The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-07-19
TUESDAY, JULY 10, 1864.
THE STRATEGIC POSITION OF THE
ARMY OF THE POTOMA CON.
TRAsTED WITH THE FORMER ONE
NORTH OF RICHMONn.


II might have been easily foretold that the
removal of the Army Of the Potomac to the
south Of Richmond would arouse apprehen-
sions "a TO the safety of Washington. The in
terposition Of the enemy between our army
and Washington is 10 many the only element
of the strategic position worthy Of considera-
ton. The late movement OF the Rebels has
confirmed this impression; for II is believed
that If our army had continued to invest Rich
mond on the north side, the enemy would have
bten unable to march on Washington.
1t Is not surprising that these views are
entertained by men who have but vague
idea OF the topography of the field of opera
tions, no military knowledge whatever, and
little opportunity of acquiring either; but
even military correspondents write in terms
which viii be regarded by those inclined to
similar views, as strongly corroborative of the
correctness of opinions which are really
erroneous. A Washington correspondent of
New York paper said in one of his late
dispatches =" L have no doubt whatever that
" atty thousand veteran troops came here 10
+" avail themselves of the blunder of un-
{" covering the capital OF the nation" &c. In
letter from Washington TO one of our
own papers, this expression occurs -"They
q have given practical demonstration of one
OF the standing dangers of putting our army
Z" out Of position TO cover Washington (as it is
before Petersburg), namely-that the enemy
can, by vigorous feint towards the capital,
" throw the whole country into alarm
d" respecting its safety. This is a dangerous
state of facts," &c.
One OF the prdiAcsg.isa.i prdi cls.ia.i elements which enter
into military saDperations, is the relation oftime
70 esssilce. To be at given place at given
isHslie, is q point upon which military success
depends as much as upon fighting. Distance is
@ otalwsys the same obstacle to opposing armies.
In fact, IL is almost impossible to imagine case
where there Is equalization. Independently
Of the superior mobility of some armies, there
is always some preponderance in means
of transportation; and of two armies, one
may possess both OF these advantages. The
Army Of the Potomac, at this moment, vir-
tually interposes between Washington and
Richmond; for the enemy is not 30 near to
Washingtcn in respect to time.
In the position north of Richmond, the
shortest line of communication with the base
of supplies--the White House-had to be
maintained The line Of communication,
south Of the James river, with our base of
supplies at City Point, is SO short that
it is scarcely entitled to the name.
Supposing our army to be on the
north side, and a Rebel force to march
for Washington, column would either be
detached to endeavor to outmarch and con-
front them, or else relief would be sent to
Washington by the York river. The probabil-
ity Is that the latter plan would be adopted; for
t!i.5 men would have time to arrive in Wash
ington, and present front of fresh troops tC
the faded forces of the enemy.
On the south side GRANT can give the
enemy start, and send troops by the Jane
and Potomac, as in the first case he woul
have sent them by the York river and Poto
mac. Eighteen hours steaming complete
the voyage, and allowing few hours for EN-
barkation, debarkation, marching and takin
position, in less than thirty hours there is a
army interpOsing between Washington an
Richmond. On the south side there is direc
telegraphic communication between Washing
ton and the headquarters of the army. No
thing more could be obtained on the mort
side, and Il is questionable whether it woul
be as secure Bermuda Hundred Is an i'm
pregnable position, slightly to the rear Q
Petersburg, and on the flank OF the line {
communication between Richmond and Peters
burg; aud the main army is drawn up belor
Pe.ersburg, with its right wing near tn
james, whence no attack can come. On tn
north side the army was in position wa 3r,
its centre and both wings were liable to attack
It has been said that had our army bee
on the north side Of Richmond, the ene ny
could not have made his late demonstration
But this IL not correct; for il our army ha
been there, it could have possessed no m)r
knowledge Of a movement which proceede
down the Shenandoah Valley from Lynch
burg ninety miles west Of Richmond, than
possessed in Its present position south
Petersburg. The Shenandoah Valley m Is
b. left out Of the question, for the datan.a O
thlt requires separate column, no matte
where the Army OF the Potonlc mty be.
direct movement on Washington coul
Dot be 30 readily perceived by the army in it
present position as in position On the mort
side of Richmond; but how is the enemy I
make movement over q country where hi
facilities for transportation and supplies wei
impaired in consequence Of the movements
two powerful armies contending the who
way from the upper Rappahannock to Ricl
mond, and when his resources have been sti
farther destroyed by an enterprising caValI-
with the express purpose Of prSvS0ting
direct movement on Washington. Could v
have better evidence of the impossibility
direct march on the national Capital, tina
the late movement OF the enemy by the lor
detour Of the Shenandoah valley?
At what period our military authorities b
came aware Of the character of the late d
mOnstration, Is Of course unknown 20 Il
public, but the fact that at a time when
must have been In progress Cor several day
troops were sent from the army, and CO.
fronted the Rebels, shows that IL the army
the Potomac do not always interpose betwe,
Washington and Richmond, II can never
because 1t Is not nearer IN point Of time.
Whether the enemy approach Washingt
n