Rutland weekly herald. [volume] (Rutland, Vt.) 1859-1877, 1863-04-02


Fall elections, has been published W. 80
below the most important portion of it. He
speaks Of the elections, then recently held .
showing revulsion of popular feeling against
the policy Of the Administration. The once
uon, he said, naturally suggested ITSELF wbefb-
or tins revulsion was such as to justify Or IN
vlte foreign mediation. He also speaks Of the
removal Of Gen. Mcclellan, which was con-
sldered proof of a determination moi 10 s,h
NIT to what is known as the sconservat;vau .,
ement, and proceeds as follows:
"Ssrero, Of the leaders of the D1moerot;c
party sought interviews aiM me. botb befo,o
1asd otter the orr5vM of the iatelyio4nee, -, ~
Gen. McCyslton's dismissal. The subiect nm,
permost'ln their minds while they were speakE-
ing TO me was naturally that of foreign med;-
alton between the North and the ssonfb Mo-,
OF them seemed to think that this med;at;a,n
must come at last but they appeared TO ba
very much afraid Of its coming too soon II
was evident that they apprehended that pre-
mature proposal Of foreign Intervention wonld
afford the Radical party means of revivinp
the violent war spirit, and of thus defeatinS
the peaceful plans Of the Conservatives. Tha1
appeared to regard the present moment as ne
culiarly unfavorable for such an offer. and in
deed, to hold that it would be essential to the
success of any proposal from abroad that it
should be deferred until the control of the Ex-
ecutive Government should be in the hands Of
the Conservative party
81 gave no opinion on the subject. | did
not say whether or no myself thought foreign
Intervention probable or advisable: but 7
listened with attention to the accounts given
me of the plans and hopes of the Conservative
party At the bottom | thought perceiced
desire to put an end TO the mar, euen at
the RISK Of losing the Southern States eztoqeth-
en-; but 1t was plain that 1T acos not thouol,t
prudent to avop this desire. Indeed. some
hints Of it, dropped before the elections, asere so
Ill received that a strong declaration I'm the
contrary sense aoas deemed necessary by the
Democratic party.
AT the present moment, therefore, the chiefs
of the Conservative party call loudly for a
more vigorous prosecution of the war, and
reproach the Government with slackness as
we'll as with want of success in its military
measures. But they repudiate all idea of in
terferelng with the institutions of the Southern
people, or of waging war of subiugation or
determination. They maintain that the object
OF the military operations should be to place
the North in a, position to demand an arms-
tlce with honor and effect. The armistice
should (they hold) be followed by Conven-
ton, in which such changes of the Constitas-
tion should be proposed as aoould giue the
South ample security on the subject of its
slaUe property, and would enable the North
and the South to reunite and to live together
in peace and harmony The Conservatives
profess to think that the South might be in
duced to take part in such Convention, and
that restoration of the Union would be the
result. The more sagacious members of the
party must, however, look upon the proposal
OF convention merely as a last experiment
to test the possibility of reunion. They are,
no doubt well aware that The more probable
consequence Of an aTmistice a1ould be the 6S-
tablishment Of Southern Independence, but they
perceive that if the South is so utterly alien
ated that no possible concessions will induce it
to return voluntarily to the Union, it is wiser
to agree to separation than to prosecute a cru
ell and hopeless war,
''lt Is with reference to such an armistce as
they desire to attain that the leaders Of the
Conservative party regard the question of for
eign mediation. They think the offer of me-
diation, if made to radical Administration,
would be rejected; that ifmade at an unprop-
tlous moment, it might increase the virulence
with which the war is prosecuted If their
own party We're in power, or virtually con-
trolled the Administration, they would rather,
If possible, obtain an armistlce without the aid
of foreign Governments but they would be
disposed to accept an offer of mediation if it
appeared to be the only means of putting a
stop to hostilities. They would desire that the
offer should come from the Great Powers OF
Europe conformity, and in particular that as
little prominence as possible should be given
to Great Britain
This letter scarcely needs explanation. 1t
is explicit in itself. 1t is fine commentary up
on the pretense sometime set forth by the
copperheads, that they favor 'Fvigorous pros
eeution of the war. They solicit interviews
with foreign ministers; they are ready to JOIN
in with the1foreign powers for intervention tc
put an end to active resistance to Southern
treason but the time had not then arrived
when this could be done with safety They
apprehended that premature proposal OF In
tSIN6UtiOH NOuiu dIouSc tht ANbi thcih "Ni
spirit to the'defeat of their plans. They therefore
propose a dragging, wasting war, opposing
such vigorous and decisive measures as would
tend to whipping of the traitors and the res
toration of the Union by force of arms, unit
the North, as well as South is completely eX
hausted and tanned down to an acdtiescence il
their cowardly schemes. They expect by tina
time to have control of the Executive Govern
ment, and all would be ready for the active
and combined intervention of the first powers
of Europe, obnoxious England keeping some
what in the back ground lest the Northern
spirit of independence should again be aroused
The only possible object for continuance
military operations at ALL in their view, is t
place the North in position to demand al
armlstice, to be followed by. convention
whereat the constitution may be changed il
any manner to satisfy the Southern traitors
ssThis,'' says the Tribune, lis what they meal
by sthe Constitution as 1t is'-that is, as tn
shareholders choose to have it transmogrifed.
But that is not the worst s'The more sa
gacious members of the party" says Eord Ly
Gus, ssare aware that the more probable con
sequence of an armistice would be the estab
lishment of Southern independence" but tina
is no objection to the plan.
Here, then, we have the copperhead schem
all in nut shell, as explained by foreign
minister, of whom the copperhead leaders hav
made a conRdant, to his government :-opposi
| ton to decisive war measures, that the contes