The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1864-11-24
We know not what may have been che


We know not what may have been che
dispositions made to meet tho invasion
of Sherman, which was certainly anon,
the contingencies that ought to have been
and we suppose were, anticipated as con
sequent upon the movement of Genera
Hood to his rear. OF this, however, We
feel assured that il the population OF
Georgia and South Carolina be only hall
as patriotic as they have credit for being,
his situation must be perilous IN the ex-
treme. lie has entirely cut himself on
from all communication with his base oil
supplies, which lies at Nashville, two
hundred and fifty miles oil. His army
is a flying column, and cannot, therefore,
be supposed TO cucumber itself with
many asons and much provision. The
country through which he is passing is
thinly settled, and the population bitterly
hostile. Here are as many elements Of
danger to an invader as it is usual to find
Upon occasions of the sort If the popu-
istion be only true to themselves and
their country, we see not how he can
possibly escape disaster.
We are still at loss to understand
the ,lterior object of Sherman. The
Yankee papers, more than month ago,
gave out that the seat of war was to be
the cotton States this winter. If such
be the design, and this the execution of
it, the certainty that he win move upon
Savannah or Charleston, in order to Sc
cure base for future operations, seems
pretty we'll established. Once in Savan-
nah or Charleston, however, he will find
himself as effectually besieged there as
Howe was in Philadelphia when DR..
Franklin wrote, that instead of Howe
taking Philadelphia, Philadelphia had
taken Howe. A Confederate army, lying
before whichever of these cities he may
select, will effectually bar his entrance
into the country and render his army
save in the article of employing so large
a force to blockade it-as useless as
though it did not exist. To take posi-
ton in Charleston or Savannah is to
place himself in precisely the same po-
sition wit Howe and Clinton in New
York. They had the city, with good
quarters and powerful fleet Wash
ington lay above them, watching them
carefully, cutting off their parties when
ever they ventured out or, when they
come out in full force, taking up such
strong ground and offering battle on snch
terms that they did not dare, in single
instance, to accept it, If it be the inten-
ton of Sherman to take either of these
cities, he has first to take it, which he
will find no easy job; secondly, to ope-
rate in the country, which, with the
army that will certainly confront him,
he will find no easy undertaking. As
for opening any communication with the |
country he has left behind him, that we |
take to be out of the question. |
In the Revolutionary war, the British, |
besides having possession of Charleston
and Georgetown, had posts all through
the State. When they were finally COM
PEELED to abandon these latter, they all
retired into Charleston, and Green held
the whole country, while they attempted
no farther enterprise. If Sherman go to
either Charleston or Savannah, and there
be shut up by our armies, it will proba-
bly, be the best thing that can happen to
either Of these States, since it will be the
means Of leaving them free and uninter-
rupted by the presence of the enemy in
the agricultural country.
Our own impression, however, is that |
this expedition has been undertaken with |
view TO render assistance to Grant. |
Savannah or Charleston once taken. it |
would be very easy to transfer Sherman's
whole force to the lines before Richmond /
and Petersburg Richmond is now the
prevailing Yankee idea and all other
enterprises dwindle into insignifcance
IN comparison with that directed imme-