Richmond Whig. [volume] (Richmond, Va.) 1862-1865, 1863-01-22

Before the court Of Inquiry MCDOWELL in Washing
ton the following letter from Lin ,oR Mcclellan,
read 1t deserves attentive perusa and perpetual pre-
ssrvAtiOn:
WASHINGTON, April 9, 1864
ia Mai -GoEend McCLEL1kN: ny Dear Sir: Your
despatches complaining that you not properly sus
sustained while they do not offend me- pain me very
much Blenker's Division was Withdrawn before you
left here and you know the pressure under which did
IT, and as thought acquiesced in It, certainly not
without reluctance After you ieft ascertained that
less than 2OOO0 unorganEed men, without field bate
nv were all YOU designed should be left for the defense
of Washington and Manassas Junction. and part Of this
even was TO 90 to General Hookers old position. Gen
Ranks eorns once designed for Manassas junction.
divided and tied up on the line Of Winchester and Stras
burg and could leave that position without again
exposing the Upper Potomac and the Baltimore and
0hio Railroad.
This presented, or would present when Mcdowell and
Sumner should be gone great temptation Tor the enemy
20 turn back from the RappahannOck and sack Washing
ton Nv explicit directions that Washington, sustained
b. the Judgment of all the commanders of corps should
Zoe left secure had been entirely neglected Ii was pre-
cisely this that drove me to detan Mcdowell do not
forget that I was satisfied with your arrangement TO
leave Banks at Manassas Junction But when that
arrangement was broken up and nothing substituted
Tor IT, of course was not satisfied. was constrained
to substitute something for it myself Aud now allow
one 20 ask YOU do you really think could permit the
line from Richmond via Manassas junction TO this city
to be entirely open except what resistance could be pre-
septed BY less than 900 unOganzed roopsg This
question which the country will not allow me % eyade.
There is a curious mystery about the number troops
now with YOU. | telegraphed you on the eth, saying
that you had over one hundred thousand with you
had Just obtained from the Secretary of War, state
ment taken as he said, from your returns making
los 200 then with you aud en- route to you You now
say you will have but 900 when all route shall have
reached you. How can this discrepancy Of $4,000 be
accounted fory As TO Gen. WoOscommandl understand
that it is doing precisely whata like number of your own
would have to do if that command was away. suppose
the whole force which hasgone forward to you has reach
ed you by this time and il So think il is the precise
time for YOU 10 strike a blow.
By delay the enemy viii readily gain on you; that is,
be will gain faster by Notifications and reinforcements
than you can by renforcements alone And once more
let me tell you il is Indispensable you that you strike
a blow. / am powerless to help. This you will do me
the Justice 10 remember always opposed 70 going
down the BAY in search Of field instead of fighting at
or near Manassas oRly shifting and not surrounding
difficulty that we would ind the enemy and the
same or equal ntrenchments a. either place The coun-
~ will NOS fail TO note-s noting now-tha, the pres
cut hesitation upon an ntrenShsd enemy is but
The story of Manassas repeated.
beg leave TO assure you that have never written or
spoken you in greater kindness OF feeling than now
uor with fuller purpose to sustain you so far as in ny
most anxious judgment consistently can. But you
must act. YouEs, very truly,