The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1863-02-07
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.


t mac written up, it will be found that tn
, failure Of Gen. Burnside to achieve grea
results at the head Of that army, was attr
=, butable to the same causes that paralyses
McClellan--to the childish timidity an,
ill-advised intermeddling of the old gran
nies at Washington. We give, in confirm
alton of this view, the following extract
from Washington letter In the New Yorl
Times, written by Mr.. Raymond himself
the editor, few days after the recent ane
last effort of Gen. Burnside to put his ar
my in motion, In which having been agair
thwarted, he threw up the command il
disgust:
WASHINGTON. Jan. "a, 1868.
! had occasion last week to visit the AR
my of the Potomac, and as l found it OF
the eve of movement against the rebe
forces in its front, ] remained to watch it,
progress and results. You will have re-
ports of both before this can reach you
but concerning the causes of the failure oi
| this movement, they may not have said as
much as the good of the service and wei
fare OF the country require, and | write
this mainly to supply the detect
The sudden change In the ,ceaiher on the
night OF Tuesday, the 18th, was the inine-
diate cause Of the failure The movement
was intended to be a surprise Tie whole
army was put III motion during the day os
! Tuesday, and each portion Of it WAS to hare
/ been by midnight in the position desgna-
| ted by the commanding General, for the
! commencement Of operations ct clock
/ below and - o'clock above Frederic.;s-
J burg on Wednesday morning. at 3 o'clock
on Tuesday evening it began 10 rain, and
/ through out the night the rain continued.
with tempest of wind Owing to other
causes, of which | shall speak hereafter.
those 40, ..:-Es Of the army designated 10
lead tie movemen. had not moved with
the vigor and energy whict. the nature oil
the service required They were arre,'Ha'
therefore, some miles short Of Their ap-
pointed positions by the conditian of the
roads, suddenly softened by the heavy
rain, and through which by morning ii had
become inpo-s ble 10 move either pom
toons or artillery with the CELEBRITY demaA-
ded The enemy meantime discovered
the movement, and instantly rallied TO
meet it. The moment for the surprise had
passed and therefore the movement was
abandoned
as things stood. the weather afforded suf-
ticient excuse !or abandoning the enter
prise-uGeed made ii necessary TO do 50
But If everything else had been right, this
obstacle would have been overcome or IA
tber would net have Griser "A time to offer
any difficulty But the army of the poto
mac Is like the soil of NirgiuiG; the upper
crust is hard, Lut thin; q little rain soak.
it and underneath lie. treecheroGs quick
sand Break through the crust, and you
sink instantly 10 . depth which makes
movement impossible. good deal has
been said Of the decentralization of the
army The word is too strong. 1t does
not apply TO the mass Of the army at all
But it does apply TO good many OF the
officers Tie, are dcH.0Tatt-e1 in every sense
OF the word, and they are source Of dis
couragcu,~ut--of aiscoa;eut--of 6ieheart-
eminent Gfthere is such word) TO their
eubordnstes and to the ranks ! do not
hesitate TO say that the failure of this
latest r.oyeIaen, was due, primarily and
maInly, 10 the .s.5y5grdtnation the wo.d is
not too strong-of some of the Generals Z
command under burnside. asl. no bet
ter evidence OF this than the language
openly held by them, III presence C: their
subU!diUaies oi newspaper reporters, aEG
Of all who chose to listen, before the more
nent while i: was in progress, and afterit
had been abandoned. Unless COMMON
report, which receives the countenahce ii
not the distinct confirms lion CT the OH
GERS most concerned, is entirely at fault,
the Commanding General was overHhelu
ed with protests from hls suOordInates
against hIs movements, Gftsr they had
been decided upon, and with exaggerated
and untrue reports of the obstacles IN his
way 50 FAR as | know, no one of them
vent so far as TO reiu.e obedience to Ls
orders; but everything short OF that
which officers could do 20 embarrass and
thwart his plans, was done-and done, too,
as on some previous occasions, with effect
and success. As every one knows, there
is a kind CT obedience worse in IS results
than fat refusal, for il leaves the com
mauding officer without remedy While
it answers IN form all the requirements OF
the service, it insures, by its hating half
hearted and possibly premeditated inefii
cheney the failure of the plan which it
pretenGs 10 second. t..
One General, Jor example, was expected
TO have pontoons enough for four brigades
-42 in all, | be!ieve--at the appointed !
spot by daylight OH Wednesday morning |
He had but eight or nine miles TO go, and |
there was no reason why he should not |
have had them there before the rain. He /
spent a good deal Of his time on Tuesday |
in demonstrating that the chances OF fail |
ure were nineteen out OF twenty; on |
Wed, esday morning he had 10 pontoons |
placed in open view of the enemy, and the |
rest were stuck in the mud from two to /
fvo miles back. He certainly nGd Gone |
nothing to disturb lis own calculation OF |
chances, and can now refer to 1t as proof |
of his own sagacty. Another General was |
in the expression Of his opinion |
against the movement, and did everything |
in his power, even after the march OF his |
troops had begun, to have it arrested.
this were the first instance ia which /.
the Willingness of certain otticerss 20 behold |
with entire eouani:nity, the defeat oil Gen. |
Burnside's plans could be traced in then |
language and conduct, should. hesitate in |
the failure of this moment to |
that cause But it is not This is the |
fourth active movement which Gen. Burn !
side has made against the enemy during
the short time that has elapsed since he
superseded Gen. Mcclellan. Let Us see
what happened in each.
| Hhis first plan was to throw his army
rapidly upon Falmouth, cross over instant
lv, take possession Of the nights OF Fred
ericksburg, and thus compel the enemy
either to fight him in that poseton. Or fall
back rapidly upon Richmond. The one
thing absolutely essential TO its succe - was
the prompt arrival of the pontoon train.
This was under the direction of Gen.
Woodbury., and no satisfactory explanation
of his delay has ever yet been made. But
that delay defeated the execution OF the
plan.
2. Next came the crossing and the battle
at fredericksburg was certainly a
failure, and which the country generally
brands as a blutder. l think it was III
General Burnside's power to have eorrect-
ed that opinion in his testimony before the
Congressional Committee Ne did not
a,.,i himself of that opportunisy but said