Cleveland morning leader. [volume] (Cleveland [Ohio]) 1854-1865, 1863-12-15

preliminary infantry movements nave
nearly ell been completed, and l am pre-
pared TO strike a blow that will tell. Bat
10 show you how differently things are
viewed here, called on my corps and d.
vision commanders and generals Of csvsl- |
~ for answers in writing to the questions
First-From your best information, do |
you think the enemy materially weakened !
10 cur fronti Secoud-Do you think this
army can advance at this time with reas-
enable prospect of fighting great and
successful battle2 Third-Do you think an
advance advisable ct this time2 To the
frBt, eleven answered no; six yes-to the
extent Of ten thousand. To the second,
four yes, with doubts; thirteen no. To tho
third, not one yes; seventeen 10.
Not one thinks an advance advisable
until Vlcksourg's fate is determined. Ad-
mitting these officers to have a reasonable
share Of military sagacity, courage and
pstriotism, you perceive that there are
graver and stronger reasons than probably
appear at Washington for the attitude Of
this army.
there ore counsel caution and patience
at headquarters. Better wait little to
get Rll We can ready to insure the best re-
suit. If, By so doing we, perfOrce of Prov
dence, observe Q great military maxim
not to risk two great and decisive battles
at the same time-ws might have caaset to
be thankful for it. At all events you see
that, to expect success must have such
thorough grounds that when l Issy 'For-
ward" my word will inspire conviction
and confidence where both ace now want
ing. / should like to have your sugges-
ton. ". s ROSECRANs,
Major General.
To M4jor-Genersl h. VI. Halleck Genersl-
in-chief.
WAsAINGToN, June II, 1858.
GENERAL-Your telegram Of yesterday
is Just received. do not understand your
application of the military maxim not to
f ght two great battles at the same time
Il will apply to single army, but not TO
two armies acting independently OF each
other. Johnston and Bragg are acting on
interior lines between you and Grant,
aud it is for their interest not ours, that
they should fight at different times, so as
20 use the same force against both Of you
It is for our interest to fight them, i! pos
sible, while divided. If you are not strong
enough to fight Bragg with part Of bis
force absent, you will not be able TO light
him after the sffair ct Vioksburg is over,
and his troops return to your front.
There is another military maxim that
councils of war never fight" If you say
that you are not prepared to fight Braggr
shall not order you &c do So, for the respon-
sibility of fChtiDg or refusing to fght at
particular time or place must rest upon the
general Ia immediate command. Il can
not be shared by council Of war nor
will the authorities here make you fight
against your will You ask me to counsel
them to caution and patience. have
done so very often, but after five or six
months ofiuaotlvity, with your foroe all
the time diminishing, and no hope Of any
immediate increase, you must not be sur
prised that their patience is pretty vel
exhausted. II you do not deem it prudent
to risk g general battle with Bragg, Why
can you not harrass him, or make such
| demonstrations as to prevent his sending
more reinforcements TO JohnstoD2 do
not write this in spirit Of fault finding,
but to a.sure you that the prolonged in
activity of so large an army in the field is
causing much complaint and dissatisfac-
ton not only in Washington, hut through
out the country. Very respectfully. your
obedient servant, II. W. HALLECR,
General in Chief.
Major General Rosecrans, MurfreesborO
TenResses.
HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT oE THE
CUMBERLAND,
MOTHERHOOD, June : l, 1868.
GENERAL:-Iu your favor of the 18th
inst, you say you do not see how the max
i'm Of not fighting two great battles at tie
same time applies 10 the case Of this army
and Granite Looking at the matter grac;
sFtaely separated ihst for Bragg to msIerl-
ally AID Johnson, be must abandon our
front snbstsnt tally, and then We osn move
20 our ultimate work with more rspldIty
and less waste of material on natural Oh
stsoles. IFGrsnt is defeated both forces
will come here, and then We ought to be
near our base. The same maxim that for
bids as yog take it, Z single army fighting
two great battles at the same timely the
way, very awkward thing to do-Eould
forbid this nations engaging all its forces
in the great West at the same time, 30 as
TO leave it without single reserve to stem
the current of possible disaster. This is, l
think, sustained by high military and po
litical considerations. We ought t. fight
here if we have strong prospect of win
ming decisive battle over the opposing
force, and upon this ground l shall act.
shall be careful not to risk our last re
serve without strong grounds to expect
success. ". s. ROSECRANS,
Msj IT General
Major General H. ". EGlleck, General-iR-
Chief.
Notwithstanding this adverse decision
Of the leading Generals of his army, Rose
Grams was induced to make his forward
movement by an elaborate argument from
his Chief Of staff showing the unsound-
ness Of their views. At length the army
moved and the recent successes Of Grant
are only the fruits of the proceeding tri.
umDhs of Rnseoraua