The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-07-01
4nNTsDAY MORNING JULY 1, 1865

= V1DxhY 0toPAyC1 bNOs WIZ e@ss
~ . esaSsssiien a O. ~ ssaoA
nNraDAY MORNING JULY I, 1853.
fhe aisuasisa IL the ssa'hwest,
: sn,sars Of Berwick Bay BY Gen. Dick
q and tho advance Of our forces - near
Orleans, are certainly circumstances
hsslaasA to inspire the Southern heart
D&ioss Of pleasure, especially - Banks
wood 70 b dependent, in great msa-
m The country In the nsiehborhood ef
Aya bay for HE supplies, and this CAP
The transit Yet every eye sill con.
red On viskshurg-shas glorious aty
~ already rivallsd The fame Of Sara
md surpassed that Of Ssbastopol.-.
rom the imporsanes Of the place, from
ansaanos Of IL commanding the river,
y, while Il IL held BY %, preventing
Aration Of our mighty empire into two
parts, the pride Of the whole Confsds'
snlistsd In IT, behalf from the unsxam-
lantry with which Il has bssn defended
it fall at last-to see that tattsred dag
= has % long waved amidst the smoke OF
Drn down BY the hand of YMkse foe
bnobls defenders prisoners with thsYan
his would bs to wound the ssnsibilities
Rspublio In the tsndsrsst part The col.
hat defend, the officers that cons ssand
y itself, have become pets with eli
Of citizsns, and the bare possibility Of q
Ifasssaphs dlls svex hesst With q . aH
. painful - 70 bs almost intolerable.
De 20 intense 10 the anxiety that psrvades
community in the Confederscy, the
pu u continually, and naturally, asked,
does not General Johnston strike at
- blow for the relief of the heroic gar.
Why does he not, at least, mako an
2" These are questions which it ia
Ne 70 answer, since We know not the
of Johnston, nor the plans which he
put, nor tho reasons which prompt him
long upon his arms. That he has
force under his command seems to
h. That that force 10 composed in
y Of excellent troops cannot be doubt
nt they are to q man impatient to
bsyousts with the enemy all accounts
ut quarter abundantly testify. Why,
icy should for seven weeks lie idle upon
u and rear Of the besieging army, and
] hem 10 raise works Of countervaliation
hendous that it must cost an enormous
lture Of blood to carry them by storm,
and to all others with whom we have
~ communication on the subject, abso.
and altogether incomprehsnsibls.-
here ever was a crisis which de.
ID q risk, this is 1t. Assuredly
sal Johnston does not mean to perfe.
In his non.combative system to tho last,
1he garrison shall have salted their last
and eaten their last potato! And If he
to offer any assistance, can there be a
time than the present. The garrison
Dsver require his aid more than it does
-the crisis can scarcely grow more ur-
han it is. Every moments delay cub
from our strength and multiplies the
fs chances Of success. If there be no in.
= to relieve vicksburg. or to make an
- relieve it, why keep that large army
deadly climate 7 We surely have not
" men that We can afford to throw them
and elk wee ks on the Yazoo will do the
[ef Elk assaults upon the works of Grant
i've always maintained that the Yankees
not take Vicksburg; but that opinion
rediested upon the certain belief that
Johnston would interposs to prevent 1t.
ever doubted that the garrison could be
y out-as they most assuredly will be
at be allowed to maintain his position
stsd. We still maintain that they can.
- it BY assault.
peak Of things only as they present
ives to an unmilitsry eye. Genera.
- may yet have in view some great
mt which we.are unable to penetrate,
Itch may aAect the object more tho
= than any that suggests itself to our
tion. 1t may bs that he designs to
y own force with that of the garrison,
hrs. established the communication with
before falling on Grant. He has high
Rty for the attempt In the campaign of
on the Danube, when the Archduke
y was advancing upon Davoust, who
Ratisbon, in the bend Of the river, with
Q men, Napoleon, who was on the flank
= Archduke, precisely as johnston is now
hs flank Of Grant, instead of waiting un'
Q had become involved in the siege of
'bon and then attacking him In the rear,
red Davoust to evacusts the place and
him, by dangerous flank march. So
was the belief of the great soldier in
Tirtues Of concentration. Perhaps John
may have in view plan similar to that Of
'lson Perhaps he may order Psmberton
'scuate Vickeburg, if it be any longer pos
and unite with him in an attack upon
t. Improbable a. this may seem, it is the
explanation We can COL csive Of his long
:. II vieksburg should fall without an
from him his military fame will be gone
'er.