Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-09-17
THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER II, 1868.
THE PRESIDENTS LATE LETTER.


simultaneously with the appearance Of the Pre-
sidents Letter addressed to the political Convention
assembled at Springfield, Illinois, we briefly ad-
verted to its views in connection with topic of
great public interest upon which we had hoped it
would hold an explicit language and shed clear
light. Disappointed in this hope as regards that
question of current discussion between the friends
and the enemies of the Constitution, we engaged
at our leisure to examine with the exposition
which the President had deemed it proper to offer
to the country on other subjects, and to sub
NIT to our readers any thoughts which a subse-
quent perusal of his letter might suggest.
In proceeding to execute this purpose to-day we
shall practise the greatest possible brevity, conn
ing our observations to the political and explana
tory portion of the paper, in which the President
seeks to answer certain objections commonly brought
against his policy
Assuming that there are those who are dissatis
fed with him he addresses himself directly to them
and says:
" You desire peace, and you blame that do not
have it; but how attain it There are but three
conceivable ways First to suppress rebellion by force of
4 his am trying to do. Are you for itl If you
are, so far agreed If you not for it, second
way is to give up the Union am against this Are you
for it If you are you should say plainly IF you
not for force yet for dissolution there only remains
some imaginary compromise
We respectfully submit that in stating the con-
ditions of this problem the President has omitted
some of its elements. He has not exhausted the
categories of the question. Many who assign to
"force of arms" its proper place in quelling the
rebellion are not willing that pure and simple
free shall be the only expedient on which they
must rely to protect them from adopting the alter
native policy of "giving up the Union" or of pro-
posing terms Of compromise to the armed insur-
gents There are conservative and loyal men
who protest against any theory Of political and
military conduct which tends to separate wise policy
from vigorous war, or which renders vigorous war
futile and purposeless by stripping victories
of their power to subdue or to pacifcate. Physi-
cal force is directed and properly directed to the
defeat and dispersion of the insurgent armies but
all force exercised an other directions, whether
aimed at the people or the domestic institutions of
the Southern States, is just much of power ap-
piled to the intensfcation of hatred and the accu-
mutation of resistance against the National Gov.
eminent. No one has recognised more clearly
than the President the impolicy of relying on
arms alone as a means of consolidating that peace
and union which furnish the only rational and
legitimate, as they are the only Christian, end of
our military operations In his last annual mes
sage the President warmly and deliberately recon-
mendcd the plan of compensated emancipation"
as means auxiliary to the restoration and mante-
nance of the national authority throughout the
Union, and urged it expressly on the ground that
it was better to adopt such of policy,
/" not in exclusion Of but in addition to others"
than "to rely on force alone" To this effect he
said:
This plan is recommended means, not in exclusion
Of but additional to- all others for restoring and preserving
the national authority throughout the Union The subject
ia presented exclusively in ITS economical apect The
plan ooud confident peace speedily and
maintain permanently than can be done by force
alone; willis all 1t would cost con.iderng amounts and
manner Of payment, and times OF payment would be
easier paid will be the additional cost of the war; II
rely solely upon force 1t is much-very much-that
it would cost no blood at ALL
1t is known to our readers that the last Con-
gress, comprising in both Houses large majority
Of the Presidents political friends, refused to eff
fecuate his policy under this head but the earnest
manner in which the President urged it, in
the name of "not relying on force alone," still
serves to indicate that his analysis is not exhaustive
or comprehensive enough to embrace his own de-
liberately announced views when, in his late letter.
he says "there are but three conceivable ways to
obtain peace There is also fourth, and, as we
think, not only excellent way, but the only
possible way-and that is to conduct tho war
against armed insurgents alone, and TO leave the
widest possible space for the full play and de-
velopment of benofcent policy which shall seek
to consolidate by prudence what has been gained by
arms. The malignant theory which embraces in
the field Of its viaon nothing better than force,
and which, with mingled buster and impotence, |
looks to the determination of the Southern peo- |
pie" and the extrpation Of slavery, not as incidents
but as motives and objects Of the war, is theory
which not only puts arms Of keener edge and |
longer range into the hands of the insurgents, but
keeps them there; for what have they to gain by |
peaceful submission when at the worst persistence
la war promises them the consolation of indicating
their claim to valor, which is all that the nag- |
nant theory leaves to the Southern peopleY We
need not say that we have no part nor lot in any
such theory Of war, as we know the President has