The weekly north Iowa times. [volume] (McGregor, Iowa) 1857-1867, 1864-09-07
McGREGOR, IOWA, WEDNESDAY, SEPT. 7, 1854.

> one of you holds in his keeping the homo
, of Ohio and Of the Union.
"lf you are called upon to overcome arm
ed opposition, know that your courage
equal to the task but remember that you
only foes are the armed traitors, and shov
mercy even to them when they are in you
power, for many of them are misguided.
Thus early did Gen. Mcclellan indicat
that he entered upon the war, not to sub
vert the institutions Of the South, or (.
conduct crusade against unarmed citizens
but singly and solely to crush treason il
arms. Who doubts that had this policy
been adhered to the rebellion would to-day
have been thing Of the past, and thu
Union to-day stronger than it was ere thu
attempt had been made to disrupt iti
The campaign in Virginia and its Corn
plete success are so we'll known that W.
need not give its details special attention
Suffice it that by July 14th, in less than
| two months, he completely cleared West
Virginia Of rebels, having killed, captured
and dispersed all the opposition that held
that portion of the State, with a most in.
significant loss to the Federal forces. II
was one Of the most mastery campaigns Of
the present war. For q special object il
was originated, and that object in little
more than month was accomplished, in.
Guiding every single detail. It evinced so
much mastery ability that the commander
at once achieved national reputation, and
in response to . universal demand he was
called to Washington to assist in repairing
the disaster of Ball Run, which just then
had fallen with crushing effect upon the
nation. He was at once given the com.
mand of Washington and the Department
of Northeastern Virginia and he immedi
ately set to work to bring order out of the
chaos that there prevailed, and an army out
Of the unwieldly mob then as now known
as the Army Of the Potomac. Before TAX
ing leave of the Department of West Vir.
ginia, it may be added, Gen. Mcclellan
urged upon the administration the building
of gunboats on the Mississippi River, which
suggestion was afterwards carried into ef.
feet, with a result whose benefit is so we'll
known that nothing more than mere allu.
lusion to it is necessary.
Upon assuming command at Washington
Gen. Mcclellan at once proposed compre.
hersiye plan to the President. 1t was first,
to crop all attempts save those directed
AGAINST tnc rebels in arms, and, second, to
raise an army o.: two hundred and eight
thousand men. which should, at given
time, strike the rebellion at dozen differ
ent points, and thus crush !: at once. AT
that time the main Confederate army was
at Manassas rebellion was not q universal
thing in the South, and had Gen. McClel-
lan's plan been pursued, the rebellion at
early day would have been completely ex.
tinguished. His policy Of conciliating
those not in arms, would have prevented
the Confederate leaders from raising form
liable armies, while the enormous physical
which he proposed to use would
have found the rebellion in its infancy and
and would have crushed it with
out difficulty.
When he assumed command at Wash.
ington, the entire effective Federal force in
the vicinity Of Washington was about
80, 600 men. 1t was the same mob that
had just been routed at Manassas, and was
<Sithout aru,e, diooiplinc, or spirit. To in
crease this force, discipline it. and to pro-
auce uniformity in the guns, artillery, am
lnunition, and equipment were the first
steps taken by the new commander. De-
partments. embracing Engineers, Quarter
ordnance, medical subsistence,
telsgraphic, &C., were either entirely
lacking or in state Of inefticiency that
rendered them worse than useless. All
these had to be created; and yet, with
an army Of only $4,000 men in this condi
ton, and with these multifarious and oner.
Gus duties t. be performed, there are peo-
pie who find fault because Mcclellan did
not at once advance and annihilate VIC
torious rebel army of 100000 men that
occupied strong position not far from
Washington.
1t is scarcely necessary 10 write in detail
Of this portion Of Gen. McClellan's career,
so well are its details known to the public.
A vast and comprehensive plan for operat
ing against the rebellion was devised by
the new commander. He indicated in this
plan points in every portion OF the Southern
States whose possession was vital to the
existence of the Confederacy, ar d which,
once wrested from the Confederates, would
give the death blow to their cause. Suf
ticr it that dear experience has since taught
how supreme was The wisdom which thus
early pointed out the weak links in the
Confederate cordon'of defence Ever since,
the Federal armies, with more or less sue
cess, but without unanimity as to time, have
been fighting for the possession of these
very points and no others.
Gen. McClellan's logical idea Of organiz-
ing an army large enough to assail ih force
all these various points, and also to weaken
the then inconsiderable Confederate armies
by forcing them to defend all these posi-
tons from q Simultaneous attack, was de.
feated through the impatience Of the people
for an onward movement, and the injudi-
clous interference of President Lincoln and
the jealousy of Secretary Stanton and other
aspiring officials. Long before Gen. Nc
Clellan had raised his armies to the size
required for the simultaneous movement,
long even before those he did have were
more than half disciplined, or their various
military departments had been more than
half reSurrected from chaos, Mr.. Lincoln
assumed command Of the armies, and on
the 9th day Of January, 1862, he ordered
that forward move Of all the land and
naval forces in the Federal service should
take place on the % day Of February. A,
the same time the new Commander in Chief
also laid his plan for the capture Of Rich.
mond before his subordinate, Gen. McClel.
ian.
1t is sufficient to say that Mcclellan saw
tuc latal cTToTS i'iVoiVcu, III tuiS pau, aiu
that he finally induced the President to
allow him to approach Richmond by route
atfording water as line Of transportation
and base Of supplies. That the former
plan was fatal one has since heen amply
demonstrated by Burnside, Pope, Meade,
and Hooker, all of whom attempted it and
were driven back with tremendous loss.
Grant has been endesvoring to effect it
during the past summer, and, owing to his
unconquerable perseverance, he succeeded
to greater extent than all others, but at
the expense of the most enormous sacri.
fees on record, and without having gained