New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1864-05-02

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largest Protestant Church has led the way,
many other denominations will follow.
-.
THE Army ~ TEE POTOMAC.
We mako n ycTy TITO remark in saying that
the success Of the coming Virginia campaign
depends largely On the spirit OF the troops; yet
trite as tie remark is, it, full significance in re-
lation TO The Army Of the Potomac i'll Virginia
lis not 10 Dc apprehended without q knowledge
of tie in rio. az well as the external, history
Of this amy during tho lat three years. Beside
the marches and battles it las endured, which
are familiar, il is necessary TO know something
Of the causes which have heretofore at diNc.,n.
times kept down the spirit Of those brave men,
and partially untitled them for strife, and to
! take note of the removal Of those causes, in
order to understand why It is now possible to
say tina. tine army was never before so strong
so confident so formidable, as it is to-day under
the leadership Of Lieut.-Gen. Grant.
II is equally essential thGt an army should
Do led By a commander in whom il has con-
lfderce and that its commander should deserve
! hat confidence. The misfortune of the Army
of the Potomac has been that for il these two
conditions have never been simultaneously Iul-
filed. There was time, for instance, when
! Cen. Mcclellan commanded tho Army, ard
when Tho Army believed in Gen. Mcclellan,
but never a time when be deserved IT'S con-
idence. On tho ether hand, Gen. burnside was
entitled 20 the trl tful respect Of his troops and
subordinate commander, hut it was withheld.
Under both Generals. therefore tho Army WIS
defeated.
But there were causes deeper than these.
This noble army was educated 20 defeat. Corr
posed Of brave men, the timidity Of Gen. Me-
Ciellan was potcn, in every battle TO chill thor
courage. On the Peninsula, they became accus-
toned 10 unaccountahle delays and hardened to
unnecessary disasters. At Yorktown. month
of digging; at Williamsburg, q division sacr.-
feed for want Of support; at Seven Pines, d.
vision Of raw troops projected lr in front to
be ma sacred; at Gaiuos's Mills .niTd of the
army isolated on the leit bank Of the Ch.cka-
hominy, and abandoned TO couiiict with the
whole force Of the enemy; then confused, pur-
uosele5s retreat, ont Of which the obstinate yalor
of the troops won at least one signal victory
which their commander flung away; at the Sec
oud Bill Run, the army which lay impatiently
at Alexandria listening TO the sound Of the cn-
mys guns held back till IL was certain their
comrades bad been defeated % Antctam, q
/. ,llwon victory nippel In the bud, at HapeF's
go. three hundred thousand men iusuited
#, 49,, t.on tat taoy shoaid BIO put to
- sa,.,e history 81 tho world, bad
soldier. Of mortal fr.I 49, ... been called on
To undergo such cruel toulr, ta. ~.'''s
Gcaton ana unmcrtod ob,oiuy 10 tl'.s ...
what other ran Ito amy oftLcPotomac you'd
have kept courage and patriotic devotion ard
soldierly Gre still burning IN 1t. heart, and watt
ing only the opportunity TO flame ont in yicto-
rious heroism on such a field IT, Gcttysburg'
OF course, it was impossible an army should
pass through that gloomy experience and not
Dg made weaker by it. The expectation Of de-
feat became in q measure infused with the an
ticjuation Of battle. IL did not suffice to make
the men fight ill--rothing could do tha.--but it
made them accept disastc- without any emotion
Of surprise. Perhaps it 10 ~ toe much to say
they yerged a little on fatalism. Such doc
trno may DO for the Mussulmani it dos not
answer for the American soldier. There come
in almost every battle critical moment when
troops waver between a victorious charge and a
retreat. Accustomed TO success, they make tho
charges; Injured to defeat, they incline to take it
for granted, and retreat without one feeling that
could be mistaken for fear, but rs il they obeyed
some inevitable law, the operation OF which
they had previously witnessed. That Is what
Mcclellan taught the Army of the Potomac to
do, and tho very confidence with which for a long
time they clung to him, only made tho matter
worse.
Before this campaign, there las been no op-
portunity to unlearn this lesson. AT Chancoi-
lorsvillc, there was not much iailh IN Gen.
Hooker; at Gettysburg, Gen. Meade was COM
paratiyely unkpown. But Gen. Grant comes 10