The Lansing state Republican. [volume] (Lansing, Mich.) 1855-1874, 1863-04-22

overcome to bring over our right wing. Al
though We did Dot then knO~ all that We now
90, it was obvious Al the time that when the
rebels struck the blow Al our lett wing, thsy did
not leave anv means IN their hands unused 10
secure success. Il Was OF yious eooagh that
they struck ~ith their whole force, aud vet We
repused them in disorder With three 9th. Of
ours. We should have followed them mp al the
same tine thai We brought over the other two
hfIhs.
After is was known that Mcdowell vas
called "a 10 another quarter, there was no lon
ger hope Of % Increase OF force by the junction
ct his corps. There were no reiuforcem~nts 70
be looked Tor beyond what received by The
middle o. the month Of jane. The rebel force
was kno~n, or supposed 10 be constantly III
creasing oy conscription, by the intaX OF troops
from other parts. aud by the breaking up Of
Beauregard's army.
"At lasl Ibe moment came when action wAs
imperative The enemy assumed the iainAIve-
We bad ~arning OF when and where be was TO
strike. Had Porter beea withdrawn on the
night Of the 26sh OF June, our army would have
been concentrated on the right bank OF the
CAlekAhomiay river, whhe two corps Al east OF
the euemss force we're On the lcit bank. Wnat-
ever course we then took, whether 90 strike at
Richmond aud tue portion OF the enemy on the
|
We could have had a concentrated army and
iair chance OF brilliant result ia the hsst; aud
ln the second, n We accomplish nothing, Nc
would have been "a the same Case on the morn
ing oi the >. "a as We we're on the 2Sth, minusa
lost battle aud a compulsory retreat
Or had the fortified ines thro~n up express
iy for that object, been held by 10000 men, -
they could have been We would have fought on
the other side with So 600 men instead OF ~
oo0. Or finally, had the lines been abandoned,
with our hold on the right bank of the Chcka-
homiuy, we might have fought and crushed the
cueny on th lvit bank, reopened our communi-
caton, aud then returned aud taken Riehmond.
As it was, the enemy ioaghs With his ~hOe
force-except enough left before our lines to
keep up an appearance-and We fought with
/ 21.OOO men, losing battle and 900 men. By
This defeat were driven from our position,
our advance for conquest turned into 4 retreat
Tor safety from force probably not greatly su-
perior % our osn.
" In view OF the length OF time Which our op
erai1Ons before Richmond consumed. there il
now no doubt that the depot al the White House
should have been fortified as well as Que OF tive
points on the railroad thence TO the Chick ahom-
nv; thar the fsis de pDnf at Bottoms bridge
/ should have been completed, aud likewise tefes
de PoHf, OF strong positions prepared 10 cover
The deoYnches from our bridges 10 the Lett bank
OF the Chickahominy With these the army
would have possessed freedom of motion TO cou-
contrale ON either side and the disastrous bat
tie OF the 27th would scarcely have occurred.
" Wnen the army reached the James river il
needed no prophet TO predict the disasters which
have since befAien our countrv's cause II the
army had sustained itsef noby, il cannot be de-
nied that 50 much irutiess toll aud so much dis
aster, had deprived il OF the elan which resalts
from success alone. IL vas, moreover as we'll
a. cur forces ei-eShere. sadly diminished in
numbers. On the other hand, the rebel army,
from its low slate, had risen up an army most
formidable IN numbers. excellent in organization
aud inspired by a great success. Had its nun
bers indeed, approached 10 that attributed 70 il
POD, 900 men-there i iitile douOt that a
march upon Washington would have speedily
followed our with .rawAl 20 the James
d" From such considerations, as well A. those
following from the results Of the past operations
| counseled the immediate withdrawal from the
James 20 reurite with our forces then covering
Washington"
The report of Gen. Barnard is Ia, lny report
Of the officers engaged 10 the campa "a OF the
Peninsula, which your Committee have obtained