The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-01-15


rotary Of State. He accepted it as a defeat He
returned to his Office satisfied that his political
career had eliminated his voluminous
diplomatic correspondence, as political capital,
was but as dust in the balance against the
''greenbacks" Of the Treasury Department.
But there was still Q chance for turning the
tables upon his victorious rival by bringing
forward against him "Honest Old Abe" him
self. And this is precisely what Mr.. Seward
has been actively doing since his remarkable
speech at Auburn on the eve of our last No
vember election. Ir we were to 60 to the bot
tom of the fate proceedings in favor OF Mr.. Lin
coin in certain conventions, Legislatures and
Loyal Leagues, we should doubtless find the
finger of Mr.. Seward in the pie and his shadow
behind the scenes.
This business, as 1t stands, strongly resem-
bles that Jacksonian Cabinet imbroglio which
resulted in killing of John G. Calhoun as
Presidential candidate. It was in the first term
Of General Jackson in the beginning Of which
Mr.. Calhoun (vice President) was generally
regarded by the party as the rightful heir to
the succession. Martin Van Buren,, however,
skilfully contrived to cut out Calhoun. and to
take his place on Jackson's reelection, and
then to become himself the chosen heir and
the successor Of OLD Hickory. Mr. Chase now
stands In the position Of Calhoun in the de-
velopment OF that Cabinet conflict which en-
ished him, while Mr.. Seward is playing the
role of Van Buren,. So far, too, as Mr. Chase is
concerned, the result will probably be the
same should he persist in the vain effort, upon
his own merits and in his own behalf, to out
general the Secretary Of State ss the faithful
squire OF the President.
But there is yet way in which the Secretary
of the Treasury may not only defeat Mr.
Seward in his present game, but a way where
| by he may also secure the capitulation of Mr.
Lincoln. Let Mr.. Chase, adopting the tactics
of his adversary, retire from tho field as .
Presidential aspirant, and bring ali his in
duence to bear upon his friends in favor Of
| General Grant for the succession, and the issue
will soon be made manifest. General Grant
working party, through which the independent
masses Of all parties will be rapidly rallied to
his support. In this way, by the time Of the
meeting Of the administration National Con-
vention, General Grant can be pushed so far
ahead Of every competitor among the people
as to bring the Convention, the administration
and all concerned to the adoption of General
Grant as their common candidate.
Thus, in providing for and securing the
triumphant election of General Grant, Mr.
Chase will himself secure the inside track and
| the election for the next Presidential term. It
is from the experience Of their predecessors
that politicians may learn wisdom; and this is
the lesson, from the experience of Calhoun and
Van Buren,. that We would commend to the
special attention Of Mr.. Chase. He is already
defeated for 1864; but by adopting our advice
he may, as the favorite of General Grant, walk
over the course in 1868.
The Proiong alton Of ths war q Repub-
iiean Party Meesure.
For more than two years the Northern peo-
ple-an aggregate Of over twenty million per-
sons-have waged . bitter and desperate
struggle against people whose numbers may
fairly be stated at about ten millions; and the
Northern people also, in addition to this pre-
ponderanoe OF numbers, have had in their favor
the service Of o navy and the possession of un-
limited means to equip armies, both by the
manufacture aud purchase Of material, while
the South has been cramped and embarrassed
in oil these respects And though the South
now seems likely to be finally beaten through
simple exhaustion OF men and material, we have
yet given no more positive evidence than that
exhaustion Of our ability to crush it. The rea-
son Of this may be either that we do not want
to crush it, or that we have failed in our many
attempts through the imbecility Of those who
have been appointed to guide u.s.
Imbccility has certainly ruled to a SUFFICIENT
extent in the councils of the War Department;
but those councils have not oil been imbecile.
In August, 1861, General Mcclellan submitted
to the President, at his request, memorandum
which reviewed the position Of our struggle at
that time, and sketched out plan for the con-
duct Of the war. His plan was first to accumu-
late, as we were we'll able to do, an army that
should overwhelm all resistance, If only by
simultaneous movements on several points OF
the confederacy, to diminish the resistance"
offered In Virginia, and, while that resistance
was thus lessened, to force q great battle In
that State with the main army, and thus "crush
the rebellion ct one blow" Upon this simple
and comprehensive plan there never was any
action. .Abolitionism was too bloodthirsty To
await the immense preparations necessary for
It. Radical journals yelled with the "damnable
iteration" apd the wildness Of lunatiss for the
slaughter Of the. rebels, for VnEard move
ments; and 80 onward movements were made
not to put down the rebellion, but to placate
and quiet the radical maniacs. Such move
ments were made singly, and we're 80 ll-timed
| that the rebelliou waa able In brinc . main