The Portage County Democrat. [volume] (Ravenna, Ohio) 1854-1868, 1863-04-15

dent ordered movement of Gen. McClel-
lan's army towards Manassas Junction on or
before the 22d of February Gen. McClel-
Ian objected, proposing to go by way of the
Rappahannock, and still leave the blockade
unbroken. The President replied to his OBJ
jections tersely and conclusively, but a coun-
Gil of war finally, by vote of eightto four,
indorsed Gen. McClollan's plan, and the Pres
ident yielded. Before it-could be executed
| the Rebels abandoned their position at Man
assas, and Gen. Mcclellan thereupon ordered
the whole army forward upon the enemy's
trail 1t went no further than Fairfax Court
Court House before Mcclellan again changed
| his purpose, recalled the army, and resumed
!. his Rappahannock plan. This was on the
11th of March. On the 18th he for the sec
ond time abandoned that plan, and proposed
i to a counciliof war the movement on. the
| Peninsula by way of York and jam rivers
| The President assented to this change, with
the stipulation that Washington should be
left secure in the opinion of all the corps
commanders. .ti+ a.i3 Aa A9if53s
Those commanders reported in substance
that not less than 81, 600 men were necessary
for the defense of the Capital. Gen. McClel-
Ian, nevertheless, after he had left Alexandria,
and without conference with the corps COM
manders sent back orders for all the troops
except about $4,000, partly raw, and wholly
i unsuppEed with artillery, to join him. Gen.
| Wadsworth, who was in command of the
! District of Washington, demonstrated, an in
vestigation was had, and the President order
ed Gen. McDowell's corps to remain, an " in
| reference on his part, to which, as subse-
! quently appeared, the nation was indebted
for the safety of its Capital .'a -'ie
| For anything like complete account of
| the Peninsuar campaign we must refer to the
report itself We remark, however, in the
first place, that it is settled even by the ad-
mission of Gen. Mcclellan himself, that on
the arrival Of his army at Yorktown, the
| rebels had not more than 10000 men to op--
pose his immediate advance, and by the tes-
timony of Senator Bowden of Virginia, then
within the rebel lines, they did not decide to
strengthen their forces till it was apparent
that Mcclellan meant to begin a regular siege
of Yorktown. A prompt and determined at
tack at that time, it is now agreed, would
have driven the rebels back at once upon
Richmond and instant pursuit would have
carried our army to the rebel capital. Thus
was the first opportunity of the Peninsula
| lost.
During thc siege of Yorktown McClellan's
appeals for roinforcements were constant; and
we may remark. once for all, that they con-
tinuedto be made on an average about once
week, even when he knew they could not
be sent, until his removal
| Yorktown was evacuated, as Manassas had
| been, without the knowledge or suspicion of
Gen. Mcclellan, and just before he was ready
to open fire. Pursuit of the retreating enemy
commenced leisurely FIVE or six hours after
the evacuation was known, and was vigorous
| ly pushed by Gems. Stoneman aud Hooker.
1t resulted in the battle of williamsburg,
] E L y n
| far in the real, attending to unimportant de-
tails BY the time he appeared on the field,
most of the fighting was over, the enemy
having been rer ulsed by the determined gall
lantry of Hooker against largely outnumber-
| ing forces Here again several of the Gener-
ais testify that, had the rebels been pushed,
they could have been followed right into
Richmond; but they We're not, and so the
second chance to end the campaign was suffer-
ed to pass 1---..--.s.--
Three or four days delay at williamsburg
was followed by a march to the line of ope-
rations on the Chickahoniny not more than
fifteen miles distant, but consuming two weeks
of time Gen. Keyest corps crossed that now
famous stream on the 1st of May. Just at
this time, and while Mcclellan was daily call
ing for McDowell's corps to be sent to him,
occurred the Shenandoah raid of Jackson,
against which, but for the presence of Nc
Dowell, says the President, Washington would
have been utterly helpless.
The battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks
were fought on the 31st of May and 1st of
June, Gen. Mcclellan as before being far from
the field. We we're badly beaten the first
day owing to the previous unwise disposition
of forces by Gen. McClellan's orders, but Fair
| Oaks was decisive retreval of the disasters
of Seven Pines. Hooker reconnoitered next
morning to within four miles of Richmond
and he, and other officers engaged agree in
the opinion that the road to the Rebel capital
was then, as twice before, open to an immedi-
ate advance; but as twice before, there was
| only hesitation instead of action, and Rich
mond was for the third time saved by Me-
! Clelan's delay. zFef4as-
On the 2Oth of June, by the returns of
| Gen. Mcclellan, it appears that the strength
of his army was 156, ,838 men, yet upon re-
ceiving information that an attack was con-
tcmplated by the enemy on his right and
rear, he telegraphs to the Secretary of War
that he is outnumbered and expects to be de
feated, but will " die with his army and share
its fate,'' without, however, accepting the re-
spensibility for that two-fold catastrophe-
This question of responsibility seems to have
been never ending trouble, for as often as
he calls for more troops or expects an engage
ment, Gen. Mcclellan is careful to re- assert
that he must be held accountable for nothing.
It is more than painful to find manifested
/ throughout his dispatches his overmastering
solictude in his own behalf. zta.es
The Seven Days Battles began with the
contest at Mechanicsville on the 26th of June,
in which the enemy was repulsed, but which
was followed by our retreat at night to Gaines
Mill The sanguinary battle known by that
name was fought on the 9th. Porter, with
about 10000 men, was left to resist the whole
force of the enemy; nor can Gen. Mcclellan
give any other reason for this exposure, and
the defeat which followed it, than that he
hoped to save his left flank and rear by sacri-
fcing his right wing The experiment cost
us terrible defeat and 5000 men, and the
} retreat of the whole army was, in cense=
quence, resolved on. So desperate did Gen,
Mcclellan consider his condition to be, that
} he had actually printed general order for
, the destruction of the baggage, tents and
equipage of his whole army but was dissua-
ded from issuing it. Is
Concerning the retreat and the actions OF
Savage's Station, Glendale and Malvern,
r which were fought while it was accomplish
ing, the Committee say that the battles 1cert
fought, the troops handled, a,eto dispositions made
and old ones changed entirely 6y corps conanean-
a ders, aoithout directions from the Commanding
: GeferdL'' hsr p lesl
!. Yet, even in such a retreat, and abandoned
l by its Generals, the Army of the Potomac
e fought with heroic courage, and bloodily con.
e tested the ground which it was forced to sur
render. Forced, not by the enemy-for his
o attacks Were again and again successfully re-
f nulsed-hlt hy the discrimination of fIan