The Buchanan County guardian. (Independence, Buchanan County, Iowa) 1858-1864, 1863-03-10

all war, but of the very nature oil the
country in which the army was 10 oper
ate, and Of the resources of the enemy
TO be convinced that had its mode ofcar
ryiug on hostilities which was the pop
ular one) been adopted, in six months
not an English soldier would have re-
manned in the Peninsula except as prls
oner of war. The history of this cam.
paign contains important lessons for us
it shows conclusively that the immediate
results of war are never equal to the pub
lie expectation, and that if this public
expectation, defeated by the imbecility
of the Government, or soured by disas-
ter in the field, is to be the sole rule by
which military operations are to be judg-
ed, no war for the defense of a principl
can long be carried on. II y
Fortunately for the fame and the pow
er of England, the Ministry, although
ignorant Of the true mode OF prosecuting
hostlities, had sense enough to perceive
that their only true policy was persever-
anoe. y The army was placed
upon better footing, was largely re.en-
forced, and Sir Arthur Wellesley was ap
pointed to the chief command. The
Government. not yet wholly awakened
from its illusions, still thought it practi-
cable t. reach Madrid in single cam
paign, and to that end the efforts Of Wei
lington were directed. 1t became nee
essary first to dislodge Soult at Oporto,
and the magnificent victory of the Eng
lish, gained by the passage OF the Douro
at that point, went far to revive conf
dence at home in the inyincibiIity OF
their army. Yet SO clear is it that vic
tory in war often depends upon what for
some better name, we may call mere
good fortune, that we have the authority
of tie Duke of Wellington himself for
saying, that this army, which had just
exhibited such prodigies of yalor, was
then in such stale of decentralization
that, although excellent on parade, ex-
cellent TO fight, it was worse than an en-
envy in country, and liable 10 dissolu-
lion alike by success or defeat" Ger
tainly no severer criticism las ever been
justified by the inexperience and want OF
discipline of our own raw leyies than
that contained in this memorable declar
alton. A litle reflection and candor
might teach US, as it did the English,
that nothing can compensate for the want
OF experience, and that every allowance
is to be made for disasters where il is
necessary to educate both officers and
soldiers in the actual presence of the en-
emy. Wellington soon afterwards NOV
ed toward the Spanish frontier, hoping
by junction with the army under Cues
IA to fight battle with the French.
which would open to him the road to the
capital. The battle was fought at Tala
vera, and although II has since been
claimed by the English as one of their
proudest victories, and the name Of TAI
AyERA is now inscribed upon the stand
ards of the regiments who took part in
il, with those Of Salamanca aad Yittoria,
yet the result was in tie end, that Wei
ington was obliged 10 retreat to Lisbon
Just three months after lie had set out
from that place, having left his wounded
in The hands Of the French, having esca-
ped as if BY miracle rom being Who'll
" cut off in his retreat. and having lost
one.third Of his army in battle and by
disease. X
When the news of the untoward result
Of this campaign reached England, the
elamor against the Government and
against Wellington was quite as violent
as that excited by the disasters of Sir
John Moore's army. The opposition in
Parliament took advantage OF this feeling
10 rouse public opinion to such a mani.
lestation as might compel the termina
ton OF the war in the Peninsula, and
drive the Ministry from office. The
Common Council Of London, probably u
fair exponent Of the opinions Of the mid
die class, pelitioned the King not TO con
firm the grant of ea,O00 year which
the Ministry had succeeded in getting
Parliament TO vote to Wellington. The
petitioners ridiculed the idea that bat
tie attended with such results should be
called victory. 1T should rather be
called eaiamity," they said. "since we
were obliged 10 seek safety IN precipi.
tate flight, abandoning many thousands
Of our wounded countrymen into the
hands of the French" In the opinion
of the strategists in the Common Coun
Gil and of their friends in Parliament
Wellington might be brave officer, bu
he was no general; he had neglected th,
protection Of his flanks and his line o
communication When ID is remember
ed that at this very time. Wellington
4 proflting by the experience Of the past
was diligently making his army really
effective within the lines of Torres We
dras from which stronghold il was il
due time 10 sally forth like giant re
freshed. never to rest until il had plant
ed the English flag on the nights Of Tou.
louse. we may perhaps smile al the pre-
sumption of those who, sincere we'll wish
ers 10 the cause. displayed only their i
norance in their criticism Bu, wha
shall be said of those wfo. knowing bet
ter, being quite able 10 understand tts
wisdom Of The policy adopted BY the Gen
eral TO insure success in the slupendou.
enterprise in which the country was en-
gagged, yet with factious spirit. an,
with the sole object Of getting into pow
Or themselves fnal, al yantar.a ar tIa av