Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-14
time we would invoke in his favor suspension Of

time we would invoke in his favor suspension Of
public judgment. y. ssa, FITS ls,.es q
According to present Appearances there are GER
taiDly some things which call for explanation,
among which we may designate his division Of the
forces under his command, and the failure ON his
part to make any demonstration against the enemy
in aid of the movement of Gen. Sedgwick, when
the latter had been ordered to effect Junction with
the main body of the army at Chsnoellorsville and
to do this by route where be would necessarily
come in conflict with the enemy. The inaction Of
Gen. Hooker throughout the entire day Of Monday
last enabled the enemy to mass his troops against
the division Of Gen. Sedgwick, and thus to infict
on the latter equally deplorable in itself
and its consequences. The New York Evening
Post undoubtedly gives expression to the first inn
pressions Of unmilitary minds when it signalizss
the following as defects in Gen. Hooker's plans
In commenting on his retreat it says ..aa
There were two patent and unaccountabe errors Of
plan which abaed hopes and indeed inspired with
q strong feeling Of apprehension and doubt
These WERE IN the rst place the singular disposition
made OF the forces under Bcdgwiek sent the river
to sttack the heights beyond Fredericksburg. We
understand why grand show Of crossing should b made
there 70 b,wilder the enemy We can understnd Why
but why asrge body of troops should be thrown between
river and four re times their number, for the pnf
pose OF taking batteries of no use to us when taken
cannot understand 1t not only dispensing with the
services Of twrnty hOuaDd when they about to
be most needed but 10 exposed them at any moment TO
entire divisions were not DESTROYED matter Of wonder
ard his escapes with the loss 1T only i've Elk thousand
men, either shows the weakness Of the rebels must be
regarded q miracuIaus Interpolation. r
But the second defrct of plan even more remarkable
IT ia the clear want far Of larger sup
porting or reserve force at hand Heintxeman
placed tho line of the Manassas Gap railroad with
large body Of men, but ought to have been larger Some
troops also, doubtless retained at Falmouth
serve, though zee mention OF them Sufficient dvi
snDs according to the reports have thus far not
available at the critic moment much less army corps
Hooker fought with what he had and when they
disabled exhausted he had strong columns to fall
hack upon Did this arise from any deficiency OF troops
Not at ALL Sixty thousaod solders scattered
the deences Of Washington the Potomac river, whose
places could have been temporarily supplied By the or
supporting distance of the main army. Why no call
made for these before Hooker began to move Was Gen.
Haleck asleep, did be suppose himself able to
the psiaest Dictates Of foresight and prudence1 Why did
the President allow Hooker to until he bad made
assurance doubly sure by placing second army easily
bscki,'
AS to the first of these alleged defects, We have
nothing to say until we are placed in possession of
Gen. Hookers reasons for the division of his army
in way which resulted so dsastrously.
As tothe second specification, under which it is
sought to cast on the shoulders of Gen. Haleck or
of the Secretary Of War, or of the President him
self, measure Of blame for Gen. Hooker's re-
pulse, it may be safely affirmed that Gen. Hooker
deemed his forces more than adequate in point Of
numbers to the work he purposed to perform. If
there has been failure any where, it certainly has
not been the part of the Administration in with
holding from Gen. Hooker the reinforcements he
is supposed to have needed.