The Union and journal. [volume] (Biddeford, Me.) 1858-1882, 1863-01-23
Sflistsuarlas&ocul.s;. a&cl.;
Letter From tho President to Gen.
.e Mcclellan.

mCCleildh.
In the Mcdowell Court Of Inquiry, during
the examination Of Maj. Gen. Hitchcock.
the l6th inst. in relation to the forces left
for the protection Of Washington when Gen.
McClellan's army started for the Peninsula.
the following letter from the President was
laid before the Court.-ED. JouR.
"WAsuiNcroS, April 9. 1862.
MAJ. GEN. McCLELLAN My Dear SIR
Your dispatches, complaining that you are
not properly sustained, pain me very much.
Blenkers division was withdrawn before you
left here, and you know the pressure under
which I did it, and, as / thought. acquiesccd
in it, certainly not without reluctance. AT
ter you left I ascertained that less than co.
900 unorganized men, without field bate
ry, weroall you designed to be left for the do
fence of Washington and Manassas Junction /;
and part of this even was to 60 to Gen.
Hooker's old position. Gen. Banks corps
designed for Manassas Junction, was divided
and tied up on the line of Winchester and
Strasburg, and could not leave it without
again exposing the Upper Potomac. and
the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. This pro-
sentcd, or would present, when Mcdowell
and Sumner were gone, n great temptation
for the enemy to turn back from the Rappa-
hammock and sack Washington. My explicit
directions that Washington should, by the
Judgment of all the commanders OF corps,
be left entirely secure had been entirely neg
lected; it was precisely this that drove me to
detain Mcdowell. do not forget that |
was satisfied with your arrangements to leave
Banks at Manassas Junction.; but when that
arrangement was broken up, and nothing
was substituted for it, of course was not
satisfied. | was constrained to substitute
something for it myself and now allow mo
to ask you, Do You really think could pcr-
nit tho line from Richmond via Manassas
Junction to this city to bc entirely open, ex-
copt what resistance could bo presented by
less than 90, 900 unorganized troops? This
is question which the country will not al
low inc to evade. There is n curious mystic
ry about the number of troops now with
you. l telcgraphed you the 9th, saying that
you had over 100000 with you. Ihad just
obtained from tho Secretary Of War state
mcnt, taken, as he said, IRON your own re.
turns, making lOS,000 then with you, and
en- route to you. You now say you will
have but $4,000 when all en- route to you
shall have reached you. How can this dis
crcpapcy Of 35 900 DO accounted for? As
to Gen. Wool's command, understand 1t is
doing precisely what q like number of your
own would have to do, if that command
was away. Isupposo tho whole force which
has gone forward for you has reached you by
this time, if SO, think it is tho precise
time for you to strike blow. BY delay tho
enemy will readily gain on you that is ho
will gain faster by Notifications and rein
forccmcnts, than you can by reinforcemcnts
alone; and once moro lot me tell you it is
indispensable to you that you strike blow.
am powerlcss to help. This you will do
me the justice to remember. / always op.
posed going down the Bay in search OF
field, Instead of fighting at or near Manassas
as only shifting, and not surmounting dii-
iiculty; that we would find the same enemy
and the same or equal intrenchments at eth
er place. The country will not fail to note
that the present hesitation to move upon an
entrenched army, is but the story of Manas.
sas repeated. l beg to assure you that lncver
have written or spoke to you in greater kind
ness of feeling than now. nor with fuller
purpose to sustain you so far as in my most
anxious judgment | consistently can; but
you must act. Yours very truly
A. LINCOLN"