Prescott journal. [volume] (Prescott, Wis.) 1861-1871, 1864-10-22

from being able to strengthen our army, you
will rather weaken disheaTten, and democrat
| ize what remains of il. The soldiers witness
| ing with disgust these senseless and ruinous
proceedings, suspicion and distrust would
| creep into the ranks, aud the brave boys
would lose half of their strength by losing
| their confidence and faith.
And then. indeed. the cessation of hos
| tilities" would acquire new aspect. Unable
to keep the field, far from being able to offer
an armstice, you might find yourself obliged
| 10 approach the rebel chief hat in hand to
| beg for one and surely, if he should have
| the contemptuous magnanimity to grant it,
| he would hardly spare your feelings with his
conditions. is that the cessation OF HOSTILE
ties YOU desire? It is certainly the cessation
| Of hostilities the rebels desire. This kind OF
arnistice will at least have one advantage:
it will save YOU the trouble OF discussing
what conditions you will or will not propose.
The rebels will take that trouble off your
hands daughter and applause.) But, seri-
ously and soberly speaking, / deem the oppO-
sition of the Woods and Vallandighams to
the Chicago nominee a most rash and illad-
vised movement; for, if they LET. him only act
| upon the general idiosyncrasies, the common
preiudicies and impulses of the party, he will
as certainly and safely ruin the prospects of
the war as they themselves might have done
with their ingeniously devised cessation of
hostlities, which offers to the rebels that
which they desire, together with the privi-
lege Of refusing that which we desire. The
one is military way of doing it, the other a
civil one the one is strategy" the other
diplomacy and candidly think the differ
ence is not worth quarreling about. At all
events, it would be well for the peace men to
set a good example by keeping peace among
themselves. daughter and applause.)
But will follow the advocates of the Chi
cago peace platform into the farthest recesses
of their argument, which we find, not in their
resolutions, but their papers.
HOW TO STRENGTHEN UNION MEN AT THE SOUTH.
They tell us, that while the rebel govern
meEt is Tor war, the Southern people are for
peace; and that we therefore must appeal
from the rebel government to the Southern
people. Certainly a good idea. But how
carry it out The number of peace men in
the South is undoubtedly large. They may
fairly be divided into two classes first, Sc
cossonists on principle, who are for peace
only because they are tired of the war and
second, Union men OH principle, who are for
peace on the basis OF reunion. These two
classes undoubtedly comprise large number
of people, but probably not strong enough to
control the rebel government; for if they
are strong enough to do so, why do they not
do it? Our Chicago men say we must
strengthen them. Certainly, but how
Why do the sccessionists who are for peace
offer no effective opposition to the rebel gov
eminent? Because, though indeed sick OF
the war, they would like to have separation
along with peace. Then it is evident they
are not yet tired enough of the war. The
remedy is simple. We must carry on the
war with such terrible energy as to make all
rebeldOm tremble and shake. That will
make them so tired of the war, that after a
while they will only be too happy to make
peace at any price. Is not that clear Zap
plause) Now for the Union men in the reb
ell States. There are undoubtedly many o
them all the blacks and a large number o.
whites. Why do they not exercise any de
cisvc influence in rebeldom. Because the
rebel government is too strong for them anG
keeps them down. What is the remedy? Ii
is simple. We must break the strength d
the rebel government by dealing it as heavy
blows as we can strike. That will give thu
Union men air to breathe, and freedom oil
action. Is not this common sense? Zap
plause.)
But how the seccssiOnlstS who are tired oil
the war can be made Unionists by stopping
the war for humanity's sake; or how we Cal
aid the Union men, who cannot stir, because
the rebel government is too strong for them
by giving the same rebel government
chance to become still stronger-that, | suS
pect, it will take the whole logic and elo
auence in Chicago Convention assembled to
make ineligible to an intelligeutspeople
Great laughter and applause.)
THE CHICAGO POLICY SUMMED UP.
The whole wisdom of the intricate peac,
policy of the Chicago party may be fairly
summed up as follows: You are struggling
with highway man who has robbed you Of
your yauables. You are stronger than he
and about to overcome him. Suddenly you
stop, and say: Now, my good fellow, l will
struggle no longer; | see 1t is failure OIL
my part; to struggle longer would be against
Justice, humanity and our common welfare
let YOU go, with view to meet you again,
| and to persuade you to give me back, at the
most practicable moment, what you have
stolen" is not this Bedlam? tremendous
laughter and applause.)
IT'S EFFECT ABROAD.
But now | arrive at feature of this bust
ness which places its true character in still
clearer light. 1t is well known that some OF
the leading powers of Europe, with whom we
are in most immediate contact, affect to be-
lieve ia, because they desire the final dissO-
| IublOu Bi Julb bepuDuC. w HhLcVeT uOLlNcE
| you may assign to this fact-tbe competition
growing from our spirit OF commercial enter
prise, jealousy of our constantly growing
strength, hatred of our republican institutions
call it what you will, the fact is too thinly
disguised to escape recognition. Still l wish
you to understand, in speaking of the tenden-
cies of some of the political and commercial
interests of England and France, it is far from
me to cast slur upon the noble natures of
those countries; for l sincerely believe the
cause of universal liberty in this country has
no truer friends abroad than they are.
| At present, the so-called Confederacy is a
mere association of political bodies engaged
in rebellion against their legitimate Gov
eminent. They are indeed recognized as bel
| ligerents, but not admitted into the family of
| nations as an independent and equal member
Foreign powers, however DESTROYS of making
separation permanent, yet hesitate to enter
into open relations and cooperation with the
Coniederacy first, because our Government
maintains with frmness the justice of our
cause, and its inhexible resolution to bring
back the rebellious States; and secondly, be-
| cause the stigma of slavery rests upon the re-
| bellion, and European governments have some
respect for public opinion in their own coun-
| tries, and for the enlightened Judgment of
mankind. But is it reasonable to suppose
that they will refrain from doing so when