Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-07
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCER
A MILITARY REVIEW

1888 Washington: hudsoa Taylor
1t may be remembered by readers that some weeks
$50 we referred to this interesting publication and an
nounced our pur pose make some cons from It's con-
tents The favorable estimate we had formed oil MT.
Scbalks merits as military writer were not Dased on
this work alone but already justified by his earlier
treatise on the Art Of War;" written at the close of the
1861 In that work he discussed the probable result
Of the which afterwards attempted to be
carried out BY our Generals aud he then indicated what
he thought TO be the defects of plans and predicted the
mshaps which actually followed.
The present volume is sequel to that which appeared
in 1851 and kind of tractate grand war; as viewed
in operations of large scale and covering wide extern
Of territory. Mr. Schslk is certainly impartial 10 his ci-
csms and to one unversed in the art OF war he seems TO
write with an intelligence equal TO bis candor
He holds that The theatre field Of war, in our
divides itself naturally into three zone the right or trans
Mississippi; the centre lying between the Mississippi and
the mountains and the left between the mountains and
the seaboa The last he eseems the Chief on when tne
principal will be conducted and he regards the
RIGHT auk OF the left zone the true field Of grand ope
rations.
On this theory the necessity Of possessing the mountain
region Of the South becomes apparent 10 every mnd'
Writing under this head Mr.. Schalk says;
.sTha very moment rebel army permits Union army
To act from mountain district against It's communca-
tlons or what better to take hod OF 50 as 10
it to fight forming its line Of battle parallel win the sea-
and facing the Blue Rdge-that s forming It's ne ~ bat
tie parallel with natural line OF retreat TO the SaVan-
nahhis rebel army in case Of defeat WIN hce on %
be aten but by rapid pursuit. will be Obliged 10 surren
der "A it will be thrown back the direction OF the ocean
an obstacle which soon stops all further retreat
The possession Of the mountain district 49, therefore
for the holding of the left necessity and stl bet
ter it 10 necessity for the possession OF the Wnoe heao
of war In fact this chain of mountains Is ike wedge
driven from the North right into the very heart oil .he
~ 10 haa al III,
mates it in all directions 1t lie like bul"ark Or better
STILL like the citadel of large fortress Of when the walls
formed by the parallel ridges the dtehe oy the rapid
Take the whole fortress-that ,s, the whole south
but leave this citadel untouched and will be the same as
nothing bad been taken In these mountains me .ha
msinain decidedly central position combined win the
facility of d.bouchng in place they Can throw tee
selves. with their whole force on all the surrounding rag
meuts of our armies, and beat them IN detail
W. have not space even for the writer's
analysis Of the campaign of 1862 in which he supposes
himself 70 have demonstrated that defeat certain
from the moment the plan made and would have been
more fatal had the rebels not also made bunders We
must therefore limit ourselves to few selections from Mr
Schalk's review Of last years operations
The immobity Of army in the Southwest, after the
battle of Shiloh aud the disasters consequent on the slow
e.s and udecson of Gen. Haecks movement on Corintb
are thus treated:
Eioht IN ten DAYS after the battle of Shiloh the FORTH
.tons of Cornth were probably not very strong; and
.hs mere .mple march or movement to Waterloo, Ala
bama aud thence to Jacinto and Danvilie, MsnfsPpi
oud probably have induced the rebels at once to leave
CoIinth and then by marching direct TO Ripley and Holly
springs the Union army might probably have prevented
the rebels from rereatng SOUTH and have forced them 10
disastrous and decisive light.
nstead of such rapid action and cisive direction OF
the line of operation and of pursuit the Union army ad
yspces slowly against Cornth, which the enemy mean-
While strongly fortfes The Federal troops bssege Co
L. 20 ham nlleh
trouble eyacuae on the 3oth of May They retreat to
Grenada; and if the occupation Of Corlnih was the
main OBJECT, the Union army remains there! zen. rope
alone undertakes the pursuit as If be by himself could ae
comoi.b against not defeated army, what he, united with
Buell. and Grant, could not do!
Tbs !. bells posted at Cornth caught fragrant
dILf Union army between Them and their East
rn armies: and BY acting with the left the Union army
might have brought about decisive and 10 the enemy
disastrous battle Negectng to take advantage OF an en-
emys faults s decidedly bu0deriDg, and here the aut
a for these very rebel troops We're alter
ward transported East and performed their share IN IN
Actne the disasters which befe the Union armies there
The cons, ouences of mistake are sometimes ncalcu
liable in war az well life general 1t Is with Them
often as it IL with Alpine ayaanche-growng growing
TIL they crush every thing under their enormous weight
The defects in the plan and execution of the campaign
at ON foot under Gen Mcclellan for the capture OF Rich
mond thus sienalized:
Zone Of the chief principles Of grand war Is to get pos
a..on Of the enemys communications without exposing
80 o,vn Evidently the app cation OF this principle
ont Of the question in the position the Potomac army wal
paced in To suppose that by transporting the troops
Fortress Monroe and by acting thence against Richmond
was seizing the communications OF the rebel army IN Yr
nisat Csptreyile for instances to suppose that thu
1ebels could neither see think, nor march
They were the tune the hrst preparation was made
in Of the right bank Of the Potomac and could
see and count the transports going TO Alexandria Ever
DEMONSTRATION for half of the army had been provided
would have taken FIVE six days to transport The whole
of and in six DAYS rebels could have maj ched from
Crutrevlle to Williamsburg and encountered the uolcr
army in front again These considerations alone shont
have been sufficient to prevent the campaign on the Pc
ninsula
"Wble the Potomac army found itself Imprisoned 81
the ANAL tract OF land between the entertainments OF York
town and Fortress Monroe the army for the defence
Ws.bnoton WAS divided three independent comm nds
Fremont in the mountains west OF the Shenandoah Banks
in the SHENANDOAH valley and Mcdowell east OF the Blue
Ridge Thus including General Burnsdes corps not ies
than Eve armies operating on i've din rent lines
opernt;ou against Richmond. A curious spectace-th'
main army shut up in the Peninsula and these other ou
ANAL armies inviting he enemy to come and snnihilat'
Them The rebels, however, magnsnimous! they
allowed THE unique opportunity OF striking decisive blow
(,Se M qht almost say, finish the war IT, clip What nj
occasion for general ambitious OF gaining the reputation
NJ A great commander jackson finally felt that cbeaI
laures might be gained here and he made the attempr
Though commanding but small corps He could not hell
gaining some laures though not enough TO enable him Il
pass for great captain
!" These surrounding forming four or five
lines Of one ration convergng all point favort
mapnuyre. in The good old times In the Peninsuar wal
the spaoish generals used them profnsey. 10 the FIRE
war OF the French Revolution the Austrian generals cout
not live without them In more modern times however
in nur the VirQi