, 1864-10-07

iudicfoosly, ind were put in position 1t the
most obvious points; but so far IS the light
Ing" Is eercernedit it is as usus1, peuncl, no
one knowing exactly who and where his
Iesd mar II hand, Who doss know all, to
direct a1d givo cohszsnce and unity to the
0Es. M'oLE11AS OK 4 Gua1oAT.
On tae Goth Of June our army stretched
acro=s The country from White OAK Swamp )
bridge to the Janse. occupying line about
eight miles long franklin had tbs 1i,,hs at
the bridge, Porter an6 Reyes the ext1rms LETT
Farther than midway tive miles sbout} from
the Jomes. this long line OF battle Was Inter
.seetsd hy two, {the 's Charles City" aad the
. New MARKET" or "Lopg Bridge'') cover.
line should be broken hers It would BE- the
destruction Of onr arm.. Here, too, the en-.
eng made desperate effort. Leeconmanl-
ed IN person, and Longstreet's aud &. P.
Hnrs veteran divisions. numbering Is coo or
10000 meD, made the attack. JEFF Davis him
self Gas said to be Iresent $50 Gen McCaEl
While prisoner that evening, WAS lnfurmet.)
1t Eas an eventful day and an eyentfuI point;
central, too, TO 'he general position Of the
army. Where was the Commanding Geaeral
dn,ing this bsttle: At the very extreme left
and fer considerable portion Of the time
on 3atn11al, (see P. 135, 'haying male ag-
rapgements for Instant Communication By
Signals" Rad the reco1t Of Gen. McCalh
tbs e1'1acts from those Of Sumuer, and
Heipt21 man. End othsra, and their testimony
before the Committee Oh tae Conduct of
the War, and see how much the control
Of tho Commanding ~Genera1 Was needed;
his knowledge OF the field and OF the poai.
fiops OF the different troops, Then taink Of
the disn1 t1ous consequences that would have
followed The 'breakiog Of our Line at that
point, (Lorgstreet informed Gsn. McClll
that Les had 10 0o0 men bearing on it. oil Of
7nich would arrive before midnight,) and let
each One 1orm his own concla sion as to
whether the commanding General had on
this occaslon any appreciation of bis duties,
or, II he la5, whether he discharged them.
1T Waa very late at night" saya General
at re- ny aas s9 gs
~hole line, and the true position Of atfatrs-"
It nay well be doubted whether, In all the
recorded reports or ''dispatches" Of military
commanders, parallel to this extraordinary
avo~el can be fouId. We suppose It tbs cs-
pecial business OF q general to know, at esch
to Rave some agency ia railing It, Here we:
find the ''day's fghttug~ all done, the re-:
md "very late At night the com mnaud
ing General just lesFned about them!
rsnu r5y coaeuaya 'sae he naia Soaa no gns:s ions
hold bis position and retired, sending word
to Gems. Sumner and Heiotzleman. These
officers, though they assert they received no
euch meassge, heard of the movement, some
how, and wisely concluded that they must
retire, too. He1e again was matter OF the
graVsst importance. which, that 1t Should be
decided at the proper time, required ths
commanding General to he: at hand-to
knoT, promptly, '.tne sltuation'' nn1 tue
"reeults Of the dnJ'a fighting" Gen.-Mc
Clellan makes no prctense that he gave any
orders to franklin, nor that he would have
had not franklin, ,gishout orders, fl1lcn back.
He h1trrs that on learning Of FEnnkltn's
viihdta-=l he sonf orders to Sum3er sud
Helntzls man 10 withdraw, but admits that
they were both In motion toitAout his
o,aer.. Now had net this withdrawal
taken. place that night, the next day
Topla 1o;an have probably ~itaesssd ,ss the
mat. Lee, as we have seen, was at The
{fry central point, ready to b:eak in, With
fbIce of 70, GOO men, as stated ~ Lnngstreet
to GIN. Mccall. The salvation Of the army
was due. not to McClellan's arrangements Of
foresight, but: to Gen- Franklln's Fortunate
decifion 70 withdraw, The army was saved
In spite of Gen- McClel1ao's Ignorance OF the
day - fght:ng," mud consequent incapAcIty
to give Intelligent orders.i
MCCLELLAN TAKES 4 RIDE ON A GUyBoAr.
Our army Is now concentrated On thu
James; but We have another days fighting
btfo1e us, ard this day We may expect ths
concentrated attack Of Lees whole army.
We know not at what hour 1t wiffcome--
p:esibly lste, for 1t requires time to find ont
our neW position and to bring together the
attacking cclnmns-Jet we know not when
1t Will come. Where, this day, ID the COM
handing G.rernl? Oh, with Capt. Rodgers,
to select "the 1nal positions OF the army and
It's dspota. !" He d -es not tell US that il was
on a gnnboat, and that this day not even
tesigDdla" a"sWould keep him in communication
wit6;n1s army, Tor bis Journey ,7as rsn or d.
teen miles down the river; and he WAS thus
absent TIL late in the afternoon.
This Is the frat time we ever had reason
to relieve TINT the highest and first duty Of
general, on the day Of hattie, was, separat-
plsce Of retreat! However that N y be, tia,
night and the day following, the whole army,
with the exception Of Gea. Keyes' corps,
marched iato q Guide sac from which 1t
ny been able promptly to folio "a np.
CONCLUDING STRATEGY.
We think 1t will row be understood why
81 large number of Gen NeClellan's high
opinions have been reported to ma"-(see
Gen. Halleck's letter, p $50 are in favor OF
''the Withdrawal from th- James" If the
enemy ras indeed, IS Gen. Mcclellan esti-
mated (Gen- Hslech's letter, p lo5l,
100000 strong, aud daily Increasing,
= renewal Of an offensive campaign
from the James Waa simple madness.
Once, by bis own accounts, he had bean
foiled and driven back, with no little hazard Of
the rum Of this army, bY "suPeslor NUM-
5els," and now he proposes to march aga!n
with l2V,otO tabout What ats ~ oa5 army wootd
have numbered with the SO,oO0 reinforce
ments be asken( against Rtchmond, held By
s0, ,oco men. No one who has reau atten-
lively the report before us, and the eSsp atch-
es therein coz ntoined, VIII o. surprised ~ tna
want OF logical sequence ~ any pattle9laf
plan, statement, OF argument, since complete
@ Q. saGa 9dssy tat1,eaaf j. ea1
lsuc OF Inc Whole; bat any 1otell'Eent Ieaa-
erWill understand that tnefe we're no fatlon-
al chatces OF success, p4ftGulnlY aItef
recent experiences, IN ADVANCING oa tslca-
mond" defended oy IN army OF .oo,ouo men
inufea ~ 20 - 6attles ana e1aIeo py snceees; VIII
out LEU Wv msn. de can ondefstaau, 100,
that anof6sr disastrous repulse IN thia r.
army and the capture or Washington-ln-'
deed, the ruin OF the canse-
II the enemy mao al,Uo men 1t was 70 ne
eeriously apptehended that, leaving 2o,ooo
neh1nd tne "a,rons Wotksn 9l e. h61ennon9, 6
Wasbie gton Why should he not? Gen.
Mcclellan and his eut1gists have held up Hs
lipLlT merltosloas atraIezv the leaving Of
Wnsh}nrfon dpfcnIcl bY lesg than 50.0o0
men. With the enemy il its front estimated
fo h. te0 000 70 15O 00O strong. and moViar
Of to take an eccentric lipe ot opera,ions
against Ricbmoud: aud no r the r.ueese cass
X Dre;tnfe9, but with au important difference
Tie enzmJ at Manassas, on learning General
McClellan's movement, could either ay to
tae os1shss or cno n vr tha ns.ach r., 1as..
6 .i7xe ,cas not to BE- FEARED. Mcclellan on. the