Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1864-06-16

/ Inc w ora lew udyb dRO, III IcSdiu W buO
nature of the work Gen. Grant has before
him, the inpossibility Of investing Rich
mond, and the tedious and protracted ma
ture of the siege which must be undertaken
| before that city can be taken.
My intelligence to-day, (Which Is very
voluminous, and which must necessarily
abridge), embraces the Confederate version
of the military operations on the line of the
Chickahominy, from the 3lst Of May to the
| 9th of June, Including the battle near Coal
Harbor on the Sd, statement of the rebel
plans for the defense of their capital, and a
| further description of the present condi-
ton of the efortificationsi simmediately around
the city.
! FORMATION oy THE REBEL LINE.
On the 3lst of May the Confederate army
held a position on the ridge described In my
letter of June Sd, extending from Mechan-
| icsville on the west to Barker's Mill on the
east. Barker's Mill is notquite mile north
of the, ,Chickahominy, and two miles east of
| Coal Harbor. General Lees headquarters
were at the house of DIR. Curtis, two miles
north of Gaines Mill. ION the 2d of May
| they were moved to Gaines Mill.) On the
3lst of May, Coal Harbor was held by a
brigade of cavalry and division of infant
ry, with q few batteries of artillery, as a
corps of observation. Their instructions
were not to hold the place if attacked In
strong force, but to skirmish with the enc
my Il. e., the Union troops as the latter adj
yanced, and endeavor to develop their
strength and intentions, and then retire to
the main Confederate line. The skirmish
of that day at Coal Harbor, and the action
of June 1st, were conducted on the Confed-
crate side in obedience to these instructions.
| Up to the latter date the formation of the
Union lines had not been completed. The
cavalry fight at Coal Harbor on the 3lst
| had served to indicate that the Confeder-
ates intended to hold that place. At ten
o'clock that night General Grant ordered
| Wright's corps to march to Coal Harbor,
but up to ten the next morning he did not
know whether or not that corps had arriv-
ed there.
WHAT IS COAL HARBOR?
Coal Harbor is point of no strategic i'm
portance at all. 1t does not lie on the right
alluded to above, but in plain fully three
miles from the Chickahominy, and one mile
north of the ridge. Several roads lead
from it, it is true. But these are of little
advantage to an army advancing against
Richmond. as those leading to the south and
west are held by strong detachments of the
rebel army. In the formation of the rebel
line mentioned above, Breckinridge's di-
vision held the right, and the corps of Long
street and Beauregard the center. HOke's
division was between Breckenridge and
Beauregard. Ewells corps held the left.
Hills corps was divided. One division was
on the extreme left, resting on Tolopotomy
creek. Another was on the extreme right
of the line, holding the road leading from
Coal Harbor to Dispatch station. And the
Third division, with General Hill himself
was held in reserve. There was very little,
if any, change in this formation, until after
the great battle of June 8. ..st,i,....
PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.
On the I'd of June, General Lee became
aware, from the movements made by the
Union forces, that his line would be attack
ed the next day. The only disposition that
he made, however, in view of the expected
attack, was to contract his lines, so that
his left rested just behind the grove on the
plantation of DIR. Curtis, and his right on a
hill mile south of Coal Harbor, and just
halfway between that point and the Chick
ahominy. H e. T..
THE BATTLE OF JUNE THIRD.
General Lees tactics at present are con-
fined to holding the line of the Chickahom-
iny at all points above the place where
General Sumner crossed with his corps at
the battle Of the Seven Pines. AS / have
before intimated, he is determined that If
General Grant crosses the stream at all 1t
shall be at Bottoms Bridge, or some point
near there. Accordingly, in this action,
his efforts were confined to the repelling of
the assaults which the Union troops made
again and again upon his lines. He sue
ceeded in doing this; and in the evening,
after Genera Grant had been compelled to
desist from the attempt to force the rebel
army across the Chickahominy, the latter
the morning-and they hold it yet.
GRANTS SUBSEQUENT MOVEMENTS.
The indications of the 4th and 9th of
June were that General Grant was moving
his army toward Dispatch station, as If to
cross Bottoms bridge. From deserters and
prisoners captured on the 9th, the Confed-,
crate officers had formed the impression
that General Grant would not move his
army to the. James river at once, but
would attempt to reach Richmond by the
williamsburg stage-road, passing to the
north of the White Oak swamp. 1t was
said that General Lee himself believed
that General Grant would cross the
Chickahominy at Bottoms bridge, and
that he would then move direct on
Richmond il he had all the troops he
expected; but that if he expected more re-
Inducements, he would probably attempt
to reach the James river, and establish q
new base there. If General Grant takes
the, former course, he will be at Bottoms
bridge, thirteen miles from Richmond, and
he will have to march nine miles, passing
Savage station, Fair Oaks and Seven Pines,
before he reaches the outermost defenses OF
Richmond. He will then have line of
nineteen miles to guard, between his army
and White House. If he attempted to reach
the james river, it was understood that Lee
would attack him in flank or rear as soon
as he had crossed the Chickahominy, or
perhaps while in the act of crossing. 1t
was believed that General Grant would not
attempt to reach the James river, unless his
losses, since he crossed the Pamunkey, had
been much greater than had been supposed;
SO great indeed as to cripple him somewhat.
1t was known at Richmond that reinforce-
ments were reaching him; butit was stated
there that his losses on the lst, ID, and ID
Of June, were fully twelve thousand men.
THE WEAK PLACE AT RICHMOND.
II there is any weak spot In the defenses
of Richmond 1t is in that part Of the chain
Of forts which can only be approached di-
rectly from the east. Ifhuman life Is count
ed cheap, If we ever have fifty thousand
men who are willing to sacrifice their lives
In order to take Richmond, that Is the place
where the rebel capital may be taken by y
succf ssion of assaults. It Is not one fort
that must be taken, nor two, nor dozen,