Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-01-03
HISTORICAL PARALLELS.

20, SVoa aieci inc supplementary DcSpdtcueoj
Correspondence, and Memoranda" Of the late Duke
OF wellington, as recently published by his son,
had reached this country, we instsnced the points
OF comparison between some Of the military opera
tons OF Wellington in the Spanish peninsula and
those which have marked the history Of our own
war.
British reviewer, in commenting on this cam
paign OF Wellington, as disclosed in the papers de-
sIguated, and in the Gurwocd SERIES observed that
cit affords proof how, in carrying on protracted
contest, settled and constitutional power, even
under very unfavorable conditions, may have ele-
ments OF strength and of ultimate success which shall
overthrow military despotism, though guided by
the highest individual genius" And the final
success Of this campaign was reached in spite OF
the great incapacity and administrative plumbers
frequently displayed by the British Government,
who on several occasions lost the opportunities and
wasted the resources of the nation as they failed
to appreciate the nature Of the struggle or the skill
and wisdom Of Wellington. Lord Castlereagh, for
instance, drew up plan of campaign on paper,
which had for its object the capture of Lisbon by
isolated corps detached from England at different
times, proceeding different lines Of operations,
and subject to happy arrangement that brought
three Generals-in-chief together to thwart each
other at the decisive moment strategic achieve
ment which should "give pause to such English
critics as might otherwise feel tempted to remark
invidiously the infelicity Of the military comb-
nations devised in this city for the "capture Of
jackson in the valley Of the Shenandoah after
the expulsion of Gen. banks from that region in
the month of May last
We observe that the lesson supposed to be taught
by this interesting chapter in British history has
been educed from the political and military annals
of that time by Mr. Charles J. Stlle, in the shape
Of pamphlet entitled How Free People con-
duct Long War" He draws parallel between
the conduct Of the English people during the Pen
insula war and the conduct Of our people now. He
finds that the English were by turns unduly Ella
ted and depressed, that complaints of Incompetence
aud mismanagement were constantly made and tie
Administration vehemently attacked, that the bur-
dens of taxation were heavier, the finances more
disordered, and the sacrifices made by the people
greater than any thing of the kind known in any
previous war"
Many citations are made for the purpose Of show
ing the dependency into which the people were
thrown by the frequent reverses that overlook the
British arms in Spain. AT one time, indeed, uni
versal distrust seized the public mind the clamors
against the Cabinet and against the Generals in the
field were violent and unintermittng and nothing
but the constancy of few statesmen and Of the great
commander Wellington enabled the nation to per-
sist in its designs. 1t was, doubtless, owing as
much to political divisions at home as to the inhe
rent difficulties of the undertaking, that the English
arms did not succeed in driving the French from
the Peninsula until after five years Of stupendous
and heroic exertion. How the commander in the
incompetence in the military direction at London,
and how his energies were chilled by the con-
seriousness that he could not rely on the generous
support of the political authorities, it does not
have been any very particular part of the writer's
object show in the present pamphlet though these
topics are not wholly overlooked. Aud it will not
be denied that they constitute of the elements
which largely tended to make the peninsular cam
paign of Wellington tedious and costly. Under
this head Napier says:
sWengons campaigns furnish lessons for generals of
all nations but they must always be especial models for
British commanders n future continental because
he modified and econcied the great principles Of art with
HE peculiar dieies ioheh attend generals controlled by
politicians ,oho prefer parliamentary intrigue national
arrests An English commander trust his forums
lie dare not risk much hooeper conscious he may Of per
sonaI resources when disaster will be his ruin at home
his measures must be subordinate to this primary consdcrd
ton yelling ous caution, springing from that source
has led friends and fees alike into wrong conclusions TO
his sysem Of war the French call it want of enterprise
tmidty the English have denomnaed it the Fabian sys
tenn These are phrases His system was the same
as that Of all great generals"
It is not difficult to collate the peculiar diff
culties" which thus attended Wellington, with
similar experiences in the career Of more than
one of our own Generals. For instance, it ap-
pears from the testimony of General Burnside,
borne before the Committee Of Investigation ap-
pointed to inquire into the circumstances of the
battle of fredericksburg, that the Administration
after certain date retained Gen. Mcclellan in
command of the Army of the Potomac only be-
cause Gen. Burnside refused to supersede him.
Gen Burnside says;
On the 9Th or 9Th of November received an order from
the President Of the United States directing me to take
command of the Army of the Potomac and al copy of
the order relieving Gen Mcclellan from that command
This order was conveyed to me by Gen Buckingham ,vho
al tot ha