on the enemy. Weitzel massed the divi-
sonS of Marston and Hickman on the Williams
burg road. and repeatedly attempted to force an
entrance az that point, but without any success
whatever. The troops were each time permitted
10 approach within close range, when they were
literally moved down with grape aud shrapuel
Musketry and artillery opened on them in front
and flank. and sent them Keeling to the earth or
back 10 the shelter where the line was formed
The fighting on the Williamsburg road wa.
kept up until night set in. and By that time
Weitzel had lost at least one thousand men. one
| half of whom were captured in front of the enc
mys works where they bad sought shelter from
the storm of death that swept above and around
them. When ethel discovered the utter fu-
tty OF attempting 60 break the line of earth
works in his front. he sent an order to Holman
not TO press the attack on the right. but Holman
had already abandoned the advantage he had
gained at the outset, aud retired To a secure po
sition near the York River railroad. and when
the order reached him he retraced his stems and
| joined Hickman and Martin on the Williamsburg
road The attack made BY the 18th corps near
the Central road was equally barren OF advan
tage. Terry made vigorous assault on the
works at that point and repused with heavy
loss Wherever Buffers troops attacked they
found the COnfederates in strong force and fully
| prepared defend their works, and the only
thing gained by the days operations was the
| knowledge that the Richmond defenses did not
| present one Penetrabie point. The movement
of the 18th corps was made with the utmost Sc
cresy in the hope that the objective point would
be reached before the enemy could send troops
to guard il, but the Confederate commander was
wide awake and had his troops in readiness To-
| repel the attack wherever made.
The loss in the three corps that advanced to-
ward the SoHthside railroad was FIVE times "a
| great as appeared in the first report. and may
turn out greater than we now know of The nj
tack on the 81 corps, by Mahone's division OF
! Hills corps, was made with almost terrible vigor
/ and the confusion that eusued was SO great that
fears were entertained that the corps would be
completely routed. Malone struck the division
/ of Gen GibbOn with such force that the flank
was at once thrown into disorder and the whole
/ corps forced back considerable distance, and
/ the conspicuous bravery of Generals Gibbon and
/ Egsn alone averted the threatened disaster.
| When Malone charged in between the ID and 9th
corps. and fell on the flank of the former, large
number of Gibbons men became panic stricken
/ and fled To the rear, where they were picked Up
/ by HamptOns cavalry and sent to swell the mum
Der of prisoners already in the hands OF the Con
/ federates. These men were TO battle. con
sistiug mainly Of couscripts. substitutes and raw
| recruits. and II Is aOt 10 be wondered at that
they fed before the veterans of Hills corps
+ GbbOn and Egsn, with the aid of their staff Off
/ GERS. rallied the old braves of Hancock's corps
and presented bold front TO the enemy thereby
inducing Malone TO retire to the Boynton road
but not until the 2d corps had lost at least one
thousand in killed, wounded and captured.
A large number OF the dead and wounded were
left on the field and these fell into possession OF
the enemy. who held the ground on which the
first fight occurred
Hampton picked 10 about four hundred strag
glers. and marched of with his booty without
even having To fight for it. Gregg's cavalry
which operated on the extreme left OF the line
bad several lively skrmisheS. which cost hin
about one hundred men, without any correspond
inc loss 20 the enemv In fact. the Confederate,
had tie best of it in every engagement that oc
CURED during the day; for with the exception o
having their skirmiSherS driven IN IN the morning
thew repui~eI every advance. anu -nOWed 40 Ooit
front II every point that Geueral Grant deemeG
il best To abandon Bis design and bring his arm,
back TO his old camp. thereby inhictng verl
severe blow upon the political prospects OF th'
President.
The losses in The operations on both sides o
the James. are about as follows hllled, 4OO
wounded, 6oO: captured, 1000: total. 5000
This i very moderate estimate, aud may b
increased by FIVE hundred when official return
are made ont The enemy lost about seven hun
dred prisoners but in other respects their los Va
tFifius
Those Nho remem5c. Meldes advance oi
Mine Run, 10 November last, ana compare
! With Tat made ~ Grant uu Thursday last. vi
find = striking resemblance in the two. ID
former VS. real advance oi the whole army
but Il failed. and was therefore represented a.
reconnaissance IN torce Grants advance va
: just a real. and vastly more important, but
also failed and the creiul0us public was nforme
/ that IS vas nothing more than a feeling Opera
ton. Is ans ole sufficiently inlatusted TO be
iieve such a statement. SEYMOUR
: INTELLIGENCE OFFICE