Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1863-06-18
From the New York Tribune.
General Mcclellan.

duct of the war, which we printed yes
terday in full, is remarkable as dealing
not with opinions, or arguments, or the
ories, bat mainly with facts. 1t is ;
historical statement Of the evidence or
certain important points. We have
already presented in these columns ar
impartial summary Of this evidence
let US endeayor to note now more brief
/ ly the conclusions which it established
We viii try to state them in such e
way that, however they may conflict
with personal partialties or preiudices
they shall not be controyertible as mat
ters of fact.
The army of the Potomac was or.
ganized by Maj. Gen. Mcclellan. BY
the first of October, 1861, it numbered
$4,000 men, and was in all respects
fit for immediate service. The rebel
army at Manassas, which was opposed
to it, was less than 10000 strong. Bu,
the Army Of the Potomac nevertheless
remained inactive during the whole
winter of 1862, and did not move till
the rebels voluntarily evacuated Manas.
sas in March. A victory that winter
would practically have annihilated the
rebellion. 1t is not now disputed that
our army would have won a victory il
it had been tried, and that Gen. Nc
Cletlan IS solely responsible for its
failure to try.
Secondly: The blockade of the Pc
might have been prevented or raised
at any time during that winter bv the
naval force with the cooperation oi
1900 troops. Gen. Mcclellan withdrew
the troops and is solely responsible for
the continuance Of the blockade.
Ihirdly: The Peninsular campaign
was Gen. McClellan's own plan, reluct.
antly acquiesced in by the President,
and undertaken by Mcclellan on the
express condition that he should have
force sufficient, in the opinion of all
his corps commanders, for the defense
Of Washington. They fixed the num-
Der of that force at 1000. But Gen.
Mcclellan, in violation ofhis agreement
| and the ar&ers Of the President, with
drew all but $4,000 troops from the
capital, part even Of these being raw,
and no light artillery left them. The
President, therefore, ordered the corps
OF Mcdowell TO remain for the defense
Of Washington, and even including
this corps the specified number of
troops Was not made up. Yet this is
what is termed an interference with
Gen. McC!ellan's plans," and is in sub
stance the onl y ground Of complaint
against the President, and the only ex-
cuse offered for the failure of the
Peninsular campaign.
FowthIy: Mcclellan took with him
to the Peninsula more than 100, 900
troops. The rebels had less than 10000
to resist his occupation of Yorktown
But 'heSs&t down to besiegc il; the rebels
concluded to reinforce and resist, and
after months delay the place was
evacuated by the rebels without firing
4 gun, just as Mcclellan was ready to
to open his batteries. Meanwhile part of
McDowel's corps had been sent to him.
1t is now known that Yorktown might
have been taken at once, and that
Richmond would have fallen with it.
For the delay and failure, Mcclellan
| alone Is responsible.
FittAly: There were three other oc-
casions when, if Mcclellan had i'm
proved his advantage, Richmond might
have been taken by the troops who
could at once have been moved against
it, viz: after the battles of Williams
burg, Seven Fines, and Malvern Hill
Each time he hesitated to advance till
it was too late, and the rebel capital was
saved.
Sirthly: The retreat Of the Army OF
the Potomac after and during the Seven
Days Battles, was precipitate and pre-
mature. The battles were all fought by
the corps commanders; Gen. McClel-
lan's only share in the operation being to
order and superintend the unnecessary
retreats by night. And when, finally,
after he splendid victory Of Malvern
Hill, won in his absence, he again fell
back to Harrison's Bar, he deSpairci OF
his army, made no preparations for de
tense for twenty four hours after. had
resolved on s,r'renderig his whole armv
| if again attacked, and was only saved
from that disgrace by a rain which pre-
vented the enemy from moving his
artillery. -. ..~ :.... .
Socenthly: All possible reinforce
mentS were sent to Mcclellan while he
was on the Peninsula The letters of
the President, Of the Secretary of War,
and of Gen. Halleck, conclusivelv prove
that every effort was made to sustain
and reinforce Mcclellan, that troops
were even sent him which were deem
ed Indispensable TO the safety of Wash
lngton, and that they were refused him
only when no more remained TO be
sent
| Eighthly:: When ordered to with
draw his army from Harrison's Bar,
Gen. Mcclellan delayed the execution
tot the order elecen days after its re-
ceipt By that delay the safety of the
army of Virginia and Washin cton was
Ilmminently endangered, and Still more
! 50 by McClellan's subsequent failure to
heartily cooperate with Gen. Pope.
| Nnthly: The battle of Antietam.
which was an lndecisive success, might
have been a complete victory, and
wonld have been followed by the de.
structioa or capture of the rebel army,
If If had bean skilIf.,Il,, ro,orbt h, AZ