The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1864-08-12


is describing theoretical monitor,
the others are considering its prac-
teal use and availability. But how
ever sound the theory may be, if the
ships built in accordance with it do not
perform the task or answer the purpose
for which they are made, they must be
held to have failed. Now, what are the
facts? The first monitor, in battle with
the very rudely contrived Merrimac, drove
her hack into Norfolk; but she did not
follow her into that harbor, and thus the
fruits of her success were lost The
Weehawken captured the Atlanta, but the
prize was so little injured that she was
lowed into Port Royal and sent North
with very little repair. We believe her
machinery got out of order at the begin
ming of the action, and she became I'M
manageable, and was thus forced to sur
render. In the trial on the Ogeechee. the
guns of land battery were able t, do
considerable damage to the monitor en-
gagged. The attack upon the Notifications
of Charleston was, however, the first COM
pete trial to which these ships were ex-
posed. There they had failed. If that
trial was not conclusive as to their powers,
why have fifteen months passed without
another trial either there or against some
other OF the rebel pc is? This is the
question which practical men, anxious
only to see the work done, and ready to
praise whatever kind of ship does it, ask.
In discussing the merits of the moni-
tors, however, the most important witness
ses are those who have handled them un-
der fire. It has, we are aware, been hint
ed that many officers are prejudiced
against these ships; but navy officers are
patriotic gentlemen; they are ambitious
to win victories, and such charge is
not to be lightly brought against such
men. What do they say in their official
reports7 Commander LETTERS wrote, Off
cially, in regard to the turret system,
protecting the guns and gunners does
not, except in special cases, compensate
for the greatly diminished quantity of ar
tillery, slow speed and inferior accuracy of
fire."
Admiral Dupont reports that though
not one of his fleet was under fire over 10
minutes, yet five of the iron-clads were
wholly or partially disabled, and that, too,
in that which was most essential to our
SUGGEST mean their armament or power
of inflicting injury by their guns"
Captains dayton and John Rogers and
Commanders Ammen, George W. Rodg
ers, Fairfax and D1wnes, unite in a re-
port thHt, "it had been proved"-in the
attack on Charleston" that any very
heavy blow ON the turret was very apt to
disorder and stop it,; and that the very
SLOW fire possible from the 15-inch gun,
and the fact that to be effective against
stone walls it must be brought so
near as to take away from the i'm
penetrable character of the iron-clads ="
constituted important points of weakness.
Admiral Dupont reports, again, that with
even their diminished surface, they are
not invulnerable, and their various me-
chanical contrivances for working their
turrets and guns are so liable to immediate
arrangement that in the brief, though
fierce engagement at Charleston, five out
of eight we disabled
Now, the gist of the matter appears to
Us to be this: the monitors have, of me-
cessity, few guns, and therefore, as COM
pared with the LAID batteries, which they
are to engage, slight offensive power.
Their guns, however, are of extraordinary
power, ard if they could be applied for
sufficient time, would no doubt be effective.
The problem, therefore, was, to make these
ships so entirely shot-proof, they could take
their time in an attack that they could
receive any reasonable amount of pun
melting unLurt, and meantime make their
tremendous shot tell. Into such prob
lem, the question of speed did not enter;
and Capt. Ericsson rightly, az we think,
paid little attention to it. Everything dc
pended upon their invulnerability; the vital
point was that the ship should be able to
sustain an enemy's fire uniniured, and this
was clearly Capt. Ericssons own thought !:
and therefore he placed the battery in a
turret made immensely strong, and de.
presse' the hull OF tie shi to near the
waters edge.
If the monitors had proven themselves
shot-proot their speed would have matter ed
but little. It would have been of no con-
sequence whether they steamed four or
eight knots. They would have done their
work thoroughly, and no artillery row
used could have witistot their slow pom
derous hammeing. But unluclily. it is
on this vital point that their success is
questioned.