Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1863-01-16

| be rulnous to relax our military energies in
! such an idea. Twelve months ago the South
3 vas even more sangulnc OF an early peace than
nov, leading Cabinet officer having ConH.
IDENTIFY asserted that Il would transprU ia sixty
| days. Within that sixty days, Instead OF peace
came a series Of disasters, ending with the sur.
! render Of New Orleans, which had well nigh
placed the Southern cause In eNtremtiUs The
prevailing expectations of peace may be Cuual.
ly dGluoive now and Il is certainly the part OF
wisdom TO shape our measures aud policy with
single reference 10 vigorous prosecution of
hostilities and an enduring war.
! But there Is radical difference between tb,
reasons which encourage the expectations now
prevailing, and those on which like expect ions
were based year ago. Then, they were found.
ed on the idea of the omnipotonce of cotton,
and the supposed necessities OF State which
would cocrce European governments into the
measure OF Intervention. These hopes proved
worse than dclusive. They not only were not
! realized, but the consequences of relying upon
them hau like to have proved destruCtiygt TO the
Southern cause. They were persisted in until
within few weeks OF the disbanding of our
armies by the expiration of the twC,vc months
term of service.
At the last hour they were dismissed, aud the
cOnsCript law was enacted, looking to a perms-
ncnt prosecution Of tho war with permanent
army. Until then, he was not considered or,
thOdoN in the Southern faith who did not be.
licye that peace was Immediately at hand from
cotton and intervention. Now, on the contrary.
no expectation Of Intervention is entertained
no Faith is reposcd in the COercivc powers OF
cotton, and the public mind Of the South has
settled down into q fixed aud deep seated rcso,
luton to owe Independence 10 ourselves. Tn,
war has proceeded for eight months on this
plan, and with all disappOintmeuts II can never
be denied that the general result is a decided
improvement In our affairs
The sanguinary battles which have rendered
those eight months memorable have produced
no strategic or territorial advantages to the
Confederacy. They all resemble, more Or lcbs,
on one count, the battle Of Fontonoy, whore Ii
was said the English General lost a. much
honor as Ills soldiers gained. But oil that
blood has not been poured out In vain. No ma.
tion will long continue such dreadful contest.
unless forced by the strongest human motive,
the preservation Of existence. The South has
that motive-thC North Is without IT, The LAT
ter country will cease to fight whenever the
hope Of speedy victory departs from II.
The carnage of the last eight months, though,
without any military profits to us, al least
achieves this result, that il assures the cuemy
OF our power and determination " fight. We
nave taught the enemy that subjugation is no
holiday soldiers game, or ninety days' task.
He sees that, after two years Of war, which
nave cost him Two billions Of money aud half
million Of men, the South Is stronger and
better organized and armed for resistance than
she was al the start. This is the only safe
ground on which expectations Of peace car be
bullti and this 10 foundation on which they
may be safely based.
The great task Of the South Is to teach the
North tho impossibllity of subIugatiOn-to
teach the fact, not only 30 that the Intelligent
may believe, but to impress ii by such cogent
physical arguments as TO convey the knowledge
OF II home TO the minds and hearts ofthe popu-
lace. When this task shall be thoroughly ac-
contpushed, then all the rest folloWs. and
nothing more is to be done. When the North
comes TO feel and know that conquest and sub
Jngation arc impossible, IL will not be long be-
fore the questions will ariso-why continue the
war Why this gratntous waste Of life and
treasure Why this enormous drain upon the
wealth Of the country, and this frightfil accu.
mutation OF debt and opprobrIumf
A year ago, We had made little proRress in
establishing wholesome conviction OF our ca
pacity for self-defence. The battle of Manassas
and those OF the first campaign had proved that
we could fight WE'LL but they did nothing to
establish conviction Of the power, the re-
sources, and the endurance Of the South The
second years campaign has6ocn chiefly sIgnifi-
cant in revealing to the world, and even to our
selves, the vast, unexpected capacities of our
country as warlike power. The brilliant vic
tories of the first years campaign, splendid as
they were, did not remove the impression which
so extensively prevailed Of the Gvanescence Of
our Ylgor.
Even our best friends abroad feared that the
splendor displayed in the opening campaign of
the warwas like that of the meteor, as transient
as dazzling. When II was found that the North
withdrew from that encounter only to organize
OO,OOO troops, ansyy northumberland,
and to project plan Of general Invasion which
should assail every part Of our outside confines
al one and the same time, the outside observer
could not resist the conviction that the South
was too feeble to Withstand so formidable an
assault
But we have protitcd by the very strength of
this general conviction; for, In proportion IL
the means brought 10 bear against US were vast
ana tDrmldablcI IN that same proportion does
our successful resistance Of them disclose the
power Of the South to be. We have proved TO
the wOrld-and, what 10 more important. VT,
have proved ~ tho North thCmsUlyus-that We
possess all the elements Of an uncomfortable
military PowUri and We have convinced them
OF tli5 fact, not by q display Of statistics. not
by an array Of verbal argument, but WI have
demonstrated the fact by the sword and tho
Oayonot, by artillery and muskUtry, upon the
persons Ul their defeated sodicrv.
We are now ON the true and high road to
peace. This road docs not lie BY way Of
Europe, and nowhere pmsucs d course Of in.
direction. We pursue II when, relying upon
thorough organization end hard fighting, we
march straight upon the enemy; and we lose il
whenever we look beyond our own eNortiOns
for the means of ending the war. Foreign in
teryCnllOn may indeed b. one Of the formalltles
attending the conclusion Of peace; but peace,
when 1t comes, will come only as a cOnse-
qucncC of au established conviction that the
south cannot be conquered. This conviction
has made tremendous strides at the North In
the last three months, and it Is daily aud hourly
extending.
We are, therefore, infinitely nearer peace in
January, 1858, than VIC were In January, 1862
men, although it was confidently predicted In
Sky days, We were as far from IL as IL was
possible to be- the North being at the time alb
soluely certain Of their prey, from the carefully
dlgesled operations Of their 600, 900 land forces,
and Ihclr vast auxiliary naval armamcnts'
these utterly failed 10 accomplish the work cX-
pcctcd OF thumi and still another half million
Of troops have met with no better success.
The South has proved that she is not TO he
conquered, even by this enormous pecniary
and moHuary outlay and the demonstration
must sooner or later COCrCU peace. The North
may be yindlCtivG enough TO pursue war of
hatred and spite indefinitely; but 1t is not In
human nature, much less in Yankee nature, TO
resist in the end the logic Of the sober second
thought, which teaches that peace is cheap and
war expensive, that peace is mine Of wealth,
and war the grave ofall prosperity.