Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-07


Aaeek relieving the Secretary of War aud the General
10 Chief from all responsibility for that movement and 1t
equally true though not 80 publicly known that shortly
after that letter published Gen Burnside made quite
as formal request to the President to remove
the Secretary OF War and the Generain Chief from the
positions severay occupied by them he did to dismiss
was true that the his il but an act
of common justice to assume its responsibility"
TWO PLANS or ATTACK,
1t appears that there two plans OF attack, upon
which Gen Franklin remarks without intending to re-
feet upon that kind of magnanmy that takes the respon
sbty of failure from the shoulders of those above
and places it upon those below u.s. He says;
81 will prove by documentary evidence from Gen
Burnsid.s hand that HIS plan, given the committee
the plan which he conducted the operations OF
the battle.
1.-THE committee have printed Gen Burnsides plan Of
attack az given by him BY the side Of this print
extract the letter of Gen Burnside to Gen Haeck
dated December 49, days after the battle by which IL
appears that he intended to make his vigorous attack
he there calls it, two miles from my front and upon
heights the of the of fredericksburg and
that part of his order to in which he informed OF
the orders which he had given to Gen. Sumner, showing
that Gen. Summers movement was to be simultaneous
with mine In this he states the taken to avoid
collision between Gen. Summers forces and mine, while
in the plan before the committee he is represented as test
flying that he did not that Gen Sumner should move
until mad taken the position designated in the order
Gen Burns,des plan of attack as gpen By the Committee.
The enemy had road along in the of the line of
heights where made attack by OF which they
the wings of their army and avoided long
eoOred man, aide town, information
regard this road which provedio be correct WANTED
obtain that road and that
for making attack the extreme left did intend to
attack the right until that position had been
their line in two and then proposed 10 make direct attack
on their front and drive them out of their works.
Gen Burnside plan Of attack his letter 70 Gen Haeck.
discovered that he did anticipate the crossing
throwing the whole command ut that place. separate
by rigorous attack, the forces of the the river
below from the forces behind and on re crest a. the rear Of
in which case we could fight him with great ad
vantage in favor. For this had to gain height
the erreme right of the crest which commanded road
late made by the enemy, &c.
Extract from Gen. Burnsid order 10 me- Informing me of
Gen. summers orders.
He has ordered another column of dyi ion or more to
be moved from Gen Summers command the plank ad
its intersection Of the telegraph road they will divide
with view to seizng the heights both these roads Hold
ing these heights with the heights near Capt Hamiltons
between these points lie makes these moves by columns
distant from each other with view Of avoiding the posi-
bity of collision of forces, which might
general movement during the fog
1.-THE statements in Gen Burnsides letter to Gen. Hal
eck his statement in the order of the 18th me- and his
statement of his plan before the committee all agree upon
point at east-that he did not make his main
attack under either of those orders Under the orders
he issued he designed sezng first the heights rear OF the
town next, the heights Captain Hamtons which he
to direct attack in the enemys 'front.' aud drive
him of his works The orders not only agree in this
but the fact in all the significant proportions of It's results
in killed and wounded, before the committee that
Gen. Summers command did actually move to seize tbose
heights the crest in of the town. almost as soon
as did At that had only taken the position at
Captain Hamons but crossing troops from the other
side Of the river to those who had been make
the attempt Gen. Burnside informed of all this BY
Gen. Hatde the effort progressed How, them to be
accounted that Burnside could have 80 far forgot
tan In nj he
the attack the right until that position my position had
been aken7 If he did not intend to do So why did he
make the attack before the contingency happened He
knew that he position on the left not taken why then
did he order Gen. Sumner forward if bis intention was to
keep him back until it taken If be did not intend
that Gen Sumner should move until had taken the heights
Captain Hamtons what does this language in his order
to he has ordered another column dIpision
to be moved from Gen Summers command up the
plank road it's intersection with the telegraph road where
they will divide with view of seizng the heights botn
of those roads. Holding these heights 10Th The heights near
Captain HamiLton's will, he hopes &c He makes these
moves by columns dtsnt from each other with view of
aroidng the possibility c collision Of our oion TO ces
which might occur in general movement during the fog
This is the language OF simultaneous movement and
that no doubt may be left about it, he gives reason
why he keeps the moving columns distant from each other
that they might not encounter each other a fog II both
columns not to be moved ut the time, it fl
cult to see how they could have colidei in log IL is
therefore perfectly evident that under both orders issued
that morning by Gen Burnside he imagined that he could
seize certain heights two miles distant from each
other with the comparatively small force of division su
GENTLY supported for each column, and that when these
were taken he expected to follow up by orders for main
attack with the whole command" which was keep
10 position for rapid movement down the old Rich
m0nd road In the execution Of these orders the enemy
discovered himself in force much greater than Gen
Burnside anticipated, that the plan proved totally made
quate to its expected results he disaster which follow
ed matter of history aud considering the pressure to
which the mind of the commanding General must have been
subjected since that time, it difficult fad reason
why his present recollection of his plan differs mate
rally from the orders which he gave before movement
was made but submit that s insufficient for
Visiting the consequences OF the failure upon his subord
mates ia command"
EXPLANATION OF TESTIMONY
Gen Franklin next proceeds to crticse the report of
the committee on account Of its omissions Of c the
testimony. Under this head extract the following:
The committee state that when last before them con.
sdered the meaning OF the order be armed obscra
ton to ascertain where the enemy They then pro-
coed as follows In bis (Frankln's) testimony, given
when your committee we're at Falmouth, he says: L put
IN all the troops that thought II prudent and proper to
put in. fought the whole strength Of my command az
Tar as could and at the time keep my elton
with The river open There two statements to be
presented under the idea that they convict me an ncon
slstency and in the report furnished by the committee to
one OF the newspapers printed ia pamphlet form entitled
Tribune War Tract No. ] this statement Of the com.
mittee is headed in capital letters 'Frankns inconss
ent statements What inconsistency ia there between nv
Interpretation OF the second cuse OF the order that it was
Tor an armed observation to ascertain where the enemy
was and in the statement that sending in This armed
force OF observation, had ascetaned where the enemy
was and had been compelled to fight the whole strength
OF my command as far IA could, and at the same time
keep my Communication with the open in resstino
"A rfnrre had dtscnv sod