Daily State sentinel. [volume] (Indianapolis, Ind.) 1861-1865, 1863-04-06


a. mere pats issues. bot Watching wi,h intense
interest the progress Of our domestic conflict and
its efIectsupon his own aud other patons. The
document is, well worthy of pernsal part of
the history Of the times:
wAss,xera~ Novemher II, 1862
Ny LORD: Ia his dkpatches Of the 18th and
Of the 2fth uitimo. and of the 18th instant Mr.
Stuart reported 20 your Lordshp the iesuts Of The
eeciion for members OF Congress aud Safe 0ih
cer- which have recently taken place in several
OF the most importaut States Of the Union With
out repeating the details. Il will be sufficient Tor
me To that the success Of the Democratic
or Ia il now styles it-eIf conservative party. has
been so great rs to manifest change in public
feeling. among the most rapid and the most com
pieie that has ever been witnessed, even in this
country.
On nv arrival at New York on the sth instant
| found .he conservative leaders exulting in the
browning success achieved by the party in that
State. They appeared to rejoice, above all. in
the conviciion that personal liberty and freedom
Of speech had been secured for the principal States
OF the Unions. They believed that The Govern
ment must at once de-ist from exercising in the
State oil New \ Ork the extraordinary aud (as they
regarded them illegal and unconstitutional pow
ers which II had assumed They were con 6dent
that ut all events after the lst OF January next
on which day the newly elected Governor would
come into Office the suspension of the writ Of
hsbeas corpus could not he practically maintain
ed. They seemed To be persu del that the result
of the elections would be accepted by the Presi
dent as declaration OF the will OF the people;
that he would increase the moderate and conserv-
alive element in MS Cabinet that he would seek
10 terminate the war; not ~ push IL 20 extremity
that he would endeavor To effect a reconciliation
with the people OF the South. and renounce the
idea OF subjugating or DISCRIMINATING them.
On the following morning. how ever. intelii
gence arrived from Washington which dashed the
rising hopes of the conservatives Ii was an
nounced thar General Mcclellan had been dis
missed from the command OF the Army OF the
- Potomac and ordered to repair To his home; that
he had. in fact. been removed altogether rom
active service. The General had been regarded
"a the representative OF conservative principle in
the army Support of him hid been made one of
the articles of the conservative electoral pro-
gramme His dismissal taken rs "A sign that
the President had thrown himself entirely into
the arms of the extreme radical party, and that
the attempt to carry out the policy of that party
would he persisted in. The irritation OF The con
servativeS in New York certainly very great:
il seemed, however. to be not IA mixed with con-
sternation and dependency.
Several of the leaders Of the Democratic party
sought interviews with me- both before and after
the arrival OF the intelligence OF General McClel
lans ismis-al. The subject uppermost in their
minds. whilst they were speaking to me.
naturally that of foreign mediation between the
North and the South. Many of them seemed t.
think that this mediation must come at last; but
they appeared very much afraid of it, coming too
soon IL was very evident they apprehended that
premature proposal of foreign intervention
would afford the radical party the means OF revi
wing the violent war spirit, and of thus defeating
the peaceful plans of the conservatives. They
appeared to regard the present moment as pecu-
liarly unfavorable for such an offer, and indeed
TO hold that it would be essential to the success
of any proposal from abroad, that il should be
deferred until the control of the executive govern
ment should be in the hands OF the conservative
party.
| gave no opinion on the subject | did not
say whether not myself thought foreign in
terventlon probable advisable; but listened
with attention To the accounts given me of the
plans aud hopes OF the conservative party At
the bottom. thought perceive desire to put
an end To the war, even at the risk of losing the
Southern States altogether; but it was plain that
it was not thought prudent to avow this desire
Indeed, some hints of il dropped before the cleo
ions. were so i'll received. that strong decara
ton tcthe contrary was deemed necessary by the
Democratic leaders.
AT the present moment. therefore, the chiefs of
the conservative party call loudly for a more
vigorous prosecution of the war, and reproach
the Government with slackness as well as with
want of success in it, military measures But
they repudiile all idea d! interfering with the IN
situations of the Southern people, or of waging a
war of extermination subjugation, They
mtntan that the OF ject of the military operations
should he To place the North in a position to de
h,and armistice with honor and with effect
The ar,nistice should (they holj) be followed b,
cons eutipn. IN which such changes of the Con
..1l.s..
South ample security the subject of its slave
property, and would enable the North and the
South 10 re-unIte and % live together in peace
and harmony. The conservatives profess to
think that the South might be induced to take
part in such convention. and that restoration
OF the Union would be the result The more sa
gacious members of the party must, however
look upon the proposal OF - convention merely as
last experiment to test the possibility of re
union. They are no doubt well aware that the
more prob able consequence of an armstice would
be the establishment OF Southern Independence:
but they perceive that ii the South Is so utterly
aiienated that possible concessions will induce
IT TO return voluntarily TO the Union. il is wiser
to agree 10 separation than prosecute cruel
and hopeless
1t i with reference 70. such an armstice as
they desire u attain that the leaders of the con.
servative party regard the question OF foreign
mediation. They think that the offer of media
ton. il made - radical administration, would
he rejected: tfat If made at unproplious no
meBt. il might increase the virulence with which
the i prosecuted 1t their own party were
in power. or virtually controlled the Admnistr.
ton. they would rather. IL possible obtain an
armistce without the aid of foreign governments
bar they would he disposed To accept offer OF
mediation il il appeared TO be the only means OF
putting a stop to hosulites They would desire
that the offer should from the great Pow
ers OF Europe conformity, and in particular that
rs little prominence possible should be given
To Great Britain.
At Washington | have had fewer opportunities
than | had IT New York OF ascertainins the pres
ent views OF the chiefs of the political parties
AT the interview which had with Mr. Seward
the day after my arrival. he showed no disps $
tiun To enter upon political matters He did not
appear t. expect To desire 10 receive from ne
any special communication from her Majesty :
Government The President, when waited up
on him. talked TO me only ordinary topics
for my part. gladly >huuuei all allu-ion To for
elsn Intervention. nv principal object ieine 10
avoid SAVING ANYTHING Which might embarraSs
me Ia carving Out any instructions on the sun
Get which my receive from YOUR loriship
All things considered. nv opinion Ger
taIniy Is that the present mo euI il not n iayorl
ble one for making an offer of mediation IL
might embaTass the peace party. and even obi e
them ln oroos % maintain their popularity. 20
make some public declarations against IT, and
tins ieht make il difficult tor them TO accept a
similar offer no a more prep'tions time Il would
in all probabilit, be rejected by the President.