Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-06-06
GRAVITY OF rHK SITUATION

BALTIMORE, May 81
Those people who. when the war broke out.
believed il would ony be a little affair Of sixty
or ninety DAYS, who have Geluded themselves
with the Oft-expoded fables of the starvation and
exhaustion Of The rebels. and who have educated
themselves into the belief that the rebellion is
at It's last gasp-such people may amuse them
selves now by believing that because Grants
army j. within eighteen miles Of Richmond.
therefore the campaign against that city is virtu-
ally over, and that the hero OF Iicksburg has
little else 70 do than % enter the streets OF the
rebel capital IN triumph. But intelligent people,
men who DO not wish 70 deceive others nor to be
themselves deceived, people who have watched
the progress OF TIE war and studied It's develop
ments in the light Of history-sueh people honor
General Grant and bis gallant army for the sue
cess which has up 70 this time attended bis efforts,
and feel that there il good reason 10 hope, row
that he has abandoned the overland route and
adopted the line marked out by Gen Mcclellan,
that the great object OF the campaign will be at
tanned. But at the same time they see that there
| is abundant ground for the most serious apDre-
tensions of possible disaster. At this moment,
therefore, when the eyes Of all intelligent and
thoughtful men are turned toward Grants army,
with hopes. but also with anxious solicitude, it
may not be out Of place 10 communicate some
! facts in relation TO the subject which | have
learned to-day from sources not usually accessi-
| BILE
| THE REBELS EXPECTED TO SIZE GRANT WHERE HE Is
According to the accounts which receive,
there is neither trepditon nor exultation in the
minds Of the rebel leaders at Richmond They
are aware of the gravity OF the situation; they
are calm and their calmness is not that OF de
SPAR. They profess 10 believe need not say
that-they 90 believe, that they have good
grounds to be satisfied with the situation as it
now exists. Ii YOU will refer 10 my letters a.
far back as April IA, you will see it is there
stated that even at that early day the rebels be-
lieved that when Gen. Grant moved toward
Richmond it would be by the peninsula route.
| Even the elaborate work that was being expended
at that time in fortilyiDg Cupepper Court House,
so as 20 make il a vast depot for the supply of
our army, could not make them have SO mean
an opinion of General Grants military judgment
as 10 believe that he would attempt ali overland
campaign. They see that Gen. Grants army is
now where it might just as well have been two
weeks ago, without the loss of a man. the men
fresh and vigorous; and they know that the
adoption, persistence in. and fnal abandonment
of the overland route. has cost Gen. Grant
| loss of fifty thousand men-fity thousand men
who might have been with him to-day.
HOW THEIR GREAT PERIL WAS AvKRTED
| Their great peril was when fifty thousand yete
teran troops, with two of the ablest generals in
the North. landed on the south side of the James
river, and advanced against the southern deienses
| of the city-defenses which have not one, but
two weak points, which General Gilmore would
have found out in less than three days But this
peril was averted from them by no less person
age than the President of the United States,
through the faithful and loyal henchman and ri
val for the accession, the he hero of Big Bethel.
REBEL ESTIMATE or POLITICAL INFLUENCE AT
WASHINGTON.
The rebel leaders do not vet know why Gen.
Grant adopted the overland route. They do not
believe that he depended General Sigel for the
| accomplishment OF any object that was essential
to the success OF the grand campaign. They at
tribute it. more than anything else. TO the fact
| which they suppose exists that General Grant is
not the supreme commander OF the northern ar
mics; that the President and his political friends
still interfere with the commanders in the field ;
and that the political influence which prevails at
Washington demanded that the march should be
made overland, the same that il demanded that
Butler should command the James river move
ment that Sgel should conduct the Shenandoah
| valley movement, and that General Mcclellan
| should not lead the army of the Potomac, al
though General Grant earnestly entreated the
President to restore him TO that command.
HOW THE REBELS HAVE IMPROVED THE TIME WHICH
THE OVERLAND CAMPAIGN AFFORDED THEM
But they know what the consequences Of that
movement have been we all know They know
what it has cost us in men. They know that il
has given to them three or four weeks of pre-
cious time. at period when each day was 90
them of priceless worth. for 1t was time which
was given to them after Gen Grants plans were
unmasked. after his line of march had been
adopted, after bis operations a certain line had
haf fhraa be-
some of their papers have since boasted was all
they wanted. They have improved it as we of
the North would have improved it. If we be-
lieved, as they do that the success of the honest
cause and the fate of that is dear 20 US, depend
ed on doing so In a word they have improved
that time with all the energy of the Southern ma
ture when aroused, and to the utmost extent of
their resources. Some damage was undoubtedly
done To some OF their railroads during the time
But this, while it could not be prevented, had
been foreSeen and provided for Construction
trains, with lay gangs Of experienced work men.
and with all the needfu materials and appliances
were kept ready. day and night, at convenient
points. These were at once put in requisitiOn
and the result was that all the damage was speed-
lily and substantially repaired. From every quar-
ter where they could be spared the telegraph
summoned troops to Richmond. Every dav. for
three weeks past. the railroads coming TO Rich
"
trains loaded with troops. And there IS now as
sembled, at and near the rebel capital far
greater force than has ever before been there.
THE FLANK MOVEMENT FLANKED NOTHING.
The rebel view of the recent flank movements
IS ingenious and curious, and NAV be useful to
the future historian and biographer 1t i. ac-
cording 20 my authority As follows: Bv the use
OF means well known To all commanders Gen
Lee became aware of Gen Grants intention TO
move his army from the line of the Pc TO the
North Anna, before the movement began In
pursuance of the rebel plans (which we're brief
~ TO interpose all possible obstacles in General
Grants path. and TO infict as much damage on
him as possible: plans which they claim have
been pretty well carried out.) it thus became ne
cesSary Tor Gen. Lee 10 evacuate his strong posi-
ton on the line of the Pc, and thus a simple
strategic movement on the part of Gen Grant
accomplished what FIVE great battles had failed
TO do But, having the advantage of shorter
lines. and timely knowledge of Gen Grants in
tended movements. the rebel General Was able 10
get TO his new position between the North and
South Anna before our army arrived NJ the
former stream. In this new position. Gen Lee
could have maintained himself even longer than
he bad on the Pc. Gen. Grant was convinced of
this fact His movements on and across the
North Anna the 23d. oath. and Goth, were
reccnu0isSsnces in force
GRANTS INTENDED MOVEMENT BAFFLEp By LIE
But Grant intended. if he was able. to keep