Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1863-03-07
St(istrllanp.
The President to Gen. MoClellan

The President to Gen. Mcclellan.
The history of the times would not DO COM
plete without the subjoinvd letter. It was
brought out in the Mcdowell Court of In.
quiry:
WASHINGTON, April II, 1862.
To Major General McClcllas-My Dear
Sir Your dispatches complaining that you
are not properly sustained, while they do not
offend me. pain mo very much. Con- Blenk-
cr's division was withdrawn from you before
you left here. You know the pressure under
which did it. and as thought acquiesced
in it, certainly not without reluctance. AT.
ter you left, l ascertained that less than co.
900 unorganixed men without a single field
battery, werc all you designed for the de-
fcnse Of Washington and Manassas Junction.
A part Of these men were to 60 to Hooker's
old position. Banks corps, once designed for
Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up
OH the limo Of Winchester and Strasburg, and
could not leave it without again exposing the
Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad. This presented, or would present
when Mcdowell and Sumner should be gone,
the great temptation for the enemy to turn
back from tho Rappahannock and reach
Washington. My explicit direction that
Washington should, by the judgment Of all
commanders Of corps, be left entirely secure,
had been entirely neglected. 1t was precise.
ly this that drove mo to detain Mcdowell.
do not forget that was satisfied with
your arrangements to leave Banks at Manas.
sas Junction; but when that arrangement
was broken up, and nothing was substituted
for it, of course / was not satisfied. l was
constrained to substitute something for it my
self. And now, allow me to ask-do you re-
ally think should permit the line from Rich
mond via Manassas Junction to this city to
be entirely open, except what resistance could
be presented by less than 10000 unorgan-
lied troopsl This is question which the
country will not allow me to evade.
There is curious mystery about the num.
Der Of troops now with you. telegraphed
you on the 9th, saying that you had over
100000 with you. as had just obtained from
tho Secretary Of War a statement, taken. as
he said, from your own returns, making 1885,
600 men then with you and en- roste to you.
Now you say you will have but $4,000 when
al en- roxte to you have reached you. How
can this discrepancy Of $4,000 be accounted
fort As to Gen. Wool's command, ! under.
stand 1t is doing for you precisely what 1t Is
likely the same number Of your own com.
mand would have to do If Wool's was away.
l suppose the force the force which has gone
forward to you is with you by this time, and
If 50. l think it is the precise time for you TO TO
strike q blow. BY delay the enemy will
readily gain on you. That is. he will gain
faster by fortiRcations and reinforcemsnts
than YOU can by reinforcements. And once
more lot me tell you it is Indispensable to
you that you strike blow. ! am powerless
to holp this. You will do me justice. You
will remember always wished you not to go
down the bay in search Of field, instead Of
fighting at or near Manassas. 1t was only
shifting and not surmountiug difficulty,
that we would find some enemy. and some or
equal intrenchments at either place. The
country will not fail to note, is noting now,