Evening star., 1863-04-07
THE EVENING STAR.
THE WAR COMMITTEES REPORT

War:
THE CAMPAIGN IN MARYLAND.
The Committee report that they having gone
SO fully into the details of the peninsula CAM
paign, do not deem it necessary to devote so
much space TO the campaign in Maryland.
The same mind that controlled the movements
upon the peninsula controlled those in Mary.
land, and the same general features charac-
terize the one campaign that characterized the
other. In each may be seen the same unreadi.
ness TO move promptly and act vigorously; the
same desire for more troops before advancing;
and the same references to the great superiority
of numbers on the part of the enemy. The
committee, therefore. content themselves with
referring briefly to the leading operation Of the
campaign.
In regard to the manner OF conducting the
attack at Antietau, Gen. Sumner testifies
"1 have always believed that, instead of
sending these troops into that action in driblets,
they were sent, if Gen. Mcclellan had au-
thoriZed me to march these 10000 men en- the
left flank of the enemy, we could not have
failed to throw them right back in front of tho
other divisions of our army On our left-Burn-
side's, Franklin's and Porter's corps. AS it
was, we went in, division after division. until
even one of my own q visions was forced out.
The other two drove tn enemy and held their
positions. My intention at the time was to
have proceeded entirely on by their left and
move down, bringing them right in front of
Burnside, Franklin and Porter.
"Question. And all escape for the enemy
would have been impossible
"AnsWer. i think so.''
The testimony of Gen. Burnside, on the SUBJ
ject of renewing the attack upon the enemy the
day after the battle, is as follows
"Question. Did you express any opinion to
Gen. Mcclellan, or to any one at headq uarters,
in relation to rene win the attack the next day;
and if so, what opinion did you express %
ssAnswer / did express an opinion to Gener-
al Mcclellan on the subject. After my COM
mand was all in position-say half past eight
O'Clock at night went over to Gen. McClel-
lan's headquarters, at Cadysville, and ex-
pressed the opinion to General Marcy, his
chief of staff. that the attack ought to be re-
newed the mex morning at five o'clock l
also expressed the saIne opinion to other men,
bers of General Nc,Ileilan's staff General
Marcy told me that ought to see General
MeClellan and tell him what thought of the
matter. / went into Grne"a al McCcllan's tent,
and in the course of the conversation l ex-
pressed the same opinion 70 him, and told him
that if could have 5000 fresh troops to pass in
advance OF min. would be willing to COM
mence the attack on the next morning He
said that he had been thir king the matter over
and would make up his mind during the night,
and if / would send a staff officer 10 his head
quarters TO remain there over night, he would
send me orders early in the morning; and if he
concluded to renew the attack, he would send
me the necessary men. l did send the staff
officer over. but General Mcclellan concluded
not TO renew the attack the next day
"Q Would there have been any
difficulty in furnishing the 5000 fresh troops
which you desired, as the corps of Gen. Fitz
John Porter, some $4,000 or 10000 men, had not
been engaged
"Answer.-There would have been no diff
Guilty in furnishing the 5000 fresh troops. In
fact Gen. Mcclellan did send Gen. Morells
division, of quite that strength, to report TO
me, but not with orders to me to renew the at
tack"
Gen. Franklin testifies:
"Question.-Were you consulted in relation
to renewing the attack the next day:
swer.-When General Mcclellan visited
the right In the afternoon. / showed hlm a posi-
ton on the right of this Wood l have already
Nnad inv oh
which / thought commanded the wood and
that if it could be taken, we could drive the
enemy from the wood by merely holding this
point. i advised that we should make the
attack on that place the next morning, from
General Summers position. / thought there
was no doubt about our being able to carry it.
We had plenty of artillery bearing upon it, We
drove the enemy from there that afternoon, and
had no doubt thatwe could take the place the
next morning, and / thought that would un-
cover the whole left Of the enemy.
go estion.-If that had been made, and that
point had been carried, what would have been
the effect upon the enemy!
"Answer.-It would have been very disas-
trous TO them.
&C uestIOn.-What reasons We're given for
not making the attack the next morning.
"Answer.-1 did not hear the direct reason
OF the general commanding, but have under
stood that the reason was, that he expected
some $1,000 new troops-those which would
make the thing a certain tning-and he pre-
ferred to wait to make this attack on the right,
unlll lntSe new troops came.
go ues stion.-And that delay gave the enemy
an opportunity to escape!
"AnSWer.-1 think it did,
On the 10th OF October the rebel Gen. Stuart
made his raid into Pennsylvania, returning
into Virginia, having made the entire circuit
OF our army. Or the 18th Gen. Mcclellan re-
ported to Gen. HalIeck the result of the raid,
and ascribed its success to the deficiency of our
cavalry, and urged 6 the imperative necessity
OF at once supplying this army, including the
command of Gen. Banks, with sufficient
number of horses to remount every dismounted
cavalry soldier within the shortest possible
time. Ii this is not done we shall be constant
ly exposed TO rebel cavalry raids
To this Gen. Halleck replies Your tele-
gram OF p. M. Yesterday is just received As
i have already informed you, the Government
has been and is making every possible effort to
increase the cavalry force Remounts are sent
to you as rapidly as they can be procured The
me TO suggest that if the enemy had more occu-
patton south of the river, his cavalry would
not be SO likely TO make raids north OF it,
On the 18th of October the President wrote to
General Mcclellan concerning the operations
OF the army. And on the 18th of October Cen
eral Mcclellan wrote in reply. The letter of
the President and the reply of General III CleI-
Ian are as follows:
"ExEcuTIvE MANSION,
"WAsHISGTON, October l3, 1863
"Ay Dear Sir: You remember me speaking
70 you OF what l called your oyercautiousness
Are you not oyercautious when you assume
that you cannot do what the enemy is con-
stantly doing. Should you not claim to be at
least his equal in prowess, and act upon the
claim!
"As understand. you telegraphed General
Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at
Winchester, unless the railroad from Harper's
Terry to that psint be put in working order
But the enemy does now subsist his army at
Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great
from railroad transportation as you would
have to do without the railroad last named
He now wagons from Culpeper Court House,
which is just about twice as far as you would
have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is GER
tainly not more than half as well provided
with wagons as you are. l certainly should be
pleased for you to have the advantage Of the
railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester:
but it wastes all the remainder of autumn to
give 1t TO You, and in fact ignores the question
OF time, which cannot and must not be ignored
"Again: one OF the standard maxims Of war.
as you know, is 'to operate upon the enemy's
communications as much as possible without
exposing your own You seem to act as if
this applies against you, but cannot apply in
your favor. Change positions with the enemy,
and think you not he break your comm unication
with Richmond within the next twenty. four
hours! You dread his going into Pennsylvania
But il he does SO in full force. he gives up his
communications 10 you absolutely, and YOU
have nothing TO do but 10 follow and ruin him.
If he DOES so in less than full force, fall upon
and beat what is left behind all the easier.