Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1863-03-26

they nave fuily maintained their superior
Iity. 1t is mons the less true, however,
that public expectation in this matter has
been much disappointed, and it is curious
to look at some OF the explanations given
for it. The Prince lie Joinville, in his re-
cent pamphlet, speaking of the battle OF
Fair Oaks. and of the neglect to throw
bridges over the Chickahominy at the prop
er time. by means of which the whole rebel
army might have been taken in flank, aud
probably destroyed. sseribes the neglect on
one page to what he calls Ia Ieafeur amer
icaine. which he seems to think always leads
our countrymen to let the chance slip of
doing the right thing at the right lime, aud
again. on the next to 'Jaute d Reorganization,
faufe de hiera' CHE. fante de hen, 9ui en- re-
suite entre Tame du eaefet FGrmee, lien
puissant oui permet an General de de-
nander a ses s0idats ct den o5tenir area
clement ces Efforts erirGo'dinaries 9m gag
nent les 5attdailes." In other words. Gen
eral Mcclellan, knowing that he could
gain decisive victory by laying down
half-a-dozen bridges. which. it is stated,
were all ready for the purpose. actually
refused to order his soldiers to do it, be-
cause he was afraid they would not obey
his orders. And this is the Princes iudg.
ment of an Amy. which. few weeks later
according TO his own account. fought FIVE
battles in as many days, all, with one ex-
ception, victories over an enemy at least
double its numbers, and arrived at its
new base on the James river in excellent
condition. and without the slightest faint
of decentralization. This illustration shows
the absurdity Of ascribing the want of i'm
mediate success to la lenteW Americai,ae,
quality. by the way. which We learn for
the frat time is one of our national char
acteristics. rtts
Among the many causes which might
be named. all perfectly legitimate. and
presenting no obstacle which little ex-
perience will not remove, we venture to
suggest but one. and that is the character
of the early military education Of cur
higher officers. The system pursued at
West Point, although admirable for quail
flying ficers for the scientific and staff
corps OF the army, seems to Tail in teach
ing the young soldier. what is just now the
most important quality he can possess for
command. the character and capacity of
volunteer soldiers. The system of discip-
line he has been taught is that which gov
erns the regular army. system modeled
upon the English, which is. with the ex.
ception Of that in use in Russia, the most
brutal and denoralizing known in any ar
my in Europe. No wonder. therefore.
that when our educated soldiers are sud
denly placed in high positions. and with
great responsibilities. and when they discov-
er that the sort of discipline which they
have beep taught is wholly out of place in
securing the efficiency Of vc.unteer army.
they are lei to doubt whether it can ever
be made efficient at all. These prcjudices,
however. are wearing away before the test
OF actual experience. Generals are grad
ually learning that they may contide in
their men. even for desperate undertakings;
they begin to sea in their true light the
many admirable qualities Of the volunteer;
and he. in turn. begins to understand some
thing of that military system. which seem
Ell at first SO irksome . q meaningless to
him; ana the advance OF the army in fhe
essentials of discipline has been proper
tionafy rapid. .se4s9 sa1
There is good deal of talk about the
impossibility of conquering or suhjugating
the South. which is based upon very vagne
notions Of what conquest and saljngation
signify. 1t is surprising tn find how even
intelligent men have been imposed upon
by this favorite boast of the rebels AMI
their sympathizers. A pretended saying
of Napoleon is quoted. that lit is impossi-
bic to prevent any people determined on
achieving its independence, from accom-
plishing its purpose" and it is confident
liy asked whether any one ever heard of
the srbjusation of twelve millions of peo-
pie determined to be free. We reply that
history, ancient and modern. is full of in
stances of the only sort of conquest or
subjugation which any sane man proposes,
shall be submitted to by the South. No
one thinks it possible or necessary, for the
purpose in view. to occupy the whole
South with garrisons, but simply to de-
stroy the only support upon which its ar
rogant pretensions are based. namely its
military power This gone. what becomes
of all the resi-? and this remaining. where
is there any hope of permanent peace and
safety to Us? For what is all war but an
appeal to force to settle questions of ma
tional interest, which peaceful discussion
has failed to settle, and what is an army,
but only another argument. the ultima ra-
tio, which, if successful in decisive battles.
must give the law to the conquered? To
say nothing of instances in ancient histo-
ry. POLAND. Hungary and Lembsrdy, in
our day. were just as determined to be free
as the South j.. and quite as full of martial
ardo,: and certainly Prussia. Spain under
the Bonaparte dynasty. aud the French
Empire, are all examples Of nations which
valued their Independence. and had ten
fold the resources for maintaining it which
the South possesses; yet the capture Of
Warsaw, the surrender of Villages, the
battles OF Novara. of Jena, of Salamanca,
and of Waterloo respectively. settled as
definitely the fate Of the inhabitants of those
countries and their future condition. as If
the terms imposed by the conqaeriug ar
my had been freely and unanimously agree,
upon by the representatives of the people
in Congress assembled. And. in like
manner, can any one donbt. looking at the
present comparative resources 9th TWO
sections. that il we should gain two 3eci-
sivs battles, one in the East and the other