Litchfield enquirer., 1863-04-30

ciotuing, Gc., that MiSht impede tnelr flight. i The failure to do it was attributed by Gen, Met Clellan to the high water in the river and
 the bad roads. The correspondence between Gen. Mcclellan and the president at this time
 referred mostly to Jackson's raid down the
 Shenandoah Gen. Mcclellan insisting that it
 was feint to prevent McDowell's force from
 being sent to him, and that Jackson would
 soon be operating near Richmond, as it turned
 out. In regard to the seven days battle and the retreat to the James. the report gives no
 new facts, but makes this statement "It would appear, from all the information your commit tee can obtain, that the battles were fought, the troops hasdled~new dispositions made and old ones changed, entirely by the corps com
 manders, without directions from the command ing general. He would place the troops in the
 morning, then leave the field and seek the po-
 sition for the next day. giving no directions until the close of the days fighting, when the troops would be ordered to fall back during the night to the new position selected by him. In that manner the army reached the James riv- er." They also say of the results of the battle of Malvern Hill /" Many of the officers exam ined by your committee are of the opinion that the enemy were so severely punished on that day that they could have been followed into Richmond, had our army followed them up wig orously-"
 |" The retreat of the army from Malvern to Harrison's Bar was very precipitate, The troops upon their arrival there were huddled together in great confusion, the entire army being collected within space of about three miles along the river. No orders were given the first day for occupyi nak the heights which commanded the position, nor were the troops placed so as to be able to resist an attack in force by the enemy, and nothing but heavy rain, thereby preventing the enemy from bring ing up their artillery, saved the army there from destruction. The enemy did succeed in bring ing up some of their artillery, and threw some shells into the camp, before any preparations for defense had been made. On the 3d of Ju- ly the heights were taken possession of by our troops and works of defense commenced, and then, and not until then, was our army secure in that position"
 The report submits correspondence between Gen. Halleck and Gen. Mcclellan, in which the former urged, with earnestness and impa- tience, the hurrying forw'rd of troops to the aid of Gen. Pope, and the latter assigned vari- ous reasons, such as lack of transportation, &e., for not complying more rapidly with these orders. The general result IS stated in the following question and the answer from Gen. Haleck Had the army of the peninsula beer brought to cooperate with the army of Virginia with the utmost energy that circum- stances would have permitted, in your judg- ment as military man, would it not have re- suited in our victory instead of our defeat ?" I thought so at the time, and still think so."
 In regard to the battle of Antietam, Gen, Summers testimony was that we. failed to gain a decisive victory by Gen. McC CIellan's mode of sending the troops into battle in driblets, in- stead of concentrating them for solid attack and Gen. Burnside testified that he believed We might have attacked and destroyed the enemy the next day, and urged it upoR Mcclellan but without avail And the correspondence of Gen. Halleck and the President with General Mcclellan shows that they were continually pushing him up, and trying to get him to follow the enemy across the Potomac, and only moved him at last by peremptory ordsrs The presi dent manifested natural impotence Tn some of his replies to Gen. MeClellans calls for re- Inducements and excuses for delay, as such passages as these show:
 "One of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is to operate upon the enemys commu nications as much as possible without exposing your own. You seem to act as ii this applies against you, but cannot apply in your .tacor. Change positions with the enemy, and think YOU not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylva- pia. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does SO with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier. Exclusive of the water line, you arc now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you can and he must take.- Why can you not reach there before him. uu- lea, you admit that he is more than your equal on march? His route is he arc of circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his"
 II have just read your dispatch about sore tongued and fatigued horses. Will lyon pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything? ?
 aYour dispatch of 3 p. m of to-day, in re- e gard to filling up old regiments with drafted
 men. is received and the request therein shall be complied with as far as practicable. And now I aak a distinct answer to the question Is it your purpose not to go into action again unt;l the man now being drafted in the states