Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-04-28
THE CAMPAIGN oF So

He thoreUpon endeavoTs to depict the features
of = campaign in which the rebels, aciioe or
right principles, oppose, aud successfully, on
wrong plans. He gives the Gavsrnman. armies
$4,000 men, and tho rebels $4,000
Correct, but audacious, and perhaps even
somewhat adventurous, operations by the rebels
alone csn obtsin them brilliant successes ani
the war, as we understand it, on the part of the
SaUth, is tbst of Nspoleon's campaign in 1875,
only on = larger scale. Giving up everything,
except the place where the army stands; con
centrating their entire forcs on the decisive
point; being victorious there and gaining, by
2 few well directed blows, not only whist has
been lost, but moro too, is the lesson we may
deTiv' frsm this campaign.
"The object Of the South in making war is tc
repel invasion and to enforce peace and thei1
recognition. Those objects can enly be attained
by destroying some Of the principal Union CT.
mics sud by taxing the Federal capilal; then
making peace with the Federal Government. or
with the ditfarsRt Sts'ss saDarately, by threaten
ing them With invasion. The first object, or the
main object of the campaign is, therefore, the
destruction Of the Uaion armies or a psrt Of
them.
Taking tia map in hand it will be seen
81. h the Union forces are scattered over
slarge tract Of land.
"2 That they are acting on exterior lines.
80. That tbs rebel forces are acting on interior
lines.
Consequently the natural plan Of operation,
in such a state of things, Is to concentrate on
the different points successfully, aod to defeat
the UaiGn troops successfully and ia detail, I 2 =,
before they can units. II campaigns of this
description, the principle IS to make q break,
generally IL the center Of tha long front Of ope-
r~aiioDs, thereby preventing the junction Of the
two wings, sod then tn defect thsse separately.
10 thu East tho Uaion army ct Newborn,
and in the West the Union army at Mnrfrees-
boro, are exeeieutly posted for the rebels to
open the campaign By two decisive blows. The
army at kswbern especially ought to be at
tackled. First, hscause it is a largo detachment
greatly exposed aud secondly, becsuse it
continually threatens one Of tho PRINCIPAL lines
Of communication of the South between the
East and The West.
at Union army at Newbsrn We have sup.
posed to be fifty thousand men strong. The
concentration Of C0nfsdsrated forces TO destroy
them might be conducted in the following way:
Already rear NewbeTn, 5000 men; from Ssvau-
nah, 10 00d; frnm Charleston, 10000; from
Richmond, IS 600; from the army of Virginia,
50 900; from BlaekEateT 5000; from Peters
burg, 1000. Totsl, $4,000 men"
He gives, with great minSteness, the manner
and ROUTES by which this concentration could
10 N1'EH@As 4 n1ppy9E5 bAAJ 4-mI u Httack
~iTpo.uonsly aZd TO destroy our forces in North
Caroline
QUERY: Whether this part of the supposed
plan is not actually now about to be carried
QUIT
meantime, too rebel army in Virginia,
greatly diminished, does not give battle, but re-
treats, fighting and disputing TIE passage Of
TIE rivers, into Redmond, which is supposed TO
be thoroughly fortified, and able to resist eVon =
siege for souae time.
"They reduce, therefore, the army of Virginia
by twenty seven thousand men more, which
they send to Tennessee. giving positive orders
10 the remaining fifty Thousand to accept no en-
gsgsmsnt of consequence; TO ratreat if the army
Of the Potomac advances; and to be satisfied
with defending the passage Of the rivers, beat.
ing an advanced guard, etc.
sThe campaign in Tennessee, as the next in
importance, they would conduct almost sImul-
tsneoilsly with that against N5wbern; snd this
is possible in the present case: first, because
the Union armies Of Newborn sad MarfreesborO
are not lsrge; and secondly, because the army
sent to Galdsboro is not far from tia decisive
mint, which we will suppose TO be Richmond,
and night be back there before a Union army
could reach it:
"The movements sgsinst Murfreesboro' might
be conbiae3 in the following way /: Army at
TuIIshoma 10000 meni from the army Of Vir-
ginia 27,G00 mon from the army Of Vicksburg
IS 600; from the army Of Mobile 5000; from
different detaehments; etc, 10000. Total, H.
600 men"
Hs gives plain accurate details Of the manner
in which this combination could be made, with
tims requisite. In fourteen days, according
to his table5, liz, 900 rebels should be eOncen-
trslod Ct Chattanooga.
son the I4th the commander in-chief should
at Chattanooga, and on the same day the
operations should be commenced.
With liz, 900 men against 10000 to $1,000. a
cormauder can well propose to himself to de-