Washington standard. [volume] (Olympia, Wash. Territory) 1860-1921, 1863-04-25

be in such state that he could not move his
cannon and wagons without building wooden
roads, much in use in this country, tedious
work, during which the enemy, having the
railroads at his disposal, could either retreat
as he had Just done, or move oft and strike
quick blows at other points. In any case'
had Centerville been attacked and taken. pur-
suit would have been impossible and victory
fruitless. The destruction of single bridge
could have enabled tho vanqushed to escape
all the efforts of the victors, Such is the in
estimable advantage of railroads for defensive
war, an advantage which an advancing army
does not possess. 1t is true, on tho other
hand, that the destruction of railroads prevents
all offensive return by those who have de-
stroyed them.
We therefore believe we can declare that
General Mcclellan never thought Of advanc-
ing OH Centrevillc. His long-dete1'nined pur-
pose was to make Washington safe from sud
den attack by means large garrison strongly
established in the works of which we have
spoken, and then to avail himself Of the great
navigable waters, and of tho immense naval
resanrces of the North, for the quick transpor-
taton of the army by water point near Rich
mond. The execution of this project had been
for weeks, and even for months, in secret pre-
paration. 1t is easy to understand that secre-
cy and promptness were here the chief condl-
tions of success. 10 keep the secret, it was
necessary to contileit to very few; and hence,
perhaps, one of the causes of jealousy OF the
the commander-in.chief.
However this may be, as the day of action
approached, those who suspected the purpose
Of the General and were indignant that they
had not been informed of it, those whose
envy had been excited by his promotion to
the supreme command, his political enemies,
(who is without them in the United States ! }
all those, in short, beside him or below him.
who wished him i'll. seemed to have taken
council together to blame with extreme vio-
lence his delay, his inaction, his incapacity.
Mcclellan, with patriotic courage which |
have always admired, despised these aecusa-
tions and made no reply. He contented him
self with continuing his preparations labori-
ously and silently. But the moment came
when, notwithstanding the loyal support
given him by the President, he could no Ion
ger resist the tempest. A council of war Of
all the division generals was held; plan Of
campaign, which was not that of the Gener-
al-in Chief, was proposed and discussed.
Mcclellan was then under the necessity of
explaining his projects, and the next day they
were known to the enemy. Doubtless in
formed by some of the thousand female agents
who act as his spies even in domestic circles,
the commander of the confederate army i'm
mcdiately evacuated Manassas. His ma
neuver was skillful one. Incapable of as
suming the offensive. threatened with attack,
either at Centervillc, where defence would
have been useless or at Richmond, the loss
of which would have been grave check, and
being unable to cover both positions at once,
he could do nothing better than transfer his
forces to the latter. For tho army of the
Potomac, this evacuation was misfortune
Its movement was unmasked before it was
ready. Tne transports were not collected
part of them were still ice-bound in tho lIud.
son. In this situation, was it best to perscvere
in moving to tho Virginia penisular as quick
as possible by water. Or should on advance be
made on Richmond by land Such was the
grave question to b. decided within twenty.
four hours by the young general in miscr-
able room in deserted house in Fairfax. II
was under such circumstances that he received
the news that he had been removed from the
position of commander in-chief; that he could
no longer reckon on the cooperation of the
other armies Of the Union with his own
and that the troops united under his orders
were to be divided into four grand corps, un.
der four separate commanders, all nominated
according to seniority, so MS to reduce tc
subaltern position some young generals of d.
vision who had his personal confidence. II
can readily be conceived that here was enough
to cause anxiety oven to the best constituted
mind. But McClellan's resolution was none
the less promptly taken.
At this season of tho year, it was physical
impossibility to pursue the confederate army
by land to Richmond. Indeed. this had just
been proven by experience. A flying column
commanded by General Stone,nan, had been
sent in pursuit of tho enemy. This column
found him retreating on the Isappahannock
along the Gordonsville railroad. and had two
unimportant engagements with him. But
heavy rains came on. All the. bridges were
carried away, the fords became impassable
the water courses could no longer b. crossed
even by swimming. for they were swollen into
torrents. The column was straitened fol
provisions, and it's situation became extremely
critical. To make this known, General
Stoneman had to send across a river on trunks
of trees, bound together with ropes, two aids
ds-camp Of the commander-in chief. who had
accompanied him. Such was the coutry
through which Mcclellan would have had ia
lead his army. 1t was March, and the rains
would last till June. Moreover. the enemy
was burning and destroying all the railroad
bridges. But, with the wants of the Ameri
can soldier, and tho usual extravagance Of his
ration, with the necessity of taking every.
thing along in country where nothing is
found, and where the least storm makes the