Richmond enquirer. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1815-1867, 1863-10-06


that the Federal army, having crossed the Po-
tnmac, was advancing northwards, and that
tho head of the column had reach he'd the South
Mountain. \. our communications with the
| Potomac were thus menaccd, it was resolved
to prevent his further progress in that direc
ton BY concentrating our army On the cas-
side Of the mountains. Accordingly, Long
street and Hill were directed to proceed from
Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point
Gen. Ewell was also instructed to march from
Carlisle.
Gen. Stuart continued to follow the move
meats of the Federal army south OF the Poto
mac after our own had entered Maryland, anc
in his efforts to impede It's progress, advanced
as far eastward as Fairfax Court House.
Finding himself unable to delay the enemy
materially. he crossed the river at Seneca
and marched through Westminster TO Carlisle
where he arrived afer Gen Ewell had left
FOR Gettysburg. BY the route he pursued the
Federal army was intcrposed between his
command and our main body. preventing any
communication with him until his arrival al
Carlisle.
The march towards Gettysburg was con
Quoted more slowly than it would have been
had the movements Of the Federal army been
known.
The leading division Of Hill met the enemy
in advance Of Gettysburg, on the morning OF
the lst Of July. Driving back these troops
| 10 within q short distance of the town, lie
there encountered larger force, with which
| twoof his divisions became engaged. Eweli,
coming up with two of his divisions by the
| IIeidlersburg road, Joined in the engagement
The enemy were driven through Gettysburg
with heavy loss, including about svc thousand
prisoners and several pieces of artillery.
He -e,;red to high range Of hills south and
east of the town. The attack was not press
ed that afternoon, the enemy's force being UNI
known, and it being considered advisable to
await the arrival of the rest Of our troops.
| Orders wersaent to hasten their march; and,
| in the meantime, every effort was made TO ascer.
tain the numbers and position of the enemy, and
| find the most favorable point Of attack. II had
not been intended to fight general battle at
such q distance from our base unless attacked by
the enemy /; but finding ourselves unexpectedly
confronted by the Federal army it became matter
Of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains
| " ith our large trains. At the same time, the
country was unfayorGb le for collecting supplies
while in the presence Of the enemy main body
~ he WAS enabled 10 restrain our foragns parties
by occupying the passes Of the mountains with
regular and local troops. A battle thus became,
in measure, unavoidable. Encouraged by the
successful issue Of the engagement of the first
LAY. and in view Of the valuable results that
would ersue from the defeat Of the army of Gen
! Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the
| attack.
The remainder Of Ewells and Hills corps
having arrived, and two divisions Of Long.
streets, our preparations were made according
| ~. During the afternoon, intelligence was
received Of the arrival Of Gen. Stuart, at Car,
Isle, and he was ordered to march to Gettys,
Durg, and take position on the left. A full
account of these eng gcmcnts cannot he given
until the reports of the several commanding
officers shall have been received, and shall
only oftersa general description.
The preparations for attack were not com
pleted until the afternoon of the ID.
The enemy he'd. high and commanding
ridge along which he had massed large
amount Of artillery General Ewell occupied
the left Of our line, General Hill the centre,
and General Loncstreet the right. In front
Of Gen. Longstrcet the enemy held position,
from which, if he could be driven, it was
thought that our army could be used to ad-
vantage in assailins the more clcva.ed ground
beyond, and TINS enable us 70 reach the crest
Of the ridge. That officer was directed TO
cndeavor to carry this position, while General
Ewell attacked directly the high ground on
the enemy's right, which had already been
partially fortified. Gen. Hill was instructed
70 threaten the centre of the Federal linc in
order to prevent reinforcemcnts being sent to
either wing, and to avail himself Of any OPP
portunity that might present itself TO attack.
J After severe struggle. Longstrect succeed
ed in getting possession Of and holding the
desired ground. Ewell also carried soma OF
the strong positions which he assailcd.and tic
result was such rs to lead 10 the belief that he
would ultimately be able to dislodse the
ennmy. The battle ceased at dark.
These partial successes determined me to
continue the assault next day. Pickett,
with three Of his brigades Joined Longstrcet
the following morning, and our batteries were
moved forward to the position SaineavA1sy him
the day before. A8#A
The general plan Of attack was 1;gsd
except that one division. and two fsfBs of
| Hips corps were ordered to support Long
| street.
The enemy in the meantime had strength.
cned his line with earthworks. The morning
was occupied in necessary preparations, and
the battle recommended in the afternoon of
the Sd, and ragged with great violence until
| sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the
advanced works of the enemy, and getting pos.
session OF some Of his batteries; but our artil-
lcry having nearly expended its ammunition,
the attacking columns became exposed 10 the
heavy fire Of the numerous batteries near the
summit Of tho ridge, and. after most deter
mined and gallant struggle, were compelled to
relin1uish their advantage, and fall lack
to their original positions, with severe loss.
The conduct OF the troops was all that |
| IL, Il
cess so far as it can be deserved by heroic val
or and lortitude. More may have been re.
quired of them than they were able to per-
ties, and confidence in their ability to cope
abatement from the issuo Of this protractcd
! and sanguinary conflict.
Owing TO the strength Of the cnemy's posi-
ton and the reduction Of our ammunition, a
renewal of the engagement could not be haz-
arded, and the difficulty OF procuring supplies
rendered it impossible to continue longer
where we were. Such Of the wounded ~
! were in condition to. be removed, and part Of
| the arms collected on tho field, were ordered
| to Williamsport. The army remained at Get
| tysburg during the 18th, and ut night began to
retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with
| it about four thousand prisoners. Nearly
two thousand had previously been paroled, but
! the enemy's numerous wounded chat had
fallen into our hands after the first and second
days. engagements, we're left behind
Little progress was made that night, owing
to ascvere storm, which greatly embarrassed
our movements. The rear of the column did
not leave its position near Gettysburg until
after daylight on the 9Th.
The march was continued during that day
without interruption by the enemy, except an
unimportant demonstration upon our rear in