The Goodhue volunteer., 1864-04-13

men are required to protect the. rear. Al
entire corps is now occupied in doing this
from the Rappahannock to Manassaa, and,
the troops Of the Department OF Washing,
ton protect the track from that locality to,
Alexandria. How great is: the" .train,o an
army for such . service can be easily esti~
mated. After)passing the @Rapidan. ifrail1.
road communication is to be" relied on, for
supplies, strong force must be constantly
kept it the rear: r:;;-svery train will ever, them
be exposed 70 the capture by bands sweep
ing down from the mountains. ~ ~,
! The leaders Of the rebels of course, fully
understand all the circumstansa. and are
always ready to take advantage Of theus.--,
They are fully aware that they can hold, in,
check, with three-tiftts Of its force, the Al.
my Of the Potomac meantime. They pur-'
sue the Fabian Poli;y-the policy Of wash
ington on the mountains Of the Hudson
River. They are not foolish enough TO-
stake everything on the risk Of battle, rex,
|cept where involunerable fortified. They
will not attack, nor will they accept bat
tie in the field. Their own rear needs no
protection; They have two railroad routes,
besides all the ordinary roads. Thus they.
have all the advantages Of position on their
sido. 'i"' '"' @+ :..,
But we are. in view of the e difficulties,
to expect nothing from the Army of the
Potomac No, it may overcome them in
two or three or four ways. First, with
sufficient force to cover its TANKS, it may
compel the enemy to retreat,and Richmond
to be abandoned: Socond,i may be able to.
bring on an engagement, which will prove
decisive. Third, by cutting it loose from,
Washington aad making it a movable col :,
umn, it may go at any TIME to the rear O.,
the rebel army, and open anew Base for,
itself on the Pamunky or York Rivers, or
by the railroad from Fredericksburg. We.
risk nothing in saying that the army at any.
time can 60 to Richmond, if relieved from
the necessity Of protecting its rear. This
could have been done last fall, when Gen.
Meade crossed the Rappidan and was stop.
|ped by the rebol works on Mine Run. The
army can transport fifteen days subsis encc
and forage, and with this it can bc moved to
Hanover Court House whore it can operate
on n,w base or, If successful in forcing
the rebel lines, can even enter Richmond at
once.
Fifteen days is the period usually assign
ed in Europe as the length Of march from
one base Of operations 70 another. except
the country traversed be able to support the
army, In Virgi,ia our army can derive no
advantage from the country. It. could not
|subsist itsel f for the most limited period
The portion Of the State which has been
the scene of war, is exhausted. Lven
among the fertile farms Of the Peninsula it
was difficult to obtain small supplies Of for.
|age; OF subsistence for the men there was
absolutely nothing. The necessity Of a"ba.
sis'' is, therefore, evident. At the South
west our armies have had the. advantage Of
operating along navigable rivers, so that
their supplies could proceed with them
Such ah expedition as that Of Sherman's'
would be impossible in Virginia; it would
starve before it could accomplish anything:
With its competent leaders, it's brave and
well disciplined troops. its superior organi.
z,tion, we are confident the Army Of the
Potomac, supported as il. generally expect
ed it will be, by the full fsrca Of the govern
ment, will achieve worthy success during
the coming season. The importance Of
capturing Richmond has been underrated
in some quarters, but We believe the people
are far from concurring in such view, and
that they would consider as the most i'm
portant achievement ofthe coming cam
paign tho occupation Of the rebel capital BY
the Army Of the Potomac. ..s...~#
Crazy Specu! alton in New. York. ii