The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-05-12

Is at fault in lis late attempt to advance agai
Richmond via Fredericksburg. The best m
tary minds have pronounced that route
practicable. Besides, he allowed Lee to sro
centrate all his force upon him, and, accord
70 all accounts, outnumber him in battle. FIR 4
tne beginning to the present time blunder AZ 4
piunder has boon perpetrated. from Ignorance i
sne nature of the art Of war. Either fui 4
attempts have been made to achieve res, Il
with inadequate means, or there has b,
promlscuous lighting without plan, by VIII 4
a. pest nothing could be accomplished but d
tual destruction
one fundamental error has hitherto pervad
our system OF campaign, and that is to quie,al
yield the enemy the benefit of interior lines, "a
70 take the disadvantage of exterior lines for . \
armies. And this has been the cause of ma, l
other errors, to say nothing of tho loss
time and the many disasters II has causps
The fact OF the Confederates possessing (
terror lines enables them to concentrate tts
forces rapidly, and, with three hundred this
sand men, to be superior in battle to the fedeb
generals with double the number Of troos,
For example: the rebel generals have an ar. i
between fredericksburg and Richmond, III
4" other at Suffolk and In North Carolina, b J,
another at Chattanooga. So long as commu
cation Ii open between these three armies, al
they can reinforce each other at will as|
form junction Of them II necessary or desirahs
they possess the interior fines; while, on u
other hand, our army on the northern bank of .
Rappahannock, our army at Norfolk, Suffolk q
In North Carolina, and our army at Murfrcss
boro, have exterior lines, because they have 81
communication with each other, cannot reinfos,
each other, and are liable to be crushed seli|
rately by the united force OF the three rek|
armies. If either or all the ConfederIf
armies arc pressed they can retreat till tie
effect junction. by which they csn first Sdea
deadly blow to one hostile army. and then
the other. The only way that this result cou
be prevented is 10 have each OF our armt
superior in numbers to the whole force Of T.
enemy combined, or, II that is iInpracticabu
then to refuse 10 give him battle except on {,
side that he is weakest Napoleon, who
ways sought interior lines, was once bafrled u
this cautious method adopted by the Allies, q
the disastrous defeat of Leipsic was tho con-
quence That, however. does not dstract ftt
the general advantages Of interior lines, viii
are necessarily shorter, In addition to rapid
OF movement being augmented in the Sou
by the use Of railroads
II the vigilance Of Wellington and the en- |
gy Of Biucher had not prevented Napoles
gaining the interior lines By their fallf
back 90 as 10 eject Q junction be wov,|
have whipped both generals In successie
Now II our generals could only 20
The interior by flank movement, eta,
ing; say, from Port Royal, In South Carolh,
or from the Ohio, and occupying eth |
Knoxville and Cleveland, Tenn, or Lynf
burg, Va, what Huttering thsre would be |
the Confederate dsvecote--tbe rebel army .
rebel territory divided, and the enemy witho
even command Of the ssa to remedy tho dies
ter. But II half the time and energy had b.
concentrated on this that has been spent
vain, isolated efforts upon the capture Of citi
on the external boundaries of the confedersc.
which are Of no stratsgical Importance VIII
ever, It would have been accomplished La
since, and the greatest resuls would h,
followed.
Wsr-especially war on large scale-ls
science, and II it Is not conducted in . scientif
manner failure must be the consequence. II |
Confederate troops fight equally we'll with o.
own, and the rebellious armies therefore q
only be overthrow by the science WIKI
can bring to bear upon the decisive point
the theatre OF operations Q much larger fort
than the enemy. This is most easily done b
internal lines. Napoleon's usual plan Of wi
ming decisive battle, after by his strategy / |
bad compelled the enemy to fight wher
he wanted him, was to penetrate his line b.
tween one OF the wings and the centre, and, th.
dividing it, to attack and defeat each in suooe
sion With his whole force. Tho same rule a,
plies TO the whole theatre of war. By gettin
interior lines aud central position the enemy
armies may be all beaten In detail. Then tbe,.
Is o vast difference between winning Q haiti
after Il has been brought on by strategic msrchs
and winning It without strategy. For Il
stance, If Burnside had won the nrst BATH
Of Fredericksburg the victory might hav
proved Of small account; for the euem
could have fallen back to other defsnces, anJ
have lived 10 fight another day. But suppos
that BY some skilful manouvering Burnsid
had got south Of the rebel army, an.
compelled 1t to fight with Its back to the north
In that event, II Il were defeated, 1t would b,
utterly destroyed, as It would have no place
safety upon which to retreat, with its communi
cations, reinfOrcements and supplies all cut
Of Had Hooker held Charlottesville and de
feated Lee the battle would have been deci
sive, because Lee could not retreat south, and
his army would have been lost. But Hooker
did not make the right use Of the mean.
at his command to achieve the victory
Sometimes . general Who ID trying. to %
complish such grand results Is accused of tardi
h~xt h<oo x~k