The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-04-25

them is most dangerous, even to q power so
much stronger than its opponent as we are
stronger than the rebels.
Mr. Schalk has just issued (by Messrs.
Lippencott Il Co.. second volume, a dis
clssion of the Campaigns of 1862 and 1858,
illustrating the principles of Strategy" in
which he criticises and discusses at great
4 er length the unfortunate campaign of last
; year; and points out, in separate and most
Interesting chapter, the inevitably disas- |
rous results of pursuing during the pres
ent year-as we seem at present to be doing
"a plan similar, if not identical, with that
which brought defeat to our arms, as a
general result in 1862
Our author recites three great principles,
which may be laid down as belonging to
the entire science Of war. They are:
4 81. To concentrate all disposable forces,
and to act with the whole of them against q
mart only of the enemy's forces.
q. To act against the weakest part of the
enemy-against his centre If his forces be
not united, and against his flank or rear, if
thew be concentrated. Also, to act against
his Communications without endangering
our own.
"s. Whatever plan of operations has been
utmost promptness so that the object may
he attained before the enemy can possibly
prevent it.
lit is of opinion that We have violated,
more or less, all three Of these fundamental
principles. .
AS to the nature or character Of our war,
he remarks very justly;
1--WE have said above, that according as
the war is national, or merely government
Al. as regards the invaded country, so the
operations, and especially the mode of occu
pyng the country, have to be different. In
the present case, though, perhaps, as re-
CARDS the South. the war may be called ma
ional, there is no danger Of such effects or
results as generally attend national upri-
sings, because the whole male pOpu-
Istion able to bear arms is already enrolled
i'm the regular armies; and the country be-
ing thus stripped of its defenders, is void Of
ali material for resistance, except where
those armies happen to be. OCCUPATION be-
comes, therefore, secondary affair. and
or breaking up Of the rebel armies. This
successfully accomplished, and all resist
ance thereby destroyed, the downfall of the
Confederate Government becomes = matter
Of course, as well as the surrender and oc-
cupation of the Southern towns and South
ern seaports.'
three systems" he says, shave been
country. The first is to march several ar
mics from the circumference into the centre
of country; the second is, to conquer by
subduing and occu plying one province after
smother; the third is, by marching one large
force, O.. q single lire of operation, right
into the centre Of q country, and when ar
rived there, spreading it out in all direc-
tions. like 4 fan, forming interior lines, di-
viding thereby the enemy, and forcing him
to act on exterior Lines. It is the very in
verse of the first system.
s'Grand operations in accordance with the
geography of the theater Of war, and those
maxims which we have laid down as the
third SYSTEM will alone be able to bring
about the destruction or breaking up of
rebel armies, All object which must be ac-
complished before attempting any thing
etse.'' .s .f.s
He remarlks, in the first place. On the inn
mobility of our armies.
"'Sucoess ia III the legs of the soldier,
was a saying of Marshal SAKE; and if this
be true for every KIND OF war IL Is more
especially so for great wars of conquest
Movement, continued, rapid movement, Is
the secret for obtaining success; and what
soldiers can accomplish in that respect may
be seen in tho campaigns of 1905, 1909, 1872,
and 1914. &c.
"In 1905, Napoleon's army was at Bou-
logne for tho grand EXPEDITION against Eng
land. when the war with Austria broke
out. Napoleon marched his army to Ulm,
thence to Vienna, and thence to Austerlitz,
making . total distance OF three hundred
and thirty three leagues, or one thousand
miles, From Boulogne to Vienna, nine
hundred miles, was one continuous march.
In 1909, NapOleon's guard was IN Spain, at
Madrid and Valencia. When Napoleon
was Obliged to make preparations for the
Austrian war, his guard marched, in nearly
one continuous route from Madrid TO Wen
ma. a distance of six hundred and sixty-six
leagues. or two thousand miles. In 1872,
the army marched from the Rhine to Mos
COW, a distance Of six hundred leagues, or
eighteen hundred miles, equal to the dis
lance between Washington and Galveston,
in Texas" r.a.s g5i
He draws 5 comparison between the eff
cheney OF two arrnies-the one acting &C
cording to the principles of methodic war
fare, and being furnished continually from
its base of supply and its magazines, the
other acting according to the principles,
"'war must nourish war;
''The system of quartering or living on
the inhabitants of the land, forms the basis
of all great wars of conquest or invasion;
unless it be adopted, it is impossible to con-
quer an extensive country possessing large
and organized armies.
II do not wish to advocate here a system
Of great and legally organized robbery,
which takes from the countrymen all he
has without any decentralization. I adyo-
cate only 3 reasonable and well-organized
system of reduisition, paying literally for
all it obtains, but furnishing the army with
all the principa. provisions from the coun-
try through which it passes. The greater
the distance an army marches in one dav.
the more plentifUlly it may be supplied.
"Ali wars OF invasion Or conquest, from
the earliest times down to the most modern
from the Romans to iNapoleon-were
based upon and rendered possible by this
principle alone. Successful wars of con-
quest are, therefore, SYNONYMOUS with
rapid and energetic preparations
He remarks OF the system which has
been pursued in supplying our armies:
SIT is scarcely necessary to remark that,
in consequence of the slow marching and
the frequent halts, in order to maintain the
supply of provisions, the enemy gains am
pie time TO prevent the success OF any plan
Of operation, not to mention the induce.
ment which, such large wagon trains offer
for cavalry raids in the rear Of the army
Do away with this system of feeding the
troops. and movement will become a neces
Sty; the most advantageous strategic lines
OF operation can be chosen; there is nC
stoppage, except by the enemy; but this
resistance is. under such circumstances
such as g General would desire. In other