The New York herald., 1863-03-02

quito heavily There was more inquiry rs crackers
which were up 81 90 81 95 for Canton No per box
Light freight engagements reported, without, soy
remarkable alteration in rates.
Secretary Stewards Plan for Restoring
the Union-Last Chance OF che Rebels.
The proposition of Secretary Seward to ad-
nit representatives from the seeded States into
Congress is discussed with increasing interest in
diplomatic and political circles. Should this
proposition be carried out. and Congress be
thus transformed into a peace convention it is
generally conceded that the restoration of the
Union would certainly follow but some per-
sons object to this new mode of restoring the
Union as impracticable. Why! First, because
rebel representatives could not take seats in
Congress without subscribing to an oath Of 10y
atty to the government; second, because Louis
Napoleon is not friendly to the Union and will
not urge the Confederates to accept Stewards
proposition and, third, because the rebels do
not desire reunion upon any terms whatever,
and will accept no offer, however advantageous
to them, which involves their submission to the
federal authority. Under these three heads all
the objections to Secretary Stewards plan ma
turally range themselves.
In regard to the first objection it may be said
that many of the rebel leaders are still mem
oath upon resuming their seats under Stewards
proposition. But the fact is that convention,
rather than congress- is contemplated by our
Secretary Of State, and delegates from the rebels
may present themselves in Congress, state their
grievances and demand certain measures of re-
dress, without taking any oath Of office. At any
rate, this objection is one Of mere routine and
precedent, and can easily be set aside il neces-
sary. Secretary Seward's offer, it must be re-
membered, is endorsed by the President of the
United States, who according to the statement
of Secretary Seward himself, reads and
approves of all State dispatches before
they are sent to our foreign ministers. The
anticipated this obvious objection to their plan,
and provided the means to remove it. Neither
of them would be so foolish and inconsistent
as to gravely recommend an impossibility or
offer an invitation which they knew could not
be accepted. Consequently, as the rebels have
been informed that their representatives can be
received in our Congress, all technical objec-
tions must be considered as already arranged.
The assertion that Louis Napoleon is hostile
to the idea of reunion, and will not urge the
rebels to accept Stewards proposition, is unsus-
tanned by any evidence. On the contrary, it is
clear that Napoleon's interests require reunion.
II is the policy of France, announced by Louis
XVI and reaflirmed by Napoleon l., to maintain
on this continent great maritime Power, as a
counterbalance to that Of England. Napoleon
Ill has immensely augmented the navy Of
France; but the English navy has been proper
tionately increased and the resources and
friendship of the United States are still neces-
sary to enable Napoleon to hold England in
check on the seas. Viscount Anatole Lemsr-
cier, of the French Legislature, sums up the
arguments upon this point in the emphatic re-
marks -" The separation of the Northern
and Southern States is contrary to the
interests and traditions Of France. Eng
land, on the other hand desires separation,
but wishes the belligerents TO be more weak
ened by their present contest before it takes
place. Add to this the fact, also adverted to
by viscount Lemercier What peace on this con-
tinent is essential to the welfare Of Europe, and
that no permanent peace can result from dis
union, so various and conflicting are the ques-
tions to be decided before the terms Of separa-
ton could be agreed upon, and so constant
would be the irritations and disputes between
two confederacies, allied and yet hostile,
like quarrelsome members Of the same family. If
the Southern confederacy could be moved five
hundred miles away after disunion all would
be well; but 1t could not remain where it is
adjacent and yet antagonistic- be at peace
with u.s. Louis Napoleon cannot but compre-
hend this, nor can he close his eyes to the fact
that reunion will enable him to withdraw homo
rably and triumphantly from Mexico, while dis
union will involve him in still greater Difficult
ties. The Mexican war is unpopular in France,
and will be disastrous to the French army, the
French treasury, and perhaps the French En-
pcror, If 1t be long continued. Reunited, these
States could afford to pay Off Mcxico's debt to
France, and allow Napoleon to retire gracefully.
| Both the Northern and Southern confederacies
would desire Mexico for themselves Both
would aid the Mexcans in defeating the French.
| Each would fear and resist any attempt
on the part Of Napoleon to secure a foothold on
this continent Consequently Napoleon would
have three enemies, instead of one, to contend
with, and his downfall would be the inevitable
result Of the rage Of the French people at this
trebly increased expenditure Of blood and
treasure, for no possible benefit to the French
nation. The Orleanists are plotting. Europe
is fermenting with revolutions. The Polish
insurrection Is . warning and me-
mace to all dcspotisms. Napoleon must tread
| warily II will be better for him to secure