Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1863-11-05

/ the day oil action.
The people have cause for great Thanks
gsving on the goth instant; not for victO-
ries in the feld-but for greater victories at
the polls, except for which pail of aImest
utter darkness would to day be settling
down upon this land.
Criticisms of the Conduct OF the War
attributed TO RosecrRns.
a history Ut the army of the Cumker-
land has been published III Philadelphia,
portions OF which are attributed to Genr
Rosecrans. The biography OF himself, it
is believed, could only have been written
under his Inspiration. In that biography
is an account of the Virginia campaigns
With which he was connected, in which we
get a new light as to some hitherto OBJ.
scured events. We copy portion of this
account:
"Tn December, 1861, Gen. Rosecrans So.
licited and received permission to go to
Washington to lay before Gen. Mcclellan
plan of operations which he had devised.
This WAS to concentrate the troops in Yves
tern Virginia and to obtain from Ohio and
| Indiana sufficient new ones to bring the
entire number up to twenty-five thousand
effective men. This force he would gather
secretly at Romuey, and with it advance
rapidly upon Winchester, which place he
would seize and strongly fortiiy, thus
tlaukiug the rebel position at MAnassas.-
Waiting in Washington nearly three weeks
for his plans to be received and considered
by Gen. Mcclellan, he learned meanwhile
that Gen. Lander had been ordered to Oc-
cupy the line OF the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad, and that all the troops iu his own
department, with the exception OF seven
teen hundred, mad been sent to that Cen
eral. With his hands tied he accordingly
returned to Wheeling, there to witness the
dissipation of the military power OF his
command and 10 contemplate the ignobe
results for which the lives OF our soldiers
were being wasted.
"IIe next formed the plan OF spring
campaign, having for its object the pos
session OF the YirginiA and Tennessee rail
road, and the penetration OF East Tennessee
rs tar as BOnsell's station, or further if
practicable, towards Lyuchburg, Virginia.
| This plan was approved by the Secretary
Of War and Gen. Mcclellan, each writing
him an autograph letter in relation To the
matter. Meanwhile, however, the clAmOr
OF politicians and the necessities Of mill
tary rank compelled the administration 10
create the Mountain department for the
benefit OF other generals (Fremont) and
their friends. The new arrangement
absorbed Gen. RosecrHns' command and
he was ordered to report to the Secretary
| of War for further orders. Thus, to sat
isfy outside demands and please H political
faction, n practical plan OF operations,
which promised highly successful ter
miuAIion and would have proved of im
mense advantage To the federal arms WAS
thrown aside, and the season FILTERED away
in a widely different cLmpaigu, barren OF
results, and on the whole not over crcdita
BILE to those by whom it was conducted.
"GeD. Banks with 30, 900
men WAS advancing up the Shenandoah
valley, and WAS then so miles distant from
his base OF operations ut llarper's Ferry
Gen. Nilroy with $500 men was at Hut.
| louisville. The centre of FremonTs force
under General SChenCk, and numbering
about $500 effective men, was at New
Creek Station. On the rebel side, Stone
wall Jackson and Ewell were in the Vlcin.
ity of Mount jackson with light column
of from 5000 to 5000 men. To make the
rebels feel the weight OF their heavy force,
the following plan was agreed upon, after
consultation with Gems. Banks, Shields
and others, and telegraphed to the secre-
tGry of war. Bienker, without crossing
|
Sperryyille, thus cutting off Jackson's re.
treat through Luray Gap, and compelling
him to go southwark to Browns or Rock.
| fish Gap. Banks was to advance imme
diately to HarrisOnburg. The force AT
New Greek Station was to move up South
Branch by way of franklin, being no
| longer meuacrd by the rebels, and join
NilrOy, who was to come across Cheat
mountain TO Middleburg. There the senior
1 nTF; oL., 1t. a..
force and move on to StauutOn and Char
lot'eville, while Blenker moved south along
the Piedmont, with MCDOwell's force in
echslon to support him. This disposition
| would bring the weight of a heavy army
corps on the lett OF the enemy's position at
Gordonsyille, while ii would facilitate the
taking of the East Virginia road by Cox.
he secretary acknowledged the receipt of
the plan, and submitted it to the president.
The latter determined that it was too late
to consult all the generals interested, and
the whole plan came 10 naught.
"Thus second opportunity TO make an
effective campaign was neglected, and a
whole season lost Perhaps its value may
be best determined by the disastrous re b.
suits which followed its non adoption
The enemy made raid northward, which
this plan would have prevented. Mellow.
ellis plan of operations was rendered inop.
erative. Our magnificent opportunities
were wasted. The enemy was relieved Of
all apprehension of danger from our forces
in the valley. The crushing blow which
Mcdowell, in aid of Met Iellau, had prepared
to deal jackson, was averted, and the rebel
general, making good his escape from the
Shenandoah, was permitted to fall upon
the right of our army on the peninsula, and
thus turu the scale OF conflict Such was
the actual result. What would it have
been had the plan agreed upoa by Gems.
Banks, Shields and Rosecrans been adopted
aud carried into effect? jackson would
have been forced southwark, aud his juno.
ton with Lee prevented. Mcclellan would