The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-11-07


Gxpose Of the Quorsel.
- :. -Ss".. rS
Ine hissosy snS qaanes setween 0i'in'ofe ana
Dahlgren. ths Federal conmandess on 6CharIestun,
has cone 10 lieht. The dIsaeyeement haA se.e m
-. -. -. .ss.,., ,...... s.-A.s...-. -
."' '-''' ''.s - csassS
have reached Washtegton, and the correspondents
have gotten hold Of them. We aIve 4 sumnasv al
a.. .....r,. - ..,-,.
.'e s."s s.. !" ,s.. se's .ocs"osu M ~ Pesssned ~
the New YORK 1smss. The squabble u not Of much
Interest 10 oar readers, but the military tacts /.
hvisxs 10 lisht are OF inuor,ance. as he,ris. NM,
en-. s,... ~ -. c.. - -. ,,, ~
tno ssesa ot t"e 'ees OF tne feoesison." We give
the sTticic from the Tym0.
Al The roof :-,hs RnAnsap * snch ..,..
cua al hy Dahlsren: I.s shana ,v.s .o1id.3 - ~.
frans6ornsed. hnt moi ree,srr1 81 =. -, ns,n; = y -
with hfe theories Of "a ~ .nd ,he
OF large sst ana shei. This :. a.eS nm ,yas he
ensire eiven - The n.wv - ,s,.es ~ LIT rs,s. !.
cover Gharlcston. ana 10 cansnrs sias r;,v. Exne-
rIment denonsessted. whs, scienrs shamIA tave
anficfnafed tpat /, vonid ,,ns h,,rn ennush
to throw projeciile at long range and high vslsci
the muzaie mpconsumcd. TO secure complete ie-
iitlon Of the charge and insure long range and
high velocity Il would have been necessary to nst.
ride powder aud rife powder would have hurst
the piece This radical and defect In the
ordnance given TO the navy to batter down the de-
fences Of Charleston and take that city, Hes the
bottom Of what cffaiiure has thus far characterized
the siese and of All the DELAYS which have drawn
il out TO the breaking Of the popular patience.
To mass over All other history of the change OF
naval commanders before Charleston, the assign
nicnl Of Dxhlgren To work his own guns against
the city and its 9cfenccs was p0llcy Of necessity
as well a. Of justice. He went down and took
command, and tnen struck hands with Gilmore on
the barfan thatthe army should morris island,
fedaee Fort Waenes and the works on Cummfngss
Point, ana from tlat position knock Sumter TO
pieces with Parroa guns, or silence iis fire; and,
this being done, that the navy should anchor Its
iron. cads on the wnarves OF Charleston.
Gilmore has performed his part Of the bargain.
D2ngfch has NOT performed his Why ! tue eouh-
try asks For two reasons: l. For want Of range
In the navy guns: y: From 'm1sunderstandiag"
between MIN ana Giiimofe.
Jhis smisundefstahd'ng ID Oh sucn nu8e proper
tions as 70 invo!ve the TWO services. was sti,au
Dabigren upon Sumter, which was regarded by
the army as Eurreptitous and unfair attempt on
te part Of the navy to snatch the honor OF taking
possession of a fortress which the former had re
duced For, In pursuance Of the original agree
mcnt between Dahlgren and Gilmore, the latter
was actively preparing transportation for two
hundred men, with whom he Intended to take
Sumter by escaIade. This MISUNDERSTANDING"
was quite fully developed by n recent cOrrespon-
dence between Dahigren and Gilmore, of which
we have minute information In a letter received
YESTERDAY from Hilton Head.
Dahlsren lirst writes to Gilmore, requesting him
to "subdue the fre"of Sumter, as he intended
soon 10 remove the distractions between that
work and Mouitsic adding that If that fire could
be "Aubduedo he might be saved the necessity OF
engaging sumter with bis iron ciads, all whose
powers weuid be required against the anterior de-
fences -oi Charseston.
To which Gilmore made reply, In substance,
that he had supposed that Sumter was helpless
and harmless ruins, far as its ability to resist
men Of war was concerned. II was true that one
gun. a. was yet mounted in II casemale, and
pointed up the harbor toward the city. But this
gun did not FIRE In the direction of the Obsirct
which Dahlgren proposed to remove. Ths fact
that sumter was powerless against tho navy was
demonstrated with recent heavy naval cannonades
upon MouItrie, in which nahIgren's ships lay for
several hours within short range of Sumter, and
failed to elicit n shot from that work. He, Gill
more, therefore. was constrained to believe that
the fire he was requested to "su.dae'' was infan
try Are.
This he thought was imposing new condition
on the army, and one which, although he was will
Ing to make great sacrifices, and shed blood gen
erously, to accomplish the object OF the Joint ex-
pedition, he would not feel Justified in nnderlak-
ing. 1t is possible, continued dillmore, in sub
stance, tnat though one attack on sumter has
failed, the army might get possession Of the ruins
but could not hold them without great saerihce
OF life, because the enemy command the i0rt WIN