The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1863-01-24

wv" "ho"iy tVA "htVh OOnBres6 mas CaIi~
ed, was brought out to-day in The M~N
DOwELI. Court of Inquiry. It's import
ance is so great that transmit 10 In
full
- WAsHwerON, April Q, 1882
Major General McO7eslan-Mv Ds.r
Sir; Your dispatches complaining tAat
you are not properly sustained. whiA
they do not offend, pain me very much.
Blenker's division was Withdrawn fro,u.
yOu before you left here. You know ths
pressure under which / did it, and seI
thought acquiesced in it, certainly net
without reluctance. After You Left 49,
certained that less than twenty thor
sand unorganized men, without single
held battery, were all you designed 70
be left for the defense Of Washington and
Manassas Janction, A part Of these men
was to go to Rockers old position. Ranks,
corps, once designed for Manassas JnDe,--
ton, was divided and tied ND on che Hva
of Winchester and Strasburr, and couId
not leave it without again exposing thu
Upper Potomac and the Baltimore e Ohio
railroad. This presented, or would pre-
sent, when Mcdowell and Sumner ehould
be gone, great temptation for the enemy
to turn back from the RappahannOck aHd
reach Washington. My explicit dires-
tion that Washington should. bv the
Judgment of all the Commanders oF
Corps, be left entirely secure. had been
entirely neglected. II was precisely this
that drove me to detain Mcdowell. I do
not forget that was satisfied with your
arrangements to leave Banks at Manassas
junction, but when that arrangement
was broken up, and nothing was sub
stituted forit, Of course was not satia-
He'd. was constrained 70 substituse
something for it myself and now allow
me to ask, do you really think l shouId
permit the line from Richmond via Ma
nassas junction to this city, 10 be ensirs--
ly open, except what resistance could be
presented by less than 10000 unorean-
! ised troops? This is the question which
this country will not ALLOW me TO evade.
There IS curious mystery about ths
number OF troops now with you. ter
egraphed you on the 9th, saying that
you had over one hundred thousand wish
You. tff.I
0 had just obtained from the Secreta-
4 ry OF War, statement, taken, as he sasd
8 from your own returns, making 100000
} then with you and en- route. You nav
s say you will have but 85, 900 when all en-
route TO you shall have reached vow
How can this discrepancy of 5000 b
= accounted for As 10 WoOls command
: understand ii is doing for yOu pre-.
o cisely what a like number of VouE
e own would have to do il the command
: was away. | suppose the whole fores
! which has gone forward 10 you. is with
you, and if SO, | think ii is the procise
r time for you to strike blow. By DELAY
! the enemy will readily gain on you; thsi
d is, he will gain faster by Notifications
: and re-infOrcements than you can by re,
4 endorsements, Once more let ME tell YOU 4
8 is indispensable to you that you strik,
Il a blow. | am poWeriess 20 hello
g You will remember always oppose,
your going down the bay in search Of .
& field instead Of lighting at or near Ma
i nAssas as IL was only shifting aad ma
d surmOunting difficulty; that we wOuIC
# find some enemy and same or equal on.
l. trenchments at either place. The coun
N try will not fail 10 note ADD is nOlins
j. now the present hesitation 10 move upoI
= the entertainments of the enemy. lei
l. but the story Of Manassas repeated.
5 beg TO assure you, that have navs
5, written or spoken TO you in greater kind
ness of feeling than now; with fulle
purpose TO sustain you as far az my mos
II anxious Judgment consistently can; b.
you must act.
IN Yours, truly,
a, "(Signed) A. LmoOLM."
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