The Grand Haven news. [volume] (Grand Haven, Mich.) 1858-18??, 1864-07-20
GEN, MoCLELLAN's FORESIGHT

ne last reDel Invasion OF Mafyianu
furnishes another instance of the peris
which have come upon the country by
the neglect on the part of the administra-
tion Of the warnings given by Gen. Nc.
Ciellan in the first year of the war. Had
the plans of the officer been faithfully
carried out, not one of the invaslons Of
Maryland would have occurred. After
he arrived on the peninsula with his ar
my, and while he supposed Gen. Banks
was still under his command, II will be
remembered that he issued an order to
that officer for his guidance in protecting
Maryland and Washington from any AT
tempt of the rebels by the Shenandoah
valley. He had previous lysent Colonel
Alexander with directions to see if forti-
ficatious could not be thrown up in such
of the gaps of the Blue mountains as
would help detain rebel army march
ing into Maryland from that direction.-
General Banks was directed to post his
troops at certain points. He was also or
dered to keep his cavalry constantly in
motion down the valley of the Shenando-
all, so as to be warned of any approach
of the rebels. This order was dated
March ls, 1862; before, in fact, the ac-
tual opening of the second campaign Of
the war. When the administration re-
lieved General Mcclellan of control over
General Banks army they entirely,
looked the wise precautions which he
took in guarding the back door to Wash
iugton. In fact, this Shenandoah valley
is the true gate for an invasion of the
North, as the rebels subsequently discoy-
cred, aud as General McClellan's wise
prescience had foreseen. When Mr. Lin.
coin himself took the control of the ar
mics out of the hands Of General McClel-
Ian, in addition to ordering the latter Of
ficer to approach Richmond from the
North, he also detached troops from the
Army Of the Potomac, which were sorelv
needed-those under McDowell---to pro.
lect, as he said, Washington. But where
did he place these troopsl In the She
nandoah valley? No; they were located
at Fredericksburg, at which point they
we're of about as much use rs they would
have been in Portland, Maine. The forty
thousand men under General Mcdowell
were utterly thrown away, rs was discov-
cred when Stonewall" Jackson made
bis first famous raid up the valley, driv-
ing back Banks to the Potomac river
The troops of General Mcdowell were
utterly useless. General" Lincoln had
ingeniouslv managed to deplete our army
by just forty thousand men. They were
denied to General Mcclellan, and put in
position where they were of not the
slightest use in defending Washington.
The curious reader who will peruse
General McClelan's official report will
know how clearly he foresaw, before the
campaign opened, that the Shenandoah
valley was The true line of approach up
on Washington. He will also remark
how far-seeing were the preparations he
made to prevent the rebels ever getting
beyond Chester or Aide gaps. If the
reader will follow still further the course
of the campaign in Virginia, be will find
that what General Mcclellan foresaw be-
fore the campaign opened, the admins
tratiun las not been able to see to this
day. They have not only failed to heed
the positive warnings Of General McClel-
Ian, but they have also failed to profit by
the bitter experiences of the three years
Of war. Time and again have the rebel
armies surged up the Shenandoah valley,
carrying desolation to the, homes Of the
people.of Maryland and Pennsylvania, and
striking terror throughout the whole
North because Of the menace 10 the Capt.
tai; yet to this day even the slightest
precautions have not been taken to guard
against this disaster. Every time the
rebels have advanced upon the valley they
have not only not been impeded, but,
through the most profound stupidity, the
administration has collected stores Of all
kinds at Martinsburg for their special ac-
commodation. We believe il can be prov
ed that in their various raids up the val
ley the rebels bave been able to procure
| II