Burlington free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, 1863-06-12

s. t.r.r.ts subject FIR r'.iicule OBJ the rl-- g ID
portion .l The press FOR some time las been the
famous be- luacouia. of two years ago. We vii
Iu-'y a-.arl % certain pI.lc Journals that
u.e-l .. Iclt which Is due tr their somewhat
late discovery THAT thc military policy o. our
government has So far been one e-re-ou> blum
der. Do even. within the past three or fur
months some q them have strongly Advocated
the seuiuc a. an expedition % Texas. thereby
adding another joint o. the fabulous monster.
We VII not pry too closely into the apparent in
consistency. Enough that they have received
clearer . -ht since the attacks upon FREEZER
icksoUrg and Charleston. They are now con-
WINGED that fighting. Ike the keeping Of L0teis.
ought 90 BE- " conducted on the European plan. 90
We have erred, say they, in sssailn- so many
different points. when We ought 20 have masscd
our forces upon only one or two, AMI hurled
them in irres sti0le strength upon the enemy.
crushing opposition op0wier by the very weight
Of our greater numbers and resources. Nor
shall We ever succeed until new policy Is iuau-
guratei. and the d" anaconda" IS consigned 10
repose with its companions, the sea-serpent and
the mermaids
For ourselves We respectfully take issue on
this subject with our military friends Of the doc
trinaire school The more closely We look into
the subject the more We are convinced that the
" anaconda plan Of operations was right,
and, what lie more. the ogiy one by which the
rebellion could be successfully assiiei. Of
cours,, this does not propose TO defend incompc-
tency on the part Of officers or mistakes commit
ted At Washington, both Of which are RESPONSE
bic for much Of the delay AMI disaster that have
taken place
In the first place, then. j, IS not true that the
plan Of assaillng an enemy occupying central
position from different points Of the compass by
separate armies, has been abandoned in Europe
Inaaa rHraav - T.
Russian invasion Of 1872, an anaconda was
formed by the governments Of Great Br tain,
Spain and Portugal. on the West, by Swelcn on
the North, and by Russia, Prussia, Austria and
minor German States on the East-all their ar
mics convcrging, first in the direction Of France,
and afterwari upon the city Of Paris It Is true
that Napoleon during this period peri rmed some
o. the splendid military ftat- that arc 10 he found
IN ms eventiul history, moving from one line 70
another IN order 70 attack with his whole army
and defeat the invaders in detail Yet this did
not prevent the Duke of Wellington from cross
ing the Fyrenees, or the allied armies on the
last and North from forcing their way into the
French capital So successful, in fact, did this
plan prove. that on the Emperur's rs-enterinr
rance m the following year another d" anscon.
da was forthwith created, Of which the Prus-
san and British oontingents constituted onlv
two Of the joints The entire force comprised J
fully one million Of men, and was 10 enter
France from at least half dozen different direc
tons Waterloo bears witness to the result So
mnch for European authority on this subject
In the second place, the adoption Of such
policy was indispensable on our part, had Euro
pean presidents been ever 50 decidedly against
US Il was Of the first importance that the In
Surgent armies should never set foot upon North
ern soil and that rigid blockade Of the insur-
rectionary States should be kept up. The divid-
ing line from the Atlantic 10 New Mexico. in
Guiding IT'S various windings, Is well up to > 800
miles Independent Of guerilla expeditions, that
] ne was penetrable from the South bv three rail
ways in Virginia, two in Kentucky, and two NOT
three in Missouri. There were also sueb naviTs-
bic rivers open 10 the enemy as the NIis,issipni
the tennessee, the Cumberland, the Osare. the
Oreen, the kentucky, the kanaWha, to say no
thlng OF MINOR streams and the comb of estu-
aries which enter the Chesapeake ANY one Of
these might be selected by the rebels as the line
Of INVASION, and consequently ell had to be ltel4
ny heavy force, Nay, more. 10 successfully
invade the rebel State at any one poiut II w.
necessary TO make imposing demonstrations
against ereTy Vulnerable quarter. The enemv's
strength WAS thereby weakened Commemorate
with our own
That the southern coast should be rici,llv blocl-
AIDED will hardly be called in question. That il ,
was exceedingly desirable to capture a. manv a. ?
possible Of the Confederate ports we viii take for 7
granted. To accomplish this a land force va.
ieeief to cooperate with the fleets. Even had ,
10 movements Of the sort been oontemplatei. n :,
: evident that the blockade could not have been !,
maintained without establishing several grand
iepots, ike Hilton Head and Ship Island, To- en-
Ioe SHIPS TO be supplied and temporarily re-
'alred But this very circumstance involved the i
necessity Of stationing at those points powerful
,arrisons for their defence. The real or f.ipnsd
ttaeks made by these have compelled the ins,rr- N
-euts to retain large hodies Of their troop, al v
round the seaboari, thereby Weakening theuo. Il
he front 10 the same extent. a
suppose we had placed quarter OF million I.
troops under the Command OF any Of our r,