Delaware State journal and statesman., 1864-04-19

2
FoT, have been confirmed, viz THAT whaever
degree Of impenetrabiity they might have, there
was no corresponding quality OF aggtes'i ijn or
destfnctiyeness As against forts.
''This experiment also convinces Of another
impression, firmly held and often expressed 4,
ihst in all suoh operations, TO secure success,
troops are necessary"
These facts, however, seemed not to have
changed the views Of the Department ind in
accordance with its previous orders, and it's well
known determination to effect the capture Of
Charleston, determined to make the expert
ment, and to risk, and possibly lose, whatever
Of prestige pertained to q long and successful
professional career, in order 10 meet the neoess-
ties Of the government.
The experiment was made, and, Ia my opinion,
sufficiently, thoroughly aud conclusively. That
1t did not succeed in capturing the forts and the
city Of Charleston is matter of regret as keen,
and Of disappointment as great to myself, and to
those who shared in II, as can be felt by the De-
partment or by the country. II was NOT, how
ever without important results, for it established
anew the supremacy Of artillery in forts, as
against floating batteries and confirmed the
truth of the opinions expressed by me in my
previous dispatches, that in all such operations,
to secure success, troops are necessary.
Had the land forces on this occasion been at
oil adequate to the emergency, the result might
army in possession Of the land approaches TO
Charleston, the attack from the sea coald have
been pushed TO desperation, and the sacrifice Of
some OF the iron-clnlB vessels could then have
been properly made, as they could not have
fallen into the hands of the enemy. But, un-
supported by operations on shore, il would have
been most cupable w0ste Of material upon an
unJustihable forlorn hope to have carried the as.
sault by sea to extremites, with the prospect of
l., e ~. a. l.
with the enemy, in condition, perhaps, to be
raised and repaired by them. and afierward used,
from their interior lines most effectively against
the wooden hlnrkaleiR
The Department Expresses disappointment at
not receiving from me suggestions In regard to
future movements.
stated to the Department In my first report,
on the 9Th Of April, that, in my Judgment to re.
new the attack would be TO convert u failure into
disnster, and that Charlie could not be taken
by ii rnrey naval attack In my detailed report
Of the 10 OF April, repeated that ii was wholly
impractcable 10 take Charleston with the naval
force under my aommaud.
In making the above declarations, without re-
serve, with u full knowledge of the responsible.
ty involved, and under high sense Of duty, re-
gardless OF consequences to myself, | thought
that would, at the same time, be relieving the
Department OF all embarrassment in reference 10
any immediate movements, and that the Depart.
ment would appreciate my motives in SO doing
dld not, therefore, make any suggestions,
but waited 10 hear from the Department in ao-
kno"eigment of my reports, and deeply re-
gret to say that the long and unusual silence
maintained by the Department has been TO me q
cause Of very sore disappointment
Coming out of a battle of 30 novel character
as to attract tho attention of the world, and be-
l1g the most momentous event in the service Of
this squadron since its victory in this harbor. tho
Admiral commanding feels that he had right
to look for ordinary official courtesy il not for
approval. The Department has declined 10 let
my countrymen see my official reports, and to
this submit. But the reasons assigned for this
course surely did not preclude me from being
houored by an acknowledgment of the receipt Of
my dispatches ia the usual course of IN l.: For
such acknowledgment, however, wa ted In vain
nnlll FIX weeks had elapsed after the bat q, and
l had the modification Of realing nuropsan
comments npon it before received u line from
the Department.
The favorable opportunity for the capture Of
Charleston presented itself when the gunboats
hrst took possession of Stono Inlet, and the army
landed under their protection on James Island,
Whlch, at lhat time, was not strongly fortified
The attack, however, failed, from causes which
II Is not necessary to mention here, and the op
porluuity was lost. James Island has been
thoroughly protected since that event, and the
labor upon the haTbor defenoes has not oeasod
since the fall Of Sumter
when stated to the Department that, in my
opinion, Charleston could not be taken by pure
~ naval attack, | wished to be understood in the
ordinary hcceptation OF thoas terms as used in
war, aud as conveying the idea of measuring the
Importance OF the operation with its cost, [ do
not doubt that there is material enough in the
country to accomplish this result in time hut
nRNf
made insuperable, and to take a place it must
first be reached,
By q siege, and with the aid of iron clads
armed differently from the present monitors.
whose turrets could bs relied upon to continue
10 turn at least for few hours consecutiyelv.
anu suihclent in number TO relieve the disabled
ones Tue iorta con be gradually reduced so as 10
get at tue distractions, which cannot be remoy.
eu ~ hlght or during daylight by the monitors
while under fire but tie Depsrment viii ral
member how opposed it was to taking Charles
'oh by aege, whether from Morris Island or
elsewhere. "
The season for joint cooperation is now PASS
ing Away-as during the summer James Island
IL said to be unhealthy for whites to remain an
on i. This, though bad for the enemy, would
oe la'al 70 our troops. 1t is probable, taking
into consideration the number aud the strength
oil the forts upon James Island, that military
science would indicate Bull's Bay on the point
rom which the army should move. This bay
was suggested as available for base Of opera-
uons against Charleston by the Board convened
by the Department in 1861.
II joint operation on u sufficient scnle ia moi
10 Dc undertaken at this moment, see nothing
70 recommend now butto endeavor 10 enforce tl,s
blockade Of Charleston, which, notwithatandiDg
,he presence here OF u larger force than have
hal before It previously, is still evadel.
The safety Of the blOckadiop foree rnnat niso
oe looked TO, and | respectfully and enrnestlv
appeal to the Department to contemplate tbe
condition Of the blockade of the whole eoast from
North Carolina to Florida. If, as seems proba-
hle' II should have to contend with sea,eoing
iron-clnds of the enemy preparing in their own
waters and NahrOad, il is to be rrentlv feareJ
mat the monitors will not bo eaun to the ocoN-
SION They can protect the inside stations. but
lhey arc not adapted for ocean work, and IRON
eiad vessels that can cruise and keen the sen nre
now absolutely needed. Wv
The want Of such vessels will be mora imnar..
lively felt ms the events of this war oontinns IA
dcVelope themselves, and feel mvself erestlS
n1anperea at this mOment, because the lIrce nm.
w y uy command SO iar as iron clads ire con-
cerned' is composed OF vessels whose ueeessities
require them to be kept ip smooth water.
But as have already called ,ha nt,,n,;or 90
eue apartment TO this subject in sptcial dis
present, ppm ~ ~
Very respectfully, your obd't servant,
y. h. DUPONT,
Rear-Admiral Commandpp
south Atlantic BlOckading Squadron.
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