The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1864-03-12
hammond as : sLralegIc Point.

Richmond as 8 Strategic Point.
We know that there are those who
are inclined TO make merry over such
as urge the capture of Richmond, not
only for political, but strategic reasons.
sOf what consequence is that place 2
they triumphantly ask; and look upon
their interrogatory as an end Of con
troversy
But we need hardly state that We
differ decidedly from these men; that
we hold the capture Of Richmond Of
the highest importance, even laying
aside the moral influences Of such a re-
suit If we look upon it from militia
~ point Of view alone, its seizure would
be as important as that Of Vicksburg
was, a year since. The possession Of
Vicksburg severed the Confederacy in
twain; what would the capture Of the
rebel Capital accomplish?
Let Us glance at the map, and deter
mine. No invasion of Kentucky can
occur, without the Virginia and East
Tennessee Railroad as base; and it
cannot be made base, save by way Of
Richmond. Capture that city, and Ken
lucky is safe; no army need be kept
there, to protect the State; a few cav
alrymen to hunt down guerrillas, will
be all that is needed If an invasion
be attempted on a large scale, supplies
will be carried through Richmond and
Lynchburg; and they can come from
no other direction.
Besides, Longstreet at the head of q
force Of rebels, will keep large army
occupied in East Tennessee yet the
moment Richmond is taken, he must
fall back, as he would otherwise be
completely isolated; and in falling back,
he could find no new base short of South
Carolina. Western North Carolina is a
region Of hills and an army, cut of
from the rest Of the Confederacy, would
be compelled to abandon it at once; or
if it attempted to remain, would be a
source of weakness, rather than strength
to the foe
If our armies held Richmond to-day,
East Tennessee would be safer, guarded
by regiment OF cavalry, than it is
now, when protected by several corps
of infantry. The rebels would have no
base whence to operate against il. The
army under Schofield could then be
joined to that Of Thomas; or could be
moved to any other point, where the
rebels had concentrated, and where
more aid was needed
These things, possessing strictly a
military bearing, are OF the highest inn
portance; and it is not surprising, under
such circumstances, that Gen. Grant,
who is a man of mind, should urge the
capture of the rebel capitol as the first
step in the campaign 1t would be a
stroke of military policy Of the first
order.
But the military are not the only
considerations which dictate an adj
vance of the army of the Potomac.
The loss TO the rebels of their capital
would have a most depressing and dis
astrous effect upon the people; and
what is more, would open to the loyal
North Carolinians an opportunity to
vindicate themselves and their cause
and we do not think we are hazarding
anything in asserting that the expul-
sion of the rebel armeis from Virginia,
would be to compel them to make their
second line of defence in South Caro-
lima
No man, has closely observed affairs
in front but is aware that the mo-
ment our troops, occupy a portion of
territory, and give evidence of their
ability to hold it, the mass of the rebel
soldiers, whose families are within our
lines, will seek the first available OPP
portunity to desert, and regain their
homes How many Kentuckians, of
the original fifteen thousand who joined
the rebellion, are now in the rebel ar
my9 Not two thousand What proper
ton of tho Tennesseans are yet in
arms Not one third of the origi-
nal number What of those Virginians
whose homes were in the northern and
western portions Of the State They,
too, have been reduced too a mere nom
inal number OF the Missourians
General Price old command is reduced
to a small brigade OF those from
Arkansas They are seeking their
homes as rapidly as possible.
Who can calculate the value of the
reorganization of such States as North
Carolina and Virginia. Would another
Chattanooga do as much to weaken
the Confederaey and strengthen the
Union cause2 BY no means
Then letside expeditions be withdrawn,
and ell available troops that can be
spared be concentrated with a view of
capturing Richmond All that is re-
CURED is to place the army Of the Pc
tomac, and such reinforcements as
can be readily collected, in the charge
of an active and able general, and the
capital must fall
About French Recognition.
We place no confidence in the ru-