Evening star. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1854-1972, 1864-12-02

of Tennessee left him nothing to do in the in
terror OF the country, except perhaps to occupy
ditIon TO attempt, for his army was diminished
to half Its numbe after the fall Of Atlanta 1t
was organized for three years in 1861, and the
enlistment of most re gimentS expired In June.
He kept them together for SEINE time by the
promise that they would be sent home as soon
IS the town was taken.
When the Jonesboro' movement proved
Federal succsss-a disgrace to our arms not
less indelible than Missionary Rldge-he kept
his promise. and his army was reduced to
what it is now. 1t was insufficient to garrison
and occupy wide extent OF country; but II
might be used against Charleston or Savannah,
or at least it might be employed, after juno
ton with Grant, against hlcnmond NOW, the
nearest way to Richmond, to Charleston or
Savannah Is precisely the road he has taken.
By a direct march TO Beaufort be reaches the
fleet, which can land him, without obstacle or
danger, on the bank of the James. In any
event, work for his army could only be found
by directing his steps to the sea. His blows
are not aimed at inland villages, nor Is the OBJ
ect of his march the separation of the Confed-
eracy. or OF those railroads W hich unite more
rapidly than he can cut the m.
The Importance of Macon and Augusta
Ursed-By Taking Either Sherman will
Accomplish Great Things.
From the Richmond Examiner, Nov. 26.
The news from Georgia, now the most In
teresting of all. is exceedingly meagre and I'M
trustworthy. But no doubt can now be en-
tertained of Sherman's design or his destIna-
ton When Davis sent and Hood took, the
only army apparent in the country off his
shoulders and carried 1T through the noun
tains to stick in the mud between Tuscumbia
and Florence, Sherman determined to make an
attempt on the lines OF communication between
Virginia, the Carolinians and the rest of the
Confederate States, his work in Northern
Georgia was done, and for Interior operations
any point on the seacoast would be better
base than Chattanooga. He Iisked much in
appearance, but perhaps little in reality. by
destroy ing his communications. A marching
three pitched battles, and for supplies this
of the year he might partly rely on the country
which he proposed to pass II he could take
Macon or Augusta by the way, he would &C.
complish great things; but the destruction of
those towns are not his main object. His de-
sign was to destroy the railroads, as far as he
could, which ran from Southern and Western
Georgia to Virginia and the Carolinas, and to
rest his army at Beaufort and Port Royal.
That he would 90 to that point rather
II ne directed bis course to Savannah OF
Charleston, he would find fortified and we'll
defended cities, and his troops, exhausted by
a long march, both in strength and ammuni-
ton, would be wholly unfit to reduce either
place. But the enemy already has possession
of Beaufort. He would have no fighting to do
there, and he would find transports laden with
every species of supply awaiting his arrival.
1t is, therefore, sonable to believe that Beau
fort is the point Of destination, and that if he
fails at Augusta he will make his way thither
as fast as the Con federate troops permit him.
II the reader will glance at the map, he will
perceive that when Sherman has passed from
Chattanooga to Atlanta, and thence to Beau
fort. he will have severed every railroad be.
tween Georgia and Virginia. This severance
will be easily repaired but if he can establish
himself permanently at Beaufort, he may be
able to operate against those roads repeatedly.
Furthermore, Beaufort lies between Charleston
and Savannah, and can be conveniently used
as the base of land operations against either
city. 1t is evidently highly important that
Sherman should never take Augusta or Macon,
and should never reach Beaufort.