Indiana State sentinel., 1863-05-18
Special Correspondence to the Chicago Times.
HEADouARrERs Army PoToMAe,(
NEAR FALMOUTH May7

pared your readers for the finale OF the brilliant
farce just concluded by Hooker, with the assist
ance of the noble army of the Potomac. The
oniv variation from the plan of the defeat then
marked out was in the timely discovery by Hook
er of the fact that he was already defeated On
the discovery of this fact he wisely concluded not
to walt for jackson to get in between him and
the ford, as had reason TO believe, and remarked
that he was attempting; but taking time by the
iorelock, backed out from his position, thus
snatching the shattered remains of his army from
almost certain destruction The telegraph has
already carried to the tarthest exremities of
the land, the intelligence Of the withdrawal of
the Federal army from the south bank of the
Rappahannock. 1t was eminently proper that it
should be Withdrawn. The mistake that it
was ever put there the second time. Its ranks
are weakened by from ten to twelve thos sand
men as the consequence of this blunder, and the
spirit of the noble old guard is crushed and brok
en-. And as we sit in our old encampments now.
and review the operations of the past week, the
inquiry forces itself upon US, Why were we drag
ged out TO such slaughter? Whyg
We are told that we have not been defeated
that the plans Of our commander have not been
materially frustrated; that offensive operations
will be resumed very soon, and much more of the
same sort. Let me ask in all soberness, in what
does defeat consist? Can an army march out
and give battle. have its ranks broken and deci-
mated be repulsed by its foe, driven back under
fire. compelled to return to its starting point. and
still be victorious in the movement? hold that
there is no middle ground between victory and
a defeat. Where two opposing parties meet in
serious combat, one or the other must conquer
There may be a wide range in the character or
perfectness of the victory gained. the complete
ness OF the defeat suffered, but the result is nva
riabIy the success of one or the other party
/ Common consent has determir ed the method of
determining the result of battle. The party
holding the battle ground at the close of con-
test. in engagement where the contehding
parties regularly Join battle. is accorded the palm
of victory. Gen. Hooker chose his position. He
moved into that position with his army on Thurs
day and Friday of last week, and then proclaim
ed, in exultaton, that the enemy must come out
of his ntrenchments and fight hin (Hooker) on
his own (HOoker's) ground. where the success OF
the latter was certain.
| The next day Hooker advanced his lines alittle
to secure even greater advantages than those be
already possessed. and which he acknowledged to
be sufficient This advance was unresisted by
the enemy. No other conclusion can therefore
reasonably be drawn than that Hooker was stu
ated precisely as, after mature study and deliber
alton, he most wished to be situated He was all
ready for the battle. His forces were OH the field
He had no reserves waiting TO be brought up-no
allies elsewhere whose coming was DELAYED. He
could have been no more ready had the enemy
left him unmolested a month longer. He prob
ably would have chosen no other field had he
taken another term of FIVE months in which to
study the situation. His plan was complete-his
arrangements all perfected.
The enemy then came upon him. In their first
real onslsught-that OF Saturday evening-they
drove US back mile aud half. In their second
attack-that of Sunday-they drove US back two
# I'll,
we annoyed them-the Orange Court House plank
road.
Their third attack was made on an exposed de
taehment of the grand army-that of Sedgwck
at Banks Ford, which was driven preciptatey
across the Rappahannock after twelve hours of
most desperate fighting. Their final attack would
have been made, as | intimated to YOU in my last
letter it would be made, on our rear at the Uni
ted States Ford. with a view to cut off our retreat
and then annihilating us at lezure. And even
this movement was not apprehended by Hooker
until the very last moment. and then he barely
saved himself by an inglorious fight
These being the plain. patent circumstances of
the case, il will not do for Gen. Hooker, or for
his radical friends, or for the Administration, or
for the Administration defenders. to claim that
Gen. Hooker's retrOgrade movement was part of
a general strategic plan Strategy does not lead
an army directly up the hill and directly down
/
Hooker obstinatey contended for the possession
of the grounds he took below the Rappahannock
| and had be, on Withdrawing. moved his army to
another offensive position rather than placing it
back in its time worn camp, he might have
claimed that it strategy on his part that die
| tated the movement. As it stands, il is next to
the defeat at Bull Run-the most complete de-
feat. and the deepest disgrace have suffered in
all this
nor oba-b b.s ban, oc
publishing the reasons that actuated his late move
ments. propose to examine these reasons.
| Here thev are
First-The fight of the llth corps, which ren.
dered Gen. Sckle's movements nugatOry, and
forced the army out of the carefully selected
field Of battle to which General Hooker re
ferred in his General Order of April 30th, and
compelled it to receive the enemy's attack
among denselv wooded hills where it was I'm
possible to bring all or nearly all our troops
into action.
Second-The rising of the Rappahannock, in
consequence of the storm, which was likely to
endanger the line OF communication between the
army and its supplies. particularly the railroad
communication with Aqua Creek had been de
stroyed by the floods for twelve hours at Brooks
Station.
Third-Ignorance of the success of Gen. Stone
mans expedition, from which Gen Hooker did
not hear until he had recrossed.
Every one of these reasons Is false in every
particular, as | will undertake to prove in a
very few words
First-The ground from which the llth Corps
stampeded was not occupied by Gen. Hooker
any of his forces when he issued the congratula
tory and boastlul order to which he refers 1t
was not taken until the afternoon of Saturday.
May "a. three days after that order was issued.
So far as this stampede rendered the movements
of Gen. Sickles nugatory. am prepared TO prove
by the parties themselves, that Gen Hooker op
posed Gen Siekles' advance on the right during
Saturday. frequently sending him (Sckles)
during the day. cautions to go slow; not to ad
vance too far; that he had better halt ETC.; and.
during the early progress of that movement,
which Sickles undertook on his own responsible
ty. positively refused to support him in it. going
even so far as TO withhold two-thirds of Sickles'
own corps from the support. thus compelling the
gallant Sickles 20 push Birney out alone and un-
supported The repulse of the right wing of the
army from field gained under these crcumstan.
ces, could have caused no serious arrangement to
the plans of the Commanding General.
Second-It is a patent fact that the rccrossing
of the Rappahannock had been comm snced and
progressed so far that all the sick and wounded,
ali the artillery the baggage traias, ambulAnces,
and everything but the infantry were across be-
fore the river began to rise The destruction Of
the railroad to Aquia Creek did not take place
until ifter the army all over, WIS OF but very
temporary duration. aud was not known by Gen.
Hooker until his return to Falmouth
Thiri-The movements of at last two divisions
of Stonemans cavalry corps-those cf Averill
and Pleasanton-were fully known by the Com
mandng General. those officers having returned
and reported to him in person several DAYS pre-
yiously. Aud. as they both reported fayorably,
the natural inference should have been that the