The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-06-22

! For the first time Is laid before the i'uDic TIM
morning in the HERALD an accurate narrative
Of the battle of Winchester, concerning which
there had been so many conflicting accounh:
most of them of an unfavorable nature but
some giving the Union General extraordinary
credit for his performances. The reliable report
which we publish to-day shows that nothing
which has hitherto seen the light reaches the
full amount of the disaster. Accompanying
detailed description of the battle is correct
map of the locality, including the roads, the
town, the Notifications and the positions of the
contendng forces at various stages of the battle.
1t will be seen that the Notifications are stu
ated on two hills to the northwest of the
town, consisting of "the main work" nearest to
Winchester, and "the star fort" further
north, both being connected with each other
by road. The position is evidently strong,
and ought to have been held, as it certainly
could have been If there had been generalship
and pluck at the head. The attacking force has
been estimated at from $4,000 to $4,000. Mil
roy had 1000 in the battle, and could have con.
centrated $4,000 from the adjoining posts. The
Confederates advanced by two roadside Front
Royal and the Strasburg-from the south,
driving in the pickets and carrying the outposts,
at the same time working their way gradually
around by the western side Of the town, from
which on the second day they assaulted the
outer works Of the main fertilization, rushing
into the ditch and up the parapet, on
which they planted their flag, carrying
the works at the point Of the bayonet, and
killing and capturing considerable numbers.
The inner works were still in the possession
Of Milroy, also the star fort But council Of
war was held after nightfall, and when the bat
tie had ceased, on Sunday. It was decided to
take advantage OF the darkness and evacuate
the place during the night in silence. leaving
behind all the cannon, ammunition and stores.
Better far to have retreated before the battle
or to have fought it out. Milroy had not gone
four miles when he found himself confronted by
an overwhelming force, which the Confederates
had sent ahead. Two regiments were Captured
wholesale, and the slaughter of those who cut
their way through was very considerable, while
the cavalry pursued and captured great num-
bers. The loss was terrible. Nothing was saved
except what was carried upon the persons of the
troops. Not soldier had change Of clothing.
The officers were compelled to leave even their
wives behind them in the hands Of the enemy.
Three entire batteries Of field pieces and one
battery of siege guns--in fact the whole Of the
artillery Of the command-were lost, together
with six thousand muskets, and small arms
without stint, all the ammunition and counts
sary stores, two hundred and eighty wagons
and one thousand two hundred horses.
Out of seven thousand men only from one
thousand six hundred to two thousand had
turned up safe, leaving upwards of five thou
sand to be accounted for. The report in cir
culation that the train of Mlroy had escaped
turns out to be without foundation. Our cor
respondent, writing on the goth, says nothing
whatever belonging to Milroy's command was
saved, and the mistake originated from the fact
that the trains from Jones' brigade, at Martins
burg, and McReynolds' brigade, from Berryville,
escaped to Harrisburg. Thus the defeat of Mil
roy was most thorough and disastrous, and 90
much was he scared that he appears never to
have stopped till he got to Baltimore.
Now, his troops fought admirably, and they
were well handled by the subordinate ofIicers.
What, then, is the cause Of disaster as need.
less and as humiliating a. that of Harper's
Ferry last year? Nothing but the want Of cool
courage and capacity in the commanding gene
raj. Unfortunately, Milroy is one Of the polti-
cal generate, appointed not for his military
abilities, but for his violent abolition opinions
Such men, being fanatical, have not the
brains to lead armies. In the second battle
of Bull run, in which Pope command
| ed, Milroy's frantic conduct showed thai
| he had no presence of mind in battle
| lie says himself, in his evidence before cour,
Of inquiry:-"I told him (McDowel) that wa
not fighting with General Sigel's corps; that
my brigade had got out of ammunition some
time before and gone TO the rear, and that had
been fighting with half a dozen different bri
gadcs, and that had not inquired whose or Il
what particular corps they belonged 1t is
evident he has no idea of order or subordina
ton, or command, and is totally unfit to lead
troops The evidence Of Captain Cutting and
Lieutenant Roebling shows the extraordinary
state Of mind in which he appeared at that battle
Brigadier General Buchanan bears similar testi
mony. He says Ills manner was very ex
cited, and every one inquired who that wa,
rushing about so wildly. l left him haranging
and gesticulating most emphatically; bu
afterwards found him giving orders to por
ton Of my brigade. His own brigade was not
near there, and be seemed to be rushing abou
the field without any special aim or object
unless it was to assist in the performance o
other officers duties" Lastly, General Nc
Dowell says Of him:-"When he spoke to nj
he was in frensy, not accountable scarcely
for what he said, and attracted the attention o.
every one by his unseemly conduct" His owl
report, indeed, written some time after, wher
his mind might be supposed to be in its norma
state, shows how extravagant and unmeasure,
he is in his language and how Illogical his mind
Now, all this evidence il in print and befor
the War Department.; and yet, since the dsas