Evening star., 1863-04-03
OFFICIAL REPORT BY GEN. McCLEL.
Ian OF TIE BATTLES OF SOUTH
MOUNTAIN AND ANTlErAM.

Il
MOUNTAIN AND ANTIErAM.
! The official report of Major General McCiel-
Ian, under date of Oct. 10, 1862 gives a history
| OF the movement of the army of the Potomac
from the time it evacuated Harrison's Land
| ing until after the rebel army was driven from
Maryland. OF the affair OF the Pope campaign,
| in connection with the army of Potomac he
| says
Il reached Aqua creek with my staff on the
! 2iih OF August, reported my arrival, and asked
| for orders. On the 27rh of August [ received
| from the General. in chief permission TO pro-
| ceed TO Alexandria, where / at once fixed my
| headquarters. The troops composing the army
| OF the Potomac We're mean lille ordered for
| ward 10 reinforce the arm under Gen. Pope
| so completely was this order carried ont. that
| on the 81 tn OF Agust had remaining under my
! command only camp guard ofabout one hun
| nrPd men. Everything else had been sent to
! reinforce General Pope. In addition, | ex-
haus TED all the means al my disposal 10 for
| wa-d supplies 10 that officer, my own head
| quarter team even being used for that purpose.
! Upon the unfortunate Issue of that campaign,
! lrect ived an lniima'ion from the General in
| CHIEF that my services were desired for the
| purpose Of arranging for the defense of the
| capital. They Were at once cheerfully given,
| although, while awaiting definite instru vtions
| AT Ali XanGr.a, i had Pndeayore as lust seen,
| to promote 4 favorable result in the operations
then pending, and had thus contributed, though
InGIrtctly, yet rs tar As | could to the defense
| o. Washing ton. On the I'd OF September the
| fCrmal order OF the War Department placed me
| in command of The fnrtifications Of Washing
ton .'and OF all the troops for the defense OF he
! capital On the lst of September had bean
| instructed fhat had nothing to do with the
| troops engaged in active operations under Gen.
Pop, but that my command was limited to the
| Immediate garrison OF Washington. On the
1 neXt day, however, l was verbally instructed
ty the President and the General in thief to
assume command Of Gen. Pope's troops I'M
| cluoing my own army OF the Potomac) as soon
! as they apprOdc he'd the vicinity of Washington.
| 10 &c out and meet them. ana 10 post them as |
/ deemed best to repnlse the enemy and insure the
safety Of the city.
| Al tins time The task imposed upon me was
limited TO the dispositions necessary To resist
! direct attack of the enemy upon the capital.
| such. deed. was the danger naturally indi-
| CtSed by the defeat of our forces in front The
! various earrisons were AT once strengthened
and put in order, and the troops were disposed
| to cover all The approaches to the city. and so
a. to be readily thrown upon thrpa ened points
| New defenses We're thrown up where deemed
necessary. A few days only had ella psei be-
/ fore comparative security was felt with regard
TO our ability 10 resist any attack upon the city
The disappearance of the enemy from the front
OF ashlngton AMI their passage into MARYLAND
enlarged the sphere OF operations, and made
an acliYe campaign necessary 10 cover Balti-
more. prevent the invasion of PennsyIyania
and DIVE them out of Maryland Being
honorr with The charge OF thls campaign. i
entered al once upon the additional duties i'm
posed upon me with cheeTtulne-s and trust
yet not without feeling the weight of the re-
slonSibilties thus assumed, and being deeply
impres sed with the magnitude Of the issues in
yolysd.'
Concerning the surrender of Harper Ferry
he states:
ION the morning Of the 18th l received
verbal message from Colonel Miles, command
ing at Harpers Ferry, informing M III 1t on the
preceding afternoon tie Maryland Heights
had been abandoned, after rrpeIing an attack
by tie rebels, and, tlat the whole force was
concentrated at Iarp,T's Ferry, he MARYLAND
Ioudoun. and Bolivar Heights being all in
posses slcE of the enemy. The mes s=enger stated
thao there was no apparent reason for the
ibaHnohm' Iii OF The MARY idad itlgiItS, and
Thar though Colonel Miles a ked for :lssistluc,
he said h" could hold out certainly two days
onecied hiln 10 MAKE his way back if posi-
bic. Win the Information that IA pidiv an
prUaC hing. and would undur3t,trdIy relieve the
place. BY tire other c)urierS sent the same
III ssaEe, Win tlt order 10 hold out to the IISt
co not learn tEat aay Of these messengers
succeeCtG iii reaching Harptr's Ferry |
should here sta,e that the i2Lt | was directed
~ assume CONN and Of tn. StTiison At Htrpers
Ferry, bui this order aehcd me after all COM
lnuh!ca ION with ta| garrison was cut OFT
Bs iCie lett " NaShin Stnn. ANA while lt WIS VT
time, recommended 10 The proper authorities
that tie garrison Of Harpprs Ferry should be
NlthdraWn. VII; La eIStt.- 10 aii il covering
the CLmiel land valley, or that taking m The
lohtoon bridge and obstructiag the railroad
brIt 2e 1t should tall back - the MARYLAND
Heights, and there hold il uN.l 10 the last IN
lhls position it coald have maintained itself
fol V eeEs. Ii was not deemed proper TO adopt
either ct these suggestions, and when the sub
jcct was lett 10 my discretion it was to- late 10
DO any tfIng except TO try 70 relieve the garri-
son.
II directed artillery TO be frequently fired
by our advanced guards rs signal to the gar
IiSGn that re let was al hand This was done
and learn that our firing was distinctly heard
at Harper's Ferry, and that they Were TINS
made aware that we Were approaching apid-
ly. 1t Was confidently expected that this place
could hold ont until we had carried the mouu-
tais, and Were in a position to make a detach-
ment fer its relief
The report goes with the particulars of
the battles of South Mountain and Antietam.
being those W ith which the public is already
familiar until We come to Gen McClelIan's
explanation of the reasons why the battle of
Ante tam was not renewed on the 18th. He
says:
with the day closed this memorable battle
In which perhaps nearly two hundred thou
and men Were for fourteen hours engaged In
combat. We had attacked the enemy in po-
sltlon, driven them from their line on one
flank, and secured a footing within it on the
other. Under the depression of previous re-
verses we had achieved a victory over an ad-
Nersary invested with the prestige of former
success, and inflated with recent triumph
Our forces slept that night conquerors, on a
field won by their valor, and covered with the
dead and wounded OF the enemy
The night, however, presented serious ques-
ticns; morning brought with it grave RESPONSE
billtlts. To renew the attack again on the 18th,
defer it, with the chance of the enemy's
retirement after a day OF suspense, were the |
questions before ne. A careful and anxious |
survey Of the condition of my command, and |
my knowledge of the enemy's force and posi- |
tion. tailed to impress me with any reasonable |
certainty of success if I renewed the attack |
without reinforcing columns. A view of the |
shattered state of some of the corps suficed to !
deter me from pressing them into immediate |
action, and felt that my duty to the army and |
the country forbade the risks involved in q |
hasty movement, which might result in the |
loss of what mad been gained the previous day.
1mpelled by this consideration, / awaited the |
arrival OF my reintorcements, taking advantage /
OF the occasion to collect together the dispersed
give rest to the fatigued, and remove the |
wounded. OF the reintorcements, COUGHS di. |
vision, although marching with commendable |
rapidity, was not in position until a late hour
III the morning; and Humphreys division of |
new troops, fatigued with forced marches,
were arriving throughout the day, but Were
not ayaiiable until near its close. Large REIN
forcements from Pennsylvania, which were
expected during the day, did not arrive at ALL
During the 18th orders were given for re.
newal of the attack at daylight on the 10TH
Cn the night OF the 18th the enemy, after hav-
ing be passing troops in the latter part of the
day trom the Virginia shore to their position
hnh arr hn