, 1863-11-01
THE SEIGE OF CHARLES.
TON.
Causes Of tho Desay-Tha Disagree.
ncnt between tcNa fillmore and
Com, Dah1Ercn.

high time that the philadelphia plstitudes
about the concord bet ween Dahfkrrn aud
Gilmore were ended. The lntesest4 Of Tho |
country. demand that tho actual rulations be.
my and navy before Charleston ba known,
with the causcs that unicrlie them.
At tue root; tho Rodman 15 Inch essny gun
Tus cut oil by Dah1gEen; it's shape was m0di.
led; It waa transformed but not reformed, 20
as " hArn onlze with hia theo1ies Ut gun max
Ih1s 1azcd gnn naa tho engine given to tho
Navy to ftduce the wolKe which cover
Charleston, and to capture that city.
Experiment demonstrated what Science
ehould hnve anticipated. that It would
Lot burn powder enough to throw =
Waa 20 shost that tho powder w.s blown ont
Of the muzzle unconsnmcd. To secure COM
pletc 'gn!tion Of the charge, and insure long
range and high velocity, i would have been
necesssfl to use .iie: powder, md rttlc.po 1der
incu1able defect IN the ordinance given to tue
navy to batter down tho defances Of Charles
ton and tako that city, lies Mt tho bottom Of
what Of fali9re las thus far characterized the
Siege, and OF all the delay which have drawn
Il out to tho breaking OF the popular pa
ueIce.
To pass over Ill other history Of the change
Of naval commanders before Charleston; the
assignment Of Dahlgren to work his owu guns
ngaapst tau city and lts detences, was policy
Ct neces*!ty a well As Of justice; ne went
harda with Gilmore on the bargain, that the
arry should take Morris Island, reduce Fort
Wagner and the works on Cummings Point,
and fiom that potltIen knock Sumter to
and this being dorc, that the navy should an
chor lts 1rou-clads of the wharyes Of Charles
ton
Gilmore has performed his part Of the har-
gain. Dab 'gten haa not performed his. Why ?
the cauntry asks. For t1o reaeous: l. For
misunderstanding" between him and Gill.
mere.
This misunderstanding Is Of such huge pro.
portions a. to involve the two services. 1t
was stimulated resentfully BY the midnight
boat attack Of Dsh1g1en upon Sumter, winch
was regarded By the army as a srrreptitfous
and III fair attempt on the part Of tbs navy TO
snatch the honor of taking possession Of q
fortress which tha former had reduced. For,
in pursuance Of the original agreement be.
tween Dah)gren and GllA ore, tie Inter was
actiyely preparing transportation for two
small picked regiments, numbering together
goo men, with whom he intended to take
Sumter By escalade. This Hmieuuterstand-
lntk" WAS quite fully developed By q recent
correspondence between DAhlgre1 and Gt1.
more. of which we have minute information
Head.
Dah1gren first writes to Gi1msre, requesting
to "aubdue the fire" Of Sumter, as he iatend-
ed soon to remove the distractions between
that work and Mouitrie- adding that If that
aIe coold be "suhdued," he might be saved
the necessity OF engaging Sumter with his
iron clads, al whose powers would be re-
qui1ed against the Interior ddeuces Of Charles.
ton. /
To which Gilmore made reply, In substance,
TINT he bad supposed that Sumter Was help
AT7h h1f fu*% H-y1f%t
resist nen.of:war was concerned. It was
truo that one gun, 50 was ret mounted In
caeemate and pointed up the harbor toward
The city. But this gun did not tlre in the d.
1ectton Of the distractions which Dahlgren
| proposed to remove. The fact that Sumter
Tas poverless agslnat the navy vas demon.
strated With recent heavy naval cannonades
upon Moultrle, In which Dahlg1cn'4 ships
| ~ for several hours within short range of
Sumter, and failed to elicit shot from thst
work. He. Gilmore, therefore, ma con-
quested to ''subdue,' y was infantry fire. This
| he thought was Imposing \ new condition on
the army, and one which, although he was
Willing to make great sacrifices, and shed
hlood keneroualy to accomplish the object OF
the JOINT eapedltlon, he would not feel jusu.
ued:Gtlmore, Tin substance, that though ono
attack on Sumter has tniled, thc army might
get poeaesslon Of the zulns, hut could not
hola them without grcat sacstfice Of Life ;
necauae The enemy command the fort with
of circle surrounding It, lam willing, con.
un1ea GILMORE. to open dro On ths WORK
again rom my batteries ut any heur ron may
dsste-eysn tsmoE1ow morning. And n,
tn1heI MaiIng las ths,e ,,,s eppsaIs 70 30 aitl.
take myse1fs With my army, aud tho means al
mycommaud, to 1enova tho obsttucttoua.
To which Dahl8ren responded thus In sub
sfancc: s"l1e DID not propose to imposa nav
solaiaena qR r. ~ army. hat ae h.d alv.y.
Ter hafose tho navy could he expected TO en-
ter tho lafhor. The dre Of 9umter, whether
from cannon Or ANAL arns, Wou!d b. vorJ
annoying during tho operation Of ramoyinx
the distinctions. And he Was surprised thal
aumore looked upon the possession Of Bum
Ter as Of no importance, for he hid recontl.
proposed 70 storm It himself He did not set
the nee<s4ftJ, either Of GAmosc's writing
four.page lettsr IN reply TO his simple Request
70 subdua tho fire Of tho Psrt--aud paftlcu
lsrly, he did tot gee why he should hlvo Of
channel, thus taking on himself duty. thai
properly belonged To tho navy 10 peifurfn
nc thought thAt Gilmore w4nla hare aeomet
It. very strange had ho {Dahlgren) offered
while they ~esu reducing Fort W.gner, t
sssosao ahS a'} 81 ss:S Z ho:sy sss'9lt ii
lipgnsss 10 cooperate. rxprtascd in hls olfol
to optn tlfo from h1s battat!oa u any tint
but sdds, that luassnuch ~ H. will take soy
o,.t wo. = y repair sho Iron ciad.. I y ut Q
such cooperation Will bo necessary.
Oar correspondent wrttes that Tho dato o
Dsalxrtn's letter IL Sspk 70.
We add from our goaeFsl Information from
I'D ns,y i, ut IN ~ tT sa.;Te, aee.s've, dste;
| mined rNmmhbdcr Eoplu quickly remove 4hl