New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-01-01
numerically equal to biz own on open aud evsu
ground; while in repeated instances thoy have
been assailed aud beaten by Union armis, far


ground: while in repeated instances thoy bays
been assailed and beaten by Union srmis, far
inferior in numbers. Mill Spring may seem b.
have eyinced more chiyslroN spirit On thar
part; but Zoctffer was dupef into that fsbs
b. transformation as to our strength; or rather.
the four regiments which he expected to
crush there had, unknown TO bin, been largely
strength ened during the day aid Night precei-
ing his attack. But give them chance +,
concentrate suddenly two or three OF their
armies against one of Ours, insuring them q
temporarily overwhelming preponderaSce Of
strength, and the Rebel chiefs do not hesitats
to advance and attack, as at Corinth, Gsinea's
Mills, &C., and as they seen nov preparing 10
strike desperately either Rosecrans or Grant.
Their chief reliance, however, would seem
10 be on cavalry raids on the tanks and 10 tao
rear of our larger armies and they make moro
account Of burning bridges than Of fighting
battles. Their cavalry is generally made up in
great part OF the planters sons and others Of
the younger and poorer aristocracy of tho
south, and is far better mounted than OURS
we buying our horses, while the Rebel troopers
nave either raised theirs or stolen them-ia
either case, with more regard to value than
cost. Compelled BY their bad roads 70 do
most OF their travelling on horseback. ths
Southern youth are fearless rides from tas
nursery forward, and early accustomed TO the uss
of firearms. Their cavalry may not be more
numerous than ours, but it has the immense ad.
vantage OF guides who Know every foot Of tas
country traversed, and it has proved by far
the more effective. While our armies remain
IN motion it can do us little harm, not know
ing precisely where 10 strike;' but tue moment
we sit down to spading or hutting, its scouts
and spies discover every weak spot in oar
lines, ascertain what posts are held By officers
who can be surprised, and what roads will
probably remain open to them In case OF
alarm or repulse, and so are enabled to strike
us damaging blows with comparative impumty.
Hence, the know ledge that any of our armies
has come to q stand, unable to adGance and
attack, is generally regarded as a prelude to
disaster.
II is the business of Commanding General
not only to fight good battles when the oppor-
tunity presents itself, but to know how TO
compel his adversary to fight on nearly equal
ground Whenever that shall seem desirable no
matter though that adversary would rather %
excused Hitherto, none Of orr Commanders
Las seemed eminenty endowed with this ca
pacty of forcing his foe to fight when desired.
and on substantially equal ground. Napoleon
never ia all his bloody career, fought hostile
army intrenched in front OF fortified city, a.
Mcclellan did at Richmond or strongly forti-
fed along range Of hills, with d non-torda-
Die river = mile or ~ ia front like the post
ton lately assailed by Burnside at FIsdericks-
bdrg. lie always found means to tur" such
defenses, and compel their evacuation, as our
Generals doubtless will in time. We expended
the first two years of our last War with Great
Britain in teaching our Generals how to fight.
We look to tire immediate future TO prove that
the education OF our present leaders IS very
far advanced, if not fully completed.