Delaware gazette. [volume] (Delaware, Ohio) 1855-1886, 1863-07-24
Lees Retreat.

The correspondent of the n Y Tribune
says:
On Sunday night council or corps COM
manders and chiefs of Departments was held
at headquarters The question to be decided
was. Shall the position of the enemy be assault
ted tomorrow" There were twelve officers
present, of whom five gave their opinions in
the affirmative and seven in the negative
The former were: Gen. Meade, Gen. Howard,
commanding 1Ith Corps; Gen. G. <. War
ren, Chief of engineers; Gen. Wadswortb,
commanding lst Corps, and Gen. Pleasanton
commanding Cavalry Corps. OF these Gen.
Howard was apparently the most thoroughly
convinced of the necessity of immediate attack
at least he was the most strenuous in debate.
Those opposed were the oldest corps comman-
ders. and their weight carried decision in the
negative It was conceded by all that if an
attack we're Eentured upon, it should be upon
the rebel left. Now it happened that Gems
Howard and Wadsworth must have led the
advance, had it been permitted. Hence their
votes were request to be allowed to fight
Moreover from the position we must suppose
them best acquainted with the probabilities
of success. Besides, Gen. Fitzpatrick, who had
recently fought over all the ground where the
fight would have been, who himself had the
/ extreme right at Hagerstown, was confident
that, his cavalry assisting, and assisted by one
| good corps, he could force the rebel flank. So
urgent were he and Gen. Howard that on
! Monday morning they telegraphed for permis-
| sion to make a reconnaissance in force in that
| direction. The mission was not granted and
| the sole operation of the day was small re-
| connoisance, just at night, by two brigades,
I one of cavalry aud one Of militia, which was
| pushed out half mile or So but was unable
/ to determise the vital question whether the
force in front was an army, or a rear guard
making believe an army. The event has shown
| that this day, Monday, was our golden oppor-
! tunity. Had the attack been made, we should
/ have caught the rebels in the midst of gen
eral breaking up, with only a thin line to op-
pose US, with the roads full Of trains, with a
thousand wagons yet quietly parked at Will
Transport; their army, its artillery, its trains,
its vast spols would have been our prey.
That no attack was made can be accounted
for only on the ground of imperfect informa-
ton, or of no knowledge whatever in relation
to the enemy. 1t may have been known that
up to Sunday night the enemy had no means
| of crossing, and have been thought impossible
that he could obtain means so soon and to
such an extent as to get away the next night
Again the Army may have been ordered il
no case to uncover Washington, while the
generals may have thought that the only prac-
ticable advance was from the position of the
right with our whole force, thus forming the
army between Lee and Pittsburg. There is
color in this view, in the fact that the ridges
between the Streams run parallel with ouI
line, while advancing from the other direc
tion they would be perpendicular TO it, thu:
affording better ground for offensive opera
tions,
This nick OF time for an attack comprised
not more than ten practicable hours. 1t i
not wonderful, therefore, that it was not seizeC
not an Impeachment of generalship that i
was not seized. 1t would have been surpri
sing bad it been hit upon.