Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1863-01-02

uS. TtgaTu iOF lno preservation OF tue w MI
e House." the property of his friend Lee, th
rebel general and his positive and persis;en
refusal, in opposition to repeated orders, t,
, allow it to be used for the comfort of our sicl
and dying soldiers-his cOntumacious an3 dis
astrous delay in evacuating his position on tn
James River-kis mysterious halt and Ions
delay, in the rear of the enemy after the battle,
of Antietam and Sharpsburg, and his attempts
TO Justify upon paltry and false pretences
eyincing a deliberate purpose to prOtract thai
delay to the coming of bad roads, the setting
in of winter aud winter quarters, the declnin
alton of the army in hospital, the sickening
of the people at the protractIon Of the war
to be followed as a probable result, by tht
severance of the Union, OF a disgraceful and
dishonerable peace.
I Add TO an this the most astoGnaing disclo
sure of the Richmosd papers, at the time he
was advancing upon that city with The ap
pelrance of being in earnest to take it, that
he had, at the breaking out of the rebellion
oDeref has serUices to the Confederacy, and
which he has taken care not to deny to the
present hour, through fear probably that the
proof would be produced if he did; and mass
Of evidence is accumulated, which long since
should and would bave brought him TO trial
before legal or military tribunal, had it moi
been for the long suffering and tender mercy
of Abraham Lincols.
! Aye, say his apologists and advocates, but
did he not fight the battles of Antetam aud
Sharpesburg, aud gain victories Admitted
certainly, for there is no dispotition to deiract
from HE glory Of our arms, although the fu
ture historian will have TO record that those
victories were strongly qualified, as they were
not complete, from the want of capacity or
loyalty of the commanding general. to render
them SO by vigorous and overwhelming pur-
suit. On the other hand the whole campaign
in Maryland, when reviewed by the historian
will, in all probability, be regarded as the
most disgraceful failure of the war, aud that
lis conduct, in point Of efficiency and skill
sinks even below the miserable abortion of the
| Peninsula campaign. Look at the facts 1t
was evident from the beginning, that the enc
my had committed a great blunder in acting
| upon the delusive expectation that Maryland
would rise in their behalf They had precipi-
tated their whole force upon its soil, leaving
/ Harper's Ferry, Winchester, Martinsburg the
! Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and the whole
south bank Of the Potomac unobstructed and
unOccupied, except by our own forces, in their
rear in their front were the gathering thou.
sauds, pouring in from the North. They had
evidently rushed into net, leaving scarcely
the hope of escape, except by re-crossing the
Potomac at the very poiut left open fog cur
occupation. The direct and nearest route for
Mcclellan TO confront the enemy led directly
to this point, aud by forced or even easy
marches il could have been reached before the
enemy disccvereataeiT mistake and commene-
o3 their vet-oers4e nio7epent Wes this done
or attempted 70 be done, or any disposition
shown to entrsp or annihilate the enemy p
Every candid man acquainted with the facts
and geography Of ihe country between Wash
iugton City and where the enemy Law, and
looking at the route pursued 10y Mcclellan and
the tardiness of his march, must admit that
the evidence is altogether against such pre-
sumption. Had there been compact between
McCle Ian and his friend Lee, the commander
Of the rebel forces that Lee should have time
to retrieve his error and escape from the net
it could not have been more religiously carried
out than hy the course pursued by Mcclellan
/ The direct route to confront the enemy men-
iored and the eneny's position, laid in a north
west direction from Washington the roads
were good and unobstructed, yet our army was
sent north east-wardly, in a roundabout
course, some 90 miles out of the 1oay going by
easy marches, Uery easy, averaging only sir
miles dag, passing to the north of Harper's
Ferry and arriving at Frederick, as il by
very precise and careful calculation, at the
very oppOriune moment, when the enemy had
left, aud were in full retreat for the mouth of
the net, which had been thus kindly left open
for their exit Here was the consumation of
STRATEGY" and "pIans" Which the calm future
will develop to the utter disgrace aud confu-
sion of their contriver and'authOr. The sense
less cry Of chow can civilians understand the
policy and wisdom of military designs and
movements" will be raised III vain Facts
are stubborn things, and men with brains, will
choose to judge Of them for themselves, and
not like gaping fool at juggler's show, take
for granted that the performer is a wizard, be-
cause be understands the art of tricks and leg
erdemain: :
The last resort of the Yenal or deludcd pa
pers, which have come to the rescue of this
man, who by his inchmpetemcy or 'treachery,
has bfOhght disgrace upon our arms and our
country into peril, is TO trumpet forth what
they assume as a fact, his popularity with the
army. That he has played the demagogue and
used great eiIjrts 10 ingratiate himself with the
army is well known, and this accounts for
some portion of that popularity. if it exists
What his ulterior design was in this is hidden
from view it certainly has not been turned to
the benefit of his couRtry. But tho larger
proportion of whatever popularity he may
have attained is attributable, beyond question,
to the attachments Of many of his officers, not
to himself, but to the enioyments OF an idle
life, and to The hopes and prospects, under
him, ofn return to the halcon days Of the for
met winter quarters, when their principal du
ties consisted in otnging upon the streets of
Washington and about Wiilurl's eating,
drinking, and faring sumptUously. These Of
ficers, no doubt, are ready and willing to throw
up their caps for him, and their example be-
comes infectious. But this real or assumed
popularity, let ii spring from what cause il
may, proves him neither loyal nor wise. Tie
village dcmagogue. with scarcely capacity suf
ticient to conduct him safely upon day
journey, is often more popular than his neigh
Dor Of towering intellect and acknowledged
worth and Benedict Arnold was as popular
with the army Of Tie Revolution, the day he
deserted il and became traitor as aay day OF
/ his life, and John &. Calhoun, the arch-traitor,
whom Gen. jackson lamented he had not
hung, was the most popular man, especially
among young men, the country ever produced
Where is the evidence that the case Of George
b. Mcclellan is an exception? lie, has now
fallen toto the hands, and under tue guidance
Of the northern secession sympa,hisers, and
4 although but vain, weak man, they expect
to use him as an instrument for evil purposes
Let the country beware Of him aud their de
signs. ODsERvER.