The daily Gate City. [volume] (Keokuk, Iowa) 1855-1916, 1863-01-20
Especial Dispatch to Chicago TriDsne.
W .shington, Jan. l6, 1868.

w @shington, Jan. 10, 1868.
The following important letter from
the President to Me Clsllan, which forms
part of the correspondence between them
and for which Congress has called, was
brought out to-day in the Mcdowell Court
of Inquiry.
It's importance is SO great that we
transmit itin full
THE PRESIDENT TO GEN. MCCLELLAN.
Washington. Jan. 9, 1862.
MAJ. Gen. Mcclellan.
My DEAR SIR. Your dispatches COM
planning that YOU are not properly sus-
tanned, while they do not offend, pain me
very much. Blenker division WAS with
drawn from you before you left here
You know the pressure under which did
it. and as ! thought ac9uiesced in it. Ger.
tainly not without reluctance,
After you left | ascertained that less
than 20, unorganizsd pen, without a
single field battery. we're all you designed
70 be left for the defense of Washington
and Manassas Junction. A part Of them
were to 60 to Hooker's old position.--
Banks corps which was designed for
Manassas Junction, was divided and tied
up on. the line of Winchester and Stras.
burg, and could not leave it without again
exposing the upper Potomac and the Bal
timore aud Ohio Railroad line.
This presented, or would present when
Mcdowell and Sumner should be gone,
great temptation for the enemy to turn
back from the Rappahannock and sack
Washington. My explicit direction that
Washington should. in the judgment of
all commanders of corps, BE- left entirely
secure. had been neglected.
1t is precisely this that caused me to
detain Mcdowell
l do not forget that was satisfied with
your arrangement to leave Banks at Ma.
nassas junction. but when that arrange
ment was broken up. and nothing even
substituted for il, OF course | was not sat
is6ed. / was constrained to retain some
thing for it myself, and now allow me to
ask, do you think / should permit the
line from Richmond via Manassas TO this
oity to be entirely open. except what re-
sistance would be presented by less than
10000 unorgauized troops2 This is a
question which the country will not allow
me to evade.
There is curious mystery connected
with the troops now with YOU, tele-
graphed you on the 9th. saying that you
had 100000 men with you. had Just
obtained from the Secretary of War
statement. taken as he said from your own
returns, making los, 900 then with you
and en- route to you Now you say you
will have but $1,000 when all co route to
you shall have reached you. How can
this discfcp ncy Of $1,000 be accounted
for? As t. Nooi's command, under
stand it is doing for you precisely what .
IKE number of your own would have to do
II the command was away.
l suppose the whole force which has
gone forward to you is with you by this
time, and if so, think it the precise time
for You to strike blow. By delay the
enemy will readily gain on you. That is,
he will gain faster by Notifications and
reinforcements than you can by reinforce
ments alone. And once more let me tell
you it is indispensable to you that you
strike 4 blow.
am poweriess to help you. You will
do me the justice to remember that al
ways wished you were not going down
the bay in search of a field instead Of fight
ing at or near Manassas, as only shifting
and not surmounting difficulty. That
we would find some enemy and some
equal entrenchments at either place.
The country will not fail to note, is
noting now, that the present hesitation to
move upon the entertainments of the enc.
my is but the story of Manassas repeated.
l beg to assure you / have never written
or spoken in greater kindness of feeling
than now, or with fulle- purpose to sus-
tain you, so far as in my most anxious
Judgment consistently can, but you
must act. Yours truly,
TrNCovr