The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-10-24

BARREN RESULTS OF REBEL VICTORIES
rI-A remarkable circumstance Of the wal
} and one that has been the subject of mos
speculation and curiosity to Europe, and
indeed, to educated minds in all, parts O
the world, is the barrenness of Confeder
ate victories. We are accustomed to reat
in history of battles as decisive results; j
they do not determine the fortunes OF I
contest, they generally pass large terrific
rles from one belligerent to another, give
the key to controlling positions, or are &C
companled with other important incidents
OF advantage. The only advantage, howev.
er, Which appears to have resulted to US IL
the comparative list Of casualties, which
after all, is vulgar and silly test OF vic
tory. o.
The war fingers in the slow and sanguin-
airy train of indecisive battles. At Chan.
cellorsville and at Chick amauaga were
fought the two bloodiest of the war; each OF
them contested for three days, and either
OF them equal, in the size of the armies, in
carnage, in dramatic display of valor, and
in all the incidents Of military pomp, to
the most famous conflicts of history. Yet
only the meagre qualification that we killed
more Yankees than they did Confederates.
So in all the war our battles have been
lcarcely more than cruel swaps of human
sife. They end with comparative lists of
killed and wounded, and with an invento-
ry of captures; there is no territory regain
ed, no enemy dispatched; it is thought suf-
icient to have accomplished the death Of
several thousand Yankees, and the taking
OF a certain number of small arms, colors
and other trash of the battlefield.
There must be some general explanation
of what has been so invariable in the war
the truitless and barren character of our
victories. It is a favorite sheer with Euro
pean journals. But they misunderstood
the causes Of what is both an anomaly and
paradox. The inferiority of our victories
IN point OF results to those Of all other wars
recorded in history while superior to them
IN other respects is not to be ascribed TO
the cowardice of our soldiers or ignorance
OF our commanders. We have enough of
Valor and military skill to accomplish VIC
tories commensurate in all respects with
the most famous Of history. The explana-
ton OF our dereliction is to be found in the
very heart of our military organization. It
involves that great vice which is constant
~ the stumbling-block of our armies, and
the source ofso much misfortune and NOR
al disease in the Conference.-The remis-
sion of military discipline. 49, ...f,i
We win great victories, but we do, not
improve them. The first successes of bat
tie are no sooner obtained, than our army
becomes mob, and falls to cheering and
Civilizations, in which general officers indie
Gently participate. The repulse Of the enc
my, Instead Of being the occasion of the
supreme and most persistent efforts for his
destruction, is the signal for relaxation and
the pleasant congratulations of success
When the French lines gave way at Wa
terlo0, the British troops raised loud cheers
for their commander, as he appeared on
the scene of the enemy's repu1se. ''No
cheering now, men, replied Wellington;
go forward and complete your victory"
That untimely exultation, which seems
TO take possession Of our army on every
occasion Of victory, and in which the re-
suits Of the victory easily escape US, is to be
attributed to want of rigor. 1t is this cry
ing evil which makes the army of the Con-
federacy, in practice, scarcely more than
huge militia. There can be no military
efficiency when the penalties OF the mill
tary code are not enforced; when preachers
and other sentimental persons in the Con-
federacy recopmend an anti-discipline
school that would pardon deserters and
pet refractory soldiers with sugar plums.
The short cOming of our victories is to be
mainly ascribed to the want Of discipline
and the consequent defect Of sustained and
persistent power in our armies. The ref
ormation must commence here, We can
not improve our victories until the disci-
pine Of our armies shall be improved, and
thSy SAaAA AC0A II, 1ASNSdu VI Cutt1Nss COuSId.
tulatory capers over every success, to fol-
low it up with undiverted and unrelenting
purposes. -g ~ -.
> We may then win victories which will
bear comparison with Marengo or Water
loo. AS yet we have accomplished nothing
in this war which will bear comparison,
unless we may except the first Manassas
and the valley campaign of Jackson. s, 81.
In one instance ''grand army was an
initiated. In the other an army less nu-
merous was stampeded by the vigor Of
pursuit. In both instances the work on
hand was completed. There were no after
claps; no stories of a recruited enemy and
renewed opposition; of successes left half
developed or suddenly converted to disas-
ter. These are, perhaps, the only two in
cidents of the war wherein the results
have been commensurate with the expen.
diture Of means and blood made to obtain
them, It is thus that they are to be es-
teemed great and decisive victories, and to
take rank in history with examples OF
power and genius and those military
events which are great for other reasons
than the arithmetic of killed and wounded.
Richmond paper.