Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1864-11-28
The RiehmOBd Enquirer of November
23d on Sherman's Movement.

From a long editorial in the Enquirer
Of the $50, we make the following import
ant extract
We are equally sure that as soon as
Sherman's trde intentions become suftiei-
emily known to prepare for counter-mnva-
ments Georgia will rise, from the Govern
or to the humblest citizen, in self-defence
and manly resistance. She will show the
same Incompatible energy and vigor with
which the people Of Virginia have risen
in arms; the same concord which here pre-
walls between the authorities and the peo-
pie end the same disinterestedness with
which separate interests have been sacri-
feed to the one great and sacred purpose.
Sherman may do great harm. BE may
emulate the destruction of Sheridan in
our valley; he may initiate Napoleon's
inhuman order, to carry off sll the cattle,
to burn the woods and destroy the fruit
trees for such is war and its horrors. Georgia
will taste the bitter cup that has so long
been at our lips. Her country may be
rsvsged, her fields may be wasted, the
tears of the fatherless and the widow in
her midst may mourn over cold-blOoded
msssacres; but her revenge is at hand, and
the opportunity to show her loyalty, her
gallantry and all her highest virtues is at
hand. For Sherman will place himself in
the most perilous position that can well be
conceived. He tries to strain the system
of pushing forward and making war sus-
tain war to the utmost. He has cut him
self of irrevocsbly from his line of com.
municstions; very few weeks warfare
must exhaust all his resources, and the
very magnitude of his forces will parslyze
them from the failure of the muniments of
war.
The farther his army, q movable col
umn Of unusual size, removes from his
base, the greater the difficulty of support
even if supplies are still in the country
The necessity of providing for their own
wants, it is well known from military ex-
perience, is inevitably fatal to military dis
cipline and subordinstion; it leads to in
dividual pillage, and that to disocganiza-
ton and decentralization. The simplest
arms put into the hands of reserves, Mill
tismen and boys will enable the people of
Georgia to cut off the enemy's forsgiRg
parties, to intercept his communications
with the different parts of the column, to
narass him on the flank and In the rear,
and thus to do him more injury than he
would sustain in q pitched battle.
The situation resembles il its military
fea lures, strikingly that of Napoleon snd
the allies before the battle of Leipsic Each
army hsd passed the other and was lying
in great strength upon the enemy's com
munications, disregarding their own. Blu
cher and Bernadotte were between Nspo-
leon and the Rhine. Napoleon was be-
tween the Prussians and the Elbe. Both
thought that by threatening their adver-
ssry's communications, they could draw
him back or reduce him to the defensive,
&nd both acted on this principle. Napo-
leon hoped to reach Berlin, leaving the
allies behind MIN, as Sherman hopes to
reach Macon, and entertsins the project of
carrying the war into the very heart of the
Gotten States, and establishing his winter
quarters In the hitherto untouched fields of
the South. If Georgia be but true to her
self, the resemblance will not end here.
We trust he will yet have to say. as Ma
poleon did after the bsttleof Culm, aWell,
this is war. High in the morning; low
enough at night. From a triumph to q
fall is often but stepP