The Burlington weekly hawk-eye. [volume] (Burlington [Iowa]) 1860-1876, 1863-04-11
BURLINGTON WEEKLY HAWK-EYE.

tirely ignorant of the force Of the enemy op.
posed to them, having only such information
as they we're allowed to obtain at headquar.
ters. The strength of the enemy WAS variously
estimated at from 10000 to 2l0,0 men,
Those who formed the highest estimate
based their opinoin upon the information re-
ceived at headquarters. As to the strength Of
the enemy's position, the general impression
seemed to be founded upon information OBJ
tanned from The same source, that it WAS ex-
ceedingly formidable. Subsequent events
have proved that the force Of the enemy was
below even the lowest Of these estimates, and
the strength Of their Notifications very greatly
overestimated. ss
DHrENsEs OF WASHINGTON.
Your Committee also sought to ascertain
what number of men could be spared from this
army for offensive operations elsewhere, as
Stunning that the works Of the enemy in front
were Of such character that it would not be
advisable to move directly upon them. The es-
innate Of the force necessary to be left in and
around Washington to act entirely on the de-
fensive, to render the capital secure against any
stack Of the enemy, as stated by the witnesses
examined upon that point. was from $4,000 to
$4,000 men, leaving 100000 or upward that
could be used for expeditions at other points.
Committee inquired in reference to what had
been done to render the Notifications here,
which had been constructed at such expense and
with so great labor, most effective for the de-
tense of Washington. Your Committee are con-
strained to say that adequate provision never
was made to properly man those Notifications
and exercise men in the management of the
guns. Several of the witnesses testified that
they had repeatedly called the attention of the
authorities to the matter, but without success.
And when the movement of the army commenced
in March, the few regiments that had been placed
in the forts and partially instructed in the use
of the guns, were almost entirely withdrawn,
leaving the Notifications to be manned by raw
and inexperienced troops. gs
THE BLOCKADE OF THE POTOMAC
The subject OF the obstruction of the naviga-
ton of the Potomac naturally demanded the
consideration of your Committee. Upon that
point your Committee would call the attention
of Congress to the testimony Of Captain G. Y.
Fox, Assistant Secretary of the Navy. Upon
reference to his testimony it will appear that, in
June, 1851, the Navy Department proposed to
the War Department that measures be adopted
to take possession Of Matthias Point, in order to
secure the navigation of the Potomac from any
danger of being interrupted. From some cause
no steps were then taken for that purpose. The
subject was again brought to the attention of
the War Department by the Navy Department
in the month of August shortly after the battle
of Bull Run. Nothing, however, was done at
that time in regard to it.
In October, 1851, the Navy Department again
urged the matter upon the consideration of the
was then in preparation and would soon be
ready to start. The Navy Department repre-
sented that it would be absolutely necessary to
send with that expedition, in order to insure its
success, the greater portion Of the Potomac TO-
tilla, because, being very powerful vessels, of
light draught, with their machinery protected,
they were better fitted for that service than any
other vessels in the possession Of the Navy De-
partment; and if anything was to be done by
them to secure the uninterrupted navigation of
the Potomac, it must be done before they left
1t was proposed to the President and the War
Department, that the gunboats should take and
destroy the Rebel batteries which had then begun
to make their appearance upon the river, and
which even then endangered the safety of YES
sells passing up and down the Potomac. When
that bad been done, it was proposed that sufi
Gent number of troops should be landed at
Matthias Point, &C., to intrench themselves, un.
der the protection of the gunboats, until they
boats of the Potomac fotilla, to hold their po-
sision against any force the enemy would be like
ly to bring against them. It was represented
that unless some such steps we're taken the de-
parture of those vessels upon the Port Royal ex
petition would be the signal for the closing of
the navigation of the Potomac, which represent
tation the result proved to be correct As was
well urged by the Navy Department, the whole
question amounted simply to this: Would the
armp Cooperate with the navy in securing the
navigation of the Potomac, or, by
Withholding that CO operation at that time, per-
NIT so important a channel of communication
to be closed.
WHY IT WAS NOT RAISED.
After repeated efforts, Gen. Mcclellan prom.
Used that 900 men should be ready at a time
named te proceed down the river The Navy
Department provided the necessary Transports.
ton for the troops, and Capt. Craven, com
mauding the Potomac Aotilla, upon being mott.
fed to that effect, collected at Matthias Point all
the boats of his fotilla at the time named
The troops did not arrive, and the Navy De-
partment was informed of the fact by Capt
Craven Assistant Secretary Fox, upon in
During Of Gen Mcclellan why the troops had
not been sent according to agreement. was
informed by him that his engineers we're of the
opinion that so large body of troops could not
be landed, and therefore be had concluded not
to send them. Capt. Fox replied that the land
ng of the troops was matter of which the
Navy Department had charge; that they had
provided the necessary means to accomplish the
landing successfully; that no inquiry had been
made of them in regard to the matter, and no
notification that the troops were not to be
sent p @ II
/ It was then agreed that the troops should be
sent the next night Capt. Craven was again
notified and again had bis fotilla in readiness
for the arrival of the troops But no troops
were sent down at that time, nor were any ever
sent down for that purpose.
Capt. Fox, in answer to the inquiry of the
Committee as to what reason was assigned for
not sending the troops according to the second
agreement. replied that the only reason, so far
as he could ascertain, was, that Gen. Mcclellan
feared it might bring on general engage
ment.
The President, who had united with the NAVY
Department in urging their proposition, first
upon Gen Scott and then upon Gen. Mcclellan,
manifested great disappointment when be learn
ed the plan had failed in consequence of the
troops not being sent. And Capt. Craven threw
up his command on the Potomac and applied
TO De sent to sea, saying that, by remaining here
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