, 1864-10-07
Qbifa9o Gribnne.
FRIDAY. OCTOBER :, 1894.

Qbifa9o Gribnne.
- FRIDAY. OCTOBER :. 1894.
CBlCK
ihas name brings up some Of the mo,
gloomy memories IN the annals ofthe Amer
can people. II 1t told only OF disaster
the field Its Significance would be sad enonp1
but when We gaze back upon the picture {
valor frustrated By irrcsolut,on, strcngt
psrs5sed by awkwardness, numbers wuste
BY lever, opportunities lost By timtdity, an
devottoH smothered b. incapable gcnerAlshlp
the spectacle Ia one most harrowlcg TINT
nation has ever been compelled to face. Bu
We can endure It. Rccollccttng that th
hundred thousand men who there upheld th
standard of 10y atty, we're heroes ii thel
leader was none, that they were stout
hearted II be was weak, that they shoEe
an nundaunted front to the foe, AID plucke,
victory from defeat while he Eas sa,lin,
away on gonboat, VIC may lind the coneo1s
ton OF one who said 1--WE have lost all say
honor" Remembering also that the com
Try, profrndly. shocked by the reverse
Hhich had belallen 1t, nevertheless rnse sn
'per'or to the occasion, and gained ftesl
courage from the contempt .uon Of disaster
VIC csn thank God that the incapacity whtc]
spoiled campaign and slaughtered our so1
dtefs had no hold rpon tl- spirit Of IRE,
people.
The Chickahominy campaign has psssci
into history. The record is made up-if can
Eot be changed. Time has cleared M man,
OF lis dark ilaces, and has pointed ont 4bt
brave men and the towards, Tie rtanta anf
the pigmlcs, who took part In It. Gen. Jc
Cle1lan has published document Which he
Calls Lis report of the operations OF the Armz
OF The Potomac while under his command
We publish this morning IN extract frcn a r.
view Of Gen McCiellnn's report. It relates
to the campaign on The Peninsula af.er the
army had reached the banks Of the Chicka.
homsny. It is from the pen of Brig. Gen.
oa1nsfo, Chirt EnG7heer of the Army OF the
POTOMAC trcm Its organization to the close Of
that csmtsien. To say that II is scathlop
fevieW Of the blundets Of the campaign, and
most fitting rebuEe Of the want or candor
displayed BY Gen. Mcclellan in his report.
would notp1operly characterize this impor-
tatt PAPER. It's merit consists In its straight.
forward presentation of concurrent facts
which took place ubder the authors eve.
verified by the testimony OF numerous wit
nceses, the most important witness being
Gen. McC1. Han himself For instance, when
Gen. Mcclellan tElls Ms in his report that he
chose the line Of the PamunEey instead of the
James tor Lis, approach to Richmond,
because the President Ind ordered Gen. Nc.
0nWe11 tn t11Ir rrh nj .,.n
instead Of going By water, Gen. Barnard
calls attention TO the fact that the decision
In favor OF the PamupkeY route was made
eight days previous to the Presidents order
to Mcdowell. He shows .lso that Gsn. lie.
Clcl]an, In his testimony before The Commit
tee on the Conduct Of The War, ASSIGNED an
entirely different reason tor his preference of
the Pamunkey line. 1t is thus manifest that
the Teaeon assigned in his official report was
I'm atterthoughr. It is proved also tha: n
bis eaeernces to bring railing accusation
against the President, he forgot his own
sW6rn testimony before a Committee OF Con
ssesa Let us See now VII It Ibis amounts 10
Gen. MCCLELLAN, In bis report, Gays: "Ihe
land mtvencnt Obliged NE to expose 1oy
Fight In oEderto secure the jutctlon, and, as
the order =. McDowelrs march was so,u
incurred great risk, Of
which Il Z enemy finely took advantage, and
I. f.ufrefed The z9an ef the campatg,t." Here is
a deliberate Charge that the r.sident frus-
trnted the plan Of his cau.paisc. Here Is
statement, msde upon his honor as 3 soldier,
that the President Of the United States, by a
certain order, compelled him to pursue
lIDe Of operations different from that which
be had Intended, end thus caused all the dis
asters Of the campaign. It turns ont that
be had adopted the 1iae Of operators 4hich
he actually pursued. at Roper'a Chur ii On
the 11th Of May, while the Presidents order,
Of which he complains, Was not issued till the
18th Of May. 1t appeaSs further that when
he was fnterrogated BY the Committee IN the
Conduct of the War, as to the lessons .hieh
impelled him to adopt the plan which he
actually pursued, be replied: 81 do not
condition to make the line Of the James river
perfectly sure for our supplies" He said
nothing about the Presidents or.rx then.
That WAS copjured mp Afterwards. What
muet We think Of General who, having lost
: campaign through his own errors and
puts talsshood into his off,
''r1 report Tor the purpose Of charging the
results OF his OWL oiundezing upon,tlis Gov
~
How beautifully does the example ct Gen.
Burnside appear In the l.got OF this shame
fnl exhibition! When the organs Of dlsloy.
Rlty charged upon the President the disaster
Of Fredericksburg, Gen. Burnside came for
ward Of his own accord and saId: ssNo, ceu-
tiemen, The fault is mine: have not been
Iuterfered with; It was my battle aud nv
defeat" History will not accord the need
of successful generalship to either Burnside
or Mcclellan, but 1t will record that tue
former was moral hero, while the latter
was q cowardly preyaricator. The stain is
indelib1e- Though Gen Mcclellan were
elected President hundred tlmes, yet could
he not tree himself from this foul blot noon
his character. It is one of the ma1ims of
West Point that a cadet who does not tel
the truth is nnft to be soldier. In view of
the case UNDER consideration, we think the
medm IL sound one
The supreme mlsmanagement4 or rather
the total lack Of management at Gaines'
NH, where Porter's corps WAS required to
sustain the oueet Of fonr-ffths of the rebel
army, while Gen. Mcclellan could not make
up hts mind whether to withdraw them to
the right bank Of the Ct1ckahominy, or to
reinforce them, or to march with the bulk
OF his army against Richmond, aud finally
did ne1ther, is pictured by Gen. Barnard Ia
It's true colorz. II Gen Lee had been in
qulred Of In scripture phrase, 1What went
ye out for to see.'' he would ha7e REPLIED.
s'a reed ehaken in the wtna.'' The rebel
army, except the two divisions OF Magtuder
and Huger, was Easeed on the lett bank Of
the rive1-the side tarthes. from Richmond
and hurled upon Porter. Any single corps
Of opr atmy could have devoured the torres
opposed to it On the right bank, and gone
1nopPostd into Richmond. Or, If it had !
been deemed best to make q battle on The |
left bank, there was every facility for moving
SIXTY or ecventJ thousand fresh men to the
support of Porter, which would have clyea
ns the numerical superiority which the enc.
my aciually had in the battle. In other
words, We had tie opportunity to gain a
great and decisive victory in either Of two
ways. The commanding General eat quiyer-
pg in the aou1d Of hostile cannon, with
and ters Of thousands Of brave
1earts NJ ound him ready to do his bidding, till
en tboutapd 1oysl soldiers were stretch ed On
he ground, and the hattie was lost, Tais
Ras case where 1t was only necessary to do
consequently Mcclellan did no.
hing. Such had been the case ever since the
'attle OF Fatr Oaks, Which was won By the
uefgy OF Gen. Sumner without orders from
nrhnf3v II Fss nn1v peraaao,r A., horIu |