The New York herald., 1863-04-28

y
fords there az such character that few hours
work WIN y ma y uen as tsss have So'ld MAKE ,hose
places cry ior'ri abc. bu Lhik hat that would hase
besn much bette G'ye thaa eter ~ the e,ners were
have not works down below hese Nut u ms
always beeu ny .nprcssion that rankin, who MAS down
there with - incn his own grand DIVISION and - OF
mne, codld have swept everyh ny be ore him. He rep
resented the position down thcTe very Formidable
Bat have idea, although have never ~, but
that - men cou d have carrieu everything down there
do not know the fact. but have that large
portion OF lranklin's force was not engaged at all.
THE ESCAPE or THE ARMY.
O. After the ugnt what prevented tho enemy crowding
you into the river, II they had made az If ~ A ~
that had thore TO prevent this dyslou
thousand men that had not been engaged and another
division OF mine in the upper end OF tho that had
been sent there TO relieve General Howards division
had full confidence in those divisions because they
O. What was the number, all together Of our forces
that we're engageds A. should think there must have
been between - and - men under nre Z.
O. What was the number OF the whole army that we
had across the rivory A. fraakln had nearly - men.
should think that must have had altogether
O. what is your estimate OF tho rebel forcss over
there' A. ! think they had about $1,000 men- The
German prisoner said that they claimed 70 have
100000 mon Once in that position they are great deal
stronger 10 rosst than we are TO attack In open
field In my opinion. they would not be match for II
our army was In good condition
0ALLANTRY OF THE TROOPS.
O. How did the mon behave during the attack, A.
They behaved well. There never was anything more
the world ever more gallant advance than Hum
phrey's mon made there. But they were put 70 work
that no men could do
@ What do you know about the delay In making the
attack after the army arrived hcres A. fhore d.
delay in getting the provisions up here. - '' - ~
Q. Do You know at what time the pontoons were OK.
pected to be hereY A. As have before stated heard
General Megs or Halleck assure General Burnside that
they would bo here in three days.
O. Would that have been a. soon - the army could
soon as the army could march here They eot ready fully
as soon as thought they could When we had
hero BEFORE the government built valuable wharf which
army Of 100000 or 200 900 men. But when the army
left here that wharf burned although the enemy had
used BY hs :.
Of the line Of operations Of this army could not be made
In three days, In three times three days There were
whArves TO be built before tho stores could be landed
the stores brought here they could not be
landed until the wharf built except II done by
must have been ten days after got here before the
bridge over Potomac creek was built M
O. Had this wharf been burned when the conversation
between General Haeck and General Burnside took placer
A. It was burned long before that.
O. From the conversation TO which you have referred
who did understand responsible for having the
ponoons and the other necessary supplies for the army
sent hereg A. supposed that was the Quartcrmasers
O. AS the matter was left at the time OF the converse
ton did you understand that the responsibility Of having
the ponoons and supplies here rested upon General Burn
think it necessarily rested upon General Halleck and
General Megs becase beyond the control Of Gene
raj Burn side, who was not where he could control It,
O. Then, az understand you, General Burnside, from
that interview had right to expect the pontoons and
supplies here he could reach here himself A.
That impression left on my mind 1tk
WHAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN.
By the Chairmnn-
resu9 A. when summers advance column reached here
only i've hundred Of the rebels in Fred
ercksburg LIDO not know why they did net take posses
to to- be that they could take possession Of Fred
At any time; only few days before. Laeusenan'
the and ooy s
When at HARDWOOD heard that there going 20
be delay Of three or four days in getting the pontoons
General Burnside at the ford there and come
down the other side Of the river. When got here
we should have been in condition 70 march right for
mistake made here that has been made oil along
through this think would have been better "a
force there threaten the enemy and keep them up
their works at Cupepper ana Gordonsve. But instead
S snas We every na man. ana even ouInso M soe
moment did So II General Summers corps had come
here and LETT up there threatening the advance
advance both lines II would have been better. But the
enemy at what we're at, and came right dowr
here and they were nearer here than ": were and sn
weeks 70 fortfy 600 make any place mpreg
nabl6 10 any other 100 900 men. saFslN
nv. coo,s Hooxsa's PLAN 81
q. What was the strength Of your command at Har,
o. would there have been any diculty a 10 supple
In your moving down the other side OF the river - yo
propossdy A. had three days ratons then; was pre-
the people had just gathered their crops could hav
got plenty Of forage and provisions enough for week
General HsllecE, General Meiss and General Burnside
there talk OF forwarding some supplies up th
Rappahannock. said that st Bowling Green l cou'
draw my supplies from Port Royal easily 40 could sc
them when was at HARDWOOD. knew that could TAX
a position with 40 900 that the whole rebel arm,
O. would that movement have been safe one In view
Of the that this army mad not the OF crossing
hsrsy A. Yes, sir; because could take the height
there with my command and put them In condition O
defence. II had gone there not man Of the enem.
would have Fredericksburg they would hav
gone other river and fortified there, n ha
given them time as ecctually as they have here re
gard the rebel position the Rappahannock stron
one- mean the one they retired 10 from Manassas The
had the advantage OF two raroads-one TO bring thei
supplies 70 them from the West, and the railroad from
Richmond bring their troops up from there II Is tn
strongest position they had in Virginia The advantage
Of this position hold against force seeking to eros
the river and attack it, are such as have never bsfor
| seen.
where army crossed heres A. About four miles.
q. You speak Of the telegraph road will you state NOR
definitely what that road iss A. The telegraph roas
leaves FREDERICKSBURG from Hanover street. and run
through depression in the hills in the direction Of Bow
ing Green.
O. How do you explain the fact that the enemy did no
shell the city when troops crossed therey A.
explain H. II is inexplcable TO that they di
do As have before stated, 1t Is reported undc
flag of that they had at time shot heating witt
which TO IRE the city and that would have made terri
BILE time OF IT,.
THE WITHDRAWAL or THE TROOPS.
Y. Was our recrossng made unbeknewn TO the enemy
A. think II was here; how II was down below cannc
say. II late when got the order TO Withdraw m
ommand-betweon three and four O'Clock the morr
ng-and II between eight and nine O'Clock when th
last troops withdrawn. The enemy did not seem
realize but that there troops in the houses with
drew my exterior line Of pckets last Of ALL and they
not followed by the enemy.
u Had they discovered that troops TO be rs
crossed, what could they have doneS A. do not thin
should have suffered much from their artillery fire
sucba night as that was as would have been but
| dom firing.
TESTIMONY OF GEN. MCCLELLAN.
~-ee>~~-DN~e~~~~~~>~~~
| ORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
WASHINGTON, Feb. %, 1862
| MAJOR General George B. Mcclellan sworn and o,
ns.aA