Delaware State journal and statesman., 1864-04-19
FLAosHiP WABASH,
PoRT ROYAL HARBoR, S. O.,
June 8. 1863.


Hon. Gileoa Weiles, Secretary Of The Nary, Wash
mgf0B, y. c..
SRI have the honor TO acknowledge the ro-
ceipt of the Departments communication OF tn
l4th ulL, informing me OF the receipt OF m.
several dispatches, accompanied by the report
Of the commanding officers who participated il
the attack upon the forts at Charleston on thI
9th Of April last.
The tone of this communication is 80 difIeren
from the one which Immediately followed it, datet
on the 18th ult., and to which | have already re
piled by the Arago, that / desire to answer i
more at length, and TO meet the statements Of tht
Department. as contained therein, as fully a,
may be in my power, and with every mark o.
consideration due to its distinguished head.
am well aware, as the Department observes,
that the results at Charleston were not all that
were wished for, and quite agree with the De-
partment that there was, never Itheless much in
them that was gratifying, particularly that the
loss Of life was small, and that the capacity OIL
the iron cads for enduring the hot and heavy fire
brought to bear upon them, which would have
destroyed any vessels Of wood heretofore used in
warfare, was made so evident. But must take
leave to remind the Department that ability t.
endure is not sufficient element whereWith Il
gain victories; that endurance must be accompa
MED with corresponding power TO infict injury
upon the enemy and will improve the present
occasion to repeat the expression Of a conviction
which have already conveyed TO the Department
in former lettcrs, that tbs weakness Of the Moni
tor class of vessels, in this important particular
is fatal to their attempts against Notifications
having outlying distractions, as at the 0geeoheC
aud at Charleston, or againet other fortihcnti0ns
upon elevations, as at Fort Darling, or fainst
aay modern Notifications before which they must
anchor or lie at rest, and receive much more than
they can return. With even their diminished
surface they are not invulnerable, and their
various mechanical cOntrivances ior working
their turrets and guns are 80 liable to immediate
arrangement that, In the brief though fierce en-
gagement at Charleston, five out of eight were
disabled, and, MS mentioned in my detailed re-
port to the Department half an hour more
fighting would have placed them nil hoFS du conI-
bat. The Department refers 10 its order of the
llth April, and to a telegram from the President
which directed the retention of the military
forces of tue United States near to Charleston, in
view Of operations elsewhere; and the Depart
ment states its impression that these dispatches
were not in unison with my convictions, and sx-
presses its regret that should have been panied
by their nature, when nothing was farther from
the Intentions of the President, OF Of the Depart
ment, than design to csnsure me in those OOla-
municatiOus.
The letter Of the Department was uneIception-
able but certainly did consider the telegram Of
the President us implying II ctnsure upon myself
and desire most respectfully to submit, as somp
evidence that such n belief was not unreAsonably
entertained by me, that the President. with great
kindness, in Il second dispatch, aud before he
could have known what impression his first had
mads took occasion to stato much 10 my graft
iication, that he hnd not intended to censure me.
In regard TO the subject matter Of the order Of
the Department of the llth Of April, and to that
of the accompanying telegram, desire to state
here that the order Of the Department Of the =
Of April had been reoaiycd by me on The gth and
was 30 imperative, mud 90 fully explanatory Of
the reasons for mailing il imperative, thntl had,
as mentioned in my dispatch No 267, proceeded,
on the l2th as soon as was practicable, ~ Port
Royal with the monitors, to put them under re-
pairs before sending them tu their new lestna
tion. The order Of the Eth nnl thc telegram
tonnd me here, in compliance with the previous
order of April "a.
1t WAS in replying To this telegram, which
then believed to imply censure upon NY action
at Charleston, that deemed il dus to myself to
state that had never advised the attack on
Charleston; and perceive the Department has
taken special exception to this expression, and
has dwet upon it at considerable length in its
letter to which am now replying A reference
TO my correspondence with the Department, and
more particularly to my letters to the Assistant
Secretary OF the Navy, will certainly show thai
| never advised the thffack on Charleston ut all,
but il made, it should be accompanied by a suf-
icient number of trooIs to insure success and
an Inspection of this correspondence which, with
the Assistant Secretary, was constantly main-
tanned, and which put him and, as | supposed,
the Department, also, in full possession Of my
views as to every matter connected with my COM
mand, will relieve me, feel assured, from the
inputaton that did not keep the Department
sufficiently advised Of my opinions as to the ore
rations contemplated ON this coast aud beg to
refer to the same correspondence as containing
all the Information obtained by me from every
source in regard TO the defences of Charleston ;
and if, after such information, Charleston harbor
continued to be a sealed book to the Department,
it was equally 30 to me.
The Department. in continuing iia remarks
upon the want of such information from mo as
the Admiral commanding observes, nevertheless,
' that the feasibility and the probable results of
the demonstrations that were to be made had
been canvassed and fully understood when |
visited Washington last autumn"
The honorable Secretary will remember how
very few words passed on the subject between
him and myself. 1t was, however, more fully
discussed with the Assistant Secretary, who Dro-
posed that should return to my station by way
Of Hampton Roads, in order that we might fur
'her canvass the matter; and he accompanied
me that far from Washington. But nothing was
matured and for the reason that all was still in
the vague future. Not now iron-clad except
the NEW lronsides" was yet finished, and the
original monitor was on the DOCK in the Wash.
ington Navy-yald. The defects of the New Iron.
sides were garing, particularly the contracted
size of her pilot-house and its improper location
behind the enormous moke-stack, shutting out
all view ahead nnd most materially Interfering
with the management of the vessel in battle
defects painfully realized in the attack on Char
lesion.
remember, however, that in our discussion.
the confidence of the Assistant Secretary in the
monitor class Of vessels was so profound as to
lead him to say that one monitor alone would
cause the immediate evacuation of Charleston
upon which occasion, not entertaining such un.
limited lalth in the powers Of those vessels nor
disposed to underrate an enemy, took the lib
erty of reminding him that ore monitor, aided
by the Galcna aud NAugatuck, both iron olads
with several wooden gunbonts. had failed to take
Fort Darling, notwithstanding the great gallant
~ displayed on that occasion.
The Department will therefore. perceive that
when lett Washington there was really nothing
matured, though | was firmly Impressed wiz
the fixed determination Of the Department that
Charleston SHOULD he attacked, and TINT. with
tue iron-clads, that attack must necessarily be
successful.
The powers and adaptabiity of these yessels
were ms much n scaled book to mo as the def n.
ces Of Charleston to the Department; but. under
all the circumstances, to witt the imperfect
knowledge of those defenees aud of tie nowers
OF the iron olads, in which the Department, Ind
expressed nnbounded confidence, no officer wonld
hesitate to make the experiment; and gave to
IL my whole heart and energy, not hesitatinr TO
ask the Department for all the iron. clads that
4 Fpl md L.