New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-12-19

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Gen. wsrren'O command by the addition Of two
divisions Of the Sd Corps and it was decided tnat no
should attack the enemy ut o'clock the next morning.
on the left while our right was 70 partcpaT a., nou
! later. Cen Warren spent the night-wheh was
bitter cold onen his saddle. arranging his troops Ior
grand assault the and as the hrst Iaye
of morning appeared in the east no had nnlshed nis
CORRECT POSITION OF OUR FORCES.
! The following was the exact disposition OF Gen.
Warrens entire force The front line extended miie
in length ana the troops formed in two and three
lines while great had been taken to post strong
supports the proper points TO guard against the as
tros results that Od from an attack OF supe.
rior numbers. Gen. II. d. Terry, commanding "a
Division 9th Corps was stationed along the Catharpin
Road. hold the left flank and act as reserve. Gsn;
st troops IN Ho ss to the irs reaching the rail-
road. Gen. Webb commanding I'd Division, "a SoIps
joined Gen Hayess forces uniting win zen n.'nf .
formed in two lines Gen. Carr, 80 Division. 81 corps
next followed in two parallel lines with strong reserve
reaching to The plank road Then came Gen Caldwens
iroops lst Division. I'd Corps acting as reserve Suo
support 10 Gen. Warrens right flank.
TIE CAUSE OF THE DELAY.
At dayhreah everything was in readiness Tor tbe
struggle butte careful examination by Gen. warren re.
yeaicd the important fact that The enemy's hnes nad
changed entirely during the night Large accessions
made 70 their ranks and every available posi-
zion That could BE- used with advantage by our 100
bs,led with artillery and infantry. The formidable
breastworks epacnents aud aoaitis We're Dnsheo ana
strengthened
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A run OF eight inmates would be required for onr
lines TO close up the distance between them and
chose OF the enemy ing which our entire advancing
lines would be subject 20 cycy description OF nre I'm
the number OF troops lis disposal, tho tremendous
odds pitted against him. and tho iln.inent peru ~
which the entire army would be placed in case 0, oe
feat az chat point aor mature and most careful dehDer
alton Cen Warren deemed it npTnGent to attack the
Rebels .mmsGiate front. and he 80 reported 10 ven.
Meade Any movement ON the part OF zen. warren ~
out;lank the enemy with the limited force under ny
command separated he four miles from the ngns
wing rsked lis troops to the chances OF sudden at
tack by the Rebels which, with their choice posI4n
aud oy erw helmisgly strong numbers, would no nouUs
have resulted in q disastrous defeat, and appearances
indicated such design their part. Such an expos
ure and infcasble undertaking was not WARRANTED
and no military principle would Justify him In attempt
ing so rash movement.
THE OPINIONS OF VETERANS, AND WHAT COULD BE
DONE.
Tho .bovc is the opinion OF veteran military tao
tcaus Regular and Volunteer and claims the consider
alton of those at homo in civil pursuits WAC con-
denim what they do not comprehend" Ihree tDines
only could be done that day. VIZ expose ms command
Ia this attack from helming numbers IN their Sc
eced and fortified stronghods assault where DC tnsu
was or reioin the right wing.
ANOTHER PLAN OF ATTACK.
There WI, a plan under consideration to bring the
entire arny TO tie position occupied by Gen: Warrens
forces and march the body toward TIE eitthe enemys
righ-but TO carry this out would necessltate COM
Mere abandonne nj of our base 1t was the opinion OF
Ten Warren that this plan was more feasible ndnacn
less hazardous than attack in front.
ABANDONMENT OF TIE CAMfhon, A'O i-HAo'~' W
OUR ARMY.
We remained quiet the rest of the day and the ist da
OF December during which time the Rebels continued,
like sensible leaders 10 strengthen ana enhrge Incl.
mpro ing the leisure and security anordeo
them by our inactivity ~ all poidts Our whole army
fell back from their position on the night OF Dec.
began retire just after dark aud on the morning OK
Dec in pursuance of orders from Army Headquarters
or troops recrossed the Rapdan the infantry ana ar
tiery crossing at cnpepper and Gsrma1na Fords and
| tie principal part of tie cavalry 1T Ely foFu'
nf-a r.
The % Corps Gen. Warren lost N killed. wounded
and missing az men, being engaged on the Zin, 1eln
and sgth Of November. Gen. H. d. Kerry, 10 O"is1oh'
!, was most unlctunsie that Gen. French Of the ID
Corps lost Lis roai the 9th Of November thefepy
causing great "A delay In uniting Win lhe iTnces
Cen Warren. Another misfortune IVES the failure oi
certain General relieve the picAets at the proper
hour which aided in frustrating the plans Of the cam
paigD. E .. ,,ox.
ments on the Rapdan is a correct one, my Information
having been derived rom personal oOsei 'aohs ~ .no
'front.' during the canpsgn anu tne a.a , ov s,sa
officers OF different corps and div sions participating
In the operations. have taken considerable pains 10
count 10 the close examination Of officers high IL com
nsnd they have pronounced II authentic.
PUBLIC CoSDEMNAroE-THE oUTCRY A POLITICAL
DODGE
Icannot close without again abiding to the many On
inst and fc insinuatons thet have appeared In the
columns Of the daily press 10 reflect upon the
4
fol operations. The high position VI nis officer
and tie gigantic influence Of his actions upon the bal
nce OF The army have naturally enough led the INITIATED
suspect him being chiefly responsible Tor ire iail-
ure His wise decision not 20 hgt the enemy at thet
particular POINT stronghold odds to the popular idea
and belief that by this conclusion victory was post
poncd Nothing be more erroneous than this I'M
preston for Gen Warrens official report tells the story
Of his complete and thorough preparation for vigorous
assaults Not ory this General nrren personally In
comnany with Lieut. Colonel Morgan his Chefof STAFF,
Inspected each position carefully before reporting him
self in readiness TO those familiar With the rules OK
military science the manner in which Gen. warren
disposed his forces to protect his TANKS from being
turned proves him 10 be not only skfai engineer.
possessed Of more than ordinary foresight but shrewd
srategst The laments Of the Richmond papers ON ac-
count VI en Meades refusing to attack them In their
mprognable position ought To be sufficient " silence
all idle earnings at home, because The soil OF virginia
has not again been Redeemed with the best blood OF our
land In fruitiess sacrifice. From al the Information
that can be gained there is nothing yet exhibited which
will in any way sanction the canor against the COM
mander In Chief Of this army and MajorGen: q. n
Warren lind that much Of the noise proceeds rom
the admirers of Gen. Mcclellan. who hope to create
sufficient public feeling of sympathy by magnifyng the
res uts this simple failure. TO influence the return OF
their political fayOrite TO the command or this unnncn
ing army Surely the opinions Of tie veterans OF ths
army who have noby fought its battles and endured
lis Lardships are entitled 10 confidence; and tho
rank aud ilc INTEL geat Citing men, uni, ersay con-
cede that III. abandonment OF the late campaign ny uen
Meade was tie salvation Of this aruy It's results arc
Lilputiln when compared Will the snaiest oi oeh.
McClellaA's disasters.
APPRECIATION OF BRAVERY.
Cen Warren speaks highly Of the bearing OF MS men
duruy the diss.Tceable campaign, and he considers
their strength and spirit unlmpaired. understand
able mention Of those soldiers who exhibited specal
gaaniry in the recent operations, Is soon rs ms de-
tailed reports arc made out JE H.
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