Daily national Republican. [volume] (Washington, D.C.) 1862-1866, 1863-01-10
Th, B.ttI. R.ror, Murrr,,,boro,.

The Battle Before Murfreesboro'.
We take the following summing up Of tina
great battle from the New York Tribune!
OF the three battles, tina. Of Wednesday wa
the most holly contested, the most unfortunate
for our army, the most cTCditably managed OF
the part Of Gen. Rosecrans. No one can rcaC
the description of our correspondent Wlthuu
coming 10 the conclusion that, In lis course
our army was, al one time, upon tho very brnl
Of utter destruction, and that the presence o
mind, GOODNESS, judiciOus aud prompt usv .
what remained Of means Of resistance By thu
( Commander-in-Chie alone saved the day and
insured our ultimate success.
/ The cause Of the disaster on the morning VI
Wednesday, as stated by ecu. ROseCrans In his
/ report to Gen. HallCCk, was the partial mis-.
formation Of our line Of battle. The right wing
under the command Of Mai. Gen. McCOok, vi iIC
getting into position ON Tuesday for the action
of the next day, came TO face, owing to maueu
Ncrs nccossitatcd 10y the strong resistance II met
andto the roughness Of the ground, to the south.
east, instead Of to tile south, as did the centre
and right. Whether this faulty disposition
arOsC from a negligence, or misunderstanding
of orders, or Was uuaN OidHblC for the mentioned
reasons, we have no means of telling. As II
was, the formation Of the right at the opening
Of Wednesday, battle vas too extended TO be
strong In itself, and brought the right flank 30
near the enemy, beyond proper supporting dis
tancC from the contrC, a. TO invite an attempt
to break II by Overwhelming pressure Of oum-
bcrs and render Its success probable.
Gen. RoseCrans' plan of battle was TO Open
ON the right and engage the enemy sufficiently
to hold him firmly; TO cross the river with our
left, consisting Of three divisions, Ito oppose
which the enemy had but tWo) the ground be-
ing favorable TO Hn attack from that side oftbu
town" The plan was formed with a knowl-
edge Of the Cnemy'S Intention to make his main
attack upon the right, and hence could only
fall TO succeed BY tho certain ability Of tho lat
ter 10 rcpcl H.. This vital condition Of success,
however, was wanting, owing 10 the weakness
Of the right from It's extended formation In a
wrong direction.
Gen. Rosecrans speaks OF "partiAl surprise
of the right" 1t seems, then, that, In addition
10 lie false disposition, It's rout was likewise at
tributablc to derellcLlons Of duty by certain of
his subordlnates. Tint this was the case ap-
pears probable from the fact that the division
first overwhelmed Is ono which had always
been distinguished for good discipline and
gallantTy In action. If not taken entirely
unawarcs, II would have fought up TO lis
splendid record, beyond all doubt. Its misfor.
tune was, most likely, due to the failure Of Ito
commander, Gen. r. ". johnson, 10 guard
against surprise. The antecedonts of that OH.
Ger warrant the supposition. II " Ill be reneIn-
at the head Of brigade Of cavalry, with John
Morgan, near HaHsyllle, Tenn, ending In the
utter defeat and capture Of himself and com.
mand. Tho officers commanding under him
In that affair publicly denounced him, through
the press and otherwise, for having manifested
both absolute imbecility Of management and
want Of personal courage.
The attack In main force on our riRLt was
madO In accordance with tho rudimcnlal
aAloms Of strategy, "tU attack the CnCmy's
weakest point with the greatest strength, )" aud
the readiness with which the rebel generals
discovered our weakness showed unquestlona.
bly, good gCnoralship. The aw full, humilitatlng
details Of the tnt act In the bloody drama or
" ednGsday-how the waves of rebel infantry
suddenly dashed upon our unPrepared lines
how the front line gave way without struy-
glo-hO& battery after battery was lOgt-hoT
brigade after brigade, division after division,
was drawn Into the vortex, confusion, fright,
and disgrace OF the rOut, until the whole right
was reduced to wild mass Of fugityes-hOw
the panic seized upon and ragged among the
tralns-our correspondent tells fully and well.
In sublime contrast to the absence of leader
ship, the shame and disaster on the right, ap-
pears the prompt recognition of the dangers of
the moment, and instant measures TO avert
them, by the Communicating hief-the stcadi
ness aud yalor Of the centre and left. The
manner in which the crisis of the battle was
'iSt ~ concentrating lnC lClt upon lnC centre
while occupying and checking the rebel right
by artillery, proves Gen. Rosocrans to possess
the qualities Of great captain in higher de-
gree than any other OF our generals has had ca
pacity or opportunity to exhibit.
The battle Of Wednesday, with its losses of ,
men and material-the complete dIsorgauza-
ton Of the whole right, comprising three d-
visions of the eight engaged-thc stampede aud
ENHANCEMENT of the trains, was to us reverse
Of decisive character. Its result placed Cen
Rosecrans ON the defensive by dCpriying him Of
more than onr-thlrd Of his army, Une-fourth Of
hls artillery, and part of his supplies Of pro-
visions aud ammunition. The attack Of the
enemy on Friday afternoon brought Oh what
was first defensive battle on his part, which
he managed, however, to turn into an offensive
onG bo successful that had not night uterpOsed
.he rebel army would have been driven from
MurirecoDOro', Instead Of retrCating without
llrect compulsiOn on the following evening.
That Friday action must have been extremely
disastrous to the rebels, the retreat establishes
beyond gaiusay.