The Lansing state Republican. [volume] (Lansing, Mich.) 1855-1874, 1863-04-22
Extracts from the Report OF the Commit
tee On the CoRduet OF the War.

In closing their report upon tne campaign Of
the Pen nsula. yosr committee would refer 70
ihe report oi General Ohm { Bernard, Chief OF
Engineers OF the Army OF the PoIonac, during
that campaign, made 10 General Mcclellan The
conclusion Of bis report, which he terms ret
respect, points out the mistakes that we're made,
and thus traces the causes OF is lthe Peninsula
eampaignl failure 10 sheir true sources.
" One OF tue prominent among the causes OF
ultimate failure, sas the inacIion Of eight months
from August, 1861, 10 April, 1852 More than
auy other vars rebellion demands rapid meas
Eres. Ia November. sol, the Army OF ths Po-
tonac, If not fully Supplied win all the "mAieFi-
al, ~as Yet about complete IN numbers, dis-
cipine, sni Organization, a. il ever came For
iour months, the great marine aveuue Of the
capital OF the nation Was blockaied, and that
capital kept IN partial sta e Of seige, by a
greatly inferior enemy, IN the face OF 4 movable
army OF l5O, 900 men.
" In the winter Of ls6I-62, Norfolk should
have been taken. The navy demanded il aud
the means we're ample. Bv its capture the ca
reer oi the Nerrmac, which proved 80 disas
trous 10 our subsequent operations, would have
been prevented. he preparation OF this vessel
was known, and the NAVY Department Was not
without iOrebodings Of the mischief il would do
Though delay might mature more compre
hensive plans, aud promise greater results il l.
not the first IN which 1t has been shoxu
that successful war involves something more
than abstract military principles The true ques-
ton vas 10 seize the hrst practicable moment 10
satisfy the perhaps unreasonable but natural
longing OF Al ambitious nation for results 90 sat
i-iy its lavish confidence, and 70 take advantage
OF All undivided command and unrameled hoer.
~ Of action while they we're possessed
- When the army a.l ,,,v.
ed perfectly certain TO invite, nAy, compel inter
ference, aud when the army vas to go by An-
nspohs 10 the lower Chesapeake. | felt conf
dent that one halt would scarcely have been en-
barked before the other halt would have been
ordered back 10 Washington. The enemy was
then at Manassas, and teint, even If Lot in re
atty, OF an attack on Washington, was 50 obyi-
Gus, so certain 10 create pane, which no Exec
utive could resist, that Interference With the
removal OF the rest of the army was certain.
W hen the enemy fell back behind the Rap
pAhannock, and destroyed the railroad bridges
Tue circumstances were greatly changed and
there were strong arguments for the line ADOPT
ed. Yet results have proved how many rea-
sons there we're TO be considered. beside the
purely military oues, which opposed themselve-
TO the adoption Of such line.
The facts connected With tke Withholding
OF McDowelIs corps have been 50 completely ex-
hblted in the proceedings Of the Mcdowell
Court Of Inquiry, that every man who wishes
can form his own judgment Whether il was
wise OF unwse, u was one Of those things result.
ing from the taking of . line OF operations which
did NOT then cover Washington
" At the time the Armv Of the Potomac lsnds
ed Oh the Peninsula, the rebel army ~as at it,
lowest cob It's army was dslaoralized bv tn.
defeats Of Port RosAl, Nil Spring. Fort Henry.
Fort Donaldson, Roanoke Island and Pea Ridge
and reduced bg sickness, loss Ia battle. expirs-
tons OF periods OF service, &c, while the con
scrpuon law vas lot even passed. IL seemed
as If 1t needed but one vigorous gripe 10 erd
forever the rebellion so nearly throttled. How
then, happened it that the day Of the initiation
ofthe campaign Of this magnificent Armv Of the
Potomac, was the day of the resuscitatinr O,
the rebel cause, which seemed 20 grow pari pas
SO with toe slow progress of Its operati1uss
" HoTever | may be committed TO any ex
pressions Of professional opinion to the contrary
Il certainly did suggest it, nv opinion nov /.
Inat the lines OF Yorktown should have been
assaulted. There Is reason to believe that the,
we're not held IN strong force when eur arm1
appeared before them, and We know that the,
we're far from complete. The prestige OF pow
or the morale, was on our side. IL was due 1,
TX. w
probably have succeeded. But il we had failed
it may well be doubted whether the shock of Al
unsuccessful assault Sould be more demoralzins
than the labOrs Of a seige
Our troops tOiied a month in the trenches
or lay Ia the swamps Of WarWick We lost fes
men oy the siege, Oat disease took a lea 10
hold OF the army, aud toll and hardship. uure
deemed Dy the excitement Of combat imDaire
their morale We did rot cary vith Us iron
Yorktown as good "a army A. We took there
Of he bitter fruits OF that mosth gained bv th
enemy We have tasted 70 our hearts content
They are not yet exhausted
, TIL siege having been determined upsn. "
should have opened cur batteries on the plsc
a. fast as taey we're Completed The effect O
the troops would have 0eeu inspiring. II woui
have lightened the seige and shortened oar !.
bors; and besides, we would have had the cree
1t Of driving the enemy from Yorktown br fore
OF arms, whereas, as it was, We only induced hil
10 evacuate for prudential reasons
"YorAtown having fallen. ho~ever. as il did
1t vas right 10 pursue the enemy with our Ehol
force. Bat the battle Of Williamsburg. foust
as il was, Si;hout accommodating the Dositio,
without concert OF action among the diff rer
corps aud division commanders. and almost with
out orders, Was 4 buuder wncn ought not I
have happened.
We snew Of this position beforehand. and v
knew il was fortified We might have bee
sure, If the enemy made a stand there that
would be str Dg One for he would he fighrn
for tine 70 get out OF our reach. We Tough
We lost several thousand men, and We game
: nothing. II We had not fought. the next d.v
battle would in al probability been unnecesssr-
y But had 1t been necessary, We should have hs
. tiine 10 brought up our resources, reconnoit,
: the position, and delivered our attack 10 such
d way that some result would have flowed fro
it.
= We bad every advantage Frsnkfn's 4
-, vision landed at West Point o. the rext da
: aud sedSEieks division on the day folOwiu
hose two divisions had the enemy waited 4
- other day at Williamsburg, would have cut Z
: nis communication, ard in that case We wou
!. have been superior 10 bis front, and have b.
= tao divisions IL his rear. bis basty retreat, 81
: perhaps bic capture must inevitably have (,
- lowed, and the great object Of keeping Frankl
80 long embarked, and finally sending him
- West Point, would have been accomplished
"On leaving Williamsburg We should ha
:, crossed the ChckahOniny and connected VI
= the navy 10 the James river. We should tn
have = united army, and the cooperation Of q
nav., and probably would have been in Rc
mOnd 10 Two weeks. The fact that We did o
know the character of the Chick ahOmiBv as
:, obstacle, A. il lay across oGr direct road
Richmond, that our transports we're on I
York river, and that the Railroad furnished
= good means Of supply 10 the army, that Ne
sired TO connect With NcDozeil coming f-,
fredericksburg, &c, determined our route
- taking il Ne lost essentially all that was wo'