Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1864-06-20
GRANTS LAST MOVEMENT.
lis Military Aspects and Objeefs---Its PrGI
able kfecI upon the Campaign.

From letter by Mr. SE1nton TO the
New York Times we make few extracts,
illustrative Of the views Of enc Of the best
military critics in the country:
Your readers will recollect that in my
letter on the battle Of the Chiokahominy,
in which endesvored to recognize the
true military character and bearings Of
that battle, put on record the opinion
that General Grant would make no fur
ther effort to pass the OhickahOminy, and
hinted that his eyes were even then turn
ed away 10 lines and combinations more
bold than any yet esssyed." Well, what
could then only be thus obseurely fore
shsdoWed, is TO day q realized fact. In
deed, l may now go further, and state
that from the very start, the transfer Of
the army to the south side of Richmond
has formed an integral part Of General
Grants plan Of eampa gn; and while the
battle Of the Ghickahominy was still in
progress, the whole question Of the pom
tooning of the james River was elabo.
rately discussed.
The battle Of the Chickahominy was an
experiment made for specific purpose
to test the feasibility Of an assault On
Richmond from the northern side. II was
an experiment perfectly proper to be made;
and il was satisfactory. Il convinced
every rejecting mind that nothing was to
be gained in that direction. This was OBJ
vious 20 overy one; and every one waited
to see what Grant would play next. But
it was only those who knew something of
ths boldness Of his military conception,
that could have ventured to anticipate a
repetition Of the Vicksburg strategy-the
same strategy, the same sudacity, only on
far gTsn1er scale.
This splendid stroke, comparable only
to McreaU's passage Of the Rhine and
flank march on Ulm, stands to day an Sc
complished fact; the Army Of the Poto-
mac, taken up, as in the srms of giant,
is transported from the Chiekahominy and
planted south Of the James River and
south Of Richmond. Now begins q new
act in the grand war drama. We shall
operate on new and uninterrupted lines,
looking to new and hitherto unattsinsble
results. l think there are few rcIiitary
men who do not now feel that the present
position Of the Army Of the Potomac gives
US Ieason to indulge brighter hopes of ul-
innate success than has been possible any
time since the war began.
By the present move new order Of
operation begins. We not only threaten
the communications Of the enemy, we
plant ourselves across his communications.
The communications of the rebel army are
the great lines Of railroad by Petersburg
and DanVille and their connections.
Richmond, as q city, Richmond, as a
military center, is strictly dependent on
these lines for its supplies. Cut it off
from these and you have tourniouet
aroud its throat. 1t may have 8 months
supplies, OF three months, or six month";,
tut these exhausted ami it must suceumb.
II Lee allows himself to be shut up within
Richmond, therefore, the problem reduces
itself to repetition of Vieksburg over
again. Will he do so2 This is a oues-
ton.
But this Is the pitiless alternative to
which Lee is now reduced 10 stay in Rich
mond and suffer the fatal lines Of circum-
vsllation 10 be drawn around him, or to
come out Of his works and give battle
Now fair field fight is precisely what the
army OF the Potomac invites and vel
oomesi it will gladly give the rebels man
for map, and engage to defeat them withal.
II Lee is unwilling to run this risk, he
retires within the defences Of Richmond,
and We then hold precisely the relations
held by the Allies to Napoleon defending
Paris in 1914. It was in vain then that
that consummste master put forth q gen.
eralship that recalled the splendors Of the
FIRST great Italian campaign in vain he
threw his masses on different points of The
investing line. If Lee is not a better
General than Napoleon, he can hardly hone
for q much better fste.
There is another aspect of the move to
the south side of the James, which from
the point Of view Of its relations 10 the
whole theater Of war, is not less import.
ant than its bearing on the problem imme-
distely before US. 1t is a division Of the
two crest rebel armies, and gives us an
interior position relative to the army Of
Lee in Virginia, and the army Of johnson
in Georgia. 1t has been reported that
Of Johnson's army are al
ready en- route to reinforce Lee, and, il not
actually under way, we NAV depend upop
1t that the able military heads that rule
the war councils in Richmond thorou9bIv |
imbued with the ooncer tion Of ooncentra- |
ton, and willing to risk everything to |
save Richmond, would willingly have ss- |
crihcedthe southwestern territory to secure |
the great point in Virginis But how |
does it stand now? Johnston coming To |
reinforce Lee would find his progress TO |
Richmond barred by the same opponent |
who stopped his junction with Pemberton
in Vicksburg We secure this. therefore:
irst, that the enemy shall receive no addi-
lion to his strength, while our position
Effects concentration of both the forces |
If Butler and Hunter with the main one
rating forces.
While, however, We have reason to lock
'orWsrd to great and important results as
coming from the new position Of the
Irmy, am v1ry far from looking on our
uccess as foregone conclusion. We have
opposed to US an enemy Of the highest
kill, handling an army of sufficient
trength still to attempt great things, and
minated by spirit of desperation. 1
ully expect some bold, audacious initis-
i've on the part Of Lee, and the greater
he straits in which he finds himself. the
nore energeticslly he will attempt to re.
rieve himself, and the fortunes Of the
jonfsderacy bound up with HIN.
WILLIAM SWINION.