The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-12-28
aENERAL GRANT AVID THE HATrLE
OF rIrrsBURG LANDINa.
General Sherman Furnishing Facts for
History

Prom ne Uuited States Ssrgice Magazine
HRADoUAnr RRs MILITARY DIVISION Mrss1s
sIPrI.-Professor Henry Coppee, Philadelphia -
Dear Sir lin the June number of the UJiitel
States Service Magasine fad brief SIX etch o
ItucUhHnt- General U. S. Grant, in which 1 sec
you are likely to perpouate an error, which
General Grant may not deem OF sufficient i'm
portance 10 correct. To General Buelrs noble
able, and gallant conduct you attribute the fact
that the disaster of April 6, at Pittsburg Landing
was retrieved, and made the victory Of the fol-
loving day As General Taylor is said In his
later days to have doubted whether he was at the
battle Of Buena Vesta at all, on account OF the
many things having transpred there according
to the historians, which he did not see, so I begin
90 doubt whether was at the battle OF Pitt5burg
Landing Of modern description. But was at
tho battles Of April 9 and I, 1862 General Grant
visited my division la person about 10 A. NJ,
when the battle ragged iercest. was then on the
right.
After some general conversation he rema rked
that was doing right in stubbornly opposing the
progress Of the enemy and, In answer to my in
qury as to cartridges, told me he had anticipated
their want, and given orders accordingly he then
said his presence was more needed over at The
4
rally slAckened his attack on me- and about 4
NJ. l deliberately made new line behind hcAT-
thurs drill field, placing batteries on chosen
gr,und repeed easily cavalry attack, ana
watched the cautious approach OF the enemy's
infantry, that never dslodged me there selected
that me In .,d--..y VI n bridge across Snake
creek, by which we had all day been expecting
the arpfoach Of Lew. wallaces division from
Ctump's Landing. About 8 +. NJ before the sun
set General Grant came again TO me, and after
hearing my report Of matters, explained to me
the situation Of affairs on the left, which were
not as favorable. Still the enemy had failed to
reach the landing of the boat.
We agreed that the enemy had expended the
Jirore o. bis attack, and we estimated our loss,
and approximated our then strength, Including
Lew. Wallace's fresh division, expected each
minute. He then ordered me to get all things
reany, and at daylight the next day to assume the
offensive. That was before General Buell. had
arrived, but be was known TO be near at hand.
General BuelPs troops took no essential part in
the first days fight, and Grants army, though
collected together hastily, green as militia, some
regiments arriving without cartridges even, and
nearly all hearing the dread sound OF battle for
the first time, bad successfully withstoOd and
repelled tbe first days terrific onset of superior
emmy, well commanded and we'll handled. l
know had orders from General Grant 10 assume
the offensive before l knew General Buell. was on
the west side Of the Tennessee. l think General
stBf, rode up to where ] was about sunset, about
the time General Grant was leaving me. General
Buell. asked me many questions, and got OF me
small map, which had made for my own use,
and told me that by day light he could have eigh-
teen thousand fresh men, which knew would
set le the mater.
understood Grants forces were TO advance on
the right Of the Corinth road and Buelps on the
left, and accordingly at daylight l advanced my
division by The flank the resistance being trivial,
up to the very spot where the day before the bat
tie bsd been most severe, and then waited till
near neon for Buell's troops to get up abreast,
when the entire line advanced and recovered all
the ground we had ever held. know that with
the exception of one or two struggles, the fight
ing OF April was easy as compared with that OF
April 6.
never was disposed, nor am / now, to ques-
ton anything done by General Buell. and his
army, and know that approaching our field OF
battle from the rear, he encountered that sicken-
ing crowd of iaggards and fugitiyes that excited
his contempt and that of his army, who never
gave full credit TO those in the front line who
did hght hard, who had, at p. M, checked the
enemy, and were preparing the next day to as
sumo the offensive. l remember the fact the
better from General Grants Anecdote OF the
Donelson battle, which he told me then for the
first tme--that at a certain period of the battle,
he saw that either side was ready TO give way
II the other showed a bold front, and he deter
mined 20 do that very thing, to advance on the
enemy, when, as he prognosticated, the enemy
surrendered.
T. VI.
anoes The same, and he judged, With Lew. Wal
laces fresh division, and such OF our startled
troops as bad recovered their equilibrium, he
would be justified in dropping the defensive and
assuming the offensive in the morning. And, l
repeat, / received such orders before knew
General Buell's troops were at the river. l admit
that l was glad Buell. was there, because knew
bis troops were older than ours and better sys-
temAtized and drilled, and his arrival made that
certain which before was uncertain. / have
heard this question much discussed, and must
say that the officers OF BuelPs army dwelt too
much on the stampede Of some Of onr raw troops,
ana gave us too little credit for the fact that for
one whole day, weakened as we were by the
absence Of Buell's army, long expected, OF Lew.
Wallace's Division, only four miles of, and of
the fugitives from our ranks, we had beaten off
our assaiants for the time. At the same time
our Army OF the Tennessee have indulged in
severe criticism at the SLOW approach of that
army which knew the danger that threatened us
from the concentrated armies OF Johnston, Beau
regard, and Bragg, that lay at Corinth.
In war like this, where opportunities for per-
sonal prowess are plenty as blackberries, 10
those who seek them at the front, all such crimi-
nations should be frowned down and were Il not
for the military character of your journal, 1
would not venture 70 offer correction to very
popular error.
/ will also avail myself Of this occasion TO cor
rect another very common mistake In Attributing
10 General Grant the selection Of that battle field
IL was chosen by that veteran soldier, Major
General Charles f. Smith, who ordered my dlvi-
sion TO disemOafk there, and strike for che
Charleston Railroad. This order was subse-
quenuy modined by his ordering Hurlbut's divi-
sion 20 disembark there, and mine higher up the
Tennessee TO the mouth of Yellow creek, TO strike
the railroad at BurnsYille But floods prevented
our reaching the railroad, when General Smith
ordered me Ia person also 30 disembark at Pitts
burg Landing, and take post well out, so as 10
make plenty OF room, with Snake and Lake
creeks the TANKS OF camp for the grand army
of invasion.
II was General Smith who selected that field Of
battle and well chosen. On any other we
surely would have been overwhelmed, as bJth
Lii k ard Snake creeks forced the enemy 70 con-
fine bis Nc vements 20 a direct front attack, which
new troops are better qualified 20 resist thar
where fianks are exposed 10 a real or chimerica
daT ger. Even the divisions Of that army were
arranged in that camp by General Smiths orders
nv div sion forming, as u were, the o1tly Ing
pickets, whilst McClernand's and Prentiss' were
the rtal line-Cf- battle, with W. H. l.. wallace 10
support Of the right wing, and Hurbut on ne
left; Law. Wahace's division being detached
All these subordinate dispositions were made by
the order Of General Smith, before General Gram
succeeded him In the command OF all the forces
up the TenneSsoe-headquarters Savannah.
II there were any error in putting that army on
the west side Of the Tennessee, exposed TO the
superior force OF the enemy also assembling a
COrnthfElhe mistake was not General Grants
but there was 10 mistake, II was necessary tina
a combat, fierce and bitter, 10 test the manhood
OF the two armies, should come OIL, and that wa
as good AB any. II was not then question O
aa.1 NraN uTH