The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-08-01

THE CONFEDERATE SITUATION.-The in
| tercepted letters from Jefferson Davis and
| the rebel Adjutant General Cooper to Gen.
| Lee, which we published last week, fur
nish a reliable and important exhibit of the
military situation of the COnfederates, and
of some of the reasons why Lee failed in
his campaign in the North. The principal
reason was the want of adequate force, and
| the letter of MIR. Davis shows why he could
not furnish the relnfOrcementS that Lee
| asked. Among the rest is mentioned Lee s
| intention to have Beauregard bring up the
| troops from the coast and every available
| man from Richmond, and assemble an
army at Culpepper, to threaten Washing
| ton, or to capture it as soon as it was un-
covered by Hooker. A strange feature in
this is that Dayis was unapprised of this
part of the plan. His reasons why it could
| not be done, are an interesting exhibition
| of beleaguered Contederacy. Beauregard
had been depleted to help Johnston, Bragg
was threatened and had fallen back and
, was calling on Buckner for aid. Charles
ton was threatened, Wilmington ditto, and
a large force was reported at White House
! advancing on Richmond. Everybody
| around the whole circuit of the Confeder-
acy was calling for help, therefore Lees
undertaking, the greatest operation of the
war, must take its chances with the rest.
It is some consolation for our distribution
of forces in numerous inconsequent lines
of operation, thereby disabling every great
and decisive moment, to see that the enc
my cooperate in this indecisive war by
similar divisions of their force. And if the
war has not yet brought forth any great
military genius on the part ofthe support
ers of the Government, we have the miti-
cation that afflictiOn derives from it's equal
enjoyment by others.
The invasion of the North was merely
marching by way left open, and with a
mountain range on the Eaststretching into
Pennsylvania, having through Virginia
and Maryland but few passes, and those
easily held, making Fertilization of the
debouching for the attack upon Philadel-
phia, Baltimore or Washington.
There was no obstruction in this route.
| 1t was an open gate into the North. Win
chester was simply stock of munitions of
war for the enemy, whenever they chose
| to take possession. The feasibility and Sc
| curity of the route are shown by the result.
Through it the rebels could debouch their
| whole force within striking distance of
three great cities, one of them the capital,
without encountering opposition. But
! there is one essential thing in the best laid
strategy, as well as in the largest opportu-
| mites ior striking decisive blows in mill
tary operations.that is, sufficient force for
| the decisive conflict. A sufficient force for
offensive strategy is generally held to be a
superior force. In fact, one great aim of
| strategy is to precipitate a superior column
against the divided forces of the enemy
At any rate the force must win when it
comes to the contest, or the greatest oppor-
tunities will be lost.
Lee had not this superior force, so the
fine opening and fortified line of opera
tons only sufficed to march up and then
march back again, carrying of his plum
| der, but leaving therefor a heavy payment
| in southern blood on the sacred soil Of
Pennsylvania. Had there been sufficient
sagacity and determination in the southern
| leaders to have seized this opportunity
| with all the force they could gather, leav-
ing some minor points which were really
in no danger, and some of the greater
points which were then beyond relief, to
| their fate, one military movement III, ght
have been accomplished in this war, ade-
qnate to the immense forces in the field,
although the possibilities are not for us
pleasing contemplation.
| But there was not the military genius
in the Contederates to seize the occasion.
In the West they were pressed at three
great points, and unable to maintain
themselves at either, or to concentrate upon
any. And in the East, instead of taking
advantage Of the division of our army by
the strong forces Davis reports on the
Peninsula and at other isolated places,
where they did not seriously threaten
anything, and precipitating every availa-
BILE man upon the reduced Army of the
Potomac, Davis was distracted by these
demonstrations, and Lees great opportu-
nifty was lost for the want of the adequate
force which he might have had by the
risk or possible sacrifice of some places in
the South, any OF which would have been
1 IF nrnnnt o0yn narad with uyh 1,o