Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-10-09


A rsmarksbls circumstance Of the war, and
Ous that has been the subject Of most speeuls-
lion and curiosity TO Europe, and indeed 10 sdu-
/ Gated minds il all parts Of the world is the bar
rgnness of Confederate victories. We are ae-
| custOmed D read in history Of battles as deei-
I sive events If they DO not determine the for
tunes Of contest, they generally pass large
territories from one bsEligersut TO another, give
I the hey IN controlling pOsitiOnB- or are acc0m-
panied with other important incidents Of advsn-
/ isge. The only advantage, however, which
apneaFs 90 have resulted 70 rs in he greatest
and everest battles Of this var IS the eampsra-
I'VE list Of cssusities which, after ALL Is q vul-
| gar ard silly test Of victory.
Z Gs war fingers in the slow aud sanguinary
! train Of indecsive battles. A. Chancell0rs-
villa and 81 Chiekamsugs were fought the
/ two blOOdiest battles OF the war; each of
I them contested for three days and either
| Of them equal in the size Of the armies
in carnage, in dramatic displays Of valor.
and in al the incidents Of military pomp,
70 the most famous conflicts o. history. Yet
the results Of thess splendid victories are
only the meager grsiifcation that we killed
mere Yankees than they did COnfsderates. So
ia al the war eur battles have been scarcely
more than cruel swaps Of human life. They
end with comparative lists Of killed and wound
ed, and with an inventory Of csnturers; there is
thought sufficient to have accomplished the
death Of several thousand Yankees and the
taking Of a certain number Of small arms, col
0rs ard other trash of the bstfls-6eid.
There mHst be some gsnsral explanation Of
what has been so invarisbls Ia the war, the
fruitless and barren character Of our victories
L is q tav0Tite sneer with European journals.
But they mjsundsrstaud the causes Of what
is both sn anomaly and a paradox The iHfs-
81, =, Il
hose Of other wars recorded in history, while
superior 10 them in all other respects, is cer-
.siHlY not to be aseribed to tho cOwardice of
our soldiers or the ignCTsne OF our command
ITS. We have enough Of vsiOuT and of military
genius TO accomplish victories Commensurate 10
I'll respects with the most famous of history
The explanation Of our dsrslicti0n Is 10 be found
in the very heart Of our military organisation;
Il Involves that gTeas vice which ia constantly
he stumbling block Of our armies, aud the
source Of 90 much misfortune snd moral DIS
ease in the COnfederacy-ths remission Of mill
tsrY discipline
We win grsst victories, but we do not in
prove them. The first successes Of battle are no
sooner obtained than our army becomes a mob
srd falls 70 cheering and exUtstiOnB in which
general officers iDdeesntly participate. The Ts-
ruEs Of the enemy, instead of being the Occa-
sion Of the supreme and most persistent efforts
for bis destruction. is the signal fer relaxation
ard the pleasant congratulations of success.
When the French lines gave way at Waterloo,
the British tr0Ons raised loud cheers for their
commander, IS he appeared on the scene Of the
euemy's repulse. 'NO cheering now men, re-
piled wellington, so forward, and complete
your victory"
That untimely exulta.i0n, which seems 70
take possession of our army On every occasion
Of victory, and in which the results Of the vic
tory easily escape u.s. is to be attributed 70 want
Of fgor. L is this crying evil which makes the
army Of the CoHfederacy, in practice, scarcely
more than q huge militia. There can be no mil
itaTY sffieieney when the penalties Of the mill >
tsry code ara not snforcedi when preachers and
other sentimental persons in the Confsde-
rsGy recommend an anti-diseipline school
Inst would pardon deserters aBd pet refractory
soldiers with sugar plums. The short coming
Of our victories is to be mainly ascr5sd to the
want Of discipline and the consequent defect Of
sustained and persistent power in our armies.
/ The reformation must commence here. We
| csuu0t improve cur victories uutil the discD-
line Of our armies shall be improved, and they
shall earn, instead Of cutting congratulatory
capers over every success, to follow It up with
untivertsd and unrelenting purpose.
We may then win victories which viii bear
comparison with MzreBgO OF Waterloo. A. yet
we have accomplished nothing in this war which
viii bear such comparison, unless We may ex-
cert the first Manassas and the valley campaign
Of jackson.
In one instance a grand army" was annihi-
hiiated in the other an amy less numerous was
sismPsded by ths yig0r Of pursuit. Il both
instances the work on hand was completed
ihero were no after-clsps; no stories Of 3 re-
eruitsd enemy and renewed opposition Of sue
cessas leit half developed or suddenly con
vsried ts disaster. These are, perhaps, the
Cnly two incidents of the war wherein the re-
suits have been commensurate with the expsnd-
ture Of means and blood made TO obtain them.
lt IS thus thas they are to be esteemed great
and decisive victories, and 70 take rank in hBtO-
~ with examples Of power and genius, and
EhOss military events which are great for other
reasons than the arithmetic Of killed and
wounded