The Lancaster gazette. [volume] (Lancaster, Ohio) 1863-1886, 1864-07-28


simply be a foot race for Richmond -
But wo'things have since been dem
onstrated, and. both are serious. Firs
that the Army Of the Union is so larg,
and powerful that the usual military
axiom, "Flanking is more dangerous
to the tanker than the fankcd," doe
not apply. The strategy of Grant
which consists in simply withdrawing
one wing at time behind the impreg
nable masses of the center and othcl
wing, would be fraught with pcri
were that center and remaining wing
contracted enough to be cnvelopcd, OF
weak enough to be broken, but is per
fcctly safe as it is. Therefore he is al
liberty to play tricks in plain sight
and without peril, simply because he is
too big to catc.l Consequently, in {
succession of tricks, even by ono Of tho
only moderate ability of Grant, there
is danger that one not seen or foiled
at exactly the right time may catch us
Such result would not bo dostruc.
ton to our army, for Lee also is toe
big to hold, but it might do US some
harm. ." ~.
The second danger is the seige Of
Richmond. Some of our cotempora
ries, and tho most of correspondents
laugh at this; and yet Grant has it in
his power to besiegc the capital, OF
force an attack on himself, or force an
evacuation of Richmond. ..r fl.
Not that he has his choice of these
thrcc things, but can force that choice
upon us. .0g.tE .. In a.H. .
In Grants moving upon the South
of Richmond and threatening James
river near the city, Gen. Lee has
choice of two evils. If he keeps ahead
Of Grant and holds the Petersburg
line inviolate, that Tanker necessarily
gets between him and Richmond, and
walks into the city at his leisure. II
Lee keeps between Richmond and
Grant, the latter of course gets between
him and the Southern States commu-
nication, and cuts off the only source
of supply now left, as the valley OF
Virginia is in the hands of the enemy.
If Lee wants to save Petersburg and
Richmond, both, he will have to attack
Grant in one of his craw-fish move
ments, and will have to attack the po-
sitions and intrenchments which tho
grand sPade-and-pick-army never cx-
lists an hour without. .,.....
In our Judgment tho plan of tho
campaign is at last devcloved. West
crn Virginia the Valley and its re-
sources, is, by the movement on Staun-
ton and Lexington, to be rendered un>
available for provisions. Grant is to
throw his army into fortifications across
the railroads from Richmond south,
and so cut off our army supplics.-
Thus the starvation of siege will be
as effectualy secured, as if an army
could be found large enough to sur
round the legions Of Lee, as Grant
did Gen. Pemberton provided, of
course, that the Danville road shares
the fate that the Weldon road prob
ably will. .-..I
If Gen. Leo chooses to stop the
game by fight, he has to put his fin
ger on the slippery Grant and stop his
flea like, Rankings /; ;and having found
him and stopped him for q fight, will
have to charge the hills, Grant will
occupy and tho trenches Grant will
dig. If President Davis concludes to
swap capitals, and giving Grant
Richmond, starts off ahead Of him for
Washington we will have tho army to
subsist in the desert waste between
the two capitals have to mako time
on foot, that will beat the transports
on the Potomac and the Chesapeake !;
have the Notifications of Washington
to storm and q siege to stand, thoro
should we get inside. .r ..., "
We lose Richmond, if we hold the
Weldon and Danville railroads; we
lose the railroads five save Richmond,
or we attack Grant in his nightly trcn-
chcs if wo try to save both. 1t is true
that General Beauregard could still
keep south of Grant, and proventraids
into Carolina but could not keep him
from stopping the roads south, unless
he has enough men to attack Grant in
reverse, and place him between two
fires. We hope Grant thinks he has.
This is a game with no possible him
drance, perfectly plain to even such
unmilitary comprehension as our own,
and we respectfully submit that there
is no fun in it. ag1.U .l.u.l'
The writer is aware from personal OBJ
that there isapersonal pop
ula'ity and enthusiastic devotion to
Grant among hissoldiers; not equalcd
by any thing ever seen in that army
beloro--nor surpassed in tho army of
Ice; and very much like the loyo of
the Old Guard for Napoleon Thoro-
foro he can flank and fight for some
days yet before they get tired of it.
These arc facts, and plain as thoy
arc, it is not in good sense to talk of
tho trap that Sherman occupies, or OF
the bull-hoaded Grant, butting his
brains out against the ramparts of
Richmond 'Yb E0 l.J6f I9 yHau
+. When tho supplies Of Sherman are
cut off, as VIC trust they will be, and
the great raider of Mississippi broken
in battle or starved out, begins a dis
astrous retreat over the country HIM
self has devastated; when Johnson
thunders on his flying rear and For
rest stops his fight; when the fords Of