Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-07-13
General Lee,s Programme. nm e .

Louisiana officer. taken prisoner by Pleas
anton's cavalry makes the following disclosure
of Lees plans for the present campaign, which
is confirmed by the movements thus far:
The aggressive position assumed bv General
Lee was resolved upon in Cabinet Council at
Richmond AS far back as the middle of May. At
that time it unanimously decided that the
army should move from Fredericksburg for the
Valley of the Shenandoah, avoiding in its march
any contact with Hooksr's right wing. then too
strongly fortified to be attacked with success
HoOker's position was such that had he been de
feated on the spot he then occupied. OH the right
bank Of the Rapnahannock, the proximity of the
Potomac river. where he might have been sup
ported by gunboats, and the vicinity of the forti
fcations of Washington, where he might entrench
himself, would have rendered victory useless to
the Confederate arms.
1t then resolved to attract him from the
neighborhood of these two shelters, and to make
him accept battle in some distant region where
the advantages Of the position he then occupied
could be of no use to him. Ii therefore de-
cided that the Confederate army should be divi-
ded into three divisions, marching within sup
porting distance Of each other, and operating all
along the line of the Potomac, from Winchester
to Martnsburc, and from MartinsbuIg to the op-
posite side of Hagerstown. If by this movement
Gen. Hooker not drawn out from his posi-
ton, then Gen. Lee was to give orders TO one of
his Leutenants To cross the Potomac and make
decent upon Maryland and Pennsylvania. Be-
fore, hover. moving in that direction, Gen. Lee
was to send several detacbments of cavalry
across to clear the roads and to ascertain if the
amount of provisions and means of transport to
be found in the country we're adequate to the re-
quirements of his army.
All these operations, as may be seen, have
been dependent one upon the other. Had the
means of transportation been found deficient, or,
what is more probable, had Gen. Hooker changed
his position, pursued the enemy, or done any
thing tending TO thwart the designs of the Rebel
General, there is good reason to believe that the
Rebels would not have crossed the Potomac, and
that their depredatons on this side OF the river
would have been confined to a few cavalry raids.
When, after a lapse of ten days, Gen. Lee gave
the order to Ewell to cross the Potomac in the
vicinity of Hagerstown. he at the same time gave
orders to Gen. Longstreet to march from Win
chester to Martinsburg. aud send word to Hill,
who is commanding the rear guard, to move upon
Winchester.
As soon as Ewell had crossed the Potomac,
and should be fairly on his march in the interior
of the country either in the direction of Fred
erick, Md, or Harrisburg, Pa, (the true destina-
ton of the Rebel army being still mystery,
then Longstreet and Hill were to follow in his
track. The plan of Gen. Lee included two
eventualities either battle with Hooker or an
invasion of the North. Victorious in the first
case. his object to dictate terms of peace
der the walls of Washington; defeated, be would
have retreated upon Richmond But Hooker
having refused to accept battle upon the soil of
Virginia. Lee, desirous, perhaps, to draw him by
a feint of inactivity as far as possible from his
base of operations, was in consequence compelled
to resort to his second scheme, that of invading
the North. 1t remains TO be seen whether the
field of Maryland or Pennsylvania will be as good
fighting ground as the one he is now leaving,
and if Hooker will not have better chance in
these new localities than at Fredericksburg or
Winchester.