The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-01-02

think it will prove disastrous to the ar
my" Advice of that kind from Sumner,
who has always been in favor of our adj
vance, whenever it was possible, caused me
to hesitate. kept the column Of attack
forward, and sent over for the division and
corps commanders, and consulted with
them. They unanimously voted against
the attack. | then went over to see the
other officers of the commands on the
other side, and found that the same opin-
ion prevailed among them. Then sent
for General Franklin, who was on the
! left, and he was of the same opinion.
This caused me to decide that / oug ht not
to make the attack / had contemplated,
and besides, the President had told me not
to be in haste in making this attack that
he would give me all the support he could,
| but he did not want the Army of the
Potomac destroyed. /, felt that L could
not take the responsibility of order
ing the attack, Notwithstanding my own
belief at the time that the works of the
enemy could be carried. While on his way
here, Hooker, on the morning of the Goth
November, wrote me a note, which was
received on the 21st, in which he suggest
ed that he should cross his force over the
Rappahannoek, at the ford nearest the
town, Richards Ford, and move rapidly
down to Saxton's Station, and take position
there. He stated that he had three days
provisions, and that he could meet any
force of the enemy in front of him. re-
piled that l was always very, glad to take
the advice ofmy general officers, and should
be 10th to make move without consulting
them, but could not approve of the move
he had suggested: Because, in the first
place, he would have to march some thirty
six miles to Saxton Station. 1t was raining
and he would have to ford two rivers,
which might rise and cut him off from the
main body of the command, and as had
no means of crossing at Fredericksburg,
would be prevented from sending him sup
plies and assistance, and although he might
reach Saxton Station, and not meet any
force OF the enemy at that time, yet it
would be very hazardous movement to
throw column like that beyond the reach
OF its proper support Hooker thanked
me, and said he only made it as a sugges-
ton, and the weather, as it was raining,
rendered it, Of course, impossible to make
the movement he suggested.
Ques.-In answer to question what rea-
son-dO you assign for the failure of your
attack. 49, 5E&
Ans.-It was found impossible to get
the men up to the works. The enemy's
fire was too hot. The whole command
fought gallantly. The enemy themselves
say they never saw our men fight SO hard
as on that day.
Ques.-Were the enemy's works very
strong.
Ans. - Their works were not strong
works, but they held strong positions. 1t
is possible the points of attack were wrong
ly ordered. If such is the case, I can only
say I did to the best of my ability. It is
also possible that we would have done bet
ter to have crossed at SINNERS Neck, but
for what ! supposed to be good reasons T
felt we had better cross here, that we
would have q more decisive engagement
here, and that, if we succeeded in defeat
ing them, we would break up the whole of
the army here, which think now is the
most desirable thing, not even second to
the taking of Richmond. For, if this army
was broken up, though they might defend
Richmond for Il while, they could not make
any protracted defense there. -, - . @.>5li
Ques. by Mr.. Gooch. DO I understand
you to say that it was your understanding
that Gems. Halleck and Meigs, while at
your headquarters, in Warrenton, and be-
fore You commenced the moyementof your
army, sent orders to Washington for the
pontoons to be Immediately forwarded to
Falmouth TN r. 81 ed .>7ss@s
Ans.-That was my understanding, GER
tainly. LII. t:5s ~, .sSeta r..
Ques.-In your judgment, could thepon-
toons be forwarded in time for you to cross
the Rappahanuock when you expected. if
all possible efforts had been made by those
charged with that dutyP
Yes; if they had received their
orders in time. j. a ,.re5 ~.
CUES Did. the non-arriyai of these pom
toons at the time you expected, prevent
your crossing when you expected to cross
and interfere with the success Of your
plans go $500,
Ans. Yes. ~ ~
Ques.Since you have assumed conf
mand of the army ofsthe Potomac have all
its movements been made by you, accord
ing to your own Judgment, or have some
of them been directed by the GeneraI-in
Chief, the Secretary of War, or the Presf-
dent of the United States
Ans. They have all been made IN ac-
coodance with my own udgment.. In some
cases / have submitted my views which
have been approved.
Cues. Who did you understand was re-
sponsible for the forwarding Of the pom
toons to Falmouth
Ans ~ understand that Gen. Halleck
was to give the necessary orders, and then
| the officers who should receive the orders
were only responsible for the pontoons
coming here. ] could have carried ont
that part Of my plan through officers OF