Mineral Point weekly tribune. (Mineral Point, Wis.) 1859-1868, 1863-11-18

She nonuIar impression is that Gen. Rose
Grams, BY sziIlful flank Increment, took
Chattanooga and might there have rested,
but that he got ambitious of further laurels,
was intoxicated by his easy success, became
as rash as he had before been cautious, rush
ed impetuously ahead, was caught of his
guard, soundly pummeled, and sent back with
a bloody nose, that his OWN indlscretlon had
secured him.
The truth is that Gen Rosecrans never
really held Chattanooga until after that bat
tie that he had to fight at Chicamauga to get
his army into Chattanooga
Let me explain as briefly as l can.
The army was thrown across the river about
thirty miles below Chattanooga. Between 1t
and the rebel position stretched Lookout
mountain, a perpendicular vail of limestone
which no wheel could cross. The mountain
juts up against the river tUo miles below
Chattanooga, leaving a narrow pass by the
river bank through which the railroad runs.
To have attempted to march up to Chattanoo-
ga through this pass would have been mad
ness. 1t were easier to cross the river direct
~ in front, and storm the works. NeYerthe-
less, it was the quickest way to get into the
place-if the rebels would only get out be-
forehand
Twenty or thirty miles out from the river
(south) was the first gap in Lookout Noun
trim; twenty miles further was the second.
The reader who finds the location Of these
gaps has Gen. Rosecrans' plan IN a moment.
lie placed Crittenden's Corps near the river,
at the foot of the mountain, ready to march
right up through the railroad pass, and so IN
to Chattanooga, the moment the rebels should
leave it. Thomas corps he sent out along
the mountain to the first gap, and McCook's
to the second with instructions to cross over
as soon as possible. The moment the head
of their columns began to debouch on the
other Chattanooga side of the mountain the
enemy saw his danger. If he remained in
Chattanooga, we were on his line of supplies
and south of him. He evacuated at once,
Fastening sOutheastward to Lafayette. Crit
tenden quietly lying a few miles down the
river, OF course, marched up through the
railroad pass at the rivers edge-n0 longer
dangerous, with the enemy goue--and occu-
pied the deserted stronghold.
But did this give ROsecrans Chattanooga
He held 1t very much straggleT who
should get away around to the enemy's rear,
could be said to hoH the enemys line of com
municatons. He had but a corps there, which
the enemy could crush at any time. Hence
forth his whole effort was directed to getting
his other two corps into Chattanooga, so that
he could re-unite his army before fight and
hold his position. 1t lgas ia trying to dc this
that Chickamsattga lcas fought.
Crittenden was not strong enough to hold
Chattanooga, so he was moved southwark
not, the public supposed, in pursuit Of
Bragg, but TO get nearer the rest Of the army,
for safety against Bragg. McCOOk was order
ed to close up on Thomas, then the two, still
fronting the enemy at Lafayette, were to close
uI, moving by the left flank, on Critteuden :;
then the whole army, continuing the left flank
movement, was TO try to slip sideways into
| Chattanooga. For the enemy was known to
| be heavily reinforced.
Immediately after crossing the river, Gen.
Rosecrans had telegraphed here: Il have
repeatedly told YOU that the enemy can re
intorce himself at viii, and that ne viii be a
great fool if he does not do it." 1t was now
| certain that he was not - a great fool
McCook was twenty miles beyond Thomas.
| Thirty hours, or at most two days, were al
lowed him 70 reach Thomas's position. Had
| he performed the march in the tire expected,
| Chickamauga would not have been fought and
the army would have got safely into Chatta-
n0oga. The order reached him on the 18th;
| by the evening Of the 18th he should have
Joined Thomas while it was not till the 10th
that Bragg issued his general order from La
| tayCtte, announcing TO the army that il was
heavily reinforced, and ordering an advance
{" TO seek the enemy
But instead Of moving directly down the
plain mountain road, McCook, under some
uuaccountabie delusion that it was not prac-
Utablc7 dG>04uJElA went Dttck over the ROAD
/ by which he had crossed Lookout Mountain,
and went down the valley to the gap through
which Thomas had crossed; and so, by this
roundabout route, came in on Thomas rear.
consuming five days instead of thirty hours in
eifectug-the junction. These five DAYS set
tied the fate OF the army. lie did not reach
/ Thomas till the evening of the 18th: on the
morning of the 10th Bragg had issued his or
ders TO advance: and the reinforced enemy
/ = ~.
compelled Rosecraus to bring Cdittcnden
still further away from Chattanooga, and clear
up TO Thomas left, To save both corps from
/ humiliation in detail.
As soon as McCOok got up, Rosecraus start
ed the army for Chattanooga, but it was too
late. The enemy struck the head of his col
umn near Bossviiie, on the 10Th, and Chica-
mauga followed. Technically it was de
feat; but Rosecrans still accomplished his
| purpose-he got his army into Chattanooga,
though at tearfully heavier expense than
had been anticipated. If he lost the battle,
he still won the campaign. And campaigns
are bigger than battles.
l have been thus particular IN tracing the
| operations preceding and producing Chica-
manga, both because It is proper to correct
/ false impressions as to the reasons why the
! battle was fought and because these false
l Impressions had their effect in increasing
/ the War Departments dissatisfaction with
! Gen. ROsecran's management Until recent
/ " the real facts have not been understood
/ here; and the Department, sharing in the
/ public impression that the battle was the i'm
| prudent act OF an ovcrprudcnt man. grown
| suddenly ambitious of greater triumphs and
4 rendered fooihardy by his easy successes went
as much further than the public in its con
! domaatjon if its disposition to condemn had
! been more aroused by previous causes
THE ELIMINATING DIFFICULTY.
But the dissatisfaction on this score was
/ light, compared with what l now name as the
/ fourth and more immediate reason for the re-
moval: Gen Rosecrans' voluntary separation
I from his Chief of staff IT the crisis OF the
/ battle, and his retiring, stampeded, as De
parJment officers arS wont to express it. to
/ Chattar- oga, while the staff officer insisted
/ on pressing forward to the front. The Secre-
/ tary of War Is understood to have gone so
| far. in speaking Of this, rs 10 dcuounce it as
1 an act of absolute cowardice. None of us,
/ who remember the brilliant personal bravery
with which the hero of Stone River has ilh-
/ mined SO many triumphant battlefeids Of this
/ war. can fail 10 regret that any one should
/ have 50 far forgotten himself and forgotten
/ the bloody records of our glory rs to harbor
such an unworthy thought for an instant: buV
il cannot be wondered that Gen. Rosecrans'