Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1863-10-26


What damage was done What is to be
done now9 These questions have been
asked, but not answered satisfactorily IN
til now. A very full and ineligible re.
view of the campaign appears in the New
York Times, by Mr.. swinton, one Of the
chief army correspondents of that journal
From that review we quote several para
graphs to give comprehensive idea of the
movements and counter-movements.
As to future movements it is assert
ed that SO great and thorough was the dam
age done to the Orange & Alexandria Rail-
rosd by Lees retreating army, that it can
not be repaired within four weeks. Every
bridge, culvert, embankment or cut has
been burned, blown up or filed in.
OF the general character of the cam
paign, it is said that it has not brought
much glory to either side.
The operations, with the exception Of
the engagement ct BristOe, have been those
of strategy, inhicting DO great amount of
damage upon either army.
The correspondent says:
4" In truth, the real results of this iaUcsivs
nOOsmsnt on the part Of General Lee, are to
be sought for, not so much in anything that has
been accomplished here in Virginia, as in the
relations Of operations here to the whole field
Of t0dr. In this regard it remains to be
seen how far the progress and fortunes of
the war will be effected by the late rebel
movement. At present it assumes the
character of a diversion in favor of ope-
rations in the Southwest There is not the
shadow Of a doubt that a considerable por-
ton of the troops with which Lee threw
back Meade are now on their way to re-
inforce the rebel army in Tennessee for
active work against some portion of the
great line now being held by the Union
forces, from Chattanooga to the Gaps of
Virginia.
MENT.
"I have had frequent opportunity of
learning the rebel theory of Lees late
movements, having conversed with many
citizens Of the country through which we
have, during the past two or three days,
passed in the wake of Lees arm ?, and
they all tell the same story: It is, that the
movement was made for the purpose of
throwing the Army of the Potomac back
on Washington and then utterly destroy
ing the railroad connecting Meades army,
on the line of the Rapidan with its base,
thus relieving Richmond from the stand
ing menace which our occupation Of that
front of operations held out, exheusting
the season during which it is possible for
us to make Fall campaign. and throwing
us over till next Spring, when the disso-
luton Of our army and prospective rebel
operations in the Southwest would secure
them peace"
OF the reports of another invasion of
Maryland being contemplated, he says:
"There is no probability that he ever
purpOsed crossing the Potomac for fresh
invasion of Maryland or Pennsylvania
There is, on the contrary, very great GER
tainty that he did not design such a move
ment, for his army brought no pontoon train,
a fact in itself conclusive against any such
design, and further eorroborated bv the
limited quantity of supplies he had with
him.
" As to the result Of the movement, the
rebels did not succeed in any considerable
captures; the movements of the lieuten-
ants on whom Lee relied 70 execute his
plans were too slow; theretrograde move
ment Of Meade, too swift and too skilful.
to afford him the fitting opportunity for
battle, and the one practical result OBJ
fa.v q = - a.
and what that involves.
TIE DESTRUCTION OF TIE RAILROAD.
This work has been very thoroughly
done, Lees whole army having been en-
gagged on it for two days From Bristoe
to the RappRhsnnOck, the destruction is
eomplete-bridge burnt, culverts blown
up, ties taken up and burned, rails twisted
and rendered useless, cuts filled up, etc,
etc. The engineers say that it will be at
least month before it can be again put in
running order. 1t is with no small NOR
ifcation, therefore, that we have to con-
fess the rebels have achieved an end fully
Commensurate with the labor and risk of
the campaign. The Rebel theory, so far
as it consigns the army of the Potomac to
a role of iaactiVi y in Virginia is accepted
By our ol2H Generals, and it will depend on
the conduct of those who direct military
operations over the whole theater Of war
how far the pass to which the rebels have
brought affairs in Virginia will affect the
fortunes Of the war on other fields"
tbs said that Meade tried repeatedly to
get battle, but that Lee would not allow
it. Meade is reported to have said that
it " was like pulling out his eye-teeth not
to have had fight" The reasons why he
could not force one are thus stated:
CRITICISM OF THE CAMPAIGN.
"In passing Judgment upon the conduct
of this campaign-even if that be possi-
ble at all at this time-We must weigh
duly all the elements that enter into the
problem. Had General Meade been free
to operate with no other considerations in
view save those of military order, a blow
might have been struck at the sudacious
invaders that would have proved their
death-bloW. When Lees force was mass
ed at Sperryville, and Meade's on the
RappahannOck, the Union Commander was
already practically on the rebel line of
communications, and an advance IN the
part of General Meade direct on Gordons-
vile would have brought Lee promptly
back to attend to the menaced safety of the
rebel Capital, and he might have, in a
strong position, given the rebels forty
thousand battle with double that force.
This would have been to repeat the brill
liant strategy of Turenne, who, when his
opponent, Montecuouli, crossed to the left
bank of the Rhine to invade Alsace, him
self passed to the right bank, and thus
brought Montecueuli hurriedly back to
look after his own communications. Tur-
enne had no Washington to look after.
Meade was bound, at all hazards, to cover
the Capital, and could not possibly afford
to risk battle with his face to the Poto-
ba oond.,o. & n