The daily Green Mountain freeman. [volume] (Montpelier, Vt.) 1861-1865, 1863-01-19

to Gen. Mcclellan, has been made public
through the Mcdowell Court of Inquiry and is
an important part of the history of the PENN
Sular campaign
WAsHINGroN, April 9, 1862.
To Major General Nc CRHan
My DEAR SIR Your dispatches complaining
that you are not properly sustained, while they
do not offend Tue, pain me very much. Blenker :
division was Withdrawn before you left here,
and you know the pressure under which [ did
it, and, as thought, acquiseed IN it,, certainly
without reluctance. After you left ascertained
that less than 20 600 unorganizad men, with
out u held battery, were all you designed to be
left for the defense Of w Washington and Manas-
sas junction. and part of this even was 10 go to
Gen. Hooker old position. Gen. Banks corps,
once designed for Manassas j. notion, was divl-
ded and tied up on the line of the Winchester
and Strasburg, aad could not leave it without
again exposing the upper Potomac and the Bal
umore and Ohio railroad. This presented, or
would present when Mcdowell and Sumner
should be gone, q great temptation for the
enemy to turn back from the Rappahannock
and sack Washington. My explicit directions
that Washington should, by the judgment of all
been entirely neglected. 1t was precisely tins
that drove me to detain Mcdowell / do not
forget that was satisfied with your arrange
mens to leave Banks at Manassas Junction
But when that arrangement was broken up
and nothing was substituted for it, Of course
was not satisfied. was constrained to sub.
stitate something for it myself. And now
allow me to ask you, do you really think | could
permit the line from Richmond via. Manassas
junction to this city to be entirely open, except
resistance could be presented by less than 20 600
unorganized troops ? This is a question which
the country will not allow NE to eyade There
is q Curious mystery about the number of troops
now with you.
telegraphed you on the 9th, saying that you
had over 100 600 with you. [ had Just obtain
ed from the Secretary of War statement taken
as he said from your own returns, making lO8,
600 then with you and en- route to you. You
now say you will have but IS 900 when all en-
route to you shall have reached you. How car
this discrepancy of $4,000 be accounted for
AS to Gen. Wool's command, understand thai
it is doing precisely what like number of your
own would have to do if that command was
away. Isuppose the whole force which has
gone forward to you is with you by this time
anu "A SSs ShAi'A ~ 40 eHo pICSioo ttuo lOE you
to strike blow. BY delay the enemy will
readily gain on you that is, he will gain faster
by Notifications and renforcements than you
can by reinfOrcements alone. And once more
let me tell you 1t is indispensable to you that
you strike blow. am poweress to help.
This you will do me the justice to remember
| always wished not going down the bay il
search of field, instead OF fighting at or near
Manassas, as only shifting and not surmouutng
difficulty that we would find the same enemy
and the same or equal intrenchments at either
place. The country will not fail to note-il
noting now--thaC the present hesitation tC
move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story
OF Manassas repeated ''..
beg to assure you that have never written
or spoken to you In greater kindness of feeling
than now, nor with fuller purpose to sustain
you so tar as In my most anxious judgment
consistently can. Butyou must act.
Yours, very truly,
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.