New-York daily tribune., 1863-09-24
sARUyE PASS.

SABINE PASS.
If the Sabine Pass Expedition had been con-
ceived with reference TO military objects only,
and had been conducted in accordance with
military principles its failure though momen-
,arilv discouraging, would have been no cause
for abandoning the enterprise. But since 1t
was such movement as ought never to have
been attempted, the present repulse should be
accepted as final, and whatever steps are here
after TO be taken for the liberation of Texas
should be governed by different considerations
and directed by wiser means than have lately
been adopted.
Setting aside for the present the question
whether any expedition TO Texas rhould have
been undertaken at moment when oyerwhelm-
ing forces are concentrating against Ro'eerais,
it is very clear that movement by way OF
Sabine Pass j. the very last that should have
been resolved on. In maritime attempt, the
first consideration is a landing-pace. II a foot
hold in an onemy's country can be gained
without opposition, the expedition should make
for that point unless there are controlling rca-
sons against it. In the present case, SABINE
Pass was, of all Others, the route known e. be
most strongly defended against The approach Of
a National force. The existence oi tie Tort
which defeated the naval lotlla had been long
before a-ccriaincd. On the other hand Il was
equally well known that by way Of The kio
Grande, almost, If not entirely, unobsirucied
access could be had 10 the territory OF Tcxa-'
and that an army once landed on is banks
might proceed at H. leisure 10 the conquest OF
other portions Of the State. II only on these
grounds, therefore, the expedition should have
proceeded by the Rio Gfande and no' by
Sabine Pass Add the fact tina, the Pas Is only
nav gable by vessels of light dfaught,' aud that
the works protecting 1t were altogether too
formidable to Do assailcd BY such vessel. with
reasonable prospect Of success, aud II be-
comes still more dithcalt Ia SEQ why sueh
route should have been chosen.
Bu, further The army entering Texas was
never desi gned to operate wholly a. al army oi
invasion. Itwas al army Of liberation. large
portion Of the people are loyal 10 The tnon and
are to-day, as they have long been, held by
force under control of the Rebel authorities.
They wait only ior the uniurllrg Of the National
flag TO ily to arms ia il defense. Arms need Ia
be furnished them, and an organized force
offered a. a rallying point. But considerable
portion Of the population IL also strongly Rebel
in sentiment. An expedition, therefore, should
have been directed 10 the point where II would
have found friends, not enemics, and where the
loyal population could have rapidly gathered
under H. banner Nosuch consideration Gems To
have had weight with the protector Of the Sabine
Pas performance. Not only was the Pas de-
Tended, but the country adjacent TO II, is Allied
with a Rebel aud not with loyal population.
Through a broad belt Of territory thus Inhibited,
-. the loyalsis Of Northern and Western Tcxas
would have had to penetrate in ordor to reach
this army, if il bad succeeded IN forcing il way
to Sabine City. To attempt, therefore, {" e.
tablish a force in this part Of thc State WAS to
! sacrifice one of the most important objects OF u
military occupation.
! An effort Is made, as usual to blame the oili-
GERS in immediate command Of the land ana
naval forces We do not consider them cnlpa-
/ bic. They were not the originators oi the
scheme; they were simply mtruAted with IT'S
execution. The naval officers undoubtedly
knew that they were sent with an utterly mad
equaie force to do what ought never to have
been attempted. They must have known the
depth of water, and the marshy character oi the
coast but it was theirs not to reason why 7;
il was "thcirs but to do or die They fought
gallantly what they knew was hopeless fight.
Honor, not blame, 10 them.
Ia view Of the consequences which have re-
suited from disregarding military principles IN
attempting military expedition, we presume
il will scarcely be urged now that the chance Of
scizing the cotton supposed to be- stored IN the
Sabine district was an equivalent for the ad-
yantages which properly directed effort would
have insured. Still less is such plea justii-
cation Of the disaster which the violation Of the
planest and simplest rules Of war has caused.
We advert to such topic with reluctance. We
consider il consistent neither with national rep
utation nor national honor to organize an expe-
dilion under the national flag against quantity
of cotton. There is no objection to coniiscatng
cotton or any other Rebel property when it falls
incidentally into military procession. But this is