Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-07

Of rrAakn tho roar Of stronger eas1y seldom do any
good and against great captains nearly always finish with
The disturbing element thrown into the Federal combi
nations by Jacksons rrupon into the Shenandoah valley
and the mistakes committed by civil authorities and
Generals in the chase of Jackson are thus considered
Jackson's offensive operation in the Shenandoah valley
was one OF the most apropos movements executed during
The war it prevented the Junction between Gen Mellow
ells and Gen McCellans troops il threw the whole
my in and around Washington on the defensive and there
by prevented reinOrcemens being sent to the Army OF
the Potomac, which left to its fate and had final
to tuccub under the blows its stronger adversary
about 10 deal it, The strategical direction OF Jackons
line of operations good one. Gen Bankss corps
not only the weakest but was the centre Of tne long
line of defence attack formed by the three Northern
armies By breaking this centre by beating Banks Zen
jackson found himself ut in central position be-
tween the corps Of Fremont Mcdowell, and Banks, and
the only mistake the rebels made was to undertake this
operation with about 900 men, instead OF win 70
| $4,000
It has been stated that Gen jackson had IS 900
do not credit this statement With IS 900 there
was no reason to away before Gen Fremont or before
Gen Mcdowell who presenting themselves to his
blows from two different sides with only Is 900 to 10000
men each II Jackson had really been strong was
he ought after driving Gen. Banks over the Poto-
to have marched to the encounter OF beaten
him. and then turning against Mcdowell driven him right
under the guns Of Washington That with $4,000 men
such action would have been possible is sufficiently proved
by Napoleons campaign of 1896 Therefore admitting
that Gen. Jackson had 25 600 men, is admitting that
blunder committed in sending Fremont and Mellow
ell convergng lines of operation against him; it was
exposing them useessy to be defeated separatey as in
tact happened to them ut Cross Keys and Port Republic
though Jackson had all tod. probably not more than
$4,000 which may also partly be inferred from the fact
that in those two engagements he had only 50OO opposed
to Fremont and 5000 opposed to Tyler making Total Of
Gen. Jacksons retreat from Winchester to STANDARDS
vile was far Judge executed in mastery
manner His two engagements at Cross Keys and Port
Republic show frmness and understanding OF the art Of
The action Cross Keys is highly credabe to the
rebel general and to his who fought it, The general
the contrary who lets slip the opportunity OF crushing
900 men with 20 OOO and what is worse, who permitted
himself to be beaten under such circumstances has GER
tainly but very few claims to the title Of general
"The direction chosen by the corps OF Fremont and Nc
Dowe for the intercepting Of Jackson wrong
To march to the place where jackson had only been heard
Of according to the last accounts was evidently coming
too late To effect the object, very simple exercise OF
arithmetic would have shown where to march to. From
Winchester where Jackson on the 25h TO Harrison
burg the Shenandoah valley is three days march from
Franklin, where Fremont two; and from Falmouth,
where McDowes corps camped three forced or four or
binary days march Both Union generals might have gain
ed certainly one and Mcdowell easily two days march
Jackson who could not have been Immediately Informed
of their movements Hence, if Gen Mcdowell had march
ed to Stannardsve and thence through Swift Run Gap
to Luray occupying Chester Gap and the road to New
Market Jackson could not have hndered him from doing
if at the time he had pushed column from War
renton Manassas Gap which could easily have been
cupied and held by small force he might have been in
those places the fourth day. and formed by bis left wing
junction with Gen. Fremont marching from Franklin to
Harsonburg and moving thence upon Broadway and New
Market Both generals, pushing rapidly forward and
throwing out cavalry the right and the left the
gaps to remain well informed Of Jacksons movements,
might been in this position the fourth day; and
surprising they had gained only day on Jackson he
could not have prevented them Ii will be that by
acting this way they light with their main force have
continually prevented Jackson returning south whatever
he might take they could always reach the de-
point before him. That point would have been evil
IDENTIFY the spot to the right left where Jackson tried to
pass them That they would have gained several marches
him lie well proved by the fact that at the commence
ment of June he still at Strasburg and the 9TH
only Port Republic, at which place or somewhat be-
low the two Union generals might have been BY the 29h
of May.
"Whe Jackson was reteang leaving the armies of the
North out of breath with their useless the Army of
the Potomac renamed inactive permitting the enemy To
from his repulse at Fair Oaks to reorga9se his
army to draw renforcemens from the West and nnaly
to proceed junction with Jackson and to the execu
ton of grand plan. which calculated to deal dec
sive blow to the main Union army.
The great mistake of the Autetam campaign" is thus
specified in the neglect rather the refusal Of Gen Hal
eek to order the evacuation of Harpers Ferry
Gen Lee had invaded Maryland. 1t will be remembered
that Gen Mcclellan urged that this should be done Mr..
Schalk says:
The great and main fault committed this short
pagn however the exposing of the troops at Hapers
Ferry to capture We have had repeated occasion TO give
our opinion sending deachmens to the Of strong
er enemy We have stated that they against the rules
badly for those who make them instead Of for those against
whom they are intended. Here is of those cases
What the Of holding Harper's Ferry the moment
the rebels in Maryland and occupied Fredercktown
The place itself has importance As strategic point
it only Of importance agant enemy coming from
Winchester serving in this a kind of ste-de pon
for Union troops debouch in the Shenandoah valley
sides the garrison sufficiently strong prevent small
corps Of the enemy from crossing above and making
raids into Maryland BY holding the rebels could be
prevented from returning into Virginia fact their
main army did not return this way The roads to Sharps
burg and HaQersown open and obstacle sted
to prevent recrossng Berlin and Knoxville. Was
it 10 few rounds Of ammunition and that
ders were given to hold the place. Why it was,
at loss guess unless it that Of those schemes
which we're such avorits with the old Spanish generals
based upon it; that it supposed that the OF
Pennsylvania would occupy Wismsport, that Miles would
hold Harpsrs Ferry, and that Mcclellan would push in
the perhaps the road BY way of Sharpsburg was
overlooked and supposed that the rebels would not
| do otherwise than surrender.
| "Harpers Ferry, we have said being Of import
the moment the rebels entered Maryland the corps
Miles ought to have been ordered to retreat
y by way Of Sharpsburg and Wiamsport Sharpsburg
Shepherdsown Martinsburg Hancock any other north
essery route unless the place fortified and really de-
fensbe for certain length Of time against army invest
ing il all sides IL the place not defensibe against
an enemy coming from Maryland the leaving Of this de-
tachment at Harpers Ferry must be considered the
most wanton and unmary sacrifice Of men that made
during the campaign"
FROM WESTERN VIRGINIA
We learned last evening from the line Of the Baltimore
and Ohio Railroad that the whole road 10 not only clear