The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1863-05-12
Why Hooker Reiterated.


with the management of the movements on the
mart of our officers It,, however, is worth our
consideration whether much OF our complaint
does not rest more upon what we have subse-
oueutly learned and what Gen. Hooker could
not have known when he determined to tall back
across the river, than upon any knowledge upon
which, movements could have been reasonably
based. We now know, t o be sure, that Rich
mond was comparatively defenceless while the
battles were going on on the Rappabannock
but we did not know that fact until the rebel
army was probably as near Richmond as any
adequate force Of ours on the Peninsula.-We
now know that Gen. Lee commenced to move
away from the Rappahannock as carly as Tues
day, May 9Th, about the same time that Hooker
commenced his retreat, but we have no reason
TO suppose that Hooker knew this or could have
no effort to pursue Hooker, even when he knew
him to be falling oack. Lee sent this official
bulletin to Richmond Tuesday.
At the close OF the battle az Charlottesville
Ou Ouuudy, Ino oHoLuJ was AOpol0'u duF dHClIlS
from Fredericksburg on our rear. Gen. McLaws
was sent back to arrest his progress, and repulsed
him handsomely.
That afternoon, learning that his forces con-
sisted of two corps, under Gen. Sedgwick, | de-
fermined to attack him, and marched back yes
terday With Gen. Anderson, and united with
McLaws early in toe afternoon, and succeeded,
by the blessing of Heaven, in driving oedgeWck
over the river.
We have occupied Fredericksburg, and no en-
envy remains south Of the Rappahannock in
2hA vicinity"
Iooker's army was then, with the exception
of Scdgwick' s corps, all on the south side Of
the Rappahannock, and it would seem mpossi-
bic that Lee should not have known it. That
he made no effort to disturb Hooker main ar
my is evidence enough OF the severity with
which h e had been handled in the fight. But
this information has come to us since the fight,
and not in season to take advantage of it,
But an abundant reason can be found for
HoJkers falling back ia facts which are
now known. Two heavy battles, Saturday and
Sunday, had been fought by the army at Chan
the relative loss of the combatants in material
and men, the rebels gained advantages Of us in
position which compelled US to continue the
fight, if at all, at great disadvantage. On
Monday Sedgwick 8 corps was driven across the
Rappah annock after severe battle, and our
Communications apparently endangered by the
approach OF the rebels to United States ford.
lit began to rain and the river which rises rap
idly began TO show the effects of the storm
Hooker's army had taken but eight days ra-
4oas, which were nearly exhausted. His am
muniton was also well nigh sptnt, and he had
no means of supplying either of these wants ex-
sept by pack mules, which, at the best, could
ansport an inadequate quantity. lie had
therefore left him no choice but to remain with
]insu{i cient supplies of both food and ammuni-
aion, in country which could furnish him
none, with only the chance of victory to save
his army from utter destruction, or return to
the North side of the Rappahannock. He wise
ly and prudently chose the latter, and has thus
proved himself safe as well as bold and
fighting commander. AS it has turned out, he
could have safely remained, though the State OF
his supplies would hardly have admitted of his
rapidly pursuing Lee, in that Generals retro
grade movements 10 save Richmond
The result of this short campaign proves,
however, as all previous ones have, the neces-
sity of concentrating our forces. Our armies
on the Peninsula, at Suffolk, and in North Car.
ollns, did not help Hooker any in his campaign.