The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-04-25
BURLINGTON WEEKLY HAWK,EYE

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bells to open the campaign by TOO decisive
blows. The army 1t Newborn, especially, 4
ought to be attacked: first, because it 10 9
large detachment greatly exposed; and
because it threatens continually
one OF the principal lines or communities
ton of the South between the East and
West. f
The Union army at Newbern we have
supposed to be fifty thousand men strong.
The concentration Of Confederate forces to
destroy them might be. conducted in the
{, 200 men; from Charleston, 10000 men
from Richmond Il, 900 mon from Army Of
Virginia, 8, 900 men from Blackwater,
8, egg men from Petersburg, 1000. Total
10000 men," 1eL>Ss
he gives, with great minuteness, the
manner and routes by which this oonoen-
tration could be effected. He supposes
this army to attack impetuously, and to
destroy our forces in North Carolina.
Query, whether this part of the supposed
plan Is not actually now about to be carried
out? o
Meantime, the rebel army in Virginia,
greatly diminished, docs not give battle,
but retreats, fighting and disputing the
passage of the rivers, into Richmond,
which is supposed to be thoroughly forti-
fed, and able to resist even asiege for some
time. 1etfft i
They reduce, therefore, the army Of
Virginia by q, 900 men more, which they
send to Tennessee, giving positive orders to
the remaining $1,000 to accept no engage
ment OF consequence; to retreat if the ar
my of the Potomac advances !; and to be
satisfied with defending the passage of the
rivers, beating an advanced guard, &c.
& "The campaign in Tennessee, as the next
in Importance, they would conduct almost
simultaneously with that against Newbern;
and this is possible in the present case:
first, because the Union armies of Newbern
secondly, because the army sent to Colds
boro is not far from the decisive point,
which we will suppose to be Richmond,
and might be back there before Union
army could reach it. IS, ra
"The movements against Murfreesboro
might be combined in the following way
Army at Tullahoma, $4,000 men from the
army of Mobile, 1000 men from different
detachments, &C., 10000 men. Total, H.
600 men,"
He gives again accurate details of the
manner in which this combination could
be made, according to his tables, Iii, 900
rebels should be concentrated at Chatta-
ION the 4th, the Commander-in-chief
should arrive at Chattanooga; and on the
same day the offensive operation should be
commenced. With III, 900 men against 49,
600 to SO, OO0, q Commander can well propose
to himself to destroy this later army; and
the only correct way to do this is to exc
cute similar maneuvers to those executed
by Napoleon in 1905 and 1S96-the relative
els to that of the line Of operation of the
Union army facilitating such action"
He gives, also, details of movements by
which our army in Tennessee would be
beaten, This done, he tells US the rebel,
would detach force to send into Kentucky,
to march to Louisville. if possible, but, at
any rate, to Lexington, thence through the
Cumberland Gap, to be transported back to
Richmond. The main rebel army of eighty
thousand men, meantime, pursues our army
westward, beating all forces which oppose
it, capturing Memphis; and then, after q
short time for repose, Fastening part Of this
army eastward again, for the grand and
final operations in Virginia.
In the meantime, he supposes the siege
Of Richmond, going on; the rebel forces
there receive daily accessions, as the oper-
athens in North Carolina and Tennessee are
completed. The Union army has long
and exposed line of communications from
Fredericksburg or elsewhere. The mo-
ment the rebels are strong enough, thirty
thousand men are dispatched to make q
"raid" on these lines, in the roar of our
detach fifty thousand men-half his force
TO meet this, for, in that case, he leaves
the other half exposed to the attack of q
superior force before him in Richmond
Our author says:
'1n a case like. this, the real character of
different generals would showitself. A Ma
soleon or Caesar would, at the first notice
oft he raid, leave their trains and parks and
move with their whole army, by forced
marches, toward Orange Courthouse, or
POttersville, according to circumstances
Executed against them, this raid would be
destruction to the corps which undertook
it. Wellington would probably at first
do nothing at all, but raise the siege as soon
as the reports were fully confirmed, and
move, with his wholematerial, composedly
back to his first base. A Jourdan or Vic
| tor would send q detachment after the reb-
els, staying themselves with the main body
! before Richmond. A Moreau or Massena
would get his trains in readiness, leave a
strong detachment to cover them, with Or
ders to retreat as soon the rebels in Rich
/ mond manifested desire to attack, and
with their main body they would march to
| intercept the rebel corps which has under
taken the raid.
| "In our case, think that the undertaking
of the raid would be sufficiently justified
by the simple fact that q Napoleon or Caesar
would probably not have chosen the line of
4
mond."
We have not space to quote the details by
which it Is shown that, choose whatever
base and line Of operations twill, the Union
army before Richmond could not escape
defeat
Immediately after the decisive defeat of
the Union army before Richmond, the Of
fensive should be taken against the North.
If the destruction has been complete. the
entire rebel army should move. If the de-
feat has been only such as after the seven
days fight, fifty thousand men left at
Richmond would be sufficient to defend the
town; the remainder-some 1SO, 600 to 200
OOO1should move on the day after the bat
tlee, by forced marches, to the NORTH
Washington we will suppose strongly gar
risoned, as well as Harper's Ferry and Bal
timore. At Warrenton 10000 men would
be detached, to move by way of Centerville
against the Federal Capital, as a kind of
corps of observation; 10000 men would be
sent through Ashby's Gap against Win
chester. and thence against Martinsburg."
| ARRIVED at Buckletown, they would
march east, and thereby prevent the garri-
son of Harper's Ferry escaping west or
northwest The main body of the army
| ,uyI,s In oil r