Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1863-11-19
10000

his estimate does not include the troops the Pen
Gsuia bore the arrival Of Gen McCellan the garrison
at Norfolk, those who remained at Washington and
Alexandria, occupied various points in Marylapd.-
These beiIg within call of some all OF the armies il
Virginia, may be properly regarded belonging to
them, and will more than compensate for any error in
the number above stated which are, ho9ever believed
70 be accurate.
In addition to this force there were twenty thousand
men under Gen. Burnside on the coast OF North Caro-
lima ard another army estimated at twelve thousand
at Beaufort threatened Charleston and Savannah, ard
ravaged the coasts of Georgia and Florida.
At the same time, two large armies under Generals
Grant and Buell., penetrated Tennessoei third, under
Gen. Pope, operated en- the Mississippi fourth
in Missouri and Northern Arkansas and fifth occu
pied New Orleans and Southern louisiana.
The strength of these Western armies is no. accurate
Iy known but it is enough for pesent purpose to
remark that 1t Sufficient to enable them 10 act III
dependently, none drawing upon the Others for rein
orcemens. Ihtse vast armies conducted their opera
tions emulaneous all sides OF the Confec.racy
aid, at many points, particularly where their navy
could cooperate, the resistance OF the III
feror forces opposed to them our extended from
tier.
1t is unnecessary to trace events il the order of their
occurrence, are only coLctrned with the gearal
result
The battles around Richmond caused the recall OF
| the main body Of Gen. Burnsides army from orth
Carolina and the beginning of that system OF cen
centration which the losses of the enemy compelled him
to adopt The Federal force n that State has never
since been strong enough TO prosecute the project OF
Invasion Immediately after those battles the forces
of Generals Mcdowell, Fremont ana Banks, with re-
Inducements from Washington and Maryland, were
united under Gen. Pope. The campaign in Northern
Virginia followed and caused the Withdraw val of GenR
Burnside and Mcclellan from the Peninsula and, also,
so large Fart of the army of Gen Cox from Western
Virginia. hat the enemy has never since teen able 10
act seriously the offensive in that quare'. All these
troops brought 10 the support OF Pope and the
defence of Washington, and all hurled back, crushed
and broken, upon that capital.
1o b, fort 1ro6
thousand additional troops to serve for nine ths
and thou III considerable number was obtained, tie
failure of nearly every State to furnish s quota gave
the fist indication Of abatement of the enthusiasm
of the North. The losses inflicted upon the enemy IN
the Maryland campaign so severe, that when Gen.
Mcclellan re-entered Virginia, it not deemed nru
dent to return any considerable number OF the troops
that had tes1 concentrated under his uand, to the
districts from which they had been drawn The bat
ties of Fred rcksburg and Charlottesville SHOWED
that this concentrated army insufficient to perform
the duty assigned to it. The Pennsylvania campaign
reduced it still further and after It's return TO Virginia,
bfore any part OF it had been sent to tie West 1t did
not venture to act the aggressive. The Valley too
with the exception Ct the immediate line of the Dati
more ard Ohio Railroad, entirely evacuated. The
necessities of Gen. Rosecranz OF which, shall pre-
senty speak, could only be supplied By further dePle-
tion of the Army Of the Potomac and as the third
year of the draws to lis close Notwithstanding all
accessons from the draft and the various acquisitions
OF Mr. Lincoln the force OF the enemy in Virginis
with the exceptions of small garrisons has dwln
died down to tie army that recently fled before the ad
vance of Gen. Lee, himself weakened by sending large
detachment to the Southwest
Such in short, has been the result OF the war IL IT.
gina.
A brief examination will show that tie indecisve
advantages obtained by the enemy in the Southwest,
have been attended with corresponding marked &C.
, crease OF strength.
} As has been sad the Federal armies ia the West,
during the first and second years of the carried on
their operations independently of each other Such IS
longer the With the aid of their Vessels, and
with the facility of safe and easy lines OF commuaIca-
ton they succeeded in forcing back armies, and
gaining some important successes. But tie reduction
Of Vicksburg lett Gen. Grant unable 10 resume TIE Of
fensve in Mississippi, and the disaster OF Gen. Rose
Grams conDeled him TO call to his support reinforce
mentssnot only from Gen. Meode, but also from Cen
Grant, aad the army in Arkansas, thus reducing the
strength of three armies to insure the SAFETY OF a
fourth
It is not pretended that there are not enough troops
left on the Mississippi invade Louisiana, even to
enter Texas bat it be supposed that the NUN
ber is adequate to occupy, even lmperecy these vast
regicns that they can maintain themselves III tie 10
terror of the country, except on navgabe "aers with
r out large reinforcements.
These facts show very plainly that the stcpg OF
the enemy Notwithstanding all the accesslons II has re-
ceved, has been largely reduced While on the other
i hand his need Of numerous army is greater than
IS in the beginning Of the war.
In Virginia, bis losses have not been productive OF
any corresponding gains. The task eeshyed Without
success by two hundred ana ten tnousdnu HeA
q with all its difficulties be performed by scarcely more
<, than one-third of that number.
In the West he has therefore had tie assistance OF
his navy, with comparatively safe lines OF comnunca-
ton by water. With these advantages, his strength
originally only sufficient to accomplish what be
has DONE after long lapse OF time, with great Effort
e and with heavy loss. Now be has military power to
overcome at least great as any he has yet enconn
D. ed while he will be compelled to depend upon his lard
T. forces alone from which large detactments mast be
= made to guard long lines Of communications and occu
pv the extensive districts in bis rear OVerranh 1t IL true
Il but far from conquered.
D. In view of the military difficulties alone, 1t Is sale te
saw that to give him ay reasonable hope of success
Il the enemy requires army at least as large as ina
with which he began the campaign OF 1862 II we looE
q at the means in his possession to raise hts orcc hf
IL moral effect of all that has been done Will become a
1s psreDt It is true that the OF the North
10 men are still great and in military supplies, are nc
Oh materially impaired but its credit s and, without
re hearty ard enthusiastic support OF the war by It's peo
pe such as marked the beginning OF the contest tnos
er resources are like steam eng without steam Un
e ouestionabtg that spirit has nearly expired we d
lr not refer to the elections Indicating the growth OF
q, peace party, though they 90 show great change
sc popular sentiment but point to The adoptcn
5e compulsory measures TO obtain men, the ofposltio
s which those measures have encountered ana lhe ahs
ne total failure in which they have resaed
he resort to consc1iptlon was an admission OF tn
decay of the spirit OF volunteering the partial an
execution of that law proves ho" utpopu
be lar it is and return to the system (already tre
IL with poor success of calling upon the States 10 rais
us Their quotas by volunteering, shows that Mr ncoi
AZ fearful of the consequences OF enforcing tne dral
~ we'll doubtful Of its value as recruiting agency
y 1t must be borne in mind that are to he rase