Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-08-10
Especial Correspondence of the Chicago Timesl

ASHlNGToS, July 70.
The events of the last few DAYS have strikinely
illustrated the wOrthessness end unreability of
the reports from the opposing armies" which
have been furnished by ''the Government" and
the agents of the Administration, and which
were telegraphed under official sanction. all over
the country. These reports, put forth under the
sanction of the Var Department, assured the
country that Lees army, when it recrossed the
Potomac to retreat into Virginia, was utterly
demoralized and routed; that Lees army was
flying before our cavalry in inextricable confu
sion-its baggage trains, artillery, cavalry, and
infantry all mixed up together; that Lee was
striving with all his might to get TO Richmond,
bat that troops held all the passes in the Blue
Ridge Mountains. so that it would be utterly i'm
possible for his army to get through; and that
instead of reaching Richmond, Lees army
would be defeated and captured | exposed
these falsehoods in my former letters, and
events have now proved them TO be such.
Up to the 2lst inst. movement toward Rich
mond formed no part of Gen. Lees plan. He
remained at Winchester, watching the movements
of Gen Meade The latter officer, whose good
judgment in this campaign entities him to the
highest praise, remained on the eastern side of
the Blue Ridge, between Berlin and Ashby e
Gap. from the 18Th to the 23d inst. The purpo-
ses of Gen. Lee we're still undeveloped Not
only the rebel General still at Winchester,
but there was reason to believe that he contem
plated a return across the Potomac, perhaps an
other campaign 10 Pennsylvania The reports
OF his having been reinforced FROM Bragg's army
assumed AZ least the semblance Of probability
His pckets. up to the 221, lined the south bank
of the Potomac from Bath to Harper's Ferry;
and Gen. Kelly's troops, between Hancock TO
Cumberlani, were having daily skrmishes with
detachments frnm Lees arrcy Under these cir
cumstances il would have been culpable il Gen
Meade TO have advanced any further south than
Ashby's Gap. since 10 have left either that pass,
or Snckers Gap, with weak guard, would have
been opening door u Washington through
which. by the wy of Aide, Gen Lees army
would have been sure tn march Besides, The
distance from Berlin 10 Ashhy's Gap is over
thirty five miles, and that is line quite as long
as his army can hold.
By the 2lst, however, Gen. Lee becaui. con
WINGED that Gen Meade was too sagacioas either
to follow him wild goose chase down the
Shenandoah VALLEY, or to moFe rapidly down the
east side of the Blue Ridge in an attempt TO cut
off his retreat t. Richmond. thereby allowing him
an opportunity to slip through Ashby's Gan and
get in Meade's rear He saw that Gen Meade
was too good soldier TO make false move. and
that Meade had compelled him TO make the FIRST
move He made it; and history viii record that
il was 4 move worthy ofa great General, for bis
On the evening of the 2lst, he issued his orders
for the movement toward Culpepper. and the
columns were set in motion on the morning of
the 22d. The corps of Lonestreet and A. P
Hill moved by way of Front Royal. Chester Gap,
and Little Washington; that of Gen. Ewell by
way of Strasburg. Thornton's Gan, and Sperry
vile. On the 23d. the corps of Hill and Long
street forded the Shenandoah at a point Just be
low the junction Of the west branch Of that
stream, passed through Front Royal and crossed
the Blue Ridge at Chester Gap. On tie same
day. Ewell's corps ptssing through Thorn
toms Gap. By this time. however. the move
ment had become known to Gen. Meade. 4
cavalry recornoisance, sent OUT from Harper s
Ferry on the 22l, proceeded nearly to Winches
ter before they encountered any signs of the
enemy. There however, they fell in with Gen
Lees rear guard, who were still holding the
town. The line of the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad from Hirper's Ferry TO Hancock, was
also found to he clear of rebel troops, although
Reconnaissance sent out only the day before, had
found VI irtinshur- occupied by Il strong body of
Confederafes.
The facts developed by these reconnosances
indicated that Lee was making a movement
southsard. that the movement had been Just
commenced. bus that it was being made with
celeriiv Geu Meade now moved with equal
CELEBRITY The Blue Ridge il lnng. however, and
has numerous passes He did NOT dare 10 leave
all Of them unguarded He WIS oblise to leave
one corps at A>hhy's Gap. bur with the remain
der OF hi> armv. b. h4s:eEei to Manassas GAP,
hoping to intercept Lees army there. Even in
doing 81 he was obIiael to leave Saicker's Gap
entirely open aud uuguarlel. and lie could not
know certainly that this apparent southward
movement of Lees uut feint. and that
while engaging Meade's attention at Manassas
Gap with part of his force. he was not really
holding the principal part of his army in reserve
between Winchester and Frcnt Royal, ready to
pour through Smokers Gap the moment he would
find it ungusrdcti. snd Gebouch on Alde. Gen.
Meade could mt tell but what that Lees in
tentipu. ana therefore his march towards Manas
sas Gap was bold and Vigorous movement The
heads of his columns arrived there on the ODD,
and fuund the Gap held by the Confederates, who
were apparently trying to march through. An
engagement eusued. which resulted in the retreat
of the Confe'lerates TO Front ROYAL That night
the main body of Gen Meade's army came up,
the Gap was occupied 10y our troops in strong
force, and one corps was sent on TO hold Chester
Gap. But unhappily. these dispositions were
make few hours too late, although that was un-
avoidable, for the troops had marched rapidly,
and they had long distance TO come.
The apparent attempt on the part of General
Lee to force passage through Manassas Gap,
was. indeed. feint On the %, nearly the whole
of Hills and Longtreet's corps had passed
through Chester Gap, and on the oath they made
the march from that point to within ten miles of
Culpepper. 1t was their rear guard alone-a
strony one II il true--that had fought the battle
Of Manassas Gap in order to delay Meade's army
there. aud the successful. General
Meade's whole army was at Chester Gap on the
oath. but then it was too late, for everything had
passed The campaign is General Lee is
safe at Cnlpepper. with his whole army, and once
more the Rippahannock rolls between the op-
posing hosts.
What is 10 be done now? and what will be
done? IL not TO be supposed that Gen. Meade
will set down quietly at Falmouth and waste the
summer in inactivity. and it will not do for him
to remain there or ut any other point between
Washington and the Rappahannock. The whole
country is desert, and every pound of food for
his men and horses has to be brought to him from
Washington He will have 10 DO one of two
things: He will either have to attempt to march
on Richmond overland, calculating of course to
meet and fight Lees army on the way; or else
the Administration will have to organize a new
Penipsular campaign against the rebel capital
Nothing would please Gen. Lee so well as to have
the former course adopted. ] was the first to as
sert and demonstrate the impracticabity of an
overland cumpaign against Richmond, and four
unsuccessful campaigns have proved it, do not
believe that Gen Meade will willingly undertake
a fifth. By properly organized Peninsula
campaign Lees army may be defeatsd and Rich
mond be taken. But the Administration have
determined that they will not make another Pen
insular campaign under any circumstances. and
so the matter stands.
--GEs Wilcox Much credit is due to Gen:
Wilcox for his efforts TO restore harmony and
maintain peace in the State. His late general
orders are to the effect that soldiers should con
duct themselves everywhere as soldiers, and con-
eennentlr as gentlemen. IL these orders are en-