New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-07-01

Opening OF the Second Campaign Of she
Array Of the CHmberIand-e)nuseso OF its
Ec,ay - The kGelusive Position md
Strength Of the Cousending Armics-e'ep.
Eosccrnnss Plan of Operntions-Thc
Thcaier OF Action-Tbe First Move
nIcnts.
From Our Special Corsspondent. 500,
MrkFkusBoRo. Tenn, June 6. 1868.
The Northern public must be 70 accustomed, oy
the experience Of tie last two years to bnef con-
summation after long preparat'on-long rest after
little work-piotrseed iDaoiion after short eSm'
psigns on the part Of the loyal armies, that the
passive attitude Of ths Army OF the Cumberland
during the last five months has in all probability
been looked upon with resignation rather than im-
psNence Sui, the mighty host that has remained
All bat motionless 70 long IS 10 be well nigh lOst
sight Of being about rOusIng and revealing te Nast
capsoty OF action ouce more, 1t nay be well enough
10 put record the reasons assigned for the uneX
pected extent OF the tern OF defensive reposs now
" be closed.
The battle at Stones River although won left the
Army Of the Cumberland in q very weakened con.
diton. Nearly oDe-fouIih Of its effective strength
had been lost in casualties. WHAT remained o. II
bSI been rendered nade4 for offensive efforts 10y
the exposures ard pIivsiious Of the bref but
campaign from Nashville. The artillery had beer
greatly weakened. The transportation had been
seriously crippled by the dssbes OF the enemys cav
airy upon hDes of communication. IL short
prudence, nay, necessity. dictated a suspension OF
aggressive oIerstions.
Tie army having settled into secure position after
the Rebels had evacuated MuriTees0oTo, all pos
sible energy at used 10 make up for the
ducti0n Of numbers ana loss of material suffered
Neeks, however, elapsed, before the damages were
fully repaired, and when the army nsd resttsined
its former efficiency IN both respects, new causes OF
Compulsory inactIOn had arisen.
The enemy Lad been no less industrious and sue
eessful than ourselves H. efforts 10 lost and
gstber new strength. Their vsrquIshed, shattered,
exhausted forces found rect, o0nposnre, and Seeu-
Yiiv ~ a strong position among the spurs Of the east
err slOTe OF The Cumberland Mountains. FOrIiCa-
bic already by nature, science and muscle made Il
etl more 20. They filled he gBls IN their ranks
with couscrIp,s. They drew upon armies and gar
moons at other points for re-enforoemeDus. VIII
crcditaOle Judgment, they collected whatever cav
airy there was In the Confederate service west OF
The southern ALE ghanies and esst Of the sssflpIl
upon their foat AID anks. IL foot sCidiery despite
their constant drafts from various lroes they did
not manage 10 become our equals. For tie G.IeG.
ence ID our favos, however, tuey mace ~ by con
flung Themselves 10 the defensive along a well
chosen fortified front. la cavalry they soon gained
ard retained superiority during tie remainder the
Winter and tie Whole Spring. With lis siG and Tie
weakness OF our OWN posluon, they succeeded in
keeping their superiors in every other respect al
bay until the Present day.
The advance from Nashville upon Murfreesboro
was hardly a strategic move the fruits Of when
were IL proper proportion 20 toe e1pense Of life,
limb, and ,roperty II involved. Ii was well known
al ~ tine 1t made that great majority OF TIE
general officers were opposed 10 II, AID II was be-
heved that Gen. kosecrAns made II only under .
pressure from Washington. Inc petition our army
gained Of inherent strategic import, aud much
more q source of weakness than Of stIeDgsA lie
occupation heightened our lines OF comIDunicsilon,
imposIng the development % long, tim, penetabe
defensive front A; Nashville II had been compact,
invunersbe resting Immediately upon our eecoIdEry
base and point Of reserve, sn1 siordng diFec' and
strong protection 10 the main channel Of supply by
rail Here, 10 secure the safety Of the connections
with our base, aud 70 prevent turning movement
Oh either Of tie hank 1t became necessary not Only
20 scatter our forces along front many dAys
marches long, but also TO Incur Immense eXpeud-
kure Of labor 30 render II h ell terabe by iofuiy mg
TIE mosj controlling lOints OF II.
A map will make tie clarsoie OF our potlilon
readily apparent. The extreme night rested at
IraLElu ~ miles due south Of NASHVILLE, While the
sxrreuity Of tie other flank extended 10 Cartilage
OIL the Cumberland. IL II true, tie MAID body Oh
the army lay lntTeDched IL tins point. But iuily
one-hTd OF II distributed IN fortified ceinps DO
tween the Two mentioned ous.Dosi points oi our
wings-
However, it became Indispensable with the sP-
proaeh Of the season Of dry ro4ds, ard new cIVis
aud pssturase, 20 fOrestall L repetition OF TIE game
march into Kentucky by obtaining the eoniT0i Oh
the Upper Cumberland from Carthage ny. Without
It. notwithstanding our already greatly extended
front COR petition in Tennessee would not Do secure
The 9Th Army Corps, togciheT with another strCLg
body o. troops aIe-dy Ia AeAs-tEy, We eDpioyeu
for that purpose.
Iii. thus eeen that the real result Of ,tle battle Of
Stones River Was limited gam Of territory 70 bod,
which IN The iace .! tie superiority Vi the enemy ID
cavalry required much more force than Lad been
a a and Fr ~.
our army both iu Kentucky and leEnesses upon tJe
deieusye. That The pOsItIOn OF the Army u Tie
Cumberland durng The last i've months has been DIS
Advantageous, IT best demonstrated by the haKiaut
fact thai tie aggregate number OF troops engaged
ia protecting our fanks, rear, and hnes Of couuuh'-
cation ia ,uls State aud Kentucky bar been nearly
equal 10 that available for oisutive operations.
Gen ROsecIans nas long been an1.Out 10 change she
pis tAeTt,G which Lie command has alone be,n e.
ercislng slace tie oOlllriOD On StoOes River lAO
more promising attitude. Tue simplest means OF DO
iug tLi, warranted by tie ruler Oh strategy, would
have been ~ fall bach "a Nashville But ts such q
retrogrGde movement would have Implied nur-
render Of What had cOtt 70 deGIl and oOIoe4 uont
loss Of the prestige Of soccess Lot made th-
out crossing Tie road. from South Middle tennessee,
conveying NssbyIle Oh tie r1ght aud The ilne oi
the Cumberland on The lsit, he could not nave Il-
taiDed hluIsel al thu point. Bat even with the
spreading out Of bis wings aud the fory OF con-
Meeting points, above described, lie could form
but screen 10 Ais liner OF comm ulcAtOu, tic
piercing Of which by the mounted troops OF the enc
my Lls nieIior cavalry was unable 10 prevent a
movement upon and attack ia force VI tho main
Rebel army Ia its chosen intTenched petition, with
the certainty Of the obstruction OF his channels Of
supply Dy the Retel cavalry. and tho lmpn,cica-
bihly VI concentrating ali the troop al Liz difiO-a
for offensive demonstrations without eIpo.ln0 both
HIS depOis and lines Of communication, appeared ex
treuely hazardous. Hence, lie deemed 1t best 10
confbe himself 70 exeTIioIs In adding the number
aud efficiency Of his cavalry, and 70 walt the effect
OF tie operations OF other Union srInies from which
either change Of front by Lii adversary, Of re-
duction Of hls strength for the Reinforcement OF