The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1863-04-07

hare been taken advantage o. 1t was one oi
those occasions which, il not seized, do not repeat
themselves. We now know the state of dlsor-
ganization and dismay in which the rebel army
retreated Ne notU knOw that 1t could haze been
followed into Richmond. Had it been SO, there
would have been resistance to overcome to
bring over our right wing. Although we did not I
then know all that we now do, it was obvious al
that time that when the rebels struck the blow at
our left wing, they did not leave any means IN
their hands unused to secure success. 1t was OBJ
visus enough that they struck with their whole
force and yet zoe repulsed them IN disorder ruth
three.ff1ith Of ours. We should have followed
them up at the same time that we brought over
the other two-hfths.
After it was known that Mcdowell was called
off to another quarter, there was no longer hope
of an increase of force by the junction Of his
corps. There were no other reinforcements to
look for beyond what we received by the middle
of the month of June. The rebel force was known
or supposed to be constantly increasing by con-
scrption, by the influx of troops from other parts,
and by the breaking up of Beauregard's army.
At last the moment came when action was I'M
perative. The enemy assumed the initiative.
We had earning of pchen and tChere he ,CaS to
strike. Had Porter been withdrawn the night OF
the Goth Of June our army would have been con-
centrated on the right bank of the Chickahominy
River, while two corps, at least, of the enemys
force we're on the left bank. Whatever course
we then took, whether to strike at Richmond and
the portion Of the enemy on the rigut bank, or
move at once for the James, we would have had
concentrated army and fair chance of brilliant
result in the first and in the second, if we accom-
pllshed nothing, we would have been in the same
case on the morning of the 9th as we were on
that OF the 2Sth, minus a lost battle and com
pulsory retreat. Or had the fortified lines, thrown
up expressly for that object, been held by 10000
men, as they could have beer, we would have
fought on the other side with S00 900 men instead
= Of 27,0O0. Or finally had the lines been abandon
ed with our hold on the right bank Of the Chick
ahomlny, we might have fought and crushed the
enemy on the left bank, reopened our communi-
cation, and then return and taken Richmond.
rs Il teas, the enemy fought Wtth his whole
force, except enough left before lines TO keep up
an appearances zoe fought Nth $4,000 men,
losing battle and 5000 men. By THIS defeat t0e
lUere driven from our position, Advance for
conquest turned into retreat for safety, by force
probably not greatly superior to our otcn
In view of the length of time which our opera
tons before Richmond consumed, there is now no
doubt that the depot at the White House should
have been fortified, as wei one or two points on
the railroad thence to the Chckahominy that
the tete-de-pont at Bottoms Bridge should have
been completed, and likewise tetsS-de-pont, or
strong POSITIONS prepared to cover the de6oucheS
from our bridges to the left bank of the Chicka'
hominy. With these the army would have pos
sessed freedom Of motion to concentrate on either
side, and the disastrous battle of the 9th would
scarcely have occurred.
When the army reached the James River it
needed no prophet TO predict the disasters which
have since betaen our countrys cause. If the
army had sustained itself nobly it cannot be de-
MED that SO much iruitess toll, and so much dis
aster, had deprived it of the elan which results
from success alone. 1t was, moreover, as well as
our forces elsewhere, sadly diminished in numbers.
On the other hand, the rebel army. from its FIRST
low state, had risen up an army most formidable
in numbers, excellent in organization, and inspired
by great success. Had its numbers, indeed, APP
preached to that attributed to 100000 men-
there is little doubt that march upon Washing
ton would have speedily followed our withdrawal
to the James.
From such considerations, as well as those fol-
lowing from the results of past operations, coun-
salled the immediate Withdrawal from the James
to reunite with our forces covering Washington
The Committee add that L" the report of Gen
Barnard, from which the above is taken, is the on
ly report Of the officers engaged in the campaign
Of the Peninsula which your Committee have OBJ
, tanned. The report of the Commanding Genera
has not yet been made, and the reports Of h'
subordinates have not been sent by him to The
| Department"
a ---------s