Ashtabula weekly telegraph. [volume] (Ashtabula, Ohio) 1853-1873, 1863-01-24
WASHINGTON, April 9. lssa
MAJ. GEN. MoCLELLAN-My Dear Sir,


MAJ GEN. MoCLELLAN-My Dear Sir,
Your dispatches complaining that you
are not properly sustained, while they dc
not offend, pain me very much BIenker's
division was withdrawn from you before
you left here. You knew the pressure nm
der which l did it, and as thought ac
quiesed in it, certainly not without reluct
ance. After you left | ascertained tha;
less than 10000 unorganzed men without
a single field battery, were all yon designed
to be left for the defence of Washington
and Manassas Junction. A part Of these
men were TO go to Hooker's old position.
Banks corps, once designed for Manassas
Junction, was divided and tied up on the
line OF Winchester and Strawsburg, and
could not leave it without again exposing
the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and
Ohio Railroad. This presented, or would
present, when Mcdowell and Sumner
should be gone. great temptation for the
enemy to turn back from the Rsppahan.
mock ond reach Washington. My explicit
direction that Washington sheuld, by the
judgment of all the Commanders of Corps,
be left entirely secure, had been entirely
neglected.
1t was precisely this that drove me to de-.
tain Mcdowell | do not forget that was
satisfied with your arrangements to leave
Banks at Manassas Junction, but when
that arrangement was broken up and
nothing was substituted for it, of course
was not satisfied. l was constrained
to substitute something for it my.
self, aud now allow me to ask, do you
really think l should permit the line from
Richmond via Manassas Junction to this
city, to be entirely open, except what res.
istence could be presented by less than 90.
600 unorgon zed troops? This is the ques.
tion which this country will not allow me
to evade. There is curious mistery alb.
out the number of troops with you.
telegraphed you en- the 9th, saying that
you had over one hundred thousand with
you.
had just obtained from the Secretary
OF War statement, taken, as be said,
from your own returns, making los, 900
then With you and enroute You now say
you will have bnt 5000 when all enroule
for you shall have reached you. How can
this discrepancy Of 35, 900 men be account
Gu iOE ms ~ w Ool b COL0ndDQ un0eT-
stand it is doing for You precisely what q
like number of your own would have to do
if the command was away. suppose the
whole force which has gone forward to you
is with you by this time, land if so,
think it is the precise time for you to strike
blow. By delay the enemy will readily
gain on you that is be will gain faster by
fortifcations and reinforcements than you
can by reinforcements. Once more let me
tell ycu it is indispensable to you that you
strike blow. l am powerless to help
You will remember always opposed
yonr going down the bay in search Of a
field instead Of fighting at or near Manass-
as, as i. was only shifting and not sur.
mounting difficulty that we would fnd
some enemy and the same or equal in
trench cents at either place.
The country will not faihto note, and is
noting now, the present hesitation to
move upon the entrenchments of the enemy.
1t is but the story Of Manassas repeated
beg to assure you that l have never
written or spoken to you 10 greater kind.
ness Of feeling than now with fuller
purpose to sustain you so far as in my
most anxious judgment l consistently caa /;
but you must act
Yours truly, LINCOLN.