Daily national Republican., 1863-11-24
OFFICIAL REPORTS OF GEN. ROSE.
GRAMS AND HIS OFFICERS.

II is expected that the War Department will
publish, ere long, the official reports Of General
Rosecrans and the different corps commanders
of his army. The report was finished and sent
of before his removal, aud Gen. Rosecrans in
it has confined himself to a narrative Of the
events of the campaign. 1t does not therefore
explain his removal.
We understand that the document, which is
rather voluminous, commences with an ac-
count of the time and labor expended In the ro
pairing of the Nashville and Chattanooga rail.
road to the Tennessee river, which goes to
show that the army of the Cumberland could
not we'll move earlier than 1t did. full de-
scription of the topography Of the theatre of
the offensive movements then follows, convey.
ing an idea of the great local obstacles that
had 10 be encountered, and demonstrating
that the plan of operations afterwards carried
out south of the Tennessee was the only practi-
cable one.
The latter was to make feint direct advance
on Chattanooga with part Of the army, along
the north aud south bank of the river, and to
execute with the main body a flank movement
upon the enemy's right, by which it was ex-
pccted either to compel the enemy to abandon
Chattanooga or to bring the aanking column
betwceu him aud his lines of communication
and retreat. After the former contingency had
occurred, and Chattanooga had fallen into our
hands, pursuing movements were Instituted,
under the Impression that the enemy was in
full retreat toward Rome and Atlanta, Gen.
Crittendcn's corps being directed to pursue via
Dalton, Gen. Thomas corps via Lafayette, and
Gen. AcCook'S corps via Alpine and Summer
willie. Upon ascertaiuing, however, the enemy
10 bo concentrated near Lafayette, a counter
concentration was ordered in McLemorc's Cove.
This was delayed some days by the failure of
McCook's corps TO take certain road, which
he had been ordered to follow. On the 18th of
September, 1t was ascertained that the enemy
was trying 10 get between our army and Chat
tauooga, and a movement by the left ordered
to prevent this. This movement brought on
the first collision on the 18th. Of the battle OF
the 18th but brief account is given. No sui
ordinate Is censured in connection with it.
The author OF the report says OF 1t that it was
absolutely necessary to secure our concentra
tion in front Of Chattanooga; that In It's course
our army maintained its ground everywhere
and gained its objects, viz: the control Of the
roads leading through Rossville TO Chattanooga
In connection with the battle Of the 10th, h,
says that not only the safety Of our commun
cations but that OF the army itself depended
upon II. He states that in the rcfor ormation o
The line Of battle during the night and In th,
curse of the early forenoon, both Generals
N,Gook and Crittenden repeatedly failed Il
Iost aud move their commands rs directed
Whereby the result OF the action was seriously y
Affected. General Wood he makes responsible
for an unfortunate mistake In the execution OF
an order, by which the gap ofthe right was ere.
ated, that resulted in the ruut of that part OF
the line.
In regard to his going into Chattanooga be,
fore the battle was over, he says that In III,
route of the right he wss entirely cut oil from
the remainder Of the army, and that, after al
unsuccessful direct attempt to reach the left
he determined to make another by way of Ross
Vile. On arriving near that place, he was IN
formed that Negley was In full retreat, and be
lieviDg him 10 have been on the extreme left
he concluded that the whole army had give
way, and determined TO 30 to Chattanooga l.
make preparations for the defence Of the plac
and sre 10 the safety Of the pnntoon bridge
across the Tennessee. Al the conclusion of tl
report, he speaks in rather brief terms Of tn
services of Gen. Thomas, and bestows rathc