The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-12-12

RosECRANs' CAMPAIGN.-TheN New York
Tribune of Saturday, contains a long re-
view of the Georgia campaign of Rosecrans,
written on the ground by one, as the Tti-
bane says, familiar with the movements
from the beginning, and having access to
the highest sources of information. The
following is the Iii6unes summary of the
conclusions it sustains:
/. The General Government assumed the
responsibility of the issue of the campaign
up to the time OF the fall of Chattanooga by
ordering Gen. Rosecrans peremptorily to
cross the Tennessee before he considered
himself ready for the movement.
2. Gen. Rosecrans never asked for re-en-
forcements and for supporting movements
until the 18th of September, SO that, what
ever blame may be justly attached to the
Government for not providing them, he
has no reason to complain, as he has done
since his removal, of being sacrificed.
3. Upon the evacuation ofChattanooga by
the enemy, Gen. Rosecrans, without salts
flying himself thoroughly as to the real in
tents of his adversary, by reconnaissance
and otherwise, assumed that Bragg was
merely bent upon another escapade from
the clutches Of our army, and upon that
theory divided his command into three
columns, and ordered them to move over
three separate routes, 20 to 80 miles apart
from each other, for the purpose Of inter-
cepting the supposed flight of the enemy
This mistaken pursuit took the different
parts Of the army beyond supporting dis
lance Of eachother, over lines OF march con-
verging upon the position assumed by
Bragg, so that they We're exposed to the
danger of successive attack and destruction
by the whole rebel force.
4. The safest course for Gen. ROsecrans
was to concentrate his army in front OF
Chattanooga; fortify the position; perfect
his communications with the North; accu-
mulate supplies, and continue offensive
operations only after accomplishing all
this. This course was also dictated to him
in specific instructions from Gen. Halleck.
To effect the concentration before Chatta-
nooga, all he had to do after the abandon
ment of the place on the Sth, was to move
down Lookout Valley and around the
northern spur of Lookout Mountain. In
three days, at the furthest, the movement
might have been accomplished. BY acting
contrary to the instructions OF the General
in Chief, Gen. Rosecrans at once relieved
the Government from, and assumed him
self, all responsibility for the subsequent
| events of the campaign.
5. Upon discovering his mistake as to the
movements of the enemy and the necessity
of rescuing his army from the peril of des-
| truction in detail, by, RECOMMENDATION he
| moved his command into position that
left Chattanooga partially uncovered, and
| invited the enemy to get between him and
that place. When this was begun, the ar.
my was not shifted to a better position as
expeditiously as it might have been, but
was drawn into a general action while
making movement by the left flank-a
disadvantage, which brought it to the
verge of defeat at the very beginning Of
the conflict, and rendered it impossible fol
our troops TO win the battle OF the 18th.
6. The loss OF. the battle of the. goth was
/ mainly due to al order of Gen. Rosecrans
given upon tip Strength of erroneous iDfor-
nation. Fbr its execution Gen. Wood ii
unjustly held responsible by him for the
centre and right.
6. Gen. Rosecrans, after being cut of
from the army by the reverse on the cen
ter and right, believed that the disaster
extend to the whole line, and that every
thing was lost. By going to Chattanooga