Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-07-30


Kansas what remains Of the armies of Bragg and John
ston must be annhilated and finally Mobile Chareston
and Wilmington must DO reduced Here work that il
at once Important, ssary difficult practicable II
complshed by the first Of November there will be
sion for another day Of Thanksgiving and Praise In the
time the Army Of the Potomac will be recruited BY
the new evies nspred by The improving fortunes Of tho
country and fully prepared to strike the last great blow
for the Constitution aud the Union Ia the time also
the army Of Lee will have consumed every green thing 10
Virginia, and upon the coming of autumn it will be diff
cult If not impossible for him ubsist his army Ia The
vicinity of Richmond"
For those who are not satisfied with this expo
sition of good and sufficient reasons for standing
on the defensive in Virginia, our contemporary
reserves as " cinching argument" that we must
by all means keep Gen. Jefferson Davis from trans
fering the seat Of his Government west Of the
Mississippi river, Gas he might do if be was too
hardly pressed by Gen. Meade,) where he would
probably form an alliance with the Emperor Of the
French in Mexico To this effect it sagaciously
reasons as follows:
The capital of Virginia should be left until othrr por-
tons Of lilo rebel empire fairly the possession Of the
Government aud the territory west Of the Mississippi
eff ctuay cut off 1t would be unfortunate TO have new
seat Of government established BY DAVE. especially il it
should DO on the wrs side Of the river We should there
fo'e ss wise precaut on take to prevent such
catastrophe. Nepoleons dallance with the rebels may
mean and probably does mean only this That desires
IN conjunction 10Th them ,ohen they driUen from the
country east Of the Mississippi TO held MertcO and Ieras
ShO Id the rebels transfer their capital to Austin and
enter upon adefensve 10 conjunction with Napoleon,
it would prove work of difficulty for the Government to
hold Texas. Many in the North would prefer to c0se
the war by the loss of Border State; Others wOud
in an act Of justice to dsmembared Mexico aud others
would acceptit If checking acquisitions of
territory on the South.
As security against event fraught not only with the
continuance Of the present civil war; but also with the
cr
teif firmly Of all the outposts towards the Southwest
and could choose the tue for reducing Richmond, it
ought to be- rednc at the Of high water when
boats navigate ths Ohio, Tennessee Cumberland,
Alabama, and Tombigber, to points near their several
ana thus render the transfer Of the rebel Govern
ment aud army an impossible undertaking
The conclusion of the whole matter is summed
up by the Republican as follows:
"These are general views based upon facts known to
the whoe country which lead to advise delay the
Potomac activity every where else dt ensve war here
and fnsve war ut all otter points 10 any event, it will
appear that the Army Of the Potomac, unfortunate in
many respects not Inferior tn any other army Of the
Republic II has resisted the eadQg nteects of the rebel
Government and met Often and always with honor, the
best troops that the cunspators have brought Into the
field We know that inacton will BE- dsagreeable to the
army and to its commanders but the wisdom Of is
the overthrow of the eneny However, the policy we
have indicated viii compel Lee to to He
to Mary second time because he could not remaa n
Virginia, and for the he will again thu
ro.omac 1883 Davis SHOULD cary atttmpt the passage
of the Mississippi"
Our readers will readily understand that we cite
these expositions made by both of the papers in
question because their political relations 60 the
Administration authorize the superstition that, if
these views have not been officially inspired they
are at least supposed by the conductors of these
sheets to be such as accord with the wishes and
purposes of military authorities If the latter
have come to the conclusion that the army cannot
wage successful war in Virginia except by keeping
On the defensive, it is only just that they should
have the benefit Of the elaborate explanations given
by their friends in support Of such policy. We
presume that nobody will deny the conclusveucss
of the reasons assigned for such inaction, if the
Army Of the Potomac i, to be kept in the present
line of its operations.