Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-05-14

farce Just concluded bv Hooker with the assist
snce OF the noble army OF the Potomac The
only variation from The plan OF the defeat | then
marked out wss "a the timely discovery by Hook
er Of the fact that he VAS already defeated On
the discovery OF tbs fact he wisely concluded not
10 wait for Jackson To get in between him and
the ford as h al retson 20 believe and rem srked
that he vas attempting; but. taking time by the
forelock. backed out from his position. ehus
snatching the shattered remains OF his army from
almost certain destruction The telegram has
already carried TO the farthest exiremites of
the land. the intelligence Of the Withdrawal Of
the Federal army from the south hank Of the
Rapp'hannock. Itwas eminently proper that il
should be Withdrawn. The mistake WIS that il
was ever put there the second time. Its ranks
are weakened 10y from ten 20 twelve tho sand
men the consequence of this blunder. and the
spirit Of the noble old guard is crushed and brok
en-. And as We sit in our old encampment- nov
and review the operations of the pa week the
inquiry forces itself upon u. WHY were We drag
gsd out to such Slaughter Whyg
We are told that we have not been defeated !;
that the plans Of our commander have not been
materially frustrated: that offensive operations
will be resumed very soon. and much more 0f the
same sort. Let me ask IN all soberness. in what
does defeat cousistl Can an army march out
and give battle have its ranks broken and deci
mated. be repul-ed BY it, foe. driven back under
fire. compelled 10 return 10 it, starting point. and
still be victorious in the movement? I hold thai
thereis no middle ground between victory and
defeat Where two opposing parties meet ~
serious combat. one or the other must conquer
There may be a wide range Inv the character or
periectne~s Of the victory gained or the cont ete
of the defeat suffered, but the result Is inva
riably the success of one or the other purity
Common consent has determir eel the method of
determining the result of battle The party
holding the battle ground ~ the close of con
test. in. an engagement where the conteiidng
parties regularly loin battle il accorded the palm
of victory Gen Hooker chose his position He
moved into that position with his army on Thur
day and Friday of last week. and then proclaim
ed. IN exultalion. that the enemy must come out
of his intrenchments and fight him (Hooker) on
his own (Hooker's) ground where the success OF
the latter was certain
The next day Hooker advanced his lines aittle
10 secure even greater advantages than those he
already possessed and which he acknow lelgcd To
be- sufficient This advance was unre.isted by
the enemy. No other conclusion can therefore
reasonably he drawn than that Hooker wns stu
ated precisely as afier mature study and dcber.
alton. he most wished 10 be situated lie was III
ready for the battle His forces were on the field
He had no reserves waiting 10 be brought up--no
allies elsewhere whose coming was DELAYED He
could have been no more ready had the enemy
left him unmolested month longer He prob
ably would have chosen no other field had he
taken another term of five months in which To
study the situation. His plan was cOmplete--his
Arrangements all perfected
The enemy then came upon him. In their first
real onslsught--that OF Saturday evenng--they
drove Us back mile aud halt In their second
attack-that OF Sunday--they drove us back two
miles. regaining TINT by the possess NJ of which
we annoyed them--the Orange Court House plank
road
Their third attack was made on an exposed lie
tachment of the grand army-that of Sedgwick
at Banks Ford, which wits driven precipitaiely
across the Rappahannock after twelve hours of
most desperate fighting Their final attack would
have been m,do. as minated to YOU in my last
letter II would he made, an our the Uni
ted States Ford. with view To cut oil our retreat
and then snnhatng US at leizure Aud even
this movement was not apprehended by Hooker
until the very last moment. and then he barely
saved himself nv an ingliorions fight
These heing the plain. patent circumstances of
the case. il will not do for Gen Hooker or for
his radical friends or for the Administration or
for the Administrations defenders. TO claim thai
Gen. Rockers retragrade movement WAS part of
sener II strategic plan. Strategy d,es not len
an armv directly up the hill and directly down
again 10 precisely its old ground Had not Gen
Hooker obsrinately coniendel for the possession
and had he. on Withdrawing. moved his army to
another offensive position. rather than placing it
buck IN lis time worn camp, he might have
claimed that 1t was strategy on his part that die
tated the movement As il stands il is next 10
the defea, at Bull Run--the most complete de
feat. and the deepest disgrace we have suffered in
all this war
Gen. Hooker has taken an early opportunity OF
publishing the reasons that actuated his late
10
Here they are
Flrst-The flight of the llrh corps which rem
dered Gen. Sickle's movements nugaturv. and
forced the army out of the carefully selected
field o: battle 20 which General Hooker re
ferred in his General Order of April 30,h md
compelled il 10 receive the enemv's attack
among denseiv wooded hills where it was m
possible to bring all nearly all our troops
into action
Second-The rising of the Rappahannock in
consequence of the storm which was likely to
endsnger the line OF communication between the
army and lis supplies. particularly as the railroad
communication with AQUA Greek had been lie
stroyed by the floods for twelve hours at Brooks
Station
Third-Ignorance of the success of Gen. Stone
man expedition. from which Gen Hooker did
nor hear until he had recrossed.
Every one of these reasons Is false in every
particular. as | will undertake TO prove in a
verv few words
Firsi-The ground from which the llth CORPS
stampeded was not occupied by Gen Hooker or
snv of his forces when he issued the cOngratula
tory and hoasitul order To which he refers IL
was not taken until the afternoon Of Saturday.
My 81. three days after that order issued
So far as this stampele rendered the movements
of Gen. Sickles nugatory. ! am prepared to prove
by the plrtieS themselves. that Gen Hooker on
posed Gen. Sckles advance on the right during
Saturday. frequently sending 10 him (SickleS)
during the day. cautions 20 20 slow. ROT TO al
vance too far: that he had better malt. etc and.
during the early progress of that movement.
which Sickes undertook on his own responsible
ity. positively refused to support him in IL. eoirg
even SEQ lar a TO withhold two thirds of Sickle
corpS from the support. thus comnelling the
gallant Siekles TO push B'ruey out alone and IN
supported The repnlse OF the right wing of the
army from a field gained under these circunlsian
ces. could have caused no serious arrangement 10
the plans of the Commanding General
Second-It j. patent fact that the recrossiuc
Of the Rarpthanuock bad been commenced md
progressed so far that all the sick and wonudei.
all the artillery. the baggage trains. ambuhnces,
and everything hut the infantry were across be-
fore the river began 10 rise The destruction Of
the railroad to AQUA Greek did not take place
until lfter the army was al over. OF hnf
temporary duration. AMI WIS not known by Gen
Hooker until his return 10 Falmouth
Thrd-The movements Of At last two divisions
OF sioneman's cavalry corps-,hose Of Averill
and Pleasauton-were fully known by the Com
49,