The Burlington weekly hawk-eye., 1863-04-18
THE PRESIDENT TO MsCLELL.A.,jN,,...

/ -e,l,oT THE PRESIDENT TO MCCLELLAN.
i 8 On the 18th Of October the President
wrote to General Mcclellan concerning ths
operations of the army. And on the Tin ~
4 October General Mcclellan wrote in replv
The letter of the President and the reply Of
/ Gen. Mcclellan are as follows: :,
| 4" EXECUTIVE MANSION, WAsHIS;Tox
OCT. IL, 1852. MY DEAR Sir You 70,
member my speaking to you of what 7
called your overcautiousness. Are you NOT
overcautions when you assume that Won
cannot do what the enemy is constantly
doing? Should you not claim to be at Ier:t
claim?
AS l understand, you telegraphed Gen.
Halleck that you cannot subsist your army
at Winchester, unless the railroad from
Harper's Ferry to that point be put in
working order. But the enemy does now
subsist his army in Winchester at a distance
nearly twice as great from railroad trans.
| portation as you would have to do without
the railroad last named. He now wagons
from Culpepper Court-House, which is lust
about twice as far as you would have to do
from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly NOT
more than half as well provided with wa
CONS as you are. / certainly should be
pleased for you to have the advantage of the
/
ter; but it wastes all the remainder of An.
tumn to give it to you, and in fact ignores
the question of time, which cannot and must
not be ignored.
| Again, one of the standard maxims of
war, as you know, is, to operate upon the
enemy's communications as much as possi-
BILE without exposing your own.' You
but cannot apply in your tuuor. Change
positions with the enemy, and think you
not he would break your communication
with Richmond within the next twenty.
four hours? You dread his going into
Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force,
solutely, and you have nothing to do but to
follow and ruin him; v he does so with
less than full force, fall upon and beat what
| is left behind all the easier.
Exclusive of the water line, you are now
nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the
route that you can and he must take. Why
can you not reach there before him, unless
you admit that he is more than your equal
on march? His route is the arc of circle
while yours is the chord. The roads are az
good on yours as on his.
You know desired, but did not order.
you to cross the Potomac below instead of
above the Shenandoah and Blue Ridge. Nv
idea was, that this would at once menace
the enemy's communications, which I
would seize if he would permit. If he
shonld move northward, / would follow
him closely, holding his communications.
If he should prevent our seizing his COM
munications, and move toward Richmond,
would press closely to him, fight him if
favorable opportunity should present, and
at least try to beat him to Richmond on the
inside track. l say try;' if we never try,
we shall never succeed. If he make stand
at Winchester, moving neither north nor
south, would fight him there, on the idea
that if we cannot beat him when he bears
the wastage of coming to us, we never
can when we bear the wastage of going
to him. This proposition is simple
truth, and is too important to be lost
sight OF for moment. In coming to
us, he tenders us an advantage which we
should not waive. We should not so operate
as to merely drive him away. As we must
beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can
do it, if at ALL easier near to us than far
away. If we cannot beat the enemy where
he now is, we never can, he again being
within the intrenchments of Richmond.
Recurring to the idea of going to Rich
mond on the inside track, the facility of
supplying from the side, away from the enc
my, is remarkable, as it were by the differ
ent spokes of a wheel extending from hub
toward the rim, and this, whether you move
directly by the chord or ON the inside are,
hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. The
chOrd-ilne, as you see, carries you by Aldie.
Haymarket and Fredericksburg, and you
see how turnpikes, railroads, and finally
the Potomac, by Acquia Creek, meet you at
all points from Washington. The same,
only the lines heightened a little, if you
press closer to the Blue Ridge part of the
way. The gaps through the Blue Ridge
understand to be about the following dis
tances from Harpers Ferry, to wit: Yes
tais, five miles Gregorys, thirteen; snick-
er's, eighteen; Ashby's, twenty EIGHT; Man
assas, thirty eight; Chester, forty five, and
Thornton's, fifty-three. l should think it
preferable to take the route nearest the enc
my, disabling him to make an important
move without your knowledge, and COM
pelling him to keep his forces together for
dread of you. The gaps would enable you
part of the way you would be practically be-
tween the enemy and both Washington and
Richmond, enabling us to spare you the
greatest number of troops from here
When, at length, running for Richmond
ahead of him enables him to move this way;
If he does SO, turn and attack him in the
rear. But 1 think he should be engaged
long before such point is reached. 1t is all
easy ii our troops march rs well as the enc
my, and it is unmanly to say they cannot
do it; This letter is in no sense an order.
Yours, truly, "a LINCOLN.
Maj. Gen. MCCLELLAN." -
t HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE PoTo-
MAC, CAMP IN PLEASANT VALLEY, Oct II,
lS62.-SIR: Your letter of the 18th inst.
reached me yesterday morning by the hands
of Col. Perkins.
I had sent out strong reconnoissances,
early in the morning, in the direction of
Charlestown, Leestown, &C., and, as sharp
artillery firing was heard, 1 felt it incum-
bent to go to the front. did not leave
Charlestown until dark, so that have been
unable to give your Excellency' s letter that
full and respectful consideration which it
merits at my hands.
II do not wish to detain Col. Perkins be-
yond this mornings train. I therefore think
it best to send him back with this simple
acknowledgment of the receipt of your Ex-
cellency's letter. am not welded to any
particular plan of operations. hope to
tbs osta day 1nm s
ieve to be between Bunker Hill and Win
chester. Ipromissffou that will give to
your views the fullest and most unprejudic-
ed consideration, and that it is my inten-
ton to advance the moment my men are
shod, and my cavalry are sufficiently reno
ofnl< <<> Ia .I,LI