Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1863-04-23
4elmomt Chronicle.
ct. clairsvillo, Ohio, April as, 1868.
Tho Report of the Senate Commit


She War--Startiing Disclosures.
From The N. Y. TiinesHerefeore Mcclellan Paperl
1t will be remembered that the dispatch
Of lord Lyons to Earl Russell, respecting
his Interview with the leaders OF what he
calls the Peace party" had the following
remarkable juxtaposition
They seemed TO be persuaded that the
result Of the election would be accepted by
the President as declaration Of the will Of
the people; that he would increase the
moderate and conservative element in the
Cabinet tptt he ic0ud scek 10 terminate the
tcdr. not to pnsh to eDiyenitN mothe mopm
eadedror 10 effect reconciliation UiM tie
Te0pte qf The South, and renoulice the idea
Of suhiugnting or exiernIinatiDg them.
"On the following morning, however, in.
telligence arrived from Washington which
dashed The rising hopes Of tie Coaserrdiires.
II tcas announced Mat Gen. " Cleilin,had
been dismissed fran, tie comnand of he
Arny ofhe Rof0moc, and ordered to repair
to his home-ihat he had in fact, been re.
moved altogether from active service. The
General bad been regarded as the uprcsen.
tdtire Of conserUdtire principles IN the drn,y
Suppor of him had been nude one Of tie
articles Of The conserCatiCe elecioIdi pr01ydB,-
me. His dismissal was taken as u sign that
the President had thrown himself entirely
into the arms Of the extreme radical party,
and that the attempts to carry out the poi
icy of that party would he persisted in. Tho
irritation OF the conservatives at New York
was certainly very great; it seemed, how.
ever, to be not uamined ioiM CoaSierHotton
aud despondeacU"
The rising hopes" of the Peace Party
dashed" " aud CONSERVATION and dcspond.
ency" ensuing, because Gen. Mcclellan is
removed from the chief command Was
the like ever heard Off An avowcdly peace
party dsmayed Mt the disappointment Of a
Commanding General. There is but one
possible way Of accounting for it; and that
is that the General was not /uyihe1ay ,oar
policy, and ,cas secretly IN synipatiywiM tie
party aiming Ut peace.
That we verify believe is the key to all the
extraordinary procrastination, ineiticiency
aud unmiiitary behavior which marked the
entire fifteen months career of George b.
Mcclellan as Commander.in Chief That
alone is the real explanation OF his constant
study how not to do it, and to misdo it when
he was forced to act. He was for harmiup
the enemy as little as possible, and for get
ting on peaceful terms with him as soon as
possible.
One is amazed in carefully perusing the
late report Of the Committee ON the Con
duct OF the War, TO mark how uniformly
ten. Mcclellan displays this disposition
from the very outset Of his assumption OF
the chief command The Committee hav,
not set this forth in the salient manner it
deserved. They confined themselves sim
ply to a digest of the vouminous testimony
and abstained from all deductions and ali
comments. They left to the readers to take
the matter home TO themselves in their own
way. We believe that it would NOT have
been departure from their proper func
tons had they summed up con,ccutiyely
the shortcomings aud nlisdoings vi Gen.
Mcclellan, as established inevitably by tho
documents and military witnesses before
them. In default Of this we have taken
the pains to go through tho whole Report
careiully, and select the more important
particulars wherein Gen. Mcclellan failed
to do his duty as the Commanding General
and acted in conformity with peace rather
than war policy. 1t is proved by irrclrag
able evidence
That with $4,000 men, on the lst oil
December, he Tor weeks relraincd from ad
vancing upon Manassas, where were less
than 10000 OF the enemy, though the roads
were hard and weather most favorable, and
President;
That during all that time the Potomac
remained blockaded, because Gen. McClel
Ian, though strongly urged by the President
would not send column to cooperate with
the naval vessels in destroying the batteries
and clearing the ilver;
That, in spite of the solicitations of the
President, Of the Secretary of War, and OF
the War Committee, and "the opinions Of
Generals most hSniliar with the subject that
u was OF the utmost importance, he neg
lccted even to begin the division Of hi,
large army into army corps until the LIST ol
blarch
That no provision was made by him 9u
ring the winter to properly man the lorti
hcations around Washington, and exercise
men in the management of the guns;
That tho President, impatient with the
long delay, on the 10Th Of January, issued
orders for n general movement Of all the
armies; that this. order not being needed
by Gen. Mcclellan, he issued another order
twelve days aitelward, specifically enjoning
an advance movement by tho Army of tho
Potomac before the I'D of February uron
Manassas, and thence on to Richmond
that Gen. Mcclellan opposed the order, in.
sistipg upon the Rappahannock route, and
that while no was consuming time in in
terposing objections, tho enemy evacuated
Manassas without the loss OF a man or O
round of material;
That then Mcclellan settled upon the
James River route, with tho assent of the
President on the single condition that such
force should DO left in and about Wash.
ington ''as in the opinion of tho General
In Chief and the commanders of the army
corps should leave said city eati, ely secure;''
that these commanders in council concluded
that ut least So, 900 men were necessary to
protect Washington, go, 600 in the forts aud
25,000 as a covering force aud yet that
Mcclellan left but 10000 to protect the
Capital, and those poorly disciplined, and
without any knowledge Of artillery;
That Mcclellan reached Yorktown on tn,
9th OF April, aud on the 9th the President
wrote him, saying that "it-is indispensable
10 you that you strike blow; tho present
hesitation TO move upon an intrencheb bposi
tion is but the story Of Manassas repeated, -
and yet Gen. Mcclellan rested one full
month before Yorktown, though when he
first reached it, it was defended by less thar
twelve thousand men;
That Gn.x M.Ni.u.