Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1864-01-09

them. tlag-Oificer Goldsborough is conf
dent he can keep open my communications
by the James" Expecting an attack, he
says, as necessity to the enemy, and feel
ing the critical nature of the position, Gen.
Mcclellan on the same day addressed to the
President the following letter.
Mr.. PRESIDENT: You have been fully informed
that the rebel army is in 'front.' with the purpose
Of overwhelming us by attacking positions or re-
ducns us by blocking our river communications. !
cannot but regard our condition rs critical, and L
earnestly desire, in view of possible contingencies to
lay before your Excellency, for your private consd
state Of the rebcllion although they do not StrictS
relate to the situation Of the army strictly
within the scope of my official duties. These views
amount toconyictions and arc deeply impressed upon
Our cause must never be abandoned-it is the
cause Of free Institutions and sef-g0ycrnment The
Constitution and Union must be preserved whatever
may be the cost in time, treasure and blood II Sc
cession is successful other dssoutions are clearly to
be seen IN the future Let neither military disaster
purpose toenforce the equal operation OF the laws Of
the United States upon the people Of every State,
termine upon civil and military policy covering the
whole ground of our national trouble. The response
bility of determining, declaring, and supporting such
civil and military policy, and of directing the whole
course of national affairs in regard TO the rebellion,
must now be assumed and rcsed by you or our
cause will be lost. The Constitution gives power
sufficient even for the present terrible eXigency.
This rebellion has assumed the character Of war as
such should be regarded and it should be conduct
ed upon the highest principles known to Christian
civilization. 1t should not be looking to the
subjugaOn Of the people Of any State in any event.
1t should not be at all a war upon population, but
against armed forces and political organization. Ne-
ther conhscation Of property political executions Of
PERSONS territorial organizations OF States, or f0rc
bic abolition Of slavery should be contemplated for
moment In prosecuting the war all private property
and unarmed persons should be strictly protected,
subject only to tie necessity Of military operations
All private property taken for military should be
/ rcCelDteu be
treated as high crimes; al unnecessary tre5paSs stern
~ prohibited, and offensive deeanor by the military
toward citizens promptly rebuked Military arrests
should not be tolerated except III places where active
hOstilities exist and Oaths not required by enact
ments eonsttutionally made should be neither de;
be confined to the preservation OF public order ard
the protection of political rights. Military power
Should not be allowed to interfere with the relations
of servitude either by supporting impairing the
authority Of the master, except for repressng disor
der as in other cases. Slaves contraband under the
act Of Congress, seeking Military protection should
| receive it. The right Of the Government to apprOpri
ate permanently to t5Own service claims of slave la
bor should be asserted and the rghtof the owner 70
principle might be extended upon grounds of mill
ary necessity and security to all slaves within par
State and in Missouri, perhaps in Western Virginia
also, and possibly even in Maryland, the cxpediency
Of such measure is only question Of time.
system of policy thus constitutional and cOnserv
ative and pervaded by the influences Of Christianity
and freedom, would receive the support Of almost all
truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel mass
and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly
hoped that it would commend itself to the favor OF
| the Almighty.
Unless the principles governing the future conduct
of struggle shall be made known and approved the
effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hope
less. declarations Of radical views, especially upon
slavery will rapidly disntegrate present armies
The policy of the Government must be supported
| by concentration of military power The national
forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts
of occupation, and numerous armies, but should be
mainly collected into masses and brought to bear up
the armies of the Confederate States. Those ar
mics thoroughly defeated, the political structure
which they support would soon cease TO exist.
| In carrying out any system of policy which you
may form you will require commander-in-chief of
the army one who possesses your confidence, UNDER
stands your views, and is competent to execute your
orders by directing the military forces Of the nation
to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed
do not ask that place for myself. l am willing to
serve you in such position rs you may assign INC,
and will do so as faihfuyas eversubordnatc served
| superior.
forgiveness from my Maker, have written this let
ter with sincerity toward you and from love for my
country
Early in August the army was ordered to
leave Harrison's Landing, on James river,
contrary to the opinion of Gen. Mcclellan
that the road to Richmond was by way Of
the Peninsula. On that occasion he adj
dressed Gen. Halleck the remarkable letter,
under date of Berkeley, (Va.) August 4th."
The condition of affairs at Washington
during the campaign of Pope is graphically
described.
September 2, the President directed Gen.
Mcclellan to take command of his own and
Gen. Pope's armies and find the enemy. On
the 18th of September Antietam was fought,
South Mountain and Crampton's Gap hav-
ing been already won by us. Not single
gun or color was lost by us in these battles,
and our total loss in men at Antietam is
stated by Gen. Mcclellan at l2,469.
The advance into Virginia after Antietam
/ is related, with an account of the causes by
which that advance was delayed. On the
night of November 18th Gen. Mcclellan was
relieved, and the command transferred to
Gen. Burnside.
General Mcclellan thus describes his own
report:
This report is in fact the history of the Army of
the Potomac During the period occupied in the or
ganzation of that army 1t served as barrier against
the advance Of lately victorious enemy while the
der the discipline which il then received 1t required
strength, education, and some Of that experience
which is necessary to success in active operations
and which enabled it afterward to sustain itself un
der circumstances trying to the most heroic men, FIRE.
quent skirmishes occurred along the lines conducted
with great gaantry which Injured our troops 10 tile
The army grew into shape but slowly and the de-
lays which attended on the obtaining OF arms, con-
|
irving to the soldiers than to the people of the
! try. Even ut the time of the organization of the
peninsula campaign, some of the finest regiments
were without rifles nor the utmost exertions on
the part of the military auth0rit adequate to over
! come the obstacles to active service.
When at length the army was in condition TO tako
the field the peninsula campaign was planned and en-
| tered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men,
Had this campaign been followed up as it was de-
| signed, IcannOt doubt it would have resulted IN q
glorious triumph to our arms and the permanent res
toration of the power of the Government in virginia
and North Carolina, if not throughout the revoted
States 1t was, however, otherwise ordered and the
Army of the Potomac was recalled from within sight
of Richmond and Incorporated with the Army oil
| Virginia. The edisappointments Of the campaign on
the peninsula had not damped their ardor or dlmln-
ished their patriotism They fought well. faithfully,
and gallantly under Gen. Pope, yet were compelled
to fall back on Washington, defeated and almost de-
moralized. The enemy, no longer occupied guard
j ing his own capital poured his troops nOrthward,
entered Maryland, threatened Pennsylvania and even
Washington ITSELF Elated by his recent victories,
and assured that our troops were disorganiZed and
4 dispirited, he was confident that the seat Of war
was now permanently transferred to the loyal State
and that his own exhausted soil was to be relieved
from the burden of supporting two hostile armies
But he did not understand the spirit which animated
tho soldiers Of the Union.
shall not nor can |. living. forget that when was
ordered to the command Of the troops for the defense
Of the capital, the soldiers. with whom had shared
so much Of the anxiety and pain and suffering OF the
war; had not lost their confidence in me as their com
mander. They sprang TO my call with all their an
cent vgor. discipline, and courage: lea fhem a.S
Maryland, Fifteen days after they had fallen pacK
defeated before Washington, they, vanquished tho
enemy on the rugged nights Of South Mountain pur-
sued TO the hard fought field of Antietam and drove