The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1864-01-13
From the sOuth.

" W aSuAus tOuf OSAelsOus anu u1AfeAeai
freedom.
From the Soutbs
From The Richmond Despatch, Dec. 2s.
AN EXAMPLE FOB MILITARY MEN.
General Jackson, like ell great military
commanders, was especially remarkable
for his attention to details. Nothing
was to small to escape bis eagle eye
Upon . march he was always to be found
with his wagon train. On ono occasion
when one Of bis wagons was stuck in tho
mud, and the wagoners were Standing
around and cursing the mules. without
doing anything to remedy the difficulty,
be suddenly rode up, alighted f N bis
old sorrel, took 3 rail from the fence, and
went TO work himself; an example which
instantly recalled the men TO q sense Of
their duty, and the wagon was soon put
on terra frmG.
He then superintended the filing up
of the hole in which il had sunk, 80 as
to secure the uninterrupted transit Of the
rest Of the train. This was General
JaeksOn's style Of doing business He
knew how much the great operations Of
war depend upon what appear 10 be the
most trihing details. He never lost
thousand dollars worth Of public prop
ertY while he was in the army. Those
who imagin that all 3 commanding Gen
eral has to do is to 6ght battles. make
an egregriOus mistake. Some OF our mil
itarT popiBiays seem to think that the
eclat of the battlefield and fuss and feath-
era make up the sum Of military glory.
If they would emulate the fame Of Jack
son thev must adopt bis habits of patient,
practical labor, and his thorough and ab-
IorbiDg attention to details.
FROM the Dispatch, De. IS.
Following UP.
A great deal has been said in the
course Of this war about the failure Of
our Generals to follow up their victories.
The Northern journals have been equal
" clamerous about similar short eomings
on the part of their own comma1ders.-
The European critics have pointed out
the same peculiarity in American mill
tarv operations. The fact is undeniable
tb At ali the great battles Of the war have
been indecisive, but that fact may be &C
counted for without any imputation up
on the skill of the Generals on either
side.
1t has been said that our officers have
been educated under = peace establish
ment and never accustomed, before the
present war TO the handling ofllrge bod
les of troops. The old United States
Army did not number tWentT-thousand
men. The military men Of Europe have
been fsmilisrized for ages to the opera
tions Of armies as great as those which
are now in operation in America. More
over. their facilities Of transportation ap-
proach perfection. Long use hss render
ed every detail of their organization per-
feet and complete. Besides, their rank
and file are ell mercenary soldiers, mill
tary-mAchines, whose discipline IS OF the
most rigid character.
Every arm of their service is perfect;
their cavalry are always in forcs suili-
cient to charge an enemy, and follow up
an advantage, and in every battle tbsr0
is 3 strong reserve, which never takes
oart in the contest until the day is deci
ded. apd is then hurled relentlsssly up
on the retiring foe. We in the South
ern States have been laboring from the
beginning again disadvantages which will
never be fully known till the war is en-
ded. We have been deficient not only
in numbers, but in munitions Of war,
and in facilities Of transportation, whilst
the volunteer character Of cur s0ldiery
renders il impossible 10 enforce that rig
id discipline which prevents men from
Struggling after q defeat, and from scat
tering themselves after q victory, 70 Sc
cure the tempting spoils Of the Vanqaish-
ed
But the best reason Of all the difference
in "folloWing up" between European and
American battles is, that ia Europe, bat
ties are fought upon q wide and level ok
panse Of country, where the cavalry,
whose business il is 70 cut TO pieces tbs
retreating foe, have full scope for their
annihilating work, whereas The thing
here is q physical impossibility. The
rugged and mountains character Of the
regions in whish most Of our battles are
fought, presents TO = retTeatiDg army q
seris Of defsnsible positions, which can
be taken up At pleasure, one after another,
and forbids the use Of cavalry except on
a very limited scale.
The main reliance in following up
must be cavalry, for foot soldiers have
but little chance Of OVtrtskiog fOot sol
diers, especially when the pursu d have
cast away the burden Of their arms and
accouirements. Our own infantry have
driven the Yankee infantry further back
than ever the Infantry Of Europe drove an
enemy. Bat there have been few Of our
battle fields in which cavalry could op-
crate. What chance was there for =
cavalry pursuit At Chiksmauga, or Fred
ericksburg, or ChancellorVille! Such
facts As these explain TIE peeuiiarity Of
not following up" in America, without
the necessity Of any reflection upon tho
military capacity Of the commanders.