Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1863-01-01

rivers, which might rise and cut him of
from the main body Of the command, and
@ l had no means Of crossing at Frsder.
would be prevented from send
ing him supplies and assistance, and al
though he might reach Saxfon's Station, and
not meet any force Of the enemy at that
time, yet il would be very hazardous move
ment to throw column like that beyond
the reach OF its proper support. Hooker
thanked me, and said be only made il AZ q
suggestion, and the weather, as it was rain
ing, rendered it ofcourse impossible to make
the movement he suggested"
Question. In answer to the question,
What reason do you assign for the failure Of
your attack
Answer. 1t was found impossible 10 get
the pen up 10 the works. The enemy's fire
was too hot The whole command fought
most CALAMITY. The enemy themselves say
they never saw our men fight so hard as on
that day.
Question. Were the enemy's works very
strong.
Answer. Their works were not strong
works, but they held strong positions. 1t is
possible the points of attack were wrongly
ordered. Esuch is the case, I can only say
l acted to the best Of my ability. It's also
possible that we would have done better TO
have crossed al SINNERS Neck, but for
what l supposed to be good reasons felt
we had better cross here, that we would
have more decisive engagement here, and
that If we succeeded in defeating, we would
break up the whole of the army here, which
l think now is the most desirable thing, not
even second to the taking of Richmond
For If this army was broken up, though
they might defend Richmond for while,
they could not make any protracted defense
there.
Question by Mr.. Gooch. DO I under
stand you to say that it was your understand
ing that General Halleck and Gen. Nieigs,
while at your headquarters in Warrenton,
and before you commenced the movement
Of your army, sent orders to Washington
for the pontoons to be Immediately forward
ed to Falmouth?
Answer.-That was my understanding
certainly.
Question. I'm your judgment, could the
pontOons be forwarded in time for you to
cross the Rappahannock when you expected,
if all possible efforts had been made by
those charged with that duty2
Answer.-Yes, if they had received their
orders in time.
Question. the non arrival Of these
pontoons at the time you expected prevent
your crossing when you expected to cross,
and interfere with the success of your plan!
Answer.-Yes.
Question. Since you have assumed the
command Of the Army Of the Potomac, have
all its movements been made by you accord
ing to your own Judgment, OF have some O
them been directed 4y the General ips Chief
the 0ectct1fy Uf VIZ 0r tnS fresidebt'U D
the United States?
Answer-They have all been made in &C
cordanes with my own Judgment. In some
cases have submitted my views, which
have been approved.
Question did you understand wa,
responsible for the forwarding Of the pom
toons to Falmouth?
Answer-l understand that General Hal
leck was to give the necessary orders, and
then the officers who should receive the Or
ders were only responsible for the pontoons
coming here. ! could have carried oui
that part of my plan through officers of my
own, but having just taken comand Of Al
army with which ] was but little acquainted
il was evident that it was as much as coult
attend to with the assistance of all my off
GERS to change its position from WarrentoI
to Fredericksburg; and felt, indeed ex-
pected, that all the parts ofthe plan, which
were to be executed in Washington, woult
be attended to by the officers at that plac
under direction OF the different Department
to which those parts OF my plan apper
tanned. ,r -ses. ,s,s,,.
Ouestion-Did you or not understan,
that you we're to be responsible for seeinl
that these orders were to be carried out.
Answer did not. never imagined
for moment that bad to carry out any
thing that required to be done at Washin
gton. General Meigs told me distinctl!
several days ago, in Washington, that b
never saw my plan Of operations until
showed it to him on that day.
Question. n.-Do understand you to say
in your statement that you expected Ger
! eral Franklin to carry the point at the el
treme left Of the ridge in the rear Of th
town, and thereby enable our troops to storl
and carry their Notifications?
Answer. did expect him to carry thi
point, which being done, would have place
our forces in the rear Of their extreme lett
and which l thought at the time woult
shake their forces on the ridge to such q
extont that the position 10 front could b
easily stermed aud carried. i... o..
| Question. what do you attribute tn
failure to accomplish thst2 a5.i
Answer. TO the great strength of Il
position, and the accumulation OF the enc
my's FORCES there. | expected that th
bridges would be built in two or thre
hours after they were unlosded, which vi
, about daylight. Instead Of that, those
j the right were not built until three o'clo,
: in the afternoon, and | had only the mea
Of getting across one division over Il
bridge on the right
Gen. Franklin's bridges were built abol
, noon, and were held by our troops on d
! opposite bank. This gave the enemy tin
. co accumulate their forces, which we
{ stretched along the river from Port Roy
: up TO the battlefield, before | was able
order the attack. There had been a gre
3 deal Of division of opinion among the cor
I commanders as to the place OF fcrossin
but after all the discussion upon the su
Q iect, the decision to cross over here "
Q we'll received and understood BY all
0 them.
8 Question, What was the conduct Of o.
4 GERS and men during the attack
0 Answer. the exception Of SIM
Q regiment, it was excellent enl il'
Question. Have you any knowledge
}. to the force Of the eneny2
# 1t is estimated at all the v
IS from I(lO. 600 to 200, 600 think il !