The Lansing state Republican. [volume] (Lansing, Mich.) 1855-1874, 1864-07-20

the Mississippi by Gen. Grant placed him
az our mercy, and that the only thing TO
fear was, that he would take the alarm and
escape TO his gunbOats before we could
make the attack. Twenty-fOur hours later,
our broken columns were hurrying along the
same road in retreat, and the lady VINO had |
believed the General could not save even |
her wearing apparel. That General was not /
named PembertOn.
Instance after instance or this KIND nave 4
We had during the war, and yet grave pa |
ners with able editors, talk of the certainty !
that sherman can never take his army back
10 Chattanooga, and congratulate the cOun- |
try that he has marched into trap. We
once had some experience with an old rat
that always sprung the steel trap from the
tfy.eleY side and always took OIL the bate, /
and never got caught. The Yankees have
a peculiar faculty OF marching into traps
and staying there. Our only commentary
upon such writing is, that such traps as
half a State. and the best half at that, are
so expensive as to perhaps awaken smiles
in the North and in Europe, when We boast
Of them.
In like manner do We talk about Grant,
and amuse ourselves over a set OF facts that
are far from amusing.
We are perfectly satisfied that the COM
mander OF the armies Of the United States
might have reached the result he now aims
for with but small portion of the loss he
has now sustained; and that, too, with all
the allowance for the peculiar Confederate
arithmetic which kills Yankees so rapidly
on paper!
Lieut.. Gen. Grant was greatly mistaken
in his idea that having turned the flank OF
Gen. Lee in crossing the Rapidan, there
would simply be tOot-race for Richmond.
But two things have since been demOnstra-
ted and both are serious. First that the
army of the Union is so large and powerful
that the usual military axiom, 4" thanking
is more dangerous TO the tanker than the
fanked," does not apply. The strategy OF
Grant, which CONSISTS In supply Withdrawing
one wing at q time behind the impregnable
masses Of the center and other wing,
would be fraught with peril were that cen
ter and remaining wing contracted enough
TO be enveloped, or weak enough 10 be bro
ken, but is perfectly safe as il is. There
fore he is at liberty to play tricks in plain
sight and without peril, simply because he
is too blg TO catch! Consequently, in the
succession of tricks, even by one of the
only moderate ability Of Grant, there is
danger that one not seen or folled at ex-
actly the right time may catch Us. Such a
for Lee also is too big 10 hold but il might
do Us harm.
The second danger is the siege of Rich
mOnd Some OF our cOtempOraries, and
the most Of correspondents laugh at this
and yet General Grant has it in his power
10 besiege the capital, or force an attack
on himself or force an evacuation Of Rich
mOnd.
Not that he has his choice OF these three
things, but can force that choice upon US.
In Grants moving upon the south OF
Richmond and threatening James River
! near the city, Gen. Lee has choice Of two
evils. II he keep ahead Of Grant and holds
the Petersburg line inviolotc, that Tanker
necessarily gets between him and Richmond
. and walks into the city at his leisure. Ii
Lee keeps between Richmond and Grant, the
latter Of course gets between him and the
Southern States communication, and cuts
off the only source OF supply now left, As
the valley Of Virginia is in the hands Of the
enemy. If Lee wants TO save Petersburg
, and Richmond BOTH he will have 10 attack
Grant in one of his craw-tsh movements,
and he will have 10 attack the positions
and entertainments which the grand spade
and-pick army never exists an hour with
out.
pain is at last developed Western Virgin
ia, the valley and its resources, is, by the
movement on Stanton and Lexington, To
be rendered unavailable for provisions.
Grant is TO throw his army into fOrtitca-
tons across the railroads from Richmond
south, and so cut of our army supplies.
Thus the starvation of u siege will be as
etlectually secured as ii an army could be
found large enough to surround the legiOns
Of Lee. as Grant did General PembertOn
provided, OF course, that the Danville road
shares the fate that the Weldon probably
will.
q -~~1 49,
fight no has IN mi his finger on the slip
perry Grant and stop his tiea-like Rankings
and having found him and stopped him for
a night, will have to charge the hills Grant
will occupy, and the trenches Grant will
dig. Ii President Davis concludes 10 swan
capitals and giving Grant Richmond, starts
oil ahead OF him for Washington, he will
have the army TO subsist in the desert waste
} between the two capitals; have 10 make
time on foot that will beat the transports on
the Potomac and the Chesapeake; have
the Notifications Of Washington to storm;
and siege to stand there should he get in
side.
? We lose Richmond if We hold the Vel
uOn ana DanVlle railroads, or we attack
Grant If We try TO save both. IL is true
that General Beauregard could still keer
south OF Grant and prevent raids into Car
DINA; but could not keep him from stop
| ping the roads south, unless he has enough
men 10 attack Grant in reverse. and place
him between two fires. We hope Grant
thinks he has. This is a game with no pos
sible hindrance, perfectly plain to even suct
unmilitary comprehension as our own, anC
we respectfully submit that there is no fun
y in it.
The writer is aware from personal obser
walton, that there is personal popularity
and enthusiastic devotion to Grant among
his soldiers, not equalled by anything evei
seen IN that army before-nOr surpassed Il
the army Of Lee; and very much like tn,
love of the Old Guard for Napoleon There
fore, he can flank and fight for some day.
E yet, before they oct tired of it."