The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-11-11
the invasion. The raid has been more re-
markable for the damage done the people,

Hhok kdOao lOI Cuo udIn8So uOu0 Ull0 poOpl0,
than any gain made by the rebels Ihave
been in the wake Of tho Deliverers,"
and do not recollect of an instance where
private property was protected. Age and
sex we're not regarded a. reasons for Sc
curity from mOlestation have visited
every town which they occupied; each
one had its tale Of horrors Women raw
ished, negroes murdered torn from
their homes and forced to join hateful
cause. In hundred cases, boys of four
teen were oOnscripted. The industry and
trade of Missouri has been interrupted.
The State has lost numerous and valuable
lives, and millions of money. The people
and the army are asking, WHY SIT?
THR CAMPAIGN.
A great deal of complaint has been
heard because the force of General Smith
were retained at Jefferson Barracks when
it was known that Price was in Southeast
Missouri. The people who thus grumble,
assert that the battle with price should
have been fought at or about Potosi. On
the other hand, many military critics
maintain that St Louis was in danger, and
that Smiths army was required for its de-
tense. The great cause of surprise is that
OPPORTUNITY FIRST.
Lexington was evacuated by Gen. Blunt
withcuta fight, when he had as many men
and more artillery than Mulligan when
that departed hero defended the city against
double the force now under Prices COM
mand. Genl Pleasantons cavalry was
within a days march of the city, and
Blunt could surely have held the place
until the cavalry came up, but no such
attempt was made, and there we lost
golden opportunity to corner Price. Cur
It's was then ON the west of Lexington,
and as wrote you from Sedelia, unless
some gross Encouragement was exercised
the rebels humiliation was inevitable.
Price entered the city Immediately after
Blunt's evacuation, and remained there
there thirty-six hours.
OPPORTUNITY sRCOND.
During all this time the advance of our
cavalry was within cannon shot of the re.
bel pockets, but no attempt was made to
hold them. Had our cavalry and Curtis
and Blunt advanced from the west and
engaged them, Smith, who was then within
a days forced march of Lexington, would
have been up in time to have supported
the attack. Curtis and Blunt were on the
west, the cavalry and Smith surrounded
all the other approaches to the town, es-
cape was impossible, as our combined
forces exceeded twenty-five thousand men
and forty guns. Why did not Curtis and
our cavalry attack Price simultaneously
This opportunity, too, escaped us, and
Price moved towards Independence.
OPPORTUNITY THIRD.
Price, on his retreat to independence,
was followed by the cavalry, and Smith
was ordered to Pleasant Hill The wis.,
dom Of this move was obvious; it threw
large force south of Price, and it was
immaterial whether the rebels moved east
or west, because Smith by moving in di-
rection parallel to the rebels march would
always be in his rear. 1t was most proba-
bic that Price would retreat south from In
dependence, either by way Of Kansas or
this State. In the event of the adoption
of either route, Smith was Immediately in
the direction of the road he would be
forced to march southwark. If on Sunday
night the infantry had been ordered to
miles to Prices front, instead of marching
forty-six miles to Prices rear, an attack
on his front by Smith could have been
made at ten O'Clock that night, whilst our
cavalry fell upon his rear. But this OPP
portuuity was lost, and Monday morning
found Price twenty miles south Of the cav
airy and Smith eight miles below Inde-
pendence The last opportunity to punish
the invader was lost
WHO IS AND WHO IS NOT TO BLAME.
Gen. Blunt, his advisers and council
lors, are responsible for the evacuation of
Lexington. 1t is stated upon good author
ity that the cavalry were not restricted in
their operations before Lexington by any
orders. Their only order was to find and
harrass the enemy. Why in those thirty
six hours concert Of action between the
cavalry and Curtis was not arranged and
an attack made is inexplicable. The dis
lance between the two forces was slight,
whilst there were no communications with
Gen. Rosscrans. The responsibility for
failing to profit by the second opportunity
lies between Curtis and the cavalry. Both
Rosecrans' and Smiths army hurried up to
what was hoped would be the scene OF &C
ton, and arrived to find that the cavalry
had only entered the town few hours
previously. know it to be true, as do
distinguished officers of the army and State
officials, that Gen. Smith gladly acceded
to Smiths proposition that he should keep
on his march southwark from Chapel Hill,
in order to "head off " the enemy. Why
then, it may be asked, YVES the infantry
ordered North? That order was given
because OF representations made from the
front that Price intended to make stand,
and because an urgent request was made
that Smith be sent where Gen. Rosecrans
had ordered him. Ali l can say is, that
neither the departmental commander or
Gen. Smith are to blame for the failure of
the third opportunity.
The enemy have invaded the State, and
remained in our borders for thirty days.
They have plundered our towns, ravaged
our country, robbed, killed and carried off
as prisoners our citizens; they have Grip
pied commerce, interrupted trade, drawn
to this department troops from places
where they were more needed-all this
has been done, and the enemy, loaded