Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1863-01-08
The Battle of Fredericksburg-AC riti-
ClSm ON Rurnside,s Tactics.

There is no need for any one to apollo
| glze for this great battle, or to attempt 10
| bellttle it into a reconnaissance in force,
| or to censure the generals who undertook
1t, Or to explain it away into what it was
! not. 1t was prodigious attempt to
achieve great result, and it was a pro
| digious failure. When such things do fail
at all, they always fail in this way. No
partial failure is, in the nature OF things,
| possible. II the event proves victory, as
it often does, it is never mere strategcal
or tactical victory; it becomes momen-
tous triumph, memorable through all sue
ceeding time.
! Burnside was unsuccessful in his at
tempt, but Napoleon was equally unsuc-
cessful at Aspern and Essling, and his fail
ure at Waterloo was awful. Burnside has
made no blunde-. His plan was worthy
of the best General in Europe. He had
used it before with skill and success at
Roanoke Island and wbern, land although
| he failed in the present case, that does not
prove that the plan itself was defective.
The main features Of his military system
seem to be to attack the enemy's center in
force, and to attack always in column.
Some of the very wise men, who think
the President and Cabinet ought to resign,
urge that both these ideas were wrong,
and that the progress of the age has ex-
ploded them. We do not believe a word
of this, and we will say why.
! We have already stated that both at
| Roanoke Island and at Newbe these
two Napoleonic ideas were used by Burn
side, and were the leading features of his
operations. He paid no attention to out
posts, to fanking efforts, etc. In this he
was right. Baron Jomini expressly says,
in his Summary of the Art Of War, that
these Hawking operations imperil al army
| by making its lines too thin and weak, so
that an attack by the enemy may easily
break it; and if the farking party is
separated and sent by detour to make a
rear diversion. it is very apt to fail through
mistake of roads, or delays of various
kinds, and, if encountered by the enemy
in force, is sure to be annihiated. In the
desperate battle of Springfield, Sigel's
flank attack was disastrous failure, and
his whole division was cut up, despite the
great skill Of the General, and his tried
abilities on many hard fought field.
In war, the most obvious and ordinary
of all efforts by Generals, of every grade
and talent, is to outfank the enemy Ma.
! poleon achieved the greatest and most
wonderful of all his successes by avoiding
this hackneyed mode of operations, and
risking his whole force on a single des
perate attack OF the center. Perhaps it
will be said that every General Is not a
| Napoleon, and therefore such risks ought
to be avoided. To this we reply that in
every battle where these fearful attacks of
the center proved successful he was on the
very brink OF destruction. In his first
signal victory at Marengo, the battle was
actually lost his army was thoroughly
beaten and flying in all directions, when
Dessaix arrived. He, too, thought the
field lost; but Napoleon renewed the con.
test with the fresh troops, and won the
| day by his attack on the center. Wagram
was memorable instance of this terrific
risk, and the terrible slaughter of Mac
donald's column in the decisive charge
still causes the reader of history to thrill
as he ponders on it.
| Our soldiers at Fredericksb burg were not
| a whit worse than those of Napoleon.
His troops recoiled in many battle be-.
| fore the awful fire of the opposing army,
| and the best troops in the world some
| times fail in charge. The British storm
ing party failed at the Redan before Sevas-
topol. They fled like sheep at Bunker
Hill and New Orleans. Napoleon's vete-
rams from hundred battlefield were scat.
tered to the wind at Waterloo. 1t is idle
to expect that men with reasoning facul-
ties will not recoil before such horrors as
| oar troops encountered at Fredericksburg.
| 1t may be said that if this is true, the
charge in column and on the centre must
be an error. But here is just the point
where modern military science shows it.
self most triumphantly.
Napoleon knew that the risk Of such
charge was awful, and that as in a great
war it must always be increased by the
fact that most of the troops in the field
are new levies, and, therefore, to certain
extent untrustworthy, means must be
found to guard against the possibility OF
their being able to take to fight. To do
this he made his charging columns always
very heavy, that however great the slaugh
ter might be IN front, 20 one could turn
and flee, as the vast multitude pressing
forward in the rear prevented. Macdon-
AIDS charging Column at Wagram started
out some eighteen thousand strong, and
when it reached thel Austrian lines had
only eighteen hundred left But it broke
the enemy's line and gained the victory.
Something of these tactics was resorted
to by Burnside in the late battle. When
Meade's Division, after its successful charge
brokesbefore the fearful fire of the enemy,
Birney's Division was immediately pushed
forward and drove back the enemy and
took several hundred prisoners This
method of attack is now the accepted one
in all European armies. The Russians
used it at Inkerman, and despite the
dreadful slaughter, they would undoubted-
ly have succeeded but for the timely ar
rival of the French. Napoleon III. used
it at Magenta and Solferino, and the car
mage was so great that for months after
these conflicts the Empsror's nerves were
completely unsettled, and his mind filed
with morbid images. Santa Anna adop-
ted it at Buena Vista, and at one time,
Notwithstanding the bravery of our troops
and the strength of our position he came
near succeeding. But Taylor arrived at
the right spot at the opportune moment,
and renewed the battle with Bragg's bat
terry, O'Brien's having been lost.
Here is just the perilous point. This
method OF attack 10 never thing without
risk, and requires General of great res
sources and unbounded courage When
the slaughter is greatest, he must be able
to command himself most. This was where
the mighty genius Of Napoleon shone res
plendent. Riding amid tie thunders and
the horrors of the battle, he seized upon
The moment of fearful peril to make bis
decisive charge with all bis force lending
| to it all the enthusiasm and cOurace which