Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-04-28
THE CAMPAIGNS OF ,os AND ,os.
A Remarkable Discussion Of tksir Merits-Are
ne on he Right Trask2

THE CAMPAIGNS OF '62 AND '63.
A Remarkable Disoussioa of a.sir Msris-Are
We on he Right Track?
From the New York POST
On the l7th of September last, we took some
notice Of a remarkable though very unprstend-
ing volume, entitled Summary Of the Art Of
Wsr," by Emil Schsik-published by Messrs.
LiPpineott g. Co, of Philadelphia. In that
volume, which was published in the spring Of
1862, Dir. Sehalk discussed the probable course
and results of the campaign then bat Just OPEN
ing. and foretol5, with singular accuracy, the
leading events, especially of the operations
agsinst Richmond, going so far as to point out
fhen-six or eight months before it happened
the rebel invasion Of Maryland.
Mr.. Schalk is no c%orjuroT; but he seems to
have studied very thoroughly the rales and
laws on which Is founded the srt of wsr;
and in applying these rules to the facts snd
movements going on before all our faces, be wss
able to SEQ what were the almost inevitable re-
suits.
That an observer should be able to tell us in
February Of an event most unlikely TO happen,
bat which nevertheless did occur in September,
and that be should prove to US why it would
happen, and that it was the ssTe result of the
breach of certain laws and rules of the military
art, is sufficient to prove not emily that there are
such rules ard laws, but that to violate them is
most dangerous, even to a power SO much
stronger than its opponent as we are stronger
than the rebels.
Mr.. Sehslk has Just issued (by Messrs. Lip.
pineOtt 6 Co., g second volume, 9 discussion
Of the Campaigns of 1852 and 1868, nlustrat-
ing the Principles Of Strategy" in which be
c~Tiiicises and discusses OF greater length the I'M
fortunate campaign of last year; and points out,
in a separate and most interesting chapter, the
inevitable disastrous results of pursuing during
tho present yeaT-ss We seem at present to be
doing-a plan similar, if not identical, with that
which brought defeat to our arms, as q general
result, in 1852.
Our author recites three great principles
which may be laid down as belonging to the
entire science Of war. They are:
. 81. To concentrate al disposable forces, and
to act with the whole of them agsinsEG part
only of tbs enemy's forces.
80. To act against the weakest part of the en-
envy against his center if his forces be not
united, and against his flank or rear, if they be
concentrated. Also, to act against his commu-
n~ications without en~dangeriug our own.
80 Whatever plan Of operations has been de-
cided or, it should be executed with the utmost
promptness, so thst the object may be attained
before the enemy can prevent it,"
He is of opinion that we have violated, more
or less, all three of these fundamental principles.
As to the nature or character Of cur war, 10
remarks very justly:
1--WE have said above that, according rs the
war is national, or merely governmental az re-
CARDS the invaded country, 50 the operations,
and especially the mode Of occupying the coun-
try, have to be different. In the present case,
though perhaps IS regards the South the war
may be called national, there IS no danger of
such effects or results as generally attend ma
.tf0ual rrnrfafuvu hpnonaa fha uh11a v,-1a -1,,
lation able TO bear arms is already enrolledi in the
regular armies and the country being thus
stripped Of its defenders is void Of all material
for resistance, except where those armies hep
pen to be. Occupation becomes, therefore, a
secondary affair and cur main object should be
the destruction or breaking up of tie rebel ar
mics. This successfully accomplished, and all
resistance thereby destroyed, tie downfall of the
Confederate Government becomes a matter of
course, IS well as the surrender and occupation
Of the Southern towns and seaports."
"Threo systems,'' be says, " have been prin.
eipelly employed for the conquest of a country.
The first is to march several armies from the
circumference into the center of a country the
second is to conquer by subduiDg and occupying
one province after another the third is by
marching one large force, on = single line of one
ration, right into the center Of \ country, and,
when arrived there, spreading Is out il ell direc-
tons like = fan, forming interior lines, dividing
thereby the enemy, and forcing him to act on
exterior lines. 1t is the very inverse of the first
system.
"G3 and operations, IN accordance with the geo
grepby Of the theater Of war, and those maTi1s
which we have laid down IS the third system,
viii alone be able TO bring about the destruction
or breaking up Of the rebel armies-an object
which must be accomplished before attempting
anything else"
He remarks, in the first place, On the inno-
biitY of our armies;
Success is 10 the legs of the soldier, was q
saying of Marshal SAKE; and If this be true for
every kind Of war, it is more especially 80 for
great wars of conquest. Movement. continued,
rapid movement, is the secret for obtaining sue
ceSs; and what soldiers can accomplish in that
respect may bs seen in the campaigns of 1905,
1909, 1912. 1914, etc.
IN 1905, NspolsOn's army was at BoulogEe
for the grand expedition against England, when
the wsr with Austria broke eut. Napoleon
marched his army to Jim, thence to Vienna,
and thence to AusteTlitz, making q total distance
Of three hundred and thiTtY-threo leagues, or
thousand miles. From B7ulogue to Vienna,
nine hundred miles, was one continuous march.
In 1909, Rsp0leou's guard was IN Spain, at
Madrid and Valencia. When Napoleon was
to mako preparations for the Austrian
wa, his guard msrchsd, in one continuous
route, from Madrid TO Vienna, Q distance Of not
thsn six hundred and six.y-six leagues, or
thousand miles ItISl2, The army marched
from tina Rhine to Moscow, q distance of six
Leagues, or eighteen hundred miles
equal 30 the distance between Washington and
Galveston, in Texas"
He draws a comparison between the efficiency
two ermies-she ono getting according to the
principles Of msthodic warfare, and being fur
continually from It's base of supply and
its magazines, the other acting according to tbs
WAR must nourish war"
''Fhe system Of qusrtering or living on the
OF the lspd forms tho basis of all
great wars of conquest or invasion. Ualess it be
it's impossible 10 conquer an extern
sive country possessing largo sad organized
81 do not wish to advocate here a system of
great end legally organized robbery, which
from the c1uutryman all he has without
any naturalization. ladvocate only q rcasona-
and w~ellorganized system of requisition,
paying literally for al it obtaina, bu' furnishing
The army with all the principal provisions from
he country through which it passes. The
greater the distance an army marches in one
day, tire mora plentfully it may be supplied.
"AH wars Of invasion or conquest, from tha
1%srlicst times down to the most m~odsrn-frcm
Romans to Napolspn-8eye based upon and
rendered possible by this principle alone. Sue
esssful wars Of conquest are, therefore, Pynony-
with rapid and energetic operatious.'
He remarks of the system which has bean
in supplying our armies:
at is scarce necessary to remark that, in !
consequence Of the slow ms-chiug and the fire.
Iusnt halts, in order to maintain the supply of
provisions, the enemy gsins ample time to pre- J
7ent the success of any plan Of operation, not {
% mention the indUcement which such large
traius offer for cavalry raids in the rear (
IF an army. Do away with this system Of
the troops, and movement will bscome !
Necessity tho most advantageous strategic |
ines Of operation can be chosen there is no 6
except by the enemy, bat this resis-
anes ie, under such circumstances, such as a /
,enersl would desire. In other words, ell that
S impossible when following the oil system, !
,econleS possible with the new. Where two {
nen can nlant their feet an amy ON narnh {