Ashtabula weekly telegraph. [volume] (Ashtabula, Ohio) 1853-1873, 1863-04-18

speeCueS ol lne numerous aud formidable
Opposition breathe like sperit. Misrep.
resentations of the Draft, hostility TO
Emaucipat ion, hatred of "nggers," bound
less admiration of Mcclellan, and TRADES
against arbitrary arrcsts--snch is the
staple of Democratic talk, whether from
stump or in the mart, in The field or by the
wsyside, throughout the loyal States Of
he Union. 1t we're absurd and misleading
to count the strength Of such an Opposi-
ton as SO much arroyed on the side Of the
Government aud the Union. .. s.. ...
But the most dcplorable exhibitions of
its spirit are those laid bare in this Report
on the conduct Of the War. They cannot
fail 10 command general and earnest at
tenion ..g.
That Gen. Mcclellan is by nature eau
tious TO timdi'y and iudocisive to faul',
was already notorious His intellectual
qualities are such as God gave him; and,
# they do not ft him to command grea,
army, the blame incurred by placing or
keeping him in that posi'io rests on others
than himself But l defy any one to
read this Report without prejudice and not
realize that he has never desired the over
throw of the Rebellion That Ii, has
throughout based his estimates of the
Rebel force ia his front on information
furnished him on purpose Ly the Rebel
chiefs, is scarcely matter Of iBfercuce.-
Wien nobt dy else in the Army Of the
Potomac believed that the rebels had sixty
thousand men in his front throughout the
winter of 1862, he persisted in declar-
ing their force nearly or quite equal 10 his
own, which ranged from ene hnndtel aud
fifty to two hundred thousand When he
was urged toward the close Of 1861, to
detail four thousand men from his great
army TO Cooperate with the Navy in
clearing out rebel obstruc,ions to the
navigation Of the Potomac result which
would have immensely diminished the d,f1i-
cul y and cost Of feeding bis men and AMI
NAL, through the ensuing winter-5e heSt-
aied, procrastoated, and lualIy refused
outright, alleging that it might bring on
general engagement" The disaster at
Balls Biuf-the failure to support Gen.
! Lauders operations westward OF Ilarper's
Ferry-the persistent, obstinate inaction
before Ccntrpvllc and Mannsses through
GU: that winter Of heartsickneSs from hope
deferrcd-lhe advance at last. after the
rebels had qpietly evacuated their wnte
quarters without loss-'he sitting down 10
the work of intrenching aud mounting
batteries before Yorktowu-,he Y strag cling,
head advance theace to Williamsburg
the failure to molest the rebel evacua
,ion Of that post-the tortoiselike ap
preach to Richmond-the quiet sltiu,
\ a y.titI ei, ~
; that ciy-ths failure to profit by tn
known abseuce Of Sionewall aek son will
u considerable force on his raid down tht
Shenandoah Naley-the refusal TO follow
up the advantage gained 10y our troops il
their secoud days Struggle at Fair Oak.
or Seven Pnes-Lhe holding inactive he
bulk of bis army While his right wing was
crushed by Overwhelming numbers at
Gaines Mll-the resolution to let eat
ihereupOn 10 the bauk Of the James river,
leaving bis severely wounded to the mercy
OF The enemy, and destroying or leaving tc
that enemy enormous supplies Of ma!ersa,
of all kluds--the failure to follow up The
victory sultched from adverse fortune by
the yalor Of his soldiers at MalverR Hill,
the hurried retreat thence 10 Harrison,
Lindiug, (wbere the committee says the
rebels might lave destroyed his army be
fore be toek up the requisite positions and
planted cannon to repei them, but for the
intervention of O heavy rain)--ihe iaexcus
able delay in evacua.ing the Peninsula
under peremp,ory orders and the obstinate
iardineSS with which re endorsements were
sent 10 the relief of General Popes out
numbered aud hard pressed forceS-lh,
slowhcss in relieving Hurpe,'s Ferry--th
circular march to get betReen them ant
tho Potamac, aud compelling them 10 hgh
ut disadvantage OF GROUND, where detea
would have been their ruln-the "Gttarl
by dribicts" at AutctaD, fist on on
wing, then, after an interval, on the other
allowing the rebels 10 meet each demon
stratIon with at least eqaaI numbers, whct
SIMULTANEOUS attack ut all poiutS wouIC
have prccluded- The failure TO order NJ
Fiz j ohm Porter'S fresh and strong reser
yes Al tho crctcal mOment-ihe refusal /,
renew the attack next day, permitting th,
rebels TO steal across the Potomac wthou
loss-the obstinate indoleuce of he mex
six weeks, 10 detiaIieo of reiterated order
aud entrcaties from his Snpefors in dc 6anct
too, Of The excellence Of the roads, the gen
ialily Of The weather, tie superiority of hi
numbers, and the anxiety OF Government
Amy, aud People thsta deceive beioy
= should then be struck, and 10 view of th
tact that his position covered Washingto
aud threatened Richmond, being nearer t
each than his antagonists, and with ever
facility for opp osing his entire force to les
T. than all the Rebel army opposing him
c this monotony of hesitation, hanging back
i magnifylng the strength of the Rebels al,
: devising excuses Tor not assailng them
: not adequately accounted for by eensitu
tional timidily, however excessive. 1t Wa
) the consistent execution Of a plan, whereC
u the object was aud is TO exhaust the r,
sources aud the energies of the loyal mil
ions, and impel them 10 say, This War
: a failure let us stop it anyhow"-and S
y throw themselves into the arms of th
: Democratic politicians and enable them /
T make grand, Pro Slavery Compromis
y with the Rebels. Well does Lord Lyon
e report to his Government that the remove
II of Mcclellan from command was receive