Burlington free press. [volume] (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865, 1863-02-20

4 COdt1Aho iAliOi A4c liOn vi
great importance to the people Of TIE North
at the present time. Findingourselves engaged
In War. Of which ss people we have had
50 little previous experience, the light Of
history is TO Us Of special value. We extract
the main points Of the psralleiism drawn by
the writer Of the pamphlet
We have known hitherto in this country 80
little Of the sctusl realities Of war on q grand
scale, that many sre beginning to look upon the
violent opposition to the government, and the
slovness Of the progress Of our arms, ne signs Of
hopeless disc0urageInent. History, however.
shows US that these are the inevitable incidents
Of all wars waged by free people. This might
be abundantly illustrated by many remarkable
events in English history, from the days Of the
Great Rebellion down through the campaigns Of
the Prince Of Orange, and Of Marlborough, to
the vars which grew out OF the events Of the
French Revolution. War is always entered upon
amidst a vast deal Of popular enthusiasm, which
is utterly unreasoning. II is the universal voice
Of history, that such enthusiasm is wholly unre-
liable in supporting the prolonged and manifold
burdens which, ara inseparable from every var
vagcd on an extensive scale, and for long Pc
riod. The popular idea Of war is a speedy and
decisive victory, snd sn Immediate occupation Of
the enemy's capitsl, followed by treaty Of
peace by which the objects Of the war are per
manently secured. Nothing is revealed TO the
excited passions Of the multitude, but dazzling
VISIONS Of national glory, purchased by small
privations, and the early and complete subjuga-
ton Of their enemies. II is, therefore, not IN
natural that AZ the FIRST reTelse they should
yield al once 10 an unmanly depression, and,
- 4
government fer its conduct Of the war, and upon
the army and its generals for their failure to
make their dreams Of victory realities, an abuse
IS unreasoning IS was their original enthusi-
asm.
The English have thus been taught tbs. the
characteristic OF public opinion in its judgment
Of vr should be, not hopefulness or impa-
tienoe Of immediate results, but rather = stern
endurance-that King-ouality Of heroic con-
stancy which. rooted deep in profound conyio-
ton Of the justice Of the cause, supports lofty
public spirit equally well in the midst Of tempo
rary disaster and in the hour Of assured
triumph.
We have had no such experience here. Our
people are perhaps more cas- " excited By sue
cess, and more readily depressed by reverges,
than the Engl sh, and /; Is, therefore, worth
while 10 consider how they carried on war On s
grand scale and for protracted period. twill
be found, if we mistake not. that the deruncia-
tons Of the government, 50 common among US
Of late, and the complaints Of the inactivity of
the army, have their exact counterpart in the
history Of the progress OF all the wars IN which
England has been engaged since the days of the
Great Rebellion. He who draws consolation
from the lessons Of the past, will not. 're think,
seek comfort in vain when he discovers that in
all those vars in which the government and the
army have been so bitterly assailed Except that
Of the American Revolution). England has st
last been triumphant. Il Is worth while then
10 look into English history TO understand how
war is successfully carried on notwithstanding
the obstacle. Which owing to perverted pubic
opinion, exist within the nation itself These
difficulties, although they inhere in the very ns-
ture Of free government, often prove,ss We shall
see, more fruitful Of embarrassment 10 the favor
able prosecution Of & war than the active oper-
sti0ns VI the enemy
We propose TO illustrate the propositions
which We have advanced by a study Of the Sc
ries Of campaigns known in English history as
the Peninsular War.
We shall find that, in the commencement,
there was the same wild and uureasoning enthu-
sissu With which We are familiar; the SAINT bit
ter abuse and denunciation Of the government
st the FIRST reverses; the same impatient and ig-
noIsnt criticism Of military operations; the
same iactious sud disloyal opposition on the part
Of powerful party; the sane Encouragement
and dependency at times on the part Of the true
and loyal; the same prophecies Of the utter
hopelessness Of success; the same complaints Of
grevions and burdens ne taxation, and predic-
tons Of the utter financial ruin OF the country;
the same violent attacks upon the government
for its arbitrary DEGREES. and particularly for
the suspension Of the writ Of ha5eas corpus
the same difficulties arising from the inexpe-
rience Of the army; and the same weakness on
the part Of the government in not Dol lly snd
energetically supporting the army in the field.
These are some Of the more striking psrallelisms
between the Peninsular War and our own .trug-
gle which 4 slight sketch Of the progress Of that
war vii render very apparent.
The instruction IN Spain which followed in
melistely upon S knowledge Of the intrigues OF
Napoleon at Bly1nne in April, 1907, by which
the royal family YES entrapped into an abdica-
ton Of its right to the throne, and Joseph Bon
aparte made king Of that country, reused uni
verssl admiration and enthusiasm IN England.
Il vas thought by all parties that IN obstacle to
the further progress Of Nopoleon's schemes Of
the most formidable character had at last been
found.
As We look back on the history Of that time,
the folly snd madness which seiTed upon the pop
ulsr mind when the terms Of the Convention Of
Cintra became known, can only be explained by
recalling the high-wrought and e1travsgant ex-
pectations Of immediate success with which the
war entered upon. By this Convention, and as
the result Of a single battle, Portugal was Who'll
" evacuatei by the French; yet such were the
unreasonable demands Of public opinion, that
because the whole French army had not been
made prisoners Of war. the Ministry was almost
svept away by the outburst, and It could only
10, -iv,r-. Ska m GENERALS
highest in rank. Il required al the family and
political influence Of the third, Sir Arthur Wei
iesev 70 enable him TO retain MS position IN the
armv The disastrous retreat Of Sir John
Moore's army to Corunns, and the easy tri-
umphs Of the French at that period throughout
all Spain, plunged the English into despair
Going from one extreme TO another, men who,
only three months before, had quarrened with
the army in Portugal because it had not given
| them the spectacle Of French marshal and
| twenty thousand Of his soldiers as prisoners Of
war at spithead, now spoke openly Of the folly
! Of any ATTEMPT 81 sll on the part Of England 10
| resist the progress Of the French arms in the
/ Peninsula In Parliament there was the usual
! lame arolorv for disaster, en- attempt 70 shift
the responsibility from the Ministry 10 the Gen.
| eneral in command; but the great fact, that all
their hopes had been disappointed stil renls 70
and after the explanations Of the government the
general dependency became more gloomy than
J ever
Fortunately for the fame and the power Of
England, the Ministry, although ignorant OF the
true mode Of prosecuting hostiiities, had sense
enough to perceive thst their only true policy
was perseverance,.
Wellington soon afterwards moved to the Span
ish frontier, hoping by a junction with the army
under Cuesta to fight battle with the French
which would open to him the road to the CAPT
tol. The battle was fought at Talsvera, and al
though II has since been claimed by the tnghsi
81 one of ,hoir proudest victories, and the nam
Of TALAvEsA is now inscribed upon the stand
ards Of the regiments who took part in it viii
those NJ Salamanca and Vittoris, yet the resul
was in the end, that Wellington was obliged Z
retreat 70 Lisbon lust three months after he ha'
set out from that place.
When the news Of the untoward resui
Of this campaign reached England, the clano
against the Government and against Wellingto
was quite as violent as that excited by the d sas
! tiers Of Sir John Moore's army. The opposIuo
p.ri tns,l- advenfsre 0f this feeling I