Raftsman's journal. [volume] (Clearfield, Pa.) 1854-1948, 1863-01-21
THE HISTORY OF THE WAR.

Important letter from the President to
General M M'Clellan-the movement on
Richmond by way of the Peninsula,
was only shifting difficulty, etc.
AT the Mcdowell Court OF Inquiry. on FRI
day the 10th of January, Generals Ricketts,
and Hitchcock were examined. The latter
produced the following letter from President
Lincoln to General Mcclellan, which WAS
written in April last. The Star of last evening
cshtans the letter, but as it was full of errors,
We obtained the following corrected and OFF,
cial copy, which is herewith opened
WASHINGTON, April 9, 1862.
Major General McCgeiian-My Dear Sir: Your
dispatches complaining that yeu are not prop
erly sustained, while they do not offended me,
do pain me very much.
Blenker's division was withdrawn from you
before you left here, and you knew the pressure
under which did it and thought, acquies-
ced in it-certainIy not without, reluctance.
After you left l ascertained that less than
10000 unorganized men, without single
field battery, were all you designed to be left
for the defense at Washington and Manassas
Junction and part of this even was to go to
Genera Hooker's old position.
Gen. Banks corps, ,once designed for Manas-
as Junction diverted and tied up on
the line of Winchester aud Strasburg, and
could not leave it without again exposing the
Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and Ohio
railroad. This presented Cor would present,
when Mcdowell and Sumner should be gomez
great temptation to the enemy to turn back
from the Rappahannock and sack Washington
My explicit order that ashington should,
by the Judgment of all the commanders OF
corps, be left entirely secure, had been neg
looted. 1t was precisely this that drove me
to detain Mcdowell. do not forget that
was satisfied with Your arrangement to leave
Banks at Manassas Junction but when that
arrangement was broken up, and nothing was
substituted for it, of course was no. satisf ID
was constrained to substitute something for
il myself
And now, allow me to ask, ssdo you really
think should permit the line from Richmond,
via Manassas Junction, to this city, to be
tirely open, except what resistance could be
presented by less than 10000 unorganized
troops a'' This is question which the coun-
try will not allow me to evade.
There is a curious myst cry about the num-
Der Of troops now with you. When tele-
graphed you the 9th, saying that you had
over 100, 900 with you, had just obtained
from the Secretary of War statement taken,
as he said, from your own returns, max ing
100000 then with you and rout to you.
You now say you will have but S5, 900, when
.all en- rout to you shall have reached you.
How can the discrepancy of % 900 be accoun-
ted for?
As to General Wools command, unde r
stand it is doing for you precisely what like
number of your own would have to do, if that
command was away. 1 suppose the whole
force which has gone forward for you is with
you by this time and, if so, think it is the
precise time tor you to strike blow. BY de-
lay the enemy will relatively gain upon you
tha. is he will gain faster by Notifications and
reinforcements, than you can by reinforce
ments alone.
And, once more, let me tell you, it is indis-
pensable to you that you strike blow! | am
powerless to help this. You will do me the
justice to remem ber, l always insisted that
going down the, bay in search of field instead
OF hghting at or near Manassas, was only
shifting and not surmounting difficulty that
We would find the some enemy, and the same
or equal intrenchments, at either place. The
country will not fail to Rote--is now noting
that the present hesitation to move upon an
intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas
repeated.
beg to assure you that have never written
you, or spoken to you in greater kindness of
feeling than now, nor with ful Her purpose to
sustain you, SO far as in my most anxious judg-
ment consistently can. But you must act
Yours very truly A LINCOLN