The Manitowoc pilot. [volume] (Manitowoc, Wis.) 1859-1932, 1864-09-09
hand, crush anv attempt at insuri eciion or

mana, crush any attempt at lnsuriecllOh Oh
their part"
AT the same time ne issued an address
to his army in which be SAYS:
81 place under the safeguard of your
honor tha persons and property of the
Nuginians. 1 know that you will respect
their feelings ard all their rights. Pre-
serve the s,rictest discipline remember
that each one of you holds in his keeping
i the honor Of Ohio and Of the Union.
"fyou are called upon to overcome
armed opposition, | know .hat your cour-
age is equal to the task; but remember
that your on y foes are the armed traitors,
and show mercy even TO them when they
are in your power, for many Of them are
misguided"
Thus early did Gen. Mcclellan indicate
that be entered upon The war, not to sub
vert the institutions of the South, or TO
conduct crusade against unarmed citi>
zens, but singly and solely TO crush trea-
son in arms. Who doubts that had this
policy been adhered to the rebellion
would to-day have been a thing of the
past and the Union to-day stronger than
i. WAS ere the attempt had been made TO
disruptit?
The campaign in Virginia and its COM
Iplete success are so well known that we
need not give its details special attention.
Suffice it that by July 18th, in less than
two months, he completely cleared West
Virginia of rebels, having killed, captured
and dispersed all the opposition that held
: hot Of ho ~
significant loss to the Federal forces. 1t
was one of the most mastery campaigns
Of the present war. For a special Object it
was originated, and that Object in little
more than month vas accomplished, in
GLIDING every single detail 1t evinced SO
much mastery ability that the commander
at once achieved national reputation,
and in response to universal demand he
was called to Washington to assist in re-
pairing the disaster Of Bull Run, which
just then had fallen with crushing effect
Upon the nation. He was at once given
the comm and of Washington and the De-
partment Of Northeastern Virginia. and he
immediately set to work to bring order
out Ct the chaos that there prevailed, and
an army out of the unwieldIy mob then as
now known as the Army of the Potomac
Before taking leave Of the Department Of
West Virginia, it may be added, Gen.
Mcclellan urged upon the administration
the building Of gunboats on the Mississip-
pi River, which suggestion was afterwards
carried into effect, with a result whose
benefit is so well known than nothing
more than a mere allusion to it is necessa-
ry.
Upon assuming command at Washing
ton, Gen. Mcclellan at once proposal a
comprehensive plan to the President. l.;
was first, to drop all attempts save those
directed against the rebels n arms, and,
second, to raise an army Of two hundred
and eight thousand men, which ehould, a:
a given time, strike the rebellion at doz.
en- different points, and thus crush it at
once. AT that time the main confederate
army was at Manassas; rebellion was not
a universal thing in the South, and had
Gen. Mcclellan plan been pursued, the
rebellion at that early day would have
been completely extlnguished. His poll
cy Of conciliatlno those not in arms, would
have prevented the Confederate leaders
from raising formidable armies, while the
enormous physical superiority which he
proposed to use would have found the re
bellion in its infancy and weakness, and
would have crushed it without difficulty.
When he assumed command at Wash
ington, the entire effective Federal force
in the vicinity Of Washington was about
$4,000 men. 1t was the same moo that
had Just been routed at Manassas and
was without arms, discipline, or spirit
To increase this force, discipline it, and to
produce uniformity in the guns, artillery,
ammunition, and equipment were the first
steps taken by the new commander. De-
partments, embracing Engineers, Quar-
termasters, ordnance, medical subsistence,
Geographic, DC, were either entirely lack
ing or in state of ineficiency that rem
dered them worse than useless All these
had to be created and vet, with an army
of only so, 600 men in this condition, and
with these multitarlous and onerous du-
ties to be performed, there are people who
find fault because Mcclellan did not at
once advance and annihilate a victorious
rebel army Of 100000 men that occupied
a strong position not far from Washing>
ton.
Gen. McClelan's logical idea of organ
izing an army large enough to assai! in
} force all these various points, also to weak,
en- the then inconsdorable Confederate
armies BY forcing them to defend all these
positions from a Simultaneous attack, was
defeated through the Impotence of the
people for an onward movement, and the
injudcious intelferences of Precedent Lin
coin and the jealousy of Secretary Stanton
and other aspiring officials. Long before
Gen. Mcclellan had raised his armies to
} the size required for the simultaneous
movement; long even before those he did
have were more than half disciplined, or
their various military departments had
been more than half resurrected from cha
os, Mr.. Lincoln assumed command of the
armies, and on the 9th day Of January,
1862, he ordered that a forward move OF
all the land and naval forces in the Fed
eral service should take place on the 22d
day of February. At the same time the
new Commander in-Chief also laid bis
plan for the capture Of Richmond before
bis subordinate, Gen. Mcclellan.
1t is sufficient to say that Mcclellan
saw the fatal errors involved in this plan,