The New York herald., 1863-07-23
A military Paraitei-AHtictsm ard Get
aM tysburg. IN 4 f8 &8

radical journals was never more forcibly iIlus
trated than in their first issues after tie battle
Gettysburg. wherein TINT victory was cageri,
seized upon to disparage General Mcclellan,
military abilities by contrasting il and what 4
was supposed would follow with the battle
fought ut Antietam on the 18th OF Septcmbe,
last
1t il far from our intention to do or say any
thing that might in the slightest degree detracl
from the merits of General Meade, AZ be Is 4
modest and worthy gentleman and.an able OIL
Ger. whose reputation is perfectly secure. even
should our great strategic critics OF the radical
press take II into their heads to ring The chang
on this second escape Of Lee for the purpose of
replacing him by general Of their own stripe,
We propose merely at this time to state few
facts regarding the battles fought at the above
mentioned places, and will leave orr ,feaders 10
draw their own conclusions as to the Justice Of
the criticisms of our radical contemporaries
The army brought into tho action at Ante
tam nv General Lee, according ia the best AT
thorties, amounted 10 between ninety and ore
hundred thousand men. The strongest position
in that section Of country was selected by the
rebel general. in front of Sharpshurc. tn mcet
our advancing forces. His line OF battle ex-
tended around the crest of elevated heights
forming the arc OF a circle. with his from. ami
tanks we'd covered and protected by the Poto.
mac and Antie'am rivers. In this highly al.
vantageous position he awaited the attack from
our army. The forces at the disposal of Genera,
Mcclellan on the i7th did not exceed eirl,ty-
five thousand men, az two divisions Of his army
did not reach the battle field until the following
day. with this force inferior ;n numbers to
that Of The enemy, and suffering under the prcs-
tgc os the recent disastrous operations Of Pope,
General Mcclellan assumed the offensive and
advanced at once to the attack, and after four
teen hours bard fighting gained a victory driy-
ing the enemy from sgrcat portion OF the battle
field
After this sauguinary contest eur troops
buried, including those killed at South Noun
tain about 1000 Of the cnemy's dead. Their
wounded, according TO the ratio. Of our own
casualties would amount to five times this
number. which. including the prisoners taken.
makes their loss about thirty thousand Our
own losses. according to General McClelan's
report, were fifteen thousand two huGlred and
twenty men, among whom were ten general
officers. In one corps alone (Sumncrs) forty
one commissioned officers and eight hundred
and nineteen enlisted men were killed while
four general officers ejghty-nine other commits
stoned officers and three thousand seven hundred
and eight enlisted men were wounded in the
same gallant corps. Other corps suffered se-
verely, and the entire army was badly cut up
and greatly exhausted from hard fighting, want
of rest and food. Its ammunition was nearly
consumed. and had to be replenished from the
supply trains several miles in the rear. Pro-
visions were also to be brought up, and it was
not until late on the following day that these
the meantime the wounded were removed and
taken care Of, and orders were issued for re-
newal Of the attack at daylight on the. 10Th.
The advance at that time disclosed the fact that
the enemy had rccrossed the Potomac during
the night, and General Mcclellan did not think
his army was in sufficient force or in condition
to follew them across the river at that time
Now, at the battle OF Gettysburg il is we'll
known that General Meade had much larger
army than Mcclellan at Antietam. II is also
understood that, with the exception OF the at
tack BY Reynolds General Meade selected his
positions and acted on the defensive. The ad-
vantage in position was therefore with our
troops at the battle of Gettysburg while at
Antietam the enemy possessed that superiority;
yet we doubt if any greater punishment was
inflicted upon the rebel army at Gettysburg
than at Antietam. They were both victories.
won from determined and brave enemy after
long and desperate struggles. The difference
consisted in this-that after General Meades
victory Washington, Baltimore, Harrisburg and
other places were drained Of troops to make
up the casualties incident to bis battles
This was the correct military policy, and should
have been acccdcd to when il was so urgently
pressed upon the department by General
Mcclellan after Antietam. But lie was left to
do the best he could with his diminished army,
while at least fifty thousand men were within
supporting distance at Baltimore and Washing
ton, where they could be Of no possible service
Then. again, il should be borne in mind that at
Antietam Lee was within a mile of the Poto-
mac, with several fords directly in his rear and
the water at a low stage, while at Gettysburg
he was fifty miles from the river and the water
above fording stage at all points. Lee
crossed the Potomac only one day after the
battle Of Antietam, while ten days elapsed be-
fore he crossed the same river after the battle
Of Gettysburg.
If, then, there is little cause to find .aslt with
Meade for not Immediately foil owing up the
fruits Of his victory, there is ass'iredly less for
censuring Mcclellan for acting on the same
prudential considerations. The obstacles that
compelled tue delay Of the one under circum-
stances no much more favorsSle fully justify
the canton Of the other. No competent mill
tary critics have been found 20 condemn the
- a. -