The star of the north. [volume] (Bloomsburg, Pa.) 1849-1866, 1863-11-25

scriplion which was applied in the mother
country only to paupers aud vagabonds. On
the contrary infer that the power confer
red on Congress was the power TO raise
armies by the ordinary English mode Of
voluntary enlistments.
The people were justly jealous of siand-
ing armies. Hence, they took away most
ofthe war power from tho Executive, where
under monarchical forms, il generally re-
sides, and vested in the legislative depart
ment, in ore branch of which the States
have equal representation, and in the other
branch Of which The people of the States
are directly represented according 10 their
! Numbers. To these representatives. of the
States and the people this power OF otigiua-
ting war was commitied, but even in their
hands il was restrained by the Limitation OF
| biennial appropriations for The support of
the armies they might raise. OF course, no
army could be raised or supported which
did not command popular appreciation, and
II was rightly considered that voluntary en-
Iistments would never be wanting to re-
cruh the ranks of such an army. The war
power, existing only for the protection OF
the people. and left, as far as il was poss-
BILE 10 leave it, in their own hands, was in
capable of being used without their consent
and, therefore, could never languish Tor en-
listments They would be ready enough 10
| recruit The ranks fan army they deemed
necessary to their safety. Thus the theory
OF the Constitution placed this great power
like other governmental powers, directly
upon the consen. of the governed.
The theory itself was founded on free and
fair elections which are the fundamental
postulate OF the Constitution II the patron
age and power OF the Government shall
ever be employed TO control popular elec
lions. the nominal representatives. of the
people may cease TO be their real represen
tatives, aud The armies which may be rails
ed may noi command public confidence as
10 at,raci the necessary recruits, and then
conscripl laws and oiEer extra consti,u-
tioUal expedieals may become necessary
TO fill the ranks. But governmental inierler-
ence with popular elections will be subver-
sion Of The Constitution, and no constitu>
iional argument can assume such a possi-
bii;y.
Supposins that the people are always TO
be fairly represented in the halls OF Con-
g,ess, maintain that it is grievous injus-
lice 10 them TO legisale on The assumption
that any war honestly waged for consiitu-
lonal objects will not always have such
sympathy and suPport from the people as
will secure all necessary en!isiments-
Equally unjust 10 their intelligence is il 10
suppose that iaey meant 10 confer on their
servants the powerio impress them into a
war which they could not approve.
When 10 these considerations we add the
ability oil great country, like ours, 10 slim.
uaie ard reward enIislments, both at home
and abroad, by bounles, pensions and
homesteads, as well as by political patron
age in countless forms, we see how little
necessity or warrant there is for implying
grant oil the imperial power of conscrip-
tion
There is nothing in the history of the Con-
stiIntIon nor in those excellent contempofa-
neous papers called The Federalisl, to JUS
tiiy the opinion that his vast power lies
wrapped up ia the few plain words Of the
18th clause, whilst the subsequent clanses,
concerning the militia, absolutely forbid it.
II the very improbable case be supposa-
BILE, that enlislmenis into the Federal ar
mics nigh: become so numerous in a par
ticular State ss sensibly TO impair its own
proper military power, is il not much more
improbable that the States mean 10 confer
upon the General Government The power 10
deprive them, al its own pleasure, altogeth-
er of the militia, by forced levies Yet this
might easily happen if the rover of con.
scrip.ion be conceded TO Congress. There
are no limitations xpressed-no,hiag 10
compel Congress TO observe quotas proper
tiohs as among The several Staies-nothing
10 ptevent their raising armies wholly from
one Stale, taking every able bodied citizen
out of it TO The eDdangering, if not utter uu
doing OF all It's domestic interests.
And besides, if we concede this danger
Gus power TO the language of the thirteenth
clause, We destroy The force and effect of
the words of the sixteenth and seventeenth
clauses We make the instrument SELL
destructive, which is violative of all canons
of construction. Congress shall have pow
er to provide for calling forth the militia in
the manner and subject to the limitations
prescribed in clauses sixteen and seventeen,
and therefore, ! argue Congress has not the
power TO draft them. Is an express rule OF
the Constitution to give way TO an implied
one !? II the thirteenth clause confers pow
er 10 draft the militia, the words Of the six
teenih and seventeenth clauses are the
i6lest that were ever written. Bot if the
eighteenth conferred ouly the power 20 en-
list volunteers then the subsequent clauses
become very inteIligible-stand well with
the thirteenth, and add essentially to the
- f.. II IL. FL (xo.r