Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-28

the army -houd he made possible as little as
possible lett TO ehane When Gen Haleck cane down 10
Harris MS Bar my reeollec ion he said 90 90 en- or
something about that number all that could be had
reoo elton Of having asked at tubequent period for
greater number than $4,000 necessary preliminary to
NOV
Question About how many had been lost from the
25lh Of June until you reached Harrisons Bar in killed
wounded and missing
Answer think The loss about Ia OOO but could not
tell positively without looking at the returns
20 iestitn Will you state in what you think your CHANCES
for ,uccess would have been eat n with the addition ~
20 900 the number which yu had at Harrisons
sou had formed Junction with the rest Of the enemys
forcesl
Answer should have COUNTED upon the effect Of the bat
es WI en- mad Ju taken place upon enemy We had
then TO believe that the enemys losses had
been very much heavier and that ions Of his
army were very much demorazed especially after the battle
Of Malv, rn Hill"
In closing their report upon the campaign OF the Penn
sula your committee would refer the report Of Gen
John g. Barnard Chief Of Engineers Of the Army # the
Potomac during that campaign made to Cen Mcclellan
The conclusion OF his report which no terms
spec pointing out the mistakes that made and thus
tracing the causes OF its he Pen nsnla campaigns failure
to their true sources" ID as follows:
One of the prominent among the causes of Ultimate
failure was tie inac on Of eight months from August Sol
rapid assures. In November 1861 the Army Of The Poto
mac II not fully .upped with all the maeriel, yet
about ete Lumbers discipline and anixaton
became For four months the great marine
the capital of the nation bloc kaded aud tn capital Kept
in partial OF siege by greatly inferior enemy face
In the 1861 1862 Norfolk could and should
have been taken The navy snded il the country de
of the Merrim whc proved disastrous
subsequent operations wonld lave been prevented The
preparation OF this vessel was known and the Navy Depart
without forebodngs of the would do
Thong delay nigh mature comprehensive pla aud
been shown that essal involves something m re-
han ab tract military principles The true question
reasonable but longing an impatient nation for
results to Justify lavish confidence and to take advantage
OF undivided command and mmeed liberty Of
while they were assessed
When the army did move plan adopted perfectly
certain invite nay compel rference and the
army to go by Annapolis the lower chesapeake
confident that onshaf would have embark Ell
before the oter half would have been ordered back Wash
ngon The enemy was then al Manassas, and feint
not reality Of attack upon Washington obvious
certain to create pane, which Executiv could
that lit rterence with the removal of the the army
certain.
When the enemy fell back behind the Rappah4nuock an
destroyed the railroad bridges the circums gre
changed and thsre arguments adopted
Yet results have proved how there to be
considered besides the purely military Ones which opposed
themselves to the adoption of such a liue.
The facts connected with the whho ding of McDowes
of the Mcdowell Court Inquiry that every wishes
can form his own Judgment Whether wise or un-
wise things resulting from the taking of
line Of operations which did not then CO, or Washnpton
At the time the Army OF the Potomac landed the Pen
demo al zed by the defeats Port Royal Mill spring Fort
Henry Frt nelson Roanoke Island and Pea Ridge; and
reduced by sickness os in battle expraons Of period Of
passed seemed if needed but vigorous grippe end
ths r. b-lion, nearly throted Ho them hap.
agnf ent Army Of the Potomac the day the
taon of the rebel eause which grow par passu
with the slow progress of ts operations?
However may be commute 10 ~ expression Of pro-
fessiona opinion to the contrary Il My did suggest
my opinion now 49, tn the lines OF Yorktown should haze
been assaulted There is to believe that they
not held In strong orce when appeared ere hcn
of power the morale, side. 1t
selves to confirm aid sustain it. We shou probably
succeeded But il we had failed il may well :, d ubted
whether the shock of unsuccessful assault would be
demoralizing than the labors Of siege
Our troops toilei mouth in enches lay in the
swamps OF warwick We lost few men by The siege; but
disease took fear hold Of the army and toll and hard hip
by the excitement of combat impaired their
rdi. We did no. carry with Us from Yorktown good
took there OF the bitter fruits Of that moath
gained by the enemy have tast to hearts
Tine siege having been determined upon should have
opened our tteries the place fact they
peted The effect the troops would have been inspiring
III ghtened the ege shortened our labors;
and besides would have had the credit of driving
enemy from Yorktown by force of whereas was
We only induced him for prudential reasons
Yorktown having fallen, however, did it right
pursue enemy our whole force But the battle of
Williamsburg f,up h. was without reconnoitring the
ton without of action among the different corps
aud divs commander, and almos without orders
blunder which ought not TO have happened
We knew of this position beforehand, and knew It
stand there that would be strong for he would be
tight for time his ms of reach We
We lost several thousand men, aud we gained nothing If we
have been ssary. But if il had ssary we
should have had ms 10 have brought up
moi red tie position and delivered attack way
th come res III would have II jwed from il.
We hal advantage. Frankn's division landed at
West Point The day and Sedgwicks division on the
day following. Ihose divisions, had the enemy waei
ano her day at Williamsburg could have his
ion and in that would been superior his front
and have had divisions in his His retreat
perhaps his capture inevitably have followed and
great tot keeping FIR akin .ong emba ked and finally
send ny West Point would we been &C, ompished
:" II leaving Wi liam bu should have crosse The
hickahominy aud connect with navy the James
river. We sh Id then ave had united army and the CO
Dpera the and probably would have in Rich
ond II The ia tn d kno the hs-
Ch ckahomny obs abe las IL Isy across
BUR dir1c hichmond that ransp were n
he York liver and at tie raj ruad furnished good
supply tn army, that wished TO with Nc
DoweH ming from FIR d.rktbu T. DC. determined our
route In taking it lost essentially all that worth
3ng ia to gain viz the James river approach and the
,o.operat on ut the navy.
The route chose two weeks should rot have been 81 emit
traversing the forty miles from Williamsburg Bottoms
aud New Bridges snd the barrier of the Chic ahom ny
ben4 left ied Bottoms bridge shoui hav
been lost in making OF The circumstance and
u passage of New Bridge which mi sht have bee by
he rs Of May, and ,arisr had
an prepa ed IL
70 Mise The rebels at Fair Oaks Eli ,uld have been
ak advantage Of IL of which
not seizt d, repe themselves. We n know the
,tste OF dsor aniz ton and dsmay which the rebel
eat We now know TIA u could have been followed
mt, Richmond Hal il 80, her would have bee no
resistance TO bIi right wing AL
though did lot then al that 10, was OBJ
viou, AT thai that VIII The rebels struck the blow at
unused ucc IL WIS byons enough that IN
struck with their whole and repulsed m in
disorder it'll thi ee.ths We should have followed
hem mp, the me time that brought the other
woffths
A ter it known that Med well was called off Ia
another omar there was longer hope of ncreas