, 1864-12-16

| NA9AtAAlA6s DeC-
The armies are perfectly quiet, Tho ther.
momctcr is low, and the men arc busy on both
sides, all engaged In keeping themselves
*afm' TO the exclusion Of every other occu.
| patton and you may be assured, reader, that
they hare quite enough to do. Not a shot
*sa nred. and not reconnaissance has been
made, BY either party during the last ten
daya; and from present nppearancesnl night will
again close In upon a complete quiet.
Five deserters from Lees corps came into
our lines yesterday, just before daylight in
the morning. They were thinly clad, with
mero excuses for shoes, and no blankets,
They said the rebel amy was suffering terri
bly,. both with hunger and cold. Nothing can
be obtained by foraging. The government
nag purchased every particle Of hay and corn,
neither man nor horse eau Get nything e1cept
what Is WaEoned from the Tennessee Tiver, at
Florence. With scarcity Of teams and fear-
tnlly bad roads. It will be difficult to imagine
Inc measure Of the supplies received.
"a careful survey Of the situation, after get
thar Hood started on his present campaign
without any plans, except to do something
desperate. Sherman was moving, regardless
Of communications, and could be not do the
same? No one need tell him heis Shcrman's
inferior in ability inderd, he regards himself
as first of military geniuses-as the superior
Of oil living men.
But there were several little matters which
Hood failed 10 take into consideration, Sher-
man was moving South, and be North, and
winter Was approaching; Sherman was NOV
ing through land which md not yet suffered
greatly from the horrors Of wnr, and consc-
quentiy was not yet drained Of provisions;
while Tennessee has been orerrun by both ar
mics, ior three years, and has not now bread
enough In 1t to subsist its citizen population
IN Georgia, horses can live on the winter
E1ass; IN this section. they must be fed with
hay or corn; and ADORE all, She man has no
amy to oppose him, while Hood is confronted
by one which, when collected torcther. was
vastly the superior Of his own.
10 the candid reader, these contrasts will
appear stirling, md be regarded as very i'm
were fully compensated for By his superior,
overlapping genius.
He has, doubtless, ere this, learned, if be il
capable Of learning anything, that he is in q
much tighter place than be bargained for.
sal,,sss Win scsnt clothing, Liz troops have been
parallel in this climate; and there can be no
question but they are suffering terribly. But
their hardshfps have only begun-and when
they will end, cannot conjecture.
We hear daily from the troops under Rous-
seau, which arc concentrated at sfurfreesboro,
irg in operation over that route. Besides,
cour1ers pass 10 and fro, by way Of Gallatin,
and Lebanon, which shows clearly that Hood
has his whole army hIddled together here.
Indeed, he dare not scatter them were he to
DO 50, The dc:achmcnts would be defeated in
bis men together.
4 week ago, was certain that battle
would take place at once now think The
prospective fight at least a week distant.
There are combinations at work, which will
require q little lime, but they will work the
complete destruction Of Hoods army. If he
remains here little longer; and II he at
tcn1pts to retreat, he will be followed, and
struck in several places at the same time
Our superiority In numbers will enable Thorn
as to do this without difficulty: and now
Forests cavalry will avail little. It is not
soto superior to ours and it will be greatly
our Mfcrlor, IN a very brief period Of time.
In making calculations relative to mpye-
ments here, it must all the time be borne in
mind that We command the Cumberland river
aootv this city. completely, and that the wa
Ter is high, and gunboats can run to the head
waters Of winter navigation and as conse-
4uence, If it we're deemed practicable for them
to cross large force at Gallatin, which is On
the Louisville railroad, md but ten miles from
Inc river, 1t could be easily done and then
II Is nut sixteen miles to Lebanon, and but
ahout twenty more to Murfrccsboro- thirty
SIX In all. Now let us suppose remember I
asset nothing-that large force, chiefly
cavalry, We're concentrated in the rear Of
HOOD, at auFtrccebo,o, and that it were 10 be
employed in harrassing his foraging parties,
picking up his baggage trains, &c, what
would DC the probable consequence? Ileave
the reader to judge. Remember that commu-
nlcatlons could, with great ease, he kept up
Between such force and headquarters at this
city. Couricrs can travel thirty-six miles in
four hours, easly, and from Gallatiu there II
Telegraph and railroad line.
But suppose Hood were to attempt to cross |
below the city? Let any ono study the maps |
and see the consequence. lie could not then |
get back By the same routc. His rear would |
1e closed and he would BE- compelled to aban- |
doned the river and gunboats could then ply |
on it md keep it open. Then NC could throw /
troops with perfect facility to his front by |
railroad and head him at any point. To at |
tempt u winter campaign in Kentucky would |
De modncss on the part of Hood, as would |
also IN assault on This city; q march to East |
Tennessee toward Virginia would be equally |
hazardous, and to retreat to the Tennessee
river and 60 again into Alabama would be an |
ecknowl lcn.ment Of u failure which The rebel
General will be hardly willing to make.
heard man Fay that he believed Hood \
knew that there could be no peace till the
1ebel arms were destroyed, and that he must
have tasned "pcace man !" and WAS doing his |
lart pretty etIectual,y towards accomplishing
The work. Every move he has made las been !
bud one; every battlc he has fuush has pnt !
thousands of his men out Of the way, and nov
he appears to have concluded to tinish the
Job" There is some philosophy in th2 say-
gestion.