, 1864-08-09
TIE ASSAULT on PETERBBV aG.
General Military Rsgiew Of the
Aclion,
The Failure and Its Causes.

Action.
The Failure and Its Causes.
2Finton, the military critic OF the NV
York Times, points ont In very plain Ian
Puage the cause of the utter and disastrous
failure Of the assault on the rebel works de-
lending Petersburg It is the clearest review
Of the sffair We have read
.Atthe threshold OF this examination, how
ever, word should be promised touching
the plan OF attack determined upon for the
operations OF Saturday. Although Peters.
burg caInot be said to be under siege, the
action Of Saturday partook largely Of the ns-
der the Category Of what military men call
an irregular eiege.n' It embraced the elm
ination from the problem Of fort, by the
explosion of niue which had been In course
OF construction for several weeks-a task be-
longing purely to engineering or Siege ope-
Tauors. 1t next required that through the
breach formed in the enemy line, By the de-
st1uction Of the foyt, an assaulting column
ehouid storm the commanding position held
By the enemy. For this purpose we have a
massipg Of troops at this point, 20 that the
plan OF action does not contemplate the ad-
vance OF the general line Of battle, but
powerful concentration OF force on IN indi-
Vidual point-the line Of battle proper CO.
operating orly go fur as to divert attention,
and employ the enemy BY gcueral artillery
firing. We thus see the whole momentum
of the action, and the whole hazard Of there
enlt iDdividuated in the corps to which the
duty Of assault Is assigned
In this state OF facts 1t would seem to be
the dictate of prudence, and certainly has
been the invariable Practice Of the great
commanders, to select for the storming COL
rmn the cite Of the army, and to take the
supporting forces, as we'll as those destined
for special service after the maiu action,
The action Of Saturday does not seem to
have been planned in conformity with this
principle. The portion Of our line fronting
the key point Of the enemy's position has
been for some time held by the 9th army
corps. It was, therefore, Gen. Burnside
the destruction Of the fort in Ills front, and
his troops would naturally form the assault
iEg column, unless other dispositions should
be mnde.
Now, with no desire to undertake the IN
| gracious task Of comparison, but with the
simple purpose Of stating matter Of fact es-
senlial to the correct appreciation Of all the
clements that enter into the question, It is
due to say that the 9th corps can not only
not be considered the tftc corps OF the army,
but is really considered far from equal to
others that might be mentioned nuequa1. for
instance, to the Cd, or the 5th, or the 9th.
Thie. again, is not In the least intended to
convey any impression OF blame, but 60 Il
AorEtn. to be. The old 9th corps, than which
there never Was better, has been reduced by
hnrd work to mere nucleus, Nith which has
been a2elomerated {not fused q mass of nc u,
lst division is largely composed OF heavy ar
| tillery, diemounted d cavalry, &c; the 18th Is
composed exclusively Of blacks Bnt what
Is even more extraordinary than the selection
| itself, is the mode In which the selection was
msde, for it appears that the choice of the
the evening bsfore,' eays correspondent,
t'the division commanders Of the corps had
| drawn lots for position in the attacking col
umn- The 1Et division (Ledlie's) won the
Leaf, and so headed the stack this morn
fng.' When such mode of determining
such question is adopted, need it bo won
| dered that fractions chance should turn up
| the poorest division Of poor corps a d.
vision fitted neither in respect OF its CONF po-
eition or Its commander for such duty as
was assigned it:
If then, in view Of this circumstance, 1t be
| aeked Why another selection was not made,
| an ansEcr does not really present ITSELF
There is, however, In Csrnot's remarkable
| work De Ia Defence des Places Fortcs, q note
worthy passage that toLches closely the very
matter in hand 1.-THE reason why our as
saults occasionally fall" says be. ARE, in
rule that the troops Immediately On duty or
near the eEut GENERALLY storm or do whatever
seryice may Be required 1Aese troops may b.
1.oA unttftJor il, and by this mode, the good
old custom is done away OF employing gTcn-
adiers or chosen men tor occasions Of difficulty.
kez indisrrin.inaftly for brlliast te1r eee, and
undoubtedly ,.o7x snoreso than for acrasag
| 4ruk* Beside, the officer to whom the com
! mand falls, may be very unit for the partic-
| ular seryice-" It will be noted that Carnot
characterizes this species Of military etiquette
near the spot" are made the storming party,
| as obe Of the causes ssschy assaults fail" The
division Of the Ninth Corps, troops imme.
diately on duty and near the spot are made
the aseaulting column-they were OF Inferior
| qualsty-tbey failed Now, whether there bt
| mate as that Of cause and effect, or whether
| there be between them any relation whatsoey
er, left for Individual judi Ement to determine
/ OF one fact there can, unhappily, be no
mistake; the alRdpct Of those troops to
Nhon vas The s.t;io glorious Us. oa.y u 10 o.
| graceful Us it proved disastrous to them
s.lves. No,1Gonsr had the moment Of Mt;
] tack al1iTed44an the fSSAtf"f uIunder ol
s-r,-:syE snch material became apparent
The position to be carried could only be won
by an advance, made at the moment of the
shock Of CONSERVATION caused By the e1.
p}osior, and marked By the utmost ptompti-
| tude, impttEOsity and e}0n. 1t required thRt
the attacki2R column should rush over the
breach, and At the 1a* tle eotfrsf, push on to
| the 1naln rebel line. This Was on the crest
Of tue I'LL, whose commanding Importance
lss been b+fore mentioned. But In plac. OF
this, tie iu-djscjplined division which had
the advance {These were white troops, not
blacks, remember huddled Into the crater
made by the explosion OF tho fort, and be-
| tore even the se1nblance Of attack was
] madc, allowed the enemy ample time
| to recover from his surprise and
| direct all Lis energies to tue
defence. Then followed two or three
| pseudo-asssu made feebly, without ordr1
or enszr-lst, OF any character Of frealty. {Fhese
charges were not made until nearly 0 Il. m,
panic.) The supporting division On the
right indeed carried a; partial outer line,
weakly held, and took a'tew. prisoners; hui
tits is tie one bright spot that lIshts up ar
atf:ir otherwise OF blacknees all compact
| After the rcpuisc OF the colorcd division, al
sent}ance If oTeneise effort ceased; black
! ard whites tumbltd pell- NELL into the hollow
ot the exploded eaIthwotk-a tlauster-p.n
in which shells and bombs, rained from tht
eremy's lines. did fearful havoc. Falling t
advance, It soun proved almost equally dill
cult to rctrest to the line the5 bad formerl,
held. Parties Of tens and tweotles cra~let
and ran back as best they could. It wa
roon, ii aypears, five or eix hours after th
evident tailare of the attack) before the orde,
to retire wes given; but 1t WAS then too late
The consequence Was that the majority seen
to have been taken prisoners; how mauy nj
returns Jet specify. The total loss Of til.
/ rebels is counted at about Thousand.
?