Smyrna times., 1863-04-16

He was also absent at the last great bat
tie of Malvern Hill until all was nearly over,
and that though, according to the testimony
of many officers, " the enemy were so Sc
verely pushed that they could have been
followed into Richmond by vigorous pur-
suit" yet, instead of advancing, he fell back
from Malvern to Harrisons Bar;
AT the latter place, the entire army was
huddled within a space of three miles along
the river, without the least order were kept
so for twenty-four hours, and would in all
likelihood have been destroyed but for
very heavy rain, which prevented the enemy
from bringing up the body Of their artillery
The Army of the Potomac originally
landed on the Peninsula l2l 800 men were
subsequently reinforced so as to raise that
number to 300 that this number. by
the time it had reached Harrison's Bar, had
been reduced to 1927 fit for duty and
that Gen. Mcclellan telegraphed to Wash
lngton for $4,000 men "to be promptly
sent" him; when, in fact, as the President
replied, all the soldiers under Mcdowell,
Banks, Fremont, Wool and Dix, and all in
Washington, did not exceed G0,0O0;
Mcclellan finally agreed to resume an ad-
vance movement with a reinforcement of
10000, but afterwards wrote to Washing
ton that he must in addition have another
$4,000 or 10000 from the armies in the
Valley of the Mississippi, which was Of
course impracticaple and absurd;
On being thereupon ordered to withdraw
his army from the Peninsula as rapidly as
possible" to cooperate with Pope, who
was contending with superior forces, he re-
fused to obey until the order had been re-
peated again and again, involving delay
which put Washington in the most immi-
nent peril
After the troops were at last brought up
the Potomac, he constantly interposed the
raost useless delays to giving Pope any help.
and that, according to Gen Halleck, pope
would have conquered instead of been de-
feated, had Mcclellan acted with all the en-
ergy circumstances permitted;
After Mcclellan had moved from Wash
ington with nearly all of his army into
Northern Maryland to intercept Lee, he wrote
to Washington for more reinforcements,
saying that even if Washington should be ta
ke" while these armies are confronting each
other, this would not, in my judgment, bear
comparison with the ruin and disasters
which would follow a single defeat of this
army
At Antietam the attacks, instead of being
rnade concurrently, were made seridtun, and
consequently with great loss and little effect
and that to Gen. Burnsides urgent request
for reinforcements to enable him to hold
very important position he had gained after
a terrible stuggle, Gen. Mcclellan replied
that no reinforcements could be sent, al
though the corps of Fitz John Porter, of
fifteen or twenty thousand men, had not at
that time fired a gun, and didnot even cross
the river during the entire battle
According to the opinion of Gen Burn
side, Gen. Franklin and other officers. the
enemy could have been overwhelmed and
destroyed had the attack been renewed next
day, but that Gen. Mcclellan retained from
all such attack without any good reason,
and allowed the enemy to escape;
After lying still two weeks. he asked for
authority to build double-track suspension
bridge and apermanent wagon bridge across
the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, with view
to make that place his great and permanent
point of concentration
Gen. Halleck, disregarding this extraor-
diary request ordered him, through the
President, to cross the Potomac at once.
and to advance against the enemy, that he
Jailed to comply, urging that his army need
cd shoes and other articles of fclothing-when
it was shown that every requisition had been
promptly met-and that the Presidents or
der was not fulfilled until four weeks after
it had been given;
The last delay was more than even the
long-suffering President could endure, and
two days after the last corps of the army
was again on the south side of the Potomac,
Major-Gen. Mcclellan was ordered to turn
ever his command to Major-Gen. Burnside,
and repair to Trenton, New Jersey, For
wonder, he obeyed the last order without
pleading inadequaey of means, and demand
ing reinforcements.
Pire persistent efforts to strip tn. Nation
al Capital of the necessary protection-the
repeated failures to seize the rebel capital
when the opportunity presented itself-the
uniformly tardy and sluggish movement
the constant avoidance Of attack on his own |
8NM4IW E&&oA ~ 2 saaa&