New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1864-01-28

Il1tdl 10 Tic Sdlcty VI tVtn' IL 'Ihclo ofc ~
other elements in the problem. it is bad gcner
alship to persist in defending such line, and
whether there are any other elements or not, il
is clear that the line may be broken at any ono
of several points by rcSolute advance of even
a small force. and that considered as q frontier
line it is not in any military sense capable OF
protection. Compared with such line as may
be drawn across Northern Georgia and South
Carolina. it affords no advantages whatever for
purely defensive struggle by an expiring
Rebellion.
In one view this statement may be said to ex-
haust the argument on the present position.
Longstrcet's hold on the northern section OF
East Tennessee is no doubt Of immense conse-
auenoe to the successful resistance which john
ston hopes to make against Grants advance into
Georgia II was mistake TO detsch him from
Bragg, but it is equally mistake to suppose
that he marched on Knoxville with any idea OF
reuniting, whether successful or not, with
Bragg. Knoxville was worth come risk, but
Longstreet'S present position just as eiiectually
threatens Gen. Grants flank and will impede
in one way or another his advance. In neither
case could the Rebel commander be considered
dangerous to Grant. or in safety himself, except
BY maintaining his communications with ir'
ginia. Destroy the railroad and he is in trap
| from which he ought not to be allowed to escape
with any large fragment of his army. He can re-
ceive from Johnston neither support nor supplies.
On Lee, and on the country which Lees army
defends, he is dependent for both. We believe,
! therefore, that sudden movement by heavy
column down The Shenandoah Valley, in con-
junction with general advance Of oil the other
Union forces in Virginia, would result in the
total disruption Of the line which the Rebels
now hold, would compel Lee TO abandon Rich
mond or TO abandon his support of Longstreet
and would result in the destruction of the latter
Such O movement has never yet been attempted
though strong reasons for il have always existed
They are stronger now than ever, and IRE are
stronger. Something more ought to be done
than merely to break up at one or two points
the railroad which carries Longsireet's supplies
TO him. The country from which he draws
them ought to be. and might be, occupied, and
his sole line of retreat, which is now along that
road, should be destroyed
We believe that the Rebels expect such
movement as this, that they regard Longstreets
campaign as contingent upon it, and that they
are either preparing for it, or have decided 10
withdraw LongStreet, and concentrate their
forces in Northern Georgia. If, however, the
decision is still in allegiance, il viii be made
when the success Of the conscrption is ascer-
tanned. A hundred thousand recruits will
enable Davis to attempt the more hazardous
scheme. He may still hold Virginia, keep Long
street in East Tennessee, and by decisive move.
mcn.s in large force sndcavor to preserve intact
this mcnaced line. He will do it with perfect
knowledge that he risks everything on success
that defeat not only perils but insures the
overthrow Of his power and the instant collapse
Of the Rebellion. II Is probable that in a miis'
tsrv view there is hat one feasible method of pnr
suing such campaign. II is probable also that
in view which should be exclusively military he
would not undertake it at all. If he cares only
10 maintain some sort Of rcbclious power, to
continue resistance in hope Of better terms nom
a Democratic Administration, or even to carry
on war that might yet be Of considerable du-
ration on a narrower field; if he were indie
pendent Of all counscls but such as the cotton
States will give him; If he could carry Lee amp
his Virginians with him in q retreat to Georgia;
if he had not to confront and control distrust-
ful public opinion and sentiment Of nationality
which, however absurd, is still intonse, he
would surely avoid the hazard Of such cam
pagn as now looms before him. He knows that
in order to be successful it must be brief; that
the larger his army the sooner his supplies will
be exhausted, and that whatever the results OF
bis CONSUMPTION, his armies will be outnum-
bered BY ours. lie may well doubt whether he
will not act on his own judgment against the
opposition be must suppress at home, rather
than against bis own judgment supported by
insufficient forces.
THE COURT OF APPEALS.