The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-08-22
Gen. Meade and the Escape Of
General Lee.

| UOACTol AOCs
We have been favored with the perusal
of private letter to friend from prom
inent officer, whose relations are such as
| to leave no doubt that it correctly exhibits
the state of facts in view of which Gen.
Meade and his corps commanders acted
when General Lee lay north of the Poto-
mac, and the reasons which determined
them to delay the attack. As an act of JUS
tice to General Meade, and as part of the
history OF the same, we are allowed to
make extracts from this interesting and
valuable communication:
After the battle of Gettysburg, when
Gen. Lee retreated through the mountain
passes, Gen. Meade's army was greatly ex-
hausted by three days fighting and its pre-
vlous forced marches, and was also greatly
reduced in numbers, having lost nearly
twenty thousand men, killed, wounded
and missing, to say nothing Of stragglers.
Directly to pursue Lee through the noun
tains, in narrow passes, would have ena-
bled him with a strong rear guard to have
held Meade in check till he could have re-
bled his army in the Cumberland
Valley, and then throw his masses on the
heads Of his columns when he forced his
way through, or he could have detained
Meade so long in the mountains that he
could easily have gotten away with the
main portion of his army if he so desired.
1t was plain that if Gen. Lee chose to
run away no one in pursuit could stop him,
and that the only chance was to endeavor
- intercept him at Hagerstown, provided he
was retiring as fast as he might have done.
The rise in the Potomac favored General
Meade, who was able to concentrate his ar
my in Lees vicinity before he had crossed
But Gen. Lee was found in a. very strong
position, with all his artillery placed, and
with his whole army behind breastworks,
| ready to defend or oppose our advance
The great difficulty was that, owing to the
character of the country, it was impossible
to reconnoiter Lees position, and ascertain
what chances Of success our attack would
have. Had it been practicable to see ex-
actly where Lee was, and for the General
inChief to have formed positive judg-
ment on the subject of the probability of
success in an attack, Gen. Meade might
have sought no advice, or at least might
have given it less Importance. But in the
absence of such precise information, his
duty required that before he incurred the
hazards of blind attack, he should SUBJ
| nit the question to those who had to exc
cute the work, if decided upon. After con-
sultation, the corps commanders decided
that the risks incurred would not Justify
an attack being made, until there was
| some reasonable degree of probability ap-
parent that it would succeed. They based
their judgment on the consequences to the
CttlSc anu COUutTy III case our dTiuy SuOulu
| be repulsed and eventually defeated, thus
losing all the advantages gained at Gettys-
burg, and placing Lee completely in mas
| terry of the situation. The country, they
thought, depended, in this juncture, upon
the existence of the Army Of the Potomac.
The reports of the decentralization of the
enemy were known to be exaggerated, and
the desperateness of his condition, if de-
feated, would tend to make the battle des-
perate beyond comparison.
! General Meade acted as prudent man
would have done. The question was,
should he order blind attack when igno-
rant of all esser tial matters, having, there
| fore, no clear view thatsuccess was proba-
| bic against sp.s 3 idly posted, desperate
| and powerful ,enemJ, when his five corps
commanders advised against it, and when
to be defeated was to lose all the benefits
of the past victory, and to place the North
and Washington again at the command OF
Lee and his army? Had he seen his own
way reasonably clear to victory, he should
have discarded advice and overruled his
subordinates. But no General-in n-chiet
would have q right to imperil so much
when his mind was not clear that he would
win.
The next day after the council was
spent in making examinations of the enc
my's position. They all resulted in show
ing him in strong force and very strong
ly posted. But, having acquired this fuller
| though not complete knowledge, General
Meade, stronger by delay, determined Oh
an attack the day after. That night Gene
raj Lee escaped, to the surprise of ala
surprise which has had its counterpart
| during this war. Such was the surprise of
Lee himself when Burnside escaped at
Fredericksburg, and Hooker at Chancel-
lorsville; of Halleck, when Beauregard got
away at Corinth.
On one important fact the public are
greatly misinformed. 1t is generally sup
posed that Lees army was crossing dur
ing the day which succeeded the council OF
war, so that only part Of it lay opposed
to Meade for some hours. Such is not the
case. Not q man IN Lees army left his
tines untu after dark. Had Meade attacked
that day, he would have found Lees whole
army in force, ready to receive him.
Disappointment at the result no one can
blame. Indeed, the chief actors, the corps
), commanders and the chief,
were most disappointed of all. But dis
satisfaction and censure, such as some
Journals express or hint, seem positively
unjust. 1t Is very improbable that an at
tack upon Lee, in that position, with his
numerous artillery crowning the nights
and commanding the defiles and roads,
could have been successful. But to have
authorized such an attack by General
subjected to the responsibilities which be-
longed to General Meade, after the victory
at Gettysburg, it should have been plain
and clear that the chances were in favor OF
success.
General Meade is, in many respects, diff
ferently situated frC1n aose heretofore in
command of the Army ofthe Potomac. He
has had no newspaper claquers in the
camp or out of it. His present post fell to
his lot through the fish OF his fellow sol
diers. To no one Nas his designation to
10 the important station he holds greater
surprise than TO hiinself. Only sense OF
duty determined him to accept it. He
seeks no personal exsltation now. When
ever it is for the interest of the cause that
another should take his place, that mo-
ment. those who know him are perfectly
assured, he will be prepared cheerfully to
vacate his position. 1t is his cherished
opinion that personal consideration should
be entirely discarded in this mGmentous
contest. All he prete,tds to is the eharac-
ter of an honest soldier, sincerely trying
to do his duty to the best Of his ability;
Such a man should redeive from all good
citizens earnest regard and support. We
have had few such in prominent stations.
tTbey are the men rssaed, The few we
Al In