Yorkville enquirer. [volume] (Yorkville, S.C.) 1855-2006, 1863-12-09
The Battle of Missionary Ridge.
. ARMY OF TENNESSEE,

The Battle of Missionary Ridge.
go. ARMY OF TENNESSEE,
Chickamauga, November 25-Midnight.
| The Confederates have sustained to-day
the most ignomipious defeat of the whole
war-a defeat for which there is but little
excuse or palliation. For the first time dur.
ing our struggle for national independence,
our defeat is ohargeable to the troops them
selves, and not to the blunders or incompe-
tency of their leaders. Iii difficult fol-
one to realize howa defeat SO complete could
have occurred on ground so favorable, not
witbstanding the great disparity in the forces
of the two hostile armies. The ground was
more in our favor than it was at Fredericks.
burg, where Gen. Longstreetis said to have
estimated that Lees army was equal to 300,.
900 men. And yet we gained the battle Of
Fredericksburg and lost that of Missionary
Ridge. But let US take upthe painful mar.
Irative at the beginning, and see how this
great misfortune, if not this grieYous dis
grace, has befallen the Confederate arms.
Lookout Mountain was evacuated last
night, it being no longer important to us
after the loss of Lookout or Willis Valley,
and no longer tenable against such an over
whelming force as Gen. Grant had concen-
trated around Chattanooga. Gen. Bragg
abandoned also the whole of Chattanooga
valley, and the trenches and breastworks
running along the foot Of Missionary Ridge
and across the valley to the base Of Lookout,
and moved his troops up to the top of the
ridge. It was found necessary to extend
his right well up towards the Ghickamauga
near its mouth, in consequence Of the heavy
forces which the enemy had thrown up the
river in that direction. The Tennessee and
Missionary Ridge approach nearer to each
other as it goes up, or rather down the val.
ley, the width of which at some points does
not exceed one.fourth of a mile. Across
this valley, now almost an open plain, vary
ing from one.fourth of mile to two miles
in width; the Federals advanced to the as
sault, their ranks exposed to our artillery
fire from the ridge, while in the plain, and
to the infantry fire when they attempted the
ascent of the hill or mountain.
The only objection that can be urged a.
gainst our line was itslength and weakness,
the latter being the result of the former, and
the former the result of circumstances be-
yond our control, it being necessary for us
to guard the passes in the ridge and to con-
form to the length of the. line presented by
the enemy. The ridge varies in height
from four to six hundred feet, and is crossed
by several roads leading out from Chatta-
noega. The Western side next to the ene-
my was steep and rugged, and in some
places almost bare, the timber having been
cut away for frewood.. Our picBets oeeu.
pied the breastworks below, while the infant.
~ and artillery were distributed along the
crest of the ridge from MoFarland's Gap
almost to the mouth Of the Chickamauga, o
distance of six miles or more. In addition
to the natural strength of position, We had
thrown up breastworks along the ridge
wherever the ascent is easy.
The Federal army was marshalled under
Grant, Thomas, Hooker and Sherman, and
did not number less than $4,000 veteran
troops. The Confederate army under
Bragg, Hsrdee and Breokinridge, did,not
number half so many. Longstreet's Vir-
ginia divisions and other troops had been
sent to East Tennessee. Had these been
present, with their steady leader at the head
of them, we should have won victory
quite as complete as our defeat has BEEN
As it was, We ought to have won the day,
aud should have done so if our men had
done as well as usual. Possibly mistake
was committed when Longstreet was sent
away, and possibly it would have been bet
Ter not to have accepted battle to-day, but
have retired last night. General Bragg
thought, however, that there was not time,
after the loss of Lookout, to get his army
safely onerthe Chickamauga last night, and
that it would be better, occupying SO strong
a position, to fight it out. But what conld
he expect from battle where the odds were
SO much against him ? Not only did Grant
have nearly three to one in number, but the
geographical con6guration of the ground,
in maneuvering an army, was as favorable
as he could desire Nature had provided
an ample protection for his fanks and rear,
and rendered his front almost impregnable.
He possessed the additional advantage of be-
ing able to maneuvre his army upon the
chord of semi-circle, whilst Bragg could
move only upon the arc.
But let US proceed with the battle ). the
strangest, most singular and unsatisfactory
conflict in which our arms have been epga-
ged. ---.-,. - SO =
Grant deployed his immense masses in
two heavy lines of battle, and sometimes in
three, supported by large reserve forces
The spectacle was magnificent as viewed
from the crest of Missionary Ridge. He ad.
vauced first against our right wing, about
10 o'clock, where he encountered that su-
perb soldier, Lieutenant-General Hardee,
who commanded on the right, whilst Major
General Breckenridge commanded on the
left. Hardee's command embraced Gle
burns, Walkers Commanded by General
Gist, General Walker being absent,) Cheat.
hams and Steyenson's divisions. Breckin.
ridges embraced his old division, comman-
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