Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1862-1865, 1864-08-01
Atlanta

Atxous about tie end Of military operations in n Q
vicinity Of Atlanta, We are yet entirely hopeful We
cannot doubt indeed on which side Victory VII be found
when the FINAL shock Of battle may coma in that az
tsr Mour fOrcss banded with The capacity and
Sumna,s qualities whoa the commAndsr Of su9h an
army should possess Il is qlie possible however that
in the meantime the enemy may successfully report in
that direction WHIT dOre In this vicinity 70 cut the
Hnss fIAilroad Communication aud supply Of General
Lees army and Of this city Ia fact from telegrspbie
dispatches b Is known ihasthis has been done; that
alrsa1y the railrcad between Atlanta acd Macon has
been cut AID much irjlred At as, this may wear
more grave aspect to many, and appear have more
important bearing the issue Of the campaign than is
sAsoutey the fact. and have depressing effect on al
EhO, IN he gEeitement Of the moment ferget or m 20
recall the serious damage dOne 10 the Oanye Railroad
snd the InaPpreoable eject that operation Of the one
ny has had 10 assisting Grant to take Richmond o. to
reach the objective point Of his campaign.
These Interruptions Of lines Of supply by bodies Of
olvaTy are Of course attended with serious anuoyanees
aad Involve labor 10 repairs Vbich We can IN afford 60
give bur s. they are necessarily made wish dash and
BY detsobmsnts Of the enemy TOO weak o hold lines
shus sundsFed or prevent their repAratcn the evil is
but transsut and hare substantial influence on
he general result Of operations Tast "a f che proper
SAT- Departments heVe (is Is to Be supposedly done
shsr dury snd established tia necessary dopos Of sup
plies Hsnes il may be saii that these raids are rot Of
she character Of military operations sgan our Commu-
aeaODs ths, held Of such nportlncs IN The srs of
va aud Eki0h, 10 be Elective muss cus C an aisq1ste
sources Of supply, ard force he adversary either TO
Ospulsse SCespt baIlls a. the dFadya1ags Of time
snd place having been selected By his enemy. An
5peFstior the other haad, of such forcs Of cav
airy as We could eonesnTas aud WELD uadsr Forrest
sgAns. the Ens Of o,mnu1ieAtions Of sherman, with
he base at Chattanooga this Stage Of tho campaign
you'd seem In strict accordance With toe pseeep.a Of
she srea, masters Of the Art military, and EOuld surely
force him ether 10 fan back 90 re- establish bis com
zunicatoas or deliver battle 90 our tsFna
The fan Of Alfalfa By fuoA a movement Of cur
icESes under General Hood may throw open The gates
81 that city to sbermans dsPlessd and iaded corps
sSua DOT rightly be dreaded an urn led and ire
EsdlAbls DISASTER In the course Of events, General
Hood may yet be sd 10 ASIDE and permit the ere
ny 70 occupy Ahansa, In view Of The apparently In
sapsFabls diiculss sherman would have IN feeding bic
HOOpI IN that position. sush sep, as may be seen
By reference 70 the maps Of Georgia would not give
sherman command Of al our lines o. communication
With Alabama and Mississippi and he Trans Mississippi.
We should yet retain ample and direct channels Of
supply and for she transit o. troOps-to reash Ehioh
she enemy must penetrate deeper into eur oO1ptry-
farther iroR his base and supply SePO:s. and Eih.in
Rsasea haEArd-Glnost oer:ain5-Of daiea "a defeat
which would necessarily be humiliation. We hope,
however, even the temporary eEsouaOn Of Atlanta may
s0t Be an eventually Of the sar-but We shall in
veg b discouraged it come 70 pass. We WOuld
ssn 0onadsntly look 70 tie army 10 rstriSyS such
casually IN due ssAson.