New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1864-05-25

on Lee as necessity, there can be no doubt
that he resolved on it with extreme roluctacceI'
Vicinity 20 the railroad will scarcely counter.
balance the influence Of another rctrogradc
movement on the spirits of his troops. The
bulletin, of victory which he has issued-bul-
lctins which he knew to be false in almost every
particular-can never have been sufficient to
etrlce the impression produced by defensive tao
ties and by the irrcsistibly southwark DRIFT of
the campaign. Whether he retreats now to be
nearer his supplies, or whether from the stress
Of Grants maneuverS he equally dscourageS
his army His soldiers will reflect that they
are twelve miles nearer Richmond-that so
much ground has been surrendered without
contest, and that if position so iinpTegnable
rs SpottSylyania has proved helpless against the
lanking columns of Grant, the North Anna line
may prove equally so; in word, that the
fruits Of their bullctincd victories are gathered
BY The enemy. They will see before them,
moreover. the near choice 10 be c0mpuDrly
made between abandoning their capital and
ablndpnng the Virginia Centrs, OH which they
depend for food; and in such circumstances
ihsy cannot escape the inrolds Of dcmoral.zl-
ton, nor put wholly aside the suggestions Of
despair.
NJ doubt the North Anna--or whatever
position Lee next Ch00Ses-will he defended
with something of the rbStinacy WHICH chung to-
Spottsylyania. But when il becomes necessary
20 decide between the two lines of retreat which
lie in ia rear, Lee will now probably choose TO
fall back on Richmond and not on Gcr,lonsyilc
Circumstances Souih of Richmond have greatly
changed within ten days, and the change prob
abs revcrses the course Of the campaign TO the
nor,hward Of the capital. While Butler lay
between Petersburg and Richmond and while
tho Danyillc road was supposed t. be at his
mercy Richmond could be expected to-
retain no railway connection with the
rest Of the Conicderacy except tyl
he Virginia Central, and wa, incapable Of sus.
tanning q siege. Bur now that Butler is shut mp
IN his intrcnchmcnts on the James, having
failed either to hold or destroy the Petersburg
road. and failed also 20 do any permanent n
Jury to the Danyillc road, Lee may goto Rich
mond If he chooses with the certainty both OF
feeding his army " bile he holds il. aud of fall
ing securely back when IFS surrender becomes
inevitable. He will moreover continue in com
mun.cl;ion with Gonon,ville and Charot'es-
Vile By way Of I.ynchburg aud BuIke,vile,
even when be abandons the Virginia Central.
We can afford TO admit that the failure to iso-
late Richmond, and with it Lees army, Is prob
ably al important interruption to Gen. Grm''s
plans. and will delay their execution. In al
broader view, the delay is of little moment
Gen. Sl~rman's operations are 10 be- taken into
account. and in connection with them the de-
struc'ion--which IA, apparently been thorough
of the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad, wo
of Chri,tian,bure by Gen. CrooA. just " D.
cutting Of the roads about Richmond tempo
rar.ly disturb, Lees supplc~, the rznrr OF A.
lanta by Sherman sud hi. control oftin country
will exhaust and destroy the great storehou-c
of provisions which j, Indispensable 20 The mill
tary strength of the Rebellion. II Grant were
10 do nothing more than hoil a1d hara-s Ice
bg such pressure and nce.sant contests ~ hiih-
crto. the end of the summer would md the
Rebels worn ont without decisive victory or d
defeat I'm a word. success either East or Wr,i
on Our side insure, the success al the VINO