Weekly national intelligencer. [volume] (Washington [D.C.]) 1841-1869, 1863-05-07
NOTIFICATIONS OF WAR IN THE o STATES

NOTIFICATIONS OF WAR IN THE u STATES
| During the last autumn there appeared in the
columns of the Aonite", the official gazette of
France, series of articles on the different events
OF the war in the United States. These articles
attracted much notice in European military cir
Giles from its being known that they were the pro-
duction of an eminent French military authority
then travelling in the United States
| In letter from New York, of the 10Th OF
October, the writer explained, with great clear.
ness, the distinctive characteristics and organize
ton of the American armies, both on the side OF
the Government and of the insurgents, and assign
ed the reasons why, in his opinion, both have alike
so often failed to reap the expected fruits of their
respective victories.
We observe that an American writer who under
the signature Of I" Miles," has frequently contri-
buted military appropriations to the columns of the
New York Times, devotes recent article to the
exhibition Of certain points of difference between
campaigning in the United States and in Europe
If great battles here have always been as decisive
as they generally are in Europe where the fate of
kingdom or of continent may sometimes depend
upon the bloody arbitrament of stricken field
like that of jena Waterloo,0 it is mainly be-
cause of the material obstacles which tend to mo-
dify the art Of war in country like ours. Under
this head the writer says:
"a campaign cannot be conducted ia this country IA
one would be in Europe for several The first
obstacle meet is the want Of the necessary
cal and Typographical knowledge of The country in which
to operate. This want is serious embarrassment
to properly prudent General and compes him rather to
feel his way than TO dash the point be reached Ten
the entire cost of the Coast Survey has been repaid
the navy and army already during the war; and had the
Government expended millions ia detailed survey of the
interior OF the country could hardly overestmate its
value to Generals Next the imperfect character and
limited number OF the roads in the South, both initiating
against rapid movements Of large armies An example
may be given showing the combined effects from all these
causes In the Maryland campaign, where the General
had the benefit of good county maps and the roads lead
in the gene raj direction the Army of the Potomac
moved so that the columns within supporting
distances and always ready for battle and without cashnp
while in the march from Berlin Warrenton the divi.
sons and trains of the army under the same leader
IN the effort to make long marches constantly cut
ting each other and getting confusion solely atrbuta
Bile to the want of knowledge of the roads and their small
| number.
Again the immense quantity of forest land in this coun
seriou Inconvenience mott in Europe The forests
make of the roads passing through them many defles
they prevent the rapid and regular deploymen Of
umns hide from accommodating officers the numbers
fensive army natural fortfcatop and render compare
lively useless much of artillery We cannot IN this
country get rid of our provision trains by supporting
armies on The country through which they Pass 1t is
sparsey settled and moving armies they would
exhaust vastly highly cultivated regions than any in
the rebelions districts.
"A modern element has been introduced, the impor
lance of which must not be overlooked in the matter Of
railroad communications An army acting on the defen
sve the roads behind for rapid concentration of
troops and for bringing up it's supplies thus diminishing its
n nnnd
mobility The offensive army, it advances, must either
rebuild aud guard the railroads. depend country roads
and wagon trains To do the former properly in coun-
try where every inhabant guide and py would weak
en- the main body rapidly that comparatively short
line Of operations forces would be too small to effect
great results when the decisive point reached To chow
the mpractcaby OF keeping railroad communications of
any length open, where even portion Of the inhabitants
hostile it only necessary to point to the road from
Louisville TO Nashville and for examples in the enemys
country to the cutting of the road behind Grant Msss
sppi and also behind Pope, in Virginia. Successful raids
have been made SIDE but they have been 80 fire.
quent and persistent absolutely to destroy any line of
communication and the only way hope to pro-
duce great results from them 10 follow the rebel plan
and make them just prior TO heavy attack with the main
army. If into the interior Of the country with
wagon train and line of operations is long our train
becomes unwedy that the roads out and our
troops separated not be within support Of each
other. To repensh the supplies the depos heavy
escorts and this acts still further to
force. One of the important lessons taught by
the is the great difficulty have experienced in keep
ing open our lines of communication by land McCellans
communications cut the Peninsula with his short
line Pop1s communications were cut at Manassas and
later, with sufficiently enterprising enemy his baggage
train would have been captured destroyed the
August last for their cavalry within artillery range of
il. The line to Nashville closed during part of the
battle Of Stone River and recently the commune alton
with Washington in North Carolina was INTERRUPTED
though may be said that by water The narrowness
OF the however and the difficulty of navigation gave
that no superiority OF importance the land line