Ashtabula weekly telegraph. [volume] (Ashtabula, Ohio) 1853-1873, 1863-02-14

sru.A RATNosD, I'D. or flnrs

q OF this latest movement was due, primarily
q and mainly 10 the. inSubordiaation--the
a. wYrd IS not TOO strong-of some of the
Generals in command under Burnsi de. ]
ask no better evidence of this, than the
d lhnguage openly held by them, 10 preseuce
% Of their subo rdihates, of newspaper report
ers and of all who chose to listen. before
the movement, while il was in progress and
after ii had been abandoned. Unless com.
mon reportg (which receives the eointeBance
II not the distinct confirmation of the off
GERS most concerned, is entirely at fault,
The Commanding General was overwhelmed
q with protests from bis shbordDaies Against
bis movements after they had been decided
npoh and with exaggerated and aatrue re-.
ports OF the obstacles in his way. q So far
i as know, not one of them went so far as
4 TO refuse obedience to his orders but ev..
erythlng short OF that which officers could
do to er1barrass and thwart his plans. was
done, and done, too as ON some rptevious
4 orcasion, with effect and success. rfA As
every one Rnows, thereiis kind of obed-
ence worse in its results than ha refusal,
I torlt leaves the commanding officer with.
out remedy. While IL answers in form all
The requirements Of the service, it inSures
by its halting. half heart cd and possibly
! premeditated ineficeney, the failure. of the
plan which it pretehds TO second. dsg. lU
Ore General, for example, was expected
Ito have poutoons enough for four bridges
"A in all, beliete-at the appointcd spot
tby daylight on Wednesday, morning. lie
had but eight or nine miles to 90, and
there was poss reason why be should not
! have had them there before the rain,- He
spent good deal of his time on Tuesday in
I demonstrating that the chances of failure
weresl 9 out OF 20; on "Wednesday mora
ling. he had7,l5 puuloons placed in open
view of the enemy, aud the rest were stuck
10 the mud from two to five miles back. -.
lie certainly had done nothing TO dlsturb
bis own calculation of chances, and can
nov Refer to il as proof of his own sagncity
J, Another General was unreseryed in be ex-
preston Of bis \ opinion against the move.
ment and did everything in his power,
even after the march Of his troops had be-,
gun, 10 have it1atrested ri' @ ~ 'T d
/ 1t may seem a severe Judgment, but can
not help believing, from what saw and
heard that each of the Generals alludedio,
and several of their snbordinates, who nat
urally yitake their cueftom ioem, reioiced in
the failure Of the movement. Thy had
committed, themselves openly and publicly
to the opinion that it would fail F: perhaps
it would he unreasonable to expect that
they should work %ithleny excess Of vigor
o Il 0 secure the failure Of their own predic.
tions. SomeTof them, unless ]. have been
misiuformcd, sought TO throw blame hpon
T., IL, III ~ r Il
cent political demonstrations at the North
had diSinclined their men to ighti; and the
election of WALL to the United States Sen.
ate from New Jersey was cited as one thing
which had so far affected the troops
| from that State as TO render them unrelia-
ble on the Geld Of battle / do not believe
that this is true but il even it were, it
would nuch better become a General of
Division to try to overcome it, than TO cite
it as a reason for inactivity
If this were the first instance in which
the willingness of certain officers to behold,
with entire eduanimity; the defeat of q Gen
Burnsde's plans could be traced in their
langdage and cohduct, I should hesitate 10
attrib1ting the failnre of this movement to
that cause But 1t is not. This is the
fourth active movement which Gen. Burn
side has made against the enemy during
the short time that has elapsed since he su.
perceded Gen. Mcclellan Let us see
what happened in each. -f
l. His first plan was to throw his army
rapidly upon Falmouth. cross over instant.
Iy, take possession of the heights of Fred
ericksburg, and thus compel the enemy Ell.
ther to fight him in that strong position, or
fall back rapidly on Richmond. The one
thing absolutely essential to its success was
the prompt arrival of the pontoon train
This was under the direction Of Gen. Wood !
bury, and no satisfactory explanation of his
delay has ever yet been made. But that
delay defeated the execution Of the plan.
2. Next came the crossing and the bat
tie at FfderickSburg-wh was certainly
failure, and which the country generally
brands as a blunder. think it was 10
Gen. Burnside's power to have corrected |
that opinion in his testimony before the
Congressional Committee. He did not |
avail himself Of that opportunity but said |
that the country would never know how |
near the movement came to being q success. |
| see no reason why the country should not
know it-and cannot help believing that |
when the official reports of that battle are |
permitted to see the light, the grounds of |
Gen Burnsides opinion will be evident to
ALL 1t is generally assumed that the main
attack on that occasion was against the |
rebel front, posted and entrenched on the
erests in the rear of Fredericksburg This |
is mistake which was corrected by the
General in his testimony. The main at. |
tack was designed to be 6pon the rebel
fight, and the object Of it was to break
their line there, where it was weakest, turn |
them, and tben--wiih the cooperation Of
Sumner attacking in 'front.'. 10 complete
the victory and convert ii into "a ront.-
Gen. Franklin led the main attack with his
own Grand Division aud two small corps
from Hookers. His orders were to at
tack with at least one corps vigorously, aud
then to follow up the attack With prompt
and heavy supports. he sent Gen Meade
TO the attack, commanding the smallest !