Wilmington journal. [volume] (Wilmington, N.C.) 1844-1895, 1863-08-06


nents as to all of whom it is piece of bad faith and
tckery that they would pot be slow to resent by pro-
pouncng the blockade null and void.
A'" Richmond Hhss.
army Corn espondence of the Savannah Republican.
MART1NsBURG, VA, Jnly IA, 1868.
The army has re-croesed the Potomac into Virginia,
and the time has when the truth may be spoken,
in candor and moderation in regard to the late unfor
innate campaign in Maryland and Pennsylvania. UpI
70 the present time there has been that
letters would not fall into the hands CT the enemy and
hence as YOU must have observed, did not deem 1t
nrudent to tell the Uhole truth, lest mail carrier
should be captured again and important information
communicated the Federal commander. a succinct
and faithful narrative, bringing events down to the
present date will place your readers In possession OF all
the material facts, ard show that the term onio:'u
as applies to the operation of the army IN ary
and is not inappropriate, unless it be too mild.
No one with that part of the army left near Cham
bersbu-g suspected, on the morning OF he LIST lnst
that the great battle would begin on that day was
sitting on the wet ground with my back against tree
writing to YOU and your readers, when Gen. Lee and
his escort passed by in the direction OF CashtoWn ono
GETTYSBURG He seemed to snuff the battle IL the
breeze and for the first time occurred to me that the
enemy was approaching cur lines. In 1e" minutes
Anderson's division OF Hills corps marched down the
same road followed hour Or two later by Johnson
division of Ewes corps, which had retaced lis steps
from Shippensburg. Ii the course OF the morning or
ders came for Longsreets corps except Plcketts d
q
same direction as soon as Gen Ewes train sent back
from Carlisle, should pass This was an immense train,
as long almost the tail OF comet and lar more oml.
nous of evil. 1t occupied four hours IL passing ano
moved go slowly through the CashtoWn Gap I'm the
South Mountan) that Longstreets corps was delayed
until near midnight in reaching point four miles dis
tant from the battle ground Penders aud Heahs dlVl-
sions alone were in position to engage the enemys ad
vance column on the morning of the lst Eariys and
Rodes divisions of Ewes corps arrived the ground
lofo tkn
hanna from Carlisle to York, and thence to Gettysburg
nese last two divisions joined the former, and togeth
err they drove the enemy back, inictng heavy loss
but Andersons and Johnsons divisions, though near
enough, put into the fight that evening The
enemy had according to the statement OF prtsonors
three army corps present on the Isl, and that night
and early next morning the remainder OF Meade's
forces were brought up and put IN very strong
position. We did not press the enemy after night
| fall
Ibe following deductions flow from the foregoing
facts Had Gen. -Lee concentrated bis forces twenty
four hours sooner he might have dispersed captured
destroyed the three Federal corps engaged the first
day, and have fallen upon the remaining forces then
coming up and not yet in position, and driven them
pell nell back upon Baltimore Washington. Or, il
AndeIson's and Jehnsons divisions had been put II
Immediately upon their arrival and advantage press
ed with vgor that night, the enemy might have beer
driven beyond the formidable position be finally occu
pied and from which subsequently found it impos
BILE to dislodge him. The result would probably
|
the side of the road and Lonestreets corps allowed tc
move rapidly to the 'front.' or if the attack had beer
renewed early the morning of the 3D. instead OF at
quarter to four in the afternoon.
1t is understood that the reduction of Harrisburg
constituted part e General Lees programme, since
be could not afford to friter away his strength AID
time upon the militia so long as an unteaten army re-
NAMED in the field. Having disposed of the army, he
could then march wherever aud whenever it suited him
The QUESTION then recurs, whether the distribution Of
| hia at different " n
fortunate in this that it required time to
trate them when the time OF battle had arrived 1t Yves
similar ersion of bis forces, after much hard fight
ing and marching, that prevented him from beating
Mcclellan at Sharpsburg last year. His object then
Was the capture Of the garrison at Harper's Ferry in
which he Successful. In the present instance il
his DESIRE doubtless, 10 place his army at conven
lent points for procuring subsistence his TANKS
against attack by cutting such railway lines might
be used agar st him, and to draw the enemy as far
into the interior OF the country possible Bat let Us
proceed
Were we compelled to accept battle at the time and
place we did We were not. Having the start OF the
enemy from Fredericksburg, and the whole country be-
fore US, we might have chosen ground aud time
for making the attack. We might have occupied the
pass at Cashtown, remained Oh the north side OF the
South Mountain or fallen dcwu to Boonsboro Cap
Having base to protect, and line of cOmmunlca-
ton to keep open, but relying upon the districts
cuped for the of substance free to GO
where pleased and to fight them when we pleased.
But the battle joined at the time and place Sc
lected by the Federal commander. The place, strong
by nature, rendered still more formidable by num-
Der of stone fences which crossed the field by the open
ground we had to to reach it, and by felc
works thrown up by the enemy during the night. The
attack renewed by ourselves the evening OF ht
3D. without proper reconnossances, and not sultane
tously along the whole line, but rregulary and spas
medically, first by corps or DIVISION and then BY
another, reminding of team of Unmatched horses
which, refusing to pull together, unable to move The
load which a simultaneous and common effort might
certainly accomplish. The troops fought better
or inflicted greater loss upon the enemy and strong
the position of the latter was they surely would have
carried it, though at heavy loss, if the attack hae
been differently planned. AS it they pushed th
enemy back, numberess batteries which they
unable to bring off, captured many flags, and kill
ed and wounded more than in any previous tile
Indeed, the successful our assaults up to 6
certain point, the greater loss tor the urhe
an attacking column drove the enemy, not being sup
ported by combined attack the more fearfuly were it
tanks raked by the oblique and enfading fire of th
batteries which were not assaulted The enemys lett
which rested upon a mountain. McLaWs and Hood, O
Longstreets corps were ordered to turn and many be
eve, if other parts of the line had been assaulted
the tme thnt Meade, strong as his position was
would have been beaten. n effort made to turf
his right wing which rested upon open and less Difficult
ground
On the 3d. Pickett's division of Longstreet's corps
(which had come up the evening before) supported b.
portion OF Hills corps, ordered to assault Gene
terry Hill the centre, believed to be the key to tn
position of the enemy. The order executed in gal
carried but his success was temporary, though pur
chased at fearful cost The want of proper support
the movement OF the enemy upon his exposed and bleed
ing tanks, and the terrible and oblique fires
centrated upon him from batteries not otherwise
pied, made it necessary for him to rerace his steps
oc fho he had ODD