Daily Ohio statesman. [volume] (Columbus, Ohio) 1855-1870, 1863-05-13
An Important Communication from q
Military Critic.

|
clusons-we might more aptly say prophecies
in reference to this war have given him Ma
tionAl reputation II Is proper to add, that the
editor Of the Press differs from the distinguished
writer Of the communication and protests against
the general tone of his reasoning, so far as Il
affects the eminent gentlemen at the head o
our armies:
rIr. Emil Schaik ON tho Last opera
tIon on tho Rappahannock, ana the
Causes or Its Failure.
To III. Editor Of The Press:
SIN: When battles are fought In which thou
sanda and thousands OF brave soldiers are i'm
molated, but which, notwithstanding the prea,
sacrifice, do not obtain an adequate result fol
the enormcua loss OF life, is Il then not tn,
duty of every friend Of the country 10 INQUIRE
into the cause Of the disasters which cover a
whole nation with mourning. and which. In III
history, remain dark spot on its glory7
The late battle Of Fredericksburg and Chan
cellorville, with its becatombs Of human he,
pgs, may, like nearly all other lost battles oil
this war, be traced directly to the mistakes oi
the Generals commanding, snd il ia but jus
that the whole cnuntry should have q clear in
sight into those mietakes, for II may be thai
thus more errors in future will be avoided
Looking al the map, II will be seen that the
rebel army, In ita encapments near Fredericke-
burg. held q line running from northwest Ia
southeast; its right wing was extended as faI
down as Port Royal, on the Rsppshannock; lie
left winr rested above Fredericksburg, on the
same river. This army has only two main
lines Of retreat One toward Richmond, the
other toward GOrdonsville. II cannot retreat
TO the east, or southeast, as such march would
carry it into the Potomac, or York river Under
these circumstances, the natural point of attack
10 the rebel left wing. II this wing is serious-
ly defeated. and the victory rapidly followed
up, the rebel army would be pressed from ita
two lines of retreat against the southeast;
thrown against the rivers, il would be finally
obliged to surrender-the same fate which be.
iel the Prussian army after the battle of Jena
Crossing, therefore, above Frederick eburg,
at United States ford, for instance, marching
rapidly to Chsncelorville, and from there to q
point midway between Chsncellorville and
Quincy, on the railroad (or, if tho last move
be considered too daring, moving straight from
Chancellorville against Frederickeburg), would
be the correct stragetiCal move to obtain the
desired result, viz: the destruction Of the rebel
army. Utmost speed, concentration of force,
and utmost daring, would guarantee complete
success.
General Hooker arranged his plan of attack
as follows: Hehsd seven army corps; Of these,
three were massed below Fredericksburg, to
cross there and make feint attack on the reb-
ella, two Of the corps, Immediately after the
crossing, to return and join General Hooker.
who, meanwhile, was crossing with the four re-
naming corps at several fords, some ten to
twenty miles above Fredericksburg.
On Sunday, 26th Of April, the movement
was commenced; on Monday il was continued
and on Tuesday morning the three corps below
Fredericksburg, snd on Tuesday night and
Wednesday morning the four corps above
Fredericklburg, made good their crossing.
On Wednesday and Thursday the main army
moved to Chancellorville, some FIVE miles from
the principal crossing place, making five miles
in thirty-six hours. Friday was occupied in
throwing up entertainments; Saturday the fight
ing seriously commenced; Saturday evening,
only, ss il appears, the two remaining corps
arrived from below. Sunday, another attack
and repulse Of the main army. Meanwhile
SedgTiek carries the entertainments behind
Fredericksburg. BY SedgWick's movement,
two lines of operation are clearly formed, the
two Union armies separated by distsnce OF
| bOmO hWCutJ tuO tODCib III u Cbubhl pUAl-
tion between them. While all these move
ments are being carried out, the whole cavalry
under General Stoneman is detached on q raid,
| In the rear of the rebel army.
General Lee. without needing the cavalry in
his rear, waits quietly in his entrenchments till
the Union movement Ia fully developed He
easily discerns the feint from the real attack
He throws his whole force against Gen. Hooker
whom be confronts on Thursday evening, Civ
| ing up, meanwhile, his entertainments near
Fredericksburg. Hooker is beaten on Satur-
day. On Sunday, scarcely 10 he on the defen-
sVe when General Lee, by means Of his inte.
rior line forces, marches Sunday pigbt, and
Lhrows, on Monday, the mass Of his forces
against Sedgwick, VINO the day before had car
ried the Notifications near fredericksburg -
Sedgwick Ia beaten, crippled, and scarcely
escapes annihilation. After this triple check
General Hooker gives up the contest, and re,
crosses the river.
By what we have said above OF the position
OF the rebel army, 1t will be seen that the cross.
ing at Chancellorville by the main force was
entirely correct; but 1t will be seen, too, that
the crossing effected by four corps only, instead
of seven, or at least six, was entirely Incorrect
Had the army consisted of the seven corps, and
marched on Wednesday morning, in forced
marches, toward fredericksburg, or In drec-
ton some FIVE or ak miles south of Fredericks
burg, they would have been, by Wednesda,
night, behind the rebel entertainments.
| The great decisive battle of the war woult
probably have taken place on Thursday, ant
would have been fought under very different
circumstances from those of Saturday, Sunda,
and Monday, where our army was beaten in de
tail. The idea Of General, VINO is on the Of.
fensive, whose av0wed object is the capture O.
destruction of whole army, making ak mile
In thirty-six hours, just iu the most critca
moment of his operations. and fnally, after en-
tyenehing himself tOithOut being on The oommuni
cations ot his enemy, tells bis soldiers that tn
euemy has TO run away or to atick him on hi
own ground, where he will destroy him, has no
lie paiaIlel in modern times. Another quite aI
objectionable mistake is the sending away
the cavalry in moment when a great battl,
was nearly certain TO happen. IL was the sam,
silly conducL which made Melas lose the BATH,
of Marengo. The cavalry ought to have form
ed the utmost right wing in the large wheeling
movement which our army performed, and il
which The left wing formed the pivot.
General Hooker's operation is modelled on tn
opei ations oil Wurmser and Alvinci, In 1886, il
ltaly; those Of Jourdan, in 1893, at Stokach
and, IN quite modern times, on that of the roys
Neo poIiSsn army, In 1860, at the yolturno. o.
the contrary, Gen. Lee took g good lesson fron
the action of Napoleon, the Archduke Charles
and GsFibaldi, on those different occasions. :
Gen Lee has certainly gained for himaelf, b
this battle, the name OF one Of the abless ger
erals of the present age.
IL would be wrong 10 make Gen Hooker alon