The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1864-10-07

1t ia no longer forbidden, we presume,
to speak of the situation in Georgia, since
the telegraph has already announced that
General Hood is in Sherman's rear, on
the north side of the Chattahoochee-di -
rectly upon the only railroad by which
Atlanta can be supplicd-withh his whole
army. The position which he has taken,
aud which it is to be presumed he has
fortified to its greatest capacity for re-
sistance, renders Shcrman's situation
critical in the extreme. lie has with
him at Atlanta, according to information
derived from sources believed to be per-
fectly reliable, not more than forty -hve
thousand effective men, all told, at this
time. lie crossed the river with sixty
two thousand five hundred. He has not
been largely reinforced since. He has
lost in battles, skirmishes, and from sick
ness, desertion, struggling, and other
causes, quite enough men to answer for
the difference between sixtytwo thou
sand and forty five thousand. The ridicu-
lous stories circulated about the strength
of his army while it was on the march
to the observation-disclosures Of which
placed it at one hundred and twenty
thousand msn-are now understood to
have been mere inventions. The army
of General Hood is supposed to be
not greatly inferior to that Of its adver
sary. 1t has recovered its spirits and
discipline in remarkable degree. 1t is
in position in the enemy's rear, upon his
only line of communication it is strongly
fortified, and is calmly awaiting for the
enemy to advance. Shereman has, no
doubt, collected many stores in Atlanta.
But it is impossible that he can have
collected more than enough to last him
very few weeks, seeing that he has but
one railroad to bring them over He
must either advance to Augusta or No |
bile, or he must fall back and sweep
Hood out of his way. Either operation
is difficult
An advance in the direction of either |
Mobile or Augusta would be the signal |
for ali the country over which he has
passed to rise in his rear The army O.;
Hood, in that case, would serve as nu
cleus around which the whole strength
of Northern Georgia would rally. Fol-
lowed closely in the rear by Hood, he
would be assailed in flank and front by
every man or boy who could carry gun
or mount horse. Arrived before Au-
gusta or Mobile, he would find fofce in
his front prepared to resist him, and he
would find Hood and his other friends
still in his lear. To fall back, on the
other hand, in the direction of his SUD-
,les, would be equally hazardous. He
you'd, in that case, be compelled to fight
Hood entrenched up to his chin, or to get
lround him by thanking. In the meantime,
forrest is between Hood and Nashville
breaking up the railroads and DESTROYING
ne communications Of every kind. Should
he pass Hood by thanking, he will still
ind it difficult to subsist his army in a
ountry rendered so desolate as that of
'orth Georgia. His only hope, it seems
D us, would lie in reinforcements to
ONE through Nashville from beyond the
'hio. and they would have to run the 4
auntlet of Forrest and the guerrillas.
n fine, We can hardly conceive case in
'hich Sherman will not be reduced to
xtreme difficulty, if the proper vigilance
e used, and the proper men hold the
1t