Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-10-23
Especial Correspondence Of the Chicago Times
WASHINGTON. October IL

CHARLEsTON.
Especial Correspondence Of the Chicago Times
wAsHISGroS. October IL.
In the brief note which wrote to you yester
dav. simply stated the great disaster that has
befalien the Army Of the Potomac Bot 20 day
il 4. evident that the reality even than 10
appeared Yesterday Ii il we're possible 10 cover
the Administration with a deeper load Of infamy
than that under which Il has long staggered. the
events OF the last week would do II. Every day
the Government organs have contained assuran
ce- that Meade had the advantage OF position;
that Lee had been fOiled Ia his designs: that the
skirmishes that had taken place OF no i'm
portance at all; that we had come off best IN
every engagement, and that our own aTmy had
gained brilliant victory. Well. here i S1iur
day. and how does the case stand nowr We
have had a light. more or less severe, every
day this week We have not had the advania se
of position for have been driven successfully
from every position occupied Every day,
along the whole OF the long route from Cul
pepper to this city, our little army made gal
LIANT stand, and fought desperate battle. And
every day We have been driven further and
further back. until now our weary troops find
shelter and rest under the deienses OF the cap
tal Gen Lee has not been toiled in bis de-
signs What hi- ultimate designs are is not
succeeded in gaining possession of the gaps IN
the Bull Run Mountains in pouring his trOoIs
through those gaps; in defeating Metde's army
in at least eight engagements on as many sue
cessive days, and in driving our forces from
Culpepper To WarrentOn Junction, from War
renton Junction to Manassas Junction. from
Manassas TO Centreville. from Centreville To
Fairfax and from Fairfax to Washington And
this, too, with such precipitation on our part
al. Oh loav LOAF nd
wounded in his hands. The engagements were
important, for they have resulted ia the com
peie defeat of Gen Meade's army ami It's re
treat to the national capital; which capital Gen
Lee is now able to besiege, and probably will
bes.ege If We have gained "a brliBnt ycto
~" these are it's fruits.
At the time wrote my letter of the 10Th inst
Gen Mesde's army was, a. | then supposed u
was, ut Centerville Meade's good generalsbiI
had enabled him TO gain that position. as the re
suit OF the action of the previous day, aud so al
he had the advantage of position But of wha
avail was il to him? On that day Lee moved hi
army from Manassas Junction. across Bull Run
around Meade's right flank 10 Chantilly. with th'
intent to reach ana occupy Fairfax. and so get II
Meade's Aud he would have done this. too
il Meade had not penetrated his design ani pre-
vented iis execution As il was, the only Wa,
by which Meade could prevent his army from
quitting his position at Centervlle and occupyin;
Fairfax before Gen. Lee could reach that point
Gen Meade did this But Fairfax is position
utterly untenable. Having got his army there
nothing remained be done but To move then
To the lines around Washington: and here accord
ingly they are Cen Lee, in the meantime
occupied Centerville. and there he is now, viii
his whole army; that is. with all except those o
his troops who are at the West
mis- il m tn az between
connoitering parties OF the ConfederateS and on
troops, all along a line from Lce-burg and Aldi
on our right, TO Fairfax Fairfax Station, and tn
mouth of Pohick Creek our left. This lin
represents near can be ascertained now, tn
debatable territory between the two armies
But there is every indication that, in the cours
of the day our line will be still more contracted
at least the right. and that the enemy picket
will be thrown forward to Drainesvie and vi
emma There is no probability that Gen. lie
will either cross the Potomac attack Washing
ton at present Even il he has so many as 50, no
troops-and | think il doubtful that he has s
many-he would not be strong enough for eithe
enterprise II he is reOined by his tour division
now in the West, he may ESSAY an attack on tn
capital II not it is at least in his power To re
main at Cenrreville during the remainder of III
tall and coming winter, even with an army
$4,000 men He will probably do that. if h
does nothing more So that the probabilities ar
that when Congress meets, they will assemble i
a beleaguered city. So much for the situatio
here.
Now for word about Charleston. The Gov
ernment's fine promises that Charleston shout
be speedily taken have ut last dwindled dow
to the following statement. as given in the Otfica
organ of the Administration: The obstruction
in the harbOr of Charleston are of such "A natur
that they cannot be removed by any appliance
of ours; and they of too formidable char
acter to justify hazardous attempt by our iron
clads to penetrate further into the harbor an
within range of the rebel guns ="
Is not that a humIliIting confession for tn
Administration to make ut this late dayI Have
then. the nature of these distractions been Jus
found out? Why was this important discover
not made beforel What has become OF thos
appliances those devils" they wer
called-upon which such fabulous sums wer
expended. and which, il was confidently asserted
would pull up the distractions "a easily ~
dentist pulls tooth? Too formidable Il chtI
acterl' Perhaps, after while. the Governmer
will discover that the job of taking Ch,reSio
il also of too formidable character "A haz
ardOus attempt bv our iron-cladSl Our iron
cladS. then never Ia engage IN any eniei prs
that is in the lelst degree hazardous They wer
made, it would seem To be kept out Of danger
for we are here officially informed that they az
not to I've expected to go "withn range OF ia
rebel guns Oh fortunate iron-clndSi Fol
bearing further "sarkasm," however. let me int
mate 10 your readers that this official announce
meni is perhaps "feeler" 10 prepare the publ
mind for the abandonment. for the present, c
the siege of Charleston. IL looks very niue
like it, "