The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-09-23
Secretary Seward's Circular. British
Opini0n Of His Position and Arsu.
ferom tho yon..ch T.,nss. Sent ~

H.
proposition is that the statement Of England
and Franee having conceived ut the begin
ming Of the American war belief that the
restoration OF the Union was an impOssibili
IL, persist in that belief To the present hoar
His argument resolves itself into a long inr
ratiyc Of the campaigns Of the last twelve
months, and this historical compendium IL
then applied TOT the purpose OF correcting The
presai.in belief, and impressing the tw,
Western Powers with convictions more favor
able To the Federal cans In IFS object this
State paper is certainly inieiIigible Mr. Sc
ward Is perfectly accurate i" ms fs'ss1mI,tios
Aaf tie sf,aeu,en Of France a.,d Es.faal- -ht
might hare Included, ia.ire1, tio~ If Tie y.a o,
E"'ofs- 10 consider 10 H'srray day U.@ Me"ia
An.estcda Union eda s.etY7' ks reconstructed. Ii
is natural, too, that lie should he dcsirous OF
removing this conviction, but the argument
which he employs for this purpose is both
ineffective and nee,iless-neediess, because
VIC all knew beforehand every particle Of his
story, and Ineffective because, even If we ar
cept it exactly as it is presente ed 10 i.s, il
!Aives our conclusions just what they were.
The truth is, the course Of the American
war has taken Hs l,y surprise. When We
first arrived at the conclusion that the South
could never be eOcrccd into reunion at the
point OF the sword We still anticipate Cd
| prompt military success on the part of the
North. The only reserve affecting our judg
ment was doubt ahont The earnestncss and
Hnanimity of the South in claiming indie
pendencc. That condition being satisfied
We considered that though twenty millions
of men were certainly stronger than nine
| millions, they WeIe mol Dsuch stronger as to
haze aay chance Of setja7ating these ni.,e mil
Tons, dispersed as they acere Deer utmost Him
table territory. We hardly doubted the i'm
mediate superiority of the North in the field
The general expectation Of Englishmen was
that the South would soon he overrun, that
its seaports would he all captured and occu
pied, and that strong Federal garrisons would
hold its chief towns. In short, We antiei
pated that the first six months, or at any
rate the first year of the war, would see the
prostration OF the Coniedeates thus far com
pleted; bnt it was then that we thought the
hOoeiessncss of the work would bt gin to be
FELT.
Ii al that time we could have fOreseen that
the successes Of the North after more than
two years of desperate lighting would amount
only to Il c achievements now recOanted with
so much complacancy by Mr.. Seward, We
should have thought the task Of the Wash
ington Government more impracticable than
ever. We venture to add that Mr.. Seward
himself would have been very much of the
same opinion. We think il may be said with
some truth that il the Federal Government
had, al the beginning Of the year 1861, fore
seeding States would still be free; Richmond
and Charleston still safe, and Washington in
some little danger, the war would never have
been untertaken at all. That Mr.. Seward, ut
this rcriod of the strife, s,o,tid be reduced 10
stigo j,tsdt oee, the deiicesaaee of the North
from he nrasioa 81 Il Sonfhern ",uty, is about
tie strongest possible p''oJ " tie holeiess"ess Of
his cuase.
The Fedcrals thought to sweep the South.
ern States with their Irresistible forces. AT
first they actually imagined that three
months and &c, 600 men would suffice for the
work. A single battle taught them the ex-
tent of this miscalcuiation and though they
still limited the time to "ninety days" they
expanded the armament TO 100000 soldiers.
The .00, 900 did no more than the 20, ,GO6-in
fact, they were defeated in the East, and
evenly matched in the West. All that can
he said at this moment of Northern eXulta-
ton is that the Federals have taken two
places OH the Mississippi after sieges three
times as tedious and as costly as they We're
expected to be, and that they have not had
their own capital occupied by the enemy, as
seemed highly probable two months ago
Mr. Seward, while coloring his history as IA.
y0rably as he can, is compelled to talk of
drawn battles, as events creditable to the
Federal arms; and the very paper which is
designed TO show the unquestiOnable ascen-
dancy of the North speaks Of the NECESSITY
Of covering the national capital" and the
absolute equality Of the helligercnt forces
in its immediate vicinity.
There might be some purpose in Mr. Sew
ards present exposition il either We i'm this
country or the Americans i'll the Federal
States had begun by regarding the bellige-
rents rs equally matched, and the war rs
likely to be prOtracted on even terms for
long series of years. This, however, WAS
not the case, and We are therefore not much
impressed with the moderate balance of sue
cess which Mr.. Seward claims for his own
side. In point of fact, taking one field with
another, the South has had u greater share
Of victory than the North, its only conspicu
ous failure, indeed was in All attempt to
bring the war to Il close by the capture of
the Northern capital. Erea mar Urn. Lee u
ty .N aeco,l,.ts n,Gfs thely 10 resume tie efti..
sire Ma" Ge'. -uta.'e, and though we do not
hear that the Federals are preparing nmedi
ately to invade the territories of the Conlede
rates, we do hear that the Confederates may
be expected nj any moment in the country Of
the Federals. This is moi much of a ease for
IA Power pretending so distinctly To suIcri-
oriiy rs to complain that the character Of y
belileercnt is AZ ,.0r.lcd 10 its rival. On that
point, indeed, lei any one read Mf. Stewards
own description, ia this vesy document, OF
| the strength, the numbers, and the hearing
of the Confederate armies, and then say ii
| The South BE- noI entitled 10 the dc9isnai ioi.
| of a bellgerent. Why, III recording The bat
| lie of Antiei:,m, the Federal Secretary is ac-
iually compelled to eypat:atc on The idcnii-
| cal qualities OF the cohtending forces, and
| 10 add that the Northern soldiers were then
| proved, for the first iimc;to be not inferior
| in heroism and yalor.
| Practically. then, Me asly gia and esse,.te
Of Nr. Semyds 0,ya,ofat Is r.,ffd 10 lis obect---
Ii all is true that he tells us, that Ill il nii
| nitely short OF what we were prepared to
| take for granted two years ago. without be-
| ing any the more saD9uine OF Northern sue
| cess We thought the North would oyerrun
| the South in 4 brief campaign, but would
then find the difficulties begin. Mr.. Seward
| tells us that after two years OfmOrtal struggle
| the North has not oyefrun quarter Of the
South--having the real difficulty still in pros
pect rs before. We only conclude from this
| that the Federals have not even that snpc-
riority for which We gfve them credit; and
| and that the relative strength OF the COnfed.
crates il by SD much he greater. Ii Mr..
| Seward really wishes to uake converts
of French and English statesmen, he must
adopt very different form of argument
He must show US either that the South Is
| eyineing readiness 10 yield, or that the
| restoration OF the Union without this sub
| mission. But he shows neither of these
things. On the contrary, he tells ia that
| the Southern President has just proclaimed
a evy ca masss, while Of his own Govern
| menf he says natbiag, except thai ii is pre-
1 pairing to prosecute the war IA before. Rn'
| what Is to be the endy sEasay1e thinks Ha
The isVsaa,a.cfioa Of lie Union 6y force of a,ns'
IL an mpass;hsl;ty, and a eeSy great 4aa.t~r .,
also sees distinctly that the South gives mol
1 ha sliul,faSf su1l 0f cat while fvf.f