The Portland daily press., 1863-01-30
ARMY NEWS.
Gen. Burnside and The Army of the Poto-
mac.

Utus DufHsl0e anu tue army OIL the tOtO-
The history of Gen. Burnside's command in
Virginia is a wearisome record of successive
failures. The nation does not charge these
failures upon the commanding general, but
waits, with more or less patience, to know
through whose fault they have come about
Gen. Burnside has not been really in COM
mand; that is the suspicion, which forces it.
self unwelcome upon every mind. Every dis
jonted movement of the army has betrayed
a lack of unanimty. Conflicting wills have
neutralized each other. Hhosep In a letter
written from Washington last Saturday and
printed in the New York Times, Mr.. Henry
an observer whose opinions deserve something
more than passing notice, comments upon
the late Virginia campaign as follows:
This is the fourth active movement which
Gen. Burnside has made against the enemy
during the short time that has elapsed since
he superseded Gen. Mcclellan. Let us see
what happened in each.
i. His first plan was to throw his army
rapidly upon Falmouth, cross over instantly,
take possession of the heights of Fredericks-
burg, and thus compel the enemy either to
fight him in that strong position, or fall back
rapidly upon Richmond. The one thing abso-
lutely essential to its success was the prompt
arrival of the pontoon train. This was under
the direction OF Gen. Woodbury., and no salts
factory explanation of his delay has ever vet
been made. But the delay defeated the exc
cution of the plan.
2. Next came the crossing and the battle
at Fredericksburg-which was certainly fail
ure, and which the country generally brands
as blunder. l think it was in Gen. Burn
sides power to have corrected that opinion in
his testimony before the Congressional Com
mittee. He did not avail himself of that op-
portunity, but said the country would never
know how near the movement came to being
a success. see no reason why the country
should not know it-and cannot help beliey-
ing that, when the official reports of that bat
tie are permitted to see the light, the grounds
of Gen. Burnside's opinion will be evident to
all. 1t is generally assumed that the main at
tack on that occasion was against the rebel
front, posted and intrenched on the crests in
the rear of Fredericksburg. This is mistake
which was corrected by the General in his tes-
timony. The main attack ,rds designed TO be
on the rebel right, and the object of it was TO
break their line there, where it was weakest.
turn them, and then-with the cooperation of
Sumner attacking in front-to complete the
victory and convert ii into rout.
Gen. Franklin led the main attack with his
own grand division and two small corps from
Hooker's. His orders were to attack with at
least one corps vigorously, and then to follow
up the attack with prompt and heavy supports.
He sent Gen. Meade TO the attack command
ing the smallest corps of all. Gen. Meade at
tackled with great vigor, broke the rebel line,
and actually pushed his adrdnce into the
midst Of the ammunition wagons and bag
gage train in their rear. He had completely
succeeded in the appointed work; the forces
opposed to him were utterly routed, and all he
needed was prompt and effective support
This he did not receiue. Gen. Franklin sent
another small corps to his aid, but it arrived
too late. The enemy, seeing Meade come TO a
stand, had rallied; reinforcements were push
ed forward, and, before Meade's supports
came up, his force was driven back and il be-
came impossible TO re-establish the line Gen.
Franklin gave a reason for not sending for
ward heavier and prompter supports, that he
was afraid the enemy would seize his bridges
and cut of his means Of retreat Gen Sum-
ner, meantime, had opened the fight to retain
as much Of the rebel force in front as possible.
for the relief OF Franklin; and as he never
does anything but with the utmost impetuosi-
ty, he had pushed the movement till it had as
sumed the proportions of terrible engage
ment. This shows show near" the battle
came TO being a success.
3. The affair at Fredericksburg, and the in
vestigations that followed it, were no sooner
over than Gen. Burnside prepared for another
aggressive movement. 1t embraced an attack
In front, at point selected with care, and
formidable raid of cavalry and light artillery
which was to threaten the enemy's communi-
cation and divert his attention from the main
attack. 1t was a bold plan, but, il vigorously
executed, was reasonably certain of success.
Every preparation had been made for it. A
picked force Of cavalry and artillery was got
ready, under the command of that dashng and
most competent officer, Gen. Averll. and the
execution OF the movement was fixed for the
31st Of December. The column destined 10
make the raid was actually in motion when a
telegram from President Lincoln announced 10
Gen. Burnside that he must make no move
ment without first consulting him. The Gem
eral at once arrested the march of his troops.
and repaired to Washington. The President
informed him that the reason Of his dispatch
was that some of Gen. Burnside's subordinate
officers had protested vehemently against the
movement. Thus failed the third attempt,
through the interference and insubordnation
of officers of the army.
a. The fourth and latest of these attempts
was the one of last Wednesday, Gen. Burn
side had prepared 1t with care. He had exam
ined personally and repeatedly the ground on
which IL was to be executed. He had fixed
the nOsifOn which each div;s;n,, ,.,,a a. :