The star of the north. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1849-1866, 1864-01-13

temptibly smaIl-almost an unappreciabls
quantity one which, considered simply a,
so much country captured, would not com
pensate for one-ienth of the blood anc
money which have been expended.
As our territorial gains have been SO
small, il will be necessary, in order to know
that we are really making progress, to find
other sources of affirmative assurance.
SlrategicalIy, we have made greater pro-
gress than in territory. At the beginning of
The year the rebels held vicksbuTg and Port
Rudson, through which they were able 10
avail themselves of the enormous produc-
.ions of Texas and Western Louisiana. A,
Duck River they guarded Chattanooga, the
door which opened into the very heart of
! the Confederacy, and also secured to them
! selves the possession of East Tennessee, tn 9
| granary of the Confederacy. From Tex
as they obtained immense supplies of cat
tie, and from East Tennessee, hogs, grain
and sallpeus wiihou, limit
ln capturing Vcksburg and Port Il Hudson,
we cut them of from The live stock Of Tex
as, and in getting East Tennessee, we de-
| prived them OF an inexhaustibe source of
cereals and vilalcousli;uent in the manu-
facnre Of gunpowder In these two posi-
tions they have sustained an irreparable
loss. The plenty which reisned in The
South during The years preceding this has
| departed, and in its place comes the grim
| monarch famine. This is no mere rhetori-
cal imagery, but an actual fact, as every pa.
per which we see from the South, and eye-
ry refugee, will snbsiantiate.
From this it will be seen that while we
have gained little in territory, we have been
more fortunate in obtaining positions whose
possessions to the South is OF vital impor.
tance. Simplifed, the gains of the cam
paign of 1893 are the capture and perma-
neni possession of two OF the rebels main
sources OF supply-their catle-yard, granary
and laboratorr Texas and East Tennes-
see.
10 other respects, we have inflicted slight
damage upon the Coniederacy, without
having ourselves acquired a corresponding
gain. The siege OF Charleston has, as yet,
done nothing more than close that port
against vessels running the blockade but
I or every dollar that we have cost the
South al this point, we have expended
a thousand. Whether this process will pay
is question about which there may be
an honest difference OF opinion. At Will
minston, we have by large and expen-
siye addition TO our squadron, succeeded
in stopping much ofthe con lraband trade,
while the same is in The case al Browns
vile, in Texas.
The victories at Vicksburg and Chaita-
nooga, especially the latter, give us other
advantages, which, however, are rather pro-
spective than present The next rebel line
of defence, owing to the situation of
streams and railroads in the South, must
be formed with IFS left on Mobile, its righ.
covering Richmond, and its centre fronting
Grant, at Atlanta. 1t is only BY thus refor-
preserve communication between the wings
Ia condition absolutely essential to the
strength and integrity of this corden.sof de-
fence. Small bodies may for while dis
pnle the possession or such points as Jack
son, Meridian, and Dalton, while il is
certain that gueriIIas will infest the country
north of the new rebel line i; bat all such
operations are irregular and valueless be-
yond the temporary annoyance they may
cause an advancing enemy, as they do not
at all effect the vital issues which must be
met and settled al Mobile, Atlanta aud
Richmond.
This new line upon which the rebel arm
les are thus forced is their last, and, by far,
the most indefensible one which they have
at any time occupied. Its air lice length is
much shorter than any of the others, but lis
actual length, owing to the iortnosity OF the
railroads which connect it, is much greater
The condition of preserving their communi-
cation from wing to wing will be greatly
enhanced in difficulty, from the fact that
the Confederacy lacks for rolling stock and
means of repairing lis railroads The result
will be that communication at first will be
exceedingly slow and difficult, and, in lit
tie while, from the complete wearing out Of
cars and trucks, impossible.
Dul " utAC INC ACbCic w tocO tuhly COu-
diiions of great value, in being forced upon
their sole remaining line of defence, they
will gain ons immense advantage. Every
foot that they yield enables them TO concen-
traie upon the shorter inner line OF defence,
while it correspondingly weakens Us by
lengthening our communication as We aes
vance. Our armies are now SO far from
their basis of supply that very slight inter-
rnplion would be fatal hence it is neces-
sary TO guard absolutely against any such
contingency by leaving small army at
every point as we leave il. This veakeRs
enormously our capacities for offence, and
is one Of the main reasons why the North
is obliged TO call for men necessarily, IN
order TO preserve its advances, and at the