The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1863-01-03

We published in our last che report Of
Gen. Burns,ds on the battle Of Fredericks.
burg, without note o. commsnt. The re-
port was 70 frank and manly, assuming
/! 90 e.tnrely upon h,inself, ard sequittins
Ian others Of all responsibility for that ter.
rible disaster, thai, howsves nashws rosy
have been disposed 10 question his gone
ralship, it WAS impossible not to admire
his noble candor aud fearlessness; We
We're not, however; Il must - conferred,
without suspicion, arising ffcn.the greedy
haste with which that report W puhiish-
cd. that the generous. patare II Gen. 3
had been imposed upon 70 sereeh others
from their just share OF. responsibility ;
and in this view We are confirmed by the
testimony taken by. the committee .oh
Conduct Of the War in -rsieisnce to the
fredericksburg slaughter, DOW published
in full - of1tEs515o 20 cal e.e6u ID,
The Investigations Of that. committee
were directed 10 these points .s.,, g
LIST. How much of the late military dis
aster was due to delay in the arrival Of
the pontoon trains at Falmouth, and who
was responsible for the delay? -,
ID Under what circumstances was the
attack precipitated upon the enemys
works? yrsv..f srecau.. Il, .-l1 .Is
3d. Were there any combinations"
made with view Of facilitating the APP
proach to Richmond by the way Of Fred
ericksburg7 aa sa. ~ 3, s. 81.
Under the FIRST head the testimony on
all sides is distinct, that the plan of ADAM
doning the route TO Richmond via Culpep-
per and Gordonsyille, if such a plan was
ever entertained by Mcclellan, aud trans
ferring the army to fredericksburg, was
agreed upon between Gen. Burnside and
Halleck at Warrenton two days after the
removal of Mcclellan; that, as 4 part Of
this plan, Summers corps was tn proceed
to Frederic ksburg at once, and that, to
enable him to cross the river imp7edia sely
thorities at Washington assumed the re.
sponsibility Of seeing that the pontOon
bridges, Chen lying near lIarpers Ferry
should be transferred to Fredericksbu
in time to be there. Oh Sumners arrival.
Had they been there an agreed. Summer
could have crossed several days before the
enemy arrived, taking possession of those
terrible heights, and of course driven the
enemy half way to Richmond before
they could have stopped to forthy. But
it is we'll known the pontoons did not ar
rive in time, nor for ten days after the
time. Burnside states IN his testimony
that it was the distinct understanding at
Warrenton that
Gen. Halleck was to sire tie necessary or
dtrs, and then the officers who should Re,
ceive the orders were the ones responsible
for the pontoons coming here. | could
| have carried out that part Of my plan
! through officers of my own; but, having
Just taken command Of an army with
| which ! was but little acquainted, it was
! evident that il was as much as could
attend to, with the assistance Of all my
officers, TO change its position from War.
renton to Frederick sburs; and | felt, IN
| deed expected, that all tie parts Of The plzn
uhich p,re 10 Je erecutea in Washington
would be attended to by the officers .,
that place, under the direction of the diff
ferent departments to which those partsc!
the plan sppertaned'
| Gen. Ilalleck excuses himself, not by
denying such was the understanding, Blu,
by saying
al told him (Burnside) that ere-ytkins
,ras al his desperation he must make his ors
acquisitions and giUe his osen orders; that !
,o0,aia not intTfere erccpt 70 assiS. IN carrying
! Lys n,,f ,S ,u,Jrf mr. r1JgIy
| To fasten the failure Of this part Of the
plan still more fully upon 1.-The authorities
at Washington" Burnside says before
| Hallsck and Meigs left Warrenton, affer
the plan Of operations wa, agreed upon,
"HaLleek sat dorn and sent kilograms {.
| Washington, whieh as I supposed, fuliy covered
| the cass, and ,co1ld ,ecurs the starting Of III,
! pon,oon trains at onnc." st
The responsibility for the first grand
failure Of the plan thus rests clearly on
the shoulders of IIalleck and the authori
| ties at Washington, and not on the shout
ders Of Gen Burnside. --i
2 Under the second head, Gen. Burn
side says his plan was to make a feiat OF
crossing II miles below Fredericksburg,
| and thus induce the rebels to send large
, force from their works at Fredericksburg
in that direction; then suddenly to cross
! at fredericksburg, and before the enemy
could concentrate his forces. take his
| works. But, although the feint was made,
ana the enemy moved large forces ID Ito
direction anticipated, instead of being able
As proposed. 10 cross at Fredericksburg in
three hours, i. took him "a hours to cross,
and the enemy had again concentrated
bis forces. Why, after this, he made the
foolhardya ssault, he gives no better rea-
son that he thought it would succeed.
3. Under the third head, the testimony
shows total blank. Burnside iutimates
that he depended on Halleek to make
counter movements and checks. while
Halleck excuses himself by saying he left
all to Burnside. Thus while Burnside was
hopefully awaiting news Of Banks landing
at Suffolk or Petersburg, Halleck was
trusting to Burnside to keep all snug in
his department, while Banks was steering
on a w;ld-gcose chase to the Gulf. s.
In this view Of the case, what are the
country to understand 10 be the functions
Of Gen. Haileck at Washington? The
general understanding has been that it
was his duty to devise " military combinA-
ticns' at Washington, to be executed. by
the Generals in the field. But if Burus,de
and Grant, and Rosecrans, &c, are ex-
peeted to devise their own combinations,
and are not to depend on the authorities
at w ashington' for the execution Of anv
orders they may want to have filed, it
would be matters of curious interest to