Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1864-11-17
Tn. Army and Navy, Sc, &s.

nossbe of jealousy arise between different
branches q, the public service It ia especially mat
ter OF regret when such things arise at time when all
the efforts of all branches absolutely necessary to
keep the ship of state from drifting upon the rocks
which threaten to destroy her.
We fear that the disaster at Plymouth may have
endency to increase the feeling OF jealousy between the
army and navy which, we regret to believe, exists in
acme uuarters and even to arouse such feelings where
they have not yet been manifested Ice INSTRUCTION o
III. Alhemsre involved the loss of Plymouth, and Of
much mora besides. By whose fault-if it sOas by q
fsuIt-was the Albemarle lost Was it by the fault
OF the navy in charge of the Abemare or by the neg
.Hgence Of the army pickets Some say one thing
some gay another. We do not design now to express
an opinion rthar than to say that 1t is natural that
mems feelings should, to extent at least influence
their Judgments, and thus that army men should lay
the blame the navy and navy men upon the army
full Investigation might be necessary to decide all
the questions involved and that hardly be obtained
daring times like these. Il would be better, if full
bearing cannot be had to have noDe at least WEang
ling through the newspapers.
The fact that Yankee vessels n several instances
have also been struck in the way and one st least
large steamshp, sunk eff Charleston bar, without
rious reproach being cast upon any Of the Yankee
val commanders. We, however, have so few vessels,
and they have been constructed under so many dsad-
vantages that perhaps expec: from them than
are justified in doing, and unduly excited by the
information of any disaster to them.
The Disadvantages to which we have above referred
press hard on the personnel of the Navy. The officers
Of the old Navy who resigned fer the purpose of tender
ing their services to the South, sacrificed than
They must have iet that the Conderacy had no bright
hopes of promotion to hold out to them, bile the Uni
ted States bad many inducements to csr. They must
have felt themselves confined to the ksome routine of
harbor Defence Or going to sea- forced to adopt
mere predatory character sea raiders, without
taring to come into collision with the heavier ard H.
dniely more powerful vessels Of the enemy
Nothing but patriotism could have prompted their
course, and feel the bound to honor those who
haVs obeyed it's teachings because OF their contrast
those who, like FARRAGUr, DRAYroN, DUPONT, GoLDs
BOROUGH, nd mary Others elected TO remain with the
North and make wsr upon their own section, AMI, as
in the case Of DEAYroN, upon bis own State and his
own home. DRATroE is q South Carolinian, FROM the
ss isar d. it is said. He waa engaged in the bom-
bArdmen. of Port Royal.
Thus it comes about that while all respect the ges-
sifmen Of the Navy appreciate their patriotism and
admire their courage and enterprise wherever eppor
tuny is ii rded for their display, the Navy Depart
nent Cannot be said to be avourite with the people
Owing perhaps to inadequate facilities something
10 always the matter with our boats which seem to
be built only to be blown up or sunk by the
enemy or by ourselves. From the first Merrimac
down to the Albemarlo such seems to have
been their usual fate. We will say nothing about
homo Tbok
We don't know that all or any part of this is Mr. NAL
LoRrs fault, or fault but fault or no fault il
IL 50. Our navy have had an uphill business from
the nrst and there are no signs Of improvement. Nil
even begin to doubt the policy Of sending out vessels
ike the Tallahassee to make few days dash and ther
return to port to lie supne for se ten times
- long While the dashes made do credit to the dar
Ing OF officers and men, they have the effect rathel
of exasperatiug the enemy than of weakening bis
sources, making him tired of the war. It may bt
said and with truth, that the enemy is doing bis WORT
Of any rata This is 30, but we do not know 0hethe
1t in thing to be desired by the OoDfederacy for hi
strength to be concentrated and his efforts rut forth tt
close main to the ocean, It is thought tha
recent events tempt him to make the tral-nay almost
compel him to do so. Perhaps people here take
wrong view OF this thing, at eaat attach mpor
ALREADY
would be done by others occupying different stand
point. 1t is 80 hard to perfectly straight ant
without bias. But right wrong, these dssbes out ant
dashea in are regarded with considerable disrus
here by very many persons not engaged in running
blockade while the government itself has suffered direc
Enthusiastically by captures to extent likely to weigl
heavily in the SCALE We do not know that the in
creased Efforts Of the enemy due to the Tallahassee
but it in perfectly reasonable to suppose that they are
TO suppose that the Yankee government would no
pat increased and more vgiant watch here for III
OF capturing armed vessels to suppose shee
nonsense. No doubt they have dore 80.
But all these considerations have reference simply
The policy pursued aud not at all to the officers engage
in carrying out that policy, which they no doubt
calamity and well. MIR. MALLORY may not be able t
do any better save by not doing st al-that is if
some contend the disadvantages overcome the advants
ges OF warfare so carried on. This is a ouestio
which We cannot pretend to decide. We do not kno
that it leaves much balance in our favour certainly
THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS
LIZ due course OF mail the President. Meass no