The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-01-03

EEKLY HAWK-EYE,
10 bridges there for future operations, in cos.
We wsnted to cross again. accordingly or.
oered the withdrawal, leaving Gen. Hooker to
conduct the Withdrawal Of our forces from the
town. and Gen Franklin to conduct it on our
left During that evening received a note
from General Hooker, and about 10 o'clock at
night Gen. Buterfeld came over with mes-
sage from Gen. Hooker, stating that he (Gsn,
| Hooker) felt it his duty to represent to me the
condition in which I was leaving the town and
the troops in it. After long conversation on
the subject with General Butterfeld, felt that
the troops proposed to leave behind would
not be able TO hold the town. then partially
decided to withdraw the whole command, .
still more perilous operation. It commenced
raining. which to some extent was IN
assistance to us, but was q very bad thing 10 the
| moving of the troops. l thought over the mat
ter for about two hours, and about o'clock
sent over an OF der to withdraw the whole force,
which was successfully accomplished. There
had been great deal of division of opinion
among the corps commanders as to the place of
crossing; but, after all the discussion upon the
subject, the decision to cross over here was we'll
on bis way here Gen. Hooker, on the morning
of the Goth of November, wrote me . note,
which | received on the 2Ist, in which he sug-
gested that he should cross bis force over the
Rsppahannock at the ford nearest the town.
Richard's Ford, and move rapidly down to Sax
tons Station, and take position there. He sta
ted that he bad three days provisions, and
thought he could meet any force of the enemy
10 front Of them. replied to him that was
always very glad to take the advice of my gem
ersl officers. and should always be 10th TO make
. move without consulting them. But I could
not approve OF the move be bad suggested, be-
cause, in the fret place, he would have to march
some thirty-si miles to get to Saxton's Station.
It was raining, and be would have to ford two
rivers which might rise and cut him off from
the main body of the command and as had
no means of crossing at Fredericksburg, would
be prevented from sending him supplies and
assistance and although he might reach Sax
toms Station and not meet any force of the en-.
envy at that time. vet it would be q very hazard.
Gus movement to throw column like that be-
ysnd the reach OF its proper support; this re:
ply sent to Gen. Hooker by an Aid de Camp
he thanked me, and said he had only made it as
q suggestion, and the weather, as it was then
raining, OF cou's. rendered it impossible to
make the movement be had suggested.
| 9. What reasons do you assign for the failure
of your attack here
! A. II was found 10 be impossible to get the
men up to the works the enemy's fire was too
hot for them; the whole command fought most
calamity; the enemy themselves say they never
saw our men fight as hard as on that day.
| O. Were the enemy's works very strong?
| A. Their works are not strong works, but
they occupy strong positions; it is possible that
the points of attack we're wrongly ordered il
such is the case, can only say, did to the best
of my ability; it is also possible that we would
have done better to have crossed at SINNERS
Neck but for what supposed to be good rea-
sons felt we had better cross here, that we
would have more decisive engagement here,
and that if we succeeded in defeating the enc
py here We would break up their whole army,
which think is now the most desirable thing,
not even second to the taking of Richmond
for if this army was broken up, though they
might defend Richmond for a while, they could
not make any protracted defense.
| @ BY Mr. Gooch-Do understand you to
say that it was your understanding that Gen.
Halleck and Gen. Meigs, while at your head.
menced the movement of your army, sent Or
ders to Washington for the pontoons to be i'm.
mediately forwarded to Falmouth?
| A. That was my understanding; certainly.
| O. In your judgment, could the pontoons
have been forwarded in time for you to have
crossed the Rarpsbannock when you expected,
if all possible efforts had been made by those
charged with that duty?
A. Yes, Sir, if they bad received their Or
ders in time.
| Q. DID the nor-arrival of these pontoons at
the siu,e you expected, prevent your crossing
when you expected to cross, and interfere with
the success of your plan? s
A. Yes, Sir.
| Q Since you have assumed the command of
the Army OF the Potomac, have all its move-
ments been made by you according to your own
Judgment, or have some Of them been directed
by the Geueral-in Chief. the Secretary of War,
or the President of the United States!
| A. They have all been made in accordance
With my own Judgment. In some cases. have
submitted my views which have been approved
| O. Who did you understand was responsible
for the forwarding Of the pontoons to Falmouth!
A. understand that Gen. hsileck was to give
the necessary orders, and then the officers who
should receive the orders were the ones respon-
sible for the pontoons coming here. could
have carried out that part Of my plan through
| officers Of nv own.
But having just taken command of IN army
With which Was but little acqusintedit was
evident that it was as much a. could attend to
with the assistance of all my officers to change
its pontoons from Warrenton to Fredericksburg;
and felt, indeed expected, that all the parts
of the plau which we're to be executed in Wash.
inston would be attended to BY the officers Of
that place under the direction Of the different
Departments to which those parts Of the plan
appertsin.
Q. Did you, or did you not, understand that
you were to be responsible for seeing that these
orders we're carried OUT o.
A. Ibid not; never imagined for moment
that had to carry out anything that required
70 be done at w sshiogton. Gen. Meigs told me
distinctly severe! days ago, in Washington, that
he never saw my plan Of operations until show.