The weekly Ottumwa courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1857-1872, 1863-03-26


ministration, to impute to it views shor'
sighted and impracticable in their policy
and to blame. it for want of energy and Wig
or in the prosecution of tho war, has only ts
turn to Colonel Nap,er's account of the stu.
4 pid blunders of the English government, its
absurd and contradictory orders. its abso.
lutte ignorance not only of the elementary
principles of all war, but of the very nature
of the country in which the army was tc
operate, and of the resources of the enemy
to be convinced that had Its mode Of carry
ing on hostiIities, (which was the ropula.
one,l been adopted, in six months, not ar
English soldier would have remained in the
Peninsula except az prisoner Of war
The history of this campaign contains i'm.
portant lessons for US; it shows conclu'
sively that the immediate res Its of War
are never equal to the public expectation,
and Il at If this public expectation, defeated
by the embecility ofthe gonernment,or sour.
ed by disaster in the field, is to be the sole
rule by which military operations are to be
judged, no war for the defense Of princi-
PIE can long be carried on.
Fortunately for the fame and power OF
England the Ministry, although ignorant Of
the true mode of prosecuting hostilities,
had sense enough to perceive that their only
true policy was perseverance. They were
strong enough to resist the formidable op-
position which the events we have referred
to developed in parliament and the country,
and, undismayed by the experience of the
past, concluded a treaty with the Provision
al Government Of Spain, by which they
pledged Engla nd never to abandon the ma.
tional cause until the French were driven
across the Pyrenees. The army was placed
| upon better footing. was largely rainforc-
ed, and Sir Arthur Wellesly was appointed
to the chief command. The government
not yet wholly awakened from its illusions,
thought it practicable to reach Madrid in a
single campaign. and to that end the efforts
Of Wellington were directed. 1t became
necessary first to dislodgs Soult at Oporto,
and the magnificent victory of the English
gained by the passage Of the Douro at that
point, went far to revive confidence at home
in the invincibility of their army. Yet so
clearis it that victory in war often depends
upon what, for some better name, we may
call mere good fortune. that we have the au.
thority of the Duke of Wellington himself
for saying, that this army. which had just
exhibited such prodigies of valor, xas then
| in such state of decentralization that, al
though excellent on parade, excellent TO
fight, it was worse than an enemy in a
country, and liable to dissolution alike by
success or defeat"
| Certainly no severer criticism has ever
been justified by the inexperience and want
of discipline of our own raw levies than that
contained in this memorble declaration. A
little reflection and candor might perhaps
teach US, as it did the English, that nothing
can compensate for the want of experience,
and that ever allowance is to be made for
disasters where it is necessary to educate
both officers and soldiers in the actual pres
ence of the enemy. Wellington soon AFTER
wards moved towards the Spanish frontier,
hoping, by junction with the army under
Cuesta, to fight battle with the French
which would open to him the road to the
Capital The battle was fought at Talavera
ard although it has since been claimed by
the English as one Of their proudest yicto-
riss, and the name Of TALAvRA is now in
snribed upon the standards Of the regiments
who took part IN it. With those Of Salamanca
and Victoria, yet the RESULT was, in the end,
that Wellington was obliged to retreat to
Lisbon just three months after he had set
out from that place, having left his wound
ed in the hands Of the French, having es-
capped as if by miracle from being wholly
cut off in his retreat, and lost one-third of
his army in battle and by disease. or
course the hlsme was thrown upon the want
of cooperation on the part of the Spaniards.
This We have nothing to do with it is the
result of the campaign with which We are
concerned. Dependence upon the spaniards
was certainly, as 1t turned out, a fault, but
it was one of the fair chances of war, and 1t
was fault in which Wellington made wise
BY experience, was never again detected.
When the rews of the untoward result Of
this campaign reached England. the clam
or against the Government and against
Wellington was quite as violent as that ex-
cited by the disasters of Sir John Moore's
army. The opposition in Parl lament took
advantage Of this feeling to arouse public
feeling to such q manifestation as nigh
compel the termination of the war on the
Peninsula, and drive the ministry from Of
flee. The Common Council of London.
probably fair exponent Of the middle class
petitioned the King not to confirm the grant
Of 50, 600 year, which the ministry had
succeeded in getting Parliament to vote to
Wellington. The petitioners ridiculed the
idea that battle attended with such results
should be called victory. "It should
rather be called . calamity" they said,
"since we were obliged to seek safety in par
ticipate flight, abandoning many Of our
wounded countr, men to the French
In the opinion Of the strategists in the Com.
mon Council, and Of their friends in Par
| liz nant w otor, ynight ha . hr.va oeE