The Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1855-1875, 1863-07-10


friends in here 10 day"
1ank.--" You don't say; who were theys
-Reb.--" a 2iEser and deg." Q.
- trem the Cincinnati Gaaetse.
The Great War Movements--A Re-
view Of the Sitsaa siOn and the Con
sequences.
Amidst the exciting and cheering news
of the day, it will aid he reader to a full
understanding of events to trace out clear
iy the actual movements of the Eastern ar
mics, and their causes and Consequences
In our las, review of this subject. We left
the armies of Lee and Hooker rapidly mar
ching nearly on parallel lines 10 final is
sue. One was pursuing the line of the
Shenandoah aud Cumberland Valleys. and
the other marchiLg in the same direction on
the east side Of the Blue Ridge. In this
movement. Lee was marching on the ouier
curve. and Hooker on an inner and short |
ler one. We said that if Lee had either Of
the cities in view point Of attack, Ii |
was probably Baltimore. which. if taken. |
would also secure Washington. We now
know this was the object. for Lee advanced
his head columns toward Harrisburg as |
feiut and then turned them south by Gettys-
burg and York. 1t will be seen by map
that Lee marched north in the valley to
Cham bersburg. then east BY Carlisle toward
Harrisburg and Columbia. and then began
to turn south again by Gettysburg; whence
two days long march would have carried
him to Baltimore. 1t is also evident that
soon after the curve made by Lees army be
gan to turn south. it would interseet the
line Of march of the army of the Potomac,
he ~ he ut
made. 1t was made, and Lees army rs to-
tally defeated. The noble but heretofore
unfortunate army of the Potomac has vim
Dictated its character, anil won laurels which
will live in the Immortality Of fame.
But here arises some most interesting
questions. Why did Lee make that danger
Gus movement? What significance has 1t in
the rebel plans Why did not the Army
Of the Potomac endeavor to intercept
him, and attack him at earlier time =
And what are to be the consequences of
Lees disaster We must put aside excite
ment, and ascertain the tree position of az
fairs, before we can make An accurate judy
ment upon them. We stated before that
the rebels had followed precisely the STRAIT
egg marked out for them by Emil Schalk
but. up to that time, had been defeated IN
epeyy part ofH In fact, the rebels were
strageticaly defeated when they crossed the
Potomac. Why? Because they we're not
able to cross east Of Harper's Ferry, and
thus proceed directly Washington. Tie
Consequence was, they were obliged to pur-
sue the outer and longer line. thus allowing
the Army of the Potomac to take the short
er. aud choose their ground for battle. The
consequence was Lee was compelled to fight
at Disadvantages, in an enemy's country,
snr nv pSta vol.
ume OF troops. Why. then. did Lee, who
is n good and cautious general, undertake
this hazardous enterprise We are COM
PEELED to believe that it was in great meas
Increment IF desperation, stimulated
also by some other circumstances. From
the beginning Of the war the rebels have
been in tie process Of exhaustion to an ex-
tent which has not been believed by many
people at the North. A large body Of what
remains Of the people in the South are dis
gusted aud weary with the war. 1t is not
possible TO recruit the rebel armies up to
their former strength. La the midst Of this
almost hopeless condition. Grants brilliant
operations practically destroyed one of their
armies, for the troops under Pembcrton and
Johnson effsctually nulliied as to any
practical use. At the same time, Lee, fol
4 lowing Schalk's advice, had failed in his
/ Newburn attack. and with the largest and
best army they had. was doing nothing
/ La this state Of things it was evident that if
something brilliant and decisive was not
done. there must be total discouraged
| it not dwindling away of the rebel armies
But there was behind this the hope that the
Northern Peace Party. if sustained by the
tpresence Of an army, would make diver.
sion 10 their favor. Then there was the
chapter of accidents which has heretofore
bee n largely in their favor. All these rea-
sons. no doubt. operated with Lee. to indu
a movement which was intrinscally difficult
and hazardous. But he pursued his course
/ for two weeks uninterrupted and successful,
and put his army just where he pleased
Why was he not attacked? Why wss he
not cut off in Maryland ? The first great
reason. and which the reader has not been
informed OF, is, that by losses occasioned by
the discharge of the short term men. sick
ness and desertion. the Army Of the Potion
/ &C had become actually inferior to that o,
Lee. To risk, a battle, them at first, on the
FIRST movement, would not do at all. VIVA,
the army OF the Potomac needed was, BY
preventing Lees crossing through the Gaps
and thus throwing it on an outer Ii re, to
gam time, ysinforcensents and positions
which would enable it to fight successfully
when 1t became necessary. After Lee cross
J ed the Potomac at Sheppardstcwn aud vii
Transport. the farther be advanced compati
Die with the safety of Baltimore, the better
for rs Armies were gathering round him
and by the time he reached Gettysburg
: IS 900 men were already 10 Harrisburg
: Foster had arrived on the Peninsula; anc
, if 50 900 more men were needed. they could
be lad Lee IN Pennsy lvania was really II
: great trap. from which nothing but tn,
, most extraordinary luck could extricate him
p He has lost the first battles, although it il
probable others must be fought
. We come now TO the probabilities OF tn.
: future situation. What are they9 If LIE,
decides (as it seems he must on an imme
/ date retreat he viii seek the shortest. b,
1 Hthe valley Of Hagerstown. and the ferrie
of Sheppards'own and Williamsport. Blu
: if the river is high. and the bridges destroy