Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-10-06

D7.es9 "0HFu
sytaoie pressure OF events to seek by return the
Union, escape from the ruin that would speedily over
whelm them out of it This said he, was my plan
But am only subordinate It is nv business to oiva
advice when it is asked and to obey orders when thew
given shall do H. There are gentlemen in the Cabinet
VINO know much mora about war than do and who have
ar greater influence than have in determining the plan
OF the campaign There more Just and up.
rght man than the President-never one who desire
more sincerely to promote the best interest of the
but tnere are men among his advisers who consult their
own resentments far than the dictates of wisdom
and experience-Rnd these oM yroJabiy decide The
plan 81 me campaign shall do or attempt whatever
am ordered to do But they must hold me responsible
Ii am ordered to 90 to Richmond shaI end IN do
it, But know perfectly well that thew have no concen
ton OF the difficulties shall encounter l know the
country--how admirably adapted it ia to defence and how
Tesoutsly and obstinately it will be defended would
ike nothing better than take Richmond Now that il
mas Deen dgraced by becoming the capital of the rebel
Confederacy, feel resentment towards it and shopl
IKE hohng peter than to scatter It's Congress the
winds. But nave lived long enough to know that huma
resentment very bad foundation for public policy
aud these gentlemen will live long enough to learn it also
snail DO what am ordered. / shall fight when and
whe.e am commanded But If I am compelied 10 fght
bgore am ready they ohaH not hoid me RESPONSIBLE
THESE gentlemen must take the of their acts
as am willing to take that of NINE But they must not
throw their responsibility my shoulders"
Such were the plans of Gen Scott. How they
were overruled the Times proceeded to explain in
the same article by saying that the President, in
such matter as fighting battles on which the fate
OF the country hung, was to very great extent IN
The hands Of has Cabinet It said:
President Lincoln is not likely of bs oan mofor "a
nave oVerued Gen Scott and to have forced him TO pht
pa'te agalnat his Will But President Lincoln is TO
very great extent in such matter as this in the hands al
hls Cabinet portion Of that Cabinet is snown to have
iui and entire confidence in the military ability of Gen
Scott while another portion equally we'll known to be
ayphic
almost to hatred 1t necessary to specify indv
duas IL matter Of nooriety that some members OF
Cabinet nave dna little else during the ast few weeks
han to denounce Gen. Scott rdlculs his plans of the
campaign and declaD tho necessity of overrune or
superseding him. they have succeeded n overrulpg him.
with what reeults the country knows too well.
Let hs President mske up bis own mi nd on
TINS point, and then make his Cabinet unit upon It, III
the Boirs aud tho Greeys and the radical conemners OF
experience and science in military matters to bear
sway, let it be undisputsd Let them have full
OF the Government, and take all The responsbltv of il.
rum II not let them retire aud give place to men Of
cooler temper and OF wiser heads The worst thing the
reseeht can 40 IN this crisis is 10 hesitate and allow
things to drttt at random, as they now doing"
Here, then, We have, in the untoward result Of
the collision" precipitated by the Tribune on the
list OF July, 1861, the origin Of contest which
has expanded not only into "thc proportion of
but into the proportion Of four success
siVe campaigns, without as yet any end being
reached. The very means taken by the Admins
tration at secondhand from the New York journal
for the purpose of crushing the rebellion by one
prompt battle" caused the struggle to "widen into
war on gigantic scale" Gen. Mcclellan, at the
advice of Gen Scott, was called from his yctorious
career in West Virginia to retrieve the fortune, Of
the Republic, imperlled and lost by partisan folly
on the field of Bull Run. He first addressed him.
self to the defence Of the capital and after educino
order out Of :he chaos created by the late rout be-
gan the construction OF those works which b.v,
since proved the sute defence of our city against
the approach of the enemy and against his inpress
when by military shiftessness he has been allowed
to approach our very gates, as in July last. Had
It not been for these much derided works. the ci,v
Of Washington would have then fallen an easy prev
to single detachment of Gen. Early's army.
On the 3lst Of October, 1861 Gen. Scott re-
signed his chief command of the armics of tho
Union. Gen Mcclellan was called by tho P,osi-
dent to succeed. In his ensuing annual MESSAGE
t' Congress Mr. Lincoln thus referred to the con-
siderations which dictated this choice
with Inc retirement OF Cen Scott came the uIive
duty oi appointing IN his stead General Chief oT the
army It's fortunate circumstance that neither in cam
Gil nor country was there, far as know sny dren
Of opinion as 70 The proper person to be seectad Tb
retiring chief repeatedly expressed his Judgment in favor
OF Gen Mcclellan for the position and in This tba ,a,on
seemed 10 give unanimous concurrence The desions
ten o Gen Mcclellan is, therefore, in a.
gree the selection Of the country well ss Of the Erecn
tve aud hence there s better reason to hone thrc l
be gwen him the confidence and cordial SUPPORT TINS b
far implication promised and without which ha con,ot
with so full efficiency, serve the country
1t has been said that bad general ia better tbs,
two good ones and the saying is true If taken 10 mean
more than that an army better directed bv s,oa ;d
though nferor than by two superior ones st yatnc ana
cross-purposes with each other"
And 50, on the lst Of November. 1861. General
Mcclellan became the Gencral-in. Chief Of the Ar
mics of the United States. He seemed to have.
and we think that he really had, the confidence and
the support Of the President until the latter conld
no longer withstand the pressure" brought to bear
against Gen. Mcclellan and himself. For. while
Mcclellan was organizing his armies, the same tur-
bulent faction which had goadcd the President into
fighting the battle Of Bull Run before he was rea-
dy, became now still more vociferous in its outcres
against Gen. McClellan's "deays" The last in
junction OF Gen. Scott to the young General-in. Chief
had been "never permit any power on earth to
make you deviate from your well-conceived plans !"
and the political stratcgists soon found that Gen
Mcclellan was not a man to be moved from bis