Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1863-09-29
Roneerans, Any.

HOHe6ERn6f Army
It really makes one trembIe to-read how
great was the danger at one time at the
fight at Chattanooga of the annihilation of
our gallant army Of the Cumberland. To
Gen. Thomas, co nobly assisted by Gen.
Gen Sawyer, must be accorded the honor
of retrieving the fortunes of the day by
covering the retreat of McGook and Grit
teuden's corps. All correspondents, the
enemy's as well as ours, admit that Gen.
Rosecrans' plans were wella cOnprehen-
sively conceived and his movements were
more than ordinarily cautious and precau-
tious. Accidents, however, as much as
generalship. often determine battles and
the peculiar topography of the Chicka-
manga, so we'll known to Bragg, let in the
enemy upon us ct great advantage and in
overpowering numbers at two or three
very vital points, thus compelling that al
WAYS proyerbially hazardous thing, q.
change of programme in the immediate
face of the enemy. Our attempts at shift
ing divisions from one point to another
were met by CALLING flank fFss' such as
not even the discipline of ROsecrans' army
the best disciplined of all our armies,
could Withstand.
There is every reason now to be hopeful
OF the "situation." Rosecrans himself says
that he cannot be disloged from Chatta-
uooga and he is not ordinarily mistaken
about what he can do. Considerable re-
Inducements must be well on their way if
not already arrived. IfRosecrans can hold
ont until sufficiently reinforced and Gen.
Meade shall meanwhile occupy Lees army
in Virginia SO as to prevent the further re-
Enforcement of Bragg, the disaster in Geor-
gia may be speedily repaired, aud General
Rosecrans press on again irresistibly to'the
accomplishment of the important purpose
OF his expedition. To that end, and not
the mere occupation of Chattanooga and
Knoxville, the government should now
bend all its energies, or Roseeraus and
Burnside might as we'll haze renaainsd
where they were before this campaign COM
menced.
1t is curious to observe how in all our,
campaigns the same movements are re-
peated. The rebels adhere TO their policy
of concentration both as to the whole
scope of the war aud the handling of their
troops in battle; and we still repeat the
mistake of scattering our armies at distant
points around the borders of rebellion,
and in each battle offer to the rebel troops
extended and easily penetrated lines, as if
to ensure success to their favorite tactics.
In the late battles, however, the nature of
the country and + the lack of time for
concentration before the attack was
made, compelled Rosecrans to fight at
this disadvantage. 1t was a matter OF
necessity, not of choice; and it enabled
the enemy TO throw his whole army into
confusion, with the exception of the single
corps of Gen. Thomas. 1t Is also noticea-
BILE that the rebels have been following the
strategy marked out for them by Chalk,
the German military essayist, not because
of his suggestion, probably, but because
they found it to be their true policy. Yet
neither in Maryland and Pennsylyania, nor
in Georgia has the policy of concentration
INDICATED itself by entire success but it
mas lalIeo oy luck Oh meu auu heausI auu
by the iudomttable lighting of our inferior
forces. The lesson yet TO be learned, after
all our mistakes of the same sort, iscOn-
centration or if the policy of scattering
eur forces and conducting important en-.
terprises at SO many widely separated
points to be persisted in, then We want
several hundred thousand more men.
r-.+