Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-07-27
Of the Chicago Tinesl
WASHINGTON, july l3.

Especial Correspondents Of the Chicago Timesl
WASHINGTON, July l3.
There have been some changes in the military
situation since my last letter, and the plans and
intentions Of Gen Lee are now better developed.
/ will state that the work undergone by army
during the whole Of last week, both ia marching
and fighting hiss been such as 20 call forth the
utmost powers of men. and 10 task the abilities
of the officers To the utmost. The result has
proved the value OF discipline. In spite of
march of seventy miles, over muddy roads; in
spite of the intense heat OF the weather, and Of
long and heavy rains; and in spite Of the lack Of
many comforts to which the men are accustom-
ed. the whole army is in better fighting trim than
it has been at any time since last November
Gen. Meade has been largely reinforced also. not
by militia alone. but also by large bodies of dis
ciplined troops, so that, even If Gen. Lee has
100, 900 troops, Gen. Meade's forces largely out
number his. In the great battle, therefore, soon
20 take place, or when it takes place, the proba-
bilities are all with US.
Our army has made steady progress during the
last three days. On Friday, the 10th inst, our
forces were all across the Souh Mountain, and
had re-occupied the MARYLAND Hights at Harper's
Ferry. This gives us the use of the Baltimore
and Ohio railroad to that point. Braddock's
Gap, Crampton's Gap and Turner'S Gap in the
South Mountain, had all been occupied and held
by Gen. Lees rear guard up to the 9th inst, but
they had been abandoned before we reached them
On the l1th we occupied Boonesboro on the right.
and had sharp skirmish with the rear guard of
the enemy between that place and Sharpsburg.
but on the left bank of Antictam creek very
near the old battle ground. On the same day a
portion of our forces under Gen. Sedgwick CON-
prising more than his own corps, pushed forward
from Braddock's Gap towards Funkstown and
Hagerstown. and occupied Funkstown On Sun
of Antetam Creek, and occupied Hagerstown.
On the same day We also crossed Antietam creek,
passed Sharpsburg and the old battlefield, and
formed line of battle extending from Bakers
vile to Funkstown, and on both sides of the
creek. We held yesterday. however, q line on
the right bank of the creek, from Bakersville on
the left TO Hagerstown on the right.
During all this time the movements of Gen.
Lee have been such a were well calculated TO
mask bis real intentions. BY the 9th of July his
whole army had reached Hagerstown. From that
time till the 10th he remained, as it seemed, qui-
etly posted on the right bank of Antietam creek,
sending over into Virginia his wounded and bag
gage trains, and receiving at the same time large
supplies of ammunition. and probably reinforce
ments. All his actions indicated that he intended
TO fight on the old field of Antietam. Neverthe-
less, this was not his intention He never had
more than two divisions on Antietam creek. But
kept up such a show Of force (even coming over
to the east side OF Antietam creek to skirmish
with our advance, on the llth) as might well de-
cieve even better General than Meade and did,
indeed, cause the belief that Lees whole army
there. During all this time, however, Gen.
Lees main body was at Wiliamsport, while a
single division held Hagerstown, and brigade
was pushed out to Clear Spring, with pickets to
Hancock. And this last fact gives us the clue
to the real design Of the Rebel General.
His object is the capture of Washington. He
invaded Pennsylvania and threatened Harrisburg
in order to compel the Army OF the Potomac TO
uncover the Capital and leave il defenseless by
marching so far away from IT, He knows that
he must defeat Gen. Meade's army before he can
capture Washington; but, the farther away from
Washington he can draw the Union army, the
better il will be for him. he endeavored, for
three DAYS to defeat that army at Gettysburg,
and failed. He has now changed his ground in
order that he may have on the Potomac what he
did not have at Gettysburg. namely: the adudR-
fGqc of position He has secured that. The po-
sitien at Antietam was good one. His position
at Williamsport is much better. II is in his pow
er now either to stand and fight where he is,
again to change bis position, and compel Gen.
Meades army to follow him still farther away
from Washington, even as far Hancock, and
perhaps across the Potomac into Virginia again.
1t is the same game that he played after his in
vasion of Maryland last October and November.
1t was beyond the power OF the Union army then
to compel Gen. Lee to fight. As be drew the
Union army after him then, until the retreat and
pursuit eliminated in the battle Of Fredercks-
burg on the 18th of December, he will now
draw the Union army after him until he has
reached the spot in which he chooses TO fight IL
he is in that spot now. he will fight now. lfnot,
he will move on.
Notwithstanding the surrender of VickSburg,
the greatest anxiety continues to be felt here in
regard TO the condition of affairs on the Lower
Mississippi and at New Orleans. The very fact
that Gen. Johnston did not march to the assist
ance of Gen. Pemberton and compel Gen. Grant
to raise the siege of that place, bodes no good.
The fact that he had large army at his CON-
mand as early as the 2Oth or 25th of June. an
army that had been heavily augmented by rein
forcemenis from Bragg's army at Shelbyville, is
admitted. What, then, has he done with III Ii
is greatly feared here that he marched south be-
fore the end of June, and that he will seek TO
demolish Gen. Banks and recapturc New Orleans
before Gen. Grant can send any trUops to that
quarter. The capture OF Brsshear City is looked
upon here as q great misfortune, as il undoubt-
edly is; and it is feared that it will be followed
by other disasters. 1t is pretty well understood
that Gen. Banks was sent OF there In order TO
keep him out of sight and out of the other Presi-
dental aspirants, and that "the Government" did
not feel very desirous of his accomplishing any
thing very brilliant. Hence he was furnished
with troops whose time expired more than
month ago, and no provision was made to supply
their places.
Had troops been sent to him to supply the
places of those whose time had expired, he could
have properly guarded Brashear City, and pre-
vented its loss As it is, in consequence OF the
mulish obstinacy of the Administration, We lose
not only the position ITSELF and the whole Of the
Lafourche country, but also vast quantity Of
military stores, two 20 FOUNDER Parrott guns, six
large siege guns, 50 900 rounds of ammunition
for the guns, and all the baggage of Gen. Banks
officers. The articles which fell into the enemys
hands in consequence of the capture Of Brashear
City, were just what they wanted most. including
large quantities of medical stores and clothing.
Indeed, 1 am assured on the very best authority
that our losses in this affair far exceed in value
all the cotton and sugar obtained in the South
during the last twelve months. For the loss of
Brashear City. in Louisiana, and Winchester, in
Northern Virginia, the Administration should be
called to a strict account, for both disasters can
be traced directly 70 the mismanagement which
prevails here-mismanagement which will con-
tinue as long as this Administration remains in
power. "
THuRLow WEEDS OPISIox-Thu.low Weed,
in recent letter. gives his opinion to the IN
citing cause of the popular prejudice against ne
groes His words will bear republication:
There is n cause however, for the hatred of
the negro and the indignities TO which he is sub
jected, that should be remembered and reproba
ted. The daily and offensive obtrusions of the