The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-07-19
rmE CAIL ron Monr MrN

would be compelled by the necessities Of the
war 10 call for several hundred thousand more
men, and our prophecy is already fulfilled.
| The proclamation demands half q million Of
fresh troops, to be raised by volunteering
before the fth fnext September, and if not,
then to be drafted. There Is time enough for
each State, each county, each township, and
each Ward and Precinct, to raise It's quota
by volunteer enlistments before the period
named, provided the right method, means.
and energies are employed in the work. And
1t is surely most desirable that the men who
are to go into the field under this last call
should 90 as volunteers rather than as con-
scripts. Any person who is forced into mill
tary service against not only his will but his
tastes and conscience, never makes a valuable
recruit himself, while he is apt to injure some
better soldier whom his contact contaminates
and demoralizes.
But, besides the superiority of volunteers
over drafted men in fghdng qualities, and
the like, it is much more creditable TO a COM
munlty to furnish the Government freely with
all its share of the soldiers successfully called
for in the public defense, than to hang back
in sullen or reasonable indifference and su-
pineness until the War Department is literally
compelled TO take its citizens by lottery. and
actually drag or drive them into the ranks of
the army. This good old Keystone State has,
fortunately for her reputation in history, thus
far answered almost every call Of the PresI-
dent with volunteers, and there is no reason in
the world why her proportion under this
| lata Of y.l,a
be entirely supplied by free recruiting before
the fifth of September next, Immediately after
which date the order for draft will be exc
cuted.
1t is to be regretted, however, that t1e tcR1re asts
of Congress left il discretionary with the
ss.Se.s55S'sjiiYe 10 accept men for one or three
years. The shortest term of service should
be for three years or the war, and the Presi-
dent should have resolved, in view of his
authority to do so, to make no draft and to
accept of no volunteers for less period than
the one we have named. The Government
and the country have already experienced the
sad inconvenience of a transitory and fluc-
tuatlng army, which disappears about the
time that it becomes thoroughly disciplined,
well seasoned, and qualified for its work, and
requires to be either supplemented or entirely
replaced by an equal or greater number Of
raw recruits. The serious disadvantage of
this system was painfully experienced by
WASHINGTON, during our Revolutionary
War, and the severe manner in which he de-
nounced it in the following extract from let-
ter addressed by him to Congress about that
time, ought to constrain the Administration
TO avoid short-lived armies WASHINGTON
said:-
"To one who has been witness to the evils
I" brought uDon us by short enlistments, the sys.
4" tenn appears to have been pernicious beyond
description, aud a crowd of motives pre- ie t
{" thems elves 10 dictate change. Itmay easily
" be shown that all the misfOrtunes we have met
" with in the military line are 10 be attributed
" to this cause. Had we formed a permanent
amy in the beginning, which, by the cont nu-
ancel of the same men in service, had been
capable of discipline, we never shoald have
bad to retreat with handful OF men across
" The Delaware, in l776, trembling for the fate of
" America, which nothing but the infatuation of
} " the enemy could have saved; we sh )uld NJ /
" have remained all the succeeding winter at
their mercy, with sometimes scarcely a sutii-
4" cientbOdy OF men to mount the ordinary guards,
| " liable at every moment to be disspated, If
, " they had only thought proper to march against
" us We should not have been under the neceg-
j. " sity of fighting at Brandywine with an unequal
o Philadelphia fall Il prey to victorious army
i we should not have been at Valley Forge with
q " less than half of the force of the enemy, dest
" tute of everything, in stu tiOn neither Ia
d &" resist nor to retire; we should not have seen
d - New York left with a handful of men, yet ar
" OvermatCh for the main army of these States
! while the principal part of their force was d.
: tached for the reduction Of two OF them. WI
/, should not have found ourselves this spriug SC
'' weak as to be insulted by five thousand men
unable to protect our baggage and magazi es
- their security depending on good cOuntenanCt
4" and want Of enterprise in the enemy. ",
should not have been, the greatest part OF tn,
u "war, inferior TO the enemy, indebted for Ju
If safety TO their inactivity, enduring frequently
the modification OF seeing inviting Oppurtuni
3 " ties to ruin them pass unmprOYed, for want D
e q force which the country was completely abl(
a g 20 afford 10 see the country rayaged, our town
e burned, the inhat itants plundered. abused
e murdered with mpunty from the same cause
. " There is every reason 70 believe that the wa
has been Irotrlcted on this account. Oar op
= position being less, made the successes OF tn
n enemy greater The huct, alton of the ARM
, kept alive their hopes; and az every pcro o
&" dissolution OF a considerable part Of IL the
J. have fa'tcTed themselves with some decsiy
d advantages. Had w kept "A permlnen arm!
on foot, tue enemy could have had nothing q
hope for, and would Ia all probability have lis
Il " 4, ned 10 terms long since. Ii the army is let
" in its present situation, IL must continue a
" encouragement to the otturls OF the enemy;
II il is put ia respectable one, il musi have
If contrary ell, ct; and nOhng believe will tea
u " Tsorc 10 give us peace the ensuing winter
10 Many circumstances will contribute % nc
Il " gOiiaTiOn. An army on tOOt. not only for anl
- " ther Campeigu, bur for several campaign,
- would dc'crminc the enemy to plCiHc mel
suTes, aud cnab us 10 insist upon tdvOrtOl
A terms ia torche language. An army iu7'g
d" ncant in numbers dissatisfied, crumbling
= pieces, would be the strongest temptation the
b could have TO try the experiments little lJngc
d, " It is an old maxim that the surest way to max
= good peace is TO be well prepared for war;
These reflections of WASHINGTON are a
y applicable now as when they were first el
u pressed. The present war is not likely to
ie a short one, and all preparations and pr
~ visions for it that are based on the idea thu
II it win end this year or next, must fall shol
" of the probable exigencies of the Governmen
re HEALTH OF THE ARMY.