The daily register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1863-1864, 1864-02-11
Of his plan, and, as we will presently show,
vas questionable benefit to the Union
cause. Had East Tennessee been taken

of his plan, and, as We will presently show,
vas q questionable benefit to the Union
cause. Had East Tennessee been taken
possession ofin the spring of 1862, and the
loyal people there relieved from the tyranny
of the rebel government the dreadful battles
which have since drepched with blood
the soil Of Tennessee and Northern Geor-.
gia 5would never have been fought, nor
would any Of the many invasions OF Ken
tucky py Generals Bragg and Morgan have
occurred. The war, in fact, would have
been half ended before it fairly begun
Another Of the strategic movements plan
ned By Gen. McO Olellan will be found in his
instructions to Gen. Butler previous to the
capture of New Orleans. This document
is a marvel of military sagaeity, and places
its author among the first cabinet strate'
gists of The age. He did not desire the.
capture of the city until Gen. Butler had
at least twenty eight thousand men under
his command. He predicted that Forts st.
Phillip and Jackson were the only impedi,,
ments to the possession OF the city, ana
the event proved the correctness OF bis
Judgment.
But the taking of New Orleans was only
small part of the campaign he had mark
ed out. Butler was directed to seize, i'm
mediately on entering the city, the avenues
of approach to it; then so much of LOUISE
ana as was necessary to support New or
leans and keep at distance the rebel arm
les: after which he was instructed to take
possession of Natchez, and Jackson, the
Capital Of Mississippi. This last instruc-
ton, as we see by what subsequently oc :
Cured at Vicksburg, Port Hudson, and all
along southern Mississippi, was OF supreme
importance. - ~.
Had Gen. Butler been able to obey Or
ders and sieze the capital of Mississippi,
our military annals might not have been
made glorious by the seiges of Vicksburg
and Port Hudson; but within three months
after the capture of New Orleans the as
pect of the military map Of the Southwest
would have been as favorable as it now is,
after the hideous waste of blood and trea-
sure which it has cost to rescue that part
Of the country from the grasp of the rebel
lion. Gen. McUlellan's final object in the
movements he contemplated, as will be
seen by his report, was the deliverance OF
the line of the Mississippi from the grasp
of the rebel government.
But he was relieved from command pre-.
maturely. The time had not arrived, nor
had the preparation been made, for moving
the armies he lad designed to act in con-
cert against the rebellion when Mr.. Lincoln
took from him the supreme control of the
army and administered military affairs act
cording to the ideas of leading members of
the administration. Gen. Mcclellan did
hot design that the grand campaign should
commence until April, and his judgment has
been singularly confirmed by the history of
the war since then All the movements of
our armies in the winter of 1861, and the
early spring of the following year were pro-
mature. Our victories, from the untimely
fruit they bore, were really disasters in dis
guise Even the capture of Donelson, and
the army it contained, is to be set down in
our future annals as the most serious blow
the Union cause received in the early his
tory of the war. Gen. McClellan's object
in postponing the movements Of our armies
until the early part of April was, that they
could all be simultaneous-tha in one full
sweep, Gen. Buell. should capture East Ten
nessce; Gen. Sherman, Charleston; Gen.
Butler, New Orleans, Vicksburg and Jack.
son; Gen. Halleck, the line of the Missis-
sippi and himself, the rebel capital. Had
all these movements been successful, which
it would not have been unreasonable to ex-
pect, there would have been no rebellion
after July 4, 1862. Had any one Of them
been successful, it would have been cruel
blow to the Confederacy. Butthe opening
of the campaign in the West in January
and February, the capture of Forts Henry
and Donelson, and the operations on the
upper Mississippi-all of which were con-
trary to the advice and in defiance Of the
then Commander in Chief Of the army
spoiled the whole grand campaign.
The rebellion then was mere SHE'LL
Davis subsequently acknowledged in mis-
m Message that he had attempted to guard
too mapy points. The Southern army was
composed only of volunteers, and, had the
attacks been simultaneous, the outer walls
of the rebellion would have been broken
down with comparative ease. The capture
of Donelsop spoiled everything. The
Union armies in other quarters were in 70
condition for rapidly following up the blow.
The rebels became thoroughly alarmed
The same February that saw the victory of
Donelson placed upon the legislative re
cords Of the Richmond government strin
gent conscription law. New lines Of de-
fence were taken up. Every man that
could be raised was pressed into the ranks.
Everything was done that q military sci
ence and the keen alarm of ready wit
ted military people could suggest to make
the Conlederacy equal to the next emer
gency that should be forced npon it by the
Union government.
The campaign against New Orleans also
opened cprematurely. Gen. Butler had
barely enough troops to hold his city, and
was unable to reap the fruits Of his victo
tory. Instead of capturing the best part
of Louisiana and occupying the capital of
Mississippi, thus severisg Texas from the
Confederacy, it was hardly able to hold
its own in New Orleans. The story Of the
military blunders, resulting in the costly
sieges of Vicksburg and Port Hudson,