Worcester daily spy. [volume] (Worcester [Mass.]) 1850-1888, 1863-01-28

burg, ana tlluS cOmpef the enemy either to
hight him in that strong position, or fall back
rapidly upon Richmond. The one thing alb
solutely essential to its success was the prompt
arrival Of the pontOon train This was under
the direction of Gen. Woodbury., and no sat
isfactory explanation of his delay has ever yet
been made. But that delay defeated the exc
cution Of the plan.
2. Next came the crossing and the battle at
Fredeucksburg-whic certainly failure,
and which the country generally brands as a
blunder. | think it was in Gen. Burnside's
power to have corrected that opinion in his
testimony before the congressional committee.
He did not avail himself of that opportunity,
but SAID that the country would never know
how near the movement came>to being
success. | see no reason why the country
should not know it-and cannot help believ-
ing that when the official reports of that bat
, tie are permitted to see the light the grounds
of Gen Burnside's opinion will be evident to
all. 1t is generally assumed that the main
attack on that occasion was against the rebel
front, posted and entrenched on the crests in
rear of Fredericksburg This is mistake
which was corrected by the general in his tes-
timony. The main attaCk qcas designed to be
upon the rebel right, and the object of it was
to break their line there where it was weak
est, turn them, and then-with the co-opera-
ton of Sumner attacking in front-to COM
plete the victory and convert it into rout.
Gen. Franklin led the main attack with his
own grand division and two small corps from
HOoker's. His orders were to attack with at
least one corps vigorously, and then to follow
up the attack with prompt and heavy sup
ports. He sent Gen Meade to the attack
commanding the smallest corps of all. Gen.
Meade attacked with great vigor, broke the
rebel line, and actually pushed his adcance
into the midst Of the ammunition wagons and
baggage train in their rear. He had COM
petely succeeded in the appointed work; the
forces opposed to him were utterly routed,
and all he needed was prompt and effective
support. This he did not geceioe. Gen:
Franklin sent another small corps to his aid,
but it arrived too late. The enemy, seeing
Meade come to stand, had rallied; reinforce
ments were pushed forward, and before
Meades supports came up his force was driven
back and it became impossible to re-eStablish
the line. Gen. Franklin gave as reason for
not sending forward heavier and prompter
supports that he was afraid the enemy would
Selse has bridges and CIT off his means of re-
treat Gen. Sumner, meantime, had open
ed the fight to retain as much of the rebel
force in front as possible, for the relief of
Franklin; and as he never does anything but
with the utmost impetuosity, he had pushed
the movement till it had assumed the proper
tons of a terrible engagement. This shows
show near the battle came to being a sue,
cess.
3. The affair at Fredericksburg, and the in
designations that followed it, were no sooner
over, than General Burnside prepared for an
other aggressive movement. 1t embraced an
attack in front, at a point selected with care,
and q forOlunb n raid Of al rvyn md iul,t
tillery, which was to threaten the enemy'S
communication, and divert his attention from
the main attack. 1t was a bold plan, but. if
vigorously executed, was reasonably certain
OF success. Every precaution had been made
for it. picked force of cavalry and artillery
was got ready, under the command of that
dashing and most competent officer, General
Averill, and the execution of the movement
was fixed for the 31st of December The col
umn destined to make the raid was actually
in motion, when a telegram from President
Lincoln announced to General Burnside that
he must make no movement without first con-
sulting hIm. The general at once arrested
the march of his troops. and repaired to
Washington. The president informed him
the reason Of his dispatch was that some of
General Burnside's subordinate officers had
protested vehemently against the movement.
Thus failed the third attempt, through the in
reference and INSTRUMENTATION of officers of
the army.
4. The fourth and latest of these attempts
was the one of last Wednesday. Gen. Burn
side had prepared it with care. He had ex~
amned personally and repeatedly the ground
on which it was to be executed He had
fixed the position which each division was to
occupy on crossing the river. He had as
certalned by spies the movements of the enc
my, whom he had completely deceived by
TENTS as the point of crossing. and counted,
with the utmost confidence, on taking him by
surprise. How this movement came to fail, |
have already endeavored to show.
Gen. Burnside has thus attempted four at
tacks upon the rebel army in his front since
he assumed command Of the army of the Po-
tomac In each instance he has been embar-
raised and thwarted by those who were bound
by every sentiment of military honor and of
patriotic duty to give him their cordial and
effective support. The inference is very clear.
lie ShOutd either hare the pOweg TO dismiss
these obiceTS, and put IN their places others
acho aoiU second his plans, or he should be re-
Heced from command. There ought to be no
halfway work about it. He will be very likely
again to tender his resignation. HIS personal
wishes will not keep him an hour in position
which he is not permitted to fill. He ought
not, III my JuuSment either TO resign or to ask
to be relieved. He should at once use the power
whichh his position gives him, and remove every
officer, high or low, who has failed in his
duty, or attempted to thwart him in the exc
cution of his plans. If the president should
refuse to sustain him in so doing, then he
would have valid reason for Withdrawing
from command. But L do not believe he
would refuse. He might hesitate to authorize
it in advance, but he ought not to be asked to
do so. Gen. Burnside has perfect right to
issue such an order; and the country would
applaud the vigor and readiness to meet re-
sponsibility which it would imply. Such an
act, moreover, would infuse heart and conf
dence into the army. The mass of the army
is thoroughly loyal and ready for service. 1
saw thousands of them on the morning after
their terrible night march through rain and
tempest and mud, and ] saw no symptoms
of dependency or of shrinking from duty.
This would not apply to all. Among
some of the troops of the Generals most open
in their opposition to the commanding gene
rails plans, there was much g struggling" on
the march, and [ heard of one corps of Ii. 900
men which on arriving numbered but little
over 5000. OF course this could only have
occurred with the connivance of their regi-
mental and company officers. and was due
primarily to the Generalization at division and
corps headquarters of which [ have already
spoken. If Gen. Burnside would take PROMPT
and resOlute measures to arrest this evil by
striking at its root,-by Furnishing insubordi-
nation in high places as well as low-it would