The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-05-23


Hung high the glorious sun, and set
Nights cressets in her arch OF jet.
Lord, teach us, while the unsated gaze,
Delighted, on Thy works delays,
To deem the forms of beauty here
But shadows of a brighter sphere,
Mr., Emil. SCHALK ON THE LAST OPERA
TON ON THE RAPPAHANNoCK, AND THE
CAUSES OF ITS FAILURE.-To THE EDITOR
oE THE PREss-Dedr Sir: When battles are
fought in which thousands and thousands
of brave soldiers are inundated, butwhich
notwithstanding the great sacrifice, do not
obtain an adequate result for the enormous
loss of life, is it not then the duty of every
friend of the country to inquire into the
cause of the disasters which cover a whole
nation with mourning, and which, in its
history, remain dark spot on its glory?
The late battles OF Fredericksburg and
Charlottesville, with its hecatombs OF hui
man beings, may, like nearly all lost bat
ties of this war, be traced directly to the
mistake of the commanding general, and
it is but just that the whole country should
have clear insight into those mistakes,
for it may be that more errors in future
will be avoided.
Looking at the map, it will be seen that
the rebel army, in its entertainments near
Fredericksburg, held line running from
north to southeast; it's right wing was
extended as far down as Port Royal, on the
Rappahannock; and its left wing rested
above Fredericksburg, on the same river.
This army has only two lines of retreat
One toward Richmond, the other toward
Gordonsville. 1t cannot retreat to the east
or southeast, as such a course would car
~ him into the Potomac or York river
Under these circumstances, the natural
point of attack is the rebel left wing. If
this wing is seriously defeated, and the
victory followed up, the rebel army would
be pressed from its two lines of retreat to
the southeast; thrown against the rivers,
itwould be obliged finally to surrender
the same fate which befel the Prussian ar
my Immediately after the battle of Jena.
Crossing, therefore, above Fredericks-
burg, at United States ford, for instance,
marching rapidly to charlottesville, and
from there to point midway between
Charlottesville and Guinea, on the rail-
road, or, if the last move be considered too
daring, moving straight from Chancellors-
vile to Fredericksburg, would be the cor
rect stragetical move to obtain the desired
result, viz: the destruction Of the rebel ar
my. Utmost speed, concentration Of force,
and utmost daring, would guarantee COM
plete success.
Gen. Hooker arranged his plans of at
tack as follows: He had seven army corps
and of these, three were massed below
fredericksburg, to cross there and make a
feint attack on the rebels, two of the corps,
Immediately after crossing, to return and
join Gen. Hooker, who meanwhile, was
crossing with the four remaining corps
atseveral fords, some ten or twenty miles
above fredericksburg.
On Sunday, 9th of April, the movement
was commenced; on Monday it was con-
tinued, and on Tuesday morning the three
corps below Fredericksburg, and on Tues
day night and Wednesday morning the
four corps above Fredericksburg, made
good their crossing.
On Wednesday and Thursday the main
army moved to Charlottesville, some five
miles from the principal crossing place,
making five miles in thirty-six hours. Fri
day was occupied in throwing up entrench-
ments; Saturday the fighting seriously
commenced; Saturday evening, only, as it
appears, the two remaining corps arrived
from below. Sunday, another attack, and
repulSe of the main army. Meanwhile,
Sedgwick carries the entertainments behind
Fredericksburg. By Sedgwick's move
ment, two lines of operations are clearly
formed, the two Union armies separated
by distance of some twenty miles the
rebels in a central position between them
ried out, the whole cavalry under General
Stonemar is detached on a raid, in the rear
of the rebel army.
Gen. Lee, without needing the cavalry in
his rear, waits quietly in his entrench-
ments till the Union movement is fully de-
veloped. He easily discerns the teint from
the real attack. He throws his whole force
against Gen. Hooker, whom he confronts
on Thursday evening, giving up, mean
while, his entertainments near Fredericks-
burg. Hooker is beaten on Saturday.
On Sunday, scarcely is he on the defensive
when Gen. Lee, by means of his interior
line, forces marches Sunday night, and
throws, on Monday, the mass Of his forces
against Sedgwick, who the day before had
carried the Notifications near Fredericks-
burg. Sedgwick is beaten, crippled, and
scarcely escapes humiliation. After this
triple check Gen. Hooker gives up the con
test, and re-crosses the river.
BY what we have said above of the posi-
ton of the rebel army, it will be seen that
the crossing at Charlottesville by the
main force was entirely correct; but it will
be seen, too, that the crossing effected by
four corps only, instead of seven, or at
least six, was entirely incorrect. Had the
army consisted of seven corps, and marched
on Wednesday morning, in forced marches
to Fredericksburg, or in direction some
five or six miles south of Fredericksburg,
they would have been, by Wednesday
night, behind the rebel Entertainments.
The great decisive battle of the war
would probably have taken place Thurs
day, and would have been fought under
very different circumstances from those of
Saturday, Sunday, and Monday, where our
army was beaten in detail. The idea of a
General, who is on the offensive, whose
avowed object is the capture or destruction
Of whole army, making six miles in Sc
hours, just in the most critical moment OF
his operations, and finally, latter entrench-
ing himself, without being on the commu-
nications of the enemy" tells his soldiers
that the enemy has run away or to attack
him on his own ground, where he will de-
stroy him, has not its parallel in modern
times. Another quite as objectionable
mistake is the sending away of the cavalry
in a moment when great battle was near
~ certain to take place. 1t was the same
silly conduct which made Melas lose the
battle Of Marengo. The cavalry ought to
have formed the utmost right wing in the
large wheeling movement which our army
performed, and in which the left wing
formed the pivot.
General Hooker's operation is modelled
on the operations of Wursmer and Alvinci,
in 1896, in Italy, those of Jourdan, in 1899,
at Stockach, and in quite modern times on
that of the royal Neapolitan army, in 1860,
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