Maysville weekly bulletin. [volume] (Maysville, Ky.) 1864-1866, 1864-07-07
From the Portland Maine Advertiser.
The Capture of Petersburg Abandone ed

The developments of the last seven q ayr
have confirmed the news stated In IN last
letter, that an advance on Richmond from
the south side of the J ames River; ana the
destruction of the Danville Railroad, were
impracticable. 1t can not be denied, now
ever, that General Grant has gone to Sres'
deal Of unnecessary trouble, and has sacL.-
feed some 900 more men needlessly; 10
cause what he has learned at Petersburg a a
such frightfnl cost, he might have learneu
much nearer Richmond; but as 1t Is now, ne
will have to learn oyer again, between Pe-
tersburg and Richmond, what he has no"
learned south of Petersburg.
This is wav his whole campaign has been
conducted IF tn ere were two ways to &C =
complish an object or to reach a certain
point. one involving an immense loss of life,
and the other by which all losses could be
avoided, Gen. Grant invariably chose the
former. 1t is no wonder that the Rich
mond papers say he is the man for them,
because he leads to fruitless slaughter so
many of their enemies.
On reaching the James River with his
army on the 18th. Il was In Gen. Grants
power to select whatever point he chose, as
the base of his subsequent operations. He
could have Cst) landed the whole army
where Gen. Smiths corps was landed. at
Bermuda Hundred, and marched direct on
Richmond from the South; or (2d) he could
have,,taken the troops to the New Market
bend of the river, (ths next bend above
Turkey Bend) and, landing them on the
north side Of the James River. at a point
four miles west of Malvern Hill. he would
have found his army within twelve miles OF
Richmond. Either CT these movements
would have been protected by the iron-clad
vessels. No necessity in the world existed
for the capture Of Petersburg. It did not
lie in his road to Richmond at all. Ii he
had left it behind him, and left it alene, he
would be to-day much nearer the capture
of Richmond than he is now. He can
never take Richmond until he gets undis-
puted possession of the Danville Railroad.
Ut is not necessary to destroy, nor would Its
destruction effect the objcet,)
He could have got full possession OF that
road by making his base at Bermuda Hun
dred, and advancing with his, first to Ches-
terfield Junction on the Petersburg Railroad
establishing his right wing there, and then
moving 10 miles north. west to a point on
the Danville Railroad milest west of Rich
mond, and establishing his left wing there
Intrenchm ents on both wings, that could
have been thrown up in a single night
would have rendered these positions i'm.
pregnable. Such could have been General
Grants position on the 10th Of June, for on
that day his army arrived in front OF Peters
burg. The distance from City Point to
Chesterfield Junction is 20 miles, the same
as the distance from City Point to Peters
burg. Besides, Gilmore's corps was already
at Bermuda Hundred when Smiths corps
landed there on the 18th, and that point is
onIv 20 miles from Chesterfield Junction.
He would have met with no opposition
from Lee. BeauregaId's corps was already
ia Petersburg, They had passed Chester
field Junction on the 18th, and reached
Petersburg that night. Ali the rest oil Lees
army rem NAMED at Richmond till the lItn
On that day Gen. Lee repaired the little
damage that Butler had done to the rail-
road. but it was not till the 18th, that the
whole of Lees army moved from Richmond
to Petersburg.
General Grant, however, determined to
take Petersburg before advancing to Rich :
mond Just as he had determined to take
Spottsylvauia and Lees position at Coal
Harbor. He believed that he could take
Petersburg just as he believed he could take
Spottsylvania and Lees position near Coal
HORROR. He has butted his head against
the stonewall at these two places. He has
sacrificed more men before Pete rsburg than
be did either at Spottsylvania or Coal Har-
Dor. He has demonstrated the impregna-
bility of Petersburg, just as he did OF the
two former positions. And now he had
abandoned the attemp to force Gen. Lees
positions at Spatsylvania and near Coal
Hsrbor.
But after committing the great olunder
of alta cking Petersburg when it was not in
his way at all, when its capture would ac-
complish any end that could not have been
attained withoutit, and now being COM
pelled to abandon the attempt to capture it
after all this, Gen. Grant has now COM
mitted a still greater blunder. 1t was still
in his power to make his base at Bermuda
Hundred and to advance on Richmond from
the south, and to gain possession OF both
the Petersburg and the Danviile Railroad.
Instead of doing this, GeA. Grant has made
a flank movement to his left, and to the
south of Petersburg, which has resulted in
placing his army in position OF great peril
This movement was made on the 21st
and 22d. 1t was not made with the whole,
but with the half of his army. He sent
three CORPS, those of Hancock, Wright and
Warren, to tear up the Wilmington Rail-
road at ReauI's Station, ten miles South CT
Petersburg; a most silly errand. The three
corps had to march with their flanks expos
ed. Petersburg being directly on their right
flank.
Gen. Leo waited till they had got to a
point where they were ten miles from the
other 8 corps, Chose of Smith. Brooks and
Burnside, left east of Petersburg) and then
he threw a heavy column of $1,000 troops
right on their flank. The wonder is that
they were not overwhelmed at once. But
they were troops of the Army of the Poto-
mac; and Hancock was there. Hancock
quickly changed his form a line of battle,
aud a terrible contest ensued. Our loss
was frightlul. When it was seen how great
was the odds against him, for rebel troops
kept pouring down from Petersburg to REIN