New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-04-04

plantations of the intervening maneuvers OF his
widely scattered and slowly advancing columns
have no real bearing on the question, and are
wholly Intellectual for his defense.
The account Of the battle of Antietam Is
equally unsatisfactory. We have heretofore
criticised in detail the tactics on that memo
rabe field, and have only to say that these
criticisms are completely justified by this ofh-
cial report. The points, however, on which
light has been most anxiously sought remain as
obscure MS ever. Why Mcclellan, after the
battle of South Mountain, when " informed by
Union civilians that the enomy were retreatlng
in the greatest haste al IN disordered masses
to the river" did not follow his flying foe
promptly and rapidly-why the head Of his tar
Oily pursuing column, when it overlook the
Rebels at Keedysville, had neither cavalry nor
euns-why the attack was not made next
morning-why all Tuesday was given to
the enemy to collect and dispose his forces,
Hooker not being allowed to cross the creek
till 4 in the afternoon and not being able 10
come up with the enemy till nearly dark
why Summers corps was not sent to REINFORCE
Hooker on Tuesday night, though Hooker sent
word that the battle would begin at daylight and
that Sumner must be on the ground-why ut any
rate it did not arrive till 10 o'clock On Wednesday
when Hooker had been fighting five hours un-
supported except by Mansfeld's weak corps
why Franklin was not brought on the field IN
season to sustain Sumner-why Burnside's at
tack was not made to cooperate with Hook
ers. the order for Burnsides advance not hnv-
ing been given till Hooker had been wounded
and Summers forces repulsed why there
were no two Simultaneous or cooperative
movements in that battle on our side all day
Longevity Burnside was finally ordered for
ward to what was meant TO be the decisive
attack of the day with only the remnant OF his
l6. 900 men, while 10000 were held motioness
on the right, four miles away and why,
finally the rest Of Franklin's and the whole OF
Porters corps, all the reserves of the army,
werc left wholly out of the tight even at tho
most perilous crsis--all these are questions OF
the greatest moment, answers to which we
vainy seek in this report Of Gen. Mcclellan.
Still more urgent has been the public de-
mand to know why this battle was not re-
newed next morning. and the indecisive sue
cess of Wednesday resolutely pursued, as 1t
might have been, till complete victory should
have destroyed at once the Rebel army and
the Rebellion itself. All that Gen. Mcclellan
has to reply is contained in this paragraph:
a CAREFUL and anxious survey Of the condition Of ny
snd MY kBowedgs Of the ensmys force and po-
.,op failed impre, with any Teasopaeie esaH oil
,lcc.. II renewed attack without reinforcing columns
view the shattered state Of some OF 'hs corps sueed
TO from pressing them into Immediate action sud
, TINT M duty TO tic army and che country forbade the
rsk. involved An baIy movement which might result In
Of wh. had been gained the previous day Impsed
by this cossaeraon, waited the arrival Of ro-cnforce-
aen TAXING Of tho occasion to collect together
the dispersed give rest to the fatisued and remove tho
wounded"
What a pitiable confession Of irresolution
No certainty of success! Will Gen. Mcclellan
be kind enough to say what great battle was
ever fought in which the victory was certain
beforehand This sentence, indeed is the key
to McClellan's campaigns, the evidence Of his
wholly uumitary character, the secret-or, at
any rate one secrct-of his uniform failures.
He never yet comprehended that in order to
win battle it was necessary to run the risk
Of losing it. 1t may DO added with equal
truth that il even he did not lack cOmprehen.
sion, courage and decision were wanting 10
make it available The critical moment came
and went, but the blow was never struck.
This report enters into no explanation Of tho
still more extraordinary and maccOuntable de-
lay in the pursuit OF Lee after he had crossed
the Potomac into Virginia. From the 18th of
September till the Goth of October the army
which its General declares to have been com.
petely victorious remained passive in Mary
land. If Antietam had been the most signal
victory its benefit would have been lost by
this delay. But although this defense is dated
October IS, and PROPOSES to include the mill |
tary operations of its author down to its date,
there is not a word Of apology for this pro-
tracted inactivity. Possibly that may be re.
served for another occasion.
We might pursue this criticism to any ex-
tent, but the task is not grateful one, and
we forbear. Gen. Mcclellan has so wholly |
forfeited the regard of that portion of the loyal
public, which once trusted him, that it is not
necessary on his account to comment further
Oh his incapacity, while so far as concerns the
history of the war the Congressional Report
will furnish much more valuable materials than
the reports of this commander can b. expected
to furnish.
THE POLES AND TIKI PATRI-
AREINA