The Burlington weekly hawk-eye., 1863-04-18

M'cLELLAN KEAPS HIS MBN In CAAP.4
On the 7th Of October 0en. Halleck re-
plies. After referring to the draft expected
in some of the Northern States he says:
"But we cannot delay the operations oi
the army for these drafts. 1t must move,
and the old regiments must remain in their
crippled condition. The convalescents,
however, will help a little. The country Is
becoming very impatient at the want OF ac-
tiyity in your army, and we must push il
on.
~ am satisfied that the enemy are falling
back toward Richmond. We must follow
them and seek to punish them. There Is q
decided want of legs in our troops. They
have too much immobility, and we must
try to remedy the defect. A reduction OF
baggage and baggage-trains will effect
something; but the real difficulty is they
are not sufficiently exercised in marching
they lie still in camp too long.
AFTER a hard march one day is time
enough to rest; lying still beyond that time
does not rest the men. If we compare the
average distances marched per month by
our troops for the last year with that of the
Rebels, or with European armies in the
field, we will see why our troops march no
better. They are not sufficiently exercised
to make them good and efficient soldiers" /"
On the 1st of October General Mcclellan
asked for authority to build double track
bridge across the Potomac at Harper's Fer
ry, which Gen. Halleck declined to give
About that time the President visited the
army. After his return to Washington the
following order was sent to Gen. Mcclellan
by Gen. Halleck:
MCCLELLAN ORDERED TO MOVE.
"WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D.
c., Oct. 6, 1927 am instructed to tele-
graph you as follows: The President di-
rects that you cross the Potomac and give
battle to the enemy or drive him South. =
are good. sa SIC
eff you cross the river between the ene-
my and Washington, and cover the latter
by your line of operations, you can be re-
inforced with 80, 600 men. If you move up
the valley of the Shenandoah, not more
than II, 900 or IL, 900 can be sent to you.-
The President advises the interior line be-
tween Washington and the enemy, but
does not order it. He is very desirous that
your army move as soon as possible. You
will Immediately report what time you
adopt, and where you intend to cross the
river; also, to what point the reinforce
ments are to be sent. It is necessary that
plan of your operations be positively de-
termined on before orders are given for
81 am directed to add that the Secretary
of War and the GeneraI-in Chief fully con-
concur with the President in these instruc-
tions. H. w. HALLECK,
"General-in Chief.
s'Maj. Gen. MCCLELLAN"
To this General Mcclellan replies on the
same day:
"It is important, in making my decision
regarding the route to be taken by the army,
that should know, first, what description
of troops am to be re-enforced with upon
the Shenandoah route between the enemy
and Washington; whether they are to be
old or new troops, or what proportion of
each. Ifpossible, I should be glad to have
Pecks division sent to me, if it can be got
here within a reasonable time.
Second. Will you inform me what the
present condition of the Alexandria and
Leesburg Railroad is; also the Manassas
Gap Railroad; and what time it would re-
quire to put them in working order? 1t is
believed that the Harper's Ferry and Win
chester Railroad is not materially injured"
To this Gen. Halleck replies on the 7th:
''The Manassas Gap Road can be repaired
in a few days. The Leesburg Road is much
more injured. You can reach the former
in less time than would be required to re-
pair the latter. The troops to be sent you
will be partly new and partly old-mostly
new" ...
his PLANS AND FEARS.
On the same day General Mcclellan tele-
graphs:
''After full consultation with the corps
commanders in my vicinity, I have deter
mined to adopt the line of the Shenandoah
for immediate operations against the enc
my now near Winchester. On no other line
north of Washington can the army be sup
piled, nor can it on any other cover Mary
land and Pennsylvania. Were we to cross
the river below the mouth of the Shenan-
doah, we would leave it in the power of the
enemy to recross into Maryland, and thus
check the movements. In the same case
we would voluntarily give him the advan
tage of the strong line of the Shenandoah,
no point Of which could be reached by us in
advance of him. I see no objective point
of strategical value to be gained or sought
for by a movement between the Shenandoah
and Washington.
81 wish to state distinctly that do not re-
gard the line of the Shenandoah Valley as
important for Interior objects. 1t is impor-
tant only so long as the enemy remain near
Winchester. And we cannot follow that
line far beyond that point, simply because
the country is destitute of supplies, and we
have not sufficient means Of transportation
to enable us to advance more than 20 or IS
miles beyond railroad or canal terminus.
If the enemy abandon Winchester and fall
back upon Stanton, it will be impossible for
us to pursue him by that route, and we
must then take a new line of operations
based upon water or railway communica-
ton.
'The only possible object to be gained by
an advance from this vicinity is to fight the
enemy near Winchester. Ifthey retreat, we
have nothing to gain by pursuing them,
and, in fact, cannot do so to any great dis
tance. The objects proposed to myself are
to fight the enemy, if they remain near
Winchestar. or failinp in that tn fOrce them