, 1863-01-30
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
The Late Movement and the Causes
Of it's Failure.
4 SuCclhcT STATEMENT BY HON.
l. n. ]. RAYMOND.

WAsnlScroS, January "a. 1868
I iad occasion last week 10 visit tic Army
Of The Potomac sand as found it on the eve
of Il movement against the rebel forces in its
front, remained to watch its progress and
results. You will have received from our
regular correspondents full reports Of both
before this can reach you. Concerning tho
Causes Of the failure Of this movement, they
may not hare said rs much as the good Of the
service and the welfare Of the county re-
quiIe: I write this letter mainly to supply
that defect.
The sudden change in the rtat1er on tho
night Of Tuesday, the, 18th, was the imne-
was intended to be surprise. The whole
army was put in motion during the day on
Tuesday, and each portion, Of It was to have
been by midnight in the position designated
by the Commanding General, for the COM
menceMent Of operations 1T O'Clock below
and ~ o'clock above Fredericksburg on
"Wednesday morning. At s o'clock on Tues
day evening it began to rain, and throughout
the night tho rain continued, with tempest
Of wind. Owing to other caueee, Of which l
shall speak hereafter, those PORTIONS Of the
army designated to lead the movement had
not moved with the yigor and energy which
the nature Of the service required. They
were arrested, therefore, some miles short Of
,hcir appointed positions by the condition Of
the roads, suddenly softcncd by the heavy
rain, ant, through which By morning It had
become impossible to move either pontoons
or artillery with the celebrity demanded. The
enemy meantime discovered the movement,
and instantly rallied 10 meet it. The mo-
1ncnt for the surprise had passed, and there
fore the movement was abandoned.
This is the sHrJt'er view Of the matter. As
things stood the weather afforded sufficient
excuse for abandoning the enterprise indeed
made it necessary to do 80. Bnt If every thing
else had been right, this obstacle would have
been overcome, or rather would not hare
arisen in lime to ofIer any difficulty. But the
army Of the Potomac II like the soil Of Vir-
ginia; the upper crust Is hard, but thin; 4
little rain koaks it and underneath lies a
3reachcrous YuicksaNd. Break through the
crust and You sink Instantly to depth which
makes movement impossible. A good deal
army. The word is too strong. It does not
apply to the mass OF the army at Ill. But It
docs apply to good many Of the officers.
1EtA are dtmoTala@ed in every sense Of the
word, and they area source Of disconragement
of discontent-of dishcartcnment, {if there
thc' ranks. | do not heeitate to say that the
failure Of this 1otcst movement was due, rri-
mafiiy and mainly, to the insubor0inatiOn-
the word is not too strong-of some Of the
Generals in command under Burnside.
ask no better evidence Of this
them, III presence Of their subordinatcs, Of
newspaper reporters and Of all who chose to
listen, before the movement, while it was in
plcgress and after it had been abandoned.
Unless common report, which receives the
countenancc if not tlc distinct confirmation
Of the officers most concerned, is entirely at
faul', the Commanding General was over
whe1med with protests from his subordinates
against his moy ements, after they had been
tsecided upon, and with exaggerated and un-
!,'ne reports Of tile obstacles IN his Way. So
far US know, no one Of them went SO far as
to refuse obedience to his orders; but every
thing short Of that which officers could do to
eibarrass and thwart his plans, was done,
and done, too, as on some previous occasions,
with effect and success. As seyery one knows,
there is Kind Of obedience worse in its re-
suits than fiat refusal, for it leaves the com-
manalug. officer without . remedy. While it
answers in FORM NIL the requirements Of the
service, It insurcs, By Its hating, halfheartel
and possibly preneditated inetticisncy, the
failure Of the plan which it pretends to
second.
One General, for example, was expected to
have pontoons enough for four bridges-fo1ty-
four, IN an, Ibelicye- the appointed spot BY
but eight or nine miles to 60, and there Was
no reason why he should not hare had them
there before the rain. lie spent good deal
Of his time on Tuesday in demonstrating that
tuc cllAuCcS u Il4lufc HCEC HlAtkCeu ouk ol
twenty; on Wednesday morning he had fit.
teen pontoous placed in open view of the enc
my, and the rest were stuck in the mud from
Two to five miles back He certainly had done
nothing to disturb his OWL calculation OF
chances, and can now refer to it Us proof Of
his own eagacity. Another General was un-
reserved in the expression Of hfs opinion
against the movement, and did everything in
| bis power, even nfter the march Of his troops
had begun, to hare it arrested.
| It may seem severe Judgment, but can
not hell, believing, from what saw aud heard,
that each Of the Generals alluded to, and sew
eral Of their subordinatcs, who naturally take
their cue from them, rcioiccd in the hilure o.
the movement. They had committed them
| selves openly and publicly to the opinion that
t it would fail; perhaps it wonld be unrcason
able to expect that they should work will. AM
| excess Of yigor to secure the fai1nrc Of thei'
| own predictions. Some Of them, unless have
been mlsinformcd, sought to throw the blamt
ulon tleir men, and alleged that the result Q
recent political demonstrations at the Nortf
had disincliucd their men to fight; and th'
election Of Wall to the United States Senat
from New Jersey was cited SIS ono thing whicl
lad go far affected tho troops from that 6tst
IA to render them unreliable on tho field 0
battle. do not believe that this Is true; bu
oven if it wero, it would much boste1 becom