Belmont chronicle. [volume] (St. Clairsville, Ohio) 1855-1973, 1863-01-01

~ uoncs hccOIulnRly teieRrapned 10 the
President Of the United States that l with
drew our army because felt the enemy g
position could not be carried"
Burnside's testimony here closed.
The Battle of Fredericksburg.
lFfom the PhilsdeIphs North AmenesnI
A few days ago, we remarked that the
frst accounts Of battles generally differ in
the most remarkable manner from those
which finally obtain place in history, being
exaggerated, distorted and inaccurate. A.
the time we wrote, we had no idea that this
would as soon be exempli6ed in the accounts
of one Of the most fearful battles on record,
one in the contemplation of which the heart
sickens, and the Imagination grows weary Of
the vain attempt to embrace the details OF
the horrible slaughter. The revelations of
this week have scared place in the mem
ory OF the present generation, the like of
which may not, and, we trust. will not, oc.
cur again. struggle so tremendous in the
size Of the armies engaged, so fearful in its
concomitants, 80 appalling in its results
and SO brief in its duration, deserves to be
memorable in our annals for all time to
come, and yet the first accounts treated il
as mere reconnaissance or skirmish.
Some Of our contemporaries are vexing
their brains to find the means of belittling
this prodigious slaughter. If they were moi
in so great hurry to judge ofeyery even,
in the very instant that the first telegram
arrivcs--ifthey were not so big with coun
sci and portentous with their threats-if, in
short, they had but little of that cool bra.
very which is the pre-eninent quality of an
officer in battle, and should be possessed by
all who undertake to counsel generals, they
would wait patiently until they we're fur.
nished with accurate details, and then Judge
calmly and philosophically There is nc
need for any one to apologize for this great
battle, or to attempt to belittls it into re-
connoisance in force, or to censure the gen.
erals who undertook it, or to explain il away
into what it was not. 1t was prodigious
attempt to achieve great result, and il
was a prodigious failure. When such
things do fail at all. they always fail in thi:
way. No partial failure is, in the nature
of things. possible. If the event proves q
victory, as it often does, it is never a mere
strategical or tactical victory; it becomes &
momentous triumph, memorable through
all succeeding time.
Burnside was unsuccessful in his attempt
but Napoleon was equally unsuccessful a
Aspern and Essling, and his failure a
Waterloo was awful. Burnside has mad,
no blunder. His plan was worthy of tn,
best General in Europe. He had used i
before with skill and success at Roanoke Is
land and Newbern, and although he faile,
n. Dan sss sIgsl.ts bs main Issaa4s
sf his military system seem to be to attacl
the enemy's center in force, and to attacl
always in column. Some of the very wis
men, who think the President and Cabine
ought to resign, urge that both these idea
age has exploded them. We do not believ,
q word of this, and we will say why.
We have already stated that both at Ro
Napoleonic idea were used by Burnside
and were the leading features Of his opera
tons He paid no attention to outposts, Il
Hanking efforts, etc. In this he was right
Baron Jomini expressly says, in his Sum
mary of the Art Of War, that these fankin
operations imperil an army by making il
line too thin and weak, SO that an attack b
the enemy may easily break it; and if tn
Hanking party is separated and sent by
detour to make rear diversion, it is yer
apt to fail through mistake Of roads, @
delays of various kinds, and, if encountere
by the enemy in force, is sure to be annih
lated. In the desperate battle Of Spring
| 6eld, Sigel's flank attack was disastror
failure, and his whole division was cut NJ
despite the great skill of the General, an
his tried abilities on many hard tough
field.
In war, the most obvious and ordinary {
all efforts BY Generals, of every grade an
talent, is to outaank the enemy. Napoleo
achieved the greatest and most wonderfl
of all his successes by avoiding this hack
neyed mode of operations, and risking hi
whole force on single desperate attack
the center. Perhaps it will be said that Q,
cry General lie not Napoleon, ard ther,
fore such risks ought to be avoided. I
this we reply that in every battle wheI
these fearful attacks Of the center prove
successful he was on the very brink OF d,
structiou. In his first signal victory ,
Marengo, the battle was actually lost; h
army was thoroughly beaten and flying
all directions, when Dessaix arrived. HI,
too, thought the field lost; but Napolet
renewed the contest with the fresh troop
and won the day by his attack on the Gel
ter. WagTam was a memorable instance
, this terrific risk, and the terrible slaught
of Macdonalds column in the decisi'
charge still causes the reader Of history
J thrill as he ponders on it.
Our soldiers at Fredericksburg were n
whit worse than those of Napoleon n
: troops recoiled in many battle before Il
! awful fire Of the opposing army, and d
best troops in the world sometimes fail in
charge The British storming party fail
I at the Redan before Seyastopol. They a
e like sheep at Bunker Hill and New Orleal
9 Napoleon's veterans from hundred hatt
Q fields were scattered to the winds at Wat,
! loo. 1t is idle to expect that men wi
, reasoning faculties will not recoil beft
such horrors as our troops encountered
IS Fredericksburg. 1t may be said that
!, this is true, the cnarge in column and i.
: the center must be an error. But here
8 Just the point where modern military S
u ence shows itself most triumphantly.
Napoleon knew that the risk Of such
l. charge was awful, and that as in great v
it must always be increased bv the fact II
10 most of the troops in the 6eld are n
levies, and, therefore, to certain exit
y mt tlustworthy, means must he found
guard against the possibility of their bel
" shle to take to fight. To do this he, ma
As his charging columns always very. hea