Evening star., 1863-04-10

REPORTS OF THE COMMITTEE ON
THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
THE BATTLES OF BULL RUN AND BALLS
BLUFF.
GENERAL FREMONT.

4 LII IN lLIc We DILL Nun AMI BALL .
| BLUFF.
| GENERAL FREMONT
| The joint committee on the conduct of the
| war have just made their report upon he first
battle Of Bull Run and the battle of Balrs
Bluff.
| Concerning the first. 1t is held that the srea,
error of the campaign ending with that battle.
!, was the failure to occupy Centreville and Ma
! nassas at the time Alex xandrIa was OCCUPIED
Another cause Of disaster specified by the
committee, was the delay in proceeding against
the enemy until the time Of the three months
| men was so nearly expired. In this respect
| the committee consider the movement was
mace 100 iate rather than too soon allowing
| sac, and strengthen their position by defensive
works. When'the move'was finally determined
upon, much time was needed to render the
troops efficient but little time having been de-
| voted to discipline and instruction even as re.
gimants, still less as brigades, and none ut all
| as divisions
The plan Of Gen Mcdowell was to NOV.
out in the direction of Centrey and by turn
ing the enemy's right, TO cut off his communi.
| cation with Richmond by railroad He was
| assured that the enemy below should be kent
| at bay by Gen. Butler, in command at Fortress
Monroe, and that those under Johnston, In the
winchester valley, should be kept there by
| Gen. Patterson: and onexprrssng some douhfs
| on this latter point, he was assured hy General
| Scott tnat ''If Johnston joined B.auregt,rd he
| should have Patterson on his heels.
The movement did not commence until IN.
| l6tn OF July The march was slow, for various
r. rtasGns-Smong them deficient trans uortation
fear OF masked batteries, and lack OF dis scipline
| Alter giving the particulars OF the move in
| detail, the report says:
| In reference 10 the orders gi ven General Pat
terson, and the object TO be accomplished by
ms operations, there seems to be no question
That object was to prevent johnson from ioin.
ing E,anregard before General Mcdowell
could have an opportunity TO attack the forces
under the latter; and after giving several tele-
grams between Gems. Scott and Patterson sub
mits the t. stimony OF the officer from which we
make up the follow ing.
"Qsestion. During all this time You knew
General Scott expected of you that YOU should
either engage and be at Johns ton or detain him
IN the valie. of Winchester: or, in the event
that he should come down by a route where
you could not follow him, that You should fol-
low him rio Keyes Ferry and I.eesburg,
"Answer. Yes, sir.
"Question. And yet, when you We're at
Chariestown, you found yourself nor in a con-
dltion 10 do ithrr No nv question is: Why
did you not communicate thai fact to General
scott
"Answer. There was no OCCASION for il, In
nay judgment He knew my condition. and TO
have added TO the information he already had
would have been a waste of time and paper I
had informed him of my condition, and it was
his business to o der me what to do. had
asked him: s'Shail attack T. It was not NV
business 10 say anything bey ond that
When asked il the tekgram of the 18th, from
General Scott did not show that he deemed il
was of the first importance thai he (Pattersoal
should detain Johnston there. General Patter-
son replies: .... a.
4 looked upon that telegraph. and 50 did
every gentleman upon my staff, as nothing
more nor less than al exhibition of bad tenn
PERI i1"s. .y.. 4. - -
Gon p4a.se~~en al t,strnes:
"G stioa. Sou say you Id i.a< co a4falsl-ad
tie 18th if ordered TO do sa You knew the
necessity Of OBTAINING johnston, and YOU must
ha a inferred the tpiapr9nh Of
Scott that ne expected or required of you that
you should do something IL that direction.
Why did you not do all that you could to de-
tain him without an order!
Answer. Because / could not go up there
without lighting. as l could not fall back
again. / had no reason to believe that the
telegram was NOT written in the morning in
reply to mine CT that morning, RI 50 4 m, 5k-
ing 'Shali attack II General Scott did not
tight that day, and 1ht re WAS no more OCCASION
for my going mp and periling by men without
an OF der, than or doing anything entirely un-
called fer-not the slightest occasion for il.
# If General Scott did not fight,
and saw the necessity Tor my acting, | repeal
it was his business 70 give the order.''
In another place he estfiss:
"luestion. When you found ,ou Were in no
conuiti. II to detain Johnson, was it not all i'm
port ant that that fact should have been COM
muIicated to General Scott; not the fact that
you could not fight Johnston, but that you
could rot detain him. that your strength was
insufficient TOR that and that he could not rely
upon his being kept back!
"Answer never supposed, for moment,
that General Scott believed for the fifty-fjfth
part OF @ second that could hold him.
General Patteeon further testifies:
s'Question: You were not threatening John
ston at Charlestown SO as to prevent his join
ing Beauregard at Manassas!
"Answer. No, sir. remained there because
! was ordered to remain in front of him until
he left.
"Question You knew at that time that YOU
We're not Offering any obstacle to his going down
to Manassas! @a
ANSWER. Perfectly. knew had not the
"Question. Why did yon not communicates
that fact TO Gen. Scott immediately aett.
"Answer did communicate my condition,
.ouestion. Did you GONNA nnicate to him by
telegraph! s.sE@z#.. IA rfsa@
ANSWER. Certainly 1 sent three telegrams
to him ON the same day. rs
"Ques,isn. Why did you not inform him that
you were not then in q condition to offer any
obstacle to Johnstons joining Beauregard
.Answer. would have considered it rather
a reflection on him to have told him SO. He
knew my condition. % a 80 -
The testimony OF Gen Patterson is followed
by that Of Gen. Scott, from which we extract
"Bnt,. although 6 enersal Patterson was never
specially ordered to attack the enendys he was
certainly told and expected, EVEN If with Infe,
Tior numbers ITO. hold the rebel army in his
front on the alert and pre- vent it from rein.
forcing Manas sas Junction, by means Of threat.
often obtained in war with half numbers."ta
! I'm stead of doing that, however,, aenenhPat.
tersop came down to Bunker Hill, remained
there over the iddylwhsn he had been given TO
understand the advanee wcnld be Commenced
by General Mcdowell; and early the next
morning, without Whiting, to- hear how far
9enefM nj C bowels had 'ad Vanced, or whether
he had advanced at all, left the neighborhood
or Winchester, where the enemy was. and
turned off to Charlestown, where, as he him.
self says, he had no means TO offer any obsta-
Gle to Johnston's joining Beauregard whenever
he chose. Johnston at once 1pok advantage of
opportunity thus afforded him, andsTein-
forced Beauregard in season TO infict defeat
upon our forces at Bull Run. sa2AzaasA
In reference to deferrings the eattack upon
Beanregard when the arrival of JOhnstun's
forces had become known, Genersf mcdowell
ssays that the Information he received was too
-indefihitaio give much credit to IL, and ha had
been assured that If Johnston did join sBeaure-
gard ne should have Patterson on his heels.
s. The testimony Of General Scott on this poias
which concludes this portion Of the Commit