The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-01-02
IMPORTANT TESTIMONY OF GEN.
BURNSIDE AND-OTHERS.
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE on THE
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
WASHINGTON. December %.

WASHINGTON, december 70.
The report of the Committee on the
| Conduct of the War embraces the deposi-
tons of Generals Burnside, Sumner, Frank
lin, Hooker, Woodbury., Haupt, Halleck,
and Meigs The Committee report the
testimony without comment. Burnside
said: When, after the battle Of Antietam,
Mcclellan decided to cross the Potomac, |
said to him that, in my opinion, he would
never be able to take the army on that
route beyond the Rappahannock, unless he
succeeded in fighting the enemy at some
| place on this side; that if he proposed to
go to Richmond by land, he would have to
go to Fredericksburg, and in that he par
TALLY agreed with me. On the 9th of No.
vember, after this conversation, Mcclellan
gave an order to Captain Drum, Chief of
| Engineers, to have all the pontoon bridges
| at Berlin and in that neighborhood, that
could be spared, taken up and sent down
| to Washington, with aview Of getting them
down to this town, in case he decided to go
by way of Fredericksburg.
The letter conveying that order was
written on the 9th of November; but, as I
understand it was not received until the
| 18th of November. Burnside speaks of the
surprise with which he received the Presi-
dents order to take command of the Army
of the Potomac, and says that he had re-
peatedly expressed the opinion that he
so large an army, and that Mcclellan was
the fttest person
He then says: ''IIallecl came to me on
November II. On the 9th | made out a
plan OF operations, in accordance with
Halleck's order, and l sent it to Washing
ton" He gives a detailed account of this
plan, and speaks of the disastrous delay
| in receiving pontoons, and says that on
| the 18th he started to lead column to
Fredericksburg, not knowing of the delay
The pOntOons did not, however, start until
the 10th, and that day it commenced rain
| ing, which delayed them so much and the
roads became so bad, that when they got
to Dumfries they lifted the pontoons off
the wagons, sent to Washington for q
steamer and carried them to Acquia Greek
by water, sending the wagons round by
land. The pontoOns did not get there
until the 22d or 23d of November. After
the first delay in starting the pontoons, |
think they were sent as quickly as they
could have been, and the supplies and
| Quarternaster'S stores have always been
in as great abundance as We could have
expected, for after the 10Th of November
the weather and roads were particularly
bad. After reaching Fredericksburg |
saw at once there was no crossing the
Rappahannock with the army at that time.
| 1t commenced raining, and the river began
to rise. There was no means Of crossing
except by going up the fordS, and it would
| be impossible to do that, because of ina
bility to supply the troops after they should
| have crossed.
Sumner arrived here with lis troops in
advance. lie sent to lie, asking me,
if he should cross the river. did
not think it advisable that he should, at
that time. 1t was first decided to cross at
Sanner's Neck, about twelve miles below
here, but our demonstration was simply for
the purpose Of drawing there as large
force of the enemy as possible. Ithen re
tired, to cross here, because, in the first
| place, felt satisfied that they did not ex-
pect Us to cross here, but below in the
next place, felt satisfied that this was the
| place to fight the most decisive battle; for
If we could divide their force by piercing
their lines at one or two points, especially
their left from their right, then vigorous
attack with the whole army would succeed
in breaking their army in pieces. Two at
tacks were made, and we were repulsed,
still holding a portion of the ground we
had fought upon, but not our extreme ad-
vance. That night l went over the field
on onr right, and, in fact, | was with the
officers and men until nearly daylight. |
found the feeling against an attack. I re-
turned to my headquarters, and, after
conversation with Sumner, told him |
wanted him to order the 9th Army Corps,
which | originally commanded, to form the
next morning column of attack by regi-
ments. 1t consisted of some eighteen old
regiments and some new ones. | desig-
mated the column to make direct attack
upon the enemy's works. | thought
that these regiments, by arriving very
quickly up after each other, would
be quite able to carry the stone wall
and batteries in front, forcing the enemy
on Their next line, and by going in with
them, they would not be able to fire upon
US to any great extent. l left Gen. Sum
ner with that understanding, and directed
him to give the orders. The order was
given, and the order OF attack was form
! ed. The next morning, just before the
| column was to have started, Gen. Sum
ner came to me and said, 81 hope you will
! desist from this attack. I do not know of
! any general officer who approves Of it, and