The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1864-11-26
ANoro.nEBEL VIEW OF AFFAIRS.


ANeLo.nEBEL VIEW Of AFFAIRS.
The London Tines Richmond CORES.
pondent writes, under date Of Oct. 8:
am happy to report far more CONT
dent feeling in Richmond than existed at
the date Of my last letter. IL cannot bede-
MED that when upon the 29th ofSeptember
il SSas discovered in Richmond that Grant
was advancing upon the city With two ar
my corps (the 10th and the 1Stb), aud that
Lee had only handful Of troops 10 resist
the Federals, feeling akin to panic pos
sessed this community. It Is the only in
stance OF panic which, in some experience
or Richmond, can recollect. But the city
slowly and sternlv recovered itself, ard II
3 nothing less than justice to an unpopu-
Tar man to say that no one In Richmond
displayed such firmness and presence OF
mind, and developed such resources at the
Bragg.
LEES DIFFICULTIES.
In many Of my previous letters I have
pointed out to your readers the true disad-
vantages of Lees position q compared
with Grants. As . general illustration 1t
may be said that Lee is on the arc. Grant
On the chord Of q circle; but - this express.
eiOn does not exactly define the position Of
the two armies, whose lines (extending
" -
not pursue any uniform course or inclina-
ton, / will endeavor, at the risk OF repeat
iog what have described many times be-
fore. to make my meaning clearer. Your
readers will understand that, in such an at
titude rs il occupied by the armies Of Lee
and Grant, the army which takes the ini-
tiative, and acts on the aggressive, has an
one-armed prize fighter, who is fighting y
big bully with two arnAs-stronger, taller.
more active and keener-sighted than him.
aelf. The most tempting and prompting
opportunities offer themselves TO him ev-
cry day. 4
twenty lives in = ten.ative operation The
fact OF his great numerical inferiority to
his enemy, and that he Is tethered down,
md forced to keep always large portion
of his army before Petersburg, are disad-
vantaxes equivalent to the loss of an arm
by Q prize-Kghter. Grant, on the other
hand, has, IN the eyes Of those who
rightly survey the ground, such advanta-
;ges as make it astonishing that. In the four
months between the 18th OF June. when he
crossed the James River, and the present
time, he should have made so little use OF
them. In his centre lies the James River,
with its dozen Yankee gunboats and mont
tors, covering the Federal base of opera
tons, and making it unapproachable to
Gen. Lee. It is doubtless with view to
getting still more out of these monitors.
Gen. Butler is cutting, o canal through
Dutch Gap, into which he hopes to tempt
the James River. It is not thought here,
may say par parenlhesc, that any advap-
tage will result to Gen. Buffers comrades
from this canal, even ii contrary to FEEDER
al experience at vicksburg, IL proves q
success. By means of the pontoon bYidg-
e. which connect Bermuda Hundred with
Deep Bottom, Grant can throw any num-
Der of men by night or day to the north or
sdu,h Of the James. 1t is almost impossi-
BILE for Lee to know if Grants demonstra-
tions, whether they threaten Richmond on
the extreme Federal right, or the South
Side Railroad on therextreme Federal left,
are teint or realities. On the other hand,
from the cOntiguraiion Of the ground, it is
almost impossible for Lee to cut Grants
extended lines il any vital place. The
most tempting place to assail those lines
would be somewhere not far from the spot
where Grants mine was sprung. But the
shape Of the ground and the position OF
the forces is such that the lines can only be
attack ed at two or three confined spots ,and
here naturally Grant has defended himself
with triple tiers OF Notifications, and keeps
always strong bodies of men in position.
But the greatest Of all advantages is the
following: From the 4th OF May up to
the present time Lees army has been con-
tinuously in the trenches, either actually
under ire, or at any rate not knowing at
what moment 1t might not be attacked by
q savage and multitudinous foe. The Con-
federates have been tighting.or on the rack,
without intermission, fJr more than five
months. On the other hand, the Federal
General, who knew from the beginning
that Lee was, through the paucity of his
numbers, restricted to acting on the defen-
sive. had it in his power at any moment to
give four ifshs OF mis- army an entire rest.
There was nothing 20 prevent Grants say
great efforts from you on the Goth Of this
month; rest and recruit yourselves until
that day." On the contrary, for one hum
bred and sixty days Lees troops have
known no rest, either by night or day. We
Ill remember how the work in the tren-
ches told upon our officers and privates In
the Crimea; it cannot be wondered at tina,
d far more uninterrupted pressure for more
than Ave months should have told fearful
" upon the poor Confederates, exposed to
one Of the fiercest summers ever known in
Virginia. scan.ily fed upon meat-;1ostly
salt meat-and bread, without vegetables,
with only occasional coffee, with no other
stimuiant, and threatened ceaselessly by
overwhelming numbers, who have at their
command all that a lavish pr0fusion of ex-
penditure and the scientific experience Of
the whole civilized world can contribute
cannot be blind to the fact, as meet Of
1cers and privates from General Lees ar
my, that they are half worn out, and that
though the spirit Is the same as ever, they
urgently need rest. am In hopes that
during the coming winter this rest will not
be denied TO them, as Lees army becomes
stronger; but be that as IL may, am con-
WINGED that when the true history Of the
Confederate campaign in 1854 in Virginia
is written, 1t will record q struggle unsur-
passed in heroism and In the patience and
self. denying endurance OF the troops, since
the time when blood was first split upon
the earth, and man first lifted his hand in
anger against his brother.
III .PETERSBCRG-HOOD.
There Is one plan by which, at the price
Of the bricks and mortar Of Petersburg,
Gen. Lee might curtail the existing pro-
longs,ion of his lines, might assume .
much stronger defensive position, and
considerably increase the difficulties OF his
opponent. That this plan will be adopted,
II occasion requires, is by no means inn
probable, but 50 long as Gen. Lee feels
himself strong enough to hold and protect
/ Petersburg, as well ~ Richmond, he will