, 1863-04-10
CONDUCT OF THE WAR.
Gen. Mcclellan and the
Peace Policy.

[From the Now York Times, 7th.J
II will be remembered that the dispatch Of
Lord Lyons to Earl Russell. respecting bis In
teryicw with the leaders Of What he calls tho
peace party" had the following remarkable
ju1,apos!tion:
"They seemed to be persuaded that the re-
suit Of the election would be accepted by the
President as the declaration Of the will OF Inc
people; that he would increase the moderate
md conservative element IN the Cabinet; that
he would seek to terminate the war, not 10
rueh It to extremity; that lie would endeaFor
10 effect q reconciliation with the people o1
the South, and renonnco the loca o1 soooo@
eating or discriminating them. .o,
"Un the following morning, however, lntci
licence arrived from Washington when daSntt
t11e rising hopes Of the Conservatives. II
rns nunouuced that Gen. Mcclellan hAd oeea
dismissed from the command 0, na,o .ne as' ~ bia II
home-that he had, III fact, been M removed u,
tocether iron, active service. The denerai
had been regarded as the represenlatlFe OF
Conservative principles IN the army s1p-
port Of hiu1 had been MADE one .. .no arale1es
His iisnliesa1 wns taken as sign that the
Presitlcnt had thrown himself entirely into
the arms Of tho extreme Radical party, and
that the attempts to carry ont the policy Of
ton Of the Conservatives at New York was
certainly very grtat; 1t seemed, however, to
be not unmi1ea with CONSERVATION and des-
pondencT."
"The rising hopes" Of the Peace party
" "dashed,' and " CONSERVATION and dcspond-
cncy" ensuing, because Gen. Mcclellan is re-
moved fiom The chief co,pmand! Was the
dlsmayed at the displacement Of 4 Command
ing General! There is but one possible way
of accounting for 1t; and that is that the
General was not furlheringa O war policy, md
WAS secretly in sympathy with the party aim
ing ut peace.
extraordinary procrastination, ineficiency and
upnilitaTy behavior which marked the entire
fifteen months career of George B. Mcclellan
rs Conrnander.1n. Chief. That n1one Is the
real explanation Of His constant study how not
to do it, and to 1nisdo it when be was forced
tic as possible, and fur getting on peaceful
| terms with him as soon rs possible.
One is amuzed in carefully pursuing the late
| Report Of the Committee on the Conduct Of
the War, to mark how uniformly Gen. Nc
Csellan displays this disposition, from the very
The Committee have not set this forth in the
| salient manner It deserved. They confined
themselves simply to digest ofthe yolnminous
testimony, and abstained from all deductions
and nll comments. They left to the readers to
take the matter home to themselves In their
| Uru MY. fC tc4lCfE LuAL - HUQlA u0k LII {
been departure from their proper functions
had they summed up consecutiyely the short
conlings and mistlolngs Of Gen. Mcclellan, a:
| established inevitably by the documents anG
the military witnesses before thcsu. In de
fault Of this, we have taken the pains to &c
through the whole Report carefully, and se!se
the more Important particulars wherein Gen
Mcclellan failed to do his duty Us the Com
mandinE General, md acted ia conforniit,
with peace rather than = war policy. 1t i:
proved by irsef.sggable syiaenee;
That with 165, 700 men, on the 1st of Decem
ber, he for weeks RETAINED from advancin:
upon Manassas, where were less than Il, 600 o
the enemy, though the roads were hard AM
the weather most favorable. and in spite Of til
urgent solicitations Of the President;
That during all that tlmc the POTOMAC re
maincd blockaded, because Gen. Mcclellan
not send IL column 70 CO operate With the na
val vessels in destroyingi the batteries ant
clearing The river;
That, in spite Of the solicitations Of th
President, Of the Secretary Of War, and Of III
War Committee, and "the opinion Of Gen
was Of the utmost importance" hc neg
lccted ercn to begin the division Of hi
large army into army corps until the 1st q
March;
) That no provision was made By him durin
the winter to properly man the fortit1cation
1
management of the guns;
Tilat the President, impatient with the Ion
| delay, on the 10Th Of January, issued order
, | for general movement Of all the armies
; that this order not. being needed by Gener;
Mcclellan, he issned another order twclv
= days afierward, specifically enjoining an nc
vance movement By tho army Of the Poton,a
, before the 2od Of February upon Mannassa;
and thence on to Richmond; that Gcners
Mcclellan opposed the order, insistin
uptn the Eappahannock. route, and the
! while he was consuming time IN fnterposin
= objections, the enemy cyacuated Manassa
without the loss Of man or pound Of LII.
!, terial;
> That then Mcclellan settled npon the Jane
| River route, with the assent Of the Presfdef
: should be left in and about Washington, 1t:
8 in the opinion Of the General-in- Chief and th
a commanders Of all the army corps, shoul
leave sold city entirely sec1re, that these con
munders in council concluded that at lea!
55,Cc0 men were necessary to protect Was]
O covering forcc,) aud yet that Mcclellan le
= but 1900 to protect the Capital, and tho
Q poorly disciplined, and without any knot
u | ledge Of artillery.
n That Mcclellan reached Yorktown on Il
5th Of April, and on the 9th tile Pre=idel
wrote to him, saying that 81 it is Indispensae
to you that Jou strike blow; the prcsc'
hesitation to move upon an intrenched pos
tion is but the story Of Manassas repeated
and set Gen. Mcclellan rested one full mon
:, before yorktown, though when he flr
reached it, it Was defended by less than L, 0
men,
c. That Gen. Mcclellan, instead of directi,
ID the movement on to Williamsburg. remain
behind at Yorktown without definitely tntru:
ing the command to any body, and that
q consequence the williamsburg battle II
G. fought in confusion, and at immense llsa
a vantage and loss;
That, after the battle, he arrested purst
and sent two Of the divisions back to Yor
r. that had the enemy baen properly followed
!, Richmond would have been taken at one
- and all the subsequent intelligence Of the co
le dition Of the rebel army and Of the rebel ca
10 ital ut that time confirms the fact;
u That two weeks were consumed In gettil
u honliny, distance Of only forty or fifty mile
of That on the Chickaloniny Gen. McClell
er ordered Gen. Cakey's division Of new and q
r disciplined troops three-quarters Of mile
F. the 'front.' at Seven Pines, within Elk miles
Richmond, lefe them there for days nnsuppo
ie and Gen. Reyes, and thst in consequence th
3 we're attacked and overwhelmed with trent
,, u?Th Fiat, ss afteF the successful battle Of F
e, Oaks, on the next day, according to the tes
:, | mopy of the highest officers, +" the army cot
40 tic resistance" but Gen. Mcclellan order
q, the troops to be recal1ed;
Id That he was continually sending on
Washington for reinfoscemeuts, and IN part
n ular for AlcDowclls corps on the Rappah.
~ mock, though he Knew that the enemy
n detached large force up the Shenandoah, !
" der StoueWau Jackson, and we're threatcui
Washington, and that the men protecting
Of were much less than the number origina
ar agreed upon a5 necessary to It's defence;
re That, at Gainesr 1{ill, 1900 Of our fro<
r. were set upon By 65,000 OF the enemy q
be badly heaten--al1 the effect, as testified
'p' high officers, Of not keeping the army pr
In erly concentrated;
That, when the resolution was taken to
r. treat to james River, Gen. Mcclellan prin
m order to destroy al baggage, tents {
cquipaee, aud only failed to issue it bees
other officers reconstructed against It;
y. That all the seven dnys' battles we're fou
J. in the absence Of General Mcclellan,
without any directions from him, he conan
md himself simply to the role Of placing
m m troops in the morning, then departing to $
troops to come up to that position as t
hin I best might;
alt att That Le was nlso absent at tho last q
a battle Of Malvern Hill until ali IVES nc:
on. over, and that, though, according to the te
in mony Of nans officers, the enemy wen
~ lowed inio Richmond hy vigorous pursu
oe vet, instead Of advancing he fell back f
7 19 Malvern Hill to 1farrison's Bar;
~ ~ That, at the latter place, the entire 81
.t3 was huddled within space Of about IL
,or mile. along the river, without the least orc
i = we're kept 50 for twenty four hours, aud VIC
in all likelihood hare been destroyed but
"a avery heavy rain which prevented the enc
WI from bringing up the body Of their artile
, That the army Of the Potomac ORIGIN