New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-09-19
GEN. ROsECRANs,s CAMPAIGN.

Ills pan Tor the seizure OF tlldt StroDgnOIu was
conceived and developed IN such Il way as to
make the possession of what was really his first
objective point incidental to the progress OF the
comprehensive campaign which contempates
the complete military occupation of the noun
tain regions of Northern Georgia, and the final
capture Of Atlanta. The columns which
fankcd Chattanooga on the south and west
were in the direct line of advance to Rome,
which is itself long step toward Atlanta, con-
nected with it by railroad, and Of very great
intrinsic importance as the site OF extensive
powder-mills and other manufactures. II will
be remembered as the point aimed at and nearly
reached by the ill-fated expedition under Col.
Streight, the destruction of Its mills being then
the chief object in view.
Like the campaigns which Gen. Rosecrans
has previously executed, the present il gigantic
in extent and besct with inconcclyable dill
culties. He operates in a mountain region,
over roads nearly impassable and often over
mountains which no road has ever crossed
! putting great distances between his separate
columns, and still greater between them and
their bases Of supplies, and confronting at every
step obstacles which to less resolute COM
mander would seem insurmOuniable. II follows
of course that such "A campaign Is work OF tlmc
and It's progress is with difficulty traceablc until
il, object is attained. For general information,
It is sufficient to indicate it, purpose and to
explain the value and relation of the points
toward which the Army of the Cumberland Is
pressing forward. Moreover, concerning the
forces. movements and plans of the Rebel COM
maudcrs. there has been little Trustworthy intel
ligcnce since the evacuation Of Chattanooga
/ ], j. only known-ai least 1t Is positively
stated-thnt Bragg and Johnston have united.
( and tha. a stubborn resistance to Rosccran,s
advance l. st.ll contemplated.
Atlanta i, the Last link which binds together
/ the southwestern and northeastern sections Of
+ the Rebel Couicderacy. Break it, and those
sections fall asuudcr. The two systems of south
western railway communication centercd at
Chattanooga and the conquest OF tia, place
and Knoxville severed the northern line.
I Between the former and the present Capitals OF
/ the CouicdcTacy, Montgomery and Richmond,
+ there Il now no railway communication, except
/ by the road which turns east at Atlanta and
runs to Augusta, thence by two lines reach
ing nor,hwardly into Virginia; and even
portions Of these are held by the
most prccar.ous tenure. OF coursc, with the
capture Of Atlanta this system is also broken
up. and since the capture Of Atlanta involves
also the suhjugation Of Northern Georgia, the
present campaign Of Gen. Rosccrans aims AZ
nothing les than the military isolation of Ms
rs ippi. Alabama. and Georgia from The remain
ing States Of South Carolina. North Carolina,
and Virginia. The southern portion Of Georgia
indeed cannot be- affected by this success, but
may speedily End itself threatened from another
quarter.
Il H. with reference TO the results Of this cam
D.. IN Of Gen. Rosocrans, not less than 10 the
movements II Gen. Meade. that the defensive
attitude Of the Rebel army in Virginia has been
maintained. Over territory SO vast as that OF
VI .s.lppi. Alabama, and Georgia, railways are
thc only possible means Of connected operations
ou % large scale. and the loss of their last rail
road j.. therefore Ia the Rebels the loss of the
STATES Tor al purposes Of military cooperation
Tacr have los, Kentucky, lost Tennessee and
+ these other three 90 with them, the Resources
of ihe Rebellion whether Of men or supplies
lrr Too much contracted 10 support military
establishment II such magnitude rs the present
And since Ice with bis present forces Is able to
hold Gen Meade q, bay, ii seems more than
c,of probable HAT The decisive battle for the
poec..ion Of Richmond is To Dee fought neither
on thc Eappahanuock nor on The Rapidan, but
in tie heart OF Georgia, five hundred miles to
The .outh and west
F !, b. too soon to express an opinion on the
/ probable strategy OF Bragg and Johnston, for
there il nothing 10 show deci-iyey whether
I their campaign is meant 70 bc rtrategically de-
+ icu,iy,. or whether the preservation of their
army Las become their principal object In
view Of the considerations already suggested,
/ the utter abandonment of Atlanta is not proba-
BILE; nor do we believe it will voluntarily occur.
Whether it may not fall a. Chattanooga fell is
another question; but is rcmotcncss Is so grea,
and ~ Typographical features materially dii-
lerent, that Gen. RoseCrans can hardly be cx-
pccted TO repeat his former strategy. lie is
more likely to direct his attention IN the first
place especially to the Rebel army, with the pur-
pose OF compelling battle, aud postpone until
after n decisive victory the occupation of Allan
Ia. II he means 70 force Bragg TO fight. the
features Of the campaign may undergo many
changes before our General finally sets his face
Southwark. But it is TO be- always kept in mind
that any strategy on the part of the Rebel lead