Democrat and sentinel. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1853-1866, 1863-11-25

clent tor their substance, and this was
as far as English legislation had gone
when our Federal Constitution was
planned. Assuredly the trainers of our
Constitution did not intend to subject the
peo pie of the States to a system of con-
scriPtion which was applied in the mother
country only to paupers and vagabonds.
On the contrary, l infer that the power
conferred on Congress was the power to
raise armies by the ordinary English mode
of voluntary enlistments.
The people were justly jealous of STAN
ding armies. Hence, they took away
most of the war power from the Execu-
tive, where, under monarchial forms, 1t
generally resides, and vested it in the
Legislative department, in one branch OF
which the States have equal representa-
ton, and in the other branch of which the
people of the States are directly represen-
ted according to their numbers. To these
representatives of the States and the peo-
pie this power of originating war was
committed, but even in their hands 1t was
restrained by the limitation of biennial ap-
preparations for the support of the armies
they might raise. Of course, no army
! could be raised or supported which did
not command popular appreciation, and 1t
was rightly considered that voluntary en-
! listments would never be wanting TO re-
cruit the ranks of such an army. The
war power, existing only for the protec-
ton of the people, and left, as tar as 1t
was possible to leave it, in their own
hands, was incapable of being used with
out their consent, and, therefore, could
never languish for enlistments. They
would be ready enough to recruit the
ranks of any army they deemed necessary
to their safety. Thus the theory of the
Constitution placed this great power, like
other governmental powers, directly upon
the consent of the governed
The theory itself was founded on free
and fair elections-which are the funda-
mental postulate of the Constitution. If
the patronage and power of the Govern
ment shall ever be employed to control
popular elections, the nominal representa-
tives of the people may cease TO be their
, real representatives, and the armies which
may be raised may not so command pub
; lie confidence as to attract the necessary
| recruits, and then conscript laws and other
! extra constitutional expedients may be-
: come necessary to fill the ranks. But
= governmental interference with popular
2 elections will be subversion of the Consti-
? tuition, and no constitutional argument car
= assume such a possibility
Supposing that the people are Away:
G to be fairly represented in the hall OF Con
n gress, maintain that it is grievous inIus
: tice to them to legislate on the assumption
4 that any war honestly waged for constitu
e tional objects will not always have suct
J: sympathy and support from the people a
q will secure all necessary enlistments
: Equally unjust to their intelligence is it t.
y suppose that they meant to confer Oh thel
servants the power to impress them into ;
o war which they could not approve.
:. When to these considerations we ado
IS the ability of great country, like ours
to stimulate and reward enlistments, bot
@ at home and abroad, by bounties, pen
y sions and homesteads, as well as by pollt
n ical patrocage in countless forms, we Sc
e how little necessity or warrant there is TO
o implying a grant of the imperial power @
of conscrlption.
O There is nothing in the history of tn
: Constitution nor in those excellent con
temporaneous papers called the Federal
>, lists. to Justify the opinion that this vas
a power lies wrapped up in the few plal
If words of the 18th clause, whilst the sui
y seuuent clauses, concerning the militia
~ absolutely forbid it.
~ If the very improbable case be suppc
: sable, that enlistments into the Federi
- armies might become so numerous In
- particular State as sensibly to impair L
= own proper military power, is 1t not muc
=, more improbable that the States meant
- confer upon the General Government tt
-, power to deprive them, at its own pleasu
y altogether of the militia, by forced levies
49, Yet this might easily happen if the pow
= of conscription be conceded TO Congress
II There are no limitations expressed-not
- - ing to compel Congress to observe quot
- and proportions as among the sever
II States-nothing to prevent their raisll
armies wholly from one State, takii
- every ab!e-bodied citizen out OF 1t to Il
" endanqerine, if not utter undoing of all
- domestic interests.
"I And besides, if we concede this dange
n Gus power to the language OF the thirteen
'iu clause. we destroy the force and effect
9" the words of the sixteenth and seventeen
clauses. We make the instrument Sc
,n on destructive, which is violative OF all ca
II ons of construction. Congress snail ma
nd mower to provide for calling forth the Il
~ i;t;a in the manner and subject TO