The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1863-11-06
sgashrIlER MGtGa.
- ri Ut
The CONFIsC ATION ACT
OF 1864.
Opinion Of Judges CatrOn and
EIEtst TIigg. lt8E

N HE n" E W - " /. T.. .H OF
The UnIted states vs.. Republican
Ranner office, &c.s No. 5. ,ss
This cause is submitted. to the court
upon motion 10 quash the information
filed by the United States Attorney upon
the ground that the real estate mentioned
therein was not subject TO seizure by vir-
tue of the act of August 6, 1861, under
which the proceeding in this cause has
been instituted.
The question, then, TO be decided by
this court is--Does the act of August g.
1861, embrace real estate within its pro-
visions, and make that, as well as per-
sonal property, for the causes mentioned
in said act, subject of seizure, coniisca-
ton, and condensation 81 q "a WI
The act reads as follows: l2th Stat
utes at Large, 3l9) I'VE omit the act.
1t is not denied that tse words of the
act, "any property of whatsoever kind
or description" are very comprehensive,
and in their terms would embrace real as
we'll as personal property. But it is in
sisted that Congress did not intend TO
include all kinds of property by the
broad and comprehensive language en-
ployed, and that this is manifest from
the words used in the act in denouncing
the penalty against the property used or
employed, or intended to be used or en-.
ployed, as therein stated. .,...-
The act declares that "all such proper
ty is hereby declared TO be lawful sub
ject of prize and capture wherever
found" and is argued that the words
prize and capture" are purely technical
in their meaning, and apply alone TO per-
sonal property, real estate not being a
subject of prize and capture, and that
these words therefore, must be UNDER
stoed TO have been used in their technical
sense. And the words "prize and cap
ture," being thus technical in their mean
ing, must control the previous words, and
limit and coniine their operation TO that
description Of property TO which "prize
= and capturep are alone applicable. NJ A.
The words of statute are ordinarily
TO be understood in their common, popular
sense, regard being had to the connection
in which they are used, and the subject
TO which they relate. But it is equally
rule of construction, as contsnded for
by the counsel of the claimants, that
technical words must be understood in
their technical sense, as applicable TO
the subject of the statute in which they
are used. They must be technical tothe
subject of the particular statute, and not
TO any other subject. The more common
application, however, of this rule is 10
words and phrases which have obtained
. peculiar legal Specification. In law
phrase many words have an exact techni-
cal sense, unlike or more limited or ex-
tended than their popular one; and in
this sense they are ordinarily TO be con-
strued in statutes. ! Bish. 368-9-70.
Now let US test the application of
these rules to the statute we are consid-
ering, and see how far those technical
words, "prize and capture" on which the
argument of the counsel of the claimants
is based, should be permitted TO govern
its construction. il / l-H,.J al,I,
"Prize and capture" are undoubtedly
words which have a technical meaning,
and if those words have obtained pc
culiar legal Specification, an exact tech
nical sense, applicable to the subject OF
the statute, then, under the above rule
they must be uhderstood to have been
used Ia that sense and thus control us in
our construction of that statute.
II would be needless, for the object We
now have inview, TO enquire into the origin
ofCourts Of Admiralty and their jurisdic'
tion as prize courts, or as instance courts
1t is sufficient for our present purpose t.
note the fact that Prize Courts of Ad'
miralty have existed for very long pc
riod, and that their jurisdiction is quit
distinct from the ordinary admiralty
court, although blended in the sAm'
A., s,w 4 &c thaan - a
and in England the Prise court ITSELF il
only called into action in time OF war
aud is governed by general principles o.
policy and the law OF nations. The or
dinAry prize jurisdiction of the admiralty
extends 10 all captures IN i0ar made OF
the high seas. al know of no other de
fnition of prize goods,p said Sir William
Scott, in the case of the 1l0O Friend,
"than that they are goods taken on tn
high seas, 5lre belh, out of the hands o
the enemy" l Rob. Rep. 27l, cited
Kent 39l, Ninth Edition. Then, accord
ing 10 this definition, 10 constitute good
or property prizs under the ordinary lega
acceptation of the term, they must b
taken OF captured on the high seas, mus
be SO taken juTe belR, aud must be take
out of the hands of the enemy. In fac
il has been held, that goods taken o
shore as prize, where there had been n
act of capture on the high seas, were nc
TO be considered % prize aud that III
Prize Courts had no iurisdicIion in sue
case. Cited by Sir William Scott
the case of the 7l0o Friends above reterre
10.
The term prize then would seem
have an exact legal and technical signii
cation, and is appropriate. only to oal
lures made from an enemy on Il
high seas in time of war And
ii our construction of the statu
Of August G. 1861, is to be limited by Il
strictly technical sense OF the wore
"priEe aud capture" it would follow tn
such property only as might be capture
upon the high seas, and which was Il
tended TO be used or employed in aidil
or promoting the insurreotion, could
the lawful subject Of condemnation ul
der said statute. Thus il will be SCI
that, in the construction Of the act und
consideration, if we are to be control,
by the purely technical meaning OF q
words "prize aud capture" the oper
tion Of the law viii be confined to su
captures only as may be made upon {
high seas, aud all property onland wou
be exempt therelrom, and be not laWi
subject OF prize,