The weekly union record., 1864-03-26
The Contrast.

In the struggle cow going 90 Tor the sup
preston Of the rebellion, the contrast between
be power Of great nation and a mere sec.
ion has been strkingy shown. The power
and capability OF a patton 10 successfully car.
y on war of the magnitude that this has as
,umed depends upon its ability to raise men,
munitions, supplies and money-or, what is
IN equivalent to the whole, 8 credit that will
,nabe it to- supply any or all of these, as the
emergency may require, and in the shortest
possible time.
Presuming that we who are arrayed against
ach other in this terrible struggle are Of the
ame blood possessing an equal amount OF
endurance and stubborness it resolves itself
nto question of endurance and capability to
ustain the constant draft upon our resources,
md one side is the weaker and poorer must
inally fail from exhaustion, and the preponder.
ance of force the other side is able to sustain.
At the commencement of this war the ad
vantage was decidedly on the side of the reb-
is. BY the aid Of an administration control
ed entirely by the leaders of the rebellion,
hey had so managed matters that the most of
he arms belonging TO the government were
distributed throughout the Southern States,
hnd the principal forts commanded by South
ern born men, who at the signal would surren
Ter all to the Confederate commanders And
while they were well and thoroughly organized
md being well drilled by recreant "West
Pointers the north was still ploddng along,
hardly noticing their warning words and
deeds, and hardly daring TO dream that we
were on the eve of the most stupendous war
the world has ever witnessed. Nor was the
dream dispelled even by their lawless seizures
OF the government property, mints, forts, &c,
and the nation was only aroused from its
which started as with an electric shock, all
classes forth to defend our country's honor and
flag
But outside of the immediate advantage
gained by preparation the power was greatly
' 10 favor of government BY the census of
1860, the military force of the United States
was about ) 800 000-of this number the 10y.
al States contained about 4 100000, leaving
only 900, 900 men between Is and As years of
age as the entire military force Of the seced
ing States.
Since the war began, the government has
called into the field not far from 900 900
men. This force has been met by the rebels
with one but slightly inferior, at least three
fourtbs as large, they being able to counter
balense slight numerical superiority by the
advantage they gain in having interior lines of
communication, and acting generally on the
defensive
But while the gOyerHment was able to put
sGeh force in the feld-about one
fourth of It's military strenglh-almost entirely
by voluntary enlistment, the rebels were forced
to resort to a sweeping conscription that spar
cd but few except those actually necessary to
carry on their state and municipal government
The I Uniou losses up to the first OF the present
year. from all causes. as killed, wounded and
deserted, will not fall short Of 100000 while
that of the rebels must fully equal 100000
This still leaves the government with 90 avail.
able force of 1000 200, while that of the reb.
els is but 100000, thus, while at the outset
the forces were as four TO one in favor of the
government, after two years of hard and con
slant service the disproportion is still greater,
seven 10 one, or but about one seventh as many
men as the Union. This estimate leaves out
the numbers TO be added for the natural in-
crease Of population, but that being much
greater in the North than South, from the
fact that European emigration is confined al.
most entirely to that section. the proportion
would probably remain about the same Thus
while the government, should our entire army
be destroyed would be able 10 raise it again
rapidly 10 the maximum, the South would be
utterly unable so 10 DO, owing to lack Of
nen-and each year the war is protracted the
proportion is growing more and more in our
favor, and it is as plain an axiom that time
slone must solve the problem of the rebellion.
SANNNSNtt. NNtSSNAN- WIS dkOES pN SN-
haustiou and derleiiou.
As the numerical preponderaucc as regards
men. is so great on the side OF the government
let us see ii II is not fully as good in material
and supplies At the commencement of the
war. foreign capitalists asd statesmen united
in pronounoins the government too weak and
poor to carry on so great war as this mast
necessarily become. and therefore we should be
compelled finally to consent to segregation of
the United States. With no money-and
at the outse, no foreign credit, how could we
hope to be able to prosecute TO successful
termination, so great an undertaking as put
ting down million of armed rebels. especially
as the head of the out going administration