The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1863-04-17

" y "
WHOLE NO. 1342
the Rappahannock or Fortress Monroe, civ.
ing preference to the Rappahannock route
He stated that thirty days would be reauir-
ed to provide the necessary means of trans
portation. He stated that he regarded sue
cess as certein, ly all the chances of war;" BY
the route he proposed while it was " b. no
means certain that We can beat them the
enemy at Manassas"
To this the President made the following
reply:
EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, February 3, 1862.
My Dear Sir r:-You and l have distinct
and different plans for the movement Of
the army cf the Potomac-yours to be down
the Chesapeake. up the Rappahanock to Ur-
bana, and across land to the terminus of the
railroad southwest of Manassas. If YOU will
give me satisfactory answers to the following
questions shall gladly yield my plan TO
yours:
l. Does not your plan involve a greatly
larger expenditure of time and money than
mine
>. Wherein is a victory more certain BY
your plan than mine?
Wbora,, ., ~
your plan than mine
I. In fact would it not be less valuable in
this. that it would break no great line of the
eneTvs communication. while mine would?
.. In case of disaster would not safe re-
treat he more difficult by your plan than by
mine
\. LINCOLN.
Major General MCCLELLAN"
There is no evidence of the considerations
which induced the President to acquiesce in
Gen NcClellan's plan, except the result of
the first council of war. held in February,
1862. Then eight TO four of the generals in
the council voted in favor of the movement
by way of Annapolis. down the Chesapeake
Bay, up the Rappahannock, landing at Urba-
ma. thence across the country to Richmond.
The four who voted against the plan were
Generals Mcdowell. Sumner, Heintzelman.
and Barnard.
TIE CHANGE OF RAsE.
Inc committee consider briefly the various
arguments in support of the different routes
10 Richmond. which were at that time sug-
sested. They add that one great objection
TO the peninsula route. as indicated BY the
testimony of all the witnesses who testify
upon that point. including General Mcclellan
himself. was the total want of information
IL reference to the nature of the country
there. the kind and condition of the roads.
the preparations for defense, &c. The diff
culties and embarrassments our army labored
under from the beginning of tha: campaign.
from that want of information, are very evil
dent from the testimony.
Il was finally decided by a council of war
TO take the Rappahannock route, leaving the
enemy in Eossession of their batteries. This
appears from the following:
"ENECUTIvE MANSION. March S, 1868.
Presidents General Var Order No. 3.
Ordered. That no change of the base of
operations of the army of the Potomac shall
ne made without leaving in and about Wash
ington such force as, in the opinion of the
General ln-Chlef and the commanders of all
the army corps, shall leave the said CITY en-
uIely secure. That no more than two army
corps taboat fifty thousand troops) of said
army 'f the Potomac shall be moven en-
route for new base of operations until the
navigation of the Potomac from Washington
TO the chesapeake Bay shall be freed from
the enemy'S batteries and other distractions.
or until the President shall hereafter give
express permission.
That any movement aforesaid en- route for
4 new base OF operations, which may be or
dered by the General-in- Chief, and which
may be intended TO move upon the Chesa-
peake Bay. shall begin to move upon the
Bay as early as the 18TH March instant. and
the Gsneral-in-Chief shall be responsible
that II 81 move as early as that dav.
Ordered, That the army and navy Cooper
ate IN an immediate efiolt TO capture the en-
emys batteries upon the Potomac, between
Washington and Chesapeake Bay.
ABRAHAM LINCOLN.
l. THOMAS, Adjutant General"
THE FORCES To EE LEFT BEHIND FOR THE
DEFENSE OF WASHINGTON.
Before the Annapolis movement was be-
gun, the rebels evacuated Manassas and Cen
;reviiie ION the 10th of March.) On the
18th Gen Mcclellan convened a council of
four of the five commanders OF army corps,
(Gsn Banks heing ABSENT and informed
them that he had abandoned the Kappa
hammock plan, and proposed instead a move.
ment by way of York and James rivers. The
council unanimously approved 1t, with GER
tain conditions relating to the neutralizins
Of the Merrimac, the sufficiency Of trans.
ports and of naval force, and ending as fol-
lows, viz: That the force left to cover
Washington shall be such as to give an entir,
feeling of security for its safety from menace.
With respect to this, keyes, Heintzelmar
and Mcdowell agreed that, with all the fort.
around the city occupied. %, 900 men in from
would suffice; Gen Sumner thought 10000
The Secretary of War and the Presiden
at once approved the plan, the latter giving
however, the following directions:
First. Leave such force at Mansssa