Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-04-28
Especial Correspondence OF the Chicago Times.
WASHINGTON, April %

WAsHINGrON, April %
Ii is understood here. IN the best informed
military circles. that the disasters which fore
Is have suffered on the Red River, in Louisiana,
Is of the most serious nature-amounIng in
deed 10 the total route of the Union troops: and
that the result must be the entire abandonment
of the expedition. An attempt will be made to
lay the blame of the defeat upon Gen Stone;
and is i said that orders for his arrest have al
ready been telegraphed The latter assertion
may be true enough. The Administration has
never been SLOW to find a scapegoat for its own
deunq and Gen Stone bias been COM
pellet once before TO suffer in that capacity
In this case. when the facts come To be known,
Il will be that the blame for this shameful
defeat OF our forces. and for the entire expedition
indeed rests upon Abraham Lincoln. The ex-
petition WAS planned aud the orders for it we're
given without consultation with Gen Grant and
in opposition TO his well known wishes No mil
i;iry object could be accomplished, even it the
expedition succeeded-and Gen. Grant knew
that the expedition could not succeed-while, at
the same time, the withdrawal of so many troops
for service IN Louisiana (about 30 900 in alb
weakens the other armies to such an extent that
Gen. Grant finds himself paralyzed in conse-
quence.
But this Is only one point on which there is
diversity of views between Gen. Grant and the
portant subjects. relating to the campaigns of
this spring and summer. in regard to which Mr.
Lincoln and the General in Chief are AT variance
and 10 such an extent. too. that harmonious ac-
ton between them is impossible Among these
subjects are-hrst, "A movement on the part OF the
Army OF the Potomac: second, the route or routes
To be taken bv that army i'm it, march to Rich
mOnd; third. what General shall lead that army
when it does march to Richmond fourth wheth-
er the campaign on our part. during this year. is
TO he offensive or defensive: filth, the cOncenira-
ton OF forces for great efforts: sixth. the re
tention in Office OF Stanton and Halleck; seventh
the status OF Gen Butler; aud eighth, the con-
tinual appointment of unworthy men to be Brig
adler Generals-appointmen made from politi
Cal considerations alone-while manv worthy
and deserving Colonels who have been acting AS
Brigadier Generals for months, and who in
every way worthy OF the position. are passed
over with silence and contempt.
On every one of these points the diversity of
views OF the part of Old Abe and Gen Grant is
SO wide as 20 amount to open rupture In re-
gard to every one OF these subjects Gen Grant
Insists upon the adoption OF IA certain line OF con
duet. which the President positively refuses to
accede to; announcing. on the other hand. his
hrm determination To pursue another and AN en-
tirely different course. Thus all harmony and
concert of action is at an end, and nothing
but defeat aud continued disaster can be looked
Tor
IL is impossible 10 say whether or not Mr. Lin
coin really believes that the Confederates intend
TO invade the North on a large scale. this sum-
mer. Ii he does believe il, common SENSE would
dictate that he should prevent that invasion by
attacking and defeating the rehel armies. He
pvereuds TO believe il. however But instead of
adopting the measures which would prevent an
invasion. he is actually pursuing measures which
viii invite and render easy such An INVASION In
other words, while Gen. Grant is striving with
might AMI main To concentrate the armies, aud
To get them IN motion. in order TO strike "A blow
a, the rebel power which shall render invasion on
their part impossible. Old Abe is insisting upon
II that the true policy is for US 20 lie STILL to act
on the defensive and to annoy the enemy ana
distract their attention by "A number of detached
expeditions 10 different parts of the South Gen
Grant wishes 10 concentrate 900, 0On troops and
with them, and an adequate naval force TO ad-
vance on Richmond at once The President has
so arranged matters that Gen Grant finds that
ne cannot get even 1904 men; that these are
separated IN three widely different localities and
that he IL not allowed 10 combine them in one
column and that he cannot get the positive As
surance OF any adequate aid from the navy All
this Is done in order 10 prevent Gen Grant from
moving on Richmond al all Mr Lincoln knows
mat ten Grant viii not Occin 10 move toward
Richmond until he has an adequate force for
that purpose aud the crafty ex Rail Splitter has
been careful that he should not have such
force
1t Gen Grant had been willing 10 make an
overland Campaign against Richmond. there
would have been no objection on the part Of the
Executive. and. indeed ~ mat case. all the Adj
mini>Tation organs. having their cue the IN
from the White House, would have been baw Ing
"Ou to Richmond long ago Whyy Simply
because among the fes things that Mr. Lincoln
knows Is this: lie knows that an overland cam
paign against Richmond would result IN a de feat
of our army He desires such defeat, for he
hates that army. and has done his bes, 70 DESTROY
IT, Therefore he would have consented 10 an
overland Campaign.
Bus Sen Grant will not consent TO make such
campaign He knows. too. that it would result
ia defeat lie understands that there is only one
route 20 Richmond. and be l. determined TO take
that route with all the forces uuder his control
or none
Events have nov proved that | was right in
my conjecture that the proposed expedition 10
Richmond IN three columns, moving oy three
different ron,es, WAS no plan OF Gen. Grants aud
that he would never sanction the adoption of
such piAn. That amazing piece OF strategy is
nov known To have originated With Stanton aud
Gen. Butler Old Abe insisis upon il that. when
the army does move on Richmond. II shall be so
divided. and shall 80 move And Badly Smith
Gen. W Smith has been sent down 70 Fort
re-. Monroe. with the remnants ot two armv