The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1863-08-08

'.'V Aehnertph weakened his
army by detacbmen,s from Il 70 inn
pede the enemy's advance, which of
course were instantly overwhelmed and
scattered through the country. Jackaon
iell with all its stores, which could not
be removed or destroyed BY us, and
hnally PembertOn had 20 moet Grant
with an army weakened, as before stated.
and suffering disSstr6us defeat with
heavy loss Of prisoners and guns, Red
ih'o Nieksburg. Then the question nat
usily arise--Why was so important q
point as Grand Gulf not fortified In the
long period of his command WHY de-
ierred until the approach of the enefnv
mau' unmounted guns aud munitions an
easy prey3 Why was Vicksburf chdeht
with insufficient supplies Grant'sob-
ieot was known months before. The
contiguous TO say nothing Of the stores
lost at Jackson,) country abounded in
supplies. Why not six months instead
OF forty days rstions2 And why, above
oil, as Pemberton must have known the
condition Of its oommissariat did ho
crowd fully 10000 men into 10, in excess
of it's wants for defence, 20 consume its
seant supplies, or become food for powder
and disease The impregnable char
aoter Of tho works went for naught and
Grant, who had evidently penetrated
Pemberton's want of providence made
the issue rest ON hunger instead Of as
sault. Hence, we find but one general
assault, aud the endurance rather than
the bravery of the garrison taxed. When
defeated, he should have retreated on
hp In -. \ al
reasons, for ii is now absolutely certain
that by not doing SO he not only de-
stroyed all hope of rescue from Johnston,
but also precipitated the fall Of Vicks-
burg by the superserviceable troops he
threw into it, The government had
thought Pemberton's force sufficient, and
hence Johnston was sent, with no force
of his own, beyond 1000 or 1000 men,
but TO take charge Of Pemberton's army
in consequence of the alarm the Govern
ment at the lAst moment began 10 feel
about his imputed unpOpularity and ins
competency. To create new army Of
20 600 men, from an exhausted country,
and weak as well as distaht points-upon
the spur of the occasion, was even more
than could be expected; but 20 dash
them, mostly militia, on Grants ninety
thousand, entrenched front and rear, aud
with river in front, would have argued
mere reoklessness. Upon these facts the
Judgment of the country mustrest, whesh-
er this first display of quality in the
field, coupled with his counsels at
Charleston, sustain or not his fitness, and
the persistence of the President Id main
tanning him a. 80 important point.
That PembertOn is brave and loyal
enough, there is no doubt; but that is no
more than may be said of every officer
and man who shared the siege Some-
thing more is required of General than
mere bravery and loyalty, the absence o
which would be a reproach-their pres
ence a matter of course. Norman would
think of oOmplimenting another because
he bad nose TO his face while, without
one, he might be thought below the orr
dinary standard of hum anity, A hAsty
public opinion was at first disposed TO su-
peradd to his generally ASSERTED d incompe-
tency, the want of good faith and courage;
but this was idle, for few mon are so re-
creant TO position and interest. And
now, aome of the same hasty sort seem
to be gratiiled that he did not actually
betray the fortress, or take 10 any enc OF
its caves with the women and children
that they are disposed 20 condole the
disaster because 10 was not more hAgrant
/ by being spiced with these additions.
But such will not be the sober verdict of
the country. There are some blunders
which amount 10 crimes, and in the
gravity of their consequences do rot
admit of that atonemeDt which merely
exposes their author TO the perils and
priyations into which his want of quAli-
ficatiOn has constrained others. In
conclusion, | observe an impatience,
mingled with subdued resentment, which
fOrbIds, unless az the expense Of coun-
ter-revoluion, the continuance of Mr..
Davis education Of military proteges at
the probable sacrifice Of the life and re-
sources, as we'll as the cause Of the coun-
try. Our military friend, whose letters
aud general information enable him 20
speak with authority on such matters,
has given me many Of the facts in this
letter They agree in the main with the
intelligent opinion heroabOuts.
have TO urge on your attention the
matter Of whioh | wrote you last, and
our friend ID. will be able 10 strengthen
it by many new facts The mails are so
out of joint and the enemy such fire.
| quent visitors Of our lines OF oommuni-
cation, that cntrust il is 10 our mutual
friend G, who vii pass near your post
| office, and will mail il. With usual sig
nature, am, with your address, most
cordially aud truly yours,
"MoUTRm"