Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1863-04-24
Report of the War COMMITTEES.


the Conduct of the War has just been issuet
and although full of matter OF general inter
est, is too lengthy for cur space. 1t opens by
showing the circumstances that led to the ap
! pOintment of the Committee, and by stating
! tie Ieading motive which has guided them in
/ their iEqairies and governed their delibrra
/ tions. The ComIsittee hold to the opinion
that if the army Of the Potomac had fulfilled
the expectations warranted by its numbers
/ its discipline, its courage and appointments
the rebellion would Today have beer among
the things that were, and not a stern reality
as 1t is. The testimony of a large number OF
individuals has been taken, among which may
be found the names of nearly one hundred
Generals, ard the historical fact which that
large body Of evidence establishes, is set forth
as clearly and dispassioaately as possible
The report begins with the disaster at Bali
Run, and follows up with that of Balls Bluff.
the battle Of Williamsburg, the advance to
the Chickahominy, the battles of Seven Pines
and Fair Oaks, and thus on through the en-
tire Of MeClellan's campaign to the retreat to
10 the James river.
The entire document goes to show the fail
ure of the Army of the Potomac to obtain
the results which the country had right TO
expect from it, 1t was tie largest army ever
mustered on this continent, ard composed OF
the best material, and apparently competent
to accomplish anything which could reasoua-
by be expected Of it. Here arises the ques
tion: Assuming these facts to be so, why
then has il failed Phe country, and the
world in vie y of the facts set forth in this re-
port, and the evidence accompanying it, must
come to the conclusion that the failure of this
army has been due wholly and aud only to
the incompetcncy Of its commanding General.
And those who lail to adopt this explanation
must tall back on one infinitely less to his
credit, namely, that be did no: think the
cnuntry was to be served aud the Union saved
by crushing the rebel armies aud that he ac-
ted more upon this conviction, than upon his
duty and his orders as a military commander
We are loath to admit these statements. but
we fail TO 5, The least possibility for escape
from one of these two conclusions The at
-temps made SO presisteully by The friends OF
Gen. Mcclellan To throw the responsibility of
his failure upon the Government, are utterly
absurd. There is not single instance IN
which II can be made to appear for mo-
ment that the A. minis ration has withheld
from him any support which he need, d aud
could rereive, or that there has been in any
quarter, or at any lime, the slightest disposi-
tion to interfere with any Of his plans which
looked toward vigorous prosecution Of the
campaign. On The contrary, we do not be-
lieve history shcws an Instance m whicha
commanding officer in the field has been so
earnestly. so cordially and so steadily sustained
by his Government, as was Gen Mcclellan
during the whole time ne Was in command OF
the Army Of the Potomac
We are somewhat surprised to fiad through
out Grn. McCleians CORES spoudence with the
Government. constant evidence of conscious
ness Oh his part that he WINS not doing what
expected AT his hands, and that he must
shield himself at all hazards from the respan-
sibility Of failures even before they had occur
red. lie puts forth one constant steady call
for rcinlorcements-witr rever he is, or what
ever he has 10 dc, before a victory and after
ID defeat, at every step on the Peninsula, be-
fore he had fought the elemy in Maryland and
after he had beaten him a' 'AntIeIum- without
any regard, apparent ly to The numbers he al
ready had or 10 those Of the enemy he had to
meet. II seems as if he had started with The
theory that by such Course be could clear
himself Of all blame. that in ease of tIeftat he
cou'd point to the fact Of his inc e5sent ca Is
for more troops as proof Of his sagacity and
in case of success he could cluim the greater
credit fer having achieved it with an inferior
force. This habit reaclrs lis climax when
after the battle Of Anlietam he asked that
Washington might be stripped of troops
even if il should be taken in consequence
ihereof-to reinforce his army, that he might
forIiry himself at Harper's Ferry. and rrpcl
the rebels if they should attempt TO cross into
Maryland again
Our Ieaders are aware we have not been
able, since the famous retreat to the James
River, 10 retain the opinion we had previously
entertained of McCleIlan's fitness for a supe
rior command, but VIC never anticipated so
signal and SO startling demonstration ol bis
incapacity as the report shows. 1t Is ser,
We ure we'll aware, to criiicise Il camp ign af
ter it is ended than to conduct il, and every
General doubtless sees many points after lie
event in which he might have done better han
he did. But il seldom happens that in no
sil gle insturce could lie possibly have done
worse; and yet We can not recall a solitary
movement of any importance in Gen. McCll-
lan's campaign which does not seem to have
been reel sely he worst that The case allow
ed
Without entering at present upOn any de-
tailed examination Of the poins which war
rant so sweeping condt mnation as this, we
desire to call attention to one feature Of The
report which merits notice. A great dea, mas
been said about President LincoIn's presump-
tuous interference with Gen. McClellan's move
meuts in the field, and it has become potent in
certain quarters 10 attribute the il-success oil
the Army of the Potomac to this cause. fhe
Report embndies Mr.. Lincoln's correspon-
dence with Gen. Mcclellan, and his orders
concerning military matters; ard so far as
general comprehension of results aud an es-
innate of the measures requisite to attain
them is concerned. they show tie President 10
be, as a military man, infinitely Gen. Nc
Clellan's superior. His letters and orders are
marked always by clear, practical good sel'se,
and evince Just apprehension of what each
emergency required, which fail TO detect
in the action OF the writing of his subordinate.
In relation to the battle Of fredericksburg,
the failure is attributed TO Gen. Frank lin, who
did not make the nttack on the rebel right
with the force and Vigor required by his orders.
-[ColHmbus Fact
THE ExACTIoNs OF JOURNALISM - Every