Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1863-10-28

wells, having como up thus for mile aut
half, laden With eight days rations.
The troops which had been marching ol
the LETT of the railroad were brought quick
lily over to the right, and Gen. Warren
seeing that the enemy had neglected tt
occupy the cut aud embankment Of the
railroad, on the instant jumped his men
unseen. into it. More prudence on the
part OF tho rebel commander, or less "a.
gacity on the PArt-of the Union commun-
der, would have PtoVed the destruction oi
that corps.
Tho rest OF the army had all gone ahead
The First corps NsWton's) had already
reached Manassas. The last one but War
ren's, namely, the Filth, (Sykes,) passed
beyond Bristoe simultaneously with War
tens coming up, Rpd just as he got engaged
with the enemy ~ received from Sykes
the comforting intelligence that he twas
moving of slowly and IN good order |"
Gen. Warren hatAtormsd his troops under
cover of the cut and e[nbRnkmsnt Of the
railroad, constituting ready made breast
works. On the left he placed n defensive
crOtChet. Down rushed the enemy, chatg-
log on this flank, when suddenly the troops
under cover rose up, and At close range
poured Volley after yolley OF deadly fire
into the advancing Aud presently retreat.
ing rebels.
After twenty minutes fight the enemy
was glad to make otf, leaving a thousand
dead aud wounded aud five hundred pris.
oners in our hands! 1t WAS well that night
came on as it did, foe just as the sun set.
Ewell, who had been following in Warren's
rear, came up. but bad only time to form
line of battle when the darkness inter-
rupted further operations, aud the rear
guard was able TO pass on and join the
main body Of the army.
LEE's PLANS DEsCONCERTED.
The repulsO at Bristoe completely dis.
concerted Lees plans, so lar rs they EN-
braced the view of getting on the commu.
nications OF General Meade, on reaching
Ceutreville before hin. Lee had NO long
er with him that unmatched executive Of
6cer, Stonewall Jackson, uuequalled at a
rapid march. Hill proved slow aud fee
bic, aud instead of striking the bead of
the Uiou columu he struck its rear, and got
badly handled in consequence.
THE REBELS HALT.
From this moment Lee abandoned all
purpose Of giving battle, and never advanc.
eed the main body OF his army much be-
yond Bristoe. Detatchments were, how
ever, sent TO follow up the Union force and
make demonstrations. On Friday at ii
O'clok A. NJ, the enemy appeared in front
of BIackburn's and Mitehells Fords, and |
made vicious attack on our skirmishers, |
but were promptly driven back Stuarts |
cavalry, meanwhile, was sent BY u detour |
round northward and WtSlward; but be. |
ing checked and repulse6 in- all their ef. |
fOFls, sfhey gaveHp the atrempt The reb-
el army was noW set 70 work TO destroy
the railroad, aud the etfeetuAl. manner in |
which they did their work has already |
been mentioned, Thursday, Friday aud
Saturday seem to have been employed 10 |
this manner, and then Lee began his ret.
rograde movemeut-the rebel army pass.
iug through Greenwich on Sunday, and
WAsrentOn on Monday, aud thence down
across the RappahaunOck, their rear GOV.
cred by their cavalry.
MEADE AWAITS FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS.
In the meanwhile the Union army lay at
BIHckburu's Ford, Bull Run, Chautilly,
and Ceuterville, awaiting the development |
of the enenys plans. Headquarters were |
on the old Ball Run battle. field itself, by |
the woods through which the regulars
made their charge.
FORWARD MOVEMENT.
Ou Monday, the 10Th, the forward move.
ment was begun, the army crossing Bull |
Run on pontOons. The Second corps took |
the road toward Auburn. the Sixth toward |
Warrentou, the Third toward Catlett's, the |
First aud Fifth toward New Baltimore
Tuesday, 20th, found the army on the line |
line OF Cedar Run. 1t had
been expected aud hoped that We should |
meet the enemy, but they were far ahead, |
and nothing but small cavalry parties ap-
peared. On Wednesday, our cavalry re-
turning, gave the intelligence that the rebels |
were all across the RAppahannock and the |
Rapidan. In this situation, pursuit was, of |
course, hopeless, aud has for the present
been given up.
CRITICISM OF TUE CAMPAIGN,
In passing judgment upon the conduct
OF this CampRign-eVen it that DO possible |
at ell at this time-we must weigh duly all |
the elements, that enter into the problem. |
Had Gen. Meade been free TO operate with
no other considerations in view save those |
Of "a military order, blow might have
been struck 1t the RudHcioua invaders that |
would have proved their death blow. When
Lees force was m0sscd at Sperryville, and
MeAde's on the Rappahannock, the Union
Commander was already practically on the
rebel line of communication, and an ad-
vance on the part of Geo. Meade direct on
Gordousville be would have brought Lee
promptly back to attend TO the menRced
safety OF tue rebel Capital, and he might
have, in strong position, given the rebel
forty thousandGuttle with double that force.
This would have been TO repeat the bril-.
liant strategy Of Turenne, who, when his
opponent, Montecuculi, crossed to the left
bank Of the Rhine to invade Alsace, him
self passed to the right band, and thus
brought Moutecuculi hurriedly back to look
after his own COMMUNICATIONS. Turenne
had no Warrington to look after. Meade
Capital, and could not possibly afford to
risk battle with his face to the Potomac.
The conduct of Gen. Meade was prudent,