The weekly Ottumwa courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1857-1872, 1863-04-02
'oTTUMwAI AfRIE Ri 4. 1863


,syaoausc e 81 Oh ".ek1ur % - - lasn
,,ds APRIL 2..qalS63.o
'oisi@si has la5ol ,hr1Si' gsye-f>-'F> :, IN
: condition Of the army Is, that the rate @
: sickness and mortality; Il excessive, an
/. that this rs due to The neglect Of the gov
= eminent. Fortunately, wehave til, mean
> ofshowing that these statements are false
I From june fsts1sef,t to March 1stnIsss-
finine months-the annual rate of moryalit,
for the whole army, IS as ascertained to y.
f53 ina thousand. and the sickness rate 10.
tn athonsand. n The RETURNS from tbs san,
fmer campaigns are not Yet printed but i
| will appear from them that in the army o
1.-THE potomaco on the 10th Of Jnne, after III,
battle of Fair Oaks, and while the arm,
4 was e.icsmpednos the Chicknhoniiuys.i ii,
1whoie nainber or the sick apresen. ana tab
fscnt, was 12s IN 4 th5nsahd. sbarihe N,
istav of the arms on the Peninsula. ii los,
Hess than IA thb isand men w fiea,h. from
disease and wounds, and the average sick.
ness rate during the campaign, was abou,
that which has for Some time prevailed in
the whole army, less than ten per cent. o,
the whole force. Itappears. strange to say
THAT the army was more healthy when in
1.-THE trenches before Yorktown. than at any
other period Of the csmpaisn.a = Compare
this with the English experience, We have
already said, thatWellingt6n lost about z one
third Of his whole army fron, f,iaiarious fever
on his retreat from Talavera on the lst OF
October,i1Sia, the Anglo Portuguese army
had $4,000 men it for duty. and $4,000
sick in.hosritals s'ana IN the Grimes, while
the annual rate ofmor.ality for the whole
war was 2s2 in, thousand. the period Of ac-
tive operations, the last three months OF
1904 and the first three months OF 1855.
shows the fearful rate or III ieaths II in q, every
thousand men. ti' - - '.'''l
It cannot be doubted that so many, the
most unJfAvorable symptom of our sprsseu.
condition is the slow progress of our arms ;.
ibis , ,slowness is more apparent than, real,
ltor the history of, modern warfare scarcely
shows shows an instance in which, so great, real
progress has been made in the same space
OF time, and it is manifest, that whenever
our northern soldiers have had chance of
lighting the enemy or anything Ike equal
terms. they have fully maintained their SUI,
perIority. 1t is none the less true, however
that public expectation in this, matter has
been much disappointed. and it is curious
to 10 look Sat at SINE Of the explanations given
Tor j. The Prince de JoiMille, in his recent
pamphlet, speaking, Of the, battle Of Fair
Oaks, and Of the neglect to throw bridges
over the Chickahomina at 1.-THE proper time, !,
by means aea Of which the whole rebel army,
might have been taken in flank. and praba-l
bly, destroyed, ascribed the, Heglect on, one,
page to what he calls Ia ls,ateur Amsricaine,
which he seems to think always leads our
conntrvmen to let the chance slip of doing
the right thing at the right time, and again
on the next to 8 faute d'organisativn, taute,
dc tierarchie, taute de kien,qui en- result en-
treFame de cegf ct rarmes, .lient puissant
qpi permet a un General de demander a ,ses
sottdats et den obtenir qeepqlement ces efforts
trtraordi"aries qua gqgeent les 6attaillies.s
In other words, General Mcclellan khowing g
that be could gain q decisive victory by, lay \
ing dlowna half-a dozen bridges. which it
IS stated, wererali ready for the purpose, ac-
tnally refused totorder his soldiers to do i,
because he was afraid they would not obey
his hls orders And this sthe Princes judg.
ment lle Of ap army, which few weeks later,
according to bis own, account, fought fvet
battles in as many days, all with one exeep
ton, victories over an enemy at least double
its numbers, and arrived. at its new, base on
the James river in excellent. condition, and |
without the slightest taint of fdemora!ization Il
This illustration shows that absurdity of
aS>cribng the want of immediate success to-
"a leattsur .Ft f4meyicaias, A quality, BY the
way, which we We learn for, the first time. is
one Of our na1iapal crhlarasterist, IS a. geao
Among the many causes which might be i
named, all perfectly Legitimate, and presen.
ting no obstacle which, . L,tlc, experience
will 9ot remsye, We venture to suggest but
one, q and that is the Character of the early
military education of our higher -officers,-f
The system pursued at West Point al.
though admirable for outlying officers for
he scientific and staff corps, Of the army, 1
seems to fail iq, teaching the young soldier,
What iI N Nis just now the most important Iqaali
y he can possess for command, the charac.
er and capacity of-yoluatesr, soldiers, :, The
system Of Discipline he has been taughtiis
bat which governs ths re saiar army. q sys
EN- modelled apon the English, which, is,
rith the exception Of that in use in Russia,
he most Brutal and deporalizipg known in
my srmy,ipi Europe. NJ wonder, q there r
ore, that when herseducat ed sold aersn are
suddenly placed in high positions, and.
yitR great Responsibilities and when they
discover that the sort Of. discipline, which
hey have baen taught is, wholly out p Of
'lacs in securing the efficiency Of O. volun-
eer army, they are ledLto doubt whether it II
;ap eyer bssmade efficient at ali. These
'rejadices, heweyers are wearing away be-
ore the test Of actaaiexperisncs. Generals
're gradually learninsnthat they imayr.con
ideia their men. even Cor despenhso ander- 4