The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1863-01-01

I president Oh Tue OHltcu OCaIO'' az
Washington, that withdrew our army
because I felt that Che enemy's posi-
ton could not be carried.
1t now commenced raining ana the
river began 10 rise; / did not know how
muclr II might rise; there were no
means of crossing except going up to
the for6s. and would be impossible
TO do that. because of the inability to
supply the troops after they should
have crossed; General Sumner arrived
here with his troops in advance. He
sent to me askingif he should cross
the river; [ did not think it advisable
that he should at that time.
It was decided to cross at Skinner, 8
Neck, about twelve miles below here
but our demonstration was simply for
the purpose of drawing there as large
a force of the enemy as possible. l
then decided to cross here, because in
the first place felt satisfied that they
did not expect us TO cross here but
below. In the next place | felt salts
fed that this was the place tie fight
the most decisive battle, because if
we could divide their forces by pierce
ing their. lines at one or two points,
separating their left from their right,
then vigorous attack with the whole
army would succeed in breaking their
army to pieces.
Two attacks were made and we
were repulsed, still holding portion
of the ground we had fought upon, but
not our extreme advance.
That, night / went over the field on
our right; and in fact was with the
officers and men till nearly daylight;
| found the feeling against an attack.
[ fastened to my headquart ers, and
after a conversation with Sumner told
him I wanted him to order the ninth
army corps, which | originally com
manded, to form the next morning a
column of attack by regiments; it con-
sisted ofsome eighteen old regiments
and some new ones, and desired tue
column 10 make n direct attack upon
the enemy's works. ....
thought that these regiments by
running quickly up after each other
would be able to carry the stone wall
and batteries i'll front, forcing the en-.
envy on their next line, and by going
in with them they would not be able
to fire upon us to any great extent.
| left Sumner with that understand
ing and directedhim to give the order;
the order was given and the order of
attack was formed; the next morning
Just before the column was to have
started Sumner came to me and said:
! hope you will desist from this att
tack; | do not know of any general
officer VINO approves it, and | think
1t viii prove disastrous to the Brmy.
Advice of that kind from Sumner,
who has always been in favor Of our
advance whenever it was possible,
caused me to hesitate; / kept the col>
umn If attack formed and sent over
for the division and corps commanders
and consulted with them.
They unanimously voted against the
attack. Then went over to see the
other officers of the command on the
other side, and found that the same
opinion prevailed among them. then
sent for Gen. Franklin, who was on
the left, and he was Of the same opin>
ion. This caused me to decide that
ought not to make the attack / had
contemplated; and besides, the PRESS
dent had told me not to be in haste in
this attack; that he would give
me all the support he could, brit he did
not want the army of the Potomac de-
I felt that l could not take the re-
sponNibility Of ordering the attack,
not outstanding my own belief at the
time that the works of The enemy
could be carried.
Willie on his way here, Hooker, on
the morning of the goth November,
wrote me note, which l received on
the , LIST, in which he suggested that he
would cross his force over the Kappa
hammock at the ford nearest the town,
Richards ford, and move rapidly down
to Sayton's Station, and take possess
sion there. He stated that he had
three days provisions, and that he
could meet any force of the enemy in
front of him.
Ireplied that was always very
GLAD 10 take the advice OF my general
officers, and should be 10th to move
without consulting them; but / could
not approve Of the move he had sug-
gesCed, because in the first place he
would nave 20 march some thirty-six
miles to Saxton's Station.
1t was raining and he would have
to ford two rivers which might rise
and crJ him off form the main body of
OF the command, and as / had no
means of crossing at Fredericksburg
| would be prevented from sendin Q
him supplies and assistance, and al,
though hemight reach Saxton's Station
and not meet any force Of the enemy
al that time, yet it would be We ry
hazardous movement to throw col.
ANN like that beyond the reach of its
proper supports.
Qen. Hooker thanked me and sal d
he made it as suggestion, and the
weather, as it was raining rendered it
of course, impossible to make the
movement.
Q.-What reason do you assign for
the failure of your attack?
At was found impossible to get
the men up to the works-the enemy's
fire was too hot. The whole OF the
command fought most CALAMITY. The
enemy themselves say they never saw
our men tight so hard as on that day.
CIV ere the enemy's works very
strong?
A.-Their works Were not strong
works, but they held strong positions.
II is possible the points of attack were
wrongly ordered. Ifsuch is the case
can only say did it to the best of
NY ability.
1t is also possible that we wouId