Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-21
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.

soon after the battle Of Bull Run in July, 1861 Gen
Mcdowell was superEeded. AID G-n MCCLELLAN was cnlrd
BY the Precedent to the command OF the Army 4 the 20
tomac The campaign in Western Virginia, tue credit
of which had been rally ascrbfd TO Gen. Mcclellan
the with which it undrs God he was regarded
by Gen. Scott then Ger eraln Chef Of the Amy 81 the
United States his comparative youth holding cut
the promise Of active and rigorous messues-a These
consider tended 10 nuse hope into the public nlad
and to the gloom and dependency which mad ioi
lowed the disastrous issue of the campaign just ended
Every energy of the G. and all the resources
Of generous and patriotic people were eey ana iavsh
pac at the disposal of Glen Mcclellan to enable him to
gather together another army put it in the most cm
pete of efficiency, that offensive operations might
DO resumed at The earliest prnc icable moment The
Army Of the Potomac became the OF special care 10
every department of the Government and all other military
aud organizations were made subordinate TO
the great purpose of collecting Washington, AMI
organizing there army which should overpower the
forces of The enemy and forever crush out any hope OF
success which the rebels might cherish.
Even when the Army of the Potomac had attained
dimensions before contemplated In the course OF
military operations upon this continent, and seldom II
rqualled 10 modern times no portion OF its rapidly
increasing numbers permitted to be diverted even for
brief period to the accomplishment OF other enterprises
The Generals in charge of the various exped ions from
time 10 tune naugufated bnd from which much beneh
was anticipated-Gen Butler Gen. Sherman, Gen Burn
side, and uhers-were compelled 10 look elsewhere for
the troops TO compose their commands TO rely upon tie
continued patriotism If the people and the zeal OF the
Executives # the various States for the raising 1t thse
reGm which would enable them TO depart for the fields
of duty assigned TO them.
No consideration was for moment allowed TO diminish
impair the ec ency of the Army of the Potomac aud
the unexamped acle presented other nations
who irenty watching the COURSE OF evnts IN TINS
country of the largest Of the present century beng
rsed entirely by voluntary enstmans IN the bref period
Of few months
When Congress assembled in this city in the beginning
of December 1851 successful bad been the ions
Of the auhort ard zenousy had the people respond
ed to cir couDtrys call that the consolidated morning
reports, furn he'd your committee by the Adtant Gee
raj Of the army showed that exclusive of the command Of
Y Bbl Ia
Of about LIS 600
During the, time ihis large army had been collecting
and organizing, nothing Of importance had transpred ia
connection with it, except the closing Of the CATION OF
the Potomac BY the rebrs which your committee treat Of
more at uRth IN another part # this report and the me
aUcbc disaster OF Balls Bluff which is made the subject
of separate report.
The weather during the f. season ard for weeks
after the converting Of Congress continued unusually ia
vorabe for active military operations. As month after
month passed without thing being done by the Army
Of the Potomac the peope became more and more anxious
for the announcement that the work OF PREPARATION had
been completed and active operations would soon be CON-
menced.
Firm the testimony before your commit ee it appeared
that the Army OF the F. tomac well armed and equip
ped, and had Reached gh state Of discpnA by the last
Of September the lt Of October The ready
and eager operations. The Generals
In command Of the various divisions opposed to
ing into winter quarters, md the most Of declared
they had DO expectation OF dong so.
DIVIDING THE ARMY INTO CORPS
In references to the proper organization Of large an
the B. tier able most effectively the field the Tee
nmoDy Of the witnesses examined upon that point lie
markedly unanimous. The Generals most familiar with
the seemed 10 regard 0 the utmost importance the
division Of the army nso corps fannie and that too il
time for the instruction OF the trEps the movements
necessary render such uzs1 tyn the ef-c-
tive Your committee deemed il sirsly necessary that
they repeatedly brought th subject 70 The AREN'T o he
authorities, and urged lite immediate ad pnn with all The
argument. their power. The President end he Seer
tary Of War with them the necessity such
mearure but il did not eem 10 be regarded with much
favor by Geo. Mcclellan. Indeed, Gen Mcclellan stated
10 your Committee at he time 81 their Conference with
him. hat although it might at some time BE- eIpedieht to
DIVIDE the army into army corps, The subject Of
great iculty He said IL was delicate uutt-r 10 ap.
pint Generals before they had been tried by actual
service aid had shown h~r fitness 10 be selected b.
mand 80 900 or 10000 A Msjo General could not
b. slowed away in pigeon-hole, il be should prove n-
competent, so easily Bigader General. He pro.
posed therefore, 10 hmtelf manage this entire army
battle campaign ana then select from the Brga
dir Generals ia such as should prove themselves
petent Tor higher commands Consequently, the division
Of The army army corps brgun until after
the movement Of the army in March had commenced and
then ony 10 pursuance OF the direct and repeated orders Of
the President
Gen Mcclellan, however, continued to oppose the or.
galI alton OF the army into army corps, will be een
from the following despatch him from the Secretary OF
War, dated May 3, 1862
1.-THE President is unwilling 70 have the army CORPS or
esniation broken up bnt a,9 unwilling that the Command
ssrmshing collision wi the enemy, and the Of
Ped hat organiaaton in The army under ur immediate
command and aopt any you h until further orders He
s.o writes you privately
The provisional corps Of Gen. Fitz John Porter and
Gen Franklin thereupon formed, by reducing the
other corp, from three TO two divisions,
FORCE THE ENEMY IN FRONT.
Your committee eDdeavord to obtain a. accurate nfo
nation as possible IN relation to the strength and position
81 the enemyln'front Of Washington The testimony of
the officers IN our army here upon that point however
far from satisfactory Early in December an order had
been issued from headquarters prohibiting the commander
In front from examining any persons should come into
our lines from the direction of the enemy; but all such
pers ms were TO be sent without examination TO the head
quarters OF the army Restrictions aso nced upun
the movements If scouts The result that he Gene
a examined appeared 10 be almost entirely ignorant of
e force Of the enemy oppo,ed 10 them having only uch
Information as they allowed obtain hesduuar.
ers Inc strength OF the enemy variousy EFT ma ed
atnom 'oOVo TO 2l0 O0U Those who formed the
esumate based their opinion upon information
cesed az neaoqusrter Asto tie strength Of the eurmys
Posuon The general mpresson seemed founded upon
Information obtained from the same sourc that II wa,
ceedDgy formidable Subsequent events have proved that
the force O The enemy below Ihe lowest az fb
estimates, and the strength OF their o great
ly over-cs mated 49,
Your committee also sought to ascertain what number
Of could be spared from this army far onsiye one
ratous elsewhere assuming that The Of the enemy
in front Of such character that il would not be ad
visabe 10 dire city upon them The estimate Of the
force to be left IN and around
entirely the defensive, TO render the capital
against attack Of the stated by the witnesses
examined upon that point from 5000 10 80 900 men,
leaving 100000 upwards that could be used Tor exped
lions at other points