New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-04-07
GEN. MCCLELLAN.


of tho War. which we printed yesterday in
full. is remarkable as dealing not with opin'
ions. or arguments, or theories, but NANNY
with facts. 1t is historical statement OF the
eridenes on certain important points. We
have already presented in these columns IA
impartial summary of this evidence; lot us
epdeayor to note now more briefly the con.
clu,ions which il establishes. We will try to
state them in such way that, however they
may conflict with personal psrtia.ities or pre-
JUDGES, they shall not be controvsrtloie as
matters Of fact.
The Army of the Potomac was organized BY
Mai. Gen. Mcclellan. BY the first Of October
1861. it numbered ls5, 900 men, and was in all
respects ct for immediate service. The Rebel
army at Manassas, which was opposed to it,
was lees than 1000 strong, But tho Army OF
the Potomac nevertheless remained inactive
during the whole Winter Of 1862, and did
not move till the Rebels voluntarily evacuated
Manassas in March. A victory that Winter
would practically have annihilated the Rebel
lion. 1t 10 not now disputed that our army
would have won victory if it had been tried,
and tina. Gen. Mcclellan is solely responsible
for its failure 70 try.
Secondly: The Blockade OF the Potomac
might have been prevented or raised at any
time during that Winter by naval force with
the cooperation Of 1000 troops. Gen. Nc
Clelan withdrew the troops and is solely re-
sponsible for the continuance of the blockade.
Tlirdly. The Peninsular Campaign was Gen.
McClean's own plan, reluctantly acquiesced in
by the President, and undertaken BY Mcclellan
on the express condition that no should leave
force sufficient, in the opinion of all his corps
commanders, for the defense Of Washington.
They Fixed the number of that force ut 80, 900.
But Gen. Mcclellan, in violation of his agree
ment and of the orders OF the President, with
drew all but 1900 troops from the Capital,
part even of those being raw, and no light
artillery loft them. The President, therefore,
ordered the corps of Mcdowell to remain for
the defense of Washington, and even including
this corps the specified number of troops was
not made up. Yet this is what is termed au
aud is in substance the only ground of CON-
plant against the President, and the only ex-
cuse offered for the failure Of tho Peninsular
Campaign.
Fourihiy: Mcclellan took with him to the
Peninsula moro than 100, 900 troops. The
Rebels had less than %, 900 to resist his Occu-
patton Of Yorktown. But he sat down to be-
siege it; the Rebels concluded to re-enforce
aud resist, and after a months delay the place
was evacuated by the Rebels without firing
gun. just as Mcclellan was ready TO open his
batteries. Meanwhile part Of McDowels
corps had been sent him. 1t is now known
that Yorktown might have been taken at once,
and that Richmond would have fallen with it.
For the delay and failure Mcclellan alone is
responsible.
fiihiy: There were three other occasions
when, if Mcclellan had improved his advan
tage, Richmond might have been taken by the
troops who could at once have been moved
against it; viz: after the battles of Williams
burg, Seven Pines, and Malvern Hill. Each
time no hesitated to advance till it was too late
and the Rebel capital was saved.
Sixthiy: The retreat of the Army of the
Potomac after and during The Seven Days
Battles was precipitate and premature. The
battles were all fought by the Corps command
ers, Gen. McClellans only share in the oper.
alton being to order and superintend the unneces-
sary retreats by night. And when, finally, after
the splendid victory of Malvern Hill, won in his
absence, he again fell back to Harrison's Bar,
he despaired Of his army, made no preparations
for defense for twenty -four hours after, had
resolved on surrenderipg bis whole army if again
attacked, and was only saved from that dis.
grace by rain which prevented tho enemy
from moving his artillery.
Scpsntiiy: All possible resnforcements were
sent to Mcclellan while he was on the PENN
sula. The letters Of the President, of the
Secretary Of War. and of Gen. Halleck con.
clusvely prove that every effort was made to
sustain and re-eniorce Mcclellan, that troops
were even sent him which were deemed in.
dispensabe to the safety of Washington, and
that they were refused him only when no more
remained to be sent.
Eighthiy: When ordered to withdraw his
army from Hasrison's Bar, Gen. McClelen do.
layed the execution Of the order eieucs days
after its receipt BY that delay the safety Of
the Army Of Virginia and Washington was