The Lansing state Republican. [volume] (Lansing, Mich.) 1855-1874, 1863-04-22

morning. and / thought that would uncover
the whole left OF the enemy.
Question. II that had been made, and
that point had been carried. what would have
been the eject upon the enemy;
Answer. Ii would have been disastrous TO
them.
Question. What reasons we're given for
not making the attack the next nornllgs
"Answer did not hear the direct reason
Of the General Commanding. but i have TN
derstood that the reason was that be expected
some 1900 new trOops-thOse which would
make the thing a certain thing-and he pre-
ferred t0 wait 10 make this attack on the rignt
until these new troops came.
Question And that delay gave the enemy
an opportunity to escape:
Answer. / think il DID,
! On the night of the 18th of September. the
enemy abandoned their position and retired
across the Potomac into Virginia. without mo-
lestation. Our army slowly followed. and took
up a position along the Potomac. on the Mary
land side, occupying Maryland Heights on the
20'b, and Harper's Ferry on the 23d
Gen Mcclellan. on the 29fh Of September.
reports our losses at South Mountain at 1885 ;
at Antieiam. 12.469-tOtal losses in both bat
ties, 1924 In relation to the losses Of the
enemy in both those battles, in killed, wounded,
prisoners and stragglers, General Mcclellan
says:
:. 1t may be safely concluded. therefore. that
the rebel army lost at least 10000 OF their best
troops in their brief campaign in Maryland
After the battle Of Antietam. Gen. Mcclellan
called for reinforcements, aud announced his
determination to fortify Maryland Heights,
making a requisitiOn on Gen Nadsworth, then
in Washington. for 900 cOntraband- for that
purpose .
/
Ca the Is, October Gen Mcclellan asked for
authority 10 build a double track suspension
bridge aud permanent wagon bridge across
the Potomac at Harper'~ Ferry. which Gen.
Halleck declined to give. About that time
the President visited the army. After his re
turn to Washington the following order was
sent to Gen. Mcclellan by Gen. Halleck:
WAR DErARrMENT.
Washington. Oct. 6, 1862.
- an instructed to telegraph you as fol
/ lows:
The President directs that you cross the
/ Potomac and give battle to the enemy OF drive
him South. Your army must move now while
the roads are good.
If you cross the river between the enemy
and Washington. and cover the latte by your
| line of operations, YOU can be reinforced by
10000 men. If you move up the valley OF the
! Shenandoah. nor more than $1,000 or l5.00O
can be sent to you. The President advises the
! interior line between Washington and the enc
my, but does not order it. He Is very deirons
1 that your army should move as soon as posi-
/ bic. You will Immediately report what time
/ you adopt. and where you intend to cross the
river also, 10 what point the reiniorcenents
are TO be sent. Ii il necessary that a plan OF
your operations he positively determined on
before orders are given for building bridges or
repairing railroads.
'- am directed to add that the Secretary Of
War and the General in Chief fully csncur with
the President in these instructions.
W. II. HALLECK.
General-in- Chief
Maj Gen. n.-McCIELIAN."
To this Gen. Mcclellan replies on the same
day:
=" IL is important in making my decision re-
gardIng the route TO be taken by the army
that | should know. first, what description Of
troops | am to be reinforced with upon the
Shenandoah route between the enemy and
Washington; whether they are to be old OF
new troops. or what proportion of each. II
possible, should be glad TO have Pecks divis
ion sent to me, if it can be got here within a
reasonable time.
" Second VIII YOU inform me what the
present condition Of the Alexandra and Lees
burg Railroad is; also the Manassas Gap Rail
road and hat time it would require to put
them in working order: 1t is believed tha
the Harper's Ferry and Winchester Railroad il
Rot materially injured
To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th:
" The Manassas Gap Road can be repaired
in few days. The Leesburg Road is mucl
injured. You can reach the former in les
time than would be required to repair the lat
ter The troops to be sent you will be parlll
new and partly Old-mOstly new"
On the same day Gen. Mcclellan telegraphs
After full consultation with the corps
commanders in my vicinity. | have determined
: To adopt the line Of the shenandoah for mme
; date operations against the enemy now nea
Winchester
) On the 18th Of October, the President wrot
to General Mcclellan concerning the operation
of the army. And on the 18th of October Gen
, Mcclellan wrote in reply. The letter Of th
President and the reply OF Gen. Mcclellan are a
follows:
! Executive Mansion,
! Washington, Oct. Is, 1862
"MY DEAR SIR You remember my speaS
ing to you Of what called your OvercautiOus
ness. Are YOU not overcautious when you a.
sumo that you cannot do what the enemy ar
1 constantly doing Should you not claim to b
at least his equal in proves, and act upon tn
> claim?
Z "As understand you telegraphed Gen. Ha
eck that YOU caunOt subsist your army at Wiz
o chester, unless the railroad from Harper's Fe
!. ~ TO that point be put in working order Bu
. the enemy does so subsist bis army at Winche.
ter, at distance nearly twice as great from TAI
J. road transportation as you Wosld have to d.
d without tie railroad last named He ROW a,
It ons from Culpepper Court House, which is il,
: about twice as far as you would have to do fro
o Hsrper's Ferry. BE is certainly not more tbs
K half as well provided With wagons as you ar,
; certainly should be pleased for you to have ii
o advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferl
d 10 Winchester; but it wastes all the remand,
II Of the autumn 20 give it TO you, sni in fact il
10 nores the question of time, which cannot an
ie must not be ignored.
10 Again, one of the standard msxims
% war, as you know, is TO operate upon the en-
l my's communications "a much as possible wit
~ ont exposing your own You seem to act a.
& this applies against you, but cannot apply
IL your favor. Change positions with the enem
and think you not he would break your csmm
IN nicstou with Richnoud within the next twent
rs tour hourss You dread his going into Pennsy
TO vana. But If he does 80 in fall force, he Civ
5 up his communications to YOU absolutely, al
u you have nothing to DO but to fOllow and ru
u MIN If be does with les than Bis full fer
fall upon and beat what Is LETT behind al &
" easier.
ps Exclusive Of the water line, YOU are nc
~ nearer Richmond than the enemy is, by {
AL route that YOU can and he must take. Why c
Q, yoa not reach there before him, unless YOU