The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-08-22

Aors de combat, not only obliged to give up
INVASION of the free North, but abandon
tne coveted crops of the Shenandoah itself
Deiore they were gathered in?' What would
have been the response? All this has been
done; But because this which seemed i'm
possible being done, he has not performed
actuai lmpossibilty-has not prevented
Lees retreat and captured all his forces
there Is disposition to murmur if not to
decry.
me great question for military men,
when this war began, was, which of our in.
experienced officers is capable of handling
on the field, a hundred thousand men p
Mcdowell, though with Scott's assistance
failed. So did Pope. So, until Antietam.
did Mcclellan himself. So did Hooker, at
Charlottesville. So did Burnside. MANY
insist that the battle best fought on onr
side, since the war began, was gettysburg.
To Meade's skillful handling of his forces
on that field, even more than his prompt
and jndicious choice of the ground, they
think our splendid success due. And the
progress of the army since has displayed
the ablest military skill. What mistakes
have occurred? What brigades of ours
have been trapped? Every where are to
energy and skillful hand. The enemy
has been every where foiled, harrassed,
defeated. True, he has escaped, but his
escape was unavoidable. When has not
an army with its rear open, been able to
get away from an enemy? Think of the
Peninsula army and its vaunted seven
days retreat. Think of the first and Sec
ond Bull Run. Think Of fredericksburg,
| cellorsville--especially the latter,
where our army was three miles from the
river, did not start till after midnight, and
yet, by seven A. NJ, the whole army, sew
enty thousand strong, with two hundred
pieces OF artillery, was across without los
ing man or horse. This retreat. we,
believe, was covered by General Meade
and the 5th Corps. Think of Corinth where
Beauregard slipped off between night and
morning. Then there was Jackson the
other day, where Johnston escaped Sher-
man, and Tullahoma, where Bragg escap-
| ed Rosecrans, and got off it is hardly
known where. The war is full of such
instances. The Potomac is too long line
to cover; else, perhaps, force on the south
might have interrupted Lee. But Meade,
compelled on one side to cover Washing
ton and Pennsylvania, could not cross and
cut of Lees retreat. Lee was too strong.
"Some who blamed the escape of Lee
rom Antietam regard the conduct of mat
ters on this last occasion as equally dilato-
ry. But, were the cases not entirely dis
similar? The question at Antietam was
pursuit at once, the day after the battle, by
a reserve amounting to one fifth the routed
enemy, which had scarcely been at all en-
gagged, and when the position of the enemy
was thoroughly known. With Meade it
was an attack Of a rested enemy, very
strongly posted in a manner unknown and
impossible then to understand. In the one
case there was every apparent probability
of success; in the other there was no such
probability apparent. In the first case
subordinate commanders blamed, in the
second they approved the delay. The ques-
ton at Antietam had its true parallel al
Gettysburg. Then pursuit was instantly
made by cavalry and infantry. So, too
when the Potomac was crOssed-at Antie-
tam we suffered:severely from mismanage
ment in the late pursuit instituted, and
then spent weeksin the mountains, while
the President was continually urging ar
advance. Meade, maneuvering with great
rapidity, endangered Lees line of retreat
and compelled him toquit the Shenandoah
i Valley, suffering no loss, but infiicting
much. Without decrying McClellan's
management, it is certainly true that
Meade's tactics have excelled in prompt.
ness, decision and energy, if not in skill
Under no leader have our troops marched
as rapidly and as far. Yet their condition
is described as excellent.
"We shall be nearer eventual success
when the people, sitting an anxiety for the
end of our troubles which half crazes them,
shall hold commanders responsible, no,
dent may give triumph to the poorest
plans and the most contemptibly unskillful
leader. The ablest General and the most
lsplendid strategy may, through circum-
stances, be prevented attaining all that he
desires. If he does all he can, and espe-
cially if with skill adequate to the situation
he shows that his sole motive is sense OF
duty, all good men should yield him their
hearty praisesand cooperation.
cit seems to us that in Gen. Meade more
desiderata combine than in any former
leader of the Army of the Potomac. OF
Il mature age, and with a previous expert
ence which all others lacked, a thoroughly
educated soldier, a man of lofty character,
loyal to the core, yet unknown to party
cliques, embarrassed by no military jeal-
ousies, prompt, active, untiring, yet dis
Greet, displaying skill as field officer
hitherto unprecedented, soldier and only
a soldier, and exhibiting in his dispatches
and official conduct mOdesty and a sense
Of duty as rare as commendable, we can not
help hoping much from him, and we are
willing to trust much to him; especially as
there looks out from all his conduct one
quality in which he stands alone, an hum
bic recognition that victory Is of the Lord
and to Him belongs the glory:-N' y Post
u MILITARY News TO BE SUPPRESSED
DEPARTMENT OF THE SOUTH; HEAD'QRs
IN THE FIELD, NORRIS ISLANDS. c., Aug.
a, lS63.-General Orders No. 66.-L The
practice of giving information to their
friends or the public Press, on matters
connected with military operations in pro-
gress or in contemplation, so unscrupuluos-
ly indulged in by officers, citizens and sol
diers in this department, and by employ
ees on transports, is fraught with incalcu-
liable evil to our cause, md must be stop
ped al once. No Information which could
IN any way benefit the enemy, must be di
yulged, directly or indirectly.
I Upon the following subjects in particular
the strictest silence must be observed, viz.
l. The names of division, brigade or post
commanders.
2. The strength of regiments, brigades or
divisions, except after engagements have
taken place.
/ 3. The numbers and positions of regi-
ments, brigades, divisions, batteries, or
pieces of artillery.
| 4. Aliusions to the kind or quantity of
arms, cannon or ammunition.
! S. The number of transports, or kind of
supplies transported in any movement.
6, The description of any movement, or
any illusions to its object, until the same
shall have been accomplished or debated.