Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-05-23


cisfve Battle Yet TO take place ppon
the North or south Anna Rivcr-In
what respect Lees Strategy was at
Fault-How the He bells regard rhe
movements ON the South Side OF the
James River. oF
Correspondence of the n. 4. word.1 .l.,
an BALTIMORE, May TO-
send you herewith preliminary account Of
the recent military events in Virginia, derived
from Southern sources
THE BATTLES UPON THE RAPrDAs MERELY
PRELIMINARY.
will send you in a day or two a full account
of the recent military operations Of the Confede-
rates in Virginia, both on the Rspidan and else
where At present the materials for such an
account have not yet reached here The roar Of
the three days battle has not yet edaway. The
smoke of the conflict still hangs heavily over the
bloody field. All that can send to you to day
is few detached facts, not without importance
in themselves, and not without their value in
aiding your readers TO comprehend fully the
tual situation. For you need not to be told that
the Administration is endeavoring to suppress
important facts in relation to events that have
transpired. No more reliance can be placed now
upon the assurance made by the Secretary of
War to Gen. Dix that .it is designed to with
ance made by that official after Hooker was de
feated at Chancelorville. "that the army had
suffered no disaster, and would speedily resume
the offensive"
All that has yet taken place in Virginia, terri
BILE and sanguinary as the battles OF the 5th and
9th of May were, is only the commencement of
the great contest for the possession of Richmond.
Fiercely contested as those battles were they are
not the great battle that Gen. Lee will fight be-
,ka .n;l anlt tha Il Tba
battles of the 5th and 6;h desperate as they were
are ndecisive. and are but the preliminary skir-
mshes to that supreme conflict TO which the
rebel leaders have been looking forward for so
long time
GREAT ADVANTAGE or THE NUMERICAL SUPERIOR
ITY or GEN. GRANT
The kew TO all of Gen. Lees movements in
this campaign will be found in my letter of April
2S It Is therein stated that there will be bat
tie on the Rapidan. but it will not be the great
battle" | am already in possession of facts
enough to show that this is the case which are
stated below. at the same time. the enormous
number of troops ut the comm md OF Gen Grant
has made Gen Lees task much more difficult
one than he expected and has caused him To
modify somewhat his original plans. This mod
ifcation, however. does not involve any radical
change in those plans. which. II Is understood
will vet be carried ont. The great dsproporton
in the size of The Union and rebel armies made il
necessary for Gen. Lee so 10 tDaneuver his troops
as TO bring on the actions that have been fought
in such positions, aud under such conditions
that his advantage OF position should counter
balance the disproportion Of numbers. and that
great loss should be inflicted on the Union troops
while the rebel troops suffered comparatively lit
tie. Another object that Gen. Lee had in view
was 10 make the battles Of the 5th aud 9th (pre
liminary and secondary i'm Importance as they
were) so fercely contested as to draw out the
whole strength of the Union forces. including
even our reserves Both of these objects the
rebels claim have been accomplished.
slGELs MOVEMENT IN THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY
OF NO CONS SQUEScE TO GEN LEE
The presence of the troops under General
Sigel. General Kelley. and General-in the
Shenandoah valley, gave General Lee no un
easiness whatever de ascertained the facts in
regard to that movement by means of recon-
nOissance along the BitimOre and Ohio Rail.
road, which was made, you will remember,
about week or ten days ago. 10y squadron OF
Imboden's cavalry He learned at that time
il is said, that all the troops under the officers
above named were to be be kept stationed below
Winchester and StraSburg, in ,he Shenandoah
Valley, in order prevent him from turning
Grants right flank. and that the B ,ltimors aud
Ohio Railroad. it guarded at all, must be guard
ed by recruits These facts gave him no
uneasiness, because the time was not yet come
for him to turn Grants left n INK aud because
when he ready aud determined to do so,
these thirty thousand Union troops. (more or
less) would not prevent his doing il.
GENERAL LEES USEAsISEss ABOUT THE MOVEMENT
on THE PENINSULA
But what did cause him some uneasiness, was
General Grants movements bv way Of the
Peninsula If this movement had been really
directed by General Butler. il would have given
Lee no concern at all. But the rebel General
understands that Buffers connection with il is
only nominal. and that it is political trick on
the part of the President. insisted on by the
latter, 80 not to offend Buffers radical and
powerful friends at Washington, that keeps But
Ter nomnally ut the head of the movement.
General Lee is fully convinced that the whole
movement on the Peninsula is a part of General
Grants grand plan of the campaign against
Richmond. and that il is directed solely by him,
aud executed solely by General Smith Aud
that is why he was uneasy about IT, Indeed, il
caused him great deal more uneasiness than
the overland movement of Meade's army. The
latter he knew he could foil and defeat. But
the movement on the Peninsula if il should he
made on the left bank of the James river, and
made in sufficient force, might render il neces-
sary for him either to oppose il with his whole
force, or at least would render it necessary for
him to detach such portion of bis army from
The line of the Rspidan as would greatly, per-
haps fatally, weaken him there. If, on the other
hand, il should be made on the right bank OF
the James river, he knew that Gen. Beaure gard
could hold it in check. and prevent il from en-
dangering the safety of Richmond in the slightest
degree. and this, too, although General Beau
regards forces were far inferior in number to
those under Generals Smith. Gilmore, and But
Ter. will merely add here that events have
shown that on this point the rebel General rea-
soned correctly
WHY GENERAL LEE ATTACKED MEADEs ARMY
General Meade's army crossed the RapJan;
Gernisnia. the 4th General Grants
purposes the peninsula entirely unde-
yel0Ded. A strong Unlon force had been landed
at West Point. aud another strong body al
troops was Ht Yorktown, while still third i,ody
was moving on Williamsburg. The whole, or q
great part uf. the Union hotilla was collected ia
the York river. All these facts were known to
General Lee, aud seemed TO indicate purpose
on the part of General Grant TO use the York
river as his line of approach to Richmond And
this seemed TO General Lee the more probable,
because there are many military reasons why
that is the true line of advance toward the rebel
capital Under these circumstances, it was VII
tally important that the advance of Meade's
army should be checked. and that army be de
feated, ii possible, before the min body oil
Buffers forces should reach the White House
on the Pamunkey; for if they should succeed Ia
doing so. the probabilities were that Mesde's
LETT would be extended down the Mattapony
river. and Buffers right be moved up the Pa
monkey to Hanover. and thus junction b<
formed by the whole of Grants forces. In thi'
case nothing but defeat could await Genera
Lee. To prevent this. therefore. it thai
General Lee assumed the offensive on the 5th
hurting his solid columns against our lines anC