The daily register. [volume] (Wheeling, W. Va.) 1863-1864, 1864-12-01

DnpIDss L1erTEns.
ESrss1 rHscaY ~ sDsss1Ax's rAnsAieArl
roserp xsAc1ArliS ~ k1L1 49,
MACON VA 4or, SAr1gAEn-1n lotgf
b THAT WILL. oPfosx SHQeeetSWAtfl
sREcKrNHIDaR ~ -aA11gt1oa{tr
NEWS FROM EAaLYr xaHkf-aSGsSo1cE-
xEsrs SENT TO LEE, &ey h "a
-BA Lff,foax, Nov. H.
STARTLING REssL THEORY ABOUT sHIR.
Il n ssposted hsee to-day TIT the Cd.
yancsd guard Of General Shsrmsn's army
he'd reached Macon, but that tho place ws
found 70 be strongiy forti6s4 and well de-
tended. A reconnoissancs Of the works
was made, il b sAid, alter which General
Shsrman's army left that place on his
right, and continued bic march toward Au-'
eusta. This rumor u most important; for
Il It should prove 70 b asaef it viii give an
air Of probability 70 what l now undsr>
stand to be the confederate view OF Sher'
mans campaign - whole. This will pc
startling to northern readers, who haHe
been accustomed to regard General Sher-
man a the ablest general 10, the eervice,
and who have accustomed themselves TO
regard his present march q one which must
certainly ind in great victory. The truth
il the truth, however, even if We learn II
from our enemies. And no rejecting mind
can fail to perceive that Sherman's cam
paign m ust have formed part Of the gems
eral plan of the campaign Of 1864; that it
must have held certain relation to Grants
campaign against Richmond; and that, a.
the latter has resulted In 20 complete and
acknowledged failure, It 10 not to be ex
pected that the plans laid eat for Sherman
could be otherwise than seriously dissr-
ranged. ,r
CONSEQUENCES or GRANTS FAILURE TO TAKE
RICHMOND. 5".
It is said, therefore, that the confederate
leaders regard the present movement of
General Sherman - one which he was
forced to make, in consequence OF the
movements which Mey made Subsequent to
the fall of Atlanta. It 10 no secret now,
that If Grants campaign against Richmond
had come to . successful termination BY the
first of September, - it was reasonable to-
suppose that it would, We would have had
fifty thousand troops to send to Sherman
by the 18th of that month, who would have
esrrisoned Atlanta and kept open Sher-
mans communications for him while he
went on with his whole army, seventy five
thousand strong in one body, and .tiniahed
and secured tie capture Of Georgia. u That
would have been an appropriate continue
ton of his great campaign from Chattanooga
to Atlanta. Our inability to do this forced
upon Sherman the alternative which be has
adopted. ...T -2t .' 1sof'' -
The ooNFEDKRATr REGARD sHElMAN As
RETREATINe TO THE ga. 1t,
These facts were plainly evident to the
confederate leaders. Of course they drew
their own differences from them. They
may be mistaken. But they arc impressed
with the conviction that the. operations of
Beauregard and Hood in Shermxn's rear,
during the month Of October, forced Sher>
man to abandon Atlanta, bscasse they made
Atlanta untonable Is . base for him, and
forced him to seek to cqange his base. They
regard him, virtually, - rstfeasing, by the
only route open TOR his retreat. 20
YET rarY DREAD THE coNsEoUEMcrs or A
SUCCESSFUL CHANGE OF HIS BASE:
with this limitation, however, that If he
succeeds in rsaohing Savannah with his
army in an effective condition, he will have
succeeded in making his movement sue.
csssful change of base, and will be ready TO-
resume his campsign against the State OF
Georgia from much more favorable base
than he had at Atlanta. The more closely
this view 10 examined the more reasonable
and forcible IL will be- seen to be; snd it is
confirmed, indeed, in q remarkable degree
by the very terms of General Sbermaa's
order to his troops, to which the World al
lude ed editorially on the 18th instant. :.
CONCENTRATIONS OF TROOPS TO oPPosE SHEER
MANS MARCH. .,.1
Holding these views, there 10 but one
thing for the confederate leaders to do, and
there is abundant evidence TO show that
they are doing that most vigorously; and
that is, to concentrate troops at Macon or
Augusta sufficient to owerwhelm and de-
feat Shsrman's army before be reaches Sc
vannah. There is nothing TO prove & Gen
eral Beauregard from being 1t Macon BY |
the time Sherman's army reaches that
place, with at least twenty FIVE thousand
Of Hoods army, and that would still leave !
twenty thousand with Hood. My infor>l
nation is to the effect that General Leo
had already sent fifteen or twenty thousand |
troops from Richmond. At least ten thou
sand, and perhaps fifteen thousand, could
DO sent from Charleston. and Savannah; |
and five thousand from Florida. There |
was already body of ton thousand Geor>
gia militia assembled at Macon, and GER
tainly 10000 more can be raised in Gsor-
gis and South Carolina. Here, then, 10 oil
body of from IS, 900 to IS 900 regular troops,
and 10000 militia, making $4,000 men in
all, whom Sherman will find to confront
him between Macon and the ssa. Is the
number too large? Cut it down; say there |
will only be 10000 good troops, and Il, 900
militia; and there are still $1,000 men.
These, fighting behind their works-aght