Daily intelligencer. [volume] (Wheeling, Va. [W. Va.]) 1859-1865, 1863-04-10

Ah44C al AoLGt SOJGSH' = 1
evacuated Manassas without the loss of a
nan or round of material.
That then Mcclellan settled upon the |
James River route, With the assent OF thei
President on the single condition that such
! force should be left in and about Wash |
ington. ''as in the opinion of the Generals |
in Chief and the commanders OF the army |
corps should leave said city entirely secure"
that these commandersgin council conclude
ed that at least So 600 men were necessary
to protect Washington, $50, O0Oin the forts
and $4,000 as a covering force, and yet
that Mcclellan left but 10000 to protect
the Capital and those poorly disciplined,
and without any knowledge of artillery;
That Mcclellan reached Yorktown on
the 9Th of April, aud on the 9Th the Presi-
dent wrote him, saying that sit is indis-
peusable to you that you strike blow
the present hesitation to move upon an
position is but the story of
Manassas repeated" and yet Gen. McClel-
Ian rested one full month before 7 orktoWn,
though when he first reached it, it was
defended by less than twelve Thousand
men; Gl
That Gen. Mcclellan, instead of direct
ing the movement on to Williamsburgh.
remained behind at Yorktown without
AChuAAVAy -AuLA HShAn6 osAJ
body, and that in consequence the Viii.
liamsburgh battle was fought in confusion
and at immense disadvantage and loss;
That, after the battle, he arrested pur.
suit and sent two of the divisions back to
Yorktown, though several of the Generals
testify that had the enemy been properly
followed up Richmond would have been
taken at once, and all the subsequent In
.telligence of the condition of the rebel
army and of the rebel capital at that time
confirms the fact;
That two weeks were consumed in get.
ting the army from Williamsburgh to the
Chickahominy, a distance Of only forty or
fifty miles; i
That on the Chickahominy Gen. Nc
Clellau ordered Gen. Casey's division of
new and undisciplined troops three.quar-
tiers of mile to the front, at Seven Pines,
within six miles of Richmond, left them
there for days unsupported, against the
urgent remonstrances of Gen. Casey aud
Gen. Reyes, and that in consequence they
were attacked aud overwhelmed with tre-
meudous slaughter;
That, after the successful battle of Fair
Oaks, on the next day, according to the tes-
mony of the highest officers, I" the army
could have pushed straight into Rich.
mond with little resistance but Gene
raj Mcclellan ordered the troops to be re-
called;
That hewas continually sending on to
Washington for reinforcements, and in par
ticular for McDowell's corps on the Kappa
hammock, though he knew that the enemy
had detached large force up the Shenan-
doah, under Stonewall Jackson, and were
threatening Washington, and that the men
protecting it were much less than the num-
Der originally agreed upon as necessary to
its defense;
That, at Gaines Mill, $4,000 of our
troops were set upon by "a, 900 of the enc
my and badly beaten-AIl the effect, as
testified by high officers, of not keeping
the army properly concentrated,
That, when the resolution was taken to
retreat to James River, Gen. Mcclellan
printed an order to destroy all baggage.
tents and equipnge, and only failed to is
sue it because other officers demonstrated
against it;
That oil the seven days battles were
fought in the absence of Gen. Mcclellan,
and without any directions from him, he
confined himself simply to the role of place
ing the troops in the morning, and then
departing to seek a position fort the next
day, leaving to the troops to come up to
that position as they best might; .b
That he was also absent at the last great
battle of Malvern Hill until all was nearly
over, and that, though, according to the
testimony of many officers, s'the enemy
were so severely pushed that they could
have been followed into Richmond by
vigorous pursuit." yet, instead of advanc-
ing, he fell back, from Malvern to Harri-
sons Bar
That ut the latter place, the entire army
was huddled within IL space of aboutIthree
miles along the river, without the least
order; were kept so fortwenty four hours,
and would in all likelihood have been de-
stroyed but for very heavy rain which
prevented the enemy from bringing up the
body of their artillery;
That the army of the Potomac originally
landed on the Peninsula l2l,5OO men /;
were subsequently, reinforced so as to raise
that number to 1863 500 that this number,
by the time it had reached Harrison's Bar,
had been reduced to 100000 fit for duty !;
and that Gen. Mcclellan telegraphed to
Washington for 1000 men "to be prompt
~ sent" him; when, in fact, as tbs Presi-
dent replied, allthe soldiers under Nj Now
ell, Banks, Fremont, Wool and Dix, and all
in Washington, did not exceed so, 900.
That Mcclellan finally agreed to resume
~ az HSA1SS L1OFCIuCuG WIN u reinforcement
of 10000, but afterward wrote to WASH,
iugton that he must in addition have
another $4,000 or 10000 from the armies
in the Valley of the Mississippi, which WAS
of course impracticable and absurd
That, on being thereupon ordered to
withdraw his army from the Peninsula.
,'as rapidly as possible" to CO. operate. with
Pope, who,was contending With superior
forces, he refused to obey uutil the order
had been repeated again aud again, in.
yolylng delay which put Washington in
the most imminent peril
That after the troops were at last brought
up the Potomac, he constantly interp6sed
the most useless delays to giving Popsauyi
help, and that, according to Gen. Haileci,
Pope would have conquered instead Of
been defeated, had Mcclellan acted with
ail the energy circumstances permitted;
That after Gen. McClellau. had moved ]
from Washington with nearly an Of his
army into Northern Maryland, to intercept