Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1863-04-06
BY TELEGRAPH.
For Latest Dispatches see Second Paqe.
Report OF the Committee on the Coduc,
of the War.

NEW YORK, April 5.-The full report OF
the committee on the conduct of the war &C.
cupies sixty-four closely printed pages. The
principal part of the testimony taken relates
to the army of the Potomac and its operations.
The report shows that in December. 1861
exclusive of the command of Gen. Dix at
Baltimore, the Potomac army numbered 1885,
600 men well armed, disciplined, and equip
| ped. The strength of the enemy was vari-
ously estimated at from 10000 to 100000
men at the time, and their works were deemed
! exceedingly formidable; but subsequent
! events proved their force less than 70, 900 and
the strength of their Notifications greatly over
estimated. AT the same time it was consider.
ed unadvisable to attack the enemy in front,
and inquiry elected the opinion to be to leave
from $4,000 to $4,000 men in front of Wash
ington for its defense, thereby allowing about
100000 for service elsewhere.
The committee aver that adequate provis-
ion was never made to properly man the torti-
ticatiOn in front of Washington. In relation
to the blockade of the Potomac river, the
committee state that it was proposed to take
possession of Matthias Point in June, 1861,
and again in August; but nothing was done.
In October plan was adopted to take Mathi-
as Point, the Potomac f0tila to act conformity
with the troops; but the troops were not sent
as agreed, and the plan was not tried. Soon
after this the Potomac fotilla left on the Port
Royal expedition, when the river was almost
Immediately closed by the rebel batteries, till
the latter voluntarily left in the ensuing
March,
On the 10Th Of January, 1862, the president
as cOmmander-in-c chief issued an order for a
general movement of all the armies of the
United States, one result of which was the
captures of forts. Henry and Donaldson. On
the 3lst of January, the president ordered all
the disposable force of the army of the Poto-
mac, after providing for the saiety of Wash
ingtOn, to seize point on the railroad south
west of Manassas, and the expedition to move
before the 22d of February. This plan was
objected to as dividing our army by too great a
distance TO enable the two portions to support
each other. The commanding general Nc
Clellan) recommended instead movement
by way of the Rappahannock or fortress Mon
roe To this proposition the president pro-
pounded questions as to its feasibility and its
advantages, and finally movement by Man
assas and the Rappahannock river was agreed
upon: but the rebels evacuated their position
at Manassas, retiring to the Rappahannock,
thus rendering the plan futile.
On the 18th of March council of generals
decided on campaign by way of York and
directing that enough force should be left to
hold Manassas and leave Washington sure.
Gen. Mcdowell was assigned the advance, but
transportation not being adequate, his divis-
ion was detained for the last, and subsequent
ly retained tor the defence of Washington.
Previous to leaving, General Mcclellan ad-
dressed communication to the adjutant gen
eral, stating that he left 81, 456 men at differ
ent points, at Warrenton, Manassas, the She
nandoah, and the lower Potomac, with 5000
for the garrisons and in 'front.' of Washington.
fhe neXtday Gen. Wadsworth stated that his
force was inadequate, and the subject was re-
ferred to Gen. Hitchcock, who reported the
same evening, stating that the requirements
ofthe president that ''enough force be left for
the security of Washington" had not been fully
complied with The president the next day
ordered General McDowell's command to re-
main.
This brings the committees report to the
Peninsula campaign. After landing near fort
Monroe, the army moved towards Yorktown
on the 4th of April, appearing before the reb
ell works on the 9TH. The committee say, the
testimony proves that the rebels had from
1000 to $4,000 men at Yorktown then, and it
is now evident that our forces could then have
pierced the rebel lines, cutting off reinforce
ments; but seige was determined upon con
trary to the wishes of the president. The
committee rehearse the facts relative to the
evacuation of Yorktown, and the battle of
Williamsburg, and say that some of the gen.
erals testified that after the latter battle, if it
had been followed up, our forces could have
reached Richmond almost without firing
gum but the general commanding stated that
bad roads made the pursuit impracticable.
After the battle of Williamsburg it was de-
cided to send Mcdowell via Fredericksburg
to reinforce the army of the Potomac; but
the operations of Jackson in the Shenandoah
valley prevented his being sent. The COM
mittee give considerable details of the battles
of Seven Pines, and of Fair Oaks, in which it
is stated that Gen. Hooker made reconnois-
sance to within four miles of Richmond, GER
tain officers testifying that the army then could
have marched right into Richmond. They
then continue relative to the seven days bat
ties, giving a number of kilograms which
passed between Mcclellan and president Lin
coin, the former telegraphing on the night of
the 9th OF June that the government has not
sustained his army. On the 9th of July,
Gems. Halleck and Burnside visited Harrison's
Landing, soon after which it was decided to
withdraw the army from there, which was
done, and to reinforce Pope. The committee
devote some six pages to kilograms and eX.
tracts of evidence relative to Pope's defeat,
and then go on to the campaign in Maryland,
also mainly composed of extracts from letters
of Mcclellan and Haleck, and kilograms.
In relation to Antietam, Gen. Mcclellan
testified that on the morning after the battle
he found our loss had been great and the COM
mands much dsorganized, and he did not re-
new the attack that day, but arranged to attack
them the day after, when the enemy abandon
ed the position. He says that, ''taking into
consideration what the troops had gone
through, we got rs much out of them in the
Antietam campaign as human endurance
would bear" Several letters and dispatches
are given that passed between the president
and Mcclellan and Halleck, the former urging
Mcclellan to move on the enemy from his po-
ton near Harper's Ferry. Mcclellan shows
conclusively in the dispatches that his cavalry
was in poor condition in October, but he
moved on the Goth, and continued ill the 9TH
of November, when he received an order de-
posing him from his command.
The campaign of Burnside is then re-
hearsed. The testimony makes it appear
that at Fredericksburg the attack by Franklin
was made by Meade's division, who pierced
the lines of the enemy but were driven back.
Several witnesses testify that had the attack
been renewed by the whole of Franklin's COM
mand, it would have been successful. 1t APP
pears that Gems. Newton and Cochrane, in an
interview with the president stated that the
army lacked confidence in Burnside, which
led the president to send dispatch to Burn
side, the effect of which was to stop an eXpe-
dition against the enemy that had already