The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-05-02

It has of course been essential to the pro.
lection of Washington, Of Maryland and
the states this side, that we should have 9
large armyin Virginia. The rebels had quite
as strong reasons, in addition to the defen-
sible character of that state, for preferring
to do most of their fighting there. 1t was
important to their general success that they
should hold the state. OF course necessity
and sound policy required that we should
maintain q large army in Virginia, and
fight the great battles OF the war there
But for the rest of the South we had our
choice of several lines of advance into the
insurgent country. IF we had chosen one
and concentrated upon that all of our dis
possible force outside of Virginia, except
the troops needed to garrison exposed
points, we should probably have achieved
more decisive success than we have done
thus far. A grand army sweeping down
into Middle Tennessee and Northern Ala
bama, on the route now held by Rosecrans,
the mountains of East Tennessee having
nection with Virginia cut off on that route
which might have been done without
great difficulty early in the war-would OF
course have forced together there for de-
Tense the rebel armies now scattered
through the South. Having sufficient
force to defend our base line perfectly, we
could have compelled the enemy to fight it
out there; and having defeated them, an
advance to the southwest would have made
Vicksburg untenable, cleared the valley of
the Mississippi, and cut the Confederacy as
under.
The forces that have been idle in North
and South Carolina, at New Orleans and
above Vicksburg SO long, because neither
is large enough to move by itself far into
the enemys country, or even to accomplish
any special object beyond garrisoning the
positions taken by the navy, if united with
the army Of Rosecrans, or operating in
some line supporting his movement, would
evidently be strong enough to advance and
compel the rebels to fight, and SO bring on
that desirable event, a fair and square trial
of strength between the nation and it's enc
mics. Such concentration would take from
the rebels their main advantage, the chance
to unite their armies and confront us by
superior forces where we are weakest
Moving around the outside of the circle
while they move across it, we must either
have immensely superior numbers at all
every prospect of success. But if we con-
centrate upon one or two lines, they will be
compelled to do the same, and to meet us
in front and on equal terms.
The present position of the opposing
armies illustrates this matter. We are
menaced in North Carolina, and at York
town and Norfolk, at New Orleans, and at
don Galveston, Jacksonville and Pensa-
cola: and Rosecrans confronts at least an
equal force, while the army of the Missis-
sippi wastes away in Intellectual explora-
tions of bayous and digging Of canals. The
rebels send armies from the Rappahannock
to operate elsewhere with the utmost conf
dence, believing they can accomplish their
objects and return long before Gen. Hooker
will fight his way from the Rappahannock
to Richmond. And they are right, because
if they fail to take any of our out-stations,
they have only to return to Virginia again;
thew know that if we are strong enough for
defense at most of these points, we are too
weak to venture any aggressive movement
of Importance, and that we can send no
reinforcements without disabling General
Hooker. Such is the evident military stu
alton. Is not the concentration of our scat
tered forces for two or three grand forward
movements the policy indicated for the
future.-SprinGfeld Republican.