The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1864-02-24

- - ~ LNSN RAee. - sasss y snS
-. Destination ~ sAevnsn's Army.
naSaoud. the editor Of the New York
1S,,sa tAs came who escaped so giorioufly
nom oolfsrino, he's bad hls head full ever
s,ncs Of '-straaegic POINTS" and "strates'.
squarA" He has just discovered gram,
sssezaaegtc tzsAagle," (not asquare IDS un,'
vhieA Il b the object Of shermAns eAp
zion 70 seise, and which. once IN DIE NE ;,
seon. = to settle the fate Of the reoel.v",
vh,cA Raymond himself bas 90 often se'"e''
hut which. somehow or rather, viii NOT stay
$500. sherman, he tells us, certainly ooes
,ok intend 70 march to Mobile. Inc iate o.
thas eity b 70 be Ieft to Banks and fal'axu :,
eharman's object b . very different Que az
eAo..h n = connected with the enterprise
.~.,neH NobilA He tells us what that 90
~ p. ana = the Yankee papers are cor
,SHantIv in the habit Of foreshadowing tue
dsairns Of their Generals, We feel quite az
surcd that his statement Is correct.
The article appears to have been wr'tten
heSore Sherman had arrived at Meridian. 1t
supposes him to be In possession OF thai
p1ece. which u 40 miles from Vicksou'g,
and 70 have placed the railroad to that point
IN rood working order. In the meantime
Baaks end Farrngut arc to be supposed 10
have taken Mobile. Then there Will De TWO
forces planted at important strategic points
-oue Ct Meridian, the other at Mobile-and
these two points are connected by railroad
mobile and Ohio) Sherman Is then to push
eastward to Selma, Ala, and these opera
lions are to give the Yankees possession Of
tho triangle Of which the three points are
Mobile, Meridian, and Selma country Il
enormous value to the Confederacy, and 1
equal value to the Yankees; for in the dis
trict between Selma, Vicksburg, and Mobile
there viii be two water bases-ona on III,
Gulf, and the other on the Mississippi-wiill
four lines OF communication by railroad ane
water, VIZ From Vicksburg the Southern
Mississippi Railroad, from Mobile the Mo
bile and Ohio Railroad, and the Tombigbee
and Alabama rivers. These points are to b
held, fortified, and made bases of supply,
and, rnatte9 being thus arranged, will form
tho second base In advance for Gen. Graz {
n invading the Gulf States, Chattanooga
and Knoxville having formed the first.
The tactician of Solferino exults over the
results which arc to flow from the occupa
ton Of his triangle" First of all, it CON-
polls Johnston to decamp, he says, with f l
speed from Dalton. Second, it anticipate,
the rebels In their only remaining line o:
defence. Lastly, it forces them into Florida,
which IL described as very little more than q
dragged"
We have seen 50 many Of this writer's
brilliant military suggestions come to sor-
row In the enactment, that we cannot bnt
hope this one may meet with the same IA: e.
That 1t is q genuine exposition of the i'll
tended campaign, We have no doubt. At the
same time, We know that nothing is more
dangerous than for military force to place
itseH In the rear of great army, in this
way, when from the very nature Of things it
cannot possibly communicate with the army
acting in front. In the Seven Years War,
General Tinck, with. % force of IA, 900 men
by the command of Frederick himself-got
In the rear of Daun's army, and was com
PEELED to surrender with the whole force.
There have been many similar instances-so
many that Napoleon pronounces it one of
the most dangerous operations in war. In
1909, before Ratisbon, when the Austrians
were advancing on Davoust, who held that
city with $1,000 men, Napoleon being on
the flank Of the advancing army-and when
he might have fallen on their flank and closed
mp their rear while they were attacking Da-
voust-he nevertheless ordered that Marshal
TO evacuate the place and join him, which he
did at great risk. At Borodino, when Da'
voust offered with his corps-by long
march-to gain the enemy's flank and rear,
he forbade 1t, because he would be compelled
to fight without communication.
In fact, Sherman has undertaken a very
dangerous. and, It may prove, very unpro-
ftable enterprise II he has no forces any
where In his front-and he seems thus far ia
have met with little opposition-he will Of
course walk over the track But if he is op
poaed, a. he ought to expect to be, he must
fail. We have, Of course, no means Of
knowing what the strength of the opposi-
tion TO him IL likely to be.
fh7-Tus CONFEDERATE RRADlna RooN-Opening
mia QOrnug with ext. aOrdinary attractions. 1t has
received complete files Of late Northern papers,
nfN VHfA w{n1a aHA III aiv