The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-05-13
THE RICHMOND CAMPAIGN.
Rebel View of the Situation.
Lees Army nearly One Hundred
Thousand Strong.
HIGH ESTIMATE OF GEN. GRANT
NO BATTLE TO BE FOUGHT ON THE
RAPIDAN.
From Correspondent of the World.

BALTIMORE, April 2S.
SOUTHERN VIEW OF THE MILITARY SITUATION
INvIRGINIA.
The following is the southern view of the
present military situation in Virginia. mean
1t is the view that comes here from southern
authority; and 1 state this with particularly,
because not o single item of the following in
formation comes from Union sources. What
is said about the strength and movements of
the Union forces may or may not be true, but
it is what is believed to be true at Richmond,
and the rebel movements are based upon it,
Longstreets whole corps has Joined General
Lee on the Rapidan, and Gen. Lees army is
now nearer one hundred thousand than eighty
thousand strong. His main body is on the
Rapidan, near Mine Run, with LOngstreet on
| the extreme left, and Ewells corps on the
right. The old corps of A. z. Hill holds the
centre.
THE REBEL CAVALRY.
| General Stuart's cavalry, fully eighteen thou
sand strong, are now massed altogether, both
men and horses being in the best possible con-
| ditiOn for making campaign. The horses
| have been feeding partly upon grass for more
| than week, and for this purpose the cavalry
have been kept little distance in the rear, and
| to the south and west of the main army. All
| along the eastern slope of the Blue Ridge, and
| in the country around GOrdOnsville and Char
lOttesville, and down to the James River, the
pasturage has been abundant for ten days
past Even on the Rapidan, where the rebel
cavalry are now assembled the grass is high
enough to afford the horses part of their food
Among the men, the general impression is that
they are to move Immediately, and that their
route will be up the Shenandoah valley.
GEN. LEES ESTIMATE OF GEN. GRANT.
General Lee is playing very deep strategic
game. Whatever may he the estimation in
which General Grant is held by the magnates
| at Richmond, General Lee is too good soldier
| to despise him. He is aware of the exact num-
Der of troops under Gen. Grants orders, and
| he knows he will have to fight much larger
| Union army than he ever before encountered.
| All of his movements, for a week past have
| been made with a view of deceiving General
| Grant in regard to his real intentions, and of
leading the latter to believe that his object is
the very reverse of what it rcallyis. All Ofhis
maneuvres during the last six or seven days
| give color to the impression that he is massing
the whole of his available strength on the south
side of the Rapidan; that he has selected that
| spot as the battle-ground, and that he intends
| the battle to be fought there which is to decide
the fate of Richmond
| GEN. LEES STRATEGIC GAME
But such is not Gen. Lees intention. He is
ready to make certain movement, and has
been ready for two weeks past. He only waits
to make it until Gen. Grants plan of opera
tinns is fully developed; until his line of march
| has been made plainly manifest; until General
Grant shall have committed himself to Il GER
tain line of operations from which he cannot
readily withdraw. Then General Lee will
! make his real movement.
| ADVANTAGES OF TIE OVERLAND ROUTE To THE
REBELS
Lee is satisfied, 10y this time, that Gen. Grant
has been compelled to adopt the overland route
as the line of his advance on Richmond, and
that any movements on Richmond made by the
way Of the peninsula or the James River. or
| from the south, will be mere feints, and that
| they will he made too with Such incOOSid-
cradle bodies of troops that they need give him
| no concern. He is surprised that Gen. Grant
should have taken this overland route, and the
| fact that he has done so is apiece of good for.
tune that General Lee did not expect. If Gen.
| Grant had made peninsula campaign against
Richmond in earnest, it would have necessitat-
ed The retention OF General Lees whole army
| there, or near there, for the defense of the
rebel capital. The adoption of the overland
route, however, leaves Gen. Lee free to carry
out the plan which he has formed for opera
tiOns in another direction.
General Lee estimates the Union troops ad-
vancing toward the Rapdan under Gen. Grant.
at 81, 800 strong, including Burnsides corps.
The ultimate destination of Burnsdes corps
gave Gen. Lee considerable uneasiness until
recently, but he kept himself advised of its
movements from day to day. Whatever might
have been thought or feared at Richmond,
Gen. Lee never believed that it was Burnside's
corps, or any part of it, that was sailing up
the Rappahannock. 1t is Il relief to him to
know, however, that Burnsides corps has
joined Meade's army, and that it will take part
in the overland movement
WILL. THERE BE A RATTLE on THE HArIDAN?
There will be battle on the Rapidan, but it
will not be the great battle. Gen. Lees posi-
| ton there is so strong, and he is so well in
trenched, that with One-third of his army he
expects to hold it for some time against the ad-
vance of the Union troops. 1t is possible,
however, that if this advance is made in great
force, the position on the Rapidan will not be
maintained, but the rebel forces will fall back
on either Mine Run or to position on the
| right bank of the North Anna River, and be-
tween that stream and the Virginia Central
Railroad, between Gordonsville and Hanover
junction. Both of these positions are strong
| ly fortified the intrenchments being very ex-
| tensive.
THE BATTLE MUST he ON GROUND or LEES
| CHOOSING.
And to whichever of these positions the enc
my retires. there General Grant will have to
| follow. 1t must not be forgotten that i'm this
overland campaign, as in all that have preceded
it, the battle. when it takes place, will have to
be fought at the time that General Lee chooses
and on the ground that he has selected for that
purpose. Itmay be in General Grants power
to defeat the rebel army after the battle has
been joined. But it Is not in his power to COM
pei Gen. Lee to fight until he wishes to, or in
| any other position tnan tnaC which he himself
| has chosen. This is disagreeable fact. But
it is fact nevertheless, and it may be we'll to
remember it.
| FORTIFICATIONS AT GORDONsyIiLE
| Gordonsvile Junction is another point that
has been strongly fortified by the rebels. This
point resembles Manassas Junction in its de-
fensiye features, and it would seem to be the
design of the rebels to hold it with the same
pertinacty. There is range of low hills that
runs from this point to Hanover, and as the
engineer officers of the rebel army spent seve.
| raj days in March in examining them, and in
surveying the adjacent country, it is probable
that the advantages which they afford will not
| he overlooked.
THE STRONG POSITIONS OF THE REBELS CAN
| NOT BE TURNED.
General Lee knows, too, that the calcula
tons are based upon this fact, that although
General Grants objective point is Richmond,
yet still he will have to attack and defeat the
/ Confederate army before he can get there and
General Grant himself, of course, is fully aware
of the fact Many people at the North who
remember the great strength of the rebel posi-
ton at Mine Run, as demonstrated by General