The Ohio Democrat. [volume] (Canal Dover, Ohio) 1840-1900, 1863-04-10


Extracts from Gen. MIcCIeIIan's.
Report, COncerning the Sur-
render OF AaFDers Ferry.
rgWhile at Fredsrick, on the 18th, I
obtained reliable information Of the
movements and intentions Of the enemy,
which made it clear that it was necessary
70 force the passage Of the South Noun
tain range and gain possession Of Boons-
boro and Rogrersville before any relief
could be afforded to Harpers Ferry.
On the morning of the 18th / receiv.
ed verbal message from Colonel Miles,
commanding at Harpers Ferry, inform
ing me that on the preceding afternoon
the Maryland Heights had been aband-
oned, after repelling an attack by the
rebels, aud that the whole force was con
centrated at Harper's Ferry, the Mary
land, Louden and Bolivar heights being
all in possession Of the enemy. The
messenger stated that there was no ap.
parent reason for the abandonment of
the Maryland Heights, and that, though
Colonel Miles asked for assistance, he
said he could hold out certainly two
days. l directed him to make his way
back, if possible, with the information
that l was rapidly approaching, and
would undoubtedly relieve the place.
By three other couriers / sent the same
message, with the order to hold ont to
the last
do not learn that any Of these mes.
sengers succeeded in reaching Harper'S
Ferry. Ishould here stdtsth on he
l9th Ii0ds directedto assume command
of the garrison at Harper's Ferry but
this order reached me after all COM
munication toith the garrison ,oas cut
off. Before / left Washington, and
while it was yet time, l recommended
to the proper authorities that the garri-
son Of Harper's Ferry should be with
drawn, via Hagerstown, to aid in cover.
ing the Cumberland valley, or that, tax
ing up the pontoon bridges and obstruct
ing the railroad bridge, it should fall
back to the Maryland Heights, and
there bold its own to the last, In thi'
position it could have maintained itsel
for weeks. IL aOas.not deemed prope,
to adopt either of these suggestions
and achen the subject was left to my dis
cretiop ii 1Uas too late to do anything
eTcept to,try to relieve the garrison.
directed artillery to be frequently
fred by our advanced guards as sigma
to the garrison that relief was at hand
This was DONE, and learn that our fir
ing was distinctly heard at Harper
Ferry, and that they were thus mad,
aware that we were approaching rapid
ly, 1t was confdentially expected tina
this place could hold out until we. hat
carried the mountains and were in po
sition to make detachment for its re
lief The left, therefore, was ordered t,
move through Jefferson to the Soutl
Mountain at Crampton's Pass, it from
of Burkettsyille, while the center o
right moved upon the main, or Turner
Pass, in front of Middletown. During
these movements1 i had not imposedlonl
marches on the columns. The abseut
necessity of reitting and giving SOM
little rest to troops worn down by pre-
vious long continued marching and Sc
we're fighting. together with the hncer
tainity as to the actual position, strength
and Intentions of the enemy, rendered i
incumbent upon me- to move slowly ant
cautiously until the headquarters reach
ed Urbana, where | first obtained relia
BILE information that the enemy's objec
was to move upon Harper's Ferry ant
the Cumberland valley, and not npol
Baltimore, Washington or Gettysburg
The early and disgraceful surrender
Of Harper's Ferry deprived my opera
tions of results which would have form
ed a brilliant sequence to the substan
tial and gratifying success already re
lated. Had the garrison held out TWEEN
ty.four hours longer, ] should, 10 al
probability, have captured that part o
the enemy's force engaged in the attacl
on the Maryland Heights, while thi
whole garrison, some. twelve Thousand
strong, could have been drawn to rein
force me on the day of the decisive bat
tle--certainly on the morning of th,
18th. | aUould thus haze been Sn DO
sition to haze destroyed the rebel army
Under the same circumstances, had th,
besieging force on the Virginia side a
Harpers Ferry not been withdrawn,
would have bad thirty five orforty thou
sand less men to encounter at Antietam
and must have captured or destroyed al
opposed to me. As 1t ,0as. Ihdd TO en-.
gage an army fresh from a recent, ,anc
to them a great victory, and to reap Ht
disadvantages of their being freshl,
and plentyally supplied aOith ammu
nition and supplies"
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The Noble County ARair-.An.
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