The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1863-04-24

dT, leSllueS tndt prior W ApIli u, lou
l2l 800 men had been landed on the PENN
sula. Shortly afterward Gen Frankln's di
vision of McDowell's corps, numbering abou
10000 men, were sent down. In the earl,
part Of June Gen McCall's division, Of tn,
same corps, of about 10000 men, WIS sen
down, together with about II 900 men from
Baltimore and Fortress Mon,oe, and ahou
the last of June some 5000 NELL of Ger
Shields division were also sent down. Tota
l59.500 men.
Gen McClellan's returns on the 20th O
July put the total at l5S,3l4 men, including
present for duty lOl ,69l.
The army remained at Harrson's Ban
during July and part of August, engaging
in no active operations and being unmoieStel
by the enemies. On the 18th Of July Gen
Halleck visited the army, aud consultation
was held as to future movements.
Gen Mcclellan applied for 10000 reinforce
men,s to enable him to resume active opera
tons. Gen lialleck, when he visited the
army, informed 6 n McCiell IN that the GOV
ernment could furnish him only 20,O0n addi-
tional troops. Gen Mcclellan consented to
renew operations with that number OF rein
forcements, and Gen Haeck left with tina,
understanding. But the day that he left Gen
Mcclellan wrote to him, asking for 1000 on
10000 troops FROM The Western army, III
addition to those promised to him, urging
very strongly that they should be brought
here temporarily, to be returned 10 the West
after Richmond should have been TAKEN
As this could not be done, the withdrawal of
the army, as rapidly as possible, in order to
cooperate with the forces under Gen Pope,
then in the presence Of superior force OF
the enemy.
The committee close this part of the re
port with extracts from the report Of Gen
John G. Barnard, chief of engineers of the
Potomac during the peninsula campaign
Gen Barnard says:
"One of the prominent among the causes
Of ultimante failure was the inaction of
eight months, from August, 1861 to April.
1862. More than any o:her wars rebt tliiou
demand rapid measures. Ii November 1861
he army of the Potomac. if not supplied
with the materisl,' was yet about as com
plete in numbers, discipline and organization
as it ever became. For four months the
great marine avenue to the cppitaI Of the
nation was blockaded, and that capital KEEP,
in partial state of siege by greatly infrri
Or enemy, in the face of movable army of
10000 men.
Gen Barnards leview of the operations on
the peninsula coinSides substantially with the
facts brought out bv the committee. The
report of Gen Barnard was the Onli one OF
he officers engaged in that camoaisn which
could be obtained by the committee. No
others had been sent to the department.
COOPERATION WITH GEN POPE.
Six pages are devoted to this iact
mainly occupie with extracts from CORES
Dondence relating to the bringing up of the
srmy OF the Potomac The following is
rom the testimony of Gen III .ileck:
q lestion. Had the army Of the ptnin>u-
l been brought to cooperate with the army
If Virginia with the utmost energy that cir-
would have permitted. in your
as military man. would It rot
nave resulted in our victory instead of oul
defeat
Answer. thought so at the time, and
still think So"
THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.
1t appears from the testimony OF Grn Hal
eck that the order reinstating Gen McC!ri-
Ian in full command of the army. emana.ed
from the President alone, without his tIial-
.eck'S) knowledge. The correspondence of
those officials shows that there was a Slight
anding in Gen McGlelian's think
ng that Gen Halecl blamed him tor
going too fast and too tar from Washington.
when Gen II. thought he went too TAR from
the Potomac and that he did not keep his
left wing up with his right.
The battle of Aniietam was fought on the
18th of September. After ske,ching the
leading movements, the committee say that
Gen Hooker teStlhes luat lie mad been given
to understand that there were to be attacks
made simultaneously on the right, centre, AMI
left of our army. lie attacked at dawn: but
General Burnside on the lett was not order
ed to attack until 10 o'clock, and tne!e was
no attack made in the centre by Gen Porter.
In gard to the manner OF conducting the
attack at Antietam, Gen Sumner testife,:
Il have always believed that. instead Of
sending these troops into that action in dri5-
lets as they We're Sent, if Gen Mcclellan had
authorized me 10 march these 10 900 mea or
the left flank Of the enemy, We could moi have
failed TO throw them right back in front OF
the other divisions Of our army Gn our left.
Burnsid@'s, FrankIi0's and Porter's corps.
As it was. we went IN, division after division.
until even one of my own divisions vas forced
out. The other two drove the et.emv agd
held their positions. NV intention at the
time was to have proceeded iilely on hv
their left and move down, bringing them
right in front of Burnside, franklin ami
Porter.
Question. And all escape of the enemy
would have been impossible?
Answer. think So
With regard TO renewing the attack on tee
next day Gen Burnside 'testifas that he urged
Gen Mcclellan to take that step, and ex-
pressed his willingness t. begin the move
ment if he could have 1000 fresh troops to
assist. Gen McCleIan hid the men, but
disapproved the plan. Gen Franklin ais 0
urged the renewal OF the light, and was CON
fdent of success.
Gen Mcclellan reports the total losses Of
our army in the battles of South Mountain
and Antietam at l4.194. He estimates the
rebel loss during their Mary and campaign
at 10000. The enemy retreated unmol->ted
across the Potomac on the night of the Is; h.
Gen Mcclellan called for more reinforcements.
About the lst of October the President
visited the army, and on his return, lie f,l-
lowing order was sent To Gen Mcclellan:
WAR DEPARTMENT., }
Washington, ID. G., Oct. s, 1863. {
l am instructed to telegraph you as fol-
lows: The President directs that you eros.
,he Potomac and give batll- to the enemy Oh
drive him south. Your army must move now
VII le the roads are good.