The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-08-25

that numbers Of our vessels could not catch
a single pirate, which, only few hours before,
had burned OF scuttled several coasters. The
best chance which we recollect as ever having
been afforded to our gunboats, was that when
some Of them lying In ChesapealeJ Bay
were apprised Of the presence Of pirate by
tug, which had cast of her tow just out
side Of the Capes. Ordinarily, when a vessel
has been captured, IL has not been until the
landing of the passengers from a small prize or
from q neutral vessel that aught has been
known Of what had been transpiring almost
within sight Of our shores. The whole of the
time after the destruction ofa captured vessel
may have been devoted 10 escape. But the
tug brought information about the pirates
presence, not only before the work Of destruc-
tion was finished, but actually before 1t COM
menced; and as the boat was steamer, the
news was carried quickly.
The interval, therefore, which elapsed be-
tween the time of the pirates appearance and
our knowledge OF her presence was, in that
instance, very much less than usual. Yet the
vessel was not caught; she was not even
sighted. Suppose that, after the destruction OF
her prize, she Immediately put to sea. BY the
time that our vessels arrived Off the Capes Of
the Chesapeake, she was probably topmast
| down below the horizon. Astern Of our yes
sells there was a continent, yet they had still
one hundred and eighty degrees within which
TO choose a water course One hundred and
| eighty courses for three or four vessels, or for
q dozeni
We are perfectly aware that we are putting
the case In rather an extreme way, and that
in practice there are generally less number
| Of courses within which TO decide, because
circumstances known by us generally restrict
the choice. For instance, we may know that
a vessel needs repairs or coal, or that she is
in search Of consort.
After vessel has appeared on the coast
and committed depredations, she always dis
appears for time. The question, therefore,
should never be as to what course she took,
but as to her probable destination. She sub
ordlnates her course to her safety. Fre-
quently she is reported TO steer away on a
particular course. There Is only one con-
tingency where such course would be pre-
; served; and that Is, her commanders belief
that the pursuer would fancy it to be ruse.
We may rest assured that II, upon information
Of pirates presence near the coast, our ships
proceed with the view of giving chase, that
the vessel will elude them. The reason Is
plain. Immediately after committing depre-
dations she makes her best speed to sea, to
avoid the consequences of unwonted vigilance
at the point of the coast where she made the
attack. For correlative reason, her next
essay will be made in the place where she con-
ceives that we will be least prepared.
These attempts on our coast can be properly
met only by defense corresponding with the
nature Of the attack. They cannot be counter
acted by endeavoring to make a stern chase,
but by endeavoring to entrap the vessel by
taking the shortest courses to those places
among which we believe that her next desti-
nation will be found.
AS to the probable destination of the Talla-
hGssee we have some useful data. She took
in a certain quantity of coal at Halifax, and
the prisoners she made agree in stating that
she was short of coal. Her officers inquired
| particularly about the fishermen in the Bay
Chaleur. AS she could not get much coal,
the probability Is that she will not try any
more experiments on our coast. AS her
officers inquired openly about the fishermen
in the Bay Chaleur, the probability is that she
will not go there.
But as nothing should be risked in such
case, whichever of our vessels could have first
reached Bay Chaleur should have been des-
patched. Four vessels on the track to Europe,
four on that to the Bahamas, one vessel to
cruise off Portland, and three vessels to cruise
at hazard along the coast, would appear to be
the best possible disposal OF a force of thirteen
vessels, and that is the number stated to have
been sent after the Tallahassee. We do not
know that disposition OF our vessels similar
to the one indicated has not been made. We
are merely illustrating our plan by suggesting
measures which appear to be applicable to the
probabilities of the Tdlldhdssees destination.
With discreetly selected commanders, upon
! whom rowing commissions should be conferred,
we feel quite sure that the enemy would not
SO often succeed in deceiving US as to which
hand it is in"