New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-07-08


was their policy observed in Congress- TO arrest the
progress Of the North toward commercial prosperity,
organizations were secretly extended through the
South, not only for the purpose OF eectina Its de-
liverance from The hated Union, but with view TO
commercial Southern empire. These organizations,
under the various baptisms OF Fire Eaters. tibus-
tsrs and Seoessoniss, prosecuted with untiring zeal
the predatory scheme OF national annexation. All
their efforts 10 this end were unavailing, and ell
were Unfortunately insignifcsni, with bnt ono
exception. 1t ID true that failure attended the effort
Of Lopez TO seize the Island Of Cuba. But the effort
projected under the auspices Of the Secessionists
Of tho South, effsctnally disclosed the 6rs,
member In this stupsndous scheme OF Q vast SouSa'
srn Empire, the second member OF which was to
have been the secession Of the Southern States from
the Federal Union. Now IL is equally impossible TO
overestinate the consequence OF Cuba, either an
accessory to the Southern Rebellion, the prn-
cips sea. OF future tropical dominion As O marine
rendezvous a naval depot, Havana Is possesssd
Of unreasonable advantages; and, as an emporium
Of commerce. statistical tables teach that che has no
superior on either continent. Tho exceeding enter
prise Of the United States had secured Of the oom
Of all Spanish America, but about one seventh
part. The remainder, flowing directly through the
port Of Havana, was distributed between the free
City Of Bremen, England, and France. The
lines Of ocean steamers which, departing
from Southampton, Havre, and Bremen,
ply along the coasts Of South America, the Gulf Of
MeIico and the Caribbean Sea, continue 10 pour the
commerce OF those vast waters through the lap OF
Havana into the marts Of Europe. And dean 1t
not extrsvsssnt to affirm that the people OF tins
continent, whose kindred shall occupy Havana,
viii at no remote future command the commerce Of
the basin Of the Mississippi, Of the Gulf OF Mexico,
Of both coasts Of South America and reaching over
the lsttIDus will make tributary the untold traffic Of
insul ar and continental Asia. Upon such magnih-
scale has been projected the scheme OF Southern
empire The failure Of Lopez Is not, however, TO be
accepted as an abandonment OF the adventure. Its
q ffsct has been only fref
place in order of events tie Rebellion which
had been ranked second In the general plan.
1t s probable that the contingency Of Southern indie
pendence would signd tho revival Of tie effort TO
acquire Cuba and the possible accou plshilent Of
the original design to create and establish upon The
basis Of the cotton star the foundations Of Il CON-
mercial empire which may compete with tie North
for the trade Of the West, and shake the seats o.
Northern power. But, while these visions Of stu
Iendous national aggrsnGlZemeut have eDlced tie
south upon its course Of rebellion, not 10
overlook the important underlying principle OF
revolt whicb the instituton o! Slavery bad implanted
Ut the very base Of Southern growth. And, what
The lntents by which they were directly actu-
ated, 1t is Percepiitle that Southern roity, as
affected by peculiarly Of social and domestic
Ifs, and Southern habits, as induced by TIE
peculiarly Of their agencies Of labor offer tie
remote causes Of the divergence Of the Southern
States from political sympathy and a.sociAon with
the Northern. Now, If such are the causes aud the
OBJECT OF lQe War, Uuts obvious CNltIotfi'lOilr
will apply TO the question Of It's probable duration.
Ii cannot be supposed that the operation Of
than two years Of mutual devastation Of territory
and destruction OF life, has inclined 20 settlement and
compromise, people who rejected, not only II the
commencement Of the strife overture OF COM
position, but 70 whom the very object OF their pur.
suit forbade the possibility Il peace except upon The
recognition Of their Independence. Nor, IN my
opinion, does the imagination that large number OF
the citizens Of the South are sohc,ous Tor restora
81 -, fNpsa
liability, through peaceful negotiations. II there
are now any considerable number Of tho Southern
population inclined 10 re-esisbsh their former poll
tical relations, there certainly must have been
larger number before two years u hostihtes had
slenated their affections and emblt,ered their foel
ings II it, therefore, TO be supposed that the Rebel
lion, which was inauQursted notwithstanding any
number Of opponents, however large tie number, or
respectable their character can be quie,od and re-
nressed when two years Of the Rebellion have &C
cumuated lite strength, and reduced both tho nun.
- and strength OF lie opponents. Evidently, then
tx~e consult our senses for the probable determine
Non OF the Rebels as TO the termination Of The war
We will be taught that the recognition Of Souih,n
the South, are the only terms they en-
terrain for its limits, and tho return Of peace
On the other hand, II We direct our enquiries
10 the people Of the North we arc thus restrained g.
but the single interrogation. Are yon prepared TO
admit q Southern CoLfedergey It's quite idle, In
NY Judgment, 70 anticipate the restoration Of the
Union through mutual concession and compromise
These instrumeniGEties weTo employed before tho
opening Of the war when only, u ever, they could
have been successful. They failed and were reject
ed then and have siuoe daily become OF leks Con,id
Grafton. The question AZ one oil victory or defeat
Ihis 10 the single question 70 which tie war is d.
rected, and 10 which our energies should Do ai-
dressed. / cannot believe that tie North IL COM
placently settling into ID. contemplation OF revose
secured by defeated armies and u divided Union.
Rather would believe TINT frn.er purpose ard
more vigorous effort are the determination Of those
who are striving for the integrity Of the
Government, and the pcrpstuity OF tie Constitution
and laws. Nor can II 10 Afr that these heroic
qualities are not wanting. Tie fatal error OF TIE
war las been its continual temporiZatiOn with the
policy OF war, its constant tendency 10 great
peace establishment. The claruOr Of tic wraDglert
las arisen above the claDgor Of arms and intrigue
OF the Cabinet engaged attention more closoly than
campaign in the field. To struggle. seems 10 hive
been supposed 70 be tho utmosi httainsbe, and 10
conquer appears 10 have been Some peoulous an
partially dehued idea Of the future. Tie great re-
bellion raging before u.s. and threatening 10 onguf
liberty law and institutions, has been plated
with philosophical interest truly, but with appa
rent view TO the Oi Eeaus adequate " as
suppression The volcano has been PEELED With pebble
stones, and our rulers have expected that the erup
tion would subsidc. Let them have done with thi.
folly. Let them, though at the iatest ad-
dress themselves to the policy Of victory-multiply
men, increass armies, employ Generals, and use al
according 10 their value III war for the pur Osoe Of
victory, and not az the opponents Of ideas without
value, and the representatives. Of mere political
opinions. For two years TIE complssional differ
ence between soldiers was allowed TO impede vie
tory, and that when applied 10 the very class on
which the Rebellion depends for subsistence. The
world knows that one million seven hundred thou
sand black warriors held in seryile bondage in
tho Southern revolted Suites, exceeding BY fonT
hundred thousand their one million three hundred
thousand white men between tho ages Of eigh
teen and forty.fve. And the world knows,
too, that tho organization OF these ono million