The weekly pioneer and Democrat., 1863-05-22

miles from the principal crossing place,
making five miles in thirty-six hours. FRI
day was occupied in throwing up intrench-
ments; Saturday the fighting seriously
commenced; Saturday evening, only, as
it appears the two remaining corps arrived
from below. Sunday another attack, and
repulse of the main army. Meanwhile,
Sedgwick carries the entertainments be-
hind Fredericksburg. By Sedgwick's s
movement, two lines of operation are
clearly formed, the two Union armies sep
arated by distance of some twenty miles
the rebels in central position between
them. While all these movements are
being carried out, the whole cavalry under
General Stoneman is detached on raid.
in the rear of the rebel army
General Lee, without needing the cav
airy in his rear, waits quietly in his en-
trenchments until the Union movement is
fully developed. He easily discerns the
feint from the real attack. He throws his
whole force against General Hooker,
whom he confronts on Thursday evening,
giving up, meanwhile, his entrenchments
near Fredericksburg. Hooker is beaten
on Saturday. On Sunday, scarcely is he
on the defensive when General Lee, by
means of his anterior-line forces, marches
Sunday night, and throws, on Monday,
the mass OF his forces against Sedgwick,
who the day before had carried the forti-
fications near Fredericksburg Sedgwick
is beaten, crippled, and scarcely escapes
humiliation. After this triple check
General Hooker gives up the contest, and
recrosses the river.
By what we have said above of the po-
sition of the rebel army, it will be seen
that the crossing at Chancellorville by the
main force was entirely correct; but it
will be seen, too, that the croossing eff
fected by four corps only, instead of seven,
or at least six, was entirely incorrect.
Had the army consisted of the seven corps,
and marched on Wednesday morning, in
forced marches, towards fredericksburg, or
in direction some five to six miles south
Of Fredericksburg, they would have been
by Wednesday night, behind the rebel en-
trenchments.
The great decisive battle of the war
would probably have taken place on Thurs
day, and would have been fought under
very different circumstances from those
of Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, where
our army was beaten in detail. The idea
of a general, who is on the offensive,
whose avowed object is the capture and
destruction of a whole army, making six
miles in thirty-six hours, just in the most
critical moment of his operations, and
finally, after entrenching himself acithout
being on the communications Of tie enemy,
tells his soldiers that the enemy has to
run away or attack him on his own @ ound,
where he will destroy him, has not its
parallel in modern times. Another quite
as objectionable mistake is the sending
away of the cavalry in moment when a
great battle was nearly certain to hap
pen. 1t was the same silly conduct which
The cavalry ought to have formed the ut
most right wing in the large wheeling
movement which our army performed,
and in which the left wing formed the
pivot.
General Hooker's operation is modeld
on the operations of Wurmser and Alviuci
in 1896, in Italy; those of Jourdan, in
1899, at Stokach, and, in quite modern
times, on that of the royal Neapolitan
army, in 1860, at the Volturno. On the
contrary, Gen. Lee took a good lesson
from the action of Napoleon, the Archduke
Charles, and Garibaldi, on those different
occasions. Gen Lee has certainly gained
for himself, by this battle, the name of one
of the ablest generals of the present age.
1t would be wrong to make Gen. Hooker
alone responsible Tor his defeat. We are
told that his army is to be reinforced by
10000 men from Washington, and by 40,
600 to $4,000 from Suffolk. Is it not
strange that those troops did not join
Hooker before the battle? What is the
use OF 10000 idle men in Washington?-
What is the use of those $4,000 on the
Blackwater? Why are some 30, 900 stand
ing sentry in North Carolina? What have
the 10000 done yet near Charleston?
Is there not common sense enough in
our great generals to understand that to
keep thousands and thousands of men as
sentries to prevent blockade runners from
coming into southern ports is ridiculous
that it is more reasonable to mass all those
troops, and to crush with this superiority
CHO ClCIlly ildlil LilCS, UCCduoO UllSu
the blockade-runners will find no more
buyers for their contraband goods? But
how could such reasonable action be eX.
pected from general-in-chief who advanc-
ed against Corinth with snail-like pace
to undertake the siege of field-works,
which the rebels afterwards, under Van
Dorm did not hesitate moment to storm
and who sent Pope with 10000 men to
capture an army which he, with 100000,
could not defeat. 1t is the same general
who, in August last, gave Gen. B1rnside
the strange order to stay quietly at Fred
ericksburg with his troops; meanwhile
Pope was defeated at Manassas. The same
who ordered Pope to retreat towards
Washington, instead of ordering him to
retreat towards Salem and Berlin, which
would have prevented the battle at Mahas.
sas and the invasion of Maryland. 1t is
the same who gave the fatal order to Col.
Miles to hold Harper's Ferry when the re-
bells were already in Maryland, and when,
thereby, Harper's Ferry had lost all i'm
pOrtance.
Have there not been useless butcheries
and failures of operation enough to warrant
finally the adoption Of sound military
plans? Till this is done, we can only hope