The Hillsdale standard. [volume] (Hillsdale, Mich.) 1851-1909, 1863-01-06
THE WARM VIRGINIA.
The Committee on The Conduct of
the War.
THE INVESTIGATION INTO THE
FREDERICKSBURG AFFAIR.
Abstract Of the Dispositions OF
Burnside, Halleck, Sumner,
&C., &c.

|
&C., &c.
WAsHINoToN Dec. 23.
The report Of the Com ttee on the Con
duct Of the War, embraces the depositions o
Generals Burnside, umner, franklin, Hook
er. Woodbury., Haup,, Halleck and MeIgs. -
The Committee report the testimony without
comment.
ABSTRACT OF GEN. BuRysIDE's DEPOSITION.
Gen. Burnside said, when after the battle o
Antietans, Mcclellan decided to cross the Po
tomac. said, that in my opinion, be would
never be able to take the army on that route
beyond the Rsppahannock, unless he succeed.
ed in fighting tho enemy at some place on
this side. That if he proposed to go 70 Rich
mond by land he would have to go to Freder
cksbug, and in that he partially agreed win
mo-
On the 9th Of November. after ,hia conver.
sation. Mcclellan gave an order to Captain
Drum. Chief Of Engineers, to have all the
pontoon bridges at Berlin, and in tat neigh
borhood, that could be spared, taken up and
sent down to Washington, with view Of get
ting them down to this town in case he decid.
ed to 90 by way Of fredericksburg.
The letter that conveyed the order was writ.
ten on the 9th Of November, but, rs under
stand was not received until tho 18th Of No
vembcr.
Gen, B rnside speaks Of the surprise with
which he received the Presidents order TO
take command OF the amy Of the Potomac,
and that he had repeatedly expressed the
opinion lie (Burnside) was not capable to com
maud so large an army, and that Mcclellan
was the fittest person.
He then saws:
Halleck came to SEQ mo November 4t5.-
On the OH made out plan Of operations
in accordance with Halcck's order, and sent il
to Washington.
Gen. Burnside then gives detailed account
Of this plan, and speaks Of the disastrous de
lay ia receiving pon,oons, and says:
On the l5lh he rtarted column to FEEDER
icksbsrg, not knowing o. the delay. The pom
toous did not, however, start till the 10th, and
that day it commenced raining, which delayed
them 40 much and the roads became so bad
that when they got TO Dumfries, they hoated
the pontoons Fl the wagons, sent to Wash
ing,on for steamer and carried hem to Aq
uia Greek. sending the wagons around by land.
The pon,oons did not get there until the 22d
or 23i Of November.
After the first delay in starting tho pom
toons, think they were sent as quickly as
they could have been, and the supplies and
quartermaster's stores have always been in as
great abundance as we have expected, for af
ter the 10Th Of November the weather and
roads were particularly bad.
aIn oh I
glance there was no crossing the Rappahan
mock with the army at that time.
Q-Since you have assumed command Of
the Army of the Potomac, hare all its move
ments been made acc riding to yorr own ju e.
men,l Or havs some of them been directed
by the General in Cbitf, the Secretary Of
War, or the President Of the United States2
A-They have oil been made in accordance
pah my opn judgment In some ca,cs have
submitted my views. which have been arprov
ed.
O. Who did yon understand was responsi-
ble for tie forwarding Of the poniooLs 10 Fal.
mouth?
Al understand that Gen. IIalleck was to
give the necessary orders, and then the Off
GERS who should receive tho orders were the
only ones responsible for the poDtoons coming
here.
l could have carried out that part Of the
plan through officers Of my own, but having
Just taken command Of an army with which ]
was but slightly acquainted, it was evident
that it was as much as could atten TO, with
the asss, ance Of all my officers, 20 change its
position from Warren,on to Fredericksburg,
and folt, indeed expected, that all the parts
Of the plan which were to be carried out in
Washington would be attended to by the Off.
C. rs al that place under the direction Of the
different departments 10 which those parts Of
my plan appe,tained.
Odd you or not understand that you
were to be responsible for seeing that these
olders were to be carried optl
Al did not; never imagined for mo
meut that l bad 10 carry out anything that
was required to be done at Washington; Geu.
Meigs told mo distinctly, several days age,
10 Washington, that be never saw my plan Of
operations until | showed il TO them on that
day.
Q-Do understand you TO say in your
stat ment that you expected General Franklin
TO carry the point at the extreme left Of the
ridge, in the rear Of the town, and thereby
enable our trocps to storm and carry tho for
tifications?
Al did expect him to carry that point
which being done, would have placed ou'
forces in the rear of their extreme left, and
which / thought at the time would shake tbei'
forces IL the ridge 10 such an extent that the
position 10 front could be easily stormed and
carried.
Q.-To what do you attribute the failure tc
accompi,h ibali
A-To tho great strength Of the position
and the accumulation Of the enemy's forces
there. Icxpccief that tho bridges would bs
built in two or three hours after they wer,
unloaded, which was abont daylight. In'teac
OF that those on the right were not built unit
three O'Clock 10 the afternoon, and had only
tho means Of getting across one division ths
night
General Franklin's bridges were tuilt sbou
noon, and were held by our troops on the op
posite bank. This gave the enemy time Il
accumulate their forces, which were stretche,
All