New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-01-15


csl provisions the gold received for customs might
he dstosited with these banks, Lay be the SUBJECT Oh
discussion hereafter.
If this system were adopted in its entirety, the
process of absorbing Treasury Notes wonid com
mence AZ once and also correspondent rice IN '1eir
market ynlue. The svsf' OF loans and iundlug
saved England from bankru icy during her iong
wars with France, 81 We must resort TO siihiHr
expediepts But as loans in the usr ii way, eAceps
a. ruinous discounts for any large amounts, arc In
practicable, we are left to the alternative OF the
secreury's system, or bankruptcy, Reputation ahi
disuuiou.
I nave another suggestion to make as regards
these notes furnished by the Government to the
banks, secured by United States stocks these
noes are guaranteed not only by the STOCK OF the
/ Government bus in addition, by the whole caplta'
aud property, real and personal, OF the banks, ana
prior lien on the whole to the Government, TO secure
! The psyment of there notes Thee notes are re-
ceivable by ths Government for all dues except cus-
IONS. These notes are national currency, iur-
nirhed by the nation and secured By its SOCK.
These notes then, as in England, should be legal
tender IN payment of all debs, except by the banE'.
IA the banks can redeem issues in legal tender
Treasury Notes these issues of the new banks ought
| to be lie al tender also, except by the 0' nks
There is another reason why this currency should
! DO made legal teuder. Our two last suspensions
OF specie payments by the banks, viz: in 1881 aud
! 1862 were based upon paRicS, yet they bad ire
same disastrous effect for the time, as II arising
from short crops overtrading or a currency greatly
redundant. Such panic cynvnrlons are caused
mainly by the call for the redemption OF bank notes
in rpece based the fear OF suspension and dePre-
citation. But il such notes, az IN European GoVerh-
ment banks were % legal tender, except ny the
banke, such panics wouIdbe far less frequent mere.
ind less injurious. The present system, as compared
with that Of Edrope, dlscrllninaes mOet ul1nIly
against our country. Az general rnle, the Aineri-
can creditor cannot demacd gold from tie forelH u
debtor, but such foreign or domestic creditor cohid
I slways demand gold from the American depteF'
This discrimination hss produced here The most dis
astrous consequences, and independent OF the pres
ent condition of tue country, our whole banking
system requires radical reform. We have had elghl
! general bank suspensions under our present pahh
system many oil them continuing for ye4Ia, aud
producing ruin and dcsoation. Under our present
system, to talk general rule OF well'regulated
banks is to talk Of wellrcguEied fnrnne or pesti-
loncc, OF a well-regu,aed earthquake or tornado;
And even the few banks That arc claimed 70 Do "eh
managed have TO appreciabe effect ON tue System.
1t is tbe system thst knows no uniformity or seca-
rlty, aud never ca1 have, as now organized Ina,
system 20 perilOus and explosive should have even
partially succeeded Is proof only OF The intelligence
aud integrity, generally, Of the bank Office and d.
rectors, but recommendation OF the system itse.i
| The want OF unf rmity as to commercial regula-
tons led TO the option OF our Federal Con tutlon
| and vet we have 10 uniformity 10 money, wnicti
represents commerce and effects interchanges. In
this respect sill suffering all the evils oil the
old Confectionery, and have thereby 70 weakened the
Government as 10 have invited this rebellion. In
deed, tie State banks IN the revolted htates
were the main auXiiaies of treason and Secession,
aud supplied 10 vast extent the sii.ws oil war ny
Census Fable 81 there were IN 1860 va banks,
Incorporated by thirty -four Sates with 10 uDifoim
i,y OF organization Issues or security Thus If It
that the States have usurped the power to regulate
commerce and currency, and 10 emit bills OF eieoll
in defiance OF the prohibition OF the Federal Cont'i
tuition. Tie Egyptans nDandoued TIER ioiy AFTER
seven plaques; but we have had eight bahK eohvui-
tions and yet We adhere ~ tho wTe. ciei syslen.
believe Il was Slavery caused the rebellion, but.
in the nbsouce OF powerful aid from the Southern
banks. the revoled States could never have maiu-
taiued 90 prolonged contest. Organized IA now
proposed, these new bank and all who held their
notes, must have slstsined the Government Ma
tiobs eXpend milhou- yearly III ereciiug iofs and
naiDi aiming, even IA peace, large alues and navies
! 20 preserve the Government. But necessary as
| these may be- they would not 10 more important
thar the system proposed rs security for the
preservation Of the Governments.
| Ny last suggestion Il that as regards all such
/ United S1ates loans during the war shal become
he basis Of this system the lime Of payment shall
be made twenty years instead Of FIVE, 20 as, with
The notifications above proposed % insure the co.
opcrston Of the banks the OF the system.
As 1is plan il deemed initial 10 our fuancss.
to suppress the Rebellion, aud rsintaiD the Union,
/ why incur any hazard Oh euch question this :
! H. all our ware, ipclddiug tie pfesent, We have
! Issued bonds running twenty years To maturity and
tie bonds redeemlble H. 1871 are scarcely a. par.
I Why then, Issue stock Of less value, which may
fail to accomplish the great object, when better
secuniy would certainly succeed L fully agree in
the opinion expressed By the Secretary against I" q
fixed interest OF fer cent on great debt twenty
years" If IL can be Hv0iced; but | nto concur ia
/ that portion OF bis report IN which he says; No
very early day will probably witness the reduction
OF the public debt to the amount required ~ basis
for secnreI circulation To that extent, then,
would enlarge tho time for the maturity OF The
bonds Surely II this be necessary 10 seeure the CO.
operation cf the banks and the capital OF the country,
/ there should be no hesitation. Even II the system
based only on the bonds OF short date should uti-
mat ely succeed, the loss ia the interim from re-
dundant and deprecated currency would iar exceed
any benefit derived from the subs'itaion OF 1--WE
tweuties for twenty-year bonds. By Ceu.us Table
No 3J our wealth in 1850 was 8, l35 7S0 el', and in
1860 sl6, 100 GIG 06S-the ratio OF iner,a se during
tue decade being E6.i5 per coot; at which rate orr
wealth IN 1870 would be sc, jo3, 49,, 80, aud ~
1880 $50 $40 22 $40 Sarey then, AT these perious,
il would be much easier 10 iquIdate this debt than
i in 1867. But, were 1t otherwise, the ina edate
gain from decreased expenditure afsing from fund
ing more RAPIDLY our treasury notee-,hgs rendering
our currency less redundant aud deprecated, with
tho revival oi the public credit, and its immediate
happy influence North aud South, here ana IN Eu-
Tope-wOud lar more than compeuea.e for any con.
ungon, advantage arising from short loans. Oar
twenty airs loan il now barely at pa, aud tho
dve-twert,es below par. The difficulty OF inducing
bs ana ether capital to invest hundreds Of millions
Of cellars under the Rew system IL very great. l.
il wis, Gu commence the e.iot confined 20 our We X
est ,eclIi les, now below par Besides, consider.
ms t.e 20 aud new debts and constantly increasing
eslo, oih,ies, II there any prospect that We will
have hqi hated al these heiore the emo Of five years
and the Gve.twenty loan alsol Surely, upon hem
eft 80 doubtful ana d contingency So Improbable, we