New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-12-05
TIE RECORD OF GEN. ROsECRANs

TEE RECORD OF GEN. ROHECRANS.
In the supplement to this issue will DO found
a lengthy review Of the career Of Gen. Rose
craus as Commander Chief Of the Army of
the Cumberland. As will be seen from its date,
the document has been in our possession for
some weeks; but we deemed il best, for reasons
which need no, be explained, to defer its publ
cation until now. The delay will account FOX
certain phrases and paragraphs in it that may
now seem out of season and place. The writer
has had authentic sources of information, and
can adduco the best authorities for all matters
Of fact alleged by him.
The main suhjec; Of the review Is the cam
paign terminating in the battles Of the Chcka-
manga, and the retreat Of our forces to Chatta-
nooga. OF the preceding period Of Gen. Rose
cranss career, only the most salient points are
reviewed Among these, the continued post
ponement last Spring and Summer Of offensive
operations from Murirecsboro', until the latter
part Of June, appears not only 10 have furnished
the first occasion for dissatisfaction on the part
Of the Government with Gen. Rosecrans. but
also 10 have been tho original cause Of the
September disaster. because 81 tho fruiiless
early Summer campaign the lcSs OF the oppor-
tunity TO fight decisive battle north Of the
Tennessee River, and the necessity involved Of
seeking the enemy in the mountainous region
south Of il, Gar away from our base Of opera
tons.
In regard to the Georgia campaign, tho writer
makes the following statements:
l. The Government assumed the response
bility Of the issue OF the campaign up TO the
time Of the fall Of Chattanooga by ordering Gen.
Rosecrans peremptorly to cross the Tennessee
before he considered himself ready for the move
ment.
g Gen. Rosecrans never asked for reinforce
ments and for supporting movements until the
18th Of September, so that, whatever blame
may be justly attached 10 tho Government for
not providing them, ho has no reason 10 com
plain, as he has done since bis removal. Of being
sacrificed.
3. Upon the evacuation OF Chattanooga by
the enemy, Gen. Rosecrans, without satisfying
himself thoroughly as to the real intents Of his
adversary, by reconnoissances and otherwise,
assumed that Bragg was merely bent upon
another escapadc from the clutches Of our
army, and upon that theory divided his COM
mand into three columns, and ordered them 10
move over three separate routes, 90 to 30 miles
apar, from each other, for the purpose Of inter-
ceping the supposed flight of the enemy. This
mistaken pursuit took the different parts Of the
army beyond supporting distance Of each other,
over lines Of march conyerging upon the po-
hiion assumed by Bragg, 80 that they were ex-
posed to the danger Of successive attack and
destruction b. the whole Rebel force
4. The safest course for Gen. Rosecrans was
to concentrate his army in front Of Chattanooga;
fortfy the position; perfect his communications
with the North; accumulate supplies, and con-
tinuc offensive operations only after accomplish
ing all this. This course WIS also dictated to
him in specific instructions from Gen. lIalleck.
10 effect the concentration before Chattanooga,
all he had to do after the abandonment of the
place on the 9Th, was TO move the army down
Lookout Valley and around the northern spur Of
Lookout Mountain. In three days, at the fur
thest, the movement might have been accom-
plishod. By acting contrary to tho instructions
of the General-in- Chief Gen. Rosccrans at once
relieved the Government from, and assumed him.
self all responsibility for the subsequent eyents
of the campaign.
s. Upon discovering his mistake as to tho
movements Of the enemy and the necessity of
rescung his army FROM the peril Of destruction
in detail, by recommendation he moved his COM
mand into position that left Chattanooga par
italy uncovered, and invited tAc enemy to get
between him and that place. When this was
begun, the army was not shifted to better po-
siton as oxpeditiously as ii might have been,
but was drawn into general action while max
ing a movement by the left fank-a disad-
vantage which brought 1t TO the verge of de-
G,ai Of the very beginning Of The conflict. end