The Ottawa free trader. [volume] (Ottawa, Ill.) 1843-1916, 1863-02-07
THE ARMY OF THE POTOMAC.
When all the facts shall be known, an


mac written up, it will be found that tn
failure of Gen. Burnside to achieve grea
results at the head Of that army, was attr
butab bic to the same causes that paralysis
McClellan--to the childish timidity an,
ill-advised intermeddlipg Of the old gran
MES at Washington We give, in confirm
alton of this view, the following extract
from Washington letter In the New Yorl
Times, written by Mr.. Raymond himself
the editor, few days after the recent ant
last effort of Gen. Burnside to put his ar
my in motion, In which having been again
thwarted, he threw up the command il
| disgust:
WASHINGTON. Jan. "a, 1868.
had occasion last week to visit the Ar
my of the Potomac, and as / found it OF
the eve of movement against the rebe
forces in its front, remained to watch it.
progress and results. You will have re-
ports Of both before this can reach you
but concerning the causes of the failure o
this movement, they may not have said as
much as the good Of the service and wei
fare OF the country require, and ] write
this mainly to supply the defect
The sudden change In the ueafher on the
night of Tues day. the 18th, was the imine
date cause Of the failure. The movement
was intended to be surprise The whole
army was put i'll motion during TIE day OF
Tuesday, and each portion Of il was to have
been by midnight in the position designa-
ted by the commanding General, for the
commencement Of operations ct 6 clock
below and - clock above Fredericas-
burg on Wednesday morning At 3 O'clock
on Tuesday evening it began to rain, aud
through out the night the rain continued,
with a tempest of wind Owing TO other
causes, of which | shall speak hereafter.
those MOI -:~Hs Of the army designated TO
lead tie movemen. had not moved with
the vigor and energy whicl. me nature OF
the service required They were ARE TED
therefore. some miles short Of their ap-
pointed positions by the condilian Of the
roads, suddenly softened by the heavy
rain, and through which by morning it had
become impo-s Die TO move either pom
ICONS or artillery with the CELEBRITY demaA-
ded The enemy meantime discovered
the movement. and instantly rallied TO
meet il. The moment for the surprise had
passed, and therefore the movement was
abandoned
This Is the surface view Of the matter
as things stood. the weather afforded suf-
fcient excuse for abandoning the enter
prise-inGeed made it necessary 10 do 81
But If everything else bad been right, THIS
obstacle world have been overcome or IA.
ther would net have arisen n time to offer
any difficulty. Blu; the army Of the Poto
mac Is Ike the soil of Virginia; the upper
crust is hard, bat thin; q little rain soak.
it aad underneath lie. treecheroCs quick
sand Break through the crust, and you
sink instantly 10 q depth which makes
movement impossible A good deal has
been said Of the decentralization of the
army The word Is too strong 1t does
not apply TO the mass Of the army at all
But it does apply TO a good many Of the
officers Iheg are deH,0raA-ed in every sense
OF the word and they are a source Of dis.
couragcueut--of diSeoa.cnt--of dieheart-
eminent Gfthere is such a world to their
subordinstes and to the ranks / do not
hesitate TO say that the failure of this
latest movement was due, primarily ARD
manly, 10 the .'.5v59rainati9a-the word j.
not too strorg-oi some OF the Generals II
under Burnside ! ash. no bet
ter evidence OF this than the language
openly held by them, IN presSnc CT their
OF newspaper reporters, and
Of all who chose to listen, before the more
nient while i. was in progress, and afterit
had been abandoned Unless coRn.on
report, which receives the counienance ID
not the DISTINCT confirmation CT the OH
GERS most concerned, Is entirely at fault,
the Command. nc General was overwhelrn
ed with protests from his subordinates
against hls movements, GfhY they had
been decided upon, and with exaggerated
and untrue reports of the obstacles in his
way 50 far as | know, no one of them
went so far ar 10 refuse obedience to his
orders; but everything short OF that
which officers could do TO embarrass and
thwart his plans, was done-and done, too,
as Oh some previous occasions, with effect
and success. As every one knows, there
is kind OF obedience worse in is results
than fiat refusal. for it leaves the com
manding officer without aremedy. While
it answers IN form, all the requirements OF
the service, it insures, by its hating half
hearted and possibly premeditated ineffi
cheney, the failure of the plan which it
pretenGs 10 second. -..
One General, Jor example, was expected
to have pontoons enough for four brigades
-42 in all, | beleve--at the appointed
spot by daylight on Wednesday morning.
He had but eight or nine miles to go, and
there was no reason why he should not
have had them there before the rain. He
spent good deal Of his time on Tuesday
in demonstrating that the chances OF fail
lre were nineteen out OF twenty; on
W ed, esday morning he had ID rontoons
placed in open view Of the enemy, and the |
rest were stucl. in the mud from two to |
Two miles back. He certainly hsd Gone |
nothing to disturb his own calculation ct
chances and can now refer TO II as proof
IF his own sagacity. Another General was |
in the expression OF his opinion
against the movement, and did everything |
IN his power, even after the march OF his
troops had begun, to have it arrested.
Ifthis were the first instance in which
the willingness OF certain officers 20 behold,
with entire eouani:nity, the defeat of Gen.
Burnside's plans could be traced in then
language and conduct, should. hesitate in
attributing the failure of this moment to
that cause But it is not This Is the
fourth active movement which Gen. Burn
side has made against the enemy during
the short time that has elapsed since he
superseded Gen. Mcclellan. Let US see
what happened in each.
| Hhis first plan was to throw his army
rapidly upon Falmouth, cross over instant
w. take possession of the nights OF Fred
ericksburg. and thus compel the enemy
either to fight him in that posetion. or fall
back rapidly upon Richmond. The one
thing absolutely essential TO its succe' . was
the prompt arrival of the pontoon train.
This was under the direction Of Gen.
Woodbury., and no satisfactory explanation
of his delay has ever yet been made. But
that DELAY defeated the execution OF the
plan.
Next camethe crossing and the battle
at Observation-Disclosures was certainly
failure, and which the country generally
brands as a builder. think it was in
General Burnside's power to have correct-
Cd that oninion in his testimony before the
Committee. He did not
avail himself of that opportunity, but SAID