The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-01-15
MCLELLAN'S REPORT.
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OBJECTS OF THE WAR.
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Important Memorandum Of Mcclellan
on Assuming Command.
o~D~~~~>~~~~~~>~~~~~>~s>N
What His Plans Were as
General-ln- Chief.
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Instructions to Generals Burnside, Halleek,
Buell., Sherman and Butler,
a., &e. ~

hutll, Nlerlnan ana butl6fs
General Mcclellan the 4h August 1861 addressed
to the President the following memorandum prepared a
i his request
| MEMORANDUM
The object Of the present differs from those In
which nations are usually engaged, mainly thsThat
the purpose OF this conquer peace and make
treaty on advantageous terms In this contes. IL has
become necessary to crush population sufficiently
merous, intelligent and warke to constitute nation.
We have not only to defeat their armed and organized
forces in the field but to display such overwhelming
strength will convince all antagonists, especially
those OF the governing arstocratc class OF the utter
possibility OF resistance Our late reverses make this
course imperative Had been successful In the
battle (Manassas), 1t is possible that we might have
other alternative Their success will enable
the political leaders OF the rebels to convince the OF
courage, and to command all their resources The con-
test began with class; now II 10 with people, mill
tary success alone restore the former issue.
BY thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their
strong places and pursuing rgdy protective policy as
to private property and unarmed persons and leniens
course as TO private soldiers may well hope per-
manent restoration Of a peaceful Union.
But in tho first instance, the authority Of the govern
men must be supported by overwhelming hysica
foreign relations and financial credit also mpera.
lively demand that the military action OF the
should be prompt and irresistible
The rebels have chosen Virginia their battle field and
seems proper for us to make the nrst great struggle
cessary to diminish tho resistance there offered by
movements on other points, both by land and water.
Without entering at present details would advise
that strong movement DO made on the Mississippi and
that the rebels be driven out Of Missouri.
cordially united With u.s. would advise movement
through that State into Eastern Tennessee for the
o. e ,ns 70
The possession Of those roads by u.s. In connection with
the moyemcn, on the Mississippi would 60 far towards
the meantime all the passes into Western Virginia from
the east should be securely guarded but would advise
fnvo rAc
less the political condition Of Kentucky renders Imposs
BILE or nexpedient for US 70 make the movement upon
should however be 10 organize equip and arm
many troops possible In Western Virginia. in order 70
operations
Al early day as practicable, i would BIO well to
baltimore and Fortress Monroe should be- occupied by
sufficient 70 retain thom IN possession Tho
% q az herry ana the lime me AZ
minshed as soon force In this vicinity becomes
raj will the river north OF this city when have
| strong army here READY to cut or hs retreat.
To revert 70 the West. probable that very large
additions 10 the troops In Missouri will be necessary
70 secure that state.
| presume that the force required for the movement
down the Mississippi will be determined by hs COM
/ mander and the President. Kentucky assumes the
right position than 90 900 will be needed, to-
gether with those that can be raised IN that State and
Eastern Tennessee to the latter region and it's
railroads, well as ultimately TO occupy Nashville
The Western Virginia troops, with not more than 5000
to 900 from Ohio and Indiana, should under proper
management, suffice for its protection. When we have
organized army here 10 900 ought TO be
enough protect the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and
the Potomac 600 will garrison Baltimore 900 Fortress
the utmost for the defence Of washington.
For tho maia army OF operations urge the folio wing
$50 regiments OF infantry. say....... 225 600 men.
doo Held batteries goo guns. 10 goo men,
i've regiments OF engineer troops. 800 men.
Total .273, 900 men
The force must be supplied with the necessary en-
gneer and pontoon trains and with transportation for
everything, save tents y: general line Of operations
be awaited OF from point TO point by 81 the ocean
and the rivers emptyng into It, An essential feature Of
the plan Of operations will be the employment OF strong
naval force 10 protect the OF feet Of
ports intended 10 convey considerable body Of troops
creating diversions aud rendering 1t necessary for them
to detsch largely their main body order protect
such OF their cities may be threatened else landing
aud form ng establishments their coasts any
ebo places that opportunity might Offer. This naval
force should also cooperate with the main army In Its
efforts to seize the important seaboard towns OF tho re-
be,s.
cannot be ignored that the construction OF railroads
has introduced new and very important element into tho
by the great facilities thus given for concentrating
mote sections and by erecting new strategic points and
lines OF operations
IL is intended 20 overcome this difficulty by the partial
operations suggested and such others the particular
may require We must endeavor TO seize paces
the railways In this rear OF the enemy points OF concen
raon, and must threaten their seaboard cities, In
order That each State may forced by the necessity or
defence to diminish It's contingent TO the Coincide
rate army The proposed movement down the Mississippi
VIII produce important results In this connection That
the progress Of the maia in the East
viii materially assst each other By diminishing the re-
SIS lnce TO be encountered by each.
The tendency OF the Mississippi movement upon al
questions connected with cotton IS too well understood
by the President and Cabinet 10 necd any illustration
from me
been suggested, and which has always recommended
itself to my judgment. | rcfer 20 movement from
ad rfv M
ing and developing the latent Union and free State scns
sn well known q %ss,s1 ana
protected, ultimately organize that section into nee
How far Il will be possible to support this movement
by an advance through New Mexico, from California, 10
matter which have not sufficiently examined 10 b able
81 ai practicable IL is eminently desirable. bring
ing play the resources and warke qualities Of the
and oementug the bond OF union between them and the
general government.
ture 10 suggest The policy Of sn ultimate alliance
dial understanding with Mexico; their mpsthies ana IN
s are .s Sn no
be difficult to obtain from the Mexican government the
right 10 al least during the present contest the rosd
very materially reduce the obstacles OF the column
moving from the Pacific A similar permission 20 use
and the Rio Grsnde would enable TO throw column o.
troops BY good road from Tampco or some Q, 'ne
harbUs nGth Of u, upon and across 'no mo ''a'u''
without risk and scarcely firing shot ,,, a. -
TO what extent any, 10 would be desIaoie 20 saso
into service and employ Mexican soldiers question
entirely political, which do not venture 70 onsf M
opinion. a.. .~r.n....
great II rs possible that smaller force might accom
piish the object Wow but understand 10 b the
pmrpose OF this great nation TO re establish the power o.
IL royernmen and restore peace 70 It's citizens In the
shor, est possible time.
Tbe question TO DO decided Is simply this. sha; We
crush rebellion a blow, terufhte the war In
campaign, or shall Nc leave u as legacy 70 our
descen dantsl
when the extent or the possible lines Of operations s
considered the force asked for the main army under my
command cannot be regarded az unduly large. Every
mile we advance carries us further from our base OF
oparatona detachments necessary 70 cover