The Alleghanian. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1859-1865, 1863-10-29
The plan of GEN. Lee.

ton on Washington:
We think it not improbable that the
passage of the Potomac was included IN
the general plan of his movements, by
Gen. Lee. "But Washington, with Its
Notifications, is impregnable," we hear 1t
said by those who instantly associate the
idea of a march upon the Capital with the
suggestions of a rebel advance. We con-
cede that Washington is impregnaoie
against any force Gen. Lee could bring
against it; and, even supposing that It
should be taken by the rebels, that It
could not be held by them forty-eight
hours. 1t would be the most fatal victo-
ry Lee could possibly achieve, for it
would bring upon his ragged legions
swift and terrible destruction, and rouse
the whole North to arms. What, then,
was the aim of the rebel General Was
il to force Gen. Meade to give battle, in
the hope of destroying or capturing his
army, and thus avenging the terrible
defeat of Gettysburg? Primarily, we
think not, although Lee, confident that
the Army of the Potomac has been weak
ened to strengthen Rosecrans, would
probably not seek 20 avoid general
engagement, if favorable opportunity
offered. Was his object simply to gain
plunder, or did he begin, in fact, foraging
expedition in torce9 Such may have
been one OF his Incidental purposes; but
certainly it cannot be the main one. Nor,
finally, do we believe that his sole object
was to make a last desperate attempt to
attach "My Maryland" to the Confederacy.
To some extent one or more of these pur
poses may help to explain his present
undertaking but we feel convinced that,
after all, his grand motive was TO gam
time In the summer Of 1862, General
Bragg, taking TIE initiative, advanced
against General BuclPs communications,
compelling him to retreat 10 louisville,
by which movement the whole of Tenn
esse came into rebel possession, and the
war was retarded for an entire year In
the fall of 1862 General Lee, taking the
initiative, adYanced against eneral Pope's
communications, com pelling him to retreat
to Washington ; by which mos ement the
whole of Virginia came into rebel posses
sion, and the war was Ietardad for at least
six months In the summer OF 1868,
General Lee oko taking tie jnitidftre,
meuaced the communications of General
Hooker, compelling him likewise TO re-
treat to Washington, by which movement
the whole OF Virginia once more fell into
the possession Of the rebels, and the war
has been retarded for at least another four
months, and the inactivity might have
continued for longer period, bat for the
fact that Lee has once more put his trains
In motion.
The strategy Of General Ice is very
evident 1t is Intimately cheaper for HIM
to prolong the war for six months at u
time, by simple march Of one or two
hundred miles, than to attempt to prolong
it by fighting decisive battles, in which his
success has always been Indifferent He
cannot spare the men. One or two
Gettysburgs would annihilate his army.
and with his army destroyed there would
be an end of the rebellion at once
Therefore, he has adopted the shrewd and
economical policy ot avoiding general
engagements, substituting strategy for
hard fighting. In the natural order of
things, his army should be upon the
defensive; but an attitude of defence is a
confession OF weakness, while the disad-
vantages, both OF a moral and military
nature, attaching TO II, are such that
except In peculiar cases it is assumed only
from necessity. That no such necessity
exists for General Lee in this instance Is
no fault Of General Meade, or Of the War
Department. For such is the nature OF
the ground in Virginia, intersectcd with
mountain ridges and numerous streams.
that the obstacles an invading army must
encounter are very difficult to be neutral
lied by mere superiority of numbers
Hence 1T has occurred that in several
memorable instances when our generals
have apparently been "masters of the
situation the advantages have rested
with the enemy. As the A,nly and lEdCy
Journal of last week said: Gas general
rule, the belligerent thar boldly seizes the
initiative will reduce his adversary tn
follow his lead, for there are few com
manders that have the audaoity displayed
by Tulenne, who, when his opponent.
Montecucuii passed to the left bank of the
thine for the purpose of Invading Alsacc
dlsregarded the initiative of his adversarv
and himself crossed TO the r3yht bank TINS
obiiging Monteeuculi to beat hastv 70
treat back again"
Although it was by feiguing to make =
movement precisely similar to this. that
General Meade compelled Ewell 10 recroSS
the Rapidan On the 10th of the nrcsen,
month. he would scarcely, in Imitation of
Iurenne's audacity, have dared to carr,,
out the coanter-movement; for the r;sI
lar outwcighed the advantages. 1t is he.
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