The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-01-03

BURLINGTON w
Msigs ct my hesdquaftefs on the night 1t the
llth and 18th of November. and, after discus
Ing It fully there, they sat down And sest tel-
'egrarns to Washington which, % supposed.
fully covered the case, and would secure the
starting Of the pontoon trains at once. lsup-
posed of course, that those portions Of the plan
which required to be attended to in Washing.
ton would be cal ried out there At once. l
could have sent officers Of my own there to at.
tend to these matters, and perhaps made .
mistake in not doing go. rs Gen. Halleck after
ward told me that ought not to have trusted
to them in Washington for the details. In re-
ply to the telegram had ordered to be sent,
Gen. Woodbury. telegraphed back that the pom.
toons would start on Sunday morning probably
and certainly on Monday morning, which
would have been on the 10Th or 18th Of Nov,
and would have been in time. They did not
however start until the 10th, and on that day
it commenced raining which delayed them so
much and the roads became 80 bad that when
they got to Dumfries, they foated the pontoons
of the wagons and sent to Washington for
steamer, and carried them down to Acquis
Creek, by water, sending the wagons around
by land. gs,
The pontoons did not get here till the 22d OF
Esd OF November. On tie 18th of November l
started the column down the road to Fredericks.
burg, not knowing anything about the delay Of
the starting OF the pontoons. because the tele-
gram announcing the delay did not reach War
renton Junction until had left to come down
here with the troops, and that telegram did not
oh sho IF
the 10th, when it was handed to me by an Or
derby, who had brought it down to Warrenton
Junction. After reaching here, saw at once
that there WAS no crossing the Rsppahannock
with the army at that time. 1t commenced
raining, and the liver began to rise, not to any
great extent, but did not know how much it
might rise. There were no means of crossing
except by going up to the fords, and it would be
impossible to do that, because of the inability
to supply the troops after they should cross-
Gen. Sumner arrived here with his troops in the
advance. He sent to me, asking me if be should
cross the river. He was very much tempted to
take bis own corps across to Fredericksburg by
Q ford near Falmouth. As there was no enemy
there except very email force, did not think
it advisable that he ehould cross at that time
The plan I bad in contemplation was, if the
stores and these bridges had come here as had
across the Rappahannock, fill the wagons with
as many small stores az We could, and having
beef cattle along for meat; then to make rapid
movement down in the direction of Richmond,
and try to meet the enemy and fight battle
before Jackson could make junction there
We knew that jackson was in the valley, and
felt that there was force enough on the upper
Rappahannock to take care of him. We felt
cei tain that as soon as the enemy knew Of our
crossing down here the force under Jackson
would be recalled, and we wanted to meet this
force and beat it before Jackson could make q
junction with them, or before jackson could
come down on our flank. and perhaps cripple
us. bad recommended that some supplies
should be sent to the mouth Of the Rappahan-
mock, With view of establishing depot at Port
Royal after we had advanced to Fredericksburg
After the first delay in starting the pontoons,
think they we're sent as quickly as they could
have been, and the supplies and quartermasser's
stores have always been in as great abundance
as we could have expected; for after the 10th
of November, the weather and the 70 Ids were
particularly bad Horses and mules, &C., were
sent down to US, SO that our cavalry and teams
we're in very good condition After it was as
certained that there must be delay, and that
the enemy had concentrated in such force as to
make it very difficult to cross, except by a mum.
Der Of bridges; we commenced bringing up from
Acquia Creek all the pontoons We could After
enough of them had been brought up to build
the bridges; called several councils of war to
decide about crossing the Rappahsnnock. It
was at first decided 10 cross down at SINNERS
Neck, about IL miles below here; but our de-
monstration was simply for the purpose of draw.
ing down there as large force of the enemy as
possible then decided to cross here; because,
800 10 - co1k Ca ~ a.. L.
not expect US to cross here, but down below. In
the next place felt satisfied that this was the
place to fight the most decisive battle; because
if VIC could divide their forces by piercing their
lines at one o. two points, separating their left
from their right, then vigorous attack with the
| whole army would succeed in breaking their
| army in pieces. The enemy had cut road
| along the rear of the line of heights where We
made our attack, by means of which they con-
nected the two wings of the army, and avoided
long detour round through bad country.
obtained from colored man, from the other
side of the town, information in regard to this
new road, which proved to be correct wanted
to obtain possession of that new road. and that
was the reason for making an attack on the ex-
treme left did not intend to make the attack
on the right until that position had been taken,
which 1supposed would stagger the enemy, cut
stuk tueH lihS All WV, ouu SuCu pGOpOseu 70
make direct attack on their front and drive
them out of their WORKS. succeeded 10 Blu Id.
ing six bridges and taking the whole army
across; the two attacks we're made, and We
were repulsed, still holding portion Of the
ground va had fought upon, but not our ex.
IRENE advance; that night went all over the
field on OLE right, in fact, was with the off,
GERS and men until nearly daylight; 1 found
the feeling to DO rather against an attsck-in
fact it was decidedly against it; returned to
my headquarters and after conversation with
Gen. Sumner, told him that wanted him to
order the 9th army corps, which was the
corps l originally commanded, to form the
next morning column of attack by regiments;
it consisted of some Is old regiments, and some
new ones, and desire the column to make .
direct attack upon the enemy's works.
thought that these regiments by arriving
quickly up after each other they would be able
to carry the stonewsll and the batteries front,
forcing the enemy into their next line, and by