The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1863-01-10
Tho Battle Of Murfree.bero.

/
and bravery Of the combatants of any that
has yet occurred during this war As has
been generally the case in our great bat
| ties, we see that our soldiers have fought
with unsurpassed bravery, and that: so far
as yet appears, no really decisive results
have been obtained The correspondents
on the ground, who have sent their des-
criptions to the press, were utterly unable
to comprehend the plan of the battle, if
there was any, and seem to have been so
much bewildered that they could not
recognize the most obvious facts before
their eyes, necessary to be understood by
those who are capable of understanding
something about battles. We cannot do
more, therefore, than to give an imperfect
statement of some of the facts connected
with the battle. 1t is probable the battle
| itself will never be described-until, per-
haps, a hundred years hence, some military
historian shall visit the spot and from an
examination of the ground, and the dis
jointed facts at present known construct
a theory of the plan of the battle, that
may be elegant, and logical-but most
probably fiction. ....
| Gen. Rosecrans had been lying several
weeks at Nashville with an army Of up
wards Of one hundred thousand men );
while Bragg, On the part Of the enemy,
was concentrating an army to oppose his
| further progress, at Murfreesboro, about
thirty two miles distant, and south, Of
Nashville.
Rosecrans communication with his rear
was by means Of the Nashville and Louis
Vile Railroad-which was substantially
his only line. and was guarded by a con-
siderable force under Gen. Granger, whose
duty it was TO keep the communications
open. Whether Granger was under Rose
Grams orders or not, does not appear-it is
rather inferrable he was not. The country
through which the rail road passes was
known TO be infested with the enemy's
cavalry, and the line of communication
subject TO be broken by their activity and
enterprize
By his right flank, Bragg had an open
rail road communication with Richmond
by his rear, with Georgia; and by his left
left flank, with Mississippi.
1t is plain, therefore, that if the battle
was fought while this state Of things con-
tnued. the result Of defeat would be far
more disastrous 10 Rosecrans than to Bragg,
Ia Co.
Rosecrans. unless he was overwhelmingly
superior to Bragg in cavalry, which he was
not, to obtain any result much greater
than the uncomfortable one az repulsing
Bragg from the ground he occupied; and
this seems TO be, in fact, precisely the re-
sui; that was obtained. kosecrans, thus
situated commenced his advance from
Nashville abou, the 18th ult and in the
course Of two or three days reached the
enemy'- front near Murfreesboro. 1t does
not appear where his reserves were, nor
how large force, if any, he left behind
to keep his communications open, and
guard his Commissariat However. Rose
Grams found the enemy drawn up a lite
in front Of Murfrees boro, and behind an
ircoDsiderable streem called stone river.
The plan Of the battle on the part Of the
euemy-who, 1t will be seen, had several
DAYS notice of Rosecrans coming, and
therefore ample time to perfect ali his
dispositious--is tolerabIy clear lie had
no entrenchments-no abatti.-nothing
to impede the free movements Of his own
troops or those of the enemy. Stone /,
river seems to have offered no serious /
obstacle TO the movement of troops; ii I
was clear TO Rosecrans, therefore, the mo /
ment he surveyed the enemys position
with his glass, that the enemy intended to
act on the offensive.
What dispositions Rosecrans made, upon
his adversarys intentions, it is
impossible at present to say. He had left
Nashville with the intention of taking the
offensive himself; he was now under the
necessity of changing his plans. He had
little to do it in. Bragg had shown gene
ralship IN thus suddenly compelling Rose
Grams to change his plans; yet. if Rose
Grams WAS up to the exigency, he might
probably make Bragg repent his temerity.
However, Bragg was not long in manifest
ing his intentions. He caused his left to
advance upon our right wing, and, in
back four miles But such was the te
naciiy, the indomitable bravery Of Nc
Cooks soldiers, who held our right. that
Bragg was unable to turn that wing in any
Of the movement AS soon as Bragg
became satisfied of this, he suddenly
changed the position of his troops, and
sadeavored to force our centre. But
R ,secrans, who had brought over hun
lred pieces of artillery with him from .
shyille-about three times as many as
ne appears to have been able to use, and
IF which the enemy had already taken
,nethird, had given Negley, who com
handed our centre all the artillery he
and Negley made so good dis
position Of his guns, that he repulsed Bragg
from his front with terrible slaughter. As
Bragg, in making this movement, had
weakened his wings, so that they were no
longer any more than match for our ewn'
It became evident to Rosecrans. that the
battle was won, and that it was now ne
,essary for him to decide the method in
which he would obtain tho victory that
vas clearly within his power Two courses
we're obviously presented for his selection
One was. to strengthen Segley, SO as to
penetrate and crush the enc
nys centre, which was plain would give
The most decisive results if it were practi-