Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1863-04-08

leading through the gap. Smlth's upon tho lett
4 A line formed Of Bartletps and Torbtt's brig
ades, supported BY Newton, whose activity wal
conspicuous Gall Of slocum's divlslon) advano
ed steadily upon the enemy at q charge on the
right. The enemy was driven from their posi-.
tion at the base Of the mountain, where they
were protected by O stone wall, and eteadily Y
forced back up the mountain until they reach
cd the position Of their battery near the road,
we'll I'D In the mountain. Here they made a
stand, They we're, however, driven back, re-.
firing their military 10 echslOn until, after an
action of three hours, the crest was gained, and
the enemy hastily fed down the mountains on
the other side On the left Of the road
Bfooks's and Irwin's brigades, Of Smiths al.
vision, formed for the protection of Slocum's o
flank, charged up the mountain 10 the same
steady manner, driving the enemy before them
until the crest was carried. The loss In Frank.
Inns corps was one hundred and fifteen killed.
four hundred and sixteen wounded, and two
missing. The euemy's loss was about the
same. One piece of artillery aud four oolors
we're captured, aud knapsacks and even haver.
sacks were abandoned as the enemy we're
driven up the hill --eg go.
On the morning Of the 18th was informej
by Union civilians living on the aldo Of the
mountains that the enemy we're re,reatiDg In
the greatest haste and In dsordered masses to
the rivor There was such q concurrence OF
testimony on this point that there seemed no
doubt az to the fact The hasty retreat of the
enemy's forces from tho mountain, and tho
withdrawal of the remaining troops from be-
tween Booueboro' and Hagerstown TO q posi-
ton where they could resist attack and cover the
ShepherdstoWn road, and receive the reinforce
ments expected from HarpeF's Ferry, were for
o time interpreted as evidences Of the enc,
my's Reorganization and decentralization.
As coon as it was definitely known that the
enemy had abandoned the mountains, the cav.
airy and the corps of Sumner, Hooker, and
Mansfield were ordered to pursue them, via the
turnpike and Boonsboro', as promptly as posi-.
BILE. The corps Of RaTnside and Porter (tbo lat.
ter having but one weak division present) were
ordered to move by the old Sharpebure road.
and Franklin to advance into Pleasant Valley.
occupying Rohrersville, and to endeavor to re-
lieve Harper's Ferry Bnrnside aud Porter, up.
on reaching the road from Boonsboro' to Rohr-
ersville, were to reinforce Franklin or TO move
on Shsrpsburg according to circumstances. -
franklin moved toward Brownsville, and found
there force largely superior in numbers to his
own drawn up In strong position to receive
him Here the total cessation Of firing In the
direction Of Hsrper's Ferry indicsted but too
clearly the shameful and premature surrender
Of that post. r
The cavalry advance overlook body of the
enemy's cavalry at Booneboro', which 1t dis
Dersed after q brief skirmish, killing and wound.
ing many, taking some two hundred and fifty
prisoners and two guns. g. :.
Richardson's division, OF Summers corpa.
passing Boonaboro TO KedysvllIe found a few
miles beyond the town the enemy's forces dis.
played in line Of battle, strong both in respect
TO numbers and position, and awaiting attack,
Upon receiving reports of the disposition of the
enemy directed all the corps except that Of
franklin upon Sharpsburg, leaving franklin Ia
observe and check the enemy in his front and
avail himself of any chance that nigh offer. ]
had hoped to come up with the enemy during
the 18th in sufficient force to beat them again
aud drive them into the river. Ny instructions
we're, that If the enemy were not on tue march
they we're to be at once attacked; If they were
fosnd In force and position the corps were to bt
placed In position for attack; but no attack wa,
to be made until reached the front. ..Ulr-
On arriving at the front in the afternoon
found but two divisions, Richsrdson,s au(
Sykes's, in position; the rest were halted II
the road, the head of the column some distanc,
in rear Of Richardson. After a rapid examin A
ton of the position found that Il was too lat,
to attack that day, and at once directed loca-
tions to be selected for our batteries of position
and indicated the bivouacs for the differen
corps, massng them near and on both sides O
the Sharpsburg pike. The corps were not al
10 their places until the next morning some tim,
after sunrise .. ..G ..
On the 10Th the enemy had slightly changet
their line and were posted upon the heights il
| the rear Of the Antietsm creek, their left ao,
center being upon and in front of the road from
Sharpsburg to Hagerstown, and protected b,
woods and Irregularities of ground. Their ex
treme left rested on wooded eminence nea
the cross roads 10 the north of ]. Miller's farm
the distance at this point between the read an,
the POTOMAC, which makes here great BEN
to the eaeb, being about three fourths of mile
Their right rested on the hills to the right o
Shsrpsburg, near Snavely's farm, covering th
crossing Of the Antietam aud the approach es &
the town from the southeast. The ground be
tween their immediate front and the Autietar
is undulating. Hills intervene whose orests 4
general are commanded by the crest OF other
in their rear. On all favorable points their or
tillery was posted. Ii became evident, fror
the force Of the enemy and the strength of thei
position, that desperate fighting alone conl
drive them from the field, aud all felt that
great and terrible battle was at hand. ... d.
| In proceeding TO the narrative of the event
of this and the succeeding day, must here re
peat what have observed in reporting upo
the other subjects of this communication, this
[ attempt in this preliminary report nothin
more than sketch of the main features OF thl
great engagement, reserving for my official re
| port, based upon the reports Of the corps con
manders, that full description of details whic
shall place upon record the achievements of Il
II dividuals and of particular bodies of troop
The design was to make the main attack upo
che enemy's left-st least, to create diversio
in favor of the main attack, with the hope
something more-by assailing the enemy
right, and as soon as one or both Of the isu
movements were fully successful, to sttsC
their center with any reserve might then hay
on hand. ''''' r-+ s1' A.'4
i The morning of the lG;h during which thel
was considerable artillery tiring) was spent
obtaining information as to the gfound, rectif
ing the position Of the troops, and parfectir
the arrangements for the attack.
On the afternoon Of the 10th, Hooker's orp
eonsisting Of Rioketts's and Doubleday q diyi
| ions, and the Pennsyivanla Reserves, und,
Meade, were sent across the Antletam cree
! by ford and bridge to the right OF Kedysvill
with orders to attack, aud, II possible, turn d
enemy's left, Mansfield, with his corpa, vi
sent la the evening 10 support Hooker. Arriv,
, in position, Meade's division OF the Pennsylvl
, MIA Reserves, which was at the head of Hooker
! corpa, became engaged In sharp contest wi
the enemy, which lasted till after dark, VIII
It had succeeded in driving in q portion of II