The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-04-11
vicinity Of Williamsburg about s o'clock in the

vicinity Of Williamsburg about s o'clock in the
afternoon.
HOOKER DOES THE FIGHTING.
By the time Gen. Kearney had reached the
field and re-enforced Gen. Hooker, taking COM
mand, being the senior in rank to Gen. Hooker,
Gen. Hancock had been engaged on the right.
but upon being REINFORCED, had succeeded in
repulsing the enemy, losing about forty men.-
The principal fighting was done by the troops
under Gen. Hooker, his division sustaining
loss Of about l 700 men. Before ne was re-
enforced, his troops were obliged to hold their
position with the bayonet and such ammunition
as the men could obtain from the bodies OF those
who had fallen, the roads being so muddy that
it was impossible to bring up fresh ammunition.
RETREAT AND PURSUIT.
That night the enemy evacuated their position
at Williamsburg. Gen. Mcclellan states that
after he arrived on the field he wse so satisfied
that the enemy had been beaten and would be
compelled to evacuate their position that night
or be taken at great disadvantage, that ne
countermsnded orders to the divisions OF Rich
ardson and Sedgwick and sent them back to
yorktown.
The next day the pursuit was continued for
short distance by Gen. Stonenan and the cav
airy, with small body Of infantry. Streral Of
tie Generals testify that, had the enemy been
tollo,oed up after the battle Of williamsburg they
could haue been followed right into Richnsond-one
Of them says vi0.oM firing gun. Gen. Nc.
Clsllan says that the roads were 80 bad, in con-
sequence of the rains, that it was impracticable
to make vigorous pursuit.
The battle of Williamsburg appears to have
been fought under many and serious disadvant-
ages. Nothing was known of the nature of the
country or the defensive works of the enemy
until our troops arrived before them there was
no controlling mind in charge of the movements
there was uncertainty in regard to who was
in command each General fought as he con.
sidered best; and, By the time the General Com
handing appeared on tie field, the principal part
of the fighting 0as ouer.
FURTHER DELAY.
Some three or four days were spent at Will
iamsburg for the purpose of bringing up sup
plies, &C., and then the line of march was taken
up for the Chickahominy. 1t was about the
time that the army left Williamsburg that Nor.
folk was taken and the Merrimsc Destroyed
But preparations had been made before these
events occurred to have supplies sent up York
River instead of the James. and the line after,
wards followed was adopted. The consequence
was, that the gunboats were of little or no ser>
vice in the operations against Richmond, and
remained entirely inactive, except in some ope-
ratons against Fort Darling, until they were
called upon to protect the army, when, in July,
it fell back to the James River.
The distance between Williamsburg and the
line of operations on the Chickahominy was
from forty to fifty miles, and the army was most
two weeks in moving that distance. The frs;
troops that crossed the Chickahominy was the
CORPS Of General Reyes, which crossed on the
Path of May, followed by the corps of General
Hentzelman on the 25th. The rest of our army
renamed ON the left bauk Of the Chickahominy
until the battle of Fair Oaks, when the corps Of
Gen. Sumner crossed to the assistance Of Gems
Heintzelman and keyes.
MCCLELLAN STILL CALLING FOR MORE TROOPS.
General Mcclellan continued calling for re-
Inducements, representing that the force OF The
enemy in his front was superior to his own, anC
that the force under Gen. Mcdowell would d.
more for the protection Of Washington, if SEN
to his army, than in any other position in whict
it could be placed. In letter written on thu
2lst of May be asks that Gen. McDowell's corp
be sent to him by water rather than by land, al
the more expeditions mode, and that he and BIZ
forces be explicitly placed under his orders, III
the ordinary way" He closes his letter by say
ing:
II believe there is great struggle befor'
couraged I wish to strengthen it's force a
much as can; but, in any event. shall igh
it with all the skill, and caution, and determine
ton that possess And trust that the result
may either obtain for me the permanent con
6dence OF my Government, or that it may clos
my career"
In reply to the request of Gen. Mcclellan tina
General Mcdowell should join his forces b.
water, the President states, on the Dist of May
"McDowell can reach you by land sooner thai
he could get aboard of boats if the boats wer
ready at Fredericksburg, unless his march shal
be resisted, in which case the force resisting hin
will not be confronting you at Richmond. B.
land he will reach you in five days after starting
whereas, by water, he would cot reach you il
two weeks, judging by past experience Frank
Inns single division did not reach you in tel
days after ordered it."
I JACKSON IN THE SHENANDOAH.
Preparations were accordingly made for Gen
Mcdowell to leave Fredericksburg on the 25t
of May to join Gen. Mcclellan. just at tia
, time, however, Jackson commenced his exped
: ton down the Shenandoah Valley, and Geners
: Mcdowell, together with Gen. Fremont, fror
! Western Virginia, was sent to the assistance {
a Gen. Banks, and to intercept jackson in bis re
9 treat. Upon being informed Of this, Gener.
~ S0Sn
- son was probably intended to prevent reinforce
: : ments being sent to him. The President replied
;. giving him full information as to the conditio
= of affairs in the valley, aud closed by saying
"T Nc DoeoeNs force ras non beyond our reac
= zoe slioud be utterly helpless. Apprehensions
!" something like this, and no unwillingness to su
. tain you, has always been my reason for With
e holding KcDowels force from you. Please u,
derstand this and do the best you can with Il
forces you now have"
}. BATTLE OF SEVEN PINES.
Is On the Slss of May and the LIST of June til
n battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks wei
4, fought. As there has been so much controyers
l. in regard to the conduct of some of the trooI
n engaged in that battle, your Committee will Re
10 fer more particularly to the testimony of Ge
c Casey. who commanded the advance division
/. upon which the attack was first made. Ge
ST Casey states that, when the campaign of Il
!, Peninsula commenced, his division consiste
,e principally of raw and inexperienced troops
nj They had suffered greatly from the labora ar
ID exposures incident upon the siege Of YosktoW