Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-21

esvng the Notifications to be mannvd by and inexpe
rlenced troops,
OBSTRUCTION OF THE POTOMAC.
The subject Of the obstruction of the navigation OF the
Potomac naturally demsnded the consideration of your
committee. Upon that point your committee would eau
the attention OF Congress TO the testimony OF Captain IT,
" Fox Assistant Secretary OF the Navy. Upon reference
his testimony twill appear that Juoe, 1s H. the Navy
Department proposed to the War Department tnat inca
be adopted take possession OF Matthias P'lnt In
order the navigation OF the Potomac from any
danger of being Interrupted From some cause no steps
then taken for that purpose The subject was again
brought to the attention OF the War Department py the
Navy Department in the month OF August, sherty ator
the battle of Bull Run Nothing however, was done a
that tune in regard 10 it.
la October, 1861, the Navy Department again urged
the matter up consideration o. the War Department.
The Port Royal expedition then In prepare ion and
would soon be ready TO sart The Navy Department
that it would be absolutely necessary to seud
with that in order t. the greater
portion Of Potomac ota because being very power
ul vessels. Of light draught with their machinery pro-
eced they better fitted for that service than any
the possession Of the Navy Department
And If any thing to DO done by them 10 the
uunterupt navigation of the Potomac it must DO done
before they eft IT proposed to the President aid
the War partmen that the gunboats should take aud
destroy tue rebel batteries which had then bgun to make
their appearance upon the river and which then
dapgered the safety Of vessels passing up and down the
Potomac. When that had been DONE it was proposed
that suc number of troops should be landed at Mat
tbla Point &c. 10 entrench themselves under thu pro
tec OF the gunboat until they should be able with the
assistance of the smaller boats of the Potomac hotla to
hold their position against force the enemy would be
likely 10 brig against them IL was repre- sented hat I'M
-ss such steps taken the departure Of those
vessels upon Port Royal expedt would be the signal
for the closing Of the Bavgat Of the Potomac, which
representation the result proved 10 be correct As
well urged by the Navy Department. the whole question
amounted simply this w, uld the army cooperate with
the navy i'll securing the unobsructed navigation OF the
Potomac by withholding that cooperation at that time,
permit SO important channel OF COMMUNICATION TO De
closed
After repeated efforts Gen Mcclellan promised that
four thousand should DO ready at time named IT,
proceed down the river The Navy Deparmen provided
The transports for troops aud Captain Craven
commanding the Potomac tila, upon being notified to
that effect collected Msttha Poiut all the 'ats OF h
otla at the time named The troops did not arrive, and
Navy Department informed OF the fact by Captain
Craven Assistant Secretary Fox upon nquirng Of Gen
Mcclellan why The troops had not been sent according to
agreement Informed by HIM that his engineers were
OF the opinion that large body OF troops could not be
landed and therefore he had concluded not TO send them
Captain Fox replied that the landing Of the troops
matter of which thu Navy Department had charge that
they had provided the to accomplish the
landing successtuyi that Inquiry had been made OF
them N regard t. that matter and no notification that the
troops not to be sent 1t then agreed that the
troops should be sent the next night Captain Craven
notified, and again had his hola readiness for the
arrival OF the troops But no troops sent down at
that tine any sent down for thai purpose
Captain Fox in to the inquiry If the Committee
10 what reason assigned for not sendlDg the troops
according 10 he second agreement Replied that the ony
reason, far as he could rtan, that General
Mcclellan feared it might bring general engagement
The President, who had united with The Navy Depart
in urging their proposition first upon Gen. Scott and
then upon Gen Mcclellan manif, sted great dsappoint
mrnt when he learned that the plan had ia led in
quence Of the troops being sent Aud Capt Craven
threw his command the Potomac and applied 10 be
sent TO sea- saying that by remaining here aud doing
hing he but losing his reputation, the blame
for PERMITTING the Potomac 10 be blockaded would be I'm
puted TO him and the foilla under his command.
Upon The ia ur- OF this plan Of the Navy Department
the efe tive vessels Of the Pot fota left upon the
Port Ros al expedition. The navigation of the
and
until the rebels voluntarily evacuated their batteries
tue March following steps having been taken in the
mean time for re-Pening communication by that route
ORDER FOR GENERAL MOVEMENT.
On the 10Th of January, 1862 the President Of the Uni
ted states, COMMANDMENTS hef OF the Army aud Navy,
Issued orders for general movement Of all the armies Of
the United States, result of which the series OF
victories at Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, &c which
electrified the country and revived the hopes of every loyal
man IN the land.
LINE or OPERATIONS
Afer this long period If insctou Of the Army OF the
Potomac tha President of the United States on the 3st
of January. 1862, issued the following order:
"FxrcurIvE MASsIos WAsHIseTos, JAN 81. 1862
Presidents Special ar Order No l-Ordered That all
hs GIs as ARM w % Inc P to after pro
expedition 70 the immediate iec Of seizng aud
known as Manassas Junction all details 10 be in the di,ce
ou of the Gtner eff and the expedition be-
ABRAHAM LINCOLN"
To this order Gen. Mcclellan wrote an elaborate reply Of
the date directing 10 the plan the reu iudicsted IN
vosing he vi dividing army by very difficult
obstacle, 1.-THE Occoqnan aad by dstaucs too great TO
enable the two pot"ns 10 support each other should
either be attacked BY the OF the enemy while the
other Is held in check" He then proceeded to argue in
favor OF by way OF the Rapp ahannock or For
tress Moroe giving the preference 10 the Rappahannock
route He stated that thirty days would be required to
provide the necessary Of transportation He stated
that he regarded success by all the ch nces
Of war;, by the route he proposed while was by no
means cFrian that beat them (the enemy ut
Manassas"
To this TIE President made the following reply:
EXECUTIVE MAssIoS WAsHIsoros Frs g. 1862
my DEAR SIai You aud We al tinct aud different
plans the Of the Army Of the Poom4cyous
10 be down the Chesapeake the Bappahannock UrbAna
aud across land 70 The terminus Of the railroad York river
mine directly pout the abroad southwest Of
Manassas. If you Will give acory answers TO the
following q4es lone shall gladly yield my plan yours
H. Does not plan involve greatly lrger expenii.
ture Of time and money than ne
Y Wherein Is victory more certain by your plan than
- Wherein is victory Uaua6e by your plan than
mine1 -
"a In fact would not be lsss valuable in this that Il
would O. eak no great line Of tie enenys communication
" lille niue would7
IS l. case Of disaster would safe retreat lie more
difncult by yonr plan u an by mne7
" Yours, Iny,
Major General McCLsLLAS'
Your committee have no evidence either oral or docu
mentary Of The discussions that ensurd or the
that were submitted TO the of the
that led him to Telnqush his lne of operations aud
consent TO The one proposed by Gen. Mcclellan the
result Of council of held in February, 1862 That
council the FIRST far your committee have been able
10 ascertain. called by Gen Mcclellan add then nv
the direction of the President NJ