Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-11-17
Buonanan's Failure to savo tho
Union,
GEN. SCOTS DISCLOSURES.

HbNSs oNOA4 . bA0O4O0OhAns a
The most interesting portion of General
Scott's autobiography, just published, is
that which relates to the rebellion. The
disclosures he makes leave NO doubt that
if President Buchanan had taken his ads
vice all the southern forts and arsenals
might have been saved and the rebellion
crushed out in its inception; and no one
can read Gen. Scott's account Withou feel
ing that Buchanan was either in guilty
completely with the southern conspiratOts,
or was their weak dupe and tool.
AS early as October, 1860, Gen. Scott
warned Mr.. Buchanan of the exposed cen
dition of the southern forts and navy
yards, and urged their reinforcement =
They might then have been made perfectly
secure, and; as Gen. Scott said, the dan
ger of secession would thus probably have
been averted altogether. But the PreSi-
dent doubted and hesitated, and matters
drifted on, the conspirators meanwhile
perfectiug their preparations for war. How
faithfully and persistently Gen. Scott af-
forwards urged upon Buchanan the per-
| formance of his duty as President, to take
| measures to save the forts, arsenals and
navy yardsin the South, these passages
from his autobiography will show:
October 31.-I suggested to the secretary
of war that circular should be sent Rt
once to such of these forts as had gRrri-
sons, to be on the alert against surprises
and sndden assaults. After long con-
fuement to my bed, in New York, came
to this city (Washipgton), December II.
Next day personally urged upon the sec
retary of war the same views, viz: strong
| garrisons in the southern torts-those of
Charleston and Pensacola harbors, at once,
those on Mobile Bay and the Mississippi,
below New Orleans, next, etc., etc. L
again pointed out the organized companies
Land-ths recruits at the principal depots
available for the purpose. The secretary
did not concur in one of my views, when |
begged him to procure for me an early in-
tervieW with the president, that l might
make one effort more to save the forts and
the Union. By appointment, the secretary
accompanied me to the president, Decem-
ber Is, when the same topics, sscessionism,
ETC., were again pretty fully discussed.
There being at the moment, in the opinion
of the president, no danger of an early
secession, beyond South Carolina, the pres
ident, in,repIy to my arguments for imme-
diateiy reinforcing Fort Moultrie and send
ing q garrison to Fort Sumter, said, In
substance, the time had not arrived Tor
doing so; that he would wait the action OF
the convention of South Carolina, In the exr
uectation that communication would be
appointed and sent to negotiate with him
aud, Congress respecting the secession OF
SOC 90 md hn 0FnnaFfV nf the United
Stated held within its limits; and that II
Congress should decide sgainst the Sc
cession; then he would send rein
forcement, and telegraph the commanding
officer, major Anderson,) of Fort Moul-
trie, to hold the forts (Moultrie and Sum
teri against attack. And the secretary
with animation, added: ave have vessel
of war (the Brooklyn) In readiness at
Norfolk, and he would send three hum
dred men in her, from Fortress Monroe to
Charleston. To which replied, hrst,
that so many men could not be withdrawn
from that garrison, but could be taken
from New York. Next. that It woala tnen
he too late, as the South Carolina Commis-
siouers would have the game in their
lhands-by first using aud then cutting the
wires: that, as there was not soldier in
Fort Sumter, any handful of armed seces-
sionists might seize aud occupy it, Here
the remark may be permitted, that, 1t the
secretary's three hundred men had then
Tor some time later) been sent to Forts
IMoultrie aud Sumter both would now have
been in possession of.the United. States,
and not a battery below them could have
been erected,byt the secessio ionists.I, Conse-
ouentIy, the access to those forts from the
/ sea would now (lhe end of March, 1861 be
| unob bstrueted and tree.
The veteran geueral-in-chief continued
to press the matter frequently upon the
President, bat without avail. He closes
his narrative of the effort he made to gel
| Fort Sumter reinforced with this summing
IL. would have been easy to reinforce thii
fort down to about the 18th of February
| In his long delay Fort Moultris had hsel
rearmed and greatly strengthened, in ever!
nav. by the rebels. Many powerful neV
4 land batteries {besides formidable raft
IbSds been constructed. Hulks, too, weri
sunk in the principal channel. so as to rem
der aneess to Fort Sumter from the sea i'm
6Faetieable. without frst carrying all u
lower batteries of the seeessionists, Tn
difficulty of reinforcing had thus been IN
creased ten or twelve fold. First, the lat
j Ores sident refused to allow any attempt
; be made, because he WAS holding negotta
tions With thsSoath Carolina commission