Indiana State sentinel. (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-08-03
From Washington.
TIE ABoLITroSIsrs ALREADY HowLING AFTER
GEN. MEADs's HEAD-THE ESCAPE OF LEE NOT
MEADE's FAuLT, But THE RESULT OF WASHING
Ton STRATEGY.
Special Correspondence of the Chicago Times.
SS

Special Correspondence of the Chicago Times.
WAsHISGToN, July lS.
A strong attempt is being made here to get rid
Of Gen Meade, and to dismiss him FROM his
command, on the pretext that he failed to ami
hilate or capture Gen. Lees army, and, instead
of that. permitted the escape of rhe whole body
of the Confederate forces. That is the pretext.
The real reason for the enmity against him is,
that it has been found that he is n man of the
Mcclellan stamp; indeed, that he is entirely too
much like Mcclellan, both n man and a
soldier. And, canddly, it was never the inten-
ton of the Administration to make his present
appointment permanent one. The removal of
Hooker was forced upon the Administration.
They want a man just like Hooker to succeed
Hooker, and. while looking for the man, they
gave the command temporarily to Gen. Meade
The subsequent conduct of that officer astounded
them much it has agreeably surprised the
whole country. So much military sagacity, such
accurate Judgment, such profound penetration,
such GOODNESS and decision in action-who could
have believed all these qualities TO exist in man
VINO had always occupied a subordinate position,
and who only Captain at the beginning of
the WARP The Administration became actually
alarmed. Gen Meade was in fair way to finish
up the war in the East AT the battle of Gettys
burg he positively defeated Lees veteran army
Here was springing up formidable candidate
Ii must te stopped, Spain itself could not
keep Gen. Meade out of Abraham's seat. But
the utmost caution requisite The people
had recognized Gen Meade's merit. They saw
too, that the danger from Gen Lee was not yet
over. They insisted that Gen Meade should be
promptly aud strongly reinforced, in order that
the annihilation OF Lees army might be put be-
yond all doubt. And "the Government" did not
dare to disregard the appeal.
Gen Meade. therefore. was reinforced. But
"the Government" so contrived matters that the
reinforcements which were most desired by Gen
Meade-that is to saw the veteran troops that
were down on the Peninsula-did not reach him
till it was a day too late Gen Lee would have
been a bungler, indeed, if he failed to compre
hend and to take advantage of this cupapble de
lay on the part of the Administration. Up to the
10Th inst. he still held his strong position the
west side of Antietam Creek On the llth he
fell back to a new line and even u stronger posi-
ton, stretching from Funkstown to Falling Wa
tiers, with his headquarters at Hagerstown, at
which place he issued his General Order No. l6.
On the 18th he formed line of battle in front of
Wilamsport, close to the Potomac, covering
with his three corps, the three roads leading re
spectively from the old Antietam battle field.
from Boonsboro, and from Hagerstown. This
line of battle he maintained during the whole of
Sunday, as Gen Meade found by actIal recon
noisSance During all these days Gen. Lee had
kept himself constantly informed of Gen Meade's
condition AS regards reinforcements. He knew
Gen. Meades actual strength, and he felt conf
dent that, AS long certain troops had not joined
the Army OF the Potomac, so long he could sue
cessfully withstand any attack that Meade might
make upon him. But, on Sunday, be ascertained
that those troops. so much desired by Gen.
Meade, had at length arrived, and it then the
part o. good Generalship TO put the river between
Gen Meade's 100 600 troops and bis own 10 900.
The dsproportion which had existed before, but
which Gen Lee trusted to the discipline Of his
troops to overcome, had nov become too great,
and Gen Lee Withdrew his army into Virginia on
Monday and Monday night; indeed, the crossing
was NOT quite concluded hv Tuesday morning,
for ii was on that morning, tue l4th inst. that
Gen Meade attacked his rear guard. took the
500 prisoners. and killed Gen Pettigrew.
During all these days that | have mentioned,
Gen. Meade had been closely following the Rebel
army On the 10Th, by extraordinary exer-
tions and long marches, he had got his whole
army across and west Of the South Mountain,
and had re reoccupied the Maryland flights at
Harper's Ferry. On the llth. be had series OF
sharp skirmishes with the enemy at Antietam
creek. On the 18th, he had forced the passage
Of that stream, and occupied Funkstown and
Hagerstown. On the 18th. he was ready to at
tack Gen. Lee at Williamsport and he would
have done il but for his orders from the War
Department. He had, even then. nearly, If not
quite 100000 men. including the Pennsylvania
militia. Lee, he believed, had not $4,000. But
il is said-and, believe it to be true-that on
Sunday he received positive orders from Stanton
and Haieck not to attack yet. for that more
troops were on the way to join him. and that, in
the meantime, it was utterly impossible for Lees
army to get across 1.-THE loyal Potomac" These
"more troops" were those recently under General
Dix. down on the Peninsula, which did subse
quently join Gen. Meade.
And now the country ought to ask ir tones o
thunder, why was il that these troops were mo-
ordered to join Gen. Meade when he was frs
appointed TO the commando Why were the,
kept idle on the Peninsula tor ten days, at a tim,
when so much depended on their presence
on the Potomsc2 Above all. why does tn,
President keep In Office two men who seem :,
have been fashioned by Providence for the ex
press purpose Of showing in what extremes imbe
cility and malignity can existf II there was an,
necessity for these troops being here at all, tina
necessity existed before the end of June, AM
Stanton and Hslleck knew IT,. II there Was q,
necessity for their presence, Gen. Meade ough
not to have been hampered BY orders TO avail
their arrival. .-a-t.,, fsll E,