Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-08-03
Especial oorrespoOaeDos Of the Chicago Timesl

The events of the last fss days have strikiug Civ
illustrated the NorthlessHess aud uDreliabilty Of
the reports from the opposite armies" which
have been furnished by 1.-The Government" and
the agents Of the Administration. and which
were autographed under Official sanction, all over
the country These reports put forth under the
sanction of the war Department, assured the
country that Lees army when II recrossed the
Potomac to retreat into Virginia was utterly
demoralized and routed: that Lees army was
flying before our cavalry in inextricable confu
sion-its baggage trains, artillery, cavalry. and
infantry all MIXED up together: that Lee was
striving with all his might TO get to Richmond
bat that troops held all the passes in the Blue
Ridge Mountains. so that il would be utterly i'm
possible for his army tn get through: and that
instead of reaching Richmond, Lees army
would be defeated and captured | exposed
these falsehoods in my former letters, and
events have now proved them to be such
Up TO the 2lst inst a movement toward Rich
mond formed no part of Gen. Lees plan. He
remained ut Winchester, watching the movements
of Gen Meade The latter officer whose good
judgment in this campaign entities him to the
highest praise remained on the eastern side Of
the Blue Ridge between Berlin and Ashby's
Gap. from the 18th TO the 23d inst The purpo-
ses Of Gen. Lee were still undeveOped. Not
only was the rebel General still a. Winchester,
but there was reason ~ believe that he contem
plated a return across the Potomac. perhaps an
other campaign To Pennsylvania. The reports
OF his having been reinforced from Bragg's army
assumed ut least the semblance Of probability.
His pckets. up 10 the 22d. lined the south bank
of the Potomac. from Bath TO Harper's Ferry
and Gen. Kelly's troops. between Hancock TO
Cumberland. were having daily skirmishes with
detachments from Lees army Under these cir
cumstances il would have been culpable III Gen
Meade to have advanced any further south than
Ashby's Gap. since to have left either that pass,
or Smokers Gap, with a weak guard, would have
been opening a door TO Washington through
which, by the WY If Aide, Gen. Lees army
would have been sure to march Besides, the
distance from Berlin 20 Ashby's Gap is over
thirty five miles, and that is line quite as long
his army can hold
By the DIST, however, Gen. Lee became con
WINGED that Gen Meade was too sagacious either
10 follow him on a wild goose chase down the
Shenandoah Valley, or 20 move rapidly down the
east side OF the Blue Ridge in an attempt to cut
off his retreat to Richmond. thereby allowing him
al opportunity 10 slip through AshbyS Gan and
get in Meade's rear. He saw that Gen Meade
was too good a soldier 10 make a false move and
that Meade had compelled him to make the first
move. He made il; and history will record that
il was a move worthy of great General for his
position a difficult one.
On the evening of the 2lst he issued his orders
for the movement toward Cul?epper. and the
columns were set in motion on The morning oi
the 22d. The corps of Longstreet and A p
Hill moved by way of Front ROYAL, Chester Gap
and Little Washington; that Of Gen Ewell by
way of Strasburg. Thornton's Gan, and Sperry
vile. On the 23d. the corps of Hill and Long
street forded the SHENANDOAH nj a point Just be
low the junction of the west branch of that
oh y. -
the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap On tie same
day. Ewell's corps was passing through Thorn
tons Gap. By this time, however, the move
ment had become known to Gen Meade A
cavalry reconnOisance. sent out from Harper :
Ferry on the 22l, proceeded nearly to Winches
ter before they encountered any signs Of the
enemy. There. however, they fell in with Gen
Lees rear guard. who were still holding the
town. The line of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad from Harper's Ferry to Hancock. was
also found 10 be clear of rebel troops, although
reconnaissance sent out only the day before. had
found Martinsburg occupied BY strong body oi
Confederates
The facts developed by these Reconnaissance
indicated that Lee was making a movement
southwark, that the movement had been Just
commenced. but that it being made with
celebrity Gen. Meade now moved with equal
celebrity. The Blue Ridge is long. however, and
has numerous passes. He did not dare to leave
all of them unguarded. He was obliged to leave
one corps at Ashby's Gap. but. with the remain
der of his army be FASTENED to Manassas Gap
hoping To intercept Lees army there Even in
ding 80 he was obliged to leave Smokers GAP
entirely open and unguardcd, and he could not
know certainly that this apparent southwark
movement OF Lees Was not teint. and that
while engaging Ieades attention at Manassas
Gap with part of his force. he was not really
holding the principal part of his army in reserve
between Winchester and Front ROYAL, ready TO
pour through Smokers Gap the moment he would
End il unguarded and debouch on Aide Gen
Meade could not tell but what that was Lees in
tention, ana therefore his march towards MaDas
sas Gap bold and vigorous movement The
beads of his columns arrived there on the 23d
and found the Gap held by the Confederates. who
were apparently trying TO march through An
engagement ensued, which resulted in the retreat
of the Confederates to Front ROYAL That night
the main body Of Gen Meade's army came up,
the Gap occupied by our troops in strong
force. and one corps was sent on 10 hold Chester
Gap But. unhappilv. these dispositions were
make a few hours too late, althou.h that was un.
avOda0le, for the troops had marched rapidly,
and they had long distance to come.
The apparent attempt on the part Of General
Lee 10 force passage through Manassas G. o,
was. indeed. feint. On the %. nearly the whole
OF Hills and Longtreet's corps had passed
through Chester Gap. and on the oath they m ,de
the march from that point 10 within ten miles OF
Culpepper. IL was their rear guard alone-a
strong one it is true-that had fought the battle
OF Manassas Gap in order to delay Meades army
there. and the ruse was successful. General
Meade's whole army at Chester Gap on the
24ih, but then IL was too late for everything had
passed. The campaign is over General Lee is
safe at Cnlpepper. with his whole army and once
more the Rappahannock rolls between the op.
posing hosts.
What i to be done now and what will be
d0nel IL is not to be supposed that Gen Meade
will set down quietly at Falmouth and waste the
summer in inactivity and il will not do for him
n remain there or at anv other point between
Washington and the Rappahannock. The whole
country is a desert, and every pound of food for
his men and horses has TO be brought to him from
Washington He will have to do one of two
things: he will either have 20 attempt 10 march
on Richmond overland, calculating Of course 10
meet and fight Lees army on the way: or else
the Administration will have TO organize new
Peninsular campaign against the rebel capital.
Nothing would please Gen. Lee so well as 20 have
the former course adopted. vas the first 20 as
sert and demonstrate the impracticabilitv OF an
overland campaign against Richmond. and four
unsuccessful campaigns have proved IT, DO not
believe that Gen Meade will willingly underta Ike
= 18th. By properly organized Penn-ular
campaign Lees army NAV be defeated and Rich
mond be taken But the Administration have
determined that they will not make another Pen
insular campaign under any circumstances. and
al