The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-12-26

| There are good reasons why troops should
| be sent to assist General Rosecrans' right
with all possible dispatch. Communicate
with Sherman to assist you, and hurry for
ward reinforcementsa spreviously directed.
| .snl H. w. HALLLCK, ,
| General-in-C Chief.
| Major General HURLBUT, Memphis.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
| WASHINGTON, d. c., Sept. IA, 1868.
| There are several reasons why you sEo'd
| reinforce Rosecrans with all possible dis
patch. 1t is believed that the enemy will
concentrate to give him battle. You must
! be there to help him. ~
w. II. HALLECK, General-in- Chief.
Major General BURNSIDE, knoxville.
In addition to Gen. Burnside's general
| instructions, number of dispatches of
the same purport as the above were sent
to him. Generals Schofield and Pope were
directed to send forward to the Tennessee
| line every available man in their depart
ments; and the commanding officers in
Indiana, Ohio and Kentucky were ordered
to make every possible eXertion to secure
Gen. Rosecrans line of communi cations.
Gen. Meade was urged to attack General
Lees army while in its present reduced
condition, or at least prevent him from
sending off any more detachments. 1t
seemed useless 70 send any more troops
into East Tennessee or Georgia, on account
of the impossibility to supply them in a
country which the enemy had nearly sex-
hausted. Gen. Burnside's army was on
short rations, and that of the Cumberland
llnadequately supplied. Gen. Rosecrans
had complained of his inadequate cavalry
force, but the stables Of his depots were
lover-crowded with animals and the hors-
es OF his artillery, cavalry and trains were
dying in numbers for want of forage
AS three separate armies were now to op-
crate in the same field, it seemed necessary
to have single commander in order to Sc
cure more perfect cooperation than had
been obtained with the separate commands
OF burnside and Rosecrans. Gen. Grant,
by his distinguished services and superior
rank to all the other Generals in the West.
seemed entitled TO this general command
But, unfortunately, he was at the time in
4 New Orleans, unable to take the field
Moreover, there was no telegraphic COM
munlcatlon with him, and the dispatches
OF the 18th, directed TO him and Gen. Sher-
man, did not reach him until some days
after their dates, thus delaying the move
ments of Gen. Grants forces from Vicks-
burg. Gen. Hurlbut, however, had moved
The troops OF his own corps, then in West
Tennessee, with commendable prompt
ness.
These were to be replaced by reinforce
ments from Steele's corps, in Arkansas,
which also formed part OF Gen. Grants 5
army. Hearing nothing from Gen. Grant
or Gen. Sherman's corps al Vicksburg, it
was determined on the 23d to detach the
f llth and 18th Corps from the Army of the
Potomac and send them by rail, under the
command of Gen. Hooker, TO protect Gen.
Rosecrans' line Of communication from
bridgeport to Nashville. 1t was known
that these troops could not 20 Immediately
TO the front. 10 send moro men to Chat
; tanooga, when those already there could
not be fully supplied, would only increase
the embarrassment, and probably cause
the evacuation of that place. In other
words, Hooker's command was temporari-
~ performing the duties previously assign
ed to the reinforcements ordered from
; Grants army.
[ Here Gen. Halleck gives an account et
the battle of Chickamauga. concluding as
follows:l
I Division after division was pushed for
ward to resist the attacks of the enemy,
when, according to Gen. Rosecrans order,
Gen. Wood overlooking the order to close
up on reynolds, supposed he was to sup
! port him by withdrawing from the front
and passing in the rear of Gen. Bra nan.
BY this unfortunate mistake, a gap was
, opened in the line of battle. OF which the
enemy took instant advantage, and striking
Davis in the flank and rear, threw his
whole division into confusion. Gen. Wood
, claims that the orders he received were OF
such character as to leave him no option
!, but to obey them in the manner he did
, Pouring in through this break in our line.
the enemy cut off our right and right cen.
ter, and attacked Sheridans division.
which was advancing to support our left.
After gallant but huitless efforts against
this rebel torrent, he was compelled togiye
way, but afterward rallied considerable
portion of his force, and by a circritous
route joined Gen. Thomas, who now lad to
breast the tide of battle against the whole
: rebel army. Our right and part1of the
r center had been completely broken. and
l fled in confusion from the field, carving
with them to Chattanooga their Command.
ers, Generals McCook and Crittendenl and
also General Rosecrans, who was: d that
part of the line. His Chief of sstafr. Gen.
t Garfield, however, made his way to the
3 left and joined Gen. Thomas, whoistill re-
manned immovable in his position. His
ranks had assumed a crescent form. with
its TANKS supported by the lower spurs Of
the mountain; here, like a lion a. bay. he
repulsed the terrible assaults Of the enemy.
=. About $3.50 P. M, the enemy discovered a
gap in the hills iu the rear of his right fink.
; and Longstreet commenced pouring his
massive column through the opening. II
II Major General Gordon Granger, who had
been posted with his reserves to cover our
, left and rear, arrived upon the field at this
: critical moment. He knew nothing of the