The New York herald. [volume] (New York [N.Y.]) 1840-1920, 1863-05-12

SHEET. q "a
corps. which was . principal cause or the
loss of the battle Of Chancellorsville
and of the forced retreat OF Hooker across the
Rappahannook. They ought to be removed
Immediately, and their places given TO superior
men. But, while the brief campaign of nine
days brought to light inferior generals, It also
developed the capabilities of men Of higher
calibre; and Sedgwick, Sickles and stoneman
may be regarded as reserve generals, COM
petent to hold posts of high command in the
Army of the Potomac when opportunity opens
the way for them.
The Lesson or the Disaster ON tho Rap-
pahnnnock-The Blundsrs OF the Two
Campaigns.
The late catastrophe on the Rappahannock
Is full of instruction, II the authorities at Wash
ington could only profit by it and amend their
ways. The criticism on the battle by Mr. Emil
Schalk, in the letter which we published on
Sunday. is well deserving of attention. This
gentleman evidently understands his subject,
and has military mind of no common order.
He is the author of Campaigns of 1862 and
1868, illustrating the Principles of Strategy"
. book which ought to be in the hands OF all
our generals. His comments on the recent fight
on the Rappuhannock are we'll reasoned. He
classes it among other battles fought during
this war, in which thousands and thousands Of
quate result for the enormous loss Of life, and
which may be traced directly to the mistakes Of
the generals commanding. OF the rebel gene
raj he says-4 General Lee has certainly
gained for himself by this battle the name Of
one Of the ablest generals Of the present age;l
while of Hooker he remarks:-"The idea OF q
general who is on the offensive, whose avowed
object is the capture or destruction Of whole
army, making six miles in thirty-six hours, just
at the most critical moment of his operations,
and finally, after intrenohing. himself without be-
ing on the communications of his enemy, tells his
soldiers THAI the enemy has to run away or to at
tack him on his own ground, whore be will de-
stroy him, has not its parallel in modern times"
These observations are undoubtedly just;
but there is one point on which we do not
agree with Mr.. Schalk. It Is bis depreciation
of the movement of Stoneman. II Hooker had
not enough of troops without this large cavalry
force, there might be some force in the objec-
ton; but when We are told by Mr.. Stanton that
only one-third of his men were brought into
action, the case Is entirely altered 1t is true,
perhaps, that all Stoncunan's cavalry were not
needed TO cut Lees Communications and CO.
operate with the Union troops In North Caro-
lima and those under General Dix in capturing
singularly successful; and had our infantry
force in the vicinity of James river been
equally enterprising, or had Hooker done his
duty on the Rappahannock, Richmond. Frede-
ricksbnrg and the whole Of Lees army would
have been captured together. The plan, % we
understand it, was TO hold Lee In check BY
means Of Hooker's army, il II was not possible
to defeat him In . pitched battle, while Stone
man and the forces in Southern Virginia and
North Carolina combined their operations
against the rebel capital. The plan was good,
and only failed in the execution from the ineifi-
cieucy Of the generals. Sedgwick, too, did bis
duty and behaved nobly; but he was not sup
ported BY Hooker. and his corps was conse-
quently victimized.
1t is worthy Of remark that Lee did not at.
tack Hooker on Monday or Tuesday. whyf
Because JEFF. Davis sent the rebel general Q
message that his communications were cut off,
and also made demand upon him for troops to
save Richmond. Lee was only too glad, there
fore, to let Hooker cross the river as soon as
possible, lest he should 6nd out what had been
done. Hooker might have known that Lee had
some peculiar motive for his apparently strange
course, and he ought to have held his ground,
and, If Lee attempted to retreat, hung upon his
rear. Thus was the campaign lost, and with it
hecatombs Of human beings sacrificed in vain.
In the campaign Of the last year time was
wasted and prestige lost because those who d.
rooted 1t did not understand the principles of
the art Of war; We had hoped that the inaugu-
ration Of the coming campaign would mark the
dawn of q new era, and that the military opera
tions of the generals of the Union would be
conducted thenceforth in conformity with those
maxims and rules which cannot be violated
with impunity. Had true military ideas pre-
vailed there would be no necessity for an at
tack on vicksburg, Port Hudson, Charleston or
Richmond. With the success of our main armies
In the field, these places would have fallen
without blow. Without the destruction of
the principal armies of the enemy in decisive
battles the capture Of Richmond, Charleston,
Mobile, vicksburg, and other cities similarly
situated, would avail little towards the over
throw Of the rebellion or towards bringing the
A. n
and incapacity have blundered at every step
since the struggle began.
In the war Of the Revolution great ability wss
displayed in the field as well as in politics By
the same men. The &c nerals were all states
men and men Of character and mark. Hence
their success. The same causa onerated Ia Tho