Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1863-10-21
Che Ogip ''7!a1ts''lan
From The New York World
Meade's and Rosecrans's Repulses--
Democratic Defeats-Their Cause.

Democratic Defeats-Their Cause.
The point dlcldsd by the late election 10, that
the war Will be protracted until aztec the end OF
the Presidential canvass. The means by which
these elections have been carried furnish both
q motive and O reason for dilatory military
policy. The war cry having been found by
trial TO be the most efficient eleotioneerlne
engine the Administration can use, they have a
politioal intereet in tie continuance Of the war,
quite distinct from the general Interest Of the
country, which requires that the rebel armies
ehall be destroyed and the loyal States relieved
OF their heavy burdens at the earliest possible
date. The country has no interest that the war
should continue for o single day beyond the
shortest period within which 1t 10 possible to
subdns the rebellion; but every interest to the
CONTRARY. Tho Republican party. ON the other
hand, has no Less aiake than its own exlatence
In the continuance Of the war, 80 long as war
cry Is the most stirring legend 1t can inscribe on
its political banners. Here, then, is q motius
which the late elections furnish for an nnneces-
cary protrsclion Of the war; and the means by
which these elections have been carried supply
q reason why the war will drag ita Glow length
along eG the Administration desires. -
We, OF couree, understand that In ascribing
to the Administration auch motive as the one
now named, we are impeaching lite hsncr and
its patriotism. Wesre making charge which,
II eust,inablo by proofs, ought to work com
plete forfeiture of public confidence in our pres
ent rulers. Shall we be told that their high
sense Of honor and duty foRbIds them to weigh
the possesalon of power against the good Of the
country We can In reply only appeal to in.
dIsputable facts. That the Administration
ought to be restrained by honor and -duty -irom
seeking to strengthen their hold on power BY
proceedings which tend to prolopg the war, is
true enough; but, unfortunately, q question of
righ. is not 10 this case identical wish a uues-
tion of fact. We ssk no reader to follow ma
into the doubtful domain of hypothesis; our
appeal Ia to facts actually accomplished, and 10
the consequences which necessarily result from
those fac!e. The evidence is such that if taken
down In the form In which testimony is given In
court Of Justice, il would procure a conviction
of the party inculpated without any labor of
summing up, 90 1t could safely be submitted tor
tho Jury without comment. -'-- so e s.
Question. What is the number of Republican
soldiers furloughed to 60 nome and vote In the
Pennsylvania electionf Answsr. From twelve
| to fifteen thousand. Question, What Ia the
Republican mejofity in Pennsylvania Ans,o,y.
From twelve TO fifteen thousand. Question,
When were these soldiers withdrawn frem G. en-
eral Msads's army2 Answer. Two or three
weeks ego. Queitton. When did General
Meade begin his arrangements toresrest from
the advanced position In the enemy's country
which be then occupied2- Ansuer. Very soon
after bis army was weakened Dy this taking
away Of Republican soldiers for political duty
10 PENNSYLVANIA. Question. Wss's General
Meade suffered by the enemy to make tbis re.
treat urmuleetsd2 An,toer. No; itwas hsstsrsd
and made compulsory by a vigorous Advance
Of she rebel sfmyy now relatively 60 5tgoug that
General Meade dared not imperii what re-
msined Of his own army by stsypg and giving
bstile. ;i,1 $50 :
Theee elmple, unvarnished facts, stated in
the piaineet and dryest form without rhetorical
artifce, prove that the political victory won by
the administration In Pennsylvapia has been
won at the expense Of a dlsgrsceful retreat by
the Army of the Potomac. The cost of this
political victory to the national treasury can
not be estimated with HrithmeticsI lccuracy for
the want OF exact date; but 1t must amount TO
many millions. The pay, subsistence, and trans.
portation Of the soldiers cent inso Penusyl yanls,
10 less than drop In the bucket. The retreat
thus made necessary by converting the army
into political machine to carry elections for
| the Republican party, has rendered abortiye all
that has been done by General Meade sinoe he
rscrosaed the Potomac in pursuit of General
Lee after The battle Of Gettysburg. Not only
has all the expense Of maintaining the Army
Of the Potomac In this long interval been
squandered, but (what is still more importantly
precious time has been wasted at a season Of
| the year which precludes the recovery of the
ground General Meade has lost until the roads
shall have become practicable In the epring of
1864, when the term of service of the three
ears men Arst enlisted will be about to expire
The Republican political victory In Pennsylva,
MIA, therefore, costs the country the greater
part of years expenses of the Army of the
Potomac, and postpones anything more than
| defensive operations, by shat army, until 8
great part of its men ere mustered out of
service. ,,.5 90 i. ID. ..s
We presume all sorts Of tales will be invent.
ed to show that Gen. Mesde's retreat was purely
voluntary, aud made for strategic rseions. But
no reason, strategic or other can be given for
Gen. Meade's retreat which is not reproach
| to the administration. A hurried retreat Of
ffty or Slx.y miles proves that be was not strong
enough, or did not think himself strong enough,
| to fight the enemy In the region into which be
had advanced. II he was not strong enough
Originally, Why was he permitted TO do SO fool.
lsh q, thing as to Rdvapesf II he was strong
enough before his army was depleted to carry
the Pennsylysnis election for the Republicans,
military advantages have been sacrificed for
party objects. II he Was originally too weak
| 20 fight In 10 advanced position and with such
long lines to defend, then so much greater is
the crime Of weakening him still futther, and
exposing his safety to accomplish party pur-
pose. If Meade could not. fight Lee on the
Rapidan, and II there is no strong military po-
sitionl In the whole intervening distance from
the Rapidanto Bull Run where he dared to give
battle, what did he advance 60 the Rapidan Ior?
awhy was he allowed to increase the cost Of
maintaining his army by lengthening the dis.
jtance from bis supplies, and guarding bng
lines Of communication in the enemy's coun-
Try, If, without fighting, he was to hurry back
to Washington and thers stand on the dsfer
isiys..o He conld have hovered aronnd Wash,
iuSton aud have kept on the defensive with
out mourning ell this expense, and Without the
loss Of prestige involved In ATTY or sixty miles
hurriet retreat, under vigorous pursuit by ih,
euemya isg r'@ .
The simple truth, obvious to the whole coun
TRY, is, thas Meade maintained his advanced
position until the Administration weakened hi
army to carry State election, and that he wa
then compelled to Hy before a pursuing foe.
4 We could, If necessary, demonstrate wit
equal clsarnsas that ths- defeat Of RoSscran
and his present critical position are the direS
a consequence of using soldiers by the Admins
4 tration for accomplishing party objects. Th
attempt to put Governor Seymour in fals