The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-10-30

Ofa'ogfana'fS' "e'
r.. .s.i,icn si Chattanooga now commands the
=, .ad,yided attention at both she nastoas es-
9. ,s,, was. Affairs elsewhere hsrdiy occspy
sa'..a, The pFomPs removal Of Ro~scsans,
..'.sr,aa successful commander, for HE defeat,
aha, importance th- FcderaIs attach 70 the
'....,,oa ,hs,e The Chattanooga correspondent
,,o Nex York Trsesne (of the 2>sh) writes q
,,-., " Interesting iestsr, which We copy II gives
s.,, ,,ccny view ofthe Yankee position:
lave already demonstrated In former letters
,,wh,le t,hastsuoOga ia atfaiegtcally Important
"a,s,. II il not safe one. To bold = secarsly tn
WV. "a, ft,y miles u the right alal left Of it,
.,oo A. our army had crossed n beiiefoat,
a,rnson. and Bridgeport, IL was virtually master
- th. mace. For the same reason, wheE Il was
.,.rA bask into 1t, after the battles Of the 10Th
ns ash nit, the question 10 hold Il rested upon
40" a hil,y not 80 much 10 Fepel an attack from the
~ W, "a 10 retain control Of the river below
,rner- vas no; force enough at the command Of
crp, RoseeraRs 10 protect all the foTds and roads
'.,Slag from the south bank To his depots and
i'aS. 81 csmmuuie alton and along the viver.-
,,.ree his principal danger was the contingency
=, aank faov emcnt by detached column Of tbs.
..smy over the same route that he took TO leave
,'h,,,aooora. With the arrival Of reinfoscements
,,,, danger pa ssea away. The failure Of the enc
n~ 70 u1ske the movement afiords good evidence
"a, only that their offensive strength was greatly
.xs.srnea In the battles, hut als0 that u really
.yrr gas AZ far superior reported.
Tbe most direct danger, In view Of the tempo
rsyy state Of partial dissolution of ii1 ~fmy, was,
a( course, at first front attack The few days.
DELAY of the enemy in closing up with us around
,h, iowa gave time TO avert 1t with the axe,
NICK, and shovel. But although we checked an
assault by infantry, we were powerlcss to remove
the danger threatening from their artillery. That
with Missionary Ridge and Lookout Mountain in
ssia q III
against US, they have amply proved by their can
nonade on the 5ih. | use the word effectively"
although they did little actual damage at the time;
(t ,heit proieciies fell into our camps all along
Cur tine, and II must be the verlest tyro In war
thai will assert that by triplng their guns, which
they bave 1t, doubtless, In their power TO, could
rot. by canR0nade Of a week, annoy and DAM
age Us beyond endurance. II would be the first
fa.raaes In the history Of wars OF large army of
uasheefed troops maintaining its position under
pro,facted aud heavy artillery fire. That the
eaeny have As yet abstained from subjectng us to
a seserer trial than on the 5th IL mystery that
am not able to solve.
But snpposing even that II Is not awaiting us,
there are sill other ways left open TO the enemy
draw us out OF Chattanooga. From Chattanooga
10 Knoxville tie distance Is no miles. That this
long line cannot be successfully guarded against
an attempt to Gloss the Tennessee in force either
BY Gen. Rosecrans or Gen. Burnside, is evident
A hankns movement 10 our right Is, as already
stated, no longer practicable for the enemy. But
there was nothing to prevent 70 our iefi in the
mentioned direction until to day. Since midnight
ibe very gates of heaven seem to be opened and
;he rain Is pouring down In incessant torrents. II
The roads be not rendered impracticable by II, we
= IN in all probability see th. one hundred aud
twenty pontoons the enemy have built at Chicka-
mausa Station put To use before long, somewhere
between here and Knoxville. Ii would certainly
be the best move they could make. Ii would give
their army once more the benefit of the crops Of
the rich valley Of the Tennessee. II would throw
II between R"secrans's and Burnside's, and com
pei the isrter TO heat hasty retreat to Kentucky
10 escape annhatiOn. And lastly, 1t WOnid force
MI. army 10 abandon Chattanooga and hunt up the
enemy for battle north of the Tennessee.
last element Of uncertainty as to tha duration
of our occupation Of Chattanooga is formed by our
.reeari0us lines OF communications. We have
had three bridges across the Tennessee. Two of
these were rendered impracticable- by the rise q
week aga, and one had TO be removed The other
was again used until his morning, when the dan
ger Of being carried away by the great rise now
to be expected, induced Gen. RosecFans to order
likewise its removal. The third was built during
last week, and affords now the only means of COM
nuncaion with tho North bank. That 1t II In
sufficient for our Immense transportation I need
hardly say.
Again. the roads TO Stevenson, our supply depot,
are so rugged that hauling suficiency Of supplies
over them ia attended with difficulties the charac
lei Of Which only those can conceive who have
passed them. The present rain will probably
double these. One of the roads alOng the river is
rendered unsafe by the bushwhackers firing from
the South BANK.
It was natural for the enemy 10 attempt to cut
the long thread Of raiIroads-OveT three hundred
mes-lhat alone connects US with the North, by
din, of cavalry raids. 1t is to be hoped that our
cavalry will prevent the mischief contemplated by
III. bands Of Wheeler and Forrest, now again
loose In Middle Tennessee and Southern Kentuc-
ny. II they should succeed In breaking rail
rad connections for any considerable length of
time, retrograde movement by our forces cannot
be avoided.
Whatever the future may have in store for US Ii
Is obvious that the rebels masters OF the siu-
a,ion-at least go far the power to shape IL Ia
with Them. That they have improved the time of
auIeiude elapsed snce the battles to repair dam
ages and gather additional offensive force may be
presumed, as the fortunes Of the COnfcderacy de-
pend In great measure upon further successes on
ihr part; aud as they have ncentrated all their
availab. strength before U.s. II Is not likely that
they will lie idle much longer. Without having
any positive ground for the theory, think that ii
they fail in starving Out Of Chattanooga, they
VIII make the flank movement to The left under
cover Of 4 cannOnade upon our front.
Asto ourselves, prudence fOrbds me from say
Ing than we not yet in the condition to
resume the offensive, although we are able to opc-
rate promptly according TO the initiative OF the
ruemy. For my part | would deem it a cause for
generalization II the enemy should give Us an Op
portuaity to meet them in decisive battle 4 hun
dfrd mijes nearer he (hiO ri