The Manitowoc pilot. [volume] (Manitowoc, Wis.) 1859-1932, 1863-04-17

| Urbana on Frederick, the Eleventh corp:
moving by lateral road between Urbans
and New Market, thus maintaining the
communication between The center and
right wing, as well as covering the direct
route from Frederick to Washington. The
Sixth corps under General Franklin, vas
moved to Darnestown on the 6 h inst
thence by Dawsonville and Barnvile On
Buckeston, covering the road from the
mouth of the Monocacy to Rockville, and
being in position to connect with and sup
port the center should i. have been neces
sary (as was supposed) to torce the line
of the Monocacy. COUGHS division was
thrown forward 10 Ofiut's roads and Poo es
vile by the river rad thus covering that ap
proach, watching the fords of the Poto
mac.anl ultimately following and support
ing the Sixth corps The Object of these
mo2emnts was to feel the enemy.
compel him to develop his intsntions-at
the same time that the troops were in
position readily to cover Baltimore or
Washington, to attack him should he hold
the line of the Monocacy, or 10 follow
him into Pennsylvania if necessary. On
the 18th portion of the right wing en-
tered Frederick after a brisk skirmish a;
the outskirts of tho city and in its streets.
On the 18Th the main bodies of the right
wing and center passed through FEEDER
lex In this city the manifestations OF
Union feeling were abundant and gratify-
lug The troops received the most en-
,husastic welcome at the hands of he
inhabitants. On the 18Th the advance,
consisting Of PIeasauton's cavalry and
horse artillery, after some skrmishing
cleared the main passage over the Catoc,
tin hills, leaving no serious obstruction to
the movement of the main body until the
base Of the South mountain range vas
reached.
While at Frederick, on the 18Th, obs
tanned reliable information of the move
ments anl intentions OF the enemy. which
made il clear that it was necessary to force
the passage of ;he South mountain range
and gain possession of Boonsboro' and
Rohrersviiie Iafore any relief could be af-
forded to !iarper's Ferry.
On the morning OF tho 18th I received
a verbal message from Colonel Miles, com
nlanding at Harpel's Ferry, informing me
that on the preceding afternoon the Mary
land Heights had been abandoned, at, CT
repelling an attack BY the rebels, and that
the whole force was concentrated at lIar-
per's Ferry, the Maryland, Loudon, and
Bolivar heights. being all in possession OF
The enemy. The messenger stated that
there was no apparent reason for the aban
donment Of the Maryland heights, and tha,
though Colonel Miles asked for assistance,
he said lie could hold cut certainly Two
DAYS | directed him TO make his way
back. If possible, with the information that
| was rapidly approaching, and would TN
doubteliy relieve lie place. BY three
other couriers [ sent lie same message
with the order to hold out 10 the last
dc no' learn that any Of ;hese messengers
succeeded il reaching Uarrer's Ferrr ]
should here state that on the 18th | was
directed to assume command of the garri-
son at Harpcr's Ferry, but this order
reached me after all communication with
the garrison was cut off. Before | left
Washington, and while it was yet time, |
recommended to the proper authorities
that the garrison of IEarper's Ferry should
be withdrawn, via Uagerstown, TO aid in
covering the CumbevIan', valley, or that,
taking up he pontoon bridge and obstruct-
ING the railroad bridge. it should fall back
to the MARYLAND heights, and there loi,
its own 10 lie last. jn this position ii
couIG have maintained itself for weeks
/ was not deemed proper to adopt either
of these suggestions, and when the subject
was left to my discretion it was too late 10
do anything except to try to relieve the
garrison
| directed artillery to be frequently fired
by our advance guards As a signa TO the
garrison that relief Was at hand. This was
done, and learn that our firing was dis
tnctly hearl at Harpers Ferry, and that
they were thu, made aware that we were
approaching rapidly. 1t was confidently
expected that this place could mold ont TN
I'll we had carried the mountains and were
in a position to make detechment for lis
relief. The left. therefore, was ordered g
move through Jefferson to the South
Mountains, at Crampton's Pass, in front o.
Burkettsvile, while tue center aud right
moved upon the main OF Turner's Pass, in
front of Middletown. During these move
ments had not imposed long marches or
the columns The absolute necessity O
reftting and giving some little rest to
troops worn down hy previous long-con-
tinusd marching and severe fighting, to.
eether With the uncertainty as to the ac-
tual position, strength. and intentions 0
the enemy, rendered it incumbent upor
me 10 move slowly and cautiously nn,il til;
headquarters reached Urbana, where
/ first obtained reliable information that tn,
enemy's object was 10 move upon Harper
Ferry and the Cumberland valley and no
upon Baltimore, Washington, or Geitys-
burg.
In the absence Of the fell reports o
corps commanders, a simple outline Of Ii
brilliant operations, which resulted in III
carving OF the two passes through ID
South mountains. IS I'll that can, st TIL
time. with justice 70 ths troops and COZ
mandsrs engaged, be furnished Th
South mountain range, ear Turner's Pas
average. psrhap, thousand feet in hsigh
aud forms strong natural military barr
~ q