The Weekly Perrysburg journal. [volume] (Perrysburg, O. [Ohio]) 1861-1???, 1863-01-21
LETTER oFABRAuAM LINCOLN.

From special dispatch to the Cincinnati
Ga1eite, we transfer to our columns the
following important letter, written during
the carly stages Of the Peninsula campaign,
by the President to Gen. Mcclellan, which
forms part Of the correspondence be
tween them, which Congress has called. II
fully explains many things about which there
has heretofore existed much controversy:
WASHINGTON, April o, 1862.
I" MJor- General Nc C2eiim-My Dear Sir |:
Your dispatches complaining that you are
not properly sustained while they do not
offend, pain me very much. Blenkcr's di-
vision was withdrawn from you before you
left here. You know the pressure under
which did it, and thought acquiescod in
it. certainly not without reluctance. A ftcr
you left asccrtaincd that less than twenty
thousand unorganzed men, without sin
gle field battery, were all you designed to
be left for the defense of Washington and
Manassas Junction. A part Of these men
were to go TO Hookcr's old position. Banks
corps once designed for Manassas Junction,
was divided and tied up on the limo of Win
chester and Strasburg, and could not leave
il without again exposing the Upper Po-
tomac and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad.
This presented, or would present, when
Mcdowell and Sumner should be gone,
great temptation for the enemy to turn back
| from the Rappahunnock and reach Wash
| ngtuu NV explicit direction that Wash
ington should, by the Judgment of all the
| Commanders Of Corps, be left entirely Sc.
cure, had been entirely neglected. 1t was
precisely this that drove mo to detain Nc.
| nnuF.ll do hat | col tip
! fed with your arrangements to leave Banks
! at Manassas Juction, but when that arrange
mcnt was broken up, and nothing was sub
stituted for it.. of course | was not satisfied
! was not constrained to- substitute some
thing for it myself and now allow me tC
ask, do You really think should pormi
the line from Richmond via Manassas juno
ton to this city, to be entirely open, cxCep
| what resistance could he presented by les
than 10000 unorgaui2ed troops? This j,
the question which this country viii not
allow me to evade There is curious mys
terry about the number Of troops now will
! you. ! teIegraphed to you on the 9th say
! ing that you had over one hundred thou
sand with you.
II had Just obtained frcm the Secretary o
War statement taken, "a ho said, fron
your own returns, making 100000 the
with you and Ell route. You now say yor
will have but $4,000 when all on routo It
you shall have reached You. How caI
this discrepancy Of - 0OO he accounted for
As to Wool's command understand it i
doing lorNou precisely what like numbe
of your own would have to do if the con
mand was away. | suppose tho whol
force which has guno forward to You, i
with you by this time, and if SO, think
is the precise time for you to strike blow
BY the delay the enemy will readily gain a
you that is. he will gain faster by tortifi
cations and To-cnlurCCmGnts than you ca
: by rc-cnfOrcemcnts. Once moro let me tc
you, it Is indispensable you that you strik
a blow | am powerless TO holp. Yo
will remember always opposed your e
in" down to the bay in search Of field il
= stead OF lighting at or near Manassas as
was only shifting, and not surmounting
, difficulty; we should find the same oncm
and same or equal entertainments at ethe
place. The country will not fail TO note
and is noting now the present hesitation t
7 movo upon the cntrcnGhments of the cnem
1t is but the story of Manassas repeated
| beg to assure you, that have never wri
ten Or spoken to YOU in greater kindness G
feeling than now; with fuller purpose t
sustain You as far as in my most anXiou
Judgment consistently can but you mus
act. Yours, truly, 4. LINCOLN"