The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-02-16

imPsrts.t from Errops-Nspoieon's
Preferred Mediation.
We hear from reliable source that the EN-
peror Of the French has no confidence in our
acceptance Of bis proposals for peace confer
ence, and that he makes them merely as pre-
liminary to more important steps. We are as
sured that in case Of the formal rejection by our
government Of Napoleon's offer be will consider
that the period has arrived for the recognition
of the confederacy by France alone II the other
Powers of Europe still refuse to act jointly
with her. In support Of this statement We no.
tice the fact that the French government have
published the last correspondence OF N.
Drouyn dc Lhuys, the French Minister Of Fo-
reign Affairs. 1t Is to be remarked that France
did not wait for Mr.. Stewards answer to her
proposal of medation, but gave the correspond
ence to the public, closing, as il did, with the
long lettor Of the French Minister offering
mediation. Had the Emperor Of France
thought for one moment bis proposal
would be accepted by the North he would
have rcfrained from publishing this diplomatic
correspondence But he is we'll aware that
the United States neither will nor can accept
his mediation, and hence he makes the offer
with great parade and aifectation OF humane
sentiments, and then stands before the world rs
q would-be benesactor and pac6sr The object
Of the publication Is twofold: first, to prepare
the people Of Europe for some action on the
part OF France in our affairx; and secondly,
to turn their sympathy away from US, as we
will be shown up as unwilling to cease the hor
rible warfare which not only devastates our
country, but causes unparalleled misery and
suffering in Europe. Napoleon will say: have
done all l could 10 arrange this matter amicably.
The North refuses my proffered services. Asa
last resort acknowledge the confederacy, in
the hopes that Europe will follow my example,
and this fearful civil war be thus ended.
Napoleon is well aware that we cannot nc
cept his mediation, because it is based upon the
condition that we SHALL II he judges it best, &C
knowledge the existence Of the South as on in
dependent nation This government cannot for
one moment entertain any proposal which con-
cludes shat, because the rebels have success
fully defended themselves for Z number Of
months, we must admit the feasibility Of letting
them 60. Such course is impossible, and
taken in the abstract the proposal Of Napoleon
i simply "a a;.lt e The government Of the
United States and its loyal subjects. Thatit Is
meddlcsome none save those who are blinded
by prejudice can fail TO see at glance. In
short, the proposal is made with determine
ton to place us in bad light before the eyes
Of the world, and from desire to impress upon
all that France, imperial France directs and
influences the West as we'll Us the East.
There is one circumstance which will,
we fear. hasten the Emperor's recogni-
ton of the Davis government We refer
to the correspondence intercepted by the
rebels, which proved that Napolcon's
agents were tamperiDg with the people Of
Texas, and endoavoring to persuade them
to declare their State free from the coniederacy
and under the protection Of Fra4cc This was
an untimeiy disclosure for Napoleon, and will
force him to give the South some immediate
proof Of good will, il only TO eiace the effect OF
his scheme. What other proof can he give
save the recognition Of the confcderacy? He is
aware that his plans in Mexico could never be
even partially successful were the South a. we'll
as the North against him; and besides, he will
fully understand that nothing would 30 likely
bring about q reconstruction OF the Union as
decided evidences Of desire ON his part to
nlch from the South any portion Of its present
territory to say nothing Of his being already in
antagonism to the spread Of their power in
Mexico. which country the South, no doubt, has
counted as its own. In this predicament Ma
poleon will DO urged into immediate recog-
milton of the confederacy; and, spite Of the OBJ
stacles which he iinds at home In the way Of
such u course, he will, we fear, take measure
which events seem forcing upon him.
The obstacles we refer to are the dislike of
the French people to all expeditions to this
continent, which betrays itself in more ways
than one; the decprooted sympathy which his
subjects have for the United States. it having
been the policy OF all preceding French
governments 10 foster this sympathy, which, al
though weakened by Napoieoa's efforts, still
in part exists; the strong feeling of the repub-
i;can party in France in favor OF our govern
meut, and the Emperor's knowledge of the fact
that the moment he undertakes any hostile step
against us the princes of the House of Orleans
will work in our favor and, consequently,
against him, through their agents in France.
The Duke d'Aumale--a keen. shrewd polit;-
cian-foresaw the moment our rebellion broke
out that Napoleon would side with the South,
and that ultimately this might lead TO q war
between France and the United States. Hence
he advocated our cause sent the young princes
to fight in the ranks Of our armies; and, should
Napoleon force upon us q war; the House OF
Orleans will use the vast influence it possesses
in France In our favor. Within the last ave or
six years. "a Napoleon's rule has become more
and more despotic the Orleans party in France
has grown daily in power This TACT is well
established. and the fear aud jealousy OF Napo-
leon and bis adhcrents have become morbid
As an instance OF the truth oil this statement,