The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1864-06-14
The Real Position or she CampaiGa In
Virginia.


larly short official bulletins of the operations OF
means the army telegraphs were made to
satisfy the public anxiety for news. and the
whole country was enabled to see at one view
| the general result Of what had been done on
the day before in the widely distant theatres OF
war. We thought this an excellent measure,
and, rightly managed, it would have been; but
| in the way Secretary Stanton has carried out
this system it has done harm. Though in
| many instances Mr.. Stanton told the stories of
| the various movements in the words of the
| generals, in others he gave them in words OF
his own, which were colored by an over san
| guine spirit. He stated to the country always
little more than the statements made to him
would justify. Where hc gave the generals
| own words he culled out the most favorable
passages. Public expectation was, as neces-
sary consequence, raised too high, and, now that
| our operations do not 60 forward so rapidly
as they did, people contrast this hitch with the
great promise of few days ago, and feel I'M
easy. Because Grant does not walk directly
into Richmond the people feel disappointed; for
from Stanton's dispatches they had supposed
he would
We must come down a little; not from any
failure of Grants promises--he keeps all his
promises; and he promised to fight it out if it
took all summer. He will do it, we may be sure.
But we must come down from Stanton's rose
colored views to Grants sober reality. We
must suppose it possible that it may stake all
summer" Apparently the operations Of the
campaign are to be somewhat less active than
they have been. General Lee, having in the
army under his command the last hope OF the
Southern eon(ederacy, has not risked that hope.
lie has not been foolhardy enough to risk the
safety Of bis cause on a second field fight after
the. very doubtful battle in the Wilderness
Nor is Genera! Grant less wise than Lee in his
disposition to economic his chances. He fights
cautiously, as the circumstances require. And
thus in their mutual caution the two strategisls
have come to point difficult to determine. Lee
has Rugged his in.renchnicnts for the last
thirty days, and Grant, rcsolute not to waste
his men in stornns those Entertainments where
such an operation was not necessary, has forced
him ont Of many strong places by man9uvres,
constantly hoping to compel battle on better
tCIiucs Dut, luUuSil iC ulduUufIc5 Ilcc vi
one position, it does no. compel battle; for
Lee only leaves one to step into another few
miles further on.
In this way they have reached Richmond.
which is merely the last fortified position on
the line, and the strongest OF ALL To force
Lee out of this by fnanGuyre involves an ope-
ration not to be entered upon too hastily. Tie
James river, and the unknown difficulties on lis
banks north OF Fort Darling. arc very formda-
BILE obstacles to Tie continuation Of The flank.
ing operations by which Lee was moved ont Of
former places. a movement across that river
would be a very bold one, and General Grant
who is very bold man, may make it. But if
there Is any good reason why such movement
cannot be made then the next step in the
Ranking advance ia impossible. ard the two
armies confront one another, with in.rcnch
ments between that one army will not relin-
qn'sh and the other cannot storm. From such
difficulty the only solution is siege.
We do not say that this was from the first
necessary result OF Grants plan. We are wei
satisfied that il was not but that the result
would have been much better had Grant had
the exclusive management OF our armies. His
plan was to occupy Lees attention on the
Rapidan with bis main force, while separate
c umns should cut the only two lines Of rail
road by which Richmond and consequently
Lees army, could be supplied from the Sontt-
err States. He expected thus to isolate Lee
and to defeat hin; and he would uuquestioa.
ably have done it; for Lees army not rein
forced and not supplied, would not have been
able TO hold its own in the late terrible
marches and battles, but wou'd have gone to
pieces, and Richmond and the rebellion would
Of course have fallen, as tic result OF The de-
structon of that army. Grants part OF this
plan was macnifcently carried out. lie engaged
Lee, and outmanmuvrcd him and outfonght
him day after day for thirty days; but the dis
trcss shat he expected the loss OF supplies to
occasion in Lees army did not appear Neither
did the severe losses by battle affect Lees
movements; for achievements came up. Both
the expeditions to cut Off the cncmys supplies
had completely failed Of their purpose. Both
tLese expeditions were under the command
Of political generals. This was the part
of the campaign that was attended to
by the President. Butler, on the James
river, and S'gel, in the valley of the
Shenandoah, were beaten with compare
tive case. Lees army was supplied with
ordinary regularity and Beaurcgard and Brock.
inridge reinforced 1t. And thus, and not
through any defect in Grants plan, resulted
the bard TACT that the army that by General
Grants plan ought to have been destroyed
before this is, though badly shaken, still for
| midable force, in a formidable position, and
that the operations for ito destruction must be
started anew.
II Grant passes the James matters will be
once more at hazard with Lee. He will