Ellsworth American. [volume] (Ellsworth, Me.) 1855-current, 1863-05-08
The Conduct OF the War

|
On the 18th of October the President
wrote to General Mcclellan concerning
the operations of the army. And on the
| 18th of October General Mcclellan wrote
in reply. Tee letter of the President
and the reply of General Mcclellan arc
as follows:
Executive MANSION,
WASHINGTON, October IL. 1868.
Ny dear sir: You remember my
speaking to you Of what L called your
overcautiousness. Are you not oyercau-
tons when you assume that you cannot
do what the enemy is constantly doing ?
Should you not claim to be at least his
equal in prowess, and act upon the claim:
AS understand, you tclegraphed
General Haleck that you cannot subsist
your ar ny at Winchester, less the road
from Harpers Ferry to that point be put
in working order. But the enemy does
now subsist his army at Winchester at a
distance nearly twice as great from rail-
Dad transportation as you would have
to do without the railroad last named.
He now wagons from Culpeppcr Court
House, which is just about twice as far
as you would have to do from Harpers
Ferry. lie is celtlinly not moreta than half
as well provided with wagons as you are.
l certainly should be pleased for you to
have the advantage of the railroad from
Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it
wastes all the remainder of autumn to
give it to you. and in fact ignores the
question of time, which cannot and must
not be ignored.
gain, one of the standard maxims
of war, as you know, is "to operate upon
the encny's communications as much as
possible without exposing your own
You seem to act as if this applies against
you, but cannot apply in your Jaror.-
Change your positions with the enemy
and think you not he would break your
communication with Richmond within the
next twenty-four hours? You dread his
going into Pennsylvania. But if he does
SO in full force, he gives up his commune
cations to you absolutely. and you have
nothing to do but follow and ruin him i;
if he does SO with less than full force. fall
upon and beat what is left behind all the
easier.
" Exclusive of the water line, you are
now nearer Richmond than the enemy is
by the route that you can and he must
take. Why can you not reach there be-
fore him, unless you admit that he is more
than your equal on march ? His route
is the arc Of circle, while yours is the
chord. The roads are as good on yours as
on his.
You know desired, but did no. Or
der, you to cross the Potomac below in
stead of above the Shenandoah and Blue
Ridge Ny idea was, that this would at
once menace the cneny's Communications,
which | would seize if he would permit.
IF he should move northward. | would
follow him closely, holding his communl-
cations. If he should prevent our selzing
his Communications, and move toward
Richmond, [ would press closely to him,
fight him if favorable opportunity
should present, and at least try to beat
him to Richmond on the inside track. |
say NY II Nc HcNGi ~ w s'
never succeed. IF he makes stand at
Winchester, moving neither north nor
south. would fight him there, on the
idea if we cannot beat him when he bears
the wastage Of coming to US, we never
can when we bear the wastage OF going
to him. This proposition is simple
truth. and is too important to be lost
sight of for a moment. In coming to US,
he tenders US an advantage which we
should not waive. We should not so op-
crate as to merely drive him away. As
we must beat him somewhere, or fail fin
ally, we can do it, if at all, easier near
to us than far away. If we cannot beat
the enemy where he now is, We never can,
he again being within the entrenchments
of Richmond.
Recurring to the idea of going to
Richmond on the inside track, the facility
of supplying from the side, away from
the enemy is remarkable, as it were by
the different spokes OF wheel, extending
from the hub toward the rim, and this
whether you move directly by the cAotG
or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue
Ridge more closely. The chord line, as
you see, carries you by Aldie, Haymarke'
and Fredericksburg, and you see how
turnpikcs, railroads, and finally the Po
tomac by Aqua Greek, meet you at a!
points from Washington. The same, only
the lines heightened little, if you press
closer to the Blue Ridge part OF the way
The gaps through tie Blue Rilge ] ua
derstanl to b: ahont a. .vHiiJ&ing dis
frances from Harpos's Ferry, to wit
Vestal's, five miles Gregory, thirteen
Manassas, thirty-eisht; Chester, forty
Eve, and Thornton's, ftty-three. shou!'
think it preferable to take the route near
est the enemy, disabling him to make al
important move without your knowledge
and compelling him to keep his force
togeihe.' for drcal of you. The gap
would enable you to attack il you shoul'
wish For great part of the way yo'
would be practically between the enem.
and both Washington and Richmond, en-
: abling US to spare yeu the greatest nun
Der Of troops from hera. When. al
length, rcaniag for Richmond ahead o
him enables him to move this way, II HI
does so, turn and attack him in tie rea
But think he should be engaged lon:
before such point is reached. 1t Is al
easy if our troops march as well as tn
enemy, aud it Is unmanly to say they can
- 4. - This lattar - in no sanSa al