Vermont watchman and State journal. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1836-1883, 1863-01-30

I HfnN
Monroe, to assure her in person that the re-
port that he had been killed in battle was a
mistake. regret that my friend Joyce has
not had a Colonel's commission. He has
richly deserved it and yet the failure is not
surprising. The truth is, the organization Of
the regiment at the beginning, though we'll
designed, was unfortunate and this fact has
stood in the way Of the promotion Of both
Col. Whiting and 1t. Col. Joyce. But Joyce
goes home with honor. Well has he deserv-
ed the rest Of peaceful home, and the joys
Of family and friends.
THE PRESIDENT AND GEN. MCCLELLAN.
Day before yesterday the annexed interest
ing letter was used in the trial of Gen. Nc
Dowell, and thus has gained publicity. Moth
ing can more accurately and perfectly show
the relations, official and personal, Of the
President to Gen. Mcclellan, and Of the spirit
in which they were maintained. What faith
fulness, what frankness, what kindness and
forbearance to Gen Mcclellan, and yet what
fidelity to the country and to his own re-
sponsibility, this letter exhibits. 1t is pho
tograph Of the Presdent-of an honest, faith =
full, just and yet generous man He speaks
plainly, nay bluntly, to the point yet how
kind to Mcclellan, how anxious that he
should succeed, bo.h for McClelan's sake
and the sake Of the country; how cordially
does he say that he will sustain him. An
other point But you mus, act" This in
April last. Act, act, act That the Pres
ident thought was indispensable for the coun-
try He had before said it was necessary for
McClellan's good thus " 1t is indispens-
able to you that strike blow. am pow
erless to help this" Thus we sec that the
President has not been tagging behind every
body else, but striding in his long legs and
big boots far ahead Of them The anxious
cry for action, for victories, which every body
makes now, was made months ago by the
President. Now in view Of this letter, how
entirely unjust is the clamor made against the
President by those who call themselves
friends Of Mcclellan. Friends ; n; ; they
would strip of his patriotism and make paltry
politician Of him they would cut him off
from the fame which he has won, and may
still win, in his profession and leave him to
rust out, as candidate for the Presidency,
they hatter him, but rather mere tool in
their hands to make little party capital.
doubt whether Gen. Mcclellan has truer or
better friend, outside Of his family and the
near friends and associates Of his life, than is
President Lincoln himself.
Major Gen ucceaanMa; BssT slS AD5 sar !Ss22
complaining that you not properly sustained,
while they do not offend me, do pain me very much
Blenker's division Withdrawn from yon before YOU
left here and you knew the pressure under which did
it; and, as I thought aequeseed in it-eertanly not
without reluctance.
Amer YOU eit ascertained that less than 20 600 un-
organized men, without single field battery all
you designed to be cft for the defense Of Washington
and Manassas Junclon and part Of this even to
to General Hooker's old position.
Gen. Banks corps once designed for Manassas Jutc-
ton was diverted and tied up on the line Of Winchester
and strasbuTg and could not leave without again
posing the Upper Potomac the Baltimore aud Ohio
railroad. This presented (or would present, when Nc
Dowell and Sumner should be gomez great temptation
20 the enemy to turn back from the Rappahanuock and
sack Washington.
My explicit order that Washington shoudb by the judg
ment Of all the commanders Of corps be lef entirely
cure had been neglected. II precisely this that
drove me 70 dciaiu Mcdowell. l do not forget that
satisfied with your Arrangement 10 leave Banks
Manassas Junction; but when that arrangement was
broken up nothing substituted FOR IT, Of course
not satisfied was constrained to substitute something
for IL myself
And now, allow ask, "do you really think
should permit the line from Richmond via Manassas
Junction 70 this city TO be entirely OPEN except what
resistance could be presented by less than twenty thou
sand unorgauized troops This is question which the
country Will not allow evade.
There is curious mystery about the number Of troops
with you. When l tclcgraphed you the 9th,
ob aimed from the Secretary Of War statement, he
said from your returns making l06 900 then with
you and route you.
You now say you have but IS 0n0 when all en- route
you shall have reached you. How the discrepancy
Of % 900 be accounted for
As 20 General Woois command, | understand 1t is
dorg for you precisely what like number Of your
would have to do, II that command was away /
suppose the whole force which has gone forward for you
is with YOU by this time and, II so, think it - the
precise time for you 10 strike blow by delay the ens
my will relatively gain upon you; that Is he Will gam
faster by ortihcaons and reinforoemeuts than you
by rCinforcemeuts alone.
And once more let me tell you, it is indispensable
you that you strike a blow | am poweTless TO help
this You viii d. the justice to remember. always
stead Of fighting or Manassas only shifting,
I and not surmountng a difficulty that we would lind
the same enemy aud the equal intrench-
mcus either place. The country will not fail to note
lis now noting-that the present hesitation 10 move
upon inenohed enemy is but the story Of Manassas
| repeated
beg to assure you that have never written to you
o spoken you in greater Kindness ol feeling than
now with fuller purpose 20 sustain you, far as
in my anxious judgment consistently can But yo''
must act.
(SigneD A.ILNcoLS.