The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-05-08

The New York radical papers have late
ly selected from the vast body of testimo-
ny taken by the joint committee of Con-
gress on the Conduct of the War, and
published, the testimony of Gen. HOOKER,
as possessing "good deal of public in
terest and historical value" The answer
to the first question replied to by the last
mentioned general the Times italicizes,
though it is not SO printed in the report.
This selection for publication was doubt.
less made under the same spirit which in
duced the editor to call the particular at
tentiOn of the reader to this first answer,
a spirit which doubtless gives, in its rank
ling, good deal of uneasiness; spirit
which no good man will envy.
The first question and answer are as fol-
lows:
Question. To what do You attribute the fail
ure of the peninsular campaign?
Answer. | do not hesitate to say that it is to
be attributed to the want of generalShip on the
part of our commander.
This question was put by the committee
TO several OF the witnesses, although it was
omitted in the examination of General Nc
CLELLAN, the leader OF the national army
in that campaign The committee, it may
be supposed, did rot wish to hear his pro-
tessional opinion on that subject. But they
did happen to put the same question to
some OF the with 5sses who did not concur
with General HOOKER, and their testimony
does not, in the opinion of the radicals,
possess the same ''public interest and his
torical vaiue" General HENRY J. Hunt
was examined: he was chief in command
of the artillery in the army of the Potomac,
and testified before the committee This
general was with the army # the Potomac
since its organization; he organized its re-
serve artillery, and many OF the batteries
that belong TO the divisions. General
HOOKER has The reputation of being a great
fighting general, ard a great swearing gen.
SAe' wv, oUI IiiSHS ii"lltlSo w liOt CIV e Ills
testimony any more value than that of men
less notorious IN these respects. The ques-
ton was put to General Hunt:
To what circumstances do YOU ;scrbe the
failure Of the pcninsnlar campaign: 4. | WAS
not consulted in regard to the plan Of the cam
paign bat 50 iar a. | understand Il. | ascribe
It's failure. IN the first place, to the failure of a
flank movement which, in ny Judgment
would have rendered the works at Yorktown
unTen1b!c by the enemy ANA have shut up
the ConfedcrltcS in the peninsula. | was of
that opinion then. and have net changed that
opinion since. | do not know that such
movement was ever contemplated It was a
matter upon which was never consulted Nv
impression Was however. and has since been
confirmed, that an attack was to have been
made somewhere near that point in which
case thought il was our game that Yorktown
should be occupied i'll strength by the enemy
50 that "c lIs4ht, if possible, shut him up in
the peninsula. 10y operating across from West
Point. ana shutting of hi~ retreat to Rich
mOnd Jriie.c II that mad been done the
1na.A force OF the enemy would lave been con-
fined - Yorktown, and We wouiG hay" met
with no serious OPPOSITION ii proceeding to
Richmond.
Z. Did You ever near Of any definite plan Of
thaO campaign. DAT va, a. tr followed!
-.
discussed ,. nose having ri.at matter in
charge: aj.o ..thcr"G, i. others have done.
from Lsii:rrl,- +uIc,s, lny IDEA OF what the
plan VA. ;.... ! I'LL expected t!lat the move
mcnt !t-'c ....,.,t &! WOG!I ~ carried out
=. u IA, ;u~ot,i: ',l- tLcr,. &. prevent The
lL,liN iIoN tta - "y;IiG iua,c W.. he force we
iD,l lll-r".
y. Isl understood IT, N~.l,wel's corps.
which N"s die .A~t ~ bl cii4 'aracd was to
in"yr t"fo-> 20 Ntst Point, oil near that place,
q pprjipn al Il COUGHING PERHAPS at Gloucester
80 IL IA throw itself between lie cneinys works
al Yorktown and Richmond. OF cours, th.
Withholding III thai corps prevented the plan
ii thai Was Tue plan. from Dei: cXccutt,! 4,
intended
O. Were We not without General Mellow
ellis corps, vastly superior to the enemy when
our army landed on The Peninsula:
y do not know. presume that We were
superior TO them but how much cannot saw
Bur the difference this, ! had looked
upon it: had il been understood, before the
campaign was commenced, that McDoweli's
CORPS was 10 be retained here. then other ar
ranrememts could have been made: but did
not hear OF IL anti after the campain had COM
mcuccd and We had been committed 10 a GER
tain course Of action in front OF Yorktown
that is. the night we arrived in front Of the
works at IOgktOWn. after clnnonading all the
afternoon aMd making rcconnOsSances there,
that night heard ot the withdrawal of Gen
eral McDOwc!l'- force. | can say, although |
was not in = position to be consulted, that did
believe that such Il movement would have rem
dcrcd our force so ycrWhcming as to destroy
whatever force the enemy might have thrown
down on the peninsula. That was the first
cause OF failure.
O. Had You attempted the flank movement
Won speak or would ii not have caused the ell
envy 10 have rcireated Immediately upon Rich
loold. before you could have intercepted them:
\. Ky opinion is that there would have been
= roce for richmond; that in the attempt to
save themselves, they would in the very begin
Ming have made the evacuation which they
made only On the 18th of May, and that evacua-
ton would have been accompanied with all the
haste of :. retreat: and by sending a few gun
boats up the York river past their works, We