Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-06-02


for the var as little a. possible by eurFen.
ey' and as muen as possible BY loans, We
enau bear even two Thousand millions of
osot a. easily Gs poorer countries in Eu-
rope bear AheiH hnodreds of Thousands.
'Ehe whole people oRa-Ihs de6t- They are
Wiling % pay anything for their national.
ny. They are rich enough 70 endure ims-
mense taTation. Who can doubt both
their 6haneiai ability aud thelF fnal imam
eial SUGGEST z-tl .vEl
ss5 Erua tie PhnndslpAia Anariean. z
Aspect efthes CRnpaiEn IN VIrginIa.
In the anxiety of the Richmond neusp5a-
pers and OF their correspondents in bees
army 10 make It appear that Grant il re-
treating souIhEardJ pursued by Lee, they
prove conel1siFsiyE hst oa each occasion
the hsnknoTenent Tas heguR byGrant be.
fore the rebel army vas prepared to move
or expected 70 do so. One Of the Rich
mOnd journals goes into an elaborate arr
gument to prOTethia view of the case the
point being that Lee beat Grant in every
pitched battle, and that Grant moved of BY
the flank 70 avoid continued 6RhtinR2
This 70 nov assumed 70 be she state offsets
in regard To the battles in fha Wilderness.
At Spottsylvanis aud ~ the North Anna, ID
which cases laboFed attempts. have been
made, BY those persons At the North Who
desire an ineonelasive termination Of the
campaign, 70 shOR. that Lee retrestsd in
full foEcs several days bsfore Grant ives
aware that he had gone OF course, even
If this had been true in each case, il would
only illustrate Lees Veakaeas and inabil.
ity 70 PrOtract the struggle bat the OBJ
| jeet these parties. have in view. i TO exale
Lees strafegicsl powers and TO lead peo-
pie TO believe that he Is outWirting Grant
at every turn. l1
We call attention to his subject because
II h Ons Of the most imPortARt connected
With the present campaign 10 ell preyi-
Gus struggles With AeClellan, Pope, Hook
eE aud Meade the flank movement was q
sfAYorite resort Of Lee, and his achievements
with II in forcing our army to retreat
noEthTard, or Away from Richmond, were
always hearlded as great exploits. 1t Is by
precisely the same policy that Grant has
upset all Of Less plans and forced him TO
retreat excessively from point 70 point.
until the two armies are now within few
miles of Richmond. The truth is that
from the frat moment of commencing his
campaign in Virginia, Grant has kept his
army on the Offensive all the time At all.
points, and given Lee so much occupation
"a Watching his movements as to leave
him no opportunity of actinRlon thesoHen.
II
battles between Grant and Lee agree in
represenIing them as constant repetitious
OF attacks, charges, flank movements, re.
l.coneoisances, cavalry raids. in front, flank
and rear, and they never loose Q chance Of
landing the heroism ofthe rebel troops in
resisting those demonstrations. '-
a general who acts upon such general
system as tbis is NOS likely TO be far wrong
IN dealing with An opponent like Lee, whose
plans have heretofore been similar. If.
tnen, Grant continues to act upon the of.
tsnsiVe. makes use Of his men 80 freely AZ
be has thus far done in this campaign. he
depriVes Lee of his principal weapon-bis
Offensive strateRy-sinee the latter, having
the defence OF Richmond resting upon him,
Is forced by necessity 10 .attempt 20 couu.
teraot whatever manouvEes Grant NAV
make. II is alleged in Baltimore letter 70
the World (Which forms part of series
continued in that and other papers sines
the breaking out of the war, by the same
hand, and evidently party in secret IN.
derstandiug with the 'rebels) that Lee will
not throw his army into Richmond and
defend the city, but that he will remain
Ioutside and attempt to attack Grants ARM
in Hank. The same letters have served as
the vehicles for just snch bugbear stories
az this on every occasion when the Onion
III,
4 stories thus put in circulation ere precisely
those which Lee would be most desirous 10
have believed in the north. .l, E5.si :,
Il Grants course is an. obvious dne.I He
has to take Richmond and the closer he
can push 70. 1T the nearer he will be To thu
end of his campaign. INSTEAD, therefore. al
fighting windmills, instead of providino
against imaginary expeditions into Penn
Esylvauia, Ohio, Maryland, the Shenandoah
valley, and Washington city, he will keep
his eye steadily fixed on the rebel capital
! Hedo not imagine that Lee will so fferth
siege TO commence without making great
eHort g, oEllAe back Grants army, and for
that purpose 4 is quite likely that Lee will
remain outside of the intrenchments To srf
upon tA9s offensive. But Ihis,s instead of
oeibgs q strong policy, as some pet5ous sun.
pose, is extremely perilous, for if Grant can
:. t.eHsct ajunctton with Butler, Hunter. and
ECtoakss he may by strategy draw his lines
CLOSE enough around the city to excluds
lee and thus fight the latter aud the civ
garrison upon interior lines, sas zhS did
johnson and PembertOn at Vicksburg. 2
! There 10 every reasonstoz believe Lea's
intention to have been to fight Grant AT
every available point, and not 10. alioE
MIN to reach Richmond If he could keen
8 4tmlaWPy. For that reason he had fortfS
Flied q strong position south 81 the Nartt
Anna river, and another south of the
South 4nuaSEG ud calculating that Grant
might turn these aud go to the Pamunkev.
he erected Qualifications at Hanover CONT
House, and stationed force there under
Breckenridge. 1t appears from the lates,
dispatch from Grant that he had CROSSED
\ the PsmunkeZ With his whole army, Ioccu.
;, pied HanoVertOwn, and oceupied>a mont
ABOUT three Hiilss south Of the river
There had been some severe cavalry fight.
ing, in which as usual, the rebels Ssrs
driveuEupop An entfenched position a T1iIs
distant. 't ne
JadginG ~ our maps. this cavalry 6rh.