Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1862-1865, 1863-09-24
AM your Obedisnt tervant,
VIZ. u. sEwARD
SECRETARY SCENARIOS CIR ULAR- BRITISH
OPINION OF HIS POSITION AND ARGUMENTS
From the London Times, Sep. a.

OF England and France having Concelved at the begin
ming OF the American var belief that the Restoration
If the Union impos SID ty - alst in that be-
lief the present hour His argun ent resolves ell
ntO long narrative vi the campaigns OF the lat twelve
mon hs and this hstOrca compendium is theu sppli, d
the purpose OF correcting the Prevailing belief aud
iup essing the two Western Powers with CONVICTION 5
re favorable to the Federal CAUSE Ia It's OH lhs
State paper is certainly intel 10. NJ Seward is per
tecty accurate H las presumption that Me statesmen
rra,ee aud kngidHd- he might have included indeed,
tLOe Of the rest BaropedO eO1lsidsr 10 has rery day
that tie old AericaH Union neper be reconstructed
IL Is natura TOO, tba ne should be DESTROYS OF
og this conviction, Gut the argumtn. rUh be enI
tor Lhi- purpose festive aud edless-need
le $ eau we al knew beforehand every ptrlire
nis story snd affective because, if We accept
exactly is preseusd " Us il laVes our CONCLUSIONS
Just what they were.
Tue Truth is, the course Of the American war has
taken Us by surprise. When we first arrived nc tue
SUBDIVISION that the South Coad never be coetced into
reunion the point If The sword snlicipa ed
prompt N Ltary tie art the North TIE
only serve affecting our judgment was doubt about
the eanesness and unAnImty Of the South in eIimug
Independence. THat condition being satisfed we con-
side,d that though twenty III lions of ntn were GER
Lanly stronger than nine milhons Mey ceye nOi so
much stronger 10 haze any chance of sIjUgatiug these
nine millions dispersed as they almost iHi.
liable terrilOry We hardly doubted the Immediate SUI
priority the NJ rth in the field The general Cxpec-
laton o. Englishmen that the South would soon be
overrun that its seaporls would be captured sn
pied and that strong Federal earIions would bold lts
chief towns In short anticiEa ed that The frst sI
months or at any the FIRST year OF the war would
see q prostraton Of the Couiederatfs thus far com
pleted; but t then that thought hopeless e-s
of the work would begin to be f lt.
II at that time could have foreseon that the sue
csssrs Of the Moth sfer more than two yeus OF dcs
psrate ightng would amount only TO the achievements
now recounted With much complacency by Mr.. Saw
ard we should have thought the Ia OF the Wishing
ton Government inn racucable than ever. We
venture to add that Mr. Seward him elf would have
been very much Of the same opinion We think it may
be said with some truth, hat il the Federal Cow rnment
had at the bgnning Of the year 1851 lorese,n that in
the die Of the year 1868 the seeding States would
still be- fre; chmOnd aud Charleston still safe an
Washington in s0we little danger the would never
have been undert ken at all That Mr.. Seward this
period of the strife shO,dd be reduced TO siHg peIu
Southern army Is about the strongest possible prof
Of the hopsiesSHeSs Of he
The FedeIal4 thought to sweep the Southern States
" tn their irresis b. forces. At first they &C ia i'm
agued that three mOuths aud 10000 mel would suffice
for the work single battle taught them the extent
Of this miscalcaton; and though they stii limited the
lime tn uine days. they expanded the armamedt to
zoo 900 sodir r. The 700 00O did no more than the
40 OOO-in fIct, they defeated in the East and
evenly matched III the W,s. All tha. c tn be said at
this moment of Northern eKulation is that the Fede-
rails have taken places the Mississippi ate scges
three times as Gus and costly they were expect
ed To be- aud that they have not had their own capital
occup ed by tue enemy, seemed highly probable two
months ago. Mr. Seward, while cOouDg his history as
favor ably he can, compelled 10 talk Of drawn
ties as event, ctedi able 10 the Federal arms and the
~ paper which DIES guol TO show the unGues iona
be aSc iancy OF the North speaks OF the nece sty
of covering the national capital aud the absolute
equality Of the belly rent forces in It's immediate VI.
cinty
There might be some purpose in Me-. SeWsrls pres
eut expost il either in this country the Amer.
caus ii the Federal States had begun by regarding the
bllgerents equal matched, and the war as likely
10 be pyOlracted on even trims for long series of
ears This, however, was not the case, AID we are
therefore much inn rsssed will the moderate bal
ance Of suecess which Mr. SeWa claims for his own
side In point of TACT taking ODe field ptl another
the South has had greater share of victory ttaa the
North; its only conspicuous failure indeed 70 bring
the war TO close by the capture Of the N0rhsru cap
tai Eusi HOiO Gen Lee is Gg all accounts more Hkely
TO resume The ofstSUs thar Gen. Meade aud though
do not hear that the Frdera4 are preparing imme-
daey TO iaVads the territories Of the Confederate We
do hear that the Uonlederses may be expected at a.
moment in the country OF the Fedtrals This is not
much of a cEe Tor a Power prete lding 80 distinctly to
superiority as to conn lain that the character OF be-
gerent accorded to lis rival On that point indeed
let any one read Mr.. Stewards own descriptions in til,
very VI bhV oINhbtui tuS huu u
bearrg Of the Confederate armies aud then cay il the
South b. not entitled 10 the designation OF bt g,-
rent Why, in recording the battle of Antietau the
Fede al Secretary il actually compelled 10 expadaie
on the identical quail les Of tue coneadng torces,
to add that the NO thern soldiers then proved for
the FIRST time To be not inferior in herosm and vaorl
Practically them he very gSt and essence of Mr. Sso
drs argument is fatal 10 ITS object. II is uua that
he tells us that ali is infinitely short OF what we were
prepared to take for granted two years ago, without
\
thought the North would OveTrun the South in brief
campaign but would then find the difficulties begun
Mr. Seward tells that after two years of mortal srug-
gle the NOrh has not overul quarter of the South
having the real difficulty sil in prospect as before We
only conclude this that the Federas have not even
that superiority for which gave them credit and
that the relative strength Of the Confederates is by so
much the greater. II Mr. Seward really wishes to maks
converts Of Freuch and English atesmen he must
adopt very different form of argument. He must
show us either tina; the South is eVincin readiness
10 yield OF that the North has policy which will ad-
init Of the, restoration Of the Union without this SUBJ
mission. But be shows neither of these things. On
the contrary be tells that the Southern President
has just proclaimed levy MdSSe, while of his own
Government he Gays Go.bing, except that it is pre-
panng 10 prosecute the war before. But what is to
be the eudY Europe thinks that the reconstruction of
the Union By force II Is G' impossibity Gndd very
great number i ARTicGRs are Of The same opinion. Eu-
rope distinctly that the South gives the sight
est sign OF concession while even the fortunes OF the
not, upon the whole very urevenly balanced.
Not therefore, without do persist 10 ORR
gHal opinions the subject; but though Mr. Seward
has thus 10 his pains, can console him with the
suiauce that, so tar We are concerned they we're
needessy eIpended II his object merely 10 deter
from Information, IL Is safe spite Of Tie failure Of
his argument In tho domestic controversies VIII ch
have cost UPWARDS of 100000 lives ard at least FIVE
hundred millions of money IN two years, have rot
the eist design Of idtererfesing The adjustment"
Of these little matters ready to lave to Ameri-
cans themselves "excluEvely" Nc Seward de-
sire; and If we add another remark upon point
certsp, IL is merely to suggest that people Wo thus busy
Themselves, shperGuousy IN d,pvtedtng inter
VsHtOn, migh6s iais less forvard an threatening us
9th the erreD,itiss which could drive 10 intsrVsns