The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-10-24

GENERAL HALLECK.-It did not yeouiro
military mathematical training to con-
preneno the magnitude of the camna;r
into Georgia and East Tennessee. nor r.
important results to be achieved hv ;ts
success, nor the consequences of failure
II was an undertaking worthy of all tho
military resources the Government had ~
the West, and whose aceomplishmant
would have been great exhibition of tho
military power of the nation. Its succass
would nave been vital blow tn tho 70
beinOn. Its failure would protract the wa,
another season, and add line of fortressss
to the natural difficulties in the next cam
paign, When Vicksburg fell the public
qualification was scarcely greater over tna,
success than over the release of a great ar'
my from the siege of place, to unite in
the decisive campaign into the centre of he
great rebel armies. The people looked ~
see Grants army united to Rosecran,s
Furnishes corps returned, and his army
strengthened, and the combined move.
ment into Georgia and East Tennessee Of
once begun, while the army of the PIT
mac would cooperate, and once more nv
the issue with Lees 8 army while ,haSa
simultaneous operations deprived il of
drawing relnforcements without limit fran
other quarters.
| The people were astonished to see Gan
Grants army frittered away in scattern no.
enterprises, and a detachment sent of on .
new expedition to Texas, while Rosecraps
was pushed forward on this decisive cam
paIgn unsupported by any cooperating
movements which could prevent the con-
centratlon OF superior force against him,
We care nothing for the puerile controver-
sy about the words which shall be applied
to the result of the engagement, nor the at
tempt OF journals who failed to place the
facts before their readers till they were old
10 1alslfy them, nor about the Chinese am
Ditlon OF writer's for the press to make a
great moral victory out of material re-
verse. The fact is plain to everybody
Ihey cannot write away its effect on the
rebels nor on foreign powers. It has en-
couraged the COnfederates, and shaken the
newborn conviction of foreign opinion that
the national integrity would be maintains
manipulation Of words write into readi-
ness for action the 5000 brave soldiers.
killed, wounded and prisoners in that bat
tie, nor restore the immense destruction OF
material and equipment. When they do
either of these, we will praise their efforts
TILL echo shall repeat. ....
TO hear that simultaneously the expedi.
abortive, did not tend to soothe the public
feeling. Nor was it mitigated by the Wash
lngton representation, whether true or
false, that Burnside was expected to take
East Tennessee, and then rapidly join Ros-
ecranS. This sounded too much like leay-
ing the loyal inhabitants of that district of
country, in which, of all others, our occu-
patton should take no step backward, to
the mercies Of returned rebel troops. 1t
cannot be supposed that the occupation of
East Tennessee, which our military man.
agement has postponed so long, Is u thing
that can be done by a flying visit, or a tri-
hing force. 1t was an important under
taking, and it demanded atrong and
permanent force. Burnsides army was
none too much for that, if enough.
Criticism of the management which
brought about this reverse, is, of all others,
most free from the imputation of after.
thought. The measures which the intelli-
gent public expected to be taken TO support
Rosecrans army, as soon as Grants was
relieved from the siege of Nicksburg,
are now taken to replace the destruct-
ION OF reverse and to renew the cam
paign under many disadvantages, among
which is that of the very best cam
palgnlng season lost. 1t does not require
an education in military routine nor the
experience of a reverse, to see that such Il
campaign against an enemy which has no
INES OF communication to guard, and
which has the facility of inner lines for
concentration, requires force larger than
any the enemy can concentrate, to secure
1t against failure and disaste.
The acknowledgement is confessed by the
measures now taken to retrieve the disas-
ter. But can these ever retrieve the sacr-
fee of these brave men? Or can future
victories atone for "a defeat that was forced
upon the army of Rosecrans by palpable
mlsmanagement at Washington. And
what does Gen. Halleck estimate the pres
tige OF victory to be worth to great army?
Experience has not enabled him to appre-
ciate the power this gives an army. The
scattering and inaction of Grants army,
and the pushing of the Army of the Cum
berland forward unsupported on no great
and important undertaking, was mex
cusable. If this were but single blunder,
after course of successful management,
public opinion would be undecided. But
the people have yet to see in Gen. Hal
leck's management an intelligent design
to secure military success. They are as
tonished now to see him depicting the
Army of the Potomac, and continuing his 4
divisions and diversions in the Vest
GIN. Gdz. % Do IT,