The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-04-25

words, all that is impossible when follow
ing the old system becomes possible With
the new. Where two men can plant their
good administration or organization for
collecting the provisions and paying for
them is required. Based ON such system
of living, and freed Of part Of its immense
wagon trains, An army in this country may
march, on an average, from seventeen to
eighteen miles day with ease."
OF THR MOUNTAIN DISTRICTS.
According to our author, the theater or
field of war, in our case, divides itself natu-
rally into three zones right, OF trans
Mississippi; the center, lying between the
Mississippi and the mountains; and the left,
between the mountains and the seaboard.
The last he esteems the chief, on which the
principal operations will be conducted, and
he regards the right flank Of the left zone,
as the true field Of grand operations. 4
ssThe army operating in the center zone
will be secondary to that Of the'left zone,
and should only serve as kind Of diver
sion.
Comparing what has been said, under
the head of Base of Operation fig. l, with
the left zone, we shall find that it exactly
corresponds with the case stated there: b
would represent the Potomac, b d, the At
lantic Ocean; a c, the mountain chain, or
the frontier of Western Virginia; and d,
the Savannah. If we succeed in placing our
army along O c.. we should be able to
act or take hold at any moment of the COM
municatiOns of the army A, which has for
it's only retreat the line d, or the Savan-
nah. The very moment a rebel army per-
mits Union army to act from the noun
tain district against it's communications,
or, what is better, to take hold of them, so
as to force it to fight, forming its line of
battle parallel with the sea, and facing the
Blue Ridge-that is, forming its line of bat
tie parallel with its natural line of retreat
to the Savannah-this rebel army, in case
of defeat, will not only be beaten, but by q
rapid pursuit, will be obliged to surrender,
as it will be thrown back in the direction of
the ocean, an obstacle which soon stops all
further retreat.
1.-THE possession of the mountain district
is, therefore, for the holding of the left zone,
a necessity; and still better, it is q necessity
for the possession of the whole theater Of
war. In fact, this chain of mountains is
like a wedge driven from the North right
into the very heart of the theater of war.
1t is the only elevated part of it, and domi-
mates it in all directions. It is like a bull
large fortress. of which the walls are form
cd by the parallel ridges, the bitches by the
rapid streams in the valley, and the doors
by the gaps.
"Take the whole fortress-that is, the
whole South-but leave this citadel I'M
touched, and it will be the same az if moth
ing had been taken. In these mountains
their occupation they maintain a decidedly
central position, combined with the facility
of debouching in any place, they can throw
themselves, with their whole force, on all
the surrounding fragments of our armies,
and beat them in detail,''
We have not space for the details of q
campaign which he lays out, in which an
army marching through the valley of Vir-
ginia; and another meeting it from the
Upper Ohio, would join in Southern Viz.
ginia, and menace the Southern army. He
says of the results of this grand movement
however:
sit is evident that such operations, aim
ed right at the destruction Of the enemy
armies, are decisive; that all towns, sea-
ports, &C., fall as a matter of course; and
| that, applied to the South, from two to two
| be required to carry them through"
He expresses the opinion that the cam
paign. or rather the plan Of the campaign
! [of 1852, had some resemblance to the in.
vasion of France in 1893. 1.-THE result was
partly like that Of this invasion, and would
have been stillmore so, had the rebels taker
| a lesson from Garnet, and followed from the
| first his plan of defense"
We have not space for condensation
even, of his analysis of the campaign O
| 1862 in which he shows that our defeat was
certain from the moment that the plan was
made, and would have been more fatal haG
| the rebels not also made plumbers. w.
| wish to take notice Of the last chapter o
his book in which he discusses the cam
paign of 1868:
"1n passing in review the campaign o
1867, we have seen how q wrong genera
plan, a division of force, q choice of indeci
sive lines of operation, led to insignificant
results, and even reverses. The campaign
of 1868 opens for the Union forces withou
any change in the general plan of opera
ton; it is but the continuation of the cam
and the opening of the Mississippi seen
still to be the main objects to be obtained
by the Eastern and Western Union armies
| "a wrong general plan of operation viii
lead to bad or insignificant results, if tn,
counter plan be correct, whatever the mi
nor or detailed operations may be. In tn,
plan of 1868, probably these latter will b,
less, the result ought to be the same.
! Ga long study of military history has lee
me to to the conviction that great decisiv,
results can only be obtained by thorough
Fly correct action, especially in case lik,
ours, where the adversary Is skillful one
and understands the great rules of wa
himself, and, what is Of more Importance
knows how to apply them.
"The campaign of 1862, as well as that o
1868, are conducted ON a great number o
lines of operation, and, consequently, OF
wrong principles. Moreover. the genera
plan of operation being wrong, the object
which are to be attained by the differen
armies are such that even were the plan o
operation right, nothing decisive could b,
achieved"
! THE CAMPAIGN OF 1868.
He thereupOn endeavors to depict tn
features of a campaign in which the rebels
acting on right principles, oppose, and sue
cessfully, our wrong plans. He gives tn
government armies 650, 900 men, and tn
rebels 100000. -
Correct, but audacious, and, perhaps
even somewhat adventurous, operation
by the rebels alone can obtain them brill
liant successes; and the war, as we under
stand it, on the part of the South, is that o
Napoleon's campaign in 1896, only on
larger scale. Giving up everything. ex