The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-04-28

calculated TO damage the President and his
Cabinet, and to throw wet blanke,
on the national enthusiasm for the war
SO as to prepare the way to bring it to a close
as soon as possible, with divided Union and
two Independent general governments
| policy which the aboltionists have been
steadily pursuing ever since their negro theo-
ries were brought to the practical test of OK
pertinent and miserably failed.
Detached portions of the testimony taken be-
fore the committee have been heretofore pub
lished in the newspapers. These extracts de-
monstrated that the chief causes of failure were
the incapacity and imbecility of Stanton and
Halleck-the War Department and "the Gene
ral-in-Chief." The full testimony, as now Off
cially published, more than confirms the melan-
choly fact. For instance Burnside's plan for
capturing fredericksburg was rem dered not
only nugatory when il would have been sue,
cesstul. but turned into serious disaster, be-
cause the pontoons required for crossing the
Rappahannock were not sent on in time.
Stanton, at the head of the War Department
did not see to it. Halleck, "the General-in-
Chief" with his headquarters at Washington,
failed to have the matter attended to. He sent
a telegraphic despatch about it to General
Woodbury., Of the Engineer Corps, at Washing
ton, from Warrenton, where he had been down
comforting with Burnside. But on his return
Immediately after to the federal capital he
never thought it worth his while to inquire
whether his order had been carried out, and, in
act To iplr 90. e;
ness. The vagueness Of his order by tele-
graph, and its entire want of precision, show
Halleck's utter unftness for the post he filed
1t was in these words:-"Can upon the Chief
Quarternaster to transport all your pontoons
and bridge materials to Aqua creek.r Wood
bury Yves COMPOUNDED. lie knew not what the
order meant; for Aqua creek was then in pos
session of the rebels, and had he been in po-
sition to promptly obey the enemy would have
got possession of the whole of the pontoons.
But the greater part of them were still at
Harper's Ferry, and at Berlin, six miles below.
At the. same time Woodbury. states that two
hundred and seventy horses were wanted; but
and teamsters for them to be hunted up. The
order OF Halleck was despatched ON the 18th Of
November. 1t was not until the Gath that the
first Of the pontoons reached Burnside entirely
too late for his purpose. 1t is thus evident that
there was no foresight, no preparation. Wood
bury says elf the emergency had been made
known to him in any manner he could have dis
regarded the forms of service, and seized teams,
teamsters and wagonmasters for instant SER
vice wherever be could find them"
But what were Stanton and Halleck about all
this time, that they did not make known to him
the emergency, and urge the necessity of expe-
dition? The Secretary of War appears to have
been ignorant Of all that was going on, or en-
tirely Indifferent to it, while Halleck seemed to
act the part of a mere clerk or messenger to
Burnside, and to have given himself no further
trouble after sending the telegraphic despatch,
at the request Of that general. Instead ofplan-
ming the campaign, and supplying to the general
in the field the means of rendering it successful
he allows an inexperienced, raw commander to
plan campaign for himself, and to suddenly
change his base of operations. He acquiesces
in the plan, but gives no assistance in carrying
il ont.
Had Burnsi dc been man like Napoleon the
First, instead of depending on Halleck, he
would have sent AL officer from his camp to SUI
perintend the transportation Of the pontoons,
seeing that everything hinged on time. When
the instruction of the Sections, in the progress
Of the French Revolution, threatened the exist
ence of the republic, the Convention appointe
a committee OF safety, consisting of FIVE men,
bers one of whom, Barras, had command Of the
military force. A young officer of artillery who
had distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon,
| and who had been cashiered by the reactionists,
was, at the request OF Barras, appointed his
second in command. This young man was b.
naparte, who had been sent for by Barras, and
was instructed as to what was required
of him. While he was yet speaking with Barras
he took time by the forclock, and sent imme-
diately an officer, at eleven O'Clock at night, to
the camp of Sablons for the artillery which, with
| five thousand men Of the Conventional army, he
| disposed at all the points where an attack was
apprehended. At the same time he armed the
Convention with muskets. The insurgents, mum
bering forty thousand. soon surrounded the
Convention. But they had failed to get the ar.
tillery They sent force for It; but Napoleon
had been two hours before them, and by thai
foresight they were utterly defeated. Otherwise
all would have been lost. This was charac
teristic specimen of the sagacity and provision
which rendered Napoleon 80 successful in his
future career Had Burnside initiated his ex.
ample Fredericksburg would have been cap
tured with scarcely any loss Of life.
The conduct Of the military authorities a,
Washington in reference TO Fredericksburg il
but sample Of their general neglect, imbecilit,
and Encouragement in the conduct of the war
as exhibited in the ponderous volumes of testi
mony which now lie open before u.s. There Il
nothing to match their failure in the history o
civilized nations. The blunders Of the English
government when the Crimcan war broke on
| ~ 4