The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-05-08

its CT that whole matter in clear and con-
vincng light.
Z. What were the reasons that influenced
/ the decision in favor of the movement by way
of Yorktown? A. In preference to the direct
movement by way of Manassas?
| e. Yes. A. / think no one regarded the line
| by way of Manassas as a practicable one. it be.
ing so long. The difficulty of guarding our
communications was almost nsuperable, and
1t allowedthe enemy to take up position be-
tween Manassas and Richmond The other
line gave us the advantage of water transporta-
ton and rendered the largest possible amount
OF the force available for active operations,
there Delng SO few necessary to guard the de-
| pots and communications.
y. Was 1t not 4 serious objection to the
movement by way of the peninsula that it
| did not cover Washington. A. Not in nv
| Judgment
Y. BY your answer do You mean that the
| advantages gained were more than enough to
compensate for the fact that Washington was
covered by that movement? A. l regarded
the dcfenses of Washington as adequate for its
protection, and that the movement of the army
OF the Potomac would necessarily draw from
in front OF Washington the force that had pre-
viously threatened it. NV mind had always
been clear and distinct that the moment the
army moved on any line from the Lower
Chesapeake, the rebels must necessarily aban-
don Manassas. never doubted that a second
always bearing in mind that the defenses of
Washington were complete
y. When your army was on the peninsula
could nos the enemy have reached Washington
easier and sooner than your army could have
been brought back A. Yes: but they wOuld
never have come here; or if they had. they
never would have got back. If the enemy had
moved on Washington, not only would have
gained possession of Richmond, but would
have cut Oft the retreat of their army and they
would never have got back
y. Was 1t not almost certain beforehand.
that the Withdrawal of your army to a position
where it did not cover Washington would cause
the enemy at least to make Il threat or teint of
IN attack upon Washington. which would lead
10 pane, and perhaps. to Il recall OF your
army, or il portion Oft:
y. think not. | do not think that any
thlhg occurred. prior to the battle of Cedar
Mountain, which should have Justified a panic
i'll Washington. The only advance of the en-
envy. that L remember of at all was that of
jackson upon Gen. Banks. When | heard of
,liat tclegraphcd to the President that | be-
leved the intention to be simply to prevent
rcmiorctments being sent to me. | had no
i"ca liiit IL meant serious threat upon Wash
in%tOn.
The only observation that needs to he
added here Is, that the President, in con-
sequence OF his ungrounded and pllsillan-
nous fears for the safety of Washington.
refused to give General Mcclellan an ade-
quate force tor his operations before Rich
mond, when lie had approached so near
that the place was within his grasp The
opponents of Gen. Mcclellan pay an I'M
intended compliment to the merits Of his
plan OF moving to Richmond by the way
ot the peninsula, III asserting, as they are
SO 10na OF dong that there were three
times when he might easily have marched
in triumph into the rebel capital; namely.
after the battle of Williamsburg. after the
battle OF Fair Oaks, and after the battle
OF Malvern Hill. This opinion, which
they are 50 fond of giving, ought at least
TO stop Their mouths respecting the folly
OF the water route. But it is the mistor-
tune Of these detractors to be ALWAYS
wrong, Whatever topic OF vituperation
they may select. Here is the reason for
not advancing after the battle of Williams
burg:
felt satisfied. from what knew of Han
co"k' ; position. that the battle wa, won 1I,t
he nad occupied the decisive point and Gained
possession Ola portion Of the encny'~ line.
ana iiH'l they nusf make night retreat or
we would have greatly the advantage of them
II ihe morning. 50 fully was satisfied of
that ;;iaJ | counternanded orders that had
given in the afternoon for the advance of Rich
ardSons and Sedgwcks division to the front.
ana sent then? back to Yorktown to 20 iy wa
ter, feeling sure that the battle was won. Du-
ring the night the enemy abandoned their no
sltioh. We sent the cavalry i'll pursuit; took a
1e" prisoners and few guns The condition
OF the roads were such that we could not
promptly advance the army. We could not
l"r more than forty-eight hours after the battle
even iced the men on the gtOund where they
stool; we could not get the supplies to them.
How General Hooker, or anybody else,
could have marched straight into Rich
mono, when the condition of the roads was
such that tie men could not be fed on the
groud where they stood, from the impos-
sio'lity OF bringing up supplies, does not
very clearly appear. If General Hooker
was at that time possessed of any mean "a
ton tor drying up or defying muddy roads,
his tedious delays this year prove that he
must have lost it,
And so in regard to the alleged feasibli-
ty, SO often and confidently asserted, of
marching immediately into Richmond after
Falr Oaks. Y simple statement Of facts
effectpaly dlSposes of that notion. We
quote again from General McClellan's tes-
timony:
q. Was the result OF the battle of Fair Oaks
and Seven Pines defeat to the enemy? A.
Yes: | think it was
q. After that defeat, could not that point in
front Of New Bridge have been carried by an
attack made, as l have before indicated. by
both wings OF your army? A. The condition
of the ground and Of the Chckahominy. in nv
opinion. rendered such Il movement impossible
ut that time.
O. Immediately after the battle of Fair Oaks
could you not have advanced on Richmond #
not why not? A. do not think il would
have been possible at that time to have taken
our artillery with lis. The result of which in.
dependently OF all other considerations would
have been to have brought us in front of the
enemy works at Richmond without artillery,
where they had heavy guns That and the con