Weekly national intelligencer., 1863-02-26

following reference TO the considerations which had
justified the consolidation Of the functions Of Gen.
Mcclellan as commander of the Army of the Po-
tomac with those of the General-in- Chief We
quote from the message as follows:
1t has been said that one bad General s better than
TWO good ones and the saying true If taken to mean
no more than that army better directed by single
mind though Inferior than By superior ones at Uariance
and ero'spuvPoses NTH each oihsr
And the is true in all joint operations wherein
those engsged have but common end 10 view,
and can differ only to the choice OF means In storm
at sea- board wish the ship to sink and yet
not unequeDty all go down together because too many
ioA Direct and single mind be aitoOsd TO CONTROL
The full force and application of these words was
not generally understood at the time. They can
be comprehended and appreciated in the light of
the letter Of Gen. Scott now for the frat time made
public In that letter We perceive I" the variance
and cross purposes" which it was sought to avoid
by the retirement of Gen. Scott and the appoint
ment of Gen. Mcclellan in his stead And to this
appointment it appears Gen. Scott gave his assent
and approval. President Lincoln expressly says,
in the message above cited, that " the retiring
Chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor
Of Gen. Nc Clellan for the position" We are left
to believe therefore, that the acts Of insubordina-
ton rected in his letter to the Secretary Of War
had left no impression on the mind either of Gen.
Scott of the Administration to the prejudice of
Gen. Mcclellan
And such being the case, we are at some loss to
conceive the motives for now giving publicity to
the letter Of Gen Scott, as whatever the military
offences committed in the premises by Gen. Mo
Cellan, they have been long since condoned by the
President, with whose encouragement" accord
ing to the representations Of Gen. Scott, the Of
fences committed. Is it desired to aim blow at
the President over the shoulders of Gen. Mcclellan
by imputing to the former colluson with the lat
ter in visiting indgnities on veteran General who
has retired from active service Why is it, then,
that similar ndgnities done to the present General
in-Chief are allowed to pass without criticism IF
it was wrong in Gen. Mcclellan to make his reports
directly to the President in October, 1861, when
Gen. Scott was in chief command, il must have
been equally improper for him to make his reports
directly to the President in the month Of October
last, when he was subject to the orders of Gen.
Halleck. And why this expression of surprise, SO
late in finding occasion for utterance, when the let
ter Of Gen. Scott simply to show that, by the
assent, or rather, we should say, the encourage
ment" of the Administration the military relations
of Gen. Mcclellan to the President were the same
under Gen. Scott as they we're already known to
have been under Gen. Halleck?
In word, these disclosures merely indicate that
the President, in exercising his prerogatives as
Commander-in- Chief, has not been careful, any
more under Gen. Scott than under Gen. Halleck,
to enjoin on commanders in the field that subordi-
nation to the General-in- Chief which we have SO
constantly insisted to be due to the latter 1t is
known that for time after the relief of Gen. Nc
Clelan from the duties of General-in-C Chief, the
President administered our military affairs without
the aid or Intervention of any such officer, and
since he called Gen. Halleck I" to take command of
seen that that command has been, in more than one
case, rather nominal than real.
We need not repeat what We have said before in
depreciation of the system of divided military ad-
ministration-with commanders reporting some
times to the Generalin-C Chief and sometimes " en-
couraged" to report directly to the President. 1t
is no fault of an officer that he should report ac-
cording to the wish or will of the President, the
constitutional Commander-in- Chief, but it seems to
us fault in any system Of military administration
that such devstons from regular and uniform rules
of proceeding should be tolerated, much less " en-
couraged." AS we said few days ago, before this
letter of Gen. Scott came to add a new confrma-
tion to our argument in behalf Of Gen. Halleck, SO
we say again, that when the President has sum-
moned to his aid General-in Chief who has made
the art Of war his special study, he should divide
with that officer due share Of labor and response
bility, and give also to the General commanding in
the field has just proportion of duty and service,
without subjecting the one or the other to those
cross purposes which spring from confusion and
the want of official subordination. In this way the
nation might hope to secure from the President,
from the Genera-in- Chief, and from the field off,
cer each in his several station, that effective
vice which results from the reciprocal action Of
operative agents employed in common work and
wisely distributed in different spheres of duty.
THE FRENCH EMPEROR
n II = II II