Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1863-04-08
RFP0RT az THE COMMITTEE ON THE
ToNDUCF OF THE WAR,
meCIeIIan Reviewed and Condemned.

can be noted at this time. The report
states the objects for which these investi-
cations were instituted, the Committee
saying that if the Army of the POtOmsc
had fulfilled the expectations which were
warranted by its numbers, its discipline,
its courage and its appointments, the re-
belliOn would long since have been closed.
Their main object in their investigations
has been, therefore, TO ascertain ,Oby these
expectations have been disappointed.
They have taken the testimony of about
two hundred witnesses, including about
one hundred Generals, aud in the report
they set forth as clearly anddispassiOnate-
ly,as possible the historical facts which that
large body Of evidence. establishes.
The battle of Bull Run in 1861 and that
of Balls Bluff in the same year are treat
ed in separate reports. The pres ent re-
port speaks Of ths organization Of the
army Of the Potomac at the time McClel-
Ian assumed command, which then num-
bered 10000 men, we'll armed and equip
ped. The organization Of the army into
corps de armee was opposed by Mcclellan
but ordered by the President in March
1882, but suspended in May in conse-
quence Of McClellan's disapproval. The
report says:
ain October, 1861, the Navy Department
applied for aid from the War Department
in opening the Potomac. The proposition
made was that the gunbOats should des-
troy the rebel batteries at Matthias Point,
and that troops should then be sent to
hold it. The President favored it and ap-
piled to Gen. Mcclellan, who promised to
send 1000 troops at certain time down
the river. The Navy Department had the
! transports ready at the time designated,
and Captain Craven had his gunboais on
hand, but the troops did not arrive. Gen.
Mcclellan, on inquiry from Assistant Sec
retary Fox as to the reason of his failure,
! said he feared the troops could not be
landed. Mr.. Fox replied that the Navy
Department would be responsible for their
landing. It was then agreed that they
should be sent the next night. But they
did not come or we're they ever sent The
only reason assigned was that Gen. Nc
Clellan feared it might bring on general
engagement.
The removal Of the army to the PENN
sula against the judgment of the Presi-
dent, and the circumstances under which
the removal was effected are next consid-
cred. These points have been made pub
lie already. The officers of the army,
called to testify before the Committee,
stated their belief that after the battle of
Williamsburg the Federal army might
have marched right into Richmond. Of
that battle the report says:
The battle Of williamsburg appears to
have been fought under many and serious
Disadvantages. Nothing was known Of the
nature Of the country or the defensive
works Of the enemy until our troops ar
rived before them; there was no controll-
Ing mind in charge Of the movements
there was uncertainty in regard to who
was in command each general fought as
he considered best; and, by the tine the
general commanding appeared on feld,
the principal part of the fighting was
over"
Of the battles of Seven Pines and Fair
Oaks, they say:
The officers engaged in thst battle,
who have been examined, testify that the
army could have pushed right on to Rich
mond with little resistance; that the enc
my were very much broken and democrat
Ia, l4V"iig sNay arms, clething, &C.,
that might impede their fight"
OF the seven days fighting and the re-
treat to James river, the Committee say:
at would appear, from all the informa-
ton your Committee can obtain, that the
battles were fought, the troops handled,
new dispositions made and old ones
changed, entirely by the corps command
ers, without directions from the Com
manding- He would place the
troops in the morning, then leave the
field and seek the position for the next
day, giving no directions until the close
Of the days fighting, when the troops
would be ordered to fall back during the
night to the new position selected By him.
In that manner the army reached James
river"
The report of the Committee then sub
mits correspondence between General Hal
leck and General Mcclellan, in which the
former urged, with earnestness and impa-
tience, the hurrying forward Of troops to
the aid Of General Pope, and the latter as
signed various reasons, such as lack of
transportation, etc, for not complying
more rapidly with these orders. The gen.
eral result is-stated in the following oues-
ton and the answer from General Halleck:
Q.-Had the Army of the Peninsula been
brought to cooperate with the Army |
Of Virginia with the utmost energy that |
would have permitted. in
your judgment, as a military man, would /
it not have resulted in our victory instead |
Of our defeat.
Al thought 50 at the time and still
think so.
THE BATTLES IN MARYLAND.
The Committee submit testimony in re-
gard to the command held by General Nc
5lellan after the repulse of Pope, and to
lis movements in Maryland. On the 1Ith
# September General Mcclellan wrote
rom Rockville as follows:
"I believe this army fully appreciates
he Importance Of victory at this time.
md viii fight well; but the result of oen-
raj battle, l0ith such odds as the snenly ao,0
.PPsaTs to hare against US, NIGH, to say the
east be doubtful; and, if we should be de-
eated, the consequence TO the country
would be disastrous in the extreme. Under
hese circumstances, would recommend
hat one or two Of the three army corps
low on the Potomac, opposite Washington,
e at once Withdrawn, and sent to reinforce
his army. would also advise that the B
orce Of Colonel Miles, at Harper's Ferry. I
There it can be Of little use, and is con. |
inually exposed to be cut off by the enc
~, be Immediately ordered here. This