Montgomery County sentinel. [volume] (Rockville, Md.) 1855-1974, 1863-08-21
THE REDUCTION OF CHARLES
TON 81 WHAT 1T INvOLS ES.

opens on Sumter, the Rebel strong
hold is sure to fan in two hours.n We
chance to remember that, on the occa-
sion Of the last attack, we were positive
" assured that Admiral Dupont would
makGe brick piie Of Sumter III lBss ss.son
'ran-keur aud Tab, EwtIirh tufnSu cut
TO be just about the time it took to drive
our whole iron feet chop-fallen out Of
the harbor.
There is no reason to argue like up
shot in the present instance. The pre-
sent plan Of attack differs from that of
last April by the whole distance between
a sound, well considered military opera
ton and an enterprise little short Of
Quixotism. The execution will, we have
no doubt, be conducted with all possible
skill and vigor. And if, as is hoped
the means are adequate to the end pro-
posed, it is fair to look forward to sue
cessful issue.
IT, therefore, the repeated prophecy
of the reduction of Sumter in a couple
of hours be intended to mean no more
than this--that in an enterprise in which
all the elements are well known, and
which admits of being treated almost as
a mathematical problem, the preponde-
rance of power is so greatly on our side
that the reduction of the fort is simply
a question of timc-it may be two hours,
or twenty-four hours, or two weeks-we
see no objection to expressing our ge-
neral sense of confidence in this way.
But to take such an expression as Ii
terally true, as many will, is to lull the
public mind with an unwarranted secu-
rity which would i'll prepare it for any
possible check, repulse or disaster, and
which even puts it in an attitude un-
fit to appreciate the magnitude of the
task which our gallant army and navy
around Sumter has to do.
The reduction of Charleston, as we
have already several times stated in
these columns, we consider precisely the
most difficult individual piece of mill
tary business thpt tho whole theatxG 81
war now presents. From a careful stu
dy of the whole subject, we have given
rations it involves, and the following
extract which we make from the Charles.
ton correspondence of late Southern
paper, is little more than what we have
ourselves already said, and does not, W.
think, in .he least overstate the diff.
culties Of the case
1.-The evident intention of the enc.
my is to secure batteries Wagner anc
Gregg, at Cummings Point, wbenc,
they think they will be able, to cree
strong works to batter down Sumter. -
Succeeding in silenciug Sumter, they
would then attempt to enter the harboi
with their iron-clad feet and Monitors
TO play upon the city. But they have
a long and tedious job before them. -
If they should succeed in gaining our
batteries on Morris Island, it will b.
very doubtful, from tho number of gum
we could bring to bear upon them, il
they could hold their position. Besides
admitting that they should succeed, anC
even be able to batter down Sumter
they would then be just as far from
their object as ever, and the struggl,
would just then commence, as For
i Moultrie, Battery Bee, on Sullivnn'i
Island, and other works could still com
mand the harbor. They would then have
to commence the bombardment Of Moul
trie, and make their approaches from
Long Island, which is quarter Of mile
Il N. Il. of Sullivan's Island, and sepa-
rated from it by Breach Inlet"
But if we narrow down our views to
the simple question Of the reduction Of
\ Fort Sumter, there is still task which
will demand the very highest skil and
valor, and which, after all, we can only
hope will be successfully executed
| With the looseness characteristic Of
popular parlancc regarding military mat
tiers, it has become common to speak Of
the operations against Fort Sumter and
even against Charleston as Il siege-~an
expression which, as its otymology i'm
ports, can properly apply only to an ope-
ration in which the assailant SITS dorm
around place, investing it and cutting
vi bnS pNblcESN iiOAb az NvHhuiAhl'oeioh
from without. In this sense Vicksburg
was properly siege" But we have
no such advantages in the operations
against Sumter. The Rebels have still
their water communications uninterrupt-
eddy open, and Charleston is free TO be
reinforced TO any available amount. II
Their steamers run up and down the
harbor every day, carrying troops, sup |
plies and ammunition, and bringing or
removing ordnance, etc. /; and the trou-
bic is that there is no possible means OF
gaining this line Of communication short
Of gaining Sumter itself II is easy to
see what immense advantages this af-
fords them, both for the defence Of Sum-
ter and The adjacent positions.
II remains then, TO consider the means
for the reduction Of the fort. II is no
secret now to any one, that, in the attack