The Jeffersonian Democrat. [volume] (Chardon, Ohio) 1854-1865, 1863-01-23
The Prssident and Cen. MoClellan.


and the Uuioa, Benz, +. Wade.
The President and Gen. Mcclellan.
The Mcdowell Court OF Inquiry has
brought TO light two very important let
tiers from President Lincoln to Gen. Nc
Clellan, which should be read by all who
desire to know who is responsible for the
failure OF the Army OF the Potomac TO
meet the demands oi the country, and for
the thousands Of lives and millions Of
treasure squandered in its unavailng Pen.
insula campaign. The FIRST letter is as
follows fr.a.
ExEcuTTvE MANSION, WAsuISGToN,
February g. 1862.
TO Major General Mcclellan:
MY DEAR SIR:--You and havo distinct
md different plans tor q movement of tho
Army of tho Potomac. YOu,s-to 90 down
the Chesapeake. up TO Urbaua, and aeross
land TO tho terminus # the Railroad on York
River. Mine--to move directly TO point
on tho Railroad, southwest of Manassas Ii
You will give mo satisfactory answer to tho
following questions, l shall gladly yield my
plan to yours; -.
lst. Does not your plan involve larger
expenditure of timo and money than miner
I'd. Wherein is victory more certain by
your plan than miuo?
Sd. Wherein is victory moro valuable
by your plan than minor - -t..t
4ih. In fact, would IL not DO less valuable
IN tins, that it would break no great line oi
the onemys communication, while mine
wouldi
9th. In case Of disaster, would not a safe
rotroat be more difficult by your plan than
minor Yours truly, A. LINCOLN
The questions addressed by the Presi-
dent to Gen. Mcclellan, in this letter, arc
the same that the people have repeatedly
asked, mentally. at lenst. and we imagine
it would be difficult to give satisfactory
answer to them. There is no evidence
that Gen. Mcclellan ever attempted the
task. The second letter reads thus:
WAsHIH1Tos, April Q, 1862
To MAJOR GENERAL MCCLELLAN;
My DEAR SIR:-Your dispatches. com
plaiuing that you are not properly sustained
whilo thev do not offend me, pain mo worry
much BoEker's division was Withdrawn
before you loft here. aud you know tho
pressure under which did it, aud, rs |
thought, acquiesood in it, certainly not with
out reluctance. After YOU loft, ! nscer-
tanned that less than 20000 unorganizod mon,
without a fold battery. were all you Designed
should be left for tho defence of Washing
ton aud Manassas junction, and part OF this
evcn, was to 90 TO General Hpokcr's old
position. General Ranks corps, once do
signed for Manassas Junction, was divided
and tied up on tho limo of Winchester and
Strasburp, and cou d not leave that position
without again exposing the Upper Potomac
and the Baltimore and Ohio nailroud.
This presented. or would present, when
Mcdowell and Sumner should DO gono, II
great temptation for tho cnomy to turn
back from the Rappahanock and sack Wash
ington. My explicit directions that WASH
ington, sustaiosd be tho Judgment OF all the
commanders of corps, should beioft secure,
had boon entirely neglected.. 1t was pro
cisely this shat drove mo to dotain Mellow
oil. lido not forgot that was satisfied with
your arrangement to leave Banks at Ma
nassas junction. But, whom that arrange
ment was broken up, and nothing was sub,
stituted for II. OF course was not satisfied.
I was constrained to substitute something
III
YOU, do you think could permit tho limo
from Richmond via Manassas Junction to
this city to be entirely open, except whaI
resistance could DO presented by less thar
10000 unarganized troops This is qucs
tion which the country will not allow me
TO evade.
There 10 mystery about tho number o
troops now with you. | photographed you
on tho 9th, saying that you had over lO0,00t
with you. had just obtainad from the
Secretary of War statomont, taken, as he
said, from your own returns, making los 00t
thon with you and en- route to you You
now say you will havo but $4,000 when all
.en route to you shall havo reached you
How can this discrepancy Of 1000 be nc
counted for As to Gen, Wool's command
understand that it is doing precisely what
like number Of your own would bayo "a
do il that command was away. suppose
tho whole force which has gnno forward TO
you Is with you by this ti,no; and If so,
think 1t Is the precise time for you to strike
blow.
-By delay. the enemy will readily gain on
You; that is he will gain fastcr by fortfca
tions and 70 enforceWents than you can b.
re-enforcomenfs alone, And once more 10
me tell you, it is Indispensable to mo tha
you elfiue UlOW. utn pOWcTlcbs 10 Hcil
This you viii! do mo tho justice to remember
always opposed to going down tho Bay i
search Of field, inslead of fighting at q
near Manassas. as only shifting and not su'
mounting difficulty; that wo would fin
tho Same enemy and tho same or equal !,
trenchments at either place. Tho countr
will not fail to noto--is noting now--thf
tho prosont hesitation to move upon au IL
trsuphed euomy is but tho story OF Manass;
repeated.
III beg loave to assure you that l has
mover written or spoken to you in create
Kindness of feoling than now, nor with
fuller purpose to sustain you 80 far as
my most anxious judgment l consistent
can. But you must act,
Yours, very truly, A. LINCOLN.
These letters need no comment. Ii
enough to say of them, that they full
yindicate the President. and render Il
position OF Gen. Mcclellan more uneny
able than ever. Who will now deem
disloyalty to criticize our "young Nap
leon 2" H
THE INDEPENDENT.
T.. ID q.