Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1863-05-23

Finally, the partisan Jackson, leaving tn,
10000 men who uselessly covered Washing
ton perfectly stupcfed at their fruitless cam
paign against him. had come to complete til.
concentration of all the confederate forces
against the army of the Potomac. He had
come by railroad. His advance was already
near Hanover Court House. With the ad
dhion of Whi,lng's division, his corps might
number 10000 men. The movement OF the
Federals on Richmond could no longer be
continued the presence of Jacks"n at Hano-
yer Court House plainly indicated his inteu'
tiors ofintercepting their communications by
cutting the York River fraihood. Tllis was
soon put beyond doubt. A considerable
body of troops was seen TO leave Richmond
and cross the upper ChIkahominy, to meet
Jackson and execute the flank movement,
the danger of which we have already pointed
out. Proiiting by his numerical superiority,
the enemy offered battle on both sides Of the
river at once.
lie had all the chances of success. Let
us recall the letter Y already used in our
account of the battle of Fair Oaks. The stu
alton Of Mcclellan is the same as then, except
that the two arms of the V are now connec-
ted by permanent bridges, offering every ia
cility for the rapid transportation of the diff
fpnnt corps from one bank to the other.
The main body Of the Federal troops, consist
Ing Of eight divisions, much reduced, is on
the left arm. on the right bank of the Chcka
hominv. aud occupies the in'renchnen's that
front Richmond. These troops have in front
oftllem the main body OF the enemy. also post
I'd in intrenchmens. On the right arm Of
ile V--hat is. on the left bank Of the river
is the Federal General Fiz John Porter,
with two divisions and the reserve of regu-
lers. Against him marched jackson and
the corps of General Hill from Richmond. all
under the orders of General Lee. who. since
Johnson was wounded has succeeded him us
communicating chief. In fact the army OF the
Potomac was about to engage two armies,
each equal to it in numbers. Battles have
sometimes been won under such circumstan-
cess but one of these rare iavors of fortune
was not now to be expected. Tha most
that could be done was to get well out OF SO
critical position. There WAS nothing for .
Int Il prompt retreat; but even this was un-
fortunately, far from easy. There was only
n choice Of dangers. To concentrate the en-
tire army on the lel bauk of the Chckahom-
n.y. was to abandon the attempt against Rich
mond, and to risk disastrous retreat upon
the White House and Yorktown, with the
whole confederate army in pursuit. in coun-
try where no support was to be hoped for.
phrre was no good to be- expected from this
plan. If, on the other hand. all the troops
were crossed to the right bank. the enemy
would immediately seize the railroad that sup
Piled the army. and would cut its commun-
cations with the White House. 1t would
then be necessary to open new communica
lions with James liver and for that purpose
10 move thi;hrr in body and without delay:
This would be retreat. but only for few
miles; and. if sufficiently reinforced. with
the aid of the Navy. wa might promptly re-
s,mc the offensive, either on the !elt bank.
against Richmond, or on the right bank.
against Petersburg. the fall Of which would
involve that of Richmond. General Mcclellan
took the latter course. AS We have said, he
had long thought Of it as one of Tho necessities
of the situation. and he had even made some
arrangements which were about to be singu-
lar!v justified: but it was one thing to make
this retreat Mt leisure, by n free and sponta-
neons movement, and another thing 10 make
it prrcip;ately before two hostile armies.
But there was no time to deliberate; the
deed must go with the purpose. 1t was but
seventeen miles from Fair Oaks to the james
river; hut the stores and baggage had to be
transported over single road, while our
flank would be open to the enemy who, by
the numerous roads ralia,ing from Richmond,
could throw considerable forces on several
points at once The speed with which the
operation was conducted foiled his calcula.
tions. lie probably supposed that we would
feel our way before deciding, and hoped that
don his line Of communication with the White
House and on this thought he acted.
The troops of General Hill. just mentioned,
after having crossed the Chickahominy at
Meadow bridge, on thu 36th-ihat is, on the
day after the affair with Hooker-attacked
on the same afternoon those of General Nc
| Call, Porter's advance on the left bank. This
first combat was very severe; but Mccall oc-
cupied good position on Beavers Dam,
sort of ravina bordered with beautiful cata-
laps, then in bloom. There he had made
abattis and thrown up some slight earth
works, so that they could not overwhelm him,
though the fight lasted till night. This vig-
orous resistance compelled the enemy to send
over the river numerous reinforcpments This
was lust what Mcclellan desired. His inten-
ton was to draw to that side the attention of
the constderates while on tho right bank Of
the Chickahominy he WINS preparing to trans
fer the army to the James river.
The night was spent inpassing over to this
bank all tho baggage Of Porter's corps. and
in uniting it with the great train that was to
begin its march on the evening Of the 9Th.
The order was then given to rdembark or DIES.