Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1862-1865, 1863-05-30
TIE Great Errors of the War.

TIE Great Errors Of the War.
The ability of our leaders who have been chosen to
direct the aairs Of the country in its time of trial. viii
be the subject Of future criticism and history, and they
viii be estimated not only by what has been done, but
what might have been done. The omissions will be pro-
pErly estimated. The President and his Cabinet are
men Of undo ibted ability but be said that all
has been done that might have been, with the armies
we have had and the Generals have have had to lead
them; and to them due the credit for the high posi-
ton we now hold in the eyes Of the world.
Il was very shorsighted and narrow policy that
prompted the construction Of Cabinet Of men repre-
sentng but one phase and Classification of political
opinion. This error was intensified when it was re-
peated on the permanent organ zlOn Of the Govern
ment The President himself the elect Of the whole
citizenship Of the country, wherein all divisions had
closed and al party lines been Obiteraed He should
have recognized the fact by basiDg his administration
upon the broad foundation Of united and eon,entA-
neOus people, instead Of eingng with prOscrptve te
nacity 70 single school of pOit clans. Bu let that
pass.
Twas great and rreparable error tat, in the two
or three months Of open trade allowed after the Govern
ment was organized at Montgomery arrangements were
not made abroad through the nstrumentality Of cot
ton any amount Of which would have been freely at its
disposal 70 secure all the arms ammunition, and espe
cially ron-pated war vessels might need. credit
of hui drsd millions of dollars might have been easi
raised in Europe through cotton the adciOuS employ
ment o! which would not only have protected US from
blockade but placed the commerce and the coast cities
Ofths enemy at our mercy. The fat and unaccOun-
table idea that there would be lost that great
- -
that, too, pass.
The first great error in the actual conduct Of the war;
was in making strictly defensive war; for while the
losses ealamaes and horrors Of are brought Who'll
" upon our own soil and the enemy is able to perpe
trate bis vindctive barbarites ad bia he is almost
perfectly free from such prosecutions carries his
usual avOcadons is making profitable, and, instead Of
being made to sicken Of itby dose Of his own med
sine Is urging It's con.nuance and, Of course, don't
care how long il lasts and worst Of all power
less 70 retaiate. This defect Of such a war is keen
" felt BY all; and we doubt if there is in ten
who would have the war end, if be could 'sithoNt
chance 70 retaate for What people have been com
PEELED 70 suffer Il might not have been policy TO have
penetrated their country with large armies but seen
aud coutended for long ago, that might enter and
dsvastate-retaate in kind-their country in every d
reotiOn By cavalry or mounted infantry and while
rying destruction on the soil Of the enemy, it would
have relieved our people from many inrOads and drawn
men from their armies of invasion. What might not
have been done BY fifty or seventy-6ve thousand
mounted men-Which additional number could have
easily been mountaineering along the borders Of
their territory? But they were quick to see and take
advantage of what was ineOmpreheusihi to our "aU-
the eleventh hour and a consequence we must Suf
fer what might have been to great extent avoided
volunteer force comprising foreigners and those out
side of the age of CONSUMPTION could have been raised
for this service by giving them onehaf the value of all
they captured and destroyed and thus much added
to the available force for the defence Of the country.
Error number two is in the failure to have had the
seas swarmng with prvateers six months year ago
III. practicable nOwit practicable then. 1.-THE cap
tured vessels could not be taken into port they could be
destroyed and paid for If there Is any great wisdom
in that omission Of "Our leaders" the people cannot
see it.
Error number three WIS in the failure to obstruct our
smaller rivers early in the war by which omission the
enemy has been able penetrate the very heart of
country in every direction, giving him immense sdvan-
LoollB " NA1h GAloAh VI EohhAtOty NASu
could otherwise have been If that oms-
sion was foresight it would be hard it with
a microscope
Error number four andis in not using the slightest
machinery Of diplomacy and political intrigue in divid
ing and disintlgrating our enemies. For this there
never was bster opportunity presented in the history
Of the world, and which might have been made of in
ollculable advantage TO US; but instead of this .
sslEnominated organs Of the administration" have
taken course calculated 10 unite the whole North ern
people against US, and thereby added largely to the
number and determination Of our enemies.
And lastly, error number Eve is the appointment
Of favOrites and young and untried men over old
and tried men, to the most responsible positions,
which have cost the country some of its most
serious disasters, and may cost it many more
And this omission viii be ascribed to the pro-
per cause By the future impartial historian.
These are the principal Shortcomings of the admins
tstOn, as they occur to minds not prone to find fault
They adverted to only with the hope Of exciting
greater vigilance and energy more catholic spirit as
70 men, and more comprehensive and statesman-Ike
policy generally.
'Charleston