Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1863-04-30

road ut that time. mad towards tn
heaviest FIRE, and came up 10 rear Of thr
enemy, and in half m hour after my tnrt
became engaged the enemy was rOured
throwing away their arms, clothing aut
havresacks, and broke for the woods in tht
direction Of Richmond.
Q.-That was the second day Of thl
fght2
A.-Yes, sir; and that was the ending O
the fight at that battle. A part OF m!
troops occupied the camp that bad beer
occupied the day before by General Reyes
corps, and the grOund that he had lost thai
day. On Monday, the day after the battle
received orders-the directions were very
vagne-to make reconnaissance in force
through the camp and beyond it, did sc
without any resistance, except little pick.
ct firing, aud proceeded to, perhaps, With.
In three.and.R half miles Of Richmond, on
the WilliRmsburgh road. was then re-
called, aud directed To establish my com b.
maud on the ground that CAsey's division
had occupied on the first day Of the fight at
Fair Oaks.
Q.-whNt portion Of our army was en-.
gagged in that battle?
A.-KeyCs' corps, little more than one
half Of Hcintzelmnu's corps, md portion
Of Summers corps. IF'auy other troops
were engaged, do not know Of it.
Q.-At what number would you estimate
the actual force engaged on our side
Al should think that, all told, there
might have been twenty-five thousand
men. The telegram directing me to re.
turn from my reconnaissance was in sub
stance this: "Geueral Hooker will return
from his brilliant reconnaissance We can
not afford 10 lose bis division" All have
to say is, that had no expectation of be.
ing lost.
Q-Suppose that the next day after this
repulse oil the enemy at Fair Oaks, Gen.
eral Mcclellan had brought his whole
army across the ChickOhominy, and made
a vigorous movement upon Richmond, in
your judgment, as q military man, what
would have been the effect Of tho move.
meut2
Ain answer TO that would say that
at no time during the whole of that cam,
pagu did feel that we could not get TO
Richmond. Aud will say further, that
after General Mcclellan received his orders
to abandon llarrison's Landing, | went TO
bin voluntarily, and suggested that, with
the force we had there, We could take
Richmond, and pressed him to do it. So
confident was that we would be success.
ful that was willing to take the advance,
and SO assured him. This interview took
place ut twelve o'clock on Sunday. From
that interview | returned to my camp,
stopping on the way two hours. On
my camp, found on my table au
order from Gen, Mcclellan to prepare my
self with three days rAtions aud the usual
amount Of ammunition, and to be ready to
march at 2O'ClOCk on Monday. This order
was communicated to the whole army, md
firmly believe that order meant Rich
moud. bad said to Geu. Mcclellan that
II we we're unsuccessful it would probably
cost him his bead, but that be might as
we'll die for an old sheep as for lamb.
told him that | knew Of no better place to
put au army than between johnson, who
was NJ that time in Pope's front, md the
lefenScs Of Richmond; that the troops
holding those dG'ensCs would have TO march
to the succOr Of Jackson, and would be
to come out tand give battle out
side of their deiences, where | knew we
were always stronger than the enemy, But
before the time arrived for executing that
order, It was CounlermAuded, aud hence
the results of POpe's campaign.