Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-04-13

PRoGSosIs OF GENERAL LEE's SPRISe CAMPAIGN
WHERE ARE THE ONWARD TO RICHMOND MEN7-
ADVANTAGES WHICH HooKER WOULD HAVE HAD
IN PESISsuLAR CAMPAIGN


ADVANTAGES WHICH HooKER WOULD HAVE HAD
IN A PESINsULAR CAMPAIGN.
Special Correspondence of the Chicago Times-I
WAsHINGToS. March 81.
The movement of General Lees troops IN the
neighborhood of this city, takea in connection
with the near approach Of the opening of the
spring campaign, are such as ought to exercise
the utmost solictude, on the part Of the authori-
ties here, for the actual safety of the Capital On
the 2Sth inst. strong party OF Confederate troops
marched deliberately along the Warrenton turn
pike from Warrenton to Bull Run, driving in our
pckets at the latter point, who fell back to Cen
treville. The Confederates then proceeded to burn
the bridges over Bull Run: and, while small
party were thus engaged, the main body secured
the country for some distance around, and pickle
up all the Information and stragglers in their way
The whole party then returned to Warrenton.
sound in wind and limb, and undisturbed by our
forces. On the 29th there were indications that
the enemy contemplated another raid on Vienna,
which is only fourteen miles from this city And,
to-day, it is ascertained that General jackson.
with part OF his corps, and General Fitz Hugh
Lee, with the lst, 9th ond 9TH regiments of Vir-
ginia cavalry, are at Front Royal
After carefully watching General Lees move
ments during the last six weeks, it seems to me
that his plan for the spring campaign is some
thing as follows: By means OF the constant re-
connoissances which have described in former
letters, and from prisoners and deserters, he has
correctly informed himself as to the military
status in and this city. The time is now
approaching when Fighting Joe Hooker must
indicate his claims to that soubriquet. he must
do of two things He must either try to reach
Richmond by the overland route, or else he must
embark his troops at Aqua Creek, transport them
to the James river, and commence there another
Peninsular campaign. The impediments in the
way of march overland to Richmond are too
Al. r. IL. -. r IL.
Rappahannock aud the Matapony exten-
sive, that General Lee believes that only a small
number of troops will be required on those lines;
while the defenses of Richmond itself are so
strong that a still less number would be required
there.
If, therefore, when the spring opens. Hooker
attempts to march Richmond either by way of
Fredericksburg, Gordonsyle or Urbana, Gen
Lee will probably leave about so 900 troops to
defend the lines OF the Rappahannock and Mat
apony, or to fall back and draw the Union army
into the swamps of the Pamunky, while, with
l25 600 troops under his own command, he as
sumes the offensive against Washington. If. on
the other hand, Hooker adopts the wiser plan of
Peninsular campaign, the so 900 troops will be
sent to act as corps of observation on the Pen
insula while Lee is employing his l25 900 troops
against this city. Whatever Gen. Lee does he
will do quickly. If he finds the attack on Wash
ington hopeless he will retrace his steps; and, if
Hooker is making an overland campaign against
Richmond. he will fall upon his II he is
making a Peninsular campaign. Gen. Lee will
mass the whole of his forces before that city.
Why is IT, bv the way that we hear nothing of
the cry con to Richmond % this spring? We
heard it in the spring of 1861. We heard moth
ing else in the winter and spring of 1862. But
now. in the spring of 1863, nobody hears the cry
of "On to Richmond % raised Why is this? Is
the possession of Richmond less desirable now
than it was year ago, or two years ago? Or
does the administration believe. with the Rebels,
that Richmond is impregnable, and cannot be
taken | know it is the fashion now, in admin
istration circles. to decry the idea of taking
Richmond at all IL you want to he in high fa
vor at the White House, or at the War Depart
ment, all you have to do is to ridicule the policy
OF sending an army TO capture Richmond. The
tone assumed by those who thus wish to curry
favor with the administration is something like
this:
why should we seek to take Richmond? Its
possession would be of no value to us. The siege
and capture of Richmond would occupy several
months, and it would require an army of 2O0,0
men and naval force quite equal to that now in
the Mississippi. In the meantime, that force
could be much more proftably employed in in
vading the South at other points, in opening the
Mississippi. and in capturing Charleston, Savan
nah and Mobile. Richmond is mere country
it themselves They are doing now"
There could not be more apt illustration of
the fable of the fox and the ripe grapes which
he declared were sour. than this language. The
persons who use such language virtually admit
that il is not in our power to take Richmond.
Such. however. is not the case. Richmond is
impregnable. 1t is strongly fortified, but it is
ours just SO soon as we attack it in the proper
manner.
year ago the whole pack of Abolition ours
kept yelping and snarling at McCellan's heels
all winter and at the President, too, urging him
to send Mcclellan "on to Richmond" They
compelled him to set his columns in motion on
the 5th of march, On the 6th 7th. 9Th and 9th
of March the Confederates at Manassas saw with
dismay McClellan's army getting around their
left iink, and on the 10Th of March they evacu-
ated Manassas and retired to Richmond. BY
this time last year Gen Mcclellan had transported
his whole army the Peninsula, and had COM
menced the siege of Yorktown. Yes. it is now
full month after the time that McClellan's army
began to move Yet Fighting Joe" remains
quiescent; he makes no sign; and, stranger still,
no one is heard to urge him "on to Richmond p"
When he does move, If he is wise. he will dis
card the advice of those tyros who would have
him march to Richmond overland, and will trans
port his troops to the Peninsular as Mcclellan
did, and inaugurate Peninsular campaign.
If be does this, he will have an immense advan-
tage over Mcclellan. He will have no rebel
steamer Merrimac blocking up the James River
He will have no Yorktown to besege. He will
have no Gloucester Point batteries to reduce. He
will have no battle of Williamsburg TO fight. He
will have no tedious march of seventy miles
through the Peninsular TO make All this has
been done for him by Mcclellan. He can begin
where Mcclellan was compelled to leave of, last
July. Mcclellan, the latchets of whose shoes
he is not worthy to stoop down and unloose, has
gone before. and has prepared the way before
him He can transport his troops up the James
River, and land them. under protection of his
gunboats. opposite City Point, within twenty
miles of Richmond. and within twenty four hours
sail of this city. Let Hooker, then, go "on TO
Richmond" The war will never be over till
Richmond is taken The capture of the Rebel
capital will give more prestige in Europe than
the capture Of Charleston, Vicksburg, Savannah
and Mobile, altogether X.
The Elections.