, 1863-01-30
8 General Of Diyision to trv to overcome It,

the failure Of this movement to that cause.
But it is NOT, This IL the fourth active move
mcnt which Gen. Burnside has made against
the enemy during the short time that has
elapsed since he superseded Mcclellan. Let ;.
us sec wIat happened in each.
|. His first plan was to throw his army rap
idly upon Falmouth, cross over instantly, take,
possession Of tie heights Of Fredericksburg,
and thus compel the enemy either to fight
him in that strong position, or tali back RIP.
lutely essential to Its success was the prompt
arrival Of The pontoon train. Tits was under
the direction Of Gen. Woodbury., and no sat
,isiacto1y explanation Of bis delay has eyer
yet been made. But mat delaT oe1eaIed Lie
execution Of the plan.
q Next came the crossing and the battle at
FredcricksburE-which was certainly a fail
ure, and which the country generally brands
ns a blunder. I think It was in Gen. Burn
sides power to hare corrected that opinion ID
his testimony before the Congregational Com,
mittce.. &c did not avail himself Of tllat op-
portunity, but said that the country would
never know how near the movement came to
DeingA success. I see no reason why the
country should not know it,-and I cannot
help believing that when the official reports
Of that battle are permitted to see the ugat,
the grounds Of Gen. Burnside's opinion viii
be evident to all. 1t is generally assumed
TINT the main attack on That occasion was
against the rebel front, posted and entrench-
ed on the crests in rear Of Fredericksburg.
This Is mistake which Has corrected By tie
General in his testimony, The Main attack
vas designed to be upon the rebel right, and
the object Of it was to break their line there,
where it was weakest, turn them, and then
with the cooperation Of Sumner attacking in
the f1ont-to complete the victory and con-
yert it into rout. Gen franklin led the
main attack with hls own grand division and
two smallcorps from 1Iooker's. His orders were
to attack with at least one corps vigorously,
and then to follow, up the attack with prompt
the attack, commanding tie smallest corps Of
all. Gen. Meade attacked with great yigor,
broke the rebel line, and actually pushed his
advance into The midst Of the ammunition
wagons md baggage train in their
rear. &c Lad completely succeeded in tho
we're utterly routed, and all he needed was
prompt and effective support. This he did
not receive. General Franklin sent another
smu]l corps to his aid, but it arrived too late.
The enemy seeing Meade cone to stand, had
rallied; reinforcenents were pushed forward,
force vas driven back and it became impossi~
bic to re.establish the line. General F franklin
gaye as a reason for not sending forward
heavier and pr0mptcr supports, that he was
afraid the enemy would seize his bridges and
cut off his means of retreat. General Sumner,
meantime, had opened the fight to retain as
much of the rebel force In front as possible,
for the relief Of Franklin; and as he never does
anything but with the utmost itnpctuosity,
he l:ad pushed the movement till 1t had as,
sumed the proportions Of . terrible engage.
ment. This shows "how near" the battle
came to being success.
s. The affair at Fredericksburg, and the
| investigations that followed it, were no soon
er oTer, than GcD. Burnside prepared fol
| another aggressive movement, 1t embraced
| m attack in front, at point selected with
care, and formidable raid Of cavalry and
light artillery, which was to threaten the
| encmy's communication, and divert his atten.
| plan, but, if lfyigorously executed, was reason
| ably certain Of success. Every preparation
had been made for it. A picked force Of cav
airy and nrtilery was got ready, under the
| command Of that dashing and most compe.
tent officer, Gen. Ayerill, and the execution
ofthe movement was fixed for the s1st Of De
ccmbcr. The column destined to make tlt
| raid WAS actually in motion, when telegram
| from President Lincoln annonncedto Gencra
| Burnside that le must make no moyemen
/ without first consulting him. The General a
| once arrested the march Of his troops, ami
repaired to Washington. The President in
formed him that the reason Of his dispatc]
| was that some Of Gen. Buruside's suhordinat
officers had protested ychemcntly against tn
movement Thus failed the third attempt
through the interference and INSTRUMENTATION
Of officers Of the army.
i. The fourth and latest Of these attempt
was the one Of. last Wednesday. Gen. Burn
side had prepared 1t with care. He lad cs
amined personally and repeatedly the gronu
on which 1t was to be executed. He had fixe
the position which each division was to occu
| py on crossing the river, He had ascertaine
by spies the movements Of the enemy, whol
he had completely deceived by feints as to th
point Of crossing, and counted, with the III
most confidence, on taking him By surprise
ready endeayored to show. =
The mass Of the army is thoroughly loyal an
ready for service. I saw Thousands Of thcl
on the morning af1er their terrible nigt
march through ruin and tempest and lnu'
aud saw 70 symptoms Sc; Of dependency Or
to all. Among some Of the troops of II
Generals most open in their opposition
the Commanding Generals plans, there n
, much "straggaing" on tho march, an1
heard Of one corps Of L, ,oo0 men which, {
conrFe This could only have occurred vii
the conniyance Of their rcgimental m
company officers, and was due primarily to Il
decentralization ut division and corps beat
quarters Of which have already spoke
If tile Commanding General would tai
| prompt aud resolute measures to arrest til
evil by striking at It's root-by Furnishing i
suhordination 1n high places rs well us low:
| it would act upon tho army like an inspiy
! ton, and III ten days time be could wiclI IL
, whole power Of that army in the prompt d,
hearty execution of any plan which he mig
devise.
+
! Gen. Hooker deserves the reputation whit
he enjoys, Of being 4 most excellent fiehti1
| Gcneral-b5aye to rashncss, gallant and G
pert in handling troops upon the field Of b.
: tic. Whether lie l!as military capacity for
great command, like that Of the Army Of Il
Potomac, is yetto be tested. Tic should la
the loyal support Of the country aud the arm,
Of one thing he may rest assured, no one Vt
= wish more heartily for his success, on q
count Of the cause he serves, than Gener
Burnside.
: +, Before closing this long letter, / desire
! correct IN impression which has become 1ui
current, aud 10 which our correspondent ~
| S.' gave countcnance In his letter Of Jan. ]
published in the Times Of the 18th, that &C
Burnside's letter to Gen. HI lleck. aFowil
: the entire responsibility Of the battle Of Ere
: ericksburg, was written under some kind
pressure from the Government, or nt least
!; the instance, md in some sort with the co
niyance Of some among its officers. ha
I taken very great pains to ascertain all the fat
J. | connected with that transaction, and knt
I this impression to be without the slighte
! foundation. The letter was wholly Gen. Bur
i | slucs o"u-IA tac oF16ius1! PURPOSE " will
i it, in its actual composition, and i'll Its lit
: publication. After the battle, Gen. Halle
c paid Gen. Burnside brief visit; but duri
!, his stay not one syllable was said by 9th
+ concerning the responsibility for the battle
Fredericksburg: On the 18th Of Dece1nbs
DR.. Church, one Of Gen. Burnsldr's Sta
; went TO Washington on business aud return
: the ncxt day, bringing with him sundry new
! papers. In the evening, Gen. Burnside, bel
~ his tent with several Of the gentlemen
{ his Staff, and reading these papers, fell up
: paragraphs in them severity nssailing t
7 Secretary Of War and Gen. Hallcck for Elyi
. ordered him to make the attack, contrary
! his Own judgment. He asked DR.. Church
= that was the general impression ut Washin
!: ion, and was told that it Fas. Heat once 81
Y he would soon put Mdt right, and OH the sp
! wrote brief dispatch intended for the ASS
: ciatcd Press, and eulbodying the substance
I his letter. Some Of his Staff remonstrat
I against his noticing the matter Mt all; but
answered all their objections By saying til
E NO man should bear an ounce Of responsible
{ ty that belonged to him. He did yield, Ao
cyer, so far as to change the form of his lett
0 and address II to Gtn. Halleck instead of t.
: Press. He came TO Washington next day, !
= wrote the letter in his own room, had it co
led by his private secretary and sent it to t
= press before he had exchanged word vi
;. any member of the Government on the ST,
) ject- These l know to he the Elcts Of Il
: case, and in justice to Gen: Burnside, vino
: noble. heartcd magnanimity is among the mo
. conspicuous traits Of lis character, as III
q Is to the members Of the Government, th'
:. ought to he generally known.
Gen. Burnside had immense Obstacles
= = contend with while he held his command. T
lacks but one element Of success, and that
eelf-confdtncc. Not that he would eve
$ through modesty, shrink from duty, or IL
a responsibility which it might involve, hut
= wp1t}H nnynr tcurf s,,f.h sihfistf