New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1864-03-25
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

Now that this army, which, spite oil Its re-
verses, and It's failures in all aggressive move
ments, the country has steadily regarded with al
lection and pride, is about TO enter on anew cam
paign under new commander, we observe with
regret an effort to revive in its ranks Senti'
ment which. for lack of better name, We must
call disloyal McClelanism. Nobody who re-
members the history of the Virginia campaign
in August, 1862, can have any doubt what the
phrase signifies, nor will any one who knows the
course of Fitz John Porter's treachery need to
be told how disastrous the influence of the Nc
Clellan sentiment has occasionally been. But
setting aside those worst developments, and
referring only TO the feeling Of personal attach
ment TO Mcclellan, which, i'll portion Of the
Army Of the Potomac, was once 80 strong as in
some measure TO ALLEVIATE his vartisans from the
Government, and TO lead them 10 regard his
claims as paramount TO those of the country for
which he and they prolessed to be fighting, We
have enough to recollect that is painful, and
quite enough 90 impel US TO resent M attempt to
reproduce similar disposition.
Yet we do not direct attention to the subject
because we suppose there is danger of the sue
cess of this unpatr!otic effort. The day is past
when il could he regarded AS dangerous. The
men who make tin public speeches, in Cop
perhead newspapers, or however else-deSerye
just es much condemnation a. if they were able
10 do the mischief they plot; but they simply
offer au opportunity of yndicating the army
from completely with their opinions and
schemes. With that view, let u state frankly
the whole truth about the supposed devotion Of
the Army OF the Potomac to its old commander
There was a time-beiore We knew anything
about him-whcn we all believed in Mcclellan.
The army shared the mad folly of the country.
1t contained some clear-headed and competent
soldiers who saw through the man from the be-
ginning, and who, as the reward Of their ca
pacity, were undcrvalued, denied promotion, and
surred in reports ever after, bat their opinion had
little influence at first on the blind crsdulty Of
the army in general. The troops, though
dis:ruted by their commander, ,went on
generously trusting him through delays,
and successive defeats, and accumulated
evidences of bis imbecIity. During the
Peninsular campaign, the men were shut
out from the world aud fed on TIE No1-
Yorh Heraid, inordinately furloughed and other
wise INDUCED, and were industriously persuaded
into the continued belief that, though they won
40 victories, they had what, on the whole, was
considerably better-a General who was capable
OF Whining them if the Government would but
give him large enough army. But il IL never
theless true that, when the Peninsular campaign
was abaadoned, and Mcclellan had brought the
remnants Of his magnificent force bach 1, Alex
sndrin. n.t more than half tho troop r~'--i-.-'
either their faith in his ability orther attachment
to him personally. Tho,r, However, who stan
eliig to him, clung strongly, and it was always
possible to get up Mcclellan demonstration ON
Tho most approved theatrical principles. II was
Easy to say, if half aregment cheered Justify for
81 George" as he rode By, that no was the idol
If his soldiers. The other bali, Of whom he was
not the idol, could only protest hy s.ence. In
particular corps-the Second Tor instance
Mechanism was predominant. In Others
here was 10 fuch sentiment whatever, while
among the best general officers Of the army,
utter disbelief in MeClellan's capacity was
almost universal.
So stood matters IL the end " The August
campaign, le62. Pope was defeated, thanks to
bis own Incompetence partly, bat lorr.ly to Ne
H. i.r.,.
troops from the Peninsula, and 10 the refusal of
biz John Porter 20 fight under any other
leader. The army was gathered under the for
liicaiiOns Of Washington, beaten, somewhat (
hspidted, and good deal puzzled at the turn
events had taken. Mcclellan was raa,igned
10 It's command. It has been repre- ented that
be was received with enthusiasm. II Is true
hat part OF the army welcomed him; il is far
from true That lie was enthusiastically received
by the whole. He led il 81 the rate OF six
miles day through Maryland, and before
II reached the field of Antietam, great
Zeal Of what enthusiasm there was had
cooled. The battle Of Antietam was fought |
under his command, and half lost By
his timidity and blundering slowness. The
failure to win o complete victory was so plainly
due to him, that that battle, which has been
widely trumpeted as his best title to fame, did
more than everything else TO destroy what con-
iidcnce his troops had in him before; and from
that time he never recovered it. Two whole !
corps passed him in silence--not single cheer
two days after. Ofcourse he had still party
and a strong one, but never subsequently a