Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1864-12-22

tNNpUTtuUt I Outt-4tS Supt|C <1WtONtto tC
Nothing-FOrt McAiIiSter ofno Account
The Ftght at CoosaWatchie-PeaeeR ReSo
EutiOnS SAgGin-NOrth CarOLinaR efractOry.
SHERMAN AT SAVANNAH.
From the Richmond Wing, Dec. H..
There is no longer any doubt that Sher-
man has contrived to get through Geor-
gia, and to reach place of safety for him
self and his army. 1t WAS to be hoped that
he might be prevented from accomplishing
| even that much; that he might be annoyed
during his march to such an extent as to
embarrass his foragiug operations and cut
off his supply of food; that his way might
! be obstructed and his progress impeded by
an energetic use of those means which
lay opulently at hand; that the militia of
the country might gather in his front, on
his fllnks, in his rear, and harrass his Wea.
ry troops by night and by day; aud that
finally, by combination of these unpropi-
tious circumstances, he might be brought
to untimely grief.
His apparently slow and languid pro-
gress through Georgia gave force and color
to these expectations, for whereas, accord
ing to his originally contemplated rate of
advance, he should havereached Savannah
in twenty days after commencing his
march, he did not arrive before that place
L Nlll lue plIdLlOu Vi LuOuNu- LAO "u6
delayed twelve days, or long enough to
march hundred and eighty miles, even at
the slow rate adopted by himself. In these
twelve days he might have been dsmolish-
| ed, had the means above suggested been at
hand and jndiciously combined for the
purpose. But it turns out that Shermau's
calculations were, to certain extent, we'll
founded, and that. for various reasons
which, no doubt, had been we'll weighed
by him, it was found impossible for us to
concentrate our forces to combine our eff
forts to involve him in any serious danger.
He has got through Georgia at last, and
that without any material loss.
he is safely established on the sea coast
That much we presume, is settled by the
capture OF Fort McAllister. Aud, after all
it is relief to know exactly how much in
Jury he has inflicted on US, to be able to
proguosticate the contingent results OF his
movement, even at its maximum of prOba-
BILE success, and to estimate with approxi-
mate precision the relative advantages and
disadvantages flowing from his radical
change of military policy. In the first we
find that the Northern press aud the North
ern people were entirely delnded by their
expectations of extraordinary results to be
achieved by General Shermsn'5 arms du-
ring it's march,
The capture of Macon and Augusta did
not illustrate the history of this grand
movement; nor were the Federal prisoners
released from captivity. Ii these formed
any part of Sherman's plan, his campaign
has been a lhmeniabe failure, If they
we're not taken into account, the great
march was comparatively pointless, and
had indeed, far more the character of re.
treat than of an invasion. Neither has
Sherman succeeded in permanently sever
ing, or eVea materially iujuring, any of
our lines of communication.
The strategIst of the New York Times,
who accompanied him on an imaginary
triumphal progress through Georgia and
South Carolina, assisted him in capturing
Augusta and Charleston, helped bin to
break up our rail road CONJUNCTION at
BrauChville, and finally established him
comfortably at Greensborough, must be
very much disgusted to discover that it
was nothing but an Alnaschar day dream;
and that Sherman was really trying to
elude pursuit, until he could communicate
with his fleet, and seat himself before the
comparatively unimpOrtsnt city of Savan-
nah. In fact, instead Of cutting off our
communication with the Gulf States, Sher.
man has restored to ns that main line,
vastly more important than ali the others,
for the possession of which he fought so
many battles, and prosecuted so long ana
so weary campaign.
He gives up all the country from the
Tennessee to the Ocean aud the Gulf, al
most the whole of the conquests of nearly
four years Of bloody struggle, end expects
to gain, in exchange, seaport which has
been for long time closed which com
mands nothing except a small area of
marshy rice land, aud which can serve at
best, only as a base for the renewal from
the ocean side of the scheme OF conquest
(which has ccufessediy rallied from the
lmountsiu side OF the Confederacy- All OF
which would be, in effect, 10 recommence
another four years of war. Aud Savannah
is not taken yet, The. iA.l # Fort Meal
lister does not by any means involve the
fall of Savannah. That post was intended
to guard the Ogechee River against the
landing of a Yankee army approaching
Savannah from that side.
As soon as Sherman arrived before the
fort, il ceased 10 serve any such purpose
1t was in his way only as it prevented him
from communication with the feet. Il
could not be held against him except By
fighting pitched battle for it, and it was
not of sufficient consequence to warrant
such a risk Sherman will now, we sup
pose, begin the siege of Savannah; or whs
the Yankees call a seige that is to say, h'
will establish himself before il and try to
take it in some way. We do not think hI
can carry it by assault, and if he canno
cut of communication aud completely in