The Caledonian. [volume] (St. Johnsbury, Vt.) 1837-1867, 1863-07-10
THE CALIFORNIAN
Gen. Lees Programme.
HOW 1T Is TO BE DONE.

Louisiana officer, taken prisoner by
pIsa,anton's cavalry, makes the following
credible disclosure OF Lees plans for the
present campaign, which is confirmed by the
movements thus far
The aggressive position assumed by Gen
lee was resolved upon in cabinet council
at Richmond as far back as the middle OF
Nav. At that time it was unanimously de-
cided that the army should move from Fred
erjcksburg for the valley of the Shenandoah,
avoiding in its march any contact with Hook
er's right wing, then too strongly fortified to
be attacked with success. Rockers position
was such that had he been defeated on the
spot he then occupied, on the right bank Of
the Rappahannock, the proximity of the Po-
,omac river, where he might have been sup
ported by gunboats, and the vicinity of the
Notifications of Washington, where he mi gnt
have entrenched himself, would have render
ed victory useless to the confederate arms
1t was then resolved to attract him from the
neiehborhood of these two shelters, and to
make him accept a battle in some distant
region where the advantages OF the position
he then occupied could be OF no use to him.
Il was therefore decided that the confederate
army should be divided into three divisions,
marching within supporting distance OF each
other and operating all along the line of the
Potomac, from Winchester to Martinsburg,
and from Martnsburg to the opposite side
of Hagerstown. If by this movement Gen
Hooker was not drawn out from his position,
then Gen Lee was to give orders to one of
his lieutenants to cross the Potomac and to
make descent upon Maryland and Penn
sylvania. Before, however, moving IN that
direction, Gen Lee was to send several de-
tachments of cavalry across the river, to clear
the roads and to ascertain if the amount OF
provisions and means of transport to be
found in the country were adequate to the
requirements Of his army. All these opera
tons, as may be seen, have been dependent
one upon the other.
Had the means of transportation been
found deficient, or what is more probable,
had Gen Hooker changed his position, pursu-
ed the enemy, or done anything tending to
,hwart the designs of the rebel general, there
is good reason to believe that the rebels
would not have crossed the Potomac, and
that their depredations on this side of the
river would have been confined to few cav
ally raids. When after lapse of ten days,
Gen Lee gave the order to Ewel to cross the
Potomac in the vicinity of lagerstown, he a;
the same time gave orders to Gen Longstreet
to march from Winchester to Martlnsburs,
and send word to Hill, who is commanding
the rearguard, to move upon Winchester-
AS soon as Ewell had crossed the Potomac,
and should be fairly on his march in the
interior of the country, either in the direction
of Frederick, Maryland, or Harrisburg, Penn
sylvania, uhe true destination of the rebel
army being still mystery then Lonsstreet
and Hill were to follow in his track. The
plan of Gen Lee included two eventualltles;
either battle with Hooker Or an invasion of
the North. Victorious in the first case, his
object was to dictate terms of peace under
the walls of Washington; defeated, he would
have retreated upon Richmond. But Hook
err having refused to accept battle upon the
soil of Virginia, Lee, DESTROYS, perhaps, to
draw him by feiat of inactivity as far as
possible from his base of operations, was IN
consequence compelled to resort to his second
scheme, that of invading the North. 1t re-
mains to be seen whether the field of Mary
land or Pennsylvania will be as good tigh,-
ing ground as the one he is now leaving, and
if Hooker will not have better chance in
these new localities than at Frederick sbn,g
or Winchester.