The spirit of democracy. [volume] (Woodsfield, Ohio) 1844-1994, 1864-06-15


and vigorous, and they know that tn,
adoption, persistence ia, and final aban
donment of the over land route, has cos
Gen. Grant loss of fifty thousand mel
fifty thousand men who might have
been with him to-day.
HOW THEIR GREAT PERIL WAS AvEkFEb
Their great peril was when fifty thou
sand veteran troops, with two of the ablest
Generals in the North, landed ON the
south side of the James river and ad.
Yanced against the southern defences OF
the city-defenses which have not one,
but two weak points, which Gen. Gilmore
would have found out in less than three
days. But this peril was averted from
them by no less'a parsonage than the
| President of the United States, through
his faithful and loyal henchman and rival
for the succession, the hero of Big Bethel.
REBEL ESTIMATE OF POLITICAL INFLU-
ENcE AT WASHINGTON.
The rebel leaders do not know why Gen.
Grant adopted the overland route. They
do not believe that he depended on Gen.
Sigel for the accomplishment Of any OBJ
| ject that was essential to the success of the
grand campaign. They attribute it, more
than anything else, to the fact which they
suppose exists, that Gen. Grant is not the
supreme commander of the northern ar
mics; that the President and his political
friends still interfere with the command
ers in the field; and that the political
influence which prevails at Washington
demanded that the march should be made
over land, the same thatit demanded that
Butler should command the James river
movement, that Sigel should conduct the
Shenandoah valley movement, and that
Sigel should conduct the Shenandoah
valley movement, and that Gen. MeClel-
Ian should not lead the army of the Po-
tomac, although Gen. Grant earnestly
entreated the President to restore him to
that command. a
HOW THE REBELS HAVE IMPROVED THE
TIME WHICH THE OVERLAND CAM
PAIGN AFFORDED THEM.
But they knew what the consequences
of that movement have been, we all know
They know what it has cost us in men,
They know that it has given three or four
weeks of precious time at period when
each day was to them Of priceless worth,
for it was time which was given to them
after Gen Grants plans were unmasked,
otte,, his march had been adopted, after
his operations on a certain line, had
been commenced That three weeks
time, as one of their papers has since
blasted, was all they wanted. They have
improved it as We, of the North, would !
have improved it. if we believed, as they
do, that the success of the holiest cause,
and the fate of all that is dear to US, de-
pended on doing so. In word, they
have improved that time with all the en-
ergy of the southern nature when aroused,
and to the utmost extent of their resources
Some damage was undoubtedly done to
some of their railroads during the time.
But this, while it could not be prevented,
had been foreseen and provided for con-
struction trains, with lay gangs of expe-
rienced workmen, and with all the need
ful materials and appliances, were kept
ready, day and night, at convenient points.
These were at once pitt in requisition,
and the result was that all the damage
was speedily and substantially repaired
From every quarter where they could be
spared, the telegraph summoned troops
to Richmond. Every day, for three
weeks past, the railroads coming to Rich
lnond from the West and South have
brought trains loaded with troops. And
there is now assembled, at and near the
rebel capital, far greater force than has
sver before been there.
THE FLANK MOVEMENTS FLANKED MOTH
.
The rebel view of the recent flank move
ments is ingenious and curious, and may
be useful to the future historian, and
tits according to my author
ity, as follows; By the use of means
we'll known to all commanders, Gen. Lee
became aware of Gen. Grants intention
to move his army from the line of the
Pc to the North Anna, before the move
ment began. In pursuance of tho rebel
plans (Which were briefly to interpose all
obstacles in Grants path, and
inflict as much damage on him as posi-
Bile; plans which they claim have been
pretty well carried out it thus became
necessary for Gen. Lee to eVacuate his
strong position OF tbs lire of the Pc, and
thus simple stragetic movement on the
part of Gen. Grant accomplished what
five great battles had failed to do. But,
having the advantage of shorter lines,
and timely knowledge of Gen. Grants
intended movements therebel General was
able to get to his new position between
the North and South Anna before our
army arrived at the former stream. In
this new position, Gen. Lee could have
maintained himself even longer than he
had on the Po Gen. Grant was con-
yinced Of this fact. His movement on
and across the North Anna on the 23rd, |
Oath 18th and 26th, were reconnoissances
in force.
GRANTS INTENDED MOVEMENT BAFFLED
BY. LEE. |
But Gen. Grant intended, if he was
able, to keep his army on the South side
of the North Anna, to gain possession Of
Hanover junction, and to advance on the
line of the railroad to the South Anna
The proof Of tais is, that Stanton know
ing what was going on, telegra phed on
the 18th that Hancock's and Wafrenfs |
corps would reach the South Anna by |