Daily national Republican., 1863-04-07
Dol E1plsnatIon p,manded.

~ military leader. Some OF these Will be
met, by the friends Of the General, with the
assertion that they are only the conclusions of
prejndiecd minds, and not fair deductions Of
the testimony. Nothing but the publication Of
the Testimony itself will satisfactorily refuto
such criticisms, notwithstanding this first re-
port of the committee is unanimous. Undoubt-
cdly, Gen. Mcclellan himself will be able 10
explain away some things which appear against
him in this remarkable document. I'd.
Without entering at this time into lengthy
discussion upon tho report, we will come at
once to the purpose Of this article. II is to
call attention to the most important fact, II
seems to us, presented by the committee, and
one not only damaging to General Mcclellan,
but, II unanswered by him, promptly aud
clearly, will, and ought, to subject him to tho
condemnation Of every patriot In tho land aud
consign him In history with Arnold Of the Rev
olution. We desire the reader to bear in mind
that this fact is not merely furnished as the
optliOn Of the committee, nor is 1t presented as
having been deduced by a preIudiced mind,
Nothing Of the kind can be charged.
The committee cali 70 tho stand three dis
tinguishod generals-sumner, Burnside and
FrAnklln-neither OF whom bore III will towards
Mcclellan. Tho former was educated, and
lived, and died, a soldier, and probably enter
tanned as few political prejudicos as any man
who ever served undT Mcclellan. Burnside
aud Franklin were McClellan's intimate per-
sonal, military and political friends, and the
latter was always understood to be his conf
dental bosom friend. These three Generals,
in whom the public have implicit confidence,
and upon whom Mcclellan always leaned for
support, and some one of whom on every field
where he met the enemy, contributed largely,
by their skill and gallantry, to give him glory,
IL not victory, have taken each solemn oath,
and under it have made statements which the
committee submits without comment, to the
end that Lees army OdS permitted, by Ne Cieiidt,
10 escape from Marvldnd, against their Gdvicc
aud entrsdtieS, and against their ophiiOH that that
SOAols army could hare been cut 10 pieces thor
Oughly routed beyond Ns possibility Of rsorgaRi-
sdtion, or made 10 surrender, thus striking ne
final crushing blow 70 de re6elIioHi
We give tho testimony on this point below.
We do not assert that Gen. Mcclellan odnaol
meet 1t. We hope, for his own sake for the
credit of the gallant army lie commanded, for
the honorof our common country, that there
does exist some light behind this black dark
ness, which he will bs able to shed upon this
now inexplieuble and disgraeenll page Of his
tory. The public have right to expect an OK
planation. This may come through a court.
martial demanded by Gen. Mcclellan. We quote
from the report as folfowst
"On tho l7th ofsepteinber the battle Of An.
tletam was fought. Il was oommuaced by
Gen. Hooker on tho right, at dawn, our troops
driving the enemy before them and gaining an
important postion. When Gen. Hooker was
wounded and taken fnoHI The field, Gen. Sum.
ner took command Four right. Gen. Sumner
had been ordered TO hold his corps in readiness
70 advance an hour before daylight, but did
not receive the order to advance unfit 1:2O in
the morning. Gen. Mansfield, who had come
up to the support of Gen. Hooker, had been
killed. Our troops, seeing their leaders fall
and being very heavily pressed by the enemy,
were forced back for some distance from The
advanced position Gen. Hooker had reached
but finally with the assistance of the troopf
brought up be Gen. Sumner, checked tho enc,
my's progress and maintained their position.
On the left, Gen. Burnside, about 10 O'Clock
was ordered TO attack the enemy at the bridge
across the AntietAm In his front, and to effect
a crossing there. Tho advance Of Gen. Burn.
side was met by most obstinate resistance on
the part Of the enemy, and It was not until Ii
O'Clock that the bridge was carried. BY
O'Clock, Gen. Burnside's whole command had
crossed and taken position on some elevated
ground just above the bridge. He was ther
ordered to take the heights commanding the
town Of shePherdstown, which was done aftel
desperate fighting. By that time the enemy or
our left had been reinforced by withdrawing
some Of their troops from opposite our right
! where our advance had been checked, and Gen
Burnside was compelled to give up some of the
ground he had succeeded IL occupying II,
had sent TO Gen. Mcclellan for reinforcements
but received In reply that there were none to bt
had, but he must hold the bridge at all hazards
The corps Of Gen. Fitz John Porter, in th,
centre, was not brought into action at all, Gen
Hooker testi6es that he had been given to uu-
derstand that there were to be made attack
simultaneously on the right, centre, and left o.
our army. He attacked at dawn; but Gen Burn
side on the left was not ordered to attack until
10 O'Clock, and there was no attack made in tn,
centre by Gen. Porter. 7
In regard tothe manner of conducting thI
attack at Antietam, Gen. Sumner testihes.
81 have always believed that, instead Of send
ing these troops into that action in driblets al
they were sent, II Gen. Mcclellan had author
lied mo 10 march these 10000 men on tue lef
flank of the enemy, we could not have fallod tC
throw them right back in front of the other di
visions OF our army on our left-Burnside's
Franklin's, and Porter's corps. As Il was, W,
went in, division after division, until even ont
OF my own divisions was forced out. The othe
two drove the enemy aud held their position
My Intention at the time was to have proceeded
entirely on by their LEFT and move down, bring
ing them right in front Of Burnside, Franklin
= and Porter.
"Question. And all escape for the enem,
would have been impossiblei
"AnswCr. think So"
I The battle closed at dark, our army hayinl
gained some little advantages, at a heavy loss
but nothing decisive The attack was not re
newed the next day, the two armies occupying
the positions held by them at the close Of Oh,
yesterdays battle.
In relation to the policy of renewing tn,
attack on the day after the battle, Gen. McClel
Ian testihesi
THE next morning (tho 1Sth) found tina
our loss had been 30 great, and there was 81
much disoTganization In some ofthe commands
that l'dld not consider 1t proper to renew th
attack that day, especially as / was sure Of tn
arrival that day Of two fresh divisions, amount
ing TO about Is, 900 Ien. As au instance of tn
condition Of some of the troops that morning
l happened 70 TecelleCt the returns of the Firs
Corps-Gen. HoOker's-mado the morning O
, the 18th, by which there were about $500 mel
reported present for duty -Four DAYS ate
lanN "a nN Nla