Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1863-01-17
THE PRESIDENTS LETTER TO GEN.
MCCLELLAN,
Concerning the PenInsular CRmpaIRn
and the Dcfenees Of Warrington.
REASONS ron WITHDRAWING N'DowELL PROM
MCCLELLAN.


REASONS ron WITHDRAWING M'DowBLL FROM
MCCLELLAN.
WASHINGTON, April 2, 1862.
Major Gcutral Nc Clclldn-My Dear Sir; Your
dispatches complaining that you are not prop.
erly sustained, while they do not offend me, do
ain me very much.
Blonker's division was Withdrawn from you
before you left here aud you know the pressure
under which | did Il; and. as | thought, acqui-
esced in it-Certalnly not without reluctance.
Amer you left ascertained that less than
20, 900 unorganlzed men, without a single field
battery, were all you designed TO be left for the
defence Of Washington and Manassas June
ton; and part ofthis even was to 20 to General
Hookor's old position.
Gen. Banks's corps, once designed for Ma
nassas Junction, was diverted and tied up on
the line Of Winchester and Strasburg, and could
not leave 1t without again exposing the Upper
Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio railroad.
This presented Cor would present, when Nc.
Dowcll and Sumner should be gomez a great
temptation to the enemy to turn back from the
Rappahannock and sack Washington.
My explicit order that Washington should,
by the judgu ent of all the commanders of
corps, be left entirely secure, had been neglect
ed. II was precisely this that drove me to de.
tain Mcdowell. | do not forget that was sat
ished with your arrangement to leave Banks at
was broken up, and nothing was substituted for
Il, of course ! was not satisfied; ! was con-
strained to substitute something for II myself
And now, allow me to ask, "dO you really
think should permit the line from Richmond
via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be Gu
tirely open, except what resistance could be
presented by less than 10000 unOrganizcd
troops!" This is q question which the country
will not allow me 10 Cvado.
There Is a curious mystery about the number
Of troops now with you. When | tCcgraphcd
you on the 9th, saying that YOU had over 100, 900
with you, had Just obtained from the Secrc
tary Of war a statement taken, rs he said, from
your own returns, making lOS,0 900 then with
you and Ci route to you.
You now say you will have but s., 600 when
all cR route TO you shall have reached you.
How can the discrepancy of %, 900 he account
ed fort
As to Gen. WoOrs command, | understand
It is doing for you precisely what like mum
Der OF your own would have to do, If that COM
mand was away. suppose the whole force
which has gone forward Tor you is with you by
this time; and il SO, think 1t is the precise
time for You to strike n blow. By delay, the
enemy will relatively gain upon you; that is, he
will gain faster by Notifications and reinforce
mentS than you can by endorsements alone.
And, once more let me tell you, II is indis-
pCnsabc to yoW that you strike a blow | am
pONNllNbb " HNl' Nnle' Ou viii uO luC
Justice to remember, ! always insisted that
going down the bay In search of a field,
! instead Of fighting at or near Manassas, was
only shifting, and not surniOunting a Difficult
tyi that We would find the same enemy, and
the same or equal Entertainments, at either
| place. The country will not fail to notc-s
now nOthing-that the present hesitation to
move upon an intrenched enemy, Is but the
story Of Manassas repeated.
beg to assure YOU that have never written
/ you, or spoken to you in greater kindness OF
feeling than now, nor with fuller purpose to
sustain you, 50 far no IN my most anxious
judgment | consistently can. Bmyou mpa act.
Yours, very truly,
(Signed) A. LINCOLN.