Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1863-01-29
The Presidents Letter to Gen. McCIel-
Ian.


The Presidents Letter to Gen. McCIel-
Ian.
The letter of the President to Gen. Nc
CLELLAN, read in the course of the Nc
| lowell inquiry, was only partially given
in our dispatches of Saturday. Below it
will be found in full as telegraphed to the
Chicago Tribune The date is probably
incorrectly given. 1t developes some
most important facts in regard to the
provision made by Gen. MCCLELLAN for
defending the national Capital when de-
| parting tor the disastrous Peninsula expe-
dition, and shows that the expedition was
contrary to the Judgment OF the Presi
dent:
WASHINGTON, Jan. 9, 1862.
Major General Mcclellan:
My DEAR SIR-Your dispatches com
planning that You are not properly sustain
ed while they do not offend, pain me very
much. Blenker's division was withdrawn
from you before you left here. You know
the pressure under which did it, and as
| thought acquiesced, in it, certainly not
without reluctance.
After you left, ascertained that less
than 10000 unorganized men, without q
single field battery, were all you designed
to be lett for the defense of Washington
and Manassas junction. A part of them
were to go to Hooker's ole POSITION
Banks corps which was designed for Ma
nassas junction, was divided and tied up
on the line of Winchester and Strasburg,
and could not leave ii without again ex-
posing the upper Potomac and the Balti-
more and Ohio Railroad line.
This presented, or would present when
Mcdowell and Sumner should be gone,
great temptation for the enemy to turn
back from the Rappahannock and sack
Washington. My explicit direction that
Washington should, in the Judgment of all
commanders of corps, be eft entirely Sc
cure, had be entirely neglected.
1t is precisely this that caused me to de-
tain Mcdowell.
do not forget that | was satisfied with
your arrangement to leave Banks at Ma
nassas Junction, but when that arrange
ment was broken up, and nothing even
substituted for it, of course | was not sat-
isfied. | was constrained to retain some
thing for it myself. and now allow me to
ask, do you think l should permit the line
from Richmond via Manassas TO this city
to be entirely open, except what resistance
would be presented by less than 10000
unorganized troops? This is question
which the country will not allow me to
evade.
There is curious mystery connected
with the number of troops now with you.
| telegraphed you on the 9Th, saying that
you had 1000 men with you. | had
| inst obtained from the Secretary Of War
a statement, taken as he said from your
returns, making 1QS,O00 then with you
and en- route to you. Now you say you
will have but IS 900 when all en- route to
you shall have reached you. How can
this discrepancy of Sc, 900 be account for ?
As TO Wools command, | understand it is
doing tor you precisely what like num-
! Der of your own would have to do if the
command was away
! | suppose the whole force which has
gone forward to you is with you by this
time, and if so, | think it is the precise
time for you to strike blow. By delay
the enemy will readily gain on you. That
| is, he will gain faster by Notifications and
reinforeements alone. And once more let
me tell you it is indispensable to you that
you strike a blow.
| am powerless to help you. You will
do me the justice to remember that | al.
ways wished you were not going down the
bay in search of field instead of fighting at
or near Manassas, aso My shifting and not
surrounding difficulty. That we would
find some enemy and some equal entrench
ments at either place.
The country will not fail to note, is 10
ting now. that the present hesitation to
move upon the entertainments of the ene-
my is but the story of Manassas repeated.
beg to assure you that | have never
written or spoken in greater kindness OF
feeling than now, or with fuller purpose
to sustain you, so far as in my most anx-
ious judgement consistently can, but you
must act.
Yours truly, A. LINCOLN.
sArbitrary Arrests"