Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1864-03-24


The New York Round Table . has an interesting
article under the bead Of "ths ue of steam in war"
which We would Ike to transfer 10 our ociuunA, isils
great length permitted, Asitis, we give the following
extracts 4
In mere than 9 quarter OF q century military men
have foTeEssn thai The uss Of steaz was destined 20
work great eha1gss in war. AL acknowledged that 1t
would grsstly modify the problem Of transportation Of
troops and supplies up to certain distance from the
SCENE OF combat Il lives equally certain that naval bat
sessug the best steam navy and acme eminent au
ghOrtiss have eyea predicted that the great agent Of
modern civllizstion would be employed by armies on
the Geld Of battle rs the motive and projecting power,
OF engines Of destruction. The CrimeAn campaign 81
1 fordsd 3 practical test Of the value Of steamships foli
transporting the supplies Of a large srmY 10 great dis
tGnesz That the experiment was eninsutly suecessful
need not De $40 a. ms lsts dsyi on; Il 4 not going
ducsod the siege OF SebHstopol to 8 suecsssful closB
without the aid sf thsir steam transports
O1iy by mesus Of them vas Il pcs ible TO insure the
rosemary rapidity End regularity IN ths axffval FeT Felns
forcemenis and supplies for such masses OF troepF. ana
% axeio those losses Of animsis and msterist which
woaid, With the cd system Of sailing vessels have been
soonormous as 20 have rendered the continuation sf the
sege nexfte Impossible even tor the great resoarcss Il
England and France. Without the steam mercantile
msrire CT Englsnd, Il "a almost certain that tie Cdassn
campaign would never have been undertaken bv he
ailiesi sne had q been, undsrthoss circumssncss, rash
4 ~ attempted ~ . squal.y Furo that they should have
been s~omPelled to abandon 4 with d~lsastrous results.
The value Of stesusrs TO he alies was greatly on.
HANGED BY tbs fac; that the Russians possessed no rail.
way south Of Moscow, and we're therefore Obliged 20
march their troops nearly a ne hundred 4ailea ovcT roaiye
tnst are aeisssAnie curing maeh o. the year. and throuth
a country where Il Is by no means alwaysssEyt TO obtain
supplies for isrge bodies OF men. That thew los. friebt.
folly "a men during these long and srduous marches "a
q well atteated TACT and IT. Ia also In the nature Of
things inst many who survived the march reached thsir
Destination IN no ht condition TO Withstand The s.vere
hardsnips lnsy were compeAedt % undergo In a beEieqpd
city. GA the other hand, the allies were abs to bring
their men fresh and in good health to their eamB, ne
have said that the allies eonld not have succeeded in the
campaign without tbs assistance Of their steamers. n
1 nav be asserted with euuaI anuha9I1 gbaf tb.v -r,ld
have failed u the Russians had possessed q Hallway
from Morrow OF WGrsaw to SimphsrupoE u
Prince Gortsehskon, the abb premier Of Russia. futre
than once urged The late Emperor ieholss to decreIss
the numerical strength Of his armies, and to appiy the
resulting savings 70 he dsvsOpmsnt Of the railway sys-
TEN OF Russia, contending tbat an army Of one half the
numerical strength Offbst maintained by Nicholas would
thsn accomplish far more than the million Of men 90 iong
tho anxiety OF Europe. BE that a. II may, II IL certain
that the CrineRn campaign proved the inestimsble va us
OF ocean steamers for military purposes and it nay
| now be regarded as an axiom, t6Et an ocean, however
vida ard IPmpestuoHs, Is 20 longer in itself a sufficient
safeguard TO any country sgsin'i invasion Sy eonsid'ra'
In he Russian war Of 1884 the uss Of raiiWsys for
mfitsry purposes VIE toe indirect to seqaiFe special
consideration; their value was proved rathtr by tleir
absence han By their employment, u NO ezeept the
il s,gnihcAn track constructed by the EDgiish from Ia
selsvE 70 their camps. Tbs Italian campaign Of 1853
/ presented The first instance Of tie direct emp oyment of
| railways in military operations on a large EeEls aad
with decisive effect Hire they we're employed not
Only for the transportation Of supplies, but also to mas
this troops for the first operations OF the esr1pa'gn al.
| most Wfiuln CANON range OF iuc enemy anu II OHe n.
stance at least TO bring a limited number Of reinforce.
Rsnts TO the actual held Of combat.
BY means Of the Genoa End Alexandria railway the
I French troops who arrived by wafer were rApidiy mEzs-
ed nsGr Alexan6Iia and ToFtonR, while those who cras
by and were transported from Lyons by rail-, making
only q comparatively short march seroSs Mount crnis.
The Ausifi sns also made good use Of their rRiiWayt in
rear Of their base Ct operations for similar purposes
The operations Of that campaign Eufaeed to prove the
great value Of railwEys to armies, and established the
fact that thsFwould greatly facilitate tho operations OF
a campaign
I'll, in fact, evident that. 10 the early period Of the
campaign in question, the AustriSns would, With their
oVeTwheiming force, easily have gained possession of
Turin and the debouehss Of the passes Of the Alps. and
c 5uld have masked Genoa and Alexandra in spite Of
the utmost Efforts Of the gallant SsTdinians, If the use
Of railway and steamers had not enabled tbs Freuth to
concentrate al Alexandria and Turin with such unex.
smplsd rapidity. Ia this instance, steam saved the king
dom OF Sardinia, and with It the hopes Of Italy. ItneY-
eTihelesS remained 10 be tested whether a railway could
be successfully usedin an enemy eou5tEY, and 1t was
reserved for US 10 solve this question in tbs exiting
war, and 20 show TO the world an example Of he en-
pl1yment Of railways and river steamers in wstlike
operations on the g~rAndstt scs'e, and under the most DIFF.
hcult circrmstsncss- The problem has been success
fully solved. for railways, stesmboEts, and the Telegraph,
have rendered movements praeticab,e on or part which
eonld net have been undertaken without then.
The employment Of these new agents presents sd-
vEntegss and Disadvantages, although ths former Jar
outweigh the latter. The chief difficulty IS that they
are rather complex AID delicate machines, easily lam
aged and somewhst difdcEli 20 res,ore. The only points
~ which a wagon road can be seriously injursd ar5 he
bridges. and when such a rosd Is used for supplying an
Mf u y hhAHLlHAN Il AAA4LAlA = kNAI1 - EaEA M
portHni bridge. and to send sn escort with eaeh convey
of WagonA Bat every foot Of q railway is liable 20 in.
jury, and must be carefully guarded or pstrOlled. This
becomes a serious evil, ard neeessiiAtes large detsCh-
ments when the line Of road is long and the partisauE of
the enemy active. II iG quite impossible, with any force
that can reasoDabiy be spared from the active srny, to
make q long railway absolutely secure for small par
ties, even a single man. acquainted with the country,
cRn often slip In at GONE point ans in Z few minutes do
a great deal Of damage which may seriously delay the
moving Of trains
sircs it is not practicable that a strong guard sllouG
accompany every train, iii often an easy nattDr for
an active enemy to capture them by obEtfucflug the
track before and behind them. But, up 10 the point
whsnlt is possible to guard the read efsttuany with
a reasonable rec, these Disadvantages are far more
than counteTbalsrced by the ease and rapidly with
which large amounts Of supplies and large numb.rs Of
iroops can be moved from point TO point On SraHHty
In fair order 8 single engine can readily draw 200 ,tuns
q ~ MES per hour. From ChsttsnOugs 70 L0uisviile
shy rail about 80 miles, which dis, snCe can be made
with Certainty mss hons, allowing q large myEin for
delays. To perform the sane work, would reqIlrs a
train Of ST lsast 200 sixraulss wagons, and Wouli oe-
cupy shouts days. For an army Of l09,03o mes, COO
tuns is no Nlarge estimate for the gross weigh. o. its
daily supply Of rAtions, forags, and other niece, say ar.
tielss This would require three railway trains, per
diem, or 600 wagons II baulsd over eomnon roads
Allowing twenty-five deysfoT 3 wagon train 70 march
from Louisville 70 Chattanooga, one d4y 10 unload,
fifteen to return empty, three 70 load up and reft, II |
would require ~foTty-one days 70 make tie round "trip.
Thus there wsuld be necessary forty one trains or a.
600 wagons and 10000 mules, to keep an army OF 100. |
600 men at Chattanooga supplied FROM day to day FROM
To supply thsn from Nashville, would re
quHe AOOH l"suly-oue UaaS iS,luB wagons and 4o,OvO
mules. As one hundred wagons occupy about one
mile when marching IN single file. each train Of SOD viii
take up six miles; the tUsnty-oRs trains, en- rou1e be-
tween Nashville and Chattanooga, would oeeupy lQ6
Of the $50 miles of road and the fortyone train, be-
tweeo Louisville and Chattanooga, would cover !l6 Of
the $50 miles Of road.
Thee facts viii give some idea Of tte erowdea and
almost impassable condition Of a wagon road when used |
tho Inns Of supply Of n large army 81 some ooas dera
Die distance from lie base. TO supply The same army
at Chattanooga by rail from Na8hrsiie would red1ire q |
engines and 60 cars per day, in 81 "a enEibss ani 800 |
csrz-dsnbhns the number strictly necessary in order
8 ock would not exceed $4,000, and tie daily sxpsnse
OF running N0uld not be more than 81 500. Gu the
other hand, the oTignsl cost Of the 1900 wagons and i
20 wv mules woull not be far from el4 100000 aud the
daily expenses something Ike $40 000, not including re-
PsrS and replacing broken dsWn animals.
1hs figures given above. although from the nature Of
the case perhaps not ktrieiiy accurate, are yet near
enough 10 tie truth 10 be taken as the basis Of com.
parlson. and sufhce 70 show the immense advantages
gained by the use Of railways Tor military purpo,eS Ia
seonomy, regularity, and rapidly. The Vrestsr he
1lstanee from thu army 10 its base Of EuppiisS the
Sfeater VIII De tho advantage Of the empIoyn snt Of
,allways The practical limit Of he distance up 10
HAeh railways cant employed IN an snemy's country
,@nnet Dc nxed with eHSetness, q pri0rf, bus 10 aeter-
mined By the amount OF rolling stock available, and The
possibility OF protecting the road sud trains eRainst the
.hemy' ana VIII Eeeessarily vary between very wide
lhiA 30 Tar a. the movements Of troops are CON
ernsdi railways csn be used only TO concentrate them
n the original base Of operations, and subscausntly to
up reinIoEeem6nts 10 the vicinity Of the main
.oey qua When an army Is once engaged insctiYe ope-
AlonA' is movements must all be made by marching
~ me talinay esn be depended upon only when Gov
req oy tue main army.
Letter from Richmond. D
ioFFsSPonaenes Charleston Mercury {;
RlgHMoED, March 10. (,