Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1863-01-20

We publish below the full text Of thc
Fresidenfs letter 70 Mcclellan in April
last portion Of which was given BY TEL
egraph. Theietter is important as show
ing that the President never approved ot
the Peninsulsr route to Richmond, butde-
sired to pursue the Manassas route. II
also shows tbatbe was earnestly and thor
Oughly determined to do som<thiag. The
inactiOn and delay were certainly not his
fault No less than three times in this let
ter does he urge upon the General the ne
cessity Of action, instant and constant Sc
ton.
And this fact makes sure Of another
that has been asserted and denied-that
Mcclellan repeatedly refused to obey the
orders given him. The very last words Of
this letter are aYeu must act, and yet
he did not act or move.
It is not alone the President, but the
hOle.country who would like to know the
disposition Of the {" discrepancy of S5, ,OOO.p
The marshes and swamps Of the Peninsula
are not satisfactory answer.
The history Of the advance upon and
occupation of Yorktown was aa- Afr. LIN
coin says, "but the history Of Manassas
repeated"
The following is the letter:
WASHINGTON, April ., 1852.
To BfAJoE GENERAL MCCLELLAN:
My DEAR SIR;-Your dispatches, COM
planning that you are not properly sus-
tsined, while they do not offend me, pain
me very much. Blenker's division was
Withdrawn before you left here, and you
knew the pressure under which 1 did it,
and, as 1 thought, scquiesced in it, GER
tainly not without reluctance. After you
left, ascertained that less than 2O, 900 un-
organized men, without a field battery,
were all you designed should be left for the
defense of Washington and Manassas
Junction, and part OF this, even, was to 20
to General Hooker's old position. GeRer-
al BGnks's corps, once designed for Manas-
sas Junction. was divided and tied up on
the line of Winchester and Strasburg, and
could not leave that position without again
exposing the Upper Potomac and the Bal
tirnore and Ohio Railroad.
This presented, or would present, when
Mcdowell and Sumner should be gone, a
great temptation for the enemy to turn back
from the Rappahannock and sack Wash
ington. My explicit directions that Wash
ington, sustained by the judgment Of all
the commanders Of corps, should be left Sc
cure, had been entirely neglected. Il was
precisely this that drove me to detain Nc
Dowell. do not forget that I was salts
fed with your arrangement to leave Banks
at Manassas Junction. Bat when that
arrangement was broken up and nothing
was substituted for ii, Of course l was net
satisfied. was constrained to substitute
something for it myself And now allow
me to ask you, do you think could permit
the line from Richmond via Manassas
Junction to this city to be entirely open,
except what resistance could be presented
by less than 10000 unorganized troops p
This is question which the country will
not allow me to evade.
+" There is a mystery about the number
Of troops now with you. 1 telegraphed !
you on the 9Th, saying that you had over
100000 with you. l had just obtained
from the Secretary of War 8 statement Ia
ken, as he said, from your own returns,
making 108000 then with you and en-
route to you. You now say you will have |
but s., 900 when all en- route to you shall |
have reached you. How can this discrep- |
aney Of 35, GOO be accounted fort As to |
Gen. Wool's command, I understand that |
it is doing precisely what like number
Of your own would have TO do if that com
mand was away. suppose the whole
force which has gone forward to you is
with you by this time; and if so, think |
it is the precise time for you to strike a
blow.
By delay, the enemy will readily gain |
on you that is he viii gain faster by for
and re-enforcements than you |
can by re-enforcements alone. And once
more etne tell you, it is indispensable to me /
that you strike blow. lam powerless to /
help. This you will do me the justice to
l always opposed to going down |
The Bay in search of field, instead of I
lighting at or near Manassas, as only |
shifting and not surmOunting a difficulty; |
hat we would find the same enemy and |
he same or equal intrenchments at either
place. The country will not fail to note
IS noting now-that the present hesits-
lion TO move upon snintrenched enemy is
but the story Of Manassas repeated.
Ibeg leave to assure you that have
never written or spoken TO you in great
sr kindness Of feeling than now, nor with
4 fuller purpose to sustain you so far as
in my most anxious judgment consis-
-ently can. But you must act.
Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN