The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-01-03
GEN. DURNSIDEsS STATEMENT
BEFORE the JOa0s Committee On ehe war,

GEN. BURNsIDE's STATEMENT
Before the Jesns Committee o. the war"
Major Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside, sworn By
the Chairman. 8e 7taA ahss3'ha.s''
Q. You have seen the resolution Of the Senate
under which the Committee is now acting Will
you now 60 on, and in your own way, without
questioning, give such accounts of the matters
in that resolution as you NAV consider
necessary aud proper.
A. In order that the whole matter may be en-
tirely understood, is may be veil to 20 back
little.
Q. Very we'll. Make your statement in your
own way.
A. When, after the battle Of Ansietem, Gen.
Mcclellan decided to cross the Potomac, said
to him that in my opinion he would never be
able to take this army on that route beyond the
unless be succeeded in fighting
the enemy at some place on this side; that if be
proposed to 60 Richmond by land, he would
nave 70 60 by way Of Fredericksburg, and in that
ne partially agreed with me; after We had started
We had another conversation on that subject,
and several other officers were present; on the
9Th Of November, after this conversation, Gen
Mcclellan gave an order to Captain Drum, bis
Chief Engineer, to have all the pontoon bridges
at Berlin and in that neighborhood that could
be spared, taken up and sent down to Washing
ton, with view Of getting them down to this
town, IN case he decided to 60 by the way Of
fredericksburg; the letter conveying that order
was written on the 9Th of November, but, % !
understand, was not received until the 18th of
November. On the 7th or 9Th of November,
received an order from the President of the
United States, directing me to take command of
the Army OF the Potomac, and also . copy Of the
order relieving Gen. Mcclellan from that COM
mand. This order was conveyed 70 me by Gen.
Buckingham, who was attached to the War De-
psrsmens After getting over my surprise, I told
Gen. Buckingham that it was . matter that re-
quired very serious thought; that did not want
the command; that it had been offered to me
twice before, and that did not feel could take
it. consulted with two Of my Staff officers in
regard to 1t tor, should think, IN hour and .
half they urged upon me that had no right as
. soldier to disobey the order, and that had al.
ready expressed to the Government my unwill-
ingnees to take toe command. I told them what
my views were with reference to my ability to
exercise such command, which views were
those had always unreservedly expressed, that
was not competent to command such large
army az this had said the same over and over
again to the President and Secretary of War,
and also that if matters could be satisfactorily
arranged with General Mcclellan, thought be
could command the Army OF the Potomac better
than any other General in it; but they had stud.
led the subject more than had, and knew more
about their obligations to Gen. Mcclellan than
did. There had been some conversation with
regard to the removal of Gen. Mcclellan when
he was bringing away his army from before Rich.
mond; the first of these conversations with the
President and Secretary of War occurred at that
time, and then, after General Mcclellan had got
back to Washington, and before the commence.
ment OF the Maryland campaign, there was an
other conversation Of the same kind; and on
both of these occasions I expressed to the Pre-
sident the opinion that did not think there was
any one who could do as much with that army
as Gen. Mcclellan could, if matters would be so
arranged as to remove their objections to him !;
after had conversed with my staff officers, /
went to see General Mcclellan himself, and be
agreed with US that this was an order which !,
as soldier, had to obey; be said that he could
not retain the command, for be- IA a soldier,
would have to obey the order, directing him to
give up that command in the midst of violent
snow storm. with the army in q position that
knew but little of; had previously commanded
but one corps, upon the extreme right and had
been upon the extreme right and in the advance
since that campaign had begun; probably knew
less than any other Corps Commander, of the
positions and relative strength of the several
corps Of the army; General Mcclellan remained
some two or three days to arrange his affairs
and came with me as far as Wsrrenton, and then
left, having given me all the information lie
could in reference to the army. Gen. Halleck
came down to see me on the llth of November;
on the 9th, made out a plan of operations, in
accordance with the order of Gen. Hslleck, which
eoI In 70 10 nd hpf q,
to state what proposed to do with it; that plan
I wrote on the morning of the 9th of November,
and sent it by special messenger to Washington;
I can furnish the Committee q copy of that plan
if they desire it; l do not have it here now.
g. State the substance of it, if you please p
That may do az we'll.
A. stated in substance, that thought it
advisable to concentrate the army in the
neighborhood Of Warrenton, to make small
movement across the Rappahannock Is feint
with view to divert the attention Of the enemy
and lead them t. believe We we're going to
move in the direction Charlottesville, aud then
to make . rapid movement Of the whole army
to fredericksburg, on this side of the Kappa
hsnnock. As my reasons for that, stated
that the further We got into the interior of
Virginia the longer would be our line of COM
municstions, aud the greater would be the diff
fculty We would have in keeping them open.
as the enemy had upon our right flank corps
that almost any time could by rapid move
ment sesiously embarrass US. II We were
caught by the'eements so far from our base Of
supplies, and at the same time inthe enemy's
country, where they had the means of getting
information that We had rot, it might.
thought, prove DISASTROUS to the army, as we
had bat one line Of railway by which to supply
it; in moving upon Fredericksburg, we would
all the time be as near Washington IS would
the enemy; and after arriving at Fredericks-
burg We wonld be at q point nearer to Rich
mond than we would be even If We should take
Gordonsville; on the Gordonsville line the enc
my, in my opinion, would not give US deci-
sive BATTLE At any place this side of Richmond;
they would defend Gordonsville until such
time as they felt they had given US check,
and then, with so many lines Of railroad open
to them, they would move upon Richmond or
Lynchburg; and in either case the difficulty of
following them would be very great; in con-
nection with this movement, requested that
barges filled with provisions and forage should