Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-09-26

s.
headquarters in North GeorgiA up 70 the even
ing of the Issh, and below win be found a spec
ulasivs article from the Nav York Tri5sas o.
thas date, showing what, in their eoufdence
the Yankees expected to accomplish, Il viii Be
seen Atlanta was bospOkea. The army Of Ten
Bessse has since disturbed these csleRlatioEs
GENERAL RosECRANs' CAMPAIGs.
Gen. Rosecrans' advsnca since ths occupation
of Chattanooga has been steadily pushed. His
plan for the se5zlre Of that stronghold vas eoae
eaived and developed in such way IS te make
the possession of what was really his Efst OBJ
jsctiVe point Incidental to lhe progress OF TIE
comprehensive campaign which cgrtsmplsfss
the complets military occupation Of TIE noun
tain regions Of NortheTa Georgian and the fnal
capture Of Atlanta. The columns which hgpkod
| Chattanooga Ou the south aud west were IN the
direct line of advance to Rome, which is itself
! long step toward Atlanta, connected with II
by TailToad, and OF very CREST intrinsic import
aucs as the site Of extensive po sder mills aud
other manufactures. It viii be remembered ss
/ the point simed az and nearly reached by the
illIaisd expedition uHder Col Streight tho de-
stTuction OF its mills being then the chief Oh isci
in view.
Like the campaigns which Gen. RJsecrsas
has previously executed, ths present is gigantic
bAlGiief anu DHath Will IlCU4taiN2Dtb QILue
| ties. Hs operates ia a mountain region over
roads nearly impasssbls, snd often ogar noun
! tains which no road has ever crossed putting
| great distances between his separate columns,
/ and sui greater between them 6nd their bases
/ Of supplies, and confronting al every step OBJ
I staeies which, to less Tes0lute c0mmsHdsr.
/ would seem insurm0uutabls. It follows, Of
! course, that such q campaign is a work Of time,
and its progress is with difficulty tTscsabIs until
! its object is attained. For general Information
! It is sufficient 10 indicate its purpose and 20 eX
| plain the value and relation Of The points to-
| ward which the army Of the Cumberland is
| pressing forward. Moreover, concerning the
! forces, movements and plans of the rebel com
manders, there bRs been little Trustworthy incl
legenea since the evacuation of Chattanooga It
| is only known-st least il is positively stated
! that Bragg and Johnston have united, aud tbs.
( stubborn resistance &c R9secrans' advance is
/ still contemplated.
Atlanta is the last link which binds together
! the Southwestern Uad Northwestern sections of
| tho rebel Confederacy, Break it, and those sec
| tions isll ssander. The two systems Of South
western raiiWsy communication centsTed at
| Chatsonooga, and the conquest Of that plsCe
D aGd KaoxYille severed the Northern line. Bs-
| tween the former aud the present capitals Of ihs
I Confederaey, Montgomery and Richmond, there
is now no railway communication, except by
the read which turns east at Atlanta and runs
/ to Augusta, thence by two lines reaching north
Wsrdly into Virginia, snd even portions of these
are held By the most preeaTiOHs tenure. Of
\ course, with the capture of Atlanta this system
is also oroks up, ana since the capture of Al
! lanta involves also the subjugation of NOTlhern
| Georgia, the present campaign of Gen. Rose
Grams aims at nothing less than he miltsry isO-
lahon of Mississippi Alabama and Georgis
! from the remaining States Of South CaIolins,
North Carolina and Virginia. The Southern
| portion Of Georgia, indeed, cannot be aft scted
| By this success, but may speedily fnd Itself
! threatened from another gusrter.
Il is with references to Ehe results Of this csm-
| paign of Gen. Rosecrsns, not less than to the
movements of Gen. Meade, that the defensive
attitude Of the rebel army in Virginia has been
| maintained. Over territory so vast as that Of
! Mississippi, Alabama aud Georgia, railways sre
| tie onlY possible me6Ds Of connected operations
on large scale, and the loss of theiE last rail
road is, therefore, 70 the rebels the loss of the
States for all purposes Of military cooperation.
| They have lost Kentucky, lost Tennessee, and
il these 0,heT three 90 with them the Resources
Of the rebellion, whether Of men or supplies, are
too much concentrated to support military ss-
tAblshmeut Of such magnitude IS the present
And since Lee, with his present f0gcs is able to
hold Gen. MeRCe st bay, It seems more than ever
probable that the decisive battle for the posses
sion OF Richmond is % bs fought neither GA he
RsPpshsunock nor an the Rapidan, bat l. ths
heart Of Georgia, five hundred miles to the
south and vest
lt IS too soon 70 express Gn OpiniOa on the
! probable strategy of Bragg and Johnston, for
there IS nothing to show, deeisiveiy, whether
! their campaign IS mesnt to be strRtegicaily de-
! tonsive, or whether the preservation of thsiT
army has become their principal object. In
yisW Of the considerations already suggested,
! the utter abandonment OF Atlanta is not probA-
bisi nor do we belive it viii voluntarily occur.
l WbetheT it may not fan as Chattanooga fell is
ano her question; but its Tem0teness is so great
and its typographical features 80 materially diff
| fersRt, that General ROsoGgens can hardly
be expected to repeat bis former strategy.
He is more likely to direct his a.
ssnticn, n the FIRST place especially, to the rebel
amy, with the purpose Of compelling battle,
and postpone until after q decisive victory lhe
oecupstiOn Of Atlanta. IL be means to ioEes
Bragg TO fight, the features of The campaign
may undergo many changes before our geneTsi
finally sets his face soulhWsrd. But it is to be
always kept in mind that any strategy on the
part of the rebel leaders which does not cover
Atlanta, and which is not meant to hold that
place to the last moment, is for them As sieni6-
cant q confession Of defeat, and is as pregnant
with disaster, as if their standard went down on
she battle Geld and their arnas were piled in front
OF victorious national army.