Dayton daily empire. [volume] (Dayton [Ohio]) 1850-1865, 1864-04-07

when the Washington Directors of this
War, must look danger in the face, at
most unpleasant nearness Of view. Iney-
table, we say, under the conditions, viz:
that they have been presiding over a revo-
luton, directing and melting it, instead Of
endeayoring to subdue a rebellion, and re-
store the peaceful and legal rule Of the
Constitution and laws. There could have
been no such danger, If Mr.. LINCOLN and
his co-adiutors had been faithful to the su-
preme law of the land. Instead of this,
however, they have pursued unlawful ends
by unlawful means in the South, and with
greater diligence and far more zeal have
wholly revolutionized the Federal Gov
eminent, subverted the Federal Constitu-
ton, broken down the Rights of the States
and instituted the iron rule of military
despotsm in the North. They must en-
counter the perils incident to men in their
position.
Revolutionists are always comparatively
safe, so long as they can WELD the power
essential to the control of events, We
do not mean the control of particular
results, such, for example, as the issue of
a battle. But we mean that they are ex
empt from danger, so long as they may
fight battles, or delay them, or not fight at
all, choosing times and places with abso-
Lutte mastery, and exerting like prerogative
in whatever else is material and essential.
The danger begins when they lose this
mastery, and become themselves the crea-
lures of events, driven hither and thither
by the exigencies of war, of finance, of
popular pressure or discomfort. This is
philosophical truth which, if unheeded
hitherto, the Administration at Washing
ton cannot learn and appreciate too soon.
We may illustrate our meaning. 1t is
not denied that LINCOLN and his subordi-
mates are intensely anxious for the perpetu-
alton of their power. There are those who
intimate that Mr.. LINCOLN is fearful to re-
linquish the authority he wields, apprenen-
sive of reaction which, as private citi-
zen, welding no more the force of an ar
my, and divested of the dungeon keys
which now hang at his girdle, would make
residence anywhere in the United States
unpleasant. This may or may not be so.
But he desires denomination aud Ie-elec-
ton. Now, success in these aspirations is
largely contingent on the battles that may
be fought in Virginia. Should GRANT
| meet with disaster like that of HOOKER
PoPE, or the Butcher of Fredericksburg
the "Commander-in-chie could hardly
p hope to be nominated in the Baltimor,
Convention.
: The taking of Richmond is now con
ceded to be an enterprise of almost insu
perable difficulty. Its practicability i
! doubted by very many competent judges
The attempt to capture is a hazard whicl
i. Mr.. LINCOLN and his subordinates woul,
Il not incur, if they could avoid it. 1t woul
5 be infinitely less damaging, politically, t
o dawdle along through the summer. delay
ing all military movements, ON one preteX
= or another, than to encounter defeat in eve
!. one great battle. Such a policy woul
:. also have the advantage of keeping til
Il soldiery in perfect discipline as voters an
d rulers of the ballot-box. 1t would |
=. mastery inactivity"
e. But Mr.. LINCOLN, granting that such
his desire. is no longer sufficiently mast'
!, of events to adopt this line of policy
= = LEE, with a tremendous army, is too clol
le to Washington, too powerful, and too AZ
4 gressive, for the admission of any thougl
!, = of a peaceful summer. The only altern
tive to terrible fights in Virginia, is Il
n recognition of Confederate independents
ot Personally, to retain the rulership Of VIII
le remains of the Union, LINCOLN mig
q consent to let the South go, but his inf
- " rated and frenzied supporters in the Mort
- would rend him in pieces for such b
trayal of their desires.
This illustrates what we mean by I
VI assertion that Mr.. LINCOLN, and those q
: sociated with him at Washington, are