The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-05-08
SAINT PAUL. FRIDAY, MAY s, 1863.

movements hinged, and in respect to which
General Mcclellan has been most fiercely
as>ailed. And first, in regald to the most
| important point of all, the general plan of
operations adopted by General Mcclellan
when, Oh the LIST of November, 1861, he
succeeded General Scott as general-inchiet
OF all the forces Was this the ineffective
plan of nbbling around the edges of the re-
belliOn, and leaving to it the advantages of
easy intercommunicatiOn, which the adj
ministration has so persistentIy pursued :?
or did he aim, by striking into the interior,
to prevent the possibility of rapid con-
cehtratiOn of the rebel forces? Here is his
testimony relative to his original plan of
the war on assuming the chief command
G. will now call your attention to the next
point i'll the general questions the long period
OF lnactlon OF the army from the time you took
| command down to the first of March, when the
movement of the army commenced:
A. think | have already stated, in answer
to some previous question. the genera! cOndi-
ton of the troops in Washington and the de-
fences of the city. That when took command
the detences were incomplete and the army
was not i'll a satisfactory condition. not organ
lied and not efficient. | devoted my attention
to the correction of these two points. viz: the
completion OF the detcnces and the Organiza-
ton OF the army. do not think that the az
my was in fit condition for offensive opera
tons until the beginning of the year 1sj2-
On the first of November | was appointed com
mandcr-in-chlef of the army in place OF Gen
eral Scott at once turned my attention to
the movement of troops in the West in cOnnec-
ton with the proposed movements of the Army
OF the Potomac. then thought that the con-
dition of things in the West was such that we
could assume the offensive without difficulty
early in December. | sent General fiallecl to
take command in Missouri and General Buell.
in Kentucky. The general idea was this: first
to gain complete possession of Missouri, and
then, as rapidly as possible. to move Il column
on Knoxville and Chattanooga, in order to gain
possession OF the Memphis and Charleston rail
road, and TO aid the loyal men of Eastern Ten
neSsec, Western North Carolina and South Car
DINA, and Northern Georgia. Gen. IIaIlcck
and Gen. Buell. reported to Inc. Immediately
after assuming their commands, that the con-
dition OF things was not satisfactory: that an
immense amount of preparation had still to be
made, not only for the organization OF troops
but to supply the necessary material | did my
best to supply the existing defects Frequently
urging upon General Bucl! the necessity of a
prompt movement upon Knoxville always re-
garding that Us OF greater importance than the
possession of Nashville. the POSSESSION OF which
L looked upon us the second operation to be
undertaken i'll Tennessee. From the beginning
L looked upon il as essential that We should
gain possession Of the Memphis and Charleston
railroad, IN orier to cut The railroad communi-
cation between the valley OF the Mississippi and
the Atlantic slope before making direct move
ment upon Richmond.
Now WIS this Il wise plan oI operations,
or was it not: Was it better, or WAS it
not better, - cut the rebellion in two IN
the mi;'tile, and prevent the divided ,eg-
ment> supporting each other either by re-
enforcement, or provisions: At the time
this plan w;ls formed, the whole mountain
region OF the AlleghanieS, stretching ike Il
backbone through the cOnie,!eracv, mad a
large element of loyalty in its population.
That region was not adapted to the south
ern staples; it had few slaves; it had It's
Internal puarrels and Hert-barnn4s with
the more pOpuious slave regions in the same
states; and II WAS ut that early day posi-
bic, by attor,.ing protection 10 the loyal IN
h;tOilants. to have intelpo>eI Il broad belt
ot loyal territory between the rebels of the
Mississippi valley and those OF The Atlantic
slope. BIT whether this part Of the plan
had been Successful OF rot, the costeIn-
plated cutting III the railroads would have
Severe; the rebellion in the middle aud in
sured its speedy extinction. The great
merits Il this plan are incontrovertible
but Who is aliowegable for its non-execu-
ton? Ii is painful to attribute the blame
to the high quarter where history will for
ever fix it, but truth is memorable The
President OF the United States made in mid
winter, 1862, pcrelnptory order in his
own name for Il simultaneous movement of
all the armies on the ensuing 22d of Feb
ruarS. The effect of this was, of course,
to diSconccit all plans for SO timing
the greater movements in the east and
west that they should lend each other
mutual support, and make success in the
one the tOrerunner OF certain triumph
in the other. The President had been led
by 1.-THE I/'tbHH" newspaper ca high mill
tary authorityD to regard the capture of
Richmond as the paramount thing to be
Immediately done; and 50 eager WAS he
10 eat his loaf hot that he would neither
tarry for the grinding, nor the kneading,
nor the baking. Had Gen. Mcclellan
been permitted to time lis movements in
accordance with his own plan, his great
and menacing army on the Potomac, would
by its mere presence, have Detained q vast
rebel force east OF the Allegiianles, While
the western army succeeded in cutting the
railroads, and the advance on Richmond
would have been the final stroke OF the
war, ending it by one crushing blow
Another question of cardinal importance
is, whether the reasons for advancing to
Richmond by the Chesapeake, instead of
in direct line by way of Manassas, were
sound, and such as ought to have prevail
ed? These reasons have, in fact, SO much
force that the sole objection ever made to
the water route was that it did not enable
General McClellan's army to cover Wash
ington during the advance. His testimo-
ny, which we here quote, will set the mer-