Daily national Republican., 1863-04-10
Report OF War Committee upon the Bull
Run and Balls BluH Battles.

battles of Bull Run and Ball's Bluff, has been
printed in pamphlet form. But little new light
is thrswn upon the causes of these disasters,
the substance Of the testimony having been
made the subject Of speeches In Congress and
of comments in the public press.
The defeat at Bull Run is mainly attributed,
of course, 10 the failure of Gen. Patterson TO
hold Johnston's forces in the Shenandoah val
ley. On this point there are some curious dis
agreements between Gen. Scott and Gen. Pat
terson. The former testifes that he ordered
Gen. Patterson to hold Johnston, but Gen. Pat
terson says that Gen. Scott knew perfectly well
that he was not In q condition TO either attack
or to hold the enemy. In reply to a question
as to his reason for not communicating that
fact to Gen. Scott, he testifies,
81 never supposed, for moment, that Gene
raj Scott believed for the fiftyhfth part Of sec
ond that / could hold him."
General Patterson further testihes:
"Question. You were not threatening John.
ston at Charlcstown so as to prevent his join
ing Beauregard at Manassas
| Ans yer. No, sir. l remained there because
I was ordered to remain in front of him until
he left.
"Question. You knew at that time that you
NSiN NV hSSaAhb my NpoN'N'N ~ AAS bSAHb
down to Manassasi
"Answer. Perfectly. l knew had not the
means to do 1t.
"Question. Why did you not communicate
that fact to General Scott immediately
"Answer. did communicate my condition,
and where / was.
"Question. Whenl
Answer. On the 10th wrote him in detail
from Bunker Hill. On the nth wrote again.
And on the 18th gave him all the information
necessary. And Il was his business to order
me, not my business to make any further sug
| gestions to him."
Gen. Scott testi6es;
But, although Gen. Patterson was never
specifically ordered TO attack the enemy, he was
certainly told and expected, even If with infe-
rior numbers, TO hold the rebel army in his
| front on the alert, and to prevent 1t from rein
forcing Manassas junction, by means Of threat
ening man9uyres and ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
often obtained in war with half numbers"
Instead Of doing that, however, Gen. Patter
son came down to Bunker Hill, remained there
over the day, when he had been given 10 under
stand the advance would be commenced by
Gen. Mcdowell; and early the next morning,
without waiting to hear how far Gen. Mellow
ell had advanced, or whether he had advanced
at all, left the neighborhoOd OF Winchester,
where the enemy was, and turned of 10 Charles
town, where, as he himself says, he had no means
to offer any obstacle to Johnston's joining
Beauregard whenever he chose. Johnston at
once took advantage of the opportunity thus
afforded him, and reinforced BeauregRrd in
season to iniict defeat upon our forces at Bull
Rum
Johnston started the greater portion Of his
forces from Winchester on the 18th; some of
the testimony shows that a portion started on
the afternoon of the nth. Gen. Patterson,
though only some twenty miles distant from
Winchester, and under orders 10 prevent the
enemy from reinforcing Beauregard, did not
discover that Johnston had left Winchester
until two days afterwards, when he telegraphed,
on the 10th, to Gen. ScOtt, that reinforcements
had l0ft there.
In regard to the Balls Bluff disaster, It ap-
pears from the testimony that Gen. Stone acted
upon the understanding that the forces of Gen.
Mccall were moving upon Leesburg from
Dralnesville, an understanding derived from
tho orders he had received from time to time
from Gen. Mcclellan. The latter testlhes;
81 have no recollection of any order which
justified the passage Of the river In force; am
| sure that had no intention that he should do
that"
| The report says:
In conneTion with the battle of Balls Blud,
two points remain to be considered
First. Whether a crossing was justlhAble
under any circumstances, considering the very
insufficient means Of transportation at the
command of General Stone.
Second. Whether the forces under Col. Baker
could, and should, have been reinforced from
the Virginia side Of Edwards Ferry, when it
was known that the troops under his command
were engaged with the enemy.
In regard to the first point, all ths testimony
| goes to prove that the means of transportation
were very inadequate. The testimony OF Gen.
Stone would seem TO Indicate that, while he
| ty,pIt V,nA
he understood TO be the circumstances under
which the movement was made, he left much
| to the judgment of others; and this much can
| be said for him, that he received no intimation
that movement across the river would bo eX-
peCted from him, or would be justified, uLtil
the day before Sunday It was actually made.
| And the reasons that he had for supposing that
other forces were within short distance to
render him assistance are set forth In the preyi-
GUS portion Of this report.
In reference TO reinforcing Col. Baker, the
testimony is very conflicting. There is no
question that 1t was known that the forces at
| Balls Bluff were engaged with the enemy.
The firing Of musketry was distinctly heard at
Edwards's Ferry, on both sides Of the river.
| The only question Is whether reinfOrcements
should have been sent under the circumstances,
and whether there was any sufficient reason
why they were not sent. Gen. Stone testihes
| that he received no intlmatiOn from Col. Baker
!
little, II any, information from Col Baker In
reference to the condition and progress of af-
| fairs at Balls Bluff and he also testi6es that
even II renforcements had been needed, they
could not have been sent up on the Virginia
sidei that the enemy had earthworks and hattie
rles between Edwards's Ferry and Balls Bluff,
which would have made 1t extremely hazardous,
II not impossible, TO have sent any reinforce
ments up by that route. Some of the other
witnesses testify TO the same effect. Others
testify most positively that, 50 far as they were
able 10 judge, there was no obstacle whatever
in the way Of our troops passing up on the Vir
ginia side from EdwardB's Ferry.
It cannot be denied that, had relnfoTcements
promptly arrived al Balls Bluff from Edwards's
Ferry the result of the battle there would In all
probability have been greatly to our advantage,
instead Of being most melancholy disaster.
The evidence is 80 very contradictory that your
committee refrain from expressing any positive
opinion upon that point, but allow each one TO
form his own conclusion from the testimony
they have been able to obtain.
SALE or FK-PRFgIDEET TyIFV'r WISEs-A