New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-09-19


slightest reference to what may have occurred before
or nav happen thereafter. At the outset Of the Rebel
lon MI Seward determined that IT should If possible
betcrminated by compromise which would leave the
Great DiploInast that negotiated 1t strong at the
North and popular at the South. rather than by the
sword. In an official letter to Mr.. Adams dated April
TO- 1851 he charged the President with believing that
VIC could not conquer the Rebels. and expressed his
conviction that in order TO do our Government
would first have TO become dcsposm. His language
Is as follows: Qhe italics are not his.)
The movement the sttempt 10 organize Con'edeney
therefore in the opinion Of the President tends directly 70 am
achy in the seeding States similar movements IN aina
have already resulted in Spanish Aercs ona
especially in Mcro He believes nevertheless ina, ne .
Of those States well ms the citizens OF inc o.he Sa
that the,e he woud not be DIS
Federal G.rerrme could not reauet e seeding stare -
obedience coHsres though he were disposed 70 I"r
on tha proposition But =; 5ae, S d.nse Gorernsent
could .ubugate thoroughly dGfo'sd and in'u,r1s,g"
members Of he Sta"- Message and Documents Oh i0'i w."
1867; p IA
There may Be persons dependent upon the patronage
or expeotant Of the yors of the State Department who
hold tina, this citation of Mexico by way Of illustration
is historically corcct-that the President did accept
il as true" that the Rebellion was inyncibe not "a
Moro ,1o,not because any other member Of his Cabi'
net thought SO for no has been suspected OF
moi because he communicated with the Rebels whose
dogma" il was-hut because indoctrinated by his
Premier" The attrlutins Of such opinion 10 the
President would not be regarded by them as libel
upon him. and the saying that he accepted" it would
no, tlcir minds convey peculiarly offensive mpua'
ton. They NAV insist that the views cnunoiaed indi'
cate both siatcmansip and splittha The publication
Of them annexed 70 tic Message was calculated 10 con-
ciliaie our republican noiglbors. tie MeX,cans; 70
induce England 10 maintain strict neutrality. and
even decline 60 recognize the Rebels hellrer us 10
oausc France respect the Monroe doc'rin" 70 dis
hosrten traitors make the President - he esteemed
TO give confidence loyal men No lone and 10 nerve
the arms Of our brave soldiers il re ap,goaci.ins
strife.
The American people. however hold directly The
contrary.
| Such was the position occupied by Mr. S'vard when
the Rebellion opened the war. His theory b1nG rr-
,irely wrong II was bat natural that lis practice oud
be more So Hence IL is that be has done more 70 cn
courage and sustain the Rebellion than to defeat and
crush ii.
BY advocating blockade. instead of a repeal # thc
laws creating the Rebel ports port cf envy he rccoe-
nized the Rebels and caused gn nations o. rceof
nizc them rs belgerens BY trying 10 tie ocr hands
against prvaieering when il our strongest check
upon Intervention he showed want Of foresight com
bined with q timidity which lowered In sic cstin,
ton of me great maritime power 81 the world ny
instructng our Ministers TO be silent 10 ~ the bearing
Of our war against the Rebellion Slayey be- cnused
the sympathy Of the enlightened and phnnthrolic be-.
yond seas TO be suspended until tie Proclamation
" lich he opposed) put forth. BY tauey abandon
ing "the Monroe doctrine and substituting in s place
its opposite "the Seward doctrine be opened the way
for foreign aggression upon Mexican ncighbors hy
falling 10 revoke the ereqEoirrs OF foreign consus IN
Rebel ports who could be o. no use 10 w. but who have
been and OF great service 10 the Rebels and are now
trying to give us trouble. be committed blund% the
rcsults Of which be estimated In what new
complications he may Involve Us and 10 What addiiiohI
huniaons be may subject u.s. remains yet 70 be secn.
Suppose for moment that u the inception Of Ills
war tie state Do partueni had been filed by poe
sessed Of no more than ordinary intelligence, informa
ton and courage. how woua he probably have shaped
his course the contingencies Of the CONTEST
On taking survey Of the field Of operations with
special reference to the trust committed TO his charge
ms eye would naturally have been turned to the only
portion Of our territory in rebellion that borders upon
foreign natloa-the Iao Grando frontier On tie one
hand Lee ould have seen Mexico. which. amer long
and aruous struggle had IN tie hands q the Liberals
subducl domestic faction and maintained Republican
form OF Government; and lie would have regarded her
~ entitled At least g. moral support. On the other
he would have seen Tc1as whose loyal citizens had
been BETRAYED by United States General and given Up
10 Rebel rule and would have thought that thcy should
not as matter o. favor bat o: right have speedy relief
At glance he would have discovered ihs, this frontier
constituted the back door Of the Rebellion through
which mails and traffic 10 immense s,tenl might pas
In safety when they could nowhere else. and through
which the Rebel leaders when the worst might cone %
tie worst would hope escape with their personal prop
eIty 10 foreign pai lie would have seen that owing 20
its and other causes the Rebels having no
nayy ii Tho reake point in oil tie territory claimed
by them and tia, such apart from tie considerations
stated IL ought a ce TO be taken and held lie would
have that to accomplish this aud call out The loyal
men Of the border an army would not be required but
that regiment gunboat. and supply VI arms &c.
would have sualccd. Seeing this condition Of hings
and knowing that diplomacy manfosis itself rather
by acts than by emsy words. he would layc demanded
that the small force required with Ito arms and sup
pes necessary should be sent 10 the mouth of tho RIO
Grande and long since Fort Brown (Which was actual.
ly abandoned by tie Rebels certain were they that
would take IL, shortly after New Orleans had sur
rendercd) would have been What a stunning blow
it would have been TO the hopes Of the Rebel leaders
What accession TO military force it would have
occasionedl What moral support and countenancc
would IL have given TO Mericoi How differently should
have stood In the estimation Of the civilized world
Suppose that when the French Emperor undertook 10
invade Mexico had been fortunate a. TO have
State Department presided over by Secretary not bold
enough to assert the Monroe doctrine possessed Of
sufficient rnDess TO take the ground that meant to
be really ncutrnthat QuartermastcIs were buy
ing breadstufs and our Ordnance officers arms. the
French should not be permitted to purchase oreadstu