New-York daily tribune., 1863-09-12

period Of grand assault. Jhs General cannot always
terinng IFS movements He Is often compelled 10 re
guided Oy evident symptoms and Appearances While
m Orderly being osp ,tched to the van 10 asccr
Down bv tho crOsstre from the enemy. Tie certainty
tha; while he absent his mission the enemy
would have tine to concentrate, and this the dam
ger 20 be guarded against.
n was OF important that Cen Grant be Informed i'm
mediately Of the fact that Lswers and Landrums
troops we're partially ia the fort ord that the enemy
II Is clenr therefore. that McClerrands dispatch
was both natural under the circurstarccs and in
truth subsianiiaed by tho facts which aftersard sp
peared, Gen. Grant says "the position occupied by
me during mos, VI tie tine Of the assalt gave ne
better opportunity OF seeing what going on IN the
18th Army Corps than believed 1t possible for the
commander Of to have could not his possession
~ forts, nor necessity for reenforccments" With
Ill respect 10 Gen. Grant wc submit that under the
circumstances tho testimony Of his eyes cond hardly
have bcon very conclusive. McPhersons bcadquarter
the position occupied by Gen. Grant, must have been
at least nile and half distant from tho center of Mo-
clernand's font. While that occupied BY the after
could not have been over eco yards from ole OF tho
forts ard for from 7o0 yards from tie other. The
position. that just behind Maloneys battery, was the
best possible oI seeing the iot attacked by Iower dhQ
Landruu, and with perfect and almost Constant COM
nuncaton With that attacked by Eenton ara Bur
bridge. The soldiers could De distinctly seen entern9
hc brepstworks or falling III the dtches taeir SIOUX.
Ing could be paiLy heard. How at so great distance
Gen. Grant had better opportunity OF seeing wlss
was going on In front OF tho I9lh army '0fp' 'aAo
NJ
l. itnot somewhat strange that when Gen Grant
bad better opportunity Of seeing the operations 1
JccleInands column than IT'S comIenuer' ana collo
his possession Of forts and wacincreduous nos
wihstalding repeated assurances OF their occupation
Is it somewhat strange that hc took 10 means OF as
eortaning the facts through aid or ordoryt Ihis
certainly might have been done without grea; 1888 of
time wlen according tn tie report Gen. Gfant va
near enoug 10 have better opportuty OF seeing mo
might vel have Afforded to delay until he coni satisfy
himself rather than to entail useless snd fearful loss
Of lie by acting upon dispatch the truth of which ne
make IN ossut satisfied Mcpherson "of the rece.'ty
Of making assault and ordered Qurneys DIVISION 70
report NcCleTnand for an assant when al me Time
lie beey ed that there no circumstances 70 wer.
rant renewed assault, Tie General holding TIE cnef
command Is responsible !or all the movements OF hs
command, because he has power tocontro them. ITO 10
ofen ch aged With failures even when actually TO. 70
sponsibo for them because not aware OF moveLcnn
which resulted IN them. IL tLis case tho comnandiHg
General acqu!sced IN the continuance OF the ass.4t
against his own best Judgment.
Another structure upon Gen. McClcrnani. eiCruy
serious contained IN tic report alleges ~ impLc hon
that hs f4isey represented himself as needing reen,
fJrccueHis or DIV son-g presentation Which caused
lTe.t and van.on slaughter. Ihe report f.Oies fVfs
McCleTnand's dispatches; "Generel we hASe saiIeo
tho ene,nys ntrelchucnts at several polnts OIL axe
brou,ht 10 stand. have sent word TO Macarthur to
roercc ne n be clnj vcud y nOi De best 70 concsh-
.r,ie the whole or q part u his command upon thn
uouf" Gen. Grant comments upon II thus. " cou!1
ot see the necessity Of rccLiorceICttS as repeseOtea
In M, dispatches expressed doubts o. Their cor
rec;nes which tie facts subsequently but 100 late con-
Lei US SEQ what was tho actual condition Of MsCler.
nand'S aessaiins col.iln AZ .A2 osoe-, n.. zen
minutes. Gen. LHHer seGg ,he rn,oN!he usp-''" ~
Gen. Carr, who commsncedfis dlvis!on
"Tbs enemy .-e MISSING ,hcir force. "a front No
movements oi or uoois IN oU' .ei -a 4 o. TsS
WI Iandrnm. conmardinr the remaining brigade.
which cooperlted with that u Llg.cr also ssas ns
name to tie dispatch. ~ - minutes past : ocock
acting Gen Landrum sends the following dApaicA 70
Cen j. j. nithi
oar men ~, hodn, Ss ssiks o, TIE foF. In our 'front.'
n -.l hs.vy eros,tro upon U.s. AID h,re Loot uay
k,l md wounded TLey hurting baud srsni-ies upoa ~
and harGsg ss socs.lsTsbig Ia tEa way
Tiis dispatch IS quoted merely to shcw that Ian:
d-ur's hrfyade was being hard pushed. Beht'n ara
Bgrhridct also demanded rs-cnorcCmeuts. ine NOR
tay sl 4 tho 18th Army Corp. sho" too plainly tne
lciy ysrate lgktirc u ~ gallant eoIlinns over to"
fuin tha. rsmorabs assault. II was apparent 10 AZ
NOS, an, observer that had the charge been made "ita
losvy ollrin instead Of small and dcc.msted force.
unon single point the day light have been easily won.
Obviously the difficult post to 6sn was Tie summit OK
he enemy basiion; thst once Carried t9r mai ,Ds,
cls was overcome. IL vas carried when serseshs
GriIth aad Ms handful Of heroes entered the h9oet
WorAs Al lha. was thcn wanting 10 rend-f 'ho ,s%
tory pete 70 hur column after column u'o VIC
well rch dc.er,ed bastion. The danger WAS tha t'ef
IL he'd an entered by our tloCp. the oe nigh. prcss
bacAIp1n our forces aud oye.NL IN ITEM Oy the sA.o
weight OF numbers The writer saw LAWYERS oci'
u'nh aGvancins that morning upon th,sg I'- i'.Sn
nlents They seemed lnriiy a tandiaL ana were
e, ,dontv go fsg in nun Der as to lie without that IN
spra!on and confidence of multitude which IS Il, sGca
eases tho condition AID generally the earnest ~ victory
|, oas cylen, that they were led forward % buchcv
simply nom want u support Tho secret Of Napoeons
successes Il sai TO have been Ls capie! i.f o,OlAF
lions for concentrating thc strength ot he own inro1
mon a single point and tie wo@Acst point u the enchy.
We sali not presume crtiCisc tie plans OF coIi-
iaaud,- 4 ACKNOWLEDGED ability Ike Gtu Grant bus
venture agcst that afcg fsilt Oi attack Il eioh8
the lines. had the weight ot his inuolse army ieen
thrown upor ono or two points iiCu uty weaker tAau
the rest the prospects of success would have been
brighter than Laye ordered ln attack nong the enro
works Iis Is question however. for military indges
10 determine u may be cor,eudCd that roenforse.
ments ordered But ft>y GTsrsa roo tate 90 De 0
af sT icc Macarthur lid not como UP until The neAe
day. Quinhy arrived A.e IN tho afternoon wheh tAc
troops O The illh Army Corps were crippled nv con-
stani of uusAeiry, ard worn oLt by eAoessi'e
eAcrtou aad exposure 10 the bsraing sun.
We will refer - one o'scr point ard We have done
General MoCerland Is accused Of having sent iass
displtchgs bOasing OF having ganct tAe latfcaeh-
rcnts" etc. General CRAFTS dispatches 20 NcClcr'
nand ihlt sherman has gain i soI-e successes " aean
that Shc! !man il getting along vel" IN hii ohieiS
report lee SAYS nothing u his successes. Og tho ocr
hhfd Re SAYS "e ass mi, filel regret % say with
atorv ard shows tia, ihe 18Th Army Corps, and thM
alone did effect m entrance into the enemy WORKS
lDc .sc n brl,l the facts ia regard 10 A,t ietna1
fiise disp.tcNgs" on tie A.ci-orat.e IA ol NAY.
Tloy nrn flc.s which We have n p.rt es'ahhsfecby
oola,ral tssfiuOry TIE. all capable OF proof and
aloSr statements Dc properly sulsantiatd beioN
a military tribunal 'hIIS'
Fs'-st. " iisr-,A,s sen, by General Orr' 90 denefI
Mctrnsnd abou. the middle OF the afternoon oil I' -a
May. leo@
MICRO KuLED-CoSscMrTs ACCUSED OF THs
y