, 1864-03-31

each other, their movements and achieve
ments must be entirely determined by the
nature Of the theatre Of operations. Perhaps
never in the history Of warfare has the char
acter Of the ground c1erted more influence
on campaigns than that Of the portion. Of
Visgfnia which lies between Washington and
Richmond. On the right Of our army arc
to conceal any tlanking movement they m.y
undertake, while the valleys afford to them
the means for any easy and uninterrupted
passage to the Potomac above Washington,
and one almost entirely secure from attacks
in their rear. On our front is succession
Of rivers, presenting grent natural obstacles
to our advance, and Mt the same time easily
ascending them Is to open our rear to attacks
from Fredericksburgb, and to cross below
the rebel army, leaves the railroad prey to
guerillae. Tie country Is, moreover, masked
in every direction by dense forests, rendering
anything like surprise in force impractica-
BILE. 4 few rebel scouts may 1T Ill times
easily detect ind thwart such q movement.
Such are the natural features of the country.
It is q Well-known rule Of military opera
tion that s'b4ee'' ehonld neither be too ex-
tended nor too limited, and that 1t shonld be
accessible By seyernl routes. The base Of
the Army of the Potomac is just the Widtl,
Of railroad track, and that railroad furnish
munication. With q limited base, Nh army
is always exposed to be cut in the rear. This
is what happens to the Army of the Poto.
mac at every advance. Guerilla bands iufest
the whole country between the Rappahan
uock and Alexandria (some sixty miles,,
and it Is Impossible to protect entire.
y In hostile country, such an extent of ter.
Fairfax Court House, dye hundred men nre
required to protect the rear. An entire corps
Ia now occupied in doing this from the Rap
pahannock to Manassas, and the troops OF
The Department Of Washington protect the
track from that locality to Alexandria. How
great IL the drain Of an army for such d SER
vice can be easily estimated. After passing
the Rapidan, If railroad communication is to
be relied on for supplies, strong force must
be constantly kept In the rexr; every train
will even then be exposed to capture by
bands sweeping down from the mountains.
The leaders Of the rebels, Of course, fully
understand all these circumstances, and are
always ready to take advantage Of them.
They are fully aware that they can hold in
my Of the Potomac meantime. They pursue
the Fabian policy-the policy of. Washington
on the mountains OF the Hudson River.
They nre not foolish enough to stake every
thing On the risk Of battle, except where
iA,ulnsTab.y fortified. They yin not stack,
Their own rear needs nc, projections; they
have two railroad routes, besides ell the OF.
dinary roads. THIS they Lave ali the udrun.
tage Of position on their side.
But are we, in view Of these difficulties, to
expect nothing from the Army Of the Poto,
1a maes No, It may overcome them In I've o.
force to cover its Hanks, 1t may com
pei the enemy to retreat, and Rich
mond to be abandoned. Second, it may be
able to bring On an engagement, which will
prove decisive. Third, By cutting 1t loose
from Washington and making 1t d movable
column, it may 60 at any time to the rear Of
on the Pamuiikey Or York Rivers, or By tho
railroad from Fredericksburg. We risk moth.
ing In saying t1.ut the army can ut auy time
20 to Richmond, II relieved from the neces.
sity Of protecting its rcar. This could have
been done last fall, when Gen. Meade crossed
the Rapidan and was stopped by tho, rebel
works on Mine Run. The army can trans
with this 1t can be moved to Hanover Court
House, where it can operate on new base;
or, Il successful In forcing the rebel liues car
even enter Richmond at once.
Fifteen days Is the period usually assigned
in Europe rs the length Of march from one
base Of operations to another, except the
country tIayersed be able to support the
army. In Virginia, our army can derive nc
advantage from the country. It could mol
subsist itself for the most limited period.
The portion Of the State which has been The
scene Of war, is exhausted. Even among
the fertile farms Of the Peninsula it was
difficult to obtain small supplies Of forage;
Of subsistence for the men there was abso.
lntely nothing The necessity Of "bascs''
is, therefore, evident. At the Southwest
our armies have had the advantage OF opera.
ting along nayigable rivers, 30 that thetl
supplies could proceed with them. sucll az
expedition as That Of Shorman's would be
Impossible in Virginia; 1t would starve be
fore it could accomplish anything.
With its competent leaders, Its brave and
wclldiscipiined troops, its superior organi
zation, We arc confident the Army OF the Po.
tomac, supported us is generally expected Il
will be. by the tull force Of the Government
will achieve worthy SUCCESS during the com
Ing season. The Importance OF capturing
Richmond has been underratcd ID som9
quarters, but we believe the people are "a,
from coueuzring. in such view, and that
they would consider rs the most important
achievement Of the coming campaign the oc
cupotion Of the rebel capital By the Army o.
the Potomac.