The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1863-02-06

why the country should not know it-and
cannot help believing that when the officia
reports of that battle are permitted to see the
light the grounds of Gen Burnside's opinion
will be evident to all. 1t is generally assum.
ed that the main attack on that occasion was
against the rebel front, posted and entrench.
ed on the crests in the rear of Fredericksburg
This is mistake which was corrected by the
general in his testimony. The main attack
was designed to be upon the rebel right, and
! the object of it was to break their line there
where it was weakest, turn them, and then
with the corporation of Sumner attacking in
! front-to complete the victory and convert il
/ into route. Gen Franklin led the main
attack with his own Grand Division and two
small corps from Hooker's. His orders were
to attack wih at least one corps vigorously
and then to follow up the attack with prompt
and heavy supports. He sent Gen Meade to
the attack, commanding the smallest corps OF
all. Gen Meade attacked with great vigor
broke the rebell line, and actually pushed his
odrdnce into the midst of the ammunition
cogons and baggage trains IN their rear.
He had completely succeeded in the appoint
ed work the forces opposed to him were
utterly routed, and all that he needed was
prompt and effective support. This he did
not receive. Gen Franklin sent another
small corps to his aid, but it arrived too late.
The enemy seeing Meade come to stand
had rallied reinforcements were pushed for
ward, and before Meade's supports came up
his force was driven back and It became i'm
: possible to re-establish the line. Gen Frank
! lin gave as reason for not sending forward
heavier and prompter supports, that he was
afraid the enemy would seize the bridges and
cM Of his means of retreat. Gen Sumner
meantime, had opened the fight to retain as
much of the rebel force in front as possible
for the relief of Franklin; and as he never
does anything but with the utmost impetuos-
lty, he had pushed the movement till it had
assumed the proportions of terrible en-.
gagement. This shows how near the bat
tie came to being a success.
{ 3. The affair at Fredericksburg, and the
investigations that followed it, were no soon
er over than Gen Burnside prepared for an
other aggressive movement. 1t embraced
an attack in front, at point selected with
care, and formidable raid of cavalry and
light artillery, which was to threaten the ene-
my's communication, and divert his atten-
ton from the main attack. 1t was a bold
plan. But If vigorously executed, was rea.
sonably certain of success. Every prepara-
ton had been made for it. A picked force
of cavalry and artillery was got ready, unde,
command of that dashing and most compe.
tent officer, Gen Averill, and the execution
cf the movement was fixed for the 3lst Of
December. The column destined to make the
raid was actually in motion, when telegram
from President Lincoln announced to Gen
] Burnside that he must make no movement
without first consulting him. The general a,
once arrested the march of his troops, and
repaired to Washington. The Presiden,
informed him that the reason of his dispatch
was tl.,.t Of Oeu burnside subordinate
officers mad protested vehementlv against the
movement. Thus failed the third attempt
through the interference and INSTRUMENTATION
of officers of the army.
t. The fourth and last of these attempts
was the one of last Wednesday. Gen Burn
side had prepared it with care. He had ex
amined personally and repeatedly the groune
on which it was to be executed. He hac
fixed the position which each division was to
occupy on crossing the river. He had ascer
tanned by spies the position and movement:
of the enemy, whom he had completely de
ceved by teints as to the poEt of crossing
and counted, With the utmost confidence, OF
taking him by surprise. How this move
to show.
Gen Burnside has thus attempted four at
tacks upon the rebel army in his front since
lie assumed command of the army of th
P,tomac. In each instance he has been EN-
blrraSscd and thwarted by those who wer,
bound by every Sentiment of military homo
and OF patriotic duty to give him their cor
dial and effective support. The inference i
very clear. lie sho"id either hare the pore
to dismiss NeSe cDicerS. and PIT IN Mei
piaces others mho 'riN second his plans, o
he sho"'d be relisred from his command.
The mass of the army is thoroughly loya
and ready for service. saw thousands O
them on the morning after their terribl,
night march through rain, tempest and mud
and | saw no symptoms of dependency or o
shrinking from duty. THIS would not appl
to ALL Among some of the troops of tn
Generals most open in their opposition t.
the Commanding Generals plans, there wa
+ much " struggling" on the march, and heart
of one corps of $1,000 men which on arriv
ing numbered but little over 5000 Of cCurs
this could only have occurred with the conni
vance of their regimental and company off
, GERS, and was due primarily TO the demorali
zation at division and corps headquarters G
which have already spoken. Ii Gen Burn
side would take prompt and resolute meas
ures to arrest this evil by striking at its roo,
by furnishing insubordination in high place
as we'll as low-it would act upon the arm
like an inspiration, and in ten days time h
could WELD the whole power of that army il
the prompt and hearty execution of any pla
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