Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-07-23

ton, under special orders from Lieutenant
General Robert E. Lee. These orders di-
rected McCausland to hold Lexington, tRi
any cost" until he could be reinforced by
troops from Richmond, who he was assur-
ed were already on the way to succor him.
He made the stand accordingly; but, find
ing the town directly under the guns OF
General Hunters infantry advance, and
that he was being fanked by AVerill's cav
airy, who had forded the river higher up,
McCausland finally fell back, just in time
to save himself and his command from
capture. AT this point occurred delay OF
two days, which resulted from Gen. Duties
having lost his way in the mountains, on
the eastern side of the Blue Ridge. He,
however, destroyed two large trains of gov
ernment stores which the enemy were NOV
ing by this route from Staunton to Lynch.
burg, and captured many prisoners. He
could not, however, materially iDjure the
railroad at any point, being everywhere
confronted by Imboden's largely superior
cavalry. Here and there only did be burn
a bridge-slight injuries that could be re-
paired in half u day.
From Lexington the command of Gen.
Hunter, thus delayed two days by Gen.
DUTIES blunder, marched towards Lynch
burg via Buchanan, partly because there
might be difficulty i'm fording the James
river below that point (our pontoon bridge
being utterly worthless, as was proved at
Fort Republic), aud partly because we bad
such information of the reinforcements
from Richmond then arriving in the valley
that it became necessary to procure two
possible lines of retreat other than the
road of our advance. At Buchanan, more
over, were located some of the most i'm.
portant furnaces, foundries and cloth mills
of the rebel government, and these it was
essential to destroy.
From Buchanan the march was continu-
ed toward Lynchburg, the country becOm-
ing barer and barer of supplies as We ad-
vRnced, the people running off all their
stock and stores into the mountains to the
right and left of us, and the business of
folaging becoming more and more hazard.
Gus, in consequence of the large rebel
cavalry force which enVelcped, as with
cloud, our front and hanks. On the 18th
of June the enemy made resOlute stand
at a place VaTiously called "Oid Church"
or "Diamond Hill" about four miles from
Lynchburg, but, after "A contest of some
three or four hours, were forced to con-
tiuue their retreat, AVerilps cavalry doing
particularly well in this fght, and Crooks
infantry charging, through storm of grape
shot, clean over the rebel breastwOrks
without single pause or moment of hesi-
tation or disorder.
On the day following General Hunter
and his subordinate commanders learned
with precision of the arrival OF the great
er part of Ewelrs corps on their front, aud
a brisk attack, which lasted with brief in-
termissions all day long, developed pow
eTful line of defences in front of us-four
regular earthworks, well mounted with
artillery, and built some years ago, con-
nected together by lines of the usual rebel
rail rife pits, on which our men had heard
"the JOhnnies' hammering and saving all
the previous night. We had also heard
not less than eight-some said eleven
trains of cars arriving, from Richmond,
and from the sorties made upon our lines,
and from what our men learned in their
two charges against the enemy's defences,
it became clear by midday that we had
then in front OF US force OF veteran troops
at least equal to our own in numbers, and
probably superior, operating in their own
country, and constantly receiving both
supplies and reintorcements by railroad
from Richmond, while we were absolutely
without supplies other than a little sugar
aud coffee still left, and drove of cattle
that we had collected in our advance up
however, we were short of ammunition,
the train expected under Gen. Stahel not
then having arrived. 1t was therefore de-
in a council OF war, consisting OF
Generals Hunter, Sullivan, Crook and
AVerill, that our best course was to retire
upon Salem, there being from that point
two lines of retreat opened to us-One
due west towards Eastern Tennessee, and
the other north and by west up the Ka-
nawha valley.
If it be asked, why did not Hunter re-
turn towards his supplies by the Shenan-
dOah route, up which he had advanced?
the answer must take the form of another
question: would the killing or capturing
OF his entire command have materially
helped the Union cause? The enemy had
a railroad east Of the Blue Ridge from
Lynchburg to Rockfish Gap or Waynes-
boro, only twelve miles from Stanton
the railroad which General Duties had
uusuccessfully attempted to interrupt By
means of this road the whole of EWelPs
corps, and as. many other troops as Gen.
Lee might think necessary, could easily
have been thrown from sixty to eighty
miles in our rear, while Breckinridge, with
the valley troops, held US on our 'front.'
And as we had but little ammunition, and
were utterly out of supplies, while there
would be no chance to collect in presence
of a superior force of the enemy, it ap-
peared reduced to a mathematical GER
tainty that an attempt to return down the
would be equivalent to the
or surrender of our force
That General Grant was OF this opinion is
abundantly testified by the anxiety for our
safety which prevailed for several days at
his headquarters. He believed that We
were in imminent danger of being de-
Ltroyed or captured for some time, and
made vigorous efforts to employ all be
could of the enemy's forces iu order to give
Hunter chance for eztricAtion from his
Perilous position.
AS to the material effects of Duties de-
lay on the eastern side of the Blue Ridge,
which apparently cost Us two days in our
advance upon Lynchburg, the matter has
been exaggerated. The enemy had signal
officers upon every hill around US, and
oil EURipa rOFna