The evening telegraph. [volume] (Philadelphia [Pa.]) 1864-1918, 1864-09-08
attest from the South
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ALL OF ATL ANITA.
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he News i'm ISichmond.
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|EsPATCH FROM GEN. HOOD.
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|EFEATED AT EAST POINT
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e is Driven from Atlanta.
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WHIPPED AT JoNEsBoRo.
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ensured by the Rebel Government.
WHIPPED AT JoNEsRoRo
ensured by the Rebel Government
lNDEmREO BY THE REBEL PRESS

IA,fter six weeks command Of the Army Of
nnessee, General Hood abandoned Atlanta on
| : Thursday night, the lst instant. An official
.spatch received from him on Saturday night,
e essential portions of which we give below,
plains all that is yet known Of the affair -
F'HBADoUARTERs, September g. lS6i.-On the
ening of the Both Of August the enemy made a
.fgment across Flint river, near JOnesbOro. We
|tacked them there on the evening Of the 3lsJ
ith two corps, but failed TO dislodge them.
"This made il necessary to abandon Atlanta,
hich was done on the night of the lst Of Sep
|mber.
"our loss on the evening Of the 3lst was small.
'On the evening of the LIST of September Gene
Hardees corps, in position at JonesborO was
|saulted by superior force of the enemy, and
|ing outflanked, was compelled to withdraw
bring the night, with the loss of eight guns.
The enemy's prisoners report their loss very
we're. ]. b. HOOD, General"
From the above despatch, 1t appears that the
rmy of Tennessee is on the Macon railroad,
mewhere south of Jonesboro, probably at Love-
y g station. Jonesboro is twenty-five miles
nth of Atlanta; Lovejoy's twenty nine. From
.oyejoy's to Macon the distance by the Macon
ad is seventy-four miles.
Though this despatch was not made public till
esterday morning, the facts set forth in 1t were
|
was then also reported that Hoods army had
ZEN cut in two. From the despatch it is clear
lat this was at one time the case. When con
G evening of the first Of September General
ardee's corps, in position at Jonesboro, twenty
20 miles south of Atlanta, was assaulted by a
lperior force of toe enemy" and "outhauked,"
he enemy pushed in between him and Hood at
tanta, and that night Hood, by striking across
be country in southeasterly direction, managed
! rejoln him on the railroad south of Jonesboro
How 1t was that, after attacking the enemy
with two corps" near Jonesboro, on We'd
esday evening" only Hardee's Corps was at
bnesboro, Thursday evening, to resist the assault
the enemy, can only be accounted for by sup
Osng that, after our attack had failed to dis
)dge the enemy, Hood withdrew one of
lem IS. d. Lee's) to Atlanta, leaving Hardee to
ear the brunt alone This he would hardly have
one had he not miscalculated the enemy's de-
gns. He must have believed the main bodyo of
herman's army to have been in front of Atlanta
hen in fact it was on Flint river, near jones'
orc, twenty odd miles to the south.
As TO the losses incurred on either side Gene.
al Hood tells us only that "our loss on the even
g of the 3lst (when we attacked) was small
Xnu tndl 'tu6 entlhy pflsOueI5 report tuelr loss
cry severe" He does not inform us whether
ur loss in men was great or small when, on the
|Yening of the LIST, Hardee, "being outAanked
as compelled to withdraw during the night.
ith the loss Of eight guns" We feel pretty sure
ur loss on this occasion was not small.
This abandonment of Atlanta, under the cir
umstances, is not good thing, but, so far from
eiDg dispirited by IL, our people ought reve-
ently to thank God that it is no worse. There
re many persons who have had a great weight
( anxiety raised from their souls by this ne VS..
. hey have been fearing for the last month, not
| My that Atlanta would be baandoned, but that
|ome great and irreuieYabe disaster would over
AXE the Army of Tennessee. Atlanta is gone,
ut the army is sill unit and is safe. The loss
Atlanta is nothing; the loss of the army would
ave been without remedy.
EDITORIAL COMMENTS on THE NEWS.
rom ae Richmond ExaiaiHer, septem6er5.
So much for the third removal of General
ohnston. First, he was virtually removed by
eug deprived OF power to direct his lieutenant,
Pemberton; and the cost Of that qualification to
he feelings of Mr. Davis, was the army of Vlcks-
urg. Next he was superseded by Bragg; and
he organization Of the second army was de-
troyed ut Missionary Ridge.
Thirdly, after restoring it, he was removed at
he very moment when his knowledge, SKILL and
nergy were indispensable to the success and
ven the safety of the campaign; superseded by
Hood, q commander OF division, VIGOROUSLY in-
apab.e of managing anything larger than diyi-
ion. The result Is disaster az Atlanta, in tue
cry nick of time when such a victory alone
ould save the party of Lincoln from irretrieya-
| lie ruin.
| General Johnston is thought Oyer-cautiOus; too
eticent about his plans; disposed to be mys-
erious as TO approaching events. He was re-
moved because she did not speak with entire
confidence about holding Atlanta" Bat results
prove that, II he was cautious in movement and
|hary of promises, it was for good reasons. IL is
II. La
vas, what material he had in hand, and the bes.
use 10 make OF Il. ..,. , ....
Wha' ever else may ne said, it cannot be said
that be ever lost IN army OF any considerable
body Of troops or incurred any disaster, or even
disadvantage, that Obscured our prospects for q
rs to question either his military capacity, hi:
courage or his earnest patriotism, certainly these
events yindicale him, But, alas, of what iuteres
s that of what importance is that Of what con
must be lost TO justify 1t Who cares now whe
her Johnston was right, or JEFF. Davis was right
Yet we must think of these things, for thesI
are the causes which produce the effects. II Il
maniiestly absurd TO put up and pull down
commander in the field according 10 the crudl
views or peevish fancies of a functionary in Rich
nond Such conduct Of government woult
paralyze the greatest military genius, ruin tht
oldest army, and render success in war absolutely
impossible.
NOW rs II NOT uhIQ-lSll II uOt Nlutill lhIu-Luh
the Struggle of eight millions, who sacrifice thei
money, sacrifice their lives, who grOan in th
excess of exeEtiOn, who wrench every muscle Ill
the blood starts with the sweat-should come Il
naught-should end in the ruin Of us all-tha
. the predictions and antpathies, the pitifu per
BOnal feelings of a single man may be INDUCED
With the scanty information at hand ii is i'm
possible TO estimate the late affair in Georgia. l
| Is certain that Atlanta has been abandoned by
our troops. We do not know whether the gan
were left or not. The loss Of the place is other
wise without material Importance. As military
post 1t had no value whatever. IL was once i'm
pOrtant as the junction of railroads but haC
ceased TO be SO since the railroads to the nortl
were lost Sherman could not hold II a week |
the Confederate army in the neighborhood was II
But the moral effect of its loss, though it ma
be temporary, will be great. II will render in
cAIculahle assistance 20 the party of Lincoln AM
obscure the prospect of peace, late SO bright.
may enable him TO execute the draft. IL vii
also diffuse gloom over the South. This depres
sion, however, may be speedily relieved il tn
administration has a grain OF real sense or
spark of unsel6sh patriotism.
The reinstatement Of Johnston or the appoint
ment of Beauregard would at once restore th
confidence Of the country and the army and th
genius OF either would soon prove Sherman's I'D
vantage to be an Illusion and an abortion. Bu
the confidence either of country or army wi
scarcely survive the continuance Of Hood /