The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-03-27
The COnscr1ptfOn Law..Has Congress
the Power to Destroy the State Gov.
ernmentS9

|
the last fanatical Congress. The Conscrip-
ton Bill was as long considered, and as
thoroughly debated, perhaps, as any other
measure which was before that body; and
while most of its provisions of detail seem
to have been carefully prepared, and judi
ciously adapted to render it efficient without
being unnecessarily burdensome, there are
yet possibilities of wrong permitted by its
terms which are well calculated to excite
| alarm.
COnceding, as we do, the power to raise
men by CONSUMPTION, has Congress, under
this, or any other pretense, the power to
destroy State Government? This ques-
ton, startling as it may seem, is one le-
ultimately suggested by the terms of the
Consumption Act. For that Act contains
provisions that can work the destruction,
or, what amounts to the same thing, the
indefinite suspension of all the State Gov
ernments.
The Act renders all persons alike liable
to CONSUMPTION, except in the specified
cases mentioned in the section on exemp-
tions; and there, we find that the Cover
nors are the only officers of the State
Governments which are exempted. Under
what principle is the Executive of State
more needed in the administration of its
affairs, than the officers of the other co-or-
dinate branches of it's Government? But,
passing by the absurdity of exempting one
branch of the Government without the
rest, and especially the Executive, which
is the least essential of all to the interests
of the people, let us examine whether the
privilege of procuring substitute, or
committing the service by the payment Of
sum of money, forms any answer to the
| objection we urge. Considered with ref
erence to the abstract power of the Fed
eral Government to draft the officers of
the State, it is sufficient to say that this
provision of the act is mere favor grant
ed, and not right conceded. 1t is not
peculiar to the State officers, but common
to all citizens; and might, at the will of
Congress, have been omitted altogether;
leaving the individual chosen no alterna-
tive but to serve. If Congress, then, can
draft State officials at all, it is clear that it
may do so without allowing them the
privilege of communication. This involves
the power to break up the State Goven-
ment, or suspend its operation, during the
continuance Of any war in which the coun-
try may be engaged. This reasoning is
applicable to all officers of the State be-
cause, Congress may as we'll draft the
Governor as the Lieutenant Governor,
Secretary of State, or Chief Justice. The
exemption of the Governor, by the Act, is
as much a boon granted to that favored
officer, as the Communication is to the COM
mon citizen.
There are other reasons quite as valid
against the drafting of State officials, even
with the privilege of committing the SER
vice for money or by substitute. The per-
son drafted is not obliged to do either, and
may prefer serving; or, he may not have
the means of doing either, and thus be
compelled to serve. The power to draft
the State officers involves the possibility OF
their all being drafted, and the probability,
under the present aspect of the war, that
enough of them will be drafted in some
States, to defeat the operation of these Gov
ernments Are the places filled by these
official conscripts to be declared vacant, OF
their functions suspended during their alb
sence? The answer to either branch OF
the question, involves the admission that
Congress may destroy the State Govern
ments
We presume that the point We raise will
prove to be rather of speculative than Of
practical Importance. For, if any State
should submit to the draft of officers which
are necessary to the administration of its
affairs, it would, by such act, submit itself
to a condition of vassalage, and even o.
absolute dependence upon the Fedora
Government for the privilege Of its exis.
tence. This, no State is so craven as to
do; nor will the Federal Government
have the temerity to insist upon its being
done. We have no idea that Congress-
in passing the Consumption Act, ever sup
posed that the provisions we have exam
ined would be enforced to the extern
which their terms would permit We sup
pose, rather, that the State officers were
not included in the list of exemptions fo
the same reason that members OF Congress
were omitted; and that this reason grew
out of an undignifed, unstatesmanlike
cowardly demagogueism, which woul'
rather violate a principle, than incur tn
unjust censure of the unthinking multi
> tude, for legislating privileges to them
} selves that are necessarily incident to tn