Marshall County Republican. (Plymouth, Ind.) 1856-1878, 1863-03-26

unlmpalred. 1he dlfflculty III Eng anu Ot
raising these vast sums was tenfold great
CT than it is here Napoleon. looking up
on England as the Southern people have
been taught to regard us, as purely COM
mercal nation, undoubtedly placed moro
reliance for ultimate success upon the in
stinct of money getting, which would
shrink from the pecuniary sacrifices neces-
sary in prolonged struggle, than upon
the mere victories of his army. Hence he
pursued, during his whole career. an intiex-
ible purpose ofruining English Commerce,
and by series Of measures known as the
Continental system, endeavoring to ex-
clude English ships and English products
from the markets of the world. The effect
of these measures, although not SO serious
as he wished and had anticipated, never
theiess crippled enormously the resources
of England inst at the period when they
were most needed.
Taking the three years before the issuing
cf the Orders in Council and the vigorous
enforcement of the Continental system,
which were coincident in point of time
with the commencement of the Spanish
war, the average annual exports sank from
fifty-seven millions to twenty-three mill
ions, taking the average of three years af-
ter they had been in operation. Taxes
were laid on at q most burdensome rate
The income tax was ten per cent, and be-
sides, specific war taxes, amounting to
more than twenty millions year, were
imposed. Notwithstanding all these tax
es, the debt increased more than one thous-
and millions of dollars during the Penin-
sula war. Discomfort and violence among
the laboring classes became universal, and
it was remarked that the greatest achieve
ment of the victories in Spain were cele-
brated in England amidst population
who have been prevented by the burden OF
taxation on the absolute Lecessaries OF
/ life, from securing a livelihood by the
strietest industry, and thus pauperism had
been generated throughout the land, pau
perism ggravated by spirit of pillagc,
which it required a strong military force
to reprcss" Bankruptcy and ruin fell up
on the trading classes, and absolute ex-
haustion Of the resources Of the country
seemed almost reached. The public stocks
had sunk to such degree that the three
per cents, which are now always above90
per cent, were rarely higher during the
war than 60 per cent, AMI SO depressed at
last had the public credit become, that .be
last loan of the Continental war, that Of
April, 1915, was taken by the contractor
at SO per cent, and paid for in the depre-
ciated paper of the day, and yet the Chan
cellor of the Excheqner was congratulated
even by the opposition for having made
go good operation" The Bank was in
state of chronic suspension, the buying
and selling Of gold were prohibited to the
public under severe penalties, and yet eve
ry gold guinea which was sent By tho
Government to the army in Spain (and
nothing else would answer the purpose OF
money in that country cost thirty per
cent. premium. How England survived
all this complication of troubles is one Of
the maryels Of history. but it it is not onr
purpose to discuss that question. The
great TACT that the money required was
raised somehow is all we have to do with
at present When we have been at war
for twenty years., and are forced, in order
to raise the means of carrying it op, to sub
init to one tithe Of the sacrifices which
were endured by the English, we may then
perhaps begin seriously to consider the
money value of the Union.
The lesson which this review of the pro-
gress Of the Peninsula war teaches, is, 4:
seems to us, one OF hope and encourage.
ment, for if it shows anything. it proves
clearly, that in the support of public opin-
ion, and in the means requisite to main
tain great army, those fundamental es-
santials Of real military success, our Gov
ernment is immeasurably stronger than the
English ever was at any period Of the war.
1t teaches also another important lesson,
end that is, that there is such thug as
public opinion, falsely SO called, which is
noisy just in proportion as its real inhu-
ence IS narrow and restricted. One of the
most difficult and delicate tasks of the
statesman is to distinguish the true from
this false opinion. the factious demagogue
from the grumbling. but sincere patriot.
and to recognize with ready instinct the
voice which comes from the depths of the
great heart of the people, in warning It
may besomesimes, in encouragement often,
but always ecboing its abiding faith in the
ultimate triumph of the good cause. p 90
We have confined ourselves in our H.
lustation to the discussion of questions as
they affected the success Of purely military
operations, because we feel that here our
grand business is to clear away the obsta-
cles, real or fancicd. which may in any
way impair our military efficiency. In
military success alone, we are firmly con-
yincsd, is to be found the true solution Of
our whole difficulty, the only force which
can give vitality or permanance to any
theory of settlement. AS the matter now
stands, it is idle to hope for either peace or
safety until this question of military supe-
rioiity is unmistakably and de6nitively
settled. Upon thispoint then. the increase
of our military efficiency. which embraces
not merely the improvement of the condi-
tion Of the army. but also. as we have en-
deavored to show by English example,,
and in greater degree than is often sup
posed. the support of the, Government in
its general policy of conducting the war,
should the efforts of all those who infu-
ence public opinion be concentrated. Is
- There is certain class Of men among
-us. not very numerous. perhaps. but still,
owing to their position and culture, of
considerable influence, who, accustomed
TO find in the European armies their stan