Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1863-11-26
HIGHLY lNTEREs TING FROM BRAGGs ARMY
THE Loss OF IADJtIoUT VALLEY AND ITS
kFsIJIr,s

HIGHLY INTERESTING FROM BRACES ARMY
THE Loss OF LOOKOUT VALLEY AND ITS
REsUITs.
ARMY OF TENNESSEE November 9.
observe that msapprehensi0n has gone abroad
with reference to the situation of affairs around Chatta-
nooga, and that by portion OF the press despOnd nj
view taken OF the rearive position OF the two armies
1t Is stated, among other things that "we have been
out general By the enemy :; and that hey have be-
come the masters 0! he saation while the advantages
OF our position have been completely lost to u.s." The
refers to the recent occupation of Lookout
Valley oy the endorsements of the Federal army.
AS one toeraby familiar with movements here, and
some OF the thereof most respectfully demar to
the assumptions above set forth.
Firstly. Lookout Valley has never bssn occupied by
d larger force OF our troops than small brigade
that of General Law-the object of which was simply
to picket the Tennessee, watch the movements of the
enemy and cover the retreat OF shspshooters aud
sirmishers whenever attacked engaged in harrassing
the wagon trains running to and from Chattanooga in
the rear.
Secondly. We could not extend our lines beyond
Lookout Mountain to the left because of the dsneg-
ration of forces which would be necessarily involved
in such movement, and the consequent weakening of
oar lines elsewhere. The difficulty of transporting
troops or supplies the mouutain, within point
blank range of the guns of Moccasin Battery was in
itself bar to the permanent occupation of the Valley
From this alone, it found almost impossible
to furnish regular ratons to the single brigade of
General Law every pound having be Carried night
in panuiers, on the backs of mules
Ihirdty. The advance of the Federals from Bridge
port known to General Bragg from the start, and
progress reported from hour hour the troops
marched up the Valley This fact learn from one of
the signal cfcersl CONSEQUENTLY there was no sur
prise, and lack of time for adequate preparation to
give them battle Both Generals Bragg and Long
str ct were Oh tie summit OF Lookout Mountain, OBJ
serving the movements Of the enemy above and below
the six thousand at Browns Ferry who had already
thousand more, who had simultaneously started, and
were advancing from the opposite directions The OBJ
iect of the Federal8 penetrated at and if
these Cficers fully possessed of all information bearing
the present and future, with plans of operation else
where already matured in their minds adjudged it pru
dent to allow The enemy to pass uumCested it was
concession with which no one here elsewhere, who
desires maintain public confidence and unite and
spire the popular heart ought to find fault ~
F0u1thly. Had an attack been made on the columns
OF the en-my while in otion up the valley, beyond
doubt it would have precpitated general battle. Re-
Inducements would have poured out Of Chattanooga
across Browns Ferry, three times more exredltiousy
than we could have thrown troops across Lookout
Mountain Through demoral!zing FREE and sweeping
down on rear, even eucount2ring front in
the valley would have rendered the result of engage
men to say the least, doubtful. Granting success,
however, what would have been accomplished The
defeat of two corps OF the enemy--the retention of
valley whose occupation would have weakened line
and been of permanent practical benef-the loss
of five or eight thousand men without commensurate
advantages at time when every strong right arm was
indispensable to the service and the grand nvov
ed in the investment OF Chattanooga would not have
been directly effected in the slightest degree. 1t is
that without the valley the Federais would have been
compelled to rely Tor their ratlons on wagon transp0r
tation over noun tain roads, and that eventually they
NAV have been forced to retire to some point nearer
their base of supplies but this If not probematca
is negative result. If the Federas had determined
to hold Chattanooga they would have done in spite
of mountain roads and beckaded railway to Bridge
port We have not therefore, been outgeneraled by
the enemy" and their movement not mastery In
conception and aultless in execution" 1t was by
simple concession part, that they were allowed
to pursue their purpose-re-open communication with
Bridgeport and establish themselves for the winter and
future Developments will prove the correctness OF the
Judgment by which that concession was made.
It all error suppose that the possession of
Chattanooga is the stake for which this army is con-
tending and the fact that the Federas may remain
disturbed there during the winter, adds and subsracts
nothing from prospects OF success In TRUTH there
are many officers who believe are better IF where
we are with railroad at our back, than if we were
forty miles on the other side OF the Tennessee river and
dependent for supplies the rugged roads and faulty
wagons which would be CUR bane during the winter.
Filthy, The effort that has been made to fasten
upon General Longsreet the responsibility of the dis
aster as it termed (which is supposed to mean the
occupation Of the valley by the enemy results from
INSTRUMENTATION of facts. The attack made by Gen.
III
General Longsreet, not, as has been stated, de-
signed to be upon the Federal renfOrcements, but upon
the rear guard and wagon train of corps which had
already reached the vicinity of Browns terry 1t had
specific purpose and did not lo1z to interruption
of the enemy march, but simply to the capture of
stached portion OF his army. How faithfully the or
ders of General Longstreet carried outflow one
little brigade, by the clouded light OF midnight
encountered whole division which had moved up tc
the designated point after dark and whose proximity
was not knoWn-how the latter was driven back, the
wagons captured the camps overrun and prisoners
zen in the rear-how the Federals at Browns ferry
now marched rapidly down and threatened to inter
the road by which the brigade to return across
Lockout Creek, and did reach point within three
hundred wards OF it forcing to abandon the results
Of victory already within cur grasp-are matters
which reed not be repeated. But if the reader will
only recall the circumstances Of the event, it will be
evident that no intended to be done than was
accomplished and that far from the occurrence of
dsaster' the situation of this army has not been in
any degree affected.
FtnaUu. We have not " lost the advantages of our
position" Lookout Mountain is still in possession
and to all ntents and purposes, the lines Of the army
have not been changed. 18th this great and almost
impossible wall on lett etfectuay barring the ad
vance of the enemy from that direction, and Missionary
Ridge. with its steep sides, on front, no Genera
can ask more desirable place OF defence than thai
which is now held by this army.
If the enemy have succeeded Ill provisioning them
selves for the winter, it is only what they would have
done under any other circumstances, somewhere disc
perhaps not 80 favorable to us-and this fact will, il
no wise interfere with the general battle which is even
tuay to decide the strength of the two armies,
probably the issue OF the 1t is question of fight
ing and not of eating, with which We have to contend
and winters ideness in place or another has lit
tie to do with the solution of the problem while the tvs
armies confront each other intact.
howe Tho efo 1pGIuD