The daily dispatch. [volume] (Richmond [Va.]) 1850-1884, 1863-08-01
The PEHasyLsAsn cAnPsIeH.

We have vet go, ,and e0ntalna many facts not
besor. pubiishsl. Il 10 wfittsn two weeks
after the cencsu1ion Of the fights, and the
v,itsr had anp,e tim4 In which 70 examine
the facts he states He says:
No one with that part Of The army left near
ChaubersbafQ suspected, on the morning of
the let inst. thasshs great battls would begin
ON that day. was citing on the vet ground,
With nv back asainst . sres. writing TO yoa
and vonr rssders, when 6sHeT&i Isee aud his
esoort psssad By II The direction Of Casktown
and 0etsysburR. He ssemsd TO. mnff The
battle in the breszs, and for the hrst time 1t
occurred to me that tbs ensT,y was appl Oach.
ing our linss. Ia fsw minutes Ande1eon's
same road. followed an hour or two lxter By
Johnson's division, Of Ewsii's corps, which
had retraced i.s sssps from Sbippenshurg. In
the course Of the morning orders aame for
Lopestrsets corps, exceps Pickstt'a division,
left behind at ChambsTsbug, to follow on in
the same direction, ~ sLon m General Z we'll Q
tr.ia, sent back from Carlis.e, should pass.-
This was On immsnse tram, as long almost
- the tell Of = seCa1et, ard far more omine as
Of eviL Is oesnpisd four hours in pass
ina, and N0vsd 70 slowly throagh tAs Cash.
t6<sff Gap Gin the South Nountainl that Long.
alreera sogps was dslays4 until nsar MD
,ffnAt 2 point four miles distant
HON tho b3es.e 8sy0Na~ Ee0tsS , au3 Astb' 3
divisions alone were ID position to engage the
enemy q advance column on the morning of the
lst Eariy's aud Rodes's divisions of EwelPs
corps arrived on the ground late in the after.
nson, having marched down ths Susqaehauna
from Carlisle 70 York, ard thence 10 9sttys
burg. These two last divisions ioinsd the
former, aud together they drove the enemy
back, iDaioting heavy loss; but Andsrson's
and johnson'e divisions, though near enough,
we're mot put into the fight that evening. The
enemy haa, according to the statements Of pri-
soners, three army corps present on the Let,
and that night and early next morning the re-
maindsr Of Meades forces We're brought mp
and put in very strong position. We did not
press the enemy after nightfalL
The following deductions flow from the
foregoing facts: Had Gen. Lee concentrated
his forces twenty four hours sooner he might
have dispersed, captured, or destroyed the
three Federal corps engaged on the first day,
and have fallen upon the remaining forces
then coming mp and not yet in position, and
driven them peil nell back upon Baltimore or
Washington. Or, if Anderson's and John.
sons divisions had been put in immediately
upon their arrival, and our advantage pressed
with vig0r that night, the enemy might have
been driven beyond the formidable position he
finally occupied, and from which we subse-
quenily found it impossible to dislodge him
!
if Ewelis train had have turned out on the
side of the road, and Longstreet's corps al
lowed to move rapidly to the font, Or II the
attack had been renewed early on the morn
ing of the I'd, instead of at a quarter to tour
in the afternoon. ts
Il il understood that .he reduction Of Har-'
fisbuig constituted no part Of General Lees
programme, since ha could not afford TO Hitter
away his strength and time upon the fnIiitia 80
long rs an unbeaten army remained III the fieid.
Having disposed scf ;Ee army hss enuta then
march wherever and n hsnevea tssuitod Lin.
The question then FtSais, wkstasr th9 dis:r:-
busion Of his tyJeys at different aud distant
points was not unfortunate, In this that 1t re-
qIired more time 10 concentrate them when
tns time OF battle had arrived II was q singa-
lar dispersion of his forces, after much hard
fighting and marching, that pssyen.ed him from
beating Mcclellan at 3harpsburg last year His
object then was tho capture OF the garrison So
Harper's Ferry, in which he was successful
Iu the present instance it as his desire, doubt
less, 10 place his army at coavcnient points for
prol ufing Subsistence, secure his Hanks asa ailst
attack by cutting such railway lines as might
be used against hin, and te draw the enemy an
Hut iet uE prucoea
Wers va compelled TO accept battle at tho
time and place we did We were not ltav-
ing the start Of the enemy from Federioks
burg, and the whole country before us, we
might have chosen our own ground and time
for making and receiving the attack. We
might have occupied the pass at Cashtown,
or remained on the north side of the South
Mountain, or fallen down TO Boonsboro' Gap.
Having 40 base to protect, and no liae Of com
munication keep open, bn, relying upon the
districts We occupied for the means Of subsist-
ence, we were free TO go whsre we pleased
and 10 fight when we pleased
But the battle was Joined at the time and
n,ses salactei by the r.. dsraI eomm.nder -
mora for .idab.e by number of stone feuses
which creased the field. by tne oman oround
we had to move over 10 reach il and 6v field
worka thrown M by the I, my during ha mi oht.
Tba s,tsek wss rsnswed hv en,ss!yss on, il.a
evening Of the 2i. wi.heut pyocsr rsoe nnsss.
sances and not simultansa.sssS along tha whole
line but irre.uIar,v and spaamodicaiIy. first by
ono corps OF division, and then by another, re-.
minding one of team of i'll matched horses.
.h;ch Ssfos;no to rniI tooether. are nnsbie To-
,oora ihs iosa vb;ci, simnl,aneon. ana com
r.o,, .ss:,rt r.;aht cartainIv aecomni;sh Ths
Icons narar fo,,oht halter or irHictad oreatar
so.s ~non tha snsmy. and strong as ,6s nosi.
sion IT the lst,er wss. thev sorelv would have
carried il thonoh at a ueayv Ios,. If ths attack
had Lesn differently planned As it was they
nnahed the enemy back ran over numberis 3,
irs,.ar;ss ,,L;nh ,i,ay wa mn lie to min. ,ft
eantn,sS many tiavs and h;iIed ana wounded
,n'frs man than in anv nrsvions hsi,Is Indeed
the n,ors snccsaafui our .,ssaul.s were IN to a
..ar,ain noint the graatsr Was onr loss for
the further an attacking column drove the enc
nv not being supported by o com b;ued attack.
the more fearfuliy were IT'S hsnks raked BY
the obiiqus aud eDiiading tire Of the batteries
which were not assaulted The ensmys left.
which rested upon mountain, MclIaws and
Hood, OF Longsii set's corps, were ordered to
turn. and many believe, if other parts OF the
line had been assaulted vt the same time, that
Meade. siroby AZ his position Was wOuil have