New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-04-10
HOW BULL RUN BATTLE WAS LOST.
GEN. PATTERSON THE CHIEF CAUSE
THE BALLS BLUFF MASSACRE.
GEN. MocLELLAN's SHARE OF IT
THE DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST
BULL RUN.


The Joint Committee on the Conduct Of the War
submit the following report with accompanying tes-
timony, In relation TO the Battle Of Bull Run, in
July, 1861:
So long time has elapsed, and so many impor'
ant event: have occurred in The o. sne
tie Of Bull Run, in July, 1861, that your COMMITTEES
do not deem it necessary to go very much into detail
in their report. The testimony they submit here
with is very voluminous. and fully covers all the
points of interest connected with that campaign
They therefore sabmit brief report combining their
attention principally to the causes which led to the
defeat Of our army in that battle.
| That which now appears to have been the great
error Of that campaign was the failure TO occupy
Centrevile and Mnnassas at the time Alexandria
was occupied, In May. The position at Manassas
controlled the railroad communication in oil that
section of country. The forces which were opposed
to US ut the batts Of Bull Run were mostly collect
ed and brought to Manassas during the months OF
June and July. The three months men could nave
made the place easily defensble against any force
the enemy could have brought aganst 1T and 1t IL
not at all probable that the Rebel forces would have
advanced beyond the line of the Rsppahannock had
| Manassas been occupied by our troops.
The next cause Of disaster was the delay in pro-
ceeding against tue enemy uutil the time OF the
three months men wac 90 nearly expired. In that
respect the movement was made too late rather than
too soon, and the enemy were allowed time to col
lect their forces At Manassas and TO strengthen the
POSITION by defensive works. The reason why
the movement was so long delayed 70 shown, to
some extent, by the testimony, to which your Com
mitlee would direct the attention Of those who de-
sire 70 examine that point.
And when the movement was finally decided upon
much was needed to render the troops efficient
There had been but little time devoted 70 discipline
ing the troops and instructing them, even as regi
ments; hardly any instruction had been given then
III. IL. a.d af al
a. divisions. When Gen. Mcdowell reviewed eigh
regiments together--the only instance previous u
the battle, as tho evidence shows, that even thai
number Of troops were maneuvercd IN one body-he
was charged wit , desirng 70 make o show.
Gen. Mcdowell was instructed, verbally, by Gen.
Scott, 70 prepare and submit plan Of operations
against the enemy ct Manassas. This plan was con.
sidered In Cabinet meeting, and agreed 20; and the
9Th of July was fixed upon by Gen. Scott O. the day
when the army should move.
The plan Of Gen. Mcdowell was to move out in
the direction of Centrsville, and endeavor 10 turn
the enemys right with portion Of his force, and
destroy his communication by railroad with Rich
mond. He asked that a certain number OF troops be
given him TO operate against the force which 10
estimated that Beauregard had under his Command
He was assured that the enemy below should be
kept occupied by Gen. Butler, who was in command
at Fortress Monroe; and that the enemy under
Johnston in the Winchester Valley, should be held
there by Gen. Patterson. Some Gays before the
II
force under johnston being detained by Patterson,
he was assured by Gen. Scott that " II Johnston
Joined Beaureaard, he should have Patterson on his
heels" t..r
The movement did not commence until the 10th of
july week later than the time first decided upon.
The transportation was deficient, and Gen. Nc
Dowell had to depend upon Others TO Tee that sup
plies were forwarded TO him IN time The marca
was Slow one reason being that since the affair ~
Vienna, near Alexandris, and at Big Bethel, near
Fortress Monroe, O fear Of masked batteries
caused hesitation in regard TO advancing upon points
concerning which there want OF information.
There was some delay, on the march, IN consequence
Of tho want OF complete discipline among some Of
the troops. They were not sufficiently under con-
troll Of officers 10 be prevented from leaving the ranks
and struggling
The affair at Blackbnrn's Ford on Thursday, tho
I8th being more extensive than Gen. Mcdowell
had ordered, drew the attention Of the enemy to
that point; and IN consequence OF the preparations
they made there TO meet any attempt OF Gen. Nc
Dowell to turn their position In that direction, 1t
became necessary 10 adopt another line OF opera
tons. Gen. Mcdowell determined to make the 81
tempt to turn their right, and steps were taken 10
secure the necessary information 1t wac not until
Saturday that the information which Gen. Mellow
ell desired WAS obtained.
He then issued orders for the troops to move the
next morning, the Dist, some at o'clock and some
nj balf.purt = The division Of Gen. Tyler was IN
out 10 Stone Bridge, and take up position there.
Cen. Hunters and Gen. Heintzelmans divisions
were TO follow, and when they reached road lead
inc 20 the risht about o mile in advance OF Gen.
TYLER camp they were to turn of and proceed IN
the direction Of Sudleys Church, and endeavor to
turn the enemy's left. The movement to the right
was intended 70 be made under cover Of Gen. Ty-
ler's force ut Stone Bridge.
But there wss much delay in the movements Of
the troops that morning. Tylers division did not
pass the point where Hunters and HeintZsman's
divisions were to turn OIL until after the time desig'
mated. Some Of the troops were delayed for three
hours, affordng time to the enemy to discover the
movement and make preparations to meet 1t.
Notwithstanding these disadvantages, our forces
were successful during the fore part OF the day. al
though Beauregard had beea REINFORCED by some of
Johnston's forces from Winchester. Our troops
were very much fatigusd. The day was exceedingly
warm, the roads were dusty, and they had been
some hours longer on the march than had been an.
ticipated In the afternoon additional REINFORCE
ments arrived from Johnston's army, and suddenly
attacked our right and threw it into disorder. 4
About the same time two OF our batteries Kick
EFT aud Griffin 81 were captured by the enemy, and
our entire force began 10 fall back in great c0nus
ION In regard to the capture Of the batteries, 1t
appears by the testimony that they were ordered TO
tate an advanced and exposed position, and were
not sufficiently supported. Not long after they
were placed in position, Rebel regiment appeared
in their immediate vicinity Capt. Griffin states
that DO took them to Nc Rebels from the FIRST, and
directed one of his ieptenants to open upon them
with canister. But Major Barry. Chief Of Artillery,
coming up just at the time, told him that they were
Of our own troops coming 10 the suppor of the
batteries, and directed him not TO fire upon them.
The battery was accordingly turned in another d.
recIion. aud. Rlmost immedistav after this regiment