The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-11-20

Poland, by the assertion that it can do no
good to prolong discussion which only
serves to develop differences of opinion.
To France, her note is even more peremp-
tory. The Gar informs the Emperor Ma
poleon that no such illusions as the French |
Minister had made to the western provin-
ces of Russia can be at all allowed.
But before this note is dispatched the |
Russian fleet sails from G'onstadt. The |
Gar evidently apprehended the possibility
of some sudden and important steps on
the part of his opponents He could not
know the exact terms of their understand
ing with each other; and he was probably
aware that efforts were making, through
French emissaries, to enlist the smaller
European states in formidable coalition
against him. He therefore takes precau-
tionary measures, and sends his fleet in
more favorable position for action before
this independent and saucy reply is uttered.
England may censure it, Austria may shake
her head at it, France may fume with in
dignatiOn at what she feels to be an in
suit, but the fleet is out of harms way.
Russia is ready for action. She had before
secured a delay which was fatal to any
action of the allies during the present
year, by land; she now secures herself
against the other danger of being fore
stalled at sea. Having accomplished these
ends, she is secure from all danger for six
months to come. No military operations
can be undertaken during the winter; and
if her naval force is secure, she is unassaii-
able.
A glance at the map will indicate the
peculiar naval disadvantage to which Rus
STA is exposed. Her territories lie far within
the coast line of the continent, wholly on
the eastern side of Europe. She touches
salt water only on the extremities of her
vast area. The Black Sea is wholly closed
by Turkey the Arctic Ocean is impracti-
cable for maj thine ornaments; the Allan
tic she reaches only through the Gulf of
Finland and the Baltic Sea. Her great
naval arsenal of CrOnstadt lies more than
1900 miles from the open ocean. The
passage through which she must reach it
consists, for the last 500 miles, of the diff
cult and tOrtuous navigation of the narrow
Straits Of Denmark. The occupation of
those straits by an allied or even by an
English fleet, would effectually close the
passage against her, deprive her of all &C.
cess to the ocean, and condemn her fleet to
inaction under the guns of her fortresses.
Even if she were to gain the German Sea,
she must still make her way through the
Straits of Dover, and along the very coast
of France, within cannon-shot of Cher
bourg and in sight of Brest, the great
French maritime arsenals, or sail for 600
miles further, around the hostile shores of
Scotland and through the stormy Hebrides,
ere her ships could have fair field for any
enterprise against the commerce of her
enemies Within the Baltic, too, she must
sail for 1000 miles in sight of the Swedish
coast and Sweden is bustling with prep
arations for participation in the coming
war, which she fondly hopes is to give her
Finland again. Sweden might throw a
fleet into those narrow seas; and with such
an obstacle within the Baltic, and COM
bined French and English fleet outside of
it, one may conceive how slender Russias
naval chances would be against such CO.
alitiOn. But with her fleet abroad upon
the high seas, and in state of readiness
for action, she is in position, in case hos
tilities should occur, to harass the COM
merce Of her opponents all over the globe.
The results of this fact are quite i'm
portant England is etfectually precluded
from taking part in an anti-Russian ALI
ance. If the Russian fleets were liable to
be sealed up in the Baltic, British COM
merce would have little to apprehend from
the war; and to secure this object would
o. course be the first care of England in
such an event. In the Crimean war it was
etfectually accomplished; and though the
vast naval force of the allied squadrOns in
the Baltic accomplished almost nothing
against Russia Extensively, they succeeded
in keeping her fleets from the ocean. Now
the case will be altered. Russia discerns
her mistake. On the first news of HOSTILE
tias, her fleet now here would scatter over
the ocean; and British and French COM
merce would be almost exterminated.
Nor need Russia give herself any concern
about her inability to send her prizes in for
adjudication. The liberation so cheerfully |
accorded by the British Government to
confederate cruisers, to burn aud destroy |
without remonstrance vessels uncondemn-
ed by prize court, will authorize the use
OF similar seventies by the navy of a fir t
rate power; and the capture of the Sea
Bride in sight of Cape Town might be
re- enacted by her enemy toward the Per-
STA in sight of Sandy Hook.
We attach, therefore, great significance
to this Russian movement England can
not afford to sacrifice her commerce.
Ships, exports, manufactures, imports of
food, these things are too important to her
to be sacrificed in behalf of Polish indie
pendence. Russia may therefore be easy
about Englands share in the coming con-
flict She may demonstrate and write
diplomatic notes, though even that is termi-
mated by the curt reply of Russia; hence
forth she may look on in silence. Her
very good friend and ally, who betrayed
her into the Mexican embrogio, will
hardly be allowed to embroil her again
so easily. Napoleon is far less vulner-
able. French commerce is not extensive
on the ocean, and he has in that direction
little to lose. He may therefore venture;
but England dare not. Russian diplomacy
has gained it's first object in securing time;
Russian activity has secured second
point of high advantage over the hardness
and ir1esolution of the allied powers. Inc
Gar may now calmly watch the march OF