Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1864-10-27

practicablity or expediency of military movement
In particular directions. Gen. Mcclellan, it seems
relied sometimes upon the professional opinions Of
Gen. Barnard in forming his conclusions, and fol
thus trusting him this officer now charges Gen
Mcclellan with nothing less than manifest inca
pacity. BE appears to think that Gen. McClel
Ian should have known at the time that his advice
was utterly worthless, and that as such it should
not have been allowed any weight in deciding
military questions.
For instance, in his "review," Gen. Barnard
imputes it rs . fault to Gen. Mcclellan that he
allowed +" the blockade of the Potomac" to take
place and to endure during the winter of lS6l-62.
He omits to state that it was partly by his advice,
given in his professional character as an engineer
that the attempt to dislodge the enemy from his
positions on the Potomac was not made. To this
effect he wrote:
The operation involves the forcing of very strong
to do we're really opening campaign against them
there true we hope to force this line by turning it,
by landing on FreestOne point With reason to believe
that this may be successful 1t cannot be denied that it in
wolves risk of failure Should Os then considering all
the hch may inUOlDed into the opera
tion merely to capture the Potomac batteries think
not"
So also Ger. Barnard complains in his " review"
that Gen. Mcclellan did not order an immediate at
tack Of the enemy's works at Yorktown when he ar
rived before them early in April, 1862. GAS to the
propriety of assaulting these ines," he nom says
I" if there ever was case in which such astep
WAS not merely justifable and advisable, but de-
manded by the circumstances, it was surely this"
All chances of the success Of the campaign, he
says, turned upon not being delayed at York
town." In his "ofioial report" written under
date of January 27, 1868, nearly year after the
occurrence of the event in question, he advances
the same opinion. But in this political " review"
he denies what in his official report he admits,
that the decision of Gen. Mcclellan not to order
an immediate attack was made in concurrence
with his professional opinion given at the time.
Gen. Mcclellan having stated in his report that
the Chief Engineer of the Army of the Potomac
had "expressed the judgment that those works
could not with anyreasonable certainty be carried
by assault" Gen. Barnard now writes in his poll
tical pamphlet that he "beeves there must be some
error in that assertion" (p. 22) forgetting that
every honest inquirer for TRUTH by turning to page
62 Of his official report As printed by Van Nos
trand, under the authors superintendent, would
be able to read as follows:
Hooeper may be committed TO any oppression of pro
ssional opinion the contrary Il certainly did suggest
t) my opinion is that the lines OF Yorktown should
have been assaulted"
It will thus be seen that Gen. Barnard here ac-
knowledges himself to have been committed by his
professional opinion" (gven at the time) against
the expediency of making assault on the enemy's
lines ut Yorktown. In his "review," now dsse-
minated as political document, he denies that he
ever gave such an opinion. In the year 1859 he
says he did give such " professional opinion but
that it was an erroneous one. In the year 1854 he
says, "there must be some error in the assertion
of Gen. Mcclellan that he gave such an opinion.
The reader can easily perceive where the " error I"
lies.
In order to expose the utter recklessness and
falsity of the representation which Gen. Barnard
now makes in first denying that he ever advised
against reducing the enemy's works at Yorktown
by siege rather than by an assault, and in then
blaming Gen. Mcclellan for taxing the former
course, we need but invite the attention of our
readers to the following extract from his official re-
port, made to Gen. Totten under date Of May g.,
1852. We quote from the report as published by
Van Nostrand, under the authors supervision,
(p. H1 }
"The line s certainly Of the most extensive known
to modern times The country both sides Of the War
wick from Yorktown down, is dense forest with
few cearngs 1t was swampy, and the roads impossible
during the heavy rains we have continually had except
where lsbors had corduroyed them III could
have broken the enemys line the ishmus could
have invested Yorktown, and it must with its garrison
have fallen into hands not deemed prac.
cable considering the strength Of that line and the difficulty
Of handling forces, (oong the pracieab character
drive the enemy out of Yorktown the enemys lines were
longer enabe This could do BY siege operations,
and the result mg mind certainty. deemed
too hazardous TO attempt the reduction Of the place By
SAUL"
And with what face this engineer can noo pre-
sumo to make it reproaoh to Gen. Mcclellan that
he preferred to reduce these works by siege rather
than by direct and immediate assault may be
read in the closing words of this same report, writ
ten on the 9th Of May, 1862, when the siege had
just closed and when besides, its events being fresh
in his mind, he had no motive to misrepresent
them. He then wrote:
"The forcing of such line with little loss s in itself
exploit less brilliant, perhaps but oorhy study
than ioomd hape been murderous assault, II it had
proptd inccessfui."