The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1864-06-16

On October 9th, 1862, Gen. Halleck
dispatched the following to Gen Nc
Clellan, then in command; Lee having
retreated after the Battle of Antietam:
Il am instructed to telegraph you as
follows The President, directs that You
cross the Potomac and give battle to
the enemy, or drive him south; your
army must now move while the roads
arc good.
"If you cross the river between the
enemy and Washington, and cover the
latter by your operations, you can be
reinforced by 10000 men. II you move
up the Shenandoah Valley, not more
than Il, 600 or $4,000 can be sent to you.
The President advises tie interior line b.
t.eeen Washington and The enemy, bit does
sot order Il.
On the 18th of the same month,
Mr. Lincoln telegraphed Gen McClel-
Ian as follows
60 Again.
one Of the standard maxims of war, as
you know, Is, ito operate upon the enc
my's communications as much as posi-
bic, without exposing your own. You
seem to act as if this applies AGAINST
you, but cannot apply in your fauor
Change positions with the enemy, and
think you not he would break your
communications with Richmond, within
the next "a hours2 You dread his 90
ing iato Pennsylvania But If he does /
so in full force, he gives up his commu- Z
nications 10 you absolutely, and you I
have nothing to do but to follow and !
ruin him; if he does SO with less than I
full force, follow up and beat what is /
left behind, all the easier.
Exclusive Of the water line, you are /
now nearer Richmond than the enemy /
is, by the route you can, and he must /
take. Why can YOU not reach there .
before him, unless you admit that he is 1
more than your equal on a march2 His
route is the arc of a circle, while yours \
Is the chord The roads are as good on
yours as on his.
AYou knew / desired, but did not or
der, you 10 cross the Potomac below
instead Of above the Shenandoah and
Blue Ridge. My idea was, that this
would at once menace the enemy's com
munications, which l would seize, if he
would permit If he should move
northward, would follow him closely.
holding his communications. If he
should prevent our seizing his commu-
nications, and move toward Richmond.
l would press closely TO him, fight him
If favorable opportunity should pre-
sent and at least try to beat him to
Richmond, on the inside track. / say
try; if we never try we shall never
succeed
Recurring to the idea of going 10 !
Richmond on the inside track, the IA
cility of supplying from the side away
from the enemy, is remarkable. as II
were by the different spokes Of a wheel, !
from the hub towards the
rim; the chord line, as you see, carries
you to Aide, Haymarket, aud Frede-
and you see how turnpikes.
railroads, and, finally, the Potomac, by
Aqua Creek, meet you al all points from Z
w ashington- The same, only the lines I
enlightened little, if you press closer
% the Blue Ridge part Of the way.
For a great part Of the way c
.ou would be practically between the J
nemy, and both Washington and Rich I
nond, enabling us 10 spare you the
Teatest number of troops from here.
When, at length, moving from Rich
nond ahead If him, enables him 70
move this way, il he does so, turn and {
ttack him in the rear
"a. LINCOLN" i
How literally Gen. GRASTs move 0
nents hayeEcOineided with these views :
We leave the public TO judge lie moved (
outh, keeping the inside track, chang I
ng his base from the Orange and Alex
.ndria Railroad to Fredricksburg, then
o Acquia creek then TO Port ROYAL. L
hen to Toppohannac, and hnhlly, 50 far c
S heard from, to White House. Every q
Iank movement made was an invitation 4
o Gen. Lee 70 move north, if he desir- .
d; but he would not accept the ehal- /
enge GRANT has been continually e
hreatening the communications of the c
ebels, without endsngering his own, e
'ecause Re has awaited himself Of the {
spokea Of wheel" as hccLrLLAS o
night have done, had he followed the v
.dyiee Of the President But il il not J
lecessary to add anything further. il