Winchester daily bulletin. [volume] (Winchester, Tenn) 1863-1863, 1863-05-24

deaVorlng 10 propagate, IL would be
well perhaps to outline some of the
leading facts in this short campaign,
from which the reader can draw his
own moral
l. 1t is not true that Lee was sur
| prised or deceived by Hookors move.
ment across the Rappahannock From
the Richmond papers of last Saturday
it is clear that tire Confederate military
leaders understood it perfectly, and
deliberately allowed our army to cross,
confident of their ability to defeat if
not destroy it. Forney, in the Pbila-
delphia Press, states that Hooker was
induced to cross by the assurances of
his spies and scouts that the only army
to oppose him was one Of forty thou.
sand under Jackson, Lee being sick
and his army scattered. The Baltimore
secessionists had the same report and
believed it. Gen. Hooker, therefore,
at the start, was tho deceived party,
and walked straight into the trap that
was prepared for him.
2. The great cavalry raid, which
was an entire success, did Gen. Hook.
or no good, because it did not prcccde,
instead of accompanying his move.
ments. Lees reinforcements had all
arrived, before the destruction of the
railroads and bridges. To him this is
now only temporary inconvenience.
Had Hooker retained his cavalry with
his army, it would have been far better
for him. lie would have captured
several thousand more prisoners when
fredericksburg was taken, and, more
than all, could have prevented Jack
sons surprise of his flank and rear
They might have changed the complex,
ion OF the fight.
3. General Hooker's division of his
army was as disastrous in this in.
stance, as have been all such in former
military history. 1t is known that
Gen. lTalleck utterly disapproved of
this dispersion Of the Union forces,
and the result proved that in this case.
at least, he was right. If Lee had
furnished Hooker with plan, it could
not have been more to his liking. He
first hurled all his forces upon Hooker
and beat him =; this was on Saturday
and Sunday, and then on Monday, he
repossessed the heights of Frcdericks-
burg, and drove Scdwick across the
river, with the loss Of one.third Of his
force. Thus Lee, with one great army,
beat two smaller armies in detail.
4. The battles of Saturday and Sun.
day were indisputable rebel victories,
as the cncmy's attack upon Scdgwlck
on Monday proved. The latter was
defeated almost before Hooker's eyes,
and the latter could not even make a
diversion to save him. Lee and Jack.
son drove our army steadily from point
to point until it was crowded back
upon the south bank Of the river
Our artillery-which, according to the
rebel accounts was splCndidy served
no doubt saved what remained OF
the army.
3. The retreat across the river, ac
cording to Lees dispatch to jeff Davis
commenced on Sunday night, and was
in consequence of his signal victory
The administration statement Is tina
it was commenced on Tuesday night
simply as u matter ofprecautlon on ac
count of the storm and rising stream
Lees account has all the known fact
and the probabilities on its side. Th'
, Union correspondents all agree tha
the stores and baggage were moved t(
:, the north bank on Monday, leaving
: nothing but the artillery and infantry
: to cross on Tuesday. The fierce stoIn
y of that day probably saved the bulk o
= our army which was passed over q
{ night.
6. Gen. Hoolier's statement Of hi!
, losses reads as if it was made by Gen
r Wadsworth. He says his total loss il
killed, wounded and missing will not
! be more than ten thousand men. L
: this be true, there are several clrcum
stances that need explaining badly
n..o1 Co1c.,u;nly olono olI the ae.