Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1863-01-21
lQluttester Daily SPY.
IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS.

Mcdowell case brought forth some important
documents, explaining the circumstances I'M
der which Gen. Mcclellan undertook the pc
ninsua campaign, and showing how he en-
tirely disregarded the explicit orders of the
president concerning the provision to be made
for the safety of Washington. We quote the
following from General HitchcockS testi-
mony =
In order to understand the case fully think
it necessary to first refer to an order from the
president, dated as early as Jan. 81, 1862, and
which is as toilows:-
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, Jan. 81,
1862 -PeSideatS SpeciI Var Order No. l.
Ordered, that all the dispoSable force of the
army of the Potomac, after providing safely
for the defence Of Washington, be formed into
an expedition for the immediate object of seiz-
ing and occupying point upon the railroad,
southwest of what is known as Manassas
Junction All details to be in the discretion
of the general in chief, and the expedition to
move before or on the I'D day of February
next. ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
On the issuing of that order there must
have been some plan from Gen. Mcclellan,
proposing some other mode Of operation. |
have not that plan, and am unable to produce
it, but | have paper, evidently foundedupon
it, dated Feb. 3, which | will lay before the
court. tbs as fOllO%s:-
THE PRESIDENT TO GEN. NC CLELLAN.
EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, Feb. 3,
1sG2.-Najor General Mcclellan: My Dear
Sir-You and | have distinct and different
plans for movement of the army of tho Po-
tomac. Yours, to be down the Chesapeake,
up the Rappahannock to. Urbana, and across
land to the terminus of the railroad to York
river. Mine, to move directly to point on
the railroad southwest of Manassas.
If you will give me satisfactory answers to
the following questions, L shall gladly yield
my plan to yours:
/. Does not your plan involve a greatly
larger expenditure of time and money than
mine?
=. Wherein is victory more certain by
your plan than mine?
8. Wherein is a victory more valuable by
your plan than mine?
4. In fact, would it not be less valuable in
this, that it would break no great line of the
enemys communications, while mine would?
5. In case of disaster, would not a safe
retreat be more difficult by your plan than
mine? Yours, truly, A. LINCOLN.
The president subsequently appears to have
yielded his plan to that of Gen. Mcclellan,
but in doing so he issued this ORDER dated
March the Sth:
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WASHINGTON, March
s, l862.-PreSidenfs General Var order,
No 3.-Ordered, that no change Of the base
of operations of the army of the Potomac shall
be made without leaving in and about Wash
ingtOn such force as, in the opinion of the
general-in-chief and the commanders of all
the army corps, shall leave said city entirely
secure.
That no more than two army corps (about
fifty thousand tro0ps) OF said army OF the P0-
tomac shall be moved en- route for new base
of operations, untilthe navigation of the Potn-
mac, from Washington to the Chesapeake
bay, shall be freed from enemy's batteries and
other distractions, or until the president shall
hereafter give express permission.
That any movements aforesaid en- route
for new base OF operations, which may be
ordered by the general in chief, and which
may be intended ito move upOl the CheSa-
peake bay, shall begin to move upon the bay
as early as the 18th day of March inst, and
the general in chief shall be responsible that it
so move as early as that day.
Orde red, that the army and navy cooperate
in an immediate effort to capture the eneny's
batteries upon the Potomac, between Wash
ington and the Chesapeake Bay.
(Signed) ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
L. THOMAS, Adjutant General.
That order led to conference of the gen
report of which conference is dated March Is,
and is as follows =
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE Potomac,
FAIRFAX Court HOUSE, March 49, lS62.-A
council of the generals commanding army
corps, at the hea Iquarters Of the army of the
Potomac, were of the opinion
|. That the enemy having retreated from
Manassas to Gordonsvlle, behind the Kappa
hammock aud Rapidan, it is the opinion Of the
generals commanding army corps that the OPP
erations to be carried on will be best underta-
ken from Old Point Comfort between the
York and james rivers, upon Richmond, pro-
vided,
l. That the enemys vessel the Merrimac,
can be neutralized.
2. That the means of transportation sufli-
cient for an immediate transfer of the force
to its new base can be ready at Washington
and Alexandria to move down the Potomac,
and
3. That naval auxiliary force can be had
to silence, or aid in silencing the enemy's bat"
teries in York river
4. That the force to be left to cover Wash
ington shall be such as to give an entire feel
ing Of security for its safety from menace.
UNANIMOUS.
H. If the foregoing cannot be, the army
should then be moved against the enemy be-
hind the Rappahannock, at the earliest posi-
bic moment, and the means for reconstruct
ing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking
them with material sufficient for supplying
the army should at once be collected, for both
the Orange and Alexandria, and the Aqua
Greek and Richmond railroads. UNANIMOUS.
NoTE. That with the forts on the right
bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and
those on the left bank occupied, covering
force in front of the Virginia line Of 1000
men would suffice.
KEYEs, HEINTzELMAN, Mcdowell.
A total of 10000 men for the defence of
the city would suffice. SUMNER.
The plan alluded to in that paper drew
from, the war department, Mr.. Stanton sec
rotary OF war communicating the order OF
the president, the following paper, dated
March 10, 1862:
AR DEPARTMENT, March ID, lS62.-TC
Majoy General George b. Mcclellan: The
president, having considered the Tlan of oper.
atons agreed upon by yourself and the com
manders OF the army corps, makes no oblec
ton to the same, but gives the following di
rection as to its execution
l. Leave such force at Manassas Junction
as shall make it entirely certain that the enc
my shall not repossess himself Of that posi-
ton and line of communication.
2 Leave Washington entirely secure.
5. Move the remainder OF the force dowr
the Potomac, choosing a new base at for
Monroe, or anywhere between here and there
or al ,,vantS ,oovo surh remainder nf tI,,