The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1863-01-26
The Army of the Potomac.

ne IIHJ VI eHS l. ObStudO mas naO all SNcHll Vi
history, aud has figured more couspicuously,
through its Generals and its fruitless campaigns
than any other of the armies of the Republic.
Since October, 1861, it has been in numbers and
armament the most power ul ofthe Union armies,
and yet, aside from defending Washington, it has
accomplished less in substantial advantages
against the enemy, than has been achieved in any
, other department. Why is this ? We believe
the question may be answered in single sen
tenceit has been more poorly Differed than any
other army. We don't mean by this that it ha
not had some good officers, and even many, who
might, if they had been SO disposed, have made
the war in Virginia as successful to our arms a
elsewhere, bat we do mean that, for the purpose
OF suppressng treason in the most effective way,
it has been, in the main, in charge Of the wrong
che ltains.
This fact is being every day made more appa
have been going on at Washington, before courts
martial, for the last few weeks. The most nota
BILE case,and the one which, in its results so far
thstsoemn judgment Of a court Of military mel
can establish anything, proves that some Of The
officers of the Army Of the Potomac were not Fl
for the duty which they had to perform, is the
case OF Fitz John Porter, who has just been dis
missed the service. The charges against this off
Ger were preferred by Gen. Pope, and distinctly
and with particularly specified the instances ii
which Gen. Porter practically refused to fight the
enemy in obedience to the command of his supe
rior officer, when, ii he had obeyed, the rebel ar
my might have been disastrously defeated at The
second battle of Bull run. The court found these
charges proved, and visited upon Gen. Porter, by
their Judgment, the heaviest punishment, short o
death, which military officer can suffer. Gen
Porter was nquestionably, in skill an excelIen,
officer. This he had proved before the present
war, and he gave signal evidence of it on the Pc
ninsula. His refusal to aid Pope was not because
of any cowardce, or any lack Of ability to com.
prehend the necessity value of his services, bu,
simply because the commands came from John
Pope, and not from Geo. Is. Mcclellan. He
purposey declined to aid the Union forces in d
critical moment, when, in the judgment of militia
~ men, that aid might have decided the battle
and made glorious victory Of what turned out tc
be disastrous defeat. This is the simple and
unexaggerated statement of the finding of the
coagt which tried him, and will remain the verdict
of history.
Very soon after Mcclellan took command o
the Army in Virginia politicians began to work
we bel eve with the full and hearty approval 0
that General, to make the army an engine which
should control the Government, instead of being
controlled by (which should dictate the policy O
he war to the Commando Chief in the White
House, instead Of yielding unquestioning obedi
encc to the head of the civil power in the Nation
We now know that the long delay on the Poto
mac last winter was due wholly to Mcclellan
who moved at last only after repeated perempto
nv orders, and who it is now impossible to believe
could have had any military reason for this delay
And we know now that from that time forward
until he was relieved from his command, his one
great offence was disobedencs of orders from hi
superior oficers--one of the gravest of military
crimes. In revolutionary times the seeds of in
subordination, when once sown, spring up rapid!
and hasten to their fruitage, and we cannot won
der, when the Chief Of the Array of the Potomac
sets the example, that his subordinates shoul'
make haste to follow his teachings. In short
Mcclellan and the pro-savery politicians ha'
played with the army the part of the dog iu tn
msnger-they would not themselves use it eff