The Lancaster gazette. [volume] (Lancaster, Ohio) 1863-1886, 1864-02-04

streets present force should be the
nucleus, and the whole, under Lee, to
march to the Ohio, to ascend the right
bank of the river, and crossing above
Wheeling, to occupy line stretching
from the ''Pan handle" to Lake Erie,
thus bisccting the territory of the 10y
al States, and by holding or destroy
ing all the railroads, to separate the
East from the West. He admitted
this could not be done without encoun-
tering great difficulties, and perhaps
fighting a great battle somewhere on
the Ohio river. "But," said he to Lee,
call ordinary difficulties l know you
can surmount; the enemy cannot con-
ccntrate an army to oppose your one
hundred thousand veterans before you
fly our flag in the sight of British sub
Iiects on the hitherto shore of Lake
Erie, and | believe the circumstance
will insure our immediate recognition
by the powers of Europe. l am not
fearful OF the result of battles, which
know must be fought to accomplish
this, for something tells me that before
=, die l shall exult in the glad tidings
|, of great and overwhelming victory
by you over our oppressors upon theil
own soil, and l firmly believe thu
next time you meet the enemy on free
soil, my hopes will be realized"
General Lee had many objections t.
the rebel Presidents plan. He ad
mitted the argumentabout recognition
but insisted there were difficulties il
) the way of success which could not b.
surmounted. In the first place h
presented the fact that rebel army 0
one hundred thousand men woul,
have to carry its supplies some tw
, hundred miles over the worst roads il
the country; and the transportation
necessary was not to,be had; beside
J had they the means at command th
progress of the army would be so de
: layed by the immense trains, it woul
: be impossible to succeed. Secondly,
3 would take twenty days, under an.
: circumstances, to advance to WheeI
: ing, and that time the Federals coul
c confront him with an equal number {
v troops; and thirdly, he might succec
; in penetrating north of the Ohio, an
' establishing his line as far as LAX
l. Erie, but he could be menaced on bot
=. flanlls at the same time, while hisre
I, and lines of communication would |
S most invitingly exposed to attack an
occupation by the enemy:
$ In conclusion, the rebel general pr
J sentcd his own plan, which was as 70
ie lows: TO give Johnston seyenty-fN
H lHe thousand troops, and Longstreet Il
IL ~ same number the former to kcC
e. q Grant employed in front, while the la
u ter would retake Knoxville and Ea
Us Tennessee. Longstrcets succe
o. would turn Grants left flank, and,
lS the latter did not then fall back fro
'e Chattanooga to Nashville, he could a
IN vance toward Middle Tennessee, an
~ menacing his rear and line of supp
oi and communication, force him to L
W treat under the most unfavorable ci
- cumstances. Grant once on the NOV
III Johnston would follow him closel
ro and, uniting with Longstreet, the tN
u could drive him to the Ohio rive
"Then, Kentucky is ours" said &c
@ "s Lee; "givc Johnston and Longstre
80 this many troops; let them start Gra
= out of Chattanooga, and then un
UIl their forces before he could fall
eh h either separately, and | am certain
NJ ~ will regain Tennessee torercr, and ca
nc ry the war into kentucky, whore, II
he lieve, it will end"
ne Which of these plans were fina
el, e adopted, my informant cannot ccrta
~ "h ly tell; but he believes that the oXc'
" ton of one of the two is now being
la+ l't ranged, and it is very likely, G.
NV NV Lees programme.
nc M P.S. TO avoid misapprchcnsion
IN will state that my informant is
ro' jeff. Davis body servant, who, rep
- says, has had hearing at the "
~ ~ Department.