The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-10-17
CSnduct OF the War in Regard tn
SOmmunicat iOns-.POsftiOns Of
ROSecrans and Bragg. y.

0 niue examination of the lines of com
r muhlcatlonS In our country VIII show IN,
} cause OF the i'll success of some of orr Gem
} erais, ana the greater length of the wa,
than was anticipated by most persons. NJ
country on earth, except Russia. present,
so great surface, and so diversified. II,
immense rivers and mountain ranges give
greater means both of otfense and defense
II such places as the passes of the Blnt
Ridge, the forks Of Gauley and Kanawha
Cumberland Gap, the suck eft the Tennes.
see at Chattanooga, the gorges of French
broad, and the mountains OF North Caro-.
ma, afford means Of obstinate defense. So
on the other hand, our immense navigable
rivers, great Underwater harbors, broad
plains and systems of railroads, afford the
very best means of attack. For. wbereve,
there are superior forces attacking, thei,
best opportunity is on good roads. leye]
country and broad streams. Their prob.
so it has happened. We have broken
down the rebel Confederacy so far by the
rivers and the plains. But ought not our
Generals to have not only anticipated this
but to have anticipated the ''last ditch',-
the places which must ultimately be the
places IT last defense, and the means of COM
'nanicatio,s, By aOhich then could bereinjoyced
was the very first thing needed in this war,
ana after that, most specially, the study OF
railroads and rivers. To destroy the militia
'y organization is admitted by both Gen
erals and civilians to be the object. When
that is none, there is no rebellion. We
have passed the time, in which any mere
llnSurrection or guerrilla war is possible.
when not supported by organized armies.
But the question is: How is the military
organization to be destroyed? Will one or
twenty battles and victories do that, while
the means OF retreat, supply, and intercom-
munication are left open? Wehave good
illustration of this in the campaigns of
Frederick. Small as his Kingdom was,
| they, the combined Austrians and French.
never really drove him from the sources
OF supply and communication. Hence
it is, that the rebel forces were more utter
fy broken, and the war draws more rapid
ly to its close by the fall of Vicksburg,
than by all other things done. Why? Not
because OF the navigation of the Missis-
sippi, as is commonly supposed. That is a
matter which comes of course, when the
rebel armies there are broken. The great
blow was, in fact, the fatal blow-that it
! cut OF from the rebel military organiZa-
| ton half its territory and recources-hence-
| forward all west Of the Tombigbee was
utterly worthless to them. 1t might as
well be desert. The beef, the sugar. and
large portion of the men, relied on bv
Davis, were cut off. This was the great
blowout to this may be added, the i'm
mense benefit to US of the great central
line of the Mississippi, as means of trans
portation.
But let US proceed little further with
the question OF supplies and communica
tons. We all see noa0 how it was that
Bragg was suddenly re-enforced, and how
our success in selling Knoxville saved (by
cutting OFT the Virginia and Tennessee Rail
road) Rosecrans from four-fold worse dis
aster. Had we not held that railroad
double as many troops, in half the time,
might have been sent. But we have ac-
in cutting tfthat railroad. The rebels un-
derstood this well. This leads us to ask,
If they did know it SO well why did they
not defend it better? Simply because Mey
could not do that, (which would have re-
qulred previous operation, and make their
desperate march on Pennsylvania, Also
We said at the time that movement was
'nents IN ihe Vest, and prevent the success
OF the fatal movements on the Mississippi.
This Lee admits in his report. They fail
ed, and hence the fall Of East Tennessee
as well as Vicksburg. The failure to de-
fend it is ample proof Of what we all know,
that the rebellion is dying Of exhaustion,
and that rapidly, too. Let those who are
impatient remember this.
Looking again at communications, who
ever consults map will see that the rebels
had t,CO connecting arteries between the |
system of railroads, in Virginia and the
Carolinas, and that on the Mississippi.
One through the valley via Knoxville, and
the other on the Atlantic coast via Angus
ia, Ga. If these two communications had
been effectually cut two years since, as
there is every reason TO believe they might
have been, the valley Of the Mississippi
would have been as effectually cut off FROM
the Eastern rebels as it is to-day, and the |
capture of every rebel defense in the Val
ley been fastened at least a year. East
Tennessee could have been taken and held |
in the autumn of 1861. Nor could it have
been difficult at all, if the expeditions to
Hatteras and Port Royal had struck at
Wilmington, to have severed entirely the
whole Southern system OF railroads. Da- |
Wis Whose mind is as acute as the shrewd |
suggestions of his satanic teacher can make
it, anticipated this, and urged the building
of a railroad from Danville to Greensboro,
N. c., which would have been wholly in
the interior. We might have learned |
something from him. But we are above
that. If they send us package ofmagnif-
icent lies which the genius of Munchausen
might envy, we believe them. But if they I
suggest at home some of their own defeats !
and remedies, and which correspond with
what we know, we don't believe word
of it.
Let us now turn moment to the posi-
ton Of Bragg and Rosecrans- now the vi
tai point of the war. A good deal is said
about Rorecrans long communications
There is nothing in that whatever. 1t Is
one hundred and thirty eight miles only by Z
rail from Nashville to Chattanooga little
more than from Cincinnati to Columbus
Nashville can be made the depot OF sup
plies for dozeu armies and the commu-
cannot be cut so as to be material
lily impeded, without marching an army
upon it. which would be the same thing
for Bragg as Lees march on Pennsylvania i,
and Bragg has not got the means to 90 1t;
so there IS no difficulty about comnunica-
tons in Rosecrans advance. Whenever he
advances, Chattanooga will be the the de- +,
pot of supplies; and being capable OF I'M
pregnable defense, with a moderate garrl-
son, viii be the same as Cincinnati to the
army. Again, if" the enemy retreats,
the Memphis and Charleston road
(which we now have) will be uninterrupt-
ed. and Chattanooga can be supplied from
every quarter, nor can we think that the
will tail 70 supply the ripper