, 1863-04-16
THE CHARLESTON FIGHT.
The Iron CIads Unsuccessful.
The Utter Imposaibility Of Reduo-
ing Charleston By Water.
REPtLSED But NOT DEFEATED.
A Complete Account Of the
Fight.


Fight.
The following details are from the CORES
pondence Of tile Nav York Times: It. Is
dated the Sth:
harbor on what It is surely no strnining of
terms to call the most extraordinary contest
in the annals of warfare.
Distressing though 1t be to write things
which will carry pain and humiliation to the
Heart Of the nation to read, it only remains to
tell you that this fleet Of iron clads has meas.
ured its strength against Fort Sumter and tho
works that Eahk tie entrance to Charleston
ltarbor, aud that it has Withdrawn from the
contcst-discomtlted
Estimated in terms Of time, the S t1iai a. tsse Was
hours served to prove that the defensive poT:
ers Of the iron fleet were not su{aclent: 70
withstand The terrible force Of the offensive
enaiucry Of the works 1t had to assn1l, Wntle
the limitations in the offensive powers OF tne
mjrht have been derived from. their superior
14,Ters of resistance over the forts. The enc
eemy by his obstructive appliances, was able to
Gr1;iu the 1ect-whosr total armament is 81
gune-in the focus Of the tl1e Of circle Of
hour, S out Of the 9 ships were wholly or par.
TALLY disabled! Such Is the ghastly fsc. il its
naked proportions.
Terrible though the action Of to-day was, it
WIS, in fact, reconn distance in force. Every
thing was untried Both the work to be done,
and the tools with which it was to be done
we're comparatively untcsted. We knew but
inperftctlJ The engines we were to use against
the enemy, and VIC knew still more imper-
fectly the engines the enemy were to use
against Us. 1t is unfortunate, no doubt, that
the revolution in the means and methods Of
offensive and defensive warfare now dawning
on the world, and the urgency Of the struggle
III which the nation Is engaged, should bare
uccc6sitated the hazarding Of 4 great battle,
on elements which arc all but unknown. Tie
tria1, however, had to be made. It has been
made, and though we are not Eainers in what
Is always the aim Of battle direct material
SUCCESSIVE have at least enriched our cxpe-
ricnce With that which, If rightly protlted by,
will get bring success.
THE FLEET ALONE CANNOT TAE CHARLESTON.
It would be folly for me to conceal from
you that the result Of this reconnaissance
produces but one conviction on tho mind of
unpTejudiced observers-the conviction of the
utter inEutt1cency Of the iron clad fleet to take
Charleston alone.
The result of the engagement, As already in
t1icated, was to lut ont Of the fight tive of the
nine iron. c1ads. One Of these-tho Keokuk-
was go horribly riddlcd that, though she was
brought out to her old anchorage, she bus
sunk
TIE 1MpEDMEETs.
Remember, now, that this tremendous ef-
fcct-tllc disabling Of one half the entire
aect-was accomplished in less than half an
hour. Remember, again, that this took place
simply at the entrance Of the inferno Of fire
| through which the fleet must have had to
| pass to reach Charleston, and that there is be-
fore ira double line Of batteries, stretching
| up for four miles before the city is Eaiued, At
each point Of which the ships must hare been
! exposed to q fire, equal in intensity to that
! felt under the walls Of Sumter. Bat, finally,
remember, that rebel artillery was not the
most formidable foe our ships had to with.
feet reached, directly across from Sumter, and
extending all the distance up to the city, arc
successive lines Of piles, effactual1y barring
the progress Of the vessels, and OBTAINING
them at known range within the focus Of fire;
that there axe other lines Of nets and ropes
that the whole channel is studied with subma
rinc battt rics, Of proportions meyer befort
J. dreamed Of in naval warfare.
That the entire fleet Was not destroyed ant
| left in the hands Of the enemy, Is due to ths
skill Of the gallant sailor commanding the ex
| peditiOn, aud to tho 'act and pluck Of the cap
taips Of the respective ships.s
orpEn OF BATTLE AND PLAN OF ATTACK uro.
1 CHARLESTON.
The bar will be buoyel by the keokuE. Com
matter Rhind, insisted BY G. o. Boutelle. Assist
an ant United States Coast Surrey, commanding th'
thc squadron. The commanding officers viii. pre-
vions to crossing, make themselves acqualntc'
| with the Fa1ne Of the bu0Je.
The ycskt1s will, on si,nal being made form Il
the prescribed ozdc1 ahcad at intervals Of onc ca
The squadron will pass up the main clip ehanne
ris Island, unless eignal nbould be made to con,
| mencc action
within easy range and will take up q portion t.
the northward and westward OF that fortitcatior
engaging fts left or northeast face. at dstlncs
from loo to SEQ yards, firing low and aiming q
The comma nding officers ril1 instruct their off
cc.eand men to ea;etully avoid wasting; shot an
vii eptoin nron them The necessity Of precisio
Each ship Vii Sc prepared to render csery 81
eis,ancc os:blc to .sesc's that 1nay require t.
clad vesrels will he used in action.
After the reduction Of Fort SUMTER it is prol,ahl
the next point Of attack will be the batteries o
The order Of battle will be the line ahead, in ii
following succet eion: tGlyen elserhere.)
Asqu- d1on of freserrc ol which Capt. ]. F. Gree
bar, an1 near the entrance buoy. consisting Of ii
in rradices 10 support the iron-clads when tht
attack tie batteries on Morris Island.
, near Admiral Commanding
II South Atlantic B!ockaasns s1uadron.
MOVING INTO ACTION.
Precisely ut llalf fpast twelve O'Clock, II
tlcct tcgins TO move on to the attack. ri
line Of battle is formed in the order assicue
to each ship in the Adn,iral's programme.
The head Of the line is some four miles fro1
The position the fleet is to make before opc
| Ing fire, aud all the batteries on Morri
Is1and-the must pass within easy range
cacIl-hnye to he run.
4 HALT.
l The feet is hardly in motion, however, wle
. The lcadin. vessel, the Weehawkcn, stops, NJ
all the others have to stop also. The cause
this delay was the arrangement ofa raft whit