Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1864-07-22

impossibility Of either of the parties
at this time, forcing a decisive bat.
tie upon the other. Hence it is pos.
sible that the concentration of a
large force for the defense Of Allan.
Ia would merely check Sherman
without involving him in defeat or
serious disaster. He has now be-
fore him the hazardous undertaking
of crossing the Chattahoochie river
lin the presence Of the enemy. II
this shall be accomplished johnson
must abandon Atlanta without great
delay, for the town is 50 situated
with reference to the river that sup
piles can be cut off entirely. We
are then to anticipate the most OBJ
stinate resistance to this enterprise
/ Ii Johnston's army has been rein
| forced, its power will be manifested
in a vigorous defense Of the river
line, and as Sherman'5 dispatches
show that he was moving towards
the river upon two roads, the CON
test will not be delayed. If no in
crease Of rebel strength is exhibited
in that quarter, we may assume that
Che armies Of our enemies are weak
Iencd daily, and that the country no
Longer furnishes supplies Of men:
WHEN THE WAR WILL END.
When that moment is reached we
shall see the beginning Of the end of
the war. A rugged solution Of our
national difficulties, but it is the on
ly solution possible. Such is the
unanimity Of the South, such the ha.
tired with which the leaders have in
spircd the mass Of the people, that
we can never obtain peace upon any.
terms Of union until the power of.
resistance is gone. Whether the
point Of exhaustion has been yet
reached is uncertain but in any as
pect Of the case that point is near.
The mcagre rations furnished to the
army, the diminished territory sub
ect to rebel authority, the compara-
i've ineliiciency Of the rebel cavalry |
lue to the scarcity Of horses. the
mpressment of boys of Is, and Of
I'D men Of 70 years Of age, and the
otal destruction of their financial
are facts calculated te con
rm the opinion that the resources
1 our enemies are nearly exhaust
d. Men, horses and food cannot
c created to meet any exigencios.
he war bears heavily upon u.s.
'ur resources were three times as
'eat-as the resources Of the South {
gagged in the rebellion. Our own I
are the measure of theirs; a
I'd had our resources been only t
le-third what they were, we should -
we been at Che point of exhaustion. S
here was time, early in the war, l
hen the North believed in the eff Y
cy Of the processes Of exhaustion. \
le continued exhibition Of power a
owe many men to the opinion that ?
e robeIhous country was too vast u
d It's resources too great to ad- t
1t OF It's 5uRJugation by such means. +
he resources Of the South were 1
eat, and they were vigorously and I
odigalIy used by the leaders and J
.oplc. This policy was their ne t
ssityj and had we been a faint q
.arted or tenacious race, their poll /
would have proved successful I
ur people possess the pluck Of the c
nS'isn' ana our soIeilers exhibit d
e courage and enterprise OF the t
rehch. me war is to continue I'M
inc south Is oIerrun, It's terrific }
eS devastated, ITS armies broken \
D It's leaders dispersed, Its shops .
Id factories burned and its agrlcul-
re rendered unproductlye' d
THE POLICY or DESTRUCTION. g
The present campaign has been q
ore effective in the two narticpIars G
st mentioned than all onr nrovionq I
.mpaions. There is no Ioncor a ?
.luctanco on the mari Of opr armies ?
DESTROY ANYTHING and everything
hich NAV contribute 10 fine nowoT
o,,,, o,6,,;o, - az b