Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1863-08-06

foe to direct concentrc fire from his numerous artie
nv upon any force which should dare to tread those open
spaces or storm those cannon crowned heights.
The repeated assaults made by Copfederates there
FORE though made with the greatest valor and
fu I'D to certain point failed to dslodge the enemy
from his strong position. 1t is but simple justice to
add that in no single instance that now to me
did our troops retire except under orders did the
enemy eyer make the least attempt to pursuit. They
advanced and withdrew ske under orders and that too
in face of fire far furious than that which greet
ed the advancing columns of the French at Waterloo
In no sense of the word were they beaten. All that
can be Justly claimed by the enemy IS that be MAINTAIN
ed his ground against assaults, though at fearful
cost OF life and limb. This much with the advantages
he possessed in numbers and position, he ought TO have
done Ii our position at Fredericksburg was such as
to make Gen. Lees army equal to force OF 3COOOO
men, as Gen. Longsrcet reported to have said it was
then Gen. Meade, who already had superior force at
Gettysburg possessed advantage In position which
was quite preponderating There was this difference,
however, in the two positions at Gettysburg the Con
federaes had TO charge much wider held than the
Federals did Fredericksburg, whilst the line OF hills
at the latter place trended off the right and did not
present concave force as at the former.
Why, then, you are ready to inquire, did Gen. Lee
FIGHT at Gettysburg when it was in his power to &C
cent or cf5r battle at different time and place He
acted probably under the impression that his troops
were able to carry any position however t0rmloapie
II such the case, he committed an error, such how
ever the aoest commanders Will sometimes ial lnto
ate troops can do what any other troops IN any period
of the worlds history have done but there are some
things which even they cam OF accomplish 1t may De,
too that the Supreme Ruer has chosen this means to
teach the iniquiy of all lnVaslons, and to impress
upon our minds the justice and wisdom OF defending
our cause upon blood baptlsed sell. Indeed,
there are something connected with the Iae battle
which would to justify the belief that this punish
ment Inflicted by Divine Hand and Tor some wise
purpose 1t but just to add that Gen. Lee does not
pretend to lay the responsibility upon his troops or
officers but takes it upon his broad shoulders In
this as in all other things, be is frank, and just and
magnanimous. Let US not be guilty o. the folly then
of withdrawing any part of our confidence from him.
but let rather initiate the Hebrew patriots and hold
up bis hands that he may prevail in the fight.
On Saturday The 4ch OF July nothing was done be-
You'd little diminishing by either side. The enemy
did not fire salute i'll honor Of the day. Both
| armies withdrew about the same tme-Gen Lee In
| the direction OF HagersoWn, and Ger. Meade IN the
| direction OF Washington. All of our wounded who
could be removed, sent back through the passes
at CaahtoWn and Monterey Springs on Saturday, and
that night and morning tbs army followed, taking
the rod that the South Mountain at Monterey
Springs and reaching HagersLown Monday evening,
the 9Th There is doubt that the enemy commenced
to retire quite did. lie bad suffered euCh
| incalcuabie loss and was so fearful lest Gen. Lee
would eventually turn his left wing, get around him
and pass rapidly down towards Frederick and Wash
ngton that be found it necessary to retreat ndepen
IDENTIFY of similar movement part. Indeed, ii
| Gen Lee had simply remained Oh the ground few
hours longer, what be regarded only drawn
battle, in which both parties suffered terribly, and
pecialy the enemy, would be considered crushing
victory.
Why, thep, did Gen. Lee retire? First, because he
did not know the enemy would retreat; secondly, be-
cause be had been checkmated and failed by the stub
born resistance OF bis antagonist and had suffered beav
| lily and lastly, because lie did not have ammunition
enough efJ fight half OF day longer, and could not
get it without taking it from his adversary reopen
log bis commune atoms with Winchester. These rea-
tor bis withdrawal did not feel at liberty to men
ton in my letters from the battle field 1t was i'm pos
sbe to take with US ammunition for the entire cam
paign, and sufficient force to keep open our commu-
| nicatons could not be spared from army, already
inferior in numbers TO that OF the enemy Our only
resource, therefore, TO take it from the enemy and
failing to do this alternative left US but to re-
tire towards our base Of supplies 1t found i'm
possible also, to subsis the army long at time in any
place, the Inhabitants having driven CT many OF
their beet cattle and horses as they could taken one or
! more wheels from their wagons, and removed their
stocks Of shoes, hats and medicines far into the ne
/ rlOr.
There are certain we'll known conditions upon which
alone invasion be successful. The invader must
have Amy twice that of the Invaded
country it be Oniy equal inferior to IT, It must
make up by its superior courage and genius what 1t
| lacks in numbers. He must have also firmly estab-
lshed base OF supplies and open communications, Or ne
must be able to exact contributions OF food forage ami
mails and clothing from the inhabitants, and to supply
bis ammunition trains by captures om the enemy We
possessed of these clements Of successful Invasion,
except the superior courage and fighting qualities OF
our ooops And hence our failure; and hence, too,
shall always fall unless command the elements
enforce the conditions necessary to successful inva-
| sion. This never do. Our army IS too small,
and AID transportation too limited for
ever to conduct q victorious campaign in popuous
country like the United States, Astounding in supplies
of all kinds, retCuated by railway lines and navlgabia
streams and having numerous amy and dense pop
uation from which to recruit it's wasted ranks Let
then, dismiss all further thought of invasion ard make
up minds the trial may be, to tight the bat
tie of freedom upon soil and in front of our
own hearthstones, with mothers and wives, madens
children and old looking spectators from the
doors of our homes. In such struggle as this
righteous God will give us the victory, and with il
| peace and independence.
Gen. Lee remained in the vicinity Of HagerstOWr
one week, waiting for Gen. Meade to attack him. HI
gave up strong position with his right resting on the
u Potomac some distance below WiiamspOrt by The
river and his left tn road from Hagerstown to Viii
Transport. The enemy threw forward forces along the
roads from Boonsboro and Sharpsburg, which were
occupied up to the time of departure in entre1ch
ing themselves. Finding it impossible alike to support
himself within bis restricted lines in Maryland Il
ford the Potomac which was much swollen by recen
rains, or to draw the enemy out Gen. Lee determined
to recros the river and to that end bis engineers
tc work and constructed substantial pontoon bridge
at Failing Waters, at sharp bend in the river fou
miles below Willamsport. The river having subse
quently fallen somewhat, portion Of the troops art
nearly all the wagons except the ordnance trains ordec
it at Wliamsport Monday night the 18th and yester
day morning whilst the great body Of the army, all
the artillery and the ambulance train crossed on III
pontoon bridge below The army was Withdrawn fror
Maryland as it from Pennsylvania withcu ut moles
tatlon by the enemy, with banners flying and drum
beating and now rests the Virginia side. It is