Semi-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1853-18??, 1863-11-13

q.
The country may as we'll prepare itself for anoth-
er retreat in the West The Indications Of the an;
nual migration Of birds are scarcely more unerTlng
shan are the auguries which forete the Gisappoint
ment of the high expectations formed OF the results
to be attained in that quarter. After continuance
of favorable prognostics to which additional strength
was given by the confident tone Of the President
since his recent tour of inspection; after reiterated
assurances Of the straits TO which the enemy was
reduced; of the precarious tenure of his communi-
cations; the difficulties Of subsistence by which he
was pressed and the impoSsibility Of his long con-
tinuance in his present position we now note a GER
tain, and somewhat inde6nable, change OF tone,
which, to people rendered doubly acute by long
habit and deep interest serves to mark the fall OF
the barometer and to give warning of the coming
storm.
certain vague mistiness Of detail; an uncertain
~ as to the actual position OF affairs confusion and
contradiction in the various accounts which reach
us both from the enemy and our own side all these
are omens which the experience, we have been
forced to acquire in the art Of divinaon, tells US
are to be interpreted in bad sense. 1t is well that
they should precede the unpleasing reality; that
the public mind inflated WITH too large a dose OF
confidence, and braced to too great degree OF ten
sion, should be gradually depleted and relaxed
The power Of adaptation which is so strong facul
ty of the human mind, and that simple philosophy
which, though not derived from the schools, sprin.s
will enable the country to bear the disappointment
OF its high hopes it has before now endured more
serious disasters, with constaney and trmneSs
little time and gentle preparation will render the
process easier and give the requisite tone to the en-
ergies and fortitude of the people.
The newspapers were enjoined at the beginning
Of the war, and they have in general displayed CON-
mendable disposition to observe proper reticence
as to the movements of troops and the probable
plans of our generals. 1t may be doubted, en- pGs-
SAINT if the practice prevalent at Charleston, OF
publishing the exact number of the enemy's shots
which strike, and the amount of damage tney do,
is exactly in accordance with the prudent policy
usually observed But no matter what may be the
general freedom from censure in this respect there
Is one point on which there is much to blame not
so much for any warning or information gives the
enemy as for its sad effect upon our own people,
1t is the continual and extrayagant representations
that are made Of the advantageous positions occu-
pied by our army, and the greatfeSults that are
soon to ensue. The enemy'S army is at one time
'hemmed in between q river aud our own forces at
one time; at another his flank is turned one corps
entirely cut off and its destruction certain again.
his communications are so embarrassed that be must
fight to save himself from starvation. These fanc-
full statements excite the contempt OF the observer
who knows from general history how rare occur
is the absolute destruction or surrender OF an
entire army, and how difficult to bar all avenues OF
retreat Applied to our own position, and read by
the light of the history of the last two years. they
excite an uneasy feeling of apprehension They re-
call too many glowing promises of the same nature,
all of which, after egettng undue feeling Of Ella
ton and high expectations, inevitably doomed to
be disappointed even by more signal success than
usually waits on military operations have been fol-
lowed by feeling Of dependency at the unsatsfao
tory sequel Let all such extravagant predictions
and Swelling prOlogues" be considered contraband
in future. The-serious difficulties of the are
enough to try all our fortitude Let US not add
those engendered by re- action arising from over
wrought expectation. ... ..,. .-e....
Accidents are to be looked for incident to war.
The most skillfal plans are often deranged by for
tuitous circumstances or the fault of subordnates.
A great commander must overcome these obstacles;
rectfy errors and direct to the best advantage the
capacity of his lieutenants. The Bayarian General
Waldo, it is related arriving late upon the field Of
Wagram, said to Napoleon, l fear have deranged
your Majesty's plans 81 have no plan," reioined
| Napoleon, "but as you have come we will attack"
1 That great commander was often subjected to Sc
rious misfoTtunes from the deficiency of his subor-
dinates but his controlling genius admirably rcgu-
| ulated and employed their various talents Consis-
! tent accounts reach u.s. not only of mistakes in ex-
| ecution, but of disagreement and discord in the
4 councils of the Western army. 1t is certain that
with such state of things full Efficiency cannot be
| expected from an army. The chief should be made
to suit the Heutenants, or the lieutenants made to
suit the chief Until this is done the valor of our
troops will probably win success upon pitched
field but the full fruits of victory will not be grasp
ed nor the decisive results attained which depend
upon the elaborate execution of extensive combna-
tions-Rich. Examiner. .. ..-.' -