Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1863-02-07
For the Worcester Daily SPY.
The Science of Strategy.

Webster defines strategy to be ''the science
of military command, or the science of direct
| ing great military movements Iomini says
STRATEGY is the art OF making war upon the
mass, after having agreed with the head of the
state upon the character of the war;" STRAIT
egg in war is a science, and as such is distin-
guished from the mere skill of general in
moving large armies in the presence of amen
| envy or the tactics of the field service, being
the instruction of the troops in the manual of
arms; or of engineering, being the forming of
plans of works for offence ard defence.
These latter are all professional, while strate-
gy is in itself ID science.
L know that too many Of our people look
lightly upon the science of strategy as con-
nected with this war; perhaps because the
strategy has sometimes been bad. If it has
been bad, it ought to be considered as not the
fault of the army, and very seldom the fault
OF the general-but more generally the fault
of the ''head of the state" who marks out
with his map, while quietly sitting in Wash
ingtOn, the character of the campaign which
decides its strategy.
Now let us come to the practical point l
am often asked, why don't our army move on
to Richmond, and take that stronghold of reb-
eldom? My reply has invariably been, we don't
need to take Richmond by directly offensive
unconventional yet nearly all our people
seem to think that such movement would be
advisable, as it has several times been at
tempted, and that when Richmond falls it will
be "a ct arulis | hold a contrary opinion,
and believe the true science of the strategy
OF wal is opposed to the attempt OF an often
sive movement against Richmond. And vet
Richmond can be made to fall as surely as
Norfolk What is to accomplish it? | an
swer, the much laughed at science of strategy.
How? Let us look at the map.
Richmond is the center of railroad commu-
nications connecting it with the producing
sections of the south through North Carolina
and East Tennessee. Prominent points on
these roads are Raleigh and Goldsboro, North
Carolina, on the direct line to Richmond from
South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama, and
also GOldsbOro in North Carolina on the
North Carolina railroad, connecting with
Richmond via Weldon and CASTOR and is also
point at which terminates Il new forty-fiye
mile road from Danville in Virginia, which |
suppose has been finished and put in running
order since the war commenced. Another,
and the only other prominent point of COM
munication with Virginia and Richmond is
Knoxville, Tennessee.
Now, it seems to me to be clear, that the
true strategy of this war is to take and hold
the above named three points in North Caro-
lima and Knoxville, Tennessee. By holding
those points we cut off all railroad commune
cation with Richmond, and the impossibility
of getting commissars stores into Virginia,
the utter destitution of subsistence which
would follow, would render grand skedad2le
of the rebel army to South Carolina Il matter
of necessity. Thus, by the science of strate-
gy, without firing gun in Virginia, and with
out the loss Of another life, Richmond would
be taken, and Virginia fall into the hands of
the federal army. BY this strategy, while an
army might necessarily be kept on the Poto-
mae and in the vicinity of Washington,
suihclent to repel an attack of the enc |
my, the great conflict of arms would be in
North Carolina and East Tennessee. Thus