, 1864-10-07

c;aIa." In othtz words, be kre = Of none at
al. a.d th<-e has Eeter bscnJ furnished ps77ieso
ef rrcej that ssns@ mar: er Rta.1cyaTa'a:.
J6 Dpt s, e1en Mr. Hur1bert's estimate is largely
IN exetsn The divisions Of Loogstses, s,.a. a.
ea,ca ea saehao';h IN the tl taslton u viii Porter On
tle 9Th, and this force has been esd
mated from 60, Geo to 10, 600 n1eu. The Rich
urnd pepers Of that cute, describing the
battle, stated 1t st e5, 900 men, and The pro "a
b!1.ty ia that It cid not Vnry much from tnat:
The t:emy made hts effort upon our right
urdtr Porter and naturally concentrated
Sc s3nst it all the troops le could spare while
Keeping up show ot force aoout Richmond
1udcpt udtntly Of such an inference, we hare
he fact that Gen. Maeruder, in his official
report, describes the Eitna,ion Of the rebel
fo1cts Jeff on tbs Richmond slde "a 81 one Of
the e1arest peril" and ssat.s that "taers
were but 25,00o men betaeen Mccleltan's
Tie eamc Richmond paper which, few
esss after the battles, u1entiuned the
amL MT Of Confederate force {as above stately
ttgsgtd with Porter, specuiated upon what
= isHt G..ye happened had Mcclellan cp the
27ta attacked Richmond. Tie rebel Gen.
S1ua1t, in an interview with 3 distinguished
officer Of our army which occurred Q fan
weeks after tEese events, p'ea5@d his honor
that the Confederate. force did not e1cesd
60 COO mef Th.t he i:n<,o what the force
YES is certain, aud 1t ia not likely that he
ponld tell gratuitious fa!sehood- Nothing
that occurred In any Of the encounters uQ.
ring the seven days or afterwards, warrants
the belief 1hnt the Confederate army excetd.
ed that nunb:r. The reg sanss corps and
divisions Which, On the left Of the Chicks
hon,iny. fought Porter at Gaines Nillt turn
up, with 31ag1u1er sud Hnger alone added.
at tue f1erce and momsntjus combats Of
Glendale ard Malvern HUI
ConcediDg, however, to Gen. Mcclellan an
adversary u hfch his ''secret service" aided
by Hseye1al contrabauds," !" had co1jure1 up,
the passive inactivity. with which he net
this crisis toEfttts for MIN eyeri Claim to gen
eralstip even OF the most indifferent cn&ssc..
ter, With IN ecemy $50, 600 strong, diy,usd
into two distinct portions, we believe sllas
there might have been found some way Of
displaying geueralship; at lelst, with lu-
tre1chments on the right bank Of the CHICK
ahom1oy which 20 COO men could have held
against 100 goo, be need not h4ye petmitte1l
on the other bank, within sight aud
cannon range Of the other two.thlrds. But,
cous,oetiDE The real strength Of ht8 enem :,
las We believe 1t to have beea,) more la-
u-entable failure to fulfill "hopes formerly
p1actd in him. d more striking Instance.
destltut1on Of "wit," and OF uureadtness ln
action, Is scarcely to be found In military
annals.
TIE enemy having been checked at Beaver
Dam Greek in the afternoon Of the 35th, no
time should have been Lost In "fthtrawing
from this posi- ion and in bringing Porter
over the Chickahomi1y, as could hlve been
Gone 4 ith the E1e4test ease the night Of the
25th. If It had been ter.nined, however,
10 fight on that sice, h1sehould have been
withdrawn III the night to the position &c.
leoied, and at the same time reinforced with
the whole Of cur right wing, except &c, DOC
men to hold the intrcnchments aud Bot
the White OaR Swamp. Thirty or forty
thousand men should anye been sett oyer tt
purttr.
TIE BATTLE OF GAINES MILL.
Ger. MeCsil, who commanded the force al
Beaver Dam Creek which received the rebel
attack under a. 2. Hill Oh tile 26sb, 8ays, ID
rtfsrerce to the order to Withdraw: Ihla
order, l confess, gave me some concern.
Had it reached te at midnight, the movement
night haze been made without difficulty aa1
without loss; bur now it would be daylight
before the movement which, under fire, IL
Gle OF the most dtliclte and difficult in tue
at of war, could be commenc -d.''
TIE moYemtnt, ordered a. nfyhtfall Of the
eGth, could have been executed without risk
OF dninage. Delayed It'll noralng, 1t 1ngoly-
cd the II. X Of the utter destruction Ct portefs
CORPS Of $1,000 men. Not sl,gAt risk merely,
ench as we must conetantty incur 10 ma
king = ar, but serious risk, and, moreover,
tt tolallJ unnecessary one. Porter ackno II
wiInGIawing his 1orcc, and even seemed,
/. when morning car1e, inclined to suspend 1t,
alleging the fear tlat McCall's division would
De cut 10 1tezxs Not only McCalrs division,
but Poftsr's whole Command, were Ii ie arful
rfk OF being 'tcas to pieces or Captured,
by heipg where thay were that morning OF
tie eth, as We shall EhoT. +"
Gsn. Sronemap, with q am IL command of
infantry and cavalry, had been cent towards
"Old Church, to obstruct roada, destroy
bridges, and prevent, as far as possible, Por-
ttr's right IRON being turned. Jackson,
who, IN 1narchieg from Hanover G. Il kept
we'll towards the Pamunkey, With the obvi-
Gus intention Of turnIcg Porter's right, on
coming In eight Of S.oreman's troops near
sO1d Church, bare off towards Mechanics
VILE. His troepe flied pa:t 10 full view Of
Etopeman from p. m. till after dark, aud
Me,s es.imated BY him 1t 3@o st599g. !522s
those reinfotcements" whi:h re hare seen
were eent. q week or two ago, out Of Rich
nond, to join bim.) Let us suppose that
jackson, irstead OF being diverted tzom his
ceurze By the handful Of troops Of 3toa .maa
been), had kept on towards Cold Harbor.
Porttr's case would have been hopeless.
lie boIe otT towsrds Mechanicsvllie, aud
encamped somewhere near Shady Grove
Church. Had be put his troops In motion
before dawn, and marched parallel to Portsr's
rttiripg columns and rendered it dtfHcnlt, If
not impossible, for him to reach the position
whcFs he actually gave battle. Finally, tnat
the force Of Porter @aa not utterly d-stroyed
By it's defeat, Is due simply to the fact {not
to hare been expected,) that the enemy did
did not accomplish his victory until after
nightfa11- These, 1t may be urged, were risks
incl: entail to w1r; but they Wetr riaks Of the
graveet character. and We are IN lble to see
what equivalent risks [rather than poaittye
adyantages) would have attended the with
drawsl Of Porter the night Of the 26th.
Gen. Mcclellan announces that s.the OBJ
ject we sought for had been obtained" "The
enemy was held at bay" (Bnt why incur a
disastrous defeat to hold him stas bay'' In q
position where he could not attack us unless
We chose to tc attacked-) sour siege guns
aud materials, .efr< sared." (Everything was
brought over on the e6th except the siege
guns. and they might have beeo, :" aud the
fight wing now Joined the main body Of the
army" (which It might have done the night
Fer cont1a, We lost twenty-two suu5 "cap-
turcd By the enemy" {better have abandoned
ard spiked the "eicge artillery" tbaa to have
lest in battle tsenty.tro guns). We lost In
killed ard wounded 5000 men, when Porter
Of man, and Te incurred dsheaEtentng
defeat betides.
AS to the answers Of the corps command.
els to the circular of the 26th, asking If they
could fpare troops to reinforce Porter, we
need hardly remark that when circulars ot
H. fr4,r 4- sHeT &nyHHi ~
one style OF answer only can be anticipated
Each commander, without precise kaoT r.
ledge Of the situation or CT tbs p1ars Of the
essae'al feel: a.s,bs bound to Rs'Vas nhc so.
hss ATTY troops to spare. 1t 10 fot
view Ct lis owo 1lans, hoT many msn
a1e waited ut different points. aud with how
munY eRch ehall be held Now 1t NAV be
safely s1i1 that the "dsfensiyc WORKS" On
the right bapk of the Chickahomtny could be
held With 20 600 men against l00 QUO Tne5
we're bujlt, {as explained BY Gen. Mcclellan
bimetH,) that he might hsius the greatest
possible numbers into action" aad, putlt Il
this view, they must nave had some constd
"erable strength. General Barnard describe;
theee lines us consisting Of six redoubts. cou
~nected by rifle pits or barricades. Tfeae rkai
pits we're in fact infantry parapets, raised Il
the height of the breast above tae natufa
eC1iRce, the 0atco o. excavation pelns on ~
outside. The redoubts were a1rahged witt
emorasures, and bad In several cases n;aga
/ lines proy1red. The woods outside tha linet
uere >felled snd formed along the greater
portion, an obstacle Impossible to be passec
under the fire Of the works. Gen. Mcclellan
| in bis brief report Of July 18th, {~hlch he has
not inherited In thie yolumc,) cav a. to atylG
|. tbele eefenses " slight earthworks," ,"-a tern
which one would apply to snch works 3:
troops could throw up in night. On thess
| our troops had been working for twenty
five days, and be hipsslf has stnted the Oh.
ject OF their construction, {p. 11s,) and b.
! bis manner OF speaking OF them has indlca