The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-12-26

"A GeductlOn OIL % NeT cent OH MI nVNSl oAsSe
ments inserted in both Daily and Weekly.
Gen. Halleck's Review of the OPP.
ePatiOnS in the Department of
the Cumberland.
While Gen. Grant was operating before
Vicksburg, information, deemed reliable,
was received from captured rebel cores
ing drawn from Bragg's army to reinforce
Johnston in Mississippi. Reinforcements
were sent to Grant from other armies in
the West, but Gen. Rosecrans' army was
left intact, in order that he might take ad-
vantage of Bragg's diminished numbers,
and drive him back into Georgia, and thus
secure loyal East Tennessee from the vile
hands of the rebels, an object which the
Government has kept constantly in view
from the beginning of the war. l there
fore urged Gen. Rosecrans to take advan-
tage Of this opportunity to carry out his
long projected movement, Informing him
that Gen. Burnside would cooperate with
his force, moving from Kentucky to East
Tennessee. For various reasons he pre-
ferred to postpone his movement until the
termination OF the siege of Vicksburg.
In order to avoid any misunderstanding
of orders given to Gen. RoSecrans on this
subject, submit the following correspon-
dence:
MURFREEsBoRo', Tenn,
June llth, 1868.
Your dispatch of to-day is received. You
remem Der gave you as necessary con-
dition of success an adequate cavalry
force. Since that time l have not lost a
moment in mounting our dismounted cav
airy as fast as we could get horses. Not
more than three hundred remain to be
mounted. The 9Th Iowa ordered up from
0onelson, arrived to-day. The lst Wis
consin will be here by Saturday. Ny pre-
liminary Infantry movements have alrea-
dy been completed, and / am prepared to
strike a blow that will tell. But to show
you how differently things are viewed here,
l called on my Corps and Division Com
manders and Generals of Cavalry for ans
wers in writing to the questions:
First-From your best information, do
you think the enemy materially weakened
in our front?
Second-Do you think this army can ad-
vance at this time with reasonable pros
pect of fighting great and successful bat
tie?
Third-Do you think an advance advisa-
BILE at this time?
To the first, eleven answered No; six
Yes-to the extent of 10000. The second,
four Yes, with doubts; thirteen No. To
the third, not one Yes; seventeen No.
Not one thinks an advance advisable un-
til Nicksburg'S fate is determined. Adj
mitting these officers to have reasonable
share of military sagacity, courage and pa
triotism, you perceive that there are gra-
Yer and stronger reasons than probably
appear at Washington for the attitude of
this army.
] therefore counsel caution and patience
at headquarters. Better wait a little to get
all we can ready to insure the best result.
If, by so doing, we, per force of Provi-
dence, observe great military maxim
not to risk two great and decisive battles
at the same time-we might have cause to
be thankful for it. At all events you see
that. to expect success, l must have such
thorough grounds that when l say "For-
ward my word will inspire conviction
and confidence where both are now want
ing. should like to have your sugges-
ton. w. S. ROSECRANS,
Major General
To Major General H. w. HALLEcK,
General-in- Chief
WASHINGTON, Jan. II, 1863
GENERAL-Your telegram of yesterday
is just received. I do not understand
your application of the military maxim
not to fight two great battles at the same
time. twill apply to q single army, but
not to two armies acting independently of
each other. Johnston and Bragg are act
ing on interior lines between you and
Grant, and it is TOR their interest, not ours,
that he should fight at different times, so as
to use the same force against both of you.
1t is for our interest to fight them if possi-
ble while divided. If you are not strong
enough 10 fight Bragg with part Of his
force absent, you will not be able to fight
him after the affair at Vicksburg is over,
and his troops return to your front.
There is another military maxim that
Councils OF War never fight" If you
say that you are not prepared to fight
Bragg, shall not order you to do so, for
the responsibility Of fighting or refusing
to fight, at particular time or place, must
rest upon the General in immediate COM
mand. 1t cannot be shared by Council
Of War. nor will the authorities here make
you fight against your Will. You ask me
to counsel them to caution and patience
I have done so very often, but after five
or six months of inactivity, with your
forces all the time diminishing and no hope
of any immediate increase, you must not
be surprised that their patience is pretty
we'll exhausted. 1t you do not deem il
prudent to risk general battle with Bragg.
why can YOU not harass him, or make such
demonstrations as to prevent his sending
more reinforcements to Johnston? / do
not write this in spirit Of fault-finding,
but to assure you that the prolonged mac
tiyity of so large an army in the field is
causing much complaint and dissatisfac.
ton, not only in Washington, but through.
out the country.
Very respectfully your ob't serv't,
III. w. HALLECK,
General-in-C Chief.
Maj. Gen. RosEcRASs, .Murfreesboro'
Tenn.
HEADo' RS DEPT OF THE CUMBERLAND, /
MuRFREEsBoRo,' June q, 1868. !
GENERAL-In your favor of the 12thinst.
you say you do not see how the maxim
Of fighting two great battles at the same same
time, applies to the case of this army and
Grants. Looking at the matter prachcal-
ly, we and our opposing forces are sc
widely separated that for Bragg to mate
rally aid Johnston, he must abandon our
front substantially, and then we can move
to our ultimate work with more rapidIty
and less waste of material on natural OBJ
stacles. If Grant is defeated, both forces
will come here, and then we ought to be
near our base. The same maxim that
forbids, as you take it, a single army fight
ing two great battles at the same time-by
the way, very awkward thing to do
would forbid this nations engaging all its
forces in the Great West at the same time,