Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-02-08

were held; the base of the Lower Chesapeake
was finally selected for the movement against
Richmond, and steps were taken to prepare
the necessary transports, under the exclusive
direction of the Secretary of War.
The Navy Department had been invited,
as early as August II, 1861, by Gen. Nc
Clellan, to take steps for protecting the navi-
cation of the Lower Potomac. Nothing had
been done, however, and Gen. Barnard,
Chief of Engineers, reported that it would be
impossible" for the army to prevent the
erection by the enemy of batteries at "High
Point and thence down to Chopawampsic."
As the navy took no steps to prevent the
erection of batteries on the Virginia shore,
nothing was left but to maneuver so as to
compel the enemy to evacuate.
THE ADVANCE TO MANASSAS.
After detailing the measures taken by him
to secure the reconstruction of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad, Gen. Mcclellan begins
the history of the Peninsular campaign. On
the sth of March the President renewed bis
objections to the Chesapeake movement, but
after full conversation again withdrew them;
and the plans of Gen. Mcclellan being laid
by him the same day before a council of Di-
vision Generals, they were by the majority
approved. Still the complete secrecy neces-
sary to their success had now by the course of
the Executive been sacrificed; and ON the
same sth of March the President issued two
new orders, still without consulting General
Mcclellan. by which the situation was greatly
modified. One of these constituted the army
into army corps; the other limited the army
of operations to fifty thousand men in the
event of certain contingencies; made the
safety of Washington paramount to all other
considerations, fixed date for the commence
ment OF operations, and ordered a combined
land aud naval assault on the Potomac bate
ries, which it was Gen. McClellan's intention
to turn by bis strategic movement.
Gen. Mcclellan was thus at the outset
made responsible for great movement, all
the essential points of which he was forbidden
to control, and the President deliberately took
npon himself the moral responsibility of ali
the disasters which were to follow.
The appearance of the Merrimae modified
the Pennsular campaign in the respect that it
made the York and not the James River the
line of the armv's communications with Fort
ress Monroe: but the evacuation of Manassas
by the enemy, which followed the publicity
given to Gen. McClellan's plans proved the
accuracy of his stragetic calculations, and pre-
pared the way for the full success of his plan
of operations.
With the hope of harraSsing their rear, and
the certainty of employing the troops usefully
in the interval before their embarkation for
the Peninsula, Gen. Mcclellan ordered an ad-
vance upon Manassas as soon as he learned
that the enemy were moving. This advance
began on the 9th of March.
At that time the force OF the enemy, as re-
ported by the chief of the secret service corps,
was as follows:
At Manassas an vicinity. ....... 10000
At Lower Occoqum aud vicinity. ...... .ls,0OO
Lee-burg -.-......-........ 4,oUt
Shensnio ioah Valley. $50. ........ .I3. 900
lI5.OO0
With about 800 field guns and so siege
guns.
A striking account is given by Gen. McClel-
Ian of the strength of the Confederate field
works at Manassas and in the vicinity-a
strength which ''civilians" cannot well appre-
ciate, but Of the Importance of which the his
tory of war gives every competent military
man a full sense.
While at Fairfax Court House, three days
after the advance had begun, Gen. Mcclellan
was informed by telegram from one of his
staff that an order had been published in the
newspapers of that day, signed by the Presi-
dent and relieving him (Gen. McClellan) of
the command IN chief of the Army OF the
United States.
BY this ord +, the plans of a campaign be-
gun and intended 10 be executed in conform
ity with general scheme of operations, were
eminently Interfered with at their very incep-
ton.
Gen. Mcclellan, though uninormed of this
most important step till it was taken, at once
wrote to the President, reiterating what he
had said before, that ''no feeling OF self
interest or ambition should ever prevent
him from devoting himself to the service"
March l3, council OF generals command
ing army corps decided in favor of the PENN
sular campaign. The President, renewing
his entreaties that Washington might be kept
perfectly safe. gave his assent to this move
ment, and Gen. Mcclellan details at length
the history of the steps by which it was finally
carried out.
THE MOVEMENT TO THE PENINSULA.
just before the expedition moved, the Pre-
sident met Gen. Mcclellan and informed
him that he had been strongly pressed to
separate Blenkcr's division from his army and
give it 10 General Fremont, but that he was
opposed 10 doing so, and would not do so. A
few days afterward, Blenker's division was or
dered to join General Fremont. and General
Mcclellan was thus deprived of 10, 900 of the
troops upon which he had counted. The
President, however, assured him that no po-
litical pressure should again induce him to
deprive the Army of the Potomac of any
more OF Its force.
On the LIST of April Gen. Mcclellan, then
on his way TO Fortress Monroe, estimated the
troops left to hold Washington, Manassas, and
the Lower Potomac, with the Shenandoah
Valley, at 1886 men, with 100 light guns. a
larger force than had held the same region
during the eventful and perilous months of
July, August and September, 1861. Gen.
Barry, Chief of Artillery, states that at WASH
ington there were left 32 field pieces, with
men, horses and equipments.
The testimony of Gen. Hitchcock, who re-
ported to the President on the I'd of April
that the force left for the defence of Wash
ington was inadequate, is adduced to show, in
his own words, that it was clear that the ene-
my ''had no intention of reoccupying Manas-
sas Junction, and that, therefore, no large
force would be required 10 holdtbst POSITION
The President, however. on the 9th of
April, telegraphed to Gen. Mcclellan at For
tress Monroe his fears for the capital, based
on the alarming fact that the ..ine from
Richmond to Manassas Junction was entirely
open"
The Navy Department is shown TO have
declared that ''the Merrimac was neutralized,
and that the naval forces could cooperate