The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1863-09-17
RosEoRANs's CAMPAIGN.

Strategy, which was first the mania and
then the mockery of our tickle public, has
never had more perfect illustration than
the campaign in Tennessee, which has
eliminated in the capture of Chattanooga
Indeed, there is some reason TO fear that
the very blooalessnesS of the victory which
Gen. Rosecrans has achieved will blind
US to the surprising Importance of the
victory itself. Victories won in the
awful shock of arms, by their brilliant
| picturesque effects and sensational ele-
ments, readily address themselves to the
public eye and ear; but victories won by
simple superiority of generslship demand
for their appreciation finer sense and
deeper study. Besides, the very vast
ness Of the theatre of war on which Gen.
| Rosecrans is operating, and the imperfect
knowledge people generally have of that
| theatre, compared with the familiar geo
| graphy of the Virginia battle-felds.
make an intelligent appreciation of his
| operations rare. Strategical operations
which are operations conducted out of
sight Of the enemy, in contradistinction
to tactical operations, which are con-
Quoted ia sight of the enemy-require for
times and places: of roads, distances,
lines of communication, lines of retreat
and the positions and relations of the
cOntending forces.
If we can hardly expect that many
will give military operations this thor
oughness of attention, we need not won
der that so few have any adequate reAli
cation of the merit of Gen. Roseorans'
splendid campaign. Works of the high
est order in any realm of intellectual
activity only grow in'o the fullness of
understanding by time, and have, as
! COleridge remarked, to make the laws
| by which they are to be judged" The
commander of the Army of the Cum
| berland must rest satisfied with having
rendered his country one of the grand
est and most permanent services in the
field of war, and wait for his country
men to grow up to the full measure Of
the stature of its greatness.
Viewed as whole, the campaign of
! Gen. RoseCrans, from Murfreesboro to
! Chattanooga, presents three brilliant
flank movements-frst on Shebyyille;
secondly, on TullahomR and thirdly on
Chattanooga. But this generalized phrase
so easily spoken, gives but faint idea
| of the prodigious difficulties in the prac-
teal execution Of what seems theoreti-
oally so simple. In the first place, the
material obstacles encountered in the ma
ture Of the country, the roads, the rivers
TO be crossed, the weather, the length of
communications, the difficulties of sup.
plies, and ten thousand other "slings and
| arrows Of outrageous fortune have been
such as rarely beset an army in any
country, aud never before in ours. Then,
1t must be remembered, that in making a
turning movement on the flank of an en-
envy one by the very act exposes his own
Hank. The care, the watchfulness, the
intense anxiety that then press upon a
! General for has communications for his
rear, Tor his train and supplies, (without
which an army is helpless are, of course
| simply inconoeivable. Ii ia a case in
which one risks much TO gain much
| The gain is appreciated; but the labor,
the soloitude the initiate wear and tear
of mind and body that bring il about,
can necessarily be known TO but few.
Gen. Rosecrans' method of using up
/ the rebel army has not been the less COM
| plete, for that it's results do not appear
/ Ia lists Of killed and wounded The
rebel army Of the West, which the iron
discipline Of Bragg has been So long
working TO cement and solidify, is TO- day
routed, demoralizad band, with 30 little
/ power of cohesion, that il can hardly be
called an army This has been brought
about by moral rather than by material