The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-04-11
United States, on the Slst of January. 1869,
Issued the following order:
EXECUTIVE MANSION, WAsHHGroH,

Jan. 81, 1862.
s.Presidents Special War Order No. l. -
"Ordersd, That ell the dieposable force OF the
Army Of the Potomac, after providing safely
for the defense Of Washington, be formed into
an expedition for the immediate object Of seiz
ing and occupying point upon the railroad
6outhwestward of what is known as Manassas
Junction; oil details to be in the discretion of
the General.in. Chief. and the expedition to
move before or on the Cad day Of February
next. ABRAHAM LINCOLN"
To this order Gen. Mcclellan wrote an elabo-
rate reply Of the same date, Directing to the
plan therein indicated a. involving 1.-THE error Of
dividing our army by very difficult obstacle,
(the Occoquan,) and by distance too great to
enable the two portions to support each other,
should either be attacked by the masses Of the
enemy, while the other is held in check" He
then proceeded to argue in favor of . move
ment by way of the Rappahannock or Fortress
Monroe, giving the preference to the Rappahan.
mock route. He stated that 80 days would be
required to provide the necessary means of
transportation. He stated that he regarded
success as certain, by all the chances of war"
by the route he proposed, while it was ''by no
means certain that we can beat them the ene-
my at Manassas"
TO this the President made the following re-
ply: .s
sas EXECUTIVE MANSION, WAsHISGToH,l
, February 8, 1852.
MI DEAR SIR: You and have distinct and
different plans for movement of the Army OF
the Potomac-you:s 10 be down the Chesapeake,
ug the Rappahannock to Urbanns, and across
land to the terminus Of the railroad on York
River; mine to move directly to a point on the
railroad southwest of Manassas. If you will
give me satisfactory answers to the following
questions shall gladly yield my plan to yours:
/. Does not your plan invove greatly larger
expenditure of time and money than mine?
2. Wherein is victory more certain by your
plan than mine? u ~ j.
8. Wherein is victory more valua5le by your
plan than mine? s5srty.s. r-4 a
4. In TACT, would it not be less valuable in this
that it would break no great line of the enemy's
communication, while mine would?
5, In case of disaster, would not a safe re-
treat be more difficult by your plan than by
mine? sl.g, t....-
Yours truly, A. LINCOLN,
Major General McCLELLAN.s "a g
Your Committee have no evidence, either ora
or documentary, of the discussions that ensued
or the arguments that were submitted to the
of the President that led him to
relinquish his own line Of operations and con-
sent to the one proposed by Gen. Mcclellan,
except the result of a council of war, held in
February, 1862 That council-the first, so far
as your Committee have been able to ascertain,
ever called by Gen. Mcclellan, and then BY the
direction of the President-was composed of
twelve Generals, as follows: Mcdowell, Sum
ner, Heintzelman, Reyes, Fitz John Porter,
w. F. Smith, Mccall, Blenker, Andrew
Porter Barnard ,!and Nagles.(f from Gen. Heoker's
Divisiop). 2safs
To them was submitted the question whether
they would indorse the line of operations which
Gen. Mcclellan desired to adopt. The result of
the deliberation was vote of eight to four in
favor Of the movement by way Of Annapolis,
and thence down the Chesapeake Bay, up the
landing at Urbanna, aud across
the county to Richmond. The four Generals
who voted against the proposed movement were
Generals Mcdowell, Sumner, Heintzeman and
Barnard Gen. Reyes voted for it with the
qualification that no change should be made un>
til the enemy we're driven from their batteries on
the Potomac
At this point it may be we'll to consider the !
principal arguments for and against the move
ment upon Richmond direct from Washington,
and the movement by way of the Lower Chesa- !
peake, including that first proposed by way of
the Rappabanuock river, and the one finally
adopted by way of Fortress Monroe and the |
Peninsula. d" 3 35sa t5 G |
IL expressing opinions upon this aud other
subjects relating more Immediately to military |
operations in the field, your Committee do not |
to form and express opinions of their
OWN, but content themselves with setting forth |
those expressed in their testimony by military
men whose education and experience enttle
to speak confidently upon those subjects per-
tanning to their profession. a"aEsf 1s -
WHY THE DIRECT ROUTE WAS BEST. |
The arguments in favor of the direct and |
against the lower route to Richmond we're many
and weighty. Some of them are most tersely |
expressed in the letter of the President to Gem
oral Mcclellan, of February 8, 1852, before re-
ferred to. Beside those, the direct movement |
enabled the largest amount of troops to operate |
actively in the field, as the army 10 its move
ment Immediately covered Washington, and
thereby rendered the presence of large force
here unnecessary. By the adoption of the lower
route division of the army was rendered i'm |
perative, in order to provide for the safety of
The Capital against any attack from the enemy. |
Thus, to use the language Of Gen. Mcclellan
himself, in reference to the movement proposed |
against the enemy while at Manassas, ''commit-
Ting the error of dividing our army by a very
difficult obstacle, and b. distance too great to
enable the two portions to support each other, |
should either be attacked by the masses Of the |
enemy while the other is held in check"
The army in moving direct from Washington
avoided all the delays and disorder consequent
upon the embarkation and Decentralization of |
DO large force with all Its material And by |
Richmond on the north and north
west, We cut them off from one of their grea,
sources OF supply, the Shenandoah Valley, |
and at the same time prevented their raids |
through that region of country, which 50 par-
alyzed all efforts to send the few troops left in
Washington to the assistance of the army on |
the peninsula. eaf e fa |
= Gen. Mcclellan states in his testimony tha
by adopting the route By way of Annapolis and |
the Rappahannock, he hoped, if proper secresy
was preserved, to be able to reach the vicinity
of Richmond before the Rebel army at Manas.
sas could be concentrated there for its defense.
Whatever probability there may have been for
the realization of such q hope at the time the
route was decided upon, it was |
entirely removed when the enemy evacuated
Manassas. before any actual movement was
made by our army. And Gen. Mcclellan at
once relinquished the Rappahannock route,
and decided with the concurrence of his corrs