Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-01-01
GENRRAL aALLRCK's hEPORF,
q seareEi..g .gnaEvsis.

From the New York World, Dec 4
The Pope campsign-the main feature Of the milf
iary administration sincs Gen. Halleck called to
Washiastor-is certai to make so ignominious figure
in history that the President foreboe all mention Of mil
tary matters in his annual Ilessage rather than to al
Iade to mortfying topic, and the Secretary Of
War equally tender of coming 10 particulars in relation
to that disastrous exhibition OF incompetent general
ship deputed HalecS the task Of ap0lOgZng for
that most dscredaDle part Of the history Of the war
The whole thing was sueh paipable Flnd gigantic
blundsr that any defense of II by military men, ike
Mr. Lincoln MT. Stanton would have made little inn
preston the public. So bad case required good
advocate and to General Halleek was committed the
task Of defending the Pope campaign. Gen. Mcclellan
hzd considered that campaign great military error
great earnestness and argumentatve Orce and Gen.
Haeek relapsng into the habits of the San FranciscO
bar-of which he is a member-atemps 70 stren gthen
his defense OF weak cause by casting inputatiors upon
the counsel for the prosecution.
A careful examination OF Gen. Halleeks elaborate
aDoioryyv show that he had better have initiated
the discreet reticence Of President Lincoln and secre
tary Stanton Passing The of subordinate
details by which Gen HalIeck attempts tc conf the
perceptions OF his readers, and coming at 20 the
ptn Of the subject shall make il evident that The
controlling reason for Withdrawing the army frorl Har
ilsons landing against Gen. MeClellans earnest re-
monstranees is which reflects tse highest dis
credit on administration. BY the showing of Gen.
Halleck himself The controlling reasen why Cen Nc
Clellan Waz wlthdrawn was that the administration
ceud furnish him the renforcements nc required FOR
the execution Of his own plans II Gen Mcclellan
would have advanced against Richmond with q rein
faroeuaent of twenty thousand his wishes would have
been accetied to but he would u1dsrtae TO cap
tare that city frsn Harris5ns landing without fifty
thousand or lest sixtyive Thousand, his judgment
was overrulod aud bis army Withdrawn. All Of your
plans Gen. HalieeS to him, require reinforce
nens which il is impossible TO give you. It is very
easy ask eforcements but it s not easy to give
them when you have no disposaole ferses At your
command The consideration on which the sTmy was
Withdrawn was merely question of 5000 men the
President offering 90 0O0 and Gen. Mcclellan requiring
IS 900 as the minimum with which he was willing to
undertake the capture Of Richmond Now whose fault
thatth hes 4 be
army in strong position, within twenty five miles Of
the rebel eapita-nesrer than any Union army seems
likely to be again great while TO come How did
ithappen that petty matter differ nee Of l5OOO
men was the controlling reason which broke up the
matured plans Of Mcclellan and substituted others which
he had no confidence in, aud which proved so disas
that full employment is now iound, not for lNfO)
more men, but for forty tines l30C0-that being the
n0uns ef the two new levest Who is responsible for
the inability furnish the reinforcemens which would
have rendered McCellans campaign against Rich nOnd
aneeessq Not General Mcclellan himself most GER
anly who has underTatsd the enemys power Of
resistance and wh at the very outset Of his campa
early in ths spring deprived OF portion Of the
he thought ary TO success. About this time
total stop put TO tn eniistmens, on tue ground
that our army large enough. Nobody has ever
claimed that this blind and fa al step taken at the
instance of General McCielau II was the ac OF those
who withheld from him the corps Of Mcdowell, which
he thought essential to the of his pa in the
Peninsula it was the If those who continued to
deny his Iequess for reinforcements from that day TIL
the date he for his withdrawal from iarrson's
landing It is the hight Of absurd ty T ths admins
ded renf rcements the ground that they had not
the men give, when the lack owing 70 nothing
bat their own folly in stopping enstments an act Of
which they aftsrard wsie so ashamed that they burst
not counter the public drrsion they were conscious
Of deseryir ealing for vast armies soon sfer
ward and resOrted TO the trick Of getting the State
governors 10 advise tn m to make the call
Cen Halleck thinks the Pope campaign was the next
best thing to complete success inasmuch as the enemy
did not actually capture the national capital His pre-
else language is: although this short and seve
pagn from causes already referred TO- less success
fnl than we had reason to expect " hAe accomplished
the great and important object OF covering ne capital
till troops could be collected for its defense. But was
It not owing this short and active camPaign that
the eapitsl ever in any danger At al Inc merit OF
the Tegcus belongs wholly to Gen. McClean the blum
degng campaign which caused the peril undertaken
ainsi his advice and in disregard Of bis remonEtrsn
Lees army ventured into a neshborhood Of Wash
ington only when McClelan's army was Withdrawn
from the neighb0rhood of Richmond. If Teinforosments
had been the James river, troops would have
been needed about Washington except gasons for its
The only s.rfous charge against Gen MeCIell4n in
this report that he dilatory obeyiug the orders
Of tbs President, n.st 10 Withdrawing Lis command
FRI Il Harrison landing snd again IN marching against
4inera Lee in Virginia after the ba tie Of AniietAm
There Unfsirness and seph try in General Ia eeks
way Of urging both these complaints He s'ases that
IL vas aven davs fer MeGiei an received he o-dsr
eFsc7ate Harrisons landing before his army began
move Bus the ana order, iu renly 10 McClellaus
rensnstrsnee, was written on the Of August aud
a. ID was not by telegraph eolid not hive been
received BY Gen Nc lei before the 7tll b. and
he arUY IN 9Ved On the l4ln We mention In al
specimen Of the unfa ruess End overs atement which
through tae report What justice n the'e in con
trastirg Butnsdes promptness IN movinI Fl m New
mort News to Aqua creek With ths time eonstned by
Mcclellan Il Withdrawing from HarrisoEs landing
ia Burnside army Of ninety thou and me - Was
il necessary for hn TO AXE that most delicate snl
psrlous OF al mil arg movements retCest in the face
of sup rOr force Ought Mcclellan TO hav5 retired
wi hcu re lsonabie pseesut3ns and ripe prspara
tioD which insured the safety o. is army IL Is tis-
nal proof of his military prudence and capacity that
be brought his army away without the sscsihce Of
man OF Of any portion OF his vslpsbae stores and
nions of For his delay after the bate Sf Anse
not seEsonshly suppl d by the aBthGiities at
Washington ] hs attempt 70 show that this eoRplain
was no. well founded wui make impression on tbs
pubic At this late day. when Gen. Barn,de, in
mand Of the army, has besn notoriousy delayed
from the esuse, sill his campaign is likely TO
he departments # tkey so entirely m
ci Mt in forwarding plies TO Gen. Mcclellan how
does it happea ia. they ell of sudden bseams such
incompetent and imbesile dono .hiugs in supplying
General Burnsi ie T?
Gen. Hslecks report is unsuccessful stasr pt to
defend the inde fens!b Pope campaign Gen HalIpek
feels fr that greatest blund Of the (which he
planned hlnse f. somethiag Of the dong affection of
ath tor his deformee and msshapen onspring Bat
All his MI TRY knoWiedsei aided 0y al his ability
lawyer esnnot 81 sT make the worse appeae the better
reason TO convince the that Il WAS merit 10
sttract 10 the very gates Of " ashington vctorieus
army which might have been beaten in defense of
own ca isi. When he coon rg reads Gen. HaileeAis
complaint that Ct n Mcclellan did not speedily
dive Lee back from the Potomac, il will ilqaire,
who IS responsible for Lees get lg to the Potomac
Who bet the orsanzer Of the aborive and disastrous
arpsgn which relieved the rebel army of employ
ment peareT home