Orleans independent standard. [volume] (Irasburgh, Vt.) 1856-1871, 1863-05-29

Wednesday night, behind the rebel en-
trenchments.
The great decisive battle of the war
would probably have taken place on
Thursday and would have been fought
under different circumstances from those
of Saturday, Sunday and Monday, where
our army was beaten in detail. The
idea Of general, who is OH the often
sive, whose avowed object is the cap
ture or destruction of whole army,
making six miles in thirty-six hours,
just in the most critical moment of his
operations, and finally, after entrenchtng
himself withom being on tie communl
cations Of his enemy, tells his soldiers
that the enemy has to run away or to at
tack him on his own ground, where he
will destroy him, has not its parallel in
modern times. Another quite as un-
pardonable mistake is the sending away
Of the cavalry in moment when a great
battle was nearly certain to happen. Ii
was the same silly conduct which made
Melas lose The battle of Marengo. The
cavalry oughtto have formed the utmost
right wing in the large wheeling move
ment which our army performed, and in
which the left wing formed the pivot
General Hooker's operation is model
ed on the operations of Wurmser aud
Alvinci, in 1896, in Italy; those Of jour
dan, in 1899, at Stokach, and in quite
modern times, on that of the royal Nea-
politan army, in 1860, at the Volturno.
On the contrary, Gen. Lee took good
lesson from the action of Napoleon, the
Archduke Charles, and Garibaldi, on
those different DECISIONS. Gen. Lee has
certainly gained for himself, by this bat
tie, the name Of one of the ablest gen
erals of the present age.
1t would be wrong TO make Gen.
Hooker alone responsible for bis defeat.
We are told that bis army is to be rein
forced by 10000 men from Washington,
and by 10000 to $4,000 from Su(-
folk. Is it not strange that those troops
did not join Hooker before the battle ?
What is the use of 10000 idle men in
Washington? What the use of those
10000 on the Blackwater Why are
some 10000 standing sentry in North
Carolina? What have the 10000 done
yet near Charleston
Is there not common sense enough in
our great generals to understand that to
keep thousands and thousands of men as
sentriss 10 prevent blockade runners
from coming into Southern ports is ridi-
cuIous that it is more reasonatls toI
mass all those troops, and to crush with
his superiority the main armies, because
then the blockade runners will soon find
no more buyers for their contraband
goo IS? But how could such reasonable |
action be expected from a general-in
,bief who advanced against Corinth with
a snail-like pace to undertake the siege
Of feld-works, which the rebels after |
wards, under Van Dorm, did not hesi-
late moment to storm ; and who sent !
Pope with 10000 men to capture an
army which he, with 100000, could not
defeat. 1t is the same general who, in
August last, gave Gen. Burnside the
strange order to stay quietly at Freder
with bis troops ; meanwhile
Pope was defeated at Manassas. The
same who ordered Pope to retreat to-
ward Washington, instead of ordering
him 10 retreat towards Salem ond Berlin,
which would have prevented the battle at
Manassas and the invasion of Maryland.
1t is the same who gave the fatal order
10 Col. Miles to hold Harper's Ferry
when the rebels were already in Mary
and, and when, thereby, Harper's Ferry |
mad lost all importance.
Have there not been useless butcher
es and failures of operation enough |
% warrant finally the adoption of sound
military plans? Till this is done, we
IAN only hope that fortune will once more
mile upon the country Of Freedom.
/ am, sir, yours, very truly,
u cnIIATTr