Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1863-11-19

Grams, by Ekillful flank movement, took
| Chattanooga and might there have rested,
| but that he got ambitious Of further laurels,
| was intoxicated by his easy success, became
| as rash as he had before been cautious, rush
| ed impetuously ahead. was caught off his
guard, soundly pummeled, and sent back with
| bloody nose, that his own indiscretion had
secured him
| The truth is that Gen Rosecrans never
really held Chattanooga until after that bat
| tie that he had to fight at Chicamauga to get
| his army into Chattanooga.
Let me explain as briefly as can.
The army was thrown across the river about
| thirty miles below Chattanooga. Between it
and the rebel position stretched Lookout
mountain, perpendicular wall of limestone
which no wheel could cross. The mountain
juts up against the river two miles below
Chattanooga, leaving a narrow pass by the
river bank through which the railroad runs.
| To have attemptedto march up to Chattanoo
ga through this pass would have been mad
| ness. 1t were easier to cross the river direct
| ly in front, and storm the works Neverthe-
| less, il was the quickest way to get into the
| place--if the rebels would only get out be-
| forehand.
| Twenty or thirty miles out from the river
| (south) was the first gap in Lookout Noun
trim; twenty miles further was the second.
| The reader who finds the location of these
| gaps has Gen Rosecrans' plan in a moment.
| He placed Crittenden's Corps near the river,
| at the foot of the mountain, ready to march
right up through the railroad pass, and so in
| to Chattanooga the moment the rebels should
| leave it. Thomas corps he sent out along
the mountain to the first gap, and McCook's
| to the second, with Instructions to cross over
| no hla
of their columns began to debouch on the
other Chattanooga side Of the mountain the
enemy saw his danger. If he remained in
| Chattanooga, we were on his line of supplies
| and south of him. He evacuated at once
| fastening southeastward to Lafayette. Crit
tenden, quietly lying a few miles down the
| river, of course, marched up through the
railroad pass at the rivers edge-no longer
| dangerous, with the enemy gone-and occu-
| pied the deserted stronghold.
| But did this give Rosecrans Chattanooga :?
| He held it very much as a straggler, who
should get away around to the enemy's rear
could be said to hold the enemy's line of com
munications. He had but corps there, which
the enemy could crush at any time. Hence
| forth his whole effort was directed to getting
his other two corps into Chattanooga, so that
he could re-unite his army before fight and
that Disadvantage acaS tonyht
Crittenden was not strong enough to hold
| Chattanooga, so he was moved southwark
not, as the public supposed, in pursuit of
| Bragg, but to get nearer the rest Of the army
for safety against Bragg. McCook was order
| ed to close up on Thomas, then the two, still
| fronting the enemy at Lafayette, were to close
| up, moving by the left flank, on Crittenden :;
| then the whole army continuing the left flank
movement, was to try to slip sideways into
| Chattanooga For the enemy was known to
| be heavily reinforced
Immediately after crossing the river, Gen.
Rosecrans had telegraphed here: a have
| repeatedly told you that the enemy can re-
intorce himself at will, and that he will be a
great fool if he does not do it." 1t was now
| certain that he was not g a great fool"
McCook was twenty miles beyond Thomas
Thirty hours or at most two days, were al
lowed him to reach Thomas's position Had
he performed the march in.the time expected
Chickamauga would not have been fought and
the army would have got safely into Chatta-
nooga. The order reached him on the ] 18th :;
by the evening Of the 18th he should have
joined Thomas, while it was not till the 10Th
that Bragg issued his general order from La
tayette, announcing to the army that it was
heavily reinforced, and ordering an advance
g to seek the enemy"
But instead of moving directly down the
plain mountain road McCook, under some
unaccOuntable delusion that it was not prac-
ticable, absolutely went back over the road
by which he had crossed Lookout Mountain,
and went down the valley to the gap through
which Thomas had crossed; and so, by this
roundabout route, came in Thomas rear,
consuming five days instead of thirty hours in
effectingz the junction. These five DAYS set
tied the fate of the army. He did not reach
Thomas till the evening of the 18th; on the
morning of the 10th Bragg had issued his Or
ders to advance; and the reinforced enemy
pressing forward and closing in, had already
compelled Rosecrans to bring Cdittenden
still further away from Chattanooga, and clear
up to Thomas left, to save both corps from
humiliation in detail.
As soon as McCook got up, Rosecrans start
ed the army for Chattanooga, but it was too
late. The enemy struck the head of his col
umn near Rossyille, on the 10th, and Chica-
manga followed. Technically it was de-
feat but ROsecrans still accomplished his
purpose-he got his army into Chattanooga,
though at tearfully heavier expense than
had been anticipated. II he lost the battle,
he still won the campaign. And campaigns
are bigger than battles.
l have been thus particular in tracing the
operations preceding and producing Chica-
manga, both because 1t is proper to correct
false impressions as to the reasons why the
battle was fought, and because these false
impressions had their effect in increasing
the War Departments dissatisfaction with
Gen. Rosecran's management. Until recent
ly the real facts have not been understood
here; and the Department, sharing in the
public impression that the battle was the i'm
prudent act of an overprudent man, grown
suddenly ambitious of greater triumphs and
rendered foolhardy by his easy successes, went
as much further than the public in its con-
demnatior, if its disposition to condemn had
been more aroused by previous causes
THE ELIMINATING DIFFICULTY.
But the dissatisfaction on this score was
light, compared with what now name as the
fourth and more immediate reason for the re-
moval: Gen Rosecrans' voluntary separation
from his Chief of Staff at the crisis of the
battle, and his retiring, "stampeded," as De-
partment officers are wont to express il. to
Chattanooga, while the staff officer insisted
on pressing forward to the front The Secre
tary of War is understood to have gone so
far, in speaking of this, as to denounce it as
| an act of absolute cowardice. None of us,
who remember the brilliant personal bravery
with which the hero of Stone River has illu-
mined so many triumphant battlefelds of this
| war; can fail to regret that any one should
have so far forgotten himself and forgotten
the bloody records of our glory as to harbor
such an unworthy thought for an instant; but
| it cannot be wondered that Gen Rosecrans'
unfortunate and inexplcable course should
have finished the work the rraviOuS