Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-08-28

WORK OF SUBJuoATTse rHE SorTH-WBAT
THK BIsISSIS0 OF THE WoKK Has CosT, &c
Special Correspondsnee Of the Chicago Times
WASHINGTON. Aug. -
ITniess the signs of the times ate uuferiv de
eeotive, The approaching mouth ct September
will open with very nearly the SINE military ~
uation near Washington witnessed IN the
hrst days Of September OF lat wear. The Con
federates are doing al in their power ~ bring
q collision betx cen the armies OF ten Lee an
Gen Meade. under Circumstances that will re-ult
in the defeat of the latter. and that will place
Washington In danger; and the administration j.
doing all in its power TO assist them
The movement of Gen Lees armv from Win
chester 10 Cupepper. between the 22l and 24fi.
OF July. was not the end Of Gen Lees campaign.
although the administration his been lei To be
lieve IL The object OF the campaign. on the
part of Lee. was the defeat of Meade's army and
the capture of Washington. All Of Gen. Lees
movements ever since he recently reached Cor
donsvlle and Culpepper. have been made with
this object still in view. The administration -
so blind that u cannot see this
At the time the two armies reached :heir pres
ent positions, opposite sides of the Kappa
hammock. saw on the 25th ult.. they were about
equal in numbers; at least the disparity between
them was not very great Whist has been the
course of the two Governments sincel The one
has been marked by wisdom, decision and
tivity; the other by hesitation, inactivity and
stupidity % the part OF the Confederaies,
Gen Lee has been reinforced TO an extent that
now gives him the command Of $50 900 troops
and he has been spending the last three weeks IN
drilling and exercising. in the cool and shady
dels OF the Shen ndoah valley. fifteen squadrous
of newly organized cavalry and twenty batteries
of newly organized artillery, the guns of which
brass field pieces Has anything of the
kind been done 10 Gen Meafe's armyf On the
contrary 40 far from acting on the offensive il
NAV well be doubted whether that army i even
able to act on the defensive on the line Of the
Rappahannock To keep that army where it Is
now is expose il TO attack from greatly su
periOr numbers, and from an enemy who has,
within a few days. showed both the ability and
the inclination TO get in Gen Meade's rear. Do
not be surprised. therefore, il at any moment you
hear thar the Army of the Potomac has returned
TO Washington II Gen. Meade is allowed To
make this movement promptly enough, il will be
in his power to occupy with his army the nights
of CentervilIe BY doing this he will not only
cover Washington efectually. but he will also be
able to prevent the enemy from coming north OF
the Occoquan river. or east of the Bull Run
Mountains all winter But, if the policy OF
vacillation and indecison prevails here many
DAYS longer. you may expect to see the nights OF
CenterviIle occupied by Gen. Lees army, and
treating To the Washington Notifications. In
this case, either the scenes of last September will
be re enacted or else We will have another win
ter like that of 1862, with Washington be
leagured and the Confederate hag floating in
sight of the Capitol: else this city will be a.
once attacked.
Such are the dsgraceful alternatives that are
presented to rs. Such i the humatng position
to which reduced in consequence of the
fact hat ha war n ia m pl nv
tcians, and solely with political ends in view
Instead of reinforcing Gen. Meade properly the
Administration during the last iour weeks has
been bending all its energies tn the task OF man
aging the next Presidential election To
cure new lease of power: and of maneuve ring
to defeat the election of Democratic Speaker IL
the next House OF Representatives; and of plot
ting for the abolition of slavery in the Southern
States.
The members of the Administration greatly
depressed ut the nature of the dispatches from
Charleston. In spite of the glowing accounts IN
the papers. and the fine promises made every dav q,
but never fulfilled. that Charleston will he tax
ell in few DAYS" that Fort Sumter will soon
be ours" and that 1.-THE nest of the rebellion will
speedily wiped out, F" it il well known that there
il no prospect of immediate success there, ana
very little prospect of ultimate success at pres
ent The popular idea that the late of Charles
ton depends upon Fort Sumter. is erroneous II
Fort Sumter were demolished tn morrow the
task of taking Charleston would only be begun
The city cannot be reached by vessels The
harb)r has been rendered utterly Inaccessible
This fact will be apparent after Fort Sumter j.
Cked to pieces IL that fate is in for IL
When Charleston is completely invested both bs
land and sea, and oy land force amounting TO
300 600 troops Charleston may be expected to
fall. But this has not been done; and the AL
mlnistration has been informed tO dav that elou.h
troops have been sent from Richmond to General
Beiuregard To insure the successful defense o
the place
The magnitude OF the task of "subjugating the
SOUTH which the Administration has under
taken. now begins to become apparent The
work is only begun vet; but see what IL is costing
the country already. Look "a; the matter OF
military force required alone We have already
clIed out and put into the field one million five
hundred thousand men OF these. 100. 900 have
returned so their homes NJ the expiration of their
term ct enlistment. and 600 900 now compose our
force in the field Where are the rest? Where
are the other 500 900 menl They have persisted.
either in battle or by disease And how many of
the troops that now have in arms are avaa
ble tor active operations IN the heldf Not
half of them IL will require more than one halt
Of them-nay il does require more than one half
OF them To- ''hold, occupy and possess" those
points on the borders OF the South that have nj
ready been captured Look a, Norfolk. New
bern and the sundry points in North Carolina
where the attempt j. being made To devtlop "a
healthy Union sentiment" by stealing slaves and
''cOnhscatng' private property. Can il
bs supposed that anything less than
Is 600 troops would be enough TO retain posses
sion OF those pacesI Look at the Peninsula
Even while General Dix WAS there with 80 .000
troops he had hard work to hold hiS own: and
now. with the Confederate in possession OF the
whole OF the Peninsula A. far down - Williams
Monroe. Yorktown. Gloucester Point. Hampton
and Newport News No one can tell what good
IL does To hold Florida. Yet il i certain that.
having a toothOd there. the administration seems
determined 10 hold il. and there must he 900 or
10000 troops there Gen Daniel G. Woodbury.
the most able and ski.liu engineer officer in the
army holds command there Would it he safe
for Gen Banks 70 have less than % 900 troops at
New Orleansf Certainly not. unless the admin
istrstion wishes To lose the Crescent CITY. Can
Nicksburg and Port Hudson be safely held with
less than 25,0OO morey Every soldier knows
they cannot be IL would puzzle the Wit Of man
TO explain why we have 20 keep , 600 or II. 900
troops at sundry points in Arkansas and Mis-
souri,; and vet the letters of correspondents from
those points mike that fact evident. Everybody
is expected to know that Washington would not
be safe il 40 600 of the best troops not left
here. Mr. Lincoln wrote long letter which he
considered sharp. and which history will charae
terixe as impudeut Ia Gen Mcclellan setting