Memphis daily appeal. [volume] (Memphis, Tenn.) 1847-1886, 1863-09-29


From the London Times, Sept Al
Mr.. Stewards diplomatic circular, which we
published yesterday, consists Of a proposition,
an argument and an application. His PROPOSE
ton Is that the statesmeR Of Englana aud France
hRving conceived at the beginDg Of ths Ameri-
can war a belief that the restoration Of The
Union was an impossibiity, persist in that be
lief to the present hour. His Argument resolves
itself into a long narrative Of the campaigns Of
the last twelve months, and this historical con-
pendulum is then applied 70 the purpose Of cor
recting the prevailing belief aRd impressing the
two Western Powers with the convictions more
to the Federal cause. In its object
this State paper is certainly Ineligible. Mr.
Seward is perfectly accurate in his presumption
that The statesman OF France and E~lglEnd-he
might have included, indeed, those Of the
rest Of Earopo-do consider 10 this very day
that the old American Bnion can never be
reconstructed It is natural, too, that he SHOULD
be DESTROYS Of removing this conviction, but the
Argument which he employs for this purpose is
both ineffective and nsodless-nesdless, because
We sll knew before hand every particle Of ms
story. and inefectiVe because, even If we accept
il exactly as it Is presented 20 as, it leaves cur
conclusions just what thsy were.
The truth is, the course Of the American war
has taken us by surprise. When we FIRST ar
lived ct the conclusion thet the South could
never be eoeTced into reunion at the point OF tie
sword, we still anticipated prompt military sac
cess on the part Of the North. The only reserve
affecting our Judgment was a doubt about the
.sarnestaess and unanimity of the South, ia
claiming Independence, That condition being
satisfied, we considered that though twenty
millions Of men were certainly stronger than
nine millions, they were not 50 much stronger
as to have any chance of subjugaHng these
nine miliins, dispersed as thew were over an al
most iLlimitsbls territory. We hardly doubted
the immediate superiority Of the North in the
field. The general expectation OF Englishmen
was that the South would soon be 0verruni that
its seaports would be captured and occupiEd,
aud that strong Federal g~aTrisons would hold its
chief towns. In short, We anticipated that the
first ak months, or 1t any rate the first year OF
tha war, would settle the prostFstion Of TIE Con
fe1erat 8 thus far c mpleted; but il was then we
thopgbt that the hJpeleBsness ofthe work would
begin to be felt.
Ii az that time we could have fsEesesn that the
Successes of the Moth after more than two yeas
Of desperate fighting, would amount only to the
/ achievements now recOunted WithHo much com
/ plseancy BY Mr.. Seward, we should have
| thought the task Of the Washington Govern
ment more impracticable than ever. We ven
surs 10 add that Mr.. Seward himself would have
been very much Of the same opinion. We think
it NAV be said with some truth, that if the Fed
sral Government had, at the beginning OF the
year 1851, f0Tessen that in the middle OF tho
year 1863 the secsding States would still be free;
Richmond and Charleston still sale, aud Wash
liugton in some little danger, the war would
never have been undertaken At al. That Mr..
Seward. at this period Of the strife, should be
reduced TO sing a pean over the deliverance OF
the North, from the invasion OF e Southern army,
is about the strongest possible proof OF the hope
~lsssness of the cause.
The Federals thought to sweep the Southern
States with their irresistible forces. At FIRST they
actually Unsigned that three months and 10000
men would suffice for the work. A single battle
taught them the extent Of this m~.scalculstion;
and though they still limited the time to "ninety
davs.H they expanded the armament to ZOO,
900 soldiers. The 100000 did no more than
he 70,000-in fact, they were defeated IN the
East, and evenly matched in tbs West. All that
can be said at this moment Of Northern eIults-
Ition is, that the Federsls have taken two places
on the Mississippi after sieges three tunes as
tedious and as costly as they were expected to
be, and that they have not had their own CAPT
tai occupied by the enemy, So seemed highly
probably two months ago. Mr.. Seward, while
| coloring his history as faV0rably as he can, is
compelled to talk Of drawn battles as events
eTeditsble to the Federal sFms; aud the very pa
ser which is designed to show the upquestiOna-
be sscendancy Of the North, speaks or the me
cessity of covering the national capital" and
the absoluts equality Oithe bsl6geCent forces in
It's immediate vicinity.
There might be some purpose in Mr.. S9waTd's
present exposition if either we in this country
r.the Americans in the Federal States had be-
gun by regarding the bslligsrents as equally
matched, and the war as likely to be protTactsd
on even terms for a long series Of years. This,
however, was not the case, sad we are therefore
not much impressed with &e moderate balance
Of success which Mr.. Seward elsims for his own
side. In point of fact, taking one field with an
other, the South has had q greater share Of vie.
tory than the North; its emily conspicuous fail
are, indeed, was to bring the war to & close by
the capture Of the Northern capital. Even now
Gen. Lee is, by all accounts, more likely 10 re-
sumo the offensive than Gen. Meade; and though
we do not hear thst the Federals are preparing
Immediately to invade the territories Of the Con.
fsderases, we do hear thEt the ConfedsTstes
may be expected 81 any moment in the country
Of the Federals. This is not much Of q case
for a owe pretending so distinctly to superior
ity as to complain tia. the character Of a belhg.
ersnt is accorded to its rival. On that point,
indeed, let any oUe read Mr.. Stewards own de-
scriptiors in this very document, of the
strength, 4he number and the bearing OF the
Confederate armies, and then say if the S0utb
be not entitled to the designation of & beLligs
rent. Why, in recording The battle Of Ante
tam, the Fedsrsl Secretary is actuslly compelled
Ito e~xpatiate on the identical qualities Of the con-
tending forces, and to add that the Northern
soldiers were then proved, for the first time, tC
be not inferior in heroism aRd valor.
Practically, then, the very gist and essence Of
Mr.. Stewards argument is fatal to its object. Il
all is true that he tells as, that sl is inf nitely
short Of what we were prepared to take fol
granted two years ago, without being any The
more ssnguine of Northern success. We thought
he North would oVeTTun the South in z briei
campaign, but would then find the difficulties
begun. Mr.. Seward tells rs that after two yecrs
OF mortal struggle the North has not OTsrrBu
= quarter Of tbs South-hsYing the real diff.
cHlty still in prospect as before. We only con-
elude from this that the Federals have not even
that superiority for which we gave them credit
and that the relative strength Of the Confed-
crates is by SO much the greater. If Dir. Seward
really wishes to make converts Of French and
English statesmen, he must adopt g very differ
ent f0Tn Of argument He must show us either
tasi the South is evincing a resdiBess to yield,
or that the North has q policy which will admit
of the restoration Of the Union without this
submission. But he shows neither Of these
things. On the contrary, be tells as thst the
Southern President has just proclaimed a levy
On masSs, while Of his 1--WE Government be says
nothing, except thas It IS preparing to prosecute
the war as before. But what is to be the end I
Europe thinks that the reconstruction of the
Unien by force of srms is an impossibiity, and
a very great number Of Americans are OF she
same opinion. Europe also sees distinctly tLst
The South gives not the slightest sign OF con-
~cession, while even the fortunes Of the
war are not, upon the whole, very u~nevenly
balanced. Not, therefore, without reason do We
persist in our original opinions on the suhjsc
but though Mr.. Seward has thus lost his pains
we can console him with the assurance that, SO
Tar IS we are concerned they were needlessly
expended. If bis object was merely to deter us
rom intervention, il IS safe in spite Of the failure
Of this Argument. Ia the domestic eontroVeT.
sizes" which have cost upward of 100000 lives
and ct least Eve hundred millions of money in
tEO years, we have net the lesst design OF inter
feTing. Zee adjustment Of these little mat
tsrs we are ready to leave TO Americans them.