Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1864-05-25
LETTER FROM WASHINGTON
Concerning Grants Movement.
Concise Statammt of its Plan and Parts
How far We Were Successful.

Special Correspondence Of the Cincinnati GaZette.l ]
t-.- WASHINGTON, May 10.
| have written nothing, for a week or
two, concerning the operations of the army,
except the telegraphlc dispatches, because
it seemed too early to attempt to form con-
nected opinions of the campaign while its
plan was as yet undisclosed.
There is u lull, however-a pause be-
tween the scenes in this latest act of our
great national tragedy, which may enable
us to gather up our fragmentary ideas OF
the contest into consistent whole.
1t has been simply a bulldog fight that
has been progressing in the Wilderness.
| They grappled, tugged and worried; now
one on top, now the other; the bigger dog
having, in the main, the best of it; but for
no other reason than because he aods the
bigger. In other words, mean that the
contest has been noted, not more for the un-
paralleled obstinacy with which it has been
continued than for the lack of important
advantages on either side, except those
| which mere superior numbers have given.
General Grant is understood to have esti-
mated Lees entire strength, including the
garrison of Richmond, at one hundred and
ten thousand men. Counting ten thousand
as required for the defenses of Richmond
outposts, guards to trains and the like, we
may fairly reckon the force with which
| Lee met us in the Wilderness, at one hur-
dred thousand. At the outset, Grant was
| at least one-fourth stronger; and he lost no
men in guarding railroads orprotecting his
| rear.
The boldest feature In General Grants
| movement was the first. What General
| Pope promised to do, in his famous address
to the army before Cedar Mountain, Gen
eral Grant did. He cut loose from his base
nf cunpl;oc on1 ollnun1 hiS limo nf nnn,
munications to take care of itself. At the
time of his movement, Brandy Station was
| his base, with communication thence by
| the Orange & Alexandria railroad via Man.
assas, to Washington. Abandoning this,
and plunging across the Rapidan into the
enemy's country, he was without base,
! and no foot of ground to gaard save that on
which his army stood. For five days nc
fought his way, then swung his army half
around and sent his trains, not northwest
again to Brandy Station, but northeast to
Fredericksburg, which point, isolated by
= his movement from the enemy's main body,
easily fell into his hands, and thus gave
him the line of the Potomac up to Wash
ington. 1t was just such movement,
though on far broader scale, that placed
our army in the rear of Vicksburg.
In another respect itstrikingly rescmbled
the opening of the Eastern campaign of
1868. Gen. Hooker refused to attack the
enemy then in his intrenchments at Fred
ericksburg but turned his left flank and
forced him to come out OF his works to save
his communications with Richmond. Pre-
cisely the same thing Gen. Grant did, cross
ing even at the same fords, and taking for
part of the way the same roads. The enemy,
this time, however, was furtherup the river,
and so we turned his right instead of his
left flank.
The old criticism on Hooker's Chancel-
lorsville operations is equally applicable to
: Gen. Grants movement. Strategically Of
fensive, it was, nevertheless, tactically de-
fensive. That is to say, it was in its very
nature aggressive; yet we waited for the
enemy to attack us. 1t may be that this
/ was not Gen. Grants intention; but if it
was not, then his movement by the left
| flank was not wholly successful. 1t was
! while our army was fastening along in this
extended line, that Lee struck it near the
| middle, and the battles of Thursday and
Friday, in the Wilderness ensued.
The fairest statement we can make of
those battles is, that they were successes,
but not victories. Lee attacked us, mass ID
/ his troops and made terrible efforts to break
our lines. Each day he was repulsed, and
4 we nearly held our ground. Had he con-
tinued to hold his, and to maintain the
slight advantage he had gained over the
right of Sedgwick's corps, 1t might have
been called drawn BATTLE but he hurried
off in the night to Spottsylvania Court
House, twelve or fifteen miles further South.
We gained no victory, for we took fewer
prisoners than we lost and did not drive the
enemy from his ground; but our success
was substantial, for we defeated the effort
of the enemy to break our lines.
We crossed the river on Tuesday and
Wednesday. Up to Friday night Lee pur-
sued the policy of attack; and we remained
on the defensive. On Saturday Lee aban-
doned this policy, and with it his position
In the Wilderness. Henceforth we were to
find him in an intrenched camp that stood
across our road and barred our farther pro-
gress. If he attacked, it was to be with his
intrenchments in his rear; If we attacked,
we were to fight him on his own ground,
and with all the advantages in his favor. 1t
was for this end he made such haste, after
| Fridays battle, to reach Spottsylvania Court
House before us. He had the longer dis
tance, but he beat us in the race.
Here begins new series of engagements.
What ensued from Sunday morning to the
following Thursday, the 18th inst, was a
varying contest, sometimes one party, some
times the other, making the attack, outside
Lees main Jortifcdtions. In this neither party
could claim the advantage, till on Thursday
morning General Hancock added fresh
laurels to those his magnificent resistance
of the great rebel charge at Gettysburg had
won him, by-his brilliant attack near the
enemy's right. On this day we won clean,
handsome, but still indecisive victory. A
whole rebel division, with its commanding
General at its head, thirty or forty pieces
of artillery, and the possession of the battle
field, were self evident proofs of the victory;
but its sole result was to lead Lee to fall
back within his Notifications.
This gave rise to the story of his retreat
Official dispatches declared it, and 1t was
i not wonderful that the newspapers believed
and made haste to announce it. When we
sought to advance, the mistake was soon
discovered, but in that densely wooded
country, 1t was at first difficult to ascertain
Lees exact position. Then came the heavy
rains, rendering movements almost impossi-
BILE, and making it difficult even to bring ip
supplies for our army. Meantime Lee eair-
ed a breathing spell; his supplies came up;
reinforcements reached him; Sigel was re-
pulsed; Beauregard forced communication
! again between Petersburg and Richmond;
and so, whatever advantage we thought we
had gained by exhausting Lee, has been
measurably lost again. h Fo i4
Under such auspices, we began active ope-
rations last Wednesday, by what may be