The Alleghanian. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1859-1865, 1863-02-05

power, even after the march Of his troops
had begun. to have it arrested.
1t may seem a severe Judgment, but
cannot help believing, from what | saw
and heard, that each of the generals allu-
who naturally take their cue from them,
rej;oticecl an tie failure O tie increment They
had committed themselves openly and
publicly to the opinion that il would fail
| perhaps it would be unreasonable TO expect
that they should work with any excess OF
! yigor to secure the failure of their own
predictions. Some Of them, unless have
been misinformed, sought TO throw the
blame upon their men, and alleged that
| the result of recent political demonstrations
at the North lad disinciined their men
/ to fight; and the election of Wall to the
! United States Senate from New Jersey
was cited as one thing which had so far
affected the troops from that State as to
render them unreliable on the field OF
battle [ do not believe that this is true,
but, even if it were, it would mnch better
become general Of division TO try TO
overcome it than to cite It as reason for
inactivity.
the Willingness Of certain officers to behold
with entire cquauimity the defeat OF Gen.
Burnside's plans could be traced in'their
language and conduct, l should hesitate
in attributing the failure of this movement
to that cause. But it is not This is the
fourth active movement which Gen Burn
side has made against the enemy during
the short time that has elapsed since he
superseded Gen. Mcclellan. Let us see
what has happened in each:
I. His plan was to throw his army rap
idly upon Falmouth, cross over instantly,
take possession Of the heights of Freaer-
icksburg, and thus compel the enemy to
either fight him in that strong position, CT
fall back rapidly upon Richmond. The
one thing absolutely essential to its success
was the prompt arrival Of the pontoon
train. This was under the direction OF
Gen Woodbury., and no satisfactory expla-
nation of mis- delay has ever yet been
made Eut that delay defeated the execa-
ton of the plan.
2. Next came the crossing and the
battle at Fredericksburg, which was
certainly failure, aud which the coun-
try generally brands as a blunder
think it was in General Burnside's power
to have corrected that opinion in his tcs-
tinony before the Congressional Commit
tee He did not avail himself of that
but SAID that the country
would never know how see,5' the move
ment came to beiu" success I see no !
reason why the country should not know
it aud cannot help believing that when
the Official reports Of that battle are per-
mitted to see the light, the grounds of |
Gcn. Burnside's opinion will be evident |
TO all It IS generally assumed that the |
main attack. on that occasion was aaains: |
the rebel frOtt. posted and entrenched on
the crcsts in rear Of Fredericks burg This |
is mistake which was corrected by the |
General in his testimony TIE main at
taclc acas desiYped to be apoa the rcdel 5i;yhf, |
and the object Of it was to break their
line there, where it was weakest, turn
them, and then--witf the co operation of
Sumner attacking in frout-to complete
the victory, and convert it into a rout -
Gen. franklin led the main attack with
his own grand division, and two small.
corps from IIooker's. Has orders were to
attack with at bast one corps vigorously,
and then to follow up the attack with
prompt and heavy supports. He sent
Gen: Meade to the attack, commanding
the smallest corps of all Gen. Meade
attacked with great v:gor, Ltoke tie rcbek
'iae, end dcfs0ty pushed his a3oance into
tie nato(st Of tie Gnansantftra acag0as and
Iaggage-traja IN their rear. He had com
pletely succeeded in the appointed work
The forces opposed to him we're utterly
routed, aud ali be needed was prompt and
support. IAis lie did not receiise
) en-. franklin sent another small corps to
ais aid, but it arrived too late. The
,nemy, seeing Meade come to stand, had
called reiniorcemeuts We're pushed for
ward, and before Mealcs supports came
40 his force was driven back, and It be-
,ame impossible to re.estabiish the line.
zen. Franklin gave as Il reason for not
sending forward heavier and prompter
,uprorts, that he was afraid the enemy
would sci-c hGs brtdges and cat ob las means
,f rctreW. Gcn Sumner, meantime, had
opened the fight to retain as much of the
'ebei force in front as possible, for the
-clief Of Franklin and as he never does
lnything but with the utmost impetupsity,
le had pushed the movement till it had
assumed the proportions of terrible en-
yagement. This shows how near" the
battle came TO being u success.