The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-01-17

Prior however, 70 IT, arrival abroad OF these
commissioner, ~ UnNsd SLAVES haa commenced
hostilittss against the confederAcy by despatching
secret expedition for he renforcemsns Of Fo Sumter,
after an express promise 70 the contrary, and with
dupci'y which bas been fully unveiled in former mes
rage They had also addressed communicatons 70 The
different Cabinets Of Europe in which they assumed the
attitude Of being sovereign this sonfederacy, a.
legng that those independent States In rebellion
against the remaining States Of tho Unisn, and
threatening Europe with manifestations Of their dpea-
sure II SHOULD treat tho Confederate States - having
an indepondent existence IL soon became Known Thai
these psetensons not considered abroad 70 DO a
absurd they be at homo, nor mad EuTep
yet learned what reliance be placed in the official
statements Of the Cabinet at Warrington. The delegation
Of power granted these States 70 the federal govern
mont 70 represent them In foreign inter-
course had Isd Europe into the grave error Of
supposing, that their separate sovereignty and
independence had been merged into one common
sovereignty and had ceascd 70 have distinct existence.
Under the influence Of this error which all appeals TO
and historical fact vainy used TO dIspel
commissioners were met by the declaration that
foreign governments could 10 Judge between
the conflicting representations Of the parties 10
the nature Of their previous mutual relations Tho
governments OF Great Britain and Franco accordingly
sgn6ed their determination confne themselves to
sef.eVfuent
and 70 maintaining strict neutrality during progress.
Some Of the other Powers Europe pursued ths Same
Of policy, and became apparent that by some
understanding, express ac, Europe had decided TO
leave tho initiative in all action touching the contest
this continent 70 the two Powers just named who were
recognized TO have the largest interests involved both by
Of proximity ana OF the extent and intimacy Of
their commercial relations with the States engaged In
war.
Il manifest that the of action adopted by Eu
rope while based apparent refusal 70 determine the
question: 70 side with either party, in point Of
fact actual decision against rights and in favor Of
the groundess pretensons Of the United States. II was
refusal to trust independent government II
independent Staes the refusal to entertain with
the International maintained
With enemy unjust and injurious in It's effects
whatever may have been the motive which prompted IT,
Neither II in accordance with the high moral obga
ons OF that International code whose chief sanction
Of soveregns and the public opinion Of man
kind thcee eminent Powers should decline the per-
Torrance Of duty peculiarly incumbent ON them from
any apprehension Of the consequences TO themselves
Immediate and necessary result Of their declining the
responsibility OF decision which must have been ad
verse extrsvagan pretensons Of the United states
the proongatlon Of hostlies 10 which enemies
were thereby encouraged, aud which have resulted
in nothing but scenes Of carnage and deyasfation
this continent and Of misery suffering the othsr
ouch have scarcely parallel in history Had these
Powers promptly admitted right " DO treated a. all
other independent Nations doubt that the moral
effect OF such action would have been dspe The della
under which the United States have persisted their
efforts to accomplish our subjugation.
To the continued hesitation Of tho same Powers in
rendering this act OF simple justice towards this
coussderacy s the continuance OF the calamities
which mankind suffers from the interruption Of i.s
peaceful pursuits both in the Old and the New World
There other in which less than justice has
been rendered TO this people by neutral Europe, and
undue advantage Effected the aggressors IN wicket
Al the inception Of hosii,ies the inhabitants Of
the confederaoy were amos. exclusively agricul
turaiisss those Of the United States, ~ great
extent, mechanics and merchants. We had no
commercial marine while their merchant vessels covered
the ocean. We without navy, while they had
powerful fleets The advantage which they possessed for
inncting injury aud harbors thus coun
tsrbaancsd in measure by the exposure Of their
commerce to attack by private armed vessels.
II was known 10 Europe that within very few years
past the had perempory refused To accede
to proposals for abolshing prvateerng ON the ground
as alleged by them that nations owning powerful fleets
would thereby obtain undue advantage those
Ing inferior naval forces. Yet no sooner was war
fragrant between confederacy and the United States
hibtng either party from bringing prizes into their
ports. This prohibition directed with apparent impair
,iay against both belgercnts. in reality effective
against tho Confederate States alone for they alone could
find q hostile commerce the ocean. Merely nominal
against the United states, The prohibition ope
rated with intense severity on the confcderacy
by depriyng IL Of the only means Of
maintaining with approach to equality, It's struggle
on the against The crushing superiority Of naval
force possessed by its cnemes The value and efficiency
Of the weapon which thus wrested from grasp
the combined action Of neutral furopean Powers fay0
Of patton which processes openly Its intention Of ravss
ing their commerce by priyatecrs IN any future
war, Is strikingy illustrated by the terror in
spired among the commercial classes Of the United
States by single cruiser OF the confederacy.
One madonna steamer commanded by officers and manned
BY crew who debarred by the closure % ncutrai
ports the opportunity OF causing captured vessels 10
be condemned their favor prizes hss suced to double
the rates q marine insurance in Northern ports and
consn 10 forced nacou numbers Of Northern vessels In
addition TO The direct damage inflicted by captures .,
sea- How dcult then, 10 oserestimate tho effects that
must have been produced by the hundreds Of private
armed vesses that would have swept the In pursuit
OF the commerce % oar enemy the Of dsposing
Of their prizes had been withheld by the action Of
neutral Europe.
But II is especially relation to the socallod blockade
Of that policy Of European Powers has been
shaped the greatest injury 20 the confede
racy, and 10 confer signal advantages the United
states The importance Of this subject requires
development. Prior TO the year 1866 the principles
regulating this subject 70 BE- gathered from
the writings OF eminent pubcists, the decisions Of
admiralty courts, international treaties sd the usases
Of nations. The uncertainty and doubS which prevailed
N references the rules Of maritime law in time
war resulting from the dscordant and often conflicting
principles an sounced from such and independent
sources mad become grIcvous evil 10 mankind whether
blockade wassrowahIs aganst port not Invested by
land a. veil ~ w sea, whether = blockade was
valid BY sea n ikc investing Gcct merely suhcicn,
~ render sress The hocaccd port evidently danger
Gus or whether a. further requlres for legality
that Il should BE- vsccnt really 70 prevent sccess and
numerous other sim Var questous bad remained doubtful