The weekly pioneer and Democrat., 1863-12-11

newspapers both in their prognosti
cations of what Meade was going to do and in
their Interpretation of his not doing it, have
sald and are saying, precisely what the mill
tary authorities, Meade included, have wanted
them TO say.
The above, written fifteen hundred miles
from the scene of operations, and based
upon nothing, may delude very few into
the belief that the late campaign was a
complete success; but to the intelligent
reader it is unmitigated nonsense. ,t
Tlae Overland Route TO Richmond.
MEADE, according to the reports, found
LEE too strongly entrenched in the vicinity
of Orange Court House, to feel himself
warranted in risking an attack, and he
therefore withdrew the Army of the Po-
tomac from the south of the Rapidan-
retiring by the same fords over which he
crossed on Thanksgiving Day This re-
treat is doubtless the end of the present
attempt to reach Richmond by the over
land route Three campaigns have been
made by that army to accomplish this feat
since the Government abandoned MCCLEL-
LAN's route by the Peninsula, and each
has failed. The good old rule OF ''Three
times, and cut has been demonstrated to
be a safe one by all experience; and there
was never a cese presented where its ap-
plication would be more judicious, than to
this of seeking to reach the Confederate
capital overland.
1t is rarely of Use to treat any matter
consciously, and we have no intention of
doing so in respect to the Governments
favori5e plan for taking Richmond Yet,
there are some considerations which force
themselves forward, when the events of
the last sixteen months are reviewed At
that time MCCLELLAN received orders to
'evacuate the Peninsula. His forces were
in an impregnable position, within twenty
five miles of Richmond, where he had
been some days, imploring the President
to send him reinforcements, with whose
aid he would be able to capture the Rebel
stronghold The answer tc his appeal was
the order, given and repeated, for his re-
treat, and the abandonment of his CAM
paign.
We all recollect how that campaign was
viewed, and especially by the radical ele-
ment of the country; how the losses it
entailed were magnitied and with what
malignity the terms cut-throat, "mur-
derer," imbecile," and even 1'traitor,"
were east upon MCCLELLAN by his ene-
mics. The losses in the Peninsular cam
paign were heavy, but they become tri
fling when compared with those since suf-
fered by the Potomac Army in the mad
attempt to work out the overland plan.
MCCLEILANs entire casualties from the
time of bis landing ON the Peninsula to
it's evacuation. amounted to 22,875 men,
in killed, wounded. and prisoners taken.
Of this number very small proportion,
only 2,73S, were killed Since that time,
working on the MCCLELLAN pro-
gramme, the Army of the Potomac has
suffered losses in action to the extent o
some 105, 900, in killed, wounded, and
captured. And we are greatly farther off
from Richmond now than we were sixteen
months ago; with every prospect utterly
cut off. in the minds of all judicious men,
of being able to reach the Rebel capital
by the overland route at any time, or with
any force at the Governments disposal
In the light of these repeated failures, it
is instructive to read the opinion which
MCCLELLAN at that time entertained of the
scheme to reach Richmond by the PREsl-
DENTS and HALLEoKs 9 route, across the
country from Washington. How clearly,
by that light, does the military sagacity Of
MCCLELLAN shinerfortb, in the letter which
he addressed to HALLEoK, after the evacu-
ating order had issued, imploring its with
drawal, that the needed reinforcements
might be sent, and that the rebellion might
be crushed at the very seat and heart of it's
life and power. We reproduce that letter,
below, and ask for its careful perusal:
BERKELEY, Va, Aug. Ala NJ.
Major Gsneral Hal'ecE, CommGuder-in-Ch Chief:
Your telegraph Of last evening is received
must confess that it has caused me the great
est pain ever experienced, for am convinced
that the order to withdraw this army to Aqua
our cause. / fear it win be a fatal blow. Sew
ernl days are necessary to complete the prepar-
arons for so important q movement as this, l
ana while they are IL progress ] beg that care
ful consideration may be given to my state-
mcnt This army Is now in excellent discipline
and concit1on We hold 2 debouchc on both /