New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1864-01-28
THE APRING CAMPAIGN.

| Gen. Halleck is quoted o. saving that tho
Rebels mean TO attempt another Northern cam
paign in the Spring-whcther into Pennsylvania
or into Ohio ho is not clear. Similar opinions have
been expressed in other quarters, and there is u
good deal of speculation which seems to leave
the forces on our side out Of the account snd to
assume that the Rebels will take the lead, and
that the National armies have only to defend
themselves and their territory as best they can.
We dissent from those views DO they advanced
on high authority, or on none. We know moth
ing of the plans which Gen. Hslleck may cher
ish. We 10 not seek to penetrate the ideas OF
strategy which control the War Department.
Bat we know that the country expects to see
the war RESUMED with energy the moment II Is
possible for our armies to move, and that il viii
not be contented with defensive operations any.
where. That being clearly understood as .
preliminary, we have no objection to consider
what the Rebels are likely 70 attempt on their
part.
There il evidence that Mr.. Jefferson Davis
means to abandon Virginia, or at least means to
put himself in position to abandon it without
loss, if the first trial of strength in the Spring
should demonstrate his inability to hold it. We
conceive, however, that the question ia not
wholly military. If Virginia. is given up, North
Carolina will also be surrendered, or will of her
own accord withdraw, it matters not which.
When those two States are gone, the effort TO
establish Southern Coniederacy is at an end
The maintenance Of military force in East
Tennessee becomes impossible, projects for
Northern invasion, or for any aggressive move
ments foil Of their own weight, and the plans
and hopes Of the Rebel leaders must then be
confined to the military occupation Of three
States: South Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama
The Rebellion win be an admitted failure, and
the world will see that its leaders are fighting
for their lives.
But gloomy as this prospect is. have the Reb-
els any betterl II they adopt the plan Of con-
centrating their forces within these three States,
of which the resources arc comparatively fresh,
and if they confine their military operations 10
the defense of strong POSITIONS risking no bat
ties except on ground which they have fortified,
they may hope still to protracf the war during
the Summer and Fall, and nourish their hopes
Of a Democratic success in the Presidential cleo
ton. They must choose between such policy
as this which ia one Of safety, and the desperate
effort to maintain their present enormously OK.
tended line Of frontier defense. They have held
it hitherto by help Of railway system; but the
railways are wearing out; there are no means Of
repairing them, and in no way except by rail
can troops be moved with rapidity along such a
line. If Lee clings to Richmond, his communi-
cations with Longstrset are at the mercy of a.
brigade Of cavalry. Ii Longstreet fingers in
East Tennessee he is equally in danger of losing
his only line of supplies. In fact, il has already
been once cut by Gen. AveriA, and we have
no evidence yet that the Virginia and Tennessee
Railroad has since been put in running order.
| It is evident, therefore, that the two Rebel
armies under these commanders are ct the ex.
tremities Of a line which they have no sure
means of protecting, and equally evident that
is interruption Is perilous, and may bs made