Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-02-06
The Array CT the Pofonac-Efs Recent
11oVeHaent Failure on Accoust Of 4
CAdF OF RIGHT GRAND DIVISION. .
AEAI oE IuE IoL.laC. LannarE q

! n ae army CT GHe Eoaouluc-HfE EfPcer1i
1loTeElent a Failure oss AccOust Of 9
Storm.
CAlF OF RIGHT GBASD DIvrsIos,
Ah4f or TIE Pof0hAC, January 3.
/ As / feared and stated when closing ny last
the movement which began so susBieiously ha,
/ been entirely defeated By tho unfortunate STATE
OF the WeGther. From Tuesday night at eirh1
o'clock ultil TsuJsday night rain fell almost
without intsrEission The roads on Tuesday
when Franklin and Hooker started, were very
gcod, and trains and artillery could move with
I facility. But twenty-fonr hours rain set them
N the mud so iaexirieabiy that the strength OF
! .5a army was well exhausted IL getting to Che
positions ordered to be taken.
Il Is really necessary TO see cur position, 60
appIeciste It. Our troops lay for two dsys and
three nights in mud aad water, and to.dsv
ualched back TO their old camps through ger
fsct seas Of mud. Let no one complain that
nothing was done. Nothing else could be done.
The movement was intended as a surprise; the
storm caught US, delayed us, and revealed cur
/ Intentions to the enemy. Had we crossed we
could not have advanced. We did tbs very best
that could be done under the circumstance.
aed all we can Go now is to wait for better
weather more plans, another movement, and
better success.
The points selected for crossing, all in the
vicinity Of BanEs' foTd, probably possesses more
advantages and less difficulties 10 tao crossing
than the poiuts chosen at the battle of Frsder-
eksbuTg So far as obstacles thrown in the
way by the enemy, such as Tids-pits, redoubss
ste, are concerned, th5Te were very few of them
visible. We have guarded this for a moath
past by a regiment Of infantry (ths l36;h New
York volunteers, Col Wood and a section Of
Weid,ief's New York battery. The rebels have
had opposite, General Wileox's brigade of Ala
bama troops, much reduced in strength By their
losses at Gaines mill and Antetam under
L0ngsIeet. Ths sppr0ach to the f0rd from this
side IS rather PERCEPTIONS, while the ascent OD-
posite i5 grsdual AID over 4 cleared ground
Half way up the hill the enemy have a line of
nfs-pits, f-om which they command the dan,
but not the point where it was intended to lay
the pontoOns for the center grand division
These pits were, however, commanded By two
of our batteries lower down, 50 as 10 rake them
with an enilading fire and render them untena-
BE. Bat one point could be discovered where
our bridge would be subject to the FIRE Of the
enemy s artillery, and traverses were immedi-
atsjy Constructed on our side to command that
The point selected for the crossing of tke
right grand division was by far the most rugged
aud difficult Of any. But this division did net
leave camp 81 al, and lis passage Of toe river
depended entirely on the operations Of the left
and center.
Sofar IS outward evidences 60 to show, there
was no visible increase Of the eneuY's forces at
this point There are no additional earthworks
added 20 those that have been there for three
weeks, and no moro troops were visible The
illumination Of our camp-fres was visible for
two miles back from the river, and so would
the enemy's have been had they been as
near. We cannot doubt they soen became aware
ef cur intentions, and, knowing if we crossed
we must sdvsncs, selected some better position
in the rear of The river, masked their hslteriss
and aWaitad orr coming. Perhaps they were
somewhat Deiogged IN regard TO our real iBten-
E0Bs, but u5uallg they ara noi Oae thing is
certain, whether they knew OF not, they had
few OF no Gefense5 sgainst cur crossing at this
ford which could have been available against
the operations Of our artillery. Hooker would
have crossed q short distance above the bend,
and, taking a road which runs down along the
river bank from the United States ford, weuld
have moved by the left flank along the river
aHd across Colin R1n, and thence By the right
and front to q position on the flank Of the enc
my For this purpose our artillery ia she bend
was SO planted as to command the bridge over
Colin Ran, near its m0uth-an important point
Every one whom 1 have heard express an
opinion as regards the point chosen for crossing,
deems it we'll chosen aud perfectly feasible
Nothing but the unfortunate and severe storm
prevented our success.
This afternoon the dreayy clouds broke away
and we had sn hour of sunshine. Bat it win
take more than week of sunshine TO dry up
the road in this soft soil
The rebels eYiRcsd tsnsalzing disposition
to-day, which shows that they are well aware Of
our position. On the Fredericksburg siie near
the railroad bridge, their piekets stuck up a
large board, with charcoal letters foot long for
our boys to read, thus: Burnside stuck in the
mud