, 1864-03-05
Qbtcago Grtbnue.
SATURDAY, MARCH S, 1864.


SATURDAY, MARCH S, 1864.
TIE MILITARY SITUATION.
The military plan begins slowly to develop
itecn. And us usual, nt certain point In the
proceedings, the sense Of danger begins to
ovcrl,owcr hope, md the feeling Of conf
dcnco to mingle' with and be swallowed by
the stronger feeling Of concern. With
good many irons In the fire some ofthem arc
liable to get triac too hot.
Sherman holds the central position. HIS
advance has been for q time reported az oei.
ma, but now VIC begin to hear that nc - 6tla
between MERIDIAN and the Tombigbec RTer,
and that he is partially fortified. Or course,
If Ills niyaacc Is for my cause arrested either
pc.maucut1y or temporarily, he has fortified;
Tor Sherman is TOO good soldier to expose
himself necd]cssly. But there Is evidently no
causc at tllis distance for such apprchensions
concerning him % are telegraphed to the
New York Words he il strong enough for
amy forces known to be in his vicinity; and
If the report Ia correct that Logan has Joined
him witl, q cavalry force, he Is in condition
TO take care Of himself. Even should he
think itprudent to retreat there isno known
cause why he cannot, rs easily as he advanced,
especially Il, he has not yet crossed the
Tombigbee.
II he is at Selma, then 1t Is plain that he
will have to be looked after; aud our suppo~
sition is, TINT looking after him is Just what
General Grant is and has been doing
this fifteen days past. He will need
10 be supported. How? Possibly In two
why's; certainly in one. He may need rein
forcemcnts. He will certain need provisions
and supplies. There are three suppssablc
ways Of reinforcing him One, and the most
natural, is by the same route Of his advance
from Vicksburg. a force might, or might
not get to him, down the Mobile d Ohio
Railroad. Smith and Grierson failed in that
direction. by having too smnu q command.
With double their force they would have
gone through. But 1t is By no means essen
tial 10 reach him in that direction; and Smith
and Grierson probably served . purpose as
truly as1f they had accomplished nll they cs-
saycd. They kept force larger than their
own from joining Polk. As to getting. sup
plies to Sherman down that road, as the
Woa7d = telegram talks OF, II is all bosh.
Sherman never relied on that road, nor has it
ever been in our possession.
He may also be reinforced by Grant, direct
from Chattanooga-only supposlng Thomas
to put Johnston out Of the way, at Dalton
and Atlanta. But this supposes fighting, or
iootEaclng, and VIC seem likely to know
which is the order Of the day, pretty soon.
But the real significance Of Sherman's sd-
vance to the Alabama River is involved in his
support from third direction Farragat, We
suppose to be tbumping away at Msbile. We
hear nothing Of him since the report TINT he
was repllsed from Grants Pass; and which
may have been repulse, but is much more
likely amere examination Of his, and which
may, or may not be more seriously repeated
there. In some way or ether, he is hound, Il
possible to go into the Alabama River, and
once there with few vessels, he will fine
Sherman, unless prevented By obstacles above
Mobile With Ills SUCCESS, or with that O.
Thonlns at Dalton, Sherman is secure bctwecz
the rivers
But le may necd supplies before the ques
tion is settled either by Fazragut or Thomas
There are two ways Of his getting them
First, by the route from yicksburg, and
second, from the country In which he ope1
rites. How far he may depend on the conn
try will hinge upon two things; first, on til
abundance wilick rcigns in that region. "
have been hearing that Central and southerl
Georgia+Was 1he 1and OF plenty for the Con
frdcracy. Al the war has not before visite
that region, we may believe tlis to be in
measure true. Then the question is as to hi
strength and ability to put the county unde
tribute to himself How far can the rebel
concentrate troops upon him, to hem him I,
and ha1ass him.. This will depend upon tn
extent to whfef they arc kept alarmed an'
lively by activity in our armies elsewhere
AS relevant to this question, We may So
that the Florida Expedition, under Gilmore
mny have been unsuccessful; but II it ha
kept force a good deal larger than his owl
occupied, and away from Sherman. it ma
have answered n good purpose after ALL Th
same is true OF That Of Smith and GriersoI
Then VIC have activity in East Tennessee
Schofield cbasee Longstreet. Our forct
move upon Tunnel Hill, and impinge haz
upon Dalton. or coursc, Johnston can aGor
no help to Polk, who must manage the Ya1
Eees MS he can. Thou. too, the POtomn
Army Is bestirTing itself, aud Richmond
for the fortieth time Threatened. And what
ever comes ot 1t, The troops which protect
must he kept there, II indeed others are nc
called to their aid. Thus we see that She
man is aided by activity every where.
The policy Of sci1ing and holding pos
uon In the heart OF Georgia is so man1fes
that VIC cannot for moment believe the WI
Department will suffer 1t to fail, If 1t is po
siblc to carry It through Sherman must +,
all events be supported. He is supported /
conaexion with Thomas, OF Farragut,
somebody else moving on his own route
his connexion. This latter support is, ho,
ever, but temporary. The ultimate reliant
is on that River; and one hope is thut IL
time hos come to takc It and keep possession
The country would like to hear from Mr. FL
ragut!