Civilian & telegraph. [volume] (Cumberland, Md.) 1859-1875, 1864-09-08
eFiE sITU lrIoN Iy VIRGINIA.

FIR STU lTIoN IN VIRGINIA.
In Virginia the military situation pre-
sents even on the surface an aspect much
more encouraging than it has yet worn
since the army crossed the James. II
Gen. Grant is not seen assuming the ef1ca-
siyc on scale commensurate with the
public expectations, he is quietly working
out the solution of the great problem in
trusted to his hands working out by
apolicy necessarily somewhat cautious,
what he will gladly carry through by
holder and more brilliant pleasures when
he obtains the sGans which the people
will shortly give HIM.
The firm foothold the left wing has o.
tanned on the Weldon Road sewers that
important line, and what is even of more
moment, gives position from which to
menace the main rebel line Of communi-
cations with the South, namely, the Dan
vile Road. So vital is this to the exis
tence of Lees army, that it is accepted by
all military men AS fixed fact, that could
4 ,cc .piaM u force on that road, or cccm Sc
rioaIy Mrcatne it, it.smonM compel tic
aJaudoamcnm u Pichmond and Ilir-
ginia, end oJlige Lee to fall back 10 the line
1 efthe ROonokc, IN mhich case, gircnthe sue
ccssfut crecutioa Of Gen. .She,mans pro-
gamnc, and he entire remaining rebel
force rould be shut up in tie Caroiinas.
! Without pushing speculation so far as
this, however, orgoing beyond the actual
clcmeats Of the situation, there is nothing
in them tc dissesrage, and much to en-
1 courage stne greatDaeso OF fear in all
previous 'thrs binations on the military
chcss-board OF Virginia, has been the
facility which the -eebcls have had to
throw us back on tttr base whenever the
Army Of tho Potomac has been pushed
Z, forward 81 as tc threaten Richmond. In
tie present sttfe of facts such u counter
m1rcmeH is far he frs H~c not to be
}roret 1t could only lie nnjMriakcn by
the rebels in i lit OF desperation, and
would be certain to work GU. their de-
struction.
For tie first time in the history of the
war the Shenandoah Nallcy--lhc gate
through which the rebels in each of their
three invasons have entered loyal States
is thoroughly gardcd. We have there
a fine army, under thoroughly ah'c sSad
ersllip, in position which perfectly coT-
ers Maryland, Pennsylvania and Wash
ington. 1t is true, and it is no secret,
that this army is largely composed of
troops thai have been withdrawn from the
army south of the James; but so far
from this having the effect to put so much
available force out Of the way, and so far
from its being any source of humiliation
or regret, the corps under Gen. Sheridan
are resl1S doing morc for the general
cause, and even for the special problem
before Petersburg, than they could if
back in the Army of the Potomac. For
white the Army Of the Shenandoah acts
as defence vf Washington, thus rclcv-
! ing Cant from all solicitule on that
score, it plays something more than a
merely defensive part, The time is not
now fitting to 'ercsl ,so csotives of the
late forward and backward movements in
the Valley, far less to indicate the pro-
! grammc assigned Gca. Sheridan in that
field of operations; but the time is not
far distant when the wisdom of the pres
cnt distribution of force will be recog-
ni1ed, ia the meanwhile, it is no small
matter that the column in TIC Valley.
while covering Washington, aafHait:es
a,tt Keeps array jrom Frtrsburg, forcc
Of .fM ,Jo.fy thousand men--a force which
had it been in front OF Cen Grant, would
probably have rendered it impossible for
him to have seized the important rc;nt
he now holds on the Weldoh road.
V.
\ REBEL ISVAsIoS-Is IT PROBABLE AND
WOULD IT PAY?
But should the rebel force in the Val
ley once moro attempt an invasive move
mcnt2
Nothing would suit General Sheridan
better than that It should do So IMink
he 'could eeen be quite uitliay to build a
britlge across the Potomac for a. Indeed,
if do not mistake the purpVt of some
late man1uvrcs. he is even now trying
to tempt Early to this very enterprise.
and if he should be unable to do so, and
Early should retreat. as it is certain he
must do if he does not 60 forward, seeing
that the valley is eaten out, and it is out
of the question for him to keep up SO long
a line as he would have over whcih to
bring up supplies, Sheridan will even in
this eventuulity follow him up, press on
his rear, and by threatening Lynchburg.
compel Lee to keep the force detached
from Petersburg. 1t may be said that
the danger might be more serious should
the rebels, by secretly reinforcing their
column in the Valley from the army de-
Tending Richmond, gain prepondcrancc
of force which would enable them to de-
feat Sheridan before he could be rein
forced by General Grant. Such Il con-
| tingcncy is very remote; for, to begin
with, the rebels have but barely men
enough to hold their own in front of Gen.
Grant. Lee has now under his own
immediate command but two corps, the
strength of which, by official estimate,
is put at between twenty-five and thirty
thousand men. A movement of the kind
indicated could, therefore, only be made
effective by total withdrawal of Lee,
determined to hazard everything on last
desperate initiation. In doing this, how
ever, he would necessarily abandon Rich
mond, and in his advance northward
would march attended by the powerful
force of Grant on his rear, and holding
his only line of communication. This
would certainly be very different kind
of enterprise from either of those no has
before advcntured in his two invasions
in both of which cases he had but to
make fanking movement to relieve
Richmond of all menace, and allow him
to. pursue his course with the rear safe
and his communications open. 1t is
thus seen how. by the admirable ccmbi-