New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-04-06

not tell positively Wilton, looking at the .urns
would have boen se.tT, with the sadii Of BOO men q
the number whchyou lad Har.'on. landng than they
Junction with che rest Of tis eneluy's ioie, - =
"Answer. should lave counted sp the effect OF The
ss r onE asa %a @ & ss
been very n,uc sesver than own s that portions o.
baltic OF MaEerp Hill"
GIN. BARNAIy,s REPonT.
In closing their report upon The campaign OF the
Peninsula your Committee Womb refer 10 tire report
OF Gen. John G. Barnard, Chief Of Engineers OF the
Amy of the Potomac durirp that ci'mpalgn, made
TO Sen. Mcclellan. The conclusion OF his report
which he terms as RETROSPECT. pointing out the MIS-
takes that were made, and TINS tracing the causes
of its the Peninsuls- cspags failure TO their true
sources" is as follows:
CAUSES OF tsCLgLLAlHs PAIIURE.
{" One Of the prominent among the causes OK niti'
mats failure was the naction OF eight moDsns, IRON
August, 1861, to April 1862 More than any other
war; rebellion demands rapid measures. In No
yember, 1861, the Army Of the Potomac, not fully
supplied with all the 'materiel was yet about as
compl ste in numbers discipline and organization "a
il ever became. For four months the great marine
avenue 10 the capital OF the nation wae bloekaded,
and tbst capital kept in partial staeo siege,py
greatly inferior enemy, IN face OF noVsoiS army %
80, 600 men. >,
"In the Winter of 1851 and 1862, Norfolk could
and should have been taken. The Nayy demanded
IT, tho country demanded -, 'aod the means were
ample. BY ia capture the career of tho hcsFinac,
which proved disastrous to- bur subsequent opera
tons would have been prevented. Inc preparation
of this vessel was known, and the Nayy.DepaFtmelt
was nos without foreboaiDgs OF lhs niiscAlet IL
would do.
although delay might mature more co7preaenslye
plans aaa greater en that 10
involves somc hing than abstract TohtaTy Piin'
cpes The true question wa to selzo tho hssI Pfae-
tcADe msnenJ TO satisfy the, perhaps, uoseasohsOie
but natural longing Of an ambitious nlh"n ZOE re-
suts uoiiiy its lavish confidence, ana 10 tRs 10
yantage Of al. undivided command and unsrai0reied
liberty OF action while they were possessed- i.
"When tho army did move, plan was adopted
perfe.sly certain TO invite, nay, compel, inerterenes
and when she aruy was - 70 by Annapolis w INC
lower Chesapeake, l felt confident thai ons-naii
would scarcely have been embarked oeiore tbs olher
half would have been ordsfed back " w ashlDgson.
The eselny was then OF AaDasaas, and faint, even
if not rsaliSy OF an attack upon asaaBEon was 80
obvions, DO certain TO create panic, wlch NO tx
sculivs could rerlst, thai interference wi'h sAe re-
moyal of the res. Of the eemy was eeriain
"When tho enemy fell back behnd the Kappa
hammock and destroyed TIE rlroad bridges, the cir
cumstances were greatly changed, aud tasEe were
strong arguments for tue line adopted Let, results
have proved how many reasons there were ~ DC con-
sidered beside tho purely military ones, which
opposed themselves to ths adoption OF sash line.
The facts connected with tue Withholding u NC
DoweI's corps have been SO completely exhibited IN
the proceedings of the Mcdowell Court CT inquiry,
hat every one who wishes can form his own JudY-
n,ant Whether IL was vice or unwise, II was Que
OF those thinzs resulting from the taking " line Of
operations which did nsL then cover Washington.
81 Al tina time the Army OF the Potomac Landed on
the Peninsula tue Rebsl army was al Its lowest SDD
Its armies wsro demoraizsd by tho defeats Of fort
Royal, Mil Spring, Fort Henry, Fort Donelson,
Roanoke Island. and Pea Ridaei aud redaeed BY
,i,kncbs, Ices IL battle, expirauons OF periods OF
service &c.; while the ConscripIiop law was NOS
vet even passed. 1t Seemed as II IL neeued Dus one
vigorous gipe ~ eud foryer shls re9elIon so nearly
thsottled. How thsn, happened IL that tue day Of
the initiation OF the campaign oil tbs magnificent
Army OF the Potomac was the day OF ths resaseita-
ton OF the Rebel cause, waiea seemed " grow Fdi1
gassu with she slow progress Of ITS operations
However may DO committed TO any expression
OF professional opinion TO the eohilafy " certainly
did suggest I'll my opinion now 10 that the iines of
Yorktown sIvuid have been assaulted. lneie 10
reason to believe that they were not held Ia etrons
lOfce when army appeared before lnell anu We
know that they were lar from coInpiele. lhe pres
tae OF power, the morale, were GA our slde. II
w. que 10 ourselves 10 confirm and sustain IL. We
should probably nave succeeded Bot II we had
failed IL may well be doubted whether tho shock o.
an unsuceessiul assault would be more oemorlzing
than the labors OF siege. f
=. Our troops toilcd o month in the trenches, or
lay In size swsmps OF Warwick. We lost lew men
by the siege, but disease took fearful hold OF tao
army, and to and hardship, unredeeIned oy TIE ez-
citepens Of combat, impsiredAhelr morale. We aid
not carry WIN us from yorktown 10 good an army
as ws took there. OF the bitter fruits Oh that mJnin
gained by the enemy We have tasted 10 CUR hearts
content. They not yet exhausted
"Ihs siege havisg been determined upon, we
SHOULD opened batteries on tbs place az fast
as they were completed. Tho effect on the troops
would have been Inspiring. IL would have light
ned the siege aud shortened our iaOors; and, be-
sider would nave had the credit oi crIYing the
enemy IRON Yorktown by Ioroo OF arms, whereas,
as IL was, only induced him 70 evaeas for pru-
Dental reasons.
"Yorklown having fallen, however, as it did, it
was ri yht TO puDue the enemy WITH our whole force.
but tho battle OF Williamsburg, fought, rs 1t was,
without accommodating tho position, without concert
Of action among the different corps and division
commanders, and almost without orders, was blum
der which ought not TO have happened. -'
''We knew OF this position beforehand, aud we
know is was fortified. We mig ht have been sure, If
tho enemy made a stand there that il would be q
strong one for no would be lighting for time to get
his trains out OF our reach. We fought; we lost
several thousand men, and we gained nothing. IL
We had not fought, the next day a battle would in
all probability been unnecessary. But If IL had
been necessary, we should have had time to have
brought up resources, the position
aud delivered our attack in sach way that some
result would have flowed from It..
1--WE had every advantage. Franklins division
landed at West Point on tue next day, and Sedg-
wick's division on the day following. Those two
divisions, had the enemy waited another day at
Williamsburg, could have cut hi, communication,
and in that case we would have been superior bis
front and have had two divisions in his rear. Hrs
hasty resreat and perhaps bis capture must newt
ably have followed, and the great object Of keeping
Franklin SO long embarked, and finally sending him
to West Point, would have been accomplished.
"On leaving Williamsburg we should have crossed
the Chickahoniny, and connected with the navy in
the James River. We should then have had united
army, and the cooperation Of the navy ana proba
bly would have been ia Richmond in two weeks
Tue fact that we did not know the character Of the
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