Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1864-02-08

the movement of Gen. Stone was ordered by
him as demonstration which he thought it
possible might induce the enemy to abandon
Leesburg-being made, as it was, contempo-
raneously with reconnoissances in force toward
Drainesville under Gen. Mccall. Gen. Stone
having accomplished on the morning of Oc-
tober goth, all that he was expected to ac-
complish, Gen. Mccall was recalled from
Drainesville to his camp at Langley. The
fact that Gen. Stones troops were in action
on the Virginia side was telegraphed to Gen.
Mcclellan on the 2lst, and. reaching the
ground the next day, he learned the full ex-
tent of the disaster which had followed from
this movement, and by A. NJ. of the Path
had caused the whole command to recross the
Potomac in safety.
Appointed to the command of the Potomac
Army, all Gen. McClellan's attempts to get
the army actively in the field in Virginia, had
been defeated through a variety of causes
enumerated by him. On the LIST of November,
he was appointed to the chief command of all
the forces of the Union, and at once began
active operations.
The theatre of the war had now extended
about the whole circumference of the South;
and it became necessary as well as practicable,
to plan large and sweeping combination of
military operations.
An organization of New England troops
for occupying the coast line of the South on
the Middle Atlantic, and which had been
suggested by Gen. Mcclellan in September,
1861, took shape in January, 1862, as an ex-
pedition under Gen. Burnside designed to
facilitate the movement of the main body in
Eastern Virginia by an occupation of the
coast line of North Carolina, Gen. Burnside
being ordered when he should have seized
Newbern, to occupy and destroy the Weldon
and Wilmington Railroad as far west as
Goldsboro, and, should circumstances favor,
to push as far as Raleigh, Wilmington being,
however, his ultimate objective point 'Cau-
ton about proclamation was recommended,
the General being urged "io say as little as
possible about politics or the negro" aud to
state merely .'that the true issue for which we
are fighting, is the preservation of the Union
and upholding the laws of the General Gov
ernment."
AT the same time, letters were sent to Gen.
Halleck (apponted to the command of the
Department of the Missouri), to Gen. Buell.
Gin command of the Department of the Ohio),
to Gen. Sherman (commandingin South Caro-
lima and Georgia), and to Gen. Butler (com-
manding the Department of the Cuff. Gen.
Ilalleck was charged with the duty of '.reduc-
ing chaos to order" in department which
had been wonderfully miSmanaged. In re-
spect to military operations, he was ordered
to hold the State by fortified posts and concen-
trate his force on the Mississippi, in readiness
for Interior operations.
Gen. Buell. was instructed as to the vast
Importance of the military occupation of
Eastern Kentucky and Tennessee. In Ken
lucky itself he was advised '.the conduct of
our political affairs is perhaps more important
than that of our military operations" and he
was urged to bear in mind ''that we shall most
readily suppress this rebellion and restore the
authority of the government BY religiously
respecting the constitutional rights of all"
In accordance ''with the feelings and opinion
of the President" Gen. Mcclellan requested
Gen. Buell. TO assure 'the people of Kentucky
that their domestic institutions will in no man.
ner be interfered with" and ito allow moth
ing but the dictates of military necessity" to
cause him to "depart from the spirit of his in
structions."
In respect TO Tennessee, Gen. Buell. was or
dered to throw the mass OF his troops "by
rapid marches, by Cumberland and Walkers
Gap, on Knoxville, in order to occupy the
railroad at that point" and '.cut the commu-
nication between Eastern Virginia and the
Mississippi"
Gen. Buell. was further counseled to avoid
''widening the breach existing between us
and the rebels' by scauseless arrests and per
secutions of individuals" IL have always
found" adds Gen. Mcclellan, s'that it is the
tendency OF suborlinates to make vexatious
arrests on mere suspicion"
IT,. SI,t H. -
able moment for a coup de main against Sa-
vannah had been lost, and that the best course
before him would be '.to isolate and reduce
Fort Pulaski" But the production of Charles
ton and Its defenses" was held up as the
great moral advantage to be sought for. and
this was stated to be an object for which Gen.
Mcclellan was actively maturing his combi-
nations. Gen. Butler was instructed as to the
obstacles to be encountered in reducing New
Orleans, and was ordered, as soon as possible
after the fall of that city, 10 seize all the ap-
proaches leading to it from the cast" and
particularly jackson, in Mississippi" with
an ultimate view as well to the capture of
Mobile as to the opening of the Mississippi. !.
The instructions thus issued 10 the Generals
named comprehend the entire scope OF the
plans of Gen. Nc Clellan, of which plans the
movement of the Army of the Potomac
under his own orders was the central fea-
ture. Ii was considered by him necessary
to the success of these plans that they
should be carried out simultaneously, or as
nearly so as possible, and the advance of
the Potomac army upon Richmond by the
Lower Rappahsanock was kept in hand by
him to be delivered as the decisive blow in
conjunction with all the rest of the general
movement.
THE PRESIDENT ASSUMES COMMAND.
On the 9th day of January, 1862, Presi-
dent Lincoln, without consultation with Gen.
Mcclellan, assumed command of all the
armies prepared and preparing for these gen.
eral movements. He issued on that day his
"War Order. No. I" prescribing that on the
22d of February, 1862, a general move
ment of all the land and naval forces of the
United States should be made against the in
surgent forces.
This order was followed four days after by
second order commanding the Army of the
Potomac to occupy point ''southwestward Of
Manassas Junction"
On the 9th of February Gen. Mcclellan
received nate from the President, reasoning
with him on the choice he had made of
route to Richmond. Gen. Mcclellan replied
substantially, in letter to Secretary Stanton,
reciting what had been done with the Army
of the Potomac. and what remained to be
done with that and with all other armies of
the Republic; stating his reluctance to ''waste
life in useless battles" and his desire 'to strike
at the heart" and pointing out the military
reasons for preferrIng the base of the Lower
Chesapeake to that Of Washington for opera
t,ops aoa,ust tho ar,rx ;s,troucbey ~ Me-