The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-08-22
BURLINGTON WEEKLY HAWK-EYE

other troops from the east, and that more
were daily reaching him. With the force
! nad, short time must have enabled him
ceed In raising the siege. Possession of
x1cKsburS at that time would have ena-
pleo me TO have turned upon Johnston and
driven MIN from the state, and possess nv
seltof all tie railroads and practical military
highways, thus effectually securing to our
serves al territory west of the Tombigbee,
and this before the season was too far adj
yanceG foc campaigning in this latitude
would have saved the Government send
ing large achievements, much needed
elsewhere; and, finally, the troops them
selves were impatient to possess vicks-
burg. and would not have worked in the
trenches with the same zeal, believing it
unnecessary, that they did after their fail
ure 70 carry the enelny's works. Accor-
dinghy on The 2lst, orders were issued for
genera assault on the whole line, to COM
mence 1t I'D q. NJ, on the cd, All the
corps commanders set their time by mine.
that there should be not difference between
them In movement or assault. Promptly
at the hour designated, the three army
corps then In front of the enemy's works
commenced the assault. I had taken a
commanding position near McPherson's
front, from which I could see all the adj
vancing columns from his corps. and a
part OF each of Sherman's and McCler-
nand s. portion of the commands of
J each succeeded in planting their flags on
the outer slopes of the enemy's bastiOns
} and maintained them there until night
Eacn corps had many more men than
could possibly be used in the assault, over
such ground as interviewed between them
and the enemy. More men could only
avail In case OF breaking through the enc
mys me or in repelling sortie. The as
sault was gallant inth extreme on the part
OF all the troops, but the enemy's position
| was too strong, both naturally and artifi-
cially, to be taken in that way. At every
J point assaulted, and at all of them at the
, same time, the enemy was able to show all
the force his works could cover. The as
sault failed, I regret to say, with much
J loss on our side in killed and wounded:
} but without weakening the confidence OF
the troops in their ability to ultimately
succeed.
No troops succeeded in entering any of
the enemy's works with the exception OF
Sergeant Griffith, of the 21st regiment Iowa
: volunteers, and some eleven priyates of the
same regiment. Of these none returned
, except the sergeant and possibly one man.
! The work entered by him, from it's position
} could give us no practical advantage unless
: others to the right and left oft were car.
ried and held at the same time.
About IL M, I received dispatch from
7 McClernand that he was hard pressed al
, several points, in reply to which ordered
him to reinforce the points hard pressed
: from SUCH troops as he had that were no,
r engaged. / then rode round to Sherman
3 and had just reached there, when receiv.
J ed a second dispatch from McClernand
: stating positively and unequivocally thai
t he was in possession of and held two ofthe
. enemy's forts; that the American flag Their
: waved over them; and asking me to have
4 | Mol T. ro;o
J in his favor. This dispatch I showed t.
: Sherman, who Immediately ordered re-
8 newal Of the assault on his front. I also
sent an answer to McCleanand, directing
= him to orderup Macarthur to his assistance
and started Immediately to the position
had just left on McPhersons line to con
9 vey him the information from McClernanC
: by the last dispatch, that he might make
the diversion requested. Before reaching
! MCPHERSON met messenger with a thirC
: dispatch from McClernand, of which thu
: following is copy:
J, 18TH ARMY CORPS IN THE FIELD NEAI
}. VIcKsBURG, MISS, May %, 1S63.-GEN
e trenchments at several points, but are
= brought to stand, I have sent word t.
Macarthur to reinforce me if he cam
S Would it not be best to concentrate the
t whole or part of his command on this
: point? JOHN A. MCCLERNNAD,
!, MAJOR General commanding.
:, Major General U. S. GRANT.
n P. 81 have received your dispatch. -
r My troops are all engaged, and cannot
: withdraw any to reinforce others. Nice.
e The position occupied by me during
e most Of the time of the assault gave me 8
d better opportunity of seeing what was
! going on in front of the 18th Army Corps
s than believed it possible for the com
s mander OF it to have. l could not see hi
), possession of forts, nor necessity for rein
: forcements, as represented in his dispatch
(, es, up to the time left it, which was be-
It tween II m. and p. M, and expressed
d doubts of their correctness, which doubts
y the facts subsequently, but too late, con
a firmed. At the time, could not disregard
it his reiterated statements, for they nigh
n possibly be true; and that no possible OPP
g portnnity of carrying the enemy's strong
a hold should be allowed to escape through
= fault OF mine, ordered Quimby's division
IS which was all of McPherson's corps ther
: present, but four brigades, to report to Nc
II Clernand, and notified him of the order.
e showed his dispatches to Mcpherson, as
If had to Sherman, to satisfy him of the ne
l. cessity of an active diversion on their par
to hold as much force In their fronts as wa:
d possible. The diversion was promptly
10 and vigorously made, and resulted in tn
Is increase of our mortality list fully fifty pc
e cent, without advancing our position o.
~ giving US OtheI dOSduCStS,SS.
d About $50 p. M, Ireceived McClernand
6 fourth dispatch, asafollows:
81 18th ARMY CORPS, May %, 1853.
e GENERAL: have received your dispatcl
in regard to Gen. Quimby's division AM
n Gen. McArthur's division. Assoon as the.
d arrive will press the enemy with all pos
n sible speed, and doubt not will force m,
J, way through. I have lost no ground. M.
70 men are in two of the enemy's forts, bu
> they are commanded by rife-pits in tn
: rear. Several prisoners have been takel
e who intimate that the rear is strong. A
d this moment I am hard pressed.
q JOHN A. MCCLERNAND.
e Major General Commanding.
d Maj. Gen. U. S. Grant, Department OF tn
d Tennessee.
e The assault of this day proved the quail
: ty of the soldiers of this army. Withou
IS entire success, and with heavy loss, ther
d was no murmuring or complaints, no fall
h ing back, no other evidences OF demorali
IS cation.
Y THE SIEGE.-After the failure of the ed
I determined upon regular siege. Tn
Or troops now hainU flllv awake tn the npCeS