New-York daily tribune. [volume] (New-York [N.Y.]) 1842-1866, 1863-05-28


so much time has sinco elnpsod that it can dc
no harm 10 rcafIirm that q movement na,
planned, and that If Gen. Hallock did not stop
It, nobody knows who did.
Between the campaign OF Gen. Lee, which
began-at least in preparation u immediately
after the retreat Of Con. Mcclellan to the
James River, aud the campaign now said IL
threaten tho Northern States, there is a no
tceable similarity in spir. aud plan of eIscu
ton. Both were based upon the conviction
that the Rebel Couioderacy could well afford
to exchange its own capital for that Of the
patton, and that, whether viewed politically OF
as a military event. the probable loss Of Rich
mond should not be allowed to weigh against
tho probable capture Of Washington. When,
therefore, Gen. Mcclellan bad once safely CO
tablished bimself under cover Of the gunboats,
the northern march Of the Rebel armies was
resolved on. Between them and Washington
was nothing but tho army Of Gen. Pope; on
army of insufficient strength to resist an ad'
vance in force, and which was not only weak,
but had been placed in q position where
it was possible, by o single movement,
to turn it's left flank, destroy its communica-
ton, and compel it's surrender or preciPitate
flight. The calculations which were made with
this view were only defeated by On accidental
encounter at Cedar Mountain; battle which
began in a mistake on both sides, was lost by
US, and its results were thrown away after
1t had been won by the Rebels. But for
that singular engagement it is difficult to see
how the swift aud victorious march Of Lee could
have been arrested until he had reached the
gates of the Capital Of the Nation.
1t ia further 10 be recolected concerning
that remarkable campaign, that it was under
taken while Richmond was still threstened-at
least in the military sense Of tho worldly the
presence Of McClelan's army on the PENN.
sula. And it is worth while to remark here
that in the discussions concerning the abandon
ment OF that field Of operations. this decisive
iact has mostly been overlooked. II McClel 10
had been allowed to have his own way, l. e
would have been before Washington while th
Army Of the Potomac lay asleep on the James
Nothing but tho withdrawal, reluctant and
tardy az il was, Of that army, against the
opinion Of Mcclellan, aud the appearance Of
some portion Of it, in spite OF bis wish 10
withhold il, on the field of Bull Run on the 9th Of
August, saved tho force OF Gen. Pope from
humiliation, and Washington itself from cap
ture.
At the beginning OF that campaign the main
body of the national forces was huddlcd to-
gcther on the Peninsula away from the line OF
Washington, and unable TO lire a shot for its
defense. At the beginning Of this, the same
army lies in a position indeed 10 cover the
capital, but not IN position ~ prevent an a.
tempt TO invade at some point the long line OF
the Northern frontier. a. Mcclellan was then
disregarded and evaded by the movement on
Warrington. 30 Hooker may be left unHoilcrd
in front Of the capital while Lee launches bis
columns from the Shenandoah aud e,tabliibrs
them on what is supposed 10 be the de!ensele's
soil Of Pennsylvania. For in this case II ia
impossible to suppose tina. Washington will be-
come the objective point Of Rebel campaign.
1t is too well defended and too completely Gov
cred 70 be suddenly approached or ea'y men
sced from any quarter. and IT is never the POI.
icy Of the Rebel commanders to attempt by lard
fighting what long marching c an be made b. effect.
Yet Lee may fad il difficult TO select q point in
Pennsylvania to which bis advance will not be-
opposed by considerable force before the bulk
Of lis own army can reach it, and il 10 a IA.
millsr principle Of war that small force skill-
fully aud eourageously handled, may long de.
lay he march OF an army immensely stronger
than itsef. The time thus gained In case
like this when railways offer facilities for
rapid concentration Of troops ought to be more
numerous enough to present to Gen. Lee the
same warlike front which he now coldly sur
veys on the other side Of the Rappahannock.
There are other reasons for discreditins the
tbick.comiDg reports OF invasion, and bmong
them two which are entitled to some weight
Lees force on the Rappahannock was never
large compared with that to which IT was op-
posed, and it suffered heavily in the recent battes
Cavalry dashes also have taught him that his
communications with Richmond are in constant
peril. Is is supposed in some quarters that be
lie really Withdrawing toward the Rebel capital
in order to hold lets extensive line than that
of the Rappahannock, or that be will cover
that line by q mask Of cavalry and infantry
pickets, while hi, main body is massed further
south. In such case nothing is more likely
than a widespread rumor OF an advance.