The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-04-17

cover the Shepherdstown ford, and receive
the reinforcements expected from Harpers
Ferry, were for time interpreted as evil
dences of the enemy's disorganization and
decentralization. W. ~ '.'.
! AS soon as it was definitely known that
the enemy had abandoned the mountains,
the cavalry and the corps Of Sumner,
Hooker, and Mansfield were ordered to
pursue them, ola the turnpike and Boons-
boro' as promptly as possible. The corps
of Burnside and Porter Qhe latter having
but one weak division present. were order
ed to move by the old Sharpsburg road,
and Franklin to advance into Pleasant
Valley, occupy Rohersville, and to en-
deavor to relieve Harper's Ferry. Burn
side and Porter, upon reaching the road
from Boonsboro' to Rohrersville, were to
reinforce Franklin orc to move on Sharps-
burg, according to circumstances Frank
lin moved towards Brownsville, and found
there a force largely superior in numbers
to bis own, drawn up in a strong position
to receive him. Here the total cessation
of firing in the direction of Harper's Fer
ry indicated but too clearly the shameful
and premature surrender of that post.
The cavalry advance overlook a body
of the enemy's cavalry at Boonsboro,
which it dispersed after brief skirmish,
killing and wounding many, taking some
$50 prisoners and two guns. .''.
Richardson's division of Summers corps,
passing Boonsboro to Keedysville, found
few miles beyond the town the enemys
forces, displayed in line of battle, strong
both in respect to numbers and position,
and awaiting attack. Upon receiving re-
ports of the disposition of the enemy,
directed all the corps except that of Frank
lin, upon Sharpsburg, leaving Franklin to
observe and check the enemy in his front,
and avail himself of any chance that might
offer. had hoped to come up with the
enemy on the 18th, in sufficient force to
beat them again and drive them into the
river. My instructions were that, if the
enemy were not on the march, they were
to be at once attacked; if they were found
in force and position, the corps were to
be placed in position for attack, but no
attack was to be made until reached the
front. ...
vi shhAASAAS5 dU wv lulu Ill dlItI-
noon, l found but two divisions, Rich
ardsons and Sykes, in position; the rest
were halted in the road, the head of the
column some distance in the rear of Rich
ardson. After rapid examination of the
position, / found that it was too late to at
tack that day, and at once directed loca-
tons to be selected for our batteries of
position, and indicated the bivouacs for
the different corps, massing them near and
on both sides Of the Sharpsburg Pike.
The corps were not all in their places I'M
til the next morning some time after sun
rise. 49,.
On the 10th the enemy had slightly
changed their line, and were posted upon
the heights in the rear of the Antietam
Greek, their left and centre being upon and
in front of the road from Sharpsburg to
Hagerstown, and protected by woods and
Irregularities of the ground. Their ex-
IRENE left rested upon wooden eminence
near the cross roads to the north of /. Mil
ler's farm, the distance at this point be-
tween the road and the Potomac, which
makes here great bend to the east, being
| about three-fourths of mile. Their right
rested on the hills to the right of Sharps-
burg, near Snavely's farm, covering the
crossing of the Antietam and the approach
| es to the town from the southeast. The
ground between their immediate front and
the Antietam is undulating Hills inter-
vene whose crests in general are COM
manded by the crests of others in their
rear. On all favorable points their artillery
was posted. 1t became evident, from the
force of the enemy and the strength of
their position, that desperate fighting alone
could drive them from the field, and all
| felt that great and terrible battle was at
hand.
In proceeding to the narrative of the
| events of this and the succeeding day,
must here repeat what I have observed in
reporting upon the other subject of this
communication, that I attempt in this pre-
| liminary report nothing more than sketch
of the main features of this great engage
ment, reserving for my official report, bas-
ed upon the reports of the corps command
ers, that full description of details which
shall place upon records the achievements
OF individuals and of particular bodies Of
| troops. The design was to make the main
attack upon the enemy's left-at least, to
create diversion in favor of the main at
tack, with the hope Of something more
by assailing the enemy's right, and as soon
as one or both of the flank movements
were fully successful, to attack their centre
with any reserve l might then have On
hand. ..
The morning of the 10th During which
there was considerable artellery firing) was
spent in obtaining information as to the
ground, rectifying the position OF the
troops, and pertecting the arrangements
for the attack.
On the afternoon of the 10th, Eooker's
corps, consisting of Ricketts, and Double
days divisions, and the Pennsylvania Re-
serves under Meade, was sent across the
Antietam Greek, by ford and bridge to
the right of Keedysville, with orders to
attack, and, if possible turn, the enemy's
left. Mansfield, with his corps, was sent
in the evening to support Hooker. Ar
rived in position, Meadeis division Of the
Pennsylvania reserves, which was at the
head of Hookeris corps, became engaged
in sharp contest with the enemy, which
lasted until after dark, when it had sue
ceeded in driving portion of the opposing