The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-12-26

so as to leave it without single reserve TO
stem the current of possible disaster. This
is, think, sustained by high military and
political considerations. We ought to
fight here II we have strong prospect OF
winning decisive battle over the opposing
force, and upon this ground shall act. /
shall be careful not to risk our last reserve
without strong ground to expect success
w. s. ROSECRANS,
Major General.
Major General II. w. HALLEcK, General
in Chief aNf sag
When Gen. Rosecrans finally determi-
ned to advance, he was permitted to select,
without restriction, his own line of opera
tions by which to reach Chattanooga.
[Gen. Halleck here gives brief state
ment of Gen. Rosecrans' movement driv-
ing Bragg across the Tennessee River:]
The first mountain barrier south of the
Tennessee being successfully passed, Gen.
| Rosecrans decided to threaten the enemy's
| communication with his right while his
center and left seized the gaps and the COM
manding points of the mountains in front.
Gen. Crit.enden's reconnaissance on the
| Sth developed the fact that the enemy had
| evacuated Chattanooga on the day and
night previous. While Gen. Crittenden's
| corps took peaceable pc session of Chatta-
nooga. the objective point of the campaign,
Gen. Rosecrons, with the remainder of his
army, pressed forward through the diff
cult passes Of the Lookout and Mission
Mountains, apparently directing his march
upon Lafayette and Rome. On ascertain
| ing these facts, and that Gen. Burnside was
in possession of all East Tennessee above
Chattanooga, and hearing that Lee was
being rapidly reinforced on the Rapidan,
| it seemed probable that the enemy had de-
| termined to concentrate his forces for the
defence of Richmond, or a new invasion OF
the North. The slight resistance made by
him in East Tennessee, and his abandon
ment without defense of so important q
position as Chattanooga, gave plausibility
| to the reports of spies and deserters from
| Lees army of relnfOrcementS arriving
| there from Bragg. afea no
Fearing that Gen. Rosecrans' army
might be drawn too far into the mountains
of Georgia, where it could not be supplied,
| and might be attacked before reinforce
| ments could reach it from Burnside, /
sent him, on the l1th, the following tele-
gram: t-fs 'aHsHl- ,E-
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, u. c., Sept. IL, 1868.
Gen. Burnside telegraphs from Cumber-
above Loudon, and also the gaps of the
North Carolina mountains. A cavalry
force is moving toward Athens to connect
with you. After holding the mountain
passes on the west of Dalton, or some other
point on the railroad, to prevent the return
of Braggs army, twill be decided whether
your army shall move further south into
Georgia and Alabama.
1t is reported here by deserters that a
part of Bragg's army is reinforcing Lee
1t is important that the truth of this should
be ascertained as early as possible.
II. w. HALLFCk,
General-in-chief.
Maj. Gen. RosECRANs. Chattanooga.
| On the same day the following telegram
was sent to Gen. Burnside:
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
| WAsHINGToN, d. c., Sep. IL, 1868.
congratulate you on your success
tains, the line of the Holston River, OF
some other point, if there be one, to prevent
access from Virginia, and connect with
Gen. Rosecrans, at least with your cavalry
| General Rosecrans will occupy Dalton OF
some other point on the railroad, to close
all access from Atlanta, and also the noun
tain passes in the West. This being done
it will be determined whether the movable
force shall advance into Georgia and Ala
bama, or into the Valley Of Virginia anG
| North Carolina.
II. w. HALLEcK, General-in- Chief
Maj. Gen, BURNSIDE, Cumberland Gap
On the 18th Gen. Bosecrans telegrapheC
that, although he was sufficiently strong
for the enemy then on his front, there were
indications that the enemy intended to turr
his ianks and cut off his communications
he therefore decided that Burnside should
move down his infantry toward Chattanoo
lfya IN laf thaf( ~ ot,fc hr,, n
the Tennessee River towards Whitesburg
to prevent any raid on Nashville. He wa.
of opinion that no troops had been sen
from Bragg's army, but that Bragg wa
being reinforced by Loring from Mississip
pi. On the night Of the 18th Gen. Foste
telegraphed from Fortress Monroe, tha
trains of cars had been heard running al
the time, day and night, for the last thirty
six hours, onthe ePetersburgand Richmont
Road, evidently indicating q movement o
troops in some direction, and on the morn
ing of the 14th that Longstreet's corps was
reported to. going South through Nortl
Carolina. General Meade had been di
rected to ascertain, by giving battle if nee
essary, whether sny of Lees forces hat
left. 1t was not tuntil the 18th he could Civ,
me any information on this point, and thel
he telegraphed, MY judgment, formed OF
Il variety of meager and conflicting testi
mony, is that Lees army has been reduced
by Longstreets corps, and perhaps b,
some regiments from Ewelrs and Hills
j AS soon as received Gen. Rosecrans
j and Gen. Foster kilograms of the 18th ant
18th, l sent the following kilograms to Gen
erals Burnside, Rosecrans, Hurlbut, Grant
/ and Sherman:
u i't HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, p
\ WASHINGTON, d. c., Sept. l3, 1868.
i 1t is important that all the available for
ces of your command be rushed forward
into East Tennessee. All your scattere,
forces should be concentrated there. S.
long as wa hold Tennessee, Kentucky il
perfectly safe. Move down your infantr,
as rapidly as possible toward Chattanooga
to connect with Rosecrans. Bragg ma,
merely hold the passes Of the mountains t
cover Atlanta, and move his main arm,
through Northern Alabama. to reach tn
Tennessee River and turn Rosecrans
right and cut off his supplies. In this cas-
he will turn Chattanooga over to you ant
i. move to intercept Bragg.
. II. w. HALLECK, General-in-Chlef.
Mai. Gen. BURNSIDE, Knoxville.
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
| n ~