The Alleghanian. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1859-1865, 1864-11-10
VIII the Slaves fight for the Re-
bellIOn.

| who manage the desperate affairs of the
Rebellion, will seriously undertake to bring
into the fel1 an army of colored troops.
| OF course they will be slaves, but they will
have the promise of freedom in case the
independence of the South is gained
Possibly the unreserved promise of freedom
| will be made, and perhaps something by
way of pay and soil added.
SO far as we have seen, this scheme is
| objected to in the South, not on account
of the hazards, or because of doubts of the
slaves fidelity, but because it will be the
destruction of slavery. The Richmond
Inquirer accuses a Raleigh objector Of
loving the institution more than Southern
independence; and we have seen it repeat
edly iDtimated that if independence can
be thus purchased the South must prepare
to make the sacrifice. This argument and
appeal pre-suppose success as certain !;
nothing is said Of what would be the effect
on the institution in case the scheme failed
and independence not won; the fact is
kept out of sight that it may fail, and that
there would be no new resort. Thus it
plainly appears that it is the last card
the South is about to play, by arming the
slaves
The question recurs, will the slaves fight
on the side OF the rebellion, even with the
promise Of freedom, pay and soil ? On the
solution of this important problem, it is
useless to deny, no little depends. It is
clear the rebels think they will. Every
thing depends on the degree of restraint,
coercion and discipline that can be brought
to bear upon every individual black man.
We lave seen the South, in the expressive
language of Gen. Grant, rob the cradle
and the grave, to keep up the Southern
armies. We have seen the white popula-
ton submit to tyranny Dot less grinding
than that would be which transferred the
slaves to the ranks, and which has ever
been over them. 1t is an indisputable
fact that the white population of the South
would yield the contest at once, but are
made to fight on, while daily-increasing
exhaustion renders the condition OF the
non-combatant population truly hopeless.
Now, the question arises, will not the
despotism that has done this, that has
brought and rigidly holds the white pop
ulation of the South to this point, that has
grasped everything and silenced complaint
will not a despotism that is absolute
suffice to make the slaves fight as willing
ly as large proportion of the white con-
scripts? Will the blacks be more prompt
to desert than white men who are hopeless
and despairing, many of whom never were
for the rebellion Will their opportuni-
ties for deserving be better, even though
their disposition be greater? On the
contrary, will they not be more carefully
guarded, and extraordinary precautions
taken to make them, as machines, move
and do at the word of com mand?
Admitting all the probabilities concern
ing the disposition of the slaves to desert
and the strong provocations to inidelity,
there are many reasons for conceding that
the Rebel leaders do not over-estimate
their power to reduce them to obedience
even in the ranks of the Rebellion. That
the slaves would be organized into indie
pendent commands, is not probable, but
interspersed with white regiments, and
commanded by white officers It may be
useful to remember that the North at the
outset OF the Rebellion expected too much
concerning the disposition of the slaves to
rise when the white population should be
Withdrawn. Long years of oppression
had degraded them to lower depth than
We had supposed, and we have learned
how little manhood slavery had left to its
victims. The South boaste6 that the
slaves would be the most serviceable sup
ports to the Rebellion, and that the North
estimated too lightly the coerced fidelity
of the slave. So it would seem. We are
willing to concede that there are good
reasons for not too speedily adopting the
conclusion that slaves cannot be made to
be fighting soldiers on the side of the
Rebellion.