The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-07-28
TUESDAY MORNING. July q. 1858


The uavasisn sf renssylvaata
Fools Alone says Napoleon /, ''jaAgs Of
the wisdom OF measures BY the result" II
needs but little reflection. and 6 elisht nc
oasiutance with maakini 10 convince us Of
,as truth Of this maxim. The wisest mea.
sursr, the mott carefully dises!si pians, are
often thwarted whea on the point Of success,
by some unforeseen incident Of the moe,
trivial Importance, some accident which never
could have entered into human calculation,
come mistake Of some s8eIA, which Il was i'm.
possible ~ foresee. What then IL tue con
Of tue failure in tho execution 80 say the
class Of persons 10 whom Napoleon Aiiudes,
and so say tho majority Of the world who
take their opinions ready made, aud never
give themselves the troubis Of thinking.
OF all other plans which are snbjeet to this
description Of criticism, military plans are
those which are most apt 10 bs jadgsd by the
result, because, Of all others, they are tho most
exposed TO the caprice of fortune. A cam
psign projected with the most profound wis
dom, and having for It's end the most impor-
tant offsets, may fail, while another conceived
in folly and executed against all the rules of
military science may succeed In such casss the
pnticnsvsr fail 10 set do wn the 6rst AZ sn en
terprise Of saah nature that it could have
succeeded in no possible combination Of cir.
cumstsncss, while they always applaud the
lac, as the perfection Of wisdom. The little
fortress OF BArd-so Insignificant that it was
entirely overlooked in ths plan of campaign-
was near battling Napoleon 10 bis advance
upon Milan in 1899, and shutting up bis army
in the narrow Valley Of Aosta, to be destroyed
Vt leisure by the Austrians. The sagacity of
peasant, by conducting tn, corps Of the Prus
sian Gen. Bulow along the road that led immsdi.
atsly TO the flank and resr of the French army,
when several others presented Themselves,
saved the Eaglsh army from utter destruction
At Waterloo II, in the IRE. case, the unfore-
seen obstacle had caused the failure Of the en-
tsrpriee, the class OF persons who judge Of
merit only by success would have pr Onounced
ha1 undertaken an enterprise above his
strength and failed, as he ought 10 have known
that he mus, fail La the last mentioned cage he
actually is condemned in almost these very
terms, because BuIow chaucsd to meet with
guide possessing above the average intelIi-
Qsucs Of Flemish peasants although his plan
Of campaign was fraught with the most CON
sammsts wisiom. Some spring or wheel OF |
the very complicated machinery with which |
the campaign against Cornwalie, terminating
10 his surrender ~ York, was worked, might
have lsrred-and in order TO ensure success it
WAS necessary that every part of it should do
it's work faithfully-and Washington might
have failed. Tnen, most aasuredly, he aud bis
plan would have been denounced by this class
of persona
We have baen led into these reflections by
the oommen,s which we hear made every day
upon the campaign of Gen. Lee in Psnnsylva.
nia To our mind it was one Of ths wissst,
yrandest, aud most imposing schemes ever
conceived by the mind Of man. 1t proposed
to foros the Federal army into a battle, tho
stake of which was Washington, Baltimore,
the whole of Mary land, and ths recognition
Of our existence as a separate nation. 10 sue.
csed, the moat ample means, ss it was believed.
were prepared. lie Was at the head OF an army
that had ne yer been beaten, and be wasoppossd
TO An army thai had never been victorious. Ac.
c,rdag 10 all rational calculation SUCCESS was
certain Yet, from one Of those accidents which
are 80 common in war--from N the failure OF u di-
vision that had never failed bef0re--he did not
succeed TO the full extent Of public expectation.
INSTANTLY ali The foois, who iadgs by sesats. /
esod ou. tina. The rchors was impracticab,e
aud thai the attempt 10 carry it out indicated a
bardihood and despe ration that i'll became the
commander Of the chief Confederate army
II ID he succeeded, as he would have done but
for AL accident past the power Of human sa'
sActy to forssee, these very men would have
been the first to sxtol his wiss foresight.
Persons Of this description ara unable 10 SEQ
s0y advantage that has been derived from the
lagasion Of Pennsylvania. The immense stores,
OF every kind, which we captured tho relief
u our own overburdsnded land by the trans-
fer Of the war to the country Ut tho enemy |
the terror with which the whole North WAS
struck, as by thunderboit , the moral advau-
'Age obtained by proving to the enemy that his
dominons We're open to invasion, all these pass |
Tor nothing with thess people. Bat they for
ianslsly do not psss for nothing with the enc
my who seed and appreciates them alt 1t their |
idll value.