Washington telegraph. [volume] (Washington, Ark.) 1839-1871, 1863-05-13

of delay, uncer ainty, and depression Of all our
! national interests, We would be no nearer q
peace than at the bombardment Of Sumter.
Northern people, Of any party (ssve the ultra
abolitionists,) will never be brought to recog-
nizs our independence by process of reason,
or apprehension of consequences. Diplomacy
and intrigue is their peculiar province. In
that field they will never abandon their OBJ
jects. If fear of consequences could deter
them, Lincoln would never have been elected,
or the war begun. 1t must be forced upon
them by the pressure of a war, and be the pre-
requisite of peace. We are mistaken, if there
is any case of the separation of a people from
the dominion of another, peacesbly acquisced
In from considerations of policy, and as matter
Of unavoidable necessity. We Of the South
who applaud and assist the Northern peace
party, expect of them to make this very con-
cession, in the absence of war. Let us rather
take it for granted that ease will bring a re-
turn of arrogance, and cease to expect from
from their sufferings.
Assuming the ground that recognition has
ever been a matter of compulsion, it follows,
that we should never agree to a cessation of
hostilitiss nor enter into negotiations for peace
until we first be recognized By the enemy as an
Independent nation. Hence it is, that we pre-
fer bending all our energies to the prosecution
of the war; and expect nothing but evil from
the success of the peace democrats, and
lull of hostilities, purchased at the cost of
difficulties, interminably prolonged
1t is interesting here, to revert to the time
and mode of the recognition of the United
States in the old revolution. the glories of
which are equally descended upon our enemy
and upon us-and of equal authority as prece-
dent for both. The circumstances of that rev.
olution are so nearly parallel with the present,
that both we and our enemies may learn It's
lessons and profit by its examples.
The Colonies did not at first desire or CLAIM
independence. They were attached to Great
Britain by the same ties which bound US to-
gether in the old Union. They songht redress
of grievances al one. The war began on that
claim. Hostilit;es began at Lexington, April
18th, 1875. Great Britain might at any time
have stopped the war, by yielding to their just
demands before the 4th July, 1875. After the
Colonies had been driven to the declaration of
independence, she could do so no longer. had
she been willing to grant all the coloni It's origi-
naly desired. After that never once was
til ere cessation of hostilities nor any he ed
given to pa ifc overtures from the mother
on any other basis than the fullest
acknowle dgment of our national independence
The first efforts at peace (it will be remem-
bered that France was our ally, were made by
the Empress of Russia early in 1881. Her
was offered and accepted by Great
Britain, (who did not consider it an insult
France declined to accede unless the Unite1
States were made party. At the request of
France, Congress sent over to Paris as ministers
for that purpose, Messrs. Jay,
Laurens and jefferson, to act in concert with
Mr.. Adams, resident minister. Mr. Adams
protested against himself or his associates ap-
pearing in any other character than as repre-
sentdtiUes of an Independent, State. Britain
W ould not accede to that, and consequently the
whole mediatory scheme was broken up.
Next year, new ministry opened negotia-
tons on lower basis. Mr.. Oswald was sent
to Paris from England commissioned to treat
with the colonies ana, plantations in Ameri-
ca. To this Mr.. Jay strongly objected. and on
the 2lst Sept. 1862 new commission was
sent to Mr.. Oswald to treat with the '.United
States of America" This was recognition of
itself. Meanwhile, Congress, before receiving
news of this commission, published resolu-
ton not to accept of anything short of entire
independence. 1t may be remarked here, that
the efforts to treat with the Colonies, as such.
were prompted by the desire to retain them in
connection with Great Britain, by conceding
their demands. The ministry would, after the
early period Of the var, have gladly closed it
on these terms. tits precisely what the North
ern Democrats would now do if possible
The negotiations proceeded on the basis of
Independence, and we've occupied with ques-
tons of boundary, fisheries, and compensation
of parties. The treaty of peace was signed
on the goth of November, 1882, and the ces.
saton of hostilities was proclaimed by Wash
ington, on the 10Th of April following, During
the whole negotiation the war was raging.
tits sublime, considering the suffering and
distress of the coun.ry-ths stern determine
ton On the part of the people of the United
States, to listen TO no overtures-to enter into
no negotiations, before their Independence
should be first officially Though informally
recognized. They rejected even. a cessation of
hostilities, which was pro posed by the British
Generals to our armies both at the North and
the South, when the making of the treaty be-
come probable. Their salvation depended on
prosecution of the war till all was safe
Congress feared the decentralization of the ar
my, and their reluctance to return to arms,
whilst the British had nothing to lose by the
delay. If the war had stopped short of the
recognition of their independence, for the
British to try experiments at reunion, who
can now tell the consequences. The tories,
many of whom were influential land let us
add respectfully men, would have gone to work
throughout the land, resusta att ng the loyal
party. British gold would have assisted the
work, and the natural reluctance to return to