The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-01-10
inactioa OF tho Army OF tho POte-

fnactioa OF tho Army OF tho Pote-
mac.
IL Ia four weeks to-day since the battle
OF Fredericksburg was fought, and yet the
Army OF the Potomac has remained inactive
ever since. on the northern bank Of the Kappa
hammock, looking at the rebel army on the
other side Of the river. We have recently
taken occasion to complain of this inaction, and
to urge vigorous prosecution OF the campaign,
The expenses Of the army are going on equally
when it is fighting and when it is not and the
question Is, can the country afford to keep SO
large military force idle, while the emergency
calls for the greatest energy and prompttude,
and the rebel stronghold at Richmond is still
unscatheds
For observations in this spirit aud to this
effect the Tribune takes US to task, and charges
us and other journals with causing the demorali
zation of the army. 1t also, for the tenth time
since the battle Of fredericksburg, accuses us
OF uDtlstly holding the administration RESPONSE
BILE for that defeat; whereas the testimony shows
that Burnside alone is responsible for having
crushed the army upon impregnable batteries,
in defiance of all military opinion" If the
army be discouraged, demoralized and disaf-
fected," as the Tribune represents it to be, the
cause is partly to be found in the late pro-
clamation, which we were told would squelch
the rebellion like magic, and partly in the mis-
management at Washington. General Sumner,
in~his testimony, said his corps was "demo-
rallied" in consequence of the disastrous result
Of the battle. He added that there was "a great
deal Of croakng"-in other words, the troops
believed that their comrades had been sacrificed
through the Encouragement Of the War De-
partment and General Halleck. What in
6uence could the press have had upon this
battle? The public journals did not plan, ad-
wise or control the movement; they did not even
know anything about it till after all was over.
The whole testimony taken by the committee
shows that but for the delay Of the pontoons--
chargeable to Stanton, Halleok and their subor-
dinates at Washing&on-the heights Of Frede-
ricksburg could have been occupied by our
army without the loss of man.
1t is worthy of remark that the Committee on
the Conduct Of the War make no comment on
the facts-a very unusual course, and very extra
ordinary under the circumstances. How is this
remarkable omission to be explained? By the
fact that the committee found something they
did not expest-the testimony was SO decidedly
against the War Department that it was impos-
sible to explain it away by any ingenuity, and
they concluded that the L, > said the better.
The testimony shows that Mcclellan was re-
moved from the command when he was about
TO bring on battle between Warrent0n and
Gordonsville, when no would have whipped Lee
again as he did before at Antietam; and the army
was given in charge, while on the march, and in
the middle of a snow storm, to Q very good
leader Of twenty thousand men, but general
who knew less of the positions of the different
corps and divisions than any OF the other geae.
rails with that army, ana Whs felt conscious that
he was forced to undertake task to which he
was not competent. If there were no positive
orders to attack the Notifications behind Frede-
ricksburg, the War Department and General
Halleck are responsible for the appointment of
the man who made the assault, and no mortal
power can SHIFT that responsibility from their
shoulders.
But it has from the beginning been very
generally believed among the officers Of
the army, who have a right to know,
that General Burnside, in the council Of war,
did state that he had his orders from Washing
ton. Certain it is his withdrawing letter and
his sworn testimony do not agree. Now we
prefer to believe his statement on oath rather
than the letter whecdled from his generosity by
the authorities at Washington to cover up their
confusion. 1t is worthy of U,nark that General
publicly absolved from blame for losing a bat
tie. There is more in that than will be soon
likely to meet the public eye. There is reason
to believe that all the dispatches, orders and
correspondence were not produced at the in
vestigation. Why was not Mr.. Stanton put on
the stand. We know that when Mcclellan was
in command Of the army on the peninsula, aud
Mcdowell was in the vicinity Of Frederick
burg, the President, Stanton aud Halleck gave
orders each on his own hook and these orders
contradictory and conflicting. The result was
that the General was mystiiicd and bewidered,
and then was abandoned to his fate and
his plans destroyed How was il possible for
caHPaigu O prosper uEuer sucn cifcum-
stancess There is too much reason to believe
that the same secret meddling on the par, OF
the politicians at Washington produced the
same disastrous results in the case of Burnside
as ia the previous campaign. But one thing il
clear, and that is that the administration are
responsible for the appointment of Burnside to
the chief command and for the failure which
so soon followed.
The hostility Of the radicals to General
Mcclellan has been the great stumbling block
in the way Of the success Of tina war in vir-
ginia from first 10 last When Mr. Cameron
was Secretary Of War General Mcclellan had
matters his own way, and everything was going
on prosperously. When any person applied
to the Secretary Of War upon matters connected
with the army he referred him 10 the General