Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1863-04-29

causes OF us (tne Penlnsu1ar camDalgns) faIl
ure TO their true source,'' is as follows:
CAUSES OF NJ M'cLELLAN's FAILURE.
Gone of The prominent among the causes o
ultimate failure was the inaction of eigh
months, from August, 1861, to April 1862
More than any other wars, rebe lliOn demands
rapid measures. In November 1861, the Ar
my of the Potomac, if not fully supplied will
ali the .material, was yet about complete
In bers, discipline, and organization as il
ever became. For four months the grea,
marine avenue TO the capital of the nation was
blockaded, and that capital kept in a partial
state of siege by greatly inferior enemy, in
face of movable army OF $50 zoo men.
s'in the Winter of 1861 and 1862 Norfolk
could and should have been taken The Ma
Wy demanded it, the country demanded il and
the means were ample. By its capture the
career OF the Merrimac, which proved so dis
astroEs to our subsequent operations, would
| have been prevented. The preparation of this
| vessel VAS known, and the Navy Department
was not without forebodings oil the mischief
| it would do.
! ''Though delay might mature more compre-
! henslVe plans and promise greater results, it
| is not the first case in which il hiss been shown
that successful war involves something more
than aostract military principles. The true
question was to seize the first practicable mo-
nent TO satisfy the, perhaps, unreasonable but
| natural longing OF an ambitious nation for re-
suits to justify its lavish confidence. and to
/ take advantage OF an undivided command and
untiammeled liberty OF action while they
were possessed.
s'When the army did move, plan was a.
! dopted perfectly certain to invite nav COM
! pei. interference, and when the army was to
go by Annapolis TO the lower Chesapeake /
felt confident that one half would scarcely
! nave been embarked before the other half
would have been ordered back to Washington
! The enemy was then at Manassas, and a feint
even If not in reality, of an attack upon Wash
ington was so obvious. so certain TO create a
panic, which no Executive could :esist, that
Interference with the removal of the rest of
the army certain.
"W hen the enemy fell back behind the Rap
pahannock, and destroyed the railroad bridg-
es, the circumstances we-esg realty changed
and there were strong arguments for the line
adopted. Yet, results have proved how many
reasons there were to be considered beside |
the purely military ones which opposed them |
selves TO the adoption of such a line.
.'The facts connected with the withholding
of MeDoweiPs corps have been so compIetel ly
exhibited inzthe proceedings of the MoDow
ell Court of Inquiry. that every one who
wishes can form his own Judgment. Whether /
IL was wise. or unwise,. it one of those
things resulting from the taking of line of
operations which did not then ever Wash
ington.
SAT the time the Army of the Potomac
landed on the Peninsula the Rebel army was
at its lowest ebb. Its armies we're demoral
lied by the defeats Port Royal.Mill Spring.
Fort Henry, Fort DoneIson, Roanoke Island.
and Pea Ridge; and reduced hy sickness loss
In battle. expirations oil periods of service
&c; while the Conscription law was not vet
even passed, 1t seemed as if it needed but one
vigorous gripe to end forever this rebellion.
SO nearly throttled. How, then happened it
thar the day of the Initiation of the campaign
OF this magnificent Army of the Potomac was
n itati ..f p.b |
cause, which seemed to grow pari pasyu with }
-he slow progress OF its operations =
"H0weyer may be committed to any ex-
preston OF professional opinion to the con-
irary q certainly did suggest it), my opinion Z
low is that the lines of Yorktown sbonld have S
1een assaulted. There is reason to believe
hat they We're not held in strong force when
'ur army appeared before them and we know G
hat they were far from complete. The pres !
lge OF power, the morale, were on our side. l
t was due TO ourselves to confirm and sustain 9
t. We should probably have succeeded 1
5ut if we@badT failed, it may wen be doubted I
Ehether the shock of an unsuccessful assault a
would be more dcmoralizing than the labors ?
II siege. rf b
Sour troops toiled month in the trenches. '
I lay in the swamps of Warwick. We lost II
ew men by. the siege, but disease took fear S
III hold OF the army, and toll and hardship, "
nredeemed by the excitement of combat,
impaired their morale. We did not carry with II
S from YORKTOWN so good an army as we took "
lere. Ofthe bitterfruts of that month gain II
1 by the enemy we have tasted to our hearts d
Dntent. They are not yet exhausted. m
1.-The siege having been determined upon
e should 5ave opened our batteries on the- m
lace as fast as they were completed. The y
fect on the troops would have been inspiring. u
wonld have lightened the siege and shor- ri
med our labors; and, besides, we would e.
ave had the credit OF driving the enemy from g
orktown by force of arms, whereas, as it was, pi
e only induced him TO eyacuate for pruden- = =
al reasons. w
s'Y orktown having fallen, however, as it W
d, it was right to pursue the enemy with
lr whole force. But the ba, tie of w iiiams- 10
lrg, fought, as 1t was, without recounoiter- ti'
G the position without concert of action "a ir'
ong the different corps and division com CT
anders, and almost without orders,
under which ought not TO have happened. po
ss$Fe knew of this position beforehand, and of
; kBw il was fortified We might have Cd
en- sure, IL the enemy made a stand there ge
at IL would be strong one, for he would be OIL
hting for time 10 get his trains out of our 10
ach. We fought; we lost several Thousand
IN, and we gained nothing. If we had not
lght,the next day battle would in all prob
ility have been unnecessary. But if il had ~
EN- necessary, should have had time to Ca oa
We biought up our resources, reconnoitered ",
position, and delivered our attack in such ~ ~
way that some result would have flowed ~. ~,
m it. ~
80, - =. W. p9,- tt wit
SaSan;a,, 5,.,;s; - ~, - A., fntIAy' Wy clio
ose two divisions, had the enemy waited n'
,ther day at Williamsburg, could have cut
commun catiUn, and in that case would liz
70 been superior 10 his front and have had so,
divisions in his rear. His hasty retreat, ant
perhaps his capture. must inevitably have err,