Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1864-02-04

In Northern and Eastern virginia. we nave
encountered the best army Of the rebels, led by
their ablcst oGicers, while acting under the
advice of Davis and others at Richmond, and
inspired by the belief that the existence OF the
Confederacy was indlssolubly connected with
tho fate Of that city. These were facts amount
ing to serious difficulties If not obstacles in
our way; to which were superadded the physi-
cal features Of the country in which military
operations have been conducted.
The region between the Potomac and the
James rivers is traversed by numerous and
nearly parallel streams and rivers and ranges
of hills and highlands. These, considered
singly, are barriers to the movements of an
army; and collectively, they become an in
superable obstacle when viewed in connection |
with the fact that an advance to Richmond |
does not relieve us from our dependence upon |
the Potomac as base of supplies, unless we
seek our way through the swamps of the
ChiCkahominy. These are the natural and
unavoidable obstacles which have impeded our
progress. 1t may be true that it was well
during these three years to contest for su-
premacy with the rebels between the Potomac
and the Rsppahannock. The rebellion could
not have been overthrown by strategy, by
bloodless victories, by advantages Of position
merely.
1t was necessary that battles should be
fought; that sacrifices should he made; that
thousands should be slain that the capacity of
each side should be fully tested. This has
been done, and no one can say that 1t was not
as well for the cause of the republic that these
sacrifices should have been within sight of
the capital as elsewhere. However this may be,
there was always a controlling consideration
which does, and will, fully justify the Admin
lStration In the policyit has pursued, since the
memorable disaster Of the Peninsula campaign,
of 1859, under the lead of Mcclellan, and In
Difference to bis views. We have combatted
the enemy In front of Washington, where he
has been crippled and the capital of the coun-
try at the same time defended.
There has never been a moment until the |
present when IL was safe 10 trust Washington
to Its fortiacations and the men within them;
but we believe that our strength is SO great and
the capacity of the enemy for offensive move.
ments so much weakened, that the safety OF
the capital should not be the occasion of dis
trust with reference to future movements. |
Moreover, the plan we suggest does not 80 re- |
move the Army Of the Potomac as to deprive |
the city of succor in case or danger
Our successes in the West are due, in a good
degree, TO the existence of nayigable rivers, and
the use We have made OF them. The ascent Of
the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers was fol-
lowed by the Victories of Fort Henry and Fort
Donaldson. Columbus, Kentucky, being thus
nanked, and assallable from the land side, was
abandoned. Memphis followed. Nashville fell
Into our hands. The possession Of the river,
with a small naval force, saved the honor of
our arms at shiloh.
Our operations on the Mississippi are well
known. The navigation Of the Tenssssec ia
the security for Chattanooga, as h was the
source OF our success in Its captave.
The rahelE are without a r,,,, IL, go.
capacity to man and use ships If they possessed
them. Our advantage on the rivers is undIs.
puted. Communication upon wafer ia safer
than spon railways even, always more econom-
lcaI, aud for Transporting sustenancc for large
army It is more effective. Hence a river /, the
most advantageous base Of supplies; and our
experience proves that an army, protected by
gunhoaIs, even though beaten in the field, Is
safe from serious disaster
With this experience, and these views, con.
bidered in connection with the changed relative
condition of the combatants, we do not hesI-
tate to advise the use of tho James river ns the
''utN W IL ID NJ once bute, certain
and economical. 1t Is nsvIgable 10 the cIty
md there are, as far as is known, no fortlAca-
tions of formidable character below Fort
Darling. If our forces ascend the river to a
point above the mouth of the Appomattor, and
effect landing there, tits impossible that they
should fail TO maintain themselves, If supported
as they would be supported, by gunboars !,
the'riVer. This being accomplished, the ,u
way from PeterShurE to Richmond ia ., on.
mercy.
Next, there would be no serious -drmcu,,y N
cutting the railway beyond, whlcl Lends from,
Richmond to Danvllei and tn Il. wouId tho
Confederate capital be cd from the
SOUTH except by the outo through Gordop,.
VIZ $50, ,,.. ,,,,,,,,.
..'e and the noun ealus at LynchbLrg, and
'hrousn Last '' 4nessce. This circuitous and
exposed line could soon he broken. Indeed