Muscatine weekly journal. [volume] (Muscatine, Iowa) 185?-1890, 1863-04-10

sltlon the President pr0pOunded certain queS-
tons as to its feasibility and advantages, and
finally movement by way of Annapolis and
the Rappahannock was agreed upon, but the
rebels evacuated their position at Manassas
retiring to the Rappahannock, thus rendering
the plan futile. --.---.---
On the 18th of March a council of Generals
decided on campaign by way of York and
James rivers, which the President sanctioned,
deciding that enough force be left to protect
Manassas and leave Washington secure.
Mcdowell was assigned the advance, but
transportation not being adequate his division
was detained till the last, and subsequently
retained for the defense of Washington.
Previous to leaving, the Commanding Gen
eral addressed communication to the Adju
tant General show he left 81, 456 men at diff
ferent points, at Warrenton, Manassas, She
nandoah and on the lower Potomac, with 49,
900 in front of Washington. The next day
Gen. Wadsworth stated that his force for the
defense of Washington was inadequate, and
the subject was referred to Gen. Hitchcock,
who reported the same evening, which con-
CLUBS with the opinion that the requirments
of the President that enough furce be left to
secure the safety of Washington had not been
fully complied with The President the next
day ordered McDowell's corps to remain
This brings the Committees report to the Pc
ninsutar campaign. ....., 3.q} r
After landing near Fl. Monroe, the army
moved towards Yorktown, on the 4th Of
April, appearing before the rebel works on
the 9Th. U Is .td .-s
The Committee say the testimony proves
the rebels had from 10000 to 100000 men
at Yorktown then, and it is now evident our
forces could then have pierced the rebel lines,
cutting off achievements but seige was
determined on, contrary to the wishes of the
President. The Committee rehearses the
facts relative to the evacuation of Yorktown
and the battle of Williamsburg, and says one
of the Generals testified that after the latter
battle, if the enemy had been followed, our
forces could have reached Richmond almost
without firing gun, but the General Com
handing states that bad roads made pursuit
impracticable. ea-. r.-L saliar
| After the battle of Williamsburg it was de-
clded to send Mcdowell via Fredericksburg
to reinforce the Army of the Potomac, but
the operations Of jackson in the Shenandoah
prevented his being sent.
! The Committee gives the details Of the bat
tie ofSeven Pines and Fair Oaks, in which it
is stated Hooker made a reconnaissance to
within four miles of Richmond. The Com
mittee then continues, relative to the seven
battles, giving number of kilograms which
passed between Mcclellan and the President,
the former telegraphing on the night of the
9th of June that the Government had not
sustained his army.
On the night of the 25th of July, Gems.
Halleck and Burnside visited Harrison's
Landing, soon after which it was decided to
withdraw the army from there, which was
done to reinforce Pope. '~sie2'
The Committee devotes some SIX pages to
kilograms and extracts of evidence relative to
Pope's defeat, and then goes on to the cam
paign in Maryland, also mainly composed of
extracts from letters of Mcclellan to Halleck,
and kilograms In relation to Antietam,
Mcclellan testifes that on the morning after
the battle he found our loss had been great
and the army much disorganized, and did
not renew the attack that day, but arranged
to do so the day after, when the enemy aban-
doned his position He says-"I think, that
taking into consideration what the troops had
gone through, we got as much out of them in
the Antietam campaign as human endurance
are given that passed between the President
|
ing Mcclellan to move on the enemy from his
position near Harper's Ferry. Mcclellan
shows conclusively from his dispatches that
his cavalry was in poor condition in October,
but moved en- the 46th and continued until
| the 5tb Of November, when he received an
order from Halleck deposing him of his COM
mand.
The campaign of Burnside is then rshearsed
| koo&s - IT,
ericksburg the attack by Franklin was made
with Mead's division, which pierced the lines
of the enemy, but was driven back. Several
witnesses testified that had the attack been
renewed by the whole of Franklin's division
it would have been successful. 1t appears that
Gems. Newton and Corcoran, in an interview
with the President, intimated that the army
lacked confidence in Gen. Burneide, which led
the President to send a dispatch to Burnside
the effect of which was to stop an expedition
against the enemy then started. Subsequently
| Burnside visited Washington, and returned.
shortly after which he planned the second
attack on Fredericksburg, which was thwarted
by storm. In consequence Of certain officers
expressing dissatisfaction in the presence of
| inferior officers, Burnside had orders written
dismissing some officers, relieving others from
duty, and sentencing deserters to be shot,
| The President refused to sanction the orders,
and Burnside offered his resignation, which
was not accepted, but he was relieved by the
President from command. .lse 2 F.
The Report recapitulates what has been
done, and reviews the financial and other
affairs of the rebels. The Committee say that
the reaction which has followed the recent
slight manifestation of willingness on the part
of secession-sympathizer to offer terms of
compromise must convince them that they
have not allies on whom they can rely that
the present condition of Europe must forever
crush any delusive hopes they might have
entertained of intervention to accomplish
what they can never attain. ..
The Committee says we must obtain unin-
terrupted control of the Mississippi. We
must reach these railroad arteries, the one
bordering on the Atlantic, the other stretch
ing through the valleys of Virginia and Ten
soon as possible take the few remaining forti-
fed seaports the rebels possess, then we shall
virtually disarm the rebellion, cut it off from
all external sources Of supplies and destroy
their means of INSTRUMENTATION by which
alone they have been able to meet us in force
wherever we have appeared, and by which
aiohe tney nave ueen ao!e 70 supply their
armies. We must destroy their armies, and
to do this we must concentrate and not scat
ter our forces. tits better to operate success
fully against one stronghold or one arm than
ty attempt three and fail.
The indications now clearly show, both in
the East and West, that the campaign of 1868
will give US brilliant achievements. The
Generals now in the field have the full conf
dence Of the soldiers and the people, and our
armies will 60 forth knowing their ranks are
to be made full, and that every day thatpass-
es will add too and not diminish their