Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1863-04-23

Hlie 10 tne llOnt, NJ seven fIneS, within
six miles Of Richmond, left them there for
days unsupported, against the urgent re.
monssrances of Gen. Casey and Cen Kcyes,
and that in consequence they were attacked
| and overwhelmed with tremendous saught-
or:
That, after the successful battle OF Fair
Oaks, on the next day, according to the tes-
timpny of the highest officers "the army
could have pushed straight into Richmond
with little resistance" but General McCicl-
Ian ordered the troops to be re called;
That he was continually sending on to
! Washington for reiniorceucnts, aud in par.
ticular for NcDowell's corps on the Rappa-
hammock, though he knew that tue enemy
had detached a large force up the Shenan-
doah, under Stonewall Jackson, and were
threatening Washington, and that the men
protecting II were much less than the mum
Der originally agreed upon as necessary to
It's defense;
That, at Gaines Mill, 27,000 of our
troops were set upon by $4,000 Of the enc.
my and badly beaten--all the effect, Us tes-
tihed by high officers, of not keeping the
army properly concentrated;
That, when the resolution was taken to
retreat to James River, Gen. Mcclellan
printed an order to destroy all baggage,
tents and equlpage, and only failed to issue
1t because other officers demonstrated against
/ it;
That all the seven days battles were
fought in the absence of Cen Mcclellan,
and without any directions from him. he
couiined himself simply to the r0te of placing
the troops IN the morning, and then depart
ing to seek Il position for the next day,
leaving to the troops to come up to that po-
sition as they best might;
That he was also absent mt the last great
battle of Malvern Hill until all was nearly
over, and thnt, though, according to the
testimony Of many officers, the enemy
were so severely pushed that they could
have been followed into Richmond by Wig.
orOus pursuit yet, instead of advancing,
he fell back, from Malvern Hill to Har
rison's Bar;
That at the latter place, the entire army
was hudded within space OF about three
miles along the river, without the least or
der; were kept SO for twenty four hours, and
would in all likelihood have been destroyed
but for very heavy rain which prevented
the enemy from bringing up the body oI
their artillery
That the army of the Potomac originally
landed On the Peninsula III 800 men; were
subsequently reinforced SO us to raise that
number to lj9 800; that this number, by
the timo it had reached Harrsons Bar
had been reduced 10 l02, 900 fit for duty
aud that Gen. Mcclellan tclegraphed tt
Washington Tor 50, 600 men ito be prompt
ly sent him; when, in fact, as the Presi
dent replied, all the soldiers under Mellow
ell, Banks, Fremont, Wool and Dix, and al
in Washington, did not exceed 60, 600
That Mcclellan finally agreed to resume
an advance movement with reinforcement
Of 10000, but afterwald wlote to Wash.
ington that he must in addition have anoth
er 10000 or 10000 from the armies in til,
Valley Of the Mississippi which was O
course impracticablc and absurd;
That, on being thereupon ordered to
Withdraw his army from the Peninsula. 'a
rapidly as possible" to cooperate witt
Pope, who was contending with superior
forces, he refused to obey until the orde
had been repeated again and again, invov
ing delay which put Washington in tn,
most imminent peril;
That after the troops were at last brough
up the Potomac, he constantly interposet
the most useless delays to giving Pope an,
help, and that, according to Gen lialleck
Pope would have conquered instead of beer
defeated, had Mcclellan acted with all tn,
energy clrculn stances permitted;
That alter General Mcclellan had moved
from Washington with nearly all of his arm,
into Northern Maryland, to intercept lee
he wrote to Washington for more reinforce
ments saying that ''euen If IYushiagio,
shOud be hkth while these armies are con
fronting each other, this would not, in m,
Judgment, bear comparison with the ruiz
and disasters which would follow a singl,
deleat OF this army"
That at Antietam the attacks. instead O
being made concurrcntly, were made serir
TN, and consequently with great loss ant
little effect. aud that to Gen. Burnside
urgent request for reinforcements to enabl,
hIln to hold very important position h,
had gained after terrible struggle, Gen
;. Mcclellan replied that no reinforcement
could he sent, although the corps of Fit,
John Porter, of l5,0OD or 10000 men, haC
not ut that timo tired n gun, aud did no
even cross tho river during the entire bat
tie;
That according to the opinion of General
Burnside, Gen. Franklin, and other officers
the enemy could have been overwhelmed
and destroyed had the attack been renewed
next dey, but that Gen. Mcclellan refraineC
from all such attack without good reason
and allowed the enemy to escape;
That, after lying still two weeks, no ask
ed for authority to build double track sus
pension bridge and permanent wagor
bridge across the Potomac ut Harper',
Ferry, with Wow to make that place hi,
great aud permanent point Of concentra.
ton;
That General Halleck, disregarding thi,
extraordinary request, ordered him through
the. President, to cross the Potomac ut once
aud to advance against tho enemy, that h,
failed to comply, urging that his army need
cd shoes and other articles OF clothing
when it was shown that every requisitlou
had been promptly met-and that tho Pres
ldents order to CROSS was not fulfilled unit
four weeks after it had been given;
The last delay was more than even the
long. suffering President could endure, and
two days after the last corps OF the arm,
was again on the South side Of tho Potomac
Major Gen. Mcclellan was ordered TO turI
over his command to Maj. Gen. Burnside
and repair to Trenton, New Jersey. For
wonder, ho obeyed this last order withou
pleading inadequacy OF means, and demand
ing reiniorcements.