Rutland weekly herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1859-1877, 1863-04-16
gen. mcCIcilan,. Campn,ua


ing the military operations Of Gen. Me-
Clellan. This abstract, however, from its
brevity, but very fecbly shows the over
whelming character of the disclosures
made by the committee againt that geuer-
al. But 1t is all that we can make room
for, and every one who has not read il,
should read the full report of the COM
mittee.
At the time OF the appointment of the
committee, IN December, 1861, the army
Of the Potomac numbered about one hun
bred and eighty-ive thousand men. Gen.
Mcclellan had been commander since July.
The whole of The intervening time had
been consumed in organization and equip
ment, and since the first of October it had
been well armed and supplied with mate
rial, well disciplined and drilled for active
service. Nowhere was it expected to go
into winter quarters. The defense of
Washington required not more than from
$4,000 TO $4,000 men, leaving 100000
men fof aggressive operations The rebels
were at Manassas, in force now known to
have been less than 10000, and by no
means strongly fortified. General McClel-
Ian nevertheless remained quiet all winter,
and the only active operations were on the
part Of the rebels by blockadng the Po-
tomac.
A victory that winter wo'd have practi-
cally annihilated the rebellion. 1t is not dis
puted that our army would have won
victory if it had been tried, and that Gen.
Mcclellan is solely responsible for its fail
ure to try.
On the 10Th of January, 1862, the Pres
ident ordered movement of Gen. Nc
Clellan's army toward Manassas junction
on or before the 22d of February. Gen.
Mcclellan objected, proposing to go by the
way of the Rappannock, and still leave
the Potomac blockade unbroken. The
President replied to his objections tersely
and conclusively, but a council of war fl"
nally, by vote of eight to four, endorsed
Gen. McClellan's plan, and the President
yielded Before it could be executed the
rebels abandoned their position at Manas-
sas, and Gen. Mcclellan thereupon Or
dered the whole army forward on the enc
my's trail. 1t went no further than Fair
fax Court House before Mcclellan changed
his purpose, recalled the army, and re-
sumed his Rappahannock plan. This was
on the 18th of March. On the 18th he
for the second time abandoned that plan,
and proposed to council of war the
movement on the peninsula by way of
York and James rivers The President
assented to this change, with the stipula-
tion that Washington should be left secure
in the opinion of all the corps commanders.
The Peninsula Campaign was McClell-
ans own plan, reluctantly acqusced in by
the President, and undertaken by Nc
Clellan on the express condition that he
should leave force sufficient, in the opin-
ion of all his corps commanders, for the
defeuse of Washington. They fixed the
number of that force at 5000. But Gen.
Mcclellan, in violation of his agreement
and of the orders of the President, with
drew all but $4,000 troops from the Capt.
tai, part even OF these being raw, and no
light artillery left them. The President,
therefore, ordered the corps Of Mcdowell
to remain for the defense Of Washington,
and even including this corps, the specified
number Of troops was not made up. Yet
this is what is termed an interference
with Gen. McClellan's plans" and is in
substance the only ground of complaint
against the President, and the only excuse
offered for the failure of the Penlnsular
Campaign.
Mcclellan took with him to the PENN
sula more than one hundred thousand
troops. The rebels had less than twenty
thousand to resist his occupation OF York
town. But he sat down to besiege 1t ;
the rebels concluded to reinforce and resist,
and after months delay the place was
evacuated by the rebels without firing a
gun, Just as Mcclellan was ready to open
his batteries. Meanwhile part of Mellow
ellis corps had been sent to him. 1t is
now known that Yorktown might have
been taken at once, and that Richmond
would have fallen with it. For the delay
and failure Mcclellan alone is responsible.
There were three other occasions when,
if Mcclellan had improved his advantage,
Richmond might have been taken by the
troops who could at once have been moved
against it, to wit:-After the battles OF
Williamsburg, Seven Pines and Malvern
Hill. Each time he hesitated to advance
till it was too late and the rebel capital
was saved.
The retreat of the Army Of the Poto-
mac after and during the Seven Days
Battles was precipitate and premature
The battles were all fought by the corps
commanders, Gen. McClellan's only share
in the operation being to order and super
intend the the unnecessary retreats by
night. And when. finally, after the splen-
did victory Of Melvern Hill, won in his
absence, he again fell back to Harri-
sons Bar, he despaired of his army, made
no preparations for defence for twenty-four
hours after, had resolved on surrendering
his whole army if afterwards attacked,
and was only saved from that disgrace by
rain which prevented the enemy from
moving his artillery.
All possible reinforcements were sent tc
Mcclellan while he was on the Peninsula
The letters of the President, of the Secre-
$685. &c Wor opd Of Gon Ha1iooly con.