Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-12-07
From the Cincinnati Commercial.
The situation In Tenneaaee,

That Hoods army forms a line of battle
within two miles of Nashville, fs not very
pleasant reading, but If the facts are calm
ly and intelligently considered, there will
be no imminent peril discovered in the sit-
uation. There was great danger few days
ago. That portion of our army on the re-.
treat from Pulaski to Nashville, WAS in a
most critical condition, and would have
been annihilated if the general manage
ment had not been, on our side, that of
alert and capable officers, and on the side
of the rebels that of sloVenIy confidence.
The safety of the 4lh and 23d Corps, with
the gsrrisons from Pulaski to Nashville,
and all the property, is in itself cause for
congratulatton. And in addition, the
bloody check given Hood at Franklin has
materially weakened him. Then we have
concentrated our forces at Nashville in
good order and good Morale.
The explanation oi the policy pursued
by Gen. Thomas is his Temporary interiors
ty in cavalry. Hoods cavalry, under For
rest, is nearly fifteen thousand strong, and,
as our cavalry is not 80 strong, the enemy
can, for the time, sweep the country.
General Sherman took with him most of
the well.mounted men in his department.
OF course it would be improper to speak
of this il the fact were net as well known
|: the rebels as to ourselves, An Addi-
Nal fact may be mentioned that ia of
sO moment. There has not been as en-
and efficient work ct Louisville in
p1S'S oJ eoSS dismounted cavalry with horses
S sasso1 to 1ents, as General Sherman had
-shsIs ms nave IL ss1Ssu of the advantage of the
ssrictIvl % In a yees temporary. 1t is SO
force viii be made bor1 lime our mounted
A snemy; and then, If 66stsstote, HouSSt the
place himself south of thS Tenuesse FQst
If he can
The rebels cannot take Nash lille by as
sauIt. and they have not siege Ealn, Q
Aunnnunition TO besiege II They will not
able 70 cut of communications with tbs
place; and, therefore, they cannot starv
US into an evacuation. Evidences haN
appeared of an intention of Hood to croE
the Cumberland and move into KeE
3 lucky, but as long as the river remain
q at its present stage he will find the en
: terprise of crossing 1t one attended wit
D tRreat difficulties. The river is Pstrole
: both above aud below Nashville, by 81
9 boats that would soon run down poutoC
d bridge. Il is not likely Hood can Cross Il
9 river unless he makes the attempt as hig
Q up as Carthage, and there he would hA'
j, q rough and lean country TO drag his arm
1
b through.
r whether Hood can supply himself
! Middle Tennessee with provisions and 81
70 munition, is q question of the greatest il
If portauce. We hold firmly the railroad
/. Chattanooga, so that nothing for the rel
= army can come from that direction. I
10 neafest point oERebel railway to Hood
Florenoe, Alabama; and it is known Il
t, he sent back his supply train to that poi
IS the other day, especially, It was thouE
fe TO bring up ammunition. The rspid
K with which ammunition Is consumed
=. action, may be judged from the fact Il
3, In the hgdt at Franklin the other day,
re expended one hundred wagon loads.
sh While Hood might bring up from FL
os euce, 9 sufieieney Of ammunition, his ira
i'd portatiun is not adequate 70 the task
Oh hauling provisions from that point to
. neighborhood Of Nashville. There