The dollar weekly bulletin. [volume] (Maysville, Ky.) 1862-1864, 1863-05-14


ments and Reverse-outlook.
Is 81 WASHINGTON, May z. E.
tits always we'll honestly to face the
facts, have no lies to give about "changes
of base" or smooth excuses about military
reasons for modifying plans" We are again
on, the Rappshapnock. The move
NJ emit, for which we" have been waiting for
months, is failure; and after four bloody
battles; we are back again at our starting
place. s,,a.,, ,.i,s--. al:
1t would be easy to gloss over the painful
facts. to dwell with deserved eulogy on the
brilliancy of Hooker's movements and the
superb fighting of the army, to show how
Hooker surprised Lee, and how he held his
ground until the flood in his rear admonish-
ed him to save his communication by re-
treating; and from all this it would not be a
difficult task to deceive ourselves with the
alusion of partial success. But this people
is strong enough to face the truth in all its
CHASTITY max edness.
We are not in any sense successful. We
started out to capture or anuihilate the rebel
army. We did neither. We expected at least
to take no steps backward. We have taken
them
In its totality it was not even drawn bat
tie. We may sometimes have held our
ground during the day, but then we feli'bsck
at night. We may sometim es have repul-
sed the enemy from certain positions, but
then they always got them next morning.
We did not hold our battle feld-which
military critics pronounce almost the inva-
riable sign of Of defeat-our wounded are
in the enemy's hands; we have retreated by
the way we came, aud made haste to place
deep river between the enemy we had
talked of aunihllatiDg and ourselves.
We have lost heavily In prisoners, killed
and wounded. The army can not be ht TOR
weeks, for mouths, if the ideas OF the old
regime prevail, for new attack. Without
better fortune than we dare hope within the
next four weeks, the doings OF the last tive
days will have put US back six months at
least-possibly even iurther-ln reaching
the end Of the rebellion which we mad e1-
ultantly thought so near.
Those are the plain, simple facts, as they
oct omit our cold critics across the waters;
we shall at least show better our national
fitness to earn victory If we fairly face the
repulse. ,r.,...,
What of it? Let US go back to the bet
ter. manlier teachings Of our more hopeful
seasons. Iremember to have written hard
iv month since, with the most cheering
prospects then ahead of US, something like
this: I'VE have passed the point where we
thought one swallow always made sum-
mer. a defeat more or less does not alter
the case. We are into this business, there
is but one way of getting out, and In the
mean time there will be no moro unmanly
,uiLIino down after q reverse. One defeat
a dozenYdefeats could not alter the fnevita-
BILE result. We have but one thing to do
foM On-after every disaster, fight on, till
@ od in his good providence and IN his own
time shall give us the victory we know is
sure to come" In that faith, which we
little thought would so soon be needed, let
US meet aud profit by and overcome this
new repulse. -..t
1t is too early yet to attempt explaining
the secret of this sudden termination, TO the
long heralded movement. The plan Tor our
operations is admitted on all hands to have
been only eaualed in the brilliancy Of its
conception by the skill with which its exc
cution was begun. The troops in the main
fought we'll; and though our lines were for
ce6 back, it was still supposed we were In
no danger Of being forced into the river.
But the plan had one element of fatal
weakness. 1t violated one Of the first axi-
oms of war, by dividing the army before the
enemy, and giving him an opportunity to
defeat us in detail. To do this in the face
of such an enemy as we had was hazardous
in the extreme, but it was essential to the
plan. -.-
Napoleon said the secret of his success
over the Austrians was, that they didn't I'M
derstand the value of half an hour. It was
the failure to porve few half hours to
the utmost that gave the enemy their first
opportunity. Hooker's right was attack ed
aud overpoweEed on Saturday. If Sedg-
wick had been one day sooner in his attack,
that days battle would hardly have gone
against us so sorely at Chancellorville. But
for some unexplained reason the movements
failed to CO. operste; the rebels were permit
ted first to attack Hooker, then turned and
attack Sedwick, then back on Hooker again.
The evidence seems conclusive that Lee
had been heavily reinforced. Even Long
streets corpse, which we thought at Suffolk,
is said to have joined him. They were
perfectly familiar with the ground. while we
had neither m APPS nor personal knowledge
of it; and thus gave them another advan-
tage. .'s...t. .... 7eat.- 80.
Stoneman, too was not heard from, and
Hooker's plan involved Stoneman's work as
one of its essential elements of success
And the heavy rain-storm was bringing on
a food in-the Rappahannock that might
have cut off the army from its communica-
tions. 80 "'
All these are urged as explanations of the
retreat; and they seem plausible enough
But, after all, is it not more rational to snip
pose that we came back because we found
we were not equal to remaining on the south
side of the river? In short, because We had
been driven 10 the river, and had reason to
fear we might be driven across it?
What is to come next, it is too soon to
think of saying. We are yet utterly with
out light as to the condition of the army
We know absolutely nothing but that it is
back on this side the river, leaving its dead |