Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-12-01
HOOD AND SHERMAN.


even the position of two powerful armies This is all the
more remarkable the Northern press though hackled,
is still full of energy aud enterprise, and journals
restrained oay by considerations Of discretion and
public policy. But the vast territory over which the
operations of this extend the sparse population of the
Southwest and the eectuay broken lines of communlca
ton explain the perpleIing obscurity in which the
oeuvres of Hood and Sherman shrouded.
We know Ia midst, toierably we'll what tie nten
tons Of Generals Brave and bold In execution,
experienced and guided BY the master OF Beaursgd
in his general plans bis westward move may puzzle u.s. but
any apprehension What he has so success
fully concealed from his willy adversary we shall OF course
not make known through columns, especially as
thing but change in the weather. with the hoped for i'm
provement in the roads, is wanting TO develop his plane
and, we trust, bring them to a happy issue.
1t is different with Shermans purpose In marching out
of Atlanta which to be unknown to the North and
ia probably in its general outlines alone dictated by Grant
and the powers above bin. Its general character how
ever is not difficult to guess from military point OF view,
for after ALL s not game OF contingencies but
science and such subjected to fixed rules, which
good General will violate he knows but TOO Well how
surely the penalty follows the neglect of certain first pn.
cipes Thus it ia evident enough that Sherman has tried
for the last menhs and tried under most aggravatDg diff
culties to hold by the railroad, which forms his main line
of communication with his base at Nashville.
doing this he had to contend with the dashng attacks
of Forrest the steady pressure of Hood and the hostility
of the inhabitants all around him his own army was
hsusted by ncessant marches and conference.-the dec
mated by continued fighting and wasting disease and
finally reduced to onehaf by the political exgences of The
Presidential election Still he has held tothe last entrem
ity without resumng the offensive at any point but
waiting patiently to take advantage Of errors which
the young, jealous General his flank might commit in
his operations immense circumference around it, He
has either been disappointed in this expectation he has
been unable from want of of skill to take advan-
tage of them.
This only he has gained and it no small gain to him.
with his plans for the winter that Hood is far of to the
West only feeby threatening HE and his flank and with
the hostile army under Thomas between him and Atlanta
1t may be that this ia the position which Sherman had in
view when no boosted that he would have Hood where
he wanted him. II is certain that his pursuit has been
but series of ents and that the door to West Tennes
purposs left open to allure the eager looks of
| gallant men in that direction.
In the time Sherman has found out what long ago
predicted on side that Atlanta could longer be con-
sdered tho pivot Of army which unable to find sub
sstence in that exhausted country 1t be made
strong place, because it is so commanded by surround
ing heights it could easily have been taken during the
three days when troops before it if they had
been in stronger force. Besides to make it valuable
point dapPui would require to be restored with sm.
muution and provisions which is impossible to in.
trOduce Nor could be any longer considered great
depot for the railroad being destroyed seriously threat
ened with constant attacks became yaueles SUCH
Having therefore, recruited and reoganz his army and
having drawn ample supplies fram his base Of operations,
well as from the scsnty remnants Of the country around
him. he resumes his march southwark What may be the
ultimate end OF this hazardous but brilliant enterprise TO-
of course, not known to the public it is most likely
think, not finally determined upon BY Sherman himself
This much only is certain, that he will try to possess
himself first OF Macon. Success In this would
bring him two valuable advantages, besides the
prestige of occupying the town and destroying whatever
may be valuable there to Government He could thus
obtain command of the railroads which lead from Macon
eastward to Augusta and the seat of Government and
westward to the Mississippi thus eectualy destroying
communications with the Trans Mississippi Depart
ment. He would, moreover, cut of Hood and his army
from his base Of operations his supplies and his of
comforting with the seat OF Government In these aspects
the move formidable one, and it is to shut
eyes wuy to the danger far better to look it the face
and prepare for resistance with vgor and Dispatch 1t 10
effect Of such minds Of the people
of Georgia. In this assured he will be bitterly
disappointed and discover how far he has been mi
led by wemeant but incauious expressions OF certain
| high officials.
We may equally sure that as soon as shermans true
intentions become sufficiently known to prepare for
ter movements Georgia will rise, from the Governor to
the humbles citizen, in seldefence aud manly resistance
She will show the same incompatible energy and vgor
with which the people of Virginia have risen in the
concord which here prevails between the authorities
and the people, and the dsnterestednes with which
separate interests have been sacrificed the great
and sacred purpose. Sherman may do great harm. He
emulate the destruction Of Sheridan in Valley he
initiate Napoleons nhuman order to carry of all the
CATTLE to burn the woods and destroy the fruit trees for
| such is and it's horrors
Georgia will have to taste the bitter that has long
been at our lips Her country be rsvaged her fields
may be wasted the tears of the fatheess and the widow
in her midst may mourn coldblooded but
her revenge is at hand and the opportunity to show her
loyalty her gaantry aud all her highest virtues at hand
for Sherman will place himself the most perous posi-
ton that can we'll be conceived he tries to strain the
system OF pushing forward and making sustain to
the utmost He has cut himself off IrretrieVaby from his
line Of communications; very few weeks warfare
exhaust all his and the very magnitude of his
forces will parayzs them from the failure Of the munments
OF war. The farther his army, movable column Of
sual size removes from bis base the greater the difficulty
OF support, if supplies still in the country.
The necessity Of providing for their wants. it is
well known, from military experience, inevitably fatal
to military discipline and subordnatoD leads TO lndi
vidua pags s11 that 70 and demoraiza
ton The simplest arms put into the hands Of reserves
militia and boys will enable the people of Georgia to
cut of the enenys oragng partics TO intercept his
municaons with the different parts Of the column to ha
him the flank and in the and thus to do him
more injury than he would sustan in pitched battle.
The situation resembles 10 its military features strikngy
that Of Napoleon and the allies before the battle Of Lepc
Each army had passed the other and lying in great
strength upon the enemys communications, dIsregardng
their own. Butcher and Bernadotte between Napo
leon and the Rhine Napoleon between the Prusssns
and the Elbe Both thought that by threatening their ad
versary's communications they could draw him back
reduce him TO the defensive and both acted this prnc
pie Napoleon hoped 10 reach Berlin leaving the allies
behind him. Sherman hopes TO reach Macon and enter
ans the project Of carrying the into the very heart
Of the Cotton Staes and establishing his winter quarters
in the hitherto untouched fields of the South If Georgia
be but true to herself the resemblance will not end here
We trust be will yet have to say Napoleon did after the
battle Of Ulm Well this is High in the morning,
low enough at night. From triumph to fall ia often but
| step"
THE CONDITION OF SLAVERY IN KENTUCKY:
The Louisville Journal shows that the labor system of