The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-10-17
conduct of the War in Regard to
Observation-Disclosures Of
ROSecraDS and Bragg.


conduct of the War in Regard In
communications nj
HOSecrans and Bragg.
} "A little examination of the lines of COM
hiuhitations IN our country VIII show the
cause OF the i'll success of some of orr Cen
erais, ana the greater length of the war
a oiian was anticipated by most persons. No
country on earth, except Russia, presents
so great surface, and so diversified Its
immense rivers and mountain ranges give
greater means both of otfense and defense.
II such places as the passes Of the. Blue
Ridge, the forks Of Gauley and Kanawha.
Cumberland Gap. the suck eff the Tennes,
see at Chattanooga. the gorges of French
Broad, and the mountains of North Caro-
INA, afford means Of obstinate defense, so.
on the other hand, our immense navirable
rivers, great, Underwater harbors, broad
plains and systems of railroads. afford the
very best means of attack. For, wherever
there are superior forces attacking, their
best opportunity is on good roads, level
/ country and broad streams. Their prob
lem is to bring their superiority to BEAR
SO 1t has happened. We have broken
down the rebel COnfederacy so far by the
rivers and the plains. But ought not our
Generals to have not only anticipated this,
but to have anticipated the last ditch''-
the places which must ultimately be the
IPt'tScc
mu,aication, by aOhich they could 6ereinjorced
and proOtstoned. The study Of geography
was the very first thing needed in this war,
and after that, most specially. the study OF
railroads and rivers. To destroy the militia
'y organization is admitted by both Gen.
erals and civilians to be the object. When
! that is none, there is no rebellion. We
have passed the time, in which any mere
resurrection or guerrilla war is possible,
when not supported by organized armies.
But the question is: How is the military
organization to be destroyed? Will one or
twenty battles and victories do that, while
the means of retreat, supply and intercom-
munication are left open? Wehave good
illustration of this in the campaigns of
Frederick. Small as his Kingdom was,
they, the combined Austrians and French,
never really drove him from the sources
Of supply and communication. Hence
it is, that the rebel forces were more utter
ly broken, and the war draws more rapid
ly to its close by the fall of Vicksburg,
than by all other things done. Why? Not
because Of the navigation of the Missis-
sippi, as is commonly supposed. That is
matter which comes of course, when the
rebel armies there are broken. The great
| blow was, in fact, the fatal blow-that it
cut off from the rebel military organiza-
ton half its territory and recources-hence-
! forward, all west of the Tombigbee was
well be a desert. The beef the sugar. and
a large portion of the men, relied on by
! Davis, were cut OFF. This was the great
blowout to this may be added, the i'm
mense benefit to US of the great central
line of the Mississippi, as means of trans
portation. se'
But let us proceed little further with
the question of supplies and communica-
tons. We all see noo how it was that
Bragg was suddenly REINFORCED, and how
our success in selling Knoxville saved (by
cutting off the Virginia and Tennessee Rail-
| road) Rosecrans from four-told worse dis
| aster. Had we not held that railroad
| might have been sent. But we have ac-
complished great deal; dealt a great blow
in cutting off that railroad. The rebels un-
derstood this well. This leads US to ask,
if they did know it SO well why did they
not defend it better? Simply because they
could not do that, (which would have re-
quired previous operation, and make their
desperate march on Pennsylvania, also.
We said at the time that movement was
one of desperation, to counterfeit our move
anents in ihe Vest, and prevent the success
| Of the fatal movements on the Mississippi.
This Lee admits in his report. They fail
ed, and hence the fall Of East Tennessee
as well as Vicksburg. The failure to de-
fend it is ample proof of what we all know,
that the rebellion is dying Of exhaustion,
and that rapidly, too Let these who are
impatient remember this.
Looking again at communications, who
ever consults map will see that the rebels
had tsCo connecting arteries between the
system Of railroads, in Virginia and the
Carolinas, and that on the Mississippi.
One through the valley via Knoxville, and
the other on the Atlantic coast via Angus
ia, Ga. If these two communications had
been effectually cut two years since, as
there is every reason to believe they might
have been, the valley OF the Mississippi
would have been as effectually cut off from
the Eastern rebels as it is to-day, and the
capture of every rebel defense in the Val
ley been fastened at least year. East
Tennessee could have been taken and held
in the autumn of 1861. Nor could it have
been difficult at all, if the expeditions to
Hatteras and Port Royal had struck at
Wilmington, to have severed entirely the
whole Southern system OF railroads. Da-
Wis Whose mind is as acute as the shrewd
suggestions Of his satanic teacher can make
it, anticipated this, and urged the building
Of railroad from Danyille to Greensboro,
n. c., which would have been wholly in
the interior. We might have learned
something from him. But we are above
that. If they send us package OF magnif-
icent lies which the genius Of Munchausen
might envy, we believe them. But if they
suggest at home some Of their own defeats
and remedies, and which correspond with
what we know, we don't believe word
Of it. q
Let us now turn moment to the posi-
ton of Bragg and Rosecrans- now the VI
tai point OF the war. A good deal is said
about Rorecran's long communications
There is nothing in that whatever. 1t is
one hundred and thirty eight miles only by
rail from Nashville to Chattanooga little
more than from Cincinnati to Columbus
Nashville. can be made the depot of sup !
plies for a dozeu armies and the commu-
nication cannot be cut SO as to be material
lily impeded, without marching an army
upon ii. which would be the same thing !
for Bragg as Lee mareh on Pennsylvania
and Bragg has not got the means to 90 y It;
so there IS no difficulty about communlca-
tions in Rosecrans' advance. Whenever he
advances, Chattanooga will be the the de- |
pot of supplies; and being capable Of Of i'm In,
son will be the same as Cincinnati to the
army. Again, if the enemy retreats,
the Memphis and Charleston road
sy,tn ant