New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-01-30

who informed me That $1,000 ueu crlered form. \
to JON me, had demanded transportation from ~
and that they would all be- shuued .igt nflernonh
or early The next morning. Ire forCs which Its,,
expected wac, as reported 70 ne, 10 consist Of liz
division OF Gen. Sturgis 49, O0l stroug; the diyii,o
Of Gen. Cox, 1000 strong; The COPS " Gen. Hen,.
zelman, l0,0JO strongi and the corps OF Gen. Ersuk
in 10 900 strong. BY the ngat Of the 18Th n n.
came apparent to me that could no longer k.-n
open my communications with Fredericksburg u,6
oppose the crossing of The Rappahann0sx at Ragps.
hammock Station, without abandoning the road rom
! Narenton to Washington aud leaving open 10 be
enemy the route through raoroughiare Gan and N
oiher roads north Of the Q. ange and Aexaud Ia
Railroad. A. the main o''dy OF hi force con.
family tending IN that direction, determined 10
longer to attempt 10 maok the lower ford. of he
Rappahannock, bat 10 assemble such forces US TAD
along tno Narrenton Turnpike, between WarreDion
aud Gainesville, and give battle 70 the enemy %
my nght or lett, as he might choose. ! there
fore directed Gen. Mcdowell to occupy Warren.
tOn with his own aud sigePs corps, supporting hin
by Banks's c0rpo IRON Tue direction Oh Fayetteville.
1 pushed Reno forward to occupy poUE near ihs
| WarrcntOn Turnpike, and about three miles to IA.
eaat OF that town. l sent orders 10 Geo. Porter
VINO bad reported To me by n0lo from the ne,shbor.
nood OF BeaIeIon Ssaiion 20 push forward sod iola
Reno. Heinz lnan's corps, winch had reaehsd
Warrenon Junction, was ordered 10 remain Tor ias
present al that point, it being NY purpose W pa.o
Toward that corps, Us coon as prasticaoe 10 Green
| witch, about hat Way between Warenlon ard
/
one Of the strongest divisions beiog sent forward u,
take post the works at Manassas Junction, and TO-
qGested Gen. Halleck to push braDklin win all
speed 10 fanesyilie; that Inc could Darch qnlle -
rapidly US he could be transported by rail- ~ nh ~
limited means OF railroad transportation Ia our s-
session, and that his baggage s.nd supplies coue %
sui forward TO q ,inesvie by rail- also senS or"
GERS TO the Colonel COMMANDING at Manansas JOue-
on Tor tue rst division that reached there from AL
exandra 10 halt AID take post III TIE works ~ ma
"a tod IN
cayaisy Ia Cue direction " iDorOughfare Gap, 70
waten any movements the enemy might make iIVn
Goat direction. had Instructed zen. Sturgss, CONC
nundlug a. Alexandra, on the "a ot AuSust, 20
post stgOag guards along the railroad from MaaAssas
Junction CatleIt StaIioa, aud requested Ian %
upeyipteud This III person.. also directed Gen.
kcarnoy, vino reached NarentOn Junction Oh Inc
I'D . that sufficient guards were piaoe1 ala
long 10. "a ir0ad IN Ills rear. Alter these pre'au"
tions and ASSURANCES, l Lad tnCught ana confidently
yuected that by the afternoon OI tho ZG.h, Franklin
would have breu at Or near GanesVLiej one glvless
uou would have been occupying Tue works 40
Mana sls Junction, aDQ that the FORCES under esureI
and Cox wOuld have been at Narrentoa JunotiOn,
wneuce they could have been ri once pushed NORTH IN
! / 40 direction Vi Murreutvn Turnpike. Inc ord 10
Tor The ois Ositon VI the forces then aader nay eou'
uaud We { teni aud the movements made, so is -
practicable, during the Jay .! the @osa' AoeA.e
clJck al nIguG Ou the .6th The advance OF JACK.
ons iorce lariDg passed through Ih0rougIIBrs
,tap cul LbG railroad the lei hOorhood OF Kettle
Run, auOut rix miles east OF WargenIon JuDcll0a.
L e cavalry force which had sent forward toward
iuOrougniare Gap Oh Tue morning Oi LIE 2otn made
40 report To ne. Iue moment oar communications
wers interrupted ut Kettle Run was saLsfed tnas
the troops viicn hal been promised Inc ffou tue ia.
rection VI Washington had made no Considerable
plogress. Had tIankIln besn even at CentIeyllle
vn Tue .6th, u Cox ana otuTgls been es lar sod
us BuII l.gi Oh That day, the movement OF jackson
through TuUroushiaro tap upon the railroad az
Manass ~ would nave been utterly imprastcsoie-
81 confidently I'D L expect, from the assugAnces
Snien 1 hsI tue and asaia reeJiyed,lthaI these
troops would % III pVsun, OK ~ All esehts, lar al
yauced toward me, That Jack,Ons movement %
waru White Plains, anu III the direction OF Thor
oug Lfaru G.p, had Caused out httle uneasiness but
Oh Tie g IL vi the 2oln II Was very apparent TO
that ell tuese expected reeI.vrceleuts had utterly
Jailed me; aud tnat upon tIe small iorce Under ny
owu immediate command, l NUS. depend alone for
any present. Operations against the enemy. liz was
eA.y Tor ne 10 relre Ia lne direction OF the lower
iorus vi the RappauannocS 10 fredericksburg 80 -
To bIIns IA iLnIneiiato contact VITA the iorcee
There or arriving Lnsre; Dut by so doing l should
have lett open whole front of Washington; ana
alter my own dlsap continent u the reenlorcemenss
:, uich had expected, wss nos sure thas there was
any sufficient iofce III me seHce of Tue army un-
der NV cOmmaud, 70 cover tue capital. deer
mined therefore, at odce " abandon the iDe Of tue
lappanannvck, and Gurvw my Whole iorce III The IL
fec.Ioa OF gainesville sLd Mauassas Junction, 70
crden tue enemy, VINO tad passed through thorough
ale Gap, and W iulofpUse between lie army or
Gen. Lee aud Bull kuu. during tie night OF ia
Is the maIA Jody tho enemy still occupied their
pOsitlous lrOm SmpIur Spiiugs 20 Waterloo Bridge
anu aOOye; but toward morning Oh the 9Th, think
,bel. uuyaucv moved OF in Tic direction OF Nulte
Pans, pursuing The rou previously taken by Jack
SOU, ana, 10 dVuyt, wlh a view VI uniting with hiI
cas- adj VI the Bull Run Range.
From the 18Th of August, until the morning OF tho
9th, the troops under NY commaud had been con-
uulvusly marching and Ig1liug night aud day, InG
ddun9 tue whole VI that time thse was scarcely aa
interval Ot hour without the r0ar OF artillery.
Tue men had had little sleep, greatly VOTE
do Sn wiki fatigue, had had hIie line 10 get proper
foOi to eat II, mad been eng aged IN coustsns bat
ties bnd sklruIshes, and had formed services, la
uorious dangerous, aud excessive, beyond any pre-
experience IL this country. As was TO be eX-
pected uhder such circumstances, the numbers OF the
army under my command bad been greatly reduced
by death, By wouICs, by eicues. aud by fatigue, sc
Ia. ou the orulI * vi 9Th vi August estimated
my whole effective force iand think The estimate
was algel us follows: Oily Is Corps, 1900 men;
Banks COrps, 5,OOJ mem aicDOHrlls Corps, Include
ln4 keyuOlls's dlylhloD, 10 JUO men; Keno Corps
V0J sc COrys Vt Hen zelnaa and POr,er (the fresh.
tot,lny far in That army about IS 900 men, Ainek
all %, 500 Our caNaify numbered on paper
about 4,UUO men; but lntlF AOrses We're conf
pietely broken down, AID there were not otC
men, al tod, capable Of doing such service
as snoud 90 expected from cayaliy. The Corps
OF Helntzoiman had reached Warrenton juno
ton, out WAS wtLouL waRone, without artillo-
~, with only forty rounds oi Ammunition 10 the
man, and wltholt even horses for tuo general and
field officers. The corps OF Porter lad ALEC reaches
Morfenton Junction, With very snan supply OK
provisions, ana but forty rounds II Ammunition Tor
each man. On tue morning OF the 2Ith, lB accord.
with the pnrpose previously set fora, diree,ec
Mcdowell to move l0rward rapidly on Gainesville,
Oy lJe NaireIion Turnpike, with MS own corps and
Siges, aud tue division OF Reynolds, ~ 10 reach
"a ,,.,. .ttrut Ia ma dad Rann