The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1863-06-19
The Struggle at Vicksburg.

What the plans of the rebels may be in
his mysterious movements, we DO not pre-
tend to know but we know plainly enough
what our policy ought to be in this juncture
of the war. We should send men enough
to Vicksburg to make its capture an absolute
certainty. We should take any risk posi-
BILE to be taken elsewhere that may be requir-
ed to compass this. We speak advised.y in
saying so. There is scal cely any calamity
possible to be imagined that might befal our
other armies for which the taking of Vicks-
burg would not more than compensate.
Let US see how it is for a moment. If
Gen Rosecrans or Gen Hooker were defeat
ed in consequence OF their armies being
weakened to reinforce Grant, the result would
be simply defeat: that We dave borne before
and can endure again. Beyond the loss at
the time, no great ultimate advantage would
accrue to the enemy. If Rosecrans were to
be driven back from Tennessee and even
through Kentucky, the ground could be re-
covered again, as it has once been already.
So of Hooker The rebels have been in
Maryland before, and they have gone back ;
and We are none the worse off for their Jour
ney. The worst that would be like to hap
pen to US would be series of disasters like
that of the second Bull Rln campaign last
summer. If Washington itself were to be
taken; great as would be the shame, and Sc
rious the loss, yet the enemy could not keep
it; and even that misfortune, SO far as its
bearing on the final issues of the war alone
are concerned, would have no such crippling
effect upon US as the loss of Nicksburg and
the Mississippi river must have upon the
rebels.
Here is the main point, which we hope
our military authorities have got clearly in
mind; but upon which they cannot by any
mischance cling too strongly, namely: There
is no stronghold of ours, which the enemy
may hope to get, either in Tennessee or Ken
lucky or Virginia or Maryland or anywhere
else, and achich they once occupying. they
would occupy forerer, mitlom al chance that
~e could take it again. Precisely such a
stronghold of theirs is Vicksburg Once III
our possession, it will remain 50 until the re-
suits of this war are wrought out; and it will
itself exert upon those results the mos. de-
cisive power. Sometimes an army is Of
more consequence than post: and some
times post is of more consequence than an
army. This is now case of the second
sort. Along the greater part of our line. the
first is true; but not as to the places that de-
eide the sovereignty of the Mississippi.
Especially in view of the fact that there our
n""y """ "oid What tho ~---y -~iAe, $3.50.
take the place in effect of an army.
Besides all this, if We set Nicksburg, We
shall capture or destroy an army with it. And
so far as loss of men alone is concerned, it IS
scarcely conceivable that we should sustain
one so great anywhere else, that it would
not be more than counterbalanced there
Still further, it is to be remembered that if
We fail at Vicksburg, it will not be without
the greatest loss to the army already fight
ing before that place; SO that We should
bring with certainty, and with no chance of
escape, that very evil upon Grant which we
had feared might befall some one else and
to avoid the possibility only of which we had
omitted to reinforce him more fully.
All sound reasoning upon the contingea.
cies of war points to the policy of making
our Mississippi army not strong only, bat IL
resistable. We trust our government means
so. But We remember that before now, we
have heard too much of sire myth "ample,'
" sufficient" and Of "no risk apprehended, -
when defeat was near at hand. This time
we want nothing ample or sufficient merely
but We want something mighty and over
whelming and absolute. If there is time
yet let the press and the people everywhere
demand it.