Civilian & telegraph. [volume] (Cumberland, Md.) 1859-1875, 1864-08-04


whence, by steamboat and railroad. he
could return to his post at Martinsburg
and the mouth of the Shenandoah Valley.
Second The only artillery lost by
General Hunter consisted of Elk pieces
out of thirty-eight, which six pieces we
had to destroy ourselves. Gen. A. N.
Duflie was in command of our cavalry
advance on our return from Lynchburg
and had orders to strongly picket all side
roads and bridlc-paths leading in upon
the main line of march. This duty he
in one instance neglected. and the result
was that the enemy, who could see all
our movements from the surrounding
hills, suddenly sent in picked force Of
about two hundred mounted men. upon
an unguarded side-road, to attack our
artillery. Of these mounted men about
sixty carried hatchets with which they
hacked the wheels of about ten pieces Of
the artillery train of our First Division.
While they were at work, however, a
section of Captain Du Points regular bat
terry wheeled into position, and sent grape
ond spherical case through the bodies OF
over thirty of them.
"Col. Schoonmaker's brigade of Gen
Averill's division also arrived quickly on
the scene, and of the two hundred picked
men who formed the attacking force, it is
questionable if over seventy got back to
their camp. -Four of the ten injured
guns were Immediately remounted on the
spare wheels Of the balance Of the artillery
and the six guns which could not be to-
ted along were so effectua!ly destroyed
us to remain mere lumber ON the road,
of no future possible use in warfare. This
was the sole injury inflicted on General
Hunters command by the enemy. They
never captured one of our wagons, either
going up the Shenandoah or returning
down the Kanawha. They never broke
our lines in any engagement, nor ever
captured prisoner, except some wound
ed men in our attacks on their rifie-pits
at Lynchburg; or some sick straglers
who may have fallen to the rear, unable
to keep up with our march.
Third. Our return by way of the
Kanawha was Gas before shown) with the
expectation of receiving supplies at Mea-
dow's Bluff This expectation was dis
appointed by the inexperience of the men
of the one hundred-day Ohio State mill
tia, and the incompetency, not to use a
harshcr term, of the commanding Off
GERS of that organization. Thus CON-
PEELED to march on to Loup Creek for
supplies, our shortest and quickest route
back to the mouth Of the Shenandoah
Valley lay BY steamboat down the Kama
wha and up the Ohio to Parkersburg, and
from thence by rail to Harpcr's Ferry -
1t was at Parkcrsburg, moreover, that we
first heard of the invasion of Maryland,
and tine fight of General Sigcl from Mar
tinsburg to Maryland Heights, before an
undevelopcd enemy So much for hav-
ing "gonc to roost among the mountains
of Western Virginia"
'IFourth Your statement that Gen.
cral Hunter is not one of Gcn'l Grants
selections. but President Lincoln's is
simply misstatcmcnt. General Hunter
MS field officer for active service, enjoys
the unlimited confidence of Gcnl Grant,
and of Gen'l Halleck also. He was BE-
lected by General Grant to command a
Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and
was at Grants headquarters, comforting
and receiving instructions for that COM
mand, when the news arrived of General
Sigel's defeat at Newmarket. 1t is most
especially by General Grants selection"
that Hunter was selected to retrieve our
disasters in the Shenandoah Valley and
it was not by his own will, nor by Gen'l
Grants that Hunter was obliged to retain
Major-Gencral Sigel in the second posi-
ton of command in the Department of
West Virginia. For that erroneous re-
tention, by whomsoever committed, GER
tainly not by General Hunter, the coun-
try has already paid sufficient price.
Fifth. You ask "Why did not Gen
eral Hunter retreat down the Shenandoah
Valcy?" or words to that effect. The
answer is simplicity itself. We were
short of ammunition, two of our brigades
expending their last cartridge in repelling
the attack made on us at Liberty. We
were utterly out Of provisions, and cx-
pected to find over a million rations at
Meadows Bluff. We were fifteen days
march from our base of supplies down
the Shenandoah, and in the presence of an
enemy our superior in numbers, and con-
stantly receiving reinforcements from
Observation-Disclosures only twelve hours by
rail
1.-The enemy had a railroad east of the
Blue Ridge from Lynchburg to Rockish
Gap. thus fanking us for seventy miles
and enabling him to throw any force he
pleased in our rear. One more general
engagement. even of the slightest mag
nitude, would have left us without a
round of ammunition for gun, howitzer,
musket, carbine or revolver; and it is no.
toriously and obviously impossible to col
lect supplies of food in hostile country
while in the presence of superior en-
my. Tn a word, it is capable of math-
ematical demonstration that an attempt
on General Hunters part to retreat down
the Shenandoah would have resulted, in
evitably, in the humiliation or capture of
his whole command"