Holmes County farmer. [volume] (Millersburg, Ohio) 1857-1926, 1864-03-24
Lieutenant-Gene Grant--IIls
New Position.

NG". VShshVns
The order issued by the War Department
assigning Lieutenant General Grant TO the
command of all the armies of the United
States, and appointing General Halleck his
chiefof staff, opens new ophoc IN our mil
itary arrangements. Since General McClel-
Ian was superseded as Gcneral-in- Chief our
armies have been under the nominal dircc-
ton of "a mere head of a Washington bureau,
but under the real direction of President
Lincoln himself, many of their most impor-
tant movements having been made without
the knowledge or against the advice of Gen.
Hallcck. The elevation of Lieutenant Gen
eral Grant to the supreme direction is
great improvement on the arrangement it
displaccs, and practical confession that
Mr.. Lincoln has been for a long while assu-
ming duties for which he is incompetent.
Obviously, no man is fit to direct military
operations who isincompetcntto to command in
the field, whether he be a village lawyer
from Illinois, or heavy and plodding wri-
ter of military books from California.
IF Halleck had natural vocation to mil
itary command, he could not have sat at a
desk in the eventfu summer Of 1862, during
and after the defeat of General Pope. He
would have paved like the war-horse when
he heareth the sound of battle atar Off
With what derision would not General Me-
Clellan have been overwhelmed, if, being
General in Chief at the time, he had allow
ed another to take the.feld and ropel the in
vasion of Gen. Lee ? What but the weight
! of years could have excused Gen. Scott
J. from commanding in person at the first bat
tie of Bull Run When General McClel-
; Ian was in chief command, he also had,
from choice, the immediate direction of our
most important army, and he would have
continued to combine both functions, and
have ended the war in 1862 if the clamor
of the radicals and the weakness of the
President had not deprived him first of the
general and afterward of the special com
mand. His special operations were thwar-
ted because the general direction did not
support them. We cannot even conceive
the possibility Of Napoleon or Yelling
ton directing campaigns from military bur.
eau. At this late day, we sec the admins
tration grc-adopting the idea with which
General Mcclellan set out, and bcstowine
the Chief command on General who ha:
, no thought Of secludng himself from active
, duties in the field.
This sensible proceeding, which is 50 sat
isfactory to the common sense of the coun
try, is adopted by the Administration rath
;, er as political maneuvcr than as tard,
strategy of Mr.. Lincon's advisers were a
good as their political, they might have lont
: ago ended the war. They are great adept
: at managing the war as an electioneering en-
= ginc. The victories which were won in thu
carly part of last summer, instead OF bein!
, vigorously followed up, were converted int
political capital. On the strength OF then
Mr.. Lincoln partisans have been election
eerfhg in his behalf with great success fo
= the last eight months Instead of taking
. advantage of the crippled condition Of til,
: rebellion to end the war, the military gain
: Of last year have all been squandered to pro
! mote the personal aspirations of one man
The rebels have hada long breathing spell
and most industrlously have they improved
it. Their military strength has never beer
SO great as it is at this moment. While tin
+, administration, for clectioneering purpose
has been amusing the conHtry with the ide
that the rebellion was tottering to its down
fall, the South has been quietly putting fortl
: all its energies in strengthening its armie
= and recruiting his shattered strength. The
: consequence is, that after this eight months
remissncss ON our side and of energy o.
,fl theirs, we are about to enter upon an une
:. quail contest in the spring campaigns.
~ Our numerous "reconnoissances til
y new euphemism for defeats---have disclose
y the alertness and vigor of the rebels in e,
:, - cry part of the Contederacy There is
IS r. great danger that the military tide will :,
- !, in different direction this year from wh'
:, itdid last and the Administration is so al
y prehentivc that it darcs not face the cons
N quences. To shirk the responsibility ofpo
= sible disasters in the spring campaigns,
! has invested Gen. Grant with the supren
,f command, to make a scapegoat for the sill
~ of the administration.
!. If the war-clouds grow black-if a su
II cession of defeats shall startlc and alarm II
u country-if the air shall be filled with IL
y Lincoln means to be in position to sa
like the frightened Macbeth, Thou cans
>, mot say l did it; shake not thy CORY loci
- ''at me-" If the spring campaigns resu
q. in disaster, he is preparing to wash his han'
), Of the responsibility by laying the blame
,s the door of General Grant.
n This may be very unfair, for Gen. Gra
Is is not justly responsible for the antecedel
IS military situation, which makes his positi,
!, difficult and success doubtful. 1t is not h
~ no but Mr. Lincoln, that has squandcred
70 political objects the military advantages til
~ ~ should have been followed up while the +
" bellion was staggering under the hea
u u blows it received last year. 1t is not Grar
sii but Lincoln, that has given the rebels eig
- ~ months to recruit their energies, and co
&c front us in greater strength than ever.
Of is very good specimen of Lincoln cunni
Iy to sink out now that matters are coming
Z pinch, and cast the responsibility of VIII
Of is to happen upon another. Ii it goes
NJ with our armies, the new command wi
40 40 which he has invested General Grant c
- - ables Mr. Lincoln to clear his own skirts
. and also kills off a rival who has been talk
" " of in some quarters for the Presidency,
ii ii will even escape the responsibility which
~, 40 taches to the selection of officers and t
W assignment of commands, since CO
gress, by the creation of new rank, {
prcssly intended for General Grant, i
seemed to designate, or at least to reco
on mend, him for the position of commando