Urbana union. [volume] (Urbana, Ohio) 1862-1872, 1864-04-13
WHOLE NUMBER D7.



always recommended itself to myjndgmsni.
I refer to movement from Kansas and Ne
0rasks through the Indian Territory upon Red
river and western Texas for the purpose Of
protecting and developing the latent Union
and free-State sentiment we'll known to pre-
dominate in western Texas, and which. like a
siH1ilar sentiment in Western Virginia. vii,
/ it protected, Ultimately organize that section
into free State, How Ear it will be posi-
! Die 10 support this movement by an advance
/ through New Mexico and California, is a
matter which have not sufficiently examin-
/ ed to be able to express decided spinion.
j If at all practicable it is eminently desirable,
as bringing into play the resources and war
Ike qualities Of the PaciRc States, as well a.
Identifying them with eur cause and connects
( ing the bond Of Union between them and the
general government
I If il is not departing too far from my pfo-
vince. I will venture to suggest the policy Of $50
an Ultimate alliance and cordial understands
leg with Mexico their synipattiss and inter.
ests are with us-,heir antipathies exclusive
/ ly against our enemies and tleir nlstfaifs1s,
I think it would not Ee difficult 70 obtain from
the Mexicsn government the right TO use. as
least during the present contest, the roadfrorn
Guaymas to New Mexico; this concession
would very materially reduce the obstacles Of
the column moving from the Pacific; a siri-
lar permission to use their territory for tfiB
passage of troops between the Panuco and
the Rio Grande would enable US to throw .
column Of troops BY good road from Tame
pico, or some Of the small harhors north Of Il,
upon and across the Rio Grsnde. without risk
aud scarcely firing shot.
To what extent, II any, Il would Be des;fas
/ bic to take into service and employ Mexican
soldiers, is question entirely p0litieaI on
which DO not venture to offer an opinion.
The force 1 have recommended is largef
The expense is great. It Is probable that q
smaller iOrce might accomplish the object in
view, but I understand it to be the purpose
Of this great nation TO rs-sstablisb the power $50
of its government and restore peace to rs
eitizens in the shortest possible time.
The question to be decided is simply thisf ~
shall we crash the rebellion at gns blow, taf4
minate the war in one campaign, or shall We
! leave it as a legacy for cur descendants.
When the extent Of the possible line Of
Operations is considered, the force asked for
for the main army under my command cans
not be regarded as unduly large; every mis-
we advance carries Us further from our bass
Of operations and renders attachments neees~
tsary to cover our Communications, while the
enemy win be constantly concentrating as
he falls back. 1prOpose, with the force which
i 1 have requested, not only 10 drive the enc.
my out Of Virginia and occupy Richmond, bus 81
to occupy Charleston, Savannah, Monfgom.
cry, Pensacola, Mobile and New Orleans; in
other words to move into the heart of :hs
enemy's country and crush the rebellion IN -,
its very heart,
! By seizing and repairing ths, railroads ss
we advance the difficulties Of transportaliOn
will be materially diminished. 4 is perhaps
unnecessary to state that, in additisn to ths
forces named IN the memorandum stronF
reserves should be formed, ready to. supply
any losses that may occur.
In conclusion, would subEit that the ex.
igehcies Of the treasury may be lsseened By
making only partial payments to our troops, sr
when in the snemy's country, spd by giving
the obligations Of the United States for such
supplies as may thers be obtained.
gEo B Mc6LELLAE, Maj. GeD.