Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-12-14

much a military as a political movement
and why It should be regarded rather as &
defensive than an aggressive measure.-
| The evacuation Of Atlanta was compulsory
! When Hood had established himself or
the Tennessee river, looking towards Nash
vile and the line by which Sherman KEEP
ouan his Communications with that city
| Atlanta ceased 70 serve its purpose as q
| base for further operations, and consequent
Iy lost its value - the enemy. II Sher'
man should stay in it with his army be
would be wasting his strength for nothing
while Hood eonld operate against HE com
munications, and by cutting him of from
| his base of supplies, compel him either TO
| fall hack and fght a battle to relieve him
seM. or to push forward for anew base on
the coast. One of these things he was ABB
solutely compelled to do. ..H-
| True military policy would have IN
structed him 70 fail back, get In HOODS
front, and by the Concentration of all his
available forces, attempt to beat that gen
oFnI ont of flhsfRoId. InIt this, as We once
before have stated, would have bseu 60
confess his whole campaign as failure,
and TO begin over again the work which
the Yankee armies have been so long and
50 weafIly prosecuting since the tall OF Fort
DonelsonL: It would have demonstrated
the impracticRbilIty Of the Yankee scheme
of conqueots; would have rendered the
Northern people disseminated, and might
have made It impossible for Lincoln 10
raise another army. To push forward to
the ocean was the only alternative. Aud
this, even while It gave up all the country
gained by go many struggles, and by 30
vast an expenditure OF means, appeared TO
offer some compensating advantages. II
u
a grand campaign, brilliant movement;
If successfully carried through it might be
claimed as a magnificent triumph, If not
over opposing Uonfederate armies for
these were persistently reasoned out OF the
vay, at least over the obvious difficulties
ofs long and tedious march through
hostile country, and over the obstacles
which always impede and the perils which
always beset this kind of invasions.
II could likewise, then, be said that the
Yankee authorities had determined to
change their whole system of INVASION ana
adopt the coast line as base OF operation
against the refractory Atlantic slope, rather
than to attempt the slow and dlhcult
transit of the mountain ranges, which, IN
three wears, has produced very little more
than was gained witlin the frat six months
after the fall of Nashville. And perhsPs
this, combined with some general theory OF
concerted action with Geaut against Lees
communications, is the a Priori military
hypothesis on which Sherman's movement
is based. ... -.
Bnt we contend that, even if successful
its immediate objsct-that OF getting
through to the coast-the Confederate cause
will be vastly the gamer aud the YANKEE
cause vastly the loser in the general resnits
of the campaign. II restores TO as all tue
lines of communication we held at the
opening of the year, yields up sto
ma "A - uAat aud Important section
which had been Wrested from US, frees
large portion OF OUT ps"pis ifcun 'ii0
domination of their enemies, and just 70
that extent increases the strength aud tne
resources of the COnfederacy. In ehect II
puts the Yankees back instead OF putting
them forward, aud forces them to Try
new experiment.-that of operating. from
the coast to the interior-a system Whlo1
they have heretofore refused 70 ADOPT, ana
shows that they abandon as hopeless tneT
former plan, go perststently adhered 10
during four years, of conquefing the coun-
try by a gradual descent from the moun'
tains. If he do not receiver that line, we
shall not he worse OF than we!were last
wear, and the Yankees will have expended
nearly thousand million dollars, sacri-
6ced thousands oflives, aud thrown away
the fruits Of City imaginary Victories and
a half dozen real ones, oaly for the sake
of irving their luck at g different point.
And, after all, there is no certainty that
Sherman will get through.