Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-02-02

RICHMOND BY THE OVERLAND h0UTE-PR0GRISs
or THE DIsISrEGRATIOS OF rHK ARMY THE
POToMAc.
Especial Correspondence Of the Chicago Tinesl
WASHINGTON, Jan. 81
The foreboding expressed in my letter of Jan.
20 (date printed enormously %, respecting the
result Of the movement of the Army of the PO-
tomac which had at that time been ordered, have
been more than realized. Burnside's second at
tempt to take Fredericksburg has failed even
more completely and ingloriously than the first.
No doubt HaIleck will seek to throw the odium
OF this failure also upon Gen. Burnside. Yet
this second attempt to take Fredericksburg was
made in exact pursuance of orders ISSUED by
Halleck and Stanton. The preparations for the
attack began to be made soon after New Years
Day. Ever since that time these preparations
have been carried forward 10y Gen. Burnside and
his officers with great vgor, but at the same time
with great publicity. The tact that Gen. Burn
side was seeking for other fords to cross the Rap
pahannock was trumpeted through one oil the
Eastern papers. and thus comes straight To the
Rebel Generals Ali the other preparations that
he was engaged in making for more than two
weeks we're regularly communicated to the
enemy, day by day. 10y the inhabitants near Fal-
mouth. Every day, from the Sd to the 10Th of
January, Gen. Lee was correctly informed, not
only of the exact numbers and strength OF each
one of Burnsde's corps, but also of the move
ments that had taken place, the progress of the
preparations for crossing the river, and the pro-
gress of the dsaffection among the troops owing
to the Withholding of their pay: and his move
ments were regulated by what he thus learned
If Burnside moved a division ten miles above
Falmouth, Lee moved brigade to a point orpo-
site, where the movements of the Union division
could be watched; and the Confederate brigade
amused themselves, and kept themselves warm
by throwing up redoubt, digging rifle pits, so
IL IL
| 1t Burnside moved brigade ten miles below
Falmouth, Lee made a corresponding movement
with regiment. And everywhere opposite TO
! where our troops novel they saw the enemy in
force.
Gen. Lees movements, during all this time,
were conducted with that judgment which always
marks hf military character. He knew that,
wherever our army could cross, Fredericksburg
would be the point OF attack; he therefore made
Fredericksburg his central point. and kept the
bulk of his army there But he kaew that the
crossing would not be attempted there Second
time; therefore hedistributed his force both above
and below But the whole line which he guarded
did not exceed thirty miles in length that is from
Barrett's Ford to Port Royal. fifteen miles above
and fifteen miles below Fredericksburg And his
roads were so constructed hat lie coulu COncen
trae all his forces on any given point on this line
in very lew hours Besides this the hills along
this whole lire bristled with iHtreIehments which
his army has been engaged in erecting ever since
the 18th OF December, "A reference to your tel
egraphc column will show. His arrangements,
in word, were such that. even ii the storm had
not taken place even il troops had succeeded
in crossing, we should, in all probability, have
been again defeated
In the face of al these facts, there are men so
infatuated to say that, if il had not been tor
the storm, Burnside would have taken Gen. Lee
by surprised Why. To say nothing of the fact that
Gen. Lee knew of every mo, ement Burnside
made, there were circumstances which occurred
just before The storm which prove tI1t, owing TO
BLrnsde's bad generalship, the crossing in any
event, would have been delay ed that the enemy
would have had abundance OF time 60 concentrate
his forces, even if he had been surprised Orders
had been issued TO Franklin's grand division 10
advance by certain road HOoker's grand d.
vision was ordered To advance hS a road bearing
T another name. The two grand div sOus marched
accordingly, obedience to their orders. When
halfway TO their destination, it was found that,
by some queer hocus pocus, the troops of Hook
er's grand division had cut into those OF Frank
Inns, and that both grand divisions were huddled
and mixed up in disorder and confusion. Either
the road had two names, two roads into
one, but however it was there were two grand
divisions IN such confusion MS to be unmanage-
, able. This caused delay long enough to give
: the enemy ample time for concentration, and il
happened after the intention 10 cross at a certain
point had been unmistakaby manifested.
Here, again. the orders of the crossing having
been issued for the both, and the preparations for
crossing ali made, these Orders we're counter
manded, merely because some negr oes came over
with cock and bull story about the enemy be-
ing strongly reinforced at the spot where il WAS
| intended to make the crossing. The movement
was in consequence delayed twenty four hours.
. In that interval Gen. Burnside satisfied himself
that the information false that the enemy
had no great force at that particular point, where
there was good ford, and that, If he had pushed
on he intended. in all probability he could
have effected crossing He had the mortifica-
ton 10 see, too, that the delay gave the enemy
an opportunity to ascertain his design, aud that
they did then actually send troops enough To that
point to foil his design. 50 much for trusting 20
reliable contrabandS:'
l. the Administration vet convinced of the inn
practcaiiiiit, of tie overland route Richmond
Suppose for a mument hat Burnside had sue
5 ceeded in getting his army qcrus, The Rappahan-
mock on the 20 On hat nightihe storm began.
On the morning of the 2lst the RappahannOck
had begun To rise By noon the WAGER had be-
come hood What would have cen the fate
{ OF our gallant nrmsr Attacked by the enemy in
/ superior force. with all The advantages on their
side, and with roaring tori ent behind them, an
army would haze been practically annihilated.
Our army defeated anu cut TO peces. Washing
ton would have been again beeaSuied 10y the
rebel hosts, and who can say win what reSultsf
! Would Washington have been safe g., day? Pos
sibly, for Gen. Mcclellan still lives When the
Capital is in peril sgain. rs it has been twice be-
fore. Mr.. Lincoln and his Administration will
grove in the dust before that pure and noble
man, and beg him, on their knees. To save them,
as he has saved them twice before.
The work of the disintegraton of the Army of
the Potomac goes lively on. Two members OF
, the triumvrate rub their hands with elee the
success of their schemes for its ruin, nearly
accomplished The slumbers of the third are
8 I'D to be broken by remOr.e AZ his violated prom
les, and az his base ns.attude toward that
splendid army and it, helo, Ell chief. But he is
powereSs tn re Isl the pressure that his friends
keep constantly upon him. Burnside over
whelmei with modification and grief, feeling
himsel punished i,r the part he was forced to
take. but which still he took in suppanting his
chief, threw his commission commander of the
Army OF the Potomac ut the Presidents feet.
For a moment the President thought at McClel-
Ian. But he is surrounded by the radicals, his
masters. He dare not rebel. "McCellani" ex-
claimed Halleck; II thought we were done with
him. "McClellani" shouted Stanton; mot
while I'm in the Cabinet. No, Mr.. President;
Hooker's your man. So Honest" Abraham has
appointed Hooker to command the 300, 600 men.
composing the Grand Army Of the Potomac;
Hooker. who is good General o. division. but
who is inferior To Burnside in commanding a
great army Burnside is to Mcclellan. No
wonder Gen. Summer and Gen. Franklin have
resigned. From Mcclellan to Burnside and from
Burnside to Hooker From the sublime TO the