Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1863-01-30
Important Letter from the President.


brief synopsis Of the lctter written by the
President 10 Gen. McClellan soon after he
had gone 10 the Peninsula. The letter came
10 light in the curse of the Mcdowell Court
of inquiry, in relation to the testimony given
by Major Gen. Hiickcocbs touching the defen-
ses Of Washington, We give now the letter
entire. From the letter it will he seen that
the President yielded his own opinions to Nc
CeilaG touching tire advisa biliiy of the route
to Richmond by the way of the Peninsula
It shows that the miserable plan of shifting
and procrastn .tiDg dificu!ties,. instead Of Wig
oFously surmounling them, was none OF his
devisiug. lie also dcpreactes the lie-slland
do-nothing policy which was So fatal to our
success at Manassas; ;and he assures Mcclellan
that this hesilancy in moving upon the rebel
is. in the opinion Of the country, but the sto-
ry Of Manassas repeated" And he says in a
manner most kind but positive, you must
act"
The country viii see from this that the
President was burflened by anxiety on the
subject, and not without cause. H. found i
deficit Of no less than $4,000 men, that Nc
Cellan'wa asked to account for. He found
that in prosecuting that round about course to
Richmond, McC elan had left Washington al
most defen>iess, in neglect of lis 'expicit d-
rectioEs; and that his arrangements had been
broken up and nothing substituted for il -
Htre is the letter: let it be read Of all men,
so replcte with kiudAess sound sefse, andsun-
eqhiv0cal candof.-State Journal.
WASHINGTON, April Q; 18G2,
To MAJ Gen. AiCCLELLAN-My deur SIR
Your dispatches. complaining that you are
not properly sustained, willie they do not Of
fend me, 7ai.3 me very much. B@enker's Dr.
vision was Withdrawn before you left here and
you know the pressure under which did it,
amly as thought acquiesced in IT,. certainly
not without reluctance. After you left I as
certained that less thad 10000 unorganized
men, without field battery, were all you de-
signed should be left for the defense of Wash
ingon and Manassas Junction and part Of
Ibis even was to go to Gen. Hookers old po-
siion, Gen. Banks corps, once designed for
Manassas Junction, was divided and tied up
on the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and
could not leave that position without again
exposing the Upper Potomac and the I}alti-
more and Ohio Rairoad.
This presented, or would present, when Nc
DoweIl and Sumner should be gone, a great
temptation for the enemy to turn back from the
Rappahannock and sack Washington. Ny
explicit direction that Washington, sustained
by the Judgment of the commanders of corps
should be left secure, had been entirely neg
iecied. 1t was precisely this that drove me
to detain MeDOwaIl | do not forget that
saas satisfied with your arrangement to leave
Banks at Manassas Junction. But when that
arrangement was broken mp, and nothing was
substituted for it, of course | was not satisfied
was constrained TO substitute something for
ii myself And now allow me to ask you, do
yon really think could permit the line from
Richmond via Manassas Janction TO this city
to'be entirely open, except what resistance
cond be presented by less than 10000 unor-
ganized froepS2 This is question which the
country will not allow me to evade.
There is curious mystery about the num-
Der of troops now with you. Iteegraphed to
you on the 9th, saying that yor had over IOo,-
600 with you. l had just obtained from the
Secretary Of War a statement taken, as he
said, from your own. returns. making OS ,OOO
then with you aud en- route to YOU. You now
say You will have but $4,000 when all en- route
te'you shall have reached you. How can this
discrepancy be accounted for ? As 10 Gen.
Wool's- command, l understand that it is doing
precisely what a large number of your own
would have to do if That command was away.
F suppose the whole force which has gone for
ward to you is with you by this time; and i'll
so. think it is the precise time for you to
strike a blow.
BY delay. the enemy will readily gain on
you; shat Is, he will gain faster by fortifica
lions and reinorcemen's than yoa can bv re-
Inducements alone And once more let me
tell you, it is indispensable to you. that YOU
strike a blow. l am powerless to help. This
you will do me justice to remember, was al
ways opposed TO going down the Bay in search
OF a field, instead. of fighting at or near Afanas
sas, as only shifting and not surmounting
difficulty; that we would find the same enemy
aud lbe same or equal entertainments at e;-
ther place The country will fail to note-is
nothing now-that the present hesitation to
move upon an entrenched' enemy is but the
story of Manassas repeated.
l beg leave to assure you that lave new
er written or spoken to you in greater kind
ness of feeling than now, nor with fuller pur-
pose to sustain you so far as in my most anx-
ious Judgment / consistently can. But you
must act.
Yours very truly. A. LINCOLN.
The Manchester Examiner and Times men,