The Jeffersonian Democrat. [volume] (Chardon, Ohio) 1854-1865, 1863-04-24


his capacity.
The retreat from Malvern 10 IIarrisou's
Bar was very precipitate, and the troops
on their arrival were huddled together
in coniusion-the whole army within
space Of about three miles along the river. |
And the Committee says: "No orders
were given Tie first day for occupying tie
lights which commanded tie position, nor
were tie troops so placed as TO be able 10 re-
sist an attack in force by the enemy, and
nothing 6ut heapy rain, Which prevented
The enemy from bringing up their trtiliery,
saved tie army from destruction" We re-
gret 20 believe that so shameful state
ment is true, but 1t only confirms what
we long since knew from other sources,
that Gen. Mcclellan on his arrival at Har-
rlson's Bar believed himself incapable of
further resistance, and was fully prepared
to surrender the whole Army of the Po.
tomac TO the robels if 1; had been again
attacked. That army numbered, accord
ingto Gen. McCellsn's own returns, on the
Goth Of July, lG8, ,314 men, OF whom l0l,-
COL were then present for duty.
Such was the end Of the Peninsular cam
paigu. The four opportunities which the
valor Of his army had offered 10 the imbe-
cility of its General had been utterly los.,
and blood and treasure and time spent TO
no purpose.
From chat time TO the 10Th of August,
when the position was fully abandoned,
no movement of any kind was attempted.
Gen. Mcclellan applied for $1,000 rein.
forcements which did not exist, and could
not be given him, and Gen. Halleck finally
withdrew the whole Army TO operate with
Gen. Pope.
The remainder Of the report Of the Com
mittee is devoted 10 subjects which have
previously been discussed in these col.
umns, excepting the events which occurred
after the appointment Of General Burnside.
We have space only 10 remark in passing
that the evidence presented by the Com
mittee entirely sustains the charge previ-
ously brought against Gen. Mcclellan,
that he did not heartily eudoavor to re.
lieye Gen. Pope when he and his army
and the Republic were immineutly i'm
perilled. And il appears as to Antie:am,
facts heretofore known. that Gen. Nc
Clellan had at least 900 fresh troops
with which TO renew the attack next morn.
ing, and THAT Burnside and Sumner botl
advised it. Gen. Sumner has heretofore
been represented as coinciding with Gen
McClellan's decision. 1t IS real pleas
ure to relieve the memory of the gallan
and loyal veteran from that aspersion.
Gen. Burnside appears in this report il
a new light. That he was brave, carr.
est, ,devotedly loyal soldier, who had every.
where done his utmost for the cause in
which he drew his sword, the whole
country gratefully knew. We believe
that henceforth his military capacity, also,
will be thoroughly respected, and at all
events he will receive, as he deserves, the
regretful sympathy OF the public in the
| singular and apparently wholly unde-
served misfortunes Of his career. He gen.
erously took on himself the sole RESPONSE
bility for the disaster at Fredericksburg
1t will henceforth rest mainly on the
shoulders of Major-Gen. Franklin. The
testimony is explicit that it was his dis
obedience Of orders which defeated plan
equally admirable for the courage and
the s!rategetic merits Of its conception. II
he had attacked with his available force on
the left, where the main attack was meant
by Burnside. to be made, the day would
have been won. The gallant effort OF
Gen. Meade was left wholly unsupported.
except by Gen. Gibbon, who was soon
wounded, while Gen. Birney, whose divis-
ion Of 1000 men was immediately in rear
Of Meade, conten.ed himself with checking
the enemy's pursuit where Meade had
been repulsed, instead of promptly ad-
vancing 10 his support. 1t seems to have
been Seven Pines over again oE his part.
The history Of Gen. Burnside's efforts
after Fredericksburg is dramatic in its in
terest, but is even more painful than in
teresting. Undaunted by his defeat, the
heroic General conceived new plan, EN-
bracing magnificent cavalry raid which
would have electrified the country by its
success, and to the success of which moth.
ing was wanting but opportunity. But
here occurs the insubordinate interference
Of which whispers have before now been
made. Gen. John Cochrane and Gen.
Newton, with the knowledge of Gen.
Franklin and Gen. w. f. Smith, went to
Washington with the admitted purpose 10
endeavor TO impair the confidence Of the
President in their commanding General.
The President listened to them, and was
so far influenced by their assertions
though il is difficult to make out how much
they are willing TO confess having said
that he telegraphed Burnside to make no
movement without consultation with him.
The cavalry expedition was at that time
under way, but WAS promptly halted, and
Gen. Burnside went to Washington. The
President told him what be had heard
The General demanded the names of bis
accusers. They were refused him. He
then declared that no person knew what
his plan was explained it to the Presl-
dent, and sought permission to proceed
The President hesitated SO did Gen.
, Halleck, and Gen. Burnside returned to
his camp.
, Meantime, these plans, which had been
, communicated only to the President, to
: Gen. Halleck, to the Secretary Of War,
and to some OF Gen. Burnside's staff who
, had left the camp, became known to the
Rebels in Washington, and the plan was
therefore necessarily abandoned !
, Gen. Burnside then devised still another
! plan and undertook TO execute il on his