Daily national Republican., 1863-04-02


the road leading through the gap; Smiths upot
the left. A line, formed Of Bartletts and Tor
bitts brigades, supported by Newton, whose
| a1tivity was conspcous, Gall Of Slocuin's divi
sion,) advanced steadily upon tile onomy at q
charge on the right. The enemy were drivBH
from thJlf poslliOii at the base OF the mountain
where they we're protected by stone wall, and
steadily forced back up the mountain until they
reached the position OF their battery near the
| road, well DIP tho mountain. Here they made
| stand. They were, however, driven back, re.
tltihg their artillery In echelOn until after an
action Of three hours the crest was gained, and
the enemy hastily nod down the mountains on
the other side. On the left of The road Brooks
and lrwin's brigades, Of Smiths division,
formed for the protection of Sloculu's flank,
charged up tho mountain In the same steady
manner, driving the enemy before them until
the crest was carried. The loss In Franklin's
corps was one hundred and fifteen killed, four
hundred andslNteen wounded and two missing.
The UnGmy's loss was about the same. Ono
piece Of artillery and four COlors were captured,
aud knapsacks, and even hayersaCks, were
abandoned as the enemy were driven up the
hill.
On the morning of the 18th was Informed
by Union civilians living on the side of the
mountains that the enemy were rctreating in
the greatest haste and in disordered masses to
the river. There was such n concurrence of
doubt as to the fact. The hasty retreat of the
enemy's forces from the mountain, and the
Withdrawal of the remaining troops from be
tween BOonsbOrO' and HagcrstOwn to a posi-
tion where they could resist attack and cover
the ShephGrdstOwn ford, and receive the re-
endorsements expected from Harpor's Ferry,
were for time Interpreted as evidences of the
cncmy's dsorganizatlon and Generalization.
As soon as 1t was definitely known that the
ln I'D hp m hp pnNy
airy and the corps Of Sumner, Hooker, and
Mansfield were ordered to pursue them, via the
turnpike and BOOnsbOrO', as promptly as pos
slble. The corps of Burnside and Porter (thC
latter having but one weak division prCsGnt)
were ordered to move by the old Sharpsburg
road, aud Franklin to advance into Pleasant
Valley, occupy ROhrCrsville, and to ondeavor
to relieve Harpor's Ferry. Burnside aud Por-
ter, upon reaching the road from BOonsboro'
to Rohrersyille, were to reinforce Franklin or
to move on Sharpsburg, according to circum-
stances. Franklin moved towards Brownsville,
and found there n force largely superior In num-
bers to his own, drawn up In strong position
to receive him. Here the total cessation of
firing in the direction of Harper's Ferry indi-
Gated but too clearly the shameful and prema-
ture surrender of that post.
The cavalry advance overlook a body Of the
CnUmy's cavalry at BoonsbOrO', which It dis
pCrsCd after brief Skirmish, killing and
wouudlng many, taking some two hundred and
fifty prisoners and two guns.
Richardson's division, of Summers corps,
passing BOOnsborO' to Kedysyllc, found a few
miles beyond the town the epemy's forces, dis
played in line of battle, strong both in respect
to numbers and position, and awaiting attack.
Upon receiving reports of the disposition of
the OuCmy, | directed all the corps, except that
Of Franklin, upon Sharpsburg, leaving Frank
lin to observe and check the enemy In his front,
and avail himself of any chance that might
offer. had hoped to come up with the enemy,
during the 10th. In sufficient force to beat
thom again, and drive them into the river. My
instructions were, that If the enemy were not
on the march, they were to be at once attacked;
If they were found in force aud position, the
corps were to be placed in position for attack,
but no attack was to BE- made until reached
the front.
On arriving at the front in the afternoon, /
found but two divisions, Richardson's and
Sykes's, in position; the rest were halted in the
road, the head Of the column some distance in
rear of Richardson. After a rapid GXamina-
ton OF the position, found that 1t was too late
TO attack that day, and at once directed loCa-
tiOns TO be selected for our batteries of position
and indicated the byouaCs for the different
corps, maSslug them near and on both sides of
the ShaTpsburg pike. The corps were not all
in their places until tho next morning, some
time after sunrise.
On the 10th the enemy had slightly changed
their line, and were posted upon the heights In
rear Of the Antletam creek, their left and CEN
tire being upon and In front of the road from
Sharpsburg to HagerstOwn, and protected by
woods and irregularities of the ground. Their
extreme left rested upon wooded eminence
near the crossroads to the north of j. Mlllsr's
farm, the distance at this point between the
road and the Potomac, which makes here
great bend to the east, being about three
fourths Of q mile. Their right rested on the
hills to the right Of Sharpsburg, near Snavely's
farm, covering the crossing OF the Antietam
and the approaches to the town from the south
cast. The ground between their Immediate
front and the Antictam Is undulating. Hills
intervene whose crests in general are COM
manded by the crcsts Of others In their rear.
On all favorable points their artillery was
posted. II became evident, from the force of
the enemy and tho strength of their position,
that desperate fighting alone could drive them
from the field, and all felt that great and ter
riblC battle was at hand.
In proceeding to the narrative Of the events
of this and the succeeding day, ! must here re-
peat what l have observed In reporting upon
the other subjects Of this commune ltion, that
] attempt in this preliminary report nothing
more than sketch of the main features of this
great engagement, rCserving for my official re-
port, based upon the reports of the corps COM
mandcr5, that tull description OF details which
shall place upon record the achievements Of in
diyiduals and of particular bodies of troops.
The design was to make the main attack upon
the Gnemy's leit-at least, to create diversion
In favor the main attack, with the hope of
something mOrC-by assailing the encmy's
right, and as soon as one or both of the flank
movements were fully successful, to attack their
centre with any reserve might then have on
hand.
The morning Of the 10th (durng which there
was considerable artillery tring) was spent In
obtaining Information as TO the ground, rccti-
flying the position of the trOopS, and perfectlng
the arrangements for the attack.
On the afternoon Of the 10th IIOOkcr's CORDS,
consisting Of Ricketts, and DOublUday's di-
visions, and the Pennsylvania Reserves, under
Meade, was sent across the Antictam creek, by
ford and bridge to the right of Kedysvllle,
with orders to attack, and, II possible, turn the
unGmy's left. Mansfield, with his corps, was
sent IN the evening to support Hooker. Ar
riyo in position, MGadUs division Of tho Penn
sylvania Reserves, which was at the head of
uOOker's corps, became engaged iu a sharp
contest with the enemy, which lasted until
after dark, when 1t had succeeded In driving in
portion Of the opposing line, and held the
ground.
Al daylight the contest was renewed between
Hooker and the enemy In his front, HUUkerE at
tack was successful lur time, but masses of the
enemy thrown upon his corps, checked it, Mans
field brought up his corps to HUUkCr's support,
when the two corps drove the enemy back, the gal
life In the effort. General Hooker was unhappily,
about this time wounded and TOmupIIrd IN ao If, -