The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-12-05
The Siege of CharlestOn-What IT
.. is, and What it is Not. -

The siege Of Charleston has been the
cause OF many misapprehensions and dis.
appointments. AT the same time. it has
given us great deal of instruction. and
corrected many mistakes, especially in re.
gard to the real use and capacities of iron
vessels. For these reasons, as well as the
interest attending many Of it's incidents, it
Is worth while to review briefly the pro
gress of the siege. The real siege. if siege
IL u.s., commenced about the LIST Of July. by
selzlng the lower end Of Morris Island. It
mas occupied, so far, five months, and there
Is no more immediate prospect Of taking
Charleston than there was three months
lie mind, and many are severe in their
CRITICISMS. Some, OF which the New York
lSDenlng Post is one, even censure General
Hllmore. All this only proves very great
ignorance of the nature Of a siege. and the
character of operations at Charleston. It
IS not difficult to prove that no engineer
oihcer, IN any country, has been more en-
brilliantly distinguished himself, than has
General Gilmore. His work has been done
excellently well. The difficulty is, that
the public have expected him to do what
could not be done, unless the iron vessels
could do more, or his army was made suffi-
Gent to invest the place. Let US see ex-
actly what was done. In the first place,
forces there, s,,veSted. Gilmore only holds
the land at one corner of Charleston, and
has no force sufficient to invest half the
place. This being the case, regular siege
could not be carried On. What, then. did
the Government expect? And what did
the public mind expect? Probably the
Government and the public expected ex-
actly the same thing, and both were misled
by certain expectations, raised by errone-
GUS speculations on the strength and ca
pacity of iron vessels. The public expect
ed after Gilmore got Morris Island, that he
would batter down Fort Sumter, and that
the iron vessels would then 60 into the inner
harbor of Charleston, and batter down the
city, compelling it's surrender. Let us see
how far this expectation has been realized.
When Fort Sumter was taken by the rebels
the Morris Island batteries were among the
most efficient, especially that of Cummings
foint-since Fort Wagner. This shows the
extreme importance Of that position. Nor
ris Island is just three and half miles long
"a low sandy beach, intersected with little
bayous Of tide water and running back in
marshes. 1t is separated from Folly Island
by Light House Inlet. Cummings Point is
just 400 yards from Fort Sumter, a capital
distance to make a mark Of Sumter; but
the wholelength of the Island is in straight
line from the Fort, like the tail of kite
Hence, it was matter Of necessity to take
the whole of Morris Island, which was gar
risoned by the rebels, and filed with strong
batteries, before Gilmore could batter down
the Fort. We had Folly Island separated
by Light House Inlet, (from Morris,l it be-
ing too exposed and distant for the rebels
to defend. General Gilmore, by q sudden
assault, carried the lower end of Morris
Island, and thence proceeded by regular
approaches to capture Forts Gregg and
Wagner: These forts were carried BY adj
vances, in what are called parallels "a
Zig-zag intrenchment, which, by making an
angle with the line Of approach. enables
the besiegers to cover themselves as thew
advance. Fort Wagner was not carried till
the last parallel was carried up to its very
parapet. Then the enemy evacuated the
for to avoid being taken prisoners by as
sault. This being done, the enemies work
at Cummings, Point was repaired and
made much stronger, and mounted with
was then mere wreck, and with all its
solid masonry must be tumbled down.
by reference to the siege of Fort Pulaski,
also reduced by Gilmore, we find the
average distance of the batteries was
100 yards, and that masonry a feet
thick was soon penetrated by 3O-pound Par
rott guns. Sumter was about 100 yards
was in short time knocked TO pieces. 1t
is over two months since Gilmore re-
ported it useless as an offensive work, and
it was. The enemy, however, having |,
held possession Of it rather as point Of
honor, than as . means OF defense. Gen.
was then directed TO knock 1t all
down, and this he has been doing. We may
ing Charleston? It may be possible-itI
probably is-for Gilmore to burn Charles I
ton by shells from Cummings Point. But 4
the experiments heretofore made do not