The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-04-28

asvsei On ~ Amsttan sampasn, ssd ,oas y M DEF
n&ay dsadsd, rp 70 ts ss lad lf astd sh aser Wes
Gs.sai Railsck sUtAsr .sas 70 connaua ne troops
hsd. aud Ne said had rot bee. dsrmi'sedi and do
| mot tank that 4 Think thai Of those
iAine' wAie. greco shape ssslf wAsn ne time eme
Us nj out
q hid that portion Of the army Of the peninsula which
landed Aqua creek receivs tn directions b. march
| 70 the assistance of General Pope you from
General Haleckf A. think !" e~Iy case tired from
O. Did that portion which at Alexandra receive
their instructions 70 march TO the assistance Of General
Pope from you from General Halle kf A. an reteipd
~ orders dred from General Hdikcs excerpt he c. @nads
| OF FranSlia and summer. I think that Hointzeman
| landed there ne orders for Franklin and SlD1r
gscen through me- but BY direction OF nsai Halle X.
T. Did you have any interview with the President IN
relation taking command te troops Maryland
campiign or receive instructions IRON him on mat
po sr a. 40 mot nnk nc gave me any o
the army In front Of Washington DO not Atak he GAGE
| me any inaructions about the Maryland campaign.
THE GENERAL-IN-CHIEF THOUGHT MCCLELLAN TOO
| O. After you commencsi the movement did you
ceve any instructions from any oneS A. received some
kilograms that might be- looked upon 10 The nature OF m
structons from General Haeck and from the President
The general tenor Of 0eneaI kaiecs d<faches 1at
imgom Nat ,uas going raisr Too fast He had the i'm
preston that tho main force Of the enemy was on he
force in front Of draw on. and then they would
come into Washington in rear As lac az The 1874 Of
ss pressed et sam: ;dsa' and LIS me- a am ronS IN
o Then the Maryland campaign WINS planned and con.
Quoted by you, without any instructions from any one
other than those which you have Indicated as coming
from General Haeck by telegraph A. had converse
tions with General aeck before starting, in reference
10 the positions given the corps that first thrown
over tho Maryland side. The campaign assumed shape
as II proceded When left Washington we knew very
little ABOUT the position intentions enemy and
nothing more definite could, at that time be decided
upon than 10 proceed carefully until we g. ned
oTNouft ha IN
ton ~ would enable US 10 cover washington, ana
necessary, Baltimore.
O. viii you give statement OF the principal events
| connected with the Maryland campaign A. When at
D. Hi BY direction OF General lee, which gave the
orders OF march for their whole army, and developed
their Intentions The substance Of the order was that
jackson to from Frederick by the main Ha.
gersown road, and leaving II at some point near Middle
burg 10 the Potomac Sharpeburg and endea
vor " capture the garrison Of harnsburg, and cut on
the OF the garrison " Harpers Ferry In that d.
rection General McI.aws was ordered, with his own
command and the division Of General Anderson,
by the Hagertown road and gain possession Of
the Maryland Heights opposite Harpsrs Ferry General
who Ssn near The
vile AID gain eSsses:!2p Of 16dOu Asisnss. linus CON-
isilpl rs @spi Harper. sd ssrTEi Ser rs.n
Nm TO serve as rear guard. Their reserve trains %
Manassas &c. ordered 70 take position either at
Boonsboro or Hsgsrstown, have now forgotten which
1t directed In the same order that AFTER Jackson
| Walker, McIaws, &C.. had taken Harpers Ferry, they
were 10 re,oin the main army nc Hagerstown Boons
boro That order Is important in another sense. Il
shows very plainly the object Of the enemy
20 Pennsylvania, or ~ least TO remain IN Maryland.
orders for Vigorous pursuit. throwing the nam force
by the Hagersi0wn road. Frankns c0rps on the left,
ordered to attack ind curry Cramptons Pass about
four miles from main road. The object OF throwing
Franklin In that direction 10 facilitate the attack on
psss and place him In position 70 afford relief
70 Harpers Ferry promptly possible. The baltic Of
south Mountain occurred sunday and, being
full ut al points, gave us possession OF the mountain
and Of tho deb0uches into the Hagersown valley
As possible utter daylight Next morning, when
the condition Of Affairs tho troops were
rs Is pI0%p ans
enssal Mansfield ordered 70 follow the main turn
pks The corps Of Barnslde and what there was up q
parallel 70 ana ON the loft tho pike thus being In
position support either Franklin tie right, ~ might
SAINT valley all that he could for the relief Of
Harpers Ferry Tho orders given 10 the troops on the
right were that they found the enemy the march 70
attack him at once; they found him in strong po-
son then put troops In position and make al the
arrangements for an attack, but not 70 attack until
BATTLE OF ANrrETAN.
The general result Of those orders on that dAy va. 10
bring tho mass Of the army in front Of tho rebel position
tho troops could not oven be got into position or bvouae
until the morning Franklin found in front o him force
TOW strong numbers and position for MIN 70 attack
that morning. about nine O'Clock, mat harperi
Ferry surrendered. Thc last Of Franklns column go
into Pleasant Valley about twelve, think. would SAY
in regard to Harpers Ferry that some days before ef
washing ton--when nrst heard that the enemy ha'
thai The garrison at Harper Ferry should either be
drawn entirely withdrawn 70 Maryland Heights Ant
Of our approach BY firing and by sendius
gers 70 mako their way into Harpers Kerry
On tho morning OF tho 10Th close OF The
ground was made and preparations the attack
The plan decided ~ attack their left The cors
M Iooker wss thrown across the Anetam early
the forenoon OF that day he 10TH gained possession
the opposite ridge without serious resistance and sher
turned to s lott moving along tho crest Of the ridge, sd
/ Aar
sharp resistance during the latter part Of It's march And
during the evening the corps u Mansfield was thrown
u support Hooker. Early ON the morning 81 tn
l7th the corps Of General sumner also pushed
| the Antetam To support the troops already engaged
Frankins corps arrived the ground from Rohrersvi
IN the OF the forenoon. The result or the day
| nghtng right WAS that we gained considerable
portion OF ground held by the enemy the night before
alter very stubborn resistance his parhe 70 tune
OF the day varying several times but finally resulting
our favor. Il became necessary TO throw FRANKLIN
corps the Anctam 10 support our right soon ate
reached the field of battle In Tho centre the effort
confined mainly 10 artillery practice On the len Burn
| side crossed the river somew here about noon, and
alter severe nghting gained possession Of the heigh
which the object Of his attack, but wa
| 1naly obliged 10 yield II TO the attack q
SUPERIOR force stlli hold ng position the further ban
OF the stream. The next morning found that our Toe
had been gLcat and there was 80 much disorgauto
Ia some OF the Commands that di not consider u pro
per this attack that day leciy as vas sur
Of arrival that day OF two rcsh divisions amountn
10 about IS 600 As instance OF tho condition
sons ~ ne Frs csIs~G IRA heoi,rs egrpsmai
ne " rsd 1n % & Four DAYS S . sS, sh n
returns corps showed IL 500 had arranged
however to the attack at day break the 18Th
But learned time during the night. early IA IA
morning, that the enemy had abandoned his position
Afterwards proved that he moved with great rapidly m
being encountered ~ wagsns was enabled 10 get h
troops across the river bofyre could do him any
rious injury. link h taxing into confederation h1
the TROOPS had gyp nrouoh, got as much out Of pn
Ani.etam campaign human endarancs could teor
BY Mr.. Odel-
o. what was your force at AntetamS A. think tina
bofore those divisions alluded
was about ~ OOO msn--uot Tar from that IL may hav
| been y3 100 " 900 There were by means tha
! many epgsgst in the battle.
. u How many had you engaged In tho battlef A. NJ
recollection that the estimate that we formed short
after Vas that had from 10 900 10 rs 900 engaged
am ceducting the camp guards, &C. tank ha,
had |rUn 20 900 10 IS 600 aen engaged
By Mr.. Go0ch:--
encrnvy A think At the time. aud whc