Wood County reporter. [volume] (Grand Rapids [i.e. Wisconsin Rapids], Wis.) 1857-1923, 1863-04-23
The Defences of Charleston.

From tho Correspondent Of the N. Y. Times
Viewed stragetically, Charleston harbo
forms cul de sac, four miles in length
from its entrance at Fort Sumter up to tn
| city. This blind passage varies in Width
from one to three miles, and is capable O
| bearing defensive works on each side ant
on shoal places in mid channel.
On these natural advantages have beer
brought to bear the finest engineering skill
in the Confederacy (and it was the f1owe
OF the genius of the country during Pc
Rod of two years. Lee, Beauregard ant
Ripley in succession have exhausted thei
professional efforts to make it impregna
| bic. Everything that the most improved
modern artillery and unlimited resources
| of labor can do has been done to make tn,
passage of a fleet impossible. And it ii
impregnable. Sebastapol was as nothin.
to it.
Our fleet got but to the entrance of thu
harbor. 1t never got within it. Had tn.
iron-clads succeeded in passing the oh
structions, they would still have found
those miles Of batteries to run. They
would have entered into an Inferno which
like the portals of Dantes' hell, might
we'll bear the flaming legend, "Who en-.
tiers here leaves hope behind" Not 6
point at which they would not have found
themselves
"Aid upper, neither and surrounding fires"
They pass out of the focus of the fire O
Forts Sumter, Moultrie, Besuregard ani
Bee, and they find themselves arrested
under the ranges of Sumter, the Redan
Johnston and, Ripley. They get beyond
this, and concentric fire from Ripley
Pinckney, the Wappoo battery and the
guns of the city falls upon them! Merely
to run by batteries, as was done at the
forts below New Orleans, is not very
difficult thing, even for vessels not iron.
clad but to be anchored, as it were, under
such fires as these, is what no ships were
ever called on to suffer.
I think l am justified in saying that the
Admiral and his staff and the captains COM
manding the iron fleet have all along well
understood the task that was given them
to do, and that they entertained no illu,
sions regarding it. But both the Navy
Department and the public have-illusions
as to the nature of the work to be done
and delusion as to the instruments with
which it was to I've done. They saw all
the weakness of the Monitors as we'll as
the strength. They knew that their
working depended on nice mechanical
combinations easily deranged. They knew
that their powers had never been tested.
These intimations, however, will over
shoot the mark if they convey the impress.
sion that Admiral Dupont lacked faith in
the enterprise, or that he entered upon it
unwillingly. 1t was, in fact, no case for
either Q blind faith or an unreasoning
skepticism. Too little was known, as
we'll Of the real character of the rebel de-
fences as of the true merits of the IRON
clad vessels, to justify one attitude or the
other. 1t was absolutely necessary to try
certain experiments as the basis of any
definite plan of siege-for it was never
thought it would be less than ten days
affair. The operations eff yesterday, there
fore, may be regarded in the light of re-
connoissance. The reconnaissance result.
ed in a repulse, though not disaster.
That it was not so is due to the admirable
skill of our naval leaders. In the process
we have learnt valuable lessons. And now
it remains true to-day as ever that Char
lesion may still be successfully assailed.
But that will begin to be possible for US
when, casting off childish illusions as to
special arms, an adequate expedition shall
be sent, military as well as naval, and in
which the navy shall only be required to
play its legitimate part.