Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-07-21

Gen. Hooker, the Confederate commander pro
ceeded to project new invasion of the North, via
this same valley of the Shenandoah From fail
The part of our military authorities to occu
py in this quarter the proper points of observa.
tion and from their failure to place in the positions
actually occupied the requisite military talent and
skill, the country again called to blush at the
disgracefu stampede of Milroy which preceded the
irruption of the enemy into Maryland. Winches-
terwas evacuated with John Gilpin speed; and eigh-
teen feld.pieces, $500 muskets, and large quan
tity of ammunition were left behind by the fugi-
tives--a valuable gift to the invading enemy.
| After such repeated ex perience of the military
relations held by this valley to the safety of Wash
ington and to the success of imper ding operations
against Richmond, it might have been supposed
that military directors with as little perspica-
city as ours have shown themselves to possess,
| would notfor the fourth time permit mismanage-
ment in this valley to lay stone of stumbling and
rock Of offence in the way of the campaign. And
yet the illustration we have just had of the want
of forecast which has been signazed by the COM
duct of the war in this quarter surpasses in it's
proportions any thing we have yet been called to
witness. Let US analyze the elements of the inva-
sion which has just ended in the raising of I" the
siege Of Washington"
1t is obvious to the most unmilitary mind that
in order to guard the side approach to Washing
ton via the Shenandoah Valley, post of observa-
tion should be selected at such pointin the
valley shall enable the force which occupies it to
discern the approach of danger in time to guard
against the descent of the blow and to calculate its
probable weight wherever it may fall. Before
starting cut on the campaign against Richmond in
the spring of 1862 Gen Mcclellan was careful to
March 10th, in that year, he wrote to Gen. Banks
(who had been selected to watch the valley) as
follows:
Your first care will be the rebuilding of the railway
from Washington to Manassas and to Strasburg ia order
to open your communications with the valley Of the She
nsndoah. As the Manassas Gap railway is in
ming order enreDch brigade of infantry say four regi
ments with two batter es, at the point Dhere the
rai,oap the Shenandoah. Something like two
regiments Of cavalry should bs left in that vicinity
occupy Winchester, and thoroughly the country
south Of the raii,ooy and up the Shenandoah Vailey,
,cctl through Chester Cap hich might perhaps be ad
pantageonsiy occupied by detachment # infantry pe
enrencd Block khouses should be built at all the rail-
way bridges Occupy by grand guards Warrenton june
ton and Warrenton ITSELF and also some little
sdvsnc pont the Orange and Alexandria railroad
soon as the railway bridge is repaired.
"Great activity should be observed by the cavalry. Be-
sides the two regiments at Manassas another regiment Of
cavalry will be at your disposal to scout toward the Oc-
coquan, and probably fourth toward Leesburg
ITO recapituaie the most important points which
should engage your attention are follows:
al A strong force, well entrenched in the vicinity Of
Manassas perhaps Centrevle, and another force
"a brigade,) also well entrenched, near strasburg.
"2. Block houses at the railway bridges
"3 Constant employment of the cavalry well to the
front.
"A Grand guards at Warrenon junction and in advance
far as the Rappshaunock, if poss BILE
80 Great to be exercised to obtain full and early
information 10 the enemy.
&c. The general object is 10 the line Of the Po
tomac aud Washington" ="
We all know how these prudential arrangements
of Gen. Mcclellan were broken up by the mill
tary powers which undertook the direction of
the war after he had been removed from his
previous control of its operations. And since that
date these prudential measures, as respects the
Shenandoah Valley, have never been re-cstablshed,
for no other reason, as far as we can perceive,
than that to re-establish them might be construed
by somebody into tribute to Gen. McClellan's
military sagacity in selecting point of observation
like Chester Gap, midway on the eastern border of
the valley, where the approach of danger would
be perceived in time to meet and check it at Har-
per's Ferry, instead Of some point on the Upper
Potomac, where, with such officers as the military
administration habitually stations there, the ap-
proach Of danger is known to the country only by
a stampede of our forces from Winchester Will
Transport, or Harper's Ferry, and by pauic of
the authorities in Washington, who, knowing
nothing with regard to the movements or magni-
tude of the invading forces, fall an easy prey to
every idle and vagrant rumor which vexes the
atmosphere in time of alarm and uncertainty
The unknown is always portentous. Iu the absence
Of the definite confgurations revealed to the mind
by assured knowledge, the startled imagination,
while bindly gropiog in the dark, peoples all space
with "gorgons, hydras, and cbimeras dire" Even
so brave heart a, that of King Richard in tho
play of our Great Dramatist, was appalled, by
shadows" as he exclaims:
"Fy the apostle Paul. shadows tonight
Have struck more terror to the soul Of Richard
Ihau can The substance Of ten thousand soldiers
Armed in proof
And so, during the last few days, we have seen
the Administration starting at spoctres, uttering
panic cries Of alarm, and with its hands palsied by
imaginary terrors, simply because it had neglected