The Nashville daily union. [volume] (Nashville, Tenn.) 1862-1866, 1863-03-05

himself, sufficient 10 hold all the forces
on his trout
Thomas and Palmer 70 open with
skirmishing, aud gain the enemy's center
and left as far as the river.
Crittenden to cross Van Cleye's division
at the lower ford, covered and supported
by the Sappers and Miners, and TO ad-
yaece on Breckenridge.
Woods division 10 follow by brigades,
crossing at the upper ford, and moving
on Van Cleve's right, TO carry everything
into Murfreesboro.
This would have given us two divisions
against one, and as soon as Breckenridge
had been dislodged from his position, the
batteries of Woods division, taking po-
sitiOn on the nights east of Stone river,
in advance, would see the enemy's works
in reverse, would dislodge them, and ena-
BILE Palmer's division to press them back
aud drive them westward across the river,
or through the woods, while Thomas.
sustaining the movement on the center,
would advance on the right of Palmer
crushing their right; and Crittenden's
corps, advancing, would take Murfrees-
boro, aud then moving westward on the
! Franklin road, get in their flank and rear,
and drive them into the country, toward
Salem, with the prospect of cutting off
their retreat and probably destroying
their army. .
1t was explained TO them that this
combination, insuring vast superiority
on our left, required for its success that
Gen. McCook should be able TO hold his
position for three hours that il neces-
sary to recede at all, he should reoede as
he had advanced on the preceding day,
slowly, and steadily, refusing his right,
thereby rendering our success certain.
Having thus explained the plan, the
General commanding addressed General
McCOoK as follows:
"You know the grOund--you have
fought over its difficulties. Can you
hold your present position for three
hours g'
To which General McCook responded :
eyes, think can"
The General commanding then said I:
81 don't like the facing so much TO the
east, but must confide that to you, who
know the ground, If you don't think
your present the best position, change III;
and the officers then returned TO their
commands"
AT daylight on the morning of the
31st, the troops breaklasted, and stood 10
their arms, and by seven o'clock were
preparing for the
BATTLE.
The movement was begun on the left
by Van Cleve, who crossed at the lower
lords. Wood prepared 10 sustain and fol-
low him. The enemy meanwhile had
prepared to attack General McCook, and
by 6 : o'clock advanced in heavy col
umns, regimental front, his left attack
ing Willich's and Kinks brigades, of
Johnson's division, which, being dispos-
ed as shown in the map-thin and
light, without support-were, after a
short but fruitless contest, crumbled to
pieces and driven back, leaving Edgar
toms and part of Goodspeed's batteries
in the hands of the enemy.
The enemy following up, attacked
Davis division, and speedily dislodged
Posts brigade Carlin's brigade was
compelled TO follow as Woodruif's brig
ade, from the gtt of testimony, had
previously left its position on his left.
Johnson's brigade, in retiring, inclined
too far 10 the west and were too much
scattered TO make combined resistance,
though they fought bravely at one or two
points before reaching Wilkinson's pike.
The reserve brigade Of Johnson's di-
vision, advancing from its biyouac near
Wilkinson's pike toward the right, took
a good position and made a gallant but
Intellectual stand, as the whole rebel left
was moving up on the ground abandoned
by our troops.
Within an hour from the time Of the
opening Of the battle, staff-Olllcer from
Gen. McCook arrived, announcing 20 me
that the right wing was heavily pressed
and needed assistance but | was moi
advised of the route of Willich's and
Kirby's brigades, nor Of the rapid with
drawal Of Davis division necessitateC
thereby. Moreover, having supposed his
wing posted more cOmpactly aud his
right more refused than IL really was
the direction of the noise Of battle die
not indicate 60 me the true state Of az.
fairs. | consequently directed him Il
return and direct Gen. McCook TO dis
! pose his troops TO the best advantage
and TO hold his ground obsiinately
Soon after a second officer from Genera
McCOOk arrived, and stated that the righ
was being driven, fact that was bul
, too manifest by the rapid movement o
the noise Of battle towards the north.
Gen. Thomas was Immediately dis
patched 10 order Rousseau-then in re-
p serve--intO the cedar brakes 20 the righ
; and rear Of Sheridan. Gen. Crittendeu
was ordered 10 suspend Van Cleve'I
movement across the river on the left
and 70 cover the crossing with one bri
gade and move the other two brigadei
westward, across the fields toward th,
/, railroad, for reserve. Wood was ais,
Z directed TO suspend his operations fo
3 crossing and 10 hold Hascall in reserve
Az this mOment fugitiyes aud slaggleri
0 from McOooks corps began TO make thei
appearance through the cedar brakes Ia
such numbers that became satisfied tia
, McCOOks corps was routed therefore,
i directed Gen. Crittenden 20 send Van Cley,
in 10 the right Of Rousseau Wood 4
% lead Col Harkcr's brigade further dowI
3 the Murfreesboro pike, TO 90 in and al
% tack the enemy on che right Of Van ClevC
u the Pioneer Brigade meanwhile occupy
$ ing the knoll Of ground west Of the Muir
IA freesboro pike, aud about 400 or 90
y yards ia ther OF Palmer's centre, sup
% porting Stokes battery, (seo accompany
a ing drawings) Sheridan after sua
tanning four successful attacks, gradual
'l ly swoung his right round southeastern
20 a nOrihw stern direction, rspul5i1g q
enemy four times, losing he gallant Gel
Sill, Of his right aud Col. Roberts, Of h
left brigade, when, having exhausted b.
"a