Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1863-01-28
Correspondence of the New York Times.
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The Late Movements and the Causes of
Their Failure.

Their Failure.
WASHINGTON, Saturday, JAN "a, 1853.
l had occasion last week to visit the army
of the Potomac: and, as | found it on the eve
of movement against the rebel forces in its
front, remained to watch its progress and
results. You will have received from our
regular correspondents full reports of both
before this can reach you. Concerning the
causes of the failure of this movement, they
may not have said as much us tile good of the
service. and the welfare of the country re-
qulre lwrite this letter mainly to supply that
defect.
The sudden change in the heather on the
night OF Tuesday, the 18th, was the immediate
cause Of the failure. The movement was in
tended to be surprise. The whole army
was put in motion during the day on Tuesday,
and each portion of it was to have been by
midnight in the position designated by the
commanding general, for the commencement
OF operations at O'Clock below and l-2
O'Clock above Fredericksburg on Wednesday
morning. At s o'clock on Tuesday evening
it began to rain, and throughout the night the
rain continued, with tempest of wind.
Owing to other causes, of which | shall speak
hereafter, those portions Of the army desig-
mated to lead the movement had not moved
with the vigor and energy which the nature
of the service required. They were arrested,
therefore, some miles short ri their appointed
positions by the condition of the roads, sud-
denly softened by the heavy rain, and through
which by morning it had become impossible
to move either pontoons or artillery with the
celebrity demanded. The enemy meantime
discovered the movement, and instantly raj
lied 10 meet it. The moment for the surprise
had passed, and therefore the movement was
abandoned.
This is the surface view of the matter. AS
things stood the weather afforded sufficient
excuse for abandoning the enterprise-indeed
made it necessary to do so. But if every
thing else had been right, this obstacle would
have been overcome or rather would not have
arisen in time to offer any difficulty. a good
deal has been said of the decentralization of
the army. The word is too strong. 1t does
notapply to the mass ofthe army at all. But
it does apply to good many of the officers.
T hey are den1ora5ized in every sense of the
word, and they are source of discourage
ment-of discontent-of disbursement of
there is such word,) to their subordinates
and to the ranks. do not hesitate to say that
the failure of this latest movement was due,
primarily and mainly, to the Naturalization
the word is not too str0ng--of some of the
generals in command under Burnside. | ask
no better evidence of this than the language
subordlnates, of newspaper reporters, and of
all who chose to listen, before the movement,
while it was in progress and after it had been
abandoned. Unless common report, which
receives the countenance if not the distinct
confirmation of the officers most concerned is
entirely at fault. the commanding general was
overwhelmed with protests from his subordi-
mates against his movements, after they had
been decided upon, and with exaggerated and
uHfTue reports OF the obstacles in his way. So
far as | know, not one Of them went so far as
to refuse, obedience to bis orders; but every
thing short of that which officers could do to
embarass and thwart his plans was done, and
done, too, as on some previous occasions, with
effect and success. As every one knows,
there is a kind Of obedience, worse in its re-
suits than flat refusal, for it leaves the COM
manding officer without a remedy. While it
answers i'll form all the requirements of the
service, it insures, by its hating, half-hearted
and possibly premature inefficency, the fail
u7e OF the plan which it pretendS to second.
One general, for example, was expected to
have pontoons enough for four bridges-forty-
four in all, | believe-at the appointed spotby
daylight on Wednesday morning. He had
but eight or nine miles to go, and there was
no reason why he should not have had them
there before the rain. He spent good deal
of his time on Tuesday in demonstrating that
the chances of failure were nineteen out of
twenty; on Wednesday morning he had fif-
teen pontoons placed IN open gieW of the enc
my, and the rest were stuck i'll the mud from
two to five miles back. He certainly had
done nothing to disturb his own calculation of
chances, and can now refer to it us proof of
his own sagacity. Another general was un-
reserved in the expression of his opinion
against the movement and did everything in
his power, even after the march of his troops
had begun, to have it arrested.
III may seem severe Judgment, but can
not help believing, from what | saw and
he ard that each Of the generals alluded to,
and several of their subordnates, who natur-
ally take their cue from them, g'eioiced IN the
future Of the n'orenIeRt. They had commit
ted themselves openly and publicly to the
opinion that 1t would fail; perhaps it would
be unreasonable to expect that they should
work with any excess of vigor to secure the
failure Of their own predictions. Some of
them, unless / have been msinformed sought
TO throw the blame upon their men, and al
legged that the result of recent political DEM
constructions at the north had disinclined them
TO fight; and the election of Wall to the Unit
ed States senate from New Jersey, was
cited as one thing which had so far affected
the troops from that state as to render them
unreliable on the battle field. L do not be-
lieye that this is true; but even if it were, it
would much better become Il general of divis-
ion to try to overcome it, than to cite it as
reason for inactivity.
If this were the first instance in which the
Willingness of certain officers to behold, with
entire equanimity, the defeat of Gen. Burn
sides plans, could be traced in their language
ana conduct, L should hesitate in attributng
the failure of this movement to that cause.
But ties not This is the fourth active move
ment which Gen Burnside has made against
the enemy during the short time that has