The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-07-13
THE REBEL INVASION As AFFECTING
TIIE MILITARY SITUATION.


What is the real military importance of
this Rebel movement North' Does it mate
rally change the military situation, which
was previously regards to be very fIvorablel
These questions are important; for the Cop
perheads are doing their best to make the in.
vasion means Of disheartening aad disgust
ing the people aith the war. They always
use every unpleasant turn of aifiirs to make it
appear that the Rebellion cannot be overcome.
Some of them, in view of the interests of
their parry, avoid making this argument in set
terms, but they, none the less, take gIJd care to
shape their language t. produce thig impreSsiJ
There are many faiut hearted, yet weil-mealing
men, who have no trOaIer Eti.n IN tue dai Issue
than what passing events supply. rhe OppJneufs
OF he Government seze every opportunity to
play upon the fears of these people, IN one way
or anoiher, and Of en- with consids, abe effect as
the ballO,- ,-bOX shows.
Tbs Rebel movement was not expected, and
no particular preparation vas made to guard
against it II l. represented 70 be all tho more
unfortunate on tat account. In fact II Is
strong indication that there is no serious danger
In ii. Lie ieutenaut-Gensril Grdlt, from tho COM
menCement of his present campaign, has nal The
entire disposal of all the nauolal forces lis
military Judgment all admit, Is excellent. It
Is fair to presume that, after Gro ;slay tho
James he would not have lett the Upper Poto-
mae comparatively nudefcn!ef II anything
serious v as 10 be appreLended Ivy amovemeut OF
the enemy scross it. The route nor;h ward f.on
the enemy pJsltiOn was notorious enough, Tor
they have triyersed it again a0d again. Their
ability 10 put troops ON that rOu'e was pain
enough. Gen raj Grants omission u has up the
ruule by fortihCatious aud heavy detachments
wculd have been he most enormous OF military
blundeIs, could the enemy gain auy decisive ad-
vaDBge by 1t. IL might be safely assumed that
he Is Incapable OF any such bunder.
,.. This antecedeut presumption Is every way
bone out by the result thus far realized. Tle
Rebs Is who nave crossed the Potomac have gained
: no military advantage. They have no. even VEN
Atured TO asssil any important military point.
\ They have hidden pre,ty mucn at rluduGi through
(\Mary land, pluDdcICd 4 few houses, torn up few
q rails, burned a bridge or two, ana stirred up a
gOOd deal Ot harmess dust. rnGy have made one
siitl little fight but have nothing t. show for IL.
The ten Gays during which lhey have been
operating have yiel-ed them nothing OF any men
tiODable value.
We soy nothing OF their picking up Major
General Franklin. II they have acco npl'shed
no mOrt when we h ID bIL mere han iful Of
troops 10 interfere VII them, l. may wo he be-
ievtd that they can do NJ hing IN the days TO
, come. Troops veterans, as we'll as militia
aIe now poariRg in upon them from all qulrcrs.
They must soon retreat or be hcmmcd ii. EYen
now it is very doubtful whether they can re-
turn TO their lines IN Virginia without great
Losses, DO b OF men and material. lt +, indeed,
po's bic lbat they may be pturod en- BidsSe.
The plunder they will carry with them, If they
return without uny tuTther harm, must De very
limited, for lhey have no transportation tr tins Of
bnov,ineLt, which the COpperheads have treated
as If II wtre disAstrUus turn TO the summers
can pnigu, now appears TO have no ma crll bear
ing Whatever upon lhe military situation.
TtHt si.nItiuu, it should he kept in MUD, Is
full OF promte. All rc0souabo hopes arc fast
being cou- nmma'ed. Shrrm N has overcome all
the tremendous oh taco, Ih,t lny Ia his pa'h III
. Atlanta, and il now virtually the master of that
hey 10 the whole Southwest. Grant has effected
q lCdPment IN the rear of Richmond, which SUI.
stantially gives him the command Of com munic a.
tionb that are Indispensable 10 tue Rebel capital
and from which IL Is Impossible for Lee 10 dis,
place IN. General Grant, whose indispostioI
10 boast is II, well understood as his ability II
perform, does hnt hesitate to declare MS absO.utt
coDddcnce that, with his present foothOld, he eau
compel the abandonmgnt OF kicdm Jud at no dis
tart day.
Even during the very Investment of Vicksburg
he was never Detttr assured in his own mind O
tie ultimate result, than he nov is Of tine early
feil of the Rebel capital. What his particular
mode of operations Is going % be, how much hC
tinSts 10 hard hghug, and how much TO The
th cts OF his stili, hErn gr;pe We do not profess
70 know, nor Is IL necessary TO know, in order 10
participate In bis confidence. The general ad
vantaees OF his position apparent to every
body. The character OF his army insures that b,
has the means, his owu character insures that h
has the ability, 10 turn those advantages to Ia,
best account. The people, therefore, even with
out a knowledge OF his particular plans, car
justly anticipate with confidence what he regards
MS a Certainty. ..
Ietno true man heed the outcries Of the Copper
. heads concerning the terrible aspects Of this Sin
Vation." They are merely tt 10 frigbten chLdrel
Those WHO care to learn the real progress anC
prospects Of the war should look only ~ the ope
rati0ns against Richmond and Atlanta. Thes
q. alone will tell the story.
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