The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-08-22

| ers suitable for the navigation ne tsI'
bayous being limited, most of the force I u.se
sent up the Mississippi River to EaoIasss
BENZ, a point where the river runs wifh;s
one mile OF Steeles Bayou, thus saving a.,
important part of this difficult nayigaf;o az
The expedition failed, probably more fro,-
want OF knowledge as to what would ha 20
CURED to open this rout han from anv;,s
practcablilty in the navigation az 81.
streams and bayous through which it w ae
proposed to pass. Want of this knowiedaoo
leo the expedition on until difficulties waso
encountered, and then it would be necessa0
ry 10 send back to Young's Point for r.
means Of removing them. This gave tIs
enemy Time to move forces to effectuaIjV,
checkmate further progress, and the exnc
dltion was withdrown when within a y
hundred yards of free and open nayigat;oS
to the Yazoo. All this NAV have To-.
providential in driving us ultimately 10
line operations which has proven eminent'
ly successful. For further particulars "s
the Steele's Bayou expedition. see rano VI
of Major General w. f. Sherman, forward
ed on the 18th of April. AS soon as 7 do,
eide to open water communication from =.
point on the Mississippi near Mlliken,s
Bend to New Carthage, / determined :"
occupy the latter place, it being the first
point below Vicksburg that could ha
reached by land at the stage of water then
|
while it secured to us point on the Mis-
sissippi River, would also protect the main
line OF communication by water. Accord.
ing, the 18th army corps, Major General !
A. McClernand commanding, was directed
to take up it's line of march, on the 10Th
day of March, for New Carthage, the 18TH
and 18th corps to follow, moving no faster
than supplies and ammunition could be
transported to them.
The roads fhpuph laval u-ara
bly, bad, and the movement was therefore
| necessarily slow. Arriving at Smiths
plantation, two miles from New Carthage
it was found that the levee at Bayou Vida
was broken in several places, thus leaving
| New Carthage an island.
RUNNING THE BATTERIEs.-All the boats
| that could be were collected from the dit
ferent bayous in the vicinity, and Others
were built, but the transportation of an ar
my In this way was found exceedingly te-
dlous. Another route had to be found
This was done by making farther march
around Vidal to Perkins Plantation, dis.
lance of twelve miles or more, making the
whole distance to be marched from Mill
ken's Bend to reach water communication
on the opposite side of the point, thirty-five
miles. Over this distance, with bad roads
TO contend against, supplies Of ordinance
stores and provisions had to be hauled by
wagons, with which to commence the cam.
paign on the other side of the river. AT
the same time that ordered the occupa.
ton OF New Carthage, preparations were
belng made for running transports by the
Vlcksburg batteries with Admiral Porter's
gunboat fleet. On the night of the 10th of
April, Admiral Porter's fleet and the trans
ports Silver Wave, Forest Queen and Hen.
ry Clay, ran the Vicksburg batteries. The
boilers OF the transports were protected as
well as possible with hay and cotton. More
or less commissary stores were put on each
AL! three of these boats were struck more
or less frequently while passing the enc.
my's batteries, and the Henry Clay, bv the
explosion of a shell, or by other means
was set on fire and entirely consumed
The other two boats were somewhat in.
Jured, but not seriously disabled. No one
on board of either was killed.
AS these boats succeeded in getting BY
so well, ordered six more to be prepared
These latter, viz: Tigress, nglo-Saxon,
Cheeseman, Empire City, Horizona, and
Moderator, left Milliken's Bend on the
night of the 22d of April, and five of them
got by but in somewhat damaged cond-
ton. The Tigress received shot in her
hull below the water line, and sunk on
the louisiana shore soon after passing the
last of the batteries. The crews of these
steamers with the exception of the Forest
Queen, Capt. ID. Conway, and the Silver
Wave, Capt. Mcmillan, were composed of
volunteers from the army. Upon the call
for volunteers for this dangerous enter.
prise, officers and men presented them
selves by hundreds, anxious to undertake
the trip. The names of those whose seryi.
ces were accepted, will be given in a sepa-
rate report. 1t is striking feature, so far
as my observation goes, of the present vol
unteer army of the United States. that
there is nothing which men are called upon
to do, mechanical or professional, that aC-
complished adopts cannot be found for
the duty required in almost every regi-
ment.
transports injured in running the blockade
were repaired by order of Admiral Porter,
who was supplied with the materiel for
such repairs as they required and who was
and is ever readysto afford all the asss,
lance in his power for the furtherance of
the success OF our arms. In a very short
time five OF the transports were in run
ming order, and the remainder were in a
condition to be used as barges in the NOV
ing of troops. Twelve barges loaded with
forage and rations were sent in tow of the
last six boats that run the blockade: one
half of them got through in condition to
be used. Owing to the limited number OF
transports below Vicksburg, it was found
necessary to extend our line of land travel
W lidtu liIieS, LOulSidi!d, WHICH, Dy the
circuitOus route it was necessary TO take,
increased the distance to seventy miles
from Milliken's Bend, our starting point.
The 18th army corps being all through to
the Mississippi, and the 7th army corps
well on the way, so much of the 18th as
could he got on board the transports and
barges were put aboard and moved to the
front of Grand Gulf on the Goth of April.
The plan here was that the navy should 81
lence the guns of the enemy, and the
troops land under cover of the gunboats
and carry the place ystorm. AT IS O'Clock
a. m. the navy made the attack, and kept
it up for more than five hours in the most
gallant manner. From tug out in the
stream / witnessed the whole engagement.
Many times it seemed to me the gunboats
were within pistol shot of the batteries.
1t soon becrme evident that the guns ofths
enemy We're too elevated and their FORTH
cations too strong to be taken from the
water side. The whole range of hills on
that side were known to be lined with rife
pits, besides, the field artillery could be
moved to any position where it could be
made useful in case of an ATTEMPT at land
ing. This determined me to again run tie
enemy'S batteries, turn his position by ef-