Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1862-1865, 1863-11-06

CAUSES OF DELAY AT CHARLESroN-THE DIS
| AGREEMENT BETWEEN GILMORE AND DAHL
GREN.
The Washington correspondent of the n. Y. Times,
! writing the 26th, says:
IL is high time that the philadelphia patitudes about
the concord between Dahlgren and Gilmore were end
cd The interests OF the country demand that the &C.
tua relations baween the respective commanders Of the
army aod navy before Charleston be known, with the
! causes that undeuie them.
At the root the Rodmau 10 inch army gun was cut
off by DdhgreD its shape modified it was trans
formed but rot reformed, to harmonic with his
theories Of gun masking and the projection Of large shot
aud she'll This raced gun the engine given to the
navy reduce tbs worss which cover Charleston, and
20 capture tina; city. Experiment demonstrated, what
sci nee should have anticipated that 1t 0oud not burn
potder enough to hroO prcjeette at long range and
hiqh velocity It short that the powder was
blown out OF the muzze unc 9nsumed. To secure COM
p.te ignition OF the charge and insure long range and
high velocity it would have bsan necessary TO riff
DO wder and fl, powder would have burst the piece.
This radical and incurable deecs in the ordnance given
10 the navy batter down the deiences Of Charleston
and take that city lies Mt the bottom of what of failure
has thus far characterized the SIEGE and OF all tho de-
lays which have drawn to the breaking of the pop
uar patience.
To pass over all other history of the change of naval
commanders before Charleston, the assignment OF Dahl
gren work his guns against the city and IFS de-
lenses policy OF necessity as well as of justice.
He went down and took command and then struck
hands With Gilmore on the bargain that the army should
take Morris Island reduce Fort Wagner and the works
on Cummings Point and from that position knock
Sumter to pieces with ParrOtt guns silence its fire.
and this being done, that the navy should anchor-ts
iron.clads of the whaTves Of Charleston.
Gilmore has per ormed his part of the bargain
Dahlgren has not performed his. Why? the country
asks. For two reasons l. For want Of range in the
navy guns. 9 From misunderstanding" between
him aud Gilmore.
This misunderstanding is of such huge proportions
as to involve the two services IL was stimulated re-
sentfuy by the midnight boat attack OF DAhgren upon
Sumter, which regarded by the army surrepd.
tous and unfair attemps The part OF the navy 10
snatch the homer OF taking possession OF fortress
which the former had reduced. For, in pursuance Of
TIE original agreement between Dalgren and lHore,
the latter actively preparing Iraspora ion for two
small picked regiments, numbering together FIVE huG-
bred mep With whom he intended to take Sumter by
escalade. Tns misunderstanding" quite fully do
veloped by recent correspondence between DAhgren
and Gilmore, of which have minute information in
letter received yesterday from Hilton Head.
Dahlgren first writes to Gilmore, requesting him to
"slbdue the fire. Of SUMTER as he intended to
the obs Iuctons between thai work and Moultre
adding that il that FIRE cond be "sub5ued" he might
be saved the necessity Of engaging Sumter with his
iron cads all whose powers wOcld be required against
the interior deierces OF Charleston.
To which, Gilmore made reply, in substance, that he
had supposed that Sumter helpless aud harmless
ruins fer It's ability resist men-ofWar was con.
ceTned 1t true that gun, 80, yet mounted
in casemae, and pointed up the harbor toward The
city. But this gun did not fire in the direction Of the
obsrucions which Dahlgren proposed to remove. The
fact that Samter pOweIess az ipst the navy was
demonstrated vita heavy naval cannonades upon
Moure 10 which Dahgeens ships lay for several hours
within short range OF Sumter, and fned TO elicit shot
from that .worl. He, Gilmore, Therefore, was con-
strained TO believe thai ;he he he was requested TO
'subdue" WAS infantry FIRE.
Tnis he thought was imposing new condition on the
army and one which, although he WAS willing to make
great sacrifices, and she'd blood generously
phsh the object of the joint expedition, he bwould not
reel juslife0 10 undertaking. IL possible, continued
Gilmore, in substance, that though attack Sum-
ter has aed the army might get possession of the ru
ns, but cou1 hold them without great sacrifice of
life because the enemy command the fort with gunner
batteries planted three-quarters OF circle sur
rOundI it. am willing, continued Gilmore, to open
fire the work again from my batteries at any hour you
may desire--eveu tomorrow morning Aud am further
willing Us there appears 10 be difficulty al which you
still hesitate) TO undertake mytelt with my army, and
the means az my command, to remove the obstruc-
tons.
To which pahlgren responded thus in substancs:-
"He did not propose 10 impose new conditions on the
army but he had always understood that the army
to reduce SUMTER before he navy could be expect 10
enter the harbOr. Toe fire OF Sumter, whether from
cannon small arms would be very annoying durii
the operation Of removing the obstruclons. And be
eaIprised that Gilmore o)ked upon the possession
of Sumter of importance, for he had recently pr
posed TO storm it himself He did not the neceri y
either OF Gillmore's wrtiog four-page letter
to hs simple request to su0due The FIRE of the Fotand
particularly, he did not why he should have fered
10 remove the distractions across the channel thu
taking on himself duty that properly belonged 70 the