Lamoille newsdealer. [volume] (Hyde Park, Vt.) 1860-1877, 1863-04-16
REPORT,ON THE WAR.

Mr.. Walton writes as follows to the
Daily Journal The report of the Con-
gressional Committee on the conduct Of
the War is altogether too voluminous for
your columns, and | have been anticipat-
ed by brief and very fair statement, in
the N. Y. Tribune, which | avail myself
of. Let me introduce it by observing
that the committee was unanimous in its
conclusions, after full and fair investi-
CATION. Officers whose conduct seemed to
be questionable, were themselves sum-
moned to testify, and so also were their
friends. Moreover the mode pursued by
the committe prevented deception. The
document deserves confidence.
From the N. Y. Tribune of April 7.
The Congressional Report on the Conduct of
the War, which we printed yesterday in full, is
remarkable as dealing not with opinions, or ar
guments, or theories, but mainly with facts, 1t
is a historical statement of the evidence on GER
tain important points. We have already pre-
sented in these columns an impartial summary
of this evidence let us endeavor to note now
most briefly the conclusions which it establishes.
We will try to state them in such a way that,
however they may conflict with personal PARTIAL
ties or preiudices, they shall not be controver-
tibe as matters of fact.
The Army of the Potomac was organized by
Mai Gen. Mcclellan BY the first OF October,
! 1861, it numbered $4,000 men, and was in all
respects fit for immediate service. The Rebel
army at Manassas. which was opposed to it, was
less than 10000 strong. But the Army OF the
Potomac nevertheless remained inactive during
the whole Winter of 1862, and did not move
till the rebels voluntarily evacuated Manassas in
March. victory that winter would practically
have annihilated the Rebellion. 1t is not now
disputed that our army would have won vic
tory if it had been tried, and that Gen. McClell
Ian is solely responsible for its failure to try
SECONDLY The blockade of the Potomac
might have been prevented or raised at any time
during the winter by naval force with the CO.
operation of 4 GOO troops. Gen. Mcclellan with
drew the TROOPS and is solely responsible for the
continuanceof the blockade
| THIRDLY The Peninsular Campaign was Gen.
McClellan's own plan, reluctantly acquiesced in
| by the President, and undertaken by Mcclellan
on the express condition that he should leave O
| force sufficient in the opinion of all his corps
commanders, for the defense of Washington
They fixed the number of that force at $4,000
But Gen. Mcclellan, in violation of his agree
ment and of the orders of the President, with
drew all but Is 900 troops from the Capital, part
even of those being raw, and no light artillery
left them. The President therefore, ordered the
corps of Mcdowell to remain for the defense o.
Washington, and even including this corps the
specified number of troops was not made up
Yet this is what is termed an interference with
Gen. Mcclellan g plans, and is in substance tn,
only ground of complaint against the President
and the only excuse offered for the failure of the
Peninsuar Campaign.
FoURTHLY Mcclellan took with him to thu
Peninsula more than 100000 troops. The Rebels
had less than 20 900 to resist his occupation o
Yorktown. But he sat down to besiege it thu
Rebels concluded to reinforce and resist, ant
after months delay the place was evacuated
by the Rebels without firing gun, just as Nc
Clellan was ready to open his batteries. Mean
while part Of McDowel's corps had been sen
him. is now known that Yorktown might
have been taken at once, and that Richmond
would have fallen with it. For the delay anC
failure Mcclellan alone is responsible.
FIFTHLY There were three other occasions
when if Mcclellan had improved his advantage
Richmond might have been taken by thu
troops who could at once have been moved
against it; viz After the battles of Williams
burgh, Seven Pines and Malvern Hill. Eacl
time he hesitated to advance till it was too late
and the rebel capital was saved.
SIxTHLY The retreat of the Army of the Pc
tomac after and during the Seven Days Battle
was precipitate and premature. The battles wer
all fought by the corps commanders. Gen. Nc
Clellan's only share in the operations being Il
order and superintend the unnecessary retreats b,
night. And when, finally, after the splendid
victory of Malvern Hill, won in his absence, h
again fell back to Harrison's Bar, he despaired o
his army, made no preparation for defence for 2
hours after, had resolved on surrenderng hi
whole army if again attacked, and was only save
from hat 10 hv roin whi oh M
the enemy from moving his artillery.
SEvENTHLY: All possible achievements wer
sent to Mcclellan while he was on the Peninsula
The letters of the President of the Secretary o
War, and of General Halleck, conclusively prov
that every effort was made to sustain and rein
force Mcclellan, that troops were even sent hin
which were deemed indispensable to the safety Q
Washington, and that they were refused him onl
when no more remained to be sent.
EIGHTHLY When ordered to withdraw hi
army from Harison's Bar, Gen. Mcclellan d.
layed the execution of the order, eleven days a
ter its receipt By that delay the safety Of tn
Army Of Virginia and Washington was immedi
ately endangered, and still more so by McCle
lan's subsequent failure to cooperate heartily wit
Gen. Pope.
NINTHLY The battle of Antietam which wa
an indecisive success, might have been complet
victory and would have been followed by the de-
truction or capture Of the Rebel Army, II il ha
been skillfully fought by Gen. Mcclellan, or If h
had renewed the attack next morning as Burr
side and Sumner advised
TENTHLY The protracted inactivity after tha
battle from the 18th Of September to the Goth {
October was unnecessary, in direct defiance
positive orders, disastrous TO the National caus,
and was the salvation of the Rebellion. The sol
responsibility for il rests on Gen. Mcclellan
The immediate cause of his removal seems I
have been this latest and most persistent insubo
dination.
, ments. They are not charges against McClella
they are the findings Of an impartial jury on tl
evidence submitted to them. The sentence whc
History will pronounce, we do not care to antic