The Alleghanian. [volume] (Ebensburg, Pa.) 1859-1865, 1863-02-05
Review of Gen. Es1rnsEIe's
mpasSn---The Late Hove
lasent and the Causes of Fail
ure.
WASHINGTON, January "a, 1863.


I had occasion last week to visit tht
Army of the Potomac; and as / found i
on the eve OF movement against The
rebel forces in its front, L remained Il
watch its progress and results. You vii
have received from our regular correspon
dents full reports of both before this car
reach you. Conserving the causes of th(
failure Of this movement, they may no
have said as much as the good Of the ser
vice and the welfare Of the country re
quire. [ write this letter mainly to sup
ply that defect.
The sudden change in the r1cather on
the night of Tuesday, the 18th, was the
| immediate cause Of the failure. The
movement was intended to be surprise
| The whole army was put in motion during
the day on Tuesday, and each portion OF
it was to have been by midnight, in the
position designated by the commanding
general, for the commencement Of opera
,tions at 6 o'clock below, and y o'clock
above Fredericksburg, on Wednesday
morning. at O'Clock on Tuesday even
ing it began to rain, and throughout the
night the rain continued, with tempest
OF wind. Owing to other causes, of which
[ shall speak hereafter, those portions of
the army designated to lead the movement
had not moved with the vigor and energy
which the nature Of the service required.
They were arrested, therefore, some miles
short of their appointed positions by the
condition of the roads, suddenly softened
by the heavy rain, and through which, by
morning, it had become impossible to
move either pontoons or artillery with the
celerity demanded. The enemy meantime
discovered the movement, and instantly
rallied to meet it. The moment for the
surprise had passed, and therefore the
movement was abandoned.
This is the sarf;,ce view Of the matter.
As things stood, the weather afforded suf-
icicnt excuse for abandoning the enterprise
indeed, made it necessary TO DO 50. But
if everything else had been right, this OBJ
stacle would have been overcome, or
rather, would not have arisen in time to
offer any difficulty. But the Army OF the
Potomac is like the soil of Virginia; the
upper crust is hard, but thin; little rain
soaks it, and underneath lies treacherous
quicksaud. Break through the crust, and
you sink instantly to a depth which makes
movement impossible. i good deal has
been said of the Generalization of the
army. The word is too strong. Ii does
not apply to the mass of the army at all.
But 1t does apply to a good many of the
officers. They are demoralized, in every
sense of the word, aud they are source
of dlscouragement-ot discoateut--of dis
heartenment (d' there is such a worsi1 to
their subordinates and to the ranks | do
not hesitate to say that the failure Of this
latest movement WAS due, primarily and
mainly TO the insuJort}iaafion--the word is
not too strong-of some of the generals
in command under Burnside | ask no
better evidence of this than the language
openly held by them, In presence of their
subordinatcs, OF newspaper reporters, and
of all who chose to listen, before the
while it Was In progress, and |
after It had been abandoned Unless
common report, which receives the coun-
tenance, if not the distinct confirmation. |
Of the officers most concerned, is entirely
as fault, the commanding general was /
overwhelmed with protests from his sub /,
ordinates against his movements, ofier |
they had been decided upon, and with |
exaggerated and untrue reports Of the 0b- !
Stacies in his way. So far as | know, no !
nne of them went so far as to refuse obedi- /
eucc to his oroers bat everything short !
IF that which officers could do to enbarrass /
and thwart his plans was done, and done,
toe, as on some previous occasions, with /
effect and success. As every one knows,
here is a kind Of obedience worse In it, /
results than fiat refusal, for it leaves the /
officer without remely- I
While it answers in torm all the require /
nents Of the service, it insures, By its t
hating, hall hearted, and possibly prcnled-
tated inefiiciency, the Jseitare OF the plan
winch 1t pretends to second
One general, for example, was expected !
o have pontoons enough for four bridges
Al In all, | 5eleve--at the appointed
pot by daylight on Wednesday morning.
he had but eight or nine miles to 20. and
here was no reason why he should not
lave had them there before the rain lie /
pcnt q good deal OF his time on Tuesday
n demonstrating Shat the chances Of fail
ire were 10 cut OF 20 on Wednesday
morning he had fifteen pontoons placed in
pen uieao IF tie enemy. and the rest were
tuck in the mud from two to five miles
'ack. He certainly had done nothing to
disturb his own calculation of chances, and