Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-04-20
rEsE sEgas OF c1sAnnnsToN.
EsificHSgies Ike Federal Forces sgig EAR
60 Contend s9gGfsssf.


Correspondence Of the Boston Journal
HmToE, Head, S. c., March 23.-Ths fact
that the Monitor received the brosdside of the
Msrrilasc so nesy tbat the rsmmers Of the can.
nonisrs almost touched US As they ran them from
The port holes, has been taken as conclusive thai
our iron-cl2is can rua past Sumter, Moultrie,
the batteries of Sullivan and Morris Islands
past the floating batteries, paying no hssd 10 the
tornado of shot and shell bechsd from the one
thousand cannon reported to be in position, and
make q straight course for the city Of Charles
ton. It is possible to do that, but I think not
probable.
There are three ways of steariDg vassels-by
sight, by lead, by compass. In great naval
engagement the immense volumes Of smoke
viii be likely to shut out prominent objects from
sight, and render steering by that method inef-
fectual To stand on the slushed deck Of the
Nahant or Passsic, and throw the lead under
such FIRE as the rebels will concentrate upon
our little feet, viii require coolne which few
mon possess besides it viii be a hszard which
Admiral Dupont viii not require unless Rhs0-
lately necessary. To steer By compass in a mar
rOT channel is not practicable. The steering
must be done mainly By sight Fortunately,
We have accurate surveys Of the her5or. and
pilots who ara intimately acquainted with the
channels If the attack is made at high wster
L-AE Nistib UL kIE Will tAk8I6
10 take position TO suit their own convenience.
We have supposed that because the Monitor
resisted the shot of the Merrimac and at the
same time accomplished so much with her
eleven.iuch guns, that tho ffteon-inch guns
would knock everything in the shape of mason
~ or earth-woTk defenses to pieces; but il has
become apparent that our ordnance department
has not kept pace with progress in marine srchi-
lecture. All Our large guos are Of cast iron.
u. IL
decrease the quantity or quality of powder-or
in other words reduce the velocity given to the
shot. The powder used must be slow burning
grains ss large as flberts. Rife powder,
which ig1ites with the quiekness Of lightning
almost, would send the gun and its carriage
head over heels from its position, CT split the
gun into fragments.
By increasing the weight of the bail we In
crease its crushing power but a rihsd hundred
pound Psrr0tt gun for penetrating or boring
purposes throwing a shot st high speed, viii
probably be found to DO superior to the fifteen
inch, four hundred pound shot, hurled, a5 they
must be, With comparatively slow velocity.
kiitsen-inch guns are as-yet unlried. The ord
nance department. Is al at see in regard TO them
They may ful6ll the most sauguine expecta-
tions, and they may be found less efficient even
than tbe eleven-iaeh guns. The experiment is
60 BE- tried. Yea remember that great results
fel NfGalCLbu lA kaa AIAIEabE2L III inc LIt-
mes Il was to send its shot completely through
Todtleban's forlifcations, but it proved to be q
failure. TIL they have been put to tbe test, we
cannot unqraliGedly and unroservedly expect |
that these monsters VIII completely destroy the |
desenses which BeauEegsrd has erected.
BsauragaFd boasts that ten minutes exposure |
of one Of our irOu-clad5 at close range under /
his convergiUg fires will use them up. The |
reb fire win be hot. It viii be a continued /
roar Of Thunder, continual bstteTiDg of shot |
upon the iron mail. They have WhitwOrth guns /
which throw steel pointed shot fortunately. |
We csnns In possession Of several thousand shot |
intaHGed for them whom we captured the Ocean /
Wave. I have faith in the power Of the iron /
elads to withstand their hottest fire. but il is yet
to be determined whether, with oBr necessary 4
slow msuipulalions, we can silence the bate /
RES opposed.
Tue labor will be exhaustive. a crew win /
hardly handle those heavy guns day after day 1
and week after week without exhaustion. Ces- |
sstien Of Ere viii enable the rebels 70 repair |
damages. You remember how the MalakOf /
held ont and tho Redan-knOcked al to pieces |
by day, but made IS good as ever By night I
how at last they were carried By terrible assault /
aud tbs slaughter Of thousands Of men. The /
rebel batteries are not like those Crimean !
strongholds, bat they are, nevertheless, f0rmid-
able works.
As 10 sailing straight in, urmindiul of shot |
and she'll, we are not to forget shat there are !
obs1uetions and torpedoes, that there are rebel |
raus. We are not to forget that the rebels have |
given out hints that We shall find ourselves con-
lronled by something new and unheard Of.
Iu view Of all this 1t is possible that the ex- |
pectations which we may have had Of taking |
Charleston in a day, may not be realized. 1t /
may be the work of days, weeks, months. We |
may be defeated. Storms may compel rs to /
Withdraw. Oor hest may be sent to the bottom 1
or driven on shore. There are possible eontin- /
cencies which are to be taken into the ealcula- /
tion of our chances of success. But though /
there nlsy be delay and failure at frss let there
be no despondency on the part Of the people Of /
the Forth, for, sooner or late Charleston, Sum 1
Ter. and Moultrie, viii be epossessed By the 1
United Ssates.
l have written thus, not from apprehension Of |
failure, but because I am near the expected /
scene Of action and have information Of what |
the rebels aTs doing.