The weekly Butte record., 1863-08-15

as tGeE existed al the commencement OF hos
tiiiteS. What We have TO say. therefore in
respect 10 the present military policy and what
II should have been. must be taken 10 view Of
the assertion that the po'flc0l policy Of the
Democratic party. were they in power, would
bring the Southern States back l0to the Union
without any violence TO the Constitution and
without any probable necessity Of resort 10
war measures If the Democracy, as their
enemies declare. are not in favor Of war to
restore and preserve the Union. il Is because
they have ever entertained the belief. that
were they restored 10 power, war wouid no, be
necessary 10 preserve and perpetuate the
Union and they DO further believe that with
Abolltionists, or any other party in power. in
the language of Gov. Seymour. d" War alore
will not save the Union.' But il is q base
misrepresentation TO say that under no circGm-
stances would the Democracy favor war for the
preservation of the Uuion. Gov. Seymour
has expressed, in lis message the patriotic
position Of our party in this respect, in the fol
lowing eloquent terms Under no circum.
stances can the division of the Union be
conceded. We will put forth every exertion
of power; we will use every policy OF conclia-
tion we Will hold out every inducement TO the
people of the South consistent with honor We
will guarantee them every right, every co0side-
ration demanded by the Constitution. and bv
that fraternal regard which must prevail in a
common country but We can never voluntari-
ly consent TO the breaking up Of the Union Of
these States or the destruction Of the ConSti
tuition
The military policy Of an invading force
should ever be TO penetrate aud attack the
centres Of the supplies and power Of the enemy
but more especially in the present instance,
where the beiligerent and opposing power was
but recently organized. and upon q new deI-
the idea of an independent nationality.
Of itself suggested the character Of the military
measures necessary to It's overthrow. Ii was
to divide it in the centre, aud prevent the
reunion of lis dismembered parts. All the
military resources Of the malcoutentS would
have been brought into the conflict to prevent
the threatened catastrophe To the unity of
their new empire. If that division could have
been accomplished, the struggle. however vio.
lent during IFS continuance, would necessarily
terminate. the grand object Of an united EN-
pire being lost and without unwise and un.
necessary complications added 10 the strife.
nothing else would be left to fight for. That
great thoroughfare of trade aud commerce
the Mississippi river-penetrating through the
military line and base of operations for the
dismemberment Of the new nationality into
two several parts. This line once taken and
held by the Federal forces, the idea of the
unity and independent nationality OF the bel
ligerent power would vanish and disappear
from the conflict. All it, energies would be
concentrated at first, to prevent the cafastro-
phe, and afterwards to restore, if possible.
communication with its dismembered parts
that failing, the only real object for continu.
auce Of the struggle within the divided parts
would be for the defence Of their local iustitu-
tlons, their property and their lives, if these
were seriously endangered or threatened by the
United States. In the campaign for the pos
session of the Mississippi, as the central line
and base of operations for the purpose of
dsmemberment, the Federal Government would
have all the time a decided advantage as to
distance, transportation and concentration OF
troops and military supplies. and must ever
have superiority III this respect, having only
to float down the river from the inexhaustible
regions lying on its banks and tributaries The
necessary men and munitions of war The
Mississippi Valley has been mp to the present
time, the great centre of military supplies to
the /" belligerent power in conflict with the
1lteO states ana lnls once taken, new and
interior centres of supplies would have to be
formed by the malcontents so remote from the
Mississippi as to render it absolutely impracti-
cable for them, with their limited means Of
transportation, 10 keep large force concen
trated in that valley. Had this military policy
been at first assumed and continued from the
commencement Of the struggle, accompanied
by disposition and offer OF honorable com
promise for the restoration of the Union, this
civil war would have terminated within a year
of It's Inception. We would then have been
fighting an idea, and not prlneiple-a bel
Ggerent power" rot of States but of individu.
ais. However dazzling and inspiritng the
conception of rival empire might have been
to its devotees, still it was not lasting as a
principle. and as it had never been realized. it
would be much easier to abandon and surren-
der the idea than to yield any substantial right
long enjoyed, or any established institution
entwining its ligaments around the habits of
thought and affections of the people who have
been reared under it.
Lincoln's Military Policy.