The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-11-14

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oAxU0nkY NunlIuD ~ : =. -.
N0AW V1NIuoI - 49,. nasees lstes
Il ~ - Ill 0Ze1 - . - = 0&AM
MN 1iD EllN 49,, y tq1p - snAil
11lllsasy 1Aescs.
AUvoantioa = 5 moral earthquake. II
upssls everything, nos only In the political,
~ h ~ military world. Il leaves moth
ineslandlag Inst Il fo1nd %. II turns tho
bsnA tspsy4srvy, md playa havoc with al
psseoncelved idsaa
sOencenerats 10 Aght,r disperse to sub
~" odd Napoleon. And, further, "wnen
20 aso shout 70 1ght = battle, cosccntratc
Il yuuf Iorcss. Bring every man. Do not
lmvo 60 beAiad." Il really would appear
% - vnlnitistsA that this y good advice.
n vouN seem when tattle h TO be fought
TIT Sysry man who b Of any service, and
wAo en- Be, ought to be brought 70 the iield.
n vouId seem 10 be the interest Of every
6enesol 70 make victory - little doubtful
. po0ibaA Again, when there 10 no imme-
Alles prospect Of . fight, II would seem that
u were bot to dihpcse the troops, In order
% render subeisteace easier and more GER
tain. A large body Of men, It ueed to be
tAoeght Win consume more provisions than
asmall body. Bat our revolution has effect
uAlly abolished these obsolete idel. Con-
csntzstion Tor the purpose of fighting seems
% have been voted an obsolete idea; disper-
sion for the purpose Of subsisting is treated
- unworthy Of consideration. Napoleon is
IN old fogy, and his military principles bt
loag to another age OF the world. The moo
En- dOctxino b 10 concentrate for subsist-
eace, and dispene to fight. By doiLg SO,
ytn take no unfair advantage. You give
your enemy every chance to attack you in
superior force, and you reserve to yourself
the glory Of beating him with an inferior
number Of men, reiinquishing all hope of
pursuing him after beating him, aud giving
him every chance of rallying to try it again.
1t b the true game of the ring, where no
champion thinks of striking an enemy after
he h down. Ills In the very spirit of chiv-
airy, for does not Sir Walter Scott, who
knew most about such things, make Richard
]. cay, when . garrison was about TO surren-
der from starvation, at were better to send
such fellows their dinner, and then buffet it
out with them for the castle, than to starve
them, - the beggaf1y Frenchmen famish
their houndsl"
Again. An army being once concentrated,
It was formerly supposed to be matter Of
great importance to prevent the enemy from
doing the same thing by attacking. their
columns In detail, while on the march for
that purpose. Where the concentrated army
held an interior line, this was supposed to
be comparatively easy, and it offered the
great advantage Of falling on each detached
portion with superior force, and thus in
curing victory, at the same time it rendered
It much less costly in blood Innumerable in
stances were quoted, in the olden time, of sue
cessfhl operations of this description. Thus
the great Frederic was threatened by three
armies, invading his territories at the same
time from three different directions. They
were each somewhat superior in numbers to
his own, and If united would easily have
overwhelmed him. But he held the
central position, and falling upon first one
and then the other, succeeded in defeating
them all. His operations on this occasion
were regarded as masterpieces, and were
held up to the world as examples to all
Generals In similar predicaments, of what
energy and activity could do. The various
operations OF Napoleon around Mantua,
where he held central position on the
Adige, and by means 1T succeeded in de-
stroying two armies, each three times as nu-
merous a his own, were ALSO thought wor-
thy OF study. Indeed, In former times it
wasthought matter of such high moment
to attack an enemy in detail that the most
elaborate manGuvres were executed to sepa.
rate his columns when united. The art.
however, has undergone complete change
Generals In . central position now wait with
the utmost patience until the most distant
columns Of the enemy unite all around
them. We recollect no instance of such
columns being attacked on the march. A
bloody and indecislve battle, in which thou
sands upon thousands are slaughtered or
MANNED for life, 10 usually fought after the
enemy has brought all his men together,
and rendered 1t impossible to gather any
fruit even from victory. A long period Of
inacti0n ensues, the parties recruit and re-
cover their breath, another bloody battle is
fought, in which, as usual, both sides claim
the victory, and then comes another resting
spell.
The pre-revolutionary idea was that bat.
ties were fought for some purpose and with
some object in view beyond the mere plea
sure Of slaughtering and being slaughtered:
Each battle Of those who, before the present
war, were regarded as master spirits was q
political stroke. and victory was therefore
followed up with unrelenting pertinacity-
Such views have become obsolete, or, at
least, they are apparently not entertained by
the leaders Of the present day. The most
Overwhelming defeat of. the enemy is sui.
fered to pass unimproved. He fiies from
the Geld in the utmost disorder, but his
flight h like that Of the wicked: "He fleeth
chen NO man pursueth." He rctires short
distance, miles. takes heart, and quietly
commences reorganizing his shattered bat
talions, recruiting his ranks with fresh.
troops, and replacing his captured artillery
with new pieces. = little time he is ont
again, more powerful than ever, and 1t ia
,,nn>>a - - IN No}f an nther Ufrantic hattie