Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1863-03-26

equal to the public expectation, and that
if this public expectation defeated by the
imbecility of the government, or soured
by disaster in the field. j to be the sole
rule by which military operations are to be
Judged, no war for the deknse of a prinei.
pie can.long be carried on i,rs.hi 'aaif-s
Fortunately for the lane and power of
England, the Ministry. although ignorant
of the true mode OF prosecuting hostilities,
had sense enough to see that their only
true policy was perseverance,. They were
strong enough to resist tn, formidable op-
position which the events that, we have re-
ferred to developed in Paliament and the
country. and. undismayed by the expert
ence of the past. concludel a treaty with
the Provisional Goyernmnt of Spain, by
which they pledged England never to a.
bandon the national cause until the French
were driven across the Pyrenss. The ar
my was placed on Z better footing. was
largely reinforced. and Sir Arthur Welles-
ley vas appointed to the chief command.
The government. not yet wholly awakened
from its illusions. still thought it practica-
Bile to reach Madrid in single campaign,
and to that end the efforts Of Wellington
were directed. 1t became necessary first
to dislodge Soult at Oporto. and the mag
nifcent victory of the English gained by
the passage of the Douro at that point,
went far to revive confidence at home in
the invincibility of their army. Yet so
clear is it that victory in war often depends
upon what, for some better name. we may
call mere good fortune, that we have the
authority of the duke of Wellington him.
self for saying, that this army, which had
just exhibited such prodigies Of yalor, was
then in such state Of decentralization that
although excellent on parade, excellent
to fight, it was worse than an enemy in
country, and liable to dissolution alike by
success or defeat" Certainly no seversr
criticism has ever been justified by the in
experience and want of discipline of our
ownraw levies than that contained in this
memorable declaration. a little reflection
and candor might perhaps teach us, as it
did the English, that nothing can compen-
safe for want of experience, and that every
allowance is to be made for disasters where
it is necessary to educate both officers and
soldiers in the actual presence of the ener
my. Wellington soon afterwards moved
towards the Spanish frontier, hoping, by a
junction with the army under Cuesta, to
fight battle with the French which wo'd
open to him the road to the capital. The
battle was fought at Talavera, and a.
though it has since been claimed by the
English as one of their prcudest victories,
and the name of Talavera is now inscrib-
ed upon the standarrs of the regiments
who took part in it. with those of Salam-
anca and Vittoria. yet the result was. in the
end, that Wellington was obliged to re.
treat to Lisbon just three months after be
had set out from that place, having left
his wounded in the hands Ct the French.
having escaped as ii by miracle from be-
ing wholly cut off in his retreat, and hav.
ing lost one-third OF his army in battle
and by disease. OF course the blame was
thrown upon the want of cooperation on
the part of the Spaniards. This we have
nothing to do with; it is the result of the
campaign with which we are concerned
Dependence upon the Spsniards was cer-
tainly. as itturned out, fault. but it was
one of the fair chances of war, and it was
fault in which Wellington. made wise by
experience. was mover again detected ga
When tue news Of the unto ward result
OF this campaign reached England, the
clamor against the Government and a.
gainst Wellington was quite as violent as
that excited by the disasters of Sir John
Moorc's army. The opposition in Parlia-
ment took advantage of this feeling to
rouse public feeling to such manifesto
tion as might compel the termination of
the war in the Peninsula and drive the
ministry from office. The Common Coun-
Gil Of London, probably fair exponent
of the opinions of the middle class, ,peti-
toned the King not TO confirm the grant
Of E2. .000'a year, which the Ministry had
succeeded IN getting Parliament to vote to
Wellington, The petitioners. ridiculed
the idea that battle attended with such
results should be called victory. at
should rather be called q calamity, ("
they said. t'since we were obliged to seek
safety ina precipitate fight, abandoning
many thousands OF our, wounded country
men into the hands of the French In
the opinion Of the stratesists in the Com
mon Council, and of their friends in Par
lament, Wellington might be brave of
fcer but he was no general; be- had, neg
lected the protection Of his fanks and his
line Of communication. When it is re-
membcred that at this very time Welling-
ton. prv6ting by the experiences of the past.
was diligently making his army, really ef-
fectiye within the lines of Torres Vedras,
from which stronghold it was in due time
TO sally f0nh. like a giant refreshened,
never toorest until it had planted the Egg
lish flag on the heights of Toulouse, We
may perhaps smile at the presumption of
those who, sincere we'll wisEess to the cause
displayed only their ignorance IN their crit
icism. But what shall be said off, those
who. knowing better, being quito able to
understand the, wisdom of the policy a.
dopted by the General to insure success in
the stupehdous enterprise in iwhick the
country was engaged. yet with a fsc,ious
spirit and with the sole object Of getting
into power themselves. took advantage Of
the excitement Of, the ignorant multitude
to paralyze the energies OF the government?
8 Fhat iiidcous moral leprosy. which
seems to be.ths sad but inysTiabo attend
ant supou ell political discussions. in free
gorernmsnt, corruptipg the, very sources
Of public life. breeding only the base spirit
-of faction, had taken complete possession