, 1864-12-16
Specific Contract Decision.

As STEPHENS
"Suit was brought on three promissory
notes given by defendant last Spring,
amounting, with the interest accrued, to-
about the sum of SO, 600, the notes specif-
caIIy providing for payment to be made by
defendant in gold and silver coin. The de-
fendant proved that he, last August, ten
dered plaintiff the amount of principal and
interest then due, in Legal Tender Notes,
which were refused by the plaintiff who
brought suit for com, under the provisions
of the law to authorize courts to enforce the
payment of specific contracts passed since
tender was thus made The Court decided
that this Act was valid under the laws of
Congress, and awarded judgment for pay
ment in gold and silver, as contracted in the
notes, holding that tender made last August
was not bar to the operation of the law in
this case, and did not defeat the recovery at
this time This is the first judgment rem
dered under the new law, and the decision
of the Court touches several important
points, and affords precedent that may be
valuable to persons, generally, as well as to
courts.
The effect of this decision if finally sus-
tanned, will be to enforce payment in gold
and silver coin in all cases whether contracts
were entered into before or after the passage
of the contract law. If no contract existed
between the creditor and debtor, previous to
the passage of the act, still the debtor under
the operations of this decision, would be
compelled to pay the creditor in gold and
silver, if exacted by the latter. 1t would
appear that the law by this construction is
c.c post tacto in its nature. 1t relates
back in its operation and may compel pay
ment in coin where debts existed prior to
the passage of the law and where no agree
ment or understanding was made as to the
kind of currency to be paid; and inasmuch
as greenbaek currency was equally legal
tender the same as gold and silver, before
the passage of the specific contract act, it
stands to reason that the legal tender notes
should be made acceptable for debts in all
eases and up to the time that the specific
contract law went into effect. 1t appears
from the decision rendered in the case of
"Bloom vs. Stephens" that the court made
the decision without reference to the legal
tender act of Congress, and just as if that
act never had any real existence. The de-
eision pays no respect to the legal tender
law, at any stage of its existence, and it
makes man pay in gold and silver for
debts contracted back to the time the legal
tender law was supposed to have gone into
operation. In short, the decision treats the
greenbaek law as nullity, having no prac-
tical force or validity
1t must be perfectly plain to every one
that Congress in passing the legal tender
law acted with view to making the green
back notes as legal currency as either gold
or silver, with the exceptions named on the
back of the notes. Now if these notes are
lawful money and "legal tender for debts,
public and private, it is nonsense for an in
dividual to attempt to enforce the payment
of debts in specified kind of money; for if
the T. S. Supreme Court sustains the act of
Congress, S5 note is as lawful tender as
Is S. in gold coin, and the one kind of
currency represents as much as the other
by national enactment. No distinction is
made between gold and silver in the pay
ment Of debts, aud man can make payment
in either or both kinds of coin, at his own
option; so, if the greenback note is lawful
u S. money, it becomes she duty of the
United States to make it good for the pay
ment of debts the same as if it were coin.
There can be no way to justify the States
in the matter of passing specific contract
laws except upon the principle that they
hold the greenback law of Congress to be
unconstitutional; that Congress has no pow
er to make other than gold and silver le-
gal tender. Daniel Webster, the great ex-
FOUNDER of the Constitution, held to this
doctrine Yet, if the U. S. Supreme Court
shall decide that the legal tender law is valid
then all specific contract laws in relation to
the currency at once become invalid, and
the States that should retain such acts upon
their statute books after and in defiance of
the supreme Court decision, would stand in
opposition to the general government as null
lifying and seditious communities. We be-
lieve that the specific contract laws and the
decisions Of the courts of the Pacific coast in
reference thereto are based upon the belief
that the legal tender act is unconstitutional
and that it will be 80 decided by the highest
court Whenever the matter is properly brought
before that tribunal Until the question is
finally decided, the complications growing
out of the specific contract acts and the de-
cisions of inferior courts, promise to increase
until the whole matter becomes complete
muddle.
JUsrrIABLE HomcIDE.-The Coroner's Jury