Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-06-18

Mr.. Wade Would they gain much more by lying in
camp than by smelling little POWDER
Gen. Hentzelman. / believe the whole army s ready
Mr.. Wade 1t seems now to be mere question Of Ion.
geVity with u.s. The idea i whether, if going
10 attempt to dsodge the enemy from besegng cap-
tai and bockadiDg the Potouac, there any why
delay of the last weeks should have been made or
why we should longer deay7
Gen. Hentzelman> presume we could attack Cam
trevie and take it but it would be at heavy sacrifice
And we would probably accomplish the same thing by re-
advance.
In the examination of Gen. VIM. B. franklin,
had on the 26th Of December, 1851, Mr.. Wade
announced the following opinion in favor of 81 ac-
tivity." Evidence, D. 1873:
Mr.. Wade We must run some risk we cannot
keep such army this without doing something; we
must get money for the army and to get that do
something, and do it it be done we must
run little hazard they the best fighters they will
whip US at last, and do not know but what they are
Certainly if their armies are more numerous than ours,
aud If they well ocered and manned as ours they
will succeed. We must do something.
Gen. Wadsworth, who is quoted by the Commit
tee on several points great military authority,
gave the following testimony in favor of the prac-
ticabilty of winter campaign, if only Gen. Nc
Clellan had mind to make one. Page 148:
Mr.. Wade Do you suppose a campaign at this time Of
the year. in the winter could be had against the enemy
lines.
Gen. Wadsworth. Yes, sir slow and cautious move
ment could be had 1t must necessarily be slow on ac-
count OF transportation The would also be exposed
to considerable suerng but the wooded nature Of the
country 10 favorable to winter campaign. The men,
with little care the part Of their officers could be
preserved from perishng, although they might suffer
little In thick woods like those 10 front Of us, and fact
all over the seabOard OF the United States you could
an army into the thick pines, aud the men could make
themselves comfortable unless in the of long drv
ing rainstorm
This was evidently conclusive with the Com
mittee. And we know of nothing that bears
against the conclusiveness Of Gen. Wadsworth's
theory as to the relation between the thick
pines" and comfortable winter campaign except
the fact that when this same army was under more
energetic Generals during the winter Of 1923,
it remained much longer inactive in its tents than
when it was under the command of Gen. McClel-
Ian. If there had been much virtue In q winter
campaign among "the thick pines," we are sure
Gen. Hooker would have discovered it, especially
as he had Gen. Wadsworth with him to point out
the military aptitudes of the Virginia forests.
But it was in the examination of Major (now
GeneraD Abner Doubleday, on the Sd of January,
1852, that the capacious military plans then nou.
rished by the Committee, if only we had had
Generals sufficiently capable to comprehend them
or sufficiently energetic to execute them, were
most clearly developed. They had planned a
scheme for substantially bagging the VIII ole
Southern Confederacy." 1t was on this wise, the
examination of the Major being conducted by Mr..
johnson, of Tennessee, p. 2l2:
Iab 7 r tha
plans, and perhaps they right do undertake to
controver that but them for instance have tho block
ade approxmating competon position here the Con-
federacy we may say IN short down in Virginia here;
their President Vice President Cabinet Congress- army
all 10 there; have every thing here fixed ready
for forward movement then, when look west, we
the great stream Of life of this rebellion coming n
there there is the line OF railroad running from Richmond
to Lynchburg into Eastern Tennessee connexion with
lines Of communication by Chattanooga and the south,
by Nashville, Memphis, across the Mississippi, to Little
Rock
Major Doubleday. We ought to cut that artery, Of
course, in connexion with this movement re.
Mr.. johnson. Now. would not column penetrating
and akg possession of that railroad In their be
important as any other point in this programmed
Major Doubleday That would be Of the most vital
thiDgs we could do
Mr.. Johnson Suppose state the case in this way:
In connection with this whole plan column penetrates
through Kentucky into Eastern Tennessee; that, you
think would be one of the most important movements In
connexion with this plan Z
Major Doubleday. 1t would be one Of the most impor
tant, without doubt That 10 very papable
Mr. johnson. You, a military man, understand how
these things operate For instance have our position
here column penetrates there aud takes possession of
that road at two or three places. That would be like
taking two or three joints out Of backbone shutting
our hand upon artery and stopping the circulation
Major Doubleday, That would dissolve the army here
at once simply holding that position.
Mr.. johnson. And substantially bag the whole Con.
federacy
Major Doubleday. Yes, sir
If this plan had been carried out it would have
greatly simplifed operations, and, had it sue
ceeded, would have reflected imperishable glory
on the Committee As it WAS, the favorable mo-
ment was lost during the delay of Gen. Mcclellan
in the winter Of lS61-'62, and this plan rests
among the things that might have been done, but
were not.
We leave our readers to draw the moral of this
review when we remind them that the men who
sat in solemn concave talking after this Sort were
the men who assumed to direct the President in
setting up and putting down the Generals who
commanded our armies What wonder that confu-
sion has sometimes waited on our banners