The Manchester journal. [volume] (Manchester, Vt.) 1861-current, 1863-12-08


Aw ihg Pc ma azht bajlr
ae Wtara ld.eH 81 Vs. hors.
Anlha rarr ftlatsstay IA. recent
d aoae rs slate 10 achieving tl rrrM
victory 3 Graa - lbi. rejH q,
akse ITO ersiin Gfor, o.
Arm, fila Potomac baar a- &
Gslu o. aehere ds .a,e fe.ui
Ibere d smother aialalty phicb
tbs Ans q ,lc Panmaa Bias hai 70
utnd sitb. rs rdiatc vicinity
5 lbe Capitol ean. vi,tom any very
efea desparagrmcal ia d. authorize,
az Washington De- placed smona tbs
causes % ID. fsilare. h j. generally
conceded that iba Rrpul5irla form
y government. crest 81 sfe sad,an.
tage-, }. not v,II calcrl1cd ~ DE
inmcdi So control Of military oprra.
tons 10 the Geld. Military success Is
greatly dependent upon RI mia decis
on and ac ION. and tliis is ie,i secured
IS where one man has tbe sole and
undivided control TIE Western gem
eral have Ind iili. 10 q nnrh greater
extent than tie commanders q lhr
Army Of lhe Potomac The vicinity
of Tie latter 10 Washington has pIac-
~ them puuaIIy unde iI,e control ~
the aUlho ii.es II Washington. Their
movements mrs he result Of councils
hc'd ~ the Capitol ard 10 general
can move as If sure Of Lis t8o,.hold
when he knows that the plan on which
&c 4 acting may be lltown aside II
ans moment by bis Supporters and am
other adopted. No one having any
definite hnowledae Of whercthe author
~ and responsibility Of tie command
inr General ended aud that Of the
Government AT Washington commenc
ed, work important to tie success q
the campaign Was often leli nndone.
each surprising that The ether bad
seen 10 it, or possibly collision etlrc.
ted by both attempting 70 DO the same
thing il different ways In addition
10 this lbe corruption and political in.
flnence which always exists at The Cap
itoi has had disastrous effect upon
the Army which defends il.
What cannot be accounted for on
these three reasons must undoubtedly
b. lad to want Of geaeralship on the
part Of H. commanders. How much
there has been OF this will he esimat
ed differently by different persons &c.
coraingly as they estimate the extent
Of The influence Of the other difficulties
mentioned. Ccrlainly nothing can be
changed against the arms itself. II,
worst enemy you'd tind it extremely
diilicalt 10 poiut out q single instance
where it has not meet danger braycly
and endured hardship with fortilude
Although it has conquered no cities %
States il has doae lis share towards il
by defeating the enemy on morr than
one battlefield. Under all the d ih-
culiies with which il has labofcd, il
has met tie brarest, The best disci
pliucd, and the best appointed army
Of the Cootederacy With nearly il moi
quite as much success, as far us re
CARDS the contest itself, as the West
crn ar'uie. have those against which
hey Lave been opposed. And where
they have been placed together their
gallantry hts by no means fallen be-
hind that Of the Western sol liers, Tie
charges Of the ninth corps at Nieks-
burg and the capture Of Lockout
Mountain by tie Eleventh corps are
sufficient proof q this. Whatcycrihe
Army of tie Potomac may have fail
ed 10 accomplish it cannot be laid 70
my want Of discipline and yaior On
its own part.
4 Few days ago the army Of tie
Potomac was brought face d face with
the enemy. Tho country expected a
battle. and had no doubt but Tie bra
very Of our sollicrs would make it y
victory. The army has now returned
to is Old camping ground. While The
army Of the Tennessee has won a elo-
rioa. victory. the army Of the Po.
tomac has oace more beu fied to re-
tire from before the enemy without n
battle. The brave soldiers 81 that ar
my caunoi but feel IT, We nish for
their own .akes that they could have
been allowed 70 fight and beat tile en-
emy. Tie policy Of the Government
At present seems TO be to keep force
enough in Virginia 10 engage the at
,eniion Of Lee AID ii,hi ihe great bat