Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-10-22
From the Richmond Exam ner.
Rarrenness of CnnIcdcrate YIcInrIes


Barrenness Of Confederate Victories.
remarkobe eirrum -tance OF the war. aud
that has been the ssls srt 81 mos, speculation
and curiosity TO Europe. and indeed to educated
minds in all parts OF the world. l. the baTrenBeSs
OF Confederate victories. We are accustomed TO
read IN history OF battles as decisive events. II
they do not determine the fortunes of a contest,
they generally pass larger territories from one
beiligerent TO another give the KEY controlling
positions, or are accompanied with other import
aut incidents al advantage The only advantage.
however. which appears to have resulted to Us in
the greatest and severest battles of this is the
comparative list OF casualties which, after ALL Is
u vulgar aud silly test of victory.
The war fingers in the slow and sanguinary
train of indecisive battles. At ChancelUrville
and at Chickamsugs fought the two blood
lest battles of the war; each of them contested Tor
three days, aud either OF them equal in size TO the
aruies. carnage. IN Dramatic displays of vslor.
and m all The incidents of military ppmp, 10 the
most famous conh cts of history Ye' the result
OF these splendid victories Is OplN the meagre
eradication that We killed more Yankees than
they Conlederates. So in all tie war. bat
tle- have been scarcely more than swaps of hu
man life They end with comparative lists OF
killed aud wounded. and with inventory OF
captures: there Is no territory regained; no enemy
dispatched II is thought suffi lent To have ac-
cOmpll-neu tue uedtn Oh -eNetdt tNutl-dub Il an
KEGS aud the taking of certain number OF small
arms cuors and other trash OF the battle field.
There must be some general explanation of
what has been so invariabe I'M the war-the
fruiIless and barren character OF our victories Ii
is ftvorite sneer with European journals. But
thew misunderstood the causes OF hat is both ai
anomaly ard a paradox The inleriority of
victories in point of results those oi other wars
recorded in history, while superior TO them in all
other respects is certainly not To he a-crIbed To
the cowardire of our soldiers or the ignorance of
our commanders We have enough OF vaior and
OF military genius To accomplish victories com
men>urate in all respects with the most famous
of history The explanation of our dereliction
is to be found in the very heart of our military
OrganzItlOn: II involves that great vice which Is
constantly the stumbling Ock of armies.
aud the source of 20 much misfortune aud moral
disease in the CDnederacy-tbe remission OF
military discipline
We win great victories. but we do not improve
them The first successes of the battle are no
sooner obtained than our army becomes mob,
and tails To cheering and exult tions. in which
the general officers miecenlly participate. Tie
repui~e of the enemy, instead of being the !
sion of the supreme aud most persistent efforts
for his destruction, Is the signal for relax itiun
and the pleasant congratulations of success.
When the French lines gave way at Waterloo the
British troops raised loud cheers for their com
mAnder as he appe red on the scene OF the enc
my's repnlse No cheering now. men. replied
Wellington GO forward and complete YOUR
victory.
The untimely exulta,iOn. which seems to take
possession OF our army on every occasion OF vic
tory, in which the suits of the victory easily
escape u.s. is 70 he attributed To want of rigOr
IL is this CRYING evil which makes the army OF
the Confederacy. IN practice scarcely more than
huge militia. There can be no military eflici
ency when the penalties of military cohe are not
exercised: when preachers ana other sentimental
persons M the COhe1eracy recommend an anti
discipline school that would pardon de-erters and
not refractory soldiers with sugar plums. The
shortcOming of our victories is Ia be m ,inly as
scribed TO the want or discipline and the c0nse
quent defect OF sn>taiue and persistent power in
our armies. The reformation must commence
here. We cannot improve our victories until tie
discipline of our arWies shall be improved aud
they shall lie rn. Instead of cutting coneratuato-
~ capers over every success, TO follow il up with
undiverte and Lnrelenting purpose
We may win victories which will bear compari
son with Narengo or Waterloo. As vet we
have accomplished nothing i'm this war which
Will bear such comparison, unless we my except
the first Manassas and the Valley campaign OF
Jackson.
In one instance "'grand army was annihi
lhteu; IN the 0thef an army less numerous was
stampeded by the vigor of the pursuit In both
instances the work on hand completed; there
were no after clhps; no stories of a recruited
enemy and renewed opposition; of successes lett
halt developed or suddenly converted to disaster
These are perhaps The only two incidents of the
war wherein the results have been commensurate
with the expenditure Of means and blood made
to obtain them Ii Is thus that they are 10 b.
esteemed great and desve victories, and TO take
rank in history with examples of power aud
genius. and those military events which are great
for other reasons than the arithmetic OF killed
and wounded