Semi-weekly standard. [volume] (Raleigh, N.C.) 1853-18??, 1863-07-14

officer iustiHes the Imprisonment or detention
To oppose this array of authorities and reason
Mr. Strong relies on two cases Aoleman vs. DooIii'
81 Howard 500, and "HiPs case" recently decl-
ded by the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama
With the decision in Ableman VS.. Booth, 81 How
ard 5O6, entirely concur, and agree with Ianey;
! Oh. Justice that it is "a new and unprecedehte1
attempt made for the first time by a State Court
to assume not merely exclusive jurisdiction put
jurisdiction controlling the District Court OF the
United States This decision of the Supreme Court
of the United States in no wise impugns the con-
current jurisdiction of the State Courts which has
| been settled by the authorities and reasoning to
| which we have referred. Two cases were present
| ed. Booth was arrested under warrant of the
| Commissioner appointed in pursuance to an act OF
Congress respect to fugitive slaves, under charge
of having aided in the rescue of fugitive slave;
and upon examination before the Commissioner,
probable cause being shown, he was committed to
answer a charge of the United States for INSIDE
meanor before the district Court in the State Of
| Wisconsin; he gave bail for his appearance, but
was afterwards surrendered by his bail and impris
oned by the marshal, whereupon he obtained writ
of RGbeGS corpus from judge of the State and was
discharged. After being discharged, the grand jury
| found bill of indictment against him In the Dis
trict Court, upon which he was tried and convicted
and sentenced to pay fine and be imprisoned
While in prison under this sentence, he obtained
| writ of hG6eas corpus from the Supreme Court OF
| the State and was discharged whereupon the Su-
| preme Court of the United States had the matter
brought before it on writ of error and decided that
as Booth in the first case was legally in custody oil
the marshal on a warrant of commitment to answer
charge for indictable offence before the District
| Court and in the second case m Jail under the
sentence of the District Court the State had no Ju-
rsdiction by hGbeaS corpus TO take him out OF the
custody of the marshal, or out OF the jail and dis
charge him. This the decision in the case, and
| if the language used by the Chief Justice in deliV-
arinnf hn IS I'll
facts of the before the court, there IS nothing
either in the decision the opinion which denies
the concurrent jurisdiction of the State Courts 1t
is true the language is susceptible OF wider mean
ing, and may afford room for an inference that the
learned Chief Justice I" goes outside of the record,
and expresses an opinion against the jurisdiction of
the State Courts in all cases. where one is restrained
ofhS liberty by officer or agent OF the government
of the United States, although the Imprisonment be
unlawful and is not authorized by the act of Con-
greSS under which the officer processes to act, but
in our opinion such inference will do great in
justice that able urist he surely could not have
Intended to put his 06iter GictuHl in opposition
to the series of authorities above referred to- with
out making any allusion or reference to them, or
any attempt to controvert the reasoning upon which
they rest. However this may be, the decision does
not conflict with the concurrent jurisdiction OF the
State Courts and the obiter dictum, if it be one is
not entitled to the weight of an authority and must
be treated simply as the opinion of an able lawyer
on question not presented by the facts before the
Court and entitled only to that degree Of conside
ration which its intrinsic merit will command
The same remarks are applicable to the case Of
Hill and others, recently decided by the Supreme
Court Of the State of Alabama. The petitioners
claimed to be entitled to exemption by reason of
bodily ncapacity, but had not been held unfit for
military service IN the field by surgeon under the
rule prescribed by the Secretary Of War. We full
" concur in the decision Of the case before the
l.. IL ~.
application of two persons, who claimed exemption
on the ground of being unfit for military service
in the field by reason of bodily incapacity" because
by the proper construction of the exemption act
only those persons are exempted, who shall be held
unfit for military service in the field by of
bodily Incapacity under rules to be prescribed by
the Secretary of War;" and according to these rules
it was necessary that the party should be examined
by Surgeon or Board of Surgeons appointed for
that purpose and the certificate of the Surgeon or
Board Of Surgeons was the only evidence of bodily
incapacity that could be acted evidence of the
fact; in that the parties were not unlawful
ly restrained of their liberty, but were lawfully in
custody of the officer of the Confederate States
der the authority of the acts of Congress according
to their proper construction. Consequently that
decision is not opposed to the jurisdiction Of the
State Courts when by the proper construction of
the acts of Congress, one who is not liable to
scription, or who is exempt is restrained of his
and reasoning of the learned Chief Justice which is
not applicable to the made By the facts before
the Court has received from US due consideration.
On the argument, this position was taken Con-
greSs may authorize the President to suspend the
writ Of hdbedS corpus this would not apply to the
State tribunals, and if the State Courts and Judges
have power to issue the writ when person is i'm
prisoned by an officer of the Confederate States,
the suspension of the writ, far as the tribunals
of The Confederate States are concerned would be
vain and nugatory. This reply answers the posi-
tion The act of Congress would specify the cases
in which the writ uni ht be suspended, or would in
general terms authorize the President to suspend it
in all cases where person shall be imprisoned by
order of the President. And as the acts of Con-
greSs made in pursuance of the Constitution
the supreme law of the land, it follows that such
an act would be as imperative on the State Courts
and Judges the tribunals of the Confederate
States.
This position was also taken: 1t is admitted that
should judicial tribunal of the Confederate States,
by its construction of an act of Congress, subject
citizen to imprisonment wrOngfully, the State
Courts, having only concurrent jurisdiction, could
not interfere to prevent the oppression and on
what ground can they have any more power to pre-
vent oppression the part of the Executive Gf we
may suppose such q case than to prevent oppres-
sion on the part of the Confederate judiciary? This
reply we think is a conclusive answer: The judicial
tribunals of the Confederate States have iurisdic-
tion consequently any adjudication of those tribu
nails would fix the construction of the act of Con-
gress and the State Courts could not review or re-
verse its decision whereas, the Executive branch
of the government has no judicial power, and any
construction it might give to an act of Congress
would be the subject of review either by the State
Courts the Confederate Courts, and when cti-
is unlawlully deprived of his liberty or proper
ty by an Executive officer acting under an erro-
construction of act of Congress, the State
Courts may give redress, as in Slocum VS.. Ma
berry, sup.
This further position was taken and seemed to
be mainly relied on: By the CONSUMPTION and ex-
emption acts, Congress invests the Secretary of
War, and the officers he is authorized to appoint in
order to carry them into effect with guIsi judi
ciaL pOOer, by which the enrolling officers have
jurisdiction to "hear and determine" all questions
which necessary to be decided in order to as