Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-01-10


g tilrs'y rinnsra whole corps across ho RsppaAaa
coa d. and having beef eaffs aonz for meat then 10
oAAe q fapd mogainest doWa Ia the dirsetioa Of Reh
80 - - " eisei ne enemy ana 9sstA pat3ie oe
80 9 - ~ eolid mske 9 iunelou tie g. He Kew
-at sSelison was q tas valley ana felt thaf tese was
~ q seo sn On ne q per appaaannoctte take care
y y H'A4. ne lHlt ceriain That tfe enemy
knew Of our croene down re- lie forces under J0b1
sso1 "et.a pc eaed and he "a to Isst ia force
aud beat II before jackson could make junction with
zen, q peiaFe jackson eaud come deuE on ON
hank aDd perhaps crippis ia
lee ee2Lli9eaded that some 1p les should be se7
% tDs ihautn o tie kapPahauneck with VisT If e.
1aS isnng depot at Port Rcyal after " had advanced
o5ofes AaFs been slways IN great abundance re
ee1.- iaSe expected for fter the l9th Of Noyelsbef
& ~ 5slst aaa the roads were particularly bad ofses
ana anes Waro Gent doFn 20 usso tkat our caFay and
teams were in cry good condition.
sitsr 2 was fseertaiued that thsre must be delay,
anq @ tpe eaeny had concentrated IN such force q 70
meAe II very dideuit cross except by number Of
plsoges. W eomme nc BRINGING up fc0m qpia creek
ossl 1loogat uf 10 1aiid she brdges called several
eaucuses Of yafsto decide about oros m the fapDaha
II was nrst decided 20 cross down at saekers
NveA aooul lFeiys naies bsloy hero But opr desoon
strauon was simply f0- ;be pur5ose Of drawing down
mere as large flores Of thu enemy possible then
aeelQsl 20 cross here because 10 the r-s place felt
safi ned that they did no expect rs to eross here but
down below. Jn the next place felt sti fled that this
the plsee 70 sat the most decisive bat Ie bsdause
one er TIVE points separating their Ell from heif agh
then genera attack with the whole Gfnay Wouc sue
lac enemy hae cut aroad along the rear eI ths An5
Of nights where We made our attark, by cans ef
"hieE they connected the two wings e their army ana
eseiaea 2 long de orr ro1nd fhrou En DAD country.
oBtalned, from c0Gred man IRON tle otner sac OF
rec town ieefafah q regard 70 This Aesy ross lsen
proved 10 be wanted 10 obtain p0-sesscu of
that road and shat was MY reassn for making
attack on the extreme left. aid not ltrnd 10 make
the attack on the right until that petition had teen
taken which supposed would stagser the enemy 1y
cutting their line in wO ami then proposed to make
direct ATTACK on their front and drive them cut Of me
works
succeeded in building six bridges and 10 EkTg the
whole army Gcross The two Attacks were made snd
we were rePHlsed-sil holding portion Of the ground
we had fought upon, but not our ek RENE advance
That night went ali the field our right IN
fact, with tbs officers and antil daylight
70 nd thefseng 10 bs ra her against ATTACK the next
morning. In fact It was decided Sgsinsr It
returned 70 my headquarters and after 3 coaFezsa
ton with Gen. sumner told him that wanted MIN 70
order the 9th army corps which was the eoTps orlg
naly oyuanded, to form the next morning column Of
attack by regiments It consisted Of some eighteen old
regiments and some ones and desired the eoiumns
to make a direct attack upon the enemys works 1
thought these regiments by diving quickly up after
each other would be able to carry the stone wall and
the batteries in 'front.' forcing the enemy into tceir next
line, and by joining in with them they would not be
able to fire upon any great extent. LETT Gen
sumner with that understanding and directed ha to give
the order.
The order wss given. and tie order Of attack was
formed. On the next morning JUST before the column
to have started, Gen Sumner came up TO me and
said General hope you viii desis1 from TINS at
tack. / dc not know Of Gpy general cfheer who ap
proves Of it, and think it viii prove dsas rous the
army To sdvics Of that kind, from Gen. l er, W 20
has always been in favor Of advance Whenever it
possible, caused to hesitate kept the column
ef attack forned and sent for the division aad
corps commanders and consulted With them Ihey
unauiaouzy voted aEEinst the attacG then went
over TO see the officers of the command the other
side, and found thai tbs same opinion prevailed Smong
them.
then sent tor Gen Fra kim who was on The lsft,
and he was 81 exactly the opinion. This caused
ne decide that ought not TO axe the attack htd
Contemplated, and beside, inasmueb as the esdent oI
she United States had OiI not 10 be IN se 10 max
ing this attack that he would give 81 the support
he could but that be did not wsnt the army 81 the
Potomac destroyed Ifelt thaE could not take the re-
sDonsibi Of ordeTdering the attack notwithstanding
nay bslef at the time that the WORKS OF me enemy
could be carried
in the afternoon Of that day again the offers
and told them that had decided to HtadlaW 10 this
side of the river, all forces except enough 10 ho1
the town ami the bridge heads, but shoaid keep l7
bridges there for future operations IA case we "19o 70
Taecsrdinglv ordered the wi hdrawa leaving General
Hooker to conduct the Withdrawal of orr forces IRON
the town aud General Franklin TO eondue 1t on our
left During that evening received note from Gen
Hooker and about clock at nPht General Butter
field came oven with message from General HocEer'
stating that he eneral HoOSsr) FELT il his dy TO rep
resent to me the condition in which was leaving the
town and the troops init Atter ong consultation on
ths spbisct with General Buterh-ld, ttit that the
treeps proposed TO leave behind woud nor be able 70
hold the town then paFta5y decided 20 W thdraT7
tho whole command whichw stil more perloGs op-
GRAFTON 1t com renced raining, which, to so e extent
was assistance but very bad thing Ia the moving
Of troops / thought over the matter for sospt tive
hours and about one O'Clock sent an order 70 with
raw h- whole force, which was successfully accom-
There had been great deal Of division Of opinion
among the corps lders as 70 the pace o cross
cision 10 erJss here understood was Wen re-
eefved by al Of heIa-