The Portage County Democrat. [volume] (Ravenna, Ohio) 1854-1868, 1863-04-15
The Conduct of the war.

w wednesday,. ......-......... April Is, 1868
The Conduct of the War.
The reader will not fail attentively to PEI
ruse the synopsis of the report of the Com
mittee on the Conduct of the War, to be
found on the first page of to-day's paper
Nor can it be read without astonishment, un-
folding as it does, the immense sacrifice of
life and treasure, resulting from ineompetency,
treachery, or both. This report will furnish
materials for future history, and will place
responsibilities where they belong. Pohti-
clans may still essay to shout the praises of
Mcclellan, but his position on the historic
record, when the Muse of history writes down
the transactions of this day with an impartial
pen, will not be an enviable one. Touching
Gen. Mcclellan, the Tribune succinctly ar
rays the following facts: a
The Congressional Report on the Conduct
of the War, which we printed yesterday in
full, is remarkable as dealing not with opin-
ions, or arguments, or theories, but mainly
with facts It is historical statement of the
/ eUiaence on certain Important points. i; We
have already presented in these columns an
I impartial summary of this evidence; let us
endeavor to note now more briefly the con-
clusions which it establishes. We will try to
State them in such a way that, however they
may conflict with personal partialities or pref
udices, they shall not be controvertible as
matters of fact.
| The Army of the Potomac was organized
! by Mai Gen. Mcclellan. i:y the first of
| October, 1861, it numbered $4,000 men, and
was in all respects fit for immediate service.
The Rebel army at Manassas which was op-
posed to it was less than 10000 strong But
the Army of the Potomac nevertheless re-
mained inactive during the whole of the
| Winter of 1862, and did not move till the
/ Rebels voluntarily evacuated Manassas. In
| March. A victory that Winter would prac-
/ tically have annihilated the Rebellion. 1t is
not now disputed that our army would have
] won victory if it he'd been tried, aud that
Gen. Mcclellan is solelgmespo for its
/ failure to try.
Secondly: The Blockade of the Potomac
! might have been prevented or raised at any
/ time during that Winter by naval force with
the cooperation of 1900 troops Gen. Nc
Clellan withdrew the troops, and is solely re-
! sponsible for the continuance of the blockade.
Thirdly: The Peninsulaf Campaign was
| Gen. MeClellan's own plan, reluctantly ac-
/ quiesced in by the President, and undertaken
by Mcclellan on the express condition th,t
! he should leave force sufficient, in the opil :
ion of all his corps commanders, for the de-
fSnse of Washington. They fixed the num-
/ ber of that force at 5000. But Gen. Nc
Clellan, in violation of his agreement and of
the orders of the President, Withdrew all but
5000 troops from the Capital, part even Of
those being raw and no light artillery left
them. The President, therefore, ordered the
corps of Mcdowell to remain for the defense
of Washington, and even including this corps
the specified number of troops was not made
up. Yet this is what is termed an /" inter-
ference with Gen. McClellan's plans,'' and is
/ in substance the only ground of complaint
against tbs President, and the only excuse
offered for the failure of the Peninsular Caln-
! paign.
aFouathlg: Mcclellan took with him to the
/ Peninsula more than 100000 troops. The
rebels had less than 10000 to resist his occu-
patton of Y orktown. But he sat down to
besiege it; the rebels concluded to reinforce
and resist, and after a months delay the place
was evacuated by the rebels without firing a
gun, just as Mcclellan was ready to open his
batteries. Meanwhile part of McDowell's
corps had been sent him. 1t is now known
that Yorktown might have been taken at
with it. For the delay and failure Mcclellan
alone is responsible. -a
! Filthy: There were three other occasions
when, if Mcclellan had improved his advan-
tage, Richmond might have been taken by
| the troops who could at once have been NOV. =.
ed against it. viz after the battles of Will
! liamsburg, Seven Pines, and Malvern Hill.
Each time he hesitated to advance till it was
too late, and the rebel capital was saved. Il
Ss1th1y: Ire retreat of the Army of the
Potomac after and during the Seven Days
Battles was precipitate and premature. The
battles were all fought by the Corps comman-
ders, Gen. McClellan's only share in the ope-
ration being to order and superintend the un-
necessary retreats by night. And when, fin
ally, after the splendid victory of Malvern
Hill. won in his absence, he again fell back
to Harrison's Bar he despaired of his army,
made no preparations for defense for twenty
four hours after, had resolved on surrendering
| his whole army if again attacked, and was
only saved from that disgraceb by rain which
prevented the enemy from moving his artil-
Eiery. - - Ems -
Seuesath1y: All possible reinforcements
were sent to Mcclellan while he was on the
Peninsula. The letters of the President, of
the Secretary of War, and of Gen. Halleck.
fIOF0 Jlstb every 0HOib was thttOC
to sustain ard reinforce Mcclellan, that troops
were even sent him which were deemed in
dispensable to the safety of Washington, and
that they were refused him only when no
more remained to be sent.
/ Esglst7sgg. When ordered to withdraw his
army from Harrison's Bar, Gen. Mcclellan
delayed the execution of the order eleUen days
after its receipt. By, that delay the safety OF
the Army of Virginia and Washington was
imminentiv endangered and still more so by
McClellan's subsequent failure to heartily CO.
operate with Gen. Pope.
Nsntsly The battle of Antietam, which
was an indeeisive success, might have been 6
complete victory, and would have been fol
lowed by the destruction or capture of the
Rebel Army, if it had been skillfully fought
by M Mcclellan, or if he had renewed the at
tack next morning, as Burnside and Summe
, advised. 1tss 8 s1o @ iii
Ient7s7y: The protracted inactivity afte
: that battle from the 18th of September to thu
+ 26th of October, was unnecessary, in direc
defiance of positive orders, disastrous to tn,
National Cause, and the salvation Of the Re
f bellion. The sole responsibility for it rest
f on Gen. Mcclellan. The Immediate cause
, of his removal seems to have been this lates
and most persistent insubordination. Hss
We have no comments to offer on thes
statements They are not charges agains
r Gen. McClellan-they are the findings of al
q impartial jury on the evidence submitted Il
2 them. The sentence which History vii
a pronounce wesdo not care to anticipate. Blu
) this General, so generally trusted, so lavishl
supplied with men and material, SO cordial
e sustained, SO tenderly borne with. SO long re
$ tained in a command which he repeated
j. proved himself unequal to WELD, cannot Ion