The weekly pioneer and Democrat. [volume] (Saint Paul, Minn. Territory) 1855-1865, 1863-04-17
III TTTTTT1OTTT-T


ner and Williams, on the 9th were moved
from Tenallytown to Rockville, thence by
and Urbana on Frederick, the
11th Corps moving by a lateral road be-
tween Urbsna and Newmarket, thus main
tanning the communication between the
centre and right wing, as well as covering
the direct route from Frederick to WASH
ington! The 9Th corps, under General
Franklin, was moved to, Jamestown on
the 9th instant, thence by Jacksonville and
Barnville on Buckeystown, covering the
road from the mouth of the Monocacy to
Rockville, and being in position to connect
with and support the centre should it have
been necessary Gas was supposedly to force
the line of the Monocacy. COUGHS divis-
ion was thrown forward to Ofut's Gross
Roads and Poolesville by the river road,
thus covering that approach, watching the
fords OF the Potomac, and ultimately fol-
lowing and supporting the 9th Corps. n ,s
The object Of these movements was to
feel the enemy-to compel him to develop
his intentionsAat the same time that the
troops were in position readily to cover
Baltimore or Washington, to attack him
elOulu uO uOlu luC lluO VI CuC U1OlOClOOS
or to follow him into Pennsylvania if ne
cessary. On the 10Th portion of the
right wing entered Fredericksburg, after a
brisk .skirmish at the outskirts of the city
and in its streets. On, the. 18th the main
bodies of the right wing and centre passed
through Fredericksburg In this city the
manifestations of Union feeling were album.
dant and gratifying. The troops received
the most enthusiastic welcome at the hands
of it's inhabitants. On the 18th the adj
vance consisted of Pleasonton's cavalry
and horse artillery, after some skirmish-
ing, cleared the main passage over the Ca
toctin hills, leaving no serious obstruction
to the movement of the main body until
the base of the South Mountain range was
reached. s."' a"...'i..1 ia l'T''-1
When at Frederick, on the 18th, OBJ
tanned reliable information of the move
ments and intentions of the enemy, which
made it clear that it was necessary to force
the passage of the South Mountain range
and gain possession OF Boonsboro and Rob-
rerville before any relief could be afford
ed to Harper's Ferry. ..,,,., .,...., ....
On the morning of the 18th I received
verbal message from Col. Miles, command
ing at Harper's Ferry, informing me that
on the preceding afternoon the Maryland
Heights had been abandoned, after repell-
ing an attack by the rebels, and that the
whole force was concentrated at Herper's
Ferry, the Maryland, Loudon and Boliver
Heights being all in possession of the enc
my. The messenger stated that there was
no apparent reason for the abandonment
of the Maryland Heights, and that though
Col. Miles asked for assistance, he said he
could hold out certainly two days. direct
ed him to make his way back, if possible,
with the information that was rapidly ap
preaching, and would undoubtedly relieve
the place. -.- ...... .". -'.'
By three other couriers sent the same
message, with the order to hold out to the
last. / do not learn that any of these
messengers succeeded in reaching Harper s
Ferry. should here state that on the 18th
/ was directed to assume command of the
garrison at Harper Ferry, but this order
reached me after all communication with
the garrison was cut off, Before I left
Washington, and while it was yet time,
l recommended to the proper authorities
that the garrison of Harper's Ferry should
be withdrawn via Hagerstown, to aid in
covering the Cumberland Valley, or that,
taking up the pontoon bridge, and obstruct-
ing the railroad bridge, it should fall back
to the Maryland Heights, and there hold
its own to the last In this position it
could have maintained itself for weeks 1t
was not deemed proper to adopt either of
these suggestions. and when the subject
was left to my discretion it was too late to
do anything except to try to relieve the
garrison. ......
directed artillery to be fired frequently
by our advanced guards as signal to the
garrison that relief was at hand. This
was done, and l learn that our firing was
distinctly heard at Harper's Ferry, and
that they were thus made aware that we
were approaching rapidly. 1t was conf
IDENTITY expected that this place could hold
out until we had carried the mountains
and were in a position to move detach-
ment for its, relief. The lef, therefore,
was ordered to move through Jefferson to
the South Mountains, at Champions Pass,
| in front of Rurkettsvile, while the centre
and right moved upon the main of Turn
| er's Pass in front or Midtlletown. During
these movements had not imposed long
marches on the columns. The absolute
necessity of reftling and giving some little
rest to troops worn down by previous long
continued marching and severe fighting,
| together with the uncertainty as to the ac-
tual position, strength, and intentions OF
the enemy, rendered it incumbent upon
me to move slowly and cautiously until the
headquarters reached Urbana, where
first obtained reliable information that the
enemys object was to move upon Harper's
Ferry and the Cumberland Valley and not
upon Baltimore, Washington, or Gettys-
burg. -..r .sZfT ...3.J r.. t.. s..I r.
In the absence of full reports of corps
commanders, simple outline OF the bril-.
liant operations which resulted in the car
rying of the two passes through the South
Mountain is all that can at this time, with
justice to the troops and commanders en-
gagged, be furnished. The South Mountain
range, near Turner's Pass, averages per-
haps Thousand feet in height, and forms
strong natural military barrier. The
practical passes are not numerous, and are
readily defensible, the gaps Astounding in
fine positions Turner's Pass is the more
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