Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-04-24
nETTRRs FRom vICMsnunG.
Special Correspondence of the Memphis Appeal
YIcKsBURG. April q, 1868

special correspondence OF tae honphis AppesLl
YIcKsBURG, April 81, 1868
Yesterday morning some uneasiness was expe-
rienced in this city from the report that picket
szirmisb had taken place between our piekets
and the oatposis of the enemy on the peninsula
The way the report originated was as follows ::
On the evening previous a number of pickets
were sent across the river to watch the enemy
during the night, end some hours later volley
Of musketry wss heard in that direction. In
the morning the rumor circulated that firing
was heard among the pickets, and our men not
returning as early as looked for, it was at once
surmised that they had been cut off by the
enemy.
But few hours later they came over all safe,
and reported that they had formed their lns go
as to wsy-lay and ambush the Yankees, if any
of them should attempt to pass that way. The
lieutenant in command had gwen his iorders for
the men to reserve their fire, and if the Yankees
approached to let them pass through their line
and then close in on them and drive them to the
river, where they might all be safely bagged-
After al the preliminaries were arranged and
the men in their proper position, squsd of blue
bellies came along, and when within q hundred
yards of the line one of our men got scared and
fred, at which the Yankees skedsddled- Our
men gsve chase and kept up running fire.
fit had not been for this unfortunate shot
the whole gang would have been captured, and
their escape is only accounted for from the fact
that one among our pickets could not obey or
dsrs, and gave them timely warning. As soon
as the fcst shot was fred they smelled q
NICE" and broke for their camp at double
quick, our men pursuing and giving them q
fire in the rear as they went. Several were seen
to fall, and it is believed that they were NOR
tally wounded, and fell so near the etge of
the water chat they relied in and disappeared.
Quantities of blood were also discovered next
morning, which proved that the fire of our boys
at least drew blood, if not the life, out of some
Of the Yankees, but no prisoners were secured.
Several other parties OF skirmishers have
since been sent over, and if the enemy keeps
investigating tho topography Of that swamp
few days longer they will have to conc in force
or run the risk of losing their men. It strikes
me to be somewhat singular that now st the
eleventh hour we should place pickle. guard
on the opposite side of the river, when they
should have been there every night for the lss:
thTea months. If this precsution had been
taken in the beginning, the incendiary Yankees
would not have been able to burn nearly sll the
buildings in DsSoto, and now when we need
these buildings for our own uses, they would
not Be found ia ashes as they sie, all through
our own carelessness.
Contrary to expectations the eDemy's guns
did not open on the town yesterday morning,
snd remained silent all day. Various con-
lectures are shoat concerning this unexpected
slencs One theory is to this effect: That the
enemy was anxious to destroy several houses
opposite town, lest we might FIRE them to light
up the river when an attack was made, which
would be greatly to tteir disadvantage, and they
10 send out party to burn them, so
ls to get them out of the way. Our officers
getting wind of this, sent over q small picket
o-cs to entrap the housebumers, which resulted
s5 above stated and that the frightened Yanks,
who had come entirely unprepsred, ran back to
.he battery ike scared hounds, and reported ,
.bat the whole rebel force was spprcaching to
take the battery, and frightening the garrison I
50 bsdly that they spiked the guns and incOn-
nenty sltsdsddIod. !
There is some plauslbility in this conjecture, I
md it is nothing more than what has happened 5
over and over again in this war The case of
he Indianala being one among the many Incl
ients of this kind, to prove how easily panic '
nay be created among the bravest and most /
Tstehful But whatever msy have been the !
ause, it IS certain that not gun was fred from !
hst quarter yesterday, and it seems evident that
omething went wrong among them during the Q
geTious night It is to be hoped that the )
heory put forth in regard to the spiking of the d
.uns may prove to be correct f
If it sh ould be SO It viii be singing rebuke e
0 our own negligence in not sending over cur
ickets wkeH the work was first commenced by il
he enemy, and is on par with the dcgged de- 9,
Of General Pemberton to reserve the
re of our batteries while he, at safe distance s.
fifty miles, can contemplate with Indifference G
le damage inflicted upon ths town, while our n
uus arc ready ct any moment to dislodge the I.
nemy. It no doubt requires great skill in mil d
ary matters to be leutensntgenersl, but it is el
ls universal conviction that if any of the sub 3
-dinates 10 command of our batteries had been Il
lowed to use their pieces to the best advan- Of
,ge, the enemy would have been dislo5ged in tr
IS than an hour after his FIRST shot. u y
It viii hereafter matter but little how well the ID
.uso Of this reticence may be explainedi the ah
lpression is firmly fixed in the minds Of the th
'oplo and army tbas the policy is wrong, and Z; y
any good should GENE of it hereafter, none HI
IN believe otherwise than that it could have
zen egsctsd in much less space Of time By an
ise of JEFF. Davis blue pills. A good deal of r y
cling IS being manifested about Gen. Pember- ca
MS continued absence from ehis place; the sn
lpression prevailing that he should once in W
lle come and see for himself tie real events III
ID condition of things here. NEsToR 1S TS
En-