New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-07-01
at the Last moment by sudden turn changes eloss
ful6llmsnt into disappointment


ful6llmsnt into DISAPPOINTMENT
What he, happened relative to the active opera
tioOs by the army Of the Cumberland, which pro.
dicted az Immediately impending In my preceding
letter, furnishes but IN addition 10 the many evi.
oeDoee Of the cspriciouaness Of events embo bodied IN
my personal experience - war espondent dur.
ing the last two years When wrote my last,
promising the render final termination Of the five
months insction Of Gen. Rosecrans's commsnd d, DO
You'd doubt the best disciplined, drilled, fed and
clothed, and equipped, and next to the army Of tn
Potomac, the strongest body in tho loyal service,
nothing seemed 10 be wanting to make good III y
words but marching orders. The last preparation
for prompt vigorous campain bad been compile tod.
TIE corps and division commanders had their In
structionG The army WAS concentrated 70 as 70 be
REALLY moved 10 the proper directions q! short notice
Tie men were t-0Yidei With eight days rstions in
their knsgsac and haVersach. The sick, with all
cumbrous baggage, lad been taken out OF the
wsy. HssIita provisions, upon the fuppos'iion
that q single days march would bring on q collision
with the enemy, had been amply msie. Inc hgnai
TO move alone remained 20 be made from the general
besdQ usrteIs 70 insugurste the campaign. now
ever, the orders 10 get ~ motion wsrs no' gwen
but u their stead such proved an At least Tempo
rsry abandonment Of offensive intentions, winch hss
continued up 10 the present time.
This unexpected denouement wa brousAt ABOUT
In this wise:
Gen. Rosecrsn,, animated in all probability with
desire Tor the assuring influence Of an appreciation
Of the contemplated Aggressive operations by we
Generals commanding under hun, determined 10 Nd
dress circular TO the corgs and diyiAon command
,rs containing four iuterrcgatories tonohinK upon
the main strategic points Of the proposed campaign
The questions addressed " each were III SUBSTANCE
hs follows:
!. VIVA IL your opinion or knowledge 81 to the nu-
erical strength OF tho rorces lGsy detached Tor
service esewber from the Rebel army Ia our front
H. DO you deem al advance upou the enemy VI
this tiue and with our present elective iorce, ad-
visible aud practicable
III. Do YOU believe that we shall be able 70
soheve a decisive victory
~. Do you believe that the results OF victory
Will outbalaDce tie rsk and sacrifices nvolvedf
In regard TO the weakening OF Bragga army ~
The withdrawal OF troops for the relief VI Nck,burg
there was some diversity of opinion eJpre'eod by
the Intercepted Generals but TO the otLer qass'
tons the Aur wers OF all seventeen were OF \ ocei-
dedly Degstlye character.
Tie grounds upon which they rested their indi-
rect remonstrsnoes against 90 immediate assumpslon
II the oAeus,e by The army were oongruous IN the
main, although they varied IN come de'-is. They
con,idered IN al vance inityisabe beoGusei
!. II tie enemy be pos Weakened enough 70 De-
cline TIE issue VI pitched general sciiVn, oar ~
vance would enable them to lghi on the defensive
In chosen, intrsnehed IosiIiou, which advsn .se
was likely to compensate Tor Ay superiority Oh NM
bets We "a, en,qy.
=. YAs 'ers.ny are too much weakened by tie
diff iJr le-eufOroenonss 20 other para o! Tie Tue
st.r Of war 10 accept the overture VI battle. 'Iey
would undoubtedly ha.l bach 20 tbeif next ha'ufsi
H. ~ Srfettss the Ieuuspsee River.
3. In the former oouuBgency, tai 10, II ths enc
my wc.~ 10 light 70, We would incur on we one
hand tie Tisk 20 losc, IN oAse Of deioAi mol only
what col the vast s1ernces OF NE ana LD ia TIE
b.t,s If sones Liyer, bul much more. victory %
lie other hsad, uplcss rtsul.rs IA tie destruction
~ = whole Rebe. army which the sdvantAs sou.
character Of lie present. pos!tJn hardly allows - 10
expect would gave "a - san ocly rolgh, noun
famous county VI 20 E.rsiesio Importance, lie POs-
session - winch could Iet hold ME balance, IN jint
of benefit 10 the drawback Of the leugin.uing OF
our line. Of Communication along unse, mach ex'
,oe-d frilroHIrs,k Which lie occupation would IN
uy0lJa1ly uecos,iiAle.
La l., later Contingency, that 10. II the enemy
were 10 r.trsts the valley Of tie "a ns,.ce apoa
our advance, our gain would again De oily mega
tive ont q territory. VIII Lie draw bse.s already
,,a,.t Whist il wogid amount TO- the oXporieaee
o. cen. Baell las. su-Iin,r folly d,nanssFHtsd.
AL toe Ot scilg az auIe utsi3n, s!'housb not car
no dlre., 70 yrt Crlftc1 iosafc Nc general ooD-
epIsCn that the country south o. Tie prosent ITon'
OF operatlsns u 1be Amy u ihe Iumberi.nd-
Souiu Middle ~. stern Tennessee. Northern
Georgia. aud ALt. --un iuprHcl.caos a. 70 al
,fen,lye csmpa.i. nr.oe, !. IL 10 bs regretted
liz ten. AOss-rs-.. .1 not sA3Ody Ia lis inter
loyaf once ouc seICE4ns l4ulJIa - 70 "LAt tbo1d
bo Gone wi;b the amy u suocossiu. onontiYe, WITH
results O; vital eject tLo coarse VI We war DC
deemed an imyO.slt!hly. fOr, The army oAnDos
10 ilsee available for oensVs pyEPpses to the fall
extent oi ia numerical apables, No sooner TIA!
Tact IL recognized, and &C. aiou " ~iLofs"A
of l., .urplEs strength foT employment where,
the better for the oouim "a cause.
However, while The o. oc10lf VI the corps and
tiyl ION commanders " al advance are ILL
que.ii uaby b.sed upon real, not merely pre-.
,uu.ed difficulties. AZ tbou.d not, be supfosed
tuht tLey are COL rluslys az 10 Lie inAd'b.oAIy
Of a. advance. and thst The other AIDE OF
tue question csnuoI be sustained I'm SOUND Is,'oIs
On lilo contrary, tie fact. adlDl,t.d even IN tho
sI,wrrs Of come Il lie consulted general officers,
tba tho prtsent strength OF the Rebel army IN our
front doe. not exceed 5000, including bat from
- OJJ - 1920 infantry, AID that ~e Gould hoNofd'
iuply &C. end sgaiusI that arm with well nigh TWO
10 one renders, with our numerical preponaefshoe,
tie Isk Of attack upon TIE enemy Dos BY any
means too great 10 permit oi lls lHourreDoe.
.hst "a 10 us victorious battle, whether entirely
destructive Of merely snpPlin9 Brsggs army for
SINE time would not be fraoshi with great bench
cial results, may well be doubted.
Apsan our AIRY, evon though siili Inferior In
uun,ber which. is rendered Improbable by The well
authenticated reports OF tie removal OF large POT
non OF the Rebel mounted forces 10 distant parts,
has OF late demonstrated lis ability 10 cope success
fully with that OF The enemy gni could be well 10
lei Oh Tor IN. protection Of lines of communication.
Next, the close approach Of the sesron Of harvest
uroise. source Of supply Ia tho new crop OF cereals
sud vegetables, which, according 10 all the state
msuts Of the Rebel press, Is unusually hne III the
valley Of the tennessee and the aoJaoent country,
miBcIsnt TO make up for any deficiency likely ~
ar.s, from prscarious connection with our base.
Moreover, although tho country through winch the
army would have ~ operate 10 rough
and broken, tue roads hue, and adsqu-Is
to rspid movements. Furthermore, sound strategy
material aud moral Weakening Of tbs enemy by the