Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1862-1865, 1863-07-31
THn sArrIE An cNrrYsaUne.
AN USFoRJuNATE o .MPsiaN-wRY GEN. LEE ATTACKED
the ENEMY AT GETTYSBURG AND EEoRoSsED THR
POTOMAC, RIO

("P. W. A w furnishes that paper with ga Succnct
and faithful narrative" Of the Pennsylvania campaign,
His letter is dated Martinsburg 18th inst. We copy
the following extracts emitting few passages descrp
tive of the charges by brave troops ard of the
strength of the ensmys position several accounts Of
which have already been published 10 this paper:
MOVEMENTS OF TRooP5-As IMMENSE TaAtS--FIRsr pays
BATTLE, ETC.
No one with that part of the army left near Cham
bersburg suspected the morning OF the lst instant,
that The great battle would begin that day. was
sitting on the wet ground with my back against tree,
writing 10 you and your readers when General Lee and
e cort passed by in the direction of CashtoNn aud
Gettysburg He seemed TO nu the battle in the breeze
aud for the rt time II occurred 70 that the enemy
was approaching our lDes. In feE minutes, Ander-
sons dlvi-ion of Hills corps marched do the same
road followed an bouf or Two later by Johnson's
division Of ESelPs corps, which had retrsced lie
steps from Shippensburg. In the course OF the
morning, ders came for Lougstreets corps, ex-
cept Picketts diViSion, lett behind at Chambers
burg to follow in the same direction, as soon as
Gen EEe's train sent back from Carlisle, should PISS
This was an immense train long almost the tail OF
a comet and far more omlnOus o evil. lt occup, d
four hours in passing ard NOV, slowly throug q e
Cashtown Gap lin the South MOuutan that Longstreets
CORPS was delayed until near midnight 10 reaching
point four miles distant from the battle ground. Pen
ana hetn OlNlSlOHS were
gage the eneDys advance column on the morning Of the
l,t Elrlys and Rodes' divisions Of EEeps corps
rived on the ground late in the afternoon having
ed down the Susquehanra from Carlisle TO York, and
thence 10 augsburg. These last two divisions Joined
the former and together they drove the enemy back
citing heavy loss; but Anderson'S and Johnsons div
slons though enough, not put into the fight
that evening. The enemy had accOrdg to the state
mens Of prisoners three army corps present the ls
a1d that night apd early next morning the reminder Of
Meade forces brought up and put in very strong
DO ition We did not press the enemy after nghifa
The following deduc ions how from the foregoing
facts Had Gen. Lee concentrated his forces twenty
four hours 500 err he might have dispersed captured
DESTROYED the three Federal corps engaged the fest
day ard haze fallen upon h1 remaining forces then
coming up and not yet in position, and driven them pill
mel back upon Baltimore Washington. Or, II An
dersons and Jobnsons div so had been put in imme
datey upon their arrival aud our advantage pressed
with vgor that night the my might have been driven
beyond the formidable position he bnaly occupied aud
from which subsequently iOun1 u impos sble to dis
lodge him. The same result would probably have fO
lowed If Ewelfs train had nave turned out on the side
OF the road aud Lones'rsrls corps allowed to move
rapidly the 'front.' or if the atsoi had been renewed
early on the morning OF the 3D. instead Of quarter
to fous in the afternoon.
An IMPORTANT QUESTION DISCUS
Were WI compelled to accept battle at the time aud
place we dg We we're not. Having the start of the
enemy rom Fredericksburg and the whole country be-
fore us might have chosen ground and time for
making and recev wing the attack. We might have
cuptd the pas at CAshow or remained the north
side Of the South Mountain fallen down to BoonsbO
ro' Gap Having base 60 protect and no line Of COM
muucaton to keep open relying upol the districts
we occupied for the means OF subsistence, we're free
(, 20 where we pleased ami to fight when pleased.
But the battle joined he time and place select
cd by the Federal commander The place, strong By
nature Was rendered still more formidable by number
of stone fences which crossed the field, BY the open
eround we had to move over 10 reach it and by field
works thrown up by the enemy during the night The
attack was wed by ourselves the evening OF tle
without proper Ieconnoisarces and not simulia
ousv along whole line but irregu ary and spasn cd
ically first by one corps or DIVISION and then by sno-
ther, reminding one Of team OF Unmatched horses,
which refusing to phil together unable TO the
load which a simultaneous and common ehIrt might
taiay accomplish. The troops fought better or
inflicted greater loss upon the eaemy and strong the
position Of the latter was they surely would have
red it, though at heavy los If the attack had been diff
ferently planned As it they pushed the enemy
buck ran over numbesss Bat cries which they we're un
able to bring Off captured many hags and Ii led and
wounded more men men than 10 any previous battle.
TUE FAILuRE OF OUR OBSERVATION-DISCLOSURES AND
dETrYsBURG.
The repeated assaults made by Confederates
therefore, though made with the geatest valor, and
ssful up certain point tailed di lodge the
enemy from his strong position. IL but simple justice
70 ad that in sins 10 Instance that
did our troops retire except under ORDERS did the
enemy ever make the least attempt at pursuit. They
advanced and withdrew alike u1der orders and that
too in face Of fe far furions than that which
greeted the advancing coUmus Of the French Water
loo In no OF the word we're they beaten. All
that can be justly claimed by the enemy is that he main
tanned his ground aga assaults though fear
full cost Of life limb. This much with the advau-
ages he possessed in numb and position he ought
ha ge done Ii position at Fredericksburg was gu
as 10 make &c Lees army equal to force Of 100000
men, General Long treet is reported to have said t
was then General Meade, who already bad superior
force at Gettysburg, possessed advantage pr lion
which quite preponderatug There thi, d der
ence no wever in the two positions: at y'hurS the
Coufederates Rad TO cha over much wider IL Id than
the Federals did Fredericksburg whilst the line Of
hills at the latter place trendsi OF to the rig and did
not present a colcave force as az the former
WHY DID GIN. LEE FIGMr THE ENEMY AT GErIYsBCRa?
Why, then, you are ready to inquire, did Gen. lie,
fight at AL Gettysburg, when it was in his power
accept or CT II battle at a different time and pace He
acted probably under the impre sen that his roo,
we're able to carry any position however formidable If
such was the case he committed error such however
as the abest commanders vii sometimes fall INFO No
general can be always success ul. The Conf tate
troops do what any other troops In any perOd OF
the worlds history have done; but there Thugs
that the Supreme Ruler has chosen this meaus 10
teach US the in,quty OF all nvssols, and impfess
upon minds the uice aud wisdom Of defending
cause upon our blood-bip.ised soil Indeed, there
are some things coateced with the late battle which
would st EN- TO Justly the belief that this punishme It
was inflicted BY Dv.ne Hand and for some wise pur-
pose l. is but just add that Gen. Lee does not pre-
tend 10 lay tie sponbhsy upon his troops o;ers
but takes it upon his broa1 sh ,uders Ia ths as
in all other things he il frank and just ard nsgnani.
NOUS LIT US not be guilty OF he folly them OF with
drawing any part Of conidGnce from him, but letn
rather initiate the Hebrew patriots and hold up his hands
that he may prevail in TIE fight
ATTEE TIE BArrLE-wirRDsAwAL OF BolH ARMIES.
On SATURDAY., the 4:h of July, nothing was done be-
yond lite skirmshng by either side. The enemy did
not fire salu honor of the day. Both armies
Withdrew about tire same tme-Gen. Lee IN the rec
ton of BagersoNn and Gen Meade in the direction Of
Washington. All OF our wounded who could be re.
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