The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-01-02

my own, but having just taken command
OF All army with which was but little &C
quainted, it was evident that it wasas much
as could attend to with the assistance of
all my officers, to change its position from
Warrenton to Fredericksburg, and | felt,
indeed | expected, that all the parts of the
plan which were to be executed in Wash
ington would be attended to by the officers
at that place, under direction of the differ
ent departments, to which those parts of
my plan appertained
Ques.-Did you not understand that you
were to be responsible for seeing that these
orders were to be carried out
Ans.-I did not. / did not imagine for
a moment that | had to carry out anything
that required to be be done at Washington.
General Meigs told me distinctly, several
days ago in Washington, that he never saw
my plan of operations until showed it to
him on that day.
Ques.-Do | understand you to say in
your statement that you expected General
Franklin to carry the point at the extreme
left of the ridge in the rear of the town,
and thereby enable our troops to storm
and carry their Notifications?
Ans.-I did expect to carry that point,
which, being done, would have placed
our forces i'll the rear of their extreme
left, and which, thought, at the time,
would shake their forces On the ridge to
such on extent that the position in front
could he easily stormed and carried.
QueS.-To what do you attribute the
failure to accomplish that?
Ans. TO the great strength of the posi-
ton, and the accumulation of the eneny's
forces there. expected that the bridges
would be built in two or three hours after
they We're unloaded, which was about day
light Instead of that, those on the right
were not built until three o'clock in the
afternoon, and l had only the means of
getting across one division over the bridges
in the night. General Franklins bridges
were built about noon, and were held by
our troops on the opposite bank.
This gave the enemy time to accumulate
| their forces, which were stretched along
the river from Port Royal up to the battle
field, before was able to order the attack
| There had been q great deal of division Of
| opinion among the corps commanders as to
the place OF crossing, but after all the dis
cusslon upon the subject, the decision to
cross over here was we'll received and I'M
| derstood - all OF them
| Cues What was he conduct of officers
and men during the attack.
Ans.-With the exception Of single
regiment, it was excellent.
Ques.--llaye YOU any knowledge as to
the force OF the enemy
AnS.--lt is estimated at all the way from
100000 to 200, OC0. | think it was less
than 10000 would add here that, al
though at the time | ordered the column of
attack to be formed on the morning after
the battle, thought the enemy's works
| could be carried, and adhered to that opin-
ion during that day. afterward became
convinced that that could not have been
done, owing to the great strength Of the
enemy, the time given them for reinforc-
ing, ana the belief, also, OF our officers that
| it could not be done [ accordingly tele-
graphcd to the President of the United
States that | withdrew our army because !
felt that the enemys position could not be
carried.
Burnsde'5 testimony here closed.
! The following is Il portion Of
UOoKER'5 TESTIMONY.
lie did not know why they did not take
| possession OF Fredercksburm but the feel
| ing seemed to be that they coUld take the
| city at any time think it would have
| been better to have held the lines where we
were, retaining sufficient force to threaten
! the enemy, and keep them up to their
works at Gordonsville and Culpepper; but
! Instead OF that We withdrew every man,
and burned the bridges, thus exposing our
! plans to the enemy the very moment we
! did SO. If General Summers corps had
come down there, and left enc up there
threatening to advance on that line, it
would have led them to believe we were
| going to advance on both lines. 1t would
| have been better; but the enemy saw at
once what we were ii, and came right on
! here, and they were nearer here than we
were; and this country is such that where
yer you give them three or four weeks to
fOrtify, 100, 900 men can make any place
impregnable to any other 100, 900 men.
! Ques.-Would there have been any diff
cul5y rs to supplies in your moving down
the other side of the river, as you proposed?
! Ans.-I had three days rations there.
! | was preparing to march down through
| Caroline county, where the people had just
gathered their crops, and would have got
! plenty Of forage and provisions enough for
a week or fortnight. AT the time Of the
conversation between Halleck, Meigs and
| Burnside, there was some talk of farward-
ing some supplies up the Rappahannock.
l said that at Bowling Green could draw
my supplies from Port Royal as easily as
we could get them. WhenI was at Hart
woot, knew that could take position
with 40, 900 men that the whole rebel ar
| my could not move me.
Ques.-W Would that movement have been
safe in view of the fact that the enemy had
not means of crossing here.