Charles City Republican intelligencer. [volume] (Charles City, Iowa) 1861-1864, 1863-02-12
Why Burnside Failed.


the army after its return to Falmouth.
He says that the great source Of the
endorsements and failures which
have occurred under Burnsidc's COM
mand, has been the spirit of covert
and open opposition which has char
acterized many of the general officers
Of the army. The faction who would
rather fail with Mcclellan than sue
coed with any other Commander, have
been at the bottom of all this trouble.
Mr.. Raymond thus forcibly characters
ICES this unpatriotic class:
"They are demoralizcd in every
sense Of the word, and they are q
source Of encouragement, Of discon-
tent, of disheartenment--if there is
such q word--to their subordinates
and to the ranks. / do not hesitate to
say that the failure Of this latest move
ment was due, primarily and mainly,
to the subordination--the word il
not too strong-of some of the Gen
erals under Burnside. I ask no bet
ter evidence of this than the language
openly held by them. in presence of
their subordinatcs. of newspaper re-
porters, and all who chose to listen.
before the movement, while it was in
progress, and after it was abandoned.
Unless common report, which receives
the countcnance, If not the distinct
confirmation, Of the officers most con.
cerned. is entirely at fault, the Com
manding General was overwhelmed
with protests from his subordinates
against his movements, after they had
been decided upon, and with exagger.
ated and untrue reports Of the obsta-
cles in bis way. So far as know. no
one of them went 80 far as to refuse
obedience to his orders, but every
thing short of that which officers
could do to embarrass and thwart his
plans was done, and done. too, as on
previous occasions, with effect and
success. As every ono knows, there
is kind of obedience worse in its
effects than fat refusal, for it leaves
the commanding officer without
remedy. While it answers in form
all the requirements Of the service,
it insures. by its hating, half-hearted.
and probably premcditated inefficien-
cy, the failure of the plan which it
pretends to second. Z.
1t may seem severe judgment
but / cannot help believing, from
what ] saw and heard, that each of the
Generals alluded to and several of
their subordinatcs, who naturally
take their cue from them, rejoiced in
the failure of the movement. They
had committed themselves openly and
publicly to the opinion that it would
fail; perhaps it would be anreason-
able to expect that they should work
with any excess of vigor to secure
the failure of their own predictions"
Mr.. Raymond says that Gen. Burn
side has attempted no less than four
distinct movements. which have failed
mainly by reason of the internal spirit
above characterized. The first was
defeated by the delay Of the pontoon
train.
Then came the terrible battle of
fredericksburg, the unfortunate re-
suit of which Mr.. Raymond attributes
to the failure of Gems Franklin and
Sumner to carry out the designs of
Burnside. he says:
The main attack WAS designed to
be upon the rebel right, and the OBJ
ject Of il was to break their line there,
where it was the weakest, turn them,
and then--with the cooperation of
Sumner attacking in froDt-to CON-
plete the victory and convert it into
rout. General Franklin led the main
attack with his own Grand Division
and two small corps from Hooker's.
His orders were to attack with at least
one corps vigorously, and then to fol-
low up the attack with prompt and
heavy supports. He sent Gen. Mead
to the attack, commanding the small
est corps Of all. General Meade at
tackled with great vigor, broke the
rebel line and actually pushed his ad-
vance into the midst of the ammuni.
tion wagons and baggage train in their
rear. He had completely succeeded
ia the appointed work the forces OPP
posed to him were utterly routed and
al he needed was prompt and effect
i've support. This he did not receive.
"Gen. Franklin sent another small
corps to his aid. but it arrived too late
The enemy, seeing Mead come to
stand, had rallied reinforccments
we're pushed forward, and before
dead's supports camc up bis force
vas driven back and it became impos-
ible to re-cstablish tho line. General
franklin gave as reason for not
sending forward heavier and prompt
supports, that lie was afraid the enc
ny would seize his bridges and cut
III his means Of retreat. Gen. Sum.
'er, meantime, had opened the fight to
'etain ss much of the rebel force in
'front.' as possible. for the relief Of