Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1863-12-18

of western Illinois where he was so we'll
known.
From Gen. Bragg,s Army.
Correspondence Of the Richmond Dispatch.
- RksXcA, GA, Nov. 80, 1863.
The news from the front, telegraphic
synopsis of which l sent you last night, is
of an encouraging and reassuriug obaraO-
ter. The euemy's advance forces, after the
bloody repulse between Tunnel Hill and
RinggoId by Cleburne, retreated to the
mountain pass at the latter place, where
they still remained at last adYices. They
destroyed the bridges as they retired, thus
showing thar they do not propose TO follow
us further at present, and that they ara not
l,Willing for the Confederates to get at them.
i Our rear is on this side of the burned
bridges beyond Tunnel Hill, where it pre-
/ sents stern and detiapt front. The main.
Il army is encamped around Dalton, where
Gen. Bragg has established his headquar-
tets. The trains and snch forces as had
\ reached Resaca have been ordered back to
the same place, and I shall follow as soon
as my horse is in condition TO travel,
The opiuion was advanced in my tele-
gram last night,thAt there was no reason
TO apprehend an immediate advance of the
Federal army. Such is still.my conviction.
If the army could not be subsisted at
Chattanooga without the aid of railroad
from that point to Bridgeport, neithsfc8n
it be subsistsd at DaltOnIor Kingston with!
ont the possessiOnlof the Western and AT.
lantic Road, aud sufficient number ofelo-
conotives and cars Tor. the, transportation
of supplies. These locomotives and cars
General Grant has mot, and probably can
not procure for some time. Rolling stock
inadequate for two. The Federal COM
mander will find it necessary, !, therefore, ia
order to advance into the conntry, to ac.
cumulate supplies at Chattanooga, to re.
pair the railway bridges which his advance
forces have already destroyed in the vicin-
ity of Ringgold, and such others as the
Confederates may destroy, and to provide
a sufficient number of cars aud engines to
transport supplies for his troops.
Ia advancing this opinion, take IL for
granted that he must advance, If at all this
winter, by the railroad route, and not by
Wills Valley, in5the direction of Rome
The roads by the latter route, if not i'm
passabIe in winter TO heavily loaded army
wagons, are of such a character as to rem
der it difficult, If not impossible, to subsist
as large an army as his by wagon trains
alone. Indeed, if General Grant had in
tended to move directly upon Rome, Ste
venson, and not Chattanooga, would have
been chosen as his base of supplies; and,
in that event the struggle OF Lookout
Mountain and Mission Ridge would not
have been necessary, .,,..!s,sa $50
3 But will General Grant advance at all
this winter Z II is Impossible, OF course,
for any one except the, Federal commander
himself to answer this interrogatory,
though it ia permissible fof us TO speculate
npon his probable designs. with the aid of
such lights as are furnished by his previous
conduct and present situation. Omitting.
as unnecessary to the argument, any infer
ence that might be drawn from his former
campaigns, il is sufficient to say that he
has neither the supplies nor the transport
tation to enable him at this time to move
upon Atlanta, the acknowledged goal Of
his ambition and the desires of his gov.
eminent. To advance along the railroad
at this inauspicious season of the year,
and repair the road as he moves, would be
a herculean task-a task, let us hope, far
beyond his power of .occomplishment. 1t
lis one hundred and thirty miles from Chat
tanooga 10 Atlanta; the wagon roads are
Inferior, and the intervening country is
|trayersede by several mountain ranges and
mum berless water, courses.
Can he cross this wide track under the
heavy rains and frequent SHOWS of'winter!
|f4h uG G44 uQk1. MAlA NV
part ofthB way now, and the remainder in
the spring? The suggestion was made
some time ago, In one of these letters, that
his efforts this fall ,wsuld probably be linn.
tied to an attempt to get possession ofithe
region OF country lying west of the west
branch of tae Ohickamauga, aud that early
next spring he would put his army in mo.
ton toward tie great railway centre ofthe
Confederacy. Can he do more than this
now? The district from this place to Chat
tauooga, fifty miles4 in width, has been
strippedtof its supplies, and an Invading
army would have TO bring along with it all
it required for its support. Grant may
make an effort, however, TO get possession
of Dalton, the point where the Georgia and
East Tennessee road unites with the West
ern and Atlantic road, aud even to reach
the EtowRh River; but there Is no reason
to believe thRthe will attempt to 90 fur
ther now. The Immediate possession of
Dalton was doubtless one of the objects OIL
his pursuit. of General Bragg, since IL
would have cut off all Communication by
railway with Knoxville, and all possibility
of succor to Gen. Longstreets isssJt7.a
That an effort will be made toscapture
IEongstreet aud his command, there lis no
room to doubt. At last accounts (the
29d inst, Knoxville WAS completely In
vested by the Cppfedera tssf wboiwere only.
waiting for achievements, then about
due, to make an assault upon the town.
An intelligent officer, who left5oRthat day,
is very confident that the attack, If NOT
prevented by the success of The on envy at
chattanooga, would prove successful
wheeler, with portion of his command,
Fhas arrived at Dalton, having, on his way,
chased the euemy from Cleveland, and
Irecaptured "a portion Of our lost wagon
train ) ..s,,..s
Capt. Heback IS Of 1.-The ouartermasters
Department, Informs US that onr total loss
lof wagons during the late battle, aud the
operations which preceded and succeeded
il, was about 60, including ordnance