Weekly national intelligencer., 1863-10-01
THE BATTLE OF CBIcKAMAUGA.

IaE BATTLE OF CblCkAMAUGA.
i We to-day spread before our readers the graphic
account of the battle Of Chickamauga, as described
by the correspondent of the Cincinnati Gszstte,
and to which reference was made by us yesterday.
The writer of this narrative, we learn from the
Gazette, has long been associated with the army Of
Gen. Rosecrans, and by familiarity with its several
commands as well as by former practice in the
difficult cart Of describing battles" has singular
| qualifications for the work he has taken in hand.
His narrative will certainly be found as interesting
rs it is graphic.
As the War Department has not thought pro-
per to lay before the people any official intelli-
ence in regard to the late disastrous battles Of
Chickamauga, which have resulted in the re-
pulse Of Gen. Rosecrans, we are necessarily CON-
PEELED to rely on the statements Of unofficial wr-
ters, like the intelligent correspondent Of our
Cincinnati contemporary. From his accounts it
appears that the Union arms have sustained
serious reverse in this quarter fact which we
suppose explains the reticence Of the War Depart
ment, as it had already been generally inferred
from such reticence. The proportions of the Gala
nifty are indeed even greater than had been sur
missed The defeat and dispersion of two corps Of
Gen. Roseorans' army, Chat of Crittenden and
that Of McCook, } with loss Of ten thousand in
killed and wounded, Exclusive of prisoners set
down at two thousand five hundred and of fifty
pieces Of artillery constitute, in proportion to the
numbers engaged, the greatest disaster which has
yet happened to either party in the history of tho
war. That the army escaped total defeat is due,
it would seem to the stubborn valor Of the troops
comprising one of the corps, and to the mastery
conduct Of Major Gen. Thomas, its commander.
1t is not for US at present to appreciate the
causes the consequences of this disaster which,
it will be seen has resulted from the superiority Of
the enemys forces, concentrated in this attack on
Rosecrans. Why this officer should be left to cope
with an enemy superior in numbers, when the
means of reinforcing him were at the command Of
the Government, Gas is proved by the fact that re-
Inducements are on the way to him. is
question about which, as we know nothing, we shall
say nothing II is enough to say that with our
superiority in numbers it is little singular that
on SO many occasions the enemy has been able to
give us battle with the advantage Of heavier
| columns on his side Whether it be from the
interior lines on which the enemy operates, from
the greater celebrity and secrecy of his movements,
from the superior ssgacty of his strategy in the
| general conduct of the war, it is certain that the
heroism of our troops has often been put to tests
which reflect more glory them than credit on the
military management to which they subject.
The Springfield Republican, in commenting on
this battle, remarks:
"It curious to observe how in all campsigns the
ua.nfa afa1 - aAka
their policy OF concentration bo to the whole of
the ard the banding Of their troops battle
aud we still repeat the psake Of scsternG our armies
each battle offer to the rebel troops extended and easily
penetrated lines to ensure TO their avGrte
tactics In the late battles, err he n,ture the
country md the lack Of time for bere the
attack made compelled Rosscrsns 10 6gct at this
disadvantage IL matter Of necessity not oI choice;
and il enabled the enemy to throw bis whcs army
confusion, with the exception Of the single cors If G-n
Thomas II also noticeable that the rebels been
following the strategy marked out for them by Schk The
German military essayst not because of his suggestion
probably but because they it TO be their policy
Yet neither in Marylsnd and Pennsylvana IN G-or
gia has the policy of concentration indicated tef BY
entire but it has failed BY lack of and ans,
and by the ndOmtabe fighting OF inferior forces The
yet to be learned after all mistakes Of the
sort is concentation or If the policy Of scattering
forces and conducting important enterprises at many
| widely separated points s 10 be persisted in, then
want several hundred thousand more men,"
| In the presence of this disaster many have any
iously inquired "what has become of the large
armies lately operating under Generals Grant and
Banks before Vicksburg and Port Hudson? Why
| could not Gen. Rosecrans' columns have been
strengthened from their forces, released as they
were from operations 10 the Mississippi Valley by
the fall of these two places?" We are unable to
| give satisfactory answer to these questions.
| though we believe it will be found that the dis
pos .be forces Of either Gen. Banks or Gen. Grant
have been greatly exaggerated And portion of
these, it is known, were diverted ia an abortive
expedition into Texas f.r The capture of cotton,
instead Of being ordered TO join Gen. Rosecraas,
or sent on an expedition cooperative with his
movements. The New York Tribune, in remark
ing on the failure of the Texas expedition, holds
the following language:
In view of the which have resulted from
disrsgarding military principles military exped on
presume it will scarcely be urged now thar the chance
of sexng the cotton supposed be stored in the SABINE
district equivalent for the advantages which pro
perly directed effort would have insured Still less is such
plea justification Of the disaster which the violation Of
painest and simplest rules of war has caused We
advert to such topic with reluctance We consider 1t
consistent neither with national reputation nor national
honor TO organize expedition under the national hsg
against quantity Of cotton There objection
6scatng cotton any other rebel property when il falls
incidentally into military possession But this very
different matter We have lost fourteen guns three ships,
and many Ives have lost time which OF ncacnlabe
values have lost the which within grap
have oet the OF the troops which we're urgently want