The weekly Ottumwa courier. [volume] (Ottumwa, Iowa) 1857-1872, 1863-03-26

better, being GU ite able to understand the
wisdom Of the policy adopted by the gener.
al, to insure success in the stupenduous in
terprise in which the country was engaged
and yet with actious spirit and with the
sole object of getting into power themselves
took advantage Of the excitement Of the ig
norant multitude to paralyze the energies
Of the Government.
That hideoua moral ieprosy, which seems
to be the sad but invariable attendant upon
al political discussions in a free government
corrupting the very sources of public life,
breeding only the base spirit of faction,
had taken complete possession Of tho oppos
tion, and in its sordid calculations, the dis
honor Of the country. or the danger Of the
army, was as nothing, provided the Office,
the power. and the patronage of the govern
ment were secured in their hands. It mat
tered little to them. provided they could
drive the ministry from Office, whether ITS
downfall was brought about by blunders in
Spain, or by the Kings obstinacy about
Catholic Emancipation, or by an obscure
quarrel about the influence of the Lords OF
the bed chamber. The sincerity of these
declaramations Of the opposition was Curl
ously enough put to the test sometime az
terwards, when the Ministry, wesried by
the factious demagoguism with which all
their measures were assailed. and under
standing perfectly their significance, boldly
challenged their opponents, if they were in
earnest to make definite motion in the
House Of Commons. that Portugal should
be abandoned to it's fate. The move COM
pletely unmasked their game, and for a
time silenced the clamor, for it was perfect
ly understood on oil hands, that deep in
the popular heart, undisturbed by the
storms which swept over its surface, there
was thorough and abiding conviction Of
the absolute necessity Of resisting the pro.
gress of Napoleon's arms and that the real
safety Of England herself required that that
resistance should then he made in Spain.
Still. this noisy clamor did immense mis-
chief it weakened the government. it pro-
lcnged the strife, it alarmed the timid, it dis
couraged the true. and It so far deceived Ma
poleon himself, that, thinking that in these
angry invectives against the government he
found the real exponent of English senti-
timent, he concluded, not upnaturally, that
the people were tired and disgusted with
the war, and that the privstions which it
occasioned were like cancer, slowly but
surety eating out the sources of national
life.
In the midst of these violent tumults at
home, Wellington was silently preparing
for his great work within the lines of Tor.
res Vedras. 1t would not be easy to over
rate the difficulties by which he was sur
rounded. He was fully aware of the out
cry which had been raised against him he
knew that from Cabinet so weakened by
internal dissensions az to be on the verge
of overthrowing from the vigorous assaults
OF the opposition. and from its own ulpcpu-
larity occasioned by the failure of the Wal
cheren expedition and the disasters in the
Peninsula, he could expect no thorough and
reliable support Indeed the government,
almost in despair, threw the whole respon-
sibilty for the military measures on the
Continent on him alone. He accepted the
responsibility in q most magnanimous
spirit. ~ conceive" he writes" .sthat the
honor and the interests of the country re-
quire that we should hold our position here
as long as possible, and, please God, will
maintain it ss long as can. will neither
endeavor to shift from my own shoulders
those of the Ministers, the responsibility for
the failure, by calling for means which
know they cannot give, and which perhaps
would not add materially to the facility Of
attaining our object; nor will I give to the
Ministers, who are not strong, and who
must feel the de'icacy Of their own situation
an excuse for Withdrawing the army from
a position which, in my opinion, the honor
and interest of the country require they
should maintain as long as possible" Ami.
mated by this heroic sense of duty, the
Commander-in,Ch Chief prepared to contend
against the 200, 900 men under Massena,
whom Napoleon had sent to chase him into
the sea. He had. to oppose this immense
force, only 5000 English soldiers, and
about the same number of Portuguese toler-
ably organized. Secure within. the lines of
Torres Vedras, he quietly waited until the
want Of provisions, and the utter hopeless
ness Of an assault upon his position forced
upon Massena the necessity of retreating.-
Then instantly pursuing. in series of bat
ties, Of almost daily occurrence, he drove
Massena out of Portugal, and reached once
more the Spanish frontier in May. 1911,
nearly three years after the English had
sent An army to the assistance Of the PENN
sula. Here he rested for long time, max
ing preparations for the siege of Badajoz
and Ciudad Rodrigo. operations requiring
time, and the success of which Was essen
tai to the safety of the army in its further
progress. Still, SO little was Wellington's
position, military and political, understood
in England, even st that time, after oil the
proofs he had given Of consummate ability,
that public clamor was again reused against
the mode adopted by him for conducting
the war. As there were no disasters at