Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1864-01-06


The Army, War AID PsaGs.
From the Mobile Rsgistsrl
The telegraphic wires brought as the other
day E rathsT singular and confused Aecouns Of q
mem0risl TO Congress By the general officers in
the army of Tennessee. The matter kRs ~
traesed q good deal of the public attention, and
some persons with quick cars fer bad news have
drawn BorlS very unpleasant inference from it.
As it was plain that the report over the wires
was made ia = buDgling msAner, and some
parts were unintelhgibe, VIC thought it better to
await the memorial in peint. Meantime, We
may as well state that we are informed by an
| intelligent officer of rank, Just frem that army,
that the idoa to which the report has given rise
of disceHtent and Generalization among Gsn.
Johnston's troops, is altogether srronseus. The
men are fixed in winter quarters, we'll provided
with clothing, and the oommissaTy department
in good condition. Ths object of the memorial
of the general officers was TO urge upon Con-
gress the necessity of an early Legislative action
on several poiais in relation to the organization
Of ths army, and to keeping up and Increasing
Ifs effective strength. Il is known thai fhs
time Of the enlistment of many Of the troops is
about 70 expire, and Congress was urged to
provide for the contingency in advance.
We believe that the general feeling OF the men
in the Geld is that they are perfectly willing to
remain in tho army and fight out the issus with
the easmy to the end of Independence, provided
The Government compels skulkers from duty and
those who, owing the same military duty to the
country that they do, and yet remain at home, to
perform that duty. They on ask for = fair and
| equal division of the hSrdBhips and dangers Of
a soldiers life, and the moro so, because they
know that the present strength Of 0nr enemies
demands g large increase Of our oWn forces
This feeling is natural, ard the bare statement
of it ought to constitute an appeal to all Whe
ere. capable Of bearing arms 20 come 20 the
rescue ef their brethren confronting the ensmy
ineuparior numbers, in q common cause.
In truth, there has besn no more critical Pc
rcd in this war Of great crises, than the pres
ent. The question CT csmplsts success and q
cTowning and glorious Independence, and a
lsmsnlabis failure, with sl its attendant hoTrsrs,
now trembles in the balance. Tho turn Of tho
scale depends exclusively upon ourselves. If
Wo have tao courage and the resolution 10 meet
it, TO fees sdveTBity, to make sacrifices and to
confront tie foe, VIC have, thank God, the power,
the means snd the numbers TO achieve our in
~Gepsndenet. One struggle moro such as we are
capable Of Baking, enc mere grand and bril-
liant campaign in tho spring, Gnd we believe
that the Moth, already weaTied of the war, will
compel the Federal Government to listen 10
terms OF pBics.
[A9 AH|A.A 49, AbFN AAaa-g E9-@l aAA 4tA
nJEi5dge our independence, which il could NOT
have done before lis Government had exhibited
Itg military strength. To have quietly submit
ted to secession, .ho stRtesmaR Of the North az
gued, and correctly, would have resulted in tho
disintegreti1n Of the United States, the with
dyaw=l OF the Northwestern States FIRST, and
afterwards, perhaps, IN the establishments of
several esufoaerEcies. BY a great display Of
peTgr The United Ssst0s have passed thiB dan.
ger, and thsY have concentrated that secession
Is q very costly and bloody operation, esd for q
generation or moro they arc secure against q
repetition Of it.
We think the time has passed whom this Gov
eIDroent should rely solely upon tho policy of
foTce--nOs that We should relax eur military en-
srgies, because the bess moment to treat with
IN NdvesBary is that in which you are strongest.
On the contrary, never was the need so urgent
fer = thorough aTming OF the whole fighting
population Of the country. If cur enemy could
sec Us ready to enter upon the spring campaign
with an hundred thousand men added to cur
armed hosts, our Gevernnsnt would act wisely
% make AZ. overture for the adjustment of tho
c~oHtestb BY negotiation.
To Ibis complexion il must CONE at last, I'M.
less we submitto tho ruin and degradation Of
conquest. And when tho time to treat comes,
va shall have to abste some of tho pretsnsioBs
which have sprung from the natural and bitter
irTitatiors Of this ~fereeious war. The essence
OF negotiation is a reciprocity Of advantages.
We must give and take. The enemy holds
lsrge portions or our territory. If relinquished,
Il mast be ioT an adequate consideration. We
have but one class Of equivalents 10 cffsr, and
those are Of 4 commercial character. II we
can gain q peace, and bring back eur lost cities
and mountains and plains by Trade stipula6ons,
Advantageous to The enemy, il would be a short
sighed ana passionate policy that Woald re-
fuse it.
II we had cur way, we should Of course ure.
Ter Chinese wall or an impossible gulf be-
tween Us and our Yankee foes, but vital inter
eAts ana stern necessity may obliee Us tosscTi-
nee these feelings 70 the good Of our country.
happily, there Is nothing in our European for
elgn relations to forbid Us to make such cenccs-
s!ols. Similar sdYantsges have been roady TO
pc laid at tho feet of England and France any
tlme during this struggle, but these mowers
nave turned a dest ear TO our sufferings and our
promises. We GIVE them nothing, and are m
DER no Obligations to them to prevent M from
making any bArgSin with tho North, bowoveT
dlsadyantageoUs It may prove to the great now
ers OF Europe, politically or commercially. In
deed, as to England, a. represented bv ber pres.
ess Government, both Qasen and Cabinet. we
co not see The slightes! difference between ber
ana tho United States. One is about a. frjendIv
as the other.
Our true policy, We hold, is 10 array the
whole ConfsdeTaey in anna, and then send tbe
heralas of peace to the North. We behave. n
skiIltuly managed, it would result in asmistioe
and negotiation. If it failed, itshould stYanothen
rs, end weaken our fees 81 home and abroad,