The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-03-12
TIE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
important Communicate from an
Eye witness.
How the Victory Was Won and How Its
Advantages Were Lost.
Generals Halleck's and Meade's Odlcia
Reports Refuted.
&sss &ess ~
To tho Editor Of the Herald.

war Il not only saved the North from Invasion but
turned the tide Of victory 10 favor The opinion OF
Europe the failure OF tho rebellion dates from this great
conflict How essential them that Its real history should
be known. Up this moment clear narrative has ap
peared The sketches the press the reports Gene
Gals Haeck and Meade and Grafton Of Mr. Everett
give only phases OF this terrible struggle and that not
very correctly. To supply this atus send you con.
nected and, hope, lucid review Of its main features
have not ventured to touch the thrilling incidents
affecting details such strife, but myself
60 succnct relation Of Its principal events and the
therein. My only motive to vindcate history. do honor
20 the fallen and justice the survivors when unfairly
impeached
General Meade took command Of tho Army OF tho Po
tomac Sunday the 2sth Of June, at Frederick Mary
land. On Monday he states, the army put In
motion and by Tuesday night the right flank had reached
Manchester left occupied Emmettsburg General
Bufords cavalry had advanced far Gettysburg
eepoted that tho Confederate army debouching
she mountains on the Cashtown road. Upon this intel
lgence Gen. Reynolds ordered to advance ettys-
burg with tho First and Eleventh corps which
early the LIST Of July found Bufords cavalry
ready engaged with the enemy-the corps OF Gen. Hill.
Rapidly making his dispositions, Gen. Reynolds joined in
the conflict. and soon fell MORALLY wounded. The
mand Of the field then devoved General Howard, Of
the Eleventh corps, who maintained his position
ell about two O'Clock P. NJ, when the enemy
was heavily reinforced by the arrival or Ewes corps
Tho battle ragged fearfuly, between Hills and Ewels
corps side and the First and Eleventh corps the
other till four P. NJ, when General Howard
compelled to yield TO the superior numbers OF the
and fall back losing many prisoners-neary four thou
eaudto the south side OF Gettysburg His position was
emnenty critical when TO the great RELIEF Of both the
General and valiant troops division OF the Third
corps under the immediate command Of General Sckles
arrived. and the fighting for that day at end 1t
should be mentioned that the Third corps was stationed
at Emmettsburg by order Of General Meade w,tha view
protect that important point but Information connu
ing reach General Scles that the First and Eleventh
corps great danges he decided TO assume the
grave responsibility OF moving to their relief without
orders Leaving two bgades at Emmetsburg, he made
forced OF miles, spite OF the heat and dust In
three hours had the satisfaction to be hailed by Gen.
era Howard his reaching the field with the factoring
phrase, "Here you are Genera-,ways reliable always
nrst,-a generous tribute from soldier TO another
General Socum Of the Twelfth corps had arrived short
time before his corps then four miles dis
cant In the early part Of the evening "wednesday
OF the leading generals took place, when some
insisted falling back towards Taneytown while Others
urged the cxpedency Of maintaining their present posi-
Sion offering advantages for the inevitable and
decisive contest that the following day.
appears Gen. Meade had issued circular (of which
I cav several copies) the morning Of Wednesday.
J., -
advance had accomplished all the objects contemplated
namely the relief OF Harrisburg and Phadel pha-and
chat he would now altogether from the Offensive
He proposed post the whole In line OF battle on
Pipe creek the right flank resting on Manchester and
che left on Middleburg. involving an entire change
or front, and there await the movements Of tho
enemy The position which General Meade
had selected for the final struggle between
the two armies was fifteen miles distant from Get
tysburg where fate wled that should occur Whether
this important circular ordering him to fall back
reached the lamented Reynolds before he became en-
gagged Gettysburg is difficult 10 say II couid DOT
hsve failed to reach General sickes but no happily
determined push to the rescue Of the First and
Eleventh corps, already engaged 1t Is strange tna'
General Meade should make no mention ID his report Of
chs singular and important facts that be Issued
plan OF campaign Wednesday, July l, directing his
whole army 70 retire up the defensive on Pipe
creek almost at the that his left flank was fierce
Nv struggling with the right wing Of the enemy This
how often plans Of general frustrated BY
sunlookedfor contingencies
General Meade broke up his quarters at fancy town, as
he states at eleven P. " Wednesday and reached
Gettysburg at one A. NJ Thursday, July 2 Early in the
morning he work examining the position OF the
various army corps. II Is hardly true TO say that he
Initiated the example OF all prudent commanders on the
eve OF battle and made complete survey Of the ground
he occupied.
twas on these occasions that the genius Of the First
Napoleon revealed ITSELF for at glance he saw the nd
vantagee OF his own position and the assaabs point Of
che enemy. II seems that General lee was somewhat
moro than Meade in this for in bis report ne
sta,es what he deemed most favorable pont' for
his attack Of General Longstres Opposite
our lett wiug) lee remarks, "ihs enemy held position
from which, IL he could be driven, IL was thought our
army could be usei to advantage In assaing the more
elevated ground beyond and thus enable us to reach the
crest OF the ridge That officer, then, ds drecssd 10
CORY thn position" II is plain enough that Lee 70
ardcd the point where left posted as the key 70
our position and that could be taken from W our defeat
was inevitable II is not TO be supposed that Gen.
Meade refused 10 this but he makes no mention Of
report propose, FOR the sake Of the future MS
toreu Or the battle, TO tell what know about IT,
Near this important ground was posted the valiant
Third CORPS and ts commander, Gen. sckI9s, saw st
once how necessary u Was 10 occupy TIE elevated
ground IN his front towards the Emmettsburs
rsad, and 10 extend his lines 70 the COM
manding sminence known ~ the Roundtop, or
suearoas Hin Unless this done the Left and rear OF
oar army would DO in the greatest danger sckes con
oiaded that no time Wa 70 b. lost a. he observed me
enemy assng large bodies Of troops on their right tour
fsf) Receiving orders, and filed with anxiety, he
reported In person to General Meade and urged the ad
vance deemed so essential soh" said Meade Scene
ss all apt look for the attack 70 DO made where
they nre." Whether this jest or snser Siokles
Gid not stop 10 consider but begged Meade 70 over the
ground with him Instantly but tho Commander In Chief
declined this account Of other duties. Yielding how
over TO prolonged solicitations Of sickles General
Meade desired General Hunt Chief OF Artillery to
nny sces and report the result Of their Reconnaissance
Hunt concurrsd with sckles TO tho line be occu-
Died the advance line from the len Of ne Second corps to
ne Pondnp HiI-but he declined 10 give any orders
ell he had reported to General Meade remarklng, now
ever thu, he General sckles) would doubtless receive
orders Immediately.
Two p NJ. came ana yet no orders. Why was thIsf
Other orders those expected by General sickles were
It appears IN preparation at headquarters u has since