The Lansing state Republican. [volume] (Lansing, Mich.) 1855-1874, 1863-04-22
wcovEsDAy MORNING. APRILas 1863
Mcclellan.


NV resume of the testimony OF nearly 40
witnesses, almost entirely Of men in the militia
~ service Of the Government, including about
100 generals" taken by the committee, and are
conclusive upon tie points discussed.
No candid man can peruse the report without
being coavinc,d Of the utter iDcApacity Of Gen
Mcclellan for the high position he too long &C.
cupied. His imbeciity, if not his coWaidice
and treacherv. can no longer be Questioned. Il
Is painful to the last degree to see what abun
dant means 10 men and equipments he squsn-
dered, what golden opportunities he lost, what
boundless trust he betrayed.
The brilliant exploits which raised him with
unprecedented r4pidity to the command Of the
armies Of the United States, we're principally
the work OF others. He rose, not from bis CON
mahding talents and his well earned fame, but,
like his balloons, from imitation, and like them
when punctured by the enemy's shot and shell
be collapsed.
When he took command OF the army Of the
Potomac, the FIRST thing he did was to cit down,
and there he sat for nearly eight long months
contemplating the enemy. With an army Of
1855. 900 men, we'll equipped, well disciplined, Of
unquestoned bravery, and eager for the fray.
pitted against a rebel force OF less than 40, 90
men, he scarcely during all that period, made
even one weak offensive movement against the
enemy. He suffered the Potomac to be block
AIDED, refusing the bare pittance Of 1000 men
20 keep open this important communication
True. he twice promised Capt. Craven the need
ed assistance, but he al &c broke his word
Hi propensity already mentioned uns through
bis whole military career. He sat dO~n before
the quaker guns Of Manassas, until bis enemies
sbasdoIed them in sheer d-rision al the farce
BE sAt down before Yorktown until the rebels
again escaped unsca,hed. lie 81, down ia the
s~smps OF the Questioning, until driven 81
by the stern psicking Of hostile bayonet-. Tie
sat down In Maryland until he was pried over
the Potomac with a Presidential handspke
His Photograph should always be taken ia SIT
ting posture. History wil ~rte him down as Il
man Who would probably have hatched ou'
great events, # be had only had pair Of fealh
er breeches Time enough certainly given
him 10 ineubate.
McCislAn's over caution, inaction and delay
were entirely nexcu-aOle. aud we're enough e.
ruin any cause. When he landed upon the Pc
ninsula. bis force numbered, by his own sdmis
sion. IS. 100 men. 10000 less than the actuAI
nunbsr) while Magrudsr had at Yorkto~u,
only ABOUT 10000. Ii Is the testimony of d
credible witness, don. Lsmue j 30 ~dei,) ther.
within the rebel lines that 1.-The rebels did noi
determine to re enforce Magruder until it was
apparent that our forces intended to stop before
YO krosn aud commence a regular siege Of the
place
By McClellan's delay at yorktown be buried
some of his best troops and lost a splendid op
portunity OF asing Richmond By his misc4r
rage at Williamsburg he lost another. By his
failure TO avail himself OF the victories OF Fair
Oaks aud y lvern Hill, he lost a third and a
fourth. IL avs the same hating hesitat-
inc. gruubling, unreaiy commander-al avs
depreciating his own resources aud magnify ing
the obstacles before him. Another peculiarly
Of Gen. Mcclellan was that be was always cry
ing for more troops, more horses more IranspOr
tation, more something Like the horse
leech, his cry was "givel givel" Even al
yorktown, where We have seen his great supe-
riority OF force, he called loudly for more troops,
He puts FORTH SAYS an exchange, " one con
slant, steady call for Observation-Disclosures
he is or whatever be has to do, before a victory
and after defeat at every step on the PennsG-
Ia, before he had fought the enemy in Maryland
and after be bad beaten him at Antietam,-
without any regard, apparently to the numbers
be already had to those of the enemy he had
to meet. Ii seems he had started with the the
DRY that by such q course be could clear himself
OF all blame in any eveht,-that in Case of de-
feat he could point 10 the fact OF his incessant
calls tor more troops as proof OF his sagscity,
and in case Of success be could claim the greater
credit for having achieved it with an inferior
force. This habit reaches its climax when after
the battle Of Antieiam he asked that Washing
ton might be stripped of troops-even il it
should be taken in consequence thereof-to re-
infOrce his army, that he might fortfy himself
At HArper's Ferry, and repel the rebels if they
should attempt to cross into Maryland again"
Again. Much has been said of McClellan's
STRATEGY" and the seven days battle OF the
Peninsula has been abducted as an astonishing
proof of il. But what shall be said when it is
known, "a it now is, that 1.-THE battles were
fought, the troops handled, new dispositions
made and old ones changed entirely BY corps
commanders without directions from the Con
handing General" What shall be said too Of
Mcclellan strategy at HsHisons Bar after his
retreat from the victory at Malvern HILL this
strategy may be summed up in this-never
follow up victory, but if you can, retreat \
where the committee say: "No orders were
given the FIST day for occupying the Nights
which CO handed the position, nor were the
troops so placed az 10 De able 10 resist an attack
in force by the enemy, and nothing but heavy
rain, which prevented toe enemy iron bringing
up their artillery, saved the army from destruc
toni" Aud what shall be said of his bravery
when isis known that during that fierce seven
days hght, he illustrated bis " conservative 3"
principles By keeping altogether out OF harms
way, and that he never was 10 battle, exeep,
for snort time in the latter part of the 6ghs
at Malvern Hi.
But We have not space to say more upon tbi>
exhausted topic. Mcclellan, by his iuexcusibls
iB4csiOu aud delays, frittered away the strength
OF one OF the most po~effsl armies the world