The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1863-04-07

hammock, and DESTROYED the railroad bridges, the
circumstances were greatly changed, and there
were strong arguments for the line adopted. Yet,
results have proved how many reasons there
were to be considered, besides the purely military
ones, which opposed themselves to the adoption
of such line.
The facts connected with the Withholding of Nc
DOwELLs corps have been SO completely exhl0l-
ted 10 the proceedings of the Mcdowell Court OF
Inquiry, that every one WHO wishes can form MS
own judgment. Whether it was wise or unwlse,
it a0as one Of those things resulting from The ia
king OF line of operations 'ohlch d1d not then
cOUer Harrington.
At the time the Army of the Potomac landed
on the peninsula the rebel cause was at Its lowest
ebb. It's armies were demorazed by the defeats
of Port Royal, Mill Spring, Fort Henry, Fort
Donelson, Roanoke Island and Pea Ridge and
reduced by sickness, loss in battle, expratlons OF
periods of service, &C.. while the conscr;puon
law was not yet even passed, 1t seemed as II 1t
needed but one rigorous grippe to end forever th'S
rebellion so nearly throHIed. How, then, hap
pened it that the day of the imitation of the
campaign of this magnificent army OF the Poto-
mac was the day Of the resuScitaton of the rebel
cause, which seemed TO grow pdI1 pdSSu with the
slow progress of its operations -?
ion of professional opinion to the contrary, Il
certainly did suggest it) my opinion now Is, that
The lines of Yorktocn should have been assaulted.
There is raason to believe that they were not
held in strong force when our army appeared be-
fore them and we know that they were far from
complete. The prestige Of power, the morale,
were on our side. 1t was due to ourselves to con-
firm and sustain it. We should probably have
succeeded But if we had failed, it may well be
doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful as
sault would be more Bemeralizing than the labors
of siege.
, Our troops toiled month in the trenches, or
I lay in the swans of Warwick. We lost few men
by the seige but disease took fearful hold OIL
the army, and toll and hardship, unredeemed by
the excitement of combat, IMPAIRED their mo.
raIe. We did not carry with us from Yorktown
, so good an army as we took there. Of the bit
ter fruits of that month gained by the enemy we
have tasted to our hears content. They are not
: yet exhausted.
G The seige having been determined upon, We
: should have opener our batteries ON the place as
- fast as they were comp eted. The effect on the
troops wouls have been inspiring 1t would have
lightened the siege and shortened our aborS and
besides, we would have had the credit of driving
G the enemy from Yorktown by force of arms,
whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evaca
ate for prudential reasons.
, Yorktown having fallen, however, as it did, il
was right to pursue the enemy with our whole
force But the battle of NVllliamsburgh, fought
as it was, without reconnoitering the position,
without concert of action among the different corps
and division commanders and almost without or
ders, was blunder which ought not to have hap
pened.
;, We knew of this position beforehand, and We
: knew it was fortified We might have been
sure, if the enemy made a stand there, that it
= would be strong one, for he would be fighting
Z for time 20 get his trains out Ct our reach. We
fought we lost several thousand men, and we
gained nothing. If we had not fought, the next
da; battle would in all probability have beer
. unnecessary. But if it had been necessary, We
) should have had time to have brought up our re
= sources, reconnoired the position, and delivered
= our attack 10 such way that some result would
y have flowed from it,
We had every advantage. Frank!ns division
> landed at West Point on the next day, and Sedg
wick's division on the day following. Those two
divisions, had the enemy waited another day a
> Wiliiamsburgh, could have cut bis communication
and in that case we would have been superior II
his front, and had two divisions in bis rear. Hi
y hasty retreat and perhaps his capture, must inev
itaby have followed, and the great object of keep
u ing Franklin SO long embarked, and hnalIy send
! ing him to West Point, would have been accom-
4 plished.
" On leaving Williamsburgh we should hav
crossed the Cnickahominy and connected with tn
navy in the James River. We should then hav
- had united army, and the cooperation Of the ma
~ Wy, and probably would have been in Richmond
:, 10 two weeks. The fact that we did not know tn
- character of the Chckahominy as an obstacle, "a
it lay across our direct road to Richmond,) tina
:, cur transnnris were On the Work River. and tia