The New York herald., 1863-04-21
Tn. War TN .hs soushwss'-TAs i~psnd-

important section of Middle Tennessee In
which the army of General Rosecrans occupies
the central position; and. in the same connec-
ton, we give some interesting details Of the
positions occupied by the rebels. their military
forces on hand. and of their probable designs
in this quarter of the vast theatre of this g-
gsntic war
1t is manifest that the enemy have very
formidable army in front Of General Rosecrans,
with several detachments operating upon his
Aanks--horse, foot and artillery-in addition to
numerous bands Of irregular cavalry or gueril-
las, cutting up his supply trains and transports
in his rear. The grand design of all these
movements, we think, is disclosed in the letter
of the rebel Governor Harris, of Ten
nessee, in which he promises his seces-
sion fellow citizens that, with the return
of the season of low water in the Tennessee and
Cumberland rivers, when Rosecrans shall be no
longer able to use those important channels of
communication, his army viii Be attacked aud
driven out, and Tennessee will be fully reclaim
ed to the Confederate States" While his river
communications are still open and nayigable, it
is important, therefore, that General Rosecrans
should advance upon the enemy and spoil their
calculations by driving them out Of the State
Bnt we hear Of no active steps towards an ad-
vance on his part. What is he waiting for? We
suspect that he is awaiting the results of Gen.
Grants inexplcable strategy against vicksburg.
We dQ not pretend Or desire to know anything
Of t6ss plans SSf tie War Office; but from the
manner in which they are working in the South
west, we have some reason to fear that they
will end there in still another budget of blum
ders - ...xs<x
1t appears to u.s., however, that the rebel
army Of Tennessee might be routed and dis
persed, and the rebel stronghold of vicksburg
reduced, by very simple process. Let the
army Of General Grant be joined with that Of
General Rosecrans, and the two together will
make very short work of the army of Bragg
Conceding that the army Of Pemberton, from
Vicksburg, with Grants abandonment of that
place, may come up to the support of Bragg
his forces will be still far inferior to ours. Nor
can Pemberton afford to withdraw more than
half his forces from vicksburg, with half dozen
gunboats left to watch him. Unquestionably,
therefore, by this junction Of Grant with Rose
Grams Bragg would be defeated and driven of,
with his army 80 cut up and so demoralized and
scattered in search Of food that our victorious
forces by an interior line, through the heart of
the enemy's country, could move down into
vicksburg without further serious resistance.
In the meantime the gunboats could do all that
Grant can do on the Mississippi river; and there
is no other position in all that country in which
he could not fight the army of Pemberton more
advantsgeously than behind its strong defences
of Vicksburg. a b
The stupendous rebel Notifications of Colum-
bus, on the Mississippi, were taken at Fort Dom
elson, on the Cumberland, by the simple pro-
cess of turning them. So Vicksburg may be
turned in Tennessee, by the junction Of the ar
mics Of Grant and Rosecrans. 1t is these divi-
sions and subdivisions of our forces st many
places which so weaken our movable armies
Is to enable the enemy In almost every great
field engagement to bring superior force
against us, with hardly half our aggregate num-
Der of soldiers in the field. Let the government
leave to take care Of themselves all unimport-
ant towns and places captured from the enemy,
and look simply to the subjugation of the ar
mics of the rebellion, and the work will soon
be done. Napoleon Bonaparte did not hesitate
to leave towns and cities and strong fortresses
untouched behind him, while aiming for the
main army Of his enemy, the destruction Of
which he very well knew would give him pos
session Of the enemy's country and everything
in it, By this simple system Of warfare, and
only by this system, can this rebellion be put
down.
The rebels have boastingly told us, and re-
peatedly, that we may take Charleston, Rich
mond, vicksburg and Mobile, but that while
they have three hundred thousand soldiers in
the field they can still maintain the war These
rebel strongholds are only important in proper
ton to the rebel troops, the artillery factories
and warlike stores aud lines of communication
which they cover. Corinth, while the army
of Besuregard was there, was desirable place
of capture; but after his evacuation with his
troops, artillery, &C., 1t was Of no account But
all these rebel strongholds may be turned by
the simple programme Of two great armies, one
East and one West, striking at the main armies
of the rebellion by interior lines, instead Of
operating around the edges of great circle.
We rely upon the practical common sense Of
President Lincoln to try this plain aud infalli-
BILE system in the Southwest; for surely after
the anaconda system has had two years Of trial,
and has been found to be advantageous only to
tbe enemv. we NAV hone that in this impend-
ing campaign It Is to be abandoned.
ATLANTIC CABLE.-It is encouraging in these
days Of commercial depression to know that
the merchants are taking q deep interest in
telegraphic communication with Europe. Not
only is this manifested In their anxiety to have
cable laid, but many have gene to work, sub