New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-08-07
TIE sITUATION.


over the territory on which tie storm Of war
rpcnt it's strength last month. Charleston is
Tho only exception. Efforts for tho reduction
Of Fort Sumter are still vigorously pressed.
Resnforcements have been sent to Gen. Gilmore
If public statements to that effect may be
trusted-and also to the Rebel commander.
batteries within easy range Of Sumter IRE
nearly ready to open; and though the repulse
OF Fort Wagner seems to be accepted as de.
c,iye, 90 far as that particular work is con.
ccned, 1t by no means involves giving over
tn. attcmp. against Sumter. The siege Of
that goes steadily on. But in Tennessee and
in Virginia, the great armies of Rosecrans mud
Meade ore either idle, or taking what the
President calls ga good ready" for the next
start. Tie same may be said, with certain
limitations, of the forces under Gen. Grant.
In the capture Of Yicksburg, moreover, their
campaign reached il, natural and final result.
/ But neither Rosecrnns nor Meade can be
said 10 have ended their work. The former
has indeed driven Brsgg from his chosen line
in front Of Murfreesborc, aud By q succession
of maneuyers, which were too well planned
to admit Of much fighting. compelled him
10 fall back to Chattanooga. In strictly
military scn.C, Tat may have termi-
mated one campaign, but II is not such u
positive complete, fruitful success as to meet
/ the popular expectation, nor, we suppose, to
/ fnlll tic purposes oil the Government Chat
! tanoogo 10 stI, n. it has been hitherto, an
objective point stratcgically essential to tho
I control Of the Rebel communications, nnd not
/ less important for the long.delsycd liberation
OF East Tennessee, II that campaign Ia TO be
undertaken from Tul9homa as base. And
this 10 why the accounts from Gen. Rosecraus
are 90 irreconcilable on the face Of them. lie
10 an ambitious, enterprisins. and capable
commander, willing 70 do hls work with very
moderate means. lie has large army
and two campaigns before him, but neither
progresses. The situation recalls bis long de-
10y at Murfreesboro, and before that at Nash
vile, each followed BY an iDpetuous advance,
which was soon srrested. i. cAn do no
harm to ,ay now that in both the former In
stances Gen Rosecrons found it nearly impos.
sbe 10 preserve his communications and that
BIO was compelled to delay till sufficient stores
could DO accumulated, frat at Nashville and
then at Murfreesboro, TO render him for the
time Independent Of other resources. The
great deficiency in his army was Of cavalry
the only arm which over country SO extern.
sive could keep open connections with Louisville.
Until the recent expedition Of Morgan came
to q disastrous end. there has been no time
when the road between Louisville and Nashville
was perfectly secure. The present hesitation,
therefore, In Gen. Rosecrans's advance, is not to
BIO regarded as an abandonment of either cam.
pagn. Brags's army. though depleted in order
to strengthen both Johnston and Lee, is still
strong enough to hold Chattanooga against any.
thing but the whole VI tho force under Con
Rosecrans. and the whole of that forcc cannot
advance while it is dependent on Nashville or
even Murireesboro for supplies and while it Il,
not augmented with cavalry enough to protect
it's rear.
Its actual condition in this respect 10 n
matter of notoriety in the Rebel army, and Il.
counted on for the present possession Of Chat.
tanooea. u
Still less can Gen. Meade DO said to have
finished a campaign-unless it be the Rebel
campaign in Pennsylvania. The escape Of Lee
across the Potomac threw upon Gen. Meade
the necessity Of taking the initiative; of re.
modelling tho whole campaign; above oil things,
of 70 ordering matters that ho should not find
himself North of tho Rappahnnnoch with Lee
once moro behind the Entertainments of Fred.
oricksburg--a position which, excepting always
tho Peninsula, Is tho most awkward In Vir-
ginia for tho National forces The line Of
Fredericksburg, considered with reference to an
advance upon Richmond. 10 q good one in
many respects, but its advantages arc all de-
pendent upon tho occupation Of tho South
side Of THO Rappahannock. not Of the North.
Whether by the ordering Of Gen. Meade or by
tho choice Of Lee. does not clearly appear, but
it does appear that the Rebel force holds at
present what is known o. the Gordonsville
line, baying that point as base, and stretch.
ing Northwardly to Orange Court House and
Culpcpper If now General Me adc intends
to make waiting campaign during tho
Summer, he has to keep his forces so
disposed as to render another movement
into tho Shenandoah valley impracticable
while at tho same time he protects his left
flank against tho even more perilous maueuver