The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1863-02-06
The Late Movements and the Causes
OF their Failure.

Oh tnelr FallGres
Under the above title the New York Times
OF the 9th containsan interesting letter writ
ten by its editor, H. J. Raymond, ESQ, from
Washington, Jan "a. Mr. Raymond NAV
or may not be correct in all the state
ments and opinions Of his letter-thoush we
zee no reason 10 distrust any of them at all
events we have them from responsible
source, and they are not of a character to
help the enemy rather than the government.
What he says of certain otficers-whom he
does not name, but who can of course be
easily identified by those whose official duty
gives them charge of such matters-is a
grave matter indeed, and accords with the
suspicious of great mahy. The investiga-
tion which led to the cashiering of Fitz John
Porter has done great service. We hope
the searching process will not stop with that
case. There is more work of the same kind
needed. We give extracts of the moe i'm
portant points in Mr. Raymond's letter.
Mr. Raymond says he was with the army of
the Potomac during the late movement,
which began on Tuesday the 18th, and was
intended to be a surprise. Each portion of
the army was put in motion during the day
and was to have been by midnight in the
position indicated by the commanding gener-
al, ready for operation at six o'clock below
and seven and half o'clock above Freder-
icksburg, on Wednesday morning. The rain
set in at s O'Clock in the evening-the effect
of which in impeding all motion, has been al
ready told. The divisions did not reach
their position, the enemy discovered the
movement, and it was necessarily abandoned.
This is the surface view of the matter
As things stood the weather afforded sutfi-
cient excuse for abandoning the enterprise
indeed II ade it necessary to do so. But if
ver,thing else had been right, this obstacle
would have been overcome, or rather would
ilOt idNC dl!Ncu III tiiit ~ diIN OlLcl
difficulty. But the army of the Potomac is
like the soil of Virginia; the upper crust is
hard but thin little rain soaks it and un-
derneath lies q treacherous quicksand.-
Break through the crust and YOU sink in
stantIy to depth which makes movement
Impossible. y good deal has been said of
the decentralization of the army. The word
is too strong. Ii does not apply to the mass
OF the army at ell. Bat it does apply to a
good many of the officers. TEey are demor-
,.ti-,,3 Ia e'.., "r ,hc "orI. ara uey
are source of discourag gement-of dis
heartenment. (if there is such word.) to
their suhordinates and to the ranks. | do
not hesitate to say that the failure of this
latest movement was due, primarily and
mainly, to the Observation-Disclosures word is
not to strong-of some of the generals in
command under Burnside. | ask no better
evidence of this than the language openly
held by them, i'll presence of then subordi-
mates, OF newspaper reporters and all those
who chose to listen, before the movement.
while it was in progress and after ii had been
abandoned. Unless common report, which
receives the countenanoe f not the distinct
confirmation of the officers most concerned,
is entirely at fault the commanding " neral
was overwhelmed with protests from lis sub
0rdinates against lis movements, after they
had been decided upon, and with exaggerated
and untrue reports Of the obsticles In his
way. So far know, no one OF them went
so far IS to refuse obedience to his orders
but everything short of that, which officers
nn,,lI Il to nr,I Ut bis lnpS (
was done, and done. toe. as on some previous
occasions, with effect and success. As every
one knows, here IS q kind..ct obedience worse
in It's results than tlat refusal, for it leaves
the commanding officer without a remedy.
While it answers in form all the requirements
of the service, it insures, by its hating. half
hearted and possibly premeditated inetiicien-
cv, the failure OF plan which it preteDds to
second.
One general for example, was expected to
have pontoons enough for four bridges-44
in all, believe-at the appointed spot by
daylight on Wedne sday morning. He had
but s or 9 miles to go, and there was no rea-
son why he should not have had them there
before the rain. He spent a good deal Of
time on Tuesday in demon strating that the
chances cf failure were - out of %: on
| "Wednesday morning he had - pontoonS
placed in open view to the enemy, and the
rest were stuck in the mud from two to five
miles back. He certainly had done nothing
to disturb his own calculation of chances
and can now refer to it as proof Of his own
sagacitv. Anothef general was unreserved
in the expression of his opinion against the
movement. and did everything in his power
even after the march of his troops had be
gun, to have it arrested.
/ 1t may seem severe Judgment, but can
not help believing, from what | saw and
heard, that each of the generals alluded to
and several of their subord mates, who natu
rally take their cue from them, rejoiced il
the failure of the movement.
/ If this were the first instance in which th'
willingness of certain officers to behold, will
entire eqanimity. the defeat of Burnside
plans could be traced on their language ant
conduct, should hesitate in attributing tn,
failure of this movement to that cause. Blu
it is not This is the fourth active movemen
which Gen Burnside has made against tn,
enemy duriug the short time that has elapse,
since he superseded Gen Mcclellan. Let u.
see what happened in each.
l. His first plan was to throw his army
rapidly upon Falmouth, cross over instantly
take possession of the heights of Fredericks
burg, and compel the enemy either to tish
him in that strong position, or fall back rap
idly upon Richmond. The one thing abso
lutely essential to its success was the promp
arrival of the pontoon train. This was un
der the direction of Gen Woodbury., and n
satisfactory explanation of his delay ha
ever vet been made. But that delay defeate
the execution of the plan.
3 Next came the crossing and the battl