Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-04-28

to act or take hold at any moment Of the com
munieation of tho army A, which has for its
only retreat the line d, or the Savannah. The
very moment a rebel army permits a Union
army to act from the mountain district against
is communications, or, what il better, to take
hold of them, so as TO force it to fight, forming
It's line OF battle parallel with The sea, and fac
ing the Blue ridge-that IS, forming its line of
battle parallel with It's natural line of retreas to
the Savannah-this rebel army in case of ds-
feat, viii not only be beaten, bat, by a rapid
pursuit, viii be obliged 10 surrender, as it will
bs thrown back in the direction Of the oeea1,
On obstacle which soon stops further retreat.
The possession of the mountain district is,
therefore, for the holding of the left zone, a ne.
eessity; and, still better, it is a necessity for the
possession of the whole theater of war. In fact,
this chain of mountains is like q wedge driven
from the North right into tho very heart Of The
theater OF war. It is the only elevated part Of
it, and dominates it in all directions. II is like
a bulwsIk, or, better still, ike the citadel Of a
large fortress, of which he walls are formed by
the parallel ridges, the bitches by the rapid
streams ia the valley, and tho doors by the
gaps.
"Taks the whole fortress-that is, the whole
South-bus leave the citadel untouched, and It
viii be the same as if nothing had been taken.
In these mountains the Southern Grmies can
rally; and, as by their occupation they main
tain a decidedly central position, combined with
the facility of debouehing in any place, they
can throw themselves, With their whole force, on
ell the surrounding fragments of our armies,
and beat them in detsil''
We have not space for the details Of a cam
paiga which he lays out. in which an army
msrchin & through the valley Of Virginia, and
another meeting it from the upper Ohio, would
join in Southern Virginia, and menace the
Southern army. He says of the results Of this
grand movement, however
at is evident that such operations, aimed
right at the destruction Of the ensmy's armies,
are decisive thai ell towns, ses ports. etc fall
as a matter of course sind that, applied to the
South, from two to two and a half months
would be all that should be required to carry
them through"
He expresses the opinion that the campaign.
or rather the plan Of the campaign (of 1882
had some resemblance to the invasion of France
IN 1913. cha result Was partly like that Of
this invasion, and would have been still more
SO, had tho rebels taken q lesson from Cannot,
and followed from tho FIRST his plan of defense"
We have net specs for q condensation even,
Of Lis analysis of the campaign of 1862, in
which he shows that our defeat was certain from
the moment thu plan was made, and w0ald have
been more fatal had the rebels not also made
plumbers. We wish TO take notice of the last
chapter of his book, in which be discusses the
camDaigo of1963:
In passing in review the campaign of 1862,
We have seen how = wrong general plan, a diyi-
sion CT force, q choice of iudacisive lines OF
operation, led TO Insignificant results, and even
to rsverses. The clm5siya Of 1853 opens for
the Union forces without a7y change in the gen
eral plan Of operation it is but tbs continuation
OF the campaign Of 1852. The capture Of Rich
mond, and the opening Of the Mississippi, seem
still to be the main objects to be obtained By
the Eastern and Western Union srmies.
"a wrong general plan of operation will lead
to bad CT Insignificant results if the counter
plan be correct, whatever the minor plan or
detailed operations may be. In the plan Of
1853, probably these latter viii be different from
those Of 1862; but, nevertheless, the result
ought to be the sama.
"a long stndy of military history has led me
to the conviction that great decisive results esn
only be obtained by a thoroughly correct &C
tio~n-espeeially il n case Ike ours, where tho
adversary is q skillfHl one, and understands the
great rules of war himself, and what is Of more
Importance, knows how to spDly them.
The campaigns Of 1862, as well as thst Of
1863, are conducted on a great number of lines
Of operation, and consequently on wrong prin-
cip'es. Moreover, the general plan Of operation
being wrong, the objects which are to be at
tanned by the different armies are such that,
sven were the plan Of operation right, nothing
decisive cluld Ia anb-avad -