Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-01-17
NATIONAL IETELLIGENCER.
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

fredericksburg the results of that disastrous en-
gagement, We held the following language, aiter
quoting the despatch in which Gen. Burnside an
nounced that he had fe-crossed the Rappahannock
because he "fslt the enemy's position IN front
could not be carried, and IL was military necesai-
ty either to attaclaor retire !:
And new yhat results from this complication Is ii
ny fhur else for the present taa military dead lock q
The approach To Rchmond by way OF the PeninsHla
being absndoDef by the present military administration
whose pride OF opinion naturally ressts return 10 ~ and
the line of approach by way Of being block
cd BY itnpassabe barrier Tho combinations OF the
GenerainCh have been brought to sudden standsti
at tune most aepropitious to the cause OF the Union
We have already stated, in the light Of subsc-
quent developments, that we were in error when
we supposed that Gen Halleck had formed any
combinations for the conduct of the campaign
in Virginia From the testimony OF Gen Burn
side and the other officers examined before the Con-
gressiona investigating committee, il appears that
no military combinations were formed by any
body as part of the campaign set on foot for the
capture of Richmond by an advance on the overland
route, via Fredericksburg. And it further appears
that in electing to make his approach by this line
Gen. Burnside acted rather against the opinion /"
Of Gen. Halleck, Of tho President, and Of the Secre-
tary of War, who however, jointly and severally
waived their convictions in Difference to the COM
manders judgment and wishes.
But these explanations as to the authorship OF
the plans devised by Gen. Burnside for the capture
of Richmond do not at all alter the military situa
ton superinduced by the disaster and check which
bcfel the Army Of the Potomac at Fredericksburg
on the 18th of December last. That army, since
that date, has been in deadlock from which
nc effort ON the part Of the Government has avail
ed to extrcate il, If any such effort has been made
After proposing to himself the capture of Rich
mond by an advance on the single line he had Sc
lected, and after being repused at the very TIRES
hold of that advance, Gen. Burnside, in the de-
spatch reporting that he had re-crossed the Rap
pahannock, accompanied this announcement with
the statement that he had retired because he felt
the position in front could not be carried"
And this being the case, it should perhaps create
no surprise that unmiitary minds are at some loss
to divine the strategic advantages that result from
retaining the Army Of the Potomac in the presence
Of works Which it is not proposed to attack again
fact Of which the enemy has been notified by the
notification OF Gen Burnsde's reason for with
drawing his army after its bloody repulse For 1T
4 conociyed that this state Of affairs while holding
our own army in vice, affords to the Confederate
commander the opportunity OF using portion OF
his forces in other fields of military operations, If
he only keeps up formidable array in front.
Whether this has been done we are unable to say,
but it is obvious that the "strategic position now
occupied by he Army of the Potomac lends itself
to the promotion Of such msnnuvres on the part Of
Gen. Lee.
We arc left to suppose, therefore, that the gal
LIANT and powerful army Of Gen. Burnside is held
in its present "deadlock by the inability CT our
militsry authorities to conceive of any plan for
again setting it 10 motion on line which promises
success The approach by way Of the Peninsula,
after being countermanded by the present military
administration, is little likely to find favor again In
its eyes, and the advance via Fredericksburg hav-
ing been checked by insurmountable distractions
placed in the way, it follows that some new manru-
vre must be devised by somebody or the enterprise
of capturing Richmond must be abandoned as
hopeless
1t seems to us, however, that if our army were
sent back to Warronton, whence it was removed to
Fredericksburg "rather against the opinion OF the
Prcsidcnt, Secretary Of War, and General in
Chief these high military authorities might then
have an opportunity Of starting it again on the
route which it seems they then preferred 70 that
adopted by Gen. Burnside. What this route is
we arc unable to say but until this has been tried
Il cannot be said that the military administration
is at the end Of its resources And if this plan
should on trial prove to be failure, the method OF
exclusions might perhaps conduct to recoDsid-
Grafton of the advantages presented by the Pen
insuar line of approach
Meanwhile it is gratifying to observe that the
aOn to Richmond" cry has entirely ceased to dis
turb the equanimity or embarra1 the orderly pro-
cesses of the Administration That cuckoo cry
came to an end so soon as Gen. Mcclellan had
been displsced for his mmobty" While he
was nc the head Of the Army Of the Potomac it
never moved fast enough to please either the Go
yernment or certain class Of the people. After
he had been removed, it appears that Gen Burn
side (ws quote bis own Words was requested by
the President, the Secretary Of War, and The Gen
aralin( Chief NOT 10 be an kosteo and the military