The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-04-08

SA4Sy coy e4A 0OAn 10 W UolCAA0 vASh0VAA ~
Breckenridge to make his way to Kentucky,
Price to attack Iuka or 60 to Tennessee. If
Prices forces are at Iuka. the plan propose Is
to move up close as we can tonight, conceal
our movements and to advance from Burns
vile, commence the attack and draw their at
tention that way, while / move In on the Full
ton road, and crushing in their left cutting off
their retreat eastward.
propose to leave in ten minutes for Jacinto,
whence viii dispatch you by line of videttes
to Burnsville. VIII wait few minutes to
hear from you before start. What news from
lsignedS W. s. RosECRANs, Brig. Gen.
To which was sent the following in re-
ply;
BuRNsyILLE, MISS, Sept. Is, 1861. +
Gen. Rosecrans:
Gen. Ross command is at this place. Nc
Arthur's division is north of the road, two miles
to the rear, and Davis division south of the
road sent forward two regiments of infant
ry with cavalry in the road north of railroad
towards Iuka, with instructions tOthem to bi
vouac for the night at q point which was de-
signated about four miles from here, if not in
terrupted, and have the cavalry feel where the
enemy are. Before they reached the point on
the road, (you will see on the map-the road
north of the railroad) they met what was sup
RObCu W Oc AtuotiOi . 4AC lCuCl
cavalry was forced back, and sent instructions
then to have them stop for the night where
they thought they could safely hold. In the
morning troops will advance from here at AZ
A. M. An anonymous dispatch, just received,
states that Price, Magruder and Breckenridge
have force of 10000 between Iuka and Tri-
pelo. This, have no doubt, is the under
standing of citizens, hut very much doubt
their information being correct. Your recon-
noissances prove that there is but little force
south of Corinth, for q long distance, and no
great force between May Spring and the rail-
road. 9i
Make as rapid an advance as you can. and
let us do tomorrow all we can. 1t may be
necessary to fall back the day following. /
look upon the showing of a cavalry force so
near us as an indication of retreat, and they
force to COVERT. 6.45, T. NJ.
(SigneO u. s. GRANT, Maj. Gen.
After midnight the following dispatch
was received:
aAes HEADoUARrEKs ENcAMpMENr,l
$50 Sept. 10, 1862.
GENERAL-Your dispatch received. STAN
ley's division arrived after dark, having been
detained by falling in the rear of Ross through
fault Of guide. Our cavalry six miles this side
of Bunett's: Hamilton's first Brigade8 second
Brigade miles this side; SANKEY'S near Day.
exports mills. We shall move as early as
PItCtlCstUit, Ssty t>2 n. VI. Ills Will give LWCU-
ty miles march for Stanley to Iuka. Shall not
therefore be in before one or two o'clock, but
when We come in will endeavor to do it
strongly. , n4
(Signed) VS.. ROSECRANs,
Brigadier General U. s. A.
Receiving this dispatch as did late at
night and when | supposed these troops
were far on their way towards Iuka, and
had laid my plans accordingly, caused
some disappointment and made change of
plans necessary. l Immediately dispatched
Gen. Ord, giving him the substance of the
above and directions not to move on the
enemy until Rosecrans arrived, or he,
should hear firing to the south of Iuka. Of
this change Gen. Rosecrans was promptly
informed by dispatch sent with his return
messenger. During the day Gen. Ord re-
turned to my headquarters at Iuka, and in
consultation we both agreed that it would
be impossible for Gen. Rosecrans to get
his TROOPS up in time 10 make an attack
that Gay. The General was Instructed,
however, to move forward, driving in the
enemy 8 advance guards, but moi to bring
Oh an engagement unless he should hear
firing. At night another dispatch was re.
ceived from Gen. RosecraEs dated from
Burnetta, about eight miles from Iuka,
writing at 12:40P M stating that the
head of column arrived there at 70 M.
Owing to the density of the forests and
the difficulty of passing the small streams
AMI bottoms, all communications between
Gen. Rosecrans and myself had to pass far
arouDd-near to Jacinto-even after he
had got on the road leading North. For
this reason his communication was not re
ceived until after the engagement | did
not near OF the engagement, however,
until the next day, although the following
dispatch had been promptly forwarded:
HEADeUARTERs ARMY OF THE M1ssrss1r ~
Two Miles South of Iuka,
Sept. 10, 1S62-1015 P. NJ.
GENERAI-We met the enemy in force just
above the Point. The engagement lasted sew
eral hours. We have losLrtwo or three pieces
of artillery. Firing was very heavy You
must attack in the morning and in force The
ground Is hOrrid-unknown to us, and no room
for development. Couldn't use our artillery at
all; fired but few shots. Push in upon them
until we can have time to do something We
will try and get a position on our right, which
will take Iukn. 9.i ~ l8 fi,a
(Signed) w. s. RosECRANs,
49, Brigadier General u 8. A.
This dispatch was received at 1886 A. NJ
on the goth, and the following wa. irnme-
diately sent: aair
s BuRNsvILLE Sept. 20, 1S62-S:35 a. NJ
& GENERAL. ORD: Get your troops up to at
tack as soon as possible. Rosccrans had two
hours fighting last night aud now this morn
ing again. and unless you can create diver
sion in his favor, he may find his hands full.
Hurry up your troops all possible.
(Signed) 500 U. s. GRANT, Major Gen.
The statement that the engagement had
commenced again in the morning was on
the strength of hearing artillery. General
Ord, hearing the same, pushed on with all
possible dispatch, without awaiting orders.
Two of my staff, Colonies Dickey and
lLagrow, had gone around to where Gen.
Rosecrans was, and were with him during
the early part of the engagement. Re-
turning in the dark, and endeavoring to
cut off some OF the distance, they became
lost and sntangled in the woods and re-
manned out'over night, arriving at head
quarters next morning about the same
hour that Gen. Rosecrans' messenger ar
rived. For the particular troops engaged,
and the part taken by each regiment, /
will have to refer you entirely to the ac-
9. mpanying reports of those officers who
N