The Richmond palladium. [volume] (Richmond, Ind.) 1855-1875, 1863-01-30

heic, Huo less III uJuflouS me pfeSenb evS
tenn. As compared with that of Europe, dis
eliminates most unjustly against our country
As general rule, the American creditor
canno: demand gold from the foreign debtor
but such foreign or domestic creditor could
always demand gold from the American
debtor.
This discrimination has produced here the
most disastrous consequences, and, indepen
dent of the present condition of the country.
our whole banking system requires radical
reform. We have had eigh; general bank
suspensions uuder our present bank system,
many Of them continuing for years, and pro-
ducing ruin and desoa,iou. Under our
present system, to talk. as general rule,
of well regulated banks. is talk of we'll
regulated famine or pestilence, or of well
regulated earth quake or tornado And
even the few banks that are claimed to be
Well managed, have no appreciable effect on
the system. 1t is the system that knows no
uniformity or security. and never can have,
as now organizsd. That a system so peril.
Gus and explosive should have even partially
succeeded is proof only of the intelligence
and integrity, generally, of the bank officers
and directors, but no recommend dation of
the system itself.
i
regulations, led to the adoption Of our Fed
eral Constitution; and yet we have no uni
formity as to money, which represents COM
merce and effects its interchanges. In this
respect, we are still suffering all the evils
of the old Contederacy, and have thereby so
weakened the Government as to have invi.
ted this rebellion. Indeed, the State Banks
in the revolted States were the main auxil-
,ar e
to a vast extent. the sinews of war By Gen.
sus Table 81, there were. in 1860. 1.642
banks, incorporated by thirty four States,
with no uniformity Of organization, issues
or security. Thus it is that the States have
usurped the power to regulate commerce
and currency. and to emit bills Of credit in
defiance of the Federal Constitution The
Egyptians abandoned their folly after seven
plaques; but We have had eight bank con-
vulsions, and yet We adhere to the wretch
ed system.
l believe it was slavery caused the re-
bellion, but. in the absence Of powerful aid
from the Southern Banks, the rev olted States
could never have maintained SO prolonged
contest. Organized as now proposed, these
new banks. aud all who hold their notes,
must have sustained the government. Ma
forts and maintaining, even in peace, large
armies and navies 10 preserve the Govern
ment. But, necessary as these may be. they
would not be more important than the sys.
TEN now proposed as security for the pres
ervation of the Government.
NJ last suggestion is, that as regards all
such United States loans, as during the war
shall become the basis of this system. the
r y. IL L.. -
instead of five. so as. with the notifications
above proposed. to insure the co operation
Of the banks. and the success of the system.
AS this plan is deemed essential to save our
finances, 70 suppress the rebellion and main
tain the Union, why incur any hazard on
such question as this? In all our wars,
the present, we have issued bonds
twenty years to maturity, and the
bonds, redeemabe in 1881. are scarcely at
par. Why, then, issue a stock of less value,
which may fail to accomplish the great OBJ
ject, when better security would certainly
succeed7 fully agree in the opinion ex-
pressed by the Secretary, against" fixed
interest of six per cent, on great debt. for
twenty years. if it can be avoided; but 1
also concur in that portion Of his report in
which he says: mo very early day will
probably witness the reduction of the public
debt to the amount required as basis for
secured circulation" To that extent, then,
would enlarge the time for the maturity of
the bonds.
Surely. il this be necessary to secure the
co operation of the banks and the capital of
the country, there should be no hesitation.
Even if the system, based only on the bonds
of short date, should ultimately succeed.
the loss in the interim from a redundant and
deprecated urrency, would far exceed any
benefit derived for the substitution of five
twenties FOR twen,y-year bonds. BY Cen
sus Table 35, our wealth in 1850 was ST.
135. 7SO,228 and in 1860, Sl6,I59, sic, 6,063,
the ratio OF increase during the decade being
| 26.4 IS per cent; at which rate our wealth
in 1870 would be $50. .593, ,45O, SIS. and
in 1880, SS2,843, ,222,849. Surely, then
at these periods it would be much ca
sier to liquidate this debt than in 1867. -
But. were it otherwise. The immediate gain
rom decreased expenditures, arising from
funding more rapidly our Treasury notes,
thus rendering our currency less redundant
and deprecated, with the revival of the
public credit. and its immediate happy ipfu-
suce, North and South, here and in Europe,
would far more than compensate for any
contingent advantage arising from short
loans.
Our twenty years loan is now barely at
par, and the five-twenlies below par The
of inducing bank and other capi-
tai to invest hundreds of millions OF dollars
under the new system is very great Is it
wise to commence the effort, confined to our
weakest securities, now below par9 Be-
sides, considering the old and new debts,
and constantly increasing responsibilities. is
there any prospect that We will have liauid-
ated all these before the end OF i've wears.
and the hve-twen;y loan also? Surely, up
on bench, SO doubtful, and a contingency
so improbable. we ought not to risk the fate
Of measure on on which depends the safe
iy of the Union. But if We could paw off
the hve-twenty loan held BY the new banks,
IS II prudent to assume that SO many hun.
dred millions of capital will be Withdrawn
from the present banks, and other business.
for investment in The now hanks which 80,