Prescott journal. [volume] (Prescott, Wis.) 1861-1871, 1864-10-08
MeClel,an,s GeueraIsbIp,

/ General who is the most conspicuous military
| failure of the age. II it is to be presumed
that the members Of that Convention have
read nothing Of the present war but the his
tory of McCLELLAS's campaigns, it is not
strange that they think the experiment OF
war" is q a failure" A brief synopsis Of that
Generals military career, compiled from trust
worthy records, will illustrate The force OF
this suggestion:
With 900 men he refrained, in spite OF
the urgent solicitations OF the President, for
many weeks, from advancing upon Manassas,
where there were less than 10000 of the en-
envy. He suffered at the same time the Ma
tional Capital 70 be blockaded, positively re-
i fusing to cooperate with the naval vessels.
After enabling Lee to eyacuate Manassas
without the loss of a man. or pound of ma
teriai, he insisted upon the Peninsular route
to Richmond, leaving the National Capital to
be covered by only about $4,000 men, poorly
disciplined and without any knowledge of ar
tillery. This, happily, he was not allowed to
do. He sat down before Yorktown one full
month of the most important period OF the
year, though it was defended by less than
y 900, while he had all the time over lOO,-
OO0 ON the spot At Williamsburg battle
was fought at an immense disadvantage
and loss because of his absence and negli-
| genee After it was over, he arrested the
| pursuit, and sent two of the divisions back to
| Yorktown; when, as is now established be-
yond all sensible doubt, by the testimony OF
the rebels as well as of our best generals,
Richmond would have been taken had the
pursuit been followed up. Two weeks were
consumed in getting to the Chickahominy, a
distance of only forty miles, when there was
no resistance. On the Chickahominy he
made blunder in posting Gen. Casey's di-
vision of new and undisciplined troops three
quarters of a mile to the front, at Seven
Pines, without support, in consequence of
which they sustained dreadful slaughter
After the battle of Fair Oaks had been won,
he ordered the troops to be recalled when,
according to the testimony of the highest Off
GERS, he could have pushed, straight into
Richmond;-only eight miles distant, with
| little resistance At the very time Stone
wall JACKSON was pushing his forces up the
valley of the Shenandoah, he was beseeching
President LINCOLN that McDOwELL's Corps on
the Rappahannock should be sent to him, and
JACKSON thereby be left to work his own
pleasure on the capital. He either had not
the comprehension or he wilfully refused to
perceive that the absence of Stonewall JACK
son with his division from Richmond was
more than an equivalent for the reinforce
ment which otherwise MCDOWELL would have
brought him. He so carelessly posted
his army at Gaines Mills that $4,000
| separated by stream and entirely unsup-
poated were set upon by 10000 of the ene-
my and badly beaten. All the seven days
battles in the rear of James River, were
fought in his absence, and without any direci
! tions from him. He was also absent at the
T. last great battle of Malvern Hill until it was
nearly over, and when the battle was won,
instead of pushing on to Richmond, as it is
now known he might, he fell back to Harri-
sons Bar, and actually conceived the idea of
surrender. His army on the Peninsula,
originally l2l 500, and reinforced so as to
raise it to l59, 500 was brought down in the
Chickahominy grave yard to 100000 fit for
duty when he made, as the sole condition OF
another attempt upon Richmond, the imme-
date sending of $4,000 more, though he had
been officially informed all the soldiers in
upper Virginia, Maryland and in the District
of Columbia amounted only to 10000, and
that he could not be thus reinforced without
leaving the National Capital entirely at the
mercy of its enemies.
On being ordered to Withdraw his army
from the Peninsula, and bring it forthwith to
help PORE, who was endeavoring to protect
the capital against vastly superior numbers,
he delayed obedience until the order had been
repeated again and again, thus putting WASH
ington in extreme peril. When the troops
were at last brought up he interposed most
useless delays in getting his troops to. the
field Of action, and privately urged upon the
President, in a telegram now existing, to ''tet
Pope get ont of his sc1ape as he best can" At
ter MCCLELLAN had moved at a snail's pace
into Northern Maryland 70 intercept LEE, he,
true to bis old fancy for stripping Washing
ton, wrote to the President for more rein
forcements, even if Washington should be
taken At Antietam, the attacks instead
of being made concurrently, were made
in succession, and consequently with great
loss and comparatively little effect, and to
General Burnside's urgent request for rein
forcements, in order to hold avery important
position gained after terrible strug
gle, he replied that no reinforcements could
be sent, although the corps of FITz JOHN
PORTER, of $4,000 or 10000 men had not at
that time fired gun, and did not once cross,
the river during the entire battle. After the
battle, he neglected to follow up the retreat
ing enemy, when, according to the testimony
of high officers, it could have been done with
great effect After delay of two weeks he
was expressly ordered by the President TO
cross the Potomac, and advance upon the en-
envy, but he interposed the most frivolous ex-
cuses for not doing it, and did not take the
first steps toward it until four weeks after
the order was given, whereupon the long-snf-
fering President, able to endure him no Ion