, 1863-07-08
Corpcrteads gnash their teeth, the Admin
istraion is not ready to adopt the susque-
hanna as the southeastern boundary Of
The Union.
HOW BRAGG ESCa Ped

HOW BRAGG ESCAPED
When Gen. Rosecrans witn his army
set out from Murfreesbo7o, every one ex~
pected to hear Of the utter aunihlatlon o1
Brngg. The army ofthc latter was on the
retreat. It had been weakened by drafts
to reinforce Johnston and Lee, and seemed
an easy prey to our advancing forces. On
the other hand, the army Of the Cumber-
land Ind completely recovered from the
effects Of the Murfreesboro fight. The long
months Of rest had been improved in thor
ongh organization. The corps were
strengthened, and the cavalry rendered
still more efficient, ly tho active and well
directed 1abors Of the gallant Turchin-
The men were in fine spirits, eager and
longing for the fray. Tho expectant hour
arrived. Bragg's army commenced re-
treat, and Rosecrans' army, like an impa-
1ient hound, slipped its leash and dashed
onwards, confident Of being in ut
the death. But Brngs slips away from
them, and now interposes the b1eastworks
Of Chattanooga between himself and our
advancing columns. Two parts Of Rose
c1ans' design were accomplisAed-the
possession Of the gaps which separate the
valleys Of Stone and Duck Rivers, and the
turning Of the cncmy's line Of fortiGca-
tiers along the latter stream and lis posi-
lion at Shelbyyillc.
But there was third step Of vital lmpor-
tance, and TINT was the occupation Of Tul
lahoma while Bragg was still at Shelby
vile. This failed, and the correspondent
of the Cincinnati Gazette assigns some
most excellent reasons- 1st, The delay Of
C1ittnden in bringing up his corps to
Manchester. I'd The precipitancy Of Nc
Cock in driving the enemy through Lib
erty Gap on tie Wartrace road, when he
should have possessed himself Of the north
EN- mouth OF the passage a1d made the
enemy believe there was our main point Of
attack.
The rebels then concentrating at the ether
mouth ct The gap would not have fallen back
On shelhyville 1t all, ard notwithstanding the
sluggish movements ef Cii:tenten on the lafl,
| we might still have time to possess ourselves
| of Tullahoma previous to Bragg's arrival
there We might have succeeded, rotwith-
stardipg Csittendcn's Delay, had not Nc
Cooks too vigorous fighting prevented. ht1
Cooks rrcci1'itancy need not hare prevented
our entire euccess, had C1ittcnGen's corps
cone MP in time. The former drove the
| enemy back 10 Shelbyv1lc just IN tine to
erAble him to Take advantage Of bis discovery
that his right flank Eas turned, ard that he
must instantly retire to Tu1lahome; while
the latter delayed just long enough to pre-
vent tie rest Of the army from being pushed
sn,media' ely forward 60 as to counteract the
| effects Of e1cCook's .ashness.
| The question next arises how far they
were to blame. Everything goes to show
that Crittenden Was guileless. Four days
rains, and well nigh impossible roads,
absolutely preclueed rapidity Of advance,
and it is almost miracle that they did
not meet with Red Sea overwhelming.
Was McCook to blame? His victory at
;le Gap was certainly an important one,
even though it mar hare deseatcd the
general plan; but censura in this case must
be Withheld until We know whether be
obeyed instructions Until the exact or
ders Of Gen. Rosecrans are known, Nc
Cock at least stands before the country
tic hero Of victory which, we fear,
stocd in the way Of still greater victory.