The Kenosha telegraph. [volume] (Kenosha, Wis.) 1860-1888, 1863-04-23
\ Complete Account OF
Charleston Fight.

1
ted the 9Th:
The sun has Just gone down in Charleston
harbor on what it is surely no strainlng OF
terms to call the most extraordinary contest
in the annals of warfare.
Distressing though it beto write things which
will carry pain and humiliation to the heart
of the nation to read, it only remains to tell
you that this fleet of iron clads has measured
it%sstrength against Fort Sumter and the works
that flank the entrance to Charleston harbor,
and that it has withdrawn from the contest
discounted.
Estimated in terms of time, the trial was
brief, but it was decisive. An ordeal Of two
hours served to prove that the defensive pow
ers of the iron fleet were not sufficient to with
stand the terrible force of the offensive engin-
cry of the works it had to assail, while the linn
~itations in the offensive powers of the iron
clads took away all the advantage which
might have been derived from their superior
powers of resistance over the forts. The enc
my by his obstructive appliances, was able to
detain the feet-whose total armament is 80
guns-in the focus Off fire Of a circle Of works
mounting. at least, 800 guns; in half an hour
5 out of the 8 ships were whole or partially
disabled! Such IS the CHASTITY fact in its ma
kcd proportions.
Terrible though the action of to-day was,it
was In fact, a reconnaissance in force. Every
thing was untried. Both the work to be done,
and the tools with which it was to be done,
We're comparatively INFESTED. We knew but
impertectly the engines we were to use against
the enemy, and we knew still more imperfect
ly the engines the enemy were to use against
us. 1t is unfortunate, no doubt, that the rev.
olution III the means and methods OF offensive
and defensive warfare now dawning on the
world, and the urgency Of the struggle III
which the nation is engaged, should have ne
cessitated the hazarding Of a great battle, on
elements which are all but unknown. The
trial, however, had to be made. 1t has been
made, and though we are not gamers in what
is always the aim of battle-direct material
successive have at least enriched our eXpe-
rience with that which, brightly profited by,
will yet bring success.
THE FLEET ALONE CANNOT TAKE CHARLESTON.
1t would be folly for me to conceal from
you that the result Of this reconnaissance pro-
duces but one conviction on the mind Of un-
preiudiced observers-the conviction of the
utter insuf1iciency of the iron-clad feet to take
Charleston alone.
The result of the engagement, as already
indicated, was to put out Of the fight five of
the min iron-clads. One of these-the keo-
kuk-was so horribly riddled that, though she
was brought out to her old anchorage, she was
sunk.
THE I~MPEDIMENTs.
Remember, now, that this tremendous eff
fect-the disabling of one half the entire fleet
was accomplished in less than half an hour.
Remember, again, that this took place simply
at the entrance of the inferno of fire through
which the fleet must nave had to pass to reach
Charleston, and that there is before it doub-
lie line of batteries, stretching up for four miles
before the city is gained, at each point of which
the ships must have been exposed to a fire,
equal i'll intensity to that felt under the walls
of Sumter. But, finally, remember, that reb-
ell artillery was not the most formidable foe
our ships had to Withstand that, conIrI1euc-
ing at the point our fleet reached, directly &C
ross from Sumter, and extending all the dis
lance up to the city, are successive lines of
piles, e~tfectually barring the progress OF the
vessels, and OBTAINING them at known range
within the focus of fire that there other lines
of nets and ropes, for the purpose Of fouling
the propellers, and that the whole channel is
studied with submarine batteries, of proper
tions never be fore dreamed of III naval war
fare.
That the entire fleet was not destroyed and
left in the hands of the enemy, is due to the
skill of the gallant sailor commanding the ex-
petition, and to the tact and pluck of the cap
tains of the respective ships.
ORDER OF BATTLE N PLAN OF ATrAoK UPON
CHARLESTON.
The bar will be buoyed by the Keokuk,
Commander Rhind, assisted by c. O. Bout
ellie, Assistant United States Coast Survey,
commanding the Bib by Acting Ensign
Platt, and the pilots of the squadron. The
commanding officers will, previous to cross
ing, make themselves acquainted with the
value of the buoys.
The vessels will, on signal being made, form
in the prescribed order ahead, at intervals of
one cables length.
The squadron will pass up the main ship
channel without returning the fire OF the bat
teries on Morris Island, unless signal should
be made to commence action.
The ships will open fire on Fort Sumter
when within easy range, and will take up a
position to the northward and westward of
fertilization, engaging its left or north
west face, at a distance of from 1000 to 800
yards, firing low and aiming at the-centre
embrasures.
The commanding officers will instruct their
officers and men to carefully avoid wasting a
shot, and will %enjoin upon them the necessity
of precision rather than rapidity of fire.
Each ship will be prepared to render every
assistance possible to vessels that may require
it.
The special Code of Signals prepared for
the iron-clad vessels will be used in action.
Afterth reduction Of Fort Sumter, it is prob
able the next point of attack will be the bat
teries on Morris Island.
The order of battle will be the line ahead,
in the following succession /: Given e~lsewhere.)
A squadron of reserve, of which Capt j. f.
Green will be senior officer, will be formed
outside the bar, and near the entrance buoy,
consisting Of the following vessels Given
elsewhere and will be in readiness to sup
port the iron-clads when they attack the bat
teoies on Morris Island.
S. T. DUPONT,
Rear Admiral Commanding
South Atlantic Blockading Squadron.